

# INSIDE WARTIME JAPAN

An American official, just back from Tokyo internment, makes a report on how the enemy is taking his defeats

by CLAUDE A. BUSS

**A**s Executive Assistant to the U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, I was interned by the Japanese from the fall of Manila on Jan. 2, 1942 until the departure of the exchange ship *Gripsholm* in September 1943. We of Mr. Sayre's staff were first confined in a private residence kindly made available to us by a Filipino friend. The Japanese refused to permit us to be together with the American consular officers or with the Americans in Santo Tomás University. Until June 1942 we made the most of our time by studying a Spanish encyclopedia and by watching the progress, or the lack of progress, of the Japanese in the Philippines. We read Japanese propaganda in the hope that we could discern their objectives and detect their weaknesses.

By mid-June the Japanese had become very exultant in their attitude toward us. They believed that they had won the war and that their occupation of Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, Batavia and Rangoon would force us to surrender. In this mood, and with no explanation, the Japanese ordered me to Tokyo. On June 17 they sent me to Shanghai with British *evacuees* and on July 1 they flew me to Tokyo with a military guard.

They took me to the Prisoners' Bureau in the Imperial Headquarters and then sent me to a local hotel. They did not permit me to visit anyone nor to receive any visitors but they provided me with a Japanese dictionary, a grammar and all their propaganda publications both in Eng-

lish and Japanese. In January 1943 I was finally interned near Tokyo with 64 others who were just as eager as I to discover the truth and the implications contained in Japanese propaganda releases. My observations and impressions on the nature of the enemy and his present position in East Asia are based upon my peculiar opportunity to study him at close range during the 20 months I was his prisoner.

The Japanese people have access to huge quantities of information and misinformation about the war. Newspapers, magazines, books, moving pictures and radio are completely mobilized for the war effort. The people have as easy access to maps as we have in this country, and they have fairly accurate reports of the advances which have been made in Italy and Russia. These news reports are usually tardy and their editorial comments gloss over the seriousness of the Axis situation, but they can sketch the actual places where fighting is taking place almost as accurately as we can over here. The Japanese do not seem to regard the war in Europe as part of their own war. The war in Europe and the war in Asia are looked upon as two distinct wars. The Japanese express a guarded sympathy for German war aims, and they find a similarity in the German demand for *Lebensraum* in Europe and the Japanese demand for a Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia. But the Japanese never admit the German pretensions to being a race of supermen, and the Japanese do not like to think of their own destiny as being linked with the de-

feat of the Axis in Europe. Most recently the Japanese press has been printing gruesome word-pictures of the aerial destruction of German cities. The propaganda-makers want to prepare Japanese minds for similar ordeals which must be expected in Japan, and they are willing to risk the unfavorable reactions occasioned by descriptions of suffering undergone by their own allies.

There are few evidences of kinship between Germans and Japanese. The Japanese say that they expect to abide by their alliance with the Germans forever and they give feature space in the papers to the speeches of German leaders. But the tone is always stiff and it follows a suspiciously regular pattern. Frequent articles have appeared which criticize German military tactics and which blame the Germans for having underrated their Russian opponents. The Japanese seldom read analyses of Nazi philosophy. Their own propaganda for Pan-Asianism allows little place for European allies. In the event of a complete German debacle in Europe, Prime Minister Tojo would almost certainly tell his people that the Japanese never counted upon the Germans, that the Germans never contributed anything to the success of Japanese arms, and that the fate of the Japanese Empire depended exclusively on the outcome of the life-and-death struggle between Japan and the United Nations. It is said that individual Germans in Japan receive deferential treatment for the moment, but that they are prepared to be classed as enemies.



**DICTATOR** of Japan is Prime Minister General Hideki ("The Razor") Tojo, 59, who is also War Minister. His family were samurai of the north. Father was a lieutenant general. He got his big start as police chief, modernized Army.



**CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY** is Naoki Hoshino, 55, an early president of the powerful Planning Board, which planned totalitarianism for Japan. He predicted in 1940 that in 1947 Japan will be most powerful nation in the world.



**DICTATOR'S FRIEND** is Lieut. General Teiichi Suzuki, 55, who succeeded Hoshino (*left*) as president of the Planning Board. Suzuki is a militant Fascist who demanded victory over the Anglo-Saxon powers just before Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese press reacted in a curious way to the surrender of Italy. High officials in the Japanese government accused Italy of infamous and treasonable betrayal of the Axis. Then the Italian ambassador published a statement in which he defended the Italian course. He said that it was easy for the leaders of Japan to criticize Italy because the Japanese war was still being fought on the fringes of the Empire. He added that the Japanese would be in no position to judge the Italian decision until their own homes would be consumed by fires caused by enemy bombs and enemy shells. It seemed curious that the Japanese censors permitted the publication of the ambassador's statement, and we could easily believe the stories that the little Italian flags were immediately taken off the streetcars, that the Italian diplomats were interned without any regard for their privileges, and that private Italian citizens in the summer resort of Karuizawa were handcuffed together as they were marched off to internment.

In their propaganda for the home front regarding the United Nations, the Japanese always lay war guilt at the door of their enemies. They never mention any evidence of historic friendship between the U. S. and Japan, but they reiterate a long list of grievances. To the historic cases of discrimination in immigration, "abuse" at the Washington Conference of 1921-2 and opposition in Manchuria they add economic warfare and military encirclement. They accuse the U. S. of being insincere during the negotiations of 1941 and of playing for time with Japan so as to concentrate in helping Great Britain against Germany. They talk about the "ultimatum" of Nov. 26 and the "insults" which were heaped upon their national honor.

The leaders of contemporary Japan have sold this case to the Japanese people. They have convinced the people that Japan had no other choice than to attack Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor is not looked upon as beginning the war, but as merely transforming the deadly economic phase of the

war into the active military phase. And even when the Japanese must admit eventual and complete defeat, they are likely to cling to their conviction that they followed the only possible course on Dec. 7, 1941.

Politically, the Japanese criticize us unmercifully and relentlessly, capitalizing on any division in our opinion which shadows our singleness of purpose or curbs our effectiveness in action.

### Japs No Longer Scorn U. S. Production

New notes have appeared in their standard themes. They no longer say that we are completely careless about the war, and they are warning their own people that the Americans are getting down to business and are coupling a moral regeneration with our undisputed engineering genius. Formerly, Japanese women's magazines poked fun at American "flappers" but they now reluctantly admit that young American girls are rising to the crisis with unsuspected energy, adaptability and initiative. In 1942 Japan scorned our astronomical production figures but in 1943 it appealed frantically to the workers to out-produce the U. S.

Judging from the papers in Japan, the country is a single political unit. Prime Minister Tojo and his friends exercise total power. Militarists hold the key positions in and out of the cabinet, in Korea, in Occupied China and throughout the other occupied areas. The masses are quiet and submissive to any person or faction which speaks in the name of the Emperor. The Diet is hand-picked, docile and regimented. It tolerates no independence of thought and believes that its wartime mission is solely to rubber-stamp any bill which the government introduces. An Imperial Rule Assistance Association (I. R. A. A.) has been formed which is an amalgamation of all the old political parties (like the Seiyukai) and political organizations (like the Black Dragon Society). This is an excellent device for "thought

control" and it takes advantage of the Japanese inclination to join some clique or group.

Throughout the period of Japanese successes the I. R. A. A. held mass meetings which were marked by cordiality and unanimity of opinion. But since victories for the Japanese have become scarce, diversities of opinion have arisen. Another organization, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association (I. R. A. P. A.) has been set up officially as a policy-making group and as a liaison between the Diet and the unwieldy I. R. A. A. Factionalism within the I. R. A. A. has resulted in the formation of unfriendly cliques, like the "Round Table" clique and the "Eight O'clock" clique. Former party leaders have apparently resented their absorption into a super-party and have acquired cabinet positions. Mr. Yamazaki, a former chief of the Seiyukai, has been named the Minister of Agriculture; and Mr. Oasa, a former chief of the Minseito, has been made a Cabinet Minister Without Portfolio. Perhaps the old-line parties intend to reassert themselves in this way.

Because of an incident in the Diet, which the press mentioned but did not describe, one member of the I. R. A. A. was expelled and several others, including the fiery Mr. Shiratori, resigned in sympathy. These slight evidences of political cleavage cast doubt upon the advertised solidarity of opinion in Japan.

Three of the Prime Minister's close personal friends—the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Naoki Hoshino; the former president of the Planning Board, Lieut. General Teiichi Suzuki; and the president of the Legislative Bureau, Mr. Moriyama—occupy the key administrative positions. The governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Toyotaro Yuki, directs the financial and currency policies of the country. He has his personal problems with the great industrial families, with the Minister of Finance and with the heads of the powerful Industrial Bank of Japan, Industrial Equipment Corporation and Wartime Financing Syndicate, who are reported to be

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE



**GOVERNOR OF BANK OF JAPAN** is Toyotaro Yuki, 56, who studied banking in the U. S. He collects swords and climbs mountains. In 1937 he blamed Japan's hard times on the assertion that the U. S. was using up metal to rearm.



**FOREIGN MINISTER** is Mamoru Shigemitsu, 56, a career diplomat who has worked in England, Soviet Russia, China, Germany. A Korean blew off his left leg with a bomb in 1932. Before that he enjoyed dancing to American jazz.



**MINISTER OF GREATER EAST ASIA** is Kazuo Aoki, 54, a favorite of Jap Army. His job now includes civilian control of Manchukuo, Occupied China, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Borneo, Celebes, Java, Sumatra and Malaya.

sensitive and occasionally difficult.

Within the cabinet the newly created Ministry of Greater East Asia has been placed under a famous Japanese economist, Mr. Kazuo Aoki. Like many other Japanese leaders, Mr. Aoki was born of humble parents but he was adopted by a wealthy family which gave him its name and prestige. He is a favorite of the Prime Minister, who has more faith in economists than he has in diplomats. Therefore the Ministry of Greater East Asia has assumed new responsibilities, which has detracted from the prestige of the Foreign Office. Mr. Aoki is in charge of all the Japanese ambassadors, ministers and consuls in his geographic area, and he has inaugurated a kind of *Gauleiter* system for the former diplomatic agents. Naturally the Foreign Office resents the intrusion of the newcomer and has prevailed upon the Prime Minister to remove the feckless Mr. Masayuki Tani from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in favor of the dynamic Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu. Mr. Shigemitsu has already called back many of the discarded but experienced professionals as an advisory committee.

Japan is organized and is operating exclusively for the conduct of the war. The little man—the consumer or the individual—simply does not count. In the industrial world the National Mobilization Act and its corollaries dedicate all production to the service of the State. Labor is now subject directly to the whims of capital, without even the nominal protection of welfare legislation. Profits are curbed, the securities exchanges are subject to strict control and prices have been rigidly pegged.

A black market exists. Some residents declared that they would not have been able to get any extra food for dinner parties if their servants had not had access to illegal sources. A local paper stated that a gang in Tokyo had been rounded up and arrested for selling 10-sen bars of soap for 2 yen 40 sen each. Though foreign whisky has been taboo in Tokyo for a long time, there were frequent occasions when a Japanese gentleman in a hotel would extract a bottle of Black & White or Johnnie Walker from his kimono sleeve.

Practically every article of food is rationed. The quantities allowed per person are based on actual bodily needs and not on the tastes or desires of the buyers. Medicine is scarce, milk is only for infants, nursing mothers or invalids, and eggs and chickens are exclusively for the soldiers at the front. Sugar is allotted at the rate of one-half pound per person per month and the monthly allowance of meat is just about sufficient to flavor one family portion of spaghetti sauce. The entire nation is undernourished. But there is also the possibility that the Japanese medical leaders are deliberately keeping their people just above the subsistence level, releasing sufficient food to prevent malnutrition and tuberculosis, and storing the remainder as a reserve in preparation for a long-term war.

Soap, matches, charcoal and other necessities of life are scarce. Few Japanese homes have any heat this winter, and the metropolitan hotels are likely to be heated only for an hour per day. Clothing is strictly rationed. The men are allowed 100 points per year. A suit or an overcoat made of staple fiber requires 60 points, a shirt 12 points, a suit of heavy underwear 20 points, a



## THE AUTHOR

Claude A. Buss was the ranking U. S. member of the High Commissioner's staff left behind in Manila when the Japs came in January 1942. Before that he had been a foreign service officer in China, taught international relations at the University of Southern California from 1934 to 1941, and written a book, *War and Diplomacy in Eastern Asia*. He received his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Pennsylvania, from which he graduated in 1927. While he was interned in Manila, and later in Tokyo, Mr. Buss lost weight but kept in good health. The material for this article was collected from the Japanese press and radio and from conversations with other internees.

Mr. Buss is now living in Philadelphia with wife and two daughters, 13 and 11, who were in the U. S. when he was interned. His newest job is deputy director for Pacific Operations for OWI.

pair of socks two points and a necktie or a handkerchief one point each. For three years the Japanese have not been able to buy warm suits or overcoats, or good kimonos, cotton shirts or underwear. Men go to the office in patched clothes, and police uniforms are usually exhibits of mending artistry. The nation is in rags, but it is tough.

There is no gasoline for civilian consumption. Streetcars and trains are crowded, even according to Japanese standards. Visible supplies of metal are nearly exhausted. Famous Kyoto temple bells and the Tokyo equivalent of Philadelphia's statue of William Penn have been melted for scrap. Fancy iron gates, decorative chandeliers, foreign stoves and radiators, surplus elevators, kitchenware, rainspouts and every other conceivable source of metal have disappeared.

## Whole Jap Budget Goes for War

The national budget approaches 45 billions of yen and the entire amount is expended directly or indirectly for the war effort. For its income the government sets an annual savings goal (27 billion yen this fiscal year) and then fixes quotas for each individual, corporation, banking institution, trust company or credit association to reach. Salaries and bonuses are paid partially in bonds. "Buy bonds" is the same slogan in Japan that it is here at home. Taxes are comparatively low because profits are curbed by other devices, luxuries are completely forbidden, and the government prefers to finance the war by bonds rather than by the pay-as-you-go method.

The spirit of Japan remains basically as former Ambassador Grew has described it. Devotion to the Emperor and the sacred mission of the nation are the guiding lights of individual lives. Amusements are taboo. Dancing in public places is forbidden, social drinking is frowned upon, the movies are dedicated to war and propaganda, and there is no room in the newspapers for a comic section. Life is grim. Every Japanese seems

to act as if he carried the whole responsibility for victory on his own shoulders.

Japanese papers formerly boasted that no enemy planes could approach the "land of the gods." They said that their own defense installations and "wild eagles" would keep the enemy away. The papers now use an entirely different line of propaganda. They say that the Americans are sure to come, and when they come next time they will come in tremendous force. The papers print maps of alleged American bases in China, and they say that it does no good to destroy these bases because Americans and Chinese rebuild faster than Japanese can destroy. Leading articles warn quite frankly that ordinary precautionary measures, such as buckets of water and sand, are likely to prove entirely inadequate if the metropolitan areas are enveloped in flames. The certainty that air raids are coming, and that they will be devastating when they come, has made a deep impression even upon the stoical nerves of the Japanese.

When announcements of "victories" are made by Imperial Headquarters the radio first plays a stirring military march. This particular music is the signal that the passerby or the listener should pay close attention to the announcement to follow. But the music is getting

stale and the recent victories have been hollow, with the result that the show falls flat. Boredom has led to disrespect and disbelief. Imperial Headquarters is hard pressed to produce an astounding victory so as to restore its own damaged prestige and to give the populace a much-needed psychological lift. However, the Japanese masses are docile and have an Oriental capacity to accept an unpalatable situation. They can look at a truth and believe that it is false.

The tone of arrogance and self-assurance has disappeared from the speeches of official spokesmen. In August 1942 all Japanese felt that they and their allies had won the war. They were then established in the southern regions, the Germans were at El Alamein and Stalingrad, and the U-boats had played havoc with our shipping in the North Atlantic. On Dec. 8, 1942, the *Japan Times* said editorially:

"From the icy rocks of the Aleutians, across the vast expanse of the Pacific and among its countless islands, down the littoral of the Asiatic continent, through the fabled lands of the Indies to the very gates of the Antipodes, and then around into the Indian Ocean, the undisputed power of Japan has been established. The sting of Japan's lash has been felt as far afield as the mainland of America, in the harbors of Australia, off the coast of Africa and even in the Atlantic. Over tens of thousands of miles, from the arctic to the tropics, over the seven seas and on the five continents, the land has rumbled to the tread of Japan's legions and the skies have thundered to the roar of Japan's winged knights of the air."

In one short year, the tone has completely changed. Every agency of publicity now warns the people again and again that Japan's enemies are approaching closer every day, and that the present moment is the gravest and most serious in the long history of the Japanese Empire.

The Japanese leaders still say that victory will be theirs but they hedge their assertions with

conditions and provisos. Early in the war they avoided the words "defeat" and "retreat" and they gave out notices of Allied gains only by the most subtle and indirect methods. For instance, the first we knew of American landings in eastern New Guinea was when an official communiqué announced that *Japanese* planes had bombed General MacArthur's forces at Buna. The Japanese always covered up their own losses by claiming that the enemy had suffered fantastic losses. In the first two years of the war the Japanese Navy announced that it had sunk or wrecked 11 enemy battleships, 11 aircraft carriers, 49 cruisers, 51 destroyers, 120 submarines and 8,000 airplanes at a total cost to itself of two battleships, five aircraft carriers, six cruisers, 20 destroyers, 16 submarines and 864 planes. But perhaps to prepare the public for worse to come, the navy has recently permitted the publication of American communiqués side by side with its own, and the disparity in figures and proportions is of course glaring.

The Japanese have also admitted defeats, not mere withdrawals but actual defeats, at Guadalcanal, Attu and Nomonhan. They have excused their soldiers by placing the blame on the lack of supplies and the numerical superiority of the United Nations. They have lavished praise upon the fighting spirit of those who chose death to surrender, but public sentiment seemed much sadder after the extermination of the Japanese garrison on Attu than it seemed after the retreat from Kiska. The Japanese appreciated the tradition and the heroism of mass *hara-kiri* but they also saw the good sense in preserving the men of Kiska for future campaigns.

The papers in Japan are filled with the exploits of Japanese heroes. Sergeant Watanabe sometimes captures three American tanks, two field guns and masses of rifles and ammunition before he dies. Rewards and citations are seldom given except to those who have perished in battle. Shrines are erected for the most distinguished, and the spirits of the departed warriors are worshipped as gods in the sacred sanctuary at Yasukuni. This ceremonial conversion of human beings into divinities is an inspiration both to the folks at home and to the soldiers at the front. The people take pride in the idea that their own flesh and blood have become guardian spirits for the nation, and the soldiers look to death as a guarantee that they will be enshrined with the thousands of warrior-gods who have gone before them.

## **Military Commentators Now Express Dismay**

Eyewitness stories from the war zone no longer disparage the courage of the Australian and American soldiers. Early stories described conquests of 40 Americans by a single Japanese, and wholesale surrender of our troops. Late stories say that the Americans are "in the groove" and that they are tough and determined. When American wounded prisoners are asked questions, they frankly tell the captors to go to hell. "We must pay attention to this awakened American fighting spirit," say the Japanese commentators. There is no longer any ridicule of our Navy. Instead, they give us credit for new weapons and improved tactics. The public relations officers of the Japanese forces take advantage of every opportunity to bemoan their numerical inferiority and to appeal frantically for the increased production of essential supplies. When the Japanese announce a victory, they give credit to the august virtues of His Imperial Majesty, but when they comment upon their losses or difficulties, they blame the home front for falling down on the job.

The Japanese find little optimism or assurance in an analysis of their contemporary position in East Asia. The China Affair defies solution. On the fifth anniversary (July 7, 1942) the Japanese press splashed the "remarkable record" of Japan in China and predicted complete victory within the year. The sixth anniversary was treated entirely differently. Victory had proved as elusive as ever, so the papers ignored the anniversary. There was no public demonstration of any kind.

Japan holds out an open invitation to all Chinese to desert the "confusion and bankruptcy" of Chungking and to join the banners of Wang Ching-wei. It would pay a high price for the elimination of Chinese resistance and for the union of all Chinese into a regime responsive to Japan's dictation. But it preserves the surface attitude of determining to crush Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese explain their own failure to advance in China as lack of desire to expand their own lines. They say that they have already won all they need in China and that they have no desire to penetrate deeper into the interior. They do not admit that the Chinese have assumed the

offensive in the "rice bowl," but they say that the most significant feature of the seventh year of fighting is that the Japanese are no longer fighting against the Chinese, that they are fighting against Americans in China.

Japanese writers give little factual information regarding actual achievements in the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies and Burma, but they describe principles and policies for eventual reconstruction. The most violent commentators assert that all Anglo-Saxon and Dutch influence must be eliminated, but the more cautious advise that many of the patterns of the original owners must be maintained and improved upon. Cultural missions praise the natives for their achievements but departing generals say bluntly, "You people must get down to work, must stop arguing among yourselves, and must do your share to win the war." The army does not care about long-run production possibilities of cotton or sugar, whether big companies or little companies take over the plantations, whether the Yokohama Specie Bank or the Development Bank for the Southern Regions finances urgent economic projects. It is interested only in getting people back to work, in repairing damaged transportation lines, in salvaging sunken ships and in setting up light, or even heavy, industries which can produce munitions or weapons for the campaigns in the south.

## Japs Try to Placate Thailand, Incite Hindus

Japan treats Thailand and French Indo-China as favored children. Cultural missions and financial loans cement the "ties" between the three countries. On paper, everything gives the impression that the Thai and the Indo-Chinese understand and accept the sincerity of Japan's purposes and pretensions. But between the lines one can detect caution and reserve in diplomatic dealings. The presence of the army and the fleet in southern waters is the iron fist within the velvet glove.

The Japanese seldom speak now about an attack against Australia or an advance into India. There are unsuccessful appeals to Australians to declare their independence and to cast in their lot with their Asiatic neighbors before it is too late. There are fantastic descriptions of the strength of the Indian Independence Army and the Indian Independence League which are intended to be the spearheads of an all-Hindu rebellion against the British. But Japan realizes that Australia and India are no longer objects of attacks by the Japanese, but are bases for the counteroffensive which aims at the heart of Tokyo. Japan is no longer on the offensive; it is completely on the defensive.

Propaganda for neutrals is directed primarily at the Soviet Union. Earlier the Japanese made a serious mistake in not treating Russia as a genuine neutral. They headlined German victories but glossed over Russian advances. The scars of Russo-Japanese antagonism were deep but the Japanese were obliged to be more careful of Russian sensibilities after the Russians turned the tide against the Germans and after the Japanese became mired in the south. Now the papers pay attention to Russian holidays, give space to the activities of the Russian ambassador and grudgingly admit the quality of

**CONTINUED ON PAGE 33**



**STREET ASSOCIATIONS** in Japan get food wholesale for whole block. There are 108,000 of them, called *tsuvari-gumi*, in Tokyo alone. They tighten Japan's unity.

the Russian fighting machine. They refer to the evils of Communism very cautiously and they are usually careful to point out the distinction between Communism and Russian national policy. The Japanese no longer mention border disputes with the Russians, and they sign the annual fighting agreements without serious differences of opinion.

It is seldom that one reads in Japan about their former grandiose schemes for a New World Order. Their discussions of war aims originally centered about the liberation of East Asia, the reconstruction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the establishment of a New World Order, but their ideas of freeing the natives met practical and theoretical obstacles in their attempt to substitute themselves for their enemies. Pan-Asianism received little response from peoples as diverse as Chinese, Filipinos, Indonesians and Hindus, and nominal independence for them promised at best no more than disguised slavery.

The Japanese said that the future world would be dominated by the Axis in Europe, the U. S. in the Americas and Japan in Asia. Weak nations would be given no opportunity to jeopardize the existence of the strong. Only strong nations would have the right to bear arms, and only the victors in war would be given the exclusive right of dictating the policies and policing the territories of the vanquished. One policeman in the internment camp asked me in all seriousness if I would give him English lessons because he expected to be made an administrator in California.

Now this theorizing is disappearing. The Japanese can no longer talk seriously about their New World Order nor about dictating the terms of peace on the White House lawn. They have reached the point where they say simply that this war is a war of life or death, a case of eating or being eaten, a test of whether the nation shall survive or perish. Leaders may realize that the cards are stacked against them and that they must prepare for possible defeat. But the masses are encouraged to maintain confidence in their ultimate triumph. They have no thought of compromise peace and they are prepared to die rather than surrender. They are determined and fatalistic. There is no clever or easy way to defeat them. Only when we surpass their standards in every phase of total war, on the home front as well as on the fields of battle, will the final victory be ours.



**WATCHING FOR THE AMERICANS**, wife of a street-association leader, Heima Otake, sweeps sky as a Tokyo air-raid warden. She wears peasant's pants called *mompei*.