AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

PhibGrp12/A16-3
Serial: C4397

C-O-W-F-I-D-I-E-T-I-A-L

From: Commander Amphibious Group TWELVE, (Commander Task Force 3.9-TWELVE).
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of the Occupation of the TOKYO BAY Area, 18 August - 1 October 1945.

References:
(a) CTF 32 (ComTHIRDPhibFor) Serial 734 6f 23 August 1945.
(b) CTF 32 (ComTHIRDPhibFor) Plain Language Dispatch 280702 August 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Commander Amphibious Group TWELVE (CTF 33) Report of the Occupation of the TOKYO BAY Area, 18 August - 1 October 1945.

1. Reference (a) directed that no ship or unit under the command of Commander Task Force 32 submit an action report covering the period of time while under his command unless the ship or unit was actually attacked by or engaged with units of the Japanese Military Forces. Reference (b) directed Commander Task Force 33 and certain other commands to submit a brief operational report without chronological record. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith in compliance with reference (b).
PhibGrp12/Al6-3
Serial: 4397

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Subject: Report of the Occupation of the TOKYO BAY Area, 16 August - 1 October 1945.

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T. B. Laird, Jr.,
Lieutenant, USNR,
Flag Secretary.
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA,
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

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AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA,
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART I - INTRODUCTION

Section (a) - Scope of this Report

This report covers the operations of TASK FORCE THIRTY-THREE from 18 August 1945, at which time Rear Admiral J. L. HALL, Jr., USN, Commander Amphibious Group T.W.E.L.V.E., was designated to command a Task Force of the THIRD Amphibious Force to transport and land the ELEVENTH U. S. Army Corps in the TOKYO BAY area until 1 October 1945, when Rear Admiral HALL was relieved of his duties as Commander Task Force THIRTY-THREE and departed the TOKYO BAY area.

Section (b) - Organization of Task Force THIRTY-THREE

1. TASK FORCE THIRTY-THREE was originally composed of the following Task Groups:

(a) Force Flagship - HANSFORD - Commander LYNCH, USN.

(b) 33.1 Transport Group ABLE (TransRon 16 (Temp)) plus TransDiv 65 (Temp) - Commodore McGOVERN, USN
   20 APAs, 9 AKAs

(c) 33.2 Rear Echelon, TOKYO Force - Rear Admiral STRUBLE, USN

33.3 Transport Group BAKER (TransRon 13) (Temp) - Commodore CARLSON, USN
   15 APAs, 6 AKAs, 1 APH, 1 LSV

33.4 Transport Group CHARLIE (TransRon 24 (Temp) - Commodore SHORT, USN
   14 APAs, 6 AKAs

33.11 - 33.19 as assigned by Commander Rear Echelon, TOKYO Force.

251 LSTs, 155 LST(s)

Combat Loading Team THREE - Major PAPURCA, USMC

Turn-around shipping as assigned.

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Occupation Report - TOKYO BAY - Part (I) - Introduction

(d) Beach Party Group - Captain COLEMAN, USNR

Amphibious Group TWELVE Beach Battalion
Beach Parties of Transport Groups Able, Baker, and Charlie

(e) LCT and Pontoon Barge Group - Commander HUSBAND, CEC, USN

35 LCTs, 40 - 3x12 Pontoon Barges

(f) Pontoon Causeway Group - Commander HUSBAND, CEC, USN

16 - 2x60 Pontoon Causeways

(g) Underwater Demolition Group - Captain McLAUGHLIN, USN

8 APD, 8 UDT

2. Upon the detachment of Rear Admiral A. D. STRUBLE, USN, as Commander Amphibious Group Nine and Commander Task Group 33.2, Captain P. J. ECKHOF, Chief of Staff to Commander Amphibious Group Nine, was designated Commander Task Group 33.2 on 28 August 1945; and Transport Groups Baker and Charlie, Task Groups 33.3 and 33.4 respectively, were removed from Task Group 33.2 and placed under the direct command of Commander Task Force 33. At this time Task Groups 33.11 to 33.19 were deleted because of change in FaG 70-B which reduced number of Task Groups available for assignment. Because of changes in loading requirements and ship availability, final composition of Transport Groups Baker and Charlie varied slightly from original allocation. As finally constituted, Transport Group Baker consisted of 15 APAs, 6 AKAs, and 1 AP; Transport Group Charlie of 14 APAs, 7 AKAs, and 1 AP. Appendix I to this report lists all ships ultimately employed by CTF 33.

3. Since the docks of YOKOHAMA were found to be in excellent condition, extensive LCT, pontoon barge, and pontoon causeway operations were found unnecessary. Commander HUSBAND, CEC, USN, was retained for overall coordination of pontoon barge and causeway operations in the areas under the command of CTF 33 and CTF 34, and on 10 September Lieutenant Commander LEWIS, USNR, (ComLCTF16) was designated CTG 33.6.

4. The escort of Task Group 33.1 during its movement to the objective was designated Task Group 33.20 until 291200/1 August, at which time its designation was changed to Task Unit 33.9.1. A total of 5 DDs, 2 APs, 1 PCF, and 5 PCs were employed during the movement, escort units joining at various times. Composition of the escort at particular times is given in Narrative of the Movement to the Objective, Section (B) of Part II of this report.
Section (C) - Synopsis of the Operation

1. Task Force THIRTY-THREE was assigned the task by CTF 32 of loading, transporting, and landing in the TOKYO BAY area elements of the XI Corps, EIGHTH Army, and attached units including elements of GHQ, US. COR "CH", Far East Air Force, and XIV Corps troops destined for the XI Corps occupation area, in order to assist in the occupation of the JAPANESE EMPIRE after the capitulation of the enemy on 15 August 1945.

2. The limited amount of shipping available required that the movement be made by echelons. The first echelon, Task Group 33.1, Transport Group ASLE, composed of Transport Squadron SIXTEEN (Temporary), lifting the 1st Cavalry Division, and Transport Division SIXTY-FIVE (Temporary), lifting the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, departed BATAAN 25 August, put into SUGIC BAY on 26 August when the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers postponed events two days, departed SUGIC BAY 27 August, and arrived off YOKOHAMA Harbor on 2 September. Movement to the objective was executed under the tactical command of CTF 33 with CTF 32 in company and controlling air cover furnished during the latter part of the movement. Regimental troops of the 1st Cavalry Division were unloaded by boat. Transports were brought in alongside YOKOHAMA docks and expeditiously unloaded, unloading being completed on 4 September. On 3 September TransDiv 65 proceeded to T. TSUINO and disembarked the 112th RCT, completing unloading on 4 September.

3. CTF 33.2 sailed from the Philippines succeeding echelons of TF 33 as additional shipping became available. Port Director OKINAWA was the sailing authority for LSTs loading elements of the Far Eastern Air Force in OKINAWA. All shipping of THIRD Amphibious Force departing TOKYO BAY was sailed by Commander THIRD Amphibious Force except during his absence from TOKYO BAY from 21 - 29 September, during which period he delegated this responsibility to CTF 33.

4. Transport Group BAKER (Transport Squadron THIRTEEN (Temporary)), lifting the Americal Division, departed CEBU 1 September, arrived YOKOHAMA 8 September, and completed unloading on 10 September.

5. The first LST convoy, TU 99.6.75, consisting of 6 LSTs carrying units of Far East Air Force from OKINAWA, arrived YOKOHAMA 8 September and completed unloading on 10 September. The first LSM convoy, TU 33.11.2, consisting of 34 LSIs, sailed from MANILA on 2 September after a three-day delay due to typhoon along the track, arrived YOKOHAMA 9 September, and completed unloading on 11 September. A total of 9 LST convoys and 4 LSM convoys, consisting of 200 LSTs and 108 LSIs arrived YOKOHAMA during the period of this report. These convoys represented only 187 LSTs and 108 LSIs as 13 LSTs made turnaround trips.
6. Transport Group CHARLIE (Transport Squadron TWENTY-FOUR (Temporary)), lifting the 43rd Infantry Division, departed MANILA 7 September, arrived YOKOHAMA on 13 September, and completed unloading on 16 September.

7. YOKOHAMA docks were found to be in excellent condition, and all cargo from transports (except for a few vehicles unloaded on 2 September) was unloaded rapidly direct to the pier from ships alongside. Suitable areas for the simultaneous beaching of about 25 LSTs or 40 LSMs were located in the harbor area and improved. Existing navigational aids were repaired, and additional aids installed. Some cargo and equipment was unloaded from merchant and Army shipping by means of lighters, but because of the amount of dock space available in relation to the cargo to be unloaded, lighterage did not play a substantial part in unloading operations. Army personnel and equipment for unloading, furnished by the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade until 22 September and thereafter by Army Service Command "C", were adequate for the task.

8. No opposition from the Japanese was experienced during the operation. Japanese pilots and tugs were used in YOKOHAMA Harbor; harbor personnel encountered appeared conscious of their defeat, submissive, and completely cooperative.

9. At 0800/1 on 1 September Rear Admiral J. L. WAI, Jr., USN, was relieved of his duties as Commander TASK FORCE THIRTY-THREE by Commodore P. P. POWELL, USN, and departed the TOKYO BAY area. At the time of his departure, Amphibious Force shipping assigned to TF 33 had unloaded at YOKOHAMA and at TATSUMI a total of 91,039 personnel, 16,413 vehicles, and 123,327 short tons of cargo including vehicles.
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AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART II - NARRATIVE OF THE OCCUPATION

(Note: All times in the report are Zone Minus Nine (ZM) unless otherwise specified.)

Section (a) - Planning and Preparation

1. On 15 August 1945, when the Japanese Government declared its acceptance of the surrender terms of the United Nations as set forth in the Potsdam Declaration, Commander Amphibious Group TWELVE was engaged in a program of refresher training of Army divisions in the Philippines for use in assault operations against Japan and was planned under Commander THIRD Amphibious Force for these operations. The liaison already established with Commander THIRD Amphibious Force proved to be most helpful in the necessarily rapid planning for the occupation. The Joint Staff Study of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Oceans Areas, for the occupation of Japan was received 18 August. On this date Commander THIRD Amphibious Force designated Commander Amphibious Group TWELVE to command a Task Force of the THIRD Amphibious Force to transport and land the XI U.S. Army Corps, and passed operational control of Transport Squadron SIXTEEN and Transport Division 65 to him. A target date of 1 September was set, which would necessitate departure on 25 August from B.T.M.G.A.S., where the 12th Cavalry Division and the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team were to be loaded. Transon 16 and Transon 65 were immediately ordered to B.T.M.G.A.S. In order that loading and planning could begin without delay, ComTranson 16 was directed to prepare plans for landing the 1st Cavalry Division and XI Corps troops over docks if available in the TOKYO area - YOKOSUKA areas (Preferred Plan) or over the OISHO and SHIMA beaches in SACHI J YOUR (Alternate Plan). ComTranson 65 was directed to prepare plans for landing the 112th Cavalry RCT over beaches in T.T.M. K. area. All loading in B.T.M.G.A.S was placed under the command of ComTranson 16. Loading began on 19 August. 2 APA's and 4 AKAs were in addition ordered to B.N.M.I. to load elements of XI Corps and CH, APP.C, which were to move with first echelon. Some concern was felt concerning the ability of ships to meet the admittedly tight loading schedule, particularly for ships loading at M.N.I., but by diligent efforts and full cooperation from Army authorities all ships completed loading in time to sail.

2. Because of the short time available for planning and the lack of definite information concerning the availability of shipping and certain other factors, it was necessary that planning proceed on several echelons simultaneously without waiting for completed plans of the next higher echelon. Daily courier service was inaugurated between M.N.I. and B.T.M.G.A.S, and
Occupation Report - TOKYO BAY - Part (II) - Narrative of the Operation

by full exchange of information and intentions, including liberal use of "rough drafts", planning was satisfactorily completed, ComPhibGrp 12 Op-
eration Plan No. A1219-45 being issued on 23 August, the day of receipt
Order No. A17-45 was issued on 24 August.

Section (b) - Movement to the Objective

1. Transport Group ABLE less TransDiv 16 (Temp) escorted by
BURKE, JOHN Q. ROBERTS, PCE 877, and PCs 466, 549, 1177, 1180, and 1230
commenced sortie from BATANGAS at 0630 on 25 August under the tactical
command of ComTransRon 16. At 1000 CTF 33 assumed tactical command of
the formation at point Lat. 13-35.5N, Long. 120-52E and set formation
speed at 12 knots, the planned speed for movement to the objective.
Route was to lie through the following points:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latitude (N)</th>
<th>Longitude (E)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>34-26</td>
<td>139-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34-50-30</td>
<td>139-28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Noon position on 25 August was Lat. 13-42N, Long. 120-39E.
At 1531 Com3rdPhibFor in MT OLYMPUS accompanied by TransDiv 16 (Temp),
consisting of SKAGIT, BOTETOURT, TODD, GASCONADE, LIBRA, and SIRONA,
rendezvoused with the formation off the entrance to MANILA.

3. In the early evening of 25 August a message was received
from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that all events were
to be postponed two days because of typhoon conditions. CTF 33 rec-
ommended that the convoy be diverted to enter SUBIC BAY. Recomma-
dation was approved, course was reversed, and the convoy entered SUBIC
4. On 27 August HILARY P. JONES reported for duty and was directed to replenish and join screen. Sortie from SUBIC BAY was begun at 0900 on 27 August with arrival in TOKYO BAY planned for 3 September. Upon receipt of information in early evening of 27 August that an arrival prior to 3 September was desired, it appeared that, barring bad weather, the convoy could arrive TOKYO BAY on 2 September, the day set for the surrender ceremony on the U.S.S. MISSOURI if speed of 13.5 knots was used most of the voyage and certain planned exercises were eliminated.

5. Prior dawn 28 August Dudley B. Smith, Pfc, was lost overboard from L.W.C.A but was picked up by BURKE. Investigation disclosed the man as a psychotic case. At 0630 rendezvous was made with ComDesRon 7 in BENCSON accompanied by KNOX, MACDONALD, and CHARLES P. HUGHES. ComDesRon 7 was placed in command of the screen, and FFS 549, 1177, 1180, and 1230 were detached to return to MANILA and report to CTF 33.2. Noon position 28 August was Lat. 18-59N, Long. 120-21E. Destroyers which had joined were refueled during the afternoon.

6. Noon position on 29 August was Lat. 22-12N, Long. 125-02E. At 1600 S.LAMANA escorted by ComSurtDiv 70 in WILLIAM J. SEVERLING with ULYSSES M. MOORE, KENNETH C. CAMPBELL, and GOSS, closed the formation to report to CTF 32, under whose direction S.LAMANA furnished air cover for the remainder of the voyage.

7. At dawn on 30 August JOHN F. ROBERTS was detached to proceed to BUCKNER BAY, OKINAWA, to embark Port Director Unit for transportation to TOKYO BAY. Noon positions for remainder of voyage were as follows:

<table>
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<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>129-26E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August</td>
<td>29-30N</td>
<td>133-59E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>32-54N</td>
<td>138-36E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Prior to dusk 1 September ships were formed into single column in order to negotiate the 800-meter swept channel into TOKYO BAY. Navigation of channel was during daylight, and little difficulty was experienced in staying within limits, although the column extended some nine miles. As the formation proceeded up the Bay on the morning of 2 September, hundreds of Army B-29s and Navy fighter and bomber planes flew overhead. The U.S.S. MISSOURI, on which the surrender ceremony was in progress, was passed to starboard with many units of the THIRD FLEET anchored in the vicinity. At 0915 2 September the column arrived off YOKOHAMA, and ships began anchoring in previously assigned anchorages outside the breakwater.
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Occupation Report - TOKYO BAY - Part (II) - Narrative of the Operation

Section (C) - Operations at the Objective

1. On 29 August as Transport Group ABLE was enroute to objective, Commander THIRD Fleet had advised that the 11th Airborne Division would clear docks and necessary landing areas at YOKOHAMA for use by the 1st Cavalry Division and that the T.T.M.A.N. area would be reconnoitered on 1 September by one underwater demolition team and by a detachment of the 4th Marine Regiment, detachment to remain in the area until the landing of the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team was complete.

2. Beachmaster THIRD Amphibious Force and Beachmaster Amphibious Group T.T.M.A.N. had proceeded by air to YOKOHAMA with the 11th Airborne Division to make waterfront reconnaissance and necessary arrangements in advance of the arrival of the first transport group. By radio they confirmed intelligence reports that berths for approximately 12 ships of transport type were available alongside YOKOHAMA docks. Upon arrival of Transport Group ABLE at 0915, 2 September, Beachmaster Amphibious Group T.T.M.A.N. boarded the HANFORD and the OSCOR with one of the senior Japanese harbor pilots and furnished additional detailed hydrographic information. In order to avoid possible interference with four destroyers which were bringing personnel to and from the MISSOURI for the surrender ceremony, transports were not at once brought alongside the docks, assault troops were, however, hoisted immediately upon anchoring of the transports, and a line of departure was established at the entrance of the inner breakwater. From this line of departure, waves were dispatched at 5-minute intervals to general landing areas previously designated from information contained in intelligence reports. Particular landing points were designated by the reconnaissance parties led by the transport division beachmasters. The landing proceeded rapidly, and by 1310 all assault troops had been put ashore. At 1145 the first transports began movement to the berths alongside the docks. Japanese pilots and tugs were available and were employed as a matter of convenience and of making full use of enemy facilities. A small number of high priority vehicles for XI Corps use were unloaded by LCIs from ships in the stream. The great bulk of vehicles and cargo, however, was unloaded expeditiously direct to docks, unloading being completed on 4 September. At 0930, 4 September, Commanding General, XI Corps, landed and assumed command of his forces.

3. At 0430 3 September TransDiv 65 got underway from anchorages of outer breakwater YOKOHAMA, proceeded T.T.M.A.N., and began landing 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team at 0930. Landing of combat troops was completed by 1100. Cargo was landed over the seaplane ramp at the T.T.M.A.N. Naval Air Station, as exits from the beaches proved poor. Discharge of cargo was completed on 4 September.

4. Upon completion of unloading, TransRon 16 and TransDiv 65 were returned to control of Commander THIRD Amphibious Force and were sailed by him to fill other commitments, TransRon 16 being assigned to FIFTH Amphibious Force and TransDiv 65 to SEVENTH Amphibious Force.
5. The undamaged condition of the YOKOHAMA docks made unnecessary the use of beaches in SHIKOKU W.N. Transport Squadron 13 and 24 unloaded the Ameical and 43rd Divisions over YOKOHAMA docks as previously narrated in Section C, Synopsis of the Operation, Part I of this report.

6. Reconnaissance of YOKOHAMA Harbor disclosed a number of areas suitable for the beaching of LSTs and LSMs. Of these areas TAKASHIMA Pier and a portion of the west bank of the TSURUMI W.N. were selected for development. Naval Underwater Demolition Personnel and Army engineers blasted the corner from a projecting underwater ledge to permit LSTs to approach with safety. Piles were driven into the earth to permit lines to be secured. LCIIs and bulldozers were made available to assist landing ships in beaching. In the confined waters of the TSURUMI W.N. they proved of particular value in helping landing ships make the somewhat awkward turn into the west bank.

7. Hydrographic survey disclosed that on the outer breakwater only a portion of the work marked as "under construction" on the standard Hydrographic Charts had been performed. Off the mouth of the TSURUMI W.N. an opening ample for the passage of landing ships was discovered, and landing ship anchorage areas were established inside the outer breakwater and near the mouth of TSURUMI W.N. These areas were conveniently located to the beaching area on the west bank of the TSURUMI W.N. and were extensively used by LSMs.

8. All convoys containing ships assigned to THIRD Amphibious Force were not off the entrance to TOKYO BAY by PC or FCE of TF 33, and anchorage charts of TOKYO BAY, Harbor Charts of YOKOHAMA, SOP Instructions, YOKOHAMA Port Instructions, and berthing assignments were furnished them. After the ships had anchored, the flagship of the convoy commander was boarded by a party containing representatives of Base Master TF 33, and the Army Port Command. Unloading priorities were determined, and a docking or beaching schedule arranged. In a few instances, where priority was considered unimportant and ample space was available at docks and beaching areas, transports and landing ships were brought directly in to docks or beaching points without a stop in the outer anchorages.

9. In addition to Amphibious Force shipping, a considerable amount of Army and merchant shipping was unloaded in the Port of YOKOHAMA. This amount was rapidly rising at the time of departure of CTF 33 from the area. The Army Port Commander was responsible for the unloading of Army and merchant shipping, but CTF 33 was responsible for its berthing and local movement. Commander THIRD Fleet on 31 September assigned most of the BuKRR berths (anchorage Chart C.C-1 and C.C-2) and blocks in CHARLIE and FOX anchorages to CTF 32, who delegated to CTF 33 the responsibility for specific
assignments. On 10 September this assignment was changed to include all of BANKE and CHARLIE anchorages. Until the establishment of Port Director, YOKOSUKA, on 18 September, Commander THIRD Fleet directed inbound army and merchant shipping to proceed to YOKOHAMA and report to CTF 33 for disposition to meet Army requirements. Then the shipping was unloaded and ready for sea, CTF 33 advised Commander THIRD Fleet of its desired destination and of any space available in excess of Army requirements. CTF 33 then directed the army and merchant shipping to report to Commander THIRD Fleet for routing instructions. Port Director YOKOSUKA, after his establishment on 18 September, performed the functions in this procedure previously performed by Commander THIRD Fleet.

10. Typhoons were prevalent during the month of September, necessitating numerous delays in sailing and diversions of convoys. Commander THIRD Amphibious Force exercised direct operational control over THIRD Amphibious Force shipping north of 20° North Latitude during periods of typhoon weather, Commander PHILIPPINES Sea Frontier being responsible for shipping south of that line. Only one typhoon passed near enough to TOKYO BAY during the month of September to interfere with unloading operations at YOKOHAMA. This typhoon passed 150 miles N of TOKYO at 0900 18 September. Maximum wind experienced in TOKYO BAY was 57 knots from 130° at 0610 18 September. Maximum gusts were 76 knots.

11. All LSTs had been retracted from the beach on the preceding evening. Transports and LSTs were instructed to anchor in berths in the cutter anchorages to insure sufficient sea room and were to steam to their anchors. LSTs were grouped in a protected basin. PC, SC, and LCI types were secured alongside docks or at mooring buoys in the inner harbor. It had been planned that LSMs would be moored in the inner harbor, but TU 33.2.6, consisting of 24 LSMs, arrived YOKOHAMA during the early evening 17 September, and it was considered advisable to hold these ships in outer anchorages rather than that they attempt to enter the restricted waters of the inner harbor and secure during darkness with a strong wind and sea. Two tugs were obtained from Commander Service Division 102 for emergency use.

12. Shortly after dawn 18 September LSTs 801, 886, and 929 parted their anchor chains, LST 929 broaching against the sea wall and sustaining damage from contact with the sea wall and with LST 886, which was driven down upon her. LSM 24, LST 713, and . . . (.KIA 22), while maneuvering to seek safer berths, collided with LST 1010, LST 47, and LST 379 respectively. Damage, which is detailed in Part III of this report, was minor. The merchant tanker DONNER LKE, anchored between inner and cutter breakwaters dragged and went aground, but sustained no damage. The small Japanese harbor tugs proved useful in pulling LSTs 886 and 929 off the sea wall, as the deep draft of the larger fleet tugs prevented their close approach. The fleet tugs successfully refloated the S.S. DONNER LKE. By early afternoon 18 September weather had moderated sufficiently to permit resumption of unloading
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA,
16 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART III - DAMAGE

1. Ships of TF 33 suffered no battle damage during the operation, but at 1100 on 10 September LST 936, while enroute to TOKYO, at position Lat. 24-03N, Long. 126-20E, sustained a severe internal explosion in the shipfitter’s locker, starboard side forward, followed by fire. Cause of the explosion was later determined to be an acetylene tank, stowed contrary to instructions in this space. In the rough seas, the tank broke loose and exploded. Personal casualties were 1 killed, 1 missing, and 4 wounded. Three compartments and several tanks ruptured. Tank deck flooded to over six feet, but flooding was brought under control at 1700, and ship and escort were dispatched to BUCKNER BAY, OKINAWA. Convoy Commander requested CONVOY, OKINAWA to repair the ship and hold a board of investigation, proceeding to be forwarded by administrative channels.

2. During the heavy weather of the morning of 18 September in TOKYO BAY, in which winds reached 57 knots with gusts to 76 knots, ships sustained damage as follows:

(a) LST 801 lost bow anchor and 80 fathoms of chain.

(b) LST 886 lost bow anchor and 50 fathoms of chain, and port screw and shaft were damaged when ship was driven against the sea wall.

(c) LST 929 lost bow anchor and 20 fathoms of chain and was driven against the sea wall. The pounding of the starboard side of the ship against the sea wall resulted in damage as follows: frames 9 to 38 bent inward from 1 to 5 inches from approximately 4 feet above 3rd deck level to 3 feet below, deck and hull plating ripped and bent, three ballast tanks holed, and starboard propeller damaged. When the bow of LST 886 struck the port side of LST 929, the latter ship sustained additional damage, main deck frames 23 and 30 and hull and deck plating being bent inward 6 inches and the after arm of the Melin boat davit bent, prohibiting lowering of the boat.

(d) LST 24 struck LST 1010, opening a 3 by 6 foot hole in the latter.

(e) LST 713 collided with LST 47, opening two holes in starboard door of LST 47 each 2 feet square, and denting LST 713.
(f) ATHENE (AKA 22) collided with LST 379. ATHENE had one LCVP crushed and sunk, after port winch davit rendered inoperative, upper deck frames 111 to 119, and 140 to 142 port side ruptured, main deck frames 111 to 116 port side ruptured, and a hole made in hull from frame 112 to 115 seven feet above water line. LST 379 lost bow anchor and some chain.
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA.
16 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

Section (A) - Intelligence Report

1. The short time available between the Japanese surrender and the sailing date of the first transport convoy did not permit the procurement, preparation, and distribution of as much intelligence as would have been necessary for an assault operation. Intelligence available was, however, adequate for occupation requirements of this command, as coast defenses were to be inspected by advance forces to insure their deactivation.

2. Since space and reproduction facilities on U.S.S. HANSFORD were very limited, Commander THIRD Amphibious Force assumed responsibility for the printing and distribution of special charts and other material. Members of the intelligence section of the staff of CTF 33 furnished assistance in interpretation of existing photo coverage of YOKOHAMA, TATEMA, and SAGAMI BAY and in the preparation of beach sketches for SAGAMI BAY. Prior to the completion of these sketches, the decision was reached, however, to confine study to YOKOHAMA.

3. Information contained in the ONI report "Port of YOKOHAMA"—OP-16-FB-57-45 of May 1945 was found to be quite accurate. Additional surveys had to be made on the spot, however, to determine the best beaching points for LSTs and LSMs. Special surveys were made of submarine building facilities in the yard of YOKOHAMA Dock Company and of beaches and harbor facilities at CHOSHUI and KATASURA, the latter survey being undertaken at the request of CG XI Corps, who was interested in the possibilities of loading Japanese ammunition at this point for dumping at sea. Loading was found to be feasible, although the unstable nature of the ammunition made undesirable the use of naval craft for the purpose.

4. As the majority of ships entering the anchorage had not previously received copies of CinCPac-CinCPA Anchorage Chart C.C-2, a reproduction was prepared and issued. In addition a special harbor chart of YOKOHAMA giving names and designation of docks and landing points and showing the landing ship channel into TSURUMI KAN, and the adjacent landing ship anchorages was prepared jointly with Commander THIRD Amphibious Force and Commanding General 2nd Engineer Special Brigade and distributed to incoming ships by this command. This harbor chart provided a common designation of docks and landing points and proved most useful.
Communication Plans were based on FAC 70-B and in general were excellent. The use of a frequency channel chart was very helpful.

Using an AFA for a flagship proved unsatisfactory as the lack of adequate facilities made communications difficult. If it had not been for the fact that the MT. OLYMPUS accompanied the HANSFORD, it would have been impossible to maintain the minimum number of required circuits. Adequate flag communications must be provided to insure the success of an operation.

The existing arrangements for the distribution of registered publications in the forward areas are not satisfactory. Changes to publications, placed in effect just prior to and especially during the operation, do not receive full distribution, with confusion resulting, especially when voice calls have been changed.

The usual difficulty was experienced in communicating with merchant ships, both by voice radio and visual means. It is again recommended that merchant ships in naval operations be furnished with Navy communication teams and that these teams be required to handle all communications for the ship.
CONFIDENTIAL

ALPHABIC GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA,
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

Section (C) - Unloading Report

1. During the month of September shipping of TF 33 was unloaded in
TOKYO Bay Area as shown in the following table:

A - Total number personnel landed
B - Total number of vehicles landed
C - Total number of short tons of cargo (including vehicles)
    landed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TU</th>
<th>COMPOSITION</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>UNLOADING DATES</th>
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<td>33.4</td>
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<td>1,990</td>
<td>12,567</td>
<td>13 - 15</td>
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<td>274</td>
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<td>99.683</td>
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<td>742</td>
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<td>1,536</td>
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<td>14,116</td>
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<td>27,070</td>
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<td>1,938</td>
<td>6,593</td>
<td>17 - 22</td>
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<td>1,600</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>53.6.46</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>26 - 27</td>
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<tr>
<td>33.27</td>
<td>ComLSTFlot6 -40 LST</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>6,258</td>
<td>28 - 29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|       | (Unloading not com-
    pleted on 1 October) | | | | |
| 33.112|ComLSTFlot3 -32 LSN | 3,360   | 582     | 3,769              | 9 - 11          |
| 33.24 | ComLSTFlot1 -32 LSN | 974     | 557     | 4,821              | 12              |
| 33.26 | ComLSTFlot6 -825 LSN | 55     | 25      | 227                | 19              |
| 33.28 | ComLSTFlot14 -18 LSN | 640     | 235     | 1,581              | 27 - 28         |
|       | TOTALS           | 91,039  | 16,413  | 123,327            |                 |

* 2 LSM unloaded at YOKOHAMA; balance at SENDAI.

2. Average loads carried by ships of TF 33 which completed unloading
at TAKAYAMA or YOKOHAMA prior departure of CTF 33 from the area were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>SHORT TONS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>1198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM</td>
<td>59</td>
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AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA.
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

Section (D) - Lighterage, Boat Pool, and Pontoon Operations

1. The 2nd Engineer Special Brigade originally desired to move 448 LCUs, 40 LCVPs, and 24 J-Boats from the Philippines to TOKYO BAY. The fact that YOKOHAMA docks were virtually undamaged reduced lighterage requirements greatly. Transon 16 (plus Transfer 65), Transon 13, and Transon 24 lifted the following Army boats to TOKYO BAY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transon</th>
<th>ENSR</th>
<th>LCU</th>
<th>LOVF</th>
<th>J-Boat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 (Plus TD 65)</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>68</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 12 Navy LCUs were transferred to 2nd ESB at YOKOHAMA. On 10 September CG 2nd ESB advised that no further transfer of Navy LCUs were desired because of ample craft on hand and limited needs for lighterage. CG EIGHTH Army on 14 September cancelled further lifts of 2nd ESB units to the objective.

2. It was originally planned that as many as 35 LCTs would be retained in the YOKOHAMA area to assist in unloading. 3 LCTs were launched on 10 September, and additional LCTs were launched on 13 and 17 September to raise the total number launched to 22. It had been planned that 11 of these LCTs would be sailed to northern KYUSHU under their own power, but this movement was cancelled. At the time of departure of CTF 33 from TOKYO, 11 LCTs had been assigned to assist ConsServDiv 102 at YOKOHAMA, where they proved useful in delivery of freight and stores and in providing transportation for large liberty parties. LCTs at YOKOHAMA assisted the Army Fort Commander in the unloading of five merchant ships. The limited use of LCTs in YOKOHAMA was due to the greater ease and economy in man-power of unloading direct to the dock rather than into lighters with the necessity of relashing at the shore. It is the opinion of the Task Force Commander, however, that if necessary the capacity of the Port of YOKOHAMA could be raised to 20,000 D.T. or more a day, as compared with its present practicable maximum of 10,000 D.T. a day, by the more extensive use of lighterage. Many areas in the northern part of the harbor between inner and outer breakwaters are suitable for the use of lighters. Increase in tonnage would be purchased, however, by a considerable increase in craft and number of men engaged in unloading operations.

3. A total of 16 3x12 pontoon barges were launched in the YOKOHAMA area. Of these, 7 were sent forward to northern KYUSHU by LSD, and the
remainder were transferred to U. S. Army Service Command "C". In the
weather conditions existing in Japan, Pontoon barges are considered in-
ferior to LCIs for lighterage.

4. No boat pool was established in YOKOHAMA, as boat service for
units requiring could be provided from other ships in the anchorage. From
Amphibious Force shipping, however, 30 LCVPs, 3 LCP(L)s, and 1 plane personnel
boat were transferred to ComServDiv 102, and 6 LCVPs to Port Director,
YOKOHAMA.

5. The excellent condition of YOKOHAMA docks precluded the need
for pontoon causeway operations, 1 2x60 pontoon causeway was installed
as a fleet landing stage, and 7 2x60 pontoon causeways were transferred
to U. S. ASCC. "C" for use as dumb barges, floating storage, and for
breaking up to provide fuel and water storage for units ashore.
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA,
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

Section (a) - Medical Report

1. As the landing was made unopposed, the problem of casualty evacuation did not arise.

2. All water was chlorinated, and the use of salt water for washing down decks was forbidden.

3. D.D.T. powder was required to be carried on all ships in sufficient quantity. Unfortunately not enough was available, so that some ships were totally without D.D.T. Although no disease developed, considerable discomfort was experienced on many ships because of the presence of fleas.

4. During the period of stay in this area there were no disease outbreaks of importance. The only diseases were:

   (1) Catarrhal Fever, which was prevalent and of the "Grippe" type, causing some incapacitation among the personnel.

   (2) Venereal Diseases, which were extremely prevalent. Syphilis, Chancroid, and Gonorrhea abounded, and it was felt that this might become a major problem if definite steps to control these diseases were not taken.
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA,
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

Section (F) - Logistics

1. Logistic support in the TOKYO BAY area was provided by Commander Service Division 102. In order to conserve supplies at the objective, no issues of stores or provisions were made to vessels returning to rear areas except as required for return passage. Transports returning to the rear areas provisioned their escorts, several cruisers which were to remain in the area, and until the arrival of YCLO (AFB-43) on 16 September, also provisioned FCs, SCs, LCIs, and LCTs remaining at the objective. Transfers of clothing and small stores and ships store stock were frozen until completion of processing of Allied prisoners of war.

2. The material condition of transports was generally excellent, and they required little maintenance other than by ship's force. The material condition of LSTs and LSMs was less satisfactory, as many had been operating from six to ten months with only a bare minimum of time for maintenance. In order to reduce the load on repair facilities at the objective, CTF 33 screened work requests and only those required for seaworthiness or those which would require only a minimum of time and assistance and which would not delay sailing were passed on to ComSerDiv 102. The heavy seas encountered by a number of convoys in their passage resulted in split seams and leaking seams in a number of vessels and in other requirements for repairs which would probably not have been necessary if voyages could have been made in a more favorable season of the year. LSMs appeared somewhat more "brittle" in this respect than LSTs. In general, however, the performance of all types under existing operating conditions was considered excellent and a tribute to the soundness of design and engineering practice in the U. S. Navy. Some repairs were delayed by a lack of spare parts.
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP T LVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA,
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. Performance of personnel was excellent. In spite of the short time permitted for planning, the operation was executed without a hitch and furnished abundant evidence of the high state of training reached by personnel of the Amphibious Force.

2. All hands received a certain psychological lift from the victorious conclusion of the long war against the Japanese. This psychological lift improved efficiency and counteracted certain slight traces of war weariness which could be seen in some personnel, both officer and enlisted, in the summer of 1945. Morale was at all times good, however, and such traces of war weariness as could be seen were the almost inevitable result of long periods of duty—generally similar duty—in the forward areas with little opportunity for leave or recreation.
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA.
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

PART VI - COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The occupation of JAPAN proceeded smoothly in spite of the short time available for planning and the wide dispersion of shipping. In some degree U.S. Forces benefited from the delay introduced after surrender by typhoon conditions and by the Japanese delay in completing formal arrangements. Credit for the rapid planning, loading, and orderly disembarkation of occupation forces is believed due, however, to the high state of training which had been attained by Amphibious Forces and by the embarked units. Both military and naval forces were well seasoned by previous amphibious operations. It is conceivable, however, that such delay as was acceptable in this instance might not be acceptable in all instances, as in circumstances in which the political situation in the defeated country was confused and delay would permit an opposition party to overthrow the existing government and renew the war or circumstances in which tension existed between victorious allies and early occupation of certain areas was important for political or military reasons. It is recommended that plans for the sudden collapse of an enemy be formulated down through the echelon of Amphibious Group Commanders well in advance of any possible collapse and that the plans be kept revised as necessary.

2. Port Director YOKOHAMA with a few members of his staff arrived in YOKOHAMA shortly before the departure of GTF 33 from the area. The difficulties that lay in the way of rapid organization and equipping of a suddenly increased number of port director units are well understood. These difficulties would be lessened by sufficiently early planning as recommended in paragraph 1. A further consideration in the efficient functioning of Port Director Units is the preservation of unit integrity. It is important that personnel and equipment be kept together and that the whole unit be kept intact in so far as possible. For this purpose a reasonable priority on a single unit of shipping should be granted. When a task force commander must handle a considerable quantity of merchant shipping, the ideal solution is that the Port Director plus key members of his staff proceed to the objective in the flagship of the task force commander, with other members of the Port Director Unit proceeding in a specially fitted LC(FF) which serves as a sub-headquarters for the Port Director at the objective. A few members may be left behind to accompany heavy camping equipment if the Port Director Unit is to be established ashore. This solution was used by Commander Amphibious Group TWELVE in the OKINAWA Operation and proved most satisfactory. When such a solution is not feasible for some reason, it is recommended that all of the personnel and equipment of the Port Director Unit be loaded on a single LST and proceed as a unit. The early arrival of the Port Director himself with a few staff members is generally of little assistance to the early and efficient functioning of his complete unit. Withdrawal of the more senior personnel frequently increases the difficulties encountered in the assembly and forwarding of remaining personnel and equipment. It is further recommended that complete units generally be assembled in

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AMPHIBIOUS GROUP TWELVE

REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA,
18 AUGUST - 1 OCTOBER 1945

APPENDIX I - DETAILED TASK ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE-THIRTY-THREE

(Note: Organization is as ultimately employed and incorporates all changes. Only LSTs and LSMs which arrived YOKOHAMA prior to departure of CTF 33 are included.)

(a) Force Flagship - HANSFORD - Commander LYNCH, USN

(b) 33.1 Transport Group ABLE (TransRon 16 (Temp) plus TransDiv 65 (Temp) - Commodore McGOVERN, USN

TransRon 16 (Temp) - Commodore McGOVERN, USN

TransDiv 46 (Temp) - Commodore McGOVERN, USN

CECIL (SF), LENAHEE, DEUEL, DARKE, BOSQUE
TOLLAND, LEDEA

2 APA

TransDiv 47 (Temp) - Captain HUTTON

RUTLAND (F), HIGHLANDS, ST. MARY'S, SHERBURNE
YANCEY

4 APA

TransDiv 48 (Temp) - Captain ANDREWS

TALLDEGA (F), MISSOURI, DICKINS, DAUPHIN
HOTSPUR, PARINA

4 APA

TransDiv 16 (Temp) - Captain PARKER

BOTETOURT, GASCONADE
SKAGIT (F), LIBRA, SIRONA, TODD

2 APA

TransDiv 65 (Temp) - Captain ROGERS

LAVACA (F), CLEARFILED, SHERIDAN, CULLUMAN
BRISCOE

5 APA

(c) 33.2 Rear Echelon, TOKYO Force - Captain ECKHOFF, USN

Group Flagship - C.RLIST

ComLSTFLOT 6 - Captain WEINTRAUB, USN, in LC(F) 1060
ComLSTFLOT 14 - Captain SELLY, USN, in LC(F) 425
ComLSTFLOT 25 - Captain RICHTER, USN, in LC(F) 792
ComLSTFLOT 36 - Captain SHEA, USN, in LST 284

(Appendix I) - 1
**LST Hull Numbers**

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<th>Hull Numbers</th>
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<td>17</td>
<td>454 595 707 797 859 947 1101</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>457 605 711 796 869 951 1106</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>474 606 712 799 875 960 1108</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>398</td>
<td>590 697 791 855 938 1072 1109</td>
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ComLSKFlot 1 - Commander TALLAFAHIO, USNR, in LC(F) 369
ComLSKFlot 3 - Commander MARRIOTT, USN, in LC(F) 775
ComLSKFlot 6 - Commander QUINN, USN, in LC(F) 532
ComLSKFlot 14 - Commander McCLELLAN, USN, in LSK 396

**LSK Hull Numbers**

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<td>56 98 142 177 218 255 324 396</td>
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(Appendix I) - 2

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ComPhibGrp2

Occupation Report - TOKYO BAY - Appendix I - Detailed Task Organization of Task Force THIRTY-THREE

Combat Loading Team THREE - Major PAUPER, USMC

(d) 33.5 Beach Party Group - Captain COLEMAN, USNR

Amphibious Group TWELVE Beach Battalion - Capt. COLEMAN, USNR
Beach Company ABLE - Lt. Comdr. SOUTHARD, USNR
Beach Company BAKER - Lt. Comdr. HOUGHTON, USNR

Beach Parties of Transport Groups ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE

(e) 33.6 LCT and Pontoon Barge Group - Lt. Comdr. LEWIS, USNR (ComLCT-Flot 16)

Group Flagship - LC(P) 1031

ComLCT-Flot 31 - Lt. Comdr. DILLEY, USNR, in LC(P) 427

LCT 001, 406, 493, 521, 525, 536, 587, 605, 606, 642, 707, 1002, 1006, 1007, 1009, 1010, 1011, 1217, 1228, 1235, 1288, 1345

22 LCT

Pontoon Barges 525-536, 557-560

16 Pontoon Barges

(f) 33.7 Pontoon Causeway Group - Commander HUSBAND, CEC, USN

8 - 2x60 causeways employed
8 2x60 pontoon causeways

(g) 32.2 THIRD Underwater Demolition Group - Captain McCLAUGHRY

GANTNER (F) - UDT 24
JOSEPH L. AUBIN - UDT 7
W. J. PATTISON - UDT 18
COOK - UDT 20
RISOR - UDT 21
WALTER X. YOUNG - UDT 22
KNUDSON - UDT 25
WALTER B. COBB - UDT 27

(h) 33.3 Transport Group BAKER (TransRon 13 (Temp)) - Commander CARLSON, USN

Group Flagship - HARRIS - Captain BURNS

1 APA

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Occupation Report - TOKYO BAY - Appendix I - Detailed Task Organization of Task Force THIRTY-THREE

TransDiv 53 (Temp) - Captain THORNTON, USN

ROCKBRIDGE (F), KITTSON, NARRO,
INDIAN, NLG-107
WOODFORD, VENANGO

5 APA
2 AKA

TransDiv 51 (Temp) - Captain ALLEN, USN

GOODHUE (F), HYDE, OCONTO, HEYWOOD, BRACKEN
UNION, POLANI
TRION

5 APA
2 AKA
1 APH

TransDiv 35 (Temp) - Captain BARTMAN, USN

CLAY (F), SAMUEL CHASE, GOSHEN, BLAND
ROLETTE, TOONER

4 APA
2 AKA

(i) 33.4 Transport Group CHARLIE (TransRon 24 (Temp)) - Commodore SHORT, USN

TransDiv 70 (Temp) - Commodore SHORT, USN

DABE (SF), SITKI, ORISBY, CLINTON,
OKALOOSA, SAN SABA
LEO, ALHENA

6 APA
2 AKA

TransDiv 36 (Temp) - Captain TYLER, USN

LONROVL (F), MARHEN, FULLER, CLARENDON
LACERTA, ATHENE

4 APA
2 AKA

TransDiv 31 (Temp) - Captain D. VIS, USN

BROOKINGS (F), NAP, SAINT CROIX, ELKHART
LELLENA, OSTARA

4 APA
2 AKA

TransDiv ABLE (Temp) -

ANNE ARUNDEL
VENANGO

1 AP
1 AKA

(j) Ships under direct command of CTF 33

YOLO (APB 43)
PEC 577
PC 466, 549, 1230
SC 1316, 1323, 1341
LCI(R) 644, 645, 646
LCS 13, 23, 24, 113

1 APB
1 PCE
3 PC
3 SC
3 LCI(R)
4 LCS

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