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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

N-4398.5



Premier Tojo of Nippon and Chairman Vargas of the Philippine Executive Commission have a friendly chat at the Manila Hotel.

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by authority of AG of S, G-2, WDC

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
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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREA
APO 958

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I N T E L L I G E N C E B U L L E T I N

No 9 - 2 Feb 1945

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
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NOTE: Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

COVER PAGE:- Picture and accompanying caption were carried in the April issue, year 2603 (1943) of SHIN SEIKI (New Era), Jap magazine published in the PHILIPPINES. Text was in Tagalog and English.


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How To Attack A Tank

(From ATIS Bulletin No 1559, 14 Nov 1944)

Following are excerpts from a mimeographed pamphlet entitled "Attack Regulations of 'A' Operation, Appendix No 3 - Reference on Attacking Tanks with Explosives" issued by Headquarters, MO Force (TN 18 Army), on 5 May 44. The place and date of capture are unknown, but its subject matter is one apparently receiving increased emphasis by the Japs. They show a preoccupation with our armored forces and indicate effort to combat the effectiveness of our tanks. Chapter summaries follow:

Chap. 1. - "Enemy methods of employing tanks and importance of close combat training: - When penetrating the enemy position, the difficulties encountered by the attacking troops are the enemy fire cutting them off from their reserve and the counterattack within the position by tanks.

Chap. 2. - "Materials used in close combat against tanks and importance of close combat training with explosives:- The materials mainly used in close combat against tanks are AP mines, anti-tank mines, frangible incendiary grenades and explosives. The AP mines are effective against tanks with armor 25mm thick. Against tanks of 60mm armor, they are ineffective. The frangible incendiary grenades and anti-tank mines are used only to assist other methods of attacking hostile tanks, and they alone cannot completely incapacitate the tanks. Therefore, under the present situation, the only method which can destroy a tank is by using bundled explosives.

Chap. 4. - "Amount of explosives required for destruction of enemy tanks and methods of destruction:- At least 6 kg (13½ lbs.) of yellow powder are required to destroy the upper portion of tanks and about 10 kg (22 lbs.) to destroy the sides. Against a moving tank, explosives are fastened on both ends of a rope and thrown at the tank. The weight of the explosive at one end is approximately 3 kg (7 lbs.).

Chap. 5. - "Summary of raids on tanks:- The raiding party is divided into one covering squad and several destruction squads. The duties of the covering squad are to guard and protect the operation and to cover the destruction squads after the raid has been made. A destruction squad is divided into several teams, usually of two men each. Each team is assigned the destruction of one tank. In order to attack hostile tanks in action, remote control mines must be installed on the route of advance. As soon as the enemy tanks or the covering infantry approach the mined area, the mines are ignited and in the following period of confusion, the tanks are attacked by the destruction squad which is waiting nearby.

Chap. 7. - "Essentials of anti-tank action during daylight:- A close quarter combat unit used against tanks is composed mainly of infantry and engineer troops. It is divided into several land mine squads (firing squads) and destruction squads, one reserve squad and, if necessary, a covering squad. According to the situation, this anti-tank close quarter combat unit is divided into several attack squads and reserve squads. Each attack squad is divided into one land mine and one destruction team.

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HOW TO ATTACK A TANK (CONTD)

"The land mine squad plants the mines along the possible approach of enemy tanks and attacks the hostile covering infantry. It separates the latter from the tanks or creates opportunities for the destruction squads by rendering a blow to the tanks. The squad consists of ten men with a NCO as its leader. One among them is the igniter.

"The firing squad creates opportunities for the destruction squad by surprising the enemy with its fire. It is equipped with two or three light machine guns.

"The destruction squad destroys enemy tanks by using AP mines, tank mines and explosives. It is composed of several men with a NCO as its leader.

"The reserve squad acts as the reserve of the land mine squad and the destruction squads and performs, whenever necessary, their duties.

"The covering squad protects the actions of the land mine and the destruction squads. When a covering squad is not formed, the first line anti-tank close quarter combat unit will perform its duties."

Along with this document is a chart showing data on American and British tanks employed at present.

Improved Jap Medium Tank

(From SWPA Daily Summary No 1007, 27/28 Dec 1944)

A Jap prisoner, a naval civilian employee, formerly member of Tokumu Kikan in SHANSI Province, CHINA, 1939 to 1942, stated he had seen plans for the improved medium tank at Technical Hq, TOKYO, Dec 43. He had been told at Technical Hq that plans called for mass production of 100,000 such tanks by 1947, which he considered an impossible aim but typical of the Army's ambition. He believed only one had been manufactured at that date. Details of the tank given by PW are as follows:

Design and construction: Basically, the design was similar to 2597 Medium but welding had replaced rivetting wherever possible.

Weight: Approximately 20 tons.

Crew: Three, comprising driver and two gunners. One of the latter was also W/T operator.

Armament: One 75mm gun in front of turret; maximum elevation $22\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ maximum depression 5° . All-round traverse by manual operation of turret. Two 20mm machine cannon in rear of turret, not ball mounted but with maximum elevation of 25° capable of being fired separately or together. No hull MG, and special MG mounted with the 75mm gun.

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IMPROVED JAP MEDIUM TANK (CONTD)

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Armor: 30mm in front, 20mm elsewhere.

Engine: Mitsubishi, V-type, 12 cylinder air-cooled diesel, developing 300 Bhp (Brake horse-power). Mounted at rear.

Suspension: Six split, rubber-tired bogies. Front double-toothed sprocket, rear idler and three return rollers.

Dimensions: Unknown but thought to be slightly bigger than CHINA model.

Speed: About 40 mph.

Drive: To front sprockets. PW thought this type of drive was favored mainly because JAPAN had designed her tanks primarily for use in MANCHURIA, where terrain was flat rather than hilly.

Gradient: About 35°.

W/T Equipment: Railing type aerial might have been replaced by rod type.

Ditching Tail: Reintroduced on this model, after being discarded on earlier Mediums.

Fuel and Range: 400 litres (88 gals) of fuel were carried but PW did not know range of operation..

Nippon Ambush

(From SWPA Daily Summary, No. 1008, 29/30 Dec 1944)

The 14th Army Headquarters instructions, dated 15 Feb 1944 with the heading, "Example of Strategic Guerilla Warfare," include the following:

"Drive along a procession of Koromata water buffalo carts, etc., fully loaded with foodstuffs particularly desired by the enemy and with our forces riding in them camouflaged. When the enemy are lured into point-blank range with the intention of seizing the goods, deliver a sudden counter attack using gas (Gasu) and hand grenades to capture them."

New Type Machine Gun

(From Hq, XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 58, 15/16 Dec 1944)

"The 77th Division captured a new type MG approximately 32 cal., 12 inch barrel with feed from a magazine located on the left side of the gun."

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Japanese Army Morale

A document captured at MAFFIN BAY and translated and published by ATIS, SWPA, reveals serious internal difficulties in the Japanese ranks in the "southeastern areas" (probably NEW GUINEA, BISMARCKS & SOLOMONS) as long ago as Oct 1943.

These aberrations were apparently so serious in nature that the War Minister and Imperial General Staff found it necessary to issue a general memorandum on the subject to all army units "to be read by officers only." It is significant also that the instances mentioned in this memorandum occurred prior to Oct 1943, before the 1944 series of major defeats in the Southwest and Central Pacific. It must not be inferred, however, that this document signifies any general deterioration of the morale of the Japanese forces. The document is presented here in its entirety because it constitutes an admission from the Japanese high command that there have been instances of "Spiritual" weakness even among the officers of the Imperial Japanese Army.

The full translation from ATIS Bulletin No 1684 follows:

Army ASIA Secret No 6990.

Dated 24 Oct 43.

Vice-Minister of War

Sub-Chief of the General Staff.

Memorandum to all army units regarding the display of the true characteristics of all ranks of the Imperial Army.

Most Secret:

To be read by officers only.

It is utterly regrettable to discover signs of deterioration in morale among a portion of the troops when all officers and enlisted men are expected to actively and faithfully serve their country during this critical moment. For instance, there are senior officers at present serving in the southeastern fronts, who are victims of homesickness and have frequently applied for transfer to JAPAN Proper. When their applications were disapproved, they became downhearted and lost all desire for war. In some cases, they either got intoxicated during the sounding of the air raid warning, besides disobeying the orders of their superiors, or purposely cut the telephone wires and refused to participate in action.

Another example is shown by a certain captain in the regular service who is also serving in the southeastern areas. Driven by an irresistible yearning for his mistress in JAPAN, he lost all his activeness and fighting spirit in the front, and, without the permission of his immediate superior officer, waywardly returned to JAPAN where he indulged in a spree with his mistress.

Furthermore, there have been cases of desertion to the enemy committed by certain malignant non-commissioned officers and men among the front-line troops. Even now nothing has been heard of them. Besides the above instances, there are examples of large quantities of weapons either lost at sea or fallen into the hands of the enemy as a result of a marked absence of regard for weapons during shipwrecks or in other battlefields. Such members have acted contrary to Imperial Rescript and are prejudicial to the tradition of the Imperial Army. It is therefore necessary to have strict supervision over these men who have failed to fulfil their duties.

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Japanese Balloons

During Dec 1944 and Jan 1945, numerous balloons sightings have been reported from various points in the western part of the US and CANADA. Many such were subsequently determined to be meteorological balloons or other balloons of domestic origin. Others, however, could not be so classified and are known to have a foreign source. Presented here is information concerning significant factors so far reported in connection with certain free balloon incidents definitely of foreign instigation. The incidents in order of their occurrence are as follows:

1. 4 Nov 44 - San Pedro, Calif. - A rubberized silk balloon was picked up at sea about 66 miles southwest of San Pedro, Calif.

2. 14 Nov 44 - Hawaii. - A large spherical balloon supporting equipment apparently like that received from the Sebastopol Balloon (see #6 below, and following description) was retrieved from the waters near Hawaii.

3. 15 Nov 44 - (Estimated) Kalispell, Mont. - On 11 Dec 44, a processed paper balloon was found near Kalispell, in northeast Montana. Detailed treatment of this balloon is contained in this treatise.

4. 6 Dec 44 - Thermopolis, Wyoming. - From two to four explosions occurred near Thermopolis in North Central Wyoming on the night of 6 Dec 44. The fragments of one bomb were recovered which, upon analysis were definitely determined to be remnants of Japanese 15 Kg Anti-personnel HE bomb. Witnesses claim to have seen a "parachute" descending at about the time of the bomb explosion but a careful search of the area did not disclose a parachute or other equipment.

5. 31 Dec 44 - Estacada, Ore. - A paper balloon, 33 feet in diameter, similar in appearance to the Kalispell balloon, was discovered near Estacada, Ore., lodged 70 feet off the ground in a tree. This balloon, like the Kalispell balloon, was equipped with a shock-absorber arrangement to which was suspended a metal framework showing evidence of having supported some type of electrical equipment. The envelope had attached to it a destructor device with fuse.

6. 4 Jan 45 - Sebastopol, Calif. - An object, first reported as a parachute, landed near Sebastopol, Calif, 4 Jan 1945. Later, the supposed parachute was found to be the lower portion of a paper balloon like the Kalispell, Estacada and Turret Mountain balloons.

7. 4 Jan 45 - Medford, Ore. - An object was seen to hit the ground in an open field. It burned for about 5 seconds and gave off a white smoke which persisted for 10 minutes. Investigation disclosed a burned metal casing with a piece of chain attached to it. The bomb (?) had a flat snublike nose. It is possible that this might be the type of bomb (?) carried by the balloons, and that the chain might be the means of attachment to the supporting frame.

8. 13 Jan 45 - Turret Mountain, Modoc County, Calif. - This balloon was recovered in the vicinity of Turret Mountain, Modoc County, Calif. It was forced down virtually intact by fighter aircraft. A detailed discussion of this balloon is contained in these pages.

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Following are condensations of detailed analyses of 2 of the above-listed balloons: namely, the KALISPELL Balloon and the Turret Mountain Balloon.

Kalispell Paper Balloon, Description:- (see listing Par #3)

The material received at the Naval Research Laboratory, Anacostia, DC, for examination consisted of the balloon envelope, the shrouds, a relief valve, a length of fuze, an ignition or flash charge and a rubber - rope assembly probably intended to act as a shock absorber. Two containers of melted snow from the discovery area were also received. The paper envelope was a true sphere 100 feet in circumference and weighing 152 pounds. Assuming the balloon is filled to capacity with hydrogen, the net lifting power (buoyance less weight of envelope) at various altitudes is as follows:

<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Lifting Power</u>
Sea level	1033 pounds
0.9 miles	876 pounds
5.0 miles	360 pounds
6.8 miles	210 pounds

The envelope has a circular opening at the base where the valve was attached when discovered. There is a skirt for attachment of the shrouds located below the equator of the balloon. The ignition charge was attached to the envelope between the skirt and the equator. At the top of the envelope was a circular patch ruled off and bearing printed and written Japanese characters. The translation of these characters reveals that the patch is a record of manufacturing data showing in part that this balloon was a type No. 2, best quality, inspected 10 Oct 44 and completed 31 Oct 44.

This balloon carried no visible weight. There was a shroud ring and a rubber-rope assembly, a fused ignition charge capable of rupturing and igniting the balloon. There were eight strands of manila rope so devised as to limit the extent of elongation of the rubber-rope shock absorber. The supposed top end of these strands terminates in a loop carrying two open steel hooks facing in opposite directions. The other end is abraded and discolored. The indication is that the 2 metal hooks were hooked into the shroud line ring and that some sort of metal hook fastened at the other, or lower, end of the shock absorber. It appears probable, but not certain, that the only weight the balloon might have carried was hooked to the lower eye of the shock absorber. The frayed and discolored condition of all rope ends, however, discourages the idea that any additional weight could have been carried on the rope directly and cut loose.

It seems probable that any load carried by this balloon did not exceed 150 pounds. The shape of the knot at the upper end and the location of the worn area of the rope around the hooks indicate that the weight was carried by the rubber rather than the rope. Tests of the strength of the rubber-rope indicate that the shock absorber was intended for a load not exceeding 150 pounds.

Analysis of the melted snow from the discovery area failed to produce evidence of any chemical material in the melted snow other than what would result from contact with the balloon envelope.

Meteorological data and tests of the permeability of the paper envelope indicate that the balloon could have traveled all the way from JAPAN. It is also possible that the balloon could have been inflated from a submarine..

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


FIG - 1

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


FIG - 2

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JAPANESE BALLOONS (CONTD)

Turret Mountain Balloon - Description:- (see listing Par. #8)

This balloon is an unmanned, free balloon, carrying a metal ring device. All evidence obtained thus far leads to the conclusion that this device is one whose primary function is the control of the lower altitude limit of the balloon, and whose secondary function is the release of an object or objects carried by the balloon and the destruction of the balloon and its control mechanism when it has served its purpose or otherwise become ineffective. It is presumed that this altitude control is accomplished by the dropping of ballasting increments as required, under the control of contact-making aneroid barometer (altimeter) elements pre-set for the desired operational altitude. The release of the object or objects carried by the balloon other than the ballasting increments, and the destruction of the control mechanism are also under aneroid control.

Operation of Control Mechanism:- A gas - filled balloon of this type rises to maximum altitude during daylight hours when the bag and gas inside are warmed by the sun. During the night hours the gas in the bag cools and contracts and the balloon loses altitude. In order to prolong the flight of these balloons a ballast dropping mechanism (see figure 2) has been provided so that whenever the balloon falls below a determined minimum altitude, one or more "ballast objects" are dropped thereby allowing the balloon to rise again. None of these "ballast objects" has been removed so it is not known whether they are simply weights or serve a dual purpose as small bombs or incendiaries after being dropped as ballast. In addition to the "ballast objects" which are hung around the periphery of the large lower ring, there are 2 plugs centrally located under this ring which support an additional object as well as cause the ignition of fuses leading to a demolition charge apparently intended to destroy the mechanical apparatus and to a flash powder charge attached to the outside of the envelope.

Details of Operation:- The operation of the mechanism is apparently initiated by means of two long fuses lit by pull ignitors. The purpose of the fuses is to allow the balloon to rise to a certain altitude before the electrical contact on the upper contractor ring is made. When these two fuses are burned up to the contractor ring, a plug is blown out, releasing a spring-loaded contact and causing the electrical circuit to become completed except for the make and break contacts located in the aneroid barometers. There are four aneroids, three of which are wired in parallel. The fourth aneroid is part of a separate electrical circuit. The three aneroids wired in parallel are so arranged that when a predetermined altitude is reached any one of the three may close a switch causing the electrical circuit to become completed. One of these three aneroids is more carefully constructed and operates in a somewhat more precise manner than the other two. It is possible that the former is the primary control element and that the latter are provided in the event the former failed to operate. When this electrical circuit is completed, two blow-out plugs located on the circumference of the large metal ring are blown out causing them to drop the "ballast object" which they supported. These two plugs are wired in parallel so that if either fails the process still continues.

This blow-out process also ignites two fuses, the purpose of which is to provide a time delay before the next set of plugs is fired, allowing the balloon to gain altitude in the meantime. These two fuses are so wired that the process of automatic discharge of ballast continues, even if one of the fuses fails to function. This process of dropping objects continues, alternating from one side of the large metal ring to the other, until the balloon is enabled to rise to the height previously decided upon, and at which the aneroid is set. When this altitude has been reached,

JAPANESE BALLOONS (CONTD)

the aneroid altimeter opens the contacts, breaks the circuit, and the ballast-dropping processes cease. When the balloon later drops to the altitude set in the aneroids, the switch is closed completing the circuit of firing plugs and causing more "ballast objects" to drop.

When the last pair of plugs has been blown, and the balloon is no longer capable of automatically renewing its buoyancy, two additional electrical circuits are enabled to function. One of these is designed to set off a flash powder charge located on the outside of the envelope. This explodes and destroys the envelope. The other circuit is connected to a demolition block located on top of the ballast-dropping apparatus, and is apparently intended to destroy the mechanism.

Conclusion: The Naval Research Laboratory, Anacostia Station, Washington D.C. advances a number of theories as to the source and use of the Kalispell balloon. They are presented here as possibly applicable to all the balloons under discussion. The list is given in order of decreasing probability:

1. Released in eastern Pacific to obtain weather information, possibly a part of world wide weather espionage system.
2. Released in JAPAN as air raid protection through dangling cable or similar means.
3. Released in JAPAN to obtain weather information.
4. Released in eastern Pacific, possibly just as an experiment or propaganda gesture, to carry some object into the US.

In connection with theory No 4, the wholesale introduction of incendiaries into the western forest areas during the dry season might be of some military importance.

MIS, Washington, D.C., adds three more thoughts to the list of possible functions of these balloons:

1. Dropping of bombs or other lethal devices.
2. Carrying of espionage or sabotage agents.
3. Use in connection with bacteriological warfare.

It has already been stated that it is believed possible for these balloons to have been released from JAPAN Proper. The evidence so far available is not sufficiently conclusive to provide a basis for definite assumptions as to probable present or future intentions. While the possibility of their use for landing espionage or sabotage agents has not been discarded the present evidence does not point very seriously in that direction.

Sightings of large spherical balloons over JAPAN at high altitudes have been reported during B-29 bomber raids. The suggestion has been made that the balloons in question were released over JAPAN as an attempted countermeasure against bombings and that they have appeared in the US by accident. Evidence seems, however, to refute this theory.

SOURCES: -

1. Naval Research Laboratory, Anacostia Station, Washington D.C., letter, 8 Jan 45, subject: Kalispell-Paper Balloon.
2. Western Defense Command Intelligence Memorandum entitled "A Study of Automatic Altitude Control Device, Japanese Balloon," prepared under the direction of the AC of S G-2, Western Defense Command, 20 Jan 45.
3. Hq, Western Defense Command Annex No 3 to G-2 Periodic Report No 161, 27 Jan 45.
4. WD MID, Washington, D.C. MIS Bulletin, AC of S G-2, 9 Jan 45.

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Changes in Beach Defense Doctrine

The Japs on LUZON offered a different type of reception to US troops from what previously had been presented to the invading Americans. Apparently the Japs have decided that under certain circumstances there can be a better way of defending an island than by attempting to prevent a landing, or by attempting to destroy the enemy at the beach. The very size of LUZON, and the extent of its coastline may have led them to a realization of the impracticability of applying this earlier practice. Also, the Japs' experience with US naval and aerial softening up may have had a decisive influence, changing their past determination to hold beach defenses, when an alternate choice was possible. It is not to be supposed that the Japs have abandoned their past doctrine of preventing landings. It is evident, however, that LUZON presented a different problem to them, which they preferred to solve in a different manner. An enlargement upon this thought is afforded by a bound mimeographed file captured at IPIL, LEYTE. This captured document contained plans for maneuvers in the LINGAYEN Gulf Area, together with conclusions drawn to the effect that the Japs could not prevent an American landing on LUZON.

Extracts from this document are presented here, and followed with recollections of earlier landings made against a different kind of Jap defense procedure. The sharp contrast between the two is apparent. Extracts from the above-mentioned LINGAYEN Gulf plans follow:

"Enemy Capabilities:- If the enemy plans landings in LINGAYEN Gulf, we must expect that he will first establish ground troops on the West Coast of LUZON North of LINGAYEN Gulf, and will then descend to the South by stages. Not only are possible landing places numerous there, but we know that our dispositions are inadequate to prevent landings.

"The area about 20 km (12.42 miles) inland from the coast is almost continuous plain and low hills, facilitating the movement of forces. In addition, the enemy would be able to cut off our rear by a series of movements in small craft. Also in view of the fact that the use of supporting naval gunfire is easy in this area, it is bound to be extremely disadvantageous to throw in the major part of our forces there.

"The conclusion is that we shall not be able to prevent the development of a situation in which we must fight a land battle with an enemy army which has fully accomplished its landing. If we do not commit our immediate LINGAYEN Gulf dispositions too hastily, the foregoing battle situation will inevitably result. If we do, the enemy will be enabled to land directly at LINGAYEN Gulf and break through into the Central Plain of LUZON at one stroke.

"Terrain Estimate:- If the enemy is allowed to penetrate the plains of Central LUZON, they will be able to maneuver freely their overwhelmingly superior power, in particular their armored forces. We would have great difficulty in checking them in an all-out engagement. Since the sector of the West Coast described above is comparatively confined; the enemy would not be able to deploy large forces there. Therefore, we shall check the enemy in the vicinity of the lower part of the East side of LINGAYEN Gulf, so as to prevent his advance to the central plain of LUZON.

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CHANGES IN BEACH DEFENSE DOCTRINE (CONTD)

"He will thus be unable to deploy his full strength. Further it will be necessary to take the offensive, utilizing irregular and difficult terrain, planning this as a crushing attack. Until that moment we must manage to whittle down the powerful enemy warships and plan to launch the final destructive smash against the warships simultaneously with the full offensive.

"To accomplish the above the vicinity of ROSARIO is vital. Also to carry out this design it is particularly essential to secure BAGUIO and the peninsula on the West side of LINGAYEN Gulf.

"If the battle situation develops unfavorably for us and we find ourselves under continuous enemy pressure, we must be able to hold a route of withdrawal to the mountainous terrain around BAGUIO. Therefore, in order to hang on doggedly in the PHILIPPINES and await the plans of later years, it is necessary to organize quickly in such a manner as to be able to establish permanent installations which can hold out for long months and years. The mountainous terrain in the vicinity of BAGUIO is suitable for this purpose." * * * *

The Japanese have been fully aware of the capabilities and limitations involved in establishing an island defense. The various examples which are here presented are thought to be representative of Japanese concepts of island defense as our troops have encountered it in the past. The standard Japanese plan was, and is, to destroy a hostile landing force on the beaches or before it reaches the shore. At ENIWETOK Atoll, for example, this plan was to be accomplished by forcing the landing craft, tanks and infantry to split up and by destroying them individually. To achieve this, obstacles were to be erected on the beaches and in the shallow water in front of Japanese prepared positions, and fire power was to be concentrated in these positions. The Japanese fire power was to be used suddenly and aggressively, to surprise the attackers. If this plan failed to prevent the hostile force from landing, the Japanese were to reorganize and counterattack under cover of darkness. The Japanese General policy for the defense of PARRY Island in ENIWETOK Atoll, for example, illustrates their established doctrine:

"Each unit on PARRY will split up the enemy's landing craft as they approach the beaches and will annihilate the attacking force piecemeal. For this purpose we shall construct the various types of antiboat obstacles, skillfully coordinate our fire power, and launch vigorous surprise counter-attacks. If the enemy attempts to land tanks with the infantry, we must destroy the tanks first. If the enemy actually succeeds in landing, we shall annihilate him by the most original night counterattack methods that we can devise. We must plan to hold for at least a month, if necessary, by relying on our system of fortified positions." * * * *

Repeated instances of Jap concentration upon their KIDO KESSEN TAI or Counter Landing Unit have provided hints that the Japs were seeking some device or tactic to offset initial landings by our troops - an occurrence which they were learning they could not prevent. It is possible that their counter landing plans, which called for counter-attack from the sea the first night, or at the latest the second night following landing by the enemy, was a step in the transition from one kind of defense theory to another.

ENIWETOK Atoll was of such size that little alternative action to defense at the beach was presented to the Japanese. Also, in this instance, the Japs were unable to provide any substantial reinforcement of their defense effort from neighboring islands. The same principle of defense, however, was followed by them in defending islands where such circumstances were not in effect, and where alternate action was possible.

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CHANGES IN BEACH DEFENSE DOCTRINE

At Cape TOROKINA, BOUGHINVILLE, defense was predicated upon the complete prevention of our landing. Jap defense positions, though very well suited to terrain, were indeed on or close to the beaches, one 75 mm regimental mountain gun being sited within five yards of the high-tide mark, for anti-boat defense. Other defenses consisted of bunkers covering the beach, disposed in depth and mutually supporting. Slit trenches and foxholes were so located as to cover the approaches to the bunkers across the beach.

The Japanese defense of SAIPAN provides another of the many examples which might be quoted of their established practice of defending an island at the beaches. Extracts from a captured document (North Sector Unit Defense Plans) provides illustrations of this:-

"In conducting a combat, the utmost progressive actions will be taken to destroy the enemy at the beaches.

"When the enemy is advancing by barge, AA Units will perform their regular AA firing, but the main part of the AA unit will destroy the enemy small ships and landing barges. Taking advantage of the opportunity when the enemy is under the disadvantage of being subjected to rifle and artillery shells, a fierce attack will be carried out. Angle and flanking fire will be used to lay down a fire not against the enemy at the beaches. If necessary, fighting power will be increased by strengthening important areas.

"At the instant that a part of the enemy lands - Concentrate the main fire power on the landing units before landings are made; take advantage of their confusion and destroy the enemy by counterattacking. If enemy landings are made, concentrate a heavy fire power and counter-attack or surprise attack to annihilate the enemy at latest by night.

"If the enemy succeeds in landing, all units will engage in the ensuing battle."

SOURCES: SWPA Daily Summary, 11-12 Jan 1945, No. 1021
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,103
MIS Intelligence Bulletin Vol III No. 1, Sep 1944
MIS Intelligence Bulletin Vol III No. 2, Oct 1944

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A Jap Artilleryman Talks

(From XXIV Corps ATIS Advanced Echelon Interrogation
Report No. 53, 31 Dec 1944)

Superior Private MATSHUISHI, Monoru was an artillery observer of the 26th Division, Heavy Artillery Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Battery. He was captured in the hills between IPIL and ALBUERA, on LEYTE. Upon interrogation he proved to be of high intellect, with knowledge of artillery matters above average. He was cooperative, friendly and appreciative, often volunteering information of great tactical value. Portions of information gained from him are presented here.

Reconnaissance and Positions: Reconnaissance for positions was conducted, according to PW, by the Battery Commander and Battalion and Regimental officers.

A Regimental reconnaissance party has about twenty EM in it, five coming from each of four Batteries. In a Battery reconnaissance, the Battery Commander, a 2nd Lt. in charge of the OP, the OP Sgt Maj, three men from the OP section and five other EM comprise the party.

Positions selected for the pieces were stated to have defilade and were usually close off roads on level ground and from about 4000 to 10,000 meters (13,120 to 32,800 feet) from the front lines. In a typical set up diagramed by PW the piece interval was twenty five meters (86 feet) but he stated that this interval is dependent on terrain.

The Battery vehicle park was located in a close-by valley or if terrain did not permit this the prime movers were dug down about fifty meters (164 feet) from the pieces. This distance seems unusually close, but PW was quite positive about its being correct.

Observation Posts: By diagrams, PW showed two OP's per Battery as standard. One is the main OP where the Battery Commander and the 2nd Lt. in charge of computing station themselves. This OP is shown on the diagrams as axial to the principal direction of fire of the Battery and forward of it. An alternate OP is also selected which is visible to the main OP. The two OP's then form a base from which to triangulate to targets in the field of fire of the Battery. PW demonstrated long base intersection from two OP's to a target in his diagrams.

Solving the triangle by computation was not mentioned by the PW or indicated in his diagrams. He did indicate that the base must be 1000 meters (3,280 feet) in length to take intersections to targets 10,000 meters (32,800 feet) in front of it. With the small angle of intersection thus resulting, it is probable that trigonometric calculation was used also. PW stated that the main OP may be 4,000 meters (13,120 feet) in front of guns.

Camouflage: With respect to camouflage equipment PW stated each piece carried a net three times the size of the piece and that it was set up over the piece and branches and brush were tied to it. He also described cutting and resetting trees around the pieces for additional camouflage. He stated that at times guns were emplaced in houses and buildings.

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A JAP ARTILLERYMAN TALKS (CONTD)

Ammunition: PW described the ammunition used in his experience with the Battery as Shrapnel M-91 and M-92. Chief of Ordnance publication referred to lists HE M-91 shells for the M-92 105 mm gun. An HE H-92 shell is not listed nor is Shrapnel M-91 or M-92. A shrapnel M-14 is listed, however.

PW, when being questioned on the duties of cannoneers, mentioned a device believed by the interrogator to be a fuze setter. Although the use of the fuze setter may have been limited to setting shrapnel, it is possible that the Japanese have an HE shell with time fuze and are capable of delivering HE time fire with this weapon. It will be recalled in this connection that the PW mentioned a Type 92 shell, which shell was not listed in our Chief of Ordnance publication.

Conduct of Fire: PW described surveying in the base piece using a transit and setting a stake under the plumb bob over which to set the sight of the piece. An angle from OP to distant aiming point was then turned off but the distance to it was not measured.

After setting up the base piece over the stake the remaining guns are laid parallel. The method for doing this is for piece No. 1 to measure the interior angle between sight of piece No. 2 and distant aiming point. Piece No. 2 measures interior angle between sight of piece No. 1 and distant aiming point. The apex angle of the triangle whose base is the distance between piece No. 1 and No. 2 is then computed and it is used as the deflection difference to lay parallel. PW explained this by drawing a diagram.

From questioning, PW did not recognize our method of using an orienting line or an aiming circle and laying the piece reciprocally on an instrument.

PW drew a gridded firing chart having 1000 meter grids. The zero x and y lines were in the center of the chart. Above and right of the center line the \bar{x} and \bar{y} lines were +1000, +2000 and so forth.

On this grid, gun's OP, and the "Test Firing" point were plotted for relative position and the angle OP-gun-aiming point was drawn. Using a protractor supplied to the PW, he measured a firing angle for the gun off the chart he had drawn and measured range with an improvised range scale. PW was then given a drawing of a situation showing OP and a hill and guns higher than Target. Using ranges and angles assumed by him, he correctly computed a site of -5 mils.

PW when questioned about drift drew a diagram illustrating its effect and the necessary correction for it. He also, by diagrams, illustrated the deflection effect of wind from various directions and stated the computations for wind effects and the range effects for density and temperature were calculated at the main OP.

PW also described the use of the instrument for computing direction and velocity of wind and drew an illustration of a device for obtaining chart direction of the wind using a comparison of wind direction and direction of fire. He stated, however, that no balloons were released as in our metro sections. Therefore data obtained by their instruments would not be accurate in the higher altitudes.

PW also stated that an instrument for measuring density was at the main OP. During combat complete metro including powder temperature are taken continuously every two hours. When shown a set of firing tables and the various columns explained to him he stated he understood their use and had used similar tables in preparing firing data. He stated that a standard form is used for computing metro data.

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A JAP ARTILLERYMAN TALKS (CONTD)

According to the PW, registration on the "Test Firing" point consisted of four rounds. Following that data was computed to a number of points in the sector of fire of the Battery but no registrations were made on these points.

PW stated that the Battery used aerial photos to fire from, and maps, scale 1/10000 or 1/25000, but that the most accurate firing was from the firing chart described above.

PW stated that forward observers are never sent forward from the Battery but that aircraft was used to observe fire where targets could not be seen. He also stated that while participating in several maneuvers in MANCHURIA, in none of them did the Battalion send out liaison parties nor did the Regiment. Division Artillery sent down a liaison officer to Regimental Headquarters. Also, one officer from the Regiment went to Divisional Artillery or Army Headquarters for orders. He stated that there was no liaison with infantry but Infantry Regiments sent his Regiment requests for fire.

Asked questions leading to a discussion of attack of targets, PW stated that the amount of fire and number of Batteries firing depended on the target. For a few tanks, one Battery would engage them. For tanks coming down the road towards the position, the piece nearest the road would engage the target. For a US Artillery Battery as the principal target for these Batteries, PW said all would fire many, many rounds.

PW stated fire would be placed at night on roads which US forces were known to be using. For targets of opportunity, PW stated that data would be calculated and three rounds fired followed by the number of rounds necessary to destroy or neutralize the target.

Method of fire was stated variously as salvo or volley as the situation warranted. He had no knowledge of use of registrations on nearby points with surprise mass transfers to the main target.

PW stated that targets were frequently assigned by coordinates furnished by Battalion and Regimental Headquarters.

When asked if more than one Battery ever fired on the same target, he replied that they did. When asked how all Batteries got on the same target, PW drew a diagram illustrating a Regimental survey plan. Plan was to set up at a point and take an azimuth reading to another point and then traverse to a point centrally located in the Regimental area. From this point, traverses are run to base pieces of the four Batteries. The Batteries are put in position about 150 meters (492 feet) apart depending on terrain. One Regimental target is shot in by the first Battery and based on its data all other Batteries register. Shifts for the Regiment are then computed from this target and coordinates sent to the Batteries ordered to fire.

PW stated that he had never seen sound locating devices; that they are not included in his Regiment; that he had never trained in conjunction with such a unit, but he has heard that they exist in the Japanese Army.

PW commented that US use of camouflage was poor but due to the many planes US forces have, he said that it was not necessary. He also expressed amazement at the tremendous volume of fire put down by US Artillery and gave instances of the panic it caused among Japanese soldiers.

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Japanese Airborne Plans

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(From Allied Air Forces SWPA Intelligence Summary
No 252 30 Dec 1944)

Documents concerning Jap airborne troops, the tactical employment of these troops, prior to and including the most recent on LEYTE, illustrates the wide extent to which Japanese thought, effort and training have been expended upon this particular kind of offense. Earlier issues of the USAFPOA, G-2 Intelligence Bulletin have discussed the LEYTE landing and the equipment of the airborne troops which participated in it.

Here is presented information on the organization of Jap airborne units. A Field Manual was captured in the LEYTE operation, which in giving conventional signs and symbols - listed designations of units. If, if actually organized, would give the enemy airborne versatility and strength on a divisional level.

The various airborne units listed in the document are set out below in Romaji and English translation:

TEISHIN SHIDAN	Airborne division
TEISHIN HOHEIDAN	Airborne infantry brigade
TEISHIN RAKKASAN RENTAI, DAITAI, SHUTAI	Airborne parachute regiment, brigade, and company
TEISHIN RAKKASAN HOHEI TAI	Airborne parachute artillery unit
TEISHIN RAKKASAN JUUKAKI DATAI	Airborne parachute heavy weapon battalion
TEISHIN KAKKUU HOHEI RENTAI and CHUTAI	Airborne glider artillery regiment and company
TEISHIN KIKANHOO TAI	Airborne machine gun unit
TEISHIN SENSHA TAI	Airborne tank unit
TEISHIN KOHEI TAI	Airborne engineer unit
TEISHIN TSUUSHIN TAI	Airborne signal unit
TWISHIN SHICHO TAI	Airborne transport unit
TEISHIN KANJA SHUUGOO TAI	Airborne casualty collection unit
TEISHIN HIKODAN, HIKOSENTAI, HIKOSHUTAI	Airborne air brigade, regiment and squadron
KAKKUU HIKOSENTAI, HOKOGHUTAI	Glider air regt and air sqdn
TEISHIN BUTAI HIKOOKI	Airborne airplane unit
KAKUU BUTAI HIKOOKI	Glider

In connection with the airborne tank unit, reference is made to a captured document which lists 12 Japanese glider models, only one of which is a trainer. The "Ku-6" was described as an armored glider. The "Ku-7," even though its listing as a 70-ton glider may be too high, may be capable of transporting tanks.

The existence of one glider air regiment has been known for some time, and it is possible that it has been expanded. Gliders have been observed on LUZON. Radio Tokyo has been boasting for more than a year of a nation-wide popular glider training movement.

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JAPANESE AIRBORNE PLANS (CONTD)

It is possible also that previously identified airborne units have been expanded. At any rate, those used on LEYTE constituted a small portion of similar known outfits. Captured documents have indicated that San Fernando South, which Japanese authorities recently declared a restricted area, is a center of considerable airborne activity.

Though the enemy has passed up numerous opportunities for effective airborne action in the course of the war, he nevertheless possesses the capacity for a substantial effort in this line - perhaps larger than any to date and perhaps in the PHILIPPINE campaign.

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Japanese Bulletin

(From AFIS Bulletin No. 1671, 28 Dec 1944)

The following is extracted from a bound handwritten file containing miscellaneous disjointed notes and operation orders for 11 Independent Infantry Battalion, belonging to Sgt Maj SHIBATA, Akira, unit not stated. It is dated 10 Nov 44 to 18 Nov 44.

"(1N Battalion) Routine Meeting Bulletin: 18 Nov (1N year not given)

"a. 2 MG Co, Leading Pvt KINOSHITA	
7 Co , 2d Cl Pvt NAGAOKA	Suicides
6 Co , Pfc MATSUMOTO	
8 Co , Pfc KITAHARA	Deserters

"b. It is regrettable that suicide and desertions have occurred. The names of above persons will be mentioned to all personnel and the following instructions will be given.

'Retainers of the Empire must not destroy themselves because of personal matters.

'No compassion can be felt for one who commits suicide or deserts. Not only personal honor but the honor of his relatives and his home town are debased.

"c. The hardships which we are undergoing are not due to the present unfavorable situation. The development of battle is difficult without a firm spirit. It is necessary to have the men believe that victory in this operation is ours.

"d. Our philosophy of life is not solved by death, but rather by the degree of success attained in accomplishing a mission."

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Chemical Warfare

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(From Hq, USAFPOA Information and Intelligence Letter
8 Jan 1945)

Excerpts from that section of this letter entitled "Japanese Chemical Warfare Preparations on LEYTE" are presented:-

"The chief discovery on LEYTE by this section (EEIST CW Section) was the negligible amount of CW material, and the relative absence of new or modified items. This might be explained in two ways: either the Japanese commanders did not have much materiel on LEYTE, or the bulk of CW equipment was evacuated by the retreating Japanese troops to the last Japanese positions on the west coast of LEYTE. It is believed that the disappointing quantity of collected materiel was compensated for by its negative implication with regard to Japanese CW projects and preparedness on LEYTE, the related general intelligence and the practical training received.

"Following is a list of Japanese CW equipment collected in the XXIV Corps area on LEYTE, by CW Section ASFEEIST:-

"Gas Masks. These were the standard Army Types 95 and 99, and the Navy Type 93 #3. In addition, a few examples of a variation of the Army Type #99 with a silver painted canister and a slightly different carrier were found. No dead Japanese soldiers were seen wearing (i.e. carrying) gas masks. The Japanese soldier on this operation has evidently handled his gas mask in the same manner as US soldiers, i.e. discarded it without care or thought as he evacuated a garrison, or on the road from one point to another. All gas masks collected or seen were new, most of them in their original paper wrappings, though all masks had been issued and carried by troops. The new type gas masks were not issued to special troops, and were mixed in with the standard Type 95 and 99 masks.

"Tanks, Portable, Decontaminant, 5 gal. These have not yet been positively identified.

"Pots and Candles. A number of boxes of smoke candles of various types was found. These included the ordinary Type 94-A smoke candle, Type 89 lacrimatory candles, and self-projecting vomiting gas candles. A new type of pot labeled "Type 97 Persistent Gas Container" was found. Some standard Type 94-B and 40 kg (88 lbs.) floating smoke pots were also collected.

"Flares. A number of red, green, white and black star shells was collected and turned over to Ordnance.

"Flamethrowers. A very few portable flamethrowers, all Model 100 were discovered. The few reports on the Japanese use of flamethrowers here reflect no organized plan for the employment of this weapon to date.

"Miscellaneous. A number of paper protective capes was found in mutilated or water-soaked condition. Some containers of individual decontaminant were discovered, but almost no large containers of bulk decontaminant. No canister or mask testing apparatus was reported from the XXIV Corps area, though some such equipment is understood to have been found in the X Corps area. No CW gas, smoke or incendiary bombs have been

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CHEMICAL WARFARE (CONTD)

found. A great number of pillboxes, fortified CP's and dugouts was visited and inspected. No definite evidence of gas proofing devices for these installations was seen, but it is concluded that the covered pillboxes and CP's could easily be rendered quite safe against gas. All in all, the significant feature regarding civilian and military Japanese CW materiel on LEYTE seems to be its paucity both in new items and in total equipment.

"Preparation for Chemical Warfare

"Offensive. The only Chemical Warfare munition reported used was the Japanese Army Type 100 Incendiary Bomb (WP-rubber pellet-carbon disulfide type) which was not effective as an incendiary.

"Vomiting gas candles in limited quantities and frangible AC grenades in rather larger quantities than in previous operations were found in storage.

"Except for those mentioned previously, no toxic agents have been located in areas captured to date. However, a PW stated that units of the 16th Division have blister gas shells in their possession. From his description of the markings it is believed that the shells are vomiting gas shells. None of these has been located although it is possible that they may be found. The Japanese have a definite tendency to emphasize the potentialities of this type chemical munition.

"Flamethrowers have been located.

"New items found in limited quantities were as follows: 25 kg smoke candle, 250 kg (551 lbs) Incendiary Bomb, Navy 32 kg (72 lbs) aerial burst Incendiary Bomb (modified), a device which may be an intermittent-blast flame thrower for fixed installation.

"Defensive. The majority of Japanese troops are reported to be carrying gas masks.

"Reserve supplies of gas masks found to date have been limited.

"Small stores of protective clothing of familiar types have been found.

"Quantities of bleach found have been small.

"No CW storage area has been located, the items located to date having been widely dispersed in different areas and types of dumps.

"No equipment or provisions for collective protection have been noted.

"Conclusions. The Japanese have either evacuated CW materiel from this area or are not giving priority for movement of such supplies.

"None of the items of equipment noted in preceding paragraphs has been found in sufficient quantities to have any real significance.

"Summary of Enemy Situation. The Japanese on those parts of LEYTE captured to date have not been prepared to initiate gas warfare nor do they appear to have seriously considered its use against them. This does not preclude the possibility of the use of gas during the PHILIPPINE campaign since it is believed that the Japanese have large stores of bulk chemicals, chemical munitions, and protective equipment located in the Islands. Priority will continue to be an important factor in the plans for initiation of gas warfare.

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Gas Warfare in Central China

(From Hq USM, CHINA Theatre; G-2 Report #10,594, 5 Dec 44.)

Foreword: This is a preliminary report on information gained from prisoners of war; it covers fragmentary data on Japanese use of gas, and equipment for gas warfare, in Central CHINA only. All information contained in this report is from prisoners of war.

Summary: Use of tear gas and vomiting gas by Japanese units in Central CHINA has been common. Several prisoners stated that in critical situations small Japanese units habitually resort to the use of such gases. Blister gases have been used in isolated instances.

1. Kinds and Designations of Gases:

The Japanese Army in Central CHINA is known to be equipped with the following five types of gas:

<u>Common designation</u>	<u>Kind</u>	
Yellow 黄	Blister (biran-sei; 糜烂性)	persistent
Green 緑	Tear (sairui-sei; 催涙性)	non-persistent
White 白	Asphyxiating (chiscoku-sei; 窒息性)	non-persistent
Red 赤	Sternutatory (kushami-sei; 嚏性)	non-persistent
Blue 青	Toxic (chudoku-sei; 中毒性)	non-persistent

(TN - NOTE: - Designations and kinds do not entirely agree with information previously received. (TM-E 30-480, 1 Oct 1944).)

Normally the color designations only are used; gas shells, candles etc. carry corresponding color bands.

The gases commonly used by Japanese units are Green (Tear gas) and Red (Sternutatory Gas).

Effect of Gas:

(a) Blister Gases: On contact with particles of this gas, clothing and living tissue decay.

(b) Tear Gases: Cause profuse tears, running of the nose, and render breathing temporarily difficult.

(c) Asphyxiating Gases: Immediate effect may not be severe, but these gases usually result in the ultimate death of the person breathing them in.

(d) Sternutatory gases: Cause profuse welling of tears, running of the nose, and continuous sneezing.

(e) Toxic Gases: Cause drowsiness and loss of consciousness.

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GAS WARFARE IN CENTRAL CHINA (CONTD)

2. Method of Use:

(a) Blister Gases: being dangerous to handle, are dropped from airplanes.

(b) All other gases: contained in gas shells, gas candles, etc., are fired from guns, gas grenade dischargers, or are self-propelled.

3. Equipment:

Three principal types of gas projectiles, containing tear or sternutatory gases, seem to be in use:

(a) Gas shells, fired from field guns.

(b) Gas cylinders or candles; cylindrical, with a spike stuck into the ground at an angle (varied for range desired). Range about 200 meters. The candle is fired by igniting a propelling charge by means of a simple matchhead fuze.

4. Organization for Gas Warfare in Individual Units:(1943/4)

3 Division: At the time of the CHANGTE (常德) campaign, and of 1944, engineer units were formed which carried one small red (sternutatory gas) candle per man (called "Sho-Akato" 小赤筒).

During the CHANGSHA operations in summer 1944, each field gun of the 3 Div was apportioned four gas shells for each twenty regular shells.

13 Division: Each infantry battalion includes one gas platoon. Each man of this platoon carries one small red (sternutatory gas) candle and one green (tear gas) candle. Regular infantry troops carry one small red (sternutatory) candle each.

22 Division: (now in South China): Each infantry battalion has fifty gas troops. Regular infantry squads each carry three or four small red candles (sternutatory gas).

34 Division: Each infantryman of regular infantry units is issued one small red candle. A gas platoon is organized in each infantry battalion. Each man of this platoon is armed with four small red (sternutatory gas) candles. These are from gas dischargers (Gas hassha-to 瓦斯發射筒).

39 Division: Artillery normally carries five gas shells for each 50 explosive shells.

40 Division: Division usually has a supply of red (Sternutatory gas) and green (tear gas) candles when in the field.

88 Division: Each infantry squad carries two small sternutatory gas candles. Each rifle company is equipped with 8, and sometimes 9, gas dischargers called "Dischargers, Red" (Hassha-Aka): (發射赤).

During active operations, work units (sagyotai: 作業隊) are organized, usually one platoon to an infantry battalion, drawing about 10 to 16 men from each company in the battalion. Those units act as combat engineers and as assault parties. Each such platoon

GAS WARFARE IN CENTRAL CHINA (CONTD)

is equipped with four gas dischargers (probably 81 or 90 mm mortar type). They fire gas shells (candles?), incendiary shells, smoke shells, normal extreme range being about 500 meters. (These platoons also carried flame throwers.)

Prisoners from this division were unanimous in stating that tear and sternutatory gas candles were used very frequently; being employed whenever any unit was pressed hard. But they know of no instance of the use of blister gases.

70 Division: Regular infantry troops normally carry six small red candles per squad. Battalions during operations may organize three gas platoons, each equipped with a total of 24 large red (sternutatory) and blue (toxic) gas candles.

19 IIMB: Infantry squads are issued 6 small red candles.

22 IIMB: (South China): Each regular infantryman is equipped with one small red candle (sternutatory gas). Battalions at times organize one gas platoon each.

5 IIB: Infantry squads are equipped with three small sternutatory gas candles.

5. Specific Instances of Use of Gas by Japanese Troops:

22 Div	May 1942	Sternutatory	Vicinity of CHIANGSHAN (江山), Chekiang
39 Div	1 June 1941	Tear & Sternutatory	In battle for crossing of HAN River (Hupeh; Ichang campaign)
39 Div	March 1943	Tear & Sternutatory	TIENFEWGSCHAN (天峯山), near TANGYANG, Hupeh
222 Inf 39 Div	May 1943	Tear & Sternutatory	near CHANGCHENG (長城), Hupeh.
39 Div	17-19 May 1943	Sternutatory ("large quantity")	HSIENJENCH'AI (仙岩), near TANGYANG, Hupeh.
39 Div	Nov 1943	Sternutatory ("large quantity")	TANGYANG Airfield, Hupeh.
40 Div	End Oct 1943	Sternutatory	NANWANCHIANG (南灣港), Hunan
56 Div	End of Oct 1943	Sternutatory	LUNGCHIACH'ANG (龍加場) and vicinity, Hunan.
40 Div	Sept 1943	Sternutatory	ANNSIANGHSYEN (安鄉縣), Hunan

Uses of Blister Gases: (Spread from airplanes)

13 Div	Sept 1940	In vicinity of TURGSHANSZU, ICBANG (Hupeh)
22 Div	May 1941	WUKANG (武康), E of HANGCHOW (CHEKIANG).

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GAS WARFARE IN CENTRAL CHINA (CONT'D)

6. Protective Measures:

Except against blister gas, gas masks are to be used for protection against enemy gas attacks, but men are also taught to use wet towels etc. over nose and mouth for temporary protection.

Against blister gas attack, rubber clothing (and masks) covering the entire body are to be used, but the Japanese army is poorly supplied with such equipment.

Orders for carrying of gas masks on campaigns are normally issued by the regimental commander (battalion commander in the case of Independent Mixed Brigades and similar outfits). If no such order is issued, lower unit commanders may issue such orders or choose not to do so.

Orders to put on gas masks, as are orders to fire gas candles, are issued by platoon leaders or higher commanders. Men are not permitted to remove their gas masks, when worn, until ordered to do so by platoon leaders or higher officers.

All officers and men of 3, 13, 34, 58, 68 Divisions, 17, 19, 22 IMBs, have gas masks. When units are in their garrisons, the masks are deposited with the barracks duty section (Naimuhan - 内務班; for which the standardized translation of 'Home Affairs Section' is not adequate). In some units the gas masks are deposited with the NCO in charge of clothing (supply sergeant) and are issued when required. Moisture being very injurious to the masks, they are sometimes stored in the unit ammunition warehouse or in concrete buildings.

7. Types of Gas Masks:

Prisoners know Model 95 Gas Mask, generally in use hitherto, and the Model 99 Gas Mask, which has recently been issued.

Model 99 Mask is considerably improved as compared to Model 95 Mask. Its resistance to gas is about 99%; its weight of about one kilogram is about half of Model 95.

Model 95 was not considered a weapon, but classified as an item of clothing; Model 99 is classified as a weapon.

Model 99 has not been issued to all units yet; men who possess it have strict orders not to leave it out of their hands at any time during active operations.

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Jap Army Insignia


(From SE ASIA Translation Report No 60
8 Nov 1944)

60 Inf Regt Administrative Instruction No. 18, issued
KAUNGKASI 1100 hrs. 17 Feb 44.


"In accordance with Imperial Edict No. 774, of 13 Oct 43, the
army uniform is to be modified, the main changes being as follows:-

1. "To avoid confusion, regulations regarding dress will be as laid
down in Army Instruction 81, dated 13 Oct 43.
 - " (a) Officers and W.O.'s summer and winter dress will remain the
same, but the former collar and breast badges will be
abolished and replaced by new designs, as laid down in
Imperial Edict 774.
 - " (b) A new sleeve marking will be worn on both summer & winter
dress.
 - " (c) The old collar badges on greatcoats will be replaced by the
new collar and arm of service identification badges.

2.













"For general officers in command of
troops; also for field officers in com-
mand of forces equivalent to a general
officer's command. Badge. Silver
chrysanthemum petals surrounding gold
cherry blossom, leaves and star.











"For field and other officers in command
of regiment, battalion, company or
equivalent unit. Silver chrysanthemum
petals surrounding silver cherry blossom,
leaves with gold star in centre.

"Both badges are made of aluminum alloy."

Collar Badges (officers)
(the badge for the left side only is shown)




Collar Badges (NCO's and Ptes)
(Badges for left side only)







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Sleeve Badges of Rank (left sleeve shown)



Arm of Service and Specialists' Identification Badges



Attached beneath the badge of rank (collar).

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(over)

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Axis Radio Intercept

(From Allied Air Forces SWPA Intelligence Summary No 252
30 Dec 1944)

Herewith is presented an excerpt from a Japanese broadcast which is of interest not because it typifies radio messages of the period of the report, but because it is an exception to the usual sort of thing given the Japanese people. There may be possible significance in this, as a trend in Jap broadcasts, either as a new manner of stimulating the home-front to an increased consciousness of war urgency, or perhaps as a real objection to the habitual Japanese misrepresentation and sugar-coating of the war's progress.

TOKYO, 12 Dec, Domestic:- "America commenced an offensive in Dec, 1942 with GUADALCANAL being taken; then Fleet Admiral Yamamoto died in May, 1943. The destruction at ATTU was in May, 1943, and the withdrawal from KISKA was in July. In Dec came the destruction at TARAWA and MAKIN, then in February, 1944, the destruction at ROI and KWAJALEIN. In April, 1944, Fleet Admiral Koga died. The destruction at SAIPAN was announced in June. IMPHAL, which we thought would fall in August, saw our retreat. Then there came the destruction at GUAM, TINIAN, LAMAING, and TENGCHUNG.

"An historian cannot speak only of the good side of history, but must also talk of the bad side. I would like to give my opinions about history and am not attempting to criticize the authorities. We stood up against the enemy preferring to die in battle rather than to be caught and have our necks cut off. Earlier in the war, we gained great victories too easily.....

"Every one relaxed into a state of complacency about the past, forgetting about resolving to live or die, or about the extreme emergency of the times. Speaking of total warfare, there were many instances where materials were said to be lacking to construct, for example, ships, when at other places there was much material not being used, and this was similar to whipping a tied horse. Everything has been lacking, people say, in giving the lack of materials as excuse for lack of production, but it was actually not the lack, but the bad organization of distribution of materials.


"I am not trying to complain here, but the authorities were over-cautious, thinking that it was for the sake of the nation, and thus not informing the people of this grave situation. Thus, the people were complacent, thinking we were winning, even when the enemy attacked SAIPAN; but any one will have to open his eyes when shots are fired at his bedside, so with the taking of SAIPAN we for the first time stood up in earnest.

"We would like to hear the truth to the extent that it would not jeopardize the nation, whether it be good or bad, or whether we are winning or losing, since we souls like the authorities to have faith in us, though I am not proposing that we be told secrets.

"Since I believe that you people listening feel the same way, I would like to make this special request as your representative. We would like to make a special plea to the authorities that the blood of our soldiers destroyed by the enemy must not have been shed in vain. It goes without saying that America suffered great losses in the actions off FORMOSA and the PHILIPPINES, thus changing the war situation.

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AXIS RADIO INTERCOMPS. (CONT'D)

"I would like to be fair to the enemy, but not because I am afraid of him. To know the enemy well is to beat him, so to know his situation is to also win from him. AMERICA did not lose hope at PEARL HARBOR, nor did she say she was afraid of JAPAN. The enemy called for revenge, crying 'Remember PEARL HARBOR.' When we were feeling triumphant even when we were losing, the enemy fought for time. Americans are famous for speed, doing in 10 hours what has been done in 12, or in 7 what has been done in 10 hours. The enemy re-organized his formation while we were fiddling with our tooth-picks and lolling with loosened belts. We piled explanations on explanations, since it would have been unseemly to admit defeat. The enemy advanced island to island, but this being too slow for him he then began island hopping.

"The enemy could not afford to draw back just because of suffering great losses in the FORMOSA and PHILIPPINES air and naval actions. He is just as eager to deal with us as we are with him. We must recognize his viewpoint..

"The authorities have no excuse with the whole world knowing of our retreats.

"The enemy is determined to crush us regardless of personnel and material losses. Should the enemy not crush us, his own people would crush him before we could get at him. So the enemy has come in spite of everything by any way, manner or fashion, to LEYTE; thus, the fighting there is termed the acme of the Japanese-American War. Should we pass the PHILIPPINES over to him, the home and front line would be cut in two. Should the enemy be resolved unto death to take the PHILIPPINES, we are equally determined not to give him the PHILIPPINES.

"What are Roosevelt, the Jews, and the various nations thinking of? They are thinking that the taking of the PHILIPPINES is synonymous with the taking of JAPAN, so the struggle for the PHILIPPINES is not being conducted for its own sake. Thus, on this point our fate is hinged. We were disgraced with the fall of SAIPAN. The PHILIPPINES are not like SAIPAN. The regrets we had about SAIPAN would not suffice if the PHILIPPINES are taken. Should such a thing happen, there is a fitting proverb, 'One cannot retrace one's course.'

"We must strive all together, no matter what the measures taken or sacrifices made, for all that matters is the victory. There should be no considerations for our welfare by the authorities. Should pots and pans be needed, they should be sent to the PHILIPPINES, for it does not matter about the morrow's meals. Everything must be swiftly sent to the PHILIPPINES. Our united efforts are for the security of the PHILIPPINES, and correspondingly of our Empire."

COMMENT: It should be remembered particularly that this type of broadcast is notable even more for its rarity than its expressions.

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Notes on Bacteriological Warfare

(From Chemical Warfare Service, Wash D.C., Special Projects Division
Periodic Intelligence Report No 6, 15 Dec 1944)

JAPAN's capabilities for waging Bacteriological Warfare are many; she has sufficient technical personnel, raw materials and manufacturing capacity to wage BW.

Documents of the Japanese Army on protection of troops against enemy BW action have been captured in the Southwest Pacific, BURMA and CHINA Theatres. Some of these documents cite specific instances of use of BW by the Chinese against the Japanese; others imply that our troops may use BW against the Japanese.

Instructions to civilians in a practice air raid on TOKYO in 1943 included protection against BW attacks on water supplies.

Japanese offensive BW intentions are indicated by captured documents concerning Bacillus Bomb Mark 7, Type 13 experimental. (No bombs of this type have been captured to date.) There are also Japanese secret documents from the CBI and SWP Theatres giving the organization of diversionary raiding parties. These groups are for infiltration purposes and may carry bacteria for infecting food, water supplies, etc.

The conclusion is drawn that the Japanese envisage the outbreak of BW and may already be using it on a small scale in "diversionary raiding parties equipped with bacteria."

This Periodic Report also presents the following information concerning a Japanese document captured at DAGAMI, LEYTE, PHILIPPINES on 7 Nov 1944: (This document is a Japanese Intelligence Report, dated 12 Oct 1944, made by the 16th Div Hq of "SHOBU" - 14th Area Army Force) "In September a 20cc ampule containing a yellow liquid was picked up in the THAILAND-BURMA Area by a native; it was confirmed that cholera bacilli were found in the liquid' and 'that many other similar incidents were reported.'" This document mentions the appearance in THAILAND of plague-carrying rats during Sept, 100 being captured on 7 Sept. It draws the conclusion that the unexpected prevalence of cholera and the plague-carrying rats in THAILAND were probably due to enemy air operations. The concluding paragraph is here quoted: "When an epidemic breaks out following the ever increasing air operations it is necessary to make detailed reports of the situation and take strict precautionary measures against the enemy's bacillus operations."

In Sept 1944, a Japanese document was captured in the LUNGLING region, concerning the organization, equipment and duties of a five man raiding party. Of particular interest in this discussion is the part which listed the infiltration equipment to be carried by the Commander of the raiding party. Among the items mentioned is "bacteria -- if necessary." (exact translation of the Japanese characters would be "bacillus ")

A Japanese PW, a superior private and a member of the 41st Mountain Artillery Regiment, 41st Division, captured in NEW GUINEA, 19 Aug 1944, states that while in PALAU in Oct 1943 he heard from a soldier with whom he was working that bacterial warfare experiments were being carried out at HSINKING, MANCHURIA, by the Water Purification Unit.

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NOTES ON BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE (CONTD)

He heard that on one occasion a gas was sprayed from the air and when it was first released it looked like a fog but gradually faded away. During experiments, gelatin in trays was set out and later checked to see results as to the amount of bacteria falling on that area and the rapidity of spreading. There were also experiments on diseases of horses being carried out. Glanders and unidentified organism were used. COMMENT: - This report indicates the possibility that there is an experimental BW station at HSINKING, MANCHURIA.

Mention of the Water Purification Unit associates it with the activities of Major General ISHII, Shiro. It has been reported that Major General ISHII, Shiro carried out experiments on a bacillus bomb at HARBIN. This report was later confirmed by a PW, a Lieutenant Colonel, pharmacist, member of Second Army Field Freight Depot, captured at sea, 9 July 1944. PW could give no additional information on these experiments, stating that the project was classified secret and not generally discussed. Major General ISHII's unit was known as Ishii Force.

Numerous references have been received to date implying that Major General ISHII, Shiro has been conducting bacteriological experiments. It is quite possible that this man is the head of BW in JAPAN, and that decorations which he has received have been for his work in BW, of which water purification is a part.

ATIS Bulletin Report from Southwest Pacific Area, No. 1495, dated 8 Oct 1944, contained a translation of a Japanese report classified secret, published by Genshi Force Dispensary, dated 1 April 1943, subject, Measures for Prevention of Contagious Diseases in 1943. This report lists all the preventive measures which are to be taken by troops in the field, with regard to contagious diseases, drinking of contaminated water and eating of contaminated food. It mentions "plans and preparations against various stratagems (bacteria and poisons of the enemy)". COMMENT: The foregoing statement of Japanese policy on prevention of contagious diseases includes anticipation of Allied use of BW. Several similar statements have been received recently and may indicate intention upon the part of the Japanese to blame a natural epidemic in their forces on Allied BW strategy and thus create an incident as an excuse for starting BW.


SECRET

War Time Medical Service

(From ATIS Enemy Publications No 194, 28 Sept 1944
Document Captured 15 June 1944)

Following are extracts from the captured document which is entitled "Provisional Manual and Textbook for Medical NCO candidates." This manual provides instructions for most of the medical units shown in the chart below. Extracts of only the most significant portions of the text are included.

CHART SHOWING CHAIN OF COMMAND OF WARTIME
MEDICAL BODIES WITH THEIR DUTIES



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WAR TIME MEDICAL SERVICE (CONTD)

"Medical service of attached units during operations consists of front-line first aid and unit dressing station service.

"When operations begin, the ranking medical officer will designate the duties of the second ranking medical officer, NCO's and men. According to the battle situation, medical NCO's may go with the second ranking medical officer and carry out first aid right at the firing line, or they may, under orders of the ranking medical officer, take charge of treatment of casualties in the vicinity, direct medical supply pack horses, dispose medical and auxiliary stretcher bearers, communicate with all areas and do clerical work. When on front-line first aid duty, note the battlefront and movements of the battle lines and the rapidity and direction of fire. Be on the alert for casualties. While there are no casualties, look around for places to serve as the so-called "casualty-nests" to which wounded are to be taken first when found and given treatment. Later remove them to a safe place. The names of the casualties must be entered in the Dead and Wounded Book. Places which may be used as casualty nests are chiefly the slope on the side of a hill away from the battle, huts, rest stops which were used before the battle, ditches, shell craters and roads over which the force has advanced.

"When the battle is fierce and the division's rear medical body has not come up or is too far away, a part of the medical personnel and the auxiliary stretcher bearers will set up a dressing station with the various supplies which they have brought and the materials available in that area, and treat the casualties.

"Usually the dressing station is set up according to the unit commander's order, but in certain situations it may be set up on the attached medical officer's initiative and a report submitted later. Sometimes it is advantageous to set up a dressing station jointly with the neighboring unit.

"The unit dressing station must be close to the front and covered from enemy sight and enemy fire. Moreover, select a spot which is convenient for communication and where gas will not accumulate. If possible select a place which will provide shelter against wind, rain, heat or cold and where covering materials and water and heating materials are easily obtained.

Duties, when setting up a Field Hospital, of the various sections follow: -

Headquarters

1. Setting up of administration office and intendance office, cleaning and arranging Hq marking off from other sections.
2. Making warehouse and storehouse for equipment and arms of personnel.
3. Work connected with guarding and posting of guards.
4. Posting gas and AA sentries.
5. Selecting sites for latrines and baths.
6. Setting up rest rooms for personnel.
7. Setting up motor pool, and horse lines.
8. (Intendance) Requisitioning supplies, examination of requisitioned supplies, report to hospital CO.
9. Selection of site for kitchen, patients' mess; distribution of medicines.
10. Handle money and valuables, also corpses.
11. Preparation of night lamps, illuminating materials and night lunches.

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WAR TIME MEDICAL SERVICE (CONTD)

12. Drawing up sketches of Hq.
13. When section is set up, make report to the hospital CO.

Receiving and Discharging Section

1. Putting up a red cross flag and the national flag. (red cross lantern at night.)
2. Receive requisitioned supplies from pharmacy, chiefly medical supplies.
3. Place markers to indicate front road. At night attach white paper on trees or spread paper.
4. Clean and arrange section, mark off from other sections.
5. Patients' waiting place must be set up (straw mats to be laid out). Tent may be set up if necessary.
6. Installation of the registrar, man in charge of arms and equipment, and man in charge of money and valuables. Arranging storage place for arms and equipment and ammunition.
7. Set up places for gas casualties, patients' waiting room and decontamination room.
8. Arrange place for hot water for drinking and place to keep food.
9. Storage place for first aid supplies.
10. Storage place for litters.
11. Arrange rest place for evacuees.
12. Signs to indicate storage place for litters, wagons and cars.
13. Arrange meeting place for patients returning to unit by litter, car or foot.
14. Post sketch of evacuation route.
15. Prepare morgue.
16. Designate storage place for personnel's arms and equipment.
17. Designate latrines.
18. Designate parking space for ambulances.
19. Prepare sketch of section.
20. Report to hospital CO when section is set up.

Treatment Section.

1. Receive requisitioned supplies from the person in charge of the pharmacy sec med supplies.
2. Indicate boundary between this section and others. Indicate exits and entrances.
3. Arrange operating room, dressing changing room and waiting room.
4. Boil instruments, prepare disinfectants and distribute to all treat-squads.
5. Clean and arrange section.
6. Work on night surgery lamp.
7. Set up hot water drinking place.
8. Prepare surgery book, daily sick book, and prescription record.
9. Storage place for personnel's arms and equipment.
10. Designate latrines.
11. Prepare sketch of section.
12. Report to hospital CO when section is set up.

Wards

1. Receive requisitioned supplies from the person in charge of pharmacy sec med supplies.
2. Mark off all wards and rooms; designate roads.

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WAR TIME MEDICAL SERVICE (CONTD)

3. Designate boundaries between other wards and rooms; designate roads.
4. Arrange storage place for med supplies.
5. Arrange hot water drinking place.
6. Designate latrines.
7. Prepare sketch of section.
8. Make report to hospital CO when section is set up.

Pharmacy

1. Arrange places for supplies, distribution and compounding.
2. Allot and supply needed supplies to each section.
3. Mark off from other sections.
4. Receive requisitioned supplies from int. offr.
5. Requisition med supplies, make improvised litters and splints.
6. Clean and arrange section.
7. Designate storage place for personnel's arms and equipment.
8. Designate latrines.
9. Test well and river water, indicate positions for well and drinking water.
10. Prepare sketch of section.
11. Make report to hospital CO when section is set up.

Jap Radar Countermeasures

(From ATIS Bulletin No. 1670)

Three handwritten pages of notes of Jap radar counter-measures and deceptive tactics, captured at SANSAPOR, DUTCH N. G., are published in ATIS Bulletin No. 1670.

The following countermeasures and methods of undetected approach for Nip air raiders are set forth in this document:

1. Use of window.
2. Use of radar jamming equipment.
3. Attack and destruction of radar installations.
4. Approach by several forces from different directions simultaneously, with or without the use of window.
5. Use of decoy aircraft which expose themselves to detection while the main attacking force makes a low altitude approach. The decoy aircraft may or may not use window.
6. Frequent changes of course when within the effective zone of radar.
7. Descent into dead space after allowing initial detection at high altitude.
8. Division of the attacking force within the effective zone of our radar and subsequent direct approach by a part of the force, while the main force makes a low altitude approach.
9. Utilization of the terrain in order to approach the target in dead spaces.

The importance of a consideration of the objective, the enemy situation, and the attacking force, in selecting the tactics to be employed, is emphasized; as is the importance of avoiding the repeated use of the same deceptive measures.

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Propaganda and the Japanese

(From Psychological Warfare Division Informational Review No. 10, 10 Nov 1944)

A report from GHQ INDIA states that the newly arrived Prisoners of War, who previous to their capture appear to have been kept completely in the dark regarding reverses suffered by JAPAN, are now having an opportunity to learn the truth. This has resulted in a lowering of morale and signs of defeatism. Their one desire now seems to be for an early end of the war irrespective of who wins. It has been noticed that this attitude of mind, coupled with their stories of unprecedented hardship which they have had to endure, is having some effect on the morale of the earlier captured "die hards" who are, however, trying to maintain their blind faith in JAPAN's victory.

The following table shows the number of Prisoners of War taken during the fighting for the first eight months of this year in Northern BURMA.

January	9	June	134
February	47	July	241
March	35	August	304
April	73		
May	56	Total	899

A recent observer at the front has stated that although too much significance should not be attributed to them, there are indications of increasing Japanese demoralization. In one instance Burmese villagers have reported that soldiers argued fiercely with their officers and then threw their arms into a railway wagon and set fire to it. In another case troops are said to have evacuated a village in defiance of their officers' orders. Even in Northern BURMA, where rail communications are closest to the front, the condition of the dead gives evidence of under-feeding as well as disease. The incidence of malaria, beri-beri and dysentery has been very high.

A copy of the magazine "Hoso" for July 1944 has recently come into the possession of OWI. It contains the report of a round table discussion sponsored by the Radio Broadcasting Corporation of JAPAN in which senior officers and P.R. Representatives took part.

Translation of this magazine shows that our broadcasts are religiously monitored, and that our constant repetition of the news is taking effect. Another point brought out in the course of the discussion is that "ever sentimental songs and music" are very effective propaganda. The fact that much music of this type, along with most European Music, has been banned from Japanese broadcasting, should give our music broadcasts to the enemy an exclusive field. For this we have to thank the rather inelastic minds of the Information Board at TOKYO.

Opinion on the attitude of civilian population in BURMA was given by three men captured in September. Two were of Talaing nationality and the other was half Talaing, half Hokkien-Chinese. They stated that the Burmese always spoke of the Japanese with derision, and while the

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PROPAGANDA AND THE JAPANESE

British troops are not popular they are much preferred to the Japanese. They said that popular names commonly used for the Japanese are Khwee Tha (descendants of dogs), Loo Poo (short ass), and "eaters of dog flesh" - all epithets of greatest insult, for dogs are regarded as the lowest of animals.

The attitude of the Burmese is much more friendly towards the Americans than towards the British. Kindnesses of American missionaries are still remembered. American troops would be strongly supported by the Burmese. British would be supported, but less strongly, and West Africans not at all, because they are feared by the Burmese. Americans are trusted to chastise the Japanese. There is a saying, "Americans are to Japs like a father with a bad child" i.e. He will punish severely. "The British and the Japanese are like a mother and a bad child". i.e. She will foolishly forgive and forget. They stated that the Burmese attitude towards the Allies is indicated by their practice of secretly passing small packages of food to Prisoners of War working on the road.

In regard to leaflets they said that in August or September last year, leaflets were dropped on two successive nights by Allied bombers over THAN BYU ZAYAT. The Japanese were very active in collecting these, but thousands of Burmese read them and they created a great sensation. The leaflets called attention to the shortage of food and clothing, and compared British with Japanese rule, referring to the indignities and lack of respect to the clergy. The impression was that they were a prelude to the flight of the Japanese, whom the Allies would soon kick out. There has not yet been any adverse reaction from the long delay since the drop. The informants knew that there have been other leaflets dropped, but they have not seen them. It was suggested by the informants that the Burmese would be particularly pleased if Japanese were referred to in any future leaflets as "dogs with long tails," or "eaters of dog flesh," but on second thought, they admitted that this might result in ill-treatment of Allied prisoners.

Attitude of civilians in a different area is indicated by interrogation of a sailor captured off the West Coast of SUMATRA in September. Speaking for the N.E.I., he stated, "All the Indonesians hate the Japs. People refer to them in their own language as Si Pendek (short one), Si Beroeh (a kind of monkey), Pabi (pig), Kera (monkey), Monket (monkey), and Andjing (dog). The Japanese are kicking and beating the people at the slightest provocation.

A Japanese surrender leaflet, written in English contained on one side a map of Northern BURMA. Arrows trace the advance of the triumphant Japanese forces. In the ARAKAN, CHITTAGONG is virtually surrounded. IMPHAL is overrun, KOHIMA has been "captured by our forces," DIMAPUR is in Japanese hands, and beyond that there are "Britishers retreating" towards BRAHMAPUTRA, and a "hot pursuit in the rear of LEDO Road."

On the other side is a surrender appeal which reads as follows:

"Major General Wingate was killed. According to a report of the South East Asia Command, your Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Charles Wingate was miserably killed in action. He came to BURMA as if to be killed. Here we warn you that you will be killed like this desperate Major-General. Now you are like an aeroplane losing its motor, or orphans in the jungle. The Japanese forces want to save you from your dangerous positions and give you an opportunity to return to your sweet home. Your counter-offensives have already come to an end. We advice (sic) you in the name of Bushido (japanese chivalry,) to surrender to the Japanese forces."

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