

RESTRICTED

U.S. STRATEGIC
BOMBING SURVEY

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE
SECTION, G-2

JAPANESE MILITARY
AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATIONS



13⁵
Japanese Military and Naval
Intelligence Interrogations

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section
Washington, 25, D.C.

1 February 1946

INDEX OF
INTERROGATIONS AND REPORTS

1. During the period 1 November to 1 December 1945, the Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS, interrogated 51 Japanese officials in Tokyo and received a number of written reports in response to requests of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey on the subject of Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence.

2. An index of these interrogations and reports follows:

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3	219	ARITA, Y., Capt.	C.O. of carrier and member Naval General Staff.
4	222	TAKEUCHI, K., R/Adm.	Chief of Naval General Staff section dealing with U.S. (See interrogation No. 258).
5	236	IMAI, N., Comdr.	Chief of Naval General Staff section dealing with Latin America.
6	246	ONO, T., Rear Admr.	Director of Naval Intelligence, Naval General Staff.
7	250	YOKURA, S., Comdr.	Officer on Naval General Staff in charge of aeronautical intelligence.
12	291	TERAI, Y., Comdr.	Air officer in War Plans Section, Naval General Staff.

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15	309	NAKAJIMA, C., Comdr.	Staff Officer, Combined Naval Force.
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17	329	OKUMIYA, M., Comdr.	Air officer on several carriers. Staff officer on Naval General Staff for one year.
18	350	OHMAE, T., Capt.	Officer responsible for estimates of Allied intentions and capabilities for Naval General Staff.
21	355	TOMIOKA, S., R/Adm.	Chief, 1st Dept., Naval General Staff in charge of planning defense of the Homeland.
23	356	YAMAGUCHI, M., Cmdr.	Air officer of 4th Fleet and Senior Staff officer of 1st Air Fleet.
24	369	MIYAZAKI, I., Cmdr.	Asst. to Chief of Operations Plans, Naval General Staff.
25 β	410	TAKEUCHI, K., R/Adm.	Chief, Naval General Staff section dealing with U.S. (see Interrogation No. 4).
27	421	SANEMATSU, Y., Capt.	Chief of section of Naval General Staff dealing with overall economic capabilities of U.S.
29	374	TAKITA, N., Comdr.	In charge of estimating U.S. carrier and land based naval air strength.
32	384	TOYODA, T., Lt.	In Airframe unit of YOKOSUKA Air Technical Arsenal studying Allied aircraft.
33	431	SATAKE, T., Lt. Cmdr.	Officer in the Naval Communications Interception Center at OWADA.

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43	603	FUCHIDA, M., Capt.	C.O. of Air Group in Pearl Harbor attack.
45	432	ITO, T., Capt.	Personnel Section of Navy Ministry.
46	433	HANDA, N., Comdr.	Staff Communications officer for Destroyer and Cruiser Squadron.
47	437	OTANI, T., Comdr.	Operations officer of 2nd Fleet.
50	605	YANAGITA, M., Lt. Cmdr.	Officer in charge of training YOMUSHI (ground officers in Naval Air Force).

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1	238	ARISUE, S., Lt. Gen.	Chief of Intelligence, Army General Staff.
8	270	MIYASHI, M., Col.	Chief of operations section, Army General Staff under which intelligence operated.
9	267	FUJIWARA, M., Lt. Col.	Chief, Weather Section of Army General Staff.
10	284	TOGA, H., Major	Instructor at Air Officers School at TOYOOKA.
11	306	OTSU, T., Capt.	Head of Air Raid Warning System in Tokyo Area.
13	307	MATSUMURA, Lt. Col.	Staff officer in 3rd Air Brigade and C.O. of 98th Air Regiment.
19	362	ASHIHARA, T., Lt. Col.	Chief of Intelligence Section of Air General Headquarters and concurrently chief Technical Intelligence Section, Air Hq.
20	343	KAWABE, M., Gen.	Commanding General, Air General Headquarters.

<u>Jap Intel.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>USSBS</u> <u>No.</u>		
22	364	OYA, K., Lt. Col.	Chief of section dealing with intelligence concerning Latin America and U.S. in Army General Staff.
28	412	SÆKI, A., Major	Squadron commander in NEW GUINEA Campaign.
31	449	ANNO, H., Major	In Intelligence Section of KWANTUNG Army.
35	402	SUGITA, K., Col.	Chief of Army General Staff section dealing with U.S.
40	450	OHMURA, S., Lt. Col.	Staff officer 25th Army in SUMATRA.
44	451	KIMURA, T., Major	Chief, Intelligence section, 51st Army in Tokyo Area.
48	604	SHIMIZU, T., Col.	Instructor at Army War College.
51	608	TOKUNAGA, H., Lt. Col.	Chief, Intelligence section, 57th Army in KYUSHU.

ATTACHES

30	455	YOKOYAMA, I., R/Adm.	Attache in Washington.
38	411	SUZUKI, M., Capt.	Attache in Berlin.
39	422	WACHI, K., Capt.	Attache in Argentine
41	423	SUZUKI, M., Capt.	Attache in Mexico.

SPECIAL SERVICES ORGANIZATIONS

25A	372	ASAI, I., Lt. Col.	Intelligence Section in KWANTUNG Army serviced by TOKUMU KIKAN.
26	398	YAMAZAKI, J., Lt. Col.	In China Section, Army General Staff, serviced by TOKUMU KIKAN.
34	452	NOZAKI, T., Lt. Col.	Instructor in KEMPEI TAI School in Tokyo.

<u>Jap Intel.</u>	<u>USSBS</u>		
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36	397	HARADA, H., Maj. Gen.	Head of NANKING TOKUMU KIKAN.
49	607	YAMAMURA, Lt. Col.	On staff of KEMPEI TAI in MANCHURIA.

FOREIGN OFFICE

37	442	SONE, E., Civilian	Experienced Foreign Office employee.
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REPORTS

1. Report on Japanese Army Intelligence submitted 3 November 1945 by Lt. General ARISUE, Seizo, IJA, Chief of G-2, Army General Staff.
2. Report on Japanese Naval Intelligence submitted 20 November 1945 by Captain OHMAE, Toshikazu, IJN, Chief Operations Planning, Naval General Staff.
3. Report on the organization and operation of First Naval Air Technical Arsenal (addendum to Interrogation No. 384, Lt. TOYODA, T., IJN) submitted 26 November 1945.
4. Report on Japanese Naval Intelligence submitted by R/Adm. TAKEUCHI, Kaoru, IJN, Chief of 5th Section (U.S. And Latin America) of 3rd Department (Naval Intelligence) of the Naval General Staff.

Set #3

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 238

Jap. Intel. No. 1

PLACE: TOKYO

DATE: 1 November 1945.

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Division.

Subject: ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF JAPANESE ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Personnel interrogated and background of each: —

Lt. General ARISUE, Seizo, was Chief of G-2, Army General Staff from August 1942 until the end of the war. An outline of the posts held by General ARISUE follows:

- 1917 - Commissioned as 2nd Lt.
- 1921 - Promoted to 1st Lt.
- 1925 - Performed minor duties at G.H.Q.
- 1928 - Was sent to Italy for military study in Italian Army War College.
- 1931 - Promoted to Major. Commander of Battalion.
- 1932 - Private Secretary of Army Minister.
- 1935 - Assigned to duties in the War Ministry.
- 1936 - Military Attache to Rome as Lt. Col.
- 1938 - Advanced to rank of Col.
- 1939 - 6 months, Chief of Staff Section, Army Ministry. 6 months, member of North China Army Staff.
- 1941 - Major General, Vice Chief of North China Army Staff.
- 1942 - July, assigned to G.H.Q. August, made Chief of G-2, Army General Staff.
- 1945 - March, Lt. General, G.H.Q., representative with Atsugi and Yokohama Commissions.

Note: Since the occupation Lt. General ARISUE has been the senior military member of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy Liaison Committee.


Where interviewed: Office of Lt. General ARISUE.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS
Lt. Comdr. Wm. BOTZER

Interpreter: Lt. (jg) SCRIBNER W. Mc COY
Lt. OTIS CARY

SUMMARY:

The 2nd Division (Intelligence) of the Army General Staff was organized as follows:



The area army had an intelligence section and each single army was assigned a full-time intelligence officer. Below the single army echelon intelligence functions were performed by a part-time intelligence officer.

The specialists in intelligence and those assigned on a part-time basis received special training at the war college before being assigned to field units. Some were brought back for further training and were then reassigned as intelligence specialists. The army as a whole thought little of intelligence indoctrination. There was too much emphasis on training on the difficult aspects of the work, code work, etc., and not enough on general intelligence training. Approximately 100 officers were assigned to the Intelligence Division of the Army General Staff.

It was the function of the Intelligence Division to collect information from all sources, analyse it, and make recommendations to the sections responsible for operations planning. These recommendations in many instances were not followed.

The sources of information upon which the Intelligence Division based its recommendations in order of reliability and usefulness were:

1. Japanese reports from the front lines on actual conditions.
2. Communications interception.
3. Newspapers and magazines.
4. Prisoners of war and captured documents.

There was an exchange of specialists and technical advisers between the Japanese and German Embassies, but they made no contribution to the work of the Intelligence Division. Very little intelligence data was received from the Germans and this by dispatch exclusively.

Dissemination of information to the field was accomplished by dispatch when it was of an urgent operational nature. Weekly intelligence summaries were published and distributed by air both at home and to field units. Intelligence broadcasts in code transmitted to units afield were judged an effective and successful means of disseminating information.

According to General ARISUE, estimates of allied strength and intentions was poor for the following reasons:

1. The Japanese underestimated U.S. capabilities in supplying its forces.
2. Japanese aerial reconnaissance was poor.
3. The United States was able to build airfields quickly on islands thought by the Japanese unsuitable for landing strips.

Conditions of intelligence functions between the army and navy was poor. The Chiefs of the two departments met once a week at Cabinet briefings held on Saturdays, and there was some exchange of information between subordinates, but in the opinion of General ARISUE, planned liaison between the army and navy intelligence departments was non-existent.

Failure of the Japanese high command to appreciate the importance of intelligence resulted in assignment of inadequate personnel in terms of number and ability. This resulted in an inferior army intelligence organization according to General ARISUE.

TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERROGATION

Q. Describe the organization of the G-2 General Headquarters.

A. G-2 was organized generally as follows:)

Chief of General Staff

Deputy Chief of General Staff

2nd Division
Lt Gen ARISUE

<u>5th Section</u>	<u>6th Section</u>	<u>7th Section</u>
Europe Soviet Russia	America South America and Possessions England India	China Manchuria

Q. How did this organization function in gathering information and disseminating it to other organizations?

A. During the war, the method of gathering information with regard to America and England can be divided into the following: The reports from our own front lines, gained from actual combat through communications interception and from our communications units. Espionage reports were nil - no good. The rest of the information was gained from newspapers, magazines, such as Life, and Time, that fell into our hands, enemy radio and American reports, official reports. These were the sources.

Q. When you speak of espionage reports being nil, do you mean those received were of no value, or do you mean that you received none?

A. The Japanese espionage system was extremely poor. The main reason for this being our complete lack of preparation for war with the U.S. and lack of placing of men in positions. We tried through what men we had in Argentina, Brazil, and China and through the embassies and consuls there; But this method was not very successful. Generally, preparation in the country faced more towards war with Russia than the U.S.

Q. Was there any organized system of information gathering through the steamship lines and your whole system of ocean transportation to various countries?

A. Even with the use of steamship lines it was poor because of the lack of contact men. What we got from the people that came back on the exchange ships was general information, and we also checked on the papers, documents, pamphlets that they had been allowed to bring back.

Q. You mentioned communications interception as being a source of information. How was this useful? What form did it take?

A. Generally, the results were not good. The direction of your communications was established; that is, the location and the quality, also call initials, and call letters. We also checked the great number of preparatory communications previous to B-29 attack, and interplane communications.

Q. Concerning the call letters of ships? Did you have those identified so you could tell what ships were simply by call letters?

- A. We were not able to identify the individual ship from the call letters. It was more a matter of identifying concentrations of ships and movements. One that came in very well, "BAMS" (Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships), was received very well and from them we estimated quite well the concentrations at San Francisco, and Hawaii.
- Q. You described a number of sources that were useful to you, which were the most accurate, reliable, useful of those you listed?
- A. Most accurate of all were the reports from the front lines, the direct reports of actual conditions. They were considered to be reliable and accurate during and after the conflict. As for the air losses, though, the one defect was the habit of reporting enemy losses as high and own losses as low always. The reason for this was that several reports would come in from Japanese flyers with regard to the one enemy plane, and (2) the lack of reports on damage to planes. The major losses were given but considerable damages were not reported. We could estimate from this side the actual conditions by checking the large orders for parts and spares that came in. This was merely an estimated figure that we had to rely on. It was a very unfortunate way of doing things. That was a definite defect.
- Q. By whom was the front line information gathered?
- A. Each unit has its intelligence representative. The area army has its intelligence section unit and then the army has its intelligence units, and within the army the divisions, battalions have their units. The report of a loss to a small unit would come first to the unit commander who would give it to the intelligence representative who would send it back up his lines. Then it comes finally back to General Headquarters where we assemble all reports and get a picture of the whole situation. General Headquarters doesn't have a direct connection with the intelligence man in a small unit. The reports are gathered progressively into larger and larger units on the way up and finally reach General Headquarters.
- Q. You mention intelligence representatives. Are those representatives employed full time in intelligence work or do they have other duties as well?
- A. Down to the army echelon we have been having the full time intelligence officer. The single army is the smallest unit that has a full time intelligence officer. Anything below the army divisions have men on part time duty. Recently, with the lack of men, we have found even in the army the intelligence officer carries other duties and also some island units that previously had a man doing that exclusively have given him additional duties.
- Q. How are these intelligence officers trained, first the man who has full intelligence duties down to the army echelon, secondly the men below the army echelon?
- A. The initial plan, the initial method, was to use graduates of the War College for intelligence work as G-2. These men received training from the officers within G-2. Later on, with the lack of manpower, they took in even those who were not graduates of the school. They received indoctrination with regard to the importance of intelligence, enemy plans, war ships, equipment. This was generally insufficient in my own mind. Another method was to return the forward intelligence officers back to General Headquarters for training and then send them out again for additional training.
- Q. With regard to the training of intelligence representatives, do you refer only to those down to the army echelon of command or does that apply also to some of the people in the lower echelons below army, that is the division, battalion, and company?

- A. The specialists in intelligence and those carrying other duties were trained by General Headquarters initially before going out, but those coming back for further indoctrination usually resulted in the specialists alone; that is, the men who were attaches as far down as the army. In 1943 it became impossible to get these men together for the indoctrination meetings. Previous to 1943 and before that it was possible. In 1943, I remember that it was not possible for the men in Rabaul and New Guinea to come to the meetings.
- Q. Am I correct in understanding that the people below the army command also received special training when that was possible.
- A. Yes, when that was possible.
- Q. Are there any other schools and training establishments for intelligence officers other than the War College?
- A. No, there were no others as far as the army is concerned.
- Q. Tell us something about the navy system of training intelligence officers?
- A. As far as I know, they are generally the same, the training facilities.
- Q. Were both Army and Navy intelligence officers trained in the War College?
- A. The Navy method and the army method were the same generally. I believe that the indoctrination was possibly easier in that the navy work was less in scope than the army's. The navy men were probably better than the army because of their more technical, factual training in technical lines. The navy communication was definitely better than the army's. When the men in the front were not able to return for the additional books and documents and pamphlets, they were sent to them, but this was not very successful because of the great length of time which elapsed in receiving these pamphlets, etc.

Generally speaking, there was not enough intelligence training in the army. I advocated a great deal more. I believe one of the main reasons for defeat was a lack of sufficient intelligence on our part. The army as a whole thought little of intelligence indoctrination, contrary to my own beliefs. I pointed out continually that there were many failures through a lack of good intelligence as to the enemy. There was too much emphasis on difficult intelligence work, code work, things of that sort, and not enough emphasis on overall general intelligence training.

The army considered that the training received in the War College was sufficient to take care of the general part of it and then give them a little more of the technical and thought that would be sufficient, but I myself believe that there was not enough time given to general intelligence work.

As an example, when a report came in that three transports left California January 1, I actually had to teach these men that it was necessary to check the speed and the possible direction and make a further check and try to find out where they were. It was simple basic things like that which were lacking in the training. Another example was your landing on Iai, September 4, 1943. An American officer, dead, was found, and your landing plans and maps were found in his pocket. But until the operation was over, this information was not given to General Headquarters. Whether the local intelligence officer got it late or what happened I don't know--anyway, it did not come up. The reason for this lack of basic intelligence training was the relatively successful operations in China without intelligence. Though losses were high, we were successful. There was a feeling on the part of the General Army officers that intelligence was not necessary. The necessity was not felt, and then, when the war with the U.S. began, we found ourselves

in a position where you had no actual lines, that is the war was in the air, on the sea, and we had no material lines of communications and then we had no intelligence plans.

- Q. Where did the navy intelligence officers train?
- A. I think at the Naval War College, but I suggest that you ask my counterpart in the Navy.
- Q. Were the army intelligence representatives always officers or were enlisted men engaged in intelligence duties?
- A. Just officers.
- Q. How were the officers selected for this duty? How did you decide that an officer should be assigned to intelligence duties?
- A. I think it is fair to say, by and large, the dregs were thrown into the intelligence service. There was no way of choosing. Since I joined Imperial General Headquarters, I made a point of at least trying to get English speaking men in on the American war and those who had some ability in Chinese into the Chinese war. At first we were drafting many men with diplomatic, commercial and economic backgrounds who had a certain amount of commercial background, and I tried to, and succeeded in getting a lot of them assigned to duties under G-2 at General Headquarters, and also, in turn, sent them out forward. For instance, in the early days of the China incident, we had no sense of intelligence, we had no sense of the need of intelligence because the fighting went pretty well and we did very much as we wanted and so intelligence was not of prime concern, and by the time it got to be a prime concern, it was too late; we had not made enough adjustments. By and large, in almost any unit of army size, not down as far as divisions necessarily, but army corps size at least, the main track is from the Chief of Staff to the Operations Officer, and the Operations Officer is usually senior.

The G-2 officer is next, the supply next, but the main line runs between the Chief of Staff and the Operations officer and that is where most things are decided. They support operations and operations pretty much determine. G-1 is operations in the Japanese organization. G-2 is intelligence. G-3 is Supply and Transportation. There was a time when the G-4 section dealt with administrative matters, personnel, history and so forth, but it has largely been eliminated. The Operations officer, by and large, would write up most operations orders and he would take into account the G-2 section estimates as to the conditions of the enemy at the time, but he would incorporate that as he saw fit a good majority of the time. There was also another reason for not building up a good intelligence section. By and large, the Intelligence officers were pretty poor grade and there were instances where intelligence should have come in before or during an engagement or operation, but all too often it would come in too late or even after the issue had been decided. The people who did the planning got in the habit of thinking of G-2 in general as a pretty undependable organization.

As the war wore on, we became more and more aware that we had to improve G-2 and so we started putting Operations Officers into G-2 because Operations officers were better grade, also, in turn, putting intelligence officers into operations; interchanging them, trying to build up G-2 that way. But decisions still were made by operations because most of the operations officers were the ones that carried the most weight in G-2; starting in 1943, through my efforts, we were able to re-allot personnel whom I was able to train here at Imperial Headquarters, sending good Chinese specialists to China, good English speaking men against America to the South. That was in 1943. I was able to get this program underway and it succeeded not only in getting out into China some of my good men here, but also in getting good men to return to Imperial General Headquarters.

Not only did I send the G-2 men forward, but I also made special effort to send them to Operations sections to get the G-2 point of view across and to get the Operations point of view back to G-2.

- Q. You have told how Intelligence Officers were trained and sent out to the echelons command down to army echelon. Were any of the Intelligence Officers who were sent out responsible directly and only back to General Headquarters?
- A. No, we thought of it but by and large, because of problems of chain of command and the problems of various theater commanders, we never got around to it. We assigned them directly to theaters and armies.
- Q. Approximately how many people were assigned to Intelligence duties at General Headquarters in the G-2 Section?
- A. About a hundred officers. It increased and decreased at various times.
- Q. At the beginning of the War?
- A. There were probably less than. I was not in control then.
- Q. A report is received that three transports left California. Through what channels did you receive that information?
- A. The initial report was gotten through the BAMS (Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships), from California. Reports of movements through Gibraltar and Suez, usually came in newspapers or general information; and also through Germans in the embassies, consuls, legations with regard to America. These reports were given to our advance units immediately. They took a long time in getting around to understanding that they should track these vessels as best they could, try to estimate these vessels, and prepare for a possible attack. We had a great deal of trouble in indoctrinating our men in these basic methods. This got progressively better. Another example was the movement, formations, and flights of your planes. We had to indoctrinate our forward intelligence officers with regard to common sense in statistical analysis of possible operations, that is, analyzing the number of observation planes and their movements, further too, after the observation planes come and go, recording the number, and using common sense analysis of your movements. Using judgement would result in anticipation of a definite movement on your part. As regards the use of the natives, the advantages to us of treating them well was seemingly overlooked in many of the early days, the result being that the natives gave you information rather than to us. Another source that can be mentioned in addition to those mentioned above is the reports that we had coming in from Germany. We got a great deal from Germany, most of this with regard to U.S. forces in Europe and not to home conditions. I don't think that Germany knew a great deal about actual conditions in the U.S. They exchanged information with regard to air forces within our own areas, Japan and Germany. The reports generally from Germany were such that we could not estimate correctly or judge conclusively the actual U.S. war effort conditions at all.
- Q. For what period were you Chief of G-2?
- A. From August 1942 until the end of the war.
- Q. Describe the method of processing information that came into General Headquarters. What was done with it?
- A. Some information was worked on immediately, some a little bit later. Information that needed to be expedited, of a vital operational character was worked on immediately. For example let's say a B-29 is reported approaching from India.

Immediately to Singapore and Nanking word is passed, by dispatch of course, so that they can get it to China and Singapore and so forth. Then, weekly summaries were sent; the information up to Friday was sent on Saturdays and this information, by and large, dealt with the war in the CBI, the Rabaul war, and a little of the German war and a little of the homeland air assaults.

Q. Did you provide for the dissemination of background material resulting from this inflow of intelligence material through publications?

A. Up until the Mariannas fell, we also sent out weekly resumes about the conditions and character of the immediate fighting, not much research material. This was sent to forces in the homeland by air because we could reach anywhere in the homeland by air overnight. Japanese communications were very poor. In addition the summaries were sent to forward areas but they would get there a good deal later.

Q. How were they sent.

A. By air. After the Mariannas fell, we had our hands too full. Publications of the summaries dropped off to three times a month instead of weekly. Because of the paper shortage we had to restrict our distribution towards the end. At the beginning of the war, troops afield, especially the Headquarters G-2 units in the field, had a good deal of spare time and they liked to look over all the information they could get. Later the troops, the garrisoning troops, were busy consolidating territories they had taken and did not have much time to worry about other things. As the war increased in intensity and gathered momentum, they became more and more concerned with everything that was going on, both Headquarters sections and troops, and it became a problem to supply them with as much information as they needed. We failed in this because of the paper shortage and congestion at home. In the beginning, when the war with the U.S. was going well, troops received information from the newspapers. The newspapers were sent to troops in the field so there was not a great deal of need for a wide variety of special intelligence data. About radio communications, in order to encode here and decode at various army area headquarters and then for them to work up a summary encoding that and sending it along to subordinate units took so much time and was so much trouble that there was a complaint to the effect that there was no reason to disseminate information other than the information of that theater to lower units.

The rest took too much trouble, and too much time. We initiated a program of news intelligence broadcasts to troops in the field at certain times over certain stations, that would give all units as much information as possible so we wouldn't have to disseminate so much material. I think that these broadcasts were extremely effective in disseminating intelligence. The broadcasts were transmitted in code.

Q. Did you have any radio transmission or reception difficulties?

A. Yes, we had a great deal of difficulty. Because of the inefficiency of operators, for one thing; because of priority, messages on the wires for another. We worked out a system of staggering these intelligence messages and giving them in five parts for 15 minutes beginning on the hour so that we would send the first of five parts and then send priority messages for 45 minutes between intelligence broadcasts.

Q. What procedure was used in estimating U.S. strength, U.S. losses, and U.S. intentions for operational purposes?

A. We broke up the analysis into three main factors (1) the Enemy air, land and sea power (2) topography and weather of the area under question and (3) Japanese strength in the area. Research was conducted. Sometimes we would even have war games and then work out, after further research, the probabilities, a, b, and c., etc.

Q. How reliable and accurate did you find those methods to be in the light of war experience?

A. It was poor for the following reasons: We continually under-estimated the effectiveness of your supply, and reconnaissance was poor, we couldn't break your codes at all, and the fact is that the sea was an unknown quantity. If B-29's would come from China to raid Japan we could pick them up. Someone would pick it up along the line and send warning or if they would go from India to Singapore, somebody would send warning because they would have to go overland. But when operations would come from across the sea we had no previous warning. Intelligence would be very little. Another reason was your ability to build airfields on islands that we had passed up as impossible for airfields. You would land, take over, and in two weeks be operating.

A. You mentioned earlier that there was considerable trouble over reporting or over optimism in the damage and sinkings to allied ships and air force by Japanese pilots. How did General Headquarters deal with that problem? Did you have yardsticks which you applied to help solve that problem?

A. We had no official yardstick. However, I cut the report of enemy losses and damage from 1/2 to 2/3. It would depend on the operation and how much information we received afterwards. Often, the information was inconclusive. During an operation there was nothing to do but to judge information from past experiences. This is a personal opinion.

Q. Do you believe that echelons in the field knowingly reported their losses inaccurately, or was it the result of incomplete information in the field?

A. In reporting losses of aircraft, it was the Japanese practice to report aircraft lost, aircraft heavily damaged, aircraft moderately damaged, aircraft lightly damaged. Aircraft damaged beyond repair were often not reported as lost, leading to some over-optimism in the estimate of Japanese air forces remaining in potentially operational status. For instance, initial claims on damage inflicted on the U.S. would by and large not increase very much after an operation was on the decline but Japanese damage and losses would keep increasing.

Q. What procedure was followed in extracting information from U.S. Prisoners of War?

A. I discount prisoners of war as a source of information. Very little good information was obtained from them. Theaters were instructed to send good prisoners back to the mainland. The rank of B-29 prisoners of war was not very high. We obtained interesting bits of information such as the fishing tackle often carried and air sea rescue maps, etc., and some technical information of your communications equipment. However, the information gained from prisoners of war did not help us very much.

Q. Did you make an attempt to interrogate all prisoners of war?

A. No, there was no calculated attempt to question all prisoners of war. In field manuals, certain very elementary and basic instructions were given such as asking the PW how his supplies were, but on the whole it was completely up to local units in various theaters. Sometimes the Kempei would have a hand in the questioning, but there were no instructions from Imperial Headquarters as to how certain information was to be obtained.

A. To what extent did captured documents provide useful information?

A. There were no captured documents that were really worth while. In the Philippines, Lingayen, we were very successful in getting a few minor articles like diaries and various scraps of paper from the dead but in regard to really, official documents, we got none that were worth while at all.

- Q. Were the documents that were secured sent back to General Headquarters here for processing?
- A. It was left up to the decision of theater commanders. Things that they deemed worth while to send up here were sent. Because of the general lack of development of the intelligence service - they could have secured many more documents but actually very few got into our hands. When the war was going well, I think that perhaps we secured quite a few, but after the allies began their offensive, we secured nothing that was worth while. It was because of the general point of view towards intelligence, the lack of appreciation of it. It resulted in few captured documents. A manual called "Jungle Battle Lessons" from Australian sources was found in the early days of the war in Buna and that helped us greatly in anticipating the lessons you had learned.
- Q. Did the Japanese make provision for securing and analyzing captured equipment including crashed aircraft in their intelligence organizations?
- A. No.
- Q. How then did you secure that information and how was it disseminated to the field? We know that there was a considerable amount of equipment captured and documents were published. Who did that - How was it done?
- A. The technical section of the Air General Headquarters was notified as soon as new information places came in, and it was their responsibility to take action on these developments. G-2 merely informed such sections about new developments as soon as we found out. It was not G-2's function to do the analyzing. They captured a jeep in Burma and I immediately wanted to get it back up here, and examine it because we had been depending on ox carts. I informed the General Ordnance Administrative Headquarters and also G-1, suggesting that they look into the merits of the jeep and do something about getting it to General Headquarters. As it finally turned out transportation facilities were such that they did not send it. Air General Headquarters was notified about technical matters pertaining to air; in matters of ordnance, General Ordnance Administration Headquarters was notified.
- Q. To what extent did aerial photography and photo reconnaissance aid in providing intelligence data?
- A. We had a school of aerial photography which dealt with everything from how to take pictures to methods of interpreting them. The work was done in the field and certain sets of pictures were sent back here. Officers from various branches of the service were sent to the school of aerial photography.
- Q. Was the Aerial Photo School operated by G-2?
- A. No, under Air General Headquarters.
- Q. How effective were the search planes in reporting back positions of ships in such a way as to make that information useful in taking action against that ship?
- A. The results were very ineffective. (1) lack of planes, very few reconnaissance planes. (2) small searches, searches that were not extensive enough. In fact, the navy did most of the searching. They couldn't begin to reconnoiter all the approaches to Japan. The army also started to send sea searches in 1943 and certain good results were obtained. In July of 1945, we obtained 2 good pictures of the navy forces which came to shell Japan. By and large, the reconnaissance was not good, but where our aircraft could find your forces, it wasn't bad. It was not the quality but the quantity which was deficient.

- Q. How was communication between search planes and the bases from which they operated?
- A. I don't know too much about this subject but I do know that often the operations people wouldn't let them report. We had many losses among reconnaissance planes because of the speed of U.S. planes and various other problems. We often wouldn't allow our planes to break radio silence.
- Q. Would it be possible to secure the search planes used by the Japanese throughout various phases of the war by the army?
- A. All records are gone. I suggest you ask the Technical Group, Air Staff Officer.
- Q. What was the maximum range of operation of your search planes?
- A. Not certain, I believe about a thousand kilometers.
- Q. You have mentioned previously that you received intelligence from the Germans on Allied and U.S. equipment and air forces. Could you elaborate a little on that and tell us how concrete that help was, how useful, and to what extent it was used?
- A. The help that was received from the Germans which came through my hands was all by dispatch. The information on equipment and planes went direct to Air General Headquarters or to General Ordnance Administration Headquarters and did not pass through my hands. They did not send any technicians and very little actual equipment, it was mostly by dispatch.
- Q. The Germans did not send technicians and intelligence officers to Japan to work with G-2 here?
- A. No. The German Military Attache here would help a little but he would usually send our information to Germany and the Japanese Military Attache in Germany would send information here. Specialists, technical attaches, were among the embassy groups on both sides.
- Q. What would you consider the main strength of the Japanese Intelligence organization, what was the branch of your intelligence service which performed best, which was most useful to you?
- A. I couldn't name anything as outstanding or even good.
- Q. Could you give an example of any outstanding success achieved by the Intelligence organization?
- A. No. There is nothing.
- Q. How was the army G-2 coordinated with the navy intelligence organization to make sure there was proper integration of information and exchange of information between the army G-2 and the navy?
- A. Liaison was very poor. I met with the head of the navy intelligence once a week because they gave a little intelligence summary to the cabinet once a week, on Saturday, and subordinates went and came, but there was no real intergrated liaison plan of any sort. During the last six months the navy moved away, and it was much more difficult for us to get together. Every Saturday afternoon we had a conference between the local army intelligence officers and the navy intelligence officers at Defense General Army Headquarters. As far as any intergrated liaison plan, it was non-existent.
- Q. What was the name of the top navy intelligence representative who conferred with the general.

- A. Admiral ONO; he came to office a year after me. His predecessor died at Saipan.
- Q. Did the G-2 and thenavy intelligence organizations have any connection with the civil police organization of Japan or throughout the home islands?
- A. No, the War Ministry handled that. It was not a function of Army Intelligence.
- Q. Could you tell me the name of the top man in the Technical Air Group?
- A. I am not sure.
- Q. What was the Japanese estimate of U.S. intelligence?
- A. I have a great deal of praise and respect for your intelligence. You consistently bombed plants and after they were dispersed you would bomb places to which they were dispersed. We would often trace reconnaissance B-29's and thus would forecast targets that would be hit and often we would be right. But the main point about the whole intelligence organization is that the recommendations made would be followed sometimes or would not but there was not a great deal of consistency in following the G-2 recommendations. Our voice did not have much effect. The intelligence may have been inadequate but when we did make any recommendations, they were not followed. You probably must have used spies. Prewar preparations on your part must have been fairly complete.

Japanese Interpreters: Col TEJIMA, Haruo

1st Lt TAKEUCHI.

Japanese Technical Air Intelligence Officer: Major HAGISHA, Eichi.

E N D

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS 208)
Jap Intel No. 2

Place: Tokyo
Date: 2 November 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Division.

Subject: Japanese Communications Intelligence.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Commander OZAWA, Hideo, a regular officer of the Japanese Navy, was graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1924. In 1940 he came to the Navy General Staff to do code research where he remained until February 1944 when he was sent to Rabaul as executive officer of a Communications unit concerned primarily with DF. In February of 1944 he returned to the Naval General Staff as executive officer of the general affairs division of the Special Section. The Special Section was headed by Rear Admiral Tomokichi NOMURA and was responsible for radio intelligence. Comdr. OZAWA held this post until the end of the war. His duties included the making of policy and plans and dissemination of intelligence obtained through communication.

Where interviewed: The Navy Department.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. Wm. H. Botzer
Lt. Comdr. T. M. Curtis

Interpreter: Lt. Otis Cary

Allied Officers Present: None, other than interrogator and interpreter.

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

SUMMARY

The organization of the Special Section (Radio Intelligence) of the 4th Dept. (Communications) of the Naval General Staff was as follows:

SPECIAL SECTION

REAR ADMIRAL NOMURA, Tomekich,
(ALSO HEAD OF 4TH SECTION)

1st BRANCH	2nd BRANCH	3rd BRANCH
GENERAL AFFAIRS	OWADA COMM. UNIT	
CAPT. ARAI (NOW DEAD) COMDR. OZAWA, Hideo LT. COMDR. 1 RESERVE OFFICER	CODE-BREAKING RESEARCH CAPT. ENDO Lt. Comdr. (Am & Brit) SATARE Lt. Comdr. (China) NAKATANI Lt. Comdr. FUJINO (Russia) 30 typists Student Trainees used upon emergency	CAPT. MORIKAWA COMDR. 10 RESERVE OFFICERS 120 COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL

OWADA COMM. UNIT was an independent unit. Capt. MORIKAWA had two duties - C.O. of OWADA COMM. UNIT, and head of 3rd BRANCH of Special Section.

Duties of the Special Section consisted of interception and analysis of Allied radio transmissions, and dissemination, by dispatch, of intelligence received in this manner to the proper activity for action when justified, otherwise by daily and periodic summary to the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff. Information judged to be of interest to the army was relayed to the War Ministry.

The Special Section analyzed ship call signs, volume of communications traffic, routing of traffic, and RDF, and had limited success in predicting Allied operations by this means.

Chief sources of information were air-to-air and air-to-ground transmission by Allied forces which the Japanese were able to break some of the time, and strike reports of the B-29's. The practice of the B-29's adjusting radio frequencies prior to a raid often gave warning of an impending strike. The presence and transmissions of B-29 weather reconnaissance planes provided information by which the Japanese were 50% successful in estimating the target area to be attacked.

The only information useful to the Special Section received from the Germans was the BAMS (Broadcasting Allied Movement Ships) basic code. Use of this code permitted the Japanese to break shore-to-ship transmissions to merchant ships, and estimate volume of movement of ship traffic. It did not permit tracking, however, nor did it provide information on the location of ships.

TRANSCRIPT

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

Q.1. What was the organization of the "Special Section"?

A. The organization of the Special Section (radio intelligence) of the 4th department (communications) of the Naval General Staff was broken down into three branches as follows:

1. General Affairs Branch which had the responsibility of planning, policy making, and dissemination of information for the section.
2. Code Breaking Branch.
3. Radio Receiving Branch.

Q.2. How did the Special Section operate?

A. The OWADA Communication Center, which is located a short distance from Tokyo, received transmissions from U.S. and Allied sources. Information gained in this way was forwarded to the General Affairs Branch of the section.

Q.3. To what extent were you able to intercept and use U.S. transmissions for intelligence purposes?

A. Call signs were analyzed, volume of traffic and routing of traffic was studied, and radio direction finding was used. Air-to-air and ~~air~~air-to-ground coded information was received and we were able to interpret much of it. Strike reports by B-29's were also received and were useful.

There were two ways to tell when aircraft were preparing for a strike. 1. When aircraft prepared to take off there was much adjusting of radio frequencies. 2. Weather reconnaissance planes which preceded large strikes gave an indication of the target area and the importance of the strike by the volume of data sent back to its base. We were 50% successful in making estimates based on analysis of weather reconnaissance flights.

Q.4. Were you successful in locating and following units of the U.S. Fleet through communication intelligence?

A. Our success was negligible. General analysis by volume of communication traffic and occasional DF gave some idea, but did not indicate size of the force.

Q.5. Did the Special Section do intelligence work other than communication?

A. No. We performed same function with regard to China and Russia as with U.S. However, we had some success in interpreting Russian and Chinese transmissions.

Q.6. What use was made of information received?

A. Results from OWADA were sent out immediately by dispatch. B-29 strike reports were made up in duly printed reports and sent to the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff. Information considered of interest to the army was sent to the War Ministry. These chiefly concerned B-29 reports. Periodic summaries were sent to all commands, including the army.

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

- Q.7. Did the army have an organization with functions similar to those of the "Special Section"?
- A. Yes. at TANASHI.
- Q.8. What was the coordination between the Army and Navy in this type of activity?
- A. Practically none.
- Q.9. Were attempts made to estimate U.S. strength in various theaters through communication intelligence analysis?
- A. We were rarely successful.
- Q.10. Were you able to make estimates of U.S. Losses?
- A. We could tell a little from strike reports.
- Q.11. Could you identify ships by call signs?
- A. No. Call signs were changed too often.
- Q.12. Did the Japanese have any success in predicting future Allied landings from communication intelligence?
- A. We could predict general areas by aircraft-to-base transmissions and by radio silence areas. We had no success in predicting days on which landings were to be made.
- Q.13. Did you capture any U.S. communications equipment?
- A. Yes. we captured strip codes from either Wake or Guam - I think Wake - and from Kiska and some aircraft codes.
- Q.14. Did you analyze this information, and if so, what use did you make of it?
- A. Nothing that could be used operationally.
- Q.15. What were your duties in censorship and safeguarding of communications security?
- A. These duties are just on paper. Actually, they don't exist.
- Q.16. How were communications with Germany?
- A. The only information of value to the Special Section was the CAMS (Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships) base code which the Germans supplied us.
- Q.17. What use were you able to make of this?
- A. The basic code remains the same and works on a numerical combination with formulae. We were able to break about 50%. The trouble was that by the time the code was broken, the ship was no longer in the original area. We were not able to track ships.
- Q.18. Did you learn the course and speed of ships?
- A. Yes, sometimes. All transmissions were from shore-to-ship, and we were not able to place the ship's location.

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

Q.19. Could you tell departures and arrivals of ships?

A. Locations of ships were not stated.

Q.20. Did you gain useful information from the Germans through communication analysis made by them?

A. The Special Section did not, but I think the 3rd Section (Naval Intelligence Section) did.

Q.21. What intelligence information did you receive from short wave radio operated by Japanese in U.S.

A. That is not the responsibility of this section. Talk to 3rd Section.

Q.22. How were communications with Japanese submarines?

A. This information came to War Ministry and was distributed to all sections.

Q.23. How successful were you in analyzing communications from U.S. submarines?

A. We could pick it up but could not intercept. Could tell in a general way by volume of traffic how much activity there was but they did not broadcast often enough to be of real help.

Q.24. What documents or manuals for instruction and guidance of personnel did you have?

A. None. We did have a basic manual explaining the nature of call signs used by various types of ships. This manual was revised from time to time as necessary.

Q.25. What was your greatest success in predicting future operations?

A. In the Marshalls operation we got word to the garrisons in time to be of some help that they should prepare for an attack. Not much success in other operations. We had no success at all in the Indian Ocean Areas because we could not hear during the day when most traffic occurred.

Q.26. What was the basis for the prediction in the Marshalls campaign?

A. Bombing grew intense. Both ship and aircraft volume of radio transmissions rose to a peak, and we were able to pick up a few plain language broadcasts. I remember one saying General Olds would arrive shortly. I cannot say how long in advance the Marshalls garrisons were alerted, but it was enough to be of help to them. We had some minor success in predicting the two Jima landings.

Q.27. What is your estimate of U.S. communication security?

A. The order of the first four or five words in a dispatch were usually the same in U.S. communications and gave some key to type of dispatch and importance.

The rapidity with which aircraft codes changed caused confusion to us.

As Japanese areas were bypassed, it was impossible to supply garrisons with new code books, so we had to use old ones, and this was very bad for our own security.

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

Q.28. What liaison did you have with Navy Intelligence Headquarters and Army G-2?

A. I was liaison officer and had constant liaison with the 3rd section (Naval Intelligence) and upon occasion, with the army. I occupied no advisory or planning capacity with the navy or army intelligence.

- END -

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
APO # 234
c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 219
(Jap Intell #3)

Place: TOKYO
Date: 2 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section.

Subject: Japanese Naval Intelligence Organization.

Personnel Interviewed and Background of each:

ARITA, Y., Captain, IJN.

Graduated Naval Academy 1920; from 1921-25, junior officer aboard various ships; 1926-27, student higher course at naval torpedo school; 1928-29, torpedo officer of destroyers; 1930-31, instructor at torpedo school; 1932-33, student at Naval War College; 1934-35, torpedo officer on war (battle) ships; 1936-37, staff officer, 2nd fleet; 1937-38, instructor at Naval Academy; 1939-41, staff member destroyer flotilla; 1941-42, staff member 3rd squadron; 1943-August 1944, staff member KURE Naval Station; August 1944-March 1945, captain of CVE KAIYO; in May 1945 became adjutant of the Naval General Staff; now in service of the first reserve.

Where Interviewed: Navy Ministry.

Interrogators: Maj. R. S. Spilman, AC.
Lt. S. P. Ahlbum, USNR.

Interpreter: Maj. J. C. Pelzel, USMCR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

Summary:


Intelligence staff organization of the Navy General Staff, based on Capt. ARITA's information and on information in FEAF Intelligence Memo #23 (10/18/45) is appended as part of the transcript. Although the adjutant was responsible for personnel in general, intelligence personnel were handled by the personnel office upon recommendations of the 3rd Department of the General Staff (Naval Intelligence).

No intelligence officer was provided aboard the CVE KAIYO during the period in which Capt. ARITA had command. He was captain for two missions, on which the KAIYO provided aerial escort for convoys between JAPAN and TAIWAN and between JAPAN and SINGAPORE between the end of October 1944 and January 1945. The KAIYO received radio reports from fleet headquarters advising of the location of Allied submarines and ships along its course, and the carrier pilots were briefed by Capt. ARITA personally prior to takeoff on such information as he felt was necessary. The pilots were interrogated upon return by the squadron commander who in turn kept the captain advised of their findings.

Each naval base and major fleet unit included radio intelligence and sighting centers, but Capt. ARITA knew of no other operational intelligence organization. His knowledge of intelligence schools was limited to a communications intelligence training course as part of the communications school. Personnel who had served in legations, as attaches or in similar posts prior to the war were, for the most part, preferred for intelligence duty.

Interrogation of ARITA, Y., Capt. IJN (cont'd)

1. Chart of Intelligence Organization, Navy General Staff.



2. Transcript of interview.

- Q. Can you develop the various echelons under the major headings or sections of naval intelligence?
- A. I am not familiar with the detailed organization within the sections nor with the fleet intelligence organization.
- Q. Describe the organization of foreign representatives?
- A. The Third Section had charge of that. I know nothing about it.
- Q. What were your specific duties as adjutant for the staff?
- A. My duties had to do with personnel, records, general administration matters, intelligence personnel were handled by the personnel office upon recommendation of the Third Section.
- Q. Do you know of any standard for assigning intelligence officers?
- A. None, other than that, for the most part, persons from legations, naval attaches, and so forth, prior to the war, were preferred.
- Q. Was that type of person assigned even to the lower echelons in the fleet and operations?
- A. I had no connections with that.
- Q. In your various assignments, what intelligence organization was there?
- A. I never had one, either at KURE Naval Base or while on the KAIYO. Aboard ship, I received intelligence only by radio from fleet headquarters. There was no intelligence organization at KURE. In my opinion, all this was handled by general headquarters. (Later, Capt. ARITA modified this statement by pointing out that each naval base and major fleet unit had a radio intelligence and sighting center, these being the only intelligence units he knew of).
- Q. Do you know how large the intelligence organization is at Tokyo headquarters?
- A. Three to four officers in each sub-section, probably.

Interrogation of ARITA, Y., Capt., IJN (cont'd)

- Q. Was there any special setup for interrogating pilots on the KAIYO when they returned from a mission?
- A. My carrier was in convoy operations. We received reports from fleet headquarters concerning the location of U. S. (sic) submarines. Pilots reported their findings to the squadron leader, who reported to me. We made one trip to TAIWAN and back from the end of October to November 1944, and another to SINGAPORE and back from the end of November to January 1945.
- Q. Was information regarding ships and submarines as received from headquarters given to pilots before flight?
- A. The pilots were gathered together and briefed by me before flight.
- Q. How much information were you permitted to give them?
- A. Only such information as I thought they needed to know.
- Q. Were the pilots given any information on your own forces in the vicinity?
- A. If any was pertinent.
- Q. How did you relay the information received from pilots?
- A. I reported by radio.
- Q. To whom?
- A. That depended on communication facilities -- usually to fleet headquarters.
- Q. Only to fleet headquarters or to other ships and forces?
- A. That depended on the situation.
- Q. Did you get your information from other ships, too, or from fleet headquarters only?
- A. From other ships as much as possible. But assembled reports came from Fleet headquarters only.
- Q. Were there any photographic planes on the KAIYO?
- A. No.
- Q. Was the KAIYO attacked or did she make any attacks while you were in command?
- A. No attacks. We had some reports, but no definite sightings.
- Q. What was required to confirm a sighting by a pilot?
- A. It was confirmed when it was a direct sighting or when a little piece of equipment on the plane, a magnetic device, I believe, gave an indication.
- Q. Were there any schools for naval intelligence?
- A. None that I know of except communications intelligence training in the communication school.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS NO. 222)
Jap. Intel. No. 4

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 5 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section.

Subject: JAPANESE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kasru, IJN, graduated Naval Academy 1918; commissioned a 2nd Lt. (Sub-Lt. or Ensign) in 1919 and assigned duty on BB SETSU which was scrapped as a result of the Disarmament Conference and converted to a target ship; post graduate courses in gunnery and torpedo schools, both six months each; was then placed on an "old DD", the KAGARO (only 300 tons, he states), the ship credited, according to Adm. TAKEUCHI, with sinking the Russian flagship in the Russo-Jap War in the battle of RYOJUN (PORT ARTHUR); went to BB OZAME; was transferred to DD HARAKAZE; 1931, at time of "Manchurian affair", was a student at the Naval War College; 1932, held command of "2nd class DD" HASU; followed with service as staff officer with 2ND OVERSEAS FLEET, then came to TOKYO as a staff officer on the Naval General Staff; 1936-37, was Naval Attaché at OTTAWA (Canada); upon return to Japan in 1939 became an instructor in the Naval War College teaching American Naval History, 1941, commanded a Naval Air (Seaplane) Group based at YOKOSUKA; (a scouting-training group with eight planes, some single and some 2 seaters, "very old style"), made some flights, however, as far as TAIWAN (FORMOSA); 1941 (end of year) left command of this air unit two months before beginning of war with U.S. and was given a post in the "Board of Research for Total War", a civilian organization directly under the Cabinet. Interpreter MIZOTA (with Adm. TAKEUCHI) who had himself spend eleven years in the U.S. as a business man, explained that this Research Board was the Japanese equivalent of the U.S. industrial mobilization board. Adm. TAKEUCHI held this post as a civilian, out of uniform. While there he was not in good health (dengue fever) and did not do a great deal of work; July 1942, became Chief of Fifth Section of Naval General Board and occupied this post until end of war; promoted to Rear Admiral in Spring of 1945; since Navy General Board was dissolved has been working for the American authorities.

Where interviewed: Navy Ministry.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. William H. BOTZEL, USNR
Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS, USNR

Interpreter: Maj. John C. PELZEL, USNR

Note: Adm. TAKEUCHI had his own interpreter, SHUICHI MIZOTA, who carried the burden of the interpreting, with Maj. Pelzel assisting and checking.

SUMMARY

Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, IJN, became Chief of the Fifth Section, 3rd Department, of the Navy General Staff in July, 1942, and held that post until the end of the war.

"Third Department (Rear Adm. N. NAKASE) is "Naval Intelligence".

"Fifth Section" is "America and possessions except Philippines".
Assigned duties were:

1. Intelligence and propaganda campaign toward USA and Latin America.
2. Estimation of national affairs of subject nations.
3. Plans for collecting information on subject nations.

Fifth Section consisted of one Lt. Aide to Adm. TAKEUCHI and four sub-sections, A, B, C, and D, each under a Comdr. or Lt. Comdr., graduates of the Naval Academy, except for 37 new graduates from the Naval Academy who, because of a surplus of naval officers, were assigned to the Fifth Section in the Summer of 1944 this was the entire officer personnel of the section. Two clerks and two temporary civilian employees, graduates of foreign language schools, completed the personnel set-up.

- A. U.S. Home country, covering all aspects of American life.
- B. Overseas territories, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam.
- C. Latin America.
- D. Concerned exclusively with Aircraft; under a Naval Engineer. This one man had cognizance of the aircraft of the entire world.

NOTE: Cognizance of the U.S. Fleet when in home ports came under (A) Section; when cruising, under (B) Section.

There were no special intelligence training schools to prepare officers for the work of this section, such training as there was, being done within the Section itself, and there were no special intelligence courses at the Naval Academy.

There was no "official" coordination of intelligence activities with the army or other governmental agencies, but unofficially, information was exchanged "where appropriate", and Adm. TAKEUCHI had requested such information be furnished him.

Before war with U.S. the Fifth Section issued monthly intelligence summaries, but later, due to printing and paper shortages, this became impossible, and serially numbered leaflets were published periodically "when information justified". In the name of the Chief of the General Staff, information prepared by this section was disseminated to Fleet Units by dispatch "when available."

SUMMARY (Cont'd)

Chief sources of information were:

- (a) Naval Attaches stationed abroad.
- (b) Interception and recording of broadcasts, which included short wave broadcasts and U.S. intermediate frequency broadcasts for domestic consumption.
- (c) Certain amount of documents seized in various war zones, leaflets, newspapers, documents, etc. in destroyed or submerged vessels, including some from Europe.
- (d) Prisoner of War information.
- (e) Aircraft shot down.
- (f) Papers picked up "at sea" by fleet units (i.e. from the water).

No special provisions were made for analyzing captured equipment, but such materials and information were passed about in the Navy Dept. to the section most directly concerned.

Adm. TAKEUCHI stated that his section "had nothing to do with photo intelligence", although "some photos were passed on and some information gained."

Japanese Naval Intelligence had complete information on U.S. fleet units and defenses in the Hawaiian Area on 7 December 1941 and prior. "No trick at all - from your own newspapers and publications which we could buy and from personal observation."

(END SUMMARY)

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru (IJN))

Q.1. What was the organization of the Naval Intelligence activity which you headed?

A. 3rd Dept., Naval Intelligence Section. Under this, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Sections. I was head of 5th Section.

5th Section - America and possessions, except Philippines.

FOUR AIDES (Comdr. or Lt. Comdr. plus one Lt. aide).

A - Comdr. - United States - Home Country covering all aspects of American life.

B - Overseas territories - Alaska, Hawaii, Guam. Whenever fleet was in home port, it was under (A) Section - when cruising, under (B) Section. (B) requires good men who understand fleet problems. (A) must understand political questions. Only one man in (A) and one in (B).

C - Latin America.

D - Concerned exclusively with aircraft. Naval engineer. One man only. Must be cognizant of aircraft of entire world.

Young Lt. - Aide to Section Head. Was picked for ability in English - also aide to Supreme War Council.

2 clerks and 2 temporary employees - rank of warrant officer - civilian employees. Graduates of foreign language schools.

NOTE: During the summer of 1944 the Imperial Navy assigned 37 graduates of the Naval Academy to the 5th Section.

A, B, and C - section heads - were graduates of the Naval Academy.

D was a graduate of Naval Engineering School.

B was such a good man he was taken by the fleet when the war started and then Admiral TAKEUCHI served as B.

Q.2. What special intelligence training was provided for? What schools? What special courses at the Naval Academy?

A. No special schools. Conducted own training as possible. No special intelligence courses at academy. Navy did not attach much importance to intelligence activity in old days. Most of officers were men of not too rugged health and slated to be placed on the retired list as Captain. Only five men went through the Intelligence Section and reached rank of Admiral. Had it not been for war, Adm. TAKEUCHI was prepared to be placed on retired list as Captain (Adm. TAKEUCHI is a little deaf).

Q.3. How were your intelligence activities integrated and coordinated with the army?

A. No official correlation, but information of Naval interest was relayed by Army General Staff and vice versa. The reports were taken for what they were worth. Copies of news reports were exchanged.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru (IJN))

Q.4. Were regular intelligence summaries prepared or published?

A. Not regularly but periodic summaries were published when information justified. Prior to the war, these were issued monthly. Due to printing and paper shortage, we were not able to continue the practice. We published serially numbered leaflets after the war started.

Q.5. Did you disseminate intelligence information to Fleet Units through dispatch? Was this on a regular schedule?

A. Yes, they did that in the name of the Chief of General Staff. There was no routine schedule of routing.

Q.6. Was there coordination with other government agencies?

A. Yes, in the sense that all other ministries were asked to pass on information of value. The Ministry of Treasury, the Foreign Office would pass on information in their own fields. This was of little value to us, however.

Q.7. What were your other sources of information?

- A.
- (a) Naval attaches stationed abroad.
 - (b) Interception and recording of broadcasts, which included short wave broadcasts and U.S. intermediate frequency broadcasts.
 - (c) A certain amount of documents seized in various war zones. These consisted of leaflets, newspapers, documents in destroyed or submerged vessels, including some from Europe.
 - (d) Prisoner of war information, i.e., statements from prisoners.
 - (e) Aircraft shot down.
 - (f) Papers picked up at sea by fleet units (from water).

Q.8. What sources did you find most reliable and effective?

A. The most valuable were seized documents. Unfortunately, not many of these were seized, however.

Q.9. Where was the main effort of your section centered?

A. We concentrated the efforts of the section in statistical study of all data received by the section, probably a result of peculiarity of my own experience, which included long study of American history, going back to days of John Calvin. This was done in the belief that if enough data was sifted, as in diamond mining, enough data would result of value to make it worth while. In Japan there is a tendency to look on intelligence as synonymous with espionage. This does not agree with my view. The long term aspect of my work was concentrated on collection of all available data over a period of time. I have done this for twenty years. To do this kind of work properly, you must have a large staff which I did not have in spite of repeated demands. Until the summer of last year, when in addition to five sectional heads the navy placed 37 men just out of the Naval Academy at my disposal (under Chief, 5th Section - Adm. TAKEUCHI). As ships were sunk, a surplus of officers made this possible. Principal work given to these 37 officers was translation of U.S. radio broadcasts and making summaries of U.S. data.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaeru (IJN)) -----

- Q. 10 Were these broadcasts helpful?
- A. No. Nothing of value was gained from a single piece of news. Broadcasts seemed to be controlled. Over a long period, studying records, they proved of considerable value. There was a great difference between short wave and intermediate (domestic) frequencies. Intermediate did prove of considerable value.
- Q. 11 What information did you receive from short wave radio in the United States operated by Japanese? New Zealand agents?
- A. Nothing of the kind. Should one be received, the operator would be suspected of being an American spy instead of Japanese. Agents in New Zealand, as elsewhere, did not come under my department.
- Q. 12 Radio broadcasts by Japanese, from Hawaii, prior to war?
- A. I was not in this position at that time, but was told the Japanese had none.
- Q. 13 Diplomatic channels?
- A. The navy had no direct communication. Such information came first to the Ministry.
- Q. 14 Was any useful information gained from interception of U.S. mail, letters, and diaries found on bodies of U.S. military personnel, prisoners of war, etc?
- A. No, nothing of significant value. Your authorities must have been cautious. I heard that U.S. authorities had given orders that no diaries be kept. We tried to have a similar order imposed without success.
- Q. 15 What provision was made for analyzing equipment captured?
- A. Nothing of outstanding importance. We were looking for Radar and bombing equipment. Equipment we obtained was broken up and not of much use. Analysis was made within the Navy department by designers making similar equipment.
- Q. 16 Did you get much useful information from natives in the areas of operation?
- A. Far from being useful. We suspected them of working for the U.S.
- Q. 17 Did you attempt in 5th Section of the Navy Department periodic estimates of U.S. strength?
- A. I believe that up to the time I came to occupy the position of head of the 5th Section a monthly summary was made. After the war started, it was difficult to keep up. We collected data of U.S. fleet losses after actions and waited for confirmation, then made an estimate of what had actually occurred. I kept a graph of my own but did not pass it on until a check had been made. It was so secret, I did not permit others into the room where it was kept.
- Q. 18 Such information was not made available even within the Navy Department?
- A. No, none available to entire navy.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru (IJN)) -----

Q. 19 What use was made of it?

A. After it had been checked, I issued my opinion. I felt any other information might be misleading. (NOTE: Adm TAKEUCHI, in reply to a query as to whether any other person or department was doing this, replied that he was the only one having cognizance of this function).

Q. 20 What was your method of estimating U. S. losses?

A. We used various methods. One was getting information from the Japanese fleet - by interviews - by U.S. radio transmission regarding losses - from Japanese fleet forces engaged in particular engagements. Often several months elapsed before we could say what U.S. units were engaged. We always checked up. In several instances where one engagement followed another, it was several months before losses in the first engagement could be estimated.

Q. 21 Were these reports disseminated?

A. Those that we had confidence in. These were not necessarily accepted as official and final because fleet officers often had opinions of their own.

Q. 22 How successful were you estimates?

A. I took the view from the first that 100% accuracy was impossible and would not attempt to make an estimate unless given a 20% leeway, more or less.

Q. 23 Did the 5th Section attempt to keep a careful and timely record of the location and composition of U.S. fleet units?

A. Yes, to the best of our ability, and especially before a large naval engagement.

Q. 24 What were your sources?

A. On basis of method already described. In addition, we would publish reports with the warning that they were not 100% accurate.

Q. 25 Were you successful in this?

A. Yes. Had we not ^{served} the fleet well they would not have come back to us as they did often for other information.

Q. 26 How were these reports distributed?

A. We never made more than five or six copies, so could not go to departments not concerned with planning.

Q. 27 Were you able to predict U.S. future operations or landings?

A. We never attempted to play the part of a forecaster. We never attempted to reach conclusions. Intelligence is subject to a time limit. It was our policy not to arrive at conclusions, but we passed information on to those whose duty it was to deploy forces. (duty of Operations sections). I impressed my subordinates with this procedure.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Faaru (IJN))

Q. 28 What information was gained from interrogation of prisoners and how was this gotten?

A. At various points local units (navy) would do questioning. Information so gained was transmitted to 5th Section. A prisoner of war camp, the only one controlled by the navy, was located at OFUNA. This was a source of information. Prisoners were accommodated temporarily (those taken by navy) and then turned over to the army. Prisoners were questioned at this camp, and a number of my staff often went to this camp to do interrogating.

Q. 29 What is your comment on the value of these interrogations?

A. They were of very little value. Most men captured were of lower rank, and in their first engagement. A career officer graduate of your academy, captured, would not talk. My policy was not to force men to talk. Because of this, men formerly at OFUNA asked to be returned there. As an exception, captured members of carrier crews gave information on the name of their carrier. According to international law, name, rank, and unit is required. This was of help in learning the identity of units. (NOTE: On direct re-questioning, Adm. TAKEUCHI repeated that international law requires NAME, RANK, and UNIT).

Q. 30 Did you rely on Photo Intelligence?

A. My section had nothing to do with this.

Q. 31 Is there a separate unit doing this work?

A. No such independent unit existed, but each air unit has its own photo reconnaissance reports.

Q. 32 Did you receive and evaluate photo reconnaissance reports?

A. Photos were passed on to my section, and by studying photos, some information was gained.

Q. 33 Was any attempt made to collect data and analyze U.S. anti-aircraft (Flak Intelligence)?

A. It is possible that fleet units did this. It was not a function of Naval General Staff.

Q. 34 What information did you have on 7 December 1941 and immediately prior thereto, including number, type, and size of U.S. fleet units in Hawaiian waters?

A. Unfortunately, at that time I was a civilian and cannot give an answer with confidence that would be correct. To the best of my knowledge, it was easy enough to deduct from your total strength the number of ships laid up in docks in the U.S. We received the Army and Navy Register, printed in Washington, and by reading personnel items could tell where ships were. This publication could be purchased for 30 cents.

Q. 35 Did the navy department concern itself with ground installations and defenses in the Hawaii Area?

A. Yes, we had access through U.S. announcements.

Q. 36 How was such information secured?

A. No trick at all. It was secured from newspapers, and by personal observation before the war.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru (IJN))

Q. 37 Was this section responsible for such information?

A. Yes. It was sent out to all departments of the Navy, and to the Army.

Q. 38 How was it disseminated?

A. In printed form - multiple copies.

Q. 39 Are copies available?

A. The Navy Ministry burned down. The records were burned.

Q. 40 Were no copies of any kind preserved?

A. No.

Q. 41 With regard to Japanese Naval Intelligence as a whole, what were the outstanding services of Naval Intelligence to the Japanese fleet units?

A. I have never pondered the question before, but feel sure that the Intelligence organization of the Navy had no injurious effect on the fleet. Men in the fleet are usually not informed on foreign affairs. My organization performed the duty of passing on well serviced information.

Q. 42 Will you comment on the times, in terms of campaigns, when the work of the 5th Section was most effective. When it was weakest. Reasons?

A. The effectiveness of the sections increased with the passage of time, due to increased experience. I believe that this was true of many of my colleagues. We enjoyed greater confidence of superiors as time passed.

Q. 43 In the light of war experiences, how would the Admiral change or improve his 5th Section operations?

A. Without question, the first change would be an increased staff, to bring men of superior qualities into sub-section (B) (Overseas territories, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam) which was vacant during the war. Another change would be improvement of conditions under which we worked:

1. Communications, which were poor.
2. Printing facilities, which were also poor, and became more so toward the end of the war.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

Julioz Files

INTERROGATION NO: 236
(Jap Intell #5)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 3 Nov 45

Division of Origin: G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section.

Subject: Japanese Naval Intelligence Organization and Operation.

Personnel **interrogated** and background of each:

Comdr IMAI, Nobuhiko, IJN. Entered Naval Academy 1929, graduated 1932; from 1932 to April 1934, engineering officer duty; April 1934-November 1934, communications officer on RYUJO (CV); November 1934-April 1935, navigation officer on cruiser KINUGASA; November 1935-December 1936, senior code officer, 3rd fleet Headquarters; December 1936-March 1937, chief navigation officer on OKIKAZI (DD); April 1937-February 1939, language student (Spanish) at Tokyo University; promoted to lieutenant June 1938; February 1939-November 1939, fire control duty aboard training fleet cruiser KATORI; November 1939-January 1942, adjutant YOKOSUKA Naval Base; February 1942-May 1943, adjutant 2nd China Fleet at HONGKONG; May 1943-February 1944, assistant officer on 5th Section of Naval General Staff, handling Latin American matters; since February 1944, regular member of 5th Section of Naval General Staff, handling all North and South American and front line intelligence matters.

Where interviewed: Navy Ministry.

Interrogator: Lt S. P. AHLBUM, USNR.
Major R. S. SPILMAN, Jr, AC.

Interpreter: Mr. John TAJI.

Allied Officers present: None.

Summary:

1. Principal sources of intelligence of the 5th Section (North and South America and front line intelligence) of the Navy General Staff were reports of military attaches in foreign countries, radio news broadcasts, interrogation of prisoners of war, captured documents, and observations by forward units and shore-based forward garrisons. Military and Naval Attaches, although a prolific source up to 1941, diminished in usefulness as the war progressed, and after the break with Argentina this source virtually vanished.

2. Information thus obtained was tabulated over long periods at General Staff Headquarters in the Navy Ministry, and from these tabulations deduction were made as to the Order of

Battle, losses, and future operations. This method was considered accurate within 20 per cent as far as the number of carriers were concerned, but in this instance the deduction method was obviously augmented by papers giving call signs and names of carriers, taken from crashed aircraft after fleet raids on the Empire.

3. During the time in which Comdr IMAI was a member of the intelligence department, radio news broadcasts were considered the best single source of information about the Allies. The ideal method, however, was thought to be the U.S. intelligence system in the Philippines, which the Japanese could not overcome. The intelligence organization within the Navy, at least, was incomplete; photographic reconnaissance was regarded as a "brute force" method which was utilized for strategic planning but very little for intelligence purposes; the Japanese counterpart of flak intelligence was made one of Comdr IMAI's responsibilities, but it was almost non-existent.

4. Apparently General Staff and major fleet Headquarters were only Sections of the Imperial Navy in which officers had intelligence as their principal duty. In lower echelons, it was regarded as collateral duty for communications officers or for officers who had special capabilities, such as knowledge of foreign languages.

5. A list of sources of intelligence for the 5th Section of the Navy General Staff, prepared by Comdr IMAI, and showing method of reception, classification, and value, is appended following the transcript.

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr IMAI, Nobuhike, IJN)

Q 1. What were your specific duties?

A. I am a member of the 5th Section, 3rd Department, of the Navy General Staff, which deals with the whole of North and South America. The department consists of the chief (Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI) and four officers under him, known as "A", "B", "C" and "D" members. I was the "C" member in charge of Latin America, Mexico and all of South America. I was picked because of my knowledge of Spanish, but I have forgotten most of it. Up to February 1944, I was not a regular member of the Navy General Staff, but in the form of an assistant officer. This was because of a rule regulating the number of regular members on the staff. I was not given the most important work while an assistant. During the war, the "B" membership, which was responsible for Canada, Alaska, other American territories, Hawaii, and front line intelligence, became vacant. I took on the "B" man's work in February 1944, at which time I became a regular member of the staff and handled more important work.

Q 2. What were your principal sources of information?

A. By the time I became a regular member of the Naval Staff we had no good sources of information in the United States, her territories, Chile, or Brazil, as attaches had been withdrawn. Only the Argentine attache was left. This was the only source of information, plus radio newscasts.

Q 3. How about your responsibility for front line intelligence?

A. Front line intelligence was obtained mostly by summing up radio reports from all over the world, piecing together information from all broadcasts, captured documents, planes shot down, and prisoners of war. These reports were tabulated over long periods of time in Tokyo, in the Naval General Staff, and deductions were made from the tabulations.

Q 4. Are any copies of these tabulations available?

A. No. They have all been burned. In July, the Ministry of Home Defense knew the battlefield would be Japan, and burning was started. Not a single copy was left. The Chief of the 5th Section was very strict about burning.

Q 5. How was the information for this tabulation brought to Intelligence Headquarters from the sources you mentioned?

A. Communication Officers in the fleet and at shore stations were at times also the intelligence officer. Also, any officer who was capable, who spoke foreign languages, for instance, was given the post of intelligence officer. It was additional duty. All units were responsible for obtaining intelligence. In the fleet, it was usually sent to us through the chain of command; sometimes, especially in the case of isolated units late in the war, it was sent directly, but the chain of command was always notified it had been sent. Important documents were sent over by plane, as well as prisoners of war, if of high rank. They were taken to an interrogation center at OFUNA.

- Q 6. In the case of isolated garrisons in the MARIANAS and by-passed islands, how was information obtained after occupation by the U.S.?
- A. Sources were practically negligent, except for broadcasts from the American side, and information from scouting planes.
- Q 7. How about isolated garrisons, such as those on PAGAN and ROTA?
- A. Very little information was obtained. Sometimes there was radio contact. We got some information from U.S. broadcasts and from pamphlets dropped by U.S. planes. No submarines or planes were sent to captured or by-passed islands for intelligence purposes.
- Q 8. After the information was tabulated, what was done with it?
- A. The information was sent only to those lower units which needed it. Very important messages were sent by wire or wireless, the rest by letter. An occasional meeting of commanders was held in Tokyo, but as means of transportation became scarce in the latter part of the war, these were less frequent.
- Q 9. Were intelligence publications issued at regular intervals?
- A. No. My office never issued publications but gave the information to operational units which issued bulletins when they thought this was necessary. My office received copies, but all have been burned.
- Q 10. Did you have any method of receiving information from the United States or Hawaii other than the news broadcasts?
- A. We had no method of communication - no neutral citizens, no spies, no hidden radios.
- Q 11. Did information come from other Japanese agencies - Army, Foreign Office, etc.?
- A. The Foreign Office had recorders for short wave broadcasts. From the Army side we would get information from Army military attaches.
- Q 12. Was Naval intelligence given to the Army and the Foreign Office?
- A. We gave little to the Foreign Office, but gave the Army information of value to them.
- Q 13. Did Navy Headquarters supervise the interrogation of their prisoners of war?
- A. We seldom interviewed prisoners of war with any definite object in mind. A member of this department conducted the interrogations, but usually we did not know what could be obtained, and we had general conversations to see what would come out. Prisoners of war gave very little useful information. Officers seldom talked. Non-coms and enlisted men sometimes talked but had very little information except perhaps names of a few ships, etc.

Q 14. What do you consider the best source of information for Naval Intelligence?

A. Do you mean ideal or in actual practise?

Q 15. I would like your ideas on both.

A. Actually, radio news reports from all over the world, as we tabulated them, were the best sources we had. For example, we would hear of a conference between MacArthur and Nimitz in San Francisco, which would mean something important was coming up. Then we would hear of a conference in Pearl Harbor of front line commanders, and would try to estimate the direction of the next move. In theory, the U.S. method in the Philippines, about which you knew more than I, is the ideal. We could not improve on that.

Q 16. What methods did you use in arriving at the Order of Battle of the U.S., both fleet and air?

A. The Order of Battle was estimated from information obtained from our island forces and front line units. We would make plots and graphs and then estimate. When air raids came from carriers, we would tabulate interval, target, type of plane, length of attack, and could deduce the strength of the carrier fleet involved in the attack. I myself could estimate strength from the length of the attack. I based my estimates on a long background of experience. In the field, there might not be people with the necessary background for such an estimation, but I could use reports from the field for this purpose.

Q 17. Were captured documents a source of Order of Battle information?

A. Yes. Now and then we would find the names of carriers checked against call signs on papers found in crashed planes. One or two scraps of paper were of little value in themselves, but putting many together gave a good basis for estimates.

Q 18. How accurate would you consider these estimates?

A. Within 20% as to number of carriers.

Q 19. How accurate as to number of aircraft squadrons or units?

A. The "D" man was in charge of this. He handled the aviation end. That is Comdr TAKITA now, but he was only in charge after June 1945. Comdr YOKURA, Sashize, was his predecessor. He is in Tokyo, in the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry.

Q 20. Did you have any responsibilities as to air?

A. I had no work connected with the air forces except that I worked with Comdr YOKURA and was familiar with what he did.

Q 21. Can you give us the outstanding accomplishments of your "B" and "C" divisions?

A. We haven't had any outstanding successes. Our best work was on the Iwo Jima attack. We estimated that three divisions would attack about February 10 or 11, which is a national holiday. We deduced that from the number

of air attacks, making our prediction about the end of January or the beginning of February. We can't tell precisely when an attack will start until just before the attack.

Q.22. What do you consider the short-comings of Japanese Navy Intelligence?

A. The system is not complete. A national trait of the Japanese is that they are not interested in intelligence; they are apt to start a battle without seeing the end, and are not much concerned with what they are going to have to meet. The main reason for the defeat of Japan is lack of intelligence information. There is a Chinese proverb: "If you know your enemy and know yourself you will win a hundred battles". Japan went into the war without enough information.

Q 23. You had a great deal of information when Pearl Harbor was attacked.

A. I was not in this section at the time of Pearl Harbor, but I think information from people coming back from Hawaii was all we had.

Q 24. Has Japanese Naval Intelligence deteriorated during the war?

A. Its capabilities have deteriorated since military attaches have been withdrawn. From the point of view of calculating the Order of Battle, it has improved. After Argentine was cut off, the only information was by radio.

Q 25. Was there any standard for choosing intelligence officers in Headquarters? In the field?

A. My section did no work on this. The Personnel Bureau handled it.

Q 26. Were written instructions given intelligence officers?

A. I have already submitted papers on this which are now being translated. They will be ready on 6 November.

Q 27. To whom was this submitted?

A. GHQ, I think. I will give you a copy if there is an extra one.

Q 28. Can you give the names of any officers in intelligence duties both with the fleet and shore-based units?

A. I don't know the names, but I can get them from personnel. I will give them to you. I don't think there were many shore-based officers.

Q 29. How were U.S. Naval losses estimated?

A. Mainly by U.S. radio reports and reports from submarine and plane commanders. Plane reports were often inaccurate. We would calculate from the size of shells or bombs how much damage could have been done. If the U.S. fleet was attacked and showed up less some ships, we would estimate sinkings or damage.

Q 30. Japanese claims by DOMEI, for example, were exaggerated. How did you compensate for exaggeration in the reports of pilots and ships? 236-6

A. We made deductions from DOMEI reports. These were taken directly from front line dispatches and did not go through us.

Q 31. What about exaggerated claims by pilots themselves?

A. We had to make allowances. Toward the end of the war, the training of pilots and crews was inadequate, and all personnel was inferior. Crews could not recognize carriers, battleships, etc.

Q 32. What percentage of accuracy did you consider these reports had?

A. I can't give percentages because each case would differ. Weather conditions, defenses, size of bombs, the ability of the crew, reports on the extent of damage - all were considered in reaching an estimate.

Q 33. How much use did this department make of intelligence obtained from photo reconnaissance?

A. The Intelligence Department never sent out photo planes, and received photos only now and then. It was considered a "brute force" method of obtaining intelligence.

Q 34. Did any officer in the Navy Staff have charge of photo intelligence?

A. No.

Q 35. What department directed photo intelligence?

A. The commander of each fleet. If headquarters wanted photographs, they would send a directive to the fleet.

Q 36. Were photographs considered more of a strategic planning function than intelligence?

A. Yes. But I thought photo reconnaissance should have been used more for intelligence.

Q 37. Was flak intelligence - the method of avoiding anti-aircraft fire - a part of Naval intelligence?

A. It was part of the department's work, but little was done about it. I am in charge, but have had very little to do with it.

(NOTE: List of sources, cited in paragraph 5 of Summary follows on page 8.)

List prepared by Comdr IMAI of sources, classification and value of information, obtained by 5th Section, Navy General Staff:

- (1) Allied radio information.
 - (a) Method of reception; - via general Division.
 - (b) Classification: - military (general, dr, naval vessels, submarines). political, foreign relations, economics, domestic conditions.
 - (c) Value: - because of the publicity control carried out by America, it was not possible to expect much value for information of temporary and short-lived nature. But, in case we were able to make statistical survey by classifying information of all kinds received over long periods, we think it was sometimes possible to obtain material of value upon which to base our judgement. That was especially so in case of the broadcasts by intermediate waves intended for domestic consumption.
- (2) Allied leaflets and newspapers.
 - (a) Method of collection: - Seizure in war zones and purchase in neutral markets.
 - (b) Classification: - no special effort was made at classification because relatively little was obtained owing to the great difficulty of getting such materials.
 - (c) Value: - although they were of greater value than radio broadcasts in that their contents were more substantial, on the whole they did not reach our hands in time to be of much use in directing the war effort. They were, however, of value as material for checking the other information already received. Photographs of naval vessels and aircraft, especially among the material seized in war zones, proved valuable as technical reference material.
- (3) Data from other sources: - none of any particular value.

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INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS NO. 246)
Jap Intell. No. 6

Place: Tokyo
Date: 5 November 1945

Division of Origin: G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section.

Subject: Japanese Naval Intelligence.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Rear Admiral ONO, Takeji of the Imperial Japanese Navy,
graduate of Naval Academy 1916:
1928 graduate Naval War College.
1928 JINTSU, Navigation Officer.
1931 Staff Officer, 2nd Overseas Fleet.
1932 Naval General Staff.
1932 3rd Fleet Staff Officer in China Area.
1934 Naval General Staff again.
1937 China Seas Fleet, Staff Officer.
1940 Naval General Staff.
1941 KISO, Commanding Officer.
1942 SUZUYA, Commanding Officer.
1943 YAMATO, Commanding Officer, left March 1944.
1944 Chief 3rd Department, Naval General Staff.
1945 (April) Chief of Naval Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry.

Where interviewed: Admiral ONO's Office, Tokyo.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer, USNR.
Lt. Comdr. T. M. Curtis, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. Scribner McCoy, USNR.

Allied Officers present: None.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral ONO, Takeji, IJN)

SUMMARY

From early in 1944 until the Spring of 1945, Adm. ONO held the position of Chief of the 3rd Department of the Naval General Staff and as such was Director of Naval Intelligence for the Imperial Japanese Navy. His views on Naval Intelligence and statements should naturally, therefore, carry considerable authority.

There was no specialized training in the Japanese Navy for intelligence officers.

There was no special integration of Naval Intelligence activities with those of the army. The only regular liaison provided seems to have been the once-a-week meetings of Adm. ONO, Director of Naval Intelligence, with Gen. ARISUE, Director of Army Intelligence, for the purpose of giving information on the war situation to the War Cabinet.

There were no special intelligence organizations provided within either the Army or the Navy for the Army Air Forces or the Naval Air Arm.

Adm. ONO denied any special liaison between the Foreign Office and Naval Intelligence, but on further questioning, admitted the Navy had special representation with attaches abroad in the form of naval personnel who acted as assistant attaches.

The organization of the Japanese Navy does not provide for intelligence officers in ships. Such duties are performed by the Commanding Officer himself. This includes aircraft carriers.

Full time intelligence officers were employed, however, in Fleet Headquarters and on Flagships with the Flag. Such officers received no specialized training, maintained no direct liaison with the 3rd Department of the Naval General Staff in Tokyo, were responsible for "digesting" information passed along by the 3rd Department, and at no time were more than 10 or 11 in number.

Sources of information for 3rd Department were:

- Reports from naval attaches.
- Foreign newspapers and magazines.
- Radio broadcasts, both short wave and intermediate frequency.
- Reports from Foreign Office and Treasury Department.
- Seized documents.
- Prisoner of War statements.

Most reliable of these sources were seized documents and most useful were radio broadcasts.

Priority information was dispatched to Fleet Units by wireless, and other information was sent out in printed form by air, no regular schedule of dissemination being set up in either case.

3rd Department did not participate in staff planning, limited its function to passing along information it had screened to the 1st Department (War Plans) for Command decision.

Estimates of type, size, and location of U.S. Fleet Units were made by 3rd Department. In the second battle of the PHILIPPINES SEA, e.g., in October, 1944, they claim accuracy to within 20% - 100% correct on BB and aircraft carriers.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral ONO, Takeji, IJN)

SUMMARY (Cont'd)

Target studies and analyses were prepared and maintained, with particular emphasis having been placed on the PHILIPPINES, HAWAII, and the west coast of the United States.

RDF equipment was carried on board Japanese combatant vessels. "Earlier few ships had such gear. Later all did".

The 3rd Department could, and did, foretell major U.S. (Allied) moves and landings in the "general areas" from three days to one week in advance and passed such information along to forces in the field.

U.S. naval losses were tallied "quite accurately".

Prisoner of war information was useful only in confirming information already held. The 3rd Department was responsible only for actual questioning of (Navy) prisoners of war, not for their custody and treatment. Custody and treatment were the responsibility of "OFUNA Provisional Camp", under TOKOSUKA Naval Base, which was under the command of Vice Adm. M. TOTSUKA


TOKUMO KIKAN was an Army organization whose work was "guidance in matters political and economic" in China and Manchoukuo, with the work "possibly extending to the south after the war started".

- END SUMMARY -

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral ONO, Takeji, IJN)

TRANSCRIPT

Q.1. Describe the organization of the "3rd Department". What were the number of personnel in each Section?



The numbers varied at different times while I was head of the Department. Generally speaking, the staff was badly undermanned at the beginning of the war and was greatly increased toward the end. All were graduates of the Naval Academy except the 40 reserve officers who were all trained at Naval Barracks, and then attended various schools (gunnery, communications, etc.), but they received no special training in intelligence.

Q.2. How were these men selected?

A. For language proficiency.

Q.3. 3rd Department staff heads. How were they trained?

A. The Japanese never had special Naval training schools for intelligence. There was never a special course at Naval Academy on intelligence.

Q.4. Was this true of the Army?

A. I believe so.

Q.5. Have you held any naval attache post during your career?

A. No.

Q.6. Did your staff officers have experience as foreign attaches?

A. No. They were career men in the Navy.

Q.7. How about the 40 auxiliary (reserve) officers? (Foreign attache duty?)

A. A few perhaps by chance.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral ONO, Takeji, IJN)

Q.8. To what extent were Naval Intelligence activities integrated with those of the Army?

A. From time to time, there would be exchanges of information by heads of departments meeting together. No organized exchange of information. Generally speaking, the Navy was more successful in securing information on the U.S. and Britain - the Army on Russia and China.

Q.9. Was General ARISUE comparable head of Army Intelligence?

A. Yes.

Q.10. Did you have scheduled meetings with him (Gen. ARISUE)?

A. Yes, once a week, as it was necessary to give information to the War Cabinet on the war situation - at first on Tuesdays, later on Saturdays.

Q.11. Was there similar liaison with the Army Air Force Headquarters?

A. The Army handled Air Army Intelligence too - 2nd Department (Gen. ARISUE).

Q.12. With Naval Air Force?

A. There was no independent Naval Aeronautical Department dealing with intelligence, but a group which sifted information of a technical nature. One officer did this. Most of the work was handled by Naval General Staff (Naval Air Corps Intelligence). The 3rd Department was responsible for intelligence information of a general nature for the Naval Aeronautical organization, and they handled their own technical intelligence.

Q.13. What was the liaison with other government agencies, for instance, the Foreign Office?

A. Occasionally, the Navy would receive written information. There were no meetings for the purpose of exchanging information.

Q.14. Name the man in the Foreign Office with whom the Admiral had most contact on intelligence matters.

A. No special person in the Foreign Office.

Q.15. What is the name of the man in the Foreign Office most cognizant of Naval Intelligence requirements.

A. I cannot do this. No individual was requested to provide information.

Q.16. Who was head of the Foreign Office at the time you were head of Naval Intelligence?

A. Mr. M. SHIGEMITSU.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral ONO, Takeji, IJN)

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- Q.17. On ships which you commanded (KISO, SUZUYA, YAMATO) did you have intelligence officers assigned on full or part time basis?
- A. The organization of the Japanese Navy does not include intelligence officers on ships. The Captain performs these duties himself. This includes aircraft carriers. Headquarters Fleet, yes, they had Intelligence officers. On Flag ships there is an Intelligence officer for the Flag.
- Q.18. Is that Intelligence officer responsible to 3rd Department in TOKYO?
- A. No liaison between 3rd Department and Flag Intelligence officers.
- Q.19. What was the function of Flag Intelligence officers?
- A. The function of the Flag Intelligence officer was to digest such information as the 3rd Department passed on to him.
- Q.20. Did Intelligence Flag officer receive special training?
- A. Generally speaking, no special training, but occasionally he would be an officer who had served in the 3rd Department, occasionally, a communications officer.
- Q.21. Was it a full or part time job?
- A. Full time job at Fleet Headquarters. For squadrons (fleet) the communications officer would handle intelligence functions on a part time basis.
- Q.22. Was there a policy to place former members of the 3rd Department in Intelligence positions on a fleet level?
- A. I personally wished to adopt such a policy, but the war ended. When I was head of the 3rd Department, I once expressed my desire that such a policy be adopted, but officers were so few, it was never done.
- Q.23. How many specialized Intelligence officers were there on the Fleet level?
- A. One to each Fleet, nine or ten, and this changed as number of Fleets varied. In December, 1941, there were five - one for each Fleet. In saying ten or eleven, I include Naval stations. In December of 1941 there were five with Fleet Units and four with Naval stations. In August of 1945, there were nine. Nominally, they represented Fleets; the Fleets had actually moved to land.
- Q.24. Describe the duties of special Intelligence officers attached to Fleet Units.
- A. Generally speaking, the job of the staff Intelligence officer was to sift information sent from 3rd Department and passed on by flyers attached to the Fleet, and information received by radio interception.

Transcript of Interrogation (Rear Admiral ONO, Takaji, IJN)

- Q.25. What, generally, is the mission of the 3rd Department, and how was information passed on.
- A. The work of the 3rd Department with reference to the Fleet reports received from Naval Attaches abroad; foreign newspapers, magazines, and broadcasts, from the Foreign Office and Treasury Department; seized documents; and from prisoner of war questioning.
- Q.26. What sources were most reliable and useful?
- A. Most reliable were captured documents.
- Q.27. Which provided the most useful information?
- A. Radio broadcasts and interception because it came in most quickly.
- Q.28. What type of radio?
- A. Intermediate broadcasts for domestic consumption.
- Q.29. Could these be picked up in Japan?
- A. Yes. Such as we could not get, our Attaches abroad provided the information.
- Q.30. Did the Navy have representatives with Attaches abroad?
- A. Yes, as Assistant Attaches.
- Q.31. While you were head of the 3rd Department, was your principal activity in receiving and transcribing broadcasts?
- A. Intercepting and recording of foreign broadcasts was an important function. The reason is that Japanese organization abroad for collection of information was frozen. Did not provide much information.
- Q.32. How was information disseminated? How did it get out to Fleet Units?
- A. Periodically, collective information would be sent out by wireless, and particular bits of information would be sent out by wireless. In addition, printed material was sent to the Units by airplane.
- Q.33. Did the 3rd Department receive and send out information from submarines and aircraft?
- A. Yes. Most of that would come under the head of captured material.
- Q.34. Sighting information by submarines?
- A. Yes, it comes in as reference material.
- Q.35. Where does such operational information go for action?
- A. The submarine sends this information to the unit of the Fleet to which it is attached. It would be intercepted here, but we were not responsible for action.

Transcript of interrogation (Rear Admiral Ono, Takeji, IJN)

Q.36. How was information developed in the 3rd Department used by the Naval General Staff for planning?

A. The function of the 3rd Department was confined to passing the information on to the Operations Planning Staff. Performed no function of forming judgements of its own.

Q.37. In the Battle of the PHILIPPINE SEA in October, 1944, for example, did the 3rd Department provide information which formed the basis for the planning of that attack?

A. No, that was outside the function of the 3rd Department.

Q.38. Who makes these estimates of Allied capabilities?

A. The 1st Department - Operations Planning - based on their own estimates and summary of information of the 3rd Department.

Q.39. Were periodic estimates made by the 3rd Department of location, strength, intentions, and capabilities of Allied forces?

A. Not periodically. Did make such tables occasionally.

Q.40. Was not a situation chart kept?

A. To make a chart showing position of individual ships at any one time was beyond the competence of the 3rd Department. We did, however, try to decide which units of your Fleet were in general large areas. This information was passed on to the 1st Department.

Q.41. How successful do you believe your estimates were?

A. The 1st Department relied on them. They were drawn from good sources.

Q.42. How did you keep up with changes in the Allied situation?

A. By checking up with records kept in the Department over long periods of time. Could not make estimates as to any one time, but could on a broad scale.

Q.43. Did you know, for example, what U S. Fleet Units were in PHILIPPINE waters in October of 1944?

A. Generally accurate within 20% - battleships 100%, also aircraft carriers. On that occasion, the estimate made by 3rd Department and the report of Japanese forces engaged coincided exactly.

Q.44. Did you prepare target studies of various areas?

A. Yes, that is an important part of the work of the Department in peacetime. They were compiled by hydrography, weather, geography, forces garrisoned in the area, etc., published yearly.

Q.45. Did you have them on HAWAII?

A. Yes.

Q.46. On the PHILIPPINES?

A. Yes, particular emphasis was placed on HAWAII and the PHILIPPINES.

Transcript of interrogation (Rear Admiral OKO, Takeji, IJN)

Q.47. On the West Coast of the United States?

A. Yes, with particular reference there to ship building capacity and other industries.

Q.48. When was the last target study on the HAWAIIAN AREA issued?

A. About a year before the war started, I think. I was not in the 3rd Department at that time.

Q.49. Describe the operation of the "Communications Intelligence Unit" aboard BB, CA, DD.

A. The Communications Officer passes information to the captain. The captain processes information, and makes his own estimates and conclusions.

Q.50. Does the captain have assistance in sifting information from communications?

A. There is no special assistance; may be some in particular cases.

Q.51. Do you have a "position finding" or "sighting units" aboard BB, CA, DD (RDF)?

A. Yes, RDF. Earlier, few ships had such gear, later all did. Could tell position of transmitting unit on long and intermediate frequencies but not by short wave; could tell location by land units on short wave, but not on ships. A man listened continuously. Having determined direction, this information would be transmitted to TOKYO and analyzed in TOKYO. Ships, themselves, did not utilize information. For the most part, could tell whether it was a submarine, ship, or aircraft transmitting.

Q.52. Was the 3rd Department able to forecast major Allied movements, landings, operations?

A. Yes. A general idea of major movements could be secured, and forecasts as much as a week ahead could be made. Could not say landing would be made on any one spot, but could indicate general area in which landing would be made. Was able to pass this information along to field units from three days to a week in advance. This was judged from information collected over a long period of time. Tabulation of information was the principal work of the 3rd Department.

Q.53. Could you tell U.S. Naval losses with any accuracy?

A. Quite accurately.

Q.54. How reliable and useful was information on U. S. equipment?

A. The Department did not attach particular importance to this work. Not a function of the 3rd Department, but good track was kept of technical developments through newspapers and magazines.

Q.55. How useful was interrogation of U.S. prisoners of war, captured airmen, and others?

A. Generally, the information received by questioning war prisoners was useful in checking information already in our hands.

Q.56. What methods were used in extracting prisoner of war information?

A. I do not know.

Transcript of interrogation (Rear Admiral ONO, Takeji, IJN)

Q.57. Who was responsible for questioning of prisoners of war?

A. One of the officers in the 3rd Department, 5th Section, under Adm. TAKEUCHI, for American prisoners. We were responsible for interrogation, the actual questioning, but not for custody or treatment.

Q.58. Who was responsible for their custody?

A. The "OFUNA Provisional Camp" under YOKOSUKA Naval Base was responsible for their custody.

Q.59. Who was in charge of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base?

A. Vice Adm. M. TOTSUKA was in charge.

Q.60. To what extent did you rely on Photo Intelligence?

A. Not very much, as the quality of our cameras and the number of aircraft assigned to this work was insufficient.

Q.61. Describe the organization of the TOKUMU HAN.

A. Can say nothing. It was independent of the 3rd Department, but information gained by it was passed on. The work of the TOKUMU HAN was to judge as to enemy conditions and positions on the basis of intercepted radio communications. This was a special section under Adm. NOMURA.

Q.62. Do you know of the organization TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. An Army organization whose work was guidance in matters political and economic in CHINA and MANCHOUKUO. It is possible that it extended its work to the south after the war started.

Q.63. Who headed TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. It was spread all over; was attached to army units. Army General Staff or Director of Personnel made assignments.

Q.64. Who is the Army Director of Personnel?

A. Lt. Gen. NUKADA is now head of Army Personnel.

- END -

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USBS NO. 250) Place: TOKYO
Japanese Intell. No. 7 Date: 5 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section.

Subject: Japanese Naval Intelligence.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

YOKURA, SASHIZO, Comdr., IJN, aeronautical engineer; from 1943-45, Air Intelligence Member, 5th Section, Navy General Staff.

Graduated Naval Engineering College, 1930; from 1930-1936, engineering duty aboard various ships; April 1936-November 1937, instructor YOKOSUKA Naval Engineering School; to February 1938, engineering duty BB YAMASHIRO; to April 1940, engineering duty, Naval Air Corps, at OMURA, YOKOSUKA, SASEBO; to October 1940, student, Naval Academy; to April 1942, staff officer, 12th Naval Combined Air Corps; made a Lt. Comdr. October 1941; to December 1942, 23rd Air Group Staff; to June 1942, student, Naval Academy; to June 1945, Air Intelligence Member, 5th Section, Third Department, (Naval Intelligence) of Navy General Staff; made a Commander 1 November 1944; to August 1945, duty at Headquarters, 3rd Fleet Air Force; to September 1945, instructor, YOKOSUKA Air Corps.

Where Interviewed: Navy Ministry.

Interrogators: Lt. S. P. Ahlbum, USNR
Maj. R. S. Spilman, Jr., AC, AUS.

Interpreter: Maj. J. C. Pelzel, USMCR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

1. The aeronautical intelligence organization within the Navy General Staff was a one-man proposition until the last few months of the war, when a number of surplus new Naval Academy graduates were made available for assistance. The one man, Comdr. YOKURA, was responsible for both U. S. and British air intelligence, technical, statistical, and order of battle. Therefore, it was necessary to concentrate on the U. S. picture, and failure to obtain any organization to effectively carry this out prompted Comdr. YOKURA to resign two months before the war ended.

2. Sources of information were reports from naval units afloat and in the field, observations following attacks by U. S. planes, radio reports from the U. S., prisoners of war, crashed aircraft, captured documents, and reconnaissance. Some exchange of technical information was maintained between the Aviation Section of Naval Intelligence and Germany. The information obtained from all sources was colated and distributed to lower echelons in written reports, which were not issued on a regular basis. The Aviation Section of Naval Intelligence also distributed recognition sheets on U. S. planes to aviation units.

TRANSCRIPT

- Q.1. With regard to the 5th Section of the Navy General Staff, you were the "D" member, were you not?
- A. Yes.
- Q.2. What was the organization for aeronautical intelligence under the "D" membership?
- A. I was the only member. I had charge of American and British aircraft. Since I could not follow both, I concentrated on U. S. aircraft.
- Q.3. Please describe the aeronautical intelligence organization for the briefing and interrogating of pilots.
- A. I had nothing to do with the Japanese Air Force. I studied technical details of U. S. aircraft, and statistics.
- Q.4. What were your sources of information?
- A. First, there was the information coming into the THIRD DEPARTMENT. Secondly, reports from the field. Third, was information from U. S. attacks - strikes were tabulated by dates and estimates made by adding up the number of planes which had to be in different units. Fourth was radio reports from the U.S., short and long wave. Other sources were prisoner of war reports, crashed aircraft, captured documents, and attaches in foreign countries.
- Q.5. Were the reports from the field sent in by special officers? How were they received?
- A. Reports were by radio from the field. There was no real Fleet intelligence. There were a few written reports, however, which came infrequently.
- Q.6. How much information did you get from visual or photo reconnaissance?
- A. We received little from photo interpretation. I have seen a few photos. I did see some photos of IWO JIMA where interpreters have identified and counted aircraft, but this is a rare case. I received little from reconnaissance planes which were sent out by the fleet.
- Q.7. How much information did you get from scouting plane visual reconnaissance?
- A. I would have liked to have had more reconnaissance. I would have liked to have known the number of planes at SAIPAN, for instance. However, Headquarters could not initiate reconnaissance. Reports from field units were scanty, and were in the form of dispatches on the number of planes and types of planes. Little information came from bases which the U. S. attacked, due largely to breakdown of communications.
- Q.8. Before the U. S. occupation of IWO JIMA, there were almost daily reconnaissance flights over SAIPAN. How did the information these flights obtained get to Headquarters?
- A. They made reports by radio from the air to their base at IWO JIMA.

Transcript of Interrogation YOKURA, Sashizo, Comdr. IJN.

Q.9. Did you ever suggest or recommend further reconnaissance by the fleet, or to lower echelons?

A. I realized fully the lack of system in reconnaissance. I heard that the U. S. had special reconnaissance squadrons and thought it was a good idea. We could not put this into practice because of shortage of planes. I made some recommendations, but no attention was paid to them.

Q.10. Who was in charge of photo interpretation in the navy?

A. There was no person in charge of this in Headquarters. There was a school for photo interpreters at YOKOSUKA, but it was concerned with technical aspects largely.

Q.11. Did your work in technical intelligence include recognition of U. S. planes? What sources did you have?

A. Three main sources of identification material were photos in U. S. magazines, photos taken by our forces from the air or on the ground, and photos of captured planes. These photos were sent to the field in the form of composite sheets showing many types. These were distributed in large numbers.

Q.12. Was your Section in charge of this recognition program?

A. Yes.

Q.13. Was any special training system on recognition set up?

A. There was no special training. I had heard of some U. S. devices on the radio and thought it was a good idea to have them.

Q.15. Did your section make any study of anti-aircraft defenses?

A. No study was made in my section or in the field. I knew your pilots were sent out with complete flak maps which we found in smashed planes, but we did not do this.

Q.15. How much data on performance, engines, and characteristics of U. S. planes were you able to obtain?

A. Sources were mainly shot-down aircraft plus labels, tags, and so forth in the planes; magazines and radio reports, also. We tried to get all planes brought back to YOKOSUKA for study, but we did not get as many as we wanted. We generally knew a lot about older types, but there was time lag in our information. By the end of the war, we knew your 1943 airplane performance well.

Q.16. How much help did you get from the Germans?

A. We received technical and tactical reports from the German General Staff. They all came by radio.

Q.17. Didn't you receive drawings, etc., which could not be sent by radio?

A. We received practically no detailed written reports. Army Headquarters and technical depots may have received more information.

Transcript of Interrogation YOKURA, Sashizo, IJN.

Q.18. Did you send similar information to Germany?

A. We did send radio reports at scattered intervals to Germany, usually about the number and type of planes in the Pacific.

Q.19. What did you consider your best source of information?

A. None could be considered very good. My work was mainly statistical, and I got little information.

Q.20. What would you consider an ideal source of information?

A. Reconnaissance, both visual and photographic.

Q.21. When you had compiled your statistics, could you arrive at an air order of battles?

A. That was my function. My only source was from shot down planes. Prisoners sometimes told the number of their own squadrons. Most of them gave nothing on any other squadrons and you could not compile an adequate picture. Carrier air groups had markings on their tails which helped a lot.

Q.22. Was the order of battles you worked out coordinated with the Fleet order of battle which Comdr. IMAI worked on?
(NB: Comdr. IMAI was "C" member of 5th Section; see interrogation No. 236, Japanese Intell. No. 5).

A. Yes, there was some liaison. If we got a plane from a certain carrier, I would call Comdr. IMAI and tell him that this carrier was still around.

Q.23. After tabulations were made, how were these disseminated to lower echelons?

A. We published printed reports and radio reports which went to KOKU TAI (air group). Printed reports were not issued at regular intervals, and there was no regular distribution. We sent them to units concerned.

Q.24. What did these reports contain?

A. They contained information of numbers and types of planes in the Pacific, usually put on maps. I put down only what I was sure of; I did not try to guess what I did not know. Technical information was not sent in these reports, but was the subject of special reports.

Q.25. Can you give us copies of these reports?

A. We have none left. All were burned.

Q.26. Were any copies moved elsewhere for safe keeping?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no. None were sent to other agencies for safe keeping.

Q.27. Were any aeronautical reports made by either Navy officers or units?

A. The only other office which issued reports was the 1st Technical Depot at YOKOSUKA. These were technical papers.

Transcript of Interrogation Comdr. YOKURA, Sashizo, IJN.

Q.28. Were any instructions issued to lower echelons for obtaining technical intelligence?

A. There were many times when I wanted to issue orders along this line, and tried to do this. Our doctrine was always attack, attack, attack, and no one was too much interested in intelligence, as evidenced by the fact that I was the only officer in Headquarters dealing with aeronautical intelligence matters.

Q.29. What do you consider the effectiveness of your organization as a whole?

A. The efforts for the most part ended in failure. I could not set up an organization so I resigned. The main reason for failure was lack of realization, both in Headquarters and in the field, of the importance of intelligence.

Q.30. Are you familiar with the U. S. intelligence system?

A. I studied it, but I am not too familiar with it.

Q.31. Toward the end of the war, 37 young officers were assigned to the 5th Section of the General Staff. Did this help alleviate your lack of organization?

A. They were assigned to various functions, but they were untrained, just out of the Academy, and helped very little. It was too late.

Q.32. Was the lack of realization of the importance of intelligence, to which you attribute the failure of your organization, evident on the part of your own department, the General Staff, or still higher up?

A. It was not the fault of any one person, but rather of the system which concentrated on attack and on operations. The viewpoint was not broad enough. If we had had a very broad intelligence, an organization as good as the American one, we might not have lost the war.

Q.33. Did you keep a file on U. S. military commanders, and how far down did this list go?

A. I tried to keep a list of this type from radio reports, but could only keep a list of the top men.

Q.34. Did you try to direct prisoner of war interrogations in order to obtain the information you wanted?

A. I sat in on some of them, at the OFUNA Interrogation Center.

Q.35. How accurate did you consider prisoner of war information?

A. Very little was of value. Very few said anything except about conditions at home. Anything else was said to be a military secret.

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RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 270 PLACE: Tokyo
(Jap Intell #8) DATE: 6 and 7 Nov 45

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2 USSBS.

Subject: Japanese Army Air Intelligence Organization and Operations.

Personnel Interrogated and Background of Each:

MIYASHI, Minoru, Colonel, Japanese Army Air Forces, Operations Officer, Air General Army, (KOKU SOGUN) during last 5 months of war.

1924, graduated Army Officers' School (TOKYO) as artilleryman; 1925, joined newly-formed Japanese Army Air Force; 1927, became a pilot; 1927-1935, aviation duties with 7th Air Regiment; 1935-1938, air operations duty, Imperial General Headquarters; 1938-1939, air operations officer, KWANTUNG Army Headquarters; 1939-1940, Army Air attache in Russia; 1940-1941, air operations duty, Army Air Headquarters (KOKU HONBU); 1940-42, operations officer, 3rd Air Division (SHIDAN), taking part in SINGAPORE and PALANG attacks; 1942-43, education section, Army Air Headquarters (KOKU HONBU); 1943-1944, "Morale and Soul Building Officer", Army Air Officers' School; August 1944 - April 1945, head of 1st Section of Chief of Staff's office, Air General Army (KOKU SOGUN).

Where Interviewed: War Ministry and Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Maj R. S. Spilman, Jr., AC, AUS.

Lt S. P. Ahlum, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt Otis Cary, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None

S U M M A R Y

1. Intelligence in the Air General Army (KOKU SOGUN) was a function of the First Section of the Chief of Staff's Office, or operations section. This section had sub-divisions for operations, intelligence, weather and organization. The intelligence sub-section was further sub-divided into operational and technical intelligence functions. Reports prepared by the First Section and transmitted to lower echelons embraced order of battle estimates, enemy loss estimates, and operational information furnished by other military and civil agencies.

2. Intelligence in Army Air Headquarters (KOKU HONBU) was mainly of the technical aspect, and reports covering this field were prepared there and disseminated to lower echelons.

RESTRICTED

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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: MIYASHI, Minoru, Col., Japanese,
AAF (contd).

3. The intelligence section of the Air Division (Hikoshidan) based on Col. MIYASHI's knowledge of the 3rd Air Division, was headed by a lieutenant colonel. It received reports on enemy strength, enemy losses, and changes in the situation from lower elements, consolidated these reports and passed them both to higher and lower echelons. Aerial photography was depended on to a great extent, and there was intelligence liaison with the ground forces by means of aerial message drop and a hikoshidan communications team working with the ground forces. Specialized intelligence work included preparation of flak maps showing antiaircraft defenses, but not methods of evasion, which were disseminated to squadron level; and technical study of crashed allied planes.

4. Below the hikoshidan level, intelligence officers as such were not included in the table of organization. However, unit commanders assigned one or more officers to strictly intelligence duty on a full-time basis.

5. According to Col. MIYASHI, intelligence training was limited to a portion of the training for staff duty in the Army Officers' School and the Army War College. What there was in the way of such training was not emphasized and was not approached scientifically.

TRANSCRIPT

Q 1. What were your duties in your last job at Air General Army?

A. I was head of the first section of the Chief of Staff's office, responsible for operations, intelligence, weather and organization.

Q. 2. Who was head of the intelligence section?


A. Lt. Col. ASHIMURA, Takeichi.

Q. 3. How many officers were there in the intelligence section?

A. On the average--this increased and declined from time to time--there were about six or seven officers and three or four enlisted men. There were two other sections run by enlisted men for convenience, a dispatch section or message center and another section taking care of written material; logging it in and out, etc.

Q. 4. Can you draw us a chart of this intelligence organization?

A. (Translation of chart drawn by Col. MIYASHI):



(Note: In explaining the organizational set-up for intelligence, Col. MIYASHI said the Lieutenant Colonel in charge knew his business; that the heads of the two divisions under intelligence were average, and that the assistants were very mediocre men.)

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: MIYASHI, Minoru, Col. Japanese
AAF (contd.)

Q. 5. What were your duties with the 3rd Air Division at PALAMBANG and SINGAPORE?

A. I was responsible for all army air operations.

Q. 6. Was there an intelligence officer in that organization?

A. Yes, a lieutenant colonel - SASAC, Hiroshi. He has been demobilized. His last job was with the chief of staff in TOKYO for the 10th Air Division. I don't know where he is now.

Q. 7. In the field, wasn't it true that operations and intelligence were practically the same thing.

A. That is correct.

Q. 8. What kind of target information and intelligence preparation was supplied in the SINGAPORE Area--what kind of maps for the pilots, what pictures, if any, what briefing of crews, etc.?

A. Mine was a staff position. A lieutenant general was in charge. My job was pretty much to determine the operations for the whole Shiden. As far as briefing or direct contact with fliers, etc., was concerned, my hands were completely out of it.

Q. 9. Just what was the mission of this particular air division (Shiden) with relation to the SINGAPORE and PALAMBANG attacks?

A. The 25th Army was there doing ground work. One of the three Air Brigades (Dens) under the Shiden was responsible for helping the ground troops; the two others were pretty much responsible for hitting PALAMBANG and SINGAPORE. We also had a communications team - 7 or 8 men to get the word back to us about ground operations. I also went personally sometimes for liaison with 25th Army Headquarters. We did a certain amount of liaison by dropping messages to the 25th Army, getting answers back through our communications team.

Q. 10. Did this liaison communications team with the 25th Army have the right to request air support from your air force?

A. No. It was purely a method of getting information back. They had no authority to request anything like that.

Q. 11. What information did the Shiden get from lower units for planning purposes? What kind of reports from operational units came up to your headquarters?

A. The two things we depended on most were situation reports and strength reports. The main thing the situation reports covered were, generally, strength, immediate conditions, changes in the situation, enemy losses. Strength reports were by and large our own strength - how many of our own planes were operational; how many men. This came from the lower units direct to my headquarters by dispatch. It came from the Sentai, jumping one echelon usually, so Shiden got the information as soon as the Den. Photos were the exceptional thing which came directly from the Sentai to the Shiden without going to the Den at all; somebody from the Den would come up to look at the photos. These photos were developed at the Sentai and sent up by air drop or by car.

Q. 12. Did you have special photo reconnaissance units?

A. Yes, we had the 81st Sentai, a photo reconnaissance outfit, in this particular operation.

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: MIYASHI, Minoru, Col. Japanese
AAF (Contd.)

Q. 13. On what basis was Allied strength estimated? What were your sources of information for this estimate?

A. I usually relied on my intelligence officers for that, but sources were very meager and they were never really very sure of reports. By and large it would depend on photos. We often looked them over while they were still wet. That's what we based most of our decisions on. By and large they panned out.

Q. 14. What reports did this Hikoshidan(3rd Air Division) make to headquarters in TOKYO?

A. Situation and strength reports were sent not directly to Koku Sogun but via the Southern Area Army(Terauchi) at SAIGON. They were sent by radio. Also a monthly written summary and personnel report was sent in writing.

Q. 15. Was a situation map and enemy air order of battle map kept at this Hikoshidan?

A. They kept a situation map, of course. The method of dissemination to lower echelons was by forwarding a simplified version, a summation, six or eight pages. They had no method of sending the map itself down to lower echelons.

Q. 16. Did this map purport to show the strength of all units?

A. Yes.

Q. 17. What method was used to estimate enemy losses at your division headquarters?

A. By and large, through daily situation and mission reports, we got some information as to enemy strength, number of planes observed, number shot down, etc. Looking it over during a period of time some duplication was obvious from different Sentai reporting the same plane shot down. We would take about 30 per cent off in making estimate.

Q. 18. Who kept the situation map - intelligence or operations?

A. Intelligence.

Q. 19. What effort was made at your division headquarters to keep track of defense locations, particularly flak. Were any flak maps kept?

A. Yes. (Col. MIYASHI illustrated his answer by making a rough sketch of a flak map showing positions and radii of fire.)

Q. 20. How often were those revised?

A. They were kept right up to date along with everything else. These maps were sent down to squadron level.

Q. 21. How much of that information was based on pre-war information, and how much on reconnaissance and photography?

A. None of it was pre-war information. Pre-war intelligence was poor. We didn't even know where some of the fields were in the SINGAPORE-PALANG area. These flak maps were based on reconnaissance, photos, and reports of pilots who had flown over the defended area.

Q. 22. How much information was given to squadrons on Allied gun performance and effectiveness, safe altitudes to fly, etc.?

A. By and large, individual squadrons were kept on particular targets and were best informed by their own experience of having flown against the anti-aircraft positions concerned.

Q. 23. Did these maps indicate possible best approaches? Who would plan this?

A. It was left to the Squadron or Hikosentai. Division headquarters gave the target, time of attack, and results desired. How they were to do it was left up to the lower echelon, Headquarters would give weather conditions, etc., and then it was left up to them (the lower echelon).

Q. 24. What use was made at Shidan Headquarters (3rd Air Division) of prisoner-of-war information?

A. Not very good intelligence was procured from prisoners-of-war; they were British in this area. Some of the information extracted at 25th Army Headquarters was evaluated and sent along to us. The fighting went so quickly there was not much of value obtained.

Q. 25. What do you know about field divisions for crash examination, technical intelligence, etc.? I'm still referring to the SINGAPORE operation.

A. In the fighting against the British, we got hold of a lot of that sort of material without much trouble. We had a lot of men looking things over, and making reports down to squadron level. In reverse, as fighting started to go against us, we never had enough of that sort of information. We had trouble getting any accurate information because so little of your equipment fell into our hands.

Q. 26. How detailed were the reports sent back to air headquarters in TOKYO on the crash information obtained in the SINGAPORE area?

A. An inspection team from Koku Sogun (Air General Headquarters) went to SINGAPORE. We also turned in material through the chain of command. By the time we got to SINGAPORE, however, it wasn't particularly our function, since they had land troops in there.

Q. 27. Can you tell us something about the briefing and interrogation procedure for pilots?

A. Squadron commanders have an intelligence officer who briefs before and interrogates after a mission. He fulfills this function of briefing officer as well as keeping up on the general situation. It is a full time job.

Q. 28. Is this officer a combat pilot?

A. Actually, there is no such position as intelligence officer in the table of organization for the squadron. But such an officer is a necessity, so the squadron commander picks out the smartest man he can - he may be a flier or he may not. We recognize intelligence in the air forces a lot more than in the ground forces.

Q. 29. What kind of reports, dispatch or otherwise, did this officer send up to higher echelons.

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: MIYASHI, Minoru, Col. Japanese
AAF (Contd.)

A. The commanders themselves - in the Dan, the Shidan, and Sentai - are responsible. He designates this man (the intelligence officer) as his brains. The information goes up through the chain of command over the commander's signature. From the squadron it goes right up in the form of daily situation and strength reports, losses, etc. Reports of missions flown also started at squadron level.

Q. 30. Did they have an intelligence department in the air group (Hikosentai)?

A. There was nothing of that sort below air division (Shidan) level. It isn't in the table of organization below that. For the Shidan it is in the table of organization. We had a lieutenant colonel and six or seven officers in the 3rd Air Division in the SINGAPORE area.

Q. 31. Were there any provisions for giving pilots information on evading capture or on how to escape from the enemy if shot down?

A. Not a bit.

(The interrogation of Col. MIYASHI was continued on
7 November 1945 at the Meiji building).

Q. 32. Were any provisions made for rescuing pilots shot down?

A. Not a bit.

Q. 33. What is the organization you have that is known as Koku Joho Rentai?

A. It was first formed in 1940, at which time we had no radar. By 1940 we had radar. Joho Rentai would have under it radar, visual, and acoustical detection. It breaks down into two branches - radar in one and acoustic-visual detection in the other. The smaller Joho Tai also breaks down in the same way.

Q. 34. Has this organization any functions other than aircraft detection or warning?

A. It also reported weather in the vicinity of each unit's operations.

Q. 35. You spoke earlier of special photo reconnaissance squadrons. At what echelons did they assign the trained photo interpretation officers they had?

A. At the Sentai level - one or two photo interpretation officers. All aviators, but especially reconnaissance pilots, were given a certain amount of photo interpretation training.

Q. 36. Was the stereo method used?

A. Yes, they used stereo down as far as the Sentai.

Q. 37. Were any manuals or publications issued for the instruction of photo interpretation officers or to guide those doing that work?

A. No. They left it up to the new photo interpreters who were going into the field to tell those already there about new developments in that sort of work.

Q. 38. What kind of information did you receive, in Air Headquarters (Koku Hombu), from lower echelons?

A. Intelligence from foreign diplomatic sources was sent over from Army General Headquarters; other information came from the various units directly. All this was evaluated and reports sent out to lower echelons about every ten days. Most of the information disseminated in this fashion by the Army Air Headquarters (Koku Hombu) was pretty much technical - new developments, that sort of thing - but no operational information. That was sent out by the Air General Army (Koku Sogun).

Q. 39. In the Koku Hombu, how was this technical intelligence distributed?

A. Single copies were sent to various headquarters; these headquarters reproduced the information for further distribution if necessary. By and large, it was for training purposes.

Q. 40. Who, at the highest level, in Koku Sogun, made the estimate of battle order - strength, loss, enemy intentions, etc.?

A. That was Lt. Col. ASHIHARA, whom I mentioned yesterday.

Q. 41. Your air force prepared an estimate of B-29 strength, attack intentions, and deployment before the B-29 attacks actually began. Who would have been responsible for this?

A. No part of the intelligence department was charged with turning out material like that. Any field command such as a division, for instance, might have done it on the basis of material it might have on which to base deductions.

Q. 42. What use was made of German intelligence procedures?

A. What the Air General Army got was negligible. The Army General staff may have gotten more than we did.

Q. 43. What kind of information, and how useful, did you get from Germany, Italy, and neutral sources?

A. All technical information came directly to Air General Headquarters via the Army General Staff. The operational information was sorted out at General Staff and use made of it there before it was passed along. The investigation section which looked into technical matters was never directly my field. Col. KAWABE, Chuzauro, had charge of this.

Q. 44. Was the information received from these sources useful?

A. The sources were Germany and Italy - special technical men we had there. It was very useful.

Q. 45. Were intelligence courses taught in air schools.

A. No, with the exception of the Army Officers' School and the Army War College, where it was included in the training for staff duty.

Q. 46. How about at TOYOOKA (air training school)?

A. Just in the Army War College, where they trained staff intelligence officers. At TOYOOKA they did no intelligence training as such at all.

Q. 47. Who is in charge of intelligence training at the Army War College?

A. I'm not at all certain. I went there ten years ago. Imperial Headquarters men did a lot of the lecturing, but I'm out of touch with it.

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: MIYASHI, Minoru, Col. Japanese
AAF, (Contd.)

Q. 48. Did you ever take an intelligence course at the War College?

A. The standard course at the Army War College was very broad. Such intelligence as was included was not emphasized. There is one of our big faults, right there.

Q. 49. What were your education section duties in Air Headquarters (Koku Hombu)?

A. I was responsible for the whole training program - communications, weather, piloting, maintenance, and so forth. But there was no training as regards intelligence. Intelligence was broken down into phases, such as photo interpretation, or communications, but it was not integrated. None of the training was. Take my case; when I was with a bomb group, I got bomb training; when I went to a reconnaissance training from them. But I never got intelligence training. We did not approach intelligence scientifically. That's why we lost the war.

JK

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 267
(Jap Intell #9)

Place: TOKYO
Date: 7 Nov., 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2 USSBS.

Subject: Japanese Weather Intelligence.

Person Interviewed and Background:

FUJIMARA, M. Lt. Col.

Lt. Col. Fujiwara, M., Imperial Japanese Army, graduated from the Military Academy in 1929, has served in various posts dealing primarily with meteorological and engineering matters and for the last two years of the war was in a staff job at Air General Headquarters in Meteorology. 1929, graduated Military Academy at Zama, became engineering 2nd Lt.; 1933, taught at Army Engineering School; 1934, went to Central Meteorology Observatory for Aerology training, 10 months; 1936, to Engineering-Artillery School as instructor, specializing in Meteorological teaching; 1937, to North China with Meteorological Regiment; 1939, back to Japan attached to Army Meteorological Headquarters; 1943, to Air Headquarters, Meteorological Department; 1945, April, came to KOKU SOGUN, Air General Headquarters Staff, as the Meteorological Staff Officer.

Where Interviewed: War Ministry.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. T.M. Curtis USNR.
Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. Comdr. Frank B. Huggins, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

Summary:

NOTE: Since the interrogation of Lt. Col. FUJIMARA was not extensive it is considered appropriate to include all essential or important facts in the summary.

Organization of Army General Headquarters.

This is directly under the War Ministry and includes five sections.

- (1) General Affairs Section.
- (2) Training Section.
- (3) Research and Scientific Section. (Technical Matters).
- (4) Medical Section.
- (5) Supply Section.

The duties of (1), the "General Affairs Sections," consist mainly of liaison outside the Army in matters relating to Air, and Historical matters. (2) "Training Section" includes 3 sub-sections. The first of these is the "Education Division", which prepared the textbooks used at the Air Officers School, located at TOYOOKA in SAITAMA Prefecture. This school concerned itself with the theory of Aerodynamics, theory of flight, etc., but did not instruct in flying.

The second sub-section of the "Training Section" was responsible for actual flight training and for the training of bombardiers and navigators.

The "Auxiliary" section or third sub-section of "Training" was responsible for the training of ground officers connected with flying and for the instruction of navigational theory and communications.

There was no special training in Air Intelligence provided anywhere in the JAAF. There was special training of communications officers, of course, and the difficulties attendant upon exact translation of the Japanese word "JCHO" often lead to confusion with this. "JCHO", which means information (generally) or "report" is the nearest Japanese word to our "Intelligence." It also has, however, such general meaning that it is applied to any kind of information or reports, e.g. radio news broadcasts. At first Lt. Col. FUJIWARA stated that specialized intelligence training was a part of the responsibility of this "Auxiliary section" under "General Affairs." However, on further questioning and elaboration, it became apparent that he was talking about communications and not intelligence in the technical sense as we understand it.

The Meteorological Section was under Air General Headquarters and under this Section there was four "Meteorological Units" operation within the Empire:

1. (5 Companies) Northern half of HONSHU
2. (4 Companies) Southern half of HONSHU and SHIKOKU
3. (3 Companies) KYUSHU
4. (3 Companies) HOKKAIDO

MANCHOUKURO and CHINA each had a meteorological Regiment, and independent Air Units (independent meteorological battalions within a regiment) were responsible for HANSEI, SHOTO and FORMOSA. All of these units gathered weather information and transmitted it by dispatch. Regimental and Battalion Headquarters made regional broadcasts to interested activities in their respective areas. Air units down to and including Squadrons had their own Aerological officers, full time and non-flyers, who received this information, constructed weather maps and passed weather information directly to pilots. Army ground units also had Aerological officers attached who made similar use of this information.

The majority of men attending the Air Training School had never attended the Military Academy. By and large, altho under the Army Command and under Army General Headquarters for Administrative purposes, the JAAF seemed to enjoy a great deal of independence and autonomy.

Numbers of flying personnel trained by JAAF.

1940----1500, approximately (regular officers and warrant officers)

1944----(Year greatest number were trained)

1200 officers and 3800 warrants, and in addition, Reserves were trained in 1944 (as they had been in other years of course) bringing the total flying training for that year to some 12,000 or 13,000 army pilots.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 284

Jap. Intel. No. 10

PLACE: TOKYO

DATE: 7 November 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS

Subject: INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE IN JAPANESE ARMY AIR DIVISION (HIKOSHIDAN).

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Major TOGA, Hiroshi, Japanese Army Air Force; staff officer for maintenance and communications with 10th Air Division (Hikoshidan) in 1944-45. In 1928, commissioned a Second Lieutenant (infantry) and served with the 57th Infantry Regiment in Manchuria until 1941; in December 1941, entered War College for ground training in air; in November 1943, went to TOYOOKA, Japanese "Air West Point," as tactics instructor.

Where interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogator: Maj. R. S. SPILMAN, Jr., AC, AUS.
Lt. S. P. AHLBUM, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. Comdr. F. B. HUGGINS, USNR.

SUMMARY:

The 10th Air Division (Hikoshidan), which was responsible for the air defense of the TOKYO area, included an intelligence unit consisting of two officers and five or six enlisted men, plus an additional special intelligence unit charged with monitoring radio communications of U.S. aviation units.

Officers performed intelligence functions in the Air Regiments (Hikosentai) and Squadrons (Chutai) and, according to Major TOGA, were listed as such (Joho Shoko) in the manning table of organization. This is contrary to the statement of Col. MIYASHI (Jap Intel Interrogation #8 of 6 November 1945) that there was no table of organization provision for an intelligence officer below the level of Hikoshidan. Intelligence officers did no actual briefing or interrogation; this was accomplished by the squadron commander. Beyond the routine functions of keeping up situation maps, making out mission reports, and handling charts, the intelligence officer's scope seemed mainly to be technical and tactical.

Intelligence training at TOYOOKA included radar, recognition, own and enemy tactics, map reading, some photo interpretation, but virtually nothing on procedure. The tactics instructor was also the intelligence instructor for all phases except photo interpretation, which was a separate school, and what written instructions there were on intelligence were included in the tactical texts.

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERROGATION

- Q. What training did you have as an intelligence officer?
- A. In the hikeshiden tactics room, where all staff officers had to do duty, a certain amount of intelligence work was required. I had no particular training. Furthermore, as communications and maintenance officer, I was not normally involved with intelligence.
- Q. Was any intelligence course, as such, given at TOYOOKA?
- A. Yes, there was.
- Q. You did not take that course?
- A. Yes, I did.
- Q. What subjects were included? Will you describe the course?
- A. It involved the study of radar, which was considered a form of intelligence, and things like that. Radar, recognition, and some tactics to be used against enemy planes were included.
- Q. Was there anything on analysis of Allied tactics?
- A. We got reports from pilots who actually fought Allied pilots in the South, also some reports from Germany. Air headquarters received the information from Germany and disseminated it to air units.
- Q. Did you have courses in map reading?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were there any courses in photo interpretation?
- A. There was special instruction in that. That's a different outfit. All pilots received a certain amount of photo interpretation training at TOYOOKA, but not a complete course.
- Q. Were any instructions given for the interrogation and briefing of pilots?
- A. It was a very general sort of instruction on how to coach pilots to tell what they saw and did. At TOYOOKA, this teaching was very general, and only when we got into the operational units did we really learn from practice.
- Q. Were there any courses on U. S. and British plane performance and capabilities?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where did the information on this come from?
- A. From Air Headquarters (Koku Hombu).
- Q. Were standard instructions issued as to what kind of photo material, charts, and so forth, were to be carried by pilots on missions?
- A. Yes. There were more or less security measures, orders against carrying material which would show the locations of our own forces, or code books.
- Q. Do you know what working material, in practice, a pilot would take with him on a mission?
- A. Usually a 1x200,000 map and pertinent aerial photographs which might be available. These were taken by the squadron leader and above only. The

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION OF: TOGA, Hiroshi, Major, Japanese AAF
(Contd).

others in the squadron followed his moves, dropping their bombs when he did, etc.

- Q. What mechanical aids or type of training material were used for recognition study?
- A. Mainly models, silhouettes and pictures. Models were hung from the ceiling, pictures were pasted on the walls so the pilots would study them as they walked by.
- Q. Were any measures taken to set up a definite intelligence procedure and routine in the field?
- A. Not at all in the air college. After we got into operational units, it was done because of actual necessity.
- Q. Who was superintendent at the Air College at TOYOOKA?
- A. Lieutenant General TOKUGAWA, Japan's first aviator.
- Q. Was any one man in charge of intelligence training?
- A. I was one of them. The tactics instructors also taught intelligence.
- Q. Were any training manuals or written texts concerning intelligence used at TOYOOKA?
- A. It was included in the tactics texts.
- Q. Do you have any copies of these texts?
- A. I will look around to see if I can find any.
- Q. Was there any separate intelligence section in the 10th Air Division (Hikoshidan)?
- A. We had an intelligence unit which was simply a radar warning unit. Then there was another squad which did deal with enemy intelligence. The intelligence officer of the division handled it, with one officer, a first lieutenant, and five men under him. We also had a nisei who could listen to the voice communications of U.S. pilots, and a special intelligence squad consisting of an officer and 10 men who monitored U.S. aircraft communications.
- Q. From what type of radio broadcast did they get the most information?
- A. Mainly from the B-29s.
- Q. Was that from the B-29s in the air, on take-off, or what?
- A. The B-29s sent out some kind of a signal, then we knew they were coming.
- Q. Were you able to estimate the number that were coming?
- A. From things like call signs of different squadrons, which we had picked out, we could estimate the number coming.
- Q. What type of intelligence reports did your air division get from higher echelons?
- A. We received spot reports coming in from China, for instance, that the B-29s had passed over a certain point. And then from Air Headquarters we got reports on tactics, mulled over from previous actions.
- Q. What type of reports did your air division require from lower echelons?

TRANSCRIPT INTERROGATION OF: TOGA, Hiroo Major, Japanese AAF
(Contd).

- A. While in the air, reports were required from squadron commanders. They reported the type, number and direction of planes. After returning to base, they would report any special types of planes or tactics.
- Q. Did you require such things as mission reports?
- A. Yes. After every mission. Division headquarters tabulated the reports when they were received and sent this tabulation to Air Headquarters.
- Q. What kind of briefing did your pilots get before taking off on an interception?
- A. They had no briefing at all. Fighter control directed them after they took off, but there was no briefing. After the day's operations were over, the squadron commander would discuss tactics with them. They were in too much of a hurry for anything before take-off.
- Q. Was there any systematic questioning of pilots after they returned from a mission?
- A. That was up to the squadron commander. If he found anything of importance he would pass the information along to division headquarters. Every pilot was required to report to the squadron commander upon return and tell his story.
- Q. Were any intelligence units as such assigned to units lower than hikoshidan?
- A. There was one officer attached to each of the various squadrons as intelligence officer. He did not do the questioning of the pilots, but examined the reports obtained by the squadron commander and also gave the squadron commander information received in reports from higher echelons.
- Q. Did the manning table, or table of organization, call this officer an intelligence officer?
- A. Yes - Johe Shoko.
- Q. Were situation maps - war rooms - maintained at division headquarters?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was that an intelligence or an operations function?
- A. It was an intelligence function.
- Q. Describe the procedure you used in estimation Allied losses, both after a mission and over a monthly period.
- A. We based our estimates on pilot reports, and reports from the radio unit which would listen in for distress calls from your planes on their way back to base.
- Q. Were the reports given by the pilots believed to be accurate?
- A. We would get the squadron commander to try to screen the pilot reports. There might be one plane shot down and many pilots trying to claim credit for it. By using the information as to where the plane was shot down, what time, and where it fell, it was possible to discount duplicate reports.
- Q. Was there any rescue organization for pilots from your division shot down during a mission?

TRANSCRIPT INTERROGATION OF: TOGA, Hiroshi, Major, Japanese AAF
(Contd).

- A. None at all. If they fell near the Japanese shore, somebody might save them.
- Q. Were there any instructions for pilots on how to escape or on how to conduct themselves if shot down over Allied territory?
- A. Very little. Just security measures: burn codes, destroy the plane, try to get back to his own lines or shoot himself if capture was imminent.
- Q. Were any special intelligence files kept in the air division?
- A. Yes, there were some files kept of our documents.
- Q. What in general did they contain?
- A. There were a good many documents on American tactics, performance, and deployment of planes.
- Q. Was the keeping of maps and charts an intelligence or an operations function?
- A. That was an intelligence function.
- Q. The Japanese Air Force prepared an elaborate intelligence study of the capabilities, deployment, and intentions of the B-29s. Who would have prepared this?
- A. I think it was Air Headquarters. The document examiner - Lt. Col. ASHIHARA - probably had charge of this.
- Q. Did your division headquarters make plans for deployment of fighter strength in the defense of the TOKYO area or did that come from above?
- A. That came from above.
- Q. Did you know the reasons for deployment?
- A. If we asked, we would be given the reasons, but otherwise not. I think the higher command based its decision for deployment on the importance of various industrial areas.
- Q. Were your fighters ever sent out against U.S. carriers?
- A. Only once, on the 13th of August. We hadn't yet received the word the war had ended. The information on the carriers came from the First Air Army; one of their reconnaissance planes had spotted the carriers. We sent out three or four planes, but they couldn't find the target. One of them didn't come back.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 306
(Jap Intell #11)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 8 Nov 45

Division of Origin: G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section.

Subject: Intelligence Methods and Procedures in Japanese Army Air Forces.

Person interrogated and his background:

Captain OTSU, Taro, an Army reserve officer (electrical engineer in civil life), was commanding officer of the 32nd Koku Joho Rentai (Air Intelligence Regiment) which had charge of the early warning system in the air defence of the Tokyo area from December 1943 to the end of hostilities. His army career follows:

February 1941 - entered army as a private and was assigned to communications maintenance
December 1943 - Commissioned without going to officer's school and given charge of radar units around Tokyo. The organization was small at first but grew to some 7,000 army personnel and 500 civilians. This is the only assignment OTSU ever held.

Where interviewed: Room 554, Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Major R. S. SPILMAN, Jr, AC.

Interpreter: Major JOHN PELZEL, USMCR.

Summary:

1. The 32nd Air Intelligence Unit operated the early warning system in the air defense of Tokyo. It reported to both the 10th HIKOSHIDAN (Air Division), the air unit in charge of Tokyo defense, and the 25th Dan (Army), charged with overall defense of the Tokyo area. The unit was organized in two sections, the radar warning and visual warning sections, both of which reported observations to a central plotting room controlled by the 10th HIKOSHIDAN. Radar could pick up high flying formations up to 250 kilometers, but the distance was less in the case of low flying planes.

2. The functions of the 32nd KOKU JOHO RENTAI were entirely in the field of operations. No studies relating to intelligence were either prepared or received by the unit and no information of value to a study of the Japanese Intelligence system was received.

3. Captain OTSU is thoroughly familiar with the early warning system in the Tokyo area and volunteered to furnish this information to any interested section.

4. Since intelligence information furnished was negligible the transcript is not included here.

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Comdr Curtis

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY - R E S T R I C T E D
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS NO. 291)
Japanese Intel. No. 12

TOKYO
Date: 10 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS

Subject: Japanese Intelligence, its organization and use in
War Plans.

Person interrogated and background:

Comdr. FERALI, Y., IJN, a Naval officer of 19 years experience, a Naval Aviator with over 2,000 hours flying time, and for 3 years, between 1939 and 1942, Asst. Naval Attache in Washington, D. C., was Air Staff Officer in the 1st Section, First Department, of the Navy General Staff ("War Plans"). In this position, he was responsible for the over-all staff planning of employment of Naval aircraft.

- 1926 Graduated Naval Academy.
- 1926 On board Training Cruiser YAGUMO.
- 1926 To CL KUMA.
- 1927 To BB FUSO.
- 1927 To SS I-53.
- 1928 To KASUMIGAURA for flight training.
- 1929 Graduated, to TATEYAMA Air Unit.
- 1930 To BB MIRISHIMA as aviator.
- 1930 KASUMIGAURA Air Unit instructor.
- 1931 To CA ATAGO as Air Officer.
- 1932 YOKOSUKA Air Unit.
- 1933 SAEKI Air Unit.
- 1935 To Naval War College as student.
- 1937 Graduated, to YOKOHAMA Air Unit, to CHINA, with First Combined Fleet.
- 1939 To WASHINGTON, D.C., as Asst. Naval Attache.
- 1942 Returned on GRIPSHOLM.
- 1942-1945 Navy General Staff.

Where interviewed: Naval War College.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. T. M. Curtis, USNR
Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer, USNR

Interpreter: Lt. Comdr. Frank B. Huggins, USNR

Allied Officers Present: None.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAI, Y., IJN)

- RESTRICTED -

SUMMARY

Comdr. TERAI comments generally on Japanese Naval Aviation with emphasis on the staff planning done for the employment of Naval aircraft. Especially emphasized are sources, processing and use of intelligence information in staff planning. In addition, Comdr. TERAI speaks in considerable detail of the organization and operation in the Japanese Navy of those functions which, in current U. S. Naval organization, come under the head of Air Combat Intelligence.

The Japanese Navy had no separate air training school such as the Army had at TOYOOKA. However, the Naval Academy at ETA JIMA had an "Air Unit" at IWAKUNI, and it was the plan for every Navy midshipman to go through that school. There he was taught the theory of flight, air navigation and communications, something of aerial gunnery, bombing, and observation, and was expected at least to solo in the air.

Intelligence officers as such were assigned only to large commands and headquarters. On individual ships and in Air Groups and squadrons, the communications officer handled many of the functions which we think of as duties of the intelligence officer.

Briefing of pilots on carriers was done by several different officers; the aerologist, the air officer of the ship (who had been given most of his "dose" by the communications officer), and the Commanding Officer (of the ship) himself. Interrogation of pilots was handled by having each pilot report to the senior man of his flight and so on up the line until the senior man in the air would report to the air officer and the Commanding Officer.

Information for planning came from the Third Department and was processed for the Planning Section by Division 3 under Comdr. MIYAZAKI. Information on enemy Fleet movements and deployment of enemy aircraft was the most useful material provided, and this was found substantially accurate.

The Navy developed the suicide or KAMIKAZE tactics in the Philippines Sea Battles of 1944. This was not directed from above, according to Comdr. TERAI, but started in the flying units themselves. It was up to any Squadron or Unit commander to decide whether his unit would adopt suicide tactics.

ZERO 53 was the best shipboard fighter developed by the Japanese.

The turning point in the war for Naval air forces came at RABAU when carrier aircraft were sent ashore and destroyed there.

5500 to 5600 operational Japanese Naval aircraft remained at the war's end, and 70% of these were trainers.

The Japanese had no separate photo squadrons in the Navy. Individual planes, primarily in reconnaissance squadrons, did take pictures. These were SAIUN (Myrts) planes, normally operating at some 12,000 feet altitude. Comdr. TERAI, following his return to Japan on the GRIPSHOLM in 1942, introduced photo interpretation to the Japanese Navy. 30 men had been trained in this work, and 100 more were in training at the end of the war.

The Japanese Navy had made no provision for Flak Analysis or Flak intelligence, and apparently very little had been done in this field.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAI, Y., IJN)

- RESTRICTED - SUMMARY (Cont'd).

Plans called for training 30,000 pilots per year. The highest peak actually attained was in the Spring of 1944 when some 1200 to 1300 per month were trained.

Fuel, according to Comdr. TERAI, was clearly the most critical item for the Naval air forces. They were "scraping the bottom of the barrel" on pilots, too, but lack of fuel for training purposes was the real reason for lack of trained pilots and poorly trained pilots at the war's end.

- END SUMMARY -

- R E S T R I C T E D -

- R E S T R I C T E D -

- RESTRICTED -

TRANSCRIPT

Q.1. Were you in the 1st Section of the Naval General Staff?

A. Yes. I was in the War Plans Division.

Q.2. What were your specific duties in this position?

A. This was the General Planning Section. It was Capt. OMAI's (Chief, 1st Section) duty to coordinate activities. I was Air Plans Officer. The organization of the 1st Section was this:

Captain OMAI, Chief of Section.

- (1) Capt. INOKUCHI, Coordinator and senior staff officer.
- (2) Comdr. YAMAGUCHI, Army-Navy liaison and joint operations planning.
- (3) Comdr. MIYAZAKI, Intelligence - gathering information given by other intelligence departments and coordinating it. NOTE: Comdr. MIYAZAKI is at the Foreign Central Liaison Office in TOKYO.
- (4) Comdr. TERAJ, basic planning for air operations which were passed up to Capt. OMAI and Adm. TOMIOKA if acceptable. These were very general plans. Much was left up to the Fleet Commanders in carrying them out. We planned simple, basic logistics also. Furthermore, based on the planning of operations, we would recommend new weapons and new air developments.

Q.3. Did the Navy have an Air Training School equivalent to the Army school at TOYOOKA?

A. No. That was left up to the Naval Academy where every midshipman had some training in the Naval Air Unit at IWAKUNI near HIROSHIMA. The Army separated Air from Ground while the Navy keeps its air and Fleet activities together.

Q.4. Was there any separate Naval Air Organization?

A. There is a separate Naval Air Headquarters for logistics rather than Command purposes. Planning was done by the Navy Dept., however, for all branches.

Q.5a. Did I understand that every midshipman attends the Air school at IWAKUNI?

A. Yes. After they graduate and go to the Fleet, then, of course, they go into specialties. Every midshipman learned to fly, however. This training started 2 or 3 years before the war.

Q.5b. Did this training include carrier operations?

A. No. The object was to get every man to solo. This did not work out exactly as planned due to war stress and demands.

Q.6. Did you fly from carriers?

A. No.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAJ, Y., IJN) -----

- Q.7. How many students graduated from the Naval Air School in 1940?
A. 300. In 1944? A. 3,000.
- Q.8. What were the subjects taught in the school at IWAKUNI?
A. The subjects taught there were regular flight training, simple observation, navigation, bombing and gunnery, and communications. Communications training was carried out also throughout the Naval Academy training.
- Q.9. Were there courses at ETA JIMA in Intelligence or information?
A. No.
- Q.10. Were you with a squadron in China at any time?
A. Yes, for four months I was a squadron commander. The remainder of my time there, I was a Staff Officer.
- Q.11. Are you familiar with carrier operations?
A. In general, yes.
- Q.12. Were Intelligence or information officers assigned to carriers?
A. Not as an Intelligence officer. Large commands and headquarters would have full time Intelligence officers. Communications officers doubled in intelligence duties aboard individual Fleet units.
- Q.13. In a squadron or air group on a carrier, how did information get to the pilots? Who did the briefing?
A. Information comes in by dispatch, RDF sightings, and all radio communications. The Captain of the ship receives this information and briefs the pilots. The pilots have a ready room with boards upon which information is listed. The communications officer passes information to the air officer who gets one of his subordinates to keep up the ready room plot. However, if they have a Flag aboard, the Staff Intelligence Officer handles these duties. The Captain of the ship invariably goes to the ready room to give the pilots a "oop talk" prior to an important mission. The weather information is provided by the air officer, as well as navigation information. A full time Aerologist is aboard all CV's, and he provides weather maps.
- Q.14. When pilots return, who interrogates them? How does information get to the Captain?
A. When the pilots return to the ship, they tell their flight commander, and he passes the information up to the senior aviator who was on the flight, and he tells the Captain in the presence of the air officer. The air officer sometimes interrogates him.
- Q.15. Would this information get back to the 1st Section, Navy General Staff? Who would act on it? Who processed it? Did it go through your intelligence division, i.e., 3rd Division, under Comdr. MIYAZAKI?
A. The 3rd Division receives this information, and it is used by the Air Planning people.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAJ, Y.; IJN)

Q.16. Give an example of one of the campaigns in which you planned the employment of Naval aircraft.

A. OKINAWA.

Q.17. Who planned the PHILIPPINES air defense?

A. Capt. GENDA. He is out of the Navy now in KYUSHU somewhere. I don't know exactly where.

Q.18. How is the information that is gathered and processed by the 3rd Division used in Naval Air Planning? Use OKINAWA as an example.

A. OKINAWA was a simple one to plan because it consisted of attacking shipping, troop transports being designated as primary targets. We planned to work in conjunction with the Army to prevent a landing, and then to send out Fleet units to clear up crinoles and make the defense complete.

Q.19. Why was there no air cover when the YAMATO was sunk?

A. We did provide cover, at least we tried to, but we lacked enough planes and were at extreme fighter range, and there were periods when no fighters could be provided. Communications and navigation were bad, and Japanese pilots could not find the YAMATO.

Q.20. Did you have any operational aircraft carriers at that time?

A. Yes. There were aircraft carriers but not enough pilots.

Q.21. How many aircraft did you have available in planning the defense of OKINAWA?

A. About 2,000 Naval aircraft. The Army had about a third of this number.

Q.22. Did the Navy adapt suicide tactics? If so, when?

A. Yes. The Navy developed them. This was done in the 26th Air Flot. under command of Rear Adm. ARIMA. During the PHILIPPINES action, Rear Adm. ARIMA had started the tactics. At the time of OKINAWA, all aircraft were suicide. It was up to the Squadron Commander at the time to decide whether or not his unit was to be a suicide unit. General Headquarters never directed that it be used, but did not try to stop this type of tactic. About the time I came to the Planning Section it was my job to evaluate this tactic, and I received reports of action. I did not believe it as effective as it might have been. New weapons were being developed (OKA and KIKI). Neither the Navy nor the Army ever directed the use of suicide tactics. Army General Headquarters did direct the landing of suicide aircraft at OKINAWA. The Navy had tried this in the MARIANAS but it aborted.

Q.23. What was the best carrier fighter developed by the Japanese?

A. The 53 ZERO.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAI, Y., IJN)

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Q. 24. On planning for the employment of Naval Aircraft, what were your sources of information upon which plans were based?

A. The intelligence officer in the 1st Section gave us all the necessary information.

Q. 25. What type of information did he place at your disposal?

A. He gave us primarily movements of enemy fleet task forces and deployment of allied aircraft.

Q. 26. Were his estimates good?

A. Yes, usually so.

Q. 27. You were in Washington in December 1941. Did you know of plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

Q. 28. Who was in charge of air planning on the Naval General Staff at that time?

A. Capt. T. MYO was in charge of air planning at that time. He is in Tokyo at the Navy Department now.

Q. 29. Did information from submarine and aircraft reconnaissance come to the air planning department?

A. Yes, directly and also through the intelligence department.

Q. 30. When plans for an operation was determined, how did they reach the fleet? First, General plans.

A. If basic plans were okayed they would go to the headquarters of the combined fleet. Orders to the fleet were issued from there. The first section sent none out direct. These were sent out in written documents and by dispatch.

Q. 31. Can you name the point in time when employment of your Naval Air Forces changed from offensive to defensive operations?

A. The turning point at first was Midway. Our carriers became deficient at Rebaul where carrier aircraft were sent ashore and there destroyed. The real turning point came then.

Q. 32. How many naval aircraft remained operational on 15 August 1945?

A. 5,500 -- 5,600 aircraft, 70% of which were training planes. The army had about 7,000 in all, I think, but I am not sure. 50 % of these were trainers.

Q. 33. How effectively was photographic reconnaissance used in the navy?

A. We had no separate Photo Squadrons. We did have reconnaissance squadrons which also took photographs. We had no great success in securing photographs. The army was more advanced. The navy did not give special training to crews in the taking of pictures. Reserve Officers (10 in the beginning and 20 later and later still 100 more) were trained in photo interpretation beginning in December 1942. The final 100 never completed training because the war ended. (NOTE: Comdr. TERAI originated Photo interpretation training in the Japanese Navy upon his return from Washington)

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation: (Comdr. TERAI, Y., IJN)

- R E S T R I C T E D -

A. (Q. 33. Contd.) Specially trained Photo interpreters were used quite fully in Air Fleets, 1 man per Air Fleet. Demands came from units down to squadrons for Photo interpreters and that was the reason for planning to train 100 more, but the plan never was fulfilled. Photos were sent in to the 1st Section and good use was made of them, for assigning special targets, especially with the suicide aircraft directed to land on OXINAWA. They were used by the fleets most fully.

Q. 34. What aircraft did you use as Photo planes?

A. Fast single engine SAIUN (MYRT) aircraft were used for this work in taking photos.

Q. 35. At what altitudes was most of your photographic work done?

A. Mostly at 12,000 feet for important targets.

Q. 36. Did your Intelligence Division make available target data and studies for air planning?

A. A great deal of information came in and was prepared by the 3rd Department. This was sent out by dispatch and followed up by publications. All this preparation was done by the 3rd Department.

Q. 37. What is your comment on the planning work done in 1st Section as to its effectiveness and usefulness, with particular reference to information provided you?

A. Most of our information came from Communications Intelligence. More Photo Intelligence was definitely needed.

Q. 38. What information was given aviators regarding U.S. Anti-aircraft weapons, methods, gun positions, etc.? (Flak Intelligence)

A. This work on our part was very meagre. There was no analysis in detail. We had no experts in this field.

Q. 39. How many squadrons were assigned to reconnaissance work?

A. We had two squadrons. One with the 3rd Fleet and one with 5th Fleet. These were land based toward the end of war.

Q. 40. Was this the greatest number you ever had?

A. Yes. This was greatest number we ever had.

Q. 41. How many planes did you have in these squadrons?

A. 36 Aircraft with 12 reserves, 48 in all, however difficulties brought this number down to 20 % effectiveness at times.

Q. 42. How many naval aviators were to be trained according to your plans?

A. We had plans for 30,000 a year. Later we reduced this to 18,000 and reached an actual peak of 1,200 - 1,300 per month. This was in the spring of 1944.

Q. 43. How many navy fliers did you lose during the war?

A. Roughly 10,000 Naval pilots.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation: (Comdr. TERAI, Y. IJN)

- R E S T R I C T E D -
Q. 44. What would you say was your one most critical item in the Naval Air Forces?

A. The most critical item at the end, limiting our operations, was fuel and as a corollary to that, lack of well trained pilots. This also was due to scarcity of fuel. It was a vicious circle, starting, however, with lack of fuel.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

- R E S T R I C T E D -

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY - Restricted -
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 307 PLACE: TOKYO
Japanese Intell. No. 13 DATE: 8 Nov 45

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2

Subject: Japanese Army Air Intelligence at HIKOSENTAI, HIKODAN, and HIKOSHIDAN Level.

Person interrogated and background:

Lt. Col. MATSUMURA, Shizuma, Japanese Army Air Force, intelligence officer of 10th Air Division (HIKOSHIDAN) from March 1944 to end of war.

Graduated from Army Officers' School in 1927 as an artillery officer; graduated from artillery and engineering school in 1929; in 1939, entered Army War College, general course; in 1941, after war began, was assigned as anti-aircraft staff officer for the Western District; in 1942-43, underwent bombardier instruction at HAMAMATSU, and in March 1943 was assigned to 3rd Air Brigade (HIKODAN) in JAVA as staff officer for operations and intelligence as well as duty involving flying as a bombardier; from October 1943 to March 1944, commanding officer of 98th Air Regiment (HIKOSENTAI) in BURMA under the 5th Air Division (HIKOSHIDAN).

Where interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Major R.S. Spilman, Jr., AC, AUS.
Lt. S. P. Ahlbum, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. Otis Cary, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

1. No intelligence officers were assigned to any Army Air Force unit below the HIKOSHIDAN (Air Division). However, in the subordinate units, officers directly under the C.O. were assigned to perform duties of an intelligence nature.
2. On bombing strikes, briefing covering bomb run, altitude, course, flak positions, etc., was given, using maps and photographs. The unit leaders carried annotated photographs in the plane.
3. Planes on patrol missions carried cameras and the HIKOSENTAI had facilities for developing film and producing prints. Trained photo interpreters were assigned only at HIKOSHIDAN (Air Division) level.
4. Information sent to field units from Imperial Headquarters included plane identification, technical intelligence, intelligence from prisoners of war and captured documents, tactical methods of the enemy and some order of battle information. Results of reconnaissance and other intelligence collected by operational units outside of Japan were transmitted to higher Headquarters by fragmentary mission reports and by periodical reports issued at ten day intervals.
5. In the TOKYO Area where ground, air, and AA units were close together, much of the paper work was eliminated, and exchange of information was obtained largely through conferences.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

TRANSCRIPT

Q.1. Have you ever done any active combat flying as a bombardier?

A. Yes, in the JAVA theatre.

Q.2. What was the mission of your unit during the days when you were a combat flier?

A. Anti-shipping patrols and bombing in INDIA.

Q.3. What kind of briefing did the pilots in anti-shipping patrol work receive?

A. There was negligible briefing as regards patrolling.

Q.4. How much ship recognition instruction did the pilots get?

A. We often took a few silhouettes with us. We flew only three sectors, and those rather haphazardly, because there wasn't much shipping in the area.

Q. 5. What were the instructions to the pilot in case a ship was sighted?

A. The orders were to contact base immediately, giving speed, course and identification of the ship, and then get out of the vicinity. We carried no bombs on those patrols.

Q. 6. When you returned from a mission, to whom did you tell the results of the patrol?

A. We never got together with anybody after a mission unless we had actually found something.

Q.7. Did the table of organization call for an intelligence officer in the HIKOSENTAI (Air Regiment)?

A. No. I kept one officer around who was for all purposes the intelligence officer, but he was not listed as such.

Q.8. Did you carry cameras on your flights?

A. Yes.

Q.9. Were the photographs developed in the HIKOSENTAI, and what was done with them?

A. We never took any pictures. If we had, we had the facilities to develop them at the HIKOSENTAI. Then we would have let the air division (HIKOSHIDAN) know what we had. As commanding officer of a HIKOSENTAI, I originated no attacks or plans; I was just a funnel through which orders from above were issued to the HIKOSENTAI.

Q.10. Did your HIKOSENTAI ever act in support of ground troops?

A. No. The fighter HIKOSENTAI did that.

Q.11. On attacks against CALCUTTA, what kind of maps, charts, pictures, or other material were used, first for study before the mission, and secondly to take with them.

A. They had aerial pictures and maps. The pictures could be carried on strikes, the maps could not. The bombing run to be made was marked on the photograph, also the altitude, course, speed, etc.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

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- R E S T R I C T E D -

Q.12. Did all the pilots carry such photographs, or just the squadron leader?

A. Just the leader.

Q.13. Before take-off, what information as to flak and defenses in general was given the pilots?

A. They had no official flak intelligence as such. However, I had had a certain amount of anti-aircraft experience before I went into aviation, so I tried to plan the best course over a target that would avoid as much anti-aircraft fire as possible.

Q.14. Did photo interpreters go over the pictures to determine anti-aircraft positions prior to a mission?

A. There were no photo interpreters at HIKOSENTAI or CHUTAI (squadron) level. We read the photographs ourselves.

Q.15. Were any order of battle maps, or estimates of enemy disposition, prepared at HIKOSENTAI level? Was there a map room and a file of intelligence matters?

A. It was all kept in our heads. All the information came to me from the division(HIKOSHIDAN), and I just executed it. Maps were sent down for a particular mission. When we were close enough, I went to the division headquarters for conferences, and kept track of the information that way.

Q.16. Describe as completely as you can the duties of the officer who performed intelligence duties in the HIKOSENTAI.

A. Generally, he expedited the mimeographing, kept the files straight, and made the routine reports on operational aircraft and personnel, as well as reports on weather based on the patrols.

Q.17. Were mission reports made of negative flights?

A. Yes.

Q.18. Were consolidated mission reports made periodically?

A. Yes, 3 per month

Q.19. What was the rank of the intelligence officer in the HIKOSENTAI?

A. In my HIKOSENTAI he was a major. He also doubled in operations. He was of equal rank with the commanding officer (Maj. TOGA) in this instance.

Q.20. Were any enlisted men with training in intelligence assigned to the HIKOSENTAI?

A. None.

Q.21. Was there an intelligence unit as such assigned to the air division (HIKOSHIDAN) in your experience?

A. Yes, a major, a first lieutenant, four non-commissioned officers and four other enlisted men.

Q.22. Was this a purely intelligence unit?

A. Yes, it was carried on the table of organization as such.

Q.23. Outline in as much detail as you can the functions of the intelligence unit you just described.

A. The general set-up was to obtain all the information from higher echelons and work it over. The 10th Air Division (HIKOSHIDAN) had its own radar network, and sent down that sort of report. Then the 32nd Air Warning outfit (KOKU JOHO RENTAI), with its many outposts sent in information to us directly. Long range information came from higher echelons, from headquarters.

Q.24. Did the 10th HIKOSHIDAN keep count of enemy losses and enemy strength?

A. Information on that came from above. We did not attempt to do that.

Q.25. Was there a war room with situation maps, etc., at HIKOSHIDAN level?

A. No. We made use of the Eastern Area Army Headquarters facilities for things like that.

Q.26. What kind of reports did the HIKOSHIDAN receive from below?

A. Nothing. The 10th HIKOSHIDAN was all fighters, and we didn't bother with any reports. We had some reconnaissance planes at the start, but when these suffered damage they were redeployed after February.

Q.27. What kind of reports did the HIKOSHIDAN make to higher echelons?

A. We submitted reports on information from radar stations and observation posts in our own early warning system. After actual raids, we reported somewhat on the activities of our fighters.

Q.28. You made no periodic reports?

A. We did at the beginning, but later we gave it up because of the shortage of paper and because headquarters was so close by.

Q.29. What were the functions of the 10th HIKOSHIDAN in assembling and reporting to headquarters on the estimated loss of Allied planes?

A. Two organizations - the air division and the anti-aircraft people - were responsible for defending the TOKYO area. We got together and tried to decide on the number each had shot down and what were duplications, and then send the report on up.

Q.30. What did the organization of the air brigade (HIKODAN) amount to?

A. We eliminated the HIKODAN in the Empire because everything was fighters and we wanted to do away with one step in the chain of command.

Q.31. In your field HIKODAN - the 3rd HIKODAN in JAVA - was there a formal intelligence unit?

A. Not on the official table of organization, although generally there was one officer picked for that duty.

Q.32. Describe your duties as intelligence officer for the 3rd HIKODAN in 1943 in JAVA.

Interrogation of MATSUMURA, S., Lt. Col., JAAF (Contd).

A. I was a major at that time. I had a captain below me who was largely used in an intelligence capacity. Both of us doubled in operations and intelligence. There was no provision in the table of organization for an intelligence officer. The commanding officer of the HIKODAN had one staff officer - I was it.

Q.33. What kind of aircraft identification pamphlets did lower echelons receive and where were these issued?

A. About twice a year a new aircraft identification sheet would be issued at the office of the Chief of Staff and sent on down. One copy was sent as far as squadron level, where it would be recopied as necessary.

Q.34. Was the same procedure followed with regard to technical intelligence?

A. Yes.

Q.35. With regards to information on enemy tactics?

A. At HIKOSHIDAN level changes in tactics, etc., would be noted and information sent out about it, either in written form or by dispatch.

Q.36. Were the combat experiences of HIKOSHIDANS exchanged back and forth, either by direct contact or through the chain of command?

A. There was direct interchange of such information between HIKOSHIDANS; also through air headquarters in TOKYO.

Q.37. What did you know about the training of intelligence officers?

A. There was no schooling, no organized training at all. Once a week all intelligence officers got together with the intelligence officer at Air General Army (KOKU SOMBU) to exchange experiences.

Q.38. How did they exchange information with tactical units in the field?

A. There was very little such exchange. They didn't need it.

Q.39. When you were in BURMA did you get any guidance with regard to the tactics used by U.S. and Allied aircraft?

A. Yes, by dispatch and written documents.

Q.40. While in BURMA and JAVA, what information did you get from prisoner-of-war sources and how was it received at SENTAI level?

A. We got none at all in BURMA and JAVA. We got some in the TOKYO area; information from the B-29 crews was quite helpful regarding course, rendezvous points, methods of attack, etc. The Army General Staff was responsible for extracting the information, and the Kempei did the work.

Q.41. In the field, were there any instructions for handling prisoners-of-war?

A. We had instructions not to question them, to send them to higher headquarters for the Kempei to handle.

Q.42. What were the instructions as to captured documents, crashed allied planes, etc.?

A. If such material was deemed of any importance, it was sent back to

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Interrogation of MATSUMURA, S., Lt. Col., JAAF (contd). -RESTRICTED-

the next higher echelon.

Q.43. While in BURMA and JAVA did your organization find any crashed aircraft or prisoners-of-war which gave you any information?

A. No. Very little came into my hands down there.

Q.44. What are your opinions on the Japanese Army Air Intelligence organization?

A. They were especially poor at collecting and disseminating intelligence. The information on the MARIANAS was bad; we didn't know when the B-29's left there too definitely so that I could get my planes into the air fast enough, and sometimes we wouldn't know they were coming until they were actually over the city. We under-estimated your bombing radar, and didn't expect bombing through heavy overcast. Our own communications were a big drawback in the intelligence set up; we could get information, but we couldn't pass it along fast enough. We had no information on your carrier striking forces against the Empire in advance, for example.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 310
(Jap Intell #14)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 10 Nov 1945

Division or Origin: G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section.

Subject: Japanese Naval Intelligence, its Organization and Operation
with Particular Reference to Small or Escort Carriers.

Person interrogated and background:

Rear Admiral OBAYASHI, Joshio, IJN, is a Naval Officer of 31 years experience, having graduated from the naval academy in 1914. His commands of note began in 1937 when he was commanding officer of the MAKO MARU as a Captain. In 1938 he commanded the TATEYAMA Air Group and from 1939 to 1941 the HAKATA Air Group. In September 1941 he became commanding officer of the ZUIHO and subsequently of the HYUGA for a short time in 1943. Then he took command of the 52nd AIR FLOT at which time he was promoted to Rear Admiral. Following this he commanded the 51st AIR FLOT, and then went to sea as commander of the 3rd CAR DIV. He was chief of staff of the 1st Mobile Fleet aboard the ZUIKAKU at the time of the Second Battle of the Philippine's Sea. Subsequently he was in command of the 1st CAR DIV and then at the end of the war he had the First Special Attack Division (suicide boats) based at YOKOSUKA.

Where interviewed: Meiji Building, Room 554

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS, USNR.
Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY, USNR.

Allied Officers present: None.

Summary:

The small or escort aircraft carriers of the Japanese Navy did not have intelligence officers as such assigned to the ship's complement, altho Flags normally did have intelligence officers.

The majority of commanding officers of carriers were not aviators due to the shortage of Captains with flying experience.

The duties of Flag intelligence officers were "narrow". In the main this officer (a Comdr. or Lt. Comdr.) was responsible for communications, having the added duty of evaluating information coming in and getting it to the Chief of Staff.

The briefing of pilots (as much as was done) was handled by the air officer who himself would fly missions upon occasion and by the Commanding Officer of the ship himself. Interrogating also was done by the air officer and by the Commanding Officer of the ship. No written reports of any kind were made, except the dispatch information which went from the ship to the Flag or from the Flag to TOKYO.

There was no program of recognition training on carriers underway. Silhouettes in sheet form were received from time to time from the Navy General Staff, but these were said to be usually out of date.

Smaller or escort carriers were not equipped and crews were not trained for night operations.

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Operational losses were high. Main cause, "engine trouble".

Pilot ability and training had fallen off greatly from Midway to the Second Battle of the Philippines Sea.

Most of the Japanese carrier pilots were petty officers rather than officers.

No air-sea rescue provisions were made for pilots downed outside of visual range of the ship. Carrier planes, according to Adm. OBAYASHI, carried no life rafts or flotation or survival gear of any kind. Within visual range of the carrier they would be picked up by escort vessels, but beyond that "it was just too bad".

Photographic aircraft were not used on any of the carriers or assignments within Adm. OBAYASHI's experience, altho they did have equipment on board for the processing of photographs.

Adm. OBAYASHI denies any knowledge beforehand of plans for the attack on PEARL HARBOR. He commanded the ZUIHO at that time; did not leave the Inland Sea until March, when he went out on several training cruises as far as the BOINGS. His first War mission was Anti-Sub Patrol at the Battle of Midway (in the ZUIHO).

Pilots had no special training in anti-sub work. Their orders on sighting an enemy sub were to "Advise the ship and attack". Weapons used were 250kg. bombs.

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Interrogation of Rear Admiral OBAYASHI, J., IJN

Q.1. In what Naval actions and operations did you participate?

A. Midway, Guadalcanal, and 2nd Battle of the Philippines Sea. I was Captain of the ZUIHO at Midway and Chief of Staff aboard the ZUIKAKU in the 2nd Battle Philippines Sea.

Q.2. What types of aircraft were aboard the ZUIHO at the time you were Captain?

A. Aboard ZUIHO were 6 or 9 reconnaissance and bomber Type 97, (KATE), and 7 or 8 Type 96 VF.

Q.3. What type aircraft did you have aboard the ZUIKAKU in the 2nd Battle of the Philippines Sea?

A. About 18 VF and 18 Bombers - Type 97 (KATE) bombers and 18 VF. I am not sure of their Type. Until I became a Captain I was in gunnery work and had had little connection with aircraft.

Q.4. Were Commanding Officers of aircraft carriers generally aviators themselves?

A. No, the majority were not, due to shortage of Captains with flying experience.

Q.5. Did aircraft carriers have an intelligence officer attached to the ship?

A. No. Neither the ZUIHO nor ZUIKAKU had an intelligence officer. The Flag Staff included an intelligence officer in its complement, however.

Q.6. What were the duties of the Flag intelligence officer?

A. The duties were narrow. He was mainly responsible for communications. He was usually a Comdr. or Lt. Comdr. He was not concerned with photographic intelligence. The job of Staff Intelligence Officer and Staff Communications Officer were sometimes done by the same man. On the ZUIKAKU in the 2nd Battle of the Philippines there were both a full time intelligence officer and a full time communications officer. The communications officer was responsible for training and operation of communications personnel and equipment. The intelligence officer was responsible for receiving and evaluating all information coming to the ship. He theoretically submitted his findings to the Flag Chief of Staff who may or may not transmit it to the Captain of the ship.

Q.7. Who briefed the pilots prior to an important mission?

A. This was done sometimes by the Captain, sometimes by the air officer. The air officer did not have an assistant who did this. The ship's Captain many times briefed the aviators himself. The air officer gave them weather and navigation information. Communications procedures were standard and no special briefing was necessary. Upon occasion simple communication devices were used, made up by the air group itself.

Q.8. Did the pilots have enemy ship and aircraft recognition training? Who did this?

A. The air officer did this. The information was sent from the Navy General Staff in the form of silhouettes and performance data and the air officer passed this along to the pilots. I never heard of motion pictures being shown. The recognition silhouettes (no pictures) were usually out of date. We could not keep up with all developments. No regular recognition classes were held. Information was distributed in sheet form.

Interrogation of Rear Admiral OBAYASHI, J , IJN. (contd)

Q.9. What were the other duties of the air officer?

A. The air officer had general education duties of all flight personnel aboard. He was usually a flyer and flew on missions also. In combined carrier operations one of the air officers will lead the flight or at least go along. The staff designates the mission and number of aircraft in combined operations. Up to a year and a half ago the air officer was part of the ship's company, then was made a member of the air group aboard. This was a little before the MARIANNAS fell. The duties of the air group commander prior to this change were as follows: The squadron commanders and air group commanders were responsible to the air officer. They advised on employment of the aircraft and aided the air officer in his work.

Q.10. Who interrogated pilots on return from an important mission?

A. Sometimes the Captain of the ship did this, sometimes the air officer. No written reports were made to the Captain except black-board diagrams. The significant information was sent to the Flag Staff. Information of extraordinary interest was forwarded to the Naval General Staff. Radio silence was often in effect which prohibited this transmission until later.

Q.11. What were your methods of communication between ships?

A. Communications between ships was by ultra-violet light at night, by flag hoist and by radio telephone.

Q.12. What information was given to the pilots relating to Allied Anti-aircraft and its capabilities?

A. None (at Midway the assignment of Adm OBAYASHI'S group was Anti-submarine patrol). The Naval General Staff gave general information about the number of guns on various Allied ships but no evasion tactics were ever developed.

Q. 13. Did any of your pilots ever attack land targets?

A. No.

Q.14. In operating ASF did you have definite sectors? What was the method of operation?

A. It depended on circumstances. We do have a book containing ASF doctrine.

Q.15. What was the outer limit of your patrols?

A. 60 to 70 miles. (In his experience)

Q.16. Was your carrier equipped to and did it operate at night?

A. No, we were not so equipped and our crews were not trained for it.

Q.17. What about your operational losses? Type? Frequency? Main causes?

A. There were many.

Q.18. What was the one primary cause?

A. Engine trouble. Also navigation trouble in finding the carrier base.

Interrogation of Rear Admiral OBAYASHI, J., IJN (contd).

Q.19. Who figured out necessary navigation for ASP sectors?

A. Air officer.

Q.20. What about pilot training - in particular on ZUIHO at Midway as contrasted with ZUIKAKU at 2nd Battle of the Philippines Sea in October 1944?

A. There was a great deal of difference between our flyers on those two occasions.

Q.21. Do you know the number of flying hours your pilots had at Midway and at the 2nd Battle of the Philippines Sea?

A. No.

Q.22. Approximately how old were your pilots?

A. Definitely younger at the 2nd Battle of the Philippines Sea.

Q.23. What was approximate age - 16?, 25?, etc.

A. Toward the end it was less than 20.

Q.24. Were most of the pilots officers?

A. No - most were petty officers.

Q.25. What measures were provided for rescue of pilots downed:

- (1) Close to ship?
- (2) At extreme range?

A. Anyone down within visual distance was picked up by escort vessels. No provision was made for those beyond this distance.

Q.26. What survival gear did the planes carry, e.g. life rafts?

A. They had nothing.

Q.27. Did they carry parachutes?

A. Most of the time they did not.

Q.28. Did you have any photographic aircraft on board at Midway?

A. I do not recall. In any event we did not use them, even if we had them.

Q.29. Any photo planes at the 2nd Battle of the Philippines Sea?

A. Again I do not recall but they were not used.

Q.30. Did any naval units regularly carry photo aircraft?

A. We had no sea based photo reconnaissance, to the best of my knowledge.

Q.31. Did any of the Japanese carriers have equipment to process photographs?

A. Yes.

Q.32. Was an officer assigned full time to supervise taking and processing of photographs?

Interrogation of Vice Admiral OBAYASHI, J., IJM (contd).

A. There were none with that specific duty.

Q.33. What pictures did they take? What was the purpose?

A. I'm afraid we didn't use them for much of anything.

Q.34. Did you have cameras on board that could be carried in any aircraft, not necessarily photo aircraft?

A. Yes.

Q.35. Were they carried as a matter of policy?

A. They were taken only on photo missions, and those were few.

Q.36. Did any missions under your direction take photographs?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q.37. Did you know before hand of plans to attack Pearl Harbor?

A. No, I knew nothing. I was then Captain of the ZUIHO in the Inland Sea.

Q.38. What did the ZUIHO do immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. We didn't leave until March.

Q.39. What was your first war mission?

A. We first took out training crews, down as far as the BONINS then my first war mission was ASP at Midway.

Q.40. Did you ever have a position as attache?

A. No.

Q.41. Have you ever been in the U.S.?

A. Only on our cadet trip to the U.S. on the YAGUMO (old CA) in 1938 or 1939.

Q.42. Admiral, what is "TOHUMU KIKAN"?

A. I don't know anything about it. It has something to do with the Navy, but is primarily an Army organization.

Q.43. Who was the Navy officer most concerned?

A. I don't know, the Navy General Staff would know.


Q.44. Admiral, please draw us a diagram showing the chain of command on a single carrier, and within a carrier formation.

A. (Note) Diagram on following page.


Interrogation of Rear Admiral OBAYASHI, J., IJN, (contd)

Approximate T.O. of Distribution of Air Strength over Single Carrier and Three Carrier Division:

EXAMPLE 1
SINGLE CARRIER



EXAMPLE 2
THREE CARRIER DIVISION



NOTE: In the former (EXAMPLE 1) the Air Officer is responsible for the flight deck and duties of Briefing pilots. In the latter (EXAMPLE 2) the Commanding Officer of the Air Unit, Executive Officer of the Air Unit, and Air Officer of the Air Unit are responsible for the flight deck and duties of briefing pilots in turn. All Air Unit personnel are under the command of the Commanding Officer of the ship. In the middle of 1943, approximately, the Air Officer was dropped from the Ship's complement and became attached directly to the Air Unit.

Interrogation of Rear Admiral OBAYASHI, J , (contd).

- Q.45. Did any of your planes ever locate and subsequently make an attack on submarines?
- A. No - except false contacts.
- Q.46. Were any of your ships ever attacked by our submarines?
- A. In Philippines we once avoided what may have been an Allied torpedo.
- Q.47. Were pilots specially trained for ASP?
- A. No.
- Q.48. What were the instructions in the event they sighted a sub?
- A. Advise ship and attack.
- Q.49. What weapons were used to attack?
- A. 250kg. Bombs.
- Q.50. What got the ZUIKAKU?
- A. 2 torpedoes - from aircraft.
- Q.51. Did she capsize?
- A. She took 2 hits, she went over on her side, communications went out, after 2 hours she sank.
- Q.52. Were the planes aboard the ZUIKAKU when she sank?
- A. No. We had launched them prior to the attack.
- Q.53. What was the average tour of duty of ships personnel (officers) on a carrier?
- A. Usually a year at least.
- Q.54. How about pilots?
- A. I'm not sure. I don't think there was any definite length of tour.
- Q.55. Were squadrons ever trained as a unit and placed aboard a ship intact?
- A. No.
- Q.56. How many carriers (capable of operations) did the Navy have at the end of the war?
- A. I'm not sure. I think there may have been 1 or 2 at KURE.
- Q.57. Do you know why they were immobilized?
- A. No planes.
- Q.58. Was your command of special attack boats the overall command?
- A. No, this was only the KANTO Area boat group (at YOKOSUKA).
- Q.59. How many boats did you have?
- A. 300 or 400.
- Q.60. What was the total number planned to be available for the invasion of the home islands?
- A. I am not sure. I don't know.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO: 309
(Japanese Intell. No. 15)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 10 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Fleet Intelligence Organization and Procedure.

Person interrogated and background:

NAYAJIMA, Chikataka, Comdr., IJN., staff intelligence officer for headquarters, Combined Naval Force (top tactical and administrative command in the Japanese Navy) from November 1943 until the end of the war. Previous career:

1926, graduated Naval Academy; to December 1932, sea duty on various ships, including seven months at torpedo and gunnery school; promoted to lieutenant December 1932; to May 1933, under instruction, communications school; to August 1934, duty at YOKOSUKA Naval Station; to December 1937, sea duty ships and staffs of 5th Torpedo Flotilla and 4th and 5th Squadrons; to December 1938, communications duty, Naval General Headquarters; promoted to lieutenant-commander November 1938; to April 1940, student at Naval Academy; to September 1941, communications duty, Naval General Headquarters; to July 1942, communications staff officer, 2nd Fleet; to November 1943, communications staff officer, 3rd Fleet; promoted to commander June 1943.

Where interviewed: Navy Ministry.

Interrogator: Lt. S. P. Ahlbum, USNR
Major R.S. Spilman, Jr., AC, AUS

Interpreter: Mr. John Taji

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY:

1. The concept of intelligence at the Combined Naval Force, of fleet, headquarters level in the Japanese Navy was not a center through which intelligence matters flowed to higher and lower levels, but rather a center for estimating Allied strength and intentions as a basis for policy and operations orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief. Originally a one-man job, the section in the closing phases of the war had been augmented by eight other officers, most of whom had no training other than aviation administration and, from Comdr. NAKAJIMA's description, would be the Japanese equivalent of A-V(S) officers.

2. No intelligence summaries were prepared at Combined Naval Force level for dissemination to subordinate commands. In fact, situation plots and records were not kept until it became necessary as a means of training the new assistants, and until that time, the only Allied fleet order of battle at Combined Naval Force headquarters was, according to Comdr. NAKAJIMA, the one he kept in his head. The system was described as weak and unscientific.

3. Sources of information tapped by the Combined Naval Force intelligence officer in preparing estimates of the situation for the Commander-in-Chief were dispatch and written summaries received from the central information center at Naval General Staff Headquarters; reconnaissance reports, both from the air and from coast watchers, operational reports from subordinate units, and traffic analysis of Allied communications. No systematic reports were required from subordinate commands, although it was within the province of the Combined Naval Force intelligence officer to request additional information on the basis of the operational reports he received. Specific requests for aerial reconnaissance often were made and sometimes carried out. Photography was done by all reconnaissance planes, but the photos themselves rarely went to Combined Naval Force level; normally, information from the photos was sent by dispatch after examination at lower levels, where photo interpreters were assigned.

4. Full-time intelligence officers were not assigned in the fleet below Combined Naval Force level. Below that, communications officers had intelligence work as additional duty. Although the Combined Naval Force was the top tactical and administrative command in the Japanese Navy, the conduct of intelligence work in subordinate commands was not the responsibility of the Combined Naval Force intelligence officer.

Transcript of Interrogation: (NAKAJIMA, Chikata, Comdr. IJN)

 Q. 1. What were your duties on the staff of the Combined Naval Force?

A. I was staff communications officer and later intelligence officer. For six months after I went to the Combined Naval Force in November 1943 I was communications officer, and after that I was intelligence officer until the end of the war. My duties as intelligence officer are hard to define, since intelligence in the Japanese Navy does not mean the same as in the American Navy.

Q. 2. Will you describe your duties, then as Jcho Sambo with the Combined Naval Force? (NB: Comdr. NAKAJIMA was listed on the Combined Naval Force organization as "Jcho Sambo" intelligence or information officer.)

A. My principal duty was to make estimates of American or other Allied forces, to make defucations on their movements on information received from the central informat. on center.

Q. 3. What were your sources of information?

A. Both the lower fleet units and the Naval General Staff.

Q. 4. How large an organization did you have at the Combined Naval Force headquarters?

A. In November 1943 I was communications officer and had some intelligence duties. I had no men under me doing intelligence work, but I did have three officers and six enlisted men for monitoring radio transmissions. In February 1944 I got one officer to assist me in intelligence, and in October 1944 I got two more. In July 1945 five more officers were assigned to intelligence, but since they had had no previous training they were not much help. All my assistants, except the one I requested in February 1944, were reserve officers.

Q. 5. How were intelligence officers selected?

A. Navy Personnel assigned them. I requested the first man I got by name, and he was a good man. The others who were assigned were average, some good, some poor.

Q. 6. What was the background of men assigned to intelligence?

A. Except for the man I requested specifically because I knew he was exceptionally intelligent, they were mostly men who had just graduated from a school for air adjutant duty, or administrative work, after a month or two of training in writing orders, etc. (NB: Japanese Navy A-V(S) officers).

Q. 7. Did you get any men with special intelligence training?

A. No.

Q. 8. Why were the men assigned to you selected for intelligence work?

A. I don't know.

Q. 9. Were you responsible for the conduct of intelligence in your subordinate commands -- the Air Fleets, Surface Fleets, and Naval Districts?

A. My primary duty was following enemy strength and movements, and I did not have charge of intelligence units in any subordinate command.

Q. 10. Were there organizations similar to yours in the subordinate commands?

A. There were no groups charged with intelligence work, but in the lower units the communications officers had intelligence, as you understand it, as additional duty.

Q. 11. How far down in the fleet organization were full time intelligence officers assigned?

A. Only to Combined Naval Force Headquarters. Below that communications officers had intelligence functions.

Q. 12. Was the increase in your staff for intelligence duties made at your request?

A. Yes.

Q. 13. Did you request that full-time intelligence officers be assigned to subordinate units?

A. No.

Q. 14. On what information were your estimates of enemy strength and movements made?

A. I based them on information from both the forward units and from the Naval General Staff. Information from forward units included reconnaissance reports, reports from coast watchers, and an analysis of the amount and type of communications between your ships.

Q. 15. What sort of information did you get from TOKYO headquarters?

A. It was fragmentary and very general, such as a note on the meeting of generals and admirals at San Francisco or Pearl Harbor.

Q. 16. How was information from headquarters sent to you?

A. Urgent information was sent by radio or telephone, other by written document. The written material was not sent at regular intervals, but whenever it was considered necessary.

Q. 17. What distribution did headquarters make on the type of information sent?

A. I don't know, but I don't think it was distributed very widely. Some information such as material on airplane and ship identification was given wide distribution.

Q. 18. How did you make use of the information you received?

A. I would think it over and come to some conclusion. It was not a very scientific method.

Q. 19. Did you keep situation maps, plots of U.S. and Allied movements?

A. Yes after I got some help.

Q. 20. Where were these maps and charts kept?

A. If afloat, on the flagship; if ashore, at headquarters. From November 1933 to March 1944 I was on the MUSASHI; from May to October 1944, on the cruiser OYODO; after that, our headquarters were ashore at HYOSHI, in the suburbs of YOKOSUKA.

Transcript of Interrogation: (NAKAJIMA, Chikata, Comdr. IJN)

Q. 21. How were your estimates passed down to subordinate commands?

A. They were not passed down in most instances. I would give the information and estimates to the Commander-in-Chief who would formulate policy and issue the necessary orders. However, after I became shore-based I used to have conferences with officers of subordinate commands once a week.

Q. 22. Were intelligence or information publications issued by you to lower echelons?

A. No.

Q. 23. What information did you require subordinate commands to send to you?

A. As intelligence officer, none, but I got all the operational information available. Occasionally I would ask for specific information, such as more details on a new plane or ship they might report, from subordinate units.

Q. 24. Did you send any information back to the Naval General General Staff?

A. Very little, but headquarters would get the same information I had through regular channels. My estimates did not always agree with theirs.

Q. 25. Was there any exchange of information with the army?

A. Very little until April 1945. After April the Army held weekly conferences and I was asked to sit in.

Q. 26. How much information was received from Germany and neutral sources?

A. I don't know. TOKYO headquarters received and passed along that type of intelligence.

Q. 27. In making your estimates of Allied strength and intentions did you keep any order of battle or organization chart?

A. I kept the information in my head, but I required my assistants to keep tables and charts to give them experience.

Q. 28. How accurate do you think your estimates were?

A. I think they were fairly accurate as to the composition of your fleet. The organization of Allied fleets were broadcast on your radios. If the broadcasts were false my estimates were bad.

Q. 29. After naval battles the Japanese radio often announced the sinking of some of our ships in an obvious attempt to get information, sort of a fishing expedition. Was this done for intelligence purposes?

A. I don't know. If this were done, headquarters would have done it.

Q. 30. How much use was made of submarine for reconnaissance purposes?

A. At the beginning of the war a good deal. In the latter part of the war we did not have enough submarines for reconnaissance, and they were being used for other purposes.

Q. 31. How valuable was the information obtained from submarines?

A. It was reliable, but submarines are slow and the field of their vision is limited, so we did not get much.

Q. 32. How much use was made by reconnaissance by airplanes launched from submarines?

A. I don't know much about it, although I have seen reports of this type of operation. When I went to the Combined Naval Force left in this type of work, and the new ones being built for this purpose were not yet in operation when the war ended.

Q. 33. How much use was made of aerial reconnaissance?

A. The information received was good, but there was not enough of it. I often requested aerial reconnaissance and sometimes got it.

Q. 34. Did your patrol planes take photographs?

A. Yes, always.

Q. 35. How was the information from reconnaissance planes sent to you?

A. By radio.

Q. 36. Did you ever see the photographs which were taken by reconnaissance planes?

A. I saw some of them, but in most cases getting the photographs to me would take too long, so I would receive the information by dispatch telling what the photograph showed.

Q. 37. Did the Navy have trained photo-interpreters?

A. Yes, but none at my headquarters. The interpretation was done at lower command levels.

Q. 38. What were the principal sources you relied upon in estimating your intentions, as an example, while the MARIANAS campaign was in progress?

A. Aerial reconnaissance. A plane saw the fleet one day before it attacked, and during the attack we received scattered information.

Q. 39. What information did you get from prisoners-of-war?

A. We got none directly. Some came from lower units and some information from headquarters.

Q. 40. How accurate did you consider this information?

A. Information from prisoners-of-war received from below was coarse and some obviously false, such as names of ships I knew were not there. I cannot judge the accuracy of the information which came through headquarters.

Transcript of Interrogation: (NAZAJIMA, Chikata, Comdr. IJN)

Q. 41. What kind of prisoners-of-war information was sent from headquarters?

A. Intelligence summaries were sent to us and I did not know how much came from prisoners, since the summaries gave just the information and not the sources.

Q. 42. Were plane recognition manuals prepared at your headquarters?

A. No, they came from Navy General Staff Headquarters.

Q. 43. How accurate were your estimate of our intentions?

A. Sometimes they were good; sometimes bad, I predicted the OKINAWA line of campaign as early as November of last year and predicted the date of attack ten days in advance.

Q. 44. Do you consider this your most outstanding estimate?

A. I don't consider it outstanding, but other people were so far wrong that I consider it good. On the other hand I missed the time of the LEYTE attack; I thought it would be two months later. The preparations seemed too small for the PHILIPPINES and too large for YAP or the islands south of the PHILIPPINES.

Q. 45. What do you consider the main shortcomings of your Combined Naval Force intelligence as a whole?

A. It is not a matter of shortcomings; the whole system was weak. With better intelligence we might have won the war.

Q. 46. The survey needs examples of the situation maps and plots you kept, and of the written intelligence summaries you mentioned receiving from Naval General Staff headquarters. It is desired that you make a search and find some of these for us.

A. There are none left. All were burned on or before August 15. At my headquarters, it was reported that a transport had been seen approaching the Empire on 13 August, and although I did not believe it, I was ordered to burn all my material.

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 330 PLACE: TOKYO
(Jap Intell #16) DATE: 10 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2 USSBS.

Subject: Japanese Naval Intelligence Organization.

Person Interviewed and Background:

Captain SHIBA, Katsuo graduated from the Naval Academy in 1922. He attended the Naval War College for 2 years from 1932-1934. From 1935-1937 he was assistant Naval Attache in GERMANY. Upon return to the Empire Capt SHIBA was commanding officer of DD HIBIKI for three months from August to November 1937 following which he taught naval history at the War College for 6 months until April 1938. In April Capt. SHIBA was transferred to the Navy Ministry. In February 1944 he took command of the OI and in August 1944 he came to the Naval General Staff where he served until the end of the War.

Where Interviewed: Room 554, Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS, USNR
Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

Summary:

Captain SHIBA's duties as the "A" member and "B" member of the Staff Department and Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Naval General Staff included, broadly, liaison with the Supreme War Direction Council and the Navy Department, determining policies of propoganda, and operations planning.

Propoganda aimed at America (as opposed to internal propoganda and that aimed at neutral countries) was intended to create a belief that American Capitalists had brought on the war, and, to instil in American troops (1) a conviction that Japan would fight to the last man and (2) a fear of the Special Attack Corps. A similar program was carried out by the Army and liaison was, in this respect, fairly close. Internal propoganda under SHIBA's cognizance was restricted to military requirements.

Foreign office information consisted mainly of newspapers from Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and Spain, and magazines from America. The German office provided some good information on German technical developments, her internal situation and some concerning Allied aircraft and equipment. Some information about B-29 production was derived from a study of our (U.S.) radio broadcasts. A monthly courier service from Moscow was maintained, but no regular service from Berlin.

Captain SHIBA will furnish, at a later date, a T.O. of Naval diplomatic representatives from 1937 through the War period.

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 330
(Jap Intell #16)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 10 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2 USSBS.

Subject: Japanese Naval Intelligence Organization.

Person Interviewed and Background:

Captain SHIBA, Katsuo graduated from the Naval Academy in 1922. He attended the Naval War College for 2 years from 1932-1934. From 1935-1937 he was assistant Naval Attache in GERMANY. Upon return to the Empire Capt SHIBA was commanding officer of DD HIBIKI for three months from August to November 1937 following which he taught naval history at the War College for 6 months until April 1938. In April Capt. SHIBA was transferred to the Navy Ministry. In February 1944 he took command of the OI and in August 1944 he came to the Naval General Staff where he served until the end of the War.

Where Interviewed: Room 554, Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS, USNR
Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

Summary:

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Captain SHIBA will furnish, at a later date, a T.O. of Naval diplomatic representatives from 1937 through the War period.

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Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K.

Q.1. What were your duties as head of the "A" Section of the Staff Department?

A. Operations and political liaison were my responsibilities; to explain the problems of and conditions in the Navy to the Supreme War Council, in terms of ships and equipment required, and plans of the General Staff. Largely it was explanation to the Navy Department and to the Supreme War Council of Naval General Staff plans.

Q.2. Did you have additional duties?

A. No additional duties.

Q.3. Did you have duties connected with determining intelligence and propaganda policies?

A. Yes. I am involved in principles of propaganda, but not with regard to intelligence.

Q.4. What do you consider the guiding principles of propaganda?

A. The general policy was laid down before I came in and these principles were not changed.

Q.5. What was this policy?

A. It can be divided into three categories:

1. Internal propaganda.
2. That aimed at America.
3. That aimed at neutral countries.

The general line up was left up to the information board.

Q.6. Along what general lines was propaganda aimed at America directed? What was it expected to accomplish?

A. There were two main approaches:

1. Toward Americans in general, that capitalists had begun the War for their own gain and America had nothing to gain by it.
2. Towards American Troops, that the Japanese would fight to the last man and that the ability and accomplishments of the Special Attack Corps were such as to make their efforts extremely costly if not futile.

Q.7. What channels were used for disseminating this propaganda?

A. This was handled by the Naval Board of Information, generally by radio and by leaflets. I was responsible for determining policy. It was up to the Naval Information Board, headed by Captain Goro TAKASE who is at the Navy Department now, to execute the policy.

Q.8. What was the effectiveness of these policies?

A. It was difficult to tell. I believe it was not great. I believe the general policies were good however.

Q.9. Who was your predecessor prior to August of 1944 when you came into your present position?

A. Rear Admiral ONO War Chief of "A" section before the war, then Captain ONODA, then Captain FUJII, and then Captain SUEZANA.

Q.10. Did the Army have a similar propaganda function?

A. Col. TANEMURA, S. had this function. He was captured in KOREA by the Russians. Col TANEMURA left for KOREA on 4 August 1945. I do not know who succeeded him.

Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K., IJN, (contd).

Q.11. Was there any liaison between the Army and Navy in propaganda policy?

A. There were two liaison officers under TANEMURA who called often. I met once a week with TANEMURA without fail in connection with our liaison duties with the Supreme War Council as representatives of the Navy General Staff and the Army General Staff.

Q.12. What was the relationship between your work and that of Adm. ONO head of the 3rd Department (Naval Intelligence) and the 5th Section (U.S. Intelligence) of the Navy General Staff under Rear Adm. TAKEUCHI?

A. We passed to the 3rd Department all information which we thought would be helpful, and made requests for information we required. With regard to the 5th Section, we maintained liaison with the Army through Col. TANEMURA and with the foreign office through Mr. E. SONE. He is now in TOKYO, head of the Central Liaison office.

Q.13. What type of information did you request of the 5th Section?

A. Since I came in, primarily air operations information, particularly regarding special attack forces.

Q.14. What type of information was requested from the Foreign Office under Mr. SONE?

A. None was requested.

Q.15. What, then, was the nature of the information received from your various legations, consulates and embassies?

A. Newspaper information from Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and Spain, also American magazines.

Q.16. For what purpose was this information used?

A. For future operations, in planning.

Q.17. What were your duties in connection with "direction of international situation?"

A. Direction internally (Japan) of the international situation.
a. Analyze American public opinion.
b. Situation between America and Russia.
c. Situation between America and China.
d. Strength of Army (Japanese).
e. Strength of Navy (Japanese).
f. Strength of Homeland.

Q.18. Did you have responsibility for propaganda aimed at the Japanese People?

A. Adm. MAKASE (Chief of 3rd Department) had that responsibility. The Army and Navy pooled information toward the end of the War.

Q.19. Were your responsibilities confined to Army and Navy military requirements or in addition did they extend to the Japanese people?

A. Mainly for military operations.

Q.20. Who was the man who was Minister of propaganda?

A. Head of Board of Information. (Changes with each Cabinet)

Q.21. Which Consulate provided you the most useful information?

A. Swedish.

Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K., IJN, (contd).

Q.22. In the Swedish Consulate what was the number of Army and Navy personnel?

A. Only 1 Naval member. I don't know the Army and civilian component.

Q.23. Lisbon - Naval representative?

A. A Naval Captain. (1 only)

Q.24. Argentina - Naval representatives?

A. A Commander (1 only)

Q.25. What other South American countries had Naval members in your delegation of representatives?

A. None. Brazil did prior to the War.

Q.26. Mexico?

A. Two before the war. (Captain and Commander)

Q.27. German Naval representation?

A. One Rear Admiral, three captains, two commanders and about ten Naval Engineers.

Q.28. Was German information good? What type?

A. Information on technical subjects and German internal conditions was good. There was no operational information of value.

Q.29. Any on Allied aircraft and equipment?

A. Some.

Q.30. How was all the above information used in planning future operations?

A. I suggest you ask MIYAZAKI (Intelligence and information officer in First Section). We carefully studied U.S. methods in the larger campaigns (e.g. Philippines operation) in an effort to predict future moves. Small lessons were gained from a study of our own tactics and an effort made to correct mistakes.

Q.31. How was Consular information specifically used?

A. Very little except figures on B-29 production, which, I believe were picked up from U.S. broadcasts. We found from study that U.S. figures as to future production announced over the radio were usually reliable.

Q.32. Who was the Navy's chief planning officer while you had your present job?

A. Captain OHMAE. I worked closely with him. (Same class at Academy.)

Q.33. Specifically, what did you do with Consular information?

A. Turned it directly to MIYAZAKI. He (MIYAZAKI) keeps files and works with Captain OHMAE who then uses it in planning. My liaison work occupied me most of the time.

Q.34. How did information from Japanese Consulates get back to TOKYO?

Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K., IJN, (contd).

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Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K., IJN, (contd)

A. Most of it came by dispatch. Some material came by air from Moscow. We had monthly courier service from Moscow.

Q.35. Did you have a courier service from Berlin?

A. No. We had no courier service to Berlin.

Q.36. What was the Consular organization at HONOLULU prior to attack?

A. The normal functions of a Consul, I think. I don't remember the Consul's name.

Q.37. When did you first learn of the plans for the PEARL HARBOR attack?

A. The 5th of December, I heard about it only that there would be a three pronged attack on PEARL HARBOR, MANILA, and SINGAPORE. Plans were very secret, only a few knew.

Q.38. What was your job at that time?

A. I had a liaison post in Navy Ministry.

Q.39. What information did the HONOLULU Consul send 24 hours prior to the attack?

A. the TATSUTA MARU was turned around. I heard talk from people aboard her, but knew of nothing received direct from the Consul.

Q.40. To this day, you don't know what information was received from HONOLULU prior to the attack?

A. No.

Q.41. Who held Mr. SONE's position at that time?

A. I don't know.

Q.42. What is TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. It is completely an Army organization and has no connection with Navy or liaison, so far as I know, there is no corresponding Naval organization.

Q.43. Do you know the names of any of the Army Officers connected with it?

A. No, but General ARISUE would know.

Q.44. To what extent were Naval attaches interchanged during the war?

A. Two were traded off at Berlin; Russian Naval representatives were changed and possibly the Swiss attache.

Q.45. Will you please provide us with a T.O. of the diplomatic representatives (Naval) from 1937 through war period?

Q.46. What special training did Naval representatives have before going to Consulates?

A. They were required to read the back intelligence files before departing for a foreign post.

Q.47. What was the name of the Japanese organization working in Argentina as an information gathering agency for the Japanese Embassy?

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Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K., IJN, (contd)

A. I don't know.

Q.48. Were there such organizations in Spain and Mexico?

A. I don't know.

Q.49. What arrangements were made to continue securing information from the U.S. after the outbreak of war?

A. I don't know. Spain supplied some poor information for which she was paid:

Example: one half of U.S. Fleet sunk in 2nd Battle of Philippines Sea. (In reply to the three last questions, the Captain offered to try to find additional information).

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U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 329
(Jap Intell #17)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 12 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2 USSBS.

Subject: Combat Intelligence for Air Operations - Briefing and Interrogation Procedure.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Commander OKUMIYA, Masatake, IJN., His career:
1931 (Nov.)-1933(April): Ensign on light cruiser and destroyer.
1933(April)-1933(Dec.): Flying School.
1933(Dec.): Ordered as Lieutenant(Jg) to OMURA Air Group.
1935-1937 - Operated from CV RYUJO in Japanese waters.
1938-1939: Flew in China as a Lieutenant. Parachuted safely when his dive bomber caught fire. Scarred about face and wrists.
1940-1941: Division Officer in YOKOSUKA Air Group.
1941-1942(March): As a Lieutenant Commander, instructed in flying at KASUMIGAURA.
1942: Attached as staff Air Officer to the Second Air Fleet. Aboard RYUJO at time of DUTCH HARBOR strike. Aboard JUNYO in battle of SANTA CRUZ.
1943: In RABAU and BUIN and SINGAPORE with Second Air Fleet as Staff Air Officer.
1944(Feb.): At RABAU when all Navy air power was pulled out of SOLOMONS theater.
1944(June): Aboard JUNYO for 1st Battle of Philippines Sea as Staff Air Officer.
1944(July & Aug.): Based at OKINAWA.
1944(Late Aug.): Came to Navy General Staff, First Section until the end of the war.
Flying time: 2000 hours approximately.

Where Interviewed: Naval War College.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. ROTZER, USNR.
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY, USNR.

Summary:

It was the air officer's responsibility to see that pilots were properly briefed before taking off on combat missions and that they were interrogated upon their return. The aerologist and the communications officer would usually aid in the briefing and the Captain of the ship would tell them their time of takeoff and sometimes give them other information. The interrogation was informal, taking place on the flight deck and conducted by the air officer often with the help of the Captain and one of the Staff Officers. In addition the senior pilot of the flight filed a report on the mission using a standard form for this purpose.

Early in 1943 the first class of reserve officers graduated from schools where for three months they had been trained in air operations and tactics, basic communications and basic intelligence. Four Ensigns thus trained were usually assigned to each group of 48 planes to handle administrative and clerical work and in addition to do certain incidental intelligence and recognition training.

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Pilots and AA gunners, loosely trained in recognition, often incorrectly recognized Allied units and fired upon their own planes. No officers were specially trained in recognition, this function usually being handled by the squadron or air group commander or an observer.

There was no organized air-sea rescue program, although pilots generally had parachutes, life preservers and rafts.

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Interrogation of Comdr. OKUMIYA, M., IJN.

Q.1. Did you do any combat flying during the war?

A. No, after parachuting out of a burning plane in CHINA, I was no longer physically qualified for combat.

Q.2. Are you thoroughly familiar with squadron and air group operations?

A. Yes.

Q.3. What type plane did you fly?

A. Type 96 (Dive Bomber).

Q.4. Did all regular officers in the Naval Academy receive air training?

A. All deck officers received a minimum training of one month. Approximately 20% soloed and became qualified fliers. Of this 20%, one half stayed in naval aviation. About 10% of all regular officers were trained as air observers.

Q.5. What was the total number of Naval fliers at the start of the War?

A. 3,500

Q.6. How many Naval pilots were trained during the War?

A. 20,000

Q.7. How many were killed during the War?

A. 9,500.

Q.8. During the training period did pilots have any special instruction in briefing, recognition, target analysis, and interrogation?

A. No.

Q.9. Before pilots took off on a combat mission, who briefed them regarding weather, navigation, nature of target and purpose of flight?

A. Several people would provide such information. The air officer furnished the navigation data and designated the number of planes taking part in the mission. The ship's aerologist described the weather, and the Staff communications officer supplied the pertinent data in his field.

Q.10. Would the Captain of the ship ever brief the pilots?

A. Some would. It depended on the Captain. In any event most Captains would give the pilots their time of takeoff, usually after the pilots were on the flight deck.

Q.11. Was there any officer responsible for seeing that the pilots had all necessary information before going on a combat mission?

A. Yes, the air officer.

Q.12. Was the air officer a ship's officer or a staff or air group officer?

A. Before September 1943, he was a ship's officer. After that time he was a high ranking officer in an air group who was assigned from

Interrogation of Comdr. OKUMIYA, M., IJN, (contd)

the group to the carrier and upon assignment became responsible to the captain of that carrier. If an air group's squadrons were divided up among two or more carriers, each such carrier would get from the group an officer who served as air officer.

Q.13. Who interrogated the pilots after they returned from a mission?

A. Usually the air officer. The interrogation was generally informal and took place on the flight deck. While the air officer was responsible, the captain or one of the staff officers or both often joined in the interrogation.

Q.14. Did any of the pilots make out a written report?

A. Yes, the senior officer of the flight himself would write the report.

Q.15. If pilots from two or more carriers went on the same mission, what reports would be filed?

A. The senior officer of each ship's flight would usually submit a report. However, this was very flexible and the commanding officer of the carrier division would designate what reports he wished from whom. In some cases he would, for example, require only one report and that from the senior officer of the entire flight.

Q.16. Were standard forms used for these reports?

A. Yes.

Q.17. May we have one of these forms?

A. I will try to send you one.

Q.18. Were any intelligence officers specially trained to work with the pilots?

A. No, but communication officers sometimes helped out. In 1943 four reserve Ensigns were attached to each HIKOTAI (usually 48 planes) and they did some incidental intelligence and recognition work in addition to handling administrative and clerical details. Such officers were called YOMUSHI ("necessary duty officers").

Q.19. Were the YOMUSHI trained?

A. They were sent to school for three months during which time they studied air operations, air tactics, basic communications, and basic intelligence. The training centers were at SUZUKA, OI, TSINGTAO, TOKUSHIMA and KOCHI. Some few of the graduates were sent to YOKOSUKA to study photo interpretation.

Q.20. When did this program start?

A. The first class was graduated in early 1943. By the time the War ended 2,000 had been trained.

Q.21. Who was responsible for the program.

A. Comdr. TERAJ (Staff Air Officer, 1st Section General Staff) would know. Captain Takeshi MIENO is familiar with the planning of the program and Captain Kenjiro WATANABE with the running of the school.

Q.22. Who briefed the pilots on the Aleutian campaign?

Interrogation of Comdr. OKUMIYA, M., IJN, (contd)

A. I did, both the pilots and the staff members. I was responsible for getting together all available written information before the campaign started. Information was very scanty. We took photographs of Dutch Harbor on the first day's attack on 4 June 1942 and these were interpreted and proved helpful on the second attack the following day.

Q.23. What were your sources of information regarding Allied fleet strength in the Aleutians and Alaska?

A. Observations were made by a Japanese sub off Seattle and another off Kodiak. The Kodiak sub launched a plane, which was damaged by high swells on landing, and thereafter made its observations by telescopes. There was no other source of information on Allied units prior to the attack.

Q.24. Did each pilot carry a large scale target map in the Aleutians campaign?

A. None of them did.

Q.25. Were pilots trained in recognizing Allied ships and planes?

A. Yes. While at sea during bad weather and other no-flying days, classes were held in recognition.

Q.26. Who developed the recognition training program?

A. Lt. Comdr. Toshi NAKAGAWA.

Q.27. Who teaches recognition at sea?

A. The squadron or air group commander. Sometimes an observer taught recognition if he was especially interested in it.

Q.28. Were there any cases of faulty recognition?

A. Many. A good example was the Coral Sea Battle when our pilots thought a tanker was a carrier.

Q.29. Did your AA gunners often fire at your own planes by mistake?

A. Often. However, after about 6 months aboard ship, they became fairly good on recognition.

Q.30. Did you have an air-sea rescue program?

A. Seaplanes, subs and destroyers were sometimes used to search for downed fliers. But this depended entirely on the will of the division commander. There was no organized system at all. This was one of the big differences in your approach and ours. Your whole philosophy was different.

Q.31. Did you carry life rafts?

A. Yes, in all planes.

Q.32. Did the pilots wear life jackets?

A. Yes and also parachutes.

Q.33. Did the rafts carry maps, food and water?

A. No. Provisions were in the plane but not in the raft itself. The pilot carried his own map.

Interrogation of Comdr. OKUMIYA, M., IJN, (contd)

Q.34. Were cameras carried as a routine procedure in all planes?

A. Multiplace planes carried them. Single seaters did not.

Q.35. Did you get much information from photographs?

A. Yes. Dutch Harbor is a good example. We took pictures on the first day's strike and used them the second in determining our targets.

Q.36. Were photo interpretation officers on each ship?

A. No. One might be on a flagship and shore headquarters establishments usually had one.

Q.37. Did your planes carry gun cameras?

A. No.

Q.38. When do you think the tide of war turned against Japan?

A. Upon the loss of the Solomons.

Q.39. What was the peak of Japanese Naval Air Forces operating efficiency?

A. In the beginning of 1943.

Q.40. What caused the efficiency to go down?

A. (1) Lack of good pilots, (2) low fuel supply, and (3) shortage of planes (in this order).

Q.41. Why did your supply of good pilots fall off?

A. Too many good ones were killed and adequate replacements could not be trained.

Q.42. What was the greatest number of operational Navy aircraft at any time during the War?

A. About 5,000 in October 1944.

Q.43. How many operational Navy combat planes did you have at the end of the War?

A. Approximately 3,000, and in addition we had roughly 4,000 trainers.

Q.44. How many combat pilots were available at the end of the War?

A. About 2,800 (compare questions (6) and (7) in which the Commander said that 20,000 Navy pilots were trained during the War and 9,500 were lost).

Q.45. What use was planned of the remaining operational planes during the closing days of the War?

A. We intended to use them in Kamikaze attacks against your transports and cargo ships when you assaulted the homeland. These would have been employed mostly in the daytime and trainers at night. In addition some of the best pilots were being saved to fly escort fighters and torpedo bombers. These latter pilots would have made standard, not Kamikaze attacks. Night torpedo attacks were to be specially emphasized.

Q.46. How many carriers were capable of operation at the end of the War?

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Interrogation of Comdr. OKUMIYA, M., IJN, (contd)

A. The RYUHO and the JUNYO (after about three months of intensive repairs). The HOSHO would not have been much use. (Note: He failed to mention the damaged CV KATSURAGI.)

Q.47. You were at the Battle of Santa Cruz on the JUNYO. How many of your planes were lost and how many of ours were shot down?

A. We lost about 150 and destroyed approximately 50 of yours.
(Note: The official U.S. combat report lists 93 enemy planes destroyed in combat and by AA and 74 U.S. planes lost, with only 24 of the 74 lost in combat.)

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY - R E S T R I C T E D -
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO (USBS NO 350) TOKYO
Japanese Intel. No. 18 Date: 11 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSES

Subject: The Contribution of Naval Intelligence to War Planning.

Person interrogated and background:

Captain OHMAE, Toshikazu, IJN, was, at the end of the war, head of the 1st Section, first department, of the Naval General Staff and in this capacity was responsible for the formulating of war plans. Other posts held by Capt. OHMAE were as follows:

Feb. 1942 - Transferred from the Bureau of Military Affairs to the Staff of the Southeast Asia Fleet. In this capacity he planned and directed the first battle of SAVO ISLAND.

Dec. 1943 - Transferred to the staff of the 1st Mobile Fleet and took part in the planning and execution of the operations for the defense of the MARIANAS and of the PHILIPPINES as the Chief-of-Staff to Vice Admiral OZAWA, Commander of the 3rd Fleet.

Jan. 1945 - Chief of the 1st Section of the first department of the Naval General Staff.

Where interviewed: Naval Staff College.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. T. M. Curtis, USNR

Interpreter: None.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

Captain OHMAE, as Chief of the 1st Section (General Operational Plans) of the first department (War Plans) of the Naval General Staff, was charged with the responsibility of making estimates of Allied capabilities and intentions for planning purposes. Supplementing this report is the report of the interrogation of Comdr. I. MIYAZAKI (Japanese Intel. No. 24) who, as Captain OHMAE's assistant, did much of the work in connection with collecting and making preliminary evaluation of the information upon which estimates were based.

This report summarizes the procedures followed in converting intelligence data into estimates for operational planning purposes. For details as to sources of data and methods used in arriving at these estimates, see Japanese Intel. Report No. 24.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

TRANSCRIPT

- Q. What departments of the Navy General Staff provided the information which you used for estimating U.S. capabilities and intentions?
- A. Some information was received from the communications department at OWADA and much of it was prepared by the 5th Section (U.S. Intelligence) of the third department (Naval Intelligence) of the Naval General Staff. Information from the operating forces comes directly here to the planning section. The 5th Section, of course, also receives this. The 5th Section collects all information, checks it, makes their evaluation, throws out information which is unreliable. It takes the 5th Section a long time to make an evaluation of most of the information. They then send their opinion to us. We also check it, and it may be a few more days before we are satisfied to use it. There were some difficulties. At the beginning of the war the third department was located in the Navy Building in Tokyo, but in the middle of 1944 it (the third department) was moved to HIYOSHI about 20 miles from Tokyo, near Yokohama. It then became very difficult to obtain their information. Telephone service often broke down. One officer, usually a commander or a captain, came daily to the Navy Department in Tokyo, usually at 8 A.M., and he reviewed with us the information of the previous day.
- Q. Rear Admiral TAKFUCHI (head of third department) did not come himself?
- A. He came twice a week. He also reviewed information he had received. It sometimes took quite a long time for information to reach us.
- Q. What other departments of the Navy are located at HIYOSHI?
- A. The Headquarters of the Grand Fleet were also at HIYOSHI. They located there in October 1944.
- Q. Where was the Communications Department located?
- A. The Communications Department was located in the Navy Department and part of it at OWADA. The center of the Communications Intelligence Service was situated here at the Navy Staff College.
- Q. Where is the Army War College located?
- A. At AOYAMA in Tokyo.
- Q. Were the written reports which you prepared, estimating Allied capabilities and intentions for planning purposes, distributed to other departments?
- A. These estimates were drawn up in written report form and, in most instances, were submitted to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. Unfortunately, all of these reports have been burned. I do happen to have one copy, my personal copy, of an estimate as of 1 May 1945. I will lend you this copy for reproduction.

- R E S T R I C T E D

- Q. Did you have an assistant who helped you in the preparation of these estimates?
- A. Yes. His name is Comdr. MIYAZAKI. It was his job to secure the information from the 5th Section of the third department and from the Communications Center. I checked this information and we held conferences to arrive at the best estimate, taking into consideration all information. We often asked the 5th Section and the Communications Department to provide information on a specific subject. Comdr. MIYAZAKI would also go to the Army General Staff. Much of our contact with these organizations was by telephone.
- Q. Did you confer in person with the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet?
- A. Usually, when we had completed an estimate, we sent it to the Staff Officer of the Commander in Chief who was responsible for checking all information for the staff of Naval General Headquarters and for Headquarters Staff of the Grand Fleet. If very important operations were being planned, or if important decisions were to be made, I would go to the Headquarters of the Grand Fleet and go over the details in person with Admiral OZAWA, Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet. We conferred and decided on the plans for the operation under consideration.
- Q. Having decided on the details of your operation plan, who prepared and issued the order?
- A. These orders were drawn up in the Headquarters of the Grand Fleet. Depending on circumstances, they were sometimes quite detailed, but often they were given in general terms.
- Q. Were you not at one time Senior Staff Officer to Admiral OZAWA?
- A. Yes. That was in March of 1944. Admiral OZAWA was Commander of the 2nd and 3rd Fleets which included all surface ships. At that time the Headquarters of the Grand Fleet was located at HIOSHI.
- Q. Did you have a staff intelligence officer?
- A. I had an officer who was responsible for information.
- Q. Did this include communications information. Was he also a communications officer?
- A. The same staff officer handled both communications information and all other kinds as well. There was also one assistant officer, a senior lieutenant, who was especially educated in communications intelligence. Every staff headquarters had some sort of communications intelligence organization.
- Q. Did the staff of Admiral OZAWA at that time prepare operations orders for the Fleet?
- A. Yes. That was the responsibility of the senior staff officer. That was my job. I had a staff officer, Capt. ARIMU, now working in the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Dept. He was Operations Staff Officer and drew up plans which I checked and then passed along to Admiral OZAWA. If he approved it, the plans were put into effect and sent out. Also, sometimes if the plans were particularly important, we would pass them for approval to the Headquarters of the Grand Fleet, after which we put them into effect.

- Q. You mentioned that you had been assigned to duties at RABAUl in February of 1942. What were your duties?
- A. I was senior officer on the staff of the Commander, Southeastern Area Fleet, and in this capacity planned and directed the first battle of SAVO ISLAND. At RABAUl, at that time Headquarters of the Southeastern Area Fleet was also Headquarters of the 11th Air Fleet. At that time there was only one Air fleet in the Japanese Navy.
- Q. Were you responsible for air planning?
- A. As senior staff officer, those duties were also included.
- Q. What was the nature of the target information provided the pilots going out on bombing missions?
- A. It was very poor. In September of 1943 three photographic interpreters were sent to RABAUl. At that time we could take photographs occasionally of GUADALCANAL, NEW GEORGIA, and PUNA. Later we lost all of our good photographers and the photographic work became very inadequate. It became increasingly difficult to get any pictures at all. The pictures we did get were not given to pilots. They were used for planning. Gun positions and general information was marked on charts for the operational fighting and bombing squadrons, and they were instructed in communications procedure.
- Q. What were the cameras used for photo work?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Were the planes specially equipped as photographic planes?
- A. Yes. Special provision was made in these planes for the taking of photographs. We used the Navy Type O2 scouting plane, a twin-engine plane, and also the Army Type 100 Army headquarters scouting plane, also a twin-engine plane.
- Q. Do you recall how many planes you had available for photographic work?
- A. At RABAUl we had one scouting unit, 12 planes by organization. Usually we had six planes for operations, but on any one day often only three could be used. The Japanese aviators did not want to be members of scouting units. One scouting unit came to RABAUl. They had no hope of getting back to Japan, and every member died in RABAUl. The reason is that there were only one or two scouting units in Japan, and therefore replacements were not available.
- Q. Were the aviators specially trained for photo reconnaissance work?
- A. Yes. They were trained at the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Station for about six months.
- Q. Was the main mission of the photo reconnaissance units to take pictures or to search sectors.
- A. The chief mission was to search sectors. In addition, they took pictures.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

- Q. Had the three photo interpreters who arrived in September of 1943 received special training in this work?
- A. Yes. They were trained at the YOKOSUKA Air Station.
- Q. Were crashed U.S. or other Allied aircraft sent back to Japan for study and analysis of equipment and performance.
- A. Complete aircraft were not sent back when I was in RABAU. If we found new mechanical ideas important to the Navy, a dispatch was sent to the Navy Department. Sometimes a representative of the Naval Air Headquarters was sent to RABAU to study the equipment, write a report, which added to the sum total of our knowledge of that equipment. Small items of equipment were often sent back to the Naval Air Headquarters for study.
- Q. Suppose a new type of gun or other ordnance equipment was captured. Where would that be sent?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Was it the responsibility of the Naval Air Headquarters to analyse capabilities of Allied equipment and materiel as regards air?
- A. Yes. They checked all such information. It took a long time. One difficulty was that it would take us so long to use improvements which we found out about. Once we captured a bomb sight from a B-24 in RABAU, and a member of Naval Air Headquarters came to RABAU to study it. It would have taken Japan five years to produce the same type of equipment.
- Q. Were the aviators at RABAU given recognition material on U.S. airplanes, pictures of the planes, silhouettes, and information on performance?
- A. They were given some information, I think silhouettes. I do not remember exactly what it was.
- Q. Did all of the pilots carry parachutes with them when they flew?
- A. All fighter pilots had parachutes. With some exception, the policy was for all airmen to have parachutes.
- Q. Suppose you received word that one of your fighter pilots had been shot down in the water 60 miles from RABAU. Was any attempt made to rescue him?
- A. If we had an exact position, we sent a small boat out for him.
- Q. Did the pilots have flotation gear?
- A. Yes. Usually they did.
- Q. Did they have any life rafts?
- A. No. Only a life jacket.
- Q. Did they get instructions as to what to do in the event they came down in the jungle or in Allied territory? Did they get instructions on how to get out?
- A. Sometimes we sent a scouting plane out to look for them. They had no transmission facilities, therefore, in order to send a message, they had to reach an area where there were Japanese troops. If they could not reach Japanese troops, there was no way to send for help.

Q. Did the men in your Navy bombers carry any life rafts, rubber boats, or similar equipment?

A. No.

Q. Were the natives of much help to you in supplying information of where our forces were?

A. Before American forces came to New Georgia, we got occasional incomplete information from them. Afterwards, we got no information at all. Natives were in favor of the U.S.

Q. Why was it that the natives were more favorable to the U.S. than the Japanese?

A. You had more materiel, more food.

Q. With regard to your work in the Planning Section, did you receive very much information from the Germans that was useful?

A. We received nothing important from them, although in the early part of the war we got some important information from them.

Q. What sort of information did you receive in the early part of the war that was useful?

A. I do not recall at this moment, but we did get information on the fighting methods of U.S. airmen. We also got information on B-17 equipment and how to fight with them.

Q. Did you not secure any useful information from the Germans in the latter part of the war?

A. Nothing.

Q. Do you know anything about the army organization of TOKUMU KIKAW?

A. I am familiar only with tactical operations. The Navy had no such thing at all.

Q. Were you at any time naval attache or assistant naval attache? Where did you learn to speak English so well?

A. In Philadelphia, in 1935.

Q. How long were you there?

A. About one year. I attended the University of Pennsylvania.

Q. Were you there as a Navy officer?

A. Yes. I learned to speak English in one year. I am getting a lot of practice now in English. For a long time I had no experience at all.

Q. What courses did you take at the University?

A. History of International Relations.

Q. Did you have a chance to travel much?

A. We travelled all over the U.S.

Q. You mentioned that you were going to supply me with the Operation Order of May, 1945. (Capt. OHMAE supplied a copy of this document).

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY - R E S T R I C T E D
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 362 Date: 12 Nov. 1945
(Japanese Intel. No. 19) TOKYO

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Division, G-2, USSBS

Subject: Organization and Operation of Japanese Army Air Force.

Person interrogated and background:

Lt. Col. ASHIHARA, T.

1928 Commissioned 2nd Lt. Army, Arty.

1933 As bombardier of Heavy Bomber Squadron.

1934 Recd pilot training and became Company CO of Light Bomber Unit.

1939 (to July 1941) Became instructor in Army Air Academy Toyooka Airport - IKUMAGAWA.

1941 (Aug to Feb) Staff member 4th HIKODAN, 5th Air Division, in Burma and Thailand.

1944 (Mar to June) HOKOTA Light Bomber School, Instructor.

1944 July (to April 1945) KOKU, HOMBURU (Air Headquarters) 2nd Dept.

1945 April (to end of war) Head of CHOSA-KA (Inquiry Dept) at Koku Hombu (Air Headquarters) and Koku Segun (Air General Army)

Where interviewed: Room 554, Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Maj. R. S. Spilman, AC
Lt. Comdr. Paine Paul, USNR

Interpreter: Lt. (jg) Scribner McCoy, USNR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

Col. ASHIHARA was head of the Technical Intelligence Section of KOKU HONBU (Air Hq.) and, concurrently, chief of Operational Intelligence of KOKU SOGUN (Air General Army). A single overworked staff of 5 to 8 officers, 3 petty officers, 1 civilian and 10 file clerks did the work for both sections. The combined sections were concerned with 3 types of information: (1) matters within the homeland, (2) information about own forces, (3) information about the enemy. The last is ASHIHARA's definition of JOHO (military intelligence). Sources of information were Imperial G. H. Q., lower echelons and reconnaissance units.

The Technical Intelligence Section received data from technical officers as far down as the division (SHIDAN), and from foreign diplomatic representatives. Reports were made to the research laboratory at TACHIKAWA occasionally from there to civilian aircraft research laboratories. The Naval Air Arm, Fleet, and Army Ground forces had similar organizations.

The Operational Intelligence Section received reports from:

- (1) Army Air Units (no lower than divisions, which assembled data from subordinate units) covering location and strength of enemy, technical data, enemy tactics and results of own (Japanese) attacks.
- (2) Land Units - covering details of enemy air attacks, (usually inaccurate)
- (3) Diplomatic sources, including fragmentary information about new aircraft type, location of air units, and tactics. (The best information about production of B-29 was obtained from U.S. radio broadcasts.)
- (4) Navy - re U.S. carrier task forces.
- (5) Civilian agencies - concerning air raids, bomb damage etc, reported through the Home Ministry.

Reports were prepared by the Operational Intelligence Section from these sources and disseminated to Army and Air Defense Divisions by radio, if urgent, by document, if less urgent, and by air courier. Estimates of enemy intentions were beyond the scope of Col. ASHIHARA's sections and were prepared by Imperial G.H.Q.

Photo intelligence in the SOGUN was ineffective. In July, 1945, a photo reconnaissance squadron was assigned directly to SOGUN but was limited by the range of the planes.

Intelligence officers received no specific training. The lack of training is considered by ASHIHARA to have been a major cause of the defeat.

- END OF SUMMARY -

Transcript of Interrogation (Lt. Col. ASHIHARA, T.)

- Q.1. What is the Colonel's military background?
- A. (See first page.)
- Q.2. Were you with Col. MIYASHI in CBI, 1941 and 1942?
- A. (See first page.)
- Q.3. Joho (Intelligence) can mean many things. What was the Japanese Army's (Air Forces) conception? What does it include?
- A. (1) Information within the country.
(2) Information re our own forces.
(3) Information about the enemy.
The 3rd is my definition of JOHO.
- Q.4. What were the principal information sources about the enemy?
- A. From three (3) places:
(1) Imperial HQ.
(2) Own lower echelons.
(3) From reconnaissance units.
- Q.5. What type of information was received from Imperial HQs?
- A. It covered all types of intelligence. Reports received at SOGUN and HOMBUR were those considered pertinent.
- Q.6. We have the impression that the Japanese AAF intelligence includes reports of agents (diplomatic), communication interception, and various things that make up order of battle. Is that correct?
- A. Correct. The air units get intelligence from its own agent and at the same time, that agent reports to Imperial HQ and it is then distributed.
- Q.7. Is weather intelligence considered part of intelligence or operations?
- A. Part of intelligence work, but it is separate. There is a central weather unit at HQ.
- Q.8. Will you outline your duties in 1st Section of KOKU HOMBUR, July 1944?
- A. To investigate technical data on enemy aircraft.
- Q.9. Actual examination was done at TACHIKAWA?
- A. HOMBUR passed information on to the technical dept of HOMBUR and also to TACHIKAWA.
- Q.10. This information sent to TACHIKAWA is compiled by whom?
- A. Generally from reports of overseas diplomatic representatives. (He is speaking not of crash intelligence but of written data on our planes)

- Q.11. Did HOMBUR get copies of U.S. and BR. technical magazines during wartime? Trade magazines?
- A. Yes. They were usually 6 months old and not useful.
- Q.12. Were special teams sent from TOKYO HQ to examine crashed allied planes?
- A. The technical officer, only as far down as the Division (SHIDAN) receives reports of crashes. He goes there and investigates. If there is a new piece of equipment, HOMBUR will ask for it. If he can examine it there, he simply sends HOMBUR a report on it.
- Q.13. Were any parts sent to civilian aircraft factories for research?
- A. A part received at TACHIKAWA may be sent on to civilian researchers if TACHIKAWA considers it worthwhile.
- Q.14. Did the Navy (Air) have a similiar organization at YOKOSUKA?
- A. The 3rd Section (similiar to Army 2nd Section) gets similiar reports. I believe the actual work is done at YOKUSKA technical laboratory.
- Q.15. Fleet and Army ground forces?
- A. The same system is used by both.
- Q.16. Outline your principal duties at KOKU SOGAN.
- A. At the SOGUN, I was in the operational intelligence dept.
- Q.17. Col. MIYASHI report says he was in both technical and operational intelligence. What were the functions of the two (2) branches?
- A. As a HOMBUR representative, I was in technical intelligence. As a SOGUN representative, I was in operational intelligence. I held both positions at the same time.
- Q.18. How many men were on the SOGUN staff, (Operational Intelligence)?
- A. At least 5, at most 8 officers - 3 petty officers, 1 civilian agent, 10 girls (for filing of reports and telegrams). The number varied because everyone was overworked and many became ill.
- Q.19. What was the HOMBUR staff?
- A. One staff took care of both units, the same staff.
- Q.20. We will concentrate on SOGUN. Describe in detail type of reports that SOGUN received from G.H.Q.
- A. They cover 5 divisions:
1. Army Air Unit reports (from lower units)
 2. Army Land Force reports.
 3. Diplomatic reports.

Transcript of Interrogation (Lt. Col. ASHIHARA, T.)

4. Navy reports.

5. Civilian reports.

Q.21. What type of information did lower units send to TOKYO, to either HOMBU or SOGUN?

A. Nothing lower than a division sends in reports. Division gathers and rewrites reports from lower units.

Q.22. What were the subjects covered through the SHIDAN?

A. The enemy location and strength, technical aircraft data, captured documents, enemy tactics, results of own attacks.

Q.23. What subjects were covered in reports from land units?

A. Land units report enemy attacks (air), losses (own), number of raids, direction of attack, plane types, (these reports were not accurate), location of enemy crashes, a list of the contents of the plane. These came through DAI HONEI to HOMBU.

Q.24. What subjects were covered by Diplomatic reports?

A. (1) Usually fragmentary on new aircraft types, performance and equipment.

(2) Location and number of enemy air units.

(3) New tactics.

Q.25. Were diplomatic agents asked to supply information regarding morale and economic capabilities of enemy countries?

A. Occasionally.

Q.26. What reports on American aircraft and armament production were received from 1944 on?

A. Regarding U.S. production, we got nothing better than radio broadcasts.

Q.27. Did you believe them?

A. We considered them generally accurate. The fragmentary reports on B-29's enabled technicians to estimate their size and performances.

Q.28. Did you know that B-29's were going to operate from China bases long before they got there?

A. Yes, We thought they would be able to fly from China bases.

Q.29. What type of reports did the Navy send in?

A. Mainly about U.S. carrier task forces and carrier-based planes.

Q.30. What reports were received from civilian agencies?

A. These were not important - damage, bomb types, number of planes etc., reported through Home Ministry (NAIMU SHO). These reports from Home Ministry went to DAI ICHI SOGUN and also to the I.H.Q.

- Q.31. After all this information was collected, what types of reports were prepared by the SOGUN for dissemination?
- A. There were 3 methods:
- (1) Wireless for urgent information (new tactics, new aircraft, etc, and enemy movements). These were sent to GUNS and also directly to the 3 BOKU SENTO HAIKO SHIDAN (home island air defense divisions).
 - (2) By document - less urgent matters. Later this became impossible and these, also, were sent by radio.
 - (3) Short messages were sent by air courier.
- Q.32. Were many copies of documents sent to the KOGUN to provide for distribution?
- A. These went down only to Division Headquarters. They then reproduced items pertinent to lower units.
- Q.33. What subjects did SOGUN report on to lower units?
- A. Information from PCW and captured documents, technical intelligence, order of battle.
- Q.34. Were studies made of U.S. flak characteristics and sent down to lower units?
- A. These reports came from flyers initially and were sent to Division Headquarters (SHIDAN). There they were analyzed and a report sent to SOGUN. They in turn made further analysis and sent out instructions.
- Q.35. What information regarding plane and ship recognition was compiled and sent to lower units?
- A. I.HQ printed pamphlets which were sent to SOGUN and they took care of distributing aircraft information. These contained photographs and performance data, when known.
- Q.36. Were consolidated estimates of enemy losses compiled and distributed up or down from your office?
- A. Yes. Estimates were distributed down as well as up.
- Q.37. What studies did SOGUN make of enemy intentions?
- A. Generally in 2 divisions:
- (1) Studies of enemy tactics were done by defense experts, not in my group.
 - (2) Larger moves were estimated by I.HQ and their estimates were used by SOGUN.
- Q.38. At LEYTE, we found a good study on future attacks by B-29's, number of aircraft in CHINA, tonnage capabilities, number of sorties, and amount of expected damage to Japan. (1) Did SOGUN prepare it? (2) If not, who did?
- A. Likely, I.HQ did it because the SOGUN was not established at the time of the LEYTE landing.

Transcript of Interrogation (Lt. Col. ASHIHARA, T.)

- Q.39. What section of DAI HONEI probably prepared it?
- A. The 2nd Section.
- Q.40. How much Photo Interpretation and information did SOGUN get?
- A. In July, 1945, the photo unit, only, of SHIMOSHIZU (an observation training division) was attached directly to SOGUN. This occurred too late to be effective and operations were limited by the range of the planes, which flew only as far as IWO JIMA. Prior to July, there was no photo unit at SOGUN. The GUNS and SHIDANS had photo units in their observation units working mainly for their own Headquarters. Copies of photos finally arrived at SOGUN, but too late to be useful.
- Q.41. How much information was passed to the Navy and Ground forces by SOGUN?
- A. Mainly, information to the Navy concerned attacks on home islands. To Army land forces the same information was sent from SOGUN through I.HQ. Only matters which concerned either group were passed to them.
- Q.42. Did the Japanese AAF make a study of German Intelligence methods?
- A. Reports on aircraft types, date, and defense tactics, but not much on attack methods.
- Q.43. But how about German Intelligence organization and procedures?
- A. Regarding their organization, we realized that we could learn from them, but details of their methods did not come in from our agents there.
- Q.44. On what basis were intelligence officers chosen for higher Headquarters? (SOGUN, I.HQ, etc.)
- A. Unfortunately, there was no set training for new officers. New ones would be checked for qualifications, but they learned by experience.
- Q.45. What influence did information furnished by SOGUN or HOMBUR have on planning (strategic)?
- A. The SOGUN had little influence and were on the defensive most of the time. HOMBUR had difficulty assembling information toward the end of the war and had little influence.
- Q.46. Did Col. MIYASHI and Col. ASHIHARA participate in Tactical planning?
- A. I had only intelligence duties, but MIYASHI as head of Section did participate. (as Operation's Officer)
- Q.47. What information regarding Allied intentions and capabilities did SOGUN consider most reliable?
- A. Information regarding intentions was considered most important. This came best through communication intercepts; also, by analysis of past attacks and ship movements.

RESTRICTED

Transcript of Interrogation (Lt. Col. ASHIHARA, T.)

- Q.46. Did you consider these sources accurate as to our landing intentions?
- A. There were no alternatives, but to rely on this information.
- Q.49. In 1939 to 1941, at the Academy, what courses did you teach?
- A. Morale Training (Student Administration, not a training course).
- Q.50. Were any subjects taught at TOYOKA dealing with intelligence?
- A. Included in the general outline was very general instruction in intelligence methods applying to land forces. We needed something for air intelligence, but nothing was developed. I believe this is responsible for our losing the war (the small importance placed on intelligence generally).
- Q.51. Have you a copy of the manual used in instruction?
- A. Yes. I will send it to you. ("SAKUSEN YOMU REI" - name of book)

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO: 343.

(Japanese Intell.No. 20.)

PLACE: TOKYO

DATE: 13 Nov.1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS

Subject: Intelligence Operations at Air General Headquarters.
(KOKU SOGUN SHIRIEBU)

Person interrogated and background:

KAWABE, Masakazu, General.

1929-31--Military Attache at Berlin.

1931-1946--Various duties in home armies and on General Staff.

1941-1942--Commanding General, MANCHURIA 1st Area Army.

Aug. 1942-March 1943--Chief of Staff, CHINA Expeditionary Army.

Nov. 1943-Dec. 1944--Commanding General, BURMA Armies.

Dec. 1944-April 1945--Commanding General, OSAKA Central District.

April 1945-Aug. 1945--Commanding General, Air General Headquarters.

Where interviewed: War Ministry.

Interrogator: Major Robert S. Spilman, Jr., AC, AUS
Lt. Comdr. Paine Paul, USNR

Interpreter: Major John C. Pelzel, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

RESTRICTED

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Transcript of Interrogation: (KAWABE, Masakazu, General)

SUMMARY:

1. General KAWABE served as Military Attache in Berlin between 1929 and 1931. He served in various army assignments from 1931 to April 1945, including position of Commanding General of BURMA Armies in 1943 and 1944. He became Commanding General of the Air General Headquarters (KOKU SOGUN), the Headquarters Section in charge of the tactical employment of the Air Force, in April 1945. His command included both operations and intelligence. He was appointed to this position to reorganize KOKU SOGUN for the defense of the homeland.

2. In the Japanese Army Air Forces there is no clear distinction between intelligence and operations. Such intelligence officers as were given specific intelligence jobs were usually second rate men, and partly because of this, the opinions of intelligence officers carried little weight in the formulation of operational plans.

3. Japanese pre-war preparations were directed primarily against RUSSIA, and for this reason intelligence concerning RUSSIA was better than that concerning the U.S.

4. An intelligence organization existed below HIKOSHIDAN (Air Division) level, but it was small and usually composed of untrained men.

5. In the early days of the war, the communications system was a major problem in intelligence but in the later stages the communication system between Headquarters in TOKYO and the field air forces in KYUSHU was largely by wire and was generally effective.

6. The reorganization of KOKU SOGUN in April 1945 came too late to affect the course of the war or to improve intelligence organization substantially.

7. Estimates of Allied intentions made by Imperial General Staff (DIKONENI) of Allied intentions following the fall of OKINAWA were:

- (a) If RUSSIA did not join the war we would invade south KYUSHU in October or November 1945.
- (b) If RUSSIA did come in we would invade the KANTO plain in the fall or winter of 1945.
- (c) We might establish B-29 bases on the CHINA coast near SHANGHI.

Q. 1. Will you explain the meaning of intelligence in the Japanese Army?

A. The Japanese Air Force realized the importance of intelligence before I became the head of KOKU SOGUN in April 1945. However the organization was weak and I personally was interested in perfecting this organization. Intelligence was primarily concerned with strength and performance of aircraft types, etc.

Q. 2. Does the intelligence function in the JAAF include distribution of detailed information to combat crews or is this an operational function?

A. There is no clear distinction between intelligence and operations in the JAAF. I realize that intelligence should be the funnel through which information goes to operations. This was not true and, in fact, opinions of intelligence section were not given much weight in operations.

Q. 3. What steps did you take to reorganize KOKU SOGUN(Air General Headquarters) when you became its head?

A. I turned the reorganization of intelligence over to Colonel ASHIHARA. I also made a number of changes in the communications system to improve transmission of intelligence.

Q. 4. What were the main points covered in your reorganization?

A. There was great need to improve our operational intelligence. The chief problem was to get the information received from DAIHONET (Imperial Headquarters) to the field units. By April when I took over our main operational units were in KYUSHU and a good deal of the communications was by wire and communications were satisfactory.

Q. 5. Our impression is that your intelligence system was pretty well organized from HIKOSHIDAN(Air Division) level up, but that the organization charts did not provide for much intelligence below that level. Is this true?

A. We had an organization set up but it was poor. Second rate men were assigned to it and they were untrained.

Q. 6. Then your table of organization did provide for intelligence personnel below HIKOSHIDAN level?

A. Yes. One or two men were assigned to intelligence duty?

Q. 7. In your opinion why were poor men assigned to intelligence?

A. We were much more interested in attack and operations.

Q. 8. Do you think, in the light of your experience in this war that better men should have been assigned to intelligence?

A. Yes, but the whole attitude toward intelligence would have to change. Operations had no confidence in intelligence and until that was changed there would be little use in assigning good men.

Q. 9. How long have you been in the Air Forces?

A. I was never in the Air Forces prior to taking over KOKU SOGUN. I had had considerable experience in intelligence however.

Transcript of Interrogation: (KAWABE, Masakazu, General)

Q. 10. Was more or less importance attached to intelligence in the ground forces than the air forces?

A. Intelligence was more important in the Air Force. Aerial reconnaissance is very important but was poor in the JAAF and I wasn't able to reorganize it in the little time I had.

Q. 11. What do you think of the effectiveness of the Japanese pre-war intelligence concerning Pearl Harbor? Singapore area? Neatherlands East Indies?

A. Since Pearl Harbor was a Navy concern I know nothing about it. I think the intelligence we had concerning BURMA, MAYLAYA, and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES was effective at the beginning of the war but became less effective as time went on.

Q. 12. The Germans very early had effective intelligence methods. Did you make a study of German intelligence methods when you were in Berlin?

A. When I was in Berlin (1931) the German army was at its lowest ebb. I think the German system was examined at the ministerial level. However, Japanese intelligence was not slanted toward a Pacific war, but rather one with RUSSIA.

Q. 13. It is our impression that before the war was over you had some knowledge of our procedures. Did you consider adopting any of them?

A. In my opinion we knew little about your methods and consequently could not adopt them.

Q. 14. What was your estimate of the effectiveness of our intelligence?

A. Quite effective. For instance, you knew our system of numbering planes and units.

Q. 15. How do you think we got this information?

A. I don't know.

Q. 16. After the first year of the war you were under a handicap in getting intelligence since you were retreating and our air power made aerial reconnaissance difficult. Considering the difficulties do you think your methods were satisfactory?

A. Since our sources were few it is difficult to say whether our organization was effective. If our sources had improved the organization was equipped to handle it or could have been expanded to do so.

Q. 17. Did units in the field build up effective intelligence organizations?

A. They usually did not have time in the field, also field communications were poor.

Transcript of Interrogation:(KAWABE, Masakazu, General)

Q. 18. You state that before the War you had concentrated on intelligence concerning RUSSIA. How complete was your information on RUSSIA? Had you made preparations for bombing industry in RUSSIA and MANCHURIA.

A. I wasn't connected with the Air Forces at that time but I think our preparations were complete.

Q. 19. Did the JAAF share our view of the effectiveness of bombing industry?

A. Never to the extent you did. Our conception of air power was in bombing troops and war factories. The general bombing of industry was not considered. There were two reasons:

- (1) The difficulty in paralyzing the total industrial strength of a nation.
- (2) The JAAF mission was to attack the military directly.

Q. 20. Did our attacks on aircraft production as opposed to combat losses seriously reduce your air force?

A. Area bombing destroyed few planes or pilots, and we saved enough planes to inflict great damage on your landing forces. However, it did have a long range effect since after your landing we would have had no air force left.

Q. 21. What was KOKU SOGUN's opinion as to when and where we would land after OKINAWA?

A. The answer was made by DAIHONET. There were two possibilities considered.

- (1) If RUSSIA did not enter the war we thought you would land in KYUSEU in October or November.
- (2) If RUSSIA did enter the war we thought you would land on the KANTO Plain in the fall or winter.

Q. 22. Did you think we had abandoned any plan to land on the continent?

A. We thought you might put B-29 bases on the continent near SHANGHAI.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO: 355 PLACE: TOKYO
(Japanese Intell. No. 21) DATE: 15 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section,
G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Japanese Naval Intelligence, Its Flow to and Use
by the Planning Department (I) of the Naval
General Staff.

Person interrogated and background:

TOMIOKA, S., Rear Admiral, IJN.

1917, - Graduated from Naval Academy.

1928-30, - Attended Naval War College.

1930-33, - Navy Representative at League of Nations.

1939(Nov.)-1940(Oct.) - Taught strategy at the Naval
War College.

1940(Oct.)-1942(Dec.) - Operations Section of Naval
General Staff.

1942(Dec.)-1943(Jan.) - Commanded fitting out of the
CL Oyodo and became her Captain
upon commissioning.

1943(Jan.) -1943(Sept.) - Commanded CL Oyodo.

1943(Sept.) - Became Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Southeast Area Fleet responsible for
Supply and Construction at Rabaul

1943(Nov.) - Promoted to Rear Admiral

1944(June) - Became Chief of the Southeast Area
Fleet.

1944(Nov.) - Returned to Homeland and assumed duty
of operations and war history officer
of Naval General Staff.

Where Interviewed: Navy War College.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. Shackelford, USNR

Interpreter: Lt. Otis Cary, USNR

Allied Officers Present: None.

RESTRICTED

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SUMMARY:

The First Department of the Naval General Staff in preparing operations plans depended on intelligence from the Fleets and from the Third (Intelligence) and Fourth (Communications) Departments of the General Staff. While the most useful information supplied by the Third Department was in the form of (1) weekly written estimates of Allied losses, strength, and location and (2) character analyses of Allied Commanders, intelligence on the whole was "very poor, very haphazard".

It was estimated that the U.S. would employ 15 to 18 big carriers against Iwo Jima and land 2 to 3 divisions and that against Okinawa big carrier strength would be between 18 and 20 and that 5 to 7 divisions would comprise the invading force. These estimates of landing forces were reached on the basis of statistical analyses showing that in past operations the U.S. had employed forces at least twice the strength of Japanese defending units. Respecting Allied intelligence, it was believed that the number of divisions defending Okinawa was known to the enemy. (U.S.)

After the fall of Okinawa, there was no thinking in the General Staff that the Allies could be stopped. The only hope was to discourage them by inflicting very heavy losses on the invading forces, losses up to 30 or 40% of the first waves. It was estimated that the U.S. would land 15 divisions in southern Kyushu at the end of July or early in August after first taking the neighboring islands, and that at the same time a unit would be landed in Shikoku. By the end of 1945 it was thought an assault would be made against the Tokyo area.

Concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor, the striking force sailed from ETOROFU ISLAND, TANKAN BAY under a cloak of radio silence on 26 November 1941 and received daily dispatches of the latest information while enroute.

Transcript of Interrogation: (TOMIOKA, S. Rear Admiral)

SUMMARY: (Contd.)

On 23 December it was told that on or about 8 December it could attack. Before the assault it was thought that 2 to 4 U.S. capital ships would be destroyed, and immediately after the attack and before the fleet broke radio silence the General Staff estimated that two capital ships had been sunk and possibly a third.

Later in the War, especially following Midway, the Planning Section was frequently misled by exaggerated claims of damage to Allied units, exaggeration due to faulty pilot reporting after many good fliers were killed and to a lack of photographic confirmation.

Transcript of Interrogation:(TOMIOKA, S. Rear Admiral)

Q. 1. Describe for us the operation of the 1st Department, Naval General Staff?

A. I was responsible for operations planned by the General Staff relating to the:

- (a) Fleet.
- (b) Defense of homeland.

Q. 2. Did this include preparation of operations plans?

A. Yes, the overall planning. Word would come from the Emperor as to the general strategy and course to follow. We would then prepare plans for the Fleet, overall plans.

Q. 3. What were your sources of information on which your operational plans were based?

- A. Three main sources:
- (a) 3rd Department.
 - (b) Information from the Fleets.
 - (c) 4th Department, Communications department

After December 1944, we relied almost exclusively on communications information.

Q. 4. What sort of information did the 3rd Department supply?

A. Background information based on diplomatic sources, U.S. broadcasts, newspapers and magazines, etc. Almost none of the information from the 3rd Department was used for other than background purposes.

Q. 5. Did you get any valuable information from the 5th Section of the 3rd Department? (Admiral TAKEUCHI)

A. Yes, but it was mostly background.

Q. 6. What information from 5th Section was most useful?

- A. Two things:
- (a) Estimate of Allied losses, strength, and location.
 - (b) Character analysis of Allied Commanders.

Information concerning damage to Allied units was generally exaggerated.

Q. 7. Did the 5th Section supply estimates of Allied strength and location periodically?

A. There was a weekly written estimate as well as oral information at daily conferences.

Q. 8. Was the weekly estimate considered accurate and was it the basis on which plans were based?

A. It depended on the source. If only an estimate, it was not relied on too much. If based on factual data such as captured documents, then it was relied upon. I have the general opinion that our intelligence was very poor, very haphazard.

Q. 9. Tell us about the daily conferences.

A. Only Navy personnel attended. The Staff duty officer, who changed daily, would review the general war situation based on the latest dispatches. Operations and Intelligence officers, and other war leaders, attended these conferences which were usually presided over by the Chief of the Navy General Staff.

Transcript of Interrogation: (TOMIOKA, S. Rear Admiral)

Twice a week there would be conferences between the Army and Navy. These would be attended by operations officer.

Q. 10. Did you help plan the operations for the 2nd battle of the Philippine Sea?

A. No. I was in RABAUl at the time.

Q. 11. What operations did you plan or help plan? How about the last YAMATO sortie, for example?

A. None. The YAMATO sortie was planned by the Combined Fleet Staff.

Q. 12. Did you help plan the air defense of Iwo Jima?

A. Yes. The general plan there was to leave it be, to let you win a Pyrrhic victory. We had to conserve our planes and use them against you on your next assault. We thought you would attack Okinawa in late March. We hoarded our strength to use it against you then.

Q. 13. Did you have much data on the strength of the Allied Fleet at the time of Iwo Jima?

A. Based on statistical analysis of your past operations, we thought you would land 2 to 3 divisions, and employ 15 to 18 big carriers. We were not bothered about the strength of your other fleet units. Our estimates were reached on the premise that you would use either the 3rd or 5th Fleet, the strength of which we had earlier known in previous landings. We also took into account your strength during the Taiwan strikes and the time we estimated it would take you to repair past war damage.

Q. 14. Was air or submarine reconnaissance more effective?

A. Air quite easily. Submarines were unable to provide details.

Q. 15. Before the fall of the Marianas, how extensive was your aerial reconnaissance?

A. We wanted to have extensive reconnaissance, but actually we employed relatively few patrols. Your TRUK raid, for example, was a complete surprise. Our reconnaissance was very spotty. Many of our patrols failed to return. This was one reason we limited the number of our search flights.

Q. 16. After the loss of Okinawa, did you fly regular patrols out of the empire?

A. Practically none, because we were unable to send them out. Operational losses due to plane or pilot failure were high.

Q. 17. How great was the range of patrols out of the MARIANAS?

A. 600 miles was the standard leg. Toward the end of the war, the leg was shortened to 500 miles. Weather fronts turned almost all flights back when they were encountered. You apparently flew right through weather but we did not.

Transcription of Interrogation: (TOMIOKA, S. Rear Admiral)

Q. 18. Were many SAIUN (Myrt) patrols flown out of the empire at the end of the War?

A. Very few. Not many of the (SAIUN) Myrt were operational. We had a great deal of trouble with maintenance. The quality of the engines was poor and the mechanics were mediocre.

Q. 19. What was the general scheme of defense planned for OKINAWA?

A. There was a difference of opinion as to the strategic importance of OKINAWA. The Navy wanted to make a stand there. The Army wished to save the last strong stand for the home islands. Only 2½ divisions were at OKINAWA. Discussion was underway at time you landed as to whether reinforcements would be landed or not. Our OKINAWA air strategy was to base planes on FORMOSA and KYUSHU and hit you from both sides. The Navy was to concentrate on carriers, the Army on transports. Both Army and Navy were committed to KAMIKAZE attacks.

Q. 20. Did you have all the information (intelligence) you needed?

A. We didn't have enough, but the shortage did not effect our basic plans. They were as good as they could be, I think, from the tactical standpoint.

Q. 21. Did you know the Allied strength at the time of the OKINAWA assault?

A. We estimated 18 - 20 carriers would be used. We thought you would land 5 - 7 Divisions. We thought you knew the number we had and would plan to land at least twice the number we had on the island. In past operations you had used forces double or more our strength.

Q. 22. What made you think we knew you had 2½ Divisions on OKINAWA?

A. We respected your intelligence--your reconnaissance, and any number of other sources. We also thought you had some Fifth Columnists or spies on OKINAWA. We caught some suspects, but we were not able to determine conclusively that they were your agents.

Q. 23. After the fall of OKINAWA was there any thinking in the General Staff that the Allies could be stopped?

A. No. Our only hope was that we could discourage you by inflicting great damage on your forces. We estimated we would destroy 30-40% of the initial assaulting forces when you hit the homeland.

Q. 24. Where did you estimate the blow would fall on the home islands?

A. At the end of July or early in August we believed you would land 15 divisions in southern KUYSHU after taking the neighboring islands. In addition it was estimated that one unit would perhaps assault SHIKOKU at the time of the KUYSHU landings and that by the end of the year you would invade the TOKYO area. We felt that your home front pressure would require you to move fast and require you to try to end the war as quickly as possible.

Transcript of Interrogation: (TOMIOKA, S. Rear Admiral)

Q. 25. What was the basis for such estimates?

A. You couldn't bomb us into submission, I thought, and therefore you would have to land on the home island. Once you took OKINAWA after IWO JIMA, we concluded that your first homeland assault must be against KYUSHU or SHIKOKU. Your land based fighters did not have any range to cover the TOKYO area landings. So that we estimated it would be necessary for you first to take KYUSHU or SHIKOKU and then move to TOKYO. This was based on estimates and not on particular factual intelligence.

Q. 26. Did you think we had enough ships to land and support 15 divisions?

A. Based on statistics of your previous landings, we figured that you would use 15 divisions and that you easily had enough ships to land and supply that many.

Q. 27. What in your opinion was the turning point of the War?

A. The fall of SAIPAN. That gave you complete supremacy in our eyes on land and sea. In the south theatre there was no suitable place where we had sufficient tactical reason to make a stand for a showdown. SAIPAN, however, was such a place. From there you could bomb the homeland and take the initial steps for invading the homeland.

Q. 28. Why did you not, then, commit your entire fleet to a defense of SAIPAN?

A. I'm not qualified to speak on that as I was in RABOUL at the time. I thought, however, that we did commit the backbone of our fleet, especially all of our carrier planes which were the most important element. We placed very heavy emphasis on air power and when those planes were lost we felt we had nothing left to throw in with any hope of success.

Q. 29. How long did you think the Navy could fight at the outbreak of the War?

A. Two years. We never felt we could land in the U.S. Our place was to take and hold onto as many islands as we could.

Q. 30. In planning the PEARL HARBOR attack did you expect to eliminate the U.S. Pacific Fleet with that blow?

A. We expected to sink from 2 to 4 U.S. capital ships and expected in return some damage to our own units. Our success was beyond all expectations.

Q. 31. Did you have specific information regarding what U.S. units were in Pearl Harbor?

A. On the 3rd or 5th, I think, you publicly broadcast what units you had in Pearl Harbor, including the names of ships. We were familiar with your pattern--operations Monday through Friday and then back to Pearl Harbor for the weekend. However, we didn't necessarily expect to find the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. We were ready to hit it outside of Pearl Harbor if we caught it there.

Transcript of Interrogation: (TOMIOKA, S. Rear Admiral)

Q. 32. When did your fleet sortie for the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. From ETOROFU ISLAND, TANKAN BAY on 26 November. It was decided by the Cabinet on 1 December and the Fleet was notified on 2 December that on 8 December or later it would be all right to attack.

Q. 33. How did you communicate with that Fleet enroute?

A. By dispatch, the Fleet itself maintained radio silence and hence, of course, did not receipt for message sent them.

Q. 34. Specifically what sort of intelligence was sent out to them while they were enroute?

A. Data from the 3rd Department regarding conditions in Pearl Harbor. There were daily summaries. For instance we dispatched to the Fleet the data contained in your broadcast of the 3rd or 5th listing the U.S. capital units in Pearl Harbor.

Q. 35. Are you familiar with the intelligence sent by the Japanese Honolulu Consulate during the 10 days prior to the attack?

A. The 3rd Department would know. I don't recall any unusual data sent from the consulate; data other than that they always sent the foreign office.

Q. 36. What was your evaluation of success of the attack immediately after it was made?

A. Two capital ships sunk and possibly a third. Many planes destroyed. But we kept asking ourselves, "When will you hit back?" Our Fleet continued to maintain radio silence after one or two communications shortly after the attack.

Q. 37. You have said that later in the War the Planning Section was frequently misled by your own exaggerated claims? What were the reasons for such errors?

A. Faulty reporting by pilots and lack of photographic confirmation. With the loss of good pilots, the accuracy of our reports dropped off sharply, that is after MIDWAY. For example, by the time of OKINAWA, we at the Navy General Staff Headquarters disregarded completely any pilot claims of damage inflicted at night.

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 364
(Jap Intel No 22)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 13 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2 USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Organization in Imperial Headquarters.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Col. OYA, Kokuzo served as Chief of the 6th Section of the 2nd Division of Imperial Headquarters in charge of intelligence concerning U.S. and Latin America from August 1943 to the end of the War. His military background follows:

- 1932 - Graduated from Officer's School.
- 1932-37 - Various assignments, not connected with intelligence.
- 1937-39 - Army War College as student.
- 1940 - Supply department of 18th Division in CHINA.
- 1940-end of War - KOKU SAMBO (Air Headquarters) (Ill and not on duty from 1940-43.)

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building, Room 430.

Interrogator: Major R. S. Spilman, Jr., AC.
Lt. Comdr. Paine Paul, USNR.

Interpreter: Major John C. Pelzel, USMCR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY:

1. Prior to August 1942 the 2nd Division of Imperial Headquarters, charged with intelligence and other duties, was small, consisting of about 5 Officers. It was reorganized and expanded in August 1942 and a new section (6th) dealing with U.S. and Latin America established. The 6th Section grew during the War until it consisted of 29 Officers and 5 or 6 NCOs at the end.

2. The principal function of the 6th Section was the keeping of enemy order of battle (U.S.) and the following of U.S. tactics. The order of battle information came largely from representatives in foreign countries and from U.S. broadcasts. The information so obtained was sent daily by radio to lower units.

3. Prior to the War with U.S. there were small intelligence units down to Army level, but no full time intelligence units below. Imperial Headquarters never set up an intelligence organization below Army due to the independent position of Army Commanders. The intelligence organization below Army was set up by the field commanders during the War.

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

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Interrogation of Lt. Col. OYA, K.

Q.1. When you were in the 18th Division in CHINA what was the intelligence organization?

A. I was not with the Intelligence Section but believe that there were one or two Lieutenants and one or two NCOs in that Section. In the regiment and battalion I think there was one Officer who performed only intelligence duties; there was certainly one assigned to special intelligence jobs.

During the CHINA War there was little need for intelligence since there was little more than garrison duty. In 1943 there was much talk in Imperial Headquarters about reorganizing intelligence along U.S. lines but little came of the talk, mainly because of the difficulty in dictating to Area Commanders.

Q.2. We have captured documents showing a pretty elaborate intelligence system below Army level. Was this organization set up by the Field Commander?

A. Largely by the Field Commander. Headquarters sometimes suggested an organization, but the Field Commander set up his own organization.

Q.3. Isn't it true that in CHINA the KEMPEI had an extensive intelligence organization?

A. I don't know, I don't think the KEMPEI had a special detachment in garrison areas.

Q.4. Were not KEMPEI units attached to major commands?

A. They were usually not attached to Divisions but to Armies.

Q.5. What is your conception of the relation between KEMPEI and the military?

A. I am not very familiar with their operations but don't think they furnished much military information. Their principal function was to keep order both in the Army and among the natives.

Q.6. What was the organization of the 2nd Department 6th Section of Imperial General Headquarters?

A. It consisted of 29 Officers and 5 or 6 NCOs.

Q.7. Was this organization in existence at the beginning of the War with the U.S.?

A. No. This was the organization at the end of the War.

Q.8. What was the organization in 1941?

A. It consisted of about 5 Officers. GHQ was reorganized in March 1942. Before the reorganization the 5th Section did the work of both the 5th and 6th in the new set-up.

Q.9. What were the principal sources of information at Imperial Headquarters?

A. At the beginning of the War the principal sources were newspapers and military attaches. The information concerned principally matters such as the number of divisions activated, organizations in the UNITED STATES, training camp locations, National Guard activity, overall strength, etc.. Most of this came from announcements of U.S. Government. After the War started we had a great deal of trouble getting this information.

Interrogation of Lt. Col. OYA, (contd)

Q.10. What types of information did you get from field units?

A. Identification of your units and tactics. We got very little on new weapons largely because you were advancing.

Q.11. How accurate was your information at the beginning of the War concerning our forces in the PHILIPPINES, GUAM and WAKE?

A. I am not too familiar with this, but think our information on Philippines forces was accurate.

Q.12. Was your information on BURMA, MALAYA and N.E.I. good?

A. I don't know (The Colonel was ill when the War started).

Q.13. Did you know much about our ground units at SAIPAN?

A. After the ENIWEPOK operation we had great difficulty in locating your units.

Q.14. What kind of order of battle information did you get from the field?

A. The usual reports included information both as to our own forces and the enemy forces. They contained some information as to tactics.

Q.15. Did you keep situation maps on which U.S. units were shown both in the field and in U.S.?

A. Yes. Certain individuals in my section also kept work sheets and graphs involving a particular phase. My papers were lost at HIROSHIMA when it was bombed. I went there about April 1 and left 2 or 3 weeks before the end of the War. I did not take my Staff there and was in fact in charge of reorganizing intelligence for the 2nd General Army.

Q.16. What was the organization of the intelligence section of the 2nd General Army?

A. I was the only intelligence Officer. There was an intelligence platoon or section under me. I organized the section and returned to TOKYO. All positions were filled by Officer Candidates.

Q.17. Tell us about communications intelligence at General Headquarters.

A. Communications intelligence consisted of breaking codes and monitoring broadcasts (Maj. Gen NISHIMURA was head).

Q.18. Of what importance was photo interpretation to General Headquarters?

A. Photo interpretation was done at Air Headquarters and sent to DIEHONET.

Q.19. Tell us about photo-interpretation in the field.

A. Some photo work is done at Army level, but most is done by Air Units. None was done at Division level. Cooperation between Air and Ground Units was good.

Q.20. Isn't the Air Force under the Army?

A. Air Force is under the Area Army, but below that is not. Air Headquarters tried to keep Air Units as much under its' control as possible.

Interrogation of Lt. Col. OYA, K. (contd.)

Q.21. How did you get order of battle information?

A. We would plot your shipping movements on the basis of volume of radio intercepts received from BAMS and when the volume reached the top of the curve we expected an attack. These intercepts gave us no clue as to the direction of the attack. We sent reports on the volume of traffic to the lower Units every 10 days. Other reports were sent when the information warranted it.

Q.22. What did you do with the order of battle information you obtained.

A. Every day a report was made by my staff to me. This report went to the Chief of the 2nd Division and through him to the Deputy Chief of Staff. They were then sent to lower units by radio. The reports made by the 6th Section were sent out over the signature of the Deputy Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

R E S T R I C T E D

INTERROGATION NO.: 365 PLACE: TOKYO
(Japanese Intell. No.23) DATE: 16 Nov.1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2,
USSBS.

Subject: Briefing and Interrogation of Navy Pilots and
Photographic Reconnaissance.

Person interrogated and background:

YAMAGUCHI, Moriyoshi, Commander, IJN

1926 - Graduated from the Naval Academy.

1938-1940 - Attended Naval War College.

1940-1941(June) - Hikoteicho of Yokohama Air Group.

1941(June) - Became Staff Air Officer for 4th Fleet.
(Vice Admiral INOUE)

1942(August) - Became training officer in tactics and
recognition at the Kasumigaura Air Group.

1943(June) - Went to the 202 Air Group in the Celebes as
air officer and executive officer.

1944(March) - Joined 61st Air Group and then became
Senior Staff Officer of 1st Air Fleet.

1944(Aug.) - Went to 2nd Air Fleet under Command of
Vice Admiral FUKUDOME.

1945(Jan) - Returned to Homeland and became Chief of
General Affairs Section of the First Air
Technical Research Arsenal under Vice
Admiral TADA.

Where interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. Shackelford, USNR

Interpreter: Lt. Otis Cary, USNR

Allied Officers present: None.

Transcript of Interrogation (YAMAGUCHI, M. Commander IJN)

SUMMARY:

Commander YAMAGUCHI has 3000 hours of flying time and did his last combat flying at HANGKOW before he went to the Naval War College in 1938. While he has not served on a carrier, he has aided in training carrier pilots, and has had considerable experience with shore-based groups.

Both briefing and interrogation of pilots were the responsibility of the air officer who was assisted by two or three regular flying officers. These assistants (HIKOSHI) without special training, gathered together for the air officer all pertinent information concerning the mission. Sometimes reserve officers trained as "YOMUSHI" did the same thing. While the "HIKOSHI" worked with the Air Group (KOKUTAI) where two or three "HIKOSHI" also compiled data on weather, communications, and target information before a mission. Following a raid, the flight leader, with the pilots in the flight present, reported to the air officer in the operations room and answered any questions. A pilot who disagreed on any of the points would speak up. Later a written report on a standard form was submitted by the strike leader; a copy of which went into the ship's log.

During 20 days of a 10-month training course, pilots would devote half the day to recognition training based on publications and movies (poor). This, in the case of a carrier would be supplemented by 15 to 20 days of training at sea, depending on the program and will of the air officer. Some attention was given to fields of fire and the safest approaches for attacks, such training being based on information from the 3rd Dept., the Air Technical Research Arsenal and The Tactical Board.

Photographic pilots, with 30 hours of special training, were often organized into units of 8 planes (Myrts) toward the end of the War) which would be assigned to three different carriers. These 8 plane units would generally have one "HIKOSHI" trained as a photographic interpreter.

Q. 1. What was the last active flying you did?

A. HANGKOW before I went to the Naval War College in 1938.

Q. 2. Are you familiar with carrier operations?

A. Yes, but I have never had carrier duty. I have trained carrier pilots.

Q. 3. What provision was made for briefing pilots before they took off on a combat mission?

A. An officer (HIKOSHI) under the air officer was responsible for getting together information for the air officer to give the pilots. He collected communications, weather, codes, etc.

Q. 4. Was the HIKOSHI attached to the ship or the flying unit?

A. He is a member of the flying group but since the group always goes on a particular ship he is also in substance a ships air officer.

Q. 5. Was the training program designed so that a particular group (KOKUTAI) would stay with a particular ship?

A. Yes, and the commander of the Group would become the ships air officer.

Q. 6. How many HIKOSHI would be with group?

A. Two or three. In addition each squadron (HIKOTAI) has 2 or 3 who collect information for the HIKOTAI commanding officer.

Q. 7. What are "YOMUSHI"?

A. Sometimes they doubled up and served as HIKOSHI. They are reserves and the HIKOSHI are regulars.

Q. 8. What is the basis for selecting HIKOSHI?

A. At the outset of the war no particular qualifications were required of the HIKOSHI. The intelligence organization as compared to your fine one was very poor. During the war there was some little improvement.

Q. 9. How long have you had the HIKOSHI?

A. We've had them a long time. Originally they helped the air officer on the flight deck.

Q. 10. Are the HIKOSHI fliers?

A. Yes, but while serving as HIKOSHI they seldom fly missions.

Q. 11. What is their rank?

A. Usually Lieut. (j.g.) or full Lieutenants.

Q. 12. Have they had any special training in intelligence?

A. No, that is a bad point about the Japanese Navy.

- Q. 13. To whom are the pilots responsible after takeoff?
- A. To the Flag alone, not the Captain of the ship.
- Q. 14. How many hours do you have?
- A. 3,000 including time in flying boats and Frances twin-engine reconnaissance planes.
- Q. 15. Did the Navy have the same organization of HIKOSHI in their shore-based Groups?
- A. Yes.
- Q. 16. When they return to the ship, to whom do they report?
- A. The Air Officer is responsible for the interrogation. The HIKOSHI assist but the Air Officer conducts it.
- Q. 17. When a pilot lands, what does he first do?
- A. He goes to the operations room, which is a big room, and is "interrogated" by the Air Officer. The flight leader, in the presence of the pilots on the flight, reports to the air officer and answers any questions. If one of the pilots on the flight disagrees, he would state his views.
- Q. 18. Is a written report submitted?
- A. Yes, by the flight leader on a standard form.
- Q. 19. Were any such reports in the material found at KOFU?
- A. I think not.
- Q. 20. How many copies are submitted?
- A. It varies.
- Q. 21. Does a copy of the report go into the ship's log?
- A. Yes.
- Q. 22. Would we find such a report by examining a carrier's log?
- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. 23. Were your pilots trained in recognizing and identifying Allied ships and planes?
- A. Yes.
- Q. 24. About how much time was assigned for this training?
- A. For about 20 days they devoted half of their time to recognition. These 20 days were a part of a 10 months training course for pilots. I was one of the instructors.
- Q. 25. What aids were employed in recognition training?
- A. Movies and recognition manuals. The movies were poor.

Transcript of Interrogation:(YAMACHUCHI, M. Commander IJN)

Q. 26. Was your information fairly well up to date?

A. Compared to your data on our planes, it was laughable.

Q. 27. Did you show fields of fire and illustrate the safest approach for attacks?

A. For your single and twin engine planes, we would simulate your planes by using ours and have our pilots practice dummy runs against them. We knew the location of your guns and taught this information.

Q. 28. How did you get this information?

A. From the 3rd Dept. and our Tactical Board.

Q. 29. What training in recognition was continued after flight training? In a carrier at sea, for example?

A. The air officer was responsible for making out a program and employing it. Standard publications on recognition and the latest data from the General Staff were available on carriers. Pilots received 15 to 20 additional hours of recognition training after becoming carrier based.

Q. 30. What publications were there?

A. Three volumes prepared at YOKSUKA and published by KOKUHOMBU.

Q. 31. We would like copies.

A. I will try to get a set for you.

Q. 32. Was there a system of keeping the books up to date?

A. Yes, supplementary information would be supplied.

Q. 33. Tell us about your photographic intelligence.

A. It was poor but we did our best.

Q. 34. Did you have specially equipped photographic planes?

A. Yes, SAIUN(MYRT) was such a plane. It had both fixed and portable cameras. SAIUN (MYRT) usually flew on photo missions at about 30,000 feet. Your radar made our missions difficult.

Q. 35. What did you think was the best Allied fighter?

A. P-38's and F6F's.

Q. 36. Was any instruction given to carrier pilots regarding what to do if forced down at sea?

A. No. They had rubber boats, but couldn't get them out if the plane sank fast. We would search for them by plane and possibly direct ships to them if they gave us their location before going down.

Transcript of Interrogation (YAMACHUCHI, M. Commander, IJN)

Q. 37. What photographic planes were based on carriers?

A. SAIUN.

Q. 38. Were photographic squadrons based on carriers?

A. Not squadrons, but 8 photographic planes would be divided among 3 carriers.

Q. 39. Were the photographic pilots specifically trained?

A. Yes. They were trained both ashore and after becoming carrier based.

Q. 40. How many hours of training would these pilots have?

A. Thirty.

Q. 41. Were there any specially trained interpreters with the photographic units or on the ship?

A. One HIKOSHI attached to the unit would be trained in photographic interpretation.

Q. 42. How did you get your technical information on our planes?

A. Air Technical Research Arsenal personnel would supply data and in addition we would secure information from your magazines.

Q. 43. How many personnel worked on technical analysis of Allied equipment?

A. Ten officers and ten civilians.

Q. 44. How many enlisted personnel?

A. 150.

Q. 45. How many planes were in your basic fighter section?

A. Two units of 2 planes each. It was not too effective because of our poor pilots and equipment.

Q. 46. Toward the end of the War what qualities were you planning to emphasize in your future planes?

A. There was no such program. KAMIKAZE attacks were the only things left.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

- RESTRICTED -

INTERROGATION NO. 369

Japanese Intell. No. 24

TOKYO

DATE: 14 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intell. Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Sources Used in Operational Planning.

Person interrogated and background:

Comdr. I. MIYAZAKI was assistant to the Chief of the 1st Section (Operations Planning) of the 1st Department (War Plans) of the Naval General Staff from October 1944 until the end of the war. This section was charged with the responsibility of drawing up estimates of Allied capabilities and intentions for operations planning purposes.

Comdr. MIYAZAKI's background is as follows:

- 1930 - Graduated Naval Academy. Training period on YAKUMO in Inland Sea.
- 1931 - On HAGURO (Cruiser) as Gunnery Officer.
- 1932 - DD MIKAZAKI, as navigator and communications officer.
- 1933 - Navigator aboard IWATE, training Fleet, in MEDITERRANEAN.
- 1934 - Senior Navigator and Gunnery Officer on SS I-22.
- 1935 - Instructor, KURE Naval Barracks; later gunnery officer on ATAGO (cruiser) of 2nd Fleet.
- 1936 - On KISO (cruiser) as Fire Observation Officer SOKUTSU CHO.
- 1937 - Student in Torpedo School, YOKOSUKA.
- 1937 - Torpedo Boat HIRODORI as Senior Officer -FORMOSA-YANGTZE area.
- 1938 - Senior Officer on Cruiser SHIOKAZE.
- 1939 - Senior Officer on DD AKEBONO.
- 1940 - Torpedo Instructor, Naval Academy.
- 1941 - Senior Torpedo Officer on Cruiser AOKA (not at Pearl Harbor) supported operations at GUAM, WAKE, RABOUL.
- 1942 - Commanded Cruiser MOCHIZUKI. Fought off GUADALCANAL.
- 1943 - Commanded DD TACHIKAZE in FINCHESHAVEN, NEW GUINEA operation.
- 1943 - Torpedo School, YOKOSUKA Disbursing Officer.
- 1943 - Entered Naval War College.
- 1944 - Commanded DD KIYOSHIMO.
- 1944 Oct.-1945 Aug. - Naval General Headquarters, Operations Plans Section of the War Plans Dept. as assistant. Also small amount of logistics planning for OKINAWA, OGASAWARA, and MARCUS areas.
- 1945 Sept. - Liaison Section, Foreign Office.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Where interviewed: Meiji Bldg.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. T. M. Curtis, USNR.
Lt. Comdr. F. Shackelford, USNR.

Interpreter: Lieut. McCoy
Major J. Pelzel

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

Comdr. MIYAZAKI, as assistant to the head of the Operations Plans (1st) Section of the War Plans (1st) Department of the Naval General Staff was charged with the responsibility of gathering together all information relating to Japanese and Allied capabilities, evaluating it, and making estimates of Allied intentions for operations planning purposes.

The majority of information supplied Comdr. MIYAZAKI came in pre-digested form from the Intelligence (3rd) Department, and Communications (4th) Department of the Naval General Staff. Additional information was received from the Army.

During the early planning stages for important operations, the heads of the 3rd and 4th Departments and section heads sat in on meetings held by the 1st Department. All information was brought together at these meetings. It then became the responsibility of the 1st Department to make a complete analysis of differing reports and produce the final estimate which was submitted to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. If approved, orders were issued putting them into effect.

This report covers, in some detail, the information and reasoning behind the estimates made by the 1st Department as to time and place at which landings on IWO JIMA, OKINAWA, and KYUSHU would be made.

With regard to estimates as to where and when landings would be made on the Japanese Home Islands, Comdr. MIYAZAKI held the personal view that a landing would be attempted in the first part of September. The opinion of other members of the General Staff was that it would come during the first week in October. This estimate was based first upon the earliest date at which it was felt the U.S. would be capable of mounting a major amphibious landing operation, and second, upon the status of the weather as it pertained to utilization of aircraft. The Army and Navy shared the view that the landings would be carried out in either the ARIAKE BAY or MIYAZAKI areas of Southern KYUSHU. This, according to Comdr. MIYAZAKI, was a strategic decision. The following were major factors in making this decision:

1. OKINAWA * based air power could be best exploited over the Southern KYUSHU Area.
2. KYUSHU is an island and can be cut off from communication with the other islands, and thus isolated.
3. KYUSHU lay strategically between China and the main part of Japan.
4. The ARIAKE BAY and MIYAZAKI areas of Southeastern KYUSHU are by far the most suitable places on the KYUSHU coast for bringing ships close in shore and carrying out large scale amphibious operations.

TRANSCRIPT

- Q. Concerning the TENGO operation plan with which Capt. OHMAE supplied us a copy. What was the purpose for which the TENGO operation plan was prepared?
- A. At the time of the appearance of your task forces, after your operations in the PHILIPPINE Islands, we considered the possibilities of your further moves, and generally decided that IWO JIMA would come first and then OKINAWA. The TENGO Operation Plan was with regard to the area of the EAST CHINA Sea, including OKINAWA. OKINAWA, as far as importance to Japan, was of top priority, so this TENGO plan was set up for the defense of that area. It did not include IWO JIMA, only OKINAWA.
- Q. What was the date of the TENGO Plan?
- A. Generally, from the end of January into February - the plan was drawn up.
- Q. What was your estimate of the date of the landing on IWO JIMA?
- A. From February 10 on.
- Q. Upon what information did you base this estimate?
- A. A study of your previous movements, and also the previous bombing and reconnaissance moves of yours. A reasonable analysis of these two factors with regard to the time of highest probability resulted in the February 10 estimate.
- Q. Did you have a part in the drawing up of the TENGO Plan?
- A. I was concerned with the TENGO Plan only basically - only the basic judgment of time, as given by me to Capt. OHMAE. I assisted only in the basic judgments as to time and place of your attacks. The final details were worked out by others as to force. I had nothing to do with the smaller details.
- Q. What were your sources for estimating the movements of U.S. forces?
- A. I believe it was mainly common sense; by analyzing previous movements of U.S. forces; by Japanese Army and Navy communications interceptions, and judgments out of what intelligence material we had. By the time I entered this work, the PHILIPPINES had been taken, and it was obvious that the U.S., in order to defeat Japan as quickly and as easily as possible, would find it necessary to take both IWO JIMA and OKINAWA. Differing from U.S. methods, our reconnaissance did not work very well. Movements of U.S. task forces, analysis of U.S. bombings, communications interception by the Navy at OWADA and the Army at TAWASHI were very helpful, as Adm. NOMURA has probably explained to you. Prisoner of war interrogations were fruitless. Especially important were our own 5th Department, and the communications interception work done at OWADA. I am not saying this in any way antagonistic towards the Army, but I know that these two divisions supplied us with the most accurate information.

- RESTRICTED -

- Q. What kind of information was secured from Adm. NOMURA's Communications Dept. at OWADA?
- A. First of all, your medium and short wave radio broadcasts. Your communications with your Merchant Marine by area. The frequency of radio messages arriving or issuing from any forward area. Task force communications, urgent communications. In this connection, it was extremely valuable to know the location of HALSEY, NIMITZ, SPRUANCE, and others. Our specialists, no matter how often you changed codes, were able to keep up in interception. As I remember, from the OWADA group, SPRUANCE and HALSEY differed in their communications methods. It was the general impression that HALSEY was the cleverer of the two in his communications methods.
- Q. What sort of information did task force communications reveal?
- A. We made no direct judgments from the task force communications. Before and after an operation, communications were numerous. During an operation, there was usually silence. We could only make a rough estimate by consideration of the communications with the task force supply groups and from the supporters in an operation, but no direct judgment.
- Q. In what way was Adm. HALSEY more clever in his communications transmissions?
- A. I cannot speak as a specialist on this subject, but only from what I heard in OWADA. My general impression was that HALSEY used far less communications than SPRUANCE.
- Q. How could you distinguish whether HALSEY or someone else had made the transmission?
- A. I do not know. I am not a specialist.
- Q. Did you have a hand in estimating U.S. strength and forces to be employed against IWO JIMA?
- A. We knew that you knew our defense forces in any area. We always considered that you would bring from two to three times the number of manpower, and concentrate as fully as possible your task forces.
- Q. Did you make these estimates yourself?
- A. These estimates were made in meetings. As Navy men, we did not consider the number of men of your landing forces. We considered only your task forces. Your task forces were generally known by number, and we considered that as far as possible, you would concentrate full power in any one operation.
- Q. Who attended the meetings at which these estimates were drawn up?
- A. By these meetings, I mean the 1st Department of Headquarters - (Admiral TOMIOKA).
- Q. Did Adm. TAKEUCHI, Adm. ONO, or representatives of the 3rd Dept. attend these meetings?
- A. Those men would be present as representatives of the 3rd Dept. only in the early stages of the meetings where estimates were studied. After the meetings went into the stage of operational planning, they were not present. I believe that differs from the Army method. As I remember, the Army has representatives from other departments even in the final stages.

- Q. Did a representative of Adm. NOMURA's Communications Dept. sit in on these meetings?
- A. A representative from OWADA would be present only in the early estimate stages of the meeting. In the early stages of the estimates, all the various departments are brought together, and it is the duty of the 1st Department to make a complete analysis of these probably differing reports.
- Q. To what extent were captured documents useful as a source of information?
- A. During my short term, from October, I believe that no use was made of captured enemy documents. As to what happened previously, I cannot say. I suggest that you inquire at the 3rd Department for particulars.
- Q. What information was received from Japanese forces in by-passed areas?
- A. We were in wireless communication with all by-passed areas. We had reports of air reconnaissance out of RABAU. We sent reconnaissance planes from Japan to TRUK. We also had communications with our submarines.
- Q. Were you able to maintain communications with your forces in the PHILIPPINE Islands after our troops had landed?
- A. Yes. We were in communication with our units in the PHILIPPINES. By this year, though, their communications units were moving around far too much to be of much use. The extent of their information was usually your attacks, upon the number of bombs, and such things.
- Q. What kind of information was received from by-passed areas with regard to strength and movement of U.S. forces?
- A. The most important information that we gained from them was the presence and number of air carriers. Other than that, the general information was with regard to your attack conditions, number of planes, number of B-25's, and fighters flying East or West. In WEWAK, for instance, we did not get very important information.
- Q. Were communications difficulties encountered in the exchange of information between Tokyo and the by-passed areas?
- A. I am not a specialist in this work and cannot make clear statements. This is the work of the 4th Department. I believe that communications with RABAU and TRUK were very successful. As for the other units, I am not sure, nor am I sure of the PHILIPPINES.
- Q. Did Army personnel ever attend meetings held by the Planning Section for the purpose of drawing up their estimates of U.S. strength and capabilities?
- A. No.
- Q. How did you get Army information to be used in making your plans?
- A. The liaison between the Army and Navy for minor matters was done usually by telephone. More important matters, members of the comparable departments would meet. For highly important, large matters, the heads of departments and staff members with comparable duties would meet. I know very little about the methods used by the Army. My own duties were to make initial judgments and work them out with Capt. OHMAE. In working out the actual operational plans, the members of the various departments of the forces - submarine, air, etc.- would meet and set their work out in front of them on a large table, and work out the operational plans there. I personally had nothing to do with the operational plans though I was an observer of the work.

- Q. Did representatives of the foreign office ever attend meetings of the Planning Department.
- A. Absolutely not.
- Q. How was information passed on from the foreign office to the Planning Dept. of the Navy General Staff?
- A. For use in operational planning, reports from the foreign office were useless.
- Q. Why is this so?
- A. They had no military value whatsoever. Reports from neutral countries were mostly concerned with diplomatic affairs. They had no military intelligence, no military mind.
- Q. Were messages sent by dispatch from the legation in Madrid ever received directly by the Navy Dept.?
- A. I am not sure about this as it is mostly the 3rd Department's work. I believe that wherever we had Attaches, we received direct communications from them. We did get some from SPAIN, but whether they came from MADRID or not I am not sure. I know that we got direct information from Adm. ABE in Germany.
- Q. What was Adm. ABE's assignment in Germany?
- A. Adm. ABE is at present in SWEDEN, and through the Navy Department here he is now trying to return via America.
- Q. What was his assignment in Germany?
- A. He came under the military exchange made between Germany and Japan, and he was the Navy representative from Japan. The army also sent a man. From Germany, I believe it was Adm. VENICKE who arrived here.
- Q. What information did you receive from Adm. ABE while he was the Navy representative in Germany?
- A. Mostly technical matters (military installations and equipment) with regard to their air forces and Navy.
- Q. Do you consider that any of the information received from Germany was useful to the 1st Department for planning purposes?
- A. It was hardly ever used in operational planning.
- Q. What was the estimate of the Planning Dept. as to the date on which U.S. forces would land on OKINAWA?
- A. From the middle of March to the end of March. Generally, around the twentieth.
- Q. Did you not think that there was some possibility that landings might be attempted in the FORMOSA area?
- A. The Army considered this possibility very strongly, but the Navy did not agree.
- Q. What was the Navy's reason for the emphasis on OKINAWA rather than FORMOSA?
- A. We in the Navy considered that your forces would not take FORMOSA and thereby spill unnecessary blood. Once you had taken the PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA is under your control, and also you had sufficient task forces to take OKINAWA.

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. I. MIYAZAKI, IJN) - RESTRICTED -

- Q. Did you ever consider that landings might be made on the coast of CHINA prior to the landing on OKINAWA?
- A. We considered that if a landing was to be made at all, it would be a small operation by KINCAID's 7th Fleet around SWATOW, but that this would not be a major operation whatsoever. We considered that the landing on the coast of CHINA would be more for a political objective rather than any direct military operation against Japan, that it would possibly be an attempt by the U.S. to establish a CHINA supporting route ahead of ENGLAND who was working from the BURMA side, but as a major operation, it was not thought to be possible.
- Q. How did you arrive at your estimate as to the date of the expected landing on OKINAWA?
- A. We considered that the IWO JIMA operation was not a major operation but a minor one with regard to forces used. I personally, as you know, was aboard ship most of my time in the Navy, and I knew that Headquarters estimates were very apt to be slow, behind the time of your actual moves. By common sense, I worked out, using reports from OWADA, shipping concentrations and information as to the complete formations of U.S. landing forces, and estimated the earliest possible move on your side. I foresaw the heavy KYUSHU attacks in support of this operation, thereby getting timing very correctly. It was obvious to us that you had sufficient land forces to cover two or three times our defense units in OKINAWA, which is the way you always operated. You also had supply bases. The damage done to your task forces at IWO JIMA was slight. Therefore, they could be brought around. From general long term statistics, accurate estimates could be made.
- Q. At the time that estimate was made, how did you know the strength of our ground forces available for the attack on OKINAWA?
- A. This was the 3rd Department's work. Your divisions in the Pacific Area were known by name and number from your own reports. We could follow statistically their operations, their rest periods. The problem now was to estimate where the assembly point would be. This could be easily deduced from the frequency of communications from supply and transport ships in concentrated areas, such as the PHILIPPINES; following frequency graph curves we had kept over long periods. One of your greatest mistakes and one of the greatest sources of information for us was your frequent and constant communications with the Merchant Marine. This is the BAMS system. (BAMS - Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships).
- Q. What kind of information did you get from BAMS?
- A. The frequency of communications was followed from area to area, such as you set up in the PHILIPPINES Area. You could follow movements from HAWAII to WAKE by following the volume of communications from HAWAII to WAKE. It was as though you said, "Please listen to this". Another method we used was to follow the volume of your reconnaissance and air cover communications; when a high volume of communications was heard in one area, it usually designated a squadron of ships leaving or arriving. By following that squadron and its steps from island to island, we could follow movements.
- Q. Were you able to tell the names of ships from these broadcasts?
- A. The actual name of the ships were unknown. It was not necessary. What we were after were concentrations. We could follow the call signals of any one ship and could deduce whether that ship, previously at one point, was now at this point.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

- Q. Did you not get from the Germans the BAMS basic code?
- A. I do not know, although I believe that OWADA did this ~~did~~ this independently. As is obvious from my history, I have spent nearly all my time aboard ships. The Japanese system differs from the American system. Whereas you have a man two or three years in the fleet, taken ashore for work, and then back again, the Japanese system has been mainly to keep the man in Headquarters over very long periods of time, until Headquarters gets out of touch with actual Navy conditions. I personally regret very much that I had not been brought as a fresh man into Headquarters much earlier - in the early part of 1944. I believe that we would have done a lot better if some of us had been there earlier, if we had changed our tactics earlier. Your forces and movements were obvious to us and your strength was known to us, although in the end, finally, we would have lost. For instance, at OKINAWA, we would have caused far more damage to your forces than was done. I admire your methods of statistical analysis and the handling of information. OWADA and the 5th Department, although possibly inferior to your comparable sections, were doing extremely good work, and were highly important to the Navy.
- Q. Can you describe what statistical methods were used? Would you elaborate on that a little and tell us how that statistical analysis was made?
- A. This was done by the 3rd Department and OWADA. We kept complete statistics on all bombing attacks, and we estimated the size, number of cities that you would attack, statistics on transportation disruption - all fairly obvious. We kept close watch on the ratio of air losses during your air attacks on the mainland of Japan proper, and estimated as to whether our production could keep up at that ratio or not. We made a study of your landing in Europe and had full statistics on the movements previous to, and during, the landing. This is mostly by 3rd Department. Whereas you had many men, and fine offices in which to do this work, we were forced to use extremely poor facilities. I believe that we did our work very well. When I entered, I furthered this type of work.
- Q. The 3rd Department had relatively few men assigned to it. Were these few men entirely responsible for the statistical analysis of data?
- A. The 3rd Department had a great number of men, and even the 5th Section, the American Section, had several tens of men.
- Q. Weren't these many tens of men assigned only during the spring of this year?
- *A. I think that was sometime last year; it was before I entered in October because when I entered they were there.
- Q. Were they assigned directly to the 5th Section of the 3rd Department.
- A. I believe that these men joined the 5th Section gradually, and that the section grew from the beginning of the war to a sufficient size by the time I joined in October, 1944.
- Q. In the 5th Section there is an A, B, C, and D member. Were these men assigned to any one member or did they work directly under the Head of the section?
- A. I am unable to give the answer to that question. I was not concerned closely with it. I believe that the names and organization have been given to the Allied forces. I remember the staff as being four or five men.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

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* This has been checked. Thirty seven newly trained Reserve Officers joined the 5th Section in the summer of 1944.

- Q. The Communications Dept. at OWADA performed statistical analyses of communications interceptions. Can you tell us how many people were assigned to this work?
- A. I have been to OWADA only two or three times and have not seen it completely. I believe that the Statistics Section had quite a number of men.
- Q. Can you tell us anything, in addition to what you have already described, about the methods of statistical analysis work done at OWADA?
- A. I think it would be better if you asked directly at the 3rd Section for this information as I am not able to give you a great deal.
- Q. Did the TENGO Plan, as originally written in January or February of this year, cover the estimate as to possible landings on the Japanese homeland?
- A. The TENGO Plan covered only OKINAWA and the Southern Area, but the KETSUGO Plan covered the eventuality of any landings on the Japanese homeland, did not include KAPAFUTO or the KOREAS.
- Q. Was the TENGO Plan revised from time to time as further information was secured?
- A. It did not change. It was a plan, was set up, and not changed.
- Q. Was there a further estimate or plan made on 1 June regarding the estimates in connection with the defense of the Japanese mainland?
- A. There was a plan made up at that time. However, I was not specifically concerned with it. I believe it was in June.
- Q. Were you not in the 1st Section of the 1st Department in June of this year?
- A. Yes. I was in the section at that time.
- Q. What was your estimate then as to where and when the Allied landings would occur on the Japanese mainland?
- A. Our estimates were always a little bit earlier than the actual facts, inasmuch as the decision as to when and where the American forces would land was a matter of higher authority, and my estimate was only an estimate. However, in my opinion, I thought that the American forces could make a landing possibly as early as the early part of August, that it depended upon the status of the weather as it pertained to the utilization of bombers. Actually, in my personal estimate, I expected landings in the first part of September. However, there were several opinions, and the opinion of certain members of the General Staff was that it would come in the first part of October. That pertained to KYUSEU. It was my opinion that landings would be carried out in the Southern part of KYUSEU on either the East or the West coast, in either the ARIAKE BAY or MIYAZAKI Areas. This opinion was also held by the Army.
- Q. Upon what information was this opinion based?
- A. This was a strategic decision. It depended, in the first instance, on air superiority being obtained in the OKINAWA Area. This was a judgment based upon no particular piece of information. I based my decision upon the past experiences of the war, particularly such a factor as the fact that as KYUSEU was an island, air superiority could be obtained over it. And it was almost without communications, particularly railroad communications with the rest of Japan. Moreover, it lay strategically between the main part of Japan and China.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

- Q. Based on this, how many divisions of Japanese troops were moved into KYUSHU?
- A. I do not remember. I was not directly concerned. The operational information on the movement of our own troops, and similar matters, was not a matter within my province. My job was specifically that of estimating American intentions.
- Q. Inasmuch as the communications were poor, especially railroad with regard to transportation had the estimate been wrong, the results would have been most serious for Japan. Isn't that so?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You must have been very sure of your estimate then.
- A. It is true that the results would have been disastrous if my estimate had been wrong. However, based on my past experiences, I felt sure that the American army would land nowhere, in this initial operation, except on KYUSHU. I did not feel that it was at all likely that the Americans would land on HOKKAIDO, and the landing in the Tokyo area, I felt sure, would be subsequent to KYUSHU.
- Q. In addition to what you have already told us, would you further elaborate on your reasoning and the information which brought you to this conclusion?
- A. In addition to what I have already said, there was practically no other method of reasoning that I used, but my method of reasoning was purely a tactical judgment.
- Q. Was it upon this judgment alone then that the deployment of Japan's forces was based for the defense of the home islands?
- A. It was not my decision alone. As I have explained before, the final decision was arrived at by a comparison of the decisions of all of the officers working on this subject in the 1st Section - TOMIOKA, OHMAE, and others. The final decision was that believed by the group to be wisest by them after considerable discussion.
- Q. Based upon this decision, was a plan for the defense of KYUSHU and Japan drawn up?
- A. The plan for the defense of KYUSHU was an Army affair since, after all, they were the ones primarily concerned. However, inasmuch as we had practically no Navy left at that time, and inasmuch as our air force was greatly depleted, the ends of both the Army and Navy were practically identical. Consequently, all of the Naval Air, as well as the bulk of the Army Air, was concentrated, as a result of this estimate, in the Western part of the island, from the KYOTO Area West and South. The KETSUGO Operation Plan applied only to air operations inasmuch as outside of air operations against the fleet prior to its landing, there was very little we could successfully have done. The plan did not apply beyond such a time as the American forces might have secured a firm foothold.
- Q. Was that plan drawn up by the 1st Department?
- A. It was made up by the Combined Fleet.
- Q. What was the date of that plan?
- A. I do not remember.

- Q. Was it about the first of June?
- A. As this is a matter of aircraft, I do not recall.
- Q. However, the estimates in the plan dealing with the time and place of the expected landing were furnished by you, were they not?
- A. The Combined Fleet was of the same opinion as we were.
- Q. Did the Combined Fleet go through the same procedure as the General Staff did?
- A. The actual decision was worked out between the General Staff and the Combined Fleet. Inasmuch as I was not directly concerned with the conferences carried on between the Combined Fleet and the General Staff, I do not know where or when meetings were held, but conferences were carried on frequently between the two.
- Q. What was the basis for your estimate that landings at KYUSHU might be made at ARIAKE?
- A. On the basis of the opinion of the LEYTE landings, it was quite likely that landings would be made in this area. Another reason was that ARIAKE is the only place in KYUSHU where a fleet can go close to shore.
- Q. In the plan that was developed, of which Capt. OHMAE gave me a copy, the numbers of ships in various classifications available for the landing was given. We would like to know upon what information these estimates were based.
- A. This estimate came to us from the 5th Section which is the section in the 3rd Department concerned with American fleet strength, based upon their past information of the fleet, plus information gathered at OKINAWA. Such information was quite easy to gather inasmuch as we were able to observe landings there and to observe fleet units throughout the majority of the campaign.
- Q. Are you familiar with a document produced by the 3rd Department of the Navy General Staff in March 1944 in which U.S. carriers are listed by name, together with the numbers of air groups assigned to these carriers? It must have been a well known document to everybody in Planning. It would have been basic.
- A. I am familiar with the information obtained. I am not familiar with the document itself. This was made up by the 5th Section.
- Q. Did captured documents provide the information given here, or was it some other method?
- A. I do not know what information it was based upon.
- Q. To what extent did aviators shot down over Japan provide useful information in making the estimates we have just discussed?
- A. That was a matter of the 5th Section, and I have not heard of any particularly important information. Such persons shot down would not have had much information on future operations.
- Q. What did you estimate the U.S. moves would be after the landings on KYUSHU?
- A. The U.S. landings would be on the KANTO PLAIN.
- Q. How long after the KYUSHU landings did you estimate it would be before that operation took place.
- A. Three to four months after the end of the KYUSHU Operation.

- Q. Were all members of the Japanese Merchant Marine members also of the Japanese Imperial Navy?
- A. Those that had training in navigation and similar subjects entered the Japanese Navy after the war began. These personnel were very few in the Merchant Marine.
- Q. Were not officers of the Merchant Marine also officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy?
- A. Yes. All officers were reserve officers in the Japanese Navy.
- Q. That was true prior to the war also?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Could you tell me what system the Navy employed for securing information from Merchant Marine officers? Were regular reports made (prior to the war)?
- A. I have never heard of any being made inasmuch as I came into the section in October of last year.
- Q. As Commanding Officer of a destroyer during the latter part of the war, what is your estimate of the adequacy of information furnished you which you required to do your work?
- A. While I was captain of a destroyer, I received practically no intelligence information. Intelligence is, after all, more a function of the Fleet Headquarters. Furthermore, the only way to receive it at sea is by wireless, and my wireless was always full of operational reports. Such matters as American naval strength and movements of American vessels I did not receive information on. However, during the period of the GUADALCANAL Operations, we received a little information as to the sightings made by reconnaissance aircraft. Outside of that, practically nothing.
- Q. Were your communications facilities satisfactory?
- A. Communications were good until the time of the SOLOMONS Operations. After that, we found it progressively more difficult, due largely to enemy action. For example, in my destroyer squadron, the lead ship was sunk, another ship was sunk, and under such conditions, which were frequent, communications became very difficult as the war wore on.
- Q. What was the date of your departure from Japan to participate in the occupation of WAKE?
- A. The early part of November 1941.
- Q. Did you know at the time of your departure what your destination and mission was?
- A. No. I had no information.
- Q. What did you think it was?
- A. I felt sure that some sort of engagement was in the offing. I had no information, however, of the objective operations against PEARL HARBOR. All such matters were kept strictly secret. The first information I had at the beginning of the war was in the early part of December, the 7th or 8th. I did not participate in the GUAM operations. They kept such news very secret so I naturally had no information.

- Q. Were there transports in the force which you accompanied?
- A. There were neither transports nor troops in the convoy.
- Q. What made up your force?
- A. They were all combatant ships.
- Q. Where and when did the troop ships join your force?
- A. The troop ships did not meet our force.
- Q. Did your force participate in the occupation of WAKE?
- A. Our itinerary was from Japan past GUAM, TRUK, KWAJALEIN, and WAKE where we participated in the occupation. Because your force put up such a magnificent fight, we thought there were many more than there actually were. We left in the early part of November to participate in the WAKE Operation. At the time of the RABAUl occupation, in March of 1942, my force was in the BISMARCK Sea, but we did not actually participate in the occupation.
- Q. Was your defense of OKINAWA upset by the fact that the assault was made on 1 April instead of the last part of March as you had expected?
- A. We thought that you would land in the middle of March. Consequently, the fact that you delayed your landing by even such a small period helped us in our preparations somewhat. If you had come in March, we would not have been as nearly well prepared for you as we were. If you had delayed one more month, we would have been able to win.
- Q. What made you so sure that the landing would be attempted on OKINAWA rather than other islands in the RYUKYU Group?
- A. Because OKINAWA is an excellent place for airfields and fleet anchorage, and the others are not.
- Q. To what extent was the TOKUMU BU helpful in furnishing useful information?
- A. No such unit in the Japanese Navy that I know of. At the time of the CHINA incident, the Army had the TOKUMU KIKAN. During the war I believe this was disbanded even in the Army. There is no such organization in the Navy.
- Q. Did you ever hear of Admiral CHUDO?
- A. I have heard his name, but I do not know him.
- Q. Do you know through what sources you got any specific details as to what air groups were aboard which carriers?
- A. That was a job of the 5th Section. I do not know. I had no dealings with anything of that kind.
- Q. Did you have in your section other people under you who helped you with the analysis of the great quantity of material flowing in to you?
- A. The work in the section was done by a number of officers working together - Capt. OHMAE and other officers. The statistical work was done by Headquarters. We all worked together in the same room, OHMAE, TERAI, and a number of other officers. In writing my decisions, I found that I needed a certain piece of information, and I would say, "Let me have your data on this". I do not know where they got it. I was Capt. OHMAE's assistant in all these matters - air, army, navy.

- Q. Where was the organization that screened the great amount of information coming in from all sources? Who summarized all the information that Adm. TAKEUCHI received and passed on to you?
- A. There is only the 5th Section. The 5th Section had charge of analysis, statistical work, etc. The Combined Fleet staff received the same information that we did directly from the 5th Section and OWADA.
- Q. From the questions that have been asked today you have some idea of the purpose of our conversations, and what we are trying to put together concerning the relationship between source of information and planning. From your knowledge, what occurs to you that has further bearing on the subject?
- A. I want to explain the setup of our physical communications which in many respects permitted a good deal of inefficiency in our operations. The 5th Section was at HIYOSHI. The Communications Section was at OWADA. The 1st Section was close by the Naval Department. Furthermore, the Army Intelligence Sections were similarly scattered out. All communications were dependent upon telephone. The Japanese telephone system is ordinarily bad. Furthermore, as a result of your bombings, oftentimes it was impossible to gain any sort of communication with these various outlying sections from which our information came. Consequently, it was very difficult to gather together information rapidly and completely.
- Q. Where was the Grand Fleet Headquarters?
- A. It was in the operations area, wherever that happened to be. In the latter part of the war, it was in KYUSHU.
- Q. Where was Adm. OZAWA located in the latter part of the war?
- A. In Tokyo.
- Q. Was he Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet?
- A. Yes. The Combined Fleet Headquarters moved to Tokyo in the latter part of the war.
- Q. How were you listed? Under what title in the Table of Organization within the 1st Section?
- A. I do not remember exactly where I was listed. I was actually Capt. OHMAE's assistant. I was carried on the list under both the Administrative and Planning Sections of the 1st Department. My job was intelligence evaluation under Capt. OHMAE.

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- R E S T R I C T E D -

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 372
(Jap Intell No 25)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 15 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.
Subject: Organization and Operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in MANCHURIA.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army.

Army Academy: 1937
1938-1940: 4th Section North China Area Army Headquarters
1940-1943: 2d Department Army General Headquarters
1943-1945: Army Attache in Moscow
1945 (May): 2d Department, Army General Headquarters

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR.

Interpreter: Major J. C. PELZEL, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY:

During the War Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, was attached to Army General Headquarters in TOKYO and also served as Military Attache in Moscow. Through his experience in Headquarters he became familiar with the organization and operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in MANCHURIA, although never a member of the organization himself. On the basis of his experience and information he estimated, after the Potsdam Conference, that RUSSIA would attack JAPAN early in November. TOKUMU KIKAN was the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army and obtained information on Soviet strength, movements and intentions through espionage, observation along the border, interrogation of Russian spies, communications interception, and analysis of news and captured documents. While there was no connection between this organization and Headquarters in TOKYO, Headquarters received from the Kwantung Army weekly and monthly reports of the organization and sent requests for information to the Army which were turned over to the organization for action when in its field.

Personnel for TOKUMU KIKAN were selected from young officers in the Academy and from units of the Kwantung Army.

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Interrogation of Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army.

Q.1. You have been referred to us as one familiar with the organization and operation of the TOKUMU KIKAN (Special Service Organization).

A. Yes, I understand.

Q.2. In what way were you connected with TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. I was not in the organization at all, but I grew familiar with it through my position in the 2nd Section in the Army General Headquarters in TOKYO. While in the 2nd Section, I neither supervised the TOKUMU KIKAN nor worked with it, but indirectly I did learn of its organization and procedure in MANCHURIA.

Q.3. Tell us what you know about the organization in MANCHURIA.

A. The name, TOKUMU KIKAN, was the name of the organization about three years ago. Then the name was changed to JOHOBU. Its central office was in Harbin, with branch offices at CAMTO, KEIMEI (BOTSURI), TOAN, JAMUS, KOKYA, HAIRAR (3 sub-divisions), KOAN, and APAKKA (across the border in MONGOLIA).

Q.4. I understand the organization you have just described was the intelligence unit for the Kwantung Army.

A. Yes.

Q.5. What was the connection between the organization in MANCHURIA and the Army General Headquarters in TOKYO?

A. None.

Q.6. Did the organization operate in areas other than MANCHURIA? South CHINA and The PHILIPPINES for instance?

A. I don't know. When I was in northern CHINA in 1938-40 there was an organization known as TOKUMU KIKAN, but I knew nothing about it.

Q.7. Who is familiar with the organization in the PHILIPPINES?

A. Lt. Col. OYA. I am familiar with the organization in MANCHURIA, Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI with it in CHINA and Lt. Col. OYA with its operation in the Southern Areas.

Q.8. How many people did the organization use in MANCHURIA?

A. Fifty Officers and non-commissioned officers and 150 civilians in the central office and 35 Officers and 30 civilians in the branch offices.

Q.9. What training have you had in intelligence?

A. As in the case of all members of my class at the Academy, I had 20 hours in intelligence indoctrination. However, I feel that my three years with Army General Headquarters in TOKYO from 1940 to 1943 and again from May 1945 to the end of the War qualified me for work in this field. I worked extensively with intelligence reports. My particular job during each period with Headquarters was intelligence, especially military intelligence, concerning the Soviet. During my second period with Headquarters beginning in May 1945 I was concerned with economic and political questions as well as military intelligence relating to the Soviet.

Q.10. Were any directives or orders given directly to TOKUMU KIKAN by the TOKYO Headquarters?

Interrogation of Lt. Col ASAI, Isemu, Japanese Army (contd).

A. Absolutely none. If I had a request for a certain type of information concerning RUSSIA, I would transmit it to the Kwantung Army. It, in turn would get the answer from the organization or any other unit that might have the particular information requested.

Q.11. What was the relation between the organization and the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army?

A. The organization was the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army. Special surveys might occasionally be made under G-2 by others regarding particular matters.

Q.12. What type of information did the organization send back to TOKYO?

A. The most important information was the order of battle, disposition of Soviet forces, and the strength of their forces. In addition it would supply intelligence on the internal situation in RUSSIA. Outside of these categories nothing else was sent.

Q.13. Was such information supplied on the basis of particular requests or on a continuing basis?

A. The reports supplied to Headquarters were of two types:

- (1) Emergency radio reports from the Kwantung Army Headquarters in response to my directives or on the basis of information gathered independently by the organization itself.
- (2) Printed reports - (a) weekly and (b) monthly. Prior to the worsening of relations with RUSSIA, there was no weekly report but instead a 10-day report.

Q.14. You say that from time to time you made requests to the Kwantung army. What was the nature of these requests?

A. Outside of the requests I've already mentioned, I know of none. For instance, I would ask for information of the situation in a particular area or for a general type of information regarding, say, the air force. I did not send out requests going into details.

Q.15. Was the information you received through the Kwantung Army from this organization satisfactory?

A. No, it was not nearly satisfactory. That was because the problem was extremely complicated, especially as conditions with RUSSIA grew worse. The information received was too incomplete on which to base plans.

Q.16. What system was used by the organization in collecting intelligence?

A. My knowledge is generally limited to the system used by the organization prior to the time I was sent to RUSSIA three years ago. However, the methods have remained pretty much the same. They may be summarized as follows:

- (1) Espionage, (sending agents into the Soviet). The operations of our agents became restricted almost totally to areas on the MANCHURIAN side of the border. We could not send agents into RUSSIA because of the dangers involved.
- (2) Observation. At high points along the borders there was a series of observation posts. Since the railroad ran close to the border, we could easily determine the movements of the Soviet troops. We could also observe the

Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army (contd).

harbor close to VLADIVOSTOK. Such sources of information were often considered sufficient on which to form a judgment as to Russian intentions.

- (3) Interrogation of Captured Russian Spies. For instance, in the summer of 1941, one hundred were taken and from these and other spies captured from time to time it was possible to assess the situation of the Soviet Army pretty clearly.
- (4) Communication Interception. This was the function of a special communication unit and not of the organization. It was the most reliable source of information. Garrisons along the border, particularly along the borders of the Maritime Province, were able to intercept almost all messages to Soviet units in their areas.
- (5) Newspapers, Magazines, Captured Documents. The analysis of these was done at Headquarters in SHINKIO.

Q.17. Did the agents of this organization work in or out of uniform?

A. It varied according to the situation. Civilians never wore them. Military personnel did or did not depending on their job at the time.

Q.18. Tell us what you know of the BORYAKU.

A. There were none in MANCHURIA. Some were in CHINA. I have had no dealings with them. They were probably operatives for the NANKING Government doing special intelligence work. Both Chinese and Japanese operatives were attached to the Chinese Government. The agents attached to the NANKING Government were called SEIJIBO and ones attached since 1940 were called GUMJI BO.

Q.19. Are you familiar with the BUNKAN?

A. The BUNKAN were Japanese hired by the army and paid by the Army. They might or might not have officer ranks.

Q.20. On what basis were personnel chosen?

A. Two bases:

- (1) Selection of young officers from the Academy.
- (2) Selection of young officers, captain or below, from units of the Kwantung Army in response to directives. Qualifications were general intelligence and knowledge of Soviet affairs. Final selection was made by personnel officers at the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and the candidates were trained at SHINKIO (Headquarters of the Kwantung Army).

Q.21. Do you know that there was a school at AKASAKA KU (TOKYO) for training of Special Service Personnel?

A. No.

Q.22. Was there any organization similar to TOKUMU KIKAN in the Navy?

A. It is likely but I have never heard of it.

Q.23. Who among your Naval Officer friends would know?

A. I don't know, but perhaps the Third Department could tell you.

Q.24. When and on what sources did you estimate the Soviet would go to War against JAPAN?

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Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army (contd).

A. In the early part of November 1945. I reached this estimate right after the POTSDAM Conference on the basis of developments at that Conference and on the movements and disposition of Soviet troops along the border. I thought that a blow would come North of VLADIVOSTOK and that they had 5,800 aircraft available for use against us.

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
c/o POSTMASTER SANFRANCISCO

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INTERROGATION NO: 410
(Jap Intell No 25)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 19 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSEBS.

Subject: Naval Intelligence at Imperial Headquarters Level.

Person Interrogated and Background of each:

Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru, IJN, was, from July 1942 until the end of the war, head of the 5th (U.S.) section of the 3rd (Intelligence) department of the Naval General Staff.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS, USNR

Interpreter: Major JOHN C. PELZEL, USMCR

SUMMARY:

The purpose of this interview was to supplement information secured in a previous interview with Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI and to correct discrepancies in information prepared by him in written form.

Admiral TAKEUCHI stated that his section prepared a document in March of 1944 outlining in detail the organization of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Forces, including a roster of U.S. aircraft carriers showing air groups assigned by air group number. This document, also included a detailed organization chart of the U.S.S. SARATOGA. Admiral TAKEUCHI said that sources of this information were:

1. Data gathered prior to the war, including a roster of officers of the SARATOGA. Such rosters were exchanged on a routine basis prior to the war.
2. U.S. aircraft shot down in raids on TRUK and SAIPAN following the MARSHALLS operation. The majority of these planes had fragments of information and in a few instances documents which were useful.
3. Prisoner-of-War information.
4. Announcements of ship launchings, disposition of forces, and new developments which appeared in the American press and on the radio.
5. Front line information relayed to Imperial General Headquarters by operational forces.

Admiral TAKEUCHI also discussed briefly information received from Naval Attaches abroad and denies any connection between the Naval Headquarters Intelligence Department and any secret or special organizations.

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Interrogation of Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru, IJN

Q.1. This is the translation of a document which fell into your hands and has in it information of the U.S. forces, the organization of the Army and Navy Air Corps, the names of carriers, the air groups assigned to carriers, the numbers of air groups. With respect to the organization of the Army and Navy Air forces as given here, this is a list of aircraft carriers, the construction number (hull number), date of sinking or damage, number of aircraft carrier groups, etc. We would like to know the source of the information given here.

A. I was not connected with operational planning as I have been out of the fleet for a good number of years, but I think I may know how they got this information. I believe the report was made in March of last year in the section which I headed. When I compiled something of this sort, I usually gathered the data for a good number of years before the war, and it is based on that. This Air Group 6 was on a carrier, but I wouldn't know whether the information was correct or not. Your carrier planes have on their tails markings of the squadron and the carrier fleet from which information could be derived. The announcement of ship construction could be tabulated statistically. On the basis of the time that we know it took to fit out ships, to move from the yards as they were constructed, through, for example, the Panama Canal, to the Pacific Areas, such information could be tabulated statistically. We could come out with an answer a month, more or less, on either side. The knowledge of plane markings was a matter known to practically everyone in the Japanese Navy. Even the most junior man in an area, when a plane was shot down, could tell from what carrier it came. Although our radar and early warning devices were very ineffective, with glasses and visual observation, we could often tell the identification of unit and ship. My work was of a statistical nature. It did not involve an aspect of spying which is a type of "last century intelligence work". My estimates would be about 20% correct. If it fell within these limits, I was satisfied.

Q.2. With regard to the changing of air groups aboard carriers, the information presented in this document is too up-to-date to have made such methods effective with regard to that particular item.

A. This document was made up, as you know, after the GILBERT Operations and just after the time of the MARSHALL Operations, during which period the number of American aircraft shot down was high. Consequently, we had many sources of information of the type I have outlined before, available upon which to make this estimate. In later operations, we did not have so much information. The fact that this estimate is accurate may be offset by later estimates which may not have been so accurate. At the time of the MARSHALL and GILBERT Operations, we had very good communications with our forces in the field and afloat. The collection of such information was relatively easy. Later our communications were not as good. Consequently, estimates as accurate as these were by no means easy to make. Only about fifteen copies of this document were made.

Q.3. The information with regard to Tables of Organization in the Army Air Forces and the Navy Air Organization is greatly detailed. Could you tell us something about the sources for this detailed information?

A. Our information for computing this sort of estimate on organization of units came from a large number of sources beyond those I have already mentioned. Information on U.S. Army Air Forces came to us from our Army General Headquarters. Information also came to us from communications intelligence activities. In addition,

Interrogation of Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru, IJN

particularly with regard to your Naval organization, a great deal of information came to us from TRUK, SAIPAN, etc., where your planes were shot down. The majority of these planes had in them some sort of documents which we were able to capture. Most of these documents were not of a detailed, elaborate nature, were not tables of organization in themselves, but were isolated orders, operations orders for example, given to the pilot of the plane. From such information, we could gather fairly well the organization of Naval air units. My operations consisted largely of putting together the very many pieces of individually meaningless information. These were gathered together from all of these sources which I have mentioned today and in previous conversations. It was my job to consider all of these very carefully and combine them into some sort of coherent picture. Any piece of information by itself meant nothing. This sort of work cannot be done over a short period of time such as six months or a year, but you must remember that I have been working on this for over three years. Consequently, I have been able to achieve a larger perspective of it than had I been working for short periods alone.

Q.4. Now with regard to the organization chart of the SARATOGA which is printed in great detail, was that specific piece of information gained from a crashed plane, from interrogation of prisoners, or from some other source?

A. I believe this information must have come from captured documents; your roster of naval officer personnel would have given such information. I kept lists based originally on your roster of naval officers, which was received every year before the war. (I would not have been able to compile such a list for a new ship)

Q.5. Could you supply us with a list of the documents captured by the Japanese throughout the war?

A. All of the material has been burned, and I do not remember, in detail, what the individual pieces were. You must realize that captured documents and other sources of information might pertain to only one squadron or one part of the ship's complement, but all other information, over a period of years, enabled me, particularly in the case of older ships, to make such detailed estimates.

Q.6. Could you supply us from memory with a partial list of very important documents captured during the war?

A. I do not remember in detail many of them, but I recall that one document obtained during the SAIPAN Operation, I believe by a ship off shore, gave the organization, including, I believe, even the air group organization of one of the task forces, though I cannot remember which task force it was. Most of the time, however, documents captured by us were only individual sheets of paper embodying small, detailed pieces of information. Such complete, large documents as the one mentioned were very rare.

Q.7. Do you know the details of how this document came into the possession of your ship?

A. I do not remember in detail how this was picked up. The fleet unit picked it up and sent it as it was into TOKYO by airmail. This is the extent of my knowledge. After the air raids began on TOKYO, in the early part of this year, we got a great number of documents from planes shot down. These did not include organizational charts but did include a great number of charts with the attack dis-

Interrogation of Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru, IJN

position drawn on the map of the TOKYO area.

Q.8. You are familiar with the TENGO Plan, are you not?

A. I have heard of the TENGO Operation Plan, but I am completely unfamiliar with it. The procedure followed was for the 1st Section, which dealt with operations, to come to me and ask me what the latest information was. I handed them the information. At that point, my knowledge of the operation plans ceased.

Q.9. I understand that is true. However, the estimates which appear in the TENGO Plan with regard to Allied forces were prepared by the 5th Section of the 3rd Department.

A. My function was to supply them with the basic materials, but the job of arriving at the final estimate of the enemy's plans and capabilities was the job of the 1st Section of the 1st Division. I sometimes heard what their estimates were, but I never saw them. I was so unfamiliar with the operations side of the picture that I did not even know at first what you meant by the TENGO Plan. Even the names of such plans and their meanings were a matter kept within the specific section charged with making them up.

Q.10. During the early planning stages, did you sit in on the meetings held by Admiral TOMIOKA and Capt. OHMAE of the 1st Dept?

A. I was never called into the conferences. Anyone outside of the planning section during a planning phase was considered almost like the enemy and was not admitted at all to the deliberations or their plans.

Q.11. Comdr. MIYAZAKI stated that quite often the head of the 5th Section sat in on meetings during the early planning stages. Was he mistaken in this?

A. They did not rely upon us, but made their own judgments in every case. During a conference they would call me in for perhaps ten minutes, give me the results of their considerations, then drive me out.

Q.12. Capt. OHMAE has given you credit for knowing much more than you give yourself credit for, and while it is true that your estimates were subject to change by the 1st Dept., actually many times they were accepted and used as originally provided. In the TENGO Plan, your estimates with regard to the number of ships in the classification of aircraft carriers, small carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers which would be available for the defense of OKINAWA and, further, an estimate of the airplanes expected to operate against the Japanese home islands in support of that operation were used, and, I understand, very much as you prepared them. Before I go on, do you wish to comment?

A. This is the first time I have heard of it. I never received information direct from the 1st Section.

Q.13. I may say further that in inquiring about this information, I was told, Admiral TAKEUCHI knows all about this. He supplied the information. You should ask him".

A. If the Planning Section wanted any information, they would ask me for it, and I would give them the most up-to-date information I had. At the time of the OKINAWA Operation estimate, my information was based upon a modification of basic information received in the form of captured documents and other captured materials from planes shot down on FORMOSA towards the end of September 1944 in

Interrogation of Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru, IJN

carrier air strikes. It was upon that basic information, as modified, that I made up my estimates of the American strength available for the OKINAWA Operation.

Q.14. You have told us about the source and have stated that the estimates were arrived at through statistical analysis of a great volume of information. Will you tell us something about the method of statistical analysis which eventually produced the estimate?

A. What I mean by statistical analysis was arrived at in the following manner: For a number of years, I gathered together pieces of information on a historical basis from such sources as books written on the subject, radio announcements, etc. Secondly, I would combine this information with information compiled on a geographical basis, based during the war upon such sources as radio broadcasts, sightings of your task forces and planes, and combine this temporal and spacial system of information, which I kept filed, with other pieces of information as they came to my knowledge. For example, an announcement of your press or radio which stated the date on which a carrier was launched; based on my past information, historical information, with regard to carriers, I could determine that within a certain period of time, say six months, this ship would be operating in the Pacific Area. Another source that I used was announcements by your side of sinkings and damage to ships and the loss of aircraft. I assumed that these announcements were the very least which you had lost. It then became a problem of determining the status of those ships which were only damaged or which may have been sunk. That could often be determined one way or another by such methods as sub-sightings or aircraft sightings. All of this information which I was able to combine together in my files over long period of years from all these sources, this combination is what I consider to be statistical analysis. We did not have a world wide organization gathering this type of information. It was a matter of statistical analysis by the individual officers concerned with the job here in TOKYO.

Q.15. How many people did you have working with you to assist in this statistical analysis?

A. I reported these figures in a written answer. Including myself, there were 41 officers at one time. Thirty-seven (37) of these were temporary and reserve officers. These had only 10 to 12 months' experience. Beside that, we had about a dozen employees, most of them young girls, used as office girls. At the beginning of my service, I had only 5 subordinates. Since the summer of last year, only one year before the end of the war, I had the staff described above. The 37 temporary and reserve officers came in the summer of 1944. They were graduated about June of last year. There was no place to put them as island bases were taken and ships were sunk. Consequently, I was able to get them for my section.

Q.16. The Communications Dept. at OWADA also supplied information, did it not?

A. A copy of any information they had of interest to me was sent to me.

Q.17. What was the nature of this information?

A. Information they gathered went directly to the 1st Section as they were directly subordinate to that section. I felt that inasmuch as much of their information was intelligence in nature, it should be mine. Such was not the case. I received only occasional copies.

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Q.18. What types of information did you receive in detail?

A. The movement of planes from PEARL HARBOR to the south and west. Movement of large forces of planes out and back to bases in NEW GUINEA. There were many cases where an occasional copy arrived as much as ten days later, after it had gone to the 1st Section. Sometimes, information with an October 1 date was received October 10.

Q.19. Did the Navy send any of its officers or anyone else to the AKASAKA Training School in TOKYO?

A. I cannot even guess. I do not know of the existence of such a school.

Q.20. In the information supplied us, there is the statement that 200,000 Yen was appropriated as an extraordinary budget for naval operations in foreign countries. How was that money spent?

A. This is the first I have ever heard of this appropriation, but I believe it was probably allotted for the most part to diplomatic personnel, such as attaches, in what might be broadly called intelligence activities, such as buying books, newspapers, etc. I do not believe that very much was received by any one attache. The man in Washington might have received as much as ten thousand yen. Probably the man in China received only two or three thousand in this type of work.

Q.21. Do you know Admiral CHUDO?

A. I know the gentlemen. About two years ago, he was in Headquarters where he was Chief of the 8th Section, concerned with England. I do not know in detail, but I believe at the present time he is in the Southwestern area attached to Field Marshal TERAUCHI's headquarters, perhaps in FRENCH INDO-CHINA, perhaps in RANGOON, carrying out liaison duties between the Army and Navy forces in the area.

Q.22. When Burma came under Japanese occupation, Admiral CHUDO was appointed naval attache at RANGOON. Did reports issued by the naval attache, for instance at RANGOON, ever come directly to the 3rd Dept?

A. I believe so, but it doesn't pertain to my section. It came under the 8th Section concerned with England, India, Burma, Australia. Admiral CHUDO was once the Chief of that section, and his position now includes that area, I believe. His report was sent to that section.

Q.23. Were the reports of the Naval Attache in Argentina sent to your section?

A. Yes. His name was Rear Admiral YOKISHIDA.

Q.24. What sort of reports did you receive from him?

A. He sent reports until late 1943. Diplomatic relations were cut at that time so we do not know how he is doing now. Before that time, he sent general affairs about Latin America and sometimes about the U.S. Navy, but his post was so far from the U.S., we could obtain reports more easily from the radio.

Q.25. What information did you get through representatives in Mexico?

Interrogation of Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru, IJN

A. Mexico is nearer than Argentina to the U.S., but that post was removed before the war so when I came to the post, there was no attache there, consequently, no reports. Before that time, I believe the attache in Mexico could supply some information about the U.S. It was not an important post.

Q.26. When did you receive reliable information of the shape and capabilities of the B-29?

A. We couldn't guess the shape of the B-29 until November of last year. We could only guess what general type of ship it was. I suppose it might resemble a B-17 or a B-24. It is an Army matter. About last September, we issued a report on that plane, but I had no information, so my subordinate drew a picture and asked me whether we should issue it or not. I laughed.

Q.27. Prior to the war, according to a rather voluminous document which was supplied us, the Navy had an organization working through the Naval Attache, called a Special Service Organization, and in the report, the statement was made that the reports of the Special Service field organization came directly to the Naval Staff in TOKYO and to the respective geographical section of the Intelligence Dept. What sort of Special Service organization was that?

A. As you know, I was not attached to the Intelligence activities at the beginning of the war. However, during my 30 years experience in the Japanese Navy, during which time I have had some connection with Intelligence activities, I have never heard of such an organization. If we had such an organization, it would have been a good idea, but we did not. On the basis of the money appropriated, 200,000 Yen, for extraordinary expenses, had that money been distributed in the U.S. at 7 Yen to the dollar, it would have given them a very inadequate amount of money to carry on widespread organization in the U.S., even had it been used for such purposes, which to my knowledge it was not. After the end of the last war, the British Navy in furtherance of its aims in obtaining oil fields built up some sort of an organization in the Near East, but the Japanese have never had such an organization, inasmuch as we are, comparatively speaking, a very poor country.

Q.28. Admiral CHUDO stated that it was part of his duties to form a data collecting organization. Was this with the Navy's knowledge?

A. If Admiral CHUDO made such a statement, it must have been based upon directives received by him from some Fleet Headquarters or from Marshal TERAUCHI. Certainly such an organization or any organization remotely resembling it has never been contemplated at the Naval General Headquarters in TOKYO. I do not know where the term is used by civilian elements for a regular civilian government political organization. We saw such a name in the press during the China incident as TOKUMU KIKAN, but as we had no relation with such a matter, we do not know what it meant, so I believe that special term was concocted by journalists. Such a name has attention value or interest to the world, but I do not know what it really means. If you mean it to be some big organization in Intelligence activities, our Navy had none of them. For America, I had only three staff officers and you over-praise my poor services to my country during my three years service. I cannot even dream there was any such organization in our Navy Dept.

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 398

(Jap Intell No 26)

PLACE: TOKYO

DATE: 15 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Duties of TOKUMU KIKAN (Special Service Organization)

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J. was second in command of the CHINA section of the second division of the Imperial General Staff and as such received all intelligence concerning CHINA, some of which came through TOKUMU KIKAN. His military background follows:

Graduated from military academy 1931

Routine assignments to 1937

1937-1938 War College

1938-1940 Supply division, 109th Division, Kwantung Army.

1940 Instructor at cavalry school

1941-1944 Intelligence section CHINA Armies

Aug 1944 to end of War: 7th Section, 2nd Division of Imperial General Staff.

Where Interviewed: Room 748, Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. PAINE PAUL, USNR
Major R. S. SPILMAN, Jr, AC.

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CAREY, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

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Interrogation of Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J., Japanese Army.

SUMMARY

1. TOKUMU KIKAN (literal translation "Special Service Organization") is an organization set up under the Area Commanders in various theaters. The purposes of the organization in CHINA were stated by Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI to be to:

- a. Assist the Area Army in governing the civil population.
- b. Looking after the health and food for the civilian population.
- c. Acquire food and supplies for the Japanese Army from local sources.
- d. Check on the attitude of the civil population.

2. The organization and strength of the unit in CHINA is described (see attached table). According to YAMAZAKI, it was entirely under the control of the Area Army Commander and received no instructions from TOKYO. Reports from TOKUMU KIKAN were usually included in area army reports and details of its operation in the field were not known to Imperial Headquarters.

3. Units were attached to armies in MANCHURIA, CHINA and BURMA and in other areas this function was performed by Military Intelligence.

4. Selection of personnel was made by the Area Army. Training was done locally, no course being given in the Empire to provide special advance training.

Interrogation of Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J., Japanese Army.

Q.1. In what capacity did you serve in TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. I was second in command of the CHINA section of the second Division of the Imperial General Staff, the Commanding Officer was Col. HARUKI, Yoshita. I have not served in TOKUMU KIKAN.

Q.2. Define TOKUMU KIKAN.

A. It is an agency which does several things. I don't know the details of any organization except in CHINA. There its functions were:


- a. Assist the Army in governing the population.
- b. See that the civilian population had food and medical care.
- c. Acquire food and other supplies for the Army from the local people.
- d. Get information as to the attitude of the people, etc.

Q.3. Is TOKUMU KIKAN an Army organization?

A. Yes. I don't know of any Navy branch.

Q.4. Give the organization of TOKUMU KIKAN.

A. It is an organization reporting only to the Commander of an Area Army (HOMENGUN) who reports directly to DAIHONEY (Imperial Headquarters). The organization varies with the Army to which it is attached. Since no two are alike no generalizations can be made, but the example below of the organization in the Northern Area Command in CHINA shows how one Army was organized.



There was no control of TOKUMU KIKAN from TOKYO. The Area Army Commander controlled the organization in MANCHURIA after the occupation. At first control of the civil population was handled by the Kwantung Army through the Division in charge of an area. The handling was not uniform and was unsatisfactory so the Commanding General set up the TOKUMU KIKAN to handle this phase of the occupation. It was organized in the field and controlled in the field. All instructions to and all reports from TOKUMU KIKAN were controlled by the Commanding General in the field. He reported to Imperial General Headquarters. From handling the civilian matters it grew into handling all intelligence not considered military intelligence. The present head Lt. Gen. DOIHARA, Kenji was chief of a Division at MUKDEN and did so well that he finally became head of the whole organization.

Interrogation of Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J., Japanese Army (contd)

Q.5. Were units of TOKUMU KIKAN attached to all area Armies?


A. There was one attached to the Armies in MANCHURIA, CHINA and BURMA. I don't think there was one attached to Armies in NEW GUINEA or the PHILIPPINES. In the last two places, the work normally by TOKUMU KIKAN was performed by Military Intelligence.

In 1943 the job in CHINA was pretty well finished and the organization was disbanded. Its personnel became a sort of liaison pool between the Japanese and friendly (to Japanese) Chinese troops. It retained some of its intelligence functions, how much I don't know.

Q.6. Describe the organization of TOKUMU KIKAN below the Area Army level.

A. The chart which follows shows the organization from GUN (Army) down:

TOKUMU KIKAN Detachment at Division (or Independent Brigade) level



There was no organization below that shown on the table. The above men had all the contacts with natives. If an Army Unit needed help of TOKUMU KIKAN it applied to the nearest office and got the help.

Q.7. Were not the TOKUMU KIKAN units charged with some duties such as espionage, sabotage, organizing the natives, etc?

A. No directives calling for this kind of work were ever issued from my office in TOKYO and I don't know anything about it. I had no part of any kind in these activities and know of no units which did this kind of thing. Individual units acting on their own responsibility may have done a good deal of this and done it well, but I know no details.

Q.8. Did DEIHONEI issue any orders to TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. No. We would ask the Commanding General for information and he furnished it from intelligence sources available to him.

Q.9. What kind of reports were made by TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. I don't know. Information came through Area Army and I did not know the source.

Q.10. Can you give us the name of a man who served with the organization in CHINA?

A. I can't but will furnish a name through Major HOTTA (Liaison Officer with Imperial Army and Navy).

Interrogation of Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J., Japanese Army (contd)

Q.11. How were men selected for TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. The military personnel was selected by the Area Army Commander. He selected men with a China background and trained them at Headquarters. The civilians were either picked locally or sometimes sent from TOKYO. With regard to the question as to what reports were made, sometimes TOKUMU KIKAN reports were attached as appendices to reports from the Area Armies.

Q.12. What do you know about a school for training for TOKUMU KIKAN in AKASIKU-KU TOKYO?

A. I never heard of it.

Q.13. Where were men trained for this service?

A. All training was done locally.

Q.14. Was there a similar organization in the Navy?

A. I don't know.

Q.15. What is KAIGUN TOKUMU BU?

A. I never heard of it.

Q.16. Was there any connection between KEMPEI TAI and TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. No. KEMPEI TAI had the same kind of organization and there was some liaison between the two organizations. They both furnished intelligence information.

Q.17. What is the difference between the type of information furnished by the KEMPEI and TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. Both furnished the same kind of information and there was considerable overlap. The primary job of KEMPEI TAI in CHINA was to police the Japanese army and Japanese civilians there.

Q.18. Did TOKUMU KIKAN interrogate Prisoners of War?

A. Very little, so far as I know.

Q.19. Who did interrogate them?

A. This was the responsibility of the regular army intelligence section.