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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958

I N T E L L I G E N C E B U L L E T I N

No 13 - 6 Apr 45

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Kendall J. Fielder

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NOTE: Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

COVER PAGE:- Taken near beach, south of the MARABING RIVER, LEYTE. Earth and Palm log gun emplacement with camouflaged observation post to the left of the photograph. The open space between the "thatched roof" effect and the surface of the ground is about two feet. The excavation beneath the thatched roof effect is about three feet deep by ten feet square.

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Jap Balloon Radar-Visibility

(From Naval Research Laboratory, Anacostia DC., letter, Serial 4590, Subject: Radar-Tests of Radar-Visibility of the Metallic Structure of the Japanese Transpacific balloon)

1. The radar-visibility tests of the metallic structure of the Japanese transpacific balloons were made to determine at what ranges it would be possible to detect these balloons in flight, with either shore-based or airborne radar, and to determine further which radar frequencies are best for effecting such detection. Radar equipment on frequencies of from 100 Mc to 10,000 Mc was used. Results indicate maximum radar-visibility at about 200 Mc, with a probable maximum detection range of about 25 nautical miles at this frequency.

2. The metallic structures tested were light-weight simulations of those attached to the Japanese balloons made available at the Chemistry Division of Naval Research Laboratory. These metallic parts were: (a) a gas valve, and (b) a ballast-control device. The ballast material was sand (a large number of approximately five-pound bags was used). It is believed that these would not give an appreciable radar echo. It should be pointed out that it is thought to be quite probable that some further object, possibly made of metal, is normally suspended from these balloons, and that no samples of this "Object" have yet been recovered (the "Object" may be, for example, a bomb or other device which is self-destructive). If this should be found to be the case, the radar detection ranges reported here would obviously be proved inapplicable, since such an object would be quite likely to have a greater cross section than the metallic parts already tested.

3. On 14 Feb the simulated metallic structures were suspended beneath a Z-M balloon and flown from a small power boat for radar observations. The propagation path was entirely over water. The altitudes of flight were chosen so that the targets being tested would be in or near a maximum in the surface-interference radiation pattern for each radar equipment; i.e., during the measurements with each radar equipment, the height of the target was adjusted for maximum reading. Measurements were made for two ranges; approximately 4000 yards and approximately 8000 yards. The relative power levels of the radar-receiver minimum detectable signal and of the balloon-borne target were measured, utilizing the pulsed-signal-generator technique and equipment developed originally for the measurement of ship-target radar cross section. From the data thus obtained the maximum radar-detection range was calculated by computing the range for which the power level for the target echo would be equal to the power level of the minimum detectable signal.

4. On 15 February, the target being tested was suspended beneath a 350 gram aerological balloon and released. The free lift of the balloon with reflector attached was such that, with the wind which existed at that time, an altitude of about 17,000 feet was attained at 12 miles range. The altitude beyond this range was not determined. The maximum range was determined by observation with several of the shore-installed radars used in the preceding day's tests. Airborne ASD and ASB were also used. The SCRL7C (similar to the Navy ASG) provided by the Army for these tests became inoperative shortly after the take-off and could not be used. No echo was observed with the ASB. Range data for the ASD and for the various shore-based radars appears in the following table.

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JAP BALLOON RADAR VISIBILITY (CONTD)

5. In the following table, Range A is the maximum range in free space estimated from the calculated maximum range in the surface interference pattern (calculation made from data obtained as described in par. 3.). Range B is the maximum range calculated from the data obtained as described in par. 3, with the target assumed to be in the interference-pattern maximum. Range C is the maximum range observed on the "free" target as it was wind-borne away from the station (see par. 4.). Range D is the range at which the measurements described in par. 3. were made.

<u>Radar</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Range A</u>	<u>Range B</u>	<u>Range C</u>	<u>Range D</u>
SCR270	106 Mc	30 miles	58 miles	20 miles	3000 yards
SCR270		21 miles	42 miles		8000 yards
SC-2	200 Mc	23 miles	47 miles	24 miles	7800 yards
SC-2		19 miles	38 miles		3400 yards
Mark 4	700 Mc	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles	9 miles	4 miles	7300 yards
Mark 4		3 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles		2500 yards
Mark 12	950 Mc	3 miles	6 miles		2800 yards
SG	3000 Mc		4 miles		51200yards
SP	3000 Mc			12 miles	
ASD	10000 Mc			2 miles	


Ranges A, B and C as given above are in nautical miles. The shore-installed radar antennas were between 115 and 135 feet above the water.

On the opposite and following pages are reproduced photographs of a standard Jap balloon ballast release device recovered in PACIFIC OCEAN Area. The pictures are published here for the exceptional quantity of detail shown of a mechanism in good condition. It should be noted that the "Side View" shows the device in an inverted position from that in which it is carried in flight.

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
I. BALLOON BALLAST RELEASE MECHANISM

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(SIDE VIEW)

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
2. BALLOON BALLAST RELEASE MECHANISM

(BOTTOM VIEW)

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3. BALLOON BALLAST RELEASE MECHANISM (TOP VIEW)

Balloons

(From Hq Western Defense Command, G-2 Periodic Report
24 Mar 45.)

A tag bearing Japanese characters was found in the envelope of a balloon found in the state of Washington on 13 Mar 45. The envelope was badly torn and the ballast-dropping apparatus was damaged. Shroud lines, valve aneroids and two arming wires were recovered. Translation of the tag follows:

SAGAMI NAVAL ARSENAL INSPECTION BUREAU

PLACE OF MANUFACTURE	Sagami Naval Arsenal #2 Shop		Balloon No.	262
CLASSIFICATION	#102 Balloon (or aerostat)		1()	
DATE OF MANUFACTURE	22 Feb 45			
DIMENSIONS	A. Outer Diameter	10.160 meters	B. Outer Diameter	10.140 meters
WEIGHT	Balloon Body	66.800 kilograms	Ropes	10.000 kilograms
PRESSURE TESTS	Initial Pressure	70 millimeters	Descent Volume	6 millimeters
LEAKAGE TESTS	Initial Pressure	50 millimeters	Descent Volume	0 millimeters
EXTERNAL APPEARANCE	No objections			
FINDING	1st Class Eligibility (re passing of examination)			
DATE OF ACCEPTANCE	1 Mar 45			Seal

BRIEFS

BOMBS OVER TEXAS

Two bomb explosions were reported in Texas 23 Mar 45. Investigation revealed that the earth was penetrated approximately five feet by each bomb. Tentative identification showed that both bombs were of the incendiary type, 12 kilogram (26.5 lbs). Bombs hit 50 feet apart and it is indicated that they were dropped by Jap balloon later recovered. This constitutes the first indication that these balloons have carried 12 kg type bombs. (San Francisco Radio 28 Mar 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Jap Balloon-Borne Radio

(From Naval Research Laboratory Report, 5 Feb 1945 as reprinted in RCM Digest No. 14, WD, Washington, D.C., 1 Mar 45)

Recovered in California was a Japanese rubber balloon believed to be an experimental weather observation unit intended to operate at about 20,000 feet. Its flight probably began on the Japanese mainland several days before the balloon was recovered in California.

The radio equipment found on this balloon consisted of a low-power transmitter and multivibrator. It was mounted on a wood panel and was enclosed in a wood box, $4\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5" x 6" in dimension. The frequency of the oscillator is controlled by a variable condenser in the plate circuit. In parallel with this condenser is another small condenser varied by an aneroid barometer. The total frequency range of both condensers is from 5.7 to 9.45 mc. The pressure variation of the small aneroid is only 8 cm. of mercury. This varies the frequency of the transmitter 0.4 mc. The setting on the larger condenser, as indicated by corrosion marks on the plates, would give frequency range of 6.2 to 6.6 mc. depending on the pressure on the bellows actuating the one plate condenser. The output of the transmitter tube is approximately 2 watts. The pressure required to operate the small aneroid indicates that it was intended to measure pressure above external, or atmospheric pressure. This would cover the range of pressures possible within the envelope of the balloon. The single plate condenser assembly is identical with that used in the standard Japanese radiosonde. The bellows of the regular radiosonde have been replaced by the two component bellows.

The multivibrator, which controls the time of transmission of the small oscillator, has a repetition rate of approximately 3 cps. It was estimated that the duty cycle of the transmitter is 70%. The entire radio equipment appears to have been built up from spare parts and definitely not to have been intended for mass production. It is believed that this radio gear was intended for use as a height device by the frequency shift caused by the variation in the aneroid condenser which is in turn actuated by the pressure in the balloon. The only purpose of the multivibrator apparently is for identification.

A recording of a monitored signal, which seemed to be emitted from the place where this balloon was found, has been obtained from the U.S. Army. A comparison of the spectrograms from the recording and from the multivibrator and oscillator signal showed that the "on" time for both signals was approximately the same. This period as measured from the spectrograms was 1.4 sec. The frequency of the monitored signal (6.91 to 6.93) is well within the range of the transmitter on the balloon. The repetition rate 3 cps and the frequency shift of 250 cycles of the two signals are almost identical. The difference between the two signals was in their frequency spectrum distribution. The signal on the recording cannot be the same as the signal transmitted by the available radio gear. This does not mean though that the monitored signal could not have come from the equipment on the balloon, since the balloon may have carried a great amount of radio apparatus which probably was lost at sea.

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JAP BALLOON-BORNE RADIO (CONTD)

It is believed that the balloon was sent aloft in or near JAPAN and that it crossed the PACIFIC and came down off the coast of CALIFORNIA, where it drifted for a short time before being recovered. It was apparently sent up as an experiment to provide information on this type of flight so that this data could serve as a guide for future flights. The only purpose of the radio gear appears to have been to provide information on the flight of the balloon.

Jap 8-Inch Rocket

(From Hq - SWPA Daily Summary No. 1080, 11/12 Mar 45)

Two launching devices for the enemy 8-inch rocket have been captured. They are crudely constructed wooden frames of six parallel members about five feet long. Rockets are placed between the parallel members. Three rockets can be fired simultaneously. Crude metal strikers are pulled by a lanyard from the side. The frame is elevated or depressed by wooden props whose length can be adjusted by pegs in an arrangement similar to the old pole vaulting standards.

The rocket has seven propellant charges. The shell is loaded with Picric acid. Propellant charges expell gas through six vents in the base cut on an angle of 30 degrees in order to effect rotation. The range of the rocket is believed to be 7000 or 8000 yards. It is an extremely powerful weapon but it is so inaccurate that its chief value is nuisance.

[REDACTED]

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The Jap Medic

(From ATIS, SWPA, Research Report No 117, "Infringement of the Laws of War and Ethics by the Japanese Medical Corps," 26 Jan 45)

A Research Report compiled by ATIS, SWPA presents evidence to prove that the Japanese not only arm their medical department personnel for self-destruction to prevent capture, but they have used the same personnel in combat.

Further evidence is offered in this report to show that Japanese medical personnel have shown little regard for human life, by killing their patients and by the vivisection of prisoners of war, during this war.

The report demonstrates that the Japs do not observe international agreements regarding the marking of hospitals and hospital ships. It cites actual verified instances of the abuse of hospital ships in transporting non-medical department personnel and cargo. Evidences show that air-ambulances have also been misused.

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Cave Warfare on Luzon

(From Hq, SWPA Daily Summary No. 1080, 11/12 Mar 45)

In the high ground areas east of ANGON-TAYTAY-MARIKINA, on LUZON, the Jap has constructed cave positions, and the bulk of the enemy lives in caves in the hillsides. A cave consists of a vertical ten foot shaft in a hillside large enough for a man to climb up or down a rope ladder. At the foot of the shaft, a small tunnel leads to a large compartment some 20 by 30 feet. Four or five lateral tunnels lead from the compartment; just before the laterals reach the surface slope of the hill, they make a sharp bend so that shelling cannot appreciably enter the tunnels. Japanese lie in these tunnel outlets, or bunkers, with high powered telescopic rifles. Their shooting is accurate at some 800 to 1200 yards. According to guerrillas and Sixth Army Intelligence reports, the system of caves extends along the high ground north and east of ANTIPOLO for a depth of several thousand yards. This system of caves represents the passive defense in its purest form. Troops can be concentrated neither for a counter-offensive nor a withdrawal. Their tactics of necessity are suicidal. The system reflects Yamashita's announced policy of holding the hills until eventually help can be sent from JAPAN.

Enemy caves are located by patrols. The position is usually disclosed when the enemy opens fire; our patrol losses have been appreciable. Each cave presents a special problem for which a special plan is prepared. In general, the outlets, or bunkers, are fired upon by our 50 calibre, 37mm, tanks and artillery. After fire has apparently knocked out the bunker, an assault team of six men moves in with white phosphorous grenades, flame-throwers and demolitions. Some 125 pounds of demolitions are placed inside the entrance to a lateral and blown to close the opening. In this manner, the four or five laterals are sealed off and then the vertical shaft is blown from the top.

During 6 and 7 March, the 2d Cavalry Brigade took 137 caves and blew 446 bunkers, or outlets, to these caves. Three caves were dug out for study. Sixteen bodies were found in one, twelve in a second and ten in a third. The enemy had been killed either by concussion or by suffocation. In a number of cases, trapped Japanese have blown their way out. Their empty canteens are evidence of a shortage of water.

BRIEFS

AID TO EFFICIENT FLIGHT ?

Jap PW navigator stated that immediately prior to leaving on a mission pilots and crews of airplanes drank sake and beer until they were almost intoxicated. Prisoner's explanation was that they presumed they would not return and they wanted to ease the pain of death if it should come. He thought that the effect of the liquor caused them to endeavor to complete their mission with no thoughts of death. (ATIS, SWPA Interr. Report No. 658, 14 Mar 45) (Confidential)

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Jap Fishing Units

(From Hw, SWPA Daily Summary No 1041, 22/23 Mar 45)

The Japanese have developed a suicide boat unit which has gained significance during the present PHILIPPINE campaign. These Units were designed for the purpose of raiding and destroying our transport and naval vessels while at anchor.

The enemy has gone to great lengths to conceal the identity of these units; as a security measure all units are generally referred to, even in official orders, as "Fishing" Units (GYORO TAI). Thus, Harbor Base Unit becomes "Fishing" Base Unit, Harbor Construction Units and Liaison Boat Units become "Fishing" units or battalions. In order to accurately identify a particular unit, it is important to understand the chain of command, the conflicting terminology used, the code designations, and the organization and equipment of these units.

The parent unit is the Harbor Base Unit. This is a headquarters of the Shipping Headquarters (SEMPAKU SHIREIBU), and the operational command of the army or area army to which the unit is assigned. Each Harbor Base Unit has under its control five to ten Harbor Construction Units (KOWAN SETTEI TAI) and five to ten Liaison Boat Units (RENRAKUTEI TAI).

When a Harbor Construction Unit (also sometimes known as a Sea Raiding Base Unit or as Fishing Unit) proceeds overseas, 100 is sometimes added to its designation number; for example, the 7th Harbor Construction Unit in JAPAN might be referred to as the 107th Fishing Unit in the PHILIPPINES. At present there is not enough evidence to indicate that this procedure is uniform.

The Liaison Boat Unit is trained in JAPAN. During the period of training, the unit will normally be referred to as Shipping Special Reserve Officers Candidate Unit (TOKKAN TAI--abbreviated term for SEMPAKU TOKUBETSU KIMBU KOHOSEI TAI). After training is completed, boat units are generally called Liaison Boat Units (RENRAKUTEI TAI) although they still may be referred to as TOKKAN TAI. Overseas these units also are usually referred to as Fishing Units (GYORO TAI). Unlike the Harbor Construction Unit, available evidence indicates that 100 is not added to its designation number, that is, the 7th Liaison Boat Unit in JAPAN is the 7th Fishing Unit in the PHILIPPINES.

It is important to remember that the Harbor Construction Unit and the Liaison Boat Unit are distinct and separate units having their own code numbers, functions and organization. However, in the field they are usually found together since each is dependent on the other for the proper discharge of its duties.

The means of identification of a particular unit is in no wise fixed. The only safe method of ascertaining the type of unit is through its organization and equipment.

The function of a Harbor Construction Unit is to build and camouflage anchorages for the Liaison Boat Unit and to maintain and guard the equipment of the latter. The Harbor Construction Unit has a T/O strength of 900 officers and men, consisting of a headquarters of

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JAP FISHING UNITS (CONTD)

70, 3 Duty Companies of 252 each and a Maintenance Company of 65. This Unit is equipped with approximately 625 type 99 Rifles, 9 type 92 Heavy Machine Guns, 36 type 96 Light Machine Guns, 36 type 89 Grenade Dischargers and one or two type 92 70mm Battalion Howitzers. In the main, the personnel are believed to consist of "B" class infantry troops with special training in construction and maintenance work. Instances are numerous where this type of unit was converted into a combat infantry unit when its counterpart, the Liaison Boat Unit, was destroyed.

The personnel of Liaison Boat Units are specially selected after rigorous physical and mental examinations. Selectees are assigned to the Shipping Special Reserve Officers Candidate Unit for training in JAPAN. The unit is not an Officers Candidate School; the term being part of the general security program for these units but indicative of the high calibre of the trainees, all of whom graduate as at least corporals. According to a PW there are 6 training companies of about 300 men each. Each training company is composed of 5 classes of 60 students each. Instruction includes Diesel engine theory, maintenance and operation; gasoline engine theory, maintenance and operation; signalling (Morse with flags and KANA Semaphore); chart reading and rifle and machine gun training. Once trained, the personnel are assigned to a Liaison Boat Unit which has a T/O strength of 104 officers with men (all NCO's) distributed as follows: Headquarters 14 and 3 companies of 30 each. Each Unit has a T/E of 100 boats. Boats are made of plywood, about 15-18 feet long, powered by 70hp Nissan or 60hp Toyoda automobile engines, with a maximum speed of 20 to 22 knots. Normally, each boat is equipped with 2 depth charges. However, some boats are so constructed that they can carry 1 torpedo or a dynamite charge located in the bow of the boat. The total weight of a boat, when fully loaded and armed, is approximately 3300 pounds.

The army suicide boat units should not be confused with the comparable navy unit (SHINYOO TAI). The latter unit uses the same type of boats as the army; however, the navy generally uses the "Maur 4" which carries a metal encased explosive charge in the forward section of the boat whereas the army generally used the "Maru 2" which carries two depth charges lashed to the top of the boat.

Although these new suicide units did not prove very effective when used by the Japanese in the PHILIPPINES, it is possible that the enemy will increase production on this type of unit because it offers them a relatively inexpensive and effective method of compensating for the current shortage in naval strength.

BRIEF

YAMASE INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD

According to PW, this company produces Army engineer equipment such as; one-piece steel bridges (for streams), etc., and 6" square steel cases for bakuyaku tottekki (Lit; a throwing explosive). PW never saw the assembled weapon, but states that this steel case is attached to a wooden support which is stuck in the ground and the fuze lighted. The case and stick are propelled toward the target like a rocket. (WD, MID Report 5 Feb 45) (SECRET)

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Fire-Breaks in Tokyo

(From Hq AAF Intelligence Summary, 15 Jan 45)

The increased tempo of AAF bombardment of the Japanese islands has naturally focused enemy attention on the defense of their cities against incendiary attack. Although approximately ten percent of the total metropolitan area of the principal cities is of modern, multi-storied construction, the greater part is a solid mass of one and two-story wooden houses. A "going" fire started in a crowded section, left unattended and favored by winds, should continue to spread until it becomes a major conflagration. (See Fig 1).

TOKYO. The fact that a much larger proportion of TOKYO than of other cities is of modern construction has not made the Japanese complacent. Earlier reports of a major program of fire-control measures to meet incendiary threats against the capital city have been verified by photographs. "Fire-alleys," totalling about 31 miles in length, consisting of adjacent city blocks cleared bare of all buildings, have been constructed in the more highly congested sections of TOKYO and adjacent KAWASAKI. Reports indicate that this work is 70 percent complete. In most instances, the blocks cleared have fronted main thoroughfares to give the "alleys" additional width, while elsewhere clearings have been along one or both sides of existing drainage canals and railroad rights-of-way. The width of these "fire-alleys" ranges from 45 to 110 yards. In the more modern sections such as the Ginza district, just east of the Imperial palace, the broad modern boulevards are apparently expected to serve a similar function. (See Fig 3).

Photo interpretation has revealed apparent reservoirs, spaced 80 to 100 yards apart, in the cleared "fire-alleys." These are intended as a source of water for fire-fighting brigades. These reservoirs in turn are interspersed with tall structures which may be standpipes and "fire watch towers." Around several factory installations located within the more congested wards, similar areas about 50 yards wide have been cleared of all houses in an obvious attempt to provide protection against sweeping fires. There is evidence from the photos that this clearing is still in progress. One of the identified targets which has been so protected is Nippon Electric Company, Factory No 2. Since clearing around all plants located within the city obviously would be impossible, it may be presumed that the clearings have been made around only such plants as are considered by the enemy to be of special importance. The location of "fire-alleys" and other fire control installations in the Sumida River District are shown in Fig 2.

--- continued next page ---

BRIEFS

JAP DIETARY REGULATIONS

Jap Operation Orders and Regulations captured in the AITAPE area 31 Dec 44, carried the following: "Furthermore, those who have consumed human flesh (excluding that of the enemy) knowing very well that it is human flesh will be sentenced to death for committing the worst possible crime against humanity, despite the fact that no reference to same is made in the criminal laws. (SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1846, 11 Mar 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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"FIRE BREAKS IN TOKYO" (CONTD)

The predominant east-west orientation of the "fire-alleys" is logical in view of the prevailing winds from the north and north-west which sweep the city for all but one or two summer months. An outstanding exception to this east-west orientation is the 110 yard "alley" which runs north-south between the Sumida and Naka rivers separating the densely populated Honjo KU (ward) from the factory district to the east. The new "alleys" are built on a pattern to supplement the natural "fire-breaks" formed by wide streets, canals, rivers, and parks. Together they have broken the city into fire-units, and elaborate neighborhood fire-fighting organizations have been described on Radio Tokyo which are to function within any unit in which a fire may start.

In NAGOYA, photos reveal a pronounced pattern of cleared breaks in the north central section of the city around NAGOYA castle. These are oriented north-south and east-west predominately and aggregate about seven and one-half miles in length. Additional checks to conflagration in the south section of the city are numerous waterways and sparsely built-up areas.

In NAGASAKI, there is no apparent evidence of deliberate "fire-break" construction. Though the whole city is classified as highly congested, the terrain and street pattern may provide some check to incendiary damage. Foothill spurs, small rivers, and wide main highways separate the area of congested buildings into numerous fire-units.

In YAWATA Proper, a curving strip, several city blocks long and a half-block wide, has been cut east-west through the congested area south of the JAPAN Iron Works. In adjacent KUROSAKI, there is no apparent evidence of "fire-break" construction.

In TOBATA, a break approximately nine blocks long and two blocks wide has been cut northwest-southwest on the border of a congested area. Another running north-south with northwest-southeast extensions at each end has been cleared to cover an area roughly 16 blocks long by one block wide.

In WAKAMATSU, a winding strip approximately 20 blocks long by one-half to one block wide has been cleared.

In KOKURA, one strip six blocks by one block, running northwest-southeast, has been cleared on the west central side of the city.

BRIEFS

JAP INGENUITY

Tests by the YOKOSUKA Air Group outlined an interesting method by which the Japs hoped to reduce the effectiveness of radar controlled anti-aircraft gun fire, through the use of special "anti-radar" formations, in which an attempt is made to space aircraft in such a way that:- (1) Discrimination between individual airplanes is impossible, so that - (2) The radar must track the "center of gravity" of the formation, and - (3) There are no airplanes near the "center of gravity." (RCM Board Newsletter No 5, Pac Flt Radar Center, 27 Feb 45) (SECRET).

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View of an inflammable section of Tokyo taken from a point about one mile west of the Imperial Hotel looking southeast.

FIG. 1.




This view of the modern section of Tokyo looks northeast over Tokyo station and includes part of the Ginza district.

FIG. 2

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Firebreaks in Tokyo

FIG. 3

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Original Ideas on Damage Control

(From SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1825, 5 Mar 45)

Taken on MOROTAI, 1 Dec 1944 was a part of a printed magazine dealing with marine engineering and shipbuilding. It was issued during 1944, with the month and issuing authority not stated. The following extract lists "original ideas" apparently for the minimizing of attack by torpedo.

"Original Ideas on Damage Control, by FUKUDA, Susumu.

"On 1 Nov 43, an Ideas Section (SOIKA) was set up in the Technical Council. Some of the original ideas on damage control which have been presented are listed below. Of course, these are still in the theoretical stage; their practicality is questionable.

1. Jets of compressed air, water under high pressure, or a mixture of compressed air and water, shot out from bow and sides in order to deflect the course of torpedoes.
2. Saw-toothed projections of armor which would deflect torpedoes in a vertical direction.
3. Attach triangular structures below the waterline to deflect torpedoes vertically.
4. Build either bow, stern, or amidships section with greater draught and make water-tight compartmentation more complete in that section.
5. Build compartmented 'boxes' along, but separated slightly from, the sides.
6. Two cylindrical hulls fastened side by side and each well compartmented.
7. Put bags of waterproof cloth or rubber into small holes and inflate the bags with compressed air.
8. Use of compressed air to prevent flooding of damaged compartment.
9. Freeze fabric over a leak by use of liquid air.
10. Blow compressed air into the ballast tanks and trim tanks in order to increase buoyancy.
11. On small vessels use hollow pipe for the frames, thereby increasing the buoyancy.
12. Put air bags in various part of the ship so that they can be filled with compressed air when necessary.
13. Shoot a jet of compressed air from amidships toward the stern along the bottom. This will both increase buoyancy and give a rocket-like propulsion effect.

CW Notes from the Luzon Operations

(SWPA Services of Supply Chemical Warfare Intelligence Digest
No 6, 4 Mar 45.)

These notes include information received up to 1 Mar, but do not include complete reports from MANILA or CLARK Field.

The only toxic agents found were a few DC candles. Japanese troops are required to carry gas masks as revealed from examination of enemy dead, installations and from statements of PsW.

In general, protective equipment, other than gas masks, was grossly inadequate. What was available was stored in a central dump. In general, the CW materiel reported is inadequate for either offense or defense.

A preliminary report states that the Japanese used Flame Throwers against troops of the 172d Infantry and 181st Field Artillery. Two men were supposed to have been killed and one seriously burned in one instance. A jeep and trailer filled with ammunition were burned on another occasion. These reports have not been confirmed.

Type 94 small Smoke Candles were found in each of the Japanese armed vehicles captured in the BINALONAN area and confirming previous information that armored vehicles are used to lay smoke screens for covering advance of troops. Army Carbon Monoxide-General Service Canisters were found in most captured tanks.

The Japanese used incendiaries extensively during their destruction of MANILA. Airburst incendiary projectiles were reported to be quite effective. Incendiary grenades were found in practically all buildings from which Japs evacuated or in which they were liquidated.

BRIEFS

JAPS CHARGE ALLIED USE OF GAS

Document captured at ALANG ALANG states, " On 26 June, enemy used sneezing gases in limited local actions in the vicinity of CHANGSHA and PINGSHANG as well as at HANGCHOW on 25 July. Enemy used choking gas for the first time in the operation at IMPHAL, BURMA during the middle of April. Indications are that the use of gas will be more widespread with future developments. (SWPA ATIS Bulletin No 1847, 11 Mar 45)
(CONFIDENTIAL)

Instructions to Jap DC Boats

(From ATIS, SWPA Bulletin No 1842, 8 Mar 45)

Following are extracts from Jap instructions for attacks on Allied shipping in the MANILA area by means of small boats carrying depth charges and hand grenades. The document (date and place of capture not given) was originally accompanied by three hand-drawn and mimeographed maps of west BATANGAS Coast, from MANILA Bay southward.

"Plan: To make a secret sudden attack from the rear.

"Launching:

1. Inspection of boats (arrangement of material).
2. Inspection of depth charges, attachment of fuzes.
3. Availability of pen-knife cutting apparatus.
4. Pocket flashlights, etc.
5. Starting of engines (at one time).
6. Assembling equipment (inspection of kapoks, hand grenades and helmets).

"Disposition for sudden attack:

1. Attack simultaneously from several directions.
2. Duties of each group. (sic)

"Movements of each group:

1. Group 1 will penetrate deeply to the rear.
2. Group 2 and 3 will envelope the left and right flanks. (It is permissible to be separated from the command of the platoon leader.)

"Movements of each boat:

1. Boats will come to a full stop and drop (TN: Presumably depth charge) from the port side.
2. If there are no enemy small boats, machine guns or other defensive weapons, it is possible to retire at full speed after dropping.
3. If there are defensive weapons, and the execution of our retirement plan is obstructed, you must calmly explode them where dropped.
4. If you have the opportunity to kill the enemy, kill as many as possible.
5. You must not bring upon yourself the shame of being captured alive.
6. During the attack, hand grenades have a good effect in killing and wounding the American devils.
7. In case there is fear that your boat will be captured, sink it with hand grenades.
8. In case of an emergency, crash the vessel and at the same time, cut the ropes (TN: Presumably those securing depth charges.)"

[REDACTED]

Japs Attempt To Use Flame Thrower

(From CW Intell Digest No. 5, Hq, U.S.A. SOS, SWPA
15 Feb 1945)

Elements of U.S. Forces were held up by a Japanese road-block 800 yards south of TALIBAU, LEYTE, on No. 2 Highway. The approach to the road block was protected by groups of individual fox holes and machine gun emplacements dug into the road-cut on the east side of the road. The road was of typical hillside construction, with the side of the hill cut away to form the road-bed. At irregular intervals caves were dug into the road-bank varying in size to accomodate from one to twelve men.

A tank was sent along the road to reduce the Japanese positions. As the tank approached the road block a single Jap with a flame thrower approached the tank. A Japanese officer followed the flame thrower operator waving his sword and urging the attack forward. No attempt was made to approach the tank quietly or unobserved, although the ditch along the road could have been used. Both the officer and operator were killed before the flame thrower was fired.

No other Japanese use or attempted use of the flame thrower was reported from LEYTE.

The Japanese did not use proper flame thrower tactics. The approach was made with noise and no attempt at concealment. Only one flame thrower was used and an assistant operator and supporting small arms fire were not provided. This operation was not in keeping with Japanese flame thrower tactics and shows lack of training and the appreciation of the possibilities of the weapon. It must not be assumed that the Japanese will use the flame thrower as foolishly on subsequent attacks.

BRIEFS

"FIRMER" INTERROGATIONS METHODS

Document captured at DULAG states: "Regardless of whether they are men or women, the Filipinos are very obstinate. Therefore, it is impossible to acquire evidence (regarding guerrilla activity) through regular interrogation, it is necessary to employ firmer methods."

(SWPA, ATIS Bulletin 1839, 8 Mar 45) (Confidential)

~~SECRET~~

American Escape

CONFIDENTIAL

(From ATIS, SWPA Bulletin No 1804, 3 Mar 45)

Captured at ALANGALANG, 2 Nov. 44, Jap Combat Information Reports issued in part by KAKI Group (HEIDAN) and Army Section Imperial GHQ, dating from 25 April to 10 August 44, contained the following account of the escape of four American prisoners of war from a PHILIPPINE Camp.

"Recently there was a case where four American prisoners employed by a certain force made a clean get-away. Precautions as to such matters have been heightened in the past. However it is desired that each force be wide awake and cognizant in such matters so as to tighten discipline and bring about alertness.

"Aspects of the Escape:- Three American prisoners (an Electrical Technician, a Sergeant and a Corporal) employed by a certain Force at KOJIMA, OTORI were under the direct surveillance of four guards. An American Electrical Technician (Captain) was brought in to repair a generator which broke down on 9 May. The job was not finished when night fell so work was stopped at 2130 hours and the prisoners were sent to bed. A guard made the rounds at 0230 hours and found nothing unusual; the four prisoners were in bed. Another guard when making his rounds at 0315 hours found the mosquito netting of one of the prisoners to be rolled up untidily. He figured that the prisoner had gone out to relieve himself so he went on to another area.

"At 0340 hours when the guards made another tour the situation was unchanged; the prisoner was not in bed. An inspection made under the mosquito netting of each prisoner showed the blankets and pillows to be stuffed together. These were made to appear just as though the beds were occupied. However the four prisoners were nowhere to be seen.

"The guard notified Headquarters immediately and made a careful search, but did not manage to turn up the prisoners on the island. It is estimated that the prisoners made off to another island or to the coast by swimming or by manning a banca (Philippine boat).

--- continued next page ---

BRIEFS

THE JAP INTERROGATES

"Much valuable information can be gained from interrogating enemy personnel who parachute from their airplanes which are shot down. On the 9th, a member of an enemy airplane crew was captured near the SASA Airfield (DAVAO Sector) and was interrogated by the Navy. We were able to learn the general composition of the enemy task force, that it accompanied no transports and that another air attack was planned for the 10th." (Document captured CATABALOGAN, LEYTE, 21 Dec 44.) (ATIS, SWPA Bulletin No 150, 13 Feb 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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AMERICAN ESCAPE (CONT'D)

"The fugitives took along one of the two blankets issued them, but left behind personal belongings, provisions and shoes. Suspicion was avoided by killing a pet dog and hiding the remains. (This was for the purpose of concealing their plans) (sic). The electrical Technician brought in from elsewhere is concluded to have been the instigator. The others were led on by him to escape.

"Instructional Items:- Even though the occurrence in KOJIMA, OTORI is an isolated case, carelessness will not be permitted. Ways and means of escape are numerous. The methods used by the prisoners were extraordinary. Attention is drawn to the concealing of the plan by stuffing the pillows in the blankets, killing the dog and leaving behind personal belongings, provisions and shoes.

"On this occasion only a perfunctory inspection was carried out. It is essential that inspections be made thoroughly with full cognizance of the tricks of prisoners.

"Places to house prisoners should be selected near the guard house. Surveillance over prisoners calls for more than tours of inspection. Consideration must be given to simplifying the task of guarding in its broader aspects.

"Examinations to ascertain identity of prisoners should be conducted with strict formality. Close watch must be kept over officer prisoners. Precautions should be doubled when officer prisoners come in contact with the enlisted prisoners."

BRIEF

RADIO TOKYO REPORTS ON IWO

Radio TOKYO reported that, "Since the enemy started landing on IWO JIM, the Japanese forces have rendered him tremendous man power losses. Enemy casualties up to 13 March are listed as 32,900, which also includes Chinese, Negroes and Australian casualties". (MIF/POA Intelligence Summary No. 185)
(SECRET)

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Model 98 Dual Purpose Gun

(From Hq AAF Radio 272353Z Mar 45, & ASFEEIST letter 30 Mar 45, subject Jap 10cm high-angle gun, Model 98) & ATIS, SWPA Item No 1296, 16 Mar 44)

The use by the Japs of twin mount shielded guns described as Model 98, 10cm, high-angle guns, manufactured in 1944 by KURE Naval Arsenal has been reported by 7th Fighter Command.

Fragmentary data indicates that the subject gun is a Naval dual-purpose gun. Model 98 indicated the year 1938. ATIS, SWPA, Item No 1296, published in Current Translations No 118, 16 Mar 44, contains information of a Type 98, 10cm Dual Purpose gun." This document is the translation of an undated notebook containing lecture notes on guns, ammunition and searchlights. The notebook was the property of Warrant Officer IKEDA, unit not stated, and was captured in the SAIDOR area (NEW GUINEA) in Jan 44. The following information is from this document:-

"This gun is different from previous dual-purpose guns in the following points:

1. It is of the turret, or barbette mount type.
2. It is equipped with a 10 HP electric motor to drive the elevating and traversing mechanism.
3. It is equipped with a 5 HP electric motor for the ammunition hoist.
4. The ventilator is driven by a 1 HP electric motor.
5. The hoist will lift ammunition at the rate of 22 rounds per minute.
6. The tube liner is of replaceable type.
7. 28 rounds of reserve ammunition are always kept at the turret and 48 rounds in the ammunition supply.
8. (Full speed) elevation and traverse may be set by one turn of the hand wheel.
9. May be fired from both sides of the ship.
10. Tube is 65 calibers in length and muzzle velocity is very high.
11. The gun is equipped with a special type timing gear to correlate the elevation and traversing mechanism.

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BRIEFS

WHY THE JAPS DO NOT SURRENDER

In July 1942, it was reported in a Formosan newspaper that Jap PsW at GUADALCANAL had their ears, noses and legs cut off and that many were laid on the ground with hands tied to their backs and run over by tanks. This report was repeated by PW's unit CO to all troops and civilian employees. Instructions were to commit suicide rather than to be captured. (ATIS SWPA Bulletin No 776, 3 Mar 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

MODEL 98 DUAL PURPOSE GUN (CONTD)

12. There are two receivers for the fore and aft AA directors. (Plan: the circuits will be made under separate wiring systems.)
13. Cordite bundles are made up and the propellant charge may be varied.
14. This gun uses the same sight as the 25mm MG. This enables an independent check on the firing data.
15. The embrasure is of the armored type.
16. Rate of elevation is 16° (TN Presumably per second)
Rate of traverse is 12° (per second.)
17. The fuze time indicator is located at the side of the gun.
18. The special type limiting gear cuts the rate of traverse (elevation) down to one fourth just 6° before the limit of traverse (elevation) is reached."

Other notes on this weapon from the same document indicate that two guns are mounted in the same turret, and that the gun is equipped with an automatic fuze setter. The following performance data is given:

Muzzle Velocity	1000 meters per second (3250 ft/sec).
Maximum Range	18700 meters (20,460 yds)
Rated rate of fire	20 rounds (presumably per minute)

Hq AAFPOA Intelsum No 45-7, 30 Mar 45 summarizes characteristics and capabilities of the Japanese Navy model 98 dual purpose gun as follows:

Projectile is high explosive Model 98-10 centimeter.
Bursting charge of projectile is Model 92 powder (TNT).
Length of projectile (unfuzed) is 12 5/8 inches.
Length of projectile (overall) is estimated at 16 7/8 inches.
Weight of projectile (empty) is 25 pounds.
Weight of projectile (loaded and fuzed) is estimated at 30 pounds.
Width of rotating band on projectile is 1 3/4 inches.
Projectile is maroon in color with white markings.
Model 88, Army point detonating fuze used for surface fire.
Model 91, Variation 3, Navy mechanical time fuze used for A/A fire.
Maximum setting is 45 seconds.
Length (overall) is estimated 4 5/8 inches.
Model 98 10cm dual purpose gun mounted on shipboard is surrounded by steel turret.
Power driven in azimuth and elevation and loaded by power.
Power driven, automatic fuze setter reported but not confirmed.
Maximum rate of elevation is 16 degrees per second.
Maximum rate of traverse is 12 degrees per second.
Caliber of gun is 100 millimeters (3.93 inches).
Length is 65 calibers.
Muzzle velocity is 3280 feet per second.
Gun has removable liner.
Rifling has right hand twist.
Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute.
Maximum horizontal range is 20,400 yards.
Effective ceiling is 35,000 feet.

It is noted that this data should be regarded as provisional.

From the fragmentary data available on this gun it appears to have been designed as a ship mounted weapon. It is well known Jap practice to use such weapons on land however.

The Jap attempt to attain higher effective ceilings is apparent from the great tube length with the consequent high muzzle velocity. The incidence of these weapons with stepped-up B-29 activity appears significant.

[REDACTED]

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Unethical Practices of Jap Medics

(From Captured Personnel and Material Branch, MIS, WD
Report, 3 Mar 45.)

The following was gained from interrogation of a Jap PW captured on SAIPAN, 8 Aug 44. The prisoner was a 1st Lt, M.D., and a graduate of the Medical University at MUKDEN, MANCHURIA.

PW stated that he knew of almost ten cases of euthanasia or medically directed "hara kiri." Each of these cases was accomplished through the use of overdosage of morphine sulfate and never with cyanide. To his knowledge, the use of potassium cyanide was limited to rodent control and the artificial manufacture of oxygen for gas torches. The cases cited were all done without authority. The PW stated that this form of "hara kiri" is considered to be dishonorable to the soldier and practiced only by "fearful" men.

A second infrequent unethical practice, used only in dire emergency, was the use of the civilians of captured communities as donors for emergency transfusions to their wounded soldiers. PW knows of no deaths caused by this practice and can cite no concrete examples.

Jap Raiders Gun for Rank

(From Periodic Intelligence Digest, Hq, AAF 246,
31 Jan 45)

Indicating that the Japs are not unaware of the damage which they can inflict by striking at key personnel is the account of their raid on PELELIU Island. It is presented here to illustrate the possibility of their attempting the same sort of thing elsewhere.

"Recently, a group of sixty-four Japs made a night raid on PELELIU Island, landing by boats which set out from nearby Jap-held islands in the PALAU Group. The Japs did not land at an isolated beach, but recklessly threaded their way through shipping off shore, and, with the aid of the darkness, succeeded in passing unidentified. Fifty-one of the Japs were killed, two were captured, and the other eleven surrendered. Captured documents and interrogation of prisoners indicate that the objectives of the raid were, in order of priority: 1, the destruction of aircraft, 2, the destruction of vital installations, 3, the death of Admiral NIMITZ, somehow known by the enemy to be on the island at the time, and 4, the death of another high-ranking officer. Though, according to available information, none of these objectives was accomplished, some of the raiders did succeed in penetrating very close to Admiral NIMITZ' quarters before being disposed of."

Radio Laboratories in Japan

(From RCM Digest No 14, WD, Wash, D.C., 1 Mar 45)

The Japanese Government has done everything in its power to expand electronic research. Few startling innovations have come out of JAPAN in this field, but many minor technical improvements have resulted and manufacturing methods and standards are high. There may be as many as 100 Japanese laboratories working on electronics and related subjects. Of these, probably two dozen are organized to conduct large scale experiment laboratories, a number of university laboratories and the research staffs and facilities employed by two or three private firms.

For nearly two decades, JAPAN has been emphasizing radio above all other means of message communication. For some time she was dependent on other countries for equipment and technicians, and she still borrows most new ideas from the West. As early as 1930, however, JAPAN was manufacturing most types of communications equipment, including such items as radio transmitters and special cable. About this time numerous research staffs were organized, and Japanese technicians began to take over more and more operational and research functions.

As a widespread war became a certainty, laboratories and personnel were expanded; even before Pearl Harbor, JAPAN was independent of outside sources for all types of specialized communications equipment in regular use, and advance research was being conducted by Government and privately-owned laboratories in an attempt to become independent of foreign innovations as well. This goal was not reached, and most of JAPAN's improved equipment of the past few years is copied directly or adapted from American or German models.

Various reports indicate that Germany figured largely in helping JAPAN to keep her electronics equipment approximately equal to that of other countries, both working models and expert technicians being loaned for this purpose. JAPAN's contribution has consisted mainly in minor improvements in design or construction rather than in revolutionary innovations. The Japanese Government has been particularly generous, both directly and indirectly, in sponsoring and encouraging electronics research. Extensive experimentation on minor problems has been conducted with apparently no difficulty in obtaining funds. While the expansion of privately-owned laboratories has paralleled that of known Government laboratories, it should be noted that official supervision of both the former and the latter has become closer; laboratory technicians have been "frozen" as tightly as any group in JAPAN, but are draft exempt.

BRIEFS

JAPS USE US TANKS

In repulsing an attack by the Japs during the night of 26-27 Mar., direct fire was laid on tanks approaching Allied MEIKTILA positions from the north. One tank which was knocked out by this fire was later discovered to be a General Sherman tank. (Radio New Delhi, India, 281301Z March 45) (SECRET)

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Japanese Gas Shells

(From CWS, Wash DC, Chemical Warfare Intelligence
Bulletin No 49, 1 Feb 45.)

General:- The Japanese have developed gas-filled shells for a wide variety of mortars, howitzers and guns, it is learned from examination of some captured materiel supplemented by a considerable amount of documentary evidence believed to be reliable.

The extent to which gas shells have been manufactured and filled is not known. In any case, the scale of Japanese efforts to develop gas munitions for their artillery and mortars is worthy of note. Coupled with their other gas weapons, including toxic smoke candles, mechanized ground spray tanks, air spray tanks and aerial gas bombs, these gas shells would appear to make the Japanese definitely a foe to reckon with in case of the outbreak of gas warfare.

From the fact that few Japanese gas shells have been captured it may be inferred that for some time the Japanese have made a practice of not keeping gas shells at the front line except, perhaps in CHINA. A year ago orders were specifically issued withdrawing all chemical munitions to certain rear areas, but again Japanese Army units in CHINA were not included in this order. Evidence available indicates that this disposition of gas shells is still in existence.

Types of gas used in shells:- The following war gases are used as fillings for artillery and mortar shells:

1. Blister gases -- mustard, Lewisite, a mixture of both, possibly a thickened mustard.
2. Lung gas -- phosgene
3. Blood and nerve poison -- hydrocyanic acid.
4. Vomiting gas -- diphenylcyanarsine
5. Tear gases -- chloracetophenone, possibly arsenic trichloride.

The five types of war gases, differentiated by their physiological effects, also fulfill a variety of tactical functions.

Construction of shells:- Japanese gas shells are constructed of three main parts: the casing, the projectile and the fuze.

The casing is a thin-walled metal cylinder which contains the powder charge necessary for the propulsion of the projectile. Located centrally at the base of the casing is the primer which detonates the propellant charge when hit by the striker.

The projectile is a heavy walled steel cylinder with a truncated ogive at one end, which is threaded internally to receive the fuze. Within the projectile are one, or possibly two, compartments or cavities holding the chemical filling and the bursting charge.

Japanese gas projectiles are of two types:

1. True gas projectiles. In these the large central cavity of the shell is occupied by the gas filling. A relatively small bursting charge, housed in a gaine, extends into a well in the filling. This type of projectile appears to be used for all gas shells except Red shells.

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JAPANESE GAS SHELLS (CONTD)

2. Gas/HE projectiles. This projectile, sometimes called the "annular cavity" type, is really double walled. The main central cavity is occupied by the large explosive or burster charge, while the space between the double walls (or annular cavity) is occupied by a relatively small gas filling. This appears to be used only with Red shells. Tactically this type shell combines a fragmentation effect almost as great as that of an ordinary HE shell with the harassing effect of a vomiting gas. Presumably, only a small gas concentration would be built up over the target but it would be sufficient to require masking and to harass seriously any men caught without masks.

The fuze is screwed to the nose of the ogive, which detonates the bursting charge upon impact or at the end of a predetermined period of time after leaving the tube of the gun, depending upon the type of fuze used. Available information indicates that Type 98 impact fuze is used for all 75mm gas shells. For the 90mm mortar shells, Type 93 "Instantaneous Short Delay" Fuze, which can be set for either instantaneous or delayed action, is provided. Gas shells for 105mm and 150mm artillery apparently function with impact fuzes.

Coordinated Jap Anti-Tank Attack

Increasing emphasis on anti-tank tactics by the Japanese has been noted during recent months in captured documents. The development of close-in attack with lunge mines and satchel charges has been the theme of the majority of these documents, with stress being placed on the necessity of neutralizing or avoiding our supporting infantry when these attacks are made. The increasing effectiveness of Jap anti-tank tactics is shown by our tank losses in the PHILIPPINES and on IWO JIMA.

An example of a well conceived and successful coordinated attack against 3 of our tanks on LUZON is given in Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 78. The account of this attack follows:

"During the morning of 4 March an enemy 47mm gun scored a direct hit on the lead tank of 3 tanks moving east 2500 yards west of ANTIPOLO. Immediately 15-20 Japs, armed with satchel charges and incendiary grenades, swarmed around the tanks. One of the satchel charges blew a track off the second tank and incendiary grenades set fire to both leading tanks. The two squads of supporting infantry were pinned down by fire from an enemy MG during this attack."

This attack is a graphic illustration of the skill and coordination of which the Japs are capable in attacks against our armor, and serves to re-emphasize the necessity of close tank-infantry coordination for mutual protection.

BRIEF

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

During mopping up operations on LEYTE, about 40% of all PWs taken during the period made use of surrender leaflets.
(Hq VI Army G-2 Weekly Report No. 75, 14 Feb 45) (RESTRICTED)

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Special Assault Air Units

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(From Hq Allied Air Forces, SWPA Intelligence Summary No 260
25 Feb 45)

Previous intelligence has indicated that suicidal dive attacks on Allied shipping were being executed by improvised enemy air organizations or by individual pilots who could at the moment summon up the proper "kesshi taki taku go" (determination to destroy one's self). Captured documents reveal that this sort of strategy has gone well beyond the stop-gap stage and that units, from the day of activation, are being trained to perform the final plunge with effective finesse.

That these "Special Assault" groups have other less sacrificial functions is nevertheless apparent in one document published by the Japanese 1 Air Fleet Headquarters in Dec 44. A mimeographed pamphlet entitled "Training References for the Newly Organized Special Assault Unit," sets forth a normal advanced training program of formation flying, bombing (exclusively dive and glide bombing) and navigation (with particular emphasis on over-water orientation). Several paragraphs are devoted to a critique on formation assembly, whose stress on throttle-settings, circling-points, closing-in, etc., would be banal to Allied pilots.

A study of a second mimeographed pamphlet captured on NEGROS Island belonged to a Japanese Naval Lieutenant and discloses the spectacular main purpose of "Special Assault" units. Included is a description of the course of action to be taken upon sighting an enemy ship, with sketches demonstrating the dive-path to be followed in the irretrievable attack. This "Reference on the Special Assault Unit" begins normally enough with instructions regarding the readiness of available airplanes, availability of maps for quickly plotting the enemy positions and there is a discussion of take-off procedure. Then in the following extract, it gets to the real business at hand:

"Advance to the Attack and Formation:- The altitude at which to advance to the attack depends on the weather conditions at the given time; however, if the weather is clear, high altitude (7000-8000m) flying is considered suitable. In cases where there are scattered clouds or where thick clouds cover the skies, it would be well to skirt under the clouds. However, if the approach is made in the breaks between scattered clouds, sharp lookout of the sky above must be maintained. The patrol formation will always be taken. It is considered suitable to have a flight consist of two fighter bombers and two direct-escort airplanes. In such a formation, each airplane and each flight are strictly cautioned not to be too far separated from one another. The arming wires on the bombs must always be removed when over the sea, and if the planes fail to sight the enemy and decide to return or in the case of an emergency landing, the bombs must always be jettisoned.


"Contacting the Enemy: Lookout must be further tightened from a position forty minutes (100 nautical miles) away from the anticipated position of the enemy. Usually enemy fighter planes patrol an area within 100 nautical mile radius from the enemy fleet.

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"When approaching the enemy, lookout must be sharp so that enemy fighters and fleet are spotted as quickly as possible. It must be remembered that it is difficult to spot individual ships but their discovery is facilitated by watching for the ships' wake.

"Contacting the enemy from a high altitude:



(TN: Exact tracing from the original document)

"The assault will be conducted as shown in the foregoing sketch. The engine will be throttled down in a gentle dive to an altitude of 2000m or thereabouts. The airplane must never overshoot the target. The boost should be in the neighborhood of -200.

"Method to correct an overshooting of the target: - Throttle down the engine and dive steeply to a point that will be slightly short of the target. At this point recover to a horizontal flight and then resume the gentle dive.

"In the event the enemy is discovered suddenly from a gap between clouds, the attack will be pressed from as great a distance as is consistent with keeping the enemy within the field of vision. The general procedure of the assault is the same as the foregoing method, however, caution must be exercised that there will be no overspeed.

"If the assault is made from a medium altitude, every possible advantage presented by the existing weather condition will be exploited and the assault will be made without preliminary movement."

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
BRIEFS

RADIO TOKYO SAYS

"The Japanese Air Force from 18 Mar to 21st in its attacks against the enemy task force confirmed sunk: 5 regular aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, one warship of unknown type; shot down: approximately 180 planes. 150 of our planes have not yet returned. Slight damage was done to our ground facilities and to our cities." (Radio Tokyo Intercept, 23 Mar 45) (RESTRICTED)

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Example of a Medium Altitude Assault




Point at which the enemy was spotted.

(TN: Exact tracing from the original document)

(TN: Translation of conventional signs and abbreviations)

Aircraft Carrier

Assaults Made From a Low Altitude



(TN: Exact tracing from the original document)

"Objectives: Aircraft carriers will be the first choice and transport ships the second."

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G-2 Operations on Leyte

(From Operation Report 7th Inf Div
Report of G-2 Section 20 Oct 44 -
10 Feb 45 Incl.)

In the LEYTE Operation, standard methods of obtaining combat intelligence were employed throughout. The troops themselves maintained a continuous flow of useful information through the normal command channels allowing each S-2 to consolidate all available intelligence for his commander. Specialized intelligence personnel were free to perform their proper function in operation of instant reconnaissance patrols, maintenance of OP's search for documents, accompanying infantry patrols when special sketches or reports were desired, and assistance of language personnel. Artillery aerial and forward observers were extremely valuable sources of enemy information, which was simultaneously reported to higher headquarters, and supported infantry units through artillery battalion S-2's and liaison officers. The specialized experience of artillery observers proved of great value in continuous confirmation and correction of other intelligence reports.

The presence on LEYTE island of a large and almost completely friendly native population was a significant factor in intelligence operations. Within the first few days of the campaign, it became apparent that reports from both organized guerilla groups, and from civilians must be treated with considerable reserve. Natural eagerness to please the Americans, limited military knowledge, and a certain degree of language barrier resulted in conflicting and inaccurate reports. It was early found that the best method of interrogating civilians was through other Filipinos already proven reliable. Each infantry unit was accompanied by several of these reliable civilians, who were utilized successfully as interrogators throughout the operation. Estimates of enemy strength were the most inaccurate of civilian reports, and reports given by guerilla officers were often grossly exaggerated. Many of the natives selected to assist our troops were chosen by the Division CIC Detachment. In some cases, CIC sent specially selected natives behind the enemy lines in order to gain specific information or to contact local leaders or guerillas. Also, reports of the CIC concerning the political animosities of guerillas assisted intelligence officers in the evaluation of information. During the entire operation, the CIC supplied G-2 with a great quantity of useful and accurate tactical information.

In the first days of an amphibious assault, there is a great need for obtaining confirmation of previously gained photo intelligence and for so developing a picture of the enemy situation that there will be no delay in continuing the attack beyond the established beachheads. The volume of operational radio traffic necessary to control this phase requires that a separate Intelligence Radio Net, including the three regimental S-2's the Reconnaissance Troop and G-2, be temporarily established.

Prior to the landing, photo-intelligence, aerial reconnaissance and guerilla reports fixed major enemy installations, troop dispositions, and the order of battle with considerable accuracy. For the first week, the principal information to be obtained from captured documents was the identity of small units, and the location of more distant outposts. From prisoners information was secured regarding the location of pillboxes and guns, the strength of artillery, command post positions, and plans for counterattack.

[REDACTED]

G-2 OPERATIONS ON LEYTE (CONTD)

After the capture of DAGAMI, and until the end of the operation, the importance of information obtained from documents and prisoners increased greatly. With the landing of enemy reinforcements on the west coast, it became necessary to augment aerial and guerilla intelligence reports with specific data obtainable only from prisoners or captured documents. From these it was possible to determine the number of enemy landed, the type and quality of his equipment, and hostile plans for defense and attack. While there were a few occasions on which the enemy made an effort to destroy documents, dog-tags, and other marks of identification which were subject to capture, it was generally found that the usual Jap failure to take security measures gave us most of the material needed.

Early prisoner interrogation by Nisei Language men with the Regiments and Divisions enabled commanders to act rapidly on current information. It was found however, that a Language Team of 1 officer and 10 enlisted men is entirely inadequate for a division. There should be sufficient interpreters that each battalion commander may have the benefit of immediate interrogation from prisoners and rough translation of important documents.

In the interrogation of prisoners, G-2 informed the Language Officer of information desired. Interrogators were given free rein to adopt whatever approach they thought necessary in questioning the individual prisoner. This system is far more effective than use of the Nisei as mere interpreters of questions placed by an intelligence officer. The difference between Oriental and Occidental backgrounds and thought processes often confuses the prisoner when questioned in the latter manner. In addition, the humiliation of the never-surrender Jap, his physical condition, and the circumstances of his capture are all barriers which can be broken down only through tactful and understanding interrogation by a member of his own race.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Principal recommendations of the G-2 Section are included in the Division Operations Report. The recommendations are that:-

1. Photos of critical areas and areas which are poorly mapped be printed in sufficient number that small units on the ground may have a good photo guide to the terrain.

--- continued next page ---

BRIEFS

EXPERIMENTAL AIR BRANCH

Jap PW formerly with the MANILA Air Depot described a new type experimental branch (of air service). This branch tested all the newest types of airplanes produced in JAPAN, and experimented with newly invented airplanes, captured Allied airplanes, and German airplanes. All captured air materiel was sent directly to this branch for inspection and examination. (ATIS, SWPA Interr Report 625, 7 Mar 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G-2 OPERATIONS ON LEYTE (CONTD)

2. For future operations, sufficient CIC personnel be provided to meet the increased security problems of an enemy civilian group.

3. Propaganda leaflets be prepared by or with the aid of Nisei particularly qualified for this work.

4. Interrogators be given free rein to adopt whatever approach is thought necessary in questioning individual prisoners.

5. For future operations, the Language Team be expanded so that each battalion commander may have the benefit of immediate interrogation of prisoners, and rough translation of important documents.

6. Theater Censors further simplify censorship regulations by additional study of the security requirements of each campaign.

7. In the first days of an amphibious assault, a separate Intelligence Radio Net, including regimental S-2's, the Reconnaissance Troop and G-2 be temporarily established.

In addition, the following recommendations are made:

1. That Division Engineer Battalion be supplied a portable lithograph unit. Such a unit is understood to have been developed, and would greatly assist rapid reproduction of sketches, etc. in the field.

2. That the following map distribution be used for a reinforced division engaged in amphibious assault:

a. Minimum of 2500 maps intended for distribution down to platoon.

b. Minimum of 3500 maps intended for distribution down to squad. (Above recommendation is based upon large number of attachments and dispersion of units among ships).

3. That division be given an assigned Public Relations Section consisting of one officer and three enlisted men. (Recommendation based upon necessity of division producing its own stories of individuals during most phases.

BRIEFS

RAMMING ORDERS

The OZUKI Combat Regt, YAMAGUCHI-KEN, intercepted B-29's on the second raid over KYUSHU, using Type 2E-F NICK. After the KYUSHU raid in June 44, Air Hq issued an order that all intercepting fighters which were unable to shoot down B-29's were to crash into them. (ATIS, SWPA, Interr Rpt 625, 7 Mar 45)
(CONFIDENTIAL)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DISTRIBUTION LIST, G-2 USAFPOA INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO 13

Chief of Staff, USAFPOA	1	G-2 WDC, S.F., Cal	2
G-2 War Dept, Wash, DC	2	G-2 S.F. POE Ft Mason, Cal, attn: Lt Col C T Harris	2
Chief Mil Intell Service Wash, DC, attn: Reading Panel	6	G-2 GHQ, SWPA, APO 500	2
Director of Intell, Army Service Forces, Wash, DC	1	Hq, SEAC, APO 432, % PM, N.Y., N.Y.	2
Div of Naval Intell, Publications & Dissemination Br, Rm 3825, Navy Dept, Wash, DC, attn: Lt Bowman Grey USNR	4	Adv Hq 11th Army Gp, % SEAC, Ceylon	2
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Hq US Marine Corps, Wash 25, DC	1	G-2 USF, India-Burma Theater, APO 885	2
G-3 USAFPOA	1	G-2 USF, China Theater, APO 879	1
G-4 USAFPOA, attn: Statistical Sec	1	Hq Commandant, Navy 128	2
G-5 USAFPOA	1	1st Provisional Base Hq, % Hq 5th Amphib Corps, % FPO, S.F., Cal	1
Surgeon, USAFPOA	1	CG, Flt Marine Force, Pacific, % FPO, S.F., Cal	1
Cml O, USAFPOA	1	CG, Flt Marine Force, San Diego Area, Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Cal	1
Artillery Officer, USAFPOA	1	CG, Camp Lejeune, N Carolina	1
J-2 JICPOA	2	CG, Tng Center, Flt Marine Force, Camp Lejeune, N Carolina	1
JICPOA, attn: O in C, Bulletin	1	Officer-in-charge, Combat Intell Sch, Tng Center, Flt Marine Force, Camp Lejeune, N Carolina	1
CG, HAAA3	6	CG, 3d Amphib Corps, % FPO, S.F., Cal	1
CG, HSAC	3	CG, 5th Amphib Corps, % FPO, S.F., Cal	1
G-2, CPBC, APO 958	2	CG, 1st Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
G-2, SPBC, APO 502	10	CG, 2d Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
G-2, Sixth Army, APO 442	1	CG, 3d Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
Hq Tenth Army, APO 357	3	CG, 4th Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
CG, XXIV Corps, APO 235	1	CG, 5th Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
CG, XXIV Corps Arty, APO 235	1	CG, 6th Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
CG, IX Corps, APO 309	3	CG, Corps Arty, 3d Amphib Corps, % FPO, S.F., Cal	1
Australian Mil Forces, % Allied Land Forces, SWPA, APO 500	2	CG, Corps Arty, 5th Amphib Corps, % FPO, S.F., Cal	1
CG, AAF/POA, APO 234	3	CG, Troop Tng Unit, Amphib Tng Comd, Pacific Flt, Camp Elliott, San Diego 44, Cal	1
AAF Evaluation Board % AAF/POA, APO 953	1	Commandant, C & GS Sch, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas	2
Deputy Comdr, Hq AAF/POA (Admin), APO 953	5	Commandant, Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Georgia	1
CG, Seventh Air Force, APO 244	10	Commandant, FA Sch, Ft Sill, Okla	1
The Mil Intell Tng Ctr Camp Richie, Md	2	Commandant, Mar Corps Sch, Quantico Virginia	1
Combat Tng Command, APO 957	5	CG, Tng Center, Flt Mar Force, San Diego Area, Camp Joseph H Pendleton, Oceanside, Cal	1
CO, 4th Armored Gp, APO 957	10	Director of Safety, Safety & Security Div, Office of Chief of Ordnance, Chicago, Ill	1
CO, 19th Armored Gp, APO 956	3	G-2 USAFFE, APO 501	2
CG, 7th Div, APO 7	10	DMI War Office (M.I. 2) Whitehall London, via US M/A, London	2
CG, 27th Div, APO 27	10	USAF, GHQ Southeast Asia Theater, APO 432, % PM, N.Y., N.Y.	2
CG, 77th Div, APO 77	10	CO, PO Box 651, Tracy, Cal	1
CG, 81st Div, APO 81	10	O in C, Advance Intelligence Center CINCPAC Advance Hq, % FPO, S.F., Cal	3
CG, 96th Div, APO 96	10	G-1 USAFPOA, attn: Mil Govt Div	1
CG, 98th Div, APO 98	10	Chief of Combined Operations Rep, British Joint Staff Mission, Wash, DC.	2
CG, Army Garrison Force, APO 86	2	Hq, AGF, Army War College, Wash, DC, attn: AC of S, G-2	3
CO, Army Garrison Force, APO 241	2	Hq, First Allied Airborne Army, APO 740, US Army, attn: AC of S, G-2	2
CG, Army Garrison Force, APO 244	2		
CO, Army Garrison Force, APO 245	1		
CG, Army Garrison Force, APO 246	2		
CO, Army Garrison Force, APO 247	2		
CG, Army Garrison Force, APO 248	2		
CO, Army Garrison Force, APO 264	2		
CG, Army Garrison Force, APO 331	1		
CG, Army Garrison Force, APO 457	1		
CG, Army Garrison Force, APO 458	1		
CO, Army Garrison Force, APO 960	2		
CO, Army Garrison Force, APO 961	2		
CO, Army Garrison Force, APO 962	2		
CG, AP & SC, APO 455	2		
G-2 Alaskan Dept, APO 948	2		

NOTE: - When this list has been perused please destroy by burning.

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