January 1, 1945

0730 B-1 moved to James Ravine.

Ammunition air raid warnings.

1st Provisional Bn joined 4th Mar designation as 31st Bn.

3 Officers, 66 Marines + 105 Philippine Naval Reservists

at 3rd Bn. 3rd Bn at Ramsey Ravine.

Additional small arms. 37 mm & 81 mm ammunition distributed to BW DP's.

Remainder + Sepoys, Bng. E 3rd Bn, USNR Philippine Marine attendant arrived at Mill from Marcelle.

Air Raid alarms: 0900-0940

1110-1230

1505-1550

Following officers were promoted to the ranks as shown by their names:

1st Lt. William L. Karric rank from 2 Dec 41

1st Lt. Jack Hawkins

1st Lt. Ralph L. Mann Jr.

1st Lt. Hugh A. Finstadt Jr.

Joint personnel for US Houston.

1st Lt. Bennet

Mar Det with Bng. E 3rd Bn changed to Det Co "M" to 31st Mar Det. 625 forming "Indiana E" off 40 men.

Det Co "M" (1 off 18 men) at H. Hughes (AR 274).
**January 1, 1942**

**Strength report**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>64</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>1496</th>
<th>1563</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Details**

- Zempatt: 1
- Deseter: 1
- Tempd-Shanghai: 1
- Tempd-w-Staff: 2

**MDARS established communications & operations cont.**

Je Btry to 3d Bn.
January 3, 1942

Midnight strength 16 367 383

USN 5 15 20

All Bns in readiness for beach defense.

1345-1600

Air raid - 1 man killed.

2 wounded. 1 shell exploded.

0510

Received Beach Defense alert warning; small boats reported headed for Corregidor from Manila.

Lt. Hensley ordered all Beach Defense positions, including Army Beach Defense artillery positions to be fully manned. Lewis MGs, plat.

0740

Ordered to report to first line, east sector.

0940 Beach Defense alert secured.

And, by ordered to have 10 men of BGM in ready for all. 2 at H. Hughes.

1400

All ORs ordered to have personal carry weapons, gas masks & steel helmets at all times.

All Beach Defense positions ordered manned from 1800 to 0700 daily.

80 USN personnel moved to Baracoa Area SE of G.M. Cond.

USN Bgt. to be formed & organized as Wall for Beach Defense Reserve Force.

88 Cases, 498 rounds of 3" 23cal Ammunition from Cape St. Louis stored in James River naval fort, Army.

Air raid alert: 0933-1100

1134-1555 Dive bombing attack.

Bombing: 1600-1645 from low and flapping chocks.

Killed: Lt. Anderson, V. C. T. C. 

Wounded: P.O. Bernardy, B. L. A.  

Lt. Smith, H. H. A.  

253
### January 2, 1942

**Length Distribution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>64</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>1492</th>
<th>1563</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempd. Mt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deserter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempd. Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempd. w/ Kaffe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Res.</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 8, 1942

0148 Empty canoes found which had been operating along south shore of Middle Sector. Cautioned to be alert for persons who may have been in boat. Ramsey Ravine notified.

1215 Naval Reservists distributed as follows: 1st BN - 28; 2nd BN - 28; 3rd BN - 17; 7th NCT - 34; 8th - 21. (Men, Boys)

1800-0600 All Beach Defense positions manned.

0830 Detail transferred from 2nd BN to detailed with Army at L. Aurora: 10 men, 2 BMG, 12 Martin MG.

Navy personnel for proposed 4th BN recalled by Adm. 4th BN Brookdale area secured.

1400 10 man detail from 2nd BN reported for duty with Army M.P. force at Harbor Defense Station, Malinta Tunnel.

Air raid alarm 0900 - 0956

1000 - 1100 4 Bombardment

1445 - 1456 Run by Jap bomber.

3 planes, 400 feet, casualties.

Ammunition, distributed to BNs, (exclusive of amts
brought by BNs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>.30 Cal</th>
<th>.45 cal</th>
<th>57mm HE</th>
<th>81mm HE</th>
<th>3 inch GRENADE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>470</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>480</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

254
January 3, 1946
Strength Distribution
2nd BN
10 Men Co H - St. Hughes
1 Man Sgt - Matinta Tunnel
9 Men Co E
3 Men Sgt - Btry Hanna
3rd Plt Co E plus 1st Plt Co H - Henry Forest
1st Plt Co E plus 3rd Plt Co F - Cheney Ravine
1 Man Sgt - 61st Regt
Main Body - James Ravine

Indy: 6 3 6 7 883
Var: 4 14 18
January 4, 1942

Rept at Fort Mills.

1800-0700 LST, part 14th Base manning Beach Defense.

Setting up bar-b-wire entanglement.

Power lines hit by bombing; no water or lights in James Ravine.

2145 3 motor boats, 10 sailing bancos reported off St. Frank head towards Mariveles or Corregidor. All sectors notified.

2200 Station ship moved to east end of Corregidor.

N. Crude #325 lost by bombing.

0930 He left L of James Ravine.


Alert Raid alarm: 0930-1312

1227-1600

**Strength Report**

End on distribution same as 4 Jan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MC</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>369</th>
<th>385</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4th**:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MC</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>56</th>
<th>69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mar 64 7 1491 1562  
Mar 13 3 43 58  
Total 77 9 1534 1620  
Tempitt 1 1 2  
Dexter 1 1  
Tempd Shanghai 1 3 4  
" w Wiffl 2 2  
Naval Res 128 128
January 5, 1942

1800-0700 All bow continuing Beach Defense security.

St. Mills bomb, Bottomsides area badly damaged.

James Irvine bomb proof lights and water back on.

0830-1600 Blott CP at Queen Tunnel.

Hyde Harbor moved to new bouwac area at

Ravine

Air Raid alarm: 0830-0945

0937-1030
1235-1440
1435-1530
1609-1628
1625-1705. No casualties.

10 men for Co "H" from MG Flat Co "M" at St. Hugh's Oheniff.
January 6, 1942.

No boats, refugees, etc., permitted to land on Corregidor.

St Mills bombed - no Marine casualties, some property damage. Heavy incoming 3rd Bn US splinter kit shelter.

Malinta Tunnel can be entered by pass only.

James R. Young - bombproof lights out. Camp House not working due to air raid.

Lewis McGinty - transferred to 4th to 12th BN.

USN organized Bluejacket plate for outpost duty 1800 to daylight daily. Positions for new outpost selected to cover dock areas approaches to Malinta Tunnel.

0800-1700 Hq of at Queen Tunnel.

1800-0700 Beach Defense positions manned.

Air raid alarms: 0825-0915
1130-1140
1230-1430 - 1 man 1st BN injured.
1505-1530. quart for

Biv "A" organized last Advance Headquarters USFFE, located R. S. West Road - Rock Coast, Batan.
January 6, 1942  
Strength report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>64</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>1491</th>
<th>1562</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>1620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempe1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempe 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Base</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 7, 1943.

0800-1100 Left CP at Queen Tunnel

1300

Operation Orders #1-42. Beach Defense. Beach Defense personnel to be continuously with at least 3 men at each position and at least 40% of personnel in reserve in immediate vicinity of respective positions at all times. All OP manned continuously. Approved by Maj Gen. Moore, US MC.

Note on ammo supply 2nd Br (West Sector):
Approx 3 units of field 30 BMG (700,000 rounds):

2 " " " 81 mm mortars

3 " " " all other weapons, except NO V.B. grenades. Some ammo received from Army is MR. Kept for reserve use only.

Air Raid Alarm: 1100-1200 No bombing.

Following promotions accepted this date:
Col. Donald McPaint to rank from 1 Jan 42.

Col. William E. Clinton " " " 1 Jan 42.

Lt Col. George A. Hamilton to rank from 1 Jan 42.

Lt Col. Samuel W. James " " " 1 Jan 42.

Maj. Frank R. Boga " " " 1 Jan 42.

Maj. Joseph J. Niel " " " 1 Jan 42.

Maj. James V. Brady " " " 1 Jan 42.

Maj. Henry C. Lane " " " 1 Jan 42.

Maj. George H. Weckle " " " 1 Jan 42.

Maj. Max W. Schaefer " " " 1 Jan 42.

Capt. Francis H. Williams " " " 1 Jan 40.

Capt. Clyde K. Mullen...
January 7, 1942

Capt. Benjamin L. McElhan to rank from 1 Mar 41
Capt. Robert B. Moore " " 1 Mar 41
Capt. Lewis H. Alley " " 1 Mar 41
Capt. Noel C. Castle " " 1 Jul 41
1st Lt. Charles H. Bennett " " 5 Dec 41
1st Lt. John T. Santore " " 3 Dec 41
1st Lt. Sidney Jenkins " " 7 Jan 42
1st Lt. John D. Manning " " 8 Jan 42
1st Lt. Ralph H. Renick " " 8 Jan 42

Strength List

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enlisted

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Death

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1780 Det Co "M" at Batangas observed unidentified aircraft on horizon.

Batangas located at 12° West, 130° East (RM 157 yd). Bateman established and maintained interior gfd for Advance. 854 cts.
January 8, 1943.

At Air Base.

0800-1700 Left Camp at Queen Tunnel.

Barge load 57mm, 81mm etc., arrived from Naples, partly distributed to Bss. Remainder night of 9 Jan.

1335-1318 Air Raid alarm; no bombing on Corregidor.

Promotions: 1st Lt. Hoaglund, William F. rank from 8 Dec 41.
1st Lt. D'yavich, Mickiel, 8 Jan 42
1st Lt. Schade, Lester A., 8 Jan 43
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>14</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1584</th>
<th>1620</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1491</td>
<td>1568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1584</td>
<td>1620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempd Standby</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Res</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Res</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 9, 1943

No air raids. Bombing on Corregidor.

0800-1700
Rest OP at Queen Tunnel.

All Beach defenses fully manned 1800-0730; 50% manned 0730-1800.

All communication procedure changed to conform with U.S. Army & U.S. Navy on Corregidor.

Ammunition taken to Soldiers; did not return this date for unloading.


1st Lt. Holdridge, Millard B. 3 Dec 41.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan 19</th>
<th>Jan 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempatt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deserter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp. &amp; Shang-fai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Res.</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 10 1942.

No bombing on Corregidor.

30 Encl. 3rd Bn to 1st Bn.

0630-1700 Regt Fl at Queen Tunnel.

1800-0730 All Beach Defense Positions fully manned.

0730-1800 50% " " manned.

Air raid alarm: 0930-1040.

Promotions: Lt. H. Lyon, Julian V. rank 5 Jan 42.

1st Lt. Hogan. Frederick H. " " 2 Jan 42.

1st Bn - East Sector Beach Defense.
January 10, 1943

Red Bel: 10 men St. Hughes
C & Co E 1 plato & Co Geary Ct.
1 Plato F 1 plato Coll Cheney Ravine
6 Men OP Hanna OP Morrison
10 Men MP's Maligat Tunnel

Strength report

Marines 64
Army 13
Total 77

Temp of Sharabi 1
Naval Res 138
January 11, 1942.

No bombings on Corregidor.

0800-1700 Regtl Col at Queen Tunnel.

1800-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.

0730-1800 50%, "at least,".

Air Raid Alarm: 0935-1020.

Major Schaeffer to R.T. Koep - Malaya.

Promotion: Capt. Davis, Howard & Rank Jr. - Dec 41.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>12/63</th>
<th>12/73</th>
<th>12/83</th>
<th>12/93</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1471</td>
<td>1563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>1620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsamp Shappgi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Safe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Lee</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 12, 1942.

No bombing this date.

0800-1700
Regt OP at Queen Tunnel.

1800-0700
All Beach Defense positions fully manned.

0730-1800
At least 50% " " manned.

1400
3rd bn. test fired all Beach Defense M6s.

1700
And the " " " " " " weapons including M6s,

37mm guns & Mortars.

All Regt Ammns received from Marineaco unloads from

barge.

No air raid alarms.
January 13, 1943.

No bombing this date.

0800-1700
Regt. Gp. at Argent Tunnels.

1800-0730
All beach defense positions fully manned.

0730-1800
About 50% in manned.

1700
One test fired at Beach Defense Line, 1st Battery in sector.
No air raid alarms.
<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1491</td>
<td>1568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>1620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp att</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployer</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempd Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hafe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Res</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 14, 1942. 9th Apr. bombers.

1236-1420  Bombs dropped at Middlesex. No casualties or damage to Marine Corps personnel or supplies.

0500-1700  Kept out at Queen tunnel.

1800-0830  All beach defense positions fully manned.

0730-0800  At least 50% " " manned.

Air raid alarms: 0903-0935

1836-1420  Bombs fell in Sarmay Ravine.

Stay: 117 West Rd - Rock Rd - Onton; gd USAFFE. Hq issued orders to move to Quarantine Station, Manueves for duty with Naval Brn. Movement completed after noon 15 Jan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>.30 Cal BMG</th>
<th>.50 Cal BMG</th>
<th>Lewis MG</th>
<th>37 mm</th>
<th>Mortars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn: Eas'</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. D. L.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. E. Beach</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. L. R.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Beach</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200' SE of RJ 43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2(modified)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, 1st Bn:</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn (Middle)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry Pt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry Pt &amp; Eng Dock</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng Dock</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malinta Pt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakwater Pt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramsey Ravine</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose Pt</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 (STM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, 3rd Bn:</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn (West)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Ravine</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. Pos., James Ravine</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheney Ravine</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trubb</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Shore</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1(81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, 2nd Bn:</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, Regt:</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RESERVE GUNS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bn</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tabulation of Beach Defense Reserves available on order of Harbor Defense Cmdr (See Par. 3(d) Opr Order No. 1-42):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>No. of Men</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHENEY</td>
<td>Post-720</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1 Platoon, 3 squads, 8 MGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 or 10 men;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 BAR, 2 Shotguns per squad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHEELER</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>C-59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEARY</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>H-59 4 MGs 1 BAR per squad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROCKETT</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>B-59 8 Mgs 1 BAR per squad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 15, 1943.

2nd B: 2 off 19 encl 2 MAT - Det L 471 Hy USAAF
10 - Ft. Hughes
1 Pl Co F; 1 Pl Co H - Cheney Battalion.
Co F; 1 Pl Co H - George St.
6 men - OPs Hannah & Morrison.
January 15, 1942.

0800-1200: Left CP at Queen Tunnel.

1600-0730: Able Beach Defense Position fully manned.

0730-1200: Air raid alarm: 0930-0937

1050-1055:

1543-1604: Dive bombing on ships. No deaths casualties.

The following msg received from Gen. MacArthur to all troops:

"Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of arrival of reinforcements is unknown, as they will have to fight their way through Japanese attempts against them. It is imperative that our troops hold until these reinforcements arrive."

"No further retreat is possible. We have more troops in Bataan than the Japanese have thrown against us. Our supplies are ample; a determined defense will defeat the enemy attacks."

"It is a question now of courage and of determination. Men who run will quickly be destroyed; men who fight will save their selves and their country."

"I call upon every soldier in Bataan to fight in his assigned position, resisting every attack. This is the only road to salvation. If we will fight we will win; if we relax we will be destroyed."

Maj. General N. E. Devers, noted case Easton Chester J.

PAL-TUSCM. See Marine Corps Dispatch 131557.
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Temp'd Shangri

1     1     2

4

P.M. Btry "A" moved from USAFFE guard's duty with Naval Base Quarantine Station, Manila.

Evening H. VanRag + 39 men returned to USAFFE established guard until relief secured.

Lt. Mann & Debrinck 47 encl. post USAFFE Hqrs, Batjan at Signal Hill. Relieved H. Vogeloom - Guard duty.
January 16, 1942.

0800-1700

Regt OP at Queen Tunnel.

1700

All Beach Defense positions fully manned.

3rd Bn test fired Matrice MG-89 75.

1st " " " BMG North Point.

3rd Bn began installing boat boom across South Harbor assisted by the Navy.

Air Raid alarms: 0715-0950

1140-1845

1825-1855

2350

Lt. Charles W. McElroy, Co I, found shot in the head by .30 cal. rifle. Board of investigation met, findings & opinion that death was accidental, in view of duty & not due to his own misconduct.

Radio sent to WSC. Next of kin not notified

Buried Jan 17, 1942, at Corregidor. Buried plot # 2, Howitzer Station Cemetery, Fort Will, P. I.

Capt Charles S. Celestine, 3rd wound in action

Capt. Richard J. Watson

Lt. Robert J. Brown, 2nd/15th, 3rd Bn, died at 4:20 am, 3 days of wounds received in action near Lemar, Bataan P. I., on 15 Jan 42. Buried Lot # 7, U. S. Cemetery, Limay, Bataan, P. I.

USAF 5th guard relieved by 5th under H. Mann. Guard 1st day 71 at Quarantine Station, Manila.
January 17, 1942.

0800-1800  Regt. Atat Green Tunnel.

1800-0730  At least 5 Ill Beach defense positions fully manned.

0730-1800  At least 50 of " " manned.

Ammunition and pyrotechnic redistributed see Regt Ammo Distribution List, 17 Jan 42, R-3.

At raid Marine: 1607-1724 - 9 dive bombers + several heavy bombers sighted; no bomblets dropped on corregidor.

Gen. MacArthur order: All gas masks will be checked immediately after bombing attacks by Japs as masks may be damaged from hitting ground or concussive de-engage outfit value.

Bty "A" fired 50 46s at 3 dive bombers bombing Delray Rock. Unconfirmed report from Navy that all planes went down in Manila Bay as a result.

1st Lt. Schade ordered to take command 190th SPS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defense Req</th>
<th>Detached Duty</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>(MAR)</th>
<th>(CORR)</th>
<th>(FTS)</th>
<th>DRUM HUGHES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq Co</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co &quot;T&quot;</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co &quot;K&quot;</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co &quot;L&quot;</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co &quot;H&quot;</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>667</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Company</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lateral #12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Sixteen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariveles (Orderly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Point</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilometer 14B, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital (Manila)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital (Corregidor)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion CP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFFE (Mariveles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramsey Ravine</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakwater</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariveles (USAFFE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital (Corregidor)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company &quot;K&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Point</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery &quot;A&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital (Corregidor)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company &quot;L&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Point</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital (Corregidor)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFFE (Mariveles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company &quot;M&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery &quot;G&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hughes .50 Cal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery &quot;I&quot; .50 Cal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company First Sergeants will notify Sergeant Major at Battalion CP of any changes in the above recapitulation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 18, 1942

0800 - 1700 Regt CP at Queen Tunnel.
1800 - 0730 Mt Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730 - 1800 At least 50% " " manned.

840 grenades, hand, frag. drawn from supply stock.

Def. of distributed to 1st Ind.One.

No air raid alarms or bombings this date.

3 men for Team "H" sent to Mt. Piest as air raid lookout.
1 Battalion of Bluejackets attached to Team "H" for training operations.
Strength report 18 Jan

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1490</td>
<td>1561</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1533</td>
<td>1619</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team att</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval base</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 19, 1942

0730-1800  Regt CP at Quees Tunnel
0800-0730  All Beach defense positions fully manned.  At left cp.. manned.
0730-1800  No bombing this date.

Anti Flot Boom at South Harford between south dock & west side of Ramsey Devine completed.

Fg. Robert J. Brown, 21-96187, Fg Adjt, died at 9:45 am.
Another Fg of Bluejacket killed at 5 Block A.
January 30, 1942

0730-1800 Lei'd up at Queen Tunnel.

1800-0730 All Beach defense positions fully manned.

0730-1800 At least 50% " " manned.

No air raids or bombings this date.

Beach defense points West sector inspected

M.D. John A. Burren passed 1st. temp. rank from Jan 13.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>1489</th>
<th>1560</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marines</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>1618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Temp Att.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. d Shanghai</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Rds</th>
<th>128</th>
<th>128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 31, 1942.

0730-1800 Pegli Wat, Queen Tunnel.

1600-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.

0730-1800 Abast 546. \[�\]

No bombing or air raids this date.
January 22, 1945

0730-1800 Regt CP at Queen Tunnel.
1800-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730-1800 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.

No air raid alarm or bombing on Corregidor since this date.

1st Bn, assisted by Navy detail, began installation of anti-boat boom across SE Harbor, Makaha Mill.

Total of 4-50 cal. MG manned by Daylight observation station, Makaha.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65 6 1487 1560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13 2 48 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78 8 1535 1618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cenpatto</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Lcs</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Lcs</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 23, 1942

0800-1700
2400-0600
Tpt 4 at Queen Tunnel

0700-0730
All Beach defence positions fully manned.
At least 500.

0730-0800
No air raid alarms or bombings on
Corregidor this date

1500
1st Bn. East Sector, test fired automatic rifles. North
Beaches.

Lt. Robert J. Brown, Agt Bn. 1st Bn., died at or about
1945 of wounds received in action at Bataan, P.I.,
on 16 January 1942. Not misconduct. Buried at
USN Cemetery No. 1, Port 4, Lumang, Bataan, P.I.

Sgt. Charles A. Eckstein, Agt Bn., wounded in
action same date, same place. Sent USA
Hospital #1, Lumang, Bataan, P.I.

Private Richard J. Watson, same as Eckstein.

Promotions to Capt.
Wade, Ernest W.

Lt. (Mc): Ferguson, George T.
Rafter, Edward F. Jr.

near Marquez, Bataan, P.I., buried 25 Jan USA Cemetery
#3, 97

Personnel from Btry "A", Btry "K", Btry "C", Btry "O"
Participated in engagements in Bataan - scout Bn.
Btry "C", Btry "M" Participated in Battle Laarawan
23-25 Jan 42. 1st Lt. Holdridge in both.
On 30 Jan 1945, I ordered Skujis to investigate reports of Japanese attack on Picket Hill. It was discovered that the Bluejackets of Marine NCOs under Maj. Preppett had moved to Picket Hill. (See copy of report of action of Picket Hill.) 3rd Platoon followed trail after departure of 2nd Platoon, to new position 200 yards west of Skipjack site. 1 squad left on hill to control trail and protect rear of Skipjack area. This squad remained in position until ordered to proceed and defend Skipjack on 27 Jan for full attack that day. Remainder of patrol patrolled area but not encountered.

Proceed to Picket Hill and took up position for night.

1st M6 squad departed from M6 area, set up defensive position at the middle NW of Picket Hill for night.

M6 position dangerous to delicate equipment due to withdrawal of rear lines, especially our artillery.
January 31, 1942.

8:00-11:00
Regt. rest. and use time for meals.

11:00-0:30
All beach defense positions fully manned.

0730-1800 At least 30% manned.

1700
Conference held by regt. command with Bn. commanders, CO, Regt. Records.

Inf. by fixed rifle and TMS fire at suspected light on beach off Shull's Ravine. Lt. Col. Anderson, 23 Jan 42.

No air raid alarms or bombings or losses reported this date.

Capt. Conwin B. House wounded in action - Batuan.


Japanese landed at Okaloma Bay & Bucot Hill.

Sunk on both sides of Main Line Bn - 1355-1405 - Col. Batuan. Petrol fuel out at intervals, but no contact made.
Strength report 31 Jan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>1489</th>
<th>1560</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troup</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1583</td>
<td>1618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th></th>
<th>8</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tempest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Old Shanghai&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Naval Air | 128 | 128 |
January 25, 1943

0930 1st Lt. 40 enl Co "H", B Co, Fm, shipped to USN section base, Marseilles, for field duty with ABT.

No air raid alarms or bombardment on Cassino this date.

0800-1700 Regt. OP at Queen tunnel.
1800-0730 All Beach defense positions fully manned.

0730-1845 At least 50% of "A" manned.

Lt. Reched with 1 BMG Platoon + 2 0.50s left for Marseilles, for offensive operations against enemy in vicinity West Hill. See B3 memo to Co.

Lt. Queen, 265435, Co "M" killed in action.

Lt. Warren J. Cresser, 275437, Co "M" killed in action 25 Jan; buried 27 Jan at US 4 Cemetery #3, Marseilles, Italy.

1st Lt. Kogelenbr and 23 enlisted participated in engagements against Japs forces at Cassino; captured "A", developed + occupied positions held by enemy previous day.
January 26, 1943.

No bombing or air raids this date on Espiritu.

0800-1700 Regt OP at Queen Tunnel.
1800-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730-1800 At least 50% Beach OP manned.
1700 Endt be test fired, MGs 4 37mm.

Capt. Max W. Clark USMCR accepted commission
his major temp), USMCR, rank fr 1 year.

PM- Following light mortar preparation, a patrol started
developed & occupied ridgeline. Attacked burial party to
bury dead of 47th. Returned to Ducat Hill for night.
Strength Report 26 Jan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>12</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>14.88</th>
<th>1559</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14.88</td>
<td>1559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td>1617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tempall

Tempal Shangri

Naval Bases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>128</th>
<th>128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MPAWS aided greatly successful bombing of two fields, airfields by US forces. This type of work is carried on continuously. Numerous other examples of value of this equip cannot be recorded.
January 27, 1942.

0800-1700 Light OP at Queen tunnel.
1800-0730 All Beach defense positions fully manned.
0730-1800 At least 50% Beach defense positions manned.
1700 1st BN test fired two recently emplaced BOLs at
North Point.

Armor transferred to 1st 88 mm M2A1 section at
Marshalls 88mm heavy

Previously 80

Newly 40

1810 Jap dive bombers attacked Saleafu:
No air raid or bombings this date.

1st Lt. W. J. Hoagboom, commanding detachment
of 4th Mar on temp duty with US Mt. Res, Bataan
O.P., and his detachment participated in en-
gagements against Japanese forces at Longas-
Bayang Pt. (3 enlisted). 3 men participated
in engagements against Jap forces at Pilot Hill.

Stay "A" co K

23 Jan - 28 Jan 43 following fatalities & casualties
at Longas-Bayang area:

Carter, W. F. Pfc. Killed

Wounded:

Monschein, W. H. Pfc.
Johansson, F. Pfc.
Kozuch, C. A. Pfc.

Colton, M. P.

281
PM of Naval Brn relieved by RBn, 52 Felipe F. Scant. Naval Brn went into reserve & Bayre withdrew to Quarantine, less 8 squad guard on front Hill.

USAFFE Ltd moved with USAFFE 15 Abn as rear guard to new Abn near Tito Bagnio. (KP 167-5)
January 28, 1943.

0800-1700 Regular Staff meeting.

1700-0730 Staff and Defense Positions fully manned.

0730-1800 Almost 50% " manned.

1st Br. test fired 6 BAs & 337mm.
<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1487</td>
<td>1558</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>1616</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempatt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 39, 1942

0800-1700 Regt CP at Queen Tunnel.
1800-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730-1800 50% R.oad " " manned.

Following list in Xc BN acc. comm. as acting Xc:

Garden, John E.
Begley, Ferdnndard T.
Hanklon, Benjamin D.

Adlt. Recon Party wounded in action - Bataan

Capt. William J. Smith
2d and 3d Plt., Btry. F. called to Xp. 179 (Nagel/Goel) to
meet reported break through by Jap. Scouts. Report
situation in hand & plts. returned to Quarantine.

MDAWS equip damaged by bombing & artillery fire.
January 30, 1945.

0800-1700 leg of Pointe du Hoc.
1800-0730 wk: Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730-1800 all positions manned.
3rd Bn test fired Stokes French Mortars.
1st Bn 6 BMG at Cavalry Point.

Following recommendations made to sector defense by relative to reinforcements for Beach Defense in the event more men become available:

1st Bn, 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn

Beach Defense
1st Bn: 25, 2/25, 2/35, 3/50, 3/65, 3/100
2nd Bn: 3/35, 3/65, 3/100
3rd Bn: 2/50, 2/100, 2/35

Reinforcements
1st Bn: 1 M6E1 (1/45), 3/65
2nd Bn: 1 M6E1 (1/45), 2/65
3rd Bn: 1 M6E1 (1/45), 2/65

Recapitation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Bn</th>
<th>2nd Bn</th>
<th>3rd Bn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer Enlisted</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Reserve:

1st Bn: 6
2nd Bn: 6
3rd Bn: 18

Total for Reserve: 33

(c) Beach Defense Reserves — 330 total
(d) Permanent details = additional 75mm gun crews - 320

See 29 Jan for pro. leg (g) 154

3d Bn and 3d Plt, 5th Bn, 3d Plt, called to KM 179 to investigate report of ships landing in Cassino vicinity. 3d Plt left at KM 179 and held procedures.
where it witnessed dropping up of Japs by a small party of scouts. All Japs killed.
January 31, 1942

1. Officer + 48 men, 2nd Bn, returned from detd at USN Section Base, Manus. Participated in action against enemy. Report later.

8mm Beach section, 1st Bn, returned same time.

Regt Reserve test fixed automatic weapons

0800-0900 24th CP at Queen's Tunnel.
1800-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0830-0840 At least 30?.

1st Bn began construction of anti-tank ditch at South Harbor.

Inter Bn: Transfer of communications: 125 grenades, hand, frag. transferred from 3rd Bn to 1st Bn.

No air raid alarms or bombings this day.

Stay A continued training of Naval Bn, based on critique of action.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>1487</th>
<th>1558</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempe Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Base</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 5, 1942

1000-1140 Indiv. manned Battle Stations in Beach Defense drill.

No bombings or air raids this date.

0730-1700 Regt Op at Queen Tunnel.
1800-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730-0730 At least one "..." manned.

1100-2136 Air raid warn. No bombing.

1200, Pvt. Andrew A. Labrozzi wounded in action.

Corp. William A. Smith
1st Squad, Btry H sent to Lingayen to operate with
Filipino Army unit setting up beach defenses.

Lt. Fulton, Corp. Swanson, Pfc. Gann, Pfc.
Bundgren assigned training as radio operator
on Station WTA from USAFFE Bn to continualll till
March 19.

MBAWS area bombed - no casualties.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Feb 1, 1948</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65 6</td>
<td>1487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13 8</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78 8</td>
<td>1530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Campatt*

Shanghai

Navel Reserve
February 2, 1943.

0800-1700  Regt CP at Queen Tunnel.
1800-0730  All Beach defense positions fully manned.
0730-1800  At least 50% " " manned.
2015-2215  Air raid alarm. No bombing.

Company "H"
From: The Battery Commander.
To: The Battalion Commander.
Subject: Narrative of Events.
Reference: (A) Battalion Order dated 1 February 1942.

2February, 1942.

1. The main body of this command was held on the top of Bucot Hill on the night of 26-27 January 1942 for departure to the attack on Longaskawayan Pt. on the morning of 27 January 1942. The force consisted roughly of four (4) overstrength squads, mixed Navy and Marine Corps personnel, myself commanding, and Lt. (jg) L. A. Pew, U.S. Navy, second in command.

2. At 0715, 27th, delivery of 81 MM mortar fire on Longaskawayan Pt was begun, with the 75MM and 2.95" mountain howitzer fire coming in shortly thereafter. Functioning as 81 MM mortar spotter, I directed the mortar fire to cover the ridge line, saddles and draws of Longaskawayan Pt. from about contour 200 to the extreme tip of the point. This mortar fire was delivered with such accuracy as to a peer to cover effectively all likely targets in view in the specified area. The effectiveness of other fire was not noted.

3. At 0800 the Battery "A" attacking force as a platoon, made its departure from Bucot Hill, leaving the forth squad under B.F. AUTREY, B.F. CTM, USN, to protect this hill. At 0815 the Duties of spotting 81 MM mortar fire were turned over to 2nd Lt. FULMER, USA 60 Coast Art., and I proceeded to join the unit.

4. The first mission of our force was to lightly patrol Laplay Pt. After patrolling the wooded section on the south-east bluff of Laplay Point, we proceeded by trail to our assigned position on the right flank of the attacking force on Longoskawayan Point.

5. The attack order for this platoon was: One squad under Sgt. "J" "T" Jenkins, USMC in assault on the right to cover the right beach line; one squad under Sgt. L.D. Sawyer, USMC, in assault, on the left; and one squad under Sgt. D.R. Bennett, USMC, in support behind our left assault squad. Contact with the right flank of the Battery "C" unit to our left was established and the platoon was moved into position on the line of departure as indicated above. At this time I turned over the platoon to Lt. Pew and went to report my disposition to Lt. Bowers, U.S. Navy and
BATTERY "A"
U.S. NAVAL BATTALION
MARIVELES, P.I.

SUBJECT: Narrative of Events (continued)

2 February 1942.

receive additional orders. I was not again on the line with my own platoon that day. On reporting to Lt. Bowers I was ordered to remain at the C.P. to act as adviser during the attack.

6. The attack force was not yet in readiness. 81 MM mortar fire was requested to cover the preparations and was delivered. This fire was drawn on the ridge line to within about 200 yards of our forming line. When the attack was later begun, the fire was moved down the ridge line at the expected rate of advance of our attack.

7. The plan of attack was to base the advance on the progress of the center of the line, as the ridge line, consisting of a series of hills, should be taken. As the attack was advanced, reserve forces were to be employed to organize each hill in succession for supporting the assault or for defense against counter attack.

8. When the report had been received that all units were in position and had established contact all along the assault line, the order was given to advance.

9. The attack had just gotten underway when shells, later identified as from our own 75 MM guns, began to fall in the rear and on the flanks of our force. The attack was held up for the investigation regarding identity, then resumed.

10. In the resumed attack it could be seen that the left flank, operating in a large, brushy, flat, draw, was advancing satisfactory. However, continued reports indicated little progress in the center. After better than an hour of the attack, with only one hump of the first hill taken despite complete silence from the enemy lines, I departed from the C.P. to investigate the holding of the center.

11. The center was found to be suffering from lack of leadership. No commissioned officer was present at this point in the line and the non-commissioned personnel appointed as squad leaders, etc were not sanctioning as such. The result was that the men were virtually taking cover awaiting orders. Sgt. A. J. Morgan, USMC, at this point brought a support squad into the center, and Sgt. L. D. Sawyer, USMC, was shifted from his squad to assist in the center. The center was then urged forward and with reluctant spurts began to get underway. The taking of the complete first hill was reported to C.P. by runner.

12. In the meantime the mortar fire had been ceased and the enemy during the lull had reorganized their defensive forces for the next hill. When the point of the advance, led by Sgt. Morgan,
BATTERY "A"
U.S. NAVAL BATTALION
MARIVELES, P.I. 2 February 1942.

SUBJECT: Narrative of Events (continued)

had started up the nearer slope of the next hill, the enemy, for the first time, opened fire, with machine guns and rifles. This fire was well laid on the military crest of the reverse slope of the first hill in such a manner as to sweep the crest and slope, apparently in an attempt to catch our forward elements behind a cross fire, trapping them. An attempt was made to gain fire superiority, which resulted only in an increase in the tempo of the fire of the enemy. In the dense underbrush it was impossible to even closely approximate the location of the enemy machine guns. An attempt to place a Lewis gun failed as all likely places were being swept by fire. I returned to the C.P. to report the situation and request orders.

13. Orders were received to have the line fall back beyond the sweep of the enemy machine-guns (on a line with the saddle of the first hill). Messengers were sent out to pass the orders on to the assault units, returning to inform that the line had properly withdrawn and was intact from flank to flank. Mortar fire was requested and received. Orders were sent to the line to dig in and prepare to hold the existing situation for continued action the next day.

14. The enemy then apparently prepared to counter attack. Two rounds of enemy mortar fire dropped between the C.P. and the line before the pieces were silenced by our own supporting fire. Enemy machine-guns and snipers were moved forward to cover our front and flanks. A patrol, apparently enemy, was reported to be working around Nawankis Bay toward our left rear. A further development was that the left flank not only was not intact but that the left flank unit could not be located. (It was later found that his unit had advanced about 200 yards beyond the line, leaving a gap through which enemy snipers infiltrated, to the rear of the unit and beyond to the rear of the main line). A request was made to have our force withdrawn to the main ridge line, which order was received.

15. Runners were sent to the line to order the units to prepare to withdraw. Some parts of the line received this order and began immediate execution, necessitating the actual order of execution sooner than was planned. As the line units were withdrawing, U.P. was evacuating, removing a quantity of automatic weapons and ammunition. Enemy machine-guns and sniper fire was becoming particularly heavy. Mortar fire was again requested to cover the withdrawal.

16. Enemy machine-gunners and snipers pressed hard on the withdrawal, in several cases setting up ambushes in line of
BATTERY "A"
U. S. NAVAL BATTALION
MARIVELES, P. I.

SUBJECT: Narrative of Events (continued) 2 February, 1942.

In one instance, the unit with Sgt. L.D. Sawyer, USMC, was ambushed by a team of three machine-guns. The unit was saved from possible annihilation only by the prompt and effective action of Sgt. Sawyer, PFC Chamberlain, R. G., USMC, Pvt J. D. Harkins, USMC and J. G. Chenoweth, T.M.3c, USN in opening an avenue of escape and covering the escape with their fire. These four men are deserving of special commendation for their determined and courageous action.

17. As a result of the premature nature of the withdrawal and the effects of the pressing enemy fire, disorganization was apparent. Only small groups remained on the main ridge line to form a defensive organization. However, strongpoints were there formed and few of the enemy passed beyond this line.

W. F. HOGABOOM.
COMPANY "D", FIRST BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES.

January 31, 1942.

From:

Gunnery Sergeant H. M. Ferrell, U.S.M.C.
The Commanding Officer, First Battalion, Fourth Marines.

Subject:

Temporary duty of Mortar Platoon, vicinity of Mariveles, Bataan, Philippine Islands, from January 25, 1942, to January 30, 1942, inclusive.

1. 25 January, 1942. The mortar platoon, attached to a platoon from "H" Company under Second Lieutenant Peshek, U. S. Marine Corps, embarked aboard a U. S. Navy tug at 1100. We disembarked at the Mariveles Quarantine Station at 1230, and proceeded via truck to a trail about one-half mile north of kilometer marker #178; we moved into position by hand to the saddle at 1843.60-818.60. We opened fire at 1415 on Longaskawayan point with the first squad mortar. The second squad mortar moved to a position to the rear of the ridge south of Gulad Bay, and opened fire on Lapay point. Fire on these points was continued throughout the afternoon as requested. Friendly troops occupied Lapay Point in the late afternoon, but were withdrawn sometime during the evening. We returned to Mariveles in the evening to get more ammunition and for evening meal. The ammunition was scrambled, and at 0100 the platoon moved to the position previously occupied by the second squad. Cossack posts were established.

2. 26 January, 1942. Mortar fire was not requested during the morning. Corporal Muniz and three men were sent as requested by Commander Bridget, U. S. Navy to the saddle at the neck of Longaskawayan point and ordered to report to Lieutenant Perez, U. S. Army, to assist in the operation of a mountain howitzer. At approximately 1500, fire was opened on Longaskawayan. Only about twenty rounds were expended, and we were informed by Lieutenant Peshek that the rounds were fired as spotting shots in preparation for an attack the following day. The mortar platoon remained in position. Cossack posts were posted to our rear and right flank.

3. 27 January, 1942. Fire by both mortars was placed on Longaskawayan point at 0830, and was continued as requested until about 1100. Commander Bridget called for a small patrol to proceed around the beach and contact a small army patrol which had left our position about two hours previously. The patrol returned after covering the beach as far as Lapay point, but did not find the Army patrol. A ten man patrol, with Private
COMPANY "D", FIRST BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES.

PROJECT: Temporary duty of Mortar Platoon, vicinity of Mariveles, Bataan, Philippine Islands, from January 25, 1942, to January 30, 1942, inclusive.

First Glass Rivera as guide was then sent by Lieutenant Peshek over the same route. On a ledge near Laplay point, a wounded Japanese soldier was sound, also various articles of clothing and equipment. The army patrol had previously found the wounded Japanese. At 1300, Platoon Sergeant Dudley with the second squad mortar was moved to the flats in rear of Lelain point, and opened mortar fire with both heavy and light shells on Longasakawayan point as requested. The returned at 1830, and the mortar platoon bivouced in its same position. Company posts were posted as on the previous nights.

4. 28 January, 1942. We were moved back to the saddle position (1843.60-818.40) at 0700. Again one mortar was moved into position in rear of “Lelain point. Fire was delivered as ordered. The squad returned at 1700, and our platoon bivouced with the platoon from "H" company. We then added only four rounds of H.E. (light) ammunition left. Corporal Muniz and his detail of three men returned about the same time.

5. 29 January, 1942. The mortar platoon remained on the saddle with the platoon of "H" company. At 1030, I was sent to Lelain point as an observer by Lieutenant Peshek, who had been there since 0630. I returned at 1800.

6. 30 January, 1942. We were ordered to prepare to move back to Mariveles upon receipt of orders. We returned to kilometer marker #179 at 1330, and a patrol of 8 men from the mortar platoon two from "H" company, and myself were taken on a patrol by Commander Bridget to investigate Pucat ridge and the beach to the east for a group of about fifteen Japanese reported in that area. We returned at 1730, were sent into Mariveles by truck for evening meal. We embarked aboard a U.S. Navy tug at 2230, disembarked at Corregidor at 2400.

/s/ H. M. FERRELL.
February 2, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

From:  Second Lieutenant Michael E. Peshek,
U.S. Marine Corps.

To:    The Battalion Commander.

Via:   The Company Commander, Company "H".

Subject:    Report of operation of Marine Detachment sent to
BATAAN on 25 January, 1942.

1.  Upon arriving at the Quarantine Station on 25 January, 1942, all hands (57) were issued rations and transported to the vicinity of PONATOC BAY, arriving there at 1330. The two 81MM mortars were immediately implaced and we shelled LEPTAY POINT and LONGASKAWAYAN POINT for three hours. After our fire lifted the infantry troops started their advance. When the attack started my platoon was moved back to the Quarantine Station. Shortly after arriving at the Station we were requested to furnish a litter party. 18 men and the two corpsmen formed this party to carry in the casualties resulting from this attack. The remaining men scraped 81MM mortar shells in preparation for the next day's firing.

2.  At 0100 26 January, we again entrucked with our equipment and food supplies and returned to PONATOC BAY and set up the mortars. The machine guns were held in reserve to protect the right flank. Leaving GySgt. Ferrell in charge of the mortars and PlSgt. Ussery in charge of the machine guns, I went forward to reconnoiter the area to select positions to deliver direct machine gun support and better 81MM fire. I reached the top of PUCOT MOUNTAIN at daylight and there contacted Lt. Hogaboom. I returned to KP 179, the location of the Naval Battalion CP, at 0900 and gathered more information from Lt. Simpson. I then climbed MAUANKIS MOUNTAIN and selected likely positions to put machine guns on either side of the nose projecting down to LONGASKAWAYAN POINT to assist the attack by fire. I made my report and recommendations to Commander Bridge that afternoon about 1530. He ordered that we remain in the present position on the right flank.

3.  The next morning, 27 January, artillery and 81MM mortar preparation fire was placed on LONGASKAWAYAN POINT. (LEPTAY POINT) had been taken, and the Naval Battalion, a collection of marines, NAD personnel, Pursuit Group, and miscellaneous other naval personnel, started the attack about 0830. The 81MM mortars laid fire on LONGASKAWAYAN POINT, being spotted by an artillery officer from PUCOT MOUNTAIN. At 1200 the attack was stopped by heavy machine gun and 60MM mortar fire, and the commander ordered the Naval Battalion to dig in and wait for the 2nd Battalion, 57th Infantry.
to pass through their lines. The 57th took up this line around 1700 on 27 January. I informed LtCol. Cranberry, the BNComdr, of my positions and assistance I was able to render.

4. The 57th launched their attack the next morning, the 28th of January, about 0800. Around 1000, twenty Filipinos with a section of .50 caliber machine guns and two .50 caliber machine guns reported to me. They had orders to go in position on LATAIN POINT and deliver harassing fire on LONGASKAWAYAN POINT. (I had previously requested permission to do this). I furnished ammunition to this section and emplaced them in previously selected positions. Also one 81MM mortar was improvised in the ravine east of LATAIN POINT. Shortly thereafter we delivered effective machine gun and mortar fire on LONGASKAWAYAN POINT in support of the attack being made. The 57th was held up at 1700 that day and withdrew so that 12 in. mortar fire from CORREGIDOR could be placed on the point.

5. The morning of the 29th, 76MM gun fire on the north, 12 in. mortar fire on the south, and 3 in. gun fire on the west from the USS QUAIL, started the attack. The 12 in. mortar fire was ineffective. The position was taken about 1630, except for mopping up. 7 or 8 remaining Japanese at the top of the point committed suicide by jumping over the edge of the cliff as the assault closed in.

6. We remained in position that night and about noon the next day we were ordered to withdraw. When we arrived at the CP GySgt Ferrell and eight of my men were ordered to go with Commander Bridget to check a ravine near where the Japanese had been operating, and I guided Major Scales, with a platoon of Scouts, and a platoon of Marines, to LATAIN POINT to check that point where the scouts had reported seeing some men. In my opinion these men (that were found and annihilated by a scout patrol previous to our arrival) had just managed to get to the point and were slowly dying. There were seven all nude, and badly wounded.

7. I was released by Commander Bridget at 1730, 30 January, and boarded the USS RANGER at 2215 that night for CORREGIDOR. We expended 17,000 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition and 392 rounds of 81MM mortar shells.

S? MICHAEL E. PESHKE.
February 3, 1942

0800-1700: Repl' CP at Queen tunnel.
1800-0730: All Beach defense positions fully manned.
0730-1800: At least 50% "manned" 1st Br completed installation of anti-boat boom across S.E. Harbor, Malinta Hill, from eastern side San Jose Ct. to Camp Ct.
1135-1230: Sirens raid alarm, Bombs dropped in water near San Jose Ct. off Hooeh Ct.

MDAMS moved to new site at night due west of Bataan airfield X4.156.5, Bataan P.O.
February 4, 1942.

0800-1700 Regt. Plat Queen Tunnel.
1800-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730-1800 Ft. lead 50% manned.

No air raids or bombing this date.

Following men wounded in action between 26-28 January 1942 in Katzen:

Serious: Capt. W. Mensching
Fred Johannsen
Stanley F. Losch

Slightly: 1st lt. William E. Holdridge
Igs. Joseph W. Cinti
Robert A. Clement
Corps. Mitchell Cohen
William J. Smith

Hylopt. James J. Stanek
Igs. Andrew J. Worsho
Campbell Louis
Robert E. Taylor
Thomson Danny

Pipe: Carl J. Nordine
Corwen E. Morey.

MDRMS set up equip.
February 5, 1943.

No air raids or bombings this date.

0800-1700
Real Art Queen Tunnel.

1800-0700
All Beach Defense positions fully manned.

0700-1800
At least 50% Beach Defense positions manned.

First Lieutenants promoted to captain (temp):

- Conner, Robert F., rank from 2 Feb 43.
- Crick, Roland E. Jr., rank
- Engeman, James E.
- Grover, Martin C.
- Hettel, Hugh E.
- Hackett, William E.
- Dillor, Ted E.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February 5, 1942</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65  6  1487  1558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13  8  43   58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78  8  1530  1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp M. at</td>
<td>1  1  2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp at Shanghai</td>
<td>1  3   4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>138  138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 6, 1942

0800-1700 Rest of at Queen Tunnel.
1300-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730-1800 At least 50% Beach Defense positions manned.
0800-1100 Japanese began shelling. St. Mills, St. Drum, St. Frank with artilleryemplaced on W.W. coast of Guite province. Many shells landed on St. Mills all of about 105 mm.

So. Fred Shanoen wounded in action - Batan
February 7, 1943.

Sgt. Charles C. Sheed, awarded Silver Star for gallantry in action by CG USAFFE for gallantry in action at Port Moresby, New Guinea, on December 29, 1944. Volunteered to drive two wounded men to hospital during bombing attack by truck; men had been abandoned by driver. Trip successful through bombing aircraft streamlining by enemy.

Sgt. Alexander Katchuck, same as above—assisted in deporting wounded men to hospital.

0600-1700

Critt of Port Queen Tunnel

All Beach defense positions fully manned. At least 50% Beach defense positions manned.

1700

3rd Sq. tank fired 4S7M (West side Malinta Hill). Artillery shelling. Shells fell on H. Mile at 4 minute intervals.

MDWSS Schedule: down at 10 pm then secured at 2400, 0200 & 0400.
February 8, 1942.

0800-1700: Reptl of Pat Queen Channel.

1800-0730: All Beach Defense positions fully manned.

0730-1800: At least 50% Beach Defense positions manned.

1st Bn began work on installation of anti-boat boom across Embudo river, connecting beach between Malinta Jr & Engineer St.

No air raids; no bombings; no artillery shelling on Corregidor this date.

Promoted to first lieutenant: Second Lieutenants Jenks, Robert E., rank from Jan 01, 1435.

Maffett, Samuel, Jr.

Stone, James W.

Casher, Michael E.

Sgt. Jenks, 1st, Mayor's Pkt. Cpl. Boy H., volunteered to go up under water boat to search caves around Aglipaya Pt. after 3 hr. search, during which many gaps were cleared out of the caves, boats were attacked by dive torpedoes. Boat was badly damaged by torpedoes alongside, killing two & injuring several. Boat reached & then partly destroyed by planes. None of our men injured.

Boat took .50 caliber machine guns over bamboo. Pilot began to trail smoke. Over bamboo.

Boat took .50 caliber machine guns over bamboo. Pilot began to trail smoke. Over bamboo.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>1487</th>
<th>1568</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaports</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honds</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 9, 1943

Artillery shelling by Japs. Concentrated against H. Dairy.

3000 tons fired 4 3" STA. 66% of 30 spot fired were direct. Enemy ordinance requested to check 3" STA shelled (all 30's issues).

No air raids.

Dogfight took place overhead between Jap and American fighters.
February 10, 1943
Regt OP and Beach Defense - same.
3rd Br continued work on South Harbor anti-tank ditch.
No air raid.
February 11, 1945

Regt CP by beach defenses some.
1335-1404 Special bombs dropped by dive bombers.
Lt. Harald W. Farrell ace warrant as New York (Artillery), rank from 87th Aug 44.
February 11, 1943

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>$7</td>
<td>1486</td>
<td>1558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>$9</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp at</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 15, 1946.
Legh Lt of Beach Defense positions same.
Jap artillery concentrated on 4th flank.
3rd Btry fired 57s.
Capt. John C. Elliston, KIA, 36, wounded in action.

MDAWS closed down unit & moved to 500 yds to better position.
February 13, 1945.
Regt OP and Beach Defenses - same.
No artillery shelling or air raids this date.

MPAWS resumed operation.
February 13, 1942

Strength report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marine</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>1486</th>
<th>1558</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp att</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp d Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regt CP of Beach Defense — Same

No artillery shelling or air raids this date.

Cpl Y. B. Bilakas, AH Plt, Det DC 114", Ft. Hughes, sent to Malintupps (psychopathic ward) for observation.

Strength of this Det from this date to Feb 26 - 11th Bn
February 15, 1942

1530-1800 Island under shell fire. H. Frank returned fire.
Regt. C, 3rd Beach Defense gun.

1640-1900 Artillery shelling by Japo. 100 rounds at H. Mills; 13 rounds at Lost Frank; 4 rounds at H. Hedge.

2115-2300 Counter battery fire by H. Mills & H. Frank.

No air raids this date.
February 15, 1943

**Strength Report**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1486</th>
<th>1558</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent to Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 16, 1943.
Reg't CP & Beach Defense Zone

1100 Ft. Miller shelled by enemy artillery.

1130 Artillery shelling by Japs from Olowan.

No air raid alarms.

Post to Lt (DC) USN: Strangman, William L. Hay
Knight, Henry C. Lt (jg) USN
February 17, 1942
Reg't D & Beach Defense same.

0854 Fort Mille shelled sporadically. Gilberto shelled by 105mm shells; 155mm shells this date.
No marine casualties.

1330 Counter battery fire from H. Mills Fire.
No air raid alarms.

U. S. Navy personnel job 46 Map from Section
Base Marseille. See strength report.

MDAWS preparation curtailed due to gas shortage. Today
& in future will operate only upon direct in-
stations. Operating intermittently.
February 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>47</th>
<th>1,486</th>
<th>1,538</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>1,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempfat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp d. Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reservol</td>
<td></td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>731</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN B</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 18, 1945

Some artillery fire by Japs during day.

One air attack. No bombs dropped.

St. Frank fired 14" guns on jap positions in Bataan Province; counter battery fire.

Regt OP and Beach Defense positions same.

Detachment of Philippine Army troops reported for duty north of Hker. See strength report.

Bay A returned from Quanantine Station. Manoeuver; Stry split up upon arrival at Xeleguer.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>1486</th>
<th>1558</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temptat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops at Hongkong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Troops</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>731</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 19, 1942

Estf' Cl. 4 Beach defense positions—same. Artillery shelling by Japs.

0234 "H. Frank
0744 " " Mile
1340 " " " "
2916 " " " "
2338 " " " "

1600 Counter battery fire. No air raid alarm.

Btry "A", 31 Br, reported from Det d with U.S. Naval Br, Mauritius; assigned to 2nd Regt Reserve.

Additional U.S. Naval unit reported for duty with 4th Det from U.S. Naval Br, Philadelphia, also Philippine Army troops. See strength report.
February 20, 1943

Rept. of Beach defense positions—same. 0930-1700 artillery shelling by Jap.
No air raids.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>1486</th>
<th>1558</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tempate: 2

Tients and Shanghai: 1

Naval Reserve: 128

Philippine Amy: 705
February 21, 1943.

0800-1700, Kelly CP & Beach Defense positions same.

Following gun crews organized to replace man additional Beach Defense guns.

1st BN 2nd BN 3rd BN

USN 1 Navy 3" 1 Navy 3"

USMC 3-50 cal MG (NC) 1-50 cal MG (AC)

No air raids or artillery fire this date.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February 31</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1486</td>
<td>1558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1589</td>
<td>1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempratt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp. Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army 26</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>705</td>
<td></td>
<td>731</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 22, 1945

0800 - project CP & beach defense - same. 

Col. Howard & Field Engineer made reconnaissance of middle & west sectors to pick positions for 75 mm 4.5 guns.

No air raids or artillery fire this date.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February 26</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1486</td>
<td>1558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp att</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Rosario</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Arm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>705</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 23, 1943.

Regt CP & Beach Defense - same.

0800-1700 Regt CP & Beach Defense positions - same.

Additional weapons implaced this date:

1st Bn. 2nd Bn. 3rd Bn.
3 cal. 50 M6 (W) 4 cal. 50 M6 (A) 2 cal. 50 M6 (W)
1 Navy 3" 23 cal. 1 Navy 3" 23 cal.
2-75 mm.

Additional .50 cal ammo issued to Bns.

Regt 4th organized 2 cos. for Regt Reserve.

8th M6 transferred to Regt Reserve each co. to organize one 4-pdr M16 plat.

No air raids or artillery fire on Concepcion.
February 23.

Marine  65  7  1486  1558
Navy  13  1  43  57
Total  78  8  1529  1615

Shanghai  1  3  4

Naval Reserve  188  188
Philippine Army  705  731
February 24, 1943

0500-1700, lleg E P a Beach Defense, same.

0900, Maj. Gen. Moore inspected Beach Defense 31 BN. Artillery fire or air raids.
February 25, 1942

0800-1700: CG with BG McClellan, CSL, and MG Moore surveyed entire beach defenses.

Major General Moore inspected East sector.

No air raids or artillery fire this date.

NDAMS secured marine radio operators return for Army unit at Bagac. Navy telephone receiver exchanged for Philippine Bn. of radio equipment. Det is completely marine except 3 naval att, 1 corporal, 2 U.S.N. cooks. Strength 1 staff 38 men.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January 25</th>
<th>February 25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>15529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total All</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp &amp; Art</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp &amp; Art &amp;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil &amp; Reserve</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army &amp; Art</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 25, 1944

2800-1700 Regt \#30 Beach defended same.
Major General Moore inspected Wet sector
Beach defenses.

Following men awarded Silver Star for gallantry
in action at Ty Mills, P.O., 16 Feb 44:

Fay, Lloyd F., 1st Lt.
Barrett, Donald J., 1st Lt.
Carbrook, C. W. 1st Lt.
Engstrom, Albert T., 1st Lt.

No artillery fire or air raids this date.
February 27, 1942

Regt B & Beach Defense Positions - same.
West Sector - 1 81mm mortars, 3 30.06 cal MG.

1330

Midday held Beach Defense.

Infantryman drawn from economy: 30, 160 lbs. each.
No air raids or artillery shellings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February 27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempatt</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Base</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army 26</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The numbers in the table are likely counts or quantities, but the context is not provided.
February 28, 1944.
6th Inf. Div. Beach defense positions - same.
1st BN held Beach defense drill.
10 BMGS & 15 BARs drawn from Army.
852 BMGs drawn loaded. 8 distributed:
1st BN: 178; 2nd BN: 348; 3rd BN: 143; 5th Battery: 83.
8-18" Army searchlights issued to 1st BN (W sector) for
Beach defense installation.
No shelling or air raids.

Hand for 0316.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>1485</th>
<th>1588</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1588</td>
<td>1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temple Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temple Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Air Base</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>730</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 1, 1943

Legth Of Beach Defense: south.

- Navy 3 lb. guns, 400 40mm. received from Section Base, Manilla. Guns to be improved.

2nd Bn. tested fired 1-50 cal. MG, 1-41 M, 3 BM 24.2 Enfield rifles.

Col. virus: no draftees. Situation to be examined 28th Feb.

No artillery shelling or air raids.
<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1485</td>
<td>1558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>730</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 2, 1942.

Goat U/S Beach Defense - same.

Additional weapons issued - Ammunition

1st BN. - 5 BAR

2nd BN. - 4 BAR & 8 BMG

3rd BN. - 9 BAR

No shellings or air raids this date.

O/N Sgt. William J. Deboisacco warrant at lighttemp - 10/10 C. March.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strength Report Mar.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65 9 1484 1558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13 1 43 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78 10 1587 1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hongkong</td>
<td>1 1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reopen Shanghai</td>
<td>1 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>704 730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 3, 1942


No air raid shelling.

33-1132. No bombs, 4 new type twin motor dive bombers reported in vicinity of Avote air raid alarm sounds.

Following men awarded Purple Heart for wounds received in action at H. Mills on date shown:


Sgt. Charley W. Sugino - do

Cpl. Lawrence E. Welter - do

St. James J. Schner - do

Cpl. John O. O'Donnel, Jr. - do

Cpl. Frank J. Falke - do

Pte. Donald L. Bempeny - 6 January 42

Cpl. Warren A. Smith - do

Cpl. Wesley E. Little - 6 January 42

In support of Gen. Casey (Eng.) Pte. W. R. Sinderfelt detailed to accompany him and Major Heyon inspection trip to front lines Bitlein.

MDAWS has acute gas shortage. Operations limited from now on to times when American planes are about to take off except when in air or on very special occasions.
Dec 4, 1942

Regt of Beach Defense Force.
Following men awarded Purple Heart:
Sgt. Emmet J. Nolan
Lt. Clif W. Kagesoa
Lt. Lawrence E. Welger
Cpl. Wesley L. Lathe
Cpl.James L. Feiner
Cpl. Ronald J. Bernardz
Cpl. Dan F. Donnell
Frank Key
W. A. Smith

Field Test fired 5 .30 cal MG.
No live rounds or artillery firing.

0130 3rd Bn reported 2000 glowed ashore near Battery Point. Had been observed by sentries while drifting in. Obviously empty. Hole in bottom reported to regiment.

1500 Ramsey Land reported large fire on south shore (Lyons) on a line to the right of Fort Drum. Reported to regiment.
<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1484</td>
<td>1358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1527</td>
<td>1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiyatt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Tempd. Chang 
\nNaval Service |  |  | 116  | 116  |
| Philippine Army |  |  | 704  | 730  |
March 5

Reg't CP & Beach Defense Zone.

At 0310 test fired 3-50 3/8" S.D.

3rd BN " " 3-50 cal. 16.

Died bombing on Ft. Frank; no artillery fire.

Received message from Regiment "Sounds like airplane approaching from north."

3rd BN test fired .50 caliber A.T. gun at Spanish Fort Area; .53 caliber A.B. guns at Malinta Point and Battery Point Area.

Ramsey Avenue 07 reported lights on south shore (Ft. Yam). Hour lights and any fire reported to Regiment.


D Hạt. Robert A. Clement - Mt. Aco - 13 Jan 42.

Sgt. Charles W. Capo - Langisburyn at 26-5 Jan 42.


Charles L. Copenhagen - Bataan Province - 16 Jan 42.

Corp. Nathan A. Muncy - 5511 KIA N CO March 23

John A. Frazell - do do

Ellery J. Smith - Langisburyn Pl. - 25 Jan

Engr. Frederick E. Thomas - do do

Pvt. Earnest H. Nelson - do do

John O. Starnes - do - 24 Jan 42

C. W. Campbell - over do - 25 Jan 42
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilfred H. MacIntyre</td>
<td>LC:1st</td>
<td>Longsannavat</td>
<td>25 Jun '46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren A. Montgomery</td>
<td>SS:1st</td>
<td>Montebelo</td>
<td>25 Jun '46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert E. Taylor</td>
<td>LC:1st</td>
<td>Longsannavat</td>
<td>24 Jun '46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph B. Elliott</td>
<td>LC:1st</td>
<td>Babylo</td>
<td>16 Feb '46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornton E. Murphy</td>
<td>LC:1st</td>
<td>Longsannavat</td>
<td>27 Jan '46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard R. Morley</td>
<td>LC:1st</td>
<td>Longsannavat</td>
<td>27 Jan '46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strength Report**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LC:1st</th>
<th>SC:1st</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maurice</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kennett**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LC:1st</th>
<th>SC:1st</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Razale Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LC:1st</th>
<th>SC:1st</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Philippines Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LC:1st</th>
<th>SC:1st</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>780</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 6, 1945.

Seal of & Beach defenses same.

US artillery shelling, no air raids.
March 7, 1446
30th CP & Beach defenses same.
155 mm gun to 42nd BN.
No artillery shelling, no air raids.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Name</th>
<th>Serial No</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Piece of Work</th>
<th>Grave No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Moore</td>
<td>290305</td>
<td>12-31-41</td>
<td>Maricopa Cemetery</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt. Poole</td>
<td>290404</td>
<td>12-31-41</td>
<td>Kansas Moore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Murphy</td>
<td>24344</td>
<td>12-31-41</td>
<td>Lot 8, Row 1, Grave 3, Section Cemetery, Fort Mills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Anderson</td>
<td>280085</td>
<td>1-3-42</td>
<td>Lot 8, Row 2, Grave 3, Section Cemetery, Fort Mills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. McElain</td>
<td>284224</td>
<td>1-16-42</td>
<td>Accidental discharge, new grave, Lot 8, Row 2, Grave 23, Section Cemetery, Fort Mills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pvt. Stovall</td>
<td>396184</td>
<td>1-16-42</td>
<td>U.S. Army Company, Lot 7, Section Cemetery, Fort Mills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pvt. Sitton</td>
<td>265953</td>
<td>1-31-42</td>
<td>Lot 7, Section Cemetery, Fort Mills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pvt. Carver</td>
<td>375637</td>
<td>1-25-42</td>
<td>Lot 7, Section Cemetery, Fort Mills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD

OF

EVENTS

BOOK TWO
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>Killed in Action</th>
<th>Wounded in Action</th>
<th>Died of Action</th>
<th>Missing in Action</th>
<th>Suicide</th>
<th>Death of Accident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 DEC 41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 DEC 41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jan 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jan 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jan 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jan 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar 42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar 42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Mar 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Mar 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Mar 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Apr 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Apr 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Apr 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Apr 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Apr 42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Apr 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Apr 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Apr 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Apr 42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Apr 42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Apr 42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Apr 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 May 42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deaths are entered on alphabetically on tabbed pages.

Deaths 4th Mar - Period 8 Oct 1941 from December

8 men killed to date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Serial No</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Location of Grave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>CHESTER</td>
<td>870427</td>
<td>9 Apr 42</td>
<td>Wounded, died in action during enemy artillery bombardment near Malinta, Bataan, P.I. Buried P.O.W. Camp, Bataan, P.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>ALBERTS</td>
<td>819248</td>
<td>15 Apr 42</td>
<td>Died of septic infection caused by wound received in action. Buried P.O.W. Camp, Bataan, P.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>292857</td>
<td>26 Mar 42</td>
<td>Buried at sea, P.O.W. Camp, Bataan, P.I.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 PFC. ANDREWS, Verdon G. 290085 2 Jan 42
3 PFC. BROWN, Robert J. 896184 16 Jan 42
3 PFC. CARVER, Warren J. 875637 25 Jan 42
DEATHS

PFC. FAIN, Truman J.  B80021  21 Apr 42  Missing in action
DEATHS

PFC. GREER, Charles R. 244422 15 Apr 42 Died of wounds received in action


PFC. HOLMES, Irving E. 250437 24 Apr 42 Missing in action
Killed in action as result of enemy artillery fire. Buried plot 57, row 12, grave 30, family plot, Ill.

Sgt. HELMS, Philip 266169 29 Apr 42 Grave 30, family plot, Ill.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Service No.</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Cause of Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>KEELER, John R</td>
<td>280833</td>
<td>14-4-45</td>
<td>Hit by enemy aircraft during combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp</td>
<td>KITE, &quot;T&quot; &quot;J&quot;</td>
<td>278394</td>
<td>8-May-42</td>
<td>Killed in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>JAMES, John D</td>
<td>290930</td>
<td>8-May-42</td>
<td>Killed in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RANK</td>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>SER/NO:</td>
<td>DATE OF DEATH</td>
<td>LOCATION OF GRAVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC.</td>
<td>PAULIN, Kenneth R.</td>
<td>281387</td>
<td>20 Mar 42</td>
<td>30茉和, Station Cemetery, F.Mills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp.(GM)</td>
<td>MEESSEN, Sam L.</td>
<td>273377</td>
<td>15 Apr 42</td>
<td>Wounds received in action on 15 Apr 42 at F.Mills, P.I., during enemy air bombardment, Buried 15 Apr 42, Plot C, ROW #5, Grave #6, Station Cemetery, F.Mills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>MESSICK, Harvey</td>
<td>293495</td>
<td>15 Apr 42</td>
<td>Wounds received in action on 15 Apr 42 at F.Mills, P.I., during enemy air bombardment, Buried 15 Apr 42, ROW #9, GRAVE #6, Station Cemetery, F.Mills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC.</td>
<td>MOORE, George S.</td>
<td>290305</td>
<td>24 Dec 41</td>
<td>Killed in action during bombing of French Ship S/S KIANG. Buried in Marne Valley Cemetery, NW Section, between two trees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC.</td>
<td>MCCLAIN, Charles W.</td>
<td>284224</td>
<td>16 Jan 42</td>
<td>Exploded on train in Germany. Buried Plot C, ROW #5, Grave #60, Station Cemetery, F.Mills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC.</td>
<td>POOLE, Gradie C.</td>
<td>290404</td>
<td>24 Dec 41</td>
<td>Same as Moore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>MURPHY, Verle W.</td>
<td>244344</td>
<td>20 Dec 41</td>
<td>Died of accidental discharge of own rifle. Buried Plot B, ROW #1, Grave #6, Station Cemetery, F.Mills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC.</td>
<td>MOORE, Gerald L.</td>
<td>290277</td>
<td>22 Apr 42</td>
<td>Suicide - Apparent in Family Residence. Buried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>MEYER, Walter W.</td>
<td>301441</td>
<td>24 Apr 42</td>
<td>Missing in action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>MYERS, Martin B.</td>
<td>301141</td>
<td>24 Apr 42</td>
<td>Killed in action. Buried Plot X, ROW #5, Grave #5, Station Cemetery, F.Mills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>MORRILL, William E.</td>
<td>241897</td>
<td>24 Apr 42</td>
<td>Killed in action as result of enemy artillery fire on F.Mills. Buried Plot C, ROW #5, Grave #5, Station Cemetery, F.Mills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>PUTNAM, Vernon E.</td>
<td>263335</td>
<td>24 Apr 42</td>
<td>Missing in action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC.</td>
<td>MATZ, Harold T.</td>
<td>269439</td>
<td>23 Apr 42</td>
<td>Died of Investigation pending. Died of gun shot wound.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

335
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Cause of Death</th>
<th>Location of Grave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PFC.</td>
<td>STONE, Donald L.</td>
<td>86518</td>
<td>23 Jan 42</td>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>Bataan Cemetery, Bataan, R.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pvt.</td>
<td>SITTON, Quentin R.</td>
<td>265953</td>
<td>23 Jan 42</td>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>Bataan Cemetery, Bataan, R.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>SMITH, Ronald B.</td>
<td>278990</td>
<td>20 Apr 42</td>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>Bataan Cemetery, Bataan, R.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>SHAULL, Donald M.</td>
<td>244397</td>
<td>2 May 42</td>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>Bataan Cemetery, Bataan, R.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC.</td>
<td>ARIVERS, Alvin J.</td>
<td>276493</td>
<td>2 May 42</td>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>Bataan Cemetery, Bataan, R.P.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 8, 1943

0800-1700 Regt CP at Queen Tunnel.
B-1 Section at James Gavine.
1700-0800 Regt CP at Middle Sector CP.
320-0300 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730-1930 " " " 50% manned.

1-37 mm gun to 3rd Bn; 1-37 mm gun to 3rd Bn.
Following ammunition from 3rd Bn to 3rd Bn;
14 cases .50 cal. ball
3 cases .50 cal. armor piercing.
5780 .50 cal. links,
No artillery shelling; no air raids.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1484</th>
<th>1588</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1588</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp mark</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp mark Shangh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 9, 1942

0800 - 1700
Regt's OP at Queen Tunnel.
G-1 section at James Ravine

1700 - 0800
Regt's OP at Middle Sector 60

0930 - 1900
All beach defense positions fully manned.

0730 - 1900
1 - 18" Searchlight (army) issued to 1st Bn.
(bast sector) 1st Bn previously led 2 - 18" ST.

Orders, etc., issued: Signal Operations Instructions, Aircraft Activity Code No. 1

0900 - 0945
Artillery Shelling - about 10 ranging shots
fired at Santa dock.

By Air raids

Regt - 0530 - Lt. Col. Adams to Mariner's
Ravine OP reported enemy commenced
shelling St. Hughes & Conr. del at 0500,
ceased at 0915. Fired 10 rounds.

1700
Fort Frank fired upon mainland.
March 10, 1942

0800-1700
Reg't CP at Queen's Lagoon.
1st Section - James Ravine

1900-0730
All Beach Defense Positions fully manned.

0730-1900
Test Firing - 1st Bn (East Sector) - 1-37 mm
(improved mount)

Orders, etc., issued: - HD Memo: Use of water.

No Artillery Shelling

No Air Raids

3rd Bn, Reg't 0800 - Lt Col Adams returned from Maimi.

2030 At 8:00 p.m. a bright light appeared on or near Ft Drum. Stayed on five minutes.

at 8:06 p.m. Ft Hughes illuminated the area approximately five minutes.

2040 Between 8:10 p.m & 8:20 p.m. Four lights came on on cavity plane between Ft Hughes & Ft Drum

Each lasted at least ten minutes. The lights were widely separated.

Lt Col. DeSanto, US Army, P.O. O.

Ft. Timp (Temp) (O.P.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1484</th>
<th>1538</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp Latt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp d Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army Bc</td>
<td>703</td>
<td></td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 11, 1942

0800 - 1100
Reg't CP Greens Tunnel
R-1 Section at James Ravine.

1100 - 0800
Reg't CP at Middle Sector CP
All Beach Defense Positions fully manned.

0730 - 1000
Ammunition distributed to Bns. 1st Bn. 3rd Bn.
37mm. H.E. 4260 lbs. 1746 lbs.
Navy 3 Pounder 200 " 200 "

Ordex, etc., received: None.
No Artillery Shelling
No Air Raids

3rd Bn. 1100

1400
Ammunition for Navy 3 Pounder delivered to position.
March 12, 1942

Regt’s CP at Guern Island
R-1 Section at Jarned Linnie
Regt’s CP at Middle Sector CP
All Beach Defense fully manned.

Position 5/0% manned.

Naval personnel, Inshore Patrol, reported for duty attached to 4th Marines.

15 men - 1st BN
5 men - 3rd BN
20 men Total

Orders, etc., received: none.

No Artillery Shelling
No Air Raid Alarms.

3rd BN to Reg.

0045 Sen Joe reports 3 floccules from Cavite shore in line with Fort Drum. Shortly thereafter similar number of floccules 5 sm aea light apparently from Hooker Point.

0047 South middle sector of reports 2 red flares, could have been traces from direction of Fort Drum or app. vicinity.

0053 South sector 37mm reports several large light flares near Cavite shore.

2156 Sen Joe reports report floating light near sea Spanish fort. Investigation found nothing.

2156 Flotting light observed off of Fort Hughes. Hughes immediately illuminated spot.

2155 5 End Navy men joined in rescues from U.S. Logon.

Red flares reported above CP. Moment 1111 + two position lights appeared to be heat lightening 341...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1484</th>
<th>1558</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp. attemp.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp. &amp; Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>788</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

March 13, 1942

0800 - 1000
Reg't CP at Greenwich Tunnel.
31st Section at James River.
Reg't CP at Middle Sector CP.
All Beach Defense Positions fully manned.

1000 - 1030
Improvized incendiary grenades (molotov cocktails) received from army & distributed to:
1st Bn. 2nd Bn. 3rd Bn. Total
140 120 40 300

Weapons received from Army Ordnance Dept.
137mm gun 1st Bn. 37mm gun 2nd Bn.

1100 - 1200
Mess firing: Navy 3rd guns, 1st Bn. (Comm. Point)
Orders, etc., issued - Field Manual #1, Gunning.
N.O. Official Bulletin #46, 13 March
Artillery Shelling - None
Air Raid Alarms - None

2100 - 2130
2nd Bn to Reg't: Capt. Robert to Caboche, dress uniform.

2215
Mag to unit: - Apparent signalling on mainland in line from Ramay Race to Hearn area.
Quiet to left of Fort Hughes.

Ramay Race CP's urgent light on Monkey Point. 3 minute later on South Shave (cave).
Also white light over Malinta Trail.

Lt. Leon S. Chabot, 1st. Fred A. Koenig, Jr., and
Lt. Marine John H. Cosley, awarded Silver Star for Gallantry in action on February 15, 1942, December 29, 1941 and December 28, 1944, respectively. (See Gen Order #16, dated 13 March 42) (Gen PGC, Flt. 42)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>85</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1484</th>
<th>1558</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1587</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temprat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp d Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 14, 1942

0800-1100
Regt'le CP at Feuvez Tunnel.
F-1 Section at Jamul Ravine.

1100-0800
Regt'le CP at Middle Sector CP

1900-0730
All Beach Defense Positions fully manned.

0730-1900
Tested demolition by demolition bomb
down chute overcliff under supervision
of Army Ordnance Dept.

Orders, etc., Reg't Gen. Order 42: Investigation
and report of possible enemy activity.

No artillery shelling, no air raids.
March 15, 1942

0800 - 1700
Reg'd CP at Queen Tunnel.  
R-1 section at James Ravine.

1700 - 0800
Reg'd CP at Middle Sector CP.

1900 - 0730
All Beach Defense Sections fully manned.

0730 - 1900

Artillery Shelling: From about 0720 to 1830, shelling of St Mills, Drum, Frank, & Hughes from South Shore.

No air raid alarms - Ordinary noise.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>165</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1484</th>
<th>1538</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1527</td>
<td>1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strength Report
March 16, 1942
0935 Japs fired 46 rounds on H. Danny
1115-1130 " " 32 " on H. Frank
1425 " " "
1500 H. Hughes fired counter-battery on Laita
1608 Japs fired 54 rounds on H. Hughes
17 " " H. Frank. H. Frank fired 3 rounds on Laita.
Regt C Binh Beach defenses same.
Lt. J. Long, RC, Boeing 5 FM Leyley awarded Silver Star for gallantry in action (see FLAC
new order #163)
Tested 30 lb. demolition with chute having
dist. of 50 feet. Results excellent.
No air raids.

By Sgt. J. E. Sullivan, USMC(RF) assigned to active duty
from SSU, 16th Naval District. (Message dated 14th, 1942)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1485</th>
<th>1559</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp at L</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp at S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
<td>728</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 17, 1942.

Regt. Lt & Beach Defence - same.

3rd Bn. issued 2 37 mm guns.

3rd Bn. 1-37 "...

Tartan guns - 1st Bn. 2 37 mm guns; 5 BMG.

3rd Bn. 2-37 "...

2 Mary Mk. guns.

1845 4 Artillery shells landed on F.

No air raids.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1486</th>
<th>1559</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporarily</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Navy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 18, 1942.

Regul OP & Beach defense same.

Improved land mine installed along beach.

South wall from South Dock to 375 yds west of South Dock. Total no. mines 135. Mines laid in 3 rows of 43 mines, staggered front to rear and diagonally.

Submitted request to Sector Defense for ten demolition bombs for beach defense.

Fired 3 artillery shells at J Franks.

No air raid alarms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1485</th>
<th>1559</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Marines</em></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1485</td>
<td>1559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Navy</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp. att.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp. d. Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 19, 1943

Regt OP Beach Defense - same.

Antm to Bn: 30 10 demolition bombs w/detons.

1st Bn - 40, 2nd Bn - 17, 3rd Bn - 18 = 75. 3rd Bn.

Sand mines - installed East (section).

Behind tank barrier, Camp 16 - 50.

Sea front --- 75. 75.

New fort 30 mts. on J. Beach.

No air raids.
March 30, 1943

Beach defense - same.
1st Br issued 1 37mm gun.
30th Br issued 1 37mm gun - installed BU-13.
No artillery fire or air raids this date.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1485</th>
<th>1559</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total at Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 21, 1942
Beach Artillery Beach defenses same.
0735-1345 artillery shelling - 300 rds landed on St. Frank.
78 " " " Drum.
38 " " " Hughes.
3200 and Bn pt. Cheney Raising held Beach defense drill.
1-36" searchlight installed at Hooker Pt.
No artillery fire or air raids on St. Mills.
March 28, 1942
Regt of Beach Defense - same.
Regt CP located at Queen Tunnel night & day.
3d Bn. CP moved to Middle Sector CP - Old CP at Spanish Fort.
No air raids or artillery firing this date.
Ftg. John C. Elliott with Purple Heart as of 5 March, per 821 USAFFE WIA, Batang Province.
(USAFFE G.O. #36, 5 Mar 42).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1485</th>
<th>1559</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp att</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp at Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army 26</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 23, 1943

Beach defense—same.
3d Bn installed two fort skids; one at San Jose At—one at Breakwater Pt.
3d Bn test-fired 1-50 cal MG.
No air raids or artillery shelling this date.

Pvt. R. L. Nordine, 1st. Purple Heart WIA
23 Jan 42, Longas Kagayan St., Bataan. (VS1P60*4V).
March 24, 1942.

1900-0730 All Beach Defense Positions fully manned.

1818-1307 " " " "

0730-1218 50% All Beach " " 50% " "

1307-1900 " " " "

1810 About 18 enemy boats reported in Manila Bay, by 2890° (from South), range 45,000 yards. All Beach defenses, including reserves, alerted.

Designation changed from USAFFE to USFIP (US Forces in the Philippines) 497, Ginebra x labuang barangay, PAAG, at landing field during night.

Artillery: 0925-1115 - Bombs dropped on 3 runs: O325, O425, O525

1435-1530

1635-1705

2053-2337 - 54 bombers used by Japanese. Casualties: 4 enlisted men, 11 killed.

Damage: 3 BMG destroyed by direct hits.

1030 Shells by Japanese.

Injured were: Sgt. Joseph M. Romarelli, WIA

Corp. Warren H. Metts, WIA
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strength report 24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campatt</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempd Shanghai Naval Base</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 25, 1945.
1900-0730 All Beach Defense positions fully manned.
0730-1900  
Air raids: 0847 - 1447
1739 - 1832
1900 - 1923 - Enemy used 34 bombers, this date.

Casualties: 1st Bn  2nd Bn  3rd Bn
10 F.  Enlisted. None
11 Enlisted injured.

See radio dispatch 1447.

T.O. 0542. 0712. Snow = leisure March 27, 1641, 60% Ward 1st Bn 1641, 60% Ward 1st Bn

Damage: 1st Bn  2nd Bn  3rd Bn

1-81 Bns
200 rounds. 50 cal.
6,000 rounds. 50 cal.
Several land mines.

Artillery shelling by Japs: 0917 + 1138.

0608  His tank & 4 tanks opened fire on mainland.

1000  Air raid sirens temporarily out of order.


Brens-ammunition salvaged. Guns can be repaired.

3080  3rd Bn - The enemy practice in the past has been to conduct landing operations just prior to daylight or morning when high tide and day will be coincident or nearly so. Tide and moon tides show that the above conditions will for the next three mornings.

O & 2 reports show some transport planes in this area. Also indication that the enemy has received reinforcements recently.

In view of this, all units, particularly OPs will be especially alert the next three mornings. During the period from moonset to daybreak. Reserve units, in particular, will be especially alert for enemy parachute troops during this period.
At this date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W. A. Allen</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>1485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billy W. Logan</td>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>1559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lathrop</td>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beckert</td>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl</td>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1616</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welch</td>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. A. Logan</td>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steele</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. A. S. S.</td>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Temp att:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temp d.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp d.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 1485 + 1559 = 3044
March 26, 1942.

Beach defense positions same.

Air raids: 0630-0132
1006-1248
1302-1443
2135-

Casualties: 2 Boats

1 killed: Cap. N. C. Makin, B.S.

1 PARC: slight

I. Mess attendant service.

Damage: None.

Artillery shelling by Japs—1018 and 1655.

Mess attendant First Class Janvier, USFR, died of wounds received in air raid yesterday at Makin Hospital.

1832

Barney having reported mirror on beach near 90th Savage—flashing toward H. Frank then moved away as planes passed overhead. Impossible to get exact location of mirror. It was reflecting sun while bombers approaching.

1545

H. Frank reported what appeared to be a mirror from South Beach of Makin Island.

Pvt. Balandas. Btry C unaccounted for since 1845 this date.
March 27, 1942.

0110-0120 Japa dropped more white phosphorous incendiary bombs. Hence, demolition bombs used exclusively.

02145 A flashlight reported blinking on South Side of Sugar Hill.

2305 Infantry report lights on St. Hughes about half way down.

Beach defense positions & Regt CP same.

Additional weapons issued:
1st Bn: 3 Bn C (25 Mar 42) — 3d Bn: 1-37 mm

0104-0120 Air raid alarm

1027 Artillery shelling

Casualties: 3d Bn—Killed, Stkh Ph, Searchlight.

Material damage — none.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1485</th>
<th>1589</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp at</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp at Shanghai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Navy 20</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 28, 1942.
Beach defense position & Regt OP same.
Ammo issued: 2d Bn - 4 cases (.600 md), 50 cal. AP.
3d Bn - 4 cases (.750 md), 50 cal. AP.

2158 Serial bomb killed Corp. Stone, Co. H, 2d Bn.
Thereafter, 15 casualties, one in PAAC, Co. H, 2d Bn.

4 other men treated for shock in 2d Bn.

Damage: 2d Bn - slight:
Corps. Martinez, Robert J., severely
1-18" Shrapnel, Lt. Burrell, Claude D., slight
2 cases, 50 cal. Gf. Stefanski, Edward D., slight
3d Bn -
Lt. (PAAC), Linsley, Bernard D., slight
21 cases, 50 cal. Corp. Kepple, Wilford, serious
Lt. Steele, Garvin H., serious
Lt. (PAAC), Wray, Anthony, severe
" " ( ), Villanen, George

Gas, decontamination outfits issued:
1st Bn, 2d Bn, 3d Bn, 1/2 & 6 Pk. 4 uniforms, 6 sprayers
1st Bn, decontamination chemical, 200 lbs.

Air raid alarms:
10:56 - 0834
09:56 - 1500
12:19 - 1408
15:20 - 1700
17:06 - 1735
21:57 - 2235
22:33 - 2330
23:38 - 0045 29 Mar

Artillery shelling, Casualties:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>165</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1484</th>
<th>1638</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1527</td>
<td>1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

March 28, 1942
March 29, 1942


1240 F-2 reports six boats at azimuth 233°, range between 25,000-30,000 yards.

Corregidor reduced in size today. Generally three or less planes made raids. Leaflets dropped which show a cartoon of an American general (presumably Gen. MacArthur) waving goodbye to Corregidor, while others left behind shake fists at him. Corregidor is pictured as surrounded with mines -- whether intended they be considered Jap origin or not is difficult to determine. The wording of the leaflet, translated from Tagalog is as follows. "Notice to the Filipino soldiers: MacArthur and Sarge. Run away from the Americans. So you, point the barrel of your rifle at the Americans and fight them bravely. Thus you will win your real liberty."

March 30, 194... 

Beach defense positions scoured.

Air raids: 0640-0107; 0844-1245; 1449-1611; 2006-2034; 2053-2110; 2129-2205

Artillery shelling: 0950 and 1451.

Casualties from artillery shelling: 145. K. Paulin.

Wounded severely. Died of shock later.

Damage none.

Paulin buried locally this date. See deaths front of this book.
March 31, 1942

Corp. G. L. Heippe and 3rd B. E. Gordon man O.P. on旗舰 Hill.

Beach defense position same.

1st O.T. test fired 2-37 mm guns and 44 BMG.

2-37 mm guns drawn from firing line, advance temp.
at CP in reserve.

Air raids: 0100-0109; 0154-0217; 0347-0421;
0917-1131; 1139-1233; 1240-1305;
1508-1706; 2008-2035; 2350-2303;
2313-2348.

No artillery shelling.

No casualties or damage.
Strength report 31 March.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>1483</th>
<th>1557</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1526</td>
<td>1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 1, 1942.
Beach defense positions same.
Regt OP at Queen Tunnel.
100 hand grenades drawn from army and assigned to Navy units and as follows:
hit raids: 0005-0044; 0109-0145; bombs dropped at 0410; 1035 1055; 1000 1208 one hit power plant: Bombay Bay; key 1B; 1504-1545 in water South Dock; Monrovia Hill and San Jose Barric.; 1848-1919; 2140-2200; 2211-2237; 2235-2311.

Following men: arc warrant rank; temp) this date to rank from this date and assigned to active duty:
OLSON, John C. MTG 3000 to MGC.
REARDON, Joseph J. 1st Lt. to QMC.
WOOD, Cecil L. 2nd Lt. to M6.
PURPLE HEART AWARDED BY PCAG GOL, 27 MAR 42:
Allen, Billy W. WIA. Anderson, Walter P. WIA.
Holuck, Frank J. WIA. Coghlan, William J. WIA.
Manning, Alan S. WIA. Doran, William D. WIA.
Hodge, Robert P. WIA. for wounds received 25 Mar 42, R. Miles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>16</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>1480</th>
<th>1557</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>1557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1523</td>
<td>1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp att</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp &amp; Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army, Bn</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 2, 1942.

Beach defense positions same.

Air raid: 0900-1320. Bombs dropped S.E. Malay Hill; Camp #6; S.E. Beach area; old Basin Hill area; Bottomside. Six planes first wave; two were shot down. Four planes following waves.

No artillery shelling.

Casualties: 1st Bn: 3 men wounded (light) (RUSK, SPENCER) 3d Bn: 1 man wounded (light) (SPENCER)

Damage: 3d Bn: 1 position damaged; no materials lost.

Bomb landed front of Queen Tunnel, 2 motor cycles destroyed.
Strength Report 3 April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>125</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>1480</th>
<th>1657</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1523</td>
<td>1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp w/Mob.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp’d Shangh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army, Bn</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>708</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 3, 1942

Beach Defense positions same.

USN units, Queen Tunnel & 3d Bn. completed secondary positions on S.W. Malinta Hill; trench system & emplacements for 3 Martin M6s to be manned by Navy personnel.

Air raid alarms: 0137 - 0150
0906 - 1222

No bombings or shelling this date.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>1480</th>
<th>1557</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1523</td>
<td>1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempatt</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariff d Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 4, 1942

Beach defense positions same.

Air raid alarms: 1011-1055; 1057-1109; 1737-1758; 1858-1916; 2251-2317.

No bombing or shelling of St. Mills.

1954: Flashing lights apparently signalling seen on St. Drum from South/Middle sector. Reported by 3rd BN.
April 5, 1943.

Beach defense positions same.

Collins, R. H. and Silver Star (see SFIP-GO 214).

Air raid alarm: 01 HR -0138; 1328-1344 No bombing;
1512-1553.
Strength reports for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>120</th>
<th>1480</th>
<th>1557</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1523</td>
<td>1614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tempatt

Tempd Shanghai

Naval Reserve

Philippine Army
April 6, 1942.

Bty "B", 3d Bn assigned to 2d Bn, 60th C.A.G. for tactical employment and control. Administration to remain under Co. 44 Mar.

4th Mar ration discipline officially turned over to 71st Commissary Off. Withdrawals on his orders only.

1917

Fire in draw W of Malinta Tunnel. West entrance mine exploded. North of W. Frank following men as a platoon (See PHAC 60**70).

Bailey, T. J. for meritorious deed.

For Wounds:

Martineau, R. J.  
Stojanski, E.  
Powers, O. D.  
Thelen, K. R.

Air raids: 0910-0930, 0938-0945, 2020-2235; 2241-2318. No casualties or damage to material.

Artillery shelling: 1845-1856-18 shells on Monkey + Mosquito Pl.
April 7, 1942

1936. Searchlights will not be used prior to 0830, unless emergency.

Beach defense positions same.

30mm gun fixed.

Air raids: 1004 - 1055; 1154 - 1216; 1427 - 1511; 1514 - 1528; 1604 - 1632; 1756 - 1844 - 2102 - 2115.

No casualties or materiel damage.
April 8, 1942

0020 Instructions order searchlights lifted as of 0030.

1000 Col. Howard held conference with Col. Sanders.

1615 Searchlights will not be used from 0000 to 0300.

Beach defense positions freeze.

Beach defense battle stations plan for all Army troops, as per CBI H.D. (Headquarters District). (See PCAC 60th 21)

Ted Anderson

Capt. Moore

Major Updyke

Wagner, H. G.

Rice, K. V.

McLarnon, W. N.

Admiral, Albert

Pleske, Albert

White, T. J.

Johnson, W. R.

Prince, E. W. Jr.

Spencer, G. R.

Taylor, R. USN

Fulmer, B. C. USN

Flagg, M. A. USN

1200 Parachute troops alert. Detail, Hopping Field (Middle Parade Ground) taken over from Army; assigned to 3rd Bn.

3rd Bn. (6th) 2.37 m.m. guns.

Air raids: 0820-0825; 0830-0849; 0955-1032; 1132-1155; 1330-1412; 1515-1544.

Artillery shelling: 1840 H. Frank + 30 m.s.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Marine</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manneu</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trampatt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempel Shanghai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napol Reserve</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 9, 1942

1350

Beach defense positions same.

1648

Jap planes using Caloocan airfield.

Jap artillery began shelling Corregidor from Bataan.

Additional personnel att to 4th Mar from

USN, USNR, USA, PA, PS, PC. See personnel.

Day 8, Marceles, 2offs + 3 enlisted USMC, 7 USNR

& 8 USN (103) arrived from Bataan. Loss 3 AMMuns

destroyed. 2d 3d Br. 339 pl. personnel P/FW.

4th Br. 4th Mar org with USN personnel as reserve

Br. Co. Major Williams, Lt. Scowen off Island due to

air raids: 0832-1129; 1150-1348; 1254-1507; 1307-1351;

1505-1545; 1545-1558; 1944-2019.

Artillery shelling: 1648 from Bataan.

1709 from Corregidor

Balde. M. Mattie USNR severely

wounded by shell fragment.

See next page for additional info.

9 Men fr 3d USN Bataan gd N/F. 60k + 22k enl personnel P/FW.

Col W.J. Clement completed duty with 45th Mar Jr.

Following personnel on last ship at Bataan: personnel P/FW.

Capt.

1st Bayi

1st Oth

1st W/P

3d Bayi

1st Oth

5d Batan

2d Obw

674

1st Bayi

3d Obw

1st W/P

2d W/P

3d W/P

202

1st W/P

201

1st W/P

202

2d W/P

203

3d W/P

204

201

2d W/P

202

3d W/P

203

4th W/P

204

5th W/P

205

6th W/P

206

7th W/P

207

8th W/P

208

9th W/P

209

10th W/P

210

202

1st W/P

201

2d W/P

202

3d W/P

203

4th W/P

204

5th W/P

205

6th W/P

206

7th W/P

207

8th W/P

208

9th W/P

209

10th W/P

210

202

1st W/P

201

2d W/P

202

3d W/P

203

4th W/P

204

5th W/P

205

6th W/P

206

7th W/P

207

8th W/P

208

9th W/P

209

10th W/P

210

202

1st W/P

201

2d W/P

202

3d W/P

203

4th W/P

204

5th W/P

205
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>1479</th>
<th>1556</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1522</td>
<td>1613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempatt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay Shanghai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ofc. Louis S. Best 279884 WIA - Slight
Gen. N. Trumula 298818 WIA - Severe
April 9, 1942

0845 - Ships have been discovered in west which might be a convoy & escort. Be prepared for long range gunfire from seaward.

0900 - Effective immediately no civilians will be allowed to come on Ormoc; includes civilian workers who left & try to return.

0941 - Forces in Caluani have sent forth a flag of truce.

1247 - Enemy ships moving N. in Manila Bay.

1845 - Searchlights will not be used tonight between 2000 & 0230 except on specific orders unless landing attempts.

April 10, 1942

1615 - Morotai OP reported 9 large, self-propelled barges moving W. azimuth 201° (South) good range.

2115 - Damage 136 cm (incl. Tulayma) assigned to Middle sect.

9 April 3 - Sotogria Chester 27.04527 dead self-reflected gunnison.

Beach defense positions safe.

Air raids: 0740-1336 about 20 stick of bombs
1408-1447 dropped. No casualties.
1516-1535 Material damage, 2 LBE
1639-1701 1 BMN destroyed in a quantity, 160, 164
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strength Report 10 Apr**

Tempatt

Symp. Shanghai

Naval Reserve

Philippine Army
April 11, 1942

Enemy fired 43 ndde at ships in South Harbor. No hits.
S1E 1 N1 80 g7 45 emd 15 emd PA + PS

Following personnel attn 15th Mar 21, 24, 41 Apr 42

USN 14 322
USA 54 707
PA 4 95
PS 0 49

78 1473

43 Bf 110 & 13 Bf 110 drawn from firing.
Air raids: 0808-1210 Night shelling: 0930-1110
1214-1653
1706-1840
A/C 302 B42 70 74 12
Aircraft destroyed: records saved.
No marine casualties.
1 - US Army WIA
1 - PAAC KIA
April 12, 1942

0703  Began stockade reported enemy ships in view, being fired on by Kidley #1 & Morrison Hill.

1150  B-17 Flying Fortresses seen coming from W at 18,000 ft to wards Rabite & left at 32,000. Exits is burning.

H.D. Mrs. Mary J. Naval & NEC units commanded by Ltr from Led Wame to Lt Moore & then by

Lt. Moore. (Hq VSIP - 2019 - 16 Apr 42)

W.T. Maxine L. Chronicler prior to 1st from this date.

Additional ammo needed for Navy, Queen Tunnel, Reserve supply, retained in tunnel as Reserve, less 50 cal lots

issued to Red 3d Bne.

B-17 Flying Fortresses (Bombers) reported to have bombed Rabite & other points. No official confirmation

Following quoted in VSIP news this date: "Bomber VP Bomber painted Red Band in R.S.: The A.D. of Gen MacArthur in Australia announced that the US air force had made smashing surprise attacks on Jap held air bases on Yap, Ulithi & Rota. Hangars at Ulithi, Yap were destroyed, storage were damaged, one seaplane shot down & transport hit.

In addition six planes bomb 4 strafed enemy troop concentrations & attacked docks & warehouses. At Cow 3 transports were definitely sunk while 2 others were hit, several other vessels were near misses. 3 planes shot down & 2 are damaged on ground while others were severely damaged & hit."

372
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>165</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>1449</th>
<th>1556</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp op Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp op Shanghai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was not disclosed whether raiding planes took off from Australia or from a Philippine base.

1 USA - WIA
1 PAAC - WIA - Critical
Hlth. James E. Bible - WIA - Slight
April 13 1942

0045 recommended to 66th & Safie Bays that an additional antitank road block be installed on the shore road south of Malinta Hill SW of rd bend, 100 yds NW of side entrance Queen Tunnel.

1000 Enemy shelling ships in South Harbor from Luco.

1330 No. 1 P.T., Byas Point out of action.

2145 Capt. Smith reported he observed from arty position Spanish fort, M C line on Batan shore around Calatagan & also AA Bases in Manila Bay NE Corregidor.

Beach defense positions same.

4th Mar. ordered to take over Parry Group. Next details topside parade ground off course to be taken over by 2130.

Report lost 81 Mar. 2.

Air raids: 0921-1046 Anti shelling 1413 Battery Point.

1059-1110

1521-1540

1606-1616

1955-2016

Corp. Raymond J. McCombs Capt. "J. G."

Downsized WIA. - Staff Services

1 P.A. enl. WIA

1 PAAC - WIA

1 PS enl. - WIA
April 14, 1945

3 Marines & 5 PHAC killed 25 wounded 30+ Be from city shelling this date at Btry B.

Indications point to possible landing tonight or early tomorrow morning.

Marines killed were Corp. Harvey Massick, Jr. Charles C. Alberts and Corp. James R. Curran.


Beach defense position X-22.

2145 2d BN took over Paratroop detail for 60th CT.

Patrols by Breakwater after clearing suspected objects of store after a wrecking & recouping enemy.

1st BN on raft killed by small arms fired.

1st BN established alternate Win. security at water near side entrance. Malinta Tower dropped.

2d BN rest fixed - .50 cal MG 1 - .30...

3rd BN...

Air raids: 0730-0750
0830-0856
0930-0930
0947-1135 - Some C. R. ammunition
1140-1230
1540-1550
1601-1740 - Some casualties Crockett, Divine
1815-1830
2135-2342

Art. shelling: 1507 South Deck area (Divine)
1603 South Deck area (Divine)
2143 Searchlight 45.
Casualties: Crockett, Davis (2), Bombard—3 wounded.
Bryant, Delano—Shelling—killed (1st Platoon), 3 wounded, slight.

2300—3 Marines killed, Btry B—shelling.
1 Marine killed Btry C—light.

37 mm position Btry joint damaged.

WIA: To Us.
Elliot, John C. E. C. Slight—Gomm, James H. E. C.
Hubbard, Joseph P. E. Slight—Parrish, Roy C. E.
Jubel, Harry W. E. C. Slight—Allen, Fred, Jr., E. C.
Gaynor, Joseph, Jr., E. C. Slight—Barnhart, C. E. C.
Adams, John C. E. C. Slight—Steele, Darwin F. E. C.

Strength Report:

Marines: 65 16 1479 1536 1
Navy: 13 1 43 37
Total: 78 13 1522 1613

Tempo: 1

Tempo: 3

6-PAAC-KIA
2-PAAC-WIA-Serious
4-PAAC-WIA-Slight
4-USN-WIA-Serious
3-USN-Slight
April 15, 1942

Beach defense positions same.

1st Ser Co Regt Reserve moved 240 drums LMG to lateral #36, Malinta Tunnel.

2d Bn test fired 5-50 cal. M-16s

1st Bn " 5-50 " 3-30 " (Monkey # 13)"13.

Battle Station Clam for Navy reported coordinated with Navy by all Bns, except Bn in ABT secto .

1st Bn has 14 .50 cal. MG, installed to date.

2d Bn " 13 .50 " " " " "

3d Bn " 15 .50 " " " " "

1 LMG + 4 MMG, manned by USN, Monkey 13 replaced by 4 BMG.

Additional weapons are mo distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1st Bn</th>
<th>2nd Bn</th>
<th>3rd Bn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USN .30 cal. tracer</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN .50 cal. loader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN .50 cal. ball</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| USN 3 lbr. | | | 64

Air raids: 0037-0047

0540-0600
0805-0843
0940-1025
1033-10505 Bomber mont. flight of 3
1053-1123 Heavy bombers reach
1512-1610
1623-1636

No casualties or damage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Sides</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>1551</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp P Shanghai</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital att. personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn 2; 2nd Bn 3; 3rd Bn 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>788</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor W Manila Area</td>
<td>3; 2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bataan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>3562</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Navy</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>676</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Army</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
<td>1418</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Regt</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
<td>3562</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 16, 1942

Beach defense positions same. 1st BN test fired 1 .50 cal. MG. Monkey Pt. (USN) 2d BN " " " .50 " " " 3d BN " " 2 ... " San Jose Pt. 50 cal. + .30 cal M. Spanish St. 3 .50 cal M.G. ( wc) complete. With .30s mount, train to reply for use at H Drum (2-3d BN; 1-1st BN).

Additional ammo issued:
1st BN: 30 cases .50 cal Ball
30 cases assorted
2d BN: 20 cases .50 cal Ball
4 cases .30 cal A.P.

1138 Rifle firing reported from Hooker Pt.
1154 Enemy short labarătes searched between Hooker + Winding Pt.

1155 Beach defense positions barely 23自由混合 unidentified boat.


Shelling: 0941 & 1425.

Casualties & damage:
Bombing: 134 dead sligh Ramsey larrice 30 ft. surf wire destroyed 5% PHAC killed. 1 PA - WIA

Shelling: direct hit on Morrison OP. No casualties Malina 3rd Flt. bldg. 15% destroyed, all bldgs. destroyed or demolished.
During the 15th and 16th, enemy artillery batteries from Baladn and Cavite laid down a heavy crossfire on Corregidor, until partly silenced by our counterbattery. Many 240 mm. shells were used. Our artillery wiped out enemy batteries which had been in action. There were approximately 40 casualties on Corregidor due to direct hit on shelter at Battery James.

From C-3: I hope to try to take Corregidor by storm. It is believed that the attempt will be made between 19-23 April, at which time the moon is right for a landing of this kind. They have had so much success with it in the past, they plan to make this attempt. It will be, in all probability, preceded by intense aerial and artillery bombardment for at least two days.

Sgt. James A. Foorle - WIA - Slight
April 17, 1942

Beach defense positions pagan.
Beach defense command (Col. Howard) addressed my
Mine Command Plan for mining Engineers +
North docks with TNT mines.

Additional ammo issued:

Zil Br
.50 cal bell (18) 5,040
A.P. 48 (5,040
Tanks 2,500
焊机 1

Tracer 2,400 - 2,400

Artillery: .30 cal M6 at Daspelase (QM)
.30 cal 11 MG & LMG, 1st BN
2 .30 cal 11 (Wag), 9) Hunter BN
.30 cal LMG, cherry carriage.

Air raids: 0921-1009, shelling - 1844
1027-1110 1350
1115-1129
1542-1609
1722-1740

No casualties or damage.
April 18, 1942

Beach defense positions same.
1 Navy 3 Lb. gun passed to Lt. Bu-Ship 1411, manned. Emplaced at Enlisted Men's Swimming Beach between Malaria and H-6.
1st Bn test fired 2 M6 4 Lb. grenade.
Air raids: 1406-1437 - two bomber raids
1732-1807

No casualties or damage.
No artillery fire from Cavite or Batangas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>1474</th>
<th>1551</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>1608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempratt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign &amp; Shanghai Naval Hospital</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strength Report**
April 19, 1942

AA & P reported 34 boats small to medium size milling around between Manila, Cavite, + Bataan.

Beach Defense positions same.

Following weapons + ammo returned to Navy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1st Bu</th>
<th>2nd Bu</th>
<th>3rd Bu</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50cal MG (ammunition)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50cal (water)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30mm MG</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30mm LMG</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50cal Ammunition (Bad Assorted)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Air raids: 0423-1015 - 5 dive bombing attacks - 1447-1459 light bomber operations.

2029-2039

Artillery shelling: 0842 - Very severe
1943 - Very severe

Casualties: 3d Bu - Killed: Sizes, C.R. Pot 31st Inf. (Shellfrag)

Wounded: Light - Dakrigan, K.N. Pot 1948 Tablo.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Attached for duty:**
- Naval Reserve

**Attended:**
- NAAC
- PS
- PA
- PC
April 20, 1942

Beach defense positions same.

Weapons and ammo returned to Navy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Bn</th>
<th>2nd Bn</th>
<th>3rd Bn</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.50 Cal MG (Air)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 Cal M2A1 (Any)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R.E.N.E. for R-4 to South Dock Pillbox, 3rd Bn (manned by USN)

Air raids: 0837-0859
1013-1055
1100-1120
1211-1241
1243-1302

Artillery Shelling: 1913
7330

Casualties: Shelling – Christian, C. P. Qtr. WIA; Egan, E. G. Qtr. WIA; DeWardner, R. E. Capt. WIA; Long, H. K. Capt. WIA; Cravens, T. W. Capt. WIA; Steffen, W. B. Capt. WIA; Watts, R. E. Capt. WIA

0930 Signalling from top U.S. Flag to Signal Bell

Damage to material - negligible.

1 U.S.A - KIA
April 21, 1945

Beach Defense positions same.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>50 Cal MG placed</th>
<th>plated</th>
<th>Manned</th>
<th>Emplaced</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12th BN</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd BN</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd BN</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All drinking water to be boiled for 20 min otherwise use purifiers (Chlorination).

Art & raid alarms: 0824-0905
0921-1042
1056-1145 flak & torpedo.
Enemy light bombers active.

Artillery shelling: 131 Batang.

1- USN - WIA - died later.
April 22, 1944

0356 Breakwater. C.T. reports flashes in Cavitie mainland, faint rumbles which might be artillery fire. Direction, character, unknown.

0400 Gen. Wainwright directed that all beach defense positions be particularly on alert tonight.

Paratroops are detail at Goflosse taken over by 85th.

Air raids: 0831-0856
1049-1104 - Hughes
1110-1117 - Sgt. Bombes operating.

Artillery shelling: 0147 (Betaan) Bottomside,
0645 (Betaan) James Cove
1040 (Cavite) Giaggi Trail
1856 (Cavite) Bottomside
1930 (Cavite) Coal Basin
2035 (Cavite) Maltese Island, Brgy. Laglag
2100 (Cavite) Bottomside
2125 (Cavite) Hughes

Gle. Gerald S. Moore, age 24, killed by self-inflicted gunshot wound. In Investigation - Suicide - Temporarily
April 23, 1946

1120 Dave bomber scored hit on small craft in south harbor.

1415 Black Defense sector bombers are reminded that any of the next four mornings just prior to daylight namely 24, 25, 26, 27 are especially suitable for landing operations against fortified islands from the point of view of moonrise and darkness.

0105 Small craft "Eugenia" failed to answer challenge, un-announced and showing no lights. Challenged by sentries on 3230 37 mm position + 50 cal position. Shot was then fired armed response bow of boat. The boat then went to Engher. 4th station reported skipper of boat was killed.

1st BN took over 3 BN of army.
2BN received from army: 24,000 rds. 0.50 cal. belt 95 belt 13 BMGs.

2d BN Kragjorgs. Total weapons: Army:

- FN 3 BMGs
- BAR 3 Shotguns
- Type X 2 Heavy
- Type Y 5
- Total 18

From OM

- Paratroop weapons 5
- Air raids: 0820-0830 Artillery Shelling
- 1046-1106
- 1327-1603
- 1722-1800 1913 Enemy rifle fire
- 2014 Flak

Dr. Harold P. Malz died of accidental gunshot wound. Bd of investigation pending.
April 24, 1943


Weapons change: 1st Bn. - 1 BMG, 2 TSMs for QM.
2302. MG + 37 mm mounts may be removed for positions during daylight provided they can be readily replaced.

Air raid alarm: 0839-0854
0925-1052
1122-1134
Artillery shelling: 0410 & 1505.
Two marines wounded slightly this date.

1st Bn. Damage: 1 BMG destroyed, Camp 48.
Navy 3 lb. guns + ammo 5 Mts. Beach destroyed. 50 cal M16 Infantry ft. damaged.

1- USN MIA
3- USN WIA - 1 severe
4- USA - KIA
1- PAAC - KIA
8- PAAC - WIA - 4 severe
HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Fort Mills, F. I.

GENERAL ORDERS

NO. 32

24 April, 1942.

The Secretary of War, in the name of the President of the United States, has approved and will publish in War Department General Orders the following citation which is hereby published for the information of this command:

The Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, and Naval and Marine Corps units serving therein, United States Forces in the Philippines, are cited for outstanding performance of duty in action, during the period from March 14th to April 9th, 1942, inclusive.

Although subjected repeatedly to intense and prolonged artillery bombardment by concealed hostile batteries in Cavite Province and to heavy enemy aerial attacks, during the period above mentioned, and despite numerous casualties and extensive damage inflicted on defensive installations and utilities, the morale, ingenuity, and combat efficiency of the entire command have remained at the high standard which has impressed fighting men the world over.

On March 15th, approximately one thousand 240mm projectiles were fired at Forts Frank and Drum and large numbers of lesser caliber projectiles struck Forts Hughes and Mills. Again on March 20th, over four hundred 240mm shells were fired at Fort Frank and a lesser number at Fort Drum. Enemy air echelons made a total of fifty attacks on Fort Mills with heavy aerial bombs. During the entire period all units maintained their armament at a high degree of efficiency, while seaward defense elements executed effective counter battery action, antiaircraft batteries, firing at extreme ranges, exacted a heavy toll of hostile attacking planes, and Naval and Marine units from exposed stations assured the defense of the beaches and approaches to the fortified islands. By unceasing labor and regardless of enemy activity essential utilities were restored and the striking power of the command maintained unimpaired.

As a result of their splendid combined efforts, ruggedness and devotion to duty the various units and services comprising the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays have frustrated a major hostile attempt to reduce the efficiency of the fortified islands.

Included in the above citation are the following units:

59th Coast Artillery
60th Coast Artillery (AA)
91st Coast Artillery (PS)
92d Coast Artillery (PS)
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays.
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 32 (Cont'd)

Medical Detachment
Ordnance Detachment
Quartermaster Detachments (American & Philippine Scout)
Finance Detachment
1st Coast Artillery (PA) (less 2d Battalion)
Company "A", 803d Engineer Battalion (Avn)(Sep)
Detachment U.S.A.M.P. Harrison (American & Philippine Scout)
Fourth United States Marines
United States Navy Inshore Patrol, Manila Bay Area
Naval Force District Headquarters, Fort Mills, P. I.
Naval Force, Moriveles Area, P. I.
Battery "D", 2d Coast Artillery (PA)
1st Platoon, Battery "F", 2d Coast Artillery (AA) (PA)
2d Platoon, Battery "F", 2d Coast Artillery (AA) (PA)

By command of Lieutenant General WAINRIGHT:

LEWIS C. HERR,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

CARL H. SEALS,
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General.
HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Fort Mills, P. I.

April 24, 1942.

Subject: War Department Citation.

To: All Members of this Command.

The following information received from the War Department April 22, 1942, is hereby published to this command:

"1. All units of the United States Army and Filipino Forces, United States Forces in the Philippines, have been awarded Battle Streamers for gallantry in action as authorized by Army Regulations 280-10, and all personnel of these units are authorized to wear the special service ribbons now being designed by the War Department.

"2. All units of the Military and Naval Forces of the United States and Filipino Forces, engaged in defense of the Philippine Islands since 7 December, 1941, will be included in a separate general citation to be issued by the Secretary of War, in the name of the President of the United States."

By command of Lieutenant General WAINWRIGHT:

CWL H. SEAL,  
Brigadier General, USA,  
Adjutant General.

[A handwritten note: April Moore sending all copies to staff distribution.]

[Handwritten signature: Carl H. Seals]
April 24

Corp. Walter W. Meyers, 301447 KIA
Corp. Martin B. Myers, 301141 KIA
Corp. William E. Morris 241890 KIA
Cpl. Alvin L. Bear 301285 KIA
Cpl. James E. Holmes 250437 KIA
Corp. Vernon E. Butman RB 3395 MIA
Cpl. Truman J. Fair 280021 MIA
Maj. Max Clark WIA Slight
1st. Lt. Grant Manning
Lt. (MC) USN Edward L. Reiter Jr.
Cpl. Harry Jenk 21440
Corp. Carlton E. Scalford 292300
Cpl. William A. Coglian 236138
April 25

Beach defense positions same.
Air raid alarms:
0847-0905; 0925-0937; 1015-1035; 1151-1215;
1239-1310; 1313-1335.
Artillery shelling: 1332 Cavite
1840 Bataan, James Macine
2201

Casualties: 2 bw, 1 USMC, 1 enb wounded slightly
Material damage: All telephone lines on
Malinta Hill, Cebu.

0415 50 cal MG fire heart of Cabacuan shore to N.F.
RJ 73 slighted 3 barge as wind 50° magnetic N
proceeding direction Bataan peninsula well
out on horizon.

2-USN - WIA - slight
CPO George B. Nelson 279899 WIA - slight
CPO Kenneth V. Rice 271366 WIA
April 26, 1942

Beach Defense positions same.

US Army forces in Philippines award Battle Streamer for gallantry in action, although special service ribbon. All units of military and naval forces will be included in a special citation. Sec. War. (See USFIP Ltr 24 Apr). 4th Mar included in citation for outstanding performance of duty in action, 14 March to 9 April, 1942. (See USFIP CDO 43, 24 Apr).

Transferred to Navy:

- .50 cal guns: Waterfall: 10 4
- .50 " " Air: 2 1 2 5
- Total: 3 3 4 9
- 37mm guns

Louis MT.

.50 cal Amm & assorted

6,000 4,000 8,000 18,000

Transferred to Navy 24 Apr. Martin MT.

Air raids: 0331-0334 Artillery shelling:

- 0333 (Oriental) Middlesex
- 0603 - Nassau
- 2311 - Pinellas
- 2345 - Saint Petersburg

USMC Casualties this date:

Material damage: Comm. Lines, 92d Gun Area

Unknown caused 1000 observed leaving Angador will be immediately challenged. Human world will be adversely affected.

All USN incorporated in Beach Defense Force today.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1st Bn</th>
<th>2nd Bn</th>
<th>3rd Bn</th>
<th>4th Bn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Hughes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Drum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blsly. Indiana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFIP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KINDLEY FLD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHIL. NAVAL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHIL. RADIO</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ATTACHED PERSONNEL TOTAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1st Bn</th>
<th>2nd Bn</th>
<th>3rd Bn</th>
<th>4th Bn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy Hospital</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Scouts</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Navy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Const</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRANDTOTAL</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Naval Reserves</td>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
<td>Philippine Air Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ent</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are up to and including MAY 1, 1942.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temp 1</th>
<th>Officers Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1464
848
1455
3967

390
Apr 26 cont.

3 - USN - WIA slight
1 - PAAC - WIA slight
April 26, 1942.

Beach defense positions same.

4 USN enlisted incorporated in beach defense forces this date.

Anti-tank barrier installed across Port Carson.

RIP paid alights: 0030-0040.

Artillery shelling: 0125 (leichte) 2023.

1 PAAC-WIA-Slight

1 USN-WIA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Strength Report 27 Apr 42</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>17 1446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>39 848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>112 1456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Regt</td>
<td>228 3770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>6 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Hughes</td>
<td>3 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dorea</td>
<td>1 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Indiana</td>
<td>1 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFIP</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.O. W.</td>
<td>7 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindley Field</td>
<td>9 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 28, 1945.

Beach defense positions same.

Wp razed always: 1050-1130.

Artillery shelling: 0012 (Batran) Bottomside.

0844

1430 (Cavite) Bottomside

1800 (Cavite) H. Frank.

1830 Msg to all units: Warning to all, bs. Tomorrow is a special Japanese holiday, the birthday of the Imperial Majesty. The enemy may celebrate by unusual aerial and artillery bombardment.

1850 Breakwater P.O. O.P. reports smoke apparently from gun firing on Frank a.m. altitude 1500, magnets north.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>off</th>
<th>end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rest</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>3767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Hughes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Squib</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry Indiana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VS FIP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post W</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kendisky Ft</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philad. Ft</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strength Report 28 Apr 43
April 24, 1942

Beach defense positions manned. Sgt. Field of Engineers placed in action this date by artillery shelling.

Boat forsker boat, Malinta Point-Engineer
Dock completed.

Air raids: 0730-1000

0730-3 dive bombers: St. Hughes +
South Dock area.
0748-6 dive bombers: Malinta Hill
and 92 nd Garage.
0913-High horizontal bombers.
0935-9 heavy bombers.
1027-1050
1114-1300
1508-1600
1505-8 bombers-Topside.
1635-8- bombers-Everyone down.

Material damage: 1st Btn: 8-30 cal. B.M. + 41 B.R.
2nd Btn: 1-30 cal. B.M.
3,000 mds. 30 Calammo.
30 Belts, 30 M.G.

Artillery shelling: 0744-(Bataan)
0800-Enemy commenced a.

Cortical Ronald B. Smith-RFA- this date.

Bay Pt. Beach defenses battered by arty fire. Position + camouflage knocked out. Subplementary positions installed + manned by night.
Strength report 29 April.

Marines 77 1464

Navy 39 848

Army 113 1455

Total Regt. 229 3767

Hospital 3 87

St. Eugene 3 84

St. Dun 14

Boy Indiana 1 38

St. Joe 12

Arms Corp War 7 96

Kimley Field 8

Phil...a.

1 USN - KIA
2 USN - WIA Slight
4 USA - WIA
9 PAAC - WIA
1 PC - WIA
4 PS - WIA
1 PA - WIA

Major Francis H. Williams - WIA Slight
Col. Orville E. Helmone - 173575 - WIA - Serious
Col. Samuel W. Hackney - WIA Slight

Mrs. Mac Clark

Capt. L. W. Smith 21-39 - WIA Slight
1st. Lt. Joseph A. Adomane 201983

Capt. Joseph M. Andrews 238282
Capt. John A. Molloy 242450
Major Don H. Jenny 258488
April 30, 1942.

Regt. OP at Queen Tunnel.
3rd, 5th, and Regt. OP from James Gavin.
Beach defense positions same.
3rd Bn apprehended 3 Filipino civilians attempting to leave island. They were turned over to MPs.

Air raids: 0755-0848-3 Dive Bombers - H. Hughes.
0810-5
0857-1006
0910-9 Heavy Bombers - Topside.
1020-3 Dive Bombers - South Harbor.

1146-1134
1233-1312 - Pvt. Gavin.
1534-1633

1540-9 Heavy Bombers - Topside.
1606-3 Dive Bombers - South Harbor.
1612- - - South Harbor.
1734-1740-7 - Malinta Hill Area.

Material damage: 1st 30-8 cases 30 cal ammo.

1PA - WIA

Frances H. Williams

Sgt. William A. Dudley - WIA - Slight
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Regt.</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>3767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Corps</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>3483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hood</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Meade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Drum</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tiny Indiana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFIP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branching War</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kewasket HI</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Red Star</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strength report April 30
May 1, 1942

1900-0900 All Beach Defense Positions fully manned.

0730-1900

Damage to Beach Defense matériel. Through 30 Apr.

BMC 18" SL Navaja Battery altered.

24 March - 2nd Bn
25 " 1st Bn
28 " 2nd Bn
10 April - 3rd Bn
16 " 3rd Bn
24 " 1st Bn
29 " 2nd Bn
12th Bn 2

30 " 1st Bn

Total 8 1 1 2 11

Site raids: 0757-0814

0817-1900

0830 - 4 Dive Bombers good Garage.

0832 - 3 " Fort Hughes.

0921 - 9 Bomsers Fort Drum.

1147-1238 " Bup Basket & Leary

1241 - 1444 " 3 Dive Bombers - Malinta Hill

1516-1558 " 3 Dive Bombers - Malinta Hill

1615 - 1635 " Navy Bombers - Malinta Hill

1804 - 1855 " Fort Drum

0 Bombers - South Tower

1 Dive Bomber

3 Dive " Ordnance + Amm Fld.

Artillery shelling: 1137 - Cavit - Barangay Katine

1231 - Cavit - 50 rds.
Strength report May 1, 1943

Marines: 214 - 77 1464 - Casualties: 848
Navy: 39 1455
Army: 111 3747
Total Regt: 227

Consequently: 214 3399
Host: 8 111
St. Hughes: 3 84
St. George: 14
St. Indiana: 1 38
USFIP: 12
President of War: 7 96
Kindley: 8
Chiladha: 5

Not material damage.

Artillery shelling cont. 0000 - Topside
0230 - Entrance Pk + Malta.
0400 - Cavalry Pk + Airfield.
0505 (Batan) - Maldive

R230 4 Japanese apprehended on raft off Malta Pk. trying to leave island. Turned over to Navy.

During last few days Japanese have augmented his supply of heavy bombers in this area. At least 5 heavy bombs in this area at present.

Capt. Nathan Montgomery Jr. WIA - Slight

USA WIA
8 PAAC WIA
May 2, 1942

Sgt. Donald M. Shauli, 244397 - KIA

Pvt. Irvin B. Steele, 243790 - KIA

Pfc. Alvin J. Rovers, 276493 - KIA

Pfc. Wm. Azelle D. Walker, 270767 - WIA - Serious

Pfc. William S. Vaiden, 248216 - WIA - Slight

Sgt. Morris V. Gecesti, 266532 - "

Pvt. Sgt. Danny W. Grumney, 255488 - "

Sgt. Frank E. Dick, 239021 - "

Pfc. Thomas A. Craig, Jr., 295526 - "

Pfc. Verne D. Cutler, 271015 - "

Pfc. John A. James, 290930 - KIA

Corp. "J" L. Litt, 278394 - KIA

Pfc. Robert O. Mitchell, 291224 - WIA Slightly

Pfc. Leo H. Cautermiller, 281081 - "
### Personnel Distribution

#### 4th Marines 92d ATTACHED UNITS

**28 April 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column No.</th>
<th>Headquarters Company</th>
<th>Service Company</th>
<th>1st Battalion</th>
<th>2nd Battalion</th>
<th>3rd Battalion</th>
<th>4th Battalion (Participation only)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total on Rolls</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detached Duty:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hughes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Beach Def. + AA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Drum (AA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Mills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Btry T (AA))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: USFIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Detached (Over)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Attached Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attached Personnel</th>
<th>US Navy(Navy)</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Det. Duty: Fort Hughes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (J &amp; K)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC(Fleet)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC(Fleet Reserve)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC(Insular Forces)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Coast Guard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAAC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det. Duty: Fort Mills</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAAC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beach Def. Force Fort Mills</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil. Scouts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil. Army</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil. Constabulary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Recapitulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beach Defense Force</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN(Ac)+(Ac)</th>
<th>USN(Ac)+(Ac)</th>
<th>USN(Ac)+(Ac)</th>
<th>USN(Ac)+(Ac)</th>
<th>USN(Ac)+(Ac)</th>
<th>USN(Ac)+(Ac)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN(Navy)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN(Ac)+(Ac)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN(Ac)+(Ac)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Coast Guard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAAC</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAAC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil. Scouts</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil. Army</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil. Constabulary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL              | 25   | 192          | 8            | 70           | 53           | 1024         | 49           |
| Detached           | 1    | 11           | 1            | 9            | 1            | 8            | 2            |
| Units & Personnel  | 2    |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| PAAC               | 20   |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| TOTAL              | 1    | 31           | 1            | 9            | 1            | 8            | 3            |

**Total on Rolls:** 26 223 9 79 54 1032 52 897 60 1267 28 272 229 3770
NOTE: No. 1: 1 officer; Major Francis H. Williams, the Commanding Officer, 4th Bn, and 5 enlisted men are on temporary duty with the 4th Bn.

NOTE 2: U. S. Navy Attached Personnel (Column N) joined from the following Ships and Detachments:

1. U.S.S. S-38
2. MADCAVITE
3. FLAT-CINCAF
4. PAT WING 10
5. NEP, CAVITE
6. U.S.S. CAMPU
7. U.S.S. HOUSTON
8. RADIO STA., CAVITE
9. U.S.S. HOLLAND
10. INSHORE PATROL
11. RECEIVING STA., CAVITE
12. U.S.S. TRABAJADOR
13. BASE FORCE, MARIVELES
14. HARBOR CRAFT
15. NAVY DET, MONKEY PT, Ft MILLS
16. NAVY SECT. BASE, MARIVELES
17. OFF. 16TH NAV DIST
18. U.S. 8 YAGA
19. U.S.S. PIGEON
21. PATRIOT 12
22. U.S.S. S-178
23. U.S.S. OTUS
24. RAD. SCHOOL, NYP, CAVITE
25. U.S.S. ALDEN
26. U.S.S. PIKE

NOTE: No. 3.

U. S. Army attached personnel (Column R), joined from the following organizations:

21st Infantry
22nd Infantry
23rd Infantry
31st Infantry
33rd Infantry
46th Infantry
51st Infantry
52nd Infantry
57th Infantry
21st Division
60th Coast Artillery
200th Coast Artillery
23rd Field Artillery
31st Field Artillery
83rd Field Artillery
8th FA Field Artillery
26th Cavalry
803 Engineers

CWS
2nd Chemical Co.
7th Chemical Co.
4th Separate. Chem Co.
132nd Tank Bn.
194th Tank Bn.
17th Ordnance Co.
440th Ordnance Co.
690th Ordnance Co.
93rd Ordnance Co.
328th Ordnance Co.
724th Ordnance Co.
728th Ordnance Co.

Ordnance
Philippine Crd. Depot.
PEAF
ACEF
AC Det

AC Weather Detachment
Prov. AC
Hq. Sq. 20th Aviation
19th Air Base Group
20th Air Base Group
23rd Air Base Group
16th Bomb. Group
16th Bomb. Group
17th Bomb. Group
19th Bomb. Group
13th Bomb. Group
27th Bomb. Group
27th Bomb. Group
31st Bomb. Sq.
17th Pursuit Sq.
21st Pursuit Sq.
24th Pursuit Group
2nd Obs. Sq.
5th Inter. Omd.
8th Inter. Group
17th Inter. Group
7th Med. Sq.
27th Med. Sq.
23rd Med. Sq.
7th Maint Sq.
48th Med. Sq.
QM Corps
PDTG, QMC
10th QM
PAASD
1st MT Bn.
US TIP Hq.
NOTE: No. 3.

Philippine Scouts:
1. 26th CAVALRY
2. 57TH INFANTRY
3. POST SERV. COM.
4. 68TH PACK TRAIN
5. 45TH INFANTRY
6. 12TH QM BN.
7. DIV HQ, P.S.
8. DET, QMC, P.M.
9. 86TH F.A.

NOTE: No. 4.

Philippine Army:
1. OFFSHORE PATROL
2. 1ST "Q" BOAT SQ
3. 42ND INFANTRY
4. 2ND "Q" BOAT SQ
5. 31ST INFANTRY (PA)
6. 51ST INFANTRY (PA)
7. 53RD INFANTRY (PA)
8. 32ND INFANTRY (PA)
9. 43RD INFANTRY (PA)
10. ORDN. SECT. 2ND DIV.
11. 7TH SCHOOL SQ.
12. 11TH A.B. SQ.
13. 51ST ENG.
14. 202ND BN
15. HQ TRPS, AIRCOURPS
16. 21ST ENG.
17. 51ST DIV (PA)
18. 3RD DEP SQ
19. 51ST DIV.
20. 21ST INFANTRY.
21. 31ST ENG.
22. PHIL M.T.C.O.
23. 41ST INFANTRY
24. 6TH PURS SQ.
25. 4TH REGT.
26. 6TH SCH. SQ.
27. 1ST PHIL. DIV.
28. 82ND INFANTRY
29. 4TH A.B. SQ
30. 2ND DIV.
31. 41ST ENG.
32. QM, (PA)
33. 41ST DIV.
34. 1ST SERV. CO, QM
35. 51ST SIG. CO.
36. 82ND INFANTRY
37. 1ST SCH. SQ.
38. 51st MT.
39. 2ND DEP. SQ.

NOTE: No. 5.

Philippine Constabulary:
1. M.T. CO.
2. "D" CO.
3. 4TH INFANTRY (PC)
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commanding General, XIV Corps, BEVY.
Enclosures: (3) (A) Memo of 8Sep42 in re Embarkation and Debarkation. (B) En General Order No. 7-42, 1990-5 over DRN/ees dated 31Oct42. (C) SOPs No. 1 to 7 inclusive and No. 9.

1. Attention is invited to report already submitted under reference (b) which is considered to be of particular value for dissemination to other AA organizations.

2. Attention is likewise invited to the enclosures which were closely related to the actual operations prepared for and conducted by this organization. Brief comment pertaining thereto follows:

(a) Embarkation and Debarkation plan (Enc (A)).

It is believed that regardless of the type of vessels furnished for movement, or the type of loading contemplated — combat or commercial — AA organizations can and should be prepared to not only furnish progressive AA protection to establish beaches or beach-heads, but to be ready to fight, within certain limitations, for the beach area on which AA defenses will be required. The planning therefore should include provisions for partial use of AA troops as infantry, if no regular infantry covering troops be readily available.

In embarkation of the Ninth Defense Battalion, troops carried one day's supply of ammunition on their persons, issued prior to embarkation, for individual arms. (M-1 rifle, Reising gun, and pistol). Other items such as grenades, pyrotechnics, communication gear, 5-day's supply of "C" and "D" rations, were likewise embarked and readily available to the troops. Light AA weapons and belted ammunition were also made ready. This should be standard for AA troops landing in secured areas, or
CONFIDENTIAL

in support of a landing in force. It would be well to stress greater flexibility in the handling and landing of heavier AA units (guns) with a reasonable amount of radar fire control and warning service gear. Plans may call for a landing at a specific point, while enroute orders for diversions may take place. The original plan may contemplate a rear area landing whereas diversions orders may direct change to a forward, and perhaps very active, area (Ninth Defense Battalion experienced just such a situation). The best course for any AA commander is to plan to land in fighting form, regardless of the orders he receives or the types of vessels furnished him for the movement of his unit.

(b) With respect to enclosures (B) and (C) — in the light of later and actual experience — it is felt that the SOPs can be elaborated and improved upon to a great extent. SOPs are extremely valuable aids in this day of greater expansion of the armed forces and inexperienced officers.

3. Tactical dispositions on Guadalcanal from the time of landing provided:

(a) Light AA coverage on beaches during landing, with improvised infantry somewhat in depth.

(b) AA defense in depth with heavy gun (90mm), and automatic weapons (40mm, 20mm, and .50 cal).

(c) Ground beach defense (.30 cal Heavy B MGs) with some Army AT and infantry units attached.

(d) Installation of GA weapons (155mm guns).

4. (a) Enemy aircraft were engaged with radar control when atmospheric conditions did not permit illumination by searchlight. All actions were at night. Enemy planes were taken under fire (from 2Jan to 28Mar) 27 times. A total of 2005 rounds of 90mm ammunition was expended in these operations and the statements of disinterested witnesses together with the finding of enemy planes indicates that 6 planes were shot down by the 90mm Group of the Ninth Defense Battalion on the following dates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2110</td>
<td>14 Jan 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0320</td>
<td>22 Jan 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0430</td>
<td>27 Jan 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0301</td>
<td>22 Feb 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>11 Mar 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0357</td>
<td>25 Mar 43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All these planes except one were flying at an altitude in excess of 21,000ft. During the past month the enemy has been making
his attacks with planes flying at varying altitudes. One or two planes have been flying at altitudes of from 21,500 to 26,000 feet, perhaps to act as bait for the AA installations, while other planes have dropped their bombs from lower altitudes. One of these relatively low flying planes was shot down from an altitude of 10,500 feet on 25 March and fell into the sea in the vicinity of the S.S. TYPHER. These tactics on the part of the Japs are good, as the natural inclination of AA gunners is to fire on the illuminated target and the chances of finding the low flying craft are relatively small. The chances of enemy success in this operation are greater on clear nights than when there is an overcast, for when radar control is used there is a greater chance of the various fire control radars picking up different targets than when visual methods are employed. So far no plane at any time flew low enough to be successfully engaged by automatic weapons.

(b) (1) Ground Defense: All 90mm gun batteries were organized as strong points; zone barrage tables were prepared for delivering 90mm fire (air bursts) against enemy personnel in landing craft off the beaches; automatic AA weapons were installed in the 155mm G.P.F. positions with the dual mission of anti-boat and anti-aircraft defense; 40mm guns were given a dual antiaircraft-antitank mission.

(2) A key (1500 yds) strip of beach was organized for defensive defense. Lack of troops prevented organization in depth by units of this battalion (No organic infantry is provided Marine Corps Defense Battalions). Defense in depth was provided by attachment of suitable Army troops.

(3) Beach defense positions were located to cover the wire with a final protective line, completely covering the area from Koli Point to Togoma Point. Guns were sighted with the thought in mind that a landing would be preceded by naval bombardment and the defense was therefore thickened so that no gun section covered more than 400 yards, thus allowing for 100% coverage even if 50% of the guns were knocked out. .30 cal MG sections were covered by riflemen. Gun emplacements were constructed in such manner that the water jacket of the B.M.G. (heavy) was just above ground level and the firing slit was so situated that fire could only be directed through a small angle along the wire. This was done to prevent the gunner from engaging landing boats while they were waterborne as it is believed that debarking troops and troops attempting to breach barbed wire are a much more profitable target for .30 cal weapons than troops in armor shielded boats. It is also believed that fire directed at boats from the .30 cal positions would prematurely disclose the location of the emplacements. Emplacements were constructed from palm logs, covered by corrugated iron and sand. Beach
grasses and vines were planted on the emplacements with the result that they were indistinguishable from their surroundings from a distance of a few yards. Grenade pits were dug in front of the slits and the slits were covered by chicken wire. Telephones were installed in each emplacement with connections to other emplacements and to the Beach Defense CP. Guns were manned night and day with one man present at each gun at night and one man present at each section during the day. Telephones were tested every fifteen minutes. Our only regret is that the Japs failed to try them out.

5. Further reports will be made from time to time as operational conditions permit.

D. R. NIMMER

Copy to: COMC
        CG IMAC
R-2 REPORT

From: 1200 17 December, 1941
To: 1200 18 December, 1941

Fourth U.S. Marines Forward CP
1200, 18 December, 1941

No. 1

Maps: Island of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. Enemy front line.—contact with enemy not made as yet.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. General Summary.—except for planes passing over area, quiet in this sector. No bombs dropped or attacks made by enemy planes. Enemy aircraft performing only reconnaissance missions in this area.
   b. Operations of component elements.
      (1) Aircraft.—Passed over this area from 1805 to 1815; no bombs dropped or attacks made; enemy aircraft believed searching for our planes in water.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
   a. Terrain not under our control.—Enemy land forces are located as indicated.
      (1) VIGAN.—about 4,500 have landed here, commandeered transportation in vicinity, and moved north (unopposed) and occupied LACAG. Last reported that none of enemy landed here is south of Vigan.
      (2) APARRI.—8 transports are reported to have landed here and an air base established. The troops have moved south (unopposed) and occupied in succession, the following towns to the south: CAMALANTUCAN, GATTERON, and TUGUEGARAO (about 50 miles south of Aparri).
      (3) LEGASPI.—an enemy force landed here and has moved (unopposed) up to the area opposite SAN MIGUEL BAY.
   b. A reliable source reports that, in landing at LEGASPI, the enemy used U.S. flags to conceal their identity from civilians there.
   c. Other sources report that Japanese bombs, because of faulty mechanism, sometimes do not explode for as long as several days after dropping; other bombs are purposely incorporated with a device which causes them to delay from a few seconds to as much as 60 hours before exploding.
   d. The method of attack used by enemy planes to date and con-
firmed by other sources is as follows: The enemy aircraft passes over the target the first time without making any attack, merely observing the exact location of the target or targets. The planes then go about 5 or 6 miles away, suddenly reverse course, and head at top speed for their target, expending their ammunition carefully and conservatively. The planes then go about 5 or 6 miles away again and the procedure is repeated until either all targets are destroyed or all ammunition is expended.

Civilians, particularly, are inclined to erroneously conclude, that, after the planes first pass over without firing and get about 5 miles away, the danger is over.

R. F. RUGE,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

Copies to:
C.O. 1st Bn. 4th
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th
R-1
R-3
R-4
C.O. Service Co. 4th
C.O. HQ Co. 4th
31st Div. HQ
File
R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 18 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 19 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines
Forward OP
1200, 19 December, 1941.

No. 2.

Maps: Island of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—Contact not gained with enemy, as yet.
   b. In other sectors.—No known changes from previous report.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—No enemy operations.
   b. In other sectors.—
      (1) Aviation.—A single enemy plane dropped a few light bombs on TBA causing no casualties or material damage.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
   a. Other sources reliably report that, in land attacks, the enemy favors using wide enveloping movements rather than frontal attacks.

R. F. RUGE,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

Copies to:
C.O. 1st Bn. 4th
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th
R-1
R-3
R-4
C.O. Service Co. 4th
C.O. HQ Co. 4th
31st Div. HQ
File

408
R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 19 December, 1941.
To: 1200, 20 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines
Forward CP
1200, 20 December, 1941.

No. 3.

Maps: Island of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—Contact with enemy not gained as yet.
   b. In other sectors.—No known changes from previous reports.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.
      (1) Aviation.—1235-1245, 17 enemy planes (Navy) passed
          over this sector heading S.E. toward Manila; 1112-
          1135, single enemy plane circled over the area (be-
          lieved on reconnaissance mission).
   b. In other sectors.
      (1) Aviation.—1310, 3 enemy planes passed over Barrios
          Laoag and San Felipe dropping 3 bombs in sea. No
          damage or casualties. Planes were heading south.

R. F. RUGE
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

Copies to:
C.O. 1st Bn. 4th
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th
R-1
R-3
R-4
C.O. Service Co. 4th
C.O. HQ Co. 4th
31st Div. HQ
Camp Commander Rear CP
File.
R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 20 December, 1941.
To: 1200, 21 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines, Forward CP,
1200, 21 December, 1941.

No. 4.

Maps: Island of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—Permanent contact with enemy not gained, as yet.
   b. In other sectors.—Enemy force is ashore at DAVAO on the island of MINDANAO; no known changes in landings at VIGAN, APARRI, and LEGASPI.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.
      (1) Aviation.—0934 6 twin motored bombers dropped 4 bombs over FORT WINT. One man's hand injured; no other casualties or damage. AA fire from FORT WINT broke up formation although no planes were shot down.
   b. In other sectors.
      (1) Land operations.—An enemy force of unknown strength has landed at DAVAO and is meeting strong resistance.
      (2) Aviation.—At 1310, 20 December, 10 Japanese dive bombers dropped 5 bombs on and machine gunned the landing field at IBA.

DIST: C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
R-1
R-2
R-4
C.O. Service Co. 4th,
C.O. HQ Co. 4th,
31st Div. HQ,
Camp Commander, Rear CP,
File.

R. F. HUGE,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.
R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 21 December, 1941.
To: 1200, 23 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Forward CP,
1200, 23 December, 1941.

No. 5.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—Permanent contact with enemy not gained, as yet.
   b. In other sectors.—At 0730, 22 December 10 Destroyers, 1 cruiser, and approximately 90 enemy transports were in LINGAYEN BAY; a large number of these troops are ashore near AGOO, ARINGAY, and CAVA (south of SAN FERNANDO LA UNION); many of the transports were not unloaded and may be used for landings elsewhere. No known changes in progress of landings at DAVAO, VIGAN, APARRI, and LEGASPI from last report.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.
      (1) Aviation.—No activity except several times single planes (believed on reconnaissance missions) passed over sector.
      b. In other sectors.—Landing of force referred to in par. 1 a., was made on barges. An unknown number of tanks were landed. After landing it is reported that enemy was encountered by USAFFE forces equipped with tanks. Accurate results not known. Remaining, unloaded transports (last seen in LINGAYEN BAY); may attempt landing near BAGAC, OLONGAPO, or along western coast of ZAMBALES PROVINCE. Near DAVAO enemy is meeting strong resistance although exact progress of engagement is not yet clear.

DISTRIBUTION: (1) C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
(2) C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
(3) C.O. 31st Div.

R. F. RUGE,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

S-E-G-E-T
R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 23 December, 1941.
To: 1200, 24 December, 1941.

Fourth J.S. Marines,
Forward OP,
1200, 24 December, 1941.

No. 6.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION.
   a. In this sector.-No change. Contact with enemy ground troops not gained.
   b. In other sectors.-Enemy force landed at LEGASPI has moved northwest and occupied towns of NAGA and DAET. Total strength of enemy in this area estimated at 5,000. Enemy force landed at APARRI has moved southward (unopposed) and established an air base near TUGUEGARO. Total strength of enemy in this area estimated at 3,000-5,000. Situation regarding landing near ARINGAY, AGOO, DANORITIS not clear. Our forces are resisting near DANORITIS. No known changes in situation at VIGAN and LAOGAS. Our communications from DAVAO on MINDANAO Island reported cut.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.-No operations here other than aviation. At 1405 nine (9) Navy bombers of enemy passed over sector toward MANILA. At 1440 same planes passed over our sector heading in northern direction.
   b. In other sectors.-On land, enemy forces landed near ARINGAY, AGOO, and DANORITIS are encountering resistance from our forces. Enemy force near TAGUDIN reported moving towards BONDOD. An unknown number of enemy transports, supported by destroyers, are reported off BATANGAS in southern Luzon. On the northern front enemy planes are very active in strafing operations in supporting their land troops. Enemy land troops are sending out reconnaissance patrols (strength: 40-150 men) in advance of their main units.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
   a. The Regimental Commander directs that all unit commanders of this regiment thoroughly disseminate the following information and pass on to all of their respective units:
      (1) In case of capture the only information a man is required to give to the enemy is his name, rank, and serial number.
      (2) In case enemy planes undertake strafing operations our men will not return fire, but will lay flat and take cover as the planes approach; as soon as the strafing attack is over our men will quickly open fire and catch the planes with "going away fire" (this method of defense against ground strafing has been successful in other fields of operations). "L" shaped trenches afford excellent protection against strafing by enemy planes and will be utilized to the utmost in constructing defensive positions.
   b. The commander of the enemy forces operating in the Philippines is Lt. General ISAHARU. He is reported to have a deep feeling of resentment against ANGLO-SAXONS. He speaks English fluently.
   c. Reliable reports from MALAYA indicate that Japanese advances in that territory have been made by short thrusts on the part of mechanized forces, with a halt to permit infantry and machine gun units to close up. Other sources state that Japanese fight well under artillery and machine gun fire, but are not good against bayonet charges.

-1-
d. The Japanese soldier.—The average Japanese soldier is short and stocky and possesses considerable stamina. He is not particularly intelligent but works hard. In accuracy of fire of infantry weapons he is decidedly inferior to our soldier. The average Japanese soldier thinks he is a good shot if he can hit our marksmanship target from 200 yards, prone position. His accuracy of fire of infantry weapons rapidly diminishes at ranges greater than 200 yards. The enemy soldier wears a khaki uniform, a green helmet, similar in shape to the German helmet, and those observed to date are not equipped with gas masks.

**DISTRIBUTION:**
- C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
- C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
- C.O. HQ Co. 4th,
- C.O. Service Co. 4th,
- R-1,
- R-3,
- R-4,
- C.O. 31st Div., USAFFE.

R. F. Rude,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.
SECRET

R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 24 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 30 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP,
1200, 30 December, 1941.

No. 7.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.
       Map of Isle of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION.
   a. In this sector.—Contact with enemy ground troops not gained,
      as yet.
   b. In other sectors.—
      (1) Northern Front.—The large enemy force which landed near
      ARINGAY, AGOC, and DAMORTIS now occupies STA. IGNAZIA,
      GERONA, PURA, GUIMBA, KUNOZ, and SAN JOSE. The enemy
      force which landed at APARRI and GONZAGA and moved south
      and occupied the area as far south as TUGUEGARO apparently
      is making no attempt to move farther southward but is
      establishing air bases in that region. Likewise the
      enemy force which landed at VIGAN is not moving southward
      but is occupying most towns in that vicinity.
      (2) Southern Front.—Enemy forces which landed at ATIMONAN
      and MAUBAN have moved westward and now occupies the
      towns of SARINA, TIMANG, and TIBASCO. The enemy force
      which landed at LEGASPI and moved northwest (unopposed) as
      far as DAET is apparently making no effort to move
      farther northwest.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In our sector.—No enemy operations other than the following
      enemy air attacks: at 1537, on 24 December, 1941 eight (8)
      enemy bombers (navy) dropped four (4) bombs in the vicinity
      of the dock at OLONGAPO causing only slight damage; from
      1230-1330 enemy navy planes bombed a French ship in MARIVELES
      Harbor killing two (2) and wounding four (4) members of this
      regiment who were standing guard duty aboard the vessel (the
      vessel sank several days later); from 1130 to 1430 on 25
      December, enemy enemy planes dropped bomb (377) FORT MILLS,
      FORT HUGHES, and FORT DRUM. Dive bombing, high altitude bomb-
      ing, and strafing operations were employed. Serious damage
      was inflicted on buildings and supplies on CORREGIDOR. One
      8" AA gun (Army) was destroyed and three (3) men killed. Five
      (5) enemy planes were definitely shot down. Six (6) others
      were reported shot down. One (1) Marine was killed and four
      (4) were wounded. Most of the enemy bombs (500, 220, and 110
      lb. were used) were dropped from 15,000 to 20,000 ft. altitude.
   b. In other sectors.
      (1) Northern Front.—The enemy force which landed at ARINGAY,
      AGOC, and DAMORTIS (estimated at two (2) divisions) during
      the period of this report moved approximately fifty (50)
      miles south in the face of opposition from our Philippine
      units. No artillery was employed during this drive but
      the enemy air forces were very active in ground strafing
      our infantry units. Light tanks with 37mm weapons were
      used.
      (2) Southern Front.—The enemy forces which landed at ATIMONAN
      and MAUBAN during the period of this report have moved
      westward and left garrisons of approximately three hundred
      (300) men in towns enroute to LIPIRIANA and TAGONG (their
      farthest points inland). The enemy is expected to
      attempt to move northward on both the east and west sides
      of LAGUNA de BAY.
3. MISCELLANEOUS.
   a. An unconfirmed report states that an enemy force has landed at NASUGBU on the western coast of southern LUZON.

DIST: C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,  
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,  
C.O. 1st Separate Marine Bn.,  
C.O. U.S. Navy Unit,  
R-3, Commanding General Fort Mills, File.

G. D. HAMILTON,  
Major, U.S. Marine Corps,  
R-2.
SECRET

R-2 REPORT

SECRET

From: 1200, 30 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 4 January, 1942.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental Command Post.
1200, 4 January, 1942.

No. 9.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.
Map of Isle of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet.
   b. In other sectors.
      (1) Northern Front.—Enemy front line now running approxi-
          mately east and west in immediate vicinity of SAN
          FERNANDO.
      (2) Southern Front.—Enemy on this front now occupied city
          of MANILA.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In our sector.—No operations other than enemy air attacks.
      Almost continuously from 0955 to 1235 on 2 January the enemy
      conducted dive bombing operations through low, overhanging
      clouds, killing one (1) Marine and wounding two (2). One
      Army AA gun was destroyed. (enemy appears to be after our
      seacoast batteries on west end of CORREGIDOR). On 4 January
      enemy aircraft conducted high bombing and dive bombing opera-
      tions directed at our seacoast batteries again. One (1) gun
      was hit (has already been repaired). The enemy attacked in
      two groups, the first having nine (9) planes and the second
      six (6) planes. A very large number of 500 lb. bombs were
      dropped. Three (3) enemy planes were definitely shot down.
      Two (2) others were reported shot down.
   b. In other sectors.
      (1) Northern Front.—Enemy front line pushed south from STA.
          IGNACIA, GERONA, FURA, GIBRA, MUNOZ, and SAN JOSE to the
          vicinity of SAN FERNANDO. The enemy suffered a large
          number of casualties and were resisted stubbornly by our
          troops during their southward drive.
      (2) Southern Front.—The enemy moved northward during this
          period and occupied the undefended city of MANILA.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
   (1) It is reported that Philippine Officers captured by the
       enemy are being shot if they refuse to work.
   (2) It is reported that many civilians on LUZON are being ruth-
       lessely treated by the enemy.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—It is expected that our forces in northern
   BATAAN will be contacted by the enemy about 5 January. It is be-
   lieved that it will take about 5 more days for the enemy to bring
   up adequate equipment and supplies so that our forces will be
   actually engaged with the main body of the enemy about 10 Jan-
   uary in northern BATAAN.

DIST: C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
       C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
       C.O. 3rd Bn. 4th,
       File.

G. D. HAMILTON,
Major, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

416
SECRET

R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 4 January, 1942.
To: 1200, 7 January, 1942.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP, Fort Mills, P.I.
1200, 7 January, 1942.

No. 2.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.
Roads and Trails of Corregidor, 1" = 600'.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—Contact with enemy ground troops not gained,
as yet. Enemy aircraft continued reconnaissance and bombing
operations causing little damage to military objectives.
   b. In other sectors.
      (1) Northern Front.—Enemy strength here estimated at 2-3
divisions or 45,000 with tanks and light artillery.
      Enemy front line running generally NW-SE about 6 kilo-
meters north of HERMOSA. Our front lines follow near
      the GOUAIN River.
      (2) The occupation of JOLO and additional landings in MIN-
      DANAQ indicate an effort to cut our overseas communi-
cation to the south.
      (3) The towns of MARIVELES, LIMAY, and ORANI were subjected
to bombing and strafing operations by enemy aircraft
resulting in little damage to military objectives.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In our sector.—Enemy aircraft continued daily reconnaissance
and bombing operations over Fort MILLS. Damage to military
objectives was very slight and casualties among our troops
very few. Our AA batteries continue to be effective against
the enemy.
   b. In other sectors.
      (1) Northern Front.—On 4 January strong enemy forces in-
cluding infantry, tanks, and artillery, and attack planes
continued operations against our forces in the GUAGUA-
PORAC position. The enemy's main effort was against our
left flank at PORAC. Initial successes gained by the
enemy were offset by counter attack by our 21st Division
and the original line was restored. The Japanese suffered
considerable losses in their assault of our position at
PORAC. From concealed positions our forces fired shrap-
nel at point-blank range through several dense enemy
columns inflicting heavy casualties. The PORAC line
while spectacularly held is actually the O.P.L. A
shallow withdrawal under cover of darkness was effected
January 5th by our forces to the line of the GOUAIN
River.
3. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) During this period considerable damage was inflicted on non-military objectives on CORREGIDOR. Roads were bombed impeding traffic temporarily. Many shacks and vacated military quarters were seriously damaged. A church was completely demolished. Some communication lines, the pump station, and several warehouses near North Dock were destroyed. In addition one tank and barge of Diesel oil and about 50,000 sandbags were burned.

(2) Enemy Mortar.—The mortar being used by the enemy has a very loud detonation and for this reason it sometimes is reported as 75mm artillery. The projectile is not as destructive as our own 81mm and a large percentage are duds.

(3) Hand Grenades.—The burst is loud but the effect is slight. The grenades are not corrugated for fragmentation.

(4) Rifle Grenades.—Range about 200 yards. They are corrugated for fragmentation but a large percentage are duds.

(5) Enemy small unit tactics.—From all fronts on LUZON it is being continuously reported that in every encounter the enemy will always follow the principle of infiltration to locate flanks then rapid fire from all sides. This is confusing to untrained troops particularly when they find themselves fired upon from the rear. Consistent reports indicated inferior marksmanship by the enemy who seem to rely mainly on volume and rapidity of fire.

DISTRIBUTION:

C.O. 1st Bn 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn 4th,
C.O. 3rd Bn 4th,
C.O. Reserve Unit,
C.G. HDM&SB,
File.

G. D. HAMILTON,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.
SECRET

From: 1200, 7 January, 1942.
To: 1200, 9 January, 1942.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, F.I.
1200, 9 January, 1942.

No. 10.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet; conspicuous absence of enemy aircraft operations here.
   b. In other sectors.
      (1) BATAN.—Enemy front line in immediate vicinity of HERMOSA with considerable troops and transportation in that town. Small strategic controls are making their way through roads from HERMOSA to west. Civilians in many small towns in BATAN were subjected to bombing and strafing from enemy aircraft.
      (2) MANILA.—There are from 6,000-7,000 enemy troops reported to be in MANILA. There are very few tanks and little artillery. The troops are mostly infantry-men armed with 30-caliber bolt action rifles. There are no motorized units. The HQ for the MANILA Garrison is split between the MANILA and BAYVIEW Hotels. The QM is at JAI ALAI and troops are quartered at Army-Navy Club, SAN LAZARO Race Track, CENTRAL Hotel, FAR EASTERN University, and SANTA ANA Club. Many horses and ponies have been commandeered for an enemy cavalry unit in MANILA. Many airplanes (types unknown) are being moved to PIONEER Field. The enemy is not commandeering private automobiles, but is taking all gasoline and oil from them. The food problem is quite serious for civilians since each person is allowed to purchase no more than ½ ganta (about 5 lbs.) of rice at a time and must show a certificate before making the purchase. (½ ganta costs 50 centavos). Philippine currency is being accepted in the city of MANILA.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In our sector.—None, except possible reconnaissance missions by a few enemy aircraft.
   b. In other sectors.
      (1) BATAN.—During the night of the 7th approximately 30 commando and launches were used by the enemy to transport troops to HERMOSA from MALAPATAN. The launches proceeded along the southern coast of PAMPANGA and landed behind the enemy's own lines, each launch carrying about 40 men. During the night of 8-9th the enemy attempted to land with a few small boats off PUERTO RIVAS (the enemy is believed to be attempting to locate our positions and may return at this beach with a much larger force; these tactics were used against HONGKONG). Sporadic fighting continues while the enemy moves troops toward the front lines.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
   (1) The Regimental Commander directs that the following information be thoroughly disseminated to their personnel by unit commanders:
      a. Experience indicated that scattered narrow, slit trenches about 3 to 4 feet deep, not over 2 ft. wide, and 6 ft. long will accommodate 3 or 4 men. These afford the greatest
protection to the largest number of men. Direct hits alongside such positions have left occupants unharmed. Large dugouts with overhead splinter proofing and built to accommodate 10-50 men are most vulnerable as direct hits endanger the lives of all personnel inside. This practice is prohibited.

b. Reports of large successes by our forces should be ignored until confirmed (this is one of the enemy's methods of trying to undermine our morale).

c. The smallest flashlight may be of considerable assistance to enemy aircraft at night. The practice of using lights at night (unless completely concealed) will be discontinued.

(2) The Commander 26th Cavalry reports that the Japanese fire very rapidly but are very poor marksmen. After a battle of several hours Christmas day one horse was killed and one man wounded.

(3) Unconfirmed reports from MANILA state that the Japanese are shooting all Filipino officers caught in khaki uniform. Enlisted men in blue denim uniform are set free.

(4) Anti-aircraft defense of this area shows one plane brought down for each 150-rounds of ammunition expended.


DISTRIBUTION:

C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
C.O. 3rd Bn. 4th,
C.O. Reserve (Maj. King),
C.G. HdM&BB,
COMSIXTEEN,
File.
R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 9 January, 1942.
To: 1200, 15 January, 1942.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental OP., Fort Mills, P.I.
1200, 16 January, 1942.

No. 11.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet.
   b. In other sectors.—On the BATAAN front heavy fighting is in progress on the right flank of our battle position which extends generally west from near ABUCAY to north of BAGAC Bay. Enemy drive south is at present concentrated on our right flank. On our left flank there is no activity, other than sporadic fighting along our outpost line of resistance with small enemy patrols. One enemy battalion has infiltrated through on the right flank to our reserve line of resistance. A counter-attack by our forces is now underway to restore our original line. The remainder of our entire battle position is intact.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. In this sector.—Beginning at 1236, on 14 January 9 enemy bombers (navy) made 2 attacks on CORREGIDOR dropping most of their bombs near Middle side. Our OP's report observing 1 planes shot down and another plane out of formation and smoking (the latter headed towards MANILA at an altitude of about 6,000 ft.). A Marine AA battery at MARIVELES reported shooting down 1 enemy plane (believed to be same one observed by our OP’s). In NAIC area (on south shore of BATAAN) 83 Bencos pulled back 53 Bencos pulled back in Bencos near the shoreline. In addition, in this area there are approximately 500 enemy troops, 3 field pieces, and a small radio station. The enemy has collected approximately 200 motor boats in PANANGA area (north shore of MANILA Bay).
   b. In other sectors.—On the BATAAN front there has been heavy, effective artillery fire delivered by both sides. The enemy has been massing in infiltrating several units through our main line of resistance. Counter-attacks by our forces have restored the original lines except that at present one enemy battalion behind our main line of resistance is being counter-attacked by our forces. Enemy aircraft are not particularly active in strafing our troops but are concentrating more in bombing our artillery positions and supply dumps. Both sides have received substantial losses in artillery with the enemy receiving more losses than his share. On the 14th our forces set a enemy tank on fire with anti-tank fire. The enemy continues to bring reinforcements to the BATAAN front.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
   (1) An enemy ship and 2 seaplanes have been observed in OLONGAPO and a small Japanese garrison has been established there.
   (2) An enemy hydrocyanic gas grenade has been discovered in BATAAN.
   (3) Enemy soldiers in BATAAN are equipped with gas masks.
   (4) The enemy has a cavalry regiment on the BATAAN front.
   (5) The enemy is using THERMITE bombs in BATAAN.
   (6) Higher 3-2 units estimate general distribution of enemy units at present as follows:

-1-
North LUZON--------4 divisions
South LUZON--------2 divisions
DAVAO----------------1 division
JOLO-----------------1 brigade (reinforced)
BANGKOK---------------1 division
SAIGON----------------1 division
MALAYA-----------------4 divisions
CANTON-----------------1 1/2 divisions

(7) The enemy is believed to be attempting to use DAVAO as a base for operations against NEI. Many bombs and aircraft facilities are reported observed there.

(8) The enemy is sending individual snipers through our lines in BATAAN. They are proving effective and are especially disturbing to untrained troops.

G. D. HAMILTON,
Lt. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

DISTRIBUTION:
C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
C.O. 3rd Bn. 4th,
C.O. Reserve (MajKing),
C.O. HD&SS,
COMSIXTEEN,
File.
SECRET

R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 15 January, 1942.
To: 1200, 26 January, 1942.

4th, U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.
1200, 26 January, 1942.

No. 12.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In area of FORTIFIED ISLANDS.—Contact with enemy ground
troops not gained, as yet.
   b. In BATAAN.—Because of enemy pressure in the center of our
Battle Position and enemy landings on the S.W. coast of
BATAAN our forces are presently moving their Battle Position
to a line extending generally along the PILAR-SUGA Road.
The enemy has an estimated 2 battalions ashore near
AGLOLOMA Bay and a number of small forces of snipers in
the area near PUJOT Hill and MARIVELES. Army units have
contacted and expect to destroy the units near AGLOLOMA Bay
while U.S. Navy and Marine units are taking action to remove
the sniper menace near MARIVELES.
   c. In CAVITE and BATANGAS Provinces.—It is reported that there
are no large, enemy forces in this area but that there are
numerous, enemy patrols each consisting of approximately
1 officer and 25 men. There are yet approximately 300
enemy troops in and to the immediate west of TERNATE.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In area of FORTIFIED ISLANDS.—No activity other than re-
   connaissance flights by enemy aircraft.
   b. In BATAAN.—The enemy continued infiltration tactics and heavy
artillery fire concentrating more on the center of our Battle
Position. An enemy force (estimated at 2 battalions) landed near
AGLOLOMA Bay. These forces were sent from the SUBIC
Bay area in landing boats. A small enemy group fired upon
our Hill 276 the night of the 23rd forcing our men to withdraw
from that position. The same night 2 armored, enemy landing boats were sunk by boats of our
Inshore Patrol off the S.W. coast of BATAAN. Enemy aircraft
continued dive bombing and strafing operations against our
troops, artillery positions, and dumps. Enemy observation
planes continued to enhance the accuracy of their artillery
fire. Our artillery fire continued to do effective work.
The enemy continued to bring reinforcements in the BATAAN-
SUBIC Bay area.
   c. In CAVITE and BATANGAS Provinces.—Construction work by
Philippine civilians under the supervision of enemy soldiers
continues near TERNATE. Although no large calibre weapons
have been observed, it is highly possible that emplacements
are being constructed in defilade to the west of TERNATE.
The Japanese are reported to have taken over the sugar re-
finery near NASUGBU for the purpose of obtaining the alcohol.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
   (1) Enemy aircraft in this area are operating from NICHOLS, CLARK,
DEL CARIEN, SAN MARCELINO, and RIOSALES Fields. Higher E-2
units estimate the total strength of enemy aircraft in this
area to consist of: 18 heavy bombers (2 squadrons), 18 dive
bombers (2 squadrons), and 36 fighter planes (2 squadrons).
(2) Enemy continues to use horse-drawn carts in lieu of motorized
vehicles, in most cases, indicating a lack of gasoline on
LUZON.
(5) The 2 Japanese landing boats referred to in par. 2 b., were sunk by our .50 calibre machine guns (.50 calibre ammunition will not penetrate the armor of these boats). The boats were 30-40 feet in length with armor in forward and rear parts and around the motor; coxswain's position is well forward; each boat has mounts for 4 machine guns. Two wounded men were captured while it is believed about 6 men went down with their boats. The captured men were engineers, about 24 years of age, with excellent physiques. Their uniforms consisted of coveralls; they possessed no rank insignia. A 1935-light machine gun (made in Belgium) was captured. The weapon is approximately .50 calibre, has a bipod mount and is similar in construction to our M2.

(4) During the night of January 23/24, approximately 40 lights floating on small rafts were found off the east coast of BATAAN near KITANG Pt. It is believed these lights were used to draw fire from our forces in BATAAN. The enemy may continue this practice and at a later date actually attempt to land in this area in boats with lights giving the same appearance from east coast of BATAAN. The Japanese practice a great deal of trickery.

(5) Enemy air bombs used in MALAYA. Usual weights in pounds are: 30, 100, 500, and 1000. The longest type of delayed action bomb was three hours. Two new types of enemy bombs have been seen: (1) A dual purpose, incendiary, anti-personnel bomb, weight 100 pounds, containing rubber pellets which ignite upon explosion. The pellets can be extinguished by water but will reignite when dry, during the following ten hours. (2) An anti-personnel bomb, weight about two pounds, length 10½ inches, effective radius 50 feet. Duds often explode from slight vibration or movement.

(6) Enemy personnel have been captured from 3 different divisions on the BATAAN Front.

(7) During this period patrols from our 41st Division found several hundred dead, enemy troops and much abandoned equipment near the SAML River to the north of our right flank in BATAAN (more indication of our effective artillery fire). There is reported to be a very heavy stench in this area because of the many dead, unburied bodies of the enemy.

(8) Civilians report considerable of the enemy north of our right flank in BATAAN moving to the west.

(9) During the morning of January 26 the enemy, using a loud speaker in front of our Battle Position in BATAAN, made the following announcement heard by our front line troops: "FILIPINOS—we are not fighting you but the AMERICANS. We are your friends. We are moving towards SUBIC Bay."

4. CONCLUSIONS—While the enemy is increasing his pressure on our northern front in BATAAN he is, at the same time, exerting considerable pressure on the west coast of the peninsula indicating a major effort from the north and west within the next, few days.


R-2 REPORT

To: 1200, 10 February, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.
1200, 10 February, 1942.

No. 13.

Maps: (1) Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.
(2) Sketch of Loneskawayan Point.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.—Enemy aerial activity has been limited to reconnaissance missions. On 6, 7 and 9 February enemy forces near TERNATE delivered artillery fire on the islands causing little damage and few serious casualties. During the period enemy troop concentrations and gun positions in and near TERNATE were taken under fire by our batteries from Forts Drum and Frank. Reports indicate that our artillery fire was effective. There are an estimated eight (8) 105mm guns near TERNATE.

   b. In BATAAN.—Enemy front lines are generally in the same position as stated in last report. An enemy force (estimated at one battalion) made a wedge through the center of the front of our left corps. Our forces are counter attacking to restore our original MLR in this area. On our extreme right our patrols have pushed as far north as BALANGA finding no enemy in this area. The situation on the west coast has improved considerably. Except for a force estimated at about 400 men ashore near ANYABAN Bay, the enemy landing forces on the west coast have been either captured or destroyed. Despite frequent dive bombing and strafing attacks by enemy aircraft against our positions and supply routes, the morale of our officers and men in BATAAN continues to be good. Philippine Army units continue to show a marked improvement in fighting efficiency.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.—From 0855 to 1025 on 6 February, from 0900 to 1020 on 7 February and from 1102 to 1230 on 9 February, enemy forces to the immediate west of TERNATE delivered fire (believed to be 105mm) on and near the islands. Most of the fire was directed at Fort Drum. The ammunition used contained very sensitive fuses and was of high degree of fragmentation indicating the fire was directed against our personnel. Damage was negligible and serious casualties were few. During the period of this report on separate days our batteries on Fort Frank delivered effective fire on the following targets near TERNATE: (1) enemy troop concentrations near PALICPICAN Bay (2) enemy troop concentrations in TERNATE proper (3) enemy artillery batteries to the immediate west of TERNATE.

   b. In BATAAN.—On our front line the enemy continued infiltration tactics. Some penetrations were made but in every case (except as mentioned in par. 1b) our original lines were restored by counter attacks. On the west coast the enemy made numerous attempts to reinforce her units there but these were successfully repelled by our aircraft and beach defenses. A captured enemy mosaic and operation order reveal that the enemy landing force on the west coast had as its mission the cutting of the BAGAC-MARIVELES Road at a point approximately...
east of QUINAUN Point. The enemy unit which landed on and near LONGOSKAWAYAN Point attempted to move east towards MARIVELES but was held back by our Navy battalion and two (2) platoons of Marines (one machine gun and one 81mm mortar). After several days fighting this enemy force was completely destroyed by a unit of the Philippine Scouts supported by the Navy and Marine units. The enemy forces in the AGLOLOKAN Bay area continued their dogged resistance until 8 February when the last of their forces were destroyed. The enemy force estimated at about 400 men ashore near ANYASAN Bay continues to resist our forces although they are completely encircled. Our forces effectively used tanks against the enemy in the AGLOLOKAN and ANYASAN Bay areas. During the night of 8/9 February an estimated Thirteen (13) small boats loaded with enemy troops attempted to land near ANYASAN Bay. It is reliably reported that few, if any of these troops, reached shore safely as they were taken under heavy fire by our beach defenses. During the afternoon of 9 February in a series of dogfights our aircraft destroyed four enemy planes in the air. One other enemy plane was forced to land near PILAR and was destroyed by our artillery fire. Our forces lost one plane during the fighting. During the night of 9/10 February a few enemy boats attempted to land near ANYASAN Bay. They too are reported to have been successfully repelled by our shore defenses (many Japanese were seen in the water).

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Prisoners of War.-Enemy prisoners of war reveal that they have been told that they would be killed if they surrendered to our forces. Enemy prisoners of war further state that our artillery fire has taken a heavy toll among the Japanese.

(2) Landing Boats.-The landing boats used by the enemy on the west coast of BATAAN recently have varied in capacity from 35 to 60 men each. Many of these boats were not armored and consisted of ordinary scows. It is believed the enemy is using inferior grade of boats in this area because their loss after landing is almost certain. They are believed to be saving their better grade landing boats for more important missions.

(3) Tanks.-In BATAAN the enemy is using a medium weight tank (1930) (or 92 (1932)) in TM 30-420. It has the following characteristics:

1. Crew - 5 men (1 driver, 1 commander, 3 gunners).
2. Armament - 37mm gun, 1 machine gun in turret, and 1 machine gun in hull fore.
3. Ammunition - 5,000 rounds small arms and 300 rounds 37mm.
4. Armor Thickness - .23 to .67 inches.
5. Dimensions - length 17' 6", width 8' 4", height 8' 5".
7. Maximum Speed - 27 miles per hour.

(4) Grenade Thrower.-In BATAAN the enemy has extensively used a grenade thrower (fired from the thigh) with the following characteristics (see model 89, TM 30-420):

1. Weight (total) - 10.6 pounds.
2. Length - 20".
3. Length of tube - 10".
4. Caliber - 50mm (about 2"
5. Ammunition - model 89 shell, time fuze hand grenade, signal grenade, smoke grenade, practice grenade.
6. Range for Model 89 shell - 140 to 700 yards.
7. Range for other Ammunition - 40 to 200 yards.
8. Time of Explosion - 7.5 seconds after discharge or on impact.
9. Rate of Fire, one man - 10 shots per minute; two men - 20 shots per minute.
10. Effective Area of Burst - model 89 shell, 50 yard radius; time fuze hand grenade, 25 yard radius.

(6) Supplies Dropped by Parachutes. - The enemy has dropped numerous supplies by parachutes intended for their troops operating behind or within our lines. These supplies consisted of food, cigarettes, medical equipment, etc. and are dropped in a brown case approximately 3' x 1' x 10" in size. Nearly all of these supplies have been seized by our troops.

(6) Enemy Tactics. - In fighting on QUINAMAN Point, as our forces made a final assault upon the few, remaining enemy troops there, the latter ceased firing their small arms and used their hand grenades (of which they had many) against our troops.

In an attack against enemy troops defending LONGGOHAYAN Point (see attached sketch) one of our small forces approached from the NE. The enemy had machine guns well concealed and laid to deliver grazing fire up the slope as shown. Other enemy infantry units were in position as shown near B. When our troops moved forward into area A, enemy fire was witheld. Finally when a number of our troops had entered area A, fire was opened by the enemy from B. Some of our troops attempted to withdraw up the hill and the enemy machine guns then opened their grazing fire. Our troops, in order to withdraw had to pass through this machine gun fire with the result that a substantial number of casualties were inflicted on our troops.

(7) Enemy Propaganda. - Enemy planes have dropped notes to our troops stating in substance as follows: "Bring this paper to our lines and you will be saved. You have only to strap your rifle over your back with barrel pointing down and proceed to our lines holding a white cloth above your head." Other propaganda sheets state in substance as follows: "Filipinos - lay down your arms. The American fleet has been sunk. The Americans are making you fight in the front lines while they seek safety in the rear." Another propaganda sheet bearing Mr. Vargas' name at the bottom asks the Filipinos "to surrender at once, as all is lost."

(8) Enemy Fighting Efficiency. - Enemy troops resist to the bitter end. Many of them commit suicide to prevent capture (they have been led to believe that they will be killed if captured). Reports continue to be received stating that the enemy small arms fire is generally inaccurate.

(9) Casualties. - In the fighting west of MARIVELES the enemy suffered approximately 250 men killed while our forces lost 22; in the AGLOLOMAN Bay region the enemy lost approximately 450 men to our 70. Enemy casualties near the front lines are difficult to determine accurately since many of their troops are killed behind their lines by our artillery fire.
BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD

DONALD CURTIS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-X.

Distribution:
C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
C.O. 3rd Bn. 4th,
C.O. Beach Defense Reserve,
R-3 4th,
COMSIXTEEN,
File.
R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 10 February, 1942.
To: 0800, 20 February, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP, Fort Mills, P.I.
0800, 20, February, 1942.

No. 14.

Maps: (1) Coast and Geodetic Survey, Southern Luzon (Western Sheet).
(2) B-Re Japanese Trench.

Sketches: (1) A-Japanese Trench.
(2) B-Re Japanese Tactics.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.—Near CALUMPAN and
LIMBONES are small enemy forces with the apparent mission of
cutting the water supply of Fort FRANK. The enemy has ar-
tillery and beach defense positions to the immediate east
and west of TERNATE. It is estimated that there are from
1500 to 2000 enemy troops in the CALUMPAN—TERNATE—NAIG
—CAVITE Area. In the MANILA area the enemy has beach de-
fenses to the immediate north and south of the city and has
available a large number of motor launches and small inter-
island vessels for possible landing operations against the
Fortified Islands.

b. In BATAAN.—The main enemy forces are several kilometers to
the north of our Battle Position. Enemy front lines opposite
our right are believed to follow along the ASCABO and TALISAY
Rivers. New artillery positions near GUITOL and BANI and
large troop concentrations in the same vicinity indicate
preparations for an attack against the center or right center
of our Battle Position.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.—From positions to the
immediate west and immediate east of TERNATE the enemy de-
ivered harassing 105mm fire on all of the Fortified Islands
during the period. It is believed that the enemy has from
3 to 6 105mm guns in this vicinity. As has been the case in
the past, the enemy shells contained highly sensitive fuzes
and were of a high degree of fragmentation, indicating that
the fire was directed against our personnel. The fire was de-
livered at irregular times, during both daylight and night
hours, and was widely distributed over each of the islands.
This fire was delivered upon one or more of the islands on
the following dates: 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20
February. It is estimated that on some of these dates 250
rounds (total) were fired. The enemy has constructed defenses
along the beaches to the immediate east and west of TERNATE.
During the period the enemy moved small forces to positions
near CALUMPAN and LIMBONES with the apparent view of cutting
the water supply of Fort FRANK. They have destroyed some of
the pipe lines connected to the CALUMPAN Dam. In the vicinity
of MANILA the enemy has recently collected a large number of
motor launches and small inter-island vessels. Beach defenses
consisting of machine guns and some artillery (reported to be
105mm) have been constructed on the beaches north and south
of MANILA. Enemy aircraft operations on the Fortified Islands
were limited to reconnaissance missions. On two occasions
enemy aircraft contributed observation for their artillery
fire directed on CORREGIDOR from TERNATE vicinity.

b. In BATAAN.—The pocket near the center of our left corps has been
entirely eliminated by our forces thus completing the restor-
ation of our entire MIR. The enemy suffered an estimated 500
dead in this area while several hundreds are known to have been wounded (approximately 150 of this group were killed or wounded by strafing fire and bombs from their own aircraft). The discovery of many buried machine guns, light artillery, flame throwers, and signal equipment indicated a large scale attack was contemplated in this area. During this period the enemy delivered heavy artillery fire along our MLR concentrating along the center and right of our Battle Position. He also increased the intensity of his bombing attacks both along the front lines and on the towns of CAGUBAN and CASAIKEN to the rear.

During this period 150 (3) twin motorized bombers commenced operations mostly in our right corps area, during this period. The enemy has moved large quantities of supplies into the town of ORAN and has established a hospital there. He has also moved large numbers of troops from BALANGA into the LOURDES - BANTU area.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) One Japanese soldier recently came over to our lines, voluntarily surrendered, and stated in substance "I'm fed up with this war. I was told the Filipinos would be fighting with us and not against us."

(2) The total, counted enemy dead in operations on the west coast of BATAAN is reported to have been over 2,000.

(3) During this period the enemy dropped even more propaganda leaflets in abundance. The majority of the leaflets consisted of advice to the Filipinos to either surrender to the Japanese or to go and hide behind American lines. Many of the leaflets had fed photographs of women on one side.

(4) The enemy is using a muddy brown, colored mine in BATAAN. It has the shape of two (2) pie tins placed together concentrically. It is about 10" in diameter and about 1½" thick and contains from 7 to 10 lbs. of TNT. Several of these mines can be carried by an individual soldier. The favorite position for these mines is under the dust on important roads or tank routes.

(5) Captured Japanese machine guns and mortars are being used effectively by our troops. Buried near enemy captured machine guns and mortars, ammunition is often found.

(6) A favorite type of trench used by the enemy is shown in sketch A. The D section is about 5' deep and about 2' in diameter. A, B, and C are each about 2½' deep, 1½' wide, and about 7' long. After firing from section D the soldier immediately crawls into A, B, or C depending upon which section affords the best protection from his enemy's fire. For example, if fire is expected from the direction of the arrow he would crawl into A section to preclude his receiving enfilade fire. The entire trench is well concealed and camouflaged.

(7) Flame Throwers—Several enemy flame throwers have been captured in BATAAN. They consisted of three (3) containers and a hose with a nozzle, giving the appearance of a fruit sprayer.

(8) Enemy Tactics.—In creating the recent pocket near the center of our left corps the tactics used were as indicated in sketch B. Enemy troops infiltrated through the stream bed between A and B and set up machine guns to cover the trail towards C. Other Japanese troops infiltrated through this opening and dug trenches (with connecting tunnels) along the trail from C to D thus creating a well protected corridor for more troops to enter the area and fan out to the east and west. This fanning out by the enemy was prevented by infiltrating a larger number of our troops to positions to the east and west and later to the north of the corridor during the early stages of the Japanese infiltration. By converging from all directions with superior numbers the pocket was eliminated. Had the Japanese succeeded in fanning out their
troops as planned, the results could have been extremely serious for our forces. Reports continue to be received indicating that enemy soldiers like to fire from one position, then immediately crawl to another position (under good concealment). Also more reports indicate that the Japanese often use fire crackers and a heavy, rapid fire not expected to be accurate, but expected to give the impression of the presence of a large number of Japanese troops. Unless our native troops realize this, panic and withdrawal sometimes follows.

(9) Information from MANILA indicates that white internees in MANILA are being treated satisfactorily, although a food shortage appears imminent. White women are not being molested by Japanese troops. Considerable raping of Filipino women in smaller barracks is reported. It is said that white internees in MANILA are permitted to walk around the town during one (1) hour each evening.

(10) Artillery Ammunition.-In BATAAN some 105mm ammunition has contained fuses with delays varying from one (1) to twenty four (24) hours. In many cases the delayed explosions occurred "piece-meal".

4. ENEMY’S CAPABILITIES.

(1) In Area of Fortified Islands.- Until seaborne reinforcements, especially landing boats, with supporting naval fire are brought into the area, landing operations against the Fortified Islands are not believed likely. More reinforcements, including boats, near CALUMFAN will be a strong indication of an attempted landing on Fort FRANK, however.

(2) In BATAAN.-The new location of the bulk of his artillery near GUJTOL and RAN, the large concentration of troops in the LOURDES - BANI area, the large number of supplies recently moved into ORANI, and the increased intensity of his bombing and artillery fire along the HLR of our right corps indicate preparations for a large scale attack through our center or right center. Either or both of two corridors in this area are considered likely points of attack. They are the FARTINGAN Trail and the Old Peak Trail.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD

[Signature]
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, R-X.

Distribution:
C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
C.O. 3rd Bn. 4th,
C.O. Beach Defense Reserve,
C.G. HDM&S Bays,
COMSIXTEEN,
File.
1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands—No change, except that
      the enemy has made available more small boats and barges in
      CAVITE and BATANGAS Provinces and SUBIC Bay, for possible
      lending operations against the Fortified Islands.
   b. In BATAN—Enemy front lines remain from one (1) to five (5)
      kilometers north of our Battle Position. The enemy has
      temporarily at least, assumed defensive positions and limited
      his ground operations to light patrol activity. The presence
      of additional planes in the area is a strong indication
      that he plans to continue to intensify his air activity.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands—During this period the
      enemy artillery batteries on the mainland south of MANILA
      Bay have been conspicuously inactive. Reports show that
      the enemy plans to construct a new gun position about 7500
      yards SE of Fort FRANK. Considerable enemy activity has
      been observed on the south side of MALABAS Mt. (about
      three miles SW of TENNIS). Supplies, including large
      quantities of ammunition, and a considerable number of
      troops have been observed in this area. The enemy has
      destroyed the barbed wire and cleared the area around PANTUCAN
      of all civilians and posted sentries to prevent their reentering
      this area. The enemy has used impressed civilian labor to
      construct a road which leads from MACAGDON SW to LOGO.
      Two separate air (bombing and strafing) attacks were made on
      Fort FRANK on 2 March, each by two (2) enemy dive bombers.
      In the first attack both bombs dropped cleared the island. In
      the second attack one (1) bomb missed the island while
      the other slightly damaged a searchlight shed. No casualties
      were suffered. The enemy is said to be constructing an air
      base at CAVITE. The enemy continued almost daily reconnaissances flights over the islands during the period.
   b. In BATAN—Enemy operations during this period consisted of
      patrolling along our OP's, bombing of both our front
      lines and rear installations, and some artillery fire directed
      against our front line troops and artillery positions.
      During this period no large scale ground attacks were
      attempted by the enemy. The enemy air attacks were more
      intense than in the previous periods and such targets as ar-
      tillery positions, motor pools, command posts, anti-aircraft
      batteries, and front line positions were subjected to level
      and dive bombing attacks. Many white phosphorous bombs were
      used. In addition, strafing operations were conducted along
      our M1 and lines of communications. In spite of these air
      operations, damage was slight and casualties few in propor-
      tion to the number and intensity of the attacks. During
      the period considerable enemy shipping arrived in SUBIC Bay.
      The enemy appears to be using the docks on GRANDE Island
      rather than the docks at OLONAPO for shipping in SUBIC Bay.
      The enemy has 5 guns and machine guns on GRANDE Island for
      defense against our aircraft.
3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy Tactics.

(1) Reports from other units state that the Japanese, prior to launching their attack on the Island of SINGAPORE, used many methods with a view to deceiving the defenders as to where their main landing would be made. Lighted cigarettes, fire crackers, moving vehicles, barking dogs, and other noises were all used opposite one of SINGAPORE'S likely landing beaches with a view to leading the defenders to believe that the main effort would be made at that point. Actually, the first landing, in force, was made on another side of the island where the Japanese had not deceived their defenders by any patrol or dummy defenses.

(2) Reliable sources from BATAN report that Japanese snipers are alert to fire in the direction of any noise heard and that our personnel who skylark, talk, or make unnecessary noises will be fired upon instantly by the snipers. The same sources state that entrenched Japanese often attempt to throw back hand grenades thrown by our personnel or kick them into a pit in their trench. In the latter case, when the grenade explodes, the force of explosion and fragments go upward, thereby causing no damage or casualties.

b. MINDANAO - CEBU Area. Reports from this area state that all of MINDANAO except the southern part, and CEBU are still held by our forces. A Japanese force has landed at SAGUINAGA, PAMPANGA, and CEBU (southern part area) were taken under naval fire by an enemy cruiser and destroyer respectively on one occasion during the period.

c. Enemy Aircraft. The following type enemy planes have operated at one time or another in the Philippines since the beginning of hostilities (the last digit of the number indicates the year of manufacture): For example, No. 97 heavy bomber was manufactured in 1937, while 100 fighter was manufactured in 1940:

(1) 100 or zero type fighter. This is a single seat monoplane with hooded cockpit and retractable landing gear. It has two (2) fixed machine guns and two (2) 20mm wing guns. Its maximum speed is 307 knots and maximum ceiling is 10,000 meters. Its maximum range is 6-8 hours. It employs dive tactics but avoids aerobatics.

(2) 97 observation and light bomber. This type is the one used for the almost daily reconnaissance flights over the Fortified Islands. It is a slightly dihedral swept-back, round tip, cantilever, low wing monoplane. It has fixed and stream lined landing gear. It has two (2) seats, three (3) machine guns, and is capable of carrying 661.5 lbs. of bombs. Its maximum speed is 217.4 miles per hour. It has a maximum ceiling of 12,500 meters. The plane uses either of two types of engines. One engine permits a maximum range of six (6) hours at 180 miles per hour while the other permits a maximum range of seven (7) hours at 200 miles per hour.

(3) Two (2) motored dive bomber. This is a new type and is believed to be either 100 or 101 type. It is dark colored, has blunt wing tips, and retractable landing gear.

(4) 97 dive bomber. This type has wing flared at fuselage and is a low wing monoplane with retractable under carriage. It has retractable landing gear, single strut, also shock absorbent legs. Its crew consists of a pilot, second pilot, and radioman. It has a single, air-cooled radial motor with a maximum speed of 200 miles per hour.
(5) 96 heavy bomber.-This type is a considerably swept-back tapered tip, cantilever, monoplane. It has a twin rudder tail section. The landing gear is retractable into engine nacelle leaving lower half of wheels protruding in belly. It is armament of five (5) 7.7mm flexible machine guns in four (4) turrets (two mounts in rear, single mount in nose above center and tunnel gun in rear of pilot). Its bomb load is 2200 pounds. It is a twin motored plane with maximum speed of 286 miles per hour. Its maximum radius of action is 725 miles with full load.

(6) 97 heavy bomber (modified).-This type is a slightly swept back wing tip, low wing, cantilever monoplane. It has retractable landing gear which fits into wing. It has four (4) flexible 7.7mm machine guns (one (1) in nose, one (1) in forward turret, one (1) in after turret, and one (1) in lower fuselage trap door). Some machine guns have been replaced by 20mm cannon. Its bomb load is 5000 lbs. It is a two (2) motored plane and has a maximum speed of 220 miles per hour. Its maximum endurance is twelve (12) hours at 150 miles per hour. It has self-sealing gas tanks and also oxygen tanks.

(7) 98 heavy bomber.-This type is a low wing, cantilever, twin-motored, metal monoplane. It has three (3) 12.7mm machine guns forward (one (1) in nose and one (1) in dorsal, one (1) in belly). Its speed is 282 miles per hour. Maximum load 6615.8 lbs. The maximum range is 2460 miles with 2200 lb. load.

(8) Messerschmitt (109F).-Planes of this type have been observed on reconnaissance missions only in this area to date. This type is a single motor, low wing monoplane with tapered, square tip. It has an enclosed cockpit and retractable landing gear. It has two (2) machine guns, one (1) in fuselage, and two (2) in fixed wing. Its maximum speed is 364 miles per hour and maximum range at 298 miles per hour is 680 miles.

At present in this area the following types are being used by the enemy: Zero fighter, 97 observation and light bomber, and both types of dive bombers.

d. Conditions in MANILA and Surrounding Area.—It is reported that since the enemy's occupation of MANILA considerable trench construction has been undertaken with special emphasis having been placed on the area from CALOOCAN through SAN FRANCISCO, DEL MONTE and around east of the city to PASIG River. Some entrenchments have also been observed at approaches to SAN FERNANDO, PANTANAGA. The Japanese have reconstructed the bridges destroyed by our forces between MANILA and SAN FERNANDO, PANTANAGA. It is said that the Japanese Commanding General occupies the American High Commissioner's mansion in MANILA. The army of occupation in MANILA has offices at the Army-Navy Club, Elk's Club, Bay View Hotel, Fort SANTIAGO, and the Military Plaza. Because of lack of fresh vegetables, meats, and fish the Japanese troops are living mostly on rice and hard tack. Because of the consequent deficiency in vitamins many soldiers are reported to be suffering from malnutrition. It is also said that Malaria and Dysentery are prevalent among the enemy troops. Civilian internees continue to receive satisfactory treatment although assault cases continue to be reported from the provinces.
RESTRICTED

It is said that Europeans and Americans are living in SANTO TOMAS University except women and children who have been released. It is said that the Philippine Red Cross is furnishing internees with two (2) hot meals daily. STA. ESCOLASTICA Convent is said to be the prisoner-of-war enclosure.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—Although the enemy has augmented his supply of landing boats, it is felt that they are insufficient in number to attempt simultaneous operations against all of the Fortified Islands. Although it is more probable that, when the attack is made, it will be against all islands simultaneously, in view of the enemy's recent action in clearing civilians from the mainland south of Fort FRANK and his recent air attacks on that Fort, the possibility of an attack on Fort FRANK alone in the immediate future certainly cannot be ruled out.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD

DONALD CURTIS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-X.

Distribution:
C.O. 1st En. 4th,
C.O. 2nd En. 4th,
C.O. 3rd En. 4th,
C.O. Beach Defense Reserve,
R-3, 4th,
Beach Defense Comd'r, Fort Hughes,
CONSEJTERA,
Commanding General, HDM&SB,
File.
4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental OP, Fort Mills, P.I.
0800, 19 March, 1942.

No. 19.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Southern Luzon (Western Sheet).

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands. — The results of the
      enemy bombardment of the Fortified Islands during the
      latter part of the period has been limited to damage to
      some of our materiel and batteries on Forts HUGHES, and
      MILLIS, and personnel were killed. Our wounded have
      been few and those not serious.
   b. In BATAAN. — Light, exploratory attacks together with increased
      troop and supply movements by the enemy indicate methodical
      preparations for at least limited offensive action in this
      area. There are indications that the troop movements fall
      into the category of replacements rather than additional
      forces.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands. — Except for a few
      "ranging-in" shots on Forts MILLS and HUGHES on the 9th,
      enemy artillery batteries were inactive from the 5th to
      the 16th. At about 7:30 AM on the 15th, enemy artillery
      batteries on the southwest mainland opened fire on Fort FRANK.
      Later during the day Forts DRUM, HUGHES, and MILLS were
      also taken under fire. It is estimated that over 200
      rounds were directed on the islands and that over 600 of
      these were directed on Fort FRANK. During the 16th, 17th,
      and 18th, the enemy continued his fire on all the forts ex-
      cept MILLS. During these three days, there was a marked
decrease in the intensity of the enemy fire. It is believed
that the enemy used three-five gun batteries, one of which
was approximately 240mm howitzers. The remaining guns were
105mm with possibly one or two 150mm guns. Damage to
Fort MILLS and DRUM was negligible. Some of our batteries
were damaged and a few personnel were injured (not seriously)
on Forts FRANK and HUGHES. Poor visibility precluded
accurate observation of the effect of our counter battery
fire during these four days. In BATANGAS Province enemy
patrols were particularly active in covering all trails and
coves in the FIOCO de LORO area. The best available infor-
mation indicates that there have been no large troop concen-
trations in this province. Enemy aircraft continued almost
daily reconnaissance missions over the Fortified Islands
devoting most of their attention to Fort FRANK.
   b. In BATAAN. — Heavy period enemy patrols continued to be
      active along our CIPOL. Towards the end of this period the
      patrols were more aggressive. During the night of 15/16 an
      enemy force estimated at two companies launched an attack
      against our 21st Infantry in the II Corps’ Area. Our forces
      launched a counter attack with artillery support and re-
      stored the original CIPOL. Enemy aircraft continued to be
      active, bombing sections of our II Corps artillery batteries,
      and air fields during the period. During the night of 8/9
      six widely scattered tugs approximately 45,000 yards NE
      of ORION in BATANGA Bay directed artillery fire along the
      east coast of BATAAN from CAPIZHEN to LUYAY causing negli-
gible damage.
3. MISCELLANEOUS.
   a. Conditions in MANILA, and Vicinity.

   (1) Supply and Ammunition Depots.—In Manila, the Philippine Raffing
   Co., Manila Rope and Cordage Co., F. A. Zuellig
   & Co., and Madrigan & Co. bodegas, all near the
   Paseo de Digitres and the Ballesteros, appear to be the main
   depots; the Tangue Luna and Tangue Ego, Atlantic Gulf
   and Engineers Island are being used for large repair
   work or for the manufacture of small bombs. The Rizal
   Memorial Stadium and

   (2) Commodities.—Food prices in Manila have gone up
   considerably. There is rationing of food and a limit to the
   price of the main commodity necessary for the local
   population, rice. Rice has fluctuated from P 1.50 per
   cavan to P 6.50, current rate; matches P 1.00 a box,
   etc.

   (3) Transportation.—Transportation is accomplished by calesas
   and the street cars operated by the Manila Electric
   Company. Some buses are operated, but all are gaso-
   line vehicles are at a standstill because of the scarcity
   of gasoline. The railroad is now operated between Manila
   - San Fernando and Manila - Lucena.

   (4) Currency.—Japanese Army of Occupation money circulates
   freely, and is exchanged at a bar with the peso. In
   some regions, the circulation of any currency with the
   exception of Occupation notes is prohibited, but in Manila,
   Philippine Government notes and dollar bills are also
   allowed to circulate. All other money of
   Japanese-occupied territory, such as China and French
   Indo-China, and the yen of Japan proper, is completely
   prohibited. All the bullion at the Philippine Treasury
   has been reported transferred to the Yokohama Specie Bank.

   (5) Civil government.—Civil government under the direct
   supervision of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese
   Army of Occupation continues to function under the leader-
   ship of Jorge Vargas. The authority of this group is
   naturally limited to Japanese-controlled areas, only
   approximately one-third of the Philippines. With him in
   the civil government are practically all of the former
   leaders of the Commonwealth and all important
   bureaus like the Post Office, Plant Industry, and Health
   are functioning with their former directors and employees.
   Salaries of all government employees have been drastically
   cut.

   (6) Outgoing Supplies.—There has been considerable information
   obtained which indicated that the enemy is shipping out
   the Philippines large quantities of foodstuffs, par-
   ticularly rice, also motor transportation and other
   needed war supplies. The main shipping points from the
   Island of Luzon appear to be the Lingayen Gulf area,
   Hauben, Tayabas, Province, and Legaspi and Sibio Bay.

   b. Situations in Other Parts of Philippines.

   (1) North LUCON.—During the period of 26-28 February, 20
   Japanese officers, an unknown number of enlisted men, and
   a Japanese Provincial Governor were reported killed by
   one of our Guerrilla units. (The governor is said to
have been a fish peddler prior to the outbreak of the war. The same unit reported that 5 other attacks were made during the preceding month with exact damage and casualties to the enemy unknown. Another unit in North Luzon reports having recovered a coast and geodetic survey chart of Eula Sound, from the body of a dead Japanese Major. The same unit reports that about 400 of the enemy are working to repair the trail leading to the Lepanto Copper mine but that they are being resisted by our units.

(c) NINDANCO.-After having landed small units at Calapan, the enemy is reported to have landed troops from 3 transports at San Jose at 6:00 AM on the 16th.

(d) NINDANAOC.-During this period an enemy force estimated at 3,000 men, reinforced with tankettes and artillery landed and occupied ZAMBANGA. This force is believed to have been a part of the Japanese force in DAVAO. On the night of the 11th a small force of ours made a surprise attack on the enemy forces at ZAMBANGA. That the surprise was complete was evidenced by the fact that the Japanese did not return fire until over 5 minutes after the attack had commenced. The exact results of the attack are as yet unknown. Aside from the southern part of NINDANAOC including DAVAO, Digos, and ZAMBANGA the island remains under our control.

(e) CEBU.-During this period an attempted landing by the enemy with a small force was repulsed. The enemy shelled coastal cities with naval gunfire and made one air attack on the city of CEBU.

c. Enemy Wire Sealing Device.-During operations in Batan the Japanese successfully used a device for climbing over barbwire. It consisted of bamboo and was brought to the location of the wire in the form of a roll. The device was then unrolled and spread over the wire like a rug thus enabling their troops to successfully pass over the wire.

d. Enemy Wire Sealing Device.-During operations in Batan the Japanese successfully used a device for climbing over barbwire. It consisted of bamboo and was brought to the location of the wire in the form of a roll. The device was then unrolled and spread over the wire like a rug thus enabling their troops to successfully pass over the wire.

e. Tactics of Enemy Land Forces.-It has been noted that Japanese penetrations, once made through our front lines, had the following characteristics: the frontages of the pockets were small compared to their depth, the front being about 200 yards compared to a depth of about 2500 yards; the penetrations were often made and the pockets well organized prior to discovery by our forces (this was accomplished by clever, well concealed, well camouflaged infiltration); the pockets were strongly fortified and prepared for "all-around" defense; each individual enemy soldier had several different fox holes offering him "all-around" defense also; the positions of fox holes and trenches were often so chosen as to take advantage of any existing cover such as logs, rocks, tree stumps, roots, etc; from the great number of fox holes it is evident that the Japanese followed the practice of "digging-in" well as they advanced. Once established the Japanese pockets were difficult to eliminate. Experience has shown that their elimination was best accomplished, not by blowing up, but by inflicting heavy casualties on our own forces around to the enemy's flanks and rear. Having surrounded the pocket with superior numbers, fire power, and hand grenades, our forces then closed in, well concealed and camouflaged and successfully destroyed the pockets. When first fired upon with a heavy volume of fire from the pockets, our units often believed that they were surrounded and with-
drew. (It should be remembered that the enemy's initial attack is made furiously with a heavy but not particularly effective volume of fire with a view to causing our forces to withdraw; succeeding attacks are less furious.) This withdrawal enables the enemy to advance and increase both the depth and frontage of his pocket. Actually, initially in nearly every case the enemy was in an ideal position to be surrounded by our forces. The grasping of these principles by our small units has greatly assisted in not only the stopping, but the elimination of enemy penetrations. Also, there were considerably less casualties among our personnel when these principles were applied.

Tactics of Enemy Air Forces.—The following information on tactics has been procured from U.S. Combat pilots who have encountered Japanese air force units:

(1) Heavy Bombardment.—Bombardment formations are generally Vees of three in V and in numbers varying from nine to thirty. Attractive formations are apparently well known, it has been noted that the formations loosen up considerably after dropping their bomb load making them particularly vulnerable to pursuit attack. Combat gunners have been noted to expend their ammunition on attacking pursuit which are considered out of their range. It has been noted, the Japanese bombardment formations often split sixty to one hundred miles prior to reaching their objective and circle. They then assemble and attack the objective in mass splitting again into smaller units and assembling at a point on the route back to Formosa. The purpose of circling is to confuse our pursuit control personnel and to lure our pursuit into the air so that by the time the bombardment is ready to strike their objective, our pursuit has consumed most of its gasoline. Many times bombardment is accompanied by escorting pursuit which generally precede the attack or remain above the bombardment formation in hopes of attacking our pursuit which might be pre-occupied with the hostile bombardment formation. It has been observed however, that in many instances Japanese escorting pursuits have been out of supporting distance of their own bombardment. Supporting pursuit have been close and practicing combat among themselves while bombers make their attacks.

(2) Dive Bombing.—Upon completion of bombardment they generally strafe objectives in very loose formation. When our anti-aircraft is active, their accuracy is very poor and in some cases they do not dive prior to releasing their bombs.

(3) Pursuit.—Japanese pursuit airplanes generally fly in two-ship element formation. They also employ "weavers" who fly about 1000 feet above and a mile behind the main formation. Formations are either very close or very loose and never are the airplanes so supported that each pilot is capable of delivering aimed fire at the target. Pursuit in accompanying bombardment flies either above or to the rear of the formation. It has been observed that in many instances pursuit is out of supporting distance of their bombardment. Pursuit has been employed in strafing
aerodromes. Because the Zero type pursuit are lighter than our F-40 type, they invariably take advantage of quick-climbing characteristics or close turning characteristics in combating our pursuit. When our pursuit has been attacked by superior Japanese pursuit forces, it has been noted that the enemy splits its formation in such a manner that whichever way our pursuit turns, they will present a target to the enemy. It has also been noted that when enemy pursuit has been surprised, they invariably execute a steep chandelle or Immelmann. It is recommended that in combating hostile pursuit the superior strength and duration of our equipment should be utilized to the utmost, i.e., our equipment can better stand steep and prolonged dives than that of the enemy. Therefore, when attacked by hostile pursuit formation, recommended tactics are to immediately execute a steep dive and pull out close to the ground, remaining at a low altitude. When attacking an enemy pursuit formation, it is advisable to make one swift attack.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—No changes from last report. However, the enemy is capable of bringing sufficient seaborne equipment and personnel into this area for attempted landing operations against the Fortified Islands within a very, short space of time. Also, landing forces and landing boats could possibly be concentrated in and near such areas as Subic Bay, Patapan Bay, Manila Bay, Palayay Bay and in coves and rivers without our knowledge.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD

DONALD CURTIS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, R-K.

Distribution:
C.O. 1st Bn., 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn., 4th,
C.O. 3rd Bn., 4th,
C.O. Regimental Reserve,
R-S 4th,
CONSEIXTEEN,
Commanding General, HOMASB,
Beach Defense Commander,
Fort Hughes,
File.
CONFIDENTIAL

R-8 REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

From: O800, 19 March, 1942.
To: O800, 6 April, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental Co., Fort Mills, P.I.,
O800, 6 April, 1942.

No. 17.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Southern Luzon (Western Sheet).

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.—Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet. Despite heavy aerial bombardment of Fort Mills and frequent artillery bombardment of all forts, the end of the period finds all units still able to perform their respective missions with practically no loss in efficiency. The enemy has made no attempts to land troops on Fortified Islands.
   b. In BATAAN.—The enemy has affected a sizable penetration through Sector "D" on the front of the II Corps. This penetration is estimated to be on a front of at least 3,000 yards, while the present depth varies in different sub-sectors, extending in some places to south of our HRL. Our forces are being employed to fill in the gap and counter attack. The MLR of other sectors in the II Corps and all sectors of I Corps remain intact.
   c. Latest strength estimates of Enemy Component Forces are as follows:

   OPPOSITE I CORPS (BATAAN)
   (1) Infantry.—4 battalions in contact on front line; no reliable estimate can be made of the strength of the forces behind this covering force.
   (2) Artillery.—One 2 gun-155mm battery; one 2 gun-105mm battery, and four 4 gun-75mm batteries.

   OPPOSITE II CORPS (BATAAN)
   (1) Infantry.—Four to five regiments.
   (2) Artillery.—Six 75mm batteries; four 105mm batteries. One artillery observation balloon of the sausage type has been observed.
   (3) Tankes.—The enemy is known to have at least 34 tanks, for this number has been observed near the front of the II Corps.

GATITAN AND BATAAN PROVINCE
   (1) Troops.—Various estimates of from 1,000 to 2,000 men have been reported. A troop concentration of unknown strength has been reported observed to the west of the BATAAN River (west of TERNATE).
   (2) Artillery.—It has been reported that enemy artillery located to immediate west of TERNATE has been moved to BATAAN. It is estimated that the enemy now has one or two 240mm howitzers and several 155mm and 105mm guns on the mainland south of the Fortified Islands. In Barrio ROSARIO (southwest of CAYETE) the enemy is known to have 12 artillery pieces, one of which is believed to be a 105mm gun.
   (3) Miscellaneous.—A number of enemy trucks, tanks, and supplies have been reported observed near Barrio PINAGASANAN (west of MARAGondon).

ISLAND OF LUZON
   (1) Aviation.—46 heavy bombers (it is estimated that at least 10 of these have been grounded because of damage by our AA or in landing); 30 light bombers; and 20-30 dive bombers, observation, and pursuit planes.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In BATAAN.
      (1) Aviation.—From the beginning of the period until 23 March
          (inclusive), the enemy restricted his aerial action to
          routine reconnaissance and observation flights accompanied
          by light bombing of infantry and artillery positions and
          dropping of propaganda leaflets. A few light bombing
          attacks were made in the CAGABEN area and on our airfields.
          From 23-26 March (inclusive) intensive air reconnaissance
          of the entire II Corps area was apparent. Since March 23,
          both light and heavy bombing of our Service Command installa-
          tions (motor pools, airfields, and ordnance bodegas) and
          front lines was noticeably increased. The last few days
          of the period, the front lines, within "D" Sector II Corps
          area in particular, received intensive attacks from both
          light and heavy bombers.

      (2) Infantry.—From the beginning of the period until 30 March,
          operations were limited to patrol activity. On the night
          of 30 March, after heavy mortar, machine gun, and rifle
          fire, the 26 March Assault Infantry ("D" Sector, II Corps) at
          about 7:55 PM. This attack was repulsed by our artillery fire.
          At 8:25 PM the enemy resumed their attack with the bayonet and
          made a breach of about 76 yards in our CPLA. At 9:05 PM another
          push was started toward the west and heavy mortar fire was placed on
          the flanks of the breach to widen it. Our troops were ordered
          to retreat to a position generally north of the TJISER River.
          The attack proved to be a limited objective attack.
          After several days of intensive artillery and aerial bomb-
          arment, in "D" Sector, II Corps, on the night of 4 April
          another more violent attack was launched in this area.
          This attack was begun on a front of about 2,000 yards.
          During the first night several of our units were pushed back
          to our HEL. During the next day and night the penetration
          was widened to over 2,000 yards and extended in depth to
          south of our HEL in some sub-sectors.

      (3) Artillery.—From the beginning of the period until about 30
          March, (inclusive) enemy artillery was not particularly
          active. Upto until this date BABAAN and TILLI Points were the
          only areas to receive more than the usual amount of shellings.
          A few days before 30 March, patrols reported that the enemy
          was very active. In the area considerably north of
          this report was definitely confirmed, for, from the evening
          of 30 March until the present, heavy enemy artillery was
          directed daily at our troops in "D" Sector, II Corps. During
          the nights of 3/4, 4/5, and 5/6 April, light artillery and
          machine gun fire was delivered toward the east coast of
          BATAAN from enemy craft operating in the northern part of
          ANZALI Bay.

   b. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.
      (1) Aviation.—During the period 19–23 March (inclusive) no aerial
          attacks were made on the fortified islands, enemy air action
          being limited to reconnaissance and observation missions.
          During 19–20 March (inclusive) our air skimming report
          heavy aerial activity over airfields in the north of BATAAN.
          On 20 March Port MILLS was subjected to severe, heavy bombing
          attacks. At one time, 27 heavy bombers and 17 light bombers were
          observed in the air. From 22 March to 2 April (inclusive) attacks were
          less severe. From 3 April until the end of the period, no aerial attacks
          were made. From 24 March to 2 April (inclusive) Port MILLS was
          under air alarm, an average of about 8 hours out of every
          12. Attacks were made during night as well as daylight hours.
          Bombs were well distributed over the island with the greatest
          concentrations landing in JAMS Ravine and Power House Ravine.
(2) Artillery.—On 19 March a few rounds of harassing fire was delivered from enemy batteries in BATAN Province on Fort FRANK. On 20 March there was no shelling. On the 21st the islands were subjected to heavy fire again from the BATAN shore. Fort FRANK received approximately 400 shells mostly of 240mm caliber, Fort DRUM approximately 50 shells, some 152mm and some 155mm caliber during that day. No enemy artillery fire was received on 22, 23 March. Fort FRANK was shelled approximately 400 shells of 240mm caliber, Fort DRUM approximately 50 shells, some 152mm and some 155mm caliber during that day. No enemy artillery fire was received on 22, 23 March. From 24 March to 2 April (inclusive), almost daily Fort FRANK was shelled concurrently with enemy aerial attacks with a few 105mm and 155mm shells. The purpose of this shelling appears to have been to silence our AA batteries during the aerial bombardment. From 3 April until the end of the period no enemy artillery fire was directed on the Forti-

duc Islands.

(3) Miscellaneous.—It is reported that a small beach defense force and patrol constantly searches the coasts as STICKY Point; other enemy patrols cover the trails leading to PICO de LORO for our troops and civilians. It is further reported that the enemy has been mining an observation post on Mount PICO de LORO continuously. On 3 April, 4 enemy destroyers were reported in LAMBING Cove (north of NASUGBU). On 27 March approximately 40 bangers, which had been brought to the beaches of LAMBING Cove, were destroy-
ed by our artillery fire from Fort FRANK. No other new concentrations of boats or barges were reported on the south mainland during the period. Concurrently with the recent bombing attacks the enemy sent varying numbers of inter-island vessels to a point in MANILA Bay approximately 20,000 yards NE of Fort MILLS. Two possible reasons for this action are as follows: to draw fire from our artillery batteries and expose them to bombing attacks; to pick up Japanese aviation personnel who might become casualties from our AA fire.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy Troops.—Units formerly in BATAN have been identified in BURIA and in MINDORO. Captured documents indicate that at least parts of 2 new divisions, the 4th and 8th, are now in BATAN. The present troops in BATAN appear to be older than the troops they replaced. The new troops seem to date were better equipped, physical specimens. Some bodies bore old wounds.

b. Enemy Tactics. (1) Infantry.—Enemy troops often follow the practice of with-

holding their fire and remaining well concealed when our reconnaissance patrols pass by. On occasions, our patrols have unknowingly operated behind enemy lines for several days and returned to their own organizations without seeing or encountering any Japanese. These enemy tactics, when successful, naturally prevent our patrols from gaining the very information for which they were sent, i.e., the location of enemy front lines, strength and identity of enemy units, etc.

(2) Air Forces.—The aerial tactics used on the 24th and 25th differed from previous tactics. Planes in groups of 9-3-25 made a single pass over the island rather than a series of consecutive passes. Starting on the 25th and continuing for the remainder of the period the enemy reduced the number of planes used in any attack over Ormoc to not more than 3 planes and sometimes only 1. He also made se-

eral attacks during hours of darkness. The night attacks have not been a very great success due to excellent work of our searchlights who have picked them up at extreme range and illuminated them in time to permit guns to open fire

-3-
at maximum range. Pick up and illumination has in all cases been superior. The result was in many cases the pilot dropped his bombs in the water and took off. The nature of the raids since the 26th has been harassing with small incidental damage. After losing two heavy bombers on the 30th March practically all attacks on Corregidor have been limited to one heavy bomber flying at extremely high altitude (around 30,000') and at great speed. Light bombers operating mainly over Bataan have generally kept between altitudes of 1500 and 2200 yards (4500' to 6600') and fly at a high speed. This is just beyond the effective range for .50 caliber machine guns and just below the effective range for 3 inch guns AA. The only weapon suitable at this altitude is the 37mm AA gun which we are not fully equipped.

c. Enemy Technical Data.—Some of the heavy bombers used in these attacks are of a new type. They are similar in appearance to HB #97 X but appear to be faster and to have a turret gun in the tail. They were effectively camouflaged in light grey paint. At least 27 of this new type have been seen in the sky at one time. At least 28 of the Light Bombers are of a new type. They are similar in appearance to the LB #97 but have a power turret in the tail, a heavier fuselage and greater wing surface. Some incendiary bombs have been dropped. It is estimated demolition bombs dropped were 60 Kilograms (133lb), 20 to 260 Kilograms (442 to 585 lb) and a few 500 Kilograms (1106 lb). Estimated speed of the new type heavy bombers, 275 to 300 miles per hour.

d. Enemy Propaganda.—During this period the tenor of enemy propaganda was not unlike that of previous periods. Leaflets had a one picture a page of a Filipino Officer (who had deserted) with his wife and children in supposed happiness. On the reverse side was a message from the officer urging his "brothers-in-arms" to lay down their arms, surrender, and enjoy life as they were. Another leaflet showed a picture of a plane departing from Corregidor with General MacArthur and Mr. Sayre. On this leaflet was printed "MacArthur and Sayre ran away from the Philippines so now aim your rifle at the Americans and fight them bravely and you will win real liberty."

e. Enemy Losses in Aircraft.—During the period 24 March - 6 April, the enemy has suffered 14 known losses (one of these was a seaplane, several light and dive bombers, and the remaining heavy bombers); 7 additional aircraft were damaged to the extent that they were classified as probable losses.

f. Transportation.—During this period the MANILA railroad line, which had previously operated only up to SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, was extended to TARLAC. The train schedule shows 5 trains departures from MANILA to TARLAC and 5 on the return trip. Key stations include CALOOCAN, BOCAUE, BIBAA, MALOLOS, SAN FERNANDO, SAN MIGUEL, and TARLAC. While strictly a military road, passes for certain parties whose services may be required by the military or the government can be secured from an office at the former Army and Navy YMCA. In BATAAN the enemy is said to have constructed parallel to and north of the PILAR-LAGAC Road, a new road connecting the East and West Road.

g. Situation on Other Fronts in the Philippines.

(1) MINDORO.—No change.

(2) VIGAYAN Area.—A report received indicates the enemy has landed a small force in the CALABASAN group. On the island of BASAYE the enemy is said to have approximately 20 men.

(3) MINDANAO.—The army force at ZAMBOANGA is estimated not to exceed 1000 men, 3 artillery pieces, and 3 tanks. In this area an enemy motorized patrol was ambushed on 23 March by our forces and suffered approximately 60 casualties. On the Digos and Davao fronts the enemy remains inactive. BUTUAN in northern MINDANAO has been attacked from the air. 22 buildings containing enemy matériel near PALAMAC were destroyed by one of our raiding forces on 31 March.
CONFIDENTIAL

h. Prisoners of War and Captured Documents.—One prisoner of war captured in BATAAN stated that he had lived in BATAAN for 2 years until 6 months before the outbreak of the present war, at which time he returned to Japan. Many captured maps of the Bataan area are more complete than our own.

i. Weather and Visibility.—During this period the weather was generally clear and gradually getting warmer. Visibility was generally good. With the exception of a few cloudy periods the flying weather was also good.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. In BATAAN.—Although the possibility of an attempted landing by the enemy on the east coast of BATAAN can not be ruled out, it appears more likely that, if an amphibious operation is attempted in BATAAN it will take place on the west coast of BATAAN in the general vicinity of SABAIEN Point. It is very likely that the artillery fire delivered on the east coast was a feint and that a logical course of action open to the enemy would be to cut off the VII Corps by a combination of an extension of his present penetration through the center of our front and a landing and advance inland from SABAIEN Point vicinity.

b. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.—Recent enemy operations in BATAAN are not necessarily an indication that the enemy's plans call for taking BATAAN and the Fortified Islands in succession. Time which is working against the Japanese may necessitate their attacking the Fortified Islands before completing the BATAAN campaign. For this reason an enemy landing attempt against the islands in the immediate future is not less likely than it was at the end of the last period.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD:

DONALD CURTIS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R.N.

Distribution:
C.O. 1st Bn 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn 4th,
C.O. 3rd Bn 4th,
C.O. Regimental Reserve,
COMMIXED,
Commanding General, HDMSSB,
Beach Defense Odr, Port Hughes,
File.
CONFIDENTIAL
R-2 REPORT
CONFIDENTIAL

From: 0800, 6 April, 1942.
To: 0800, 2 May, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.,
0800, 2 May, 1942.

No. 18.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Southern Luzon (Western Sheet).

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. In BATAAN.—On 9 April practically all resistance in southern
      BATAAN subsided enabling the enemy to gain control of the en-
      tire BATAAN Peninsula.
   b. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.—Contact with enemy ground
      troops not regained, as yet. Despite heavy aerial and artill-
      ery bombardment throughout the entire period, the end of the
      period finds all Beach Defense units able to perform their
      missions with no great loss in efficiency. Having received
      additional personnel, many Beach Defense units are now strong-
      er than they were at the end of the last period.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.
   a. In BATAAN.—During the period 6-7 April the enemy extended the
      penetration through the front lines of the II Corps (referred to
      in our last report). During the morning of 8 April, enemy
      infantry, supported by a vicious aerial and artillery bombard-
      ment, were able to drive south and east and reach CASABAY.
      During the remainder of 8 April advance enemy units, including
      tanks, drove west and entered MARIVELES. The swiftness with
      which the entire attack was executed caused the complete dis-
      organization of our II Corps and left our I Corps in Western
      BATAAN entirely isolated. By the evening of 9 April all ex-
      cept desultory fighting ceased. These successful enemy oper-
      ations are attributed largely to:
         (1) The enemy's facilities for laying down on our troops and
             lines of communication extremely intense aerial and ar-
             tillery bombardment.
         (2) The poor physical condition of our troops resulting from
             their receiving extremely reduced rations during the pre-
             vious 6 to 8 weeks.
   b. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.
      (1) Enemy artillery batteries on the north and south
          mainlands and aircraft based near MANILA heavily bombarded
          the Fortified Islands daily throughout the entire
          period. During this period neither enemy aircraft nor
          artillery appears to have concentrated particularly on
          our Beach Defenses, the most often and heavily attacked
          targets being friendly batteries and observation posts,
          located aore Inland. Insofar as Beach Defenses were con-
          cerned, enemy artillery fire was more effective than
          aerial bombardment during this period.
      (2) Operation of Component Elements.
          Aviation.—During the period 6-9 April the enemy's air
          activity over the Fortified Islands was comparatively
          light, his attention being devoted more to operations
          over BATAAN during these days. During 10-13 April, using
          heavy bombers, the enemy made many vicious attacks on
          Fort MILLS. During the period 19-27 April the enemy's
          air attacks on Fort MILLS were limited to occasional
          high altitude and dive bombing attacks. From 28 April
          until the end of the period attacks on Fort MILLS and
          HUGHES were noticeably more vigorous again. Both heavy
          bombers and dive bombers were used in these attacks which
          were made during daylight hours. During the entire peri-
          od the other Fortified Islands and friendly craft in

-1-
MANILA Bay were subjected to occasional dive bombing attacks. Enemy strafing operations were limited to one attack directed at the top of MALINTA Hill by a single dive bomber. In the early part of the period many heavy bombers were used. It is believed that most of these were sent south after several days operations here. Toward the end of the period at least 16 of a different type of heavy bomber, No. 97 Heavy Bomber (R2XACD), made their appearance, and were especially active the last 4 days of the period. Other type enemy planes used during the period were No. 97 Heavy Bomber (modified); Nos. 97, 98 Light Bombers; and No. 98 Observation and Light Bombers.

Artillery.—During the period 6-8 April, comparatively light artillery fire was directed on the Fortified Islands from enemy batteries on the south mainland. On 9 April enemy batteries in BATAAN made their first appearance. From 9 April until the end of the period the Fortified Islands were taken under heavy fire daily by enemy batteries on either or both the north and south mainlands. During this part of the period up to and including 29 April the shelling from BATAAN gradually increased in severity. On 29 April, the anniversary of the Japanese Emperor, an extremely intense bombardment was directed on all of these islands continuously for approximately 5 hours. During the period Fort HUGHES was bombarded mostly from enemy batteries in BATAAN. Forts DRUM and FRANK received artillery fire from only the south mainland and this was considerably less severe than that received during the period of our last report. In BATAAN in addition to an unknown number of 75mm guns, the enemy is known to be using approximately sixty other field pieces including 105mm, 150mm, 155mm guns and 240mm howitzers. The 240mm howitzers have been causing the greatest damage and casualties and are the most difficult to locate because of their well-protected positions. It is believed that the enemy has at least two 4-gun batteries of these howitzers in BATAAN. On the south mainland the enemy is estimated to have one 4-gun battery of 105mm guns.

Miscellaneous.—
1. Enemy boat patrols.—During this period the enemy maintained continuous small boat patrols along the south mainland from CAVITE to Fort FRANK. It is believed that a similar patrol has been established along the southern coast of BATAAN.
2. NASUGUE.—During this period a number of enemy transports, destroyers, and submarines were observed to operate in and out of NASUGUE (south of Fort FRANK). These movements are reported to have been for the purpose of transferring troops to the Southern Philippines for operations.
3. During the period the enemy used, almost daily, 5 observation balloons in BATAAN for artillery observation.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Situation in Other Parts of Philippines.
(1) LUZON.—The only friendly resistance on LUZON at the end of this period consists of our guerrilla units operating near GERVANTES in the northern part of the island. It is reported that the enemy is sending two separate forces to the northern part of the island with the mission of completely eliminating these friendly units. SUBIC Bay and LINGAYEN Gulf continue to be the main enemy shipping
centers of the island. The former also serves as a refueling base for enemy seacouriers. NIPAHO Field near MANILA serves as an important refueling base for enemy planes proceeding south to the AUSTRALIAN Theater.

(2) CEBU. The enemy has occupied all important towns in CEBU, including CEBU City. Prior to landing on this island enemy warships and transports cruised from 24-26 hours in the vicinity reportedly for the purpose of securing complete information on all local tides and currents. Friendly resistance continues on this island in the interior near the TALISAY Mountains.

(3) PANAY. The enemy now controls all important towns in PANAY including ILOILO. In landing on this island, some of the Japanese wore civilian clothes, indicating the enemy’s intention to rapidly colonize and utilize the island’s food and supplies. Although resistance continues in the interior of the island, it is expected to be short-lived because of the limited supply of ammunition available to our forces operating there.

(4) NEGROS. Latest information indicates that no enemy landing attacks have been made on this island to date, although one is suspected in the immediate future. Enemy warships and transports were recently observed off the coastal town of BACOLOD. Camp CARMIH, BOROL, and BACOLOD were bombed and strafed during this period.

(5) MINDANAO. On 29 April 4,000 enemy troops landed from 7-8 transports and 2 destroyers near Cotabato and PANAY. Troops and tanks from this landing force appear to be moving towards the city of DAVAO. Our forces have organized a line about 4 kilometers west of PANAY. The enemy continues to control only the southern part of this island including the area in and near Zamboanga and the area around Davao Bay.

(6) MINDORO. The enemy has retained only enough troops on the island to control its airfields and sugar centrals.

(7) SAMAR, LEYTE. These two important islands of the Philippine group remain under our complete control, although the airport at ORMOC, LEYTE was bombed and strafed on one occasion during the period.

b. Tactics.

(1) Enemy Aviation. During this period high altitude bombings on Corregidor were conducted in most cases, at above 22,000 feet. Except near the end of the period, when attacks were made on our mobile 155 and seacast batteries, heavy bombers were apparently “area bombing.” During this period dive bombers released their bombs, in most cases, at between 1500-3000 yards. It is recalled that these same tactics were employed in BATAAN by enemy dive bombers with a view to remaining above the effective range of our machine gun fire and below the effective range of our 3rd AA fire. Towards the end of the period enemy dive bombers were noticeably less cautious, often making almost vertical dives to as low as several thousand feet. In many cases bombs released in diving attacks on Forts FRANK, DRUM, and HUGHES and friendly vessels in MANILA Bay missed their mark.

(2) Enemy Artillery. During this period accurate enemy artillery fire from CAVITE and BATAAN shores was directed on the Fortified Islands at irregular times, both day and night. Practically all observers,達到 observations, seacast batteries and concentrations of personnel seemed to be the chief targets of the enemy. The enemy followed the practice of continually shifting his batteries to new positions throughout the period.

c. Possible Enemy Landing Craft in MANILA Bay Area. Based on the best information available, the following is an estimate of possible enemy landing craft in the MANILA Bay area at the end of the period:
CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
<th>TOTAL CAPACITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Boats</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>(30-100)</td>
<td>5460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barges</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(150-200)</td>
<td>4800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launches</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(60-100)</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber Boats</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(120-800)</td>
<td>3940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total Capacity - 17,420

In addition to the above the enemy has an unknown number of craft in the SUBIC Bay area, NASUGBU, and BATANGAS (in southern LUZON). Except for the rubber boats it is believed that most of the craft in MANILA Bay were designed for transportation services and are unsuitable for use in landings except possibly during the latter stages of such operations, after a beach head has been established. Craft designed for landing operations are reported to be under construction in the Navy Yard at CAVITE.

c. Bamboo Ladders.—An unconfirmed report states that the enemy has brought 10 truck loads of bamboo ladders into southern BATAN. Japanese troops have reportedly used these ladders in previous operations when landing on islands having steep cliffs near the beaches.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
   a. To heavily bomb and shell the Fortified Islands into submission.
   b. To force the Fortified Islands into eventual submission by continuing the present, harassing attacks from artillery and the air; maintaining the present, effective blockade.
   c. To occupy the Fortified Islands by landing operations, employing sufficient forces supported by a preponderance of artillery and aircraft.

5. CONCLUSIONS.—Which of the three lines of action (enumerated in par. 4) the enemy will follow is dependent to a great extent upon his success in other theaters of the war. It is believed that the enemy plans to temporarily follow the line of action in par. b. If operations continue to progress satisfactorily for him in other theaters, and if he is able to overcome the remaining friendly resistance in the Southern Philippine Islands, it is believed the enemy will then shift to the line of action of par. c.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD:

DONALD CURTIS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
M.S.

Distribution:
C.O. 1st Bn., 4th
C.O. 2nd Bn., 4th
C.O. 3rd Bn., 4th
C.O. 4th Bn., 4th
C.O. Revt.'l Reserve, M.S.
CONSIDERED.
C.G., HD M&S.
Beach Defense Comdr, Fort Hughes, File.

451
Headquarters, 4th Marine
February 4, 1942

From: The Commanding Officer,
The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

To: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Subject: Intelligence Summary.

Enclosure: (A) Intelligence Summary for the Period
8 December, 1941 to 1 February, 1942.

I. Enclosure (A) is submitted herewith.

S. L. Howard.

There have been previously submitted to C.M.C. copies were sent to CINCPAC, CINCPAC.
GENERAL OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(PREPARED BY THE R-2 SECTION)

I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

II. COMPONENT FORCES.

A. Land Forces.
   (1) Equipment.
   (2) Tactics.
   (3) Miscellaneous.
   (4) Conclusions.

B. Air Forces.
   (1) Equipment.
   (2) Tactics.
   (3) Miscellaneous.
   (4) Conclusions.

C. Landing Forces.
   (1) Equipment.
   (2) Tactics.
   (3) Miscellaneous.
   (4) Conclusions.

III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.

A. Equipment and Armament.

B. Tactics.

C. Miscellaneous.
SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RE-JAPANESE FORCES FOR PERIOD DECEMBER 7, 1941 TO FEBRUARY 1, 1942

I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION. The information submitted has been obtained from various sources. In addition to the information procured by this section and subordinate E-2 sections considerable information has been obtained from other E-2 units in this theatre of the war.

II. COMPONENT FORCES.
A. Land Forces.
(1) Equipment and Armament.
(a) Rifles. One type has been observed frequently in the Philippines. This type is approximately .26 caliber, weighs about 6½ lbs., is shorter in length than, but closely resembles our 1917 Enfield type (kiddystone). It has a place in the forestock for a cleaning rod. The rear sight is about 3" in front of the receiver and has no correction for drift or windage. The front sight is similar to that of the 1917 Enfield. It has a dust cap in front of the bolt head and loading slot, completely covering the bolt when closed. It is necessary to depress the follower in order to close the bolt (when the piece is empty) as is the case with the 1917 Enfield. The weapon appears rugged and well constructed. (Except for weight this weapon compares with the ARISAKA rifle, model 1905 described in T.H. 30–480).

(b) B.A.R. This weapon is similar to our BAR but is shorter and approximately 4 lbs. lighter. It has a 20 round magazine, is .303 caliber, and fires a 7.62mm shell. It is different from our BAR in that it has a bolt driving spring in the butt stock and a dust cap over the magazine and ejection slots. It is usually fired from a bipod mount. One weapon of this type was made in Belgium and marked 1932.

(c) Machine Guns. In the Philippines several different types have been observed. One is a .303 caliber, A.A. Lewis (M1A) with a 97 round pan. Also a light (air cooled) .25 caliber machine to be carried and fired on the back of the soldier has been observed. (It is believed this is the Kusü type, model 1922). The new tripod (described in TH 30–480) has been observed.

(d) Mortars. The .60mm type have been used quite effectively. They have a loud detonation and for this reason are often confused with 76mm artillery. The projectile is not as destructive as our 81mm and a large percentage of the shells are duds.

(e) Side Arms. The Japanese officers carry many different types of side arms varying from .26 to .48 caliber. Lugers and Mausers have been seen. The most frequently used side arm is a .38 similar to our .45 Colt in construction.

(f) Artillery. 105mm guns have been used. Their accuracy has been enhanced by aerial observation. Enemy artillery fire has not been as accurate or effective as the fire of our 155mm guns operating without air observation. 178mm pack artillery have also been used by the enemy in the Philippines.
(g) **Rifle Grenades.**-Those observed to date have a range of about 200 yards. They are corrugated for fragmentation but a large percentage are duds.

(h) **Mai Grenades.**-The fragmentation grenades seen are not corrugated. They have a loud bursting noise but produce only slight effect. Heavy grenade thrower, model 99 (Th 50-480) has been observed. A hydrocyanide gas grenade was found in Batan.

(i) **Tanks.**-Light and medium tanks have been used and their details have not yet been available. Enemy tank operations in the Philippines have been severely hampered by our artillery fire.

(j) **Anti-Tank Weapons.**-An anti-tank gun of approximately .50 caliber has been observed. It has a dual purpose mount which permits either anti-tank or anti-aircraft firing.

(k) **Gas Masks.**-One was procured in the Philippines with the following markings: Cannister-soldier model 1938; manufacturer number 0267; tube model R 0159, number 56; face piece model 1939 R 005. It contained a bottle of fluid to be used on lenses during sub-zero weather. It also had a container with poison which, when moistened, is used against mustard burns. Among the accessories is a lens case which contains rolls of lens to be used during sub-zero weather. It has a flutter valve model 1939, number 56, head model 88, protected by a perforated metal cover. This mask appears to be much lighter in weight than our mask.

(l) **Jackets.**-The ones observed are approximately 12" by 10 1/2" by 4 1/2" with a wooden frame inside. The side that rests against the back is covered with fur. It has straps to go over each shoulder for support.

(m) **Helms.**-Helms captured are muddy brown shade and are similar to the German type. They are lighter in weight than ours but provide more protection for the sides and back of head. The helmet will fit inside of a tropical hat of somewhat similar shape which has a net that is camouflaged with grass, leaves, twigs, etc.

(n) **Uniforms.**-Most prisoners captured were green coveralls (with no insignia or rank) and medium weight split toe rubber soled shoes. Some near the front lines wore civilian clothes.

(o) **Rations.**-The food of civilians in the Philippines have been looted freely. The food of special troops such as snipers and troops on patrol consists of small squares of concentrated foods approximately 1 1/2" by 1" by 1/2" of dried fruit, fish, cereal, candy, etc. packed in a small rectangular basket 6" x 4" x 4".

(p) **Water.**-Some troops suck water from streams through a rubber tube which has a purifying device on the end. The device has two cloths one of which contains chemicals which purify the water while the other cloth contains a substance which removes the taste of the purifier.

(q) **Entrenching Tools.**-A spade was captured approximately 30" long with two (2) peep holes in spade portion providing protection and concealment to soldier's face when protruding above a trench. The nose fits into a crease where the spade joins handle.

(r) **Shade.**-Black screen 7" x 24" fitting across the face, above the mouth and over the eyes, keeps dust from eyes. The screen is secured by means of a string which is tied in back of the head.
(a) Radio Sets.—A small portable radio set weighing about 10 lbs. was observed. This set could be carried in the soldier’s pack and is reported to have a radius of action of 80 miles.

(2) Tactics.
(a) Against Front Lines.—Large forces on offensive missions are preceded by reconnaissance units varying in strength from 50 to 150 men until contact is made with the main body of the enemy. The success of offensive operations against front lines by the enemy in the Philippines to date is attributed largely to their ability to infiltrate by small groups either through or around the flanks of enemy lines. Any weaknesses in enemy observation are exploited, often at night. Having successfully infiltrated partially within enemy lines, fire is opened on their surrounded enemy simultaneously from many, if not all directions. Firecrackers are used to conceal firing positions and deceive the enemy. (To be fired upon from the flanks and rear, is naturally demoralizing and confusing, particularly to partially trained troops). To accomplish the aforementioned infiltration, special troops, well skilled in the use of observed and deceptive measures are employed. These troops wear green coveralls similar in color to the terrain, and helmets covered with leaves and twigs. Many improve their concealment when stationary by covering themselves with green nets covered with artificial grass and twigs. There is a distinct tendency on the part of Japanese land forces to launch their attacks at night. The accuracy of fire of their infantry troops is only fair. They seem to rely more on a heavy volume rather than accuracy of fire. At ranges greater than 200 yards the accuracy of their fire rapidly diminishes.

(b) Sniping Operations.—Sniping operations are carried out by specially trained troops who are also particularly skillful in camouflage and deceptive measures. Many of these troops are able to speak English fluently. The snipers reach the area well behind the lines either by infiltrating around or through enemy lines by land or, when geographical conditions permit, they often proceed in boats by the enemy’s rear or flanks. Having reached the area to the enemy’s rear, the snipers search for officers and non-commissioned officers (particularly white). They locate command posts and staff cars. They often remain stationary in trees or on the ground, well camouflaged under green nets, etc., for long periods. When opposing units approach they often hold their fire, remain quiet and motionless, and allow the enemy troops to pass through the area unmolested. At this time officers and NCO’s are spotted. When the group has passed, fire is often opened on the enemy’s rear.

Confusion among their victims is a natural consequence.

On one occasion a patrol of American troops was given the mission of contacting and destroying some Japanese in a designated area. The latter, as our troops searched the area, withheld their fire and remained quiet and motionless and well concealed in trees and on the ground. Our patrol, failing to see any of the
Japanese, returned and the leader reported that there were no enemy troops in the area. Later operations by our units were conducted under the assumption that there were none of the enemy in this area. As a consequence the same Japanese (who had been overlooked) later attacked the rear of an American unit with telling effect. In addition to the deception explained heretofore, these troops successfully employ other, miscellaneous, deceptive measures. One frequently used is to say in English "We give up." When their opponents raise up from the ground to approach the Japanese, they get a blast of machine gun fire. The Japanese will sometimes engage in conversation in English with each other to attract the attention of Filipino and American troops. The latter, believing they hear their buddies, approach not on their guard, and walk into enemy fire. In addition, these troops leave various objects such as fountain pens, flashlights, watches, rifles, helmets, and bayonets in the field which, if picked up or examined with, may cause an immediate explosion or set off a mine resulting in casualties to nearby personnel.

3 Miscellaneous

a Japanese Soldier—The Japanese soldiers observed to date average from 20-36 years of age. Most of them are fine physical specimens, possessing considerable stamina. They appear to be adaptable to hardships. The marksmanship ability of the average soldier is considered to be inferior to that of our troops. Principally because of initial successes not only locally but in all theatres of the war, their morale at present is very high. Some of them have committed suicide when their capture appeared imminent.

4 Conclusions—Instead of using heavy frontal attacks the enemy's tactics in the Philippines has been based more on infiltration and wide flanking movements enveloping either of both flanks. The rugged and terrain of Bataan (where the most active fighting has taken place) may be the reason for the enemy's employing these tactics. Where the geography permits, landings are made behind their opponents lines, often at undefended beaches, (believed unsuitable by the defenders) at night. Sniping operations are carried out with effect behind the enemy's lines. The substance of the sniper's tactics appears to be to completely conceal themselves in trees or on the ground, allow the enemy to pass through an area unslept, then open fire on the victims from as many directions as possible, concentrating on white officers. Experience indicates that the best results are realized against these sniper troops by using specially selected troops of our own, familiar with the sniper's tactics and deceptive measures. In clearing out an area containing these snipers, trees, bushes, and all possible locations of the snipers must be covered with either small arms fire or grenades, whichever is more feasible. Advances must be made slowly, quietly and cautiously and troops must be kept well concealed until advanced. Snipers' and MG positions are frequently behind rocks or wood piles along roads and trails. For this reason operations against these snipers should not be conducted along roads, trails or often used routes.
B. Air Forces.

(1) Equipment and Planes.

(a) Types of Planes.—The following types have been observed in the Philippines (all navy): heavy bombers—numbers 96, 97, types; light-2 motorized bombers, with motors in line—used for attack, with estimated speed of 300 miles per hour in level flight. Two (5) new types observed include a low or flying boat with fixed landing gear and a long, slender, single motor monoplane with single tail surfaces. (The cowlings of this type were painted black and a yellow band was observed around the fuselage near the tail.)

(b) Types of Bombs.—Usual weights in pounds are: 20, 100, 500, and 1,000. The largest delayed action type observed were 3-hour. They are: (1) a dual purpose incendiary, monoplane bomb, weight 100 lbs., containing rubber pellets which ignite upon explosion. The pellets can be extinguished by water but will reignite when dry during the following 10 hours. (2) an anti-personnel bomb, weight 2 lbs., length 10½, effective radius 50 feet. Duds often explode from slight movement or vibration.

(2) Tactics.

(a) High Altitude Bombing.—Heavy attacks are usually made by one or more squadrons of nine planes each. They often pass over the area first time without dropping any bombs and then proceed to point 5 or 6 miles away from their objective. They then suddenly reverse their course and return with their objective, this time dropping their bombs. (Civilians and untrained troops are often deceived by this procedure as, when the planes first pass over without attacking, many come out from behind their cover to observe the planes. When the planes suddenly return, many persons are thus caught unprotected and the casualties are heavy.) This procedure is repeated until either all bombs are dropped or the mission has been accomplished. Altitudes for high bombing in this theatre of the war have varied from 16,000 to 22,000 feet. Accuracy of high bombing is classified, in general, as good.

(b) Strafing.—One example of enemy strafing our planes on water showed high accuracy of fire. It is believed that the best personnel are used. Most attempts to strafe troops to date in Batan have produced very few casualties. This is attributed to two factors. First, our troops are improving in the use of anti-strafing measures (using L shaped trenches). Secondly, planes conducting strafing operations recently have not been low enough to be effective. The smoke shell with smoke has been successfully used. Accuracy is classified, in general, as fair.

(3) Miscellaneous.

(a) Most large scale bombings in this theatre of the war have commenced about noon.

(b) Unless direct hits are made, enemy bombs used to date in this theatre of the war will not harm occupants of trenches approximately 2 feet wide and 6 feet long and 2½ feet deep. Large splinter proof with insufficient overhead protection occupied by a large number of personnel are most vulnerable to bombing.

(c) Cases are reported where Japanese planes dropped leaflets and then soon afterwards dropped bombs, causing heavy casualties among personnel in the open attaining
to pick up the leaflets.

(4) Conclusions.—Facilities and opportunities for close observation of enemy aircraft have been limited. Their offensive operations are marked by a tendency to be very methodical and cautious. When they meet difficulties they drop their bombs immediately and flee. Well placed AA fire greatly affects their operations.

6. Naval Landing Forces.

(1) Equipment.—One landing boat observed in Manila Bay area was 30-40 feet in length, armored forward, aft, and around the motor, and believed capable of carrying 120-140 men fully equipped. The coxswain’s position was well forward. There were mounts for four (4) machine guns. This boat was sunk by .50 caliber machine gun fire, (.50 caliber is believed not effective against this particular type of boat).

(2) Tactics.—In the Far Eastern theatre of the war the Japanese have habitually followed the practice of making landings behind the enemy’s lines. This was true in Malaya where large scale landings were made south of the British lines on numerous occasions; in the Philippines, where landings were made at Atimonan which is behind where our final defenses for the Lingasip landing was to be made; and, on a smaller scale, on the west coast of Bataan in rear of our main lines. The Japanese usually choose to land on undefended or weakly defended beaches (it was unsuitable by the defender). Landings were usually made during darkness.

(3) Miscellaneous.

(a) It has been reported that the Japanese in landing at Lingasip carried American flags with them.

(4) Conclusions.—Thus far, the Japanese have not had to land on a well defended beach in the Philippines area. They were, however, on one occasion attacked by our air power and in certain cases by some beach defenses and the landing was not successful. Many landings were made by transporting the troops ashore in barges in the face of little if any resistance from beach defenses. The small landings on the west coast of Bataan were made in armored landing boats and in some cases, in unarmed boats (bangaos), (a Filipino type of canoe).

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

A. Parachute Operations.—No parachute troops have been used in the Philippines to date. Supplies including food, ammunition, and cigarettes have been dropped to snipers operating in the rear areas in Bataan by parachutes.

B. Many of the enemy observed in the Philippines are not equipped with gas masks.

C. Enemy propaganda has appeared in the Philippines in the following forms:

(1) Leaflets dropped by planes or distributed by hand among Filipinos stating in substance as follows: "Filipinos— we are not fighting you, we are fighting the Americans. We are trying to free you from the American yoke. Americans consider you to be an inferior people and employ you as servants. If you want to be saved — lay down your arms and stop fighting. "Surrender before it is too late."

(2) It is reported that a loudspeaker, set up in front of the American-Filipino Battle Position in Bataan on January 26, 1942, broadcasted the following message: "Filipinos— we are not fighting you, we are fighting Americans. Lay down your arms we are moving to Subic Bay."
D. Different sources report that the Japanese are distinctly lacking in adequate supplies of gasoline on Luzon. Gasoline is seized from private automobiles. Radio broadcasts are made by Japanese stating that gasoline brought for sale will be paid for in Japanese currency. Water transportation and horse-drawn carts are used whenever possible by the Japanese.

IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.
A. Equipment and Armament. The enemy possesses modern equipment and armament for operations on land and in the air. With few exceptions, however, item for item and weapon for weapon ours are superior.

B. Tactics. He is deceptive, employing both lawful and unlawful means. On the ground, while on the offensive, his infiltration tactics coupled with sniper activity behind the lines stand out. A heavy volume rather than an accurate fire is employed. Attacks are often launched at night. In landing operations there is a distinct tendency to land at night at undefended beaches which the defender might consider unsuitable for landing. Information regarding tactics in the air has been limited, but there is a noticeable tendency for the Japanese to be careful and methodical in high altitude bombing and cautious in dive bombing and troops strafing operations. Every effort is made to conserve planes.

C. Miscellaneous. The enemy encountered in the Philippines to date is rugged, smart, aggressive, and thoroughly schooled in the advantages of deception and camouflage. Initial Japanese successes in all theatres of the war contributed to his present high morale. The accuracy of his fire of small arms is below that of our troops. Heavy, accurate artillery fire and favorable terrain have contributed greatly toward the effective American-Filipino defense in Bataan to date. Our artillery appears to be much superior to the Japanese.
RESTRICTED

Headquarters, 4th Marines, February 20, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.

To: The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.

Subject: Intelligence Summary.

Enclosures: (A) Intelligence Summary for the Period 2 February to 20 February, 1942, with sketches A, B, C, D, E, F.

1. Enclosure (A) is submitted herewith.

S. L. HOWARD

-----------------------------------------------
GENERAL OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Prepared by the R-2 Section)

I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

II. COMPONENT FORCES.

A. Land Forces.
   (1) Equipment and Armament.
   (2) Tactics.
   (3) Miscellaneous.
   (4) Conclusions.

B. Air Forces.
   (1) Equipment and Armament.
   (2) Tactics.
   (3) Miscellaneous.
   (4) Conclusions.

C. Landing Forces.
   (1) Equipment and Armament.
   (2) Tactics.
   (3) Miscellaneous.
   (4) Conclusions.

III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.
I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION. The sources are the same as those of our last report.

II. COMPONENT FORCES.
A. Land Forces.
   (1) Equipment and Armament.
      (a) Grenade Thrower. In the Philippines the enemy has been using the grenade thrower, model 89, described in TM 30-480. The ammunition is the same as that described in this same publication.
      (b) Hand Grenades. The same model 89 shell described in TM 30-480 is being used as a hand grenade.
      (c) Tanks. Reliable sources state that in BATAAN the enemy is using a medium weight tank corresponding to the 11.35 ton type (1930) (or 95(1932)) described in TM 30-480.
      (d) Flame Thrower. The enemy has used a flame thrower in BATAAN which consists of three (3) containers and a hose with a nozzle giving the appearance of a fruit sprayer.
      (e) Mines. The enemy has extensively used a type mine shown in sketch A. It is a muddy brown color and has the appearance of two (2) pie tins placed together with concave portions adjacent. A number of these mines are usually placed across a road or likely tank route. They are covered with dust to provide concealment. The mine contains from 7 to 10 lbs. of TNT and is capable of seriously damaging the wheels or belt of our 18 ton, medium weight, tanks.

(2) Tactics. In BATAAN, infiltrations (usually at night) through suitable corridors in our front lines coupled with clever sniper activities within or behind our lines continue to stand out in Japanese tactics. Excellent concealment and camouflage discipline are practiced at all times. As stated in our last report the Japanese often allow their enemy to pass through an area without firing upon him with a view to surrounding him and eventually inflicting more casualties. Therefore, the strictest precautions must be taken while in an area which possibly contains Japanese troops. As advances are made, bushes, trees, rock piles, and all other possible locations of these Japanese troops should be sprayed thoroughly with small arms fire or covered well with hand grenades, depending upon which is the more feasible. To effectively combat these snipers who are within or behind our lines, large quantities of small arms ammunition and hand grenades are required.

Thompson sub-machine guns are suitable for operations of this nature. The following cases which actually occurred in BATAAN may somewhat clarify the statements made above.

(a) See sketch B. This case illustrates one of the methods the enemy employed in an effort to end the Battle of BATAAN. A captured enemy mosaic and operation order reveal that an enemy force of approximately three (3) battalions with attached engineers and other special troops were to land near APOLOMAN Bay, move to the east, and cut the MARIVELES-BAGAC Road. Another small force was to simultaneously attack the front of the I Corps. Had not the landing operation been repulsed, the road would have been
cut, and an entire corps would have had its line of communication cut since the MAKIKELES-BAGAG Road is the only route in that vicinity to the rear areas.

(b) See sketch C. In this case our forces were attempting to destroy a Japanese unit which had landed and gained a foothold on the point shown. The enemy had well concealed machine guns, layed to deliver grazing fire up the hill as shown. (The enemy were well protected from mortar and artillery fire by nearby caves; attack from the water was not feasible because of the enemy’s control of the air). As our troops moved forward over and down the hill, the Japanese held their fire. Finally when a number of our troops had entered the area A, the Japanese opened with a heavy volume of fire from B. When some of our troops attempted to withdraw up the hill the machine guns opened their grazing fire. By attempting to withdraw through this grazing fire, our forces received considerable casualties. The enemy force was subsequently destroyed using the tactics recommended in the beginning of par. If A (c).

(c) See sketch D. In this case one (1) enemy battalion affected a penetration through our lines. Had not our forces taken action in the early steps of this infiltration, considerably more of the enemy would have been infiltrated. A few Japanese infiltrated south through our MLR near the stream bed shown. Machine guns were set up near A and B to cover the infiltration of others who dug trenches between A, B and C. These troops in turn covered the entrance of still more Japanese into the corridor created. With a well protected corridor the enemy planned to fan out to the east and west. Fortunately this was prevented by timely infiltrations of our own forces. By employing a greater number of our forces, the Japanese were surrounded on all sides and their entire force was destroyed. During mopping up operations in this area, a large number of light and heavy machine guns, cannon (approximately 75mm), flame throwers, radio and signal equipment, and ammunition of different types were found indicating that more than a small operation had been contemplated.

(d) See sketch E. In this case a 57mm anti-tank gun was exceptionally well camouflaged and concealed behind the bush X shown in the sketch. The gun crew, the ammunition, and the gun itself, less the barrel, were concealed and under cover in a pit on the north side of the bush. This bush was no larger than an ordinary waste basket. The barrel of the gun was completely concealed in the bush and was elevated to deliver fire up into the belly of any tank approaching up the road from the south. The concealment was so complete that a person a few feet to the south could not detect the position.

The artillery fire (105mm) directed against the Fortified Islands of MANILA Bay during this period has been of a harassing nature. The ammunition used has contained highly sensitive fuses with a high degree of fragmentation. The fire was widely distributed over each of the islands and was conducted at irregular times during both daylight and darkness. In BATAAN some artillery ammunition used contained fuses with delays varying from one (1) to twenty four (24) hours.
(3) Miscellaneous.
(a) A favorite type trench of the Japanese is shown in sketch F. The D portion is about 8' in diameter and 4½' deep. Sections A, B, and C are each about 2' deep, 1½' wide, and 7½' long. The soldier usually opens fire from D and then moves to section A, B, or C depending upon which section offers the most protection from his enemy's position. For example, if his enemy is located near E he would crawl (under good concealment) to A to preclude his receiving en- filde fire.

(4) Conclusions. Same as those of our last report.

B. Air Forces.
(1) Equipment and Armament. During this period the following type planes were observed in BATAAN: (1) Zero type fighter; (2) Number 97 bomber; and (3) A medium bomb- er with single air cooled motor, low wing monoplane, a rear machine gun, and markings consisting of a white band edged with red around the fuselage halfway between the fin and cockpit and two (2) red horizontal stripes on the rudder.

(2) Tactics. No changes noted except that the enemy has been somewhat more bold in his strafing operations, conducting his firing at lower altitudes than before. Staff cars, trucks, and their occupants have been frequently strafed on roads to the rear of the front lines.

(3) Miscellaneous. No new information.

(4) Conclusions. Same as those of our last report except as noted in par. II B (2) of this report.

C. Landing Forces.
(1) Equipment and Armament. Many different types of landing boats with varying characteristics have been observed. Many of the boats had armor only in the bow and this only sufficiently thick to prevent small arms ammu- nition from penetrating. The capacities of the boats varied from 26 to 140 men, fully equipped.

(2) Tactics. No changes from last report.

(3) Miscellaneous. No new information noted.

(4) Conclusions. Same as those of our last report.

III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.
A. Prisoners of War. Captured Japanese prisoners of war reveal that they had been told that they would be killed by Amer- icans if captured. Japanese prisoners also state that, if captured, they would never be permitted to return to Japan, even after the war. (These disclosures accounts for their tenacious resistance and many of them committing suicide to prevent being captured.) Enemy soldiers seemed astonished when offered food, clothes, cigarettes, and medical treatment by our forces. One Japanese soldier recently came over to our lines, voluntarily surrendered, and said: "I'm fed up with this war. We were told the Filipinos would be fighting with us, not against us." Most prisoners state that our artillery fire has been very effective.

B. Supplies Dropped by Parachutes. The enemy has dropped numer- ous supplies by parachutes intended for their troops operat- ing behind or within our lines. These supplies consisted
RESTRICTED

C. Propaganda.—During the period of this report the enemy intensified his propaganda campaign. Thousands of leaflets were dropped among our troops. Most of these advised the Filipinos to either surrender or to go well behind the American lines and hide. Many leaflets had large pictures of women on one side. Other leaflets stated that the entire U.S. fleet had been sunk and that all convoys to the Philippines had been destroyed. Other leaflets bore the signature of Mr. Vargas and asked the Filipinos to “lay down their arms since all is already lost.”

D. Captured Enemy Weapons.—Captured Japanese machine guns, mortars, and ammunition are being effectively used by our native forces. Enemy ammunition is usually buried near the weapons. Also, often light artillery and signal equipment (intended for later operations) are buried near their trenches.

E. Conditions in MANILA.—Sources from MANILA state that white internees are being treated satisfactorily, although a food shortage appears imminent. The same source adds that white women are not being molested by Japanese troops. However, considerable raping of Filipino women in small barrios is reported. It is said that white internees in MANILA are permitted to walk around the town for one (1) hour each evening.

F. Situation between MANILA and LINGAYEN Bay.—Reports have been received stating that the Japanese have constructed barricades in many positions along the road from MANILA to SAN FERNANDO (PAMPANGA Province). This road is also reported to be mined in places. It is also reported that the Japanese have constructed defensive positions from LINGAYEN Bay south to SAN FERNANDO (PAMPANGA Province).

G. Reports indicate that all available small boats and interisland craft have been assembled in the vicinity of MANILA and that from 1600 to 2000 troops have been assembled on the south shore of MANILA Bay. A captured operation plan indicated a landing attack supported by naval units against at least one or more of the Fortified Islands on or about March 5, 1942.

IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.—The information obtained during the period of this report completely substantiates the conclusions drawn and stated in our last report. For emphasis, it is repeated that the basis of Japanese land tactics is infiltration. This is usually affected at night and is coupled with clever camouflage, concealment, and deceptive measures. When he has surrounded his enemy, the Japanese opens with a heavy volume of fire (not intended to be as accurate as rapid) from all sides with a view to making his enemy withdraw. The Japanese troops’ concealment in trees, bushes, rock piles etc. is often so complete that our troops often pass nearby them unless there are bushes, trees, and locations, etc. are thoroughly sprayed with small arms fire or hand grenades depending upon which is the more feasible. Fire is often withheld by Japanese troops with a view to causing our forces’ entrance into a trap, from which es-
cape is almost impossible. In landing operations it is again emphasized that landings are usually made at night and at undefended beaches and often on points (thought to be unlikely landing beaches by the defender). Information received during this period substantiates the statement of our last report to the effect that Japanese small arms accuracy is well below our standards.
Headquarters, 4th Marines,
March 14, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Subject: Intelligence Summary.

Enclosures: (A) Intelligence Summary for the Period 20 February to 15 March, 1942.

1. Enclosure (A) is submitted herewith.

S. L. HOWARD.
GENERAL OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Prepared by the R-2 Section)

I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

II. COMPONENT FORCES.

A. Land Forces.
   (1) Equipment and Armament.
   (2) Tactics.
   (3) Miscellaneous.
   (4) Conclusions.

B. Air Forces.
   (1) Equipment and Armament.
   (2) Tactics.
   (3) Miscellaneous.
   (4) Conclusions.

C. Landing Forces.
   (1) Equipment and Armament.
   (2) Tactics.
   (3) Miscellaneous.
   (4) Conclusions.

III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.
SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RE - JAPANESE FORCES FOR PERIOD
February 20 to March 13, 1942

I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.—Aside from the sources of information re tactics of Japanese air units the sources are the same as those of our previous reports.

II. COMPONENT FORCES.

A. Land Forces.

(1) Equipment and Armament.

(a) Hand Generator for Portable Japanese Field Radio Set.—The unit is contained in an aluminum case, outside dimensions 7¾ x 4¾ x 2½. Weight 18 lbs., with two adjustable leather carrying straps attached to case. It has a single hand hand drive, with ratchet attachment to the armature. This handle folds into the bottom of the case when not in use; on the back side of the case is a four prong outlet for plug and cable connection to the set itself. The hand drive unit is constructed for a hand driven speed of 70 rpm (turns easily), which through a gear ratio turns the armature at a speed of 5200 rpm. With these speeds and under "no load" conditions the generator has the following electrical characteristics: High voltage - 150 volts and 0.08 amperes; Low voltage - 6 volts and 1.0 amperes. A single scale voltmeter visible through top of carrying case, meter graduated from 1 to 10 volts.

(b) Japanese Field Telephone Set.—The set is carried in a highly polished wood case approximately 5" x 5½, x 10". By pressing a button the case is opened. The set has a one wire line and ground return. The ear-piece and mouth-piece are smaller and lighter in weight than ours. All sets captured were in excellent condition and were put to immediate use by our forces.

(2) Tactics.—During this period it was noted that Japanese penetrations, once made through our front lines, had the following characteristics: The frontages of the penetrations were small compared to their depth, the front of one being about 200 yards while its depth was almost 3000 yards; the pockets were strongly fortified and positions were prepared for "all-around" defense; there were an unusually large number of fox holes with connecting trenches; the positions for fox holes and trenches were often so chosen as to take advantage of any existing cover such as logs, mock piles, tree stumps, roots, etc.; by clever concealed infiltration, the penetrations were often made and the pockets well organized before discovery by our forces; the penetrations were often made along trails; light artillery, radio equipment, and large quantities of ammunition were found buried in the areas in which the penetrations were made. During this period it was also noted that in advancing the Japanese moved slowly and "dug-in" well as they advanced. Individual enemy soldiers often had several fox holes with connecting trenches thus enabling them to fire from one fox hole and then immediately crawl to another, new position. Once established, the Japanese pockets were difficult to eliminate. Experience has shown that their elimination was best
accomplished by infiltrating forces of our own around to both flanks and rear of the Japanese and then closing in on the enemy with superior numbers from all directions.

(3) Miscellaneous.

(a) Extracts From USAFFE Training Memorandum.-The following extracts from USAFFE Training Memorandum on Jungle Fighting, dated 26 February, 1942 are believed accurate and reliable:

(1) GENERAL. The following principles and methods based on recent successful operations of the 57th Infantry (P2) at Longoskawayan, Anyasan, and Sibailim Points, and of the 87th (US) Infantry in the wooded area on the left of the first battle position of the II Corps are published for the information of this command. Variations of these methods to fit local conditions should be worked out by commanders and individuals on the ground.

(2) Individual Equipment. The equipment carried by the soldier should be the minimum required for actual fighting. It will usually consist of his primary weapon plus cartridge belt, first aid packet, hand grenades, bandoleers of extra ammunition, entrenching tool and the bayonet if armed with a rifle. The striped pack or blanket roll should be left behind as they materially impede progress in dense underbrush.

(3) Feeding. During operations conducted by the 57th Infantry it was usually found that one cooked meal a day, served just before dark, was the most practical solution. This meal must be distributed to the troops by carrying parties operating in daylight both because of the difficulty of finding individuals at night and because the enemy often launches his initial attack about thirty minutes after complete darkness. It is also advisable when the country is unusually thick or prolonged close action can be foreseen to issue each soldier a canned ration. The method of feeding and the number of meals served will depend on the tactical situation and the density of the jungle.

(4) ATTACK - UNIT COMBAT PRINCIPLES. Preparations for an attack must be complete, a thorough reconnaissance must be made and responsibility for maintaining contact between adjacent units clearly placed. Even small gaps, fifty yards or less in extent, must be covered by vigorous patrolling. The enemy has proven himself adept at finding unprotected flanks and wide gaps and it is quite to make use of this information.

Our advance may be necessarily slow but it should progress steadily and aggressively. Prepared machine-gun emplacements, dugouts, or foxholes containing more than one enemy can best be reduced by maintaining continuous fire on them while one or more individuals approach from the flanks and reduce the resistance by throwing hand grenades.

The forward movement of our attack should usually be halted for one hour and a half to two hours before darkness. A dug-in defensive position should be prepared; especially must contact between units and individuals be insured. The enemy invariably launches his initial attack, or counter-attack, shortly after dark. Additional attacks may be expected throughout the night.

-9-
The 31st Infantry (US) while operating in the woods in central Bataan was attacked heavily at 12:30 AM; two other lighter attacks were experienced the same night, one at 3:30 AM and the other at 4:30 AM.

The initial enemy attack is furious and aggressive, but may be met by heavy fire in a short duration. Subsequent attacks are less intense and may be for the purpose of covering the removal of his wounded and dead.

b. INDIVIDUAL ACTION. Successful jungle fighting more than any other type of warfare depends upon the aggressive intelligent action of the individual soldier. Advantage must be taken of available cover, to do otherwise results in needless losses.

A count of "one thousand one," "one thousand two," should be made after releasing the safety spring of the grenade before throwing it, in order to obviate the possibility of the enemy picking it up and hurling it back. The tendency on the part of our soldiers to stop and examine enemy dead and material should be prohibited, however, great care should be exercised in ascertaining that apparent enemy casualties are in reality dead. In many instances individual enemy soldiers have assumed death only "to ease life" and hurled grenades or shot into the backs of our passing troops. The only safe solution apparently is to consider each Japanese as potentially dangerous unless he has surrendered or is dead.

The individual soldier as he advances must be on the alert and closely observe the ground for enemy "booby" traps. These may be heavy grenades, tank mines (pancakes type), and 3-inch trench mortar shells with the safety fork removed, all of which are dangerous to tanks and personnel.

(5) SUPPORTING WEAPONS. a. MACHINE GUNS. Machine guns should generally be employed against definitely located hostile machine guns. However, a section or platoon should be aware of added elements to assist in the advance of the assault echelon.

b. MORTARS. Mortars, except in dense wooded areas, are extremely effective.

c. TANKS. Tanks, if used, must be closely followed by six to nine infantrymen. Tank weapons cannot reach an enemy in a foxhole, nor can the tank crush him if the foxhole is narrow and dug in firm ground. The tank will keep the enemy down and the accompanying infantry must clean out the foxholes with rifle, bayonet, or grenades.

d. FIELD ARTILLERY. Close support of field artillery is difficult. Distance between friendly and hostile lines is necessarily close. Therefore, effective artillery fire on enemy lines is practically impossible without an elaborate wire communication system down to and including the assault companies. Higher headquarters should place the artillery in direct support of battalions and leave the calling for artillery fire to battalion commanders. Artillery fire properly
coordinated can be effectively used for reducing located centers of resistance. The enemy has repeatedly timed the firing of his own artillery, mortars and grenade throwers to that of our artillery fire in order to create the impression on friendly troops that our own artillery was falling short."

(b) Sniper Tactics.—Reliable sources from Bataan report that the Japanese snipers are alert to fire in the direction of any noise heard and that our personnel who skylark, talk, or make unnecessary noises will be fired upon instantly by the snipers. The same source state that entrenched Japanese often attempt to throw back hand grenades thrown by our personnel, or kick them into a pit in their trench. In the latter case, when the grenades explode, the force of explosion and fragments go upward, thereby causing no damage or casualties.

(c) Wire Sealing Device.—During operations in Bataan the Japanese successfully used a device for climbing over barbed wire. It consisted of bamboo and was brought to the location of the wire in the form of a roll. The device was then unrolled and spread over the wire like a rug thus enabling their troops to successfully pass over the wire.

(d) Tactics During Route and Approach March.—During the route and approach march the Japanese have a tendency to be careless. While the camouflage and concealment of the individual soldier is excellent, columns of trucks and troops often approach the battle area unconstealed, without any camouflage, and often poorly dispersed. (Many enemy truck and troop columns have been taken under accurate artillery fire by our forces.)

(e) Bayonet Fighting.—Reports continue to be received to the effect that the Japanese dislike bayonet fighting and avoid it whenever possible.

(f) Tenacity of Japanese Soldier.—A recent report well exemplifies the tenacious fighting qualities of the Japanese soldier. The lone Japanese was surrounded by our troops and was out of ammunition. When asked to surrender, he refused, and kept his bayonet pointed at our troops, and challenged them to come and get him.

(4) Conclusions.—No changes or additions except those stated in II A. (2) and II A. (3) above.

B. Air Forces.

(1) Equipment and Armament.

(a) Types of Aircraft.—The following type planes have been observed in this theater since the commencement of hostilities:

- Fighter, 100 or Zero Type.
- Dive Bomber, No. 97 Type.
- Observation and Light Bomber, No. 97 Type.
- Dive Bomber, believed to be either 100 or 101 Type. (It is dark colored, has blunt wing tips, and retractable landing gear).
- Heavy Bombers, 90, 97 (modified) and 98 Types. Messerschmitt, 109P Type.
(b) Enemy Airfields.—The main activity has been reported at Nichols, Clark, and Nelleen Fields. The following other fields have been used: San Rafael (Bulusan); San Ildefonso (Tlocos Bay); Villamil, San Fernando (Pampanga). Airfields are reported to be under construction at Cavite and at San Luis (south of Reina Mercedes, Isabella). An auxiliary field in the foothills between Calongan and Dinalupihan has also been reported.

(2) Tactica.—The following information on tactics has been procured from U.S. Combat pilots who have encountered Japanese air force units:

(a) Heavy Bombardment.—Bombardment formations are generally Vees of three in V and in numbers varying from nine to fifty. Although formations are generally very close and apparently well flown, it has been noted that the formations loosen up considerably after dropping their bomb load making them particularly vulnerable to pursuit attack. Combat gunners have been noted to expend their ammunition on attacking pursuit which are considerably out of their range. It has been noted, the Japanese bombardment formations often split fifty to one hundred miles prior to reaching their objective and circle. They then assemble and attack the objective in mass splitting again into smaller units and assembling at a point on the route back to Formosa. The purpose of circling is to confuse our pursuit control personnel and to lure our pursuit into the air so that by the time the bombardment is ready to strike their objective, our pursuit has consumed most of its gasoline. Many times bombardment is accompanied by escorting pursuit who generally proceed the attack or remain above the bombardment formation in hopes of attacking our pursuit which might be pre-occupied with the hostile bombardment formation. It has been observed however, that in many instances Japanese escorting pursues have been out of supporting distance of their own bombardment. Supporting pursuit have been practicing combat among themselves while bombers make their attacks.

Dive Bombing.—Upon completion of bombardment they generally strafe objectives in very loose formation. When our anti-aircraft is active, their accuracy is very poor and in some cases they do not dive prior to releasing their bombs.

Pursuit.—Japanese pursuit airplanes generally fly in two-ship element formation. They also employ "weavers" who fly about 1000 feet above and a mile behind the main formation. Formations are either very close or very loose and never are the airplanes so supported that each pilot is capable of delivering aimed fire at the target. Pursuit in accompanying bombardment flies either above or to the side of the formation. It has been observed that in many instances pursuit is out of supporting distance of their bombardment. Pursuit has been employed in strafing airzones. Because the Zero type pursuit are lighter than our P-40 type, they invariably take advantage of only take advantage of only take advantage of any climbing characteristics or close turning characteristics in combating our pursuit. When our pursuit has been attacked by superior Japanese pursuit
forces, it has been noted that the enemy splits its formation in such a manner that whenever way our pursuit turns, they will present a target to the enemy. It has also been noted that when enemy pursuit has been suspended, they invariably execute a steep chandelier or lassellman. It is recommended that in conducting hostile pursuit the superior strength and duration of our equipment should be utilized to the utmost, i.e., our equipment can better stand steep and prolonged dives than that of the enemy. Therefore, when attacked by hostile pursuit formation, recommended tactics are to immediately execute a steep dive and pull out close to the ground, remaining at a low altitude. When attacking an enemy pursuit formation, it is advisable to make one swift attack.

3. Miscellaneous.—The following extracts from British Intelligence Information Memorandum Number 6, dated 7 October, 1941 are quoted:

(a) "The Japanese Naval Air Service is divided into two branches—shore based and ship borne units. In the organization of shore based units, in August, 1941, shore-based units consisted of about 90 squadrons. Each squadron has from 8 to 12 first-line aircraft according to type and in theory each squadron has an immediate reserve of 60%. A squadron is divided into two flights (Buftsal). Recently, the allotment of ship borne aircraft has been substantially increased. As with shore-based units, aircraft in aircraft carriers and seaplane carriers are organized into squadrons and flights. The establishments are also the same, and 50% immediate reserves are normally held aloft. All squadrons except flying boat squadrons have 12 first-line aircraft and 6 immediate reserve, and the flying boat squadrons have 8 first-line aircraft and 4 immediate reserve. Battleships carry 3 aircraft each while cruisers of 8,000 to 10,000 tons carry 3 to 4 aircraft each according to the type of ship. Cruisers of 5,000 to 7,000 tons carry 2 to 4 aircraft, while destroyers have 2 to 3 aircraft. In immediate reserve of aircraft amounting to 50% of the aircraft allotted to battleships and cruisers is held aloft.

(b) In the organization of first-line units, the units are normally all controlled by the Air Corps, or air division commander and comprise those air regiments shown in the order of battle. The basic unit is the squadron, and two to five squadrons form an air regiment. Some regiments are divided into battalions and when this is so a battalion consists of two squadrons and a regiment of two battalions. Regiments are again organized into brigades which may consist of from two to five regiments. Squadrons consist of from 9 to 12 first-line aircraft according to type, with 20% immediate reserve. They are not sub-divided into flights. Squadron commanders are usually captains, though sometimes a major may be in command. Battalion commanders are either Lieutenants-Colonels or Majors. The establishment for aircraft in Army Air Service units is as follows:
1st Line Immediate Aircraft Reserve

Single-seater fighter and light bomber squadrons 12 3
Heavy bomber squadrons 12 3
Reconnaissance squadrons 9 3
(Some light bomber squadrons consist of 7 two-engine and 4 single-engine bombers; others of 12 single-engine light bombers).

Official figures are not available for the personnel, but a general estimate of the establishment of a typical air regiment is as follows - 36 officers, 35 warrant officers and NCOs' 500 in other ranks, and 85 in civilian personnel. Of the 36 officers in a regiment, 16 are probably pilots; 3 employed on general duties, 10 as observers, 5 as technical officers, 3 as accountant officers and the remaining 2 are medical officers.

(c) The monthly output of the Japanese aircraft industry probably lies between 300-500 aircraft per month. It is known that experiments in the construction of an electrically operated nose turret of very light metal fitted with a new type of light machine gun are in progress and that turrets are installed in naval heavy bombers.

(d) If the opening Japanese air effort can be thrown back with considerable loss, it will place the Japanese Air Services in a dilemma from which they will take a long time to recover; a well-organized defense which can inflict initial losses disproportionate to the weight of attack will receive its reward in the form of breathing space, for the Japanese are most religiously 'text-book'; they take time to ponder counter-measures, and they are most careful not to venture again into what has proved to be a dangerous area before they are satisfied that they can escape more or less unscathed. The Japanese fully realize the value of amphibious operations in their national strategy and have developed their methods and equipment to a high degree of efficiency. They have had more up-to-date experience in this type of warfare than any other nation. The Army is responsible for transportation and for the landing and also for erection of a temporary base ashore. The Navy is responsible only for convoy protection, for assisting the Army by gunfire and by provision of aircraft. A specially trained naval detachment may also be landed if necessary. This latter force is the most efficient Japanese unit employed in this type of operation. They are not deterred by difficult landing places, if by the use of them, strongly defended areas can be avoided. The wide front on which the Japanese land is notable. At Shanghai the distance between the wings was about 16 miles and at Hangchow and Binz Bay about 20. Success at any point is rapidly and fully exploited. In all major landings the speed of advance inland was very rapid. The infantry of the first flight push on to the utmost of their ability, using mountain guns for their artillery and apparently dispensing with tanks and M.T. till those can catch up. In most cases tanks appear to have been little used. They have ample material for combined operations which is both cheap to produce and is reliable to use. They have great reserves of suitable craft, which in peace are employed commercially and which, with their crews, are readily impressed when required. Full use is made of rivers and creeks and
captured native craft to penetrate and turn the defense and all lines of communication. They have gained great knowledge of river warfare in the Hankow campaign. The speed of convoys appears to be from 8 to 12 knots. Ample time is allowed for the final advance, and a considerable period of time elapses between the arrival of the transports off the objective and the actual landing.

(e) There are two main types of landing craft which are: large, 60 to 100 men, speed 10-12 knots, and small 50 to 80 men, speed 6 to 10 knots. They drew about 27 inches. The majority have a flap in the bows to form an unloading ramp. In general, the landing craft make their final approach in line abreast. They drop stern anchors before grounding and haul off the beach by an engine-driven winch when clear of troops.

(f) The Japanese lag behind the other Powers in night operation of their carriers. Their bombing operations during the Sino-Japanese hostilities, many of which have been the work of carrier aircraft, have shown that they dislike night flying especially on moonless nights during which most of their landings have been staged. In several cases the Japanese have apparently made a surprise more than the preliminary bombardment which has not started until after the first flight has landed. On one occasion a preliminary bombardment of enemy positions was made at a range of 1,500 yards, and the covering fire was most accurate, the Japanese keeping only a short distance behind the bursting shells. This was done by destroyers who never fired at more than 2,000 to 2,500 yards, sometimes using howitzer fire on special areas by extreme elevation and a small charge. By this means shells were lobbed accurately for about 1,500 yards.

(g) It appears to be the Japanese practice to anchor their transports off the point of attack at about 0500 and for the troops to reach the beaches about 0430, depending on the time of sunrise. In general, therefore, embarkation in landing craft is carried out in the dark, and the first troops landing in the dark just before the first light of dawn. The landing in staged two or three hours before high water, and on a moonless night if possible. The exceptions to this rule were probably dictated by strategical circumstances or navigational difficulties. It has been the practice of the Japanese to indulge in reconnaissance and bombing of areas subsequently attacked. On the other hand their successes against feebly opposition, which have followed careful espionage, bribery and meticulously detailed planning, may lead to failure if their plans can be dislocated. In this connection the importance of early location and destruction of their landing craft carriers or carriers is a matter of the utmost importance, for by this method their landing organization can be most seriously upset. The tactical composition of aircraft in carriers is normally about one-third fighters and two-thirds torpedo or dive bombers.

(h) All Japanese cruisers carry aircraft and at least
three submarines have been fitted to carry one aircraft each, also merchant vessels are being converted probably to seaplane tenders. The N.Y.K. liners *Kasuga Maru* (16,500 tons) launched in September, 1940, and *Kamuro* launched July, 1941, also the *Kanivara Maru* launched 26th June, 1941, are in process of reconstruction as aircraft carriers.

1. All naval aircraft, with the exception of heavy bombers, are marked on the tail and fuselage with a letter of the Katakana Alphabet denoting the squadron, followed by the number of the individual aircraft. Identity of army units is shown by colored bands on the tail and fuselage. Squadrons are denoted by various symbols on the tail, for instance, the painting of an eagle; star, or some other Japanese emblem. It appears that aircraft operating in China, both of the army and naval service, have a white band on the fuselage near the tail.

(4) Conclusions—No changes or additions other than those stated in II B. (1) and II B. (2) above.

C. Landing Forces.

1. Equipment and Armament—No changes or additions noted during this period.

2. Tactics—Reports from other units state that the Japanese, prior to launching their attack on the Island of Singapore, used many messes with a view to deceiving the defenders as to where their main landing would be made. Lighted cigarettes, fire crackers, moving vehicles, barking dogs, and other noises were all used opposite one of Singapore's likely landing beaches with a view to leading the defenders to believe that the main effort would be made at that point. Actually the first landing force was made on another side of the Island where the defenders had only patrols as their defense. It is also reported that individual Japanese snipers swam from the Malay mainland to the Island of Singapore prior to the landing of the Japanese main forces. It also is known that Japanese swimmers were used in the attempted Japanese landings on the west coast of Batavia. These special troops are capable of swimming long distances and swim with their weapons, ammunition, and a limited amount of food with them. It is further reported that, in landing operations, some Japanese troops landed on beaches which had nearly vertical cliffs; that these cliffs were scaled by improvised ladders and successful infiltration inland accomplished.

(3) Miscellaneous—No changes or additions noted during this period.

(4) Conclusions—No changes or additions noted other than those stated in II C. (2) above.

III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

A. Enemy Information Re-Occupied Territory.

1. Shipping—The following inter-island boats, which were sunk at Manila prior to the evacuation, are reported to be refloated: Ntra Sra De Guia, Ntra Sra De la Paz, Ntra Sra Del Rosario, Don Juan O. Haga and Alabat. Several launches formerly belonging to the Bureau of Customs have been seen patrolling in the
north Manila Bay area, and appear to be armed with light caliber machine guns and possibly carry armor. In the Tarlac-Sabal region, at Piers 3, 5, and 7 of Manila, and at Balibago, concentrations of barge and barges have been reported. We have had a report from Mindoro station that barge and barges are being built at Batangas for an invasion of Mindoro.

Comment: If true, it would be more reasonable to suppose that the barges and barges built there would be used for an assault on the Fortified Islands at the entrance of Manila Bay instead of Mindoro.

(2) Supply and Ammunition Depots: In Manila, the Philippine Refining Co., Manila Rope and Cordage Co., F. E. Zuellig & Co., and Madrigal & Co. bodegas, all near the Pandacan District, and the Balintawak Beer brewery in Caloocan, appear to be the main depots, the Tanque Luna and Tanque Sago, Atlantic Gulf and Engineers Island are being used for large repair work or for the manufacture of small bombs. The Rizal Memorial Stadium and LaSalle College adjoining it have been used for troops, trucks, and tank concentrations, and there is a possibility that La Salle is also a hospital. Calamba (Laguna Province) appears to be the main supply point for the South, and San Pedro (Samar) and Angeles, and Pampanga for the northern area. Of these three in the north, the main one is San Fernando. In the area near Lingayen, Agoo and Dasmariñas have been reported as large bases for troops and supplies.

(3) Construction-Field Works: In the latter part of January, large trench construction was reported around the city of Manila, with special emphasis on the area from Caloocan through San Francisco del Monte, and around the east of the city to the Pasig River. Some entrenchments have also been dug in the approaches to San Fernando, Pampanga. The enemy have been working extensively in the reconstruction of bridges which were destroyed on our withdrawal to Bataan, and the reconstruction has been done, in every case reported, by heavy timbers and wooden planks. The greatest number of reports on this work have come on the reconstruction of the Calumpit Bridge, a very important bridge for the Manila - San Fernando highway, and reports indicate that it should have been completed between February 20-21. If all the reports turned in are correct, every foot of the road between Dinulupihan and San Fernando, San Fernando to Manila, and San Fernando to Tarlac has been mined, and would be completely destroyed if the Japanese were forced to retreat. (Comment: inexperienced agents may have mistaken routine repair for the mining of roads and bridges).

(4) Japanese High Command: The Japanese Commander in Chief is occupying the American High Commissioner's mansion for his headquarters and a recent report states he may be occupying a wing of St. Thomas University. The Army of Occupation have established offices at the Army & Navy Club, the Elk's Club, the Bay View Hotel, Fort Santiago, and Military Plaza.

(5) Japanese Troops: Due to lack of vitamins (no fresh vegetables, fish or meat, and living on constant diet of rice and hard tack) soldiers are reported as suffering from malnutrition — some even complain of night blindness. Malaria is becoming common, because of lack of quinine. (Early arrivals were known to
carry cuisine), and dysentery is prevalent.

(8) Internees.—The civilians as a whole have been treated well in Manila, and the only reports of assaults have come from the provinces. Europeans and Americans are interned at Santo Tomas University, and latest reports indicate that many women and children have been released. A prisoner of war who had been on N.F. duty at Santo Tomas stated that married families were occupying one building, and men and women without families were each installed in separate buildings. The Philippine Red Cross is reported to be furnishing the internes with two hot meals daily. Sta. Ines de la Convent is reported to be the enclosurer for prisoners of war.

(7) Commodities.—Food prices in Manila have gone up considerably. There is rationing of food and a limit to the price of the main commodity necessary for the local population, rice. Rice has fluctuated from P 14.50 per cavan to P 6.50, current rate; matches P1.50 a box, etc.

(8) Transportation.—Transportation is accomplished by calesas and the street cars operated by the Manila Electric Company. Some busses are operated, but all other gasoline vehicles are at a standstill because of the scarcity of gasoline. The railroad is now operated between Manila—San Fernando and Manila—Laguna.

(9) Currency.—Japanese Army of Occupation money circulates freely, and is exchanged at a par with the peso. In some regions, the circulation of any currency with the exception of Army of Occupation notes is prohibited, but in Manila. Philippine Government notes and Dollar bills are also allowed to circulate. All other money of Japanese-occupied territory, such as China and French Indo-China, and the yen of Japan proper, is completely prohibited. All the bullion at the Philippine Treasury has been reported transferred to the Yokohama Specie Bank.

(10) Civil Government.—Civil government under the direct supervision of the Comander in Chief of the Japanese Army of Occupation continues to function under the leadership of Jorge Vargas. The authority of this group is naturally limited to Japanese-controlled areas, only approximately one-third of the Philippines. With him in the civil government are practically all of the former leaders of the Commonwealth regime and all important bureaus like the Post Office, Plant Industry, and Health are functioning with their former directors and employees. Salaries of all government employees have been drastically cut.

E. Outgoing Supplies.—There has been considerable information obtained which indicated that the enemy is shipping out of the Philippines large quantities of foodstuffs, particularly rice, also motor transportation and other needed war supplies. The main shipping points from the Island of Luzon appear to be the Lingayen Gulf area, Nueva, T,abac, Province, and Lagsap and Balde Bay.

C. Buried Ammunition and Equipment.—Buried Japanese equipment and ammunition is often marked as a grave. Considerable quantities of ammunition and weapons were found so marked in Bataan.

(11)
IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.—Information obtained during this period substantiates previous statements to the effect that the Japanese think only of the offensive and seek to avoid the defensive whenever possible. While enemy infiltrations are made with the clearest camouflage and concealment, troop and supply columns often proceed carelessly, uncamouflaged, and poorly dispersed well within range of our artillery fire. Similarly enemy aircraft are often found on the ground poorly camouflaged and dispersed. Individual Japanese soldiers are rugged, aggressive, and resist tenaciously. Whenever the enemy soldier stops his advance he immediately digs in, makes use of any existing cover, and prepares his own position for “all around defense.”