

Military
RRFE 42 30 March 1944

While Tokyo sees the danger of the development of American supply bases in the Central and South Pacific, she is confident that her inner defenses cannot be penetrated. At a time when Nimitz "shouts about advancing from the Central Pac to the China continent", he sees in his path the Japanese fleet. And when "MacArthur" shouts about the capture of the Philippines it is our Army force...which he sees in his dreams." "...if the supply of our mighty invincible Army and Navy is perfect, the destruction of the United States will be an insignificant problem." (March 19)

Adm. Toyoda
INTERROGATION NO: (USBS NO. 378) -13
(NAV NO. 75)

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Subject: Japanese War Plans and Peace Moves.

As I stated yesterday, I personally believe that the turning point in the war was the Battle of Midway; and at that time I believe that not only the Government and the two services but the people, also, should have realized that the turning point had come and made up their minds for the future accordingly. Notwithstanding, the general public got the impression that the Battle of Midway was an outstanding victory for us. Moreover, our withdrawal from GUADALCANAL, although that marked a definite disadvantage for the Japanese forces, was publicized as though it had been a grand and sublime operation and tactics on our part. On the material side, although it was known from the start that there would be basically a shortage in resources as the war progressed, the rapid depletion of what we had to start with was not made known to the people as a whole. To be sure, individuals realized that there was a shortage in activities with which they were directly concerned, that is true; but they were not given a chance to find out the overall shortage that was increasing from day to day, because that shortage was kept under cover as a national secret, and

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PRECAUTIONS IN REGARD TO SPEECH AT GATHERINGS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE TERMINATION
OF THE SAIPAN CAMPAIGN

Impress upon the minds of the people that the war situation has reached a critical stage and that the nation is now at the crossroads which will determine the rise or fall of the Empire. Simultaneously, the people must be aroused to a pitch of burning hatred of the arrogant enemy and their morale must be stirred to new heights. The fact that the people must indeed, now fight to the last with the determination that the 100,000,000 will die to defend and guard the Empire, must be strongly emphasized.

The people must be impressed with the fact that the war situation has reached a serious stage and that the mainland is about to become a theater of war, and that no matter what may arise, they must maintain a cool and collected spirit, overcome all difficulties, and stand in the defense of their respective posts if need be with their lives. Their determination to forge ahead toward the final victory must be heightened and strengthened.

The people must be persuaded of the fact that victory or defeat depends on the strength or weakness of their will to continue and it must be held out to them that they should hold fast to the firm conviction in the final victory and not be influenced by any of the intervening developments.

In speaking of any matter connected with Saipan, in referring to the losses suffered there or the war developments in that area, keep within the scope of the information released by the Imperial Headquarters. Be especially careful not to stimulate any excitement. d

Military Difficulties--Saipan *C*
RRFF 50 21 July 1944

Tojo revealed on July 18 that "although a great blow had been inflicted upon the enemy by the gallant and courageous efforts of the officers and men of the Imperial Forces on the Mariansa Islands since June 11, Saipan Island has finally fallen into the enemy's hands."

Emphasized heavy fighting and U.S. admissions of severe losses

Military Reverses--Formosa , Oct 12-14, 1944 C
RRFE 57 27 October 1944

The two-day raid after which "a crushed American fleet fled in confusion." Domestic audiences led to believe that another threat to the homeland and to China had been beaten off leaving the enemy in a battered and weakened condition. Such a report was made by Koiso to the Emperor who regarded the occasion of sufficient importance to issue an Imperial Rescript.

Military
RRFE 55 29 September 1944 C

Speech by Gen. Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Chief of the IRAA Youth Corps, admits that there are "quite a few" people who are war-weary Sept 14.) / Says, among other things:

"Why of course our fleet is still intact. It is watching gloatingly for the opportunity to strike. Besides, warships are not the deciding factor in the present naval warfare, anymore. It is the planes that do the decisive battle. So, if we manufacture enough planes, we have all the chance in the world to beat the enemy. Since the authorities are telling us not to worry, we can rest assured in that respect. The Government admits that there are quite a few planes that are useless, but when you say half of them are useless, that's absurd." ("Sound" reply to rumors)

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General

RRFE 5-7 27 October 1944

Koiso keynoted a rally of the IRAA and IRAPS in Tokyo on 20 October with the themes: 1 the great victory of Formosa, 2, American atrocities, and 3, the improvement in home morale.

Military Reverses--Battle of Leyte Gulf

RRFE 57 27 October 1944

Described as another great victory brought about by "the close teamwork between our Air Force, surface units, and undersea craft."
Despite the "annihilating blows" suffered by the American fleet in the Formosa battle "the enemy made no changes in his strategical plans."
In consequence, "the Imperial Fleet, which patiently held back its desire to engage in battle...has finally given the chance to manifest its power."

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Military Reverses
RRFE 64 2 February 1945

The latest convulsion of Jap home front ppda is to dispense a fair measure of reasonably accurate, and so unfavorable, war news. This shift became apparent a few months(?) ago, coincident with ~~the~~ indications of internal political disunity. Although blatant and obvious lies still exist, they are interlarded with astonishingly frank statements, both official and unofficial, about Japans present predicament.

Change seems to have occurred between 8 Dec and New Year's. Speeches at latter time admitted that "regrettable as it is our war results were not the best during the past year" but still insisted that "the turning point has come already." Since then less is said about the turning point and more about "banishing all optimism."

Commentators no longer digress frequently to gloss over the sit. Promises of future victories have almost disappeared in the past month. Such as do crop up are vague and unconvincing.

Consolation by talk of enemy's precarious supply lines and losses of men and materials.

Kamikazes exploited to the full for the past 4 months, with moral of emulation.

Philippines campaigns played up to epic proportions with heavy emphasis on the strategic necessity for retaining the islands.

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RRFE 64 2 February 1945

Report on Shigemitsu's (for min) speech to opening of 86th Diet said that his statement "We have not the slightest doubt as to our final victory" was greeted by a burst of applause. Further said: "A war for justice always wins, and for this reason our confidence in certain victory is further solidified. We should not expect to see a miracle come to our aid in this war which heralds a great change in the world. Of course, we must ~~ex~~ naturally expect to meet many storms."

Military

RRFE 68 16 March 1945 C

Vice

Attcked/ Admiral Turner, said to command the amphibious forces on Iwo, in Feb 21 broadcast. Described as a "devil man" and held him responsible for the deaths fo "dountless numbers " of Jap forces in the CenPac area. Promised that Turner "shall not return home alive--he must not and shall not."

C From Iwo comes a constant stream of stories of bravery and hardships calculated to inspire the Jap home front with courage and determination to live up to the sacrifices so willingly offered by these doomed men.

Military Reverses

RRFE 68 16 March 1945 C

Broadcast of March 3 belatedly foreshadowed complete American occupation of Iwo: "Where will the enemy attack next after Iwo Island?" "It is very regrettable that an enemy invasion, which we should never have let happen, has been permitted against Iwo."

March 6 bdcast said "we are adopting a very advantageous tactic in facing the enemy in the vicinity of our homeland."

Koiso, Mar 11, to reconvened 86th Diet: war situation "very serious" with the enemy "recklessly advancing" despite heavy losses. Called nation to "be prepared for the time when our homeland will be made a battle ground." Predicted that if the Allied forces should succeed in effecting a landing on the homeladd "we will annihilate them with sledge-hammer blows."

Military
RRFE 69 30 March 1945 C

Announcements (21 March) of Iwo's fall accompanied by numerous pep talks and appeals for unity to make the Jap people fully conscious of the situation created by the island's loss. The price which we were willing to pay cited as an indication of the island's importance.

Military
RRFE 72 18 May 1945 C

Prep of the Oki battle in the well-worn pattern used before. Working overtime to create the myth of air victs over allied surface vessels. (Groundwork has been laid for putting resp for outcome of the battle in the lap of the civ population of Japan, as their productive efforts deter the chance of overcoming our much-vaunted material superiority.) As of May 10 calimed 282 ships sunk and 515 (incl the 282) sunk or damaged. Includes 15 carriers, 14 BBs, 4 BBs or cruisers, 46 cruisers, etc.

515
282
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Military

RRFE 72 18 May 1945 C

Despite extravagant claims of damage to U.S. fleet off Oki, civ population warned not to "mix the war results with the general way the war is going." Told that "we know that the gigantic war strength of the enemy is replacing her losses," and reminded of the events in the Philippines, where the Japs "severely damaged the enemy, but were unable to check" his advance. (May 11)

Military

RRFE 72 18 May 1945 C

By early May the following indications of a write-off of Oki:
Decline in refs to Oki as Japans "divine opportunity" to inflict a telling defeat on the U.S.

Sharp drop in emphasis on the strategic importance of the Ryukyus.

Increase in stories about enemy reinforcements etc.

Various admissions of allied air superiority, sig in view of their early mil analysis, which stated that air supremacy is the key to ultimate victory.

Military-Okiawa
RRFE 70 20 April 1945

Made no effort to minimize significance of invasion. People urged to greater efforts with such statements as "the battle for the Ryukyus is one upon which on life or death is staked", the "destiny of the nation" rests upon the outcome of these battles. Tempered with stories of the "terrible" price exacted of American forces, esp by the increased Kamikaze attacks. Called the Ryukyu a "graveyard for American Ships" and a "hell ocean for enemy America." (Mar 31) Claimed 168 ships sunk by April 7, including 9 carriers, 6 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers or BBs, 30 cruisers etc.

Own naval losses treated as part of the Kamikaze effort. (8 Apr)

People warned not to expect Americans to withdraw despite "great losses" "Now that the enemy has already committed his entire strength in the Okniawa battle, he cannot pull out and leave his landing forces to their own fate. We must continue to make frantic efforts and pour in more and more supplies and reinforcements." (April 10)

Told that Oki "must" be held but given little encouragement that it would. One commentator said "unfortunately we have less warships and... less transports" and consequently "there is nothing for us to do but wait for the enemy to come to our homeland." (31 March)

Apparently in answer to complaints about fleet inaction, Vic Admiral Kondo urged those who ask "what is the Navy doing?" to "wait patiently" and to have confidence in Navy Minister Yonai. Warned that impatience will lead
OVER

Respondent: Mr KIMURA, Former newspaper editor, OGAKI
19 Dec 45 OGAKI

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Q. How did Japan explain the losses of islands as the war progressed?
A. They told the people that these islands were small and insignificant, but that when the enemy came to the mainland, there would be hundreds of thousands of defenders, and that in the end they would win.

Military
RRFE 69 30 March 1945 C

Steps taken after heavy March raids and fall of Iwo to prepare for invasion:

Admissions by Koiso and other leaders that invasion a definite possibility.

Nationalization of key industries.

Announcement on 17 March that the Emp had granted P.M. the right to sit in on war strategy planning at I HQ, thus "closely relating" home ad with home defense.

18 March announcement that all schools above the elementary grades to be closed for 1 year to "fulfill the demand of the students for more 'blood and toil'".

20 March introduction into the Diet of bill permitting the govt to mobilize everything--people or proerty.

Also reassurances about J's ability to cope with the invasion.

Military
RRFE 68 16 March 1945 C

War Minister Sugiyama on Army day, March 10, said "the enemy invasion of our homeland is imminent, warned that the situation had become very critical and that the enemy will "stop at nothing." Asked forces and civilians to make the supreme sacrifice if necessary "for the immovable security of this Imperial nation."

Maj Gen Matsumura, Chf Army Press Sec IHQ, said, "we must anticipate the battle of decision to be fought on our homeland," praised the Jap "bleeding tactics" in the Philippines. An invasion would be met by "our crack defenders, who...are ready to become literally human bullets."

Interview with Mr. KOIZUMI, Chief, Police Bureau,
Home Office, TOKYO, 23 Oct 45.

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(47)

A. During this period, especially from November 1944 on and during early 1945, morale fell, but the government took continual measures to stir up public determination.

Q. What measures did it take?

A. In general the government stressed the policy of persuading the people that probable success awaited the strategy of enticing the enemy within Japan's inner defense lines and annihilating them there.

Special Interview; Respondent: Professor OTAKA, *Pmdc* Dept of *S*ociology, Tokyo Imperial U
Meiji Bldg Tokyo 5035 44

A They said that even if Saipan or Okinawa fell, the situation was still becoming favourable, because Japan's supply lines were being shortened and her strength was being concentrated. They assured the people that the enemy would be destroyed on our home soil.

Interview with KUSUYAMA, Yasutaro, President, NIPPON TIMES,
TOKYO, 15 Dec 45.

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Q. What would the government say?

A. Well, they said, "Even if we have lost Saipan or Leyte, our Army is intact. The Navy might not be able to defend. American soldiers are not strong so they can be smashed easily." That was the last story. Of course, there were millions of stories. Such a childish way of defending the land--bamboo spears, and you may have seen the tunnels (bokugo) around Tokyo.

Any idea

TOYAMA CITY HALL REPORT

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MEASURES FOR RAISING MORALE AND AGAINST ALLIED PROPAGANDA

As the war situation became adverse at about the time of the end of the war the Imperial Rule Assistance Ass'n was reorganized into the People's Volunteer Units, and, on the pretext (TN:literal translation) of national defense, unity of the people was strongly urged. Furthermore the people were made to believe that the ultimate decisive victory would take place in the Japanese homeland, and the people in each town and each village were made to do bamboo spear drill.

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Adm. Toyoda

INTERROGATION NO: (USSBS NO. 378)- 13
(NAV NO. 75)

Subject: Japanese War Plans and Peace Moves.

Q. It is your belief, then, that the people should have been told the facts concerning the course of military operations throughout the war?

A. Of course there were some things that the people could not be told from a standpoint of concealing such certain facts from the enemy, so that it would not have been possible otherwise to tell them everything; but certainly they should have been given a chance through acquisition of more information, at least, to understand and how the war was progressing. One of the things that impressed me on your side was the fact that Ambassador Grew, after his return to WASHINGTON, kept warning your people that JAPAN must not be held too lightly and that JAPAN'S war strength was very deeply rooted. On the contrary, the situation in JAPAN was that certain information coming from your country would be used by our propaganda organs in just contrary fashion. For instance, the fact that more women were joining industry

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General

RRFE 57 27October44

Notes campaign under way to whip up hatred of America and Americans, emphasizing brutality and desire to enslave or wipe out Japanese nation. Race line and exploitation.

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SPECIAL INTERVIEW with Dr. SHIMMEI, Masamichi, Professor of
Sociology at TOKOKU Imperial University at his home in
SENDAI on 2 Dec 45.

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"They lost confidence by the second year. Rumors were circulating. Many kinds, about real war situation. Some said we'd lost all battleships. Last fall government must have feared loss of popular confidence, so made strong propaganda to rouse antagonism to U.S. among people. Photograph of American girl with skull of Japanese soldier, as example."

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Mil etc

FMAD Japanese use of Amer Statemets and Acts, Real or Alleged, in Ppda
to Create Fear June 15, 1945 P

Various examples of statements by prominent Americans to created hatred
and fear of the U.S.