HOG WILD-ONE B-29
OVER KOREA
AND
THE CONSPIRACY THAT NEVER WAS
Hog Wild – 1945: One B-29, One Soviet Conspiracy

27 July 2012

Dwight R. Rider
This book is dedicated to several people:

First and always, to the crew of Hog Wild, you will always be remembered.

To the late Roger Mansell who dedicated a large portion of his life to researching prisoners of war held by the Japanese during WWII and passed on during the writing of this book. Roger was a dear friend who had a positive impact on my life. Roger was and will always be an American hero and a National Treasure.

To the late Paul Fisher (27 May 1982 – 25 July 2009) of Minnesota who was murdered by an unknown assailant during the writing of this book. You are sorely missed. A special thank you goes out to Minneapolis Homicide Detectives of the 3rd Precinct and the Crime Stoppers of Minnesota for all your efforts in solving this senseless crime.

To my daughter Mackenzie Brooks Rider for simply for being a far better daughter than anyone deserves, and to my step-sons Michael and Peter Nguyen who helped in the research, editing and formatting of this book. Without all of their support this work would have never been completed.

To Barb Hartwig and Terry Rainey without whose support and friendship this book would have never been written.
FORWARD

I first became interested in Japan’s World War II era atomic bomb program when stationed with the U.S. Air Force in the Republic of Korea in the mid-1980s. It was there that I read Robert Wilcox’s book, Japan’s Secret War: Japan’s Race against Time to build its Own Atomic Bomb. Published in 1985 and available in the Kunsan Air Base Stars and Stripes Book Store the book shed light on a shadowy bit of long-since forgotten Japanese military history dating into WWII. At the time, as a targeting intelligence specialist, the Wilcox work created in me an interest in possible origins of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Robert Wilcox’s research was based largely upon an article written by David Snell (28 Mar 1921–Jul 1987) and published in the Atlanta Constitution in October 1945. Snell’s article was front page news. Its headline shouted at readers; “Japan Developed Atom Bomb; Russia Grabbed Scientists.” The article then, as now remains the subject of intense review, myth and legend. Hog Wild – 1945, One B-29 and A Soviet Conspiracy explores but one portion of the multi-element account of Japan’s atomic bomb program as written by David Snell in 1946.

On the surface the story that Snell wrote appears to be a largely correct accounting of what was then known about Japan’s wartime atomic research project, reportedly located in in northern Korea during the war. Examined in detail decades later, parts of the story continue to appear to be correct while other parts of the story cannot withstand exhaustive inquiry. Some of the errors contained within the original story are likely the result of incomplete information; information that Snell did not have at the time the story was written. These errors only become apparent decades after the story was written as more information was released into the public through the US National Archives. Other parts of the story remain to be proved or disproved. The parts that remain to be proven mostly relate to the existence of the facilities required to build a uranium-based bomb in the area of Konan during the period 1940-1945. Other than the event itself, as this book will show, there was little to connect the loss of the bomber in 1945, to the existence of the Japanese program in Konan. The two issues, the bomber and the bomb, are largely unrelated.

Oddly enough however, when David Snell included comments about the B-29 lost over northern Korea he was on to something – but it is doubtful that he ever knew what it was. What led to the story of 1946 also remains in question. The motivations that led to the publishing of the story in 1946 have never been fully examined, and with the passing of David Snell in 1987, are likely to be lost forever. Why the story was written, what it said about the US in 1946 may eventually be more important that what it revealed about Japan. There is also a possibility that the story published by David Snell was not written by David Snell. Future researchers would be wise to keep these ideas in mind. This book reveals secrets long-since held but largely forgotten.

As for myths and legends the Snell story has spawned more than a few; from Japanese scientists held against their will for decades inside Soviet Russia, to the existence of underground facilities of immense size near Hamhung, North Korea, to secret uranium production processes that defy the laws of physics. But none of those theories stand up to serious review. Even the North Korean news agency has issued comments about the tale.

In 1993, now assigned to the Joint Military Intelligence College in Washington DC and within easy driving distance of the National Archives at Adelphi, I reengaged the issue of Japan’s bomb. Not obsessed, but tenacious and persistent, I spent numerous Saturdays and late weekday nights at the National Archives researching leads, chasing clues, running down threads of information, locating misplaced and renumbered boxes of old dusty documents. Because most of the documentation concerning Japan’s wartime atomic energy research programs was reportedly destroyed in the days and weeks immediately after its surrender, or otherwise hidden, the history of its wartime bomb project remains shrouded in mystery. For numerous reasons the Japanese are loath to discuss the issue or even admit that such a program existed. What little that is known suggests a more multifaceted and complex research program than many are willing to admit.

Working at the time with Dr. Eric Hehl, we began pursuing the topic in a period when the copying of documents at the archives was done via Xerox – and a large quantity of dimes. No fault of Xerox but at the time a good day’s work might result in only 75 pages copied. Our efforts were for fairly good reasons; most dealing with Japan’s wartime effort to produce an atomic weapon. The singular goal of discovering the truth about Japan’s wartime nuclear research program was accompanied by a desire to gather other information as we found it concerning Japan’s chemical, biological, high-technology programs and prisoners of war (POW) held by the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria from 1942 through 1945. As technology changed so did we, moving to digital scanning and then to digital cameras. We worked with VHS tape, CDs, and eventually DVDs. Some of the processes we used were antiques when we used them; some of the technology we use today will one day become antiques.

Over a period of years Eric and I examined numerous documents, still photographs, rolls of WWII and Korean War Era gun-camera film taken over Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia argued and discussed the finer points of the materials we had found. In time the single stack of papers on one corner of my desk became a bookshelf. The bookshelf grew to be bookshelves in the plural, and now includes softcopy files in gigabyte chunks. The issue of Japan’s bomb program is extremely complex.
There are few research and development projects of any nation in peace or war that can exceed the scope and physical area encompassed by Japan’s wartime research program; that reach across so many countries or involved so many issues. Depending upon the definitions used, parts of the program were located in Burma, China, Malaysia, Manchuria, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The subject involves POWs, science, advanced technology, politics, international relations, capital investment and funding, physicists, engineers, lowly researchers, zaibatsu, Konzerns, military officers, politicians, the history of Asia, the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy, the Kwantung Army, Manchukuo, the Imperial family of Japan, Emperor Hirohito, etc., and more. 60 years since past, there are no simple answers

The ability to understand the Japanese atomic weapons program requires a capacity to think across multiple timelines of events, processes, developments, subjects; to understand multiple cultures, disciplines, histories, etc. It is a daunting subject, one that some might refer to as a morass – if not a quagmire. For everything that Eric and I accomplished, more needs to be done. In addition to all the above, there is the issue of Korea.

There is little about Korea that is not complicated or difficult to explain. The peninsula lies at the crossroads of Northeast Asia between the better known countries and cultures of China and Japan; each of which have sought hegemony over the peninsula for centuries. To the north of the peninsula lies Russia which began to involve itself on the peninsula in the late 1800s. Because of or due to its larger neighbors Korea has been fought for, fought over and fought on for centuries if not millennia. While time in China can be measured by Dynasties time in Korea can be marked by war.

Understanding Korea in-depth requires a similarly detailed understanding of all the other countries, governments, and cultures that have sought to interject themselves onto the peninsula, or that have found themselves there by accident over the last several hundred years. Only a small number of events take place in isolation. Due to the complexity that is Korea, few accept the challenge of learning about the country, its history or culture. As a result when it comes to discussing the peninsula many have an opinion – few have facts. While China, Japan and Russia might be amongst the first nations involved in Korea, in this story Americans, Australians, British, the Irish and even a few Scotsmen appear. To some degree that is how this book came to be, an effort to present an accurate explanation of a number of events as they occurred on 29 August 1945 the day that one B-29, carrying the moniker Hog Wild was forced down over the northern part of the Korean peninsula.

Concerning the book itself throughout readers will notice that I do not use shortcuts when documenting footnotes. As some of the information presented herein is controversial, and much of it the result of original research, the full source for each document used is provided as an aid to follow-on researchers. Readers will note that when citing a document held at the U.S. National Archives the entire entry for each source is given from the Record Group to the Box Number to enable follow-on researchers to easily locate the document cited. Those who might disagree with the information cited in this book, the conclusions reached, are encouraged to reexamine the documents to draw their own conclusions. Readers will also note that the military ranks of the individuals involved are spelled out in full resulting in far less familiarity with military terms as might have been in years past. Place names and surnames also posed an issue.

Japanese and Korean names will appear as family name first, followed by given name as is common in East Asia. As for place names in Korea, I have chosen to use the city and province names used by the Japanese in their Occupation of Korea, 1904 to 1945, vice the modern names currently in use. I did this for several reasons. First, at the time this story takes place and throughout World War II, Seoul was known as Keijo, Pyongyang as Heijo. Secondly, most of the official documents of the period refer to Korean locations by their Japanese place names. Where no Japanese language place name for a Korean location could be found, Korean place names are used. In the first instance where a Japanese language place name is used, Korean language for that place name is given in parentheses: Keijo (Seoul), Heijo (Pyongyang).

Every effort has been made to ensure that the thoughts and words contained in this paper are mine or properly documented as to where they first appeared. All images are footnoted as to their original location unless the image is held within the public domain or is the property of the author. As might be imagined with a work of this scope and depth, there are many contributors and people who deserve my thanks and appreciation, chief amongst them are the son of First Lieutenant Robert Rainey, Mr. Terry R. Rainey, the pilot of Hog Wild that day of 29 August 1945, and the daughter of Lieutenant Eugene Harwood, Mrs. Barbara Hartwig without whose help and encouragement, this book would have surely never been written.

I first met Terry after he published an article in Gary Power’s November 2009, Cold War Times, titled “The Hog Wild Story: Memories from Those who were there,” providing additional information about the bomber’s mission and the men that flew it that day, 29 August 1945. Mr. Rainey’s work can be located at http://www.coldwar.org/text_files/ColdwartimesNov2009.pdf. I was fortunate that Terry provided a roll of microfilm containing the statements of Captain Campbell, Lieutenant Weeks, Lieutenant Grant, Staff Sergeants Jose Rinaldo and Cyril Bernacki which I lacked when wrote the original paper. As Terry pointed out, the microfilm did not contain a statement from Corporal Richard H. Turner – it is unlikely that one exists. We, Mr. Rainey and I, are not sure if Corporal Turner ever

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submitted a report, or if his report was simply lost over time. Exchanging e-mails over a period of time, Mr. Rainey and I became well acquainted. He has been a great source of information, encouragement, and a great friend!

In mid-October 2009, Roger Mansell notified me of an article by Pat Kinney appearing in the WCF Courier titled “Wild blue: Book recalls how Waterloo airman was shot down by Soviets.” The article concerned a book, “Honorable Heart: Memoirs from Colorado to B-29s to Iowa,” written by Eugene R. Harwood, navigator of the bomber, Hog Wild, and his daughter Barbara Hartwig (Harwood). I sent Mrs. Hartwig a note through Mr. Kinney. Barb and I subsequently made contact over e-mail.

Like Mr. Rainey, Barb Hartwig has provided a tremendous amount of support, ideas, information – and a bit of prodding to turn my earlier work on the subject of Hog Wild into a hard copy publication. Barb’s book “Honorable Heart: Memoirs from Colorado to B-29s to Iowa” is simply, priceless! The work of Barb and her father not only describes the mission over Korea, but Mr. Harwood’s life before and after the war. Anyone born in the decades after World War II can easily relate to the story as told by Mr. Harwood. The story brings back long-forgotten memories of the things in life that mean most. Making homemade ice cream or taking a vacation on the road, Mr. Harwood had the ability to make his readers become part of his story. Anyone not born in those two decades and interested in the history of World War Two can only benefit from reading the story of Mr. Harwood’s life, and one man’s honorable service to his country.

In the weeks after meeting Mrs. Hartwig, she and Terry Rainey provided me with copies of their father’s personal post-war correspondence with former crewmates and POWs held at the Konan Camp during WWII, for which I am greatly indebted. Though a historian and an intelligence analyst familiar with human derived intelligence, I had never had the responsibility of working with personal correspondence. I was honored and intimidated; it is a profound responsibility.

Through Eugene Harwood and Robert Rainey’s personal correspondence I found that the former crewmembers of the bomber held occasional reunions in the decades that followed the war. Their shared experience in the skies of northern Korea in August 1945, bound them together for the rest of their lives. The POWs held at the camp remained forever grateful to the crew for their efforts on their behalf. An event that nearly killed them all, bound crewmembers and POWs friends forever. I found that, remarkably, reassuring.

Within the file of materials provided by Mrs. Hartwig was a recounting of the event, years later, as written by Captain Campbell. More than ten pages long, Captain Campbell compiled his pages from the story as described by the crew. His paper describes the mission of Hog Wild in great detail from the hours before the flight, the aircraft’s forcing down, their time in the prisoner-of-war camp, and eventual return to Saipan. As discussed later, the recounting is historically significant for what it says, and what it doesn’t.

Terry Rainy and Barb Hartwig also provided leads to other previously unknown information such as an article written by Lieutenant Marion J. Sherrill, the bombardier of Hog Wild. Titled, “The Russians Shot Us Down,” and contained in Volume 1 of “The Global Twentieth: An Anthology of the 20th AF in WWII” by Chester Marshall. Published in 1985, Sherrill’s account provides a complete recounting of his experience in Korea after bailing out of the aircraft and becoming separated from the remainder of the crew. Finally Barb provided a lead to a book published in 1987, “Guest of an Emperor,” by Arthur Cramsie, which recounts a prisoner-of-war’s time in Korea. It is the only such accounting written by a POW held at the Konan Camp during the war. Terry and Barb deserve my undying appreciation and admiration. I have been honored and blessed to be their friend.

Any researcher can tell you that no research effort is never fully completed. There is always one small piece of the puzzle that is missing, one more thread to the story that needs to be followed. Even now, having talked with the descendants of three of the crew; and through them to the one remaining crewmember of Hog Wild that is still living, there are at least eight families remaining that I have not talked with. Each has more to add to the story than I have told here. For those I have yet to meet, I assure you that Terry and Barb have stood you in good stead.

As with any paper there are many people who deserve my appreciation and a strong note thanks. Some of these are listed below. Some provided information and served as a sounding board for the threads I researched in producing this work. Other prodded me to keep going. Some simply provided a good swift kick in the seat of the pants when I really needed it. You are all appreciated. To:

- The Australian War Memorial – few nations so greatly honor those that have sacrificed for the greater good of all than the Australia.
- Rod Beattie for his undying efforts on behalf of the Allied POWs and Asian nationals who slaved during the construction of the Thai-Burma Railroad.
- T. Kessara Leake-Campbell for her ability to do great research, dig and “acquire” information – without getting caught.
- Dr. Chris Frankle of Los Alamos National Labs who for years has tolerated my near-constant questions on uranium, uranium enrichment methods and my frequent exclamation of “Eureka!” thinking I had hit pay dirt, when it was only dirt.
• Dr. Eric Hehl, the “genuine article,” who picked up the challenge of researching the subject of Japan and the bomb, when he had many other interest taking up his time and energy.
• Dr. Darrell Herd of the Defense Intelligence Agency who sets the highest standards for academic research and who has always had but one goal; the truth.
• Wes Injerd and family for providing translations of Japanese language materials, tidbits and sources of information for which without, this would be a far lesser book.
• My fellow researchers that work on issues related to Allied Prisoners of War held by the Japanese during WWII; Linda Dahl, John Hicks, John Eakin, Fred Baldasarre, James Erickson and others too numerous to mention, we will get there.
• Dr. Charles Perkins of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who cares about a job well-done.
• Daryl Peterson of the Idaho National Laboratory, who has kept me straight on a number of issues related to nuclear reactors and reactor construction.
• Mr. Ray Vallowe who served in the U.S. Army during the Korean War at the Battles of the Chosin Reservoir, and is correcting a large number of misconceptions regarding what really took place early-on in that struggle of 1950. The world owes Ray a debt that can never be repaid.
• To the veterans, the servicemen and women, that fought World War Two and the Korean War, without their sacrifices, there might be no need to tell this story.
• To the Prisoners of War held by the Japanese across the Pacific War Zone, despite the trends of the post-war era your sacrifices and suffering are not forgotten.

Finally, this paper is only one small piece of the greater tale of the Japanese atomic bomb program. There is far more to the tale than is told here. I reserve the right to continue updating this book.
Many a small thing has been made large by the right kind of advertising.

- Mark Twain

There are basically two types of people. People who accomplish things, and people who claim to have accomplished things. The first group is less crowded.

- Mark Twain

Providence protects children and idiots. I know because I have tested it.

- Mark Twain
Hog Wild – 1945: One B-29, One Soviet Conspiracy

Section 1 – RIGHT FOR THE WRONG REASONS

On 29 August, 1945, forces of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (U.S.S.R.) actively engaged in combat with Japanese military forces in and around Konan (Hamhung), northern Korea, forced down an American B-29 delivering supplies to a Japanese Prisoner of War camp located near the city. The bomber, the Hog Wild, was on a humanitarian relief mission providing, food, medicine, and clothing to Prisoners of War (POW) only weeks before held prisoner by the Japanese Imperial Army in northern Korea. It was the last U.S. B-29 lost to hostile fire during World War II (WWII) and one of the earliest events of the Cold War.

The POWs, British and Australian soldiers, had been held by the Japanese since the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942. Most had worked as slave laborers in Japanese-owned industries, in and around Konan area since 1943, but most notably in the Nichitsu carbide factory.

More than a year after Hog Wild had been forced down, newsman David Snell would publish a story in the Atlanta Constitution with the front page headline “Japan Developed Atom Bomb; Russia Grabbed Scientists.” Snell described the incident with Hog Wild in the text of his article as support for his primary theme that during the war Japan had attempted to develop an atomic bomb and that the primary facilities supporting this effort were located in northern Korea. Published on 3 October 1946, the article suggested that the Soviet Union, attempting to prevent the U.S. from locating the major facilities supporting Japan’s wartime atomic bomb program then located in Konan; had purposefully shot down the aircraft. In all likelihood Snell was right, but for the wrong reasons. Presented in its entirety below, Snell believed that the Soviets suspected Hog Wild of “snooping” in and around the area of Konan, looking for the specialized facilities that should have supported Japan’s WWII era atomic bomb program. It was not quite so simple.

1 Snell, David. Japan Developed Atom Bomb; Russia Grabbed Scientists. Constitution. Atlanta, Georgia. 3 Oct 1946.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Japan developed and successfully tested an atomic bomb three days prior to the end of the war.

She destroyed unfinished atomic bombs, secret papers and her atomic bomb plans only hours before the advance units of the Russian Army moved into Konan, Korea, site of the project.

Japanese scientists who developed the bomb are now in Moscow, prisoners of the Russians. They were tortured by their captors seeking atomic “know-how.”

The Konan area is under rigid Russian control. They permit no American to visit the area. Once, even after the war, an American B-29 Superfortress en route to Konan was shot down by four Russian Yak fighters from nearby Hammung Airfield.

I learned this information from a Japanese officer, who said he was in charge of counter intelligence at the Konan project before the fall of Japan. He gave names, dates, facts and figures on the Japanese atomic project, which I submitted to United States Army Intelligence in Seoul. The War Department is withholding much of the information. To protect the man that told me this story, and at the request of the Army, he is here given a pseudonym, Captain Tsetusuo Wakabayashi.

The story may throw light on Stalin's recent statement that America will not long have a monopoly on atomic weapons. Possibly also helps explains the stand taken by Henry A. Wallace. Perhaps also, it will help explain the heretofore unaccountable stalling of the Japanese in accepting our surrender terms as the Allies agreed to allow Hirohito to continue as puppet emperor. And perhaps it will throw light new light on the shooting down by the Russians of our B-29 on Aug. 29, 1945, in the Konan area.

When told this story, I was an agent with the Twenty-Fourth Criminal Investigation Department, operating in Korea. I was able to interview Captain Wakabayashi, not as an investigator or as a member of the armed forces, but as a newspaperman. He was advised and understood thoroughly, that he was speaking for publication.

He was in Seoul, en route to Japan as a repatriate. The interview took place in a former Shinto temple on a mount overlooking Korea’s capital city. The shrine had been converted into an hotel for transient Japanese en route to their homeland.

Since V-J Day wisps of information have drifted into the hands of U.S. Army Intelligence of the existence of a gigantic and mystery-shrouded industrial project operated during the closing months of the war in a mountain vastness near the Northern Korean coastal city of Konan. It was near here that Japan’s uranium supply was said to exist.

This, the most complete account of activities at Konan to reach American ears, is believed to be the first time Japanese silence has been broken on the subject.

In a cave in a mountain near Konan, men worked against time, in final assembly of genzai bakudan, Japan’s name for the atomic bomb. It was August 10, 1945 (Japanese time), only four days after an atomic bomb flashed in the sky over Hiroshima, and five days before Japan surrendered.

To the north, Russian hordes were spilling into Manchuria.

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Shortly after midnight of that day a convoy of Japanese trucks moved from the mouth of the cave, past watchful sentries. The trucks wound through valleys, past sleeping farm villages. It was August, and frogs in the mud of terraced rice paddies sang in a still night. In the cool predawn Japanese scientists and engineers loaded genzai bakudan aboard a ship in Konan.

Off the coast near an inlet in the Sea of Japan more frantic preparations were under way. All that day and night ancient ships, junks and fishing vessels moved into the anchorage.

Before dawn on Aug. 12 a robot launch chugged through the ships at anchor and beached itself on the inlet. Its passenger was genzai bakudan. A clock ticked.

The observers were 20 miles away. This waiting was difficult and strange to men who had worked relentlessly so long who knew their job had been completed too late.

**OBSERVERS BLINDED BY FLASH**

The light in the east where Japan lay grew brighter. The moment the sun peeped over the sea there was a burst of light at the anchorage blinding the observers who wore welders’ glasses. The ball of fire was estimated to be 1,000 yards in diameter. A multicolored cloud of vapors boiled toward the heavens then mushroomed in the stratosphere.

The churn of water and vapor obscured the vessels directly under the burst. Ships and junks on the fringe burned fiercely at anchor. When the atmosphere cleared slightly the observers could detect several vessels had vanished.

Genzai bakudan in that moment had matched the brilliance of the rising sun in the east.

Japan had perfected and successfully tested an atomic bomb as cataclysmic as those that withered Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The time was short. The war was roaring to its climax. The advancing Russians would arrive at Konan before the weapon could be mounted in the ready Kamikaze planes to be thrown against any attempted landing by American troops on Japan’s shores.

It was a difficult decision. But it had to be made.

The observers sped across the water, back to Konan. With the advance units of the Russian Army only hours away, the final scene of this gotterdammerung began. The scientists and engineers smashed machines, and destroyed partially completed genzai bakudan.

Before Russian columns reached Konan, dynamite sealed the secrets of the cave. But the Russians had come so quickly that the scientists could not escape.

This is the story told me by Captain Wakabayashi.

Japan’s struggle to produce and atomic weapon began in 1938, when German and Japanese scientists met to discuss a possible military use of energy locked in the atom.

No technical information was exchanged, only theories. In 1940 the Nishina Laboratory of the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research in Tokyo had built one of the largest cyclotrons in the world. (Cyclotrons found in Tokyo by the invading Yanks were destroyed).

**THOUGHT ATOMIC BOMB RISKY**

The scientists continued to study atomic theory during the early days of the war, but it was not until the Unites States began to carry the war to Japan that they were able to interest the Government in a full-scale atomic project. Heretofore, the Government had considered such a venture too risky and too expensive.
During the years following Pearl Harbor, Japan’s militarists believed the United States could be defeated without the use of atomic weapons.

When task forces and invasion spearheads brought the war ever closer to the Japanese mainland, the Japanese Navy undertook the production of the atomic bomb as defense against amphibious operations. Atomic bombs were to be flown against Allied ships in Kamikaze suicide planes.

Captain Wakabayashi estimated the area of total destruction of the bomb at one square mile.

The project was started at Nagoya, but its removal to Korea was necessitated when the B-29’s began to lash industrial cities on the mainland of Japan.

“I consider the B-29 the primary weapon in the defeat of Japan” Captain Wakabayashi declared. “The B-29 caused our project to be moved to Korea. We lost three months in the transfer. We would have had genzai bakudan three months earlier if it had not been for the B-29.”

The Korean project was staffed by about 40,000 Japanese workers, of whom approximately 25,000 were trained engineers and scientists. The organization of the plant was set up so that the workers were restricted to their areas. The inner sanctum of the plant was deep in a cave. Here only 400 specialists worked.

KEPT IN DARK ON EACH OTHER’S WORK
One scientist was master director of the entire project. Six others, all eminent Japanese scientists were in charge of six phases of the bomb’s production. Each of these six men were kept in ignorance of the work of the other five. (Names of these scientists are withheld by Army censorship).

The Russian’s took most of the trained personnel prisoner, including the seven key men. One of the seven escaped in June, 1946, and fled to the American zone of occupation in Korea. U.S. Army Intelligence interrogated this man. Captain Wakabayashi talked to him in Seoul. The scientist told of having been tortured by the Russians. He said all seven were tortured.

Captain Wakabayashi said he learned from this scientist that the other six had been removed to Moscow.

“The Russians thrust burning splinters under the fingertips of these men. They poured water into their nasal passages. Our Japanese scientists will suffer death before they disclose their secrets to the Russians,” he declared.

Captain Wakabayashi said the Russians are making and extensive study of the Konan region.

When Edwin Pauley of the War Reparations Committee, inspected Northern Korea, he was allowed to see only certain areas, and was kept under rigid Russian supervision.

On Aug. 29, 1945, an American B-29 headed for Konan with a cargo of food and medical supplies, to be dropped over an Allied prisoner of war camp there. Four Russian Yak fighters from nearby Hammung Airfield circled the B-29 and signaled the pilot to land on the Hammung strip.

PILOT REFUSES; REDS FIRE
Lt. Jose H. Queen of Ashland, KY., pilot, refused to do so because the field was small, and headed back toward the Saipan base, to return “when things got straightened out with the Russians.” Ten miles off the coast the Yak fighters opened fire and shot the B-29 down. None of the crew of 12 men were injured, although a Russian fighter strafed but missed Radio Operator Douglas Arthur.

The Russian later told Lt. Queen they saw the American markings but “weren’t sure.” because sometimes the Germans used American markings and they thought the Japs might too. This was nearly two weeks after the war ended.
Captain Wakabayashi said the Japanese Counter Intelligence Corps at least a year before the atom bombing of Hiroshima learned there was a vast and mysterious project in the mountains of the eastern part of the United States. (Presumably the Manhattan project at Oak Ridge, Tennessee). They believed, but were not sure, that atomic weapons were being produced there.

On the other hand, he said, Allied Intelligence must have know [sic] of the atomic project at Konan, because of the perfect timing of the Hiroshima bombing only six days before the long-scheduled Japanese naval test.

Perhaps here is the answer to moralists who question the decision of the United States to drop an atomic bomb.

The Japanese office, the interpreter and I sipped aromatic green tea as Captain Wakabayashi unfolded his great and perhaps world-shaking story. His eyes flashed with pride behind the black-rimmed glasses. When the interview ended, he ushered us to the door and bowed very low.

In the decades that followed the Snell article, myths regarding the plane, its mission, and its final fate grew in proportion to the time that passed since the events that afternoon of 29 August 1945.

Was Hog Wild the first real incident in a Cold War that would exist between the U.S. and Soviet Union for the next 40 some odd years? Did the Soviet Union shoot down Hog Wild to prevent it from identifying production facilities supporting Japan’s WWII atomic bomb program? Or was it simply that the aircraft had intruded over an active combat area, and failed to obey Soviet orders to put down at the nearest airfield – as indicated by the Yakelov-9 (Yak) pilots that approached it that fateful day? Or was there something more nefarious to the incident that has lain hidden for the last 60 years. Myth, lie or propaganda, what really happened in that early autumn afternoon over Konan, Korea, 29 August 1945?

Section 2 – NOGUCHI’S EMPIRE IN KOREA

Noguchi was a second-level zaibatsu (a financial clique) founded in 1908 and heavily invested in electro-chemicals. Also known as the Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Company (Nichitsu) the company was headed by Noguchi Shitagau (26 Jul 1873–15 Jan 1944). The company specialized in the production of nitrogen-related products, mostly based upon ammonium-sulphate (NH$_3$SO$_4$). Of the “New Zaibatsu” sometimes referred to as “Konzern” that developed in turn of the century Imperial Japan, Nichitsu was the largest. The Noguchi Konzern was actually larger than several of the older zaibatsu that had grown out of the Meiji Restoration of 1867.

Following Japan’s imperialist expansion into Northeast Asia, Nichitsu was one of the first major industries to move outward from the home islands of Japan into Korea, a country occupied by Japan in 1904 and annexed in 1910. Prior to Noguchi’s investment, the town of Konan was a sleepy little fishing village located on the northeast coast of the Korean Peninsula. Noguchi moved to take over the area in the mid-1920s. Over the next two decades Noguchi developed the village into one of the largest seaport cities on the northeast coast of the Korean Peninsula. The Konan of 1945 was a major Japanese-owned industrial complex centered on the investments of Noguchi industries. The Noguchi combine served as the city’s primary industry.²

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In 1923, under Noguchi’s leadership the company began to invest heavily in an area along the northeastern coast of northern Korea near the village of Konan. The Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Company was the largest factory in all of Korea. Though there were other companies and industrial facilities located in and around Konan, it was largely a company town, a Nichitsu town.

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The Noguchi owned company supplied the water needs of the city, its electrical power, imported its food, and so on. The company also owned the city’s primary hospital, the Konan Nippon Chisso Hiryo Hospital which operated three branch infirmaries operating out of the main medical center. The three branch hospitals were located in the Ryuteiri, Kyururi and Hongu sections of the city and were known as the Ryuteiri, Kyururi and Hongu Factory Hospitals. At least one of these hospitals would play a small part in the survival of the POWs held in the area during WWII – a small part.

In 1926 Nichitsu established the Chosen Suiryoku Tenki Kabushiki Kaisha – the Korean Water Power Corporation – with a capital investment of 20 million yen to develop the hydroelectric power potential of the Pujon River. It was the largest capital investment scheme of its time in Korea, Japan’s colonial market.

Under the venture Nichitsu halted and reversed the southward flow of the Pujon River forcing the water south into a system of underground aqueducts. These tunnels in-turn fed water into to a series of power plants, one feeding into the next; a cascade located on the eastern face of North Korea’s Jangbaik Mountains. The first of three hydroelectric plants comprising the cascade was completed in November 1929. That single power plant alone generated 65,000 kilowatts.

In 1927 Nichitsu created Chosen Chisso – the Korean Nitrogen Fertilizer Corporation – the first of a number of large-scale electro-chemical industries to be developed by Noguchi along Korea’s northeastern coast. Construction on the Chosen Chisso Hiryo Kaisha, the Japanese Carborundum and Carbide Factory, Nichitsu, the centerpiece of Chosen Chisso began in 1928. Two months after the completion of the first power plant of the Pujon Cascade, November 1929, Chosen Chisso began operations. It was the largest such complex within the Imperial Japanese Empire and was reportedly only the Hoover Dam in size by Du Pont. When Japan’s war with the U.S. began in 1941, the plant was already 13-years old.

In time Nichitsu also developed the hydroelectric power resources of the Changjin River, creating, once again, a hydroelectric cascade that harnessed the river’s power for his industries located in and around Konan. For this project the Japanese forced a northward flowing river to flow southward into a new set of underground aqueducts feeding another series of power stations, another cascade, located on the east face of the Jangbaik Mountains. The cascade’s reservoir was created by a series of four dams along the Changjin River. The reservoir area became the scene of a number of major battles during the Korean War which became known as the Battles of the Chosin Reservoir, Chosin being the Japanese name for the power system and its reservoir.

Nichitsu was also partly responsible for the construction of the Suiho (Chinese – Shuifeng Shuiba) hydroelectric power plant along the Yalu (Amnok) River between the Japanese states of Chosin and Manchukuo and a number of other hydroelectric cascades in Korea. The Supung Dam at 525 feet high, 2,790 feet long, created a reservoir more than 20 miles long. The plant’s six turbine-generator sets produced 450,000 kilowatt-hours. Begun in 1937, at the time of its reported completion in 1941, the plant was the second largest hydroelectric power station in the world. Only the Hoover Dam was larger. As the Empire grew so did Nichitsu.

Supporting Japan’s territorial expansion, Nichitsu eventually diversified into explosives production, synthetic oils, coal and strategic metals such as aluminum and magnesium. By the time of Japan’s collapse in 1945, Nichitsu industries possessed industrial holdings throughout northern Korean, China, Formosa (present-day Taiwan), Manchuria, and Japan’s acquisitions in Southeast Asia as far south as Singapore. Nichitsu’s holdings in Singapore included a three-year lease on the Ho Hong Oil Mill on Havelock Road, in the central region of the island. During the war Nichitsu became closely associated with Japan’s Imperial Navy. The combine operated several joint Nichitsu-Navy facilities in Korea and Manchuria, primarily

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7 Ibid.
associated with the Navy’s synthetic fuel-oil production program. Toward the end of the war the Konzern’s plants in Korea produced jet and rocket fuels in support of imported advanced German military aircraft. Nichitsu was also involved in the Japanese Navy’s atomic energy ship propulsion programs and by default, Japan’s atomic weapons programs.\textsuperscript{11}

It was these factors, as alluded to by Snell in 1946 that generated post-war suspicions that the combine had played a major role in Japan’s atomic bomb program.\textsuperscript{12} However, it was not Nichitsu that drew Hog Wild to the area on 29 August 1945, but the existence of a Japanese POW camp holding starving Allied soldiers prisoner that drew the bomber to Konan. The POWs at the camp had been held prisoner by the Japanese since the fall of Singapore in 1942.

Section 3 – THE FALL OF MALAYA AND THE BATTLE OF SINGAPORE

The Battle of Malaya, which ultimately led to the fall of Singapore began across the International Date Line on 8 December 1941 (7 December Hawaii Time) near simultaneously with but actually several hours before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The battle pitted the forces of the British Commonwealth mostly British, Australian, Indian and Malayan troops under Lieutenant-General Arthur Ernest Percival against those of Imperial Japan under General Tomoyuki Yamashita. While Japan may have sought access to the rich natural resources of Southeast Asia, its tin, rubber, but mostly its oil – it needed command of Singapore to advance its forces into the various islands lying between Southeast Asia and the northern coast of Australia. Singapore was the lynchpin to consolidating the earliest Japanese gains in Southeast Asia into Pacific Asia. Considered by the British as an unsinkable fortress, the conquest of Singapore would take the Japanese a mere 70 days and rock British morale to the core. In attacking Singapore, General Yamashita would seize the advantage in northern Malaya, never relinquishing the initiative until Britain’s Gibraltar of the East was firmly in Japanese hands.

Tomoyuki Yamashita was born the son of a local doctor in Osugi village, in what is now part of Ōtoyo village, Kōchi prefecture, Shikoku on 8 November 1885. He attended the Imperial Japanese Army Academy graduating with the 18\textsuperscript{th} class in 1905 and joined the Army in 1906. In 1914, during WWI, he fought against German forces in Shantung, China. During the early part of the 1920s he served in the Imperial Headquarters and the Staff College. Becoming involved in the various political factions he became a leading opponent of Tojo Hideki and the Control Faction. Following the 26 February Incident of 1936 he supported leniency for the various officers involved in the plot, falling out of favor with Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Yamashita was then reassigned from Japan to Manchukuo where he languished until 1939. During the 26 February Incident of 1936 he supported leniency for the various officers involved in the plot, falling out of favor with Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Yamashita was then reassigned from Japan to Manchukuo where he languished until Japan’s decision to go to war forced his recall from internal exile. He assumed command of the Japanese 25\textsuperscript{th} Army on 6 November 1941, a little over one month prior to the initiation of hostilities with Britain and the U.S. Yamashita was assigned to implement a plan of attack against Malaya that had been previously drawn up by Japanese planners. The plan was largely unalterable. At 7 a.m. on 4 December 1941 Yamashita’s attack force sailed forth from Hainan Island off the southern coast of China for the Malayan Peninsula.

At 2 a.m. on the morning of the 6\textsuperscript{th} of December 1945 several Australian Lockheed Hudson light bombers operating from an airfield near Kota Bharu confirmed the presence of a Japanese invasion force steaming toward Malaya. The news was not good.

The Hudsons reported the presence of two separate invasion convoys. The first consisted of 22 merchantmen, averaging about 10,000 tons each. The convoy was escorted by one battleship, five cruisers and seven destroyers. Five submarines protected the flanks of the convoy. The second convoy consisted of 21 merchant ships shepherded by 12 additional warships. The Hudsons, now running low on fuel were relieved by two Catalina flying boats, one of which was shot down a full nine hours before the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. The attack was the first openly hostile act of the war. For the British in Asia, the attack came without warning, without an end to negotiations, with no declaration of war.

The Japanese invasion of the Malayan Peninsula commenced with an amphibious assault along the northeastern coast of Malaya near Kota Bharu just after midnight on 8 December 1941. With its beachhead firmly established Japanese


\textsuperscript{12} Wilcox, Robert K. Japan’s Secret War: Japan’s Race against Time to build its Own Atomic Bomb. Marlowe & Company, New York. Copyright 1985.
troops began moving south down the east coast of Malaya. Additional landings took place virtually unopposed at Patani and Singora, Thailand.

Prior to the commencement of war between Japan and the Allies, Thailand had fought the French in the Franco-Thai War (October 1940 to 9 May 1941). The war was the result of an effort by the Thais to wrest territory that had previously belonged to Thailand from a weakened Vichy French Indochina. During the Franco-Thai War, the forces of Thailand rapidly overwhelmed the French in Laos, but mired down inside Cambodia. The Japanese, who were in the process of forcing Vichy France to permit Japan to establish military bases inside the French colony of Indochina, mediated the conflict to the benefit of Thailand. It was one of the first Asian conflicts where Asians had overcome a European foe. The Thai government under Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsongkram (often referred to as Phibun Songkhram, or simply Phibun) was widely praised by the Thai people for that nation’s ability to force a European colonial power, to come to terms with an Asian nation.

Secretly however, in return for Japanese support at the peace table, the government of Phibun Songkhram agreed to allow the Japanese to use Thai territory as a future staging area for any Japanese move against the British into Burma and Malaya. Faced with the reality of Japanese aggression into British held Malaya, Thai forces fought against the Japanese in the early hours of the invasion; however the Thai government quickly surrendered and publicly allied itself with Japan. On the 21st of December Thailand signed a military alliance with Japan. On 25 January 1942, Thailand would officially declare war on the U.S. and Britain. That same day Great Britain, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa declared war on Thailand. Australia declared war against Thailand on 2 March 1942. Of the major Allies, only the U.S. refrained from declaring war on Thailand. Japanese aircraft, now operating from air bases near Saigon in then French Indochina began the strategic bombing of Singapore.

A Failure to Prepare

Despite the rising face of war in Europe and previous Japanese aggression in Asia, the British continued to rest the defense of its Asian Empire on its ability to base a strong naval force in Singapore. The British strategy was based on two separate assumptions: 1) That sufficient warning of a Japanese buildup in the area would allow the British to reinforce Singapore and Malaya before Japan could attack, and that 2) its American ally would be capable of providing assistance and support when and if needed. By the time the war with Japan began for British forces in Asia, these assumptions had been largely recognized as ill-considered if not completely unfounded for two reasons: First, warning of an impending Japanese attack, much desired, was preceded only by a few days; hours if one considers the time it took the British to determine that the fleet it observed off Thailand was indeed heading for Malaya. Second, when the war began, the American Fleet that Britain relied upon to sail west in defense of Singapore; rested at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. America was also at war.

The age when Britain could defend an Empire that stretched across the world with a navy that controlled the seas, had long since passed. It was not new information. General Percival, the commander of British forces in Singapore, had been instrumental in pointing out that particular fallacy to the British leadership when he served as Chief of Staff to Lieutenant General Sir George Shedden Dobby (12 July 1879-3 Oct 1964), Commander of Malaya in Singapore from 1936 to 1938. Despite this in 1941 Percival dutifully accepted assignment as General Officer Commanding (GOC), Malaya.

Arthur Ernest Percival was born on 26 December 1887 in Aspenden Lodge, Aspenden near Buntingford in Hertfordshire, England. He was the second son of Alfred Reginald and Edith Percival. He was educated at the Rugby School, one of Britain’s oldest independent schools. At Rugby, Percival studied Greek and Latin but was at best a mediocre student. Percival was however far more athletically inclined enjoying cricket, tennis and cross country running, none of which however would lead to great financial success. As World War WWI drew near Percival found himself in London working as a clerk for the iron-ore merchants Naylor, Benzon & Company Limited. On the first day of WWI Percival enlisted as a private in the Officer Training Corps of the Inns of Court.

Following five weeks of basic training Percival was promoted to the rank of temporary Second Lieutenant. Many of his fellow graduates would not survive the war. During the war Percival fought in several major engagements including the Battle of the Somme in July 1916 where he was wounded by shrapnel as he led an assault on the Schwaben Redoubt. When the war ended Percival held the rank of temporary Lieutenant Colonel. Following WWI he volunteered for service with the Archangel Command of the British Military Mission during the North Russia Campaign of the Russian Civil War. Following his service in Russia he was reassigned to Northern Ireland where he served first as a company commander, and later the intelligence officer of the 1st Battalion of the Essex Regiment, in Kinsale, County Cork. As the battalion intelligence officer he was accused by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) of brutality and operating the “Essex Battalion Torture Squad.” This notoriety resulted in the IRA placing a £1,000 bounty, a “hit,” against Percival. A subsequent raid eliminated the threat of Percival’s assassination.

Following an appointment with the Cheshire Regiment, Prince of Wales Division, he spent several years as a staff officer with the Nigeria Regiment of the Royal West African Frontier Force in West Africa. In 1929 he received brevet promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel and subsequently spent a year studying at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. From 1931 to 1932 Percival served as an instructor at the Staff College at General Staff Officer Grade 2. In 1935, he attended the
Imperial Defence College, was promoted to full colonel in 1936, and served as Chief of Staff to General Dobbie, General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Malaya in Singapore, in the rank of General Staff Officer Grade 1 through most of 1938.

In Malaya Percival conducted several staff studies concerning the defense of the peninsula, one of which included the concept of a Japanese attack against Singapore from Thailand. Percival held few illusions about the ability of the British to hold back a Japanese advance into Malaya and on to Singapore. March 1938, saw Percival in Britain where he served on the staff of the Aldershot Garrison, receiving a temporary promotion to brigadier general. In April 1941 he was promoted to acting Lieutenant-General and was appointed GOC Malaya. He held the position of GOC Malaya only 205 days; about seven months before Japan attacked. Like the good soldier, despite knowing the weakness of a Singapore that could not be correct Percival soldiered on.

Between the end of WWI and the beginning of Britain’s war with Japan, British military strategy in the Far East was dominated by a lack of foresight, planning, and most of all, funding. At the time of the Japanese attack into Malaya, British forces had been at war with Germany in Europe since September 1939, almost two years. British forces were spread thinly across the various military theaters of the war. Strategically in 1941, the military requirements of Singapore rested at the bottom of a stack of competing demands facing the British Empire: In Russia the Soviets were continuing to lose ground to the German advance; in Britain the German air force, the Luftwaffe, was attacking British cities; across the English Channel a German crossing into Britain remained a serious threat and America had yet to enter the war. When war came in Asia, British, Australian, Canadian and other Commonwealth army forces were heavily engaged against Axis forces across North Africa in an effort to keep open the Suez Canal, Britain’s lifeline to India. What soldiers that were available to the GOC Malaya were poorly led, largely untrained but mostly nonexistent.

British ground forces in Singapore and Malaya were armed with outdated and antiquated equipment, if they were armed at all. Before the war began the forces under Percival’s command consisted of a total strength of 88,600 men in 31 infantry battalions. 19,600 of the men under his command were British. 15,200 were Australians, 37,000 Indians, and 16,800 were locals.13 Many of the soldiers were not regular army but Territorial Army – derisively referred to as “Saturday Night Soldiers” by regulars.14 Despite the large numbers, there were simply not enough men available to defend all airfields and possible landing beaches dotting the Malay Peninsula. Likewise, the British Navy was engaged across the globe with forces deployed in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Pacific Ocean and elsewhere.

Pre-war planning for the British navy to speed relief from the United Kingdom to Singapore had grown from a planned 70 days to 180.15 The British Admiralty’s willingness to dispatch the fleet to Singapore had been steadily eroded over time by the demands of the Empire elsewhere.16 In the end, the amount of aid the British Navy was capable of sending to the relief of Singapore would depend on the amount of naval forces available in other theaters of the war and not currently engaged. Any loss of British sea lanes to the German Navy had the potential to starve Great Britain into submission. The long held promise to dispatch the main fleet to thwart an enemy advance was therefore broken. Lastly, the required supplies to support the defense of Singapore had been largely diverted to the Soviet Union when that country was attacked by Nazi Germany earlier that year. All the tanks and aircraft necessary for the survival of Singapore when the island fell were then landing on Russian docks in Archangel and Murmansk.

British plans dating to the 1920s to update the defenses surrounding Singapore centered on the development of the island into a large naval base and the construction of several airfields in the area. The policies were largely unpopular in Britain and eventually led the British in Singapore to overestimate their ability to withstand a long-term siege.17 Even as war loomed on the horizon the highly vaunted naval base itself remained partially incomplete. Singapore’s highly touted large-caliber naval coastal guns designed to defend the island from a naval threat and supplied with armor piercing (AP) shells, lacked the large numbers of high explosive (HE) shell required to defend the island from an overland army.

Designed to penetrate the heavy armor and hulls of naval surface ships, AP shells lacked the explosive power on impact of HE shells and were, for the most part, ineffective when used against ground forces. Most AP shells fired at the Japanese from Singapore’s large caliber guns simply buried deep into the ground causing little damage.

Even had the large caliber guns at Singapore been adequately supplied with HE rounds, they alone could not have stopped the Japanese invasion. The even greater potential number of casualties inflicted on Japan’s ground forces by these guns armed with HE rounds would have likely only slowed the collapse of the island, by allowing British forces to better organize their resources and defenses to meet the enemy as they came ashore. They would not have stopped Singapore’s eventual collapse. The lack of preparation caused by decades of promises with no funding could not be overcome in mere weeks.

Claimed by many as the guns that pointed out to sea and could not engage targets north of the island, all of Singapore’s guns were capable of firing to the north, and every available gun did engage the enemy. Other issues existed.

Like the earlier British intentions to update Singapore’s defenses, plans to increase the number of aircraft in the area to a number between 300 and 500, never fully materialized. When war began that December, the Royal Air Force in Singapore and Malaya possessed only 141 operational aircraft, most of which were outdated F2A, Model 139 Brewster Buffalos. The scores of untold bombers staging out of airfields carved from the jungles of Malaya to defend the island fortress never appeared.18 What air power the British did possess was rapidly overwhelmed by greater numbers of Japanese aircraft and better trained pilots. Despite numerous previous requests by General Percival, the British forces facing the Japanese also lacked mechanized armored units. The British infantry, valor aside, would find itself overrun time and again by the 200 tanks the Japanese had landed in Thailand. Efforts by General Percival to position fixed defenses across Malaya when he served under General Dobbie had been thwarted by the continuously rising cost of labor and were never completed. Britain’s reliance upon a naval deterrence was also doomed.

Britain’s planned deterrence, based upon the movement of capital ships and outdated strategies represented a hollow threat. The ability of large naval forces operating on the open seas to provide a credible deterrent against an aggressive enemy was outdated and overcome by technology in the form of air power. Lacking air superiority, naval forces at sea or in port were subject to accurate Japanese aerial bombing and torpedo attack. While ships could be sacrificed in a show of support, the large-scale move of military forces required to defeat Japan’s invasion would never arrive.

Despite the fact that the British had prepared and planned for a Japanese assault on Thailand, codenamed OPERATION MATADOR, the plan was never implemented. As the army of Thailand feigned resistance to Japan’s advance through its territory, the full force of British power was never concentrated against the Japanese invasion at its weakest point, the beachhead. The British had long since realized that the defense of Singapore depended on meeting an invasion of Malaya on the beaches of Thailand; at Patani and Singora. Due to indecision on the part of Britain’s local political leadership, the British Army in Malaya would never advance into Thailand to meet the enemy on the beachhead. Singapore’s leadership did not want to precipitate a war that already existed by entering southern Thailand. A belated British plan, based upon allowing the Japanese to land at Patani, resisting their forces at Singora and stopping them at Kroh, codenamed OPERATION KROHCOL, for the Patani-Kroh Road was eventually implemented with Commonwealth forces finally entering Thailand. OPERATION KROHCOL was far too little far too late.

To succeed in stopping the Japanese advance into Malaya, British forces would have to reach and occupy a geographic feature some 30 miles inside Thailand, known as “The Ledge,” a six-mile section of road cut along a steep hillside and bounded on one side by a sheer drop into the Patani River. Dynamiting the road would succeed in delaying, if not stopping the Japanese advance. Opposed by 300 Thai police manning several roadblocks, and delayed in moving forward by the absence of another assigned battalion and artillery support, British forces reached one end of the objective as the Japanese entered the other. Japanese forces overwhelming the defenders forced the British to withdraw. Japanese forces continued to land along Thailand’s southern shores.

Delayed by rough seas the Japanese invasion force eventually put ashore 13,500 soldiers at Singora; 7,550 at Patani. Unfortunately British forces engaging the Japanese were rapidly encircled by Thai police and additional Japanese forces landing in Pattani, Thailand and subsequently defeated. Notwithstanding the lack of a firm British response to the invasion, the Allied forces that did meet the Japanese on the beach killed or wounded 15 percent of the opposing landing force.19 The Japanese were overwhelming in tanks and air support, but apparently not invincible.

**Holding All the Cards**

In its initial engagements against the British in northern Malaya, the Japanese held many advantages. The Japanese possessed exceptional air forces; maintaining air superiority and providing the advancing Japanese Army significant close air support. Japan’s 3rd Air Division, operating from Indochina possessed a force of 354 first-line aircraft. In addition aircraft of the Genzan and Mihoro Air Groups making up the 22nd Air Flotilla and operating from French airbases at Thudaumot and Soctrang near Saigon brought to the battle an additional 180 aircraft.20 The Japanese initially possessed greater mobility than did the British and took advantage of the British weakness massing their forces in areas lacking a serious British presence in southern Thailand, northern Malaya. The Japanese won by moving into the areas where there was little British presence and cutting off the British rear. Later British efforts to advance their forces northward piecemeal would be consistently met by superior Japanese numbers. In addition, the Japanese invasion force was accompanied by over 230 light and medium tanks, a

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19 The Attack on Malaya by Japan. enquiries@historylearningsite.co.uk. 2000-2010
weapon that British planning and funding had never provided its forces in Singapore or Malaya.\(^{21}\) The Japanese also made quick use of British supplies, food and fuels as they were abandoned by retreating Commonwealth forces, rapidly integrating those capabilities into the Japanese advance. Japan’s military forces were also battle hardened, blooded, and experienced by their long running war in China.

The tactics and strategies Japan employed in Malaya had been developed, tried and tested on battlefields across northern China. Many of the Japanese soldiers moving into Malaya had recent or long-term experience in fighting Chinese nationalist and communist forces across China. The Japanese also innovated in their use of bicycles as a means of transport and advance into Malaya.

The Japanese use of bicycles to advance their infantry down the Malayan Peninsula while appearing crude and antiquated, was well suited to Malaya’s jungle environment, small roads and trails. When the Japanese ran into large numbers of British forces along the major roads, they simply took to the jungles and by-passed them, only to show up to the British rear. Bicycles allowed the Japanese to rapidly move their forces to meet British opposition. Once defeated, the bicycles allowed Japan’s army to seize the initiative, and maintain constant pressure against the retreating British. The Japanese also employed suicide troops drawn from Formosan and Korean conscripts whose sole duty was to man the initial wave of Japanese attack troops as they faced off against fixed British positions.\(^{22}\)

British opposition against the invasion centered on the 3rd Corps of the British Indian Army and several battalions of the British Army. The Japanese isolated the various units comprising these forces, defeating them separately prior to isolating the main British effort and forcing them to surrender or retreat. The British Navy, operating off the coast of Malaya in the Gulf of Siam was likewise defeated.

Completing the British strategy for the defense of Singapore, on 15 October 1941 Britain ordered into the area naval Force Z, under Admiral Tom Phillips. The British naval force consisted of Britain’s newest battleship HMS Prince of Wales (53), HMS Repulse and four destroyers; the HMS Electra (H27), HMS Express (H61), HMS Tenedos (H04) and HMAS Vampire (D68). The Prince of Wales, a King George V-class battleship, though commissioned in January 1941 had sailed into the Atlantic Ocean in May that year with the HMS Hood (51) in pursuit of the German pocket battleship KMS Bismarck. Though the HMS Hood was destroyed with only three of its 1,418 men surviving, the Prince of Wales scored three hits on Bismarck. One of its hits disabled the Bismarck’s aircraft catapult, the second destroyed a dynamo room, and the third rendered Bismarck’s bow fuel tanks useless, forcing Bismarck to steam toward France for repairs. The Bismarck never arrived in France.

In August 1941, while still under repair from its battle with Bismarck, the Prince of Wales carried Winston Churchill to Naval Station Argentia, Newfoundland, where Churchill met with U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. The meeting resulted in a joint statement that eventually became known as the Atlantic Charter, the outline for the post-war world. Force Z arrived in Singapore on 2 December 1941, less than a week before the war began with a Japanese attack on Malaya. Force Z was doomed.

Warned beforehand that no air support could be provided, Force Z slipped forth from the port of Singapore on the afternoon of 8 December in an effort to engage the Japanese landing force along the east coast of Malaya. The Japanese submarine I-65 sighted the force in the afternoon of the following day (oddly enough when Hog Wild entered northern Korea on 29 August 1945 the first Soviet fighter it encountered would be Yak-65). Japanese aircraft located the task force on 10 December 1942, but eventually lost contact. In the early morning hours of 10 December, the Japanese submarine I-58: the same submarine that would eventually sink the USS Indianapolis after it deposited the first U.S. atomic bomb on Tinian on 30 July 1945, reestablished contact with the attacking British surface fleet. Lacking air cover, Japanese aircraft attacked Force Z off the coast Malaya sinking the HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse that afternoon. The attack killed 793 British officers and sailors, and broke the back of British naval forces operating in the area. The Japanese invasion of Malaya proceeded unmolested.

With the loss of the HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, and the return of surviving U.S. capital ships to Pearl Harbor, there were no British or American capital ships in the Indian or Pacific Ocean to challenge the Japan’s Imperial Navy.

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\(^{22}\) Ibid.
The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse increased the confidence of Japan’s military surging throughout East Asia and its prestige throughout the world. On 11 December 1941, the day after Britain’s loss Adolf Hitler (20 Apr 1889–30 Apr 1945) declared war on the U.S.

Defeated by Japanese forces at Jitra; lacking naval forces to thwart the Japanese invasion; failing to implement OPERATION MATADOR to meet the Japanese on the beaches in Thailand; lacking aircraft to maintain air superiority, and under constant attack, Commonwealth forces and civilians alike began to retreat toward Singapore. Those who accurately assessed the situation left Singapore for other islands such as Java, and into the path of additional Japanese advances toward Australia. Those more knowledgeable fled directly to Australia.

On 8 December Japanese aircraft began bombing the Malayan Island of Penang. British military forces and European civilians abandoned the island nine days later leaving the native population open to Japanese aggression and reprisals. In leaving Penang’s native population to the Japanese, the British succeeded in alienating any local support they might otherwise have received in thwarting the Japanese advance. Malayans never rallied to the British cause.

By early January the Japanese were in control of the entire northern region of Malaya. The government of Thailand observing Japan’s advances down the Malay Peninsula from its capital of Bangkok as the end of British rule in Asia, officially signed a Treaty of Friendship with Imperial Japan. Thailand acquired sovereignty over several northern Malayan sultanates in the process.

At Kampar, the 11th Division of the Indian Army rallied, delaying the Japanese advance for several days and inflicting severe casualties on Japan’s invading army. Operating in an area which forbade the use of tanks and limited the application of close-air-support, the 11th Division of the Indian Army was forced to retreat only when additional Japanese forces were landed along the Malay coast to the rear of their position.

Kuala Lumpur fell to the Japanese on 11 January 1942. Japanese forces entered the city unopposed, placing Britain’s Gibraltar of the East, Singapore, connected by the Jahor-Singapore Causeway to the Malayan Peninsula, within 200 miles of advancing Imperial forces. Shorter-range Japanese aircraft near immediately began to bomb the island city.

Retreating to prepared positions south of the Slim River, two Indian Brigades were devastated by Japanese forces attacking at night behind a shield of advancing tanks. Replaced by the 8th Australian Division, the 11th Indian Division was now retired from the battle. Despite its being out numbered man-for-man Japanese forces continued to advance down the Malayan Peninsula. Near-constant Japanese pressure against British positions prevented Allied forces from regrouping and reorganizing their defenses north of Singapore.

On 31 January 1942, British Engineers destroyed the Jahor-Singapore Causeway severing Singapore’s only link to mainland Asia. More than 25,000 Allied soldiers north of the causeway had been captured or killed. 15,000 of those lost in the Malaya Campaign were non-combat troops such as cooks, logistics support, and pay clerks. 23

In its advance down the peninsula, Japanese forces suffered 25,000 men killed or wounded. Despite the aggressiveness of the Japanese forces operating against the British, the high number of Japanese casualties adversely impacted Japan’s ability to force a rapid conclusion to the campaign. In addition Japanese supplies of food, ammunition and other military stores were being rapidly depleted. The Japanese had out run their logistics support. As the Japanese moved toward Singapore, British engineers attempting to delay the Japanese advance destroyed over 100 bridges as they retreated down the peninsula. The British action against the bridges of Malaya did little to slow the Japanese advance, but it did complicate Japanese planning, add confusion to the advance and increase the stress on Japanese commanders. On 31 January 1942 after the surviving Commonwealth forces fighting in Malaya retreated onto Singapore Island, the British blew the Jahor-Singapore Causeway, the only overland route from Malaya into Singapore. The Japanese now laid siege to Singapore.

Singapore Falls

While the British destruction of the Jahor-Singapore Causeway delayed the advance of Japanese forces into Singapore, it could not stop the invasion. The assault against Singapore began on 8 February at 8:30 p.m. when Australian machine gunners engaged a number of small ships transporting the first wave of 4,000 Japanese soldiers leading the assault against northern Singapore. More would follow.

Singapore was defended by 85,000 men under Lieutenant General Arthur Percival. Of the 85,000 soldiers about 70,000 were considered front-line or combat soldiers. These 70,000 soldiers manned 38 infantry battalions: 13 British, six Australian, 17 Indian, and two Malayan. An additional three battalions of machine-gun troops were also available. Though the numbers appear impressive at least seven of the battalions were undermanned, six of the battalions had only been in-

23 Ibid.
country for less than two weeks.\textsuperscript{24} Five of the six Australia battalions had been only recently augmented by about 1,900 soldiers who had received less than two weeks training total.\textsuperscript{25}

The combined British force offered a mixed bag of strengths and weaknesses. Only one division, the British 18\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, was manned to full strength. However, the division was largely undertrained and lacked combat experience. Most of the other divisions and units on the island were also under strength and where fully manned on paper, consisted of a combination of untrained soldiers inserted into previously decimated units. Some units were completely untrained. The British were opposed by a Japanese force less than one-half their number.

Japanese forces under General Tomoyuki Yamashita consisted of three divisions numbering just over 30,000 men. These 30,000 soldiers had been blooded in combat in China, and along the advance into Malaya. Yamashita’s army forces were accompanied by a light tank brigade.

Over the next five days the number of air attacks launched against the island by Japanese aircraft steadily increased. According to Rohan Rivett in his book Behind Bamboo; an inside Story of the Japanese Prison Camps, over a period of 24 days Singapore withstood 80 major air raids.\textsuperscript{26} Artillery, fired into Singapore from Japanese positions inside Malaya steadily intensified. Communications between British units attempting to prepare defenses were constantly disrupted, preventing the British from establishing a more solid defensive line. Civilian casualties among the local population and refugees pouring onto the island from fear of the Japanese advance down the Malayan Peninsula began to mount. On the night of 8 February the Japanese began to cross the narrow strip of water from Malaya to Singapore.

Though many of the British defenders had never fired a rifle, much less fired one in anger, the Japanese landing along the northern coast of Singapore was fiercely contested. Eventually the ever increasing number of Japanese soldiers landing along the beach, heavy artillery fire, close air-support, and better combat intelligence began to over-task the thinly stretched British defenders. Japanese forces began to identify and exploit gaps in the British lines, moving inland along unguarded creeks, riverbanks and into mangrove swamps. A second Japanese beachhead was soon established further along on Singapore’s northern coast. 13,000 Japanese troops would land on Singapore’s northern coast overnight. Another 10,000 would soon follow.\textsuperscript{27} By the morning of 9 February 1942 substantial elements of the British coastal defense network had been overrun, surrounded and cutoff by the large number Japanese landing along the coast. At Kranji, Japanese light tanks landed completely unopposed. The tanks quickly began to move south, bypassing Indian units along the way.

On 11 February 1942, knowing that Japan’s forces had out run their logistics and supply lines; that several units had already been reduced to only a few hundred men, attempting to bluff his way to victory General Yamashita called on General Percival to surrender. Some of Japan’s shortages would alleviate themselves as much of Britain’s ammunition and fuel stores were now in Japanese hands as were Singapore’s main fresh water resources. Other shortages were insurmountable.

Despite the success of the Japanese offensive, Allied lines on Singapore finally began to stabilize the morning of 12 February in a small area in the southeastern part of the island. Malayan forces opposing the invasion checked the Japanese advance for two days.

On the 13\textsuperscript{th} of February, with Japanese forces continuing to compress British forces into an ever smaller defensive circle General Percival was advised by his senior officers, in the interest of minimizing civilian casualties to surrender. To his advisors Percival refused, however he did seek permission from his immediate superiors to surrender British forces to the Japanese.

The morning of the 14 February saw Allied forces continuing to offer stiff resistance, however it was becoming increasingly apparent that the fight was over. As more than one million noncombatants began to crowd into the areas held by the British, the civilian death toll was rising. Japanese artillery and air attacks continued to increase throughout the area. The Allies were beginning to run out of food. The ammunition depots supporting anti-aircraft artillery units were now depleted. Japanese air units attacking the center of the city faced little opposition. On the morning of 15 February Japanese forces broke through the last British line of defense. British forces on Singapore had suffered 9,000 casualties, killed and wounded. At 9:30 a.m. General Percival called his senior commanders into conference.

Surrender

Held at Fort Canning, Percival presented his commanders with two alternatives: Launch an immediate counterattack to regain control of Singapore’s reservoirs, water services, military food depots and dislodge the enemy’s artillery, or surrender. General Percival was advised that a counter-attack under the current conditions existing at the time was not possible. Surrender was the only option. Percival formally surrendered Singapore at 5:15 p.m., on 15 February 1945. The

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Rivett, Rohan. Behind Bamboo; an inside story of the Japanese prison camps. Angus and Robertson. Sydney, Australia. 1946
cease fire was to begin at 8:30 p.m. that evening. For the British, Indian, Australian and Malayan forces that had defended Malaya and Singapore, the collapse of the British defenses and the surrender Singapore were a catastrophe.

The fall of Singapore represented the largest single surrender of British-led forces in the history of the British Empire. About 80,000 British, Australian and Indian soldiers became POWs, joining the 50,000 prisoners taken by the Japanese in the Malay campaign. Japan now held 130,000 British soldiers captive. Some would survive the years of imprisonment. Many would never return home. Thousands would slave across Asia on the Thai-Burma Railroad, at Sandakan Airfield in northern Borneo, the Mergui Road and other locations now forgotten to history. Many would suffer further when they began to be shipped to other parts of Asia on Japan’s numerous Hell Ships, as Japan’s hard won empire of 1942 began to contract. All of the POWs held at the Konan POW Camp in northern Korea were formerly soldiers of the British Empire captured in the defense of Malaya and the Battle for Singapore. They would eventually sail to Korea aboard a Japanese tramp steamer, the Fukkai Maru.

General Percival would spend most of WWII in a POW camp located in Formosa and later in Manchuria. He was found at the end of the war by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and transported to Tokyo along with Corregidor’s General Wainwright where he would stand to the rear of General Douglas MacArthur (26 Jan 1880–5 Apr 1964) as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers signed the instruments of Japanese surrender for the Allies. Using several pens, MacArthur presented one each to the two former commanders of Allied forces, Percival from Singapore, Wainwright of the Philippines.

General Yamashita survived the war as commander of Japanese forces on Luzon, the Philippines. Generals Percival and Wainwright were present at the formal surrender of Yamashita at Baguio, the Philippine on 3 September 1945 where General Percival refused to shake the hand of his former adversary. General Yamashita was subsequently found guilty of war crimes by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. He was executed on 23 February 1946 at Los Baños Prison Camp, 30 miles south of Manila. Although Yamashita had surrendered he and his forces had never been decisively defeated. Yamashita was simply complying with the orders to surrender his forces that came from Emperor Hirohito as the Japanese Empire collapsed. Like most Japanese commanders Yamashita knew that Japan was losing the war, but the rapid end came as a surprise nonetheless.

Section 4 – UNEXPECTED ENDINGS

The end of WWII in the Pacific came suddenly with all previous planning overtaken by the course events – events largely out of the control of war planning staffs and major commanders across the Pacific. Most commanders were caught unaware of the existence of the atomic bomb. Few commanders, British or American were even consulted about the use of the bomb. Even fewer commanders had any foreknowledge of actual Soviet plans to cross their common border southward into Japanese occupied Manchuria.

Unlike the war in Europe there were no large-scale advances of warring armies across the continent of Asia. In many cases when WWII ended in the Pacific theater of the war, major combat forces remained separated by thousands of miles. Due to the island hopping campaign, many of Japan’s best combat units were left isolated on long-since by-passed island strongholds to wither, starve and mark time awaiting other events. Despite the lush greenness of most Pacific Islands, the jungle is actually little more than a wet desert with little food of real value. Without supplies brought in from the outside Japan’s forces were starving.

Unlike Germany and despite the futility of their situation there were no mass surrenders of Japanese forces before the ultimate surrender in August 1945. Whereas Berlin had fallen to the advancing Allies and Adolf Hitler had committed suicide, when the war in Asia ended Tokyo had not been occupied by Allied armies. When the surrender came Japan’s Emperor, Hirohito (29 Apr 1901–7 Jan 1989) remained free. Several million Japanese soldiers and sailors remained under arms in the field. Many U.S. commanders believed dropping the atomic bomb was unnecessary as Japan was near collapse. The home islands were isolated from its Empire. They believed a Japanese collapse would come with the passage of time.

To the casual observer signs that Japan would collapse were numerous: Its cities had been burned out, its economy was in ruins, and its people were starving. The Imperial Japanese Navy now rested at the bottom of the Pacific, logistically; its armies in the field could not be supported. Allied air supremacy had been achieved, Japan’s sea lanes had been blocked, and the island nation had been isolated. At the lowest possible level, that of rumor and “scuttlebutt,” Allied forces; soldiers, marines, and seaman alike hoped Japan would soon surrender or “throw in the towel,” without the need for an invasion. Generals and admirals saw a nation defeated; one incapable of continuing the war.

At the POTS DAM Conference held after the German surrender in late July and early August 1945, plans had been made between the U.S. and its Russian Allies to coordinate their future military moves against Imperial Japan. These plans included an exchange of liaison officers and some form of common communications. Vladivostok would be the home of an American naval unit under Admiral Ivan Stepanovich Yumashev (9 Oct 1895–2 Sept 1972). Marshal Aleksandr
Mikhailovich Vasilevsky’s (30 Sept 1895–5 Dec 1977) headquarters at Khabarovsk would house a similar detachment.28 While the soldiers prayed that no invasion would be necessary, the generals and admirals continued to plan. It was a mixed bag of expectations opposed by political and military realities. Though Japan tottered on the verge of surrender the planning for an invasion, OPERATION DOWNFALL continued.

OPERATION DOWNFALL was the overall Allied plan for the invasion of Japan. It consisted of two parts, OPERATION OLYMPIC – the invasion and capture of the southern one-third of the island of Kyūshū, and OPERATION CORONET – the invasion of the main island of Honshū with an attack across the Kanto Plain and the capture of Tokyo. The invasion of Kyūshū under OLYMPIC was scheduled to take place on 1 November 1945, with OPERATION CORONET to take place in 1946 on 1 March. With knowledge of the commanding generals, many commanders expected Japanese resistance to continue well into 1947 or 1948. The events of early August 1945 occurred in rapid fire sequence leaving well-thought out plans in the dustbin of history, and many soldiers, sailors and marines thankful.

On 6 August 1945, just 23 days before Hog Wild was forced down the U.S. detonated the world’s first atomic bomb, a uranium-based weapon over Hiroshima, Japan. On 8 August, two days after the blast at Hiroshima, the U.S.S.R., formerly neutral in the four years of fighting raging across the Pacific declared war on the Empire of Japan.

Launching what became known as “August Storm,” the invasion of Manchuria, more accurately known as the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation Soviet forces rapidly advanced across Manchuria and into Korea.29 Eight days after the Soviet declaration of war, Russian soldiers were attacking Seishin (Chongjin), Korea. On 9 August 1945, the morning after the Soviet invasion of Manchuria the U.S. detonated the world’s second atomic bomb, a plutonium-based weapon over Nagasaki. Additional attacks by B-29s continued to force home the reality of the situation to Japan’s military and civilian leadership, bombing an oil related target on the night of 9 August and a factory in Tokyo the next day. On the 14th of August over 1,000 aircraft, 828 of them B-29s bombed Ise, Iwakuni, Kumagaya, Osaka and Tokoyama.

Following the hammer blows of two atomic bombs, the Russian declaration of war, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, Japan admitted defeat. At noon on 15 August Japan surrendered. Japan’s government accepted the surrender terms as outlined in the POTSDAM Declaration ending the war in the Pacific. The American liaison missions scheduled for Vladivostok and Khabarovsk awaiting transport at Seattle, Washington, were canceled.30 After nearly four years of constant war, the conflict had ended over a period of about nine days. In the Pacific Theater the B-29 was a major contributor to Japan’s surrender.

**Section 5 – SUPERFORTRESS**

At nearly 100 foot long with a wing span of 142 foot the B-29 “Superfortress,” a name derived from its famous predecessor, the B-17 “Flying Fortress” was one of the largest aircraft of any nation to see service in WWII. The bomber’s cost; $3 billion was $1 billion more than that of the Manhattan Project at $2 billion, by half. The B-29 program of WWII was the largest single industrial undertaking ever financed by the War Department and the single-most expensive program of the entire war.31 The B-29 Superfortress was a high-altitude day-light bomber capable of operating at altitudes of up to 40,000 feet (12,000 m) and at true air speeds of up to 350 mph. It was intended to be capable of navigating over vast distances over large

stretches of water with no visual ground aids, under radio blackout and in bad weather when celestial navigation would be virtually impossible. The Superfortress was designed to and did take the war from the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean into the heart of Japan.

The B-29 possessed a combat radius of 1,600 miles with a record range of 5,333 miles. While all other bombers of its time were described as “heavy bombers” the B-29 would be the first bomber to be described as a “very heavy bomber.” The Superfortress had greater speed, range, and payload than any of its predecessors, the B-17 and the B-24 Liberator which were considered “heavy bombers.” During initial production runs a single B-29 cost more than a half a million dollars each at a time when a single B-25 Mitchell Bomber cost by comparison, $96,000. By the end of the war cost per bomber would rise to nearly $600,000 each. Some reports put the price of each B-29 at one million dollars.

Each B-29 produced required over 26,000 pounds of aluminum and 1,000 pounds of copper. More than 600,000 rivets, nine and a half miles of wiring, and two miles of tubing went into every B-29 built. The B-29 contained about 55,000 numbered parts. Flight controls were counterbalanced and operated by wire with no hydraulic assist.

The normal B-29 aircraft crew consisted of twelve airmen; a pilot (referred to at the time as the airplane commander), co-pilot (referred to at the time as the pilot), bombardier, navigator, flight engineer, radio operator, radar operator, and five gunners. Gunners were sometimes referred to as “scanners.” The pilot, co-pilot, bombardier, navigator, flight engineer and radio operator, occupied a pressurized cabin in the forward part of the aircraft. Four gunners occupied a similar cabin to the rear. The aircraft’s tail gunner occupied a small pressurized pocket in the tail section of the aircraft. During missions the tail gunner was isolated in the rear of the aircraft for the duration of the flight.

In the latter part of the war, crews were sometimes augmented with an additional two radar or radio operators who manned the aircraft’s radar and operated the aircraft’s electronic countermeasures package. One of the worlds’ most advanced aircraft; technologically the B-29 was a full generation ahead of all other high altitude bombers. Much of the technology developed to support the B-29; radar, electronics and fuels systems, would continue to be mainstays in aircraft production for decades after the B-29 was built – and subsequently retired from service.

The aircraft boasted a pressurized cabin, a computerized fire control system, a flush-riveted skin and was armed with up to 12 remotely controlled .50 caliber machine guns. The aircraft’s Central Fire Control Computer could compute corrections for altitude, bullet drop, deflection, range, speed, wind and temperature. With the exception of the aircraft’s tail gunner, any gunner inside the Central Fire Control Center could access and operate any of the aircraft’s guns at any one time. The B-29 Central Fire Control System was WWII deadly.

The B-29 had five turrets: Front upper, front lower, aft upper, aft lower and a tail turret each with twin .50 caliber machine guns. The upper forward turret actually held four .50 caliber machine guns. On earlier B-29s the tail also mounted a 20mm cannon. The turrets were electrically powered, remotely sighted, controlled and directed by an electro-mechanical computer developed by General Electric and known as the Central Fire Control System. The system consisted of five interconnected electro-mechanical analog computers, one per gun turret. The system provided each gunner primary control of the gun at his sighting station and secondary control of all other weapons. Gunners tracked attacking aircraft from their assigned position through a reflector gun sight that automatically aimed the gun.

The upper gunner served as the “master gunner” assigning turrets to each gunner through a master control panel. Each gunner could simultaneously operate two turrets. The upper gunner could access the forward and aft upper turrets. The bombardier normally controlled the lower forward turret. Side gunners could operate their weapon and trade off control of the lower aft turret, the front and tail guns. The tail and bombardier positions were equipped with dead-man switches, if the

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36. Ibid.
switch was open then the two turrets (lower forward and tail) could also be controlled by the side gunners. When the forward and tail positions were open for use by the side gunner, a switch box located between the two gunners allocated control of the three turrets between the two gunners. If the computer system failed, each gunner could manually fire the guns at his position. When operating correctly the B-29 gun system could put more lead on a moving target at a far greater distance than any other aircraft ever built.

Possessing thirty fuel tanks carrying over 9,400 gallons of gasoline, the B-29 had a combat range of over 3,000 miles; sufficient to bomb Japan from bases in the Marianas Islands. The bomber’s ailerons, rudder and elevator were the largest ever placed on a workable aircraft. At takeoff, the B-29’s four Wright Duplex 3350 Cyclone engines could produce 8,800 horsepower. As electrical wiring was more reliable than hydraulics in combat, the B-29 made extensive use of electrical systems. With the exception of hydraulic braking, all systems on the B-29 were electrical. 129 electric motors could be found throughout the B-29, all drawing their power from a seven-generator electrical system operating off the aircraft’s engines.

Over the course of the war a total of 3,628 B-29s were produced. A photographic reconnaissance model of the B-29 would also be produced. Training losses in the U.S. accounted for 260 B-29s destroyed. 512 were lost overseas with 576 crewmembers killed. 2,406 crewmen would be listed as missing in action and presumed dead. At the end of the war, 433 B-29 crewmembers surviving in captivity were liberated from Japanese POW camps.

Though designed as a high-altitude bomber, a later change in tactics resulted in the bomber mostly flying low altitude nighttime missions employing incendiary bombs against Japanese cities or mining the sea lanes and convoy routes that supported Japan’s wartime economy. The B-29 became the primary aircraft used to deliver incendiary weapons and mines against mainland Japan. The success of the B-29 in taking the war directly into the heart of Japan did much to ensure the creation of an independent Air Force in the years after the war. However such an advanced bomber did not come without its share of problems.

The first prototype B-29 bomber, the XB-29 (Serial Number 41-1002) took to the air on 21 September 1942 when U.S. forces in the Pacific were still largely on the defensive. A second aircraft was completed in December 1942. This second aircraft suffered a massive engine failure in-flight on 18 February 1943 crashing into the Frye Packing Plant just north of Seattle’s Boeing Field. The crash killed the entire ten-man crew and 20 people on the ground at the plant including Eddie Allen its primary test pilot. Loss of the bomber prompted a Senate investigation and tighter Army Air Force control over the project. Details associated with the loss were held as Top Secret information until after the war. Originally attributed to an engine fire the subsequent incident investigation identified the primary cause as a fire initiated by an instrument package leading from the cockpit to the outermost engine. Located along the leading edge of the wing once the package caught fire, the fire spread long the wing and into the bomber’s engines. Allen was an aviation legend, remembered as the father of flight testing. Despite the loss of Allen and the second B-29 prototype the program moved forward. But for all its advances and beauty; its ability to take the war to Japan from the Marianas Islands, the B-29 was not without its initial shortcomings: Flaws that could rapidly lead to catastrophic failures and often did.

Section 6 – OF BREAKDOWNS AND CATASTROPHIC FAILURES

Most of the bomber’s defects stemmed from early wartime requirements for a long-range bomber that could attack targets in Germany from bases in the U.S. should England, then at war with Germany, collapse or surrender. Conceptual drawings for the bomber were produced in 1938. Specifications for the most formidable bomber to serve during WWII were drawn up in 1939 and completed on 29 January 1940. The plans were delivered to the Boeing Aircraft Company seven days later. USAAC deliverables included a requirement for four full bomber groups to be combat ready by 1 January 1944. It was another in a long line of requirements that Boeing would never achieve.

To meet the four bomber group requirement, the B-29 went from inception to actual production in only three years at a time when it normally took five years to take an aircraft from concept to first prototype. To decrease production time; aircraft design, manufacture and testing took place simultaneously. Demand for the B-29 was so great that the USAAC ordered 250 of the bombers before the first fragment of the aircraft was actually ever produced. Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor but before the first B-29 prototype had even flown, the U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC) now renamed

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) increased the initial order for the bomber to 1,650 aircraft.\(^4^4\) It was the great demand for the bomber that led to many of its production and operational problems.

Design changes were incorporated into the aircraft as each bomber moved along the assembly line. Some 900 modifications to the initial design were ordered by the U.S. military before the first test flight of the aircraft prototype ever took place.\(^4^5\) Bombers exiting the plant were moved directly into modification centers where many were rebuilt to standards that had changed from the time the basic hull was constructed; to the time the plane was factory complete. At best the B-29 entered Army Air Force inventories at least one year before it was fully perfected. The great need for the bomber, outweighed the risks – and possible loss of aircrew lives. More changes would follow the aircraft to operational bases.

As a consequence of this constant change and upgrading, while outwardly any two of the aircraft might appear identical; internally each of the 3,965 aircraft built could be vastly different. Due to a difference in tolerances for raw materials the weight of each aircraft could also be profoundly different.\(^4^6\) It is likely that the best operational B-29 to exit the production line was actually the final bomber to roll down the assembly line, the one that benefitted from all the testing, adjustments and knowledge gained from those that went before.

**Section 7 – BOMBER TROUBLES**

By early-January 1944, 97 B-29s had been completed by Boeing’s Wichita Plant; however, only 16 were airworthy. Most of the 97 aircraft produced before January 1944 were either grounded at the Wichita plant itself or at “Modification Centers,” such as those in Marietta, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama or Wright Field in Ohio pending urgent changes. Only 70 pilots had ever “checked out” on the aircraft. While the basic design of the aircraft was solid, the urgent operational requirement for a very heavy combat bomber overseas had resulted in tremendous shortcuts being taken on the production line. The constant upgrading and changes ordered by the military as the planes moved down the assembly line, thought to save time in its eventual deployment, actually caused additional delays. The Wright engine alone had been the object of over 2,000 changes.\(^4^7\)

**Advanced Engine, Advanced Problems**

The earliest B-29s were equipped with the Wright R-3350-13. The basic engine was developed and tested in 1937 and eventually grew to become the workhorse of larger piston-engine aircraft worldwide. Nevertheless, in its earlier days, the engine was plagued with problems; most resulting from the wartime demand for the B-29 to rapidly enter service.

A radial engine, the Wright R-3350-13 contained 18 cylinders in two tightly arranged rows of nine cylinders each; one row in front, one to the rear. Displacement was 3,350 cubic inches; 186 cubic inches per cylinder. The arrangement was so compact that the diameter of the entire engine was only 55 inches. The engine was designed to achieve one horsepower for each pound of weight.\(^4^8\) The result was an engine that could produce 2,600 horsepower; double the power of the Wright R-1820 engines that powered the B-17. The Wright R-3350-13 was the only air-cooled engine available at the time that met the power requirements of the B-29, while remaining within the established ratio of power to weight. The engine had a tremendous power-to-weight ratio but the advantage came at a high cost to its overall durability.\(^4^9\) The engine was a nightmare for mechanics. In 23 test flights of the first prototype of the B-29 consisting of total

\(^{44}\) Ibid.

\(^{45}\) Correll John T. The Matterhorn Missions. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2009. http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2009/March%202009/0309matterhorn.pdf


\(^{48}\) Ibid.

a flight time of only 27 hours the aircraft burned through 16 engines; nearly one engine lost for each two hours of flight.50 Ground crews commonly referred to the aircraft’s power plant as the Army’s first “disposable engine.”51 Thousands of the worn out engines would eventually dot the Marianas and probably portions of Kansas; it is likely that some are still there.

Each engine was supported by two superchargers which increased the pressure of air at the air intakes to above atmospheric pressures, allowing the amount of fuel to be fed into each cylinder to be increased. The design improved the engine’s performance by increasing the available horsepower. In the end each engine would cost $25,000.52 Early Wright R-3350-13 engines were temperamental: Its rear cylinders had an alarming tendency to overheat. Its 18 cylinders were simply too close together to permit an adequate flow of cooling air around the engine. The engine regularly overheated at combat weight and particularly while climbing after takeoff. In 1944 alone fully 31 percent of all engines produced failed.53 The B-29 began to develop a reputation as unreliable and dangerous. Aircrews began to lose confidence in the ability of the bomber to take them into combat and return them to base safely. The overheating problem was partially due to the tight clearance between the cylinders baffles and the engine cowling (engine cover). The frontal air intake for the 3350 engine measured only 1,164 square inches to cool 18 cylinders, while an area of 1,417 square inches was provided for cooling the engines on the B-17.54 The lack of cooling air passing around the engine resulted in the engine overheating, causing the engine’s exhaust valves to unseat. Once unseated, the valves released fuel-air mixtures into the engine that acted much like a blowtorch against the engine’s valve stems. The burning engine subsequently “swallowed” its own valves, resulting in serious and devastating engine fires.55 The engine would simply disintegrate.

To further compound the problem, a high-magnesium content accessory housing was located just to the rear of the engine. Magnesium had been chosen as a construction material for the compartment as it was one-third lighter than steel. Each engine was virtually surrounded by magnesium. Aircraft weight against engine performance was a constant factor under consideration when choosing construction materials such as aluminum and magnesium. Likewise, while the earliest B-29s were often painted in a camouflage colors with large amounts of olive drab, later versions remained as bare aluminum reducing overall weight by several hundred pounds.

In addition to the engine accessory compartment, the engine housing and crankcase contained large amounts of magnesium, and oil. The engine itself held 80 gallons of oil, but often flew with only 60 gallons to reduce weight.56 A properly operating engine consumed oil at alarming rates. In an emergency the propellers on an engine losing oil would not feather, increasing drag and forcing the aircraft to consume more fuel.57 B-29s with engines damaged over Japan that could not be feathered never made it back to Saipan. After the war many B-29 pilots would comment that they had spent more time flying on two or three engines alone than they ever did with all four engines running.58

Engines that burned too much oil at some point would fail completely. Once an engine caught fire the accessory housing located to the rear of the engine would also catch fire. Once burning, the oil and high magnesium content of the housing’s alloy resulted in severe fires which would burn through the main wing spar in about 40 seconds.59 Any fire that not was immediately put out or contained in the forward part of the engine by fire extinguishers, became impossible to stop. The end result was catastrophic wing failure.60 The engine problem had to be overcome and until it was the B-29 remained an experimental aircraft.

The engine’s early difficulties were so numerous that then Senator Harry Truman (8 May 1884–26 Dec 1972) headed a committee to investigate its problems. Truman’s committee found the USAAF guilty of pressuring Wright Aeronautical to speed up engine production; allowing quality to suffer in favor of quantity.61 Had more time been available, many of the problems experienced with the engine might have been overcome prior to its use, however the necessary time was not available.

According to Lieutenant Eugene Harwood writing in Honorable Heart, Memoirs from Colorado to B-29s to Iowa “At MacDill Field, everyone was having lots of problems with the new shiny B-29s. It had been rushed into production to get it out there for us to use for the war and had quite a few problems that hadn’t been perfected yet. The whole problem with the

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52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
B-29s was the engine and we lost three B-29s in training with 33 crewmembers aboard. When the props got so they couldn’t be feathered, they started wind-milling, rotating faster than normal with normal power, and it would brim up the feathering system, and the whole four-blade prop system would fly off to anywhere. Sometimes the prop would cut right through the pilots section of the fuselage. It seemed like we had to pre-flight two or three B-29s before we found one that was flyable.”^62

To overcome the problem of engine overheating, Boeing engineers working with their Wright counterparts ultimately developed several “work around” systems that, while not completely eliminating the problem at least mitigated the engine’s issues until an improved engine was available. These improvements included a system to increase the flow of oil around the cylinders, redesigned engine cowling flaps, and baffles calculated to redirect the flow of incoming air directly onto the engine’s exhaust cylinders to keep them cooler. A cuff, which acted as a fan, was also placed onto the engine’s propellers near the hub forcing more air into the engine cowling, adding further cooling to the operating engine. ^63 The use of magnesium in engine crankcases was eventually discontinued in favor of aluminum, further limiting the amount of magnesium in the area of the engine.

Toward the end of the war the engine was equipped with a fuel injection system replacing the former carburetors. The cylinders were now forged instead of cast. Newer valves had hollow stems filled with sodium, greatly alleviating the problem of swallowed valves. ^64 Common knowledge among B-29 crews, the engine’s faults would weigh heavily on the decisions made by the crew of Hog Wild as they took fire from Soviet Yaks near Konan in the early afternoon of 29 August 1945. The B-29’s advanced APQ-13 radar was also problematic.

The AN/APQ-13 bombing-navigational radar was a complex piece of equipment, one that was vulnerable to dirt and vibrations. It was highly temperamental and had to be carefully checked before each mission. The components of the APQ 13 were connected by numerous cables and wires. No matter how carefully these cables were connected the effects of humidity, corrosion, and vibration would often cause radar failure. When the radar failed, connections were the primary suspect. The radar required a large amount of stable electricity which was generated by the bomber’s six power generators. However the bomber’s electrical system had difficulties regulating the power produced at the voltages required. Electrical problems increased at higher altitudes. The radar transmitter and wave-guide to the antenna had to be maintained as a pressurized unit for proper operation. Pressurization leaks and failures at high altitudes were common. Some radar sets worked better than others. In the era before the transistor, vacuum tubes also caused problems.

The radar held thirty to forty vacuum tubes, any of which were subject to failure in flight. In most cases the radar was too complicated to be worked on at forward airbases located on Guam, Saipan or Tinian. Tubes could be replaced, the wiring checked. Repair usually consisted of removing failed components and replacing them with spare components until the radar began to work, or failed completely. Forward located maintenance units were incapable of working on radars that failed completely. Defective units were sent to the service squadrons for repair. Operationally the APQ-13 was noticeably complex. Special schools had to be set up at Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Boca Raton in Florida to train crews to operate the radar. The General Electric Central Fire Control Computer was likewise complex. In training the system bewildered and confounded gunners as most had never seen it actually work. Despite its advances, in early 1944 the entire bomber production program was on the verge of failure. Boeing production management at Wichita plant was on the brink of complete collapse.

Few industries could have survived developing, testing, building, and altering a product as it moved down the assembly line under demands of wartime. With aircraft on the assembly line, aircraft at the modification centers, and additional modification packages being sent into the field, it was only a matter of time before the assembly and maintenance system became overloaded and collapsed. Only the direct intervention of General “Hap” Arnold saved the program from cancellation.

“Hap” Arnold

Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold was born on 25 June 1886, in Gladwyne, Pennsylvania. He entered the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York in 1903 at age 17. Originally assigned to the infantry, he applied for transfer to the Signal Corps in April 1911 and was ordered to Dayton, Ohio for flight training under the Wright Brothers. He made his first solo flight on 13 May 1911 after only three hours, 48 minutes of flying time. Arnold was the second U.S. military rated
pilot in history, holding Military Aviator Certificate No. 2 and the first rated flight instructor in the history of the U.S. Air Force. He was the 29th pilot licensed worldwide by the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale. Arnold was promoted to Captain (temporary) in May 1916 and Major in June 1917. On 5 August 1917, he was promoted to full colonel becoming the youngest full colonel in the U.S. Army.63F

During WWI Colonel Arnold oversaw the growth of the air arm of the U.S. Army becoming a protégé of General William “Billy” Mitchell (28 Dec 1879–19 Feb 1936). Mitchell would later publicly accuse the senior leadership of the U.S. Army and Navy of incompetence in the administration of the national defense, and would subsequently become the subject of the most controversial courts-martial in U.S. military history, standing trial in 1925. Major General Douglas MacArthur one of the courts-martial’s ten judges ten judges is reported to have voted for Mitchell’s acquittal. MacArthur, a major character later in this story, did not believe that a senior American officer should be silenced when that officer disagreed with his superiors in rank over matters of doctrine. Despite testifying on behalf of General Mitchell and advocating a separate air force, Arnold ultimately rose to command the U.S. Army Air Force immediately prior to the U.S. entry into WWII. He oversaw the growth of a pre-WWII Air Force of 11,000 men with 1,200 officers to a force that eventually included 2.5 million men. Arnold would eventually be the only five-star general in Air Force history and the only five-star general to ever hold that rank in two different branches of the military, the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. In January 1944 as Boeing management collapsed under the weight of building the B-29 it was Arnold who saved the Superfortress.

General Arnold at Wichita

Visiting the Boeing Plant at Wichita on 11 January 1944, ten days after Boeing had failed to meet their 1 January 1944 deadline for 100 bombers; Arnold insisted that Boeing have 175 of the planes combat ready by 1 March 1944. Viewing the 175th aircraft fuselage on the production line Arnold actually signed the bomber stating “This is the plane I want. I want it before the first of March.” The B-29 signed by Arnold was ultimately nicknamed the “General H.H. Arnold Special.”

Problems in managing the construction of the bomber were so numerous that the Boeing organization overseeing production of the bomber eventually did collapse under the strain. The company was again unable to meet Arnold’s March deadline. Planning to witness the departure of the 58th Bomb Wing for combat duty General Arnold arrived for the event on 9 March 1944 to find not one combat-ready aircraft available. A furious Arnold assigned General Bennett Myers to the problem.

Arnold delegated to Myers full authority to bring the 97 finished bombers to combat ready status and the entire bomber program into full production. To meet Arnold’s demands, Myers pulled USAAF ground crews and technicians from across the nation directly to the Wichita plant modification center to work on the assembled bombers. More than 600 line workers were pulled from the Wichita plant production line itself and were assigned to the effort. Though lacking more than 600 workers, the Boeing assembly line continued to operate. The struggle to get the bombers combat ready became known as the “Battle of Kansas.” On 26 March, about five weeks after the effort began; the first combat ready bomber piloted by Brigadier General LaVerne G. “Blondie” Saunders, commander of the 58th Bombardment Wing, departed the U.S. for the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater. The last of the original 97 bombers and more departed Wichita on 15 April 1944. Even at this late point in their training, the average crew had only 18 hours experience with the B-29. The first bomber to reach its base in India landed on 2 April 1944. Despite the success in getting bombers to the field, some difficulties persisted, the most common and serious problem continued to be the aircraft’s engines. With a new bomber, a new mission, a new capability, an organization had to be developed to maintain and employ the weapon in a way to positively impact, if not win the war. The organization that would do that was the 20th Air Force.

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Section 8 – 20th AIR FORCE

Twentieth Air Force was established on 4 April 1944 at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-level by General Henry H. Arnold to perform strategic bombing missions against Japan. It was the overall parent command of the echelons and subunits to which all B-29s, and eventually Hog Wild would be assigned. To prevent the B-29 from being diverted from strategic bombing to a tactical role by hard-pressed theater commanders such as Douglas MacArthur, Chester Nimitz (24 Feb 1885–20 Feb 1966), or Joseph Warren “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell (19 Mar 1883-12 Oct 1946), Arnold himself would serve as commander of the 20th Air Force. In July 1945 the command was reassigned from Washington D.C. to Guam. General Arnold transferred command of the 20th to General Curtis LeMay. The unit was eventually commanded by General Nathan Twining.

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63F Photo Credit. General H. H. Arnold. Courtesy: U.S. Army
20th Air Force operated two bomber commands, the XX Bombardment Command and the XXI Bombardment Command. Had the war continued a third Bombardment Command the XXII was planned for operations out of the Philippines or Okinawa, and a fourth, the XXIII was planned for eventual deployment from Alaska. 66

XX (20th) Bombardment Command

The 20th Bombardment Command was created on 19 November 1943 and activated the next day. The command was assigned to Twentieth Air Force and moved to India early in 1944. Headquarters XX Bomber Command was established at Kharagpur, India about 90 miles west of Calcutta on 28 March 1944 and stood-up on 23 April 1944. The Twentieth Bomber Command fielded two wings, the 58th and the 73rd Bombardment Wings. The 58th Bombardment Wing consisted of four bombardment groups, the 40th, 444th, the 462nd, and the 468th while the 73rd consisted of the 497th, 498th, 499th and 500th. Though initially assigned to the XX Bombardment Command the 73rd never actually reached India and was eventually reassigned to the XXI Bombardment Command at Saipan. The command’s first B-29 reached India on 2 April 1944.

The first B-29 raid under the 20th Bombardment Command operating out of India took place on 5 June 1944 when ninety-eight B-29s took off from the eastern part of the country to attack Bangkok, Thailand’s Makasan railroad yards. A 2261-mile round trip, the attack on Bangkok was at that time the longest bombing mission of the war. The 20th conducted long-range attacks against the Japanese home islands from June 1944 until relieved in March 1945. The XXI Bombardment Command took the war to the Japanese mainland.

To reach Japan the B-29s of the 20th Bombardment Command operated four forward bases located near Chengtu, the capital of Szechuan Province, China. Under OPERATION MATTERHORN B-29s home based in India flew over the Himalayas to China where they were refueled and loaded with weapons. After loading the B-29s attacked Japan. Far more expensive in costs than the results achieved, MATTERHORN was phased out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1944 with the last raid taking place from China against targets on Formosa on 15 January 1945. In 1944 the Twentieth was selected to be the operational component of the Manhattan Project conducting the atomic bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. In February 1945 the 58th Bombardment Wing was moved from its bases in East India to the Marianas Island chain. The 20th Bombardment Command’s sister organization was the 21st Bombardment Command.

XXI Bombardment Command

The XXI Bomber Command was established on 1 March 1944 at Smoky Hill Army Air Field, Kansas and activated the same day. The command was subsequently transferred to the Colorado Springs Army Air Field, renamed Peterson Army Air Field, Colorado on 13 December 1942. Initially responsible for training of B-29 crews the command moved to Harmon Airfield on Guam on 4 December 1944.

At Guam the XXI Bomber Command became the primary operational component of 20th Air Force operating five bomb wings with 22 bomb groups assigned. In addition to the 58th and 73rd Bombardment Wings discussed above the XXI Bomber Command operated the 313th, 314th, and 315th Bombardment Wings. The 313th Bombardment Wing operated six Bombardment Groups (Very Heavy) the 6th, 9th, 383rd, 504th, 505th and the 509th Composite Group, the unit responsible for delivering atomic weapons to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The 314th Wing was comprised of the 19th, 29th, 39th and 330th Bombardment Groups (Very Heavy) while the 315th consisted of the 16th, 331st, 501st, and 502nd. While the 58th continued to operate out of India the 73rd operated out of Saipan, the 313th from Tinian. The 314th and 315th flew from Guam.

The XXI Bomber Command flew its first mission from the Marianas when fourteen B-29s attacked a number of submarine pens on Dublon Island, Truk Atoll. The command followed up its mission to Truk with its first mission to Japan on 24 November 1944 when it sent one hundred B-29s against Tokyo. The last mission flown by the command took place over the 14th and 15th of August 1945 and was executed by the 313 Bomb Wing, laying naval mines at Hamada, Nanko, Miyazu, and Shimonoseki. 67 Brigadier General Haywood “Possum” Hansell served as the commander of the XXI Bombardment

Command from August 1944 to 20 January 1945 when he was succeeded by Major General Curtis E. LeMay. During the war against Japan the XXI Bomber Command flew a total of 332 missions. The XX and XXI Bomber Commands would give way to the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, Pacific.

**U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific**

In July 1945 the XX and XXI Bomber Commands were combined to form the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, Pacific. The new command was led by General Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz. Major General Curtis LeMay served as Spaatz’s Chief of Staff. Lieutenant General Nathan Twining then took command of 20th Air Force, which, along with the 8th Air Force, became a subordinate command under Spaatz. Hog Wild flew under the 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy), 73rd Bombardment Wing, 20th Air Force, XXI Bomber Command and later the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. The first operational wing to reach Saipan was the 73rd.

**73rd Bombardment Wing**

The 73rd Bombardment Wing moved to Isley Field, Saipan Island, the Marianas Islands in October 1944. The wing was comprised of the 497th, 498th, 499th and 500th bombardment groups. The 73rd was the first wing to attack the Japanese capital of Tokyo. It eventually flew fully one-third of all missions against the Japanese homeland and Japanese forces deployed across the western Pacific. Overall the 73rd Bombardment Wing flew 9894 sorties; a total of 155,545 flight hours. 88 Percent of all hours flown by the wing were rated as combat hours. The wing dropped 48,532 tons of bombs on Japan. Hog Wild would fly a number of those missions. During the war 1,044 of the 73rd’s aircraft would suffer battle damage, 182 of the wing’s plane were lost. The wing’s commander for much the 73rd Bombardment Wing’s time at Saipan was General Emmett “Rosey” O’Donnell, a survivor of the U.S. withdrawal into the Bataan Peninsula, the Philippines, in the early part of the war. The voice call sign for the wing was “Husky.” One of the 73rd Wing’s primary units was the 500th Bombardment Group.

**500th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy)**

The 500th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy) (Tail code Z) was created on 19 November 1943 and activated the next day at Gowen Field, Boise, Idaho on 20 November 1943. In December 1943 the 500th moved from Gowen Field to Walker Army Air Field, Kansas. The unit was originally equipped with the B-17 Flying Fortress and later transitioned to the B-29.

When created the 500th group consisted of four bombardment squadrons; the 881st, 882nd, 883rd, the 884th and four maintenance squadrons. On 27 January 1944 thirty officers and 127 enlisted men from the 480th Anti-Submarine Group arrived at Clovis Army Air Field (later renamed Cannon Air Force Base), New Mexico forming the core unit of group’s four tactical squadrons. On the 15th of April 1944 the four tactical elements moved from Clovis Army Air Field to Walker Army Airfield in Kansas. Walker had begun operations a few years earlier as a satellite field of the Smoky Hill Army Airfield located at Salina, Kansas. By August 1944 Walker Army Airfield boasted a complement of nearly 6,000 men with over 3,200 of those in training. The 500th Bombardment Group began departing Walker by train for Saipan on 28 July 1944 with the advance echelon sailing on the SS Alcoa Polaris, a ship of the Alcoa Steamship Company from Los Angeles on 13 August 1944.

The Alcoa Polaris arrived at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, on the 18th of September 1944. On 11 November 1944, the unit flew its first combat mission from Saipan against a Japanese submarine base on Dublon Island, Truk. Its first attack against mainland Japan took place less-than two weeks later on 24 November. In January 1945 the 500th attacked the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Plant at Nagoya receiving its first Distinguished Unit Citation (DUC) in the process. In April 1945 the 500th took part in the U.S. assault on Okinawa, bombing several Japanese airfields in southern Kyūshū which were conducting Kamikaze attacks against the U.S. fleet operating in the area of the Ryukyu Islands. The 500th received its second DUC for incendiary attacks conducted against the urban-industrial areas of Osaka. John E. Dougherty served as group commander for most of the period that Hog Wild served under the 500th.

Voice call sign for the 500th was Dagwood – January 1945, Pluto – May 1945, Wisdom – August 1945. Radio call signs were, January to February 1945 – xxV534, February to March 1945 – xxV609 with “xx” being the aircraft’s

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70 An Unofficial Pictorial History of the 500th Bombardment Group, One of the Four Combat Groups in 73rd Wing under 21st Bomber Command and 20th Air Force, Stationed for Overseas Operations at Saipan in the Marianas Islands
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
identification number. Prior to April 1945 tail code for the 500th was a “Z” over a hollow square over the aircraft identification number. After April 1945 a 12 foot tall “Z” on the vertical stabilizer took the place of the “Z-square.” Most crews of aircraft prior to the April 1945 change would continue to refer to their aircraft as “Z-xx” and after April 1945 as “Z square xx.” Change took time, remarking the aircraft would take time. In September 1945 some members of Hog Wild’s crew would continue to refer to some of the wing’s older aircraft as “Z-xx.” Hog Wild flew for the 500th Bombardment Group, 882nd Bombardment Squadron.

882nd Bombardment Squadron

The 882nd Bombardment Squadron was created on 19 November 1943 and activated the following day. It was one of three squadrons assigned to the 500th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy) the other two being the 881st Squadron the 883rd Squadron. The unit was originally equipped with B-17s until B-29 production allowed the unit to be reequipped with Superfortresses. In August 1944 the squadron was reassigned to the central Pacific under its parent command, the 500th Bomb Wing where it initially conducted operations against Japan’s military-industrial complex. Hog Wild served under the 73rd Bombardment Wing, 500th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy), 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Debate aside, the B-29s operating from Saipan were considered by many to be a major factor in ending the war. The squadron would later delivery incendiaries against Japan’s dispersed industrial production system which supported the country’s larger industries and the Japanese war effort. In early 1945, U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) B-29s operating from Guam, Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas Islands began launching incendiary raids against Kobe, Nagoya, Osaka, and Tokyo.

Section 9 – THE B-29 IN ACTION: JAPAN BURNING

The Marianas had fallen to U.S. invasions in mid-1944 and Isley Field was to be the home of Hog Wild for all its combat missions against the Japanese homeland from the Marianas. Isley Field remains today one of the most complete WWII era airfields to survive the war. Whatever quiet and solitude that can be found there today does little to reveal the level of activity that surrounded the airfield when under U.S. control in the latter part of The Great Pacific War.

U.S. forces invaded Saipan on 15 June 1944 under OPERATION FORAGER, The Marianas Campaign – only nine days after Allied Forces in Europe in launched OPERATION OVERLORD with D-Day on the coast of France. 127,571 American soldiers, sailors and marines were involved in the invasion. Air operations against the island had begun on the 11th of June and continued into the next day. The aerial bombardment of Saipan was followed on 13 June when the battleships of the Task Force 58 opened fire against the Japanese held island. 165,000 shells were fired at the island from fifteen battleships, including the USS Iowa (BB61), USS South Dakota (BB57) and USS Tennessee (BB43). The USS “Indy” Indianapolis (CA-35) was also involved in the battle for Saipan, and the later battle for Tinian Island. Unfortunately for the Indy it would not be the last time she would visit the Marianas. On 30 July 1945 after delivering parts for the atomic bomb to Tinian Island where they would be assembled for delivery over Hiroshima the Indy would be struck by two torpedoes fired by the Japanese submarine I-58 under the command of Mochitsura Hashimoto. Of the Indy’s crew of 1,196 men 325 would be rescued, only 316 would survive.

Despite three days of intense aerial and naval bombardment, U.S. forces landing on the island’s designated invasion beaches would suffer more than 2,000 casualties as they struggled to establish a beach head and move inland. In the first two days of fighting, the U.S. Marines coming ashore suffered 4,000 casualties; wounded or killed. The planned three-day battle eventually extended to three weeks. Of the 71,000 men that landed on Saipan, 2,949 would be killed, 10,364 would be wounded. In the end, more than 31,000 Japanese soldiers and 22,000 Japanese civilians lay dead. A major objective of the invasion force in the first days of the Battle of Saipan was the capture of Aslito Field, the Japanese constructed air base that would eventually become Isley Field.

Aslito Field was constructed by the Japanese in 1934. During the lead-up to the Battle of Saipan, the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Service operated two squadrons of Mitsubishi A6MT Zeros from the field. Most of the Zeros were destroyed before the invasion of Saipan began. Overrun by the 165th Infantry Regiment on the 18th of June, Aslito Field fell to the invasion force with no opposition. A later nighttime counter-attack by Japanese forces that evening failed to retake the field. Once secure members of the 121st Naval Construction Battalion, Seabees assumed control of the airfield initiating immediate repairs.

The field was first named Conroy Field in honor of Colonel Gardiner Conroy, U.S. Army, commander, 165th Infantry Battalion who had died at Makin Island in 1943. The U.S. Navy later renamed the airfield Isley Field in honor of

Navy Commander Robert E. Isely, the first American pilot to die in the Battle of Saipan and whose misspelled family name would become eternally linked to the newly created Isley Airfield. Flight operations from the airfield began two days later on 20 June 1944. Construction of future bases for B-29s operating from Saipan began almost immediately under fire from Japanese stragglers and snipers.

Work on the airfield complex proceeded 24 hours a day, seven days a week. By 6 August 1944 Aslito’s single runway had been extended to 6,000 foot and widened to 150 foot. By 19 October the field’s main runway had been extended to 8,500 foot and widened to 250 foot. The airfield would eventually operate four parallel 8,500 foot runways. All runways were constructed or rebuilt to a depth of 30 inches of coral base and hardtop to support aircraft weighing in excess of 100,000 pounds. Aircraft taxiways were constructed alongside runways as needed. More than 120 hardstands were completed; additional taxiways were built to connect parking aprons, hardstands and runways. During construction of the airfield Naval engineers used 372,000 pounds of dynamite and 226,000 foot of Primacord. More than 90 miles of access roads were constructed. In all more than 4 million cubic yards of rock and coral had to be moved, removed or rearranged. A new airbase, Kohler Field, was eventually constructed adjacent to Isley Field. The new field was named in honor of Lieutenant Wayne F. Kohler who had been killed over 27 June 1944 while flying a low-level mission over nearby Tinian. Construction work continued.

Two former Japanese airstrips, Banadaru at Marpi Point and a light aircraft runway near Charon Kanoa were determined to be redundant and abandoned. A third airstrip at Kagman Point was subsequently constructed for the use of fighter aircraft. The first B-29, Joltin Josie the Pacific Pioneer, or T-Square 8, piloted by General Haywood “Possum” S. Hansell arrived on Isley Field on 22 October 1944. 30 Days later 100 B-29s were operating out of Saipan. The airfields built at Guam, Saipan and Tinian were at the time, the largest airfields in the world. The first aircrews to arrive on the island had an average of less than 100 hours flight time in the B-29. The average aircrew had less than 12 hours flight time in high altitude formations. Despite a lack of proficiency with the B-29, high altitude bombing, weapons delivery, and the problems that seemed to come with new aircraft and increased capabilities, the 20th Air Force prepared to wage air war against the Japanese much as the 8th Air Force operating from England had against Germany. Target systems supporting the Japanese war effort were identified and prioritized.

Japanese aircraft production and engine plants formed the initial set of strategic targets to be followed with attacks against Japan’s transportation networks, petroleum refining and storage systems, its electrical power systems and so on. However the high altitude strategic bombing campaign against Japan did not live up to expectations.

Of seven missions delivering 1,550 tons of explosives to Japan post-mission bomb damage assessment indicated only one weapon in 50 hit with 1,000 foot of its aiming point. Of the 1,065 aircraft launched, only 386 had actually bombed their primary target. 37 Airmen had died, 238 were missing, 49 were wounded. None of the designated targets had been destroyed. For a number of reasons, including knowledge of the 1923 fire that had followed the Great Kanto Earthquake burning Tokyo to the ground, the high-altitude jet stream, generally bad weather, and the inadequacies of the B-29’s AN/APQ-13 radar system to provide the level of accuracy needed for precision bombing; the 20th Air Force under General Curtis LeMay moved against high-altitude strategic bombing of Japan’s major industries, in favor of incendiary raids against the country’s population centers surrounding the larger industries which supported Japan’s industrial combines. More than half of Japan’s industrial capacity was located in its six largest cities. These same six cities held one-fifth of the national population. 64 percent of the nation’s entire industrial output orginated from a total of just 24 cities. More than 40 percent of the nation’s electric power plants were located in the Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe-Osaka area. Japan’s cities were highly combustible, homes were made of wood, paper screens separated rooms and straw mats covered floors. Small mom-and-pop industries located around major industrial facilities provided much of the building block materials needed to produce Japan’s major weapons and support materials. Japan’s cities were viable and valid wartime targets.

By the end of the war incendiary raids launched from bases in the Marianas attacking the cities of Kobe, Nagoya, Osaka, and Tokyo had destroyed over 31 square miles of their industrial areas. Over 80 percent of the industrial potential of these six cities was destroyed. Each bomber carried 68 M-69 incendiaries. The load of one B-29 covered an area about 500 foot wide by 2,500 foot-long. By 1 August 1945 more than 147,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on Japan. By the end of

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78 BOMBING JAPAN. http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/3758/siege.htm
the war B-29s had destroyed more than 178 square miles of urban area in 68 Japanese cities.\textsuperscript{79} Total damage within these cities ranged from 25 to 90 percent. The firebombing of Tokyo alone had left 83,793 Japanese dead with 40,918 were reported as injured. Over one million Japanese were left homeless in Tokyo alone. More than 17 percent of Tokyo’s total industrial areas had been destroyed. 63 percent of the city’s commercial area was gone.\textsuperscript{80} Bomb shelters built to withstand bomb blasts became places to die as the surrounding air was consumed by fire. City services were rapidly overwhelmed. Few fire departments had sufficient equipment or training to combat incendiary bombing and where such fire departments might exist, the water pressure required to fight such fires was sorely lacking. According to General Arnold writing after the war it cost the Air Force $3 million per square mile to burn Japan’s cities to the ground.\textsuperscript{81} During the war B-29s inflicted heavy damage to 602 major Japanese war industries.

Due to the firebombing Japan’s economic system of small home-scale shops supporting larger local industries collapsed and with it Japan’s ability to produce the war supporting materials required by its military. According to John Glusman in his book, Conduct under Fire, Japanese Radio labeled the incendiary bombing, “Slaughter Bombing.”\textsuperscript{82} Nearly 60 years later debate the incendiary raids against Japan continue.

During the war Hog Wild, the bomber, flew mostly incendiary missions over Japan. It also flew at least one leaflet mission on 3 August that concentrating on areas near Tokyo. Far less appreciated, but perhaps equally important was the bomber’s use to deliver aerial-mines against Japanese shipping routes and harbors. Other B-29s would mine Japan’s harbors and sea-lanes.

A Barrier of Mines

As an island nation Japan was extremely susceptible to mine warfare. Under OPERATION STARVATION B-29s deploying 2,000 pound MK 25, 1,000 pound MK 26 and 500 pound MK 36 naval mines conducted numerous long-range mining missions against Japan’s shipping. The goals of the mining operation were to prevent the flow of raw materials and foodstuffs from entering Japan, disrupt shipping in the Inland Sea and to prevent the resupply and movement of Japanese forces in the field. The mining raids decreased Japan’s ability to feed its people and provide the material support required for Japan’s military in the field to continue the war.\textsuperscript{83}

In the five months of the mining campaign B-29s are reported to have laid more mines in Japanese waters (over 12,000) than were laid over the entire Pacific Ocean Theatre in the prior two years of the war (over 9,000).\textsuperscript{84} In some of the longest missions of the war with aircraft staging from Iwo Jima, B-29s mined Korean ports as far north as Rashin (Najin). The Initial Point (IP) for the port at Rashin was just sixty miles south of Vladivostok. Lacking the mine sweeping capabilities of ports in Japan the Korean ports were mined with magnetic and acoustic mines. The more advanced pressure mines were reserved for use in Japanese coastal waters.

During the few months of OPERATION STARVATION mines laid by B-29s accounted for 1,250,000 tons of shipping lost and destroyed. The effort resulted in the sinking of 293 Japanese merchantmen. Lacking the ability to rapidly clear the mine fields Japanese merchant shipping began attempting to run the mine fields; many were obviously unsuccessful. By the end of the war 35 of Japan’s 47 normal convoy routes had to be abandoned. Reconnaissance flown in support of the B-29 was conducted by a photo-reconnaissance version of the bomber, the F-13A.

Section 10 – NO BOMBS, BUT A CAMERA

All reconnaissance version B-29s, no matter the model were designated F-13A. The letter “F” standing for “photo.” Conversion of the aircraft to a reconnaissance platform took place at the Continental Air Lines Denver Modification Center.

A high-altitude reconnaissance platform with a pressurized cabin, B-29s converted to F-13s required considerable modification. Three-quarter inch thick square glass windows were required to ensure cabin pressure. These windows had to be cut into the bottom and sides of the aircraft. Additional fuel tanks were installed in the aft bomb bay giving the aircraft greater range. The forward bomb bay remained empty and housed the aircraft’s cameras. As the F-13 would normally operate

\textsuperscript{79} Table 199 – Destruction Inflicted on Japanese Urban Areas by XXI Bomber Command: Nov 1944 to Aug 1945
\textsuperscript{81} Garrett, Garet. Symbol of Annihilation. American Affairs – Vol. VIII, No. 3 July 1946
\textsuperscript{83} United States Strategic Bombing Survey Reports, Pacific War No. 66, The Strategic Air Operation of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan (Twentyfourth Air Force), Military Analysis Division Army and Army Air Section, September 1, 1946.
alone over occupied or enemy territory all defensive armaments were retained. The F-13 was manned by the standard B-29 crew plus a photo-navigator and cameraman. On 1 November 1944 a F-13 became the first U.S. aircraft to overfly Tokyo since the Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942. Toward the end of WWII a decision was made to remove most of the aircraft’s defensive armaments, some of its armor and its turrets creating a faster aircraft with a bit less drag. Only a few of these more advanced F-13s reached the Pacific theater before the end of the war.\(^8\)

**Imaging the Enemy**

Each F-13A carried a bank of six aerial cameras to include three K-17Bs, two K-22s and a single K-18. All standard cameras used in the B-29 were produced by the Fairchild Camera and Instrument Company. Additional cameras such as the Eastman Kodak K-24 Aerial Surveillance Camera, could also be used aboard the aircraft. Of the abovementioned cameras the K-17 was by far the most common and versatile and remained in use long after WWII.\(^8\)

The K-17 was used primarily as a mapping and reconnaissance camera. Both the K-17 and the K-22 were nine-by-nine-inch format (negative size) while the film format for the K-18 was nine-by-eighteen-inches. All three cameras were normally operated from a 24 volt DC electrical power source. The K-17 and K-18 could be operated manually whereas the K-22 could only be operated electrically. Manual operation of the two cameras was limited as a fully loaded K-17 weighed in at about 30 pounds. The K-18, depending upon the lenses used could weigh as much as 75 pounds. All three cameras were connected to an intervalometer which activated the cameras at intervals as set by the aerial cameraman. Sighting of the cameras was made through a modified B3 Drift Meter; a drift sight in the bombardier compartment. The drift meter was operated by the photo navigator. The six cameras were mounted in the F-13 behind and below the aft crew compartment usually in the forward bomb bay.

The F-13’s three K-17 cameras were arranged as a tri-metrogon: One camera pointing straight down, with the two remaining cameras mounted one to each side of the center camera at an angle which provided left-to-right, horizon-to-horizon coverage. The tri-metrogon arrangement provided coverage over an area of 194 degrees, 7 degrees over each horizon. The aircraft’s two K-22 cameras were mounted side-by-side in a split vertical arrangement. This K-arrangement gave the aircraft side-to-side overlapping coverage. The single K-18 was usually mounted to provide large area vertical coverage but could also be mounted to obtain low-altitude oblique images.\(^7\)

In the days before computers, imagery analysts increased the utility of oblique imagery by use of a system of perspective grids prepared in incremental steps matching flight altitude and camera tilt. Known as the “Canadian Grid Method” these overlays allowed analysts to convert measurements taken from one part of the film to a different part of the film or to a common standard. It was awkward, time consuming work. The film had to be developed, enlarged, laid out on long tables with the grid accurately overlaid onto the film.

Despite difficulties working with the film, the methods used to exploit the intelligence gathered by reconnaissance platforms increased the utility of the film on-hand lessening the need for additional reconnaissance, and solidified decisions concerning the application of force.

Before the arrival of the F-13 over Asia all previous strategic reconnaissance aircraft had been other converted bombers such as Consolidated B-24 Liberator (F-7), B-17 Flying Fortresses (F-9) and B-25 Mitchell Bombers (F-10). Though the range of these earlier converted bombers was limited in comparison to the F-13, such improvised reconnaissance platforms did in fact image and map most of wartime Asia to include the Korean Peninsula.

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\(^8\) SSgt. Arthur L. Goins, combat crew photographer on the RB-29 of the 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, loads a K-18 camera prior to take-off. Photos of WWII. http://www.photosofwwi.com/KoreanWar/

\(^7\) Carrara, Michelle. World War II Oral History Interview. Veteran: Captain Irving Bauman. USAAF/PTO

16\(^6\) Photo Laboratory, 73\(^4\) Bomb Wing, 498\(^9\) Bomb Group, 20th Air Force. Summarizer: Joseph G. Bilby

All B-29 bombers as with most other U.S. bombers could also be retrofitted and altered to fly photographic missions, as did occur with some Superfortresses stationed in India. By the end of 1944 the 20th Bomber Command operating from India had only four actual F-13As on-hand; Brooklyn Bessie, Double Exposure, Quan Yin Cha Ara and Under-Exposed. Despite these limitations 20th Air Force using its meager number of F-13s locally converted B-29s in a reconnaissance role flew more than 250 photoreconnaissance missions in support of bombing operations within the CBI alone. As more F-13s became available all previously modified bombers were returned to duty as combat aircraft. After the departure of the command’s combat bombers for the Marianas the F-13As remaining behind continued to image and photomap central and northern China, southern Manchuria, and Korea.

As with almost all other U.S. bombers the B-29 could also be fitted with cameras inside its bomb bay that would be triggered during bomb release to capture bomb fall and impact to allow post-strike re-targeting and bomb damage assessment. The requirements for high quality imagery were less stringent in post-strike damage assessment and bomb accuracy scoring. This was especially true in the latter part of the war with its incendiary bombing campaign. Such requirements allowed more latitude in the type of camera used to achieve the results desires. No permanent mount camera was ever installed on Hog Wild for use in its ill-fated flight to Konan. The crew did however carry a K-20 camera.

Throw Away Aerial Intelligence Camera

The K-20 was the foremost handheld aerial camera in use American forces during WWII. The K-20 was bulky, cumbersome, designed for military use and when empty weighed in at over ten pounds, eleven pounds fully loaded, nearly one pound more than an M-1 Garand rifle. Much has been made about the fact that there was a K-20 handheld camera aboard Hog Wild as it flew into Korea that afternoon of 29 August, none of which can be substantiated by the technical specifications of the camera or its lens.

Produced by Graflex, the camera was simple and easy to operate. The K-20 had a fixed focal length of six and three-eighths inches (161mm), no adjustments and was at best a point-and-shoot camera. The camera’s lens was not interchangeable with other cameras. With a negative format of four-by-five-inches the camera could hold rolls of film providing for up to 100 images however, rolls of 50 images (191/2 foot long rolls) were far more commonly used. During the war Graflex produced about 15,000 copies of the K-20 camera. As an aerial camera the K-20 had serious limitations.

At low altitudes the K-20 provided excellent images, however at higher altitudes the quality of its images decreased. The angle at which the image was taken was also important. Unless the K-20 was aimed through the bomb bay near vertical, most images taken with the camera would be some form of oblique with the overall clarity of the image decreasing as the distance from vertical increased. Due to the lack of accurate information about aircraft altitude and the angle of the camera when images were taken, most of the film taken by K-20 cameras was rarely exploited to the level of detail as were the images obtained by other aerial cameras. The film could be useful in identification of bomb fall locations.

Aboard aircraft the K-20 was used primarily to obtain post-attack imagery for use in Bomb-Damage-Assessment (BDA). Such assessment was central to determining

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88 Ibid.
the overall effectiveness of the munitions used, their fusing, delivery tactics and the requirement for follow-up attacks if any. Based upon the facts revealed by images taken by crewmembers using cameras such as the K-20, weapons and target specialists would determine if restrike was required. When used for bomb damage assessment purposes the camera met the needs of military for a less-technical point-and-shoot camera. Crew members were also encouraged to use the camera to take pictures of anything they found to be unusual or of interest during the flight, accounting for a lot of the photos taken from one B-29s by another B-29 in the air over Japan.

Staff Sergeant Bob Caron (31 Oct 1919–3 Jun 1995), the tail gunner aboard the B-29 Enola Gay, used a K-20 from the tail of the aircraft held against the escape hatch window to obtain the photos circulated worldwide of the mushroom cloud that rose above Hiroshima after the dropping of the atomic bomb. Geoff Hall in “Harold Wingham: pioneer aerial photographer” recalls the K-20 “as a sort of throwaway camera.” The K-20 was also used by ground forces, on ships and by U.S. Allies. In many areas of the war it was a simple matter for soldiers, sailors and marines to check out a K-20 camera for official use such as taking pictures of buddies on airfield flight lines, aboard ships, posing in front of tanks and so on.95

Section 11 – HOG WILD, Z-28’s WAR RECORD

Hog Wild: B29, Model B-29-80, Serial Number 44-70136, was produced at Boeing’s Wichita plant and assigned to the 500th Bombardment Group, 73rd Bomb Wing, 882 Bombardment Squadron at Isley Field, Saipan. It was the second Superfortress assigned to the 500th Bombardment Group to bear the call sign Z Square 28. Its Z-28 predecessor was Serial Number 42-63436, the illustrious “Old Ironsides.”

Old Ironsides flew a total of 42 missions over Japan against such targets as the Musashino Aircraft Engine Factory, Iwo Jima, the Tokyo Arsenal, and the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Factory. The bomber took part in the first fire bombing mission against Tokyo where B-29s, stripped of guns and ammunition by order of General Curtis LeMay flew low-level over the target area burning out nearly 16 square miles of the Japanese capital. During the war ten different crews are known to have flown Old Ironsides into combat. The crew of Raymond Hass flew 11 missions into Japan aboard the bomber. The Gerrick Crew flew Old Ironsides to Japan nine times, mostly to point targets such as the Musashino Aircraft Engine Factory. The Arbon, Cordray and Sasser crews flew the bomber in combat four times each. Old Ironsides flew it last combat mission on 15 June 1945. After its last flight it was retired war weary to the U.S.

Serial Number 44-70136, the bomber that became known as Hog Wild was originally nicknamed “Buckin’ Brone.” From 17 June to 2 July 1945, as Buckin’ Brone, 70136 flew six missions to include attacks on the Kure Naval Arsenal, the Osaka Arsenal and incendiary missions to Fukuoka, Hamamatsu, Sasebo, and Kumamoto. As Buckin’ Brone the

![The Haas Crew with B-29 Serial Number 44-70136 under the Name “Buckin’ Brone”](image)


Superfortress never attacked the same target area twice. On 3 July 1945 Buckin’ Bronc now renamed Hog Wild flew its first mission, an incendiary run against Kochi, on Shikoku. The reason for the name change is lost to history.

Between 3 July and 29 August 1945 as Hog Wild the Superfortress would fly at least 14 more combat missions. With two exceptions all its missions carried incendiaries. The bomber’s targets included the cities of Akashi, Kochi, Ichinomiya, Nishinomiya, and Oita. Hog Wild also flew one mission to the Osaka Arsenal. On 3 August the bomber flew a leaflet mission near Tokyo. Hog Wild’s last combat mission was to deliver supplies to the POWs held at Konan. Whether named Buckin’ Bronc or Hog Wild the two names were never tasked to attack the same target area twice under the same name. Under the two different names, aircraft 44-70136 hit the Osaka Arsenal once as Buckin’ Bronc and once as Hog Wild.

Altogether the Hog Wild flew at least 20 combat missions and probably a number of training missions often bombing Japanese forces continuing to occupy islands such as Marcus Island near Japan. This was how a new Superfortress, became an old Superfortress – if it survived flights over Japan. 10 of Hog Wild’s missions were flown by the Sasser crew. The crew of D. Jackson flew the bomber twice, once when it was named Buckin Bronc’ and once when it was named Hog Wild. Five other crews, including that of Joseph Queen, flew the bomber only one time each. The Arbon and Sasser crews flew both Old Ironsides (42-63436) and Hog Wild when it was named Buckin’ Bronc (44-70136). The Sasser crew was the only crew that flew all three names; Old Ironsides (42-63436), and 44-70136 as Buckin’ Bronc and Hog Wild. The Arbon crew never flew the bomber when it was named Hog Wild. Best guesses suggest that it was the Sasser crew that changed the name of the bomber from Buckin’ Bronc to Hog Wild. The last flight of Hog Wild occurred on 29 August 1945. The aircraft was manned by the crew of First Lieutenant Joseph Queen. Though the crew had flown the bomber from Wichita to Saipan, it is believed that the into Korea was the only time the Queen crew actually flew the Hog Wild into combat.

The Joseph Queen Crew

Most of the known information concerning the crew of Hog Wild is derived from the 2007 book written by Eugene Harwood and his daughter Barbara Hartwig, Honorable Heart, Memoirs from Colorado to B-29s to Iowa. It is the only published memoir of a crewmember of the flight into Soviet-held Korea. Other information has been draw from the statements of the crew after their return to Saipan, letters exchanged between the former POWs and crewmembers over the decades that followed the event, or from discussions with their descendants.

Lieutenant Eugene Harwood underwent navigator training at San Marcos Army Air Field, Texas. From 25 August 1943 through the end of the war San Marcos Army Air Field trained about 10,000 navigators. Harwood completed navigator training on 13 January 1945 and was assigned to Drew Field near Tampa, Florida. The land for Drew had been leased in 1928. The airfield was upgraded under a Civil Works Administration project in 1934 and again in 1935 under the Works Progress Administration. In 1940, with war approaching, the U.S. Army leased the field for a further period of 25 years. During the war Drew would train 120,000 air crews. At Drew, Lieutenant Harwood was initially assigned as a navigator on B-17 Flying Fortresses but was later transferred to neighboring MacDill Field and into the B-29. Lieutenant Harwood would join the crew forming under First Lieutenant Joseph Queen and First Lieutenant Robert S. Rainey.

The Queen crew consisted of 11 men. As with the military of the time the crew was a cross-section of America. From left to right in the image to the right, back row first left-to-right was Aircraft Commander First Lieutenant Joseph Queen of Ashland, Kentucky; the pilot, Second Lieutenant Robert S. Rainey of Moroa, Illinois followed by the bomber’s navigator, Second Lieutenant Eugene R. Harwood, Colorado Springs, Colorado; the bomber’s Flight Officer and Bombardier, Marion J. Sherrill of Flat River, Missouri. Front row, left-to-right, Gunner, Staff Sergeant Jose Rinaldo,
Bronx, New York; Flight Engineer Staff Sergeant Jesse Owens from Fayetteville, Tennessee. Staff Sergeant Arthur Strilky from Chicago, Illinois, the bomber’s Radio Operator. Right Blister Gunner, Corporal Clifford McGee. Next in line was Staff Sergeant Cyril Bernacki of Stafford, Connecticut, Ring Gunner; Corporal Richard H. Turner, Tail Gunner, Greenville, Ohio and Radar Operator, Sergeant Douglas E. Arthur, Millersburg, Pennsylvania. Lieutenants Queen and Rainey had been together through B-29 pilot training at Maxwell Field, Alabama and formed the core of the group that would eventually become much like a family, remaining close to each other for the rest of their lives. Training gave the crew a foundation of similar experiences that would bond them together. Many of these shared experiences took the form of tragedies and reinforced the seriousness of the war that awaited them overseas.

According to Eugene Harold as he and Lieutenant Sherill were exiting the base one afternoon “One of our planes, which was coming in to land, crashed in a wall of fire...”99 As Mr. Harwood related, “We heard a tremendous blast with fire 100 feet in the air. The firemen were there and foaming a B-29. No one survived.”100 On a multi-plane 3,000 mile training flight over Cuba, Puerto Rico, into the Caribbean Sea near Panama with return to MacDill, separated by 30 minutes spacing, one B-29 was lost. The crew of Joseph Queen had to fly the same mission the next day along the same route to look for survivors.101 None were found. On a later mission one B-29 began to smoke and turned toward Sarasota, Florida to land. The bomber was lost when it exploded.102 For the crews in training at MacDill the motto was “One a day in Tampa Bay.”103 The crew had good times also. They played poker, visited nearby family and kin, and shared more than a few drinks at local bars, and probably several open bottles. In May 1945 the crew was ordered to Saipan. In the coming months they would live or die together.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Call Sign Aircraft</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 July 1945</td>
<td>Osaka Arsenal</td>
<td>Z-27 The Cannuck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-27 July 1945</td>
<td>Matsuyama – Shikoku</td>
<td>Z-37 Belle Ruth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-29 July 1945</td>
<td>Ichinomiya – Near Nagoya</td>
<td>Z-32 Fever from the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 August 1945</td>
<td>Toyama – Honshū</td>
<td>Z-27 The Cannuck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6 August 1945</td>
<td>Nishinomiya – Honshū</td>
<td>Z-57 Three Feathers (883rd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August 1945</td>
<td>Yawata</td>
<td>Unknown *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 August 1945</td>
<td>Osaka Arsenal</td>
<td>Z-32 Fever from the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 August 1945</td>
<td>Chosen #1</td>
<td>Z-28 Hog Wild</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Few records of the mission to Yawata exists. None of the records that do exist list Hog Wild or the Queen Crew as being on the mission. Personal flight records held by Lieutenants Rainey and Harwood document the crew’s participation in mission to Yawata, they do not document the aircraft.

As a group the crew flew first to Topeka Air Base, Kansas where they picked up a new B-29 to ferry oversea. Oddly enough the Superfortress they would fly to Saipan would be the same bomber they would fly to Konan that afternoon of 29 August 1945, B29, Model B-29-80, Serial Number 44-70136, the bomber that would become known as Hog Wild.104 They next flew to Mather Field, Sacramento, California then on to Hawaii where they landed at John Rogers Field near Barbers Point. Leaving Hawaii the crew flew to Kwajalein Island, the scene of a battle fought between Japan and the U.S. from 31 January to 3 February 1944. The battle cost the lives of 7,870 Japanese and Koreans, and 372 U.S. servicemen. From Kwajalein the crew overflew Eniwetok Atoll and landed at Harmon Field on Guam. The next morning the crew flew to Isley Field on Saipan for assignment to 500th Bombardment Group, 73rd Bomb Wing, 882 Bombardment Squadron their home for the remainder of the war. At Saipan the 73rd Bomb Wing relieved the crew of its shiny new B-29. The bomber went to the

99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Individual Aircraft Record Card. B-29. A.A.F Serial Number 44-70136. Manufacturer and Location: Boeing, Wichita, Kansas. 11 May 1945
wing, the crew entered training. The crew flew its first mission from Saipan on 30 May 1945; practice runs against Japanese forces still occupying islands nearby.\textsuperscript{105} Taking off from Saipan was always the worst part of a mission.

Isley Field had two 10,500 foot runways. Combat-ready B-29s taxiing from their hardstands would pull onto the runway and stop. The ship would then run up all four engines to near full power. The bombers weighed in at around 150,000 pounds; including 80,000 pounds of high-octane aviation gasoline and 20,000 pounds of bombs. Its bomb load alone was more than the combined weight of two fully loaded P-51 Mustangs. When the on-ground spotter felt the plane was up to full power, he would flag the pilot to begin takeoff. Despite its power the bomber could only crawl forward, gaining speed as it bore down the runway to lunge into the air over a 300 foot cliff, the pilot hauling back on the yoke at the last possible moment, the last yards of the runway. At the end of the runway stood a Catholic and Protestant chaplain, one on each side of the runway. Some bombers could not gain enough speed to lift off, others lost an engine plunging over the cliff and into the ocean.

As a group the Queen crew flew a total of seven combat missions together. The crew flew its combat missions in six separate airplanes, one whose name and call sign remains unknown. The crew flew two bombers, The Cannuck and the Fever from the South into combat two times each. Eugene Harwood called the Fever from the South the worst B-29 in the group as it had once rolled completely over in the updraft of fires caused by incendiaries;\textsuperscript{106} Harwood referred to it as “the slowest plane in the whole bomb group.”\textsuperscript{107} On the Queen crew’s last mission aboard the Fever from the South the bomber was so badly damaged it lagged far behind the other bombers of the group. Two bombers dropped back to fly alongside providing cover.\textsuperscript{108} After the incident with Fever from the South, the Queen crew was assigned to Hog Wild as a replacement crew. On their seventh and final mission, the POW relief mission, First Lieutenant Lucius W. Weeks took the place of Corporal Clifford McGee. Captain Robert W. Campbell and First Lieutenant John B. Grant also accompanied the group either to obtain flight hours or to see some of Asia not at war.

Though assigned to the 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron the Queen crew also had the rare distinction of flying Z-58 Serial Number 42-2461, Three Feathers a bomber from the 883\textsuperscript{rd} Bombardment Squadron into combat over Honshū. Aircraft then as now were assigned to specific squadrons that bore responsibility for the weapon. Flight crews are trained, qualified and combat certified on that squadron’s aircraft. Due in part to accountability issues commanders rarely allow “outsiders” to fly the aircraft assigned to their squadron. It was a rare moment when the crew of one squadron was allowed to fly a bomber belonging to another squadron. Three Fathers was somewhat unique. During the war Three Feathers Serial Number 44-69878 flew a total of 52 missions including bombs runs on the Musashino Aircraft Engine Factory, the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Factory in Nagoya, and the Kawasaki-Akashi Aircraft Plant. Three Feathers bore the call sign Z-49 however some documents carry it as Z-57. The 500th Bomb Group Operations Journal lists the two call signs as operational in the air at the same time, suggesting that they belonged to two different bombers.

On the 15\textsuperscript{th} of February 1945 Three Feathers was severely damaged on an attack against the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Plant over Nagoya, returning to Saipan on two engines. Between 4 April and 21 April for unknown reasons, possibly due to its survival over Nagoya the bomber’s name was changed from Three Feathers to Three Feathers II. On 22 June the bomber was again damaged with two engines shot out over Kure and had to make an emergency landing at Iwo Jima. Returned to Saipan Three Feathers was again repaired and once again in the air by mid-July. The bomber’s first call sign Z-49 had been reassigned to B-29 Serial Number 44-61668. After the June incident the bomber was renamed Three Feathers III, Z-46.

Section 12 – BLACKLIST OPERATIONS

Hog Wild’s last mission was planned as a POW supply flight within Blacklist Operations supporting the Occupation of Japan and Korea, following the sudden collapse or unconditional surrender of the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command. The flight would support Annex “(5f) Basic Plan, Care, and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War (POWs) and


\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
Civilian Internees, including definitions of POW and Civilian Internees and the names, locations, numbers held, and nationalities held of POW encampments in Japan and Korea.”

Blacklist Operations in support of Japanese held POWs were designed to provide military POWs and civilians held by Japanese forces across the Empire with food, clothing, and medical supplies as rapidly as possible. It was widely believed that the lives of countless POWs could be saved by a rapid, ground up effort to provide relief and support. Blacklist also provided for the registration and evacuation of all POWs and interned civilians to rear areas. Blacklist required the repatriation of all prisoners “at the earliest possible date consistent with military operations.” According to Blacklist “The urgency of this mission is second only to military operations and to the maintenance of the forces of occupation.” Annex 5f of the plan predicted that most “personnel will be in extremely poor physical condition…” Blacklist ordered that “First available air, motor or water transportation is used to expedite movement of recoverees from their camps through dis-position centers to their final destinations. Movement by air is utilized to the maximum extent.”

The Basic Outline Plan for Blacklist Operations had been under development since May 1945. The first edition of the plan was published on 16 July 1945 and was rapidly distributed to subordinate commanders. In the Pacific theatre of operations it was first presented at a conference of service representatives in Guam on the 20th of July 1945, just 25 days before the surrender of Japan. Blacklist operated with two assumptions: “a. That the Japanese government and High Command have surrendered unconditionally or have collapsed and b. That neither enemy air nor ground forces will interfere with flights of airplanes making air droppings in this operation.” Though best remembered for its effort to provide for the health and welfare of POWs and interned civilians, the plan also provided for the basic occupation of Japan and Korea by U.S. forces.

The Basic Outline Plan for Blacklist Operations supported only U.S. operations in the Pacific theater. The plan did not include references to the participation of British, Australian and Canadian forces in the Occupation of Japan. It contained no references to the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Union, Russia or Russian forces. Blacklist made no effort to prioritize the camps to be liberated nor the order in which camps were to be liberated. The plan proposed no method as to which POWs were to be removed from a liberated camp first; for the most part commanders removed the sick and wounded first. The plan did require for the removal of between 200 and 250 POWs per day from Japan. According to Blacklist: “Allied prisoners of war in Japanese custody, including merchant seamen, are (to be) repatriated at the earliest possible date consistent with military operations. The urgency of this mission is second only to military operations and to the maintenance of the forces of occupation.”

Blacklist estimated that it would take up to four months to remove all the POWs from Japan and the Far East. The plan did discuss POW relief missions into Southeast Asia, but only to state that those areas were “under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, Lord Louis Mountbatten.” Unlike Blacklist the British plan was divided into two separate parts; OPERATION BIRDCAGE which consisted for dropping 33 million leaflets on 90 POW camps explaining that the war was over and that assistance on the way, and OPERATION MASTIFF which consisted of dropping one million Atrabine tablets to protect against malaria. The two British operations were to take place simultaneously over a period of less than one week. The British plan also included parachuting into the camps doctors, medical orderlies, food and medicines into each camp wherever possible. Luckily for the British in dropping supplies to POWs located across Southeast Asia they did not have to contend with the Soviet Union.


111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.


117 Ibid.


There is no evidence that the Basic Outline Plan for Blacklist Operations was ever officially coordinated with the U.S.S.R. or other Russian forces in the Pacific area. It is likely with the Soviet Union entering the war against Japan on the 8th of August, the dropping of the two atomic bombs, and the surrender of Japan only several days after, that the normal planning and coordination cycle that would have occurred between the Allies had been outpaced by events. The plan did not propose any unilateral U.S. operations inside the agreed upon operational areas previously assigned to the forces of the Soviet Union and other allies. As the Soviet Union had entered the war against Japan only a few days before the war ended, it is unlikely that U.S. planners ever considered back-briefing Soviet area commanders once the Japanese had surrendered.

Section 13 – SLAVE LABOR AND WORSE

The conditions faced by Allied POWs held by the government of Japan across Asia were widely known long prior to the end of the war. One-in-three Allied POWs held by the Japanese died in captivity. Starvation, disease, mistreatment by guards and Bushido discipline was the rule, not the exception. POWs were regularly abused by sadistic Japanese, Korean and Formosan guards. Serious beatings were so common-place that, after the war, many POWs questioned for evidence of war crimes had to be prompted to tell about simple face slapping and minor beatings. When so many beatings resulted in broken bones and required days or weeks to recover, how could a face slapping or minor beating even compare? After a short beating many POWs were simply thankful to just be alive. For POWs food was always the greater issue.

It was the odd prison camp that provided much more than the absolute minimum amount of food for the POWs held within the camp: Prisoners were given the minimum amount of food to survive, not the minimum amount required to maintain a low-level of body mass or health. It would be a rare POW that did not suffer tremendous weight loss and near starvation conditions throughout the war. Most POWs held by the Japanese would lose 50 percent of their pre-war body mass or more. Vitamin deficiencies were also common.120

In the weakened condition of most POWs, a small scratch obtained during captivity that would have been ignored years before could easily lead to a grisly death from infection. Beriberi, pneumonia, malaria and dysentery took countless lives. Work projects also accounted for the deaths of thousands.

On 23 October 1942 the Japanese War Ministry issued a declaration enabling Japan’s industries to utilize POWs as labor. The decree required industries to house and feed the POWs “as if they were in prisoner of war camps.”121 According to the War Ministry ruling prisoners would be paid for their labor under the regulations governing POWs. The prisoners would be judged by their skills and assigned to produce transport or electrical equipment.122 There was no mention of work in mines, around blast furnaces, digging tunnels.…. Allied POWs were assigned to construct the Thai-Burma Railroad, the Soto Dam near Sasebo, and numerous airfields throughout the Pacific Islands. In Japan many POWs were assigned work in mines, fields, shipyards, and factories. Wherever slave labor could be used POWs could be found. Japanese zaibatsu such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Konzern such as Nichitsu all relied upon POW slave labor to maximize industrial production to some extent throughout China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. As for Korea, a U.S. Army report filed in the aftermath of the war states: “Twenty-seven prisoners of war died in Korea. Of these twenty-four were British, two were American, and one was Australian. The chief cause of death was disease of one sort or another, brought on by exposure and malnutrition. The two Americans, both officers, died at the Inchon camp during the year 1945. 2Lt. W.N. King died from amoebic dysentery on 15 May 1945. The Japanese medical personnel at the camp refused to allow him the necessary medicine, and one Private Sasaki, in the presence of another prisoner said ‘Let him die.’”

“After Lt. King’s death, Lt. Yamaguchi, the medical officer, forced Colonel Beecher by threats of violence to sign a false statement of the cause of Lt. King’s death. Captain G.C. Brundrett died on 4 July 1945 from generalized anasarca [extreme generalized edema]. Although medicine and Red Cross plasma were available Lt. Yamaguchi refused to allow them to be used. In the case of the British personnel who died at the Seoul camp, the negligence of the Japanese medical personnel seems to have precluded any hope of recovery for the dying men. Two of the men who died at Konan, Sapper Whitaker and Corporal Kayter, could have been saved in the opinion of British medical officer, if sulfa drugs, which were available at the Seoul and Inch’on camps, could have been procured. Another prisoner at Konan, Private Knowles, died after a four month

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120 Battling Bastards of Bataan. WWII POWs by the Japanese. www.forties.net is©2002-2009 http://www.forties.net/WWIIPOWs.html
122 Ibid.
illness in the civil hospital. For the most part he was starved to death. Knowles was not permitted to receive his Red Cross parcel nor were his friends allowed to visit him.\(^{123}\)

Section 14 – THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE: TAKING THE LEAD

Blacklist was based upon a requirement to support a projected 69,000 internees for a period of at least 30 days.\(^{124}\) Blacklist Annex 5f however placed the expected number of internees at only 36,000.\(^{125}\) In planning for the mission, the Commanding General, Armed Forces Western Pacific gathered enough supplies to sustain an estimated 45,000 prisoner for up to 30 days. Additional supplies for another 13,000 internees were stored in the Philippines.\(^{126}\) The number of internees was admittedly a guess; there were no exact numbers available and it was obvious to operation planners that there would be numerous cases of over- and under-supply. The task ahead was daunting in size and scope.

With speed of the essence supply by air was chosen as the fastest method to place the needed relief materials directly into the hands of POWs as rapidly as possible. It was estimated that more than 63,000 parachutes would be required to support the mission. 1.4 parachutes for each of the Commanding General, Armed Forces Western Pacific estimate of the number of POWs held.\(^{127}\) There were however only 12,000 cargo parachutes available at Saipan.\(^{128}\) More parachutes would be flown in from bases in the Philippines. Flight crews from as far away as India, North Africa and so on were summoned to the Pacific to assist in the delivery of supplies.

On 23 August crews from the 315th Bomb Wing began flying into Saipan the 24,000 parachutes located in the Philippines.\(^{129}\) Planning and direction for the mission was provided by the Twentieth Air Force headquartered at Harmon Field, Guam. The various wings involved were responsible for mission planning, aircraft loading, flight scheduling, etc., for each of the aircraft under their command. While B-29s would eventually dominate the effort, in the early planning stages aircraft of all types throughout the Pacific were tasked to participate in the operation.

The factor that weighed most heavily in operational planning was the general availability of materiel and the location of those supplies in relation to the aircraft available for delivery. Resources supporting the operation were to be withdrawn from the stores of material on-hand in rear areas that were originally the scheduled invasion of Japan, OPERATION DOWNFALL planned for October 1945.\(^{130}\) Most of those supplies were located in the Mariana Islands. It was


\(^{125}\) Annex 12.


\(^{129}\) Swann, Ralph. Major. USAF. 315th Bomb Wing. "Adapted from Air Command and Staff Research Report 862460 entitled A Unit History of the 315th Bomb Wing, 1944-1946," 14 September 2004

originally thought that Far East Air Forces (FEAF) aircraft stationed in the Philippines and Okinawa would also share the POW supply delivery mission with the B-29s located in the Marianas.\textsuperscript{131}

Due to the complex nature of redirecting supplies, the location of the materiel, coordination and de-confliction of missions it was eventually decided that the Twentieth Air Force would command the entire effort. The 315\textsuperscript{th} Bomb Wing alone transported 205,000 pounds of food from Tinian into Saipan.\textsuperscript{132} All supplies for the effort were directed to be made available at Saipan; contributing to the decision to place the overall burden of the operation solely on the B-29s located in the Marianas. By 18 August 1945 enough medical supplies for 31,000 people had been delivered to Saipan from Guam. Meanwhile, food sufficient for another 50,000 POWs had been assembled from invasion stockpiles held at Saipan.\textsuperscript{133} Though some flights were staged from the Philippines and Okinawa due to the location of the supplies, the aircraft stationed at these locations were eventually dropped from the plan.

An additional factor playing into the assignment to deliver supplies to the POWs to Twentieth Air Force was the large number of B-29s available in the Mariana Islands: By August 1945 the Twentieth had 1,042 B-29s available to support the operation.\textsuperscript{134} With the end of the war what had once been a shortage of bombers to deploy against Japan had now become a shortage of capable aircraft for saving the lives of POWs. Designed as a long range bomber with two internal bomb bays capable of carrying a maximum bomb load of 20,000 pounds of bombs, tests were required to determine the load potential and handling characteristics of the bomber when carrying bulky cargos such as food and other material.

The Operational Engineering Section of the Twentieth Air Force was responsible for conducting load weight analysis for the aircraft and test drops of the containers available.\textsuperscript{135} A load of 10,000 pounds was eventually arrived as the best possible weight for transport and delivery. Each 10,000 pound load consisted of 40 bundles or individual drop units of supplies.\textsuperscript{136} Actual deliveries consisted of 25 to 40 bundles per aircraft.\textsuperscript{137} The loading of supplies varied according to the projected needs of each camp.\textsuperscript{138} Most drop units consisted of palletized 44-gallon drums, but 55-gallon drums, barrels, and numerous other containers were reportedly used. A 315\textsuperscript{th} Bomb Wing history stated that “Many of the supplies were packed in used fuel drums. Service crews, who called themselves the ‘Saipan Samaritans,’ welded two barrels together into what looked like ‘blockbusters.’ The oil drums filled with supplies were anchored to the bomb racks by the same shackles that had once been used to secure bombs.”\textsuperscript{139} In late August 1945, Hog Wild would carry a full 10,000 pounds of food, medicines and clothing, 40 individual drop units total into Korea.

Planners considered one load of 10,000 pounds sufficient to support 200 POWs.\textsuperscript{140} While 10,000 pounds were thought sufficient for smaller camps; for larger camps, tighter load restrictions were followed allowing for a greater quantity of supplies to be carried at an increased weight. Test drops conducted by Twentieth Air Force determined that the optimum altitude and speed for dropping the supplies was between 500 and 1,000 foot at 165 miles per hour.\textsuperscript{141} To aid in identification,
all aircraft involved in the POW supply operation would be marked “PW Supplies” in letters three foot high under each wing. The markings would extend from the tip of the wing to the outside of the engine nacelle. It is not entirely clear if Hog Wild carried the “PW Supplies,” marking. None of the crew or the POWs held at Konan ever mentioned the markings in their statements taken after the incident, in their writings neither after the war nor to their families over the decades that followed. In his reply 28 September to General George Marshall, General Aleksei Innokentievich Antonov noted that the bomber lacked any “DISTINGUISHING MARKS.”

For want of a better term, post-strike photos were to be taken for each mission, weather permitting. Bomber crews used the Graflex K-20 portable camera to take post-strike photos. According to the instructions issued by 20th Air Force to the various bomb groups under its control, crews were instructed to “Take pictures on each dropping run to get as definite information as possible on the success of the drop and the location of the drop. Best method of photographing the drops is to have the tail gunner operate a K-20 camera from his position. Pilot will inform the tail gunner upon approaching the target and release of supplies to alert the tail gunner for picture taking.” Of the more than 100 post-strike images contained in the Headquarters Twentieth Air Force, POW Supply Report on POW Supply Missions to CHNA, KOREA, FORMOSA, MANCHURIA AND THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS all were taken by the tail gunner of the aircraft involved.

Hog Wild had one K-20 on board as it departed Saipan in the Marianas Islands for Konan. With one captain, six lieutenants, and five sergeants aboard, if Hog Wild were really on a spy mission to uncover Japan’s atomic bomb production facilities in or around Konan, Tail Gunner, Corporal Richard H. Turner of Greenville, Ohio would seem to have been the mission commander.

Section 15 – SUPPLYING THE CAMPS

From 27 August to 20 September 1945 the B-29s of the 58th, 73rd, 313th, 314th and 315th Bombardment Wings flew 900 sorties in support of Blacklist Operations. The five bomb wings would deliver a total of 4,470 tons of supplies to 63,500 POWs located in 158 separate camps and other identified locations. The overall mission would be conducted in three phases; all based upon drops of three-, seven- and ten-day supply bundles. A fourth phase would be flown contingent on the overall progress of the evacuation effort. According to Blacklist “Commencing B-Day or the date, as later directed by this headquarters, air dropings of emergency supplies to camps are initiated and continued until thirty (50) days of emergency supplies have been dropped to all presently known and subsequently identified camps.”

All missions flown in support of Blacklist Operations were to be flown as combat missions. Ten of the relief flights would be staged out of Okinawa. It is likely that these ten flew the initial missions to POW camps located in Manchuria. Of the known and suspected camp locations each bomber group employed was assigned a number of camps; most groups divided the assigned number of camps as evenly as possible among their various squadrons. The 73rd Bombardment Wing, Hog Wild’s home unit would fly more than half of all POW relief missions. It would also suffer more than 50 percent of all personnel lost during the operation.

During the 24 days of Blacklist Operations the effort to provide POWs with supplies would cost the lives of 77 B-29 crewmembers. Eight Superfortresses would be lost: Three would be not return due to operational or mechanical failures,

142 Ibid.
144 NR-MX-25646. GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC. To: AGWAR. FROM: MOSCOW. 28 September 1945
146 Ibid.
another four would fail to return for “unknown reasons.”\textsuperscript{153} Two Superforts ditched immediately after takeoff; of the 23 men on board, only 15 were rescued.\textsuperscript{154} Of the eight aircraft lost only Hog Wild would be forced down by gun fire.

**Section 16 – LOCATING THE CAMPS**

One of the major difficulties facing the Twentieth Air Force in planning and accomplishing its mission of delivering supplies to the prisoners, was a lack of accurate information regarding the location of the POW camps. According to Blacklist “Best estimates indicate that there are approximately 36,000 (Allied) personnel of various categories located in approximately 140 camps. In most instances this personnel will be in extremely poor physical condition requiring increased diet, comforts and medical care. Poor housing and sanitary conditions will require immediate large scale transfers to best available facilities to be peremptorily commandeered. Complete re-clothing will be imperative. Records in general will be incomplete for both survivors and deceased.” \textsuperscript{155} Simply put, neither the Japanese nor the U.S. knew where every camp was located.\textsuperscript{156 157}

**“Yellow List” and CINCPAC CINCPOA Bulletin No. 113**

The first list of POW camp locations, known as the “Yellow List” was passed to the Allies on 27 August 1945 a full 12 days after Japan’s surrender.\textsuperscript{158} Prior to receiving the Yellow List all Blacklist Operations were planned from the few known camp locations contained in CINCPAC CINCPOA Bulletin No. 113 45, dated 15 June 1945.\textsuperscript{159} The Bulletin listed less-than 30 known camps. Yellow List contained information on a total of 73 POW camps and locations. The Japanese eventually provided a more complete list containing a total of 102 camp locations within Japan.\textsuperscript{160} Further compounding the accuracy of the two lists was the indiscriminate efforts of the Japanese toward the end of the war to move Allied POWs from the more heavily bombed coastal areas to other locations within the country. Many POWs had been moved further inland.\textsuperscript{161} The final list of confirmed POW camp locations culled from CINCPAC CINCPOA bulletins and the Japanese Yellow List contained no information on any of the camps located on the Korean Peninsula.\textsuperscript{162}

Though some POW camp locations could be supplied based upon the information on-hand, further confirmation of reported and suspect locations was necessary. As early as 26 August some B-29s overflowed parts of China, Japan, and Korea in a visual search for camps. At least one B-29 flew over the Konan Camp reporting its approximate


\textsuperscript{154} http://home.comcast.net/~winjerd/Supply/splymssn.htm


\textsuperscript{157} http://www.philcrowther.com/6thBG/6bgmisstyp.html

\textsuperscript{158} http://home.comcast.net/~winjerd/Supply/encmpmnt.htm

\textsuperscript{159} http://home.comcast.net/~winjerd/Supply/splymssn.htm

\textsuperscript{160} SUBJ: POW Supply. The 6\textsuperscript{th} Bomb Group

\textsuperscript{161} http://home.comcast.net/~winjerd/Supply/encmpmnt.htm


\textsuperscript{163} http://home.comcast.net/~winjerd/Supply/encmpmnt.htm

location. The bomber dropped instructions to the POWs on how to mark off a drop area. The instructions warned the camp that additional B-29s carrying supplies would arrive over the camp in three days, 29 August 1945. Despite the success of locating many of the larger camps visually, a greater effort was required to locate numerous smaller unidentified camps.

To identify additional camps the 314th Bombardment Wing operating out of Guam was ordered to image large areas of the home islands: Honshū, Shikoku, and Kyūshū. Photographic missions over Japan were flown on 29 August 1945 with additional missions flown over Beijing, Hainan Island, Hong Kong, Mukden and Shanghai two days later. Airmen of the 19th Bomb Group under the 314th continued to conduct visual searches over Japan. The mission was considered so important that Colonel Carl R. Storrie, 314th Wing Commander flew as an observer on several missions as did other wing commanders.

To further aid the identification of POW camps from the air the Japanese government was ordered under the terms of the surrender to mark the roofs of POW camps with the letters “PW.” The letters were supposed to be painted in yellow, 20 foot tall on a black background, however such colors were not always available and the markings varied from camp to camp. The subsequent reconnaissance effort verified the locations of all previously reported camps and aided in the identification of another 57 camps.

Approximately 400 POW camps of some type; compounds, camps, jails, would be eventually identified throughout the Far East, 250 in Southeast Asia alone. Many of those identified were located long after the war had ended. According to Gavan Daws in his book Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific, for every POW repatriated through Japan two would be repatriated through Southeast Asia. Though the preparation of the Basic Outline Plan for “Blacklist” Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea after Surrender or Collapse represented a step taken in the Pacific Theater that had not been taken in Europe, more could have been done to prepare to support the implementation of the plan prior to Japan’s collapse, especially in the arena of intelligence.

No Prior Analysis

It is likely but cannot be absolutely confirmed through research at the U.S. National Archives, that it was not a lack of intelligence information concerning the location of the camps and conditions facing the prisoners that prevented their identification prior to the supply effort; but a lack of requirements at the national level to compile and analyze the information that did exist in support the commands involved in the POW supply effort. There was no organized intelligence activity gathering, collating, managing, organizing and analyzing reports on the locations, conditions and treatment of POWs held by the Japanese. The idea that POW camps were an extension of the battlefield would not become a more commonly held belief until the Korean War (1950–1953).

To the U.S. government prior to the surrender of Japan, the issue of American POWs in the hands of the Japanese had not been thought sufficiently important to generate intelligence studies or any analysis. In addition because there were no studies supporting the issue of POWs held by Japan, any information held at the national-level by the federal government was not readily accessible to the 20th Air Force and other commands in the area. Other than Blacklist there were few published materials that subcommands could draw upon as reference materials. As with most issues involved with the end of the war and its rapid ending, it can be argued that the intelligence community of the time was largely unprepared to support the effort to provide relief to the POWs. The fact that some Americans had been held by the Japanese since December 1941 however negates the argument. The collection and accumulation of reports and documents should have begun shortly after the start of the war.

As events will show whatever the true ability of the intelligence community to support the later POW relief missions, the required analysis of information related to the POWs, their camps, locations, conditions and so on, had simply never been accomplished. Further complicating the issue the “Europe First” policies of the Roosevelt presidency developed at the ARCADIA Conference early in the war, downplayed the plight of POWs held by the Japanese and politicized the issue within the administration.

Between 22 December 1941 and 14 January 1942, delegations headed by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met to decide the course of WWII. Known as the First Washington Conference or ARCADIA the two leaders decided that Hitler represented the far greater threat, and that the combined military resources of both nations would be better focused against Germany first, Japan second. The war against Japan was a sideshow, and considered by some to be no more than a regional war.

In defense of Roosevelt and Churchill, ARCADIA took place about two weeks after the war began. When ARCADIA ended the Allies were falling back, reeling but holding under pressure in Europe and Asia. The issue of Japan’s advance into Malaya was still an open question; American forces in the Philippines were falling back into the Bataan Peninsula as envisioned under War Plan Orange. The fate of thousands of British and Americans captured by the Japanese after the collapse of Malaya, Singapore, Bataan and Corregidor lay in the future. At the time, the issue of POWs was of little concern.

That there were far less American prisoners held in Europe during the early part of the war worked to further push the issue of POWs to the back burner of American public opinion. As there were only a few thousand POWs held by the Japanese, the numbers of voting public personally interested about their health and welfare was relatively small. That many of the men came from the more rural parts of America, any interest group that might form in their support would be disjointed in the early days of the war and could be safely ignored.

With the exception of New Mexico whose National Guard had been activated and sent to the Philippines and Java respectively, there were few concentrations of interested parties that might lobby Congress and the Administration on behalf of POWs held by Japan. While families of the New Mexico national guard eventually organized to demand answers from the nation’s political leaders, they was far too distant from the goings-on in Washington D.C. and far too small to impact decisions. The administration could afford to ignore this small number of voters in favor of what they perceived as the greater good.

With the number of POWs held by the Japanese fairly small in number, and with those prisoners held deep in Japanese occupied Pacific there was little interest on the part of Roosevelt administration to concern itself with their welfare. America’s POWs were far away, out of sight, and out of mind. As early as February 1942 the Office of Censorship asked reporters to refrain from publishing stories of the atrocities perpetrated on POWs by the Japanese.169 With the Roosevelt administration uninterested in the overall welfare of American POWs the overall result was a lack of a concentrated intelligence collection and analysis effort against the issue.

Ultimately, the lack of an intelligence effort against the issue of POWs in the hands of the Japanese would manifest itself as an intelligence failure that would result in the near fatal forcing down of Hog Wild over Konan in August 1945. The dots were never connected the lines were never drawn. While the result was not the collapse of a nation or the major failure of Allied forces in the field, ultimately the lack of analysis would lead in part to the downing of Hog Wild and the potential loss of American lives. While this story primarily concerns the British and Australian POWs held at Konan it is important to understand that there were also numerous American POWs in the hands of the Japanese across much of Eastern Asia, some in Korea. And while there was an alliance fighting the Axis Powers, in the Pacific Theater of the conflict it was largely a U.S. war. Why these Americans were there, what becomes of them during the war directly impacts the last flight of Hog Wild.

Section 17 – THE PHILIPPINES: AMERICA OUTPOST LOST

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War (1898) the U.S. found itself in with an overseas empire which included Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippine Islands. The Spanish ceded these territories to the U.S. under the 1898 Treaty of Paris. To rule the Philippines the U.S. established a military government over the islands administering the archipelago through the American military into 1901. From 1901 to 1935 the islands were ruled by a Governor-General appointed by the U.S. President. The islands achieved Commonwealth status in 1935 and were to be granted independence in 1946 under the Philippines Independence Act (1934), more popularly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

Between the end of military rule in 1901 and Philippine independence in 1946, the U.S. exercised sovereignty over the islands through a series of territorial arrangements and commonwealth agreements. Under these agreements the U.S. assumed responsibility for the defense of the islands against outside military threats. To accomplish this task the U.S. maintained a garrison of about 10,000 Americans in the archipelago to provide for the island’s security. This force was augmented by Philippine Scout and eventually by the Philippine Army.

For an American stationed in the Philippines, life was good. Outside China, it was probably some of the best military duty possible. As an American trying to survive the Great Depression of the 1930s until the U.S. economy improved, if you had to be in the Army the Philippine Islands was not a bad place to sit it out.

For an American serviceman in the Philippines in the years prior to WWII the duty day began at 0730 and for the most part ended 1230 hours. Training, what little there was of it consisted of light duty at best. There were no formations, few parades and drills. Once each month soldiers stationed in Manila conducted a 15-mile forced-march with full field pack. Troops did not pull KP (Kitchen Patrol) but paid Filipinos to do the work. Each barracks had a houseboy or several. Soldiers paid the houseboy a set fee per month for each service provided. The houseboy would keep the soldier’s personal area clean, bed made, shoes shine, laundry washed, uniforms heavily starched and pressed. Uniforms could be tailor, or handmade at shops off- or on-base. A tailored set of khaki’s cost about $7.50. A silk-lined officer’s white mess dress cost $12.50. Prostitution, loan sharking, and gambling thrived. For officers, there were champagne breakfasts, moonlight socials, dress balls, and songs sung by the piano. For the enlisted men, brawling and bar fights made up much of the evening’s entertainment. For a Filipino serving in the American Army the standards were a bit different.

Approximately half of the American garrison in the islands was comprised of Philippine Scouts, Filipinos serving with the U.S. Army. The Scouts were officered in many cases by Americans; re white military officers, and supplemented by Filipino officers who had attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

Sometimes derided for its lack of indigenous leadership an accusation that was somewhat untrue, the Philippine Scouts were the most professional soldiers in the islands; American or Filipino. First organized in 1901 to augment the U.S. Army in the Philippine Revolution, the Scouts were a proud organization of skilled soldiers dedicated to the profession of arms. In the coming battle against the Japanese invader, it was the Scouts that inspired confidence among U.S. and Philippine military forces wherever assigned. It was the Scouts that were sent in again and again to shore up weakening lines and to carry the war to the Japanese. As America’s outpost in the Far East, a coaling station for its naval power from WWI onward the U.S. sought to further develop its military footprint across the islands.

In the years between the two world wars the Philippine Department of the U.S. Army established numerous military facilities throughout the islands to include Forts Mills (Corregidor Island), Fort William McKinley, Stotsenberg, and Wint (Grande Island); Camps Murphy, O’Donnell, and Wallace. Airfields included those at Clark, Del Monte, Ilba, Legaspi, and Nichols Field. A large naval station was located at Sangely Point. Just before the start of the war a Marine Corps unit was relocated from China to Olongapo at Subic Bay. Numerous other facilities dotted the islands.

Much of the construction and development supporting the expansion of military forces in the islands took place in the 1920s and 1930s. Malinta Tunnel, built by the Army Corps of Engineers on the island of Corregidor was completed in 1932. Camp Murphy was established in January 1935. Construction on an airfield at Del Monte began in secret on 27 November 1941.

Becoming a Commonwealth of the U.S. in 1935 to be granted its independence in 1946, the Philippines would eventually be responsible for its own national defense. In meeting this challenge the Philippine government sought the assistance of the United States in developing its projected military requirements into military realities.

To achieve the required results, Philippine President Manuel Quezon persuaded U.S. General Douglas MacArthur to serve as the chief military adviser to the Philippine government. MacArthur, a political outcast within the Roosevelt administration and nearing the end of his term as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army accepted the offer filling the post from 1935 to 1941. MacArthur was given the rank of Field Marshal – largely over a force that did not exist even on paper.

Once in the islands MacArthur found a military expansion program long on goals short of actual achievements and more importantly – short on money. Though President Quezon had tasked MacArthur with building a Philippine military capable of defending the islands from outside threats by its projected date of independence, the political will to fulfill established goals was often lacking. Philippine politicians had opposing and complicated objectives. Social programs competed for defense funds. Military budgets were established and subsequently cut. Despite this reality and to his credit MacArthur soldiered on.

Under MacArthur’s guidance the islands were divided into ten separate military zones. 4,000 soldiers were to be conscripted from each zone every year to reach a training goal of 40,000 soldiers per year. The army of 1946 was projected to
reach a level of 400,000 men led by a trained professional officer corps of Filipinos. To some degree, quantity in numbers would replace quality in forces. 128 separate camps were to be constructed as barracks, posts, and forts. To professionalize the nation’s new officer corps MacArthur established the Philippine Military Academy. Despite MacArthur’s best efforts progress was slow.

When World War II began in 1941 the Philippine Army undertook the defense of the islands with two regular and ten reserve divisions. Recall of the divisions was slow. Some divisions never reached full strength. Communications man-to-man could be frustrating: depending on the method of classification a Philippine draftee might speak any of more 120 to 175 different languages or dialects. The fledgling Philippine Army possessed few modern weapons to include small arms.

Most of the Philippine Army’s small arms were WWI-era U.S. castoffs; Enfield and Springfield bolt-action rifles. Many Philippine Army soldiers had never actually fired a rifle. The firing ranges required to train the Philippine Army simply did not exist. Training for the first 20,000 conscripts did not begin in earnest until 1937, leaving the islands with just over 100,000 soldiers when WWII began. The number of camps required to support the proposed training program failed to materialize. The island’s air force which would be its primary off-shore defensive arm against invasion would not organize its first squadron until 1939. A Philippine Navy was planned to consist of fast torpedo boats plying local waters, hiding in the islands numerous coves and bays. At the start of the war, the Philippine Navy consisted of two British made, and one Philippine produced Q-boat. While these were MacArthur’s plans U.S. war planning for the islands was based upon the defensive.

**Douglas MacArthur**

Douglas MacArthur was born to Arthur MacArthur (2 Jun 1845–5 Sept 1912) and Mary Pinckney Hardy (22 May 1852–3 Dec 1935) at the Arsenal Barracks in Little Rock, Arkansas on 26 January 1880. His father Arthur was an Army officer who would eventually rise to the highest rank of the pre-WWI American Army, that of Lieutenant General. A winner of the Medal of Honor for his bravery on Missionary Ridge, Tennessee during the Chattanooga Campaign of 1863 Arthur MacArthur would go on to command the Department of Northern Luzon in the Philippine Islands during the Spanish American War (1898–1899) and the subsequent Philippine-American War (1899–1902). From May 1900 to July 1901 Arthur MacArthur serve as the United States Military Governor of the Philippines and then as Military Attaché to the to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) where he served as an observer; accompanied by then Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur.

Douglas MacArthur entered the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on 13 June 1899 graduating first in his class of 93 cadets on 11 June 1903 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He served in the Philippines from 1903 to 1905 and as aide-de-camp to his father during the Russo-Japanese War. Assigned to several stateside posts in the years leading up to WWI he took part in the Veracruz Expedition of 1914 where he was nominated for the Medal of Honor. During WWI MacArthur was once again nominated for the Medal of Honor. In Europe MacArthur fought in the Second Battle of the Marne and the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. During WWI Douglas MacArthur rose to the rank of Brigadier General and served as the commander of the Rainbow Division. He was decorated twice with the Distinguished Service Cross and won the Silver Star seven times.

From 1919–1922 Douglas MacArthur served as the Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy which included promotion to the permanent rank of brigadier general. As superintendent he initiated numerous and long overdue changes to the Academy’s curriculum including education in the liberal arts and expanding the academy’s sports program – all of which were fiercely resisted by the cadets and the staff. He was reassigned to the Philippines again in 1922 and served there through 1925. Returning to the U.S. in 1925 he was promoted once again becoming the Army’s youngest Major General. Reassigned in 1929 again to the Philippines he returned to the U.S. in 1930 to serve as Chief-of-Staff U.S. Army through 1935, a post his famous father never held. MacArthur returned to the Philippines in 1935 to head the Philippine military but remained on the U.S. active-duty list at the rank of Major General. He retired from the U.S. Army on 21 February 1937.

On 26 July 1941 U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the Philippine Army into federal service and recalled Douglas MacArthur to active duty as a Major General. MacArthur was immediately appointed commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). The following day MacArthur was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and on 20 December 1941 promoted once again to the four-star rank or General.

In 1941 under the leadership of Generals Marshall and MacArthur the American military began reviewing the previously held long-term assessments contained in U.S. war planning; primarily War Plan Orange, that the Philippine Islands would be quickly overrun in an attack by Japanese forces. General MacArthur, long an opponent of existing U.S. plans proposed a new strategy for the Philippines, one that met the Japanese on the beach during an invasion and forced them out before they could establish a strong toehold in the islands. Planners began moving to a policy of forward defense. As events would later prove it was the right idea – at the wrong time.

Ordered out of the Philippines in early 1942 and now operating from Australia, MacArthur unsuccessfully championed an early U.S. return to the Philippines. Over the next two years MacArthur led Allied forces in dividing the
Japanese overseas Empire by his defense of Australia and advances through New Guinea, the Battle at Milne Bay and OPERATION CARTWHEEL which isolated the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul. Summoned to Hawaii for a meeting with President Roosevelt, Admirals William D. Leahy (6 May 1875–20 Jul 1959), William F. Halsey (30 Oct 1882–16 Aug 1959) and Chester W. Nimitz; he convinced the U.S. president of the moral and political soundness of an early U.S. return to the Philippines. On 20 October 1944 U.S. forces under General Walter Krueger landed at Leyte fulfilling MacArthur’s 1942 promise that he would return. In a series of 52 separate amphibious landings, fighting across the Philippines would continue until 2 September 1945 when General Tomoyuki Yamashita surrendered the final Japanese forces holding northern Luzon. In April 1945, MacArthur was designated Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC). On 2 September 1945 Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan accepted the surrender of Japan. Like much of this story however, in late 1941 MacArthur was operating under War Plan Orange Number 3. The Japan’s surrender lay years into the future.

**War Plan Orange No. 3 (WPO-3) and RAINBOW**

War Plan Orange was developed in 1919 in the aftermath of WWI by the Joint Army and Navy Board. It was formally accepted in 1924. The plan formed the baseline for all future military planning in the Philippines.

Orange was one of several so-called “color-coded” war plans that outlined possible U.S. strategies for a number of hypothetical situations. War Plan Black, the first color-code plan was developed during WWI as a contingency plan against the fall of France and the projected German occupation of French Territories that then existed in the Western Hemisphere. War Plan Red concerned Britain and Canada. Additional “shades” of Plan Red concerned U.S. strategies for British Territories such as; “Ruby” for India, “Scarlet” for Australia and so on (See Appendix 1: Color Plans). For planning purposes and to maintain secrecy Japan was known as country “Orange,” hence War Plan Orange. WPO-3 was based upon the U.S. defending itself alone against Japan in the Western Pacific. The plan had undergone several formal revisions each major revision known by its revision number; WPO-1, WPO-2 etc. Orange-3 was the primary plan covering operations when war began in the Pacific.

Under WPO-3, arms, supplies and reinforcements would be withheld from those U.S. forces then in the Pacific outposts of Guam, Midway, and the Philippines pending the buildup of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in California. For those forces forward deployed or stationed in Asia it would be a “come as you are war.” All materiel, supplies or other items required for the operation had to be on stock at sufficient levels in Army warehouses prior to the beginning of the war. If the food, supplies, medicines, ammunition and so on that were needed when war began were not on-hand when the war started, they never would be.

According to the WPO-3 once the U.S. fleet had been mobilized and readied for war only then would it sail to the relief of America’s Pacific outposts. Upon relieving Guam and the Philippines the U.S. fleet would then sail north in an effort to engage the Japanese in what was then termed the “decisive battle,” a type of strategy first put forth by Alfred Thayer Mahan in the 1890s. Following the Munich Agreement, the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and concerns that the U.S. would face the possibility of war on several fronts, all color-coded plans were withdrawn. The Joint Planning Board now developed a new series war plans based on a series of consolidated national strategies known as the RAINBOW Plans.

The plans were referred to as RAINBOW because they blended together all the previous color-coded plans into a more comprehensive overall strategy, not based entirely on the defeat of one county. The RAINBOW series of plans supported five different strategies one of which, RAINBOW-5 (WPL-46) became the eventual Europe First strategy that would dominate American strategy throughout WWII. WPO-3, the former Orange was rolled into RAINBOW-3.

Though the plans had new names arrangements for the defense of the Philippines, Guam and other outposts remained basically the same: Those units were to hold out under attack until relief arrived. The final version of WPO-3, the new RAINBOW plan was based upon the Orange plan of 1938 and was finalized in April 1941. In the Philippines, as with WPO-3 the new plan called for the denial of Manila Bay to the Japanese for six months by forces on-the-scene. Once under attack U.S. forces were to withdraw onto the Bataan Peninsula where food, ammunition and fuel would be pre-positioned to support the long-term defense and denial of Manila Bay to the enemy. On Bataan U.S. forces would hold out under a long-range protective artillery umbrella provided by the island fortress of Corregidor. As with all earlier versions of WPO-3 unstated was the hope that American forces holding out in the island could be relieved at the end of the six month period. Behind the scenes in the War Department however, it was an open-secret that U.S. forces in the Philippines were doomed.

Under the April 1941 revision Plan Orange divided the island of Luzon into six sectors. Each sector commander was responsible for the defense of his assigned zone. The new plan provided for a mobile reserve to support the various sectors as required. Plan Orange provided for the supply of each sector during its initial phase of operations. In addition to his responsibilities for the defense of the sector or sectors assigned to his command, the commander of the Philippine Division; the sole U.S. Army division then present in the islands, was further responsible for organizing the defense of Bataan and
command of the American redoubt, if necessary. All of the division’s enlisted men with the exception of the 31st Infantry Regiment, some military police and headquarters soldiers were Philippine Scouts.

The new RAINBOW plan called for the eventual withdrawal of all forces into the Bataan Peninsula primarily in defense of Manila and Subic Bays. Supplies, material, ammunition and food were to be established on Bataan to support defensive operations for a force of 31,000 men for a period of six months, after which reinforcements were expected to arrive. With the exception of ammunition, which had yet to arrive, most of the stores required to support the plan as it existed were on-hand in the Philippines in early 1941. Through lacking protection from air attack most of the stores required for the defense of Bataan were held in warehouses in or near Manila. WPO-3 required U.S. forces to hold open all roads between Manila and Bataan to permit the shipment of on-hand stores from Manila to the peninsula in the event of an attack.

On 26 July 1941 as rumors of war began to increase President Roosevelt recalled General Douglas MacArthur to active duty as a major general, placing him in command of all U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). The president’s order also federalized the Philippine Army bringing it directly under the control of the U.S. Army. The Philippines were to be reinforced with additional U.S. forces in the form of Federalized National Guard Units. Some, such as the New Mexico National Guard would arrive in late 1941, other units were destined to arrive in early 1942. A budget of $10 million was now provided for a buildup of the island’s defense. 100 B-17s Flying Fortresses were promised. One of MacArthur’s first decisions as commander was to press for additional changes to the recently revised WPO-3, that would reflect the larger forces presently under his control and those that would soon to be arriving in the Philippines. It was a fateful decision.

RAINBOW: War Plan Orange-3, Revised

In a 1 October 1941 letter MacArthur notified the War Department of his objections to the updated WPO-3/RAINBOW-3. Macarthur sought a more aggressive plan, one that encompassed the defense of the entire archipelago. According to MacArthur there could be no defense of Manila Bay or the island of Luzon if an enemy was allowed to land and secure the country’s southern islands. In MacArthur’s opinion the current plan failed to recognize the most recent changes in command relationships in the islands and the mobilization of the Philippine Army. With the U.S. garrison now under his control and the federalized Philippine Army with its one regular division and ten divisions in reserve added to the rolls of the U.S. Army, MacArthur now possessed a far larger force to defend the islands than had any of his predecessors. MacArthur noted that he would soon have at his disposal a force of nearly 200,000 men (the actual number was far less) in 11 divisions with its corresponding corps organization.

Less than three weeks later, on 18 October 1941, General Marshall, agreeing with the requested changes informed MacArthur that a revision to the Army mission in Philippine had been drafted and was awaiting approval by the Joint Board. Recognizing the potential of a buildup of military forces in the Philippines as a deterrent to Japanese aggression the U.S. now moved strategically to convert the island’s small garrison into an offensive force by overlaying a long-range air capability onto the existing garrison. The air forces in the island would be expanded with the addition of B-17 Flying Fortresses and more than 100 P-40 Warhawks. Training of the Philippine Army would be increased. MacArthur had achieved his goal and the Army in the Philippines was now assigned the broader mission of defending the entire archipelago. The decision was to have a critical impact on the coming struggle to defend the islands.

In receipt of the approved request MacArthur now began to officially implement the requested changes, most of which were already a reality. On 4 November MacArthur formally stood up the North and South Luzon Forces and the Visayan-Mindanao Force; all of which had actually been in existence for several months. On 21 November 1941 the War Department formally approved the changes requested. In MacArthur’s mind the U.S. Army would meet the Japanese on the beachhead where they were most vulnerable, and drive them back into the sea. It was a great plan, if he could pull it off. However the reality of the situation seemed to escape MacArthur from his penthouse in Manila. War in the Philippines would begin long before MacArthur’s preparations were final.

The projected buildup of U.S. and Philippine forces would not be complete before April 1942. Only 35 Flying Fortresses would reach the Philippines prior to the Japanese attack in December. Most P-40 Warhawk pilots lacked the experience necessary to get a fighter into the air and land when required. Crack-ups of pursuit aircraft on the ground were a common occurrence.
In redirecting the forces available to meet a Japanese invasion, the joint U.S.- Philippine force would by necessity be widely dispersed into the newly established sectors to meet an invasion anywhere and could never be massed to face the Japanese when they landed in Northern Luzon. The dispersal of forces required that supplies of ammunition and food move forward in support of the new plan and away from the central supply point of Manila. Depots were established north of Manila at Tarlac the capital of Tarlac Province, and Guagua, Pampanga and to the south at Los Banos, Laguna Province. Though U.S. and Philippine Forces were not in complete and total disarray due to the reorganization, they were at a distinct disadvantage. MacArthur’s plan had been implemented but had not been extensively distributed, studied or exercised by the American and Filipino forces assigned to turn the plan into action.

The Japanese Attack

The first reports of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor reached the Philippines at roughly 0230 hours on 8 December, the Philippines being on the other side of the International Date Line. Official reports reached Manila at 0530 that same morning. Ten hours after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor the first Japanese bombs fell on the Philippine Islands at the summer capital of Baguio. Further Japanese air attacks against U.S. air assets then on the ground at Clark Field crippled the ability of the Far East Air Force to take the war to the Japanese.

Most of the USSAFE’s B-17s (12) and many of its P40s (26) were destroyed as they were being prepared for offensive operations. There were a number of factors that contributed to the defeat; the command’s early warning system consisted of local observers reporting incoming aircraft via telephone; the command’s radar warning system consisted of seven radar sets, but only two were in-service at the time of the Japanese attack. Disagreements between commanders, bureaucratic infighting, personalities, and vacillation also contributed to America’s second Pearl Harbor. America’s Far East offensive air arm was destroyed before it could ever be employed; no one was ever held responsible, no one was ever relieved of duty or fired for incompetence. To the contrary most American officers in the Philippines at the time were in-fact eventually promoted or moved into positions of greater responsibility.

 Rumors that the aircraft were lined up wingtip-to-wingtip unprepared at Clark Field were largely untrue. While Clark would eventually become one of the largest American Air Force installations outside the continental U.S., in 1941 it only possessed only a few hangars and five dirt runways, only one of which had been previously sealed. Parking space on the airfield was at a premium and though all aircraft present at the time of the attack were as widely dispersed as possible, fully 12 of the 17 Flying Fortresses present were destroyed on the ground. Only three of the P-40s present at the field when it came under attack managed to take off. 26 of the P-40s in the Philippines were destroyed on the first day of the war.

The Japanese seaborne invasion of the Philippines began almost simultaneously with the bombing attacks against the islands. The first Japanese landings in support of a full invasion took place at Batan Island, a small spot of land about 120 miles north of the main island of Luzon by Japanese naval infantry units that morning. Other landings would soon follow.

On 10 December units of the Japanese Army landed at Camiguin Island, again north and off the northern coast of Luzon and south of Batan Island. Additional units landed at Aparri, Gonzaga, and Vigan on the north and west coast of Luzon. Two days later, on 12 December the Japanese put ashore 2,500 men at Legaspi, 150 miles south of the nearest U.S. and Philippine Army units. Landings on Mindanao, the largest island in the far south of the island chain began on the 19th of December. The main attack against the islands would begin three days later. Unlike the invasion of Malaya and the attack on Singapore driven by the desire to control the natural resources required to fuel the Japanese economy, the attack against the Philippines was designed primarily to secure the Japanese flank in its drive toward Australia. On 22 December 1941 the Japanese landed nearly 45,000 men under the command of General Homma Masaharu at three points along the west coast of Luzon along the Lingayen Gulf.

The main Japanese invasion was accompanied by 90 tanks and various artillery tubes. Forces of U.S. General Jonathan Wainwright, commander of the North Luzon Force attempted to contain the Japanese invasion to the coast. Poorly trained, widely dispersed, lacking the necessary equipment to fight off Japan’s tanks and artillery; Wainwright could neither hold the Japanese to the invasion beaches nor contain their advance inland from the coast. By nightfall of the 23rd of December 1941 Japanese forces had advanced ten miles from their beachhead. Additional Japanese landings along Lamon Bay in southern Luzon found U.S. and Philippine forces under the South Luzon Command similarly incapable of containing the Japanese to the invasion beaches.

On the 24th of December with U.S. and Philippine Army units being pushed north and south into Manila General MacArthur now backtracked and implemented the April 1941 revision of WPO-3. All forces now under his control were now ordered to withdraw into the Bataan Peninsula. Three days passed between the main Japanese invasion and an assessment of its success before MacArthur reached the decision to revert to WPO-3. A total of 16 days since the beginning of the war, crucial days had been lost implementing MacArthur’s envisioned forward defense plan. Those lost days when supplies could have been moved from Manila into Bataan, would have a detrimental impact on the ability of the combined U.S. and Philippine forces ability to defend the peninsula.
Battles of Bataan/Corregidor

Following the activation of WPO-3, U.S. and Philippine Army units began moving into positions delaying the Japanese advance and keeping open escape routes into Bataan. Quartermaster units now began moving all supplies of food, ammunition, medical supplies, fuels, and so on, out of their Manila based warehouses and pre-war storage sites into the Bataan Peninsula. Large amounts of military stores held on the docks of Manila were successfully moved across the bay to Corregidor Island. Supplies previously advanced into areas supporting the new concept of advanced defense of the Luzon south and north of Manila were largely surrendered to advancing Japanese. Some Allied forces did return to the depots removing as much material as time would allow. On the 24th of December 1941 Philippine President Manuel Quezon and Vice-President Sergio Osmeña along with Quezon’s war cabinet were evacuated to Corregidor, two days later General MacArthur declared Manila an “Open City.”

Corregidor

Of the four islands that jut up from the ocean at the mouth of Manila Bay, at 3.5 miles (5.6 km) long and 1.5 miles (2.4 km) across at its head tadpole shaped Corregidor is the largest. In the days prior to WWII the island was known throughout the world as the “Gibraltar of the East,” a moniker also claimed by Singapore. To soldiers assigned to the island it was known simply as the “The Rock.” When the Philippines had been a Spanish colony Corregidor had been used as a fort to prevent entry of unwanted ships, pirates and military vessels into Manila Bay. Following the Spanish-American War the U.S. likewise moved to fortify the island with powerful, long-range anti-ship artillery.

In keeping with Army traditions to divide, label and paint things, Corregidor was developed into three rather distinctly obvious Army-style areas: Topside, Middleside and Bottomside. At 390 feet the island’s highest point Topside contained the majority of the island’s 56 coastal artillery pieces and batteries. Battery Hearn, consisting of one 12-inch seacoast gun had a range of 29,000 yards. Battery Crocket, another Topside battery contained two 12-inch disappearing rifles that could sling a shell 17,000 yards. Battery Way and Geary boasting four 12-mortars each were also located on Topside. Each of these large mortars could throw a 1,000 pound anti-ship deck piercing shell or a 700 pound anti-personnel high explosive shell a distance of 14,600 yards. Each of these mortars required a crew of 14 men to fire only one round. These “big sticks,” installed in the 1920s had however one major defect; they were never designed to operate in the age of airpower. Though fearsome they were extremely vulnerable to air attack. Middleside, resting on a small plateau contained several additional batteries and the majority of the island’s barracks and administrative areas. The lowest part of the island, Bottomside, held the island’s docks, its civilian town of San Jose and Malinta Tunnel.120

Malinta Tunnel

Malinta tunnel was originally built to house a 1,000-man hospital, ammunition, food and supplies. Early in WWII it was pressed into service as a military headquarters. During the early part of the war the tunnel also served as the seat of the government of the Philippine Commonwealth under President Manuel L. Quezon. Just 22 days into the war Philippine President Quezon and Vice-President Sergio Osmeña were sworn into office for their second term as president and vice-president on the afternoon of 30 December 1941 just outside the entrance to Malinta Tunnel.

Construction on the tunnel began in 1922 and took roughly ten years. The main tunnel was 24 foot wide and roughly 835 foot long. The top of the tunnel’s arch rose to 18 foot. 24 lateral tunnels; 13 branched off the north side of the main tunnel; 11 branching off of its south side, completed the underground structure. Each lateral tunnel measured 160 foot long by 15 foot wide and 15 foot tall. The entire complex was largely complete in 1932. A double-tracked trolley line ran through the center of the tunnel. Never designed for human habitation, at one point in 1942 more than 4,000 soldiers, sailors, marines and nurses sought shelter within its underground spaces. Corregidor was accompanied by three other forts sitting astride the mouth of Manila Bay; the most unique being located on the island of El Fraile, Fort Drum.

Fort Drum

120 Ph00000367 - General and Mrs. MacArthur exit the Malinta Tunnel, Corregidor, December, 1941. The MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia http://www.macarthurmemorial.org/Corregidor_Philippine_Campaign_1942.asp
Fort Drum was located about 7500 yards south of Caballo Island, or Fort Hughes. Between the years of 1910 and 1914 the small uninhabited stone island rising up from the bay had been completely leveled and replaced with a reinforced concrete battleship-shaped fort. Fort Drum measured 240 feet long by 160 feet wide and rose 40 feet above the mean low water level. Its exterior walls measured between 20 and 36-foot thick.

Internally the fort contained four levels connected by an axial tunnel running through the island. For protection Fort Drum housed four 14-inch long-range anti-ship coastal defense guns. These 14-inch guns could fire shells a distance of 22,500 yards; 12.78 miles. Six 6-inch casemated guns were included for minefield defense. The six-inch guns were controlled by a 60 foot tall fire control cage mast that rose above the fort’s uppermost deck. Three 3-inch batteries completed the fort’s defense. Two of these were designated for air-defense. During the war, Fort Drum was reported to have received more than 1,000 direct hits on its concrete deck. Two additional fortified islands, Forts Frank and Hughes completed the harbor’s defense. Together Fort Frank and Fort Drum added another 32 heavy artillery pieces to the Corregidor’s 54 weapon defending Manila Bay.

The Move into Bataan

Arriving on the Bataan peninsula Philippine and U.S. military units began to immediately construct defensive lines and positions designed to hold back the advancing Japanese. On 6 January 1942 the last U.S. and Philippine units to escape into Bataan moved across the neck of the peninsula and assumed defensive positions. The retrograde maneuver was now over; the combined Philippine-American forces would retreat no more.

In a defense that should be as well remembered as the Battle of the Alamo or Bunker Hill, for more than three months American and Philippine forces repelled repeated Japanese overland assaults and several amphibious landings launched against the west coast of the peninsula. In a series of actions two of which were the “Battle of the Points” and the “Battle of the Pockets” the combined forces of the U.S. and Philippines savagely defeated and evicted Japanese forces advancing into the areas under their control. Despite its lack of training, initial concerns about their readiness, and some failures on the field of battle the Philippine Army on Bataan held its ground against repeated Japanese attacks. Casualties amongst Philippine Army units were high and some units did break in the initial moments of combat, but all were usually quickly rallied back to their original positions. For the peacetime Philippine Army its combat training was conducted on the fields-of-fire. Its forces on the peninsula eventually consisted of only combat hardened survivors. Philippine Scout units established themselves as legends. U.S. Army forces repeatedly rose to the occasion.

By the 8th of February 1941, Japanese Army units under General Homma were forced to suspend offensive operations in order to reequip and await reinforcements. Additional Japanese units were now redirected into the Philippines from Malaya and China. On 28 March the Japanese resumed offensive operations against the combined Allied force operating on Bataan. After holding their own since January it was now only a matter of time before U.S. and Philippine forces occupying Bataan fell.

As U.S. and Philippine forces retreated into Bataan the supply situation existing on the peninsula and the island fortress of Corregidor was precarious at best. Planning for the defense of the peninsula had been based upon a force of 43,000 men for a period of six months; more than 106,000 soldiers and civilians now occupied the peninsula. Units escaping into Bataan were placed on half-rations on 6 January 1941. As the siege of the Bataan lengthened rations of rice increased, but the amounts of meat and vegetables available decreased.

171 El Fraile Island (Fort Drum) http://www.pbase.com/fots2/image/117257850
Despite the heroism and sacrifice of Philippine-American forces in the islands Washington was quick to write the Philippines off as a loss.

The fall of Bataan, Corregidor and the Philippines

Under a Japanese air blockade and with the Japanese Navy in control of nearby waters U.S. efforts to break through to the defenders met with failure. Quartermaster supplies enroute to the Philippine known as the Pensacola Convoy, in-accordance-with RAINBOW-3 were diverted first to Hawaii and later to Australia. The U.S. Navy suffering disaster at Pearl Harbor, suffered from a loss of confidence and was incapable of relieving to the Philippines. Despite much chest thumping there was never any serious effort to resupply and reinforce the islands. Under the U.S. strategy of Europe First contained in RAINBOW-5, those supplies, weapons and military stores that should have been on the way to the Philippines, could be better utilized by Britain and the Soviet Union. U.S. Army efforts to run the blockade from Australia resulted in the loss of those merchantmen that attempted to reach Luzon. U.S. submarines running the blockade were able to deliver only small amounts of food, ammunition and medical supplies. Even blockade runners usually the less savoy characters in a port, could not be convinced regardless of the money involved to undertake the trip from Australia to the Philippines. For the men on Bataan it was a matter of survival.

Medical officers issued repeated warnings that the combat efficiency of the men on Bataan was steadily decreasing due to a lack of food. Units on Bataan killed and consumed carabao (water buffalo), horses, donkey, monkeys, lizards, rats and so on just to live another day. Soldiers suffered the loss of fifteen to twenty pounds body-weight in silence. Some lost as much as 30 pounds; weight that they could ill-afford to lose in fighting the Japanese and could far less afford to lose prior their march into captivity. In a meeting with Roosevelt in December 1941 Secretary of War Henry Stimson, faced with the inability of American forces to resupply and sustain the forces holding out on Bataan reportedly said “There are times when men must die.”

As enemy forces attacked into prepared defensive lines the soldiers, sailors, marines and civilians facing them were steadily becoming physically incapable of resisting the Japanese advance. Japanese forces under the command of General Homma were relentless. American and Philippine forces, exhausted and starving began to fall back. The defense began to crumble.

On the 9th of April, realizing that there was no more room to maneuver no more land to trade for time General King, the commander of all forces on Bataan met with General Nagano Kameichiro to arrange terms for the surrender of all American and Philippine forces then fighting on Bataan. Nagano turned General Edward P. King over to Colonel Motoo Nakayama the senior operations officer for the Japanese 14th Army. Nakayama demanded the surrender of all forces then fighting in the Philippines. General King told Nakayama that he did not have the authority necessary to surrender those forces or the forces continuing to fight from Corregidor. As General King would explain to the Japanese General Wainwright, then on Corregidor was the overall commander of all forces located in the Philippines.

Realizing then, that General King was not the overall commander of all forces in the Philippines, Nakayama broke off negotiations, informing General King that the forces under his control would be required to surrender as individuals or as units to whatever Japanese units were facing them in the field. In his subsequent interrogation by members of the Japanese negotiators team General King informed them that he had reserved sufficient fuel and vehicles to transport the soldiers under his command to whatever location the Japanese desired. In seeking terms for the surrender of his forces on Bataan all that General King requested was that his soldiers be well treated. In answering his request Colonel Nakayama informed General King that “We are not barbarians.” Nakayama, whether he knew it or not, whether he believed it or not, lied. At 1230 hours on 10 April all U.S. and Philippine Army forces on Bataan surrendered.

More than 75,000 U.S. and Philippine Army soldiers, sailors, marines, Philippine Scouts, Philippine Constabulary and civilians were taken prisoner when Bataan surrendered. The island fortress of Corregidor held out as a loss.

additional 11,000 men were captured when Corregidor fell. Additional Philippine and U.S. soldiers would be taken captive on other islands.

U.S. and Philippine forces surrendered only a few days short of five months after the initial Japanese invasion, one month shy of the six-months demanded by RAINBOW and WPO-3. Fort Drum, the Concrete Battleship that helped guard the mouth of Manila Bay continued firing until a few minutes before the official surrender. The collapse of Bataan and Corregidor was the largest single defeat of the U.S. Army in American military history.

As the defenses at Singapore and Bataan collapsed, the U.S. and its British allies fully expected the Japanese to abide by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929 their expectations were obviously misplaced.

Japan and the Geneva Conventions of 1929

The Third Geneva Convention was drawn up in 1929 to govern the treatment of soldiers, sailors, marines and some civilians who might be taken prisoner of war. The convention was based on lofty goals and ideas, most of which have never been achieved. The convention consisted of 97 articles governing the implementation and the terms of the convention. In the most general terms the convention provided that those taken prisoner would be:

- Treated with respect at all times.
- Allowed to notify their next of kin and the International Red Cross of their capture, correspond with their relatives and to receive relief parcels from their family members.
- Provided with adequate food and clothing generally equal to that of their captors soldiers.
- Provided with housing equivalent to that used to house their captor's military.
- Provided with proper medical care.
- Paid for any work they would do at a rate commensurate to that of their captor’s officers and enlisted personnel.
- Sent home if seriously ill or wounded, provided they agreed not to resume active military duties afterwards (parole).
- Rapidly released and repatriated when the war is over.

Prisoners of war were not to be:

- Forced to give any information except their name, rank and number
- Deprived of money or valuables without a receipt and a guarantee that those valuables would be returned at the time of release.
- Given individual privileges other than on grounds of health, sex, age or military rank.
- Held in close confinement such as solitary confinement unless they have broken any laws.
- Be forced to do military, dangerous or unhealthy work.

Though many writings accuse the Japanese of violating the Geneva Conventions of 1929, and Japan was a signatory to the treaty, the truth was that the Japanese government had never ratified the treaty into law. Under international law Japan was neither bound to the treaty nor required to conform the articles contained therein. Humanitarian the treatment of POWs may be, but law it was not. The Japanese Diet did however ratify the Geneva Convention with reference to cooperation with the Red Cross. Neither the U.S. military nor governing civilians had any right to expect reasonable treatment of their POWs captured during the war.

Like many other nations Japan had signed to the treaty at the convention in Geneva on 27 July 1929. Among the men that represented the Japanese government were Yoshida Isaburo, Shimomura Sadamu and Miura Seizo. At the time of their signing, Yoshida Isaburo was serving as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Japan at Berne, Switzerland. Shimomura Sadamu and Miura Seizo were active-duty military officers. A second treaty, the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, Geneva, 27 July 1929 also signed at Berne.

Once presented to Japan’s legislative body the Diet, it ratified the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field Geneva, 27 July 1929 into law, however no action was ever taken on the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. As late as 1934 the Japanese Army, whose minister held the power to collapse the government simply by submitting his resignation, had decided to refrain from endorsing the treaty’s ratification. No reason for the Army’s refusal to support the treaty was ever given. For its part the Japanese Navy offered several reasons for its opposition to the treaty.

First and foremost the Japanese Navy argued that since no Japanese service member had a reasonable expectation of being taken prisoner; the obligations of ratifying such a treaty would fall unilaterally on Japan. The Navy feared that the expectation of moderate treatment on the part of airmen conducting raids against the islands might actually encourage those airmen to take part in such attacks. As for allowing representatives to visit and conduct unobserved interviews with the prisoners the Navy believed that such interference would actually harm any ongoing war effort. Lastly, as current Japanese
law was stricter on Japanese soldiers than the laws of other nations, ratifying the treaty would entail the implementation of far too many changes to the current Japanese legal system adversely impacting discipline in its own military. As a result of the Navy’s arguments against the treaty and the Army’s refusal to support the treaty, it was never ratified.174

After the initiation of war between the Allies and Japan, the Allies queried Japan regarding adherence to the Geneva Convention. The Japanese government responded saying that it would apply the provisions of the treaty mutatis mutandis, meaning that “the necessary changes had been made.” The exchange implied too many of the men reading it that Japan would comply with the existing guidelines established by the Geneva Convention of 1929. They were entirely wrong.

**Bataan and Corregidor – the Aftermath**

After the fall of Bataan, the Americans and Filipinos that had surrendered were marched more than 60 miles from their assembly points in Mariveles to the railhead at San Fernando, Pampanga Province. At the railhead they were shipped by rail or truck to a point near Camp O’Donnell in Tarlac Province north of Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg. There the POWs disembarked from the train and marched the last eight miles to captivity at Camp O’Donnell. Known as the Bataan Death March of the 75,000 men on the Bataan Peninsula that began the journey it is estimated that between 6,000 and 11,000 U.S. and Philippine servicemen died from abuse, starvation, and outright murder along the way. None of the men had ever received any training on what to expect or how to survive being held POW. Once relocated to Camp O’Donnell, though exact numbers are unknown, it is estimated that between 25,000 and 30,000 Philippine and American servicemen died within the camp in the first six weeks of their incarceration. None of the more than 11,000 men that eventually surrendered on the island of Corregidor made the Bataan Death March.

The soldiers captured on Corregidor were initially held on the island as insurance that other American and Philippine forces located on islands to the south, in the area of Visayas and Mindanao would indeed surrender. The soldiers held on Corregidor were moved first by ship then barge to Manila where they were forced to wade ashore in chest-deep water to make them appear as shabby as possible, and then force-marched through Manila. Filipinos witnessing the event were not fooled. The POWs were later shipped by truck or rail to a large POW camp established near Cabanatuan. The camp had formerly been a barracks supporting Filipino detachments of the Far East Forces.

Once at Cabanatuan the prisoners from Corregidor would eventually be joined by the POWs from Bataan that had been previously held a Camp O’Donnell. But none of this was known to the U.S. government in 1942. In fact little of the story would be known until three U.S. POWs, Commander Melvyn H. McCoy, USN, Captain S. M. Mellnik, Coast Artillery Corps, and Captain William E. Dyess, Army Air Corps, escaped from the Japanese penal camp at Davao. Retrieved by the U.S. submarine USS Trout (SS-202) and taken to Australia in July 1943 they were debriefed by intelligence officers under the command of Douglas MacArthur. The U.S. public would not know about the plight of its POWs until 27 January 1944 when a joint Army-Navy investigation of the reports on the three former prisoners was released to the nation.

The stage was set as early as 1942 for the subsequent forcing down of Hog Wild in 1945 and the theft of a Superfortress. From the fall of Bataan until 27 January 1944 the administration of Franklin Roosevelt quarantined information on the treatment of U.S. POWs by the Japanese and censored newspaper reporting on the subject. The censorship ensured that those tidbits of information that made their way to the U.S. were never the subject of the intense analysis or public debate. The war in Europe came first Japan came second, the fate of the POWs held by the Japanese was a non-issue. As time moved cracks began to appear in the efforts of the Roosevelt administration to hold the fate of the POWs in silence.

**Prisoners of War: What Americans Knew and When They Knew it**

On 4 January 1943 the Office of War Information (OWI) reported that the three Axis powers were holding 1,685 U.S. military personnel prisoner and had interned 3,399 American civilians. Of these Germany held 228 American soldiers as POWs and 1,491 American civilians as internees. The Italian government reported 15 U.S. military personnel and 21 civilians as prisoners. Japan however reported only 1,442 soldiers and 1,883 civilians interned. Of the military prisoners the Japanese reported that 310 were U.S. Army soldiers, 728 were Marines and 404 were Navy. No mention was made of the thousands of U.S. and Philippines military personnel taken prisoner at Bataan and Corregidor.

OWI reported in the Hammond Times of 4 January 1943, “Japan holds many times this number of Americans and every available means is being used to obtain from Japan complete lists of names, the furnishing of which is required under the international convention which country has agreed to apply.”175 The report continued stating that, “The nation’s fighting men taken prisoner by the Axis and interned civilians receive regular Red Cross food parcels and necessary clothing as soon

175 Axis Nations Holding 1,685 U.S. Prisoners – Have Also Interned 3,399 American Civilian Reports OWI. The Hammond Times. Hammond, Indiana. 4 January 1943.
as the International Red Cross committee in Geneva is notified of their capture and camp location.” 176 The Red Cross reported that their “food parcels contain evaporated milk, biscuits, cheese, cocoa, sardines, pork, beef, chocolate bars, sugar, coffee, powered orange concentrate, prunes, cigarettes, and smoking tobacco.” 177 Such packages saved the lives of numerous POWs in Europe.

In the early part of the war a single Red Cross package weighed more than 8 pounds. In a sleight of hand limiting its comments to reports solely to camps in Europe, the OWI reported that, “large numbers of parcels have been shipped through the neutral port of Lisbon. They are handed out by ‘the man of confidence’ the camp leader chosen by the prisoners from among themselves.” 178 In November 1942 alone the Red Cross shipped 5,931 parcels to Germany. 179 By 15 December 1942 it had shipped at total of 1,004,000 such parcels to Germany. By the end of the first year of the war the weight of each package increased to 11 pounds on average. 180 In June 1942 more than 20,000 food parcels, 10,000 articles of clothing, $50,000 in medical supplies and 10,000 cans of tobacco was sent to Japan aboard the MS Gripsholm an ocean liner of the Swedish American Line. And there it sat.

The Gripsholm had been chartered by the U.S. Department of State under the International Red Cross to carry German and Japanese nationals to neutral exchange ports where enemy civilian internees, held by the U.S. and British Commonwealth would be traded for civilian internees held by the Axis. In the early part of the war the MS Gripsholm would make 12 such trips, returning 27,712 civilian and ambassadorial personnel to the control of their home countries. The exchanges with Germany took place at Lisbon, Portugal and Stockholm, Sweden. Exchanges with the Japanese took place in Lourenco Marques (modern-day Maputo), Mozambique, and at Mormugao in Portuguese India. A second Swedish ship the MS Kanagoora was loaded the next month, July 1942. It’s safe conduct to Japan was eventually refused. A subsequent loading of the Gripsholm in August was eventually sent to Europe as, like the Kanagoora, safe passage to Japan was denied. 181 The only reason the Japanese would allow the Gripsholm safe passage that August was the fact that it carried diplomatic personnel.

During the war prisoners held in Europe by the Germans, could expect to receive one Red Cross parcel per week. POWs held by Japanese would count themselves lucky to see three such packages in one year, five throughout their entire period of captivity.

Hugh H. Myers, a U.S. Naval Officer captured on Guam recalled receiving a total of five such parcels during the entire war. 182 He was one of the luckier few. Each of the five packages that Myers received had been “inspected” prior to issue. 183 During 1943 American POWs held at the Davao Penal Colony received all of two Red Cross parcel per prisoner. Delivery was hit or miss at best. POWs held at Jinsen (Inchon) reported receiving a large number of Red Cross packages in 1943. 184 In a short note sent to his parents in Winnipeg, Canada, George Stevenson, then held in Hong Kong, reported receiving one of the 20,000 packages transported to Japan by the Gripsholm in the summer of 1942 – at Christmas that year. 185 According the War Department POW family members could also send gifts to their relatives then under Axis control. Family members could send one package to their POW family member every two months. Six packages per year.

The contents of a family-sent package had to be listed on an attached Post Office Department Customs Declaration. If no form was available, a plain piece of paper listing the contents could also be used. Certain foods; processed cheese, dried

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176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Red Cross Aids Prisoners of War. The Llano News, Llano, Texas. 7 January 1943.
182 Myers, Hugh M. POW – World War II. Metropolitan Press. Portland, Oregon. 1965
183 Ibid.
fruit, chipped beef and such could not be shipped to POW camps. Packages could not contain more-than-one-pound of coffee, clothing, tobacco, toilet articles and so on. Labels had to be signed and placed on the outside of the package wrapper. All packages sent by family members would be sent free, no postage required. Such packages could not be shipped to Japan or Japanese held territories, only Germany. A subsequent article published by newspapers nation-wide in April 1943 advised readers that “There is no assurance that the letter will be delivered, but it is hoped that, enemy nations will extend the same courtesy to our prisoners as we extend to theirs.” America’s desire for reciprocity in the treatment of its POWs at least those in the hands of Japan, was ill-conceived.

Numerous packages were shipped to Japan regardless of the warning that they might not be delivered and few were ever received by their intended recipients. Japanese authorities were anything but prompt. Any package that did make it into the hands of a POW held by the Japanese had usually been thoroughly pilfered. Food was consumed but not by the Allied POWs held by the Japanese. The one item that most POWs could count on to always remain after pilfering was tinned cheese, obviously distasteful to the more refined palate of the average Japanese conscript.

Additional amounts of smoking tobacco, cigarettes, and medical supplies accompanied the November Red Cross shipment to Europe. POWs held in the Pacific might receive issues of Japanese cigarettes and tobacco while held prisoner, however U.S. brands were generally consumed by the Japanese, Koreans and Formosans guarding the camps. The Japanese Army itself confiscated most of the Red Cross packages sent to the POWs. Kyle Thompson a member of the 131st Field Artillery, the famed Lost Battalion, captured in Java in 1942 reported on several occasions seeing formations of Japanese soldiers on their way to the war’s front lines, carrying Red Cross parcels tied to their field packs. Japanese soldiers receiving Red Cross parcels had little reason to complain. In addition to the Red Cross, other charities and non-governmental organizations also tried to help the plight of POWs held by the Japanese.

The Youth Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) working through its offices in Tokyo and internationally with the Red Cross in Japan also worked to provide relief to the POWs held by the Japanese. The YMCA’s War Prisoners Aid Committee comprised of a number of Swedes and Swiss citizens then residing in Japan provided large amounts of money to purchase supplies and recreational equipment for the POWs held at camps in Japan, Korea and Formosa. According to Theron Browne, Secretary General of the YMCA in San Antonio, Texas “Everything is going smoothly and we are able to continue with the sending of supplies (for prisoners of war) at a fairly good scale.” It might have been a reassuring statement but it was largely untrue.

Together the Red Cross and the YMCA worked in concert publicly and behind-the-scenes in pressing the Japanese to allow representatives of the two agencies to visit and inspect the camps holding Allied POWs. Over the course of the first two years of the war the two charities would become one of the few sources of solid intelligence concerning the POWs available to the U.S., Britain and their Allies.

Allied eavesdropping on Japanese communications revealed little information concerning the plight of POWs. In the earliest part of the war the Japanese military rarely referred to the POWs in their tactical or strategic communications. Prior to the movement of POWs into Japan by Hell Ship, American and British communication intercepts and code breakers rarely noted any traffic concerning POW issues. Lacking access to the camps or communications traffic regarding POWs the Red Cross and YMCA would become central to the Allies’ understanding of the Japanese POW camp system, and the treatment of the prisoners held within. The reports of the Red Cross, forwarded to the U.S. State Department and the other offices within the executive branch of the government, represented some of the most accurate intelligence the U.S. would ever acquire on the location of camps and the conditions existing within.

Like the U.S. government in its dealings with the Japanese over the issue of POWs, the Red Cross and YMCA had been likewise restrained from revealing too much information about the conditions facing POWs held by the Japanese. For the organizations to publicly complain would have resulted in their being denied access to any of the camps. To the two charities any visit, any inspection, was better than no visit at all, barely but just barely. In February 1943 Japanese authorities agreed to allow representatives from the two organizations to visit and inspect certain camps.

Six camps near Osaka and several located near Fukuoka, Japan holding U.S. British, Canadian and Dutch POWs were opened to visits by representatives of the Red Cross. Comments concerning the inspections were reported to the Allied governments. The Allied governments were largely responsible for releasing to the public any information gleaned from the Red Cross reports. Most statements released to the public were cautiously guarded and general in nature. In London, War

187 Ellis Explains How to Write War Prisoners. The Pampa News. Pampa, Texas. 11 April 1943.
189 Pvt. Jocelyn Is Prisoner of Japanese, Wife is War Worker at Pittsfield GE Plant. The Berkshire County Eagle. Pittsfield, Massachusetts. 10 February 1942
190 Japan Allows Increase in Work Done to Aid American Prisoners. The San Antonio Express. San Antonio, Texas. 27 February 1943.
Secretary Sir James Grigg responding to a question posed by the House of Commons reported that meetings with the Japanese “indicated a correct attitude toward the prisoners by the Japanese.”

Grigg reported that in five of the camps visited the prisoners were housed in single story wooden huts. Sleeping arrangements were reported to be satisfactory. Prisoners in a camp containing a high percentage of officers were held in a large four story brick building, a former warehouse. The quarters provided were reported to be “clean and tidy.” According to Secretary Grigg, morale amongst the prisoners was reported to be high. His report was important more for what it did not say than what it did.

There were no comments about medical care, the quality and quantity of the food provided or the physical condition of the men held. The report did not mention near starvation, the cold of winter, the lack of heat and blankets or the use of POWs as slave labor in Japanese war industries. While the U.S. and its Allied governments routinely withheld reports of bad treatment of POWs by the Japanese, some information did reach the public. Some newsman were beginning to take it upon themselves to push the limits of the imposed censorship.

In March 1943 The Bee of Danville, Virginia reported: “There is a natural uneasiness about the manner in which prisoners of war are being treated. The Germans have been doing reasonably well with Americans and have shown a disposition to measure up to the international treaty. There is little of record so far as to how the Italians, treat Americans and there is a good deal of contradiction about how American soldiers fare at the hands of the Japanese.”

“There appears to be little doubt that the Japanese ‘are treating Americans harshly though there has recently been a greater disposition on the part of the Japanese to list and forward to the Red Cross the names of its prisoners. But for a year at least the Japanese spurned their Geneva pact obligation. There is no doubt that the food given prisoners is inadequate, because the prisoner of war receives the same field ration as the Japanese soldier and it takes far less to sustain the life of an oriental as it does an American.”

“Then, too, there have been many indignities—face slapping and the requirement of free Americans to make obeisance when the name of the Mikado is mentioned. In some camps the American prisoners are required to bow so many times a day to the emperor.”

In May of 1943 Colonel Frederick Palmer of the North American Newspaper Alliance admitted that reports of brutal Japanese treatment of Americans held in the Philippines were beginning to reach the Allies through the grapevine that moved information person-to-person, island-to-island. Palmer referred to the Japanese treatment meted out to POWs as a “violation of cardinal articles of the Geneva Convention to which Japan is a signatory.” According to Palmer “Our men who fought on Bataan are crowded in unsanitary quarters without proper medical attendance; they do not receive rations up to the standard of that to the enemy army which the convention calls for; they receive no Red Cross packages; their right to protest their treatment through their chosen leaders is denied.” Palmer reported that “so far as is known, prisoners from Bataan and Corregidor are in the Philippines. Under the convention the names of prisoners are to be cleared through Geneva promptly but the names of those in the Philippines have only recently begun to arrive in small batches.” As reported by Palmer none of the supplies sent to Japan for POW relief in November 1942, had reached the prisoners held in the Philippines. While Colonel Palmer was correct about the requirements of the Geneva Convention his application of the treaty by the Japanese to POWs under their control was unfounded. Again, Japan had no obligation to abide by the treaty as it was never ratified by the Japanese Diet. More bad news was to follow the next month.

In June 1943 the International Red Cross in Japan notified the U.S. War Department possibly through its offices in Geneva, that more than 300 American soldiers held since the fall of Bataan and Corregidor had died while in captivity. Malaria, diphtheria, dysentery, and pneumonia were cited as the chief causes of POW death. Beriberi was also reported as a cause of death for some of the POWs.

Reading between the lines all of the diseases present in the POW camps could have been easily cured with the medicines of the time, or completely avoided had the prisoners had an adequate diet. Following an earlier report of more than 300 prisoners dead due to battles received at Bataan or Corregidor the number of Americans that had died in captivity now climbed to more than 600. Even at this early date the true death toll was more than 50 to 60 times the number reported and it would grow far higher before the end of the war. Far worse awaited the British; through January 1944 the Japanese had

191 Prisoners in Japan Reported Well Treated. The Winnipeg Free Press. Winnipeg, Canada. 7 April 1943.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Food Parcels and Books May Be Sent to Prisoners of War Under the International Red Cross Pact. The Bee. Danville, Virginia. 10 March 1943.
195 PALMER, FREDERICK. COLONEL Japs Refuse To Allow Red Cross To Check Prisoners. North American Newspaper Alliance. The Valley Morning Star. Harlingen, Texas. 5 May 1943.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 Disease Kills 300 Prisoners in Philippines. Las Cruces Sun-News. Las Cruces, New Mexico. 22 June 1943.
reported only a few more than 10 British deaths.\textsuperscript{199} Thousands of British and Australian soldiers would die constructing the Thai-Burma Railroad.

In late July 1943 the Red Cross reported that outgoing and incoming mail was being distributed to and received from POWs held at a camp in Mukden, Manchuria. In a Red Cross article recounting the story, the charity reported that more than 1,000 Americans were being held at the camp.\textsuperscript{200} The numbers of POWs held at the camp and reported in the article were remarkably close to actual numbers. When liberated the Mukden camp held 1,220 Allied POWs.\textsuperscript{201}

According to an article built off the information published by the Red Cross the Deming Headlight of New Mexico reported that at least five camps were located on Formosa and the Red Cross had visited all of them. Conditions at the camps were described as “not as black as feared” and further stated that some of the POWs held there were actually gaining weight.\textsuperscript{202} The article did not reveal just exactly who “feared” what.

In a second article contained in the same newspaper, it was reported that POWs then held in the Philippines were being moved from the islands to other camps in Formosa or Japan. Little noticed the period of the Hell Ship, the transports used to move POWs across the war zone to factories and industries mostly located in Japan had begun. The real truth was that conditions in Japan’s ships and camps were even worse than the Red Cross who had been there could even imagine. When the Red Cross visited the various camps Japanese commanders put on a great show of abundant food and good conditions. When the Red Cross left the camp the good food and extra blankets disappeared. Some camps were worse than others.

As many POWs reported after the war some of the camps located on the island of Formosa were the closest the Japanese Army would ever come to actually developing death camps. Unlike the POWs assigned to the infamous Thai-Burma Railroad POWs assigned to the Kinkaseki copper mines on Formosa were there solely to be worked to death. After the war the only copy of the orders issued by the Japanese military to exterminate all POWs prior to their recapture ever located issued in May 1944, were found on Formosa. Known as Document 2701, (Exhibit “O,” Doc. No. 2687) the order is believed to have been transmitted to all Japanese POW camp commandants throughout Asia.\textsuperscript{203}

Acting upon this or a similar order on 14 December 1944, at Camp 10-A on the island of Palawan in the western Philippines 150 American POWs were ordered into air raid bunkers they had only recently been ordered to build. Fighting in the nearby Visayan Islands; over-flights by American aircraft and the presence of American naval forces nearby prompted the Japanese to take action. Once inside the bunkers Japanese regulars entered the compound. The soldiers poured buckets of gasoline atop the bunkers and lit the bunkers them with torches. In the ensuing melee only 11 POWs escaped, about 139 died. Things were indeed not as dark as “some” previously believed they were actually Pitch Black.

In late July 1943 an additional 249 American soldiers in captivity were reported to have died in the Philippines. Nothing was said of the numbers of Filipinos that had died. The admitted Japanese death toll for Americans had now risen to 1,178 out of about 14,000 believed to be held by the Japanese Army. Using these numbers alone for every 100 prisoners held in the Philippines eight had died of wounds received at Bataan or Corregidor or from some largely preventable disease.\textsuperscript{204} The capture of several of Doolittle’s Raiders would call unwanted attention to the subject of Allied POWs held by the Japanese.

The Doolittle Raid – Abusive Treatment Revealed

On 18 April 1942 sixteen U.S. Army B-25B Mitchell medium bombers were launched from the flight deck of the USS Hornet operating about 700 miles from the east coast of Japan. Once airborne the 16 bombers proceeded west, toward Japan.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{199} Ill-Treatment of Prisoners Held by Japs. The Argus, Melbourne, Victoria. 29 January 1944.
\item \textsuperscript{200} Red Cross Reports On Jail Prison Camp. The Deming Headlight. Deming, New Mexico. 30 July 1943.
\item \textsuperscript{201} Mukden (Hoten) Timeline \url{http://www.mansell.com/pow_resources/camplists/china_hk/mukden/mukden_timeline.html}
\item \textsuperscript{202} Postcards Received from Japanese Prisoners. The Deming Headlight. Deming, New Mexico. 30 July 1943.
\item \textsuperscript{204} 1,178 Americans Die in Japanese Prisons. The Billings Gazette. Billings, Montana. 30 July 1943.
\end{itemize}
The concept for the use of B-25s launched from a carrier originated with Navy Captain Francis Low, Assistant Chief of Staff for Anti-submarine Warfare. Planning for the attack was handled by Lieutenant Colonel James “Jimmy” Doolittle. The aircraft were launched from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet on 18 April 1942 at about 0740 hours (1) local time and began arriving over Japan at about noon, Tokyo time. The planes bombed industrial targets in Kobe, Nagoya, Osaka, Tokyo, and Yokosuka. It was the first air raid by the U.S. to attack the Japanese homeland. It would not be the last.

The Japanese people had been assured on numerous occasions that the home islands were impervious to Allied bombing. Jimmy Doolittle proved them wrong. Though the raid produced negligible results and was derided by the Tokyo press as the “Do-nothing Raid” it was a tremendous psychological blow to the prestige of the Japanese military. After bomb release 15 of the aircraft headed for the Chinese mainland; one chose a heading to Vladivostok. Most of the aircraft crashed along the coast of China none of the aircraft were shot down by the Japanese. The only plane to actually land wheels down was the plane that headed to Vladivostok. Eight survivors of the raid were later captured by the Japanese in China. Two of the ten crewmembers from the two bombers had drown off the coast of China.

On 15 August 1942 the U.S. learned through the Swiss Consulate-General in Shanghai that the eight crewmembers of the Doolittle Raid captured by the Japanese in China were being held prisoner at the police headquarters in Shanghai. In a Japanese radio broadcast on 19 October 1942 it was announced that the eight missing airmen had been tried and sentenced to death. The broadcast stated that several of the death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. The announcement relied on out-of-date information overtaken by the events that occurred in China days before.

On 28 August 1942 eight men of the two crews were given a mock trial. None of the eight were ever informed of the charges against them. One of the aircraft’s pilots Dean E. Hallmark, had to be carried into the court on a stretcher and spent most of the trial in the fetal position unaware of his whereabouts. Forced to stand during the trial George Barr collapsed and upon recovering was provided a chair. All eight men were sentenced to death. On 14 October 1942 Dean E. Hallmark and William G. Farrow along with gunner Harold A. Spatz were told that they would be executed the next day. On the afternoon of 15 October 1942 the three were removed from police headquarters to Public Cemetery Number 1 on the outskirts of Shanghai where they were executed by firing squad. Of the five survivors of the raid that were spared the death penalty one would die in captivity, the remaining four would be freed at the end of the war. The executions, originally believed to have taken the lives of all eight prisoners were announced by President Roosevelt on 21 April 1943 six months later.

In a statement issued to the press the president stated that “It is with a feeling of deepest horror, which I know will be shared by all civilized people, that I have to announce the barbarous execution by the Japanese government of some of the members of this country’s armed forces who fell into Japanese hands as an incident of warfare.”205 The President’s statement was accompanied by the full text of a diplomatic protest against the executions filed with the Japanese government through the Swiss embassy in Tokyo. As of April 1943 it was the first of nearly 90 such protests filed by the American government through the Swiss to Tokyo concerning the mistreatment and abuse of POWs held by the Japanese. If the definition of insanity was to do something again and again expecting a different outcome, one would think that after 30 or 40 protests the State Department would have recognized the lunacy of the effort. According to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in late January 1944, the U.S. never received a satisfactory to any of the protests it had filed with the Japanese.206 By the end of the war the U.S. would file more than 200 protests. The Japanese consistently ignored all of them.

To continue filing such protests only served to document the fact that the U.S. had filed such complaints in the first place. To American bureaucrats then as now, that filing such complaints accomplished nothing was all the reason to file more. It was the act of moving papers across a desk and accomplished nothing. America’s newspapers, despite the censorship surrounding the treatment of POWs held by the Japanese would soon begin to raise the issue with the American public.

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Chaffing Under Censorship

One and one-half years into the war some newspapers were beginning to chaff under the policies of the Roosevelt administration. Many began to walk the fine line between freedom of the press and imposed censorship. Worthy of admiration some 60 years later, The San Antonio Express of San Antonio, Texas was one of the first to express its concerns about the issue of U.S. POWs held by the Japanese to a news hungry American public.

In a piece titled “American War-Prisoners in Japanese Hands,” the San Antonio Express complained that it had been 15 months since the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, and during those months there had been no news from the thousands of soldiers taken prisoner in the Philippines. The Express called to task the War Department for taking more than a year to notify next of kin whether a soldier fighting at Bataan, or Corregidor was indeed a POW. According to the Express when notification to families had finally been made, that notification contained only the most minimal information. Noting the length of time that American forces had held out on Bataan, the lack of food and medicines available to defenders, the paper speculated that such soldiers “must have entered the enemy’s internment camp in poor physical condition.” The San Antonio Express did not report any censored information but attacked the Roosevelt administration indirectly. An subsequent article published by the Kerrville Mountain Sun of Kerrville, Texas summed up the problem in one small paragraph.

“The picture in the Orient is not so clear, and our government appears to say little about the known facts except to next of kin, possibly because of the difficulty of predicting what the Japanese might do. They are touchy about such matters as their treatment of prisoners, and it’s possible that almost anything which got back to them might cause reprisals against their American prisoners.” While America’s press as a whole was chaffing under censorship, perhaps out of necessity the Red Cross continued to portray conditions within the camps across Asia as improving.

In September 1943 the American Red Cross published its Prisoner of War Bulletin, Volume 1, No. 4. In an article titled Japanese Prisoner of War Camps – Taiwan (Formosa) the organization described the physical layout of the various camps on the island, but downplayed the conditions within. The booklet noted that there were five camps on the island of Formosa and that each was operated on a near identical basis. According to the article by John Cotton, “The Japanese commander is apparently a strict disciplinarian who keeps the camps in good order. The subcommanders are reported to be ambitious men who are keen on improving their camps. They appear to be doing their best for the prisoners, and the prisoners’ representatives in all the camps confirm that conditions are gradually improving.”

According to Cotton “On the whole, the food supplies, although sufficient to live upon, do not appear to be entirely adequate for a balanced diet.” Cotton reported that “when the camps were opened there were a considerable number of cases of colitis diphtheria, aggravated by exhaustion as a result of the journey from the south and the sudden change of climate.” Mr. Cotton stated that each camp operated an infirmary with doctors and attendants present. Officers and civilians were allowed to work only if they desired; all enlisted men were required to work. According to the report prisoner weight was noted to have increased from an average of 144 pounds upon arrival in the summer of 1942 to 146 and one-half pounds by the end of May 1943; a two and one-half pound increase!

Understandably the Red Cross was in the unenviable position of losing any access to the camps if it reported conditions as they really existed, however it might have been far better had the humanitarian organization had said nothing at all. In a surprising admission the Red Cross reported in June 1943 that its reports prepared by their representatives in Japan were censored by “the Japanese government and must be read with this reservation.” In most of its pamphlets produced throughout the war the Red Cross rarely discussed the actual conditions of Japan’s POW camps or the plight of the prisoners held there.

Reading between the lines of what Mr. Cotton had carefully said there was clearly a message to be gained from what was not said. Each sentence concerning circumstances within the camp or of the prisoners described some inadequacy and then deflected the cause off to some other reason than the Japanese Army. Food was sufficient, but not adequate for a proper diet; diphtheria was present, aggravated, but obviously not a result of moving POWs from the Philippines to Formosa in the holds of the tramp steamers known as Hell Ships. The Red Cross was playing a dangerous game of give and take, carrot and stick with the lives of the POWs in Japanese hands. If it complained too loudly about the conditions observed in the show camps it risked losing any access at all. It was a conscious decision.

208 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
On 2 September 1943 the Gripsholm departed New Jersey carrying a second load of Japanese repatriates and 140,000 Red Cross parcels for POWs held throughout Asia. The shipment included 7,125,000 multivitamin capsules, 2,120,000 vitamins A and D and nearly 24,000,000 cigarettes.214 Weighing in at an average of 13 pounds each these new parcels were intended to put as much food as possible into the hands of any POW that might receive one. Few would.

Cracks in the Façade

In early September 1943 events occurring behind the scenes were moving in a direction that would ultimately portray the U.S. government as hiding much of the full story of the plight of its POWs from its citizens, and the Red Cross from its contributors and supporters. There was a leak, one that would lead to a torrent of revelations.

Information on the conditions facing America’s POWs held by the Japanese in the vacuum of censorship was making its way out of classified channels. The previous chaffing of the press was possibly a response to the slow leak of a story that was to change the policies of the Roosevelt administration and its handling of issues related to POWs held by Japan. The story started five months earlier in Davao the Philippine Islands. It is a story that has long since been forgotten to the national memory for reasons that will eventually become apparent to the reader. Several of its key players would not survive the war.

Section 18 – OF DYESS, McCoy, AND MELLNIK

On 4 April 1943 in what was to become the largest single escape of POWs held by the Japanese during WWII, ten American POWs, and two Filipino convicts held at the Davao Penal Colony on Mindanao Island, one of the southernmost islands of the Philippine Archipelago escaped. After four days spent evading the more than 100 Japanese soldiers attempting to recapture them, the 12 escapees made contact with a local guerilla group under Casiano de Juan.215 In a fierce skirmish with the pursuing Japanese the Philippine guerillas under the leadership of de Juan forced the Japanese back to Davao.216

The ten Americans were Captain Stephen Mellnik, Coastal Artillery; Lieutenant Commander Melvyn H. McCoy, Navy; Captain William Dyess, Second Lieutenant Leo. A. Boelens and Samuel Grashio, Army Air Corps; Captain Austin C. Shofner, First Lieutenants Jack Hawkins, Michael Dobervich, Marine Corps; Sergeants R. B. Spielman and Paul Marshal, U.S. Army. The Philippine convicts were Benigno de la Cruz and Victorio Jumarung. The two Filipinos had been separately convicted of murder prior to the war.

From their initial contact with the guerillas, the escapees evaded capture for over one month, traveling though largely unexplored jungle. They eventually made contact with Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig (16 Dec 1900–24 Mar 1975) commander of all guerillas operating on the island of Mindanao. Fertig was one of those unique Americans that rise to the challenge when failure surrounds them, when darkness seems ready to overcome hope. In short when the U.S. Army under General Wainwright was eventually forced to surrender – Wendell Fertig didn’t. In May 1942 as American forces across the Philippines were ordered to surrender Fertig, simply refused. Asked by a fellow officer also evading capture what they were going to do, Colonel Fertig replied, “Any damn thing but surrender.”217

One of those long-forgotten heroes that dot American history, Wendell Fertig was a civil engineer serving in the Commonwealth of the Philippines prior to the beginning of war with Japan. Holding a reserve commission in the U.S. Army Fertig was activated a Captain just before war began, eventually serving on both the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor Island. By April 1942 he had been promoted twice, to Major, and then to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He was subsequently ordered off Corregidor to Mindanao to assist General William F. Sharp the commander of all forces on the island, to construct airfields in the southern Philippines. The airfields were supposed to be used by aircraft flying to the aid of Bataan and Corregidor from Australia. The runways were rarely ever used for their intended purpose.

After the surrender of the Philippines Fertig spent nearly a year hiding from the Japanese and organizing the resistance. In January 1943 using a broken-down radio transmitter in numerous attempts to contact U.S. and Allied forces, a U.S. Navy radio monitoring station near San Francisco finally answered the signal. Headquarters Australia initially viewed Fertig’s messages with some degree of skepticism. Prior to Fertig’s contact, U.S. intelligence knew of no stay-behind forces attempting to form an organized resistance. According to U.S. Army rosters Fertig’s last known location was Corregidor. He was presumed a prisoner of the Japanese, or dead. It took several weeks after initial contact to confirm to the satisfaction of

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216 Ibid

Army intelligence that Wendell Fertig and his operation were genuine, and not some Japanese ploy designed to lure Allied forces into the area and destroy them.

On 5 March 1943, with his identity confirmed a U.S. submarine bearing 92 tons of medicine, communications equipment and military supplies arrived at Mindanao. Less than 30 days later, the ten American POWs and two Philippine convicts escaped the Davao Penal Colony. Roughly one month after their escape the POWs were led to Wendell Fertig. It was Wendell Fertig who notified Australia of the POW escape from Davao. Before the Davao Penal Colony breakout there had never been a successful escape of American POWs from a Japanese prison camp. Repercussions from the breakout extended to all camps in the Philippines, some in the form of a further reduction of already meager rations. Not all prisoners remaining in the Philippines appreciated the escape. Many POW resented the willingness of a few men to gamble with the lives of the many left behind.

For nearly four months the POWs worked with Colonel Fertig. The escapees served with the guerillas in various capacities. Captain Dyess served as Fertig’s G-3, Chief of Operations. After the departure of Dyess, McCoy and Mellnik; Shofner would serve as the Deputy Chief of staff and later as Division Operations officer. Dobervich served as Chief Division Officer. Over time the group of escapees were eventually divided among several operating units each ultimately contributing in their own way to the defeat of Japan.

Suspecting the invasion of the Philippines would soon take place, it was decided that several of the escapees would be transported out of the islands to Australia where they could report intelligence information to MacArthur’s command. On 27 July 1943, three of the prisoners, Commander Melvyn H. McCoy, Captain S. M. Mellnik, and Captain William E. Dyess were retrieved by the 1,475-ton USS Trout from Pagadian Bay on Mindanao and taken to Fremantle Submarine Base, Australia. The USS Trout had its own history of amazing achievements.

It was the USS Trout that had delivered 3,500 rounds of 3-inch anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) ammunition to Corregidor on 12 January 1942 and evacuated 20-tons of gold and silver from 12 Philippine banks to the cruiser USS Detroit (CL-8), who ultimately delivered the cargo to United States Treasury at San Francisco. It was the Trout that attacked the Japanese escort aircraft carrier Taiyō south of Truk on 28 September 1942. Initially the retrieval of the POWs included only McCoy and Mellnik. The two were furious. Headquarters had selected the two for their specific knowledge, naval and artillery, of the current situation in the Philippines and for their efforts in planning the initial escape. Dyess was finally included in the belief that needed supplies for the insurgents could be delivered by air. Again, it was Fertig that made the recommendation. What they ultimately delivered however was far more than anyone in Australia was prepared to receive.

The POWs represented the first eyewitness accounts to the Bataan Death March and the conditions confronting prisoners held by the Japanese. While the military officers of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) in Australia were far more interested in the military situation within the Philippines, the three officers were far more interested in calling attention to the plight of the men held by the Japanese. Mellnik was the first to lose his patience with the AIB. Faced with a vast amount of testimony, from three unimpeachable sources, the AIB did what militaries do all over the world when confronted with the unknown or something not discussed in rules and regulations; they sent the three up the chain-of-command to General MacArthur.

In Sydney the three told their story to General MacArthur and his staff. Of the three former POWs, only Dyess had actually survived the Bataan Death March. He lived it. The details Dyess provided were far worse than military staffs and civilian bureaucrats had ever imagined. It was a story of murder, starvation, brutality and depravity. The Death March was not one isolated incident occurring over a few minutes, but thousands of single incidents that took place over several weeks. It was not an incident committed by several officers or noncoms acting alone, but that of an army. Commander Melvyn H. McCoy and Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Mellnik, had been taken prisoner on Corregidor and had little knowledge, other than hearsay of the Bataan Death March and Camp O’Donnell. Nonetheless their stories revealed a Japanese military culture of organized violence and abuse directed at the POWs under their control. The prisoners taken after the fall of Corregidor were marched through Manila as proof positive of Japanese superiority in Asia and then transported to the Cabanatuan POW Camp. Though their experiences were different all three had suffered as prisoners of the Japanese, and all three had a tale to tell. MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific spent hours with the former prisoners. Of the three former POWs, William Dyess would be the one to take the tale to Washington D.C., the Pentagon, and eventually the American public.

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220 Ibid.
221 Mellnik, S.M. Coast Artillery Operations in the Philippine Islands, December 8 1941 to May 6, 1942. Record Group-30: Papers of Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, USA, 1941–1945 Reel 1003, Box 3, Folder 5 MacArthur Memorial Archives Norfolk, Virginia
The brutality that would grow into the Bataan Death March began nearly as soon as the American and Philippine forces defending the Bataan Peninsula surrendered. According to Captain Dyess, worn, defeated by starvation and racked with disease, at daybreak on 10 April 1942 thousands of American and Philippine service men were herded together at Mariveles Air Field and into other open areas nearby. Those without food were given nothing to eat, those with food were not allowed to eat. Even water was withheld. The rainy season had yet to begin. Tongues were dry throats were parched. Daytime temperatures rose above 90 degrees. The prisoners were searched.

According to Captain Dyess all personal items were confiscated: Rings, watches, eye glasses, cigarette lighters, and ink pens, especially ink pens. For unknown reasons Sheaffer pens were highly prized by the Japanese. Most military items: mess kits, canteens, and so on were confiscated. Any soldier found with Japanese souvenirs: money, coins, cigarettes, rations; was immediately beheaded. Death was everywhere. The prisoners were then divided into groups of 500 to 1,000 men.

Some men were chosen as porters for Japanese gear. Stunned, confused and terrorized the once proud forces that defended the Bataan Peninsula who had upset the Japanese timetable for the conquest of the Pacific islands, were pointed north on the National Road and ordered to march. The march would end 60 miles later at San Fernando.

In hindsight, despite the murders, the killings and the brutality, the assembling of prisoners at Mariveles was as good as conditions would get. The trucks that General King had reserved for transporting the POWs and requested that the Japanese let him use were denied. What food that was available was never distributed. Those soldiers that needed medical attention received no assistance at all.

Had the prisoners known what awaited them over the next several days as they marched from Mariveles to the railhead at San Fernando, Pampanga, it is doubtful that any would have ever voluntarily surrendered. Most likely all would have resisted the orders of their superiors to lay down their arms and would have fought capture to the last man. Over the next four to five days, over a week for some the prisoners marched. The overall march with different groups starting at different days, would last for nearly two weeks. Those assembled at Mariveles marched the farthest. Whatever the distance the march was endless misery.

As reported by William Dyess water was mostly refused. Prisoners died scrambling for water in streams, drainage ditches and carabao wallows. Those that could find water in carabao wallows or in ditches along the way if not seen and murdered outright, would be plagued with dysentery. Food was rarely provided. What food the men were given was usually something boiling in a gasoline drum and passed out by the handful as soldiers staggered along. The Filipino people who lived along the route at great risk to their personal safety tried to throw bananas, rice and other food into the ranks of the marching POWs. Many Filipinos who supported the POWs with kindness from their heart, paid for that kindness with their lives.

Along the way, to the horror of the onlookers prisoners were randomly pulled from the ranks and beheaded. Numerous soldiers were bayoneted. Those that fell from exhaustion were shot where they lay. Random acts of murder, cruelty and pure sadism were common. Any soldier that stopped to assist a fallen brother might be killed simply for slowing down.

As recounted by Captain Dyess the road north out of Bataan was lined with the dead and dying. Japanese tanks, trucks and other vehicles heading into the Bataan Peninsula drove over dead bodies forever crushing them into the macadam that formed the highway. A new form of torture was created, the sun treatment – where POWs would be herded into an area and forced to sit in the sun for hours.

In some cases prisoners were forced to dig their own graves; some men were buried alive by their fellow soldiers forced at gun point to shovel dirt over a struggling POW. Some soldiers made the march in six days. For others the agony, this orgy of death lingered on for up to 12 days. Exactly how far you marched depended upon where you were when you had surrendered and where your group had been assembled. Though the exact number of dead along the route taken by the Death March remains unknown it is estimated that between 6,000 and 11,000 U.S. and Philippine servicemen lay dead along the way; roughly 185 men dead per mile, one dead man every 29 foot along the line of march.

Once at San Fernando, Pampanga Province the prisoners were herded into windowless cattle cars and moved about 25 miles north. There was no room in the cars to sit, lie down or rest. If a man had to relieve himself he did it where he stood. Those that fell unconscious stood, as did those that did. When the train stopped the prisoners were offloaded and forced-marched another eight to nine miles to a former U.S. Army training center known as Camp O’Donnell. The last prisoners of the Death March entered the camp on 24 April 1942. For those on the march that imagined their circumstances could not any get worse Camp O’Donnell proved that conditions under the Japanese could always be worse.

**Camp O’Donnell**

Camp O’Donnell was a small Philippine Army post built just prior to the outbreak of war in the summer of 1941 to house a Philippine Army Division. When the prisoners from Bataan arrived the camp consisted of about 20 crudely
constructed buildings, possessed few sanitation facilities and little access to water. There were two water spigots to supply the thousands held there. Construction on portions of the camp had been on-going when the war started but few buildings were inhabitable. The Japanese estimated that Camp O'Donnell could hold about 30,000 prisoners; more than 60,000 were forced into the compound.

Any expectation that conditions would improve were quickly put aside by the Japanese commandant who introduced the POWs to the camp stating, “We are enemies. We shall always be enemies. The only thing I am concerned of is how many of you are dead every morning.” The commander ended his welcome speech with a warning for those who had survived the march from Mariveles – “the dead were the lucky ones.” After only a few days in the camp most survivors of the Death March would agree.

Conditions at the camp were horrific. One of the prisoners, Cipriano Ramirez of New Mexico would later recall that, “The camp was beyond description. There was no water, and the dead and dying were everywhere. We dug straddle trenches for latrines, which soon turned foul. The rice we were given was watery and worm-infested. All night long, dying soldiers screamed as their temperatures rose from dysentery and malaria.”

The death rate at Camp O'Donnell was one of the highest ever recorded in a Japanese POW camp and though numerous Americans died, Filipinos were to suffer far worse. As Dyess would report while more than 1,500 Americans would die in the first month at Camp O'Donnell, more than 20,000 Filipinos would perish. The Japanese, unconcerned about the welfare of the prisoners simply stood to one side and watched as the POW population rapidly decreased. Though the Japanese would try to incorporate the Philippines into its Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere they would never accept the Filipinos as racial equals. As many Filipinos had cooperated with the American administration that dominated the islands the Japanese viewed them as traitors to Asia. Filipinos could expect little clemency and no mercy.

Due to the high death rate in May 1942 the Japanese began to transfer most Americans to three campsites at Cabanatuan. 500 Prisoners remained at O'Donnell as caretakers. Later in the same month all Filipino prisoners were paroled and released. Most of the paroled Filipinos remembering the kindness of their Japanese captors became guerillas in the fight against the Japanese occupation.

Though Bataan fell in early April the bastion of Corregidor held on for almost one more month surrendering on 6 May 1942. The fall of Bataan and the surrender of Corregidor were two largely separate events.

**Prisoners taken on Corregidor**

According to Stephen Mellnik two days after the surrender of Corregidor prisoners from across the island were ordered out of the various tunnels, buildings and other areas of protection to one area, the Kindley Field garage. Those suffering with broken bones and gaping wounds were included in the round up. For the next two weeks more than 12,000 men lived on a concrete pad about 100 yards square at the Kindley Field garage. As the survivors were to learn, the battle for the island and its subsequent surrender was the easy part long-term survival would be far more difficult. With one spigot available men waited 12 hours or more to fill one canteen with water. The men waited nearly seven days before any food was provided. The Japanese largess consisted of one mess kit of rice and a tin of sardines. Black flies covered the area as the dead from the previous battle and those who later died on the pad bloated and putrefied in the boiling sun of May 1942.

On 22 May the captives on Corregidor were loaded aboard three small merchantmen, roughly 4,000 men to each ship for transport to Manila. Held on the ships overnight the steamers moved to Paranaque, a suburb of Manila the next morning. There the POWs were moved from the ships to barges. The barges moved to within 100 yards of the shore where the waters were about shoulder deep. The POWs were then ordered to move into the water and wade to shore.

Wet, exhausted, dirty, and starving in a show of Japanese military superiority the survivors were marched five miles through the streets of Manila. Japanese Calvary and armed Japanese soldiers marched with the POWs all the way. According to Commander McCoy those that fell were beaten back into the line. Filipinos attempting to help the prisoners were severely abused. The captives were herded pass the former High Commissioner’s residence, the Elks Club, the Legislative Building

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224 Ibid.

225 Ibid.

and over the Quezon Bridge. Some were held at Old Bilibid Prison others were held at a public school in the suburb of Pasay. In late May the prisoners were moved by railcar, about 1,500 at a time to a point about 12 miles from the camp at Cabanatuan. The prisoners then marched the 12 miles from the rail line to the Cabanatuan POW camp.

**Cabanatuan**

The POW camp at Cabanatuan initially consisted of one large camp subdivided into three separate camps each containing about 1,500 prisoners. The area allotted to the camp formed a rough rectangle about 500 yard wide and 700 yards long. The road from Cabanatuan formed the boundary of one side, cultivated fields the other three. Like Camp O’Donnell the camp at Cabanatuan had been under construction prior to the start of the war, but unlike Camp O’Donnell many of its buildings were either complete or nearly finished.

Like Camp O’Donnell conditions at Cabanatuan were dire at first but gradually began to improve. Unlike Camp O’Donnell, Cabanatuan formed a holding place for the eventual transfer of prisoners from the Philippines to Japan. In the home islands the POWs would be employed by Japan’s industrial giants such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi as slave labor in factories, docks and in mines. In June 1942, the Japanese began to move the American prisoners held at Camp O’Donnell to Cabanatuan. Though the prisoners taken from Corregidor had been abused and terrorized nothing could prepare them for what they saw of the soldiers that survived the Death March beginning to arrive from Camp O’Donnell.

**MacArthur Takes Action**

The conditions in the camps as reported by the three former POWs were appalling and nearly unbelievable. The three men spent nearly four hours briefing General MacArthur who stated “It is a story that should be told to the American people. But I am afraid, Captain, that the people back home, will find it hard to believe you. I believe you. Make no mistake about that. I know the Japs.” For a five-star general in charge of all Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific, spending several hours with the former POWs spoke volumes concerning the importance MacArthur attached to their story. It was in hindsight one of MacArthur’s best moments. An opponent of the censorship applied to the plight of America’s POWs MacArthur readily grasped the seriousness of the revelations, and probably their implications to current U.S. policy. MacArthur held within his hands the ability to alter Roosevelt’s policies and possibly the course of the war.

It was an explosive story, one that could not be kept under wraps for long. There were too many people involved, too many witnesses to the arrival of the former POWs; too much physical distance had been traveled. Even with newspaper censorship word of the escape and the condition of the POWs retrieved at Mindanao was beginning to make the rounds of the military grapevine. A classified piece of paper was easy to file and protect from unwanted intruders, but three men? The three POWs retrieved had a story to tell, information to provide, and little of it was what military commanders and intelligence officials ever expected to hear.

The debriefings of Dyess, McCoy and Mellnik were sent by pouch to Washington D.C. over the signature of Douglas MacArthur. General MacArthur also made sure that Dyess, McCoy and Mellnik would accompany the documents. Worse for the military brass in Washington D.C., MacArthur reassigned Captain Dyess to the Pentagon. Douglas MacArthur had placed a witness to the atrocities that occurred on Bataan in the center of American policy making. Putting Captain Dyess in Washington D.C. pulled the one thread that would eventually unravel all administration efforts to keep a lid on Japanese treatment of Allied POWs. But for the purposes of documentation Captain Dyess was never there.

**Moments of Hesitation**

Once in Washington D.C., William Dyess was escorted to the newly opened Pentagon where he was thoroughly debriefed and then ordered to the Greenbrier Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia for a period of rest and recuperation. The Greenbrier, purchased by the Army early in the war was then known as the “Ashford General Hospital.” The reports drawn from Dyess’ debriefing in the Pentagon were classified, taken into closed channels and considered highly sensitive. They were the subject of counsels at the highest levels of the government. Generals Hap Arnold and George Strong were among those with knowledge of the secret. What Dyess reported, though the Japanese had never enacted the treaty into law went against the spirit of the Geneva Conventions of 1929. While Japan had never ratified the treaty it was a signatory. Through Dyess the fallen men of the Bataan pointed a long-dead skeletal finger at the entire Japanese Army and its culture of brutality.

The presence of the three former POWs in Washington DC was a closely held secret. Security surrounding the three was tight. The existence of the three threatened established U.S. policy dating to the beginning of the war. Roosevelt’s

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Europe First strategy was threatened. The administration’s callous treatment of Bataan’s defenders in early 1942 now returned to haunt them.

Initially Dyess was kept from his wife and family but was eventually able to reunite with them and appear in public—so long as he kept quiet about where he had been, and what he knew. Visiting his home town of Albany, Texas in December 1943 the entire town turned out to welcome him. Given the podium Captain Dyess would take no questions, provide no answers. It was not until after his story came into the public eye in January 1944 that friends and relatives would understand his silence.229

The story told by William Dyess was far too explosive to release without confirmation. The standards by which the reporting of the escapees would be judged did not allow for the reporting of hearsay, rumor, or third-person accounts. If true the story told by Captain Dyess and the others would wreak havoc on Roosevelt’s policy regarding information on the treatment of American POWs under Japanese control. The public, long held hostage to the censorship exercised by the Roosevelt Administration would now know the truth. Roosevelt’s policies would be overturned; the administration embarrassed by the revelation that it had purposefully misled the country to fulfill a previously decided war strategy overseas. Europe came first; RAINBOW-5 said so and the defenders of the Philippines had been a necessary sacrifice. Slowly but surely the Dyess story would be verified.

Over the next several months intelligence analysts and other investigators would crosscheck and reference the debriefing of Captain, now Lieutenant Colonel Dyess against any other intelligence they possessed on the subject of POWs held by the Japanese. Unfortunately for Colonel Dyess, neither Melvin McCoy nor Stephen Mellnik had experienced the fall of Bataan or the subsequent Death March. Taken prisoner when Corregidor fell and marched through Manila, the two could only confirm their experiences and not what had occurred on the Bataan Peninsula. Lost in hindsight, the object of their move from Mindanao to Australia had not been revelations of Japanese atrocities, but the transfer of local intelligence to the command in Australia. Standing alone with no other witness available, Dyess’ statements were being investigated, scrutinized. It was a time consuming process but required to validate the story. Without independent confirmation the statements made by Dyess amounted to raw and not finished intelligence. Days, weeks, months passed and the story continued to be withheld from the public. An undercurrent of rumor moved in to replace truth withheld.

Other POWs who had first-hand knowledge of the Bataan Death March such as Samuel Grashio, Michael Dobervich, Jack Hawkins and Leo Boelens who had continued to serve with the guerilla forces of Colonel Fertig after the initial escape from the Davao Penal Colony, were transported out of Mindanao to Australia in November 1943 by the USS Bowfin (SS-287). Like Dyess these men had been there. Their statements and debriefs would add to the body of evidence and the number of witnesses supporting Dyess’ original affidavits. In the interim, no-less than President Roosevelt moved to keep the release of the story under his control.

Keeping the Dyess Story under Control

In a message, NR: 8843 7 OCT 43 from Washington sent to the Commander, South West Pacific Area (SWPA), General Douglas MacArthur, General Marshall presented MacArthur the following: “The President has directed that measures should be taken to prevent the publication and circulation of atrocity stories (for MacArthur, Harmon, Richardson, Emmons, Buckner and Stilwell), emanating from escaped prisoners until he has authorized the release. One reason for this decision was not to jeopardize the present and future mission of the exchange ship Gripsholm particularly the delivery of food and medical supplies carried on that exchange ship. It is desired that effective measures be taken to prevent the circulation or publication of such stories emanating from any source. COMICHI has requested that this information be passed.”230 It was hoped that the passage of the Gripsholm would provide the distraction necessary for interest in the Dyess story to wane.

The Gripsholm had sailed on 2 September 1943 carrying 1,330 Japanese nationals and supplies for American POWs. The final destination of the ship was Mormugao, Portuguese East India. Enroute the Gripsholm was scheduled to dock at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Montevideo, Uruguay where it would embark another 173 Japanese civilians for return to Japan.231 The Gripsholm was expected to return home about 1,500 citizens of North and South America interned in Japan since the beginning of the war. The Gripsholm docked at New York City on 1 December 1943. Still the administration stonewalled the story of the Bataan Death March.

In a follow-up message, NR: 9129 13 Oct 43 sent to the commander, South West Pacific Area (SWPA), General Douglas MacArthur, General Marshall stated the following: “The President has directed that publication of stories of

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Japanese atrocities will be withheld until he as authorized their release and has asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff advise him as to the moment when he should advise the country of the mistreatment of our nationals.”  

“In considering the President’s request, (Reference our 8843 of 6 October and your C-6490 of 8 October) the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to him that, for the time being, the release of this information should be withheld and advised him that they would make recommendations later regarding publication of such information when it is felt that the opportune time has arrived.”

The message continued. “There is deep concern here regarding the atrocities committed by the Japanese against our national and also Japan’s failure to supply necessary food, shelter, clothing and medical supplies. Studies are being conducted to determine the most appropriate course to secure better treatment for American prisoners held by the Japanese. There is grave doubt as to whether this can be accomplished through the pressure of world public opinion brought about by the publication of the atrocity stories. The possibility of violent adverse reaction by the Japanese to such publication cannot be overlooked.”

What had started with the reports of one man never doubted but requiring verification was becoming less-and-less an easy secret to keep. Possibly incapable of forgetting his men held in the Philippines and despite orders to the contrary, William Dyess began to tell the story of the Bataan Death March to Charles Leavelle of the Chicago Tribune. A crack was developing in the dike of POW censorship. Most of the press continued to support the illusion that POWs under Japanese control were being satisfactory treated. Throughout December 1943 and into January 1944 press reporting on conditions in the camps, the fate of the POWs continued to be downplayed and underreported.

The Press through January 1944

In an article titled “Behind Barbed Wire of Jap Prison Camp” published in the San Mateo Times on 1 November 1943, Andrew E. Boone reported that “little news comes out of Japan. The Red Cross works unceasingly to succor our people and bring home word of their treatment.” According to Boone in describing conditions at the Woosung Camp near Shanghai, “They work in two vegetable gardens, and enjoy some recreation. Conditions are described as ‘tolerable.’ Prisoners do their own cooking, and their health, since the International Red Cross last winter supplied extra bedding, is satisfactory.” The article continued stating that “Unlike camps elsewhere because many educators are numbered among these prisoners and internees, a school system flourishes, with instruction including grades from the second to college.”

According to San Mateo Times, at the Zentsuji Camp opened in January 1943 “Clothing is now adequate, to including captured uniforms and overcoats. Daily food ration totals 100 grams of bread, 160 grams of wheat, 300 grams of rice—all totaling 26 1/2 ounces. Potatoes, fish, eggs and vegetables are added. Not sumptuous, but the men can maintain health on this diet.” Continuing to describe Zentsuji the article pressed on stating “American and European sports are permitted, including baseball, cricket and deck tennis. Once each week, the inmates are allowed to visit a nearby area outside camp. They may listen to the radio, but reception is confined to local, Japanese stations.” While the picture painted by Andrew Boone more aptly described a summer boy’s camp, he summed up the article by warning his readers that such camps as Zentsuji which had been the subject of previous Red Cross visits; were obviously stage managed and that it was unlikely that POWs held at other camps fared quite as well. Boone warned the public as best he could; all was not well. The following month, the Red Cross issued another in a series of reports on camp visits.

In a release filed from London on 14 December 1943 the Red Cross reported that its representatives had recently visited camps in the area of Shanghai and Peking. In a telegraphic report filed by its field office the Red Cross reported that “camp conditions seem to be quite good.” No mention was made of extra blankets, baseball, cricket, deck tennis or the Japanese radio hour.


233 Ibid.

234 Ibid.

235 Ibid.

236 Ibid.

237 Ibid.

238 Ibid.

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 Ibid.

Six days later on the 20th of December 1943 in an article published in the Titusville (Pa) Herald, titled “2nd Area Man Dies in Jap Prison Camp” the Red Cross announced the death of Private First Class Walter A. Smith.242 The notification was simple and to the point, “Report received from the Japanese Government through the International Red Cross states that your son, Pfc. Walter A. Smith, who was previously, reported a prisoner of war, died in Mukden, Manchukuo. The Secretary of War extends his deep sympathy.”243 It was unknown exactly when Walter Smith died.

Smith was the second of five men from the Titusville area reportedly in the hands of the Japanese to die in captivity. Private First Class Smith had enlisted in the Army on 13 August 1940 and had departed the U.S. for the Philippines on 14 September 1940. According to the report his family had no communications with Walter after the fall of the Philippines, leading the author of the article to speculate that Smith had died shortly after becoming a prisoner.244 The Titusville Herald noted “that more than 14,000 American soldiers out of 18,000 originally listed as missing in action in the Philippines have been reported prisoners of war, according to the War Department. Of this total, 1,555 were reported to have died from disease in Japanese prison camps, another 300 of wounds.”245 The actual numbers were far higher than 1,555 dead, 20 times higher. If, according to news accounts the sky was indeed falling; on 27 January 1944 it fell completely.

### Dyess Story Released

On the evening of 27th of January 1944 following an internal political battle long-since forgotten to time, the OWI standing against policies promulgated by the Roosevelt administration won the battle and released the joint Army-Navy inquiry into the statements of Dyess, McCoy and Mellnik. The news cycle of the time was different than today with the 24-hour per-day cable news. The 27th of January was a Thursday. The evening editions of most newspapers had been put to type or were already on the streets. The week was winding down. For the most part, the news would not hit the newsstands until the next morning, a Friday. The release was planned to coincide with a weekend. The administration hoped that by early the next week the issue would be forgotten. They were wrong.

The OWI Report stated that “the facts about what happened to American and Filipino troops who surrendered in the Philippines were given to the American public after a majority of government experts on Japan had decided that publication of an official account might bring improvement in the Japanese attitude toward our prisoners in their hands.”246 Few newspapers of the time failed to carry the story. After nearly two years of government reassurances it was now apparent that thousands of American and Philippine soldiers had died while in Japanese custody. There were few doubts that those POWs remaining under Japanese control would continue to suffer.

The joint Army-Navy statement, based solely on the statements of Dyess, McCoy and Mellnik, made it clear that the report contained no hearsay. Government officials who declined to be further quoted or identified said that “experts on Japan in all quarters of the government, including the Army and Navy, felt that telling the true story in full detail certainly would not cause the Japanese to be more brutal.”247 Officials admitted that “Until last night’s joint Army-Navy release, the official policy had been that publication of atrocity and horror stories might react unfavorably upon military and civilian prisoners still in Japanese hands and upon the chances of exchanging them later.”248 The release broke the silence that surrounded the capture of so many thousands of U.S. and Philippine military personnel. The dice of censorship and governmental secrecy for the national good had finally broken.

The statements of the three men had been crosschecked and validated against the sworn statements of several other POWs that had escaped with Dyess. These other former POWs had been removed from the Philippines in November 1943. According to an article carried in the Sheboygan (WIS) Press on 28 January, “The army and navy made it clear that nothing in the report was hearsay—that it contained only facts which the officers related-from their own personal experience and observations.”249 Additional U.S. soldiers such as Reid Carlos Chamberlain who had escaped and evaded Japanese troops earlier in the war and served with Philippine guerilla forces were also retrieved to validate the story. Their testimony had been further compared to other rumor and information making its way out of the Philippines through the grapevine. The rumor and other information agreed with the sworn testimony. The report was based upon solid intelligence.

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243 Ibid.
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
Less-than one month earlier the number of dead in the Philippines had been publicly reported at fewer than 1,600 men. Now the number of American dead topped 7000. 25,000 Filipinos had died. Untold thousands continued to die. The public was outraged.

According to the joint Army-Navy report, of the nearly 20,000 Americans fighting in the Philippines at the fall of Bataan and Corregidor at least 7,700 were dead or near dead by October the same year. Reports indicated that at some camps the death toll was as high as 50 American soldiers per day. For the Filipino soldiers the death toll was ten times higher; 500 dead per day. Of those remaining alive American or Filipino, it was certain that thousands more were dead or would soon die. It was believed that between 400 and 1,400 technical specialists had been removed from the camps and sent to Japan as slave labor. 250

Though the government, specifically the Department of State tried to paint the policies of the Roosevelt administration in the best possible light the American public was incensed. In the aftermath of the revelations anti-Japanese sentiment ran so high that in Colorado as a precautionary measure “All military and civil police in the Denver area were placed on the alert today to prevent any demonstrations against the large number of persons of Japanese ancestry in this area following the announcement of Japanese atrocities in the Philippines.” 251 Other cities and localities took similar actions.

In Albuquerque, New Mexico, the families of the New Mexico National Guard, 1,900 men of the 200th and 515th Coastal Artillery Regiments called to active duty by Roosevelt in August 1941 and ordered to the Philippines where they were subsequently captured, met to organize a march on Washington, D.C. 252 Though overlooked 65 years later, according The Lowell Sun that January of 1944 “There was no doubt that the American people had been aroused to a pitch of anger unparalleled since Pearl Harbor by the army-navy disclosure that the Japanese – employing starvation, torture and butchery – had exterminated it least 7700 American and many more Filipino heroes of Bataan and Corregidor.” 253 The details were grisly.

Americans were introduced to “the march of death,” soon to be known as the Bataan Death March, the “sun treatment,” and “carabao walls.” Food and water had been withheld not for hours, not for days, but more than a week. Singular summary execution, outright murder, was commonplace. The bayoneting to death of helpless prisoners had been a regular occurrence. The beheading of prisoners by sword was routine. The report listed diarrhea, beriberi, diphtheria, and dysentery as major causes of death – death brought on by starvation. Any effort on the part of a prisoners to escape, real or imagined, brought execution. Soldiers, American or Filipinos, prisoners at the mercy of their guards with no ability to defend themselves had been outright humiliated, brutalized and starved.

Dyess admitted in his sworn statement that “though beaten, hungry and tired from the terrible last days of combat on Bataan, though further resistance was hopeless. Our American soldiers and their Filipino comrades in arms would not have surrender had they know the fate in store for them.” 254 In 1955, words strikingly similar would be incorporated into Article II of the United States Military Code of Conduct which stated in full “I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.”

Many of those that survived the Bataan Death March and conditions at Camp O’Donnell were later worked to death on farms and fields near Cabanatuan. According to published reports, it was not uncommon for up to 20 percent of an assigned work detail to die. 255 In one reported instance 75 percent of a single work party had succumbed to Japanese abuse before it could return to Cabanatuan. 256 Few of the advertised Red Cross packages carried into areas under Japanese control by the MS Gripsholm ever reached the Philippines. Those few that did make their way to the Philippines arrived nearly seven months after they had been unloaded at the dock in Japan. For the POWs held by the Japanese, the Red Cross relief program was a failure.

Those who had survived the O’Donnell Death Camp, the camps at Cabanatuan and transferred to Davao had hoped conditions would be better. Similar to Camp O’Donnell the POWs were informed upon arrival that “You have been used to a soft, easy life since your capture. All that will be different here. You will learn about hard labor. Every prisoner will continue to work until he is actually hospitalized. Punishment for malingering will be severe.” 257 Of the 2,000 POWs known to have

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250 Ibid.
251 Ibid.
been transferred to Davao according to Dyess, McCoy and Mellnik, as of April 1943 nearly half were no longer capable of work. For the American public it was a rude awakening to the unvarnished truth.

The Debate Goes Public

Even before the ink dried on the joint Army-Navy statement regarding the testimony of Dyess, McCoy and Mellnik, newspapers, released from the censorship of the previous two years began to dig for other background materials from the officials who had withheld that information. One former OWI official contacted was Palmer Hoyt, publisher of the Portland Oregonian, who had served six months as the former director of OWI’s domestic branch. Once queried, Hoyt – was blunt in his response to the press.

Hoyt stated outright that the “full-blooded story of this war is not being properly presented to the people.” Hoyt made it clear that he was “not charging malicious obstructionism or a sinister conspiracy to withhold the truth from the people of this nation.” Hoyt admitted that it was relatively simple, “We haven’t known for two years that the Japanese brutally murdered most of the 50,000 prisoners taken at Bataan.” Hoyt wrote “They marched them through deadly heat without water, although they had thousands of available vehicles. And they crushed thousands of men who did not die from exhaustion and thirst by running trucks through their columns.” Hoyt asked the hard question “Why shouldn’t we get the facts through the news, day by day, atrocity by atrocity? What if it does upset our comfort?” In an additional article published the same day Mr. Hoyt further criticized Roosevelt administration officials “who warned repatriates arriving recently on the exchange liner Gripsholm against talking of Japanese atrocities for fear of reprisals among prisoners still held by the Japanese.”

What Palmer Hoyt was admitting was that for the most part when it came to the safety and welfare of its POWs in the hands of the Japanese, until Dyess and the other had escaped, the government and the nation’s military had little reliable information. Those parts of the story that it did have were incomplete and could not be verified. Due to those reasons whatever information the government had received before the Dyess escape had been withheld from the American people. In the absence of conclusive and incontrovertible evidence the authorities had withheld comment on the conditions confronting American POWs until more was known. It was a weak excuse at best. In the words of The Daily Mail of Hagerstown, Maryland, “The question of fundamental government policy was further complicated by the apparent lack of a full, on-the-record explanation of why it was finally decided to put out the report of the Philippine tragedy. However, this apparently was the situation.” Now backtracking U.S. government officials promised to hold those Japanese responsible for the mistreatment of its POWs accountable for their actions. It was another empty promise. In the end few Japanese would ever be held responsible for the atrocities committed against Allied POWs. More excuses were to follow.

The Wisconsin State Journal noted that “The state department would make no immediate comment, but this government, presumably, had long and insistently sought satisfaction from Japan over her refusal to abide by the conventions of decent nations in the treatment of war prisoners.” In an article published by the Denton, Texas, Record Chronicle, Secretary of State Hull said that “this government has been gathering all possible information about the treatment of American prisoners in the Pacific so that war criminals may be punished when the war ends.” At the time it was an odd statement for an official to make, how could information be gathered on those committing the crimes when before the escape of Colonel Dyess, the U.S. government could not even confirm the conditions under which its POWs were being held? There was more to come.

In an article published in the Sandusky Register Star on 12 February 1944 it was further revealed that the State Department had sought to suppress news of Japanese atrocities long prior to the revelations of Dyess, McCoy and Mellnik as it had hoped to arrange a wartime exchange of prisoners. The State Department effort was so naive as to be completely ludicrous. In an era where reciprocity ruled relations between nations even in war, the U.S. was faced with the fact that such an idea could only be viewed by the Japanese as one-sided. As of January 1944 only 377 Japanese were held in American operated POW camps – and none had died. Worse yet in the eyes of the Japanese military its soldiers and sailors could not be captured. For Japan’s servicemen, surrender was not an option. The U.S. possessed no bargaining power. For Japan the lives

258 Let People have Full Story, Plead Former OWI Official. The Sheboygan Press. Sheboygan, Wisconsin. 28 January 1944.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
of its soldiers could not be held ransom for lives.\textsuperscript{268} For the Japanese government on the official level, there were no Japanese POWs held by the Allies. Additional efforts to rationalize away Roosevelt administration policies followed, led now by Presidential Secretary Stephen Early.

In an statement released in Washington D.C., Early explained “These documented accounts of atrocities against American prisoners of war have been in the possession of the American government for some time, Presidential Secretary Stephen Early said, but their publication was withheld so long as there was any further hope of getting aid to American soldiers who have been captured by the Japanese. It now further aid to reach these prisoners of war. Early continued, the time had come to tell the American people of the treatment the Japanese had dealt to American captives.”\textsuperscript{269} Had it not been for Dyess that time for the administration would have likely never come at all. Though the administration could argue that prior to Dyess it did not have proof, the truth was that even after Dyess it still had no proof, only witnesses. In arguments between nations there are no police. There are no district attorneys, no trials to examine evidence, there is only information and information that prisoners under the Japanese had been harshly treated had been available since 1942.

**The Impact of the Dyess Story**

It is difficult to determine whether the revelations of Dyess and his fellow escapees produced any tangible improvement in the lives of those POWs still held by the Japanese. That study is far beyond the scope of this work. There are a number of mitigating factors that would have to be considered to answer such a question. The war in the Pacific was now entering its end-phase; POWs across the Pacific and South Asia were being moved by Hell Ship closer to and into Japan. The lack of food was an issue prior to the April 1943 escape and remained an issue after the revelation of the Dyess affidavits. Food was becoming hard to obtain even in Japan as shortages of daily necessities began to grow. The Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway had taken place nearly a year before, leaving the Japanese Navy largely incapable of protecting Japan’s merchant fleets. The Japanese Empire taken at the cost of so many civilian and military deaths, was putrefying.

Large units of the Japanese Army lay isolated on islands across the Pacific. Many Japanese units dispatched to island strongholds across the Pacific would never engage the enemy. By the end of 1942 the war was virtually lost. Throughout the war conditions in the camps largely depended upon the personality of the camp commander and what standards he enforced, or failed to enforce. Though commanders came and went, conditions rarely changed.

The Japanese POW prison camp system did undergo several reforms around the time of the Dyess revelations, but such reorganizations would continue throughout the war. It is not known what impact the testimony of Edwin Dyess had upon such reorganizations, if any. On 7 May 1944 Japanese radio announced that the POW supplies shipped to Vladivostok in the Soviet Union and held there for several months would finally be allowed into Japan, leaving the possibility that something, no matter how small had changed.

**Why Dyess is forgotten, a Footnote**

Colonel William Edwin Dyess did not live to see his story released; the policies of the Roosevelt administration changed; his nomination for the Medal of Honor approved (downgraded to the Soldier’s Medal), conditions for the POWs bettered, or his fellow soldiers released from captivity. Following a long period of recuperation Colonel Dyess was reassigned to fly the P-38 Lightning. Unlike others that could have taken the easy way out, and stayed on the sidelines, Colonel Dyess requested a return to duty and the chance to repay his Japanese tormentors in kind. During a training mission on 22 December 1943 over Burbank, California his P-38 caught fire. Though Dyess had ample opportunity to abandon the burning aircraft he guided the P-38 to a vacant lot dying in the crash.

The man that would become a hero to the nation had his story been published while he was still alive died a hero nonetheless. He was a man that in retrospect was truly living on time borrowed from his survival of the Bataan Death March. Like many others that would not survive the camp at Davao, the trips on Hell Ships to Japan or the war, Colonel Dyess was destined to be taken at a time when America could have used another hero in the highest sense of the word. The man that would have been interviewed, would have given war bond speeches, would have been focal point of American pride and admiration was gone. With his departure gone with him was the opportunity to push harder for the defeat of Japan and an earlier release of his fellow prisoners.

**Inadequate Analysis**

Long prior to the escape of Captain Dyess and the other American POWs information was making its way into the press that suggested the Japanese military and government condoned a policy of indifference, if not outright brutality against the men and women it had taken prisoner early in the war. The indicators were overwhelming.

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\textsuperscript{268} Japs Close Avenues of Aid from U.S. to Captives; 7,700 Tortured, Slain, and Starved. Chester Times. Chester, Pennsylvania. 28 January 1944

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
The physical condition of the American and Philippine troops fighting from Bataan and Corregidor were well known prior to the fall of the Philippines.
  o Their decreasing combat efficiency due to starvation had been previously reported.

Press reports of previous repatriates, diplomats and other protected civilians discussed only the better aspects of their treatment at the hands of the Japanese.

Members of the Doolittle Raid had been executed and the executions had been released over Japan radio.

Japan had never ratified into law the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva 27 July 1929.

As of 4 January 1943 the Japanese had reported only 1,442 soldiers and 1,883 civilians as held captive.

Neither the Red Cross nor the YMCA was allowed easy access to the camps.

Red Cross packages, safely transported and supplied throughout the prison camps operated by the Nazi regime in Germany were not permitted delivery in Japan.

The Japanese did not permit mail to-and-from POWs and their relatives as allowed under the Geneva Convention and adhered to by Nazi Germany and Italy was not permitted

The chief causes of reported deaths; malaria, diphtheria, dysentery, and Beriberi indicated poor diets, overwork, bad conditions and starvation.

The MS Gripsholm and other Red Cross contracted transports were not permitted safe travel by Japan.

Throughout the war analysis on the information and intelligence gathered and collected concerning the location of POW camps, the camp system, their operations and the conditions facing POWs held within was sorely lacking. The State Department comment concerning a lack of evidence was an admission that no analysis of the information it had received had been accomplished. Police work with evidence; intelligence works with information. Raw intelligence is original reports that have never been compared and contrasted with previously accumulated information. Finished intelligence is information that has been compared, contrasted and collated with previously accumulated information. There are several reasons why the work had never been a serious undertaking during the war.

First and foremost, the plight of the POWs was not a major concern to the Roosevelt administration. Intelligence information is collected and analyzed to support the requirements of policy- and decision-makers. It is likely that when the defense of the Philippines was written off in the early part of the war the defenders were also written off. There was little if any interest at the highest levels of the U.S. government in the issue of POWs, hence there was no requirement to process the information gathered. It could not be denied that some information concerning the issue of POWs held by Japan was available. To quote Secretary of State Hull “this government has been gathering all possible information about the treatment of American prisoners in the Pacific so that war criminals may be punished when the war ends.”

To Secretary Hull, the collection effort was apparently far more concerned with the prosecution of war criminals after the war than with the location of camps and conditions facing the POWs during the war. Hull’s comment was an admission of defeat. The question remains as to whether the information that was ever processed prior to the end of the war.

Second, any U.S. interest in the plight of POWs held by Japanese went against the stated policy and strategy decided prior to the war embodied in RAINBOW-5 in 1941 and confirmed at the ARCADIA Conference held between 22 December 1941 and 14 January 1942. Administration officials feared that any information concerning the atrocities committed against American prisoners held by the Japanese and revealed to the public would result in a massive public outcry leading to a change in the policies established RAINBOW-5 and at the ARCADIA Conference. The administration had judged the Third Reich under Adolf Hitler as the primary threat to the nation, revelations about the plight of U.S. servicemen under the control of the Japanese could threaten the success of that strategy. The move in effect limited inquiry within the nation’s intelligence apparatus. With no public outcry supporting a stronger effort in the war against Japan, the administration was able to direct most of the nation’s resources against Germany.

The intelligence effort required to form an understanding of what was taking place within the Japanese POW camp system and the conditions facing the prisoners contained within if attempted at all, had never been a serious undertaking within the Roosevelt administration. The administration did not want to know the facts and until the Dyess escape were never

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faced with the undeniable truth. The press at the time, prior to the era of investigative journalism missed the underlying story behind the revelations contained within the Dyess story. The resulting intelligence failure would manifest itself in the Basic Outline Plan for “Blacklist Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea after Surrender or Collapse,” the eventual forcing down of Hog Wild over Konan northern Korea in August 1945 and provide the Soviet Union with a technical intelligence windfall.

Section 20 – THE INHERENT FAILURE OF BLACKLIST

With the fall of Japan becoming more possible with every bombing mission the planning contained in Blacklist had been accelerated; mistakes were apt to be included. The plan was still under coordination when briefed at Guam in July 1945. Appendix 1, The Political and Military Background of and Negotiations for the Surrender and Occupation of Japan stated “In view of Japan’s expressed desire for peace negotiations, Russia’s imminent entry into the war, and our contemplated employment of the atomic bomb, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington realized that the surrender of the Empire of Japan might come at any moment. This being so plans to anticipate that day as completely as possible became imperative, and speed in their preparation of the essence.”

Considering the lack of intelligence analysis supporting the relief of POWs held by the Japanese, as an operational outline Blacklist was probably the best effort possible at the time of Japan’s surrender. The Blacklist briefed at Guam on 20 July 1945 was the product of months of research and tremendous coordination at a time when there were no computers, no ability to move hundreds of pages across thousands of miles in mere minutes. In 1945 the coordination of such a document could take months. Each unit, office, or command that had to coordinate on Blacklist had the ability to make changes, offer suggestions, or object to any sentence contained between its covers. Once these changes had been accepted or denied the plan would again enter the coordination process. This coordination process might take place several times depending upon the number of recommended changes and disagreements within the drafts.

The Blacklist in-hand at the moment of Japan’s surrender was a basic outline of what would have become a larger product had the time been available. A fully completed operations plan with annexes, deployment lists, sub-plans and so forth could easily number into the thousands of pages. The plan as it was in July 1945 was probably as good as could be expected in an outline plan however the sections concerning the location of POW camps and numbers of prisoners held at those locations was rife with errors. Unlike the testimony of Captain Dyess the listing of camps in Japan and Korea was apparently never submitted to a thorough review or validation. Keeping in mind that the plan was a draft, the information presented in the plan’s listing of POW camps in Japan and Korea does not appear to have been finished intelligence but raw reporting. The directory of camps contained within Blacklist listed known and suspect locations. Each entry contained in Blacklist was accompanied with the name of the camp; geographic coordinates if available, additional comments and the number of POWs held at each camp. The listing was simply a placeholder used in lieu of more solid information.

The List of POW Camps in Korea

Blacklist cataloged a total of 13 POW camps in Korea. Archival research so far has confirmed only three of the reported locations. Several of the reported but unconfirmed camps may have been civilian internment camps and not POW compounds. Some of the camps listed within Blacklist may have been transient locations that did not hold POWs over the long term, or were satellite camps of the three known POW camps. A supplement to the Blacklist Plan for the camps in Korea published on 20 August 1945 somewhat summed up the situation: “Intelligence on Korean Camps, like most other sections [of the plan], presents an incomplete picture. Information received to date has not been sufficient to give accurate strengths and descriptions of these camps, but the intelligence available, which is compiled below, is enough to give a general outline of Prisoner of War Camps in this area. It is clear that the great majority of prisoners interned here are British and Australian, but there is a strong possibility that the numbers of American prisoners have been increasing. The camps in Korea have remained static in location and no new camps have been reported within the last year. The general trend of Prisoner of War movements has been northward and it is not unlikely that strengths in Korean Camps have been considerably increased within the last year. It is encouraging to note that the Red Cross has been able to send food parcels into this area, which should help improve conditions.”

Blacklist reported a total of five camps as being located in Keijo (Seoul) alone. Cross-referencing comments and geographic coordinates indicates that one of the camps contained in Blacklist, the camp reported at Rysuzan was misidentified as Keijo Number Two. The city prison at Keijo, the infamous Seodaemun Prison (but not known by that name at the time) was also reported as holding POWs.273 At least two POWs were actually held there during the war, incarcerated for attempting to escape from the Keijo camp. One of the two POWs held at Seodaemun died as a result of conditions in the prison. The other prisoner was released by U.S. forces at the end of the war.

One camp each was reportedly located in Fusan (Pusan), Koshu (modern-day Kwangju), Repho, and Seishin. Fusan never held a permanent camp. The city served as the primary point of entry for all POWs entering Korea which may account for reports of a camp in the area. POWs pulled from the Hell Ship used to transport them from other areas under Japanese control and were too ill to travel were held at a nearby hospital until they had recovered. Postwar reports indicate that only the most ill POWs were ever held for any length of time in the city. Many of those removed from ships to hospitals eventually succumbed to illnesses they had acquired while on the ship, or prior to their departure from Singapore enroute to Korea. According to Blacklist the camp held between 150 and 500 POWs.

Although Blacklist contains a listing for a camp at Koshu, no camp is known to have been located in the city. None of the POW statements taken after the war mention any men being held at that location. POW labor has been reported as contributing to if not entirely responsible for the construction of a highway tunnel in the area. None of the POW statements contained at the U.S. National Archives, reports this construction though some do mention the use of POWs in the construction of roads in the area north of Keijo. No statements have been located on camps in the area Repho and Seishin, if such statements exist at all. It is likely that reports of camps in the area of these two cities refer to civilian internment camps. A Japanese Army camp was located in the area of Ranam (modern-day Namam), about nine miles south of Seishin and may be the source for the report of POWs in the area. Two large Russian-expatriate communities were located in the mountains nearby one of which was known as the Novina. This Russian community may serve as the basis of reports of POWs located in the area. Likewise Repho, mapped within Blacklist as south of Genzan and the site of a Japanese naval base may have swerve as the source for the report of POWs in that area. None of the postwar POW affidavits mentions the area of Genzan or Repho.

While no documentation has been located to confirm the locations of all camps listed in Blacklist, this should not be taken as solid proof that no camp existed in those areas; only that there is no documentation in U.S. archives to support the existence of a permanent camp at the reported location. It is possible that some of the more isolated reports of POWs in remote areas reflect real incidents of prisoners transported through an area as proof of Japanese superiority across Asia.

Archival document research on prisoners held in Korea by the Japanese identified several POWs statements recording their transport and interment at Taiden (modern-day Taejon) jail at some point during the war; however the Taiden jail was not contained in the list of POW camps listed in Blacklist. The prisoners held at Taiden had served in the area as temporary labor mostly in road building.

Reports after the war concerning a POW camp in the area Heijo (Pyongyang) may also refer to some similar effort to parade POWs through the area. In 1943 some POWs held at Jinsen worked on roads in the area north of Keijo, how far north is unknown, but this may be the source of the reports of a camp located there. Newspapers of the time do not mention any POW camps outside those subsequently identified at Jinsen, Keijo and Konan. Few descriptions of the camps in Korea provided more than the most basic information. Most of the textual comments included in Blacklist served only to provide other information about the location of the camp when geographic coordinates were not provided.

Regarding geographic coordinates Blacklist only listed coordinates for eight of the 13 reported camps listed in the plan; the location of the other five was unknown. The coordinates listed for three of the camps located in Keijo; Keijo Number 2, Keijo Number 81, and Keijo City Prison (Seodaemun) plot geographically to an area of about one nautical mile, 6080 foot. The listing of the three camps within one nautical mile, of each other suggests that all three reports actually

referred to the same camp. The listing of three camps may also reflect some confusion concerning the use of the Seodaemun prison as the location of some POWs. Camp Number 2 and Keijo Number 81 are not known to have existed at all. Coordinates were also provided for the locations of camps in the area of Fusan, Jinsen and Konan however these coordinates appear on the surface to refer to the general area of the city and not the specific location of a POW camp itself. Of the 13 entries contained in Blacklist only one directly labels a area as the Konan camp. A second entry in the area of Konan lists the same camp by an alternate name, the Korea Divisional Camp. The two entries as they appear in Blacklist are presented below. The lack of analysis regarding the information contained in these two descriptions nearly proved fatal to the crew of Hog Wild.

**KONAN NEW DIVISIONAL CAMP**

Coordinates: 39.52’N-127.35’E  
Strength 23 British and Australians  
“Reported coordinate place the camp northeast of the main town. Prisoners presumably work in a foundry. One source states that prisoners are moving here from Keijo and Jinsen.”

**KOREA DIVISIONAL CAMP**

Coordinates: Unknown  
Estimated Strength 75 Prisoners of War  
“All that is known about this camp is that it covers 2,000 square meters and includes 17 buildings with a vegetable garden. It is possible that there are more prisoners here than reported.”

The two comments were extracted from human intelligence (HUMINT) or reporting derived from human sources as were most reports of POW camps locations, conditions within and so on, hence the statement “One source states…” These reports may have been obtained from Red Cross or YMCA reporting or from other sources in the field. The two reports were at best clues as to the location of what appeared to be on the surface two separate locations, there was however only one camp.

Read separately, as presented above, there were two separate camps at two different locations somewhere near Konan, one was a small camp where the prisoners worked a foundry the other was a larger camp nearly 2,000 meters square. Read together, the two reports described the Konan POW Camp near perfectly. It was this intelligence failure that contributed to the inability of Hog Wild’s crew to locate the Konan POW camp on its first pass over the area. The two reports dictated what the crew would be looking for when they overflew the target area.

**KOREA or KONAN NEW DIVISIONAL CAMP**

Coordinates: 39.52’N-127.35’E  
Estimated Strength 75 or more Prisoners of War  
All that is known about this camp is that it covers 2,000 square meters and includes 17 buildings with a vegetable garden. It is possible that there are more prisoners here than reported. Reported coordinate place the camp northeast of the main town. Prisoners presumably work in a foundry. One source states that prisoners are moving here from Keijo and Jinsen.

The two separate entries discuss only one camp, and that camp was located northeast of the main town of Konan near the coordinates 39.52’N-127.35’E. The camp contained 75 or more prisoners. The Konan camp actually contained nearly 400 POWs, actually 359. The camp covered an area of about 2,000 square meters almost the exact area of the Konan camp. Depending on how the buildings were counted, if the barracks areas were counted as separate buildings there were about 17 buildings within the camp. The actual camp also had a vegetable garden.

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275 Ibid.  
276 Ibid.  
277 Ibid.  
278 Ibid.
According to the above report the prisoners at the camp might work at a foundry. The POWs at the Konan camp worked stoking the carbide furnaces of the Nichitsu Nitrogen Fertilizer Company. Konan was the only camp in Korea that worked with a furnace of any type. The use of POWs held by Japan in stoking furnaces at carbide plants was not all that unusual. POWs were assigned such work at the Tokyo 3B-Nagaoka Branch Camp (Hokueutsu Electro-Chemical Industry Company), Tokyo-16B-Kanose (Showa Denko Plant), Niigata-15B (Niigata Tekko), and Naoetsu-4B (Nippon Stainless Shinetsu Kagaku) and possibly others. Conditions at these camps were often worse than those at the Konan Camp. On 9 March 1945 an electric furnace at the Showa Denko plant exploded killing three British prisoners and one Japanese employee. All four were burned to death by superheated carbide ejected from the furnace when it exploded.\(^279\) At Naoetsu-4B POWs worked 12 to 16 hours a day 7 days per week. The beating of POWs to death at Naoetsu-4B was a common occurrence. Eight Naoetsu-4B camp guards were arrested after the war and executed.\(^280\)

At the Wakayama POW Camp, 69 miles south of Osaka 395 POWs; 392 British and three Australians who had been captured at Hong Kong were used as slave labor to feed the blast furnaces of the Wakayama Iron Works. Owned by the Sumitomo Steel Industrial Company the POWs held there worked three eight-hour shifts where some fed the furnaces. Others held there produced steel pipe and bomb casings. The prisoners at Wakayama had one-hour off for lunch and no other rest breaks.\(^281\) The death rate of Wakayama, at 18 men during the period of its operation was three times that of the Konan POW Camp. Wakayama opened on 5 November 1943 and closed on 20 March 1945 five months before the end of the war. Other POWs worked at steel mills such as Hirohata Osaka-12B (Nippon Nittetsu) Narumi POW Camp (Daido Electric Steel Company).

Oddly enough, though there was a calcium carbide plant in Formosa the POWs held there were never employed to feed its furnaces. That other POWs were not assigned to feed furnaces suggests that the decision to assign POWs to specific work projects was made locally and not part of a decision made at the national level. The POW camps at Jinsen and Keijo were not located in an industrial area and did not perform industrial-type labor.

In the above comments held in Blacklist, the prisoners held at the Konan Camp had moved from that location from camps in the area of Keijo and Jinsen, which was true for the POWs at Konan. The description given above derived from the two separate pieces of information; validated, analyzed, collated and briefed to the crew would have presented a far more accurate picture of what they were looking for when they initially passed over the area. Depending upon what information they had been given prior to their departure from Saipan and how it was presented, they could have been looking for two separate locations; one larger camp of 17 buildings containing nearly one hundred prisoners or one smaller camp, size unknown, holding less than half the number of prisoners held at the larger camp.

That the two reports were considered separate and never read out as one location indicates a lack of basic analytic familiarity with the subject matter, supporting the concern that little analysis on the subject had ever been accomplished. Had the subject been the targeting of a steel mill or a fuels storage facility, greater analytic effort would have been expended against the identification of the camps to be targeted with supplies. As it was when the crew of Hog Wild flew through the area they were conducting an operation based upon faulty intelligence, an incomplete picture when additional information never fully analyzed was on hand. Eugene Harwood said it best more than 50 years later when he and his daughter wrote, “We had no idea what the camp looked like.”\(^282\) Unlike steel mills and aircraft plants there were no target folders built to support operations against POW camps. During the Korean War and the Vietnam War, that would change.

### Target Folders

During WWII U.S. intelligence developed target materials on not-less than 12 separate Japanese civil-military support systems. For the most part these analytic studies supported America’s strategic bombing effort against Germany.

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\(^{279}\) 『新潟県警察史』Niigata Police Department History. 1959.

\(^{280}\) Watanabe, Toshio. Interview by Gregory Hadley. MD Recording, Sanjo, Niigata. 15 November 2003.


Italy and Japan. These studies included analysis on aircraft production, armaments, nonferrous metals, petroleum production and storage, etc., all war supporting industries. For each facility or installation within a targeted system there was a separate target folder. The number of folders included in a system depended upon the number of identified facilities and installations supporting that system and their overall importance within the targeted system. There might be only twenty folders in the system supporting steel production, and over one hundred supporting the electrical power network.

Such folders included written descriptions produced by analysts responsible for that target system and copies of imagery collected on the facility targeted by reconnaissance collection efforts. These folders enabled mission planners to rate each target. For example: The largest single hydroelectric power plant in the Japanese Empire was located in Korea along the Yalu River, however, that power plant did little to support war production on mainland Japan. Likewise while the Nichitsu facilities in Korea might support war production in Japan, once the sea lanes between the two areas had been severed, the facilities in Korea were no longer worth attacking.

The descriptions provided usually discussed the various aspects and areas of the target in detail. Specific attention was paid against those sections of the facility the destruction of which would do the most damage to, or completely shut down the overall installation. For instance, the destruction of a steel mill’s blast furnaces would render that facility incapable of producing steel; the loss of one specific electrical power substation would cause the loss of power to a neighborhood, a city, or an industry. Taken together if a certain steel mill was too heavily defended for a direct attack, the loss of its supporting electrical power substation some miles away might be the key to limit its operations. While there were about 12 complete targeting systems many identified facilities did not fall squarely into one of these systems and in these cases specialized target folders, subsets, containing maps, imagery and other target materials were produced. This “miscellaneous” set of targets consisted of several hundred separate facilities many of which were destroyed during the incendiary raids launched against Japan’s major cities.

The information contained within target folders, combined with the accurate delivery of weapons, or supplies, limited the number of attacks, sorties, missions and the number of lives, enemy or Allied required to adversely impact the production of the materials required to support a nation’s military in the field. The most bang for the buck.

POW Camp Target Folders

Through the revelations of Captain Dyess and other escaped POWs most of the agencies and militaries involved had a solid picture of the conditions facing Allied POWs, and some idea where the camps were located. Yet the subject of POWs in the hands of the Japanese does not appear to have been seriously studied by any intelligence agency or service branch of the government at any point during the war. As discussed earlier, apparently none of America’s policy- or decision-makers saw the issue as sufficiently demanding to force military or civilian intelligence agencies to generate any analysis or collection requirements against the overall issue.

Throughout the entirety of WWII against Germany, Italy, and Japan the U.S. and its Allies never produced a single target study or target folder on a known or suspected POW camp. Other than a camp that might have been collected against on imagery due to its proximity to some targeted military or industrial facility, known as “bonus imagery,” there was no intelligence effort during the war to study POW camp organization, management of the system, or the various camps within that system. There was no effort to develop more than rudimentary information on the camps or the POW camp network.

While imagery, target or mapping quality was on-hand covering many POW camps that imagery was rarely exploited to gain information on the POW camp that imagery might contain. Imagery was collected, but only in the process of collecting intelligence on adjacent targets. Numerous camps in Thailand and Burma along the Thai-Burma Railroad were identified but only as an aside to identifying rail yards and bridges. Some camps, several in the Philippines had been overrun by U.S. forces in early 1945 presenting the intelligence community with a working model of a Japanese POW camp, but little was done to optimize the information gained in the Philippines for later use in Japan, Korea and Manchuria. The information was available, the HUMINT and the imagery required for researching the various camps existed but no target folders were ever built for eventual use.

There were no target folders supporting the identification of the camps, no target studies, few textual descriptions, and until the 314th began flying photo-reconnaissance missions on the 29th of August in support of Blacklist Operations – no POW camp specific target imagery to support the resupply or rescue of Allied POWs should the situation arise. The subject languished. In the end, there was no pre-planning, no preparation, and no effort to examine the subject prior to the end of the war.

The Basic Outline Plan for Blacklist Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea after the Surrender or Collapse briefed at Guam that July of 1945, as updated on 20 August with imagery collected later that month, was all the pre-planning that would ever take place. Most crews, those flying over Formosa, Japan, Korea and Manchuria were in a sense conducting armed reconnaissance missions overflying an area, with only the most basic intelligence on their target to deliver supplies. This was the larger intelligence failure that would eventually confront Hog Wild over Konan on 29 August 1945 and provide the Soviet Union one up-to-date B-29.
POW Recovery Team

Unlike the effort to locate and identify POW camps holding Allied POWs, plans were made to recover and transfer POWs in Japanese hands to Allied control. Planning for the transfer of POWs into Allied hands had begun as early as February 1942. These plans referred to the prisoners as Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMPs). After a prisoner had been recovered, his status was changed from POW to Returned to Military Control (RMC). The recovery effort was established as a joint mission of the Adjutant General and the Commanding General, Special Troops, General Headquarters (GHQ). General Headquarters of the U.S. Army Forces Pacific (GHQ/AFPAC) was designated as the lead element in the recovery of imprisoned Allied military and civilian personnel. GHQ/AFPAC bore the full responsibility for training, assigning and deploying the forces assigned to recover prisoners to the field. Prisoners of war and civilian internees were defined within Blacklist Annex F as:

DEFINITION: UNITED NATIONS PRISONERS OF WAR
1. The term, “United Nations prisoners of war”, as used herein includes all personnel held in Japanese custody:
   a. Who are or have been members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, the armed forces of any of the United Nations, or
   b. Who as members of the armed forces of countries occupied by Japan have been captured by the Japanese while engaged in serving the cause of the United Nations and who under the rules and customs of war, should be treated as prisoners of war even though not recognized as such by Japan, or
   c. Who are or have been members of or serving with the merchant marine of any of the United Nations.
2. Such term does not include personnel who, although formerly held in Japanese custody as prisoners of war, have accepted release from the status in exchange for employment in or by Japan. Persons in this category, after appropriate identification will be dealt with as displaced persons

DEFINITION: CIVILIAN INTERNEE
A civilian internee is a person without a military status, detained by the enemy, who is not a national of the Japanese Empire as constituted on 10 July 1937.

Recovery teams were established on a basis of one deployable team for every 500 prisoners believed to be in Japanese hands. Teams were generally composed of two officers; one U.S. one British, and four enlisted members; three U.S. and one British. An additional twelve recovery teams consisting of one Dutch enlisted man each were to be attached as to the primary team as required. Approximately 70 recovery teams were established in support of the planned recovery effort.

To supplement the recovery teams an additional final processing team consisting of nine officers and 20 soldiers were to be assigned to four personnel disposition centers, or collection points at proposed locations in Korea and Japan. Among the nine officers assigned to the personnel disposition centers would be at least one officer each representing Britain, Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands. U.S. officers would make up the remainder of each officer team. The collection center for POWs held in Korea would be located in the area of Jinsen and Keijo.

The 9th PW Liaison Team, 69th Recovery Team and 70th Recovery Team are known to have operated in and around the area of Konan. These teams had entered northern Korea with the permission of Soviet authorities. Unbeknownst to the Soviets and not revealed by the U.S. one of the teams was accompanied by Leonard E. Baradell, a stowaway of sorts. Baradell was a member of the Australian Department of Information who passed himself off to the Soviets as an Australian War Correspondent there to interview British and Australian prisoners of war. Though concealing his true purpose Baradell was there with the permission of U.S. Colonel Duncan Sinclair. Baradell remained in the area for about one week.

283 Annex 5 f. “BLACKLIST.” Basic Plan, Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
284 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
287 Msg. CINCAF PAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan. To: WARCOS. ID Number: CA 52414. 28 September 1945. Formerly: SECRET TOT. Declassified on 11 July 1975.
288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
Responsibility for implementing the orders concerning the recovery of Allied POWs was delegated downward, primarily to the Sixth and Eighth Armies, and the XXIV Corps. The Tenth Army, designated to assault Honshū under CORONET was assigned the mission of occupying southern Korea under BLACKLIST OPERATIONS. Overall responsibilities were outlined below. The:

a. Commanding Generals of Armies, within their respective areas, are responsible for:

1. The location, care and safeguarding of all Allied recovered personnel.
2. Providing billets, food, clothing, comforts and medical care.
3. The initial processing (completion of RPD form #44 and #23, Incl 1 to Circulars 19 and 20, this headquarters, dated 9 July 1945)
4. The establishment of recoveree disposition centers near ports of embarkation as may be required
5. Evacuation of recovered personnel including all records, to recoveree disposition centers established by Commanding General, AFWESPAC, in the Philippines.
6. The collection and preservation and forwarding of all records that may be captured pertaining to recovered personnel.
7. Exacting from the Japanese Civil Government and Military Command, in their respective areas, the maximum resources and facilities available to assist in the accomplishment of (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) above.
8. The assumption of the operation of Allied prisoner of war and internment camps located within their respective areas

Organizing the Supplies

Material drops from B-29s were arranged in issues of three-, seven- and ten-day delivery packages. Three-day supplies would consist of clothing, medical supplies, juices, soap, etc. Some three-day supplies contained vitamin tablets, canned fruit, dehydrated soups and C-Rations. Seven-day supplies would consist of further medical supplies and food of a more substantial nature. Ten-day supply missions would consist of some medical supplies but mostly food. Long-since forgotten, many flights would include bundles of newspapers and magazines which served to bring isolated POWs up to-date on the last few weeks of the war and world events. Instructions for use were contained within each shipment.

Much like the prisoners held by Nazi Germany in concentration camps throughout Germany and Poland there was a real fear that POWs would cause themselves additional harm from over-eating, pushing their wrecked bodies far too hard after years of maltreatment and starvation. While the supplies were organized, the plans laid, the aircraft ready to fly their assigned missions, just where they could fly across Asia had been decided long before the end of the war against Japan; and Konan lay outside the agreed upon airspace.

Section 21 – THE TERMINAL CONFERENCE: BABELSBURG, GERMANY

The agreements defining future operational areas for U.S. and U.S.S.R. naval and air force units in the war against Japan in, around and over the Korean Peninsula were made at the POTSDAM Conference codenamed “TERMINAL” held from 16 July to 24 July 1945 in Babelsburg, Germany. The POTSDAM Conference was one of many high-level conferences held between the various allies at different times during WWII. Previous conferences had included ARCADIA, QUADRANT, SYMBOL and TRIDENT. According to the minutes of the TERMINAL Conference operational areas in the west Pacific were defined as: “Separate zones of naval and air operations are to be set up for the United States U.S.S.R in the Sea of Japan. The boundary between these zones will be along the lines connecting Cape Boltina [Busui Tan] on the coast of Korea to point 40° north 135° east to point 45° 45’ north 140° east thence along the parallel 45° 45’ to a line connecting Cape Crillon (Kondo) (on the southern Sakhalin) with Cape Soya Missaki (Soyasaki) (on the northern tip of Hokkaido).”

290 Annex 5 f. “BLACKLIST.” Basic Plan, Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
293 Winstanley, Peter. MILLER ROBERT LEWIS, (Bob) (Dusty) RAN F/FV18 AUSTRALIAN SAILOR SERVING WITH ROYAL NAVY BECAME A POW NEAR BANGKA ISLAND 18 FEB 1942 .Prisoners of War of the Japanese 1942-1945. Research & Articles by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Winstanley OAM RFD (Retired), JP Articles by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Winstanley OAM RFD (Retired), JP. http://pows-of-japan.net/articles/82.htm
The U.S.S.R naval and air forces will operate north of this line. United States naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine craft and for aviation.”

Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line may be subject to change.

United States naval and air operations north of this boundary line and Soviet naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject to coordination.”

“In the Sea of Okhotsk there shall be a zone of mutual operations for the naval and air forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Operations in the Okhotsk Sea will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.” The agreement continues: “In the Bering Sea there shall be a zone of mutual operations of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from Cape Dezhnez to Diomede Island and then along the boundary of the territorial waters of the U.S.S.R and the United States to parallel 51° 35’ north 157° east; thence to 49° 50’ north 156° 20’ east and thence along the parallel 49° 50’ north to the Fourth Kurile Strait.”

“The remainder of the Bering Sea as well as the bordering regions of the Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the United States Fleet.

The boundary line between operational zones of the United State and Soviet air forces in Korea and Manchuria shall be as follows: Cape Boltina, Changchun, Laioyun, Kailu, Chihfeng, Peking, Tatung and thence along the southern boundary of Inner Mongolia.

United State aviation will operate south of this line including all the above-named points. U.S.S.R aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. United States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated.”

At TERMINAL General “Hap” Arnold raised the issue of bombing and reconnaissance mission north of the proposed boundary lines, questioning whether the United States could send missions north of the boundary line within 24 hours after the application had been made to local Russian authorities. Air Marshal Fallalev replied that if it became necessary to attack targets north of the boundary that reliable communications would permit these arrangements to be made. He admitted that the loss of communications might be the cause for “some difficulties.” According to Fallalev permission for reconnaissance flights beyond the boundary lines should be coordinated through the assigned liaison offices.

Additional topics discussed at the conference included general operations in the war against Japan, Army Air Forces operations against Japan, information for Russians concerning the Pacific war, and operations to increase the movement of supplies into China. The naval and air forces of the Soviet Union are not known to have violated the boundaries set forth in the agreement. With the war over some Army and Naval units began to drop supplies immediately.

Section 22 – THE SUPPLY DROPS

Some supplies were dropped almost as the war ended by pilots of U.S. Navy aircraft such as those from the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV/CVA/CVS-10) and USS Wasp (CV-18), as they overflew known POW camps in the days and weeks after the end of the war. Such supplies initially consisted of whatever materials the pilot could carry with him on the mission he was assigned. The amount of material dropped by these pilots was noticeably small compared to the needs over the overall camp, but their effort did let the POWs know that they were not alone; that the U.S. military did know where they were, and that additional supplies would follow. Leo Burrows, a radio-gunner aboard the USS Wasp describes the effort of his ship to provide relief in the days immediately after the war: “Soon sailors from every division on the WASP were bringing mattress sacks filled with cartons of cigarettes, boxes of cigars, candy, and gum to our ready-room, to drop

294 Intentions and Plans of the U.S.S.R. with Reference to the Japanese. Papers and Minutes of Meetings, Terminal Tripartite Military Meeting. The Terminal Conference, July 1945. Edited and Published by the Office, U.S. Secretary of the Combine Chiefs of Staff. 1945
295 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
along with the food and medical supplies. It was a spontaneous act of charity by the Ship’s Company, done at their own expense, and reflects the compassionate nature of the American Sailor.”

“We found the POW Camp without any difficulty and made a perfect drop. In fact, our drops were so good, we were ordered to repeat the performance the next day, which again included a contribution from the ship’s crew.”

“Our eight plane section came in low over the camp, the same as the day before, only now we were stunned by the message that greeted us. On the roof of the barracks the POWs had spelled out: ‘MEN FROM BATAAN AND CORREGIDOR THANK WASP’ We made good drops and slowly turned to go back to our carrier, but the usual meaningless chatter was missing as aircrews contemplated what they had just witnessed. My thoughts, like others, went back to those dark days of early 1942 when the cry from the Philippines was: ‘NO MOTHER, NO FATHER, NO UNCLE SAM, WE ARE JUST THE POOR BASTARDS OF BATAAN.”

POW resupply by B-29 began not–later-than 28 August 1945. As Sergeant Peter McGrath-Kerr, an Australian held at POW Camp 14 near Nagasaki, Japan and injured during the atomic bomb blast of 9 August 1945 recalls: “On 19 August the POWs were paraded before the Camp Commandant and told that the war was over…. Work parties ceased from then on. Several days later some Mitchell bombers flew low over the barracks so we arranged plywood panels on a level area to spell ‘POW.’ On 31 August an American bomber with ‘PW Supplies’ painted under the wing flew over the camp, turned away and flew back overhead and dropped containers with parachutes. These were full of food and were recovered by the prisoners of war helped by some of the local Nipponese. Apart from some Red Cross supplies which has been brought in by ferry about a week before, this was the first lot of European food which we received”.

Flight Lieutenant C.H. “Spud” Spurgeon, of the 8th Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, who had flown against Japanese shipping from Kota Bahru in Malaya and was captured in 1941 recalled the numerous mercy flights over his camp in Mukden: “We had almost daily visits from B-29s whose bomb bays opened overhead and literally showered us with supplies. I have never seen so many Mars bars and neither had the kids in Mukden, who dived into the adjacent swamp to recover them. A photograph I obtained after the war shows a bag of cocoa exploding as it penetrated the roof of, I think, the camp mortuary.”

Section 23 – THE PLANNED DROPS VERSUS REALITY

Though the planned delivery attitude for the delivery of supplies by B-29 was 500 to 1,000 foot, the low-level drops left much to be desired. At such low altitudes parachutes lacked sufficient time to fully deploy and slow the descent of loaded pallets. Drums welded together broke apart when released from B-29 bomb-bays. Many of the initial drops were more akin to bomb runs with drums than the delivery of supplies and provisions. Due to a number of reasons such as faulty rigging, the weight of the pallets and the difficulty in securing the drums to the pallets, parachutes quickly broke away from the palletized containers, scattering medical supplies, provisions and prisoners.

According to POW supply mission statistics recorded by the 497th Bomb Group for 28 August 1945, 35 aircraft dropped supplies over 10 POW camps in different areas of Japan. Of the 458 parachutes used by these 35 aircraft 203 failed to deploy properly. On the 29th of August the 497th Bomb Group deployed six aircraft delivering POW supplies to camps in Honshū and Kyūshū. Of the 84 parachutes used in the mission to slow the descent of the drums and palletized supplies, 45 failed to deploy correctly.

302 Ibid.
306 Ibid.
Injuries were reported at Tokyo POW Camp Number 4, at Naoetsu, and camp Number 7 at Hanaoka.\(^{306}\) Robert B. Heer, writing in a letter to the editor of the “The Quan,” reports that at his POW camp one prisoner was killed and two injured as they entered the drop zone prior to the final delivery of a fourth aircraft.\(^{307}\) Mr. Heer also reports that another prisoner was similarly killed at Camp 17, likely Fukuoka Camp 17 when the parachute of a large container of supplies separated from its pallet.\(^{308}\) According to Ruben Flores, a POW taken captive at Bataan one of the drums delivered to his camp landed on a building within the compound crushing to death one prisoner inside.\(^{309}\) Lorenzo Y. Banegas reports that at his camp near Fukuoka, a Japanese woman and her child were killed by one drum that possibly exploded or burst when opened.\(^{310}\) One Korean and several Japanese soldiers were reportedly killed outside the Jinsen Camp in Korea during similar deliveries.\(^{311}\) The British did not fare much better in their attempts to deliver relief supplies by air.

As reported by Brian Best in the 2004 book “Secret Letters from the Railway: The Remarkable Record of Charles Steel – a Japanese POW,” on 18 September 1945: “A terrific show by the RAF in Consolidated Liberators this morning. They roared low over the parade ground and actually dropped a number of canisters right into the camp. One went through a hut. Another hit a man on the head and chest and put him in a hospital as seriously injured case.”\(^{312}\) Three days later on 21 September 1945 Best would describe another delivery of supplies by a four engine Consolidated B-24 Liberator.

“A stunning display by the RAF again today”

“A Consolidated Liberator came down low over the Camp, diving down and soaring again, while its crew lined the open doorway and waved. They threw out a roll of newspapers, which crashed through the roof of a hut and some magazines, some of which were unfortunately cut to ribbons by the tail.”\(^{313}\)

Where entire drums did not become free falling bombs of supplies individual cases of fruit, soup, stew and other materials were scattered across the camps. POWs waving flags and t-shirts to attract the attention of low-flying bomber crews were often left running for their lives as drums separated from parachutes, cases separated from drums, and cans separated from cases. Wastage was high, but the poor condition of most prisoners demanded no less than the best imaginable effort to put food, clothing and medicines in their hands as fast as possible. In the immediate aftermath of the war speed in delivery was far more important than accuracy and safety.

Due in part to such mishaps, on 30 August, only three days after relief flights began, aircrews were ordered to increase their delivery altitude to allow parachutes to fully deploy and avoid casualties amongst POWs and others in the area.\(^{314}\) Changes to delivery parameters improved the ability of parachutes to fully deploy. On 31 August the 497th Bomb Group launched 37 aircraft in support of Blacklist Operations, of the 406 parachutes used, only 46 failed to operate properly.\(^{315}\) Changes to the delivery altitude would be listed in the “fragmentary order.” Delivery altitudes however would

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\(^{308}\) Ibid.


\(^{313}\) Ibid.


still vary mostly due to terrain and weather.\textsuperscript{316} Reading the Soviet cover story issued in the days following the incident the change in delivery altitudes came one day too late for Hog Wild.

Section 24 – AIR-TASKING-ORDERS: “THE FRAG”

The daily schedule of air activity for each bomb wing was contained in the unit’s “fragmentary order.” Commonly known as the “FRAG” the fragmentary order was an abbreviated form of the overall “operations order” otherwise known as the “OPORD” that directed units to conduct military operations. The OPORD was extensive and contained detailed information on the current situation, the unit and all other activities required to support the basic order. The OPORD was based upon the commander’s guidance, in this case General Curtis LeMay. The FRAG was less extensive than the OPORD and represented a way to manage the day’s scheduling, control air assets, coordinate targeting without re-issuing the entire operations order to execute the mission assigned. The FRAG eliminated duplication and increased effectiveness.

Changes to the FRAG were posted in a Supplementary FRAG. The FRAG received at a squadron was usually planned a day, possibly several days in advance of the mission to be flown that day. Planning for the FRAG normally took place at higher headquarters. The higher headquarters planning function usually worked the war days in advance of actual operations. The higher headquarters planning process was complex.

At any single moment higher headquarters would be assessing operations that had occurred that day or even days before; integrating bomb-damage-assessment into current operations to determine re-targeting; monitoring the day’s events; planning the next day’s missions, and projecting future operations days in advance. In designing the FRAG timing was all important. Several targets in the same area might be hit minutes or hours apart. Not all aircraft could be over a target at the same time. Not all targets assigned would be hit by the same squadron. Aircraft from several squadrons, wings or groups might be assigned to attack a single target minutes apart. Though some might think that the FRAG was only designed to support bombing operations the FRAG assigned rescue aircraft as backup to combat operations, provided air cover by fighters flying out of Iwo Jima and so forth.

At the various wings and squadrons the FRAG was referred to as the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The FRAG was published to the wing, and then broken out to squadrons on a day-to-day basis. The wings would generally “break out” the FRAG distributing the various sections to the wing’s squadrons, its maintenance units, munitions, and supply sections. Squadrons were responsible for mission planning; the selection of approaches into and egress away from the target. The route of Hog Wild would have been included in that planning.\textsuperscript{317} The final mission of Hog Wild was not listed on the FRAG covering the 29\textsuperscript{th} of August 1945. It was likely however to have been listed on the Supplementary FRAG. Hog Wild was a stand-in for Lucky Eleven that had aborted its flight to Konan on the 28\textsuperscript{th} of August, the day before. Lucky Eleven was the only B-29 scheduled to overfly Korea that day. Its target was the Chosen Number 1 Branch Camp – Konan. Lucky Eleven had aborted for unknown reasons. The ATO for 28 August 1945 read as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call Sign</th>
<th>Serial #</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>TOT Saipan</th>
<th>TOT Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z-11</td>
<td>42-24714</td>
<td>“Lucky Eleven”</td>
<td>ABORTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Queen Crew was called together by the 500\textsuperscript{th} Group Commander on the evening of 28 August and notified of the change.\textsuperscript{318} The air tasking order for the 29\textsuperscript{th} of August scheduled three aircraft for Keijo and five for the Konan Camp. Hog Wild would be the sixth. The ATO for 29 August 1945 read as follows:

\textsuperscript{317} Ibid.
Section 25 – PRE-BRIEVED

Hog Wild’s last mission began with a preflight briefing held on the night of 28 August 1945 at 1800 hours (K) local time, Saipan. Such briefings usually took several hours. Though the crew of Joseph Queen had only recently been permanently assigned to Hog Wild, and the names of the crew would be forever tied to the ill-fated bomber; the mission to Konan was the only time the crew ever flew this particular Superfortress into a combat situation. The Sasser crew had flown the bomber named Hog Wild into combat not-less-than ten times. The crew of D. Jackson had flown combat missions aboard the bomber twice, once when it was bore the name Buckin’ Bronc. The Sasser crew had flown the bomber twice under the name Buckin’ Bronc. All other crews that had previously flown the bomber, as with the crew of Joseph Queen flew it only once.

The briefing for this and all other crews involved in the humanitarian airlift mission was conducted similar to earlier combat mission preflight briefings. The brief began with an overall mission brief describing the goals to be achieved in that day’s mission. The mission brief was often given by the wing or squadron commander. As a group the crew would be briefed about weather along the route and over the target area, evasion and escape should the crew be forced down, target justification and so on. The crew would also be briefed about the threat, any expected resistance, anti-aircraft artillery and possible fighter opposition to include the fighter-types known to be operating along their route and in the area of the target. After the mission brief the crews broke apart into specialties.

Though the crew manned the same aircraft, bombed the same target, the information covered in the briefs was specific to their flight position: pilots attended pilot-specific briefings; navigators went to briefings with other navigators. Radar operators would receive a radar brief that included a radar prediction if available. Radar predictions consisted of hand-drawn shadow-images of what the assigned initial point (IP) and target area should look like on the radar scope as the aircraft approached the final point of their ingress routes. The Navy had been notified of the relief mission and had agreed to position air-sea rescue vessels on permanent station along the routes into and out of the camp-target areas. When passing over U.S. Navy picket ships aircraft navigators were required to document in their logs the airspeed, direction and time they

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319 Ibid.
321 Ibid.
passed over each ship. The crew would actually turned into squadron intelligence officers during the post-mission debrief. Many navigators are reported to have maintained two flight logs, one of the actual flight and a second “fabricated” log that recorded the flight as it should have been flown. During their initial brief the crew of Hog Wild was never given any more information about the location of the camp other than its geographic coordinates and that it was located southeast of Konan and north of Kanko Army Airfield.

Take off was scheduled for 0300 hours. The bomber was to land at Iwo Jima where it would refuel and then fly to Konan. The Superfortress was carrying 10,000 pounds of food, medicine and clothing, enough supplies for 200 men. The prison camp was estimated to contain 156 men, more than 200 short of its actual population. Parachute static lines were hooked to bomb shackles. The weather section predicted occasional showers at low-level near Iwo Jima, good weather all the way into Korea. In 1945, the weather forecast largely a guess based upon the weather encountered by previous flights, active weather reconnaissance flights, picket ships or coast watchers. The crew would actually find stormy weather over Korea.

The crew was ordered to acquire the target visually prior to delivery. The supplies were to be dropped “on near side of camp to you.” The drop-zone was supposed to be marked by smudge-pots. Ground indicated air speed for the delivery of supplies was 160-170 miles-per-hour. A dry run of the target was to be made at flight-level indicated altitude of 800 foot. Once the camp was identified the bomber was to overfly the camp dropping first the supplies for the rear bomb bay. A second run was to be made to deliver the supplies held in the front bay. The aircraft would carry 6,800 gallons of fuel. Alternate or emergency airfields were identified as Clark Field in the Philippines; Manila Airport the Philippines; Okinawa and Iwo Jima, Japan. Actual takeoff took place at 0315 hours (K) local time.

Though the supply delivery effort demanded visual confirmation of the camp, the radar prediction could be used in target acquisition and in confirming the aircraft’s location. The crew also received an intelligence brief given by the squadron S-2 Intelligence. Nothing unusual was expected, but the crew was instructed to return to Iwo Jima if there was any trouble delivering the supplies. The crew was briefed on the approximate location of the camp but as in most cases there were no photographs of the actual prison. The briefing was followed by an issue of available maps, charts, target folders and the necessary forms to complete during flight. In the cases of Konan there were no accurate maps available for a low-level approach.

The instructions given were not that unusual in and of themselves. O.W Burchett, the pilot of B-29 Serial Number 44-70100 “Miss You,” in Memories, 40th Bomb Group Association Newsletter recalls receiving little information about his drop zone. Burchett recalls being briefed to fly directly to Formosa, locate the camp and drop the load of supplies held in one bomb bay from an altitude of 500 foot. After observing the impact zone of the first bomb bay, making any corrections

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231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
required, he was instructed to overfly the camp a second time to unload the contents second bomb bay. All aircrews involved in the Blacklist mission delivering supplies had been given similar orders – to return to their home bases or otherwise should they run into trouble when delivering the supplies.

After briefing the crews proceeded to the Personal Equipment Section or life support, where they were issued their flight gear; parachute, survival vest, flak-vest, flak helmet, leather helmet with headphones, Mae West life jacket, a small inflatable rubber boat which also served as a seat cushion, and one pistol, a.45-caliber automatic. After issue and prior to leaving life support each crewmember went through a physical inspection, a “shakedown” to ensure that he had all his gear, it was all in working order, and he was properly equipped.

Prior to departing Saipan one member of the Hog Wild’s crew, probably the aircraft’s navigator, signed out from the intelligence branch a K-20 camera to obtain post-strike photos of the supply drop as required by Blacklist Operations. Images of the camp and any other objects of interest could be taken at any time with the K-20 handheld camera by any crew member or others on the flight. A number of the images taken of the initial and follow-on supply drops to other camps were later published in “ANNEX D - Strike Photographs and Assessment Reports of Supply Missions as included in the Report on POW Supply Missions to China, Korea, Formosa, Manchuria and the Japanese Home Islands, 27 August - 20 September 1945 HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE.”

Once at the aircraft each crewmember began to pre-flight his part of the aircraft to ensure all systems were operational. Sergeant Douglas E. Arthur would preflight the aircraft’s radar. Lieutenant Harwood checked the bomber’s navigational systems. The crew’s gunners inspected their weapons and armaments. The plane’s Norden bombsight would be checked as would all the aircraft’s communications systems. As flight engineer Staff Sergeant Jess Owen was responsible for checking most of the bomber’s operating systems such as its engines, electrical power and fuel systems, flight controls and auxiliary power units. Bombs, mines, or in the case of Hog Wild palletized POW supplies were also inspected. If necessary, additional fuel was loaded and transferred between internal tanks. Most of the bombers flew at weights beyond design specifications. Except for box lunches, nothing was left to chance.

Flight lunches typically consisted of peanut butter sandwiches, sometimes peanut butter and jelly, or often what was referred to as “bully beef,” biscuits, and a chocolate bar. The “mystery meat” of the Vietnam War Era lay far into the future. Though the bomber had ovens cooking trays were usually hard to find. For the most part the ovens installed on the B-29 went unused. The coffee available during flight was usually lukewarm at best.

Immediately prior to engine-start, each of the aircraft’s propellers were rotated at least twice to ensure there were no oil accumulations in the engine’s lower cylinders. The engines were usually started in sequence; engine number two, then one, three and finally number four. At Saipan it was not uncommon for all runways to be launching aircraft at the same time. For a 60-plane mission, all 60 bombers could be airborne in only 15 minutes.

Though the war had been over for 13 days when Hog Wild departed Saipan the evening of the 28th of August there was always the threat that not all Japanese military units would accept the surrender; some might refuse to comply with the surrender order while many others might simply have not gotten the word. It was a valid concern.

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Hog Wild was scheduled to depart Saipan at 0300 hours (K) local time proceeding to Iwo Jima.\textsuperscript{341} Marion Sherrill, the aircraft’s bombardier recorded takeoff as occurring at 0315 hours (K), local time.\textsuperscript{342} Once airborne the crew would trim the engines to ensure maximum efficiency. During the flight, Sergeant Owens would monitor fuel use, comparing planned usage to actual performance. Prior to flight, projected usage had been plotted against aircraft performance curves. At selected points, actual fuel consumption was compared to projections. A dark line past the target was used to mark the point-of-no-return. Within the limits of the fuel on-board flying past that line meant a one-way flight. Calculations-to-performance were usually accurate to within a few gallons. Aircrews that were forced to ditch due to a miscalculation of fuel paid dearly. Those not found by search aircraft or on-station submarines, died.

Departing Saipan

Late in the morning of the 29\textsuperscript{th} of August, Hog Wild: B29, Model B-29-80, Serial Number 44-70136, Z Square 28, produced at Boeing’s Seattle Plant and assigned to the 500\textsuperscript{th} Bombardment Group, 73\textsuperscript{rd} Bomb Wing, 882 Bombardment Squadron departed Saipan on its assigned POW relief mission.\textsuperscript{343} The aircraft was manned by 13 crewmembers, two more than normal, and commanded by First Lieutenant (1Lt) Joseph W. Queen. Ten of the men were regular members of the Queen crew. Three were observers. Hog Wild was piloted by First Lieutenant Robert Rainey. Lucky numbers 11, 12 and 13 were rated flight officers pulling ground duties, sandbagging the flight to maintain their flight ratings, combat efficiency and more importantly – their flight pay.

Section 26 – SANDBAGGING THE FLIGHT

Flight pay was created in 1917 as a method of encouraging trained or rated officers primarily pilots, to maintain their flight ratings and levels of proficiency. Over time, flight pay was extended to other aircrew members, such as navigators, gunners, flight engineers, radar operators and so on. The extension of flight pay to other aircrew members derived from the recognition of “a shared danger” in the operation of the aircraft during flight and over enemy territory. During WWII flight pay could equal 50 percent of base pay. For a corporal with three years of service making $72.60 per month an additional $36.30 per month was quite an incentive.\textsuperscript{344} Foreign Service and Combat Pay also added to a serviceman’s compensation.

Additional servicemen but not part of the actual aircrew assigned duties that required regular flight such as ground crew members, mechanics, certain engineers, munitions, medical personnel, photographers and others might also qualify for flight pay. Though a different category flight surgeons, military medical personnel that have received a degree of flight training could also qualify. Regardless of the specialty involved those granted flight pay were required to maintain their eligibility by acquiring a set number of flying hours per month usually, but not always in the type of aircraft for which they have qualified. A crew chief on a B-29 might qualify only by flying a jump seat in a B-29 or fill the position of an observer or gunner. A pilot might maintain their required hours by flying a training aircraft they were previously checked out on but not their primary aircraft.\textsuperscript{345}

Some airmen such as pilots, navigators and radar operators reaching a higher level of proficiency might be at various times assigned ground support duties that did not require regular flying. These rated officers provided additional training, monitored qualifications and performed other functions that kept squadron, wing or group qualifications at the highest levels possible. These crewmen might fill such positions could include pilot qualification personnel, mission planners, air traffic controllers, and other positions within a bomb wing, numbered air force, and major command that managed air assets and their employment. Again, to maintain their proficiency and incentive pay such airmen were required to fly a set number of flying hours per month. Trennis Beers, a medic in Headquarters, 498\textsuperscript{th} Bomb Group recalls in his article, “Our First Hot Meal On Saipan,” that most had to obtain a minimum of four hours per month to maintain their qualification.\textsuperscript{346}

\textsuperscript{341} Queen, Joseph W. 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron, 500\textsuperscript{th} Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated

\textsuperscript{342} Marshall, Chester. The Global Twentieth. An Anthology of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Air Force in WWII. Volume 1. Apollo Books. 107 Lafayette Street. Winona, MN. 1985

\textsuperscript{343} Queen, Joseph W. 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron, 500\textsuperscript{th} Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated

\textsuperscript{344} Information gathered from the WWII Enlisted Man / WAC Pay scale from the Official Army Register dated 1 January 1944 (pages 1624-1629), http://www.29thdivision.com/research/payscale.html

\textsuperscript{345} 1\textsuperscript{st} Fighter Group WW3 War Stories. Charles L. Hoffman talks about WWII and his tour in Italy http://www.1stfighter.org/warstories/hoffman.html

Tagging along on a flight to maintain flight hours and flight pay was often referred to as “sandbagging a flight,” in reference to a sandbag’s weight and lack of utility aboard an aircraft. Both combat and training flights could be used to acquire flight hours and maintain eligibility. At least three of the airmen aboard Hog Wild on the flight to Korea that morning of 29 August 1945 were simply present to acquire flight hours to maintain their proficiency, their flight pay and help with the delivery of supplies to starving POWs. The war was over. Most hostilities had ended days before, the planned flight would be long in duration and was considered fairly safe.

After months of combat missions over Japan, warding off fighter aircraft and flak attacks the flight to Konan was expected to be a “milk run,” a “cake walk,” a “piece of cake.” Such expectations probably impacted the decisions of the three airmen sandbagging the flight to Korea. Even better the mission was to provide support and relief to men held prisoner by the Japanese for more than three years. It was a mission with its own appeal. The mission itself was meaningful and worthy of sacrifice. There were seats available and as it turned out – it could not have been a worse decision on their part.

In addition to sandbagging ground personnel other military members were allowed and encouraged to take part in the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the Allies imprisoned forces. There is no record, government or private writing that suggests a lack of volunteers, or a lack of enthusiasm and eagerness to be a part of the supply missions. It would be the rare soldier, sailor or marine that was not aware of the suffering that the POWs endured. George Simeral, an aircraft commander with the 52nd Squadron 29th Bomb Group reports arranging flights for Seabee’s that had supported the 20th Air Force on POW supply delivery missions to the area of Tokyo. To Simeral and likely to the Seabees accompanying the flights, it was a small reward for a job well done. Hog Wild’s first stop was Iwo Jima, Sulfur Island.

Section 27 – IWO JIMA: SULFUR ISLAND

Located nearly halfway between Saipan and Tokyo, Iwo Jima was considered strategically important in the American air war against Japan. It was the scene of heavy fighting between U.S. and Japanese forces from 19 February to 26 March 1945. In the Japanese language the words Iwo Jima translated roughly into “Sulfur Island.” Most men that landed on Iwo Jima described the island as a “no man’s land,” or “hell on earth.” Captain Harry Crim of the 72nd Fighter Squadron stationed on the island said of Iwo Jima, nature “provided an active volcano and men provided the war.”

At about five miles long and two and one-half miles wide at its broadest point, Iwo Jima was the largest island of the Volcano Islands group. The most prominent feature of the island Mt. Suribachi, a volcanic cone was located at the southern end of the island. At 550 feet high Mt. Suribachi dominated the island. The northern half of the island rose to a maximum elevation of 387 feet.

Under U.S. control, the island would provide much needed airfields for long-range fighter operations in support of B-29 missions against the Japanese home islands. Bombers suffering mechanical problems prior to reaching Japan proper would find a safe haven against a crash landing in the Pacific Ocean. Most important, the island’s landing strips once extended would provide emergency airfields for B-29s damaged during their raids over Japan. Capture of Iwo Jima would eliminate the use of the island’s airfields as staging bases for Japanese air attacks against U.S. forces in the Marianas Islands. Between November 1944 and January 1945 Japanese aircraft operating from Iwo Jima destroyed 11 B-29s and damaged another 43 on the ground at Saipan. Taking the island from the Japanese would also eliminate its use as a staging platform for Japanese fighter aircraft operating against U.S. Superfortresses inbound to or returning from Japan. Bombers running low on fuel after leaving Japanese airspace could also land on the island to refuel or repair mechanical problems.

Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iwo Jima the Japanese had worked to develop the island into a fortress of underground interlocking tunnels and bunkers. Above ground the island was dominated by runways and airfields that few Japanese aircraft would ever use in a counterattack against U.S. forces.

By the time U.S. Marines landed on Iwo Jima under OPERATION DETACHMENT the Japanese had completed construction of two separate airfields and were developing yet a third. The southernmost airfield consisted to two airstrips: One 5,025 foot in length, the other 3,965 foot long. The airstrips of the centermost airfield, forming an X across the landscape were 5,225 and 4,425 foot in length. The third airstrip along the northern part of Iwo Jima and also under construction contained one airstrip about 3,800 foot long.

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The Assault

The U.S. ground assault against Iwo Jima began at 0859 hours on 19 February 1945 when the U.S. Marine Corps Fifth Amphibious Corps consisting of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Marine Divisions and three Seabee Battalions, the 31st, 62nd, and 133rd landed along the island’s southeastern coast.

The initial Marine landing encountered little resistance. However the Japanese who were heavily dug in beneath Mount Suribachi and along the northern heights of the island, eventually responded to the landing with concentrated artillery and mortar fire against the invasion beaches. Operating from a series of interconnected tunnels, dug-outs and bunkers the Japanese viciously contested ownership of the island.

The first U.S. B-29 landed on the island on 4 March 1944 at the height of the fighting then raging across the island. B-29 Dinah Might declared an in-flight emergency; it was low on fuel and its bomb bay doors were stuck in the open position. Its pilot Lieutenant Fred Malo, requested permission to land on an existing runway then under Marine control. The aircraft landed, was refueled and successfully departed the island. The battle ended on 26 March. Of the 22,786 Japanese dug-in on Iwo Jima, 21,703 died in combat or by ritual suicide. U.S. forces suffered 27,909 casualties: 6,825 Americans died on Iwo Jima.

U.S. plans for the island much like the Japanese, called for the construction of three separate airfields to be known as South, Central, and North Fields. The previously existing 5,025-foot strip at South Field was extended to become a 200-by-6,000-foot fighter strip. The longer runway at Central Field was extended to 8,500 feet for B-29 operations. The second strip at Central Field was extended to 6,000 feet. North Field, where Japanese construction had only just begun prior to the U.S. invasion was to eventually have one 200-by-5,000-foot strip for additional fighter operations.

The first B-29 strip at Central Field was placed into operation on 7 July 1945. On its first day of full operations 102 B-29 Superfortresses returning from a raid on Japan landed on the field. By war’s end, about 40 days later, more than 2,251 B-29s had made emergency landings on the island. 27,012 Bomber crewmembers eventually landed at on the island. There are no figures reporting the number of wounded aboard the aircraft who survived due to the sacrifice of Navy and Marine Corps personnel. The crew of Lieutenant Joseph Queen supporting long-distance air operations landed at Iwo Jima on several occasions.

At Iwo Jima Hog Wild on its mercy mission to Korea would be refueled; its fuel tanks topped-off. The crew would be given any additional intelligence if available and further weather updates. After breakfast the aircraft would then depart Iwo Jima, continuing on its mission to Konan to locate and drop supplies to the POW camp. It is not known if while at Saipan or Iwo Jima the crew was briefed on the rain and low-lying clouds then over the area of Konan. Regardless, Hog Wild would arrive over the target area in stormy weather.

Section 28 – CHOSSEN BRANCH NO.1

For the most part U.S. and British intelligence knew little about the POW camp system run by the Imperial Japanese Army across Japanese Occupied Asia, and even less about the POW camps in China, Korea and Manchuria. The precise location of most camps was unknown. The Konan POW camp was reported to be located at or near Konan. The Blacklist Operations Plan listed the little that was known information about the camp as:

KONAN NEW DIVISIONAL CAMP

Coordinates: 39.52’N-127.35’E
Strength 23 British and Australians

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351 Ibid.
“Reported coordinate place the camp northeast of the main town. Prisoners presumably work in a foundry. One source states that prisoners are moving here from Keijo and Jinsen.”355

The information was so general that the coordinates given were accurate to only degrees and minutes with no seconds or to within approximately one nautical mile.356 Despite the guesswork the coordinates were not that far off the actual coordinates for the camp. The coordinates, 3952N12735E as given plotted to a spot equidistant between the port of Konan along the coast, and the town of Kanko (Hungnam) about eight miles to the north.

Plotted to a map or chart, the point given to the crew referenced a location nearly 5 miles due south of Konan Airfield and ten miles nearly due north of the Kanko Army Airfield. Though the location given was at best a guess the actual coordinates of the camp would turn out to be 395110N1273529E: ten seconds north of and 29 seconds east of the reference point; about 5,000 foot from the point referenced in Blacklist. Unfortunately, the coordinates contained in Blacklist were not the coordinates given to the crew.

During its pre-brief the crew of Hog Wild was briefed that the camp was located at 39°53’N 127°38’E, placing the bomber approximately two nautical miles north and two and one-half nautical miles east of the camp’s actual location. It is likely that the coordinates given the crew were updated from the flight of 26 August the identified the camp. To further compound the problem the information presented in Blacklist lacked any general description of the camp.

To identify the camp the crew would be more or less dependent upon the POWs themselves. If the camp had been marked with the “PW” markings as requested by the earlier flight of 26th of August, if the smudge pots dropped by that bomber were lit and smoking, then the crew of Hog Wild ingressing the target a 800 foot in bad weather might be able to find it. Hog Wild would be forced to locate the camp under overcast skies in rain.

Locating the Camp from the Air

Under ideal conditions simply to locate the camp the crew of Hog Wild would be forced to overfly the area at least once, possibly several times. Once the camp had been located, the aircraft would first drop markers for the POWs to use in outlining the area where they wanted the supplies dropped. The bomber would again overfly the area to locate and identify the drop zone. Only then would the Superfortress begin its final run to deliver its palletized containers or drums of food and supplies. Follow the drop the aircraft would then depart the area. When Hog Wild arrived over Konan conditions were anything but perfect with rain falling and the sky overcast with low-lying clouds. The mission itself was a meaningful and worthy of sacrifice. The prisoners interred at the Konan Camp consisted of nearly 400 British and Australian soldiers captured by the Japanese at the fall of Singapore.

By the end of the war in August 1945, these POWs had been in captivity slightly more than three years. In contrast the average time for a soldier captured in Europe to be held prisoner was less than one year. The largest number of American POWs captured by the Germans in Europe would center on two events only; the D-Day Invasion of Europe on 5 June 1944 and the Battle of the Bulge that ran from 16 December 1944 to 25 January 1945, a fact not lost on the Allied POWs held by the Japanese. A POW captured at the beginning of the war at age 27 would be over 30 years old when the war ended.

Section 29 – THE PRISONERS OF WAR AT KONAN


Blacklist estimated the population of the Konan camp at 23 POWs.\textsuperscript{357} Nearly 400 men were actually held at the camp. A final estimate of the camp’s population made during the supply delivery planning stage placed the total camp’s population at 354 men, only five short of the actual number held.\textsuperscript{358} The difference in numbers was one of the many variables that mission planners were prepared to meet. Hog Wild was not the only B-29 heading to Konan but would be the last of a six aircraft supply missions to fly against the camp that day. Two other bombers would arrive at the camp only minutes before Hog Wild.

Most of the prisoners at the Konan Camp had been held in Korea since mid-September 1942, when they were shipped to the peninsula from Singapore to Korea at the request of General Itagaki Seishiro, (21 Jan 1885–23 Dec 1948) Commander-in-Chief, Chosen Army.

Itagaki Seishiro was born on 21 January 1885 into a family that had formerly been of samurai rank serving the Nanbu Clan of Morioka. He entered the Imperial Japanese Military Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakkô) at Ichigaya, Tokyo in 1899 at age 14 and graduated in 1904. He fought in the Russo-Japanese War and from 1924 to 1926 served in China as a military attaché to the Japanese Embassy. Through most of 1927 he served in various positions with the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff until he was reassigned to a field unit as the commanding officer of the 33rd Infantry Regiment in China under the Kwantung Army. By 1931 Itagaki had risen to become the Chief of Intelligence, Kwantung Army where he helped to engineer the Mukden Incident of 1931. In 1934 Itagaki was appointed to command the Kwantung Army. He was appointed as Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army in 1936 and served as War Minister from 1938 through 1939.

In 1939 he was held somewhat responsible for the defeat of the Japanese Army at the hands of the Soviet Union in their long-running conflict along the Manchukuo-U.S.S.R. border at Nomohan. He was subsequently reassigned actually exiled, to command the Chosen Army in Korea which was later renamed the Japanese 17th Area Army. His subsequent role in WWII was limited.

In April 1945, as the Japanese Empire began to collapse Itagaki was reassigned to serve as commander of the Japanese Seventh Army then based in Singapore and Malaya. On 20 August 1945 following a conference with Field Marshal Count Terauchi Hisaichi in French Indochina, Itagaki radioed Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theatre Louis Mountbatten that he would abide by the Emperor’s decision to surrender. Officially Itagaki surrendered his sword to Mountbatten (25 Jun 1900–27 Aug 1979) in Singapore on 12 September 1945. OPERATION TIDERACE, the British plan to retake Singapore took place without a fight. Held responsible for the poor treatment accorded Allied POWs in Southeast Asia, Itagaki was tried as a Class A war criminal at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) also known as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. He was found guilty, sentenced to death and hung on 23 December 1948.

In a 1942 memo to the Japanese War Ministry then located at the Ichigaya Garrison in Tokyo, General Itagaki requested 2,000 white prisoners of war (half British, half American) to be sent to Korea for propaganda purposes.\textsuperscript{359} Itagaki’s goal was to use the prisoners to “stamp out respect and admiration of the Korean people for Britain and America,” while simultaneously “establishing in them a strong faith” in an eventual Japanese victory in the war.\textsuperscript{360} Itagaki’s request read in part: “It is our purpose by internment American and British prisoners of war in Korea, to make the Korean realise [sic] positively the true might of our Empire as well as to contribute to psychological propaganda work for stamping out any ideas of worship of Europe and America which the greater part of Korea still retains at bottom.”\textsuperscript{361}

Itagaki’s initial request was filled with British and Australian POWs captured at Singapore. The requested Americans, most captured at the fall of Bataan and Corregidor would follow later. Some of the U.S, prisoners would be held

\textsuperscript{357} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid.
at the Jinsen and Keijo POW Camps; some would be transported deep into Manchuria. No American POW would ever serve time at the Konan Camp. Nearly 4,000 pages of documents extracted from U.S. and Australian archives; POW statements, affidavits and copies of post-war investigations of the camps in Korea tell the tale.

Koreans, under Japanese rule since 1905 were fiercely independent and never stopped seeking an end to Japan’s domination of the peninsula. By displaying and humiliating worn, starved, helpless British and Australian POWs across Korea, Itagaki sought to emphasize the superiority of Japan’s power across Asia. Koreans were to understand that it was useless to hope for eventual liberation; useless to hope for independence and that any effort on their part to resist Japanese authority over their daily lives was doomed to failure. The Western powers had been defeated; proof could be seen in the rabble that was forced-marched down the streets of Funan, Jinsen, and Keijo.

B-Party

In response to Itagaki’s request the Japanese Army in Singapore assembled two groups of prisoners, “A” and “B” parties, consisting of about 1,400 soldiers on Artillery Square in Singapore on 20 July 1945. Rumors of the impending move to Korea began to circulate amongst the POWs in early July with the best occurring on the 16th suggesting that the group was to sail for Japan on the 22nd.

“A” Party, later known as the “Special Party” or “Senior Officers Party” was comprised of senior Malayan and Netherlands East Indies government officials; British, Dutch and Australian officers, full colonels and above; engineers and technicians. “A” Party consisted of about 400 men. “B” Party, often referred to as the “working party” consisted of about 1,000 soldiers.

“B” Party was made up mostly of surviving members of the 2nd Battalion Loyal, Lancashire Regiment and the Yorkshire-based 122nd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery. The remaining few were drawn from other British and Australian units. Their departure, scheduled for the 30th of July was delayed until the 31st and then delayed indefinitely.

On the 16th of August 1942 the soldiers were trucked to Keppel Harbor, a body of water in Singapore which lies between the mainland and the southern islands of Pulau Brani and Sentosa. Prior to their move the unit quartermaster cleared out most tinned food giving the POWs at least one good meal prior to departing and an issue of tea, butter, sugar and milk to take aboard the ship. Reveille that morning of the move took place at 0530 hours (H) local time. The POWs were then ordered to board the Elistor Maru where their clothes were steam-fumigated and each POW chemically deloused. After realizing that two parties could not be jammed aboard one ship for the propaganda tour of East Asia, most were loaded aboard the Fukkai Maru a 3,821 ton tramp steamer converted to troop carrier especially for the event. The Fukkai Maru’s keel had been laid down in September 1919 reportedly in Clydebank, Scotland and completed in January 1920.

The ship had four holds; two small, two large. The two smaller holds held 200 POWs each. 400 to 500 troops, primarily the A-Party remained dockside unable to load onto the Fukkai Maru. A-Party would eventually be loaded onto another ship bound for Formosa.

With an overcrowded load of POWs the Fukkai Maru moved away from shore and later attached itself to a small convoy. On the 18th of August 1942 from a point just offshore the ship sailed for Indochina. Four days later on the 22nd of

### Notes


563 Wallwork, Eric. The War Diary of 3859081 Lance Corporal Eric Wallwork. 2nd Battalion, the Loyal Regiment.


567 Transportation to Korea, August, 1942. A Pictorial Record of the transfer of POWs from Singapore to Chosen, Korea. Pictorial Record-Korea. FEPOW Memorial Church, 27 March 2005. [http://www.fepow-memorial.org.uk/a_pictorial_record.htm](http://www.fepow-memorial.org.uk/a_pictorial_record.htm)

568 Wallwork, Eric. The War Diary of 3859081 Lance Corporal Eric Wallwork. 2nd Battalion, the Loyal Regiment.


August the Fukkai Maru docked at Cape St Jacques (present-day Vietnam) about 40 miles from Saigon.\textsuperscript{372} Even in this early part of the war the convoy stayed close to the coast of the Malaya Peninsula, Thailand and French Indochina.

During the move from Singapore the POWs were told they would be allowed above-deck three times per day for periods of up to one hour. The schedule was rarely followed, but in this early part of the war the POWs were allowed on deck on occasion. The ship remained at Cape St. Jacques for one day, taking its place in another convoy of six vessels on the 23rd August bound for Formosa. Beriberi raged amongst the POWs between French Indochina and Formosa.\textsuperscript{373} The Fukkai Maru docked at Takao Harbor on the 29th of August, a principal Japanese port and naval base on the southern coast of Formosa. At Takao Harbor “A” party was removed from its ship to be held at local prison camps.\textsuperscript{374} While in port the POWs aboard the Fukkai Maru were used to unload the ship’s additional cargo of Bauxite. The Fukkai Maru was then reloaded with additional cargo to include arms, weapons and other war materials.\textsuperscript{375,376}

After numerous delays on the 15th of September 1941 in the company of one light cruiser and eight other vessels, the Fukkai Maru departed Formosa for Korea.\textsuperscript{377} More delays followed, including passing through a typhoon. The Fukkai Maru anchored at Fusan harbor on the 22nd of September.\textsuperscript{378}

First Lieutenant Alfred Edward Wood of the 122 Army Field Regiment, Royal Artillery describes the transfer of POWs from Singapore to Korea: “On the 15th February, 1942 I was serving with my regiment in Singapore, when I was taken prisoner by the Japanese. We were engaged in road construction in the Singapore district until the 16th of August, 1942 when about 1,000 British prisoners were collected at Singapore and taken on board a Japanese tramp steamer of about 3,000 tons named the “Fukai [sic] Maru.” The lower holds of the vessel were loaded with bauxite and in the upper holds of the ship the 1,000 prisoner were housed at the rate of 250 in each of the four holds. The ship sailed for Saigon French Indo China and subsequently to Formosa where we docked for a period of 19 days. The prisoners were employed in the Ordnance Depot and unloading bauxite and re-loading the vessel with rice. The Prisoners were then re-shipped into the Fukai [sic] Maru and arrived in Fusan, Korea on or about the 27th September 1942.\textsuperscript{379}


Douglas Charles Stewart, a Lieutenant with the Loyal Regiment and captive held at the Keijo Camp provides additional information regarding the shipment to Korea in his statement provided after the war: “On the 16th of August, 1942, with 1000 Prisoners of War I was moved from CHANGI, Singapore Island, to Korea, by means of the 3000 tons Japanese steamer FUKI MARU. The end of our journey was FUSAN, Korea. The journey took six weeks in all with a stop of three weeks at TAKOA, South Formosa. While in TAKOA we were confined to the ship except for working parties which went ashore.”

“In the bottom hold of the ship bauxite was stored. This was unloaded by Prisoners of War at TAKOA, and rice substituted. Below decks, along the whole length of the ship, Prisoners of War were accommodated in each of four holds.”

“These holds covered the whole area of the ship except those parts taken up by the engine room, cabins and bridge amidships. Each hold contained a wooden platform all around, raised three feet six inches from the floor level. This allowed just enough space for a man to crawl in on hands and knees under and atop the platform. It was impossible for a man to rise from that position owing to the cramped space. Under and on the platform were our living, eating and sleeping quarters during the whole of the voyage. Between the foot of the platform and a stack of sacked river covering the hatchway of the lower hold, there was space for two men only to walk abreast. All ranks slept shoulder to shoulder, light were burned all day from reveille until nine o’clock at night, except when the hatches blue night light was allowed. No bedding was issued. Prisoners of War were allowed on the open deck from reveille until eight o’clock at night.”

“Sanitary arrangements were wholly inadequate; sic closed in compartments being provided for five hundred men, consequently if a man wished to use one of these he would, in all probability, have to queue for an hour.”

\textsuperscript{373} Wallwork, Eric. The War Diary of 3859081 Lance Corporal Eric Wallwork. 2nd Battalion, the Loyal Regiment.
\textsuperscript{375} Miller, James, Escape from Jinsen Chesan P.O.W Camp, Korea and other Memories. Part 2. Article ID A4332070. The BBC. 02 July 2005 \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldpeopleswar/stories/70/a4332070.shtml}
\textsuperscript{376} \url{http://homepage3.nifty.com/mpnships/taisho/taisho_vdock_01.htm}
\textsuperscript{377} Wallwork, Eric. The War Diary of 3859081 Lance Corporal Eric Wallwork. 2nd Battalion, the Loyal Regiment.
“Washing water was not provide, neither were buckets by which sea water could have been obtained. Each man had to wash from the supply of two pints per man per day allowed him; this was supplied for drinking purposes. Tea (without sugar or milk) could be obtained at all hours of the day; but it was a very weak brew. Each man was allowed only two meals per day; this was on account, as the Japs said, we were not working. Each meal consisted of about half a pound of cooked rice and one tin of meat and vegetable stew – 12 ounces in weight – for each, at first fifteen, later 36 men. A third meal each day was allowed to men who worked ashore. After protest from the British Commanding Officer a certain amount of fresh pork was brought on board for the journey of FUSAN. A small portion was issued to each man each day until the pork went bad, when it was thrown overboard.”

“As a result of the conditions obtaining during this voyage about twenty Officers and other ranks were taken of the ship on arrival at FUSAN suffering from acute dysentery. Of these, to the best of my memory, four died, and a number of men who managed to make the journey to KEIJO subsequently died from dysentery which in the opinion of the British Medical Officers could be attributed to conditions on the voyage.”

The statement of Lieutenant Wood continued, providing a description of the Fukkai Maru and conditions during the voyage: “The Fukai [sic] Maru was in a filthy verminous [sic] condition and infested with rats. Prior to being shipped on this boat a considerable number of prisoners had suffered from dysentery. All ranks were mixed in the holds and battened down except for short periods allowed on deck and shortly after the journey was commenced it was apparent that numbers of them suffered from dysentery and epidemics of diphtheria and beri beri [sic] developed among the prisoners.”

According to a later statement given by Robert Donnison a Sergeant Major with the Royal Field Artillery, by the time the ship reached the port of Fusan the men aboard the Fukkai Maru had been at sea for six weeks. Donnison states that by the end of the journey seventy five percent of the men aboard the Fukkai Maru suffered from dysentery. Disembarking in Fusan the POWs were met by a party of about twenty Japanese photographers documenting the arrival of Japan’s defeated adversaries.

The POWs were then force-marched for about five hours through the city to the jeers and taunts of approximately 120,000 Japanese and Koreans assembled for the occasion. The statement of Lieutenant Wood provides one of the few surviving first-person accounts the post-war period of investigations.

“On arriving at Fusan it was apparent that the occasion of our arrival had been made a reason for a general holiday and the Koreans lined the streets while the 1,00 [sic] prisoners were compelled to march through the town from about midday until 5.20 p.m. Although in a shocking state of health due to diphtheria and dysentery while aboard the ship, the prisoners had

382 Ibid.
383 Wallwork, Eric. The War Diary of 3859081 Lance Corporal Eric Wallwork. 2nd Battalion, the Loyal Regiment.
to carry their small kit with them. The only prisoners excluded from the [sic] parade were about twenty men who were too weak to stand and about six others including Pte. Lomasney and B.S.M. William who were sent to the hospital at Fusan. B.S.M. William later died there."

"After the parade we were taken to the Fusan Railway Station where we were sent by train to the Keijo Prisoner of War Camp. Near Keijo the train split and all prisoner of the Loyal Regiment, together with all senior Commanding Officers of other regiments, were taken to Keijo main camp and the rest of us (some 500) were conveyed a further 30 miles to Jinsen sub camp."  

"We arrived at Jinsen sub camp after a 17 hours journey by train from Fusan. The camp was previously a Japanese military camp consisting of four main wood huts for sleeping quarters and the officer incharge [sic] of the camp was named Major ‘Okuda.’ He was assisted by Lt. Otaki, Lt. Isobe, Lt. Chiba, and a medical officer a 2nd Lieut. ‘Takahashi.’"  

In a statement written by five Korean guards after the war who were assigned to accompany the prisoners from Fusan to Jinsen and Keijo their orders were as follows:

**Treatment of PWs from Fusan to Keijo**

The first inhumane treatment of the PWs in Korea started while en-route from Fusan to Keijo. The following regulations governing the PW were issued to the guards in the trains.

(a) Prevent the escape of PW.
(b) Prohibit singing and unnecessary loud talk.
(c) Prohibit the throwing of garbage, refuse, etc., out of the windows.
(d) Prohibit the waving of handkerchiefs to Koreans.
(e) Shot all PWs who attempt to escape.  

A U.S. report filed after the war best describes what occurred next. "The prisoners at the Seoul camp, it will be remembered, were chiefly British. They arrived at the camp on 25 September 1942 via Pusan from Singapore, where they had been captured and held since the conclusion of the Malay campaign. The number in that shipment was 500, of whom about half were later sent to the Inch’ on camp, some later continuing on to Konan. Apparently some 1000 prisoners arrived at Pusan on this occasion, but what happened to the balance will probably always be a mystery. Presumably a great many prisoner of war camps were consolidated or moved during the course of the war and many prisoners were transferred to Manchuria and Japan proper. For the arrivals, the sea voyage from Singapore had been a hardship and left them in bad shape. It had lasted more than five weeks during which the thousand men had been shut up in the hold of a 3000-ton cargo ship; much dysentery, diphtheria, and Beriberi resulting from the unsanitary conditions."

The report continued, discussing the movement of the prisoners to their permanent camp in the area of Jinsen. Arriving at Keijo and Jinsen the prisoners were once again marched through the streets of a major city. The report continued.

**Japanese Treatment of Prisoners**

“All the allied prisoners appear to have entered the peninsula through Pusan, the principal port of southern Korea, reaching their camps thereafter by rail. During this trip and while in the camps, they were closely guarded by Korean and Japanese guards, who in addition to preventing them from escaping were under orders to prevent excessive noise and all attempts to communicate with Koreans. Apparently over ten prisoners died during the various trips that were made from Pusan to the camps. Once installed in the camps the prisoners were as a rule subjected to some sort of military training; this was carried out under the Allied officers but was required to be conducted in the Japanese language. The confusion that naturally
resulted brought ill-treatment. The prisoners were required to salute all Japanese soldiers of any rank. The Japanese considered them as enemies and they were treated as such."

Once at Keijo, the British and Australian POWs were addressed by Colonel Y. Noguchi, Superintendent of all Chosen POW. Though not entirely germane to the story of the aircraft and its forcing down at Konan in 1945, the speech given by Colonel Noguchi in September 1942 is worth repeating here in its entirety as it set the tone for what the POWs would experience in Korea for the next three years.

“I am Colonel Y. Noguchi, Superintendent of the Chosen War Prisoners’ Camp. Receiving you’re here, I should like to give necessary instructions to you all.

I hope you will reconsider how this Greater East Asia war happened. Nippon’s desire for peaceful settlement arising from the conciliatory spirit, rejected by America and Britain in order to attain their ambitious demand to control East Asia. Finally they overwhelmed Nippon, the important defender [sic] of Asia, to the extent that they dared to resort to violence of economic disruption. Promoting Chinese internal confusion and increasing military preparation on all sides of Nippon Empire to challenge us, thus the very existence of our nation being in danger we stood up resolutely with a unity of iron under the name of Tenno (Emperor) for the emancipation of the nations and elimination of even sources in East Asia. The rise or fall of our Empire that has the glorious history and the progress or decline depend upon the present war. Firm and unshakable is our national resolve, that we should crush our enemy, the U.S.A. and the British.

Heaven is always on the side of Justice. Within ten days after the war Declaration, our Navy and Naval Air Forces annihilated both the American Pacific Fleet and the British Far Eastern Fleet; within a few months, American and British long established Army, Navy and Air bases were crushed by our Army and Army Air Forces; and now, tide turning in our favor, all parts of regions linked with Burma, Java and Wake Island have already been occupied by us, and the inhabitants were rejoicing in co-operation with us for the construction of a New Asia. And now these above facts have induced the Indian rebellion and Australia come to a crisis of capture. After our belligerents sent to their air crafts and feet for the rescue, but every time they were sunk to the bottom or destroyed and repulsed, thus the total damages come up to 2801 vessels and 4500 aircrafts.

I think these war results do not signify the inferior power of our enemy but rather owe to our absolute indomitable power of – that is to say the power protected by Kami (Heaven). Wherever Nippon Army and Navy advance, Tenyu Shinjo (Special Providential Help) always follows; you should recognize the fact and consider the reasons. Nippon Army and Navy are under the Imperial command of Tenno (Emperor) who is the personification of Kami (God), so that the Imperial troops are to be called the troops of God. Now you have become war prisoners because of struggling against the Kami-no-Gun (God’s Army). And now you are convinced of fearfulness to the marrow and became aware of unsavory results. What do you think of this?

However you have lost fighting strength now, you once fought fiercely against us. Judging from this fact some of you will hold hostile feelings against us in your hearts that can never be permissible. Accordingly, we will punish you if you act against our regulations, disobedience, resistance and escape (even an attempt to do so) are understood as manifestation of hostility. I kindly request you that you must be cautious not spoiling yourselves by punishment.

But on the other hand, with Nippon warrior’s forgiveness I express respect to our faithfulness to your country and fulfillment of your duty, and feel pitiful for your capitulation after exhaustion. You should reflect on your selves. According to the extent of your malice feelings we also put certain limit to our freedom you enjoy or severity and lenity on your treatment.

390 Ibid.
Parole is of use as a proof of wiping away your hostility. I am regretful to say those refused to swear will be treated as persons of enemy character, will be place under restraint regarding maintenance of honour, protection of your persons, and must endure pain in compensation of hostility.

The details of concrete outline of style of daily life are defined in “The regulation regarding to daily life;” you should put them into practice strictly after reading them. Prejudice against labour and grumbling over food, clothing and housing are strictly prohibited, because change in your daily life and custom are inevitable under present war situation.

Closing my instructions, I will advise you all to find interest and anxiety in your forthcoming life by acting according to Imperial military discipline.”

The Konan Camp would not open until September 1943. Though the camp would eventually hold nearly 400 POWs only one Arthur Cramsie, would ever publish a book about the camp and his experiences therein. Cramsie’s work, Guest of an Emperor was published in Enniskillen, Ireland, in 1987. The POWs were held at camps in Keijo and Jinsen for nearly a year prior to their transfer north.

On the 13th of September 1943, about 170 men from the Jinsen camp led by Captain George Kinlock who, with another 30 men taken from the Keijo camp were transferred by train to Konan. Captain Kinlock would serve as the camp’s senior British Officer and senior POW. The first shipment of POWs to the camp was accompanied by a total of four officers including Captain Kinlock. The officers were largely responsible for representing the prisoner population to the camp’s Japanese administration. A fifth officer would follow in a subsequent later transfer. The following officers were imprisoned at the camp:

- Captain George Kinlock, Senior Ranking Officer.
- Captain H. V. Morris: A Canadian doctor serving with the Indian Army Medical Corps. (Medical Officer)
- Captain Arthur Cramsie: Far East Combined Intelligence Corps.
- Captain Bell: Royal Army Dental Corps. (Dental Officer)

The officers divided up duties within the camp. As to be expected Morris served as camp doctor. Mill was responsible for logistics; food, clothing and supplies. Cramsie was in charge of working parties and details. To Kinlock fell the duty of negotiating with the Japanese. The division of work broke up the daily routine and gave the officers a reason to exist. After the fall of Singapore with the surrender of so many men while it appeared that the means to fight on continued to exist, many of the enlisted men lost faith and trust in the leadership of the officers assigned over them. Captain Kinlock and the other officers who accompanied the men to Konan saw it as their responsibility to insert themselves between their Japanese overseers and the mass of POWs, reasserting their control over the group and winning the respect of their men by exposing themselves to extreme personal risk. Though some of the men might continue to resent their officers for the surrender at Singapore, the men supported the requirements for some form of regimen as a way to survive their imprisonment. None of the enlisted men, also known as “other ranks” within the British Army are known to have ever spoken ill of the officers assigned to lead them at the Konan POW camp.

The first POWs arrived at the Konan Camp on the 14th of September 1943. Oddly enough, there was no effort on the part of the Japanese at Konan to march the POWs through the town or expose them to any form of humiliation. The local population was not turned out for the arrival of the POWs. The prisoners marched about one mile from the rail station to the camp, suggesting that they arrived at the Konan station and not some other rail siding nearby.

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According to Arthur Cramsie on the night of their arrival they had the best meal they had in months: “a piece of fish in addition to the usual rice, turnip soup and tea.”396 One POW describes the move to the camp and the work: “We arrived at the Konan Camp on 14th Sept. after a nightmare trip in Railway trucks – 50 POW’s including six guards to a truck. I remember one chap named “Butch” Sharp, AIF who had diarrhea bad, he was refused permission to ease himself whilst the train was in motion, sometimes he would have to wait over three hours before the train stopped, even the other PW’s were refused permission to urinate out of door – we had to urinate in our tin cups and throw it through a window even when we stood up to throw the urine out we were shouted at and told to sit down.”397 More POWs would follow in May and July 1944 overcrowding the camp population to 343 men. In May 1945 additional prisoners would arrive.

Eugene Harwood, navigator aboard the Hog Wild and taken to the camp on the late-evening of 29 August 1945 described the camp this way: “The POW camp was a mangy, dirty-looking place where the prisoners were forced work labor for the carbide furnaces located there that were fed continuously day and night.”398 The furnaces melted calcium and coke – the volatile constituents of coal – which was drawn off at the bottom of the furnace and poured into molds to cool.399

Section 30 – CHOSEN BRANCH NUMBER 1

Chosen Branch Number 1 was located about one statute mile from the Nichitsu Carbide Plant known to the POWs as the Chosen Chisso Hirio Kaisha, or the Japanese Carborundum and Carbide Factory. The camp was roughly triangular in shape, surrounded by a wall with wire atop. Within the walls there were about 15 separate buildings including barracks, cook house, food stores and camp hospital.

Each barracks or hut consisted of two large rooms. Each of these large rooms was further subdivided into two smaller sections. Each section housed between 40 and 50 prisoners per room, 160 to 200 prisoners per barracks (Refer to Appendix 2: List of POWs held at Konan). A smaller room, actually a hallway connecting the two largest barracks and located between the two buildings housed 29 men. The camp’s officers were housed separately in a small room at the end of one barracks. To the delight of the officers their room actually had a table.400 Each hut contained two stone or concrete fireplaces, one in the center of the each room. According to Arthur Cramsie: “Konan was a newly-built-camp on very much the same lines at Jinsen but, in some respect superior: for example, the hut floors had been bricked over which added enormously to the cleanliness of the living quarters. The fires in the middle of the huts were better constructed, the walls of the huts had been plastered and the cookhouse was much better laid out.”401

Within the barracks each prisoner was given a floor space, a personal area of seven foot by two foot six inches. Beds, actually wooden racks lined the outside walls of the barracks. The racks were raised slightly off the floor. 40 prisoners slept on these racks virtually shoulder-to-shoulder. Roll call took place at 0600 hours (I) local time. Breakfast began 15 minutes later. At 0700 hours each morning about 200 men marched from the camp to work details at nearby factories and industries.

POW A.J. Bulmer describes the life the prisoners led during the first half-year they were at the camp in a statement given after the war in 1945: “The work we did at Konan for the first 7 months was, there may have been 8 different working parties – some were employed cleaning up the carbide factory – other PW’s trucking a substance used in welding the carbons together in the furnace. Some were employed making boxes and packing a very dangerous acid into some boxes.”

To survive the winter each prisoner was provided with five or six thin blankets for warmth at night and one Japanese military greatcoat for use outdoors. Winter temperatures at Konan often dropped to 30° Fahrenheit or less. One prisoner noted the lowest temperature they experienced as -42° below zero.402 Of the nearly 400 prisoners held at Konan, only two were known to have retained their British winter-weight battle dress uniforms. All remaining POWs were clothed in the uniforms they were captured in; a lighter weight material designed for use in the tropics.403 Assigned in 1944 to work the furnaces of

396 Ibid.
401 Ibid.
the Japanese Carborundum and Carbide Factory where the heat of the furnaces might provide some warmth, the POWs were still exposed to the elements.

During the winter months a limited amount of coal or wood was supplied to feed each room’s fireplace overnight. The use of fireplaces was authorized from the 21st of November to the 21st of March – no exceptions. The amount of coal or wood provided to each barracks was rarely enough to maintain a fire the entire night. To stay warm the POWs resorted to stealing coal from the carbide factory to fuel the fires in their barracks. POWs caught smuggling coal back from the carbide furnaces could expect a thorough “bashing” – a violent beating.404

For their service to the Emperor enlisted POWs were paid at a daily rate of 15 sen. Officers, depending on rank might be paid as much as 43.83 yen per month for a Sub-Lieutenant; 190 yen for a Lieutenant Colonel. As with other locations in the Japanese Army POW camp system food, or better yet the lack of food was a constant concern. As noted by many POWs the Koreans were nearly always there to help. In May 1946 Private Dahill would describe conditions this way:

“The food consisted of one small cupful of boiled rice with one cupful of vegetable water for breakfast; one half cupful of boiled rice; a small soya bean loaf of about five ounces and one cupful of vegetable water for lunch, and supper was almost identical with breakfast with the addition of a small portion of dried fish, which we had on average of about once a week. The vegetable water was made up, as far as I knew of about three cabbages to three hundred men. The only supplement to this food were about eight Red Cross parcels, British and American, in three years, the first arriving on the 15th of February, 1943, at Keijo. We had three more parcels at Keijo and four at Konan.405 Lieutenant Cramsie had a different take on the food at Konan, perhaps a longer view derived from his experience at Singapore and aboard the Fukkai Maru. Cramsie would later write that “From the day we arrived the food at Konan was better than anything we had experienced since leaving Singapore: We were still more or less permanently hungry but there was a little more variety and we got fish, sometimes a fish the size of a herring each for the evening meal.


was called ‘Saba’ in Japanese and very like mackerel. Some people were allergic to it and it gave them an extraordinary red-looking face but everybody ate it regardless of the consequences.”\footnote{Cramsie, Arthur. Guest of an Emperor. William Trimble, Ltd. Enniskillen. 1987} The camp commandant was Captain Otaki.

Otaki ran the camp in a solid fashion, but not at the level of brutality that prisoners under the Japanese had come to expect. Of Otaki Arthur Cramsie would write “Our first impressions of Otaki were reasonably favourable; he spoke no English but seemed to be a better type than the average Japanese officer we had met so far and we noticed his uniform was of superior quality. We got the impression that he would settle for a quiet life and had no particular urge to humiliate or ill-treat us, but we all still had to salute all Japanese and, in spite of reasonable first impressions, we assumed thing [sic] would go on more or less as we had learnt to expect.”\footnote{Ibid.} He was one of the few camp commanders across Asia that did not hold a mass assembly to harangue the prisoners about their fortunes in life upon their arrival at the camp. As best as can be determined from the available records apparently Otaki rarely ever addressed the POWs as a group and never outwardly harassed them.

At one point Captain Otaki actually hosted Captain Kinlock and Lieutenant Cramsie for tea. Otaki had one simple rule, “be good boys and all will be well, do bad things and you will be punished.”\footnote{Ibid.} This is not to say that beatings, face slapping, and corporal punishment from the guards were not common they were, however not to the degree that occurred along the Thai-Burma Railroad, the Bataan Death March, Cabanatuan…. Cramsie wrote years later “There were frequent occasions when our men were carried back into the camp by a working party after they had been beaten up. For the most part no bones were ever broken but a man could be badly assaulted and physically ill-treated for some minor offence by a guard, a private soldier, who enjoyed the power he had over us and who knew he could do as he pleased with impunity.”\footnote{Ibid.} Otaki ran the camp through morning assemblies consisting of one Japanese and Allied officer. The meetings were referred to as “informations.” The morning conferences actually resembled small staff meetings.

Otaki’s informations were used by the Japanese to issue instructions to the POWs, assign work priorities and work assignments. The informations also provided the POWs a venue to complain about conditions, eliminate misunderstandings between the two cultures, and suggest solutions. By Japanese standards for the treatment of POWs across Asia, it was an exceptional arrangement. As Cramsie would write “We actually had more or less for the first time, an official point of contact with our captors where we could negotiate without being beaten up for doing so. During the first few weeks we talked to them with some success about food, working clothes, soap to wash with, rest days for the men, baths and conditions general and throughout our two years at Konan this daily meeting with the Japanese proved of considerable value.”\footnote{Ibid.} The ability of an officer to negotiate with the Japanese without being beaten, depended upon the skill they displayed in presenting their case. Though the Japanese at Konan did allow negotiations, they usually failed to follow through on the agreements made.

When the prisoners first arrived at the Chosen Branch Number 1 they were divided into eight working parties. These working parties were farmed out to the various industries in the area of Konan, but most went to the Chosen Chisso Hirio Kaisha where they were used to perform light maintenance, heavy lifting or janitorial duties. The POWs also hauled in the materials used to weld the produced carbides together inside the furnaces. Many POWs spent their time building crates for transporting the carbides or other materials produced at the Nichitsu chemical plant. Others were employed on the maintenance of production lines, digging and transporting coal from railhead coal dumps to the carbide factory. Other factories in the local area also employed the POWs, but only on the most menial tasks; sweeping floors, stacking warehouses, unloading ore from trucks and railcars, etc. The monotony of boring and dirty work was broken up by the noonday meal which was carried to the various workplaces by other prisoners from the camp. Despite their previous trades and potential talents, the prisoners remained the enemy and would never be relied upon to perform tasks requiring technical training or work that contributed meaningfully to the Japanese war effort. With the Japanese unwilling to use the POWs on meaningful work on simple tasks, arguments that the Japanese used the prisoners in their effort to produce an atomic bomb do not bear critical review. The object of the POW presence in Korea was to humiliate them in front of Japan’s subjects, the Koreans. As a group however the POWs did not accept their positions willingly.

As admitted to after the war, most POWs across Asia whatever work assigned did their utmost to sabotage the facilities they worked in or the materials they produced in any way possible: POWs dusted new engines with metal shavings, poured water on gun powder, and punctured oil drums. The POWs in Korea were little different; however at Konan they apparently sabotaged themselves from light duty to hard labor.

In May 1944 the POWs were shifted from menial light duties to feeding the furnaces at Nichitsu’s calcium carbide factory. Just exactly who in the Japanese Army chain-of-command had authorized the use of these prisoners for work stoking the furnaces at the factory was never satisfactorily answered. None of the POW statements ever seem to give a clear-cut
answer. Apparently none knew. Though it seems unlikely, it may well be that Otaki himself made the decision to employ the POWs at the plant. None of the interviews of Japanese camp authorities taken at Keijo after the war ever posed the question. It is known that Colonel Noguchi, the overall Japanese authority for POW affairs in Korea did visit Konan at various times from 1943 to the end of the war. It is inconceivable that he was unaware that the POWs were working for the Noguchi Konzern.

Initially the prisoners protested the assignment. In classic British understatement Arthur Cramsie related years later: “It was one of those confrontations which arose with the Japanese over fundamental issues.”\textsuperscript{411} The first prisoners reported for work at the Chosen Chisso Hirio Kaisha on 11 May 1944.\textsuperscript{412}

At the carbide factory the POWs worked to stoke the plant’s furnaces with limestone and coal.\textsuperscript{413} It seems that initially the men worked only the day shift and were later assigned to work two to three shifts per day. Several sources suggest that shift work began only weeks after being assigned to stoke the furnaces or in late May 1944. Over the next 16 months many men would be carried back to the camp on a stretcher. During the first week of work feeding the furnaces 42 POWs collapsed from the work.\textsuperscript{414}

The carbide production plant of the Chosen Chisso Hirio Kaisha contained four furnaces arranged in-line one after the other. The furnaces were circular in shape about 40 foot in diameter. Each furnace supported a separate production line or plant. Four furnaces, four plants, four production lines numbered Furnace Number 1 to Number 4, Plant Number 1 to Number 4. At some point in late 1943, Furnace 3 of the Number 3 Carbide Factory blew up.

Over the course of 1943 alone about 32 Japanese and Korean workers died in and around the Number 3 Furnace.\textsuperscript{415} It is unclear from the statements of the POWs if all 32 had died in the single accident. In early 1944 the Number 2 Furnace in the Number 2 Carbide Factory blew up killing three Korean laborers.\textsuperscript{416} It is unknown from the events that followed the explosion of the Number 2 Furnace whether the Koreans and Japanese working the furnaces protested, went on strike or simply quit but there was trouble with the workers.\textsuperscript{417} It was at this point that the Japanese Army stepped in with solution to the loss of civilians working the furnaces – the nearly 400 POWs held at the Konan POW Camp.

A number of Korean guards after the war described the work assigned to the POWs at Konan as follows: “PsW [sic] were forced to work in the Carbide, Nitrate, and Lime plants and also in the hauling of Coal and Iron. At first they were forced to work during the day, but eventually they were put to work for 24 hours with 8 hour shifts. This is the most difficult type of work for the PW and the Japanese selected the healthy individuals.”\textsuperscript{418}

At the time when such furnaces were a common sight before and during WWII, calcium carbide was produced in large amounts inside electric arc furnaces in support of the world’s steel production from a mixture of lime and coke at approximately 2000° Centigrade. According to several POW statements, the furnaces operated at several thousand degrees.\textsuperscript{419}

Calcium carbide was, and is still used extensively in the desulfurization of iron; as a fuel in steelmaking and as a deoxidizer at foundries where large ladles were used to transport and pour the molten metal. Calcium carbide was and

\textsuperscript{411} ibid.


\textsuperscript{413} ibid.


\textsuperscript{416} ibid.

\textsuperscript{417} ibid.


continues to be used to produce fertilizers. Calcium carbide, reacting with nitrogen at high temperatures forms calcium cyanamide. The calcium carbide produced at Konan was mainly used to create calcium cyanamide and acetylene. Mixed with water, calcium carbide produces acetylene, which is widely known for its use in welding but can also be used as a vehicle fuel, which became increasingly important to Japan as the war continued into 1943 and beyond. The acetylene produced at Konan was used primarily to operate military vehicles on the various Japanese fronts, but mostly in Manchukuo and China. According to PTE Vincent Mahboub, an Australian POW held at the Konan camp, the “carbide was utilized in petrol production.”

Once at work each POW stoked, or fed two furnaces simultaneously. The men worked in teams of three men. Three teams worked one shift to feed the furnaces. A prisoner would stand between the Number 1 and Number 2 Furnace and feed each. Another man stood between Furnace Number 2 and Number 3 Furnace feeding both and so on. Each team worked 20 minutes at the mouth of the furnace before being relieved by the next team: 20 Minutes on, 40 minutes off. The Carbide Factory supplied the POWs with lightweight, cotton suits to wear while performing the work. Such suits were overexposed to the lime would lead to the inability of POWs to wash off the lime with any enough dust would cause a build up of dust in the lungs and would ultimately cause skin lesions. Swallowing dust would cause burns in the mouth, throat and esophagus. Swallowing exposure to lime dust would cause excessive tearing, conjunctiva edema, hemorrhage, and so on. When inhaled the airborne powder that was always present irritated the respiratory tract; could cause nausea, a retching cough, or a near continuous cough from an excess of sputum created in the lungs to combat the dust. Left untreated with no relief from exposure the conditions created by the dust ultimately lead to pulmonary edema, culminating with respiratory or heart failure, coma and death.

Contact with skin could cause skin irritation, redness and swelling. Prolonged contact, as experienced by the POWs would ultimately cause skin lesions. Swallowing dust would cause burns in the mouth, throat and esophagus. Swallowing enough dust would cause nausea, vomiting, diarrhea and could lead to a coma. The lack of time away from the carbide plant; the inability of POWs to wash off the lime with anything more than water; the poor overall health care available to those overexposed to the lime would leave the already miserable POWs in continuous agony. There was no escape from the

428 Ibid.
torment of exposure. No mitigation of the discomfort. No relief from irritation of the skin and so on. Many POWs would bear the scars of their work on the furnaces of Nichitsu for the rest of their lives.

According to a U.S. authored report on the camp filed at the end of the war in the Pacific: “The situation at the Konan camp was different in many respects. The camps was situated in the more highly industrialized northern part of Korea, and the prisoners’ principal occupation had been working in a carbide factory. It would be accurate to describe this camp as a work camp rather than as merely a prison camp.” The report continued stating that “The factory in which they worked was dangerous and dirty; the work was strenuous, and the food which the prisoners received, being small in quantity and lacking variety, was insufficient for persons doing hard physical labor.” Despite illnesses, diseases and injuries the men at the camp were forced-marched to work each and every day.

In his statement after the war Matthew Thompson of the 2nd Loyal Regiment taken prisoner at Singapore in February 1942, makes clear the alternative given to work in the Nippon Carbide Factory. “In February 1944 I was sent to a prisoner of war camp Konan. The conditions at this camp were similar to those at KEIJO, the work was very hard as we were acting as stokers in the carbide factory and were told by Captain TORRES, a Japanese, if we did not do that work we would be shot.”

Lieutenant Will of the Australian Imperial Forces described the daily duties of the POWs while at the Konan POW Camp this way: “WORK: Factory work was filthy, and in parts dangerous. Parties were breaking stone, shifting limestone to furnaces, stoking furnaces, (extremely hot and dangerous when furnaces blew back) building air raid shelters, working with blocks of carbon, steel bars, pushing trucks and general factory work.” Workers reached the gangway around the furnaces by metal stairway. The heat around the furnace openings was so intense that camp guards stayed on the first floor and did not climb the stairway to monitor the POWs.

Will continued, “Our own doctors tried time and time again to have this working party (No 8) stopped – due to it affecting the men’s health – but to no avail, when furnaces started then only was it stopped. No 1 party were employed making carbondum powder. Other PW’s were employed on maintenance of lines and digging and trucking coal from dump to furnace, others trucking carbine dust to tips.”

“I remember No. 2 Furnace in No. 2 carbide factory blowing up this would be in early 1944, it shook our camp a distance of perhaps 1 mile away, it happened at night, the next morning our job was cleaning up, even then we considered it dangerous due to the carbide making contact with the water and exploding. I believe 3 Korean laborers lost their lives that night.”

“I also remember the Japanese holding a service in late 1943 for the men who lost their lives in No. 2 and No. 1 carbide factory for that year. Us POW’s eventually learned that 32 Japan and Koreans had lost their lives in one year due to furnace work.”

“Then in early May of 1944 Captain Otaki notified Captain Kinlock that we will have to work on the furnaces in No. 1 carbide factory. Of course all the POW’s immediately protested, grounds were it was too dangerous and unhealthy, we had a few meetings in camp about it, always in attendance was an interpreter named ‘Kittyaka.’”

“Afier about 1 week of protesting etc. – we went to work on the furnaces on 11 May 1944. I here give a rough estimate of the number of POW’s who collapsed at work in the first week, 3 shifts per day – 42 men collapsed. Our own M. O. Captain Morris tried hard to have it stopped – but from Keijo Camp came a Jap M. O. he was fairly tall and slim. I think he was a Captain – it was he that overrides all our protesting by saying that the furnace work was not dangerous nor was it unhealthy. A few PW’s who worked on the furnaces will bear scars for life, here are two names of chaps who were burnt the worst, Lance/Cpl. Harold Knoc (Shanghai) and Pte. Jack Lawson of Carlisle, Scotland. That is only to mention two PW’s."

“Furnace work also brought another kind of work – On lime kilns where the dust off the lime was really bad, a few cases of PW’s falling off their platforms where one worked to fill the trucks underneath, was recorded a distance of 12 feet or more due to the lime dust temporarily blinding them. There was one portion of the huge Factory off limits to us, we often wondered why, then we found out off a Korean – it was here that they made carbide a gasoline which was used in the Nip

aeroplanes. A few of us PW’s traced a pipe line that ran from the back of No. 2 carbide shed to this other factory where we understood there to be underground storage tanks.”

“Another job as POW was building air raid shelters – but not for us – for the Koreans and Japanese. Our air raid shelter was the mess room where we ate. From June ‘45 onwards the alarm went quite frequently at night, we were then made to go into or mess room approx. 6 yds. by 2 ½ yds. with the door closed – usually about 20 PW’s were forced into this for up to 4 hours, no ventilation.”

Once assigned to the carbide furnaces the POWs attempted to increase their sabotage of Japanese operation, damaging water cooling lines and fire brick within the furnaces. Some of the POW efforts to sabotage Nichitsu operations actually forced the company to shut down the furnaces for days on end as the materials then inside the furnace had to cool before repairs could be initiated. Their sabotage was subtle, with any evidence of their treachery usually destroyed inside the furnace. Unfortunately for the Japanese it was normally the POWs themselves that had to break out the cold carbide within the furnaces, preventing plant managers and guards from ever discovering their sabotage. In a sense though it was the perfect system; it was the POWs who sabotaged the furnaces, it was the POWs who cleaned up the evidence. When the factory’s furnaces were shut down from POW sabotage the prisoners were usually assigned other jobs within the plant, none of which supported uranium enrichment or Japan’s atomic bomb program. Despite the hard work, the POWs in Korea still had it far better than most POWs held by the Japanese.

For a POW held by the Japanese in Asia, conditions at camps in Korea were far better than any camp in Southeast Asia or Japan proper. However none of the POWs held at Konan would know this until after the war. Vincent Maboub, an Australian POW would state after that war that “We thought we were badly off, but now we have seen and spoken to others we think we are about the most fortunate prisoners of war in the East – and we were not well treated.” Maboub had joined the Australian Army when he was 15 and would not return home until he was 20. But even in a grouping of good POW camps, some were worse than others and Konan would qualify as the worst in Korea.

Chosen Branch No.1, also-known-as the Konan New Divisional Camp was one of the few POW Japanese camps in all of Asia where despite the inability of prisoners to blend into the local population outside the camp escapes actually took place. In 1944 two men, Sergeant Griffiths and Private Broughton both of the 2nd Battalion, Loyal’s fled the carbide furnaces while working the night shift and made for Soviet Russia. The two were caught four or five days later and were returned to the camp for courts-martial action. Incredibly the two nearly made the Soviet border before being turned over to the Japanese by a number of Koreans. In a statement provided by several camp guards to the Recovered Personnel Detachment who worked at Konan immediately after the war the “two PWs who escaped from the camp were captured by the Japanese and punished.”

Broughton had been the victim of a severe bashing at the hands of a Japanese Lance Corporal Sito who accused Broughton of attempting to escape. Lance Corporal Sito beat Broughton about the head and shoulders with a two-inch by four-inch board about two foot long. Unbeknownst to Sito, and perhaps he did not care; Broughton had been previously excused from work by another guard who allowed him to visit the lavatory. For their escape attempt Sergeant Griffiths was sentenced to seven years hard labor; Private Broughton received a sentence of five years.

435 Ibid.
436 Ibid.
437 Ibid.
439 Ibid.
The two escapees were to serve their sentence in a regular Japanese prison in Korea and after their Courts-Martial were removed from the camp. The two escapees were liberated by the Soviets in August 1945 and survived the war. Several escapees from the Jinsen prisoner camp likewise recaptured, tried by Japanese courts-martial, sentenced, and held at Seodaemun Prison in Keijo but did not live to see the end of the war.

Perhaps indicative of the conditions within the prison, Konan was one of the few camps in Korea that the International Red Cross never visited.\(^{446}\) On the only day a Red Cross inspection was planned, the Red Cross representative, the Japanese-speaking Mr. Harry Angst took ill and the camp was never inspected.\(^{447}\) In his defense Mr. Angst had previously inspected other Japanese POW camps at other locations in Japan, Korea and Manchukuo where he made diplomatic attempts to mitigate the treatment of the POWs.\(^{448}\) To keep the paperwork straight on the Konan POW camp, the Japanese military completed the required Red Cross inspection and reported satisfactory results.\(^{449}\) With conditions at Konan as they were, perhaps it was best that Mr. Angst was never there. One of the camps Angst did visit was the camp at Jinsen, however no mention of the visit or the conditions noted were ever reported in the American press. Angst is believed to have visited the Jinsen camp on three occasions; the 7th of January 1943, the 13th of December in 1943, and on the 29th of November 1944.\(^{450}\) As the Japanese knew beforehand when Red Cross visits would take place, the inspectors rarely saw the camps as they really existed.

Of the 65 scheduled Red Cross visits to Japanese operated POW camps anywhere in Asia from 1942 to 1945 less than half would actually take place.\(^{451}\) Hugh Myers held at a camp in Japan reports that at the end of the war, a Scandinavian from one of the embassies visited their camp to tell them that the war was over. According to Myers “we instinctively mistrusted him.”\(^{452}\) Small wonder.

Working against the Japanese at Konan was the fact that many of the guards at the camp were Korean, a fact that the POWs were able to exploit to some degree.

At least some of the Korean guards were not as loyal to the Japanese as the Emperor might expect. Some of the guards passed on information to the POWs concerning the progress of the war and current events. (Refer to Appendix 3: List of Japanese Personnel). The problem with the war news the Koreans provided was that the POWs had no way to confirm what they were told. Smuggled copies of the Mainichi Shimbun (Daily News) provided small comfort as most of the war news contained therein was little more than Japanese propaganda. Though the newspapers of the time might be propaganda, the numerous reported Japanese victories did allow the POWs to track the progress of the war closer to Japan. The Japanese may have tried to hide their setbacks, but the POWs were aware of major events such as the Allied invasion of France or D-Day in June 1944, and the surrender of Germany in May 1945. There were other signs that indicated to the POWs that the war was drawing to a close. The first B-29 reconnaissance aircraft flew over the camp in mid-1944.\(^{453}\) Additional reconnaissance over flights of the area were eventually to become a near regular occurrence. Though the POWs might be starved for news, it was the food that Koreans smuggled food into the camp that kept them alive.

Many Koreans slipped food to the POWs by throwing it over the camp walls late in the evenings or early in the mornings. Older Koreans provided assisted wherever possible. These small alliances between the POWs and Korean guards would be instrumental in the ultimate survival of the prisoners as the war turned increasingly against Japan. After the war at least five of the Korean guards would swear out statements against the Japanese on behalf of the POWs. Medicines were also important.

Throughout the war Korean doctors are reported to have smuggled medicines to the POWs when possible. Without the assistance of local doctors, it is likely that many more POWs would have died due to minor illnesses. The camp hospital as provided for by the Japanese offered little comfort.

The camp hospital contained three rooms and was little more than a clinic. Day-to-day a Japanese Corporsman, Sergeant Ueshama ran the hospital. Ueshama’s primary duty seemed to be declaring all ill POWs well enough to work. A Japanese doctor Watanabe Tokio was in attendance every other day for two hours per day.\(^{454}\) When prisoners were too ill for

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\(^{448}\) Porter, Carlos Whitlock. RED CROSS VERSION OF MUKDEN PRISON CAMP, I Left My Heart In Old Mukden. Japanese War Crimes. War Crimes Trials. \texttt{http://www.codoh.com/trials/trib Japan.html}


\(^{450}\) Ibid.


\(^{452}\) Myers, Hugh M. POW – World War II. Metropolitan Press. Portland, Oregon. 1965


work, their rice rations were cut to only twice per day. It was a simple rule that seemed to be enforced at all Japanese POWs no matter where they were located: No work, no food.

The camp hospital received its medical supplies directly from the main Konan hospital operated by Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant. When sufficient supplies were not available from the Nichitsu hospital, the Japanese Army bore the responsibility for supporting the camp. When prisoners were seriously ill they were reportedly seen or hospitalized at the Hongu Factory Hospital, an outlying clinic operated by main Nichitsu run hospital.\(^{455}\) Generously, Doctor Watanabe Tokio reports that at least six prisoners were transported to the Hongu Factory Hospital over the two years the POWs were held at Konan.\(^{466}\)

Few POWs were ever actually admitted to the hospital and once admitted, a stay in the hospital might not result in the prisoner actually recovering or even receiving care. According to Cedric Allen Hayes an Australian prisoner held at the camp for nearly two years, the Japanese treatment for dysentery – three days starvation.\(^{457}\) At least one POW underwent surgery at the Hongu Hospital. The surgery was conducted without anesthesia.\(^{458}\)

Of the several hundred POW statements taken at the Konan Camp in September 1945 and throughout 1946, few actually mention the Hongu Factory Hospital and those few that do most often discuss the story of Frank A. Knowles. Knowles had become sick in late 1944. According to the statement of James Walters, a Private with the 2\(^{nd}\) Battalion, The Loyal Regiment and worth repeating here: “KNOWLES was taken ill towards the end of 1944, and was first thought to be suffering from Chronic [sic] bronchitis. But when he commenced to lose weight, the Medical Officer asked that he should be transferred to a civilian hospital where he could get proper attention. He was removed to the civilian hospital at KONAN early in 1945, after a delay of about 6 weeks, during which time the Japanese did nothing to have him moved. We heard from time to time that he was not getting any better, and in May, 1945, REID and I were sent for from work to go to the hospital, with a rough coffin. I understand that Captain MORRIS asked for permission to go the hospital, with another officer, but was refused.”\(^{459}\)

“When we arrived in the hospital, we were taken to a ward, where we saw that [sic] we thought was a huddle of blankets on bed [sic]. The Japanese officer, a Lieutenant or Captain named YOSTAKI, Ration Officer for our camp, told us to get on with it, and when we went to the bed a moved the blankets [sic], we found the body of KNOWLES. He was very thin, and very filthy. He was still wearing the same clothes in which he had been admitted to the hospital. There was only a folded blanket for a pillow, and three dirty Army shirts he was dirty all over his body. No attempt had been made to straighten out his body, and he was lying stiff in the position in which he had apparently died. There was an accumulation of dirt under his bed. We placed him in the coffin and the officer told us to nail up the lid, but only allowed me time to knock in 6 nails before we had to remove the coffin. In the locker by the side of the bed were unopened tins of Red Cross foodstuffs, which we took back to Camp, and handed to the M.O.”\(^{460}\)

Frank Knowles was the only Konan POW to die at the Hongu Factory Hospital. In fact he was the only POW in such serious condition that was ever admitted to the Hongu Factory Hospital for a lengthy stay. All other POWs that passed on while held at the Konan Camp died in the camp clinic with the full knowledge of Doctor Watanabe.\(^{461}\) None of the statements made by the POWs after the war mention Doctor Watanabe as being in attendance when a POW was seriously ill. In his statement taken in February 1947, Watanabe could not recall the name of even one of the POWs that died under his care.\(^{462}\) Nor could he recall ever treating a single POW who had been injured while stoking the furnaces at the Japanese Carborundum and Carbide Factory.\(^{463}\)

No-less-than six British and Australian POWs are known to have died at the camp, 15 at Jinsen. All six of the POWs that died at Konan passed away after beginning work at the furnaces. Three of the POWs died from respiratory related


\(^{462}\) Ibid.

\(^{463}\) Ibid.
illnesses; two from croupous pneumonia, one from pulmonary tuberculosis. The names of those that died at Konan, the location of their deaths, reason given for the death and the date they died where known are listed below.

- Private Anderson died at an unknown location for unknown reasons in Sept 1944
- Sergeant J. Fathers died at an unknown location for unknown reasons on 5 Feb 1945
- Reginald H. Hayter died at the Konan Camp of croupous pneumonia on 18 May 1945
- Frank A. Knowles died at the Hongu Hospital of pulmonary tuberculosis on 17 May 1945
- John Murphy died at the Konan POW Camp of high blood pressure on 14 Apr 1945
- Albert Whittaker died at the Konan POW Camp of croupous pneumonia on 25 Apr 1945

On several occasions, prisoners were known to have been transported from the Hongu Factory Hospital to the main Nippon Chisso Hiryo Hospital where they might stay for a short period of time. While one POW died at the Hongu Factory Hospital, none are known to have died at the main Nippon Chisso Hiryo Hospital. It is possible that several POWs eventually removed from the Konan Camp, subsequently died at other locations on the peninsula due no-less in part to the conditions they experienced while under Japanese rule at Konan. The movement of POWs between camps in Korea was rarely recorded in-depth by either the Japanese or the POWs. Most of the records that were maintained were destroyed in the immediate aftermath of the war by Japanese administrative personnel prior to Allied forces asserting control over the camps.

Some prisoners are reported to have been transferred from the Nippon Chisso Hiryo Hospital at Konan to an unknown hospital in Keijo, probably the Keiki Provincial Hospital at Jinsen. At Keijo the POWs actually received an acceptable level of care. Apparently factory-level and lower-level hospitals offered only basic care. Treatment at regional hospitals was far better than the treatment received at the county-, factory- or clinic-level.

Despite the presence of a Japanese corpsman and the Japanese doctor, for the most part the prisoners took care of themselves and their own. A Canadian doctor named Harry Morris of Newfoundland, Canada and held at Konan was not allowed to practice or assist the Japanese in attending to the needs of the sick and ill but, did so anyway. In early 1945 rather than risk a visit to the Hongu Hospital Captain George H. Bell of the Royal Army Dental Corps would undergo an appendectomy at the camp clinic. Lacking anesthesia the POWs strapped Bell to a table and otherwise held him still. A razor blade served as a scalpel. Captain Bell passed out early in the procedure, was sewn up with cotton thread and survived the surgery. For the most part burns from working at furnaces of the Nichitsu facility were the most common complaint treated at the clinic.

During their years of imprisonment, most of those held at the Konan camp would contract malaria. The camp was located on a manmade island of reclaimed land in the middle of a swamp; disease was commonplace. While malaria was ever-present, most of the prisoners that died at the camp succumbed to malnutrition and over-work. Many survivors would perish in the years immediately after the war as a result of diseases acquired and left untreated during their imprisonment in Korea and other locations. As the U.S. Army would describe the camp in the aftermath of the war “The facilities for bathing were fairly good, but in general medical conditions were bad; the latrines were filthy, hospital facilities were poor, and the medical care which the prisoners received had been very poor indeed. In spite of these facts, the general physical condition of the prisoners when they were evacuated was surprisingly good. One hundred and five cases of malaria were unrecorded on 11 Dec 1944.

As for medications few prisoners ever report receiving any more than aspirin powders. When available, Vitamins A, B, and C were sometimes provided. As the war ground on into late 1944 and into 1945 the availability of medicines such as quinine, sulvalzan, sulfon and diphtheria anti-toxin became far more limited; quantities of the more common medicines such as aspirin were near nonexistent. After March 1945 the POWs received no medicine from either Nichitsu or the Japanese Army.

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647 Ibid.
650 Ibid.
Goro Uchida, a Japanese military doctor serving at the Keijo POW Camp with the Japanese Medical Corps interviewed after the war, provided some insight into health conditions at the Konan Camps during inspections he conducted during the war.

“4. Q. When you inspected the Jinsen and Konan Camps did you have authority to give orders on anything of a medical nature? That is, could you order the Doctor at these camps to correct certain matters which you thought needed correcting?

A. I could not give orders but I could give my opinion on matters relating to medical conditions etc. at those camps.

5. Q. Why did you make these inspections if you could not give orders to correct improper conditions? Who did have the authority to issue orders on medical matters?

A. I went to the Jinsen and Konan Camps to inspect on the sanitary conditions and the conditions of the sick PW’s at those camps. If the conditions were bad or the patients were not receiving proper treatment I would give my opinion on these matters. I made my suggestions to the doctor and the camp commander at these camps.

I could go to the camp commander and report the medical matter which needed correcting. He would order to the camp doctor that the correction be made. Noguchi was the authority above the camp commander who could order that a correction be made. Actually it was never necessary to use this means to correct something.

6. Q. Did you inspect the work conditions as the Carbide Factory at Konan before the PW’s began to work there?

A. Yes, I inspected the work conditions but it was after the PW’s had begun to work there.

7. Q. Did you approve the work conditions? Were they alright from the health standpoint?

A. I did not give an okay but I gave my opinion to Col. Noguchi. My opinion was that the working conditions were not good for the health of the PW’s. It was too hot and too dusty working on the furnaces at the Carbide Factory.

8. Q. Who was responsible for keeping the prisoners at work on the furnaces after you recommended that the work was unhealthy?

A. In my opinion Col. Noguchi; the Camp C.O. at Konan and the Factory Officials.”

In March 1946 Goro Uchida was again interviewed regarding his service with the camp at Konan:

“Q. What were your duties at the Konan Camp?

A. I inspected the medical records and the condition of the POW and Japanese soldier patients at the Camp. The medicine was generally supplied to the Konan Camp by the hospital of the Nippon Carbide Co. In case of an emergency and the medicine is was not available, the Keijo Camp would supply the medicine. I had the duty to report any bad medical conditions I observed at the Konan Camp. Once I told NOGUCHI that I went to the Carbide Company Hospital several times and complained to them to furnish more sufficient medical supplies. I told them to treat the POWs good so that they would get well. I went to the company doctor to change medical matters at Konan.”

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472 Ibid.
As the war progressed with Japanese cities being bombed and its island empire contracting, those Japanese at the camp were reported to have become even more reasonable in their demands. In 1943 the Konan camp began to receive mail. On Christmas Day, 1943 the camp held a Carol Service were issued a bit of extra food and even held a concert. In early 1944 the camp received a shipment of Red Cross parcels. Near the same time the camp received a shipment of technical and history books from the YMCA. In the summer of 1944 another shipment of Red Cross medicines and clothing arrived.

The Japanese Collapse at Konan

In early 1945 the POWs held at Konan began to get more war news from outside the camp, however the details were often hazy and incomplete. The POWs knew that the war in Europe was not going well for Germany and Italy. It was also apparent to the POWs that the Japanese were being driven back island-by-island across the Pacific. Shortages such as fruits and vegetables began to occur more often. The British and Australians officers had been previously told in October 1943 that the POWs would be killed if Japan lost the war, and slaves forever if Japan won. That information was well-known to the officers of the camp but had been withheld from the rank and file.

The POWs now increased their efforts to obtain more current news using Red Cross supplies to bribe Korean guards for more information. After Germany’s surrender in May 1945 Captain Otaki’s “informations” now became a forum where the principal answer to any POW issue was “no!” The food situation also began to grow steadily worse.

The daily stew became basically heated water; the fish previously provided began to disappear. Red Cross parcels, when issued, were cut from one per man, to one box per two men. The camp routine went on per the usual, working parties continued to go out, however there was the sense among the POWs that the war was reaching a climax. The Japanese guards themselves began to dig air raid shelters. Air raid sirens were tested with alarming regularity. Most of the POWs now saw the Japanese as preoccupied with their own thoughts, their mood subdued. Informations were often cancelled with little notice with no apparent reason. The Korean guards began to talk of the Japanese as “leaving.” As 1945 reached a mid-point, Japanese in the camp and elsewhere began to burn records and documents. Weeks later a Korean guard patrolling near the window of a barracks whispered “Japanese go – kill you first.” Captain Kinlock now assembled the officers and squad leaders and informed them of the earlier threat that they would be exterminated if Japan lost the war.

At the gathering it was agreed by all present that despite the change in the attitude of the guards that the POWs should carry on as if they had no unusual concerns. The POWs could not afford to give the Japanese some reason to kill those present. It was agreed among the POWs that in the event of some Japanese attempt to eliminate them that the survival of some, would require the cooperation of all. Captain Kinlock ordered a 24-hour watch headed by a regular officer or a warrant officer. If the Japanese were to move against the camp those on watch would raise the alarm by banging tin plates together. As the alarm spread it was to be repeated in hut after hut until the entire camp was alerted. The officers expected that any attack on the camp would come through the main gate, the largest opening in the surrounding wall and the main link between the Japanese and POW sections of the camp. It was a desperate situation, one in which few of the POWs could expect to survive.

The officers divided the camp into four separate sections, probably based upon the four main barracks areas. Each section identified a place in the wall surrounding the camp they would attempt to scale in the event of an attack. Unlike a plan of attack whose strength was found in organization, the plan to flee the camp would rest on creating confusion. The POWs would attempt to flee in several different directions to disrupt the Japanese plan of attack. With no firearms, over the last two weeks of the war the POWs gathered rocks, boards, pipes, tree limbs; anything that could serve as a weapon. It was a primitive plan. Captain Cramsie admitted years later that the officers expected only about 30 percent of the POWs to survive in the face of automatic weapons, but it was better than sitting still for a massacre. It was a tense frightening situation, to survive the war then be killed when it ended.

672 Ibid.
673 Ibid.
674 Ibid.
675 Ibid.
676 Ibid.
677 Ibid.
678 Ibid.
679 Ibid.
680 Ibid.
681 Ibid.
682 Ibid.
683 Ibid.
According to Arthur Cramsie the POWs now slept fully clothed, boots on.\textsuperscript{484} They kept anything that they wanted to take with them close at hand. It was early August, the skies were clear, the air dry, and the moon was full. Those assigned as sentinels stood guard, watched and waited. On the afternoon or evening of 7 August a Korean guard, again passing under a window whispered to those inside “Big Bomb – Big Bang.”\textsuperscript{485} The warning was too far outside the prisoner’s realm of experience to understand what had happened.

The POWs were aware that Tokyo had been bombed by U.S. bombers, but not that it had been burned to the ground and was no longer a viable target. They knew nothing of the American attacks on Japan’s other major cities. The best that the POWs could come up with to explain the warning was that it probably referred to “a massive raid on Tokyo by a large force of bombers.”\textsuperscript{486} The information, scheduled for the morning of 8 August was cancelled, but Japanese activity within the camp increased in tempo.\textsuperscript{487} Viewing the activity with suspicion; the level of tension within the camps now increased dramatically. Squad leaders now reorganized their squads. The POWs slept in shifts. Half the men had to be awake at all times. Everyone remained fully dressed. Several days later, a source at the factory told the POWs that there had been another big explosion. This time the information was more specific, Nagasaki had been attacked with an atomic bomb.\textsuperscript{488}

14 August saw the cancellation of the morning information. Work parties, even those supporting the carbide furnaces were cancelled.\textsuperscript{489} With all the prisoners now confined to the camp the POWs expected the worst.

On 15 August Captain Otaki called for Captain Kinlock and informed him only that the Emperor had ordered Japanese forces to lay down their arms. Otaki also informed Captain Kinlock of Russia’s entry into the war; a move none of the POWs expected. At no point did Otaki utter the word “surrender.”\textsuperscript{490} According to Otaki, until he was so informed by Japanese commanders in Keijo the POWs remained his responsibility. The POWs continued to watch, but after a few days it was clear that the guards no longer had any interest in continuing the fight. Face-saving aside, the war was over.

Twilight of the Japanese Empire at Konan

40 years after the surrender Arthur Cramsie would write that “we entered a strange and unreal twilight period of neither one thing nor the other.”\textsuperscript{491} The war was over, they had survived, they were now free men, but it was also an illusion. The POWs at Konan were located far behind enemy lines and isolated. They would first be heavily dependent upon the good will of the Japanese to keep them informed of ongoing events, and later dependent upon the Soviet Union. The Japanese, for all intents and purposes, remained in control and demanded that the POWs “carry on as usual.”\textsuperscript{492} Otaki did not have the authority to make any drastic changes and like the POWs, awaited direction from his commanders in Keijo. Captain Otaki did however agree to cancel morning roll calls and limit unnecessary Japanese intrusions into the camp. The war was over, there was no need for any of the POWs to die. More than a few POWs wanted to settle old scores with “the little yellow bastards.”\textsuperscript{493}

With Japanese authority diminished, Koreans outside the wall celebrating the Japanese defeat, and the POWs now free; the camp began to descend into chaos. As armed Japanese guards stood outside the camp, British officers stepped in to reassert control. Captain Kinlock established a camp office or orderly room. A military police unit was formed to restore some form of stability. Orders were now issued and the men were expected to follow them.

On the 26th of August, a B-29 overflew the camp and loitered about the city. With each pass over the area the bomber flew lower and lower. The POWs began to gather in the yard waving at the bomber. On the underside of the bomber’s wings could be read the words “PW SUPPLIES.”\textsuperscript{494} Once the bomber crew identified the camp they dropped leaflets in English and Dutch telling the prisoners that additional aircraft would follow in three days, 29 August 1945. The leaflets asked the prisoners to paint the letters “PW” onto the roofs of buildings within the camp to aid the planes in locating them. The leaflets also advised the POWs to mark out and set up a drop zone for the bombers arriving on the 29th to target with the supply drops. That night it was rumored that Red Army forces were nearing the camp. Captain Kinlock decided on an attempt contact to make contact with the invading Soviets and in the late evening departed the camp heading north. He would not return until the next morning.

\textsuperscript{484} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{485} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{486} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{487} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{488} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{489} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{490} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{492} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{493} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{494} Ibid.
In the meanwhile the other British officers at the camp attempted to convince Captain Otaki to lower the camp’s Japanese flag. The British officers feared that approaching Soviet forces might ignore the surrender and simply open fire on the camp. Otaki refused the first request falling back on a lack of orders from his superiors in Keijo. A second request, with Soviet small arms fire now audible in the background about a mile away found Otaki more reasonable — the Japanese flag over the camp was taken down for the last time. Captain Cramsie acting as Orderly Officer, the U.S. equivalent of Officer of the Day, requested Captain Otaki to dismount the camp guard, stack arms, and confine the guards to their barracks. The Soviets would remove the Japanese from the camp at the end of August.

Once away from Otaki Captain Cramsie issued “guard mount.” The POWs retrieved Japanese rifles from the former guard house and assumed full control of the camp. The guard lacked the spit and polish normally associated with the British Empire; their boots were dirty, their uniforms were no more than rags, but their pride was apparent to all. The gates to the camp were opened wide and left that way. Being night; all lights in the camp were turned on and left burning. The Flag of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, used for the funerals of six men over the past year rose over the Konan POW camp. In northern Korea, on the morning of 27 August 1945, the sun would rise on the Union Jack. In the background hovered the great unknown, the approaching Soviet Red Army. Captain Kinlock returned early that morning.

Freed by the Russians

As Captain Cramsie would report 40 years later, “The first wave of Russians were the wildest soldiers we had ever seen: we were I suppose, glad to see them, but when they moved on south we heaved a huge sigh of relief!” Captain Kinlock had returned with two Soviet soldiers. The three had obviously been celebrating. The two Russians did not speak English but powered by the bottle, the words “Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt,” was all one needed to propose a toast and raise a glass. As the minutes passed more frontline Red Army troops began to arrive. Some were kids, no older than seventeen. Youthful soldiers were common to all sides during WWII. According to Arthur Cramsie “their blood was up and they were drunk with killing and alcohol. They were festooned with clothing and arms they had taken from the Japanese and appeared to be completely wild and undisciplined.”

In a classified report sent first to General MacArthur and later forwarded to the Joint Chiefs, Leonard Baradell hitchhiking into Konan with a POW recovery team wrote “the Russians, from the Manchurian border to areas below Kanko and Konan industrial districts, are indulging in widespread and indiscriminate looting of both Korean and Japanese property; and are indulging in rape and robbery of both Koreans and Japanese by armed force.” Cramsie wrote “they frightened the life out of us, far more than they Japanese had ever done!” According to Baradell not a day went by that he did not observe looting taking place somewhere in the area of Kanko or Konan. On one occasion Baradell asked and was actually allowed to accompany a looting party. The soldiers of the Red Army were shameless; they had the act of looting down to a science.

According to Baradell the Soviet procedure for which went something like this: “The Russians, armed with tommy guns, would drive up to a Korean or Japanese house, fire a few shots in the air, then break into the house, drag out what women (mostly young girls) they could find, put them into the truck along with the furniture and any other article that caught their eyes, and drive off to their barracks. After a day or two the girls are thrown on the street. The scene must have been comparable to any stereotypical movie of the era depicting Russians as an unruly horde. Most of the looting was done at night.

Arthur Cramsie wrote that the Russians “fired their light automatics off, even inside the buildings missing us all by inches. It was quite a night; we almost wondered if the price of liberation was worth it but, miraculously, the night passed without anybody getting hurt.” Once the Japanese were relieved of command the Soviets left the prisoners to their own devices. The Japanese Army was no longer there to provide any food or resupply for the camp. The Soviets on the other hand were unconcerned with the welfare of the POWs. In the end it was Korean and Japanese civilians who would provide for the camp.
As Baradell would relay to MacArthur, “Many hundreds of Korean and Japanese women in the vicinity helped feed the prisoners after the Japs were thrown out. At first they bartered with the prisoners in a healthy way, the latter paying in Korean yen for eggs, tomatoes, potatoes, and so forth – food they had not tasted in three and a half years. As time went on, however, the women would bring food to the prisoners without seeking anything in return. They said the prisoners were their friends, and the Russians their enemies.”

On the morning of 29 August, another B-29, Z-33, Serial Number 42-24700 Slick Dick, passed overhead. It circled the area looking for the camp. The POWs began to assemble and wave to attract the attention of the bomber’s crew. Once the crew identified the camp it circled north behind the nearby mountains returning low over the camp, its bomb bay doors open.

The first drop was too low. The parachutes attached to the drums of supplies did not have time to open. According to Cramsie the drums buried themselves three foot into the ground. No one was hurt during the delivery and none of the POW statements taken after the war ever mentions the camp hospital being struck by a wayward pallet or drum of supplies. James Miller, a POW held at the camp, simply reported that the supplies were dropped and carried into the camp, suggesting that nothing unusual occurred. Several POWs Arthur Kerr among them, did come close to being killed by a drum of cocoa and sugar.

Ken Marshall would write to Robert Rainey 48 years later that “you were one of the fellows that nearly brained me with a two ton crate of ‘K’ rations on August 29th 1945. I was standing there in an open field in Konan, north Korea, waiting for this little Red Cross parcel to my hands when seconds later it turns out to be a ten by four feet crate that made a hole in the ground big enough for a ‘bus within and arms’ length of me.” In a letter of 3 December 1993 Marshall would tell Eugene Harwood of a nearby Korean home that was demolished in the first delivery by two 40-gallon drums of apricot jam.

On its next pass over the bomber climbed to gain altitude before releasing the drums giving parachutes more time to open. The bomber made a final pass over the camp waving its wings as a “goodbye” as POWs waved and cheered. Drums were collected, contents sorted, food distributed. The POWs had clean clothing, socks, and boots. The sick had food and medicine. Compared to the war and the bombing of Japan, many would overlook the significance of the supply effort. In 1987 Cramsie would write that the “supplies transformed out lives and returned us, for the first time for three and a half years, for all the bombing of Japan, for the war and the pressure, for this little Red Cross parcel to my hands when seconds later it turns out to be a ten by four feet crate that made a hole in the ground big enough for a ‘bus within and arms’ length of me.” A second bomber soon arrived as it departed the area Hog Wild was only minutes out and on approach

**Passage to Konan**

Hog Wild landed at Iwo Jima at about 0625 local (K) time spent less-than two hours on the island, refueling and getting any additional information on the targeted POW camp. The bomber departed the island at 0810 hours (K) time. Little is known about conditions faced by the crew as they departed Saipan and flew toward Japan. According statements given after the fact, nothing of real significance regarding their inbound flight was reported. No engine trouble, no low oil pressure, no loss of fuel.

Much of the flight would be over the Philippine Sea. On a straight line from Iwo Jima to Konan, the flight would cross Japan at about 7,800 feet, south and west of Osaka then into the Sea of Japan (present-day East Sea) before reaching Korea. The flight from Saipan to Konan would cover a one-way distance of about 1,800 nautical miles. Lieutenant Harwood would later report the bomber encountered “no flak, Jap planes, no sweat.” The Superfortress did encounter a violent weather front over Japan accompanied by heavy rain. 25 miles from the coast of Korea, Hog Wild descended to an

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505 Msg. CINCAFAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan. To: WARCOS. ID Number: CA 52414. 28 September 1945. Formerly: SECRET TOT. Declassified on 11 July 1975.


510 Personal correspondence, Ken Marshall to Eugene Harwood. 5 December 1993.


514 Ibid.
altitude of 800 foot. Eugene Harwood reported the aircraft’s radar as working well indicating that it was used or in-use as an aid to navigation.

As Hog Wild exited Japan on an otherwise uneventful flight, it was entering an unstable and confused area where fighting between the forces of the Soviet Union and Japan continued more than nine days after the war in the Pacific had ended and Japan had surrendered. Fighting in the area of Konan would last into November 1945, more than three months after WWII had ended. The Japanese would look upon the Soviet attack as a “stab in the back.” The Soviets would look upon the attack as long overdue payback.

Section 31 – JAPANESE-SOVET RELATIONS: A PERIOD OF TENSIONS

During the YALTA Conference in February 1945, Joseph Stalin (18 Dec 1878–5 Mar 1953) agreed to terminate the Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1941 with a declaration of war against Japan to follow three months after the surrender of Germany. The Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1941 had been signed in Moscow by Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (3 Mar 1880–26 Jun 1946), Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union Tatekawa Yoshitsugu (3 Oct 1880–9 Sept 1945), and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Mokhailovich Molotov (9 Mar 1890–8 Nov 1986) on 13 April 1941. At the time it was signed the pact provided for the security needs of both countries.

The Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1941 also known as the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact of 1941 allowed the U.S.S.R. to concentrate on the growing threat of war in Europe, while securing its eastern borders against possible Japanese aggression in the area of Outer Mongolia. Japan wanted a nonaggression pact with the U.S.S.R. for much the same reason. Japan sought to secure the frontier of its puppet state of Manchukuo against a possible Soviet invasion. Much like the Soviet Union the treaty allowed the Japanese to focus their attention on other areas such as the growing war in China, and Japan’s increasingly deteriorating relations with the U.S. The Soviet Union abrogated the treaty on 5 April 1945.

The tensions between Japan and the Soviet Union that led to the treaty dated to the Russo-Japanese War, but more recently had centered on the creation of their two respective satellite states; Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo. From 1932 into 1939 the border area between Manchukuo and Mongolia had been the scene of a long-running conflict between the two nations. The conflict culminated in the Battle of Khalkhyn Gol or the Nomonhan Incident of 1939 for which the Japanese paid dearly.

Section 32 – THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC

The establishment of Outer Mongolia predated the formation of Manchukuo by about 12 years. Outer Mongolia had broken away from China during the collapse of Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) China in 1911. It took the Outer Mongolia another nine years to firmly establish its independence but not without external interference.

In 1919 following the Russian October Revolution, Chinese troops attempted to reassert the China’s rule over the area occupying the Mongolian capital Nisiel Khüree, modern-day Ulaanbaatar and placing under house arrest Bogd Khan (1869–1924) who had been installed as Mongolian Emperor when independence had been declared in 1911. Bogd Khan had been previously named the eighth Khalkha Jebsundamba Khutuktus, the spiritual head of the Gelug or “Yellow Hat Sect” of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia. Though Nationalist China achieved its goal of controlling Mongolia’s main cities in its 1919 invasion, Chinese control of the country was short-lived.

The following year, 1920, Baron Ungern von Sternberg (22 Jan 1886–15 Sept 1921) a subordinate of Grigori Semenov (13 Sept 1890–30 Aug 1946) the Japanese supported leader of the White Movement in Trans Baikal who had opposed the Bolshevik October Revolution, broke ranks with Semenov and led his troops into Outer Mongolia. After several battles with Chinese Nationalist forces in late 1920 and early 1921, in February 1921 von Sternberg succeeded in evicting the Nationalist Chinese from the area and occupying Ulaanbaatar in the process.

In the aftermath of the fighting, Baron Ungern freed Bogd Khan from house arrest and reinstated him as Mongolia’s rightful ruler, however von Sternberg actually ruled the country with the Khan’s approval as a dictator until early 1921. In July 1921 a joint Mongolian-Soviet army evicted Ungern from Outer Mongolia. Ungern then led his forces back into Soviet Russia where his counterrevolutionary army was ultimately defeated. Ungern was later executed by the Red Army.

516 Ibid.
517 Ibid.
With Soviet troops occupying Outer Mongolia Moscow supported the country’s desires for independence, albeit under some level of Soviet control. Three years later in 1924, Mongolia became the world’s second communist country. It is somewhat possible that the generals of Japan’s Kwantung Army may have viewed the detachment of Mongolia from China and its eventual independence as a communist state, as a model for Japanese designs on Manchuria.

Section 33 – THE KWANTUNG ARMY

Following the Japanese victory over Imperial Russia in the Russo-Japanese War and the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the southernmost section of the southern branch of the China Far East Railway was placed under Japanese control. To manage the enterprise the Japanese created the Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki-gaisha, the South Manchurian Railway Company. The Japanese rapidly expanded the former Russian railway system to encompass numerous large-scale Japanese industries constructed along the railway such as the Showa Steel Works, Dalian Ceramics, South Manchurian Glass, as well as flour and sugar mills, electrical power plants, shale oil and chemical plants. The rail company expanded coal mining throughout the area and further developed existing harbor facilities along the coast. The company encouraged Japanese immigration to the area through the construction of schools, libraries, hospitals and public utilities. The Kwantung Army, also known as the Kwantung or Guangdong Army, was established in 1906 in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War to defend the territory of the Kwantung Lease and the areas adjacent to the South Manchurian Railway. The Kwantung Army was permanently assigned to the Kwantung Leased Territory on the Liaodong Peninsula.

The Army’s name “Kwantung,” was reportedly derived from the Shanhaiguan Gate along the Great Wall of China which guarded a narrow pass between Manchuria and the Central East Region of China. The Kwantung Army was initially composed of one infantry division, one heavy siege artillery battalion and six independent railway guard battalions. In the decades after its establishment the Kwantung Army would develop into one of the largest and most prestigious military commands in the Imperial Japanese Army. It would be heavily reinforced and enlarged to a point where, by the start of World War II it would number well over 700,000 crack troops. The Kwantung Army became the center of Japanese power in Asia and operated nearly independent of Japan itself. Over the period of Japan’s descent into left wing extremism the Kwantung Army would be front and center in the move towards military dictatorship and totalitarian rule.

The Kōdōha and Tōseiha

In the course of its development, the Kwantung Army became a center of the highly political Kōdōha, the Imperial Benevolent Rule or Action Group. The Kōdōha rose to prominence in response to the downturn of the Japanese economy and far-reaching social change taking place in the country in the aftermath of World War I. The Action Group was founded by General Araki Sadao (26 May 1877–2 Nov 1966), who served as a general in the Imperial Japanese Army prior to WWII and was a leading ultranationalist theorist. As with many of the early officers who served in the Japanese Army in the post-Meiji Restoration period Araki was born into a family of former samurai. Araki graduated the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in November 1897 and served as a company commander of the 1st Imperial Regiment during the Russo-Japanese War. During WWI he served as the Japanese military attaché in Saint Petersburg, Russia. As a general-officer he served as the Commandant of the Army War College, Inspector General of Military Training, and later Minister of War in the cabinet of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (20 Apr 1855–15 May 1932).

Radical and ultranationalist, the Kōdōha sought a return to a romanticized Japan; one pre-industrial and lacking in western influence. Rising from within a Japanese Army that had fought and initially defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, the Action Group continued to view its larger northern neighbor as its primary threat into the late 1930s. As a group Kōdōha supported a preventative war against Russia known as the “Strike North” option of war in Asia. Strike North envisioned a preemptive attack against Russia as a means to ensure Japan’s continued survival, defeat communism, and expand Japan’s empire into Manchuria.

The Action Group viewed all Japanese bureaucrats as corrupt; politicians as opportunistic, and the leaders of Japan’s zaibatsu as simply greedy capitalists. During the 1930s under the reign of the Shōwa Emperor Hirohito, the Kōdōha sought the elimination of the liberal reforms brought about during the Taishō Period (30 Jul 1912–25 Dec 1926) which coincided with the reign period of the Taishō Emperor Yoshihito (31 Aug 1879–25 Dec 1926). The Action Group sought to accomplish its goals through a Meiji-type Restoration promoted as the Shōwa Restoration. The restoration sought by the Kōdōha would have been based upon state socialism much like that of Nazi Germany. Looking to the rise of European Fascism as a model
the Kōdōha adopted certain aspects of Fascism; primarily its militarist and expansionist ideas especially in regards to Asia. Recognizing that the modernization and mechanization of armies occurring in Europe as beyond the reach of Japan’s post-WW1 and Great Depression-era economy, Kōdōha emphasized the martial spirit a French-type “élan” over advanced weaponry. As Japanese soldiers would learn during WWII martial spirit would not stop bullets. The Kōdōha was opposed by the Tōseiha or Control Faction.

The Tōseiha was a loose-knit grouping of high-ranking influential officers, primarily Japanese Army, whose principal reason in existing as a group was their like-minded opposition to the Kōdōha or Action Group. The Tōseiha was led by such men as General Ugaki Kazushige (9 Aug 1868–30 Apr 1956), along with Sugiyama Hajime (1 Jan 1880–12 Sept 1945), Kuniaki Koiso (22 Mar 1880–3 Nov 1950), Umezu Yoshijiro (4 Jan 1882–8 Jan 1949), Nagata Tetsuzan (14 Jan 1884–12 Aug 1935) and Tojo Hideki (30 Dec 1884–23 Dec 1948). The Tōseiha represented the more conservative and nationalist groups within the Japanese Army as opposed to the more radical and ultranationalist Kōdōha. The term Tōseiha was actually a pejorative, a derogatory term developed by the Kōdōha as a way to refer to members of the Tōseiha.

The Tōseiha opposed the Kōdōha’s emphasis of élan or martial spirit over technological advances in weaponry and mechanization. Where the Kōdōha proposed aggression the Tōseiha proposed a more cautious course of action to include future expansion into China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, a strategy later termed “Strike South.” Japanese strategists believed that a move south would gain Japan tremendous natural resources and protect Japan’s Asian flanks. Where the Kōdōha sought confrontation with the bureaucracy and industrial leaders as a way to protect Japan, the Tōseiha sought cooperation and consensus. Where the Kōdōha viewed any future war as a somewhat localized and concentrated effort, a limited war for limited goals, the Tōseiha viewed any future war as being a general war; a total war where all of Japan’s resources would be necessary to survive to include Japan’s bureaucrats and industrialists.

While the two factions did oppose each other both groups sought a stronger central government under the control of the Shōwa Emperor, Hirohito. Various incidents occurring in the early to late 1930s eventually doomed the Kōdōha faction leaving the Tōseiha faction with little reason to exist. The first such incident leading to the eventual repudiation of Action Group was the March Incident of 1931.

**Politics, Confrontation and…Episodes**

The March Incident of 1931 was an attempted coup d'état later abandoned, which sought to eliminate political corruption through the establishment of a totalitarian socialist state in Japan. Leaders of the plot were heavily loyal to the Sakurakai, the right-wing Cherry Blossom Society formed by Hashimoto Kingorō and Isamu Chō. The plotters of the coup sought to bring about large-scale riots in Tokyo as a pretense for military control – a coup d'état to executed by the Imperial Japanese Army. When the coup began and the large-scale riots failed to appear on cue the plan was abandoned. Had the coup been successful the plotters would have formed a new Cabinet under the leadership of the then-War Minister, General Kazushige Ugaki. Though the coup failed the attempt was widely known. As War Minister Ugaki failed to punish those involved which allowed the plotters to plan and eventually attempt to foment a second coup. Under heavy criticism Ugaki would subsequently resign as War Minister and take up the post of Governor-General of Korea. The March Incident was followed on 18 September with the Manchurian Incident of 1931.

Discussed in greater detail elsewhere the Manchurian, or Mukden Incident of 1931 involved a Kwantung Army-staged event along the South Manchurian Railway, which was ultimately used as a pretense to the invade Manchuria to bring the area under Japanese control. The incident eventually led to the establishment in 1932 of the Japanese puppet-state of Manchukuo. On 21 October 1931 a little over one month after the invasion of Manchuria, the Sakurakai staged its second coup attempt known as the October, or the Imperial Colors Incident.

The motivations behind the October Incident were little different than those of the February coup attempt with the only new issue being the retention of the territorial gains achieved by the Japanese army in Manchuria. Part of the October Incident was to assassinate key Japanese statesmen and officials such as Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō, Grand Chamberlain Saito Makoto, Prince Saionji Kinmochi, and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki, and Foreign Minister Kijūrō. The Imperial Palace, Tokyo Metropolitan Police Headquarters and other key government buildings were to be seized by troops loyal to the Sakurakai, the ultranationalist Cherry Blossom Society. If this coup had been successful a new cabinet would be formed under the leadership of General Sadao Araki, chief of the Imperial Way Faction. The new government would ban political parties and consolidate the recent territorial gains of Japan in Manchuria. The Emperor would be forced to accept the Shōwa Restoration made in his name under the threat of physical violence if necessary.

The October Incident was discovered or perhaps acknowledged by Japan’s military leadership prior to its being implemented, causing the attempt to fail before it had begun. Public knowledge of the plot was again suppressed. Most Japanese would never hear of the October Incident until long after the war when prosecutors revealed the plot at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. In the aftermath of the incident the leaders of the Sakurakai were apprehended and detained, but those involved with the actual Imperial Colors Incident were never tried and remained at-large. For his part Isamu Chō received ten days house arrest. Cho would commit suicide in 1945 during the Battle of Okinawa, Hashimoto suffered a heavier fate; 20
days house arrest. The light punishment received by the plotters added to the level of unrest across the country and encouraged the coup leaders to stage further attempts. Most former Sakurakai members now joined the Toseiha.

Yet another attempt at radical reform and confrontation took place in early 1932 when military members both Army and Navy, attempted to assassinate key business leaders who were viewed as far too pro-Western. Known as the League of Blood Incident, its members originally planned to assassinate about 20 political and business leaders, however only two assassins carried out their assigned missions. While the plotters failed in their attempt to bring down the government the subsequent trial of the conspirators resulted in an outpouring of public support for their cause, further limiting the ability of the government to deal effectively with the ultranationalists. Additional attempts to change the government continued to follow.

In late 1934 a plot to murder a number of national-level politicians by Army officers associated with Kōdōha, later known as the November or the Military Academy Incident was similarly exposed before it could be implemented. The event was subsequently exploited by General Nagata Tetsuzan, a supporter of the Toseiha Faction, to force the resignation of General Masaki Jinzaburō (27 Nov 1876–31 Aug 1956) an Araki protégé from the third most powerful office in the Japanese Army, that of Inspector General of Military Education. General Nagata also used the November Incident as a pretense to demote about 3,000 Japanese Army officers tied to the Kōdōha. For his part Nagata did not escape retribution.

On 12 August 1935, Nagata was assassinated by a sword-bearing Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa Saburo (6 Sept 1889–3 Jul 1936) in what became known at the Aizawa Incident. Aizawa’s court-martial was convened by the 1st Division of the Imperial Japanese Army in Tokyo, a center of Kōdōha power in Japan proper. The Kōdōha used the trial as an instrument to condemn the Toseiha. During the trial Aizawa was portrayed as a self-sacrificing nationalist and Nagata as a corrupt schemer. Aizawa was found guilty and ordered executed by firing squad.

Seeking to lessen tensions within the national capital the Japanese Army subsequently reassigned the Japanese 1st Army Division from Japan into Manchuria. The 1st Army Division did not go peacefully. In the early morning of 26 February 1936 low-ranking officers of the Imperial Japanese Army, primarily those assigned to the 1st Division, began deploying into downtown Tokyo.

Known as the “2-2-6 Incident,” over the course of the next few hours Japanese Army soldiers seized key government offices to include the Diet, Army Ministry Headquarters and the headquarters of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. The soldiers killed Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo (27 Jul 1854–26 Feb 1936), Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Saitō Makoto (27 Oct 1858–26 Feb 1936), and the Inspector-General of Military Education General Watanabe Jotaro (16 Apr 1874–26 Feb 1936). The rebels stormed the residence of Prime Minister Okada Keisuke (20 Jan 1868–7 Oct 1952) who escaped injury, but only after the insurgents had mistakenly killed his brother-in-law and his personal secretary, Colonel Matsuo Denzō. The Grand Chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki Kantarō (18 Jan 1868–17 Apr 1948) was attacked and wounded at his residence. Suzuki carried one bullet (discovered after his cremation in 1948) for the rest of his life. Attempts to kill the former Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki (24 Nov 1861-25 Jan 1949) and Prince Saionji Kinmochi (23 Oct 1849–24 Nov 1940), Japan’s most honored statesman of the era failed. The revolt was largely supported by senior ranking officers associated with the Kōdōha faction who again failed to repudiate the insurgents.

The insurrection collapsed three days later in the late morning hours of 29 February 1936, but only after Emperor Hirohito demanded that the Army put down the uprising. In the aftermath of the 26 February Incident Araki Sadao now a Baron, retired from the Japanese Army. 19 men were eventually executed for their involvement in the incident; another 70 served time in prison. With the loss of Araki the power formerly held by the Kōdōha faction began to wane. While the Tōseiha faction won the debate the ideals of spiritual power and imperial mysticism espoused by the Kōdōha faction continued to heavily influence the army. The two factions were later brought together to form the Kodoshugisha – the Imperial Way also known as the War Party under the leadership and influence of General Tojo Hideki and Akira Muto (15 Dec 1892–23 Dec 1948). The center of military power now shifted from Tokyo to Manchuria.

Independent Actions in Manchuria

While the Kwantung Army reported to the Imperial Japanese General Headquarters and the senior organization of the Army General Staff its leadership and field grade officers often operated independent of control from Tokyo. The Kwantung Army conducted itself as if it were more the center of Japanese military thought and action rather than Japan itself.

The Kwantung Army was partially responsible for the 1928 Huanggutun Incident in which the train carrying Fengtian Army warlord Zhang Zuolin (19 Mar 1875–18 Sept 1928) was completely destroyed by an explosion near
Shenyang (Mukden). Wu Junsheng (23 Nov 1863–18 Sept 1928), the governor of Heilongjiang Province was also killed in the blast. Zhang Zoulin the target of the explosion lingered on for several hours afterward. Although the attack was planned by officers of the Kwantung Army it actually took the Kwantung Army by surprise. The leadership of the Kwantung Army was unaware of the planned attack and its timing; their forces were not mobilized prior to the explosion and were therefore incapable of exploiting the situation. Similar such events would follow.

At approximately 10:20 p.m. (H) local time 18 September 1931, three years to the day Zhang Zoulin was killed, a small explosion damaging 31 inches of rail line took place along the South Manchurian Railway in the area of Liútiao Lake. The explosion occurred only eight hundred meters from the Chinese military barracks near Beidaying. Known as the Mudken or “Manchurian Incident” the explosion served as a pretext for the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The explosion was designed less to damage the railway than to attract the attention of a nearby Chinese garrison and then fix blame for the explosion to the Chinese by their presence at the scene of the blast. 500 Chinese were killed at a cost of two Japanese dead.

On the morning of the 19th of September Japanese forces opened hostilities against the Chinese in response to the alleged attack. By that evening aircraft of the Chosen Army of Japan in Korea were landing in Mukden. At the time of the Manchurian Incident, the Kwantung Army numbered a little over 10,000 men.

Section 34 – MANCHUKUO: THE JAPANESE STATE OF MANCHURIA

Despite opposition from the Japanese cabinet, within five months of the incident and with the assistance of additional troops from Korea, Japan’s Kwantung Army went on to wrest the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning in Manchuria from an internally weak Republic of China. Japan followed the absorption of Manchuria, the traditional homeland of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) with the establishment of the State of Manchuria on 18 February 1932. The Manchurian Incident was the beginning of 14-year occupation of Manchuria by Japan.

Japan’s Kwantung Army subsequently installed Pu Yi (7 Feb 1906–17 Oct 1967); reign title Hsuan-t’ung – the last Qing Emperor of China, as the country’s regent. Two years later in 1934, Japan declared Pu Yi Emperor of Manchukuo, the Great Manchurian Empire, under the reign title Kangde. However, like Bogd Khan in Mongolia, real authority over the country rested with those behind the throne, primarily the Kwantung Army; its commanding officer also served as the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo.

In response to Japan’s aggression in Manchuria, China appealed for justice to the League of Nations under Article 11 of the League Covenant. The League, a forerunner to the modern-day United Nations formed a committee headed by Victor Alexander George Robert (V.A.G.R.) Bulwer-Lytton (9 Aug 1876–26 Oct 1947) the second Earl of Lytton of the United Kingdom to examine Japan’s actions in Manchuria. Known as the Lytton Commission the committee’s members traveled to Manchuria in the spring of 1932 to investigate the situation in northeast Asia. In reaction to the departure of the commission from Europe and prior to its arrival in Manchuria the Japanese staged the Manchurian Revolution, proclaiming the Republic of Manchuria an independent nation. Despite the creation of Manchuko the Lytton Commission pressed forward with their investigation.

The commission spent six weeks in Manchukuo interviewing officials of the Republic of China and Imperial Japan. The commission’s report of 148 pages published in 1932 discussed numerous issues relevant to the creation of the Manchurian state such as: The weaknesses of the previous Chinese administration of Manchuria, Soviet and Japanese economic interests in area and Japan’s involvement in the creation of Manchukuo. Despite efforts to maintain the appearance of impartiality the report was extremely critical of Japanese maneuverings in Manchuria. The completed report was largely a vindication of the Chinese position.

Overall the Lytton Commission concluded that the state of Manchukuo would have never been created without the interference and support of Imperial Japan. Despite Japanese protestations to the contrary the commission concluded that Japan’s claims of legitimate self-defense in the aftermath of the Mukden Incident in occupying Manchuria were largely untrue. The commission noted that the new government of Manchukuo lacked widespread support among the local population. Despite Japan’s best efforts in portraying the Manchurian Revolution as a result of an indigenous uprising, the commission found the claim invalid.

The Lytton Report concluded that contrary to Japanese claims the area of Manchuria remained a legal part of China. The report condemned Japan’s actions in Manchuria as outward aggression and refused to recognize the newly created state of Manchukuo. The Lytton report, recommending that Japan withdraw her troops from Manchuria and restore the area to Chinese sovereignty, was adopted 42 to 1 by the League of Nation, with only Japan voting in opposition. Despite its condemnation the League of Nations was incapable of enforcing the findings of the Lytton Commission onto and unwilling Japan.

Japan took advantage of the Lytton Report and the League’s refusal to recognize Manchukuo as a legitimate state as cause célèbre, and resigned its membership in the League through a much publicized walkout by Yosuke Matsuoka on 24 February 1933. The League could have taken action against Japan. It could have levied economic sanctions. It could have raised an army and forced Japan to withdraw from Manchuria. In the end it did nothing.

The Japanese walkout would eventually be cited as one of the numerous reasons the League of Nations ceased to exist and was eventually disbanded. Of the world’s 80 countries at the time only 23 ever officially recognized the new state to include the Vatican, the Denmark, Germany, Spain, and the U.S.S.R. With Manchuria under Japanese control, the Kwantung Army next set its sights on Outer Mongolia, the Russian Far East, and Siberia. Following Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations the Japanese government actively promoted Japanese colonization and the industrialization of Manchukuo. Between 1931 and 1932, about 100,000 Japanese immigrated to the area. Officially the Japanese government planned for 5 million Japanese to immigrate to Manchukuo between 1936 and 1952. The goal of the Japanese government was to establish 10 percent of Manchuria’s overall population as Japanese. When the Soviet Red Army overran the country in 1945 they took into custody about 850,000 Japanese. Failing to entice Japanese to immigrate to Manchuria a new policy was developed to encourage Koreans to immigrate to Manchuria. Prior to the creation of Manchukuo more than one million Koreans fled the Japanese Occupation of Korea for greater political and economic freedom in Manchuria. By the end of WWII more than 2.3 million Koreans had immigrated to Manchukuo.

During the 1930s Japanese zaibatsu under the guidance of the Kwantung Army began investing heavily in Manchukuo. To promote foreign investment and industrialization the Manchurian government with the assistance of the new zaibatsu or Konzern of Nissan, set up the Manchurian Industrial Development Company. Nissan eventually went so far as to relocate its headquarters from Japan to Manchuria. Nichitsu also invested in Manchukuo. Nichitsu partnered with Manchurian Industrial Development Company to build synthetic fuel plants in the country and electrical power plants along the Yalu River, the border between Korea and Manchuria. The company also participated in the construction of the Supung Hydropower Plant.

With Japanese investment and abundant natural resources Manchukuo was on course to become one of northeast Asia’s industrial powerhouses. By the end of the 1930s steel production in Manchuria led by the Showa Steel Works, had outpaced that of Japan. The Manchukuo Aircraft Company, established in 1938 produced training aircraft, light and advanced fighter aircraft and dive bombers. Other companies such as Manchurian Petroleum, Manchurian Chemical, and Dowa Automobile Manufacturing dotted the landscape. Despite the colony’s success there were continuing conflicts between Japan and the U.S.S.R. along the 3,000 miles of shared border between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia. Ultimately all roads led to Nomonhan.

Section 35 – MANCHUKUO AND MONGOLIA: ARMED BORDERS MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS


Over 400 incidents involving the military forces of Japan and the Soviet Union took place along the mutual border of Manchukuo and Mongolia between 1936 and 1938. Major battles developed in 1938 and 1939. Most engagements resulted in Japanese victories. Japanese intelligence on the subject of war with Russia suggested that Stalin’s continuing purges of the Red Army’s officer corps engineered by Adolf Hitler, had fatally weakened the ability of the Red Army to defend Mother Russia. They were wrong.

In June 1937 the Japanese Kwantung Army easily displaced Soviet forces from two small islands, Sennufa and Bolshoi, which the Soviet Union had earlier occupied along the Amur River on the border of Manchukuo. The victory led to increasingly large border skirmishes.

One year later in June 1938 Soviet frontier guards units begin the occupation of two strategic hills, Bezymyanaya and Zaozernaya known in Chinese as Shachaofeng and Zhanggufeng south of Vladivostok, just north of the Korean border. The two hills were located near Lake Khasan. After occupying the two hills the Soviets began to secretly fortify the base of Zaozernaya.

On 29 June 1938 Japanese forces attacked a Soviet patrol in the area. One month later the Japanese Army attacked the two hills but were initially forced back. By the 31st of June the two hills and most others in the area were under the control of the Japanese Army. Soviet attempts to dislodge the Japanese failed. Japanese forces eventually withdrew from the hills after seeking a ceasefire and a truce agreement.

Considered a partial victory by the Japanese in the spring of 1939 the Kwantung Army prepared for greater advances against the U.S.S.R. on the border of Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. In April 1939 the Kwantung Army’s 23rd Division deployed into a disputed area along the border at Kalkhin Gol (river) more properly known as Nomonhan.

Section 36 – JAPAN VERSUS THE USSR NOMONHAN

The Japanese Army believed that a swift victory in the area of Nomohan might encourage an internal revolt of Mongolians against the Soviet supported government of Outer Mongolia. The belief was somewhat well founded.

The Mongolian central government now under the control of the Mongolian People’s Party had moved to collectivize herding, eliminate the Mongolian nobility, ban private enterprise and suppress Mongolia’s Buddhist faith. Between 1937 and 1939 when Stalin purged the Soviet Red Army the Mongolian government had purged the Mongolian Army.

The policies of Mongolia’s communist government had led to a breakdown in the national economy and the country’s transportation system. Large-scale revolts against the government had occurred in western and southern Mongolia that could only be put down with the assistance of the Soviet Red Army. Strategically the Japanese believed that in the event of a major war with the U.S.S.R. if Japan controlled the country, Japanese Imperial forces operating from within an occupied Mongolia moving northward into the U.S.S.R could force the Soviet Union from Siberia with little effort. The adventure did not end quite as the Japanese had planned.

From May to July 1939 the Japanese hurled themselves across the desolation of Nomonhan in an effort to push a combined Soviet and Mongolian force from their positions along the Khalkha River. Japanese generals soon realized they had underestimated the resistance of the Soviets, whom they still identified with the Imperial Russian disasters of the Russo-Japanese War, years of successful border clashes, and Japan’s more unreliable Mongolian allies.

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523 Ibid.
524 Internal Discord and War with Japan. Mongolia – A Country Study. Federal Research Division
527 Internal Discord and War with Japan. Mongolia – A Country Study. Federal Research Division
The Russians, who defended their positions along the Khalkha River in 1939, were a different breed of soldier than those of Russo-Japanese War of and provided stubborn resistance to the Japanese advance: They were far more effective than the Japanese and their Mongolian cronies. Following a large Japanese air attack against the Soviet air base at Tamsak-Bulak, Mongolia, Joseph Stalin dispatched Georgi Zhukov (1 Dec 1896–18 Jun 1974) to the area to command the First Soviet Mongolian Army.

Enter Georgi Zhukov

Georgi Konstantinovic Zhukov was born in December 1896, in the village of Strelkovka, near the city of Maloyaroslavets in Kaluga Province. At the outbreak of WWI, he was drafted into the army of the Russian Empire, serving initially as a private in a reconnaissance company of a cavalry regiment. During WWI he was twice decorated with the Saint George Cross. He joined the Communist Party after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and served in the Red Army during the Russian Civil War of 1918–1921.

In 1919 Zhukov received the Order of the Red Banner and in 1923 was promoted to command a regiment of the 7th Samara Cavalry Division. During 1924 he attended the Higher Cavalry School at Leningrad. In 1933 he was assigned to command the 4th Cavalry Division. His success as the commander of the 4th was rewarded with the Order of Lenin. He was one of the few Soviet generals to survive Stalin’s 1937 purges of the Red Army which resulted in the execution, imprisonment or dismissal of nearly 37,000 Soviet Red Army officers.

In dealing with the Japanese incursion into Outer Mongolia, Zhukov proceeded to amass a Soviet force which included thirty-five infantry battalions against the Kwantung Army’s twenty-five, and twenty cavalry squadrons to the Kwantung Army’s seventeen. Zhukov had 500 aircraft, and nearly 500 tanks brought into the area. He successfully confused Japanese forces by broadcasting a series of radio messages ciphered in easily breakable codes designed to give the impression that he was simply occupied in building up his defenses. In July, the commander of the Japanese 23rd Division, Lieutenant General Komatsubara Michitarō (20 Jul 1885–6 Oct 1940), launched a two pronged attack designed to encircle Soviet forces and drive them from the area. It was a great plan on paper.

The Japanese Advance

Under the Japanese plan the first prong of the attack; three regiments, plus part of a fourth would advance across the Khalkhyn Gol to destroy Soviet forces occupying Baintsagan Hill on the west bank of the river. Once in possession of Baintsagan Hill the unit would then execute a left turn, advancing south to the Kawatama Bridge. A second prong, the Yasuoka Task Force under Lieutenant General Yasuoka Masaomi (21 Jul 1886–12 Apr 1948) consisting of two tank regiments, one artillery battalion, several partial regiments and battalions of Japanese infantry were assigned to attack Soviet troops along the east bank of the Khalkhyn Gol, at a position north of the Holsten River. Under the plan the two Japanese thrusts would meet in the Russian rear, encircling and destroying the Soviet force.

In early July the northern task force crossed the Khalkhyn Gol as planned driving the Soviets from Baintsagan Hill and advancing south along the west bank of the river. Zhukov, recognizing the threat launched a counterattack with 450 tanks and armored cars. The Russian armored force, despite lacking infantry support attacked the Japanese on three sides nearly surrounding them. The Japanese northern advance was forced to withdraw.

To the south a pitched battle ensued in which the Yasuoka Detachment, losing over half its armor was unable to break through the Soviet forces on the east bank of the river to achieve its objective. On 9 July a Soviet counterattack threw the battered and depleted Yasuoka Detachment back across the river. The southern attack collapsed; Lieutenant General Yasuoka was relieved of duty. The Yasuoka Detachment was dissolved.

On 20 August 1939, Zhukov ordered Soviet forces to advance. Zhukov, now deploying approximately 50,000 Soviet and Mongolian troops to defend the east bank of the Khalkhyn Gol crossed the river. Attacking the Japanese force with three infantry divisions, a tank brigade, 250 Soviet fighter and bomber aircraft, and massed artillery Zhukov’s attack; a near mirror image of the Japanese plan of July linked up at Nomonhan village in the Japanese rear five days later. The Japanese 23rd Division was encircled, cut off, and isolated.

Subsequent Japanese attacks to relieve the encircled division failed. A later attempt by the 23rd Division to break out of the Soviet trap collapsed. When the surrounded Japanese forces refused to surrender Zhukov annihilated the encircled division with artillery and air attacks. All remaining Japanese units east of Nomonhan retreated back into Manchuria. The
Battle of the Khalkhyn Gol or Nomohan further discredited the Kōdōha and the desire of factions within the Imperial Japanese Army for any future an attack into Russia. In 1941 the Japanese would attack south into the Pacific.

Though the Battle of Nomonhan ended years of conflict between Japan and Russia memories fade slowly; Moscow was unlikely to forget. The stage was set for Russia’s eventual retribution. In 1945 the Soviet Union would settle old scores against Japan with the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation.

Section 37 – THE MANCHURIAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

Though the Soviet Union and Japan had signed a Nonaggression Pact in 1941 suspicions about the validity of the Pact persisted. Maintaining a strong reaction force of aircraft and ground forces along the common border seemed to suit the needs of both nations. During WWII the Japanese maintained about 700,000 troops in the area to prevent Soviet aggression. Likewise the Soviet Union maintained 40 divisions (about 750,000 men) in the area to confront any Japan aggression.

During the war in the Pacific continued Japan withdrew its better armed and better trained forces from the area of Manchuria, replacing them with substandard divisions who were far less-well prepared. Likewise the Soviet Union moved its better divisions from the area of the border into Europe. As the war against Germany wound down, the Soviet Union began to shift its battle-hardened armies from Europe back to the Soviet Far East. Japan was now at a distinct disadvantage. By the early part of August 1945 the Soviet Union had positioned nearly one million men along the shared Manchurian-Soviet border. Faced with conflicting intelligence regarding conditions within the Kwantung Army, no one in the Soviet Union was entirely confident that Japan’s forces in Northeast Asia would be easily defeated, whether they would put up a strong defense or fight to a standstill. With that in mind, the negotiated peace of 1941 became a declared war in 1945.

Attack South

The U.S.S.R. entered the war against Japan in the Pacific with a large-scale invasion of Manchuria at midnight, Trans-Baikal time on 9 August 1945. The attack into Manchuria began one hour and ten minutes after the Soviet Union issued its declaration of war. Soviet forces advanced into Manchuria along three main routes; along the Chinese eastern railway from Lupin (Manchouli); along the Mongolian caravan route from Lake Bor in Southeastern Europe, and from the Sungari River valley near Khabarovsk. Including Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands the Soviet front extended nearly 4,000 miles.

Along its common border with the Soviet Union in Manchuria the Japanese had built 17 fortified districts consisting of 4,500 permanent emplacements. At the time of the invasion the Kwantung Army, now combined with the 17th Area Army of Korea and the 5th Japanese Air Army numbered in excess of one million men. The Soviet forces outnumbered the Japanese more than 1.7 times in terms of manpower. In aircraft and armor the Soviets outnumbered the Japanese 4.5 and 2.8 times respectively.

The wide Soviet sweep into Mongolia was designed to ensure that Japanese forces in Manchuria would be cut off from their forces operating in China. The Soviet attack into Korea would consist of ground forces invading across the common border, seaborne and airborne soldier insertions. Soviet naval artillery, air attack and amphibious landings behind Japanese lines would be used to eliminate Japan’s ability to reinforce or evacuate the Korean peninsula. No one would get in, no one could get out.

Soviet airpower was the first to initiate hostilities in Korea bombing the ports of Rashin, and Seishin. Japan’s sea line-of-communications with the Asian landmass were severed completely in the first days of the war. The Soviets quickly gained air superiority over Korea, Manchuria, the northern parts of China and the southern portions of Sakhalin Island.

Following air attacks, ships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet under Admiral Ivan Yumashev (9 Oct 1895–2 Sept 1972) began shelling the Japanese ports of and Yuki (Unggi), Rashin and Seishin located along the northeastern coast of the Korean
Peninsula. Rashin served as one of the primary ports in Korea shipping raw materials from Manchuria to Japan and was considered one of the better harbors in Korea. Soviet Pacific Fleet naval aviation units initiated three days of concentrated air strikes against the two naval bases of Yuki and Rashin, their wharves and harbors while also striking Seishin nearly 200 miles to the south. Soviet torpedo boats also entered the three harbors attacking Japanese surface ships docked at the ports as Russia began to sever Japan’s naval lines-of-communications with Korea and to protect the Soviet main port of Vladivostok to the north. Less than a week after the Soviet declaration of war Soviet airborne units and naval marines assaulted Rashin and Yuki. They would occupy and hold the two seaports until the main Soviet Red Army, entering Korea from Kainei (Hoeryong) on the 12th of August, arrived in the area to relieve them. With Rashin and Yuki now secured Soviet marines began moving south overland from Rashin toward Seishin. Soviet naval aviation initiated further anti-shipping sweeps off the Korean Peninsula between Korea and Japan.\footnote{528}

Soviet aircraft sunk the Japanese cargo ships Taishun Maru and Awakawa Maru near Seishin. The merchant cargo vessels Taiko Maru, Erimo Maru, and Kari Go were sunk in or off Rashin harbor. The Japanese army cargo ship Ishin Maru was sunk off the coast of Ulsan, far outside the area of operations agreed upon at Potsdam, Germany. The merchant cargo ship Shofuku Maru was sunk in Tsushima Strait several hundred miles south of the 38th parallel north. The Japanese Coast Defense Vessel No. 194, Coast Defense Vessel No. 198 and the Imperial Army cargo ship Tairetsu Maru were damaged.

At Seishin 45 miles south of Vladivostok, Soviet air attacks continued against the city until 13 August when the Soviet First Far Eastern Army under Marshal K.A. Merestskov (7 Jun 1897–30 Dec 1968) staged their third amphibious assault of the war in Korea. Soviet soldiers and sailors advancing from the port attacked through the city against violent house-to-house street fighting. On the 14th of August Soviet forces were reinforced by airborne troops landing near the city, with a second group parachuting into Seishin the next day. It was the only major reinforcement of Soviet forces required across Korea. On 15 August Japan surrendered. At Seishin the Japanese fought the Red Army to a standstill.

The town was largely secured by the evening of the 16th despite several Japanese attempts to retake the city. Fighting in the area of Seishin would continue for several more days as Soviet forces advanced westward out of the town. The Japanese made their final stand at Seishin several days later in the mountains in the west of the city after being surrounded by Soviet marines moving south out of Rashin. Soviet airborne troops also attacked and occupied Kisshu (Kilchu), an important railway junction 60 miles south of Seishin and 20 miles inland.

On the 16th of August Soviet amphibious forces attacked and secured the port of Genzan (Wonsan), 48 miles south of Konan. With Seishin to the North secured and Genzan now in Soviet hands, Konan stood isolated. Soviet forces now moved south overland toward Konan from Seishin, and north to the city from Wonsan. Ten days after the Soviet Union entered the war; 18 August, three days after the Emperor of Japan announced the surrender of the Empire, the Japanese Kwantung Army made its first efforts to seek an end to the conflict. The fighting continued on.

On the 24th of August nine days after the Japanese surrender, the Soviet Union inserted airborne units and staged their sixth amphibious assault of the Korean Peninsula against the city of Konan. As with Seishin, Konan was attacked from land, sea, and air. When the airborne troops landed in Konan they were 120 miles away from any other Soviet ground forces then operating on the peninsula. The Japanese 34th Army and the 59th Division headquartered in the city quickly collapsed under the weight of the Soviet invasion and by the early morning of 26 August the cities of Konan and Kanko were in Soviet hands. After taking Konan the military forces of the Soviet Union rapidly advanced down the Korean Peninsula reaching the 38th parallel north on 26 August.

In some areas such as Kaesong, the Soviet Red Army moved south of the 38th parallel north, only to retreat back across the line when U.S. troops landed at Jinsen on 8 September 1945.\footnote{529} Historically, on 12 September a small group of Allied correspondents were the first to make official contact with the Russian forces now occupying northern Korea.

\footnote{528} Poland Campaign (1939). War and Game. 5 September 2005. \url{http://warandgam.wordpress.com/2008/09/05/}

\footnote{529} Appelman, Roy E. South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu. (June-November 1950) Chapter I. South Korea and the Background of Conflict. CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1992. First Printed 1961-CMH Pub 20-2-1 \url{http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/20-2-1/St01.htm}
Soviet Union completed its occupation of northern Korea on 15 September 1945. The next day (16 September) a XXIV Corps Liaison Team moved northward establishing contact with the 25th Soviet Army and the 258th Soviet Division near Heijo. The liaison team left a radio party behind at Heijo to ensure continuous communications and connectivity with Russian forces. With the situation less-than-stable, Soviet forces immediately began to herd the more than one million Japanese who were cut off from the home islands in Korea into concentration camps near Konan. The Soviets began construction of concentration camps in the area of Konan on 15 September 1945.

Section 38 – KOREA: A BACKWATER ISSUE

Much as it had Burma, the U.S. military had long considered Korea a backwater issue against the greater war in the Pacific. Strategically; and probably correctly, the island hopping campaigns into the heart of Japan were far more important in the ultimate goal of defeating Japan. The U.S. had exerted little effort in penetrating Korea.

Several U.S. submarines entered the Sea of Japan (present-day East Sea) in July 1943, but the U.S. Navy had largely avoided the area after the USS Wahoo (SS-238) had been declared overdue on a patrol to the area on 2 December 1943. The Wahoo, commissioned in May 1942 was on its seventh patrol. Exiting its assigned patrol area in the East Sea south of 43 degrees latitude north, it was to make contact again in the area of the Kuril Islands after passing through the narrow straights separating Sakhalin from Hokkaidō Island. The loss of the Wahoo stunned U.S. submarine forces fighting in the Pacific. Operations in the East Sea were curtailed pending the development of better anti-mine technologies and tactics. The Wahoo was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register on 6 December 1943. Post-war reviews of Japanese naval records suggest that the Wahoo was sunk on 11 October 1943.

In June 1945 U.S. submarines began to reenter the East Sea, sinking numerous Japanese merchantmen plying one of the few waters then available for resupply of the Japanese mainland. In May 1945 the USS Spadefish (SS-411) was ordered into the Sea of Japan. On 10 June Spadefish sank the Daigen Maru No. 2, Unkai Maru, No. 8, and Jinstu Maru. On 12 June Spadefish sank the Daido Maru. Two days later Spadefish sent the Seizan Maru under. On 17 June it sank the Eijo Maru. The USS Sennet (SS-408), USS Torsk (SS-423) and USS Bowfin among others also patrolled the Sea of Japan between Japan and Korea. The USAAF also began to penetrate Korea.

In July 1945 U.S. B-29s began to mine the waters around most of Korea’s major ports, further limiting the transfer of troops and supplies between Japan and Korea. These long-range mining operations required Twentieth Air Force B-29s operating from the Marianas, to land and refuel in Iwo Jima prior to continuing their flights to the Korean ports of Fusan-Musan, Rashin, and Seishin. The mining flights to the northernmost Korean port of Rashin were among the longest combat missions of WWII. F-13 reconnaissance flights with their additional fuel tanks mounted in the bomb bay, flying over and across the peninsula were far longer in duration. In June 1945 one F-13, the Double Trouble flew a radar combat reconnaissance mission that covered a distance of 4,650 miles and is believed to have been the longest B-29 mission of the war. Total flight time for the mission was just under 23 hours. To complete the mission the bomber carried three extra fuel tanks in its bomb bay. Double Trouble carried about 8,000 gallons of fuel.

Section 39 – RECONNAISSANCE OVER KOREA AND TARGET FOLDERS

In late 1944 the U.S. began deploying the F-13 out of the Marianna Islands to conduct long-range imagery reconnaissance missions over Japan and Korea. By August 1945, Twentieth Air Force was operating a total of 52 F-13s out of its air fields in the Marianas. The Korean Peninsula was not out-of-reach to U.S. reconnaissance flights nor far too dangerous to the aircrews conducting the missions.

531 Msg. CINCPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan. To: WARCOS. ID Number: CA 52414. 28 September 1945. Formerly: SECRET TOT. Declassified on 11 July 1975
Historical target folders available on microfilm and in hard-copy at the National Archives at Adelphi, Maryland, reveal numerous over-flights of the Korean Peninsula by F-13 aircraft prior to the ill-fated flight of Hog Wild. These reconnaissance missions provided detailed imagery support for the development of target folders on all known and previously unknown, Japanese industries and military targets located on the Korean Peninsula. Each image used within a target folder lists the mission date of the imagery used to develop the target materials. This image date can be used in-turn, to track over-flights of the peninsula; revealing the number of missions, the unit conducting the mission, date of the mission, and so on, but only for the imagery used for the development of the target materials. Other imagery acquired during the war, and not used in target materials production remains unknown.

Using the imagery date as a reference for the day when a mission was flown, at least eight F-13 reconnaissance over-flights of the peninsula were conducted during 1944 and 1945 with no aircraft lost, no confrontations noted. As indicated by the imagery dates contained within the target folders, the earliest over-flight of the peninsula occurred on 10 December 1944, the last on 29 May 1945. F-13s imaged Fusan, Genzan, Jinsen, Konan, Seishin, and Yoshi. Imagery from these flights was used to create target folders on the Chosen Chemical Industry, the Chosen Oil Refinery, Heijo Army Arsenal, the Motomiya Chemical Plant, and numerous other civil-military targets. Many of the images taken in late 1944 and early 1945 had been taken by 20th Air Force F-13s stationed in India and operating from forward bases in China following the departure of all combat B-29s to the Marianas.534 Exploitation of the imagery gathered was not limited to the better known targets that had been previously identified from newspaper and insurance archives prior to the first over flights of the peninsula. Previously unknown facilities were also documented and analyzed. Mapping missions were also a priority.

No-less-than five imagery mapping missions, different from photo-reconnaissance missions were flown over the peninsula imaging numerous target areas to include Fusan, Konan and Moppo (Mok’po). The earliest photo-mapping mission took place on 17 November 1944. According a document known as World War II Records in the Cartographic and Architectural Branch of the National Archives, “target charts, target approach charts and photomaps and perspective charts of target areas in Japan, China, Indochina, Korea” and the Philippines were produced from these efforts.535

The Army Map Service (AMS) produced 17 city maps covering Korea’s largest cities to include Fusan, Genzan, Kanko, Konan and Seishin, all from updated imagery.536 The maps documented cotton, rice and steel mills; iron works, oil storage facilities, water towers, electrical power lines, military and even college dormitories. In the case of the largest industrial facilities such as those at Ch’innam’o (Namp’o), Konan and Seishin, each major building within the confines of any large installation was further identified. Of the Nichitsu facilities at Konan, every building within the plant was identified to include the Ammonia Synthesis Plant, Main Fertilizer Storage Area, Air Liquefaction and Nitric Acid Plants, the

536 Ibid.
Sulphuric Acid, Super-Phosphate, Magnesium and Aluminum Plants. Additional sources for these maps included The Japanese Imperial Land Survey, Hungnam, 1936; The Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Company Report, Osaka, 1937, and other Intelligence Data. None of the 17 maps documented any large-scale unidentified facilities in or near any major city on the Korean Peninsula. Though the maps were produced by the AMS for intelligence study, flight, mission and target planning, several entire sets of these city maps accompanied the Pauley Reparations Mission to Korea and Manchuria in 1946.

Maps and mission overlays held at the National Archives reveal that at least 10 additional flights covered the area of Konan alone. Further over-flights, acquiring imagery not used to develop target folders would have taken place with some regularity as there was a constant need for information on enemy order-of-battle, troop movements, and unit redeployments. Bad weather, cloud cover, the presence of dust blown across the peninsula from sand storms in the Gobi Desert, camera malfunctions and so on would have dictated additional over-flights as necessary. When high-resolution imagery of the target areas of sufficient quality to permit the development of target folders could not be acquired handheld imagery often obtained prior to the war was used to develop the required target folders. Some target folders contained handheld and additional reconnaissance imagery. The Konan folder contained handheld imagery of the Nichitsu facilities as well as imagery obtained by Air Corps reconnaissance units. Though target folders had been prepared none of the facilities targeted were ever bombed. In July 1945 naval aircraft did bomb several rail bridges near Seishin. Evasion and Escape maps of the Korean Peninsula were also developed over the area to increase the survival rates of aircrews lost or forced down over the area. Naval charts also produced to support naval operations in the area.

In 1941 the Engineer Reproduction Plant (ERP) produced 41 naval air charts of Japan and the coastal areas of China, Korea and Manchuria from a set of Japanese originals developed from 1934 to 1938. These charts were further updated from imagery and other intelligence materials available prior to December 1941. Maps of coal reserves, coal and oil facilities in Korea were produced in 1943. An additional 2,000 annotated aerial photographic prints used in the identification of industries, munitions plants, ammunition storage locations; shipyards and airfields are also held within these files. These maps contain no large-scale unknown facilities located in Korea.

While the Air Corps and Navy intelligence units were working issues related to Korea, the OSS had also been busy.

Section 40 – OSS PLANS FOR KOREA

The OSS was a wartime intelligence agency established by Presidential Military Order on 13 June 1942. The OSS was created to collect and analyze the strategic intelligence required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to successfully prosecute the war. The agency also conducted special operations not assigned to other U.S. agencies and military forces. The OSS took the war to the Axis. In Europe, the OSS established itself as a legend. During the war OSS Jedburgh teams penetrated Europe and Germany running guerilla and sabotage operations against German Occupied Europe, and returning downed aircrews to England. In Asia, its efforts were much less well known but also largely successful. The OSS was primarily active against the Japanese on the Asian landmass.

From 1943–1945 the OSS trained Nationalist Chinese troops in China and Burma, recruited Kachin, Burmese, and other indigenous irregular forces to conduct sabotage operations against the Japanese. These irregular forces often served as guides for Allied forces fighting the Japanese Army in Burma. The OSS helped arm, train, and supply numerous indigenous resistance movements, including Mao Zedong’s (26 Dec 1893–9 Sept 1976) Red Army in China, and the Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh (19 May 1890–2 Sept 1969) in French Indochina. OSS agents provided weather reporting across Asia and


Ibid.

Ibid.
where possible recovered downed airmen in enemy territory. Little known to history the OSS also located, recruited and trained numerous Koreans for insertion missions onto the peninsula.  

In 1942 the OSS recruited Rhee Syngman (26 Mar 1875–19 Jul 1965), the future president of the Republic of Korea as an operative. Rhee was inducted into the OSS with the rank of colonel by Colonel Preston Goodfellow. Rhee was instrumental in the development and training of Koreans for OSS Detachment 101 which was to be infiltrated into Japanese controlled areas in China, Korea and Manchuria. Some of these Koreans were trained at the Special Operations Executive’s (SOE) Camp X near Toronto, Canada. Others were trained at Area B, the Catoctin Mountain Park, Maryland and Prince William Forest Park in Virginia.

On 7 August 1945, General William Joseph Donovan (1 Jan 1883–8 Feb 1959), the head of the OSS, met with Kim Ku (29 Aug 1876–26 Jun 1949), the last president of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, in China, where Donovan agreed to send an OSS team to work with Kim’s Korean Independence Army. Donovan’s goal was to use Kim’s fellow Koreans as spies and saboteurs against the Japanese in any future land battles to liberate Korea. However, as of mid-August and the rapid end to the war none of the plans were ever implemented. In the end, unlike the Soviet Union, the OSS never penetrated Korea in any meaningful way. Like the OSS the Soviets also trained a number of Korean expatriates for eventual clandestine work on the peninsula during the war. By the end of the war one of these Soviet trainees would rise to become the leader of that group; his name was Kim Il Sung. Like their counterpart OSS agents none of the Soviet trainees under Kim Il Sung would land in Korea during the war. Kim himself did not return to Korea until 19 September 1945 when he landed at the port of Wonsan, then under Soviet control.

Section 41 – PROJECT NAPKO

PROJECT NAPKO was a clandestine plan to infiltrate Korean-Americans and Korean POWs into Japan and Korea to gather intelligence and commit sabotage in advance of the planned U.S. invasion of the home islands in late 1945. In the summer of 1944 the OSS began training about ten different groups of Koreans to infiltrate the peninsula. Most were drawn from among the Korean POWs held at Camp McCoy in Wisconsin. Some were recruited from Korean populations captured on Japanese-held islands as the U.S. advanced across the Pacific to include Pak Sundong, Yi Chongsil, and Pak Hyŏngmu. About 30 American officers were trained to accompany the various groups. A request initiating the plan was submitted by the OSS to the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff on 31 May 1945, only three months before the end of the war. NAPKO would have initially put seven Koreans ashore in Japan and Korea.

The Koreans to be landed in Japan were to make contact with the Korean minority then living in Japan, foment unrest, and possibly rebellion. Though many Koreans had immigrated to Japan before the war and worked in legitimate jobs on the islands, many Koreans had been pressed into service by the Japanese and were held as virtual slaves across the islands, most in conditions worse than those facing Allied POWs. The Koreans in Japan worked as stevedores in Japanese ports, mine workers in coal mines, and as labor building military fortifications such as the Matsushiro Underground Imperial Headquarters. It would have been a tall order for the Koreans to succeed and it is unlikely that any of those landed on the

546 Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 1385, Napko Project. Report by the Joint Staff Planners, 14 June 1945. Note by the Secretaries, Decision on J.C.S. 1385, Napko Project. 19 June 1945; JCS Message, WARX 53111, 22 August 1945. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 1942-45, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Folder CCS 385 Korea (13-16-42), RG 218, Box 140, NA.
of Japan would have survived the venture. There were language differences to consider, the Korean and Japanese language were vastly different; during the war the movement of Japanese were tightly controlled; Japanese police were constantly looking for Koreans that had escaped Japanese mines. It is likely that anyone attempting to infiltrate Japan, without the proper documents, roaming through Japan’s cities or countryside would have escaped notice and eventually capture.

The atomic bomb ended the war before the Koreans trained under OPERATION NAPKO could be deployed from their training base at Catalina Island off the southern coast of San Francisco to the peninsula. Those recruited Koreans captured with Japanese military forces in the island campaigns were sent back to their respective POW camps and never served in combat with U.S. forces, others were simply sent home. There was however, one other OSS operation ongoing at the time that was executed, resulting in the end of OSS operations in Korea – the Eagle Mission.

The Eagle Mission

Eagle was one of nine OSS missions ordered out of Xian on POW relief missions by Colonel Richard P. Heppner, Chief of the OSS, China. The missions were coded named Cardinal, Duck, Eagle, Flamingo, Magpie, Pigeon, Quail, Raven and Sparrow. The teams were to land at Hainan Island, Hanoi (French Indochina), Harbin, Keijo (Korea) Mukden, Peiping, Shanghai, Vientiane (Laos) and Weihsien (Shandong). The teams were ordered to make contact with Allied POWs in their assigned areas; take the prisoners under their protection, and render all humanitarian and medical assistance possible. Their follow-on orders were to locate and secure any nearby airfield for use in removing the POWs from that area. Lacking an airfield, the teams were to identify a drop zone to support the insertion of additional medical and relief personnel. The teams were also assigned an intelligence mission; to locate any downed airmen or escapees, and to develop an order-of-battle for the Japanese forces in their areas. It was suspected that some Japanese military commanders might decide to continue the war, and information on the size and disposition of Japanese forces remained essential. Time was also an issue.

The members of the OSS teams assigned had only days to prepare for their missions. Though the idea of a rescue had long existed, actual planning would take place over a period of days, not weeks or months. Magpie was planned over a period of about ten days. Major John “Jack” Singlaub, the commander of Pigeon, the OSS mission to Hainan, assembled his team in only two days.

In the early morning hours on 16 August 1945 the day after Japan surrendered Eagle team, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Willis Bird climbed aboard a C-47 in Xian, China, on a one way trip for Keijo. Bird was a 36-year old graduate of the Wharton School of Finance. Prior to the war he had served as an executive for Sears, Roebuck in Pennsylvania and New York. His fellow OSS officers considered him a “con-man, an “operator” and “vain.” Bird is reported to have carried a pair of pearl-handled revolvers. The Eagle team was too large to fit aboard a single B-24, and the C-47 could not carry enough fuel for a round trip. The C-47 would have to land in Korea and refuel at the grace of the Japanese prior to returning to China. Bird, seeking to “liberate” Korea from Japanese oppression single-handedly and in violation of the previous orders of Colonel Heppner, had added to the Eagle team a United States OWI reporter Mr. Henry R. Lieberman (24 Nov 1916—15 Mar 1995). During the flight to Korea the mission received reports that Kamikaze aircraft were continuing to attack U.S. ships and that the ordered ceasefire issued by Japan’s Emperor Hirohito was being ignored. The team was ordered to turnabout and return to Xian. Two days later, on 18 August 1945 the team once again departed Xian, China for Keijo, Korea.

Arriving at Keijo the team was met by members of the Japanese military, to include Lieutenant General Kotsuki Yoshio who informed the team that all POWs and foreign civilians in captivity in Korea were in safe hands and in good health. The Japanese would not however allow the team to meet with any of the POWs held at Keijo.

With no instructions from the Japanese government directing the military in Korea to negotiate the surrender of its forces in Korea to the OSS, and with the OSS having no authority to accept a surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea, the Japanese ordered the OSS team to return to Xian until a later date. Requests by Bird that the team be interned with the POWs allowing the OSS team to perform its relief mission were politely refused. With more than 50 Japanese planes parked on the field, to include 20 Zeros and soldiers marching in formation, Bird was quickly made to understand that the Japanese in Keijo were not to be trifled with. As the C-47 required a different octane level fuel than the Japanese aircraft stationed at the base the Japanese were forced to hold the crew and the aircraft overnight while the correct grade of aviation fuel was trucked to the field. The Japanese colonel left in-charge of the group hosted a dinner for the crew complete with Kirin Beer.

548 Smith, Richard Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency. First Lyons Press. 2005
549 Ibid.
and sake. Despite the dinner and shared drink the night before, the next morning the Japanese brought up tanks and mortar teams placing these near the C-47 to reinforce their request that the Americans leave. 552 A message from Japanese Imperial G.H.Q was later forwarded to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers requesting that such air drops end until the situation could be clarified. 553

After refueling with Japanese aviation gasoline, the team departed Keijo on the evening of 19 August for Shandong, China where it made contact with Team Duck. The next day Eagle Team was ordered to Keijo once again by OSS headquarters and told to remain there even at the risk of internment by the Japanese. Colonel Bird informed OSS headquarters that the team had been ordered out at gun point by the Japanese who refused to accept their mission.

On the 22nd Bird flew to OSS headquarters at Chungking where he informed the OSS leadership that in his opinion the situation in Korea was far too dangerous for the team to return and that if they did, it would probably result in the execution of the 22-man team and the crew of the C-47. Unfortunately, while Colonel Bird was explaining his views of the team’s chance of success to no less than General Albert Wedemeyer, commander of U.S. forces in China, and the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander of the South East Asia Command, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Lieberman was completing a recording of his report of the first encounter of Japanese and U.S. forces in Korea to be broadcast to his audience in China the next day. Lieberman’s version of the historic first meeting between U.S. and Japanese forces in Korea was slightly different from the story that Colonel Bird had told General Wedemeyer, and upon hearing the broadcast, General Wedemeyer was not happy.

What Colonel Bird had not told General Wedemeyer was that after the flight had landed in Korea and, while the Americans waited for the Japanese to bring the type of aviation fuel required for the C-47 to depart the base at Keijo, another air base in Korea, the Japanese entertained the OSS team with beer and sake. Staying at the base overnight the party continued on into the evening with the Japanese and Americans singing the national anthems of the two nations and various other military songs. Learning about the party through an OWI radio broadcast the morning after his meeting with Colonel Bird, General Wedemeyer was furious.

In Wedemeyer’s opinion Colonel Bird was guilty of fraternizing with the enemy and had disgraced U.S. forces in China. Worse still while the colonel had thoughtfully taken along a reporter from the OWI he had failed to take any food, medicines or other supplies to the starving POWs held in Korea. The contrasting differences between Bird’s report concerning the hostility of the Japanese in Korea, and Lieberman’s story of a Japanese-American military drinking party in Keijo in the opinion of General Wedemeyer, reflected poorly on the OSS. In the end Willis Bird and his pearl-handled revolvers never made it to Konan. Bird did not free the POWs held in Korea and he did not get to accept the surrender of the Japanese in Korea.

An irritated General Wedemeyer demanded the end of all OSS POW rescue efforts on the peninsula and that Colonel Bird face charges for his actions in Korea. Bird was never disciplined and is reported to have remained in Asia after WWII. In 1962 he was indicted by the U.S. Justice Department under Robert Kennedy. Bird never returned to the U.S. and the OSS would never put any more teams into Korea.

Section 42 – DIVIDING KOREA

Though the end of the war against Japan was in sight for many as early as July 1945 Allied leaders had reached no agreement on Korea’s future. The war had ended so unexpectedly that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had only agreed on 10 August 1945, about two weeks before Blacklist Operations began to divide the occupation of Korea along the 38th Parallel.

As late as 1943 U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) (30 Jan 1882–12 Apr 1945) had been unsure that the U.S. would even occupy Korea. In 1943 FDR thought the peninsula would be occupied by the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek (31 Oct 1887–5 Apr 1975) reasserting China’s historic role in Northeast Asia. 554

With the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the simultaneous Russian invasion of Manchuria and rapid movement of Soviet force into Korea, alarm grew in Allied circles regarding the total occupation of Korea fait accompli by the Soviet Union. 555 As the Russians advanced southward, pressure grew to prevent the complete loss of Korea to the Soviets. Action was required.

Two days after the Soviet invasion of Manchuria two U.S. Army colonels – Dean Rusk (9 Feb 1909–20 Dec 1994) and Charles Bonesteel (6 Sept 1909–13 Oct 1977) – were assigned to identify a dividing line between Soviet and U.S. occupation forces on the Korean Peninsula. Using a map reportedly produced by National Geographic the two colonels decided upon the 38th parallel north as the dividing line between the occupiers. The parallel would give the U.S. access to two major ports, Jinsen and Fusan; keep the capital of the country, Keijo in the U.S. sector and place most of the Allied POWs in Korea in U.S. hands. Unfortunately the POWs at Konan and those reported at the time to be in Heijo and Seishin would not be among the mass of Allied prisoners falling on the U.S. side of the 38th parallel. The artificial boundary would leave about 45 percent or more of the peninsula’s land area, and 70 percent of its population under U.S. control.

To Rusk and Bonesteel, keeping the capital of Korea in U.S. hands was a definite bonus and represented a psychological victory over the Russians. To the surprise of Rusk and Bonesteel when the proposed border was presented to the Soviet Union, Stalin immediately agreed with the line selected. The two colonels were unaware that nearly forty years earlier, in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War that Imperial Russia and Japan had discussed dividing the Korean Peninsula along the same line. Stalin had achieved in 1945 what Tsar Nicholas II (18 May 1868–17 Jul 1918) could not achieve in 1905. Regardless, this line of demarcation was written into General Order No. 1 the first post-war order issued by General Douglas MacArthur to the military forces of Imperial Japan.

General Order No. 1 arranged the surrender of Japanese forces in specific regions to specific Allied commanders; forced Japan to reveal the current deployment of Japanese military forces across the war zone and to maintain all military equipment in their possession for subsequent disarmament. Approved by President Truman, General Order No. 1 was afterwards forwarded to London and Moscow for their approval. General Order No. 1 would subsequently become the source for the modern day division of Korea. U.S. forces would not land in Korea in large numbers until the 8th of September when General John R. Hodge (12 Jun 1893–12 Nov 1963) landed at Jinsen with members of the XXIV Corps dispatched to Korea from Okinawa. The corps advance party landed in Korea two days earlier.558

Captain Grant, one of the men aboard the Hog Wild when it was forced down on 29 August 1945 would include in his statement the comment that “The Koreans don’t like having their country occupied by two allied nations. They think it will lead to civil war and strife.” Less-than five years later on 25 June 1950 the concerns of the Koreans that Grant mentioned were proven correct when North Korea invaded South Korea.

Section 43 – TURMOIL IN NORTHEAST ASIA

The Occupation of Japan by U.S. forces began the day before the final flight of Hog Wild. On 28 August 1945 an advance party of 150 U.S. military personnel accompanied by 38 combat troops arrived by air in Japan landing at Atsugi Air Base. The arrival of this first group of 150 U.S. personnel was rapidly followed up by the arrival of the USS Missouri off the coast of Japan. Ships accompanying the Missouri proceeded to land the 4th Marine Division on the southern coast of Kanagawa Prefecture. Events over Konan, Korea were however far more complex.

Prior to the arrival of Hog Wild on the afternoon of 29 August 1945, two additional B-29s also supporting Blacklist Operations had earlier penetrated the area. The bombers were simply two of the many B-29s that had flown over the known POW camps in China, Japan, Korea and Manchuria that day, such as the camp at Jinsen, dropping loads of food, medicines, and clothing. The two B-29s penetrating the area of Konan would drop two full loads; 20,000 pounds, of humanitarian supplies near the camp.

As with the later flight by Hog Wild neither of the earlier two B-29s knew the exact position of the camp at Konan. As Hog Wild would do minutes later, the two bombers, Z-33, Serial Number 42-24700 “Slick Dick” and Z-6, Serial Number 44-69746 “Booze Hound” had overflown the area at 1420 and 1422 hours (I) local respectively. Two minutes apart. Each would overfly the Konan area several times to locate the camp and deliver their supplies. In executing their low-level deliveries, as with other attempted deliveries across Asia in the early days of the effort, parachutes would immediately separate from pallets; drums would break open as they exited the B-29’s double bomb bay, supplies would be widely scattered over the camps. A single drum from one of the earlier flights over Konan had reportedly crashed through the roof of

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the Chosen Branch No.1 camp hospital, nearly crushing a visiting Russian colonel.\textsuperscript{560} None of the POW affidavits taken after the war would ever mention the near miss. Photos of the camp taken after the deliveries show no such damages.\textsuperscript{561}

Completing their mission Slick Dick and Booze Hound departed the area; the Soviet mission however was just beginning. It was more a matter of timing than skill that Slick Dick and Booze Hound got away at all. Neither bomber expected a threat over Konan. But a threat was there nonetheless.

The division of Korea into two separate occupation zones; the continued fighting between forces of Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union in the area; the beginning of the U.S. Occupation of Japan; the earlier supply drops over or near the camp, stormy weather over the target area, and intrigue on the part of the Soviets would all work together to wreak havoc on the mission of Hog Wild. Crossing the east coast of Korea in the early afternoon of 29 August 1945 the bomber had only minutes remaining before it became for all the wrong reasons, an urban legend. The truth about the incident would lay undiscovered for more than 60 years.

Section 44 – ENTERING KOREA

It is likely that Hog Wild’s flight path from Iwo Jima allowed the bomber to make landfall near Konan. Hog Wild was equipped with an AN/APN-9 Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN) constant beam navigation system which had replaced the AN/APN-4. The AN/APN-9 increased the ability of aircraft to fly long distance over water. The LORAN system was based on the principle of the time difference between the receipts of two separate radio signals from a pair of two geographically separate radio transmitters. If the position of two synchronized stations were known, then the position of the receiver could be determined. With two successive fixes (determinations of position), ground speed, drift, and estimated-time-of-arrival could be determined or confirmed. At the end of WWII there were 47 station pairs in operation throughout the Pacific. In addition Hog Wild was equipped with the AN/APQ-13 ground scanning high-altitude area, search and navigation radar.

Developed jointly during the war by Bell Telephone Laboratories and the MIT Radiation Laboratory, the AN/APQ-13 system was used extensively in high altitude radar bombing, search, navigation and radar photoreconnaissance.\textsuperscript{562} The coastline of Korea; with its numerous unique land features, points, bays, and inlets as compared to their radar presentation, would have enabled the crew’s radar operator to precisely locate their actual position relative to their planned position as they passed over the coast into the interior of the peninsula. Contrary to legend while the AN/APQ-13 was the most widely used radar on the B-29 during the war against Japan it was not the best radar carried by the bomber, that title was held by the AN/APQ-7 Eagle.

The AN/APQ-7 Eagle – The most Advanced Radar in the Field

The 3 centimeter AN/APQ-7 Eagle was a marked improvement over the AN/APQ-13 flown by Hog Wild. The Eagle was conceived by Dr. Luis Alvarez of Manhattan Project fame earlier in the war, and before his later association with the atomic bomb. Like the AN/APQ-13 the Eagle was developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories and MIT.

The AN/APQ-7 provided better ground-water contrast than the AN/APQ-13, a better target identification capability and an enhanced all-weather radar bombing capability. The radar antenna swept side-to-side through an area of about 60 degrees in front of the aircraft only, vice revolving radar which swept a full 360\textdegree circle. The Eagle provided better cloud penetration and radarscope photographic capabilities. Numerous radarscope photographic missions would eventually be flown by Eagle-equipped aircraft over the Japanese mainland including the aforementioned mission of the Double Trouble over Hokkaido imaging Muroran Sapporo and Otaru.\textsuperscript{563} The imagery acquired through the radar ranged from good to excellent.\textsuperscript{564f} Though the Eagle was a better radar, it did have its flaws.


\textsuperscript{562} Photostatic copy of captions to pictures taken of the Konan POW Camp after the capitulation of Japan. Provisional Caption for Photograph No. 41175, 41176, 41177, and 41178. Available upon request to the Australian War Memorial. Treloar Crescent (top of ANZAC Parade), Campbell ACT 2612 AUSTRALIA


The Eagle radar suffered two major deficiencies; it was less reliable above 20,000 foot and it required an IP to target run of about 70 miles. Weight was also a problem. At almost 18 foot long the radar’s antenna alone weighed almost 1,000 pounds. The increased weight detracted from the B-29’s larger bomb load, but the radar’s increased accuracy in weapons delivery made up for the loss.

AN/APQ-7 equipped B-29Bs, could be identified by the radar’s wing shaped antenna mounted under the bomber’s fuselage and by the presence of the external gun-laying radar antenna in the extreme tail. With its greater precision and increased fidelity B-29Bs required a smaller target system vice larger targets such as steel plants, ship yards and harbor facilities. Eagle-equipped bombers were eventually deployed against fuels related targets – petroleum refineries and bulk fuels storage areas, destroying most of the target set by the end of the war. The first four Eagle-equipped B-29Bs arrived in Guam on 26 April 1945.

Eagle-equipped B-29Bs began to arrive en masse in the Marianas in June 1945. Though the earliest arrivals in theater were assigned to the 314th Bombardment Wing, the majority of Eagle-equipped aircraft served with the 315th Bombardment Wing. All earlier arrivals assigned to the 314th Bombardment Wing were eventually transferred to the 315th. Near the end of the war a second Eagle-equipped Bombardment Wing, the 316th was established on Okinawa underneath the Eighth Air Force commanded by Lieutenant General Jimmy Doolittle.

A new radar tail turret, the APG-15, also began appearing on Eagle equipped aircraft. Most 315 Bombardment Wing B-29Bs were equipped without the tail turret APG-15 gun-laying radar and were retrofitted with the new radar in the field. Most APG-15 radars failed to operate efficiently in the air often requiring recalibration once at altitude. All B-29Bs operating with the 316th out of Okinawa were equipped with the AN/APQ-7 Eagle and the APG-15 gun-laying radar. Hog Wild never served with the 315th Bombardment Wing and was neither Eagle nor APG-15 equipped.

Section 45 – SOVIET AND CREWMEMBER STATEMENTS

No Missing Air Crew Report (MACR) was ever filed for the loss of Hog Wild. MACRs were not generally filed on lost aircrews if the fate of the crew and aircraft could be established within a few days of the loss. The MACR reporting system was far more concerned with the fate of the crew than the loss of the aircraft. According to IDA DOCUMENT D-1485, HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCHING MISSING-IN-ACTION CASES: 1941–1960: MACRs “only pertain to combat losses on the enemy’s side of the battle line. Reports of aircraft lost in training accidents, non-combat operations, and combat damaged aircraft known to have gone down over territory under Allied control” were not generally documented by a MACR. The loss of Hog Wild did not meet the criteria for the issuance of a MACR, hence; none was ever issued.

While no MACR was filed, the crew of Hog Wild was debriefed by squadron intelligence with statements taken after the crew was returned to Saipan. Such debriefs were customarily accompanied by at least one quart of whiskey,

566 Ibid.
typically supplied by the flight surgeon or by intelligence debriefers.\textsuperscript{569} The whiskey was considered “medicinal.”\textsuperscript{570} As it was immediately after the war, and the crew of Hog Wild had been forced down, the debrief consumed two quarts of whiskey. The following crewmember statements regarding the forcing down of Hog Wild, arranged by rank, still exist and are on file with the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.


No statement exists for
Corporal Richard H. Turner – Flight Position – Tail Gunner. Greenville, Ohio.\textsuperscript{571}

Only two of the 12 statements bear a date, 19 September 1945, that of Staff Sergeant Cyril Bernacki and Staff Sergeant Arthur Strilky.\textsuperscript{572} It is likely but remains unknown, if all statements were taken on the same day. Captain Robert W. Campbell, First Lieutenant Lucius W. Weeks and First Lieutenant John B. Grant were sandbagging the flight and were not part of the original Queen crew.

The Soviet commander of the 14\textsuperscript{th} Fighter Bomber Regiment Major Savairmuke and Assistant Commander, Operations Department of the 88\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment Senior Lieutenant Churvin also provided a statement to Lieutenant Queen the aircraft commander, prior to his departing Konan explaining their actions.\textsuperscript{573} This statement also exists and was included in the file of aircrew member statements obtained from the AFHRA at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. What follows is a synopsis of the events surrounding the loss of Hog Wild as culled from the 12 aircrew reports and the Soviet statement.

Section 46 – CONFRONTATION OVER KONAN

According to the statements rendered by the crew Hog Wild arrived in the area of Konan between 1430 and 1440 hours (I) local time, Korea at an altitude of 1,800 foot. The crew was unable to locate the POW camp on its first pass and circled the area at least once, possibly up to three times attempting to identify the prison. As previously discussed the coordinates given the crew would have placed the bomber several miles north of the camp. None of the crew would ever report identifying the camp from the air.

On their second pass over the area Hog Wild was joined by two Soviet Yak-9 fighter aircraft, marked as numbers “60” and “65.” The Soviet fighters approached Hog Wild from the bomber’s left, passing low below and beneath the Superfort. Though some statements identify the Soviet aircraft that approached the bomber as Yak-3s, the preponderance of evidence presented in the later statements given by the aircrew suggests that that the attacking aircraft were actually Yak-9s.

\textsuperscript{573} Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron, 500\textsuperscript{th} Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
According to the statement of Sergeant Arthur, Millersburg, Pennsylvania, given weeks after the attack, in their initial axis-of-attack the Russian aircraft approached so near Hog Wild that he could clearly see "their facial expressions."\(^{574}\) The Yakovlev (Yak), Yak-9 was a WWII, Soviet-designed single-engine combat fighter. More Yak-9’s, nearly 17,000, were built during WWII by the Soviet Union than any other Russian combat aircraft. The Yak-9 was developed through from combat experience gained from the Yak-7. The fighter began service in October 1942 seeing combat for the first time at the Battle of Stalingrad. The number of Yak-9 variants constructed would go on to combine two different wings types, five different engines, and seven different armament arrangements packages.

The earliest production model Yak-9s were armed with the Shpitalny-Vladimirov Aviatcionnyi Krupnokalibrenyi (ShVAK) 20mm autocannon which could fire 700 to 800 rounds per minute. Some Yak-9s were armed with 12.7mm machine guns or some combination of 12.7 and 20mm autocannons. Several additional armament packages were produced during the war including:

- The Yak-9K, a tank destroyer armed with a single 45mm Nudelman-Suranov (NS-45) cannon and the Yak-9T armed with ShVAK 20mm autocannons and a 37mm Nudelman-Suranov (NS-37) cannon. The use of large cannons such as the 37mm in the various Yak-9 models came at the cost of a lower rate-of-fire for the weapon and a smaller ammunition load, usually 32 rounds.\(^{582}\) The Yak-9K and Yak-9T were the equivalent of a flying artillery piece.

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**Section 47 – AIR INTERCEPT: YAK-9**

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\(^{575}\) Weeks, Lucius W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-514225. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-514225. 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron, 500\(^{th}\) Bombardment Group, as Right Blister Gunner, B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated

\(^{576}\) Grant, John B. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-866994. Statement by First Lieutenant John B. Grant. 0-866994. 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron, 500\(^{th}\) Bombardment Group, Squadron Engineering Officer, B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated

\(^{577}\) Weeks, Lucius W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-514225. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-514225. 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron, 500\(^{th}\) Bombardment Group, as Right Blister Gunner, B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated

\(^{578}\) Ibid.


The 37mm autocannon of the Yak-9T could pierce a 30mm plate of face-hardened steel mounted at a 45 degree angle, or 45mm of armor plate mounted at a 90 degree angle, from a distance of 500 meters. Dropping low over an Eastern European battlefield, few vehicles were safe from attack including heavy German tanks roaming the battlefields.\textsuperscript{583} The Yak-9T was also used extensively during WWII against German shipping in the Black Sea with some success. As a fighter aircraft the Yak-9T had considerably greater success in air-to-air engagements. A single hit from a 37mm cannon was usually sufficient to tear apart an opposing fighter. Several such blows against a larger enemy bomber usually resulted in the disintegration of the heavier aircraft.

The Yaks operating over northern Korea in August 1945 were under the command of Lieutenant General G.N. Lemeshtko (1906–1985), Soviet Pacific Fleet Aviation. The aircraft were assigned to the 14\textsuperscript{th} Fighter Regiment of the Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Flotilla, then operating against Japanese Seventeenth Area Army lines-of-communications, roads and rail lines, across northern Korea.\textsuperscript{584} Soviet Pacific Fleet Aviation units operating over Korea had four objectives: 1) To prevent Japanese units in Japan from reinforcing the Seventeenth Area Army; 2), to prevent Japanese military members and civilians in Korea from escaping the Soviet onslaught by evacuating to mainland Japan; 3) to provide for ground support; and 4) interdiction.

**Section 48 – JAPANESE FORCES: 1945**

**The Chosen Army of Japan**

The Japanese Seventeenth Area Army was unique to the times. It had only recently been activated; 22 January 1945 and reorganized under the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo. The Japanese Seventeenth Area Army grew out of Imperial Japanese plans to deter possible Allied landings on the Korean Peninsula during OPERATION DOWNFALL, and a reassessment of the ability of the Kwantung Army to defend Manchuria in the event of a fullscale Soviet invasion. In the mind of Japan’s Army leaders such landings were a real possibility, a possibility placed there by U.S. propaganda and misinformation.\textsuperscript{585} Japanese field armies, combining the administrative and operational responsibilities of a U.S. field army were the tactical equivalent to a U.S. Army corps. The Seventeenth Area Army was headquartered in Keijo.

The Japanese Seventeenth Area Army was the successor to the Chosen Army of Japan. The Chosen Army could trace its heritage to the Russo-Japanese War when the Southern Korean Garrison Army was established on 11 March 1904 to protect Japan’s embassy in Keijo and Japanese nationals then residing in Korea. When Japan annexed Korea on 22 August 1910 the Southern Korean Garrison Army became responsible for the suppression of Korean political dissent and possible revolts. It was renamed the Korea Garrison Army on 1 October 1910.

During World War I, on 1 June 1918 the Korean Garrison Army was again reorganized and renamed the Chosen Army of Japan. Under the 1918 reorganization the Chosen Army of Japan was now responsible for guarding the Korean Peninsula against possible Soviet invasion or other Russian incursions across the common border into Korea.

The Chosen Army of Japan was subsequently placed under the General Defense Command established on 5 July 1941 to control all land and air units stationed within Japan proper, Korea, and Formosa. Reorganized yet again in January 1945 and renamed the Japanese Seventeenth Area Army it, like the highly praised Kwantung Army was a shell of its former self. By 1945 no amount of reorganizations or reshuffling could create new Japanese armies from a manpower pool that no longer existed, or from a supply source that possessed only worn and outdated equipment.

The men available for the Chosen Army to draw upon were no longer the robust youth of Japan’s manhood but the veteran soldiers, retirees and administrators left behind as Japanese forces advanced across the Pacific Ocean and into Southeast Asia. Like the Kwantung Army, during the war entire units of the Chosen Army had been reassigned to Pacific Island areas or the jungles of Southeast Asia. Former Kwantung Army units would fight on Peleliu and Okinawa. By late 1944 the Chosen Army of Japan was largely a paper army. The formerly combat-ready Chosen Army of Japan when reactivated as the Japanese Seventeenth Area Army was manned by reservists, students, conscripted regulars, home militia, young boys and old men.

Armed with leftovers, older and outdated equipment, the Japanese Seventeenth Area Army would be incapable of withstanding the Soviet attack that was being prepared for it west of Vladivostok. When the Soviet Union declared war against Japan the Japanese Seventeenth Area Army was immediately reassigned to the Kwantung Army, formerly the largest and most prestigious command within the Imperial Japanese Army, for its ultimate destruction. The Kwantung Army whose activities had been curtailed after its poor showing at the Battle of Nomonhan was likewise in dire straits.

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\textsuperscript{585} Skates, John Ray. The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. University of South Carolina Press. Columbia, South Carolina. 1994
The Kwantung Army in 1945

The Battle of Nomomhan had taught the Kwantung Army and the nation’s high command that Japan could not win in a land war against the Soviet Union. Japan’s loss at Nomomhan forced the Japanese Army to reevaluate its goal of adding Russian territory to the Japanese Empire at Stalin’s expense. At Nomomhan Japanese intelligence assessments had underestimated the ability of the Russian military to defend the country, and the Soviet Union’s willingness to absorb exceptionally large casualties to maintain its territorial integrity.

As Soviet soldiers stood their ground at Nomomhan in 1939 Japan’s expansionists were forced to look elsewhere for access to the territory they desired and the natural resources required by Japan’s economy. Nomomhan forced the Japanese to look south and to eventual war with the U.S, Britain, and the Netherlands. No longer on the forward edge of the battle area, now the far rear, the Kwantung Army became a casualty of its previous aggressiveness and ultimately its failures.

By the end of WWII the Kwantung Army had become a relic of its past. Over the course of the War in the Pacific many of the Kwantung Army’s finest combat capable units had been transferred to the Pacific Theater. There they would be decimated by Allied Forces or cut off and left behind to starve to death on unimportant islands. Most of Japan’s air forces would be likewise transferred south into the Pacific. The never ending war in China also deprived the Kwantung Army of needed manpower.

Though the Kwantung Army numbered between 600,000 and 700,000 men when the Soviet Union attacked in August 1945, like the Japanese Seventeenth Area Army its combat units were inadequately manned with poorly trained conscripts and outdated equipment. In early summer 1945 Japan’s military leadership abandoned the concept of holding Manchuria against a fullscale Soviet invasion and had revised its war plans for the area accordingly. Like MacArthur’s forces in the Philippines in 1941, few Japanese lower echelon commanders in Manchuria were aware of the change and entered combat against Soviet forces under the old plan. Manchuria was ripe for the picking. In the aftermath of the Russian attack on Manchuria, Soviet forces took more than 594,000 Japanese soldiers in Manchuria and Korea prisoner. Many would never return. Over 140 Japanese generals were led into the Soviet Union. More than 850,000 Japanese settlers were also captured.

Section 49 – ORDERED TO LAND

According to Lieutenant Queen the pilots of the Yaks “waved in a friendly manner” and motioned for the B-29 to follow them. Lieutenant Weeks reported over interphone that the pilot of Yak 65 suddenly “motioned for us to land.” The Yaks had led Hog Wild directly to a small military airfield about 10 miles from the area of the POW camp. Staff Sergeant Rinaldo in his later statement wrote that the pilots of the Yaks used different methods to indicate that the bomber should set down, but does not say what those methods were. Lieutenant Rainey reported that after following the Yaks for a few minutes, the Yak pilots lowered their landing gear and began to motion toward the ground. Captain Campbell, in a diary he would write while at Konan wrote that the “Yak peeled off and dropped his wheels indicating for us to land.”

According to information contained in their later statements, it was likely that the B-29 was led to Kanko Army Airfield, present-day Yong’o Airfield about nine miles south of Kanko, 12 miles south of Konan. Yong’o matches the description given by the crew of the airfield where they eventually landed. The only other airfield in the area was the actual Konan Airfield located in a mountainous area about three miles north of the city.

590 Diary of Captain Robert Campbell while held at Konan POW Camp. 30 August to 15 September 1945.
Lieutenant Queen believed from the motioning of the Yak pilots that the Russians believed that Hog Wild was searching for a field to land; Lieutenant Rainey thought the Yaks wanted them to put down at the airfield indicated. Captain Campbell believed the Yaks were simply showing the Americans where their field was located in case they wanted to land. Neither of the two earlier bombers that had overflown the area had received a similar such invitation. As Campbell would later state concerning the desires of the Russian pilots for the bomber to put down, “We didn’t.” The Soviet pilots were not showing the crew of Hog Wild where they could put down if they wanted to, but where they were being ordered to land.

Captain Campbell, Lieutenant Rainey, and Lieutenant Weeks all agreed that the runway of the airfield indicated was too short for a B-29 to takeoff or land. Lieutenant Queen estimated the airfield’s main runway to be about 3,500 feet long. After passing once over Kanko Army Airfield Lieutenant Rainey turned the bomber to its right, headed again to the reported area of the camp pressing on with the mission. As Hog Wild flew over the camp a second set of two Yaks joined the first set, surrounding the bomber. As Eugene Harwood wrote years later observing the activity from the B-29s astrodome “One Yak fighter was under our right wing and another under our left engine with one directly behind us and two more coming up in the rear.” According to Lieutenant Rainey, as the bomber moved away from the airfield the Yak pilots began to motion angrily at the bomber. Hog Wild was now surrounded by five to six Yak fighters. It is possible that additional Soviet fighters were also loitering nearby in case something went wrong. As Eugene Harwood recalled years later of the fighter behind the bomber’s left engine “he was practically flying into our engine from the rear.” Lieutenant Harwood indicates that the Yak pilots were now making “wild gestures” for the aircraft to land. Turning north again and passing over the area of the coordinates given for their drop, the crew was once again unsuccessful in locating the camp. None of the crew ever reported locating the camp from the air. Captain Campbell wrote that, “We never did come to any definite conclusion of which group of buildings were the P.W. camp.” As the bomber passed over the airfield without dropping its gear, to the crew of Hog Wild events began to spiral out of control. To the Soviets in the Yaks over Konan the events were taking the shape of a well-thought out plan.

Lieutenant Weeks reported that “When we still did not drop our gear the Yak pilot threw open his canopy and violently motioned us to land by jerking his fist at the ground.” Lieutenant Rainey reports that by the time the bomber had approached the reported site of the POW camp yet again, the Soviet pilots were “becoming very angry and were making all sorts of gestures with their hands…raising and lowering the landing gear” of their aircraft, indicating once again an order to set the bomber down.

As they approached the area of the camp on perhaps their second or third pass a Yak along the left side of the aircraft fired a short burst of 20mm rounds across the nose of the bomber. In his statement Sergeant Arthur reported hearing several additional bursts of fire after the initial shots were fired but was unsure if these bursts had come from that same

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593 Ibid.
598 Diary of Captain Robert Campbell while held at Konan POW Camp. 30 August to 15 September 1945.
599 Ibid.
Yak. According to Staff Sergeant Rinaldo the first warning shots were fired in front of Hog Wild after it passed over the airfield. At this point Lieutenant Weeks “immediately informed Lt. Queen that we either land or fight.” To Captain Campbell their options were to “land, fight, or get out of the area.” Lieutenant Queen responded to Lieutenant Weeks telling the crew to “hold your fire.” After taking fire Lieutenant Queen decided to abort the mission and depart the area.

Having received no instructions in their pre-mission briefing to land in Korea, Lieutenant Queen and Rainey believed that if Hog Wild left the area departed Konan, the fighters would not follow them out to sea. Lieutenant Rainey asked the bomber’s navigator Lieutenant Harwood for a heading to Iwo Jima and set a course of 148° out of the area. According to Captain Campbell, once over the ocean Lieutenant Queen planned to dump the POW supplies into the water lighting the aircraft’s load and allowing the bomber to more rapidly gain altitude. Captain Campbell reported that “from the front end of the plane that the Russian fighters were leaving us.” They were. However the Yaks were only moving away from the B-29 to take up positions that would allow them to initiate pursuit curves against the heavily loaded bomber. The crew of Hog Wild continued out to sea believing the Yaks had broken contact as the aircraft continued to depart: They were wrong.

Section 50 – TAKING FIRE IN THE NUMBER ONE ENGINE

At about five miles off the coast, ten miles from the Konan POW camp two Yaks appeared along the left side of the B-29 and began to make “dry passes” at the bomber, a warning to return to the airfield and land. As the minutes passed the bomber was now 15 to 20 miles off the coast in a shallow dive attempting to build up speed. Hog Wild was in the worst possible position to refuse an order to land.

The aircraft was operating at low-level, at low speed, and trying to gain altitude. Yak 65 now moved away to the five o’clock position, level with the bomber. The Yak now began to close on Hog Wild towards seven o’clock. Lieutenant Weeks relayed the approach of the Yak to Lieutenant Queen who again told the crew to hold their fire. Each of the machine guns aboard Hog Wild was armed with 500 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition. The Yak passed slightly below the

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008 Ibid.


010 Ibid.


013 Ibid.


rear of the bomber about 50 yards away firing several cannon and small arms rounds into Hog Wild’s bomb bay. Eugene Harwood wrote that “You could feel the shots hit on the plane.” Several rounds struck Hog Wild’s number one and number two engines. According to Lieutenant Harwood Yak, number 65 fired on the B-29 with its machine guns (12.7 or 20mm) and 37mm cannon. Several shots tore into the top of the bomber ripping open the cover of the number three machine gun turret and starting a fire in the fuselage. As the fighter moved out of range Lieutenant Queen turned the bomber back toward Kanko Army Airfield. Queen now ordered the crew to prepare to bail out. If they did not already have them on men now scrambled for parachutes, life vests and life rafts.

In its one pass Yak-9 number 65 had hit Hog Wild in the center of its left wing; between engine two and the fuselage; punctured a fuel tank behind the number two engine, and scored a direct hit on the number one engine oil tank and the engine’s accessories section. At least one shell had exploded within the B-29’s bomb bay. Lieutenant Queen later attributed the damage to the aircraft’s bomb bay as resulting from a 37mm shell. One 37mm round was enough. Lieutenant Queen ordered the crew not to return fire and lowered the bomber’s landing gear indicating to the Soviet fighters that the bomber would land. Queen now executed a 190° turn back toward Kanko Army Airfield.

Soviet Lieutenant M. I. Zizevskii of the 14th Fighter Aviation Regiment would later be credited with firing on the bomber. According to E. S. Harrison writing in 1947 “On the Americans visiting the aerodrome, the Russian pilot responsible for the incident freely admitted the attack and was quite enthusiastic about his good shooting.” As later information suggests perhaps Zizevskii had good reason to be proud of his shooting. Despite the damage inflicted on the bomber, he had not shot it down or destroyed the bomber in the air. In retrospect however, had Lieutenant Queen chosen to return fire it is likely that Hog Wild could have given far better than it had received, especially as the Yaks closed in to press home their attack. According to Eric Harrison writing after the war, “We greatly admired the self-control of the American plane commander, who could have shot the Russian plane to pieces if he so desired with his wonderfully armed machine.” Lieutenant Grant reported that from his position across the plane at the right blister “The volume of flame was

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621 Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron, Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
622 Ibid.
623 Ibid.
624 Ibid.
625 Ibid.
628 Harrison, E. S. Korea, North of 38. Some P.O.W. Memories. The West Australian. Perth. Australia. 28 June 1947
so great that the left blister seemed full."\(^{629}\) Captain Campbell reported the flames as “a good ten feet thick and were going back pass the tail of the ship.”\(^{630}\) Seeing the fire Lieutenant Weeks shouted “Let’s get out of here!”\(^{631}\) In an attempt to control the fire the aircraft’s flight engineer Staff Sergeant Owens discharged the aircraft’s fire extinguishers into the burning engine while Lieutenant Queen feathered the engine’s propellers. The fire extinguishers had little effect on the blazing engine and failed to immediately contain the fire. Rapidly, flames from the burning engine were gaining in intensity and extending over and under the wing. According to one statement, the flames now stretched from the engine past the tail section of the nearly crippled bomber. Lieutenant Harwood noted in his statement that the aircraft "threatened to blow up at any instant."\(^{632}\) With their efforts to control the fire failing Lieutenant Queen turned the aircraft back towards the airfield which the Russians had earlier led the bomber.

With the stricken bomber now moving at 220 mph, about 3.5 miles per minute, it is likely that Hog Wild even as it turned remained more than 20 miles out to sea. 48 years after-the-fact Robert Rainey would tell John Grant that, “I well remember it took Joe [Queen] and I [both] on the controls to get the aircraft back to land.”\(^{633}\) The crew reported their altitude at this point to be about 2,000 foot. As flames spread from the area of the number one engine and fearing an explosion or catastrophic failure, Lieutenant Queen looked to Captain Campbell who recommended that "we’d better get out of the ship before the engine exploded."\(^{634}\) Queen now ordered the crew to bail out.\(^{635}\) Lieutenant Rainey passed Queen’s bail out order to the rest of the crew over the aircraft’s interphone.\(^{636}\) Only one man on the ship’s interphone system heard the order.\(^{637}\) Dazed, shocked, possibly incredulous, some with minor injuries; 15 miles or more from the coast of Korea over cold and stormy seas, the crew readied itself to bail out of a burning and disabled B-29.

### Section 51 – INTO THE EAST SEA

Bailing out from the rear Lieutenant Weeks and Sergeant Arthur were the first to exit the B-29.\(^{638}\) It was Sergeant Arthur’s third time to bail out of a damaged aircraft having climbed from one burning B-17 on a training flight over the U.S and another over wartime Europe.\(^{639}\) Lieutenant Harwood was the first to exit from the front of the bomber bailing out through the B-29’s forward wheel well. As Harwood left the navigators position he glanced at the altimeter; it read 600 foot.\(^{640}\) Captain Campbell, Lieutenant Sherrill and Flight Officer Owens in that order, exited the aircraft behind Lieutenant Harwood. As he slipped from the cockpit Captain Campbell reported the airspeed at about 220 miles-per-hour indicated.\(^{641}\) Lieutenant Grant, now nearing the rear door of the aircraft heard the order “Brace for ditching” and stayed on-board the still

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\(^{630}\) Diary of Captain Robert Campbell while held at Konan POW Camp. 30 August to 15 September 1945.


\(^{633}\) Quote from Robert Rainey.


\(^{635}\) Rainey, Robert. Personal correspondence to John Grant. 25 October 2003.


\(^{638}\) Rainey, Robert S. 2nd Lieutenant. Statement Lieutenant Robert S. Rainey. 8-386787, Pilot on Lieutenant Queen’s crew of the 882\(^{4}\) Bombardment Squadron, 500\(^{th}\) Bombardment Group, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\(^{4}\) Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated


\(^{641}\) Hog Wild 40th Year Reunion. Dayton, Ohio. August 1985


\(^{643}\) Diary of Captain Robert Campbell while held at Konan POW Camp. 30 August to 15 September 1945.
burning bomber. Of the six men that bailed out Staff Sergeant Owens was the last to exit the stricken B-29. At less than 600 foot above the ocean those bailing out had only seconds to deploy their parachutes.

Riding the Stricken Bomber to Ground

After the six crewmen had bailed out Lieutenant Rainey reports that the left blister gunner indicating that the flames extending from the B-29’s number one engine had begun to subside. Lieutenant Queen now decided to chance it and land the stricken plane. He gave orders for the remaining crew to stay with the now smoking aircraft and to brace for impact. Unbeknownst to those in the front of the bomber, Lieutenant Weeks and Sergeant Arthur had already bailed out. Hearing the order to prepare for ditching and now closing the rear door Lieutenant Grant could see that the water below was now only about 100 foot away. Lieutenant Rainey motioned to Staff Sergeant Strilky, preparing to bail out from the front wheel well behind Staff Sergeant Owens, to take the engineer’s seat and prepare for a crash landing. Arthur Strilky therefore remained with the aircraft as it headed for the coast of northern Korea; the Kanko Army Airfield runway began only about 200 yards from the beach. Water, beach or runway Hog Wild was going in.

With one engine on fire, its left aileron shot out, its left tire destroyed, Lieutenant Queen set the bomber wheels-down tail-down hard on the airfield’s short runway. It was a nearly disastrous landing: Everyone aboard expected to hit water. As the aircraft approached the water Corporal Turner yelled over the bomber’s interphone for the crew to “wait till it settles!” The bomber’s retractable tail skid, which operated in conjunction with the landing gear to prevent damage on a tail down landing, scraped the runway. The propeller of the number four engine dug into the ground. The blades to the number four prop bent far to the rear. Opening the hatch to escape, Staff Sergeant Bernacki shouted “…we’re on land!” Completing his statement weeks later Captain Campbell observed “Lt. Queen must have made a good landing considering the circumstances.” It was now about 1515 hours (I), local time. For better or worse Hog Wild was on the ground in Soviet-held northern Korea.

With the number one engine still burning the crew rapidly escaped the aircraft running about 50 yards from the bomber before they stopped – in Soviet held northern Korea – the first officials of the American government to enter northern Korea since 1938. It was not however the first B-29 to fall into Russian hands.

Section 52 – THE VALUE OF STRATEGIC BOMBING
While the Allied bombing campaigns against Nazi Germany are often criticized as ineffective, and unable to bring the war to a conclusion without the use of ground troops, it is undeniable that long-range bombing adversely impacted the ability of Germany, and later Japan to continue the war. Bomb runs over Germany’s rail and transport sectors made the transportation of required materiel difficult and costly. Aircraft production plants were destroyed and forced underground. Oil production fell. According to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), the air campaign against Germany’s aircraft industry damaged 75 percent of all buildings and shops producing 90 percent of all German aircraft.653 The USSBS also pointed out however that much of the bombing had failed to accomplish its stated goals. After the war, the Germans disagreed.

Albert Speer (19 Mar 1905–1 Sept 1981), Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production credited the bombing campaigns with causing crucial problems within the German economy. Allied bombers were also involved in softening up the French invasion beaches where Allied troops landed on D-Day. German soldiers were terrified of being caught in the open by Allied bombers. In the Pacific, U.S. attacks against Japan’s aircraft factories, arsenals, electronics plants, oil refineries, and finished military goods plants greatly reduced that nation’s ability to continue the war. Most of Japan’s major cities were burned to the ground. Regardless of its ultimate effectiveness strategic bombing succeeded in taking the war home to the heart of Germany and into the Japanese home islands. It was a long range capability the Soviet Union lacked.

The Alps from India

In an effort to expose Japan to sustained bombing, improve Chinese morale, and prove the value of strategic bombing in bringing the war to an end the USAF initiated OPERATION MATTERHORN. Under MATTERHORN B-29s of the Twentieth Air Force would fly bombing raids out of India against targets on the main islands of Japan. B-29s reached India by a circuitous route flying first to Gander Lake, Newfoundland, then to Marrakech in French Morocco and on to Cairo, Egypt. From Cairo the aircraft flew to Karachi, India (Pakistan would not exist until 1947) then to operating bases near Calcutta. The first B-29 arriving in India landed at Chakulia Airfield on 2 April 1944; by 15 April there were 32 B-29s spread across several bases in India.

While enroute one B-29 was lost at Marrakech followed by another near loss at Cairo.654 Five additional accidents quickly followed to include the complete loss of two bombers at Karachi. An investigation stand-down was quickly ordered, with engine overheating around the exhaust valves on the rear row of cylinders eventually identified as the culprit. This new difficulty was overcome only with the design of 14 new engine baffles to force additional air to the valves; the installation of moveable top engine cowlings flaps operable from the cockpit, and the addition of crossover oil lines from the engine intake to the exhaust rocker box of the five top cylinders on the front and rear rows of cylinders that made up the engine.655 Once all the enroute bombers had been altered the movement of B-29s into India continued. By 8 May 1944 a total of 130 B-29s were located at bases throughout India. Modification kits, the result of still on-going changes to the bomber continued to follow the aircraft overseas to India even as it deployed.

The Wright Cyclone R-3350-13 continued to be an issue with engine fires commonplace. By early 1945 the engine itself would undergo more than 2,000 modifications.656 The troublesome engine would continue to be plagued with problems until eventually replaced late in the war by the improved R-3350-21. However despite the better engines and the tactics of maximum aircraft loads in the high-temperature tropics, problems remained. By the end of 1945 failure rates for the engine had decreased to only 2 percent.657 The bombers were home based at airfields near Bengal, India; forward operating bases were located near Chengtu, the capital of Szechuan Province more than 1,000 miles to the northeast.

In conducting their long range mission, the bombers would depart India, land at forward bases in China for refueling prior to continuing their assignments against targets in Japan proper. To succeed the plan required the transportation of all fuels, munitions, and other supplies from India over the Himalaya Mountains, referred to by pilots as “The Hump,” to forward air bases in China before the actual combat mission against Japan could be executed. The economic costs were enormous.

Initial planning included requirements for the use of more than 400 transport aircraft simply to support B-29 operations from their forward operating bases in China. The Army Air Force estimated requirements for sustained operations at 60,000 tons of bombs, fuel, and spare parts. Fuel was the most critical issue.

654 Photo Credit. B-29s at an airfield in India. United States Air Force Historical Research Agency.
657 Ibid.
The logistical nightmare of supplying the bombers nearly crippled the supply chain supporting not only the 20th Air Force operating from India but also the commands of Lord Mountbatten in India; General Stilwell in Burma and General Claire Chennault in China. Supplying the bombers in India also diverted supplies from the Pacific Ocean where General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz faced continuing combat against the Japanese. Through the end of 1944 the B-29 effort using forward air bases in China required the additional use of combat ready bombers to ferry the required fuel to support the mission from India into China. A total of 12 round-trips by a single B-29 carrying bombs and other supplies over the Hump were required to bring all the material and equipment necessary to fly one combat sortie from India, to China and then to Japan. The Japanese first encountered the B-29 in the air just north of the Himalayas in China.

On 26 April 1944 six Japanese fighters flying air interdiction missions noted a strange aircraft flying northward at high altitude. The six Japanese aircraft began to climb. Reaching the higher altitude of the B-29 the Japanese noted a large silver bomber with four large engines, a high tail section and numerous defensive gun mounts. After observing the bomber from a distance the six fighters began their attack. A gunner on the port side of the ship was wounded. Mysteriously the B-29 did not fire back. An electrical problem aboard the aircraft prevented operation of the fire control system. On their second pass the B-29’s tail gunner, operating the gun on manual, zeroed in on one Japanese fighter and send it away in flames. The remaining fighters broke off their attack. Though the Japanese high command was aware of the bomber, finding it in the air over China was an unpleasant surprise. In addition to the threat of Japanese fighter attacks the use of B-29s to ferry supplies across the Hump also shortened the projected lifespan of the bombers involved. The logistical demands of MATTERHORN eventually forced the conversion of some B-29s to the role of fuel tankers with most of their combat support systems, armor plating and other such equipment removed. Additional fuel tanks were mounted in the bomb bay of the converted bomber to allow it to haul more fuel. The decreased weight of the aircraft allowed more fuel to be carried this stripped aircraft consumed less fuel in transporting its load over the Hump. Building additional operating base inside China was also problematic.

Simply to develop airbases in China required the construction of new railroads, fuel pipelines, bridges, and primitive roads. Little construction machinery was available. As a result each runway, taxiway, and support road leading into and through the bases was built by hand. Thousands of Chinese worked on the project. Other problems existed.

Despite the range of the B-29 even when executing missions from forward operating bases at Chengtu, most of the Japanese homeland remained out of reach. Of the four major islands forming mainland Japan, the only island lying within range of B-29s operating from China was the southernmost island of Kyūshū. For these and other reasons OPERATION MATTERHORN did not lack for highly verbal critics to include its commander, Curtis LeMay (15 Nov 1906–1 Oct 1990).

According to General Curtis Lemay “The scheme of operations had been dreamed up like something out of The Wizard of Oz…No one could have made it work. It was founded on an utterly absurd logistic basis. Nevertheless, our entire nation howled like a pack of wolves for an attack on the Japanese homeland. The high command yielded. The instrument wasn’t ready, the people weren’t ready, nothing [sic] was ready. Folks were given an impossible task to perform.” Despite the odds against it from June 1944 to January 1945 B-29s of the 20th Bomber Command flew combat missions in support of OPERATION MATTERHORN.

The first Superfortress combat mission originating from India took place on 5 June 1944 when B-29s flew against Japanese controlled railroad facilities, not in Japan or Japanese occupied China but against rail yards located in Bangkok, Thailand. Of the 98 bombers lifting off from India, 77 B-29s hit their target delivering 368 tons of bombs. A week-and-a-half later on 15 June 1944 B-29s staging from forward bases at Chengtu, China flew 1,500 miles to bomb the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata on Kyūshū Island, Japan. The Yawata Imperial Iron and Steel Works produced about 20 percent of Japan’s steel; approximately 900,000 tons per year and was often referred to as “the Pittsburgh of Japan.” Over 20,000 Japanese worked at the plant. The mission to Yawata represented the beginning of the U.S. strategic bombing campaign against mainland Japan. With the exception of bombing raids against the Kuril Islands staged out of the Aleutian Islands, Alaska, Yawata was the first bombing mission against the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle Raid of 18 April 1942. Achievements aside this first B-29 mission against Japan was not an unqualified success.

The raid accomplished little in terms of physical damage: Less than three percent of the plant received any damage at all. Of the 68 B-29 departing Chengtu only 47 actually reached the target to drop their weapons. Four of the aircraft suffered mechanical problems and returned to Chengtu. Four crashed. Six suffered from other mechanical problems that forced them to jettison their weapons prior to the target and return to Chengtu. Nine could not locate their primary target and

dropped their bombs on secondary targets. Of the 47 B-29 that bombed the Yawata Imperial Iron and Steel Works 32 had to rely on radar to drop their bombs while only 15 dropped their weapons visually. High winds and bad weather over target areas also worked to limit the bomber’s effectiveness. Larger groups of B-29s striking a target would have increased the bomber’s overall impact but the required numbers of bombers were simply not available.

Despite the lack of physical damage the psychological impact of the raid against Yawata was enormous: The inner core of the Japanese Empire had been breached. Like the Doolittle Raid the security of the homeland had been violated once again, though the Japanese military had sworn no more U.S. bombs would fall on Japan. The raid against Yawata would not be the last time that Japan would be bombed. In an effort to end the bombing raids from China the Japanese Army was now forced to take action.

In 1944 the IJA launched OPERATION ICHI-GO. The effort was intended to force U.S. bombers out of China and to create a direct overland route from Fusan, Korea all the way to Saigon in French Indochina. Under ICHI-GO which consisted of OPERATION KOGO (the Battle of Central Henan), OPERATION TOGO 1 (the Battle of Changeng) and OPERATIONS TOGO-2 and TOGO-3 (the Battle of Guilin-Luizhou respectively) the Japanese nearly succeeded in forcing the USAF out of China, overrunning several air bases and threatening operations from Chengtu. Though B-29 operations from inside China were only mildly impacted by the Japanese offensive, the overall inability of the Chinese Army to fully protect the bases convinced the USAF to move its bombers out of the India-China Theatre and relocate them to the Marianas Islands.

By the end of January 1945 most of the B-29s assigned to the 20th Air Force operating from India had been withdrawn from their forward operating bases located in China. Though imagery reconnaissance missions continued to be flown from India into China and then against targets across Asia, all remaining combat B-29s were shifted from India to Saipan and other islands in Marianas chain.

While OPERATION MATTERHORN did not achieve much in the way of physical destruction, it did have the psychological impact of bringing the war to Japan. In its operations from India the 20th Air Force had flown a total of 49 missions dropping 11,477 tons of bombs and some naval mines. Of the initial 160 bombers sent to India, by the end of 1944 a total of 147 had been lost. 30 percent of the initial crews had also perished. The concepts attempted from India revealed numerous problems, which resulted in innovative solutions such as the conversion of some bombers to fuel tanker aircraft. At worst the effort to bomb Japan from bases in China supported from bases in India was a learning experience. The experience gained was invaluable to the successful deployment of the B-29 from its new home in the Marianna Islands against Japan. In the end however, it was only the constant introduction of reinforcements in the way of new bombers and combat crews that enabled MATTERHORN to continue. Sixty years later OPERATION MATTERHORN remains the object of contentious debate.

Despite its overall inability to achieve its strategic objectives, OPERATION MATTERHORN probably did more to prove the value of long-range strategic bombing to Joseph Stalin than did the Allied bombing of Germany. It also gave Stalin the B-29s he needed to develop a long-range bombing capability.

Failed Requests for Support

After information on the B-29 began to appear in U.S. newspapers and other unclassified sources, the U.S.S.R began to submit requests for the four-engine bomber through Lend-Lease channels. The Soviet Union would request copies of the B-29 not-less-than three times. Each request would be met with a denial.

The first Russian request for the aircraft was filed on 19 July 1943 by Soviet General Alexander I. Beliyayev (Belyayev) chief of the Soviet military mission to the U.S., when he submitted an inquiry requesting the possible delivery of the Lockheed P-38 Lightning, P-47 Thunderbolt, Consolidated B-24 Liberator, and the Boeing B-29. The U.S. denied most of the request delivering only the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt. Very heavy four-engine bombers were denied to Russia as being outside its tactical aviation needs. The request for the B-29, coming as early as it did should have raised some suspicions concerning Soviet knowledge of the bomber, but that was overlooked. After all, the Soviet Union was an American ally.…..

Officially Lend-Lease was known as Public Law 77-11 An Act to Further Promote the Defense of the United States, 11 March 1941. The Act was actually an attempt by the U.S. to purchase a successful conclusion to the war in Europe cheaply without the loss of American lives. Under the law the U.S. provided war materials to the United Kingdom, China, France, U.S.S.R and other Allied nations fighting the Axis Powers of Germany, Italy and Japan in return for any “payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.” The law repealed the earlier Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937 which had limited the ability of the President to respond to events then

663 "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States." U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. LV. 11 March 1941
occuring in Europe and Asia. Though officially neutral in the conflict at the time Lend-Lease was passed, the act was a decisive step toward U.S. involvement in the war. While successfully shoring up U.S. allies, Lend-Lease may have delayed America’s entry into the war, but it didn’t stop it.

Under Lend-Lease the U.S. delivered more than 850 B-25 medium-range Mitchell Bombers to the Soviet Union. Over the course of the war the U.S. would provide the Soviets 4,600 P-39 Airacobra. Large numbers of C-46 Commando and A-20 Boston aircraft were also provided. However none of these aircraft represented the latest in U.S. technology and though useful in the current situation, most would be obsolete by the end of the war. Lend-Lease also provided the Soviet Union with other military materials outside of aircraft. During the war the U.S. provided the Soviet Union with 4,104 M4 Sherman tanks, 2,000 locomotives and 11,000 railcars. Lend-Lease also provide large amounts of food, aviation and automotive fuels, ships, tires, aluminum and more to the Soviet Union throughout the war.

Following their previously unsuccessful request for a very heavy four engine bomber, the Soviets would file two additional requests for the B-29 citing future involvement in the war against Japan only to be turned down once again. The last Soviet request, for 120 B-29s was filed in May 1944 and subsequently denied. Despite the support and assistance provided to the U.S.S.R during the war, when it came to the B-29 and other technologies of value in the coming post-war era, the U.S. declined all Soviet requests.

Section 53 – RAMP TRAMP: STALIN GETS HIS BOMBER

From mid-to-late 1944 three B-29s operating over Japan and China in support of OPERATION MATTERHORN declared in-flight emergencies diverting to Soviet airfields near Vladivostok. The first to land in the Soviet Union was B-29, Serial Number 42-6256; Ramp Tramp. The similarities between the events that surrounded the landing of Ramp Tramp at an airfield near Vladivostok and what later occurred to Hog Wild over Konan are worth examining.

On 29 July 1944, B-29-5-BW Serial Number 42-6256, Ramp Tramp assigned to the 462nd (Very Heavy) Bomb Group and commanded by Captain Howard R. Jarrell, departed its base near Chengtu, China on a bomb run to the Showa Steel Works. The Showa Steel Mill was a subsidiary of the South Manchurian Railway Company located near Anshan, Manchukuo. The Showa plant produced pig iron and steel.

According to target intelligence produced during the war, the Showa works was the “second largest integrated pig iron/steel works in the Japanese system,” the largest being the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata in Japan proper. The Showa Steel Works covered an area of almost two and one-half square miles and was surrounded by other industries that manufactured finished products from Showa’s production. The Manchurian steel plant was “the largest Japanese industrial operation on the mainland of Asia.” The plant produced fully one-third of the Japanese Empire’s coking coal used in industrial ovens and furnaces. Though 96 bombers were assigned to attack the plant just 72 airplanes took off from their bases in China to attack the steel mill. Of the 72 that departed, only 60 actually reached Anshan.

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667 Target Number 29. Showa Steel Works. Iron and Steel. Index of Targets by Number. Classification and Name. Manchuria Region. Manchurian Areas, Nos. 93.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Washington. D.C. 31 July 1944
669 Ibid.
The only combat loss over the target belonged to the 468th Bomb Group. The Lady Hamilton Serial Number 42-6274 had lost one engine in-flight, took several rounds from flak and was attacked by several aircraft over the target area. At least one of the aircraft attacking Lady Hamilton was an American-made P-40 bearing Chinese markings. Of Lady Hamilton’s crew, three were killed in action eight were rescued. A second aircraft, Hap’s Hope Serial number 42-6240 crashed 25 miles southeast of Likiang, China. Eight members of Hap’s Hope were killed in the crash. Experiencing problems with its auxiliary power unit prior to take-off, Ramp Tramp was the last of nearly 100 bombers assigned to the mission to takeoff. Once airborne it took Ramp Tramp almost two hours of high-powered flight to close with and join the rest of the bomber formation.

The high-powered flight and problems with its auxiliary power unit left the bomber low on fuel as it exited the target area. Problems with the right inboard engine (Number 3) forcing the crew to shut the engine down during the flight further increased the overall drag of the aircraft. With the aircraft still over Japanese held territory, low on fuel and incapable of returning to its home base in China the plane’s commander, Captain Jarrell pointed Ramp Tramp toward Vladivostok. Jarrell assumed as did the several bombers that eventually landed in the Soviet Union, that they would be allowed to land, initiate repairs, refuel and return to their bases in China. As Ramp Tramp entered Soviet territory and neared the Soviet airfield, Russian aircraft scrambled to meet the bomber.

As the Russian interceptors, Yak-9s near the B-29 several of them fired shots across the nose of the crippled bomber. According to the crew during their subsequent debrief, it was initially unclear whether the Russian fighters were trying to hit the aircraft or simply force it down. After firing on the bomber one Soviet pilot motioned for Ramp Tramp to land.

The B-29 was led to a grass strip on the Tsentrahl’naya-Ooglovaya Airfield near Tavrichanka, one far too short for the bomber, where it was forced to put down. Approaching the field at nearly stall speed the aircraft coasted to a stop just before running off the runway. The Soviet Union, at that time neutral in the war against Japan interned the crew for seven months at an internment camp 60 kilometers south of Tashkent, Uzbekistan prior to “allowing them to escape” into Iran. None of the crew was ever allowed to see or approach the bomber again. Stalin now had his first strategic bomber. Three more bombers would eventually divert or crash in the Soviet Union. The circumstances of their treatment and welcome were oddly similar and some aspects of their loss would apply to Hog Wild.

“Cait Paomat II” – “Saint Catherine”

On 20 August 1944 during a raid against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata on Kyūshū from air bases near Chengtu, China, B-29A-1-BN Serial Number 42-93829 “Cait Paomat II” (Gaelic for St. Catherine), piloted by Major Richard McGlinn took heavy flak knocking out engine number 2. The aircraft’s radar had ceased operating just prior to arriving at the IP (generally the IP is the last turn point prior to the target) of the bomb run. The crew bombed the target visually.

Running low on fuel with its radar inoperable, as the aircraft crossed the coast of China the pilot diverted the aircraft to the Soviet Union. After passing over the Amur River and flying deeper into Soviet Territory the crew bailed out over the Russian Far East. Members of the crew spent more than 40 days wandering through the Siberian forest before being rescued. The bomber itself crashed in the foothills of

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675 Ibid.
678 Ibid.
681 Ibid.
Sikhote Alin Range about 30 miles east of Khabarovsky and was of little value, but the crash site was salvaged for parts.682 As with other aircrews that had crash landed in the Soviet Union, the crewmembers of the Caiť Paomat were likewise incarcerated, but eventually “allowed to escape” into Iran.

“General H. H. Arnold Special”

Oddly enough the third B-29 lost to the Russians was B-29 Serial Number 42-6365 the “General H. H. Arnold Special” of the 468th Bomber Group. It was the same B-29 identified by General “Hap” Arnold as the bomber he wanted completed, and had actually signed when he visited the Boeing Wichita Plant on 11 January 1944. Exactly ten months later on 11 November 1944 the General H. H. Arnold Special was one of 90 aircraft taking off from Chengtu to bomb the Omura Aircraft Plant on Kyushu.

According to its Flight Engineer Eugene Rutherford the General H. H. Arnold Special had previously flown missions over the southern islands of Japan; Nagasaki, Sasebo, and the Yawata Steel Works683 Rutherford reports that the bomber had previously attacked targets in Singapore, the Shell Oil Refinery at Palembang, Sumatra, and steel works at Harbin, China.684 At the time it was flown, the mission to Palembang, Sumatra was one of the longest of the war. Prior to the Arnold departing China for Kyushu, the bomber’s crew had been instructed that if there was no other way to get back from the mission “to drift up to Siberia and land in Soviet Territory.”685 686

While the bomber was enroute to bomb the Omura Aircraft Plant, meteorological aircraft reported bad weather conditions over the target area and orders were transmitted diverting the attacking force to its secondary target in the area of Nanking, China.687 The General H. H. Arnold Special never received the order to divert its secondary target. The Arnold and 29 other bombers pressed on through the storm on to Kyūshū. One engine had to be shut down over or near Japan. Rutherford reported the bad weather as a typhoon.688 The Canberra Times would later report that the winds of the storm were so damaging to the B-29’s flying through, as to spring rivets off the skin of the bombers flying within the storm.689 A scout aircraft, the General H. H. Arnold Special had flown ahead of the group as a pathfinder to bomb the target before the larger group arrived over the target area, thereby making target acquisition for the bulk of the force easier.

After completing its mission the bomber turned for China. Emerging from the storm after flying five hours against a 155-mph head wind the navigator discovered the bomber was just off the southern coast of the Korean Peninsula and still 900 miles short of their estimated position.690 The typhoon had also blown the aircraft north of its expected position. The Special had been airborne nearly 18 hours and was nearing the limits of it fuel reserves. At this point a second engine began having problems with its cylinder head pressure redlining and its oil pressure beginning to drop. The engine could not be shut down as that would have eliminated two engines on the same side of the bomber, making overall aircraft control difficult. The choices were clear; crash somewhere in China or turn to Vladivostok. The aircraft’s pilot Captain Weston Price diverted the aircraft toward Vladivostok and disappeared into the Soviet Union.691

The previous headwinds now turned to tailwinds, pushing the bomber north. Despite broadcasting his intentions as he approached Vladivostok the General H. H. Arnold Special was fired upon by Soviet coastal anti-aircraft guns and surrounded by Yaks. More than 10 fighters escorted the bomber to the ground.692 Many of the Yaks fired in front of and around the B-29 without seriously attempting to shoot the

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682 Intrusions, Overflights, Shootdowns and Defections During the Cold War and Thereafter. 1 March 2009. http://home.comcast.net/~anneled/ColdWar.html
685 Ibid.
686 Photo Credit. “General H. H. Arnold Special.” Courtesy: U.S. Army
bomber down. Rutherford reports that the bomber’s pilot, Weston H. Price was reluctant to put the bomber down as the field’s runways were too short. With its brakes nearly locked down the General H. H. Arnold Special stopped just short of the airfield’s barracks. When the bomber shut down its engines the Soviets were on it. A Soviet Lieutenant entered the plane and through words and motions ordered the crew to gather their weapons and throw them to the ground. The crew was then ordered to exit the aircraft with their hands up.

The crew later learned that as the airfield was under the control of Soviet Naval Aviation, the Yak crews thought that forcing the bomber to land at their airfield was a real coup. According to Lieutenant Rutherford the crew was detained at the field several days while several Soviet Generals were flown out from Moscow to interrogate the crew. Rutherford reports Soviet interrogators as being “pretty hard” on some of the crew. The crew also reported that at least one Soviet female was assigned to sympathize with the crew as a “plant” in an attempt to get additional information, but was ignored. Lieutenant Rutherford reported her questions as being “harmless enough.” Weeks went by before Army Air Forces at Guam learned the fate of the aircraft and its crew. For a time the aircrew was carried as “missing in action.” The crewmembers were interned and as with the crew of Ramp Tramp, never allowed to return to the aircraft.

The crew had arrived in India in April or May 1944 and when lost had been in combat for about six months. The day before the General H. H. Arnold Special landed at Vladivostok it had flown a 17-hour search mission attempting to locate another Superfort that had been lost on the 5 November raid on Singapore. The bomber had flown 11 missions from bases in India, and was the first bomber to drop bombs over Bangkok, Thailand. The bomber had flown ten combat missions recording 563.30 hours airtime. It had flown against additional targets in Singapore, Sumatra and Formosa. The General H. H. Arnold Special was also a veteran of 11 missions over the Hump. The crew was returned to Allied control on 1 February 1945.

“Ding How” – “Very Best”

Ten days after the General H.H. Arnold Special was lost, on 21 November 1944, B-29 Serial Number 42-6358 the “Ding How” (sometimes rendered “Ding Hao”) also from the 468th Bomber Group became the last intact and flyable B-29 to fall into Russian hands. Like the General H.H. Arnold Special the bomber was on a mission over the Omura Aircraft Plant when it was attacked by an enemy aircraft disabling one engine. The crew was able to feather the engine and while over the Yellow Sea diverted across the Korean Peninsula to Vladivostok. Ding How arrived over Vladivostok during a storm overflying the city at about 5,000 foot. The bomber’s radio operator continuously broadcast the international signal for “friend.” The bomber’s commander, Captain Mickish circled Vladivostok for a full

696 Ibid.
697 Ibid.
698 Ibid.
699 Ibid.
700 Ibid.
701 Ibid.
702 Ibid.
703 Ibid.
704 Ibid.
705 Ibid.
706 Ibid.
707 Ibid.
708 Ibid.
709 Ibid.
710 Ibid.
711 Ibid.
713 Ibid.
714 Ibid.
719 Ibid.
ten minutes while searching for a place to put the aircraft down. With the weather getting worse Mickish knew he would have to set the bomber down somewhere and turned to a small naval airfield south of the city. The crew then spotted a B-29 parked at an airfield below. It was the General H.H. Arnold Special. Mickish set up an approach into the same airfield.

At an altitude of about 500 foot, with its landing gear now down Ding How was greeted with a hail of ack-ack fire. Six Soviet fighters rose to meet the bomber. Like Ramp Tramp, Ding How was fired on by no less than six Soviet Yaks. At least ten Yaks are believed to have escorted the bomber to its landing site—continuing to fire across the bomber’s nose even as it rolled down the runway. Once on the ground the crew was ordered from the aircraft and taken to a nearby naval headquarters. As Captain Mickish later reported “We felt that they (the Russians) should have been friendly, but somehow didn’t seem friendly.” The crew never saw the Ding How again.

Not-less-than eight Russians initially interviewed or interrogated the crew of Ding How. There was no torture or ill-treatment. The crew was actually released in time for dinner. After eating, the crew returned to interrogation where they were met by a Soviet three-star general, name unknown. The general was reportedly “very active in the interrogation.” According to Mickish the general asked repeatedly why the U.S. had not given the Soviet Union copies of the bomber. It was a question the answer to which was far above Mickish’s pay-grade.

To its credit Ding How had flown nine combat missions from its bases in India and 10 missions over the Hump. Like the H.H. Arnold Special, the crew of Ding How was also carried for a time as missing in action, “but believed to be safe.”

All the crews that escaped from Japanese controlled airspace into the Soviet Union assumed that upon landing they would be allowed to initiate repairs, take on fuel and depart. None were. Once the crews were escorted from their landing fields, none of the men ever saw their Superforts again. None of the crews that had landed in the Soviet Union ever knew prior to diverting that all previous planes escaping into Russia and listed as “missing-in-action” had been interred. Decades later other than the four B-29s listed above, it was never actually determined whether any additional Superforts presumed lost over the sea or in China had actually crashed in the Soviet Union. There remained the possibility that there may have been others. The crews of the stricken bombers that landed in the Soviet Union were held in austere conditions; nothing worse though than the conditions faced by the average Soviet citizens every day. Most were released or “allowed to escape” into Iran several months later. None of the four separate crews ever foresaw the value of their lost bombers to the future survival of the Soviet Union. U.S. diplomatic efforts to force the Soviets to return the bombers were lame at best.

Section 54 – QUIET PROTESTS

The Soviet Union now had in its possession three complete and largely flyable B-29s not to mention some parts salvaged from a fourth, and possibly parts from other unknown losses within the Soviet Union or northern China. Despite quiet U.S. requests that the Soviets return the bombers the three airworthy B-29s remained firmly in the hands of the U.S.S.R.

On 21 December 1944, General Curtis LeMay, referred to by most crews as “The Cigar” had all crews briefed that under no circumstances were they to divert their aircraft to the Soviet Union. LeMay told the crews that there was no emergency worth losing another B-29 to the Soviet Union. Aircrews were told that despite the nature of the emergency, if need be they should get as far into China as possible then abandon their aircraft. LeMay’s disdain at allowing damaged bombers to fall into Soviet hands enabled him to enlist the assistance of Mao Zedong and the Communist Chinese to get
downed aircrews back to safe areas. LeMay assured the crews that the Chinese; Communist or Nationalist, would do everything possible to get the crews out of Japanese occupied territory and back to free China. Numerous B-29 airmen that later bailed out over China were eventually returned by Communist and Nationalist soldiers to the U.S. forward operating bases in China, sometimes escorted over a distance of one thousand miles or more. For their part the Soviet Union continued to hide behind international law as a screen to retain the bombers.

The Soviets argued that Russia could not appear to the Japanese to be supporting the U.S. in its ongoing war in the Pacific without possibly suffering adverse consequences. Allowing the aircraft to bomb Japan, recover in the Soviet Union and then return to their forward bases in China could be interpreted as a violation of their neutrality. Soviet diplomats argued that if the U.S.S.R. allowed the bombers to return to their bases in China the nation would be risking war with Japan in the East, while fighting Germany in the West. Considering its Nonaggression Pact with Japan and the previous conflicts between the two nations along the mutual border of their puppet states of Manchukuo and Mongolia, it was a valid argument. There were also other matters to consider.

The first issue, one of near constant concern to Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt was the fear that the U.S.S.R. would sue for a separate peace with Germany in WWII as it had during WWI in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, leaving the United States and United Kingdom to fight Nazi Germany alone. During WWI Russia was a member of the Triple Entente, an alliance with Britain and France which opposed the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. After the fall of Russian Tsar Nicholas II in 1917 and the rise to power of the Bolsheviks that October, Russia concluded a separate peace with Germany and withdrew from the Triple Entente leaving Britain and France to fight the war alone.

The U.S entry into WWI in April 1917 with the arrival of a large number of American soldiers in late 1917 and early 1918 provided a counterbalance to the withdrawal of Russia from the war, and possibly saved England and France from possible defeat. The thought of a separate Soviet peace with Germany in WWII as had occurred during WWI, was the nightmare scenario that the U.S. and Britain sought to avoid at all costs. Unbeknownst to U.S. and British leaders Stalin possessed similar concerns and worried about his allies concluding a separate peace with Germany and abandoning the U.S.S.R. to Hitler’s tender mercies. That did not however stop Stalin from retaining the lost B-29s.

The Soviet Union continued to cite international law and its responsibilities as a neutral nation in the war against Japan as a reason not to return the bombers. General Arnold was extremely bitter over the Soviet action and considered it inexcusable that the Russians would confiscate the aircraft. Arnold also thought that the State Department did not go far enough in its efforts to retrieve the downed aircraft. While many might consider that Hap Arnold was only venting his frustration at losing three B-29s at a time when more were needed, he was absolutely correct about the State Department’s lack of enthusiasm.

Soon after landing at the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Base at Tsentral’naya ugovovaya and finding themselves under near arrest, Ding How’s commander Captain Mickish asked to see the American Consul General at Vladivostok. It was a three-day wait before O. Edmund Clubb; a Foreign Service officer stationed at Vladivostok made the visit. Asked by Captain Mickish if the crew would be able to affect repairs to the bomber and depart, Clubb replied: “No, you’ll never see your plane again.” Lieutenant Rutherford would later report that the crew became rather abusive and that Clubb beat a hasty retreat and was never seen again. As they might say in the 1940s, “the fix” appears to have been in. In the early 1950s Edmund Clubb became the focus of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s investigation of disloyal Americans employed by the State Department and was subsequently forced to resign. He was eventually reinstated and assigned to a menial task within the department where he resigned five days later. Activity ongoing in Europe when Ramp Tramp landed in the Soviet Far East would also play a part in allowing the Soviet Union to retain the bombers.

Section 55 – OPERATION FRANTIC JOE

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722 Ibid.
Ramp Tramp landed near Vladivostok during the middle of OPERATION FRANTIC, then ongoing in Europe. Known originally as OPERATION FRANTIC JOE the name was later changed to OPERATION FRANTIC to prevent offending Joseph Stalin. OPERATION FRANTIC supported a request by the Soviet dictator for long-range air support to Red Army operations then ongoing in Romania. One of the least recalled strategic undertakings of the war, the Allied goal in cooperating with the U.S.S.R. was to convince Stalin to allow the Allies to permanently station three heavy bomber groups within Soviet territory for use against targets in Germany. Less talked about was a second strategic goal, one centered on a U.S. request for access to Soviet air bases in Siberia where American bombers could more easily bring the war to Japan. Such U.S. requests dated to the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor and had constantly suffered “death by silence.” The Soviet Union ignored the requests for fear that Japan would involve Russia in a two front war something Stalin desired to avoid at all costs.

Known as “shuttle bombing,” Allied bombers flying from bases in Italy, and England would overfly Germany—bombing industrial targets in Silesia, Hungary, and Romania and then recover at airfields in the Soviet Union. The bombers would attack additional targets in the same areas on return flights to their home bases. The primary targets of the effort were 16 German war supporting industries, including the Schwartzheide Synthetic Fuel Plant near Berlin and the Gelsenkirchen synthetic oil plant in Drohobycz, Poland.  

Under OPERATION FRANTIC the Soviets eventually allowed Allied bombers to operate out of airbases at Poltava and Milgorod Airfields in Ukraine while Allied fighter aircraft protecting the bombers would fly out of Piryatin Airfield also in Ukraine. As with most innovative military operations the first several missions were the most successful. Eventually the German Air Force, the Luftwaffe caught on to the ruse by following the bombers back to their Russian recovery bases. German retribution soon followed.

On the night of 21–22 June 1944 in a low-level air attack, 80 German Junkers Ju-88 high-speed bombers and a number of Henkel He-111 medium bombers attacked the airfield at Poltava damaging 25 B-17s and destroying another 43 on the ground. An additional 15 P-51 Mustangs were also destroyed. It was the largest single loss of U.S. aircraft on the ground in Europe during WWII. No German aircraft were lost in the attack. Luftwaffe attacks against the U.S. bombers operating from bases in the Soviet Union continued.

The next night Luftwaffe aircraft attacked the Milgorod and Piryatin Airfields destroying more Allied bombers and fighters. The tremendous loss of aircraft on the ground almost forced the cancellation of OPERATION FRANTIC; however, like the loss of Ramp Tramp the lure of greater military cooperation with the Soviet Union continued to attract U.S. leaders.

Despite the large losses, continuing OPERATION FRANTIC would allow the Allies to attack industrial targets in most of German-occupied Europe and possibly bring Soviet air forces into greater cooperation with the Allies. If successful the effort would increase the overall operations tempo of attacks against German targets across Europe and decrease the ability of the Germans to counter Soviet moves in Central Europe. If this greater level of cooperation between the Allies could be achieved in Europe, it was hoped that the new found spirit of cooperation would transfer to the Soviet Far East when the Russians entered the war against Japan. It was a consideration of strategic importance.

Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in the war against Germany, if such cooperation could shift to the Pacific Theatre would allow Allied bombers to overfly and bomb Japan, recover at bases near Vladivostok and attack the Japanese once again on their way home. Though some bombing missions from Soviet airbases would continue, the overall Russian refusal to allow Allied fighter aircraft to protect the forward operating bases supporting OPERATION FRANTIC eventually caused the U.S. to abandon its plan to station bomber groups inside the U.S.S.R.

Officially OPERATION FRANTIC ended when Soviet ground forces advancing toward Germany captured the industrial targets which were the original focus of the larger Allied operation. OPERATION FRANTIC marked the high water mark of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the air war against Germany. Despite its failure the U.S. continued to press the Soviet Union for access to land for bases in Siberia throughout most of the entire war. U.S. proposals included bases north of the Amur River or along the Kamchatka Peninsula. The 1944 U.S. acquisition of the Marianas Islands; Saipan, Tinian and Guam negated the need for bases nearer to Japan inside Russian territory and the issue was forgotten. Overall OPERATION FRANTIC failed to achieve its strategic objectives of increased Soviet-American cooperation in the war, and future U.S. access to bases in Soviet Siberia.

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With the constant Allied fear of a separate Soviet peace with Germany playing in the background, and cooperation between the Allies against Nazi Germany in Europe in the offing, the U.S. quietly allowed the matter of a few B-29s lost the U.S.S.R. to drop. The bombers were considered too technologically advanced to be of much use to the Soviet Union and besides, there were only three of them. There would be no diplomatic effort expended to recover the lost B-29s.

The U.S. could have threatened an end to Lend-Lease materials to recover the bombers however that could have provided the U.S.S.R. pause to seek a separate peace with Nazi Germany. Moreover, the U.S. had already provided the U.S.S.R. a number of B-24 and B-25 aircraft through Lend-Lease. The loss of a few B-29s to the U.S.S.R. was a small price to pay for continued Soviet involvement in WWII. Stalin thereby got his long-range strategic bombers. To Joseph Stalin the three intact B-29s provided a ready-made answer to the Soviet Union’s lack of a long-range very heavy bomber capability.  

Section 56 – B-29 SUPERFORTRESS TO TU-4 BULL

As it stood in late 1944 the three stricken bombers were located in the Soviet Far East with two of them under the control of the Pacific Fleet Air Arm. As in the U.S. at the time, possession was nine-tenths of the law. Seeking any technical advantage possible, People’s Commissar of the Navy Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov ordered an examination of the two damaged Superfortresses, Ding How and General H.H. Arnold Special then in the possession of the Pacific Fleet Air Arm. In late December 1944 Naval Air Arm Vice-Chief of Inspection Colonel Semyon Borisovich Reidel was dispatched to the Soviet Far East Vladivostok to evaluate the Superforts.

Reidel had previous experience with test aircraft, spoke English and had accumulated numerous hours ferrying Lend-Lease aircraft to the front; the qualities necessary to conduct a technical evaluation of any downed American aircraft. Through 1 January 1945 the two bombers were known to have been at Tsentrakh' naya-Ooglovaya Airfield under the tight control of the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Arm. Reidel was assisted by Major Vyacheslav P. Maroonov and one other pilot, name unknown from the Black Sea Fleet. Like Reydel, Maroonov also had previous experience with American aircraft. English to Russian translations being what they are, Reidel’s name is sometimes transliterated as Reydel; Maroonov is often rendered as Marunov or Mironov.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet also provided two aircraft engineers, A.F. Chernov and M. M. Krooglov. Over a period of two days Reidel mastered the bomber by studying its flight manuals, taxiing and lifting the aircraft from the runway on high speed taxis. To qualify additional pilots Reidel examined and qualified Maroonov to fly the B-29. The bombers were thoroughly examined.

The third bomber, Ramp Tramp was under the control of the 35th Independent Long-Range Bomber Squadron. It was later transferred to the 65th Special Mission Air Regiment a unit specially formed to study the B-29.

Flight familiarity, pilot qualification and testing of the two bombers under the control of the Pacific Fleet Air Arm were conducted at Romanovka Air Base. Reidel is known to have operated one of the bombers while it was under initial tests, Maroonov and Chernov are known to have operated the other. Reidel is likely to have been assisted by Krooglov as Krooglov is not known to have flown with Maroonov. Flight testing at Romanovka continued until 21 July 1945 when the last bomber was transferred to Izmailovo Airfield on the outskirts of Moscow.

Colonel Reidel, Major Morzhakov and M. M. Krooglov transferred first U.S. B-29 to Moscow.  It is not yet known who flew the second and third bombers to Moscow, but it is known that Major Vyacheslav P. Maroonov was not assigned to the ferrying mission as he had been reassigned prior to the transfer of the bombers to fly the TU-2 in the coming

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http://www.rb-29.net/HTML/03RelatedStories/03.03shortstories/03.03.10contss.htm
534 Ibid.
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
537 Ibid.
538 Ibid.
The Soviet Union had dropped production of the TU-2 at the end of 1942 in favor of the Yak-9 but had resumed production in 1944 with the TU-2 now designated as a high-speed bomber. The last B-29 was flown to Izmailovo Airfield at a later date. All three bombers were now assigned to the 65th Special Air Mission Regiment. After having their U.S. markings removed and upon being repainted 42-6256 Ramp Tramp was transformed into “256 Black,” 42-6358 Ding How became “358 Black,” and 42-6365 the General H. H. Arnold Special became “365 Black.” To the Soviet aircraft industry the three aircraft represented a technological windfall: The bombers were far more advanced than any similar Soviet aircraft of the period. The decision to produce a Soviet copy of the B-29 was reached on 22 June 1945. All further research and development efforts to produce an advanced Soviet very long-range bomber in the form of the ANT-64 were cancelled.

Stalin assigned the Aviacionny Nauchno-Tehnicheski Komplex im A.N. Tupoleva (A.N. Tupolev Experimental Design Bureau) under Andrie Nikolayevich Tupolev (10 Nov 1888–23 Dec 1972) the task of reverse engineering the B-29 and building the Soviet Union’s first long-range, very heavy, strategic bomber. Stalin directed that the Tupolev experimental version of the B-29 be produced in quantity as soon as possible. “As soon as possible” became a deadline of about two years. Arkadii B. Shvetsov (25 Jan 1892–19 Mar 1953) was assigned the responsibility of providing an engine for the B-29 copy. Tupolev would have his first encounter with the B-29 on the night of 21 July 1945 about seven weeks before Hog Wild would be forced down over Konan, northern Korea. Within Russia producing the bomber became a project of the highest national priority. Much of Soviet Russia’s aircraft industry would be involved in the reproduction of the bomber. The Soviet Union had for all intents and purposes stolen the B-29. Under the Soviet Union the new bomber was to be referred to as the “B-4,” or “Object R.” Numerous aircraft engineers were involved with copying the B-29 and developing the Soviet duplicate. Thousands of Soviet workers were assigned to manufacture the bomber. Production would proceed around the clock. No less than Lavrentiy Beria (29 Mar 1899–23 Dec 1953), would oversee its production. Beria was also in charge of the Soviet Union’s atomic bomb program. Chief of the NKVD, Beria was the longest surviving of Stalin’s secret police chiefs. Though it is an overused cliché Beria was indeed a monster.

Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria was a Georgian politician and state security administrator, chief of the Soviet security and secret police apparatus (NKVD) under Joseph Stalin during World War II. He would rise in the postwar years to the position of Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union from 1946-1953. Beria assumed control of the Soviet security apparatus near the end of the Great Purge of the 1930s and is often erroneously credited with the conduct of the NKVD over the entire period of the purges. The purges was primarily a result of a desire on the part of the Soviet leadership to eliminate dissonance within the Communist Party; however Stalin is often credited with using the purge to consolidate his authority over the party. Eventually the purge began to consume itself as it increasingly turned on the Soviet government and other institutions such as the Red Army.

When the purge began the NKVD was led by Genrikh Yagoda who supervised the arrest, trial and execution of many of the Soviet Union’s original Bolshevik leaders. In 1936 Yagoda was replaced by his deputy, Nikolai Yezhov who would actually lead the NKVD at the height of the purge. The period of the purges where the most notable show trials and confessions were obtained are referred to in Russia as the “Yezhovshchina,” or the “Yezhov era.” Yagoda himself was arrested in March of 1937. Yezhov would torture confessions from Yagoda. In March 1938 Yagoda was executed. Prior to his execution Yagoda was stripped naked, beaten and humiliated. NKVD General Vasili Blokhin conducted the execution.

739 Ibid.
740 Ibid.
741 Ibid.
3,000 of Yagoda’s fellow NKVD officers would also be executed. With the removal of Yagoda and the elevation of Yezhov the purges intensified.

Over the two years of 1937 and 1938 the Great Purge reached its zenith. It is believed that at least 1.3 million Soviet citizens were arrested during the purge while 681,692 were executed. 50-70 percent of the Supreme Soviet, the legislative body of the Soviet Union were removed from their positions, imprisoned, or exiled to the Soviet prison system the Gulag. On the eve of The Great Patriotic War, WWII, the Soviet Red Army was also purged. 60-70 percent of all Soviet officers were arrested, exiled or eliminated. 90 percent of the nation’s general officers were likewise removed. Georgi Zhukov was one of the few to survive. As the removals began to disastrously impact the country’s industrial sector and the military’s ability to defend the country’s borders, Stalin now moved to distance himself from the purge. Yezhov became expendable. In a move reminiscent of Yezhov’s rise to power on 22 August 1938 Lavrentiy Beria the NKVD leader in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic was named Yezhov’s deputy. On 25 November 1938 Beria succeeded Yezhov as the Soviet leader of the NKVD. Unlike his predecessors Beria would outlive Stalin, but only for a few years.

In 10 April 1939 Yezhov was arrested. On 2 February 1940 he was tried in Beria’s office by Soviet judge Vasily Ulrikh. Yezhov knew far too much about Stalin’s involvement in The Great Purge to risk his disgrace in a public trial. In Beria’s office, when Ulrikh sentenced him to death Yezhov fainted and had to be carried from the room. Just prior to his execution like Yagoda, Yezhov was ordered to undress, was savagely beaten and further humiliated. A barely conscious Yezhov had to be carried into the execution chamber believed to be in the basement of a small NKVD station on Varsonofeyskii Lane in Moscow. As with Yagoda NKVD General Vasili Blokhin conducted the execution. Over a 28 day period in April of 1940 Blokhin would personally kill over 7,000 Polish officers captured in the joint German-Soviet invasion of Poland. In 2010 the Guinness World Records would list Blokhin as the world’s “Most Prolific Executioner.”

Like Yagoda and Yezhov, Beria would administer large areas of the Soviet Union. He would be responsible for wartime anti-partisan campaigns, operations against anti-Soviet ethic groups and Nazi collaborators. During the war Beria would order the execution of numerous turncoats, deserters, and suspected malingerers. Beria would also administer the nation’s prison system, its Gulag and slave labor camps. He is believed to be largely responsible for the April 1940 massacre of about 22,000 Polish military officers, police and other Poles in the Katyn forest. Beria was uncompromising and utterly ruthless. His violent nature made him feared and notorious even among other leaders within the Soviet Union. Beria produced results through intimidation.

Under Beria’s leadership the Soviet effort to build an atomic bomb was completed in less-than five years. The reverse engineering of the B-29 into the TU-4, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) codenamed “BULL” was accomplished in less-than two years. After Stalin died Beria elevated himself to First Deputy Premier and was briefly part of the ruling “troika,” a party of three with Georgy Malenkov and Vyacheslav Molotov. Following the 1953 East German uprising which was only put down by an invasion of Soviet forces Beria advocated normalizing relations with the U.S., an act that alarmed other Politburo members. Nikita Khrushchev and Marshal Georgy Zhukov now formed an alliance to remove Beria from power. On 26 June 1953 at a meeting of the Soviet Presidium Khrushchev launched a scathing attack against Beria accusing him of spying for British intelligence. Molotov and others quickly joined in. Malenkov, pressing a button on his desk signaled Marshal Zhukov and several other military officers who then burst into the room arresting Beria.

After he was arrested Beria was taken to an undisclosed location near Moscow and later to the headquarters of the Moscow Military District. Soviet Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin now ordered the Kantemirovskaya Tank Division and Tamanskaia Motor Rifle Division to move into Moscow to prevent forces loyal to Beria from rescuing him

Reported Image of The General H. H. Arnold Special being disassembled in a Hangar near Moscow

On 23 December 1953 Beria and others were tried by a special session of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. He was allowed no defense counsel and no right of appeal. Beria was found guilty of treason, terrorism, and counterrevolutionary activities during the Russian Civil War and sentenced to death. Later that day, after stuffing a rag in his mouth to muffle his crying, General Pavel Batitsky shot Beria in the forehead. Politics, murder, rape, slave labor and massacres aside Beria gave the Soviet Union the atomic bomb, and through the reverse engineering of the B-29 the means to deliver it to most of America’s largest cities to include Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City.

More than 900 factories and research institutes would be involved in the effort to reproduce the B-29. 744 New institutes and production facilities were built as required. More than 90 percent of materials required to build the bomber had never before been produced in the Soviet Union. 745 Where new equipment was required the Soviets imported captured German plant. In some cases the machines used to produce the bomber were obtained from the U.S. under Lend-Lease. Preparing the factories in Kazan for full-scale production required the development of more than 30,000 original manufacturing techniques, the production of 27,000 pieces of braces, struts, lifting gear, blocks and tackle. 756 To begin the effort on the night of 11 June 1945 the General H.H. Arnold Special was rolled into in the only hangar large enough to hold it at the Moscow Central Aerodrome where it was slowly disassembled. 747

Its disassembled parts were used to develop patterns for a future Soviet produced version of the long-range bomber. 748 Tupolev was ordered to duplicate the B-29 down to its smallest detail. As the bomber was disassembled each of its more than 105,000 parts were measured, numbered, labeled, photographed and cataloged for duplication. Teams were assigned responsibility for each part or section of the bomber removed from the aircraft. The effort required the production of 40,700 detailed drawings, patterns and guides. 749 Each drawing had to contain a list of all measurements in standard American inches converted to the metric system. The drafting effort alone employed more than 1,000 draftsmen. As much as possible the Soviet rendering of the airframe would be a bolt-for-bolt, wire-by-wire copy of the stolen design in minute detail. 750 Any delays, any variation, any deadlines that could not be met drew the attention of Lavrentiy Beria. All drawings, templates and blueprints were completed in April 1946. By late summer 1946 a full-scale mock-up of the TU-4 was complete.

Unlike the General H.H. Arnold Special, Ding How was kept in-tact, serving as the standard or reference model. 751 Ramp Tramp was repaired and sent to the Soviet Flight-Test Center at Zhukovski where it was used to train Soviet aircrews that would test the TU-4; develop flight training manuals and ground maintenance schedules. 752 The time lines given for completing a Soviet version of the B-29 were tight, less than two years.

Work on the prototype BULL took place at Moscow factory N23 (referred to as “Red October” and sometimes Experimental Plant Number 23) and at factory N22 in Kazan. 754 Personnel assigned to the program worked 12 to 14 hours per-day, seven days per-week. The TU-4 Central Station Fire Control System posed numerous problems. Andrie Tupolev himself thought that reproducing the fire control computer was beyond the ability of Soviet industry, but he was wrong. Work on the system was delegated to I. I. Toropov and what would become known as the State Engineering Design Bureau “Vympel.” Toropov eventually mastered the complex circuitry and switches of B-29s Central Station Fire Control System producing the PV-20 and PV-23 gun systems used on the TU-4, TU-16 and TU-95 Soviet bombers. Like Tupolov, Toropov had exceeded Stalin’s expectations, and possibly his own. …

Unlike the rest of the B-29 the Soviets did not copy the Wright R-3350 engine but instead used the Soviet ASh-73TK, an enhanced version of the Wright R-1820 which was produced legally by the Soviet Union under license from Wright. However, like the Wright R-3350 the operational life of the ASh-73TK engine was short. The Soviet engine had a

746 Ibid.
747 Ibid.
752 Mayo, Wayland. Russian B-29 Clone – The TU-4 Story. Cold War Stories, Related Tales, & Commentary. http://www.rb-29.net/HTML/03RelatedStories/03.03shortstories/03.03.10conns.htm
tendency to overheat.\(^{355}\) Runaway or wind-milling propellers were also a common problem.\(^{356}\) The first 20 pre-production test and evaluation aircraft were built at a Soviet factory on the Volga River.\(^{357}\)

These 20 aircraft completed flight testing at the LII Flight Test Institute at Zhukovski in the Moscow Oblast.\(^{358}\) Two aircraft factories beyond the Ural Mountains were assigned to produce the final Soviet production model.\(^{359}\) Aviation Plant 18 in Kuibyshev also contributed to the program building TU-4s from 1949 to 1952. The Soviet production version of the B-29 the Tupolev TU-4, codenamed “BULL” by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took to the air in 19 May 1947 about 20 months after the project began. Oddly enough, the TU-70, a Soviet passenger version of the B-29 built side-by-side with the TU-4 actually flew in November 1946 several months before the TU-4. The Soviets first flew the TU-4 publicly at the Tushino Air Show on 3 August 1947 as part of the traditional air show.\(^{760}\) At first only three of the bombers appeared leading most observers to humbly assume that the Soviets had repaired and were now flying the three B-29s previously lost at Vladivostok. The appearance of the TU-70, some distance behind shattered the confidence of the observers. When the scene at Tushino was described to General Carl Spaatz he opined that there were “definitely more than came by us.”\(^{761}\) There had been reports as early as Veteran’s Day 1946 that the Soviets were reproducing the bomber in factories in the Urals. There were other indicators that something was going on but most were ignored.

In 1946 the Boeing Aircraft Company was approached by the Amtorg Trading Company with a purchase request for a number of B-29 tires, wheels, and brake assemblies. The request was denied. On 11 November 1946 an article appeared in the Berlin newspaper Der Kurier, reporting that Soviet factories in the Ural Mountains were duplicating the B-29. A British journal, The Aeroplane Spotter first publicly disclosed what had happened to the three bombers lost near Vladivostok.\(^{762}\) One of its writers had noticed the TU-4 in the background of Soviet newsreels announcing the 72-seat passenger plane TU-70 that closely resembled the B-29.\(^{763}\) Viewing the same clips, Boeing engineers confirmed British suspicions.

Boeing engineers matched more than 20 parts copied from the B-29 to include; the wing, nacelles, cooling air intakes, cowl flaps, main landing gear, and propellers.\(^{764}\) Boeing Magazine later wrote that “The famed Boeing 117 airfoil that the TU-70 is sporting is an exact replica of the Boeing B-29 wing. Along with the wing are the Superfortress nacelles; outline, cooling air intake, auxiliary air scoop, cowl flaps and inboard and outboard fairings. The cabin air inlet in the wing leading edge between the body and the inboard nacelle is the same. The trailing edge extension on the flap between the inboard nacelle and the side of the fuselage are also identical, according to the evidence provided by the photographs.”

“The Tupolev TU-70 uses the Twenty-nine’s main landing-gear structure as well as its fairings and doors. The nose gear also appears to be that of the Superfortress, with the upper trunnion located closer to the body contour of the TU-70 than on the Boeing bomber.”

“The tail surfaces of the Russian transport also come direct from the Boeing engineering department. On comparison it is apparent that the vertical tail and the dorsal outline as well as the leading edge of the rudder are the same on the two planes. The rudder of the TU-70 appears to end at what would be the top of the tail gunner’s doghouse on the Superfortress. The shape of the stabilizer and the elevator is the same on the two ships, and the transport also uses the inverted camber of the B-29’s tail.”

“Propellers of the Tupolev TU-70 appear to be original B-29 props, less cuffs. The hubs are characteristic of the Hamilton-Standard design. Boeing engineers also report that the drift meter installation of the Russian transport looks like that of the Superfortress, and the pilot head type and location match.”

“Tupolev did, however, design a new fuselage for the transport. It sits higher on the wing of the TU-70 than does the fuselage of the B-29, and the fuselage is larger in diameter and a little longer (119 feet as compared to 99 feet). While the transport has a new fuselage, it retains the bomber nose, including the bombardier’s plate-glass window.”\(^{765}\)

Far too late, Soviet efforts in 1946 to order B-29 tires through an American tire manufacturer, wheels and brake assemblies now took on new meanings. The rumors previously ignored were now understood. The Soviets had indeed reverse


\(^{357}\) The Billion-Dollar Bomber, William Green, Air Enthusiast, July, August, September, 1971.


\(^{361}\) Ibid.

\(^{362}\) Ibid.

\(^{363}\) Ibid.

\(^{364}\) Ibid.

\(^{365}\) Boeing Magazine (Seattle), Flying. Number 6, Volume 2. February 1948
engineered the Superfortress. Stalin had his bomber, but the war against Germany and Japan was over and the pressure to produce the TU-4 was still on. Why? The answer lay in the Manhattan Project.

Section 57 – THE MANHATTAN PROJECT, SPYING AND THE DELIVERY PLATFORM

After it was revealed in 1947 that Russia had copied the Superfortress, the Soviet effort was attributed to a reverse engineering program based upon the four aircraft lost Vladivostok in 1944. Like much of the Hog Wild story, on the surface it appears that the story of Stalin and his bomber was fairly clear cut. The lost bombers provided the Soviets with working models, patterns, designs, metallurgy, and so on. But like most of this story the explanation was not quite so simple. Stalin had indeed stolen the bomber, but long before the first aircraft had crashed in the Russian Far East or the first intact bomber had ever landed near Vladivostok. The tale was told to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by Elizabeth Bentley in late 1945.

Elizabeth Bentley

Elizabeth Terrill Bentley was born in Milford, Connecticut on 1 January 1908 to May Charlotte Turrill a schoolteacher and dry goods merchant Charles Prentiss Bentley. She was an only child. Following high school Bentley attended Vassar College, graduating in 1930 with a degree in English, Italian and French. Primarily a loner, at college Bentley apparently rebelled against her Episcopal New Englander upbringing associating with individuals possessing radically different views. While in college her mother passed away. Apparently her father had died some years earlier. Bentley used the inheritance gained from her mother’s passing to travel to Europe. Whether in Europe or prior to traveling there, Bentley is reported to have learned to massage her frequent bouts of depression and loneliness with alcohol and promiscuity.

In 1934 Bentley returned to the U.S. where she enrolled in business courses at Colombia University. Invited by another student to Communist Party meetings, Bentley eventually began to embrace the movement. In 1938 at times unemployed and living through the Great Depression Bentley began to increasingly dedicate herself to the party. In October 1938, she was introduced to a new contact, “Timmy.” Bentley would later learn that Timmy was actually Jacob Golos.

Jacob Golos

Jacob Golos was born in Ekaterinoslav in present-day Ukraine, at that time part of the Russian Empire, on 24 April 1889 with the given name of Yakov Raisen. In 1906 Raisen took part in a general strike at Ekaterinoslav where he operated a printing press. For his involvement Raisen was sentenced to eight years hard labor in Yakutia, the Russian far north. After serving two years of his eight year sentence the Communist Party assisted him in escaping. In 1909 he immigrated to the U.S., entering the country at San Francisco. While in the U.S. Raisen sometimes resided in New York City or Chicago, Illinois and at other times in California. In 1915 he gravitated to the Socialist Party of America. Raisen was a founding member of the American Communist Party.

In 1923 on orders from the Communist Party Golos returned to New York. There he became a Communist Party section organizer, responsible for organizing party cells. The party also appointed him Secretary of the Central Bureau of the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia. The society had been organized in May 1919 on the basis of the engineering department “Techotdel,” of the so-called Martens Bureau headed by Ludwig Martens a revolutionary and engineer. In 1927 Raisen returned to Moscow where his activities become somewhat murky. He returned to New York in 1929 where he managed the offices of “Novi Mir” magazine. In 1932 Golos became head of World Tourist, a communist front organization. At World Tourist Golos specialized in assisting delegations and individuals in visiting the U.S.S.R. or in traveling to attend various Communist International (Comintern) events. Golos also provided travel documents for Americans who journeyed to Spain during the Spanish Civil War to fight as volunteers in the International Brigades against European Fascism. By the time Raisen, now Golos met with Elizabeth Bentley he was one of the Soviet Union’s most valuable assets in the U.S. Bentley would know Timmy for six months before she accidentally learned that Timmy was really Jacob Golos (formerly Jacob Raisen).

Though operatives weren’t permitted to socialize, Golos and Bentley developed an intimate relationship. Over the course of time Golos trained Bentley in the finer arts of spy craft.

Under Golos’ tutelage Bentley was taught to use pay phones as a means of contacting agents, how to identify surveillance; shake a tail and use dead drops. Bentley was also taught to maintain a motive for being at any one place at any one time. If her presence in an area was questioned, Bentley was to have a reason for being there ready for instant use. In the early years of the 1940s Golos’ suffered a series of heart attacks. As his physical health deteriorated he transferred most of his responsibilities, including spy rings to Bentley. Golos also appointed Bentley as vice-president of United States Service and Shipping Corporation; a Comintern front organization for espionage activities. Over a period of about five years Bentley
had moved from novice party member to spy master. Despite her training Bentley if not also Golos, was never more than an amateur.

Elizabeth Bentley – Spy Chief

As Bentley began to assume a greater role in the espionage effort against the U.S., the Soviet Union assigned her a code name “UMNITSA” meaning “CLEVER GIRL.” On Thanksgiving night 1943, Jacob Golos passed away leaving Bentley in charge of several Soviet espionage networks. Bentley now managed the Silvermaster Group, one of the largest spy rings ever uncovered in America and the Perlo Group. The Silvermaster Group existed under the leadership of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster a government employee in the Agriculture Department. Members of the Silvermaster Group included his wife Helen Silvermaster, Bela Gold, Frank Coe, William Ludwig Ullmann, George Silverman and several others. In addition Bentley also managed William Remington who was assigned to the War Production Board. Information obtained from Harry Dexter White, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Head of the International Monetary Fund; and Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, Deputy Administrator of Foreign Economic Administration; Special Representative to China also saw its way into the hands of Elizabeth Bentley. It is likely that several other groups also existed but were never uncovered. As the new spymaster Bentley was not without her enemies – and the worst of those were her Soviet masters.

Soon after Golos passed on Earl Bowder, the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) working with Bentley decided that she should assume the role of the now departed Golos. Bentley’s Soviet intelligence contact Iskhak Akhmerov, the leading Illegal Rezident for the People’s Commissariat for State Security (NKVD) or undercover spy chief working without a diplomatic cover disagreed. Unlike Golos, Bentley was not a Russian and therefore could not be entirely trusted. Under orders from Moscow Akhmerov wanted Bentley's contacts to report directly to him. It was a move that Bentley, Browder and even Golos before he passed way had resisted. Aware of American sensibilities, Golos feared that a Russian handler would possibly drive away his spies and that an American intermediary managing the assets would best serve the cause. With Golos now gone Akhmerov persisted.

Initially Bentley ignored Akhmerov’s requests. Browder, seeking to bolster Bentley’s position placed the Perlo Group, a second spy group which maintained contacts in the War Production Board, the United States Senate and the Treasury Department under her control. In early June 1944 under pressure from his Soviet masters, Browder submitted to Akhmerov’s demands and instructed the Silvermaster Group to report directly to the NKVD. In late 1944 Bentley was ordered to surrender her remaining contacts. Akhmerov also removed Bentley as vice-president of United States Service and Shipping Corporation. As some of her contacts had visited her at her home address, Bentley was also forced to move. Initially Bentley was accepting of the situation but eventually grew resentful.

An American Defector

On 23 August 1945 Bentley visited FBI offices in New Haven, Connecticut meeting with the agent-in-charge. She did not immediately defect but was apparently exploring her options. Oddly enough that same month Louis F. Budenz, the head of the Buben Group defected from the communist cause and began revealing his espionage activities to the FBI.

After visiting the FBI Bentley continued to defy her Soviet handlers returning to the United States Service and Shipping Corporation where she attempted to reassert her former authority, to no avail. In September Bentley arrived drunk to a meeting with Anatoly Gorsky, Akhmerov’s replacement. During the meeting Bentley drunkenly made vague references to becoming an FBI informer. Reporting the threat to Moscow Gorsky was initially ordered to try and calm the former spy master, suggesting that she take a vacation. Appreciating her need for an income Gorsky gave her $2000.00. Gorsky even suggested that Bentley immigrate to the Soviet Union, a move that Bentley feared would lead to her execution. To Moscow, Gorsky suggest it was time to “get rid of her.” Cognizant of her tenuous position, knowing she had threatened to reveal the activities of her masters, aware of Louis Burden’s recent defection in late October 1945 Bentley abandoned communism and sought the protection of the FBI. On 7 November 1945 Bentley began to reveal all she knew about the communist party in the U.S. providing the FBI with a signed 31 page statement outlining her espionage efforts. Though the FBI had been aware that Soviet spies were busy throughout the war acquiring American industrial secrets, it was the defection of Elizabeth Bentley that revealed the scope of the Soviet effort against the U.S.

Over the course of several interview sessions Bentley gave names, listed contacts and laid bare her knowledge of the Soviet espionage system operating inside America. The FBI gave Bentley the code name “GREGORY” and attempted to run her as an agent in-place against the Comintern front organizations that employed her. By day Bentley reported to work at USS&S; at night she was debriefed by the FBI. When the interviews were finally concluded, Bentley’s full statement numbered 107 pages. She had revealed the names of 87 U.S. citizen and Russian spies operating within the U.S. for the

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Soviet Union. J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI was thrilled with Bentley’s defection. By December 1945 there were 227 special agents assigned to verify Bentley’s claims.

Despite the efforts of the FBI NKVD intelligence soon discovered Bentley’s defection. In an attempt to limit fallout from the deflection the NKVD shut down its spy networks in the U.S. and called home its Russian nationals and illegals agents. For the next three years the FBI quietly investigated Bentley’s claims.

The Investigation

From 1945 onward the FBI monitored the activities of the people named in Bentley’s statement, monitored their movements and connected the dots. In many cases the FBI used “technical means,” re: wiretaps, to monitor calls. The various members of the Silvermaster and Perlo Groups, and individual operators or “singletons” were slowly identified and cross-referenced to Bentley’s testimony. Lacking validation Bentley’s story was just so much smoke. Two years into the investigation the Bentley story began to leak.

In 1948 following her testimony before a grand jury arranged by U.S. Attorney General Tom C. Clark the story leaked to the press. In July 1948 with details of her testimony becoming public, Bentley met with reporters of the New York World-Telegram. In a series of front pages articles the World-Telegram presented Bentley’s story in-depth. Nearly as the World-Telegram was publicizing her tale the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) issued a subpoena for her to appear in open session before the committee.

Bentley testified in before of a number of grand juries, theHUAC, and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS). She was the first woman to ever appear on the television show Meet the Press. Her testimony was responsible for identifying, indicting and in some cases convicting several alleged spies. The judge in a later appeal of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg’s conviction said that it was Bentley’s testimony that connected the CPUSA to the Soviet Union. Bentley’s human frailties raised questions her honesty and integrity. Bentley became a lightning rod for public and scholarly debate for the next 40 years. Though many would later accuse Bentley of being an alcoholic and a person that played lose with her morals, her story withstood intense FBI scrutiny and was largely validated by classified U.S. cryptologic analyst of Soviet communications in the decades following WWII. Publicly her testimony was backed up by the additional revelations of Whittaker Chambers.

Chambers

Whittaker Chambers was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on 1 April 1901 with the given name of Jay Vivian Chambers. In 1904 his family moved to Lynbrook on Long Island, New York. In 1919 he graduated from South Side High School in Rockville Centre. He attended college classes at Williams College in 1920 and later transferred to Columbia University, New York. In 1925 Chambers joined the Workers Party of America (WPA), the legal party organization of the CPUSA. While a member of the WPA he wrote articles for and edited The Daily Worker newspaper and The New Masses magazine. He was eventually recruited into a communist underground organization headed by Alexander Ulyanovsk under the Soviet Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).

For the next several years Chambers served the party as a courier under the codename “KARL” or “CARL.” His contacts included John Bat, Frank Coe, Lachlin Currie, Lee Pressman, Nathan Witt, Alger Hiss, Henry Collins, Vincent Reno, George Silverman and Victor Perlo; all members of Roosevelt’s “New Deal” administration. Chambers was also allegedly in contact with Noel Field at the State Department; Harold Glaser and Harry Dexter White at Treasury.

Whether it was the stress of working undercover or a sense of hypocrisy caused by the Soviet government’s actions against its own people inside the U.S.S.R, Chamber’s dedication to the party began to wane. Despite his earlier enthusiasm for the Soviet Union there were too many public indicators that all was not well with Stalin’s Russia.

To Chambers, the first sign could be found in the Soviet effort at farm collectivization. In what became known as the Great Famine 1932-1933, millions of people starved to death. The famine was largely man-made, the result of mistaken policies. According to others it was an effort at genocide or “ethnic cleansing.” Though a lack of records prevents an accurate death toll, most scholars estimate the total death at between 3.5 and 8.5 million. Unlike an earlier famine in 1921, Soviet spokesmen officially denied that the Great Famine ever took place. Stalin’s Great Purge further increased Chamber’s concerns.

In 1936 Stalin implemented a number of campaigns designed to repress political dissent and eliminate opposition to his rule. Government officials within the Soviet Union from the left and right wings of the party were persecuted, publicly
tried or simply executed. The purges severely impacted the Communist Party and eventually grew to consume the leadership of the Red Army.

In Moscow, show trials of senior Communist Party officials were held where those on trial admitted to outrageous crimes against the Party or Soviet Union and even requested death sentences. Party members that escaped Stalin’s purges by fleeing overseas were often hunted down and assassinated. In 1937 Ignacia Poresky (a.k.a. Ignace Reiss) was assassinated in Lausanne, Switzerland. Juliet Poyntz, an American citizen and founding member of the CPUSA disappeared that same year. Soviet intelligentsia; writers, artists, and other intellectuals suffered heavily. Writer Issac Babel was arrested in 1939 and executed in 1940. Boris Pasternak the author of Doctor Zhivago barely escaped a similar such fate. Soviet intelligence agencies were also purged. Many Soviet agents and their handlers were recalled to Moscow, interrogated and in many cases summarily executed. Agents such as Richard Sorge operating in Japan survived efforts to recall him to the Soviet Union by simply ignoring the invitation. On several occasions Chambers himself was ordered to Moscow. He also ignored the request but began to prepare a file to protect himself from further persecution.

Fearing Stalin’s purges, ordered to Moscow, Chambers began storing the documents and microfilm he collected as courier as a life preserver or insurance policy against future Soviet retribution. In 1938 Chambers formally broke with communism and his Soviet handlers. After the break Chambers took his family and went into hiding.

At first Chambers sought simply to fade into the background. He had little desire to inform on his activities or those of his fellow spies. He considered most of his contacts to be his friends. After some time in hiding Chambers emerged and took a job with TIME magazine. It was Stalin’s efforts to reach an understanding with Adolf Hitler in the form of The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union signed in August 1939, that finally prompted Chambers to take action against the communists.

Prior to the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R, the CPUSA had been seen as a leading opponent of Hitler. In the aftermath of the pact the CPUSA began to downplay its former hardline stand against the German dictator, losing much of its credibility in the process. The CPUSA was now seen by most Americans as little more than a pawn of the Soviet Union. In September 1939 at the urging of anti-Communist journalist Isaac Don Levine, Chambers and Levine met with Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle.

Berle, an original member of President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust” advised the president on major policy issues. Chambers and Levine met with Berle at his home on Woodley Road, near Connecticut Avenue in Washington D.C., on the evening of 2 September 1939. The discussion between Berle, Chambers and Levine took place to the rear of the house in the home’s back yard.

According to Chambers, Berle was no mood to hear what Chambers had to say. For the next two or three hours Chambers laid out the Soviet Union’s infiltration of the U.S. government. Chambers named 18 current and former government employees as Soviet spies. Berle took notes.767 The meeting ended shortly after midnight. Berle considered Chamber’s allegations as vague and uncorroborated. Nonetheless Berle took Chamber’s story to President Roosevelt, who reportedly discounted the tale. It took until March 1940 for Berle to notify the FBI of Chamber’s allegations. Correct or not the FBI was far more concerned with the possibility of Nazi than Soviet spies and placed Chamber’s report on the back burner, where it sat for at least two years.

In 1942 as the FBI became more and more aware of Soviet espionage activities in the U.S. the agency’s interest in the 1939 report took on greater importance with several agents interviewing Chambers. Over several subsequent interviews sessions Chambers outlined the communist organization infiltrating the U.S. government, and provided the bureau with the names of the individuals involved. On 3 August 1948 Chambers was called to testify before the HUAC in part to bolster the testimony of Elizabeth Bentley whose credibility due to her personal life had suffered under intense scrutiny. Though his credibility was similarly doubted Chamber’s testimony withstood attacks by his critics. Unbeknownst to Bentley and Chambers, much of what they had testified to was independently confirmed by a secret U.S. government effort to decipher encrypted NKVD and GRU message traffic reporting information obtained by their agents and transmitted to Moscow between 1942 and 1945: The VENONA project.

Section 58 – VENONA

In 1943 the U.S. Army’s Signal Intelligence Service, a forerunner of the National Security Agency began a program to exploit encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications. The project was initiated by officials in Washington and London over concerns that the Soviet Union might conclude a separate peace in the war with Germany, leaving the United States and British Commonwealth to fight Nazi Germany alone. Under VENONA the U.S. and United Kingdom cooperated in
eavesdropping and recording Soviet diplomatic communications. If the Soviet diplomatic codes could be broken, U.S. and United Kingdom leaders would have a window into Soviet plans and intentions. The knowledge gained would allay their fears of a Soviet betrayal and an outcome to the war similar to what occurred after the Russian Revolution at the end of WWI. The conclusion of this effort became known as the VENONA project.

The word VENONA was actually the last of a series of code words used to describe the program over the decades of its existence. Previous names assigned to the program included BRIDE, DRUG and JADE. The word VENONA itself has no known meaning. Most of the message traffic recorded were transmitted during WWII. The effort to decipher the traffic was highly classified and sensitive. Even U.S. leaders such as Roosevelt and Truman were unaware of the program’s details. The most easily deciphered messages were transmitted and intercepted between 1942 and 1945. In 1945 the Soviet Union was informed of the program by Bill Weisband, a United States Army SIGINT and cryptologic analyst. Despite intense wartime effort the first messages were not deciphered until 1946. Those messages that were eventually deciphered played a critical role in the early Cold War. The effort to decipher the messages continued over several decades after the war at some level through 1980. The Soviet codes used were virtually foolproof – but for one mistake.

The initial breakthrough in cracking the Russian code came as a result of early wartime pressures on Soviet cryptologists designing the cyphers. The codes were based upon the “one-time-pad.” The one-time-pad, also called Vernam-cipher is a crypto-algorithm where plaintext is combined with a random key to encipher data or words. The one-time-pad was also called the “perfect cipher.” It is the only known method to produce mathematically unbreakable encryptions. The security of the cipher lay in its randomness. The cipher could only be broken if one of two events occurred; 1) large volumes of material using the same pad were transmitted at one time, or 2) if the same pad was used more than once to send at least two messages. It was a violation of the second rule that enabled U.S. crypto-analysts to read some of the messages recovered. The Soviet gaffe took place in the early years of the war when Soviet cryptologists creating the pads were overwhelmed by the demand for new codes, and older pads, but not entire books were used more than once. As a result some of the copied message traffic could now be read. Those messages that were read provided far more than insight into Soviet thinking on the subject of a separate peace with Nazi Germany, which had originally prompted the program.

Once it was learned a one-time pad had been used twice, U.S. cryptanalysts were able to read some of the messages transmitted using NKVD and GRU codes. As it would turn out all of the duplicate one-time pad pages were produced in 1942. Nearly all had been used by the end of 1945. A few were used as late as 1948. After the pads reproduced in the earlier part of the war had been used up, Soviet message traffic was once again completely unreadable. The first indicator that the Soviet Union had penetrated the Manhattan Project was uncovered on 20 December 1946.

Reading the messages that analyst were able to decipher it soon became apparent that Soviet spies had penetrated the Manhattan Project, the State Department, Treasury, Office of Strategic Services, and the White House. Other nations such the United Kingdom and Australia were also targeted by the Soviet Union. The messages deciphered by the VENONA effort revealed the personal names of more than 350 Americans, many not involved in spying and numerous targets of interest to the Soviet Union such as the Manhattan Project. In many cases codenames were assigned to the people mentioned in the message traffic whether they were a source of information or not. Roosevelt was codenamed “KAPITAN,” Winston Churchill was referred to as “BOAR.” Los Alamos was known as the “RESERVATION” while San Francisco was identified as “BABYLON.” VENONA also identified the personal and codenames of some of the spies that reported on the B-29.

Though numerous people were identified through the deciphered Soviet traffic, there were at that time and even fifty years later numerous issues with those identifications. The single mention of a person might not be a solid indicator of espionage. In many cases, the subject of a Soviet approach, the initial contact was named by personal name and only later assigned a code name. Many Soviet approaches to spy were met with a refusal. Only rarely was a message decoded that identified a spy by their personal name and codename in the same message. In many cases only a portion of a specific message might be decipherable. In other cases the words that were recorded were only fragments of the total message sent. Adding to the confusion, one spy might be referred at different times by several entirely different code names over the years of their involvement.

The effort to correlate a code name to a personal name was often based solely on the hints and clues to the person’s true identity contained in only one specific message which discussed some specific information, reported by that specific individual. Some of the messages that were decoded might not contain a name or codename but the name of the college the person had attended; the years that they attended the school, the name of a wife or husband, some specific activity undertaken at some specific time and so on. It took a great deal of detective work to accurately identify the actual subject of a specific message. It was possible in many instances to have several suspects matching the information identified under one codename. In some cases mistakes were made when an innocent person fit the description of a body of information, but the error was subsequently corrected. The traffic itself was also inconsistent and suffered from enormous gaps. The body of information available consisted only of the number of messages recorded, not all the traffic transmitted. Thousands of messages transmitted were never recorded. Only a small amount of the total message traffic that was recorded was ever decoded. Many
of the codenames that were eventually deciphered were never correlated to any individual at all. Translations were also an
issue.

Translations might also pose a problem due to their accuracy and the familiarity of the translator with the Russian
language. Words have meaning and they do not always mean the same thing to different people. Those individuals that might
have been involved in spying during the war might not be involved in such activities years later. Monitoring the activities of
those individuals identified in the traffic recorded in 1943, might not reveal the identity of the person that was active years
before and had long since abandoned the Soviet Union. How deeply those named in the traffic were involved in espionage
was also a subject of great debate. Investigators were often left with matching what was discussed in a single message to a
long list of suspected spies. Cryptographers and investigators were often left pondering assumptions.

Some of the names identified were actually spies; some of the people identified were only contacts, acquaintances,
sources of information that were caught unaware that their conversations were being reported to anyone. Some of the people
identified had acted with malicious intent, others were simply useful idiots. The leads and cases developed through
VENONA were often circumstantial at best. It is likely that while many spies were eventually identified, many times the
number identified escaped suspicion. In the several spy trials that resulted from the information provided by Bentley and
Chambers, and Senate and House hearings that followed the war none of the message traffic recorded and decoded by the
VENONA project was ever used in support of those efforts.

Some of the traffic decoded would have supported the testimony of Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers. While the traffic could have been introduced in court, it could have been challenged on a number of different levels. At best
the traffic represented a form of hearsay, and might not be admissible as evidence in a court of law. The gaps in coverage,
translations, the skill of the translators involved, the method of acquisition, would have all served as a basis for challenge.
Introducing the traffic in court would have also revealed U.S. and British intelligence methods and sources, information that
the Soviets might use to eliminate any future efforts to intercept and decode Soviet communications. But when Whittaker
Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley began spying in the 1930s such issues lay far in the future. Much of the espionage activity
that occurred from the mid-1930s through the end of the war, the limited activities that were identified could all be traced to
one person, Harold Ware and the “Ware Group.”

The Ware Group

Harold M. “Hal” Ware (1890 - 14 August 1935) was a member of the Communist Party of America and in 1919
became a founding member of the Communist Labor Party of America (CLP). He was regarded as one of the Communist
Party of America’s top experts on agriculture. Much of what is known about Harold Ware is derived from the book Witness
by Whittaker Chambers which dated the espionage activities of the Soviet Union in the U.S. to the 1930s and Harold Ware.768
According to Whittaker Chambers, Ware was the leader of the alleged “Ware Group” a clandestine group of intelligence
operatives within the United States government which aided Soviet intelligence.

Ware was the fourth child of Ella Reeve Bloor and Lucien Ware. Two of Hal’s older siblings died in early childhood.
Following high school Ware completed a two year course in agriculture at Pennsylvania State College, later Penn State
University. Following graduation with his father’s assistance Ware purchased a grain and dairy farm near Arden,
Pennsylvania, southwest of Pittsburgh. Ware married young but his first wife Margaret, died giving birth to their second child,
a daughter named Nancy. Ware’s experience as a farmer made him somewhat unique among members of the American
Communist Party, a group primarily composed of urban laborers, factory workers, or intellectuals – most European-born. At
a time when most women protected hearth and home Ella Bloor, Hal’s mother was similarly exceptional.

Ella Bloor converted to the ideas of socialism during 1894 and 1895 when the family lived in Philadelphia. Later
divorced, Harold lived with his mother who became a lifelong activist. She spent most of her free time in Wilmington,
Delaware on speaking engagements, organizing literature sales, and performing duties as a state organizer for the Socialist
Party. Ella was close associate of Victor Berger and Eugene Debs and was a founding member of the Communist Party of
America. She ran several unsuccessful campaigns for political office to include that of the Connecticut Secretary of State,
Governor of Pennsylvania, and Lieutenant Governor of New York. By the time Ella Bloor passed away in 1951 she was
widely known as “Mother Bloor.”

In 1921 Harold Ware took a six-month trip around the U.S. to study migrant workers. Ware worked his way across
the nation from harvests in the South to the Midwest, Northwest and then back east again through the Upper Midwestern
states. His journey combined with his previous interest in agricultural, cemented Ware’s place as the Communist Party’s
leading agricultural expert.

Nearly as the Communist Party of America was launched, local, state and federal agencies moved against it.
Members of the party became adept in the use of pseudonyms and conducting activities in secret. It was a party of divisions,

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sections, parts and cells; open and clandestine. There were aboveground and well-known communists, and those that operated entirely in an underground and out-of-sight. Ware was comfortable operating in either group; open or clandestine. Throughout his life Ware wrote and published articles in the Communist press under his given name and pennames.

Throughout the 1920s Ware collected money and organized relief efforts for Soviet farmers suffering from the Great Famine and collectivization, making several trips to Russia. Ware seems to have never questioned the source of Russia’s Great Famine and any possible relationship between the famine and Soviet agricultural policies. During the 1920s Ware lived in Russia for extended periods of time where he mostly promoted the farm collectivization campaigns of the Soviet Union and attempted to create a “model” collective farm in the area of the Ural Mountains. Ware’s efforts in a Soviet Union seeking legitimacy were the subject of much praise from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin himself.

During one of his return visits to the U.S. in the early 1920s Ware conducted an exhaustive survey of American agriculture. Ware’s research included extensive maps showing the distribution of different types of farms and farm incomes across the nation. Original research, Ware’s study was transmitted to the Communist International (Comintern) in Moscow where it was well-received and praised by Lenin.

While Ware’s efforts in the Soviet Union drew praise from Lenin there were problems with his work that were only reported in the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. Ware’s model farm was actually a center of brutal repression based upon active and passive coercion. After Lenin died in 1924 Joseph Stalin became the source of praise for Ware’s efforts. Ware returned to the U.S. for good in 1930.

According to Whittaker Chambers when Ware returned to the U.S. from the Soviet Union, he brought with him $25,000 in unreported currency. In 1932 the unreported cash financed the creation of Farm Research Incorporated, a farm research center located in Washington D.C. The center was actually a front organization; a safe haven for American Communists and NKVD operatives. Throughout most of the Great Depression the center published The Farmers National Weekly. Ware also had other sources of income.

During much of the early 1930s Ware was employed by the federal government as a consultant to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, a New Deal agency. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration was independent of the Department of Agriculture’s bureaucracy reporting directly to the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace who would later serve as Vice-President of the U.S. during Roosevelt’s third term, 1941-1944. Wallace was replaced on the Democrat ticket of 1944 by Harry Truman. Wallace would serve for a time as the Secretary of Commerce under the Truman Administration.

Wallace would be mentioned by David Snell in his 1946 article concerning the Japanese atomic bomb program for the political position he took on the issue of atomic weapons in September 1946. In a speech given at Madison Square Gardens in New York City, Wallace publicly pressed Truman to initiate changes in U.S. foreign policy to include an end to Truman’s hardline approach to the Soviet Union, United Nation’s control of atomic weapons, denouncing the U.S. special relationship with the British, and more. 769

In the aftermath of the speech, Truman asked Wallace to resign from the government. Returning to Hal Ware, Farm Research was never more than a cover for Ware’s less-than savory activities, such as spying for the Soviet Union. According to Whittaker Chambers: “Once the New Deal was in full swing, Hal Ware was like a man who has bought a farm sight unseen only to discover that the crops are all in and ready to harvest. All that he had to do was to hustle them into the barn. The barn in this case was the Communist Party. In the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Hal found a bumper crop of incipient or registered Communists. On its legal staff were Lee Pressman, Alger Hiss and John Abt (later named by Elizabeth Bentley as one of her contacts). There was Charles Krivitsky, a former physicist at New York University, then or shortly after to be known as Charles Kramer (also, later on, one of Elizabeth Bentley’s contacts). Abraham George Silverman (another of Elizabeth Bentley’s future contacts) was sitting with a little cluster of communists over at the Railroad Retirement Board.” 770 Ware used his position within the Agricultural Adjustment Administration to hire into the government a cell of dedicated communist sympathizers who supported the Soviet Union.

Members of the Ware Group included John Abt, Nathan Witt, Alger Hiss, Henry Collins, George Silverman, Charles Kramer and Victor Perlo. As each man assumed higher grades within the government they hired additional sympathizers, managed each other’s careers, arranged promotions, served as references for validating each other’s background investigations and managed each other’s transfers between agencies. On 13 August 1935 Ware was involved in an accident when his car collided with a coal truck near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Following the collision Ware never regained consciousness and died the next morning. Ware’s mother, Ella Bloor would outlive her son two days short of 16 years passing away on 11 August 1951

With Ware’s passing Nathan Witt is alleged to have assumed control of the group. At that time, Witt was a member of the legal staff of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In December 1935, following the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act that June, Witt was named as assistant chief counsel to the NLRB. In October 1937 he was named as Secretary, the highest non-political appointee position within the NLRB and subsequently became the most powerful individual on the Labor Relations Board. In his position as secretary he attended all meetings of the board, managed the appointments of the board members, administered the board’s offices, and the bureaus of the board located outside the Washington DC area. Unlike many of his fellow communists, Witt never sought to hide his views and opinions. In the end it was a combination of Congressional opposition to the NLRB, Witt’s perceived as his abuse of power and his communist views that led to his downfall. Under intense criticism from members of the House Special Committee to Investigate the National Labor Relations Board or the “Smith Committee” Witt resigned his office on 18 November 1940. Like his government service Witt’s tenure as leader of the Ware Group also had its share of turmoil.

In the aftermath of Ware’s death, others in the group also sought the leadership position. Chief among those opposed to Witt’s leadership was Victor Perlo. According to Whittaker Chambers in his book Witness, Perlo lacked sufficient credibility within the group to ascend to its leadership.771

Victor Perlo

Victor Perlo was born 15 May 1912 in East Elmhurst, Queens County, New York. He was the son of ethnic Jewish parents who had emigrated to the U.S. from what at that time was the Russian Empire. His father, Samuel was a lawyer; his mother, Rachel Perlo was a teacher. Victor Perlo completed his bachelor's degree at Columbia University, New York City in 1931 and his master's in mathematics from the same institution in 1933. He joined the CPUSA while a student at Columbia University remaining a member for the rest of his life.

After graduating Columbia, Perlo obtained a position with the National Recovery Administration (NRA) as a statistical analyst until June 1935. Perlo then moved to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board where he served as an analyst for the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation until October 1937. In 1937 Perlo left government service to work in the Brookings Institution, a liberal think tank but returned to the government in November 1939 with the U.S. Department of Commerce. There he worked as a senior economic analyst in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.

In November 1940, Perlo moved yet again to the Office of Price Administration (OPA) where he headed the Economic Statistics Division. In 1943 Perlo became the Chief of the Aviation Division of the Bureau of Programs and Statistics at the War Production Board (WPB).

While Perlo apparently accepted the decision of the group to deny him the leadership position he nonetheless became associated with a spy ring that would bear his name, the Perlo Group.772 VENONA identified Perlo as “RAIDER.”

Soviet Inroads

During the decades following WWI and the creation of the Soviet Union, Soviet planning emphasized the growth of heavy industries and in influencing American policy as it impacted Soviet economic goals. Most of the Soviet espionage efforts against the U.S. were directed toward obtaining industrial and political secrets first; military secrets second.

In April 1941 the NKVD was reorganized with new departments dedicated toward Scientific and Technical Intelligence independent of political and military spying.773 Industrial espionage had come into its own at a critical point in world history. By 1941 nearly one-fourth of the 221 NKVD agents operating in the U.S. were engineers.774 The new effort was known as “Line X,” or “Line XY.” In Britain however, much of the Soviet pre-war espionage effort was directed against military secrets. Soviet espionage in Britain was so efficient that it reported the contents of the 15 July 1941 MAUD Committee Report on the feasibility of building an atomic bomb the same day that British scientists completed the paper. Much of the full report reached the Soviet Union that September. With the Soviet Union being drawn into war with Germany, its intelligence services began to increasingly expand their collection against America’s military-industrial complex.

American Spies

Like many of those that would follow in his footsteps, Ware entered the world of espionage providing information to the Soviet Union which on the surface did not appear to have a direct impact on U.S. national security. Much of the information that Ware provided was likely unclassified and the result of his own research. Information that Ware could have gathered from the Agricultural Adjustment Administration or the Department of Agriculture was important primarily because

772 Ibid
the political leadership of the U.S. were interested the material. In the era when the vastness of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans provided a buffer from attack and there were no atomic bombs, U.S. national security consisted of an entirely different set of interests than it would several years later. Others in the Ware Group would start out much the same way, providing information on the U.S. economy, its industries, railroads, electrical power systems; all believing their contributions were harmless. Many of them rationalized their actions under any number of personal beliefs.

Some were alarmed at the growth of European Fascism and believed that providing information to the Soviet Union aided the fight against Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler. Many of the era’s spies such as the Rosenbergs were true believers and saw the Soviet Union as an attempt to build a better world. For some, their conclusions grew out of the Great Depression as in their view capitalism had failed to provide for the welfare of the masses. Ted Hall, the youngest scientist on the Manhattan Project sought by providing nuclear weapons information to the Soviet Union to end the American nuclear monopoly. Many of the era’s earlier spies abandoned their activities when Stalin staged the Moscow Trials, a series of purges eliminating his political opposition. Others fled the movement when Stalin signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler. Each American citizen spying against the U.S. had their reasons.

Many of these spies would confess decades later that, at the time they did not realize that the information they turned over to their handlers found its way into the Soviet Union. Several believed that the information they provided went only to Earl Browder, the General Secretary of the CPUSA and no further. It was a perception that Browder himself is admitted to having encouraged. Browder was later identified in VENONA as “FATHER.” Some, such as Martin Sobell eventually admitted that they were ashamed of their actions as young men and women. Many had other reasons. None had an excuse. While some did stop their spying, others never quit. By the time the U.S. was drawn into WWII many of the Ware Group’s clandestine agents had imbedded themselves deep within the U.S. government. When war came they were in excellent positions to relay to their Soviet masters U.S. national security information. It was this second echelon, those that followed Ware that would place into Soviet hands the designs and plans for America’s B-29.

Into The Open

While Soviet spies in the U.S. had uncovered the Manhattan Project it was reportedly an American hero, Eddie Rickenbacker that identified the B-29 program to the Soviet Union. The incident occurred in mid-1943 more than a year before the first damaged B-29 was impounded near Vladivostok.

In a trip that took months to arrange Rickenbacker was touring the Soviet Union on a fact-finding visit. Rickenbacker traveled to Russia under the authority of Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The object of the visit was to arrange technical assistance to the Soviet aircraft industry, primarily on aircraft that the U.S. had provided the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease. Over several weeks of close contact with Soviet officials, and an unprecedented visit to a Russian aircraft factory at Stormovic, Rickenbacker is reported to have made several comments about the B-29 which identified the existence of the project to Soviet authorities. Visiting India on his return trip Rickenbacker told assembled pilots and soldiers that “In 1944 a new bomber will join Liberators and Flying Fortresses and will be the determining factor in crushing Germany. He told members of the 10th USAAF that this new Superfortress of the air is especially designed for bombing Europe and will have double the load and fighting power of the planes they are flying out here now.” Rickenbacker continued, saying “No nation could survive the pounding a fleet of these planes can deliver and they will be out in mass production next year.”

Newspapers of the period report that Rickenbacker returned to the U.S. on or about 12 August 1943 where he immediately reported to Secretary of War Stimson. More than a month later, on 27 September Rickenbacker spent two hours with the House Foreign Affairs Committee back-briefing them on his tour of the Soviet Union. Neither Rickenbacker nor the committee’s members would comment on the contents of the brief. On 14 October 1943 Yank Magazine revealed the existence of the new bomber to the public.

According to Yank Magazine the plane was identified as the B-29. The Abilene Reporter-News described the bomber as “Dwarfing the Consolidated Liberator and Boeing Flying Fortress, the new dreadnought of the sky is reckoned capable of bringing the innermost production centers of Hitler’s European Fortress and the Japanese empire within the sights of United States bombardiers.” Citing Yank Magazine the Abilene newspaper stated that “From previous guarded reports which have cleared military censorship, it appeared that officials do not expect to see the new airplane in combat before 1944. This presumably is because of the time required to attain full-scale production, train crews, and eliminate any “bugs” which may show up in the early models. A prediction that the new heavyweight puncher will be “the determining factor in crushing

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778 Super-Bomber in Production, Deliveries to Army Enters Combat Next Year. Abilene Reporter-News. Abilene, Texas. 15 October 1943
779 Ibid.
“Germany” came last summer from Eddie Rickenbacker, World War Ace. In June he told the 10th United States Army Air Force in New Delhi, India that the new bomber would join the Liberators and Fortresses in 1944. While the Rickenbacker tale and the revelation of the plane’s existence by Yank Magazine made for a great story and is the generally accepted version of events, like most of the events that surround Hog Wild the tale was largely untrue.

The first public mention of a super bomber under development actually originated with Charles E. Wilson, the executive vice-chairman of the War Production Board who referred to the scheduled production of the bomber in print on 22 May 1943. According to newspapers of the time, the Army’s newest bomber was its “worst-kept secret.”

Yank Magazine, Eddie Rickenbacker, and even General Arnold had talked about the bomber in public long before its existence was officially acknowledged in late December 1943. Even with the public mention of the bomber in May 1943, it is likely that Soviet intelligence was aware of the B-29 program long before any U.S. official had ever mentioned the bomber publicly. Note that the Soviet Union’s first request for copies of the bomber was filed on 19 July 1943, less than a month after Charles Wilson had first publicly mentioned the existence of a super bomber. Though the Soviet Union could possibly point to Wilson’s comments on the bomber as an indicator of its existence, the speed of the Soviet request should have raised suspicions within U.S. intelligence circles. It didn’t. True to the fashion of most despots, Stalin had his spies and those spies had delivered. As the Manhattan Program moved forward into 1943 the program’s interest in the B-29 began to increase and for good reason; Manhattan needed a delivery platform. Unfortunately, so did Stalin.

Section 59 – THE MANHATTAN PROJECT AND THE B-29

In the spring of 1943 scientists at Los Alamos were beginning to design the actual weapons that would be used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the time it was thought that the final combat weapon(s) would be based solely upon plutonium. Two plutonium designs were under consideration, implosion and the gun assembly. Though some scientists had been pursuing implosion for months, the design was fraught with difficulties.

Implosion required near-perfect symmetry. Under the design being considered the sub-critical plutonium mass was surrounded by specifically shaped explosives arranged in a manner that upon detonation, focused the subsequent explosion’s shock waves upon the core material at nearly the same moment. The shock waves compressed the core to the same degree on every point on its surface at the same time. Collapsing inward upon itself the compressed mass would then reach criticality, releasing the energy of the atom. Implosion demanded extremely precise timing and overall reliability. The design if used when complete, would be about six foot in diameter. The plutonium gun assembly, thought to be simpler and favored by many scientists came with other problems.

On the surface the gun assembly was thought to be far less complicated. In basic terms all that was required for success using the gun assembly was to fire one piece of material down a gun barrel into another piece of material at a speed sufficient to bring the two pieces together fast enough, and hold them together long enough to create critical mass. As it was to turn out its simplicity was the problem.

Due to plutonium’s rate of spontaneous natural fission, the two pieces of material had to be brought together at a muzzle velocity of about 3,000 foot per second. Bringing the two pieces together too slowly would result in a long a drawn-out, low-yield, reaction, a fizzle that would waste most of the plutonium's potential energy. The design required extremely high propellant pressures that pressed the outer limits of existing explosives and metals. Slower speeds invited failure.

By late 1943 the search was on for a capable delivery system and there were few viable candidates. In September 1943 Dr. Norman F. Ramsey a member of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Group E-7 was assigned to identify a delivery platform capable of carrying a weapon weighing nearly 9,000 pounds, either an implosion or gun assembly-type bomb. Calculations indicated that to be successful a plutonium bomb using the gun barrel design would need to be a whopping 17-foot long, five foot longer than the standard B-29 bomb bay. Shortly after Ramsey was assigned to the project

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780 Ibid.
782 Ssh! We Do Have B-29 But Keep It a Secret. The Times. Troy, New York. 4 November 1943
the following cable was sent from Washington D.C. to Moscow. Dated 3 August 1943 the cable read: “Information of MAYOR[MER]. In the current program of airplane construction in the USA basic attention is being given to preparations for secret production of long range B-29 bombers, 4 motors each.”

Flying With the Bomber You Have

In September 1943 there was no aircraft in the U.S. inventory that could carry a 17-foot long bomb internally, including the B-29. Initially three aircraft were under consideration as a weapons platform; the Consolidated-Vultee B-24 Liberator, the British Avro Lancaster, and the Boeing B-29 Superfortress. All three designs would require some modification. Of the three aircraft being considered, the Lancaster possessed the largest bomb-bay and could easily lift the heavy weapon. The Consolidated-Vultee B-24 Liberator was quickly abandoned after it was discovered that the Navy had already tried and failed to reengineer the aircraft for internal torpedo delivery. In August 1943 Ramsey had surreptitiously measured the Superfortress. He found that it could be adapted to carry either weapon, but only if its two 12 foot bomb bays were combined and only if the gun-assembly-type bomb was no more than two feet in diameter. The distance between the aircraft’s wing spar carry-through box and the bottom of the bomber’s fuselage, limited the weapon’s diameter to about two foot. Due to these limitations the odds-on favorite appeared to be Avro Lancaster.

In October 1943 Ramsey traveled to Canada to meet the Lancaster’s chief designer Roy Chadwick who was in Toronto to look over the Lancasters being built at Avro Canada. Viewing sketches of the two bombs Chadwick assured Ramsey that the Lancaster had sufficient capacity to carry either bomb. Nearly as Ramsey was investigating the Lancaster the difficulties with implosion were overcome. Back in the U.S. Ramsey recommended the Lancaster to Captain William Parsons, Ordnance Division Associate Director at Los Alamos. Neither had considered the desires of General Arnold.

Most sources indicate that prior to Ramsey’s recommendation General Groves had done little to coordinate weapons delivery with the U.S. Army Air Force, especially General Arnold. According to some historians the explosion of an atomic bomb was a minor event compared to what occurred in General Arnold’s office when the recommendation to use a British bomber as the delivery platform reached Arnold’s desk. In his subsequent communications General Arnold made it abundantly clear that if any atomic bombs were to be dropped in this war a B-29 crewed by a USAAF crew would carry the weapon to its target. There is no record of any further discussion past General Arnold’s singular recommendation.

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Section 60 – SILVER PLATED, PULLMANN, MX-469

On 29 November 1943 at Wright Field, Ohio a team of USAF and Manhattan Project technicians met to work out the details for modifying a small number of B-29s to carry atomic weapons. The day after the conference instructions were sent to the AAF Materiel Command (AAFMC) to modify a B-29 at Wright Field for a project to be held in greatest secrecy. Code-named assigned: SILVER PLATED. It should be kept in mind that the B-29 and the atomic bomb had developed independently of each other. There had never been a long-range plan to carry the first atomic bomb in a B-29.

The USAF had less than two months to deliver the first B-29 modified to carry an atomic bomb. The due date was 15 January 1944. Additional aircraft were to follow. The Manhattan Project would be responsible for sending technical representatives and two full-sized examples of the plutonium gun weapon (code-named THIN MAN) and the implosion weapon (codenamed FAT MAN) to Wright Field by mid-December 1944. Over time the codename SILVER PLATE became the one word codename SILVERPLATE by which it is known today.

AAFMC’s engineering Division assigned the modification project an internal code name, PULLMANN and a classified project number, MX-469. The word PULLMANN was chosen to fit the overall cover story devised for the project on 29 November. Under the cover story British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, code-named the FAT MAN would visit the U.S. on a tour of defense plants with President Roosevelt code-named the THIN MAN in a specially-modified (SILVER PLATE) B-29 known as PULLMANN. The first aircraft B-29-5-BW Serial number 42-6259 PULLMANN, was delivered to the 468th Bomb Group at Smoky Hill Army Air Base, Kansas on November 30, 1943. It was flown to Wright Field, Ohio on 2 December 1943.

The alterations to PULLMANN were extensive and time-consuming. Each part required for the modification had to be hand-made, hand-fitted, and hand-altered. The bomber’s four 12 foot-long bomb bay doors; two right, two left and the fuselage section between the front and rear bomb bays had to be removed to create a single 33 foot-long bomb compartment. Bomb-specific release mechanisms had to be built and mounted. The implosion-type weapon was to be mounted in the bomber’s front bomb bay. Mounts for the gun-assembly weapon were installed in the bomber’s rear bay. The plutonium-

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783 No 1843. From: Washington. To: Moscow. No. 44. 3 August 1943. TOP SECRET, “Daunt” subsequently reassigned as “Bride.”
based gun-assembly weapon if produced, would extend into the forward bomb bay through the space previously occupied by the bomber’s wing spar carry-through box.

More than 6,000 man-hours, 150 man-weeks were required to modify PULLMANN. Like the overall B-29 program complications with the modifications caused the project to fall behind. Problems with the bomber’s engines further delayed delivery of the weapons system until 20 February 1944. By December 1947, 65 Bombers would be altered to carry the atomic bomb. 53 of those would serve with the first nuclear weapons delivery unit, the 509th Composite Group. Of course Joseph Stalin probably knew that. His three most notorious spy rings those of Victor Perlo, Greg Silvermaster, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg all had access to and were all reporting on America’s B-29.

Section 61 – SOVIET ESPIONAGE

Soviet espionage against the U.S. predated America’s entry into WWII by two decades. The subject is complicated and complex. Despite the revelations of the last several decades as Soviet archives began to be released to the public, it is unlikely that the full scope of Russian espionage activities in the U.S. after the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 will ever be known. For the purposes of Hog Wild, the story of Soviet espionage against the B-29 begins with the revelations of Elizabeth Bentley to the FBI in November 1945. VENONA later identified Bentley as “MYNA.”

Though it was thought in the late 1940s that Stalin wanted the B-29 as a long-range bomber for the delivery of conventional weapons in a strategic role; in the end the Soviet Union actually needed the bomber for the same reasons as the U.S. – the delivery of an atomic bomb. In the coming Cold War, without a suitable delivery system that could threaten the U.S. or Great Britain from inside the U.S.S.R; any Soviet atomic bomb would be useless. In many ways the B-29 represented far more advanced technology than the atomic secrets stolen by these same spies. In the end it would be the B-29 that revolutionized Soviet industry – not the atomic bomb.

Though often overlooked, Stalin’s knowledge of the Manhattan Project and later the B-29 was an outgrowth of the pre-war Soviet industrial espionage campaign against its closest allies, primarily the U.S. and Great Britain. It was the overall Soviet effort of vacuuming up all industrial information possible in the period before the war, which would develop the spies that would later report against the Manhattan Project, the B-29 and other U.S. and British national security programs during the war. Though many associate Soviet spying against the Manhattan Project with the Rosenbergs, the Soviets had actually penetrated the bomb program as early as September 1941. Their most likely source for this information was John Cairncross, an NKVD agent who passed official British government documents to Anatoli Gorsky, NKVD resident, London. Once the bomb program was identified, Soviet agents then concentrated their espionage efforts against it.

According to Elizabeth Bentley’s testimony “The Russians never restricted anyone. They took whatever they could get.” As recalled by Admiral William Standley, who served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and quoted by Katherine Sibley, the Russians “were the most avid seekers of information I have ever seen…. The Russian attaches, military, naval and commercial picked up everything – copies of all technical and trade…and military and naval professional magazines, blueprints of everything from nuts and bolts to washing machines.” The same held true for its efforts to obtain information on the B-29. Most of the material stolen or copied by Russian agents in the U.S. was transported to the Soviet Union via diplomatic pouch. During the period of the war tons of information, classified or otherwise was hauled out of the U.S. through Great Falls, Montana to Alaska and then into the U.S.S.R. under diplomatic cover. The plans for the B-29 were just one more example of many.

Several of Stalin’s American spies from the era’s most notorious spy rings are known to have turned information on the B-29 over to the Russians, to include any number of blueprints. At the time none of the spies are likely to have realized the eventual use of the Superfortress as a nuclear weapons delivery platform, any more than the Rosenbergs are likely to have understood the ultimate potential of the atomic bomb to alter international relations. It is doubtful that despite their educations and intellectual achievements any of Russia’s spies ever thought that far into the future. Alexandre Feklisov, Rosenberg’s Soviet contact claimed that Julius Rosenberg was ignorant of the weapon, its capabilities and was unable to help the Soviet Union acquire information on the bomb. Overall the efforts of the spies of the 1930s and 1940s were adolescent, amateurish, but ultimately successful. In many ways, America’s turncoats were primarily a social club; albeit one dedicated to spying. As became apparent to the FBI most of the identified spies practiced loose spy craft at best if any spy craft at all.

The members of the rings knew each other professionally and socially. In many cases they lived in the same homes, shared apartments and drove each other’s cars. Many of the spies working for the NKVD knew other spies who were also

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working for the GRU and vice-versa. Members of one ring often knew the members of another ring. Many worked together in the same agency. Some had arranged for their fellow spies to obtain employment with the government in the various agencies. Many of those that would rise to higher levels in the government managed the career progression; promotions and assignments, of their fellow spies. At one point during WWII one spy was drafted. He and his fellow spies plotted his entry into the Air Corps where his presence might best serve the cause. He entered the Air Corp in 1943 as a Private. He was subsequently assigned to the Pentagon and was discharged only one year later as a Major.

With the Soviet aircraft industry heavily invested in constructing light- and medium-bombers; strategic bombing in its infancy; the enemy located on its immediate border and in control of large portions of the Soviet Union, Stalin initially paid little attention to the B-29. Previous Soviet efforts to produce a long-range strategic bomber, primarily in the form of the ANT-64 had met with numerous delays many of which were the result of Soviet concentration on the production of tactical versus strategic aircraft.

As with the U.S. the strategic interests of the Soviet Union in the period before and during the war, were entirely different than their interests after the first plutonium weapon was detonated in New Mexico on 16 July 1945. Any information on B-29 the Soviets had in their hands in 1942 or 1943 was probably assigned to some empty file for use after the war. However by 1944 with the war turning in favor of the Soviet Union, the Manhattan Project closing in on a successful weapon, and the B-29 being selected as the delivery platform for that weapon, Soviet needs for a strategic bomber took on new importance. The Soviet Union now took a greater interest in the very heavy, long-range bomber. Former files were located. Old reporting on the bomber was reexamined. At least three separate spy rings and the CPUSA had reported on the bomber. Some had provided information only; others had provided documents, to include some if not all plans to the bomber. In a column released on 7 September 1947, Drew Pearson of the Bell Syndicate revealed that Soviet spies had delivered blueprints of the B-29 to Jacob Golos, who had died in late 1943 through Elizabeth Bentley. Technically, the bomber had been stolen long before the first B-29 landed in Vladivostok.

The Bentley Debrief, November 1945

The first inkling the FBI had that the B-29 program had been compromised came with the debriefing of Elizabeth Bentley in November 1945. According to Bentley “…the B-29—the B-29 was a new development during my days and we had a man who was a specialist in B-29s. He was sent out to Dayton Field to do work on them, as a result of which we knew how they tested, how they stood up, we even knew about projected raids on Tokyo, and so on—that type of information.” Bentley reported that at least two spy rings; the Silvermaster and Perlo Groups had reported information on the B-29. It was actually worse than Bentley thought. Other spies and groups had also reported on the B-29.

The Silvermaster Group

The Silvermaster Group takes its name from its leader Nathan Gregory Silvermaster who served as an economist with the War Production Board during WWII. Silvermaster was born in Odessa, the Russian Empire in 1898. He immigrated to the U.S. through China in 1914. He graduated with a Bachelors of Arts from Seattle’s University of Washington and completed his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Silvermaster was an unabashed communist.

In 1935 Silvermaster and his wife moved to Washington D.C. where, similar to Victor Perlo he served with various U.S. government agencies eventually joining the U.S. Treasury Department. In 1942 Silvermaster was discharged from Treasury and was reemployed by the Farm Security Administration where he was detailed to the Board of Economic Warfare. At some point Silvermaster was identified by the FBI as a communist and became the subject of further investigation. During the inquiry Silvermaster denied his communist sympathies and appealed the results of the investigation to the Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson.

Through the assistance of White House Advisor Lauchlin Currie and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White, Silvermaster retained his position at the Board of Economic Warfare. Currie and White were members of the

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789 COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES AMONG ALIENS AND NATIONAL GROUPS HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON S. 1832 A BILL TO AMEND THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF OCTOBER 16, 1918, AS AMENDED PART 1 MAY 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, JUNE 1, 8, 9, 18, JULY 15, 16, 27, 28, AUGUST 10, 11, 12, 1949 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Silvermaster Group. Other members of the group included Solomon Adler at the Treasury Department; Frank Coe, Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department; Special Assistant to the U.S. Ambassador in London; Assistant to the Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare; Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration; Bela Gold, Assistant Head of Program Surveys, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture; Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization; Office of Economic Programs in Foreign Economic Administration, George Silverman and William “Lud” Ullmann. Silvermaster’s wife Helen collated the group’s material prior to its being turned over to the group’s Soviet masters. VENONA would identify Lauchlin Currie as “PAGE;” Harry Dexter White as “JURIST,” “LAWYER,” and “RICHARD.” Frank Coe was tentatively identified as “PEAK;” Bela Gold was “ACORN” Helen Silvermaster was known as “DORA.” Some members of the Silvermaster Group were likewise members of the former Ware Group.

At the War Production Board Silvermaster was able to provide the Soviet Union with large amounts of information on arms, aircraft, and shipping production. In June 1943 Silvermaster is known to have forwarded a War Production Board report on arms production in the United States, which included information on bombers, pursuit planes, tanks, propelled guns, howitzers, radar and submarines, sub-chasers to Soviet intelligence. Most of what Silvermaster could accumulate on the B-29 was general in nature and consisted of numbers produced, numbers to be produced, costs, etc… Silvermaster was identified in VENONA as “PAL,” “PAUL,” “PEL,” and “ROBERT.” George Silverman and William Ullmann provided more specific information on the bomber to Silvermaster. Silverman and Ullmann worked so closely together that Bentley was unable to determine exactly what information each had supplied.

Abraham George Silverman was born on 2 February 1900 at Pesaznysz, Poland. He immigrated to the United States around 1905. The family settled outside Boston, Massachusetts. Silverman studied at Harvard University where he received B.S. and PhD degrees. He took his Master of Arts at Stanford University, California. Silverman came to Washington D.C. around 1933 seeking government employment. He is thought to have joined the CPUSA around the same time but is known to have enthusiastically supported Roosevelt’s New Deal. Like many at the time Silverman was interested in the Soviet model of central planning. Like Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, George Silverman held several technical and administrative positions in various federal government agencies.

Silverman’s first position with the government was with the Labor Advisory Board of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) as Chief Statistician, a post he held from 1933 to 1934. From 1934 to March 1936 he served as Special Expert for the U.S. Tariff Commission during the negotiation of a Canadian-American trade agreement. From March 1936 to March 1942 he was Director of Research for the Railroad Retirement Board; administering old-age pensions and unemployment insurance for rail workers. In March 1942 Silverman was named Chief of Analysis and Plans of the Material Service Headquarters, Army Air Corps, Assistant Chief of Air Staff. Silverman was now in an excellent position to report general information on the B-29 to his Soviet handlers, but exactly what Silverman turned over to the Soviets is difficult to determine.

According to the FBI soon after Silverman was “assigned to the Pentagon building as a civilian specialist,” he “began to bring documents to the Silvermaster home for copying.” In her 1945 debrief with the FBI Elizabeth Bentley referred to Silverman as one of the most “the most prolific furnishers of information” in the group of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. In VENONA Silverman was fittingly known as “AILERON.”

That Silverman worked with and had access to some information on the B-29 is undeniable. But having access to that information, and proving that Silverman had turned that information over to Nathan Gregory Silvermaster who would have in-turn given it to Elizabeth Bentley was far more difficult to prove. By the time that the FBI became aware of the Soviet Union’s spying and who the spies were many, like Silverman were already out of the government or the military. He was never caught in the act, observed copying documents or removing them from government control. Without an admission of guilt on the part of Silverman and lacking any direct evidence or a witness, Silverman escaped prosecution. Despite the inability of the government to prosecute to prosecute Abraham George Silverman he was eventually called before theHUAC and intensely questioned. His answers to questions posed by theHUAC’s Chief Investigator Robert E. Stripling, theHUAC’s Chief Investigator since, and John McDowell, Republican member from Pennsylvania were telling:

“Mr. Stripling: Have you ever been in the home of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster at 5515 Thirtieth Street N.W., in Washington, D. C.?”

791 Ibid.
Mr. Silverman: On advice of counsel I refuse to answer that question in the exercise of my constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.

Mr. Stripling: Mr. Silverman, during the course of your official duties with the War Department, did you have access to reports relating to the B-29, the production figures concerning aircraft, location of aircraft plants, the names and types of aircraft, and the location and construction of aircraft material?

Mr. Silverman: I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds."\textsuperscript{792}

Silverman’s testimony continued:

“Mr. McDowell: Did you ever discuss with any person the creation of the B-29 plane?

Mr. Silverman: On advice of counsel I refuse to answer that question in the exercise of my constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment."\textsuperscript{793}

Whatever Silverman had accomplished in his espionage career he could not compete with his longtime friend William Ludwig Ullmann.

William Ullmann was born in Springfield, Missouri in 1908. He attended Drury Exeter Academy and later Drury College, Springfield, Missouri, graduating in 1930 with a Bachelor Degree. He graduated Harvard Business School with a Master Degree in Business Administration in 1932 and took a job in Washington D.C. with the National Recovery Administration. While living in Washington D.C., Ullmann became acquainted with Nathan Gregory Silvermaster and his wife Helen Silvermaster. In 1938 the three purchased a house together. In 1937 Ullmann transferred to the Resettlement Administration which later became the Farm Security Administration. In 1939 Ullmann was hired by Harry Dexter White, also a member of the Silvermaster Group at the Department of the Treasury and assigned to at the Division of Monetary Research. His immediate supervisor in his new post was Frank Coe, a member of the Ware Group. Coe was tentatively identified in VENONA as “PEAK.” In 1941 Ullmann became White’s Administrative Assistant.

Ullmann served under Harry Dexter White at Treasury until October 1942 when he was drafted for service in WWII. According to Ullmann’s testimony before the HUAC, “he served as an enlisted man until January 1943, when” he attended “officer candidate school, graduating in April 1943 with the commission of Second Lieutenant.”\textsuperscript{794} While Ullmann was in training George Silverman used his influence within the Army Air Corps to arrange for Ullmann’s eventual transfer to the Pentagon. After graduating officer candidate training Ullmann was assigned to Wright Field, Materiel Command in Dayton, Ohio.\textsuperscript{795} After only a few days at Wright Field possibly for orientation, Ullmann was transferred to the Pentagon. It was Ullmann, a traitor serving as a U.S. Army officer in wartime that stole much of the information on the B-29 that saw its way into Soviet hands. In VENONA Ullmann was known as “PILOT.” Bentley was referring to Lud Ullmann when she testified before the HUAC that “we had a man who was a specialist in B-29s."\textsuperscript{796}

According to most sources Ullmann was discharged from service in 1943 after serving about one year in the military. In his one year in service Ullmann rose from the rank of basic trainee to the rank of Major. According to Elizabeth Bentley, Ullmann frequently traveled to Wright Field, Ohio to monitor developments on the B-29. It was at Wright Field where the B-29 was modified to carry the atomic bomb. Joseph Stalin was undoubtedly pleased.

As related by Bentley, the information stolen from the Pentagon by Ullmann was passed to Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, who in-turn passed it on to Bentley. Acting as courier Bentley then passed the material to her lover Jacob Golos. As Golos died in 1943 the Soviet Union could have had the information in 1942 from sources other than Ullmann, but definitely from Ullman by mid-1943 at the latest; long before the first B-29 landed near Vladivostok or Hog Wild overflew the Konan POW camp. Like George Silverman, William Ullmann was eventually called before the HUAC and questioned by the HUAC’s Chief Investigator Robert E. Stripling. In his appearance before the HUAC on 10 August 1948 Ullmann read a

\textsuperscript{792} HEARING REGARDING COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. EIGHTIETH CONGRESS. SECOND SESSION. 31 JULY; 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30 AUGUST; 8 AND 9, SEPTEMBER 1948. Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities
\textsuperscript{793} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{794} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{795} Ibid.
Previously prepared statement to the committee. The last two paragraphs of his statement appear below followed by the first question posed to him by the Mr. Stripling verbatim.

“The scurrilous charges made against me by Miss Bentley before this committee are false. I state categorically that she is a liar. I am and always have been a loyal American citizen. I never have betrayed any confidence reposed in me by my Government. I am not and never have been a spy or an agent of a foreign government. I have never photographed any Government documents.

In view of the fact that the charges against me are under investigation before a grand jury, and since this committee is not, in my opinion, a tribunal before which a citizen may adequately defend himself, I shall, on advice of counsel, refuse to answer any questions relating to charges against me under the constitutional right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment.

Mr. Stripling. Mr. Ullmann, while you were in the Air Corps did you have access to any information regarding the B-29?

Mr. Ullmann. I refuse to answer that question on the ground that it might tend to be self-incriminating.”

Like George Silverman, Ullmann was never charged with spying. The government lacked the solid evidence required to indict and take him to trial. This did not however mean that Silvermaster, Silverman, Ullmann and the others were not guilty, just that the government lacked the evidence it needed to successfully prosecute them for their crimes.

While the Silvermaster Group; George Silverman and Ludwig Ullmann were highly effective and productive they were not the only spies or spy ring gathering information on the B-29 and other industrial targets. The Perlo Group, which could also trace its membership to the Ware Group and was likewise operating in the area of Washington D.C., and was also reporting information on the B-29, possibly in even greater detail. The Perlo Group’s namesake Victor Perlo described earlier, was the Soviet’s primary source for information on the B-29 from within the group.

**Victor Perlo and the B-29**

Victor Perlo appeared before the HUAC on 9 August 1948. There was no question that Perlo had been in a position to acquire classified information concerning the B-29. During the testimony of Elizabeth Bentley, Robert Stripling stated specifically that the government was “prepared to show that Victor Perlo, an employee of the War Production Board, was given special permission to copy secret data on aircraft production, location of plant-making engines, wings, struts, aircraft armament, B-29 synchronized turrets, and automatic computing aircraft gun sights, as well as other similar data. He was given permission to copy this data from the secret records of the Resources Protection Board.”

Stripling stated that “The Resources Protection Board drew in secret information from all phases of the war program, on shipbuilding, artillery development, tanks, explosives production, bombsights, key chemical production, aircraft production, and chemical, as well as mechanical, components for the above. Much of this information was obtained from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces, with the understanding that (1) the information would remain classified as secret; (2) that it would not be disseminated to personnel in the War Production Board; and (3) that it would be used only in a specified manner.” While George Silverman and Ludwig Ullmann provided technical information on the Superfortress to the Soviets, Victor Perlo filled in the blanks on U.S. strategic thinking concerning deployment and use of the B-29.

According to Robert Stripling: “The Resources Production Board compiled and focused this data to show at a glance the most strategic and vulnerable and key points in the entire war-production program. For example, their data would show how many F4F fighters were made by Grumman at the Long Island plant this month, how many were scheduled for next month, for the next year; the location at which engines, propellers, and valves for this plane were produced, with many schedules of such production; when and where the B-29’s would come into production, and the schedules of future production. The location of each ordnance plant; of every strategic chemical plant, of each aluminum plant, et cetera, with the volume produced at each and schedules of production in future months; the number of freight cars across vulnerable railroad bridges, and the crippling effect their destruction would have upon the war program.”

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797 HEARING REGARDING COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EIGHTIETH CONGRESS: SECOND SESSION. 31 JULY; 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30 AUGUST; 8 AND 9, SEPTEMBER 1948. Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities
798 Ibid.
799 Ibid.
800 Ibid.
Perlo’s testimony to the HUAC took place over two separate sessions on the same day, 9 August 1948. Most of Perlo’s testimony consisted of him exercising his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In the morning session alone, he invoked the right not-less-than 40 times. Like the other spies revealed by Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, Victor Perlo was never charged with espionage and he escaped justice. However the same would not be true for two of the 20th century’s most famous spies, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

The Rosenberg

Ethel Greenglass was born Evan Adintori on 28 September 1915 in New York City to Barnet and Tessie Greenglass. Ethel attended a religious school, Downtown Talmud Torah and then Seward Park High School graduating at the age of 15. Immediately after graduating high school Ethel took a job as a clerk for a shipping company. She held the job for a period of four years but was later fired after organizing a strike of 150 women working for the company. Greenglass was politically active and joined the Young Communist League USA (YCLUSA) where in 1936 she met Julius Rosenberg.

Julius Rosenberg was born more than two years after Ethel on 12 May 1918. His parents were Polish immigrants. Like Ethel Greenglass, Julius also attended Downtown Talmud Torah and later Seward Park High School graduating at age 16. After graduation Julius enrolled at the City College of New York (CCNY) to study electrical engineering. Once in college Julius joined the Steinmetz Club, the campus branch of the YCLUSA and later the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians (FAECT). At CCNY Rosenberg would become close friends with Morton Sobell, William Perl (Mutterperl) and Joel Barr. During his college year Rosenberg allowed his activism to distract him from his studies, graduating in 1939 one semester behind the rest of his class with a degree in electrical engineering. Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Greenglass were married that same year. After graduation Rosenberg freelanced as an electrical engineer through the fall of 1940 when he landed a job as a civilian employee of the U.S. Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. He is thought to have begun spying shortly after taking the position with the Signal Corps. In VENONA, Rosenberg was identified as “LIBERAL.” Julius and Ethel Rosenberg became full members of the American Communist Party in 1942.

Like many of the spy rings which operated before and during WWII Rosenberg was primarily tasked with conducting industrial espionage. Dedicated to aiding the Soviet Union, Rosenberg sought to expand his efforts recruiting his former CCNY classmates Joel Barr, William Perl and Morton Sobell. Barr, Perl, Rosenberg and Sobell had all been members of the YCLUSA. Barr and Perl had also been members of Branch 16B of the Industrial Division of the Communist Party.

Graduating one semester earlier than Rosenberg, Joel Barr had been hired by the U.S. Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth before Rosenberg where he became close friends with Alfred Sarant. Once enlisted to the cause, Barr in-turn recruited Sarant. Barr and Sarant shared an apartment and were allowed by their Soviet handlers to operate as a team. William Perl on the other hand took a job with the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) at their Langley Army Air Base research facility in Hampton, Virginia in 1940. In 1944 Perl transferred to the NACA Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio. Morton Sobell worked first in Washington, D.C. for the Navy Bureau of Ordnance and later in Schenectady, New York for General Electric.

In VENONA, Joel Barr was identified as “METER (METR or METRE)” and later as “SCOUT,” while Sarant was identified as “HUGHES.” Though scholars are not entirely sure, it is believed that William Perl is identified in VENONA as “GNOME,” “JACOB” and “YAKOV.” Regarding Morton Sobell, disagreement continues to exist on whether VENONA intercepts refer to him as “RELAY” or “SERB.” Max Elitcher, Vivian Glassman, David Greenglass and others were also associated with the group. During the war the FBI and Army security had several opportunities to eliminate the Rosenberg Group but their procedures were lackluster at best.

In December 1941 the FBI identified Joel Barr’s signature on a petition supporting Peter Cacchione, a communist candidate for New York City Council. The Signal Corps placed Barr’s name on list of undesirable employees who were ineligible for employment by the U.S. Army. Based on this evidence Barr was fired by the Signal Corps on 23 February 1942. More than 100 of Barr’s fellow employees signed a petition asking that the Army reconsider his termination; until they found

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801 Ibid.
out he was fired for being a communist. Most reconsidered their support and removed their signatures from the petition. Portraying himself as resigning the Signal Corps to seek a better position elsewhere within two weeks Barr was hired by Western Electric, the production arm of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) to work on airborne radar systems. Western Electric and the Army granted Barr access to highly sensitive technologies and information. Western Electric had worked with Bell and M.I.T. to develop the AN/APQ-13 radar, Sarant would also come to the attention of the Army.

In September 1942 Alfred Sarant was fired from his position as a Junior Radio Engineer at Fort Monmouth for attempting to recruit Army civilian workers into a trade union. He was characterized by his supervisors as a “labor agitator.” Like Barr, Sarant was also subsequently hired by Western Electric where he also had access to radar and other sensitive technologies. Rosenberg himself would also be eventually exposed and fired.

In March 1944 the FBI acquired the membership list of the New York County Committee of the CPUSA’s. The list contained the names of Barr, Rosenberg and Sarant to include their home addresses and party aliases. In February 1945 the Signal Corps fired Julius Rosenberg from his job at Fort Monmouth. Claiming that the firing was due to anti-Semitism, Rosenberg was instantly hired by Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corporation which was heavily involved in advancing the development of radio-beacon artillery fuses, the proximity fuse.

At least four members of the Rosenberg Group; Joel Barr, William Perl, Rosenberg himself, and Alfred Sarant were either in a position where they could gather information on the actual B-29 or its subsystems; or are known to have turned such information over to the Soviet Union. Joel Barr is known to have worked on the AN/APQ-13 low-level bombing radar, the same radar set mounted on Hog Wild. Though none of four ever moved into high positions where they might acquire the full details of an entire research effort, they did have unfettered access to basic information supporting a number of classified programs. Together Barr and Sarant are known to have turned over to the Soviet Union in excess of 9,000 pages of classified material on more than 100 weapons systems to include at least 17 drawings of the AN/APQ-7 radar.

Though it is unclear to this author exactly what William Perl spying from within the NACA provided to the Russians, the Rosenbergs Russian handler Alexandre Feklisov later admitted that over the course of one year alone Perl provided the Soviet Union 98 classified NACA studies. During the war the NACA conducted research against the turbocharged Wright R-1820 engine powering the B-17. The research conducted by NACA resolved problems with the engine and its superchargers. The knowledge gained from the Wright R-1820 was later applied to the Wright R-3350 engines used on the B-29. The NACA also conducted separate wartime studies on the Wright R-3350 engine, its cowlings and the bomber’s wing design. It is unknown at this time whether Perl turned this specific information over to his Soviet handlers.

According to Alexandre Feklisov, Rosenberg himself provided the Soviet Union with over 20,000 pages of classified material. How much of the material Rosenberg passed to the Soviet Union concerned the B-29 directly has yet to be disclosed. Exactly what Rosenberg passed to the Russians, where and how he got all the information he turned over to the Soviet Union information may never be entirely known. Like Nathan Gregory Silvermaster and Victor Perlo, Rosenberg wasn’t talking – he never would. When arrested in June of 1950 had Rosenberg’s brother-in-law David Greenglass maintained a similar degree of silence, it is likely that none of the spies within the Rosenberg Group would have ever stood trial. As it was Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were the only American civilians executed for espionage-related activity during the Cold War and the only American civilians ever executed for espionage in the history of the United States. The two were put to death on 19 June 1953. The CPUSA was probably also reporting on the B-29.

The Communist Party of the USA

Though the primary role of the CPUSA was to transform America from a capitalist democracy to a socialist state modeled on the Soviet Union, it did support the espionage operations of the NKVD and GRU as they took place inside the U.S. According to John Earl Haynes speaking that the Raleigh International Spy Conference “Prior to the Cold War the USSR put more resources into foreign intelligence than did any other nation, but its espionage ambitions still exceeded its resources, and the assistance of foreign Communist parties allowed Soviet agencies to make up for a large part of their shortfall. Indeed, the assistance of the American Communist party magnified the productivity of those professional...
intelligence officers sent to the United States." The CPUSA operated as an adjunct organization supporting Soviet intelligence.

Supporting the NKVD and GRU the CPUSA conducted research, monitored the press, gathered intelligence, identified potential targets for additional collection and infiltration, and served as a talent scout identifying Communist Party members within the government that might be induced to spy on the U.S. Like the Rosenbergs CPUSA members that moved into clandestine operations were usually dropped from the rolls of the party. Prior to his imprisonment in 1940 for passport violations, the General Secretary of the CPUSA Earl Russell Browder ran a spy ring that he later turned over to Jacob Golos prior to beginning his prison term. Released from jail by President Roosevelt as a gesture of goodwill to the U.S.S.R. after the U.S. entered the war, Browder was heavily involved in attempting to secure Elizabeth Bentley’s position as Soviet spy chief after the death of Jacob Golos. In VENONA Browder was identified by the codename “FATHER.”

Soviet Infiltration the U.S. Aircraft Industry

In the years following the war, it was determined that Soviet agents had penetrated Bell aircraft, maker of the P-38 Lightning and P-47 Thunderbolt and Curtiss-Wright the maker of the P-40 Warhawk. VENONA identified not-less-than 10 Bell company employees as either Soviet agents in-place or sources of information. At least two Soviets agents were identified as working for Curtiss-Wright. Douglas, Lockheed Aircraft and Republic Aviation had also been the targets of spying. Though the B-29 was mentioned in at least one of the messages deciphered and translated through VENONA, none of the traffic mentioned Boeing or any of its employees yet Boeing built the B-29 sought after by the Soviet Union.

With NKVD and GRU agents employed within most U.S. aircraft makers supporting the war effort, it is likely that Boeing employed some unknown number of communists who spied on the plane. Though no Boeing employees were identified in the small number of messages deciphered and translated through VENONA, that does not mean that they were not there only that none were identified.

In the aftermath of revelations that the Manhattan Project had been penetrated; the identification and arrest of spies throughout the Federal Government, the trial and subsequent execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg; the fact that the B-29 program had also been penetrated with plans to the bomber turned over to the Soviet Union was lost in the background. In the long run it was Soviet access to U.S. technology which allowed the country to upgrade its weapons industries after WWII and to compete with the U.S. throughout the Cold War. The technological information the Rosenberg ring transferred to the Soviet Union during the war ultimately aided Russia in rebuilding the country and its industrial capacity in the years following WWII. By 1949 the Soviet Union would be producing its own version of the AN/APQ-13. In hindsight it was obvious that the FBI and Army’s policies for preventing the reemployment of those it deemed ineligible were lackluster at best. Much of the success that spy rings such as the Rosenbergs achieved was due less to their ability to conduct espionage and more to the ineptitude of those assigned to monitor the programs they worked within.

Though the Soviet Union acquired three working copies of the B-29 in late 1944 it already possessed a large amount of information; production figures, the location of the plane’s assembly lines, and many of blueprints necessary to engineer the world’s most advanced bomber. What the three battle-damaged Superfortresses represented to the Soviet Union were working models of the aircraft, and knowledge of the materials needed to build the bomber. However by the time the first bomber landed in Vladivostok, the blueprints the Soviet Union had acquired several years before were now largely out-of-date, and did not match the ground truth provided by the bombers on-hand which had been produced from later designs.

Though the three bombers that landed at or near Vladivostok represented early model production, they were produced from blueprints that were far more current than those the Soviet Union had acquired through espionage. When produced, as each bomber had rolled down the production line changes had been made. Once each bomber had exited its production plant, it was sent to a modification center where the bombers were further updated. When the bomber arrived at its wartime base, additional changes followed it overseas. The records maintained on each aircraft would reflect those changes; however those records were not available to the Soviet engineers examining a specific bomber. To the horror of Soviet engineers examining the stolen bombers to update the blueprints they had on hand, they found that compared one-to-one, none of the three aircraft that had landed at Vladivostok were exactly the same.

Though functionally all the bombers operated the same, internally there were differences. A change made on the production line might be consistent aircraft-to-aircraft from the first aircraft where that change was made, but it is unlikely

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810 Ibid.

that this same change would an identical modification in aircraft that had already exited the plant. Modifications made after
the bomber exited the plant were likely to require additional changes beyond those made to aircraft on the assembly line
simply to effect the required modification. Such changes might result in additional holes being drilled, equipment being
moved about or wiring added with outdated wiring left in place, etc. In the end, each bomber was unique.

To the Soviet engineers examining the B-29 there would appear to be no standard model. More alarming to the
engineers was knowledge that Stalin, “the boss” had ordered the new bomber to be a bolt-for-bolt copy of the original. That
the program was under the control of Lavrentiy Beria can only have increased the apprehension of the engineers involved.
That none of the stolen bombers was a SILVERPLATE version might have also caused a degree of alarm. Command
economy aside, with the Soviet Union on the verge of investing tremendous resources into copying the B-29 with no standard
model apparent it is likely that Soviet engineers balked at the assignment. Better to go to the gulag for being incapable of
reverse-engineering the bomber than to be killed for failure. Moscow now needed the most up-to-date version of the bomber
possible; the latest model, preferably a SILVERPLATE. Unknown to the bombers that were approaching Konan on 29
August 1945 Hog Wild would become the victim of Soviet intrigues.

Section 62 – ON THE GROUND IN NORTHERN KOREA

Nearly as the crew exited the aircraft, Lieutenant Grant “noticed Russians all over the place armed with pistols and
rifles.”812 Soviet ground crew members at the airfield began rapidly throwing dirt and sand on the bomber’s burning engine,
extinguishing the fire. Some of the Russians used their rifles to loosen dirt to throw on the engine.813 Staff Sergeant Strilky,
still occupying the engineer’s seat was the first to emerge from Hog Wild onto Soviet-occupied northern Korean soil.814
Strilky, along with the rest of the crew was thoroughly searched by Russian aircraft ground crews or other soldiers for
personal weapons. The Russians found none. The crew was then taken into custody.

The crew members that remained with Hog Wild over the ocean were held for a time at the aircraft after they were
searched for weapons by Russian guards at the airfield. No one had been seriously injured during the landing; no one
required immediate medical attention. After determining that none of the crewmembers were armed, the Russian guards led
the airmen to a small building and held them in a room within under guard to await an interpreter. According to Staff
Sergeant Rinaldo “Everyone seemed friendly.”815 The crew was given bottled mineral water.816 During the wait, Lieutenant
Queen tried to obtain assistance from the Russian crew members who had exited the aircraft over water – but to no avail:
None of the Russians at the building spoke English.817 As with the aircrews of all previous aircraft that had landed
within Soviet territory during the war, the crew of Hog Wild was mildly interrogated. As aircraft commander Lieutenant
Queen was the focal point of the Russian interrogation. Staff Sergeant Bernacki, using broken Russian served as Queen’s
interpreter.

According to later statement after about two hours on the ground the airfield commander, Colonel Bratislava
accompanied by an interpreter, a Major Kruger arrived at the scene. Speaking more English than Bernacki spoke Russian,
Krugalov was accepted as the interpreter.818 Staff Sergeant Rinaldo reported that for the first ten minutes of their
interrogation Major Kruger appeared hostile.819 Note that, of the crew members that mention Major Kruger each will give a

813 Ibid.
816 Ibid.
different spelling to his name in the statements they later submit at Saipan. In the sections that follow the various spellings of his name are derived from the spellings used within the various crewmember statements as they discuss the Major.

The first question from Colonel Bratislava as recorded by Lieutenant Queen would be “what was the bomber doing in that area?” According to Staff Sergeant Rinaldo the first question asked was “why had the crew not landed?” Lieutenant Queen explained the bomber’s presence in the area and described the POW relief missions. According to Lieutenant Queen the Russians then wanted to know why Hog Wild did not land as ordered. The question should have alerted the crew to the fact that Colonel Bratislava was aware before he arrived at the building that the bomber had been ordered to land. Queen answered the question by explaining that the airfield indicated by the Yak’s was too short for a B-29 to land and take off safely. At this point the exchange became rather pointed as the Russians scoffed at Queen’s concerns over the length of the airstrip. According to Staff Sergeant Rinaldo “they laughed and said it could have been done.” As the crew had just walked away from a controlled landing in a damaged bomber the Russians were probably right.

Another Major accompanied Colonel Bratislava and Major Kruger. This second Major insisted that the bomber could have landed on the field. Every crew statement that mentions the second Major notes that the crew took an immediate disliking to him. None of the crewmembers ever provided the name of the second Soviet Major and few would ever mention his presence other than in passing.

Lieutenant Queen reported that although they were under firm but polite guard the Russians were fairly friendly. According to Staff Sergeant Strilky the Russians they encountered at the airfield were “friendly enough and the more they learned of the Americans the more they friendly the Russians became.” The Russians told the crew that there had also been a second bomber over the area at the same time as Hog Wild. The crew told the Soviets that they had not seen any other bombers over the area. Moving at about two and one-half miles per minute at least six minutes behind Z-6 Booze Hound, the two bombers were separated by about 15 miles. Encountering a storm front over Japan and bad weather over the area of Konan it is entirely possible that the crew of Hog Wild never saw Booze Hound 15 miles away in front of them. None of the cockpit crew mentioned seeing any other bombers in the area in their statements given at Saipan. It is however entirely possible that Corporal Turner, sitting in the tail section would have seen Z-48 Million Dollar Baby trailing about two to three minutes behind, between six and nine miles away, possibly closer. Corporal Turner was the only crewmember whose statement, if he ever wrote one is no longer available to researchers. Observing events from the ground Australian POW Charles William “Bill” Gray reported a total of four bombers over the area. Two that delivered supplies, Hog Wild and a fourth.

According to the tasking order of 29th of August 1945 this fourth aircraft could only have been Z-48 Serial Number 42-65247 Million Dollar Baby following a few minutes behind. B-29s Z-33 Serial Number 42-24700 Slick Dick and Z-6 Serial Number 44-69746 Booze Hound had preceded Hog Wild into the area and had already delivered their supplies. Z-33 and Z-6 were the only two B-29s to deliver their supplies to the camp that day and would have exited the area eight to ten minutes before Hog Wild arrived. Z-48 Million Dollar Baby would have been over the area within minutes of Hog Wild and probably accounts the Mr. Gray’s report of a fourth aircraft in the area. The crew of Z-48 should have been in a position to observe the incident between Hog Wild and the Soviet fighters as it took place and probably monitored distress calls put out by Hog Wild. Z-48 Million Dollar Baby is likely to have warned the two other bombers, Z-3 Ann Dee and Z-7 Serial Number 44-70117 Naughty Nancy approaching Konan miles behind of the on-going incident.

820 Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron, Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
822 Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron, Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
Once the incident with Hog Wild began none of the follow-on bombers; Million Dollar Baby, Ann Dee or Naughty Nancy delivered their supplies. It is doubtful, other than possibly Million Dollar Baby that any of the follow-on bombers ever made landfall over Korea. Million Dollar Baby, Ann Dee or Naughty Nancy probably jettisoned their loads of POW supplies over the ocean and then returned to Saipan.

At least one of the follow-on bombers reported Hog Wild as “on the ground” to Saipan. This report should have come from Z-3 Serial Number 42-65249 Ann Dee. Observing the incident from the air several miles away Million Dollar Baby probably began climbing and was by that time working to evade any Soviet aircraft in the area. B-29 Million Dollar Baby would have been out of the target area before Hog Wild would have landed. Ann Dee flying three minutes behind Million Dollar Baby also evading the area and climbing to gain altitude is the only bomber likely to have seen Hog Wild on the ground at Kanko Army Airfield. Naughty Nancy, following nearly 45 minutes behind Ann Dee is unlikely to have ever entered the immediate area of Konan. Volume Five, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki June 1944 To August 1945, The Army Air Forces in World War II notes that the incident “interfered briefly with the [POW supply] program in that area.”

During the course of the Soviet interrogation Lieutenant Queen requested permission to return to the bomber to radio Saipan their status and, as with all other aircraft that had landed in Russia during the war the request was initially denied. Lieutenant Queen then requested that Colonel Bartoslav notify Saipan of Hog Wild’s predicament. The Soviet Colonel stalled, replying that nothing could be done until the remainder of the crew had been located. According to Major Kruglov's report out were looking for the crew members that had bailed out over water. As reported by Lieutenant Queen the Soviet airfield commander later apologized for having forced down the aircraft and invited the crew to dine with him at the airfield that evening. By apologizing to Lieutenant Queen, Colonel Bratislava was admitting some prior knowledge of the event. Lastly the Soviets promised to unload the POW supplies from the aircraft and deliver them to the POW camp.

As the questioning ended, unlike events surrounding the three previous landings of damaged B-29s on Soviet territory, Lieutenant Queen and another crew member were allowed to return to the stricken bomber to retrieve personal equipment such as a canteens and clothing. Entering the aircraft that evening Lieutenant Queen reported noticing “that all papers such as Form 1 & 1A, SOI, Airplane Commanders Handbook, G-file, K-20 camera, all the Navigator’s, Engineer’s and Bombardier’s briefcases, etc., had been removed from the plane.” At the aircraft Lieutenant Queen was unable to release the bomb bay doors so that the Russians could unload the supplies. Between the time of the initiation to dine with Colonel Bratislava and the actual dinner, Lieutenant Grant accompanied by Corporal Turner with Major Krugalov in town opened the bomb bays of the bomber to allow the Russians to unload the supplies intended for the POWs. Upon entering the bomber Lieutenant Grant was taken aback by Krugalov’s knowledge of the bomber.

Grant noted that: “On Lt. Queen’s request I accompanied Major Krugalov out to the airplane to see if I could get the supplies out. Cpl. Turner went with us. The Major preceded me up into the ship, and I saw him flip on the battery switch with the nonchalance of one who knew the plane like a book. I tried the normal and emergency systems with no success. Major Krugalov meanwhile remarked on the fact that the three red handles on the floor to the left of the pilot’s seat had been replaced by two, and asked me if the Bombay doors were operated some other way. I told him they were air operated, but he didn’t press me for more information. I went back to the auxiliary power plant to see if I could start it. It was covered with all sorts of equipment from the big kit and the life rafts, and parachutes. The plane was a shambles as if torn into by someone looking in desperation for something.” On earlier production B-29s the bomb bay doors were electrically operated. The electrically operated doors were slow to open and close. On later models the doors were operated pneumatically. Air operated doors could open and close in only seconds. None of the B-29s that had previously landed at Vladivostok had been equipped with pneumatically operated bomb bay doors.

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827 Radiogram. 3861, Commanding General USASTAF to Commanding General 20th Air Force, 3 September 1945.
829 Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron, Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
830 Ibid.
831 Ibid.
832 Ibid.
833 Grant, John B. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-866994. Statement by First Lieutenant John B. Grant. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron, Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
Dinner with Colonel Bartoslav lasted about two hours with numerous toasts using Japanese whiskey to President Truman, Chairman Stalin and others. In fact, the Soviets ensured that each crew member was seated next to a full bottle of Japanese whiskey. Major Krugalov sat next to Lieutenant Grant insisting that the “engineers stick together.” Lieutenant Grant reported that no one talked about their work or duties during the dinner, but Japanese whiskey flowed freely with Colonel Bartoslav leading the charge. Everything was fairly pleasant until about 2200 hours (I) local when two British officers accompanied by two British enlisted men, arrived from the POW camp with Lieutenant Weeks in tow. Lieutenant Grant identified the two officers as Captain Kinlock and Doctor Morris. At least one of the two enlisted men was later identified as Bill Gray.

Lieutenant Weeks had bailed out of Hog Wild over the ocean and after having been picked up by local fishermen, had been taken to the POW camp. Upon arriving at the camp Lieutenant Weeks requested the POWs accompany him to the Soviet airfield in an attempt to locate the rest of the crew. With arrival of Lieutenant Weeks Colonel Bartoslav, possibly seizing the interruption as an excuse or otherwise angered by the uninvited presence of two British officers informed the group that the dinner had ended and that those present would be taken to the Chosen Branch No.1 camp the next day. Colonel Bartoslav, concerned about the possibility of Japanese snipers still in the area insisted that those at the airfield, to include the British officers remain at the field overnight. The guests were held four to a room.

Before bedtime down that evening Staff Sergeant Rinaldo met the pilot of Yak “60,” the second of the first two aircraft that incepted Hog Wild. Rinaldo noted that the pilot “seemed proud in having a hand in shooting us down, although I only saw 65 doing the shooting.” Perhaps the pilot of Yak 60 had his reasons. None of the crew reported meeting the pilot of Yak 65 but that does not mean he was not present. During the night Lieutenant Grant reported hearing rifle fire outside the airfield between the “Koreans and Japs.”

Though not imprisoned, Lieutenant Queen noted that later in the night when he had gone to the latrine, he was accompanied by a Soviet guard. Staff Sergeant Strilky also noted the guards posted at their rooms. The guards apparently did nothing to inhibit the movements of the crew and were likely posted at their rooms solely for protection or possibly out of courtesy.

As time progressed Lieutenant Weeks and those at the airfield became more concerned that those who had bailed out of the bomber over the water had not survived. Those men that had exited the craft had done so over cold waters churned up by the ongoing storm. By the time the dinner had ended they would have been in the water for four or more hours. The crewmembers at the airfield were concerned that exposure to the rough seas and the cold, all leading to hypothermia had likely claimed the remainder of the crew. The hypothermia itself would effect each crew member differently. Body fat and the amount of clothing would be chief determinants. After some time in the water body temperatures would drop, speech would become more difficult, apathy begins to develop followed by a form of amnesia. The salt water itself would act as a corrosive, containing more than three percent sodium chloride, and other lements like magnesium and potassium. Swallowing the sea water, the potassium itself would begin leaking into the bloodstream and breaking down red blood cells. Fortunately, after several hours those who had landed in the water had been saved by local fishermen.

Section 63 – SURVIVING THE EAST SEA

Lieutenant Harwood and the others exiting the burning bomber landed in the water at about 1506 hours (I) local time. Harwood would later report that a Russian Yak had made shallow attack dives at his chute as it floated on the water. Fearing he would be fired upon by the Yak he had moved away from the parachute as fast as possible, losing his life raft in the

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834 Ibid.
835 Ibid.
836 Ibid.
837 Ibid.
Campbell and Harwood were the only crewmen to reach the water with their life rafts. Most of the others either failed to find their rafts aboard the bomber before bailing out, lost the rafts as they bailed out or lost them as their parachutes snapped open ripping the raft from their survival vests. Captain Campbell’s raft slipped from its case when he hit the water and sank. Lieutenant Harwood’s raft slipped loose and simply sank. Those crewmen who bailed out would be in the ocean for nearly four hours with only their Mae West life vests to keep their heads above water. The ocean waves churned up by the storm were cresting in whitecaps at about ten feet, and for the most part breaking over the floundering airmen. Due to the height of the waves, none of the airmen could see each other. Each was alone in his own small spot of liquid hell. The seas were also growing rougher, with local currents pulling the airmen further out into the ocean.

Unlike Lieutenant Harwood, Sergeant Arthur who had likely entered the water only moments before was actually fired on by a Yak. The bullets from the firing Yak had missed him by only 15 or 20 foot. Sergeant Arthur reported the fire as .50 caliber rounds; however it was likely the round came from the Yak’s 12.7mm machine gun or 20mm autocannon. Sergeant Arthur later identified the attacking aircraft as the infamous Yak 65. The same Yak also buzzed Lieutenant Weeks. From their position in the water none of the crewmen in the sea would know what had become of the Hog Wild. Most thought the bomber had crashed into the East Sea.

At one point Eugene Harwood reported that an American-built Consolidated PBY Catalina twin-engine flying boat flew overhead. The plane bore the Red Star of Soviet Union. Harwood’s attempts to attract the attention of the aircraft failed. The report of a Consolidated PBY Catalina was telling and would eventually become a key part to understanding what happened to Hog Wild early that August afternoon of 1945. Slowly, Korean fishermen heading home to escape the storm began to retrieve the downed airmen from the East Sea. In being saved the crewmen were simply lucky. No one had been sent to look for them. Lieutenant Weeks was the first to be pulled out of the choppy waters.

Lieutenant Weeks was in the ocean about one and one-half hours when he spotted a Korean fishing boat about one-half mile south of him. By yells and screams Weeks was able to attract the attention of the fishermen who pulled him from the water. Despite Week’s efforts to convince the Koreans that they were other airmen in the water, the fishermen covered him with blankets and headed towards shore. Once on the beach Lieutenant Weeks was approached by a Korean holding a rifle who motioned for Weeks to follow him. Weeks was led to a nearby police station that would later be identified as the Konan Police Headquarters. By hand gestures and words Lieutenant Weeks convinced the Koreans at the Police Headquarters that he was an American airman. One of the policemen contacted the Konan POW camp and its commander Captain Kinlock. The Captain explained to Weeks what to tell the Koreans to have them to take him to the camp. The police delivered Lieutenant Weeks to the camp in a 1932 Ford. Weeks was the first of the 13 airmen aboard Hog Wild to reach the camp.

Once at the camp Lieutenant Weeks was examined by Captain Harry Morris a Canadian doctor from Newfoundland, Canada serving with the British Army and captured at the fall of Singapore. Lieutenant Weeks asked Captain Kinlock to

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846 Ibid.


849 Ibid.

850 Ibid.

851 Ibid.

852 Ibid.

853 Ibid.
contact Soviet authorities to ask their assistance in locating the crewmembers that Weeks was sure were still treading water in the East Sea. After the exam Weeks was given food and clean clothes. Captain Kinlock with Harry Morris, Bill Gray, one other man and Weeks in tow set out for Kanko Airfield. 855

Sergeant Arthur

Approximately 15 miles out to sea and drifting with the tide four hours after hitting the water, tired, suffering from moderate hypothermia Sergeant Arthur was able to attract the attention of a local one-mast fishing boat which pulled him from the ocean. Once aboard the “junk,” Sergeant Arthur convinced the Korean boatmen to search the waters for the remaining crew, retrieving Lieutenant Harwood, Staff Sergeant Owen, and Captain Campbell in that order. 856 Of the men in the water only Staff Sergeant Owens is known to have released a dye marker. 857 Spotted by Korean boatmen, the marker likely saved his life.

The men were physically and mentally exhausted. Most were nauseous from swallowing sea water. Eugene Harwood who had likely reached the stage of severe hypothermia stated “I could hardly even comprehend what was happening.” 858

Years later Eugene Harwood, only weeks before his passing would credit Sergeant Arthur with saving his life. 859 Doug Arthur never saw it that way. He would credit the Korean boatmen or any other of the people who came to help. In Captain Campbell’s diary written while at Konan he noted that there were six Koreans aboard the boat. He estimated that two were between the age of 20 and 30, two between the age of 40 and 50, and two that were over 70 possibly 80 years old. 860 The rescued airmen convinced the fishermen to circle the area and look for the others but found no other survivors. They could not know that Lieutenant Weeks had already been picked up, or that Flight Officer Sherill was still treading water miles away or that those remaining with Hog Wild were still alive. With the storm worsening and the small boat being tossed about ocean the vessel’s captain turned the craft towards land. To those aboard the boat it appeared that the remainder of the crew had perished. 862

The Korean fishermen took the four airmen to their home village. As they approached the shore Koreans from the village waded into the water offering assistance. Most of the downed crew walked ashore of their own volition; Lieutenant Harwood still suffering the effects of severe hypothermia was carried. 863 The downed crewmembers were taken to a local police box, a small guard shack on the main street passing through the village. 864 A crowd of the curious now began to form.

Upon entering the police box the crew was asked to remove their shoes. Once inside the crew was asked to remove their flight gear which the Koreans took to rinse with fresh water. Next the Koreans brought in a bowl of water and started to rinse with fresh water. The downed crewmembers were asked to remove their flight gear. The Koreans also understood that the shore Koreans from the village waded into the water offering assistance. Most of the downed crew walked ashore of their own volition; Lieutenant Harwood still suffering the effects of severe hypothermia was carried. The downed crewmembers were taken to a local police box, a small guard shack on the main street passing through the village. A crowd of the curious now began to form. Upon entering the police box the crew was asked to remove their shoes. Once inside the crew was asked to remove their flight gear which the Koreans took to rinse with fresh water. Next the Koreans brought in a bowl of water and started to wash the feet of the crew – the townspeople were Christians. The language barrier was tremendous, consisting mostly of a combination Korean-Pidgin-English such as “welcome” and “hello.” 865 According to Captain Campbell they were eventually able to communicate that the aircrew was “American.” 867 The Koreans also understood that the Americans flew the “big

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855 Ibid.
857 Diary of Captain Robert Campbell while held at Konan POW Camp. 30 August to 15 September 1945.
859 Personal correspondence, Douglas Arthur to Barbara Hartwig. 25 February 2005
860 Ibid.
861 Ibid.
862 Diary of Captain Robert Campbell while held at Konan POW Camp. 30 August to 15 September 1945.
864 Ibid.
866 Ibid.
867 Ibid.
ones,” the B-29. 668 A short time after their arrival a doctor was called to look after Staff Sergeant Owen who according to Sergeant Arthur “appeared quite ill,” probably the aftereffects of swallowing too much saltwater. 669 Luck was with the crew as the doctor could speak some English and the two groups were able to communicate after a fashion. After some time the local mayor or village leader arrived. The crew recalls the mayor as being referred to as “Ishband” but the word was most likely “ichiban:” Japanese for the numeral one. 670

The mayor also spoke some English and was a Christian. With the crew in the hands of the mayor, the doctor departed. The mayor asked Captain Campbell if he was also a Christian and asked if he read the Bible. In his statement Campbell admitted with some misgivings he had answered that he did. 671 When told that the crew had departed Saipan that morning the mayor appeared skeptical. 672 Learning that the crew flew the B-29 the mayor’s skepticism disappeared.

Captain Campbell explained to the mayor that the crew had bailed out of their bomber and that other crewmembers might still be in the water. Like the other men in his group Campbell was unsure of just how many of the crew had bailed out of the stricken bomber. When last seen the still burning bomber was heading out of sight. Once in the water, none of the four had seen Hog Wild make landfall much less a wheels-down landing at Kanko Army Airfield. The mayor promised to have the fishermen look for the remainder of the crew the following morning. Pressed by Campbell to initiate an immediate search, like any good politician the mayor “hemmed and hawed” then changed the subject asking if the crew was hungry. 673 The crewmembers asked instead for something to drink. Pressing on with his success at changing the subject and like any good politician anywhere the mayor inquired as to the homes of the crew.

As with many people outside the U.S. the mayor was only familiar with the largest American cities such as New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco. The crew had difficulty relating their hometowns to these largest cities. Places like Dostero and Colorado Springs, Colorado; Fayetteville, Tennessee were simply out of the range of the Korean’s knowledge of the U.S. just as Kaishu (Haeju), Shariin (Sariwon) and Gishu (Uiju) and other Korean cities were similarly alien to the crew. A short time later the doctor returned.

In his absence the doctor had obtained some vitamins and wanted to inject them into the crew, explaining that the vitamins would help the crew rest. Though the Koreans had been helpful, courteous even, understandably apprehensive the crewmembers politely refused. Efforts by the doctor to convince the crew of his sincerity, the difficulty in obtaining the vitamins and how they were used to cure cases of beriberi did little to allay the fears of the crew. 674 It was a simple issue of trust. Had the situation been different; perhaps the crew more familiar with Korean customs and traditions; the Koreans more familiar with Americans or had the crewmember been burned or severely wounded the efforts of the two groups to assist each other would have been accepted. Within these confusing and uncomfortable moments a small group of Soviet officers approached. The Soviets could best be described as antagonistic.

Staff Sergeant Arthur reports the Soviet airmen as being “haughty and arrogant.” 675 The first to meet the four crewmembers was a Soviet Lieutenant. The only way the crew could make themselves understood to the Lieutenant was through the mayor who was only just able to make himself understood to the Russians through a mixture of Japanese and English. The Russian quickly grasped that the crew were Americans, but it took true effort to make it understood that the crew had bailed out of a burning B-29. A second Soviet officer, also a Lieutenant spoke and understood more English. A third Soviet officer, a colonel conducted a mild interrogation of the crewmen through the English speaking Lieutenant. None of the men told the Soviets anything other than the engine of their aircraft had “caught fire.” 676 None mentioned being attacked by Soviet fighters. The crewmembers again asked for assistance in locating the remainder of their crew which most thought were still treading water in the East Sea. The group asked several times to be taken to the Konan POW camp and after some additional conversation or mild interrogation, the Russians agreed to arrange transportation for the group to the Konan.

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668 Ibid.
670 Ibid.
672 Ibid.
673 Ibid.
674 Ibid.
676 Ibid.
According to the record left by Eugene Harwood the Soviet colonel name unknown, expressed concern about any additional crewmembers possibly remaining in the water. Harwood reported that the colonel initiated a search for the remaining American airmen. It being about nine hours after the bailout, Lieutenant Harwood did not expect the search to result in any success. The three Soviet officers then departed the village eventually returning with a truck, and took the four U.S. servicemen to the POW camp. In the one and one-half hours they were gone the Korean villagers served the crew rice and some kind of fish stew or “chaegae.” The airmen had been in the village about four hours.

The Soviet colonel and the two Lieutenants subsequently returned with a truck and an American jeep. Captain Campbell reports that the truck was loaded with “Korean kids carrying rifles.” As Sergeant Arthur had been fired upon by the same Yak that had shot up the bomber, the crewmembers were concerned about just how much the three Russians knew about the incident or that versus a fire the bomber had actually been shot down. The crew rode in the truck while the Soviet officers rode in the jeep. At one point the jeep and truck turned down a dead end street. After making the turn the jeep stopped and turned out its lights, the truck did likewise. The truck stopped near a clearing and the soldiers began dismounting. The crew was apprehensive, suspecting that they were to be eliminated. With the airplane in the sea and its crewmembers eliminated, the incident would simply become another wartime mystery. Luckily the crew’s apprehension was seriously misplaced. The Soviets in the jeep had simply lost their way.

As Captain Campbell reported “I didn’t know what was going to happen and was getting set to run.” Several of the crewmembers actually jumped from the truck and did run a few yards away. With all the rifles and tommy guns present; having been shot down for no reason; strafed or buzzed by a Yak as they treaded water though the crew’s fear might be misplaced, it was understandable. The English-speaking Russian Lieutenant later approached the truck to explain their predicament. As if the day was not already full of bewildering events, as the truck carrying the crew attempted to turn around the driver steered off the road and into a ditch– everyone pushed. More excitement than they could stand, the Korean kids in the truck decided that now was a good time to start walking. Captain Campbell referred to the rest of the journey as “a hootin ride.” Part of the “hoot” was getting lost in the dark at least one more time.

Captain Kinlock, now on his way to Kanko Army Airfield was not present when the four fliers were brought to the camp. According to Staff Sergeant Arthur once at the POW camp the three Russians continued to mildly interrogate the four crewmembers. The U.S. airmen in turn continued to repeat their previous tale with the camp’s Adjutant, Lieutenant Mill now informing the three Soviet officers that the bomber had not developed engine trouble but that Yak fighters had shot it down. Initially the three Russian officers refused to believe the story. The Soviets moved Lieutenant Mill aside and asked Captain Campbell to repeat the tale several times. The Soviet officers were incredulous and disbelieving but soon apologized, shook hands with the crew and departed leaving them at the camp. Most Russians, while perhaps less appreciative of the British looked favorably upon most Americans. The Russian colonel was positive that some mistake had been made and promised to look into the incident. A mistake had been made, but it had been made by Lieutenant Queen in not landing the bomber as the Soviets desired. The colonel also promised to send patrols down the coast to locate the remaining crewmembers, it is not known if he did either, looking into the incident or sending patrols out to locate the remaining crewmembers.

879 Ibid.
880 Ibid.
881 Ibid.
882 Ibid.
885 Ibid.
The coming morning found the various crewmembers at several locations spread out over a distance of 50 to 70 kilometers north to south. Some were at the airfield; four were at the POW camp, Flight Officer Sherrill’s whereabouts remained unknown. It was a dangerous environment.

When the Red Army disarmed the Japanese Army it armed Koreans with the Emperor’s rifles. There were several Korean factions competing for power in the area. The most organized of these was the Korean communists who were publicly supported by the Red Army. Despite rivalries between the Koreans the several groups in competition were also tracking down and killing former Japanese soldiers, government officials and even Japanese civilians; a fact not lost on Captain Campbell who, like Lieutenant Grant awoke to rifle fire in the early morning hours of 30 August 1945. Despite their personal situations the conditions of the POWs was far better than the crew had been led to expect.

Captain Campbell “was surprised to see them looking as good as they did for they were in better condition than some of the prisoners I had read about.”887 Though nothing could excuse the way Japan had treated the POWs across Asia, prison conditions in China, Korea, and Manchuria were far better than conditions in similar camps located in Southeast and Pacific Asia. It was matter of degree and a large amount of luck. Unlike camps in Southeast Asia the prisoners in Northeast Asia had received a few less beatings, a few more ounces of food, a few more fish heads in their soup or a few more morsels of meat. More than food, the POWs wanted news about the world they had left behind more than three years ago. They wanted to know about American movie stars, the course of the war, the atomic bomb and more.888 The crew was overwhelmed with questions about things they had taken for granted just one day before. As for Russian search parties it is unknown if anyone ever took action on the any of the requests of the crewmembers wherever they were that morning in locating their fellow airmen.

Section 64 – FLIGHT OFFICER SHERRILL

Landing some distance from the others, Flight Officer Sherrill was eventually pulled from the water by another Korean fishing boat returning to port for the night. Years after the war in an article published in “The Global Twentieth, An anthology of the Twentieth AF in WWII,” Marion Sherrill would write of the Soviet aircraft firing on the bomber and his subsequent rescue: “At the time I wasn’t wearing any of my equipment, but it didn’t take me long to put it on. We opened the nose wheel well, and Lieutenant Rainey put the wheels down. I will never forget the look on the navigator’s face when he came crowding between the upper forward turret and his desk. He was the first to jump. Campbell, the squadron engineer, was next, and I followed. I climbed down into the wheel well, facing toward the rear of the aircraft and started feeling for my rip cord. I looked down at the water and knew that if I stayed there much longer, I wouldn’t jump. Before I crawled into the well, I had glanced at the burning engine and knew I didn’t have too much time, so I jumped up a little, placed my feet together, and away I went. My feet hit the slipstream and were thrown up over my head.”

“When I saw the tail of the aircraft pass me, I pulled on my rip cord, and it seemed like ages before my chute opened. One of the Yak’s circled me, then flew away. I hit the water pretty hard with my back downwind, but I didn’t go all the way under the water. I had to hit my chute release two times before it worked. I pulled my rubber boat out of its case, then turned it loose while I inflated my Mae West. When I turned back to the boat, I found that the securing strap had broken loose and had sank. I got a little scared when I realized that my boat was gone and only the left side of my Mae West would inflate. Waves were breaking over me, and I swallowed a lot of water. The Yak circled me one time then went away. I pulled my shoes off, so I could keep afloat better. At the time, I thought I could swim to shore, but I realized I was about eight miles out.”

“I spotted a fishing boat in the distance and started waving and hollering at it every time a wave lifted me up, so I could see it. The fisherman finally spotted me and steered their boat over to me. One of them held out a stick and pulled me into the boat. There were two men in the boat – one young fellow and an old man with a long beard. I didn’t know if they were Japanese or what, but I was glad to see them. I had been in the water about forty-five minutes.”889

Like the other four airmen who were taken to the home village of the fishermen that had plucked them from the water, Flight Officer Sherrill was likewise taken to the village of those that had retrieved him albeit another location along the coast further north. Sherrill indicates that the village was located some 50 kilometers or so from Kanko.890 While at the

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887 Ibid.
888 Ibid.
890 Sherrill, Marion J. Flight Officer. Statement Flight Officer Marion J. Sherrill, T-135123, 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Bombardier on Lieutenant Queen’s crew, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
village Sherrill stayed with a Korean doctor overnight. It was through the doctor that Lieutenant Sherrill learned that Soviet
troops had occupied the northern part of Korea.

A rising the next morning, Lieutenant Queen and the airmen with him at the Soviet airbase dressed and finding no
guards present began walking out to the damaged B-29. Captain Kinlock had asked to see the bomber. About half way
across the field they were approached by a Russian major who signaled them to stay away. Pretending that they did not
understand what the major meant perhaps testing the waters, Lieutenant Queen and the remainder of the crew continued to
walk toward the plane. The Soviet officer tapped the pistol on his belt immediately clearing up any confusion. The crew
left the area.

At about 0900 hours a truck loaded with POW supplies from the bomber arrived at the airfield headquarters, more
likely the base operations center. A Soviet Captain in charge of the supplies told Lieutenant Queen and the others to climb
aboard. Stopping at three or four of the various headquarters along the way, the crew and supplies wound their way to the
POW camp. At each stop Lieutenant Queen and the others remained with the vehicle. After a nearly four hour ride the
group was eventually dropped off at the Konan POW Camp where they were reunited with four of the airmen who had bailed
out of the burning bomber. The crew was housed in the former quarters of the camp’s Japanese guard force. A
straw-filled mattresses awaited the exhausted crew. Lieutenant Sherrill was still missing.

After unloading the supplies and before departing the camp, the Soviet Captain reassured the airmen that they would
do everything possible to find the missing Lieutenant. This being at least the third time the Soviets had indicated they would
initiate a search for the bomber’s missing crew members, Lieutenant Sherrill was obviously either a casualty of the attack, or
on his own somewhere in or near Korea.

In the late morning the day after Flight Officer Sherill had bailed out of the burning bomber, the doctor who had
taken him into his home took the airman to a nearby rail line where the two were able to board a train carrying Russian troops
south to Kanko. The ride from the village to the station at Kanko took about two hours. Lieutenant Sherrill and the doctor
arrived in the city at about 2000 hours (I) local time. Once in Kanko, Lieutenant Sherrill was detained at the rail station by several Soviet soldiers where he was questioned as to how he had gotten there and why he was in the area. Like the four other airmen Sherrill described the POW
supply mission and bailing out of a stricken aircraft. Sherrill never mentioned that the bomber had been fired upon by Soviet
aircraft. Sherrill asked his interrogators to be taken to the airfield to find the remaining crew but his request was refused.

Over the course of his interrogation the Soviets told Sherrill that there was no POW camp in the area and that the U.S. had taken possession of the Korean Peninsula from the area of Keijo south. The Russians advised him to remain at the
Kanko station overnight then to catch another train south to Keijo the next morning. They placed Sherrill and the doctor
under guard, probably for their own safety but otherwise allowed them to freely roam about the area. Lieutenant Sherrill and the
doctor used their limited freedom to locate the Korean Communist [Party] Headquarters (KCPH) where they inquired
about the crew of the B-29.

At the KCPH Sherrill was told that the crew of the B-29 was located at one of the local hotels. Sherrill indicates that
on 31 August 1945, with the help of the doctor and some Soviet soldiers he made his way to the airfield and the stricken
bomber. Once at the airfield Sherrill reports that the Russians were excited at seeing him as there had been on-going

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891 Ibid.
892 Ibid.
893 Ibid.
894 Ibid.
895 Ibid.
896 Ibid.
897 Ibid.
898 Ibid.
899 Ibid.
900 Ibid.

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communications between the Soviet and American high command regarding the incident, the forcing down of the bomber and loss of one of its crewmembers; Lieutenant Sherrill. 901

At the airfield Lieutenant Sherrill was taken to or met with Colonel-General of Aviation Evgenii Nikolaevich Preobrazhenskii (1909–1963), Colonel Bartoslav, Commander of the Kanko Airfield, and Major Kruglev. 902 Colonel-General Preobrazhenskii was the Deputy Commanding Officer Air Forces Pacific Ocean Fleet a U.S. Lieutenant General equivalent. 903 In 1941 as the commander of an air regiment in the Baltic Fleet, Preobrazhenskii had flown some of the earliest strategic bombing missions against targets in Berlin from Kaluga Airfield from Saaremaa Island in Estonia. Of the ten raids that staged out of Kaluga against Berlin early in the war, Preobrazhenskii flew everyone.

According to Lieutenant Sherrill the Soviets showered him with vodka and sake. The Soviet commander of the airfield reportedly removed his wings from his uniform and pinned them on Sherrill. 904 Colonel-General Preobrazhenskii invited Lieutenant Sherrill to breakfast with him. Though not specified, subsequent information contained in his statement suggests that Lieutenant Sherrill breakfasted with the Soviet General at the Kanko Army Airfield. The breakfast had its own uniquely tense moments.

Over breakfast, Lieutenant Sherrill noticed the crew’s K-20 camera, clearly marked as belonging to the 500th Bomb Group in the company of the Soviet officers. Sherrill inquired from Major Kruglev if the camera in their possession was the camera from Hog Wild only to be assured by Colonel-General Preobrazhenskii that the camera had been obtained by the Soviets through Lend-Lease. 905 After breakfast Lieutenant Sherrill pressed the Soviets to allow him to visit the bomber. Though the Soviets hedged for a few minutes Lieutenant Sherrill, accompanied by Major Kruglev was eventually allowed to return to the bomber. 906 Following the discussion with General Preobrazhenskii about the camera, what Sherrill found when he arrived at the aircraft was probably unexpected but also a bit humorous.

Upon arriving at Hog Wild the first thing that would have struck him was that the Soviets were defueling the aircraft. They were draining all the gas from the bomber! When he went into the bombardier’s area of the ship he found that “they,” the Soviets, had taken everything he had left behind when he had bailed out. 907 His winter flying jacket, stop watch, and all his bombing equipment except his Type C-2 Altitude Correction Computer, Type E6B Flight Computer Slide Rule (Dead Reckoning Computer) and G-1 True Airspeed Computer had been taken. 908

The bomber had received a thorough going over; it had been plundered and ransacked. Every life raft and emergency kit within the aircraft had been torn open. According to Lieutenant Sherrill there was little of any value remaining in the aircraft. 909 While aboard the bomber Lieutenant Sherrill did locate his personal diary and after proving that it contained no secrets, was allowed to remove it from the aircraft. 910 Though he asked Major Kruglev for the return of his equipment he

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902 Sherrill, Marion J. Flight Officer. Statement Flight Officer Marion J. Sherrill, T-135123. 822nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Bombardier on Lieutenant Queen’s crew, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
905 Sherrill, Marion J. Flight Officer. Statement Flight Officer Marion J. Sherrill, T-135123. 822nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Bombardier on Lieutenant Queen’s crew, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
906 Ibid.
907 Ibid.
908 Ibid.
910 Ibid.
never received a reply. 911 Upon exiting the aircraft, Major Kruglev and Lieutenant Sherrill returned to the airfield’s headquarters building. There General Preohrazhenskii accompanied by the two other Soviet officers and using an old Japanese car, delivered Lieutenant Sherrill to the POW camp where he was reunited with the rest of Hog Wild’s crew. During the ride over the POW Camp, Lieutenant Sherrill and the three Russians talked.

According to the statement of Lieutenant Sherrill over the course of the ride to the camp the Russians never offered any explanation as to why they had opened fire on the bomber.912 The General did inquire why the bomber had not landed when ordered to do so, to which Lieutenant Sherrill replied that the airfield’s runways were too short.913 General Preohrazhenskii however maintained that the field’s runways were over two miles long914

At about 1030 hours (1) local on the morning of 31 August, travelling in an old Japanese car with three Soviet officers, one the Deputy Commanding Officer Air Forces Pacific Ocean Fleet, two days after hitting the water Lieutenant Sherrill was finally reunited with the crew – who were playing a game of baseball against the POWs. The crew lost the game but the POWs awarded them a trophy, a loving cup – stolen from the local Kempeitai (a Japanese Army gendarmerie, or military police force) as it was. With the game now over General Preohrazhenskii called Lieutenant Queen aside and asked him to repeat the tale of the shoot down.

With Major Kruglev serving as interpreter Lieutenant Queen and General Preohrazhenskii conferred at length about the incident. After listening to the story once again in its entirety General Preohrazhenskii “expressed his apologies and laid the blame on both of our higher commands for not getting together before we flew over.”915 The General had a point; the flights into Red Army-held airspace had not been coordinated with Soviet authorities. However as the information will show there was a hidden irony in his comments. General Preohrazhenskii offered any and all assistance to help the crew – going so far as offering to have the crew flown south to Okinawa and U.S. forces or north to Vladivostok where the U.S. maintained a consulate.916 Lieutenant Queen declined the two offers in favor of awaiting instructions from Saipan.

General Preohrazhenskii gave the crew full access to the downed bomber, including use of the ship’s radio to contact Saipan to notify their unit of their location and situation.917 Allowing the crew full access to the bomber was a generous but empty gesture. Preohrazhenskii, Bartoslav, and Major Kruglev all knew that the bomber would never leave the airfield on its own power. Whatever the reason the Soviets had forced down the Superfort, Hog Wild had obviously fulfilled the purpose. General Preohrazhenskii concluded his visit with Lieutenant Queen by inviting the crew to stay with the Soviets at Kanko Army Airfield; however the crew declined the invitation in favor of remaining with the POWs. Hearing this the General arranged for the crew to have daily transportation to and from the bomber.918 Hours later, soldiers of the Soviet Union escorted the Japanese camp administrators and guards out of the camp.

Section 65 – THE JAPANESE REMOVED

As the Soviets promised at the end of August the Japanese guards, administrative personnel and Captain Otaki were removed from the camp. It is not known if the crew of Hog Wild witnessed the departure of the Japanese, however the crew was present at the camp when the event took place. The only available account of the Russians removal of the Japanese is that of Arthur Cramsie.

According to Captain Cramsie at the end of August the Russians sent a truck to remove the Japanese who had up until that time, been held in the barracks at the Japanese end of the camp since the 26th of August. The POWs surrounded the Japanese as they left the camp most shouting well aimed obscenities that usually ended with “…little yellow bastards.”919 It was only after the Japanese were loaded into the waiting Soviet truck that Captain Otaki finally appeared from the hut. As

911 Sherrill, Marion J. Flight Officer. Statement Flight Officer Marion J. Sherrill, T-135123. 882nd Bombardment Squadron. 500th Bombardment Group, as Bombardier on Lieutenant Queen’s crew, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
912 Ibid.
913 Ibid.
914 Ibid.
917 Ibid.
918 Ibid.
Cramsie would write “Captain Otaki came slowly out of the door. He had his best uniform on and knee-high boots and his two handed war sword: he also wore a military cloak fastened by a brass chain at the neck. Although he was not a tall man, he cut an impressive figure for a Japanese.”

“Instead of turning right to go to the lorry, he turned to everybody’s surprise and walked slowly up to the shouting British soldiers. He stood and looked at them and they fell strangely silent. Otaki lifted his shoulder and beckoned to his interpreter; he spoke slowly in Japanese and the interpreter said “Captain Otaki wishes you a safe journey and a happy reunion with your families.”

As Cramsie would relate “You could have heard a pin drop; it was an impressive performance; the last we saw of the Japanese and afterwards, we wondered if they had been taken down the road and shot or what fate had befallen them.”

It was a good question and probably one for which there are no easy answers. Efforts to determine the fate of Captain Otaki by this author have been unsuccessful.

In the war against Japan the Soviet Union could only be described as a late comer, declaring war only on 8 August 1945 after the U.S. its British and Dutch allies had fought the Japanese for over three years. Throughout the entire war in the Pacific the U.S. and its Allies had taken only 35,000 Japanese prisoners. In its few weeks of war the Soviet Union had taken between 560,000 to 760,000 Japanese captive. Most were captured after the Japanese announced their acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, with reservations to the status of the Emperor. Like the men and women at Bataan who had laid down their arms in early 1942, it is likely that had the Japanese known what lay in their future as POWs under the Soviet Union that few would have ever surrendered.

10 percent of those transported to labor camps in the Soviet Union and Mongolia died in the first winter of 1945 to 1946. Best estimates place the total number of Japanese deaths in Soviet captivity at between 60,000 and 370,000. Like the men held prisoner in Singapore and used to build the Thai-Burma Railroad (TBR), many of the Japanese (at least 200,000) were assigned to construct the Baikal-Amur Mainline which crossed Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. The Baikal-Amur Mainline spanned a distance of 2,687 miles, required the construction of 4,200 bridges and 21 tunnels with a total length of 29 miles. Others were used to rebuild cities damaged by the Germans during WWII as far away as Ukraine. Though the Soviets began repatriating Japanese prisoners in 1946 some were held until December 1956; eleven years after the end of the war. The majority of Japan’s military forces across Asia were disarmed by the U.S. and Kuomintang Chinese government. Most of these were repatriated to Japan in 1946.

Section 66 – RETURNING TO HOG WILD

By order of General Preohrazhenskii, from the morning of the 19th of September until retrieved later in the month the crew had regular access to the bomber. Through this access they maintained daily radio contact with Saipan. Staff Sergeant Owens reports in his statement that he was taken on the morning of 1 September to the bomber by two of the same Soviet officers that had retrieved him from the Korean village on the evening of the 29 August. It is unclear exactly how many of the crew returned to the Superfort that morning of 1 September but it is known that Lieutenants Queen, Harwood, Sherrill and Staff Sergeant Owens did visit the aircraft that morning.

Once at the bomber Staff Sergeant Owens was allowed to recover some equipment, never indicating what type of gear he reclaimed but confirming some control of the aircraft as promised. Sergeant Owens indicated in his statement that one of the Soviet officers that accompanied him to the aircraft was an engineer and “continuously” asked him questions about the specifications of the B-29 many of which he did not answer. By that August 1945 the specifications of the B-29 were no longer held as closely as they had a few months before.

By July 1945 aircrraves were being told that if they were captured and interrogated they no longer had to answer with only rank, number and serial number. Fiske Hanley reports in his book, Accused American War Criminal, that by March 1945 “The intelligence officer cheerfully briefed...If captured, we were to boast of the thousands of airplanes, ships, weapons, men and battle victories.” Fisk continued “This didn’t sound like too good an idea. He bravely said that he would like to go with us. We sat there, dumb and happy, and believing it all.” Hanley, spending five months as a POW held by the

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920 Ibid.
921 Ibid.
922 Ibid.
926 Ibid.
Kempeitai in the dungeons of their headquarters in Tokyo and accused of being a war criminal should have taken the intelligence officer with him.

Any secrets the aircraft might have held when it first arrived in the Pacific Theater were now mostly available in the aircraft that had crashed or been shot down and lay strewn across the battlefield that was once Japan.\(^{927}\) Sergeant Owens also stated in his report that the two men who accompanied him to the airfield appeared friendlier than they had been the day before when they had dropped him off at the POW camp.\(^{928}\)

Though few of the crew ever mention returning to the bomber while at the camp, it is likely that some or all of the remaining crew revisited the aircraft several times during the period of their stay at the Konan POW camp. It is unlikely that the crew would have enjoyed their stay at the POW camp sufficiently enough not to use a visit to the bomber as a reason to escape their confinement. Few left any remarks about those visits. It should also be noted that none of the crew ever discussed any Russian limitations on their personal movements in the local area, other than to say that the Soviets were more concerned about them moving around unarmed than about where they went. Captain Campbell reported that “during the remaining days, we visited Konan and the vicinity and obtained some souvenirs.”\(^{929}\)

Interestingly enough while at the camp, the pilot of Yak 60 invited the crew to inspect his fighter. At the aircraft Staff Sergeant Rinaldo reported that the Yak ground crews were against the visit but the pilot paid no attention to their objections.\(^{930}\) According to Rinaldo “the wings seemed to be made of plywood.”\(^{931}\) The only armament that Rinaldo noted on the Yak was a 20mm cannon extending through the propeller hub.\(^{932}\) Of his visit to the bomber the morning of 1 September Lieutenant Harwood wrote years later that “It was in bad shape with two burned out engines with bullet and cannon holes all over the left wing and fuselage.”\(^{933}\)

Regarding his return to the Superfort, Lieutenant Queen provided additional remarks in his statement on the condition of the plane as they found it on the morning of 1 September. According to Lieutenant Queen all of the aircraft’s emergency equipment had been ripped open. The remaining crew parachutes had been popped open and cut up. Taking inventory of the damage, Lieutenant Queen noted that the aircraft’s gun turrets had also been opened. Three of the aircraft’s clocks had been removed. Like the B-29 itself the bomber’s clocks were some of the most advanced time pieces ever produced, the Hamilton/Elgin 37500.

The bomber’s clocks were produced under a contract that was divided between the Hamilton Watch Company and the Elgin National Watch Company under contract by the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics and the U.S. Army Air Corps. The contract itself was problematic and complicated the clock’s production. Elgin produced the clock’s plates, screws and escapement. The Hamilton Company made all other parts. Once completed the parts were then shared between the companies with each manufacturing complete clocks. The clocks were eight-day, mechanical-wind, five-function timepieces designed as navigational instruments and not simply timepieces. The clocks were 24-hour timepieces displaying running seconds, length of trip with Civil Date – generally standard time within a time zone and 60 minute Center Seconds Chronograph and were used to record elapsed time as an aid to navigation and in bomb delivery.

According to Lieutenant Queen in his subsequent statement, an unidentified Soviet Major, probably Kruglev informed him that morning that Russian ground crews had removed about 3,500 gallons of fuel from the aircraft.\(^{934}\) While some readers might consider this outright theft, it should be kept in mind that Hog Wild was severely damaged. With other aircraft operating from the field and combat operations ongoing having a very heavy bomber on the field containing 3,500 gallons of fuel, with damaged engines and wings, was an operational hazard that had to be mitigated. Removing the fuel from the aircraft would limit additional danger to the damaged aircraft not to mention an active air base.


\(^{931}\) Ibid.

\(^{932}\) Ibid.


\(^{934}\) Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. A Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
Lieutenant Queen noted in his later statement that Major Kruglev possessed “superior knowledge of the B-29.”

Lieutenant Queen noted that Kruglev made remarks about Hog Wild “being a new B-29 as several switches and things were in different places than in the B-29s he had seen,” suggesting some prior knowledge of the aircraft. Kruglev was reportedly a “ground engineering officer.” Oddly enough though Kruglev may have actually been more familiar with the B-29 than the crew of Hog Wild had suspected. Lieutenant Grant also had more to say about Kruglev: “On several occasions I accompanied Lt. Queen and S/Sgt. Strilky, the radio operator, out to the airdrome after the Russians allowed us to go to the plane. On those occasions I saw Major Kruglov several times.”

“The first day we were allowed near the ship we tried to start the auxiliary power plant and found the battery dead from overload. Most of the switches except ignition switches had been left on when we had abandoned the plane. There were shorts in the electrical system that caused operation of the of the landing lights, among other things, even when the switches were off. Major Kruglov was with us as we attempted to eliminate the discrepancies one at a time. He showed amazing knowledge of the ship. He knew where junction boxes for all the systems were located, and on three occasions he pulled the fused [sic] on the shorted systems. He told me later that he had studied the B-29 in Vladivostok last year. He was a graduate aeronautical engineer from the leading aeronautical academy in Moscow. In my opinion he knew the B-29 better than many men who work on them. He seldom asked questions, but when he did he usually had a good idea of the answer and simply wanted verification. He was fascinated by the air operated doors and the feather prop. The Russians do not have either of the features on any of their aircraft.” That would change. Sergeant Owens had additional observations about the Soviet Major.

While at the aircraft on 1 September, Owens attempted to start the aircraft’s putt-putt to use the bomber’s radio to contact the 73rd Bombardment Wing at Isley Field and notify them of the crew’s situation. The bomber’s batteries were dead but Major Kruglov loaned some to Sergeant Owens who, after repairing some shorts and wiring the batteries to the bomber’s aerial used the bomber’s radio to contact Saipan. Sergeant Owens was assisted by – Major Kruglev who, according to Campbell, “knew as much about the B-29 as I did.” When pressed by Captain Campbell as to why he was so familiar with the B-29 Kruglev “said that two of them had landed at Vladivostok and he had a chance to examine them thoroughly.” The Soviets asked what the crew had transmitted and the crew described the transmission in its entirety. There was more. Captain Grant noted yet another Soviet officer with an interest in the B-29. As Grant relates:

“Perhaps the man who did the most for us was a little engineering officer named Capt. Urikov. He spoke practically no English, but we managed to understand each other. He went to no end of trouble to help us out and always seemed glad to see us. He asked questions about the B-29 such as bore and stroke of the cylinder and pistons, propeller shaft size etc., but these questions were always put in a manner that seemed to be merely personal curiosity. One day when I was looking for equipment that might be used for an engine or nacelle change, he took me all over the field and even tried to improviz [sic] something. He said he could give us 2500 gallons of 100 octane gas, but when the C-46 finally arrived to take us away, the gas was never procured. It just never arrived, though the Russians assured us it was coming.” Captain Grant had one last telling observation, “I asked several people if there were any Russian B-29 pilots and they all assured me there were. Also a Major appeared one day who insisted he was a B-29 pilot.” As events will show he probably was a B-29 pilot.

As described by Lieutenant Queen in his statement the crew was informed in that first or some subsequent radio exchange with Saipan to prepare and send to Isley Field a detailed description of everything required for repairing the stricken B-29. According to the statement of Lieutenant Queen, 20th Air Force planned to repair the bomber and fly it out

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935 Ibid.
936 Ibid.
937 Ibid.
938 Ibid.
939 Ibid.
940 Ibid.
941 Ibid.
942 Ibid.
944 Ibid.
of Korea. It is possible that “Colonel Martin” was actually Colonel Glenn W. Martin, the former commander of the 504th Bomb Group who had only recently moved into a staff position with the 20th Air Force some months prior to the loss of Hog Wild. 956 Campbell described Martin as being from Guam which would have put him at headquarters 20th Air Force. 957 Martin was reportedly accompanied by R.D. White, Mortimer Green, Lewis T. Simmons, Norma Schwartz, Morton A. Wiltre, George R. Maxwell, and Hy Tabb.

Lieutenant Harwood reports that “Colonel Martin studied the situation for days.” 958 Whether it was because it was the end of the war or that the bomber was far too damaged to patch-up, Colonel Martin decided not to repair but to salvage the damaged Superfort. E. S. Harrison, an Australian POW held at the camp writing two years after the event reported that by the time the American repair team arrived, Soviet ground crews had tampered with the bomber and removed so much of its

Section 67 – ASSISTANCE ARRIVES

On 11 September 1945 a USAAF Curtiss-Wright C-46 Commando carrying a B-29 repair crew dispatched from Guam arrived at Kanko Airfield. The repair crew was headed by a “Colonel Martin,” Chief Engineer of Pacific Air Forces who examined the damaged bomber. 959 It is possible that “Colonel Martin” was actually Colonel Glenn W. Martin, the former commander of the 504th Bomb Group who had only recently moved into a staff position with the 20th Air Force several months prior to the loss of Hog Wild. 956 Campbell described Martin as being from Guam which would have put him at headquarters 20th Air Force. 957 Martin was reportedly accompanied by R.D. White, Mortimer Green, Lewis T. Simmons, Norma Schwartz, Morton A. Wiltre, George R. Maxwell, and Hy Tabb.

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equipment, that the repair crew was forced to abandon Hog Wild where it sat.\(^5\) Staff Sergeant Rinaldo visiting the aircraft several days after the landing reported that the inside “of the plane was in mess,” and blamed “Russian souvenir hunters” for the damage.\(^6\) According to Captain Campbell, Colonel Martin “said that it wasn’t worthwhile to repair the plane and that we would just strip it of critical items and leave the rest to the Russians.”\(^7\) Air Force concurred with Martin’s recommendation. Colonel Martin posted guards around the maintenance crew’s C-46 to prevent it from being stripped by Russian “souvenir hunters.”\(^8\) Had the B-29 landed at the field as the Soviet Yaks originally directed it is likely that the Soviets would have still plundered the bomber. Following Colonel Martin’s decision the most valuable parts of the aircraft were removed.

Hog Wild was stripped of all its flight and engine instruments, machine gun and bomb sights, Automatic Flight Control Equipment (AFCE), Auxiliary Power Plant (APP), radios, radar, several engines and other salvageable parts. The crew augmented the repair team in stripping the bomber. Captain Campbell wrote in his diary “I never worked so hard for quite some time.”\(^9\) Evidently everything of any value that remained attached to the bomber was removed. Anything that is that was not already removed by the Russians. It was a sad ending for a war hero. According to Lieutenant Queen the Russians expressed no interest in the ongoing salvage effort.\(^10\) As a serviceable aircraft, Hog Wild would never fly again.

On the morning of 14 September 1945 the crew of Hog Wild along with the parts of the bomber salvaged was flown on a C-46 from Konan to Saipan via Keijo, Korea, likely Kimpo Airfield. Prior to departing Lieutenant Queen was provided with a Russian statement explaining Soviet actions that day of 29 August 1945. At Keijo the crew spent the night at the Royal hotel. There they were mauled by reporters including a reporter from Yank Magazine who was interested in their story. The crew was unaware that while at Konan they had become the subject of strong U.S. protests to the Soviet Union originating from MacArthur’s headquarters. Hog Wild was now the last B-29 shot down during WWII and the first U.S. aircraft forced down by the U.S.S.R. in the Cold War. Over the next 40 years about 60 U.S. additional aircraft would be shot down or otherwise forced to land in the U.S.S.R.

While in Keijo the U.S. Army bureaucracy caught up with the crew in the form of a Lieutenant in charge of repatriating P.O.Ws “and although we tried to explain that we didn’t belong in such a category, we still had to fill out several forms and were considered as such.”\(^11\) The next day the crew was flown to Kanoya, Japan probably to the Kanoya Naval Air Base then to Iwo Jima and finally to Saipan. At Saipan the crew was interrogated for about two hours and probably wrote out their statements concerning the incident. The war was over; the usual one quart of medicinal whiskey following a bomb run was dispensed with – this crew was given two quarts.\(^12\)

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\(^7\) Campbell, Robert W Serial Number: 0-562676. Statement of Captain, Robert W. Campbell. 0-562676. 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron, 500\(^{th}\) Bombardment Group, Flight Engineer/Passenger B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
\(^8\) Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron, 500\(^{th}\) Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
\(^9\) Diary of Captain Robert Campbell while held at Konan POW Camp. 30 August to 15 September 1945.
\(^11\) Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron, 500\(^{th}\) Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
\(^12\) Campbell, Robert W Serial Number: 0-562676. Statement of Captain, Robert W. Campbell. 0-562676. 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron, 500\(^{th}\) Bombardment Group, Flight Engineer/Passenger B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\(^{nd}\) Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated

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Section 68 – THE RUSSIAN STATEMENT
In a short translated statement dated 6 September 1945, signed by Senior Lieutenant Churvin, Major Savahenko Commander of the 14th Fighter Bomber Regiment and Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen the Soviets described the events and their actions that day. The Soviets statement read “On the 29th of August 1945 at about 1430 Korean time there appeared in the vicinity of the Red Army Airfield at Konan an unrecognized B-29 without signaling to the Russian airdrome. Commanding Officer and Staff of Red Army did not know in advance about the appearance of this B-29 in the Konan area and the fighting with the Japanese had not ceased.” The statement continued, “due to the fact that during the war with Germany there had been American type planes flown by German pilots that still had American markings on them the Russians were not sure of who was flying the B-29.”

The Soviet statement contains several additional sentences only two of which address the forcing down of the bomber one of which stated that “In accordance with above the Commander of the 14th Fighter Bomber Regiment ordered all measures be taken to land this plane. Four fighters were sent aloft to land the B-29. The fighters signaled the B-29 and pointed out the airport. The B-29 did not land so the Russian fighters opened fire and as a result the B-29 returned to the airport at Konan and landed.”

The statement’s final two sentences addressed the subsequent treatment of the crewmembers, the delivery of the intended supplies and the quartering of the airmen at the POW camp. The Soviet statement was short, sweet, and to the point.

Prior to their departing Kanko Army Airfield the Soviets returned to the crew two of the aircraft’s clocks, the Navigator’s kit (minus its watches), Forms 1 and 1A, the Aircraft Commanders Handbook, the Engineer’s briefcase, the G-file, and the Pilot’s Flight Operating Manual. Overall the crew was missing the Bombardier’s brief case, one clock, and its K-20 camera.

Section 69 – MACARTHUR RECEIVES AN APOLOGY

Following the loss of the bomber, General Douglas MacArthur filed a protest with the U.S.S.R. through Military Mission to Moscow with information copies to the War Department Chief of Staff (WARCOS) over the incident. General MacArthur’s protest, in its entirety, dated 4 September 1945 is reproduced below.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 SEP 1945

CINCAF

MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW – URGENT
INFO: WARCOS

REQUEST YOU DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL ANTONOV FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR CLN( ) (CAX 51677) QUOTE ON AUGUST TWO EIGHT AT KANKO CMA( ) KOREA ABLE UNITED STATES ARMY BAKER TWO NINE OF THE SEVEN FIVE BOMB WING WHILE ENGAGED IN DROPPING SUPPLIES TO PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS AT HOSEN BRANCH CMA THREE NAUGHT DEGREES FIVE THREE MINUTES NORTH ONE TWO SEVEN DEGREES THREE EIGHT MINUTES EAST CMA WAS SHOT DOWN BY RUSSIAN FIGHTERS PD( ) THE AMERICAN PLANE WAS PLAINLY MARKED AND ITS MISSION COULD NOT FAIL TO HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS PURELY BENEVOLENT PD THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE CAUSE ME THE GRAVEST ANXIETY AND ITEM REQUEST THAT IMMEDIATE AND DECISIVE STEPS BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ABLE RECURRENCE OF SO DEPLORABLE AN INCIDENT PD ABLE PROMPT REPLY IS REQUESTED PENDING WHICH THE MUCH NEEDED DROPPING OF SUPPLIES TO PRISONERS OF WAR IN THIS AREA HAS BEEN STOPPED UNQUOTE


969 Ibid.

970 Ibid.
On 11 September 1945 the Chief of the Military Mission Moscow (1943–1945), General John R. Deane raised the forcing down of the Hog Wild over Korea with Lieutenant General Nikolai Vasilevich Slavin, Directorate for Liaison with the Allies, Soviet Red Army. Seven days after General MacArthur had filed his protest General Deane forwarded the following reply to General MacArthur through the office of the Adjutant General War Department (AGWAR).

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
SECRET
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

11 September 1945

To: SCAP; INFORMATION: AGWAR FOR WARCOS
FROM: MOSCOW (DEANE)
NR: MX-25544 10TH

AT MEETING WITH GENERAL SLAVIN, GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE, THIS AFTERNOON, WAS TOLD THAT REPLY TO YOUR CAX-51777 CONCERNING LIAISON IN KOREA IS NOT YET READY.

WHILE SLAVIN COULD NOT GIVE ME OFFICIAL REPLY CONCERNING JAPANESE REQUESTS TO SEND MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVES VISITS TO AREAS FORMERLY UNDER JAPANESE CONTROL, HE SAID IT WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT NO GENERAL APPROVAL COULD BE GIVEN TO THIS REQUEST AND THAT ANY VISITS REQUESTED BE HANDLED AS INDIVIDUAL CASES BY THEATER COMMANDER CONCERNED. HE EXPRESSES SURPRISE THAT JAPANESE IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS IS STILL IN EXISTENCE.

SLAVIN STATED THAT THE B-29 AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS ATTACKED BY SOVIET FIGHTERS NEAR KANKO, KOREA, REQUIRED A NEW ENGINE AND A NEW PROPELLER. HE SAID THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF HAD NO OBJECTION TO SENDING A C-46 AIRCRAFT WITH PERSONNEL TO REPAIR THE B-29, AND THAT HE WOULD INFORM THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES THAT A C-46 WOULD BE ARRIVING IN THE NEAR FUTURE. SLAVIN SAID THAT THE DETAILED REPORTS OF THE REASONS FOR THE SOVIET ATTACK HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED, BUT THAT WE WOULD BE FURNISHED WITH THE RESULTS OF THEIR INVESTIGATION, AND OF THE MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE. HE SAID THE ATTACK OCCURRED BEFORE THE JAPANESE HAD CEASED RESISTANCE AND SUGGESTED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ATTACK THAT JAPANESE MIGHT HAVE BEEN FLYING A B-29 THAT HAD LANDED IN JAPAN.
SLAVIN POINTED OUT THAT ANSWERS ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS LIAISON IN KOREA ARE UNNECESSARILY DELAYED BY BEING REFERRED TO THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF IN MOSCOW THROUGH THE MILITARY MISSION.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET

There was nothing in Slavin’s reply to MacArthur to suggest that the Soviet Union sought to retain the stricken bomber or that they might object to the bomber being repaired and flown out of Soviet-occupied Korea. There were no unnecessary restrictions placed upon on additional U.S. aircraft or servicemen entering the area to affect a repair of the stricken aircraft. Furthermore, in a somewhat rare disclosure indicating this was really not an issue of concern to the Soviet leadership, General Slavin pointed out that most of the answers sought by MacArthur could be dealt with through liaison with Soviet forces in Korea. The offhand remark suggested a degree of autonomy rarely delegated to Soviet generals in the field and should have raised the eyebrows of those used to dealing with Soviet officials. According to Slavin, routing communications through Moscow only added to the delay in resolving the issue. To outside observers the Soviet Union appeared to have no desire to keep the stricken aircraft and add it to their fledgling fleet of damaged U.S. B-29s. The outside observers were wrong.

Information that a B-29 had been shot down by the Soviets began to reach the public on 5 September 1945 in two articles one by Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) the other by the International News Service (INS). The articles initially placed the incident as occurring in China.

U. S. RELIEF PLANE REPORTED DOWNE

New York, Sept 5 (AP) CBS Correspondent John Adams said in a broadcast from Manila today that an American B-29 relief supply plane was shot down by Russian fighter planes in China ‘a few days ago’ Adams described the incident as “purely accidental.”

Adams said that establishment of Allied fleet and shore bases along the Asiatic coast “will help prevent such accidents.”

REPORT B-29 DOWNED ACCIDENTALLY OVER CHINA

New York, Sept 5 (INS) A CBS Manila corresponded said tonight that it had been “reported a few days ago” that Russian fighter planes accidentally shot down a United States B-29 relief supply plane over China.

The source of the information was not given in the broadcast and here has been no confirmation.

A follow-up article from the Associated Press (AP) appeared on 14 September downplaying the event.

B-29 CREW SHOT DOWN OVER KOREA ALL RIGHT

SEOUL, Korea, Sept. 14 (Delayed)

(AP)—The crew and three observers of a B-29 shot down Aug. 29 by Russian Yak fighter planes during a food dropping mission over a Korean prisoner of war camp on northern Korea were on their way back to Saipan today, none the worse for wear.

The Russian explained it was a case of mistaken identity

972 REPORT B-29 DOWNED ACCIDENTALLY OVER CHINA. Long Beach Independent. Vol 8 – No 8. Long Beach, California. Thursday, 6 September 1945
974 REPORT B-29 DOWNED ACCIDENTALLY OVER CHINA. Long Beach Independent. Vol 8 – No 8. Long Beach, California. Thursday, 6 September 1945
975 B-29 CREW SHOT DOWN OVER KOREA ALL RIGHT. Big Spring Herald. Vol. 18; No. 83. Big Spring, Texas. Tuesday, 21 September 1945
For all the latter-day efforts to tie the loss of the bomber to some Soviet effort to prevent U.S. intelligence from investigating Japan’s atomic bomb program the newspapers of the period seemed to concentrate primarily on reporting the story as it appeared to be at the time, the accidental forcing down of a U.S. Superfortress. Most of the smaller newspapers of the period did not report the incident at all.

Overall there were only four basic articles written about the incident and carried by the wire services of the time. All other articles published were derivatives of the original four. With the end of the war against Japan, the occupations of Germany and Japan ongoing, the competition for space in newspapers was intense. With no one killed in the attack, the crew returned and the Soviet Union apologizing the story received little play in the smaller newspapers of the time, nearly none at all in the larger venues.

The first detailed article to describe the events that occurred over Konan on 29 August 1945 was written by Howard Handleman and crossed the wire services nearly two weeks after the incident took place. The article was filed just after the crew arrived in U.S controlled Korea and is based partially on an interview conducted by Handleman with the crew in Keijo. It was the first article written about the incident to mention an earlier B-29 supply delivery to the Konan camp as injuring anyone on the ground.

YANK Fliers Tell of Being Downed by Soviet Plane976
By Howard Handleman

All Escape Injury
All the crew members escaped injury as the Russians warned the B-29 to land before shooting out the Superfort’s engines to prevent dropping of supplies to a British PW camp, endangering the prisoners.

Previously, 29 of 350 British prisoners were injured when a parachute with supplies dropped by a B-29 failed to open and Russian forces acted to prevent a recurrence of the tragedy.

When the B-29 crash-landed after its engines were shot out a Russian Lieutenant General apologized “and fed us vodka” said the pilot, Lieut. Joseph W. Queen of Ashland, Ky.

Believed Field Too Short
Queen said he understood the Russian signals to land rather than drop supplies, but considered the field too short for n landing.

Among those with Queen were Co-Pilot Lieut. Robert S. Rainey, Marion, Ill., and Flight Officer Marion J. Sherrill, Flat River, Mo.

Six of the crew parachuted to water and were picked up by fishing boats. The others rode the plane to earth in the skillfully handled crash landing.

The two B-29s making deliveries to the camp on 29 August in the few minutes before Hog Wild arrived over the area were instructed as was the Queen crew, to deliver their supplies to the area immediately south of the camp, a large tract of open rice fields. According to Handleman 29 of the camp’s 350 POWs had been injured in an earlier delivery and the Soviet Union had forced down the B-29 in an effort to protect the remaining POWs. The true story was that no one had been injured in the delivery of POW supplies to Konan and the Soviets had not forced down Hog Wild to prevent further possible injuries to the POWs.

None of the falling supplies ever hit or otherwise injured a POW held at the camp. No injuries from falling supplies were ever reported as occurring at the Konan Camp. None of the POW supplies delivered to the Konan camp by B-29s had struck a building inside the camp. None of the falling supplies ever hit or nearly killed a Soviet colonel. None of the more than 2,500 pages of materials concerning the Konan Camp and available through the U.S. National Archives ever mentions the delivery of supplies by B-29 to the Konan camp more than in passing, any POWs injured by falling supplies, nor any such

976 Handleman, Howard. YANK Fliers Tell of Being Downed by Soviet Plane. INS. Seoul. 15 September 1945
incident concerning a visiting Soviet colonel. None of the crew statements taken at Saipan around 18 September detailed as they were, ever mention any such incident. Neither does Arthur Cramsie writing 42 years after the war mention such an incident as taking place at the Konan POW Camp. In 2009 one POW, Bill Gray did describe such an incident as occurring at Konan; however he may have actually been referring to a similar incident that took place at Jinsen Camp on the same day as the reported incident at Konan, 29 August 1945. That Gray could make such a mistake is understandable, he was describing an incident that occurred 64 years before. Gray was also evacuated through the Jinsen Camp shortly after the incident on his way home.

Granted, there were numerous such incidents connected with the delivery of POWs supplies across Asia including the incident at the Jinsen camp where the supplies dropped from a B-29 did land within the camp with several drums destroy the camp’s hospital, its kitchen and injured a number of POWs and this may be the incident that Howard Handleman described. However no such incident ever occurred at the Konan POW Camp. Where Handleman had gotten the numbers reported in his article injured remains suspect, however it is likely that the number he used reflected the total number of POWs actually injured across the entire area Asia in the early days of the supply effort and not simply the number of POWs that might have been injured in Korea alone.

The Handleman article was followed up the next day with a release by the Associated Press which concentrated mostly on MacArthur’s protest filed with the Soviet Union. The article carried no byline.

RUSS SHOOT DOWN B-29 IN KOREA APOLOGIZE

Tokyo, Sept. 16 (AP)—The Russians shot down an American Superfort over northern Korea last month and then apologized after Gen. MacArthur lodged a strong protest, supreme headquarters announced Sunday.

The text of the protest over the incident, which occurred Aug. 29, was not disclosed. Headquarters said its language was strong.

Headquarters gave this account:
The Superfort was flying over Russian-controlled Korea when Russian fighter planes intercepted it and by signals attempted to force it to land at a near-by airfield.
The big bomber headed toward the sea and the fighters again tried to force it to land. Then they made a third pass, shooting out an engine and the pilot ordered the crew to bail out.
The report here said all members of the crew managed to escape.

MacArthur’s protest pointed out that the Superfort was obviously an American plane and had been shot down after the Japanese had been ordered to cease fire and keep all their planes grounded.

The protest was filed a few days after the incident. The Russians replied that the shooting was to be regretted, that it was a mistake but that Russian fliers knew some Japanese planes still were in the air.

The Russians said their pilots thought the Japanese might have repaired a Superfort forced down in Japan and were taking no chances.

It wasn’t learned whether MacArthur considered the case closed.

This was the only known case where the Russians had any contact with the American’s long-range bomber.

In his post-flight report before his commander concerning the last flight of 44-70136 Hog Wild, Eugene Harwood had one reply for the Russian statement that “their pilots thought the Japanese might have repaired a Superfort forced down in Japan and were taking no chances:” and that was “My answer to that is that they were close enough to see our faces.”

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978 RUSS SHOOT DOWN B-29 IN KOREA APOLOGIZE. Associated Press. Tokyo, 16 September 1945
There was no doubt on the part of the crew as to whether the Soviet pilots could have mistaken them for Japanese. At best the Soviet excuse was simply a cover story. The Soviet excuse was plausible but when examined in-depth lacked credibility.

Closely scrutinized or questioned, the Soviet story would have fallen apart. No one questioned the Soviet reply. For the Soviet Union the apology to MacArthur’s was a small price for the Soviets to pay; one nearly complete B-29 Superfortress for several days of bad press. On the 17th of September a third variation of the two earlier stories appeared with many papers picking it up off the wire service of the Associated Press.

On 17 September 1945 Don Caswell a correspondent for the United Press (UP), the forerunner to United Press International (UPI) filed the following report. It was the final article to discuss the loss of Hog Wild until the Snell article of October 1946.

RUSSIA APOLOGIZES FOR DOWNING B-29 ON MERCY FLIGHT

By DON CASWELL

United Press Correspondent

Tokyo, Sept. 17—Russia apologized for shooting’ down an American Superfortress on a mercy flight over northern Korea and the case was closed today.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur had protested strongly and vigorously to the Soviet high command over the incident. The Soviet reply expressed regret and called the downing of the plane a mistake.

Four Russian Yak fighter planes shot down the B-29 Aug. 29, two weeks after Japan’s surrender, when it ignored their signals to land. All 12 American crewmen escaped injury. Six bailed out and the other six made a crash landing safely.

The Superfortress had been sent over Korea to drop food and medical supplies to a war prisoner camp at Konan just north of the American occupation zone. It was almost directly over the camp when the Soviet fighters appeared.

“First, they led us over nearby Hammung [sic] airfield and indicated by dropping landing gear and buzzing the field they wanted us to land,” the pilot, Lit. Joseph Queen of Ashland, Ky., told a United Press Correspondent in Korea later.

“However, the field wasn’t big enough for a B-29 and we headed out to sea. About 10 miles off the west coast of Korea, the Yaks started making passes. The first fired across our bow.”

“Our guns were loaded and ready to talk, but I told the members of the crew to hold their fire. Then the Yak made a pass and hit number one engine.”

On the 28th of September 1945, about one week after the aircrew had been returned to Saipan, General Marshall received the following reply from General Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Red Army. General MacArthur received an information copy of the Soviet reply. Note the Soviet reference to the aircraft arriving without “preliminary announcement,” the inference being that Hog Wild was the only bomber in the area, comments concerning the lack of distinguishing marks, and that there were no other intended acts.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

SECRET

28 September 1945

To: AGWAR (PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MARSHAL, INFORMATION GENERAL MACARTHUR)

980 CASWELL, DON. RUSSIA APOLOGIZES FOR DOWNING B-29 ON MERCY FLIGHT. United Press. Tokyo. 17 September 1945
FROM: MOSCOW
NR: MX-25646

THE FOLLOWING REPL HAS BEEN RECEIVED FORM GENERAL ANTONOV IN RESPONSE TO WX 59134 AND SOUTH PACIFIC MESSAGE CAX 51677:

"IN ANSWER TO YOUR LETTER NBR 1??2, I REQUEST YOU TRANSMIT TO GENERAL MARSHAL THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: AS A RESULT OF INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT ON THE SPOT, IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT A B 29 AT 1430 HOURS 29 AUGUST, WITHOUT ANY PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT OR DISTINGUISHING MARKS SUDDENLY ARRIVE IN THE AREA IN WHICH OUR AVIATIONS UNITS WERE LOCATED.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA WERE NOT YET OVER AND THE UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL OF AN UNDETERMINED BOMBER SEEMED SUSPICIOUS, ON THE STRENGTH OF THIS SUSPICION THE COMMANDER OF THE FIGHTER UNIT BASED IN THIS REGION TOOK MEASURES TO HAVE THE B 29 LAND AT THE AIRDROME.


AFTER THE B 29 HAD LANDED AT THE AIRDROME, THE IDENTITY OF THE PLANE WAS ESTABLISHED, AND AN ACT WAS DRAWN UP IN RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH A COPY OF WHICH WAS HANDED TO THE PILOT OF THE SHIP.

THE CREW OF THE PLANE, CONSISTING OF 13 MEN, WAS UNHARMED.

THE CARGO, ON BOARD THIS PLANE, WAS SHIPPED TO THE BRITISH POW CAMP IN THE REGION OF KANKO.

THE PILOT OF THE B 29, 1ST LT JOSPEH QUEEN, ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD SEEN THE SIGNALS OF THE SOVIET FLIERS AND HAD UNDERSTOOD THEM, BUT HAD NOT OBEYED THEM BECAUSE HE FIGURE THAT THE SMALL NUMBER OF FIGHTERS WOULD NOT BRING HIM DOWN.

HAVING INFORMED YOU OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION, I FEEL, DEAR GENERAL, THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT IN THE ACTION OF THE SOVIET FIGHTERS IN THIS INCIDENT, THERE WERE MANIFESTED ONLY MEASURES OF SELF DEFENSE AGAINST AN UNKNOWN PLANE, AND THERE WERE NO OTHER INTENDED ACTS.”

T00: 261450 Z MCN:USFD 100/27
DISTRIBUTION: INFORMATION COPIES TO: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

Section 70 – THE AIRMEN IN KEIJO

After landing at Keijo Lieutenant Queen met with XXIV Corps, G-2; Colonel Cecil Nist who interviewed or debriefed him. While at Keijo the crew was also interviewed by YANK, The Army Weekly magazine which published editions in every major combat theatre of the war.981

The airmen departed Keijo on the 15th for Kanoya, Japan where, with the exception of some flight and engine instruments, all parts salvaged from Hog Wild were then unloaded. The crew arrived on Saipan at about 2030 hours on the night of 16 September 1945 two days after they had departed Konan. They gave their statements on or about 18 September. After giving their statements the story quickly fell into the background noise of history until 3 October 1946, when David Snell published his exposé concerning the Japanese atomic bomb program in the Atlanta Constitution.

In his article Snell suggested that the Soviet Union had purposefully shot down the bomber to prevent it from confirming the location or existence of Japan’s WWII atomic bomb research facilities located at Konan. Snell had gotten the story of the bomber and the program partially correct, the Soviets had purposefully forced the bomber down but their actions had nothing to do with preventing the bomber from observing any remnant facilities associated with Japan’ atomic bomb program. Their motivations were far less complicated than those described by David Snell; the Soviet Union simply wanted one more B-29.

Section 71 – SPY MISSION?

With everything written so far considered, were the Russians at Konan overreaching reality with their concern about a U.S. aircraft being flown by Japanese airmen? Was it unreasonable for Soviet forces to suspect that the B-29 could have been flown by the Japanese? Was the previous Russian reception of U.S. bombers; flak and aircraft attacks, never returning the bombers, the internment of the crews all that odd, different or otherwise out of character for the country or the times? Was what happened to Hog Wild over Konan consistent with what had occurred to the other B-29s lost to the Soviet Union during WWII? And lastly, was Hog Wild on some secret mission to locate and identify Japan’s reported atomic bomb research and production facilities as located in and around Konan? Or were the events that prompted the actual incident far simpler than the myths that grew up around it?

Section 72 – THE AXIS FLYING ALLIED AIRCRAFT

Throughout the war, numerous Allied aircraft, damaged or experiencing mechanical problems, crashed or otherwise landed inside occupied Europe. Some of these were repaired and flew again as test aircraft, and on occasion in combat against the Allies. In a February 1944 Nazi German effort becoming known only in the immediate aftermath of WWII, all covert aerial reconnaissance, agent deliveries, flights to Japan, developmental aircraft testing under the German Luftwaffe were concentrated under one German bomb wing, Kampfgeschwader (Battle Wing) 200, or KG 200. The wing consisted of several large geographically separated squadrons located across Germany and Occupied Europe.

At least two official squadrons were formed, one for dropping Axis agents into enemy territory and another which included all other operations such as electronic warfare, special bombing missions, and flights to Japanese held northern China. The two squadrons operated from hidden airstrips located in or around heavily forested areas. Other squadrons were also established but it is not entirely clear whether these additional squadrons ever became operational.

The wing flew captured Allied aircraft for experimental and research purposes, such as identifying technological advances or inherent weaknesses in the basic design. Some of these aircraft were also used against the Allies for intelligence purposes. The unit flew Spitfires, de Havilland Mosquitoes, B-24 Liberators, P-38 Lightnings and P-51 Mustangs to name but a few. The Germans captured several dozen B-17 Flying Fortresses. At least seven of these downed B-17s were fully flight capable.

982 983

983 日本に鹵獲されたB-17。[陸軍航空本部に勤務していた祖父が持っていた写真です。](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-17_Flying_Fortress)
There are reports that on occasion some of these bombers would infiltrate U.S. daytime bomber attacks into Germany to report their position and direction to German fighters, and may have actually fired on other aircraft from inside the formation. To Allied airmen the threat was sufficiently real enough to cause Allied bombers to actually fire on Allied aircraft that could not be positively identified. The Soviet Union did much the same thing and flew captured German aircraft into combat. Though armed with far less captured aircraft the Japanese operated units with responsibilities similar to the German Kampfgeschwader.

In the early months of WWII, Japanese forces captured intact a number of Allied aircraft to include several Curtiss-Wright CW-21 Interceptors, Douglas A-20 Havocs, Martin B-10s, Brewster F2A Buffalos, and others. At least three B-17 Flying Fortresses were captured intact at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. At least one of those B-29s was flown to Japan and put on display early in the war. The Japanese also captured a large number of Curtis P-40 Tomahawks during their advance into Burma.

These P-40 Tomahawks were actually flown by the 2 Hiko Chutai, 50 Hiko Sentai (2nd Air Squadron, 50th Air Regiment) in air combat over Rangoon in 1943. During the B-29 attack of 29 July 1944 against the Showa Steel Mill an American-made P-40 bearing Chinese markings was among the defending fighters attempting to protect the steel mill. Captured Allied aircraft received further testing at the Tachikawa Branch Test Center in Singapore.

Though it was unlikely that the Japanese could be flying a captured B-29 Superfortress over Konan that day of 29 August 1945, it remained a possibility that had to be considered. Like U.S. bombers firing on aircraft attempting to enter their formations over Europe, Soviet airmen also had some experience with familiar, correctly marked Allied aircraft overflying Russia only to become the victim of an enemy ruse. The Soviet justification for firing on the B-29 though weak was credible and subsequently accepted by MacArthur and other U.S. officials. Failing to convince the bomber to land by dropping landing gear and signaling, the Soviets resorted to stronger methods none of which were out-of-place for the times.

Section 73 – SEEKING SHELTER AND NEUTRAL SHOOT DOWNS

During WWII it was not uncommon for military aircraft damaged in combat to land or seek shelter in a neutral country. It was not all that unusual at the time for countries neutral in the war to force down any aircraft violating its airspace. At the time aircraft seeking shelter, visibly damaged or not entering the airspace of a neutral country could reasonably expect to be fired upon. Firing shots across the nose of an aircraft as had occurred with Hog Wild was a recognized signal in many countries for an aircraft invading a nation’s airspace to follow the intercepting aircraft and to land at a field as indicated. It is likely that such actions were a natural outgrowth of the long-standing “shot across the bow” used by naval forces when demanding a ship on the high seas to stop for inspection, or as a warning to “heave to” when violating a nation’s territorial waters.

Between 10 May and 17 June 1940, Switzerland actually shot down no-less-than 11 Luftwaffe aircraft violating their airspace. It was not all that unusual at the time for countries neutral in the war to force down any aircraft violating its airspace. At the time aircraft seeking shelter, visibly damaged or not entering the airspace of a neutral country could reasonably expect to be fired upon. Firing shots across the nose of an aircraft as had occurred with Hog Wild was a recognized signal in many countries for an aircraft invading a nation’s airspace to follow the intercepting aircraft and to land at a field as indicated. It is likely that such actions were a natural outgrowth of the long-standing “shot across the bow” used by naval forces when demanding a ship on the high seas to stop for inspection, or as a warning to “heave to” when violating a nation’s territorial waters.

Between 10 May and 17 June 1940, Switzerland actually shot down no-less-than 11 Luftwaffe aircraft violating their airspace. On 13 April 1943 the Swiss Air Force shot down a crippled U.S. bomber despite its lowering landing gear and releasing flares in response to Swiss orders. The shoot down killed six Allied airmen. On 11 July 1943 the Swiss military forced down another eight wayward U.S. bombers that violated their airspace. The next day another twelve bombers were forced down by the Swiss.

984 B-17 with the Enemy. 27 July 1999, [http://home.att.net/~jbaugher2/b17_22.html](http://home.att.net/~jbaugher2/b17_22.html)
986 Ibid.
Shots across the Bow a Warning to Land

As late as September 1983 the Soviet Union continued to use shots across the nose of an aircraft as a warning signal that an aircraft had violated Soviet airspace, or to follow the interceptor to a nearby field, as evidenced by Russia’s shooting down Korean Air Lines Flight 007. This incident was preceded in April 1978 when aircraft from the Soviet Union fired on and forced down Korean Air Lines Flight 902, 250 miles south of Murmansk, 20 miles from the border of Finland. The holding of wayward aircraft by the various countries neutral during WWII, as was the U.S.S.R. in the war against Japan in 1944 was also common.

During WWII 244 Allied aircraft declared in-flight emergencies, crashed, or subsequently landed in Switzerland. 166 of the 244 were American aircraft, 12 were British. 327 foreign aircraft landed in neutral Sweden during the war. Of these 140 were American, 113 were German and 58 were British. More than 80 damaged aircraft landed or crashed in Turkey during the war, including one Soviet aircraft that defected. During WWII several German aircraft crashed or otherwise landed in Spain and Portugal with the aircraft detained but the crews returning to Germany. Many aircrews surviving crash landings in neutral nations however were not so lucky with many being incarcerated for the duration of the war.

In the Soviet Far East several U.S. Army and Naval aircraft above and beyond the four previously discussed B-29s, declared emergencies and landed at airfields in and around Vladivostok, including one B-25 from the 1942 Doolittle Raid over Tokyo. The Doolittle raider piloted by Captain Edward Joseph York landed in Primoski Province north of Vladivostok where the aircraft was confiscated and the crew detained. On approaching the airfield Captain York thought they were landing at an airport and not at a military base. The York crew was first taken by plane to the Soviet city of Khabarovsk, then by train across the Trans-Siberian Rail Road to Kuibyshev, European Russia. From Kuibyshev they were transferred by car to Okhuna, a town located about 300 miles south of Moscow.

The York crew would spend 13 months in the Soviet Union before being allowed to “escape” into Iran and eventually return to the U.S. By the time Russia entered the war against Japan the U.S.S.R had impounded a total of 37 U.S. aircraft making emergency landings in the Russian Far East. All crewmembers accompanying these aircraft were subsequently interned. After a lengthy period of incarceration these crewmembers were eventually allowed to “escape” to Iran.

Neutrals in a Bind

In wartime a declaration of neutrality entails certain rights, privileges and responsibilities. Neutral nations can do nothing to assist or impede a warring nation. For example: Neutral nations cannot construct or outfit ships for a belligerent nation. A neutral nation cannot allow belligerent armies to transit or engage in hostilities within that nation. Belligerent war ships may enter the port of a neutral nation for repairs or other emergencies, but they are usually given a limited amount of time to complete repairs and exit the port and territorial waters of the neutral nations. Unlike ships the aircraft of a belligerent nation landing in or transiting a neutral country are more-often-than-not subject to internment.

In the early years of the war in Europe most German aircrews and aircraft seeking refuge in Sweden had been allowed by authorities in Stockholm to initiate repairs and return to Germany with their aircraft. As the tides of war turned against the Nazis, Sweden began to detain the crews and their aircraft. The Swiss government eventually held all violating air crews landing in Switzerland until the end of the war, not with the German surrender but the surrender of Japan.

Ireland another Neutral nation in the war, held 33 Allied airmen including nine Canadians, one New Zealander, one American, and at least 17 German airmen. At some point during the war the Soviet Union held a total of 291 U.S. servicemen from 36 aircraft including those from the aforementioned B-29s at Tashkent, Uzbekistan in the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The American airmen held were the crews of U.S. Naval and Army Air Corps aircraft that had suffered damage in raids against Japan from missions originating at forward operating bases in China or the Aleutian Islands. The average length of stay for an interned U.S. airmen in the Soviet Union was seven months, with longest wait being 13 months. Those held at Tashkent, with the intercession of U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Averell Harriman; and with the assistance of the Soviet Foreign and the Internal Affairs Commissariat eventually “escaped” Soviet confinement


990 Ibid.


to Tehran, capital of Iran. The escape included a farewell banquet of caviar, fish, and vodka held in Ashkhabad immediately prior to their departure.994

The first arranged escapes from Soviet custody included the original airmen interred from the B-25 used in the 1942 Doolittle Raid. A total of five such, “arranged escapes,” were eventually allowed, however the final U.S. airmen held by the U.S.S.R near Tashkent were not released until 24 August 1945 after the end of the war with Japan. Though the staged escapes seemed an overly dramatic solution to the existence of interred U.S. airmen held within the Soviet Union, the releases were not without danger. In liberating the airmen the U.S.S.R risked open conflict with Japan, a conflict the Soviet Union was not prepared to wage while at war with Germany. Unfortunately the arranged escapes became public knowledge in early 1944.

Though Major General John R. Deane who served in the U.S. Embassy Moscow during the war credits the release of the story to Henry Shapiro of United Press, newspapers in London were actually responsible for releasing the information as early as September 1943.995 All Shapiro had done in December 1943 or January 1944 was to question General Deane about the reports gleaned from London papers and later carried in newspapers across the U.S. The release of the London article, only two paragraphs and several sentences greatly offended Soviet sensitivities regarding the existence of the airmen on Soviet soil. All airmen who continued to be interned in the Soviet Union were subsequently sworn to secrecy before being released; a vow they kept to ensure others held at Tashkent would likewise be allowed to escape the Soviet Union.996

The internment of belligerent forces seeking refuge in neutral nations was neither a rare occurrence nor an uncommon event out of place for the times. The reception of Hog Wild over Konan was not much different than the reception it would have received over Ireland, Turkey, Switzerland, or any number of other nations during WWll. The welcome Hog Wild received over Konan in August 1945 may have been crude but it was not unusual. Firing on the B-29 as it departed Konan may have been excessive in light of its lack of aggressive actions, but it was a very-heavy bomber flying low-level over an active combat zone.

**B-29 on Offense**

Capable of delivering a 20,000 pound bomb load, the presence of B-29 anywhere near an active war zone was cause for some concern. Twisting maneuvers requiring high bank turns were not the delivery tactics of a very heavy bomber. It was not unusual during the war against Japan for a B-29 to maintain a steady course of over 50 miles along the bomb run from IP to its target. Some bomb runs were over 70 miles long.997 From 1944 through 1945 a B-29, flying in a straight line, low-level over Japan to drop incendiaries was pure aggression.998 As described by soldiers on every front from every country involved in the war, the last thing they wanted was to be on the receiving end of an attack from a large bomber. The B-29 of 1945 was air power.

Entering Korea and proceeding in a direct line from the coast to Konan, Hog Wild could easily have been interpreted by anyone manning a mobile radar station or receiving radio reports of the bomber on approach as aggressive action. Yet Soviet forces in Korea are not known to have deployed radar sets into the area. The real challenge for the Soviet Union in trying to downplay the forcing down of Hog Wild’s was that prior its arrival over Konan two other bombers had delivered supplies to the POW camp using the same, or similar delivery tactics. In addition at least one of the earlier bombers had loitered in the area over the POW camp after its supply delivery, making at least three additional passes over the prison and wagging its wings goodbye. The Soviet explanation, while it offered a plausible account of the incident was a lie. Had anyone challenged the account it would not have withstood intense scrutiny. Worse for the Soviets was the fact that one week prior to the event, all Japanese aircraft had been grounded under General Order Number 1, the first order issued by MacArthur to effect the surrender of Japan. Unnoticed by many the last Japanese aircraft shot down by the Soviets fell from the skies on 15 August, a full nine days before Hog Wild overlived the Konan POW camp.

**All Japanese Aircraft Grounded**

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After 15 August 1945 capitulation the Japanese government was ordered by the Supreme Commander Allied Pacific (SCAP) to send representatives to Manila to arrange the formal surrender. On 19 August 1945 two Betty bombers (G6M1-L and G4M1) bearing the Japanese delegation led by General Torashiro Kawabe departed Tokyo. The delegation carried with them Japan’s entire order-of-battle to include all of Japanese defensive plans. The Bettys were painted white with green crosses on the wings and fuselage in accordance with the terms of surrender for aircraft. The bombers were assigned the call signs “Bataan I” and “Bataan II.”

South of Tokyo the Bettys rendezvoused with two B-25J Mitchell Bombers of the 345th Bombardment Group and were led to le Shima Airfield. Six P-38 Lightnings of the 80th Fighter Squadron provided top cover protecting the Japanese delegation. At le Shima the delegation boarded a C-54 Skymaster, Serial Number 44-9045 which flew Japan’s representatives to Manila where they would to meet with the staff of General MacArthur to work out details of the surrender. The Bettys bombers remained at le Shima.

Arriving in Manila the Japanese reported to MacArthur’s general headquarters where they turned over the locations and strengths of all Japanese military remaining in the field. The Japanese were presented with a number of documents containing the “Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers” and a copy of General Order Number 1 which stated “Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will insure that all Japanese military and naval and civil aircraft remain on the ground, the water, or aboard ship until further notification on the disposition to be made of them.” 999 The order became effective at 1800 hours 24 August 1945 a full five days before Hog Wild would be lost. 1000 The Japanese were also required to provide “Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil, giving complete information as to the number, type, location, and condition of such aircraft.” 1001

Across Asia some commanders and airmen ignored the order to ground their aircraft and attempted to continue flying offensive air missions against the Allies. Some Japanese air units actually mutinied in response to the order to surrender. The last known Japanese combat mission took place on 18 August 1945 eleven days before Hog Wild was forced down over Korea when several Japanese pilots attacked two U.S. B-32 Dominators. On 21 August as Japanese ground crews at Atsugi Airfield began removing propellers and draining fuel to disable the field’s fighters, Japanese pilots fought back and manned their aircraft. The pilots held the base for seven days before the revolt finally collapsed. Though the issue remains in dispute, according to some records the last Japanese aircraft to be shot down during World War II was a “Judy” carrier bomber, credited to an U.S. Navy F6F-5 Hellcat from Fighting Squadron 31 flying from the aircraft carrier USS Belleau Wood. Other sources claim that last aircraft to be shot down by U.S. aircraft was a Nakajima C6N1-S shot down at 5:40 A.M. on 14 August 1945. The last two Japanese aircraft to be shot down over Korea by Soviet air forces fell from the air on 15 August 1945.

On 15 August 1945 at 1330 hours Soviet 29 Pe-2 dive bombers of the 55th Bomber Air Regiment (BAP) bombed the railroad station at Ranam. A Pair of J2M Raidens tried to intervene. An escorting Yak-9 of the 19th Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP) shot down one, the other escaped. At 1718 hours that same day 34 Pe-2s of the 33rd BAP again escorted by Yak-9s of the 19th IAP, attacked the rail station at Funai. One J2M Raiden was shot down.

Though the facts are sparse it is possible that there were additional air engagements, wins and losses taking place that remain to be revealed however from what is currently known the air war over Korea ended on or about 15 August 1945. Though fighting on the ground continued no additional Japanese aircraft were reported shot down in the 14 days before Hog Wild flew over the camp. Though the Soviets could attempt to justify the forcing down of Hog Wild as a possible American aircraft flown by the enemy the Japanese had not flown an aircraft over Japan or Korea for at least a week prior to the arrival of Hog Wild. By the time Hog Wild flew over Konan the air war over Korea had ceased to be a factor. Had the Japanese acquired a flyable B-29, any advantage in deploying the bomber against Soviet forces pouring down into the Korean Peninsula had been long since been overcome by events. The Japanese Empire had already surrendered, the Soviet occupation of northern Korea and Manchuria was already underway.

That the Soviets were continuing to claim that it was possible that the Japanese were flying captured American aircraft nine days after the Japanese agreed to ground their aircraft; 11 days after the Japanese flew their last combat mission, 14 days after the last Japanese aircraft was shot down in an air engagement anywhere over Korea or Pacific Asia should have been the cause of some concern. It wasn’t.

Once on the Ground

\footnotetext[999]{GHQ. SCAP. Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Presented to the Japanese Representatives at Manila, P. I. 19 Aug 45 (Formerly TOP SECRET).}
\footnotetext[1000]{GENERAL MACARTHUR’S INSTRUCTIONS TO JAPANESE ON OCCUPATION LANDINGS. New York Times. 23August 1945}
\footnotetext[1001]{Ibid.}
With the single exception of Cait Paomat all other B-29s entering Soviet airspace had been fired upon by Russian aircraft. Most of the above mentioned bombers, once intercepted had received shots across the bow and an order to land. Of the three B-29s landing near Vladivostok only the General H. H. Arnold Special had taken fire from anti-aircraft units.

It is not clear from any of the encounters whether the Soviets really wanted to shoot down any of the intruding bombers. It is clear that, surrounded by between four and six Yaks at low-level had the Soviets desired to shoot them down none of the bombers would have survived.

Once on the ground and in custody all of the crews involved were mildly interrogated. None of the B-29 crewmembers landing inside the Soviet Union were ever allowed to return to their damaged aircraft. Unlike the crew of Hog Wild none of the other crews were ever allowed to report their situation to their home base or commanding units. While in Soviet custody, B-29 crew or not none of the 291 men incarcerated by the U.S.S.R. ever reported being made to suffer, being mistreated, tortured or beaten. Most did report months of agonizing boredom, terrible food leading to weight loss, illegally produced local vodka and absolutely miserable wine.1002

**Flights into Korea**

In addition to the repair team that flew in to repair Hog Wild, Allied repatriation teams from the Recovered Personnel Detachment in Okinawa also flew into the area to document and organize the British and Australian POWs held at the camp for return to their homes of record.1003 More than 70 such teams had been established on Okinawa, one team for each 500 POWS. Each team was managed by two officers, one British, one American.1004 Once returned to Allied hands POWs were considered Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMP).1005 POWs that had died as a result of their captivity and whose remains could be located were disinterred and returned to their families, or reinterred in Allied war cemeteries overseas. Additional aircraft had flown into Heijo and other areas of northern Korea under Soviet control to assist in the repatriation of Allied POWs held in Korea since the fall of Singapore. The team flying into Heijo was further tasked with organizing some form of communications with the commander of Soviet forces in Korea. None of these additional flights were ever interfered with, forced to land, or shot down. Nor were those soldiers left behind in Heijo to arrange communications or liaise with Soviet forces in northern Korea otherwise tortured, harmed, beaten or interrogated.1006

Had the Soviet Union suspected that Hog Wild had been on a spy mission or had the U.S. sought to mount a spy mission against unknown facilities in the area of Konan, it is unlikely that additional over flights, transportation units, POW recovery teams consisting of several officers and others, would have been allowed into northern Korea; Heijo, Konan or any other areas of the country.

**Blacklist Achieves its Goals**

In broad terms the Blacklist relief effort achieved its goals. Between the Yellow List as provided by the Japanese, the list of POW camps contained in CINCPAC CINCPA Bulletin No. 113 45, and the additional locations identified by efforts of the 314th Bombardment Wing and others a total of 169 POW-Civilian internee camps and other prison locations were identified.1007

Of the 169 camps B-29s and other aircraft were able to drop supplies to all but 11. These 11 could not be identified from the air at or near the coordinates given. 158 of the camps received a delivery of three-day supplies. 128 camps received a seven-day food and medical supply drop. 91 of the 158 camps were supplied with one or more ten-day supply drops. With more than 900 missions flown, most camps received multiple air drops of three-, seven- and ten-day supplies often on the same day.1008 The camp at Konan would continue to receive additional resupply drops after the 29th of August 1945 through the final departure of the POWs on 21 September 1945 with no further incidents or harassment by Soviet aircraft.1009

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Though the Australian and British POWs held at the Konan camp would be released from Japanese imprisonment by the Soviet Union when they took control of the area in late August 1945, the POWs would not be transported to Keijo until 21 September 1945 when they were forcibly removed from northern Korea and Soviet control by U.S. and British recovery personnel. In one of the odder turnabouts of WWII due in no small part to difficulties caused by language – resulting in poor communications, and differing cultures it is possible that the POWs held at Konan nearly traded imprisonment under one master – the Japanese, for imprisonment under another – the Soviet Union.

Treated Differently
Though Hog Wild had taken fire from Soviet aircraft and had been forced down, after landing and with the situation somewhat defined, unlike all other crews of aircraft confiscated by Soviet forces during WWII, Lieutenant Queen and a second member of the crew were allowed to return to the aircraft to retrieve personal equipment such as canteens and clothing. Lieutenant Grant also returned to the aircraft the day of the landing to open the B-29’s bomb bays to allow the POW supplies to be offloaded. These stores were later delivered to the POW camps as promised. Within a few days of the event the crew was also allowed to use the bomber’s radio to contact Saipan and stayed in contact with its command until removed to southern Korea. It was a privilege never granted to any of the other crews forced to land in Soviet territory during the war.

Additional U.S. servicemen in the form of a repair crew arriving by C-46 Air Commando at the same Kanko Army Airfield where the stricken bomber had previously put down were also allowed access to the area and the aircraft. No such access was ever provided to the crews of the other bombers and fighter aircraft that had previously landed near Vladivostok. The C-46 brought with it two replacement engines and various other replacement parts. After examining the bomber, the recovery crew deemed the aircraft to be beyond repair and condemned it for salvage.

The privileges granted to the crew of Hog Wild as it sat on the airfield in a northern Korea under Soviet control, and the treatment received by its crew after it was established what had taken place, were different from what had been previously experienced by other aircrews landing inside the U.S.S.R. These two facts suggest that the Soviets respected the changing nature of its alliance with the U.S. in the war against Japan, and that Stalin had obtained sufficient B-29s to support the development of his own strategic bomber without the need for more Superfortresses. Nothing could have been further from the truth concerning either suggestion. Though no maintenance report has ever been found listing all the damage to the aircraft from its encounter with the Yak, some assessment of the overall damages is possible from comments contained in the aircrew statements given at Saipan.

Section 74 – DAMAGED BEYOND REPAIR

With the aircraft taking cannon fire in the bomb bay, to the area of engine one, between engine one and two, and having the propellers of engine four hitting the ground on impact during the landing, Hog Wild is likely to have had not-less-than three damaged engines. None of the damaged engines were recovered, but its only undamaged engine was removed from the bomber. Damage to the wing spar from the magnesium fire that occurred behind engine number one was also likely. The shell that exploded within the bomb bay would have also damaged some of the aircraft’s hydraulic and electrical lines.

The aircraft was obviously beyond repair and subsequently condemned by the visiting 21st Air Force maintenance crew. After condemning the bomber an effort was made to salvage the aircraft’s most valuable parts.

The bomber was subsequently stripped of its flight and engine instruments, machine gun and bomb sights. The bomber’s AFCE, APP, radios, radar, and other salvageable parts were likewise removed. The entire recovery operation took place on a Soviet-occupied airfield in the presence of Soviet soldiers, aircraft ground personnel, and airmen with no effort on their part to interfere with or otherwise stop the salvage operation.

Soviets Unconcerned With the Salvage Operation
As reported by Lieutenant Queen, Russians at the airfield paid no attention to the ongoing salvage operation. They made no effort to stop the repair or salvaging of the downed bomber. Had they been seeking additional aircraft to complete their own bomber program it would seem unlikely that the salvage effort would have ever been allowed to proceed, much less proceed unhampered. Why the change? There were three reasons: The existence of the three previously intact
bombers within the Soviet Union, the changing relationship between the Soviet Union and the Allies in the war against Japan and the fact that the Soviets had already examined the damaged bomber to their satisfaction. Whatever their goal in forcing down the bomber the Soviets had acquired the information they sought, even from a damaged bomber. The information contained within Hog Wild was needed by the Soviet Union to complete its version of the B-29, the Tupelov Tu-4 BULL.

Section 75 – HOG WILD IN THE U.S.S.R?

To date no official documents have ever been revealed which listed Hog Wild, parts of or the bulk of the aircraft as being inside the U.S.S.R. 99 foot long with a wingspan of more than 140 foot, an empty weight of more than 74,000 pounds; B-29s were somewhat difficult to hide. Of all the interviews and investigations that have taken place concerning the creation of the Soviet Tu-4 BULL, there has never been any mention of information of parts from Hog Wild being used in its construction. There have however been admissions that the Soviets might have possessed at least one bomber, or parts thereof in addition to the four known bombers landing or crashing near Vladivostok.

Though there certainly remained on the ground and within the airframe of Hog Wild salvageable parts and equipment it is unlikely that the bomber known as Hog Wild would ever be flown again. While the Soviet Union had indeed reached a decision about duplicating the B-29 when Soviet aircraft forced down Hog Wild Russia would have likely remained incapable of repairing a B-29 with this level of damage, and flying it from Korea to Moscow. The salvage crew had also removed at least one of the bomber’s engines. Without a matching engine, and with three engines damaged and no similar Soviet replacement engines available it is unlikely that Hog Wild could ever have taken off from the Kanko Army Airfield. While at least two of the previous bombers lost to the Soviet Union had landed on short airstrips near Vladivostok it should be noted that two of the bombers, Ramp Tramp and the General H.H. Arnold Special were simply low on fuel and not battle damaged. The third bomber, Ding How had one damaged engine but that engine had been feathered and could be repaired. That Ding How was used as the reference model in the effort to reverse engineer the B-29 suggests that its one damaged engine was easily repaired. Hog Wild on the other hand had nearly been shot from the sky. The B-29 had suffered damage to a point where the crew was ordered to escape the burning aircraft. It was only after the fire in the number one engine had subsided that the order to bail out was rescinded. While remaining airborne a few miles to a nearby military airfield was a remarkable achievement, flying the aircraft with the outward level of damage that Hog Wild had received from Korea to Moscow would have been an entirely different matter.

While outward damage to the bomber could be easily assessed, structural damage to the craft’s airframe could only be judged by an in-depth investigation requiring a dismantling of a considerable portion of the Superfortress. Replacing one or two damaged engines was one thing, replacing a wing spar or judging internal damage to the aircraft’s frame prior to flight was beyond the capabilities of the repair crew. The maintenance crew judged the bomber a total loss. It is unlikely that any Soviet aircrew would have thought the bomber airworthy.

To be flown again the stricken bomber would have required at least two possibly three new engines at a time when the Soviet Union had only recently decided to use the ASh-73TK as its power plant for their copy of the B-29, the TU-4. The first prototypes of the ASh-73TK were not complete until 1946 and did not enter production until 1947. As the aircraft was now missing most of its flight instruments these would also have to be replaced, synchronized with the aircraft and any new engines before the bomber would ever fly again. Flying the aircraft with replacement parts not meant for use with such an advanced aircraft would lead to additional problems. However there was little need for Hog Wild to be moved to Moscow. Stalin already had the B-29s necessary to reverse engineer the American bomber into the Soviet TU-4. In most situations where controlled or secret military products are reverse engineered, those doing the work are fortunate to have one completely intact copy of the weapon or material to be studied and reproduced. The Soviet Union had the luxury of three operating copies of the B-29 and parts from a fourth; parts from a fifth if what remained of Hog Wild was salvaged or dismantled.

Of the three complete bombers only the General H.H. Arnold Special was disassembled for examination. Ding How was kept intact and served as a reference model for the reverse engineering project while Ramp Tramp was used as an operating copy to develop maintenance and operations standards. If the Soviets had to disassemble another copy of the bomber either of the remaining two intact bombers, Ramp Tramp of Ding How remained available. Hog Wild had been severely damaged. Unlike Hog Wild the two remaining bombers were intact copies. The Soviet Union did not need Hog Wild as an example in their effort to create a strategic bombing capability. However the Soviet Union might have needed the bomber for more innocuous reasons.

It is likely that what remained of Hog Wild after it was salvaged by U.S. maintenance crews was of course, further salvaged by the Soviets. The Russians could and probably did recover the undamaged portions of the airframe, fuselage, wings, wiring harnesses, hydraulic lines, etc., and ship these parts into the Soviet Union. The recovered parts could have been used either to keep Ding How flying as a test aircraft, or added to stockpiles of TU-4 spares. Though the value of spare parts for the ongoing Russian effort to copy the bomber cannot be underestimated, the Russians at Konan would have been under few constraints in dismantling the remains of the aircraft and placing those spare parts in the Soviet parts inventory. It is unlikely that Hog Wild, the complete bomber with its three damaged engines, a possible damaged wing spar, and a damaged aileron ever flew the skies of the U.S.S.R. It is likely however that parts of the bomber did once again take to the air. These parts are likely to have flown in the Tupolev TU-70.

Along with the TU-4 Tupolev built a passenger variant of the Soviet bomber known as the TU-70. The TU-70 was completed in October 1946 and made its first flight in November of that year, months before the TU-4 would ever take to the air. The passenger version is reported to have utilized parts taken directly from two of the American B-29s used in the development of the TU-4. Known parts from a B-29 that were used on the TU-70 included the outer wing panels, engine cowlings, undercarriage, flaps, and tail assembly. Some of the TU-70’s avionics was also taken directly from a U.S. B-29. The concern with these reports is that the parts used on the TU-70 represented entire sections of an existing B-29 at the time when the TU-4 was being developed from the three B-29s.

If one of the known B-29s was used in the effort to build the TU-70 it would have deprived the Soviets of one entire copy of their three samples; either 1) the disassembled bomber, the General H.H. Arnold Special 2) their reference model, Ding How or 3) their training and development model, Ramp Tramp.\(^{1013}\) Though most papers report the General H.H. Arnold Special as the source of parts for the TU-70 it remains possible the parts used to build the TU-70 actually originated with Hog Wild. For the parts to have come from the General H.H. Arnold Special would have also required their reassembly before use. The list of entire sections known to have been used on the TU-70; its outer wing panels, engine cowlings, undercarriage, flaps, and tail assembly match those parts or sections of Hog Wild known to be intact at the Kanko Army Airfield in northern Korea. Rail connections north from Konan northward would have allowed Soviets engineers to dismantle the damaged bomber into several large section and ship those parts to the Moscow area. Immediately after WWII the Soviets were reported to be stripping northern Korea’s Japanese installed industries and shipping them into Russia as war reparations.\(^{1014}\) Generators of several large hydroelectric turbine-generator sets along the Yalu River were actually removed from Korea into the Soviet Union and later returned, indicating that sufficient rail connections between the two countries did exist.

Of the three bombers confiscated at Vladivostok, Ramp Tramp is known to have served for nearly a decade with Soviet Air Forces after its loss and could not have served as a source of parts for the TU-70. General H.H. Arnold had been disassembled and was being relied upon as the standard, the basis of comparison for all Soviet produced parts. Had the Soviets reassembled the General H.H. Arnold for use as the foundation for the TU-70, the final version of the passenger plane would have contained far more original parts than it is reported to have include. The Soviets may have disassembled Ding How; however this bomber was serving as the complete model. During the fabrication of the Soviet version of the B-29 if there were difficulties in its assembly, Ding How was the only guide available for additional research as Ramp Tramp was then in use. In the end the timeline of Hog Wild’s availability for use on the TU-70 project; it’s possible disassembly and shipment into the Soviet Union, and its potential use as a source of parts for passenger plane production matches the known production timeline of the TU-70.

Finally it should be remembered that the original goal of the Soviet program was the creation of the TU-4 not the TU-70. Only one TU-70 was ever built and that aircraft was constructed on a parallel assembly line while the TU-4 moved forward along another, suggesting that the development of the TU-70 rested on an unexpected opportunity and was not part of Stalin’s original order. The use of pre-existing sections in the construction of the TU-70 probably accounts for the passenger plane’s rapid development and its taking to the air prior to the object of Stalin’s program, TU-4. As with the BULL the TU-70 would make its first public appearance at the Tushino Air Show of 1947.

Section 76 – RUSSIAN ACTIONS ON 29 AUGUST 1945

No documents or other accounts outside of the messages exchanged between the Soviet Union and U.S. government, and the letter provided to Lieutenant Queen have been uncovered to further explain Russian actions in regard to the forcing


down of the bomber on 29 August 1945. It is possible that additional documents exist in the archives of the former Soviet army or those of the U.S. military, but they have yet to be made public.

It is likely that the change in treatment experienced by the crew of Hog Wild had more to do with the shifting role of the Soviet Union and its entry into the war against Japan than any need to tightly control the movement of the crew. In the war against Japan the Soviet Union was now an ally and was obliged to treat the crew of Hog Wild as an ally. Though suspicions between the two countries, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were present at the time Hog Wild was forced down and would continue to grow; in August of 1945 the Cold War, with its hardening attitudes and tremendous tensions lay sometime in the future. The rising tensions between the Allies in Europe had not yet transferred to the Pacific Theatre and remained somewhat absent at the time Hog Wild was forced down.

Now allied with the U.S. in the Pacific War, the Soviet Union could no longer hide behind neutrality and its commitments to Japan under the Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1941 to deny the crewmembers and repair crews access to the downed bomber. With its previous treaty obligations no longer in effect, and the Soviet Union now at war with Japan the U.S.S.R. was required to render all support and assistance to an Allied aircrew landing in territory under its control. Though the Soviets had forced the aircraft down over northern Korea, once the dust had settled, on the surface the Soviet Union appears to have fulfilled its obligation as an Ally. Below the surface, the U.S.S.R. had succeeded in achieving other goals.

In the aftermath of the forcing down, Soviet forces on the ground in Korea had allowed the crew easy and constant access to the stricken bomber. The crew often walked or were driven from the POW camp to the bomber. Unlike previous aircrews the Soviets allowed the crew of Hog Wild to report their situation via radio back to their command in Saipan. The Soviets also allowed a B-29 repair crew and support aircraft to land at the airfield where Hog Wild had come to rest and did nothing to interfere with subsequent repair and salvage operations. The Russians treated the bomber crew fairly well offering to accommodate them at the airfield. It was the crew that elected to stay at the POW camp. The crew was never detained or incarcerated at the POW camp by the Soviet military. Furthermore, the Soviets did nothing to detain or otherwise interfere with the movements of the former POWs held at the camp. All were free to move about as they chose. Eugene Harwood reports that “On Sunday, September 2, some of the crew walked to the plane and a few of us walked to the town of Konan (Hungnam) which was about 8 miles away where there was an internment camp still being maintained by the Japanese troops. We were looking for Japanese souvenirs...” Harwood reminisced years later about a British Warrant Officer Anderson who often escorted them through the town.

The simple walk of eight miles to the town without a guard suggests that the area of Kanko and Konan was not tightly controlled by the Soviet Red Army. After the end of the war none of the crew or the POWs would ever mention encountering any Soviet check points or military police on any of their excursions into the local area. None of the crewmembers would ever report having searched the area for clues to Japan’s bomb program. Interestingly none of the POWs ever reported any Soviets soldiers as interfering with their movement either. There were incidents that did take place between individual Soviet and Allied soldiers, most the result of misunderstandings based upon different cultures, but these incidents took place between individuals and did not have their origins with military commanders. According to Staff Sergeant Arthur Strilky the bomber’s radio operator quoted after their return to Keijo: “The last two weeks have been just one round of parties. Those Russians drank everything, including the anti-freeze from our plane. That gave us all sorts of stuff, including their wings. Quite a time we had. We toasted just about everybody.” Like the aircrew, none of the POWs would ever mention the Japanese atomic bomb program either.

**Fighting Around Konan, the War Continued**

With the sudden end of the war there were real concerns within the Allied camp as to whether all Japanese across the Empire would surrender as ordered to by Japan’s Emperor, Hirohito. Initially, many Japanese commanders, units and individual soldiers refused to accept the Emperor’s announcement that Japan had surrendered. Though the war had ended and Japan had surrendered some fighting did continue across Asia and not just in Japanese Occupied Korea. In Tokyo on the night of 14 August several Japanese officers under the Ministry of War attempted a coup d'état, killing Lieutenant General Mori Takeshi of the Imperial Guards Division and trying to place Emperor Hirohito under house arrest. Known as the Kyūjō Incident, on the morning of 15 August the attempt collapsed; some of its leaders committed suicide while others simply faded into the background to be hid by subsequent events.

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1016 Ibid.
Japanese Army units in Indonesia and Malaysia, were never engaged in combat during the war, remained armed and ready to continue the fights. Japanese units on the Chinese mainland were currently engaged in combat and continuing to win battles. Japanese units in China would not officially surrender until 9 September 1945. Japanese forces in Southeast Asia did not surrender until three days later on 12 September. Due to a stroke, Field Marshal Count, Supreme Commander of the Imperial Japanese Forces, Southern Region Terrauchi Hisaichi (8 Aug 1879–12 Jun 1946) did not surrender until 30 September 1945. One pocket of 10,000 to 20,000 Japanese soldiers caught between forces of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese in Manchuria would not surrender until late 1948; a full three years after the war officially ended. On Anatahan Island, about 75 miles north of Saipan the survivors of a Japanese ship sunk by the U.S. military near the end of war did not surrender until 30 June 1951, six years after the end of the war. The holdouts were removed from Anatahan by the U.S. Navy tug USS Cocopa under “OPERATION REMOVAL.” Some such as Captain Fumio Nakahira who was based in the Philippines in 1945, continued to hold out in isolation into the 1980s.

Section 77 – THE SCIENTIFIC AND INTELLIGENCE MISSION TO JAPAN

Long prior to the end of the war in August 1945, the United States military had identified the gathering of all information on Japan’s progress in the various sciences during their wartime isolation, as a collection priority for the post-war occupation. Major Robert R. Furman (1 Aug 1915–14 Oct 2008) who would later become the Chief Investigating Officer of the First Technical Service Detachment, GHQ, AFPAC, Advance; the unit which assembled the weapons used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Tinian Island, was assigned to develop and submit a plan to Brigadier General Thomas Farrell (3 Dec 1891–Apr 1967) for conducting a post-war investigation into Japan’s wartime scientific and technical achievements.

Roger Meade, historian emeritus of the Los Alamos National Laboratory described Major Furman as a “very shadowy figure.” Thomas Powers, historian and author of Heisenberg’s War said of Furman whom he met with in the late 1980s “You could never imagine a man who was more secretive by nature.” A review of materials concerning the Manhattan Project held at the National Archives in Adelphi, Maryland rarely uncovers a document authored by or even mentioning Major Furman. In his book Alsos, Samuel Goudsmit (11 Jul 1902–4 Dec 1978) who worked with Major Furman in Europe as Allied forces advanced across the continent referred to Robert Furman as the “mysterious Major.” Indeed, it was not until the 1980s that Robert Furman, his association with the Manhattan Project, and his activities during WWII became widely known. Documents from the Manhattan Project that remain classified nearly 60 years later may one day reveal more about Furman’s role within the project. Until that time Furman’s wartime activities and the man himself will remain a shadowy figure within the Manhattan Project.

Robert Ralph Furman was born on 21 August 1915 in Trenton, New Jersey. He graduated from Princeton University in 1937 with a degree in civil engineering. Post-graduation he took positions with the Pennsylvania Railroad and later a construction company in New York. A member of the U.S. Army Reserve Furman was called to active duty in December 1940, one year prior to the initiation of hostilities with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Once on active-duty Furman was commissioned as an artillery officer in a horse-drawn artillery unit. Reassigned to the Washington D.C. Headquarters of the Quartermaster Corps Construction Division, he came to the attention of then Colonel Leslie Groves (17 Aug 1896–13 Jul 1970). He became one of only six officers assigned to oversee the construction of the Pentagon where he managed daily construction activities.

1019 Ibid.
1025 Ibid.
Furman’s time with the Manhattan Project can be traced to August 1943 when, after the completion of the Pentagon, he was asked by General Groves to join the Manhattan Project. Furman’s more permanent task began in September 1943 when General George Catlett Marshall (31 Dec 1880–16 Oct 1959) asked General Groves for more information on German efforts to develop an atomic weapon. In response to the request and at Marshall’s prompting, General Groves established an independent intelligence branch within the Manhattan Project to obtain, collect, evaluate and analyze information concerning possible German research and development efforts in the area of atomic weapons.

The U.S. Army and Navy possessed separate intelligence missions under their respective G-2 and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). The Joint Chiefs of Staff possessed the OSS. These intelligence operations were largely inadequate to the task of assessing intelligence information concerning atomic energy research and weapons development for a number of reasons, most of which involved the secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project itself. As the argument went, the existing intelligence activities could not be briefed into the project, informed of its ongoing activities, educated about the science involved and the processes required and would therefore not be in a position to collect, evaluate and analyze any information they acquired. While the Departments of the Army and Navy appear to have been satisfied with this arrangement, the OSS would eventually develop some capacity to exploit nuclear intelligence most notably against German activities in Europe as Allied forces advanced across the continent, and Japanese goings-on as observed from Southeast Asia. General Groves assigned the leadership role of the Manhattan Project’s intelligence division to Robert Furman. To answer Marshall’s inquiry, Furman relied mostly on German technical literature, Norwegian and Swedish scientists, and refugees fleeing Nazi Occupied Europe. When he entered the universe of wartime intelligence Robert Furman was 28 years old.

Although Chief-of-Intelligence for the Manhattan Project Major Furman also served as a member of the ALSOS teams that searched Occupied Italy, France and Germany for signs of German research against nuclear energy and atomic weapons as Allied forces advanced across the continent. ALSOS teams gathered information on the suspected German atomic bomb program and confiscated all forms of uranium found under Nazi control. It was a role Furman was later to repeat in post-war Japan albeit less successfully.

In the technical realm of the intelligence effort under Robert Furman, Manhattan Project scientists developed an air sampling device to detect the presence of Xenon particles created as a fissile byproduct in the operation of reactors producing plutonium. In 1944 the Army Air Force flew the device over Germany, detecting no evidence of a German plutonium weapons program. Early on in the war General Groves coordinated the efforts of his intelligence branch with the OSS’s General Donovan ensuring the subsequent close coordination of the ALSOS teams with the OSS as they moved through occupied Europe.

An offshoot of the Manhattan Project itself, OPERATION ALSOS also-known-as the ALSOS Mission was a joint British-U.S. effort that took place toward the end of WWII to investigate possible German progress in nuclear energy research and weapons development. During the war, the U.S. and its allies suspected that any German effort to develop an atomic weapon might be as much as two years ahead of its counter-effort, the Manhattan Project. Such suspicions actually dated to 1939 and in a large part were responsible for the U.S. wartime effort which took place under the Manhattan Engineering District and General Leslie Groves. The thought of such a weapon under Hitler’s control was a motivating factor for many of the U.S., British, and other international scientists that worked to develop the wartime weapon. Albert Einstein (14 Mar 1879–8 Apr 1955), Leo Szilard (11 Feb 1898–30 May 1964), Eugene Wigner (17 Nov 1902–1 Jan 1995) and many other European scientists fleeing Germany in the late 1930s feared a Nazi bomb in the hands of Adolf Hitler. It was a real fear. In the end, until the U.S. and its allies had positive information regarding the status of any German effort, it had to be assumed that Nazi Germany was ahead of the U.S. and British in the race for the bomb. The ALSOS Mission was designed in part to confirm or deny the existence of a German atomic bomb.

The objectives of the ALSOS Mission regarding German investigations into nuclear energy and weapons were clear: 1) to provide immediate intelligence reports, 2) to seize all materials and equipment related to that research, 3) to seize or arrest any scientists associated with such work, and to 4) capture or otherwise obtain any documents related to the German effort. Any installations or other facilities associated with the work would be seized and held. The destruction of any such installations would take place only with the specific approval of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), at that time, General Dwight David Eisenhower. Additionally no German scientists involved in Nazi efforts to develop nuclear energy were to be left in the hands of the Soviet Union. What was left unsaid was the ALSOS Mission’s

1027 Ibid.
1029 Ibid.
Though mostly overlooked in many histories of WWII’s Manhattan Project, the mandate of OPERATION ALSOS included far more areas of interest than simply Germany’s research into nuclear energy and possible attempts to harness the atom for a weapon. The mission searched throughout Nazi Occupied Europe for information concerning: Bacteriological Warfare; The Organization of Enemy Scientific Research; Enemy Aeronautical Research; Proximity Fuses; Guided Missiles; German Government Support of Research; Chemical Research; Shale Oil Production; and various items considered under Miscellaneous Intelligence. While many of these programs operated independent of the effort to discover Germany’s nuclear secrets, all were reportedly subject to investigation under the ALSOS umbrella.

The ALSOS Mission was headquartered in wartime London. Officially OPERATION ALSOS reported to the U.S. Army G-2. The headquarters unit’s primary purpose was three-fold: 1) To develop intelligence on Axis scientists and laboratories of potential interest, 2) liaison with Allied and U.S. intelligence activities operating in Britain, and 3) to smooth over command relationships prior to the arrival of ALSOS teams in Europe. Any movement of ALSOS forces into a theater of operations had to be approved by the Theater Command, usually a staff officer underneath the Theater commander.

The ALSOS Mission consisted of three phases, one stage each to take place in Italy, France and Germany as Allied forces took possession of Adolf Hitler’s Europe. Oddly enough despite his wartime intelligence role under General Groves, it Major Furman who established the London headquarters passing off that duty to Captain Horace Calvert when Furman later returned to Washington D.C. Wartime landings in Europe under each phase of the operation were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Boris Pash (20 Jun 1900–11 May 1995).

Boris Theodorovich Pashkovsky was born in San Francisco, California on 20 June 1900. His father, Friar Theodore Pashkovsky was a Russian Orthodox missionary priest assigned to the U.S. in 1894, who returned to Russia with his family in 1912. While in Russia Boris attended a seminary school graduating in 1917. During the 1918 Russian Civil War Boris served with the naval forces of White Russia but eventually returned to the U.S. as the Bolsheviks began consolidating their power over the former Russian Empire.

After returning to the U.S. Pashkovsky, changing his family name to Pash attended college at Springfield College in Massachusetts graduating with a Bachelors of Arts in Physical Education. Moving to California he taught high school at Hollywood High School in Los Angeles. He continued his education at the University of Southern California where he received a Master of Art degree and eventually joined the U.S. Army Reserves. Like Robert Furman, Pash was called to active duty in June 1940 and assigned to work as a counter-intelligence officer with Ninth Corps Headquarters at the Presidio in San Francisco, California. He was eventually reassigned as a security officer with the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, New Mexico and near the end of the war headed the ALSOS Mission to Italy, France and Germany. The Italian Mission under Push’s command landed in Algiers, French Morocco on 14 December 1943.

The goal of the Italian Mission, and all subsequent efforts, was to 1) identify any new scientific advances occurring in Italy during the war, 2) to obtain the underlying research and development, 3) to obtain any information on German progress and 4) to capture or secure Italy’s leading scientists and their laboratories as they were overrun.

Though the team accomplished its mission of securing Italy’s leading scientists and their laboratories, identifying new information and capturing Italy’s leading scientists it provided no conclusive evidence on the wartime progress of Germany in nuclear energy or weapons research. The primary achievement of the Italian phase of the ALSOS Mission lay in its inability to identify any knowledge of a German atomic energy and weapons program in Italy, an achievement that Lieutenant Colonel Pash attributed to the German ability to protect such information. Though considered somewhat a failure in all fairness Phase 1 of the ALSOS program suffered the same misfortune as Allied forces advancing up the Italian

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1031 Ibid.
Peninsula; heavy German opposition and slow progress preventing the rapid occupation of suspected locations. The team did however, despite setbacks prove the viability of the ALSOS concept. Like ALSOS the OSS was also active in Italy.

The OSS in Italy

Morris “Moe” Berg (2 Mar 1902–29 May 1972) a catcher for the Boston Red Sox came to the attention of the OSS and joined the organization in August 1943. Later that year he was assigned to PROJECT LARSON an OSS effort to locate, detain, interrogate, kidnap and possibly relocate to the U.S., Italian missile and rocket specialists. OSS documents discussing the efforts of Moe Berg are referred to as “REMUS.”

Through the OSS Major Robert Furman brought Berg into the Manhattan Project. To his credit, like Furman, Mo Berg was a deeply secretive person. Unlike the ALSOS teams with their jeeps, agents and officers, Berg traveled and operated alone. Furman quickly recognized Berg’s talents, co-opted Berg into assisting the Manhattan Project intelligence effort and provided Berg with a list of German and Italian scientists that could possibly be involved with any Axis bomb project. Even as Furman was recommending the termination of ALSOS operations in Italy, he requested that Berg visit Florence and its Galileo Laboratory. Hidden within PROJECT LARSON was PROJECT AZUSA, an OSS effort to remove from Italy or interview, Italian physicists regarding their knowledge of a possible German bomb program and its suspected chief scientists, Werner Heisenberg (5 Dec 1901–1 Feb 1976) and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (28 Jun 1912–28 Apr 2007). Most of the time Mo Berg had met with and interviewed Italy’s top scientists long before the ALSOS team also in Italy, arrived on scene. As a result Berg’s relationship with the ALSOS team operating in Italy was strained at best. At one point Lieutenant Colonel Pash threatened to bring charges against Berg, for the OSS failure to extract Italian physicist Edoardo Amaldi (5 Sept 1908–5 Dec 1989) from behind German lines to the safety of Allied Occupied Europe and eventually to the U.S.

The ALSOS team viewed Berg’s involvement in Italy as interfering with its mission, however Berg’s effort had been previously coordinated at higher levels between the Manhattan Project and the OSS. Berg also had Furman’s support. Through his interviews with Italy’s leading scientists Berg, neither scientist nor analyst concluded that any German effort to produce an atomic weapon was far behind that of the U.S. and its Allies. Furman would later deal with Berg again on a small matter of loose ends in Switzerland. On 9 August 1944 forward elements of ALSOS II arrived in France proceeding first to the French city of Rennes where Colonel Pash searched the residence of Frederic Joliot-Curie (19 March 1900–14 August 1958) for links to the German program. The first and foremost concern facing the team as it landed in France was as always, the level of possible German success in developing a working atomic bomb.

Though fighting in France continued, ALSOS teams moved forward in many cases advancing past the front to capture or occupy some suspect or known facility. Colonel Pash himself was actually in the second Allied vehicle to enter Paris and was among the first Americans to enter the French capital. Once in Paris the team advanced to the College of France where it made direct contact with the country’s foremost nuclear physicist, Frederic Joliot-Curie. Joliot-Curie was one of several leading European scientists identified by Albert Einstein as investigating chain reactions and the conditions required for developing a nuclear reactor. Joliot, familiar with German state-of-the-art at that time was taken to London where he eventually expressed a belief that Germany had made little wartime progress in harnessing nuclear energy and weapons development. After the fall of Paris ALSOS moved its headquarters from London to the French capital. While the OSS was only allowed to operate against targets not under Nazi control, hence Berg’s activities in Italy, the OSS working closely with Furman were not just sitting idly by.

1036 Ibid.
1037 Ibid.
1038 Ibid.


Under OPERATION HARBORAGE many of Germany’s remaining at-large nuclear scientists living in the area of Hechingen; Erich Bagge (30 May 1912–5 Jun 1996), Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Max von Laue (9 Oct 1879–8 Apr 1960), and Karl Wirtz (1910–1994) were apprehended and escorted from the French operational area into U.S. and British hands. Otto Hahn (8 Mar 1879–28 Jul 1968) was arrested in Teilingen while Werner Heisenberg, a primary objective of the ALSOS Mission was finally apprehended near his home in Urfeld. None of the German scientists would fall into the hands of the Soviet Union nor France.

The flying column had operated for more than a week inside French lines. The team had captured and removed most of Germany’s top nuclear research scientists. Germany’s research reactor had been dismantled. All captured documents, heavy water and uranium had been transported out of French controlled German territory before the French began to catch on. The French share of Germany’s nuclear past had been denied. In addition Colonel John Lansdale operating near Stassfurt, Germany had located another 1,100 tons of uranium ore hidden in a salt mine. Most materials seized were shipped to Paris then to the U.S. and into the Manhattan Project. Keeping research materials, documents and uranium out of Soviet hands sometimes required stronger measures.

At least one facility known to support Germany’s uranium research program was located in the Soviet zone of occupation, the Auer Company which exploited the rare earth minerals extracted from mines located around Joachimsthal, Czechoslovakia. During WWII the German Army Ordnance Office had established an industrial scale production high-purity uranium oxide facility at the Auergesellschaft Plant in Oranienburg. On 15 March 1945, to deny the Soviet Union access to the plant 612 B-17 Flying Fortresses of the Eighth Air Force dropped 1,506 tons of high-explosive and 178 tons of incendiary bombs on the plant. Unexploded ordinance around the plant prevented its full operation for years after the attack. Despite U.S. efforts Soviet Forces eventually located 100 tons of uranium oxide in barrels in and around the plant. Germany’s top physicists previously captured and detained by U.S. and British forces were transported to Britain and incarcerated under OPERATION EPSILON.

Section 78 – OPERATION EPSILON

More than a year prior to the collapse of Hitler’s Third Reich plans had been laid to incarcerate Germany’s top scientists. Under OPERATION EPSILON ten of Nazi Germany’s foremost nuclear research physicists; Erich Bagge, Kurt Diebner, Walther Gerlach (1 Aug 1889–10 Aug 1979), Otto Hahn, Paul Harteck (20 Jul 1902–22 Jan 1985), Werner Heisenberg, Horst Korsching (1912–1998), Max von Laue, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, and Karl Wirtz, were removed from Germany to Chateau du Chesnay known as “DUSTBIN" and later to villa Argentina, at Le Vesinet in the western suburbs of Paris. Major Furman was nominally responsible for the scientists while they were in France and later escorted the majority of them to Britain where they were held at a heavily bugged English estate, Farm Hall in Godmanchester, England. At Farm Hall the German’s daily conversations were heavily monitored without their knowledge. For most of their incarceration few of the scientists were even aware of their whereabouts. OPERATION EPSILON would be the last gasp in the official effort to lay to rest Manhattan Project concerns about Germany’s wartime efforts to produce an atomic weapon.

The goal of OPERATION EPSILON was to determine how far Nazi Germany had gotten with their nuclear research program. The German scientists were held at Farm Hall from 3 July 1945 to 3 January 1946. During their stay at the estate, most of their conversations were recorded without their knowledge in an effort to determine to the fullest extent Nazi Germany’s nuclear energy research program. Microphones were installed in all bedrooms and living areas. Summaries of their conversations were produced and forwarded to British and U.S. leaders monitoring the effort. It was a matter of mirror imaging.

Manhattan Project leaders had operated for three years under the assumption that Germany was far ahead in the race for an atomic bomb. So far the evidence gathered by ALSOS teams scouring Germany indicated that the concern had been unwarranted. As the leadership of the Manhattan Project was less concerned about the possibility of any Japanese counterpart to the German nuclear research program, none of Japan’s leading scientists would ever be so intensively monitored.

Despite the monitoring program, the results of OPERATION EPSILON were inconclusive. Absent any subsequent interrogation and updating by the scientists monitored, the statements made by most of them while held at Farm Hall remained open to interpretation. It is possible that the scientist suspected that they were being monitored and tailored their comments to areas of research where little could be learned by those monitoring their conversations. Without some direction or list of topics introduced by an outsider, it is possible that the subjects of interest to the U.S. and Britain simply never arose in ordinary conversation and were therefore never discussed. Considering the environment that had molded these ten scientists in Germany in the decade prior to the end of the Nazi era, it should not come as a surprise that their conversations

even amongst themselves after the war would be somewhat guarded. As the ALSOS teams were searching occupied Europe for atomic weapons facilities another team far-less well known, but equally important, was likewise scouring Fortress Europe for Nazi Germany’s secret weapons and advanced sciences under the name of T-Force.

Also known as “Target Force,” T-Force was to some degree the follow-on to “S-Force” which had operated in Italy in 1943. T-Force however was far better organized, funded and supported than the earlier S-Force.

T-Force was created under orders from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force; General Eisenhower in July 1944. While the ALSOS Mission was more extensively covered in the years after the war due mostly to the intense public interest in the atomic bomb, T-Force was a more closely held secret, rarely mentioned by those involved or knowledgeable of its activities.

Like the ALSOS Mission one of the primary goals of T-Force was to deny information concerning Germany’s advanced technologies, facilities and scientists to the French and Russians. Such information was to include the documents, equipment, factories and plants involved with advanced technologies and the human assets; the businessmen, scientists and engineers that developed that material. T-Force secured chemical weapons; chemical weapons production plants, nuclear research facilities, universities, aircraft research and design facilities, U-boats, advanced aircraft, biological warfare facilities and more.

As it moved across Germany, T-Force targeted and exploited military research and development efforts, fixed-place military headquarters, government ministries and agencies, installed industrial plant and other facilities. Unlike the ALSOS Mission whose interest in German science was primarily generated from within the Manhattan Project, T-Force operated with a far broader mission more deeply involved in identifying, securing, guarding and exploiting any information or technologies of value to Allied Powers, primarily the British and U.S. governments. T-Force was also tasked to identify any German technologies that had been transferred or shared with Imperial Japan.

As the war against Japan was expected to last into 1946 if not later and few Allied military commanders knew anything of the effort to produce an atomic bomb, it was imperative that the Allies know exactly what information Germany might have been shared with its Asian ally. Such information included any sharing of atomic research and the possible development of an atomic bomb by the Axis powers. As T-Force spread across Europe any Asian person identified by T-Force Japanese or not, was to be arrested or otherwise detained.

Over the course of its existence T-Force identified numerous technologies and weapons designs that had been transferred to Japan. Such information included data on jet and rocket propulsion, conventional aircraft, and aircraft armaments. Information and examples of the transferred technology arrived in Japan by German blockade runners; surface ships and submarines. The data transferred included information on the rocket-powered Messerschmitt (ME)-163 and the Me-262 the only jet powered aircraft to see combat during the war.\textsuperscript{1049}

The German government also transferred to Japan large amounts of detailed information concerning the production of German chemical rocket fuels. The formulas for advanced German fuels to include T-Stoff (highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide stabilized with a phosphate), C-Stoff (a reductant used in bipropellant rocket fuels) and Z-Stoff (a mixture of hydrazine hydrate in methanol).\textsuperscript{1050} A 1945 document, “German Technical Aid to Japan” reveals that these fuels had been later produced at the Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Company in Konan and at its plant at Eian, Korea.\textsuperscript{1051}

In the initial stages of the war such transfers were limited in nature and scope, however as the war in Europe continued the number of transfers, the levels of advanced technology and the types of equipment made available to Japan were increased. In January 1945 Adolf Hitler enlarged the scope of access afforded to Japan to include experimental and fully operational technologies. In the aftermath of this decision such items as early warning radar and German information on defensive anti-aircraft artillery began to make their way to Tokyo. With Germany now defeated, its scientific leadership detained, and overall anxiety concerning Hitler’s super weapons proven unfounded, planning for a scientific review of Japan moved forward albeit on a far smaller scale.

As defined in Furman’s plan the primary goal of the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group deploying to Japan was to secure scientific, technical and medical intelligence regarding the effects of the U.S. atomic bombing from within Japan as soon as possible after the end of hostilities. The target was not so much an investigation into a Japanese bomb program as it was an investigation of the results of the U.S. strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

According the plan developed by Major Furman the aims of the investigation in Japan were threefold to: 1) conduct medical research in relation to the investigation into the general effects felt by the atomic bomb victims in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with particular attention being paid to investigating consequences arising from radioactivity; 2) examine the physical effects of the blasts on building and other structures in Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities; and 3) report on

\textsuperscript{1049} German Technical Aid to Japan. Prepared by Military Intelligence Service, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 25 Sept 1945.
\textsuperscript{1050} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{1051} \textit{Ibid.}
Japan’s atomic bomb production plants. The plan also included an examination of Japanese atomic power research and a mineralogical investigation of Japan which would encompass Korea. The mineralogical investigation of Japan and Korea was actually a search for uranium deposits.

Like ALSOS in Europe the purpose of the teams deployed into Japan was to gather information on Japan’s wartime atomic research activities. Unlike the European effort where the acquisition of German materials was paramount, for the Japanese effort the gathering of intelligence was the team’s only purpose. Were any further investigations of the Japanese effort required after Furman’s investigation was complete, such investigations would be left to any subsequent and follow-on scientific intelligence efforts.

Two days after the Nagasaki bombing on 11 August 1945 Major General Leslie R. Groves directed Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell, the Manhattan Project’s Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Field Operations for the Manhattan Engineer District forward headquartered at Tinian, to implement Furman’s plan; the special Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group.

In his message to General Farrell, Groves stated that all available specialist personnel and instruments required for the investigation into Japan’s program would be sent directly from the United States thereby relieving Pacific commanders of any support responsibilities for the investigating team. After maintaining B-29 operations out of the Marianas from their own supply chains, theater commanders such as Nimitz and MacArthur were long since wary of taking on any additional units with open-ended logistical support requirements. In his message Groves made it clear that the SCAP would be informed via message about the organization and the mission of the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group.

That same day, 11 August 1945 the personnel alluded to in the above message from General Groves to General Farrell who were to form the investigating team; were identified, selected, and transported to California. The main portions of the team departed from Hamilton Field, California on the morning of 13 August and arrived in the Marianas on 15 August 1945. The assembled Atomic Bomb Mission (ABM) team consisted of 17 U.S. Army and Navy Personnel and would include Dr. Phillip Morrison (7 Nov 1915–22 Apr 2005) and Major Robert R. Furman. Morrison and Furman were already in the Marianas as part of PROJECT ALBERTA’s 51 member, 1st Technical Service Detachment (the Destination Team), of the 509th Composite Group. PROJECT ALBERTA was a section or branch of the Manhattan Project that had developed the means of delivering the atomic bomb against targets in Japan. The two men were also partly responsible for assembling the atomic bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Following up on his promise to notify General MacArthur of the presence of the team and its mission on 12 August the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General of the Army George Marshal sent MacArthur the following communication:

“For MacArthur, Signed Marshal:”
“Groves has ordered Farrell at Tinian to organize a scientific group of three sections for potential use in Japan if such use should be desired. The First Group is for Hiroshima, the second for Nagasaki, and the third for the purpose of securing information concerning General Japanese activities in the field of atomic weapons. The groups for Hiroshima and Nagasaki should enter those cities with the first American troops in order that these troops shall not be subjected to any possible toxic effects although we have no reason to believe that any such effects actually exist. Farrell and his organization have all available information on this subject.”

The Official Investigation Begins

Officially the U.S. inquiry into Japan’s atomic bomb program would begin on 7 September 1945 just seven days after General MacArthur landed at Atsugi Air Base, nearly one month after the plutonium bomb had detonated over Nagasaki but only a week after Hog Wild had been forced down. While the Germans had cooperated with the investigation into their atomic bomb effort the Japanese would be less than forthcoming with such information. As events were to show the Japanese, military or civilian, would regard any U.S. inquiry on any subject not just nuclear energy with a jaundiced eye.

Departing Tinian on 20 August aboard the USS Lansdowne (DD-486) the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group arrived at Okinawa on 23 August 1945. On 8 September 1945 members of the ABM investigating mission landed at Atsugi Air Base. The mission had been previously divided into three teams with one team each to visit


\[1053\] Ibid.

\[1054\] Ibid.
Hiroshima (First Investigation Group) and Nagasaki (Second Investigation Group) with the Third Investigation Group, the Tokyo group tasked to secure all information concerning general Japanese activities in the field of the atomic research. The Hiroshima Team was headed by Colonel Stafford L. Warren (19 Jun 1896–26 Jul 1981), Head of the Manhattan Project Medical Department and Chief of the Radiological Division of the District. Major Furman was to head up the Nagasaki and Tokyo Groups.1055

10 September: Arriving in Tokyo

Upon arrival at Atsugi the Hiroshima group under the command of Colonel Stafford Warren proceeded as quickly as possible to the damaged city arriving that day. Team 2 entered Nagasaki later the next day on 9 September 1945. Preliminary inspections of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were conducted on 8–9 and 13–14 September respectively. That same day Soviet commanders announced that most of the Japanese army in Manchukuo and northern Korea had surrendered.

The Tokyo Group of the Manhattan Project intelligence team arrived in the capital two days after landing at Atsugi; slightly more than a week after U.S. occupation forces had secured the air base, a full 12 days after Hog Wild had been forced down near Konan and over one month after the last atom bomb had been dropped. Armed with a list of Japan’s best known pre-war physicists Furman’s team proceeded to interrogate Japan’s most prominent nuclear researchers and scientists. Dr. Nishina Yoshio (6 Dec 1890–10 Jan 1951), Dr. Yukawa Hideki (23 Jan 1907–8 Sept 1981), Dr. Sagane Ryokichi (1905–1969) and Dr. Arakatsu Bunsaku (1890–1973) were among those interviewed.1056

Section 79 – THE FURMAN INVESTIGATION

During its investigation the Tokyo team inspected the physics laboratories of all Japan’s primary research centers and national universities to include the Tokyo Imperial University, Kyoto Imperial University, Osaka Imperial University, and the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN). Members of the team also traveled to the Korean peninsula where they toured Keiyo Imperial University and met with the school’s most prominent researchers. The Third Investigation Group also visited RIKEN field offices located in the Korean capital of Keiyo and the Korean Bureau of Mines. Many facilities escaped the investigation.

In late September 1945 the ABM team completed its enquiry. Through its investigation, site visits, and interviews, the Tokyo team reached a number of conclusions. According to Furman’s investigation the report stated up front that “The [Japanese] government and the military gave no priority to research in the field of nuclear physics and had no program to produce a bomb.” The report stated that, “The principle nuclear physicists were diverted to other research” and had not worked on nuclear energy or an atomic bomb. The report indicated that “Science in Japan was organized,” but “was organized behind existing industries to the immediate development of production problems” within those industries.

The report noted that during the war years most of Japan’s research labs remained small and that many had not received any new equipment since January 1943 through the end of the war. According to the Furman report most “Research of importance to the military had been evacuated to the country to avoid bombing…but the nuclear research work remained in Tokyo.” Furman observed that the lack of effort on the part of the Japanese government to move its nuclear research program out of Tokyo as the threat of bombing grew “clearly indicates the low priority assigned to this work.” The report also noted that Tokyo further displayed a “lack of government interest” in the program when “repairs for the cyclotron were not made when the machine was rendered inoperative by American bombing.” Furman pressed on.

1058 Ibid.
1059 Ibid.
1061 Ibid.
1062 Ibid.
1063 Ibid.
1064 Ibid.
1065 Ibid.
The report discussed Japanese efforts to obtain uranium and stated that “mines were concentrated on essential materials, iron, copper etc., to ease severe shortages” and that even the mining of rare elements for vacuum tube production rated below concerns in easing shortages in other strategic areas.1066 The Furman Report noted that Japan’s “Geological surveys apparently failed to disclose new sources of uranium to the Japanese with the territory under their military control.”1067

Though the report contains further information pertinent to its investigation a final note worth considering from the paper was that “The Japanese would be able to organize a group of twenty first-class scientists capable of initiating a project for the production of atomic energy. They have the theoretical background. They could progress rapidly to the point of production, especially if they were given the results of the work in America in any detail. They appear to have the interest necessary to form such a plan.”1068

In reaching their conclusions the ABM team cited the depth of their research, the number of institutions they had contacted and the number of Japanese scientists interviewed as sufficiently broad enough to have uncovered any inconsistencies in the information obtained that would have led them wide of the mark.1069 With the exception of the final conclusion regarding the theoretical background, and the interest to form a plan, Furman, his team members, and his superiors were completely – wrong.

Section 80 – OBFUSCATION

Though Furman had thoroughly investigated the question as far as possible in the few weeks he was there, he had not counted on the scientists and administrators in charge of the institutes the team visited of simply – lying. During the ALSOS Mission to Germany of which Furman was previously involved, the Germans contacted had been more forthcoming in their admission that a program had existed, and in revealing their research and associated facilities. At no point had it been necessary for ALSOS in Europe to resort to any extreme measures in reaching their goal of finding out what Germany had done in the area of nuclear research, if not the complete truth then most of the story. In Germany it had always remained unsaid that it become necessary, the U.S. could have always left the German scientists in the more capable hands of the Soviet Union. German scientists, more fearful of Russian methods were far more willing to talk than their Japanese counterparts.

Such cooperation as had occurred in Germany between the victor and the defeated would never take place in Japan at any point in the American Occupation, 1945 to 1951. If such records supporting total cooperation in the investigation of Japan’s nuclear research program do exist they have yet to surface. If such records do exist they may remain highly classified and sensitive. Over time a working relationship did eventually develop between the Japanese and the U.S. Occupation, but for the most part that relationship was one of SCAP issuing orders with the Japanese making a show of attempting to implement them. As time created distance between the end of the war and the present time, the relationship between the scientists involved in the program and the interrogators assigned to SCAP matured. Eventually, faced with other issues SCAP interest in a nonexistent program decreased. For the most part the U.S. Occupation of Japan accomplished little in the way of reform or openness regarding the country’s wartime past. The reason for the lack of Japanese cooperation possibly lies in the way the war against Germany ended as compared to the way the war had ended for Japan.

Even before Adolf Hitler committed suicide and Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz (16 Sept 1891–24 Dec 1980) surrendered Nazi Germany to the Allies on 8 May 1945, large units of the German armed forces had previously surrendered. Many had laid down their arms on German soil. Army Group B surrendered on April 24 more than two weeks before the German surrender. German forces in Italy surrendered seven days later. German forces in Holland surrendered on 4 May 1945. Most Germans, surveying the wreckage that was once Germany knew the war was lost. Yet in Japan it was different.

While most of Japan’s cities had been laid to waste, its industries and cities burnt to the ground, many Japanese thought the Imperial Army and Navy were continuing to inflict great damage on Japan’s enemies. They were for the most part unaware of the U.S. victory in the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Battle of Leyte Gulf. They were unaware that many of their island strongpoints across the Pacific had been isolated, cut off and left to rot.

In the eyes of the average Japanese large areas of China remained under Japanese control. The war in the Philippines with General Yamashita Tomoyuki (8 Nov 1885–23 Feb 1946) and 50,000 soldiers holding out on Luzon Island’s more

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1066 Ibid.
1067 Ibid.
1068 Ibid.
mountainous north was still an open question, however one whose conclusion was inevitable. Japanese forces still ruled Indochina, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and parts of Burma.... That Japan's colonies of Korea and Manchukuo had come under siege or completely collapsed was not widely known for several days after the Soviet attack.

Many Japanese did not yet know about the Soviet “stab in the back” that took place on 8 August, when Russian forces rolled into Japanese occupied Manchuria and advanced southward into Korea. Japanese forces in Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and numerous islands throughout the Pacific had never been attacked, defeated, nor even engaged. The massive Japanese military base at Rabaul had never fallen. Singapore, Hong Kong, Saigon all remained in Japanese hands. At the end of the war over 3 million Japanese soldiers remained in the field.

In the aftermath of the Emperor’s announcement of the surrender rumors were rampant. Several coup attempts were planned with at least one attempted. At least one last Kamikaze attack took place after the surrender. Military weapons were stored in hidden locations. Classified documents and official records were burned before the Allies landed. The present war was over trust between the victors and the defeated lay somewhere in the future, possibly never. Unspoken, unorganized, and lacking government support, the Japanese people resisted any request or demand to provide information to those scouring the island nation for advanced technologies or innovative solutions to old problems. The Japanese people simply refused to fully cooperate with the Occupation and Japan’s scientist were people also, and patriotic. They may have had to bear the unbearable but they did not have to give away national secrets easily – if at all.

Section 81 – THE FURMAN INVESTIGATION CONCLUDES

Until Major Furman began his investigation the U.S. had no information about any secret Japanese atomic weapons research program located in part or in toto in northern Korea. In fact there would be no suspicions of a site in northern Korea until October 1946 when Snell published his article in the Atlanta Constitution. Major Furman did not begin his investigation until almost two weeks after Russian Yaks fired on Hog Wild. In the more than 60 years since the events that day of 29 August 1945 no Top Secret documents, no communications intercepts, no minutes of a meeting, no Memos for Record have ever appeared to support any prior U.S. government knowledge of an active Japanese atomic bomb program before 8 September 1945. The facilities and such in Korea may have been in-place and operating but the U.S. government had no knowledge of their existence. Other issues also played into the findings of the initial investigation into Japan’s wartime atomic bomb program.

As with any investigation into almost any subject the Furman Report was a mixed bag of valuable insights and missed opportunities. During the investigation into Japan’s nuclear energy effort neither Robert Furman nor his investigators in Tokyo and Nagasaki; nor Colonel Warren’s team in Hiroshima uncovered any information on either of Japan’s best two later-known atomic bomb research programs, the Imperial Japanese Army’s Ni-Project, or the Japanese Navy’s F-go. Additional Japanese atomic weapons and nuclear energy research efforts ongoing at the end of the war also went undiscovered. Facilities possibly supporting one or any combination of these programs, in Burma, China, Indochina, Japan, Korea and Manchukuo and were largely ignored and disregarded.

In Japan there was no Manhattan Project and looking for a large-scale program similar to that which existed in the U.S. was useless. From the start any effort to locate any large-scale and isolated production facilities was doomed to failure. But some form of atomic energy and weapons research program did exist on some scale.

The ability of Japan to produce heavy water or deuterium oxide in Japan, Korea and Manchukuo was identified to some degree, but never seriously investigated.1070 The investigation never uncovered any information on the Japanese program as located in Manchuria and China. The mining of uranium in Burma and Vietnam was ignored. The Furman Report noted the presence of large amounts of fergusonite, euxenite, and monazite ores at various locations in Japan and Korea, and the presence of triuranium octoxide (U₃O₈) in high percentage within this ore; yet accepted at face value Japan’s reported use of these materials. The Japanese interviewed expressed no interest in the uranium present within the ore and were never pressed for any real answer as to why such massive amounts of raw ore were being maintained at all.1071

The Furman Report inaccurately cited the absence of Japanese government interest in the damages suffered by the two cyclotrons at the RIKKEN campus in Tokyo from U.S. bombings, as evidence of a lack of government support for an overall uranium research program. Though the American and British scientists involved in the investigation knew that the

machines had little bearing on the success or failure of a large-scale Japanese uranium enrichment project; they erroneously inferred from the lack of repairs on the machines, that there was little interest on the part of the Japanese government and military in developing a bomb. Had the cyclotrons been completely destroyed, their loss would have had little to no impact on the ability of the Japanese to build a bomb.

Throughout the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group investigation those scientists and administrators interviewed at Japanese research facilities and universities appeared friendly and cooperative. They perhaps answered any questions presented, but unlike the Germans interviewed they offered no additional information that was not specifically requested. Nothing was volunteered.

While it is uncertain and remains open to much speculation whether there was an organized effort on the part of the Japanese government to hide the program, its various parts and research efforts; there is no doubt that the Japanese scientist and researchers involved had done so. The stories given by the scientists to those investigating the program at that time and on into the future, were in hindsight, vaguely similar.\(^{1072}\) In every interview Japan’s scientists concentrated on four main points; 1) Japan did not have a viable nuclear energy program; 2) Japan invested little in terms of funds into such research; 3) Japan lacked an indigenous source of uranium; and 4) Japan lacked the scientific knowledge required to conduct such research. The statements Japan’s scientists provided to the U.S. investigators operating under Warren and Furman were at some level, entirely false. The Japanese researchers by their statements and the information they provided, to a large degree dictated the contents of the Furman Report and its conclusions. Japan did have a program, did invest considerable sums into nuclear energy and weapons research, had access to the uranium required and possessed the scientific talent necessary to conduct and direct such research.

Largely unnoticed Furman’s report did document Japan’s leading scientists in the field of nuclear energy, supporting organizations and the laboratories that it visited leaving a paper trail for later researchers to follow.\(^{1073}\) Unfortunately documents later obtained by the OSS prove that for the most part the scientists and researchers contacted by the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group may not have actually been the scientists and researchers responsible for developing Japan’s wartime nuclear energy and atomic weapons programs.

In its defense however, the Furman Report noted that Japanese science nationwide was organized during the conflict to support the war.\(^{1074}\) The report stated that this organization was carried on behind the scenes and within existing industries. To the casual observer, it would appear that Japanese science had sat out the war in its research labs and universities but this was largely untrue. Whereas U.S. science was organized under the major military and industrial efforts supporting one or more of the numerous major projects such as the Manhattan Project and research into radar; Japanese science was more centrally organized behind the older Zaibatsu and newer Konzerns of Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Nichitsu and on.

The Imperial Japanese Army and Navy might have their programs, they might manage the funds supporting those programs and apply pressure to the scientists involved to succeed, but Japan’s zaibatsu and Konzerns carried out the work. While names such as J. Robert Oppenheimer (22 Apr 1904–18 Feb 1967), Arthur Holly Compton (10 Sept 1892–15 Mar 1962), Enrico Fermi (29 Sept 1901–28 Nov 1954) and Ernest Lawrence (8 Aug 1901–27 Aug 1958) were to become household words worldwide in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, names such as Nishina, Arakatsu, Kazuo Kuroda (1 Apr 1917–16 Apr 2001) and Sagane remained hidden behind the backdrop provided by the existing industrial infrastructure. For the most part, the subset of scientists that were actually developing Japan’s bomb, included none of the Japanese scientists noted above and remain largely unknown even today.

Though it is doubtful that Japan had some atomic research facilities, primarily support facilities, in and around Konan during the period of 1938 to 1945 and some of those facilities have been identified, it is unlikely that Hog Wild was involved in any U.S. effort to ferret out information on these facilities. There were other facilities, perhaps even more valuable at Chinamp’o, Genzan and Seishin. While many things are possible it is unlikely that even Leslie Groves could have

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\(^{1072}\) GEORGE C. FLOWERS. “WORLD WAR II—20 YEARS AFTER. The Day the Big Bomb Was Dropped.” Independent Press Telegram. Long beach, California. 11, August1962

“Japan Savant Visits Atom Lab.” Oakland Tribune. Berkeley, California. 5 September 1948


\(^{1074}\) Ibid.
arranged for Hog Wild and its crew to undertake a spy mission after it had already been forced down and was on the ground in Soviet-occupied northern Korea.

Section 82 – THE RACE FOR THE BOMB

The initial prompting for the U.S. to develop an atomic bomb stemmed from the concerns of the mostly European scientists who had fled the Nazi racial policies of 1930s Germany and the territories threatened by Hitler’s aggression. Those scientists feared Adolf Hitler and were concerned that Nazi Germany would develop the power of the atom into a weapon, and use it. In 1939 concerned about the state of uranium research and fearing that large stockpiles of uranium ore then in the Belgian Congo might fall into Nazi hands, Leo Szilard and Eugene Wigner approached Albert Einstein for assistance in warning Elisabeth (25 Jul 1876–23 Nov 1965) the Queen Mother of Belgium to the existence of the ore and the feasibility of a bomb. Einstein agreed with the concerns of the two scientists and dictated a letter in German to the Queen Mother warning her of the existence of the ore and the possibility of a powerful new weapon.

Taking the issue one step further, Edward Teller (15 Jan 1908–9 Sept 2003) along with Eugene Wigner felt the U.S. should also be warned. Using Alexander Sachs, a Wall Street economist and unofficial adviser to the president as a conduit, Roosevelt was warned of the threat on 11 October 1939. The race against Germany in the development of the atomic bomb was on.

Throughout the history of the Manhattan Project the fear that Germany could develop and deploy the weapon before the U.S. played constantly in the background. Within the Manhattan Project the race for the bomb was never between the U.S. and Japan but always between the U.S. and Germany. U.S. scientists believed that 1) only Germany possessed the science and scientists required to develop the weapon, 2) that only Germany out of all the Axis Powers had the industrial and scientific infrastructure required to develop an atomic weapon, 3) that only Germany had access to the uranium necessary to develop the device, and so on. As Nazi Germany collapsed inward teams of American scientists followed the advancing forces to locate and interview Axis scientist reasonably suspected of being involved in such a program.

Subsequent interrogations of German scientists, the examination of identified research laboratories and production facilities previously discussed above, proved that Germany had never organized its scientist adequately or dedicated the resources required to produce a weapon. An anti-climax to five years of concern, the lack of German progress toward building a weapon led to a lack of interest in proving whether Japan had ever made the attempt at all. No Phase IV ALSOS effort on the scale of the effort against Germany was ever planned for Japan.

Oddly enough, in hindsight the ALSOS Report on Germany and the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group’s report on Japan were remarkably similar. Neither Germany nor Japan had organized their science and scientist in an effort to build the bomb. Neither had invested the funds necessary to develop such a weapon. In fact, according to the two reports the efforts of both nations were grossly underfunded. Though Germany was known to possess the uranium necessary to produce a weapon, the possibility that Japan also possessed access to uranium outside of Japan and Korea was never seriously investigated. While the ability of Germany’s scientist to build a bomb was recognized before the war, the ability of Japan’s scientist to have also constructed a bomb was never a subject of discussion. The racial prejudices of the period played a large part in limiting the investigation into Japan’s wartime research into nuclear energy and fission.

Simply put in the eyes of most Allied scientists, American, British, and Canadian, the Japanese were incapable of developing nuclear energy or a fission weapon. Pre-war and wartime Allied stereotypes of Japanese with buck teeth, thick glasses, and slanted eyes were common wartime propaganda.

Japanese, virtually any Asians were referred to at the time as “Nip,” “monkey face,” and “slant eyes.” Prior to the war the threat of attack from Japan was downplayed by the U.S. military as it was well known that the Japanese could not fly aircraft as most were nearsighted and myopic. The Japanese were known to be poor navigators and lousy strategists: All myths started by the Japanese themselves, to lull Western governments and militaries into believing that in a real war, Japan would be a pushover. It took the Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines to dissuade the West that their bigotesies were largely unfounded. The U.S. underestimated Japan’s military at the beginning of the war and continued to underestimate Japan’s scientists when the war ended. Like any belief system, there was some basis of fact supporting such attitudes against Japanese scientists.

Japan’s Physicists
On the scale of physics internationally, pre-war Japan had few scientists that were well known outside the home islands. Most prominent among those few were Hantaro Nagaoka (15 Aug 1865–11 Dec 1950), Kotaro Honda (23 Feb 1870–12 Feb 1954), Dr. Nishina Yoshio, Yukawa Hideki, and Dr. Kikuchi Seishi (25 Aug 1902–12 Nov 1974). However, compared to the physics community of Germany and that of the U.S. the intellectual foundation for Japan’s developing an atomic bomb program on the surface appeared to be lacking. Japan also appeared to lack within the Japan proper, the industrial infrastructure and natural resources required to support such a program. These assertions for all intents and purposes were a form of “gray propaganda,” truth, half-truths and outright lies that can be accepted on the surface as true, but fall aside to more in-depth research.

Lacking Real Talent?

In the area of physics, Japan was never considered a serious threat, nor had any western scientists considered that nation capable of achieving such a goal as an atomic bomb. Many of Japan’s physicists, though little known outside Japan were highly educated and operated on the pre-war cutting edge of physics.

Dr. Nishina Yoshio had studied abroad in Europe for almost a decade. While in Europe, Nishina studied at or visited the Cavendish Laboratory, the University of Göttingen, and the University of Copenhagen. In Copenhagen Nishina worked with and developed a long term friendship with Niels Bohr (7 Oct 1885–18 Nov 1962). In 1928 Nishina co-authored and published with Oskar Klein (15 Sept 1894–5 Feb 1977) a paper on incoherent or Compton scattering, the decrease in energy of an X-ray or gamma ray photon when it interacts with matter which established the Klein-Nishina Formula. Nishina was a noted colleague of Albert Einstein and served as the wartime head of one of the Imperial Army’s most well-known nuclear research programs the Ni-Project, but Nishina was not the only noteworthy Japanese physicist of the time.

Nagaoka Hantaro was a noted Japanese physicist who developed an early model, however incorrect of the atom known as the Saturian model. Arakatsu Bunsaku was also a noted physicist. Like Nishina, Arakatsu had also studied abroad in Europe at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge under Ernest Rutherford and at Berlin University. Arakatsu served as the head of one of Japan’s other widely-known atomic research programs, the Imperial Navy’s F-go. The list continued.

In 1939 Yukawa Hideki, a Japanese theoretical physicist would publish his theory of mesons and would become Japan’s first Nobel Prize winner when he accepted the award in 1949. During the war Yukawa worked with Arakatsu Bunsaku on the program of the Japanese Navy – F-go. Tomonaga Sin-Itiro (31 Mar 1906–8 Jul 1979) would jointly share the 1965 Nobel Prize in Physics with Richard Feynman (11 May 1918–15 Feb 1988) and Julian Schwinger (12 Feb 1918–16 Jul 1994) both Manhattan Project alumni. Tomonaga spent the war working with Nishina under the program of the Japanese Army – Ni.

Sakata Soichi (18 Jan 1911–16 Oct 1970) who studied under Nishina Yoshio from 1929 to 1933, would later win the Imperial Prize of the Japan Academy and the Order of the Sacred Treasure. Imai Isao (7 Oct 1914–24 Oct 2004) of the University of Tokyo would be awarded a Cultural Medal in 1988 and the First Class Order of the Sacred Treasure in 1992. At least two of Japan’s wartime physicists would eventually have specific institutes named in their honor.

In 1931 the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research established the Nishina Laboratory in honor of Nishina Yoshio. The Yukawa Institute for Theoretical Physics of Kyoto University was established in 1952 with Yukawa as its first director. Though not as well-known as the Manhattan Project’s numerous physicists, it cannot be said that Japan lacked the talent necessary to develop a weapon or direct its required production facilities, a fact noted by Furman himself in the final report he filed at the conclusion of the Tokyo Team investigation. While Japan’s scientific community and its capabilities were ignored or overlooked in the race for the bomb, its other achievements were not so easily explained but continue to be downplayed more than 60 years after the end of the war.

Industrial Infrastructure Lacking

Compared to Germany’s Ruhr Valley industrial complex with its vast number of coal mines and steel plants, there was nothing inside Japan proper that could compare. Japan did have a large number of heavy industries and chemical complexes; however nothing within the main islands that could measure up to Germany’s heavy industrial complexes.
Accurate figures are difficult to acquire for either Germany or Japan during the war however some comparisons can be made. In 1939 Germany produced 86 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity. In 1943 Japan produced 38.4 billion kWh, less than half that of Germany.\textsuperscript{1076} Roughly 80 percent of the power produced in Germany was derived from coal-burning thermoelectric plants while 20 percent of its electricity was derived from hydroelectric plants.\textsuperscript{1076} In Japan the near exact opposite was true with 80 percent of its power derived from water power and the remainder derived from coal.

Unlike Germany, Japan lacked large coal reserves and relied almost entirely upon rivers for electrical power generation. The opposite was true for Germany which lacked access to water resources similar to those of Japan but had tremendous coal reserves. Note that for the processing of uranium hydroelectric plants provide a more stable source of power than do thermoelectric plants. Great fluctuations or the complete loss of power to the equipment used for most uranium enrich processes during operations, could damage or otherwise destroy sensitive enrichment equipment. If not destroyed such equipment would require some level of clean-up before a process underway at the time power was lost could be restarted. Any loss of power for only a few seconds could result in cleanup operations lasting several days or even weeks.

In 1943 Germany produced 30.6 million tons of steel, while steel production for the entire Japanese Empire in 1940 including Manchukuo, stood at 6,455,000 tons. In 1938 Germany produced 20,000 metric tons of magnesium while Japan produced just 1,000 tons. In the production of military goods supporting the war Japan’s ability to manufacture such equipment was far behind that of Germany.

During the war Germany produced in excess of 119,000 aircraft of all types while Japan produced just over 76,000. Of the total aircraft manufactured during the war Germany produced nearly 56,000 fighter aircraft while Japan produced just over 30,000 combat fighters. Over the course of the war Germany produced nearly 160,000 artillery tubes while Japan produced only 13,350. In self-propelled guns Germany produced more than 67,000 while Japan mustered only 2,515. In almost every category of civil-military production Germany led Japan by huge numbers.

Section 83 – APRIL 1947: HOG WILD PART TWO?

Before descending into the numerous reasons discounting the theory that Hog Wild was on some spy mission to locate Japan’s atomic bomb research facilities another, a similar event should be considered. The event occurs two years later in April 1947 when a U.S. B-17 was similarly forced down by Soviet aircraft operating near Genzan. The differences and similarities between the two incidents; the area where they occur, the over flight, the actions of the Soviet fighter aircraft, etc., allows some level of contrast and comparison between the events in the air, once on the ground, and in the aftermath of the return of the crew to U.S. hands. Note that the event occurs well within the Cold War period in East Asia.

Unlike Hog Wild where at least parts of the story are fairly well known the story of a U.S. B-17 forced down over Genzan is little known even to scholars of the Cold War Era. Whereas the tale of Hog Wild was reported in the newspapers of the time the forcing down of the B-17 was never covered by the major press of the time, Yank Magazine, or even Stars and Stripes. The forcing down of the Flying Fortress drew no demands of an apology from SCAP or General MacArthur.

The B-17 was assigned to the 6\textsuperscript{th} Emergency Rescue Squadron based at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa under the 8\textsuperscript{th} Air Force.\textsuperscript{1077} The aircraft was piloted by First Lieutenant C. W. Hargrove. The co-pilot for the flight was First Lieutenant Jacobosky. The flight’s navigator was Second Lieutenant C. M. Ochs. The intelligence debrief was signed out for transmission by Colonel W. H. Burgess, Assistant Chief of Staff, PACUSA.\textsuperscript{1078}

The B-17 Serial Number 44-3802 was not on a clandestine spy mission. The plane suffered a navigation error and simply flew off course whereby it was eventually intercepted by Soviet aircraft and ordered to land at Genzan airfield. Unlike Hog Wild where each crewmember rendered an independent statement after the fact mostly directed toward explaining the incident, the crew of the B-17 was interviewed for intelligence purposes after-the-fact as a group, with every shred of

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{B-17_Flying_Fortresses.jpg}
\caption{B-17 Flying Fortresses – Source: U.S. National Archives}
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\textsuperscript{1076} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1078} Ibid.
possible information extracted. Unlike Hog Wild the crew of the B-17 was as it says in the official report, “interrogated.” Unlike the reporting of Lieutenant Queen and crew which mostly concerned the air intercept and shots fired, the interrogation of the B-17 crew described the numbers and type of aircraft seen at Genzan, the number and type of soldiers there, the types of vehicles at the base, the number of buildings and types, conditions at the field, and other information not easily obtained by off-site observation. This type of information was not gathered by those interviewing the crew of Hog Wild. The interrogation of the B-17 was a true intelligence debriefing and not an aircraft accident report. The report as it appears in General Headquarters Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff Report Number 1472, dated 15 April 1947 is presented below in its entirety. 1079

NORTH KOREA

“Abstract: Article discussed interrogation of American flyers whose B-17 was forced down at Wonsan, Korea; Soviet troops and armament; Russian planes at field; transportation; AA and ground units; hangars and equipment; barracks; living conditions; American crew activity on ground; and return flight.”

“The following information was obtained from an interrogation of the crew of a B-17, enroute to Seoul that was forced down by Russian fighters at Wonsan (Genzan): The Russians were amazed that the plane had gotten so far north without having been intercepted by fighter patrols which they (the Russians) stated are flown by them regularly just north of 38°. Interception of the B-17 was believed to have been by visual means, as no evidence of radar was seen. After the B-17 had touched down, the two intercepting fighters turned toward the sea, and made strafing runs with live ammunition, apparently to show the American crew that the fighters meant business. The formation flown by the Russians was tactical, one plane flying top cover for the other. Later a major, pilot of the intercepting planes said “had the B-17 not landed, it would have been shot down.”

On landing the crew was interrogated as to whether the ship was armed and what bomb load it was carrying, and as to whether any cameras were aboard. The Russians expressed surprise that the ship was unarmed. The crew was allowed to lock the ship, and to return to it when desired, if accompanied by a Russian. A Soviet guard was placed on the plane. The Russians showed little interest in the plane since they seemed quite familiar with it. The pilot and the navigator were interrogated further as to the flight plan; at what point they lost contact; and as to what year the plane was built. They were also asked when and where their instruments went out. The flight map was asked for, and when produced by the navigator, it was photographed by the Russians and a photostatic copy given to the pilot in a remarkably short time (only a few minutes). The pilot’s written statement was also photographed and a photostatic copy given to the pilot.

The crew was told by the Russians that the field was a naval base. However, soldiers, marines, and paratroopers were seen. All personnel was armed. Those carrying sub machine guns and pistols had them fully loaded. Most of the Russian personnel were veterans of the German war. It is believed a large percentage of the garrison arrived in the area several months ago. Officers live in town. Their families joined them in January this year.

Planes at the field were estimated at 8 to 10 twin engine, and 20 to 30 single engine fighters. The fighters were believed to be Yaks or Spitfires. (Pictures taken of them will be blown up by 5th Air Force and identifications made). The Russians called them Russian Spitfires. Planes were engaged in firing at towed sleeve targets and in strafing runs. Some trainers were reported over the field but not based there. The combat readiness of the aircraft was unanimously expressed by the crew, as from 90 to 95 percent operational. Air crews were plentiful as were ground service crews. Another fighter field was believed to be at Kanto to the north. One American C-47 with top-turret, one C-64 type, and a bi-plane with cabin were seen on the field. Transportation seemed scarce. Several GMC 6x6 trucks were seen with the American insignia painted over, two jeeps and a few Dodge ¾ ton weapon carriers were also seen. Everyone walked, including the Commodore.

1079 General Headquarters Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff Report Number 1472, Summary of Daily Messages, dated 15 April 1947. NND765693. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001. – 14 November 2002
Train service was reported as very bad by the Russians. However, the crew reported many more railroads than appear on American maps. Several, believed to be five, come into Wonsan. Mail service was also said to be slow.

Crew members of the ship saw three anti-aircraft guns believed to be either 40mm or 20mm manned by approximately six man crews. One crew member reported seeing what he believed to be a 3" AA gun. The largest ground formation seen at the field was approximately 100 infantrymen, fully equipped for extensive field duty, carrying rifles (model 03 type) and long bayonets. A long barreled shoulder weapon, believed to be a .5 anti-tank rifle also was observed. The ground troops were engaged in small tactical problems. Squad (7) eight man groups were participating. No large concentrations of ground forces were observed. No tanks were seen. The obstacle course was used extensively. The interior guard was changed every 3 hours and consisted of 16 or 17 men. These were infantry and very young, but still have two to three years of combat experience. Clothing was very mixed and very worn. Shoulder boards were worn by all personnel, mostly Air Corps, but no unit designations were worn. All other equipment observed seemed good and serviceable. Much of this was Japanese.

Three new hangars were being built into the hill at the far end of the field, one was completed, and the frames of the other two were up. The buildings entered were apparently set up for extensive training. The link trainer, photo gun, and wire diagram were observed. One large building with twin stacks was supposed to be a heating plant. Two large buildings in Wonsan with twin stacks were said to be breweries.

Numerous L shaped buildings, apparently newly constructed, were seen in small groups along the roads and railroads north of 38°. The crew differed as to whether they were of barrack or warehouse type.

The Russians said while the war with Germany was on they were drafted for five years, but when war was declared with Japan an additional five years were added. At the present they have Sundays off, and at the completion of ten months’ service are to have 60 days leave.

The crew was fed and entertained but were not aware at any time of being questioned. They (the Russians) appeared not to be interested in what we are doing. The crew was not allowed to go any place without an escort. However, three crew members did get their cameras off the ship (they were not searched, to the amazement of the crew) and took several unobserved pictures of the field. Several other pictures were taken in flight. The 5th Air Force has arranged to get these and have them blown up.

The opinion of the entire crew was that they would hardly have seen less, unless they actually had been restricted to their assigned quarters. They were allowed to go only to the Headquarters building, the mess hall, the aircraft, and latrine and nearly always were accompanied by a Russian. Only ingenuity allowed them to escape their (guard’s?) Russian companions.

The Russians offered to gas the ship, despite the fact that only one small gas truck and not above ground tanks were seen. Gas appeared to be no problem.

Only three small freighters around 5,000 tons were observed in the harbor at Wonsan. No liberties were seen in any port on either flight north or the return flight down the east coast.

On the return flight down the east coast (made approximately five miles off shore), an apparently very deep harbor, believed located at Changjon, was observed. A breakwater extended for some distance across the harbor, and small freighters (5,000 to 6,000 tons) were right up against the sea wall. No evidence of heavy shipping was observed, docks observed were quiet and practically empty.”

Section 84 – HOG WILD: COMING IN FROM THE COLD

While it makes for a great conspiracy tale; an aircrew on a secret mission, a bomber delivering humanitarian supplies, a life and death struggle between capitalism and communism, playing in the background the dropping of the atomic
bomb, the fall of Japan, even a pickup truck, there is no evidence to support speculation that Hog Wild was on some secret reconnaissance mission over northern Korea on 29 August 1945 to discover Japan’s atomic research facilities. The facts simply do not support the argument. The information available does support Soviet intrigue but not a secret U.S. mission to locate any secret Japanese atomic research facilities near Konan.

**Myth of Konan**

Had it not been for Snell’s 1946 article it is likely that the city of Konan and its major industry of Nichitsu would have faded so far into history that it would have been largely forgotten. It would have become some tale of a lost and forgotten city; or mostly remembered for what it was then and continues to be today; an isolated industrial center dominated by several large-scale heavy industries located on the coast of northern Korea along the East Sea. Few historians today talk about Konan’s sister cities of Genzan, Seishin or Yuki, and without Snell; it would probably be the same for Konan.

In alluding to….

Due in no small part to the Snell article; Nichitsu, Japan’s atomic bomb program, Hog Wild, the British and Australian POWs held there and the city of Konan are forever entangled in myth and legend, and for few good reasons.  

There is little information other than that contained in the Snell article to tie them together into the package they eventually became. In fact there is no evidence that the facilities as alluded to by David Snell as being located in northern Korea ever really existed at all; at least not in or around Konan. There is no real evidence that Japan’s atomic bomb project was ever located in that city. There are no documents in the U.S. National Archives, prior to the Snell article which might support the existence of a Japanese bomb program of the scale described by Snell as located in northern Korea. A later book will discuss the Snell article in-depth; another will be produced to identify the actual facilities in northern Korea that were involved in the Japanese atomic bomb project.

Several statements made by Snell bear some examination. In his 1946 Atlanta article Snell actually says little about Konan other than 1) the area was under Russian control, 2) that a B-29 had been shot down enroute to the city, 3) that the Japanese counterintelligence officer he interviewed was in charge of counter intelligence at the Konan project before the fall of Japan, 4) that “a gigantic mystery-shrouded industrial project” was operating near Konan, 5) that Japan’s source of

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uranium was located nearby, 6) that the weapon was assembled in a cave in a mountain near the city, 7) that the weapon had been loaded aboard a ship at Konan, and that 8) the Russians would arrive at the city before the bomb could loaded aboard waiting Kamikaze planes and deployed against U.S. attempting to invade the Japanese home islands. 

According to the his informant the Japanese had destroyed the cave where the bomb was developed before Russian soldiers had arrived in the area, and that the Soviet Union was now conducting an “extensive study” of the Konan area. While Snell alluded to a number of things, he actually presented little real information on the wartime Japanese atomic bomb effort. The terms Snell used in his article were general in nature and non-specific. Terms like “large,” “near,” and “gigantic” were words that are relative, lack specificity and defy definition. Snell does little in the article beyond restate what was publicly known and tie loose facts together in a way to make the tale told more believable.

Though Snell reported that the officer he had debriefed “gave names, dates, facts and figures on the Japanese atomic project,” the source either provided no distances, descriptions, sizes, or locations or Snell had chosen not to include them in his article. Snell did state that he had turned over more specific information “to the United States Army Intelligence in Seoul” yet that report if existed at all has never been found. According to Snell the War Department was “withholding much of the information” but again if such information existed, none of it has ever been released. Broken into several parts and examined in-depth the story falls apart.

That the Russians occupied the area of Konan was commonly known. However the Soviets also occupied Heijo, Genzan, Seishin and any other number of cities and towns in northern Korea. Russian forces being at Konan or any of northern Korea’s other cities had little to do with any Soviet prior knowledge of a Japanese bomb project. The Russian occupation of the northern part of the peninsula was the result of the previous Allied agreements reached at Yalta in February

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1081 Snell, David. Japan Developed Atom Bomb; Russia Grabbed Scientists. Constitution. Atlanta, Georgia. 3 Oct 1946.
1082 Ibid.
1083 Ibid.
1084 Ibid.
1945, and only agreed to by the two nations in the days immediately before the Soviets occupied the northern portion of the Korean Peninsula. The two men that proposed the 38th parallel north as the border between occupying forces, Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel were actually surprised that the Soviets accepted the proposal.

While it was agreed that the Soviet Union would accept the surrender of all Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel north, the Soviets did not control the U.S. proposal of the 38th parallel north as the border between the occupying forces. The decision to propose the 38th parallel north as the line of demarcation between the two armies was reached on the night of 10-11 August, only hours before the Soviet Red Army entered northern Korea far too late to ensure that the Soviet Union would end the war in control of the area. The U.S. could have just as easily recommended the 39th or 40th parallels as the border. Had the Soviets made a counterproposal to the 38th parallel there might be some validity to support suspicions that the Russians were not seeking to occupy northern Korea to accept the surrender of Japanese forces, but for some other reason. Nothing of the sort ever occurred.

Though the Red Army did cross the designated border of the 38th parallel north in some areas, they rapidly moved back across the line when informed of the violation. Those Soviets that did enter the parts of Korea under U.S. control after the surrender of Japan “vandalized, pillaged and looted indiscriminately.” Fortunately such incursions were “infrequent.”

It is possible that the Soviet Union had prior knowledge of Japanese atomic research facilities located in the area of Konan, they were aware of such facilities in Manchuria and were elated that the U.S. had ceded them control of the area, however to date there has been no documentation discovered to confirm such suspicions. Soviet forces overrunning Japanese nuclear research facilities located in Manchuria may have been informed of the existence of additional such facilities in the area of Konan, however the time constraints enforced by the rapid move of the Red Army southward would have been eliminated the value of the knowledge.

Had the Soviet Union moved military forces into areas of Korea outside the arrangements made at Yalta, dismantling industries south of the 38th parallel north under tight security, egregiously violating all previous agreements it would make Snell’s article more believable. Again however, nothing of the kind ever happened. Quite the contrary, according to the report submitted to President Truman by Edwin Pauley and used by Snell to bolster the validity of his article, Pauley had reported to the President that in Korea, unlike in Germany the Soviets were removing little if any industrial plant or other facilities to the U.S.S.R. At the time of the Pauley visits to northern Korea the Soviets had removed little of the Japanese installed industry at Konan into the Soviet Union. This would change as the Soviet occupation extended into late-1946 and into 1947.

According to Anna Louise Strong who was in Konan in 1948 the Nichitsu plant was operating at full capacity when she toured the facility, unlikely for a plant that many believed had been dismantled. As the workers related to Strong in August 1945, they had actually prevented Japanese workers from scuttling the plant as the Empire collapsed by removing the explosives set throughout the facility before they were detonated.

Of counterintelligence….

Though the counterintelligence officer that Snell debriefed was based in Konan does not mean that the actual bomb program or its production facilities were also located in or near the city. An entire counterintelligence program could be located a desk in an office and likely was. For several years the only contact the Los Alamos laboratory in New Mexico had with the outside world was an address; 109 East Palace Place, Santa Fe, New Mexico. The Manhattan Project itself was originally headquartered on the 18th floor at 270 Broadway, Arthur Levitt State Office Building, in the Manhattan Engineering District, New York. The original chief of security Major John Lansdale, assigned to the project in June 1942 was headquartered in Washington, D.C. Though based in Washington D.C., Lansdale traveled extensively across the U.S. to the more than 30 sites that made up the project. There is no reason that a counterintelligence officer located in Konan could not have roamed the Korean Peninsula, Manchuria or Northern China as required. Snell’s article was again, purposefully vague.

How Gigantic was Gigantic

Regarding the existence of a “gigantic and mystery-shrouded industrial project operated during the closing months of the war in a mountain vastness near the Northern Korean coastal city of Konan,” Snell never said just how gigantic the

1086 Ibid.
1088 Ibid.
1090 Ibid.
“gigantic” facility really was. Snell never provided a physical description of the facility the layout of the production facility itself or the processes used by the enrichment plant to produce the high quality uranium necessary for a weapon. In fact Snell never described any physical aspects of project. Snell never said if the facility was one mile long or twenty; if it covered an area of ten acres or ten thousand, or if the facility contained one building or three hundred. Snell provided no measurements, no distances, no size of the area involved. Snell never actually said that the plant that produced the bomb was in fact located in Konan itself only that it “operated during the closing months of the war in a mountain vastness near the Northern Korean coastal city of Konan” and as with the rest of the article the word “near” was relative. Near to where?

David Snell never actually mentioned Nichitsu or stated that it was involved in any work related to Japan’s atomic bomb program. So how did Nichitsu become so closely associated with the program?

Nichitsu and the Bomb

In his 1946 article Snell never discussed the Nichitsu chemical complex, the fertilizer plant, the carbide plant or any other aspect of the Noguchi facilities at Konan. Nor did Snell mention by name any of the other companies located in the city and there were several, most owned by Japan’s larger and older zaibatsu. That Konan was a “Nichitsu town” is not evidence that the company was heavily involved in the Japanese atomic bomb program or that it managed any portion of that project.

While Nichitsu was headquartered in Konan and was perhaps the most widely known industry in the area, other Japanese Konzerns and zaibatsu also operated in the city. 54 percent of all Japanese investment on the Korean Peninsula was located in northern Korea. 86 percent of all Japanese heavy industry on the peninsula was located north of the 38th parallel. Motomiya operated a large chemical-mineral refining plant to include a steel mill, just west of the Nichitsu fertilizer plant between Konan and Kanko. The Motomiya Plant, also known as the Bogun Chemical Plant was the largest chlorine and electrolytic caustic soda production plant in Northeast Asia and was nearly as large as the Noguchi operation. Mitsubishi operated several large-scale mines and ore separation facilities in the immediate area of the city. If Japan’s uranium supply was really located near Konan it is likely that Mitsubishi owned that mine. These industries provided mainland Japan with the raw materials necessary to fight the war. As war supporting industries closely tied to the Japanese military they were also heavily involved in secret Japanese military programs that became widely known, and quickly forgotten in the aftermath of the war.

During the war, in cooperation with Japan’s other zaibatsu, Konzerns and under the control of the Imperial Japanese Navy Nichitsu Fuel Industries built, managed and operated to some degree 13 coal liquefaction plants for the Imperial Navy across Korea and Manchuria. One such plant was located near the Korean-Soviet border at Agochi. Another was located at Konan itself about three miles west of the fertilizer plant. The plants produced isooctane and synthetic butanol for use as an aircraft fuel. A third liquefaction plant was located north of Konan at Eian. Though similar to the plants at Konan and Agochi, Eian produced rocket fuels in support of Japan’s licensed copy of the Messerschmitt Me-163 Komet, the Mitsubishi J8M Shūsui. Known in English as the “Autumn Water” the J8M and was considered a “secret” program. The rocket fuels produced by the plant included the German bipropellant rocket fuel combination of T-Stoff oxidizer and C-Stoff (hydrogen peroxide/methanol-hydrazine); known in Japan as Ko and Otsu. The Japanese Navy’s involvement in the fuels program brought with it an increased level of physical and information security, to possibly include counterintelligence operations.

Though the Eian Plant employed thousands of Korean in its operations, sections of the facility, as with the facilities at Agochi and Konan were considered secret with access limited to Japanese citizens only. Access to these areas by Nichitsu and Chosen Chisso officials with no need to know was likewise denied. For the most part however safety, more than security concerns dictated access to the forbidden areas. Most off-limits areas within these plants actually dealt with explosive materials that required specific training. It was safety procedures more than security which limited the number of people allowed into those particular areas. With the exception of only one area within the Konan plant, the acetylene filling section the POWs who worked at the factory had free access to any area of the plant. The unfettered access of POWs to all factory areas does little to support the argument that the plant operated a large-scale uranium enrichment facility. It is not completely out of the question that the Japanese might have used POWs as labor in its program; the U.S. considered using Italian POWs in the construction of its facilities in at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. After WWII the Soviet Union did use prisoner-labor in the construction of its earliest nuclear facilities. However there is no information or documents to support such allegations on the part of the Japanese. 1091

After the start of the war any information concerning the capacities and capabilities of Nichitsu and other plants on the peninsula was considered sensitive or classified information, and a closely held secret. Such plants as the Nichitsu facility or any of the other major facilities located in Korea represented economic assets and warranted protection. Information such as production capacities and capacities would form the foundation for Allied target identification and selection. An increased security presence was required to minimize such threats. That Nichitsu was one of the largest chemical plants in the

world at the time the war started would have by necessity attracted the attention of combat intelligence target planners. As targeting represents a value system, larger production facilities are generally targeted for destruction first.

The existence of synthetic fuel plants producing methanol and isoctane for a nation that was near completely dependent upon outside sources of petroleum, would only increase the value of the facility as a target for long-range bombing. Such war-related industries required increased physical security to protect the industry from outside attack, destruction or sabotage. When the war began local access to entire facilities by those that did not work or have a reason to be in the area of the plant was denied. With the onset of the war in the Pacific the Nichitsu facilities and those of Motomiya and Mitsubishi in Konan were now secured and guarded by the Japanese military. In 1943 Nichitsu itself was nationalized by the Japanese government. Several anti-aircraft batteries were established around the Nichitsu facility during the war and are marked on the maps contained within intelligence studies produced on the facility during the war. Such enhanced security arrangements could only add to local folklore surrounding Nichitsu and other facilities in the area.

Few Koreans or Japanese employed within these plants would be knowledgeable of all ongoing production within the site. Workers at one plant for one company are not likely to have known all the functions and work related to another plant under a different employer.

An increased wartime security regime would also tend to inhibit inquisitive inquiry by workers and managers alike. In the presence of military security such as the Kempeitai and the Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu (a civilian counterpart to the Kempeitai); not knowing anything of military value becomes an asset.

With the Japanese military’s known propensity for not explaining many of its actions, it stands to reason that the increase in local physical security was never fully explained to the local population or their cooperation sought in the protection of the nation’s industrial infrastructure. In the absence of information rumors would have arisen to explain those functions that were not readily identifiable. Like myth in the vacuum of official information, rumor and speculation would fill the void. In the aftermath of WWII with the atomic bomb and other scientific wonders coming into public knowledge, unknown functions now assumed greater unjustifiable significance to those who did not possess details. Any physical changes to the industry such as new construction which did take place at Nichitsu during the war and occurring behind a wall of physical security becomes the source of rumors. Set astride the main road leading between Konan and Kanko security around the Motomiya plant aided the increase in rumors. With its increased security direct travel between the two cities was now restricted by road blocks and checkpoints. Roads through the Motomiya Factory would eventually be augmented by trails around the plant as civilians living in the area sought ways to avoid the increased security presence that now dominated the area. The port facilities that formerly served all of Konan and located inside Nichitsu boundaries, now required additional permissions for use and access. The presence of the Japanese Navy at all Nichitsu facilities would have likely supported the assignment of a counterintelligence officer to the plant at Konan to protect the navy’s investment and the development of some type of cover story.

During the war not-less-than 12 heavy caliber AAA sites along with two dummy sites surrounded the Nichitsu facility protecting the plant against air attack. Additional AAA sites protected other industrial facilities nearby. Similar to the restrictive security posture taken within the U.S. in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the changing security posture around Japanese facilities on the Korean Peninsula would have been similarly restrictive and intrusive to the average citizen living in the area.

That there were secret Japanese programs in wartime Korea, like the rocket fuel plant at Eian and the coal gasification plants at Agochi and Konan is neither unusual nor out-of-place for the time and the location. That Nichitsu, Mitsubishi, Motomiya and other companies would be possibly involved in classified research and development programs is

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1093 Hungnam Plant Chosen Nitrogen Fertilizer Co (Chosen Chisso Hiryo KK), Hungnam (Konan), Hamgyong Namdo (Kankyo Namdo) Korea. Photographic Interpretation Center and Far Eastern Theater ONI, February 1945. 124795. Record Group, Records of the OSS. Research and Analysis Branch Division. Intelligence Reports. Entry 16. Box 1429.
normal in a wartime environment. While these activities in hindsight are easily explained, solid evidence or conclusive proof of Japan’s atomic bomb program continues to elude historians and investigators researching that program some 65 years after-the-fact. That proof also eluded U.S. military investigators researching the program in the years immediately following WWII.

The Supreme Commander Allied Pacific (SCAP) Investigates

During the Occupation of Japan, SCAP conducted roughly three investigations into Japan’s atomic bomb program. The first, conducted under the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group began on 10 September 1945 and concluded near the end of the month. A cursory review of Japanese science during the war, the investigation is generally known as the Furman Investigation. Conducted by Robert Furman, this first inquiry into Japan’s wartime nuclear research program concluded that Japan did not possess a viable weapons program, lacked the scientists necessary to construct such a device and never dedicated the resources necessary to its program to develop such a weapon. The conclusions of the Furman Investigation were later proven incorrect, and were largely an answer to a self-fulfilling prophecy that no such program existed in Japan during the war.

For most of WWII the Allies had operated under a worst-case scenario where Germany was the only other nation capable of developing and deploying an atomic bomb in time to alter the course of the war. To the Allies at the time, Germany was the only other nation to possess the scientific and engineering talent required to develop such a device. Throughout the war the U.S. and its British allies, primarily at the insistence of the U.S. worked constantly to ferret out information on Germany’s efforts to develop an atomic bomb. Though their investigations located nothing to prove Germany was working on a weapon, no solid information was acquired to discount the original assumption. To the scientists and military of the Manhattan Project, the effort to build an atomic bomb before the end of the war was a race between the U.S. and Britain against Nazi Germany and for good reason.

Over the last few years of WWII Adolf Hitler issued repeated threats concerning the use of German miracle weapons, yet provided few details of just what those weapons might be. The V-1 buzz bomb, the V-2 rocket, the ME-262 jet aircraft and the air-launched Fritz X anti-ship weapons are just a few of the most well-known technological surprises that Germany threw at the Allies over the last years of the war. The introduction of these high-tech weapons added credibility to the threats of the Führer, Adolf Hitler. Decades after the war the V-1 is credited as the world’s first cruise missile; the V-2 is considered the forerunner of today’s intercontinental ballistic missiles. In light of such advances Allied military intelligence considered the possibility of a Germany atomic weapon to be a real threat.

It was only with the findings of the ALSOS Mission at the close of the war in Europe that those fears could be laid to rest. With the greatest potential threat, that of Germany proven to be far behind the Manhattan Project; the Japanese never being viewed as a serious threat; and with many of the same investigators assigned to search Japan having worked on the German ALSOS Mission, the first post-war investigation of Japan served only to confirm the basic assumptions of Manhattan Project leaders and scientists: That Japan had studied the problem, conducted some research into the question, lacked the scientific and engineering talent required to develop such a weapon, and never moved forward with a large-scale uranium enrichment process. In the race for the bomb between the Allies and Germany, Japan was never a serious contender.

After the war when the Allies searched Japan for evidence of an atomic bomb project, they entered the country under a self-fulfilling prophecy and ultimately worked to prove their hypothesis correct. The war was over. The soldiers, scientists and statesmen involved wanted to wrap things up quickly and go home. No further investigation was required. To its credit the Snell article changed that.

The second period of investigation begins in late 1946 and was prompted by the publication of the Snell article itself. Though some documents were produced by the SCAP Scientific and Economic Branch investigators concerning the Snell article, and additional interviews were conducted of persons that should have been knowledgeable of any program located in Konan, no concluding documents ending this period of inquiry have ever been located. It remains unknown whether the investigators of 1946 considered the Snell story to be compelling evidence of a wartime Japanese bomb program, if they thought the story contained any clues worth following, or if they considered it to be an article from the tabloid press. It is known from the number of documents that do exist that whatever the depth of investigation Snell story might have generated after its release, the lack of documents concerning the story in the months following October 1946 suggests that within SCAP there was clearly little interest in pursuing the story past early 1947.1094 A final period of investigation takes place in late 1948 and runs through the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco on 8 September 1945, ending the war between Japan and the Allied Powers.

Documents retained from the activities of the final investigation, suggest that the primary goal of this investigation was the monitoring of any stockpiles of monazite, thorium, uranium and so on held by Japan’s colleges, research laboratories and industrial facilities. Only on occasion do the documents produced by the investigators over this period mention the Japanese bomb project, the Korean Peninsula, or the Japanese involved in the original program. There are no documents available that indicate what prompted this investigation or why the investigation lasted three years. This period of investigation ended when The Treaty of San Francisco returned sovereignty to Japan on 28 April 1952. With the return of sovereignty to the Japanese, SCAP no longer possessed the legal authority within the country to conduct investigations independent of the Japanese government and the Japanese government had nothing to gain from any additional investigations into the wartime past. As with the 1946 investigation the inquiry that ran from 1948 to 1952 apparently never reached any conclusion on the Snell article, the involvement of the industries at Konan, or Japan’s stockpiles of radioactive materials. As an aside, most of the materials identified and monitored under this last period of investigations consisted of monazite ores, black sands, and thorium compounds.

Running throughout the various investigations are the background questions concerning the existence of the large-scale industrial facilities required to support a large-scale uranium enrichment program and the amounts of electrical power required to support such a facility. The historic inability of researchers to locate the large-scale industrial production facilities required to produce the uranium necessary for the production of an atomic bomb plagues the tale told by David Snell. This lack of identifiable facilities raises serious doubts regarding Snell’s 1946 reporting. That some of the facilities at Konan were involved in a Japanese atomic bomb program is undeniable. That there was a large-scale weapons-grade uranium enrichment facility at or near Konan remains to be proven. Did the large-scale facilities as alluded to by Snell as present in northern Korea ever really exist in the area of Konan? The answer is a firm – no!

No Large Unknown Facilities

The facilities required to enrich uranium under the processes known and possible at the time to the levels necessary for a bomb, simply did not exist in the area of Konan on the Korean Peninsula. Of the known uranium enrichment processes of the era; electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), gaseous and thermal diffusion, all required large-scale industrial production facilities. As intelligence imaging of the peninsula revealed during the war there were no large-scale industries located on the peninsula whose functions were not be identified. There were no factories or other large buildings at the Konan Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant that could not be explained or whose functions were not identified long prior to the end of the conflict. The use of high speed centrifuges, more commonly in use today was proposed by the leader of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s uranium program Bunsaku Arakatsu in early 1940, indicating some Japanese consideration of the problem early on, but the technologies needed to operate a centrifuge at the high speeds required did not exist until near the end of the war. As early as 1941 Dr. Eric Bagge, Dr. Paul Harteck and others were also exploring the centrifuge separation In Germany.

It can be argued that Japan's uranium enrichment program could have utilized smaller facilities; however those smaller facilities would have produced less weapons grade uranium over a longer period of time. Despite the location or the processes used the physics remain the same. The amount of uranium at the level of purity required to achieve the critical mass necessary to develop a controlled explosion does not change from continent-to-continent, government-to-government. The Japanese would require the same amount of highly enriched uranium as the U.S. to produce a blast equal to the detonation that occurs over Hiroshima in 1945. The facilities producing this amount of uranium would require, depending upon the processes used and the purity of the base product, a similar amount of energy to create the and equal amount of weapons grade uranium. Smaller facilities would have only further eliminated any possibility that Japan could have produced a weapon in time to impact the final days of the war.

Though huge areas of the installations the U.S. constructed to produce the highly enriched uranium required were not employed in the production of weapons-grade uranium, the functional facilities within those installations were large nonetheless. The U.S. uranium separation facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee occupied an area in excess of 59,000 acres. Oak Ridge measured nearly 17 miles in length and up to seven miles in width in some spots, and contained several separate functional areas the best known being K-25, Y-12, S-50 and X-10.

By itself the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant occupied about 1,550 acres or an expanse of more than two square miles. Construction on K-25 began in 1943 and was complete by early 1945. At the time of its completion the plant contained the largest single building in the world; one structure covering an area of 44 acres. This single building provided more than 2,000,000 square foot of work space. The site’s compliment of buildings included 50 separate structures of four stories or more. Within Oak Ridge K-25 alone employed more than 12,000 workers.

Y-12, the Oak Ridge EMIS facility covered an area of 825 acres, more than one square-mile. Y-12 contained 531 separate buildings providing more than 7,000,000 square foot of total work area. Construction on Y-12 began in 1943 and was nearly complete in 1945. At its peak Y-12 alone employed 22,000 people. Oak Ridge contained numerous other facilities such as the S-50 thermal diffusion production facility and the X-10 graphite reactor pilot plant. The reactor plant itself, though not producing uranium encompassed an area of more than 2,900 acres. The engineering to support the processes to develop the amounts enriched uranium demanded required the construction of such large facilities. The facilities later constructed by the Soviet Union, China and India in the post-war era were similar in size and scope to those constructed in the U.S. during the war. No such similarly large unknown facilities were ever identified in or around Konan, or on the Korean Peninsula during WWII. Regarding the actual plant area, the differences in size between U.S. enrichment uranium facilities and those of the Nichitsu chemical plant were striking.

Nichitsu’s entire facility occupied an area less than three miles in length by about 1.8 miles in width encompassing a total land area of less than six square miles. The entire installation consisted of about 3,700 acres. The Nichitsu plant’s largest building, the facility housing the Nichitsu Carbide Factory, measured about 1,125 foot long by about 575 foot wide providing 646,875 square foot of work space, far smaller than the 2,600 foot long by 1,000 foot wide building housing portions of the Manhattan Project’s gaseous diffusion process at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Altogether the Nichitsu plant occupied a total area equal to one-seventeenth of the Oak Ridge facility.

Understanding that not all the land area covered by the Oak Ridge housed buildings, plants or functioning facilities; the entire Nichitsu chemical plant remained far smaller than the operational areas of the uranium enrichment facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Had even the smallest of the Oak Ridge facilities the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant, been reproduced within the Nichitsu facility it would have occupied nearly one-quarter of the entire Noguchi combine and would have drawn the notice of U.S. wartime imagery interpreters. In addition, while the Nichitsu installation constructed only one new plant between 1940 and 1944 the entire Oak Ridge facility was constructed and fully operational in about two years. No such facility was ever constructed at the Nichitsu plant at Konan. Any claims that the Nichitsu plant could have been converted from a chemical production to uranium enrichment also fall apart under close scrutiny.

**Converting the Nichitsu Facility to Enrich Uranium**

Any effort to convert the Nichitsu plant to enrich uranium would have been ultimately cost prohibitive. Few of the processes of an operational fertilizer production plant could be converted in any way to support a uranium enrichment plant. The machinery, processes and techniques involved in the production of the chemicals produced at Nichitsu in Konan were radically different from those required to enrich uranium and would have added little to the process. Though some suggest that the buildings housing the chemical plant could have been useful in housing a uranium enrichment facility, the argument cannot be supported. To convert the plant it would be necessary to remove the existing functions then operating inside the assigned space to support the required conversion.

Converting a warehouse to hold cases of a new product in a new size may result in a gain or loss of space, usually a minor issue. Retroﬁtting an existing building dedicated to one industrial function with its supporting machinery to sustain a completely different function with entirely different machinery is wrought with difficulties. Previously existing design-

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1096 Ibid.
specific ceiling supports and load supporting walls would be difficult to alter. Any previously existing internal lighting, electrical wiring and water piping would be virtually useless. Such supporting and existing internal infrastructures designed into the building when it was originally constructed, would probably require massive upgrading to support the minimum requirements of a uranium enrichment process. Such alterations would also consume the one thing that Japan lacked in its effort to enrich enough uranium to build a bomb and that was – time.

To convert an existing industrial facility to support an entirely different function would require engineering studies, space and space-allocation studies, all of which consumed time. Dismantling the existing industry then occupying the space within the building would also require time. The build-out, reconstructing the previously existing facility to support the new function would require more time. Every hour, day, week, month consumed in converting the Nichitsu facility from fertilizer production to uranium enrichment represented hours, days, weeks, months that would not be available for uranium enrichment. The time required to convert the Nichitsu plant from a known function to a new function, which was in a large part experimental, was exorbitantly expensive in terms of the time required to alter the facility against the time available to produce the uranium required. It would have been far faster, not to mention far cheaper to construct a new plant from the ground up. Protecting the conversion of the Nichitsu plant from outside observation would create additional problems.

To keep the conversion invisible to outside observation, efforts would have to be taken to ensure that the functions removed from the existing buildings would not be visible on imagery outside those facilities as the conversion was taking place. The amount of materials removed from inside the facility might not alert an imagery analyst to the new function of the facility, but it would alert them that some major activity was underway. In the middle of a war for national survival, this activity would have raised an unwanted amount of interest.

Had the Nichitsu plant been converted to fulfill a new function no amount of chicanery could justify the amount of excess materials that would be required to maintain the illusion that the previously existing plant had undergone some form of transformation. In a resource strapped wartime Japan any scrap metal; steel, iron and copper not fulfilling a worthwhile function was recycled into useful war related materials. Lastly, hand held imagery of the facility taken in 1938 allowed the various functions of the plant at that time to be matched to their associated buildings within the existing installation. Over the course of the war the observables associated with those function allowed analysts to monitor the previously identified function of those buildings against current use, and those previously identified functions never changed. It is further unlikely that any effort to convert the buildings to house a new function would have escaped the notice of Koreans living nearby despite the increase in security; Koreans whose jobs and livelihood were being adversely impacted by the conversion, or the notice of those enemy POWs freely roaming the Nichitsu facility. No such interruptions were ever reported by the Allied POWs held at Konan or the Koreans and Japanese working at the plant.

Finally those who suggest that the plant was converted to some other function, fail to consider what the dismantling of the largest producer of nitrogen in the Japanese Empire would have meant to Japan’s ultimate survival. Converting the plant would have deprived the Empire of resources it desperately needed to support its agricultural sectors and ammunition producers. It is doubtful that even Japan’s staunchest militarists could have justified such a change in the middle of a war of national survival. As noted by Anna Louis Strong in her 1948 visit to the plant the facility was intact at that time and operating. If the Japanese had converted the plant to the production of enriched uranium, the North Koreans had returned it to fertilizer production. Any need to mask or hide the facility from observation is also questionable.

Hiding the Operation

Regarding the need to hide the operation the first and foremost question has to be – Why? Consider that during the war there were only three known facilities worldwide separating or enriching uranium. Consider also that while there were many people involved in the construction of the facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee few of those people knew the proposed function of the facility. Outwardly there is no single observable associated with a uranium enrichment function that can be used to positively identify the existence of such a facility. Tertiary observables such as access to a reliable source of electrical power, physical security and so on can be used to identify facilities possessing the potential to produce enriched uranium, but without direct access to the facility it is nearly impossible to identify such a facility by remote means. Had the Japanese built such a plant from the ground up in the area of Konan, it is unlikely that Allied imagery interpreters observing that facility on reconnaissance film could have identified the process imaged. There are reasons why.

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Aerial imagery interpretation is nearly as old as the airplane itself and dates to the period before WWI. During that war as aircraft developed and the ability to bomb targets far to the rear of front lines began to increase, requirements to accurately locate and identify targets also grew. The imagery intelligence program developed during WWI answered that requirement. The intelligence gathered by aerial reconnaissance was combined with the information contained in newspapers, journals and magazines to isolate and accurately identify the industries, headquarters, communications facilities and other supporting infrastructure that allowed a military to successfully prosecute the war. In the decades between the two world wars, the skills learned, techniques developed, and knowledge gained was allowed to wane. However in the next war imagery interpretation would become the passion of many.

During WWII imagery interpretation became a profession. To enable imagery interpreters to positively identify the industries, facilities and installations imaged the military, with the assistance of American and Allied industrialists developed a series of training and identification aids known as imagery interpretation keys. These imagery interpretation keys contained images taken from aircraft of nearly every known industry, military facility and installation supporting civil-military infrastructure, aircraft, rail car, bridge, building, barracks, etc., type known to be available. The images within the key were accompanied by written descriptions of the functions and processes contained within such facilities.

Used properly the imagery interpretation key worked much like a dictionary or encyclopedia of industries, infrastructure, military and civilian constructed objects. The keys could be used to confirm or deny information derived from other sources or to confirm the information derived from imagery. Each feature, installation or function bore certain markers that allowed the industry or feature in question to be identified. For example; steel mills are supported by furnaces which are usually fueled with coal, however glass plants are also supported by furnaces. Yet unlike a steel mill large piles of sand are usually found at a glass plant and not at a steel mill. These piles of sand serve as an observable indicating the production of glass and not steel. As the art of imagery analysis matured these markers became known as signatures and over time became more refined.

Most industries could be identified by the signatures associated with the industry imaged or by a process of eliminating the signatures not observed. The sand found at a glass plant would not be found at a steel mill. However there were no keys produced during WWII identifying the features associated with a uranium enrichment facility. 65 years after WWII intelligence communities worldwide still suffer from an inability to identify such facilities as there are no specific features supporting the enrichment of uranium which can be used to accurately identify such a facility. Unlike a steel mill or a glass plant, uranium enrichment facilities do not require large smokestacks, furnaces, heavy load bearing walls, piles of sand, piles of coal, etc. Other than operating space and access to reliable sources of electrical power such facilities bear few signatures at all. Of the signatures that are observable at uranium enrichment facilities most large warehouse areas would bear many of the same signatures. 1098

Lacking the institutional knowledge required to identify such a facility, coupled with the fact that few such facilities existed, it is reasonable to assume that had an imagery interpreter located such a facility it would have likely been misidentified or listed as “unidentified.” A review of targets located across Korea during the war reveals no such misidentified or unidentified facilities. An additional factor to consider in any Japanese decision to hide such a facility would have been their having knowledge beforehand of any other such facilities operating worldwide. According post-war debriefs of individuals involved in the Japanese atomic bomb program, though they had noticed the absence of articles related to fission in leading publications originating in the U.S., the Japanese were not aware of the U.S. effort to develop such a weapon until November 1944.

According to the debrief of a Lieutenant Suzuki serving with the Japanese Army in China and debriefed in Tientsin in December 1946 the Japanese had learned in November 1944 that the U.S. “had perfected the Atomic Bomb.” 1099 Lacking prior knowledge of the U.S. effort to develop an atomic bomb, and its required uranium enrichment processes the Japanese would have had no reason to suspect that any similar such facility could have been identified. Without such knowledge it is unlikely that the Japanese would have expended the effort required to mask the existence of any similar such facility constructed in Korea. The suspicion of many that the required facilities were constructed or located underground while absolutely possible, would have incurred problems that make locating such a facility below ground difficult at best. Again the first and foremost question concerning locating a uranium materials production system underground has to be – Why?

An underground enrichment process?

Absent any need to hide the existence of a uranium enrichment production process why would the Japanese go to the effort of locating a nearly unidentifiable process in an underground facility in one of the most secure areas of the Japanese Empire? The simple answer is that the Japanese wouldn’t, and like the requirement to hide the facility there are numerous reasons why.

In the modern-day era if the question were asked there would be two answers. The first is that the underground facility would hide the process from outside observation. However as we have seen from earlier discussions on converting facilities there would have been little reason to suspect that such facilities would have been identified even had they been observed. The second reason would center on the ability of the underground facility to protect the operation from attack, and depending upon its depth this would include attacks with nuclear weapons. However there are problems with these arguments.

The chief argument is that during WWII Korea was never the target of aerial bombardment. While the Allies did indeed mine ports along the east coast of the peninsula during the latter part of the war in July 1945, they never bombed any of the industries or other facilities located on the Korean Peninsula. There were numerous viable strategic targets located on the peninsula during the war, however there were larger and more viable targets located on Japan proper. By the time B-29s began to mine Korean ports in 1945 the focus of their attacks were solely against the center of gravity, the Japanese home islands. With Korea’s ports mined, transport between Japan and Korea was now limited. There was little reason to bomb Korea to defeat Japan. Furthermore, once the Allies began to bomb mainland Japan there were less raids against industrial targets in Japanese Occupied China, none against targets in Manchuria, none against such targets in Korea. The ability to accurately locate and identify an industrial target requires in-depth research and study.

Tremendous research goes into ensuring that the industrial and infrastructure targets attacked are worth the effort, the lives and money spent to carry out that attack. The value of each target is generally based upon how the loss of that facility will impact the actions of the enemy along the front. A steel mill manufacturing baby carriages is a lot less important than one producing artillery barrels. The issue of time is also important.

If an enemy possesses millions of tons of ammunition attacking an ammunition plant will have little impact on enemy actions at the front. The immediate target now becomes the military’s ammunition dumps and storage areas and not the ammunition plant. Similarly as was the case with Japan, lacking its own oil fields and possessing a limited number of petroleum refineries, toward the end of the war Japan’s oil storage facilities and refineries became a major strategic target for attack by B-29s. By the end of the war more 83 percent of Japan’s total oil refinery capacity lay in ruins. Some missions such as “armed reconnaissance” or “armed recce,” a form of interdiction, was used by all sides during the war to harass troops in the open, attack road bound convoys, transport networks and so on. However such flights were usually based upon intelligence information suggesting a reasonable chance of successful interdiction. Sending a mass of bombers to locate an unidentified facility and attack it without knowing the function of an infrastructure target or its location was something that was never done. Bombing the wrong target achieves nothing.

Despite the large number of bombers and bombs available to U.S. mission planners, those weapons systems and weapons represent offensive assets. Destroying or damaging any one target means another target escapes attack. Putting assets against a target incurs risks that must be weighed against the value of the target. Those risks are measured in aircraft and crew losses. Consider an actual mission flown in 1943.

Section 85 – OPERATION TIDAL WAVE

On 1 August 1943 178 USAAF bombers and 1,751 men of the 8th Air Force launched from airfields located in North Africa around the Libyan city of Benghazi. Their mission was to attack nine oil refineries located around the town of Ploiesti, Romania. The installments had been well studied, the critical points identified. The Ploiesti refineries alone were responsible for 35 percent of all Axis oil production. The attack was part of a strategic plan to deny oil to the Nazi war machine. An earlier attack launched against the refineries on 12 June 1942 had met with little resistance and because of this it was decided that the 1 August 1943 attack would be flown in daylight. For reasons far too numerous to recount here OPERATION TIDAL WAVE became one of the most costly missions ever flown by USAAF strategic bombers.

In what became known as “Black Sunday” 53 bombers failed to return from the mission; 660 airmen were lost, five Medals of Honor were awarded three of them posthumously. It was the greatest number of Medals of Honor ever awarded for a single air mission in U.S. history. The mission accomplished virtually nothing.

Damage to the refineries was repaired in about two weeks. After the attack oil production at the nine refineries actually increased. Ploiesti serves as a good example of just what the risks were. Despite solid information, meticulous planning and a good concept of attack the mission against Ploiesti shows just how quickly things could go disastrously wrong. After the earlier raid the Germans had upgraded defenses within the area. Allied target packages did not reflect the change. With Japan under constant assault as the military center of gravity, attacking Korea would add nothing to ending the war.
Turning again to the issue of the Japanese locating their enrichment facility underground to protect it from nuclear attack, the argument though entertaining, simply does not hold water.

While the depth of cover provided by an underground facility can protect operations being conducted within the underground from nuclear attack, the Japanese had no information on the U.S. Manhattan Project until November 1944; long after Japanese construction on such a facility would have begun. The Japanese military would be hard pressed to justify the construction of a large-scale underground facility to protect a uranium enrichment process from nuclear attack when no one in Japan knew such weapons existed. Attacks by conventional weapons such as the British Tallboy 12,000 pound bomb or the Grand Slam 22,000 pound bomb could have probably destroyed, depending on its depth, any underground Japanese uranium enrichment plant. The Tallboy was used to attack sites supporting Germany’s long-range weapons programs such as its V-1 buzz bomb, V-2 rocket, and V-3 long-range cannon programs. The Tallboy was also used to destroy German submarine pens located in France and the German battleship KMS Tirpitz. Due to its immense weight, use of special fins to increase its spin, and height of fall a Grand Slam or Tallboy drop usually exceeded the speed of sound with the weapon’s fall heard by witnesses after it exploded.

In a worst case scenario for the U.S. had it launched such an attack against an unknown or enigmatic facility it would have at the least, disrupted or delayed any ongoing underground uranium production process. Due to problems with the Grand Slam or Tallboy itself and the ability of crews and aircraft to deliver the weapon, numerous such attacks could have been required to ensure destruction of a targeted underground facility. In addition these weapons were too large to be carried inside a B-29 and had to be strapped beneath the aircraft. British experience with the delivery of the Tallboy ranged from good to excellent. As for hiding such a facility there were far better ways to hide such a factory that were more cost effective than locating the function underground.

While the processes required to enrich uranium in the U.S. were housed in large buildings on large installations, the processes themselves could have been broken down into numerous sections or its various components to be to be dispersed among any number of locations. Broken into numerous parts the function itself would dissolve into the background of other buildings, warehouses and large industries to the point where the process would become invisible to those looking for a larger facility. The monetary cost of numerous buildings might be higher than one larger building, but those costs would have continued to be less than the price of one extremely large underground facility. In addition the above ground support elements required for a uranium enrichment process could have been likewise dispersed throughout the area to diffuse further suspicions. The combinations that could have been constructed across the landscape were limitless. The combinations that could be built underground were far more limited by geography, terrain, and the experience of Japan’s engineers in building a large number of isolated underground facilities that could be supported by aboveground facilities.

One additional argument against a Japanese effort to locate a uranium enrichment facility underground rarely considered remains the issue of – time. Japan’s leading scientist, Nishina Yoshio, did not decide to pursue thermal diffusion as his primary production process until March 1943. Though Nishina’s decision was arrived at nearly one full year before the U.S. would pursue thermal diffusion under the Manhattan Project, Japanese scientist would not develop their first working model of a uranium thermal diffusion column until July 1944; a full month after General Leslie Groves had ordered the construction of the Manhattan Project’s S-50 thermal diffusion plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Consider also the singular effort required to construct the Manhattan Project’s S-50 thermal diffusion plant.
In early 1940 the S-1 Uranium Committee of the National Defense Research Committee that would eventually evolve into the Manhattan Project reviewed experiments conducted into thermal diffusion under the U.S. Navy. Phil Abelson, working under the Navy had been conducting research into the process since as early as 1940. Naval research at the time was concentrated on developing nuclear propulsion systems. While Abelson’s research had not produced the economical enrichment method sought, funding of the project had continued. In its review the S-1 Committee determined that the process was too time-consuming to add appreciably to the planned output of the enrichment methods already endorsed. When the decision was made electromagnetic isotope separation and Manhattan Project efforts to construct an operating atomic pile held greater promise. A second look at thermal diffusion in 1942 supported the original assessment. However by early 1944 with wartime pressures increasing, Robert Oppenheimer suggested to General Groves that the research on thermal diffusion conducted by the U.S. Navy at the Philadelphia Naval Yard deserved a closer look.

In June 1944 after reviewing the most recent work on the process, Manhattan Project scientists recommended the construction of a separate thermal diffusion plant to General Groves. Less than two weeks later on 18 June 1944 Groves ordered the H.K. Ferguson Company of Cleveland, Ohio, to build the new plant, S-50. Time was critical; there was no time left to develop new or to improve existing technologies. H.K. Ferguson was ordered to build an exact copy of the Navy pilot plant in Philadelphia. Ferguson was given only 90 days to complete the project. Union Carbide was assigned as the operating contractor. In one of those odd coincidences that seem to occur in wartime, Grove’s decision to build a thermal diffusion plant was made only two days after the first B-29s operating out of forward bases in China conducted their first bombing mission over mainland Japan. That first mission targeted the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata on northern Kyūshū. H.K. Ferguson – met the deadline.

S-50: Oak Ridge, Tennessee – Construction

S-50 would be located immediately adjacent to the thermoelectric power station built to support the K-25 gaseous diffusion process. The K-25 power plant would provide the steam required to operate S-50. The main processing building was 522 foot long by 62 foot wide by 75 foot high.

Included in the construction of the plant was a requirement to install a total of 2,142, 48-foot tall, copper and nickel diffusion columns into 21 separate racks; 102 per rack. Each of the 48-foot tall columns contained three concentric pipes. The innermost pipe was made of nickel; the outer pipe of copper. These two pipes were held inside yet another pipe made of steel. High-pressure (1,000-psig) steam passed through the innermost nickel pipe which was located inside the copper pipe. Uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), also referred to as “hex” was batch-charged into the gap between the nickel and copper pipes at about 1,500 psig. Temperatures inside the inner pipe were kept at between 188°C (370°F) and 286°C (546.8°F). Temperatures in the space between the nickel and copper pipes hovered around 65°C (149°F).

S-50 began partial operations on 16 September 1944 but not full operations until 15 March 1945. While still under construction, leaks throughout the system limited its overall production capacity. Under less-than-perfect conditions, with the highest access to resources allowed under War Production Board guidelines, the Manhattan Project needed nine full months to bring S-50 into production. While the Manhattan Project was successful in mitigating the issue of time in the construction of S-50 its thermal diffusion plant was not however, constructed underground.

The Construction of Industrial Plant

The construction of industrial plant is dependent upon the ability of the builder or developer to manage, plan, coordinate and control the project from inception to completion. As with H.K. Ferguson it is doubtful that the Japanese would have suffered any serious drawbacks other than materials, in constructing the thermal diffusion facilities required to enrich uranium to some level. Japanese construction managers were entirely competent and the equal of any worldwide. Japan’s construction managers and engineers had decades of experience in bringing forth the completion of numerous factories and industrial plant across Japan, Korea, Manchuria and China. The challenges of constructing large-scale facilities were well-

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known however, the construction of industrial processes underground were less-well understood. In some sense it had never really been done before.

Until WWII few industrial processes had ever been located underground. Over the course of the war most of the processes relocated underground consisted of fabrication, assembly and repair or storage functions, not production. In addition the center of knowledge concerning industrial plant and underground facilities at that time was Germany, not Japan.

By the latter part of WWII Germany had begun relocating factories into abandoned mines. These mines were often expanded by the use of slave labor, mainly concentration camp inmates. From 1943 onward V-2 production was relocated into underground facilities at Ebansee and Nordhausen (Mittelwerk). Most aircraft assembly was also moved underground. Germany eventually began to build specific underground facilities to house specific functions. By 1944 upwards of 24 percent of all German armaments were being produced in underground facilities. Yet again, most of this work consisted of fabrication and assembly work. The development of underground facilities capable of supporting a fully integrated industrial operation was a goal that lay outside the experience of most construction managers and engineers. The lack of experience could be overcome however in constructing a plant underground many lessons remained to be learned.

Managing a construction effort building-out a plant underground was not entirely unlike building-out a new industry inside the outer walls of an existing building. Unlike a ship in a bottle where the model is built outside the bottle strings attached to the sails, with the model slipped through the mouth of the jar and the sails then erected, the tricks to building an industrial facility were again, different. Planning for the process and the underground facility would have to be accomplished at nearly the same time. Prior to installing the enrichment process the underground facility including its liner, ventilation, cooling, water handing, and wiring to name but a few of its many support subsystems had to be fully in-place and entirely operational. To simply state that the Japanese located their uranium enrichment program in an underground facility ignores the challenges that would accompany such a task. As U.S. intelligence agencies found in 1999 when the American government paid $177 million to inspect North Korea’s Kumchang-ri underground facility, locating a uranium enrichment facility underground is far more complicated that simply digging a big hole into the side of a mountain and calling the job done.

First and foremost in locating a large-scale uranium enrichment process underground is the size of the facility required; it would have been enormous. Certain processes would have required minimum distances, lengths, widths and clearances. At a minimum the underground facility would have required the removal of thousands of cubic yards of rock. During construction, toxic gases released from the rock, dust, and other contaminants would further complicate construction requiring that such poisons be removed before the facility could be occupied for long-term use. 1101

While the function to be installed might occupy a set amount of space; when constructing the underground cavity additional space would be required for the movement and arrangement of equipment and other materials when installed. The cranes that might support the raising of some overhead beam in the construction of a building aboveground are not available to the same degree inside an underground facility. Unless the constructed chambers are large, trucks delivering cement to the construction site can’t be taken into the underground. Most construction materials that might be delivered to the site would have to be moved underground via wheel barrow or conveyor. The underground facility would have had to be nearly complete before the enrichment process could be installed, detracting again from the time available for actual production. For the most part everything required to be inside the underground facility had be moved into the space piece-by-piece, and with the Japanese, usually by-hand, section-by-section by forced Korean labor. Despite this, none of the Korean or Japanese laborers that might have supported such a project have never come forward to identify the facility. That aside, the greatest problem with installing a uranium enrichment process underground lay in heat removal. 1102

In the 1940s the linings of most underground facilities consisted of prefabricated concrete slabs held in position by reinforced concrete or steel frameworks. Such prefabricated linings were designed more to deflect falling rock than to support industrial processes that required clean facilities. A poured concrete liner would have been a near necessity. Initially heat buildup would occur in the facility as the underground’s concrete lining was installed and began to dry. Such a facility would require huge amounts of concrete and this concrete would have to be moved deep into the underground. To remove the heat

1102 Ibid.
and humidity would require the installation of some degree of heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) systems prior to concrete being poured. The rate of heat transfer would depend largely upon the thermal properties of the exposed rock; stratification, faults, inclusions, fissures and the difference between the temperature of the rock and the temperature of the air. The temperature of the concrete would have to be maintained at a set level to prevent it from cracking while setting or curing to increase its long-term strength.

During outfitting the testing and installation of equipment, welding, compressors, pumps, blowers, motors, would also cause heat buildup. Though the machinery and equipment might be engineered to withstand high temperatures, its human operators could not survive those conditions without some form of ventilation. The larger the facility, the deeper it was buried, the further it extended away from the point of entry, the larger the ventilation system would have to be. The ventilation systems required would have been complex and multilayered, consisting of booster stations, filtering and cooling devices with back-up systems; spinning reserves to include back-up electrical power systems to ensure that if the primary ventilation system shutdown, the machinery and its operators would survive. The reserve systems would have to be constantly turning in a standby mode to ensure worker survival under emergency conditions such as the loss of power, earthquakes, or bombing.

Consider also that the thermal diffusion columns operated at temperatures between 65°C (149°F) and 286°C (546.8°F) and that a large steam plant was needed even for a small thermal diffusion plant. The steam generated was circulated throughout the plant adding additional heat sources and contributing to the overall problem of heat removal. Steam lines would have been as common as electrical lines would become later in the century. S-50 had numerous exits and windows for a reason. One small accident could be deadly. The supporting steam plant, chillers, cooling towers or ponds required to operate the air handling and cooling systems would have been located outside the facility and visible to imagery analysts. The size of the underground space would have also been an issue.

The underground facility itself, the size of the chambers required would have been limited by the type or rock containing the cavity, the number of fault lines, cracks in the base rock and so on. Granite would hold a larger cavity than would sandstone. As mentioned above, S-50 alone was 522 foot long by 62 foot wide by 75 foot high. Any cavity built to contain the S-50 operation as it existed would have required the removal of nearly 7,500 cubic yards of rock. While interior chambers could be arranged to spread the equipment about the space provided, the vertical requirements for the diffusion columns remained. Though the production facility might be located underground the complex would require aboveground support.

Underground facilities do not exist in isolation. The processes used at the time, electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), gaseous and thermal diffusion required steam for operations, water for cooling, methods for releasing the waste heat stored in the water used in the cooling process such as cooling towers, compressors, piping, the all-important steam plant, dry air and nitrogen. These supporting functions require additional support such as coal yards, pumps, storage facilities and so on. Compressors require oil. Pipes require maintenance. There are additional requirements for workers, worker housing, food storage, etc.

While some of these functions could be collocated within the underground uranium enrichment facility many could not. The required steam plant was a example of a supporting process that would not be located within the underground facility. The production of steam requires water, coal, creates dust, smoke and soot. The steam plant would be located outside the underground facility, aboveground and observable. The dissipation of waste heat, a major requirement for thermal and gaseous diffusion though probably relying on heat removal by water would require some method to encourage the water to release the waste heat within into the atmosphere. While water storage ponds might be constructed underground to hide them from view, the ponds would still require venting to open air. That air would still carry steam. That steam would again be visible on reconnaissance imagery. During the war no such aboveground support systems were ever identified. The necessity for large amounts of electrical power transmitted underground brings with it further problems.
Electricity is generally transmitted at high voltages, 110-kV or higher normally through overhead power lines to reduce the energy lost in long-distance transmission. The Japanese power system installed across the Korean Peninsula transmitted power along 110-, 154- and 220-kV power lines. All three of these transmission systems extended into the area of Konan.

Placing power lines underground raises the costs associated with electric power transmission. An underground transmission line generally costs two to four times that of an overhead power line. Operations are also more difficult since the high reactive power of underground cables make voltage control more difficult. These fluctuating voltages can damage or destroy key enrichment equipment driving the cost of refining uranium even higher. For these reasons few electrical power systems extend transmission lines underground. It is likely that the Japanese would have extended an overhead transmission system with its transmission towers and higher voltage lines to the edge of the underground facility involved. This transmission line would then tie-in to a high-voltage transformer substation which would then step the power down to lower voltage levels for use inside the underground facility. The major power transmission lines in the area of Konan were mapped by Army imagery interpreters during the war; there were two major substations located in the area of Konan. No newly constructed or additional and outlying transmission-level transformer substations were ever identified.

Throughout the war the industrial processes; general, chemical and physical processes creating the basic materials supporting work accomplished underground, remained aboveground and for good reason: Most of these processes generated heat, were toxic in nature or otherwise hazardous to work with. Thermal diffusion was no different.

UF₆ emits low levels of radiation. Released into the atmosphere where it can mix with moisture it will produce uranyl fluoride (UO₂F₂) and hydrofluoric acid (HF). The reaction is instantaneous. Exposed to air a UF₆ release is visible as a white fog. HF is also detectable by its smell. As a heavy metal, uranium can also have toxic effect primarily affecting the kidneys. In high enough concentrations, as an acid it can damage the skin and lungs to the point of death. Released in an underground facility, regardless of any well-planned ventilation, the occupants of the facility were likely to suffer some ill-effects. Unable to immediately escape those remaining in an underground facility experiencing a major failure would be incapacitated. Despite the best efforts of the Manhattan Project as noted above, leaks prevented S-50 from achieving full operations until 15 March 1945. Consider the dangers of one large-scale release of UF₆ inside the enclosed space of an underground facility. Though temperatures inside S-50 were controlled through the installation of various environmental systems the building itself had windows, and in most photographs of S-50 many of those windows remained open.

Lastly during WWII the U.S. military had photo-mapped the entire peninsula identifying all viable targets. Again, there were no large industrial facilities anywhere on the peninsula whose functions were unknown to U.S. intelligence much less an underground uranium enrichment facility. For the Nichitsu plant specifically there were few buildings within the installation whose function remained unknown; none the scale required for any of the uranium enrichment process known at the time capable of producing the amounts of enriched uranium required for a bomb in the amount of time available. Concerning Nichitsu itself the U.S. knew a lot more about the Konan plant than most researchers realize. Konji Kiyono a
former employee of the company in Korea, drafted into the Japanese Army and captured in the Philippines – provided much of that information.\textsuperscript{1103}

**Konji Kiyono**

Konji Kiyono, 20\textsuperscript{th} Independent Artillery Mortar Battalion, Imperial Japanese Army, was captured on Leyte Island, the Philippines in October 1944. Konji worked at the Nichitsu plant for four years from 1940 to April 1944. He was subsequently debriefed by U.S. military intelligence adding to Allied knowledge of Nichitsu and its Konan facilities. Given a sketch map of the Chosen Chisso Hirio Kaisha produced from imagery dated 31 December 1944, Konji mapped the entire plant providing information on every function and building within.\textsuperscript{1104}

All together Konji produced five separate appendices to the annotations he provided on the sketch map. Appendix four of his report listed 60 separate annotations. The only construction noted by Konji during the period he was employed at the plant was the addition of an aluminum plant constructed after 1942. Konji reported “that he thought that the plans for more extensive development had been cancelled because of the scarcity of building materials.”\textsuperscript{1105}

Konji accurately identified the facility’s carbon factory, the plant’s transformer yard, the electrolytic plant for the electrolysis of water into oxygen and hydrogen, and the tanks into which the separated oxygen, hydrogen and carbonic acid were stored. The buildings where fertilizer was produced from sulfuric acid ammonia were also identified. The combine’s soap factory, nitrogen plant, steam plant, magnesium factory, zinc production plant and alumina plant were also annotated. Support facilities such as rail yards, rail stations, dining halls, and tennis courts were likewise documented. Konji identified the installation’s housing areas for workers and supervisors, community baths, Japanese and Korean schools. Where possible Konji Kiyono also provided accurate physical measurements of the facilities and buildings he identified. Imagery analysts relying on signatures associated with facilities similar to that of the Nichitsu operation validated the information provided by Konji. The information he provided was regarded by the wartime intelligence community as “reliable.”\textsuperscript{1106}

**Manpower**

According to David Snell “The Korean project was staffed by about 40,000 Japanese workers, of whom approximately 25,000 were trained engineers and scientists.”\textsuperscript{1107} By comparison during its construction in 1943 Oak Ridge, Tennessee alone employed 66,000 people. During its peak operating period of 1945 the Oak Ridge facility employed 75,000 people nearly two times the total number of workers employed by Nichitsu. It should be noted however that as the Japanese only pursued one enrichment method, that of thermal diffusion, it is likely that any Japanese facilities constructed would have been much smaller. A single large thermal diffusion plant would require far less people than the numbers employed at Oak Ridge during the war.

In the years that Konji worked at Nichitsu he estimated that the plant’s work force had increased from 20,000 to 30,000 workers.\textsuperscript{1108} These workers were drawn from an area-wide population estimated in 1938 to be 63,859 people.\textsuperscript{1109} In

\begin{tabular}{l}
\textsuperscript{1104} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{1105} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{1106} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{1107} Snell, David. Japan Developed Atom Bomb; Russia Grabbed Scientists. Constitution. Atlanta, Georgia. 3 Oct 1946 \\
\end{tabular}
1938 nearly half the entire population of the city, men, women and children living in the area of Konan worked at the Nichitsu plant. By 1945 the population of Konan is believed to have grown to an estimated 140,000 people. By the end of the war Nichitsu employed more than 43,000 workers at its Konan facility, close to the number quoted by Snell. Other sources report the number of employees at Nichitsu in 1945 to be as high as 45,000 workers. In 1948 Anna Louis Strong numbered the workforce at the plant at 20,000. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document produced that same year estimated the population of the city at 120,000.

Compared to 1938 by 1945 only one out of every three people living in the area of Konan worked for the Noguchi Konzern. Other industries now also competed for labor in the area of Konan. During the seven-year period between 1938 and 1945 the Motomiya and Mitsubishi industries located in Konan had begun to encroach on Nichitsu’s domain. Comparatively, Nichitsu’s sway over the area had contracted when according to the report by Snell it should have been growing. It was not Nichitsu, but these other industries that had been responsible for attracting the large numbers of workers to Konan reported by Snell, but there were other problems with the issue of labor and the bomb.

Labor Issues

At the time that Japan’s atomic bomb project should have been employing an additional 40,000 people to support a large-scale uranium enrichment program, the manpower quoted by Snell was simply not available at Konan or even on the Korean Peninsula. By 1943 the peninsula was actually suffering a acute labor shortage. Due to the demands of war many military age Japanese males, Konji Kiyono comes to mind living in Korea had been drafted into Japan’s military creating a shortage of the Japanese citizens required to man any uranium enrichment program. It is unlikely that Koreans, considered untrustworthy by most Japanese would have been used to develop a secret weapon of any kind but the subject deserves to be explored.

For the first two decades of the Japanese occupation Korea was a backwater. Its greatest value to the Japanese lay in its usefulness as a buffer state to Imperial Russian aims in the Far East that threatened Japan. After the fall of Tsar Nicholas II and the assumption of power by communists in Russia, Korea’s value as a buffer state grew as Japanese worries over communist expansion into Asia also increased. When annexed by Japan in 1910 the peninsula supported a largely backward agrarian society mostly tied to the land. Living standards were low; the average Korean lived in squalor. At the time of the annexation most Korean adults were illiterate; access to education was limited. But all that was to change.

Natural resource surveys conducted in 1914 and 1926 revealed the presence of large amounts of natural resources such as limestone, gold, bauxite, magnesium, coal, and iron ore, which attracted investors and forced an industrial revolution onto the peninsula. Japan’s investment on the peninsula created a demand for qualified labor. As a rule Koreans were not considered worthwhile, eligible or qualified to fill these positions. To meet the demand for a literate labor and management force, the Korean Government-General of the late 1920s under a shortsighted policy encouraged Japanese nationals to immigrate to the peninsula to fill the void of skilled labor.

Efforts by the Japanese Government-General to foster Japanese immigration met with mixed results. Japanese immigrants were not easily enticed. A Japanese immigrating to Korea would be forced to leave behind to families and friends. Only fifty years out of serfdom themselves most Japanese still bore close ties to their immediate families, friends, and villages. Many of those Japanese that did eventually immigrate to Korea originated from the same village, district or area in Japan. As with their customs they bought their prejudices with them. The average Japanese considered Korea to be a far less advanced country than Japan. Living conditions in Korea were considered primitive, government services near nonexistent. In the end it was monetary incentives and not opportunity that lured most Japanese to Korea.

Special pays and allowances could raise a migrant’s wages over those of friends and acquaintances in similar jobs in Japan by upwards of 40 percent. Free housing at the expense of the industrial concerns in Korea provided an additional incentive. However, requirements that the Japanese worker guide the work assigned, supervise and manage Korean workers, represented a major drawback to immigration. Most Japanese considered Koreans to be lazy, ignorant and unwilling to work. Many Japanese managers would readily vocalize such opinions in their criticisms of workers as individuals or as a group.


Most Japanese treated Koreans as harshly. Koreans workers did not speak Japanese; the immigrating Japanese did not speak Korean. Neither group was willing to learn the language of the other.

Once in-country Japanese immigrants found themselves isolated into small groups from the community in which they lived. They were largely sequestered to a section of a town, city, or the immediate area of the industry that hired them. To shop for food, clothing and other goods the Japanese found themselves in the uncomfortable position of relying upon those same Koreans that they despised. The industries in which the Japanese worked did little to increase understanding and cultural cross feed, but neither did the Government-General. For the Japanese a position in a major corporation in Korean represented a career; to a Korean work at a Japanese plant was little more than slavery.

A Korean working in a Japanese-owned industry in the first twenty years following annexation, despite their talents or loyalty had no job at all. Koreans working at a plant had to work their way up the various seniority systems just to obtain a permanent job. Additional effort was required to obtain a fulltime position. Once a fulltime position was secured there was little possibility of advancement in the company hierarchy. Factory policies prevented Koreans from moving upward into positions of increased responsibility.

Noguchi’s interest in Korea and his later investment in the peninsula eventually became a source of tension between Koreans and Japanese. Many of the Japanese workers that eventually immigrated to the peninsula were concentrated at Konan. The introduction of additional industrial concerns across that part of the peninsula resulted in an increased demand for Japanese immigrants but also for Korean workers to build factories, hydroelectric power plants, and dams. The Japanese held the technical positions while Korean filled the Japanese demands for unskilled labor. More than 20,000 people daily are reported to have worked on the Pujon River Dam alone for a period of nearly three years. Koreans across the country migrated to northeastern Korea for jobs. Most though, came from the southern provinces of the peninsula and left that area of the peninsula for good reason.

Much of Korea’s agricultural economy was centered in the southwestern part of the Korean Peninsula. By the late 1920s, early 1930s Korea’s agricultural sector was in turmoil and decline. The Great Depression had begun; agricultural prices worldwide were in decline. Japanese efforts to tie the Korean economy to that of Japan resulted in laws that benefited Japanese over local Koreans. Japanese mandated land reform efforts whatever their actual intent, had resulted in a substantial transfer of land ownership from Koreans to Japanese immigrants. Early Japanese efforts to industrialize the Korean peninsula absorbed some of this excess labor. However it was Nichitsu’s investment in the peninsula’s electrical power industry in support of its fertilizer production that substantiated Korea’s value as a location for heavy industries. The demand for Korean labor continued to increase.

As other industries such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Motomiya followed Nichitsu into northeastern Korea the demand for additional labor especially in the construction industry and other menial jobs, continued to grow. The Manchurian Incident of 1931, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and eventual invasion of China further increased the demand for Korean labor as those industries in northeastern Korea began to be heavily tasked to support Japan’s military involvement in Manchuria and China. The Korean Peninsula became the central location for all supplies and support moving from Japan into those areas. In part, to meet the demand for labor in Korea’s expanding industrial zones the Korean Government-General moved to mobilize the country’s population to support the demands of Japan’s expanding Empire. Japan’s previous attempts to hold Koreans in subservient positions now returned to haunt the Empire as trained and educated Japanese were siphoned off into the various wars with fewer qualified workers available to replace draft age Japanese.

The government’s first effort to balance the situation came in April 1934 when it issued instructions aimed at shifting excess populations from the southern areas of the peninsula into the more isolated Northern provinces (dogai shokugyo assen seisaku). Many of the Koreans observed in the aftermath of WWII escaping communist dominated North Korea were simply Koreans from the southern areas of the peninsula trying to return home after the collapse of the Japanese Empire. This first effort was followed in April 1937 when the Korean Government-General issued the Official Employment Promotion Policy (kan assen shokugyo seisaku). The new policy consisted primarily of a large-scale mobilization program designed to provide labor in support of Japan’s large-scale strategic industrial projects. The program provided thousands of workers for employment in the Japanese industries located across northern Korea. Ever harsher measures were eventually required to meet the increasing demands for labor.

In 1938 the Japanese Governor-General of Korea Minami Jiro convened the Jikyoku Taissaku Chosakai, the Commission on the Investigation of Countermeasures for the Current Situation. The purpose of the commission was to better align the Korean economy and society with that of Japan to meet the industrial demands of the Japanese war in China. The commission’s recommendations included the expansion of military related industries across the peninsula; the reorganization of the Korean work force to include the training and integration of Korean technicians into the Japanese labor system on the peninsula; and the transition of smaller Korean and Japanese companies and industries on the peninsula, into a subcontracting system supporting the larger-scale industries present on the peninsula, much like the small industries that existed in Japan in support of larger local industries – the target of the B-29 incendiary missions over the home islands. While the Japanese
government in Korea recognized a greater need to incorporate the economic potential of the peninsula into its strategic goals, it seems to have overlooked a need to include the Korean population as a part of that goal.

Near simultaneously with the Commission on the Investigation of Countermeasures for the Current Situation, the Government-General now under the control of Minami Jiro initiated a heavy-handed policy of assimilation by suppressing Korean culture. In 1936 the Korean language (Hangul) was eliminated as a subject of required study in the Japanese installed public education system. Koreans were now forbidden to speak or write Hangul in schools, businesses or public areas under threat of death. In 1939 the government issued Decree Number 19, Soshi-kaimei which made it mandatory that Koreans create a “family” or surname distinct from their traditional clan name. Decree Number 20, known as the Name Order followed. While the two ordinances prohibited Koreans from being forced to change their surname, adopting Japanese names; lower-level officials continued forced Korean families to do so anyway. The law was extremely unpopular with many Koreans refusing to comply. In another well-known example of Japan’s assimilation policy the Japanese destroyed many Korean national monuments or altered them to reflect Japanese values. Again, the effort did not go over well with Koreans.

The treatment of Koreans at the hands of Japanese government and industrialist did much to reawaken a long-dormant Korean nationalism and pride in all things Korean, while simultaneously creating in a long-term anti-Japanese emotion that continues in part to dominate Korean-Japanese relations decades later. Many Koreans, despite the length of time removed from the event continue to resent Japan’s annexation of the peninsula – and the Japanese that came with that event.

On 1 March 1919 Koreans of all classes took to the streets to protest Japanese occupation of the peninsula and press for independence. The demonstrations made an international mockery of Japan’s rule of the peninsula. The peaceful protests known also as the Samil Movement (Three-One) or the Manseki Demonstrations, met with violent Japanese opposition in the form of savage counterattacks by Japanese national and military police. As the situation progressed and the number of demonstrations increased the police called on the Japanese Army and Navy to restore order. Continued demonstrations were met with gunfire from Japanese constabularies and military forces. Several hundred protestors were killed across the country; thousands were wounded with additional thousands arrested. With Korean independence savagely oppressed few Koreans could find reason to ally themselves with their Japanese or their goals for the peninsula. With the demonstrations meeting with violence, tensions across the peninsula ran high. Such tensions continued to simmer under the surface of what appeared to be a calm acceptance of Japanese rule.

Japan’s entry into WWII resulted in further mobilizations of the Korean population as Japan’s military absorbed Japanese citizens then residing in its overseas colonies into its military. As the number of reliable Japanese workers on the peninsula began to decrease; Japan’s industries were forced to employ increasing numbers of Koreans to fill the void.

The demands of the war on Japanese resources forced further changes in the relationship between the Japanese managers that ruled the large industries on the peninsula against the needs of the Koreans who performed the work. A lack of workers would lead to low production only, but a lack of trained workers led to lower production and problems with quality.

Training programs initiated by the Japanese to develop Korean talent increased the number of qualified Korean workers, technicians and engineers available for hire. These programs included instruction in the Japanese language as, despite Japan’s previous efforts many Koreans remained hesitant to read, speak, and write the language. The inability to communicate resulted in slower production further sabotaging war work. Korean college students, trained in Japan and sometimes in the U.S. began to find heretofore unknown opportunities in the Japanese installed industrial base in northeastern Korea. By 1945 the majority of workers in Japanese industries in Korea were no longer Japanese but Koreans. These Koreans however did not support the goals of their colonial masters and in the eyes of most Japanese could never be trusted to work in a secret Japanese weapons program.

As in many societies during wartime despite what the Korean Government-General viewed as undesirable, unforeseen changes began to take place on the Korean Peninsula. Many of the institutions and ideas the Japanese went to war to protect, began to fail more rapidly despite efforts to the contrary. The war was bringing forth the exact changes the Japanese militarists sought to prevent.

As more Koreans became qualified for technical jobs, the ratio of Japanese to Korean workers began to decrease; the number of Korean workers in most large-scale Japanese industries began to increase. In the 1920s if a Korean had a job in a Japanese industry and he quit or was fired, he might never get another such opportunity. By the middle of the war, Japanese industries on the Korean Peninsula found themselves competing with each other to obtain the best Korean workers. By 1943 a fully trained Korean worker could leave his job in one company and take a better paying position at another company. In 1944 Japan began drafting of Koreans into the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy.

In April 1944 Korean conscripts began to enter the Imperial Japanese Army in ever larger numbers. Korea’s total contribution to the Japanese war effort totaled nearly 367,000 soldiers, sailors and military civilians. Beginning in September 1944 Korean factory workers could also be conscripted as labor in support of Japan’s war effort. Large numbers of Korean men were drafted into the mining sector of Japan’s wartime economy. Most Japanese men were not allowed to obtain a deferment through labor and were forced to serve their time in the Japan’s military. Though changes were taking place and in many cases things in general were becoming better for Koreans, Japanese abuses continued.
Even during the war Korean wages lagged far behind those of Japanese doing similar work. A Japanese worker’s age, gender, education level, work history and family size were key determinants in establishing their wage rates. Koreans were paid based solely on the amount of time they had with the company, with lower wages the result. Korean pay could also be arbitrarily reduced if a manager suspected a worker of shirking their duty to the company. Koreans were often forced to work additional hours to maintain good standing with their Japanese managers. 12 to 16 hour workdays and 7-day workweeks were a common feature for Korean workers at a Japanese industries located on the peninsula. As with POWs, beating from Japanese managers and security guards were commonplace.

Korean workers that died from poor working conditions or from being beaten to death were dumped in unmarked graves to conceal the death and to prevent labor disturbances. Koreans were to be pushed as hard as possible to meet the requirements of a Japanese wartime economy. If hurt on the worksite, or ill, a Korean would be quickly discarded. Workers were also kept under surveillance to prevent labor disturbances. To prevent workers from deserting, a set amount of their wages was held in bank accounts inaccessible to the worker until their contract was complete. Companies in Japan confiscated Korean employment passports to prevent workers from deserting and returning home.

By 1945 Japanese mobilization efforts had marshaled between 4.1 and seven million Korean workers out of an estimated population of 24 million into the various industries then dotting the peninsula. From 1937 to 1944 more than 4.1 million Koreans worked in nonindustrial professions mostly agriculture and forestry. A total of four million Koreans were used as forced labor in the munitions plants and construction projects on-going in Korea during the war. As the war grew more desperate, girls as young as 13 and women as old as 50 were mobilized for military-related labor service. The demand for women to work forced the creation of day care centers across the peninsula. By 1944 there were 34,711 temporary child care centers housing 915,003 children operating in Korea.\(^{114}\)

Another 2.1 or more million Koreans were removed from Korea to Japan where they labored as virtual slaves in coal mines, in the construction underground military facilities and as stevedores in Japanese ports. Between 1939 and 1945 more than 300,000 Koreans were sent into the various mines in Japan.\(^{115}\) Over one-half of all the coal mined in Japan during the war was pulled out of the ground by Koreans.\(^{116}\) By the end of the war in August 1945 Japan had integrated into its wartime economy over varying periods of time, an estimated 15 million workers across Asia.\(^{117}\) Adding to the labor drain, in the aftermath of the Japanese occupation and annexation of Korea numerous Koreans migrated to Manchuria. In 1930 more than 600,000 Koreans lived in Manchuria. By 1940 more than 1.3 million Koreans lived there. Additional Koreans drifted away from the peninsula to Shanghai and other areas of China. By 1945 more than 20 percent of the Korean population lived outside the country.

Despite gains, the relationship between Japanese and Korean continued to be strained if not openly hostile. Those gains that Koreans did make during the war did little to eliminate Japanese prejudices or to soothe previous insults. Resistance continued to run high amongst Koreans as political and social change failed to keep pace with the changes taking place in the labor market. For a Korean, collaboration with Japanese would do little to enhance his standing within his countrymen.

As Koreans moved into higher positions the role of the Tokubetsu Koto Keisatsu, the Special Higher Police increased as Japan demanded greater obedience from its subjects. To the Japanese government in Korea, if Koreans were to be part of the leadership on the peninsula they must submit to greater Japanese scrutiny of their daily lives. Such invasions would include adopting the Japanese language, adopting Japanese surnames, adopting the Shinto religion and so on. Those Koreans that were vocal in objection to these changes came under ever the increasing scrutiny of the police. This scrutiny led to continued apprehension and anger on the part of Koreans and greater suspicions on the part of the Japanese. It was not a climate conducive to the development of a top secret uranium enrichment program.

If the Japanese had attempted the construction of a large-scale uranium enrichment production plant with the existing shortage in labor, they could not have made the attempt without Korean cooperation. When the Japanese surrendered and the Empire collapsed on 15 August 1945, millions of Koreans took to the streets across Korea to celebrate. Though Snell reports that there were 40,000 people involved in the project, no Japanese, Korean, Chinese, or Allied POW has ever stepped forward to confirm the tale.

**Natural Resources Survey**


\(^{115}\) Smith, Donald W. Beyond *The Bridge on the River Kwai*: Labor Mobilization in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. University of Illinois. ILWCH, 58, Fall 2000.

\(^{116}\) Ibid.

\(^{117}\) Ibid.
In 1911 the Korean Government-General initiated an investigation into the natural resources available on the peninsula. Completed in 1914 the study revealed that the peninsula possessed a potential hydroelectric power generation capacity of only 57,000 kilowatts. According to the study, the chief obstacle hindering development of the hydroelectric resources available was the highly variable periods of drought and flooding that plagued the peninsula. A second survey conducted from 1922 to 1926 arrived at a higher potential figure of 2,250,000 kilowatts generated mostly from hydroelectric resources. The higher potential capacity was derived by considering new techniques such as the use of larger reservoirs, higher dams, aqueducts and water tunnels to redirect stored water to power generation plants.

Subsequent studies raised the estimated potential capacity of the peninsula to a figure in excess of 5,000,000 kilowatts. These later studies estimated that another one million kilowatts could be generated from plants located along the Yalu River. It was further estimated that tidal plants, taking advantage of the extreme tides along the western coast of the peninsula including the area of Jinsen, could add another one million kilowatts to the total potential power generation capacity of the peninsula.

In the years following these reports the Japanese continued installing small-scale power plants across the peninsula, nearly all thermoelectric. By the late 1920s the country produced about 50,000 kilowatts; 13,400 kilowatts from hydroelectric plants and 34,500 kilowatts from thermal sources to include coal. Nichitsu under Noguchi changed that.

The first true development of Korea’s hydroelectric potential came as a result of Nichitsu’s decision to build a nitrogen fertilizer production facility at Konan. As the nitrogen produced by Nichitsu could also be useful in the production of munitions, the Imperial Japanese Army and the Government-General of Korea supported and approved of the Konzern’s decision. Further investment by Japan’s major combines, zaibatsu and Konzerns followed. In 1930 the Chosen Chisso Hiryō Kaisha opened its first large-scale hydroelectric power station near Kanko. By 1932 the total generating capacity of all power plants on the peninsula had grown ten times the 1920 figure to 350,000 kilowatts. The follow-on enactment of specific laws by the Government-General in Keijo further secured Nichitsu’s position as the “King of Electric Power” in Korea.

In 1932 the Government-General established new rules governing the development and operation of any additional power stations on the peninsula; any future plants had to be approved by the Government-General prior to construction. The government of Korea would now be responsible for the design of all future power stations. The Government-General would exercise management of all power plants, to include the approval of senior managers and technical personnel assigned to the power stations by the companies involved. Though all power stations would remain the property of the various corporations involved, with the single exception of the Kenjiho (Songnim) plant which was a municipal power station, control and management of Korea’s electrical power assets would from this point forward be heavily influenced by the Government-General.

1119 Ibid.
1120 Ibid.
1121 Ibid.
1122 Ibid.
1123 Ibid.
1124 Ibid.
Following the new rules enacted by the Korea Government-General, of the 63 electric power companies operating in Korea in 1933 the number dropped through mergers to only 18 in 1939.\footnote{Grajdanzev, Andrew J. Modern Korea. International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. The John Day Company. New York. 1944} The number of power companies operating in Korea eventually settled out at around 15.\footnote{Ibid.}

Japan’s later move into Manchuria, the subsequent creation of the state of Manchukuo and war with China further secured the peninsula’s importance as an industrial center supporting the Empire’s advance onto the Asian mainland. The peninsula’s nearness to Japan relative to Manchuria further increased its strategic importance to an expanding empire. The potential for producing additional electricity power from hydroelectric resources to support industrial plant encouraged the growth of Japanese industries along the country’s northeast coast. Korea slowly became a strategic asset in Japanese ambitions. Electrical power would lead the way,

Section 87 – ELECTRICAL POWER: OVERSTATED CAPABILITIES

Nichitsu and the History of Electrical Power on the Peninsula

Though the development of Korea’s hydroelectric potential is credited to Nichitsu much its growth was the result of investment made possible by the Japanese Government-General Chosen. Likewise the Japanese installed government of Pu Yi in Manchuria participated in the construction of power stations along the Yalu River

The Growth of the Electrical Power System in Korea

Prior to the entry of Noguchi into the electrical power industry on the Korean Peninsula most of the electrical power plants operating across the country consisted of small-scale thermoelectric plants generating electricity from coal. The first electrical power plant constructed in Korea dates to 1899 when an American citizen installed a thermoelectric generating unit at Keijo to support a small tramway and a number of electrical streetlights located along its path.\footnote{Electric Power of Korea. Strategic Engineering Study. S.E.S. 157. Engineer Research Office. North Atlantic Division. Corps of Engineers. Office, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. February 1945. Record Group 331. Stack Area 290. Row 3. Compartment 28. Shelf 6. Entry 16. Box 853. File Number 70913. NND750140. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001.} Similar such power stations were built in Fusan in 1902 and Jinsen in 1906.\footnote{Ibid.} These three power stations producing 1,380 kilowatts represented the total installed electrical power production capacity of the country until the Japanese annexed Korea in 1910.

By 1920 there were a total of 80 power stations operating in Korea. 28 of these plants were operated by private electric companies. Altogether these 28 companies produced only 35,000 kilowatts electrical power.\footnote{Ibid.} Of the remaining 52 power stations throughout Korea 42 were in private hands, while the government operated the remaining ten.\footnote{Ibid.} Most of these power stations were located in Korea’s major towns and cities providing electric power the various municipalities and some installed industries.

By March 1938 the electrical power generating capacity of the peninsula stood at 668,100 kilowatts; hydroelectric power plants accounted for 522,300 kilowatts installed capacity. Another 848,500 kilowatts hydroelectric capacity was under construction. 798,300 kilowatts of this additional plant would be derived from hydroelectric power stations.\footnote{Ibid.} By 1940 the construction of additional hydroelectric plants would increase overall production by 710,000 kilowatts while thermal power plant construction would only increase by another 40,000 kilowatts.

The largest of Korea’s power plants in operation or under construction in 1940 were located along the Choshin (Changjin), Funei (Puryong), Fusen (Pujon), Kokai (Kanggye), Kyosen (Hoch’on), and Yalu Rivers. The dams, reservoirs, power plants and turbine-generator sets installed in Korea were among the largest in the world. That same year, 1940 67 year-old Noguchi Shitagau the founder of Nichitsu suffered an intracranial hemorrhage while visiting Keijo. In the aftermath of the hemorrhage Noguchi began to withdraw from public life and active direction of the company. If Japan did build an
atomic bomb it is unlikely that Noguchi was heavily involved. It is also unlikely that his company Nichitsu, was deeply involved either. In 1942 Noguchi was awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 1st Class. He died on 15 January 1944.

By 1943 it was estimated that the overall generating capacity of all power plants on the peninsula exceeded 2,000,000 kilowatts. A February 1945 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Strategic Engineering Study estimated Korea’s 1943 installed capacity to be in excess of 2,500,000 kilowatts. Another study projected that by 1945 the electrical power production capacity of the Korean Peninsula would exceed 3,000,000 kilowatts. By comparison, the production capacity of 1937 Japan stood at about 7,000,000 kilowatts while the electrical power production capacity of the U.S. stood at 42,000,000 kilowatts. In 1941 all power plants located in Korea with the exception of those located along the Yalu River which would remain independent, were nationalized and brought under the direct supervision of the Government-General.

While the Government-General Chosen encouraged the growth of Korea’s hydroelectric potential despite the vast amounts of brown and bituminous coal across the peninsula, the Japanese did little to expand the growth of the peninsula’s thermoelectric power generation capabilities. During Japan’s Occupation the Japanese constructed few large-scale thermoelectric power stations on the peninsula. Most reported thermoelectric power stations in Korea of any size burned coal. Few if any of Korea’s thermoelectric power plants burned diesel or fuel oils. There are actually no reports from WWII of diesel or fuel-oil medium- or large-scale power stations operating in Korea.

The two largest thermoelectric plants discussed in wartime documents include a 100 megawatt plant located at Neietsu (Yongwol) in Kogen-do (Kangwon Province) and a 50 megawatt plant at Sanchoku (Samch’ok) in the same province. Nichitsu’s on-site power plant; a Standley thermal plant was rated at 14,000 kilowatts. There were three 10 megawatt thermoelectric power stations in Korea, one each at; Keijo, Rysuzan (Yongsan) and Seishin. The next largest thermoelectric power station, a nine megawatt plant was located at Fusan. One four megawatt plant was located north of Yuki near the Korea-Russian border. All remaining thermoelectric power stations located on the peninsula were far smaller.

Japanese Hydroelectric Power Stations in Korea

The Japanese installed national power system on the Korean Peninsula centered on six major hydroelectric power complexes each consisting of a number of large-scale hydroelectric power stations. The six complexes consisted of the Fusen (4 plants), Choshin (7 plants), Kyosen (4), Funei (2), Kokai (4) and Suiho (7 plants), Kyosen (4), Funei (2), Kokai (4) and Suiho (Supung) power systems. Most other thermoelectric and hydroelectric power stations on the peninsula provided dedicated support to a single customer or some municipality. Though two of these power stations were rated as large-scale power plants in excess of 20 MW; most did not materially add to the power available across the peninsula’s national-grid. Several of the complexes developed are described below.

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1134 Ibid.
The Fusen Power System

Construction on the Fusen system began in 1926. It was the first hydroelectric power plant constructed by the Nichitsu Konzern in support of its industrial expansion onto the Korean Peninsula. Construction of the Fusen power plant system was a direct result of cooperation between Nichitsu and the Government-General of Korea.

The Fusen system contained four generating plants deriving their power from a series of three reservoirs located to the west of Puksubaek-san, a mountain in the Nangrim Range. The Fusen Reservoir was the largest of the three man-made lakes and was located at an elevation of 4,015 foot. The dam forming the Fusen Reservoir stood 285 foot tall and 1312 foot wide, providing a reservoir of nine square miles. The maximum depth of the reservoir was 239 foot. The reservoir’s shallows were 88 foot deep. The maximum capacity of the reservoir was calculated to be 23,660,826,703 cubic foot of water. 16,421,320,025 cubic foot of water was available to support power generation. 20,000 people per day for a period of three years are reported to have worked on the construction of the Fusen River Dam. The main dam required 150,000 tons of cement. The other two reservoirs supporting the system were located downstream of the main reservoir but were designed to serve as additional storage facilities in support of the main reservoir.

During periods of low water levels in the primary reservoir water from the two lower lakes was pumped to the main reservoir from two separate pumping stations, one station located on each reservoir. Five 2,500 horse power pumps were used to transfer water 400 foot upward and into the main reservoir. When in use the pumps consumed the combined entire power generation capacity of the third and fourth power plants downstream of the first generating station.

Water from the primary reservoir was carried through the mountains separating the Pujon Plateau from the coastal plains by a concrete-lined headrace pressure tunnel 12.1 foot wide, extending eastward 16.5 miles through the mountains. The headrace pressure tunnel created an operating head of 2,319 foot above the first power plant in the system. Water from the headrace tunnel entered a surge tank located above the first station. From the surge tank water dropped through four 9,280 foot long penstocks. An extension of the aqueduct tunnel system, each pipe supported a single turbine-generator set located inside the generating plant. Portions of the penstock system were located underground. Unlike the aqueduct, each penstock was either steel or steel lined. The first plant in the Fusen System, Fusen-ko Hydroelectric Power Plant Number One had a rated production capacity of 130,000 kilowatts, three times the capacity of the largest hydroelectric power plant then operating in Japan.

Fusen-ko Hydroelectric Power Plant Number One was built into solid bedrock. 15,695 cubic yards of rock was excavated from the construction site. A nearly equal amount of concrete was poured to replace the rock removed. The plant’s operating head was 2,296 foot. Its four generators, built by Siemens of Germany produced 36,000 kilovolt amps and weighed 230 tons. Each generator...
supported its own single-circuit 110,000 kilovolt high tension transmission line. If necessary all lines extending from the plant could be operated in parallel. The plant’s turbines, built by S. M. Voith operated at 360 revolutions per minute (rpm) and were rated at 45,000 horse power. Each turbine weighed 100 tons. The maximum guaranteed efficiency of the turbines was 89 percent. The plant’s main transformers built by Tokyo Shibaura Electric, stepped up power from 11,000 volts to 110,000 volts. Each transformer weighed 98 tons. The total capacity of the plant was 144,000 kilovolt amps. The entire output of the plant was supplied to the Chosen Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant located 38 miles away.

Hydraulically Connected

Water exiting the first plant, the station’s tailrace located 1,581 foot above mean sea level was led into a second concrete lined tunnel, 3.6 miles long leading to the second power plant in the system. The water tunnel exiting the first plant formed an operating head of 708 foot for use by Plant Number Two. The water tunnel fed a second set of penstocks, each about 1,550 foot long extending from a surge tank located above the power station. Each penstock supported a single turbine-generator set located inside the power station. The plant’s generators could be operated singly or in parallel. Each generator in the system operated at 11 kilovolts. The total design capacity of the nine installed generators stood at 230,000 kilowatts. The plant’s turbines rotating at 460 rpm produced 31,000 horsepower. Each turbine had a guaranteed efficiency of 89 percent. The transformers supporting the second plant were rated at 23,000 kilovolt amp and were manufactured by the Fuji Electrical Machine Manufacturing Company of Japan. Water from the tailrace of the second power plant entered a third aqueduct 3.2 miles long which fed water into the third plant in the system.

The second, third and fourth generation plants were located three, seven and twelve miles downstream of the first power station. The operating heads of the third and fourth power stations were 308 and 134 foot respectively. Water discharged from the fourth and final power station exited into the Songchong River, near Shinko (Sinhung) west of Konan. In November 1929 the first portion of the Fusen River Dam was completed, providing a generating capacity of 65,000 kilowatts. The Chosen Chisso fertilizer plant began operations in January 1930. The Fusen hydroelectric power plant system was completed in 1932.

38 miles separated the first plant in the Fusen system from the last. Power produced at each plant was stepped up to 110 kilovolts for transmission to the cities and industries supported by the grid extending outward from the generating complex. Two sets of double-circuit high-tension 110-kV power lines extended between the first, second and third power plants in the system. At least one set of lines extended from the system directly to the Nichitsu chemical plant located at Konan, other lines connected the four plants to the national grid. High-tension power lines connected the Fusen-ko development to the Choshin power system. In the ten years after the construction of the Pujon River power plant system, the Nichitsu-Ugaki partnership succeeded in developing most of the peninsula’s hydroelectric potential. Any potential sites that were not otherwise fully developed in that ten year period were under construction. Some were under construction during and completed during the war.

The Choshin System

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1151 Ibid.
1152 Ibid.
1153 Ibid.
1154 Ibid.
1155 Ibid.
1156 Ibid.
1157 Ibid.
1158 Ibid.
1162 Ibid.
1165 Ibid.
1166 Ibid.
The Choshin System was the second major hydro-electric power scheme constructed in Korea. In 1950 during the Korean War the area of the reservoir was the scene of a series of unusually brutal engagements between Chinese Peoples Volunteer Forces and forces of the U.S. known as the Battles of the Chosin Reservoir. The power system was constructed in the 1930s to meet the demand for additional power by the functional areas of Nichitsu plants either operating at Konan or under construction. Though constructed just a few years after the completion of the Fusen system, the facilities, turbine-generator sets and so on of the Choshin system were far more modern, up-to-date and efficient than those of the Fusen cascade. Two reservoirs supported the power system.

The larger of the two reservoirs, the Choshin-ho was formed by a concrete dam 159 foot in height, 2,404 foot in length. The reservoir created by the dam held 37,398,232,058 cubic foot of water. The effective volume available to the system’s generators stood at 29,664,320,046 cubic feet. Two separate concrete-lined aqueducts one each, extended from each reservoir to a surge tank above the first power plant in the system.

The Choshin system consisted of a total of seven separate power plants; four large-scale, and three medium-scale plant with a total design capacity of over 300,000 kilowatts.

Plant number One, Choshin Number 1, of the Choshin system was designed to produce 144,000 kilowatts. Water was fed to the plant from the two concrete-lined aqueducts originating at the two reservoirs to a surge tank located above the generating station and then into four alternating, five and six-foot wide penstocks. The plant’s four penstocks measured 5,418 foot long. The penstocks created an operating head of 1,525 foot. The power plant itself contained four horizontally mounted 60-cycle turbine-generator sets each producing 10,500 kilovolts. Each turbine was rated at 36,000 kilowatts each. The transformer substation and switchyard serving the plant were located next to the main generating hall. As with the Fusen system water exiting the first power plant, the plant’s tailrace, was fed into a second set of concrete-lined aqueducts that fed the next plant in the system, Choshin Number 2.

Choshin Number 2 was located four miles downstream from the first power plant in the system and was completed in January 1937. The second plant contained four vertical generators rated at 31,111 kilovolt amps each. Penstocks dropping water to the plant created an operating head of 1,027 foot. The power station’s total design capacity was between 106,000 and 112,000 kilowatts. The plant’s transformer substation and switch yard were located immediately adjacent to the power station. The tailrace of Choshin Number 2 was fed again, into a third concrete-lined aqueduct to generate additional power at Choshin Number 3.

Plant Number Three was located 2.5 miles downstream of Choshin Number Two. Three penstocks fed water into the plant generating additional power from three vertical, 15,500 kilovolt amp turbine-generator sets. The operating head of plant three was 466 foot. As with Choshin Number Two, water from the tailrace of the third plant was fed into a fourth concrete-lined aqueduct which fed water to Choshin Number Four. The fourth power plant contained three smaller turbine-generator sets. Choshin Number Four was rated at 34,200 kilowatts possessing an operating head of 302 foot. The system’s three medium-scale power stations were located on the Plains of Hamhung west of the city, generating power from a canal leading from Choshin Number Four to a point near the coast. The power produced by the Choshin system was transmitted by the Korea Power Transmission Company to Heijo and Keijo on the west coast of the peninsula, Konan and


1170 Ibid.


1173 Ibid.

1174 Ibid.

1175 Ibid.


1178 Ibid.

1179 Ibid.

1180 Ibid.

1181 Ibid.

1182 Ibid.

1183 Ibid.
Seishin on the Korea’s east coast. The Kyosen power system was the last of the peninsula’s major hydraulically interconnected power stations to be installed by the Japanese during their Occupation of Korea.

**The Kyosen System**

Work on the Kyosen System began while the Choshin system was still under construction. Four reservoirs were built to support the production of electrical power. Stair-stepped through the mountains, the water of each reservoir could be used at any time to support power generation.

Due to the larger volume of water and the greater head pressures available to support the Kyosen system as compared to that of the Choshin and Fusen designs, the supporting water tunnels and penstocks of the Kyosen system were larger than the others installed on the peninsula. As with the other systems the water from the first plant was fed into additional tunnels to support the next plant in the system. Four power stations worked to extract energy from the moving water. Each power station held four generators for a total of 16 turbine-generators sets operating throughout the system, each producing 11,000 volts at 60 cycles. Total design capacity of the Fusen System stood at 394,000 kilowatts. Nine to 11 miles separated one plant from the other. Two final interconnected systems the Funei and Kokai completed the Japanese development of cascade systems on the Korean Peninsula.

The Funei system was completed in 1939 and primarily supported the Japanese industries located in and around Seishin. The two power stations of the Kokai system completed before the end of WWII generated about 200,000 kilowatts. Work on the Kokai system would continue throughout much of the Korean War. To generate additional power the Japanese turned to run-of-river and base-of-dam power plants: The largest of these were located on the Yalu River that formed the border separating Korea from Manchuria.

**Suiho/Supung HPP**

The Suiho (Chinese: Shuifeng-tung, Korean: Supung) Hydroelectric Power Plant was located about 30 miles northeast of Antung, Manchuria along the Yalu River. It was the first of seven major power plants that the Japanese designed for eventual installation on the Yalu River. 50 Percent of the funds required to build the Supung power plant were provided by the Manchurian Yalu Water Power Company. The Korean Yalu Water Power Company provided an additional 40 percent of the investment required while Nichitsu provided the remainder. The Suiho Dam measured 2,950 feet long and stood 349 feet tall. The dam was 262 foot wide at its base, 26 foot wide at its crest. Originally scheduled for completion in 1941 frequent heavy floods delayed its completion until just prior to the end of WWII. When completed it was the largest single power plant in Asia and the fourth largest dam in the world after the Grand Coulee, Shasta and the Hoover Dams located in the U.S.

The reservoir created by the Suiho Dam covered 128 square miles and is reported to have stretched 60 miles up the Yalu River. The volume of the reservoir was estimated at 257,797,067,070 cubic foot. Unlike the other plants built by the Japanese, the Suiho did not rely upon high water pressures created by lengthy aqueducts to generate electrical power but on the massive volume of water held back by the plant’s dam. The power plant itself was located at the base of the concrete Suiho Dam on the southern side of the Yalu River.

The design capacity of the plant was 700,000 kilowatts. The plant’s seven turbine-generator sets rated at 143,000 horsepower each, were the most powerful in the world at that time. Daily operational capacity at maximum water levels was 640,000 kilowatts. Average water levels in the reservoir produced 445,000 kilowatts. At least one of the Supung’s installed turbine-generator sets was built in Germany by Siemens-Schuckert just before the start of WWII. Two of the plant’s

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1187 Ibid.

1188 Ibid.

1189 Ibid.


1192 Ibid.


1196 Ibid.


1198 Ibid.
100,000 kVA generators had been ordered from the same German company. WWII prevented the second generator from being delivered. The plant’s remaining five generators were built by Tokyo Shibaura Electric of Japan. The plant’s seven vertical Francis turbines were manufactured by Dengyoasha of Japan. Between four and six of the plant’s 16,500-volt generators were installed before the end of WWII though only four were actually operational at the end of WWII. Each turbine-generator set had an operating capacity of 100,000 kilowatts. Two of the plant’s generators, numbers six and seven produced only 60-cycle power for use in the Korean grid, while number’s four and five provided power at 50-cycles for use in Manchukuo. 50 percent of the power generated by the plant went north into Manchukuo, while the other 50 percent supported industrial operations in Korea.

Most of the electricity generated by the Suiho hydroelectric power plant (HPP) for the Korean grid supported the industries and population of Korea located on the western side of the peninsula at Heijo and Keijo, though the Korean national grid could move power anywhere around the peninsula. The remaining power produced by the Supung HPP was transmitted into Manchuria in support of the Japanese installed heavy industries in Mukden, Harbin and as far away as Darien. In 1947 the Soviet Union seeking war reparations removed the Supung’s third and fourth generators, its third, fourth, and fifth turbines from the Supung HPP into Soviet Russia. These were later returned to the Yalu River and reinstalled in the Suiho plant.

Additional plants similar to the Supung HPP were to be built along the Yalu River at Gishu, Igen, Jigi, Kogen, Rinki and Shuan. At least one of these plants located at Taifu was largely complete and operational by the end of the war. The Japanese had also planned the construction of a similar such power station near Tokusen (Toch’on) in central northern Korea.

The management of Korea’s electrical power assets grew in importance as the industrial concerns began to install production facilities outward from Korea’s northeast coast into the peninsula’s major population centers. Once nationalized the power plants operating on the peninsula were now also responsible for supplying power to the country’s major cities. High tension 110-, 154-, and 220-kV power lines were constructed to move power from the isolated plants located in the mountains into areas of national importance.

Korea’s National Grid

The majority of the major power plants installed on the peninsula were connected to a national transmission grid that enabled the bulk power being generated at geographically isolated power plants in the northeastern mountains, to be transferred to the population centers and industries located across the country. Certain plants, though connected to national grid such as the Kenjiho plant were designed to support specific areas of the country or the industries located in their geographical areas. Such plants, known as “dedicated power plants” operated continuously in support of some specific industry or area, only drawing power from the national grid during periods of plant maintenance, shortages of coal, drought, or periods of excess demand. In the absence of national level power from the grid such plants could disconnect from the national grid to operate independently as “islands.” These plants rarely relied upon the country’s national grid.

Most of the power generated by Korea’s plants, though connected to the national grid distributed the electricity that was generated to the specific industry or city they supported. Power produced in excess of factory needs was transferred to the national grid. The peninsula’s power transmission system was operated by the Korea Power Transmission Company, Ltd.

The Korea Power Transmission Company was established solely for the purpose of constructing and operating the transmission system that moved power from the Choshin system to the peninsula’s largest cities of Heijo and Keijo.
During WWII, intelligence analysts wrote that the Korean transmission system was under the direct control of the Government-General. In return for establishing the country’s grid the Korea Power Transmission Company received the rights to develop the power of the Kosuín River, ultimately building several reservoirs near Hwangsuwon. The Japanese eventually installed additional and higher-voltage transmission systems across the peninsula.

The national grid installed across Korea by the Japanese before the end of the war operated at three kilovolt ranges, 110-, 154- and 220-kV. Power was transmitted along single-, double-, and triple-circuit lines. Though the nation’s power system was interconnected, transmitting power throughout the country, the mountainous interior of the country forced the national grid to be operated nearly as two separate grids; an eastern grid along the narrow coastal plains abutting the East Sea and a western grid located on the Plains of Pyongyang.

The eastern grid drawing its power from hydroelectric power stations located high in Korea’s mountains primarily supported the Japanese industries located at Genzan, Konan, Ranam, Seishin, and so on. The western grid drawing most of its power from the huge Supung-ho Hydroelectric Power Plant installed on the Yalu River, transmitted electric power to the cities of and industries located at Chinamp’o, Fusan, Heijo and Keijo.

The country’s first transmission system, its 110-kV grid was installed along Korea’s eastern and northeastern coasts to and north of Konan. This early national-level grid served to transmit the bulk power generated by the peninsula’s large-scale hydroelectric power plants located in isolated areas across the country, to national-level transformer substations located along the grid. These national-level substations would then step the power down to distribution-level voltages for use in its specific geographic area. Over 134 miles of 110,000-volt lines was in-place by March 1931. By March 1938 the 110-kV system had grown to distance of 408 miles. It was by design a regional grid only.

A higher-level transmission system consisting of 154-kV transmission lines was installed between 1931 and 1938. The higher kilovolt power lines allowed greater amounts of bulk power to be shipped from their production centers in the high mountains eastward to the centers of demand located along Korea’s east coast. By 1939 the 154-kV system covered a distance of 423 miles. The 154-kV system nearly paralleled the 110-kV system, but also transmitted power cross country to a national-level substation east of Heijo where power was further transmitted to Keijo and other population centers along the west coast of the country. No further expansion of these two systems occurred under the Japanese during the remainder of the occupation.

The final high-voltage system installed by the Japanese, a 220-kV transmission system was far more extensive that the 110-kV regional grid.

The 220-kilovolt transmission system was installed after 1939 and was far more extensive than the previous 110- and 154-kV transmission grids. Like its lower-voltage predecessors the 220-kV system moved bulk power from the large power plants then operating, or to be constructed along the Yalu River and its tributaries to Chinamp’o, Heijo, Keijo, and as far south as Fusan. By 1945 the 220-kV system would measure 2,025 miles in length, twice the length of the country’s 110- and 154-kV systems combined and stretched the entire length of the peninsula. Unlike the 110- and 154-kV grids the 220-kV grid served both the country’s east and west coasts. Most power stations were connected to the national grid for power transmission purposes but also plant-to-plant for operational purposes. The country’s distribution system was similarly extensive.

Korea’s Distribution Grid
The Japanese installed distribution system operated at 66,000 volts (66-kV). The distribution system transmitted power via alternating current (AC). 124 miles of the distribution-level power system was in-place by March 1931. The majority of this early distribution grid directly supported Nichitsu interests at Konan. As the distribution system expanded it served to deliver power transmitted from the peninsula’s power plants through the nation’s grid to national-level substations where it was then stepped-down in voltage and distributed to cities, towns and industrial facilities. The power supplied was transformed to direct current (DC) on-site at these locations where necessary for use in such industries as the Nichitsu chemical combine at Konan.1214

The 66-kV distribution system also extended directly from the peninsula’s various power stations into local areas where demand existed. By March 1938 the distribution system had grown to a distance of about 1,491 miles.1215 The construction of another 450 miles of 66-kV power lines was planned for completion after 1939.1216 By 1939 12.5 percent of all Koreans had access to electrical power.1217 A sub-distribution system operating at 33-kV augmented the operations of the 66-kV distribution grid. The existence of a large number of power plants and an extensive grid did little to support a large-scale uranium enrichment program.

The Korean Electrical Power System – Over-Tasked

Uranium enrichment facilities require access to large, stable, uninterruptible and reliable distribution-level power supplies produced by thermal or hydroelectric power plants over a long period of time with some minimum level of emergency back-up power resource constantly available. The key words are stable, uninterruptible, reliable, distribution-level and emergency back-up.

According to a Strategic Engineering Study, Electric Power of Korea, produced by the Corps of Engineers U.S. Army in February 1945 “an abnormally large proportion of the Korean power production is absorbed by powerful industries, mines of various types, munitions factories, nitrogen plants,” and so on located on the peninsula.1218 The facilities of Nichitsu alone were estimated to require 400,000 kilowatts.1219 As stated in the report “since most of the output is absorbed by mines, electrochemical and munitions plants, the load factor must be high.”1220 The load factor is the total energy consumed in a period (kWh) over maximum power that can be delivered (kW) into the number of hours (h) in that period. One watt is the rate at which work is done when one ampere (A) of current flows through an electrical potential difference of one volt (V).

While the amount of electrical power required to successfully operate a production facility of the size necessary to produce a Japanese uranium weapon was for the most part available on the peninsula, and the locations of those power plants known, that electrical power resource existed only within finite limits over specific periods of time. Though the potential capacity to produce electricity in the amounts necessary to support such a large-scale uranium enrichment operation might have been available as indicated above, the electric power required to operate such an installation while supporting the other industries located on the peninsula was not. The Japanese constructed power plants located in Korea were in-fact already over-tasked with supporting the Japanese industries then located on the peninsula and could not support a large-scale uranium enrichment process and still meet the requirements of existing customers.

The amount of electrical power that could be produced at any one moment, over one week, one month or one year was limited. To develop a large-scale uranium enrichment process on the peninsula during the years proposed while operating most if not all other industries then located on the Korea Peninsula, required the ability to generate a level of power far beyond the installed production capacity of the power plants then in operation.

The demand for power required by a large-scale uranium enrichment process in Korea as with the U.S. Manhattan Project, could only be achieved at the loss of electrical power to the other industries or industrial processes that also required access to that power over the same period of time. The Manhattan Project’s Oak Ridge plant faced this same dilemma in fulfilling its electrical power requirements when it accessed the electrical power production capacity of the then continental U.S., most notably the electrical power produced by the Tennessee Valley Authority, (TVA) to enrich the uranium required for the bomb used at Hiroshima. The uranium production processes conducted at Oak Ridge during the latter part of WWII

1214 Ibid.
1215 Ibid.
1216 Ibid.
1217 Ibid.
1218 Ibid.
consumed fully one-seventh of all the electrical power produced in the United States at that time. Oak Ridge was supported by eight separate distribution-level 66-kV substations. The maximum peak electric power demand rate established for the facilities at Oak Ridge was 310,000 kilowatts. The highest demand rate ever recorded by the facility occurred on 1 September 1945 when demand reached 298,800 kilowatts.

The electric power required to enrich uranium to weapons-grade material in the U.S. came at the cost of providing that same electric power to the aluminum plants and steel mills which supported the wartime production necessary to win the war. Less aluminum and steel meant less bombers, fighter aircraft, tanks, ammunitions, carriers, rifles, bayonets, helmets, etc. Some argue that the resources dedicated to building the uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima actually lengthened the war by diverting resources away from other weapons may have ended the war earlier.

In the U.S. during WWII to balance demand against production, the War Production Board worked to ensure the amount of electrical power required to meet the challenges faced by the country could be achieved by the generating capacity available. The War Production Board managed the creation and development of new federally-owned electrical power production plants, transmission and distribution systems many of which supported the Manhattan Project.

Similar to the Manhattan Project, Japan’s war planners also recognized that electrical power was a resource. Like any other resource the amount of electrical power was limited; it had to be rationed and properly managed to meet the requirements of the industries supporting the war. More bullets could only be produced at the expense of some other needed commodity. Tatsusaburo Suzuki, a Japanese physicist involved in Japan’s atomic bomb program stated in 2002 “One of our officers suggested we should scrap five or six heavy cruisers to make a 50,000-tonne facility.” As with ships it was a process of balancing the demands of the war against the resources available. While most researchers concentrate only on the Nichitsu complex those other major combines and industries then operating on the peninsula at that time; Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and RIKKEN would have been likewise adversely impacted if access to the normal level of electrical power support could not be maintained.

Though the electrical power production capacity to enrich uranium to the level required for a bomb program may have existed in Korea, the decision to operate such a facility would have meant curtailing the operations of most other industries then operating on the peninsula. Like Nichitsu, the other industries that would have been shut down to operate a uranium enrichment program were also supporting the Japanese war effort.

As of 1939 more than 6,953 enterprises small or large were operating on the peninsula. 149 of these enterprises employed 200 or more people while 5,676 employed 30 or less. With the reorganization mandated by the Commission on the Investigation of Countermeasures for the Current Situation most of these smaller shops now supported the larger combines, all of which worked in support of the war. These small and large companies represented a considerable political and economic force governing the allocation of resources across the Korean Peninsula. The decision to operate a large-scale enrichment process of the size required to develop a uranium-based bomb would have required most existing munitions production facilities, crop irrigation systems, gun powder, steel mills, aluminum plants, magnesium refineries, coal mines, and so on, to cease regular operations while the uranium enrichment process was operating. The diversion of the electrical power required to support a large-scale uranium enrichment process would have included limiting power to the major population centers of Fusan, Heijo, Keijo, Konan, Seishin and all remaining cities on the peninsula. Had these industries and population centers suffered a major diversion of electrical power, periods of massive long-term blackouts for weeks at a time, some record of the event would remain. From the statements of POWs held at Jinsen, Keijo, Konan and those prisoners passing through Fusan during the WWII, the writings of Japanese and Koreans living on the peninsula, no such blackouts ever took place. Not one POW affidavit taken at the end of the war ever mentions a rationing of electrical power to the industries where they labored.

The POWs stoking the furnaces at the Nichitsu calcium carbide facility worked 365 days a year; 24-hours a day, seven days per week continuously until released from work at the end of the war. No brownouts, no blackouts. Eugene Harwood called the work of the POWs at Konan, “appalling.” In addition thousands of Japanese and Koreans would have been forced into unemployment and economic dislocation. No such periods of unemployment and economic dislocation ever took place during the period that such facilities would have been in operation.

To develop a uranium enrichment program of the size necessary to create an atomic bomb in time to alter the course of the war without interrupting the ongoing operations of existing industries would have required a high volume of excess electrical power production capacity. Though electrical power utilities normally maintain some level of excess production capacity, usually to manage periods of peak demand the excess capacity required to operate a uranium enrichment program in Korea while all other industries continued to operate, did not exist on the peninsula either before or during WWII. While several new hydroelectric power plants did come on line during the war, the power those plants produced was consumed by the planned pre-war industrial expansion that continued to occur on the peninsula after the war began.

The key difference in the ability of the U.S. over that of Japan in producing a uranium-based weapon lay in the amount of excess electrical power production capacity available to the U.S. throughout the war. During WWII the growing requirement for additional power in the U.S. was met by the growth of privately-owned power plants and the expansion of federally owned power stations.\textsuperscript{1226} In 1937 U.S. production capacity stood at 42,000,000 kilowatts. From 1941 to 1945 the growth in Federally-owned capacity alone averaged 21 percent per year. Over the same period federally owned generation capacity grew by 27 percent per year. During the war the total U.S. generation capacity grew at a rate of over 7.5 percent annually.\textsuperscript{1227}

During the same period of time, the installed electrical power production capacity on the Korean Peninsula also expanded. In 1937 the installed capacity of Korean power stations stood at about 1,378,100 kilowatts. By 1943 U.S. intelligence analysts estimated the total installed capacity of the Korean Peninsula at about 2,500,000 kilowatts; by 1945 the estimate had increased to roughly 3,000,000 kilowatts. But these numbers were based upon ideal conditions. As noted in the earliest Government-General studies weather impacted the power station’s ability to reach maximum operating potentials. The Korean Peninsula suffered from no lack of adverse weather, periods of flooding and drought.

\textbf{No Water, No Power}

Weather over the Korean Peninsula is highly dependent upon two factors; continental high pressure air masses that develop over Siberia during the winter months pushing dry cold air down over the peninsula, and summer monsoons that force moist air northward over the Asian landmass. Most rainfall over the area falls across the southern part of the peninsula, far from the reservoirs and drainage areas that support the large-scale power plants located in northern Korea.

A report produced by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare during the war divided the peninsula’s rainfall map into three areas; a southern, a central and a northern area. The document reports yearly rainfall in the southern part of the peninsula at 57 inches, rainfall in the center of the country at 44 inches, and in the northern part a mere 32 inches.\textsuperscript{1228} Fully 70 percent of the rainfall over the Korean peninsula takes place from June to September each year. Korean winters bring less than ten percent of the peninsula’s annual precipitation. The remaining months of the year are fairly dry. Korea’s hydroelectric power potential was therefore extremely dependent upon seasonal variations adversely impacting the ability of these plants to provide a stable, reliable source of electrical power.

The majority of the power plants built by Nichitsu before and during the war were located in some of the driest areas of the peninsula the country’s far northeast. As electrical power produced cannot be stored for future use, hydroelectric power stations manage overall annual production by storing large amounts of water in reservoirs for later use throughout the year. The heavy rains taking place in the spring and summer of the year in Korea were held by large reservoirs as a reserve for use during the drier parts of the year. Rainfall and snowmelt replenish the water held in a reservoir for later use by the power plant. Frequently these seasonal rains generate flooding that would overwhelm the capacity of the reservoir and flood the power plants located below.

To defeat flooding during periods of heavy rains reservoir operators would open flood gates to lower the level of the reservoir. During periods of drought the gates were closed. It was a balancing act. If too many flood gates were opened too much water could be released and later rains might not refill the reservoir. If too few floodgates were opened the water would overflow the dam and flood power stations or damage aqueducts. Power stations such as those located along the Yalu River were the most susceptible to this type of flooding.

The ability of Korea’s industrial plant to conduct operations throughout an entire calendar year was therefore limited to the ability of power plant operators to manage the water levels supporting the major reservoirs, a continuously risky proposition in an area known for its periods of frequent drought and flooding.


\textsuperscript{1227} Ibid.

As with the Nichitsu chemical combine and other industries located in Korea, any uranium enrichment facility operating on the peninsula would be faced with the same problem; timing operations to periods of intense rainfall and balancing long-term operations against the ability of the peninsula’s power stations to continue generating the required electrical power. 50 to 70 years after the construction of these major power plants it is a difficulty that continues to plague modern-day North Korea in managing their industrial production capacities.

The last major period of flooding across the peninsula occurred in 1996 with several North Korea base-of-dam power stations heavily damaged. Often, periods of drought would follow the years of flooding. As late as 2001 Korea suffered the worst drought of the last century. The last previous drought had occurred only four years before in 1997. As for a back-up source of electrical power Nichitsu lacked a source sufficient to support the emergency shut-down of any possible large-scale uranium enrichment plant.

**Back-Up Power**

For industries conducting operations on the Korean Peninsula, a source of emergency back-up power sufficient to shut down on-going operations when power from the national- or distribution-level grid was interrupted was a requirement. All chemical plants, steel mills, cement plants located on the peninsula maintained some level of emergency back-up electrical power system. A back-up was required to permit the safe shutdown of operating equipment when national- and distribution-level power was lost. Such power plants did not possess the capacity to support continued operations until such power was restored, but were only large enough to support shut down operations when stable power was lost. Nichitsu maintained such a power station.

Nichitsu’s on-site emergency back-up power system consisted of a single Standley thermal plant rated at 14,000 kilowatts. The plant was installed during site construction between 1928 and 1930 and was never upgraded. Had the fertilizer plant been the location of a large-scale uranium-enrichment plant it would have lacked sufficient back-up power to allow the safe shutdown of a large-scale uranium enrichment operation. The Korean electrical power system was further limited by the production capacity of the plants installed, the availability of the water, coal, or oil required to operate them, proper maintenance and so on.

**Taken Out of Context**

The Snell article succeeded in generating the interest required to force the intelligence community to reexamine Japan’s program far deeper than it had previously. It also forced the intelligence community to devote scarce assets and resources toward validating the information presented in one single, sensational newspaper article. That Japan might have possessed an atomic bomb program hadn’t been a serious consideration during WWII. Over the course of WWII no large unexplained facilities had ever been located on the Korean Peninsula, it was a self-fulfilling prophecy; the Japanese were incapable of producing a bomb, there were no large facilities located in Korea hence, no program. Facing public inquiry the intelligence community closed ranks against any serious investigation into the subject. Despite Snell’s claims the U.S. intelligence community never seriously considered the possibility that a Japanese bomb program actually existed and would never seriously investigate the claim. It was a problem that would continue to plague the U.S intelligence community into present times as bureaucracies protect themselves from outsiders and previously taken positions become wedded to agency credibility. Vice expending more resources reinvestigating the issue with an open mind, the intelligence community closed ranks behind its original assessment. As the years and decades passed with the intelligence community defending an assessment overcome by current events in the form of new information, the community’s lack of action allowed the tale to assume the status of myth. As for the 1946 newspaper article, part of the problem stemmed from the lack of specific information presented by Snell in his article.

By centering the program near Konan and omitting pertinent details Snell’s article diverted investigators away from other information which might have pointed to different locations in northern Korea away from Konan and different paths to the development of a nuclear weapons capability. All other leads to the existence of such a program or its facilities were ignored. The article led follow-on investigators and analysts to search for a large-scale uranium enrichment program in an area where one never existed, Konan. The article raised more questions than it answered, most of which were never fully explored. Researchers confronting the subject would be wise to ask probing questions and perform further in-depth research.

Was the city of Konan unusual in the expansion of Japanese industry into Korea, Manchukuo, or China? Not really, other cities under Japanese control had seen similar such investment and growth. Was it all that odd that Nichitsu controlled the level of investment in Korea that it was reported to control? Not entirely, Nissan occupied much the same position in Manchukuo that Nichitsu would manage in Korea. Mitsubishi held a similar position in China. Was it unusual that a city would grow up around a single industry, or several industries located in the area? One has only to look at Omaha, Nebraska; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Liverpool, England or any of a hundred other towns and cities worldwide to see numerous examples of areas that are closely associated with one or several industries centered or headquartered in an area, town or city. Most of the industrialized areas of Korea including Eian, Genzan, Kaishu, Kainei, Kosei (Kangso), and Shariin were all
largely company towns based upon one or several major industries. Was Konan unusual in its location and growth as an industrial city of some note? Certainly not, Jun Noguchi as would numerous other industrialists then and now, located his industry near the resources that made his investment profitable.

Based upon research that Jun Noguchi himself performed in Korea in the early 1920s; access to electrical power, the location of raw materials, the potential for cheap transportation to name but a few factors for the most part dictated the location of his future industries. Was Konan the only city in Korea that the Soviets would deny the Pauley War Reparations Committee access as alluded to in the Snell article? No. There were three major areas the Pauley commission was denied access; Konan, Seishin and Manchuria. As the Pauley Report also reveals there were numerous specific facilities that the commission identified while on the ground in northern Korea outside the number of known facilities that it came to inspect that they were not allowed to enter. Pauley was reportedly the first American citizen to enter northern Korea since 1938. 1229 He might have been the first private citizen to enter northern Korea but he was not the first American, that honor went to Arthur Strilky. Western newsmen were not allowed to accompany the Pauley mission into northern Korea in 1945, so more in-depth reporting past the ambassador’s public statements is sorely lacking.

Was there research being conducted at Konan in the Nichitsu facilities that possibly supported Japan’s bomb? Most likely the answer would be yes. However the answer is largely dependent upon the meaning of the word “research.” It is a matter of degree. According to Anna Louise Strong who was in Konan in 1948, the plant produced “one of the constituent elements of the atom-bomb on which the Japanese were experimenting.” 1230 Strong does not offer any information to suggest what this element was, however the comment could apply to either uranium, deuterium oxide or even plutonium. As the plant did not contain a large-scale uranium enrichment process the statement suggests that whatever the involvement of Nichitsu in Japan’s atomic bomb program, it was of a smaller physical scale than that of a uranium enrichment facility. That Japan was researching atomic weapons in Korea or Japan though not well-known before the appearance of the Snell article was not at all unusual for the time in which that research took place.

During WWII the United States, Canada, China, England, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union all conducted research against nuclear weapons. Only one, the U.S. with assistance from Great Britain actually developed a weapon in time to alter the course of the war. With the rapid discoveries in physics taking place in the immediate decade prior to the war it is entirely possible but unlikely that any nuclear research and development ongoing at Konan was simply a result of internal interests within Nichitsu. Such research could have been easily conducted without the involvement of the Japanese government. Finally, was Konan the center of the Japanese atomic bomb program? No.

Growth of Industries in Korea

Unlike the Governor-Generals of Japan’s other colonies such as Formosa, Karafuto (South Sakhalin Island) and Japan’s South Pacific Mandates (Kwajalien, Palau, Saipan, Truk, Majuro, and Jaluit Atoll) acquired in the aftermath of WWI, the Governor-General of Korea also served as commander of the armed forces serving on the peninsula. Japanese law required that the person appointed Governor-General of Korea be an Army General or Naval Admiral currently on active duty. Of the 11 Japanese that served as Governor-Generals of Korea from 1910 to 1945 only one, Ugaki Kazushige (9 Aug 1868–30 Apr 1956) would serve twice.

Ugaki served Governor-General of Korea first in 1927 and later from 1931–1936. His first assignment as Governor-General provided him with a foundation, an understanding of the potential of Japan’s then agrarian colony. A ranking Japanese general officer knowledgeable of the ability of a government to manage or influence a country’s economy, his initial assignment to the country provided him first-hand knowledge of a leader’s ability to influence a government’s policies at a national-level to encourage or deny a country’s growth. Ugaki was present in Korea at the completion of Japan’s Imperial Geological Survey of 1926 providing greater evidence of the peninsula’s natural resources and industrial potential. To prospective investors the maps produced under the survey portrayed the locations of Korean deposits of coal, iron ore, bauxite, gold and other minerals necessary for the growth of Japan’s Empire. The maps also portrayed the water resources of Korea, of major interest to industries such as Mitsubishi who initially possessed the developmental rights to much of northern Korea’s hydroelectric power potential. Mitsubishi would eventually surrender those rights back to the Japanese government who would in-turn pass them to Jun Noguchi and Nichitsu.

Ugaki was also the only Governor-General to serve in Korea during the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression. Ugaki knew from experience that the right policies put in place could encourage industrial growth, expand of the economy, provide jobs and educate Korea’s population albeit under Japanese control. The wrong policies, too much government control,

1229 Pauley Will Inspect Soviet Zone of Korea. Monitor-Index and Democrat. Moberly, Missouri. 28 May 1946.
high tariffs, taxes and overall interference would only serve to limit and retard growth and expansion. The former leader of the Tōseiha, one of the more conservative and politically moderate factions vying for ideological supremacy within the Imperial Japanese Army Ugaki possessed the power and personality to convert goals into reality. Though somewhat liberal in his policies concerning Korean nationals when compared to his successors, Ugaki was not as much interested in the welfare of Korea’s population as he was in building a strategic industrial base capable of supporting any future Japanese war primarily against China, but also against the Soviet Union. Though Ugaki departed the peninsula in 1936 it was his efforts that set the pace for the further industrial development of Korea.

From the late 1920s through the 1930s the Japanese government in Korea encouraged efforts to increase Japanese industrial investment on the peninsula and Ugaki Kazushige continued those policies. Ugaki’s effort to expand Korea’s industrial base concentrated primarily on the creation of war supporting industries such as cement, chemicals, gun powder, munitions, steel and synthetic fibers at the expense of consumer and final goods. The welfare of the masses lay outside the goals of Ugaki’s government.

As the Japanese military possessed the same goals; placing additional military support industries closer to the front lines of any future war Ugaki’s plans were closely tied with Japan’s military interests abroad. Any industry venturing onto the peninsula could count on military support, government subsidies and guarantees, investment and consumption of the products produced on the peninsula in support of the war against China or a future war against the Soviet Union. In a real sense, Ugaki’s desire to industrialize Korea led in part to the perception of the close relationship identified between Japan’s government, military and its businesses noted after the war and expressed in the U.S. desire to break up the country’s large conglomerates, its zaibatsu and Konzerns.

The two Governor-Generals to follow Ugaki, Minami Jiro and Koiso Kuniaki continued the effort to attract Japanese industries to the peninsula and were largely successful. Unlike Ugaki however Minami and Koiso implemented many of the harsher programs against Koreans such as the previously mentioned ban on the Korean language and eventual universal conscription: Decisions that continue to scar Japanese-Korean relations 60 years later. At the end of WWII Minami Jiro and Koiso Kuniaki were arrested and convicted as Class A war criminals. The two were sentenced to life in prison. Koiso died at Sugamo Prison in 1950 while serving out his sentence. Minami was paroled for ill-health in 1954 and died the next year. After the war Ugaki was and purged from public service but was never charged with war crimes and was soon released. In 1953 Ugaki was elected to the House of Councilors in the post-war Diet of Japan. He passed on in 1956.

Investment in Korea

For a variety of reasons the total value of Japan’s major industries at home or abroad was never fully assessed in the aftermath of the war. The post-war confusion created by the loss of territories was a major factor in the inability to determine a value; the destruction of many of those industries by the war added to the confusion. The wartime classification of such data by the Japanese did little to assist investigators. In the immediate aftermath of the war, but prior to the arrival of U.S. occupation troops in Japan much of the information that was available was reportedly destroyed. The conversion of Japanese industries from a wartime footing to the production of consumer goods; the disruption caused by the dismantling of Japan’s major zaibatsu and Konzerns by SCAP economists and other investigators caused additional problems in assessing total holdings. Finally, the activities of Japan’s industrialists downplaying the roles of their companies in the expansion of the Japanese Empire during the war, further detracted from any ability to arrive at an accurate assessment of the total value of Japan’s wartime industrial sector. 1231

Data for the year 1939 used in many preliminary surveys of Japan’s war industries the most comprehensive material subsequently available in 1944–1945, indicated that more than 15 percent of the holdings of Japan’s 12 largest zaibatsu and Konzerns were located outside Japan proper. 1232 This figure would grow throughout the war as greater demand forced increased production. Real investment in new facilities and sources of production however would actually decrease as the cost of the war siphoned off excess sources of investment.

Of Japan’s zaibatsu and Konzerns, the industrial conglomerates originating during the Meiji Restoration, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Yasuda were far less interested in supporting the goals set by Ugaki or Japan’s controlling military elites than in making money. The older conglomerates however did not have to necessarily operate the industries created across Japan’s Empire to make a profit; they owned the banks. The Bank of Chosen operated 13 branches on the peninsula. The Chokusan Ginko, the Industrial Bank operated 67 branches. These banks operated in a semi-official capacity each within its own specialty areas. Three Japanese national banks operated in Korea; Dai-Ichi, Yasuda and Sanwa. By offering and

1232 Ibid.
guaranteeing loans the zaibatsu could invest, control and direct expansion with few undue risks. For Japan’s Konzerns it was more an issue of survival.

Many of Japan’s second-tier zaibatsu, the Konzerns of Asano, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Mori, Nissō, Nichitsu, Nomura, Okura, and RIKKEN, interested in the growth of their respective industries attached themselves to Japan’s military expansionists’s policies more aggressively investing in China, Formosa, Korea and Manchuria. Of Japan’s 13 major investors outside the main islands, nine were Konzerns. Of the 12 major investors in Korea only Nichitsu would eventually relocate its actual headquarters from Japan to the peninsula. In 1940 Nichitsu would reorganize its major subcomponents, its various factories located in and around Konan into one major company. However Nichitsu was not alone in relocating outside Japan. Nissan Konzern would relocate its headquarters from Japan to Manchukuo becoming the industrial center of the Manchurian Industrial Development Company in Manchukuo much as Nichitsu would in Korea.

As the chart below shows, investment across the Empire was a mixed bag of diversification and varied interests. Mitsubishi makes the chart five times once in each geographic area. Mitsubishi was the heaviest investor in China, second heaviest investor in Formosa and Karafuto and placed third in Korea and Manchuria. Mitsui shows up three times and led investment in Formosa and Karafuto. Like Mitsui, Sumitomo also makes the chart three times, once as the primary investor in Manchuria an third place in China and Karafuto. Nichitsu shows up twice on the chart once as the highest investor in Korea, and once as the second heaviest investor in China. Yasuda only shows up once as the second heaviest investor in Manchuria. It should be noted that according to the attached chart the investments of Yasuda and Mitsubishi combined in Manchuria were only slightly less than seven times as high as all of those of Nichitsu in Korea. Rated by total investment across Japan’s Empire, Nichitsu ranked fifth overall.

Japan’s four zaibatsu, its oldest conglomerates held the top four positions of major investors across the Empire. Japan’s new zaibatsu, the Konzerns held the lower positions. Sumitomo held the leading position across Asia. RIKKEN, The Institute of Physical and Chemical Research believed to be heavily involved in Japan’s atomic weapons program held the lowest position of Japan’s top twelve investors across the Empire. RIKKEN, unlike Nichitsu was actually invested in only one area of the Empire – Korea. Of Japan’s Konzerns, Nichitsu held the highest position of all investors across Asia but it was not alone in Korea and possibly not the best industry to manage Japan’s atomic bomb program.

It is often noted that Nichitsu was responsible for between 34 and 36 percent of all investment on the peninsula, a considerable amount. However it should also be noted that Nichitsu was not responsible for the remainder, between 64 and 66 percent of total investment. Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda and others were also heavily invested in Korea. Sumitomo and Yasuda though mentioned in the same breath as zaibatsu were clearly second rank at best when compared with Mitsubishi and Mitsui. Though forgotten today, in the era prior to and during WWII Mitsubishi and Mitsui not Nichitsu, dominated Japan’s economic life. Kuhara, Fujita and Furukawa three of Japan’s second rank zaibatsu were controlled financially by Mitsui. Sumitomo, oddly enough, was allied by marriage to Mitsui. Most engineering assets – an area critical to the development of nuclear weapons – were controlled by four large enterprises, Furukawa, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Okura, not Nichitsu.

Prior to the occupation of Korea by Japan, Mitsui had already established itself on the peninsula investing in textile and paper mills, light industrial ventures and mining operations. By 1907 Mitsui was heavily investing in Korea’s railroad system. One of Mitsui’s refining subsidiaries eventually merged with a chemical company operating in Korea to form Toyo Light Metals which later evolved into Mitsui Light Metals. The company eventually expanded its holding in Korea to include blast furnaces, chemicals, machine tools, and mining. Mitsui and Mitsubishi would later become a large user of Chinese, Korean and POW slave labor at their mines, refineries and other industries throughout Asia. With its involvement in the construction of the Thai-Burma Railroad considered Mitsubishi was the largest abuser of POW labor across Asia. Mitsubishi was also heavily involved in the economic expansion of Japanese industries onto the peninsula.

Unlike Mitsui, Mitsubishi was deeply invested in mining; primarily magnesium and tungsten, both strategic minerals; the production of iron and steel and in ship building. Most of Mitsubishi’s investments in Korea consisted of joint projects with other companies. In 1937 Mitsubishi in cooperation with Totaku Mining established the Chosen Jukogyo, a ship building firm in Fusan. The Mitsubishi Mining Company was one of the peninsula’s chief producers of anthracite coal. Mitsubishi also used loopholes in Japanese law to control numerous undeveloped mining interests as an absentee landlord. In

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conglomerates by Order of Total Investment across Asia- 1945.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sumitomo 849,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasuda 705,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsubishi 454,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsui 285,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichitsu 248,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okura 96,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nisso 23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mori 20,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomura 18,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwasaki 13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asano 9,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rikken 9,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

123) Ibid.
the late 1930s the Mitsubishi Mining Company, Japan Iron Manufacturing Company, and Japan Iron Mining Company formed the Mosan Mining Corporation to exploit the large Korea iron ore reserves located at Mosan. Near the end of 1939 the Mosan Mining Corporation produced its first pig iron. Mitsubishi also established steel plants across Korea.

Mitsubishi operated a large steel and pig iron production center at Keijo. In May 1939 the first blast furnace of the Mitsubishi Steel Plant at Seishin began operations while the Japan Iron Works, a joint Mitsui-Mitsubishi plant also located in Seishin was expected to begin full operation in April 1941. Mitsubishi was also involved in the extraction of fluorspar and other minerals in southern Kankyo (Hamgyong-namdo) province and like Mitsui, built, constructed and operated railroads. Despite the involvement of Mitsui and Mitsubishi in Korea no effort was made at the end of the war to investigate any possible role of these companies in the Japanese bomb program. The two companies had far more to recommend them as the industrial combine tasked develop a uranium enrichment program than Nichitsu; more so Mitsubishi than Mitsui.

Mitsubishi had far more experience working major, large-scale projects for the Japanese government and military than did Nichitsu. It was Mitsubishi that built the Yamato-class battleship, Musashi. It was Mitsubishi that built the famed Japanese Zero fighter. For the most part, the underlying physics behind uranium enrichment were widely known at the time, it was the engineering problems that stifled the development of separation technologies.

Unlike Nichitsu; Mitsubishi had ready access to the engineers necessary to solve the problems associated with uranium enrichment operations. Few chemicals are required in the production or enrichment of uranium. The most prominent, sulfuric acid is used primarily in the production of yellowcake. The Noguchi plant at Konan did produce sulfuric acid, however sulfuric acid can be easily transported. The production of yellowcake usually takes place at or near the mine location, often at the ore concentrator and not normally at a chemical production plant.

Unlike Nichitsu, Mitsubishi was heavily invested in mining across the peninsula and according to Snell, the mines producing the ore were located near Konan. Though it was actually Mitsubishi that possessed the primary resources required to produce an atomic bomb, it was Nichitsu that became the focus of historians, investigators and intelligence analysts. Pressing on….

One of the most difficult to understand issues related to the forcing down of Hog Wild over Konan in August of 1945 was the event’s ultimate impact on the release and movement of the Allied POWs formerly under the control of Japan; and now under Soviet jurisdiction, to that portion of the peninsula then under U.S. control – Korea south of the 38th parallel. Had the Hog Wild not been forced down over northern Korea on 29 August 1945 it is likely that the British and Australian prisoners of war held at Konan since 1945 would have remained prisoners for some time not of the Japanese, but of the U.S.S.R.

Section 88 – THE YALTA AGREEMENT IMPACTS KONAN

Several of the POWs at the Konan camp reference a Soviet plan in their writings or interviews after the war to ship the prisoners from northern Korea into the U.S.S.R. and then on to Europe for eventual return to British control. James Miller would write years later “We learned that the Russians wanted to take us back to Britain via Russia, but the Americans claimed that it was their responsibility.” At least one of the crewmembers mentions Soviet intentions in their statement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Industrial Paid-up Capital Combine</th>
<th>¥ 1,000</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Mitsubishi</td>
<td>134,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nichitsu</td>
<td>130,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sumitomo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>Mitsui</td>
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<td>Mitsubishi</td>
<td>75,083</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Iwasaki</td>
<td>56,333</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karafuto</td>
<td>Mitsui</td>
<td>42,500</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mitsubishi</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sumitomo</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Nichitsu</td>
<td>209,020</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mitsui</td>
<td>44,100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mitsubishi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo</td>
<td>Sumitomo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yasuda</td>
<td>704,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mitsubishi</td>
<td>192,728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source – U.S. National Archives

regarding the forcing down of the aircraft and their subsequent treatment at the hands of the Russians. A number of former POWs mention the Soviet transfer plan in their correspondence with members of the bomber’s crew years, even decades after the end of the war. These POWs credit the forcing down of Hog Wild with ensuring their eventual release not from Japanese – but Soviet control.

Oddly enough the experience of the Konan POWs and eventually the crew of Hog Wild with the threat of further incarceration as a group at the hands of the Soviet Union past the end of the war, more specifically any Japanese-held POWs liberated by the Russians in Asia, was entirely unique to the POWs held at the Konan Camp in northern Korea. It was not however unique to POWs liberated by the Soviet Union in Europe. Numerous similar such events took place with POWs that found themselves under Soviet control in Europe, all lending credence to the story about what might have happened to the POWs at Konan if Hog Wild had not been forced down over northern Korea.

There has never been an official Soviet explanation as to why the Russians at Konan might have sought to retain the British and Australian POWs held in northern Korea. There were no press releases, statements to the media or even to its Allies as to why they may have wanted to keep the POWs at Konan. The events took place in an era with no 24-hour news cycle to inquire as to the welfare of the POWs. It may be that the Soviets at Konan were operating under the assumption that the POWs would be transferred from the Soviet Far East to Odessa, Ukraine. Such a move would be inefficient and unproductive, a hallmark of the Soviet Union at the time, but the intentions of the Red Army have never been explained. Nor is there any solid evidence; official documents, memoirs, statements of POWs held in other areas of Korea and Manchuria of any real intent on the part of Soviets at any of those locations to transfer the POWs out of Russian occupied Japanese territory, and into Soviet Union.

The story itself may have originated on the U.S. side as Eric Harrison writing after the war reported that until the crew of Hog Wild notified the command of their plight on 1 September that Saipan was “surprised to hear that we were still there, as the Russians had informed them that we had been sent back via the Trans-Siberian Railway.” The forcing down of Hog Wild over Korea in August 1945 and the fate of several hundred POWs at Konan was a small issue at a time of far greater concerns. So why did the Red Army attempt to delay the return of the POWs at Konan to the control of their home countries?

In answering this question many reasons come to mind: Confusion on the battlefield; a lack of communications between Moscow and its battlefield commanders; Soviet pride in liberating the POWs; the need for a Soviet propaganda coup in the Far East; the lack of a Soviet policy regarding the repatriation of POW, and according to some; a Soviet need for the POWs to continue their work on the Japanese atomic bomb program. The Soviets may have also wanted to force the POWs to continue working at the Nichitsu fertilizer plant which was within their rights under the Yalta Agreement – at least until the official Japanese surrender. It should also be noted that according to some of the POWs there was never any Soviet plan to take the former prisoners into Russia at all. According to these POWs the story was a matter of rumor supplanting truth due to a lack communications and solid information from the Soviets regarding the repatriation of the prisoners into southern Korea. In the absence of information rumor inserted itself into the vacuum. According to Arthur Cramsie however, while the U.S. and Britain might be concerned about the immediate repatriation of the POWs home the Red Army in Korea was simply busy.

According to Captain Cramsie at some time Captain Kinlock “went to see a Russian Colonel at the Russian Headquarters to try and speed our return home, but while he was quite pleasant, he obviously did not consider us a high priority. He said he would arrange something as soon as possible but that he himself had not been home for four years and we would just have to wait patiently.”1235 Otherwise the Red Army “did nothing, until representations were made by members of the American Recovery GH Unit, to repatriate the prisoners.”1236 The Soviets however probably did have some hidden agenda.

Though the Japanese had formally surrendered the invasion of Korea by the Soviet Union continued. The Soviets were expanding their empire. The Red Army had one more country to conquer; an ideology to enforce on a captive

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1236 Msg. CINCAFPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan. To: WARCOS. ID Number: CA 52414. 28 September 1945. Formerly: SECRET TOT. Declassified on 11 July 1975
population, and a future regime to install in northern Korea. In the mind of the Red Army the plight of the Allied POWs under their control was insignificant compared to other issues.

Though no specific program of official documentation related to the events described by the POWs at Konan has been released by the governments involved; at least two U.S. documents released in the past decades allude to a Soviet offer to transport men from Konan to Vladivostok. The first is the official statement given by Lieutenant Queen after returning to Saipan where he mentions Soviet offer to fly the crew to Vladivostok to the U.S. Consul. The other is a U.S. Forces in Korea (USAFIK) G-2 Periodic Report dated 14 September 1945 which states: “On 6 September Lt Col Elrington (Br), senior officer of the Keijo PW Camp, talked to the senior office of the PW Camp at Honan [sic], located 8 miles SSW of Hamhung, and was assured that all PsW [sic] would be evacuated to Vladivostok by the evening of 6 or 7 September. The call was put through by the Russians.”

Whatever actual knowledge the POWs had of the Soviet rationale for holding them in Korea and eventually moving them to Russia, there was a legal basis for moving the POWs into the Soviet Union and that was the agreements reached at the CRIMEA Conference, codenamed ARGONAUT, known mostly today as the YALTA Conference. The specific instrument decided upon at Yalta was the “Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces Operating Under Soviet Command and Forces Operating Under United States of America Command; February 11, 1945.” According to the above statement, in planning to move the POWs into the Soviet Union the Soviets were in compliance with the Yalta Agreement.

The YALTA Conference

The YALTA Conference was held between 4 February and 11 February 1945 near the end of the war in Europe at the Livadia Palace, a summer retreat of the Russian czars near Yalta in the Crimea. It was in hindsight, the final meeting of the war’s big three; U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin. By the time of the POTS DAM Conference held in the summer of 1945: Franklin Roosevelt had passed away, Harry Truman had taken his place; Churchill would be voted out of office during the conference with Clement Attlee taking his place as the new British Prime Minister.

The primary purpose of the YALTA Conference was the re-establishment of pre-war European states in the post-war world. During the conference a number of accords would be reached to include understandings on the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany; the establishment of occupation zones within Germany; the issue of reparations; the status of Poland and the Soviet entry into The Great Pacific War. More importantly for the fate of the Konan Camp’s POWs and the aircrew of Hog Wild was the signing of a separate arrangement between the U.S. and U.S.S.R; the Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces Operating under Soviet Command and Forces Operating under United States of America Command; February 11, 1945. A similar but separate agreement was signed between the U.S.S.R. and United Kingdom.

Understanding the Yalta Agreements: what was occurring in Europe at the time that Hog Wild was forced down and Soviet intentions in the territories now under their control, helps to put what eventually occurs at Konan in some perspective. Articles 1, 2, 4, and 6 of the agreement along with the future of Poland, would directly impact the POWs held at the Konan Camp.

Article 1

All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

United States and Soviet military authorities will respectively, take the necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

Article 2

\[1237\) G-2 Periodic Report. Headquarters United States Forces in Korea (USAFIK). Section 5: Summary of Intelligence in Adjacent Areas Occupied by Other Forces. 14 September 1945

\[1238\) A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49 Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950
The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens of the other contracting party found by them, and will at the same time take the necessary steps to implement the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and United States repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the dispatch [sic] or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be effected by agreement with the competent Soviet or United States authorities. The removal of camps and transfer of liberated citizens may, in exceptional circumstances, also be effected without preliminary agreement provided the competent authorities are immediately notified of such removal or transfer with a statement of the reasons. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted. 1239

**Article 4**

Each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens held by the other contracting party. 1240

**Article 6**

Ex-prisoners of war and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and United States authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers. 1241

The End of the War in Europe

As the war in Europe was winding down and German forces began to surrender in large numbers the U.S., Great Britain, and France were finding that many of the prisoners they captured were not native Germans; but anti-communist East Europeans. Several countries: Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, had fallen under Soviet rule in the aftermath of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed between the Soviet Union and Germany in the early morning hours of 24 August 1939 and resentment against the Soviet Union in those areas ran high. 1242

Soviet annexation of these countries had not taken place unopposed; thousands had been arrested, imprisoned or simply executed throughout the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) as the U.S.S.R. took control and extended communism throughout Eastern Europe. Over a two day period, 13 and 14 June 1941 the Soviets deported an estimated 15,600 Latvians. In Estonia over 8,000 people to include most of that country’s political leaders were arrested; 2,000 were simply executed. On those two days alone across the Baltic States; Estonia; Latvia and Lithuania more than 131,000 people

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1239 Ibid.
1240 Ibid.
1241 Ibid.
were deported into the Soviet Union. Many were simply murdered with the remainder suffering internal exile in Stalin’s ever-expanding gulag.

When Germany invaded Russia on 22 June 1941 and overran large swaths of the country, the German Army (Wehrmacht) surrounded, isolated and captured several million Soviet soldiers. As the Germans advanced whole units of the Soviet Red Army surrendered to the Germans with many switching their allegiance to Germany in the process. By 1 November 1941 more than two million Red Army soldiers had surrendered to the Wehrmacht. By 1 March 1942 that number had grown to over 3.5 million.

During the early part of the war Germany captured an estimated 5.7 million Soviet soldiers. Rather than submit to the reprisals these soldiers knew would follow their return to communist control many of these POWs decided to fight against the Soviet Union by joining the German Army. It was not cooperation with Hitler in support of Fascism that drove many to support the German war effort, but resentment against Stalin. Many of those held in German camps as POWs who turned against Stalin simply sought more favorable treatment. The Soviet government however saw those who surrendered or gave aid to the Germans as traitors and to a large degree, refused to admit that its citizens might support the Germans against Stalin. There were others that supported the German war outside those from the Baltic States, many others. In pushing out the Soviet Union many Eastern Europeans saw the Germans as liberators, not conquerors and flocked to aid them in throwing out the Soviet Union.

Numerous Albanians, Armenians, Byelorussians, Caucasians, Ukrainians and so on collaborated with the Germans against the Soviet Union. Each had numerous grievances and motives in serving the Germans. In the Ukraine millions had died during the Holodomor, known also as the “terror-famine” which continues to be the subject of intense debate nearly 80 years later. Many blame Soviet collectivization for the famine that raged across Ukraine from 1932 to 1933.[1243] Belarus and Kazakhstan suffered a similar famine over the same period. The Great Terror; the large-scale purge of the Soviet Communist Party, the government, and the Red Army left a wake of resentment as it spread across the Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht, the Nazi SS and Gestapo would all incorporate these anti-communists into their ranks in some form.

In the Wehrmacht former Soviet soldiers would form the Ostlegionen, or East Legion – conscripts and volunteers taken from the eastern territories, or Hilswilliger often referred to as Hiwi – voluntary assistants. By the end of 1943 the Ostlegionen could boast 30 divisions. Hilswilliger alone counted for over 25 percent of German frontline strength at the Battle of Stalingrad. The Wehrmacht was also supported by the Russkaya osvoboditel’naya armiya or Russian Liberation Army (ROA) which would eventually form 10 divisions within the Wehrmacht.[1244] During the war over 680,000 non-Germans from not-less-than 16 countries served as members of the Waffen SS (frontline SS combat troops).

Opening its ranks to foreigners, by June 1941 the SS had sufficient numbers of volunteers from Denmark and Norway alone to form a special SS regiment, Nordland. A second regiment, Westland consisting of Dutch and Flemish volunteers soon followed. These two regiments with one other would eventually make up the SS Division Wiking. The SS was further strengthened by volunteers from most of the countries that Germany occupied.

Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) from Croatia, Serbia, Hungary and Romania served with the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prinz Eugen. French made up Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Charlemagne while Latvians formed the 15th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS. Albanians served in the 21st SS Division Skanderbeg. Muslims formed the 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian). The SS were even able to form one unit of British Commonwealth soldiers known as the British Free Corps though it was rarely ever manned by more than several dozen men. Nearly 60 percent of all soldiers who served the SS were foreigners.

While the combat quality of some of these units might be doubtful the fact that they were in battle against the Soviet Union was never in question. As for the Gestapo it organized police and collaborators throughout Nazi Occupied Europe.


To admit that millions of people under Soviet control would rather fight and die for Germany than for their Russian homeland, was a propaganda nightmare of immense proportions for the Soviet Union. Some three to five million Soviet citizens would aid the Third Reich whether as POWs, laborers or collaborators. At the end of WWII the Soviet government would seek to punish those Russians that had aided the Germans thoroughly, and they would be assisted in their efforts to repatriate those Soviets that had fought for Germany by their Western Allies the U.S. and Great Britain.

To the U.S. and Britain the Yalta Agreement was designed to protect its POWs liberated from German camps from the Soviets and hasten their return home. To the Russians however the Yalta Agreement was designed to force its Allies to return Soviet citizens found across liberated Europe back to Russia for punishment. Note that in the above four articles from the Yalta Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces Operating under Soviet Command and Forces Operating under United States of America Command, the term “prisoner of war” is mentioned only twice while the term “citizen” in mentioned not-less-than eight times. From the end of the war against Germany in April 1945 through September 1945 alone SHAEF repatriated about 2,034,000 people into the U.S.S.R. After the war the U.S. and Britain repatriated more than 4.2 million ethnic Russians and 1.6 million Russian POWs to the Soviet Union.

The above articles related to the release of the POWs became troublesome not because the U.S.S.R. tried to abide by the agreements of February 1945, but because the U.S. and Great Britain had come to disagree with the enforcement of the articles, and for good reason: Many if not most of the Soviet personnel, military or civilian found in Europe and returned to the Soviet Union were simply executed or imprisoned. In implementing the articles related to the return of Soviet citizens to Soviet control, the British and U.S. government, especially those persons tasked with carrying out the agreement, found themselves complicit in the execution of the people they returned or the eventual exile of the returnees to Russia’s system of internal prisons, the gulag. Though the civilian governments of Britain and the U.S. could justify the agreement as a tradeoff ensuring the safe return of all their POWs, the various militaries responsible for sending the Eastern Europeans home to Stalin did not support the agreement and took action to include disobeying orders, to avoid fulfilling the issued commands.

Average Soldiers React

The average general issue (GI) soldier was the first to realize that repatriation was not all it had been cracked up to be. Ordered to assist in the transport of the German-held Soviet POWs and other displaced persons to Soviet forces located nearby or the Russian zone of occupation for repatriation, the assigned soldiers quickly began to realize that many of those to be repatriated did not want to go home. Russians that had migrated out of the Soviet Union decades before in fleeing the fall of Tsarist Russia and legally residing in Western Europe were often rounded up against their will and subsequently returned to Stalin’s Russia. Many refused to board the trucks or rail cars that would carry them back to the Soviet Union. In many cases the U.S. and British soldiers attempting to repatriate the Eastern Europeans were forced to resort to clubs, truncheons and firearms to force the prisoners to board the vehicles.

Those prisoners the soldiers dragged to trucks and railcars once aboard, would jump out and flee. Many repatriates made the trip into Soviet custody unconscious if not in a coma. On 10 June 1945 154 Russians being held at Fort Dix, New Jersey rioted against repatriation. Barricading themselves inside their barracks the prisoners proceeded to fight guards with the knives from their mess kits and homemade clubs. Three of the prisoners detained at Fort Dix hung themselves. Nine prisoners and three guards were seriously injured in the brawl.

With their near daily contact with those to be repatriated, over time the soldiers of the Western Allies began understand what really awaited the Russians once they were returned to Soviet control. The reality of the situation conflicted with the wartime propaganda U.S. and British soldiers had been fed throughout the war. While soldiers serving the Western Allies could understand the need for a wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, they could neither understand or justify treating unarmed civilians with such violence – even in wartime, even in honoring the agreements made by their political leaders. The U.S. and British soldiers involved in the repatriation began doubt that their wartime sacrifice had served to bring liberty and freedom to anyone. The concerns of the average soldier began to rapidly move up the military chain-of-command as low-level leaders sought high-level answers.

As the Allied militarys awaited a decision from their civilian leadership some commanders began to take matters into their own hands. General George A. Patton released 5,000 prisoners under his control his own authority; other

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1246 Ibid.
commanders simply allowed prisoners to slip away.\textsuperscript{1250} Patton wrote in his diary “I’m also opposed to sending POW’s to work as slaves in foreign lands (in particular, to France) where many will be starved to death.”\textsuperscript{1251} He also wrote “It is amusing to recall that we fought the revolution in defense of the rights of man and the civil war to abolish slavery and have now gone back on both principles.”\textsuperscript{1252}

The final policy, released on 20 December 1945 long after Hog Wild had ceased to be an issue, instructed commanders to repatriate all prisoners “without regard to their personal wishes and by force if necessary” persons who were Soviet citizens on 1 September 1939, who were captured in German uniforms or were members of the Soviet military after 22 June 1941 and had not been subsequently discharged.\textsuperscript{1253} Efforts were to be made to ensure that all other repatriations were voluntary. Force was no longer authorized to compel reparations.\textsuperscript{1254}

Background to Yalta

By September 1944 it had become apparent that forces of the Soviet Union would overrun German POW camps holding U.S. and British prisoners as they advanced into Poland and Germany. In recognition of this eventuality the British government approached the Soviet Union with a request that it be 1) notified of the names of the POWs liberated, 2) to allow British officers to meet with the POWs and 3) to care and organize them for transport back to Great Britain. This initial British approach to the Soviet Union was met with a chilly reception.

On 11 October 1944 as Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden were visiting Moscow, Josef Stalin raised the issue of Soviet citizens then held in England as German POWs, requesting London’s assistance in securing their release and return to the Soviet Union. The British agreed to provide all assistance possible in returning British-held Soviet soldiers to Russia, and then raised the issue of British POWs then in Soviet hands. The British received reciprocal assurances from Marshal Stalin that Russia would do everything in its power to repatriate Commonwealth POWs to Britain. The Russians then requested that the British agree to the return all Soviet citizens, not simply its POWs to the Soviet Union regardless of the desires of the individuals concerned. Believing the issue as simply a matter of returning Soviet citizens that had been displaced by the German invasion to their homeland, the British agreed to the Soviet demand. What the British did not consider was that many of the Soviet Union’s citizens would not want to return to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.

Several weeks after the Moscow Conference the British government submitted a draft reciprocal agreement to the Soviet government detailing the proposed treatment of all Soviet prisoners liberated by Allied armies, against the treatment of all Commonwealth prisoners liberated by the Red Army prior to the actual surrender of Germany. The British feared, and with good reason that without an agreement in-hand the Soviet Union might not immediately repatriate Commonwealth personnel who fell into Russian hands but hold them hostage against future agreements; mostly related to the future of Poland or simply employ the POWs as an additional labor force in rebuilding a war-ravaged Soviet Union. In reaching an agreement the British sought the rapid return or evacuation of all Commonwealth prisoners from continental Europe to British territory or control. By December 1944 as the British government awaited a Soviet response to its earlier proposal, British care packages containing tobacco, food, clothing and medical supplies were being shipped to the Soviet Union and delivered to liberated POWs. In January 1945 the Soviet Union submitted a counterproposal to the initial British offer.

The proposed Soviet agreement was nearly identical to British proposal differing in only one major area; it stressed that all Soviet prisoners liberated by the advancing armies, military or civilian be recognized as free citizens and respected as such.\textsuperscript{1255} The Soviet proposal also included a reference to the use of POWs in work related to the common war effort until such prisoners could be repatriated. With the number of Russians falling into the hands of the advancing armies increasing; the need to exercise some control over the liberated prisoners by employing them in useful work, with no agreement in-hand concerning the repatriation of British POWs falling into Soviet hands and the need to feed Europe’s displaced persons, the British government felt compelled to agree with the Soviet proposal.

The British cabinet suspected that any effort on their part to bargain for lesser terms on the issue of displaced persons and those that might not want to return to the Soviet Union, could result in British POWs continuing to be held by the Soviets after the war.\textsuperscript{1256} With this in mind the British submitted a further counteroffer to the Soviet position.

In their counterproposal the British insisted that upon liberation, all British POWs would automatically revert to their previous status as members of His Majesty’s Forces and be placed under the command of British officers. In camps

\textsuperscript{1252} 
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where no British officers were available, British officers would be dispatched to assume command of the POWs. London further stipulated that while their personnel could be used in like-minded work supporting the common war effort, they could not be moved about inside Russia in support of additional Soviet labor requirements. The British military mission to Moscow made further arrangements for all British POWs to be repatriated through the port of Odessa on the Black Sea. Though other ports were sometimes used in the transfer of POWs out of Eastern Europe, Odessa remains the most widely known and well documented port of return. The British and Soviet proposals described above would form in-part the foundation for the subsequent agreements on the repatriation of POWs reached at Yalta.

Yalta

At Yalta Soviet negotiators initially sought separate agreements with the British and the Americans on the return of POWs; in-part because the Soviet Union had already reached agreement with London and suspected that reaching a similarly broad agreement with U.S. negotiators, might not be as easily achieved. The British citing the integration of Allied forces ranging across much of Europe, sought agreement between the three powers instead and raised the issue as a subject for tripartite consideration. In resolving the issue, separate agreements would eventually be signed by the Soviet Union with each the U.S. and Britain. The British and U.S. had previously discussed the issue of POWs at the MALTA Conference held prior to the meeting of the big three at Yalta. At Malta the U.S. and Britain had decided that the issue centered on two questions: “(a) the treatment of Allied civilian and military prisoners of war who were liberated by the Russians and (b) our own treatment of Russian prisoners of war who came into our hands.” As no good deed goes unrewarded the Soviet Union informed the British that until such an agreement was completed, no British liaison officers would be allowed into the Soviet Union to supervise or care for captured British personnel.

The updated British proposal presented at Yalta stipulated that POWs could be made to work, but only if the assigned liaison officers agreed. With Britain and SHAEF already employing Soviet citizens in war work in the home islands and on the European continent; neither the British nor the Americans could refuse Soviet requests to use their soldiers in a similar role in Eastern Europe. To limit potential abuse the British proposal at Yalta again stipulated that any work to be accomplished by the POWs had to be located in the general vicinity of the camp where the POW was liberated. Such an agreement would limit Soviet efforts to deploy the captured POWs as additional labor wherever they might desire in other parts of the Soviet Union. The proposed agreement further stipulated that whatever duties performed by a POW; that work would not be allowed to impact a POW’s rapid repatriation. Assigned liaison officers would also be given the power to decide the conditions under which the work would be performed. The provisions of the agreement would apply equally to all POWs and displaced persons liberated as the various armies raced into Nazi Occupied Europe and Germany. The issue of captured Soviet soldiers and citizens that did not want to be repatriated to the U.S.S.R. was avoided by all parties.

In its proposals at Yalta, the British sought further guarantees that ships transporting Soviet citizens to the designated transfer points could be used to transport Commonwealth POWs back to Britain. As British transfers of 11,000 Russian POWs to Odessa were taking place simultaneous with the conference with another 7000 to follow in March, Churchill inquired of Stalin what intentions the Soviets had for the prisoners remaining under British control.

In his reply Stalin asked that the remainder of the Soviets held in Britain be sent to the U.S.S.R. as rapidly as possible. According to Stalin many of the Soviet citizens captured by the advancing Allies had been previously forced to work for the German army, and would often be captured in the company of German forces. He asked that all such Soviet citizens be separated from German POWs. Stalin explained forcefully that despite the role such prisoners may have played while under German command, all Soviets captured in the company of Axis forces remained Soviet citizens. As Stalin explained, these people would be dealt with after they returned to the Soviet Union, and should not be considered POWs with the same rights as captured soldiers. Stalin further expressed the opinion that there should be no effort on the part of the Allies to convince Soviet citizens to refuse repatriation. It was a subject that would become a sticking point in concluding the Korean War a few short years later.

The Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces Operating under Soviet Command and Forces Operating under United States of America Command was agreed to by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on 11 February 1945. The issue of repatriating citizens that did not want to return to the Soviet Union was never fully addressed. The agreement signed on the issue of POWs would remain Secret until 1972 when it was eventually declassified.

1257 Ibid.
With Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Ukraine and other countries previously under Soviet control and once again falling to the Soviet Union the issue of just exactly what defined a Soviet citizen was left open to interpretation. Immediately after the end of the war in Europe, SHAPE estimated the total number of displaced persons under its control to include previously repatriated and liberated POWs at about 5.2 million people. Though the Yalta Agreement had been signed few of its goals would ever be realized.

For the most part the U.S. and British had agreed to Soviet demands with few exceptions. The Soviet Union achieved its goals at Yalta while the U.S. and Britain received little in return. Throughout the conference, playing in the background was U.S. and British concerns for the welfare of their POWs in the hands of the U.S.S.R. At the time of the YALTA Conference the U.S. already had two years’ experience with U.S. POWs under Soviet control in the form of its airmen then held by Russia Tashkent. The British also had similar experience with a number of lost airmen also held in the U.S.S.R. The two nations were certain that without an agreement giving the Soviet Union what it desired their POWs would be held in Soviet labor camps after the war.

The above mentioned Article 1 of the agreement respected the Soviet government’s request that its citizens captured by British and American forces in the company of the German army, be separated from German prisoners of war and maintained separately from POWs in other camps. These prisoners would not be afforded the rights of POWs under the Geneva Convention. Article 2 addressed British concerns regarding supervisory contact with Commonwealth POWs held within the Soviet Union, but also allowed the POWs to be removed unilaterally if required. Though it remains unknown at this time, Article 2 could have been a source of contention at Konan. Article 6 addressed issues related to the employment of British personnel awaiting repatriation. Article 6 also provided for the use of POWs in nearby war work until they were repatriated. As with Article 2, Article 6 would have supported the continued Soviet use of Konan POWs at the Nichitus plant as war work at least until the POWs were returned to the control of their parent country. According to Arthur Cramsie the POWs continued to man the furnaces of the carbide plant into early September 1945 if not longer. Article 4 may have also presented a point of contention.

Article 4 alone dealt with the transportation of repatriated POWs out of occupied areas allowing either party to arrange for the transportation of prisoners out of an area with the prior agreement of the other party. Either party was allowed to arrange such transportation, but each party to the agreement signed had to consent to the move. As at least one document will show, any planned Soviet transfer of POWs at Konan had been so coordinated.

While the agreement would seem on its surface to provide a framework for the Western Allies and Moscow to cooperate in the repatriation of POWs and other displaced persons, the issue of POWs was actually of little concern to the Soviet Union. What was really important to the Soviet leadership in Moscow was the future of Poland and it would use U.S. and British concerns about the safety of their POWs to secure a Polish government in Warsaw that would be ultimately supportive of Moscow.

Poland in the Balance

The history of Poland is a far too long and complex a subject to address in its entirety within the pages of this book. However some understanding of the relationship of Poland to the end of WWII and Soviet goals in Eastern Europe, is required to appreciate the forces at play in Europe in August 1945 and to show how those forces may have impacted Soviet behaviors at Konan.

Long prior to WWI much of Poland had been absorbed into Austria, Germany and Russia proper. During WWI Poles had been drafted or conscripted into the armies of the three nations in a war that was largely of no concern to most Poles. By the end of WWI all of the powers that had previously occupied portions of the older Polish state; Austria, Germany and Russia had been defeated. Polish independence was one of the 14 Points espoused by President Woodrow Wilson in his effort to gain acceptance for U.S. involvement in the post-WWI League of Nations. In the aftermath of WWI Poland declared its independence with the existence of the Second Polish Republic confirmed by the Treaty of Versailles.

In the aftermath of WWI the victorious Allies created portions of Poland from territories previously accepted as part of Austria, Germany and what was formerly the Russian Empire. The position of Poland’s eastern borders had to be decided by blood in the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1921. For these and many other reasons Poland therefore became the target of tremendous resentment from most of its neighbors to include Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Russia. For the Poles, the period between the creation of Poland and the beginning or WWII was a time where stability was sought but difficult to achieve.

Internally the Polish government was faced with tremendous problems; damage from WWI and the Polish-Soviet War scarred the country; the nation’s economy was partially derived from an industrial base owned somewhat by the government and partly by German industrialists. Several disaffected minority groups; Germans, Ukrainians, Slovaks, and

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Lithuanians resided within the country. Despite such difficulties Poland developed a level of economic success and prosperity comparable to that of many Western nations. In the years immediately after its creation the country was also torn politically.

In December 1922 the country’s first President Gabriel Narutowicz was assassinated. In the aftermath of the assassination of Narutowicz and after several efforts to restore the country to stability, Józef Piłsudski (5 Dec 1867–12 May 1935) assumed control. In 1926 Piłsudski overthrew the Second Republic. Like many in Europe Piłsudski viewed the rise of Adolph Hitler in Germany with alarm.

Under Piłsudski Poland attempted to maintain good relations with its neighboring countries of Hungary, Latvia and Romania and was largely successful. Its relations with Czechoslovakia remained strained while its relations with Lithuania remained tenuous at best. Poland’s relations with the German Weimar Republic and Stalin’s Soviet Russia varied over time, but were largely stable. Piłsudski was able to keep the Soviet Union off balance by supporting the numerous independence movements of the major non-Russian minorities that resided within the Soviet Union. Poland maintained good relations with the United Kingdom and France as an additional counterbalance to Soviet interests in Poland and supported the creation of a Franco-Polish Military Alliance. Poland was similarly successful in developing such an arrangement with Romania in the form of the Polish-Russian Alliance, but was less successful in establishing such an alliance with the United Kingdom.

Under Piłsudski’s rule Poland signed non-aggression treaties with the Soviet Union in 1932 and Hitler’s Germany in 1934. The non-aggression pacts gave Russia a free hand in Ukraine and may have provided Hitler breathing space to rearm Germany. Though Russia and Germany signed such treaties with Poland, the two nations continued to their efforts to undermine Polish independence. In addition as Hitler consolidated power in Germany he often sought Poland’s entrance into a German-Polish Alliance against the Soviet Union. Piłsudski refuted such overtures in the hope of buying time for Poland to rearm against the potential of war with either Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union. After Piłsudski’s death in May 1935 his successors continued his efforts to maintain a balance between Soviet and German demands against Poland, however German demands for territorial concessions against Czechoslovakia, along with the United Kingdom’s policy of appeasing Hitler destroyed Poland’s ability to balance its national independence through the force of its allies.

**Hitler’s Demands against Poland**

In early 1939 Hitler demanded that Poland allow Germany to incorporate the Free City of Gdansk (Danzig) into the Third Reich. Gdansk had been created at the end of WWI by the Treaty of Versailles against the wishes of its people who were largely German. A large port on the Baltic Sea and formerly part of the German Empire the city was under the protection of the League of Nations and was not part of either Germany or Poland. In international relations Gdansk was represented abroad by Poland, economically Gdansk was connected to Germany. Trade between Germany and Gdansk was conducted along a Polish maintained rail line.

Seizing trade as an issue, Hitler demanded that Poland allow Germany to build an extra-territorial highway through Polish Pomerania to Gdansk. In return for compliance Germany offered Poland territorial concessions to include; the possible annexation of Lithuania, a portion of the Memel Territory, Soviet Ukraine and possible remnants of Czechoslovakia. Poland viewed Hitler’s offer as an effort to subordinate Polish interests to those of Germany. Poland chose to maintain its independence. The United Kingdom and France, recognizing Hitler’s demands on Poland in much the same way, allied themselves with Poland in an attempt to guarantee its independence. On 24 August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (effective on 23 August 1945). The Pact’s secret agreements included a division of Poland between the two dictatorships similar to the partitions of the country that had divided Poland prior to its reemergence at the end of WWI. Germany attacked Poland on 1 September 1939.

Two days later, on 3 September 1939 Great Britain and France, followed by India, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand declared war on Germany. Two weeks later as agreed to under the secret provisions of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Soviet forces invaded Poland taking control of those portions of the country that were populated by significant numbers of Ukrainians and Belarusians. Just short of two years later on 22 June 1941 Germany launched OPERATION BARBAROSSA, attacking the Soviet Union across a broad front and taking control of the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, and large portions the Soviet Union west of Moscow. In part, because of the history of events surrounding Poland that had led to the beginning of the war in Europe, each of the Allied powers at Yalta professed a major interest in the future of the Poland that would come into being after the end of the war.

**Poland at the YALTA Conference**

While the Allies might portray the conferences at Yalta as concerned with the reestablishment of nations within a post-war Europe, the major topic of discussion would center on the future of Poland. With Stalin hosting the conference the
future of Poland was high on the agenda. The issue was contentious, with Stalin seeking a future Poland that would be allied with and sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

Though Stalin attempted to portray Soviet interests in Poland as one of concern regarding the future of Polish independence, in the same breath he stubbornly refused to return to Poland the territory that the Soviets had acquired at Polish expense under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939. The disagreement was not about Polish independence, but about Soviet national security. Stalin argued that any enlargement of the previous Polish state should come at the expense of Germany with German, and not Soviet territory ceded to create a new Poland. All Polish territory the Russians had acquired in their agreement with Germany that led in-part to WWII in Europe would remain a part of the Soviet Union.

Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt would agree with Stalin’s demands. Churchill pointed out that the United Kingdom had in fact entered WWII to ensure a free and democratic Poland. Churchill and Roosevelt were left seeking the establishment of democratic governments across an Eastern Europe that was occupied by a Red Army, an army that outnumbered the militaries of its Western Allies more than three-to-one. In the game of Yalta Poker, Stalin held all the cards – and played them.

Militarily the Soviet Union had beaten the German Wehrmacht back into Germany and now dominated Eastern Europe. It is unlikely that short of a military confrontation with the U.S. and the United Kingdom at the end of nearly six years of war in Europe, the Soviet Union would have ever loosened its grip on Eastern Europe and Poland. While the U.S. and Great Britain continued to eye Polish independence as the desired outcome of their negotiations with Stalin, the Soviet Union began to install People’s Republics in Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The Baltic States; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would also remain under Soviet control. In an attempt to placate Churchill and Roosevelt, Stalin agreed to free elections in Poland.

With the U.S. seeking Soviet assistance in the Far East against Japan; Roosevelt and Churchill believing that the issue of Poland could be dealt with in the as yet to be established United Nations, the two nations conceded their concerns regarding the future of Poland to the Soviet Union. In the months following the YALTA Conference the Soviet Union would attempt to force the U.S. and United Kingdom to work and negotiate directly with the Soviet installed government of Poland. The Soviet Union perhaps viewed direct contacts between the governments as convincing its Western Allies that the installed leadership in Poland was indeed a legitimate government and free of undue Soviet influence. The issue of POWs held in Poland would be used by the Soviet Union to force the U.S. and Britain to initiate and maintain those contacts. The issue would overflow Europe to encompass the events that occurred at Konan that August of 1945.

**Yalta – Lost in Translation**

Even as the ink continued to slowly dry on the Yalta Agreement, the Soviets refused to allow British officers to visit British POWs in an Eastern Europe now under Soviet control. Without the loss of Hog Wild over Konan that August and the subsequent visit of U.S. aircraft maintenance crews and POW repatriation teams into the area, it is entirely possible that the POWs at Konan would have been shipped into the Soviet Union. Once in the U.S.S.R it is anybody’s guess whether the Soviet Union would repatriate them to Europe, use them as forced labor, or hold them hostage pending future agreements; most dealing with the future of Poland. The Soviets had yet to live up to the spirit of the Yalta Agreement in Europe and were unlikely to do much better in Asia.

By the middle of February 1945 several thousand British and American POWs had been liberated by Russian forces moving into Poland. As the Soviets collected British and U.S. POWs, the officers assigned to visit the camps remained in London awaiting visas to enter Poland. Few visas would ever be issued. Those that were issued would be provided long after the requirement for the presence of British officers at the camps had long since passed. Pressed to explain why the agreements signed at Yalta was not being adhered to, the Soviets accused the British of delaying diplomatic status for Russian personnel who had arrived in London to visit Soviet citizens then held in Great Britain.

According to Russian diplomats the Soviet Union was complying with the Yalta Agreements, providing the POWs protection, moving them to Odessa for release and so on. At best the Soviet claims were only partially true – the POWs were indeed no longer under the threat of German reprisals. As then Lieutenant Bill Kaplan a B-17 Navigator was to report years later: “The Russians were wonderful the first day or two. They went into the fields and slaughtered cattle, called us “comrade," offered us cigarettes and couldn’t do enough for us. The next day, their attitude changed 180 degrees. Word had evidently come down from Moscow, and the 45 year “Cold War” had started. They wanted us to march to Rostock, some fifty kilometers away; board cattle cars there for a lengthy rail trip to Odessa, Russia, on the Black Sea, and then to be turned over to the Allied forces.”

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Less than 30 days after of the Yalta Agreement was signed U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman sent an Urgent Top Secret message to President Roosevelt stating that “Since the Yalta Conference General Deane and I have been making constant efforts to get the Soviets to carry out this agreement in full. We have been baffled by promises which have not been fulfilled.” Harriman further stated, “I am outraged that the Soviet Government has declined to carry out the agreement signed at Yalta in its other aspects, namely, that our contact officers be permitted to go immediately to points were our prisoners are first collected, to evaluate our prisoners, particularly the sick, in our own airplanes, or to send out supplies to points other than Odessa, which is 1000 miles from point of liberation, where they are urgently needed. There appear to be hundreds of our prisoners wandering about Poland trying to locate American contact officers for protection. I am told that our men don’t like the idea of getting into a Russian camp. The Polish people and the Polish Red Cross are being extremely hospitable, whereas food and living conditions in Russian camps are poor.”

Long after the war Maurice J.A. Markworth would record of his release: “I spent 6 ½ months in the German POW Camps and finally was liberated by the Russians at Stalag III C about 90 kilometers east of Berlin. The Russians made us walk back to Warsaw, Poland where we were processed and sent to Odessa to board ships to England, and Italy and on to America. I got into the Polish underground and was fed and cared for until the war was over and they got me and two other prisoners of war held at German camps under the control of the Red Army. In many areas the Russians were hospitable, whereas food and living conditions in Russian camps are poor.”

In a subsequent message to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman stated: “I feel the Soviet Government is trying to use our liberated prisoners of war as a club to induce us to give increased prestige to the Provisional Polish Government.” According to Harriman, “American POWs freed by the Red Army were in the main treated very shabbily and came to hate the Russians. Many of them were robbed of watches, rings and other personal possessions which had been converted to detainees even after extended periods of captivity under the Germans. Their food at Odessa was very poor, consisting mainly of soup with cucumbers in it and sour black bread.” Harriman continued in terms that would ring true throughout the months of repatriations that were to follow stating: “The Russians generally tended to throw obstacles in the way of repatriation, frequently calling off shipments at the last minute and insisting always upon clearance from Moscow for every prisoner released. American POWs at Odessa were guarded by Russian soldiers carrying loaded rifles with fixed bayonets, and Russian security was more stringent there than German security had been in the various Stalags and Oflags. A number of American officers who went to Poland at various times to coordinate the hunt for liberated POWs were ordered out very quickly at Russian insistence.” The Soviets treated the British even worse.

In a message dated 20 April 1945 acting British Secretary of State Sir Orme Sargent advised the British Ambassador to the United States, Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax, Lord Halifax that “It is clear that Soviet Government will not allow our contact team into Poland. The Russians deny the existence of any British prisoners of war in Poland, but we have evidence that there are prisoners of war concentrated at Cracow and Czestochowa in hospitals. This is a clear breach of the Yalta agreement.”

Discussing efforts to repatriate German-held Soviet POWs back into Russia, British Secretary of State Sargent noted in the same message the growing and violent resistance of Russian soldiers against being sent home. In a recent effort to send 399 former Soviet soldiers back into Russia, Sargent stated “All of these men refused to entrain. They begged to be shot. They resisted entrainment by taking off their clothing and refusing to leave their quarters. It was necessary to use tear gas and some force to drive them out. Tear gas forced them out of the building into the snow where those who had cut themselves fell exhausted and bleeding in the snow. Nine men hanged themselves and one had stabbed himself to death and one other who had stabbed himself subsequently died; while 20 other are in the hospital for self-inflicted wounds. The entrainment was finally effected of 368 men who were sent off accompanied by a Russian liaison officer on a train carrying American guards. Six men escaped en route. A number of men in the group claimed they were not Russian.”

British officers and repatriation teams would eventually be allowed to visit Odessa, but for the most part would never be allowed to visit the POWs held at German camps under the control of the Red Army. In many areas the Russians immediately emptied the POW camps of U.S. and Commonwealth prisoners providing them with no alternative housing or

1264 Martin, Harry V. Military records show Soviets held 20,000 U.S. POWs. Copyright FreeAmerica and Harry V. Martin, 1995
http://www.israellect.com/reference/WillieMartin/POWs.htm
1265 Ibid.
1267 Martin, Harry V. Military records show Soviets held 20,000 U.S. POWs. Copyright FreeAmerica and Harry V. Martin, 1995
http://www.israellect.com/reference/WillieMartin/POWs.htm
1268 Ibid.
1269 Ibid.
1270 Ibid.
1271 Ibid.
food, them using the emptied camps to hold German POWs. For the most part British soldiers liberated by Soviet forces as they moved into Nazi Occupied Poland and Czechoslovakia were largely left to their own devices as to just how they were to get to a repatriation point. Most were afraid to contact Soviet combat troops for assistance. Many simply wandered about the liberated territories eventually finding their own way to Odessa. Some were luckier than others as they were liberated relatively close to U.S. or British lines and repatriated themselves to the Western Allies.

Debriefings of British POWs making their way to Odessa revealed that despite high-level Soviet claims otherwise; the Russians lacked any organized program at the lowest levels of the Red Army to relocate the POWs of their Allies and repatriate them to U.S. or British territory.\textsuperscript{1272} The Russians simply lacked a plan to deal with the liberated POWs. When Red Army combat forces overran camps holding Allied personnel they viewed the POWs with a degree of understandable suspicion that usually faded away as contact between the two groups grew. The longer Red Army personnel were in contact with the POWs the less suspicious they became.

As the Red Army took little action to guarantee the repatriation of POWs into British and American control the number of official U.S. and British protests to the Soviet government increased. The official protests made for great bureaucratic drama but did nothing to lessen the plight of the POWs roaming Eastern Europe lacking shelter and without means of support. For its part the Soviet Union met complaint with counter-complaint and little changed. Approaches to the Soviet government would eventually result in the approval of a number of visas issued to British officers for entry into Poland; continued efforts to gather up British subjects found in areas under the control of the Red Army and further promises that they would adhere to the Yalta Agreements. Actual performance however was never more than lackluster. In an effort to smooth the transfer of previously captured POWs from one Allied camp to the other, on 16 May 1945 a joint British-US-Soviet meeting opened at Halle, Germany. While the object of the meeting was to establish a foundation for building upon the Yalta Agreement and the repatriation of POWs the two Allied camps, the Western Allies and the Soviet Union entered the meeting with entirely different agendas.

Halle, Germany

The U.S. and Britain sought the earliest possible repatriation for their POWs to include providing for air or ground transport of the former prisoners out of Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe into Western Europe. The Soviet Union however sought to limit U.S. and British access to any portion of Soviet Occupied Europe. The Soviets argued that the number of serviceable airfields available for such an airlift was far too limited. The U.S. and British request to be allowed to airlift their POWs out of Eastern Europe was firmly denied. Nothing could be done. In attending the meeting, the Soviets presented a new plan to its allies for the repatriation of U.S. and British POWs which included the establishment of repatriation centers in areas that did not conform to the road and rail networks under U.S. and British control. As the Soviets explained it, some marching was always necessary.

The U.S. and British response to the plan was to explain that their purpose in attending the meeting at Halle was not to establish new agreements, but to implement a repatriation plan based upon the previously approved Yalta Agreement. Unbeknownst to U.S. and British negotiators any change to the new Soviet proposal had to be approved by Moscow, but some level of concurrence was reached with an agreement signed on 22 May 1945.

Known as the Halle or Leipzig Agreement the arrangement settled the question of exactly who was to be repatriated stating “All former prisoners of war and citizens of the USSR liberated by the Allied Forces and all former prisoners of war and citizens of Allied Nations liberated by the Red Army will be delivered through the Army lines to the corresponding Army Command of each side.”\textsuperscript{1273} It was a far reaching net. The finalized agreement provided for POW delivery, reception points, transportation plans, and other administrative details.

Perhaps as a sign of good faith on the 20\textsuperscript{th} of May as the Halle conference moved forward the Soviet Union transferred 400 U.S. prisoners released from Luckenwalde’s Stalag IIIa into U.S. control at the Elbe River after a wait of several hours. The wait began after 20 U.S. trucks arrived to transfer the prisoners to the American side. The Soviets had expected the American convoy arrive at the river with Soviet personnel in tow for repatriation. It was the only transfer of U.S. and Commonwealth POWs that ever took place without a transfer of an equal or greater number of Soviet POWs or civilians in exchange. Despite appearances the POWs were not really hostages. Not really.

In the three weeks immediately following the Halle agreement more than one million Soviet citizens under the control of the Western Allies were assembled at the various reception centers to begin the journey home.\textsuperscript{1274} More than 50,000 Soviet citizens were sent eastward every day. Over one three day period in June 1945 the number of Soviet citizens

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repatriated into Stalin’s Russia exceeded 101,000 per day. By 1 October 1945 over two million Soviet citizens had been repatriated.

**Yalta and the Status of POWs at Konan**

The repatriation of the Soviet citizens and POWs formerly held by Germany in Europe continued to play in the background as the war in Asia wound down. It was legitimately feared by the U.S. and Britain that their POWs falling into Russian hands in Asia, would wind up as pawns in Stalin’s greater scheme of having all Soviet citizens repatriated back too Russia. While the Japanese had not conscripted Soviet citizens into its military as had Germany; Manchuria, as with French Indochina and many other areas of Asia under Japanese control did possess a large population of Russians and other minorities who had fled Russia when the Bolsheviks took power in 1918. It was not yet known by the Western Allies exactly what demands the Soviets would make against their allies in securing the repatriation of Soviet citizens identified in the Far East. With the Soviet Union on possession of many of these areas Stalin wanted these anti-Soviet refugees returned to Soviet control.

While such anxieties in Asia had so far proven in action largely unfounded, the American suspicions were valid. In Asia, whether by accident or design, the response of the Western Allies in repatriating their POWs was to present the Soviet Union with a repatriation program that fulfilled the Yalta Agreement fait accompli – as an accomplished fact. It was the one great difference between the repatriation program that took place in Europe and the efforts that took place in Asia. In the long run the forcing down of Hog Wild may have been the only factor that decided whether the Soviet Union could use the POWs at Konan as pawn in their struggle for power in Europe, the Soviet domination of Poland, or whether they would indeed be released.

**Liberating Allied POW Camps – The OSS**

Immediately after the Japanese surrender General Albert Wedemeyer, Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ordered the agencies under his control to locate and evacuate all POWs in China, Manchuria, and Korea. At the time there were real fears that the Japanese would execute all POWs much as they had at Palawan. As discovered decades later in U.S. National Archives holdings concerning the Japanese operated POW camps on Formosa by the late Roger Mansell, such orders had indeed been issued.1275

The POWs at numerous camps across Asia; those in the Philippines, Thailand, Burma and other locations had been made aware of Japanese War Ministry intentions usually by friendly Formosan, Japanese or Korean guards. The POWs at Konan were no different. The Japanese camp commandant Captain Otaki at the Konan POW Camp had reportedly issued a similar such order to execute prisoners if Japan should be forced to capitulate.1276 In response to a warning from a Korean guard the POWs had made plans to resist any Japanese attempt to execute them, arming themselves with clubs and bricks.1277 The camp doctor, Captain Morris had gone so far as to prepare an emergency medical kit for the treatment of any casualties that might occur in resisting Japanese attempts to execute all POWs.1278

In accomplishing Wedemeyer’s directions the OSS assembled a number of six-man rescue teams, to include combat medical personnel, communication specialists and interpreters. Wedemeyer was the only commander fighting the Japanese to develop such teams. A total of nine rescue teams were assembled: Cardinal (Mukden), Duck (Weihsien), Eagle (Korea), Flamingo (Harbin), Magpie (heading to Peiping), Quail (Hanoi), Pigeon (Hainan Island), Raven (Vientiane, Laos), and

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1275 Document 2701, Exhibit “O” – The Order to murder all the POWs. U.S. National Archives, War Crimes, Japan, Record Group 24, Box 2015.  
http://www.mansell.com/pow_resources/Formosa/taiwandocs.html  
1277 Ibid.  
1278 Ibid.
Sparrow (Shanghai). As they would amongst the deepest insertions into Japanese held territory undertaken during the war, facing an enemy that had for the most part never been defeated, Cardinal (Mukden), Duck (Weihsien), Eagle (Korea), Flamingo (Harbin), and Magpie (Peiping) were considered the four most challenging and critical missions in saving the lives of Allied POWs. These insertions would place the OSS teams far to the rear of enemy lines and well beyond the ability of the Allies to salvage the operations if the missions went astray. As the only other locations overrun by Soviet troops advancing against the Japanese were situated in Manchuria, those camps serve to compare and contrast the treatment of POWs held under Soviet control against the treatment of POWs held at Konan.

In Manchuria the Japanese held Allied POWs in two large camps, one at Mukden the other at Harbin with several sub-camps located throughout the area. Camp rosters as of 30 June 1945 indicate that there were 1220 POWs interned at Camp Hoten main camp; 150 at Hoten Sub-camp No. 1; 180 at Hoten Sub-camp No. 2; 125 at Hoten Sub-camp No. 3, with an additional 34 mostly high-ranking POWs held at Hoten Branch Camp No. 2 in Hsian. Altogether the camps held about 1,300 American and 250 British POWs. Lieutenant Generals Jonathan Wainwright and A.E. Percival, the American commanders of the Philippines and the British commander of Singapore in 1942 respectively, were held at Hoten Branch Camp No. 2. Sir Shenton Thomas the former British governor of the Straits Settlements was also held at the Hoten Branch Camp No. 2.

On 16 August 1945, the day after the Japanese surrender a six-man OSS team parachuted from a B-24 into the area of the Mukden Camp. Once on the ground the team was surrounded, taken prisoner, but only mildly abused and interrogated. Once confirmation of the Japanese surrender took place the team was taken to the camp commandant, Colonel Matsuda and immediately began efforts to coordinate the evacuation of the main camp at Hoten. The team also sought to make contact with Generals Wainwright and Percival held at the Hoten Branch Camp No. 2 in Hsian. Two members of the team would eventually depart Mukden by train on the 18th of August bound for Hsian, returning on the 26th with General Wainwright and his party. Unlike the U.S. and British experience in Europe, the OSS was waiting cap-in-hand with the POWs in tow as the Red Army, Transbaikal Front, entered the city. While the U.S. and Britain had negotiated the presence of liaison officers at German POW camps in Eastern Europe, a lack of negotiation on the part of the Western Allies was the rule in Asia. Wedemeyer’s move to action apparently made a large impact on Soviet forces as they invaded Manchuria.

The first Soviet Red Army troops parachuted into Mukden by C-47 on the 19th of August taking over the local airfield. By 21 August the 6th Guards Tank Army of the Trans Baikal Front arrived overland in the city. By the 24th of August Soviets forces were in possession of Mukden, Dairen and Port Arthur. Once the area was secure the Soviets disarmed the camp’s Japanese guards and left the prisoners in charge. It was noted that for the most part Soviet soldiers greeted the Americans with great enthusiasm, perhaps more than most of the former POWs expected – with large amounts of alcohol being the rule and not the exception. A small number of incidents took place between Americans and Soviet soldiers, most involving harassment and theft. For the most part these incidents occurred in the early days of the Soviet arrival and were attributed to a small number of Soviet soldiers not identifying the Americans they encountered as fellow soldiers, or former POWs.

None of the noted clashes between the two groups interfered with the evacuation of the POWs from Manchuria. To the contrary, unlike Europe where Soviet aid to the POWs had been virtually nonexistent, Soviet assistance in Manchuria was instrumental in evacuating the prisoners out of the area. The relief team at Mukden considered the Soviets to be extremely helpful in procuring the transportation used in the evacuation and in providing general manpower support. Given the large number of prisoners located in the area vice the small number of Americans in the contact team, Soviet participation was crucial to the success of the evacuation. In the aftermath of the evacuation a number of Russian officers, including the Soviet commander Major General Aleksandr Dorofeevich Pritula were recommended for American military decorations in appreciation of their assistance.

The evacuation of American POWs from Mukden began shortly after the OSS team arrived. On 20 August a B-24 carrying relief supplies landed at Mukden and brought with it an additional three relief workers to aid the OSS team. By mid-September the evacuation was largely complete.

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1281 Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. Little, Jr. (Field Service Division, OSS, China Theater), POW Hum.
1283 "Manchuria," RG 389, Entry 460A, Box 2134
The first group of POWs 18 in all, mostly needing medical assistance departed Mukden by air transport on 21 August 1945. Another thirty men were medically evacuated by air on the 24th of August. On the 27th of August, only after all remaining medical cases had departed General Wainwright and the remaining high-ranking dignitaries flew out of Manchuria to Japan. Most remaining POWs were sent by train from Mukden to the port of Darien where they boarded the hospital ship USS Relief and the transport USS Colbert, for evacuation to Okinawa.

The insertion of OSS teams into the area of the largest POW camps confronted the Soviets in Asia with what they had avoided in Europe, the presence of liaison officers at the camps who would organize and assist in the evacuation of U.S. and British POWs to areas under control of the Western Allies. Had the OSS not parachuted in the relief teams it is likely that the situation in Asia would have largely resembled that of Europe, with individual and groups of POWs wandering the countryside in an inhospitable environment dependent upon the good will of poverty-stricken Asians to assist them in their repatriation. The insertion of OSS teams into these areas eliminated any Soviet attempt to hold the POWs as bargaining chips in their ongoing struggle for power in Eastern Europe. It also removed Stalin’s ability to use the POWs in his ongoing negotiations with Nationalist China regarding land borders and Soviet access to warm water ports such as Darien. Without the pro-active policies of General Wedemeyer in facing down the Soviet early in the game it is unlikely that many of the POWs who had survived years of imprisonment by Japan, would have survived the journey out of Japanese occupied territory to any Soviet established collection points.

The presence of U.S. and British officers at the major POW camps throughout Asia was the one major difference between what the Red Army had experienced in Europe and what it would later experience in China, Korea, and Manchuria. It presented the Soviet Union with an obstacle, after-the-fact that their military and political systems were not immediately prepared to deal with. The presence of outside observers with communications gear in-hand allowing immediate contact with major U.S. commands operating in and around South and Northeast Asia; with additional POW repatriations teams reinforcing the initial OSS insertions without prior Soviet approval, presented the Red Army with a situation unlike what they had experienced in Europe. Any desire on the part of the Red Army to ignore the plight of the POWs, to construct stumbling blocks to their repatriation and purposefully stall their return was largely out of the question. Soviet commanders in the area had little alternative other than to cooperate and assist in the repatriation of the POWs and did.

The Soviets at Konan

As the shock of Japan’s surrender wore off Captain Otaki ordered the camp’s guard detachment to disarm to leave the camp. In the absence of Japanese guards the POWs armed themselves with Japanese weapons and posted sentries throughout the camp.1284

The first POW encounter with Soviet military forces occurred on the night of 26 August 1945 when, in an effort to secure their safety Captain George Kinlock of the British Army left the prison to seek out the Red Army after small arms fire was heard about one mile from the camp. Captain Kinlock returned to the camp on the early morning hours of 27 August in the company of two Soviet soldiers. Frontline combat troops, the two soldiers and Captain Kinlock were very obviously drunk.1285

The Soviet troops encountered by Captain Kinlock had fought their way from their 8 August invasion of Manchuria down the Korean Peninsula and into Konan.1286 In an article dated 28 June 1947 E. S. Harrison, a POW in the camp reported that the first two Soviets to enter the camp were Russian officers.1287 An eyewitness to the events that followed Harrison reported “That night the camp was thrown open and we all made for Konan, about three miles distant. The town was full of Russian soldiers, whom we observed for the first time. They looked a scruffy lot: dirty, ragged and patched, but well armed with tommy-guns, besides rifles and wicked-looking three-cornered bayonets. As they were said to be front-line troops, some excuse for their dirty appearance could be expected. They were friendly and offered us cigarettes, which were gratefully accepted.”1288 From Harrison’s vantage point, the Red Army was to put it mildly – different. Leonard Baradell portrayed them as far worse than different.

As Harrison recollected, “We were much amused by the trigger-happy Russians. The majority had revolvers which they would draw and take a shot at any object; they would do this whilst speeding in their trucks or, if a suitable target presented itself, such as a fowl, they would pull up and pot away. If no pistol was available, then a few bursts from a tommy-gun would suffice. It was amusing to see the Koreans, men women and children and any other living thing, disappear over fences as soon as a Russian appeared with a gun.”1289 Eugene Harwood would write years later “Sherrill and I were walking

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1285 Ibid.
1286 Ibid.
1287 Ibid.
1289 Ibid.
1289 Ibid.
from the airport one day when a Russian truck with a full load of Tommy gunners passed us. As they passed, all the soldiers shot off many rounds of machine gunfire at our feet.

Baradell wrote: “The Russians I saw were a poor peasant type, dirty and ill kempt, without organization or leadership. Some hadn’t washed for months by the look of their clothes or faces and necks. That all acted belligerently and with some show of bravado, but it was easy to see that they had in [sic] inferiority complex. There was no method in anything they did. When they looted, which was pretty often, it was quite indiscriminately.”

Baradell pressed on writing that “Some of the Russians had a Mongol look, more like a Tartar. They ate in filth with flies everywhere – even the officers – and they dressed in clothes unwashed for months.” Baradell would note to the contrary of historians writing years later that the Soviet soldiers were more of a mass-mob than an army, many of the Red Army soldiers that entered Konan were vicious survivors. According to Baradell, “Some told me they had just returned from the Berlin Zone. That might account for the condition of their dress but not for the dirt on their skin. Many supported medals. Some said they had fought in the Battle for Moscow and a few said they were at Stalingrad when there Germans there were beaten.”

Even as Hog Wild was forced down; two days after the POWs made contact with Soviet forces in Korea fighting continued throughout the area. Though the war against Japan had been over for 12 days it had not ended: Liberated Koreans armed by the Soviet Union took revenge against the Japanese. The Japanese were left fighting Korean insurgents and the Soviet Army. Korean communist with the support of the Red Army were fighting other Korea political groups. For the most part, the Soviets were only fighting the Japanese. As Harrison would later relate “A large Japanese settlement of civilians had a particularly bad mauling at the hands of both Russians and Koreans.”

“First authenticated reports of Soviet political activity in north Korea substantiate rumors that the Soviet Army is doing everything in its possible to spread communism despite the objections of the people. In one town a successful ‘self-rule council,’ created after the Japanese surrender, was forcibly replaced by the Soviet commander was a ‘people’s political committee’ in which Korean communists were given the dominant position although they are only a small minority of the people.”

Leonard Baradell reporting from the scene would write the “Communists, who represent about 1 tenth of the population of Kanko and Konan, are taking advantage of the advent of the Russians and are using the Russians to further their own ends.”

Captain Grant reported in his statement of meeting a Professor Chang, the English and German language instructor at the Kanko Medical College (becomes the Hamhung University of Medicine in 1949) who inquired of Grant what “American policy would be in Korea?” Grant answered “that America stood for a democratic government set up by the people themselves.”

Chang told Grant that “ninety percent of the Koreans were so poor, illiterate, and used to Japanese domination that they were easily susceptible to Communism, but all of Korea wanted American occupation, not Russian.”

According to Captain Grant “Professor Chang has spent fourteen years in America, attended the University of California, and had studied mathematics in Germany under Einstein and had spent two years studying in Paris. He admitted he knew the occidental world better than the oriental and that he had been on the Japanese black list because of his anti-Japanese ways of thinking. He knew what Japan was ravaging Korea instead of building it up.

He was a bright man, and he wanted very much to go to Keijo and till [sic] the Americans what was going on….” Eugene Harwood referred to Chang as a “teacher who had graduated from Stanford in California.”

In the tumult that overcame Korea in the months and years following WWII it is likely but at this time unknown, that Professor Chang did escape to Keijo or into southern Korea.

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1291 Msg. CINCPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan. To: WARCOS. ID Number: CA 52414. 28 September 1945. Formerly: SECRET TOT. Declassified on 11 July 1975
1292 Ibid.
1293 Ibid.
1294 ibid. Harrison, E. S. Korea, North of 38. Some P.O.W. Memories. The West Australian. Perth. Australia. 28 June 1947
1295 Ibid.
1297 ibid.
1298 Msg. CINCPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan. To: WARCOS. ID Number: CA 52414. 28 September 1945. Formerly: SECRET TOT. Declassified on 11 July 1975
Harrison continued reporting that “We were soon to see the might of the Red Army. It came down in convoys, a continual stream passing through day after day. They had every conceivable mobile weapon, and jeeps, waggons [sic] and amphibians; these, all on questioning, they would proudly pat and say, ‘American.’ Armoured [sic] trains also passed through frequently, loaded with troops and equipment We were surprised at the predominant youth of their army, it was mostly comprised of lads in late teens. They brought no rations with them, but just confiscated supplies as they passed through. We who as prisoners had not tasted fresh meat for months, were having water buffaloes and cows thrust upon us, because the Koreans preferred us to have them before the Russians. By this time we were living on American rations, and did not want the gifts.”

As Harwood would report “These supplies were a real treat to the POWs. In the supplies were new uniforms and all kinds of food and medicine, all of which they hadn’t seen for over 3½ to 4 years after a steady diet of potatoes, rice and watery soup.”

Combat against Japanese Imperial forces in the area of Konan would continue into late November 1945; months after the Japanese had signed surrender documents aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. Soviet units entering Konan, similar to their counterparts in Europe were likewise unprepared to administer a large number of POWs as they advanced into Korea.

To a large degree the Soviet treatment of its Western Allies POWs at Konan was comparable to their exchanges with POWs in Europe. Once the camp had been liberated and its location identified, Soviet forces in Asia as they had previously in Europe generally ignored the POWs. As with camps liberated by the Soviets in Eastern Europe the POWs were largely left to their own devices. Similar to their actions in Manchuria, once the camp was liberated the Soviets left the administration of the camp to the prisoners themselves.

**Soviet Release**

As demonstrated above Soviet treatment of the POWs at Konan was solidly in-step with the previous treatment of other POWs falling into Soviet hands in Europe. There was little interaction between the Soviet military in Korea and the POWs at Konan. The Russians did provide the POWs with Japanese tinned rice, a whole ox and two pigs. As Harrison told the story in 1947, “Although the Russians often inquired how we were faring they gave us very little supplies,- but as we were living well on those dropped by American planes we did not worry.” It is unlikely that the Russians had any food to spare, according to Leonard Baradell “The Russians are living off the land they have occupied, and are using only meager quantities of their own supplies which consist mainly of rice, bean meal, rice bread, and a few vegetables, principally cabbages.”

In the Kanko-Konan area Soviet soldiers took whatever they wanted when they wanted it. Entire farms were stripped of vegetables still in the field; draft and food animals were taken. The food stolen during the day was often consumed at large feasts later that same night. Rape was so common as to be uncommon. The Soviets paid for nothing. One thing the Russians were prepared to offer on any occasion was vodka.

The Russians gave the POWs vodka drinking lessons. According to POW James Miller the tale went something like this: A few days after the camp was liberated “…a large Russian lorry entered our camp. On board there were two 45 gallon drums, and a dozen or more Russian troops complete with a brass band. We were asked to provide buckets of water and cups or something, as each of us was to receive a ration of Russian Vodka. A Russian soldier gave a demonstration of how to drink the stuff. He poured a large Vodka, swallowed it in one big gulp followed by a cup of water. We were then invited to do likewise. There was much spluttering and coughing before this ceremony was completed. Many were sick in the attempt to down their ration. Others went into their respected huts and collapsed…”

As POW Harrison recounted “They used to bring into the camp drums of vodka; vile stuff it seemed to me and tremendously potent; we always broke it down to half strength with water. Some was poured on the stone floor one day and a match applied to see the result; it burnt with a fierce blue flame.” Lieutenant Harwood also had his tale of Russian drinking to tell. According to Harwood while he and Lieutenant Sherrill were at the Hog Wild on 1 September “an old Russian 1921 vintage bomber was flying in. When it landed, the crew all spilled out, and the came over to Sherrill and me. They acted like

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1299 Harrison, E. S. Korea, North of 38. Some P.O.W. Memories. The West Australian. Perth, Australia. 28 June 1947
1300 Harwood, Eugene R. and Barbara (Harwood) Hartwig Honorable Heart. Memoirs from Colorado to B...
1303 Harrison, E. S. Korea, North of 38. Some P.O.W. Memories. The West Australian. Perth, Australia. 28 June 1947
1304 M sg. CINCAPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan. To: WARCOS. ID Number: CA 52414. 28 September 1945. Formerly: SECRET TOT. Declassified on 11 July 1975
1305 Ibid.
1307 Harrison, E. S. Korea, North of 38. Some P.O.W. Memories. The West Australian. Perth, Australia. 28 June 1947
they had been drinking and insisted that we join them. The drank Vodka and then they went over to a Russian Yak fighter plane and drained the glycol out of the radiator and forced us to drink along with them a coffee cup of radiator fluid…. They kept toasting Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill. We saw those guys all pass out one by one around their plane.”

With few exceptions the POWs had little contact with Soviet combat or administrative personnel. Few of the POW accounts and statements given as the prisoners were processed for movement out of the Konan camp in mid-September discuss Soviet forces in the area or any assistance rendered. To the average British and Australian POW held at the camp the presence of Soviet forces in the area was of little concern.

As with the treatment of POWs in Europe, the Soviets left the POWs at Konan largely to their own devices. The POWs were not removed to locations outside the combat area but the Soviets did continue, or force the POWs to continue their work on the furnaces of the Nichitsu carbide factory. As Gene Harwood noted when playing the game of baseball “We were playing a game of baseball that morning with the Allies, the ones who were not on shift for the forced labor at that time period.”

The Soviets could justify the use of the POWs as labor as the Nichitsu plant also produced munitions and explosives and the work continued to support the common interest of the Allies, at least until the 24th of September 1945 when Japan formally surrendered. With several British officers present at the Konan Camp there was nothing standing in the way of the Soviets requesting that the POWs continue to work. None of the POWs at other camps in northern Korea; Heijo, Repho, or Seishin had been previously employed in Japan’s war related industries. They did work building roads, dikes, jetties and such but were not employed in war-related industries such as Nichitsu. While the Soviets could request that the POWs continue work at the furnaces and they could hold the Japanese in concentration camps to force the plant’s former engineers and managers to continue operating the plant, they could not hold the Koreans who formed the baseline for the industrial operations within the various plants of the Nichitsu facility. The Koreans did not gradually drift away from the plant, they fled. Within weeks of the Soviet occupation of northern Korea nearly all of the industrial activity north of the 38th parallel north ceased.

One eyewitness wrote that “When I visited the big carbide works at Konan on September 20th and 21st only one of the six furnaces was in operation, and then only at half cock. On the latter day I counted only four men on the premises which stretch for miles. When the Japs were in occupation the works occupied some ten thousand employees. The same applies to the chemical works. Apart from a few Koreans walking about the whole place was idle on September 21st. The Koreans says that if the Russians take over the works, as they expect them to do, they will be forced to work hard at low rates of pay. They don’t want to work for the Russians, so they are letting the works go idle in the hope that the Russians won’t bother to set them in motion again.” If the Nichitsu facility was involved in the production of uranium at some level, it was not an issue important to the Red Army. Whether due to their inability to effectively manage the Westerners in their midst or because of it, relations between the POWs and Soviet forces also began to change.

As Harrison reported in 1947 “Although the Russian troops were quite friendly to us, gradual restraint was put on us by the authorities and different areas were put out of bounds; first the aerodrome and then military barracks of all kinds. Some of our men who were armed were disarmed and incidents between Russians and our men began to occur.” The crew of Hog Wild also noticed the tense relations between the Soviets, British and Australians.

Captain Grant noted that: “On the whole, the Russians I met were very friendly and polite, especially after the Lieutenant General apologized to Lt. Queen. Though they seemed disorganized and there word was always to be taken with a grain of salt, they treated us fairly considering the state they were in themselves. This attitude was definitely not show toward the English. Capt. Urikov was always interested in whether and Englishman was involved in anything he did for us. He didn’t like doing things for the English at all. It was the same attitude shown at the party the first night.” The ill treatment had also filtered over into the Korean community, Harrison wrote: “Reports of ugly incidents between the Russians and the civilian population soon began to filter back to the camp. Russian soldiers, mostly youths, would walk into a house demanding money and jewels at the point of their tommyguns [sic]. The women were frequently attacked and molested, and

1309 Ibid.
1310 Ibid.
1311 Ibid.
1312 Ibid.
two cases of shooting of Koreans who had refused to surrender to their demands occurred close to the camp.” Tensions between the POWs and Russian soldiers were also on the rise.

Leonard Baradell would observe: “Many prisoners, who spoke Japanese well, were asked to visit Japanese and Korean homes, but more particularly Japanese. If Russians saw them entering they (the Russians) would demand entrance, too, and a woman. The position became so electric one night while I at the camp that the Camp Commandant (Captain George Kinloch, of Glasgow, Scotland) henceforth denied the men leave at night. His action, in my opinion, was a wise one, because the prisoners to a man would stand up to defend any woman, regardless of her nationality. And this may have led to bloodshed.” Soviet-era propaganda aside, neither the Koreans nor Japanese had any love for the Russians. Baradell would write: “The Russian occupation is forcing thousands of Koreans and Japanese to trek south to the American Zone.” It would become a Korean version of the Exodus. Thousands and thousands of Koreans, and Japanese who could pass as Koreans, fled southward.

Leonard Baradell would write: “All along the line, from Kanko to the American lines, there is a stream of Korean and Jap refugees trekking south. A few I interviewed said they were escaping from the Russians who they feared. There one desire was to get to American occupied Korea. I saw this line just out of Kanko, I saw it coming into Kanko from the Manchurian border, and I saw it entering the American Zone, some 200 miles to the south. I don’t suggest that the line stretches that distance without a break, but it is significant.”

According to Captain Grant, who was the only crewmember to mention Korean-Russian relations in his subsequent statement wrote: “The Koreans hate the Russians because of their methods. They were front-line Russian troops and more than one Korean told me that a Russian would take anything from him from his wrist want to his wife. I know the Russians stole from the markets and the people themselves and killed livestock with their reckless driving. I was on a truck one day in which the driver was obviously trying to hit pedestrians, men particularly. They had to scamper off the road to escape him. Furthermore the Russians had given arms to communist sympathizers in the town of Kano and arrested five of the anti-communist league.” In a classified report sent to General MacArthur, Leonard Baradell wrote that “In Kanko and Konan the attitude of the Russians is bringing together the Japs and Koreans – for the time in 40 years.” The Soviets were doing more to promote positive Japanese-Korean relations than the Japanese were able to do over a period of four decades.

“At Konan I visited a Japanese house and was invited to drink tea. I was introduced to two Koreans who stayed in the same house. The Jap told me that he and the two Koreans were traders. During the war they were enemies, but since the coming of the Russians they were friends, and intended to be friends and trade amicably in the future no matter what happened. I was quite convinced they meant what they said. Captain Kinloch, the Camp Commandant was with me at the time. He translated for the Koreans, and the Jap spoke English. At Kanko I met the same thing – Koreans and Japs befriending each other against the Russians.” It should be noted that in the aftermath of the war while many Japanese returned to Japan, many stayed in Korea becoming in effect Korean citizens. Loyalties between friends are often greater than loyalties to governments.

As Captain Grant concluded, “Toward Americans and English the Koreans always seemed friendly; once they were sure we were not Russians. The often thanked us for freeing them for the Japanese, but they added that the Russians were not much better.”

Leonard Baradell would conclude his report warning that “From my observations of the two zones I say definitely that Korea is being torn in half. People in the northern zone are terrified of the Russians, industry is at a standstill, and one desire, it seems, is to get south to the American Zone as quickly as possible.” To the POWs held at Konan it was little consolation.

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1315 Msg. CINCAFPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan. To: WARCOS. ID Number: CA 52414. 28 September 1945. Formerly: SECRET TOT. Declassified on 11 July 1975.
1316 Ibid.
1317 Ibid.
1320 Ibid.
The Red Army in Korea as in Europe did little to assist the POWs in their eventual repatriation either into the Soviet Union or south into the U.S. controlled southern areas of the peninsula. If anything the Red Army had proven in Korea as it had in Europe, that it was largely unprepared to deal effectively with the Western POWs they located in their areas of occupation. As their later actions were to prove the Soviets at Konan would put far more effort into thwarting U.S. and British efforts to repatriate the POWs than they did to assist in the operation. Baradell wrote that “The Russians did nothing to repatriate the prisoners. They promised all sorts of things, but nothing happened.”1324 According to Eric Harrison, “We could not get any information regarding just when we would be moved.” The POWs were only told that “Soon you will go back via the Trans-Siberian Railway.”1325 As Harrison reports “our impatience mounted as the weeks went by and we were still in Korea.”1326 The Soviet commander in Heijo did not help matters.

At one point Soviet Red Army headquarters in Heijo refused permission for a six-man U.S. Army recovery team to precede to Kanko to arrange for the return of POWs at held at Konan.1327 The personnel and crew of a B-25 which flew into Heijo to obtain permission for the recovery team to enter the area was held in a nearby barracks for 36 hours and then ordered to return to Keijo.1328 A second B-25 carrying a POW recovery team and landing at Kanko was likewise ordered to return to Keijo. Its recovery team however stood its ground and stayed in the city despite Soviet objections. As Baradell would write, “When the Russians did act it was with ostentation.”1329 After some haggling, a later U.S. team headed by an unknown colonel proceeded by rail from Keijo to Heijo where it succeeded in establishing some form of liaison enabling the POWs held at Konan to be released.1330 It was a matter of give and take, gains and losses, and the Soviet Union stood to gain nothing from transferring the POWs into Allied hands.

In contrast to Europe where the Soviets attempted to swap the POWs man-for-man for Soviet personnel under German control, there were few Soviets held by the Japanese in Korea other than those that might have been recently captured. Worse yet is the fact that many of the Russians that the Japanese had taken prisoner when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, were people who had fled the Soviet Union after the fall of the czar decade before and reestablished themselves in Japanese Occupied Korea. When the war ended these people were further detained and returned to Soviet Union, and eventually its gulags. Others taken prisoner included members of the Soviet embassy in Keijo.

Unlike Europe there were no nearby international borders where the Soviets might transfer the POWs and release them. As for removing the POWs into Russia for repatriation to Europe, had the Soviets coordinated the move with British and had the British approved, it was within Soviet rights as agreed to under the Yalta Agreements to move the POWs into the Soviet Union and then on into Europe. If anything the forcing down of Hog Wild over Konan had drawn attention to the presence of British and Australian POWs in the city, and prevented their transfer into the Soviet Union or other locations under Soviet control.

Lacking the presence of an OSS team in the area of Konan to negotiate the return of the POWs to Allied control, the loss of the aircraft and the presence of the crew at Konan had served the same purpose. The incident served as the focal point for return of the POWs at the Konan Camp to Allied hands. The incident brought additional U.S. aircraft into the area, maintenance teams, and finally a POW repatriation team. At worst the loss of Hog Wild caused the Soviet Union locally to lose control of the situation. Like-it-or-not because of Hog Wild, at least at the Konan Camp the Red Army was no longer in charge.

Unlike locations where the OSS had parachuted in to save the POWs from Japanese retaliation and possible execution, until Hog Wild had been forced down the POWs at Konan remained solely at the tender mercies first of the Japanese, and later the Red Army. As revelations of Stalin’s Gulags were to later reveal, differences between the two were hardly arguable. The value of Hog Wild being at Konan did not go unrecognized by the POWs. Eric Harrison, an Australian POW captured at Singapore and held at Konan would write in 1947, “We were indebted to the American crew of the plane shot down for eventually leaving Konan. These 13 men were with us for three weeks before eventually being taken out by an American transport plane. They informed the American High Command at Keijo of our plight; they were surprised to hear that we were still there, as the Russians had informed them that we had been sent back via the Trans-Siberian Railway.”1331 But what of Hog Wild’s reported role in seeking out the Japanese facilities supporting Japan’s wartime atomic bomb program

1322 Ibid.
1324 Harrison, E. S. Korea, North of 38. Some P.O.W. Memories. The West Australian. Perth. Australia. 28 June 1947
1325 Ibid.
1326 Ibid.
1327 Russians Halt Yanks Sent to Free POW. The Salt Lake Tribune. Salt Lake City, Utah. 21 September 1945
1328 Ibid.
1329 Msg. CINCPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan. To: WARCOS. ID Number: CA 52414. 28 September 1945. Formerly: SECRET TOT. Declassified on 11 July 1975
1330 Russians Halt Yanks Sent to Free POW. The Salt Lake Tribune. Salt Lake City, Utah. 21 September 1945
1331 Harrison, E. S. Korea, North of 38. Some P.O.W. Memories. The West Australian. Perth. Australia. 28 June 1947
possibly located in Konan? What of the spy mission to Konan to locate secret Japanese facilities hidden in the city? While it makes for a good tale of post-war conspiracies loosely based upon fact, there are several problems with the Snell article of October 1946 concerning Hog Wild specifically which make the story of the bomber as it relates to the Japanese atomic bomb program – questionable.

**Section 89 – DEBUNKING THE MYTH: THE SPY MISSION THAT NEVER WAS**

**Mismatched Chronology**

First and foremost the timelines of U.S. knowledge of Japan’s program and the forcing down of Hog Wild do not agree. Research to date at the National Archives in Adelphi, Maryland has yet to reveal any official documents or other information detailing U.S. knowledge of Japan’s wartime program prior to 8 September 1945 when members of the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group arrived at Atsugi Air Base 20 miles southwest of Tokyo, a full ten days after Hog Wild had been forced down.

Due to Japanese intractability months would pass before investigators would uncover any evidence suggesting that Japan had pursued an atomic weapons program during the war, much less operated nuclear research facilities in northern Korea during the war. The OSS would not begin to uncover information on Japan’s wartime efforts until late 1945. U.S. intelligence would have no information concerning the possible involvement of facilities in northern Korea until late 1946. Were additional imagery of the Konan area required to allay any undocumented suspicions, there were far better assets available for use in imaging the area than a combat bomber and a K-20 camera.

**F-13 Reconnaissance Aircraft Available**

At the time Hog Wild would have been outfitted for its photographic spy mission over northern Korea, with its single low-resolution, K-20 handheld camera the USAF had at Saipan sitting on the flight-line under the control of the 20th Air Force, 52 under-tasked F-13 reconnaissance versions of the B-29. The war was over, the command’s F-13s had little tasking and nearly no mission. From the end of the war until the occupation of Japan began the primary mission of the F-13s would be to orally the islands imaging airfields, ports and other military facilities ensuring Japanese compliance with SCAP orders and directions subsequent to the surrender.

Aerial reconnaissance units were by nature at the forefront of clandestine operations. The aircrews of F-13 units were fully prepared, trained and equipped to conduct intelligence gathering missions over enemy territory. If the object of Hog Wild’s spy mission was not known, and the area of these facilities had been identified, a K-20 hand-held camera taking images out of the bomb bay or oblique imagery out a side window would be incapable of providing imagery necessary to further identify the facility or its function.

Unlike the combat B-29s used for bombing F-13s were equipped with extra fuel tanks in one bomb bay thereby increasing aircraft’s range and loiter time over the target, while the other bomb bay held the aircraft’s camera system. Each of the 52 F-13s available at Saipan was equipped with a bank of six aerial cameras to include three K-17Bs, two K-22s and a single K-18. The F-13 provided horizon-to-horizon multi-camera coverage of the area being imaged. Additionally an F-13 tasked with flying from Saipan to Iwo Jima, there refueling and continuing to the area of Konan could have spent several hours imaging the area or the “mountain vastness” nearby from every possible direction. Lacking the extra fuel Hog Wild could have only spent minutes imaging the area with its K-20 camera. Altitude was also an issue.

Flying at an altitude of less than one thousand feet the area of coverage provided by any imagery system, F-13 included would have been extremely limited. Arriving over the area in stormy weather would further degrade any imagery obtained by a photo-reconnaissance platform of the era operating over Konan that afternoon. Though F-13s conducted numerous missions to locate and identify the 158 POW camps located throughout the empire, none are known to have participated in the bulk delivery of POW supplies to any of the identified camps. Finally, why would the 20th Air Force send a single combat B-29 with one K-20 handheld camera when 52 F-13s capable of imaging the entire area at an altitude of greater than 35,000 foot, out-of-the-reach of most Soviet fighters with multiple high-resolution aerial cameras sat on Saipan with no current tasking? David Snell never provided an explanation for this inconsistency.

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1332 Reconnaissance Total. F-13. Table 96 – Airplanes on Hand in Twentieth Air Force, by Type and Principal Model Apr 1944 to Aug 1945.


1333 Snell, David. Japan Developed Atom Bomb; Russia Grabbed Scientists. Constitution. Atlanta, Georgia. 3 Oct 1946.
But even had information come into U.S. hands before the Hog Wild flew its mission, was there an urgent need for imagery of the area to locate any Japanese wartime uranium enrichment facilities? The answer was “no.”

**Previous Over Flights of Korea – Imagery On-Hand**

By 29 August 1945 numerous F-13s and other aircraft had previously flown reconnaissance missions over the Korean Peninsula, imaging Konan and Kanko and other areas of note. By early 1945 20th Air Force F-13s had the run of the peninsula. During the period of wartime reconnaissance over-flight of the Korean Peninsula, no U.S. aircraft of any type was ever reported shot down over the Korean Peninsula.

By the end of the war the Korean cities of Fusan, Heijo, Jinsen, Kanko, Keijo, Konan, Moppo and Chinamp’o had been overflown numerous times by the various reconnaissance units located in the Pacific. Long prior to the loss of Hog Wild, target folders on the various industries located across the peninsula had been built using imagery acquired from previous reconnaissance flights over the area. By late-1944 the entire Korean Peninsula had been thoroughly mapped. Hardcopy maps of most Korean cities had already been shipped to the Pacific Theater. Neither of the two city maps produced in 1945 for Konan or Kanko note any large-scale unknown facilities. All major facilities and most of the individual buildings within these larger installations such as those at the Nichitsu fertilizer plant, had been previously identified.

Barring some planned event of which the U.S. had prior knowledge and wished to capture on film using a reconnaissance platform, there was no need for additional imagery of the area of Konan to be taken on 29 August 1945. Had there been a need for some type of low-level clandestine reconnaissance mission other imagery collection platforms far better suited to low-level reconnaissance missions were available. These assets included P-38 Lightning reconnaissance versions designated as F-4 and F-5 and additional naval assets. The P-38 based reconnaissance aircraft carried a camera arrangement of four K-17 cameras.

**First in – First Out**

Had 20th Air Force decided to overfly Konan on a low-level clandestine mission on the afternoon of 29 August 1945 the first aircraft to overfly the area would have flown the mission, not the third. Ultimately the first aircraft over any target is the one with the best chance to achieve tactical surprise. First in – first out. Hog Wild, the third aircraft in proved the point. As Konan was at the time an active combat zone with fighting on the ground continuing, with close air support and combat interdiction missions flying in support of forces in battle; it is difficult to believe that any combat mission planner would have seriously expected that a second or third aircraft entering the area would escape unmolested. Had anyone suspected that there might be trouble, additional aircraft would have likely accompanied the bomber or set up a diversion.

If any of the bombers had been assigned a clandestine reconnaissance mission only Z-33 Slick Dick the first bomber to enter the area, met the requirements of a special mission. Of the three bombers that did arrive over the camp, only Slick Dick swung wide over the area and northeast behind the mountains completely out of view of the camp. Slick Dick returned, delivering its supplies and then departed the area. In flying north of the city and behind the mountains Slick Dick would be making its turn largely over an area of Korean wilderness. In 1945 there was little in that area, to include roads. Neither Z-6 Booze Hound nor Z-28 Hog Wild made such a wide turns over the area.

With two B-29s overflying Konan prior to Hog Wild, each dropping POW supplies, a pattern would have been established. That pattern would have worked against Hog Wild, the third aircraft in as it did; but it would have worked against Booze Hound, the second aircraft in but didn’t. There was less to Slick Dick’s wild maneuvering however than some search for an unidentified Japanese atomic bomb facility. As the first of six aircraft on approach to Konan to enter the area only Slick Dick bore the additional responsibility of identifying and locating the camp. Slick Dick was lead aircraft. All of the crews were assigned to locate the camp and drop supplies. But only Slick Dick was assigned to identify the camp for the follow-on bombers. Slick Dick and all other bombers were ordered to drop their supplies “on near side of camp to you,” and the term “near side,” had a specific meaning.

**The “Near Side….”**

Slick Dick’s maneuvering was directly related to the coordinates the crews had been given prior to departing Saipan. Unlike the aircraft following behind, Slick Dick would be the only aircraft to head directly to the coordinates briefed, two

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1336 Ibid.
miles north northeast of the camp’s actual location. Even more confusing sixty years later were the orders given to crews that the supplies were to be dropped “on near side of camp to you.”

The term “near side,” had a specific meaning that could be traced back to the cavalry and the use of the horse. It is one of those terms that has long-since fallen out of common usage in the military, a term that was never updated to reflect new meaning. The term did not make the transition from the U.S. Army to the U.S. Air Force when the Air Force became a separate service in September of 1947. Billy Mitchell, Hap Arnold and Harold L. George to name but a few Army Air Corps generals had all began their careers as cavalry officers.

While there remains some disagreement on the term’s exact origins and usage, as read in the orders given to the crews approaching the camp the supplies to be delivered “on near side of camp to you” were to be dropped on the left side of the camp as observed by the crews on their initial approach to the camp. According to the definition of the term a horse did not have a left or right side, but a near side – the horse’s left, and a far side – the horse’s right. In the case of the POW camp at Konan the “near side” of the camp as observed on the initial approach would have been on the south side of the camp in an area of open fields.

Part of Slick Dick’s role in the delivery of the supplies was to pinpoint the camp’s location for the bombers following behind and now approaching the coast. Each follow-on bomber would further refine the in-bound track and notify those aircraft following behind and nearing the coast of Korea of the camp’s actual location. As Slick Dick approached the coast of northern Korea the crew had only two minutes to accomplish its assignment.

According to the day’s ATO B-29 Z-33 Slick Dick was scheduled to arrive over the camp at 1420 hours (I) local time. Z-6 Booze Hound was also approaching the coast of northern Korea two minutes, six to eight miles behind Slick Dick. Z-6 Booze Hound was scheduled to arrive over the camp at 1422 hours (I) local time. Z-48 Million Dollar Baby was following in-line eight minutes behind Z-33 Slick Dick; two minutes behind Z-6 Booze Hound. Hog Wild not listed on the day’s primary ATO but listed in the day’s supplemental ATO was also inbound, somewhere between Z-6 Booze Hound and Z-48 Million Dollar Baby.

Closing rapidly with the coast, Slick Dick was inbound on a heading generally west toward the coordinates provided 39°53'N 127°38'E, two miles north northeast of the camp’s actual location of 39°51'00"N 127°35'29"E. All eyes aboard Slick Dick were scanning the areas east and west of the aircraft’s track for burning smudge pots and the roofs of buildings marked “PW” in yellow letters 20 foot tall, on a black background. Slick Dick’s crew

1338 Ibid.
1339 Ibid.
located the camp about one mile west of its track and radioed the follow-on bombers to adjust their courses accordingly. The follow-on bombers adjusted their course accordingly.

Once past the camp heading north at low-level Slick Dick would disappear from view as it passed over a ridgeline several miles north of the camp. Out-of-sight of the camp Slick Dick banked to the east completed its turn to the south and was now bearing down on the waiting camp. Passing immediately west of the camp Slick Dick would unload one or both of its loaded bomb bays. If it unloaded one bay at a time it would turn again to the north, extend its range, turn to the south and make a second pass just west of the camp. It is unknown for sure whether Slick Dick made two delivery passes as no after action report of the bomber’s mission exists, however the two-pass delivery method had been as established by 20th Air Force as preferable. As each bomber would unload its supplies immediately west of the camp on a southerly course, they would exit their delivery runs on a heading toward the east coast of Korea and ultimately, Saipan. Shortly after, or even as Slick Dick passed over the coast Z-6 Booze Hound would have been entering the area.

As reported by POWs on the ground Booze Hound would pass almost directly over the camp but still somewhat to the east. The aircraft’s crew would locate the camp to the west of the bomber’s northbound track. Booze Hound would radio this information to the next four bombers approaching the coast.

Each of the bombers following Booze Hound would once again adjust their courses in to a bit to the west. Unlike Slick Dick, Booze Hound would remain constantly in view of the POWs at the camp never disappearing over the mountains, suggesting that it remained entirely over the Plains of Hamhung. As with Slick Dick, Booze Hound would continue northward then turn south and circle around the area to approach the camp from the north, dropping its supplies on the west side of the camp. As reported years later by Arthur Cramsie and Bill Gray independent of each other, Booze Hound is known to have made three passes over the camp; two delivering supplies and on the last pass wagging its wings “goodbye” to the POWs. Booze Hound would have radioed additional course corrections to the bombers still on approach to the camp. As Z-6 Booze Hound passed over the coast Hog Wild was less than three minutes out, heading west and north into Korea but on a track taking it still further west of the camp.

As Hog Wild approached the area, its two previous course adjustments would take it west of the Konan POW camp. As with the two previous flights all eyes aboard Hog Wild were turned left, looking for the camp to the west of its line-of-flight. None of the crew ever identified the camp from the air. As Captain Campbell would write, “we never did come to any definite conclusion of which group of buildings were the P.W. camp.”1340 The crew of Hog Wild did however see the approaching Yaks. Hog Wild would never broadcast any additional course corrections but it would broadcast several emergency messages. Passing west of the camp on a northward heading Hog Wild would then circle southward, following the Yaks to Kanko Army Airfield.

If the Soviets were protecting some unknown Japanese atomic bomb or research facility in the area of Konan from outside observation, despite the arrival of a B-29 over the city on the 26th of August dropping leaflets announcing the supply flights to follow three days later, they were obviously failing. Three U.S. bombers had already penetrated the area, two without challenge. Had the Soviets been protecting some unknown and secret facility why had they allowed two of the bombers to escape the area unscathed? Why had they allowed Slick Dick and Booze Hound to drop their supplies and continue south over the ocean and back to Saipan, if it was possible that the two bombers had observed the clandestine Japanese atomic bomb facility the Soviet Union was believed to be protecting? The answer to this question lay in the fact that the Soviets were not protecting some unknown Japanese atomic bomb facility, but they were interested in acquiring a fourth intact bomber in support of their program to reverse engineer the B-29. On 29 August 1945 the Soviets would have had a total of six opportunities. They would take what they could get, and they took Hog Wild.

**Culling the Herd**

Rarely mentioned in discussions about the forcing down of Hog Wild is the fact that a total of six bombers were scheduled to arrive over Konan that afternoon, or that two had entered the area prior to the ill-fated Hog Wild. Slick Dick and Booze Hound operating in the same environment and unaware of the Yak-9s rising to meet them, entered and exited the area without incident. They were simply lucky. Soviet Naval Aviation was going to force down one bomber from the herd. Hog Wild or not, one of the six bombers approaching Konan would not return to Saipan.

Had the Soviet Union been protecting some Japanese atomic weapons production facility it is unlikely that any of the bombers would have ever been allowed to reach the POW camp, much less deliver supplies. Had the Soviets been protecting some unknown and sensitive facility why allow any of the bombers to enter the area? If they were protecting some sensitive facility from outside view why not intercept the bombers and force them back to Japan? Where was the Soviet cordon sanitaire? That air barrier designed to prevent penetration of the area by aerial vehicles. Neither Slick Dick and Booze Hound reported the presence of Soviet aircraft over area of the camp or the East Sea, suggesting that there were either no

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1340 Diary of Captain Robert Campbell while held at Konan POW Camp. 30 August to 15 September 1945.
Yaks airborne when they approached the camp or if they were they airborne they were more than ten minutes away. The fact that neither of the first two bombers was intercepted suggests that the Russian were not aware of the approaching bombers or their presence in the immediate area until the second bomber had arrived and departed. This lack of early intercept further suggests that there were no Soviet radar systems operating nearby, no aircraft flying defensive counterair missions to prevent penetration of the area and no cordon sanitaire.

If the Soviets were protecting some unknown facility from outside observation, why didn’t their AAA units engage the low-flying bombers? At least one of the bombers, Slick Dick had flown directly over a Nichitsu facility protected by not-less-than 12 permanent Japanese AAA batteries. As the Soviets moved south from Manchuria they brought with them additional AAA units. Despite an overwhelming number of AAA units in the area, not one engaged any of the incoming bombers.

If there were something to protect from observation by Hog Wild, why didn’t Soviet Yaks pursue Slick Dick and Booze Hound over the East Sea and dispose of them before they could possibly report an unwanted observation? The answer was that there were nothing in the area for the two bombers to report. Other than Hog Wild none of the other bombers were intercepted or followed out to sea and Hog Wild was not shot down, but only damaged. The Soviets were not protecting a facility from observation but had some other purpose in mind when they opened fire on Hog Wild.

**What the Soviets Knew and When They Knew It**

The Soviets knew from the leaflet drop of 26 August that bombers delivering supplies would be in the area on the 29th of August. What the Soviets did not know was what time the bombers would arrive or how many there would be. The fact that the first two bombers entered and exited the area without incident suggests that Soviet Yaks were not airborne waiting to intercept the first bomber, but at best were sitting strip-alert in their aircraft waiting to take off from nearby Kanko Army Air Field to intercept the bombers. The timing of the intercept of Hog Wild suggests that the Soviets were largely unprepared for the arrival of the first bomber, manning their aircraft and taking off only after the first bomber arrived in the area. It is likely that it was only after Slick Dick arrived over the area that the Yaks scrambled to intercept the B-29s. By the time the Yaks had taken off, gained altitude and made their way north, the first two bombers had already departed the area. Regardless, they were on-scene when Hog Wild strayed into the area about one mile south of the POW camp. At best Lieutenant Queen and the crew of Hog Wild had stumbled into something that was completely unexpected. Like it or not, the Soviets were going to force down at least one of the B-29s entering the airspace around Konan that afternoon of 29 August 1945.

Short of spy at Saipan or Guam Soviets commanders were unlikely to know how many bombers would be over the area or what time they would arrive. The idea of a spy at the airbases in the Marinas was not entirely out of the realm of possibilities but extremely unlikely. Being able to warn the Russians at Konan of the arrival of several B-29s would have required knowledge of the tasking order, the timing of the flights, knowledge of the Soviet requirement for a bomber, and an ability to coordinate that requirement across the Pacific.

Once a spy had overcome those obstacles he would require access to a radio transmitter of sufficient power to warn Moscow that the conditions for acquiring a B-29 would exist on 29 August 1945 over northern Korea. With Allied radio intercept stations active across the Pacific and aboard ship, it is unlikely that any broadcast directed at Moscow would have gone undetected. If such a person were in-place and operating on Saipan it likely that the he would be discovered or lost. As agents in-place are extremely valuable and represent years of effort, it is unlikely that Moscow would have risked the loss of such an asset in an effort to acquire a single bomber when it was already known that several would be available on 29 August. Lastly, had a spy broadcast such a warning it would suggest that the incident that would occur over Konan on 29 August had originated at Saipan. It hadn’t. There was also the matter of the three bombers behind Hog Wild still on approach to the target area.

Had the Soviets been pre-warned of the number of bombers approaching Konan, their order or arrival, time-over-target (TOT) etc., they would have likely been better prepared for their arrival. If they had been forewarned they would have probably interacted with at least one other bomber prior to forcing down the first Superfort they encountered, Hog Wild. As it would turn out the Soviets were forced to attack Hog Wild because they didn’t know that additional bombers would be following this third bomber over the camp. Hog Wild was a target of opportunity. As far as the Soviets knew it was the last B-29 scheduled for the day and they could not afford to let it escape, explaining also why the Yaks were willing to followed it out to sea.

Million Dollar Baby only minutes behind, likely observed the attack in progress and aborted its mission. Ann Dee likewise aborted but did report Hog Wild on the ground in Soviet-occupied northern Korea. Naughty Nancy, nearly one hour out either aborted upon hearing the report of Hog Wild on the ground, or was recalled by commanders at Saipan. Had Hog Wild exploded in mid-air, it is possible that Million Dollar Baby would have continued into the area first to investigate then delivered its supplies. Had Hog Wild exploded, Million Dollar Baby would have then become the object of Soviet attention. Hog Wild itself was not the target; the B-29 was the target.
OSS: The Outcast in the Pacific

Much is made about a link between the OSS in the Pacific Theatre and the possible clandestine imagery collection mission of Hog Wild, however the connection does not stand up under critical review. Neither General Douglas MacArthur nor Admiral Chester Nimitz had much use for the OSS in their theater of operations. Neither commander wanted nor would either knowingly permit the OSS to operate out of areas under their control. The two had actually banned the OSS from operating within their theatres. Vice-Admiral William F. (“Bull”) Halsey also had little use for the OSS. In April 1943, General Donovan sent an agent to try and convince the admiral to allow the cloak and dagger office to operate in his area. Unimpressed Halsey finally to the agent to “Get the hell out of here.”1341 In 1942 MacArthur allowed the OSS to maintain a liaison officer on his staff, but this one officer was limited to duties related to basic research. Nimitz did not allow the OSS to operate with the forces under his command until August 1944. The OSS under Nimitz was somewhat limited to Maritime Unit Group A which conducted operations with Navy Underwater Demolition Team 10.

On Saipan the OSS was allowed to operate a propaganda radio station manned by Nisei (a term usually referring to second generation American citizens of Japanese descent) which broadcast programs aimed at undermining the morale of the Japanese on the home islands. However this radio station did not conduct combat operations or initiate clandestine imagery reconnaissance missions using B-29s. There were no additional OSS units or other OSS personnel assigned to Guam or Tinian. Operationally the OSS was officially shut out of any activity in the Southwest or Pacific Theatres of the war but was successful in its operations conducted in the CBI Theatre under General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell (19 Mar 1883–12 Oct 1946) and his successor General Albert Wedemeyer. The OSS POW rescue missions were organized by General Wedemeyer from his headquarters in China, and were only inserted into camps in the area under his command. Neither MacArthur nor Nimitz deployed POW rescue teams. Considering the challenges of running a clandestine mission out of Saipan without the knowledge of MacArthur or Nimitz, it is unlikely that the OSS could have mounted such a mission without the support of at least several local commanders. Consider the requirements.

In mounting a clandestine imagery collect over Konan from Saipan without the knowledge of local commanders the OSS would have had to employ a long-range aircraft such as the B-29. No other aircraft available at the time could reach Japan or Korea from the Marianas without refueling at Iwo Jima. At the time there were 52 F-13 reconnaissance aircraft on Saipan with no active mission other than to monitor Japanese military movements across Japan. Each of these aircraft mounted numerous aerial cameras that could have supported such a mission much better than a B-29 with a K-20 camera, and if the OSS had mounted the mission it had ignored the best collection platform available. Once the OSS had acquired a B-29 it would need a qualified crew and few if any were available outside existing bomb squadrons.

If the mission was to be conducted without the knowledge of the command, it would have been difficult even for the OSS to hide the disappearance of the entire Queen crew. If the mission was indeed a clandestine collect using a misappropriated crew, it is unlikely that the OSS would have allowed any of the command staff to accompany the mission or sandbag the flight. Yet as a replacement for the aborted mission of Lucky Eleven, on the 28th of September the crew had been called to the office of the 5005 Group Commander who notified them of their assignment.1342 In addition the OSS would need fuel, food, flight plans, ammunition, permission to land at Iwo Jima, rescue backup and so on. On top of all the above requirements the OSS would be faced with accomplishing their mission under two theatre commanders that detested the organization and had previously forbidden the agency from operating within their commands. Why would even an OSS known for generating a number of crackpot operations mount such a mission from Saipan when all their requirements could be easily mounted from China under General Wedemeyer in China who supported their activities? Finally, for a clandestine mission none of this activity would have been documented, yet the last flight of Hog Wild was scheduled and listed under an active operations plan. Its mission was “fragged.”

An Active Operations Plan

At the time that Hog Wild was forced down over northern Korea, it was operating under an active operations plan; The Basic Outline Plan for Blacklist Operations. The plan had been implemented by command authorities and as such moved from an Operations Plan to an Operations Order. Redirecting Hog Wild to another mission would have violated command tasking and forced a reallocation of limited resources already tasked to support the POW relief mission. Any change to the planned daily operation, would require additional authorities within the command to approve the new mission outside the

implemented plan, creating additional security concerns by increasing the number of people who would be knowledgeable of the clandestine mission.

Crew Access to the Aircraft

Problematic to the conspiracy theory regarding the forcing down of Hog Wild is crew access to the bomber. Had the aircraft been on a spy mission with unusual equipment, additional cameras, or some other sensors aboard, the Russians would have made quick work of finding that equipment and would have ultimately denied the crew any further access to the stricken bomber – possibly permanently. Though the U.S.S.R. was at war with Japan and was an allied nation, the crew been spying that act would have probably led to their execution.

Unless one expected the aircraft to be shot down or planned for mission failure as a method of success, such equipment would have been mounted in some part of the aircraft providing the crew easy access. Had such equipment been aboard the bomber it would have likely been mounted inside one or both of the Superfortresses’ bomb bays. Access to the equipment by the crew in-flight would be required to correct any failure while over the target, to recalibrate the equipment, or make further adjustments to its position within the aircraft.

The presence of such equipment inside the bomb bay would have also required modification of the bomber’s bomb bay doors to allow the equipment to image or gather intelligence, a process that took the Manhattan Project several months to accomplish yet is believed to have occurred overnight in the case of Hog Wild. Any extraneous equipment would have detracted from the ability of the bomber to carry the POW supplies, yet we know from the POWs at Konan and the Soviet statement that unlike this unknown equipment, the bomber was loaded with supplies.

Had the bomber been carrying specialized gear, that equipment would have required the presence of a systems operator, much as the bomber required a radio operator, a bombardier, a radar operator or as the F-13 required a photographic systems operator to control and direct the intelligence collection effort. There were no such individuals aboard the Hog Wild. None of the 13 men on board Hog Wild possessed a background in intelligence operations or collection. None were special systems operators. There remains the possibility that the crew could have dumped any sensor out of the aircraft while over the East Sea; however it should be recalled that once the bomber caught fire, most of the crew concentrated on finding parachutes, life vests and rafts before exiting the burning aircraft.

Had Hog Wild been carrying highly sensitive equipment, the first objective of the crew would have been destroying that equipment in-place, jettisoning it, dumping it overboard or ensuring the complete destruction of the aircraft. Had the bomber been carrying some unknown sensor package, once over the open sea the crew should have jettisoned the equipment. However the crew could only jettisoned the gear if the aircraft’s bomb bays were open. In its effort to evade Soviets Yaks, once over the ocean Hog Wild was in a shallow decline at full throttle attempting to gain speed and eventually altitude. Had the crew opened the aircraft’s bomb bay that action would have increased drag on the aircraft, defeating their effort to escape. If the crew had time to have jettisoned anything it would have been the bomber’s entire load of 20,000 pounds of POW supplies.

Several crew member positions within the bomber had the ability to jettison weapons or supplies from the bomber to include the pilot with the flip of a switch, yet no one jettisoned the supplies. Opening either bomb bay would have also left the tell-tale sign of no supplies, alerting the Soviets to something amiss. Of those remaining aboard the stricken bomber, none mention dumping anything overboard or destroying any equipment. There was nothing out of the ordinary to destroy. As it would turn out it was the Soviets themselves that unloaded Hog Wild’s POW supplies. There was no clandestine espionage equipment located aboard Hog Wild.

Considering the size of the K-20 camera proposed by many to have been used to image the suspect facilities, why didn’t any of the crew throw it overboard or take it with them when they bailed out of the burning craft? Once the bomber caught fire and crew was ordered to bail out, none of the crew delayed their exit out of the blazing aircraft. With Hog Wild on fire and the order given to bail out, the K-20 camera was unimportant.

Had the bomber been assigned a clandestine mission it is likely that the aircraft would have been expendable. Had there been sensitive equipment aboard the aircraft that could not be jettisoned, Lieutenants Queen and Rainey were fully capable of pointing the bomber out to sea or toward land, bailing out, and allowing the B-29 and its sensitive gear to be destroyed in the crash. It is unlikely that any crew of a burning and expendable B-29 carrying sensitive equipment with its number one engine on fire and that engine’s known propensity to burn through the craft’s wing spar, would have concentrated on saving the bomber when allowing it to crash into the sea or on land remained a viable option. That they tried to save the bomber again suggests that there was nothing unusual aboard the aircraft.

Note that during the crew’s subsequent interrogation the Soviets never asked about hidden cameras or any unusual equipment. In the 1947 forcing down of the U.S. B-17 the Soviet commander at Wonsan simply asked the crew if there were any cameras aboard the bomber – and accepted the crew’s answer. The crewmen of the B-17 denied that any cameras were aboard, kept their personal cameras with them and took pictures around the airfield. While the crew of Hog Wild had to wait for access to their aircraft, the crew of the B-17 never lost access to their bomber.
Note also that once the crew of Hog Wild departed the bomber, Soviet security or ground maintenance personnel went through the aircraft removing documents, briefcases, orders, opening the bomber’s gun turrets, and examining entire sections of the bomber. The Soviets opened every life raft, parachute, and emergency kit. It was only after this search had been conducted, that the crew of Hog Wild was allowed to return to the bomber to unload the bomber’s load of POW supplies. Had the Soviets detected anything untoward within the bomber, it is unlikely that any of the crew would have ever been allowed to return to the aircraft. With the possible exception of the first 24-hours following the bomber’s landing, the crew had access to Hog Wild everyday while it was at Kanko Army Airfield. Had Soviet commanders feared that the aircraft was on a spy mission and their search had turned up something out of place, it is unlikely that the crew would have enjoyed such access.

The Apology, MacArthur and Memoirs

Though much has been made about General MacArthur demanding an apology for the forcing down of the aircraft, the truth is that as an issue it really never caught on with SCAP or the American public. The issue was of little importance to General MacArthur. Few articles were ever filed about the incident; most of the articles that did appear were filed two weeks after the bomber had been forced down with no follow-up.

According to an article filed by Don Caswell of the United Press, “Gen, Douglas MacArthur had protested strongly and vigorously to the Soviet high command over the incident. The Soviet reply expressed regret and called the downing of the plane a mistake.”1343 The article stated up front that “Russia apologized for shooting’ down an American Superfortress on a mercy flight over northern Korea and the case was closed.”1344 The loss of the bomber was a much to do about nothing – if that.

No loss of life had occurred due to the incident, none of the airmen were seriously injured, and the POW supplies needed by the prisoners at Konan had been successfully delivered – albeit by truck. The mission had been accomplished at the cost of one now surplus, B-29 Superfortress. After receiving the apology, MacArthur made no further comments about the incident.

MacArthur did not mention the incident in his memoirs, Reminiscences.1345 William Manchester made no reference to the incident in his monumental biography of General MacArthur, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1890-1964.1346 George Marshall never wrote about the loss of the bomber, nor did Harry Truman, Hap Arnold, Carl Spaatz or any of the other political and military authorities that would have been aware of its loss. The subsequent forcing down of the B-17 in April 1947 warranted no newspaper coverage at all. Two years into the Cold War the incident was never mentioned in the press of the time. Neither SCAP nor its commander General Douglas MacArthur, ever requested an explanation or an apology for the stray flight of the B-17. None was needed; the B-17 was outdated technology.

The Soviet apology served several purposes: First the Soviet apology ended command and public interest in the incident, second it provided a plausible explanation for the incident, and lastly it fed the perception that the incident was a minor event, one of no consequence. Nothing was or could have been further from the truth. The Soviet Union was not protecting any unidentified Japanese atomic weapons research, design, or production facilities located in the area of Konan, it was seeking a further example of the B-29 Superfortress to validate the information they had obtained from the three bombers than landed at Vladivostok. For Soviet Union the effort to acquire of one more B-29 was unbelievably low, MacArthur had asked for an apology and received one. Case closed. But was it?

Other Flights into the Area Ignored

Central to the ability of conspiracy theorists in maintaining the tale of Hog Wild as some Soviet plot to hide the facts about Japan’s atomic research projects located in northern Korea, is the premise that the bomber was the only U.S. aircraft to penetrate the area, and as a result of its snooping was shot down. As noted earlier Hog Wild was the third B-29 to penetrate the area that day of 29 August 1945. It was not the last to overfly Korea north of the 38th parallel north or Konan that same day. B-29 Blacklist flights also dropped supplies to the POWs at Heijo that same day without incident. South of the 38th parallel north B-29s dropped supplies to the POWs held at Jinsen and Keijo. Additional flights also overflew the Konan camp later in the month of September.

Between the Yellow List provided by the Japanese, the list of POW camps contained in CINCPAC CINCPAO Bulletin No. 113 45 and the locations identified by efforts of the 314th Bombardment Wing, a total of 169 POW-civilian

1344 Ibid.
intee camps and other prison locations were identified. Of the 169 camps B-29s and other aircraft were able to drop supplies to all but 11. These 11, despite repeated attempts could not be identified from the air or near the coordinates given. 158 of the camps received a delivery of three-day supplies. 128 camps received a seven-day food and medical supply drop. 91 of the 158 camps were supplied with one or more ten-day supply drops. Additional three-, seven-, and ten-day supply drops were made as needed to keep the camps well supplied. The longer a camp remained occupied by Allied POWs humanitarian relief flights would continue, explaining the 900 missions flown over the length of Blacklist Operations.

Though the Australian and British POWs held at Konan would be released from the camp itself by the Soviet Union when it took control of the area in late August, the POWs would not be transported out of northern Korea to Keijo until 21 September 1945. With its original occupancy estimated at 23 prisoners against a reality of nearly 400 POWs, the Konan prison camp would be one of an ever decreasing number of camps to be continuously resupplied by air drop. Additional B-29s would be involved in resupplying the Konan camp until it was finally evacuated on 21 September 1945.

In addition to the supply flights and the maintenance crew that flew in to repair Hog Wild, repatriation teams also flew into the area to gather and organize the Konan POWs for return to their homes of record. The first RAMP team arrived at the Konan camp on 15 September 1945. The POWs were removed from Konan to Keijo six days after the arrival of the RAMP team on 21 September by rail in a special train, “heavily guarded,” and provided by the Russians. As James Miller would recall years later “The disagreement between the Russians and Americans regarding who would handle the responsibility of getting the ex-prisoners of war back to their respective countries, was resolved with the Americans having their way.” One wonders just how much “classic British understatement” Private Miller’s words contained. According to Miller “A party of Americans escorted us to a train at ‘HOUAN’ Station,” emphasis on the word “escorted” added.

Leonard Baradell recorded the scene writing that “the prisoners were taken in Russian trucks to Kanko station on the first stage of their journey home. Although under heavy Russian guard – each truck carried two Russians each armed with tommy guns – Koreans and Japs lined the roads and waved and cheered. Some wept openly, and many waved American and Korean flags. It was the same at the station. Although the Russians kept the crowd at a distance the locals cheered and clapped as the train pulled out. It was really touching. They regarded the prisoners as their friends. The women especially, looked to them for assistance when they were in trouble.”

Ken Marshall years later would write of the ride from Konan to Keijo, “the train journey down to Jinsen (Inchon) turned out to be a circus. A squad of Russians who travelled with us and were supposed to get off at the 38th parallel, chose to stay aboard when American MPs joined the train and we arrived at Jinsen, all well and truly sloewed on saki and vodka.”

From Jinsen, the POWs held at Konan were removed from Korea by hospital ship, the U.S.S. Mercy (AH-8) to Philippines. The aircraft carrier HMS Colossus transported the Australian POWs held at Konan from Manila and to Australia. A reflection of Western values, only the fittest Australian soldiers would sail home aboard the HMS Colossus; those that were seriously ill were transported from Japan to Australia by air.

On 18 October 1945 the British POWs held in Korea along with other POWs whose homes were in Europe, boarded the USS General A.W. Brewster (AP-155) for San Francisco, California. Disembarking at San Francisco they were greeted

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1352 Ibid.

1353 Ibid.


by a brass band. From San Francisco they were taken to Oakland and given medical and dental examinations. After a stay of about five weeks they boarded a train to New York City passing through Salt Lake City, Utah and Baltimore, Maryland. In New York they boarded the RMS Queen Mary, serving since the start of the war as a troopship for the remainder of the journey to landing at Portsmouth, England. Heijo was also the scene of numerous flights into Soviet-occupied Korea.

At least one team flying into Heijo was tasked with organizing some form of communications with the commander of Soviet forces in Korea. None of these additional aircraft whether at Heijo or Konan, were ever forced or shot down. Nor were those left behind in northern Korea otherwise tortured, harmed, beaten nor interrogated. There were no further incidents or harassment by Soviet forces in the area against American aircraft “snooping” over northern Korea.

Had Hog Wild been on a spy mission or had the U.S. sought to spy upon unknown facilities in the area of Konan, it is unlikely that additional over flights, POW recovery teams, transportation units, and the like would have been allowed in any of the areas controlled by Russian forces. If the Soviets were intent on protecting the northern Korea from observation it was fully within their power do so. Other than being difficult to deal with, obstinate and bureaucratic, there is no evidence that the Soviets had any such intentions.

A Storm of Controversy

One of the more interesting aspects surrounding the saga of Hog Wild and its supposed imagery espionage flight that makes the mission doubtful, was the weather. Planning for reconnaissance missions includes consideration of the weather. On the day that Hog Wild arrived over Konan it was overcast and raining. The military weather system was aware of the conditions over the target area that day. If mission planners had assigned Hog Wild a clandestine mission to image Japan’s atomic research facilities in Konan they could not have picked a worse day. No matter the camera used; K-17, K-18, K-20 or K-22 none could obtain a clear image through the rain. No amount of flyovers that day could have provided clear imagery of facilities located on the ground.

Recall that Hog Wild received a weather brief concerning conditions over the target area prior to their departure from Saipan. The crew received an additional weather update at Iwo Jima. Had the mission objective been a clandestine imagery collect, if not scratched at Saipan it would have been scrubbed at Iwo Jima or enroute as more information became available. As the area of Konan was socked in the bomber would have been diverted to a secondary imagery target, yet the bomber was never diverted. The low-altitude approach of the bomber would have also further limited its area of coverage. The lower the altitude the less area imaged on a single photograph. At low altitude the B-29 would have been flying in the rain. At a higher altitude its imaging efforts would have suffered greater interference from the cloud cover overlying the target area.

Debriefing the Spy Mission

Note that after the crew landed at Keijo in U.S. Occupied Korea Lieutenant Queen was debriefed by XXIV Corps, G-2; Colonel Cecil W. Nist. Even though the movements of the crew around Konan had not been hampered by the Russians, no other crew members report being interviewed by Colonel Nist or any other members of XXIV Corps, G-2. None of the airmen on Hog Wild were ever subsequently interviewed of debriefed by the Army’s Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) or its Criminal Investigation Division (CID) in an effort to gain intelligence on Soviet forces then operating in or around Konan. Compare the lack of interest by Colonel Nist at Keijo in the incident with Hog Wild against the 1947 incident with the B-17 at Genzan when intelligence information on Soviet forces in northern Korea was now at a premium.

1356 NEI Royal Navy Sailor Hendrik Dob, POW. An Autobiography
1357 Ibid.
1358 Ibid.
1361 Ibid.
There was no organized effort in the part of U.S. intelligence to document what the crew of Hog Wild had seen in or over the area of Konan.

The reports filed by the crew of Hog Wild at Saipan concentrated more on their being forced down than on what they had seen of the area. None of the Hog Wild crew reported on the industries within the area, the morale of the Soviet soldiers, or Soviet operations in the area despite being housed inside the former POW camp nearly equidistant between Konan and Kanko and given free roam of the area. In the incident with the B-17 its crew is debriefed en masse with minor information such as morale, clothing and types of buildings under construction noted in detail. Such minutiae as mail, train service and a lack of local transportation were also documented. As for Colonel Nist some discussion of who he was, why he becomes important, and how he plays into the later story of Japan’s atomic bomb program is required.

Colonel Cecil W. Nist

The connection of Colonel Nist to the forcing down of Hog Wild and the Japanese atomic bomb comes about retrospective of subsequent events. It is only on hindsight of the later events of May 1946 that Colonel Nist becomes important to this story and later conspiracy theories about the Japanese bomb program.

Colonel Nist attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point graduating in 1923. When Hog Wild was forced down at Konan Colonel Nist was serving with the U.S. Army at Keijo as XXIV Corps G-2, Intelligence. As the G-2 Colonel Nist was the principle advisor on intelligence matters to the commander of the 24th Corps, Lieutenant General John Reed Hodge. Nist’s responsibilities also included counterintelligence and security.

Tracking him through the various newspapers of the time Colonel Nist had held the position of G-2 with XXIV Corps for some time during World War II, months prior to the deployment of the 24th Corps to Korea. In June 1945 as 24th Corps G-2 Colonel Nist served as the spokesman for the 24th Corps in revealing the deaths of Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru (31 Jul 1887–23 Jun 1945), commanding general of the 32nd Japanese Army and his chief of staff Lieutenant General Chō Isamu (19 Jan 1895–22 Jun 1945) in the final days of the Battle for Okinawa. The Lieutenant General Chō Isamu who committed seppuku (stomach cutting) on Okinawa in 1945, was the same Chō Isamu who was a leader in the attempted coup d’état March Incident of 1931 against the Japanese government. Following the Battle for Okinawa Colonel Nist continued to serve as G-2 until reassigned in late 1946 to the Organization and Training Division of the Army General Staff, Washington D.C.

In June 1950 Colonel Nist returned to the Pacific theater where he assumed command of the 7th Calvary Regiment of the 1st Calvary Division. Four months later at the Pusan Perimeter Colonel Nist was reassigned as the commanding officer of Camp Osaka, Japan. In November 1952 he was named Deputy Commanding General of the XVI Corps. Though Colonel Nist had several moments where he was mentioned by the press of the time, he would achieve his most lasting fame when he signed out a May 1946 Intelligence Summary report stating: “Of increasing interest has been reports dealing with an apparent undercover research laboratory operated by the Japanese at…Kanko.…All reports agree that research and experiments on atomic energy were conducted…The two chief scientists were Takahashi, Rikizo and Wakabayashi, Tadashiro [whom I had never heard of]. The recent whereabouts of these two individuals is not known, inasmuch as they were taken into custody by the Russians last fall. However, before their capture they are reported to have burned their papers and destroyed their laboratory equipment…Some reports…say…the Russians were able to remove some of the machinery. Further reports stated that the actual experiments on atomic energy were conducted in Japan, and the Kanko plant was opened for the development of the practical application of atomic energy to a bomb or other military use. This section of the…plant…was always heavily guarded…. These reports received separately are surprisingly uniform as to content. It is felt that a great deal of credence should be attached to these reports as summarized.”

Though it provides no solid evidence the document is oftentimes cited as proof positive that a Japanese nuclear research program existed in Konan. Retrospective of the release of this document, Colonel Nist is credited with being knowledgeable of the activities and installations involved in the Japanese atomic bomb program of WWII with little evidence to support the assertion. It is the only such report ever signed out by Colonel Nist on the issue of atomic research facilities in Konan. The subject of atomic research facilities at Konan was only one of numerous subjects discussed within the document.

1363 Ibid.
1364 Ibid.
1366 Ibid.
If on the basis of this one report Colonel Nist becomes the expert on Japanese atomic bomb research facilities at Konan, then it would stand to reason that he was the expert on all other matters discussed in the report. However the truth was not quite as complicated.

As the 24th Corps G-2 Colonel Nist was responsible for the content and quality of the reports issued by his organization. As the responsible official, and long before e-mail Colonel Nist would have signed out most of the reports issued by his organization. He would have done this for several reasons, 1) to protect the integrity of his unit’s reporting; and 2) to ensure his commander was receiving the information he needed to perform his duties properly. If there was the possibility of some nuclear weapons research effort ongoing at Konan, General Hodge needed to know. As the command’s chief-of-intelligence Colonel Nist would have also been the point-of-contact for any future requests for information regarding the reports issued by his command. Colonel Nist was not the analyst responsible for the information in the report but was responsible for the quality of the reports issued by his unit.

On the surface and in retrospect the Intelligence Summary signed by Nist appears to support Snell’s assertion that a B-29 was shot down over Konan because it was snooping around the area searching for Japan’s atomic research facilities. However, on closer review the timeline of the forcing down of Hog Wild and the issuance of the Intelligence Summary Report does not support the assertion that the Soviets in August 1945 were aware of any special facilities in the area of Konan that required some degree of protection, denial and deception.

**Colonel Nist: Interloper?**

A final clue that the mission of Hog Wild was not involved in intelligence gatherings lies in the fact that Colonel Nist ever debriefed any of the crew at all. Had the crew been on some kind of secret mission Colonel Nist, located in Keijo would not have been involved in planning the original or in identifying its collection objectives. As a long-time professional intelligence officer Colonel Nist would have known not to insert himself into the process at a point where the mission was still ongoing. Colonel Nist would have known that any interference on his part at that point in time could have compromised any previously established clandestine collection objectives. That he interviewed the crew and that his meeting with them was publicly acknowledged is a further indicator that the mission of Hog Wild was not an intelligence operation.

**Clandestine Collect/Public Acknowledgement**

Lastly regarding Hog Wild, in an after action report issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 9 May 1946 the fate of Hog Wild receives some mention. The report states, “One aircraft was shot down by Soviet forces over Korea when they took it to be a captured plane manned by Japanese personnel, but all crew members were rescued uninjured.” The U.S. military had obviously accepted the Soviet explanation of the event and their apology. If there was a requirement for plausible deniability covering Hog Wild’s true mission over northern Korea that early afternoon of 29 August 1945, the incident would have doubtlessly received fewer acknowledgements in official records.

One final aside, recall also that the crew of Hog Wild had been interviewed by reporters from Yank Magazine with several additional articles later published detailing its being forced down, and the impressions of the crew regarding the incident. Lieutenant Queen, Sergeants Strilky, Arthur and others made comments to the press after crew’s return to U.S. control. It is unlikely that any supposed clandestine mission has ever received more open press coverage at the time it occurred with the people directly involved than did the crew of Hog Wild.

So if Hog Wild was not on a mission to snoop on possible Japanese atomic bomb facilities located in northern Korea, and if the Soviets had not forced it down to protect the Allied POWs from dangerous supply drops why did the Soviet Union force down the bomber? The answer was rather simple and was contained in the aircrew debriefs submitted by the crew members at Saipan.

**Section 90 – STEALING THE B-29**

In a nutshell, due to the differences built into each B-29 as they moved along the assembly line; the updates they received at the modification centers and adjustments they underwent once overseas, each B-29 the U.S.S.R had been lucky enough to acquire was slightly different one to the next. Though the differences might have been minor to an untrained observer to a competent engineer assigned to assess the bomber; reverse engineer the entire aircraft, these changes

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1368 Ibid.
represented substantial ambiguities in their understanding of the bomber and its production processes. There were also advanced technologies aboard the bombers that required tremendous study and investment to master. Any additional information would be useful. Though few documents have been uncovered detailing the Soviet effort to steal the B-29, what follows can be derived and largely substantiated from the materials currently available.

Where the Soviets actually had blueprints, for the most part those plans were essentially out-of-date. Some of the plans were obtained by spies in early 1942 into 1943, two to three years before the first B-29 landed in the Soviet Union. The plans were also stolen over a long period of time and did not represent a complete package that might apply to an entire model. While the older drawing might remain correct; any alterations made to the part since the original design had been drawn were not reflected on the older blueprint. The Soviets had three intact aircraft, all somewhat different. They had actual blueprints and drawings which did not match the aircraft they had in their custody. They lacked specifics, leaving them with imprecise knowledge. Why was one change made on the assembly line to one aircraft and not another? Why were some changes made in the field and not on the assembly line? Of the three intact bombers the Soviets possessed there was no standard model.

In the Soviet experience with the U.S. industry, one item coming off an assembly line was generally the same as another. With the B-29 this was not the case. Unlike the plans for the atomic bomb where the Soviet Union had received detailed information on one prototype or on several different designs, in the B-29 there was one basic design but variations in each successive example produced. Ramp Tramp was different than Calt Paomat II was different than General H. H. Arnold Special was different from Ding How. To successfully reverse engineer the aircraft, some validation of the information the Soviets had obtained; the plans, blueprints and three bombers became a necessity. In acquiring so much information to reverse engineer the plane the Soviets muddled the process. In a sense, operating from the acquired plans with only one example would have been easier. Operating from a varied set of plans with three physically different samples, under a direct order from Joseph Stalin, with Lavrentiy Beria in-charge overwhelmed the reverse engineering process. Due to the presence of so many different sources the baseline for development was corrupted. Simply put Soviet engineers needed more information. Another example of the bomber, or at the least a chance to examine one became essential to the success of the project.

Much depended upon the answer. The Russian effort to reproduce the B-29 would lead a Soviet industrial sector based upon technologies from the 1920s and 1930s to the cutting edge of aircraft technology. The information gained from reverse engineering B-29 would spread outward from the Russian aircraft industry into rest of the Soviet industry. Stealing the atomic bomb was a tremendous accomplishment, but copying the B-29 would allow the Soviet Union to survive the coming Cold War.

Though it could be argued that the Soviets were seeking a later model of the B-29 such as a B-29B to update the aircraft before it was produced, several experts on the bomber report that there few ways to tell one of the earlier models of the aircraft on the other short of inspecting the bomber on the ground. Though later models of the bomber were produced without the 20mm cannon that decorated earlier models, most of the 20mm cannons carried on the original aircraft had been removed once they were deployed. Changes to the tail gunners section and radome did take place over the lifespan of the B-29’s production however these changes took place intermittently and often within the same model whether the B-29A and B-29B. Because the bomber was produced in large sections by the numerous manufacturers involved and assembled at a several locations such as Wichita, Kansas and factories in Georgia, the outside appearance of the bomber would often depend upon which sections arrived from which factory in what order.

Any two bombers on the same assembly line might contain several similar sections produced by several different factories. As modifications to the basic bomber were also incorporated into a section as that section was completed at the sub-factory along that company’s assembly line, it was possible for several similar but different assemblies to be incorporated on several different B-29s completed at the same plant only hours apart. Arguments suggesting that the Soviets might have thought they could acquire a SILVERPLATE version of the bomber are similarly difficult to support.

During and after WWII a total of 65 SILVERPLATE versions of the B-29 were produced. 29 of the 65 produced were assigned to the 509th Composite Group the unit that dropped the world’s first atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. the SILVERPLATE version was noticeably different from its counterparts. A Soviet pilot well briefed on the difference between the B-29 and the SILVERPLATE version flying less-than 50 foot away would have experienced little difficulty in distinguishing one from the other.

The standard B-29 had two 12-foot long bomb-bays covered by four doors, two doors each for each bomb bay. The SILVERPLATE version had one 33 foot-long bomb-bay covered by two doors only. The four remotely operated gun turrets

[Image: B-29 Nose Sections, Wichita, Kansas – Source: U.S. Army]
visible on all other B-29s were completely absent on the SILVERPLATE version. The only defensive guns on the SILVERPLATE were located in its tail section.

Because Stalin’s spies had doubtlessly reported the existence of the SILVERPLATE program to modify the B-29 to carry the atomic bomb, the Soviets probably also knew that the bomber’s movements were tightly controlled. Until the 509th Composite Group moved from Wendover Field in Utah to Tinian Island in the Marianas SILVERPLATE aircraft rarely flew outside the continental U.S.

The need for some modification of the B-29 to carry the atomic bomb was a matter of public knowledge soon after the first SILVERPLATE version Enola Gay dropped its atomic payload on Hiroshima. One day after the destruction of Hiroshima newspapers were already questioning the changes made to the B-29 that allowed it to carry the atomic bomb, and whether due to those modifications the role of the Superfortress as an atomic weapons delivery platform would be taken over by America’s newest bomber, the B-32 Dominator. Even the Soviets could read newspapers.

Only 15 of the SILVERPLATE bombers were available at Tinian during the period of the supply effort while more than 1,000 other B-29s were available throughout the Marianas Islands. Tinian alone was home base to nearly 1,000 B-29s as was Guam. The 15 SILVERPLATE versions of the B-29 would have added little to the ability of the other units in the Marianas to accomplish the task of delivering supplies to the POWs held by the Japanese. None of the SILVERPLATE modified bombers were ever used to fly POW relief missions.

Due to the limited availability of the SILVERPLATE, the lack of large numbers of the bomber at Tinian and the specialized nature of the aircraft, it is doubtful that the Soviets really expected to obtain a copy of this version. The fact that the Soviets actually harvested the first bomber they encountered over Konan versus inspecting the several that had either overflown the camp or were flying into the area, suggests that they were after any bomber that strayed over the POW camp. Many of the SILVERPLATEs located on Tinian would remain on-site into late 1945 with the Enola Gay and Bock’s Car only departing the island in November 1945. In forcing down Hog Wild the Soviets sought to obtain a standard bomber – there were none.

Stealing the Standard Bomber

Command economy or not, the Soviets would be investing tremendous resources into their version of the B-29. The U.S. had spent $3 billion to develop and build the B-29, $1 billion dollars more than it had cost the U.S. to build the atomic bomb. Regardless of the information Stalin possessed the investment required to duplicate the Superfortress would be immense. Due to waste and inefficiencies in the Russian economic system; transportation, production, storage, the final cost to the Soviet economy to produce the bomber may have actually exceeded its overall cost to the U.S. Before Stalin could transform the entire Soviet industrial base, the country had to have more information. That could only come from additional copies.

Stalin’s assignment of Lavrentiy Beria to manage the program may have also raised the costs associated with the TU-4 even higher. It may have also prompted the program’s aviation engineers to push the Soviet military for one final copy of the B-29.

Within the Soviet Atomic Bomb Program also under Beria’s control, engineers, managers, and directors were required to sign or initial all approved drawings, plans, and blueprints. If the design failed the signatures could be used by Beria to threaten the lives of the scientists assigned to the project with imprisonment the gulag, torture or death. Secrecy within the program to build the bomb was ever present and suffocating. Information was strictly compartmentalized. In the numerous reports written in support of the Soviet atomic bomb project, scientific terms were replaced by code words. Typists were not to be trusted, so scientist wrote all reports in long hand. On the rare occasions when a document was typed, the key words were hand-written into the report. Each morning the scientists and engineers assigned to the Soviet bomb effort could see prisoners held in the gulag marching to work. In the evenings they could see columns of prisoners marching back to their settlement. The pressures of security alone were so great that at least one person committed suicide due to anxiety over a single misfiled document. The pressures on Soviet aviation engineers to accurately reproduce the B-29 were equally oppressive.

For the engineers assigned to copy the B-29 their lives were only as secure as their ability to accurately reverse engineer the Superfortress. Under orders from Joseph Stalin to reproduce the bomber exactly as it was; with an uncompromising Lavrentiy Beria monitoring their every decision to ensure that the orders of “the boss” were strictly followed, lacking a standard model, it would be understandable if engineers assigned the task of reverse engineering the B-29

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were at best – somewhat reluctant to sign off on drawings, specifications and blueprints. It is possible that it was the reluctance of Soviet engineers to take responsibility for the design of a bomber based upon three different examples that led to the need to acquire one last copy. The engineers assigned knew the risks associated with disappointing Beria. Many of them had been the victim of previous purges at the hands of Stalin and knew the risk associate with failure. The group’s knowledge of the gulags started at the very top of the project with A.N. Tupolev himself.

Purging the Nation’s Engineers

In the 1930s Tupolev was one of the leading engineers at the Moscow-based Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute (Центра́льный аэрогидродинамический институ́т) (ЦАГИ) (TsAGI). The Central Design Office (Tsentrnalnoye Konstruktionnoye Byuro) (TsKB) which was based in the TsAGI produced bombers and some commercial airliners. During the early 1930s the Soviet Union was the world’s leader in the construction and operation of large bombers. Throughout the decade Soviet bombers set and broke numerous world records related to heavy aircraft and overall load capacity. As Tupolev matured and rose in stature he established a separate office producing aircraft designs prefixed ANT – his initials. On 21 October 1937 Tupelov along with Soviet designer Vladimir Petlyakov and the entire directorate of the TsAGI were arrested on charges of sabotage, espionage and of plotting a “Russian Fascist Party.” Tupolev was never allowed the privilege of facing his accusers. Many of the engineers arrested were subsequently executed. Tupolov was actually taken to the Lubyanka, the NKVD’s notorious central prison in Moscow and scene of countless executions, where he was tortured.

For two years Tupolev languished in Stalin’s gulag. Aircraft design within the Soviet Union came to a standstill. In 1939 the NKVD moved Tupolev from prison to a secret research and development laboratory operating within the Soviet labor camp system at Bolshove, northwest of Moscow. Many of the surviving TsAGI personnel had been transported to the center before Tupolev arrived. The laboratory was eventually moved closer to Moscow where it was referred to as “Tupolevka” in honor of its most famous inmate. In 1940 Tupolev was finally tried and convicted on the trumped up charges of 1937. He received a sentence of fifteen years. In 1941 he and 15 of his associates were granted mercy. In July 1943 Design Bureau Tupolev was assigned to design a high-altitude bomber, the ANT-64, also known as the Samolet 64.

The ANT-64 would be far larger than any previous Soviet aircraft. Like the B-29 the ANT-64 would have pressurized cabins and cannon for defense. The bomber was to have a top speed of 311 mph, a range of about 3,100 miles and carry about 11 tons of bombs. Two versions of the ANT-64 were to be built, a bomber and a passenger-transport. The project presented a number of problems to its designers who were constantly concerned about aircraft weight versus propulsion, the allocation of scarce resources during wartime, and the requirement for advanced materials. The need for Soviet industry to produce the required materials in the necessary amounts in the timeframe allowed would be a major drawback. By August 1944 the design was complete. The final Soviet design could carry a bomb load of nearly 40,000 pounds to include bombs weighing over 11,000 pounds each.

Like the B-29 the ANT-64 had two bomb bays; one fore and one aft of the aircraft’s wing. The bomber’s pressurized cabins allowed the crew to operate without gear at altitudes between approximately 26,000 and 33,000 foot. The bomber’s communications suite would carry the most up-to-date radio gear that Soviet industry could produce. Defensive armament would include up to twelve 20 to 23mm remotely controlled cannon. The aircraft’s tail turret was to be armed with one 45 or 57mm cannon. An automated system controlling the bomber’s defenses had been planned but was proving beyond the capabilities of the Soviet Union when the three intact B-29s landed near Vladivostok. The planned Soviet gun system was never completed. Several variants of the bomber were considered for production based upon differences in armament, crew accommodations and weapons designs under consideration at the time. A full-scale mockup of the aircraft was completed in September 1944. A review of the aircraft by Soviet officials that September resulted in a number of changes such as the addition of airborne radar. The mockup was endorsed on 27 April 1945. The final aircraft would have a nominal operating speed of 379 mph with a maximum combat speed of 391 mph; its service ceiling would extend to approximately 36,000 foot. Its projected range was just over 3,100 miles, not far enough for it to threaten the continental U.S. but it could easily dominate Western Europe. Though work on the ANT-64 was far advanced when the first B-29 fell into Soviet hands, once the decision was made to proceed with reverse engineering the B-29 the entire ANT-64 program was cancelled. Tupolev was now assigned to manage the reverse engineering of the B-29.

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1373 Ibid.
1374 Ibid.
1375 Ibid.
1376 Ibid.
1377 Ibid.
1378 Ibid.
Tupolev and his associates entered the project far more aware of the dangers incumbent with copying the B-29 than their physicist counterparts working on the atomic project, none of whom had ever been arrested or sentenced to the gulag. Tupolev and his associates were personally aware of the cost of failure. The aeronautical engineers assigned to the TU-4 project were caught between pleasing Stalin and fearing Beria. As if Tupolev needed even more encouragement, near mid-point in the project in April 1946 Stalin purged the leadership of the Soviet Union’s military and aviation industries. Stalin removed A.I. Shakurin, head of the wartime aviation industry and Alexander Novikov, Chief Marshal of Aviation, Soviet Air Forces. By December 1944 the Soviet Unions’ one-time large bomber force had shrunk to a single long-range aviation unit, the 18th Air Army. Shakurin and Novikov would bear the blame.

Once arrested Shakurin and Novikov were accused of sabotage and criminal negligence for failing to provide the Soviet Union with the technical means for producing a very heavy bomber. It was Shakurin who, under orders from Stalin himself had managed the rapid expansion of Soviet Union’s aircraft production at the beginning of WWII. Marshal Novikov was an aviation pioneer, an advocate of both strategic and tactical aviation forced by necessity early-on in the war to emphasize tactical aviation in direct support of ground forces over long-range strategic bombing into the heart of Germany.

From 4 to 8 May 1946 Novikov was tortured almost continually without rest; Lavrentiy Beria is reported to have attended, overseen or even conducted the torture. Beria was in his element. Novikov confessed to planning to overthrow the Soviet government. In addition Beria and his torture squad forced Novikov to implicate Marshal Georgi Zhukov, labeling him a fellow conspirator. Novikov would out outlive Beria, eventually being restored to his former rank by Nikita Khrushchev and reassigned once again as Chief Marshal of Soviet Aviation.

Validating Intelligence

Hog Wild was not forced down to prevent the U.S. from “snooping” about the area of Konan to observe some unknown Japanese facilities involved in the enrichment of uranium but to validate Soviet plans to reproduce the bomber. There were no large-scale uranium enrichment facilities in the immediate area of Konan and even had there been, on the 29th of August 1945 the U.S. had no knowledge of the existence of numerous facilities involved in the program across China, Japan, Korea, Manchuria and Vietnam. Though the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan far more knowledgeable of the Japanese atomic research program than the U.S., it was primarily aware of those Japanese facilities that were in Manchuria and China.\(^{1379}\)

The Soviets may have suspected that such facilities existed in northern Korea; however there is no documentation indicating that the Soviets possessed any intelligence on Japanese atomic research facilities in the area of Konan at the time they entered the war.\(^{1380}\) Similarly Hog Wild was not forced down to prevent its supplies from hitting the POW camp directly or to protect the POWs from falling supplies.

None of the POW statements taken after the war mentioned the supply drops over Konan. Not one of them reported the supplies heavily damaging buildings within the camp or injuring the POWs contained therein. Arthur Cramsie never mentions the incident in his book about the camp but does discuss the arrival of the Hog Wild crew. None of the POWs that later exchanged letters with the crew members of Hog Wild mention anything other than a few tiles knocked loose from the roofs of several outbuildings and number of close calls with falling supplies. Photos of the camp reportedly taken after incident show no damages to the roofs of the buildings contained within the camp.\(^{1381}\) The only report to suggest such an incident came from Howard Handleman in his article of 15 September 1945, Yank Fliers Tell of Being Downed by Soviet Plane and Handleman was not there when the supposed incident occurred.


\(^{1380}\) Ibid.

\(^{1381}\) Photostatic copy of captions to pictures taken of the Konan POW Camp after the capitulation of Japan. Provisional Caption for Photograph No. 41175, 41176, 41177, and 41178. Available upon request to the Australian War Memorial. Treloar Crescent (top of ANZAC Parade), Campbell ACT 2612 AUSTRALIA
According to Handleman “Previously, 29 of 350 British prisoners were injured when a parachute with supplies dropped by a B-29 failed to open and Russian forces acted to prevent a recurrence of the tragedy.”\textsuperscript{1382} Read another way, Handleman was reporting that nearly one of every ten POWs at the Konan camp had been wounded by falling supplies. While some POWs may have indeed been injured in the deliveries at Konan, nothing approaching an injury rate of nearly ten percent ever occurred. It is likely that the numbers that Handleman quotes in the story were actually the total number of POWs known to be injured by the supply drops across the entirety of northeastern Asia under Japanese control. It should be noted that the only previous supply drops over the camp occurred less-than 10 minutes before Hog Wild was forced down. Slick Dick had been over the camp at about 1420 hours, Booze Hound overflew the camp two minutes later. Hog Wild arrived six to eight minutes after Booze Hound at 1430 hours. The speed of the various deliveries arriving over the camp left the Soviets little time to assess the situation and take action to protect the POWs, but plenty of time to launch numerous Yak-9s to intercept one bomber. Note that once Hog Wild landed, it was the Soviets that informed them that another B-29 had been in the area. Two had been there.

Few commanders Soviet or U.S. would have directed fighters already aloft to a target with open-ended orders to investigate and fire on the intruding aircraft. The presence of a Soviet Consolidated PBY Catalina twin-engine flying boat, more probably a Soviet produced GST as reported by Eugene Harwood now becomes more significant – and disturbing.\textsuperscript{1383} The flying boat’s probable mission was to warn Soviet Naval Aviation at Konan of the approaching bombers. Judging by the response times of the Soviet Yaks rising to meet the bombers, the GST had probably failed to identify and locate the incoming bombers.

By the end of WWII the PBY Catalina was near legendary. The flying boat flew and fought in every theater of the war. The Soviet Union had actually negotiated a contract for three of the aircraft in 1937. Moscow subsequently obtained a licensing agreement to build 150 of the seaplanes in the U.S.S.R. but only built 27. The small number actually produced under the contract reflected the Soviet Union’s low interest of the in the usefulness of the aircraft, the difficulties in producing the seaplane and ultimately the fact that the Taganrog Plant assigned to build the aircraft was overrun early in the war by the advancing German Army. The Soviet Union designated the Consolidated PBY Catalina as the GST. An early effort by the U.S. Navy to improve the Catalina resulted in an updated model designated as the PBN-1 Nomad. Of the 156 PBN-1s ordered by the U.S. Navy to fill its wartime requirements nearly 140 were delivered to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease. By the end of the war another 48 Catalinas model PBY-6A were sent to the Soviet Union. 30 of the PBYs transferred to the Soviet Union are known to have been delivered to the Soviet Far East.

During the war the Soviet Union used the PBY for anti-submarine patrols, convoy escort, rescue missions, long-range reconnaissance and the insertion of espionage agents and seaborne infantry into battle areas. The PBY had a reported range of about 2,520 miles. It is likely that the Soviets used the PBY to support the insertion of paratroops or airborne soldiers into Seishin and Konan in August 1945. Of the 30 PBYs known to be in the area of Vladivostok as of the 25th of August 1945, 17 of those delivered 215 Soviet soldiers to Darien and Port Arthur in China.

In hindsight there was little justification for the aircraft’s presence in the area of Konan other than warning Soviet authorities at Kanko Army Airfield of the approaching B-29s. By the 29th of August as the U.S. Navy could later attest, the utility of the PBY had been rapidly overtaken by events: Most Japanese submarines and surface vessels had surrendered; any requirement to insert agents and naval infantry no longer existed, short of a Soviet ship sinking for reasons unrelated to the war there was no remaining rescue missions. Of all the PBY’s known roles the only one that could account for the aircraft’s presence in the area was that of long-range patrol or picket. It is likely that what Lieutenant Harwood actually observed was at one of several possible Soviet PBYs returning to its base. The PBY was likely flying such a mission that day in an effort to identify the scheduled B-29s as they approached Konan. With the GST’s service ceiling of 15,800 foot, cruising speed of only 125 mph, operating in stormy weather, the slow response of the Yaks to the presence of the B-29s over Konan suggests that the Superforts had inadvertently evaded the PBY. It is likely that other Soviet PBYs had sortied from Genzan and

\textsuperscript{1382} Handleman, Howard. Yank Fliers Tell Of Being Downed By Soviet Plane. The Port Arthur News, Page Three, Port Arthur, Texas, Sunday, 16 September 1945

\textsuperscript{1383} Commandeur, Marc. Red Star Catalinas. \url{http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/english/articles/commandeur/}
Seishin to intercept and report the approach of the American bombers. Note also that the PBY was returning long after all B-29s in the area to include the late-arriving Z-7 Naughtey Nancy, had long-since departed.

As it would turn out the Soviet Yak launched to intercept and force down one of the bombers only after the first B-29 appeared over the area. None of the previous bombers reported any Soviet aircraft airborne in the area. The Soviets were not taking action to protect the POWs but to force down one B-29 – any B-29. If it had not been Hog Wild it would have been another. Slick Dick and Booze Hound were simply lucky. Hog Wild wasn’t. Million Dollar Baby watching the incident unfold as it approached the area aborted the mission. Ann Dee following three minutes behind likewise aborted but was also able to report Hog Wild on the ground and in Soviet hands. The Soviets were waiting for them and were fully prepared to fly any bomber that landed out of the area.

Plotting the Capture

On hand at Konan was at least one man who would later admit to a disbelieving Lieutenant Grant that he was a B-29 pilot. At least one known B-29 qualified flight engineer, possibly two were also present. Had the bomber landed undamaged more-than-likely the Russians would have found a way to confiscate it and fly it into the Soviet Union. Had the bomber simply landed as requested, it is unknown the fate that would have awaited the crew after the Soviets had obtained the intact bomber. By ordering Soviet Yaks to fire on the Superfort it appears that no cost was too high for the crew to pay for the Soviet Union to get another bomber.

Hog Wild was the third of six planned missions to arrive over Konan that afternoon of 29 August 1945. In the ten to fifteen minutes before Hog Wild arrived two other B-29s had penetrated the airspace around Konan, identified the camp and delivered their supplies. In the 15 minutes or less between the arrival of Slick Dick and the arrival of Hog Wild, Soviet Naval Aviation launched or scrambled between four and eight Yaks, possibly more. At one point a single member of Hog Wild’s crew reported no-less-than six Yaks surrounding the Superfort. The first two Yaks took up positions; one to the front and right of the bomber, the other off the bomber’s right wing. The pilots of the Yaks “waved in a friendly manner” and gestured for the B-29 to follow them. The Yaks then led Hog Wild to a small military airfield about 10 miles south of the POW camp.

Once over the field the pilot of Yak 65 suddenly motioned for the bomber to land. Two additional Soviet fighters now joined the Yaks still flying to the front and side of Hog Wild. The Yaks now began to raise and lower their landing gear, and angrily motion for the crew to sit the bomber down. Lieutenants Queen, Rainey and Weeks recognized the motions of the Soviet pilots, the raising and lowering landing gear as an order to land the bomber. As the crew of Hog Wild accurately observed, the runway at Kanko Army Airfield was too short to safely land the Superfort, it was not however too short to land the bomber in an emergency. The Soviets had already seen three other bombers, damaged over Japan land on similarly short runways near Vladivostok. Lacking any indication that the bomber was going to obey their orders the Yaks would provide an emergency. The fighters now moved to surround the bomber.

According to Lieutenant Harwood “One Yak fighter was under our right wing and another under our left engine with one directly behind us and two more coming up in the rear.” Writing years later, Eugene Harwood described the Yak flying behind the bomber’s left engine as “practically flying into our engine from the rear.” The Yaks now moved to box in the bomber and by doing so control its movements.

Theoretically, much like police attempting to force a car to the side of the road, with up to six Yaks surrounding the Hog Wild had the crew understood that the Soviets were attempting to control the bomber’s movements, the Superfort could not maneuver without colliding with a Yak. However the crew was not aware of Soviet intentions and had orders in the event of trouble to return to Saipan. As Lieutenant Weeks reported “When we still did not drop our gear the Yak pilot threw open

1389 Ibid.
his canopy and violently motioned us to land by jerking his fist at the ground.”

Ordered not to land and aware of the limited ability of fighter aircraft to navigate over long stretches of open water, Lieutenants Queen and Rainey turned the bomber toward the open sea. The Yaks now moved away from the B-29.

To the bomber crew as Hog Wild began to clear the coast it appeared that the Yaks had indeed decided to leave the bomber in peace and allow it to depart the area. Unfortunately the Yaks followed and were assembling to start initiating pursuit curves as a further warning the bomber to land. At this point had the Soviets intended to prevent the U.S. from collecting imagery on some unknown Japanese atomic weapons production facility or were taking action to protect the POWs from falling supplies, they had achieved their purpose. If either of these motivations given for the actions of the Soviet Yaks at Konan that day were true, there was no longer a need to shadow or threaten Hog Wild any further. The Yaks however continued to harass the bomber. Pursuing the bomber 20 miles out to sea suggests that the Soviet’s real interest lay in forcing the B-29 to land, not in preventing it from snooping around the area or protecting POWs from possible injury.

About five miles from the coast the Yaks reappeared, initiating pursuit curves and making “dry passes” at the bomber. It was a clear warning to return to the airfield and put the bomber on the ground. Previously ordered not to land and having been told to return to Saipan if they ran into trouble, the warning went unheeded.

20 miles out to sea Yak 65 passed slightly below the rear of the bomber and from 50 yards out fired several cannon shot and small arms rounds into Hog Wild’s bomb bay. Whether from the warnings dropped by the earlier bomber on the 26th of August or if actually reacting to the supply drops of minutes before, the Soviets knew the bomber was not carrying a weapons load of incendiary or high explosive bombs. The attack was not without its risks but those risks were acceptable. The war was over. Stalin himself was on vacation, his first since the war began. The last B-29 bombing mission against Japan occurred on 14 August a full 15 days before Hog Wild entered Soviet controlled airspace.

Firing into the Superfort’s bomb-bay was perhaps the least risky approach to damage the bomber without shooting it from the sky and impress upon the crew that they needed to land. However the Yak in attacking Hog Wild either overshot the B-29’s bomb-bay putting rounds into the wing and engines on the left side of the aircraft, or its rounds had penetrated the bomb bay into the aircraft’s left wing and engine. Armed with a 37 or 20mm cannon had the Yak pilot wanted to destroy the bomber now cruising at low-level attempting to gain speed and altitude, the B-29 would have been an easy mark. With one engine on fire and not responding to the discharge of fire extinguishers, Lieutenant Queen turned the bomber toward the Korean coast and Kanko Army Airfield. The survival of the airmen in the water aside, more evidence of Soviet perfidy would become evident once Hog Wild was on the ground. The presence of Colonel-General of Aviation Evgenii Nikolaevich Preohrazhenskii.

Of Generals, B-29 Pilots and Flight Engineers

Evgenii Nikolaevich Preohrazhenskii rose through the ranks of Soviet airmen during WWII from within the U.S.S.R’s bomber commands. Preohrazhenskii had led some of the earliest Soviet strategic bombing missions from islands in the Baltics directly into downtown Berlin. Of the Soviet Union’s ten earliest missions into Berlin, Preohrazhenskii had flown on every mission. At the time Preohrazhenskii flew those missions the U.S.S.R. did not possess a long-range strategic air arm based upon a very-heavy bomber.

Until his assignment as the Deputy Commanding Officer Air Forces Pacific Ocean Fleet in early 1945 Preohrazhenskii had served in European Russia as opposed to the Soviet Far East. Preohrazhenskii’s assignment to the Far East followed on the heels of the landings of the three B-29s near Vladivostok in late 1944. Though he was the Deputy Commanding Officer Air Forces Pacific Ocean Fleet his presence at the specific Korean airfield where Hog Wild would be forced to land, so near the operational front begs the question of why was Preohrazhenskii there. He was out of place. Preohrazhenskii was a long-range bomber pilot in a command with no long-range bombers. As in Europe, in the fight against Japan most Soviet bombers would conduct tactical operations in direct support of the advancing Soviet Red Army.

Konan had fallen to the Red Army on 26 August 1945 just three days before Hog Wild arrived. Ground combat between the forces of the Soviet Union and Japan was ongoing; armed Koreans were exacting revenge upon Japanese stragglers, former government officials and in many cases each other. Japanese snipers were active in the area. Preohrazhenskii was not a combat soldier but an airman. Preohrazhenskii himself warned the crewmembers that landed with Hog Wild of the dangers of being out at night and arranged for them to sleep on the base that first night in Korea. As a

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bomber pilot Preohrazhenskii was experienced in managing risks; planning combat missions and orchestrating attacks, not engaging snipers.

At the time Hog Wild was forced down Soviet Naval Aviation remained formally in control of the two B-29s that had previously landed at the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Base at Tsentral’naya ulogovaya near Vladivostok, Ding How and the General H.H. Arnold Special. Though all three bombers had by that time been flown to Moscow, the Soviet Navy continued to retained control of Ding How and the General H.H. Arnold Special. Preohrazhenskii would be hard-pressed not to know of Stalin’s order to reproduce the bomber or the importance of B-29 reverse engineering program to the future of the Soviet Union. His command owned two of the bombers.

As a bomber pilot Preohrazhenskii would know better than most the risks involved in physically forcing a B-29 to land. Whether they accompanied General Preohrazhenskii to Konan or not, there was at least on one qualified Soviet B-29 pilot, one qualified B-29 flight engineer and possibly a second qualified flight engineer on hand at the airfield under his control. As Lieutenant Grant later related “I asked several people if there were any Russian B-29 pilots and they all assured me there were. Also a Major appeared one day who insisted he was a B-29 Pilot.” He probably was. Though none of the crew ever reported the name of the pilot the information at-hand suggests that it was a Major named Vyacheslav P. Morshakov. While Preohrazhenskii may have headed up the operation and Morshakov may have been the B-29 pilot identified by the crew of Hog Wild, Preohrazhenskii’s most obvious agent as reported by the crew of Hog Wild was the highly visible Major Krooglov.

Soviet Major Kruger, Kruglov or Kruglov as reported by the crew of Hog Wild was actually flight engineer of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Major M. M. Krooglov, sometimes given as Kruglov. Krooglov was one of two Soviet flight engineers that the crew of Hog Wild would meet and interact with closely while at Kanko Army Airfield; the other being a Soviet Captain Urikov. More is known about Major Krooglov.

Like General Preohrazhenskii, Krooglov was out-of-place at Kanko Army Airfield. There were no Soviet aircraft on the base other than Yak fighters and none of those required a flight engineer. It is entirely possible that several Soviet cargo aircraft had landed at the base in the time since it was overrun on 26 August accounting for his presence; however no large cargo aircraft were reported by the crew to be in the area. Similarly no multi-engine Soviet or American bombers including those obtained through Lend-Lease and requiring a flight engineer were ever reported to be operating out of the base.

With A.F. Chernov, Krooglov was one of the Soviet Union’s first two B-29 qualified flight engineers. The two men had qualified on Ding How and General H.H. Arnold Special, the bombers which had landed at the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Base at Tsentral’naya ulogovaya in November 1944. Krooglov worked under the command of Naval Air Arm Vice-Chief of Inspection Colonel S. B. Reidel and Major Vyacheslav P. Maroonov; a pilot from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to assess the capabilities of the forfeited B-29s.

Unlike Reidel and Maroonov who were dispatched to the Russian Far East from European Russia; Chernov and Krooglov were pulled directly from the naval aviation division of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. Like Reidel, Krooglov was familiar with written and spoken English which was probably one of the reasons he was selected for the effort. His experience with the English language and American aircraft was possibly a by-product of experience gained ferrying U.S. Lend-Lease aircraft from Alaska into the Soviet Union during the war. Chernov is known to have flown with Maroonov, Krooglov with Riedel. The four began their inspection of the B-29 in January 1945, seven months before Hog Wild was forced down over northern Korea.

As discussed earlier, Colonel Reidel mastered the bomber by studying its flight manuals, running up the bomber’s engines and lifting the aircraft from the runways of the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Base at Tsentral’naya ulogovaya during high speed taxis. As Reidel became more confident with the bomber, he eventually lifted it aloft becoming the Soviet Union’s first and only self-qualified B-29 pilot. On 11 January 1945 Reidel qualified Major Moroonov as the Soviet Union’s second B-29 pilot. The two now moved rapidly to analyze the Superforts conducting four flights on 9 January 1945 alone. Reidel flew the missions as aircraft commander (left seat) with Moroonov as pilot (right seat).

Once Reidel and Moroonov had mastered the bombers the two weapons systems were then flown to Romanovka Air Base about 22 miles northeast of Vladivostok. At Romanovka these four men and a small but growing number of Soviet personnel evaluated, trained on and analyzed the bomber. On 10 July 1945 Reidel, Morshakov, and Krooglov ferried the first B-29 from Romanovka to Izmailovo Airfield near Moscow where they turned the bomber over to the design team of A.N. Tupolev. They were the only three airmen aboard the bomber on its trek from the Soviet Far East to Moscow. Reports

conflict as to whether Maroonov ever flew any of the damaged B-29s to Moscow. Most sources suggest that Moroohnov was not involved in the ferrying operation as he was reportedly reassigned to a combat position in the Soviet Far East just prior to the Soviet entry into the war against Japan.

At Moscow, Reidel, Morshakov, and Krooglov are likely to have spent some unknown period of time with Tupolev and his design team going over the bomber before they returned to their previous assignments. Their work evaluating and transferring the B-29s to Moscow was only temporary duty. Once the bombers had been delivered to Moscow the airmen would return to their earlier assignments and resume their previous responsibilities. Reidel would return to his former position as the Naval Air Arm Vice-Chief of Inspection. For Krooglov and possibly Morshakov this would entail their returning to the Pacific Ocean Fleet. As of 10 July 1945 however, the three men can be documented as being in Moscow. Krooglov’s return to the Pacific Ocean Fleet placed him relatively nearby when it became known that several B-29s would be overflying Konan on 29 August 1945.

How and when Krooglov and according to the crew of Hog Wild at least one Soviet B-29 pilot (probably Morshakov) made their way to Konan is unknown, but they were there on 29 August 1945. Krooglov would later admit to Lieutenant Grant over dinner on the night of 29 August that he and Colonel Bartoslav had only arrived at Konan two days earlier on 27 August, the day after the city had fallen to the Red Army.1395 It was also the day after the first B-29 that had overflown the camp dropped leaflets informing the POWs of the relief missions that would follow three days later. It is likely that Bartoslav, Krooglov, Urikov and the purported Soviet B-29 pilot had flown directly into Konan from the area of Vladivostok, a distance of about 300 nautical miles.

Though it remains to be solidly confirmed with documentation extracted from former Soviet or Tupolev archives, the presence of the Colonel Bartoslav and Major Krooglov at Konan after the B-29 warning mission of 26 August follows a pattern of cause and effect in a timeline of events, with one event following another. It is undeniable that the two men were within range of Konan and arrived in the area only after the B-29 over flight of 26 August.

The air distance between Vladivostok and Moscow, 3995 miles and the speed of air transportation at the time suggests that Krooglov had to be somewhat nearby and not in Moscow. It is likely that once it was known that a chance to obtain another B-29 had presented itself, Colonel Bartoslav and Major Krooglov had flown into the area from a Soviet airbase near Vladivostok, a flight of only a few hours. Regardless of where Krooglov was and how he got to Konan on 27 August 1945 he was there and waiting at Kanko Army Airfield when Hog Wild crash landed. His presence in the area was too convenient to be coincidence.

At the moment Hog Wild was fired upon, Krooglov was one of the Soviet Union’s few experts on the B-29. That he was physically at the airfield Kanko Army Airfield when Soviet aircraft fired on the B-29 suggests some ongoing conspiracy to obtain an additional bomber; thoroughly examine one on the ground, or if necessary to retrieve damaged sections. It is obvious from the actions of the Yak pilots that they had not desired to shoot the bomber from the sky. Once the bomber landed Krooglov was one of the first Soviet officers the crewmembers of Hog Wild that had remained aboard the burning bomber would meet in Soviet occupied northern Korea. Krooglov appears on-the-scene about two hours, possibly less after the bomber lands. Krooglov would first serve as an interpreter between Colonel Bartoslav and the crew on their initial interrogation and would later serve in the same capacity between General Preohrazhenskii and Lieutenant Sherill when Sherill was finally recovered. He would serve as the interpreter one last time between Preohrazhenskii and Lieutenant Queen at the POW camp on 30 August.

Krooglov’s was a technical intelligence mission. To the Soviet Union his mission was paramount to the future survival of the country. The aircraft had to be examined immediately and it was. The Soviets could not be absolutely sure the moment Hog Wild landed that it would not be repaired and immediately depart the field. Had the bomber been airworthy when it landed it is likely that a qualified Soviet B-29 pilot and crew would have boarded the bomber and flown it to an airfield somewhere in the Soviet Far East. Heavily damaged by Yak fighters the Soviets were left with inspecting the bomber where it sat. Forcing down Hog Wild was a more than simply a technical intelligence operation, it was an in-depth reassessment.

Technical Intelligence Mission

For Krooglov speed was of the essence. Within two hours of the bomber’s landing it was hastily examined then physically torn apart. Lieutenant Queen, allowed to return to the bomber with Corporal Turner a few hours after they were forced down noted that, “When we were allowed to return to the plane to get our personal belongings (evening of the 29th

Aug) I noticed that all papers such as Form 1 & 1A, SOI, Airplane Commanders Handbook, G-file, K-20 camera, all the Navigator’s, Engineer’s and Bombardier’s briefcases, etc., had been removed from the plane.\textsuperscript{1396}

Consider the words of Lieutenant Grant concerning the condition of the aircraft when he returned the bomber to open its bomb bay the afternoon of 29 August: “On Lt. Queen’s request I accompanied Major Krugalov out to the airplane to see if I could get the supplies out. Cpl. Turner went with us. The Major [Krooglov] preceded me up into the ship, and I saw him flip on the battery switch with the nonchalance of one who knew the plane like a book. I tried the normal and emergency systems with no success. Major Krugalov meanwhile remarked on the fact that the three red handles on the floor to the left of the pilot’s seat had been replaced by two, and asked me if the Bombay doors were operated some other way. I told him they were air operated, but he didn’t press me for more information. I went back to the auxiliary power plant to see if I could start it. It was covered with all sorts of equipment from the big kit and the life rafts, and parachutes. The plane was a shambles as if torn into by someone looking in desperation for something.” \textsuperscript{1397} Everything that Lieutenant Grant reported in the above paragraph took place within two hours of the bomber landing on fire at Kanko Army Airfield.

Once it was safe, Krooglov probably entered the plane with a number of “reference points” to be quickly examined. He probably had three basic plans in-hand before the Superfort was forced down; 1) to confiscate an airworthy bomber and flee into the Soviet Far East, 2) to evaluate the bomber on the ground if it had to be damaged to force it too land, or 3) to salvage parts from its crash. Krooglov doubtlessly moved throughout the airplane examining each reference point in sequence, validating or refuting Soviet concerns. Krugalov is also likely to have surveyed the damaged bomber for any additional changes that had taken place in the nearly one year since the last damaged B-29 had landed near Vladivostok. At this point in the war it would seem that there would have been few major updates to discover, yet as Lieutenant Queen noted in his statement Krooglov knew his B-29s intimately and recognized even minor changes. Allowed to return to the bomber the afternoon they were forced down to recover their personal gear, Lieutenant Queen noted as they entered the aircraft that Kruglev remarked about Hog Wild “being a new B-29 as several switches and things were in different places than in the B-29s he had seen.”\textsuperscript{1398} Krooglov had probably been at the bomber prior to his first encounter with the crew. His initial behavior in the presence of the crew is suggestive.

Krooglov’s first minutes interacting with the crew concerned the Soviet argument that the runway at the airfield the bomber had been led to was not too short to land the aircraft safely. As stated by Staff Sergeant Rinaldo, for the first ten minutes after Krooglov arrived he appeared hostile.\textsuperscript{1399} Staff Sergeant Rinaldo reported Krooglov asking Lieutenant Queen “…why didn’t land? The pilot told him the field was too small. At this they laughed as said it could have been done.”\textsuperscript{1400} Of the disagreement Lieutenant Grant wrote, Krooglov “flatly insisted that a B-29 could land and take off on the airdrome.”\textsuperscript{1401} The other Soviet officers present had laughed or scoffed at the crew’s suggestion that the airfield’s runway was too short to land the Superfort.\textsuperscript{1402} Soviet naval pilots, they had already seen two B-29s land at the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Base at Tsentral’naya uglovaya.

\textsuperscript{1396} Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated

\textsuperscript{1397} Grant, John B. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-866994. Statement by First Lieutenant John B. Grant. 0-866994. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, Squadron Engineering Officer, B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated

\textsuperscript{1398} Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated


\textsuperscript{1400} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1401} Grant, John B. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-866994. Statement by First Lieutenant John B. Grant. 0-866994. 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, Squadron Engineering Officer, B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated

\textsuperscript{1402} Ibid.
It is likely that Krooglov’s initial irritation stemmed from being called away from his primary mission of examining the bomber to attend to the American crew. Krooglov had an important task and had been interrupted. That Krooglov displayed this degree of displeasure with the crew in the presence of Colonel Bartoslav is telling, suggesting that he possessed authority exceeding his rank. Krooglov probably never considered that he would have to interact with the crewmen that his mission nearly killed. Once he understood that the American crew was none the wiser to the Soviet treachery, Krooglov appears to have relaxed. Had the air crew been indoctrinated to be more suspicious of their surroundings as would be common in the warming Cold War, they might have reacted far differently.

Krooglov’s presence as General Preohrabovekski hosted breakfast with Lieutenant Sherrill further supports the argument that the Soviet Major was at the least, inordinately important to the mission at hand. Had General Preohrabovekski required an interpreter it is likely that many other Soviet officers could have filled that need. However unlike those other officers, Major Krooglov knew the objective in forcing down the aircraft. Who better to interact with the crew than someone who understood the sensitivity of the situation and would work to protect the secret? As it was the Soviet Union had committed a nearly perfect crime; an act of war against its own ally during wartime. Unconscious of Soviet duplicity in forcing down the bomber, each of the Hog Wild crewmembers that interacted with Major Krooglov noted his amazing familiarity with the B-29.

Lieutenant Grant wrote that Krooglov “showed amazing knowledge of the ship. He knew where junction boxes for all the systems were located, and on three occasions he pulled the fused [sic] on the shorted systems.” 1403 On Grant’s first visit to the aircraft the evening of 29 August to offload the POW supplies carried by Hog Wild he wrote of Krooglov “The Major preceded me up into the ship, and I saw him flip on the battery switch with the nonchalance of one who knew the plane like a book.” 1404 According to Lieutenant Grant, “In my opinion he knew the B-29 better than many men who work on them. He seldom asked questions, but when he did he usually had a good idea of the answer and simply wanted verification.” 1405 Captain Campbell in discussing their effort to radio Saipan regarding their situation noted of Krooglov, “On September 1 we went to the plane and started the putt putt, and then had to borrow some Jap batteries from the Russian Major. I wired them in serial, and after hunting the shorts in the wires, we were ready to transmit. During all this work, the Russian Major helped me, and he knew as much about the B-29 as I did.” 1406

Lieutenant Grant would later remark that “On several occasions I accompanied Lt. Queen and S/Sgt. Strilky, the radio operator, out to the airdrome after the Russians allowed us to go to the plane. On those occasions I saw Major Krugalov several times.” 1407 Though admittedly Krooglov had only recently arrived at the airfield and may have been waiting some other assignment, that the crew should regularly encounter him on their visits to the stricken bomber, suggests that Krooglov had more-than a passing interest in the damaged B-29. For a person who should have been an uninterested party, Krooglov appears to have spent an inordinate amount of time at the bomber. He apparently had few assigned duties other than loitering near the damaged B-29. Soviet or American, a fully qualified pilot, navigator or flight engineer is a valuable asset who is normally overtasked performing his primary duties. It is entirely possible that Krooglov had been ordered to assist the crew, but none of the crewmembers would ever credit Krooglov with being of much assistance. That role would be filled by a rarely mentioned Captain Urikov.

Lieutenant Grant was the only crew member of Hog Wild to leave remarks about Captain Urikov, but the Soviet captain did play an important role in the Soviet effort to examine the bomber stating “Perhaps the man who did the most for us was a little engineering officer named Captain Urikov. He spoke practically no English, but we managed to understand each other. He went to no end of trouble to help us out and seemed always glad to see us. He asked questions about the B-29 such as bore and stroke of cylinder and pistons, propeller shaft size, etc., but the questions were always put in a manner that seemed to be purely personal curiosity.” 1408 Captain Urikov appears to have acted as a foil to Krooglov, assigned to assist the crew allowing Krooglov more time with the bomber. Like Major Krooglov, Captain Urikov was a flight engineer. It remains to be determined whether Urikov was likewise intimately familiar with the B-29. It is possible with the lack of aircraft larger than the Yak fighter at the Kanko Army Airfield that Urikov was present only to assist Krooglov. Urikov entertained the crew’s requirements and request without ever fulfilling any of them. At one point Urikov promised the crew “2500 gallons of

1403 Ibid.
1404 Ibid.
1405 Ibid.
1408 Ibid.
100 octane gas, but when the C-46 finally arrived to take us away, the gas was never procured. It just never arrived though theRussians assured us it was coming." Of all the crewmen, only Lieutenant Weeks and Staff Sergeant Jesse Owens appear to have been suspicious of the Soviets and their ever-present Major.

In his statement given at Saipan, Staff Sergeant Owens wrote “One of the fellows was an engineer. He was continuously asking me questions about the B-29. I did not answer all of the questions he asked.” Lieutenant Weeks would write “At no time did I contact the Russians or have any dealings with them whatsoever while I was in Korea.” Jesse Owens would end his statement describing his interaction with the Soviets writing “I did not have any more contact with the Russians except seeing them at the field while we were at the plane to contact Saipan. I will state that they were friendly with us after the first two or three days.” Despite the dinner that night with Colonel Bartoslav, Owen’s statement was not a rousing endorsement of Soviet hospitality. Over dinner the night of the 29th the Soviets continued to ply the crew for additional information.

It was not a banquet. There were no dress uniforms, no coats or ties. It was a dinner hosted by Colonel Bartoslav, attended at that time by the only known survivors of Hog Wild, Major Krooglov, several other Soviet pilots and crew. Those attending sat at one large table; Colonel Bartoslav at one end, Lieutenant Queen sat at the other. Major Krooglov sat next to Lieutenant Grant insisting that “engineers stick together.” Though the dinner appeared to be a spur-of-the-moment arrangement, it was likely arranged at some point before the incident by the Soviets as an opportunity to gather additional intelligence and information about the crew, the bomber, the command and so forth. The idea of a dinner may have been decided days before as the Soviets began to plan their intelligence mission. While the crew may have dropped in unannounced, the Soviets clearly knew early-on that if their operation to obtain a bomber was successful, they would have dinner guests that evening.

Though the crew would report the dinner as being informal and devoid of talk about their work during the war, it was probably unavoidable that some such discussions would take place. The dinner was attended by a diverse group of pilots, navigators and gunners; their only common experience was their duties as military officers, airmen and the war. Some conversation would be nearly unavoidable. Conversation is a two-way street with information being exchanged by both persons involved. In the hands of a well-training intelligence officer, even comments avoiding such discussions hold great value. The Soviets were well prepared and apparently attempted to loosen the crew’s tongues with large amounts of captured Japanese whiskey.

Each place at the table was accompanied by a full bottle of Japanese whiskey. A military custom, toasts were offered to the national leaders of the Allied nations; to Stalin, President Truman, the United States, and Victory. There were so many toasts that Lieutenant Grant reported “that the crew was getting pretty high.” When Lieutenant Queen suggested to Colonel Bartoslav that the crew be allowed to retire for the evening “the Colonel would not hear of it and was drunker than anyone else.” Two hours into the party the Americans were saved from further toasts by the untimely appearance of Captains Kinlock and Morris bringing news of the crewmen pulled from the sea.

As Grant later reported “The Russians were obviously angry at the intrusion of the British and the party broke up immediately.” Had the meal continued it is likely that the crew would have found it more difficult as the hours passed to avoid conversation about the bomber and their duties. The crew was worn down. They had been up hours before the flight attending briefings, flown most of the day, had taken fire and been forced down. The rapid consumption of large amounts of alcohol could only increase their exhaustion. Had the dinner continued eventually the Soviets would have worn down the

1409 Ibid.
1414 Ibid.
1415 Ibid.
1416 Ibid.
1417 Ibid.
1418 Ibid.
crew’s resistance. Though the Soviets probably sought to gather intelligence material from their discussions with the crew, what they really needed was the bomber.

Even as the dinner was underway and later while the crew slept, the Soviet effort to inspect the bomber was probably underway. Soviet flight engineers needed time to inspect the aircraft. Though the crew was not under arrest and after their initial interrogation the Soviets made little effort to control their freedom of movement, the Soviets did post guards outside their rooms. The guards were probably posted nearby not so much as to guard the crew, but to prevent them from returning to the stricken Superfort. When the crew at the airfield awoke the morning of 30 August the guards posted the night before were gone. The more in-depth inspection which likely took several ours was probably over.

The more in-depth Soviet inspection had probably been completed overnight. After the crew gathered that morning a curious Captain Kinlock, the British commander of the Konan prison camp asked to see the Superfortress. Halfway to the bomber a Russian officer warned them to stay away. Continuing to approach the Superfort, the Russian officer patted his gun. The crew wisely retreated. It should be noted that few militaries post soldiers of officer rank to guard aircraft. From their interaction with Soviet officers over the past 18 hours or so, it is unlikely that the crew mistook the Russian guard as an enlisted man.

Unlike the bombers that had previously landed in Vladivostok the Soviets did not arrest the crew of Hog Wild or otherwise attempt to control their movements, except when the crew attempted to return to the stricken bomber on the morning of 30 August. Other than allowing Lieutenant Queen and Corporal Turner to return to the bomber to retrieve personal gear and attempt to open the bomb bay to release the supplies intended for the POWs; and the later visit of Lieutenant Grant to release the supplies when Lieutenant Queen could not open the bomb bay, the crew was not allowed to return to the bomber until 1 September. The Soviets had the bomber in their possession more than 72 hours before they returned it to the control of the crew. The Soviets covered their examination of the Superfort by plundering the bomber.

Covering Tracks

Lieutenant Sherill, the only member of the crew to visit the bomber on the 31st of August 1945. He found the bomber in a shambles. According to Sherill “In the radar compartment they had torn open every life raft and emergency kit.” Others would return to the bomber the next day.

Lieutenant Queen wrote that “When we returned to the plane on Sept. 1” all emergency equipment had been ripped open, parachutes popped and cut up. Gun turrets had been opened and three clocks removed.” Staff Sergeant Rinaldo would report of his return to the bomber on 1 September that “The inside of the plane was a mess. I think Russian souvenir hunters can be thanked for that.” It was unlikely that Soviet souvenir hunters had torn the plane apart but probably Major Krooglov, other Soviet pilots and flight engineers. The Soviets themselves do not appear to have had any problems with looters attacking Soviet Yaks or other Soviet aircraft. As the crew had noted earlier, the airfield was guarded by at least one armed officer, apparently protecting the damaged B-29. As a guard, the Soviet officer was an obvious failure. Though the bomber’s parachutes and survival gear had been popped open and torn apart; other than the bomber’s clocks being removed, none of the crew ever mentioned any the plane’s equipment as actually being stolen nor did any of the crew members ever report encountering any Soviets stripping the bomber of parts. It is likely that when any of Hog Wild’s crewmen entered the base that any Soviet airmen examining the bomber or removing parts, were warned allowing them to leave the area unnoticed.

1419 Ibid.
1420 Sherill, Marion J. Flight Officer. Statement Flight Officer Marion J. Sherrill, T-135123, 882nd Bombardment Squadron, 500th Bombardment Group, as Bombardier on Lieutenant Queen’s crew, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882nd Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
Had Soviet ground crews or other soldiers been brazen enough to rob the bomber, why not take the parachutes as they were? Why simply pop the chutes and tear them open. With so much coastal fishing in the area, why tear open life vests, emergency rafts and so on when it would have sold well on the black market? What the crew was seeing was an apparent attempt on the part of the Soviets to divert the attention of the crew from the Soviet effort to examine the bomber by creating a more obvious problem; looting. It was a distinction with a difference: Vandalized parachutes are far more visible than popped rivets and removed screws. Like a magician’s trick, the ransacking of the bomber created an illusion which diverted the attention of the crew from the deeper Soviet examination of the aircraft. The ransacking of the bomber conditioned the crew to accept further damage to the Superfort the longer it sat on the Soviet parking apron. They were not to be disappointed.

Most visible to the crew when they first returned to the bomber on 1 September was that the aircraft’s clocks had been removed. It is possible that as they were wind-up eight-day clocks that could be used even on a desktop. Clocks were a high-theft item. In the Soviet military was standard-operating-procedure for ground crews to secure an aircraft’s clocks after each mission. Clocks were reinstalled prior to flight. It is true that they were high-quality precision timepieces, but they were not useful to any nuclear process that the Japanese might have left in operating condition at Konan. Had the clocks been stolen, perhaps sold on the local economy they would have been far more difficult to recover. All three clocks were returned by the Soviets prior to the crew’s departure for Keijo, suggesting that Soviet ground crews had protected the clocks on Hog Wild the same as they would the clocks on their own aircraft. It was the least the Soviets could do; it was a good trade, three clocks for one B-29.

Though none of the crew mentioned the Soviets removing equipment in their statements given at Saipan, equipment was taken nonetheless. One POW writing in The West Australian did leave some comments concerning the Soviet effort to strip the bomber. E. S. Harrison an Australian POW held at the camp wrote two years after the war in 1947 that by the time the American repair crew arrived; Soviet ground crews had tampered with the bomber and removed so much of its equipment, that it was only valuable as scrap. By the time the repair crew from Guam arrived at the Kanko Army Airfield, there was not much of a bomber left to repair.

According to Lieutenant Harwood “Colonel Martin studied the situation for days” before concluding “that it wasn’t worthwhile to repair the plane and that we would just strip it of critical items and leave the rest to the Russians.” If Colonel Martin wrote up a list of missing parts and damages it has yet to be located.

Faced with the situation he found when he arrived in Korea it was probably easier for Colonel Martin to list what they could salvage from the damaged B-29, surveying or writing off the remainder rather than to repair the damaged bomber. Under the circumstance with the B-29 heavily damaged and the Soviets stealing parts, it was probably the best that could be done. Only one question now remained. With everything that took place at Kanko Army Airfield over those last days of August and early September, why didn’t the crew or Colonel Martin ever suspect that the Soviets were conducting an intelligence mission against the bomber? The answer is that they probably did.

What did the Crew Know and When Did They Know It?

The 11 crewmembers of Hog Wild and half-dozen or so men of the maintenance repair team sent to Konan from Guam were not ignorant men. Bomber pilot, tail gunner, group commander, staff officer, maintenance technician; none of these men could qualify as oblivious to the situation. In many cases classroom training for their military specialties alone required weeks, months, and in some cases years. Once in the field or on-station, the training required to become proficient in their specialty continued on for weeks or months if not longer. In many cases the men that were on-site were college educated, in other cases the men had “street smarts” gained from years of eking out a living during the Great Depression. It is likely that all the crew members had some suspicions or were at the very least, wary of the situation.

The statement of Staff Sergeant Owens that “One of the fellows was an engineer. He was continuously asking me questions about the B-29. I did not answer all of the questions he asked,” strongly suggests that Owens harbored some concerns or at the least some suspicion of Major Krooglov. Lieutenant Weeks’ statement that “At no time did I contact the Russians or have any dealings with them whatsoever while I was in Korea,” suggests some sense of unease with the events.

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that took place over the days the crew were at the Kanko Army Airfield. ^1426 Lucius Weeks further statement that he “did not have any more contact with the Russians except seeing them at the field while we were at the plane to contact Saipan,” while Soviets were everywhere implies some effort on his part to stay away from them. ^1427

Most crewmembers would comment on the amazing knowledge of Major Krooglov, but not one would write that they had spent much time with him or that they claimed to know why the Major was always at the stricken bomber. It is likely that all the crewmembers of Hog Wild could sense that something more than simply assistance was going on, but none of them knew exactly what it was. It was outside their realm of experience. None of the crew had served in positions of testing or evaluation of U.S. of captured foreign materials. None of the crew had served as intelligence officers either in the Army Air Corps or as civilian agents prior to the war. Of all the U.S. airmen and maintenance men that were on-site, Colonel Martin was probably the only person that had some clear-cut idea as to what was probably happening.

Of all those present only Colonel Martin would be fully conscious of U.S. technical intelligence efforts to obtain, inspect and test enemy technologies and equipment. It is possible that as a former squadron and later group commander that he had often been briefed about U.S. and Allied efforts to exploit Japanese materials captured on the battlefield or crashing nearly intact in Allied-controlled areas.

Initially the British led efforts to gather technical intelligence against the enemy stressing the importance of such information to the U.S. military as America began preparing for war in 1940 and 1941. In 1942 as the U.S. Army’s Materiel Division became the Materiel Command, responsibility for the evaluation of foreign equipment was assigned to its Engineering Division at Wright Field in Ohio.

Through 1942 most U.S. Army evaluations of enemy equipment were conducted under the division’s Foreign Developments Unit which operated under the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. On 3 December 1942 the unit became a major component of the Army’s Technical Data Laboratory (TDL). The lab’s mission was to procure, evaluate and disseminate technical information on foreign aircraft and aeronautical equipment to the Army’s Engineering Division and American manufacturers producing equipment and aircraft for the Army Air Force. It should be noted that the primary purpose of the TDL was improvements to U.S. aircraft and not the collection of intelligence. The U.S. Navy operated a similar technical analysis operation however during the first years of the war cooperation between the services was limited at best. In 1943 the two services put aside interservice rivalries reaching common ground.

In the early part of the war in the Pacific the British and Australians bore the brunt of gathering intelligence gained from captured Japanese aircraft, their recovery and evaluation. In November 1942 the Allies formed a joint evaluation unit comprised of members from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army Air Forces, Royal Australian Air Force, and Royal Navy at Eagle Farms near Brisbane, Australia. The unit became known as the Allied Technical Air Intelligence Unit (ATAIU). Its subcomponents in the field were known as Technical Air Intelligence Units (TAIU).

In the U.S. the Army Air Forces moved to develop educational courses to train officers to conduct basic investigations of captured materials, complete required documentation and determine exactly what materiel from all that was captured should be returned to the Wright Field for further evaluations. By the end of 1943 a total of 43 Air Force and Naval officers had graduated the course. Despite their presence in the field, only a small amount of the Japanese materiel captured was making its way to the U.S. for further evaluations. In most cases the real enemy threatening captured materials was Allied soldiers.

Most of the Japanese materials captured by advancing forces were either thoroughly plundered by Allied soldiers or completely stolen before they could be secured by field intelligence units. It was often difficult for commanders to distinguish the assaults by soldiers onto defended beaches from the assaults of souvenir hunters while the battle was taking place. Legal efforts to stop soldiers, sailors and marines were so ineffective that later regulations and orders allowed some

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form of souvenir hunting to prevent the full-scale loss of the materiel acquired. A little souvenir hunting was good for morale; too much was detrimental to the overall war effort. The Allied Translator and Information Service (ATIS) went so far as to create programs whereby soldiers turning in useful documents containing valuable intelligence materials were allowed to select replacement souvenirs from a stack of other captured materials such as postcards, clothing and other item that were less valuable or had been previously exploited. The system worked.

In most cases the willful pilfering of captured materiel would never be stopped. In some cases soldiers simply did not recognize the importance of the materiel, destroying any captured equipment in-place to prevent its being salvaged and reused by the enemy. The effort to capture and evaluate Japanese material did however have its moments. For some TDL officers the enemy was far less a threat to their personal safety than were Allied soldiers when faced with losing hard-earned souvenirs. Distance was also a factor. Much of the material that might have been of real value was located in isolated areas and difficult to retrieve.

By end of the war several hundred TDL trained officers were accompanying the advance into recently captured areas to isolate and ship captured Japanese equipment to U.S. evaluation centers. By January 1945 Field Orders would contain written assignments such as “Commanders of units effecting capture of enemy equipment will be charged with collecting, security and labeling of the equipment, indicating date and place of capture unit effecting capture, and that the item was acquired by United States Forces. In case of new weapons, methods of use, if known will be stated. Name plates will not be removed except by authorized technical intelligence personnel. Theater regulations will govern the retention of any captured equipment.”

Where possible aircraft that were not too badly damaged were sent back to the U.S. and sometimes Australia for testing and evaluation where they proved useful in determining performance characteristics, identifying weaknesses, limitations and in developing aircraft recognition training aids, useful knowledge in the hands of a skilled combat pilot. TAIU engineers scoured the captured aircraft checking engines, serial numbers and dates of manufacture. Cockpits were inspected for their layout and location of aircraft controls. The aircraft’s electronics suite was thoroughly examined, recovered ammunition was identified and tested. Captured aircraft revealed secrets about Japan’s wartime economy. The equipment needed to fight a war such as aircraft were a reflection of a nation’s economic power. As the war progressed and Japan’s access to natural resources declined, the decline revealed itself in the use of cheaper materials to construct combat aircraft: Armor became thinner, steel replaced aluminum, overall quality declined. When aircraft were too badly damaged to fly Allied engineers would resort to reverse engineering much as Soviet engineers would in uncovering the secrets of the B-29, enabling them to recover information about the damaged aircraft. Few completely intact and operational aircraft were ever recovered.

In December 1942 at the Battle of Buna a TAIU captured the Allies’ first examples the Mitsubishi A6M3 Type 0 Model 32 Zeros which were subsequently transferred from the battle area to Eagle Farm Airfield, Australia for test and evaluation. In 1943 using parts from several Mitsubishi A6M “Zeke” aircraft captured at the same Buna Airfield, a TAIU in Australia built a complete working model of the aircraft which was then tested against Allied fighters over Brisbane. Later that same year a Zeke was transported to Wright Field for further testing and evaluation. Several Nakajima Ki-43s, “Oscars” and a Kawasaki Ki-61 “Tony” would also be captured intact, flown, tested and evaluated by Allied airmen and aircraft engineers. As noted earlier when Soviet Yaks unexpectedly approached Hog Wild over Konan on 29 August it would be Staff Sergeant Rinaldo that initially identified them as Tonys. In his defense Soviet aircraft were not trained to U.S. aircrews a threat. Similar to the training aids derived from captured Japanese and German the U.S. War Department produced such training aids on Soviet aircraft, and while these materials were available for aircrews to study and intelligence officers to brief, the war at the moment was against the Japan, not the Soviet Union. Return to Colonel Martin....

Of all those present at the Kanko Army Airfield Colonel Martin would be the most likely to have recognized the organized Soviet activity for what it was, a technical intelligence collection effort. Because of his rank, his previous training, and the duties that come with increased responsibilities in the military, Colonel Martin would have probably been in the best position to be familiar with technical intelligence collection activities. He, better than the crew would have understood a technical intelligence collection effort and how such missions are conducted. Within the U.S. military Colonel Martin would have probably understood how the results of such efforts were protected and the information gained from such inspections was disseminated.

Different parts of a technical intelligence mission were protected by different classifications. The fact that the U.S. had captured a completely intact Japanese fighter might be classified TOP SECRET. The examination and engineering study could be classified SECRET. Certain information, such as the fighter’s top speed, service ceiling, might be classified

The descriptions sent out to the field for use in briefing aircrews were often completely UNCLASSIFIED. The various levels of classifications represented an effort within the military intelligence services to seek a balance between protecting the sources of method of the information, and ensuring that those who needed the information to survive were kept informed. It was based upon the need to know. A fighter pilot needed to know the weaknesses of the aircraft he was facing in combat but not the fact that the U.S. and its Allies and acquired a sample of that aircraft, or that were evaluating it over the Australian outback or the corn fields of Ohio. That an airman did not know the details of certain intelligence activities would protect them from intense interrogation if captured. Ultimately it was Colonel Martin that decided to salvage the bomber and leave the rest of the B-29 to Soviet Naval Aviation.

Colonel Martin and his maintenance crew probably knew before they arrived on 11 September that Hog Wild could not be repaired. Shortly after being allowed to return to the bomber the crew of Hog Wild had been asked to prepare a list of the materials needed to repair the B-29. When the C-46 carrying Colonel Martin and crew arrived at Konan it carried none of the parts needed to initiate repairs. Though none of the crewmember statements report the absence of spare parts, the specifications of the C-46 argue that the parts needed to repair the bomber were not on board the cargo plane.

To fly again Hog Wild required at least one, possibly two engines, at least one tire, an oil tank for its number one engine, engine oil, propellers, repairs to its landing gear, a new left aileron and more. The bomber had taken rounds in its bomb bay, fuselage and left wing. An empty C-46 Commando could reportedly carry 15,000 pounds of cargo, flight crew not included. The Commando could carry 50 fully armed soldiers into combat, or carry four flight nurses into an area to evacuate 30 litter cases. With its large cargo doors the C-46 could carry jeeps, small trucks and even light planes. Despite its ability to haul large amounts of material, it could never carry enough material into Konan to repair Hog Wild and simultaneously carry the parts salvaged from the stricken B-29 out again on one load.

A single R-3350 engine used on the B-29 displaced 3,350 cubic inches and weighed more than 3,500 pounds. According to the crew reports, Hog Wild is likely to have needed at least two, possibly three new engines. The aircraft’s number one engine had caught fire during the attack of 29 August. Its number two engine had also taken several rounds from the same attack. The propellers of its number four engine had struck the ground during its controlled crash. Hog Wild might have landed on two to three operating engines, but it would never get off the short runway at the Kanko Army Airfield without four operating engines. Add the required tire or tires, at least one propeller, one or more oil tanks, the tools, jacks and hoists required to repair the bomber, the weight of the airmen, the need to balance the load throughout the C-46 for it to stay airborne and the single Commando was incapable of carrying the amount of material needed to repair the bomber into Konan. While similar repairs had been done to numerous damaged B-29s that had landed at airfields on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, those airfields were under U.S. control when the bombers had landed, spare parts and repair crews were already on hand. The C-46 arrived at the Kanko Army Airfield empty, ready to salvage the downed bomber.

As it was the maintenance crew and grounded crewmembers would remove several of Hog Wild’s engines, all its classified materials and other heavy equipment for transport to Japan. Had the C-46 carried in one or more spare engines for a repair effort, it could have never departed Kanko Army Airfield with the parts salvaged from Hog Wild. As Arthur Cramsie reported on the day the overweight C-46 had departed, it was only able to clear the end of the runway at Kanko Airfield by inches. Even then the C-46, limited by the fuel it had on-board when it landed did not make for an airfield in Japan but Kimp’o Airfield just outside Keijo in southern Korea. Lastly the team that Colonel Martin had brought with him to the Kanko Army Airfield was not entirely a repair team. It was actually a survey team.

The team’s job was to examine the damaged bomber, determine whether it could be repaired and whether it was worth the investment to return the bomber to service. It wasn’t.

In the military full Colonels do not normally accompany a repair crew to work on a damaged bomber. It is likely from the description of the damages to the bomber as radioed in from Konan from the crew, that military authorities in Guam already suspected that the bomber had suffered far too much damage to be repaired. Colonel Martin was at the Kanko Army Airfield because he possessed the legal authority to document and dispose of government property. The key to determining whether or not Hog Wild could be returned to duty probably lay with the fire in its number one engine damaged in the attack of 29 August.

While the crewmen could inventory and radio a list of parts needed to repair the bomber, an examination of it internal structure, its wing spars and airframe to determine airworthiness was a near thing. Lacking the structural x-ray equipment that would become more commonplace years later, and the inability to transport such equipment had it been available at the time, determining structural damage would have been a judgment call based upon previous experience. With

the assets available to the Army Air Corps at that time, the bomber could have been repaired no matter the level of damage but the investment had to be justified by later returns. The war was over, most B-29s were now surplus property. Colonel Martin decided within hours of arriving at Konan to condemn the bomber.\textsuperscript{1434}

Though it might seem unusual or out-of-place to a researcher or the uniformed 60 years later, it was not uncommon toward the end of the war to find sizeable parts or entire aircraft condemned and left to rot where they sat throughout the Pacific and European theaters of the war. Where once early in the war a nearly intact U.S. aircraft that crashed miles from the nearest base would be thoroughly salvaged of all useable or repairable parts, as America’s industrial capacity began to meet the demands of the war such aircraft were left where they fell – and remain there 70 years later. Colonel Martin’s decision to abandon Hog Wild where it sat on the Kanko Army Airfield was probably a good one, and not out-of-place at that point in the war. In the end the Soviet Union got its last B-29. However the question remains as to what motivated the Soviets to force down an American B-29 during wartime nearly killing the crew? The answers are not surprising. The Soviet effort to reverse engineer the B-29 into the TU-4 BULL provide some clues to the mystery.

The TU-4

In reproducing the B-29 the Soviets faced a nearly impossible task; the technologies contained in the B-29 were far beyond the capabilities of the Soviet Union’s industrial infrastructure at that time to duplicate. The bomber’s airframe, its metallurgy, props, wheels, landing gear, the compound curves of it Plexiglas covered cockpit, represented insurmountable challenges that had to be overcome, or else. Beria and the NKVD hovered in the background.

Despite the Soviet Union’s ability to acquire blueprints, drawings, plans, and several copies of the bomber many of the core competencies required to reproduce the bomber would never be achieved. From the outside the Soviet TU-4 appeared to be an exact copy. From the inside however, it left a lot to be desired.

The bomber’s pressurization system and variable pitch propellers failed to function properly. Though the Soviets did not copy the B-29’s Wright Cyclone R-3350-13 using instead the ASh-73TK produced under license from Wright itself; engine fires were a constant problem. The Soviet version of the Plexiglas birdcage housing surrounding cockpit with its reflections back into the cockpit would be a condition Soviet crews would have to tolerate for the service life of the bomber. The metallurgy required to produce the bomber would never be recognized. Thicker materials were finally used to produce the bomber’s frame and skin, resulting in a heavier aircraft. To save weight on the TU-4, entire portions of the B-29 such as its tunnel linking the forward and rear compartments of the B-29 were left off entirely. But it was the bomber’s advanced electronics, its radar, computerized fire control systems and avionics that threatened to kill the project – and probably a few of it its engineers.

Tupolev himself thought that copying the bomber’s fire control computer was beyond the ability of Soviet industry. Difficulties with the bomber’s radar and computerized fire control system were so great that when Hog Wild landed at the Kanko Army Airfield in northern Korea that afternoon of 29 August 1945, the bomber’s rear pressurized computerized fire control and radar center was first places Krooglov headed.

As Lieutenant Grant wrote “I went back to the auxiliary power plant to see if I could start it. It was covered with all sorts of equipment from the big kit and the life rafts, and parachutes. The plane was a shambles as if torn into by someone looking in desperation for something.”\textsuperscript{1435} The bomber’s “big kit” and life rafts were only accessible from pull handles located on either side of forward entrance to the B-29’s pressurized tunnel.\textsuperscript{1436} Lieutenant Queen reported that the bomber’s “Gun turrets had been opened,” further indicating that at least one of the Soviet objectives in forcing down the bomber was to inspect its computerized fire control system.\textsuperscript{1437} Though it is not known whether the Soviets removed avionics, flight instruments and other items from the bomber before the repair crew arrived, it is known from the comments of E. S. Harrison that some equipment had been stripped from the aircraft.

As Lieutenant Queen would report, the repair team and aircraft crew stripped the bomber of all its flight instruments, engine instruments, machine gun and bomb sights, AFCE, APP, radios, radar, several engines and other salvageable parts.\textsuperscript{1438} Lieutenant Queen did not mention removing the aircraft’s computerized fire control system, the bomber’s internal electronics; or any of its advanced avionics.

\textsuperscript{1434} Diary of Captain Robert Campbell while held at Konan POW Camp. 30 August to 15 September 1945.
\textsuperscript{1435} Grant, John B. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-866994. Statement by First Lieutenant John B. Grant. 0-866994. 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron, 500\textsuperscript{th} Bombardment Group, Squadron Engineering Officer, B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
\textsuperscript{1436} Pilot’s Flight Operating Instructions. The B-29. AAF Manual No. 50-9. United States Army Air Forces. January 1944
\textsuperscript{1437} Queen, Joseph W. 1st Lieutenant. Serial Number: 0-810732. Statement of First Lieutenant Joseph W. Queen. 0-810732. 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron, 500\textsuperscript{th} Bombardment Group, as Airplane Commander of B-29 Z-28, concerning the forced landing in Korea. Headquarters 882\textsuperscript{nd} Bombardment Squadron. Office of the Intelligence Officer. Not Dated
\textsuperscript{1438} Ibid.
According to Lieutenant Queen the Russians expressed no interest in the ongoing salvage effort. Doubtlessly the Soviets had already inspected the most troubling areas of the bomber or removed materials of greatest interest. The remarks of Colonel Martin “that it wasn’t worthwhile to repair the plane and that we would just strip it of critical items and leave the rest to the Russians” as reported by to Captain Campbell were telling.

It is likely that as the crew quit for the day or otherwise ended their salvage of the bomber, the Soviets followed along behind removing additional equipment; or at the least surveyed those portions of the bomber that remained. As to what occurred to the remainder of aircraft after the crew departed Konan on the morning of 14 September there remain some leads to follow-on investigators. It is likely that remnants of Hog Wild were removed to the Soviet Union by rail and eventually found their way into the Soviet TU-70; the passenger version of the TU-4.

Tracking Hog Wild

It should be noted at this point that the curator of the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum Von D. Hardesty, with the cooperation and assistance of the Russian government and historians conducted a 12-year study on the Soviet effort to copy the B-29. It was a commendable effort. Von Hardesty’s study forms the baseline for most of the information regarding the Soviet effort against the TU-4 that presently exists in the West. One limitation of the effort was that the account was largely based on the writings of a single person, Leonid Kerber, a specialist in radio and navigation instruments who worked with Tupolev in producing the TU-4. Some sources indicate that Kerber actually served as Tupolev’s assistant. The development of the TU-70 was peripheral to the Hardesty investigation of the TU-4. Another limitation is that only one example of the TU-70 was ever built. Sadly the sole copy of the TU-70 was scrapped in 1954. For the purposes of this work, the most important detail on the TU-70 revealed by Von Hardesty was that the passenger version of the bomber utilized parts taken directly from an American B-29.

Tupolev’s 72-passenger TU-70 was reported to have made use of the wings, tail section, undercarriage, engines and some instruments directly off a B-29. According to Boeing engineers examining photos of the aircraft taken at the Tushino Air Show on 3 August 1947 “the TU-70 is sporting is an exact replica of the Boeing B-29 wing.” The aircraft’s engine “nacelles; outline, cooling air intake, auxiliary air scoop, cowl flaps and inboard and outboard fairings” were all the same. “The trailing edge extension on the flap between the inboard nacelle and the side of the fuselage” were identical. As the Boeing engineers reported the “Tupolev TU-70 uses the Twenty-nine’s main landing-gear structure as well as its fairings and doors. The nose gear also appears to be that of the Superfortress.” The parts were not the same as those of a B-29 or even identical, they had been taken directly off a Superfortress, Hog Wild.

Relying on the August 1947 photos, Boeing engineers concluded that the “The tail surfaces of the Russian transport also come direct from the Boeing engineering department. On comparison it is apparent that the vertical tail and the dorsal outline as well as the leading edge of the rudder are the same on the two planes. The rudder of the TU-70 appears to end at what would be the top of the tail gunner’s doghouse on the Superfortress.” As the Boeing engineers observed the TU-70 even retained the B-29’s “nose, including the bombardier’s plate-glass window.” TU-70 actually took to the air in November 1946, a full six months before the first TU-4 ever left the ground. That large portions of an existing B-29 were used in the construction of the TU-70 probably accounts for the speed in which the aircraft was built. The timeline of events suggest that it was likely that many of those parts came from Hog Wild and not the other B-29s possessed by the Soviet Union.

The last of three damaged B-29s to land in the Soviet Union, Ding How, landed near Vladivostok on 21 November 1944. The following month People’s Comissar of the Navy Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov ordered an evaluation of the damaged Superfortresses. Naval Air Arm Vice-Chief of Inspection Colonel Semyon Borisovich Reidel, accompanied by Major Krooglov and others began their inspection of the three Superforts in January 1945. Several weeks or months later Admiral Kuznetsov forwarded a report to Moscow extolling the bomber’s pressurized crew compartments, its computerized fire control systems, avionics, turbocharged engines, and reliance on lightweight aluminum construction.

1439 Ibid.
1442 Boeing Magazine (Seattle), Flying, Number 6, Volume 2. February 1948
1443 Ibid.
1444 Ibid.
1445 Ibid.
In early June 1945 the first of the three lost B-29s was flown to the Soviet Union’s Moscow Central Aerodrome. On the night of 11 June 1945 the General H.H. Arnold Special was pushed into a hangar at the Moscow Central Aerodrome where Soviet engineers and technicians began to disassemble the Superfort. Ding How is known to have been kept in-tact as a standard or reference model. The order to produce a Soviet copy of the B-29 was officially signed by Stalin on 22 June 1945. In signing the order Stalin crossed out the name “B-4” and designated the bomber the “TU-4.” Flight testing of the B-29 at Romanovka Air Field continued until 21 July 1945 when the last bomber was transferred to Izmailovo Airfield on the outskirts of Moscow. Events were moving forward rapidly as Soviet industries came under pressure to support the production of the Soviet TU-4 to U.S. standards. Early in the afternoon of 29 August 1945 Z-28 Hog Wild, Serial Number 44-70136 was forced down over Konan, Korea.

While some reports suggest that parts off the General H.H. Arnold Special were used to build the TU-70 such reports fail to explain how during the critical months when Soviet engineers were disassembling, measuring and cataloging the bomber’s 105,000 parts, and Soviet industries were trying to reproduce these parts that they could reassemble the parts removed from Arnold Special to produce the TU-70. While the General H.H. Arnold Special was being disassembled, Ramp Tramp remained in-tact and flying out of the Soviet Flight-Test Center at Zhukovski leaving only Ding How, the Soviet Union’s reference model as the source of parts for the TU-70. The suggestion that Ding How served as a source of parts for the TU-70 ignores the fact that the first TU-4 would not roll out of a Soviet factory until early 1947. As a construction reference model Ding How could only be torn apart after the first TU-4 took to the air in April or May of that year. In addition the large portions of the American B-29 known to be used in the construction of the Soviet TU-4: sizeable areas of its wings, complete sections of its fuselage, its tail, cockpit and nose assembly would require the near total destruction of Ding How, the construction reference model. Lastly the same sections used on the TU-70, in many cases in their entirety were the same parts that remained on the ground at Kanko Army Airfield at Konan, northern Korea.

It is likely Tupolev himself; receiving reports of the intelligence coup that took place in northern Korea recognized the nearly intact Hog Wild as an opportunity to expand the TU-4 project to include a working airliner. According to Paul Duffy and Andrei Kandalov writing in Tupolev, the Man and His Aircraft, “Tupolev was never a man to waste opportunities” and it is likely that the forcing down of Hog Wild presented Tupolev with an opportunity that he could not ignore. Stalin had not ordered the construction of the TU-70 but the TU-4. The Soviet state airlines Aeroflot, though growing in the post-WWII era could not use an aircraft the size of the TU-70 with its requirements for long concrete runways of which few existed within the U.S.S.R.

Though the TU-70 met the goals of Tupolev’s design team, it never went into full production. In the late 1940s there were few concrete runways that could handle the Superfort passenger plant, other Soviet passenger planes were also in production, and there was little need for such a large passenger liner. In December 1951 the sole TU-70 was sent to the NII

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1447 Mayo, Wayland. Russian B-29 Clone – The TU-4 Story. Cold War Stories, Related Tales, & Commentary. http://www.rb-29.net/HTML/03RelatedStories/03.03shortstories/03.03.10contss.htm
VVS (Научно-Исследовательский Институт Военно-Воздушник Сил – Air Force Scientific Test Institute) for evaluation as a military transport aircraft. It was used during a variety of tests but was scrapped in 1954. Stolen plans, spies, parts of one crashed bomber, three B-29s confiscated during the war, and one stolen bomber later the Soviet Union flew its first TU-4 on 19 May 1947. Was it all worth it? The answer depends on what the Soviet Union was trying to achieve.

Section 91 – SUPERFORTRESSKI TU-4

Like the U.S. at the time Stalin and his cronies foresaw the coming of the Cold War, the worsening of relations between the U.S.S.R and its wartime allies. While the U.S. and Great Britain worried about Stalin concluding a separate peace and leaving them to fight the war alone, Stalin likewise worried about the U.S. and Great Britain concluding a separate peace and leaving the Soviet Union to stand alone against Germany. For the U.S. and Great Britain the conflict was a war of liberation. For the Soviet Union the struggle was a war of territorial acquisition. Even as Germany collapsed and Japan stood alone, the post-war goals of the major allies were diverging. While many thought that Stalin “envied” the U.S. and its large bomber force, what it had accomplished against Germany and later Japan, it was not “envy” that drove the Soviet Union to copy the B-29 but national survival. From where Stalin sat in Moscow it did not take a much of a strategist to see that the U.S.S.R was surrounded.

As the war against Germany was reaching its conclusion and before the U.S. tested its first atomic bomb Stalin, could see American bomber forces ringing the Soviet perimeter. Had the U.S. and Britain chosen to press their end of the war advantage in medium, heavy, and very heavy bombers, large portions of the Soviet Union would be within reach of air forces operating from bases in Germany, Finland, Japan, Turkey, etc. Stalin’s distrust of his allies and his goal of creating a series of “buffer states” on the perimeter of the U.S.S.R to protect the country from overland invasions, was one of many factors that would turn such perceptions into realities.

The Soviet Union had just fought a vicious war, much of its European infrastructure lay in ruins, its economy was in a shambles but recovering. The Red Army was a drain on the Soviet economy and would be a drain on efforts to rebuild the country, 29 million Soviet citizens had died over the period of the war. Despite the size of the Red Army, the Soviet Union had its weaknesses. Technologically the Soviet Union was years behind its Western allies. The thousands of Red Army aircraft that had fought the war were outdated and with the coming of jet propulsion were obsolete. Though Lend-Lease had not won the war for the Soviet Union it did provide food, supplies and materiel that would not have been available otherwise. Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union ended on 20 September 1945. For whatever it was worth to the Soviet Union during the war, that support was no longer available.

As the war drew to an end the U.S.S.R. was saw itself as vulnerable to U.S. and British pressures to withdraw from Eastern Europe had those pressures been applied. While Poland was a contentious issue, the fates of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Balkans and large parts of Eastern Europe hung in the balance. Prior to the end of the war against Japan but after the surrender of Germany, Winston Churchill had predicted that the Soviet Union would ignore its previous agreements on the future of Eastern Europe and ordered plans drawn up for British forces to attack the Red Army across Europe. Codenamed OPERATION UNTHINKABLE, WWII would have continued on 1 July 1945 with a British attack against Soviet forces. One of the assumptions of OPERATION UNTHINKABLE was that if the British attacked, the Soviet Union would ally itself with Japan.

The new war had it begun, would have centered on the future of Poland. A reformed German Army of at least ten divisions would also take part. A draft copy of the plan was completed on 8 June 1945. Numerous issues prevented the plan from going forward. The large numbers of Soviet troops across Europe, a war weary population and an empty British treasury are just a few of the issues that put an end to its consideration. A lack of U.S. support also helped to doom the idea. At the end of WWII the Soviet Union fielded 491 divisions with most in Europe. By comparison the U.S. fielded 94 divisions marine and army, split between Europe and the Pacific, Great Britain only fielded 31 divisions. It is highly likely that Stalin was aware of the British study even as it was undertaken.

Though Stalin probably knew OPERATION UNTHINKABLE would fail to gain support, that it was even considered only served to reinforce his fear of his wartime allies. Possessing the secrets to the atomic bomb also did little to allay those fears; the Soviet Union would not test its first weapon until 29 August 1949, four years to the day it had forced Hog Wild down over northern Korea. To protect the Soviet Union Stalin needed a weapon with which he could threaten his enemies, one that would allow him to drawdown the size of the Red Army without leaving the nation overly vulnerable and

1452 Ibid.
he found that weapon in the B-29. While the ANT-64 would have tested the capacity and capabilities of Soviet industries and engineers, the effort to build the B-29 would increase that challenge even further.

The first BULL rolled out of the factory on 28 February 1945, about five months ahead of schedule. The first TU-4 flew from Kazan on 19 May 1947. Nikolai Rybho was at the aircraft’s controls. The bomber did not enter service until 1949. The first 20 TU-4s produced would serve as test aircraft under the state acceptance program. The bomber passed its state acceptance trials with no few issues. The aircraft’s certificate of airworthiness was signed by Stalin himself, the first and only time the Georgian dictator would ever personally sign the acceptance forms for an aircraft built for the Soviet state. Though many would argue that the Soviet BULL was an identical copy of the B-29 there were differences and some of these differences were more important than others.

The TU-4 did not use the Wright Duplex 3350 Cyclone but the Ash-73TK, a water-cooled piston engine. The engine produced 2,000 horse power while cruising at 2,400 rpm or 2,400 horse power at 2,600 rpm at full takeoff power. Soloviev OKB-19 under the guidance of A.D. Shvetsov developed the engine. The engine was produced at Plant Number 36 in Rybinsk, in the Yaroslavl Oblast, Russia. The B-29’s 50 caliber machine guns were replaced with the Nudelman-Rikhter NS-23 a 23mm cannon. Unlike the B-29, the TU-4′s fire control computer allowed the bomber’s entire complement of 10 cannons to be focused on one target at a time.1453 But the BULL did not entirely live up to expectations.

The TU-4 was heavier than the B-29 by about 3,100 pounds, shortening its range and payload. Problems with the bomber’s Plexiglas cockpit previously discussed were never fully overcome. The TU-4′s cabin pressurization system was unreliable. Like the B-29 the TU-4′s engines were a constant problem with runaway propellers and short engine lives. The bomber’s computerized fire control system was far-less reliable than that of the B-29; the problems associated with its fire control computers would never be fully overcome. Its electrically operated landing gear sometimes failed to drop the gear, resulting in several wheels-up landings. By the time the BULL began to enter service it was largely obsolete. Turboprops and jet engines were rapidly beginning to replace piston-engine aircraft. Two days short of seven months after the TU-4 took to the air in 1947, the first prototype of the U.S. B-47 Stratojet flew its first flight. The Stratojet would sit nuclear-alert and remain the backbone of the U.S. Strategic Air Command into 1959. Still, as far as the TU-4 being a threat to the Stalin’s enemies the BULL fulfilled its mission.

When the TU-4 appeared at the Tushino Air Show on 3 August 1947 it created an international furor. Its appearance at the air show was stunning. At first those in attendance thought that the Soviets had simply repaired the three bombers that had landed near Vladivostok during the war and were flying them over Moscow. Observers initially found the incident humorous, if not outright embarrassing. When the three bombers were followed up by the TU-70, the atmosphere went from one of humor to awe. The Soviet Union now had a strategic bombing capability based upon a very heavy long-range bomber. Soviet industry had done the impossible, reverse engineering the U.S. bomber into a robust bomber production program. The TU-4 changed everything. The Soviet Union had arrived.

U.S. analysts who had previously discounted rumors that the Soviet Union was building copies of the B-29 at factories east of the Ural Mountains, were now faced with a change in the balance of power. Naive opinions strongly held that the U.S.S.R was incapable of reverse engineering the B-29 had been toppled in moments. In hindsight the Amtorg approach to the Boeing Aircraft Company to buy B-29 tires, wheels, and brake assemblies now made sense. Intelligence information previously gathered was beginning to fall into place. The newly created CIA began to take notice.

In one of the earliest documents CIA ever produced its analysts attempted to downplay the event and allay fears of the TU-4 writing in November 1947 that “Soviet development of improved postwar conventional type aircraft undoubtedly has been aided by the items of American equipment available for their use, including the two flyable B’29s which were
interned in 1944.” Though analysts could take comfort in the fact that Soviet TU-4s could only carry conventional munitions, and reach portions of the U.S. from its bases in the U.S.S.R. that changed on 29 August 1949 when Russia tested its first atomic bomb, codenamed “Joe 1.”

In the aftermath of “Joe 1” the existence of a B-29 knockoff in Soviet hands now assumed a greater degree of importance. In a CIA Report dated 6 April 1950 analysts wrote that “The USSR either has or can easily produce enough TU-4’s (B-29’s) and trained crews willing and able to attempt the delivery against all key US targets any number of atomic bombs the USSR can produce.” By 1950, more than 270 TU-4s were deployed in Soviet Long-Range Aviation regiments. The CIA warned that “Assuming the continued stockpiling of bombs by the USSR and the US, Soviet atomic capabilities have the following military implications for the security of the US in the event of war. (1) The continental US will be for the first time liable to devastating attack.” Again the analysts attempted to downplay the importance of the TU-4 arguing that before the leadership of the Soviet Union would ever order an attack against the U.S. it would have to find “a more effective means of delivery than the TU-4.” Subsequent considerations would not refute but alter this view.

On 10 January 1951 the CIA published National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 18. The January 1951 NIE did not discuss atomic weapons but concentrated on Soviet offensive capabilities for biological and chemical weapons, and the TU-4 was an offensive weapon. The NIE stated clearly that “The Soviet Union has and will have sufficient long range aircraft, trained crews, and bases of operation to enable it to attempt to deliver sizeable CW [Chemical Weapons] attacks against targets in the US.” The CIA estimated that “the Soviet Union will not be able to employ heavy bombers on conventional two-way missions against the entire United States before 1953.” The agency noted at the time the report was authored, “while there is no evidence that the Soviet Union has developed a refueling technique, US experience indicates there are no significant difficulties involved.” The CIA observed that if the TU-4 could be equipped with an aerial refueling it would increase its combat radius by 40 percent to approximately 3,360 miles. The agency estimated at the time that the U.S.S.R had at its disposal 500 TU-4s. This number was expected to rise to “an estimated 900 by mid-1951 and 1,200 by mid-1952.” Unknown to the CIA between 1949 and 1951 the Soviet Union had developed an aerial refueling capability and had already altered some TU-4s to carry nuclear weapons. The altered TU-4 was now known as the TU-4A. As the months passed CIA concerns about the potential capabilities of the TU-4 began to grow.

In an NIE published on 4 September 1951, doubtless briefed, debated and thoroughly researched in the 17 months since the report of 10 January 1951 the CIA wrote “Because of its resemblance to the US B-29, the Soviet TU-4 could be disguised with US markings and employed for clandestine delivery of atomic bombs. Flying a one-way mission, the TU-4 has sufficient range to reach every important target in the US and the USSR has an adequate number of TU-4s and trained crews to perform such missions.” The CIA estimated that “A small number of disguised TU-4s, by taking advantage of the gaps in our radar screen, might escape detection. This would greatly increase the probability of a successful attack on high priority targets, such as the Washington area, for the purpose of paralyzing the top military and civil command a few hours prior to the initiation of hostilities elsewhere.” Eleven short days later, on 15 September 1951 the CIA issued a Special Estimate (SE).
In its September 1951 SE, CIA analysts would write that the “The TU-4 is the only Soviet bomber in operational use known to be capable of reaching the US with an atomic bomb from present Soviet bases. Considering present estimates of production and present TO&E strength of about 600-700 TU-4 type aircraft, it is estimated that approximately 1,000 TU-4s will be in units by mid-1952.\textsuperscript{1467} In assessing the TU-4 the CIA wrote “It is believed that operations of Soviet Long Range Aviation would include night and bad weather missions. The following long-range operations could probably be carried out with TU-4 aircraft carrying a bomb load of 10,000 pounds.”\textsuperscript{1468} The CIA envisioned two different types of missions for the TU-4, “a. One-way missions, from potential staging bases in northeast Siberia and from bases in the Murmansk and Baltic areas, could reach any important target in the US. There is no evidence that the Soviets have in fact developed aerial refueling techniques. However, one aerial refueling would extend the range of a one-way mission and enable Soviet planes to reach any important target in the US even from interior launching bases.”\textsuperscript{1469} “b. Two-way missions from Velkal (in Eastern Siberia) could be carried out against the small segment of the US northwest of Seattle. One aerial refueling would extend the radius to include an arc passing through Los Angeles, Denver and Minneapolis. Two aerial refuelings would extend this radius to include an arc running from Galveston to Cape May.”\textsuperscript{1470} The CIA also warned of the TU-4’s close resemblance to the U.S. B-29.

“Because of its resemblance to the US B-29, the Soviet TU-4 could be disguised with US markings and employed in small numbers for clandestine atomic attacks on high priority targets. The capabilities of the TU-4 aircraft discussed in connection with over air attack...apply to clandestine attack as well.”\textsuperscript{1471} On 18 October 1951 the Soviet Union conducted its third test of an atomic bomb the RDS-3 a uranium-plutonium composite weapon, airdropping the bomb onto its Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan. The weapon had a yield of 41.2 kilotons, more than twice the size of either weapon dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The RDS-3 was carried to its target by a Soviet TU-4A.

When the TU-4A delivered the Soviet RDS-3 to its target, the B-29 and its Soviet derivative became the first bomber on either side of the Iron Curtain to drop an atomic bomb. Whether because of this event or just coincidence on 23 October the CIA published SE 14. According to its preface “All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 18 October.”\textsuperscript{1472} Over half of SE-14 was dedicated to the TU-4.

According to SE-14 “the TU-4 (Soviet version of the United States B-29) is the only known bomber in operational use capable of reaching the United States with an atomic bomb from present Soviet bases.”\textsuperscript{1473} The CIA estimated that the Soviet Union now possessed about 700 TU-4s, SE-14 projected that by mid-1952 the U.S.S.R could field a total of 1,000 TU-4s.\textsuperscript{1474} The CIA believed that the Soviet TU-4 was capable of carrying a 10,000 pound bomb load. The TU-4’s combat radius was estimated at 2,150 miles; combat range was set at 3,950 miles.\textsuperscript{1475 1476} The CIA remained uncertain as to whether the Soviet Union had developed an aerial refueling capability but at that time the issue was assessed by the agency to be a


\textsuperscript{1468} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1469} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1470} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1471} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{1473} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1474} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1475} Ibid.

developmental priority for the U.S.S.R. As the CIA would report the “present range limitation of Soviet long range bombers, warrant the assignment of a high priority to the development of operational aerial refueling techniques and equipment.”

According to the CIA on a one-way mission if the bomber and its refueling tanker were to take-off from the same airfield and refuel at 1,600 nautical miles distant from its point of origination, the range of the TU-4 could be increased to over 5,000 nautical miles. On a two-way mission the TU-4 if refueled at 1,600 nautical miles from the point of departure and once at 2,100 miles from its final landing base, the bomber’s combat radius could be extended to 3,700 miles. The CIA considered it remotely possible that the TU-4 with one aerial refueling could strike the Panama Canal.

SE-14 considered three separate areas as the best locations for launching a Soviet attack against the U.S.: Soviet bases along the Baltic, the Kola Peninsula area and the Chukotski Peninsula in northeast Siberia. SE-14 identified specific bases in all areas that could be used to support TU-4 operations against the U.S. to include airfields at Alakuratti, Magadan, Varlamovo, and Velkal. Concerning the TU-4’s radar bombing capabilities the CIA admitted that during the war the U.S.S.R. had acquired several copies of the B-29’s AN/APQ-13 radar under Lend-Lease.

Though the CIA had photographs of the TU-4’s radome and judged it to be identical to that of the B-29, SE-14 was remained uncertain whether the Soviet Union had ever actually installed a radar system on-board its TU-4. SE-14 admitted that the Soviets had acquired at least one copy of an American aircraft that had been equipped with the three centimeter AN/APS-15 bombing-navigation radar, also known as the British H2X. The agency also identified a possible transport version of the TU-4 as the TU-70 but admitted that the CIA was unsure if the transport had been placed into serial production. The CIA noted that the TU-4 could also be converted to haul paratroopers or special operators. Though it is likely that numerous CIA documents related to the Soviet BULL bomber remain to be released to the public, those that are available indicate that the CIA continued to concentrate on the offensive capabilities of the TU-4 throughout the remainder of the 1950s.

Published on 5 March 1953 SE-36 superseded SE-14. In SE-36 CIA analysts wrote that “The TU-4, which was copied from the American B-29, is the only Soviet bomber, known to be in operational use, capable of carrying atomic weapons to distant targets. As of 1 January 1953, a total of 900 to 950 TU-4s was estimated to be available for operational use.” CIA analysts noted that while “there is no intelligence to indicate that it had done so, the USSR is considered capable of modifying the TU-4 to increase its range in the same manner that the American B-29A was stripped to produce the B-29A. This modification involves removal of...
defensive armament, except for the tail turret, and increase the fuel capacity, with a net weight reduction of 2,600 pounds in takeoff weight. So modified, a TU-4 would have markedly reduced defensive capabilities against interceptor attack, but its combat radius would be increased to 2,150 miles and its combat range to 4,000 miles carrying a 10,000 pound bomb load.”

Coming full circle the reported noted that “as of 1 January 1953 approximately 180 TU-4s (seven regiments with an aggregate T/E strength of 224) were located in the Far East. It is believed that deliveries of the TU-4’s to the Far East are continuing.”

The heirs of Ramp Tramp, Cait Paomat, the General H. H. Arnold Special, Ding How and Hog Wild had finally come home to the Soviet Far East where it had all began. Despite this achievement the TU-4’s days as the backbone of the Soviet bomber force were numbered.

Even as it was stolen and later reproduced, the B-29 was obsolete, as was its offspring the TU-4. Jet engines and turboprops had replaced piston engines; the Soviet Union was now investing in the rocket and missile technologies it had acquired from the Germans at the end of WWII. As SE-36 observed “It seems only safe to assume, however, that the USSR is planning to replace to obsolete TU-4 with Aircraft of higher performance characteristics.”

The CIA noted that while it remained possible through advances in technology to further extend the range of the TU-4, the Soviet Union was likely to put its resources into a new bomber rather than to continue investing in the outdated B-29 derivative. Information on Soviet inflight refueling capabilities continued to remain elusive.

Several additional NIEs followed: NIE-65 was approved on 9 June 1953 and published on 16 June. SE-36/1 was approved on 31 July 1953 and published on 3 August. Special NIE 11-2-54, assessing Soviet capabilities for an attack on the U.S. through 1957 was approved on 16 February 1954 and published on 24 February. Special NIE 11-2-54 superseded SE-36/1. As NIE 11-2-54 noted, at the Tushino Air Show of 1951 the Soviets would display a new long range bomber.

Known initially as the “Type 31” and sometimes as the Myasishchev M-13 it was actually a TU-4 derivative, the TU-85. Though these additional reports added little to previous assessments of the TU-4, they kept the issue in the eyes of Washington decision-makers. By 1954 concerns about the TU-4 were lessening while concerns about the TU-85 were increasing. CIA concerns about the TU-85 were largely misplaced, only two of the large piston driven TU-85s was ever built however the overall CIA analysis remained correct; the days of large piston engine aircraft engine aircraft were over. In November 1951 the TU-85 super-bomber was cancelled in favor of the turboprop TU-95 NATO codenamed, BEAR. By 1955 U.S concerns about the TU-4 have given way to concerns about the BEAR.

However paranoid today the idea of an attack by Western air forces might be, a decade after Stalin had died and Beria was executed the TU-4 continued to serve the Soviet Union. The BULL served the Soviet Union into the 1960s when it was finally withdrawn from service. The reverse engineering of the B-29 propelled the Soviet Union into the modern-age of airpower. Without the BULL the Soviet atomic bomb of 1949 was an achievement but not an offensive weapon capable of intimidating Western governments. The TU-4 changed that.

As the mainstay of the Soviet bomber force the TU-4 served in a number of roles as an aerial refueling and missile launch platform and drone carriers. Six were converted to serve as flying laboratories in support of the Soviet turboprop engine test program. The existence of the TU-4 spawned an arms race of sorts. In-part, because of the TU-4 the U.S. moved to install radars stations, interceptor squadrons, and ground control centers along the outer edge of the U.S. and Alaska. The interim network was known as LASHUP and consisted of 44 separate radars stations. The final network was known as PERMANENT. When production of the TU-4 ended in 1952 the Soviet Union had built 847 copies of the bomber. Western intelligence agencies continued to maintain for years that the Soviet Union built about 1,300 copies of the bomber.

Some of the Soviet bombers made their way to the People’s Republic of China where it was upgraded with turboprop engines, and outfitted to serve as an airborne early warning and control platform. Ultimately unsuccessful a single survivor of the Chinese effort resides today at the China Aviation Museum at Datangshan. The Russian Federation maintains a reportedly pre-production copy of the TU-4 in storage at its Central Air Force Museum at Monino Airfield about 25 miles east of Moscow.

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1486 Ibid.
1487 Ibid.
1488 Ibid.
1489 Ibid.
Unlike the B-29 the TU-4 never flew a combat mission. The closest it ever came to dropping an iron-bomb in anger occurred in the early hours of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 when Nikita Khrushchev and the leadership of the Soviet Union ordered the bombing of Budapest. Loaded with conventional bombs, airborne and enroute to Budapest had they not been ordered back it would have been the first time the B-29 had done what it was designed to do, bomb a European target in anger.

AN EPILOG – OF SORTS

Hap Arnold
After the war Hap Arnold retired to his ranch at Sonoma, California. He was in bad health. During the war Arnold suffered not-less-than four heart attacks, at least four that required hospitalization. He suffered his last wartime heart attack just days after replacing Haywood Hansell with Curtis LeMay. He died on 15 January 1950, at his home in Sonoma. He buried in Section 34 of Arlington National Cemetery.

Joel Barr
Joel Barr worked into late 1946 with the Sperry Gyroscope Company on classified radar systems. He was fired from Sperry in October 1947 after the Army Air Corps denied him a security clearance. Barr eventually moved to Sweden where he furthered his education in electrical engineering and music composition with Olivier Messiaen. He disappeared into Czechoslovakia the day after Ethel Rosenberg’s brother David Greenglass was arrested by the FBI. Barr eventually made his way into the Soviet Union where the NKVD gave him a new identity, that of Joseph Berg. As Berg, Joel Barr was instrumental in the development of microelectronics in the Soviet Union and enjoyed the benefits of membership in the Nomenklatura, the Soviet upper class. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Barr visited the U.S., but denied his part in the Rosenberg spy ring. He was never charged with spying. Barr died in 1998 in Moscow.

Elizabeth Bentley
In the years after Bentley’s defection and appearances before HUAC she continued to be called before the various committees and courts investigating Soviet infiltration of the U.S. government. She was widely criticized in the press and was often the victim of ridicule. Regardless, the FBI continued to rely upon her as an expert witness. Despite Bentley’s successful operation of the various front organizations that employed her, after her defection she survived solely on income earned as a teacher and often as a secretary. Bentley died on 3 December 1963 from abdominal cancer at the age of 55. With the release of the VENONA transcripts and the opening of formerly closed Soviet archives, Bentley’s testimony was largely vindicated.

Moe Berg
Moe Berg was one of those unusual Americans that seem to rise to the occasion or the demands of the moment, achieves a level of greatness, but is in the long-run unable or unwilling to fulfill his greater potential. In the aftermath of the war, despite numerous offers to do so Berg never returned to the baseball he loved. In the 1950s he did some work for the CIA, but never fulfilled the demands of his contract and was later released. He spent most of his remaining decades living off the largess of friends, acquaintances and family. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1945 but turned it down. His sister accepted the medal after his death. Moe Berg died on 29 March 1972. His last words are reported to have been “How did the Mets do today?”

Whittaker Chambers
In 1952 Whittaker Chambers published a book, Witness. The book combined the story of his life to that point with warnings about the dangers of communism. The book was on the bestseller list for over a year. Chambers died of a heart attack on 9 July 1961. Like Elizabeth Bentley, much of what Chambers testified to was later validated publicly by the release of the VENONA transcripts. In 1984 he was posthumously honored by President Ronald Reagan with the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

Captain Cramsie
Arthur Cramsie, the only POW to ever write a book about the Konan POW Camp, Guest of an Emperor, passed on in 1993.

Wendell Fertig
Though the Japanese referred to Wendell Fertig throughout the war as “Major General Fertig, Commander in Chief in the Philippines,” he was never promoted past the rank of Colonel. For the most part, after the war MacArthur’s staff did everything possible to downplay Fertig’s contributions in forcing the Japanese out of the Philippines. After the war Fertig spent the next four years as the officer-in-charge of the Reserve Officer Training Corps at the Colorado School of Mines. When the Korean War broke out the Army retrieved Fertig from Colorado and he spent the next two years operating a psychological warfare unit from within the Pentagon. He was released from the Army in the mid-1950s but later helped to establish the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Fertig is considered by many to be the father of U.S. Special Forces. Wendell Fertig passed away on 24 March 1975.
Fukkai Maru
On 13 December 1943 off Palau, the Fukkai Maru heavily laden with Japanese troops was sunk by the USS Pogy (SS-266).

Robert Furman
In the post-war era Robert Furman’s established himself in the construction industry forming Furman Builders Inc., where he prospered. His company built the Potomac Mills Mall south of Washington, D.C., St. John’s Episcopal Church in Chevy Chase, Maryland, the U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua and numerous other structures. His involvement in the Manhattan Project continued to remain hidden until the early 1980s. Furman passed away on 13 October 2008 at the age of 93.

Isley Field
Isley Air Field continues to exist today as the Saipan International Airport, however only one of it WWII era runways remains in operation. Over time most of the temporary U.S. facilities were salvaged, however many of the concrete facilities Japanese or American remain. Most of those have been long since reclaimed by jungle. The island’s road system, built by Seabees and others during the war remains today as trails, mute reminders to the wartime activities of the warring parties.

Kanko Army Airfield
After WWII, with the occupation of northern Korea by Soviet forces, Kanko Army Airfield became known as Yongp’o or Yong’o Airfield and continued to exist as an active airfield. During the Korean War as forces of the United Nations (UN) moved north, U.S. and Australian aircraft operated from the base. On 11 December 1950 Douglas MacArthur visited the base. Once the Chinese entered the war and UN forces began to move back, the airfield was instrumental in removing military and civilian out of the area. The airfield continues to exist today in the service of North Korea.

Korean Electrical Power System
On 23 June 1952 in the largest single strike of the Korean War more than 500 aircraft from the Air Force, the Navy and Marine Corps attacked the Japanese installed power plants supporting the North Korean war machine. U.S. Navy aircraft severely damaged the Supung Hydroelectric Power Plant and the Kyosen system, while Air Force and Marine units damaged the lower-level plants of the Fusen and Choshin systems. The next day Air Force units returned to the Choshin and Fusen systems to attack the first and second plants in the Choshin System and to reengage the lower-level plants of the Fusen system. These raids were followed up on the 26th of June with attacks on the Choshin and Fusen system, mostly concentrating on the system’s upper-level plants. About 90 percent of the Japanese installed electric power systems were destroyed. Follow-up attacks launched throughout the remainder of the war prevented North Korea from bringing the plants back on-line. After the Korean War, North Korea’s East Bloc allies returned the systems to service.

Major Kruglev
Nothing further is known about Major Kruglev.

Curtis LeMay
It is not hard to describe Curtis LeMay’s post-war achievements but far more difficult to understand the man behind the legend. After the war General LeMay served as the Commander United States Air Forces Europe where he directed the Berlin Airlift, the 1948 U.S. response to the Soviet blockade of Berlin. In 1948 he returned to the U.S. to lead the Strategic Air Command (SAC), at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Receiving his fourth star in 1951 at age 44, he became the youngest U.S. four-star general since Ulysses S. Grant, LeMay was an advocate of preemptive nuclear war. In 1957 LeMay was assigned as Assistant Chief-of-Staff, United State Air Force, becoming Chief-of Staff in 1961. Serving during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 he repeatedly clashed with President John F. Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara arguing that he should be allowed to bomb Soviet nuclear missile sites in Cuba. Widely perceived as hostile to Robert McNamara and disapproving of Lyndon Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War, in February 1965 he was for all
intents and purposes forced into retirement. In 1968 he served as the running-mate to Alabama Governor George Wallace in an unsuccessful bid for the White House carrying five states and receiving 46 votes in the electoral college. Due largely to his association with George Wallace, LeMay found himself labeled as a racial segregationist a charge that was blatantly untrue but supported by the press nonetheless. General LeMay died on 1 October 1990, at March Air Force Base, Riverside County, California. He is buried in the United States Air Force Academy Cemetery, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

**Noguchi Shitagau**

In 1940 while in Keijo the founder of Nichitsu, Noguchi Shitagau suffered an intracranial hemorrhage. In 1941 Noguchi donated his personal fortune to the Korean Scholarship Foundation. The next year he was decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 1st Class. He died on 15 January 1944.

**Nichitsu**

In the aftermath of the Soviet occupation of northern Korea most Japanese were rounded up and held in concentration camps reportedly centered on Konan, but actually all over that portion of the peninsula under Soviet control. Losing its managers, engineers and core-workers, production at the plant quickly ground to a halt. The Soviets rapidly stepped back from their policy of isolating all Japanese into concentration camps and though not officially in-charge, the Japanese that had previously operated the plants returned to work. As late as 1946, the plant employed 2,496 Japanese. 90 of these were administrators, 450 were engineers and 1,956 were technicians. Over the next several years, these Japanese were repatriated to Japan. The plant itself would not be so lucky.

On 31 July 1950, just over one month after the beginning of the Korean War B-29s now based in Japan dropped 500 tons of bombs on the plant. Numerous secondary explosions were reported. Crews reported “reddish-brown smoke,” rolling skyward. On 3 August 30 B-29s struck the plant in what was now the third raid on the plant. The raid delivered 400 tons of munitions to the plant. 1,200 tons of explosives had hit the plant in less than one week. An estimated 85 percent of the plant was destroyed. After the war North Korea rebuilt the plant with the assistance of East Germany.

**Boris Pash**

After the war Boris Pash continued to serve with the U.S. Army mostly with intelligence organizations. From 1946 to 1947 he served under General Douglas MacArthur in Japan. He was later assigned as a military representative to the CIA. Pash retired from the U.S. Army in 1957. He died on 11 May 1995 in Greenbrae, California.

**Victor Perlo**

Victor Perlo was never brought to trial or charged for his treason. The accusations of spying did end his career in the government and as an academic. Years later he served as chief economist of the Communist Party of the United States. He died on 1 December 1999 in New York at the age of 87.

**Lieutenant General Arthur Ernest Percival**

General Percival returned to Britain in September 1945. He was never forgiven for the loss of Singapore. He retired from the army in 1946 with the honorary rank of lieutenant-general but with a pension rank of major-general. His 1949 memoirs, The War in Malaya did little to reform his image. Percival was however greatly respected by his men for his time in

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1495 Jordan, William. B-29s Hit Industrial City with 500 Tons of Bombs. The Post-Standard, Syracuse, N.Y., Monday, July 31, 1950. Volume 121, Number 219
1496 Ibid.
1497 30 Planes Hit North Korea Plant, US BOMBER BASE. Japan The Daily Review, Thursday, 3 August 1950
1498 B-29s Drop 600 Tons of Bombs in N. Korea The Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria, Ohio Friday, 25 August 1950.
captivity and served as the lifetime president of the Far East Prisoners of War Association (FEPOW). He did much to gain public support for the former POWs and was eventually able to obtain some compensation for them from frozen Japanese assets in Britain. Unlike other former British Lieutenant Generals, Percival was never awarded a knighthood. He died on 31 January 1966.

**General Preobrazhenskii**

After the incident with Hog Wild, General Preobrazhenskii was promoted and served as the Commander of Officer, Air Force, Pacific Ocean Fleet. From 1947 to 1950 he served as Commanding Officer Air Forces 5th Fleet. Between 1950 and 1962, he served as the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Aviation. From 1962 onward he served at the disposal of the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and the Military Inspector-Councilor, Group of Inspectors-Generals, Ministry of Defense. Preobrazhenskii died in 1963. Over his career Preobrazhenskii was awarded three Orders of Lenin, five Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov - Second Class, the Order of the Red Star, various other medals and the Order of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic

**Ramp Tramp**

Ramp Tramp was the only one of the three in-tact U.S. B-29s that landed near Vladivostok that was never disassembled. It continued to serve Soviet air forces for many years after the development of the TU-4 eventually serving as an airborne launch platform for the Soviet Union’s rocket powered research aircraft the Samolet 346. Ramp Tramp was reportedly destroyed sometime in the early 1990s.

**Julius and Ethel Rosenberg**

The Rosenbergs were taken to trial on 6 March 1951, were convicted on 29 March of transmitting or attempting to transmit to a foreign government information relating to the national defense. They were sentenced to death on 5 April 1951. At sundown on 19 June 1953 they were executed in the electric chair at Sing Sing Correctional Facility in Ossining, New York.

**Alfred Sarant**

Following the war, in 1946 Alfred Sarant moved to Ithaca, New York where he worked in the physics labs at Cornell University. In July 1950, two days after Julius Rosenberg was arrested, the FBI began to interview Sarant. The next day Sarant fled to Mexico. From Mexico officials of the Polish trade mission smuggled Sarant to Guatemala, then to Poland via Spain. Sarant was eventually reunited with Joel Barr in Czechoslovakia. The two were finally moved to Leningrad in the Soviet Union where they headed a military electronics research institute. Sarant died of a heart attack on 12 March 1979.

**Abraham George Silverman**

Though Silverman was never charged with espionage or treason, his professional life was ruined by the investigations and his refusal to do more than assert his rights under the 5th Amendment. In the aftermath of his testimony he became unemployable. Silverman died of a heart ailment in January 1973

**Nathan Gregory Silvermaster**

In the aftermath of accusations of spying for the Soviet Union Nathan Gregory Silvermaster moved to New Jersey and entered the construction business with William Ludwig Ullmann. He died on 7 October 1964.

**David Snell**

David Snell never followed up his 1946 article in the Atlanta Constitution on the Japanese atomic bomb program with additional information. Inexplicably, drafts of the Snell story can be found in the 1946 files of the SCAP held at the U.S. National Archives. During the Korean War several journalists wrote revised interest stories based upon the 1946 article. When approached by those journalists Snell had little to add to the 1946 tale. Snell eventually took a job with Life Magazine until the magazine closed in 1972. In the years after Life magazine Snell wrote freelance articles for several national magazines. David Snell died in July 1987.

**TU-4 derivatives**

The TU-75, an outgrowth of the TU-70 program took to the air in January 1950 but was never submitted to the government for continued production. The TU-80, a longer range version of the TU-4 was also produced but would be cancelled in 1949. Only one TU-80 was ever built. The prototype eventually served as a research aircraft. It spent its final days as a target on a bombing range. The ultimate B-29 derivative built by the Soviet Union was the TU-85 NATO codenamed BARGE, 50 percent heavier than the B-29 with nearly double the range of the Superfortress. However the days
of the piston engine bomber were over. Only two TU-85s were ever built, the super-bomber was cancelled in November 1951 in favor of the TU-95, NATO codenamed, BEAR.

**Ugaki Kazushige**  
In 1944 the former Governor-General of Korea Ugaki Kazushige stepped away from politics and the military to become president of Takushoku University. After the surrender of Japan Ugaki was arrested by Occupation authorities and held for investigation of war crimes. He was never charged and was subsequently released. In 1953 he ran for public office and was elected to the House of Councilors in the Diet of Japan. He died on 30 April 1956. He was 88 years old.

**Ludwig Ullmann**  
Like his fellow spies Lugwig Ullmann was never charged and tried for espionage. After the war Ullmann entered the construction business in New Jersey with Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. When he died on 3 February 1993 he left an estate of more than $8 million.

**Jonathan Mayhew Wainwright IV**  
After the collapse of Corregidor and the surrender of U.S. forces in the Philippines General Wainwright was held at prison camps in northern Luzon, Formosa and at Mukden in Manchukuo. He was liberated by the Soviet Red Army when it overran the Japanese Kwangtung Army in August 1945. Though he was the highest ranking American POW he was constantly abused by the Japanese. After his release from prison Wainwright and Lieutenant General Arthur Percival stood immediately behind General Douglas MacArthur aboard the U.S.S. Missouri to witness the surrender of Japan. He then traveled to the Philippines with General Percival to witness the surrender of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, the Tiger of Malaya.

Honored and respected by the men who served under him for his willingness to lead by example Wainwright was considered an American Hero. For his leadership he received the Medal of Honor, a honor which General Douglas MacArthur opposed. On 5 September 1945 Wainwright received his fourth star. Upon his return to the U.S. he was again honored with a ticker-tape parade in New York City. He retired in August 1947 as the Commander of the Fifth United States Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. After he retired he served on the board of directors for several corporations but made himself constantly available to speak before numerous veterans groups. Despite the number of invitations General Wainwright fulfilled almost every request received. On 2 September 1953, eight years to the day Japan surrendered Jonathan Wainwright suffered a stroke and passed away in San Antonio, Texas. Douglas MacArthur did not attend the funeral.

**Yasuoka Masaomi**  
After his detachment was dissolved at Nomonhan in 1939 and he was relieved of duty, Yasuoka Masaomi was reassigned to the 3rd Depot Division. He resigned from the Army in 1941. He subsequently agreed to take the post of military-governor of Surubaya, Japanese Occupied Java in the Netherland East Indies. At war’s end he was arrested by Dutch authorities and was tried under a military tribunal for war crimes. He was sentenced to death and executed on 12 April 1948.

**FINAL THOUGHTS**  
On the surface what David Snell wrote and published in the Atlanta Constitution on the 3rd of October 1946 appears to meld well with the known facts at the time. The timeline of events that Snell established seemed to flow together well. There appeared to be a cause and effect. According to Snell 1) there were hidden facilities located in and around Konan that supported Japan’s atomic bomb program, 2) the forces of the Soviet Union had captured these facilities when they invaded Korea and were protecting them for future use, 3) a U.S. B-29 was overflying the area snooping, and 4) the Soviets shot it down. But was it really that simple?

The story that Snell told was for all and intents and purposes largely true. Fact: There was a Japanese nuclear energy and atomic bomb research program. Fact: Parts of this program, research and design, bomb assembly, and other such facilities were likely located in and around Konan. Fact: The Soviet Union turned these facilities over to their Korean communist cronies in late 1946. Fact: There was a B-29 forced down over the city shortly after the end of WWII where these facilities were located. The list of facts is extensive. But deeper research into the story, its timeline, the activities ongoing in the area, and what documentation that continues to exist, reveals that what appeared to be true on the surface was not entirely true when researched to a deeper level. Despite concerns with the article, Snell cannot be blamed for writing the story that was published if he really wrote it at all. That several drafts of the original article are held in the National Archives in the files of the U.S. Army is disconcerting at best.

Snell was an investigative journalist, a man interested in ferreting out the facts and reporting the truth. What Snell lacked then was access to the information we now possess some 60 years after the fact. His effort to reveal the story of Japan’s atomic bomb program took place closer in time to the actual events, a little over one year after the end of the war. As
with any initial reporting of an event it was inevitable that some details would be incorrect. Such was the case with his comments concerning Hog Wild in relation to the Japanese atomic bomb program as located in and around Konan.

The real issue is not that Snell got one part of the tale incorrect but that little so has been done to set the record straight, get the facts, and correct the myths that surround the loss of Hog Wild. While it makes for a great conspiracy, like most great conspiracies looked into at a deeper level there is not much to the story. But like any conspiracy there was a story buried underneath and that story, the Soviet effort to steal the B-29 had been entirely overlooked: The Army Air Corps accounted for the loss of the bomber but failed to include its loss in context of known Soviet interest in acquiring bomber and its technologies. Curtis LeMay had gone so far as to open relations with Mao Zedong to ensure air crews safe passage and assistance if lost in areas under their control, and to encourage bomber crews to fly as far into China as possible and then bail out to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring even one more copy of the B-29. For his part Hap Arnold waged active warfare against the U.S. Department of State for not doing more to force the U.S.S.R. to return the three damaged bombers that had diverted to Vladivostok in late 1944. Other government agencies had also dropped the ball.

While the FBI had largely ignored Soviet industrial espionage activities early in the war, it had become more concerned of those activities as the war continued into 1943 and 1944. Several months after the loss of Hog Wild the FBI was informed by Elizabeth Bentley that plans and blueprints for the bomber has been turned over to Soviet intelligence in the early years of the war. No one in the FBI would ever make the connection between the early events of the war and the later loss of Hog Wild to the Soviet Union. The OSS, though forbidden by MacArthur and Nimitz to operate within their command areas, was ultimately responsible for collection and evaluation of strategic intelligence, and yet similarly failed to detect or understand the desires of Soviet leaders for a post-war strategic bombing capability. A review of all the known facts about Hog Wild, the aircraft, the mission, turmoil in the area and so on would take several pages, consider just the few paragraphs below.

- Blacklist had not been previously coordinated with the Soviet Union. There is no evidence to indicate that Soviet command authorities had been previously made aware of the POW supply effort prior to the forcing down of Hog Wild.

- The U.S. had no prior knowledge that the Japanese were investigating nuclear energy or an atomic bomb until September 1945; weeks after Hog Wild had been forced down over northern Korea. Imagery collection missions would not be arbitrarily flown without an object.

- Two B-29s had already penetrated the area of Konan earlier that morning prior to the arrival of Hog Wild without taking fire, being forced down, or encountering any Soviet interference. The Soviet Union was being disingenuous when it said it did not know why the bomber was there and for good reason: The Soviets needed one more copy of the B-29. Other aircraft were to later overfly the Konan camp delivering additional supplies. At least two C-46 Commandos would eventually land at the same airfield without any additional interference, one to repair Hog Wild, the other to begin repatriation of Allied POWs. The U.S.S.R. never placed any limitations against U.S. flights into the area to support the POW camp or the repatriation of the former prisoners. The U.S.S.R. did not make the repatriation process easy, but it did not interfere excessively with the eventual transfer of the prisoners out of Konan and to Keijo.

- The K-20 camera; the photographic intelligence camera of numerous conspiracy theories, had a fixed focal length of six and three-eighths inches, no adjustments and was at best a point-and-shoot throwaway camera. Had additional reconnaissance of the area been necessary, other camera systems with a higher resolution were available in the Marianas, the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan…. None of these systems could however take high resolution images in the rain which was falling over the area when Hog Wild arrived over Konan early on the afternoon of 29 August 1945.

- Numerous reconnaissance flights over the Korean Peninsula had already taken place. Prior photographic mapping missions had imaged most of the peninsula. The major cities of Fusan, Genzan, Jinsen Konan, Seishin, and Yoshi to name but a few had been photographed in great detail with numerous images taken. Target folders had been produced and prepared for use by U.S. long-range bombers. There was no requirement for follow-on missions to image the area. The imagery needed to locate any secret Japanese facilities was already on-hand in U.S. files. The Soviet Union provided the incident, conspiracy theorists provided the cover-up.
• Though Japan had surrendered on 15 August 1945, fighting in and around Korea would continue on for several more weeks. Lacking any advance warning that U.S. B-29s would be operating north of the 38th Parallel, observing two separate over-flights of the same area that morning, having yet a third or the same aircraft overflying the area in the early afternoon, all in an active war zone; it is not unreasonable that Soviet forces in and around Konan could pretend with great effect to be somewhat concerned and confused.

• Confusion is part of the art of war that every state tries to employ against its enemy. Japan was no different. Had Japan captured a flyable B-29 it is possible that they would have flown it against the Soviets. Would that aircraft if captured, have been capable of flying it over the area of Konan in the latter part of August 1945? It is unlikely but operationally and politically the Soviets fighting in northern Korea could not afford to assume that the plane had not taken off from some point in Japan, southern Korea or China. They could not assume that the aircraft overflying the area that afternoon was not the same plane that had over flown the area twice that morning. In war, when bullets are flying and bombs are being dropped – assumptions get people killed. The POW supply flights were a readymade cover for a clandestine operation, not one by the U.S. but one supporting Soviet efforts to acquire one last copy of a B-29.

• That the Soviets would launch a number of aircraft to intercept Hog Wild as it over flew Konan would appear to be understandable. That the Soviets wanted Hog Wild to land is clear to the crew by the actions of the Russian airmen piloting the Yaks as they raised and lowered their gear to alert the bomber to follow them and land. By all appearances Hog Wild had simply intruded into Soviet controlled airspace and failed to follow the orders of aircraft sent to intercept the bomber. Though the crew of the bomber likewise communicated their intentions to leave the area, there was no ability on either side to initiate voice communications. After making numerous attempts to communicate their orders to the intruding bomber, the Soviet Yak pilots opened fire and forced the bomber to land. Not one of Hog Wild’s aircrew ever argued the point. On the surface the story appeared rather simple, but wasn’t.

Did Japan have facilities in the area of Konan that were researching nuclear energy or an atomic bomb during the war? Absolutely, numerous post-WWII intelligence documents reporting activity related to nuclear energy research in the area of Konan exist. Expect further revelations on the subject to follow in later papers.

Was Hog Wild involved in a search to locate these facilities? No. At the time of the forcing down, no U.S. agency military or civilian had any prior knowledge of such a program or possible facilities located in the area of Konan. Recall also the Allied effort to prevent Nazi Germany from acquiring the heavy water, produced by Norsk Hydro at its Vemork Power Plant.

Had the U.S. possessed any information revealing the presence of some type of uranium research program in the area of Konan, it is unlikely under General Order One that the area would have been turned over the Soviet Union with such facilities in-place. From 1940 through 1944 the Allies launched three separate special operations; “Grouse,” “Freshman,” and “Gunnerside” to destroy the Norsk Hydro Plant which provided heavy water to the German atomic bomb project. Once successful Allied bombers revisited the Norwegian facility on several occasions to ensure it remained out of operation. Recall also the Allied effort to bomb the German uranium metal production plant occupied by the Soviet Union in Auer, Germany in 1945. It is unlikely that had the U.S. known such facilities were located in Konan, that they would have allowed these facilities to continue to exist without some attempt to shot them down or destroy them outright. Some convenient bombing missions to assist the Soviet Union in their conquest of northern Korea would have likely taken place – requested or not.

While the idea of a conspiracy theory involving a U.S. bomber searching the area of Konan for some for facilities supporting Japan’s WWII nuclear research and atomic bomb program is entertaining, it is not factual. To date there are no affidavits, no memoirs, no diaries, no official documents, no papers, no journals, no evidence to support the claim that Hog Wild was on a spy mission of any kind. The charge is a myth perpetuated by poor research and improper inquiry.

Was the forcing down of Hog Wild in northern Korea on 29 August 1945 a case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time? At the time Hog Wild was forced down over northern Korea it was delivering supplies and medicines to needy POWs held by the Japanese since the fall of Singapore in 1942. If there is any fault with the assigned mission of Hog Wild it lies not with the aircraft’s crew, Soviet forces in the area, or the command ordering the bomber into the air at Saipan. The fault probably best lies in the confusion that accompanied the unexpected and rapid end of the war against Japan that gave the Soviet Union one final opportunity to acquire one last U.S. Superfortress. The operations plan had never been fully coordinated, the Soviet Union had only recently entered the war, there was much to be done, and little time to get what needed to be accomplished completed. But the loss of Hog Wild did serve a greater purpose.
Because of Hog Wild the POWs were eventually repatriated. As Eric Harrison reported the event “Within a few days a special train was chartered and we were heading south to below the 38th parallel and the beginning of our journey home.”\textsuperscript{1499} These words alone would have sufficed to end his article however Harrison had one last observation reporting that “We could not help contrasting the two zones. In the north the Russians fully armed their sector; they had brought down innumerable troops and guarded every bridge and crossing. Below the 38th parallel there were no signs of weapons of war and a soldier was rarely to be seen. The impression gained was that until things in Korea were very much to the Russian way of thinking, the visitors from the north were in for a long stay. May liberation eventually come to this beautiful country, whose people for years have known nothing but occupation and exploitation.”\textsuperscript{1500} 65 years after, the people of North Korea continue to bear the burden of that yoke.

As for the crew of Hog Wild they performed their assigned mission admirably. They had flown a long mission, taken hostile fire, and survived a burning aircraft. Some had bailed out as ordered; others rode the plane to ground. Three of the crew; Captain Campbell, Lieutenants Harwood and Sherrill received the Purple Heart for wounds received on 29 August 1945.\textsuperscript{1501} Once on the ground no matter where the crew was, they never gave up on each other. Despite what some of the crew had believed was the tragic loss of their fellow airmen, they continued to pursue the mission and deliver the needed relief supplies so that others could survive. In the decades after the war the crew of the Hog Wild held several reunions. Off and on over the years several former British or Australian POWs also attended these reunions. Whether they could attend reunions or not many POWs kept in touch with the crew.

In 1985 the crew of Hog Wild held their reunion in Dayton, Ohio and visited the National Museum of the United States Air Force. The Air Force honored the airmen by allowing them to enter the museum before it opened, giving them 30 minutes alone with the Bock’s Car and presenting films of the war to include some on the bombing of Tokyo. In 1995 the crew held its reunion at Hershey Park in Hershey, Pennsylvania. President Clinton recognized their achievement in a letter from the White House. They likely never thought of themselves as heroes, but truly were heroes in war and in peace. As the years passed on so did the crew. By 1995 Joe Queen, Jesse Owens, Cy Bernucki, Richard Turner, Lucius Weeks, Bob Campbell and Barry Grant were gone. As of this writing only Arthur Strilky remains alive residing in Chicago, Illinois.

In 1986 as he was researching his book, Arthur Cramsie wrote a letter to Eugene Harwood, in it he said: “I so well remember the extraordinary episode of your B-29 on your mercy mission after the war had finalized and you all damn nearly got killed for your trouble.”\textsuperscript{1502}

The crewmen of Hog Wild were good men, they were American soldiers.

Nearly getting killed was no trouble at all.

\textsuperscript{1499} Harrison, E. S. Korea, North of 38, Some P.O.W. Memories. The West Australian. Perth. Australia. 28 June 1947
\textsuperscript{1500} Harrison, E. S. Korea, North of 38, Some P.O.W. Memories. The West Australian. Perth. Australia. 28 June 1947
\textsuperscript{1501} General Orders, Number 41. Headquarters 500th Bombardment Group. APO 237, San Francisco, California. 24 September 1945.
\textsuperscript{1502} Personal correspondence Arthur Cramsie to Eugene Harwood. 20 July 1986.
### APPENDIX 1: Known Color Plans

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<tr>
<th>Color</th>
<th>County</th>
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<td>Black</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Blue</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Manchukuo</td>
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<td>British India</td>
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<td>Crimson</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Gray</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pink</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>Brazil (after 1938)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rainbow</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
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<td>Red</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
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<td>Scarlet</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tan</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violet</td>
<td>Intervention – Latin America</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Internal Disturbance</td>
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<td>Yellow</td>
<td>China</td>
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APPENDIX 2: Prisoners of War Held at Chosen Number 1.
Alphabetical; Name by Country Order

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<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
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APPENDIX 3: List of Japanese personnel known to be associated with the Konan POW Camp, 1943-1945

EXTRACTED FROM:
Document 18347 A (2) STN/MDI. 25 September 1945
Korea PW Camp, Examination of Korean PW Camps
U.S. National Archives, Record Group 331, Stack Area 290, Row 11, Compartment 10, Shelf 2-3, High Seas Area 17 to Korea PW Camps # 6. Boxes, 936, 937, and 938

CAVEAT: Many of the personnel listed below served at camps in Keijo and at Konan. According to many POW accounts some of the personnel listed as Japanese, are likely to be Koreans who had adopted Japanese names under the 1939, Decree Number 19, Soshi-kaimei. Names are presented as spelled in official U.S. documents. While Document 18347 A (2) lists Japanese name in Romaji with Kanji identifiers, it is possible that some of the spellings listed below were phonetically derived. It is unlikely that the list below includes all those that served at the camp.

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EXTRACTED FROM: Chart 1, Part 2 – List of Personnel on Detached Service to the Camp.

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EXTRACTED FROM: Chart 1 Part 3 – List of Prisoner of War Guards

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<td>NAKAYAMA, Yochin</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
<td>Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>NISHIHARA, Jinsen</td>
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<tr>
<td>NISHIKAWA, Tokin</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSHIBO, Keikao</td>
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<td>OYAMA, Yoshitatsu</td>
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<td>YAMAGI, Kiratsu</td>
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<td>SANGO, Keitaro</td>
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<td>SUKYAMA, Genseki</td>
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<td>TAKAMINE, Norihide</td>
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<td>TAKAHARA, Ensaku</td>
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<td>TAKAHARA, Eukiichi</td>
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<td>TAKAHARA, Masuchika</td>
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<td>TAKANAGA, Akio</td>
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<td>TAKAYAMA, Issei</td>
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<td>TAKEMOTO, Ariyoshi</td>
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<td>TAKEMURA, Yasuo</td>
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<td>TAKEYAMA, Yasuhara</td>
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<td>TAMAYAKA, Shoze</td>
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<td>Guard</td>
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<td>TANIGUCHI, Yukinori</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
<td>Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>TATSUJO, Sando</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
<td>Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOYOKAWA, Koshun</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
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<td>TOYOSHIMA, Yasuhiro</td>
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<td>Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAKA, Tsusgiatsu</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
<td>Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>YAMAGIDA, Konju</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
<td>Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>YAMAMOTO, Tsunehara</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
<td>Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>YAMAMURA, Yasuo</td>
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<td>Guard</td>
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<td>YANAKI, Hirone</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
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<tr>
<td>YASUHARA, Noritoshi</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
<td>Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>YASUMURA, Toka</td>
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<td>Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>YASUTOMI, Gempuku</td>
<td>Civilian Employee</td>
<td>Guard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CAVEAT: Japanese names derived from POW statements taken after the war are probably phonetic spellings at best and are listed below as spelled in such statements. This index is based upon last name, first name. Where no first name is given, rank is provided.

“A” Party, Singapore
AAF Materiel Command (AAFMC)
Abelson, Phil
Acetylene
ACORN (Bela Gold)
Action Group (Kōdōha)
Adams, John
Adelphi, Maryland
Adjutant General War Department
AFwdN (ALSOS Forward North)
AFwdS (ALSOS Forward South)
Agochi, Korea
Agricultural Adjustment Administration
AGWAR (Adjutant General War Department)
AIB (Allied Intelligence Bureau)
Aircraft Commanders Handbook
AILERON (George Silverman)
Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA)
Air Tasking Order (ATO)
Aizawa Incident
Aizawa Saburo
Akhmerov, Iskhak
Akira Muto
Alabama
Alakuratti Airfield, USSR
Alaska
Albania
Albert Canal, Belgium
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Aldershot Garrison
Alcoa Steamship Company
Aleutian Islands, Alaska
Algiers, French Morocco
Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB)
Allied Technical Air Intelligence Unit (ATAIU)
ALSOS
ALSOS Forward North (AFwdN)
ALSOS Forward South (AFwdS)
ALSOS Mission
Amaldi, Edorado
American Communist Party
American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)
Ammonia Synthesis Plant
Ammok River, Korea
AMS (Army Map Service)
Amtorg
Amtorg Trading Company
Amur River, Korea
Anatahan Island, Mariana Islands
Anderson, Henry Cooks Leslie
Anderson, Private
Angst, Harry
AN/APN-9 (Radar)
AN/APQ-7 Eagle (Radar)
AN/APQ-13 (Radar)
AN/APS-15 (Radar)
Ann Dee (B-29)
Anshan, Manchuria
Antung, Manchuria
A.N. Tupolev Experimental Design Bureau
Antonov, Aleksei Innokentievich
ANT-64
Aparri, Philippine Islands
APG-15 (Radar)
Araki Sadao
Arbon Crew (B-29 aircrew)
ARCADIA Conference
Archangel Command
Arden, Pennsylvania
ARGONAUT Conference
Area B (Catoctin Mountain Park, Maryland)
Arlington National Cemetery
Armed Forces Western Pacific
Arnold, Henry Harley “Hap”
APQ-13 (radar)
Arakatsu, Bunsaku
Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge)
Armenia
Army Air Corps
Army Map Service (AMS)
Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg
Arsenal Barracks, Arkansas
Arthur, Douglas E.
Arthur Levitt State Office Building, New York
Artillery Square, Singapore
Asano (zaibatsu)
ASh-73TK
Ashford General Hospital, West Virginia
Ashland, Kentucky
Aslito Field, Saipan
Aspenden, England
Associated Press (AP)
Atrabine
Atlanta Constitution
ATO (Air Tasking Order)
Atomic Bomb Mission (ABM)
Atsugi Air Base, Japan
Auer Company, Germany
Auergesellschaft Plant, Germany
August Storm (Soviet Invasion of Manchuria)
Australia
Australian Imperial Force
Austria
Austria-Hungary
Automatic Flight Control Equipment (AFCE)
Autumn Water (Mitsubishi J8M)
Auxiliary Power Plant (APP)
Aviacionny Nauchno-Tehnicheskii Komplex im A.N. Tupoleva (USSR)
Aviation Division of the Bureau of Programs and Statistics (USSR)
Aviation Plant 18 (USSR)
Avro Lancaster
Awakawa Maru
Axis Powers
“B” Party, Singapore
B-4 (TU-4)
B-17 Flying Fortresses
B-24 Liberator
B-25 Mitchell
B-25B Mitchell
B-25J Mitchell
B-32 Dominator
B-47 Stratojet
B-29-5-BW
Babel, Issac
Bacteriological Warfare
Babelsburg, Germany
BABYLON (VENONA)
Bagge, Erich
Baguio, Philippine Islands
Baikal-Amur Mainline
Baintsagan Hill, Nomonhan
Baltic Fleet
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania)
Banadaru Airstrip, Saipan
Banegas, Lorenzo Y.
Bangkok, Thailand
Bank of Chosen, Korea
Baradell, Leonard E.
Barr, Joel (Berg, Joseph)
Bartoslav, Colonel
Barbers Point, Hawaii
Bataan I
Bataan II
Bataan Death March, Philippine Islands
Bataan Peninsula, Philippine Islands
Batitsky, Pavel
Battery Crocket, Philippine Islands
Battery Hearn, Philippine Islands
Battery Geary, Philippine Islands
Battery Way, Philippine Islands
Battle of the Alamo, Texas
Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes Offensive)
Battle of Buna, New Guinea
Battle of Central Henan, China
Battle of Changeng, China
Battle of Guiliin-Liuzhou
Battle of Khalkhyn Gol, Mongolia
Battle of Midway
Battle at Milne Bay, New Guinea
Battle of Nomonhan, Mongolia
Battle of Okinawa, Japan
Battle of Singapore
Battle of Kansas
Battle of the Coral Sea
Battle of the Pockets, Philippine Islands
Battle of the Points, Philippine Islands
Battle of the Somme, France
Battles of the Choshin Reservoir, North Korea
Beecher, Colonel
Beers, Trennis
Beidaying, Manchuria
Beijing, China
Belarus, Belarusian People's Republic
Belgian Congo
Bela Gold (ACORN)
Beliayev, Alexander I General
Bell, George H.
Bell Syndicate
Bell Telephone Laboratories
Belle Ruth (B-29)
Benghazi, Libya
Bentley, Charles Prentiss
Bentley, Elizabeth
Berg, Joseph (Joel Barr)
Berg, Morris “Moe”
Berger, Victor
Beria, Lavrentiy
Bering Sea
Berkeley, California
Berlin, Germany
Berlin Airlift
Berlin University, Germany
Berlin Zone, Germany
Berle, Adolf
Bernacki, Cyril
Best, Brian
Beymyanaya, Lake Khasan
Bilibad Prison, Philippine Islands
Bird, Willis
Black Sunday, Ploesti Raid
Blacklist Operations
Blokhin, Vasili
Bloor, Ella Reeve
Bloor, Mother
BOAR (Winston Churchill)
Board of Economic Warfare
Boca Raton, Florida
Bock’s Car (B-29)
Bogd Khan
Boeing Aircraft Company
Boeing Wichita Plant
Boelens, Leo. A.
Bogun Chemical Plant, Korea
Bolshevik October Revolution
Bolsheviks
Bolshevo, Russia
Bolshoi Island, Amur River
Boone, Andrew E.
Bonesteel, Charles
Booze Hound (B-29)
Borneo
Boston, Massachusetts
Bottomside, Corregidor
Bowder, Earl
Brain Trust
Branch 16B, New York
Bratislava, Colonel
Brewster F2A Buffalos
BRIDE (VENONA)
Brisbane, Australia
British Empire
British Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section
British Free Corps
British Indian Army
3rd Corps (British Indian Army)
11th Division (British Indian Army)
British Territories
British 18th Infantry Division
Bronx, New York
Brookings Institution
Brooklyn Bessie (F-13)
Broughton, Private
Brundrett, G.C. Captain
Brussels, Belgium
Bubenz Group
Buckin’ Bronc (B-29, Hog Wild)
Budenz, Louis F.
Bulganin, Nikolai
Bulmer, A.J.
Bunker Hill, Battle
Buntingford, England
Burbank, California
Burchett, O.W.
Bureau of Aeronautics
Bureau of Agricultural Economics
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce
Bureau of Programs and Statistics
Burma
Burmese (Ethnic Group)
Bulwer-Lytton, Victor Alexander George Robert
(V.A.G.R.)
Byelorussians
C-46
C-47
C-54 Skymaster
C-Stoff (Fuel/Oxidizer)
Cabanatuan, Philippine Islands
Cairncross, John
Cairo, Egypt
Cait Paomat II (B-29)
Calcium carbide
Calcutta, India
California
Calvert, Horace
Camiguin Island, Philippine Islands
Camp Hoten, Manchuria
Camp McCoy, Wisconsin
Camp Murphy, Philippine Islands
Camp O’Donnell, Philippine Islands
Camp Osaka, Japan
Camp Wallace, Philippine Islands
Camp X, Ontario
Campbell, Robert W.
Canada
Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico
Cape Boltina, Korea
Cape Crillon, Sakhalin Island
Cape Dezhezne (USSR)
Cape St Jacques, Vietnam
Cape Soya Missaki, Hokkaidō
Cardinal (OSS POW Rescue Mission)
CARL (Whittaker Chambers)
Carlisle, Scotland.
Caron, Bob
Charon Kanoa, Saipan
Cartographic and Architectural Branch, US Army
Caswell, Don
Catalina Island, California
Catoctin Mountain Park, Maryland
Caucasians
Cavendish Laboratory
Center Seconds Chronograph
Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute
Central Air Force Museum
Central Bureau of the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia
Central Design Office
Central Europe
Central Fire Control Computer
Central Field, Iwo Jima
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Chadwick, Roy
Chakulia Airfield, India
Chambers, Whittaker
Chang, Professor
Changchun, Jilin Province, China
Changjin (Seishin)
Chateau du Chesnay, France
Chattanooga Campaign of 1863
Chemical Research
Dayton Field, Ohio
Dayton, Ohio
de Havilland Mosquito
Dead Reckoning Computer
de Juan, Casiano
de la Cruz, Benigno
Deane, John R.
Debs, Eugene
Decree Number 19, Soshi-kaimei
Decree Number 20, Name Order
Del Monte Field
Dengyosha of Japan
Denmark
Denton, Texas
Department of Agriculture (US)
Department of Commerce (US)
Department of Northern Luzon (US Army)
Department of State (US)
Der Kurier (Newspaper)
Design Bureau Tupolev
Destination Team, Manhattan Project
Devil’s Delight (B-29)
Diet of Japan
Dinah Might (B-29)
Ding Hao (B-29)
Ding How (B-29)
Diomede Island (USSR)
Distinguished Unit Citation (DUC)
Division of Monetary Research (US)
Dobbie, Shedden
Dobervich, Michael
Document 2701, Exhibit “O,” Doc. No. 2687
Donnison, Robert
 Dönitz, Karl
Do-nothing Raid
Donovan, William Joseph
Doolittle, Jimmy
Doolittle Raid
Doolittle’s Raiders
DORA (Helen Silvermaster)
Dostero, Colorado
Dougherty, John E.
Douglas A-20 Havocs
Double Exposure (F-13)
Double Trouble (F-13)
Dowa Automobile Manufacturing (Manchuria)
Downtown Talmud Torah, New York City
Drew Field, Florida
Drohobycz, Poland
Dublon Island, Truk Atoll
Duck (OSS POW Rescue Mission)
Duffy, Paul
Du Pont Chemicals
DUSTBIN (EPSILON)
Dutch
Dutch East Indies

Dyess, William E.
Eagle (OSS POW Rescue Mission)
Eagle Farms Airfield, Australia
Earl of Lytton
Early, Stephen
East Elmhurst, Queens, New York
East Legion (Ostlegionen)
East Sea (Sea of Japan)
Ebanssee
Economic Statistics Division
Eden, Anthony
Eighth Army (US)
Eian, Korea
Eighth Air Force (US)
Eijo Maru
Einstein, Albert
Eisenhower, Dwight David
Ekaterinoslav, Ukraine
Elgin National Watch Company
Elisabeth, Queen Mother of Belgium
Elster Maru
Elitcher, Max
Elks Club
Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corporation
Emperor of Manchukuo
Enemy Aeronautical Research
Engineer Reproduction Plant (ERP)
Eniwetok Atoll
Eminiskilen, Ireland
Enola Gay (B-29)
Erimo Maru
Essex Battalion Torture Squad
Estonia
Europe First policy
European Fascism
Experimental Plant Number 23 (USSR)
F-go
F4F Wildcat
F-7 Photo Reconnaissance (B-24 Liberator)
F-9 Photo Reconnaissance (B-17 Flying Fortress)
F-10 Photo Reconnaissance (B-25 Mitchell Bomber)
F-13 Photo Reconnaissance (B-29 Superfortress)
F-13A Photo Reconnaissance (B-29 Superfortress)
Far East Prisoners of War Association (FEPOW)
Farm Hall Godmanchester, England (EPSILON)
Farm Research Incorporated
Farrell, Thomas
Farrow, William G.
Far East Air Forces (FEAF)
Far East Combined Intelligence Corps
Fascism
FAT MAN
FATHER (Earl Browder)
Fathers, J. Sergeant
Fayetteville, Tennessee
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federation of Architects, Engineers,
Chemists and Technicians (FAECT)
Fédération Aéronautique Internationale
Feklisov, Alexandre
Fermi, Enrico
Fengtian Army
Fertig, Wendell.
Fever from the South (B-29)
Feynman, Richard
Field, Noel
Fifth Amphibious Corps (US)
Fifth Marine Divisions (US)
Fighting Squadron 31 (USN)
Finland
First Investigation Group (Manhattan Project)
First Technical Service Detachment (Manhattan Project)
First Washington Conference (ARCADIA)
Flamingo (OSS POW Rescue Mission)
Flat River, Missouri
Florence, Italy
Flores, Ruben
Flying Fortress, B-17
Force Z
Ford Motors
Foreign Developments Unit (US Army)
Foreign Economic Administration
Formosa
Fort Canning, Singapore
Fort Dix, New Jersey
Fort Drum, Philippine Islands
Fort Frank, Philippine Islands
Fort Mills, Philippine Islands
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
Fort Stotsenberg, Philippine Islands
Fort William McKinley, Philippine Islands
Fort Wint, Philippine Islands
Fourth Marine Division (US)
Franco-Polish Military Alliance
Frag
Fragmentary Order
Fritz X
France
Franco-Thai War
French First Army
French Indochina
Freshman (Norsk Hydro Plant)
Frye Packing Plant
Fuji Electrical Machine Manufacturing Company of Japan
Fujita (Zaibatsu)
Fumio Nakahira
Fukkai Maru
Fukuoka Camp 17
Fusen Hydroelectric Power Plants
Furman Builders Inc.
Furman Report
Furman, Robert R. Major
Furukawa (Konzern)
Fusan, (Pusan) Korea
Fusen (Pujon), Korea
Fusen Hydroelectric Power Plant
Fusen-ko Hydroelectric Power Plant Number One
Fusen Reservoir
Fusen River Dam
Fusen System
G-I True Airspeed Computer
Gaelic
Galileo Laboratory
Gander Lake, Newfoundland
Gdansk, Poland
Gelug (Yellow Hat Sect – Tibetan Buddhism)
General Defense Command (Japan)
General Electric
General H.H. Arnold Special
General Headquarters Far East Command
General Order No. 1
General Staff Report Number 1472
Geneva Conventions 1929
Genzan, Korea
Genzan Air Group
George, Harold L.
Georgia
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic
Gerlach, Walther
German Army Ordnance Office
German Government Support of Research
German Empire
Gerrick Crew (B-29 aircrew)
Gishu (Uiju), Korea
Gladwyne, Pennsylvania
Glasser, Harold
Glassman, Vivian
Glusman, John
 GNOME (William Perl)
Gobi Desert
Godmanchester, England
God’s Army
Gold, Bela
Golos, Jacob
Gonzaga, Philippine Islands
Goodfellow, Preston
Goro Uchida
Gorsky, Anatoly
Goudsmit, Samuel
Governor-General of Korea
Gowen Field, Boise, Idaho
Graflex camera
Grand Slam (22,000 pound bomb)
Grande Island, Nebraska
Grashio, Samuel
Grant, John B.
Gray, Charles William “Bill”
Great Britain
Great Depression
Great Falls, Montana
Great Famine (USSR)
Great Kanto Earthquake, Japan
Great Purge (USSR)
Great Terror (USSR)
Great Wall of China
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere
Green, Mortimer
Greenbrae, California
Greenglass, David
Greenglass, Ethel
Greenville, Ohio
Greenwich, Connecticut.
Grigg, Sir James
Griffiths, Sergeant
Grouse (Norsk Hydro Plant)
Groves, Leslie
GRU (Soviet Main Intelligence Directorate)
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Company
Guagua, Pampanga
Guided Missiles
Guam
Guatemala
Guinness World Records
Gulag
Gulf of Siam
Gunnerside (Norsk Hydro Plant)
H2X radar
H.K. Ferguson Company
Haeju (Kaishu), Korea
Hagerstown, Maryland
Hahn, Otto
Hainan Island, China
Hajime, Sugiyama
Hall, Geoff
Hall, Ted
Halle, Germany
Hallmark, Dean E.
Hamamatsu, Japan
Hamhung (Konan), Korea
Hamhung University of Medicine
Hamilton/Elgin 37500
Hamilton Field, California
Hamilton-Standard
Hamilton Watch Company
Hammond Times
Hampton, Virginia
Hanaoka Number 7
Haeju (Kaishu), Korea
Handleman, Howard
Hangul (Korean Language)
Hanley, Fiske II
Hanoi, French Indochina
Hansell, Haywood “Possum”
Hap’s Hope (B-29)
Harbin, China
Von D. Hardesty
Hardy, Mary Pinckney
Harriman, W. Averell
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
Harrison, Eric S.
Harmon Field, Guam
Hartwig, Barbara
Harteck, Paul
Harvard University
Harwood, Eugene R.
Hashimoto Kingorō
Hass, Raymond
Havelock Road, Singapore
Hawaii
Hawkins, Jack
Hayes, Cedric Allen
Hayter, Reginald H.
Hechingen-Bisingin, Germany
Hechingen, Germany
Heer, Robert B.
Heidelberg, Germany
Heijo (Pyongyang), Korea
Heijo Army Arsenal, Korea
Heilongjiang Province, China
Heisenberg, Werner
Hellcat (F6F-5)
Hell Ships
Henan, China
Henkel He-111
Heppner, Richard P.
Hertfordshire, England
Hershey, Pennsylvania
Hershey Park, Pennsylvania
Higher Cavalry School, Leningrad
Hilswilliger (Hiwi)
Himalaya Mountains (The Hump)
Hirohata Osaka-12B
Hirohito
Hiroshima, Japan
HMAS Vampire
HMS Electra
HMS Express
HMS Prince of Wales
HMS Repulse
HMS Tenedos
Hiss, Alger
Hitler, Adolf
Hiwi (Hilswilliger)
Ho Chi Minh
Ho Hong Oil Mill, Singapore
Hoch’on (Kyosen), Korea
Hodge, John R.
Hoeryong (Kainei), Korea
Hog Wild (B-29)
Hokkaidō Island, Japan
Hokutetsu Electro-Chemical Industry Company
Holland
Holsten River, Nomonhan
Holodomor, “terror-famine”
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
Homma Masaharu
Hong Kong
Hong
Hongu
Honshū, Japan
Hoover, J. Edgar
Horb, Germany
Hoten Sub-camp No. 1, Manchuria
Hoten Sub-camp No. 2, Manchuria
Hoten Sub-camp No. 3, Manchuria
House of Councilors, Japan
House Foreign Affairs Committee (US)
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)
Hoyt, Palmer
Hsian, China
Huanggutun Incident
HUGHES (Alfred Sarant)
Hull, Cordell
HUMINT (Human Intelligence)
Hung Nam Japan Nitrogen Works
Hungarian Revolution
Hungary
Hungnam (Kanko), Korea
Hwangsuwon, Korea
I-58
I-65
ichiban
ICHI-GO
Ichigaya Garrison
Ichigaya, Tokyo
Ichinomiya, Japan
Inchon (Jinsen), Korea
Igen, Korea
Ilba Field, Philippine Islands
Imai Isao
Imperial Benevolent Rule
Imperial Colors Incident (Japan)
Imperial Defence College
Imperial Geological Survey of 1926 (Japan)
Imperial Guards Division (Japan)
Imperial Iron and Steel Works
Imperial Japanese Military Academy
Imperial Navy
Imperial Palace
Imperial Prize of the Japan Academy
Imperial Way Faction
India
Indian Army Medical Corps
Indochina
Industrial Bank
Industrial Division of the Communist Party
Inland Sea, Japan
Inner Mongolia
Inspector General of Military Education
Inspector General of Military Training
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN)
International Brigades (Spanish Civil War)
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)
International Monetary Fund
International News Service (INS)
Inukai Tsuyoshi
Ireland
Isaburo, Yoshida
Ishesaki, Japan
Isely, Robert E. Commander
Isley Field, Saipan
Ishband
Isobe, Lt.
Isshin Maru
Itagaki Seishiro
Italian POW
Italy
Iwakuni, Japan
Iwasaki (Konzern)
Iwo Jima, Japan
Izmailovo Airfield (USS)
J2M Raidens
JACOB (William Perl)
Jackson Crew (B-29 aircrew)
Jackson, D.
JADE (VENONA)
Jahor-Singapore Causeway
Japan Iron Manufacturing Company
Japan Iron Mining Company
Japan Iron Works
Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Company
Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Company Report
Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant
Japanese 1st Army Division
Japanese 14th Army
Japanese 25th Army
Japanese 23rd Division
Japanese Carborundum and Carbide Factory
Japanese Empire
Japanese Imperial Land Survey
Japanese Occupied China
Japanese Occupied Korea
Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1941
Japanese War Ministry
Jarrell, Captain
Java Island, Dutch East Indies
Lourenco Marques, Mozambique
Low, Francis
Lubyanka Prison
Luckenwalde, German
Lucky Eleven (B-29)
Luftwaffe
Lupin, China
Luzon, Philippine Islands
Lytton Commission
Lytton Report
M4 Sherman
M-69
Maboub, Vincent.
MacArthur, Arthur
MacArthur, Douglas
MacDill Field, Florida
MACR (Missing Air Crew Report)
Mae West
Magadan Airfield, USSR
Magpie (OSS POW Rescue Mission)
Mahan, Alfred Thayer
Makasan Railroad Yards, Thailand
Makin Island
**Makino, Nobuaki**
Malaya
Malayan Peninsula
Malenkov, Georgy
Malinta Tunnel, Philippine Islands
Malo, Fred
Malyaroslavets, USSR
Manchouli, China
Manchukuo
Manchukuo Aircraft Company
Manchuria
Manchurian Chemical
Manchurian Incident
Manchurian Incident of 1931
Manchurian Industrial Development Company
Manchurian Petroleum
Manchurian Revolution
Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation
Manchurian Yalu Water Power Company
Manhattan Engineer District,
Manhattan Project
Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group
Manhattan Project Medical Department and Chief of the
Radiological Division of the District
Manila, Philippine Islands
Manila Airport, Philippine Islands
Manila Bay, Philippine Islands
Manseii Demonstrations
Mansell, Roger
Mao Zedong
March Air Force Base
March Incident of 1931.
Marcus Island, Japan
Marianas Islands
Marietta, Georgia
Marine Corps (US)
Mariveles, Bataan, Philippine Islands
Markworth, Maurice J.A.
Maroonov, Vyacheslav P.
Marpi Point, Saipan
Marrakech, French Morocco
Marshal, Paul
Marshall, George Catlett
Marshall, Ken
Massachusetts
Martens Bureau (Techotdel)
Martens, Ludwig
Martin, Colonel
Martin, Glenn W.
Martin B-10
Material Service Headquarters
Materiel Command
Matsuda, Colonel
Matsuo Denzō
Matsushiro Underground Imperial Headquarters, Japan
Matsuoka, Yosuke
Mather Field, Sacramento, California
MAUD Committee Report
Maxwell Air Force Base
Maxwell Field, Alabama
Maxwell, George R.
Masaki Jinzaburō
MAYOR
McCoy, Melvyn H.
McGlinn, Richard
McGrath-Kerr, Peter
McNamara, Robert
Meade, Roger
Meanwell, Reginald
Meiji Restoration
Mellnik, S. M.
Memel Territory
Mergui Road
MER (MAYOR)
Messerschmitt-163
Messerschmitt-262
Messiaen, Olivier
METER (Joel Barr)
METR (Joel Barr)
METRE (Joel Barr)
Meuse-Argonne Offensive
Mickish, Captain
Midway Island
Mihoro Air Group
Milford, Connecticut
Milgorod Airfield, Ukraine
Military Academy Incident
Military Mission Moscow
Military Tribunal for the Far East
Mill, Ronald
Miller, James
Millersburg, Pennsylvania
Million Dollar Baby (B-29)
Minami Jiro
Minami Manshū Tetsudō
Kabushiki-gaisha
Mindanao, Philippine Islands
Ministry of Economic Warfare
Miss You (B-29)
Missing Air Crew Report (MACR)
Missionary Ridge, Tennessee
MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
MIT Radiation Laboratory
Mitchell Bomber
Mitchell, General William “Billy”
Mitsubishi (Zaibatsu)
Mitsubishi A6M Zeke
Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Factory
Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Plant at Nagoya
Mitsubishi J8M Shōsui
Mitsubishi Mining Company
Mitsubishi Steel Plant
Mitsui (Zaibatsu)
Mitsui Light Metals
Mittelwerk, Germany
Miyazu, Japan
MK 25 (2000 pound naval mine)
MK 26 (1000 pound naval mine)
MK 36 (500 pound naval mine)
Modification Center
Mok’po (Moppo), Korea
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mokhailovich
Mongolian People’s Party
Monino Airfield, Russia
Montana
Montevideo, Uruguay
Moppo (Mok’po), Korea
Mori (Konzern)
Mori Takeshi
Morioka, Japan
Mormugao, Portuguese India
Moroa, Illinois
Morris, Harry V.
Morrison, Phillip
Morshakov, Vyacheslav P. Major
Mosan Mining Corporation
Moscow Central Aerodrome
Moscow Military District
Motomiya
Motomiya Chemical Plant
Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima
Mountbatten, Louis. Lord
MS Gripsholm
MS Kanagoora
Mukden (Shenyang), China
Mukden Incident
Munich Agreement
Murmansk, USSR
Murphy, John.
Musashi, Battleship, Japan
Musashino Aircraft Engine Factory
Mussolini, Benito
Mutterperl (Perl), William
Myasishchev M-13
Myers, Bennett. General
Myers, Hugh H.
MYNA (Elizabeth Bentley)
Mystery meat
MX-469 (PULLMAN)
N22 (TU-4 production plant)
N23 (TU-4 production plant)
Nagano Kameichiro
Nagaoka Hantaro
Nagasaki, Japan
Nagata Tetsuzan
Nagoya, Japan
Najin (Rashin), Korea
Nakayama, Motoo
Nakajima C6N1-S
Nakajima Ki-43s Oscar
Nampo (Ch’imampo), Korea
Nanbu Clan
Nangrim Range, Korea
Nanam (Ranam), Korea
Nanking, China
Nanko, Japan
Naoetsu-4B, Japan
Narumi POW Camp, Japan
Narutowicz, Gabriel
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)
National Archives, U.S
National Defense Research Committee
National Geographic
National Guard, New Mexico
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
National Labor Relations Act
National Museum of the United States Air Force
National Recovery Administration (NRA)
National Security Agency
Nationalist China
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
Naughty Nancy (B-29)
Naval Station Argentia, Newfoundland
Navy Bureau of Ordnance (US)
Nazi Germany
Nazi Occupied Europe
Netherlands
Neutrality Acts
New Deal
New Guinea
New Haven, Connecticut
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York City
New York City Council
New York County Committee of the CPUSA
New York University New York World-Telegram
New Zealand
Newfoundland, Canada
Ni-Project
Nicaragua
Nichitsu
Nichitsu Carbide Plant
Nichitsu Nitrogen Fertilizer Company
Nichols Field, Philippine Islands
Nigeria Regiment, British Army
Niigata-15B
Niigata Tekko
Niislel Khüree (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia)
Nimitz, Chester
Ninth Corps Headquarters (US)
Nippon (Japan)
Nippon Carbide Factory
Nippon Nittetsu
Nippon Chisso Hiryō Hospital
Nippon Stainless Shinetsu Kagaku
Nishina Laboratory
Nishina Yoshio
Nishinomiya, Japan
Nissan (Konzern)
Nisso (Konzern)
Nist, Cecil W.
Nitric Acid Plants
NKVD (People’s Commissariat for State Security)
Noguchi Shitagau
Noguchi Jun
Noguchi, Y. Colonel
Nomenklatura
Nomohan
Nomonhan Incident
Nomura (Konzern)
Nonaggression Pact in 1941
Norden Bombsight
Nordhausen, Germany
Nordland (Germany)
Norsk Hydro, Norway
North Africa
North American Newspaper Alliance
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
North Carolina
North Field, Saipan
North Korea
North Luzon Force, Philippine Islands
North Russia Campaign
Northeast Asia
Northern Ireland
Norwegian
November Incident
Novi Mir (Magazine)
Novikov, Alexander
Novina, Korea
Nudelman-Rikhter NS-23
Nudelman-Suranov (NS-37)
Nudelman-Suranov (NS-45)
Number 2 Carbide Factory
Number 3 Carbide Factory
Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Occupation of Japan
Occupation of Korea
Occupied Europe
Occupied Italy
October Incident
Odessa, Ukraine
O’Donnell, General Emmett “Rosey”
Office of Censorship (US)
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
Office of Price Administration (OPA)
Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
Office of War Information (OWI)
Official Employment Promotion Policy (US)
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska
Oflag (Officer Only POW Camp)
Oita
Okada Keisuke
Okhotsk Sea (Western Pacific Ocean)
Okinawa, Japan
Okura (Zaibatsu)
Old Ironsides (B-29)
Olongapo, Philippine Islands
Omaha, Nebraska
Omura Aircraft Plant
Oolen, Belgium
OPERATION ALSOS
OPERATION BARBAROSSA
OPERATION BIG
OPERATION BIRDCAGE
OPERATION CARTWHEEL
OPERATION CORONET
OPERATION DETACHMENT
OPERATION DOWNFALL
OPERATION EPSILON
OPERATION FRANTIC
OPERATION FRANTIC JOE
OPERATION FORAGER
OPERATION HARBORAGE
OPERATION ICHI-GO
OPERATION KOGO
OPERATION KROHCOL
OPERATION MASTIFF
OPERATION MATADOR
OPERATION MATTERHORN
OPERATION OLYMPIC
OPERATION OVERLORD
OPERATION REMOVAL
OPERATION STARVATION
OPERATION TIDAL WAVE
OPERATION TIDERACE
OPERATION TOGO 1
OPERATION TOGO-2
OPERATION TOGO-3
OPERATION UNTHINKABLE
Operations Order
Oppenheimer, Robert
Oranienburg, Germany
Order of Lenin
Order of the Red Banner
Order of the Sacred Treasure
Organization of Enemy Scientific Research
Osaka, Japan
Osaka Imperial University, Japan
Osaka Arsenal, Japan
Osment, Sergio
OSS
OSS rescue teams
Ossining, New York
Ostlegionen (German SS)
Osugi, Japan
Otaki, Lt.
Ōtoyo, Japan
Otsu (Fuel/Oxidizer)
Outer Mongolia
Owens, Jesse
P-26 Peashooters
P-38 Lightning
P-39 Airacobra
P-40 Warhawk
P-47 Thunderbolt
P-51 Mustangs
Pacific Ocean Fleet
Pagadian Bay, Philippine Islands
PAGE (Lauchlin Currie)
Pak Hyŏngmu
Pak Sundong
PAL (Nathan Gregory Silvermaster)
Palawan, Philippine Islands
Palembang, Sumatra
Palmer, Frederick
Panama
Paris, France
Parsons, William
Pass, Boris
Paszkowksy, Boris Theodorovich
Pasternak, Boris
Patani-Kroh Road
Patani, Thailand
Patterson, Robert
Patton, George A.

PAUL (Nathan Gregory Silvermaster)
Pauley, Edwin
Pauley Reparations Mission
to Korea and Manchuria
Pauley Report
Pauley War Reparations Committee
PBN-1 Nomad
PBY Catalina
PEAK (Frank Coe)
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
Pearson, Drew
Peiping, China
Peking, China
PEL (Frank Coe)
Penang (British Malaya)
Penn State University, Pennsylvania
Pensacola Convoy
Pennsylvania State College, Pennsylvania
People’s Commissariat for State Security (NKGB)
People’s Republic of China
Percival, Lieutenant-General Arthur Ernest
Perl (Mutterperl), William
PERMANENT (Radar Warning System)
Pentagon
Perlo Group
Perlo, Victor
Pesaznysz, Poland
Petlyakovand, Vladimir
Portland Oregonian (Newspaper)
Phibun Songkhram
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Philippine-American War
Philippine Army
Philippine Department (US Army)
Philippines Independence Act (1934)
Philippine Military Academy
Philippine Navy
Philippine Scouts
Phillips, Admiral Tom
Pigeon (OSS POW Rescue Mission)
PILOT (William Ludwig Ullmann)
Pilot’s Flight Operating Manual
Pilsudski, Józef
Piryatin Airfield, Ukraine
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Plains of Hamhung
Plant Number 22, Kazan, USSR
Plant Number 36, Rybinsk, USSR
Plexiglas
Ploesti Raid (Black Sunday)
Ploesti, Romania
Poland
Poles
Polish Red Cross
Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1921
Poltava Airfield, Ukraine
Poretsky, Ignace
Port Arthur, China
Portsmouth, England
Potomac Mills Mall, Virginia
POTSDAM Conference, Germany
POTSDAM DECLARATION
Potsdam, Germany
Powers, Thomas
Poyntz, Juliet
Preobrazhenskii, Evgenii Nikolaevich
Presidential Medal of Freedom
Presidential Military Order
Presidio, California
Pressman, Lee
Price, Weston
Primacord
Primorski Province, USSR
Prince William Forest Park, Virginia
Princeton University, New Jersey
Pritula, Aleksandr Dorofeevich
PROJECT ALBERTA (Manhattan Project)
PROJECT AZUSA (OSS)
PROJECT LARSON (OSS)
PROJECT NAPKO (OSS)
Proximity Fuse
Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea
Provisional Polish Government
Pu Yi (Kangde Emperor)
Pujon (Fusan), Korea
Pujon Cascade, Korea
Pujon River, Korea
Pujon River Dam
Puksubaek-san (Korea)
Pulau Brani Island, Singapore
PULLMANN (MX-469)
Pusan (Fusan), Korea
Pusan Perimeter, Korean War
PW Supplies (Markings)
Public Law 77-11
Puerto Rico
PV-20 (gun system)
PV-23 (gun system)
Pyongyang (Heijo), Korea
Q-boat, Philippine Islands
Qing Dynasty
QUADRANT Conference
Quail (OSS POW Rescue Mission)
Quan Yin Cha Ara (F-13)
Quartermaster Corps Construction Division
Queen, Joseph W.
Queens County, New York
Quezon Bridge, Philippine Islands
Quezon, Manuel
RAIDER (Victor Perlo)
Railroad Retirement Board
RAINBOW-5 (war plan)
Rainbow Division
RAINBOW Plan (war plan)
Rainey, Robert S.
Rainey, Terry
Raisen, Yakov
Ramirez, Cipriano.
Ramp Tramp (B-29)
Ramsey, Norman F
Ranam (Nanam), Korea
Rashin (Najin), Korea
Raven (OSS POW Rescue Mission)
RDS-3 (uranium-plutonium composite weapon)
Record Chronicle (Newspaper)
Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMPs)
Recovered Personnel Detachment
Red Cross
Prisoner of War Bulletin
Red Army
Red October
Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production
Reidel, Semyon Borisovich
Reiss, Ignace
RELAY (possibly Morton Sorbell)
Remington, William
REMUS (Moe Berg)
Rennes, France
Reno, Vincent
Repoho, Korea
Republic of China
Republic of Manchuria
RESERVATION (Los Alamos, New Mexico)
Reserve Officer Training Corps
Resources Protection Board
Rhee Syngman
RICHARD (Harry Dexter White)
Rickenbacker, Eddie
Rikizo
RIKKEN (Institute of Physical and
Chemical Research)
Rinaldo, Jose
Rinki, Korea
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Riverside County, California
Rivett, Rohan
RMS Queen Mary
ROBERT (Silvermaster, Nathan Gregory)
Rockville Centre, Maryland
Romania
Romanovka Air Base, USSR
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano
Rosenberg, Ethel
Rosenberg, Julius
Rosenberg Group
Rostock
Royal Air Force
Serial Number 44-70136
Seventeenth Area Army
Seward Park High School
Shachaofeng (Lake Khasan)
Shakurin, A.I.
Shale Oil Production
Shandong, China
Shanghai, China
Shanhaiguan Gate, China
Shantung, China
Shariin (Sariwon), Korea
Sharp, William F
Shikoku, Japan
SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force)
Sheaffer ink pens
Shell Oil Refinery
Shenyang (Mukden), China
Sherrill, Marion J.
Shimonoseki, Japan
Shinto
Shofner, Austin C.,
Shofuko Maru
Showa Denko Plant
Shōwa Emperor
Shōwa Restoration
Showa Steel Works
Shuan, Korea
Shuifeng (Suiho, Supung)
Shvetsov, Arkadii B.
Siberia, USSR
Sibley, Katherine
Siemens, Germany
Siemens-Schuckert
SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)
Signal Intelligence Service
Sikhote Alin Range
Silesia, Germany
Silverman, George
Silvermaster Group,
Silvermaster, Helen
Silvermaster, Nathan Gregory
SILVER PLATED
Simeral, George
Simmons, Lewis T.
Sinclair, Duncan
Sing Sing Correctional Facility
Singapore
Singlaub, John “Jack” Major
Singora, Thailand
Sinhung, Korea
Sito, Corporal
Sixth Army (US)
Slavin, Nikolai Vasilevich
Slaughter Bombing
Slick Dick (B-29)
Slim River, Malaya
Slovaks
Smith Committee
Smith, Walter A.
Snell, David
Sobell, Morton
Socialist Party
Socialist Party of America
Soctrang Airfield, French Indochina
Soloviev OKB-19
Songchong River, Korea
Songnim Special Higher Police
Sonoma, California
Sorge, Richard
Soto Dam, Japan
South America
South Field, Saipan
Southeast Asia
South Africa
South East Asia Command
South Luzon Forces, Philippine Islands
South Manchurian Railway Company
South Pacific Mandates (Japan)
South Side High School in Rockville Centre
South West Pacific Area (SWPA)
Soviet Air Force Scientific Test Institute
Soviet Black Sea Fleet (USSR)
Soviet Communist Party
Soviet Far East
Soviet Flight-Test Center
   at Zhukovski
Soviet Foreign and the Internal Affairs Commissariat
Soviet Long-Range Aviation
Soviet Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)
Soviet Occupied Europe
Soviet Pacific Fleet
   Soviet Pacific Fleet Aviation
   Soviet Ukraine
Spaatz, Carl A. "Tooey"
Spain
Spanish-American War
Spanish Civil War
Sparrow (OSS POW Rescue Mission)
Spatz, Harold A.
Special Operations Executive’s (SOE)
Speer, Albert
Spielman, R. B.
Springfield College
Spitfire
Spokane, Washington
Spurgeon, C.H. “Spud”
Springfield, Missouri
SS Alcoa Polaris
SS Division Wiking
St. Catherine (Cait Paomat II) (B-29)
St. John’s Episcopal Church
Stadtllm, Germany
Stafford, Connecticut.
Stalag IIIa
Stalag IIIC
Stalin, Joseph
Stalingrad, USSR
Standley thermo power plant
Standley, William
Stanford University, California
Straits Settlements, Malaya
Stassfurt, Germany
State Engineering Design Bureau
Strelkovka, USSR
Sternberg, Ungern von Baron
Stettinius, Edward R.
Stevenson, George
Stewart, Douglas Charles
Stilwell, Joseph Warren “Vinegar Joe”
Stimson, Henry
Stockholm, Sweden
Stormovic, USSR
Storrie, Carl R. Colonel
Strasbourg, France
Strike North (strategy)
Strike South (strategy)
Strilky, Arthur
Stripling, Robert E.
Strong, Anna Louise
Strong, George
Subic Bay, Philippine Islands
Sugamo Prison, Japan
Suiho (Shuifeng, Supung), Korea
Sulfur Island, Iwo Jima, Japan
Sumitomo (Zaibatsu)
Sumitomo Steel Industrial Company
Sungari River, USSR
Supreme Commander Allied Pacific (SCAP)
Supreme Court of the Soviet Union
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)
Supung (Shuifeng, Suiho)
Supung Hydropower Plant
Sutherland, R. K.
Suzuki Kantarō
Swiss Air Force
SYMBOL Conference
Szechuan Province, China
Szilard, Leo
T-Force (Target Force)
T-Square 8
T-Stoff (Fuel/Oxidizer)
Tabb, Hy
Tachikawa Branch Test Center, Singapore
Tadashiro
Taganrog Plant, USSR
Taiden (Taejon), Japan
Taiko Maru
Taiyō
Taishō Emperor
Taishō Period
Taishun Maru
Takahashi, Korekiyo
Takahaski, Lieutenant
Takao Harbor
Takushoku University
Tallboy (12,000 pound bomb)
Tampa, Florida
Tamsak-Bulak, Mongolia
Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division
Tanapag Harbor, Saipan
Target Force (T-Force)
Tarlac, Tarlac, Philippine Islands
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Tatekawa Yoshitsugu
Tatung
Tavrichanka, Primorye, USSR
Technical Data Laboratory (TDL) (US Army)
Technical Air Intelligence Units (TAIU) (US Army)
Techotdel (Martens Bureau)
Tehran, Iran
Teilfingen, Germany
Teller, Edward
Tennessee Valley Authority, (TVA)
Tenno (Emperor)
Tenth Army (US)
Tenyu Shinjo
Terauchi Hisaichi, Field Marshal Count
TERMINAL Conference
Thai-Burma Railroad (TBR)
Thailand
The Abilene Reporter-News (Newspaper)
The Aeroplane Spotter (Journal)
The Army Weekly (Newspaper)
The Bee (Newspaper)
The Cannuck (B-29)
The Daily Mail (Newspaper)
The Daily Worker (Communist Newspaper)
The Farmers National Weekly (Newspaper)
The Hump (Himalaya Mountains)
The New Masses (Communist Newspaper)
The Quan
The San Antonio Express (Newspaper)
The West Australian (Newspaper)
The Wizard of Oz
THIN MAN
Third Investigation Group (Manhattan Project)
Third Marine Division (US)
Third Reich
Thomas, Shenton
U.S. Army Reserves
U.S. Army Signal Corps
U.S. Embassy, Moscow
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo
U.S. Forces in Korea (USAFIK)
U.S. Military Academy
U.S. Occupation of Japan
U.S. Pacific Fleet
U.S. Special Forces
U.S. Strategic Air Forces
U.S. Tariff Commission
Ushijima Mitsuru
USS Belleau Wood
USS Bowfin
USS General A.W. Brewster
USS Cocopa
USS Detroit
USS Hornet
USS Indianapolis
USS Iowa
USS Lansdowne
USS Missouri
USS Pogy
USS Sennet
USS South Dakota
USS Spadefish
USS Tennessee
USS Torsk
USS Trout
USS Wahoo
USS Wasp
USS Yorktown
V-1 Buzz Bomb
V-2
Varlamovo Airfield, USSR
Varsonofevskii Lane, Moscow
Vassar College
Vasilievsky, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Marshall
Vatican
Velkal Airfield, USSR
Vemork Power Plant, Norway
VENONA
Veracruz Expedition, Mexico
Vernam-cipher
Vichy French Indochina
Vientiane, French Indochina
Viet Minh
Vietnam
Vigan, Philippines
villa Argentina, Paris
Visayan Islands, Philippines
Visayan-Mindanao Force
Vladivostok
Volga River
Volksdeutsche
von Laue, Max
Vympel, State Engineering Design Bureau
WWI
Waffen SS
Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Charlemagne
Wainwright, Jonathan. General
Wakabayashi, Captain
Wakabayashi
Wakatsuki Reijirō
Wakayama POW Camp
Wake Island
Walker Army Air Field, Kansas
Wallace, George
Wallace, Henry A.
War Department (US)
War Plan Black (Color Plan)
War Plan Orange (Color Plan)
War Plan Red (Color Plan)
War Production Board
Ware Group
Ware, Harold
Ware, Lucien
Warren, Stafford L (Hiroshima Team)
Washington, D.C
Watanabe, Doctor
Watanabe Jotaro
Watanabe, Tokio
Wedemeyer, Albert
Weeks, Lucius W.
Wehrmacht
Weihsien, China
Weimar Republic, Germany
Weisband, Bill
Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von
Western Electric
Western Europe
Westland (SS Regiment)
West Point, New York
Whitaker, Sapper
White, Harry Dexter
White House
White Movement
White, R.D.
White Russia
Whittaker, Albert
Wigner, Eugene
Wilcox, Robert
Will, R.
William, B.S.M.
Williams College
Wilmington, Delaware
Wilson, Charles E.
Wilson, Woodrow
Wiltre, Morton A.
Wingham, Harold
Wirtz, Karl
Wisconsin
Wisconsin State Journal
Witt, Nathan
Wood, Alfred Edward
Wood, Edward Frederick Lindley, 1st Earl of Halifax
Woodley Road
Woosung Camp
Workers Progress Administration
Workers Party of America (WPA)
World Tourist
WPL-46 (War Plan)
Wright Aeronautical
Wright Cyclone R-3350-13
Wright Duplex 3350 Cyclone
Wright R-1820
Wright R-3350
Wright R-3350-13
Wright Field, Ohio,
Wu Junsheng
Wurtemberg, Germany
XB-29
XVI Corps
XX Bombardment Command
XXI Bombardment Command
XXIV Corps
Xenon
Xian, China
Y-12 (EMIS facility)
Yagoda, Genrikh
Yak-3
Yak-9
Yak-60
Yak-65
YAKOV (William Perl)
Yakovlev
Yakutia, Russia
Yalta Agreements
YALTA Conference
Yalu
Yalu River
Yamaguchi, Lt.
Yamashita, Tomoyuki
Yamato Class Battleship
Yank Magazine
Yaroslavl Oblast, USSR
Yasuda (Zaibatsu)
Yasuoka Masaomi
Yasuoka Detachment
Yasuoka Task Force
Yawata, Kyūshū Island, Japan
Yawata Imperial Iron and Steel Works
Yellow Hat Sect
Yellow List
Yezhov era
Yezhov, Nikolai
Yezhovshchina
Yi Chongsil
YMCA’s War Prisoners Aid Committee
Yokosuka, Japan
Yongsan (Rysuzan), Korea
Yonp’o Airfield, Korea
Yongwol (Neietsu), Korea
York, Edward Joseph
Yoshi, Korea
Young Communist League USA (YCLUSA)
Youth Men’s Christian Association (YMCA)
Yukawa, Hideki
Yukawa Institute for Theoretical Physics
Yuki (Unggi), Korea
Yumashev, Ivan Stepanovich Admiral
Z-3
Z-6
Z-7
Z-11
Z-21
Z-27
Z-32
Z-33
Z-37
Z-48
Z-57
Z-58
Zaibatsu
Z Square 28
Z-Stoff (Fuel/Oxidizer)
Zaozernaya
Zentsuji Camp
Zero
Zhang Zoulin
Zhanggufeng (Lake Khasan)
Zhivago, Doctor
Zhukov, Georgi
Zhukovski, Moscow Oblast
Zizevskii, M. I.
Zurich Polytechnic
Zurich, Switzerland
14 Points
2-2-6 Incident
26 February Incident
1st Calvary Division
1st Imperial Regiment
1st Technical Service Detachment
2nd Air Squadron
2nd Battalion Loyal Lancashire Regiment
4th Cavalry Division
4th Marine Division
5th Japanese Air Army
6th Guards Tank Army
7th Calvary Regiment
7th Samara Cavalry Division
7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prinz Eugen
8th Australian Division
8th Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force
9th PW Liaison Team
13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian)
14th Fighter Bomber Regiment
15th Waffen Grenadier Division
17th Area Army
17th Area Army of Korea
18th Air Army
19th Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP)
20th Bomber Command
20th Independent Artillery Mortar Battalion, Imperial Japanese Army
21st SS Division Skanderbeg
22nd Air Flotilla
25th Soviet Army
29th Bomb Group
31st Seabee Battalions
33rd Bomber Air Regiment (BAP)
33rd Infantry Brigade
33rd Infantry Regiment
35th Independent Long-Range Bomber Squadron
38th parallel north
40th Bomb Group Association
50th Air Regiment
52nd Squadron
55th Bomber Air Regiment (BAP)
58th Bomb Wing
62nd Seabee Battalions
65th Special Mission Air Regiment

69th Recovery Team
70th Recovery Team
72nd Fighter Squadron
73rd Bombardment Wings
80th Fighter Squadron
88th Infantry Regiment
121st Naval Construction Battalion
122nd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery
133rd Seabee Battalions
165th Infantry Battalion
200th Coastal Artillery Regiment
258th Soviet Division near Heijo
256 Black
314th Bombardment Wing
315th Bombardment Wing
316th Bombardment Wing
345th Bombardment Group
358 Black
365 Black
500th Bombardment Group
509th Composite Group
515th Coastal Artillery Regiment
462nd (Very Heavy) Bomb Group
468th Bomb Group
480th Anti-Submarine Group
497th Bomb Group
498th Bomb Group
882nd Bombardment Squadron
About the Author:

Originally from Douglasville, Georgia, Dwight R. Rider is a Senior Intelligence Associate with Intelligence Decision Partners of Virginia. He possesses more than 30 years military-civilian experience as a targeting intelligence specialist, electronic warfare officer, electric power, weapons of mass-destruction, and underground facilities analyst specializing primarily in East and Southeast Asia. He holds a Master Degree in Strategic Intelligence awarded by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and is a Magna Cum Laude graduate of the University of Nebraska. He can be reached at: dwrider24@gmail.com