EXTRACT

THE SUNDAY STAR (Washington, D. C.), 8 April 1945

... ... ...

Domei said Horimesa Matsuzaka, minister of justice in the Koiso cabinet, would continue in that post.

The Japanese agency listed the other new cabinet members as follows:

Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, minister of munitions and also minister of transportation and communications.
Toyosaku Hirose, finance.
Genki Abe, home affairs.
Tadahiko Okada, welfare.
Kozo Ota, education.
Tadao Iseiguro, agriculture and commerce.
Vice Admiral Seizo Sakonji and Hyogoro Sakurai, state ministers.
Dr. Hiroshi Shimomura, state minister and president of the board of information.
Hisatosune Sakomizu, chief cabinet secretary.
Chokkyo Murase, chief of the legislative bureau.
Extract


Chokuyo Murase, Director of the Bureau of Legislation:

He is a native of the City of Nagoya, born in December 1880. He was graduated from the Law Department of Tokyo Imperial University in 1914 and began his government career in the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry. He has served as a Cabinet secretary, councilor of the Cabinet's Bureau of Legislation, director of the Patent Bureau of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, and director of the Commerce Bureau in the same ministry. In December 1935 he became Vice-Minister of Commerce and Industry, holding the post for 2 years. In 1938 he served as Vice-President of the Commodities Regulations Board. He was appointed director of the Bureau of Legislation in July 1940 in the second Konoye Cabinet and held the post until October 1941 when he resigned and left government service. After his resignation he was nominated to the House of Peers.
EXTRACT


Lt. Gen. Tashio Akinaga, President of the General Planning Board.

He is 52 years old and was born in Oita Prefecture. Among the positions he has held are: administrative official in the Emergency Resources Investigation Bureau; investigation official with the former Ministry of Commerce and Industry; member of the Planning Board; and director of the First Section of the Planning Board. He was also attached to the Inspectorate General of Military Aviation. In November, 1944, he was named chief of Munitions Control of the Chugoku District, and in March this year given the additional post of chief of Munitions Control in the Regional Administrative Council.
Q. Please state the names of such Japanese personnel as you remember at Camp 1.

A. I remember Lt. Okamoto who was in charge of the camp farm until he left the camp in March 1944; he was very vicious and brutal to the Americans in the camp. Also Lt. Yamagi who treated the Americans fairly decently. As I recall he came to Camp 1 in about June, 1944 and left in about September, 1944 with a prisoner of war detail bound for Japan. We subsequently heard that he became commanding officer at Bilibid Prison in Manila. At Camp 1, Lt. Yamagi was the executive officer. I also recall a Lt. Ota who was a supply officer at Camp 1 and treated the Americans decently so far as I know. There was also a Japanese superior private named Honda who handled supplies and acted as interpreter at Camp 1. In addition there was a Doctor Shibira who arrived at Camp 1 early in 1943 and remained there until the Japanese personnel left on January 7, 1945. He was a vicious man and required all dysentery cases to work on the camp farm despite their illness.
12 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR USE AS A BASIS OF REPLY TO QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL.

Question No. 1 Please state the major considerations which went into the conclusion that - "Nor is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan."

Evidence that the Japs gave the Germans prior notice of the attack on Pearl Harbor has not come to my attention.

There were great distances between the theatres of war in Europe and the Pacific. The logistical factors and long time period involved in shifting Allied resources between the two theatres made "close" strategic coordination unnecessary in order to achieve a considerable proportion of the re-summation possible from strategic coordination.

The effort was achieved by dividing the attention and the resources of the Allied nations, particularly those of the U.S. For instance, an Australian division was returned home from Egypt. New Zealand resources were kept from the European war. U.K. and Indian forces were held in India and India was reinforced by British forces. The divided commitment of U.S. resources is well-known and requires no further comment. The coordination achieving these results required little or no consultation and planning. It was automatic.

The lack of "close" coordination is indicated by:

(a) A question as to whether Japan informed Germany of her intention to start a war on 7 December, 1941.

(b) The fact that Germany was fighting the U.S.S.R. but not the U.S. Hence "close" coordination should have involved consideration of a Japanese attack on the rear of the U.S.S.R.

(c) Japan preserved a strict neutrality toward the large number of Soviet ships (burned over to the Soviet by the U.S.) carrying U.S. Lend Lease to Vladivostok.

(d) Japan did not press to the utmost her attack to the west beyond Burma when such pressure might have diverted more Allied resources from Europe to that area.

(e) No evidence of a "close" cooperation on intelligence and operational information has come to my attention.

(f) A major German effort in the Egyptian-Suez area, which might have collapsed the Middle East and flanked the U.S.S.R. on the south, would have coordinated reasonably with a Japanese strategy putting pressure on India. This major German effort was not made -- nor the Japanese effort.

Question No. 2. Please give facts and figures substantiating this statement in order that the same shall not be considered as a conclusion but as a statement of concrete facts.

See answers to question No. 1.
Question No. 3. Please break down the statement into the effect which lack of cooperation between Japan and Germany had upon the success of the Allied Nations' forces in the various campaigns.

Any answer to this question is purely speculative. See statement on question No. 1. For instance, one item of possible coordination might have involved simultaneous attacks on the U.S.S.R. by Germany and Japan while the U.S. still withheld herself from the war. Hence any conjectures concerning the "various campaigns" must rest on a series of assumptions which make them of no value.

Question No. 4. Please state the probable result and the difference in time in the end of the war, had there been the same efficient cooperation between the military forces of Japan and Germany as there was between the Military, Naval and Air Forces of the Allied Powers.

See answer to question three and page 5 of Defense document No. 1674 which is Exhibit 2766-A

"Had the U.S.S.R. and the British Army of the Nile been defeated in 1942, as they well might if the Germans, Japanese, and Italians had better coordinated their plans and resources and successive operations, we should have stood today in the western Hemisphere confronted by enemies who controlled a greater part of the world."

Question No. 5. Please state whether or not there was ever a concrete exchange of ideas, of information and of battle experience between Germany and Japan, and the probable effect of the lack of such exchange of information, if so be the case.

No evidence of any material exchange has been presented to me. The effect of such exchange or lack thereof is a conjectural matter particularly since the terrain and nature of the combat operations varied greatly between the European and Pacific theaters.

Question No. 6. State for how long a time the United States was preparing for the Pacific war before the actual outbreak of hostilities, giving some breakdown as to the dispatch of units to the Philippines and other points in the Far East of troops prepared for Far Eastern combat.

The U.S. did not initiate a major effort to maintain its own security until the fall of France in June 1940.

(any data as to dispatch of units must come from files of G.S.U.S.A. - probably OPD files).

Question No. 7. Since the surrender of Japan and Germany has there been any evidence to the contrary, or is it still believed that Japan acted unilaterally in her war and not in accordance with the unified strategy plan? If additional evidence has been discovered to confirm this statement, please document and give a synopsis of the newly discovered evidence on this point.

None has been brought to my attention.

Italian participation in the War.

Question No. 1. Please state more concretely the effect of Mussolini's unilateral action in attacking Greece and Egypt, and whether or not this action caught the Germans unprepared for the Greek and Egypt campaigns.

It opened another front before the Germans had completed the campaign in the west by reducing the British Isles. See Def. Doc. No. 1674. Exhibit 2766-A, page 1 and question 2, which indicate basic economic reasons.
Italian Participation in the War (contd)

Question No. 2. Please state the major considerations for the statement "from the very beginning Italy was a burden on the German war potential."

See succeeding sentence in Def. Doc. No. 1874 to quotation in above question.

Question No. 3. It has been charged that there was close collaboration between Italy and Germany militarily. Please state whether or not this is a fact and if your answer is in the negative, please give some detail in justification of the answer.

Def. Docs. No. 1874 records Keitel's and Jodl's views on instances of non-collaboration in high policy matters. The frequent conferences between Hitler and Mussolini, the close operational collaboration required by use of Italy as a German line of communications to Rommel's forces and the combined command exercised by Rommel, all seem to indicate a generally close collaboration militarily.
TRANSLATION OF TRIAL VERDICTS BEGINS

Dispatch in English Morse from AFP Correspondent in Tokyo for AFP Agencies in the Far East, Aug. 1, 1948, 4:30 a.m. EST--H

(Text)

"Tokyo, Aug. 1--The last stage of Tokyo trial will begin tomorrow when Japanese and Allied translators will be held incommunicado for a 6 to 7-week job of translating the several thousand pages of the historic judgment. Observers generally estimate that the judgment may be read during the latter part of September. The reading will take a few days, beginning with the findings and ending with the sentences.

"The 11 judges have been meeting in the chambers ever since the conclusion of the proceedings on Apr. 16, with the exception of Lord Patrick, judge for Great Britain, who has been ill in a hospital. Indian Judge Pal left for his home country and may not be back for the reading of the judgment, but he has left his findings and conclusions.

"The current Japanese press insists on the fact that the judgment will be reviewed by MacArthur, who will have full authority to reduce the sentences. It announces that Japanese and American defense counsels will prepare a petition to MacArthur as soon as the judgment is ready and report that American Attorney Blakeny, who defends General Umezu and Foreign Minister Togo, will direct the proceedings for the appeal.

"According to the same reports American defense counsel Cunningham, former adviser to the American Military Government in Germany, who defends former Ambassador to Berlin General Gahima, will soon return to the United States to campaign against the trial and arouse public opinion."

Translation Staff

Dispatch in English Morse from Reuters Correspondent in Tokyo for Reuters Far Eastern Agencies, Aug. 3, 1948, 5:10 a.m. EST--H

(Text)

"Tokyo, Aug. 3--Thirty-five men and one woman entered a life of virtual imprisonment yesterday in one of the remaining luxurious homes where they have begun the translation of the verdict and sentences of ex-Premier Hideki Tojo and 24 other major war crimes suspects. The group, which consists of 12 Americans, 24 Japanese, and an American secretary will be cut off entirely from the outside world for approximately 6 weeks, the time estimated as required to complete the translations."
"At the same time a four-men brain trust to direct party policies was erected under the party president, concurrently Premier Ashida. The brain trust named a 'staff committee' composed of Wataru Narahashi and Ken Inukai who were both recently cleared of purge charges.

"Other members are Director General of Economic Stabilization Board Takeo Kurusu and Welfare Minister Gichirō Takeda.

"The need for strengthening the Democratic Party was felt by Ashida, because of a threat by Socialist Party Chairman Tetsu Katayama to demand the dissolution of the Diet immediately after the passage of the Civil Service Law in special session to be called in mid-September. With the major Government party Socialists threatening to withdraw their support of Ashida's Government, the third establishing a new 'Central Party' by joining hands with the more progressive elements of Ashida's Democratic Party.

"Chairman of the People's Cooperatives Takeo Miki has been actively campaigning for the merger, which will mean that the Democratic Party will split into two with the more conservative members forced either to join Shigeru Yoshida's ultraconservative Democratic Liberal Party or the smaller opposition parties and groups.

"In any event, Premier Ashida, and consequently his Democratic Party, is in a tough spot over the impending revision of the Civil Service Law to prohibit Government employees from strikes and collective bargaining. Due to SCAP MacArthur's letter advocating the revision, which will virtually take away the labor unions major weapon, 'work stoppage,' it is not considered possible that the revision will be rejected by the Japanese Diet. However, the result will be that Ashida will be violently opposed by the labor unions, which is the most articulate, the largest, and the most powerful of Japan's organized groups.

"This is tantamount to a political death sentence for many of Democrats in the next general elections, which appear inevitable in the near future, if the Social Democratic Party, together with Democratic Liberal Party, carry out their threat to demand the Diet's dissolution in the near future. Hence, many Democrats are looking for another party to join, which at least does not have the unpopular name of the Democratic Party."
Contents of file transferred to 101-384-2 on 6/7/45.

M. Lah.
Domei said Baron Masayuki Matsuka, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Koiso Cabinet, which preceded Kantaro Suzuki's government, had been named to the same post in the new Cabinet.
Contents of this file
combined with 101-125 as
Serial 3.

12 June 1945
Koga, Admiral

(OSS 714215)
JAPAN 1943
ADMIRAL MINEICHI KOGA,
C-IN-C OF COMBINED
FLEET. NIPPON TIMES
WEEKLY. OSS-P-12111
Jap Fleet Admiral Koga Captured by Filipinos, But Released, Dying, to Save Natives’ Lives

By RICHARD BERGHLZ
Associated Press War Correspondent.

CEBU, P.I., March 31. (Delayed).
--Tokyo radio wasn’t kidding when it announced March 4 that Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander of the combined Japanese fleet, was killed in a plane crash.

But Tokyo didn’t mention that the paunchy, balding admiral was captured by Filipino guerrillas and released, a dying man, only to stop Japanese troops from murdering natives en masse.

The remarkable story of Koga’s last days were told to the here today by Lt. Col. James Cushing of Downey, Calif., who held him prisoner and had to decide to trade Koga’s life for the lives of innocent civilians.

Col. Cushing, a mining engineer in the Philippines when the war broke out, is the leader of Filipino guerrillas on Cebu, officially credited by Army sources with killing more than 10,000 Japanese.

When Admiral Koga’s big transport plane crashed off the coast of Cebu, the few people to get to the wreck were Filipinos.

"There were 27 passengers and crew members on the plane," Col. Cushing said, "but only 12 survived. When they reached the beach the Filipinos met them. Ten were turned over to us but unfortunately two were taken to the local mayor who in turn gave them up to the Japs.

"One of our prisoners was Admiral Koga. He didn’t tell us that. He mumbled something about being a general. But we got word who he was and the Japs later confirmed it.

"Anyway, we took our 10 prisoners up into the mountains and started to make it to headquarters. Koga and three others were badly wounded. We had to carry them all the way.

"Immediately the Japs, who learned the story from the two survivors they had, started out after us in force. It was slow going for us. We had to carry these four little patients and had to be doubly careful to avoid any possible traps and to conceal the presence of our prisoners.

"I guess we should have known from the beginning we couldn’t keep Koga. The Japs had enough strength to throw against us, so sooner or later they would catch us.

"But they took it out on the civilians. In following us they passed through villages and barrios we had left. They were absolutely ruthless. They tortured and killed innocent people to gain information and often killed apparently just as an object lesson.

"In one village they killed more than 200 people because they wouldn’t tell where we had taken Koga.

"Col. Cushing paused a moment, then told how the 58-year-old enemy admiral was given every medical attention possible by the under-equipped guerrillas.

"Finally," Col. Cushing related, "I could see it was hopeless. The longer we held out the more innocent people the Japs killed. Besides Koga was a very sick man and it would do us no good if he died on our hands.

"So I sent a note to the Jap commander of the Cebu garrison. I told him I would release Koga to him if he would promise to stop murdering Filipino civilians and if he would return to Cebu City and leave the country people in peace.

"I suppose you wonder why I even considered trusting the Jap commander to keep his word not to molest our people. It seemed to me it was the only logical thing for me to do. Koga was our only talking point and I hoped the Japs would figure the face-saving value of his rescue would make such a concession worthy of fulfillment.

USA War Crimes Office
11 APR 1945
Right after our first bombing of Palau, a Japanese Admiral and a Japanese General were flown from Palau to Cebu. This plane crashed in guerilla occupied territory in Cebu. Neither of these high ranking passengers were hurt. They were taken into custody by Cushing's men. Major McClenahan says that he got a letter from Cushing reporting the matter just prior to his departure for Australia. He is not certain as to what disposition was made of these officers; whether they were interned in Cebu or sent to Australia.
JAPAN 1939 YOSHI SUKE AIKAWA, PRES. MANCHURIA INDUS. DEVELOPMENT CORP.
FROM: JAPAN TIMES WEEKLY, VOL. II, NO. 1, JAN. 1, 1939, PG 53, OSS P-4131-L
I also remember being in Sinalonan, Pangasinan Province, Luzon, in August of 1942. There I heard General Tanaka, whom I understood was the commanding officer of Luzon after General Homma left, give a speech to the Filipinos in that town. He told them that the Japanese were there to stay and that the American influence was going to be wiped out. He did not threaten them and made no attempt to scare them. I understand that General Tanaka left Luzon sometime in the spring of 1943 and was succeeded by General Kuroda. I have never seen General Kuroda.
Lt Gen Shigemori Auroda, CG in the Philippines in 1943, shown waiting at Yokohama Prison for transfer to Omori Prison camp, where he will await trial as a war criminal.

Photo: Pierce
I also remember being in Binalonan, Pangasinan Province, Luzon, in August of 1942. There I heard General Tanaka, whom I understood was the commanding officer of Luzon after General Homma left, give a speech to the Filipinos in that town. He told them that the Japanese were there to stay and that the American influence was going to be wiped out. He did not threaten them and made no attempt to scare them. I understand that General Tanaka left Luzon sometime in the spring of 1943 and was succeeded by General Kuroda. I have never seen General Kuroda.
4 More Jap Admirals
Join Long Death List

By the Associated Press.

SAN FRANCISCO, July 6.—A Japa-
nese vice admiral and three rear
admirals today joined the enemy
Navy's long death list of top officers.
The Tokyo radio listed the deaths
as Vice Admiral Katsukyo Shimoda
and Rear Admirals Goaburo Nagui-
chii, Uroku Hashimoto and Kureo
Yamauchi, in a broadcast recorded
by the Federal Communications
Commission. No details were given.
JAPAN 1934
MR. MITSUTOYO ARUGA, PRESIDENT.
CHOSÉN INDUSTRIAL BANK LTD.
THE JAPAN MAGAZINE.
VOL. XXIV, NO. 3,
1934, P. 131.
OSS-P-10139
JAPAN 1940
MITSUTOYO ARUGA, b. 1873. PRES.,
THE NIPPON HIGH-FREQUENCY WAVES HEAVY
INDUSTRY, LTD. PRESENT-DAY NIPPON,
1940.
OSS-P-12356

mitutoyo aruga
recorded work
WAR CRIMES OFFICE

Judge Advocate General's Office

No abstract.
JAPAN TOKYO PUB. 1939
KENJI KODAMA, PRES.,
JAPAN FOREIGN TRADE FED.
'JAPAN IN 1939' JAPAN
TIMES & MAIL, pg 33
OSS P-2054-L

Kenji Kodama

X

recorded - mb
JAPAN 1938 SOICHIRO ASANO,
PRES. ASANO PORTLAND CEMENT CO.
FROM: JAPAN TIMES & MAIL
CEMENT NUMBER: 1938 pg. 1.
OSS P-2096-L
AREA 11 JAPAN HON. YAKICHI ATAKA
BBD. 1940 MEMBER OF HOUSE OF PEERS
PRESIDENT OF ATAKA & CO. LTD.
PRESIDENT OF OSAKA CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE. OSS 712460

Yakichi Ataka

recorded: mb

Eastern Div.
JAPAN MARCH 10, 1936 AKIRA
ARIIYOSHI, FORMER AMBASSADOR
TO CHINA. FROM: PRESENT
DAY NIPPON - THE OLD & THE
NEW, No. 12, 1936 pg 25
OSS P-4360-L
MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo
SUBJECT: Clarification of Status of Former Suspected War Criminal

The following named Japanese listed on Memorandum indicated below is deleted from said list, is released from suspicion as a Suspected War Criminal, and henceforth will be returned to his former status.

NAME MEMORANDUM 5 Nov 46 PAGE NO
HASEGAWA, Kiyoshi Adm 1

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

[Signature]

for
JOHN F. COOLEY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.
EXTRACT

List of Major Japanese War Criminals, dated 14 Feb 1946.

************

19. **AOKI, Kazuo.**

Minister of Finance

Crimes:

(1) In August 1939 Aoki was Finance Minister in the Abe Cabinet and supported the Japanese militarists with his financial power in intensifying their war of aggression.

(2) As Director-General of the Banning Board, he was responsible for the planning of Japanese economic aggression in China.

(3) When he was the highest adviser to the puppet regime at Nanjing, he urged it to establish a reserve bank and issue an unlimited amount of spurious currency for squeezing the people in the occupied areas.

(4) In October 1941, he became the First Minister of East Asian Affairs. In that capacity he might be regarded as Japan's prime agent of the invasion and subjugation of China.
OSS P-4207-L
JAPAN 1935 BARON SEIICSUKE GOH, PRES. JAPAN ECONOMIC FEDERATION. FROM 'NIPPO' 1935, VOL 4, p. 27.

Baron Seinosuke Goh

recorded rules
President Yakichi Ataka
JAPAN 1939 YAKICHI ATAKA, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, FROM: JAPAN'S EXPORT TRADE & INDUSTRY, OSAKA MAINICHI, 1939, pg 14. OSS-P-2179-L
JAPAN 1939
HIDEO BEKKU.
THE FIRST GOV'T-APPOINTED MAYOR
OF THE DAIFEN MUNICIPALITY.
MANCHURIA, VOL. 4, NO. 10, 15
MAY 1939, P. 1194.
OSS-P-9563

Hideo Bekku
recorded run

Eastern Div.
JAPAN 1926
PRINCE CHICHIBU, SON OF THE EMPEROR. PHOTO:
OXFORD, 4 JAN. 1926.
CSS-P-9146

Prince Chichibu

Recorded route

101-337-1

Eastern Div.
THE EVENING STAR (Washington, D. C.), 6 July 1945

4 MORE JAP ADMIRALS JOIN LONG DEATH LIST

A Japanese Vice Admiral and three rear admirals today joined the enemy Navy's long death list of top officers.

The Tokyo radio listed the dead as Vice Admiral Katsukiyo Shinoda and Rear Admirals Gosaburo Noguchi, Uroku Rashimoto and Kirozo Yamauchi, in a broadcast recorded by the Federal Communications Commission. No details were given.