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Report of surrender and occupation of Japan and Korea

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Report of Surrender and Occupation of Japan.
Enclosures: (See Table of Contents following.)

1. The subject report is forwarded herewith.

2. Reference (a) contains most of the source materials on which this report is based.

3. The operations described herein include brief mention of the activities of Army forces under CinCAFPac, inasmuch as all forces involved were closely integrated under a common plan. It is not intended, however, that this report should cover in much detail the operations of Occupation Forces, especially after completion of the landing phases.

4. This report is CONFIDENTIAL, and shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of Article 76, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
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J. M. LEE,
Flag Secretary.
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PART I.

INTRODUCTION.

General.

In order to present a comprehensive account of the surrender and occupation of Japanese-held territory as a whole, this report will cover the period from cessation of hostilities on 15 August (ELD) to the end of major naval participation in the occupation of such Japanese possessions.

The regular monthly Reports of Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas were discontinued with that for August 1945, which covered operations up to the cessation of hostilities, with some brief mention of subsequent events to the end of the month. Operations after 15 August are, however, treated in greater detail herein, for the purpose of clarifying the situation existing prior to formal surrender ceremonies on 2 September 1945.

As explained in ANNEX "B", this publication constitutes the final analytical report by CinCPac-Cincpoa covering World War II operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

Unless otherwise noted, local times and dates are used throughout this report.

Advance Planning and Organization.

In view of Japan's expressed desire for peace negotiations, Russia's imminent entry into the conflict, and our contemplated employment of the atomic bomb, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington realized that the surrender of the Empire of Japan might come at any time. This being so, plans to anticipate that day as fully as possible became indispensable, and speed in their preparation of the essence.

Less than a fortnight before the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July, the Japanese Government had requested Russia to exercise its good offices as a peace mediator between the Allied Powers and the Empire of Japan. This request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was followed by a personal message to Marshal Stalin from Emperor Hirohito. The Soviet Foreign Office immediately informed the governments of the United States and Great Britain of this development, and the latter nations, provided with this evidence of Japanese war-weariness, joined with China in issuing the Potsdam Proclamation.

While the heads of these three nations were conferring at Potsdam, the Soviet Union confirmed its decision to enter the war in the near future. Finally, there was reason to believe that the use of the atomic bomb, superimposed on the effects of previous disastrous blows on their homeland, would dissipate any remaining Japanese will to resist.

The formulation of plans for occupation therefore became imperative. General of the Army D. MacArthur (CinCPac) was designated as "Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers" (short title SCAP) for the purpose of enforcing the surrender of Japan and of exercising supreme command over all occupying forces which might be allocated by the Allied Powers. CinCAPPac, accordingly, prepared plans for the Army participation in the occupation of Japan. Similarly, Fleet Admiral C.W. Nimitz (Cincpac-Cincpoa) prepared plans for the conduct of the naval and amphibious phases of the occupation. Under both the Army and Navy plans, the day on which Japan should accept surrender terms would be designated as "B-Day". Subsequent events were to make this day 15 August, 1945.

As Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, CinCAPPac was given primary responsibility for the conduct of the occupation of Japan (the four main islands of Japan—Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku—and about one thousand smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands) and Korea, except that Russian forces were to occupy Karafuto and that part of Korea lying north of 38° N. Latitude.

Naval and Army plans outlined a progressive occupation in three phases of certain Japanese cities and areas adjacent thereto. Dates were set for those areas to be occupied in Phase I, these dates being expressed with relation to B-Day. Zones of responsibility were allotted, the EIGHTH Army being assigned the Japanese islands to the northward and eastward of a line crossing Honshu west of Yokohama and Tokyo, the SIXTH Army being responsible for the remainder of the Japanese home islands to the southward and westward of that line, and the TENTH Army being assigned Korea and objectives on the China coast. The TENTH Army areas, however, were reallocated on 12 August to the XXIV Corps.

In Phase II, additional objectives were allocated to each Army or Corps within its respective zone. No dates were set for these operations, but they were to be conducted at the discretion of the respective Army commanders. In Phase III, further objectives were allotted to each organization, the dates again being discretionary. Operations of Phases II and III were for the most part to be conducted with the troops brought ashore earlier in Phase I, although some additional troops might be brought forward for the execution of later phases.

In correlation with the military zones, the THIRD Fleet was assigned naval responsibility for the zone of the EIGHTH Army (which would mean eastern Honshu and Hokkaido); the FIFTH Fleet was assigned naval responsibility for the zone of the SIXTH Army (which would involve command of the naval occupation of western Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu, as well as control of the Inland Sea, the southern half of the Sea of Japan, and the waters east of a line drawn from the southern tip of Korea at 127° E., south to 32° N., 127° E., southwest to 26° 30' N., 123° E., thence south to 20° N.); and the SEVENTH Fleet was assigned naval responsibility for the area of the XXIV Corps (which would comprise responsibility for planning and conducting operations from the Luichow Peninsula along the China Coast, in the Yangtze River, and in the Yellow Sea). The Commander North Pacific Force was to be present in northern Honshu, with the possibility of his being assigned local responsibility for that area and for Hokkaido.

Similarly, the three Amphibious Forces were coordinated with the respective Fleets and Armies, the THIRD Amphibious Force being assigned to the Commander THIRD Fleet for operations of the EIGHTH Army, the FIFTH Amphibious Force assigned to the Commander FIFTH Fleet for operations of the SIXTH Army, and the SEVENTH Amphibious Force assigned to the Commander SEVENTH Fleet for operations of the XXIV Corps and of any troops which might require transportation to China.
The naval operation plan provided for future modification of naval zones of responsibility in connection with operations as follows: (See Plate I).

(1) Initially the Commander THIRD Fleet would be responsible for operations within the "combat area" east of the 135th meridian (the "combat area" extended eastward to the 155th meridian), while the Commander FIFTH Fleet would be responsible for operations west of the 135th meridian.

(2) When directed by Cincpac-Cincpoa, Commander FIFTH Fleet's zone of responsibility would be extended eastward to the 139th meridian. Commander THIRD Fleet would retain responsibility east of this line.

(3) When directed by Cincpac-Cincpoa, Commander SEVENTH Fleet would assume responsibility for operations along the China coast and in the Yellow Sea within his zone of responsibility. Commander FIFTH Fleet would then be responsible for operations only within his own zone. Should Commander SEVENTH Fleet later be directed to conduct landing or other operations on the Korean coast within the FIFTH Fleet zone of responsibility, Cincpac-Cincpoa would either modify the boundary between the areas of the two commanders, or he would direct that those operations be coordinated by Commander FIFTH Fleet.

(4) When directed by Cincpac-Cincpoa, Commander North Pacific’s zone of responsibility would be extended southward to the 40th parallel west of 155° E. Longitude. Commander THIRD Fleet would then coordinate the activities of the THIRD Fleet and the units of the North Pacific Force in the Hokkaido-Ominato area insofar as cooperation with the EIGHTH Army was concerned. For all other purposes, the Commander North Pacific Force and North Pacific Area would continue to be responsible directly to Cincpac-Cincpoa.

Preliminary Operations.

Diplomatic Negotiations—The details of diplomatic negotiations preceding the surrender ceremony, and of the surrender terms themselves, are discussed at some length in Appendix I, and will not be repeated here.

Operations during August—Most of the operations in the Pacific of sea, air, and ground forces during August have already been described in the Report of Operations for that month. It is desired, however, to refer herein to some of the operations preliminary to the surrender and occupation of Japan in order to show their relation thereto, although some repetition may result.

Between the 10th and 15th of August, while diplomatic negotiations were being conducted, Allied military operations were progressing on a reduced scale. A brief lull in the operations of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces came on the 10th of August, and on the 11th, as a result of the announcement of Japan's peace offer, General C.A. Spaatz, Commanding General of the USASTAF, ordered the TWENTIETH Air Force to suspend operations against Japan for that day. On 14 August, the air war was resumed in full strength by more than 800 B-29s from the Marianas, and that night three final B-29 attacks were sent against northern Honshu. Shortly before the last planes returned from these missions on the 15th, General Spaatz ordered the grounding of all combat planes of the Strategic Air Forces, as a result of the Japanese surrender. It was planned, however, to continue photographic and weather reconnaissance missions over Japan.
It is interesting to note that one of these last three missions of the war was at the same time the first and only mission for the EIGHTH Air Force B-29s based on Okinawa, whose commanding general, Lieutenant General J.H. Doolittle, had commanded the first Tokyo raid of 6 April, 1942, with B-25s launched from the deck of the carrier HORNET.

Orders to "Cease fire" were transmitted to the Pacific Fleet and all other units under the command of Fleet Admiral Nimitz almost at once after President Truman's announcement on the 15th that Japan had accepted surrender terms. Unlike the Strategic Air Force, the THIRD Fleet and all other Pacific naval forces had previously been ordered by Fleet Admiral Nimitz to continue offensive action against Japan "unless otherwise specifically directed," and it was only because otherwise prevented that the THIRD Fleet made no strikes on the 11th and 12th. In the first instance, scheduled fueling operations had taken the fleet out of action, and on the 12th a threatening hurricane had forced Admiral Halsey to cancel all strikes and steer to avoid the storm. Fleet Admiral Nimitz warned that "vigilance against Japanese attacks and treachery should be exercised even if a general surrender should suddenly be announced." The 13th saw the resumption of attacks on TOKYO by planes of TF 38, and the 14th was occupied with refueling operations in preparation for renewed strikes on 15 August.

At 0111 on the 15th, the carriers, having returned to a launching point 110 miles southeast of Tokyo, sent attacks against the airfields on Honshu; but at 0633 ComTHIRDFleet relayed a message received at 0615 from Cinopac which ordered him to "Suspend attack air operations." The 103 planes comprising the first strike had already dropped their bombs, but the "cease fire" message caught the 73 planes of the second strike enroute to their targets. These planes jettisoned their bombs and returned to their carriers.

Thirty-five minutes after the victory ensign had been hoisted on the flagship, however, a Japanese bomber was shot down near the task force, and before the afternoon was over, seven additional Japanese aircraft were destroyed as they approached the fleet. At 1600, the task force proceeded toward a position about 300 miles southeast of Tokyo to await further orders. As a result of these incursions Cinopac requested the Supreme Commander to inform Japanese authorities that our own measures for defense would require our naval forces to destroy any Japanese aircraft approaching our dispositions.

In mid-afternoon of the 15th, the THIRD Fleet received ALPOA 579, which ordered it to "Cease offensive operations against Japanese forces. Continue searches and patrols. Maintain defensive and internal security measures at highest level and beware of treachery or last moment attacks by enemy forces or individuals." Such an order had been anticipated by the Commander THIRD Fleet, and appropriate steps had been taken to carry it out.

In the week following the Emperor's order to cease hostilities, U.S. planes on photo-reconnaissance missions over Japan were twice attacked by enemy interceptors. On 17 August, four B-32s were attacked over Tokyo by an estimated 10 Japanese fighters, of which two were probably destroyed and a third damaged. The same day, three other photo planes over Yokosuka and Miyakonojo were met by anti-aircraft fire. On the 18th, two unescorted reconnoitering B-32s over Tokyo were
attacked by 14 enemy fighters. An aerial photographer in one plane was killed, two of the crew were wounded, and both planes were heavily damaged. Our aircraft retaliated by shooting down two of the Japanese attackers and probably destroying two more. This attack occurred only a few hours after the Japanese government had accepted General MacArthur's instructions to fly a peace delegation to Manila on the following day.

In what was probably the final naval action of the war, a submarine, presumably Russian, was reported by Japanese General Headquarters to have sunk four Japanese merchant vessels on 22 August, in the coastal waters of northern Hokkaido.

Conference in Manila—In response to instructions of the Supreme Commander, a 16-man delegation was sent by air to Manila on 19 August to receive surrender terms. (Details of this conference are discussed in Appendix I).

Capture of Japanese Submarines—At about 1020 on 27 August, in position 38° 40' N., 143° 12' E. (east of northern Honshu), planes of TG 38.1 sighted a Japanese submarine on course 000° T., proceeding at a speed of 12 knots. The submarine was flying a Japanese ensign and a black flag. Fifty minutes later, TG 38.1 planes sighted a second Japanese submarine on course 290° T., moving at a speed of 10 knots, a short distance to the south and east of the first submarine.

Two destroyers were dispatched from TG 38.1 to intercept and board each submarine, and Commander THIRD Fleet ordered the submarines taken to Guam, if sufficient fuel remained on board; otherwise, they should be taken to Sagami Wan. At the same time, submarine prize crews were ordered from PROTEUS (AS) to board the Japanese submarines. MURRAY and DASHIELL (DDs) intercepted one submarine, which turned out to be the A-14.

As the boarding party, consisting of four officers and 14 men from MURRAY, approached the submarine, they could see the Japanese writing with chalk on the conning tower, "I am navigating for Ominato". No Japanese ensign was flying. After the party had gained the deck of the submarine and received an affirmative answer to the question submitted to the Japanese captain as to whether he surrendered, a search party of five men accompanied by a Japanese officer guide left the bridge to inspect the space below decks.

When the Japanese commanding officer was informed that the two destroyers would sink him if he attempted to submerge, he replied that "Our men have been told war conditions ended, and that we (the officers) are ordered by our Emperor to obey instructions of American commanders." He stated further that all explosives, including torpedoes, had been jettisoned on 22 August, together with all logs, charts, documents, and small arms. At 1334 the boarding party hoisted the American Flag to the top of the No. 2 periscope. At approximately the same time, orders were received from MURRAY that the boarding party was to take the submarine to Sagami Wan, in spite of the Japanese commanding officer's insistence that his orders required him to proceed to Ominato.

The searching party inspected the engineering spaces, living compartments, storerooms, and torpedo tubes, but found no explosives or small arms. Having exchanged two members of the boarding party for four other enlisted men in order
to obtain a more balanced prize crew, the officer-in-charge ordered the A-14 to get underway at 1500. The run to Sagami Wan was made with a Japanese OOD and helmsman on the bridge acting upon orders of the particular boarding officer having the conn, while the Japanese engineers on duty in the engineering spaces acted upon orders of the American engineering watch.

The A-14 was of the latest type, having been launched 20 months previously by the Kawasaki Shipbuilding Company at Kobe, and commissioned five months prior to her capture. This was not only the Japanese captain's first submarine duty, but the first for the majority of his officers and men. The A-14 had left the submarine base at Ominato on her first patrol on 17 July 1945, her mission being to supply the Japanese garrison at Truk with approximately 25 tons of provisions and machine gun ammunition. She passed "many" U.S. ships and planes between Saipan and Guam, but was under orders to deliver the cargo and not to attack. The Japanese commanding officer emphasized that he had never sunk an American ship.

The run to Truk was made submerged during the day, as the A-14 was equipped with a periscope-mounted schnorchel on the starboard wing of the bridge, which the Japanese asserted "was very good". As a result, she was not sighted.

While lying in Truk Lagoon, the A-14 learned on 14 August that "war conditions no longer existed, by decree of my Emperor." Three days later she sailed for Ominato, and on either the 17th or 18th (the captain was not certain) he received orders from his Emperor to "never attack", to cruise on the surface, to show running lights at night, to expend his torpedoes, to jettison all logs, charts, documents, ammunition, and small arms, and to fly the black flag. These orders were complied with on 22 August (the reason for the delay not being given), and from that date until intercepted by MURRAY and D.SHEILL, she headed generally north, passing east of Guam and Saipan. Though surfaced, they saw no U.S. ships or planes for five days until sighting the flight which reported them about an hour before they sighted MURRAY.

The whole submarine was covered by a dull black plaster-like substance which was supposed to be "anti-acoustic". All of the officers of the submarine's crew merely said "not good", when queried as to its value. The A-14 was also equipped with the latest Japanese surface and air-search radars, one of which was periscope-mounted. An inclined aircraft catapult extended from the bow to the cylindrical hangar which was streamlined into the forward part of the conning tower. The Japanese officers stated that the plane had been launched several times during the training period and was "successful". The plane was described as "twin float with two seats and a single low wing". From the manner in which the seas broke over the bow at 13 knots, the officer-in-charge of the boarding party believed that it would be dangerous to launch the plane in any but calm seas.

BLUE and MANSFIELD (DDs) intercepted the other submarine, which was the I-400. After a seven-hour chase which terminated before dark only because planes of TG 38.1 forced the submarine to turn toward the destroyers, a prize crew from BLUE went aboard, and the I-400 started for Sagami Wan under escort of BLUE. Both submarines surrendered without resistance. When the latter submarine was examined subsequently, it was found to displace 5700 tons, to have two decks, to be designed to carry four float planes in a pressure-proof hangar, and to be equipped with the German-invented "schnorchel".
Two days later, a second I-class Japanese submarine was captured under similar circumstances. **SEJUNDO (SS)** had left port for her 5th War Patrol and was enroute to her assigned patrol area in the vicinity of the Central Kurile Islands when she received orders from ComSubPac to cease hostilities against Japan because the war had ended, but that she was to remain at sea for further orders. At 2253 on August 28th, while patrolling off the northeast coast of Honshu in accordance with these instructions, **SEJUNDO** made radar contact on a large Japanese submarine steaming at a speed of 15 knots on course 290° (T). At 0419 on the 29th, the stranger stopped, in response to an order to that effect sent in international code by **SEJUNDO**. More than an hour later, a rubber boat sent to the Japanese submarine returned with Sub-Lieutenant Muneo Bando, who stated that the I-401 was proceeding to Ominato, the Japanese submarine base in northern Honshu, because she did not have sufficient fuel for the trip to Tokyo Bay. The Commanding Officer of **SEJUNDO**, Lieutenant Commander S.I. Johnson, expressed skepticism concerning the accuracy of this statement, and Lieutenant Bando eventually admitted that there might be more fuel on board than he had at first alleged.

In reply to questioning, Lieutenant Bando related that I-401 carried a float plane, which had crashed during her last patrol near the Marshall Islands. The submarine could dive in 1 minute, 10 seconds, could submerge to a maximum depth of 100 meters, and had a top speed of 17.5 knots. The crew of I-401 was said to number 200 men.

Lieutenant Bando was returned to the I-401 and a boarding party of one officer and five enlisted men from **SEJUNDO** boarded the Japanese submarine and remained topside, while the Japanese were permitted to continue operating the submarine, steering a new course of 195° (T).

The Japanese Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Nambu, made persistent efforts to persuade **SEJUNDO**'s commander that he should proceed to Ominato, asserting in support of his view that the Emperor had ordered him to report there; but, when Lieutenant Commander Johnson informed him that the I-401 would either go where he told it or the prize crew would take control completely, the Japanese desire to "save face" and surrender formally at Yokosuka outweighed the desire to go to Ominato as originally planned.

The I-401 and her captor arrived at Sagami Wan at 1125 on 30 August, and that afternoon, **O'BANNON (DD)** took over control of the Japanese submarine from **SEJUNDO**. The latter was one of the 11 submarines present in Tokyo Bay for the ceremonies in which the Empire of Japan formally surrendered on 2 September.

A third Japanese submarine of the I-class, the I-402, was captured at her berth at Kure, and was subsequently sailed on 12 November, at American direction, to Sasebo, in company with I-36, 47, 53, and 367. On 29 October, while proceeding from Kure to Sasebo with the Japanese submarines HA-201, 203, and 20, I-363 struck a pressure mine and sank off Abaratsu.
THE SURRENDER AND OCCUPATION OF THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS.

A. THE OCCUPATION OF CENTRAL HONSHU.

Preparations for Surrender and Occupation.

Preliminary plans called for a small force of 150 Air Force technicians to land at Atsugi Airdrome, 14 miles southwest of Tokyo, on 26 August, to prepare the way for a subsequent large-scale airborne landing two days later by the 11th Airborne Division, supplemented by Advance Headquarters of the EIGHTH Army, Advance Headquarters of the Far Eastern Air Forces, and Advance Headquarters of the General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific—amounting to 7500 men, in all.

The advance plans also called for the entry on the 26th of THIRD Fleet units, guided by a Japanese ship, into Sagami Bay; while other naval forces, employing Japanese pilots, would enter Tokyo Bay the same day.

On 28 August, the THIRD Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3), under the command of Brigadier General W.T. Clement, USMC, was to go ashore on the Miura Peninsula, 30 miles southwest of Tokyo, on which was located the sprawling Yokosuka Naval Base. On the same day, the Supreme Commander would land at the nearby Atsugi airdrome to discuss occupation arrangements with members of the Imperial General Staff.

This Fleet Landing Force was a part of TF 31 (Rear Admiral O.C. Badger), which comprised all the task groups which would participate in the occupation of Yokosuka. TG 31.3 was originally conceived as an assault group composed of Marine and Naval Units from the THIRD Fleet. Later orders made the 4th Marine Regiment (reinforced) available, and with this unit as a nucleus, a landing and occupation force was activated. The THIRD Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3) was composed of the 4th Marine RCT with 5400 officers and men, who had embarked at Guam on 15 August and rendezvoused with the THIRD Fleet on 20 August, designated as TU 31.3.1; the THIRD Fleet Marine Landing Force of 1635 officers and men, designated as TU 31.3.2; and the THIRD Fleet Naval Landing Force of 863 officers and men, organized and equipped from the three task groups of TF 38, designated as TU 31.3.3. The British Pacific Fleet (TF 37) supplied a landing force of 450 officers and men, consisting of 250 Royal Navy Blue-jackets and 200 Royal Marine Commandos, designated as TU 31.3.4.

The Fleet Landing Forces would carry with them sufficient "K" rations for nine meals, as well as five units of fire, and they were equipped with heavy marching order and all available landing force equipment, though inadequately for opposing organized resistance.

Also organized, but not embarked for landing, was an additional assault battalion of 400 men from TG 38.3 and five guard battalions of 400 men each from TF 38. These last units were activated and equipped for duty ashore, and were to remain in a state of readiness on board their own ships. Because of the poorly-equipped condition of these reserves, it was fortunate that events did not make it necessary to call upon them.
Airborne and naval landings were scheduled to continue on the 29th and 30th of August. On the 31st, as further landings continued, the formal surrender ceremonies were expected to take place aboard the THIRD Fleet flagship MISSOURI. Immediately following the ceremony of surrender, these two documents, together with the Supreme Commander's General Order No. One, were to be promulgated to the Japanese people by the Imperial Japanese Government.

In planning the entry into Tokyo Bay, CTF 31 required exact information concerning the location of enemy minefields, as well as the location of the extremely sensitive pressure mines laid by the TWENTIETH Air Force's B-29s. The location, type, and number of mines in each stick laid by the Superforts was obtained from Cincpac Headquarters.

Certain areas in the approaches to Tokyo Bay had been declared restricted to shipping by the Japanese, making it reasonable to assume that mines had been laid in these areas. It was also possible that mines had been laid in areas other than those so restricted.

Entry of THIRD Fleet Units into Sagami Wan.

The beginning of the occupation was delayed 48 hours to 30 August by a typhoon, which also forced postponement from 31 August until 2 September of the formal surrender ceremony. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Fleet Landing Force and components were already embarked and in a congested situation, on the morning of 27 August, Task Group 30.1 (Fleet Flagship Group), consisting of MISSOURI (BB)(OTC) and the destroyers NICHOLAS (CDS 21), O'BANNON, and TAYLOR, steamed toward Sagami Wan (which joins Tokyo Bay through a narrow strait 25 miles south of the Japanese capital), with NICHOLAS acting as vanguard.

At 0630, the Japanese destroyer HATUZAKURA was sighted about 20 miles from O Shima, a large island outside the approach to Sagami Wan. Admiral Halsey had arranged through the Supreme Commander for the Japanese DD to meet the Fleet Flagship Group at that time and place, with pilots and interpreters to pilot the THIRD Fleet ships first to Sagami Wan, thence into Tokyo Bay.

At 0723, NICHOLAS established contact with HATUZAKURA, which transferred two Japanese commissioners—Captain Y. Takasaki (from the Yokosuka Naval District Command) and Captain Yokashika (from the Tokyo Naval District Command)—13 harbor pilots, and six interpreters provided with numerous maps and charts, chiefly ones showing the exact location of their swept channels and the location of all minefields. These charts provided more exact information than those previously supplied by Japanese emissaries in Manila.

At 0845, NICHOLAS transferred the two commissioners, as well as one pilot and an interpreter, to MISSOURI to receive instructions from Rear Admiral R.B. Carney, THIRD Fleet Chief of Staff, and to give information concerning hydrographic matters.

Having received general instructions concerning the occupation of Tokyo Bay waters and the Naval Control Zone around Yokosuka, the Japanese emissaries were further instructed in detail by Rear Admiral Badger (CTF 31) in matters pertaining to the occupation of the Naval Control Zone by landing forces. After all the Japanese aboard MISSOURI had been given a thorough briefing, the pilots and interpreters were distributed among the other large ships of the fleet.
The charts delivered by the Japanese representatives showed that the anti-
submarine nets were still in place and blocked the proposed entrance channel, a
situation necessitating a change in the sweeping plan previously set up. The shore-
controlled mine fields had been blown up, but all moored minefields were still in
place, since the Japanese had not carried out any of the sweeping which they had
been ordered to accomplish prior to the THIRD Fleet's arrival. Investigation as to
why the Japanese had not attempted to clear the minefields disclosed that very few
sweepers were available to accomplish the task, and, in addition, their methods
were very crude.

Making a general rule from his experience in this case, CTF 31 concluded that
the best method of obtaining information from the Japanese as to the exact location
of minefields in any particular area was to contact the local naval officials and
make the necessary demands. The Japanese Navy Department had burned most of its
official records, but all information received from the local Japanese officials
proved remarkably accurate.

Since the anti-submarine nets still blocked the proposed channel, Rear Admiral
Badger decided to use the west channel, which the Japanese had swept, for the entry
of the forces into Tokyo Bay. Before any units were permitted to use this channel,
however, it was swept by our own minecraft (TU 31.2.2) to a depth of 60 feet, with
negative results. Sweeping efforts were also concentrated on clearing all anchor-
age areas in Tokyo Bay prior to assigning ships to these berths.

Information received from the Japanese emissaries indicated that they had
swept some of the B-29-laid magnetic and acoustic mines off Yokosuka and Yokohama,
but they had no knowledge of mines having been laid in the Tokyo area. Concentrated
sweeping by our forces in the Yokosuka and Yokohama areas yielded negative results,
but three magnetic mines were swept off the entrance to Tokyo Harbor. The Japanese
were ordered to clear the anti-submarine nets and the minefields in Uraga Suido.
These operations were begun on 31 August and by 8 September they were completed.

Following the entry of TG 30.1 into Sagami Wan, TG 30.2 (British Flagship
Group), TF 35 (including TG 35.90 (Support Force) plus Commander TG 30.6 in SAN
JUAN (CL)), TF 37 (British Support Forge), and TF 31 (Yokosuka Occupation Force)
moved into the bay in that order. Meantime, advance contingents of minesweepers
had commenced sweeping operations at the mouth of Uraga Suido Channel.

As these task forces and task groups steamed into Sagami Wan, they were covered
by an air umbrella consisting of hundreds of carrier planes from TG 38.4, while the
skies over Japan itself were patrolled by land-based fighters and bombers from
Okinawa and Iwo Jima. All enemy planes had been grounded by command of the Supreme
Commander, with the exception of certain specially-marked aircraft engaged in liaison
work connected with the surrender. As a consequence of these extensive precautions,
joined to the passive attitude of the Japanese people, the entry into Sagami Wan was
effected without incident.

The Airborne Landings at Atsugi Airdrome.

On 28 August, the 150 FIFTH Air Force technicians landed as planned at Atsugi
Airdrome, with emergency communications and airfield engineering equipment, from 47
transports and a B-24—the first Allied occupation forces to land in Japan. (A Fleet
Air Wing 18 "Liberator" had been compelled by mechanical difficulties to land at
Atsugi the day before and had returned to Iwo Jima the same day, no Japanese attempt-
ing to approach the plane).
Shortly after the initial landings, naval planes landed on the field, bringing Navy liaison officers and members of Admiral W.F. Halsey's staff for discussions. The same day, Rear Admiral O.C. Badger (CTF 31) (Commander Yokosuka Occupation Forces), accompanied by Brigadier General W.T. Clement, USMC (Commanding General THIRD Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3)), proceeded in SAN DIEGO (CL) to Tokyo Bay, where a conference was held with Japanese representatives of the Yokosuka Naval Base for the purpose of propounding certain demands relative to the landings. The Japanese were directed to clear the area of personnel in excess of skeleton maintenance crews, to demilitarize and mark all coastal defense and AA batteries with white flags visible four miles to seaward, to have Japanese officers and guides on the beach to meet the landing force, to provide certain motor transport, and other matters tending to facilitate the landing and occupation.

A final conference of subordinate unit commanders of TF 31 was held on 29 August. All plans had been predicated on a How-Hour of 1000 on 30 August. During the late afternoon of the 29th, however, a dispatch was received announcing that How-Hour for the 11th Airborne Division would be 0600. This required the stepping-up of the ship movements into Tokyo Bay, in order to land at Futtsu Saki at 0600 and at the Yokosuka Naval Base at 0930.

On 29 August, Fleet Admiral C.W. Nimitz, who had been designated to sign the formal surrender documents for the United States in the forthcoming ceremony, arrived from Guam in a seaplane and hoisted his flag on SOUTH DAKOTA (BB). The same day, the fleet flagship MISSOURI (BB) moved into Tokyo Bay.

Meanwhile on Okinawa, the 11th Airborne Division and the various advance headquarters staffs prepared themselves for the airlift to Atsugi Airdrome. All available troop carrier transport planes of the Far Eastern Air Forces were utilized, as well as C-54s and C-47s of the Air Transport Command. These troops, with complete combat equipment, commenced landing at Atsugi Airdrome at 0600 on 30 August, marking the beginning of the greatest aerial mass movement yet seen in the Pacific. The paratroopers landed at Atsugi in 40-man plane loads at three-minute intervals throughout the day. At 1400, only eight hours after the first of the 7500 airborne troops had reached Atsugi Airfield, the Supreme Commander landed from his C-54 to set up General Headquarters in the New Grand Hotel at Yokohama, having arrived from Manila via Okinawa. Fifteen minutes later, Rear Admiral J.J. Ballentine, Liaison Officer of Cincpac-Cincoa with the Supreme Commander (short title FLTLOSCAP) landed at Atsugi, and departed for Yokohama and Yokosuka for a conference with Fleet Admiral Nimitz.

One regiment of the 11th Airborne Division moved east from the field to secure the Yokohama dock area; then it moved south to establish contact with the 4th Marine RCT, which had meantime executed a series of amphibious landings for the purpose of securing the great Yokosuka Naval Base.

Amphibious Landings by Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3).

Love-Day (30 August) dawned clear and warm, a calm sea making it a perfect day for an amphibious landing. The transports, with their escorts, moved from Sagami Bay at 0315, proceeding in three groups to Tokyo Bay. The first group carried the Second Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, which was designated to land on
Futtsu Saki as soon as possible after daylight. (This reorganized Marine outfit had been given the post of honor of making the first seaborne landings in Japan as a tribute to the old 4th Marine Regiment, which had fought at Bataan and Corregidor in the early days of the war.

The second group of transports carried the bulk of the landing force, consisting of the 4th Marine Regiment (minus the 2nd Battalion (TU 31.3.3). The third group consisted of four APDs carrying the British Landing Force (TU 31.3.4), which was scheduled to land on Saru Shima and island forts Nos. 2 and 3 in Sahago Suido at 0600. All these seaborne landings were to involve approximately 9000 U.S. Marines, 1200 Bluejackets, 250 British Bluejackets, and 200 British Marine Commandos.

Ten days previously, on 20 August, the Marines and Bluejackets who were to take part in these landings had been transferred by breeches buoys from their own ships to the participating transports while underway at sea—a monumental and unprecedented feat involving the transfer of 3500 men and their equipment, which was considerably expedited by bringing carriers, battleships, and cruisers of the THIRD Fleet along both sides of the transports simultaneously.

The 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, landed on the south shore of Futtsu Saki at 0558, and the American Flag was raised on the beach at 0636. Twenty-two Japanese surrendered Fort No. 1 and Futtsu Saki Fort, both of which were at once demilitarized. Seventeen guns and mortars of various calibers were rendered inoperative in Futtsu Saki Fort, and four 150-mm guns were demilitarized in Fort No. 1. American flags were raised over both forts. At 0845, the 2nd Battalion had accomplished its mission and begun to reembark in landing craft to take part in the main landing as the reserve battalion for the 4th Marine Regiment.

The 4th Marine RCT landed and moved rapidly inland from the beaches at the navy yard and air station. There was no resistance at any point, and the few remaining Japanese wore white arm bands in accordance with instructions. These arm bands signified that the wearer was essential to the maintenance and operation of public utilities and other necessary functions of the Yokosuka Naval Base.

The troops moved through the naval base and airfield, leaving guards on warehouses and installations, checking all AA and dual-purpose guns to see that the breech blocks had been removed, and driving all non-essential Japanese before them.

During the initial phases of the landing it was noted that the Japanese had complied with the order that they should place white flags on all coastal batteries and AA positions, and that these flags should be plainly visible from the water. This was the first of many instances of ready cooperation on the part of the Japanese.

At 1000, the Commanding General and his staff landed and established the Fleet Landing Force Command Post. General Clement was met by a Japanese Naval Captain and a party of Japanese officers, who formally surrendered the area and received instructions as to what was expected of the Japanese in the way of cooperation. They were advised that passive resistance or opposition of any kind would be severely dealt with.
General Clement then proceeded to the old Yokosuka headquarters building, where the American Flag was raised officially over the naval base at 1018 with appropriate ceremonies. This flag was the same one previously raised by the First Provisional Marine Brigade over Guam and by the Sixth Marine Division on Okinawa.

Instructions were then issued for Japanese Vice Admiral Totsuka, Commandant of the Yokosuka Naval Base, to be present at Berth 36 at 1030 to surrender the entire naval area formally to Rear Admiral Badger. This was the signal for SAN DIEGO, the flagship of CTF 31, which had been anchored off Yokosuka since the 28th, to dock at the Japanese base. At 1030, Admiral Totsuka officially surrendered the area to Rear Admiral R.B. Carney, Chief of Staff to Commander THIRD Fleet, and to Rear Admiral Badger (CTF 31); and at 1045, a Commander THIRD Fleet Headquarters and a CTF 31 Headquarters were established at Yokosuka Naval Base.

Earlier that morning, a prize crew had boarded and taken command of NAGATO (BB), the 33,000-ton sole survivor of the Japanese battleship force; and even she was found to have received severe damage to her superstructure from three direct hits by THIRD Fleet aircraft on 18 July.

The British Landing Force (TU 31.3.4), having made successful landings on three harbor forts, moved in to occupy their assigned area in the general vicinity of the Navigation School. The initial landings on the island forts had been made at approximately 0900, and numerous coast defense guns were quickly rendered inoperative. Royal Marine Commandos occupied and demilitarized Azuma Island, which had apparently been abandoned for two or three months. All Japanese personnel were evacuated from these forts and transported to the Yokosuka Navy Yard for further disposition.

All landings on the 30th—both airborne and seaborne—were thus made without incident, except for a few bursts of flak fired at one of our planes enroute to Atsugi. Every possible precaution was taken against Japanese treachery. Armadas of Army and Navy fighter planes covered the amphibious forces, while the guns of the THIRD Fleet at anchor in Sagami and Tokyo Bays were trained on the shore. As an added precaution, both the airborne and amphibious landings were made with full combat equipment.

At 1200, 30 August, operational control of the THIRD Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3) passed to the Commanding General EIGHTH Army (Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger).

On 31 August, the Fleet Landing Force continued consolidation of the occupied naval base and made preparations for sending patrols down the peninsula to demilitarize outlying installations. One company from the 4th Marine RCT was embarked on two APDs at 1030 that day to make a reconnaissance in force of the Tateyama Airfield and beach approaches and to cover the landing of the 112th RCT, scheduled to take place on 3 September.

The company was preceded by two Underwater Demolition Teams embarked on two APDs with the mission of reconnoitering and clearing approaches to the Tateyama Naval Base beaches (at the eastern entrance to Sagami Wan). At 1545 on the 31st, the Marine company went ashore without incident, to be met at the beach by a Japanese surrender delegation. Complete cooperation on the part of the Japanese Army,
Navy, and Foreign Office representatives enabled the company to discharge its mission expeditiously and to set up headquarters in the naval air station. During the course of the day, all units continued to occupy and secure the various areas assigned them. No instances of violence or non-cooperation occurred.

Simultaneously, troops of the 11th Airborne Division took up their stand on the south banks of the Tama River (which runs into Tokyo Bay immediately south of the capital), at the same time being careful to observe the temporary demarcation line until time for the Supreme Commander to make his entry into Tokyo. Japanese soldiers mounted guard along the northern bank of the Tama River. (Japanese Imperial Headquarters had requested that Tokyo be declared "out of bounds" for Allied forces until after the surrender articles had been signed, in order to prevent possible clashes or other incidents).

At 0630 on 1 September, all landing force personnel from MASSACHUSETTS (BB), SAN JACINTO (CL), WASP (CV), WHITE PLAINS (CVE), SAN DIEGO (CL), and ASTORIA (CL) were detached from the landing force and returned to their ships. At 1100, 1 September, Vice Admiral J.H. Towers relieved Vice Admiral J.S. McCain as CTF 38 and Commander Second Carrier Task Force. (Vice Admiral McCain died five days later in San Diego).

The same morning, two motorized patrols of company strength were detached from the 4th Marine RCT and dispatched south to Uraga and Kubiri, where several Japanese garrisons surrendered to the officers-in-charge of the patrols and at once set about accomplishing the demilitarization of their installations.

Meantime, three other patrols of platoon strength covered areas adjacent to the Yokosuka Naval Base. In addition, a guard of company strength was placed on a Japanese APD in Dry Dock No. 4 to guard Japanese prisoners of war who had been evacuated from Marcus Island on 29 August.

By the close of 1 September, Allied troops had thus taken over most of the strategic area along the shores of Tokyo Bay, with the exception of Tokyo itself, and the hour had arrived for the surrender of the Japanese Empire. A detailed account of the formal surrender ceremonies on board the battleship MISSOURI on 2 September will be found in Appendix I, and a list of ships present at the time is included as Appendix II.

Demilitarization Operations of Task Unit 35.7.2.

TF 35, the Naval Gunfire Support Force, while not called upon to perform its natural function, nevertheless found profitable employment. First, all known Japanese suicide boat and torpedo boat nests and coastal batteries in the Tokyo area were demilitarized, with the midget submarines, "kaitens" (human torpedoes), and suicide boats themselves being destroyed or sunk. Then a carefully-planned, methodical search was made of the Japanese coastline in the THIRD Fleet zone of responsibility, utilizing all possible sources of intelligence—an operation that resulted in the elimination of numerous potential threats afforded by the Japanese midget submarines, suicide boats, and MTBs concealed in caves along the coast of Honshu in the Tokyo Bay—Sagami Wan areas.

Operations of TU 35.7.2 at Abaratubo and Kurihama—Task Unit 35.7.2 (Demilitarization Unit Baker) was formed on 5 September for the purpose of clearing beach
approaches, demilitarizing coastal positions, and inspecting midget submarine and suicide boat bases in the vicinity of Aburatubo and Kurihama, on the Honshu coast near Tokyo. On the morning of 12 September, CTU 35.7.2 (Captain W.W. Juvenal) in WILKES-BARRE (CL), INGERSOLL (DD), KNAPP (DD), W.J. PATRISON (APD) with UDT 18 embarked, and MOCTUBI (ATF) got underway for Sagami Wan, anchoring at Moroiso Ko. INGERSOLL, accompanied by one LCPR with half a platoon of UDT and a 10-man Marine detail, left the formation at Kurihama and proceeded on an inspection mission in that area.

The search of the Aburatubo Area revealed 39 midget submarines in the two coves of Moroiso Ko, while two apparently completed midgets and one in process of assembly were found in caves on the north shore of the northern cove. A well-constructed system of tracks and switches served these and two other empty caves, as well as tying into the one track which served as a marine railway. The land-borne midgets were destroyed in their places by demolition charges. Three water-borne submarines were sunk at their moorings before instructions were received to scuttle them in deep water. The 36 midgets which remained were then towed to deep water and sunk with explosives.

This operation was conducted simultaneously with the demolition of guns and torpedoes, and was completed by 1430 on 13 September. The small arms and light weapons, including mortars, were confiscated and delivered to CTF 39, while 14 coastal guns, ranging in size from 37mm to 6", were rendered permanently inoperative by detonation in or on the barrels. Two additional emplaced 5" coastal guns at the tip of Miuraga Saki were left for destruction by an Army unit. One of several torpedo storage caves found on the northern shore of the northern cove contained 34 torpedoes (18") with warheads attached. Other caves contributed 12 more 18" torpedoes not fitted with warheads. All were destroyed by demolition.

Demilitarization Operations of INGERSOLL—While the main force of TU 35.7.2 was demilitarizing Aburatubo, the destroyer INGERSOLL, using one LCPR, half a UDT Platoon, and 11 Marines, was searching the shore line of the Kurihama Area from Kannon Saki Light southward, including Uraga Ko, Kurihama Wan, and, later, as INGERSOLL and the LCPR rejoined the task unit, the entire southern shore line of the Sagami Peninsula.

On the 13th, INGERSOLL made a more detailed reconnaissance of Uraga Ko and began demilitarization of the installations there. One midget submarine was found in an assembly plant for submarines in Uraga Ko and was destroyed by a demolition charge, while the single suicide boat located in the vicinity of Kurihama was hoisted aboard INGERSOLL.

A total of 47 torpedoes were found in the warehouses of the Kurihama-Uraga area, and destroyed with demolition charges. No warheads were found in the area searched. Inspection revealed that the Japanese had made progress in their demilitarization program, the breech blocks having been removed from the larger calibre guns and from the machine guns. On the other hand, the breech blocks and light guns had been centrally stored, which meant that the batteries could easily be restored should the Japanese be so inclined. These were, therefore, destroyed by demolition. The small arms in this area had been confiscated on September 2nd and 9th by Marine elements, and the guns remaining—mortars and machine guns—were collected in trucks rather than being confiscated, because of the difficulty in transshipment and handling by boat. Of 46 miscellaneous surface craft found in Uraga Ko, all were left undisturbed with the exception of three torpedo boats towed away by the fleet tug MOCTUBI and delivered to CTF 39 at Yokosuka.
Operations of TU 35.7.2 at Onagawa Wan—A boat reconnaissance of Onagawa Wan made by TU 35.7.2 upon its arrival on 15 September disclosed the existence of two small Japanese naval bases—one located at Onagawa, the other at Nonohama. Interrogation of Japanese naval personnel disclosed that construction of the midget submarine operating base at Nonohama had been started in June 1945, and inspection established that the base had been near completion when the war came to an end, making operations therefrom entirely feasible.

Nine midget submarines found at Nonohama were towed to deep water and scuttled. Twelve torpedoes, together with the same number of warheads, as well as detonators, land mines, and assorted explosives, were destroyed in place on 16 September. Land mines located at Onagawa, together with depth charges, were left in place and not destroyed. Small arms ammunition, mortar ammunition, and "throw bombs" (spherical rubber containers, three inches in diameter, packed with explosives, presumably tetral) were loaded aboard commandeered Japanese tugs and thrown overboard in deep water near the mouth of Onagawa Wan.

Small arms and light weapons were collected, taken aboard WILKES-BARRE, and turned over to CTF 39 at Yokosuka. Because of the dampness of the caves in which this equipment was stored, much of it was in bad condition. Approximately eight caves in the Nonohama area, containing medical supplies and other assorted stores and equipment for the base, of a general non-military nature, were left intact.

Operations of TU 35.7.2 in the Obama-Okitsu Area and Sunosaki-Hasama Area—Task Unit 35.7.2 (the designation given TU 35.7.2 after Commander FIFTH Fleet relieved Commander THIRD Fleet on 20 September) commenced demilitarization operations in the Obama-Okitsu area of Honshu on 21 September. Two UDT platoons searched the northern, western, and southwestern shores of Sunosaki, destroying four suicide boats which had previously been demilitarized by removal of the explosive charges. When no submarines or other suicide craft were found in the area, contact was made with Japanese naval representatives ashore, from whom it was learned that all such craft in the Obama-Okitsu area had been destroyed by TU 35.7.1 about 10-11 September. Information was obtained, however, that 103 suicide craft were in the Chosi area, and this information was relayed to CTU 53.7.1, who was engaged in inspecting that area.

PATTISON was ordered into Kurihama Wan to complete demilitarization of coastal guns on 24 September. One major-caliber twin turret battery (approximately 14"), which had been discovered by aerial reconnaissance after completion of the Kurihama operations on 13 September, was rendered inoperative.

With the completion of this operation, CTU 53.7.2 expressed the belief that no offensive threat to naval operations, in the nature of suicide craft or midget submarines, remained in the Obama-Okitsu area or in the Hasama-Sunosaki area.

Demilitarization Operations of TU 35.7.1.

While TU 35.7.2 was carrying on demilitarization operations, TU 35.7.1 (Captain M.R. Kelley) had been conducting a similar program in the same general area.

Shortly after dawn on 9 September, TU 35.7.1, composed of BOSTON (CA)(F), COGSWELL and CAPERTON (DDs), BEGOR (APD) with UDT 21 embarked, and MOLALA (ATF),
commenced demilitarization operations at the Katsuura Submarine Base, locating and beginning destruction of coastal guns, ammunition, suicide boats, and small arms. Two days later, the task unit had completed the destruction of the 34 suicide boats and seven midget submarines at Katsuura, and had taken the small arms into custody for delivery to CTF 39. Large quantities of all types of ammunition, however, were left for removal by the U.S. Army. Guns and boats at Kominato were also disposed of. Five other submarines were found in caves at Ubara, just to the west of Katsuura, which had been the major radar station for the Tokyo Area. There were seven radar sets in one station, all in good condition, though the Japanese had removed the tubes and disconnected the power leads.

The next operation of TU 357.1 came on September 14th, when BOSTON (F), CLARENCE K. BRONSON and HEALY (DDs), BEDOR with UDT 21 embarked, and MOLALA departed Tokyo Bay for Sendai to clear the beach approaches, land, and inspect the midget submarine and suicide boat bases in that area. By evening of the 15th, the task unit had completed inspection of the western coast of Ōshika Hanto from Kuro Saki to Ishinomaki, except for a few checks that remained to be made at Oninohama on the following morning. The subsequent search of Oninohama and the coastal area to the westward and southwestward as far as Gamou found all the caves and barracks empty, as all weapons had previously been removed to Onasawa.

On the 17th, TU 357.1 continued its reconnaissance at Onigawa, finding midget submarines, suicide boats, and large quantities of assorted ammunition. By 19 September the midget submarines and suicide boats had been destroyed, and the task unit returned to Tokyo Bay.

Summary of the Demilitarization Program in Japan.

ComTHIRDFleet and ComNorPac having been relieved of responsibility for naval operations in Empire waters on 20 September, ComFIFTHFleet was left with sole naval responsibility for the demilitarization program, while the Commanding Generals of the SIXTH and EIGHTH Armies continued to exercise Army responsibility, all being responsible to the Supreme Commander.

ComFIFTHFleet, in turn, delegated this task to the Area Commanders—Vice Admiral J.B. Oldendorf (CTF 51, Commander Southwestern Japan Force), Rear Admiral J.C. Jones (CTF 53, Commander Eastern Japan Force), and Rear Admiral F.C. Denebrink (CTF 56, Commander Northern Japan Force). Within the limits of such bases and airfields as were occupied by the Navy, and in the Izu Islands, this work was performed by the Navy. Outside these areas, the responsible task force commanders arranged with the corresponding Army commanders for demilitarization of naval installations, of which there were more than 600 in the Japanese Empire.

To facilitate this operation in the SIXTH Army area, and to expedite the release of material from intelligence restrictions, a Naval Liaison Group was established at SIXTH Army Headquarters, with liaison officers from the Naval Technical Mission Japan (NavTechJap) at each corps and division headquarters.

As specified in the Supreme Commander's Occupation Instructions Nos. 1 and 2, enemy equipment of a purely military nature, except for intelligence items, was either destroyed or scrapped. Other enemy equipment was used by the occupation forces or turned over to the Home Ministry for use by the Japanese.
Suicide craft and midget submarines, except in Yokosuka, were destroyed wherever found, but other Japanese craft, both naval and merchant were placed under repair and utilized to the maximum extent possible for Japanese repatriation, for lifting essential cargoes (under the supervision of the Administrator, Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine, Rear Admiral D.B. Beary), for minesweeping, for ferry service, and for fishing. Even submarines, disarmed and not capable of diving, were used for short daylight repatriation hauls.

A survey of Japanese combatant ships by U.S. Navy experts showed the condition of the remaining units of the Japanese Navy to be as follows:

- Undamaged: 1 CV, 1 CVL, 2 CL, 32 DD, 53 SS, 62 escort vessels.
- Damaged but towable: 1 BB, 1 CVL, 1 CVE, 1 CL, 11 DD, 19 SS, 31 escort vessels.
- Uncompleted but towable: 3 CV, 1 DD, 10 SS.
- Damaged and not towable: 3 BB (bottomed), 2 CV (1 bottomed), 1 CVE, 4 CA (2 bottomed), 1 CL (bottomed), 3 old cruisers (bottomed), plus minor units.

Most of these damaged ships were in the Kure area. Of the serviceable vessels, nearly all were used—in a demilitarized condition—in repatriation duty. A large number of operational small units were employed in minesweeping under the supervision of U.S. forces. The final disposition of Japanese combatant vessels has not yet been determined.

The status of the Japanese merchant marine as reported by the Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine, was as follows:

- Over 500 tons: 421 ships of 705,200 gross tons ready for use. An additional 221 ships of 563,200 gross tons were capable of repair.
- 100 to 500 tons: 1,461 ships of 253,300 gross tons, ready for use.
- Under 100 tons: 11,400 ships of 301,000 gross tons ready for use.

The authorization for the employment of both naval and merchant Japanese ships in repatriation duty, and the operating schedules for these vessels, were controlled by the Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine, Pacific Fleet.

Occupation Instructions No. 2 issued by the Supreme Commander stated that all materials seized by the armed forces were to be destroyed, scrapped, used by the occupation forces, or turned over to the Home Ministry if usable for civilian purposes. Later directives specified that fuels, scrap, automobiles, and Army and Naval foodstuffs which were spoiling were to be transferred directly to representatives of the Home Ministry.

Early in the occupation, the Naval Base, Yokosuka, yielded 786 silver ingots and 119 boxes of copper and silver coins. On 11 October, CTF 51 reported the discovery of 110,000 kg of tin, 12,000 kg of tungsten, and 3000 kg of raw rubber aboard two former German submarines at Kobe. A considerable quantity of new manila line was also found among the naval stores seized by the SIXTH Army at Kure.
Evacuation of Prisoners of War from Central and Northern Honshu.

Even before the formal surrender ceremony, Commander THIRD Fleet had assigned Commodore R.W. Simpson the mission of liberating, evacuating, and extending medical care to Allied prisoners of war in Japan within the THIRD Fleet area of responsibility. Task Group 30.6 was established, Commodore Simpson commanding, for the purpose of effectuating this mission, although the primary responsibility for the evacuation of prisoners of war rested with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and his representative, the Commanding General EIGHTH Army.

In the period between TG 30.6's inception on 15 August and the beginning of actual evacuation operations on the 29th, Commodore Simpson organized and trained special medical units, portable communication units, and minor landing forces; while making use of the detailed information of P.O.W. camps acquired from carrier searches, photographic coverage, and other intelligence sources to prepare extensive plans for execution when the time came.

It was assumed in drawing up these plans that the Japanese would not dare to oppose the liberation and medical assistance operations, as they would be well aware that their treatment of Allied prisoners of war would in any case be one of the sore points in our post-war attitude toward their wartime leaders.

The plan of operation was to make minor amphibious landings with medical parties, which would proceed to prisoner of war camps to extend immediate medical care, and begin the evacuation to hospital ships of the most seriously ill. Then would come the turn of the ambulatory P.O.W.s. Landings were not to be made in force, however, as the forces were neither available nor authorized to penetrate to those P.O.W. camps beyond the areas of occupation, prior to the formal surrender. Therefore, if organized resistance in strength were encountered, the minor amphibious landing forces would of necessity withdraw.

At 1130 on 29 August, CTG 30.6 in SAN JUAN (CL), with BENEVOLENCE (AH) in company, entered Tokyo Bay. At 1300, Commander THIRD Fleet ordered Commodore Simpson to proceed with the emergency evacuation of Allied prisoners of war in the Tokyo Bay waterfront area; whereupon CTG 30.6 in SAN JUAN, accompanied by GOSSELIN (APD), LANSDOWNE (DD), and BENEVOLENCE, proceeded toward the northern part of Tokyo Bay and anchored about four miles east of Omori. Commodore Simpson embarked with a medical and evacuation party in LCVPs of GOSSELIN and, with the assistance of air guidance by TBMs from COWPENS (CVL), proceeded to the Omori Camp No. 8, which was known to be the Tokyo Headquarters Camp.

The appearance of the landing craft in the channel off the camp produced an indescribable scene of jubilation and emotion on the part of hundreds of prisoners of war, who streamed out of the camp and climbed up over the piling. Some even began to swim out to meet the landing craft.

After encountering some difficulty in making himself heard, Commodore Simpson assured the prisoners that more boats would be forthcoming soon, and that they should stand by patiently for an orderly evacuation, since the liberation party planned to extend medical assistance first to those who were ill, then to those less in need of immediate assistance.

The Japanese camp commander protested that he was not authorized to turn the prisoners over to the task unit and that he must await word from headquarters that
the formal surrender had taken place. He was informed, however, that the task unit
had come to evacuate the men to the hospital ship, and that the cooperation of the
Japanese was not requested but required.

Commander A.L. Maher, former gunnery officer on the cruiser HOUSTON (sunk in
the Battle of the Java Sea), was found to be the senior prisoner of war present,
and was requested to assemble the men in the P.O.W. compound for evacuation and
instructions from CTG 30.6. A portable communications unit was set up in the prison
hard, and information concerning the progress of the mission was relayed to the
THIRD Fleet flagship. From Commander Maher and other P.O.W.s it was learned that
there were many seriously ill at another camp known euphemistically as Shinagawa
Hospital, in the near vicinity. Although Commodore Simpson desired to evacuate the
inmates from this hospital as soon as possible, the fact that its exact location and
approach by boat were not known determined him to remove 18 litter cases and
approximately 125 ambulatory cases from the Omori Camp at once, meantime obtaining
information regarding the hospital.

Commodore Boone, medical officer of ComTHIRDFleet, and a group of officers
whose task it was to ascertain the water approach to the Shinagawa Hospital, were
directed to commander trucks and automobiles for the purpose of locating the camp.
Upon this party's return, they reported that Shinagawa Hospital was "an indescribable
hell hole of filth, disease, and death."

CTG 30.6 ordered an immediate evacuation of Shinagawa, assigning landing craft
and four LCVPs from REEVES (APD) to bring back the patients from this place. By
daybreak on the 30th, this evacuation, together with that of the remaining prisoners
of the Omori Camp, was completed, making a total of 707 persons freed. All of these
men were taken aboard BENEVOLENCE and passed through the procedure prepared in
anticipation of their arrival. This process involved a bath, medical examination,
the issuing of clean clothes and food, the filling out of a mimeographed question-
naire of basic information (particularly, instances of atrocities), then either to
bed in the hospital ship, or, if ambulatory, immediate transfer to an APD alongside
the hospital ship for billeting.

During the night of the 30th, information of additional camps having been
obtained from the released P.O.W.s, CTG 30.6 divided the landing craft into two
units. One of these evacuated Kawasaki Camp No. 1, the Kawasaki Bunsho Camp, and
Tokyo Sub-Camp No. 3—all in the adjoining area. The other unit evacuated the
prisoners of war from the Sumidagawa Camp deep in the Tokyo Bay inner channels the
same day. A contact unit was also maintained at Omori Headquarters, and prisoners of
war from an inland camp came to Omori and were evacuated from that point. The
transfer of these prisoners to BENEVOLENCE was completed at 2130 on the 30th,
bringing the total of those liberated to 1,496. Searches which were extended into
the Tokyo waterfront area on 1 September resulted in the liberation of 22 civilians.

Joint Army-Navy Evacuation Plan—As a result of a conference held at ComGen-
EIGHTH Army Headquarters at Yokohama on September 1st, Admiral Halsey agreed to
coordinate his P.O.W. evacuation operations with those of the EIGHTH Army Recovered
Personnel Officer. The result of this conference was the promulgation on September
2nd of a memorandum by the EIGHTH Army which divided the camps into four groups:
East Honshu, West Honshu, North Honshu, and Hokkaido. To accomplish the evacuation
of these areas, the following measures were taken: (a) One task unit of TG 30.6 was
assigned to liberate all personnel of the camps within each group and evacuate them
to the Tokyo area, there to await orders of ComGenEIGHTH Army. (b) All recovered personnel would be processed aboard ship as soon as practicable. (c) Liaison officers of the EIGHTH Army (G-1 Section), Surgeon's Section, and representatives of the International Red Cross, Swedish and Swiss Legations would be aboard the flagship of each of the four task unit commanders. (d) EIGHTH Army medical teams would be aboard the hospital or evacuation ships of each unit to screen medically all evacuated personnel and to furnish medical care and treatment enroute. Evacuees requiring hospital care would be off-loaded at Yokohama and transferred to the U.S.A. Hospital Ship MARIGOLD for additional hospitalization and appropriate disposition. (e) Ambulatory patients desiring air transportation and not requiring hospital care would be off-loaded at Yokohama and transferred to Atsugi Airfield by the EIGHTH Army. Those not desiring air transportation would remain aboard ship, awaiting orders of the Commanding General EIGHTH Army. (f) The Japanese Government would be required to furnish transportation from the camps to the designated evacuation points on the coast, under the direction and supervision of officers of the U.S. Army and Navy. Limited motor transport would be loaded in an amphibious ship of each task unit to assist in the operation. (g) Air protection and reconnaissance would be provided by the THIRD Fleet during the operation.

Evacuations Carried Out by TG 30.6 under the EIGHTH Army Plan—On September 3rd, an officer of the Staff of CTG 30.6 flew to Niigata (on the west coast of Honshu) in company with an officer of the EIGHTH Army Headquarters, arranging for the evacuation of seven prisoners of war camps in that area. The P.O.W.s were to be evacuated by rail to Yokohama in seven special trains for reception aboard ship at that port. The camps and the numbers of prisoners released were as follows:

- Tokyo Camp 5B—Niigata: 688
- Tokyo Camp 15B—Niigata: 314
- Tokyo Camp 16B—Kanose: 288
- Tokyo Camp 4B—Naoetsu: 698
- Tokyo Camp 13B—Aomi: 530
- Tokyo Camp 3B—Nagaoka: 197
- Tokyo Camp 3B—Branch Nagaoka: 98
- Totals: 2,813

Meantime, TU 30.6.9 (Captain Heneberger) remained in Tokyo Bay to receive and to arrange for the onward passage of any repatriates who might be evacuated from other areas.

The same day, 3 September, TU 30.6.1 (Captain G.H. Bahm), with CTG 30.6 in company with SAN JUAN, proceeded to the vicinity of Hamamatsu, arriving at daylight on the 4th. The first detachment of boats to leave the line of departure was led by Commodore Simpson, who found that the depth of water at the beaches was not as great as shown on the available charts, a discrepancy making evacuation over the beaches unfeasible. He took one boat over the bar, however, and obtained local Japanese pilots to guide the remainder of the landing craft through the unmarked channel to the railroad station at Arai, where prisoners from the Hamamatsu area could be evacuated.

Beach parties and communication teams having been established ashore, prisoners of war were transported by rail to Arai, where they were taken aboard the hospital ship RESCUE for processing. Able-bodied repatriates were then transferred to
destroyers and APDs for further transportation to Tokyo. The following camps were evacuated on 4, 6, and 7 September:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
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<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAGOYA No. 2</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>4 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGOYA No. 5</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>4 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIROSI</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4 September</td>
</tr>
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<td>MITTSUSHIMA</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>4 September</td>
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<td>NAGOYA No. 8</td>
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<td>6 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGOYA No. 9</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>6 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGOYA No. 11</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>6 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGOYA No. 6</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>7 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGOYA No. 10</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>7 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGOYA No. 3</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>7 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSURUGA OSOKA Area</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,558</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same day, 7 September, reports were received that 152 prisoners at Nagoya Camp No. 7 had been evacuated by air, and 606 P.O.W.s at Nagoya No. 1 had been evacuated by rail to Yokohama.

Because of transportation difficulties, the Japanese were unable to evacuate Nagoya Camp No. 4 until September 9th, at which time 283 prisoners were received and processed aboard SAN JUAN, BARR (APD), and WANTUCK (APD) prior to removal to Tokyo Bay. With the discharge of these repatriates in Tokyo Bay, the total persons evacuated in the Hamamatsu operation came to 2841.

On 11 September, an entrance channel having been swept by TU 35.8.5 (Captain G.K. Carmichael), Task Units 30.6.1, 30.6.2, and 30.6.3 arrived at Shiogama (near Sendai, in northern Honshu) and consolidated into one unit—TU 30.6.1 (Captain G.H. Bahm). Commodore Simpson landed at Shiogama for the purpose of confirming train schedules for the various camp evacuations. At 1600, the evacuation began with the arrival of 179 civilians from Fukushima, trucks and ambulances being used to transport the evacuees from the railroad station to the landing, a distance of about two miles.

At dawn on the 12th, HMAS WARRAMUNGA (DL) was loaded with 171 of the repatriates received the preceding day, and departed for Tokyo Bay. The same day, 283 prisoners were recovered from Sendai No. 7, 336 from Sendai No. 8, and 245 from Sendai No. 3, for a total of 864 persons.

On 13 September, 279 persons were evacuated from Sendai No. 10, 293 from Sendai No. 9, and 187 from Sendai No. 11, totalling 878 repatriates. The final day of operations at Shiogama yielded the greatest number of prisoners to be discovered at one camp, when 544 men were recovered from Sendai Camp No. 36. With that, the ships of the task unit remaining (after the departure of several others for Tokyo Bay) got underway for Kamaishi (farther north along the east Honshu coast) for further evacuation.

Upon arriving at Kamaishi, the task unit resumed the now-familiar procedure. Sendai Camps Nos. 4 and 5 were cleared of 598 prisoners of war. A labor camp nearby containing 167 Chinese was also evacuated, and all but seven of these, who were hospitalized, were loaded into LSMs and carried back to Tokyo Bay.
Air reconnaissance provided on 16 September by CTG 38.2 failed to locate any prisoners of war between Latitudes 39°20' N. and 40°50' N., within five miles of the coast line; so the remaining ships of TU 30.6.1 returned to Tokyo on the 17th.

Having evacuated 7,598 prisoners of war and believing that no more remained to be evacuated in the central or northern areas of Honshu, Commander THIRD Fleet ordered the task group dissolved as of 0000 (GCT) on 19 September.

The success of the operation had been aided materially by the assistance rendered by members of the Swedish Legation, the Swiss Legation, and the International Red Cross in arranging train schedules, furnishing information on the location of camps, the composition of their occupants, and their general condition.

Notwithstanding the fact that the greater part of the released prisoners of war and civilian internees were British, the over-all plan for evacuation consisted in transporting the P.O.W.s from Japan, Formosa, and China to Manila by whatever means were available. From there, after the necessary rehabilitation, they were to be transshipped to their ultimate destinations. No arrangements were provided in Manila for civilian internees, however. All U.S. Navy repatriates, an equivalent number of recovered U.S. Army personnel, and some Canadians were taken to Guam for rehabilitation and transshipment to the United States.

The United States assumed responsibility for the evacuation of all ex-prisoners of war from Japan to either Manila or Guam, and from Guam to the United States, using both U.S. ships and aircraft; but the transshipment of British ex-prisoners of war (except Canadians) from Manila to their destinations was a British responsibility. Although this was the plan, in practice British hospital ships, aircraft carriers, escort carriers, and many other vessels actually took an active part in the transportation of British repatriates from Japan, Formosa, and China (including Hong Kong) to Manila.

The problem of distributing British repatriates from Manila to their destinations was complicated by the large number of destinations involved and the scarcity of British shipping available. As a result, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet, made available for the purpose all CVs and AHS within his command. In the case of British CVs going to America, he also offered transportation to U.S. evacuees. Some ex-P.O.W.s and internees were also flown to Australia by the RAAF. In order to expedite matters further, on 27 September Admiral Fraser also requested the ACNB (Australian Commonwealth Navy Board) to assist in this evacuation of British subjects by sending some Australian cruisers to Manila.

Continuation of Amphibious and Ground Operations in the Tokyo Bay Area.

Meantime, while these P.O.W. rescue and demilitarization operations were going on, the major echelons were engaged in putting more troops ashore and in expanding the occupied areas held by the troops already ashore.

At 1200 on 2 September, the situation of the Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3) was as follows: the Fleet Naval Landing Force (TU 31.3.3) was engaged in garrisoning and providing for the internal security of the eastern half of the Yokosuka Navy Yard, the Fleet Marine Landing Force (TU 31.3.2) had a similar mission in the entire Yokosuka Airfield area, and the British Landing Force (TU 31.3.4) was engaged in occupying and securing important installations along the beach between the airfield and the Navy Yard, as well as garrisoning Azuma Island.
The 4th Marine RCT (TU 31.3.1) was engaged in garrisoning the remainder of the Yokosuka Navy Yard and Naval Base perimeter of the British sector, as well as in sending out daily patrols to demilitarize installations and small local garrisons, in accordance with information furnished by Japanese Imperial Naval Headquarters.

On September 4th, the 4th Marine RCT commenced taking over the security of the area, as remaining Navy units were detached, and by evening of that day, all Blue-jackets of TU 31.3.3 had been reembarked on their ships or on transports for return to units operating at sea. The British Landing Force (TU 31.3.4) was returned to its ships on 5 September, and the Fleet Marine Landing Force (TU 31.3.2) departed on the 6th.

Personnel from ships of TF 31 who were operating shore activities at the base were gradually relieved by personnel from CruDiv 10 and by the permanent shore-based personnel who were to be attached to Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Commodore C.O. Kessing). In preparation for this turn-over, Commodore Kessing acted as Deputy Commander of TF 31.

By the evening of 3 September, meanwhile, American and British troops had occupied approximately 720 square miles of territory in the initial zone of occupation, and were preparing to move into other sectors. Our troops, who had been held on the south bank of the Tama River since 31 August by agreement with the Japanese Government, crossed to the north bank on September 3rd and took over four more airfields—Chofu, two miles west of Tokyo; Tachikawa, nine miles west of the city; Showa, one and a half miles north of Tachikawa, and a fourth field.

The actual accomplishment of the formal surrender meant that the number of occupation troops would no longer be restrained by any delicate qualms on the part of the Allies toward overrunning the soil of an enemy while a species of temporary truce existed, and henceforth the only restricting influence would be that presented by problems of logistics. The size of the occupying force would be limited by the number of ships and troops available, and the number of divisions which the Supreme Commander should deem necessary to ensure the success of the occupation.

With the removal of these restraining inhibitions, CTF 33 (Rear Admiral J.L. Hall, Jr., ComPhibGrp 12) was assigned the task of loading, transporting, and landing in the Tokyo Bay area elements of the XI Corps and attached units, including elements of GHQ, USACOM "C", Far Eastern Air Force, and XIV Corps troops destined for the XI Corps occupation area.

The limited amount of shipping available required that the movement be made by echelons. The first such echelon, TG 33.1 (Transport Group ABLE) was composed of TransRon 16 (Temp.), with the 1st Cavalry Division (Major General W.C. Chase, USA) embarked, and TransDiv 65 (Temp.), with the 112th Cavalry RCT on board. This task group departed Batangas on 25 August, put into Subic Bay the following day when word of the postponement of the surrender ceremony was received, departed Subic on the 27th, and at 0915 on September 2nd arrived at Yokohama Harbor, where the ships anchored outside the breakwater. The movement to the objective was executed under the tactical command of CTF 33, but with CTF 32 in company, and controlling the air cover furnished during the latter part of the voyage.

On 29 August, as TG 33.1 was enroute to the objective, word was received from the Commander THIRD Fleet that the 11th Airborne Division would clear the docks and
necessary land areas at Yokohama for use by the 1st Cavalry Division, and that the Tateyama area (on the opposite side of the bay from Yokohama) would be reconnoitered on September 1st by an underwater demolition team and by a detachment of the 4th Marine RCT, which would remain in the area until the landing of the 112th Cavalry RCT was complete.

The Beachmasters for the 3rdPhibFor and PhibGrp 12, who had proceeded by air to Yokohama with the 11th Airborne Division to make a waterfront reconnaissance and the necessary arrangements in advance of the arrival of the first transport group, confirmed by radio the intelligence report that berths for approximately 12 ships of APA type would be available alongside the Yokohama docks. Upon the arrival of TG 33.1 at 0915, 2 September, the Beachmaster for PhibGrp 12 boarded the group flagship with one of the senior Japanese harbor pilots and furnished additional detailed hydrographic information.

In order to avoid possible interference with the four destroyers which were shuttling personnel back and forth from the battleship MISSOURI for the surrender ceremony, the transports were not at once brought alongside the docks. The assault troops were, however, boated as soon as the transports anchored, and a line of departure was established at the entrance to the inner breakwater. From this line of departure, waves were dispatched at five-minute intervals to the general landing areas. The specific landing points were designated by the reconnaissance parties, led by the TransDiv beachmasters.

The landing proceeded rapidly, and by 1310, all assault troops had been put ashore. At 1145, the first transports began moving to the berths alongside the Yokohama docks. Since Japanese pilots and tugs were available, they were employed, both as a matter of convenience and in order to make full use of enemy facilities. A small number of high priority vehicles for use by the XI Corps were unloaded by LCMs from the ships in the stream. The great bulk of the cargo and vehicles, however, was discharged directly to the docks, the unloading being completed on September 4th. At 0930 on that date, the Commanding General XI Corps (Lieutenant General C.P. Hall, USA) landed and assumed command of the troops ashore. A day earlier, on 3 September, the 1st Cavalry Division had set up headquarters in Hara-Machida, a road junction midway between Tokyo and Atsugi, commanding three entrances into the capital.

The initial reconnaissance of the Tateyama Airfield and Naval Base had been made on 31 August by one company of the 4th Marine RCT. Early on the morning of 3 September, the five APAs of TU 33.1.6 (TransDiv 65, Captain E.C. Rogers) got underway from Yokohama and proceeded to Tateyama Wan, where they began discharging the 3847 troops of the 112th RCT (Brigadier General J.W. Cunningham, USA) at 0730 over the seaplane ramp at the Naval Air Station, because of the poor quality of the beach exits.

Almost simultaneously, at 0746, Colonel Yamamura, of the Japanese Army, Captain Okizu, Imperial Japanese Navy, and Baron Hayasaki, a Japanese Foreign Office representative with the rank of Consul General, came aboard LAVACA, the TransDiv 65 flagship, to arrange the terms of occupation with Brigadier General Cunningham and Captain Rogers.

The Japanese delegation stated that no mines of any description and no suicide boats or swimmers were in the area, and that the Japanese naval forces in the area
consisted of two inoperative, demilitarized ships, each about the size of a sub-chaser, and two inoperative, demilitarized motor launches—all four of which were secured along the dock at Tateyama, adjacent to the Naval Air Station.

All of the stipulations set forth by the Commanding General of the 12th RCT and by CTU 33.1.6 were readily—almost hastily—agreed to. At 1100, the last assault wave of troops having reached the beach, all ships of the division proceeded to the assigned anchorage in the Inner Transport Area and commenced unloading the cargo, using the 20 LCMs and ships’ boats available. By 1200 the next day, September 4th, all ships of the division had been unloaded at Tateyama. In addition to the troops, the ships of TransDiv 65 had put ashore 355 vehicles and 3126 tons of cargo (including the vehicles).

Upon completion of unloading, TransRon 16 and TransDiv 65 were returned to the control of Com3rdPhibFor and were sailed by him to fill other commitments, TransRon 16 being assigned to the FIFTH Amphibious Force and TransDiv 65 to the SEVENTH Amphibious Force.

Transport Group BAKER (TG 33.3, TransRon 13 (Temp.), Commodore Carlson), with the Americal Division embarked, departed Cebu on 1 September, arriving at Yokohama on the 8th, and completing unloading there on the 10th.

The first LST convoy, TU 99.6.75, consisting of six LSTs carrying units of the Far Eastern Air Force from Okinawa, arrived at Yokohama the same day as TG 33.3, and also completed discharging on the 10th.

The first LSM convoy, TU 33.11.2, consisting of 34 LSMs, sailed from Manila on September 2nd, and, after a three-day delay enroute because of a typhoon along the track, arrived at Yokohama on the 9th. Two days later, TU 33.11.2 was unloaded.

Transport Group CHARLIE (TransRon 24 (Temp.), TG 33.4, Commodore Short), lifting the 43rd Infantry Division, departed Manila on 7 September, arrived at Yokohama on the 13th, and completed unloading on the 16th.

No opposition was encountered from the Japanese during these operations by TF 33. The harbor pilots and tugboat crews appeared conscious of their nation's defeat, and were submissive and completely cooperative.

Two days after the surrender ceremony, naval forces went ashore at Hamamatsu, 120 miles southwest of Tokyo, to accept the transfer of prisoners being brought in from the Nagoya area. The following day, September 5th, Army troops took over part of the Yokosuka area from the Fleet Landing Force, which had occupied it since 30 August. The same day, the 1st Cavalry Division patrolled to Tokyo, and advance reconnaissance parties entered the city without incident, to make preparations for the entry of the permanent occupation troops of the EIGHTH Army. Weather continued to delay air transport operations of the 11th Airborne Division to Honshu from Okinawa, but on the 6th, the division completed its movement to Atsugi, and the 27th Division prepared to move from Okinawa by air. No casualties were reported in the move of the 11th Airborne Division to Atsugi, but 59 were killed and 9 seriously injured in plane crashes while moving from Luzon to Okinawa.
The same day, September 6th, the 27th Division began moving into Atsugi, followed closely on the 8th by the Americal Division, which was completely ashore from the transports of TG 33.3 by noon on the 10th, and which relieved elements of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Tachikawa and Yokohama Area the following day.

On 8 September, the 1st Cavalry Division occupied Tokyo in strength with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade less the 8th Cavalry Regiment (which remained in Yokohama). The remainder of the division moved to Tokyo by motor and rail the following day.

At 0900 on 8 September, TF 31 was dissolved, and Rear Admiral Badger was relieved by Commodore Kessing, who assumed the duties of Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (TF 39), and by Commodore J.T. Acuff, Commander Service Division 102 (TG 30.9), who assumed the duties of SOPA Administrative. At 1035 on September 8th, Rear Admiral Badger went aboard IOWA (BB) and broke his flag as Commander BatDiv Seven.

With the dissolution of TF 31, the 4th Marine RCT assumed responsibility for maintenance of the defense perimeters as necessary to insure the security of the occupation forces and activities, including essential power plants, public utilities, and off-shore fortifications. This command additionally assumed general responsibility for the occupied area, issuing such orders and directives to other shore-based units as seemed necessary to insure over-all security.

The climax to the occupation of Honshu, however, came when the American Flag was raised in Tokyo on 8 September, in the presence of the Supreme Commander, the Commander THIRD Fleet, the Commanding General EIGHTH Army, and a few members of their staffs. The ensign which was hoisted to the top of a pole in the American Embassy Compound in Tokyo was the same one which had previously flown over the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., on the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor, which had later been flown over Rome on July 4th, 1944, over Berlin on 20 July 1945, and over the USS MISSOURI on 2 September 1945, on the occasion of Japan's formal surrender.

At the same time that the American Flag was being raised over Tokyo, a Royal Marine guard from KING GEORGE V (BB) was mounted over the British Embassy in that city.

Because of the great preponderance of the Japanese in Tokyo over the American troops ashore there, the Supreme Commander held the display of Allied might to a minimum, in order to avoid exciting Japanese passions.

Advance units of the 27th Infantry Division began occupation of several towns southwest of Tokyo on the 9th, one infantry regiment initiating movement to Hirasuki (at the head of Sagami Wan), while two infantry regiments occupied Zama (just north of Atsugi Airdrome) and Odawara (on the northwest shore of Sagami Bay). Meanwhile, other troops, including naval landing parties, took over the Katsuura Naval Base, on the coast east of the entrance to Sagami Wan.

On 11 September, the Americal Division relieved elements of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Tachikawa and Yokohama Areas. The XIV Corps under Major General O.W. Griswold, USA, prepared to move by water from Tokyo Bay to Sendai (an important east coast rail city 190 miles north of Tokyo) to join the advance party of the 11th Airborne Division which had departed for Sendai by rail on the 10th, when tunnel and bridge limitations prevented the movement of all troops and supplies by rail from Yokohama to Sendai and Niigata as originally contemplated.
Five days after the American Flag had been raised in Tokyo, September 13th, the 43rd Infantry Division began landing by sea at Yokohama, two RCTs boarding trains for Kumagaya, about 65 miles northwest of Tokyo, for the purpose of establishing headquarters there, while the remainder of the division continued to unload at Yokohama. At the same time, the Japanese were ordered by Supreme Allied Headquarters to turn over to occupation forces the small Haneda Municipal Airport at the mouth of the Tama River, between Yokohama and Tokyo. This action was taken with a view to rebuilding the field for use as the principal Air Transport Command terminal in the Tokyo Area.

On 15 September, XIV Corps Headquarters and Corps troops commenced unloading in the Sendai Area from transports of the THIRD Amphibious Force, while the main body of the 11th Airborne Division departed by rail and motor convoy for Sendai to join the advance party. The 1st Cavalry Division performed motor patrol and security guard missions in the Tokyo Area, and camp construction continued. The Americal Division assumed responsibility for all patrol and security missions in the Yokohama Area the same day.

By the middle of the month, the occupation was proceeding with greater speed than anticipated, all areas being occupied without incident. During the preceding week, naval units had landed in the Sendai Area to set up the machinery for evacuation of P.O.W.s from upper Honshu.

On 18 September, the 27th Division prepared to move overland to Niigata on the northwest coast of Honshu, while the movement of the 11th Airborne from Yokohama to Sendai continued. The port of Niigata was blocked by over 800 mines laid within six miles of the harbor entrance by the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force, including magnetic, acoustic, and pressure types with sterilization dates extending to February 1946. Although the Japanese had reported sweeping an entrance channel into the port, it was also reported that six of their ships had been sunk entering this harbor, making it obviously unsafe to use this channel.

Accordingly, an Underwater Demolition Team embarked in WALTER YOUNG (APD) with a representative of the THIRD Amphibious Force Commander was despatched to reconnoiter for a suitable landing beach in the vicinity of Niigata. One was located at Senami, about 20 miles northeast of that port, and all cargo destined for Niigata was satisfactorily unloaded over this beach from LSTs and LSMs.

The Parachute Glider Infantry Regiment took over the Naval Arsenal area at the small port of Shiogama (15 miles from Sendai), which proved accessible to vessels of 24 feet draft or less, and a number of LSTs and LSMs were discharged there, as well as several transports and AKAs by boat service from an anchorage outside. Miyako, Kamaishi, Hanamaki, and Ichinohe were also occupied.

At 0000, 20 September, the Commander FIFTH Fleet (Admiral R.A. Spruance) relieved Admiral W.F. Halsey, Jr., (the Commander THIRD Fleet) of all tasks and responsibilities for naval operations in Empire waters as assigned by Cincpac Operation Plan 12-45. Task Forces 32, 35, 38, and 39, and Task Groups 30.8 and 30.9 were directed to report with the forces then assigned to ComFIFTHFleet for duty at that time.

The Southwestern Japan Force (TF 51, Vice Admiral J.B. Oldendorf) assumed responsibility for the area assigned the FIFTH Fleet under the original plan; the
Eastern Japan Force (TF 53, Rear Admiral J.C. Jones) assumed responsibility for the area originally assigned the THIRD Fleet; while the Northern Japan Force (TF 56, Rear Admiral F.C. Denebrink) assumed responsibility for that area formerly assigned the Commander North Pacific Force west of the line from Cape Lopatka to latitude 42° N., longitude 155° E.

Commander THIRD Fleet's Operation Plan was canceled at the time of his relief. At 0630, 20 September, Admiral Halsey hauled down his flag in SOUTH DAKOTA (BB) and departed by air with 11 staff members and three flag allowance personnel for Pearl Harbor.

The same day, September 20th, the 27th Infantry Division occupied Kashiwazaki, Takada, Korizama, Fuchishima, Sanjo, and Nagoka in the Niigata area. At the same time, the first casualties of the occupation were incurred when an American soldier accidentally dropped an explosive which he was handling, to touch off a Japanese ammunition dump 2500 yards southwest of Tateyama Airfield. The resulting explosions killed one soldier and injured 53 others, in addition to wounding a number of Japanese.

On 21 September, advance elements of the 97th Infantry Division arrived by water in Yokohama. This division had seen action in the European Theater of Operations and was the first redeployed division to arrive in Japan. On the 27th, the 43rd Division was relieved by the 97th Infantry Division, and commenced embarkation at Yokohama for return to the United States.

By the end of the month, the EIGHTH Army had completed its scheduled phase in the initial occupation. The Tokyo-Yokohama area was firmly under its control, as were the Niigata area, the Sendai area, and the Aomori area to the north (which had been occupied initially on 26 September by the IX Corps' 81st Infantry Division, while an advance reconnaissance party of the Corps had departed by air from Ominato for Sapporo, Hokkaido, to insure Japanese compliance with the surrender terms and to make preparations for the occupation of that island in October).

During October, the 97th Infantry Division secured the Kumagawa area; the American Division, the Yokohama area; the 112th Cavalry RCT, the Chiba Peninsula; and the 158th RCT, the Utsunomiya area. These units of the XI Corps seized and secured the financial institutions of the once-powerful Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Yosuda families, maintained guards on critical installations, and moved precious metals, consisting of gold, silver, platinum, diamonds, and other precious stones to the vaults of the Bank of Japan. Enemy ammunition, small arms, and all warlike materiel were moved to regimental and divisional dumps to be inventoried and eventually destroyed or disposed of at sea. The XI Corps Artillery moved to Ibaraki Prefecture on 11 October and established its Command Post at Mito, thereby assuming responsibility for that sector.

On 11 October, the 158th RCT landed at Yokohama and the following day entrained for Utsunomiya, where the combat teams took control on the 16th. The Regiment assumed occupational control of Tochigi Prefecture and demobilized all Japanese military personnel without incident. Precious metals discovered by the 158th RCT during the remainder of the month were collected at Utsunomiya, in preparation for their transfer to Tokyo for safekeeping in the Bank of Japan.
The 112th Cavalry RCT carried on routine occupational security in Chiba Peninsula during October, spending considerable time in hauling Japanese explosives and ammunition from the Tateyama area for eventual disposal at sea.

The 4th Marine RCT, charged with responsibility for the occupation of Yokosuka Naval Base, conducted routine security patrols, collected precious metals, and supervised the debarkation of Japanese troops at Uraga. At the close of the month, this regiment was preparing to pass from the control of the EIGHTH Army to the control of Cincpac-Cincpoa, while it was contemplated that the Yokosuka Naval Base would pass to the control of the Navy and that the Marine Garrison would be reduced to one battalion.

On 22 October, the Americal Division was relieved of all occupational responsibility in Yamanashi Prefecture. During this transitional period, the Commanding General of the Americal Division assumed operational control of the 5th Cavalry Regiment on 31 October, as the 5th Cavalry was charged with occupational security of the sectors previously occupied by the 132nd and 182nd Infantry Regiments (Americal Division). Meanwhile, as other elements of the Americal Division were relieved of their duties, preparations were made for the return of the division to the United States early in November.

The 11th Airborne and the 27th Divisions, operating in the Sendai and Niigata Areas under the XIV Corps, secured all of Eastern Honshu during October. Troops of these divisions were employed in routine security patrols, the seizure and securing of critical Japanese installations, the demobilization of Japanese military and naval personnel, and the destruction of enemy ammunition and materiel. The 81st Division continued to occupy the Aomori area throughout October.

The Supreme Commander's Appraisal of Japan and Her War Potential.

Five days after the Supreme Commander arrived at Atsugi Airdrome and had been afforded an opportunity to make what was admittedly "a superficial inspection" of the occupied areas about Tokyo Bay, he summarized his impressions as follows: (1) Japan was near economic and industrial collapse, as a consequence of the home islands' being stripped by the conduct of the war. (2) The fire raids by the B-29s had apparently so destroyed the integrity of Japanese industry as to prevent the continuation of modern war. (3) Manpower alone was the only warlike resource available or potential. (4) The Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Staff were fully aware of these conditions, and, as nearly as could be judged, were "completely through with this war", their attitude encouraging the strong belief that these agencies were striving to their utmost to effect a rapid disarmament and demobilization. This interpretation was based on their submissiveness and apparent sincerity.

Further, the Chief of the Japanese Imperial General Staff had informed the Supreme Commander that the 2,250,000 men formerly under arms in the Japanese home islands would be demobilized and in their homes by 10 October. General of the Army MacArthur therefore recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that only three of the six divisions already allocated for redeployment be sent to the Pacific, these to be the two enroute and the 13th Airborne Division.
On 17 September, the Supreme Commander announced that unless unforeseen factors should arise, the occupation force in Japan would probably be pared to 200,000 regular Army troops within six months, this force being "sufficiently strong to enforce our will." Two days earlier, Lieutenant General R.L. Eichelberger, Commanding General EIGHTH Army, announced that approximately 100,000 men of the occupation army, expected at the time to total at least 400,000, had landed in Japan. He added, however, that the size of the army originally scheduled to police Japan had been reduced somewhat by the cancellation of orders for part of the railroad troops and engineers, since many of the country's installations were in better condition than had been expected. A week later, General Eichelberger stated that the latest plans called for the SIXTH and EIGHTH Armies to be built up nearly to their originally projected strength, then to be cut within six months to the 200,000 envisioned by the Supreme Commander. Although the EIGHTH Army had between 100,000 and 130,000 troops in its occupation area at the time of his announcement (very few troops had as yet been put ashore in the FIFTH Fleet and SIXTH Army zone of responsibility in southern Japan), adherence to the original plan, which was modified by the cancellation of three divisions, would have seen the SIXTH Army built up to 275,000 at the time he spoke.

Lieutenant General B.M. Giles, Deputy Commander of the Pacific Strategic Air Force, announced that the Army Air Forces would use from 30,000 to 40,000 men and approximately 800 planes to police Japan. About the same number of men and planes would also be needed in other Pacific bases such as the Philippines, the Nansel, Shoto, and the Marianas, according to General Giles.

Near the end of September, Headquarters for the Supreme Commander announced that the rapid demobilization of the Japanese Army would permit the release of a fourth U.S. division from occupation duties, in addition to the three whose redeployment was cancelled earlier in the month. This would be the 43rd Division, which had gone to the Pacific in October, 1942, and fought in the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines, having made its most recent landings in the Yokohama area. The 43rd Infantry Division was to be relieved by the 97th Division, recently redeployed from Europe, and would embark on the ships which brought the 97th to Japan.

Organizational Changes of Fleet Air Wing ONE During September.

Fleet Air Wing ONE, the chief land-based naval aviation wing in the Pacific, underwent a number of changes in organization during September. During the first few days of the month, Fleet Air Wing ONE operated as TG 95.9 (TF 95 operated under Commander FIFTH Fleet), until 5 September, when it was designated as TG 50.2, TF 95 being dissolved at that time. On 20 September, it became TG 51.7 and was assigned to the Western Japan Force for the occupation. On the last day of the month, Fleet Air Wing ONE passed to the control of Commander SEVENTH Fleet and became TF 75. Throughout September, however, the Wing remained as the Air Search and Reconnaissance Group of the FIFTH Fleet, and Rear Admiral J. Perry continued as Wing Commander, with NORTON SOUND (AV) as his flagship.

With the Wing's transfer to the SEVENTH Fleet on 30 September, it became responsible for all search and reconnaissance in the SEVENTH Fleet zone, including a portion of the FIFTH Fleet area south of Kyushu. The units at Sasebo, Wakayama, and Yokosuka, hitherto attached to Fleet Air Wing ONE, were transferred to Fleet Air
Wing 17, which assumed the search, rescue, and ferrying functions in the FIFTH Fleet area. The Okinawa Air-Sea Rescue Unit was dissolved. CTG 70.4, with CURRITUCK (AV), BARATARIA, ORCA, DUXBURY BAY, REMBOOTH (AVPs), and VPBs 17 and 20, reported to CTF 75 for duty the same day. FAW 1 also received VPBs 53 and 133.

MTBRons 31, 32, and 37, and their tenders PORTUNUS, SILENUS, and ANTIGONE (AGPs) were relinquished at the same time by Fleet Air Wing ONE, and assigned to CTG 75.5 for temporary control pending a decision by higher authority on their eventual disposition.

The units transferred to Fleet Air Wing 17 by FAW-1 were CUMBERLAND SOUND, HAMILN, PINE ISLAND, ST. GEORGE (AVs), MACKINAC, GARDINER'S BAY, SUISUN, BERING STRAIT, YAKUTAT, CORSAN, and FLOYD'S BAY (AVPs), VPBs 22, 26, 27, 205, 208, and VH 4.

Activities of FLTLOSCAP and SCAJAP.

An important link between Cincpac-Cincpoa and the Japanese Naval General Staff and the Japanese Navy Department, as well as between Cincpac-Cincpoa and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, was the Cincpac Liaison Officer with the Supreme Commander (Short title, FLTLOSCAP), Rear Admiral J.J. Ballentine, who had landed at Atsugi Airdrome on 30 August at almost the same time as General of the Army MacArthur.

With few exceptions, all instructions and directions sent to the Japanese Navy Department pertaining to naval matters, including general instructions for mine-sweeping, preparation of naval vessels for repatriation voyages, and other matters, were issued by FLTLOSCAP. Representatives of the Japanese Navy Department consulted daily with his office concerning naval matters, and General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander utilized the knowledge of the officers attached thereto whenever advice on naval matters was required.

Pending the establishment of a Shipping Control Authority for Japan, FLTLOSCAP performed the functions of such an organization. Up to 30 September, authority had been given the Japanese to resume operations with 317 cargo and passenger vessels, totalling about 388,600 tons, and representing about 56% of all the Japanese shipping reported to be operational as of 5 September, 1945. In addition, some 455 wooden vessels totalling 77,000 tons were placed in operation in the coastal trade.

Rear Admiral Ballentine also granted the Japanese permission to resume fishing, and, with the sanction of the Commander FIFTH Fleet, established areas in which this activity could be practiced.

Another function of FLTLOSCAP was the assignment of Japanese naval vessels for use in the repatriation of Japanese garrisons from the by-passed Pacific islands, the Philippines, and the continent of Asia. The Japanese merchant shipping already available evacuated Japanese nationals from Korea at the rate of 180,000 per month.

On 29 September, however, ComFIFTHFleet designated ComServRon Six (Rear Admiral D.B. Beary) as Commander Japanese Repatriation Group (CTG 50.3). A short time afterward, on 9 October, Rear Admiral Beary was designated by Commander FIFTH Fleet as Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP) and was authorized to order officers of the ServRon Six Staff to duty on
the staff of his new command. Simultaneously, he was detached as Commander Service Squadron Six. FLTLOSCAP continued to control Japanese merchant and demilitarized naval shipping until October 11th, however, when Rear Admiral Ballentine turned over these functions to SCAJAP.

The mission of SCAJAP was to control the operations of the Japanese merchant vessels and Japanese naval vessels engaged in repatriation service in the manner that would most effectively maintain a minimum standard of living in Japan and expedite the return of Japanese prisoners of war and nationals from conquered areas to Japan, to the end of supporting the Supreme Commander in the successful imposition of surrender terms upon the Empire of Japan. The Supreme Commander continued to exercise control of the repatriation program, while SCAJAP carried out the details.

During the first part of October, the Naval Technical Mission to Japan (mentioned later in the section on the Occupation of Kure-Hiroshima) continued under the operational control of the Commander FIFTH Fleet and the administrative control of the Commanding General 5th Amphibious Corps, maintaining its headquarters in Sasebo, Kyushu. Intelligence targets in the Kyushu, Kure, Osaka-Kobe, and Yokosuka-Yokohama-Tokyo areas were partially covered by NavTechJap. Experience gained during the first few weeks of operations demonstrated that for efficient functioning of the technical mission, headquarters should be located in the Tokyo area, in close proximity to the headquarters of both the U.S. and the Japanese organizations with which it must deal.

Subsequently, on 24 October, Cinopac approved the transfer of the administrative control of the Naval Technical Mission to ComFIFTHFleet, and at the month's end, the organization was preparing to move to the Tokyo area, where the majority of the personnel would be quartered aboard ship, pending completion of negotiations for the acquisition of a limited amount of office space in the Meiji Building (in Tokyo) as a headquarters office.

On 15 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed that Japanese shipping be given maximum utilization for repatriation and the maintenance of minimum Japanese economy, and that representations should be made to British, Soviet, and Chinese commands that they report to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander all Japanese shipping which could be used for the repatriation of Japanese nationals.

Because of the disastrous economic situation in Japan, it was directed that no Japanese cargo ships were to be used for the transportation of repatriates except when their cargo capacity would not be curtailed thereby. A ferry system was established between Korea and Japan and between the Ryukyus and Japan, using short-range Japanese shipping, while schedules for certain Japanese hospital ships and Japanese long-range shipping were arranged and approved. The initial allocation of Japanese shipping was 40% for repatriation from the Philippines and 60% from other Pacific Ocean Areas.

On 30 September, records indicated that 2,508,934 Japanese had to be repatriated from Korea, the Philippines, and Pacific Ocean Areas; but by contrast there were available only 47,800 passenger spaces in operable Japanese merchant vessels and 7650 passenger spaces in operational Japanese naval vessels. As a result of this situation, the War Department, on 9 October, approved the use of Allied shipping in Japanese repatriation, and thereafter, Liberty ships returning empty from the Philippines, Ryukyus, and Korea to the United States were made available for repatriation by routing them to various ports in Japan, where they unloaded the Japanese repatriates.
embarked at those three points. This did not affect the return of U.S. service personnel to the United States for discharge, since Liberty ships were not considered suitable for transporting them. A similar use was made of ISTs.

Although accurate data were available by 9 October (the date on which SCAJAP was established), it was not possible to consider repatriation from Soviet or British (except Australian) areas of command at that time. The location of Japanese to be repatriated was approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>138,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,358,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1,135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>147,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryukyus</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>221,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,079,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inasmuch as both Korea and the Ryukyus were near Japan, and repatriation from those areas could be handled by short-range vessels unsuitable for use elsewhere, the following allocation of long-range shipping was approved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Percent of Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (including Formosa)</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next problem was the repatriation of non-Japanese, of whom it was estimated on 15 October that the following numbers were to be found in the home islands of Japan:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosans</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these known non-Japanese in the home islands, there was an unknown number of personnel from other areas of the Pacific to be found there. The initial decision concerning these people was that shipping in addition to that already allocated for repatriation would not be employed for this purpose.

U.S. guards were placed aboard certain Japanese vessels engaged in the repatriation of non-Japanese, for the purpose of maintaining discipline, on the premise that delay or destruction of any shipping engaged in this duty would delay the entire program.

From 25 to 27 October, a conference was held in Shanghai at the headquarters of the Commanding General China Theater regarding the repatriation of Japanese from China
and the return of displaced Chinese from Japan, as well as the repatriation of Koreans and Formosans. This meeting was attended by representatives of the Supreme Commander, FLTLOSCAP, the Commanding General China Theater, the Commander SEVENTH Fleet, the Commanding General SEVENTH Amphibious Force, the Commander 3rd Amphibious Corps, the Chinese Government, Supreme Headquarters Chinese Ground Forces, and the War Transportation Board. The principal points discussed at the conference were the following:

(a) The ports in China, Japan, and Korea to be used for repatriation.
(b) The rate of flow of repatriates into and out of each port.
(c) The methods of employment of U.S. Naval shipping.
(d) The employment of Japanese merchant shipping.
(e) The procedure of liaison between the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine commands and the Chinese and Japanese military.

On 1 November, a directive for the repatriation of non-Japanese from Japan was issued. This directive incorporated the repatriation of non-Japanese within the system already operating for the repatriation of Japanese nationals.

On 19 November, Rear Admiral Beary was succeeded as Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP) by the former Deputy Administrator, Rear Admiral C.B. Momsen.

Eight days later the Supreme Commander revised the list of Japanese ports which could be used for repatriation. The newly-authorized ports consisted of Hakata, Hakodate, Kagoshima, Kure (to be used until Ujina was free of mines), Maizuru, Moji, and Shimonoseki (the last two to be used as staging areas until mine-free), Sasebo (for Allied ships only), Senzaki, and Uraga.

Status of Repatriation of Japanese Nationals.

By the end of October, 88 long-range Japanese ships with a passenger capacity of 59,950 persons and 80 short-range Japanese ships with a passenger capacity of 55,610 were being employed in repatriation service. Twenty-five U.S. Liberty ships on their way to the United States from the Philippines were being routed via Japan for repatriation, and 12 others were to remain in the Western Pacific area. These LSTs were to begin repatriation operations from China by 15 November, and by 15 December, 107 LSTs were scheduled for employment.

As of 1 November, the figures on those nationalities repatriated were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>272,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>183,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>459,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following tabulations for the periods indicated show the status of repatriation of Japanese and other nationals:

- Japanese
- Chinese
- Koreans
(a) Status of Repatriation of Japanese Nationals as of 28 October.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>STRENGTH (Approximate)</th>
<th>Evacuated To Date</th>
<th>To Be Evacuated (Approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Korea</td>
<td>625,000</td>
<td>205,808</td>
<td>419,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>147,287</td>
<td>4,880</td>
<td>142,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryukyus</td>
<td>176,886</td>
<td>16,951</td>
<td>159,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nearby Islands</td>
<td>67,059</td>
<td>7,382</td>
<td>59,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>34,127</td>
<td>5,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>211,563</td>
<td></td>
<td>211,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>807</td>
<td></td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>1,630,302</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>1,626,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Indo China</td>
<td>224,459</td>
<td></td>
<td>224,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>41,102</td>
<td></td>
<td>41,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
<td>936,500</td>
<td>936,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACSEA</td>
<td>643,724</td>
<td></td>
<td>643,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>16,260</td>
<td></td>
<td>16,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>6,448</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,698,877</td>
<td>272,508</td>
<td>6,426,369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Status of Repatriation of Koreans, Formosans, and Chinese from Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repatriates</th>
<th>STRENGTH (Approximate)</th>
<th>Evacuated To Date</th>
<th>To Be Evacuated (Approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>1,043,700</td>
<td>183,800</td>
<td>859,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosans</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>31,601</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>28,501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. OCCUPATION OF HOKKAIDO AND NORTH HONSHU.

Preparatory Operations.

As previously noted, the THIRD Amphibious Force (TF 32, Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson) was charged by Cincpac's operation plan 12-45 with the landing of troops of the EIGHTH Army in the THIRD Fleet zone of occupation. The Phase I areas for the EIGHTH Army were (1) the Tokyo Bay area (which has been discussed) and (2) the Aomori-Ominato area in northern Honshu.

At the moment when the surrender offer was made, the amphibious forces of the Pacific Fleet were widely spread over the Pacific, from the U.S. West Coast to Okinawa and the Philippines, engaged in troop movements and transportation of troop equipment, in overhaul, and in troop training. Plans and orders had been issued for concentration of these forces at a later date in preparation for an assault on Kyushu, but these concentrations had by no means been effected at the time of the surrender, and the simultaneous provision at the mounting points of adequate shipping to meet the dates originally established for the occupation of all Phase I areas was impossible.

Instead, therefore, of ordering ships to mounting points for all Armies simultaneously, Cincpac was obliged to adopt a system of priorities, based upon the relative dates of arrival prescribed in the basic plans. Accordingly, shipping required for Tokyo was given the first priority, that for the SIXTH Army objectives the second and third, that for Korea the fourth, and that for Aomori-Ominato the fifth.

Further, the successive availability of shipping even in the first priority was such that a substantial delay in the first movement, and consequent failure to meet the planned dates of debarkation at Tokyo, would result if the entire expedition, composed of the XI Corps, were to load and proceed to the objective as one unit. This was also true later in the case of the Aomori-Ominato Force which, at best, could anticipate considerable delay due to its being assigned fifth priority on shipping.

The basic plans were therefore modified to provide that the sea-borne units of the Aomori-Ominato Force would proceed in echelons, each echelon containing a division plus a portion of Corps and Headquarters troops, as quickly as shipping could be assembled successively for the mounting of each division. Ships carrying the first echelon of the Tokyo force were, upon completion of debarkation at the objectives, to return to the mounting areas, in order to lift succeeding echelons to either the Tokyo or Aomori-Ominato areas.

The THIRD Amphibious Force was designated as TF 32. Its principal subdivisions were TF 33, the Tokyo Force, under Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, and TF 34, the Ominato Force, under Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly. TF 34 was assigned to transport the IX Corps (Major General C. W. Ryder, USA), consisting of the 81st Infantry Division (Major General P. J. Mueller, USA) loaded at Leyte for landing at Aomori, and the 77th Infantry Division loaded at Cebu and landed at Otaru and Hakodate. The 158th RCT was to be loaded at Legaspi and landed with the IX Corps in northern Japan. (Subsequently, its destination was changed to Yokohama, to join the XI Corps.) TransRons 15 and 19 were assigned to TF 34.
Naval Occupation.

Inasmuch as these forces could not be organized and sailed to the objective as soon as seemed desirable, a naval force under Vice Admiral F. J. Fletcher, Commander North Pacific Force, departed Adak for Ominato (on Mutsu Bay, near the northern tip of Honshu) on 31 August to effect an emergency occupation. The force under Vice Admiral Fletcher's command comprised approximately 60 ships in all, led by the flagship PANAMINT (AGC), escorted by vessels of the North Pacific Force, and augmented by numerous fleet units despatched from the Central Pacific, including five escort carriers, to provide air coverage. This force arrived off Ominato on 6 September in a heavy rainstorm and proceeded to anchor.

Marines immediately manned reconnaissance boats to tour the shoreline, and naval crews prepared to immobilize Japanese shipping. Few Japanese warships were found in the port, however, there being only 8 frigates, 12 torpedo boats, 13 small gunboats, and 4 launches in the harbor ready for service. In addition, there were a damaged destroyer, an obsolete cruiser, and four merchant ships, the largest being 8000 tons.

A conference was held the following morning between Commodore R. E. Robinson (Chief of Staff to ComNorPac), and three Japanese Enissaries representing the Commandant of the Ominato Guard District. The requirements for the entry of the North Pacific Force were delivered to the Japanese, while the Japanese in turn delivered charts of the minefields in Tsugaru Straits and the entrance of Mutsu Bay, as well as data concerning the shore defenses guarding the base. With the receipt of this information, Task Group 40.4, the Minesweeping Group, commenced sweeping the entrance to Tsugaru Straits. Meantime, aircraft from TF 44 conducted a reconnaissance of northern Hokkaido, in addition to furnishing fighter cover and anti-submarine patrols.

On 8 September, Japanese pilots came aboard and assisted in bringing the entire force into the Ominato Naval Anchorage, via Tsugaru and Tairedate Straits, without incident.

The following day, September 9th, the flag officers and commanding officers of the ships of the North Pacific Force came aboard PANAMINT (Vice Admiral Fletcher's flagship) to witness the formal ceremonies of occupation. The senior Japanese Navy, Army, and civil officials were brought aboard PANAMINT at 1012. Vice Admiral Kangi Ugaki, Commandant of the Ominato Naval Guard District, Lieutenant General Toshimoto Hoshino, Commander of the Aomori Defense Force, Motokiko Kanai, Governor of Aomori Prefecture, and Yoshio Kaiho, Chief of Police, were the seniors in each category, and each was attended by appropriate aides. Vice Admiral Fletcher addressed the delegates, setting forth his policy and orders in brief, and giving the Japanese officials copies of Order No. 1 for the Emergency Naval Occupation of the Ominato Naval Guard District.

On 11 September, the North Pacific Force prepared for the evacuation of prisoners of war from the camps in the vicinity of Ominato, five P.O.W.s being freed from Bibai Prison Camp and brought aboard PANAMINT the same day. Communications were established with another camp north of Bibai, and supplies
were dropped by carrier aircraft. KILLEN (DD) boarded and inspected the Japanese hospital ship Kaasaii bound for Truk with supplies for the by-passed garrison there. No contraband was found, and the ship was permitted to proceed.

Five more P.O.W.s (all U.S. Army personnel) were recovered and brought aboard PANAMINT the following day, and on the 13th, these repatriates together with the five released on 11 September were flown to Yokosuka by a PBM of VPB 21.

The inspection of Ominato Naval Base was completed on the 13th, whereupon an inspection of the seaplane ramp was made and soundings taken for a seadrome. Inspection revealed that Ominato Airfield was better suited for operations than Kabayama Airfield.

On 14 September, KITKUN BAY (CVE), HOWORTH (DD), and HMS BARFLEUR were ordered to Hakodate, Hokkaido, for the evacuation of P.O.W.s held there. The following day, this task unit departed from Hakodate for Tokyo Bay, having embarked 296 repatriates. The same day, Lieutenant Colonel James P. Devereux, USMC, former commander of the heroic Wake Island garrison, was flown into Ominato by carrier plane from the P.O.W. Camp at Chitose, being flown south to Tokyo Bay by a PBM on the 16th.

The Japanese were ordered to commence minesweeping at the eastern end of Tsugaru Straits and off Muroran on September 15th. A total of 27 Japanese vessels sortied from various locations to rendezvous at Ohata and commence sweeping operations.

Satisfied that Japanese resistance would not materialize, Vice Admiral Fletcher detached the major portion of the fleet units that they might be reassigned where needed, and departed Ominato by PBM on the 17th to attend a conference in Tokyo with the Commanders THIRD and FIFTH Fleets. That same day, the evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and internees in Hokkaido was completed. ComNorPac returned to Ominato from Tokyo on the 19th, again hoisting his flag in PANAMINT.

After the minesweeping operations of the Japanese had been interrupted on the 18th by a typhoon which passed 90 miles southwest of Ominato, AMs of the North Pacific Force were assigned the task of sweeping the western entrance of Tsugaru Straits on 19 September, while Japanese vessels swept in the area around Shiriya Zaki.

At 0000, 20 September, the Commander FIFTH Fleet (Admiral R. A. Spruance) relieved ComTHIRDFleet and ComNorPac of their respective responsibilities in eastern and northern Japan and assumed command of all naval operations in the Japanese Empire. Most of the ships previously under ComNorPac were transferred to the FIFTH Fleet.

At that time, the U.S. Naval Support Forces in Northern Japan were constituted as Task Force 56, under Rear Admiral F. C. Denebrink, with the title Commander North Japan Force, and consisted of units in the Japanese home islands formerly under ComNorPac. The functions of TF 56 in the Northern Japan area were threefold: (a) the demobilization of Japanese naval forces; (b) the demilitarization of Japanese naval installations; (c) the disposition
of Japanese naval material, either by destruction or being rendered militarily useless, by diversion to the use of the U. S. occupation forces, or diversion to Japanese uses.

The same day, September 20th, Vice Admiral Fletcher, in PANAMINT, with DesDiv 89 less BENNETT, plus RICHEY, MILLS, and RAMSDELEN, departed Ominato and returned to Adak. Ten days later, Vice Admiral Fletcher was ordered detached as Commander Alaskan Sea Frontier, CTF 95, and Commander North Pacific Force, effective 10 October. He was succeeded by Rear Admiral R. Wood, who had previously acted as Commandant Seventeenth Naval District, Commander Naval Air Base Seventeenth Naval District, and Commander Fleet Air Wing FOUR.

**Occupation by Army Units.**

Meantime, while the North Pacific Force was effecting this emergency occupation of northern Honshu and of Hokkaido, the ships of the THIRD Amphibious Force and the Army troops which were to participate in the regular amphibious landing and occupation were mounting their forces in the Philippines.

TransRon 15, commanded by Commodore W. S. Popham, was assigned to lift the 81st Infantry Division (veterans of the PalauS Campaign) plus IX Corps Headquarters and Base Units. Of the squadron, three ships loaded at Manila, the remainder at Leyte. TransRon 15 departed from Aomori (on the coast of north Honshu) under ComPhibGrp 3 (CTF 34, Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly) on 18 September, arriving on 25 September and landing from boats without incident; part over a low seawall in the city and part over beaches to the eastward. Aomori was the only one of the four major ports in the Northern Japan area which had suffered appreciable damage during the war, being approximately 85% destroyed.

Transport stores were landed over the seawall, while the AKAs were taken alongside a dock and unloaded there. Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson (Commander THIRD Amphibious Force) had proceeded from Yokohama in MOUNT OLYMPUS (AGC) and was present at this landing. After Com5thFleet assumed responsibility for all naval operations in Japanese home waters at 0000 on 20 September, he approved the continued use of task force numbers 32, 33, and 34 for operations already in progress. All other forces assumed FIFTH Fleet designations. (TF 34 was dissolved on 15 October, but the task units of this force retained the same numeral designations under the operational control of CTF 32, until the respective dissolution of each.)

Stand-by fire support, from cruisers and destroyers of TF 34.7 (Rear Admiral Denebrink) and limited air support from two CVEs—HOGGATT BAY and MATANIKAU—which were assigned by CTF 56 (Rear Admiral Denebrink, the Commander North Japan Force) were provided for the landing of the 81st Infantry Division at Aomori on the 25th, but no firing was necessary, as the landing was entirely unopposed. The escort carriers, operating about 50 miles east of Mutsu Wan, launched a combat air patrol of four VF, a single VTB air observer, a direct air group (4 VF and 4 VTB), and four VTB photo planes at 0530 on the 25th. "Dumbo" services were furnished by VTB aircraft operating from the Ominato Seadrome. The air support units were released at dark on 25 September, the CVEs returning to Yokosuka.
The 3rd Battalion, 321st RCT, of the 81st Infantry Division, was assigned to Ominato, later moving overland from Aomori to occupy that area. Subsequently Rear Admiral Denebrink concluded an agreement with Major General Mueller (Commanding General 81st Infantry Division) whereby the Army was given jurisdiction over the eastern half of the Ominato Naval Operating Base. Included in this half were most of the stores and warehouses, over the contents of which the Army thereafter had responsibility.

The three APAs and three AKAs which were loaded with IX Corps Headquarters were not unloaded at Aomori, but awaited the arrival of TransRon 13 and joined those ships scheduled for Otaru (on the west coast of Hokkaido). The remaining three AKAs departed on 30 September for Manila for a turnaround lift. Of the remaining APAs, 11 were transferred to the FIFTH Fleet and two to the SEVENTH Fleet.

Some of the ships of TransRon 13 which returned prisoners of war to Manila were unable to arrive at loading points in time to make the second echelon of TF 34; so it was necessary to substitute four ships of TransRon 19, which was forming up at that time. The newly-constituted TransRon 13 (TG 34.8, Commodore M. O. Carlson) commenced loading the 77th Division at Cebu and IX Corps elements and base command units at Leyte, Manila, and Batangas on 20 September. The Squadron sailed on 26 September, arriving on 5 October at Otaru, where it began disembarking 10,000 troops. Three APAs and one AKA, loaded with the 3000 troops of the 306th RCT (Brigadier General Burnell) were diverted into Hakodate (the most important harbor on Hokkaido, covering about 3000 acres, but classified as a typhoon anchorage) for unloading on October 4th. CTF 34 was present at and directed both of these landings. Stand-by fire support and very limited air support from cruiser planes and PBMs of a seaplane squadron based at Ominato, similar to that provided for the Aomori landings, were present at the landings at Otaru and Hakodate, but again were not employed. At Hakodate the air support consisted of one VPB from the Air Search and Reconnaissance Group (TG 53.6, Captain Tracy, in CHANDELEUR (AV)), operating from Ominato Seadrome, and one VOS aircraft from TU 34.7.3. At Otaru, one VPB from TG 34.7 were employed. In both operations, the aircraft remained on station during the forenoon, returning to their bases by 1400.

The Hakodate detachment completed unloading on 6 October, and that at Otaru two days later, on the 8th, the docks being utilized satisfactorily at both ports. TransRon 13 was then assigned to SEVENTH Amphibious Force, while the AKAs of TransRon 15, which unloaded at Otaru, were sailed to Leyte for another lift.

On 8 October, a Japanese minesweeper suffered 11 dead and one wounded, when it struck a floating mine near Muroran, in southern Hokkaido. Three days earlier, the salvage vessel NASA MARU was sunk by a mine two miles from Niigata Light (on the northwest coast of Honshu).

TransDiv 51, consisting of two APAs and two AKAs, was formed from ships of TransRon 19 to lift elements of the IX Corps troops from Leyte. They commenced loading on 26 September and sailed on the 29th, arriving at Otaru on October 10th, after being diverted by typhoons. After unloading, the APAs were turned over to Cincpac for further assignment, and the AKAs were ordered to Manila for another lift.
As the transports disembarked the 77th Infantry Division troops and elements of IX Corps Headquarters, detachments moved by rail to Sapporo, 18 miles inland, where Major General C. W. Ryder, USA, Military Governor of the Prefecture of Aomori (northern Honshu) and Hokkaido, as well as Commanding General Aomori-Ominato-Hokkaido Occupation Troops, set up his headquarters on 7 October.

By the close of the month, the 77th Infantry Division had completed the deployment of regimental troops by assembling the 305th Infantry Regiment at Asahigawa and Rumoi, the 306th Infantry Regiment and Division Artillery at Hakodate and the 307th Infantry at Muroran and Ebetsu. From these strategically-located positions, security patrols were dispatched to all critical areas. Chinese slave labor employed in the coal mines of Southern Hokkaido precipitated many small riots against their Japanese oppressors. These disturbances, motivated by lack of food, pay problems, and old grievances, were easily quelled by soldiers of the 77th Division.

While the Japanese in Hokkaido cooperated with the American Military officials, they did not express the same friendliness which residents of Tokyo, Yokohama, and other cities previously occupied in Honshu and Kyushu had displayed. There were fewer salutes from civilian police, while smiles and bowing were less common. One theory expressed as the reason for this different attitude was that Otaru had never been bombed nor subjected to the extreme shortages of food and clothing which Japanese to the south had experienced, making it difficult for them to believe that they had really lost the war.

The people on the streets were found to be healthier, cleaner, and better dressed than the shabby, hungry residents of Tokyo and other metropolitan areas to the south. Many articles completely unobtainable in those shattered regions, or costing exorbitant prices in the black market, were found as a regular part of the stock of the department stores of Otaru.

Coordination between TF 56 and the U.S. Army.

Liaison with U. S. Army forces at Ominato was conducted through the Commander Naval Air Base, Ominato, and occasionally directly with the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 321st RCT. Army commands elsewhere in the Northern Japan area were contacted through the designated naval representatives of the task force commander.

Between 31 October and 4 November, each of the other principal ports of Northern Japan was visited by Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo, who had succeeded Rear Admiral Denebrink as Commander North Japan Force on October 20th, with the latter departing by air for Yokosuka the same day to assume command of Service Squadron 10. In addition to these coastal cities, CTF 56 paid a visit to the inland city of Sapporo, the principal city of Hokkaido, where the headquarters of the IX Corps was located. During the course of this inspection tour, Rear Admiral Deyo conferred with Major Generals Ryder and Mueller, the senior Army commanders in the area. It was the unanimous opinion of these officers that the demilitarization of naval installations in northern Japan was virtually completed. Accordingly, Rear Admiral Deyo recommended to the Commander FIFTH Fleet that TF 56 be dissolved as soon as the demilitarization of the Naval Operating and Air Bases at Ominato was completed. On 18 November, all SCAP
demilitarization directives pertaining to these bases having been complied with, they were turned over to the Army, which had expressed its readiness to occupy them.

On 19 November, TF 56 was dissolved. In accordance with recommendations made on November 11th, the various matters for which Rear Admiral Deyo had been responsible were reassigned as follows:

(1) Sailing of Japanese ships within the Northern Japan Area became the responsibility of SCAJAP.

(2) Any further minesweeping to be conducted in the area would be supervised by Commander Minecraft, U.S. Pacific Fleet. This function included the sailing of Japanese minesweepers to other areas, and their employment.

CTF 53 was directed by Commander FIFTH Fleet to take over the Northern Japan Area.

**Termination of Transfer of U.S. Naval Vessels to Russia.**

The termination of lend-lease on 5 September automatically concluded the program at Cold Bay, Alaska, under which U.S. naval vessels were being transferred to the USSR, following a period of training of the Russian crews by our personnel. Ten additional vessels in the process of training on September 5th were transferred immediately, however, bringing the total number of ships transferred to the Soviets to 129--31 less than originally planned. Two frigates, ANNAPOILS and BANGOR, arrived at Cold Bay subsequent to the termination of lend-lease and were utilized to transport personnel from that base to Seattle. In addition, SC-1055, which was undergoing repairs at that time in Dutch Harbor, was not transferred to the Soviets.

A total of 1348 Russian officers and men, who had been partially trained by Cold Bay and who were to man two PFs, five YMSs, and 24 SCs yet to be transferred, were placed aboard the SS CARL SCHURZ, along with Soviet Admiral Popov and his staff, and returned to Petropavlovsk, embarking 27 September.

**C. OCCUPATION OF KYUSHU, SHIKOKU, AND SOUTHERN HONSHU.**

**Preliminary Operations and Organizations.**

On 15 August, the Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force (CTF 54, Vice Admiral H.W. Hill) conferred with Cin cpac-Cincpoa and Commander FIFTH Fleet (Admiral R.A. Spruance) concerning the contemplated occupation of Kyushu, Shikoku, and southern Honshu by forces of the SIXTH Army, which were to be put ashore by the transport squadrons and tractor groups of the 5thPhibFor. The specific landings set up at this time were as follows:
Information received by Com5thPhibFor regarding the availability of shipping assigned to Guam made it apparent that the target dates set up in Cincpac's Operation Plan 12-45 could not be met. The tentative dates that the first three transport squadrons would be available were as follows:

- TransRon 22----19 August at Pearl Harbor.
- TransRon 18----1 September at Pearl Harbor.
- TransRon 14----1-10 September in the Philippines.

There was also reasonable assurance that the original allocation of tractor craft (90 LSTs and 45 LSMs) would be available by the same dates.

From the first it was apparent that the extensive operations which had seen the Army and Navy air forces successfully close certain Japanese ports by aerial mining had now become a boomerang, in that they closed these ports to our occupation forces as well. No method of successfully sweeping the pressure type mine was known, and their presence in certain areas created an undue hazard to the sweeping of other types of mines. Yet it was true that the other types of U.S. mines and the Japanese defensive minefields had to be swept if entry of these ports was to be effected, and the problem presented in the case of these mines was not so much one of technical difficulty as in the number of minesweeping craft required.

In an endeavor to make use of areas in which there was a presumption, though not a certainty, that pressure mines had been sown by our B-29s, CominPac conceived the idea of the "Guinea Pig" minesweeping vessel, and put his plan into action by requesting three damaged ships of Liberty and Victory type to make safety check-sweeps of channels in Japanese waters suspected of being mined. (See Section D.)

Initial studies of the effect of mines on the assigned landing operations disclosed that Sasebo (in northwest Kyushu) and Nagasaki (in western Kyushu) offered no difficulties for sweeping operations. Kobe and Osaka (in southern Honshu) were inaccessible, but the near-by port of Wakayama afforded satisfactory conditions for landing the Kobe-Osaka occupation force, and the necessary sweeping was practicable. Shimonoseki (on the southern tip of Honshu) and Fukuoka (in northern Kyushu) were inaccessible; while Nagoya (in south-central Honshu) was at first considered inaccessible, but careful analysis showed that adequate sweeping operations were practicable, by making use of the town of Yokkaichi as the landing site.
Hiroshima and Kure (in southern Honshu) were both inaccessible; but Hiro Wan, just east of Kure, afforded satisfactory conditions for landing the Hiroshima-Kure occupation force, and the necessary sweeping was practicable. Kochi (in southern Shikoku) was originally thought to present no difficulties, but the landing scheduled for that port was later transferred to Matsuyama (in northwest Shikoku), a site which offered no obstacles in the form of mines, when Kochi was discovered to be inaccessible. Tsuruga (in south-central Honshu) and Okayama (in southern Honshu) were both inaccessible.

In order to execute the occupation of the key cities as set forth in the original plans, Com5thPhibFor found it necessary to occupy the Shimonoseki-Fukuoka area by an overland movement from the accessible ports of Sasebo-Nagasaki; the Tsuruga locality from Wakayama or Yokkaichi; and Okayama from Hiro Wan.

After a conference between the Commander FIFTH Fleet and the Commanding General SIXTH Army (General W. Krueger) in the Philippines about 21 August, the following schedule of landings within the FIFTH Fleet zone of operations was tentatively planned. These dates were subject to change as circumstances might dictate:

2 September—Kagoshima, Kii Wan in support of the occupation of Kanoya Airfield.
22 September—Sasebo.
25 September—Wakayama.
26 September—Nagasaki.
3 October—Nagoya.
3-13 October—Hiro Wan.
4 October—Matsuyama.

CominPac was directed to carry out the necessary sweeping.

All landings made by SIXTH Army elements in Kyushu, Shikoku, and western Honshu were to be the responsibility of the Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force, with the Commanders Amphibious Groups 4, 5, 8, and 14 assigned specific missions. At the same time, the SIXTH Army was originally assigned troops as follows:

FIFTH Amphibious Corps — (VAC) — 2nd, 3rd, and 5th MarDivs and Corps troops.
FIRST Corps — 6th, 25th, 33rd, and 98th Infantry Divisions and Corps troops.
TENTH Corps — 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions and Corps troops.

The Amphibious Group Commanders were assigned the following missions:

ComPhibGrp 4 to conduct landings of VAC troops.
ComPhibGrp 5 to conduct landings of X Corps troops.
ComPhibGrp 8 to conduct landings of I Corps troops.
ComPhibGrp 14 to act as Commander Base Group at Manila to handle the logistics of turn-around shipping and to supervise the loading of service units, rear echelons, etc.

Prior to the actual commencement of the loading of the divisions concerned, the following changes in assignments of the divisions were made:
32nd Infantry Division assigned to VAC in place of the 3rd MarDiv detached.
96th Infantry Division assigned to I Corps in place of the 6th Division detached.

In late August, ComPhibGrp 5 was detached, and his duties were reassigned to ComPhibGrp 14. Upon the latter's detachment on 5 September, ComPhibGrp 11 was assigned to the FIFTH Amphibious Force to take over the landing of X Corps troops. The Acting Commander of Amphibious Group 14 was then assigned duties as Commander Base Group at Manila.

During the early planning stages, when the form Japanese reaction to the surrender rescript would take was still an unknown quantity, the 5thPhibFor's general conception of the operation was one of landings conducted as assaults in everything but actual firing, with naval gunfire and air support deployed and instantly ready. The initial landings of troops were to be made across suitable beaches, to be followed up by seizures of dock areas and the unloading of service elements, equipment, and stores. The necessity for minesweeping in the vicinity of each objective obviated any question of effecting surprise landings.

Later directives took cognizance of the submissive attitude of the Japanese and provided for early announcement to Japanese authorities of the dates of arrival of the occupation forces and the presentation to these authorities of the conditions to be met by the Japanese prior to these landings. Before sending any troops ashore, the Commanding General SIXTH Army determined that the Japanese people were sufficiently tractable in temper to permit the widespread travel throughout Japan of small units whose purpose was the investigation of prisoner-of-war camps and the acceleration of their evacuation. Incident to this plan, the first objectives of the 5thPhibFor--Sasebo-Nagasaki-Wakayama--were occupied by naval forces well before the arrival of occupation troops.

On 2 September, elements of the FIFTH Air Force and the 1st Battalion of the 127th Infantry (32nd Infantry Division) landed at Kagoshima (in southern Kyushu) to set up emergency airfield facilities at Kanoya to cover the movement of troops by air to the Tokyo area.

In coordination with these airborne landings, TU 95.3.8 (Captain C. M. Jensen, ComDesRon 46 in DAVID W. TAYLOR) put ashore elements of the SIXTH Army from the six LSTs of the force at Takasu, four miles west of Kanoya, on 4 September. By 0930 on the 6th, the last LST had been unloaded, and the following day, TU 95.3.8 departed for Okinawa.

This occupation allowed the entry of advanced parties, representing the Amphibious Force and troop commanders, to check Japanese compliance with the stated conditions, investigate beach and dock conditions, arrange troop and dump areas, etc. In turn, landing plans were modified to take advantage of the changed conditions.

In the forthcoming landings at various ports in southern Japan, the following procedure was followed in determining the command relations between various flag officers: When an amphibious flag officer was present and conducting scheduled occupation operations in an area within the jurisdiction of an area
commander junior to him, the immediate area of amphibious operations would be considered outside the area commander's jurisdiction. During the period that the amphibious commander was present, he would control the naval missions therein as assigned to him. The area commander would, during this period, conduct operations outside the scope of amphibious operations as directed by Task Force commander. Upon the departure of the senior amphibious commander, the area commander would assume complete naval responsibility, including control of any elements left behind by the amphibious force, such as port directors, beach parties, etc.

The initial allocation of shipping provided a total of five transport squadrons to the 5thPhibFor, three of which were definitely assigned, and two (to be designated later) were not expected to be available until about 20 September. Based on this assumption, the following additional tentative schedule for landings was set up:

(a) Operation B-3 (Kure-Hiroshima). Target date—22 October. Load 41st Infantry Division and X Corps from Mindanao in TransRon 22 (turn-around from B-2) and assigned LSTs and LSMs.
(b) Operation B-4 (Kochi) and B-5 (Okayama). Target date—25 October. Load 24th Infantry Division from Mindanao (2 RCT to Kochi, 1 RCT to Okayama) in TransRon 14 (turn-around from B-10) and assigned LSTs and LSMs.
(c) Operation B-1 (Fukuoka-Shimonoseki). Target date—21 October. Load 3rd Marine Division from Marianas to land in Sasebo in TransRon 18 (turn-around from B-10) and assigned LSTs and LSMs.
(d) Operation B-11 (Nagoya). Target date—2 October. Load 25th Infantry Division from Lingayen in TransRon to be designated and assigned LSTs and LSMs. Same TransRon on turn-around to lift 6th Infantry Division from Lingayen to Nagoya (possibly one or more RCTs to Wakayama) with target date of 26 October.
(e) Operation B-1 (Nagasaki). Target date—6 October. Load 2nd Marine Division from Marianas in TransRon to be designated and assigned LSTs and LSMs.

This schedule having been decided upon, the 5thPhibFor and PhibGrp commanders proceeded with detailed planning on this basis. Prior to actual loading, the total assignment of tractor ships to the FIFTH Amphibious Force was increased to 175 LSTs and 138 LSMs to be assigned as they became available. This augmentation allowed an increase in the number of tractor craft assigned to the earlier lifts.

Commander FIFTH Fleet arrived in Manila in NEW JERSEY (BB) on 21 August and remained until the 28th. This permitted close liaison between him and the various task force commanders in arranging details of minesweeping, fire support, air cover, and the procedure to be adopted in dealing with Japanese authorities. His operation plan covering the occupation of Kyushu, southern Honshu, and Shikoku was placed in effect on 4 September.

The task of occupying the whole of Kyushu and the adjacent islands, including the Nansei Shoto north of the 30th parallel, as well as Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Honshu (which controls the Shimonoseki Strait entrance to the Inland Sea) was assigned to the FIFTH Amphibious Corps (Major General H. S. Schmidt, USMC.)
Commander FIFTH Fleet's Operation Plan 6-45 contemplated landing the 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions of the 5th PhibCorps in the Sasebo-Nagasaki areas on B-Day plus 20, or 4 September. These landings were to be reinforced later by the 3rd Marine Division's landings in the Fukuoka-Shimonoseki areas. The 3rd MarDiv was subsequently withdrawn from the plan and the 32nd Infantry Division substituted.

The 33rd and 98th Infantry Divisions of the I Corps were scheduled to land in the Kobe-Osaka areas commencing on B plus 23, or 7 September. These landings were to be followed by landings of the 25th Infantry Division (I Corps) in the Nagoya area. The 6th Infantry Division (also of the I Corps) was to be held in reserve to land at either Nagoya or Wakayama, but was afterward released to the XXIV Corps in Korea.

The X Corps' 41st and 24th Infantry Divisions were scheduled to land in the Kure-Okayama area and on Shikoku respectively, commencing on B plus 49, or 3 October. Because of the wide dispersion of assault shipping and the magnitude of the minesweeping problem, however, these landing dates were postponed in most cases. Adverse weather also delayed the landings in some instances.

The basic conception, as outlined in Commander FIFTH Fleet's Operation Plan No. 6-45 of 27 August, was that TF 55 (the Western Japan Force, Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo, ComCruDiv 13) and TF 56 (the Southern Honshu-Shikoku Force, Vice Admiral J. B. Oldendorf, ComBatRon ONE) should together make up TF 51, of which Vice Admiral Oldendorf was also the designated commander. TF 55 was therefore a semi-autonomous force operating within another task force. Task Forces 55 and 56 were separately organized, however, under ComFIFTHFleet's Operation Plans 7-45 and 8-45 respectively, of 2 September, and separate tasks were assigned each force, effective at 0000, September 5th. For training purposes, ComCruDiv 12 (Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs) assumed command of TG 56.3 on 5 September, by orders of CTF 56.

Simultaneously with Commander FIFTH Fleet's assumption of command of all United States naval forces in Japanese home waters at 0000, 20 September, Admiral Spruance placed in effect his Operation Plan 9-45 reconstituting the North Pacific Force as TF 56 and the forces formerly constituting Task Forces 55 and 56 were consolidated into TF 51, Southwestern Japan Force (Vice Admiral Oldendorf). It was stated, however, that the TF 55 designations remained available to CTF 51. Included in the new TF 51 organization were the carrier units under the Commander Escort Carrier Force, CTU 51.3.13 (Rear Admiral C. T. Durgin).

On 22 September, CTU 51.3.13 assumed command of TG 51.3, Wakayama Covering Group. With the dissolution of TG 55.2, ComCarDiv 22 (Rear Admiral W. D. Sample) was assigned to TG 51.3 for duty.

A week later, Vice Admiral Oldendorf published his Operation Order establishing covering units for the Kure landings, with Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs (ComCruDiv 12) as CTU 51.3.3. The same order established the Nagoya Covering Unit, TU 51.3.2, under Rear Admiral Durgin.

On 8 October, Rear Admiral Deyo, having been ordered with his flagship to Wakayama to relieve Vice Admiral Oldendorf of command of TF 51, turned over command of TF 55 to ComCruDiv 4 (Rear Admiral F. G. Fahrion).
On 26 October, Rear Admiral Fahrion was redesignated as Commander Task Group 55.2, and CTF 51 (Vice Admiral Oldendorf) assumed the additional designation of Commander Task Force 55.

Three days later, 28 October, Vice Admiral Oldendorf (CTF 51 and CTF 55) assumed naval responsibility for the area originally assigned Commander FIFTH Fleet, which corresponded to the land area controlled by the SIXTH Army. The same day, Vice Admiral Oldendorf placed his Operation Plan 8-45 in effect, setting up operational groups within TF 51 and dividing the Southwestern Japan area into five administrative groups in TF 55.

Assignments of Shipping for Southern Japan.

As a result of additional allocations of shipping to the FIFTH Fleet and the availability of certain transport squadrons earlier than expected, a considerable change in the original schedule listed above was made possible. The revised schedule was as follows:

(a) TransRon 12 was assigned to the FIFTH Fleet and became available in the Marianas about 10 September. By this time, the 3rd MarDiv had been replaced in the FIFTH Amphibious Corps by the 32nd Infantry Division. This assignment and availability permitted loading the 2nd MarDiv to land at Nagasaki with a target date of 23 September, which was later confirmed.

(b) TransRon 16 was assigned to the FIFTH Fleet and became available at Leyte about 11 September. It was detailed to Operation B-3 (Kure-Kiroshima). This availability would have permitted a landing at Hiro Wan on 28 September, but the mine force was not able to meet this advanced date; so an alternate target date of 3 October was set. Additional delays, partially chargeable to typhoon weather, caused a postponement of this landing date to 6 October.

(c) TransRon 22 was assigned to lift the 32nd Infantry Division from Luzon to Sasebo with a target date of 15 October.

(d) TransRon 20 was assigned to B-11 Operation (Nagoya). At the time the transport squadron became available, it appeared practicable to meet the originally-assigned target date of 2 October. Minesweeping difficulties caused a postponement to 7 October. At the time when Vice Admiral Hill was relieved as Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force on 3 October, the minesweeping unit had recommended a further postponement until October 14th, but no decision was reached until the 22nd, however. An inspection of dock facilities at Yokkaichi subsequent to the Wakayama landing showed severe damage from an earthquake, and the site of the landing was transferred to Nagoya itself.

(e) TransRon 12 (on turn-around) was assigned to lift the 96th Infantry Division (which had been selected to replace the 6th Infantry Division) from Mindoro to Nagoya and Wakayama with a target date of 25 October.

In order to increase the lighterage available, and to provide transportation for the air force units from Okinawa, Com5thPhibFor requested and was assigned 110 LCTs available at that island. Of this reinforcement, 50 LCTs were assigned to the Sasebo Operation and 60 to that at Wakayama. These LCTs made the trip.
to their destinations under their own power, but escorted by DD/DE types and by tugs.

Upon its arrival at the original destination, the Sasebo Unit was made available for partial reassignment to the Nagasaki Operation and to Shimonoseki-Fukuoka (when these ports were opened) as desirable, and the Wakayama Unit was similarly made available for the operations at Yokkaichi-Nagoya and at Kure.

Evacuation of Prisoners of War from Southern Japan.

As the first U. S. troops began to land in Japan, it became apparent that the evacuation of Allied prisoners of war must receive the highest priority if many of them were not to succumb before assistance arrived, as a result of their poor physical condition. As we have seen, the evacuation of P.O.W.s from Honshu by THIRD Fleet and EIGHTH Army rescue teams began immediately. On 3 September, the day after the surrender ceremony, a FIFTH Fleet delegation headed by Rear Admiral D. C. Ramsey, Chief of Staff to Admiral R. A. Spruance, flew to Yokohama for a two-day conference with the staff of the Supreme Commander on the evacuation of Allied prisoners of war from Southern Japan.

The plan agreed on called for the EIGHTH Army to extend its evacuation program to the west, and to evacuate P.O.W.s through Osaka to Tokyo until relieved by FIFTH Fleet and SIXTH Army units. The RAMPS (Recovered Allied Military Personnel) on Shikoku were to be ferried across the Inland Sea to the mainland of Honshu, then moved by rail through Osaka to the Tokyo area.

The FIFTH Fleet and SIXTH Army organized two evacuation forces consisting of suitable landing craft, hospital ships, transports, Army contact teams, truck companies, and naval medical personnel. Two ports, Wakayama and Nagasaki, were established as evacuation centers for all western Japan. To the SIXTH Army belonged the responsibility of supervising the delivery of the RAMPS to these two ports. The medical examination and processing became the function of the FIFTH Fleet. This was accomplished by stationing Navy medical teams at both ports and by assigning medical officers and corpsmen to accompany Army recovery teams into the various prisoners of war camps.

The Evacuation of P.O.W.s from Nagasaki - On 11 September, TU 56.5.1 (Rear Admiral F. G. Fahrion, ComCruDiv 4) arrived at Nagasaki to commence the repatriation of Allied P.O.W.s rescued from camps in that area and brought to that port for evacuation to Okinawa. The medical examination and processing station was established in a large warehouse near the docks, but the hospital ship HAVEN remained at the dock in the capacity of a station and screening hospital. She also supplied the processing station with steam, hot water, general utilities, and food.

Some medical teams were stationed on the dock; others worked with Army recovery teams which went to the various prisoner of war camps. The medical screening was so planned that every prisoner was routed past a battery of trained nurses and interpreters, where a check-off questionnaire was made. This included a brief summary of the individual's military and naval experience, the date of his capture, the type and degree of his sickness in camp, his mistreatment or punishment in camp, the quality and quantity of food he had been given, and his occupation while a prisoner. More than 9000 personal statements
were obtained in this way.

The medical examinations and processing disclosed many instances of brutality. On the other hand, close questioning often brought out that the prisoner had been guilty of breaking some petty but strict prison rule. A considerable number of the older men stated that the camp treatment, although extremely severe, was on the whole not too bad. They expected quick punishment when caught for an infraction of the rules, and they were not disappointed. All complained of the food, clothing, housing, and lack of heating facilities. Malnutrition was common. Many serious cases of beriberi and tuberculosis required hospitalization.

A total of 9061 RAMPS were evacuated at Nagasaki. Of this number, 685 were stretcher cases or patients so weak as to require hospitalization. The rest, more than 92%, were able to proceed on transports as ambulatory troop passengers. Upon their arrival at Okinawa, many RAMPS were flown in troop-carrying C-46s to Manila.

By 22 September, the evacuation of these P.O.W.s from the Nagasaki area had been completed. Meantime, the medical officers of TU 56.5.1 had found opportunity to study at first hand the effects of the atomic bomb dropped on 9 August upon the inhabitants of Nagasaki.

On 12 September, many bomb victims were still being treated for burns, fractures, and a type of severe anemia said to be due to exposure to the radio-active gamma rays released by the bomb. The availability of HAVEN (AH) at the dock created a fortunate opportunity for factual clinical findings, since the main hospitals and the Nagasaki Medical College, including practically all medical equipment, had been destroyed. The facilities of HAVEN permitted X-Ray studies and a collection of valuable pathological specimens, biopsies, and autopsies to be made. Preliminary findings indicated that many victims were suffering from the radioactive gamma rays, which produced a delayed severe anemia. This was accompanied by a great reduction in white cells, simulating a type of pernicious leucopenia or agranulocytosis.

The Evacuation of P.O.W.s from Wakayama — Task Unit 56.5.2 (Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs, ComCruDiv 12) was formed on 4 September to evacuate RAMPS and Allied civilian internees from the Prisoner-of-War and internment camps of western Honshu and Shikoku, a group estimated by intelligence reports at 10,000 persons. The port of Wakayama (in southern Honshu) was selected as the evacuation port because of its centralized location and its position as a rail center. TU 56.5.2 was therefore designated as the Wakayama Evacuation Unit, and comprised MONTPELIER (CL)(F), SANCTUARY and CONSOLATION (AHs), CABILDO (LSD), TANEX (CGC), HOPPING, COFE., and TATUM (APDs), LUNGA POINT (CVE), FLOYD's BAY (AVP), and four DEs of CortDiv 86.

The Wakayama Evacuation Unit anchored in Wakanoura Wan (a smaller but comparatively sheltered anchorage just south of Wakayama Beach) the afternoon of 11 September, and during the evening the initial contact was made with Major B.F. Maloney, USA, the SIXTH Army representative in the Wakayama area, who had arrived there during the morning to assist the Evacuation Unit and to prepare the way for landing of the I Corps of the SIXTH Army later in the month. Contact was also established with Japanese officials representing the Vice Governor of Wakayama prefecture.
In the forenoon of the 12th, representatives of CTU 56.5.2 went ashore and examined facilities for processing, examining, and transporting recovered Allied military and civilian personnel from the Wakayama-Osaka Railway Depot to the evacuation ships in Wakanoura Wan. Japanese civil authorities were found to be cooperative, and a resort hotel, the Mampa Ro, on the north shore of Wakanoura Wan, was obtained by Major Maloney for use in processing RAMPS. A small warehouse near the only serviceable jetty in Wakanoura Wan was taken over as headquarters for the Beachmaster Shore Patrol.

Events proved that the original estimate of 10,000 prisoners of war to be evacuated through Wakayama was considerably exaggerated, as Major Maloney revealed that only about 2600 were to be expected. It had been thought that the first of these would arrive during the night of 12-13 September, but these were diverted to Nagasaki and never appeared at Wakayama.

Throughout the day of September 13th, preparations went forward for the arrival of the RAMPS. The hospital unit and the medical examination rooms of the Mampa Ro Hotel were set up, staffed, and equipped by all ships in the unit, but principally by the hospital ships. Showers and a decontamination unit were installed. Stocks of fresh clothing were sent ashore, a galley was set up to feed on a 24-hour basis, and voice radio and signal stations were established at the hotel and at the Beachmaster's headquarters. During the afternoon of the 13th, HMNZS GAMBIA (CL) and NIZAM (DD) stood in to Wakayama and added their facilities.

The first train bringing RAMPS to Wakayama from the Prisoner of War Camp at Nii Hama, in Shikoku, arrived on 14 September. The litter cases, including those mentally defective and (should any appear) women and children, were to be processed and dispatched directly to designated hospital ships. The ambulant males (by far the great majority) were transported by boat from the jetty to the Mampa Ro Hotel, about a quarter mile to the westward, where they were processed.

Upon arriving at the hotel, the RAMPS checked their gear and were stripped, showered, and decontaminated. Next, they underwent a thorough medical examination, were issued fresh ship's store stock clothing, were fed and examined. SIXTH Army Recovery Teams interviewed each RAMP, giving him an opportunity to send a cable home and to file an affidavit with the War Crimes Commission representative. A Records Unit compiled statistics on the RAMPS, and a designating officer assigned each RAMP to his ship. Upon leaving the hotel and reclaiming their gear, the RAMPS were sent directly by boat to their assigned ship.

The work of processing and embarking RAMPS continued throughout the morning of 15 September. By 1500, the last RAMP had been embarked in his evacuation ship. During a period of 27 hours, a total of 2575 recovered personnel had passed through the processing machinery. They came from Prisoner of War and civilian internment camps at Obe, Zentsuji, Nii Hama (Hiroshima No. 2), Tamano (Hiroshima No. 3), Omine (Hiroshima No. 4), Motoyami (Hiroshima No. 6), and Ohama (Hiroshima No. 7). They included U. S. sailors from Guam, U. S. Marines from Wake, U. S. soldiers from Corregidor and Bataan, Australians captured in Java, Dutch from Sumatra, British and Scotch taken at Singapore and Hongkong. As it turned out, there were no women, no children, and only a handful of civilians.
Typhoon of 17-18 September - With the departure of SANCTUARY (AH) and CARRIZO (LSD) for Okinawa, HOFFING (APD) for Guam, and LUNGA POINT and COOPER for Nagasaki on the 15th, it was planned to sail CONSOLATION for Okinawa, and TATUM for Nagasaki, to assist in RAMP evacuation, but the presence to the southwest of the Ryukyus of a typhoon which was moving northwest, caused these plans to be deferred, and on 16 September, TU 56.5.3 (the LST Unit) was recalled to Wakanoura for protection.

The majority of ships were at anchor on one half hour's notice for full power when the center of the typhoon struck the southeast coast of Shikoku shortly after nightfall. At Wakayama, winds of 50-60 knots, with gusts up to 90 knots, were experienced. The barometer fell to 28.94. Maneuvering control was lost on many vessels, and dragging anchor was prevalent. TATUM (APD) dragged her anchor to within 200 yards of the seawall along the northeastern shore of Wakanoura Wan and would have been driven into the wall had she not slipped her anchor and gotten underway. Unfortunately, while accomplishing this, her First Lieutenant and two enlisted men were lost overboard.

Heavy seas carried YMS 478 up on the north shore of Wakanoura Wan, where she broached and capsized, and was finally deposited high and dry on the beach between Dejima and Tanoura Villages. One officer and one man were lost during the disaster. Subsequent inspections by CTG 52.6 and SOPA (Admin) disclosed that salvage was impossible, and she was given up to cannibalization.

During the typhoon, three LSTs (555, 965, and 890) were driven aground and considerably damaged on the north coast of Wakanoura Wan. Eventually, however, LSTs 890 and 965 were unbeached on the 22nd and 23rd respectively with the assistance of LCMs and other LSTs. No personnel casualties were incurred by any of these three LSTs. LST 555 had to be pulled off by a rescue tug.

Damage was considerable in Osaki Wan, adjacent to and south of Wakanoura, where small craft had been berthed. LCIs 320 and 350 were driven aground, but unbeached themselves without aid at high tide on the night of 20 September. Damage was negligible, and these ships returned to duty the next day. LCI 814 was damaged at the waterline by collision but continued to operate. One LCVP was sunk, but no personnel casualties were incurred. One PBM-5 seaplane was lost, with one member of her crew.

Occupation by SIXTH Army Units.

Occupation of Sasebo - The Southern Occupation Group, TG 54.1 (Rear Admiral L. F. Reifsnider, ComPhibGrp 4) was assigned the task of mounting, moving, and landing SIXTH Army troops assigned to the occupation of the Sasebo-Nagasaki and Fukuoka-Shimonoseki areas of southern Japan, following the termination of hostilities. The particular SIXTH Army force assigned to these operations was the FIFTH Amphibious Corps (Major General H. S. Schmidt, USMC), consisting of the 5thMarDiv (Major General T. E. Bourke), and 2ndMarDiv (Major General L. F. Hunt) the 32nd Infantry Division, U. S. Army (Major General McBride, USA), as well as 5thPhibCorps Headquarters and Corps troops. These divisions were mounted in the Hawaiian, Marianas, and Philippine areas respectively, and moved progressively as separate groups to the Sasebo-Nagasaki area in accordance with the movement orders issued by the Commander Southern Occupation Group.
On 14 September, the Commanding General SIXTH Army (General W. Krueger, USA, CTF 59) embarked at Manila in AUBURN (AGC) with the Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force (CTF 54, Vice Admiral H. W. Hill) and sailed for Sasebo via Okinawa. AUBURN arrived at Okinawa on the 18th, where conferences were held between those aboard and Vice Admiral J. B. Oldendorf (Commander Southwestern Japan Force) and Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs (ComCruDiv 12), as well as with representatives of Cominpac.

Two days later AUBURN arrived at Sasebo, where she was boarded by the Commandant of the Sasebo Naval District, Vice Admiral Sugiyama, who was apprised of the arrangements expected of him in order to facilitate the landings at both Sasebo and Nagasaki.

The Commander Southern Occupation Group in MOUNT MCKINLEY (AGC), together with TransRon 22 (TG 54.2, Commodore S. P. Jenkins) and attached tractor units, with 5thPhibCorps Headquarters and the 5thMarDiv embarked, arrived at Sasebo at 0600 on 22 September, where they were met by Japanese pilots who assisted the transports in entering the harbor. All units of the Sasebo Group, except LST Group 14, entered Sasebo Ko on the 22nd. Three Japanese aircraft carriers were found in the harbor, but all had previously been demilitarized.

The beaches were composed of cement seaplane ramps which presented no difficulty to the boats, as long as they hit the ramps at a speed sufficiently low to prevent damage to the boats upon impact. A fast-falling tide presented some difficulty to cargo-laden boats, but despite this fact, there was very little salvage required, and more than an adequate number of salvage boats.

The debarkation of troops and unloading of cargo commenced immediately after TransRon 22 entered the harbor on 22 September, elements of the 26th RCT (5thMarDiv) being landed by boat over the ramps at the Naval Air Station, commencing at 0900. A total of 10,000 troops were debarked prior to 1800 on A-Day, all of the ships of the transport squadron having moved into the inner harbor and docked at the Outfitting Basin and Dry Docks for general unloading of the 27th and 28th ACTs, 5thMarDiv Headquarters, and the cargo, as soon as the initial RCT had established itself ashore.

The 5thMarDiv completed unloading troops, and ComGen 5thMarDiv assumed control of the troops ashore at 1330 on the 23rd. The Commanding General of the 5thPhibCorps (Major General Schmidt) moved his headquarters ashore and assumed control of the troops ashore at 1600 the same day. General Krueger assumed command of all forces ashore in the 5thPhibCorps zone of responsibility at 1000 on 24 September. At 1615 the previous day, a detachment of the 5th Marine Division entered Omura, southeast of Sasebo, without incident.

The unloading of troops and cargo continued with such dispatch on the 24th and 25th that TransRon 22, together with the remainder of the initial shipping, having put ashore approximately 18,000 Marines, was able to sail in two echelons to the Philippines on the 25th and 26th, to load the 32nd Infantry Division for the Fukuoka-Shimonoseki landing in October. With the departure of ComTransRon 22, Major General Schmidt assumed responsibility for further unloading operations at Sasebo. On the 27th, patrols of the 5th Marine Division moved to Kawatana, 10 miles southeast of Sasebo.
Prior to the beginning of the occupation of Sasebo on September 22nd, ComDesRon 5, Captain F. D. McCorkle (CTG 55.10) had been ordered to act as CTF 55's representative in that port, procuring information concerning berthing and other facilities at Sasebo Harbor and the surrounding area, in order to provide the occupation forces with advance data essential to their amphibious landings. Subsequently, CTG 55.10 formed technical teams from the various destroyers present to conduct inspections of all Japanese naval and merchant craft in the Sasebo area and insure that the Japanese had complied with the directives of the Supreme Commander pertaining to the demilitarization of all ships.

At 0600 on A-Day (September 22nd), CTG 55.10 embarked in BURDO (APD), together with representatives of the 5th Amphibious Corps and Japanese pilots, and rendezvoused with the Southern Occupation Group, TG 54.1, outside Sasebo Ko, at which time Captain McCorkle provided Rear Admiral Reifsnider with harbor information of immediate moment to the ships of TransRon 22 in effecting the landing of troops and in unloading cargo.

Having been designated on 19 September as Naval Inspector of Japanese Vessels, Captain McCorkle, or the teams under his command, inspected between 24 September and 25 October, approximately 600 craft, comprising three aircraft carriers (including the 30,000-ton JUNYO), the medium light cruiser SAKAWA, destroyers, coast defense ships, submarines, suicide craft, motor torpedo boats, training ships, tugs, oilers, and merchant ships. No Japanese violation of surrender terms was discovered at any time, however.

During these inspections, various Japanese naval officials worked regularly with CTG 55.10, who found them peaceful and "incredibly helpful and cooperative". As far as Captain McCorkle could observe, they literally "bent over backwards" to observe the treaty provisions in an endeavor to insure complete, accurate, and full compliance with all directives issued, whether by day or night, and many of them went so far as to declare that "we are glad you are here".

Only one instance of uncooperativeness on the part of a Japanese naval commander was observed. This offender was Lieutenant Commander Yasuo Hanzawa, Commanding Officer of the Coast Defense Ship TSUIISHIMA, who was insolent and provocative during the inspection made of his ship at about 1600, 26 September. The matter was brought to the attention of CTG 55.10 at 2200, who in turn brought it to the attention of CTF 55 at 2300 the same date. Before the resulting official directive could be delivered to the Japanese at 0900 on the 27th, the offending officer had already been placed under arrest by the Japanese and locked up in Sasebo, some 20 miles from his ship in Omura Wan. Within 48 hours of the incident, he was relieved of his command and dismissed from the Japanese Navy.

These destroyers inspecting teams were each composed of a destroyer commanding officer and four to 10 of his officers. All were accompanied by a Japanese naval officer appropriate to the size of the ship to be inspected, together with a Japanese interpreter. In all larger ships such as carriers, cruisers, or destroyers, CTG 55.10 or a DesDiv Commander accompanied the inspection party.

As a result of his inspections, ComDesRon 5 recommended that the light cruiser SAKAWA be acquired immediately by the U.S. Navy, in order that its speed and combat qualities might be fully ascertained, and that all other...
Japanese naval vessels in the Sasebo area which displaced more than 1000 tons under any condition of loading, except coast defense ships, should be cannibalized, then sunk.

Occupation of Nagasaki - On 23 September, one day subsequent to the landings at Sasebo, TransRon 12 (CTG 54.3, Commodore H. B. Knowles) with the 2nd Marine Division embarked, arrived at Nagasaki (on the west coast of Kyushu) on schedule, and at 1300 the 2nd RCT began landing on the east side of Nagasaki Harbor on the finger piers north of Dejima Wharf, while the 6th RCT went ashore on the west side near Dry Dock No. ONE, to bring the number of troops ashore to approximately 7000. Soon afterward, instructions were issued to the Governor of Nagasaki concerning the part he was to play in the occupation.

At 0620 the following day, troops of the 8th RCT and miscellaneous units commenced landing over the same piers used by the 2nd RCT, to bring the total personnel and material discharged to approximately 12,000 troops and 10,000 tons of cargo. With the arrival of the tractor group at 0830 on the 24th, the harbor, which had already been cluttered up by the 17 transports tied up at Nagasaki, now became thoroughly congested--particularly in the inner harbor. To make matters worse, the roads leading out of the port were of such poor quality that the spearheads attempting to move overland to the other cities and towns in the area were quickly immobilized by the congestion existing there.

At 0900 on the 25th, ComGen 2ndMarDiv assumed command ashore. Despite inadequate dump areas and road congestion which retarded the unloading rate, midnight of the 27th found all of the APAs and all but two AKAs unloaded, with 19,378 troops and 32,100 tons of cargo already ashore. The same day, elements of the 2nd MarDiv moved overland to Isahayu and Kikabori, five miles southwest of Nagasaki.

With the unloading of the last transports and ships of the tractor group on 28 September, the total of personnel put ashore was brought to 20,051. In addition, 34,954 tons of cargo had been discharged, including 3285 vehicles.

Occupation of Wakayama - The Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT, as Commander Eastern Occupation Group (CTG 54.5 and CTG 54.6, Rear Admiral A. G. Noble) was given specific responsibility for transporting the I Corps (Major General I. P. Swift, USA) to its assigned occupation area, centering around Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto-Nagoya. The I Corps planned to establish headquarters at Osaka and desired that its troops and equipment be landed as near to that city as possible.

A careful study of Allied offensive mining revealed that a landing in the Kobe-Osaka area was impracticable, if not impossible, without extensive and hazardous preliminary minesweeping operations, and the need for early entry of occupation forces precluded any extended delays for essential minesweeping. After a series of discussions between the Army and Navy commanders concerned, the decision was reached to land the initial occupation force with its supplies and equipment over Wakayama Beach (in southern Honshu) on September 25th.

While planning continued and the forces involved were preparing for embarkation at the various staging areas, minesweepers were busy at the objective clearing a swept channel through Kii Suido (the strait separating Shikoku from the Wakayama area of Honshu) to the proposed transport area and landing beaches.
Because of the early target date, together with the hazards presented by the U.S. pressure mines guarding the approaches, and the adverse weather conditions, it was necessary to restrict the swept channel to a path 6000 yards wide.

The Naval Gunfire Support Force (TF 51, Vice Admiral Oldendorf) arrived in the Wakayama area on 22 September (K minus 3 Day) and found the Japanese so cooperative that naval gunfire support was deemed unnecessary. A conference held between Vice Admiral Oldendorf and Vice Admiral Oka, Commander Kobe-Osaka Area, and Rear Admiral Yokoi, Liaison Officer for the Wakayama District, settled such matters as the restoration of navigational aids in Japanese waters and Japanese cooperation in the minesweeping program.

Underwater Demolition Teams 3 and 17, which arrived in the objective area ahead of the occupation group, reported that the beaches were clear of obstacles and fortifications, and that a pier on the right flank of Yellow Beach, although unsuitable for unloading, could be used as an anchor for a pontoon dock.

The ships proceeded through the swept channel at Kii Suido and anchored off Wakayama Beaches at 0630. At 0827, the 130th and 136th RCTs from the 33rd Division began landing in 11 scheduled waves, departing for Kobe and Kyoto as quickly as they gained the shore. At 0846, the Commanding Officer of the 136th RCT assumed command of the forces ashore.

Seven LSTs and 21 LSMs of Tractor Unit Baker and 61 LCTs of TU 54.24.5 beached at high tide and unloaded during the day. The troops scheduled for the occupation of Osaka moved by vehicles over poor roads and railroads at the rate of 700 per hour. A third RCT, the 123rd, landed on call at 1330 on the 25th, and at 1730, the SIXTH Army and I Corps troops commenced landing. By midnight of K-Day, 20,750 troops, 2486 vehicles and 7820 tons of cargo had been discharged at Wakayama.

Excellent weather held throughout the day, making it possible for more Army personnel to have been put ashore, but troop unloading was ordered held to the number that could be cleared from the area by train and mobile equipment to the occupation areas at Kobe-Osaka and Kyoto. The beach at Wakayama sloped gently, was composed of fine sand, and had very little surf, making it quite suitable for unloading small boats, except at low tide, when a sand bar about 40 feet out from shore made unloading difficult.

All beach party labor was provided by the Army Engineers, who made use of Korean laborers and a Japanese defense battalion of about 40 men, in addition to our own troops. At no time during the night or morning of 25-26 September were more than 340 men engaged in unloading the boats. This number proved to be insufficient, with the result that congestion developed all along the beach, and many boats were left high and dry when the tide receded. The Navy Beachmaster made every effort to get more troops and equipment, but the two cranes working on the beach were put into operation only after many hours of unloading without benefit of their assistance. Many LCVPs had to remain off the beach for as long as 12 hours before being unloaded. Despite these handicaps, hard work on the part of all concerned brought the total number of troops ashore by the evening of 26 September to 31,424, while 4987 vehicles and 16,118 short tons of cargo had been unloaded by that time.
At 0900 on the 26th, ComGen33rd Infantry Division (Major General P. W. Clarkson, USA) assumed command ashore. Rear Admiral Noble assumed duties as SOPA (Administrative) at 1200 that day, and at 2000, Major General Swift assumed command of all I Corps troops ashore, establishing his command post at Osaka. The same day, TransRon 14 sailed for the Philippines, having completed unloading.

The following day, September 27th, the Wakayama Group, with the 98th Infantry Division (Major General Harper, USA) embarked in TransRon 18 (Temp.) and Tractor Unit 54.25.2, landed at 0830, the 389th and 391st RCTs making the initial landings. During the next 24 hours, 14,867 troops, 989 vehicles, and 6188 short tons of cargo were put ashore, despite the fact that the weather had become unfavorable. The pontoon dock at the landing beaches was expanded with all possible speed to expedite unloading and the discharge of shipping.

The unloading of TransRon 18 and the remaining LSTs continued on 28 September. The Commanding General 98th Infantry Division assumed command ashore at 1200 that day, establishing his command post at Kashihara. The same day, General Krueger (ComGenSIXTHArmy) transferred his command post to his headquarters at Kyoto. One RCT of the 98th Division landed at Wakayama and departed at once by rail for the Taisho Airdrome.

A threatening typhoon on 29 September led to the adoption of precautionary measures by the landing ships, but unloading continued, bringing the cumulative totals by 1800 to 48,995 personnel, 7305 vehicles, and 41,083 short tons of bulk cargo.

Heavy swells stopped general unloading on the 30th and required temporary dismantling of the pontoon dock, but before the unloading was thus halted, the cumulative totals put ashore had been brought to 54,628 personnel, 10,138 vehicles, and 48,478 tons of cargo. Heavy swells and high surf precluded the beaching of amphibious craft in the Wakayama beaches from 1 to 5 October, but some supplies and equipment were put ashore during this period by LCTs in the estuary of the Kino Gawa. On the 6th unloading was resumed from LSTs.

On 2 October, Rear Admiral Sample (Commander Kure Carrier Support Unit and ComCardiv 22) accompanied by Captain C.C. McDonald (Commanding Officer of Admiral Sample's flagship SUWANEE) took off in a "Mariner" based on ST GEORGE (AV), at anchor in Wakayama Harbor, for a local flight of eight hours' duration with a radius of 75 miles from base. When nothing was heard from them, other PBMs, supplemented by aircraft from Santee and SUWANEE (CVEs), conducted a coordinated search, but no traces of any kind were found, although the search was continued until October 18th.

In addition to directing the amphibious landing and occupation of Wakayama, Rear Admiral Noble, as Commander Eastern Occupation Group, had been charged with responsibility for directing the landing and occupation of Nagoya, with a target date of 2 October. When magnetic mines were unexpectedly discovered in northern Ise Wan, and adverse weather conditions hindered the operation of minesweepers in this area, the target date was postponed to October 25th, by which date it was believed that the Nagoya area would be sufficiently safe for shipping. Much of the shipping destined for Nagoya, including TransRon 20 (with the 25th Infantry Division embarked) was therefore diverted to Wakayama to await the opening of Yokkaichi and Nagoya Harbors. Other shipping destined for Nagoya
but not yet underway, was ordered held in the Philippines until the date of
M-Day had been settled upon.

All amphibious shipping of the initial lift of Headquarters SIXTH Army,
Headquarters I Corps, and troops of the 33rd and 98th Infantry Divisions were
completely unloaded by October 8th. The totals put ashore comprised 58,140
personnel, 10,346 vehicles, and 52,855 short tons of bulk cargo. The unloading
of 55 LSTs during the first five days at Wakayama could not have been accom-
plished with the available facilities had it not been for the erection and use
of the pontoon dock.

After repeated violation of restrictions had resulted in cancellation of
fishing privileges on the 20th, Rear Admiral Noble conferred with Japanese re-
presentatives on 22 October concerning control of fishing craft in the Wakayama-
Wakanoura areas, and the Japanese were directed to submit a written proposal
for the control of their own craft. If such proposals proved satisfactory,
ComPhibGrp 8 would authorize the resumption of fishing.

Changes in Command Reassignments between the Wakayama and Hiro Operations
- In order to make troop shipping available for demobilization at the earliest
practicable time, all APAs and APs were ordered released to duty in the "Magic
Carpet" (the code name given the operation for the return of personnel to the
United States under the point release system), upon completion of their original
lifts as assigned.

By 3 October, TransRon 18 had been so released, TransRon 12 was loading
the 96th Division but would be released upon completion of its current opera-
tion, and TransRons 14, 16, 20, and 22 (less AKAs) were likewise to be released
upon completion of their current lifts.

At 1200 on 3 October, ComPhibGrp 12 (Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, Jr.) relieved
Vice Admiral H. W. Hill as Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force, but assumed no
operational functions of the occupation. Thereafter, Com5thPhibFor and CTF
54 became separate commands.

At 0800 on 4 October, ComPhibGrp 4, the Commander Southern Occupation Group
(CTG 54.1, Rear Admiral L. F. Reifsneider) relieved Vice Admiral Hill as CTF 54
and assumed all the duties assigned to that command in connection with the
occupation.

With these changes in command, the occupation groups of Task Force 54 were
disposed as follows on 4 October:

(a) CTG 54.1, Commander Southern Occupation Group (Rear Admiral
Reifsneider, ComPhibGrp 4) at Wakayama.
(b) TG 54.4 (Shimonoseki Group) loading the 32nd Infantry Division
at Lingayen.
(c) CTG 54.5, Commander Eastern Occupation Group (Rear Admiral
Noble, ComPhibGrp 8) at Wakayama.
(d) TG 54.26 (Nagoya Group) enroute from Lingayen to Nagoya with
the 25th Infantry Division and other U.S. Army elements embarked.
(e) CTG 54.11, Commander Central Occupation Group (Rear Admiral
Rodgers, ComPhibGrp 11) with TG 54.12 (Kure Group) enroute from
Zamboanga to Kure with the 41st Infantry Division and Headquarters X Corps embarked.
(f) TG 54.13 (Kochi Group) awaiting arrival of shipping, formation, and loading of the 24th Infantry Division at Mindanao.

Occupation of Kure-Hiroshima Through Hiro Wan - As has been seen, both Kure and Hiroshima, on the Inland Sea, were rendered inaccessible by B-29 pressure mining, but Hiro Wan, a few miles southeast of Kure, was found to be free of obstacles and was selected as the target for F-Day. The Commander Central Occupation Group (CTG 54.11, Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers, ComPhibGrp 11) departed Zamboanga with TransRon 16 (Commodore J. B. McGovern) and attached tractor units on 30 September. Embarked on the transports were the 41st Infantry Division (Major General Doe, USA) and X Corps Headquarters. The Kure Group landing was scheduled to take place between 1 and 3 October, but was delayed by the necessity for checking the channel for the presence of U. S. pressure mines, and was further delayed by a typhoon.

On 5 October, Rear Admiral Rodgers, the Kure Occupation Group (TG 54.12, TransRon 16), and CTF 54 (Rear Admiral L. F. Reifsnider) in MOUNT MCKINLEY (AGC) entered the Inland Sea. On October 7th, the 41st Infantry Division and X Corps Headquarters commenced landing at Hiro Wan. At 1100 the same day, the Commanding General 41st Infantry Division assumed control of the forces ashore, being relieved at 1200 the following day by the Commanding General X Corps (Major General Sibert, USA). From Hiro Wan the troops moved overland to the primary objectives at Kure and Hiroshima.

In compliance with ComFIFTHPhibFor's directive of 20 September addressed to the Commander in Chief Sasebo Naval District, Vice Admiral Masso Kanazawa, Commandant of the Kure Naval District, and Navy Yard, with several members of his staff, reported on board the flagship of ComPhibGrp 4, MOUNT MCKINLEY, at 0900 on October 5th for a formal conference with Rear Admiral Reifsnider. Other conferences on occupational matters were held on later dates.

Vice Admiral Kanazawa delivered a letter to CTF 54 which stated that all instructions passed to the Commander in Chief Sasebo Naval District had been carried out, with the following exceptions: (a) The Japanese sweeping operations had not removed all mines; (b) Five one-ton cranes were inoperative; and (c) One seaplane pier at Hiro Wan was unusable because of the recent typhoon.

Cominpac (Rear Admiral Struble) had information that the harbors and approaches to Moji and Shimonoseki contained 3000 live influence mines, 1200 of which were the pressure type—which cannot be swept, the only means of testing an area suspected of containing pressure mines being to employ "guinea pig" ships. According to the sterilization dates given on the TWENTIETH Air Force mine charts, which were calculated to be the last dates on which the sterilizers would act, these pressure mines would become sterile by 17 February 1946, with most mines sterilizing 20 to 30 days before that time. A small percentage would fail to act, leaving the mines alive and dangerous. This would necessitate a post-sterilization sweep, but the risk by then would be materially lessened, and the loss of sweeping gear due to mine explosions would be greatly reduced.
On this basis, Cominco did not believe that the U.S. forces should open Moji and Shimonoseki, and recommended that the Japanese should not commence sweeping there before 1 February 1946. He recommended instead, as a more feasible alternative, that the Japanese assist CTG 52.10 in opening the route to Matsuyama and Kure.

Vice Admiral Oldendorf, therefore, ordered all Japanese shipping suitable for minesweeping to report to the control of Cominco for employment in the overall minesweeping plan. At the same time, Commander FIFTH Fleet revoked his instruction of 6 October which gave the Japanese permission to sweep Shimonoseki Strait, and instructed them to address further requests for permission to sweep specified areas to Cominco via CTG 52.10.

In line with his policy of maintaining closer control over Japanese minesweepers, ComFIFTHFleet directed CTF 54 to keep Cominco advised of the employment of Japanese minesweepers in the Hiro-Kure Area. This was accomplished by requiring the Commander Bungo Sweep Group (CTG 52.7) to submit a daily list of Japanese minesweepers operating under his jurisdiction.

A daily round-trip ferry service between Oura and Kure was authorized to begin on 14 October. The craft to be employed were to be of 50 to 100 tons displacement. On 26 October, the Inland Sea Company was authorized to establish regular ferry service in the Inland Sea, using eight ships of less than 220 gross tons each and stopping at 14 ports.

A Board of Inspection Survey, with Captain A. D. Blackledge as senior member, was appointed to inspect all ex-Japanese merchant and naval vessels (except submarines) in the Kure-Hiroshima Area. The board was to report on the physical and mechanical condition of each ship and recommend to ComFIFTHFleet via ComCruDiv 12 (Rear Admiral Riggs) the final disposition of each ship and the service it seemed best fitted to render in the near future.

With the submission of a list of former Japanese shipping in the area by the Japanese Liaison Office at Kure, the board began its inspections on 15 October, and on the 17th had completed inspection of the following Japanese vessels: 3 BB, 5 CL/CA, 24 DD, 3 AP, 10 coast defense craft, 5 PCs, 2 SCs, 30 tugs, 17 AKs, and 564 assorted small craft.

Among these vessels was the ex-USS STEWART (DD 224) which had been used by the Japanese as Patrol Vessel 102 since her capture in a drydock at Soerabaja, Java, on 3 March 1942. This vessel was taken over by a U.S. Navy prize crew on 28 October 1945, and placed in commission the following day by Vice Admiral Oldendorf under the name DD-224, her previous name having been given to IE 238 after the captured vessel was stricken from the Navy Register on 25 March 1942. On 3 November, DD-224 (ex-STEWART) was ordered to the United States to report to the Commandant 11th Naval District. There were also two ex-Chinese vessels at Kure with Japanese crews on board awaiting final disposition.

ComSubRon 13 (Captain S. P. Moseley) made an inspection of 47 Japanese submarines in the Hiro-Kure area, and on 23 October submitted a report to CTF 51 recommending the total destruction of them all. Later, two Japanese submarines were inspected at Ono Seto, and these were also recommended for destruction. Japanese submarines were ordered to Sasebo to be concentrated at
Kawanotani Wan, where ComSubRon 13 was to establish inspection and surveillance programs to insure essential maintenance and immobility. The use of the 5700-ton Japanese submarine I-402 as a floating storage for diesel oil for use by the Bungo Sweep Group had already been authorized.

On 25 October, ComSubRon 13 reported that 113 midget submarines in the Kure area and 16 in the Maizuru area were being demobilized by cutting up the hull. No other midget submarines were located in these areas except the Kaitens (human torpedoes), and those midget submarines which had been taken over by the Naval Technical Mission, Japan, for transfer to the United States for scientific study.

Occupation of Fukuoka-Shimonoseki - When it became apparent that the opening of the ports of Fukuoka (on Kyushu) and Shimonoseki (on the southern tip of Honshu) to shipping would be delayed by the highly-dangerous pressure mines that had been laid in that area by the B-29s of the TWENTIETH Air Force, General Krueger (Commanding General SIXTH Army) ordered the 5thPhibCorps to occupy Fukuoka without delay be means of an overland movement to that port by advance elements of the 5th Marine Division landed at Sasebo on September 22nd.

An advance party, including Counter-Intelligence officers of the 5thPhibCorps and 5thMarDiv, moved by rail from Sasebo to Fukuoka on the 27th to make preliminary arrangements for the entry of occupation forces into the Fukuoka area. Upon this party's arrival, conferences were conducted with the Japanese military and civilian authorities, in the course of which various orders relative to the arrival of the main occupation forces were issued to these Japanese officials. These initial arrangements greatly facilitated the entry of the major portion of the Fukuoka Occupation Force into that city three days later on 30 September (O-Day), with the remainder of the force arriving the following day.

The Fukuoka Occupation Force (short title, FOF) was composed of a Headquarters Detachment, the 28th RCT, and the Shimonoseki-Moji Occupation Group, the whole being commanded by Brigadier General R. A. Robinson, USMC, who arrived with his staff at the Kashii Station at 1445 on O-Day.

The following day, the Commanding General met with several Japanese civil and military authorities, orders and instructions pertaining to the occupation being issued to the Japanese at this time.

On 4 October, the Fukuoka Occupation Force expanded its control over its Zone of Responsibility by moving one reinforced company into Shimonoseki, where it established the Shimonoseki Occupation Group. Two days later, another reinforced company established itself in the Moji area. With the arrival, on October 10th, of the remainder of the battalion from which these two companies were drawn, the Shimonoseki-Moji Occupation Group was activated. The following day, the Yamaguchi Detachment, consisting of 50 officers and men commanded by a field officer, was dispatched from Shimonoseki to Yamaguchi. Eight days later, on 19 October, other elements of the Fukuoka Occupation Force were established in the port of Senzaki in Yamaguchi Ken.

Patrols covering the entire FOF Zone of Responsibility reported the existence of numerous Chinese labor and P.O.W. Camps. Further investigation determined the existence of 10 Chinese P.O.W. Labor Camps in the FOF Zone in Fukuoka Prefecture and two more in Yamaguchi Prefecture, with a total of approxi-
mately 3200 inmates. Trouble and unrest from clashes between Chinese and local Japanese civilians resulted in the immediate dispatch of Marine detachments to maintain order until such time as wage agreements could be reached between the laborers and their employers, and until the Chinese could be repatriated as they desired. A census taken from Prefectural Government records showed a total of approximately 6000 Chinese on Kyushu and in Yamaguchi Prefecture. As a result of this survey, necessary shipping was requested of ComFIFTHFleet for the purpose of repatriating over 5000 Chinese to North China and about 250 to Central China. In the meantime, 18 truckloads of clothing from Japanese military warehouses were distributed to the Chinese camps. By 7 November, 1430 Chinese from five labor camps had been paid a minimum wage demand by Japanese mining authorities and, together with 866 Chinese from camps on Honshu, had embarked at Hakata for T'ang-Ku, China.

Another source of trouble was the result of the movement of large numbers of Korean nationals to ports of exit in the Fukuoka Occupation Force's Zone of Responsibility. The Fukuoka Prefectural Government estimated that there were 1,911,307 Koreans in the Japanese home islands at the end of the war. Of this total it was originally ascertained by the occupation authorities that 667,112 desired to be repatriated—a figure revised to 1,500,000 by November.

The movement of Koreans into the ports of Shimonoseki, Senzaki, and Hakata was at a rate considerably greater than that at which they could be repatriated by the shipping available. This resulted in large concentrations of Koreans existing at these ports under unsanitary and congested conditions while awaiting shipment to Korea. Japanese authorities were directed to take immediate steps to curb the influx of Koreans into these ports, and these authorities in turn requested the Bureau of Railways in Tokyo to issue orders halting the sale of railroad tickets to Koreans for the city of Shimonoseki.

This policy was put into effect on October 16th and was continued for 10 days, during which period all available shipping was used to return to Korea the natives of that country already stranded in Shimonoseki. As a result of these restrictive measures, the situation was greatly alleviated by 24 October, when the 32nd Infantry Division, which had landed on the 14th at Sasebo, relieved the Fukuoka Occupation Force.

At the same time that Koreans were pressing into the northwest ports of Kyushu for repatriation, at least two of these same ports—Hakata and Senzaki—were serving as ports of entry for thousands of Japanese evacuated from Korea. During the period from 6 to 23 October, 23,356 Japanese civilians entered Hakata alone. Beginning on October 12th, these repatriates were screened on the docks by examining teams (including both line and medical personnel) for currency in excess of authorized amounts, valuables, loot, and excess food, after which they received cursory medical examinations. Spot-checks were also made by the FOF Counter-Intelligence Corps.

Investigating patrols were dispatched to all prisons and places of detention within the Fukuoka Occupation Force Zone of Responsibility on 15 October, with the purpose of determining the extent of Japanese compliance with the Supreme Commander's directive of 4 October, and to determine whether all persons, detained or imprisoned under protection or surveillance, or whose freedom was abridged in any manner, had been released. A total of 11 such places in the area were so investigated.
An advance party of the 32nd Infantry Division arrived at Fukuoka by rail on 3 October to begin preparations for the arrival of that division, which was to form the permanent occupation force for that area, upon its arrival at Sasebo in the ships of TransRon 22.

On the morning of 14 October, TransRon 22 (Temp.) (TU 54.15.4) began discharging elements of the 32nd Infantry Division at Sasebo for an overland echelon movement to Fukuoka by motor transport and rail to begin the following day. The troops, however, found the roads to be in such bad repair as to be incapable of taking heavy equipment. This left the railroad as the only apparently reliable means of transportation overland. There were tunnels, however, which were too small to admit certain essential heavy equipment such as bulldozers.

As a result of these conditions, the decision was made to transport by rail such men and equipment as could be accommodated by this means, while the heavy equipment was retained in Sasebo Harbor for transshipment to Fukuoka at the earliest date on which that harbor could be opened to LSTs, a date estimated by Cominpac as around 15 November.

Fukuoka Harbor had recently been used by Japanese shipping, but several ships had struck mines there. Pressure mines also barred Allied traffic from the Straits of Shimonoseki and large portions of the Inland Sea, since information on the location of the B-29 sown fields was none too definite, in many cases being as much as five miles or more in error.

Elements of the 32nd Infantry Division began arriving in the FOF Zone of Responsibility on 15 October, and operational control of these elements came under Brigadier General Robinson until the establishment of the division headquarters in Fukuoka on the 22nd. The 32nd Infantry Division relieved the Fukuoka Occupation Force at 0800, 24 October, at which time the latter organization was dissolved and the Fukuoka-Shimonoseki area assigned to the Commanding General 32nd Infantry Division, with the title of Commanding General Fukuoka Base Command.

The movement of troops and cargo transportable by road or rail from Sasebo to Fukuoka was completed early in November. On 25 November, the Fukuoka Base Command was dissolved.

Occupation of Matsuyama and Okayama - One of the operations specified by Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force for execution in Phase III of the Occupation of Southern Japan was the landing of troops, equipment, and supplies on selected beaches in the Matsuyama Area of Shikoku (on the Inland Sea). The responsibility for this mission was assigned to Task Group 54.13 (The Matsuyama Occupation Group), consisting of TransDivs 35, 56, and 62 (units of TransRon 14, Commodore D. L. Ryan), as an echelon of the Central Occupation Group (Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers, ComPhibGrp 11).

It had been planned originally to land the 24th Infantry Division at Kochi, Shikoku, but this operation was abandoned when the approaches to that port were found to be impassable because of extensive mining. The plan was therefore modified, with Matsuyama being substituted for Kochi, and the following schedule was adopted:
Commencing at 0830 on 22 October (G-Day), the 24th Infantry Division (Major General Woodruff, USA), less the 21st RCT, would be put ashore, three battalions of the 34th Infantry Regiment leading the way in column, to be followed by three battalions of the 19th Infantry Regiment, also in column.

The specific mission of the Okayama Unit (TransDiv 38, a unit of TransRon 14) was to land the 21st RCT of the 24th Division on designated beaches in Hiro Wan, the port of Okayama in Southern Honshu, the same day, October 22nd. In addition to the ships of TransDiv 38, TELFAIR and SIBLEY (APAs) were to land elements of the X Corps at the same place.

The transports of the Matsuyama Unit (TU 54.13.2, Commodore Ryan) loaded the 24th Infantry Division at Mindanao and departed there on 15 October, arriving at the objective at 1600, October 21st. The beach directly south of Takahama was designated as Red Beach and was to be used for the landing of assault waves, cargo, and vehicles. Red Beach was about 500 yards in length and 20 yards in width, composed of loose sand which could not be traversed by loaded vehicles except over Marston Matting.

The boat basin at Mitsuhama (a few miles west of Matsuyama) was designated as Green Beach, and only personnel and rations were unloaded there. Green Beach was a seawall inside a boat basin on whose steps LCVPs and LCMs could lower their ramps at any stage of the 11-foot tide for unloading, with space for about five boats. The boat basin at the Naval Air Station was designated as Yellow Beach, and personnel, cargo, and vehicles could all be discharged there. Yellow Beach was a small beach with a single, narrow exit road.

Air support for the Matsuyama landings was provided by TU 51.3.26 (Captain C. F. Coe) consisting of PUGET SOUND (CVE) escorted by PURDY (DD). Flight operations were conducted on 21, 22, and 23 October, whereupon the task unit returned to the Yokosuka Area.

Minesweeping operations for moored, acoustic, and magnetic mines were completed by TF 52 (Minpac) prior to the arrival of TransRon 14 in the transport area at Matsuyama, with the result that no mines were encountered in Japanese waters by the ships participating in the operation.

The control vessels arrived on station at the scheduled time, and H-Hour (0830) was met without difficulty, although adverse tide conditions delayed the unloading of vehicles scheduled for discharge by 1037 until 0730 the following day.

As the ships of TransRon 14 were unloaded, they were ordered on various missions and sailed from the objective area. The total force put ashore consisted of 14,290 troops of the 24th Division, while 14,751 short tons of cargo were discharged. On 25 October, LST Group 13 (TU 54.15.9) arrived at Matsuyama and delivered additional elements of the 24th Infantry Division. The unloading of these craft was completed on the 27th. Control of the forces ashore was assumed by the Commanding General 24th Infantry Division at 1300 on 22 October.

Meantime, the Okayama Unit, TransDiv 38 (Temp) (TU 54.13.11, Captain P. P. Welch) had anchored in the outer harbor of Hiro Wan, the port of Okayama, on October 21st, and the following morning the disposition moved in to the inner anchorage, where the landing operation commenced at 0815. By 1100 on the 23rd,
all troops of the 21st RCT (24th Infantry Division) had been put ashore, and at 0730 the same morning, the Commanding General 21st RCT assumed command ashore at Okayama.

The Occupation of Nagoya - The final landing of FIFTH Amphibious Force elements in the area of responsibility originally assigned the Commander FIFTH Fleet was successfully completed with the amphibious operation by the Eastern Occupation Group at Nagoya in late October.

The Commander Eastern Occupation Group (Rear Admiral A. G. Noble, ComPhib Grp 8) was assigned the mission of landing the 25th Infantry Division (I Corps) in the Yokkaichi-Nagoya area on completion of the landings in the Wakayama area. After a series of conferences between the Army and Navy commanders concerned, it was decided that the occupation forces for the Nagoya area would be landed at Yokkaichi, with a target date of 2 October. Because of the necessity for extensive minesweeping operations under unfavorable weather conditions, however, ComPhibGrp 8 found it impossible to meet this proposed target date. When information subsequently obtained from minesweeping units operating at the objective area indicated that the Yokkaichi harbor facilities had sustained such severe damage from the earthquake of 7 December, 1944, as to make them unusable, Rear Admiral Noble modified his plan to consist of a dockside landing at Nagoya proper. Meantime, the shipping scheduled for Nagoya was held in port or diverted to Wakayama.

TU 54.26.33, TransRon 20 (Temp.) (Commodore H. W. Graf) and a tractor unit of 15 LSTs were allocated for embarking and landing the 25th Infantry Division (Major General Mullins, USA), which was being staged from Lingayen Gulf. The FIRST Corps was under the overall command of Major General I. P. Swift, USA.

In spite of the assignment of additional sweepers to the area, clearance of the necessary channel was delayed by the discovery of magnetic mines, and by typhoon weather about 4 October. On 10 October, typhoon weather in the vicinity of southern Honshu again interrupted minesweeping operations in the Nagoya area. Two days later, CTF 52 (Cominpac) advised Rear Admiral Noble that the earliest date on which he estimated ships could enter Nagoya with reasonable safety would be 22 October. At the same time, Admiral Spruance advised the interested commands that the safety of the personnel and ships destined for Nagoya was to be considered of paramount importance, a speedy occupation being secondary.

Following the typhoon of October 10th and 11th, minesweeping operations continued satisfactorily, and on 22 October Rear Admiral Struble arrived at Wakayama to confer with Rear Admiral Noble concerning the opening of Nagoya harbor for shipping. It was agreed at this meeting that although M-Day would be 26 October, with limited unloading taking place that day, the major unloading would commence on the 27th, because of the late arrival of the APAs and AKAs in the transport area on M-Day. Even so, the initial landings were scheduled for the very first day on which the channel would be open to heavy shipping.

On 23 October, Nagoya Movement Unit Charlie, consisting of 12 LCTs escorted by OSMOND INGRAM (APD) and SERRANO (ATF) departed Wakayama for Nagoya, followed the next day by Nagoya Movement Unit Baker, consisting of 7 LSTs, 5 LSMs, 1 LCPP, 6 LCSs, and 1 LCI, and by ComTask Flotilla One in COWELL (DD), with TAYLOR, BRADFORD, BROWN, ORDRONAUX, and MURPHY (DDs). Two more echelons
proceeded on the 25th; Nagoya Movement Unit Easy, consisting of 1 IC(FF), 1 SC, 8 ISTs, and 15 ISMs, and Nagoya Movement Unit Able, comprising 6 APAs, 1 AKA, and 1 AGC, and screened by IRA JEFFREY (APD) and FCE 872. Rear Admiral Noble, embarked in WASATCH (AGC), departed in this unit.

As the ships arrived at Nagoya, they found it possible to enter the inner harbor to dock and unload 11 large ships simultaneously. Three of the docks had double-tracked railroad lines running out upon them, but a fourth dock utilized was not so equipped. Unloading was well underway when the last echelon, Nagoya Movement Unit Dog, consisting of 9 APAs, 4 AKAs, 1 IX, and 5 XAKs, escorted by LOY, BASSETT BARBER, and REGISTER (APDs), departed from Wakayama for Nagoya at 1330 on October 26th. Major General Mullins, Commanding General 25th Division, assumed command of the forces ashore at 0900, 28 October.

M-Day operations were covered by an eight-VF CAP and a four-VT Anti-Mine Patrol provided by SIBONEY and PUGET SOUND (CVEs).

The cumulative unloading report as of 1800, 30 October, comprised 26,735 troops put ashore, 3775 vehicles, and 16,230 tons of bulk cargo, and the unloading of all material involved in the initial 25th Division lift was completed except for low priority material in TRECO (AKA), which was unloaded the morning of 1 November.

Upon completion of discharge, the APAs departed individually, as they were ordered to Magic Carpet duties, and the AKAs got underway on orders from Cincpac. TU 54.15.24 (LST Grp 44), consisting of 11 ISTs, delivered the remaining 2297 I Corps and 25th Division troops from Luzon to Nagoya during a three-day period from 4 to 6 November.

On 30 October, ComPhibGrp 8 received orders detaching him from the FIFTH Fleet and ordering him to report to the Commander SEVENTH Fleet (Admiral T. C. Kinkaid) for duty. Rear Admiral Noble departed for Taku, China, on November 1st, where he was to relieve ComPhibGrp 7 (Rear Admiral I. N. Kiland).

Conditions in Southern Japan.

Few individuals occupied as excellent a position for observing the effects of World War II upon the cities and people of southern Japan as did Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo, CTF 55 (Commander Western Japan Force). The conclusions which he drew as a result of his observations were as follows:

"The most impressive lesson learned in this operation was the cataclysmic result of losing a modern war. Nothing could be more impressive than the utter destruction of the resources of this country, carrying with it the loss of all will to resist and ability to defend themselves.

"There is a good deal that we do not understand about the Japanese psychology. Two months before at Okinawa their troops were fanatically fighting to the last man in a lost cause. Here in Japan there had been no evidence of any inclination to resist. On the contrary, every effort has been made by the Japanese officials to facilitate the work of de-militarization and to give the invader everything he asks. There is no show of resentment. The small children soon after occupation were waving
their hands and shouting to the American Military. Offers of personal friendship by high Japanese officials had to be tactfully repelled with some embarrassment. Ex-captains of men-of-war would turn over to United States Naval Officers their ships without any display of regret.

"Three possible explanations of this attitude can be offered:

(a) The Japanese are all so war weary and convinced of their failure that they welcome the end of the war no matter what it involves.

(b) They are possessed of Oriental fatalism which accepts any existing condition, good or bad, so long as it appears to be inevitable.

(c) Their belief in the Emperor is so absolute that his word to comply with the terms of Surrender is carried out in spirit, as well as to the letter, without question.

"Perhaps the answer is a combination of the three. It did not seem appropriate to question the Japanese themselves upon these matters.

"The question which was uppermost in the minds of our officers after inspecting the Sasebo Naval Base was how it had been possible for the Japanese to do as well as they did with the primitive and meager tools and equipment available. They have no conception of quantity production methods nor up-to-date production. They are indeed very efficient in doing things with their hands, and they contrive astonishing results with hand work performed in long hours of toil. They are years behind in industrial organization, equipment, and methods.

"The Navy Yard itself (at Sasebo) was extremely disorderly, with a vast amount of scrap and junk scattered apparently without any system, and congesting the space in the Yard.

"Here, as well as in all other areas in Japan, their characteristic of hiding material in dispersed caves and dug-outs was apparent. Countless man-hours of labor were expended in hiding away all manner of equipment. This was often badly done with perishable material in wet caves, which appeared to indicate the state of mind of the Japanese in the latter part of the war.

"While there were some exceptions, the general impression was that we had considerably over-rated the Japanese ability to produce up-to-date war equipment, and that we should have had less trouble with them than we did. It would appear that only their great personal bravery and willingness to sacrifice everything for their Emperor, plus the vast distances our forces had to come, made it possible for them to carry on as long and as effectively as they did.

"One other factor was also apparent. Judging by the difficult terrain; the scarcity and poor quality of the roads, the small size and capacity of the railroads and tunnels, and the prevailing weather conditions, it was fortunate that the invasion of Kyushu took place after the surrender and not before."
Another view was that the cooperative civilian attitude in southern Japan was conditioned initially by the great relief felt at the orderly behavior of the American troops. Many Japanese stated that the conduct of the occupation forces had dealt a blow to the prestige of their military class by disproving propaganda claims about American cruelties. The dispelling of the fear that Chinese or Russian troops might be used for occupation duty also served to contribute to the friendly reception given American forces.

A sustaining factor in the friendly relations prevailing between U.S. troops and civilians was the wide-spread expectation on the part of the latter that the occupation forces would devote their efforts to alleviation of Japanese food, fuel, and other welfare problems. Among the Japanese, however, there was a definite popular disapproval of open fraternization, and the subject of greatest interest to all civilians was how soon the occupation forces would depart.

Captain F. D. McCorkle, during his inspections of Japanese combatant ships at Sasebo, had an excellent opportunity to study their naval officers, and makes the following enlightening observations:

"From conversation with a young ensign who was born and lived 17 years in Pasadena before his return to Japan in 1936, it is obvious that the true plight of Japan was concealed from such officers as he and, of course, all those below him. Consequently, it may be assumed only a very minor percentage of the Japanese were acquainted with the true state of Japan or the outside world on 10 August 1945. All had learned what bombings and fires meant; so, regardless of what they really knew about what was going on, not one (civil or military) ever failed to signify that he was glad the war was over.

"Commander Destroyer Squadron Five is of the further opinion that much misunderstanding can occur with the Japanese because of their language. Apparently it in no way approaches English in its capacity to communicate thoughts and ideas precisely and accurately. For example, in a transaction with Japanese, it is much better to write out a statement than to speak it. Short sentences spoken two or three times often cannot be understood, yet when written down are grasped instantly due to the Japanese practiced capability of determining the meaning of a group of characters assembled together, rather than one for a word signifying one meaning and one meaning alone.

"This was confirmed by Captain Tobita (the Japanese liaison officer for inspections) who further stated that control of a naval ship and its weapons (where language must be precise) was a burdensome matter to the Japanese. He appeared amazed, and so stated repeatedly, at seeing a yeoman take down five minutes of dictation and then find in a few minutes more a full plan of inspecting a dozen or so ships for the following day, including all plans for transportation, boats, and or vehicles, times, names, etc.

"For the Japanese to bring a small boat alongside requires no end of talk. Whether the evolution is smart depends on conditions. It is always careful and slow; also, the coxswain can always know each man of the crew will perform accurately, exactly what he has been told to do. The crew do what they are told very precisely, but if something upsets the plan, then the talk is bedlam, and they must often start all over again."
D. MINE FORCE OPERATIONS.

Introduction.

Although minesweepers are usually the first vessels to operate at the scene of impending landings, their mopping-up work continues long after the other major naval forces have completed their missions, with the result that the reports of major task organization commanders frequently contain only sketchy coverage of the preliminary minesweeping. The minesweeping operations in connection with the Allied occupation of Japan were no exception to this rule.

No report of the operations involved in the occupation of Japanese-held territory could, however, be considered complete without some account of the activities of the Mine Forces. Although the material which follows can only be considered a partial report, since sweeping is expected to continue in the Japan-China area until February 1946, and in the Philippines area until May 1946, the data herein will give some idea of the magnitude of the task in which these hard-working little vessels are still engaged. Incidental reference to their activities also appears elsewhere in this report.

British forces are at the same time engaged in sweeping the Singapore area and certain fields in the South Pacific, while the Russians are concentrating on the northern Korean ports.

Magnitude of the task.

During the war in the Pacific, 17,875 mines were laid by U.S. aircraft, 7632 defensive mines by surface ships, 3010 offensive mines by surface ships, and an additional 1020 by submarines. (See Plate III). These figures do not include the estimated 100,000 moored-type mines laid by the Japanese. The greatest concentrations of Japanese moored mines encountered by 15 December were swept from the following areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of Mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East China Sea</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsushima Straits</td>
<td>2350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsugaru Straits</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bungo Suido</td>
<td>1687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kii Suido</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow Sea</td>
<td>1259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chusan Archipelago</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo and Nagasaki</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa Gunto</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima Wan</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 17,285 mines laid by Army and Navy aircraft, some 12,000 were dropped by B-29s of the 20th Air Force, principally in Japanese home waters. Of this total, 41% were magnetic type, 29% were acoustic type, 24% pressure-magnetic type, and 6% were low frequency type. These influence mines were developed by the Navy, and prepared by Mine Assembly Depots on Tinian and Okinawa. Subsequent to the first two missions of the B-29s, all of these were equipped with sterilizers, rendering the exploding mechanism dead after a given period (15 February 1946 for B-29 laid mines). For this reason, the influence mines have not been swept to the same extent as the Japanese mines. It should also be noted that the number of mines swept is not necessarily indicative of the effort involved, moored mines
being swept in two or three passes, while fields of influence mines require at least six or seven passes for adequate coverage.

Although the total number of mines of all types laid in the western Pacific is smaller than the total laid in the North Sea during World War I, the current sweeping problem is considered to be considerably greater in magnitude. The North Sea sweeping operation, however, required eleven months to complete, while it now appears that far greater areas in the western Pacific will be completed in less time, and with much smaller losses of sweepers.

Direct comparison with the North Sea sweeping is difficult, however, because of the new types of mines which have been introduced. Approximately 172,000 mines had been laid in the North Sea and English Channel, while Italy had laid 12,200 mines in the Adriatic. These mines were all of the moored contact type, and a large percentage had sunk or broken from their moorings by the time sweeping was commenced. In the Pacific, in addition to the 100,000 contact mines planted by the Japanese, the more modern influence mines planted by U.S. agencies presented a major share of the problem.

**Forces Available.**

There are some 510 sweepers involved at present (December, 1945) throughout the Pacific Ocean areas. Of these there are 270 YMSs, 129 AMs, 60 ANs, 23 DMSs, 12 SCs, 11 DMs, 4 AKNs, and 1 CM. In addition to these forces, the Japanese have mustered about 100 minesweepers from the remnants of their fleet. Their cooperation has been excellent and they have rendered every possible aid. Under U.S. Naval operational control, the Japanese have been sweeping their own fields with their own gear. The results to date have been satisfactory in sweeping moored mines, although Japanese sweepers are not well equipped to combat influence types.

As the only method thus far developed of clearing the pressure type of mines, several battle-damaged ships of merchant or amphibious types were made available as "Guinea Pig" ships. These vessels were intended to explode any remaining mines by actual passage over them, and in so doing, were naturally in great danger of being sunk. They were, however, ballasted to minimize underwater damage, and all possible precautions were taken to protect the personnel manning them; such as remote controls by which the machinery could be operated from the upper decks, and mattresses placed on the decks, overhead, and bulkheads of spaces containing personnel, who wore crash helmets and kapok life jackets.

Volunteers were called for to man the "Guinea Pigs", the great majority of them being supplied by the Mine Force. Only skeleton crews of approximately four officers and 15 men were used during actual passage through the mine fields. The ships assigned to this "Special Sweep Squadron" were PRATT VICTORY (XAK), MARATHON (APA), JACK SINGER (AK), FGM 24, PCE(R) 858, ICI 817, and ATA 188. To date, none of these vessels has been lost. The Japanese, however, have lost two destroyers in the same type of work.

**Progress of the work.**

In the Japanese homeland and Chinese coastal waters alone, more than 84,000 square miles had been swept by U.S. forces by the middle of December 1945. An
additional area of some 18,000 square miles, including most of the areas containing influence mines, was in the process of being swept. (See Plate II).

While much of the influence sweeping has been postponed until these mines become inactive, a number of channels through our own minefields have been swept successfully into such occupation ports as Wakayama, Tokyo, Nagoya, Hiro, Sasebo, Nagasaki, and Shanghai.

Losses.

To date, there has been only one recorded loss of a U.S. Sweeper attributable to mines, in the entire sweeping operation in Japanese waters. This loss was MINIVET (AM) which struck a mine and was sunk on 29 December while operating northwest of Kyushu. Casualties were 12 killed, 19 missing, and 5 wounded. At the time she struck, MINIVET was operating with a task force supervising a sweep by Japanese vessels of the shallow mine field in Tsushima Strait.

Other minecraft have fared less fortunately from operational causes. In the typhoon of 16 September, 5 YMSs were lost; and during the severe typhoon in the Okinawa area on 9 October, a total of 13 mine vessels were lost, consisting of 6 YMSs, 2 ANs, 2 DMSs, 2 AMcs, and 1 CM.

In compensation for these losses, it has been obvious that U.S.-laid mines contributed heavily in completing the blockade, not only of Japan's rapidly dwindling Navy, but also of her large fleet of smaller ships which were counted on to move vital cargoes of food, raw materials, and military supplies between Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Korea.

The effectiveness of the minelaying campaign is demonstrated by the percentage of casualties caused by mines alone. Figures submitted by the Japanese Navy disclose that mines prepared by the U.S. Navy were responsible for more Japanese shipping losses in the last four months of the war than all other causes combined. Some 503 vessels of 500 tons or larger were sunk or damaged from all causes, for a total of 1,458,000 tons of shipping, during the period from 1 April to 1 August 1945. Of the total tonnage, 785,000 tons were attributed to mines, or 52% of the overall figure. Of the 503 ships sunk or damaged, 297 were reported to be mine victims. Actual sinkings were distributed as follows: mines 127; aircraft 94; submarines 80; other causes 15.

Some Japanese authorities expressed the opinion that the war might have been shortened materially if it had been possible to start extensive mining sooner than was actually done.
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY BACKGROUND OF
AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR
THE SURRENDER AND OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

(Note: - The events discussed in this Appendix, although largely not under the control of Cincpac-Cincpoa, are included with this report for the purpose of providing a better background for an understanding of actual operations).

Introduction.

The final phase of the second great World War came to a formal close on 2 September 1945, aboard the USS MISSOURI, at anchor in Tokyo Bay. On that date, the Empire of Japan, which had first bound itself to the Rome-Berlin Axis in November, 1936, and which had subsequently joined Germany and Italy in their policy of aggression and conquest, submitted to the Allied Powers and accepted the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation.

The first phase of World War II had opened on 1 September, 1939, with Germany's invasion of Poland, had featured the fall of France, and had closed with Hitler's invasion of Russia in June, 1941. The second phase had seen a continuation of the Axis career of success, and the involvement of Japan and the United States on 7 December, 1941, as a consequence of the former's attacks on Pearl Harbor, Midway, Wake, Guam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand. This was followed by Japanese victories in the Battle of the Java Sea, the Malay Peninsula, Singapore, the Philippines, Wake, Guam, and by an overrunning of the lands of the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies in the area of the Southwest Pacific. Save for the two American victories of the Coral Sea and of Midway, the atmosphere of this period was one of unrelieved gloom.

In the third phase, a gradual transition to the offensive began with our invasion of Guadalcanal and Tulagi Islands in the Solomons on 7 August, 1942, when the Japanese Empire had extended its sway over the largest area which it was ever to possess, from Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians down to the Eastern Gilberts. In October and November, 1942, the Germans suffered their great defeat before Stalingrad; Montgomery repulsed and routed Rommel's "Afrika Korps" at El Alamein in Egypt; North Africa was invaded by Eisenhower's Army; and American troops began to push the Japanese invaders back across the Owen Stanley Mountains in eastern New Guinea, marking the first offensive gesture made by our ground forces in the Southwest Pacific.

The fourth phase, in which allied forces were everywhere on the offensive, witnessed the collapse of Italy; her acceptance of a state of co-belligerency toward her recent Axis partners; the Russian drive toward the west; the naval battles in the waters of the Solomons; the capture of the Gilberts and of three important islands in the Marshalls; the reconquest of the north Solomons, the coastal fringe of New Guinea and various strategic islands along its northern
coast; and the turning of the tide in Burma.

The last phase began with our seizure of the three Marianas Islands of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian in June, July, and August 1944, punctuated by the Battle of the Philippines Sea; while the reconquest of Europe was undertaken with the invasion of Normandy. There followed the capture of Peleliu, Angaur, and Morotai; the invasion of Leyte and Samar, accompanied by the Battles for Leyte Gulf; the gradual reconquest of the other Philippine Islands; the capture of Iwo Jima; the occupation of certain ports in Borneo; the surrender of Germany and her satellites; and the tremendous operation that gave us Okinawa.

On 26 July, 1945, the heads of the States of Great Britain, the United States, and China gathered together at Potsdam, Germany, issued the following declaration of purposes which is known as the Potsdam Proclamation:

"We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agreed that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

"The prodigious land, sea, and air forces of the United States, the British Empire, and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

"The result of the futile and senseless resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges upon Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry, and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the fuller devastation of the Japanese homeland.

"The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

"Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest. We insist that a new order of peace, security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

APPENDIX I
Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out, and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.

The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.

Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

Earlier in the year, at the Yalta Conference, Premier Stalin of the Soviet Union had informed President Roosevelt that Russia would join in the war against the Japanese. No time was set for the declaration of war, but the commitment was sufficiently explicit to permit the Allies to prepare their military and psychological warfare plans accordingly. Revelation of this agreement made clear a policy which had caused much opposition at the time—the continuance of shipments of lend-lease to Siberia even after the surrender of Germany.

Less than a fortnight before the Potsdam Proclamation, Ambassador Sato had transmitted to Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov a message from the Japanese Government requesting the USSR to exercise its good offices as a peace mediator between the Allied Powers and the Empire of Japan. This request was followed by a personal message to Marshall Stalin from Emperor Hirohito. The Soviet Foreign
Office immediately informed the governments of the United States and Great Britain of this development, and the latter nations, provided with this evidence of Japanese war weariness, joined with China in issuing the Potsdam Proclamation.

In addition to drawing up this ultimatum to Japan at the Potsdam Conference, the heads of the conferring States made final plans for Russian participation in the war. (Marshal Joseph Stalin was present at the Potsdam discussions, in addition to the three signatories of the Proclamation). This decision of the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan in the near future was made without previous knowledge of our atomic bomb, according to a statement made subsequently by President Truman.

Occupation Plans Prepared in Anticipation of the Surrender of Japan.

In view of Japan's expressed desire for peace negotiations, Russia's imminent entry into the war, and our contemplated employment of the atomic bomb, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington realized that the surrender of the Empire of Japan might come at any moment. This being so, plans to anticipate that day as completely as possible became imperative, and speed in their preparation of the essence.

Accordingly, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General Army Forces Pacific (referred to hereafter by his short title CinCAPPac), prepared a study for conduct of the Army occupation of Japan proper. On 12 August, Fleet Admiral C. W. Nimitz issued his corresponding operation plan for the conduct of the naval and amphibious phases of the occupation of Japan. Under both the Army and Navy plans, the day on which Japan should accept surrender terms would be designated as B-Day. (The general features of these plans are set forth in PART I of this report).

In accordance with an agreement among the government of the United States, the Chinese Republic, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, CinCAPPac was designated "Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" (short title SCAP) for the purpose of enforcing the surrender of Japan and of exercising supreme command over all land, sea, and air forces which might be allocated by the Allied Powers concerned for the enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms.

The Atomic Bomb and the Soviet Union Enter the War Against Japan.

On 24 November, 1944, the first flight of B-29s to strike Japan from the Marianas had taken off from Saipan to bomb Honshu, the main island of Japan. From that time until the fall of the Empire, these planes of the XXI Bomber Command and TWENTIETH Air Force had continued to operate with ever-increasing destructiveness against the Japanese home islands from their hard-won bases on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. The climax came on 6 August, 1945, when one of these B-29s left Tinian to drop the most deadly weapon yet devised by man. Hiroshima was the target. The atomic bomb was the weapon.

Two days later, at 1700 on the 8th (Moscow time), Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov handed the Japanese Ambassador a note declaring that a state of war would exist between their two countries as of 0001 on 9 August. The full text
of the declaration of war was as follows:

"After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan became the only great power that still stood for the continuation of the war.

The demand of the three powers—the United States, Great Britain, and China—on July 26th for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan, and thus the proposal of the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union on mediation in the war in the Far East loses all basis.

"Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies submitted to the Soviet Government a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of victims, and facilitate the speedy restoration of universal peace.

"Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied Powers of July 26th.

"The Soviet Government considers that this policy is the only means able to bring peace nearer, free the people from further sacrifices and suffering, and give the Japanese people the possibility of avoiding the dangers and destruction suffered by Germany after her refusal to capitulate conditionally.

"In view of the above, the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is, from August 9, the Soviet Government will consider itself to be at war with Japan."

In accordance with the diplomatic protocol which obtains on such occasions, the Japanese Ambassador was permitted to send his "last message" following receipt of the Soviet communication, and it might appear that these should have placed the Japanese Government and Army on guard against surprise attack. This was not the case, however, because of the difference in time zones between Moscow and Tokyo. Russian troops were actually crossing the Manchurian frontier within a few minutes after the state of war became effective, and long before the Japanese troops received any official notification from their own government that the USSR was no longer neutral.

Apparently the broadcast by the Kwantung Army Headquarters early on 9 August, announcing that Soviet forces had attacked along the entire east Manchurian border shortly after midnight, was the first intimation the Imperial Japanese Government had of Russia's state of belligerency. Soon afterward, Radio Tokyo rebroadcast a Tass (Soviet) News Agency announcement of the declaration of war.

At 0400, 9 August, the Manchukuan puppet government of Henry Fu Yi proclaimed a defense decree for the entire nation against the Soviet Army's unlawful invasion." Some time later, Japanese War Minister Anami issued a proclamation
to the Japanese Army, announcing the Soviet entry into the war, and ordering the Japanese "to fight to the last" in this "holy war" for the "divine nation."
(The Kwantung Army had been sadly depleted, in order to throw a force of 14 divisions and five brigades into Kyushu to repel the American amphibious operations expected there shortly).

Before another 24 hours went by, the Soviet-dominated People's Mongolian Republic (Outer Mongolia) added its declaration of war on Japan to that of the USSR. This one-time Chinese province still belonged nominally to China, but since Japan had attempted to penetrate the area a number of years before, Russian troops had garrisoned Outer Mongolia with sizable armies and had waged several unofficial campaigns against the Japanese across the border.

Immediately after the Soviet declaration of war on Japan, millions of United States propaganda leaflets were showered on the chief cities of Japan. This was not, however, the first use of this insidious weapon against Japan. The first propaganda leaflets had been dropped on Formosa and Okinawa by carrier aircraft of the THIRD Fleet as far back as October 1944, opening the strategic leaflet campaign in which approximately one hundred million leaflets and newspapers were dropped on Japan before the war ended. The first drops on the home islands had been made on 16 February, 1945, when FIFTH Fleet aircraft hit the Tokyo area. The great majority of strategic leaflets were distributed by B-29s of the XXI Bomber Command, which made their first propaganda drops on Osaka on 4 March, 1945. The initial drops on Kyushu were made by FIFTH Fleet planes on 18 March, 1945.

During the final three weeks of the war, an intensive campaign against the Japanese homeland was carried on in conjunction with the B-29 operations. Special leaflets dropped in this period were calculated to hasten the cracking of enemy morale, and included: (1) Warnings that Japanese cities named in the leaflets would be bombed by B-29s; (2) Notification to the Japanese people of the complete text of the Potsdam Proclamation; (3) News of the first atomic bomb attack and warning that other such attacks would follow if Japan did not capitulate; (4) News of the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan because of the Imperial Government's refusal to accept the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation (these leaflets told of the Russian declaration of war and depicted American and Soviet soldiers clasping hands across a map of Japan—having been printed well in advance of the Soviet declaration, and being designed to emphasize the hopelessness of the Japanese situation); (5) Warning of greater bombing attacks to follow, and an appeal to the Japanese people to "petition the Emperor" to accept the Potsdam Proclamation.

During the last two months of the war, Japanese reaction to this propaganda campaign, as expressed over Radio Tokyo, indicated the enemy's grave concern with "thought warfare" and its "paper bombs". A group of Japanese officer prisoners expressed the opinion three weeks before the end of the war that the Radio Tokyo commentaries on American propaganda indicated official Japan's fear of the subversive effect of the leaflets. This was especially true of the "Mariana Jiho" (Marianas Review), a weekly newspaper prepared by the Psychological Warfare Branch of Cincpac-Cincpoa and the Office of War Information, and dropped over Japan every week for the last five months of the war.
As though to add emphasis to the Soviet declaration of war and point to the propaganda leaflets, a second, reportedly more-powerful, atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki the same day, 9 August.

**Japan Announces Her Acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation.**

The effects of this avalanche of disasters was quickly apparent. In the succeeding hours, announcements by Radio Tokyo indicated that some extraordinary action was under consideration by the Japanese Government. Domei, official Japanese agency, announced at 0015 on 10 August that its transmitters would remain open throughout the night for "an important announcement."

The decision to sue for peace was reached at a meeting of the full cabinet which lasted from mid-day on the 9th until dawn on the 10th, according to a broadcast by Domei. All cabinet members, including the War and Navy ministers, reportedly voted in favor of the proposal.

Possibly because of the government's need to secure the acceptance of the peace proposal by political leaders outside the cabinet, the decision to surrender was not immediately announced, however, and it is presumed that the Privy Council and Hirohito himself were consulted before the proposal was transmitted. It is also regarded as likely that such figures as General Jiro Minami, professional extremist, (whose Political Association of Japan was the organization corresponding most closely to the Italian Fascist Party, the German Nazi Party, or the Spanish Falangist-Party) may have been consulted. At least, if Domei is to be believed, the Political Association of Japan met in emergency session at 1300 on August 10th.

Although the surrender proposal was beamed toward the United States in the English language by Radio Tokyo late on the 10th, 11 hours and 15 minutes were to elapse before the offer reached Washington through diplomatic channels. Switzerland acted as intermediary in the transmission of the message to the United States and China; while it was transmitted to Great Britain and the Soviet Union via Sweden. Before resorting to these neutral countries, however, the Japanese Government had attempted to transmit the message through Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, who had been interned following his nation's declaration of war, but communication between the USSR and Japan had been cut.

The text of the Japanese peace offer was as follows:

"In obedience to the gracious command of His Majesty the Emperor, who, ever anxious to enhance the cause of world peace, desires earnestly to bring about a speedy termination of hostilities with a view to saving mankind from the calamities to be imposed upon them by further continuation of the war, the Japanese Government several weeks ago asked the Soviet Government, with which neutral relations then prevailed, to render good offices in restoring peace vis-a-vis the enemy powers.

"Unfortunately, these efforts in the interest of peace having failed, the Japanese Government, in conformity with the august wish of His Majesty to restore the general peace and desiring to put an end to the untold sufferings entailed by war as quickly as possible, have decided upon the following:

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**APPENDIX I**
"The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26, 1945, by the heads of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed to by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.

"The Japanese Government sincerely hope that this understanding is warranted and desire keenly that explicit indication to that effect will be speedily forthcoming."

Although peace was desired almost as ardently in the Allied World as in Japan, this did not prevent the reservation in the enemy surrender offer from receiving a varied reception in different quarters. In the Pacific, where the technical question of crowned heads seemed of small importance, the announcement resulted in premature celebrations and suspension of operations by some organizations, even though there was no assurance that the stipulation regarding the Emperor would be acceptable to the Allied Powers.

Unofficial reports from the Allied capitals indicated that the governments of the Soviet Union, China, and Australia might object to the retention of the Emperor, on the ground that as head of the State he had sanctioned or condoned the many war crimes of which the Japanese had been guilty. Great Britain, it was believed, would abide by the decision of the United States.

In the United States, on the other hand, two schools of thought on the subject became apparent. One group regarded the Emperor as the epitome of everything which we had been fighting, and which we were determined to eliminate from the Japanese body politic. In short, Hirohito should be treated as a war criminal. The other group asserted that the Emperor was merely a figurehead, and through the prestige of his position as a Shinto divinity, he could be employed profitably by the Allies to induce remote and unconquered Japanese armies to lay down their arms.

For a better understanding of the Emperor Hirohito and his peculiar position in Japanese life, it is necessary to know that although he is in appearance a small, unimposing man, Japanese veneration and his cloistered manner of living had so beshrouded his human attributes that he had become an almost legendary figure, regarded by many as a demi-god. Hirohito was educated by private tutors, had rarely appeared in public, and was reported to have devoted much time to study of the natural sciences, particularly his hobby of marine biology.

At the time of Japan's surrender, the 44-year old Hirohito wielded, in theory at least, absolute executive power (including the power to declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties), while (with the consent of the Imperial Diet) he could exercise legislative power. Although the Prime Minister is the Chief member of the Japanese Cabinet, he is not chosen by the Emperor, but rather by the Privy Council, which recommends his appointment by the Emperor. This recommendation is tantamount to actual appointment.
Other advisers of the Emperor are the Army and Navy leaders, who exercise another aspect of the Imperial power independently of the Prime Minister, who, although himself the nominal head of the Japanese Government, can not interfere with anything pertaining to national defense. Thus it is apparent that it would be the weight of the Emperor's authority over the Japanese, rather than his personal character, which might determine Allied leaders to keep him on the throne during a period of occupation.

Moved by these considerations, White House and State Department officials drafted a reply to the Japanese surrender proposal, which retained the Emperor—at least temporarily—but placed him in a subservient position. All of the Allied Governments accepted the reply prepared by the United States Government, but the very fact of their being consulted delayed its transmission approximately 25 hours; so that the answer did not leave Washington until 1030 on 11 August (Washington time). The text of the Allied reply to Japan was as follows:

"With regard to the Japanese Government's message accepting the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation but containing the statement, 'with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler', our position is as follows:

"From the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

"The Emperor will be required to authorize the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation, and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval, and air authorities and to all the forces under their control wherever located, to cease active operations and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

"Immediately upon the surrender, the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports.

"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Proclamation, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

"The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Proclamation are achieved."

Once this reply had been started on its devious way to Japan, the world settled down to a period of tense inactivity, waiting for the final decision of the Japanese Government. The message, which left Washington at 1030, 11 August (Washington time), as we have seen, was transmitted to Tokyo from Berne at 1715
On the night of 13-14 August (ELD), seven B-29s of the TWENTIETH Air Force dropped 5,500,000 propaganda leaflets informing the Japanese people of the terms of the Japanese Government's surrender offer and the reply of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, as well as the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation. Although the population centers—Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kobe, and Kyoto—got most of the leaflets, all four Japanese home islands were covered. Plans further called for two B-29s on the 15th four on the 16th to drop four million more leaflets on 31 major cities, keeping the Japanese people advised of the course of negotiations.

Many hours were to pass, however, before the Japanese Government gave any sign that it had received the surrender message. (On 14 August, Domei reported—apparently falsely—that the message had not been received until the morning of the 13th). Five hours after the note is believed to have been received in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Togo conferred with the Emperor. It is known that leaders of the Japan Political Association also held an emergency meeting on the same day. The Japanese Cabinet, according to Domei, met throughout the day on 13 August, deliberating on the Allied terms. At 1410 the same day, Togo is reported to have again visited the Emperor, apparently to report the decision of the government.

At 14:49 (or 0149 Washington time) on the 14th—90 hours and 19 minutes after its first announcement of the Japanese surrender offer, Radio Tokyo announced that an Imperial Rescript accepting the Potsdam Proclamation would be "forthcoming soon".

Inasmuch as Radio Tokyo had been sending code messages to Switzerland for an hour before the flash, the inclination of the Allied World was to assume that one of these would contain Japan's long-awaited reply—an assumption that once more touched off widespread celebrations among the peoples of the United Nations. When these dispatches were decoded in Berne, however, they were found to contain no matter pertaining to Japan's surrender.

The long Japanese delay in replying to the Allied note led to widespread speculation as to what was going on in Tokyo. It was suggested that Japanese officials were trying to work out some face-saving formula for Emperor Hirohito; and this theory was nourished by the Japanese radio's repeated and favorable mention of the heir-apparent, Akihito, and of Prince Takamatsu, Hirohito's brother, a tactic suggesting that a regency might be installed to save the Emperor personal embarrassment. Another theory was that the delay was being caused by the necessity for preparing the Japanese people psychologically for surrender. (Events were to prove the latter the more likely theory).

The Japanese message of acceptance was finally transmitted late on 14 August. It was received by the Swiss Government shortly after 1500 (E.W.T.) on the same day, whence it was immediately re-transmitted by the Swiss to their representatives in the United States. The State Department received the message at 1810. The complete text of the President's announcement to the American people (including the Japanese surrender message), which followed shortly after his receipt of the vital document, was as follows:
"I have received this afternoon a message from the Japanese Government in reply to the message forwarded to that Government on August 11. I deem this reply a full acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation, which specifies the unconditional surrender of Japan. In the reply there is no qualification.

"Arrangements are now being made for the formal signing of surrender terms at the earliest possible moment.

"General Douglas MacArthur had been appointed the Supreme Allied Commander to receive the Japanese surrender. Great Britain, Russia, and China will be represented by high-ranking officers.

"Meantime, the Allied armed forces have been ordered to suspend offensive action.

"The proclamation of V-J Day must wait upon the formal signing of the surrender terms by Japan.

"Following is the Japanese Government's message accepting our terms:

"Communication of the Japanese Government of August 14, 1945, addressed to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China:

"With reference to the Japanese Government's note of August 10 regarding their acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation and the reply of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, sent by American Secretary of State James F. Byrnes under the date of August 11, the Japanese Government have the honor to communicate to the governments of the four powers as follows:

"1. His Majesty the Emperor has issued an Imperial Rescript regarding Japan's acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation.

"2. His Majesty the Emperor is prepared to authorize and insure the signature by his government and the Imperial General Headquarters of the necessary terms for carrying out the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation. His Majesty is also prepared to issue his commands to all the military, naval, and air authorities of Japan and all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations, to surrender arms, and to issue such other orders as may be required by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces for the execution of the above-mentioned terms."

Meantime, the American State Department was preparing the reply to Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation and our subsequently clarified surrender terms, and shortly after President Truman's address, the following instructions were sent to Japan:

"1. Direct prompt cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces, informing the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of the effective date and hour of such cessation.

APPENDIX I
"2. Send emissaries at once to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with information of the disposition of the Japanese forces and commanders, and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enable him and his accompanying force to arrive at the place designated by him to receive the formal surrender.

"For the purpose of receiving such surrender and carrying it into effect, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and he will notify the Japanese Government of the time, place, and other details of the formal surrender."

Later the same day, 14 August, General MacArthur implemented the State Department's directive to Japan with the following order to the Japanese Emperor, the Japanese Imperial Government, and the Japanese General Headquarters:

"I have been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and empowered to arrange directly with the Japanese authorities for the cessation of hostilities at the earliest practicable date.

"It is desired that a radio station in the Tokyo area be officially designated for continuous use in handling radio communications between this headquarters and your headquarters. Your reply to this message should give the call signs, frequencies, and station designation. It is desired that the radio communication with my headquarters in Manila be handled in English text...."

Two hours later, the Supreme Commander sent a message to the Japanese, directing the cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces, notification of the effective date and hour of such cessation, and ordering the Japanese Imperial Government to send representatives to Manila. This was supplemented with an outline of the exact procedure to be followed by these representatives in visiting Manila.

The same day, 15 August, Cincpac requested that the following naval requirements be presented to the Japanese mission upon its arrival at Manila:

1. "That the Japanese Imperial High Command will promptly direct all Japanese and Japanese-controlled ships, warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships, and other craft to comply with the following instructions:

(a) Ships in harbors to remain in harbor pending further directions from Cincpac; ships at sea report their position in plain language immediately to the nearest U.S., British, or Soviet Radio Station...Proceed to nearest Allied port or such port as Cincpac may direct, pending further notice. Ships will burn navigational targets at night and display searchlights with beams held vertically.

(b) Submarines will remain on surface, fly a black flag or pennant,
and show lights at night. Report their positions in accordance with (a) and proceed on surface to nearest of following ports: Agana, Guam, Midway Island, Subic Bay. Upon arrival at a point 10 miles from entrance to port, communicate with port, and lie-to until boarded by Allied naval forces.

(c) All warships and merchant ships, whether in port or at sea, will immediately train all weapons fore and aft. Torpedo tubes will be unloaded, and all breech blocks will be removed from all guns.

(d) All minesweeping vessels will carry out prescribed measures of disarmament, fuel as necessary, and be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the direction of Cincpac.

2. "The Imperial High Command will forthwith direct that Japanese naval aircraft are not to leave the ground or water or ship, pending directions from Cincpac.

3. "The Japanese High Command will forthwith direct that any neutral merchant ships in Japan or Japanese-controlled ports are to be detained pending instructions from Cincpac.

4. "The Japanese High Command will forthwith issue categorical directions that:

(a) All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and open at all times; and, where possible, they are to be removed.

(b) All controlled minefields at all ports and harbors are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.

(c) All demolition charges in all ports and harbor works are to be removed or rendered ineffective.

(d) The existing wartime system of navigational lighting is to be maintained, except that all dimmed lights are to be shown at full brilliance.

(e) All pilotage services are to continue to operate, and all pilots are to be held at their normal stations ready for service, and equipped with charts.

(f) Japanese naval and other personnel concerned in the operation of ports are to remain at their stations and continue to carry out their normal duties.

5. "The Japanese Imperial High Command will be prepared to deliver forthwith to the Cincpac representative in the Tokyo Bay area:

(a) Corrected copies of charts, showing all minefields laid by Japanese or Japanese-controlled vessels or aircraft, and all other underwater obstructions.
(b) Details of all Japanese coastal convoy routes, searched channels, and of all buoy lights and other navigational aids.

(c) Exact information with regard to disposition of Japanese naval units.

(d) Detailed lists of fuel stocks, including furnace, diesel, gasoline, and coal.

6. "The Japanese Imperial High Command will forthwith direct that except as may be required for the purpose of giving effect to the above special orders, all personnel in Japanese warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships, or other craft are to remain on board their ships, pending further directions from Cincpac or his representatives.

7. "The Japanese Imperial High Command will issue instructions forthwith that:

(a) The Yokosuka, Hiroshima, Omura, and Yabayama airfields be prepared immediately for occupation by U.S. Marine and Naval Air Units.

(b) The Yokosuka Naval Base be prepared immediately for occupation and possible operation by U.S. Naval Service Units.

(c) All troops and personnel other than those required for normal caretaking functions be removed from the foregoing areas prior to the arrival of U.S. forces."

Four hours after President Truman's announcement of the surrender to the people of the United States, the Japanese people were informed of their country's capitulation in a broadcast by the Emperor Hirohito himself, the first he had ever made. An English translation of this broadcast was beamed at the United States.

It was the Emperor's desire to bring "common prosperity and happiness" to all the nations of the world which had impelled him to sue for peace, Hirohito declared. In fact, the failure of the Japanese armed forces, which had led to a situation euphemistically described as "not necessarily to Japan's advantage", was less responsible for the surrender than were "the general trends of the world". The Emperor called particular attention to the Allies' control of atomic power, describing it as "a new and most cruel bomb". By extension of this theme, Hirohito found that "should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but it would also lead to the total extinction of human civilization." (The implication was that "Japan" and "civilization" were synonymous terms). Surrender having been decided on by the Emperor, he ordered the Japanese people to control their emotions, avoid "fraternal contention", unite for the "construction of the future", and "keep pace with the progress of the world".

In a statement made several weeks after Japan's surrender, Baron Suzuki, the last Japanese wartime Premier, explained that the plan to attack Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, was a "top secret", and that the Emperor did not know that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor until the militarists informed him. "He
had to approve the war, according to Suzuki, "but the decision of where to attack came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Staff." Ex-Premier Suzuki also declared that the Emperor was definitely opposed to the war from the start, but that the militarists wanted it. "They regarded the note by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on November 26, 1941, as an ultimatum, and felt that they had to take action," declared Suzuki.

After Baron Suzuki took office in April, 1945, he had held many discussions with the Emperor on the question of negotiating a peace, and at a secret session of the Japanese Imperial Diet in June he had made public his views on ending the war. "There was a great difference of opinion at that time", related Suzuki. "A small patriotic group...was the most demonstrative exponent of the war to the death, and it contained about 30 members of the Diet." In the interview, Suzuki admitted that he had acted on his own, and without the knowledge of the Diet, as a mediator in arranging a peace.

Whatever the truth of the 79-year old Suzuki's statements, it is known that retention of the Imperial House of Japan was the single, reiterated theme of the Japanese propaganda organs from the moment that the Japanese peace proposal was submitted to the Allies. Foreign propaganda broadcasts were devoted to attempts at proving to the Allies the indispensability of the Imperial House; while domestic broadcasts, which gave the Japanese no hint that peace negotiations were underway, exhorted the people of Japan to give the Emperor their absolute loyalty.

The Japanese radio also let the world know that Crown Prince Akihito was being publicized at home, suggesting, it would seem, that a regency might be created should the Allies have personal objections to Hirohito. It is the custom for a Japanese crown prince to be assigned a special household staff upon attaining his twelfth birthday, but Radio Tokyo let it be known that Akihito was being given such a staff, even though he lacked four months of that age. Continuing the apotheosis of the Imperial House of Japan, succeeding broadcasts by the Japanese radio dwelt on the virtues of Prince Nobuhito Takamatsu, a brother of the Emperor, but dwelt much more attentively on his work in war relief and as honorary president of the Japanese Red Cross than on his membership in the Privy Council and on the Navy General Staff. In view of the Allied reply to the original Japanese surrender proposal, which tacitly permitted Hirohito to remain upon the throne, it was difficult to understand this reiterated concern with the succession to the crown. Events have not as yet given an explanation.

During the same period, Japanese newspapers stressed the need for national unity and obedience to the commands of the Emperor, warning that the "gravity of the situation is undoubtedly more than words signify", and advising the people to "wait for the great command from the throne."

Running through the broadcasts, during the days from the original Japanese surrender offer to the actual culmination of that surrender, were statements apparently designed to prepare the people to accept the idea of capitulation,
although the same broadcasts never went so far as to admit that surrender could actually be under consideration.

Pervading the editorial pages of Japanese newspapers issued on 11 August (the day following the transmission of the original surrender proposal) were phrases declaring that Japan must "face reality with courage" and that it was "useless" to engage in further discussion of the war. Reality must be faced by the people and "wishful thinking" abandoned.

The following day, August 12th, the Tokyo paper "Yomiuri" averred that a country had no right "to commit suicide", the "highest duty of a nation" being to continue its existence. A hint to potential candidates for the Allied War Criminal list was contained in the statement that "there are times when statesmen must have the courage to save the nation at the cost of their own lives". Thus, by committing hara kiri, these militarists and statesmen might mitigate the rigors of occupation for Japan as a whole by assuming complete blame for the nation's war guilt.

On 13 August, the tabloid "Tokyo Shimbun" declared that "the worst has come to the worst" and urged the Japanese to avoid "indignation" and a "fatal internal split". The article added that "His Majesty's decision" on any matter civilian or military is "final and best, and all must obey".

An isolated instance of intransigence came from Field Marshal Prince Norinsha Nashimoto, honorary president of the Japanese Imperial Reservists' Association, who broadcast a message to Japanese reservists telling them they must "ultimately destroy completely the strong enemy" in consummation of the "purpose of this holy war". The 71-year old member of the Imperial Family declared that a nation "relying on quantitative might and without fearing the power of Heaven" is "never the final victor".

In addition to the actual attacks on our ships and planes after hostilities were supposedly suspended (See Part I), further evidences of Japanese intractability were provided by several protests concerning the conduct of Allied military operations still in progress, which the Japanese Government forwarded to the Supreme Commander. The first of these was in the form of a warning on August 16th that Allied forces should refrain from approaching the islands of Japan proper until the Emperor's order bringing an end to hostilities had become fully effective.

A second complaint was sent to Allied Headquarters later the same day, protesting that the Japanese forces in Manchuria were meeting great difficulties in carrying out the Imperial Order, because the Soviet troops in the area continued to maintain their offensive. The Japanese message to General of the Army MacArthur "urgently requested that the Supreme Commander...take proper steps to bring about immediate cessation of the Soviet offensive. Although the Soviet commander had issued an ultimatum to the Kwantung Army to lay down its arms by noon on the 20th, fighting continued to be heavy on all fronts in northeast Asia. Kwantung Army headquarters promised to transmit a cease-fire order by aircraft on the 16th, but complained that bad flying weather prevented
delivery of the order. By 19 August, however, troops of the Kwantung Army were surrendering in large numbers, and Soviet headquarters was able to report that resistance had ceased, for the most part.

In what was probably the final naval action of World War II, a submarine, presumably Russian, was reported by Japanese General Headquarters to have sunk four Japanese merchant vessels on 22 August in the coastal waters of northern Hokkaido.

Resignation of the Suzuki Government and Succession of the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet.

Less than five hours after Emperor Hirohito broadcast his surrender message on 15 August, the Suzuki cabinet resigned, thus clearing the way for the formation of an interim government to carry out the surrender terms. The Suzuki Government had taken office on 7 April, 1945, seven days after the invasion of Okinawa, succeeding the Koiso Government, which had enjoyed an unbroken series of disasters. The resignation of the Suzuki Cabinet was announced to the public following a special cabinet meeting and a conference between the Emperor and the Premier. According to the Tokyo radio, the step was taken because "the new situation created by Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation requires a new cabinet of men with fresh ideas".

According to Japanese accounts, there were no disorders during the first few hours following the Emperor's announcement. Tokyo papers bannerlined the end of the war and printed the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation, as well as the Imperial Rescript.

In a step without precedent in Japanese history, General Prince Naruhiko Higashi-Kuni, a cousin of the Emperor and an uncle of Empress Nagako, was commanded by Hirohito on 16 August to form a new cabinet, marking the first time that a member of the Imperial Family had been called to head the government, or a premier had been selected by the Emperor without consultation with his Privy Councillors. Higashi-Kuni proceeded rapidly with the formation of his cabinet, and the new ministers were formally installed by the Emperor on the 17th, the Premier himself assuming the additional post of War Minister.

Prince Fumimaro Konoe, a former premier, was appointed Vice Premier and Minister without Portfolio. The other two most important posts of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Navy were given respectively to Mamoru Shigemitsu and Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai. Shigemitsu, whose portfolio included that of Greater East Asia Minister, was a career diplomat who had been Foreign Minister from April 1943 to April 1945; while Yonai was a hold-over from the Koiso and Suzuki cabinets.

A career man, Iwao Yamazaki, was selected as Home Minister; Chikuhei Nakajima, a member of the powerful aircraft-manufacturing family, as well as a Konoe man, was named Munitions Minister; Juichi Tsushima regained the post of Finance Minister, which he had formerly held in the Koiso Cabinet; Suzuki's Minister of Transportation, Naoto Kohiyama, continued in that post; Kotaro Sengoku was appointed Minister of Agriculture and Commerce; Dr. Chuzo Iwata became Minister of Justice; and a veteran Imperial Diet member, Kenzo Matsumura, was named Minister of Welfare.
One of the most felicitous choices, to all appearances, was that of Tamon Maeda, a graduate of the University of Michigan, a former government administrator, and a supposed moderate in sympathy with the Western World, to be Minister of Education. Lieutenant General Tashishiro Obata, former president of the Army Staff College in Tokyo and once a Japanese Military attache at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, was named to serve as Minister without Portfolio.

Taketora Ogata, a long-time Japanese newspaperman and propagandist, was made Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister without Portfolio, and President of the Board of Information. He had been a member of the Suzuki cabinet for several months. Chokuyo Morase was appointed as President of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau.

Broadcasts emanating from Tokyo indicated that the War, Navy, Munitions, and Greater East Asia Ministries would probably be abolished in the near future, in keeping with the Potsdam Proclamation. They would then be replaced by a new Ministry of Reconstruction. Another indication of growing enlightenment (or the desire to create such an impression) was the Emperor's order of 20 August, lifting the blackout and censorship regulations throughout Japan.

Upon assuming office on 17 August, Higashi-Kuni issued an order to all officers and men of the Japanese armed forces to "observe strictly" the Imperial Rescript calling on all Japanese forces to cease fighting. Avoiding use of the word "surrender", the order stated that "the decision has been taken to cease fire and return to peace". It further declared that "all officers and men of the Imperial armed forces are hereby ordered to refrain from any outbursts of emotion at the sacrifice of their sentiment, face stark reality calmly and squarely, and maintain solid unity and strict discipline, in order to carry out the Imperial instructions to the letter".

On 23 August, General Sadamu Shimomura, Supreme Commander of the North China Expeditionary Force since November 1944, took over the post of War Minister, held by Premier Higashi-Kuni since the formation of the cabinet. At the same time, the Munitions Ministry was abolished, as promised earlier; but its head, Chikuhei Nakajima, remained in the cabinet as Minister of Commerce and Industry. Kato Sengoku, who thus lost one half of his ministerial portfolios, received nominal compensation by having the Ministry of Forestry added to his remaining portfolio of Agriculture. Hisatada Hirose, a former Welfare Minister, was named governor of the Tokyo metropolitan area; and Kingo Machimura, former chief of metropolitan police, was made deputy governor.

A short time after taking office, Premier Higashi-Kuni delivered a speech to the nation in which he emphasized that he would have "special respect for the constitution and would strive to control the armed forces, to maintain order, to encourage energetic and open discussion and freedom of wholesome association".

He also expressed a hope for amity with nations in Greater East Asia, including China, and warned the nation "to guard against emotional outbursts and live up to the letter and the spirit of the Imperial Rescript".

Two rather contradictory themes dominated Japanese broadcasts to the
people of the homeland. The first stressed the fact that the Emperor had accepted the Potsdam Proclamation and that all Japanese should abide by his decision. The second attempted to prove that while Japan had been forced to sue for peace, she had been defeated only by superior material resources and should prepare to overcome this deficiency in the future. At the same time, broadcasts to the United States stressed the need for continuance of the Imperial institution, and Allied acceptance of the new government, to insure cessation of hostilities and orderly occupation.

Following the Japanese acceptance of the preliminary surrender terms, there ensued a period of five days in which the Japanese Government feinted, procrastinated, and raised questions about the formalities and technicalities of officially surrendering. Two theories concerning the causes of this delay have been advanced. One is that it was simply a traditional Japanese ruse of keeping the other party to a transaction waiting, to gain psychological or other advantage. The other view is that the new Japanese government did not yet have the situation fully in hand, or that confusion and extraordinary strain within the Japanese hierarchy had partially paralyzed the ability to act.

This latter theory is given added credit by a story of palace intrigue published more than a month afterward by the Tokyo newspaper "Mainichi". According to the article, a group of young general staff officers seized control of the Imperial Palace after killing Lieutenant General Mori, Commander of the Imperial Guard, imprisoning the Emperor's chief aide, and only being dissuaded from taking over control of the government by the arrival of Lieutenant General Tanaka, Commander of the Japanese Eastern Army Headquarters, who lectured the young officers for three hours that they must not commit the outrages, once the Emperor had reached his decision. Four officers committed suicide on the spot, while the others were taken to the guard house.

In the first message to the Supreme Commander following the Emperor's acceptance of surrender terms, the Japanese disclosed that the Emperor had issued an Imperial Order at 1600 on the 16th to all the armed forces to cease hostilities at once. It was estimated that the order would not reach the various fronts and take full effect for a period of 2 to 12 days—two days for Japan proper, six days for China, Manchuria, Korea, and the southern regions, except the Philippines, Bougainville, and New Guinea—where 8 to 12 days would be required for the order to reach isolated front areas. The order stated that members of the Imperial Family were to be sent as personal representatives of the Emperor to headquarters of the Kwantung Army, to the Expeditionary Forces in China, and to forces in the southern regions to expedite enforcement of the Imperial Order.

The Arrival of Japanese Emissaries at Manila.

After more delay, two Japanese "Bettys", painted white and marked with green crosses, as specified by the Supreme Commander, finally departed at 0718 on the 19th from Kisarazu Airdrome, south of Tokyo, with the 16-man delegation being sent to Manila to receive the terms of surrender from General MacArthur's aides, in compliance with the Supreme Commander's instruction of 15 August.
At 1100 they passed over Cape Sata, the southernmost tip of Kyushu, which had been originally designated as their take-off point. Proceeding over the northern Ryukyus, the two planes were met north of Ie Shima by an escort of B-25s and P-38s. Landing at Birch Airstrip on Ie Shima, which was marked with a white cross, the delegates were transferred to a C-54 transport for the flight to Manila, the planes in which they had arrived from Honshu remaining at Ie Shima for their return. At 1755 on the 19th, the C-54 reached Nichols Field, outside Manila.

The Japanese delegation to Manila, headquarters for the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, was headed by Lieutenant General Torashiro Kawabe, Vice Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff; and included Captain Hidemi Yoshida, Navy Bureau of Military Affairs; Rear Admiral Ichiro Yokoyama and Captain Toshiichi Omoe, both of the Navy General Staff; Major General Morikazu Amane, Chief of the First Section of the Army General Staff, and Colonel Arata Yamamoto, of the Army General Staff. The other 10 members of the delegation were military and technical advisers who did not attend either of the meetings with members of General MacArthur's staff.

Representing the United States in these conversations were Lieutenant General R. K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff to General MacArthur; Major General C. A. Willoughby, APPac Intelligence Chief (both of whom had escaped to Australia from Corregidor as members of General MacArthur’s party in March 1942); Rear Admiral F. P. Sherman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Cincpac-Cincpoa; Major General L. J. Whitlock, Chief of Supply; Brigadier General S. J. Chamberlain, Assistant Chief of Staff to General MacArthur; and Brigadier General D. R. Hutchinson, Chief of Staff for the Far Eastern Air Force.

Two conferences were held during the 19 hours that the Japanese mission remained at Manila, Kawabe and his colleagues cooperating to the fullest extent in giving information about harbors and airfields around Tokyo, which the Allied forces would require for their entry. The Japanese envoys further reported that there were eight Japanese submarines at sea—three near Okinawa, three in the vicinity of the Marianas, and two near Truk. On 16 August, and again on the 18th, these submarines had been ordered to cease hostilities and return to base.

Whether one of these Japanese submarines was involved is not known, but on the morning of 21 August, SMITH (DD) made a single depth charge attack on a good sonar contact at 21° 24' N., 127° 33' E. (northeast of Luzon), after the submarine failed to reply to a challenge.

As soon as the Japanese delegation had completed this briefing of their recent enemies, they were handed a copy of the Instrument of Surrender, which representatives of the Japanese Government would have to sign at the formal surrender ceremony to take place soon thereafter. It was emphasized at this time that, despite a popular misconception of their role, the enemy emissaries at Manila were not empowered to bargain, but merely to accept and transmit to Japanese Imperial Headquarters the occupation terms. If, however, Japan should reject these terms, her only alternative would be to resume fighting.
The formal surrender of the Japanese Imperial Government, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and all Japanese and Japanese-controlled armed forces wherever located, was signed aboard the battleship MISSOURI at 0908 on 2 September 1945. Looking down upon the ceremony, to present a reminder of an earlier occasion on which Japanese truculence had been humbled by American sea power, was the American Flag which had flown over Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry's flagship MISSISSIPPI when he steamed into the Bay of Yedo (Tokyo Bay, as it was known after 1868) in 1853. An interesting sidelight concerning this 31-starred flag was the circumstance of its being framed in reverse, as a result of the obverse side's having suffered such decomposition from mildew that it had been necessary at some time in the flag's history to back that side with cotton batting.

Acting on behalf of Emperor Hirohito and of the Japanese Government, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu signed first for Japan. The next to affix his signature to the surrender document was General Yoshijiro Umezu, Chief of Staff, Japanese Army Headquarters, who signed for the Imperial General Headquarters. Both Japanese emissaries, as well as the various Allied representatives, signed two documents—one for the Allies, and a duplicate to be retained by Japan.

As Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General of the Army MacArthur, attended by Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright, defender of Bataan and Corregidor, and by Lieutenant General Arthur E. Percival, British commander at Singapore at the time of the Japanese conquest of that base, signed next. Both generals, recently released from a prison camp near Mukden, Manchuria, had been especially invited by General MacArthur to witness the surrender of Japan.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers then called upon the other signatories in the following order:
For the United States—Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.
For the Republic of China—General Hsu Yung-Chang.
For the United Kingdom—Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, GCB, KBE.
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Lieutenant General Kuzma Nikolaevich Derevyanko.
For the Commonwealth of Australia—General Sir Thomas Blamey.
For the Dominion of Canada—Colonel Lawrence Moore-Cosgrave.
For the Provisional Government of the French Republic—Major General Jacques LeClerc (Count Philippe de Hauteclocque).
For the United Kingdom of the Netherlands—Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich.
For the Dominion of New Zealand—Air Vice Marshal L. M. Isitt, RNZAF.

The complete text of the surrender articles signed by the Japanese and Allied representatives was as follows:

"We, acting by command of and on behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers."
We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese Armed Forces and all Armed Forces under Japanese control wherever situated.

We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property, and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to issue at once orders to the commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

We hereby command all civil, military, and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders, and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority; and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government, and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that declaration.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all Allied Prisoners of War and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance, and immediate transportation to places as directed.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.

Immediately upon the signing of the surrender articles, the Supreme Commander ordered that the following proclamation be issued by Emperor Hirohito:

Accepting the terms set forth in the declaration by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and China on July 26, 1945, at Potsdam and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have commanded the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to sign on my behalf the Instrument of Surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to issue General Orders to the military and naval forces in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. I command all my people forthwith to cease hostilities, to lay down their arms, and
faithfully to carry out all the provisions of the Instrument of Surrender and the General Orders issued by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters hereunder."

At the conclusion of the ceremony, the Japanese received copies of General Order No. One, prepared previously by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President of the United States, containing instructions for disarming Japan. The General Order, which was to be issued through the Japanese Government, called upon all commanders in Japan and abroad to lay down their arms, cease hostilities at once, and to remain in their present locations, and it required that all Japanese except the police force in the main islands of Japan be disarmed.

It further provided that the Allied powers should be furnished lists of all land, air, and anti-aircraft units, aircraft, naval and merchant vessels in or out of commission or under construction; maps of minefields and all other obstacles to movement by land, sea, or air should be provided; locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments; and locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees. Other sections of the General Order stressed that all military and naval installations were to be kept intact, as well as all industrial establishments engaged in war work.

To implement the formal instrument of surrender, General Order No. 1 specified that immediate contact would be made by each Japanese commander with the indicated Allied commander, or his designated representative, for each of the six surrender regions into which the Japanese area of influence was divided. These regions and the commanders to whom the surrenders would be tendered were as follows:

(a) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa, and French Indo-China north of 16° North, would surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

(b) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in the Japanese mandated islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Pacific Islands were to surrender to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

(c) The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, air, sea, and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38° North, and the Philippines should surrender to CinC AFPac.

(d) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38° North, Karafuto, and the Kurile Islands would surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.

(e) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China (south of 16° North), Malaya, Sumatra, Java, the Lesser Sundas (including Bali, Lombok, and Timor), Boeoeo, Ceram, Ambon, Kai, Aroe, Tanimbar (and islands in the Arafura Sea), Celebes, the Halmaheras, and Dutch New Guinea would surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, Lord Louis Mountbatten.
(f) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces within Borneo, British New Guinea, the Bismarcks, and the Solomons would surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces, General Sir Thomas Blamey.

A subsequent readjustment, made at the request of the British Chiefs of Staff led to the following procedures being adopted in the Japanese capitulation of Ocean and Nauru Islands:

At Ocean, the Australian Commander concerned in accepting the surrender signed once on behalf of the theater commander (Cincpac-Cincpoa) and a second time on behalf of the United Kingdom, as the territorial authority. At Nauru, he signed once on behalf of the theater commander (Cincpac-Cincpoa) and again on behalf of Australia, the territorial authority.

The question of the Admiralty Islands' being retained by the United States because of their strategic importance was also the subject for an exchange of views by the governments of the United States and of Australia, the nation to which the Admiralties had been mandated after World War I. The Prime Minister of Australia urged that control of all Australian-mandated territories should revert to that country as soon as possible, now that the requirements of war no longer made their retention by the United States a military necessity.

The American view, that security against future Japanese aggression was of prime importance, prevailed, however—at least for the time being—with the result that Manus Island (in the Admiralty Group), with its superb Seeadler Harbor, as well as Emirau and St Matthias Islands (in the St Matthias Group), and the Ninigo Group (to the west of the Admiralties), all of which had been in the Philippine Sea Frontier, were added as bases under Commander Marianas, in the Pacific Ocean Areas, during the last week of September. A Naval Operating Base was established at Manus, while Emirau, which had been rolled up as an air base several months earlier, was retained as an emergency landing strip.

Simultaneously, preparations continued for the roll-up of American bases in South Pacific and Southwest Pacific islands being returned to British, French, Australian, and Dutch sovereignty. It was evident that by 15 October the shore establishments in the South Pacific would be sufficiently rolled up to permit the closing of the headquarters on Noumea and the establishment aboard VINCENNES (CL) of mobile headquarters which would enable ComSoPac to move with greater freedom to the various ports in which the roll-up was being accomplished.

At the same time, BIRMINGHAM (CL) was assigned to Commander U.S. Naval Forces Australia-New Guinea (a command established on 15 August, 1945, under Commander SEVENTH Fleet) to facilitate his visiting of the ports in which the roll-up of his area was to be accomplished.

Somewhat earlier, on 27 August, the War Department had decided to maintain token garrisons on the South Pacific islands of Aitutaki and Penryhn (in the Cook Islands), pending the completion of negotiations with the government of New Zealand by the American State Department.
Simultaneously with the formal surrender of the Empire of Japan on 2 September, the title of Commander Allied Naval Forces Southwest Pacific Area was abolished, and all naval forces thereunder, except United States vessels, passed to British control.

On 17 September, Supreme Allied Headquarters shifted to Tokyo from Yokohama. The Supreme Commander, his aides, and other high-ranking officials established themselves in the American Embassy, while headquarters officials were located in the lavish, seven-story Dai-Ichi Hotel and the Mutual Insurance building facing a section of the moat around the Emperor's Palace. Six hundred officers and 1,400 enlisted men moved into Tokyo with headquarters. The rear echelon of general headquarters remained in Manila. The EIGHTH Army took over Yokohama buildings formerly occupied by Supreme Headquarters.

The same day, the British Flag was formally hoisted over the British Embassy, a Marine guard from the Cruiser NEWFOUNDLAND relieving the Marine guard from KING GEORGE V which had been on duty at the Embassy since 8 September.

In a move by Premier Higashi-Kuni to purge from his cabinet all members who might not prove acceptable to the Supreme Commander, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had signed the surrender document for the Imperial Japanese Government aboard the USS MISSOURI, was asked, on 18 September, to resign. He was replaced the same day by Shigeru Yoshida, a career diplomat well known for his consistent stand against Japanese aggression. Yoshida was reported to have opposed the war from the start, and to have been jailed for a month early in 1945 because of his persistent efforts to bring about peace through diplomatic channels. Premier Higashi-Kuni stated that he made the appointment because "his record is free of any suspicion of actively supporting the war."

The same week, Taketora Ogata was removed as President of the Board of Information and Minister without Portfolio, after he had been ordered arrested by the Supreme Commander as one of the leaders of the notorious Black Dragon Society. His place was taken by Tatsuo Kawai. Ogata retained his post as Chief Cabinet Secretary, however.

Formation of a New Japanese Cabinet.

On 8 October, the Supreme Commander approved the newly-completed cabinet which Baron Kijuro Shidehara had formed at the request of the Emperor upon his resignation of the Prince Higashi-Kuni Government a few hours earlier. In a step unprecedented in Japanese Political History, Premier Shidehara called his 15-man cabinet together for an informal meeting prior to being formally inducted into office at 0900 the following day, and even prior to reporting its roster to the Emperor.

In addition to Premier Shidehara, the 73-year old career diplomat, the cabinet included Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida, 67, a holdover, who, like Shidehara, had opposed Japan's militaristic clique; Home Minister Zenjiro Horikiri, 61, a career government official; Finance Minister Keizo Shibusawa, 49, a financier; Commerce and Industry Minister Sankuro Ogasawara, 60, a parliamentarian and businessman; Agriculture and Forestry Minister Kenzo Masumura, 62, a statesman who had been parliamentary vice minister.
The War Ministry was retained by Lieutenant General Sadashi Shimomura, 58, a militarist holdover; Admiral Hoyemu Toyoda, the 60-year old militarist who had commanded the Yokosuka Naval Base when TG 31.3 made its amphibious landings there in late August, became Minister of Navy; Justice Minister Dr. Chuzo Iwata, 70, a lawyer, retained his post from the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet; Dr. Hitoshi Ashida, 58, a parliamentarian, author, and member of the house of representatives, was named Welfare Minister; the Ministry of Transportation was assumed by Takao Tanaka, 57, a parliamentarian and veteran member of the house of representatives; and Education Minister Tamon Maeda, 61, a journalist, remained at his post.

Ministers without portfolio were Daisaburo Tsugita, 63, a parliamentarian, concurrently serving as chief cabinet secretary; Joji Matsumoto, 68, a parliamentarian; and Tatsuo Kawai, a diplomat who held his former post as president of the board of information. Holding a cabinet post without the rank of minister was Wataru Narahasi, 44, a parliamentarian who was president of the board of legislation.

Abolition of Japanese Imperial General Headquarters.

On 10 September, the Supreme Commander ordered Emperor Hirohito to dissolve the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, effective 13 September. Up to this time, the Supreme Commander had been compelled to adopt the same methods used so long by the Emperor—that of dealing separately with two entities—the Imperial Government and the General Staff. By eliminating the latter, General MacArthur would henceforth be enabled to give all orders and directives to the Imperial Government alone. This was another step toward breaking the hold of the Japanese militarists, regarded by many as the hands governing the movements of the puppet Emperor.

The Imperial Headquarters included both naval and army officers, and was the third to have been organized to wage war for Japan. The first was for the Russo-Japanese War, the second was for the first World War, and the third for the conflict begun in Manchuria in 1931, leading up to the "China Incident" and the attack on Pearl Harbor.

September 13th also witnessed the dismissal by the Japanese Government of some 17,000 students of naval colleges and naval intendence schools, who were ordered to assemble at prefectural capitals on the 23rd for new instructions.

Many of the Imperial Headquarters' personnel continued to work with the U.S. occupation authorities after the abolition of their official functions, and it appeared likely that most of them would serve as liaison personnel until demobilization was completed.

The Japanese home army, which numbered 2,253,000 on 15 August, had been reduced to approximately 608,000 by 17 September, at which time demobilization was proceeding at the rate of approximately 50,000 men per day.

As of 15 October, all tactical Japanese Army Groups were dissolved in accordance with the schedule set up by the Office of the Supreme Commander, and demobilization functions were assumed by Army Districts. The Japanese Army as...
such had ceased to exist. This marked the culmination of one of the greatest mass surrenders in history, involving the laying down of their arms by some 7,000,000 Japanese troops, including those in outlying theaters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, within a period of only six weeks. In the words of President Truman:

"I know of no demobilization in history, either in war or in peace, by our own or by any other country, that has been accomplished so rapidly or so frictionlessly. Everything military, naval, or air is forbidden to Japan. This ends its military might and its military influence in international affairs. It no longer reckons as a world power either large or small. Its path in the future, if it is to survive, must be confined to the ways of peace...."

"In the accomplishment of the extraordinarily difficult and dangerous surrender in Japan, unique in the annals of history, not a shot was necessary, not a drop of Allied blood was shed. The vindication of the great decision of Potsdam is complete. Nothing could exceed the abjectness, the humiliation, and the finality of this surrender. It is not only physically thorough, but has been equally destructive on Japanese spirit. From swagger and arrogance, the former Japanese military have passed to servility and fear. They are thoroughly beaten and cowed, and tremble before the terrible retribution the surrender terms impose upon their country in punishment for its great sins...."

Of the approximately 2,250,000 Japanese troops in the home islands on V-J Day, some 80,000 were to remain in uniform temporarily, according to the Minister of War, Sadashi Shimomura, but they were to lose their military designation and would be known as liaison personnel for demobilization. Their tasks would include the handling of "Landing Point Repatriation Bureaus" for demobilized troops, directing such men to their homes, finding them jobs, and assisting American occupation troops at various points. As their work was completed, they were to be dismissed, with perhaps 10,000 remaining at the end of 60 days. At the same time, approximately 30,000 Japanese naval personnel would remain on duty to man ships repatriating Japanese nationals from outlying islands and the continent of Asia. It was estimated that 1,300,000 naval personnel had been demobilized by 15 October.

Coincidentally with the completion of demobilization in the Japanese home islands, it was announced that Japan's War and Navy Ministries had been abolished, and would be replaced by civilian agencies known as "Ministries for Demobilization", which would handle such questions as demobilization of troops from overseas and veterans' employment.

Although the Japanese Army and Navy General Staffs were also abolished, the Japanese announced that the overseas fleet headquarters would continue to function temporarily for the purpose of insuring order within the forces under its command. General Yoshijiro Umezu, Japan's 38th and final Army Chief of Staff, reported to the Imperial Diet on 16 October that there had been not only a physical disarmament of troops, but a "disarming of the fighting spirit." To a direct question concerning the ulterior intents of the military clique,
General MacArthur answered that the Japanese Army would not be kept alive by "any clandestine organisation", and that the people would "attempt to regain respect for Japan in a new peaceful world". He added that he expected to remain in uniform until mid-November to direct the investigation of Japan's war industries, as ordered by the Supreme Commander.

The Supreme Commander's Occupation Instructions No. 1.

On 13 September, the Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued Occupation Instruction No. 1, the first of a contemplated series of instructions intended to guide Cincpac-Cincpoa in his operations concerning the Occupation of Japan.

Cincpac, as Naval Representative of the Supreme Commander, was ordered to conduct the operations of U.S. Naval Occupation Forces in Japan and in Korea south of the 38th parallel. In addition he was to:

(1) Occupy selected Japanese naval shore establishments.
(2) Assume control of Japanese naval vessels.
(3) Direct and supervise the operation of the Japanese merchant fleet, except vessels of less than 100 gross tons.
(4) Establish a system of surveillance and inspection to verify the execution by Japanese naval forces of their own disarmament and demobilization, and their compliance with the directives of the Office of the Supreme Commander.
(5) Issue the necessary instructions and make arrangements for the transfer of Japanese naval armament, equipment, and supplies to Occupation Forces, and make disposition of the same as approved by the Office of the Supreme Commander.
(6) Direct Japanese naval commanders to submit to appropriate fleet commanders such reports as might be necessary to facilitate the surveillance of disarmament and demobilization, in addition to the collection and disposition of naval armament, equipment, and supplies to be turned over to the Occupation Forces.
(7) Submit to the Office of the Supreme Commander special reports covering the progress of disarmament and demobilization of Japanese naval forces.
(8) Submit to the Office of the Supreme Commander special reports covering any indication of unsatisfactory progress on the part of the Japanese naval forces in effecting a rapid and orderly disarmament and demobilization.
(9) Conduct naval intelligence activity in Japan proper and Korea south of the 38th parallel.
Although the greater part of the ports occupied by U.S. naval forces were to be held only temporarily, with the Army taking over permanent occupation duties, certain areas were assigned to the U.S. naval forces in Japan proper for permanent occupation. These were as follows:

**THIRD Fleet Zone**

(Until relieved by
FIFTH Fleet)

- Yokosuka Naval Base.
- Yokosuka Naval Air Base.
- Ominato Air Base.
- Kabayama Airfield.
- Sagami Beach Recreation Area.

**FIFTH Fleet Zone**

- Sasebo Naval Base.
- Omura Seaplane Base and Airfield.
- Hiroshima Airfield.
- Iwakuni Airfield.

The designation of Naval Occupation Force Commands and the assignment of areas thereto for permanent occupation would be subject to amendment from time to time, as arranged by Cincpac with the Supreme Commander.

The delineation of an area assigned for permanent occupation by U.S. Naval Forces would be defined by the boundaries of the Japanese military or naval installation concerned as it existed prior to 2 September 1945, as modified by mutual agreement between the Naval and Army Occupation Force Commanders within whose general areas the establishment might be located.

Naval Commanders of Occupation Forces were to be responsible for the security, police, and administration within the boundaries of shore establishments assigned for permanent Naval occupation. The relations of such Naval Occupation Force Commanders, with those Central Agencies established by the Imperial Japanese Government in each of the major occupied areas of Japan proper for the allocation of resources and coordination of local Japanese administration, were to be conducted through the Army Occupation Force Commander within whose area the Japanese Central Agency functioned.

In the occupation of Japan it would be the principal mission of the Army Forces to occupy the land areas, and that of the Naval Forces to occupy the sea areas. In the accomplishment of initial occupation tasks, however, Naval Forces might, by mutual agreement between the Army and Navy Occupation Force Commanders concerned, temporarily occupy additional selected localities whose occupation would expedite and further the early occupation of Japan, though these localities would in general be restricted to Japanese Naval establishments on the seaboard.

Likewise, Army Forces would be permitted to occupy selected inland sea areas, taking possession of Naval vessels and Naval armament and equipment, where the occupation tasks would thus be expedited and promoted.

In general, however, Naval vessels, armament, equipment, and supplies taken over by Army Forces were to be placed at the disposal of Naval Forces after possession was obtained. Similarly, armament, supplies, and equipment of the Japanese Army taken initially by Naval Forces were to be placed at the disposal of Army Forces for permanent disposition.
Restatement of the Powers of the Supreme Commander.

On 29 November, a restatement of the powers accruing to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was made by his Headquarters. They were listed as follows:

"a. The authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers over Japan is complete for the purpose of carrying out the terms of the surrender. In addition to the powers of a military occupant of enemy territory, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has the power to take any steps deemed advisable and proper by him to effectuate the surrender and to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and the directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"b. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will exercise control over Japan and the Japanese, to the greatest practicable extent, through the Emperor and various instrumentalities of the Imperial Japanese Government which prove suitable for this purpose. The Japanese Government will generally be permitted to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration, subject to the right of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to require changes in the governmental machinery and personnel. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will have authority to take direct action in the event of the unwillingness or failure of the Japanese authorities to act effectively."

Ultimate Objectives of the Occupation.

The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which the policies in the initial period of occupation were to conform, were twofold: (a) To insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world; (b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which would support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desired that the Japanese Government would conform as closely as possible to the principles of democratic self-government, but it did not feel any responsibility on the part of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely-expressed will of the people.

In order to achieve these objectives, the following policies were followed: (a) Japan's sovereignty would be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and about one thousand smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands; (b) Japan was to be completely disarmed and demilitarized,
with the authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism to be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression would be vigorously suppressed; (c) The Japanese people should be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for the fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They should also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations; (d) The Japanese people were to be afforded an opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which would permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met.

Cautions Imposed Upon the Occupation Forces.

The Supreme Commander ordered that the civilian population of Japan was to be treated by the occupying forces in such a manner as to develop respect for and confidence in the United States and other members of the United Nations and their representatives, and to encourage cooperation in the accomplishment of the desired objectives. The civilian population was to be completely free from all unwarranted interference with its individual liberty and property rights. Historical, cultural, and religious objects and installations (including the several Imperial Palaces) were to be carefully protected and preserved. Subject to the requirements of military security, the occupation forces would permit freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly, as well as observing the obligations imposed upon them by international law and the rules of land warfare.
## APPENDIX II

**SHIPS PRESENT IN TOKYO BAY DURING THE SURRENDER CEREMONY.**

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THE SURRENDER AND OCCUPATION OF KOREA.

Introduction.

General Order No. 1 issued by the Supreme Commander had provided that the Japanese senior commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in Korea south of the 38th parallel should surrender to CinCPac. The latter delegated Lieutenant General J.R. Hodge, USA, Commanding General XXIV Corps, to receive the actual surrender of forces in Korea and charged him with the physical occupation of that country. The responsibility for lifting the troops of this Corps from its staging points in the Ryukyus and the Philippines was assigned to the Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, Vice Admiral D.E. Barbey (CTF 78), with the date for the initial landing designated as B-Day.

The 7th Infantry Division (plus certain XXIV Corps elements) was to be transported to the occupation area in time to land on that date. The 40th and 96th Divisions plus remaining Corps elements would be landed as soon thereafter as the availability of shipping might permit. The strategic areas to be occupied by the XXIV Corps were the Jinsen-Keijo area, the Fusan area, the Gunzan-Zenshu area, and such other areas in Korea south of 38° North Latitude as the Commanding General XXIV Corps should direct.

The Situation Existing in Korea.

Korea was garrisoned by an estimated 325,000 Japanese Army troops when the war ended, including at least five depot divisions (a disposition indicating Korea's importance to Japan as a training ground) plus combat units, service units, and air force troops. Seoul (the Korean name for the ancient capital which had been renamed Keijo by the Japanese) was the headquarters of Japanese Army activity. In addition, an estimated 25,000 Japanese Navy ground forces were in Korea. These were composed chiefly of the Chinkai Guard Unit, the Chinkai Defense Unit, and the Rashin Base Force. These forces were employed as garrisons, in anti-submarine warfare, in control of picket boat activity, and in other defensive naval operations.

The population of Korea in 1940 comprised 24,327,326 persons, of whom 97% were Koreans. In 1939, there were 650,104 Japanese, 51,104 Chinese, and 1,219 Europeans and Americans—the non-Asiatic inhabitants being principally missionaries. Most of the population was rural, only 61 municipalities having more than 10,000 inhabitants. Nearly half of the population was to be found in the six southern provinces, which had an average density of 412 persons per square mile. The Koreans were much like the Chinese in culture, but they had their own language. About 15% of the Koreans had learned the Japanese language, this group being found chiefly in the large cities and towns.

The Japanese administered Korea through a Governor-General appointed by the Emperor. Under him there was an Inspector-General of Political Affairs. A Central Council, consisting of a president, vice-president, five advisers, and 65 councillors—all Koreans—considered matters submitted to it by the Governor-General. A Governor, who could be either Japanese or Korean, served as the immediate head of each province;
and, although subordinate to the Governor-General, he administered the affairs of his province, supervised all public bodies, and was authorized to issue local ordinances. He also had control of the local police, which was mostly officered by Japanese, of whom there were 500 in Seoul alone.

Before the year 1895, Korea had for centuries been under the influence of China, whose suzerainty she acknowledged. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, which was fought on Korean soil, Japanese influence in the country became pronounced, increasing steadily thereafter until Korea was officially recognized as a Japanese sphere of interest by the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, which ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

The Japanese substituted their own names for the Korean names of the principal cities—Seoul becoming Keijo, Chemulpo becoming Jinsen, and Phyeng Yang being transformed to Heijo. Korean names were thenceforth systematically omitted from all publications, with the result that Korean towns are now mostly known by their Japanese names. In 1910, the Emperor of Korea handed over his prerogatives to the Emperor of Japan, and Korea was, by Imperial Japanese Decree, declared an integral part of Japan.

Most Koreans did not take kindly to the annexation of their country, with the inevitable result that an underground opposition developed, chiefly fostered by an active minority of students and scholars, and supported by exiles, mostly in China, Manchuria, and the maritime provinces of Soviet Russia. Opposition had crystallized into an independence movement by 1919, from which date three main phases are discernible—the Nationalist period from 1919 to 1924; the Communist period from 1924 to 1935; and the "National Front for Korean Liberation" which was set up in 1936. Since the Japanese savagely repressed any such attempts made within the country itself, these movements were generally conducted on territory outside Korea.

The 1919-1924 Nationalist movement was fostered by the middle classes and had a religious backing, mostly Christian, which was greatly strengthened by American missionary influence. Its sponsors hoped to get Korea's case reviewed by the Versailles Conference in 1919 at the end of World War I, but no success attended their efforts.

By 1924, other groups had been formed which had little faith in aid from foreign countries. Some of these resorted to terrorism and the formation of secret societies, resulting in the killing or wounding of several high Japanese officials (including the career diplomat, Manoru Shigemitsu, who lost a leg as the result of the explosion of a bomb) at Shanghai in 1932.

Earlier than this, however, the greater part of the Korean independence movement had come under Communist influence, receiving active support from Manchuria, where there were a million Koreans, as well as from the Soviet Far Eastern territories, to which area 200,000 Koreans had migrated after the annexation of their country in 1910. The success of the Kuomintang party in China induced many Koreans to join the Chinese Red Army, and although the Kuomintang breach with the Communists at a later date caused considerable discouragement, the Communist element remained the backbone of the independence movement until 1935-36, when a "Korean National Front" was formed in Shanghai. This front was designed to unite the Communist and non-Communist elements, whose disunity had greatly hampered the movement for freedom.
The two groups agreed on a program, the aim of which was to confiscate and nationalize all Japanese imperialist interests, while leaving native properties in the hands of the Korean owners. The independence movement, however, was marred from the start by cliques and factions, each striving to obtain control. At the time when the XXIV Corps was preparing to occupy the country, there were pockets of Korean nationalists in both Chungking and Yenan, the capitals of the Central Chinese Government and of Communist China respectively.

The Purpose and Objectives of the Occupation of Korea.

The expressed purposes of the military occupation of Korea by Allied troops were (a) The enforcement of the Instrument of Surrender upon the Japanese armed forces in Korea; (b) The accomplishment of complete political and administrative separation of Korea from Japan and the emancipation of Korea from Japanese social, economic, and financial control; (c) The facilitation of the development of a sound Korean economy devoted to peaceful pursuits; and (d) The establishment of local self-government and the restoration of a free and independent nation which would conform to the principles expressed first in the Cairo Declaration, later in the Potsdam Proclamation, and finally in the Charter of the United Nations.

The immediate objectives of the military occupation of Korea were the abolition of militarism; the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment; the disarmament and demilitarization of Japanese arms; the abolition of discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed, or political opinions; the strengthening of democratic tendencies and processes; the encouragement of liberal political, economic and social institutions; and the creation of conditions in Korea which would facilitate the emergence of a free and independent nation capable of taking her place as a responsible and peaceful member of the family of nations.

Proposed Policy of Allied Military Government in Korea.

Operation Plans for the administration of Korea by Military Government called for occupation forces to utilize the existing government machinery, effecting only such reorganizations in governmental machinery as seemed necessary. Maximum responsibility for carrying out essential administrative functions and implementing the directives and policies of the Military Government would be imposed on governmental officials and administrative agencies at all levels.

No persons would be allowed to hold public office or any other position of responsibility or influence in public or private enterprise who had been flagrant exponents of militant Japanese nationalism and aggression, or who had been influential in the activities of the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Society, their affiliates and agencies, or any successor organizations, the League of Great Japan Women's Association, or any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, or secret societies, their agencies, or affiliates. In addition to these potential war criminals, plans called for the removal of other incumbent policy-making officials, where such removal would not jeopardize the efficiency of existing government controls and administration.
Political parties, organizations, and societies would be placed under control. Those whose activities were consistent with the requirements and objectives of Military Government would be encouraged. Those whose activities were inconsistent with such requirements and objectives would be abolished, and all records and property owned or controlled by such organizations would be seized as public property.

The records of all governmental and quasi-governmental agencies and organizations would be impounded for inspection and use by the Military Government. All military pensions, emoluments, or benefits to Japanese would be stopped, as well as all pensions, emoluments, or benefits, public or private, granted by reason of membership in any organization enumerated above, or granted to any person removed from office or arrested by the military occupation forces under the directives issued to the Military Government.

**Occupation of Jinsen.**

**Characteristics of the Harbor—**Jinsen, on the west-central coast of Korea, was selected as the site for the initial landings by troops of the 7th Infantry Division on 8 September (E-Day), chiefly because it was the port of Seoul, the capital of Korea, in which role it constituted the best available means for movement from the Yellow Sea to the latter city. Jinsen (with a 1940 population of 171,165) was one of the principal deep-water ports of Korea, serving as the port for the entire Seoul industrial area. In this role, it occupied a position similar to the relationship of Yokohama to Tokyo by maintaining close road and rail connections with the capital, handling its imports and exports, and serving the rapidly expanding industrial area in the vicinity.

Jinsen was situated at the mouth of the Er-Ka Estuary, a tributary of the Kan-Ko River, with a well-protected natural harbor that was ice-free in the winter. The greatest disadvantage for navigation was the high tidal range of 30 feet, which forced the larger vessels to work their cargoes at a distance of three miles offshore.

The port was divided into an inner and an outer harbor by a system of breakwaters and causeways. The outer harbor was the western, open portion within the harbor limits, extending out for some distance into the deep channel and covering an area of approximately 3800 acres. This harbor was used as the anchorage for large vessels. The inner harbor was protected by several islands and breakwaters which sheltered the fairway to the tidal basin. The greater part of the inner harbor habitually dried out at low water, leaving only the dredged fairway to the tidal basin. To counteract the great tidal range, a wet dock for deep draft vessels had been constructed at the southwestern end of the inner harbor.
Because of the 30-foot tidal range, the wet dock (covering an area of 119,000 square yards) was equipped with a pair of "double leaf" lock gates, the only ones in existence in the Far East. The gates were controlled by electricity with a speed of 60 seconds per operation, and enclosed a 430-foot lock with a width of 60 feet. The height of the lock walls was 50 feet. Limited in the inner harbor by the shallow fairway with a mid-channel depth of 13 feet at low water, vessels of more than a 12-foot draft could gain access to the lock and basin only at high tide. Although the lock and tidal basin were constructed to serve 4500-ton ships as the standard vessels, larger vessels could proceed with extreme caution through the lock to the wharves.

The river mouth on which Jinsen is located was fringed by the Marie Fortune group of islands, south of which was the 50-mile entrance channel to the port, with depths varying from 40 to 60 feet. Jinsen was customarily approached from the south via this channel. There was also a waterway approaching the city from the north, but it was navigable only at high tide by shallow-draft vessels.

At one point, the main (south) channel split into two subordinate channels—Higashi Suido (East Channel) and Nishi Suido (Flying Fish Channel), the former passing eastward of a group of islands and shoals lying to the eastward of the northern islands of the Tokuseki Group. Deep-draft vessels could use either passage, but numerous shoals and strong tidal currents made caution essential. Higashi Suido was the channel generally used, as the tidal currents were weaker there, never exceeding four knots, although numerous obstructions existed. In addition, Higashi Suido was lighted for night navigation, while Nishi Suido was not.

The two channels united about eight miles below Jinsen, from which point vessels proceeded in a northeasterly direction in the nearly mile-wide channel, with a prevailing depth of eight fathoms, to enter the southern boundary of Jinsen Harbor. Within the harbor, a 2100-yard fairway marked by light buoys, with an average width of 130 yards, led to the inner harbor and wet dock. As a result of the rapid silting of the harbor, dredges were kept in constant use to maintain a minimum depth of 13 feet in mid-channel.

Support Operations—For more than a week before our troops began landing at Jinsen, powerful units of the SEVENTH Fleet patrolled the Yellow Sea and the waters to the northwest of Korea. Task Force 71 (North China Force, Rear Admiral F.S. Low), led by CruDiv 16 (ALASKA and GUAM (CBs)) and CruDiv 6 (SAN FRANCISCO, NEW ORLEANS, MINNEAPOLIS, and TUSCALOOSA (CA s)), made a show of strength off Tsingtao on 1 September, and on several succeeding days demonstrated at various points along the west coast of Korea and at Pohai Gulf (north of the Shantung Peninsula, in north China).

At the same time, TF 72 (Fast Carrier Task Force), commanded by Rear Admiral A.C. Davis, and consisting of ANTIETAM and INTREPID (CVs), CABOT (CVL), BLACK, BULLARD, CHAUNCEY, STEVENS, and DUNCAN (DDs), sortied from Okinawa on 1 September and steered a course for the Yellow Sea to make a show of strength over the coastal areas of northeast China, Manchuria, and western Korea, and to render direct air support for the units of the SEVENTH Amphibious Force scheduled to land at Jinsen on 8 and 9 September.
To enemy opposition was encountered at any time during the flights over Shanghai, China; Kaishu, Kaijo, Koshu, Shang, Kaishu, Kaijo, Koshu, Moppo, Rashu, Riri, and Zenshu in Korea; Dairen and Port Arthur in Manchuria; and Chefoo, Chinwangtao, Peiping, Taku, Tientsin, Weihaiwei, Yentai, and Tsingtao in North China from 2 to 12 September. On the 4th, however, a number of Soviet PBNs were encountered over Dairen. One of these opened fire on the CAP, but inflicted no damage, and as soon as the incident was reported to CTF 72, the CAP was ordered to clear the vicinity of the contact.

The success of these operations could not be determined, by reason of the intangible nature of a "show of force," but it was felt that they were of definite political value, as indicated by the Chinese and American flags waved enthusiastically at the carrier planes flying overhead by the populace at Peiping and Tientsin.

On 5 September, while TF 72 was operating in the Gulf of Pohai, DUNCAN reported a submarine contact, and dropped a pattern of depth charges set at 50 feet—the depth of the bottom in that area. Debris, including what appeared to be life jackets, came to the surface with an oil slick. The target was evaluated as non-submarine, however, on the basis of all evidence, with the probability of its being a submerged wreck seeming most likely.

In course of these sweeps, the destroyers of TF 72 came upon numerous floating mines off the Shantung Peninsula and in other sections of the Yellow Sea, as the result of heavy seas in the area. Most of these were destroyed by gunfire. On 4 September, all ships of the force began reporting many submerged mines, with the formation passing through what appeared to be the largest mine field ever laid. Well over a thousand of these mines were sighted by BULLARD alone. Depth charges were expended in an effort to detonate the mines. By 1300, the "mines" had been identified as large, rust-colored jelly fish, which the task force continued to see in great numbers throughout the day.

Because of the mine-infested waters in which it was necessary for TF 72 to operate, use was made of a type of air search which was an innovation both to the carrier involved and to the air group. This patrol was designated as MASP (Anti-Mine and Anti-Submarine Patrol). The ASH radar carried by the carrier aircraft was not successful in detecting floating mines beyond visual range, perhaps because of the small amount of mine surface exposed above water; but it proved of unquestionable value in picking up floating mines that were masked from the crew's view by the structure of the aircraft or overlooked by the crew for other reasons.

Prior to the beginning of the Jinsen landings on September 8th, minesweepers of TG 71.2 (the Minesweeping and Survey Group, Captain Hooper) operated under the protection of the North China Force (TF 71) to sweep a path across the enemy minefield blocking the entrance to the Yellow Sea, as well as the approaches to Jinsen, its transport area, and the beach approaches to that port.

The Landings at Jinsen—B-Day for the occupation of Jinsen was set for 8 September, and on that date, the initial landing was made by troops of the 7th Infantry Division, who had departed Okinawa in the transports of Amphibious Group Seven (TG 78.1, Rear Admiral L.N. Kinsey) three days earlier, in the form of an assault amphibious landing. Leading elements of PhibGrp 7 were met at the entrance to Jinsen Channel early on the 8th by a Japanese picket boat with 12 harbor pilots...
embarked, to guide the convoy through the maze of passages leading to the harbor.
Four days earlier, 17 officers of the 7th Infantry Division had landed at the Seoul
Airfield to make the preliminary arrangements for the beginning of the occupation.

Tidal conditions proved slightly less adverse than had been anticipated, as a
result of which the scheduled time for H-Hour was advanced from 1500 to 1430. The
first waves landed within a few minutes of this time, and as no resistance was
encountered on the beach, boats were despatched to the beach as quickly as they could
be accommodated at the unloading points. Almost all vehicles and personnel were
handled at the pier or ramps, while the bulk cargo and some of the smaller ships were
unloaded within the tidal basin, which had been found intact. Carrier aircraft of
TF 72 provided general cover for the entire operation, while planes of TG 78.3 (ANZIO
CVE) plus Cort Div 72 less LERAY WILSON) provided direct air coverage and air
support for the Jinsen landings after providing ASP and CAP for TU 78.1.15 (one of
the transport divisions) enroute from Okinawa to Jinsen.

The chief obstacle to the unloading of heavy vehicles in LCMs was, as antici-
pated, the precipitous tide, which, at low water, left only a narrow channel and a
series of mudflats extending for several thousand feet toward the transport area. At
low water, only one of the ramps was usable, and boats could be unloaded only one at
time.

Underwater Demolition Team No. Nine had landed on the beaches north of Jinsen
at 1300, to determine the possibility of landing LCMs and LSMs there, to record the
depths of the water off these beaches, and to mark a channel into those beaches
which could be used by landing craft. Simultaneously, UDT 12 conducted a reconnais-
sance of Yellow Beach (500 yards wide) and Yellow Two Beach (1000 yards wide) to the
island of Wolmi-Do (Getsubi To). Yellow Beach was found to be blocked by mud flats
extending above the low tide mark, preventing landing boats from entering at low
tide. Blue Beach (2200 yards wide) was found by UDT 9 to be impracticable for un-
loading any type of landing craft at any but the highest tides (20 feet or more), and
then only LCMs and ICTs could be unloaded in the submarine basin facing the western
end of the beach or on the narrow slip at the foot of the jetty, because of the very
high and steep slope along other parts of the beach.

Five APDs of TransRon 17 entered the tidal basin at high tide on the afternoon
of E-Day and unloaded throughout the night. Other cargo was handled by boats which
entered and left the tidal basin by the use of locks, on the average of twice each
tide. By this means, a fairly constant rate of unloading bulk cargo was maintained.
The two obstacles to the unloading, in addition to the tides, were the lack of
available lighterage and the lack of facilities for unloading heavy vehicles.

Control of ship traffic was well handled, considering the extent to which it
was complicated by the narrow channel through which all boats and ships had to pass
to reach the unloading points. In fact, at low tide, there was only one lane for in-
coming and outgoing traffic, through which it was necessary for all boats to go in
single file. The Rendezvous Area was crowded at all times, and it took capable
handling to keep the situation from getting out of hand. In spite of these potential
complications, the piers and the tidal basin were so well managed that, in almost all
cases, the unloading of boats was handled faster than the boats could bring in their
loads.
Abbott was ordered to withdraw at least 12 miles from the area of contact. As a consequence, there were no incidents of treachery among our forces. While the Jinsen signal tower hoisted a message that read, "Welcome United States Fleet."

At 1600, the main landings of the 7th Infantry Division being well underway, representatives of the Japanese commanders in southern Korea conferred with representatives of Com7thFleet and ComGen24thCorps to arrange details for the surrender of Seoul (Keijo) the following day. The same day, the hospital ship RELIEF arrived at Jinsen to evacuate the prisoners of war known to be in the area. A total of 168 Allied P.O.W.s were found in a camp a mile from the port city. Of these, 138 were American veterans of Bataan and 30 were British veterans of Singapore.

All scheduled assault elements were ashore by 0722 on the 9th. Lieutenant General J.R. Hodge and Admiral T.C. Kinkaid then proceeded to Seoul, where the surrender articles were signed at 1600, 9 September. The ceremonies were held in the throne room of the Governor's Palace at Seoul, from which Japanese Governor Generals had ruled Korea since 1910. Admiral Kinkaid signed the surrender documents along with General Hodge.

The signatories for Japan were the Governor General, General Nobuyuki Abe, and the top-ranking military and naval commanders—Lieutenant General Yoshiio Yokozuki, Commanding General 17th Army Group, and Vice Admiral Gizaburo Yamaguchi, Commander Naval Forces in Southern Korea. General Yokozuki surrendered about half of the estimated 375,000 Japanese troops in Korea (the other half being in the Soviet occupation zone north of the 38th parallel). Vice Admiral Yamaguchi surrendered only a small force of escort vessels and harbor craft. It was estimated additionally that about 920 Japanese planes of all types were surrendered. Detailed instructions for the disarmament and demobilization of Japanese naval forces in Korea were given to Vice Admiral Yamaguchi.

The port district of Jinsen was silent as the troops of the 7th Division moved through the streets, the inhabitants having been warned by Japanese newspapers that U.S. authorities had directed the Japanese commander to prohibit any demonstration of welcome on the part of the Koreans. Japanese police had fired on one group of Korean workmen who had gathered for a march to the shore to welcome American troops, killing two and wounding 10. To prevent further disturbances, local Korean patriotic committees had instructed the people to remain in their homes and await the formal day of welcome, which would be announced later. In other parts of the city, however, American troops reported a joyous welcome by the populace. By 11 September, all initial troop units of the XXIV Corps had completed unloading at Jinsen.

In addition to the 168 P.O.W.s released at Jinsen, 150 British Army officers, survivors of Singapore, were liberated at Seoul.

By September 11th, approximately 16,000 troops of the 7th Division were ashore and had removed the Japanese military forces from Seoul. Lieutenant General Hodge estimated that about 300,000 Japanese troops were in the American zone, and with their families and other civilians would bring the total number of Japanese nationals in southern Korea to some 950,000.
The XXIV Corps Commander announced that "as much as the Japanese Government had run virtually everything in Korea—the postal service, hotels, railroads, telephone and telegraph companies—it would be necessary to maintain the Japanese officials in their places for the time being, in order that these utilities and services might operate at all. The Japanese governor-general, and also the Director of the Police Bureau were, however, removed from office on 12 September, and replaced by the U.S. Army officers. These were the first steps in reconstituting the government and the police force.

These progressive developments in the delicate Korean political situation were the result of orders by the Supreme Commander to replace all Japanese officials in the American zone of Korea as rapidly as possible, "consistent with the safety of operations." Only in exceptional circumstances, as determined by the Commanding General XXIV Corps, were any Japanese to be allowed to hold any position of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprises in Korea. Where no qualified Korean or other suitable personnel were available, however, such Japanese or pro-Japanese Koreans as were deemed essential by reason of their technical qualifications might be temporarily continued in positions of responsibility, security factors permitting. At the same time, every effort was to be put forth to recruit and train Korean replacements for these undesirable persons at the earliest possible moment.

Continuing the trend which had been started with the dismissal of the Japanese Governor-General and the Chief of Police for Seoul, some 700 Koreans were sworn in as provincial police during the first two weeks of occupation, and the lower courts began operating.

The first contact with the Russian occupation forces in northern Korea was made on 12 September at a small Soviet outpost by a small group of Allied correspondents. Four days later (on the 16th), a XXIV Corps liaison party established contact with the 25th Soviet Army and the 258th Soviet Division near Heijo, and left a radio party behind to insure continuous communications with the Russian forces.

The same day, 16 September, a joint Army-Navy reconnaissance detachment from Seoul arrived at Fusan (on the southeast tip of Korea) by train to prepare for the occupation of this major port by the U.S. 40th Infantry Division, advanced elements of which were scheduled to arrive at Jinsen on the 22nd.

**The Movement to Fusan.**

On 19 September, a U.S. Naval Reconnaissance Party under ComDesRon 64 (Captain C.C. Wood) inspected the small Japanese naval base at Chinhae (Chinkai), a short distance west of Fusan. Although the Japanese had complied meticulously with orders from U.S. military authorities in preparing the small base for inspection, it was apparent that they had also cleaned out everything of value—arms, boats, and machinery—several months earlier. Japanese officers explained that the base had been used only by small coastal patrol craft. Chinhae had also been the base for minesweepers assigned to southern Korean waters for the removal of U.S. mines. Inside the small anchorage, six wooden minesweepers were tied up; but they lacked any modern detection devices.
Huge caves had been cut into the hillsides all around the base for the storage of ammunition and supplies. The only weapons found, however, were dismantled 5-inch trainning cannon that were strategically located for the defense of the installation, and a small number of rifles, mortars, and machine guns in a shed, that had for the most part been rendered useless from rust.

The initial echelon of the 40th Infantry Division (Brigadier General Myers, USA) plus XXIV Corps, 308th Bomber Wing, and 532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment elements, arrived at Jinsen from the Philippines on 22 September in the transports of Amphibious Group 13 (CTG 78.2, Rear Admiral R.O. Davis); while at Panay the last elements of the division finished loading and departed aboard the ships of TU 78.22.31. The same day, a road reconnaissance party was dispatched from Seoul to Fusan to investigate routes in preparation for the arrival of the 40th Division and its subsequent overland movement to Fusan. This detachment reported that the roads between the two cities were extremely bad.

The original plan drawn up by ComPhibGrp 13 had been to lift the 40th Infantry Division, plus Corps, Service, and Air Force troops, as arranged with the Commanding General XXIV Corps, and land them in the Jinsen area of Korea on a date dependent upon the availability of shipping. After arriving in the Jinsen area, TG 78.2 would remain there until otherwise directed by Vice Admiral D.E. Barbey, Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force.

Because of the critical shortage of shipping and the necessity for expediting the arrival of the various elements of the occupation force in Korea, the original plan of transporting the 40th Division as one unit was modified so that the movement of the 40th Division to the objective was accomplished by sailing it in echelons from Panay as shipping and escorts became available. As a result of the many reports received concerning floating enemy mines which had broken loose from their moorings during the recent typhoon weather, all convoys were sailed at such time as to take them during the hours of daylight through areas known to be mined.

Perhaps because of these precautions, no damage was received from mines by any ships of TG 78.2. The initial echelon, which arrived on 22 September, was TU 78.22.1 (TransDiv 54, Captain J.R. Lannom) with the 160th RCT, 40th Infantry Division, embarked. Three days later, having discharged 5233 troops and 4093 tons of cargo, the task unit departed for Leyte.

September 22nd was also the date for the establishment of contact between one regiment of the 7th Infantry Division and the 999th Soviet Infantry Regiment at Carsong.

Yet another event of the 22nd was the removal of 302 British and 52 Australian P.O.W.s from Kanko, in the Russian zone of occupation, to hospital ships at Jinsen by American evacuation parties accompanied by nine Soviet officers and men.

On 23 September, one battalion of the 40th Division arrived at Fusan after moving by rail from Jinsen. Other elements of the division entrained for Fusan the same day, while the 7th Division occupied Suwon, Ichon, and Kumyangjang. Supervision of occupied areas, road reconnaissance, and guarding of critical installations continued without incident.
On September 28th, Rear Admiral David (ComPhibGrp 13) was advised that he was to supervise and coordinate the lifting of the 6th Infantry Division, then based at San Fernando, Luzon, in lieu of the 96th Division, previously scheduled.

Because of the intense civilian reaction to the retention of certain Japanese officials and the tension thus created, General Hodge (ComGen XXIV Corps) requested early and rapid removal of the Japanese from Korea to the home islands. Accordingly, on 28 September two Japanese ships evacuated 3500 soldiers and 3500 civilians through Pusan Harbor to Japan. Another 10,000 Japanese were evacuated from Jinsen to Sasebo on 11 October in LSTs of TU 78.27.2, a unit of PhibGrp 13. While engaged in this repatriation duty, two Japanese vessels were lost—the TAKASAKI MARU as the result of a typhoon off Hagi, and the KOTO MARU when it hit a mine off Moji.

Although the 7th Division reconnaissance party reported as early as September 28th that the road from Seoul to Pusan, a distance of 355 miles, requiring 60 hours to traverse, was in generally fair condition, the 40th Division continued to go by rail from Jinsen to Pusan until 5 October, when, with only two LSTs of TU 78.22.34 remaining to be sailed, permission was received by CTG 78.2 to land elements of the 40th Division directly at Pusan, provided they were embarked in LST shipping or smaller. Prior to this authorization, all troops embarked in LSTs and LSMs scheduled for Pusan first had to put into Jinsen, whence they were rerouted to Pusan by the SEVENTH Amphibious Force representative. With completion of the lifting of the 40th Division on 7 October, the number of troops of this division and attached elements put ashore in Korea totalled 14,389 officers and men, while 16,605 short tons of cargo, including 2697 vehicles, had been discharged as well.

Other Operations in Korea.

Further activity on 28 September saw the surrender of 50,100 Japanese Army and Navy personnel on Cheju (Quelpart) Island, southwest of Korea. Lieutenant General Toyama of the 58th Japanese Army presented the capitulation of the forces under his command to a representative of the Commanding General XXIV Corps and to CTU 71.1.9 (Commander A.J. Walden), representing the Commander SEVENTH Fleet. Detailed plans for disarmament of the Quelpart forces were presented the Japanese as soon as the surrender ceremony had been concluded. CTU 71.1.9 found 88 Japanese suicide boats at Quelpart Island. In the Pusan area, the Pusan Chianti (Korean Political Police Party) surrendered its arms to the 40th Infantry Division without incident.

By the end of September, the XXIV Corps' occupation of Korea had progressed satisfactorily, although civilian disturbances and difficult liaison along the 38th parallel continued. The 160th RCT of the 40th Infantry Division had gained complete control of Pusan by 2 October and had assumed responsibility for the evacuation of Japanese military and civilian personnel from that port to Hakata, on the Inland Sea.

On 1 October, the general status of the surrender of Japanese naval forces in Korea was as follows:

All naval personnel except "naval police" engaged in guard duty were disarmed. All personnel except "naval police" had been evacuated from the Naval Air Bases at Geijitsu, Pusan, Heitaku, Koshu, Oshin, and the Seaplane Bases at Chinkai and Reisui, to the Chinkai Minor Naval Station, the Headquarters of the Japanese Naval Commander. Some naval personnel remained at Saishu-To (Quelpart Island) to be evacuated concurrently with Army personnel.
Japanese naval and merchant ships had been concentrated at Chinkai, and suitable Japanese ships were engaged, under U.S. naval supervision, in minesweeping, the dumping of ammunition at sea, and the evacuation of Japanese naval personnel and naval civilian employees to Japan. Removal to Chinkai of usable material located at outlying bases, and the destruction of munitions at these bases were also in progress.

On 29 September, initial plans for the landing at Jinsen and Pusan of 6th Infantry Division troops under Major General C.E. Hurdis, USA, had been formulated at a conference at Manila, and on 2 October, ESTES (AGC), with ComPhibGrp 13 embarked, arrived at San Fernando, Lingayen Gulf, Luzon. In addition to loading and lifting the 6th Division, the ships of TG 78.2 were to embark miscellaneous XXIV Corps elements and 308th Bomber Wing units in the Philippines. As in the case of the 40th Infantry Division, shipping for the 6th Division was sailed in small groups; whenever sufficient ships were loaded to warrant a sailing, a convoy was formed and dispatched to Korea. Meantime, while awaiting the arrival of the 6th Infantry Division, units of the 7th and 40th Divisions moved into the sector of responsibility assigned the 6th Division.

On 17 October, the 6th Division landed at Jinsen, and a day later, the division commenced moving by rail and truck to its sector. The Division Command Post was established in Chonju on the 18th, and Major General Hurdis assumed command of his troops ashore. During the remainder of the month, the 6th Division moved units into its assigned zone, relieving units of the 7th and 40th Divisions which had been diverted to the 6th Division's sector for occupational duties prior to the arrival of the latter command.

On 8 October, the Japanese destroyer KURE, which was being used on "Guinea Pig" runs (described in more detail in the section on minesweeping) through possible minefields in Pusan Harbor, was blown up and sunk by a mine. Because of the precautions taken for the protection of the personnel aboard, no lives were lost. Evidence derived from previous minesweeping indicated that a magnetic mine had caused the disaster, as the chances of acoustic or pressure mines being present in the immediate area were considered remote. The KURE's degaussing belt was inoperative at the time—a fact further supporting the view that a magnetic mine was responsible.

On 14 October, the Supreme Commander was requested by the Japanese Government to secure authority and facilities from the Soviets for the prompt repatriation of Japanese nationals in Northern Korea, Manchuria, Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and the Kamchatka area, pointing out that navigation would be hazardous after October and that approximately 70,000 Japanese were reported starving in Northern Korea.

At 1430 on the 15th, a tremendous explosion rocked the Chinkai area when some Japanese loading ammunition for disposal at sea allowed some black powder to ignite, then let it burn for 20 minutes in the vicinity of six mines filled with TNT. The explosion of these mines set off several other groups in the area, detonating a total of approximately 20 tons. In addition to the severe damage done to the western end of the base by the blast, fire, and falling debris, 62 Japanese were killed and 60 more wounded. No Americans were hurt, nor were any U.S. vessels damaged.

In the period of 16-23 October, the final duties being performed by the Japanese naval garrison at Pusan were taken over by Koreans, and the entire Japanese
garrison was evacuated to Chinkai. At the same time, the evacuation of Japanese naval personnel and civilians from Chinkai to various ports in Japan continued at the best rate possible with the few decrepit ships available.

The 7th Infantry Division was granted permission by the Soviet Army on October 24th for the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment to use the highway north of the 38th parallel three days a week in order to reach the Ongjin Peninsula, a vital port supply point.

As of 27 October, the total Japanese naval personnel evacuated to Japan numbered 318 officers, 3111 enlisted men, and 3673 civilian employees. It was expected that the repatriation of all Japanese Army and Navy personnel in Korea would be completed by 8 November. The chief port of embarkation for this repatriation work was Fusan, with five Japanese hospital ships and about 50 naval vessels—chiefly of the DE and AM class—supplementing the ferries. In addition, U.S. Navy LSTs discharging the 40th Infantry Division at Fusan, whose return trip to Japan would otherwise have been made without cargo, were also utilized to bring Japanese nationals home from Korea, using Sasebo as the terminal port.

During the month of October, units of the XXIV Corps were engaged in inventorying all Japanese military and naval installations and collecting Japanese weapons and equipment. Japanese military personnel and police were relieved of civil and military authority by U.S. troops as order was restored throughout the U.S. zone in Korea. Units of the 40th Division assisted in screening and processing Japanese personnel repatriated from the port of Fusan to the home islands.

The end of October found all Naval Air Bases in Korea demilitarized, with all Heitaku taken over by the U.S. Army, and the Japanese "naval police" removed; the disposal of all ammunition and armaments at naval bases in Korea (south of 38° N.) was completed; the re-establishment of aids to navigation by the Marine Section of the Transportation Bureau, National Government of Korea, was in progress; listening stations had been inspected and all apparatus found destroyed or removed to Chinkai, while all personnel had been withdrawn; minesweeping operations along the coast of Korea would soon be completed; and all Japanese naval aircraft in Korea had been destroyed.

With the departure of TU 78.23.2 from Lingayen Gulf for Jinsen on 5 November, the total number of 6th Infantry Division troops loaded and dispatched to Korea was brought to 14,009 officers and men, while the cargo comprised 15,706 short tons, including 2656 vehicles.
PART IV.

THE LIBERATION OF JAPANESE-HELD CHINA.

Introduction.

The capitulation of the Japanese, occurring as it did before the Japanese home islands had been invaded, posed a major troop movement problem for the Allied Powers, as it became necessary promptly to land certain occupation troops in Japan even before the formal surrender which took place in Tokyo Bay on 2 September. A long delay would have weakened our position.

Because of this necessity for putting as many troops ashore as speedily as possible in the areas assigned the United States for occupation by its forces, Cincpac-Cincpoa and CinCAFFac established by joint agreement a system of priorities to be applied to the three countries involved. Under this plan, the occupations of Japan and Korea were given priority ahead of Eastern China. Lack of sufficient shipping prevented the simultaneous occupation of these three areas.

The political situation in China complicated the surrender of the Japanese forces there. Shortly before the end of the war, the Japanese had begun to withdraw their forces from southern China and had concentrated them along the Yangtze River Valley and the Chinese East Coast in the vicinity of Shanghai and northward. Best estimates indicated that about six Japanese divisions were located in the general area of Shanghai, while approximately 280,000 Japanese troops were believed to be in North China's four provinces of Hopeh, Shantung, Honan, and Shansi. Of this number, between 50,000 and 60,000 were believed to be in Hopeh Province and a similar number in Shantung Province (Hopeh Province being the location of the ports of Tientsin, Chinwangtao, Taku, and T'ang-Ku, as well as the inland city of Peiping; while the important coastal cities of Tsingtao, Weihaiwei, and Chefoo are located in Shantung Province).

These Japanese troops were elements of the North China Area Army, commanded by General Tada Hayame, whose headquarters were at Peiping, while this Army, together with the Central and Southern China Area Armies, formed the China Expeditionary Army Group, whose commander, General Okamura, made his headquarters at Nanking.

Chinese "Communist" forces, long opposed to the Chinese Central Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, attempted to profit by the impending Japanese surrender. Being stronger than Chinese Central Government forces in Northeast China, they demanded the surrender of the Japanese forces in that area. The accomplishment of that demand would have given them access to considerable quantities of Japanese supplies and equipment, and would have placed them in a position to dispute the authority of the Central Government.

On 17 August, 1945, General Okamura intimated that he would not surrender his troops to the Chinese "Communists" and that he would resist any "Communist" attempt to compel him to surrender; but at the same time, he expressed his willingness to surrender formally to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek or his authorized representative. Since the Chinese Central Government forces had heretofore concerned themselves primarily with operations in Southwestern China, centering at Chungking, it seemed
doubtful that they were yet in a position to enforce the surrender of Japanese forces in Northeastern China, because of the vast distances which separated these two areas and the limited Chinese transportation facilities connecting them. On 6 September, the surrender of all Japanese forces in China was received at Nanking, but it was not known to what extent this event would influence Japanese troop dispositions, or how local Japanese commanders would react to this overall capitulation.

In addition to the "Communists", another element for which provision had to be made in planning for the landing of troops along the Northeast China Coast was the Chinese Puppet troops, whose total strength was estimated at 505,000 men—of whom 140,000 were "regulars", 340,000 were "Peace Preservation Troops", and 25,000 were "Independents". These Puppet troops were Chinese nationals organized by the Japanese to assist in governing the occupied areas of the country, to maintain order, and on occasion to fight Chinese "Communists" or National Government troops—chiefly the former, since the Central Government armies had seldom penetrated into the areas where the Puppet regime had its greatest strength. They were nominally controlled by the Japanese-sponsored government originally established at Peiping in December, 1937, as the Provisional Government of the Republic of China.

When the Japanese secured the services of the late Wang Ching-Wei and set him over the National Government of China, with the capital in Nanking, in March, 1940, the Peiping Government became the subsidiary North China Political Council under Wang Yin T'ai. This government was rigidly controlled by the Japanese Army, which placed its "Advisors" at every level of administration. The Puppet troops controlled by this government were poorly trained and poorly equipped. That they were inevitably poorly inspired, as well, is hinted at by the heterogeneous nature of the elements composing their faction—(1) Chinese defeated by the Japanese; (2) mercenaries; (3) political opportunists; (4) conscriptees; and (5) patriotic Chinese who secretly worked either for the "Communists" or for the Chungking Government. Thus the Puppet troops were not a force to be reckoned with too profoundly when the time should come to establish a unified Chinese Government.

Just prior to the Japanese capitulation, the three-cornered struggle for power in Hopeh and Shantung Provinces had been approaching a climax. The Japanese preparations had included pressure against Chinese "Communist" and other resistance forces. The "Communists" were countering this pressure and undertaking operations of their own, initiated against both the Japanese and the pro-Chungking forces. The latter, which were the weakest in the area, were declining in power as elements splintered off to become absorbed by the "Communists" or to join the Puppets. The trend indicated that the "Communists" were the only important resistance force remaining in Hopeh and Shantung, though the Central Government's influence appeared to be dormant rather than dead, and it was kept alive by the prospect that Nationalist troops might one day return to Hopeh and Shantung. With the surrender of Japan, this dormant allegiance to the Chungking Government sprang to life and increased in strength, but even with the cessation of fighting, it was manifest that weeks would pass before Nationalist troops would enter these provinces, because of the vast distances involved.

It was the policy of the United States Government to assist the Chinese Central Government in reestablishing control over China, but not to the extent of supporting it in a civil war against "Communist" forces. To aid the Chinese Central Government in enforcing the terms of the surrender, U.S. Naval forces of the SEVENTH Fleet were
called upon to establish control of certain strategic coastal areas then in Japanese possession, and to assist in the extension of United Nations control in those areas by landing U.S. Marines there. In order of priority, the areas to be seized by U.S. and/or Chinese Nationalist forces were to be Shanghai, Taku, and Tsingtao; while the SEVENTH Fleet would establish control of the East China Sea, the Yangtze River, the Yellow Sea, and the Gulf of Chihli (Gulf of Pohai).

To put this policy into effect, an Expeditionary Force composed of the III Amphibious Corps (Major General K.E. Rocky, USMC), including the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, reinforced by certain naval, medical, construction, and port-operating elements, was organized, and plans for the occupation were drawn. The 3rd Marine Division would remain in area reserve at Guam, and the 4th Marine Division at Maui, with the former to be employed first should the utilization of the area reserve be required.

Landings would be made in the Tsingtao and Taku (Tientsin) areas, at which points the ports, airfields, vital areas, and lines of communication would be seized, in order to establish control of the surrounding areas and to support further operations. As for the Nanking area, it was estimated that six Chinese divisions could be flown in by 2 October, from which point they could march overland into the Shanghai area in a short time. Upon landing, the Expeditionary troops would pass to the command of the Commanding General U.S. Forces, China Theater (Lieutenant General A.C. Wademeyer, USA), who was also Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, hence responsible for coordination with the Generalissimo in the planning and execution of all U.S. operations in the China Theater.

Our forces would cooperate with the forces of the Chinese Central Government in extending control of the strategic areas thus occupied and would retain control of these areas until relieved by Chinese Central Government forces. Insofar as the military situation should permit, any cooperation with the Chinese "Communists" was to be avoided, and the surrender of Japanese forces in the area, whether complete or piecemeal, would be to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek or his representatives. U.S. commanders would, at the discretion of ComGenChina, be authorized to accept local surrenders of Japanese forces on behalf of the Chinese Central Government.

According to these general plans, the 1st Marine Division (Major General D. Peck) (less one battalion landing team destined for Chinwangtou) would land such combat elements as might be necessary to seize and hold the port facilities at Taku and its nearby sister port of T'ang-Ku. When these two ports of the important city of Tientsin and their immediate vicinities had been secured by advance elements of the 1st Division, the Corps Shore Brigade would be sent ashore to establish port and inland transportation facilities. This organization would be responsible for all unloading, loading, transportation inland, and evacuation to ships. When the Shore Brigade was ready to perform its functions ashore, the remainder of the 1st Marine Division present and IIIPhibCorps troops would be landed.

The 1st MarDiv would proceed at the earliest practicable date to Tientsin, thus securing the lines of communication between Taku-T'ang-Ku and Tientsin. These lines of communication consisted of an excellent paved highway between Taku and Tientsin, a standard gauge double-track railway and a fair dirt road between T'ang-Ku and Tientsin, and the Hai Ho River, which connected all three points. It was anticipated that the 1st MarDiv would utilize fully all of these routes in order to expedite its movement to Tientsin.
Although Taku was the nearest sea port to Tientsin, it was a poor one, as a sand bar prevented the approach of large ships closer than approximately seven miles. From this bar, a narrow channel which permitted the passage of LSMs at high tide led to Taku. In addition to these hydrographic detriments, the Hai Ho River customarily freezes during the winter months, thus making the use of Taku and T'ang-Ku as ports extremely hazardous. For this reason, it might subsequently be advisable, or even necessary, to transfer the base of operations to Chinwangtao (120 miles to the northeast along the shore of the Gulf of Pohai) during the winter season.

In anticipation of this necessity, the 1st Marine Division would seize and hold the airfield at Linyu, about nine miles east of Chinwangtao. After the occupation of Tientsin by the 1st MarDiv, it would seize, hold, and initiate rehabilitation of the airfield at Peiyang, about three miles southeast of Tientsin. The division would also be prepared to occupy Peiping with one RCT, seizing and holding the American Legation and one U.S. Marine barracks at that point, as well as the airfield at Nanyuan, about 10 miles southeast of Peiping.

On about M plus 10 (October 10th) the 6th Marine Division (Major General L.C. Shepherd, Jr.), less the 4th RCT, would land at the excellent all-weather port of Tsingtao, about 265 miles southeast of Tientsin, seizing and holding the port facilities at that point and occupying the city. It would then seize, hold, and initiate rehabilitation of the airfield at Tsangkow, about seven miles north of Tsingtao.

In order to bring the port facilities in all ports seized to full operational status as soon as possible, Gropacs would be provided.

Air support for these Marine operations would be furnished initially by CVs, but as soon as airfields could be made operational, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing would be established in the area, with headquarters at III Amphibious Corps Headquarters in Tientsin. Marine Air Bases would be established at Tientsin and at Tsingtao, and subdivisions of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing would be based at each point. In addition to these primary bases, auxiliary airfields would be established at points of secondary importance as required by future developments.

Although it was not anticipated that large-scale combat operations would be necessary, our forces were to be prepared for any contingency. Acts of treachery, attacks by individuals or small groups, and sporadic fighting among the irregular bands had to be expected. Inasmuch as developments requiring full-scale combat operations subsequent to the landings did not appear likely, assault landings were not contemplated. The ships of the SEVENTH Fleet would be prepared to provide naval gunfire from light units only, but adequate air support would be furnished, and, in an emergency, the potential air support available from fast carriers and Land-based air appeared certain to be sufficient to cope with any situation which might arise.

The Evacuation of P.O.W.s from Manchuria and China.

The Program of Supply Drops to P.O.W. Camps—The confirmation of the Japanese surrender on 15 August, 1945, presented the Allied Powers the difficult task of supplying Japanese-held prisoners of war and civilian internees with food, clothing, and medical supplies until they could be evacuated by occupation forces. A large
number of prisoners were known to be in Japanese camps, and the reported conditions of starvation-rations, disease, and maltreatment made relief measures particularly urgent. It was estimated that the time that would be required for the evacuation of the prisoners from the widely-scattered camps in Manchuria, Korea, North and Central China, and the four main Japanese home islands would be about 30 days, and it was believed that many lives could be saved by prompt and adequate supply of the known camps.

It was apparent that air transport would be the most feasible method of providing the supplies necessary, particularly to those located in the interior; and the original plan was that Far East Air Forces aircraft, based on Okinawa and the Philippines, would share the air-supply task with Marianas-based B-29s. Later the entire project was assigned to the Twentieth Air Force.

The most perplexing problem in planning these operations was the determination of the location and population of the camps to be supplied. Until 27 August, 1945, the only information upon which the Twentieth Air Force could base its planning was a compilation called the "Black List", issued by the General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, and a Navy Compilation issued in Cincpac-Cincpoa Bulletin No. 113-45. These lists were incomplete, and their accuracy was further reduced by the wholesale removal of Allied prisoners from the heavily-bombed Japanese coastal areas during the last few months of the war.

One of the surrender conditions imposed by the Allies was that the Japanese Government should mark clearly all prisoner of war and civilian internment camps by means of landmarks 20 feet high with the letters "PW" painted in yellow on a black surface, and that it furnish the Supreme Commander a complete list of the names, locations, and populations of all the camps. The first Japanese list, known as the "Yellow List", was made available to the Twentieth Air Force on 27 August. It contained 73 camps. There remained the task of verifying the location of those camps appearing on the "Black List" and in the Navy Bulletin but upon which no additional information had been received.

On 29 August, aircraft of the 314th Bombardment Wing based on Guam were dispatched to verify the location of camps on the Japanese home islands of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu; and on 31 August, aircraft of the same Wing were dispatched on reconnaissance missions to Hainan Island, the Peiping, Hong Kong, and Shanghai areas of China, and the Mukden area of Manchuria. This reconnaissance verified the existence and location of 57 additional camps. Special requests and additional reports were expected to increase the list of camp locations as the operations progressed. Cincpac-Cincpoa provided air-sea rescue facilities consisting of surface vessels on permanent stations interspersed along the routes to be flown.

An important factor in planning these operations was the availability of food, medical supplies, and cargo parachutes. It was obvious that all supplies must be packaged and made available in the Marianas, if the Twentieth Air Force was to carry out the supply drops with the necessary dispatch. The food and medical supply requirements for the program was set up on a basis of 30 days' supply for 69,000 persons. Of the 63,000 cargo parachutes required for the project, there were only 11,100 in the Marianas, making it necessary to air-lift all available cargo parachutes from the Philippines to the Marianas.
From a series of tests, it was found that a 10,000 lb. load, consisting of 40 individual drop units, was the capacity of a B-29; while the best altitude for dropping was between 500 and 1000 feet, and the best speed approximately 165 miles per hour. To facilitate identification, it was decided that all aircraft engaged in these operations would be marked "PW Supplies" in letters three feet high under each wing. Population figures for many of the camps were merely rough estimates, and it was considered inevitable that there would be cases of over-supply and under-supply.

It was planned to drop supplies in three increments of 3-day, 7-day, and 10-day supplies. A fourth increment of additional 10-day supplies was to be dropped if needed, though many of the camps would have been evacuated before that became necessary. The three-day supplies were to include juices, soups, clothing, and medical supplies. The seven-day supplies were to include additional medical supplies and food of a more substantial nature. The 10-day supplies were to be almost entirely food, with some medical supplies. Leaflets with instructions concerning the allocation and use of supplies were also to be dropped. Photographs of the camps and the results of the drops were to be taken by each aircraft, when conditions permitted. Normally, each aircraft was to carry supplies sufficient for 200 persons for the particular 3, 7, or 10-day period; however, for camps of 1000 or more population, the aircraft were to be especially loaded for greater efficiency of packaging.

From 27 August to 20 September, aircraft of the 58th, 73rd, 313th, 314th, and 315th Bombardment Wings flew 900 effective sorties over 158 prisoner of war and civilian internment camps, including sorties flown to camps which were added to the lists after operations had begun. Although all five Twentieth Air Force Wings participated in the operations, more than half of the effective sorties (52.4%) were flown by the Saipan-based 73rd Wing because of the greater range made possible by its location. Ten sorties were staged through Okinawa. A total of 4470 tons of supplies was dropped by B-29s on these missions.

After three days of operations, it was decided that the planned altitude of 500 to 1000 feet for dropping was too low for efficient operation of the cargo parachutes, with the result that all crews were briefed to release at altitudes above 1000 feet, in order to allow better functioning of the parachutes, to avoid casualties among the prisoner personnel, and to prevent destruction of the supply bundles.

Evacuation of the P.O.W. camps by the U.S. Army and Navy and other agencies gradually reduced the task of supply during the course of operations. Although lack of information on evacuation progress caused some confusion in the first few days of the operations, the list of camps was reduced rapidly after 5 September. Each succeeding phase of the operations saw a marked decrease in the number of targets, and the fourth phase included only a few camps.

Missions were directed to 169 prisoner of war and civilian internment camps during these operations, with one or more successful drops being made at 158 of these camps. All missions against the other 11 camps were unsuccessful, chiefly because of the inability of crews to locate the camps from the coordinates available. Of the camps upon which successful supply drops were made, 158 received a three-day supply drop, 128 received a seven-day supply drop, and 91 received one or more 10-day supply drops.
Eight B-29s were lost on these missions, with a total of 77 casualties. One aircraft was shot down by Soviet forces over Korea when they took it to be a captured plane manned by Japanese personnel, but all crew members were rescued uninjured. Three of the planes were lost operationally, and four were lost from unknown causes.

In Manchuria, four camps were located near Mukden, one at Sian to the north, one at Hsinking, and one north of Harbin. In North China, two camps were located near Peiping and one at Wehsien. In Central China, a group of about 30 camps was in or near Shanghai, two each were found near Kinhwa and in the Chusan Islands, and one was located east of Nanking. In Southeast China, 32 camps were evenly divided between the Canton area and Hong Kong, and seven were located on Hainan Island.

Evacuation of P.O.W.s from Manchuria—At Mukden, Manchuria, the relief team dropped there found 1673 prisoners, consisting of 1321 Americans, 293 Englishmen, 67 Dutch, 44 Australians, one Canadian, and one Frenchman. The Sian camp, 100 miles to the north, which was apparently used for high-ranking officers and important civilians, contained 34 prisoners of war—eight Americans, 16 Englishmen, and 10 Dutch. In addition, the Russians reported liberating 1670 prisoners, including 28 generals, in the Mukden area.

The Evacuation of prisoners from Mukden was begun on 23 August, and on the 24th the men began arriving in Kunming. Many were survivors of Wake Island and Bataan, of whom some were suffering from malnutrition, while others had contracted tuberculosis or other diseases. They reported that their treatment had not been unduly harsh except in the case of prisoners who attempted to escape. During the final days before the Japanese Government announced that it would surrender, the attitude of the guards changed radically, with the prisoners being told that the Japanese and Americans were the best of friends.

Two plane loads of Allied military and administrative leaders were flown from Mukden to Chungking on August 28th, the most famous of whom was Lieutenant General Jonathan W. Wainwright, former commander of American forces in the Philippines. Other officers of general rank in this party were Major General E.P. King, Jr., who signed the surrender of Bataan; Major General A.M. Jones, who commanded the southern front in Luzon during the early phases of the fighting; Major General W.F. Sharp, former commander in the southern Philippines; Major General T. Dooley; Major General G.F. Moore; Brigadier General L.C. Beebe; Brigadier General W.S. Lough, Brigadier General C. Bluemel; Brigadier General J.R. Weaver; as well as Colonel J. Pugh.

In the British group were Lieutenant General A.E. Percival, former commander in chief of the forces in Malaya and Singapore; Sir Shenton Thomas, former Governor of the Straits Settlement and High Commissioner for Malaya, and Sir Mark Young, former Governor of Hong Kong. Dutch evacuees included A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, former Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, and Lieutenant General Hein ter Poorten, former commander of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army.

By 3 September, 120 military personnel had been evacuated by air to China from prison camps in the Mukden area. The Mukden-Dairen Railroad Line, although in great disrepair, was opened on the 6th, and arrangements were made with the Russians for the evacuation of the remaining 1721 P.O.W.s (including 1210 Americans) through Dairen.
On 11 September, after a three-day wait while tied up alongside the docks at Dairen, Manchuria, the U.S. Navy hospital ship RELIEF began to receive on board a capacity load of Allied military personnel recently recovered from the Japanese military camp at Mukden, 200 miles to the north. During the three days of enforced waiting, the ship had made complete preparations for receiving the liberated men, and throughout the afternoon of the 11th rumors persisted that the train which was to bring the prisoners was enroute to Dairen. The scene that ensued when they did appear is described by RELIEF as follows:

"When they finally began to arrive at 2050, the scene was dramatic and poignant. They were heard before they were seen. Then, from out of the darkness beyond the docks, the first of them stepped into the glare of the dock floodlights, first one or two, then 10, then the whole procession. They carried all their worldly possessions on their backs or in duffle bags.

"The entire ship's company manned the rail to greet them. As the ex-prisoners crowded the dock at the foot of the gangway, the ship's crew shouted over the rail to them, tossing them cigarettes, swapping stories, finding out where they were from 'Back in the States.' The ship's Red Cross lights and green bands had been illuminated, and the ship started Stateside music, playing over the ship's public address system—Dixie, The Marine Hymn, Stardust, etc. The RELIEF was the first American ship these men had seen in three years; in some cases, four years."

By 2245, the last of the 753 RAMPs, including 518 Americans, had been received aboard. The others were Dutch, British, and Australians. The senior officer of the group of RAMPs was Colonel L.S. Churchill, USA, formerly of the Far East Air Force. The nationalities represented were varied, but they were one in requesting a hot shower as the first thing they wanted. By midnight, most of the repatriates had been provided with beds, but, in the words of the RELIEF's observer:

"After everything was quiet, some of the ex-prisoners, hungry for conversation with Americans, and too excited to sleep, stayed about the decks, swapping yarns with the crew, or listening avidly to accounts of what had been going on at home during the past four years. They wanted to know who the movie stars were, what songs were being sung; they listened proudly to descriptions of the rocket guns, and the accounts of Kwajalein, Okinawa, Guam, etc."

Later that night, two civilian internees came aboard RELIEF for transportation, and early on the 12th, the hospital ship set out for Okinawa.

The general physical condition of the recovered prisoners from the Mukden Prison Camp was higher than expected. Even though malnutrition was evident, and many of the personnel were suffering from impaired eyesight, while almost all were afflicted by parasitical intestinal growths, the general condition was excellent, considering the treatment they had received. The average loss in weight had been 40 lbs. In the period between the end of hostilities and the arrival of the P.O.W.s at Dairen, most of them had regained from 10 to 30 pounds. This gain was attributed to two factors—the supplies dropped by the B-29s, and the release to the prisoners since 15 August of the food previously withheld regularly from them by the Japanese.
The following day, COLBERT (APA) left Dairen with the remaining prisoners from Mukden. On 17 September, when approximately 100 miles west of Okinawa, she struck a mine, flooding her engine room. One man was missing and two were injured in the explosion. After her boilers had been secured and the flooding brought under control, COLBERT was taken in tow by BUTTE (APD), and ordered to proceed to Buckner Bay. Later, the tow was taken by a tug, and COLBERT arrived at Okinawa on the 19th.

Evacuation of P.O.W.s in China—A total of about 1100 P.O.W.s and internees were liberated from camps in the British concession at Tientsin during the first week of September. In the same period, a total of about 1200 prisoners were found in the Yangchow Prison Camp, northeast of Nanking. In the Canton area, humanitarian teams reported finding 18 U.S. Army men, two Navy men, and 16 merchant seamen. A rescue team dropped near Samah Bay in southern Hainan Island reported that about 400 men had been found in a camp at that location. The men, mostly British and Dutch, were reported near death as a result of malnutrition and disease. Medical supplies, food, and clothing were dropped at the camp on 31 August. Around the middle of September, GERUSALAMME (AH) and the transport GLENBEARN arrived at Hainan from Hong Kong and evacuated approximately 140 stretcher cases and ambulatory patients from the P.O.W. Camp there.

Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War from Formosa.

Task Group 77.1 (consisting of BLOCK ISLAND and SANTEE (CVEs) and THOMAS J. GARY, BRISTER, FINCH, and KRETCHMER (DEs)) was enroute to Jinsen, Korea, on 3 September, to participate in the landings there by supporting the minesweepers clearing mines in the Yellow Sea off that port, when orders were received cancelling the scheduled mission and ordering the task group to alter course for Kiirun, in northern Formosa. There the planes of the group were to make air drops of food and medical supplies to prisoner of war camps, preliminary to effecting the evacuation of the inmates as quickly as possible.

The following afternoon, 4 September, Colonel A.O. Cooley, USMC, Commanding Officer, Marine Air Support Group 48, three members of his staff, and 15 Marine enlisted men were transferred from BLOCK ISLAND to THOMAS J. GARY, with orders to proceed inland from Kiirun to the P.O.W. camps in the vicinity and arrange for the evacuation of the Allied prisoners being held there. It was known that a special AGAS P.O.W. team was operating in that part of Formosa, but all attempts to contact them prior to landing were unsuccessful.

Before dawn on 5 September, planes of TG 77.1 took off for Kiirun and Taihoku (inland from Kiirun). Inasmuch as there had been no previous communications whatsoever with anyone on Formosa, one of the primary missions of this flight was to make message drops in strategic places such as administration buildings near Kiirun Harbor, Matsuyama Airfield, and P.O.W. camps. The purpose of these messages was to inform the Japanese that the task group expected to dock at Kiirun and would demand the utmost cooperation. In addition, the planes made a show of force, flew photographic runs, covered the escort vessels, and carried out a reconnaissance of the entire area.

Reconnaissance and photo planes having reported Matsuyama Airfield operational, and having also located three P.O.W. camps—Nos. 1, 4, and 6—in the Taihoku area, Rear Admiral Ketcham determined to risk landing one of the planes at Matsuyama Airfield.
in order to establish liaison ashore as quickly as possible. At 1010, accordingly, a TBM carrying a staff liaison officer landed and was met by the Japanese commander of the airfield. The liaison officer immediately commandeered a car and was driven to the prison camps to determine the most urgent needs of the prisoners of war. Having gathered this information, he arranged for it to be flown back to the flagship by one of the F6Fs covering the landing of the escort vessels. Shortly thereafter, planes loaded with suitable medicines and food began landing on Matsuyama Airfield, delivering a total of 9500 pounds during the day.

Meantime, the main seaborne landing was underway. As the intelligence concerning Kiirun was very meager, it was not known whether resistance would be encountered from some of the more fanatical Japanese. Neither was the location of the Japanese minefields known. In view of these circumstances, when THOMAS J. GARY, and KRETCHMER entered the probable minefield area at 0718 on the 5th, all possible precautions were taken to put the ships in a condition to repel any attack which might be forthcoming, and to minimize damage and casualties should they strike a mine. Covered by a CAP of four planes and two anti-mine aircraft from the CVEs, the two destroyer escorts moved to a point one mile due north of Kiirun Island, where they lay to for a pilot to guide them into the harbor.

Although unable to raise the shore station by flashing light, the DEs did manage to contact it on the radio; whereupon they directed the Japanese to send a pilot and the local military commander. To this demand the Japanese radio station replied affirmatively. After an hour's delay, a small tug came out at 1000 and motioned for the escorts to follow him in to the harbor, where the pilot was waiting.

There was no sign of hostility from the port, while the Japanese flags on the public buildings and on the fort were at half mast. The populace of Kiirun was kept back from the docks and warehouses by Japanese Army guards. Everywhere there appeared to be a spirit of cooperation.

Having picked up the pilot and moored, THOMAS J. GARY put Colonel Cooley ashore to meet the Japanese representatives and begin negotiations for the evacuation of the P.O.W.s. On the dock were a group of American and British P.O.W. officers, four members of the AGAS P.O.W. team, and a five-man Japanese delegation, all of whom participated in conferences aimed at speeding up the evacuation. It was learned from the Japanese in course of these conferences that the P.O.W. camps had been turned over to the prisoners on 3 September.

A detail was sent ashore from GARY to take over the local Japanese radio station, thereby establishing reliable communications between TU 77.1.3 and activities ashore at Kiirun.

At the conclusion of the conference aboard GARY, Colonel Cooley proceeded to Camp No. 1 to supervise the evacuation of the 312 prisoners located there, and at 1630, the first P.O.W. train arrived at Kiirun with the repatriates. GARY took aboard 156 of these, and KRETCHMER received the other half for delivery to BLOCK ISLAND and SANTEE. The outbound route of the DEs did not coincide with the one used in entering the harbor, since information obtained from the Japanese showed that the inbound track had crossed several minefields. The Japanese naval commander at Kiirun expressed the opinion that they had been very fortunate in not striking a mine on the way in, indicating that the task group's intelligence concerning the Kiirun minefields was decidedly faulty.
The following day, FINCH, BRISTER, and KRETCHMER followed GARY into Kiirun Harbor to evacuate the remaining prisoners of war in northern Formosa, except for those in such bad condition as to prohibit their being moved.

At 1730, September 6th, another P.O.W. train arrived at Kiirun, and the evacuees boarded the four ships of the task unit, a total of 848 being received, bringing the total number evacuated in the two days' operations to 1160. Shortly after, Colonel Cooley and the other personnel ashore reembarked, having completed their mission. With the departure of the American communications personnel, the local radio station was returned to the Japanese. At 1730, the four DEs commenced the transfer of the evacuees to the escort carriers.

Most of the repatriates were British Army survivors of the siege of Singapore, although 89 were American Army enlisted men, most of whom were survivors of the Bataan death march. The majority had been compelled to work in the Kinkaseki copper mines in northern Formosa.

The same afternoon, British Task Group 111.3 (Rear Admiral Servaes) arrived at Kiirun from Leyte. BERMUDA (CL), ARGONAUT (CL), and QUIBERON (DD) entered the harbor, while COLOSSUS (CV) and TUMULT (DD) remained outside to provide air support. Upon the task group's arrival, Rear Admiral Servaes visited Taihoku, where all of the remaining prisoners of war (121) were concentrated at the Japanese Military Hospital. Of these, 82 were non-movable patients, and the remainder were doctors and medical personnel. Most of the patients were desperately ill from malnutrition. A few days later, all of these invalids were transferred to the British hospital ship MANGANUI, which was sailed for Manila as soon as the weather permitted.

The Landing of the 1st Marine Division in the Tientsin-Chinwangtao Areas.

Tientsin, the second largest city and the commercial capital of North China, is located in Hopeh Province at the junction of the Pei Ho (River), Hai Ho, and the Yun Ho (Grand Canal), about 36 miles from the Gulf of Pohai and 70 miles southeast of Peiping. The meandering Hai Ho flows through the city and is an important outlet to the sea. The T'ang-Ku-Taku area is located about 30 miles downstream from Tientsin on the Hai Ho, and about seven miles upstream from the Gulf of Pohai.

T'ang-Ku, a short distance upstream from Taku, occupies a low plain along the north bank of the circuitous Hai Ho. Taku is on the opposite bank, along a bight of the river to the southeast. At Taku the entrance to the Hai Ho is obstructed by a bar of silt which extends across the river mouth. Before the Japanese occupation, a dredged channel approximately 1½ miles long was maintained to allow a minimum depth of 10 feet at low water, but vessels drawing more than 14 feet of water could seldom cross this bar. Taku roadstead lies seaward of Taku Bar and is used as an anchorage for deep draught vessels unable to cross the bar. This anchorage is exposed, so that frequent heavy seas and swells hamper the unloading of cargo.

No suitable landing beaches existed in the Tientsin area, since the shore for many miles south of the mouth of the Hai Ho is low, muddy, shell-strewn, and backed by flat terrain, which is marshy, and is covered with a network of drainage ditches.
and minor canals. The shore north of the Hai Ho is low and sandy, and is fringed by drying mud and salt flats. The water offshore is shallow, and the terrain inland is very flat, swampy, and is usually inundated during the rainy season.

TransRon 17 (TU 78.1.1, Commodore T.B. Brittain) was assigned to lift the 1st Marine Division (Major General Peck) from Okinawa to the ports of Taku, Tientsin, and Chinwangtai in Northeast China. The loading of rations and fuel for the operation commenced at Hagushi, Okinawa, on 15 September, but was interrupted by a typhoon from 16 to 18 September, during which COLBERT (APA) struck a mine. The remainder of the troops and cargo were loaded at Nago Wan.

TransRon 17 (Temp.) was composed of six transport divisions for the operation—TransDiv 49 (TU 78.1.11, Commodore Brittain), TransDiv 59 (TU 78.1.12, Captain J.K. Davis), TransDiv 69 (TU 78.1.13, Captain P.R. Glutting), TransDiv 65 (TU 78.1.15, Captain E.C. Rogers), TransDiv 36 (TU 78.1.14, Captain C.L. Tyler), and TransDiv 50 (TU 78.1.16, Captain R.W. Abbott). TransDiv 50 was scheduled to land the embarked troops at Chinwangtai, but was to use Taku as a rendezvous point; hence, it was made a component element of TransRon 17. A total of 23 APAs and 10 AKAs were involved in the operation.

The strength of the 1st MarDiv embarked for this expedition numbered 22,780 troops, the total vehicles loaded came to 2972, and the cargo tonnage, including the vehicles, was 33,290. These figures include the cargo transported by 40 LSMs of the Tractor Group.

On 26 September, TransRon 17 got underway from Okinawa for Taku, arriving without incident on the 30th. Meantime, on M minus 1 (September 29th), Underwater Demolition Unit 7 (composed of UDTs 9 and 26) had arrived at the objective from Jinsen, Korea, in the two APDs of TU 78.16.9, and at once commenced a reconnaissance of the approach channel to the mouth of the Hai Ho, the dock facilities at Taku and T'ang-Ku, and the area between the breakwater and the mole at Taku, including the dock facilities on the mole itself. They also sought to determine the usability of the docks and piers for unloading ships alongside, and to ascertain the possibility of using the river banks for beaching LSMs.

Using the information gathered during this reconnaissance, the UDTs prepared suitable charts, which were submitted to the interested commands. While the UDTs were at work, they observed Japanese troops in the Taku-T'ang-Ku area, who had been detailed to guard their installations against vandalism until relieved by U.S. Marines. These enemy soldiers were docile, and kept to their own areas, interfering in no way with the reconnaissance operations. One group even joined in the welcoming cheers of a group of native Chinese. During the reconnaissance, a number of Chinese troops landed from up the river and took over some of the Japanese sentry posts, also without any apparent opposition or friction.

No Japanese-constructed obstacles were found in the approaches or along the river banks, and such facilities for unloading as did exist had been improved recently by coolie labor employed by an American Army representative who had been in T'ang-Ku for several weeks completing arrangements for the landing.
Immediately upon the arrival of TransRon 17 at the target on September 30th, the amphibious craft began unloading, with troops being disembarked into LCIs and the cargo discharged into LSMs, LCTs, and Chinese lighterage. The ships' landing craft were not used, because of the unfavorable weather conditions, the rough water on Taku Bar, and the extended run between the Transport Area and the beach—a distance varying from 15 to 47 miles. The Chinese commercial tugs and lighters could be used only for general and bulk cargo, and carried from 200 to 600 tons apiece. Facilities for receiving vehicular cargo at the beach were non-existent at the start of the unloading operations; however, during the first three days these were developed in the form of pontoon causeways and docks.

Before these complex operations could be executed, however, considerable planning had been necessary, with thought given to the unusual distance between the Transport Area and the landing points, the necessity for maintaining three separate control stations (Taku, T'ang-Ku, and Tientsin), the shallow and treacherous channel into the river mouth, and the employment of LSMs, LCIs, and LCTs rather than shipborne landing craft.

As a result of these studies and considerations, a plan was evolved, the salient features of which provided for (a) the assembling of loaded landing craft in the Rendezvous Area, from where they were to be dispatched by a Rendezvous Control Officer into the river mouth; (b) the control of traffic on the shoreward side of Taku Bar by a River Mouth Control Officer who was to assemble loaded craft in the river and dispatch them on call to designated landing points; and (c) the direction of craft within the river to appropriate unloading points and the prompt return of unloaded craft by a River Control Officer who was to represent the Officer in Tactical Command of the landing operation at the landing points, maintain liaison with Marine commands ashore, and exercise overall command of the entire control organization.

Provision was also made for an adequate number of LCMs equipped for duty as salvage vessels and tugboats under the direction of the control officers, it being anticipated that LSMs and LCIs would require frequent assistance in gaining entrance to the river and in maintaining position for unloading against the swift river current.

On M-Day, 30 September, the Rendezvous Control Officer transferred to PC 802 and anchored seaward of Taku Bar, where he maintained a waiting area for loaded craft which the River Control Officer advised were to be held seaward of the bar. All landing craft arriving from the transport area first reported to the Rendezvous Control Officer and advised him of the priority number or the type of cargo embarked. This information was relayed to the River Mouth Control Officer, who advised whether or not the vessel was to be sent into the river.

In order to take advantage of tide conditions, priority units were not dispatched in order of importance. This arrangement permitted a greater number of vessels to enter the river the first day, when complete detailed information concerning the channel was not yet available. A few vessels were held in the waiting area pending more favorable tide conditions or the arrival of a pilot to guide loaded vessels across the bar. The greater part of the loaded vessels were dispatched immediately to the River Mouth Control Officer, after being given all pertinent information in regard to courses, buoys, ranges, etc., by the Rendezvous Control Officer.
Despite all of these precautions, however, some landing craft went aground. Salvage operations were delayed by the unfavorable sea conditions, because the salvage LCMs had to be moored alongside the River Mouth Control Vessel and called for when needed, to avoid damage to these makeshift tugboats from the rough seas.

The River Control Officer embarked in PC 807 and led the LCM salvage boats up the Hai Ho (the banks of which were lined with people who gave the vessel a tremendous ovation) as far as Taku where the vessel was moored at Pier 25, communications established, and reconnaissance reports received.

It was found that Piers 25 and 26 were available at all stages of the tide for the unloading of troops, but that Pier 34 was weak and unsafe, making it necessary that ramps be constructed in the treacherous river mud before vessels could come ashore.

At 0900 on M-Day, the River Control Officer reported that he was ready to receive landing craft. LCIs which had been held down river by the River Mouth Control Officer proceeded at once upstream under escort of LCS(L)s, and Marines were landed at Piers 25 and 26, from where they marched to the railroad yards and entrained for Tientsin.

Twenty-seven pre-loaded LSMs were dispatched on the tide directly up the river to Tientsin. Upon their arrival they found it impossible to unload the heavy vehicles they carried, with the result that most of them were ordered down stream to discharge their cargo at Pier 34.

On M plus 1 Day it was found that a food crisis was imminent among the Marine assault troops landed the previous day, a circumstance necessitating the abandonment of the scheduled unloading plan and a shifting of priorities. Rations became the priority one item in cargo, and Pier 28 was opened to receive them.

In order to expedite the delivery of the badly-needed rations, it was found necessary to land trucks through the mud at Pier 34. The first vehicle landed—a jeep—sank to the hubs, and was pulled to firm ground with the greatest difficulty. Hundreds of truck loads of stone with layers of timbers were absorbed by this beach before a bottom stratum was encountered which afforded sufficiently solid foundation to support the rubble top structure. This operation required several days to complete, during which time practically no vehicles were unloaded. The seeming hopelessness of ever establishing a landing beach for vehicles along the lower reaches of the Hai Ho was a considerable factor in determining the River Control Officer to send large numbers of landing craft up river to Tientsin to unload the vehicles there, despite the obvious handicap of keeping the vessels out of further unloading activities for days to come.

The landing of so few vehicles during the first days of the operation contributed to the development of a serious tactical situation. The troops landed the first day, equipped for assault conditions, carried with them only one day’s rations, and the rations stowed in the vehicles to be landed the first day for the first echelon were not at hand, the vehicles being still afloat in lighters or transports. To forestall approaching hunger among these first troops ashore, the regular order of unloading transports on the basis of priorities was interrupted to rush bulk quantities of rations ashore in the small amount of available Navy and commercial lighterage, and on to Tientsin on an emergency basis.
active use of the vehicles that were finally becoming available on the beach. The final dislocation in unloading plans, likewise stemming from the difficulties encountered in establishing a beach, resulted in an impending gasoline shortage, due to the intensive employment of vehicles delivering rations. This problem, like its predecessor, was met by again departing from the priority basis for unloading transports, and dispatching emergency shipments of gasoline ashore. These disarrangements in the established unloading schedules caused ultimate delays in unloading the transports, in that rations and gasoline, the items first loaded aboard, had to be pulled out from under other items of higher landing priority, creating further difficulties in the subsequent unloading.

The final organization for unloading found troops landing at Piers 25 and 26; vehicles being unloaded on the two beaches and the pontoon causeway landing near Pier 34; rations, water, gasoline, and general cargo at Pier 28; and ammunition and gasoline from Chinese lighters at Pier 19. The city of Tientsin was also utilized, ramp-to-ramp unloading from LCMs into LCMs being used at first; and, later, a pontoon causeway was placed in operation to receive vehicles too heavy to land on the stone-ballasted mud beaches near Pier 34, or too heavy to pass over railway and highway bridges enroute to Tientsin. Chinese lighters were unloaded in Tientsin at commercial piers equipped with cranes, as well as by coolie stevedores.

ComTransDiv 59 (Captain J.K. Davis), who was to be one of the chief planners for the next operation, which would involve the transportation of the 13th Chinese Army from Kowloon to Chinwangtao, departed with the APAs of his division on October 5th, leaving the AKAs TROUSDALE and SIRONA to complete unloading, and arriving at Manila on 13 October.

On October 6th, Major General Rockey, Commanding General III Amphibious Corps, accepted the surrender of the 40,589 Japanese troops in the Taku area on behalf of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The following day, three Marines of a 1st MarDiv engineering party were wounded when 40 or 50 bandits fired on them 22 miles from Tientsin. The fire was returned.

ComTransRon 17 departed the area on October 9th, leaving part of TransDiv 36 to complete unloading. On 11 October, the last ship having discharged her cargo, ComTransDiv 36 departed the Taku area for Manila, leaving only ComTransDiv 50 (Captain Abbott) in SARASOTA. The latter had assumed the duties of Administrative SOPA and SEVENTH Amphibious Force Representative Taku on the 8th, upon his return from landing a 1st MarDiv BLT at Chinwangtao.

On October 13th, a riot between Chinese and Japanese nationals occurred in Tientsin, with 74 Japanese being injured before Marines could intervene and break up the affray. The following day, a Japanese unit near Tientsin sustained 19 casualties—13 killed, four missing, and two wounded—when attacked by elements of the "Communist" 8th Route Army. Two Marines were wounded on October 19th between the cities of Langfang and Peiping in a skirmish with Chinese "Communists", of whom six were killed.

Vice Admiral D.E. Barbey (Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force) arrived at Hulutao (a town northeast of Chinwangtao on the Chinese Coast) on 27 October, and while attempting to land in his barge, was fired upon by "Communist" troops ashore. A formal apology by Lieutenant General Lan Shok Hai of the "Communist" 4th Route Army
disclosed that the arrival of the Americans was a total surprise to the Chinese—as much so, in fact, as was the presence of “Communists” in Hulutao to the Americans. At the same time that the Commanding General of the 4th Route Army apologized for firing on Vice Admiral Barbey, he made it clear that he would resist any landing of Chinese Nationalist troops. As a result of this incident, Vice Admiral Barbey decided that Hulutao would not be used to land troops of the 13th Chinese Army until assurances were received from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek that the Russians would not oppose such a landing and that Central Government troops were in control of the landing area.

The next indication of “Communist” hostility to American intervention in the Chinese game came on 30 October, when Major General Rockey was notified by the “Communists” that they would prevent the entry or passage of U.S. troops through areas under their control, unless they were previously notified of the proposed movements.

The repatriation of Japanese troops from Tientsin began on October 31st, and on 9 November, Rear Admiral A.G. Noble, ComPhibGrp 8, established his headquarters at Taku to handle Japanese repatriation from that port.

The 1st Marine Division truck convoy escort arrived at Peiping from Tientsin on November 11th without incident, after anticipating considerable opposition from Chinese "Communists", and the following day a unit of the 94th Chinese Army moved unmolested from Tientsin to Peiping.

Two days after arriving at Peiping, the 94th Chinese Nationalist Army disarmed the T'ang-Ku-Taku "Peace Preservation Corps" (a Chinese Puppet faction), and Commander Wang Hsing-Pai, together with important subordinates, was arrested. The troops were processed, and the undesirables were discharged, while the remainder were incorporated into the 94th Army. The same day, 13 November, a train from Tangshan to Tientsin was derailed, but the Marine guards succeeded in returning to the nearest town unharmed. A reconnaissance party sent out to investigate the reason for the train's derailment found approximately 100 feet of track out, a condition forcing the III PhibCorps to close the Tientsin line to traffic temporarily. On the 14th, several skirmishes between the "Communists" and the Chinese Nationalists took place northwest of Tientsin. Four days later, Chinese Nationalist troops were again attacked in the same region by 700 unidentified troops.

On 19 November, Admiral T.C. Kinkaid hauled down his flag and was detached as Commander SEVENTH Fleet. He was relieved by Vice Admiral D.E. Barbey, who continued in his former assignment as Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, but was relieved as CTF 78 by Rear Admiral A. G. Noble.

Tientsin was placed under martial law on November 20th, and Puppet troops were assigned to guard all coal trains enroute from Tangshan to Tientsin. In spite of this precaution, two trains bound for Tientsin from Tangshan the following day were stopped by a damaged bridge and by gunfire.

Meantime, while the operations at Taku and Tientsin had been progressing, TransDiv 50 (TU 78.1.16, Captain R.W. Abbott), which had been designated to lift the 1st Battalion Landing Team of the 7th RCT, 1st Marine Division, to Chinwangtso
The beaches at Chinwangtao have long, uninterrupted stretches of sand, and the 1st BLT took advantage of them to land in assault boats in four waves, commencing at 1055 on 1 October. By 1123, all assault troops were ashore. The general unloading of SARASOTA commenced at 1240 the same day, alongside the pier. All wheeled vehicles were unloaded directly onto the pier, and all bulk cargo was unloaded onto railroad cars which were run out onto the jetty. LSM 96 commenced unloading onto a favorable beaching area within the harbor at 1500 the following day, and was completely discharged by 1545. The total personnel put ashore comprised 1194 troops, while the cargo amounted to 1203 short tons, including 105 vehicles. The troops embarked on LSM 96 were members of the 1st Pioneer Battalion.

These landings were entirely unopposed by the "Communists" or Japanese, and the leading citizens of Chinwangtao turned out en masse to welcome and assist the troops. On completion of unloading, the task unit returned to Taku on 3 October.

On 15 October, two trains traveling between Chinwangtao and Tangshan received rifle and mortar fire, and in two places the "Communists" dynamited the tracks. As the result of numerous recurrences of these rail-breaking incidents, on November 6th the Commanding General III PhibCorps issued an order that Marines would henceforth guard all local trains on the Chinwangtao-Beiping Railroad; but, later in the month (on the 23rd), a plan was worked out with the Chinese Nationalist Government whereby the Chinese 43rd Division relieved the 7th Marine RCT of this duty.

On 15 November, as Major General Peck, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division was enroute from Tangshan to Chinwangtao, he and his party received small arms fire from a village just north of Luanhsien. Upon being informed of this overt act, the Commanding General III Amphibious Corps sent word to the "Communists" in the offending village that if such fire continued against U.S. forces, he would order an aerial strafing mission against the place. Meantime, the "Communists" in North China continued to cut lines of communication with monotonous regularity.

On 16 November, it was learned that a TBM which had been missing since the 10th had been forced down 90 miles due south of Peiping and the crew were being held captive by the 8th Route Army. The same day, a PBM encountered a Russian fighter three miles southeast of Port Arthur, Manchuria, while investigating six large AKs in the area (which proved to be Russian). The Russian VF made several runs, then opened fire when the two planes had gained a position about 40 miles south of Dairen. The "Mariner" took evasive action, whereupon the fighter disappeared without having inflicted any damage.

The III Amphibious Corps reported on November 22nd that there remained 326,000 troops of the Japanese 43rd Army in North China. Meantime, the Tientsin-Beiping area was quiet, and the entire Chinwangtao-Tientsin Railroad line was open to traffic along its entire length by 27 November.
The Landing of the 6th Marine Division at Tsingtao.

As has been seen, the 6th Marine Division was scheduled to land at Tsingtao on 10 October, and an RCT from that division was expected to move into the Chefoo-Wei-Hai-Wei area on the same date. Landings by Chinese Central Government troops at North China ports and at Dairen, Manchuria, were to be made at later dates.

A large number of Japanese troops remaining in the Shantung Peninsula area had not yet surrendered, nor had they been completely disarmed, because of the political differences between the Chinese "Communists" and the Chinese National Government. In these circumstances it would have been unwise to disarm the Japanese completely and leave them easy prey for the "Communists", who were on the alert for any opportunities to accept the surrender of Japanese troops and with them the cities under their control. The purpose in landing the 6th Marine Division in Shantung Province, therefore, was to maintain order, to assist the Chinese National Government by receiving the capitulation of the Japanese forces and the areas in their possession, and to arrange for the orderly disposition of the unsettled situation in the northern part of China.

While the landings at Tsingtao and Chefoo were expected to be unopposed, full account was taken of the possibility that isolated instances of opposition might develop, and the proper way to insure peaceful occupation would be by an initial show of force. For this reason, the units destined for both ports were to be combat-equipped to handle any situation that might arise.

The extensive port facilities and railroad terminals at Tsingtao made that city the gateway to the North China Plain from the Yellow Sea. Considered the best harbor north of the Yangtze River, it had all the requirements for a fleet and supply base. Tsingtao, on the southwestern coast of the Shantung Peninsula, had been leased to Germany in 1879, seized by the Japanese in 1914, and finally restored to China under terms of the Washington Agreement of 1922. In January, 1938, it was again seized by the Japanese from the Chinese National Government and subsequently given over to the Japanese-sponsored Provisional Government at Peiping.

Chefoo, on the north-central coast of the Shantung Peninsula, was an important North China commercial port with a harbor protected by a breakwater. The Chinese "Communists" had infiltrated this area extensively, particularly since the surrender of Japan, and the chances of meeting opposition at Chefoo were consequently far greater than at Tsingtao.

TransRon 24 (TG 78.6, Commodore E.T. Short) was selected to lift the 6th Marine Division from Guam to the dual objectives in the Shantung Peninsula. Five ships of TransDiv 71 (Captain W.P. Davis) were assigned to land the 29th RCT of the 6th MarDiv at Chefoo, while the bulk of the 6th MarDiv was to be landed at Tsingtao from the ships of TransDiv 70 (Commodore Short) and the remainder of the ships of TransDiv 71.

TransRon 24 (Temp.) arrived at Guam on 23 September and occupied the period until 2 October in loading the troops and cargo involved in the Shantung landings. While enroute to the objectives, TG 78.6 received directives from ComSEVENTHPhibFor,
who—together with ComGen IIIPhibCorps—had gone ashore at Chefoo on October 8th, first to defer, then, on 9 October, to cancel the scheduled Chefoo landing, because of the certain opposition from the "Communists" that would develop if an attempt were made to put troops ashore at that port.

The target date had been established as 10 October, but because of extremely adverse sea conditions bordering the typhoon area at Okinawa on October 8th, the debarkation was postponed until the 11th.

Prior to the arrival of TransRon 24 at Tsingtao, UDT 9, embarked in LANING (APD) arrived at that port and made an unopposed reconnaissance of the beaches. Extensive soundings were taken and accurately-controlled beach profiles made. A group, consisting of one officer and four men, was landed from a rubber boat on a mole near the Japanese suicide boat basin for the purpose of recording the action of the tide.

On the morning of 11 October, TransRon 24 entered Tsingtao Harbor and began unloading passengers and cargo. It had originally been planned to land one advance Battalion Landing Team (BLT) over the beach of Tsingtao Wan (in the outer harbor) and a second advance BLT over the docks of Tai Kiang (in the inner harbor). Beach parties were to land in the first waves, thereby establishing a control organization for subsequent docking and unloading. When intelligence gained from the UDT reconnaissance revealed that no necessity existed for this initial landing by boats, however, all the troops were unloaded over the docks in the inner harbor in a routine fashion.

The 11 LSTs of LST Group 100 (TU 78.6.2, Commander J.W. McBrier) beached themselves on the north side of the sand spit at the eastern side of the harbor entrance where a very favorable beach was situated.

On 14 October, CLINTON and CLARENDON (APAs), having completed unloading, were sailed to Manila to report to ComTransDiv 36. On the 17th, ComTransRon 24 and the remainder of the squadron took their departure for Manila, having put ashore 12,843 troops of the 6th MarDiv, as well as 17,038 tons of cargo, including 1333 vehicles.

On 12 October, the Japanese Girls' High School No. 10, which had been scheduled for use as a Marine barracks at Tsingtao, was destroyed by fire, with evidence of incendiaryism. ComGen 6thMarDiv thereupon ordered the Japanese consul to provide a billeting replacement.

At 1100 on October 13th, Major General L.C. Shepherd, USMC, Commanding General of the 6th Marine Division, assumed command ashore at Tsingtao, and on the 25th, Major General Eiji Nagano surrendered all Japanese forces in the Tsingtao area to Major General Shepherd and Lieutenant General Chen-Thang, in the name of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

On 19 October, 5000 Chinese Nationalist troops of the 1st Regiment, 37th Brigade, arrived at Chefoo in nine small steamers and 33 junks, and when reconnoitered by a SEVENTH Flotilla destroyer were discovered to be flying the American Flag, either alone or jointly with the Chinese National ensign. ComGen IIIPhibCorps
subsequently learned that this force, commanded by one General Wang Chih-Shan, had been destined for Chang-Shan Island, but that it was blown off its course by a storm and its fuel ship sunk at the same time, stranding the force at Evans Island, Chefoo Harbor. The messenger who brought this information from General Wang added that the troops were short of ammunition and water. Fearing that they might be attacked by the "Communists" in Chefoo, the general requested U.S. naval protection for his flotilla and assistance in withdrawing the troops to Chang-Shan Island. The only American response to this request was an order to General Wang to cease using the American Flag on the ships of the flotilla. On October 29th the Wang Flotilla was attacked by troops of the 8th Route Army, compelling the craft to withdraw from Chefoo to the eastward. On 4 November, the flotilla appeared at Tsingtao. One reason for this lack of sympathy on the part of the American leaders was their belief that the Wang Flotilla was in reality composed of independent Puppet guerillas, rather than regular Chinese Nationalists, as they claimed.

The determination of the Chinese "Communists" to hold the port of Chefoo against any pressure that might be brought against it was indicated when an aerial observer of the Fast Carrier Force reported on 4 November that fortifications were under construction on high ground at Chefoo Harbor.

On November 15th, the Commander SEVENTH Fleet was informed by the Chinese "Communists" that 150,000 Japanese troops were attacking the "Communist" held areas. Admiral Kinkaid, however, felt certain that this number was exaggerated, and, further, that the Japanese participation actually consisted in cooperating with the Chinese National Government in repairing and holding lines of communication, as well as other garrison duties. Two days later, the 6th MarDiv reported that the "Communists" were attacking the Japanese at Liu-Ting airfield.

The Lifting of the 70th Chinese Army from Ningpo-Chinhai to Kiirun, Formosa.

On 28 September, CTF 73 (The Yangtze River Patrol Force, Rear Admiral C.T. Joy) was instructed by Commander SEVENTH Fleet to initiate plans and preparations for the movement of the 70th Chinese Army from the Ningpo-Chinhai Area of China to Northeastern Formosa on or about 12 October, employing 48 LCIs of his force, supplemented by seven LSTs of LST Group 37 then in Shanghai, which would be transferred to TF 73.

General Chen-Pei of the 32nd Chinese Army Group received orders from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to assemble 20,000 men of the 70th Chinese Army in Ningpo on 5 October for embarkation upon the arrival of the U.S. naval vessels which were to lift them to their objectives. At the same time, TG 74.3 was directed to make a show of strength over Kiirun, Formosa, on the early morning of 14, 15, and 16 October, inasmuch as the initial landing was scheduled for the 15th and the second echelon for the 16th. When CTF 73 received warning of a typhoon making up south of Okinawa on October 9th, however, he notified all interested groups and units that adverse weather conditions would delay the Kiirun landings at least two days. At the same time, he directed that the air show from the escort carriers of TG 74.3 should be planned for 16, 17, and 18 October, instead of the dates originally requested.
Admiral Kinkaid ordered Rear Admiral Joy to investigate the feasibility of lifting 4000 troops of the 70th Chinese Army from the beaches in the vicinity of Fuchow without waiting for the clearing of the Japanese minefields there. Rear Admiral Joy found, upon investigation, that although the minefields did not present great difficulties, the lifting of troops from the Fuchow beaches was not practicable for several reasons. These included the strong currents which would be encountered, the 20-foot tidal range, and the unreliability of the beaches themselves. Subsequently, it was decided to have LCIs proceed up the Min River to load the Fuchow detachment at Pagoda Anchorage.

On 12 October, the Covering Unit (TU 73.12.1, Captain J.B. Griggs), consisting of ST. LOUIS (CL) and PHILIP (DD), and the Minesweeping Unit (TU 73.12.2), composed of YMSs 224 and 259, departed for Kiirun to make arrangements for the entry of the tractor group.

On October 15th, the Covering Unit entered Kiirun and found the situation to be excellent. The Japanese were very cooperative, the local people were friendly, and the Advance Group, Chinese Army, and civil officials had assumed control as far as possible.

By mid-October, Japanese minesweepers had been operating for about 30 days off Kiirun, using small motor boats, in which time they had swept 30 mines out of a total of 225 composing the minefield. The Japanese estimated that at least another month would be required to clear the entire field.

On the 17th, TU 73.12.3 arrived at Kiirun and disembarked 6935 troops of the 70th Chinese Army, 212 Chinese civilians, 78 Americans, and 1000 tons of rice. As the troops and other passengers came ashore, they were covered by an imposing air umbrella. A day later, TU 73.12.4 landed the second echelon of 3800 troops, leaving 312 officers and 2228 troops at Ningpo to be moved by one LST and one LCI Group.

CTF 73 was advised on 18 October that one Chinese officer and two men had died of dysentery since their arrival at Kiirun, an occurrence creating the fear that an epidemic of cholera might be about to strike the area. One SEVENTH Fleet Epidemiology Unit then staging at Tolosa, Leyte, was therefore transferred by air, with the necessary medical supplies, including sulfa drugs and equipment, to Kiirun, for the checking of possible cholera and dysentery epidemics.

On 23 October, the Fuchow detachment, with 3000 troops of the 70th Chinese Army embarked, departed Pagoda Anchorage for Kiirun, which movement cleared Fuchow of all troops. Two days later, the Ningpo detachment departed for Kiirun with the remaining troops of the 70th Chinese Army. The same day, 25 October, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek received the formal surrender of all Japanese forces on Formosa. Civil control of the island passed therewith to the Republic of China. With the unloading of these troops of the Ningpo detachment on 27 and 28 October, CTF 73 ordered that the Kiirun Task Group 73.12 be dissolved. During its brief existence, TG 73.12 had transported 16,275 troops of the 70th Chinese Army from Nangpo and Fuchow to Kiirun, Formosa.
One consequence of these tractor group lifts was the following recommendation by ComLCIFlotilla 15:

"Due to the ingrained low standard of sanitary habits and high incidence of many infectious diseases in Chinese troops, it is an unsurmountable problem to maintain even a reasonable standard of sanitation in LCI type vessels. Internal arrangements of these vessels render it impossible to segregate troops from crew. It is also impossible to segregate troops who develop infectious diseases."

In view of the obvious unsuitability of the smaller amphibious craft, APAs and AKAs were substituted for the LCIs originally considered for use in the Haiphong to Chinwangtao lift of the 52nd Chinese Army in late October and early November.

Meantime, the airlift of the 92nd Chinese Army into Peiping, involving 26,098 Chinese troops and 14 U.S. personnel, was completed on 24 October.

Operations of TF 72, the Fast Carrier Force.

On 27 September, TF 72, the Fast Carrier Force (Rear Admiral A.C. Davis, ComCarDiv 5), comprising ANTIETAM (F) and INTREPID (CVs), CABOT (CVL), BLACK, BULLARD, DUNCAN, and CHAUNCEY (DDs), sortied from Buckner Bay, Okinawa, and headed for the Yellow Sea.

During the period of September 28th and 29th, operations were conducted over Shanghai and Tsingtao for the purpose of displaying air strength over those cities and the contiguous areas, while the air operations of 30 September and 1 October were flown for the purpose of furnishing air cover for the landings of the 1st Marine Division at Taku-Tientsin. On 3 and 4 October, air cover, a show of strength, and reconnaissance were executed over the Chinwangtao-Tangshan area just south of the Great Wall of China, where difficulties had arisen with the Chinese "Communists", and where there were great numbers of Japanese troops as yet not disarmed.

From 5 to 8 October, TF 72 was anchored in the Gulf of Pohai, during which time air cover and reconnaissance were flown for elements of the 1st MarDiv advancing overland from Tientsin to Peiping.

On 8 October, Rear Admiral D.B. Duncan (ComCarDiv 4) relieved Rear Admiral Davis as CTF 72, and his flagship, BOXER (CV), replaced INTREPID in the Fast Carrier Force, the latter proceeding to Saipan.

On October 9th, the task force commenced preliminary flights over Tsingtao, in preparation for the landings there on the 11th. The force remained in the northern reaches of the Yellow Sea and covered the Tsingtao area as far north as Chefoo through 15 October, being ready at all times to take whatever action might be necessary to protect the 6th Marine Division troops landing there.

No flight operations were conducted by TF 72 on 16-17 October, and the former date saw the departure for Guam of TG 72.1, consisting of ANTIETAM, BLACK, and CHAUNCEY, with CABOT in company. That same day, the force was further weakened by the detachment and departure of SHIELDS (DD) for duty with TF 71 (the North China Force). (SHIELDS and WILEY (DDs) had reported for temporary duty with TF 72 on 12 October).
Flight operations were conducted, in which 40 sorties were flown over the Taku-Chinwangtao-Tangshan areas on the 21st. The following day, the planes of the force flew 61 sorties while patrolling the railroad between Taku and Chinwangtao. On the 22nd, one aircraft was damaged by bullets fired by unidentified Chinese troops south of Antzu, while the planes were engaged in covering operations for the 1st Marine Division in the Taku-Peiping-Chinwangtao sectors. The remainder of the month was devoted to supporting Marine operations in the general Chinwangtao-Taku-Tientsin-Peiping-Tangshan areas, and, on the 31st of October, with the completion of air operations, the force got underway for Tsingtao, where it dropped anchor on November 1st.

On 3 November, Rear Admiral Duncan assumed the title of ComCarDiv 5, in lieu of his former title of ComCarDiv 4. SHIELDS and METCALF (DDs) joined TF 72 at Tsingtao on the 4th, while the force was reinforced the following day by the arrival of TG 72.1 (ANTIETAM, BLACK, and CHAUNCEY) from Guam, where the ships had undergone replenishment. HERNDON (DD) also joined up on the 5th. Three days later, TG 72.1 was ordered to depart Tsingtao for the Gulf of Pohai.

TG 72.2, consisting of BOXER, METCALF, DUNCAN, and BULLARD, sortied from Tsingtao on 6 November and steered for Guam, where it was to have its turn at replenishment. On the 9th, while operating in the Gulf of Pohai, TG 72.1 conducted reconnaissance flights over Chinwangtao, where the 52nd Chinese Army was being landed, and the adjacent areas. With the completion of that uneventful operation, the Fast Carrier Force found little employment other than air training, gunnery exercises, and general drills for the rest of the month.

On 1 December, Rear Admiral Duncan was detached from duty with the SEVENTH Fleet and reported with the carriers BOXER and ANTIETAM to Commander FIFTH Fleet for duty.
The Landing of the 13th and 8th Chinese Armies at Chinwangtao and Tsingtao.

Introduction - While Major General Peck's 1st MarDiv troops were still moving ashore at Taku, trouble developed at the small but strategic port of Chefoo, on the north side of the Shantung Peninsula. There, firmly-entrenched Chinese "Communists" made it clear that they would oppose any Allied landings.

After a hurried trip to Chefoo on 8 October by Vice Admiral D. E. Barbey, Major General Rockey, and Rear Admiral T. G. W. Settle, who appeared before the port in the SEVENTH Amphibious Force flagship, Catoctin (AGC), with several cruisers in company, Vice Admiral Barbey recommended that American troops not be landed there or at the nearby port of Weihaiwei, inasmuch as there were no Japanese to be disarmed nor any American interests to safeguard. Instead, he directed the landing of the 6th Marine Division at Tsingtao, on October 11th, as we have seen.

Since it had become patent that American lives would be unnecessarily jeopardized by landings which could not be justified, due to the absence of Japanese garrisons or American prisoners of war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised the plans for the occupation of China and Manchuria in such manner as to substitute Chinese troops for American Marines in future operations to be conducted in Northeast China. At the same time, however, it was provided that the SEVENTH Amphibious Force would furnish the necessary shipping to transport the Chinese 13th and 52nd Nationalist Armies from Kowloon and Haiphong to Chinwangtao, and the Chinese 8th Army from Kowloon to Tsingtao.

To ComTransRon 17 (CTG 78.7, Commodore T. B. Brittain) was given the task of lifting the 13th and 8th Armies to their respective objectives at Chinwangtao and Tsingtao, while ComTransRon 24 (CTG 78.6, Commodore E. T. Short) was assigned to transport the 52nd Chinese Army from Haiphong to Chinwangtao. The problems faced by TransRon 17 in planning this operation in conjunction with the Chinese and British (Kowloon, the staging port, was in British hands) were many and varied, as described briefly below. Those of TransRon 24 were not so much ones of liaison with our Allies as medical difficulties arising from the unhealthful conditions existing in the area through which the 52nd Chinese Army had marched, and in the port of Haiphong itself.

Advance Planning - TransRon 17 was composed of three transport divisions—TransDiv 49 (Commodore Brittain), TransDiv 59 (Captain J. K. Davis), and TransDiv 69 (Captain P. R. Glutting). The TransRon Operations Officer, Commander G. A. Parsons, and Captain Davis were charged with the task of liaison and with the execution of all planning for the two inter-connected operations.

After these two officers had studied the Operation Plan for the projected landings prepared by Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force and had considered the many facets of the unusual operation, they found that only two major problems remained for which they could find no ready solution. These were the transportation of 5000 mules (2500 for each Chinese Army) and the control of the Chinese troops themselves.

The fact was quickly borne home on them that the U.S. naval forces in the Far East were not prepared or equipped to transport horses or mules. To do this, one of two things would be necessary. Either properly-equipped horse transports...
would have to be sent out from the Atlantic, or extensive alterations to Liberty
ships or LSTs would have to be accomplished. Nor were loading docks assured at
Kowloon. The prospect of having to load 5000 mules across beaches into landing
craft, and from these craft into ships not designed to carry animals, appeared
most unpleasant. In addition, the problem of communication with and control of
the inland Chinese, wholly unfamiliar as they were with ships and the sea, pre-
sembled a major difficulty, particularly if an emergency should arise while en-
route to the target.

The first difficulty was met by substituting 36 trucks (2½ ton) for each
Army (13th, 8th, and 52nd) in place of the mules. It was also found that the
U.S. Army Chinese Combat Command (CCC) had been acting for and with these
Chinese Armies in a liaison capacity; hence, direct negotiation with the Chinese
would not only be unnecessary, but desirable.

Advice was also obtained from U.S. Public Health authorities in Shanghai
as to the best methods of combating the spread of possible disease among and
from embarked troops. This advice was later promulgated to all embarked CCC
officers and to all Commanding Officers.

The Commander SEVENTH Fleet specified that the movement in echelons of only
one Chinese Army division at a time would be followed, in order that the British
activities in the Hong Kong-Kowloon area would not be adversely affected. The
British were at first unenthusiastic over the prospect of large movements of
Chinese troops through this area, but these difficulties were eventually ironed
out.

While these negotiations were progressing, it developed that the whereabouts
of one 13th Chinese Army division was a mystery to everyone in Kowloon concerned
with the operation, making it necessary for the TransRon 17 planning officers
to fly to Canton, where they contacted the Commanding General of the Second
Chinese Army Group. From him it was learned that the missing division was about
four days' river journey from Canton by sampan, which meant that the planned
date for embarkation of the Chinese troops would not necessarily be jeopardized.

About the same time, it became increasingly evident that the Chinwangtai
Operation would be executed under at least two restricting conditions in addi-
tion to that imposed by the critical attitude of the British toward the pre-
seence of Chinese troops in the Hong Kong-Kowloon Area. For one thing, the
Chinese armies to be lifted had originally been scheduled to serve as the Chinese
Central Government's occupation forces in the Hong Kong-Kowloon Area, which was
now occupied by British forces--giving a turn to events not entirely to the sat-
isfaction of the Chinese National Government and creating an undercurrent of
resentment among the Chinese. This circumstance created a delicate situation
requiring very accurate timing if a dangerous concentration of idle troops was
to be prevented.

Secondly, the exact locations, strength, and arrival dates of the Chinese
Armies were impossible to determine accurately, because of the lack of precise
information as to their whereabouts and the uncertainty of transportation faci-
lities.
The following planning doctrine was developed to avoid undue friction:

(1) All Chinese troops must be held outside the Hong Kong-Kowloon Area until just prior to embarkation.

(2) Not more than five transports must be in Hong Kong Harbor at any one time, and not more than nine in a waiting area (Junk Bay) several miles from the loading area. (For the 8th Army, this latter restriction was removed, due to the necessity of fueling the entire transport squadron.)

(3) A continuous pressure for accurate information and firm commitments must be maintained on the Chinese Army Command, through the Chinese Combat Command, to insure the timely arrival of the units to be embarked.

This doctrine was approved by the British authorities, who granted the nine requested anchorages in Junk Bay and the use of five docksides for loading in Kowloon. This involved an agreement on the part of the TransRon 17 planners to increase the rate of loading from 3500 troops per day, as originally planned, to about 10,000 per day, which was concurred in by the senior Chinese Combat Command representative.

An even echelon movement was thereby made possible, and plans were drawn up to load one Chinese Army division in each TransDiv, using approximately a 12-hour loading cycle (day and night) at the dockside, and sailing, by divisions, at 24-hour intervals as follows:

TransDiv 69—early morning 24 October.
TransDiv 49—early morning 26 October.

Throughout the planning phase, extreme care was taken to plan no move of troops, cargo, or ships without first consulting the proper British authority. At first their attitude was somewhat non-cooperative, but as each move gradually proved its value, or appeared to be logical, their attitude changed to one of cordial cooperation. On the common ground of both interests' being anxious to get the troops through and out of the Hong Kong-Kowloon Area as rapidly as possible, the British bent every effort to assist the preparations.

Direct relations between the British and Chinese, however, appeared far less cordial. At times, misunderstandings over rice, equipment, and railroad transportation threatened to endanger the time schedules to be met. On the other hand, despite the continuous pressure exerted by U.S. representatives on the Chinese for exactness, the Chinese-American mutual relations were at all times most harmonious and without any misunderstandings of significance. Chinese appreciation of our support of their Central Government and its efforts to unify China politically and economically was frequently expressed, although this very appreciation had its disadvantages, in that the Chinese often presumed that we would land Central Government troops against resistance from the 8th Route ("Communist") Army—a form of active support extending beyond the bounds of our national policy. On at least one occasion, air support and a show of naval strength were openly requested for Nationalist landings.

Just before the Japanese surrender ceremony in Tientsin, a U.S. Army liaison officer visited Chefoo with military representatives of the Central Government.
He reported that although he was most cordially received by the local authorities, his companions were so definitely warned not to risk entering the city with him. The so-called "Communists" were reported, in fact, to be in control of the major portion of the Shantung Peninsula.

The Landing at Chinwangtao - It had originally been planned for the 13th Chinese Army to land at Dairen, Manchuria. Because of failure to complete negotiations between the Chinese and Russian Governments, however, the entire movement was held in abeyance by Commander SEVENTH Fleet. As the negotiations took turns for the better or for the worse, the operation was successively restored to the original plan on October 19th, shifted to Hulutao on the 20th, diverted to Taku on the 27th, and finally settled on Chinwangtao on the 28th, by which time TransDivs 69, 59, and 49 had loaded and sailed from Kowloon on the 24th, 25th, and 26th of October, without possessing exact knowledge of their ultimate destination.

Upon the arrival of TransRon 17 at Kowloon from Manila, the ships found the Chinese troops waiting on the dock. They had marched 40 miles during the previous night to get there, with the natural result that they were tired, dusty, and restless. The troops were subjected to cursory inspections which culled the worst physical cases, and were searched for ammunition which they were likely to be carrying in their packs and about their persons. With the completion of this inspection, they were hurriedly herded aboard the transports in a bewildered and worried state of mind. Their cargo and equipment had been brought in on the Kowloon and Canton Railroad from a staging point two hours inland. This railroad had become badly depleted from the ravages of war. Only two locomotives were available, and as a result of the almost total disappearance of coal stocks in Southern China, it was necessary to operate these locomotives as wood burners, an adaptation to circumstances which reduced tractive power and restricted any train to a few cars.

Despite their unfortunate introduction to shipboard life, the Chinese troops proved most willing to cooperate. After they understood what was expected of them, they responded cheerfully and wholeheartedly, being well-organized and disciplined. They took excellent care of their firearms, were orderly and docile, and their personal cleanliness was above expectations, with all of them wearing complete uniforms which they maintained in a good state of cleanliness. Despite their seasickness and lack of adequate clothing, their spirit remained high and their morale good.

Upon the arrival of the Chinese troops at the staging area, it was found that they had in their possession considerable quantities of fresh meat and fresh vegetables, both items requiring refrigeration aboard ship. Because of the dubious sources and inspection of the meat, and because the vegetables had undoubtedly been grown with night soil fertilizer, it was impossible to admit these foods to the refrigeration spaces on the transports, or even to allow such stores aboard ship.

This problem was solved by an agreement among the Navy, the Senior U.S. Army CCC Liaison Officer, and the Chinese Army Commander that these items would not be brought aboard ship. The transports in turn would mix meat and canned vegetables with the rice issues to the Chinese troops and would invoice the cost of these naval food issues to the U.S. Army CCC Administration.
Generally speaking, the troops received at Kowloon were in good physical condition. It became evident later, however, that they had not been carefully inspected on the dock, as many had succeeded in concealing chronic leg ulcers and Oriental sores with the wrap leggings which they wore. Military necessity, however, made it neither practicable nor desirable to disqualify from embarkation Chinese troops suffering from mere skin diseases, inasmuch as Chinese armies are inherently disease-ridden, and any attempt at establishing physical and hygiene standards comparable to those of the U.S. Navy would simply have had the undesired effect of eliminating the greater part of the Chinese troops. The best that could be done under the circumstances was to clean and disinfect with cresol and DDT the compartments used by these passengers, in order to prevent future contagion. This disinfecting program was supplemented by strict injunctions to the naval personnel on the transports to refrain from fraternization with the Chinese troops.

Enroute to Chinwangtao, no regular sick call was held for the troops. Instead, two corpsmen were designated each morning to go through the troop compartments with the interpreter, while Chinese platoon officers stood by. Any passengers exhibiting suspicious signs, symptoms, or behavior (with the exception of seasickness) were escorted to sick bay for examination. Thus it was assured that the ones most in need of medical aid were seen and treated; for it had been observed that those most in need of attention were the most reluctant to complain. Several ships carried no Chinese doctors or medical corps personnel, and were thus entirely dependent upon the ships' medical personnel for treatment.

Before the proper use of shipboard sanitary facilities and requirements could be impressed on all of the troops, sanitary conditions had declined to a disreputable state, and any improvement in this condition was hindered by the prevalent seasickness. When indoctrination of the troops was complete, however, and they had recovered from their initial seasickness, the improvement became rapid and thorough. The Chinese officers were quite apologetic about this condition, and were further embarrassed by the fact that they, too, had been seasick and had consequently lost control of their troops temporarily. As the seas became calmer and the Chinese troops became accustomed to the movement of the ships, the passengers gradually came to life and set to work to restore conditions of cleanliness, with the result that by the time they were disembarked, their spaces had been brought up to standard.

Chinwangtao Harbor contained two excellent wharves which were used for unloading the 13th Chinese Army, both wharves being readily accessible for loading from ships to railway cars, and these spurs being connected with the Peiping-Mukden Railroad.

Four berths were available for unloading. Two were suitable for smaller APAs and AKAs, and two for larger ships. Unloading was, therefore, simply a problem of getting the ships to the wharves, disembarking the troops and cargo, and replacing the unloaded ships at the dock with loaded ones. The only bottlenecks involved were harbor pilots, of whom only three were available.

A few hours before the first echelon of TransRon 17 arrived at Chinwangtao, two regiments of the 43rd Division of the 94th Chinese Army arrived at that port by rail, having come from Tientsin to cover the landings.
TransDiv 59 arrived in Chinwangtang on 30 October with a total of 8,027 troops of the 89th Division. SIRDA (AKA) and CORTLAND (APA) were immediately docked. Two berths were available. At daylight, the troops were disembarked, and Lt. IRISCOE and CRENSHAW (APAs) were replaced by BRISCOE and CRENDSHAW (APAs). Two berths suitable for large APAs having become available at 0900 on the 31st, LEBON and CLEARFIELD moved in. CLEARFIELD completed unloading before noon, and was replaced by TROUSDALE (AKA). The entire division was unloaded and ready for sea by 1600.

The Liberty ship J. H. QUICK, which had been loaded at Shanghai with 36 trucks and winter clothing for the thinly-clad 13th Chinese Army, was meanwhile sailed to rendezvous with TransRon 17 in the vicinity of the 13th Army's objective at Chinwangtang. The liberty ship EDWARD B. HAINES, which had been similarly loaded for the 8th Chinese Army, was then directed to sail from Shanghai for Kowloon, to arrive there prior to 6 November, offload her winter clothing, and re-sail at once with her 36 trucks for the target of the 8th Chinese Army at Tsingtao.

J. H. QUICK arrived on schedule at Chinwangtang and landed winter clothing for the 13th Chinese Army, this material being distributed among the shivering troops. Before sundown of the 31st, the landing of the 36 trucks for the Chinese Army had also been commenced by the merchantman.

The whole unloading operation by TransRon 17 was performed as expeditiously as possible in order not to tie up the Chinwangtang docks any longer than necessary, as many merchant vessels were anchored in the harbor to take aboard coal for Shanghai and various South China ports, where the need for fuel was a vital and compelling necessity.

TransDiv 69, which had departed Kowloon on 24 October, a day earlier than TransDiv 59, meantime arrived at the target at 0805 on October 30th, and unloaded the 6547 troops of the 89th Division which it was carrying. At 1700, 31 October, TransDivs 69 and 59 weighed anchor and headed south for Kowloon to embark the 8th Chinese Army. TransDiv 49 departed Kowloon on October 26th, arrived at Chinwangtang on the 31st, discharged the 12,374 embarked Chinese troops of the 54th Division, and set out for Kowloon on November 2nd.

Thus, 27,948 Chinese troops of the 13th Chinese Army were landed at Chinwangtang, 7% less than the figure of 30,052 which had been used in planning. The absence of any "Communist" opposition was attributed to an apparent withdrawal north of the Great Wall of China.

The Landings at Tsingtao - Although the time of return of the ships of TransRon 17 was still unknown, plans for the movement of the 8th Chinese Army were instituted immediately upon the departure of TransDiv 49 for Chinwangtang. On that date (26 October), the initial planning conference was held among all interested parties, including the Commanding General of the 8th Chinese Army, and the Commanding General of the Chinese Service of Supply. Uncertainty as to the location of certain Chinese troops necessitated further conferences, but a sailing date was eventually established.

The cargo to be carried consisted largely of rice, small arms ammunition, and light equipment. The problem of cooking for the Chinese troops while they
were embarked was simplified by their habit of consuming two pounds of rice per day (a pound per meal at 1000 and 1600) without extra ingredients.

Because of the great discrepancy between the published figures of the Chinese 8th Army's strength and the actual figures, every effort was bent to arrive at actual figures at once during these planning conferences. These efforts proved abortive, however, because the figures then given as stable were later greatly reduced, then raised, and finally reduced again. In small part, the final reduction was attributable to the destruction of a river boat by a mine, with the consequent loss of most of the troops embarked. (A wide discrepancy in actual and published figures of Chinese Army strength is said to be commonly true, in any event, with the payroll figures being published, while the actual figures are never published or admitted. By this method, it appears that excess funds become available to augment the regular pay of the higher-ranking Chinese Officers).

To insure the carrying out of basic plans and to provide the follow-up and liaison necessary to complete successfully a complex and lengthy operation, Commander Parsons, the TransRon 17 Operations Officer, had remained in Kowloon while the 13th Chinese Army was lifted to Chinwangtao. Early in November, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek requested that the SEVENTH Amphibious Force transport the Chinese 8th and 62nd Armies to T'ang-Ku (Tientsin), but on the 6th—two days before the sailing of the first echelon of TransRon 17 for Tsingtao—Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer refused his request on the grounds that disident Chinese elements and not the Japanese were the cause of the current serious trouble; therefore, the U.S. would not be justified in moving additional Chinese troops of the Nationalist Government for the purpose of coercing another Chinese faction.

In accordance with the plans drawn up for the lifting of the two Chinese Armies, as soon as the three transport divisions arrived at the staging port of Kowloon, they were provisioned, fueled, loaded, and sailed for the 8th Chinese Army's objective at Tsingtao (on the south shore of the Shantung Peninsula)—all in less than 24 hours after arriving at Kowloon. The careful preliminary planning and liaison work had paid dividends.

TransDiv 69 departed on 8 November with 7,994 troops of the 103rd Division; TransDiv 59 loaded 7,978 troops of the Honorable 1st Division and sailed on the 9th; while the 7,790 Chinese of the 166th Division boarded the ships of TransDiv 49 and departed for Tsingtao on the 10th.

As in the case of the Chinwangtao Operation, the force actually embarked was considerably smaller than that listed by the Chinese High Command while planning the Tsingtao Operation, with the difference that the discrepancy was even greater in the case of the latter operation. Of 34,942 troops originally listed, 11,180 failed to materialize. Thus, a force of 23,762 Chinese 8th Army troops actually participated in the Tsingtao Operation.

Again, as in the Chinwangtao lift, the Chinese troops with their equipment were ready on the docks upon the arrival of the transports, having used the vacant lots in the vicinity of the Kowloon loading docks as a staging area, where they had bivouacked and messed in the open through rain and unsettled weather for two days prior to the docking of the transports.
The problems of hygiene and sanitation were similar to those encountered on the previous lift of the 13th Chinese Army, and the same preventive measures insuring non-fraternization, isolation of patients, and keeping of all Chinese troops from the gasket areas were in effect.

The inevitable comparison of the two Chinese Armies lifted to North China by TransDiv 17 found that the troops of the 8th Chinese Army were well-disciplined veterans, seasoned to hard campaigning, whose appearance and equipment contrasted unfavorably with that of the 13th Chinese Army, while their average age level was about 10 years greater than that of their predecessors aboard the transports. The troops of the 8th Army were in much worse condition than those who had been lifted to Chinwangtao, as they had marched for the part 40 days from Burma to Hong Kong, with little food other than rice, with the result that several men had died during the march, others had to be carried to Kowloon, and approximately 17% of the Army fell and were left along the route of march. As a consequence, the survivors arrived at the port physically exhausted and weakened from malnutrition. By way of contrast with the 52nd Chinese Army which was embarked at Haiphong a few days earlier, the troops of the 8th Chinese Army had passed through no plague or cholera areas, and they stated that none of their personnel had been ill of either disease during the past few months.

At least one ship observed that the officers of this contingent were of lower caliber than those of the 13th Chinese Army. Although sea conditions were better, and troops were not loaded beyond the ships capacities, the Commanding General of troops and a majority of his officers succumbed to seasickness and were useless during almost the entire trip. The Chinese civilian interpreter, directed by the U.S. Army Liaison Officer, performed a great part of their duties. Some troops died while embarked for the lift, because of the added shock of seasickness. They had been in feeble health upon embarking, and probably died of exhaustion and heart failure.

One APA which had four Chinese medical officers embarked found that they apparently knew each individual man of their unit and administered to his care when they thought it necessary. The medical officers were fairly well versed in knowledge of various pharmaceutical products, especially those of the "sulfa" family. The ship's medical officers observed in course of their frequent inspections that the Chinese medical officers performed various bizarre treatments such as "blood letting" and the use of "needles", together with the "pinching" of the skin and vague chiropractic maneuvers. The plans drawn up beforehand however, had directed the ships' medical officers to act only in an advisory capacity whenever a Chinese medical officer was embarked, and this policy seemed quite acceptable to the Chinese medical officers.

Upon the arrival of TransDiv 69 at the objective on 14 November, the ships moved in to the Tsingtao docks and began discharging troops and cargo. Less than an hour later, TransDiv 59 arrived, and, rather then interfere with the third echelon upon its arrival, Captain Davis ordered the troops to be put ashore in landing craft and unloaded over the beaches.

This operation proceeded expeditiously, as ComTransDiv 59 had anticipated the possibility of such an amphibious landing and had instructed the ships of his division to hold practice unloads over cargo nets secured to bulkheads, thus familiarizing the Chinese troops with the use of cargo nets. The ships'
platoon working parties of Chinese troops had been organized previously, and were retained aboard to unload the cargo. Naval personnel supervised and operated the winch and boom equipment, however. The Chinese shore parties were landed and organized in advance of the cargo phase. These parties were large enough to perform quickly the arduous tasks of unloading bulky bagged and baled cargo over boat ramps. To this task was added the job of passing the cargo up the steep stone facing of the shore and assembling it along the street curb above, ready for pickup by trucks. The stone facings had steps placed at convenient intervals, and shore party troops formed double lines along these steps and passed up cargo in old-fashioned "bucket brigade" style. This means of unloading cargo proved very effective, despite the Chinese habit of discussing the pro's and con's of everything before taking any action, and their curiosity which prompted them to open and inspect all cargo before moving it.

As the tide receded, random boulders emerged to interfere at several points, so that boats could not approach close enough to drop their ramps on dry land. This difficulty was met by retaining one LCVP in place as the tide receded. Loaded LCVPs came alongside the beached boat at its seaward end, and cargo was transshipped from one boat to the other, and thence to shore. The troops were initially landed in LCMs, while the vehicles and cargo were ordinarily landed in LCVPs.

The sandy beach supported the weight of the various vehicles landed, as long as they remained on wet, firmly-packed sand. When the vehicles were driven beyond the area of wet, packed sand into dry, loose sand, they at once lost traction and bogged down. By the time this situation was reported to the Trans-Div 59 Beachmaster, a number of vehicles had stalled. The Beachmaster at once established an impromptu beach party, obtained a tractor from the U.S. Marines in garrison there, and organized a regular towing service to bring each landed vehicle to high and dry ground.

The prompt action of ComTransDiv 59 in so debarking the personnel under his command succeeded in maintaining the unloading schedule on time, so that when TransDiv 49 arrived at Tsingtao early on the 15th with the last echelon the ships were able to dock immediately to commence discharging.

With the completion of unloading by TransDiv 49 on 16 November, U.S. participation in the operation was ended. All of the ships of TransRon 17 remained in the area of Tsingtao for the time being, having been granted their first availability for upkeep and maintenance since August, and on the 22nd, ComTransRon 17 departed independently for Nagoya, thence to the West Coast.

An interesting commentary on the problems inherent in operations involving the Chinese was made by Commander Parsons, the TransRon 17 Operations Officer, who, with ComTransDiv 59, executed the planning for the lifting of the 13th and 18th Chinese Armies. He wrote as follows:

"Throughout the planning phase, the most baffling problem with which the planners had to cope was the lack of exactness and precision on the part of the Chinese. The doctrine of continuous pressure for exactness which was adopted, was found to be correct, but further than this, it was found that this pressure must be not only constant but uniform."
"More specifically, it means that pressure once applied for a commitment of action on one side was lost if that planned date was changed in the process. It is well noted that the loading dates which were agreed to by all at the Cairo conference were kept inviolate. What changes were necessary were made around these dates, even to the point of holding a Transport Division at sea for an extra day.

"The inbred custom of the Chinese is to compromise. He is inexact and does not expect exactness from others, because it had not been in his experience. To get this exactness from him, the most punctilious and unchanging precision on our part is necessary to secure exact performance from him.

"For the benefit of those who may have to demand exactness from the Chinese in the future, it may be said that the success of any closely coordinated schedule of action is considered to be largely dependent upon adherence to this principle."

On 26 November, the 6th Marine Division reported that leading elements of the 8th Chinese Army were engaged in a fight with the "Communists" on the railway about 30 miles north of Tsingtao, and that all ammunition of the Nationalists had been expended. In consonance with our policy of not actually supporting one Chinese faction against another, however, no American forces provided the requested ammunition.

Movement of the 52nd Chinese Army from Haiphong to Chinwangtao.

Preliminary Arrangements and Loading - It had been planned to land the 52nd Chinese Army in Dairen, Manchuria, but the target was shifted to Chinwangtao, Northeast China, when Rear Admiral T. G.W. Settle, the Cincpac Liaison Officer with the Russian Far Eastern Forces, learned on October 27th that the Russians would not permit the entry of Chinese troops at that time, despite earlier assurances of Soviet evacuation of the port of Dairen whenever the Chinese Nationalist forces should be ready to move in. Lieutenant General Kozlov (the Russian Commander of Dairen) stated that he was under the impression that the Chinese were not to land until late November, and that he would not approve the landing at Dairen unless instructed by higher authority. In addition, the only naval vessels that would be permitted to enter Port Arthur were those of Russian nationality, but all Allied merchant vessels except those flying the Chinese flag would be allowed to enter. As a result of this Soviet stand, it was agreed that no Chinese Nationalist troops would be landed in Manchuria without Russian acquiescence.

Meantime, the planning phase of this operation proceeded, even though the eventual objective had not yet been definitely decided on. The task of lifting the 52nd Chinese Army from Haiphong, French Indo-China, to a port in Northeast China was assigned to TransRon 24 (CTG 78.6, Commodore E. T. Short), which had just completed landing the 6th Marine Division at Tsingtao on October 11th. TransRon 24 was composed of three transport divisions—TransDiv 70 (TU 78.6.1), TransDiv 71 (TU 78.6.2), and TransDiv 36 (TU 78.6.3)—with a strength of 1 AP, 14 APAs, and 9 AKAs.

TransDiv 36 (Captain E. B. Boyer), having completed preparations for this operation before the remainder of the transport squadron, was ordered to proceed
independently from Manila to Haiphong on 23 October, there embarking the 25th Division and elements of the 195th Division of the 52nd Chinese Army, as planned.

The plans drawn up for the operation envisioned an abnormal lift of 2000 troops by each large APA, and 1000 by each AKA and small APA; but the cargo tonnage was expected to be negligible (less than 100 tons per vessel), because of the light nature of the equipment habitually carried by Chinese troops, and the fact that the cargo consisted mainly of rice in sacks, although there were small numbers of vehicles and field pieces.

While the ships of TransRon 24 were still in Manila completing logistics for the forthcoming operation, they received reports from the TG 78.6 liaison team which indicated that far fewer Chinese than the original figure of 39,000 troops should be expected. Forecasts were revised accordingly, and three liberty ships (YAKs) heretofore assigned tentatively to TG 78.6 were reported to be superfluous and were returned to the Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force for assignment elsewhere. On October 30th, ComTransRon 24, departed Manila for Haiphong with TransDivs 70 and 71.

That same day, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek notified Admiral Kinkaid that Soviet authorities had guaranteed the safe landing of Chinese troops at Yingkow, and he requested that the 52nd Chinese Army be landed there. In order to satisfy himself that a favorable reception would be accorded U.S. ships and the Chinese troops should they select Yingkow as their objective, Vice Admiral Barbey sailed in his flagship to that port, arriving there on November 3rd. Although he found the Russians cordial, they declined to guarantee the safe landing of Chinese troops there; and, when he learned that the Chinese "Communists" at Yingkow were being reinforced with men, arms, and munitions, he advised that the 52nd Chinese Army be landed at Chinwangtao, rather than at Yingkow. Events proved that it was well that his recommended course was adopted, as the Russians withdrew from Yingkow on November 8th, leaving the Chinese "Communist" forces in possession of the city.

Meantime, TransDiv 36 had arrived at Haiphong on October 26th, embarked the first echelon of the 52nd Chinese Army (some 13,000 troops of the 25th Chinese Division), and departed on the 30th for Chinwangtao. The 52nd Chinese Army was one of three Chinese Armies forming the First Chinese Army Group, the others being the 60th and 93rd. These three armies were commanded by the Yunnanese General, Lu Han. The Commanding General of the 52nd Chinese Army was General Chao Liang-Ta (referred to as General Chao). It was an experienced organization, which had won many battles during more than 10 campaigns along the Yangtze River.

It was known that many types of disease could be anticipated among the Chinese troops coming aboard. At a meeting of the Senior Medical Officers of the ships involved, the scope of the problem was discussed. It was decided that the troops should be treated for body vermin prior to loading, and the troop spaces should be sprayed thoroughly with DDT before the ships arrived at the port of embarkation. Furthermore, it was agreed that a separate sick bay for passengers should be established, in accordance with the general plan to compel, as completely as possible, a segregation of the crews and the troops. The expectation of a high incidence of intestinal parasitic disease, together with a fear that cholera and typhoid might be present, led to the conclusion
that the Chinese should be completely excluded from all ships' galleys. Food
would be served topside after its preparation below decks by Navy personnel,
thereby affording a means of keeping the mess areas clean; and accessory steam
lines could be run along the decks to the C.I.U's, used for cleaning. It was
also agreed that fly control would be of paramount importance, and it was re-
commended that each ship should at once initiate a campaign to exterminate
rats. All these suggestions were approved and adopted by ComTransDiv 36.

During the three days enroute to Haiphong, the corpsmen were instructed in
the plans, and teams were formed to man the sick bays, spray the ships, set
traps for rats, and prepare supplies. All hands had received routine immuniza-
tion, including inoculations against cholera and typhus, but, as a special pre-
caution all replacements taken aboard at Manila were checked and injected with
the proper serums.

Upon the arrival of TransDiv 36 at Haiphong, it became possible for the
ships' medical officers to become acquainted for the first time with the actual
facts relative to the current condition of the troops and the endemic diseases
of the country. French Indo-China was in a political turmoil, having been
successively occupied by the French, Japanese, and currently by the 52nd Chinese
Army. Civilian medical supplies of even the most elementary type were non-
existant, as a result of the country's isolation during the years of war.
Pestilence, floods, and famine had always been accepted as inevitable, and the
dire poverty and filth of the natives made the country "a veritable bacteriologic
incubator".

The usual fall cholera epidemic had visited Northern French Indo-China and
was still not under control, according to the reports of the only Haiphong hos-
pital, which was accepting 20 to 25 cholera patients a day, and witnessing a
daily death rate of 17 to 22 persons from the disease. Even then, only a few of
the natives were fortunate enough to receive hospital care; so that the actual
morbidity rate of the area was in reality many times that of the figures obtained
from the hospital.

The 52nd Chinese Army had marched 500 miles from Southern China into the
Haiphong Area, passing through a region notorious for malaria and other diseases
common to the Orient, including cholera. Valuable information was obtained by
the TransDiv medical officers from conversations with U.S. Army medical officers
who had been liaison agents with the Chinese for two years. They reported that
the 52nd Chinese Army was heavily infected with malaria, exhibited obvious
evidences of malnutrition, was almost universally affected with scabies, and pro-
bably carried active cases of cholera, as well as an unknown number of cholera
carriers. The Chinese medical officers gave contradictory statements about the
immunization of the troops for cholera, and it was obvious that little reliance
could be placed in their statistics.

A cursory inspection of the troops was made at the beach by the TransDiv
Medical Officers in company with the U.S. Army doctors. The equipment of the
Chinese was strictly for a tropical campaign, for the uniform was of light
khaki cotton with knee length shorts. Their hair was closely cut, and the men
were clean, with the uniforms evidently having received good attention and being
free from dirt. Some of the men had one cotton blanket. In general, the nutri-
tional state of the soldiers was fair, although many were recognized to be unfit
for transportation. A considerable number on the beach were undergoing malarial chills—a fact quite understandable, as the Chinese Army was unable to supply them with adequate amounts of quinine or atabrine.

These Chinese troops had been recruited from inland districts of South China, and the vast majority had never seen the sea nor encountered the cold climate prevalent in North China in November. The medical problem therefore resolved itself into one of controlling the multiplicity of diseases among the troops while embarked, and protecting the American Navy personnel aboard ship, who would be brought into intimate contact with these health hazards. Seasickness and exposure to unaccustomed cold, with insufficient clothing, were additional problems that would probably be encountered once the convoy got underway on its voyage north.

Upon the arrival of TransDiv 36 at Haiphong, the Chinese troops, together with their baggage and sacks of rice, were reported by their officers to be ready for embarkation. Captain Tyler, however, decided to load only 100 on each ship as a dress rehearsal preliminary to embarking all the troops. Flaws in the system could then be detected and adjustments made. The beach crews and medical parties, consisting of one medical officer and from three to six corpsmen, were landed at the eight loading points, and delousing equipment was set up.

The troops were formed in lines for spraying, but first a brief medical examination was made to eliminate the weak, sick, and those with advanced pustular skin diseases and purulent trachoma. Those classed as unsuited for transportation were marked with a stain of gentian violet on the forehead.

The Chinese troops arrived at the transports after a five-mile trip in landing boats. A moderate sea was running, and practically all the Chinese were seasick, several to such an extent that they could not climb the landing nets on the side of the ship and had to be hoisted aboard in stretchers.

The death of a Chinese soldier from cholera within seven hours after embarking injected a serious consideration of the advisability of loading more troops if it could be assumed that many others had the disease. Because of this unexpected turn of events, the entire situation was reviewed by higher authority, who decided that the rest of the troops should be loaded the following morning. Military necessity outweighed the possible effects of a doubtful epidemic.

The medical beach parties established their stations, and within five hours, 10,272 officers and men had been inspected, thoroughly dusted with DDT, and loaded into small boats. The rejection rate varied at different beach stations according to the standards of the medical officers and the quality of the troops. The rejected men were further inspected by a committee composed of one Chinese Medical Officer, one U.S. Army Medical Officer, and the TransDiv 36 Medical Officer. Of approximately 300 rejectees, five were allowed to embark, as a result of this final screening.

The arrival of the main body of the 25th Division at the transports saw a reenactment of the scene of the previous day, the vast majority of the troops suffering intensely from seasickness. Once they were all embarked, the immediate task became that of decontamination—which was a sizable one.
Before the convoy got underway, the APA turned 52 Chinese to the beach as unfit for transportation because of dysentery. Even so, this ship had the largest number of deaths from presumptive cholera of any ship in the division during the passage.

Conditions on Board During Passage - The segregation of the Chinese troops on board the ships, with the consequent construction of sanitary and messing facilities, was admittedly a problem, and one requiring practical solution because of the unhealthy condition of the Chinese soldiers. The ships made various provisions for this, such as rigging of topside heads, removal of the crew from certain compartments, and the isolation of the hold sections for the troops. G.I. cans were distributed in quantity, and steam lines were run topside for ready use in cleaning feeding utensils.

When the report was received that the Chinese were clad in light summer uniforms and short pants (Haiphong is in approximately the same latitude as Pearl Harbor), with no protection against the rigors of a long, cold sea voyage or a winter in North China or Manchuria, ComSIXTHPhibFor procured blankets for the squadron for issue to the passengers. Unfortunately, this report arrived too late for TransDiv 36 to secure any of these blankets, with the result that those ships proceeded to the objective without them. It was later learned that winter gear was moving north independently on the Liberty ships GEORGE R. HOLMES from Shanghai for issue to the 52nd Chinese Army upon its arrival at the target. Where available, however, the blankets filled an urgent need during the course of the voyage to the target and protected the precarious health of the Chinese troops.

The first three days of the voyage were characterized by rough seas, and seasickness continued to be a common complaint, compelling the liberal employment of infusions to prevent dehydration. Many of the troops were so ill that the intravenous use of fluids was a life-saving measure. The TransDiv Medical Officer observed in this connection that "once a Chinese is ill, he is completely resigned to die and is totally dependent on others for care. It is with great urging and encouragement that he can be persuaded to leave his bed and take active measures for recuperation."

The morning Chinese sick call gained in popularity and attendance daily, as a result of the recovery of the troops from seasickness and the spread of the knowledge that medical attention was available. By the 6th and 7th days of the voyage, between 300 and 400 men daily visited the Chinese sick bay on the flagship.

This expenditure of time, energy, and medical supplies upon improving the health of the Chinese was warranted for more than motives of humanity and the desire to put ashore an efficient fighting force. It was also felt that the health hazards to the ships' crews would be reduced proportionately to the control of infectious diseases among the Chinese. The availability of the services of the medical staff encouraged the passengers to present themselves for treatment of all types, thus providing the medical officers an opportunity to detect and treat any contagious diseases, as well as reducing the symptoms of the prevalent dysentery, which was of importance, regardless of the danger of cholera.
The Chinese proved cooperative and very appreciative of medical services, in addition to which they maintained excellent personal cleanliness throughout the voyage and washed their clothes daily. The soldiers further kept the troop spaces in commendable order and were taught to spray the holds and heads daily with DDT solution and cresol. Flies disappeared completely from the ship within 48 hours after the division's departure, and were not seen again during the trip.

The health of the TransDiv crew was excellent, as a result of the extensive precautions taken. Men with diarrhea and dysentery were given particular attention, and an average of five cases a day was reported in the entire convoy, none of which was serious. There were no seriously ill among the Navy personnel, and no deaths.

The reports of the Chinese troops revealed an average of 162 in the sick bays of all ships each day. A daily average of 166 were under treatment for dysentery or diarrhea. An average of 10 Chinese were classified each day as being seriously ill. The total number of deaths during the 10-day voyage was 18, one from proved cholera, 15 from presumptive cholera, and two deaths from combined dysentery and malnutrition. Five of the 18 deaths occurred on the last day the troops were aboard. The number of patients on the "serious" list rose progressively, especially during the last three days, which led to the conclusion that the morbidity and mortality would have been considerably higher had the length of the operation been prolonged.

The Landing - On 7 November, the Chinese (11,072 in number) were disembarked from the ships of TransDiv 36 at Chinwangtao, North China. A strong, cold wind was blowing in from the north, and the Chinese were obviously chilled in their tropical clothing. It was necessary to take 41 patients ashore in stretchers to an undisclosed destination. The small local civilian hospital was quickly filled to capacity, and no tentage of adequate quantity was carried by the Chinese to supplement it. In the words of the TransDiv Medical Officer, "The ultimate outcome of the management of the sick ashore remains unknown, but from all indications, it would appear that the outlook was decidedly pessimistic".

TransDivs 70 and 71 employed similar precautions in loading the remaining troops of the 52nd Chinese Army upon their arrival at Haiphong and rejected approximately 5% of the troops. An army of 39,000 had been expected, but, including the 11,072 troops of the 25th Division already delivered by TransDiv 36, the total actually loaded numbered only 23,169. It was found that TransDiv 70 and only four ships of TransDiv 71 were required to lift the remaining 12,097 Chinese of the 195th and 2nd Divisions. The four ships thus freed were left at Haiphong and made available to CTF 74 for other assignment.

The two TransDivs of the rear echelon departed from Haiphong on 4 November and arrived at Chinwangtao on the 12th, accomplishing discharge of the troops embarked in two days. Upon completion of this mission, the squadron reported to Taku, where orders were received for the individual ships to report to "Magic Carpet".

Several days preceding the arrival of TransDiv 36 at Chinwangtao, the Liberty ship GEORGE R. HOLMES had arrived at that port with winter clothing for the 52nd Chinese Army, and had given liberty to part of its crew. Five of these Americans were captured by the "Communists" and detained at Shanhaiwan, the
eastern terminus of the Great Wall of China. On November 6th, however, all were released, with the exception of the chief officer, who had been wounded while being captured and was being retained in a local hospital. Two days later, he was released by the "Communists" and was brought back to the hospital in Chinwangtao.

On November 16th, the city of Shanhaikwan fell to the 52nd Chinese Army under General Tu-Li-Ming, after which the army continued its advance northeastward, with the "Communists" offering only sporadic resistance and withdrawing before the Nationalist line of advance.

On November 17th, the city of Sui-Chung was captured by the Nationalists on the 22nd, and General Tu-Li-Ming moved there with his staff. Also on the 22nd, the Central Government announced that it planned to fly the 12,000 troops of the 5th Chinese Nationalist Army Division from Peiping into Manchuria as soon as the Russians withdrew from that area. Two days later, the important port of Hulutao fell to the 52nd Chinese Army, and by the 26th the Nationalists had reached the southern banks of the Hailiuto River, three miles south of Chinchow, from where they advanced in two directions. The main body moved along the railroad to Kowpangtze, while a smaller group moved along the railroad northward to I-Hsien. No fighting was reported during any of these advances.

On the last day of November, it was reported that "Communist" General Chuteh was flying to Mukden, Manchuria, to assume command of the defense of that area.

As December opened, the Chinwangtao-Peiping-Tientsin-Tsingtao area continued to be quiet, though air reconnaissance planes discovered that the railroad two miles southeast of Luan Tsun had been blown up at 20-foot intervals for a distance of two miles. An American observer reported, however, that tens of thousands of Japanese Kwantung Army troops had escaped to the Tung Pien Tao Mountains (on the Korean frontier), where an estimated five years' store of military provisions was cached.

On 2 December, Vice Admiral Barbey, Commander SEVENTH Fleet, arrived at Hulutao, Manchuria, in ESTES (AGC) and departed via rail the same day for a conference at General Tu-Li-Ming's Headquarters near Chinchow, where he learned the following facts concerning the situation in Manchuria:

(a) General Tu-Li-Ming's Army had reached Kowpangtze, an important railroad junction 30 miles northeast of Chinchow, with only token "Communist" resistance encountered during their move from Shanhaikwan to Chinchow, including the capture of the important port of Hulutao.

(b) Immediate movement to Mukden was possible in spite of the lack of satisfactory rail and motor transportation. This move was not contemplated, however, until the Soviets had evacuated the city.
(c) The use of the 475 vehicles included in the forthcoming movement of the Northeastern Army Headquarters Unit was urgently needed in order to facilitate the advance to Mukden, Manchuria.

(d) It was planned to send one regiment south to capture the port of Yingkow immediately, and to advance on the other fronts.

(e) There was considerable evidence to support previous statements that the Russians had removed heavy industrial equipment from Manchuria, as well as rolling stock.

Having completed his talks with General Tu-Li-Ming, Vice Admiral Barbey departed Hulutao for Shanghai on December 4th, stopping enroute at Tsingtao.

On 2 December, a four-plane division of F7F-2Ns belonging to VMF(N) 533 took off from Nan Yuan Airfield, Peiping, on a routine search and reconnaissance patrol. Reports had been received of a massing of "Communist" troops in the area north of Tangshan. These troops were reportedly threatening to attack Tangshan, in an endeavor to cut railroad lines leading into T'ang-Ku and Tientsin. At Feng-Jun, 14 miles north of Tangshan, large groups of unidentifiable people could be seen massing in the streets, and additional people were observed heading toward the town along the roads leading from the northeast, and west. While flying along one of these roads in an effort to determine whether the people were civilians or soldiers, the pilot noticed a hole appear in his port wing. On landing at Nan Yuan Airfield, he found that it was a .30 calibre bullet hole.

During the early part of December, preliminary arrangements were made with the Chinese Minister of the Navy for the location of the "Chinese Amphibious Training Group" at Tsingtao. The purpose of this school would be to train Chinese officers and enlisted men in the handling of LSTs and other amphibious craft to the end that the United States could turn over considerable numbers of these vessels in the perceptible future, with the knowledge that the Chinese would be able to man, operate, and maintain them unassisted. This would permit the re-assignment of SEVENTH Fleet personnel engaged in lifting Chinese Armies to Northeastern China and Manchuria. Com7thFleet proposed appointing his Deputy Chief of Staff, Commodore P. L. Carroll, as head of this school, with the designation CTG 70.3. The latter was to arrange with Chinese naval authorities for the selection and assembly of students and for the commencement of the school as soon after 10 December as possible.

The first class of the "Chinese Amphibious Training Group" was scheduled to assemble on 20 December at the training headquarters in Tsingtao, the plan being to continue training classes in increments of 50 officers and 150 enlisted men per month, pending definite information as to the numbers and types of amphibious craft to be transferred to the Chinese Navy and the personnel requirements therefor.

On 3 December, the 8th Chinese Army resumed its advance inland toward Wehsien after receiving ammunition from the 6th Marine Division at Tsingtao, in what amounted to a reversal of the III Amphibious Corps' earlier stand of non-intervention in internal Chinese factional strife.
By December 5th, the 3rd and 16th Chinese Nationalist Armies had reached Nankow, and the 92nd Chinese Nationalist Army had moved into Shunyi and Miyun, while the 13th and 52nd Chinese Armies had occupied Chinchow and were pushing northward along the Peiping-to-Mukden Railroad. The Chinese "Communist" forces were reportedly withdrawing simultaneously, to avoid a clash with the Nationalists. Meantime, the final echelon of 671 troops of the 62nd Chinese Army had been embarked and were enroute to Takao, on the southwestern coast of Formosa, to complete the lift of 20,156 troops of that Army.

Two Marines were shot, one fatally, when fired upon by Chinese civilians near Anshan, on 6 December. When the head man of the village failed to surrender the assailants, III Marine Corps troops fired 24 rounds of 60mm shells into the offending village. Later the same day, Colonel Chappell, USMC, president of the court of inquiry, departed Tientsin for Anshan to investigate the affair, and the Marine forces were ordered to take no further action, pending further instructions.

On 8 December, the 7th Marine RCT reported that 30 to 40 Chinese, believed to be "Communists", had encircled Marine encampments at two railroad bridges in North China and were expected to attack at any time. As soon as this information was received at 1st MarDiv Headquarters, a train was ordered to stand by at Anshan for the use of a relieving force, if further events made it necessary.

Major General K. E. Rockey, USMC, reported on 9 December that six Marine SB2C "Helldivers" had failed to return the day before from operations in the Tientsin area. The aircraft had last been reported in a snow storm. A general search with all available aircraft was inaugurated at once, but with negative results. On the 13th, however, it was learned from Chinese sources that the missing planes had crashed close to the village of Shan-Li-Shih-Chin (36° 54' N., 120° 08' E.). Seven of the crash victims were known to be dead, one was alive but had a broken leg, one was reported to be alive, and 10 were reported injured. The fate of the remaining three missing crew members was unknown. It was believed that the survivors were in "Communist" hands; so a civilian was sent to the area to arrange for the evacuation of the survivors and the delivery of the bodies of the dead. The wreckage of five of the six planes was located on the 14th.

On 10 December, a two-plane section of VMF(N) 533 observed platoons of troops marching toward Feng-Jun, the scene of the incident in which a squadron plane was holed eight days previously. One mile south of Pai-Tsao-Wa the flyers noticed approximately 50 troops grouped on what appeared to be a drill or athletic field. Shortly before the two F7F-2Ns passed over the troops at an altitude of 1000 feet, a pilot saw one of the troops raise a rifle to his shoulder and a few seconds later a puff of smoke appeared as the piece was fired. When the pilot glanced at his port wing and observed a small hole in the outer panel, he radioed his companion to join him in circling the troops in order to identify them. The two "Tigercats" thereupon swooped low over the troops a second time, and the latter at once ran precipitately for cover, hiding in dugouts surrounding the field. After circling the area for a few minutes, the two planes continued their search, then returned to base at Nan Yuan Airfield, where further examination revealed that the damaged plane had been hit three times by bullets of approximately .30 caliber.
On the 14th, the 6th MarDiv reported that the Headquarters of the 8th Chinese Army was located west of Chiaohsian, while leading elements of the Army had penetrated to Kao-Mi. The same day, Chinese General Headquarters announced that the 60th and 93rd Chinese Nationalist Armies were due to arrive in the Hanoi-Haiphong area on 20 December for water-lift to the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway area. On the 17th, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek visited Chinchow by plane, to discuss with a Russian major the prospect of the Chinese Nationalist Army's movement to Mukden.

Two Marines of the 1st MarDiv were held in custody, pending investigation of a shooting incident at Yangtsin on 17 December, in which one Chinese civilian was shot and killed.

The six Marine crew members of the TBM which was forced down at Ho-Chien (90 miles due south of Peiping) on 10 November, and who had since been held captive by the "Communists", were returned by the latter to Tientsin on December 18th. The flyers reported that they had received fair to good treatment during the first 15 days of their captivity and excellent treatment throughout the last 23 days.

General Liu, of the Chinese Nationalist Army, passed through Chinwangtao on December 18th while enroute to Peiping. He stated that the static condition of the Chinese Nationalist Army front in Northeast China and Southern Manchuria was due to a Russian request for more time in which to evacuate troops and equipment from Mukden.

During the same week, TG 74.1, the convoy made up of six Liberty ships and three LSTs which had sailed from Hongay for Hulutao on December 8th with the Garrison Headquarters Unit of the Northeastern Chinese Nationalist Army and 475 vehicles embarked, ran into high winds and heavy seas while in passage, with the result that its speed had to be reduced to a token advance of two knots. STEPHAN LONG (XAK) suffered casualties to two embarked Chinese troops and LST 1020 sustained a five-foot split in the main deck, forcing the diversion of these two ships to Woosung. TG 74.1 had been expected to arrive at Hulutao on the 19th, but this adverse weather played such havoc with the schedule that it was not until December 23rd that two destroyers, six Liberty ships, and two LSTs arrived at Hulutao. By the evening of the 24th, TG 74.1 was unloading, with minor exceptions. Two days later, LST 1044, with a delayed unit of the Garrison Headquarters lift, was unloaded at Hulutao, bringing the total personnel and equipment discharged to 4500 troops and 475 vehicles.

Com7thFleet advised Cincpac on 19 December that carrier-based aircraft were no longer required for the support of operations in the China theater, inasmuch as the winter season in China, the lack of deep water ports in South China, and the absence of facilities in that area for basing the carrier planes ashore all precluded the operational training considered essential for any degree of effectiveness. Vice Admiral Barbey recommended, therefore, that the three CVEs employed in that theater, together with their escorts, be withdrawn from the SEVENTH Fleet, without replacement.

On 19 December, it was reported from Manchuria that the Chinese Nationalist Army had taken Pan-Shan. The same day, General Tu-Li-Ming sent 500 Chinese Nationalist Army troops to Chinwangtao to reinforce the Government forces in that area.
The Chinese Naval Training Center was formally commissioned at Tsingtao on December 22nd, and the training of six Chinese LST crews was begun at once.

Rear Admiral S. S. Murray (prospective head of the Naval Advisory Group China) flew from Shanghai to Canton on 27 December to inspect Chinese naval facilities there, and two days later flew from Canton to Takao.

On 11 December, the situation of the various Chinese Nationalist Armies was as follows (it should be noted that a Chinese Army is composed of three divisions and that the strength of each division is highly variable, but generally is from 8,000 to 10,000 troops):

- 70th Army at Kiirun, Formosa.
- 62nd Army at Takao, Formosa.
- 8th Army at Tsingtao, moving to Tsinan.
- 13th Army at Sin Min, moving to Mukden.
- 52nd Army at Chinchow, moving to Mukden.
- 92nd Army at Peiping.
- 94th Army at Peiping, moving to Cheng-Te.
- 71st and New 6th Army in Shanghai Area.
- 2nd and New 1st Army in Canton-Hong Kong Area.
- 54th Army in Canton.
- Northeast Garrison Headquarters Unit enroute to Hulutao.

The Landing of the New 6th Chinese Army at Chinwangtao.

In the latter part of December, as various Chinese Armies landed by sea and air from French Indo-China and Southern China and moved overland from their landing points in Northeast China into Manchuria, it became apparent that the number of troops involved would have to be augmented by additional Chinese Armies, if the National Government was to have a preponderance of strength over the "Communist" troops at every strategic point in those remote regions.

As a result of this decision, plans were drawn up to transport the New 6th Chinese Army from Shanghai to Hulutao, Manchuria, in LSTs of TG 78.12 around 20 February 1946 (the earliest date on which the necessary Arctic clothing required for the contemplated operation would be available), and on 24 December, Lieutenant General Y. C. Liao, Commanding General New 6th Chinese Army, conferred with Com7thFleet (Vice Admiral D. E. Barbey) and CTF 78 (Rear Admiral A. G. Noble) regarding the preliminary arrangements for this operation.

This was the situation as far as Com7thFleet was concerned, when on 6 January he read press reports based on an interview with Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General U.S. Forces China, in which the latter was quoted as saying that the New 6th Chinese Army would be lifted from Shanghai to a Manchurian port within a week or 10 days. Vice Admiral Barbey was taken completely by surprise by this disclosure, and sent a dispatch to ComGenChina requesting confirmation or disavowal of this press report, in order that he might be able to reassign the LSTs in his command accordingly. CTF 78 had begun transferring LSTs to Shanghai from the Japanese repatriation shuttle (running between Korea and China and the Japanese home islands) on 26 December, but Com7thFleet was prepared to accelerate this reassignment of amphibious craft if it proved true that Lieutenant General Wedemeyer expected to begin the Shanghai to Hulutao lift by the middle of January.
On 8 January, ComGenChina informed Com7thFleet that the target dates for the lifting of the New 22nd and 14th Divisions, as well as Corps and 6th Army troops had already been announced in a dispatch to Vice Admiral Barbe (which he had apparently failed to receive) and confirmation of these target dates would be furnished Com7thFleet upon completion of the conferences to be held between the staff of CTF 78 and Colonel McReynolds of Lieutenant General Wedemeyer's staff. The general added that medical teams were being dispatched to Hankow to perform the initial inoculation of 207 division and rear echelons, thus reducing the delay that would otherwise be encountered in Shanghai.

On 13 January, CNO recommended that the use of Navy-manned LSTs for the lifting of Chinese troops and for Japanese repatriation be discontinued not later than 7 April 1946 and that the LSTs involved be withdrawn at that time.

Commander SEVENTH Fleet authorized CTF 78 on 13 January to land the New 6th Chinese Army at Chinwangtao instead of Hulutao as originally planned, because of ice conditions at the latter port which made unloading operations or even mere entry into the harbor extremely hazardous.

Two days later, CNO authorized the decommissioning and demilitarization of 100 LSTs then in the Marianas, which were scheduled for eventual disposal to SCARJAP for operation by that agency, using Japanese crews under a special flag. These Japanese-manned LSTs would be employed in the repatriation of Japanese nationals from China and Korea and the repatriation of Chinese nationals from Japan. The low point U.S. Navy personnel released as a result of this decommissioning and transfer would then become available as replacements for the high point personnel of the 7thFleet LSTs engaged in the lifting of Chinese Armies.

On 15 January, CTF 78 commenced loading 100 vehicles and mounted guns of the first echelon of the New 22nd Division of the New 6th Chinese Army aboard six LSTs of TU 78.12.12 at Shanghai; the following day, the 4971 troops and equipment were embarked; and on the 17th, the convoy departed for Chinwangtao, arriving there on the 20th. TU 78.12.12 completed discharging the following day, and departed for Taku to take aboard a load of Japanese repatriates for the return voyage. Following a rapid movement after going ashore at Chinwangtao, the first echelon of the New 22nd Division drove to Hsinmin on the 23rd.

Meantime, another task unit of six LSTs departed Shanghai on the 21st with the second echelon of the New 22nd Division, arriving at Chinwangtao on the 24th and completing offloading the same day. A day later, the six LSTs of this echelon sailed for Taku to take aboard a cargo of Japanese evacuees, arriving there on the 26th.

On 22 January, the 3rd echelon of LSTs having completed loading 287 officers and 4480 troops of the New 14th Division, 74 units of wheeled vehicles and mounted guns, and 517 tons of bulk cargo, sailed for Chinwangtao, where it arrived on the 26th. The next day, the New 14th Division troops departed Chinwangtao for Hainan on three trains, while the LSTs which had brought them arrived at Taku on 28 January to backload Japanese repatriates to Sasebo.

The 4th echelon completed loading at Shanghai on the 25th and sailed for Chinwangtao with 461 officers and 3942 men of the 14th Division, 10 nurses, 5 dramacorna, 59 vehicles, 16 mounted guns, and 512 tons of bulk cargo. By
January 30th, the 4th echelon of the New 6th Chinese Army lift had completed discharging at Chinwangtao, bringing to an end the lifting of that Army; whereupon the six LSTs departed for Taku.

One of the interesting features of the medical treatment given the Chinese troops during their passage from Shanghai to Chinwangtao was the use of "needles", a practice which we have already seen put to use in the lifts of the 13th, 8th, and 2nd Chinese Armies. Although several of the Chinese medical officers accompanying these troop movements were versed in modern science, lack of conventional drugs and equipment forced them to resort to this bizarre 5000-year old Chinese medical practice of literally needling the patient.

Needles of hairlike fineness, made of gold and silver alloys, were stuck into the patient's flesh to a depth of one half or three quarters of an inch. Sometimes one needle was used, sometimes many. This primitive method was frequently used to alleviate the symptoms of malaria among men who had passed through areas of China or French Indo-China where this disease was prevalent. In one case, a malaria stricken soldier returned to duty one day after receiving the needle treatment in the back of the neck. One European doctor, who used this method because he had no quinine or atabrine, said the needle treatment suppressed the malaria symptoms for as long as three weeks, though he found that a second treatment was not as effective as the first. Other Chinese medical officers reported that the needles were successful in treating rheumatism, night sweats in tuberculosis patients, and nervous disorders such as insomnia and muscular weakness.

The Chinese enlisted personnel were quartered on the tank deck, while they were permitted to use the main deck forward of the super-structure for exercise and airing. The Chinese officers were berthed and messed in the port troop compartments, one of which was set aside for messing only.

The food for the Chinese troops was prepared by U.S. Navy personnel, and no Chinese were allowed to enter the galley. The food to be cooked for each meal was delivered to the galley by authorized Chinese personnel, and when the food had been prepared, the ship's personnel moved it to the deck outside the galley where designated Chinese troops carried it to the assigned space on the tank deck. The rations consisted mainly of rice and vegetables, but meat was also served occasionally.

An unusual feature of this operation was the provision of six LSTs especially converted in Shanghai by ComServDiv 101 for the purpose of transporting horses and mules. Fodder for the animals was stowed on the tank deck with the animals, and Chinese veterinarians and animal keepers were quartered and fed in the same manner as the regular Chinese troops, in the tank space not used for the animals. All animals which died enroute were promptly thrown overboard, while the animal keepers were instructed to clean the deck as often as necessary to prevent contamination. Approximately one attendant was embarked for each animal carried.

As the various echelons of TG 78.12 completed their repatriation hauls from Taku to Sasebo, they were routed to Kowloon to embark the New 1st Chinese Army, which consisted (on paper) of 3,265 officers and 37,086 enlisted men, 4,626 animals, 108 guns, 1,380 vehicles, and large amounts of ammunition, gasoline, lubricants, rations, baggage, light and heavy machine guns, and miscellaneous equipment. As the echelons were loaded, they were sailed to Chinwangtao to support the North China and Manchurian operations.
The Re-Occupation of Hong Kong by the British Pacific Fleet - Within a few days after the Japanese offer to accept the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation, the Commander in Chief, British Pacific Fleet (Sir Bruce Fraser), commenced receiving instructions from the British Admiralty regarding the re-occupation of Hong Kong by the British.

Task Group III.2, which had been formed to conduct a "fuddle" (training) operation against Truk prior to joining the THIRD Fleet, was assigned to the task of re-occupying Hong Kong. TG III.2 consisted of the following-named ships under the command of Rear Admiral C.H.J. Harcourt, who flew his flag in HMS INDOMITABLE:

- INDOMITABLE
- WHIRLWIND
- VENERABLE
- URSA
- SWIFTSURE
- QUADRANT
- EURYALUS
- PRINCE ROBERT
- KEMPENFELT
- MAIDSTONE
- Eighth Submarine Flotilla
- OXFORDSHIRE
- A number of minesweepers.

In order to prevent the United States from becoming involved in any political dispute which might arise between Great Britain and China regarding the status of the former British Crown Colony, all U.S. Naval Liaison personnel were withdrawn from all British ships prior to their entry into Hong Kong. The ban was removed, however, after the re-occupation had been accomplished.

At daylight on 29 August, TG III.2, which had been standing by at Subic Bay, got underway for Hong Kong, where it was joined by TG III.4 (ANSON, TYRIAN, TUSCAN, Rear Admiral C. S. Daniel) from Leyte. A Japanese naval party from ashore came aboard that day, and arrangements were made for both task groups to enter Hong Kong the following day. On the 30th, according to this plan, Task Groups III.2 and III.4 entered Hong Kong without opposition and seized the naval dock yard, from which all Japanese including the naval and military commanders were ejected.

A large number of suicide boats were observed in Picnic Bay. Three of these were seen to leave the bay and were attacked by British carrier aircraft, one being sunk, one beached, and one returned to harbor. The suicide boats were then well bombed, and most of them were driven ashore. For the next few days, HMS VENERABLE (CVL) remained at sea to maintain a continuous air patrol over Hong Kong.

The British Pacific Fleet Train, which had been based in Manus, sailed for Hong Kong on 30 August. The following day, CTG III.2 met with the Japanese commander to discuss arrangements for maintaining law and order and eventual surrender.

On 1 September, Rear Admiral Harcourt was appointed Commander in Chief, Hong Kong. Thereupon, TG III.4 was merged with TG III.2 and Rear Admiral Daniel assumed command. Rear Admiral Harcourt then moved into Government House, which had just been completely renovated by the Japanese for their own use. At 1600 that same day, British forces took over from the Japanese the responsibility for preserving law and order. The latter appeared quite docile, and the Chinese population had begun to treat them roughly.
With the arrival of the British task force, the taking over of the colony of Hong Kong and the leased territories proceeded rapidly. By 2 September, the Kowloon dockyards were clear of Japanese and the white ensign was flying over Kaitak Airdrome. All Japanese ships were demilitarized, and the crews were evacuated. A shed was found containing about 50 new suicide boats which had never been used. These were rendered useless.

The only airfield in the Hong Kong area at Kaitak was so short that it could not accommodate four-engined aircraft, and it was estimated that six months would be required for construction of a long strip on the mainland opposite Hong Kong.

The Kowloon Naval Dockyard was undamaged except for minor damage resulting from air attacks and neglect of maintenance during the three years of Japanese occupancy.

On 15 September, the Commander in Chief, Hong Kong, informed the Supreme Commander that there were 21,000 Japanese prisoners of war at Hong Kong, and that it was most desirable that they be repatriated as soon as possible. He stated further that there were six small Japanese ships at Hong Kong which he proposed to use to start repatriation and requested that the Japanese authorities be directed to send additional ships to assist in this repatriation.

In the period between 12 and 15 September, the three British destroyers QUEENBOROUGH, KEMPENFELT, and WHIRLWIND made a round trip from Hong Kong to Hainan to investigate and assist in the evacuation of the prisoners of war from the latter island. They returned to Hong Kong with a total of approximately 90 Australian, Dutch, and British Indian prisoners of war. In addition, the transports GLENEARN and GERSALAMME (AH) left Hong Kong for Hainan about the 14th of September and returned with approximately 140 sick prisoners of war.

At 1600 on 16 September, the formal surrender of the Japanese at Hong Kong took place at the Government House. It was purely a formality, as all of the Japanese had been in prison for over two weeks, and the Japanese general and admiral were removed from the prison and brought to Government House for the ceremony, then returned to prison. The instrument of surrender was signed by Rear Admiral C.J.H. Harcourt, the Commander in Chief, Hong Kong, on behalf of Great Britain. Major General Umekichi Okada and Vice Admiral Hattako Jufita, formerly Commander in Chief, Japanese South China Fleet, signed for Japan. The ceremony took place in the Japanese-built Government House, and immediately after the Union Jack had been hoisted in the grounds of this official residence, a 21-gun salute from the British warships in the harbor sounded the official surrender.

Evacuation of Recovered P.O.W.s and Internees - At the beginning of November, more than 20,000 released prisoners of war, internees, and distressed Indian nationals remained to be repatriated from Hong Kong, Shanghai, Manila, and Rabaul by the British Pacific Fleet and Allied vessels, despite the fact that sailings by carriers, transports, hospital ships, and merchant vessels cleared some 9,000 persons from these places during October. Most of those remaining to be evacuated were civilians, released internees, and Indians, whose distressed condition made it desirable to repatriate them soon, even though they might not have been incarcerated by the Japanese.
On 1 November, the Hong Kong staging center had 1000 RAPWIs (Recovered Allied Prisoners of War and Internees) awaiting repatriation, in addition to 2000 Indian nationals, while some 2500 more Indians were at Shanghai, as well as 3000 other RAPWIs. A total of 4000 Indian RAMPS were at Rabaul, and 800 French citizens were waiting at Hanoi for transportation to Europe.

At the same time, the movement of 7000 persons from Manila to the Netherlands East Indies was held in abeyance pending clarification of the political situation in Java, with DEFLACABLE (CV) available for this assignment whenever the necessary clearance was obtained.

The British Pacific Fleet assisted in the transportation of 31,000 AIF from the islands to Australia, as extensively as the schedules permitted. Northbound British ships also assisted in lifting Asiatics from Australia to China whenever space was available.

**Communications of the British Pacific Fleet** - Although the British Pacific Fleet was to continue using certain U.S. Navy publications until 1 December, 1945, the active participation of U.S. naval communications personnel in billets with the British Pacific Fleet ceased on 1 October, with the dissolution of the flag (ECM) teams assigned to the staff of the Commander in Chief. All inter-navy communications were to be handled in the interim via combined U.S.-British channels and procedure.

Upon reversion to British signal books on 1 December 1945, it would be necessary for the BPF to abandon the U.S. system of task group designation and rename the existing groups in accordance with normal British designation. This consists of letter names (i.e., Force Able, etc.) and type designations (i.e., Twenty-fifth Destroyer Flotilla, etc.). Because of the inflexible nature of these designations, considerable difficulty was encountered in adapting them to the wartime organization. As a result of the difficulty thus encountered, it appeared possible that the signal books themselves might be amended to permit a system similar to that of the U.S. Navy to be introduced.
PART V.
SURRENDER AND DEVELOPMENT OF OUTLYING JAPANESE-HELD ISLANDS IN THE PACIFIC UNTIL AREAS.

Introduction.

The question of effecting the surrender of isolated Japanese garrisons on the many islands and occupied areas outside the homeland had been a subject for speculation long before Japan indicated her willingness to capitulate. It was considered doubtful whether the island and area commanders would automatically follow the lead of the Imperial Government in accepting defeat, or whether fanatical resistance, such as had been encountered on all islands previously taken from the enemy, would continue long after V-J Day.

After the issuance of the Emperor's Imperial Rescript, however, it was found that outlying garrisons were more than willing to comply with his orders, once they were persuaded of their authenticity. Even fanaticism, when subjected to protracted hardships with no hope of retaliation, is glad to accept surrender, provided "face" is saved at the same time.

To assist the local Japanese area commanders in arriving at the decision that submission was not shameful, Psychological Warfare teams assisted in establishing contacts with the Japanese garrison forces. Then, when the enemy commanders had determined on surrender, these teams played a vital part in the actual surrender arrangements and ceremonies by serving as interpreters.

Although the end of the war found the Japanese with 211 freighters of 631,000 tons, 21 tankers of 42,000 tons, and 101 transports of 61,000 tons, the position of the Supreme Commander (General of the Army Douglas MacArthur) with regard to this shipping was that the need for food and clothing in the home islands was more pressing than the need for repatriating the troops on the outlying islands. Furthermore, the available tonnage was wholly inadequate to meet both demands simultaneously. Consequently, the Japanese were permitted to use for evacuation "only those ships obviously more efficient when used as passenger ships rather than as cargo vessels".

The Japanese were forbidden to convert ships for passenger use "until further notice", and passengers were to be transported on cargo ships only when those vessels were "insufficiently loaded to insure the maximum use of the shipping space". As of 7 October, according to Domei, only 38,645 troops had been returned from overseas, including the continent of Asia, which meant that some 3,320,000 Japanese Army and 300,000 Navy personnel still remained outside the home islands.

Inasmuch as the four Allied Powers had been bound by the Potsdam Proclamation to permit the return to their homes of all Japanese military forces after their complete disarmament had been effected, the enemy garrisons of the various atolls were left undisturbed, funding for themselves from their own gardens until such time as Japanese shipping could be made available to transport them back to Japan. What
was more to the point, the United States and her allies concurred in the feeling that the sooner the Japanese could be removed from all outlying islands of the Pacific, the better. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had set forth as a rule to be followed in the case of any Japanese forces isolated from the home islands, that, during the interval between such disarmament and evacuation, enemy personnel could be used for such purposes and subject to such conditions and directives as might be prescribed by the commanders authorized to receive the surrender. Further, surrendered Japanese soldiers were to be considered as disarmed personnel, and not necessarily prisoners of war.

The first week of November saw an important change in CinCPac-CINCPAC's evacuation policy. Whereas only Japanese ships had been used for the evacuation of Japanese nationals up to that time, authority was now granted by CinCPac-CINCPAC, and approved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, to use U.S. amphibious shipping not suited for the "Magic Carpet" in the repatriation of Japanese from the Marshalls-Gilberts and the Marianas Areas. Accordingly, 20 Liberty ships at Subic Bay and Samar were assigned to ServRon 7 for conversion to Japanese repatriation vessels. On 15 November, 20 LSTs were ordered to report to ComMarGils Area for evacuation duty, with plans calling for the lifting of 650 Japanese by each LST. Uraga and Yokohama were designated as the ports of debarkation in Japan, with the inflow of repatriates not to exceed 6000 per day.

At the same time, it was estimated that sufficient U.S. amphibious shipping would soon be available to evacuate Japanese military personnel at the rate of 3000 daily from the nearer Marianas Area. At this rate, only 30 days would be required to clear that area entirely of the Japanese military. The evacuation of the remaining 25,219 Japanese civilians would then present the only major evacuation problem in the Marianas Area.

By the end of November, 50 LSTs had been allocated to Commander Marianas for the repatriation of Japanese personnel, but they were not immediately available, as they were then lying at Saipan with full loads, and had to be moved to Guam and unloaded before they could be used for repatriation. Commencing on 5 December, however, these LSTs were made available weekly in three separate groups, with the Bonins, Truk, the Palaus, Guam, and Saipan scheduled for evacuation by this shipping. With the assignment of an additional 20 LSTs to ComMarianas during the week 14-21 December, the complete quota of 50 LSTs requested for that area had been filled. Yap, on the other hand, was to be evacuated by Japanese shipping, of which an additional 23 vessels were assigned to the Marianas Area around the middle of December. Subject to unforeseen developments, it was expected that this large number of amphibious craft would, by the early part of January, 1946, have evacuated all Japanese disarmed military personnel who were to be repatriated immediately. At the same time, however, it was contemplated retaining a sufficient number of disarmed Japanese military personnel and prisoners of war on certain islands of the Marianas Area for labor incidental to fulfilling the surrender terms.

The Japanese would be required to furnish all food, winter clothing, blankets, and medical supplies for all Japanese, Koreans, Okinawans, and Formosans evacuated from the Marianas Area in Japanese vessels. They would also be required to furnish these necessities to U.S. ships engaged in repatriation duty upon their initial arrival in a Japanese port, but U.S. surplus stocks could be used by U.S. vessels making their initial evacuations.
A second minor change in the United States evacuation policy was the assignment of evacuation priority to Japanese miners as feasible and practicable. This change was made in accordance with a request of the Supreme Commander, in order to assist in making the production of coal and mineral mines meet the requirements of the United Nations.

At the end of November, the ComMarianas evacuation policy was further modified to discontinue the evacuation of Okinawans, pending instructions from CinCPac. In previous evacuations, no distinction had been made between Japanese and Okinawans. Recent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander, however, stated that it was not desired to have Okinawans repatriated to Japan, nor was it desired to have Japanese nationals repatriated to any islands occupied by U.S. forces.

On the other hand, because of the greater expedition desired in the evacuation of enemy nationals from the Marshalls-Gilberts Area, Commander Marianas was granted authority to issue clothing from surplus stocks to the Koreans being evacuated from the Mar-Gils Area to Korea. This clothing would be taken from the Koreans upon their arrival in Korea. Of 9500 Koreans in the Marianas Area questioned concerning repatriation, only 22 desired to remain where they were. All of the others wished to be repatriated to Korea at the earliest possible date.

The continued presence of Koreans, Formosans, Okinawans, and Japanese civilians, totalling approximately 58,000 persons, required the use of a large Marine Occupation Force in the Marianas Area. If these Marine forces were to be reduced to normal post war strength, while meeting the demands for additional Marines in the China theater, these foreign nationals had to be repatriated as quickly as possible.

The last week of December saw the promulgation by CinCPac of an order whereby Chamorro and Carolinian natives were permitted to return to the Marianas Area from Japan. With the announcement of this policy, the Advanced Army Forces, Pacific, began to procure and furnish the required data on these expatriated natives, while ComMarianas formulated plans by which those LSTs assigned to shuttle duty in the evacuation of Japanese from the Marianas Area would bring back loads of natives on their return trips.

On 22 December, a decision concerning the disposition to be made of Japanese and other alien civilians in the late Japanese-mandated islands was reached by joint agreement of the State, War, and Navy Departments and transmitted to CinCPac and CinCPac for their future guidance.

According to this plan, all alien civilians in these Japanese islands who might wish to be repatriated were to be accommodated, while all persons whose presence in the islands constituted an active threat to security should definitely be repatriated, whether they desired it or not.

In addition, all Japanese nationals whose place of origin was the Japanese home islands should be repatriated to Japan, except those whom CinCPac should permit to remain because of palliating circumstances. All Japanese nationals whose place of origin was the Nansei Shoto (of whom the Okinawans constituted by far the largest part) and who had resided in the Japanese mandated islands for less than 10 years were to be repatriated to the Ryukyus or the main Japanese islands, as they might
prefer, except for those whom Cincpac should at his discretion permit to remain. No repatriations to the Ryukyus were to be undertaken, however, until adequate facilities for their reception had been established and appropriate arrangements made with the military government of the Ryukyus—which were under Army control.

All movements of the persons to be repatriated should be coordinated with CinCAPPac, and no actual evacuation should be made without the mutual agreement of Cincpac and CinCAPPac.

Upon completion of the initial repatriation authorized under this plan, the situation in regard to non-native civilians in the Japanese mandated islands was to be re-examined by Cincpac and a further report made containing such recommendations as might seem appropriate at that time.

In the first week of January, 1946, the Supreme Commander designated seven points of debarkation for foreign nationals being repatriated by Japanese and U.S. shipping from the Marianas Area. These points were as follows:

(1) Korean foreign nationals would be disembarked at Kiirun, Formosa.
(2) Formosan foreign nationals would be disembarked at Kiirun, Formosa.
(3) Chinese would be sent to Japan for transshipment to China. The Japanese port of debarkation was not specified, but it was presumed to be Uraga, since all other repatriations to Japan had been to that port.
(4) Japanese foreign nationals whose place of origin was Japan would be landed at Kure, Honshu.
(5) Japanese whose place of origin was the Northern Ryukyus would be sent to Koniya, Amami O Shima.
(6) Japanese whose place of origin was the Central Ryukyus would be landed at Chimu Wan, Okinawa.
(7) Japanese whose place of origin was the Southern Ryukyus would be disembarked at Ishigaki Jima or Miyako Jima.

All information available, however, indicated that very few Ryukyuans desired to be repatriated to either the Northern or Southern Ryukyus. ComMarianas, therefore, in order to conserve space on the evacuation vessels, directed that all repatriates destined for any point in the Ryukyus be loaded for shipment to Chimu Wan, Okinawa, from where they could be transshipped to their home islands.

During the first week in January 1946, the Commander Naval Operating Base, Okinawa (Rear Admiral J.D. Price) promulgated a policy establishing 1500 persons per week as the rate of debarkation in Okinawa for all Ryukyuans evacuated from the Marianas Area. Those Ryukyuans present in the latter area less than 10 years and all other Ryukyuans desiring repatriation numbered approximately 23,000. Of these, 417 desired to return to Japan, only 543 desired to return to islands of the Ryukyus other than Okinawa, and the other 22,200 desired to return to Okinawa proper. It was planned to evacuate the 417 Ryukyuans desiring repatriation to Japan in one ship, with the port of debarkation being Kure, Honshu.

When ComMarianas pointed out that the quota of 1500 repatriations per week would result in the prolongation of the evacuation program until the middle of May,
which in turn would result in the delay of the occupation forces' withdrawal from
the Marianas Area, Rear Admiral Price revised his schedule to call for a maximum
of 4500 Ryukyuans to arrive each week for debarkation at Buckner Bay.

On 5 January, 1945, the Marshall-Gilberts Area was dissolved as a separate
command directly under the direct subordinate commands of that area were
amalgamated under the control of command Marianas.

The Surrender of Mille Establishes a Pattern.

The first capitulation of an enemy garrison in the Pacific Ocean Areas took
place on 22 August (11 days before the formal surrender of the Japanese Imperial
Government), when Captain Masanari Shiga, the Japanese commander of Mille Atoll,
in the Marshall Islands, surrendered his command aboard the destroyer escort LEVY.
The capitulation was received by Captain H.B. Grow, Atoll Commander Majuro, acting
for Rear Admiral W.K. Harrill, the Commander Marshalls-Gilberts Area. Six days
later, on 28 August, the American Flag was raised over Mille.

Of an original garrison of 5101 men on the atoll at the beginning of 1944
(comprising 1250 naval personnel, 1250 construction troops, 2600 Army personnel,
and 1 Japanese civilian), there remained only 2395 half-naked, half-starved men.
Of these, 810 were naval personnel, 615 were construction workers, and 970 were
Army men. The lone Japanese civilian had died. In addition to these aliens,
300 Marshallese natives had survived. American air attacks had accounted for 780
of the losses; illness had taken 180; malnutrition had caused the deaths of 1550;
and 196 were either missing or prisoners of war.

During the interval between the surrender and the raising of the American
Flag, the Japanese had gathered their small arms and coastal guns, piling them in
specified areas. All facilities on Mille had been damaged by bombing to such an
extent that they were no longer of any value to anyone—this destruction being of
greatest concern to the Commander Marshalls-Gilberts Area in the case of the bomb-
 cratered airstrip. In the weeks that followed, bull-dozers were brought in to fill
the bomb craters, as well as to break up the Japanese huts on the atoll. This
activity was halted temporarily, however, when a study of the dud bomb situation
revealed that a large number of such duds were present, unlocated and unmarked.

On 29 September, the dead body of Captain Shiga, the late Mille Atoll Com-
mander, was found in his tent at Majuro, where he had been taken pending the
outcome of an investigation attempting to fix responsibility for the torture and
decapitation of five American flyers in late January, 1944. It was believed that
he had taken poison, though the exact cause of his death was not determined. In
a suicide note, Captain Shiga accepted responsibility for the executions, but
denied issuing the actual orders.

On 29 September, 2380 members of the Japanese garrison were loaded aboard the
HIKAWA MARU for evacuation to Japan, thus clearing the atoll of all enemy troops.
(in addition to Captain Shiga, two other Japanese had died between the date of the
atoll's surrender and that of the evacuation, while 12 officers were removed to
Majuro for trial in connection with alleged war crimes.)
By 7 October, Mille had been cleaned up by the Military Government organization to such an extent that it appeared possible to return in the near future the natives evacuated during the war to Aur, Arno, and Majuro. On that date, 121 natives were returned from Majuro and Arno, being established on Lukunor and Alu Islands in Mille Atoll, where they were put to work cleaning up the islands, in order to facilitate the return of the rest of the natives.

On 25 October, Colonel Chisoto Oishi and 10 other Japanese officers previously taken from Mille to Majuro were removed to Kwajalein and confined there pending trial for the murder of five members of a B-25 crew at Mille on or about 2 February 1944. One of these, Lieutenant Tomita, was also being held in custody on Majuro for the execution of two Catholic priests who had been shipwrecked on Mille on 19 September 1942.

Surrender of Aka Shima and Tokashiki Shima.

On the same day that Mille capitulated (August 22nd), the enemy garrison at Aka Shima in the Nansei Shoto surrendered to elements of the TENTH Army, and the following day the forces on Tokashiki Shima surrendered to the same command.

Surrender of Halmahera and Garrisons Remaining on Morotai.

Although Morotai had been invaded by forces of the Southwest Pacific Command as far back as 15 September, 1944, there still remained many enemy troops on the island, inasmuch as no attempt had been made to wipe out all the pockets of Japanese resistance on the jungle-covered island. U.S. Army forces had been content to establish a defensive perimeter to prevent interference with American operations—air and staging—from Morotai. Large Japanese garrisons also existed on Halmahera Island proper, as well as the lesser islands of the Halmahera Group.
After preliminary arrangements had been made during a PT boat rendezvous off the coast of Morotai two days earlier, on 29 August Major General H.W. Johnson, Commanding General of the 23rd Infantry Division, received the surrender of all Japanese forces on Morotai consisting of 31,700 Army personnel under Lieutenant General Ishi, 5000 Navy personnel under Captain Fujitar and 4000 civilians. The surrendered military comprised the garrisons of the entire Halmahera Group.

**Surrender and Development of Marcus Island.**

Marcus Island, located between Wake and the Bonins, was the next Japanese island to surrender. On 31 August, Rear Admiral F.E.M. Whiting, aboard BAGLEY (DD), accepted from Rear Admiral Matsubara of the Japanese Imperial Navy the capitulation of enemy forces there. The surrender of Marcus found 1763 Army and 779 Navy personnel remaining—the majority ill and emaciated—even though 300 moderately sick cases had been permitted to depart two days previously in a demilitarized Japanese APD which had been allowed to bring in food for the starvation-threatened garrison and instructed to remove as many of the sick as could be returned to Japan. There were also 204 civilians on Marcus, including 15 Koreans. Because of inadequate facilities for their reception and treatment, the Japanese APD had not attempted to remove the worst hospital cases, but had, instead, left them for future evacuation by a hospital ship.

The air distance from Honolulu to Tokyo, when taken via Johnston to Kwajalein to Saipan to Tokyo is approximately 4758 miles. When figured via the route Honolulu to Midway to Marcus to Tokyo, it is 3709 miles. Because of this saving of 1049 miles made possible by use of the northern route, Cincpac-Cincpoa planned to establish Marcus Island as an Island Command, the chief function of which would be that of administering a Naval Air Base.

The inspecting officer, Commodore V.F. Grant, found that the runways had been pulverized and all the area in the angle formed by the runways was full of bomb craters or semi-underground structures constructed by the Japanese garrison. In order to begin construction of any runways for use by NATS or commercial planes, it would first be necessary to level practically the entire island. To this end, a considerable quantity of equipment would be needed, comprising bull-dozers, at least two bladers, trucks, a roller, and a rock crusher. Inasmuch as the soil on Marcus is entirely of loose sand and coral, showing no binding quality whatsoever, it would undoubtedly be necessary to use a cement-stabilized surface.

The island's area is approximately 320 acres, shaped in such a way as to make possible a NE-SW runway slightly over a mile long, while the E-W runway would be limited to approximately 4500 feet in length. Both runways could be made 500 feet wide, with the landing strip itself 300 feet wide; but hardstands were considered out of the question, because of the need to utilize all the land within the angle formed by the runways for a living area, shops, storage, tank farms, etc.

By 22 September, Commander Marianas was able to report that the airfield was being lengthened and repaired to service NATS and ATC planes enroute to or from Japan, and three days later Marcus was available for emergency landings. By 19 October, 4750 feet of the runway had been completed, and on 1 November, with the airfield fully operational, the Naval Air Base and the Island Command Marcus were placed in commission.
With the inauguration of NATS service from Honolulu to Tokyo via Midway and Marcus on 9 November, it became possible for planes to cover the distance from Oakland, California, to Tokyo in approximately 31 hours' elapsed flight time, and by 7 December, Marcus Airfield was servicing eight C-54 planes per day for NATS and ATC.

Before all this progress was made, however, the enemy occupants of the island had first to be attended to. The entire garrison was suffering from malnutrition and diseases deriving therefrom—a condition not only disabling them as possible laborers, but also rendering them a menace to the health of our own occupation forces. It was therefore recommended that they be evacuated as rapidly as possible, but that those members of the Japanese naval forces skilled in operating the existing equipment and facilities be kept to the last.

In accordance with this recommendation, the Island Commander Saipan dispatched 22 officers and 278 men of the 11th Military Police Company (Provisional) to Marcus Island on 2 September aboard LCI(L)s 336 and 1062 and LSMs 250 and 459. This Marine detachment assumed the Island Guard two days later, but because of the protracted delay in the arrival of any Japanese evacuation vessel, it was not until October 8th that the island was cleared of all nationals, when the DAIKAI MAI shipping vessel sailed from Marcus for Shibasera, Japan, with 2398 Japanese military and civilians aboard.

During the week of 11-18 January 1946, the SS KING WILLIAM picked up 14 Japanese civilians and three former Japanese Army personnel from a trawler adrift at sea near Marcus and turned them over to the Commander Naval Air Base Marcus for detention. As all 17 men were in good physical condition, they were put to work as stevedores pending their evacuation.

The sole use of Marcus in the future, according to CNO's Basic Post-War Plan No. 1A of 14 December, would be as an air base.

Surrender of the Palaus.

The next Japanese area commander to capitulate was Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue, who came aboard AMICK (DE) on 2 September to surrender the entire Palau Group and all forces under his command (including Yap Atoll) to Brigadier General F.P. Rogers, USMC, Island Commander Peleliu. The forces under General Inoue's command consisted of 18,493 Army and 6,404 Navy personnel, as well as 9,750 Japanese and 123 Chinese labor troops, in the Palaus; while an estimated 7000 Army and Navy personnel garrisoned Yap. In addition to these military forces in the Palaus, there were two German missionaries and approximately 5000 natives.

During the next few weeks, the Japanese Commander of the Palaus liberated 433 British Indian troops and 100 Dutch Javanese military. Their rehabilitation was undertaken at once by the Island Commander Peleliu. In the same period, extensive mine-sweeping operations were carried out in the waters of the Palaus, with the date of completion estimated as 1 November.

By 5 October, all Japanese had been removed from the islands of Koror, Malakal, and Arakabesan to the largest island of the entire Palau Group—Babelthuap. As a
concession to the usual problem of feeding the captured garrisons, however, the Military Government officials permitted the Japanese to harvest the crops which they had already planted on the islands. During the first month of our occupation, approximately 225 natives, including residents of Angaur, who had been transported to Babelthuap by the Japanese, were returned to Angaur; while a Military Government camp was constructed on Koror and headquarters established there.

Evacuation and occupation preparations in the Palaus were complicated by the information that a large proportion of the Japanese civilians and many of the garrison troops desired to remain in the Palaus and would attempt to evade evacuation—an intention made quite practicable by the 140 square miles of dense jungle and rugged terrain comprising Babelthuap. As a result of this report, Commander Marianas recommended that one Marine Infantry Regiment (reinforced), less one battalion, be employed for the initial occupation. Upon completion of the evacuation, search, and occupation phase, the reduction of the initial occupation force to a force approximating the small post-war garrison would then be feasible.

On 20 and 21 October respectively, the FUKAE MARU and Transport No. 19 evacuated 666 Japanese military personnel from Babelthuap. Escort No. 106 removed another 285 on October 29th, and in the week of 9-16 November, an additional 241 Japanese military personnel were lifted to Japan from the Palaus.

All Indian and Indonesian troops who had formerly been prisoners of war on Babelthuap departed Peleliu for Manila on the ship HIGHLAND CHIEF early in November. In accordance with the recommendation of Commander Marianas that 19 Japanese military personnel accused of war crimes by these recently released P.O.W.s be put aboard the HIGHLAND CHIEF in custody of their accusers, in order that both prisoners and witnesses could be kept together until the cases were tried by the War Crimes Commission, the Indians and Javanese were accompanied by their recent Japanese guards.

By 16 November, all Japanese ammunition had been removed from Koror, Arakabesan, and Malakal Islands, while the removal of ammunition from Babelthuap was brought near to completion. Minesweeping continued in the waters adjacent to the northern Palaus.

During the week of 14-21 December, 8120 Japanese military were evacuated from the Palaus aboard 10 LSTs and one Japanese ship; and the following week, 3053 Japanese military were repatriated by three LSTs and two Japanese ships. A total of 2928 Japanese military and 547 Formosan Gunzoku were lifted from the Palaus by three LSTs and three Japanese vessels in the period from 27 December to 4 January 1946; while 1783 Korean civilians were repatriated by three LSTs during the week of 4-11 January. At that time, the repatriation of Japanese military from the Palaus had been completed, with the exception of approximately 2000 who were retained to carry out necessary work projects.

In the week of 11-18 January, two LSTs lifted 1218 Korean civilians and two Japanese vessels cleared 527 Japanese civilians from the Palaus. The number of Korean civilians evacuated exceeded the number the Japanese had previously reported as present in the Palau Group, but this discrepancy was not due to any dishonesty or desire to deceive on the part of the Japanese. The reason lay in the circumstance of the Koreans' having fled to the Palau jungles during the Japanese occupation, and their subsequent return to the inhabited areas after the majority of the Japanese military had been evacuated.
CNO's Basic Post-War Plan No. 1A of 14 December 1945 contemplated the use of the Palaus as a temporary fleet anchorage and air base, with all facilities to be kept in a maintenance status, except on Angaur, which would be abandoned.

Surrender of Tobi-Sonsorol-Merir.

Search units which went ashore on several islands to the south and west of the Palaus found that the 439 Japanese Army personnel on Tobi, the 639 on Sonsorol, and the 261 on Merir had no knowledge of the cessation of hostilities until these American parties notified them. These Japanese units were a part of the 35th Division, with headquarters in the Celebes, but because of their location within the limits of the Pacific Ocean Areas, Commander Marianas ordered that their surrender be accepted by the Island Commander Peleliu. This capitulation was received aboard CARROLL (DE) on October 6th.

On 21 October, the Japanese cruiser SAKAWA evacuated 800 of these 1339 Japanese military, while the special ship ETOROFU lifted the remainder on the 29th of the same month.

Meantime, American Military Government units had removed the 20 natives on Merir to Sonsorol to join the 156 natives already there, while the 123 Carolinians on Tobi were left undisturbed. In this period, 23 tons of rations were supplied to the inhabitants of these three islands to meet critical needs.

Surrender of Rota.

The same day that the Palaus capitulated, 2 September, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces on Rota surrendered to Colonel H.N. Stent, USMC, the representative of the Island Commander Guam, aboard HEYLIGER (DE) off Rota Island. On the island were 2651 Japanese Army troops and 13 Japanese naval enlisted men and one naval officer, as well as a civilian population of 5562 persons, divided among 1019 Japanese, 3572 Okinawans, 181 Koreans, and 790 native Chamorros.

Although badly in need of clothing and very short of imported food, the civilian population of Rota was found to be in satisfactory health. The people were living, for the most part, in caves and in areas protected from bombing by overhanging cliffs. During the month, the people were gradually moved out into their former village sites and cultivated areas, and clothing (mostly surveyed military garments) was distributed among the natives.

The government of Rota was handled as though the island were in effect another municipality of Guam. The primary objective of the Military Government in Rota was to encourage the people to resume their usual peace-time occupations of farming, fishing, handicraft manufactures, etc. It appeared probable that a small force under the control of Military Government would be sufficient to assure law and order, as the inhabitants were tractable and very cooperative. The fullest possible use was made of civilian Japanese and native officials. Every effort was bent toward improving sanitation and health conditions—as endeavor in which the civilian Japanese doctors and nurses proved quite helpful.

All of the 2651 Japanese military forces except for five filariasis patients were transferred on September 4th by means of LCTs from Rota to Guam, where they...
were placed in the Prisoner of War Camp. Military Government officers and men went ashore with the first echelon on 4 September, which comprised three officers, seven Navy enlisted men, 10 Marine enlisted men, and 15 Guamanian policemen of the Local Security Patrol.

By 29 September, the total strength of U.S. forces on Rota had been reduced to 424, including two Navy officers, two Navy enlisted men, five Marine enlisted men, and five Guamanian policemen. One month later, the occupation forces were reduced to a Naval Military Government Unit alone, consisting of three officers and 30 enlisted men.

American occupation forces, consisting of approximately 150 Marines and 300 Seabees, had assumed control and commenced repair of the Rota Airstrip on September 4th. By the 26th of the month, emergency landings had become possible, and the repair of the runway was completed on 1 October, making the strip operational for its entire length. By November 1st, the airfield had been extended to 5000 feet of usable runway, and flights were scheduled between Guam and Rota every other day.

Toward the end of October, the U.S. Commercial Company was requested to make a study of the possibilities of developing the phosphate, bauxite, and manganese deposits on Rota. Until such time as the mining industry might be developed, the economic possibilities of Rota would be limited and largely subsistent in nature.

Surrender of Pagan.

Another surrender executed on 2 September was that of Pagan Island in the northern Marianas. At 1415 on that date, Major General Umahachi Amau surrendered 2239 military personnel (1908 Army and 331 Navy), 486 Japanese civilians, and 286 native Chamorros to Commodore V.F. Grant, Deputy Island Commander Saipan, on board RHIND (DD). An hour and a half later, the United States Flag was raised over Pagan. Preparatory arrangements for the surrender had been arranged by Captain J.C. Hammoch, Commanding Officer of Military Government for Saipan.

When the island surrendered, there remained on hand only enough food to last the garrison 10 days. Commander Marianas decided, therefore, to withdraw all American occupation forces from Pagan as soon as the evacuation of the bulk of the Japanese garrison could be accomplished. This repatriation was completed on 19 October with the transfer of 2164 members of the Japanese garrison aboard the CHOUN MARU for return to Japan. The only Japanese military remaining were the Japanese commander, his staff, and a small garrison (75 men in all) who were left behind to control the 486 Japanese civilians on Pagan. The Japanese commander and his small garrison were to be evacuated at a later date, when arrangements had been completed for the supervision of the island by Military Government Units.

As early as 22 September all of the native Carolinians and Chamorros on Pagan had been evacuated to Saipan, as had the approximately 200 Carolinians and Chamorros on Agrihan, Asuncion, Alamagan, and all other islands of the Marianas Group north of Saipan.

Search parties combing the islands of Sarigan and Anatahan (in the same area) found evidences of nine Japanese on the former and approximately 30 Japanese on the
latter; but, since contact with these groups appeared impossible by use of American search parties, unarmed groups of Japanese from the Pagan garrison were employed in an endeavor to gain contact with them and effect their surrender. On 10 October, LCI(L) 1062 embarked 20 Japanese naval personnel at Pagan and sailed for Sarigan, where five of this party were disembarked on the 11th. LCI(L) 1062 then proceeded to Anatahan the same day, putting ashore the other 15 Japanese naval personnel, and returning to Saipan.

By 9 November, Pagan had been demilitarized by removing the breech blocks from the larger weapons and by collecting the smaller weapons in two dumps.

Evacuation Policy in the Marianas Area.

The evacuation plan promulgated by Commander Marianas to govern the removal of enemy personnel from the various islands under his jurisdiction is described below.

For each evacuation, a small armed detachment with an officer-in-charge of such rank and experience as to be qualified to make mature decisions on the spot was to be assigned. He would be accompanied by the necessary language interpreters, a medical officer, and photographic personnel for intelligence purposes and assistance in the supervision of evacuation operations.

In all cases where our forces had not already landed and hoisted the American Flag, this evacuation detachment was to be dispatched on a destroyer escort or other suitable vessel to the spot where the evacuation was to take place. The DE would then send a boarding party to board the Japanese evacuation vessel prior to embarkation of the Japanese, detaining the vessel until all investigations were satisfactorily completed.

Prior to embarking any personnel, the Japanese commanding officer would be required to submit a roster showing the name, rank, organization, and permanent residence in the home islands of all personnel who were to embark. One copy, in both English and Japanese, would be delivered to the captain of the Japanese vessel, with instructions that it be turned over to the proper authorities in the Empire, while three copies, in English, would be furnished the Commander Marianas.

A careful inspection would be made to insure that each person brought only his personal effects aboard. Unnecessarily large amounts of personal effects such as clothing and other bulky matter would not be permitted, since this would take up valuable space aboard ship. No side arms—including swords and dirks—ammunition, or other weapons were to be brought aboard.

Koreans and Japanese nationals being repatriated to their respective countries would be permitted to take limited funds and valuables with them, including securities, insurance policies, bank pass books, checks, bills of exchange, and other financial instruments, with control over these items to be exercised at the port of debarkation in the Empire. Commissioned officers could carry 500 yen, while enlisted men would be allowed only 200. Personal items such as trinkets, watches, and miscellaneous items of value only to the owner would not be disturbed.
A careful spot interrogation was to be conducted to determine if any Americans or Allies were being held prisoner on the island being evacuated, or if any Americans or Allies had ever been on the island. Spot interrogations of the Japanese coming aboard the evacuation ship would also be conducted in an effort to determine if any war crimes or atrocities had been committed ashore. Should evidence of such deeds be revealed, appropriate interrogation or required as witnesses to such crimes were to be removed forthwith, and immediately debarked on board a U.S. naval vessel for further questioning by higher authority.

In the event that, immediately following the departure of the Japanese for home, the natives, freed from fear of reprisal, should reveal that war crimes and atrocities had been committed, such information was to be dispatched promptly to the Supreme Commander. This dispatch would include the names and ranks of all Japanese accused of crimes and all witnesses thereto, the names of the ships upon which they were embarked, and the estimated time of arrival at the Empire port to which they were bound, in order that the accused could be taken into custody prior to their disembarkation.

The Commanding General or senior Japanese officer in command, his staff, and any high Japanese civil authorities were to be the last to leave the island. An inspection was to be made of the island to determine that the conditions existing there were satisfactory to the United States; that the terms of the surrender and instructions included in the Supreme Commander's General Order No. 1 had been complied with prior to releasing the Commanding General and his staff to embark on the last evacuation vessel.

To carry this detailed plan into effect, Commander Marianas (CTF 94, Vice Admiral Murray) established a task organization, the Marianas Evacuation and Occupation Command (TG 94.3) with himself as task group commander. Under this command were the following task units:

- TU 94.3.1 Truk Occupation Unit—Brigadier General R. Blake, USMC.
- TU 94.3.2 Bonins Occupation Unit—Colonel P.M. Rixey, USMC.
- TU 94.3.3 Yap Occupation Unit—Commander, Naval Vessels and troops as assigned by the Island Commander Peleliu.
- TU 94.3.4 Palau Occupation Unit—Brigadier General F.O. Rogers, USMC.
- TU 94.3.5 Guam Evacuation Unit—Major General H.L. Larsen, USMC.
- TU 94.3.6 Saipan Evacuation Unit—Rear Admiral F.E.M. Whiting.
- TU 94.3.9 Bonin Island Anchorage Occupation Unit—Captain C.E. Carroll, USN, in WILSON (DD).

**Surrender of Truk Atoll and Its Appurtenances.**

The largest-scale surrender in the Pacific Ocean Areas came shortly after the senior Japanese Army and Navy officers at Truk Atoll had received word of the capitulation of the Imperial Government on 2 September. On that date, Vice Admiral G.D. Murray, Commander Marianas Area, aboard his flagship PORTLAND (CA), accepted the surrender of all Japanese-held islands under the jurisdiction of the senior Japanese Army and Navy officers based at Truk.

By the act of signing the terms of surrender, the Commander of the 31st Imperial Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Shunzaburo Magikura, committed the
following islands under his control to lay down their United States occupation: Truk, Wake, the Palaus, Mortlock (Nomoi), Mille (which had already submitted), Ponape, Kusaie, Jaluit, Maloelap, Wotje, Pulauaot, Woleai, Rota, and Pagan (the latter pair also having already capitulated). In addition to these Army-controlled islands, the Japanese Navy-controlled bases of Namoluk, Nauru, and Ocean were pledged to surrender at the same time by the signature of Vice Admiral Chulchi Hara, Commander Imperial Japanese FOURTH Fleet. Rear Admiral Aritaka Aihara, I.J.N. (Ret.), Head of the Eastern Branch of the South Seas Government, stationed at Truk, signed for the 9000 civilians there and for those on the other islands within his jurisdiction.

It was estimated at the time that a total of 130,000 Japanese military personnel were involved in this surrender, including 49,000 troops on Truk itself. In the case of both Army and Navy surrenders, the actual capitulation of the other individual islands was effectuated over a period of weeks following the ceremony at Truk, but their submission became only a matter of time after the surrender was consummated aboard FORTLAND.

When an actual survey was later made of the forces on Truk, it was found that the military forces there were considerably smaller than estimates had indicated. The Japanese garrison consisted of 24,061 naval personnel and 11,294 Army forces—a total of 38,355 men, including 3345 Korean military personnel. On the other hand, when a census was taken, the figures for the civilian population rose to 11,486, consisting of 1338 Japanese, 252 Koreans, 9082 native Carolinians, 793 natives of Nauru, 8 Germans, 7 Spaniards, and 6 Chinese. The Germans and Spaniards were missionaries.

On Moen Island, one of the chief islands of Truk Atoll, it was found that bugs and worms had so ravaged the sweet potato crop on which the Japanese garrison largely depended for subsistence that all of the troops were suffering from malnutrition similar to that of many Allied prisoners of war recently rescued from the Japanese Camps. Rank upon rank of "living scarecrows lined up along the route of the inspecting party—men with ankles as thin as skinny wrists, with sunken cheeks, and with every rib showing sharply."

A source of considerable surprise to those who inspected Moen Island was the superficiality of the much-publicized defenses. The "main highways" were little more than dirt trails, the bomb craters in the airstrips were patched with crushed rocks, and "it was difficult for most observers to escape the conviction that Truk was never quite the Truk of legend, because the Japanese lacked something the Americans have displayed in abundance—the ability to conceive and execute big ideas."

An occupation force was organized on Guam and was to begin by inspecting and supervising the final evacuation of Japanese military forces on Truk as soon as Japanese shipping became available. Immediately upon commencement of American occupation, the development of base and anchorage facilities outlined by CNO's Basic Post War Plan would get underway. Meantime, the Japanese garrison was directed to carry out various tasks. By the end of September, these were reported by the Japanese commander to be from 10% to 90% completed, with the stacking of weapons and ammunition in dumps entirely completed. A week later, the Japanese commander reported that Airfield No. 1 on Moen Island could be used in an emergency by single-engined aircraft. American minesweepers commenced sweeping operations in Truk Lagoon early in October.
A reconnaissance survey of Dublon, Moen, Eten, and Param Islands in Truk Atoll was conducted on 4, 5, and 6 October by Commander J.P. MacBean, of the 53rd Naval Construction Battalion. The following paragraphs summarize his findings:

On Dublon, none of the barracks buildings were fit to be salvaged, the only buildings suitable for American use being the former Civil Administration Buildings and the former Military Headquarters. The roads were narrow and poorly graded, with inadequate drainage. The construction repair depot had an underground machine shop with modern equipment, but with poor working conditions because of high humidity and water seepage. The submarine base on the west coast had a complete underground torpedo shop, with power plant, compressor, and storage facilities. On the southwest tip of Dublon there was a cold storage refrigeration plant, two-thirds of which had been bombed out, but with 9000 cubic feet still operational. The seaplane base had a concrete apron and ramps 65 x 160 feet, partially serviceable. Two 1000-ton fuel tanks were still standing, but were riddled by gunfire. All of the warehouses and the town of Dublon had been leveled by heavy bombing attacks.

On Moen, the south airfield, then 3250 x 130 feet, could be lengthened to 5600 feet. A barrier to the field's further development, however, was its elevation of only five feet above low tide and two feet above high tide. The north airfield, then 3900 x 200 feet, could be extended to 5000 x 300 feet. The roads adjoining both fields were not usable in their existing condition.

Eten Island possessed the best constructed airfield, but it was also the most heavily damaged in the Truk area. Its length could be extended to more than 3900 feet, and the runway was surfaced with asphalt and concrete. It also had the best housing and repair facilities of all the airfields on Truk Atoll.

Param had the poorest airfield of the Truk islands, portions of it being covered at high tide, and the surface being of uneven grade. In addition, it was learned from the Japanese that on the sea level fields built up on coral formations, such as Param Field, craters caused by 500 lb. bombs and larger had produced a mining effect on the coral structure which caused many apparently undamaged sections of paving to sag—a type of damage requiring much time and effort to repair. It had been observed, however, that this mining effect was not obtained by 100 and 250-lb. bombs.

As a result of this report and of his own observations, Brigadier General Blake made the following recommendations concerning Truk:

(a) That the landing strip on the northwest corner of Moen Island should be improved, and that the installations and activities of the Occupation Forces for Truk and the Central Carolines be established on Moen Island.

(b) That all recreational facilities should be centralized on Moen.

(c) That boat repair facilities, docks for small craft, small craft moorings, and other facilities then located on Dublon should be duplicated on Moen, and all activities be concentrated on the latter island.
During the latter part of October, the floating dock in Truk Harbor was placed under repair by the Japanese and was scheduled to be in operational condition by the middle of November.

The recommendations concerning the concentration of the proposed facilities on Moen Island made by Brigadier General Blake proved useful soon after, when Commander Marianas adopted plans to concentrate all available Japanese shipping to lift 5386 of the 7886 Japanese on Moen as soon as possible, thus facilitating early occupation of that island by our forces and the subsequent base development.

In line with this policy, 1300 Japanese military personnel were evacuated from Moen Island by the Japanese Transport No. 9, Transport No. 20, and the Escort UKU on 14, 18, and 18 October respectively; while, because of the possible involvement in alleged war crimes on Maloelap and Kwajalein of a number of Japanese aviators who were reportedly transferred from Maloelap to Truk, special care was exercised in their evacuation, with careful screening being carried out in an endeavor to prevent the escape of criminals or witnesses.

A further evacuation of Japanese military personnel on Moen took place on November 2nd and 6th with the lifting of 1000 Japanese troops in two Japanese destroyers. In the week ending 16 November, 1897 more Japanese military personnel were evacuated from Moen, leaving only 2489 Japanese military personnel to be lifted from that island. Because of the serious need for coal miners in Japan, the 438 miners on Truk Atoll were included among the next group of 2149 Japanese military personnel who were evacuated in the week of 15-22 November in two eva-uation ships which also brought 16 tons of provisions to the Japanese remaining on Truk. All of those suspected of war crimes or able to serve as witnesses were retained on the atoll. During the first week in December, an additional 2602 Japanese military were evacuated from Truk by Japanese shipping. The week of 14-21 December saw the evacuation of 7,563 Japanese service personnel aboard 11 LSTs and two Japanese ships; while approximately 2000 of those remaining were engaged daily in direct assistance to the Occupation Forces, unloading ships, repairing roads, clearing the camp area, and constructing quonset huts. A total of 2750 Japanese military were evacuated aboard two LSTs and two Japanese vessels during the week of 21-28 December, and the following week, 1147 Japanese military, 9 Formosan military, and 1 Formosan civilian were evacuated aboard two Japanese ships. The week of 4-11 January 1946 saw the repatriation of 3987 Japanese and 10 Formosan military by five LSTs; and 1600 Japanese military and 300 Japanese civilians were evacuated aboard two LSTs and one Japanese vessel the following week.

A Japanese labor battalion was organized on Moen early in November, and was assigned to clear the projected camp area. All surrendered personnel not engaged in subsistence farming were employed in the rehabilitation of Truk, as specified in the terms of surrender. One important project which the Japanese commander was called upon to accomplish was the development of an LST landing site on Moen.

There were 761 natives of Nauru on Truk, the survivors of 1202 Nauruans who had been transported there by the Japanese in July and August of 1943 to work seven days a week on the airstrips and garden food production. The others had died of starvation. Early in November, these Nauruans reported that they were in dire need of food. In response to this plea, HEYLIGER (DE) delivered 240 K-rations to them,
and the Japanese were ordered to give the Nauruans food and medical supplies to prevent suffering. Cincpac-Cincpoa informed the Australian Government of the presence of these Nauruans on Truk, and arrangements were made with British officials to repatriate these displaced persons with Australian vessels in the early part of January. On 4 November, LSM 301 delivered a cargo of emergency supplies to the Japanese garrison.

On the other hand, although the Nauruans had been decimated during their enforced residence on Truk, and even though the Japanese themselves had suffered severely from malnutrition during the last two years of the war, the native Trukese had endured the food shortage with marked success.

On 7 January 1946, LST 51 evacuated 46 Carolinians from Truk to their home islands in the Central Carolines, while an additional 23 natives departed Truk for Nama, Losap, and Nomoi, using their own native craft for the voyage.

The Truk and Central Carolines Occupation Forces, under the command of Brigadier General R. Blake, USMC, began landing on Moen Island on 24 November, and the following day saw the completion of the operation. This force was composed of the 2nd Battalion of the 21st Marine Regiment, the 29th Naval Construction Battalion, Acorn 52, a Military Government Unit, a Base Headquarters Company (Provisional), and an AACS Unit. The main body of the occupation troops was carried from Guam to Truk aboard NEVILLE (APA), while four LSTs lifted the remainder of the troops and the bulk of the supplies. A few hours after the last man came ashore, the American Flag was raised over Moen Island.

With the beginning of American occupation of Truk, it became increasingly obvious that Truk was not a great base, and did not have sufficient facilities to service the Japanese fleet; its chief value to the Japanese lay in the potentialities inherent in its natural harbor and sizable islands, joined to the reputation it had acquired as a fortress defying capture.

The Japanese, in fact, had never intended to use Truk as a major repair base for the fleet, since dry dock facilities and heavy repair installations would have been too expensive for Japan's limited budget. All but the most minor damage had to be repaired in the shipyards of the home islands. The general policy of Japan, in fact, had been to put its limited budget into a large mobile fleet, and not into defensive installations. Up to the beginning of the war, the facilities of the Truk Naval Base were very limited, and Truk was apparently only an anchorage in which the fleet could obtain some replenishment.

Indicative of the true strength of Truk Atoll, that fraud among fortresses, even after 26 years of Japanese occupation, is the startling fact that until the end of 1940 there were no actual fortifications at Truk, and among the first guns installed in November of that year were four to six coast defense guns used during the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. Again, when Rabaul was taken by the Japanese in the early part of 1942, the guns then at Truk were moved to the New Britain stronghold. These were later replaced by guns intended for Rabaul. It was not until January 1944 that the Japanese aimed into Truk.
The Naval and Naval Air Field Team No. Three of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, headed by Rear Admiral C.T. Durgin, visited Truk during the latter part of November 1945 and carried out an extensive interrogation of the garrison there. The following interesting and revealing statement is made by this unit:

"The situation at Truk was well described by Vice Admiral Sare (Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Fourth Fleet) when he said that he would listen to the American radio proclaim Truk the 'impeccable bastion of the Pacific' and then he would get the 'South Sea Blues' when he felt the United States might learn the real truth."

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey team also learned from the Japanese that the FIFTH Fleet carrier attack of 29 April 1944 practically eliminated Truk's effectiveness as an air base, although the ensuing B-24 attacks were not valueless; for without them Truk would undoubtedly have been able to effect some reconstruction and replace its aircraft losses to a considerable extent. The B-29 training flights of the XXI Bomber Command which began in October 1944 had little damaging effect on the atoll, but only because there were no worthwhile targets remaining. They did, however, prevent rehabilitation of any above-ground installations, and the Japanese declared that their accuracy was good--better than that of the B-24s. In general, the Japanese felt that our air attacks had been very effective, the carrier attacks being the most damaging, though it was the combination of large carrier-borne attacks, followed up by persistent attacks by smaller groups of land-based bombers, that kept them in a near-helpless condition.

The Imperial Japanese General Staff had considered Truk Atoll as the most important advance base of Japan, and the major fleet units stationed outside the home islands utilized Truk as a fleet base until the beginning of our air attacks. In spite of the high costs in numbers of ships lost through the attacks of our submarines and aircraft, supplies were continuously sent from Japan to support the fleet until the air raids of February, March, and April 1944 brought home to the Japanese High Command that the logistic facilities at Truk were almost completely destroyed and could not thereafter support the fleet. About that time, the Imperial Headquarters in Japan decided that it was unwise to continue to hazard shipping to supply Truk. This decision doomed Truk to a state of utter insignificance for the remainder of the war. In summation, the veil of mystery that enshrouded Truk, and, in fact, all of Japan's mandated islands, proved to be their strongest defense.

CNO's Basic Post War Plan No. 1A contemplated the establishment of Truk Atoll as a fleet anchorage and air base.
Surrender of Puluwat-Nomoi-Namoluk.

Three minor islands near Truk, which were involved in its capitulation, were found on inspection to contain small Japanese garrisons. Puluwat, to the west of Truk, held a garrison of 711 Army and 27 Navy personnel; Nomoi, directly south of Truk, had 719 Army and 250 Navy; while Namoluk, situated between Truk and Nomoi, yielded 18 Navy personnel, as well as 230 natives.

The total evacuation of the Japanese garrison on Puluwat (Enderby) was accomplished on 16 October by the two Japanese Escorts No. 37 and UKU and the Transport No. 16, under the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Spurlock, USMC, with a detachment of Marines from the Truk Occupation Force. The island was inspected after the evacuation and declared secure.

A partial evacuation of 350 men from the total garrison of 969 Japanese military on Nomoi was accomplished on 21 October by the minelayer KYOSAI, and the remainder were removed from Nomoi on 1 November by the destroyer HARUZUKI.

As soon as an Atoll Command was established on Truk Atoll, it was planned to conduct the military government for these three islands from there.

Surrender and Development of Wake.

The next island surrendered to American forces was Wake, a former United States possession, which had fallen to the Japanese on 24 December, 1941.

On 3 September, 1945, Wake Island again became an American possession when Brigadier General L. H. M. Sanderson, USMC, Commanding General Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing, accepted its surrender from Rear Admiral Shigimatsu Sakaibara aboard LEVY (DE). General Sanderson acted as the representative of the Commander Marshalls-Gilberts Area.

Although a Japanese garrison of 609 Army and 653 Navy personnel was involved in the surrender, this was only a fraction of the total number of Japanese who had been isolated on the island by the progress of the American naval blockade into the western Pacific. Since Wake's by-passing, American bombs and shells had killed 600 Japanese, 1288 had died of malnutrition and disease, and 974 had been evacuated to the home islands as hospital cases.

On the date the Japanese surrendered Wake Island, there were 405 patients, 200 of whom were bedridden, among the comparatively small garrison which was turned over to the Americans. Prior to and after the completion of surrender negotiations, food and medical supplies were sent to relieve the situation of the survivors.

On 7 September, the occupational forces, consisting of 12 naval officers and 126 men, 1 Army officer, and 11 Army enlisted men, sailed from Ebeye, arriving at Wake on the 12th, as did the Marine detachment of two officers and 54 men who sailed from Engebí.

By 11 September, the preliminary occupation parties had removed all Japanese personnel from Wake (the chief island of the atoll) to Peale and Wilkes, all Navy personnel being settled on the former, and all Army personnel on the latter.
An inspection of the air facilities disclosed that the east-west strip was in good condition, capable of landing any type of plane, though there were as yet no facilities. The seaplane lane formerly used by Pan American Airways was marked during the first few weeks of reoccupation, and a depth of five feet was assured at all locations within the markers. Three mooring buoys for sea-planes were also placed during this period.

On 4 October, 726 Japanese were evacuated on the TACHIBANA MARU (AH) for repatriation to the home islands. With the departure of this greater part of the Wake garrison, the remaining 536 Japanese were concentrated on Peale Island and employed in local labor. A second hospital ship, the HIKANA MARU, arrived on 30 October. This vessel evacuated the remaining 519 Japanese on November 1st.

Rear Admiral Sakaibara and 16 commissioned and non-commissioned officers of his garrison were detained at Wake temporarily until their transfer to Kwajalein on 10 November for further clarification of their responsibility for the alleged execution of approximately 100 American civilian workers in October, 1943.

On 9 October, Captain E. A. Junghans, assumed command as prospective Atoll Commander Wake and relieved Commander W. Masek as Officer-in-Charge of the Naval Air Facility. By 27 October, a tentative Naval Air Base organization had been created, with the Acorn personnel being fitted into this organization, rather than continuing as components. By the same date, a temporary aviation gasoline supply system was ready for operation and was expected to have a maximum capacity of 12,000 gallons daily. SUNCOCK and SANDALWOOD (ANs) arrived at Wake the same week to lift and replant the ship moorings and to assist in removing obstructions from the boat basin. With the erection of the range masts and the pouring of a concrete floor for the power building, the radio range was completed on 31 October, and by November 14th it was in continuous operation.

Wake was officially commissioned as an Island Command and a Naval Air Base on 1 November, with Captain Junghans being installed as Island Commander and Commander Naval Air Base Wake. The Naval Air Base replaced the former Naval Air Facility and absorbed Acorn 57.

A joint survey party to survey naval facilities at Wake for use by Pan American World Airways arrived at Wake on 25 November and departed the next day. Information was received that ATC would make three trips daily from Hickam Field, Oahu, to Tokyo via Wake beginning 2 December. By the end of November, five of the 14 1000-barrel aviation gasoline tanks had been completed, and work was progressing on the foundation for a quonset hut which was to serve as a terminal building for air passengers.

Early in December, SHACKLE (ARS) arrived at Wake to salvage the dredge COLUMBIA, which had been at Wake at the start of the war and had been captured there by the Japanese, who thereafter used it until it was wrecked by a storm. After raising the dredge, SHACKLE towed it to Pearl Harbor for overhaul.

As in the case of Marcus Island, CNO, in his Basic Post-War Plan No. 1A, contemplated using Wake only as an air base.
Surrender and Occupation of the Bonins.

At 0905 on 3 September, Lieutenant General H. Tachibana, Senior Commander of Japanese Forces Ogasawara Group (Bonins Islands), surrendered the forces under his command to Commodore H. Harod NLP (DD) off Chichi Jima. The Japanese garrison on Chichi Jima consisted of 54 Army personnel, 524.1 Navy, and 204.1 Gunzoku (civilian laborers in military employ); while Haha Jima contained 298.9 Army, 327.0 Navy, and 224.4 Gunzoku. There were no civilians on any island in the Bonins. Unlike the garrisons of the other islands already surrendered, however, the Japanese in the Bonins were sufficiently provided with food and medicines to require no help from our stocks.

Lieutenant General Tachibana, who had risen from a sick bed to sign the surrender (at the insistence of the ComMarianas representative), was ordered to concentrate his forces on Haha Jima and Chichi Jima, taking any forces off the small islands in the group, with the exception of 100 men on Ani Jima and 300 more on Ototo Jima, where continuation of the farming projects was desired.

Interrogation revealed that until the fall of Iwo Jima, the Commander of the Bonins had made his headquarters on that island, but that after that event, with the death of General Kuribayashi, the Sub-Commander at Chichi Jima (Lieutenant General Tachibana) had succeeded to the command of the Bonins. General Tachibana's command extended north through Muko Jima only, as—to the best of his knowledge—no troops were stationed on Sofu (Lot's Wife), Tori, or Aoga Shima (all located to the north of Muko Jima in the Nanpo Shoto). Marcus Island was also considered a part of the Bonins in the Japanese island organization. There was, however, a division of troops on Hachijo Jima, the island next above Aoga Shima, according to General Tachibana. (Search units combing the southern Izu Islands near the end of September and in early October nonetheless found a garrison of two Japanese naval officers and 94 enlisted men on Tori Shima; while Aoga Shima yielded 13 Army and 92 Navy personnel, as well as 207 civilians). There were no civilians on Tori Shima.

On 26 October, the entire garrison of Tori Shima was evacuated to Japan by the escort IKUMO, and plans called for the early removal of the Japanese military from Aoga Shima to Hachijo Shima by utilization of local Japanese shipping. There were also indications that demilitarized submarines and other short-range Japanese vessels would become available for the evacuation of the major Bonin Islands in the near future.

For this purpose, a small detachment of Marines was formed by Colonel P. M. Rixey, USMC, Commander Bonins Occupation Forces and Prospective Island Commander Bonins, to be based at the Naval Base Iwo Jima during the evacuation precedent to actual occupation, as it seemed likely that the transfer would be piecemeal and might extend over a considerable period of time.

On 9 October, Cincpac advised Commander FIFTH Fleet, Admiral R. A. Spruance, who had relieved Commander THIRD Fleet in Japanese home waters at 0000 on 20 September, that although the Izu Group as a whole came under Cincpac control, it would not be necessary to occupy any of the Nanpo Shoto north of the 29th parallel (the dividing line between the Bonins and Izus). As a result of this decision, the Izu Islands were not occupied, nor were any special surrender ceremonies required for the individual islands of the Bonin Group.
On 11 October, Colonel Rixey, accompanied by five officers and 35 enlisted Marines, made an inspection tour of Chichi Jima in which he gained the following impressions:

The Japanese personnel encountered looked well-fed and healthy. Evidences of the devastation caused by American air raids appeared everywhere, and the Japanese were living for the most part in make-shift shacks. Six large two-lane road tunnels were discovered between the naval base and the airfield. Colonel Rixey, who had seen Japanese defenses on many Pacific islands from Tarawa to Iwo Jima, stated that the coast and artillery defenses around Chichi Jima Harbor were vastly superior to any he had seen previously, and that they must be seen to be appreciated. He recommended a thorough study of these defenses immediately after the beginning of American occupation.

The Susaki Airstrip had been roughly serviced by Japanese hand labor, but its length was only 2525 feet, with no possibility of extending it, because of its location across a peninsula. On the other hand, it had the extraordinary width of 984 feet. In its existing state it was believed suitable only for use by "Cub" spotting planes, but it could be made operational eventually for transport planes.

The evacuation of Japanese personnel to the homeland was begun toward the end of October when the CHITOSE MARU and the Escort IKUMO evacuated 507 men on the 23rd and 25th respectively, highest priority in loading at first being given to patients and second priority to Gunzoku (labor troops). As the year wore on and the need for coal became more acute in northern Japan, miners were given the priority next after the sick. On November 3rd, the destroyer KAIDE lifted 556 Japanese nationals from Haha Jima, including 31 litter and 159 ambulatory patients. The next evacuation, of 20 November, saw the lifting of 2490 military personnel from Chichi Jima by the CHITOSE MARU, including 336 sick personnel and 230 miners. The following week an additional 3499 Japanese military were evacuated from Chichi Jima. Included in these evacuees were 482 sick personnel and two coal miners. Since 1 October, there had been 30 deaths in the Bonins, including those killed in the storm of October 30th. Meantime, while the Japanese garrisons were awaiting evacuation, they were assigned to clear the area and build the camps for the U.S. occupation forces in order to facilitate rapid occupation.

Although there were no foreign nationals other than Japanese in the Bonins, some of the Gunzokus had lived in the islands prior to the war and were descendents of the early white settlers of these islands. The only persons in the Bonins remaining armed were a few Japanese Military Police troops. By 16 November, the demilitarization of Chichi and Haha Jima had been completed with the exception that the coast defense guns, with their breech-blocks removed, had been left in place.

All tunnels and tank traps had been cleared, and it was apparent that the Japanese had fulfilled the surrender terms to the best of their ability with the equipment available. A total of 12,997 Japanese rifles had been collected by the 22nd, at which time the Japanese had also been directed to destroy 134 suicide boats, because of their unsalvageable condition. Ten of these boats were retained for shipment to the Ordnance Investigation Laboratory, Indian Head, Maryland.
On 30 October, a storm with excessive rain, hail, and wind up to 45 knots struck Chichi Jima, causing serious damage. Numerous wash-outs and cave-ins caused the death of 19 Japanese military personnel and the serious injury of 11 others. In addition, an estimated 10 days' food supply for the entire Japanese garrison was destroyed, and half of the vegetable crops on the island were ruined. All main roads were severely damaged. The damage to Chichi Jima was light, however, and there were no casualties or damage to the U.S. Anchorage Occupation Unit.

In the last week of November, Cincpac-Cincpoa granted the Japanese permission to engage in whaling in the Bonin Island area during the winter season of 1945-46, in order to help alleviate the food shortage in Japan. Fishing vessels, however, were not permitted to anchor or land in the Bonins. In accordance with General Order No. 1 issued by the Office of the Supreme Commander, the whalers were limited to one harpoon per ship, and the vessels hunting seals were restricted to four shotguns apiece.

During the first week of December, Cincpac-Cincpoa ordered that no expatriated civilian inhabitants of the Bonins or Volcanoes were to be permitted to return to their former homes until further notice.

Near the end of November, Colonel P. M. Rixey, Commander of the Bonins Occupation Unit, transferred his headquarters from Iwo Jima to Guam for the preparation of plans for the occupation of Chichi Jima, where at 1025 on 13 December, the American Flag was run up on the flagpole from which the Japanese colors had been lowered ten minutes earlier, marking the official termination of Japanese rule in the Bonin Islands and the reoccupation of a group of islands which had been held briefly 117 years before by a small group of American settlers, in 1828. Following the reading of the occupation proclamation which directed that all powers of the Imperial Japanese Government be suspended and which promised that all existing customs, religious beliefs, and property rights would be respected, Lieutenant General Tachibana and Vice Admiral Mori led their officers in surrendering their Samurai swords.

The week of 7-14 December saw the evacuation of an additional 5545 Japanese military personnel from the Bonins by two Japanese ships and three LSTs. The following week, 5287 servicemen were repatriated by four LSTs and two Japanese vessels, and 900 Japanese military were taken back to the home islands during the period of 21-28 December by a single Japanese ship. With this evacuation, there remained only 2566 Japanese military and 96 Korean service personnel. On 4 January, 1946, the CHITOSE MARU began loading all Japanese military in the Bonins except for approximately 400 Japanese troops on Haha Jima and 900 others on Chichi Jima who were retained to carry out the work of the final clean-up of the islands, with their numbers to be reduced progressively to a total of approximately 500.

During the week of 4-11 January 1946, the CHITOSE MARU evacuated 1187 Japanese military, leaving a total of 1330 Japanese military on hand to clean up Chichi Jima and Haha Jima. On 14 January, all Japanese troops on Haha Jima were moved to Chichi Jima, and the former island was inspected, demilitarized, and secured. This action brought the total number of military on Chichi Jima to 1328 Japanese and 97 Koreans. Approximately 10 of these Japanese soldiers were to be retained pending investigations of war crimes which they were alleged to have inflicted on captured American aviators. Except for this group, it was planned to evacuate all Koreans and Japanese from Chichi Jima on 10 February.
The Basic Post-War Plan No. 1A issued by CNO on 14 December contemplated the employment of Chichi Jima as a temporary fleet anchorage, but no use would be made of the other Bonin Islands. In view of this plan, and in the light of studies recently made of the defenses of these islands by the Japanese Defense Study Group, as well as because of the anticipated early withdrawal of all occupation forces by 15 February, ComMarianas requested that an early decision or policy with respect to the disposition of the major military installations there be formulated. At the same time, Vice Admiral Murray recommended that the major weapons, radios, generators, and masts be destroyed; that all other weapons and military equipment excepting optical and appropriate souvenirs be dumped at sea, and that power plants, water systems, telephone and cable installations be abandoned.

Surrender of Aguijan.

Aguijan Island, five miles southwest of Tinian, was officially surrendered on 4 September to Rear Admiral M. R. Greer, Commander Fleet Air Wing 18, by the Senior Officer Present, who was found to be a second lieutenant, Kinichi Yamada, of the Imperial Japanese Army. The ceremony took place on board USCG 83525, which was lying-to off the island. A garrison of approximately 67 Japanese troops was involved in the surrender.

Surrender and Development of Jaluit.

The surrender of Jaluit Atoll, the nerve center and strong point of Japanese administration in the Marshall Islands, was accomplished on 5 September, when Rear Admiral Nisuki Masuda signed the unconditional capitulation of the forces under his command aboard MC CONNELL (DE) in Jaluit Lagoon. Preliminary arrangements for the surrender of Jaluit had been made three days previously, and the formal surrender was merely the culmination of the terms agreed upon at that time. Immediately following the capitulation, flag-raising ceremonies were carried out on Emidj, the chief island of the atoll.

The Japanese force which was turned over at that time consisted of 1191 naval personnel, 637 Army troops, and 75 Japanese civilians, as contrasted with the 1401 naval personnel, 719 Army, and 85 Japanese civilians who had been on Jaluit at the time of its isolation by the FIFTH Fleet's conquest of Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok early in 1944. Of an original garrison of 2205 Japanese military personnel, 1903 thus survived—a ratio marking Jaluit as the most fortunate atoll in the by-passed Marshalls. By 14 September, all Marshallese natives (about 1290 in number) had been segregated by the Japanese and relocated among the islands in the northern part of the atoll. In the week ending 20 October, 90 Ailinglapalap natives were repatriated from Jaluit to Ailinglapalap.

During the period of Jaluit's isolation, 13 persons had died from gunfire, 10 from sickness, and 395 from air attacks.

A thorough inspection of Jabor Town, the chief place of Jaluit Atoll, was made on 7 September, disclosing that all installations on the island had been completely destroyed. Several buildings remained standing, but even these were in bad condition. The fueling station had been completely destroyed; all tanks and equipment had been burned out; all docks were destroyed except the fuel dock, which was only slightly damaged. The dock foundation was untouched, while the
On 5 October, Rear Admiral Masuda, the former Atoll Commander Jaluit, who had previously admitted the murder of 47 Marshallese natives in April, 1945, shot and killed himself at Emidj Island a few minutes before the arrival of the Commanding Officer of the station ship THORNHILL (DE) for a conference at which Masuda was scheduled to make a written statement concerning the American prisoners of war.

Rear Admiral Masuda had previously made a complete report to the American authorities concerning the disposition made of the flyers and had named four Japanese responsible for the actual shooting of these American aviators. All of those named were at once arrested and placed in safe custody. On October 21st, a total of 28 Japanese officers and men charged with war crimes were transported to Majuro for trial. On the 25th of October, these defendants, augmented by two Japanese Seabees and two civilians, were removed from Majuro to Kwajalein to await trial.

As a consequence of Rear Admiral Masuda's accusations and the testimony introduced by various witnesses, the military commission found four Japanese officers guilty of murder. One day earlier, 11 December, the military court sitting on Kwajalein had condemned six Japanese officers to death for the decapitation of five American prisoners of war on Mille Atoll in February, 1944. Of four other Japanese officers involved in this latter crime, two were sentenced to prison for life and two for 20 years. All cases would be subject to review by higher authority before being placed into effect.

On 28 September, 88 Japanese military patients were transferred from Jaluit to Mille aboard LCI 481, whence they were evacuated to the Japanese homeland on the hospital ship HIKAWA MARU, which arrived at Mille the morning of the 29th. A second evacuation took place on 22 October, when the Japanese light cruiser KASHIMA departed Jaluit with 911 repatriates aboard. Five days later, the Japanese carrier HOSHO lifted 308 evacuees from the atoll. With the transfer aboard LCI 481 of the 58 Korean members of the garrison to Wotje via Maloelap on October 25th, the evacuation of the enemy nationals from Jaluit Atoll was accomplished.

Plans for bull-dozing and leveling operations on Jaluit were suspended in mid-October, when a study of the dud bomb situation revealed a large number of dud bombs to be present, though unlocated and unmarked.

In the week of 3-10 November, 524 Jaluit natives were repatriated to Jaluit from the Majuro area aboard four LCIs. The following week, 308 Marshallese were evacuated from Jaluit to Majuro and Ebon, and by the end of November, 223 more displaced persons were returned to their home islands on Ebon, Namorik, Ailinglapalap, Namu, Kwajalein, Lee, Ujae, Wotho, Bikini, and Rongelap. A Military Government Unit arrived at Jaluit on November 7th and began regular activities.

Natives of Jaluit and the other atolls in the Marshalls with some training in medical work, and others having an aptitude for it, were selected and placed...
under training in native hospitals. When considered adequately trained, they were stationed in the native villages and on non-garrisoned atolls and islands. By the end of October, native practitioners were functioning on Majuro and Jaluit, while native nurses and corpsmen were under instruction at Roi and Majuro. It was planned to use the training school for native medical personnel on Guam to provide additional training of Marshallese natives, as well as those from other islands under Naval Military Government administration.

During the first half of November, council meetings were held by Military Government with the Marshallese leaders, in which medical and sanitary regulations were laid down. A committee was formed to distribute recovered Japanese food stores and to reapportion Japanese canoes to the islands of the atoll. Civilian relief supplies of salvaged lumber, cement, canvas, cooking utensils, and clothing were distributed, and supplies were furnished to rebuild damaged cisterns.

Surrender and Development of Yap.

The surrender of Yap Atoll by Colonel Eto, Imperial Japanese Army, was received aboard the destroyer TILLMAN on 5 September by Captain J. L. Wyatt, Atoll Commander Ulithi, as representative of the Commander Marianas. Colonel Eto further supplied an officer courier and written orders for the surrender of any Japanese nationals that might be on Sorol, Ifalik, and Eauripik Islands (to the southeast of Yap, and included in his command). The expedition made to these three island is described in a later section.

Involved in the surrender at Yap were 4123 Army personnel, 10 Japanese civilians attached to the Army, 16 Formosan civilians attached to the Army, 1161 Navy personnel, 717 Japanese civilians attached to the Navy, 713 Korean civilians attached to the Navy, and five Formosan civilians attached to the Navy, as well as 5500 native Carolinians. The Japanese destroyer HIBIKI and the survey ship SOYA lifted 1914 Japanese military personnel from Yap on 11 and 14 October respectively, this evacuation being supervised by a unit designated by the Island Commander Ulithi aboard SILVERSTEIN (DE).

On October 12th, the Military Government Unit at Yap was commissioned, with Commander E. B. Hayden commanding. Meantime, the Japanese garrison had cooperated so whole-heartedly with our forces that certain elements of the 603rd Naval Construction Battalion were enabled to go ashore to commence the construction of the Military Government camp near the location of Yap Town. The Japanese even went so far as to assist in this construction work. Most of the roads on Yap were impassable, but were soon repaired by the Seabees, assisted by the Japanese garrisons.

The Yap and Gagil-Tomil Airfields were abandoned, because the labor required for the repair and maintenance of the strips was considered excessive for the amount of air traffic likely to utilize them. A seaplane runway, however, was laid out and buoyed in Tomil Harbor.

On 16 November, General Order No. 1 was still in process of being executed. All Japanese land mines, beach mines, and known unexploded American ordnance, with the exception of 200 rounds of rifle ammunition which were held for security
purposes and one box of dynamite which was kept for possible bomb disposal work, were dumped at sea. The butterfly fish area was fenced in by barbed wire. Six moored minefields also remained to be cleared.

During the week 15-22 November, Yap Atoll had heretofore been under the command of the Atoll Commander Ulithi, was placed under the jurisdiction of the Commander of the Occupation Forces Palau, in accordance with Commander Marianas Operation Plan 6-45.

The following week, 319 natives who had been transported by the Japanese to Yap Atoll from various islands of the area were transferred to Mogmog Island, Ulithi Atoll, where they were given medical examinations preliminary to repatriating them to their native islands.

The American Flag was raised over Yap on 7 December, with the arrival of one Marine platoon aboard LCI 729, at which time Major Storm, USMC, assumed responsibility for the evacuation of the Japanese from the atoll. Later the same week, four Japanese ships repatriated 2674 Japanese military personnel from Yap, and, when 1700 additional Japanese servicemen were removed by three Japanese ships during the week of 14-21 December, the evacuation of Japanese military from Yap was complete, except for 663 men who were retained to perform the labor necessary for the restoration of the island. It was expected that this work would be completed by 28 January, and the repatriation of the remaining Japanese was accordingly planned for approximately 1 February. The only other foreign nationals left on Yap were four White Russians and 31 Korean military.

Surrender and Development of Wotje.

On 6 September, Captain H. B. Grow, Atoll Commander Majuro, received the surrender of Wotje (one of the by-passed Marshalls atolls) which had contained an early 1944 population of 2103 Navy personnel, 129 Army personnel, and 766 civilians—or 3298 persons in all. When American troops took over, however, there remained only 497 Navy, 136 Army, and 436 civilian personnel, for a total of 1069, of whom a substantial number were in serious condition—much worse than at Mille, which had been the atoll where the greatest attrition had thus far been encountered in the Marshall Islands. Air attacks had accounted for 564 deaths, malnutrition had caused the deaths of 1235, illness had killed 166, 107 were either missing or deserters, while 157 had died from various other causes.

During the last week of September, 112 patients were transferred from the Japanese garrison to Mille aboard LCI 880, and from there they were evacuated to Japan on the HIKAWA MARU (AH). The destroyer escort YAMASHI evacuated 225 Japanese military on October 20th. The 7470-ton Japanese carrier HOSHO executed one of the largest evacuations yet effected in the Marshalls—Gilberts Area when she departed on 31 October with 1947 Japanese repatriates aboard, comprising 529 from Wotje, 610 from Maloelap, and 808 from Jaluit. This completed the evacuation of the Japanese garrison from Wotje, leaving only 265 Koreans on the atoll.

On 30 October, LCI 481 discharged a total of 63 Koreans at Wotje, including 58 from Jaluit and five from Maloelap, to bring the number of Koreans in the Majuro sub-area to 328—all of which were concentrated at Wotje, with the exception of the 63 prisoners of war at Majuro. This concentration of Korean troops was carried out in order to make the process of shipping the entire group back.
to Korea at one time less complicated than would be the case if they were scattered among the several islands of the Marshalls-Gilberts Area. All stores remaining on Emidij Island, Jaluit Atoll, were transferred to Wotje to supply the Koreans until their repatriation.

The Japanese merchant ship NISSHO MARU departed Wotje on 29 November with 260 Korean nationals aboard, thus completing the evacuation of all Japanese and Korean nationals from Wotje. On 24 November, 33 Japanese prisoners of war had been embarked on the escort carrier SALAMAUA at Majuro for transfer to the Commander Marianas Provost Marshal at Guam for trial.

All Marshallese natives had been evacuated previously to Majuro during the war by the Atoll Commander Majuro, in order to keep them from starving to death on Wotje and to deprive the Japanese of their labor. As in the case of the other Marshall Islands from which the natives had been removed, it was planned to return the former inhabitants to the atoll upon completion of the evacuation of the Japanese. The first step in this repatriation process took place on 21-22 October, when 330 natives were returned to Wotje and settled on Ormed Island. Because of the devastation wrought by American bombs on the atoll, it was necessary to distribute relief supplies and provide canvas for temporary shelters until the natives could rebuild their destroyed homes. A Military Government Unit arrived at Wotje on 5 November and commenced regular activities.

A survey of the Wotje airstrip revealed it to be of concrete construction—the NE-SW strip being 3500 feet long and 275 feet wide, while the NW-SE strip was 5000 feet long and 275 feet wide. The concrete was, however, so badly broken up and cratered by bombings that it was not believed susceptible of repair by "patching", but the possibility of turning the field into an emergency landing strip was investigated. As at Jaluit and Mille, bull-dozing and leveling operations on Wotje were suspended when a survey revealed the existence of a large number of unlocated and unmarked dud bombs.

**Surrender and Development of Maloelap.**

A few hours after the surrender of Wotje on 6 September, Rear Admiral Shochi Tamada, of the Imperial Japanese Navy, signed an unconditional surrender instrument aboard WINGFIELD (DE) as Atoll Commander Maloelap. Captain Grow also received this surrender, accepting the capitulation of 172 Army, 734 Navy, and 260 civilian personnel, for a total of 1066 Japanese. At the time of Maloelap's original isolation, however, there had been 1772 sailors, 368 soldiers, and 957 civilians on the atoll. Thus Maloelap had cost the Japanese Government 2031 men during this period. Air attacks had claimed 624 lives; ship bombardments had killed 25; disease had accounted for 150; accidents or suicides had been responsible for 12; and malnutrition had caused the deaths of 1220.

The Japanese hospital ship HIKAWA MARU arrived at Mille the morning of 29 September to evacuate 56 Japanese patients transferred there from Maloelap, in addition to invalids from the other Marshall Islands. By October 7th, all of the Japanese remaining in Maloelap Atoll were concentrated on Taroa Island. On 19 October, the Japanese carrier HOSHO lifted 610 Japanese from Maloelap, in addition to the 808 already loaded at Jaluit. The same day, LCI 481 transported five Koreans from Maloelap to Wotje, in addition to the 58 Koreans evacuated from Jaluit. The evacuation of the enemy garrison on Maloelap was completed on 2 November, with the departure of 163 Japanese aboard the Escort No. 126.
On 31 October, 10 Japanese commissioned and non-commissioned officers, headed by Rear Admiral Tamada, had been taken to Majuro and confined pending further investigation of alleged war crimes committed on Maloelap.

The runways and hangars on Taroa Island had been rendered useless to us, as well as to the Japanese at an earlier time, by the incessant pounding to which they had been subjected.

All the natives of Maloelap had been evacuated by U.S. forces during the war, creating a moral obligation to see that they were repatriated at the earliest possible date. On 16 October, the first Maloelap natives—252 in number—were returned from the Majuro Area and established on Kaven and Airik Islands.

Surrender of the Ryukyu Islands.

Lieutenant General Toshiro Nami, Japanese Commander of the Ryukyus, formally surrendered all troops under his command to General J. W. Stilwell, Commanding General TENTH Army, on 7 September, at the latter's headquarters on Okinawa. It was estimated that 105,000 Japanese Army and Navy forces on some 60 islands of the Ryukyu Group were involved in the surrender. In view of the fact that administration of this area was an Army responsibility, details of the surrender and occupation will presumably be found in Army reports. The only use to which the Navy planned to put the Ryukyus in future years, according to CNO's Basic Post-War Plan No. 1A, was that of a secondary operating base.

Search of Sorol, Eauripik, and Ifalik Islands.

On 8 September, a special party led by Commander J. W. Buxton boarded BOOTH (DE) at Ulithi Anchorage for the purpose of searching the atolls of Sorol, Eauripik, and Ifalik (all to the southeast of Ulithi) to remove any Japanese found on these islands, and to transfer them to the Atoll Commander Ulithi. They were also to search for any possible survivors of American ships or aircraft who might have landed there. Included in the party were a Japanese lieutenant and a corporal who had surrendered on Yap three days earlier, a native interpreter from Fassarai Island in Ulithi Atoll, and a Nisei interpreter.

The first visit to Sorol on the 8th was productive of no contacts, although three Japanese were sighted as BOOTH neared the island. Messages describing Japan's surrender and that of Yap Atoll, as well as a personal note from the Japanese lieutenant informing them that the ship would return in a few days to receive the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island, were left in conspicuous places.

When BOOTH returned on 12 September after visits to Ifalik and Eauripik, one Japanese civilian met them and gave himself up in preparation for being carried off to Yap. The other five Japanese on the island, however, were found to have committed suicide the day following the DE's initial visit. These civilians had operated the Japanese weather station on Sorol until American bombings in June 1944 destroyed both transmitters and receivers. The last Japanese ship to put into Sorol had been in May 1944. In addition to the Japanese, 10 natives inhabited the atoll.
On September 10th, BOOTH arrived at Eauripik, but after a careful search it was determined that the island was deserted, though evidence existed of former residence there by both Japanese and natives. The 20 well-constructed native huts found on Eauripik appeared to have been deserted for several months.

Ifalik was the next atoll to be inspected by BOOTH, the destroyers escort arriving there on the 10th and remaining for almost 24 hours. Here were found no Japanese, but there were some 550 natives, approximately 200 of whom had come from Woleai to escape the American bombings of that atoll. An additional 88 natives of Ifalik had been taken to Yap by the Japanese at an earlier period, according to those natives remaining on the island. Plans were formulated for returning these two groups of expatriates to their original homes at an early date.

**Surrender of Kusaie.**

The American Flag was hoisted over Kusaie, in the eastern-most Carolines, on 8 September, following the unconditional surrender of the 3423 Army (including 317 Koreans), 601 Navy, and 499 civilians (357 Okinawans and 142 Japanese nationals) attached to the garrison forces—a total of 4,523 men under the command of Lieutenant General Harada, to Commodore B. H. Wyatt, representing the Commander Marshalls-Gilberts Area, earlier the same day aboard HYMAN (DD). At the time of Kusaie's isolation there had been a total garrison of 4,967 men, comprising 3,853 Army, 615 Navy, and 499 civilians—indicating a loss of 444 men.

After a census of the non-military population of Kusaie had been completed by Cincpac Military Government Units (established the day of the Japanese surrender there), there were found to be 771 Ocean Islanders, 170 Ponapeans, 35 Marshallese, 2 Americans, and 1,542 Kusaieans—a total of 2,520 persons.

In accordance with the terms of unconditional surrender, General Harada was informed that, effective immediately, the control of the natives passed out of his hands into that of the American Area Commander, but that the control of Japanese military and civilian personnel, including Koreans and Okinawans, remained his responsibility, and that he would be responsible to the Area Commander for the actions and discipline of these people, as well as for the distribution of food to them. When Lieutenant General Harada mentioned that the 771 Ocean Islanders were living in the villages with the Japanese and conducting joint gardening with them, Commodore Wyatt modified his original directive to such effect that, for the present and until otherwise directed by the Area Commander, the Ocean Island natives would also remain under the control of the Japanese. This arrangement caused some dissatisfaction among the natives, but they were persuaded to cooperate. Arrangements were later made for segregation of native groups from the Japanese, pending repatriation of the Ocean Islanders, which was accomplished by the British phosphate vessel, SS TRIENZA, on 26 November, following two months of negotiations with the British Resident Commissioner at Tarawa.

Military Government plans also envisioned the repatriation of the Marshallese on Kusaie at the earliest opportunity. In pursuance of this policy, 37 displaced Marshallese were returned to Ennylabegan Island in Kwajalein Atoll, on 19 October for further evacuation to their home atolls.

The native population, both Kusaiean and other tribes, appeared to have fared fairly well during the Japanese occupation, Lieutenant General Harada
evidently having been one of the more humane atoll commanders. While there was a shortage of some foods, the situation was not critical, and the natives, in general, appeared to be in good physical condition. The Japanese had required that all food raised on the island be turned over to the Japanese military officials, who, in turn, apportioned the food among all the personnel—military, civilians, and natives.

While the natives undoubtedly received less food than the Japanese under this distribution system, general appearances indicated that the natives had been able to hold out a portion of their food from the Japanese. Food and supplies obtained from the Kusaiean natives were paid for by the Japanese in yen at prices fixed by the Japanese.

By 26 September, Military Government had been established on Kusaie, and the natives were segregated completely from the Japanese military forces. The 317 Korean members of the Japanese garrison were to be embarked for Korea when shipping became available.

Kusaie was inspected with a view to developing an air base there, but it was found that the runway was completely overgrown by vegetation, bombings had destroyed all former barracks, storehouses, etc. After an attempt to carry out seaplane operations had resulted in the grounding and consequent scuttling of the PBM involved, it was decided to abandon them, as Lele Harbor proved dangerous for the take-offs and landings, not only because of the boulders and rocky ledges visible beneath the surface, but also by reason of the two Japanese AKs which had been sunk in Lele Harbor by American bombers, while unloading supplies for the garrison in June, 1944. These two wrecks lay in water six to eight fathoms deep.

Naval Military Government planned to administer Kusaie from Ponape when the Japanese garrison had been completely evacuated and as soon as school, agriculture, fishing, sanitation, and trade programs were well underway.

By the first week in November, work was proceeding rapidly on the rehabilitation of the native gardens, and plans were being made for a survey of agriculture products intended to determine types and amounts available for export to the Marshalls. With the arrival of Federal Economic Administration (FEA) representatives on 7 November, arrangements were made for organizing a trade store and developing an industrial program.

Soon after the arrival of the FEA representatives at Kusaie, the title of the Foreign Economic Administration was changed to the U.S. Commercial Company, and became a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The new agency would continue with the same personnel, policies, and operating procedures as it had used in the past.

In the week 13-20 November, the U.S. Commercial Company landed trade goods and established itself in a preconstructed warehouse and store. The same week saw the completion of the construction of Military Government shore facilities, making it possible to accommodate all officers and men ashore for the first time. A native police force was appointed by village leaders, and appropriate uniforms were issued to them by Military Government.
On 5 November, 1802 Japanese nationals were evacuated from Kusaie by the Japanese hospital ship HIKAWA MARU. The Japanese merchantman KOEI MARU arrived at the atoll on November 16th, lifted the remaining 2404 Japanese, then proceeded to Ponape, where she arrived on the 19th to evacuate 596 Japanese nationals. The NISSHO MARU (also a merchantman) arrived at Kusaie on December 3rd, and evacuated 317 Koreans, to complete the evacuation of all alien groups from Kusaie.

Meantime, while they were awaiting repatriation, the Japanese and Koreans had been employed in repairing roads, bridges, water-front facilities, and in the reconditioning of land and water transportation facilities.

Surrender and Development of Ponape.

Three days after the capitulation of Kusaie, on September 11th, Commodore B. H. Wyatt accepted from Lieutenant General Masao Watanabe the surrender of Ponape, in the Eastern Carolines, with its garrison of 5796 Army and 2197 Navy personnel. In addition to these military, there were 11,286 civilians on Ponape, of whom 5886 were Japanese, and the remainder native Carolinians, except for 29 white settlers. At the time of the atoll's isolation, there had been on Ponape 5983 Army, 2291 Navy, and 5789 Japanese civilians, in addition to the natives and white persons already mentioned. Naval Military Government was established ashore on the same day that Ponape capitulated.

Soon after the surrender, the former Japanese airfields on Ponape were inspected to ascertain if they might be utilized by our planes without too great an expenditure of effort and money. Ponape Airfield No. 1, located two airline miles southwest of Ponape Town, was found to be situated on a plateau which limited the extension of either runway to an additional 100 to 300 feet. There were two runways, both of which had once been oil-topped, but they were found to be badly damaged as the result of American bombing attacks, as well as somewhat overgrown by the luxuriant vegetation prevailing, and inadequate in size for anything larger than carrier aircraft. All facilities had been completely destroyed. In view of these conditions, this airfield was abandoned.

Ponape Airfield No. 2, lying four airline miles southwest of Ponape Town, consisted of a single strip 3050 feet long and 328 feet wide, constructed in 16 days during February and March, 1944. Surrounding hills, rivers, and ravines definitely prohibited any large extension of this strip. As the runway was located on the side of a hill, landslides had narrowed the field in various spots, and the airfield had been built by hand labor to such poor effect that considerable effort would be required to recondition it. Under these circumstances, it was planned to abandon Ponape Airfield No. 2 as well as No. 1.

In course of conversations between the representatives of the Commander Marshalls-Gilberts Area and the Japanese officer in charge of the 221st Navy Construction Corps, which had been assigned to construct the Ponape Airfields early in 1944, an interesting story came to light regarding this Japanese counterpart of our Seabees.

The 221st Japanese NCC, having built the airstrip on Satawan, embarked on the 6600-ton AK OKITSU MARU and set out for Ponape, in company with the SUZUKAZE (DD), SC-32, and the NIPPO MARU (AW). While enroute to their destination, the
SUZUKAZE was sunk approximately four miles north of Ponape on 25 January 1944, by a submarine, presumed to be American. Less than five hours later, the OKITSU MARU was sunk, with a loss of life. Thus, because of the loss of vital construction equipment on the latter vessel, the Ponape Airstrip No. 2 was not properly constructed, as most of the work had to be done by hand. The consequence was that, although the 221st Navy Construction Corps consistently repaired the field after each bombing, only one landing and one take-off had been made during the entire Japanese occupation.

Ponape Harbor was found to possess an excellent natural seadrome, however, with sufficient water devoid of obstructions to permit PBM landings and take-offs. The Japanese had marked all coral heads and reefs with spar buoys, with the exception of a dangerous coral head northeast of Japutik Island, which would have to be marked if seaplane operations were to be safe. A seaplane ramp built by the Japanese on the northeast side of Langar Island had been cratered by bombs and stood in need of repair before it could be used, but it appeared basically sound. On the other hand, it was in a poor location, as it faced into the prevailing winds. In addition, the old Japanese seadrome area east of Langar Island (in outer Ponape Harbor) was too inaccessible for the necessary traffic between ships and planes.

As a result of these considerations, a seaplane mooring was established in Langar Roads (to the south and east of Langar Island) on 15 September, and it was strongly recommended that Langar Roads be utilized by all seaplanes, inasmuch as it was well adapted for multi-engine seaplane operations, although the water was so deep that suitable aircraft anchorage area was very limited. By 5 October, vessels of the Japanese Navy stationed temporarily at Ponape had completed the marking of the reefs around the ship and seaplane anchorage on the northern side of the island.

By the middle of October, continued efforts by Military Government officials on Ponape to inspire the natives with interest and initiative in their own welfare and administration began to bear fruit. The gradual transfer of administrative power to the local native councils, which had been mere figureheads in the past, and to native policemen, who had been "messenger boys" under the Japanese regime, was increasingly successful. Because of the almost complete lack of skilled labor among the natives, however, it was evident that their rehabilitation would be a slow process, even after the departure of their erstwhile masters.

A district police force designed to cover the entire area of each district was in the process of being organized during the latter part of October. Each district had a police chief and as many assistants located at various points in the district as seemed necessary. The authority of the district police force was limited to natives and Koreans. As soon as the organization was completed, it was planned to limit the authority of the Japanese policeman in each district to the Japanese nationals residing therein.

It was planned to open the schools on Ponape formally as soon as the vernacular text book could be reproduced in sufficient numbers. A vocational training program was inaugurated with encouraging results. This program was to be expanded wherever possible and practicable. Although facilities for instruction in machine shop work existed, such training was impossible for the time being, because of the lack of a qualified machine shop instructor. It was hoped, however, that in the not too distant future, the Ponapeans would themselves be able to take care
of the operation and maintenance of all equipment on Ponape.

On 14 October, the Japanese destroyer HATSUSAKURA departed for Tokyo via Saipan with 220 Japanese military evacuees from Ponape. Two days later, LSM 228 and REINOUR (APD) embarked 35 and 41 Chamorro natives respectively for repatriation on Saipan, where the vessels arrived on the 19th. Of the 110 Chamorros originally on Ponape at the time of the Japanese surrender, the remaining 34 elected to stay permanently.

The evacuation of Japanese nationals from Ponape continued on November 16th, with the departure of 249 Japanese aboard the destroyer TAKE. On the 17th, the merchant ship KOEI MARU arrived at Ponape from Kusai to lift 596 Japanese. On the 29th, the NISSH0 MARU arrived to evacuate 585 Koreans, while four days earlier the Japanese destroyer HATSUSAKURA completed her second evacuation of Japanese nationals from Ponape, embarking 605 repatriates, comprising 274 Army and 331 Japanese naval personnel.

Meantime, the Japanese military personnel were occupied with their own gardening, road repairing, and clearing of vegetation and debris. Japanese naval craft were employed in installing buoys as markers on the most dangerous reefs in Matalanima and Ronkiti Harbors.

During the week of 27 November-4 December, 146 natives were repatriated from Ponape to Mokil Atoll, and 243 were returned to Pingelap Atoll from Ponape by LCI 520. In the week ending 21 December, 17 Marshallese were repatriated from Ponape to their home island of Eniwetok.

By mid-November, plans had been formulated to sail 20 LSTs from the Marianas Area to Ponape in groups of four, spaced two days apart. These ships would then be loaded to capacity with Japanese evacuees and sailed alternately to Urage and Yokohama for discharge. The first group of LSTs was ordered to depart Guam on 30 November and proceed directly to Ponape for loading to capacity with Japanese repatriates, thence to sail to Urage and Yokohama.

Clothing for the Japanese civilian repatriates from Ponape was made available during the week of 14-21 December. The first four LSTs to be used in this repatriation service were routed to Chichi Jima to pick up winter clothing, while all subsequent LSTs were to be routed through Guam, where they would be supplied. It was not necessary to provide the Japanese military personnel with winter clothing, as they already had sufficient amounts to withstand the voyage.

Nine LSTs and the Japanese destroyer TAKE evacuated 4,525 Army personnel, 1,115 Navy, and 1,111 civilians, for a total of 6,751 Japanese, during the week of 7-14 December. The following week, 4,173 Japanese nationals were evacuated to Japan from Ponape by LSTs 1011, 1035, 548, 669, 276, 736, 1103, and 690. Of this total, 4,100 were civilians, 70 were Japanese Army personnel, and three were Navy. With the departure of LSTs 861, 390, and 547 from Ponape on 23 December, with 1,118 Japanese embarked, the repatriation of Japanese nationals—both military and civilian—from Ponape, and from the entire Marshalls-Gilberts Area, was completed.
Surrender and Evacuation of Nauru.

Two days went by, following the capitulation of Ponape, before the next surrender took place in the Pacific Ocean Areas, with the surrender of Nauru Island (situated just below the equator, to the west of the Gilbert Islands) to Brigadier J. R. Stevenson, Australian FIRST Army, on 13 September, aboard DIAMONDINA (PF). The Japanese force on Nauru was commanded by Captain Soeda, Imperial Japanese Navy, and numbered 2681 men. In addition to these Japanese naval personnel, there were 541 Koreans, 31 Japanese civilians, 591 Nauruans, 837 imported natives, and 166 Chinese. On 17 September, 92 Japanese officers and 1327 enlisted men left Nauru on the ships OL RIVER GLENELG and OL RIVER BURDEKIN.

Although no supplies had been landed since September, 1944, all personnel were in fair condition from existing on local produce. There were only 130 hospital patients on hand.

The western airstrip on Nauru was completed on 23 September, and became available for use by aircraft up to the size of the C-47 type.

As indicated elsewhere in this report, Nauru and Ocean had been turned over to Australia and the United Kingdom respectively after some negotiations between the State Departments of those countries and that of the United States. They both remained subject to coordination by Cincpac-Cincpoa in operational matters, however, since they were within the limits of the Pacific Ocean Areas, and on 7 October, Cincpac-Cincpoa directed the commanders of the occupation forces of these two islands to report to Commander South Pacific.

Surrender of Lamotrek.

PAPAYA (AN), Lieutenant R. W. Melum Commanding, arrived at Lamotrek Atoll, in the Central Carolines, on 16 September to receive the surrender of the Japanese garrison there. Lieutenant Melum represented the Atoll Commander Ulithi. A force of 25 Japanese naval personnel was found there, operating the seaplane base and the radio and weather stations, which were still in commission. The radio equipment, arms, and Japanese personnel were taken aboard PAPAYA and carried to Ulithi, while the 135 native Carolinians were left on their atoll.

Surrender and Development of Woleai.

On 19 September, the American Flag was raised over Woleai Atoll, in the Central Carolines, by personnel from SLOAT (DE) two days after the beginning of surrender negotiations. Lieutenant Colonel P. R. Colmer, USMC, representing the Island Commander Guam, received the surrender from Major General Kitamura, the Woleai Atoll Commander, who had arrived by plane before the war's end on an inspection tour, and had been stranded there by the damage done to the airstrip by American bombing strikes.

The destroyer escort, and a 9,347-ton Japanese AP converted into a hospital ship (the TAKASAGO MARU) had arrived at Woleai almost simultaneously on the 17th. A Marine detachment from SLOAT boarded the Japanese vessel and concluded arrangements for the evacuation of the entire Japanese garrison. The same afternoon, a small Marine detachment went ashore on Woleai Island, where it made arrangements with Major General Kitamura to demilitarize the atoll and embark the entire garrison on the TAKASAGO MARU within 52 hours.

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At 0730 on the 18th, a small Marine detachment landed on Woleai to check the progress of the Japanese garrison in the work of demilitarizing the island, then moved to one of the islands in the atoll inhabited by the natives. Before evening 195 serious cases had been put aboard the hospital ship. The Japanese had been ordered to carry out the usual demilitarization procedure and burn the majority of dirty shacks in which the garrison had been quartered. Despite their generally enfeebled condition, the Japanese fell to with alacrity in the accomplishment of these instructions, in order to expedite their return to the Japanese homeland.

In January 1943, the Japanese garrison on Woleai had numbered approximately 6500 men, but since that time, starvation had claimed approximately 4400 persons, and 450 to 500 had been killed by air raids, reducing the garrison to 1634 undernourished skeletons when the end came.

The Japanese had attempted to supplement their diminishing supplies by gardening on most of the sandy, coral-exposed islands of the atoll. Although this proved partially successful, the death rate from starvation increased rapidly before sufficient quantities could be raised and harvested. The number of deaths from malnutrition had fallen off gradually as the gardens yielded more and more foods; but, because of the long period of malnutrition, a large percentage of the survivors suffered from undernourishment, with many having beri-beri.

The garrison, in fact, were in such a weakened condition that some men fell to the ground when carrying relatively light packages, though the officers appeared to be in better health than the enlisted men, having received first priority in obtaining the rations of fish, rats, sweet potatoes, coconuts, and a small amount of rice.

By 2200 on the 19th, 1251 more Japanese had been removed to the TAKASAGO MARU, and by 1112 on the 20th, the last Japanese had been evacuated. The Japanese military personnel, who had obeyed their officers implicitly in disposing of the island's military equipment, lost all semblance of discipline as soon as the order was given to evacuate the atoll. In some instances, too many men crowded aboard a rather unseaworthy boat, and when ordered to disembark, clung to their seats with such desperate tenacity that they had to be thrown off forcibly. Orders from their own officers were completely ignored. At 1220, on September 20th, the TAKASAGO MARU set sail for Japan.

The natives on Woleai totalled 91 persons (22 men, 24 women, and 45 children), concentrated on the three islands of Falalis, Pial, and Faluselegalae, which had been left alone by the Japanese. Although none of the natives complained of sickness or undernourishment, which indicated that they had found a sufficient diet in the foods available during the Japanese occupation, the women did not look very strong. The native men, on the other hand, appeared to be quite healthy.

Before the war, approximately 300 natives had lived on Woleai Atoll, but after the coming of the Japanese, the Carolinians found it difficult to obtain adequate food for that number. When American bombings began to add to the unpleasant aspects of life on Woleai, approximately 200 natives migrated in their canoes and sailboats to Ifalik Island to find more food and safety. The 91 natives who remained expressed a desire to remain on the atoll under American rule.
A hospital ship which arrived in May 1944 had been the last surface ship to visit the atoll, but Japanese submarines had subsequently come in October 1944, December 1944 (on which occasion the garrison received the last mail to reach Woleai), January 1945, and May 1945.

An inspection of the Woleai Airfield showed that it required rebuilding, so thorough had been the destruction wrought by the 7th Air Force B-24s and various Navy search and photographic reconnaissance planes. This was a task which would require the use of heavy equipment. Many bomb craters were eight or 10 feet deep, necessitating the hauling of large volumes of coral to fill them. Most of the field was overgrown with vegetation, and some parts had even been made into gardens by the Japanese. The last plane to use the airstrip had come from Truk in October 1944.

Before leaving the atoll, the landing party from SLOAT secured and boarded up the Woleai radio station (which was able to reach Truk), leaving it intact for possible future use.
Search of Taongi Atoll.

On 21 September, LCI(L) 601 was sent from Kwajalein to search Taongi Atoll (the northernmost of the Marshalls) for possible Allied survivors, natives, or members of the Japanese garrison known to have been there at one time. Rear Admiral Sakaibara, the former commander of the Japanese garrison on Wake, had disclosed under interrogation that about 20 Japanese were removed from Taongi to Wake around March, 1943, because of the lack of food there and their general inability to sustain themselves on the former atoll.

After stopping at Utirik Atoll to pick up eight natives who were to form part of the searching party, the LCI(L) proceeded to Pakaakku Island (the chief island of Taongi Atoll), where, at 0800 on the 24th, a 12-man search party was put ashore over the encircling reef in course of two trips by the ship's rubber boat.

While the shore party searched the interior, LCI(L) 601 cruised up and down the east side of the atoll close to the reef, displaying an American Flag from the gaff and sounding her whistle at intervals. At 1100 the same day, a Martin "Mariner" joined the search.

At 1130, 24 September, the American Flag was raised on Pakaakku atop one of the poles formerly used as a radio aerial by the Japanese garrison, who had apparently used the island as a small seaplane base, judging from the large number of burned-out gasoline drums and full crates of 500-lb. bombs clustered about the island.

A broken radio set was also found, as well as a strongly-fortified AA gun position (with the gun removed), good dugouts, and numerous slit trenches. The reason for the latter was made apparent by the numerous .50 calibre bullet holes which gave the buildings a sieve-like effect, several large craters from bombs, and at least one 500-lb. dud. Sixteen to 20 structures found on the island substantiated the estimate of the former garrison's strength made by Rear Admiral Sakaibara.

Bundles of practically new clothes, together with Japanese coins, pictures, and aluminum cooking utensils indicated that the Japanese had left hurriedly, perhaps by plane. The other islands of Taongi Atoll—Sibylla and Kamone—were searched at a later hour on the 24th, and on the following day, but with negative results. The absence of any skeletons or signs of any graves indicated that no survivors had come to Taongi Atoll.

During November, Taongi Atoll was surveyed as a possible site for a Loran station.

Surrender of Ocean Island.

At 0820 on 2 October, Ocean Island, which lies a short distance to the east of Nauru, was surrendered to the United Kingdom. The Japanese garrison there was composed of 670 Marines of the 67th Naval Guard Unit, in addition to 30 Japanese civilians. All but 50 natives had been evacuated previously. As in the case of Nauru, Ocean Island remained subject to operational coordination by Cincpac-Cinpoa.
Interrogation of Natake, the former commander of the Japanese garrison on Ocean, revealed that four or five of the natives there had been evacuated with most of the natives to the Gilberts and Truk in August, 1944.

The health of those remaining on Ocean was good, and a reasonable reserve of supplies remained on hand to supplement the well-developed gardens. The island also possessed a serviceable boat harbor.

**Demilitarization of O Shima.**

As has been seen in the section on the Bonin Islands, Cincpac advised the Commander FIFTH Fleet on 9 October that it would not be necessary to occupy the Izu Group in the northern Nanpo Shoto. Nevertheless, in conformity with the policy of the Supreme Commander to demilitarize all Japanese positions in the United States zone of occupation, CTU 53.7.1 (Captain R.R. Hartung, Commanding Officer CHICAGO (CA)) was ordered by the Commander FIFTH Fleet to proceed to O Shima, the northernmost of the Izu Group, to inspect the island and supervise any demilitarization which might remain to be accomplished.

The initial landing was made on 24 October, and after Captain Hartung had contacted the senior military and civil authorities on the island, the inspection tour was begun, being completed the following afternoon. The Japanese had complied with the directives of the Supreme Commander to the extent that they had collected in suitable locations and inventories all military and naval stores, arms, and munitions; but they had not disposed of any of the material or accomplished any demolition of guns or fixed emplacements. The Japanese authorities appeared happy to have TU 53.7.1 land and direct the disposal of the stores and munitions, as they had apparently been waiting for some time for the arrival of an American task unit to guide them in this work.

The spirit of willing compliance and cooperation exhibited by Lieutenant General Yazaki and his staff, together with the excellent liaison and staff work of his organization in providing trucks, boats, manpower, and accurate information, furnished an impressive example of Japanese organization and efficiency at their best.

The arms and munitions on O Shima were concentrated mainly in three dumps located near the villages of Motomura, Okada, and Habu, respectively. The military stores, such as clothing, gas mask, and miscellaneous items were concentrated in the area near Sashikijii, where there were also large radio and radar installations. The large gun emplacements were high in the hills, some inaccessible by motor car.

TU 53.7.1 anchored off Motomura, which, fortunately, had a beach suitable for use by a limited number of landing craft, as well as a good concrete ramp leading from the road to the water's edge. The initial landings having been made, beachheadquarters was established in a well-situated waterfront building, which was large enough to billet the Marine detachment and provide a usual and radio communications center.

During the first day's inspection, the Officer-in-Charge ashore ordered the Japanese to employ their own demolition teams in destroying all heavy gun emplacements and all 28 cm. projectiles, as well as to accomplish the usual demilitarization
procedure. By agreement with the beachmaster, the Japanese were allowed enough trucks and demolition materials to carry out these assignments. Their compliance, as established by frequent inspections, was prompt and satisfactory.

The entire operation had been carried out with high efficiency, and the greatest single obstacle to an even speedier demilitarization had been the fact that most of the munitions were so well boxed that the unopened boxes would not sink.

Demilitarization of Nii Shima.

Upon completing the demilitarization of O Shima on 31 October, TU 53.7.1 steamed south to Nii Shima (also in the Izu Group), but the high wind and sea made landing impossible and the exposed anchorage proved untenable; so the task unit proceeded to Sagami Wan. After two more days of fruitless attempts to land on Nii Shima, TU 53.7.1 was finally able on 3 November to land an inspection party of three officers and two men through heavy surf by means of rubber life rafts. This party found the Japanese well organized for the task at hand. The Commanding General had concentrated all armaments and munitions formerly on the islands of Ko Shima, Shikine, Kozu Shima, Miyake Shima, and Mikura Shima for disposal as the American authorities should dictate.

Army goods suitable for civilian use had been sold to Japanese civilians, but nothing had yet been destroyed. On 4 November, good weather permitted full-scale operations and 10% of all munitions on Nii Shima were dumped and 25% of all artillery was converted to scrap. The following day, Captain Hartung turned over the command of TU 53.7.1 and the conduct of demilitarization operations in the Izu Islands to the Commanding Officer of INGERSOLL (DD), Commander F.J. Blouin.

Search for Missing American or Allied Personnel.

In an endeavor to find any missing American or Allied personnel who might be on the many islands in the area under the jurisdiction of Commander Marianas, this region was divided into five search sectors, with responsible commanders appointed for each sector, and a careful centralized search record was kept in the headquarters of Commander Marianas.

By 29 November, the following islands had been searched with negative results, though natives were found on some: Kita Iwo Jima, Olimaro, Mei Jima, Elato (60 natives), Imoto Jima, Farrelon De Pajaros, Maug, Pagan, Asuncion, Agrihan, Guguan, Soro, Pais (190 natives), Eurasipik, Ifalik, Pulusuk, Namoluk, Nama (470 natives), Ngulu (58 natives), Helen Reef, Lamotrek, Etal, Losap (290 natives), Murilo, Nomwin (291 natives), Kuop, Mishino Jima, Pulap, Aoga Jima, Pilelot, Pikelot, Puluwat, Satawal (200 natives), East Fayu, Kapinangamerangi (441 natives), Nishi-No-Jima, the Namouinig Islands (250 natives), and all but seven of the Admiralty Islands within the Marianas Area. STOCKDALE (DE) was directed to search Hermit, Ninigo, Kaniet, Sae, Sama, Liot, and Suma-Suma (in the Admiralty Group) for missing U.S. or Allied personnel, but on 27 December she completed her search of these islands, with all results negative.

The only unoccupied islands remaining to be searched were those in the extreme southern portion of the Marianas Area, most of which had only recently been assigned
to Vice Admiral Murray's command. These included the Aroe and Asia Island Groups, Mapia, Wajag, Deem, Urania, Wazo, Yampoo, Vanoeran, and Budd Islands. The question of whether these islands were searched by Australian forces, Dutch forces, or by Commander Marianas was raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, pending a decision in the premises by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the institution of a search by Commander Marianas was withheld.

In the Marshalls-Gilberts Area, similar searches were made of various isolated atolls in the northern Marshalls and in the area of Ponape, but all results were negative. Jemo was visited on 14 September, Taka on the 20th, and Bikar on the 21st; but, although a thorough search was made, in no instance was any evidence of life found upon the islands searched, nor were any signs of recent human habitation discovered. A preliminary search of Mokil (327 natives) and Pingelap (383 natives) Atolls (near Ponape) was completed on 11 October, with no survivors, Japanese, or other personnel for evacuation being found on either place.

Searches of Oroluk, Nukuoro (158 natives), Ngatik (222 natives), Ant, and Pakin Atolls (also in the general vicinity of Ponape), which were completed by 27 October, similarly yielded no survivors or Japanese. Three of these—Oroluk, Ant, and Pakin—were in fact found to be uninhabited. Native government on the four inhabited atolls was found to be functioning smoothly in all cases, with the natives appearing capable of managing their concerns with but little supervision. It was planned by Naval Military Government to make periodic inspections of these islands from Ponape.

Other islands in the Marshalls-Gilberts Area and the number of natives (if any) located thereon at the beginning of 1946 were Ailinginae, Ailinglapalap (957 natives), Ailuk (385 natives), Arno (864 natives), Aur (322 natives), Bikini (164 natives), Ebon (829 natives), Eniwetok (129 natives), Erikub, Kili, Kwajalein (591 natives), Lae (101 natives), Lib (64 natives), Likiep (583 natives), Majuro (1098 natives), Mejit (382 natives), Namorik (408 natives), Namu (302 natives), Rongelap (101 natives), Rongerik, Ujae (122 natives), Utirik (166 natives), and Wotho (40 natives).

To expedite the search of the 173 islands in the Samoan Defense Group, Cincpac dispatched three destroyer escorts, which reported to the Commander South Pacific Area on 18 September. HURST and PETTIT were assigned to the search mission, while CROW stood by at Guadalcanal to assist in the surrender of Nauru and Ocean Islands, the last two enemy-held points in the South Pacific Area. On 20 October, CROW was relieved by MARCHAND (DE). In addition to the Samoan Defense Group, forces of the South Pacific Area searched three islands and one small group in the South Solomons; the New Caledonia Command; 23 islands, three small groups, and numerous reefs in the New Hebrides; and two islands of the Fijis. All results were negative.

Summary of Evacuations in the Marianas Area.

By 10 January 1946, 79,868 Japanese nationals—73,474 military and civilians—had been evacuated to Japan. On that date there yet remained 28,163 Japanese nationals—17,705 military and 10,458 civilians—on the islands in the Marianas Area. In addition to these 28,163
Japanese, there remained on 3 January the following natives and foreign nationals: 49,007 natives, 11,308 Koreans, 31,619 Okinawans, Formosans, Chinese, and other nationals. This made the total of all natives and non-Japanese foreign nationals in the area 92,103 at the time that the Marshalls-Gilberts Area was merged with the Marianas Area on 5 January 1946.

Among the civilians were included 27,930 Oriental internees on Saipan and Tinian. The nationality and numbers of the civilian internees on these two islands were as follows:

**Saipan Civilian Internees**

- 2,392 Japanese
- 11,156 Okinawans
- 1,451 Koreans
- 14,999 Total Internees on Saipan.

**Tinian Civilian Internees**

- 7,589 Okinawans
- 1,863 Japanese
- 2,575 Koreans
- 4 Chinese
- 12,031 Total Internees on Tinian.

With the amalgamation of the Marshalls-Gilberts Area subordinate commands into the Marianas Area, the number of natives and foreign nationals in the enlarged Marianas Area was, of course, altered, so that by 17 January the figures were as follows:

**Total Natives in the Marianas Area**

- 6 Bonin Islands
- 26,357 Marianas Islands
- 9,124 Western Caroline Islands
- 21,837 Central Caroline Islands
- 10,039 Marshall-Gilberts Islands
- 67,363 Total of all natives in the area.

**Total Foreign Nationals in the Marianas Area**

- 17,705 Japanese military
- 10,458 Japanese civilians
- 28,163 Total Japanese
- 4,164 Korean military
- 4,407 Korean civilians
- 8,571 Total Koreans
- 965 Okinawan military
- 28,364 Okinawan civilians
- 29,329 Total Okinawans
Summary of Evacuations in the Marshalls-Gilberts Area.

By 27 December, 26,511 Japanese and Korean military—100% of the original total to be evacuated from that area—had been repatriated to Japan and Korea from the Marshalls-Gilberts Area, to bring an end to the process of repatriation in that region. (Not included in these figures are 73 Japanese, of whom part were held at Kwajalein pending trial for alleged war crimes, others were detained to serve as material witnesses at these trials, while the rest were awaiting approval of their sentences).
On 4 October a typhoon developed just north of Rota as a result of a barometric depression and the convergent flow of equatorial air and tropical air. Guam Weather Central called this storm of apparently weak intensity "Louise" and put out the first weather advisory on it at 041200Z, with further advisories following at intervals of six hours. Up to that time of the 16th advisory (080600Z), the storm was following a fairly predictable path to the NW, and was expected to pass between Formosa and Okinawa and on into the East China Sea. At this time, however, the storm began to veer sharply to the right and head north for Okinawa. The 17th advisory at 081200Z (0811001) showed this clearly, and units began to be alerted for the storm late in the evening of the 8th. The forecast for Okinawa was for winds of 60 knots, with 90 knot gusts in the early morning of 9 October, and passage of the center at 1030(I).

"Louise", however, failed to conform to pattern, and that evening, as it reached 25° N (directly south of Okinawa) it slowed to six knots and greatly increased in intensity. As a result, the storm which struck in the afternoon of the 9th has seldom been paralleled in fury and violence; the worst storm at Okinawa since our landings in April.

The sudden shift of the storm 12 hours before its expected maximum, from a predicted path 150 miles west of Okinawa to an actual path that brought the center of the storm less than 15 miles east of Okinawa's southeast coast, caught many craft in the supposedly safe shelter of Buckner Bay without time to put to sea far enough to clear the storm. The ninth of October found the Bay jammed with ships ranging in size from Victory ships to LCV(P)s. All units, both afloat and ashore, were hurriedly battening down and securing for the storm.

By 1000 the wind had risen to 40 knots, and the barometer was down to 989 millibars, visibility was less than 800 yards, the seas were rising, and the rain was coming down in torrents, liberally mixed with salt spray. By 1200, visibility was zero, and the wind was 60 knots from the east and northeast, with tremendous seas breaking over the ships. Small craft were already being torn loose from their anchors, and larger ships were, with difficulty, holding by liberal use of their engines. At 1400 the wind had risen to 80 knots, with gusts of far greater intensity, the rain that drove in horizontally was more salt than fresh, and even the large ships were dragging anchor under the pounding of 30 to 35-foot seas. The bay was now in almost total darkness, and was a scene of utter confusion as ships suddenly loomed in the darkness, collided, or barely escaped colliding by skillful use of engines, and were as quickly separated by the heavy seas. Not all ships were lucky; hundreds were blown ashore, and frequently several were cast on the beach in one general mass of wreckage, while the crews worked desperately to maintain watertight integrity and to fasten a line to anything at hand in order to stop pounding. Many ships had to be abandoned. Sometimes the crews were taken aboard by other ships; more often they made their way ashore, where they spent a miserable night huddled in caves and fields. A few were lost.

By 1600 the typhoon reached its peak, with steady winds of 100 knots and frequent gusts of 120 knots. At this time the barometer dipped to 968.5 millibars. This was the lowest reading that the barometers recorded, and was probably
the point of passage of the center of the typhoon, but the maximum winds continued unabated for another two days. The gale became more fierce, if anything. During this period, the wind continued to the north, and then to the northwest, and began to blow ships back off the west and north reefs of the Bay and across to the south, sometimes dragging anchor the entire way. These wild voyages by damaged ships caused a nightmare series of collisions and near escapes with other drifting ships and shattered hulks.

A typical experience was that of FLAGLER (AK). Her anchors dragged at 1200, and despite the use of both engines she was blown ashore a mile north of Baten Ko by 1315, colliding with LST 826 on the way. Grounded, she began to pound, and all power was lost. At 1710, as the wind changed, FLAGLER was blown off the reef and back across the bay, grazing a capsized YF and continuing on, with a 13° port list, no power, and the lower spaces and after engine room beginning to flood. One anchor was lost, the other dragged across the bay. By 1800 she had moved two miles across the bay and had grounded on the east side of Baten Ko, alongside a DE hulk. Lines were made fast to the DE, but flooding continued, and at 0545 ship was abandoned. A small party remained on board, however, and successfully stopped flooding as the typhoon subsided. FLAGLER was later salvaged.

Many other ships had similar stories. SOUTHERN SEAS (PY) rammed or was rammed by five other ships, before sinking. NESTOR (ARB) was forced to start maneuvering as early as 1020, in order to avoid INCA (IX), which had started to drag at 0950. In dodging INCA, NESTOR slipped nearer to the beach, and was forced to put all engines ahead one third in order to hold position on her anchor. At 1230 NESTOR again had to maneuver to narrowly avoid a collision with LST 826, which was dragging anchor very rapidly; but in so doing, NESTOR nearly ran down ARD 27. Another LST, the 823, was being slowly driven towards NESTOR. While maneuvering clear of LST 823, NESTOR's anchor chain fouled the buoy to which an LCI was secured, and NESTOR had to slip her anchor chain. Despite the full use of all engines, NESTOR was being driven on shore by the increasing winds. The starboard anchor was let go but would not hold, and in clearing two more ships dragging anchor (ARD 22 and LCI 463), NESTOR moved perilously close to the beach. At this time the winds were constantly rising, seas were breaking clear over the ship, and the conn was being deluged with salt water and torrents of rain.

No sooner had the last two ships been cleared than YF 289 closed dead ahead, and it became necessary to back all engines to avoid a collision, but this put NESTOR so close to the beach that she soon grounded. It was now 1345, only an hour and a quarter after first dodging LST 826. While grounded, NESTOR was struck by YF 1079, was holed, and began to pound badly. At 1420 a sudden shift of wind drove NESTOR off the beach, flipped her around end for end, and drove her back on the beach alongside OCELOT (IX 110). Breakers 20 to 30 foot high now pounded NESTOR, flooding all starboard compartments aft of frame 25. At 1530 the wind again shifted, driving NESTOR's stern against APL 14, completely crushing the stern, while the bow penetrated the side of OCELOT at frame 10. A few minutes later, NESTOR settled in 24 feet of water. At 1945 all personnel and records were evacuated to APL 14.

Conditions on shore were no better. Twenty hours of torrential rain soaked everything, made quagmires of roads, and ruined virtually all stores. The
hurricane winds destroyed from 50% to 95% of all tent camps, and flooded the remainder. Damage to Quonset huts ran from 40% to 99% total destruction. Some of these Quonsets were lifted bodily and moved hundreds of feet; others were torn apart, galvanized iron sheets ripped off, wallboarding shredded, and curved supports torn apart. Driven from their housing, officers and men alike were compelled to take shelter in caves, old tombs, trenches, and ditches in the open fields, and even behind heavy road-building machinery, as the wind swept tents, planks, and sections of galvanized iron through the air.

At the Naval Air Bases some 60 planes of all types were damaged, some of which had been tossed about unmercifully, but most of which were reparable. Installations suffered far more severely. The seas worked under many of the concrete ramps and broke them up into large and small pieces of rubble. All repair installations were either swept away or severely damaged. At Yonabaru, all 40' by 100' buildings were demolished, the same being true at the NATS terminal. Communication and meteorological services were blown out at most bases by 1900.

The storm center of typhoon "Louise" passed Buckner Bay at about 1600, from which time until 2000 it raged at peak strength. The storm was advancing at the rapid rate of 15 knots in a northerly, then northeasterly, direction, and by 2000 the center was 60 miles away. The winds gradually began to subside. Conditions in Buckner Bay were at this time somewhat improved by the wind's having veered to the northwest across the land mass of Okinawa, which reduced the size of the seas, and probably saved many more damaged ships from being driven off the reefs and sunk in deep water. Nevertheless, the subsidence at 2000 was a relative one, from "super-typhoon" to typhoon conditions, with steady winds of 80 and 60 knots throughout the night, and some gusts of higher velocity. A wild, wet, and dangerous night was spent by all hands, afloat or ashore. It was not until 1000 on the 10th that the winds fell to a steady 40 knots, and rains slackened.

Having left Okinawa, the storm proceeded NNE on a curving track. Ships of occupation groups anchored in Amami O Shima anchorage had a rough time, with winds over 70 knots; and Japan, from Nagasaki to Tokyo, was alerted for the storm. On the night of 10-11 October, "Louise" ran into cold air from over Japan; as a result the center of the typhoon occluded, moved aloft to the north, and eventually dissipated. Our forces from Nagasaki to Wakayama experienced winds of 40 to nearly 60 knots on the 11th and 12th. Ships at sea were enabled to maneuver clear of the worst of the storm, and sustained only minor damage, despite heavy seas.

This ended typhoon "Louise", but the damage it left behind on Okinawa was tremendous. Approximately 80% of all housing and buildings were destroyed or made unusable. Very little tentage was salvageable, and little was on hand as a result of previous storms. Food stocks were left for only 10 days. Medical facilities were so destroyed that an immediate request had to be made for a hospital ship to support the shore activities on the island.

Casualties were low, considering the great numbers of people concerned and the extreme violence of the storm. This was very largely due to the active and well directed efforts of all hands in assisting one another, particularly in
evacuation of grounded and sinking ships. By 18 October, reports had been sifted and it was found that there were 26 dead and 41 missing, with approximately 100 receiving fairly serious injuries.

The casualty list of ships was far greater. (See Appendix I following). A total of 12 ships were sunk, 222 grounded, and 32 damaged beyond the ability of ships' companies to repair. ComServDiv 104 under Commodore T. J. Keliher, was assigned to the salvage work. By 19 November, 79 ships had been refloated, and 132 were under repair. The remaining 53 badly damaged vessels still afloat had been, or were being, decommissioned, stripped, and abandoned. On 14 November, ComServPac, (Vice Admiral W. W. Smith) inspected the damage, and decided that only 10 ships were worth complete salvage, out of some 90 ships with major work to be done on them. This decision was made chiefly because similar types of ships were rapidly being decommissioned in the United States, and the cost of salvage would have been excessive for unneeded ships.

Repair work went on rapidly ashore. As a result of experience in the earlier typhoon in September, extra stocks of food and tentage were to be stored on Okinawa. These were enroute on 9 October, and in less than a week after the storm, supplies were fairly well built up; emergency mess halls and sleeping quarters had been erected for all hands, and 7500 men had been processed for return to the United States.
### APPENDIX III.

**TYPHOON DAMAGE AT OKINAWA.**

*(Based Upon Progress Reports to 19 November)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Status and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFD 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Damaged - considered unsalvageable. Limited local repairs, for local use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDL 32</td>
<td>ALAMOSA</td>
<td>Damaged - salvage doubtful. Strip, abandonment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK 156</td>
<td>FLAGLER</td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown. Refloated 10/29. Recommended return rear area and decommissioning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN 23</td>
<td>MAHOGANY</td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN 52</td>
<td>SNOWBALL</td>
<td>Grounded. Refloated 10/10/45.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA 68</td>
<td>BUTTE</td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD 86</td>
<td>HOLLIS</td>
<td>Grounded. Not considered salvageable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APL 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refloated 10/25/45. Limited local repairs, for local use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APL 33</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refloated 10/10/45.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF 117</td>
<td>WATEREE</td>
<td>Sunk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF 115</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refloated 10/25/45.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARB 6</td>
<td>NESTOR</td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown. Refloated 10/10/45.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARV 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARV 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessel</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG 9 MONA ISLAND</td>
<td>Grounded. Damaged beyond economical repair.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS 16 EXTRICATE</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR 9</td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR 191</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARD 21</td>
<td>Grounded - salvable. Recover, tow to Guam, dock, refloated 11/20/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARD 22</td>
<td>Refloated 10/12/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARD 29</td>
<td>Refloated 10/12/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA 177</td>
<td>Refloated 10/12/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA 181</td>
<td>Grounded. Refloated 10/14/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA 191</td>
<td>Grounded. Refloated 10/12/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA 200</td>
<td>Grounded. Refloated 10/12/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barge K-4058</td>
<td>Refloated 10/22/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM 12 WESHAWKEN</td>
<td>Grounded. Beyond economical salvage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMS 2 LAMBERTON</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMS 10 SOUTHARD</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMS 17 DORSEY</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dredge MACKENZIE</td>
<td>Refloated 10/24/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS 406</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS 409</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS 411</td>
<td>Refloated 1/22/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS 552</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX 91</td>
<td>Sunk.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX 162 LIGNITE</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI 31</td>
<td>Grounded - Refloated 10/15/45. Captain POHL recommends decommissioning and strip of all salvageable material.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI 37</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI 379 LCI 397</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI 399 LCI 399</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Damaged - extent unknown.
Refloated 11/5/45.
Refloated 11/7/45.
Refloated 10/22/45.
Refloated 10/12/45.
Refloated 10/21/45.
Grounded.

Refloated 10/19/45.
Refloated 10/21/45.
Refloated 10/19/45.
Grounded - Probable total loss.
Refloated 10/23/45.
Grounded.

Refloated 10/30/45.
Damaged - extent unknown.
Grounded.

Grounded - strip, abandonment.

Grounded - Refloated 10/19/45.
Grounded.
Grounded.

Refloated 10/19/45.
Grounded.
Grounded.

Refloated 10/22/45.
Refloated 11/5/45.
Refloated 10/24/45.
Sunk.

Grounded.

Refloated 10/19/45.
Grounded - strip, abandonment.
Grounded.

Grounded.

Grounded - Refloated 10/11/45.
Refloated 10/22/45.
Grounded.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSM 361</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 365</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 406</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 408</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 437</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 444</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 458</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 465</td>
<td>Grounded - refloated 10/14/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 468</td>
<td>Refloated 10/21/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 1120</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 169</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 494</td>
<td>Refloated 10/22/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 501</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 534</td>
<td>Sunk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 561</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 568</td>
<td>Refloated 10/13/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 675</td>
<td>Decommissioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 684</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 690</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 717</td>
<td>Refloated 10/21 (CSD 104 has 10/12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 823</td>
<td>Grounded - Beyond economical salvage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 826</td>
<td>Grounded - Beyond economical salvage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 830</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 876</td>
<td>Grounded - Refloated 10/14/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 890</td>
<td>Grounded - Refloated 10/19/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 896</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 1001</td>
<td>Grounded - Refloated 10/1/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 1128</td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB 37</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 584</td>
<td>Grounded - Beyond economical repair.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 614</td>
<td>Grounded - Beyond economical repair.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 590</td>
<td>Grounded - Beyond economical repair.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1018</td>
<td>Damaged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1120</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1128</td>
<td>Grounded - Beyond economical repair.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1178</td>
<td>Refloated 10/24/45. (CSD 104 refloated 10/16/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1239</td>
<td>Refloated 10/19/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1245</td>
<td>Refloated 10/19/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1418</td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown. Beyond economical repair.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1419</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1461</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS 1418</td>
<td>Grounded - Beyond economical salvage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS 1461</td>
<td>Grounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship Type</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 99</td>
<td>Grounded - Abandonment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 151</td>
<td>Grounded - Strip, abandonment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 193</td>
<td>Refloated 11/6/45 (CSD 104 has refloated 10/15. Damaged seriously but afloat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 275</td>
<td>Grounded - Beyond economical repair. Strip, abandonment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 292</td>
<td>Refloated 10/19/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 348</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 381</td>
<td>Damaged - extent unknown.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 308</td>
<td>Refloated 11/6/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 383</td>
<td>Grounded - Sunk, strike from register.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 384</td>
<td>Sunk.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 424</td>
<td>Grounded - Beyond economical salvage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 442</td>
<td>Refloated 10/19/45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS 590</td>
<td>Grounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sunk.
Grounded.

Damaged seriously but afloat.

Sunk.

Grounded.

Refloated 11/20/45.

Grounded.

Refloated 10/12/45.

Refloated 10/12/45.

Grounded - Recommended for stripping.

Refloated 10/22/45.

Refloated 10/22/45.

Refloated 10/24/45.

Grounded.

Refloated 10/22/45.

Damaged seriously but afloat.

Sunk.

Damaged - extent unknown. In service present location, then strip.

Refloated 10/22/45.

Refloated 10/22/45.

Grounded.

Grounded - Recommended for stripping.

Refloated 10/19/45.

Grounded.

Refloated 10/19/45.

Sunk.

Sunk, strip, abandonment.

Refloated 11/20/45.

Grounded.

Grounded.

Grounded.

Refloated 10/12/45.

Grounded.

Grounded - Recommended for stripping.

Sunk.

Grounded - Recommended striking from register.

Grounded.

Damaged - extent unknown.

Sunk.

Grounded.

Sunk.

Grounded.

Refloated 11/5/45.
YTL 422
YTL 423
YTL 550
YTL 551
YTL 552

YDG 6

YNG 28

SS MONROE VICTORY (XAK)
SS JACK SINGER
SS WILLIAM RALSTON
SS RICHARD J. OGLESBY
SS HARRINGTON EMERSON
SS JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON
SS OVID BUTLER
SS BROCKHOLST LIVINGSTON
SS AUGUSTINE HEARD
SS GUTZON BORGLUM
SS DAVID S. BARRY
SS FRANCIS WILSON
SS JOHN M. MILLER
SS EDGAR W. NYE
SS JOSEPH HOLT

Refloated 10/22/45.
Refloated 10/24/45.
Refloated 10/24/45.
Grounded.
Refloated 10/21/45.

Damaged seriously afloat.

Damaged - extent unknown.

Grounded.
Grounded.
Grounded.
Grounded.
Refloated 10/27/45.
Grounded.
Refloated 10/12/45.
Damaged seriously but afloat.
Damaged - extent unknown.
Damaged - extent unknown.
Damaged - extent unknown.
Damaged - extent unknown.
Refloated 10/18/45.

APPENDIX III.
MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMMAND CHANGES

FROM SEPTEMBER THROUGH DECEMBER 1945.

At 1100 on 1 September, Vice Admiral J. H. Towers relieved Vice Admiral J. S. McCain as CTF 38 and Commander Second Carrier Task Force.

On 4 September, Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo assumed command of TF 55 (The Western Japan Force).

On 14 September, Rear Admiral F. C. Denebrink (ComCruDiv 5) relieved Rear Admiral J. H. Brown as CTF 42 (The Northern Control and Covering Force).

At 0000, 20 September, Commander FIFTH Fleet (Admiral R. A. Spruance) relieved Commander THIRD Fleet (Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr.) and ComNorPac (Vice Admiral F. J. Fletcher) of their respective responsibilities in Eastern and Northern Japan, and assumed command of all naval operations in the Japanese Empire.

On 20 September, Rear Admiral F. C. Denebrink assumed command of TF 56 (The Northern Japan Force), consisting of units in the Empire waters formerly under the control of ComNorPac.

On 23 September, Rear Admiral D. B. Duncan (ComCarDiv 4) relieved Rear Admiral A. W. Radford as CTG 58.1.

On 29 September, Rear Admiral D. B. Beary (ComServRon 6) was designated as Commander Japanese Repatriation Group (TG 50.3).

On 30 September, Rear Admiral H. M. Martin assumed command of Fleet Air Wing 17 and reported to ComFIFTHFleet for duty.

On 30 September, Commodore P. P. Powell relieved Rear Admiral J. L. Hall as CTF 33.

On 3 October, Rear Admiral J. L. Hall relieved Vice Admiral H. W. Hill as Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force, but assumed no operational functions of the occupation. The following day, Rear Admiral L. F. Reifsnider (CTG 54.1) relieved Vice Admiral Hill as CTF 54 and assumed all the duties assigned to that command in connection with the occupation.

On 8 October, Rear Admiral D. B. Duncan (ComCarDiv 4) relieved Rear Admiral A. C. Davis as CTF 72 (Fast Carrier Force).

On 9 October, Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun was detached as Commander South Pacific Area, and the following day Rear Admiral P. Hendren succeeded to the command.
On 9 October, Rear Admiral D. B. Beary was designated as Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP). At the same time, he was detached as ComServRon 6, a command which had been dissolved effective 30 September.

On 10 October, Rear Admiral R. Wood, Commandant Seventeenth Naval District, Commander Naval Air Bases Seventeenth Naval District, and Commander Fleet Air Wing Four, succeeded Vice Admiral F. J. Fletcher as Commander North Pacific Force, Alaskan Sea Frontier, and TF 95. (At 0000 Zebra, 8 October, ComNorPac and ComAlSeaFron had been designated CTF 95. The assignment of Task Force numbers 40 through 44 to the North Pacific Force was cancelled at that time).

On 14 October, Rear Admiral J. L. Hall relieved Admiral R. K. Turner as Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific. Cincpac directed Rear Admiral Hall to execute the authority of ComPhibsPac, regardless of relative rank, upon assuming command.

At 0001 GCT, 15 October, TF 34 was dissolved. The task units of this force retained the same numeral designations under the operational control of CTF 32, until the respective dissolution of each.

On 19 October, Admiral R. A. Spruance departed from the Tokyo area for Pearl Harbor. Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson assumed temporary command as ComFIFTHFleet by virtue of seniority, pending the assumption of these duties by Vice Admiral J. H. Towers. The same date, Vice Admiral Towers was detached from duty as Commander Second Carrier Task Force to proceed and report for duty as Commander FIFTH Fleet.

On 20 October, Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo (ComCruDiv 13) relieved Rear Admiral F. C. Denebrink as Commander Northern Japan Force (TF 56). The same date, Rear Admiral Denebrink assumed command of Service Squadron 10.

On 21 October, Vice Admiral J. H. Towers relieved Rear Admiral A. C. Read (ComBatDiv 5) as CTG 30.1. Rear Admiral Read had assumed this duty on 15 October.

On 1 November, TF 33 was dissolved. All units of that force passed to the direct control of CTF 32.

On 2 November, Rear Admiral O. C. Badger relieved Rear Admiral J. F. Shafroth as ComBatRon 2.

At 0000, 8 November, Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers (ComPhibGrp 11) relieved Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson (Com3rdPhibFor) as CTF 32 and simultaneously relieved Rear Admiral L. F. Reifsnider as CTF 54. Task Groups 54.1, 54.5, and 54.11 were dissolved.

On 8 November, Vice Admiral J. H. Towers relieved Admiral R. A. Spruance as Commander FIFTH Fleet and simultaneously acquired the rank of Admiral.

On 9 November, Rear Admiral E. P. Forrestal relieved Rear Admiral L. J. Wiltse as ComCruDiv 10.
On 11 November, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that full control of the British Pacific Fleet should revert to the Admiralty. It was decided that CinCBPFF would assign units of this fleet, as agreed with SCAP, for occupational duties in Japanese and Korean waters, varying the number of ships as circumstances required. Furthermore, British and French naval units employed on occupational duties in the home Japanese and Korean waters would continue to be under U.S. control. In compliance with these directives, Cincpac returned full control of the British Pacific Fleet, except for the units as indicated above, to CinCBPFF, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser. In accordance with this action, 11th Fleet Task Force designations ceased to be effective.

On 11 November, CNO directed that Rear Admiral H. F. Kingman be detached as ComBatDiv 9 and ordered to duty as ComTHIRDFleet, succeeding Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr.

On 13 November, Admiral R. A. Spruance was appointed Deputy Cincpac-Cincpoa in place of Vice Admiral J. H. Newton, who was to return to the United States for further orders.

On 13 November, Admiral T. C. Kinkaid was appointed Commander Western Sea Frontier, vice Admiral R. E. Ingersoll.

On 15 November, Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo was detached as ComCruDiv 13.

On 15 November, Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson was detached as Com3rdPhibFor, being relieved by Commodore P. F. Powell. Upon the arrival of the staff at San Francisco on or about 22 November, the 3rdPhibFor was to be dissolved.

On 15 November, the Second Carrier Task Force was dissolved.

On 15 November, Rear Admiral T. G. W. Settle relieved Rear Admiral F. S. Low as CTF 71 (Commander North China Force), and as ComCruDiv 16.

On 16 November, Rear Admiral C. T. Durbin was detached as Commander Escort Carrier Forces Pacific, being relieved on the 22nd by Rear Admiral D. Ketcham.

On 18 November, Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge assumed command of CruDiv 17 and TF 53.

On 19 November, Vice Admiral D. E. Barbey relieved Admiral T. C. Kinkaid as Commander SEVENTH Fleet. Vice Admiral Barbey continued in his former assignment as ComSEVENTHPhibFor, but was relieved as CTF 78 by Rear Admiral A. G. Noble.

On 19 November, Rear Admiral C. B. Momsen succeeded Rear Admiral D. B. Beary as Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP).

On 20 November, Rear Admiral F. S. Low relieved Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy as Commander Cruisers and Destroyers Pacific. Rear Admiral Blandy was under orders to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

APPENDIX IV.
At 0000 GCT, 20 November, Rear Admiral F. C. Fahrion relieved Vice Admiral J. B. Oldendorf as CTF 55. TF 51, as previously constituted, was dissolved. At 0000 GCT, 20 November, TF 56 was dissolved. The Northern Japan Area was assigned to CTF 53, in addition to the Eastern Japan Area.

On 24 November, Fleet Admiral C. W. Nimitz was relieved as CinCPac-Cincpola by Admiral R. A. Spruance.

On 24 November, Rear Admiral O. C. Badger, who had assumed temporary additional duty as ComBatRon 2 on 15 November, pending establishment of ComCruBatPac, was detached from duty as ComBatRon 2 and ComBatDiv 1, and was directed to proceed and report for duty as ComServPac. Rear Admiral I. C. Sowell assumed the duties of ComBatRon 2, and Captain J. C. Roper succeeded as ComBatDiv 1.

On 25 November, Captain E. Grant relieved Rear Admiral H. M. Martin as Commander Fleet Air Wing 17.

On 25 November, TF 32 was dissolved. The ships and units of TF 32 not previously transferred to TF 54 were absorbed therein on that date.

On 26 November, Rear Admiral D. C. Ramsey reported for duty as Deputy CinCpac-Cincpola, and was subsequently nominated by the President of the United States for the rank of Vice Admiral, effective the date Rear Admiral Ramsey reported for this new duty.

On 1 December, TG 74.3 (Air Support Group) was redesignated TF 72 (Escort Carrier Force), with Rear Admiral D. Ketcham (CTG 74.3, ComEsCarFor) assuming the designation CTF 72 in place of Rear Admiral D. B. Duncan, who reported to ComFIFTHFleet on 3 December for duty as CTF 58.

On 6 December, Rear Admiral M. R. Greer was relieved as Commander Fleet Air Wing 18 by Captain C. L. Lee.

On 7 December, ComBatRon 1 was dissolved.

On 7 December, General C. C. Kenney, USA (Commanding General Far East Air Forces), was appointed to the command of the new Pacific Air Command. Simultaneously, the U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF), Lieutenant General B. M. Giles, was disestablished. General Kenney's former command (the Far East Air Forces) had included the 5th, 7th, and 13th Air Forces; while the new organization comprised all of these, as well as the 20th and 8th Air Forces (U.S. Army organizations equipped with B-29s and formerly the component parts of USASTAF). The only U.S. Army Air Forces units excluded from the new command were the 10th and 11th in China, the 11th in Alaska, and those located in Panama and the Southeastern Pacific. Whereas the Commanding General USASTAF had reported directly to the Commanding General Army Air Forces (General of the Army H. H. Arnold) the Pacific Air Command would report to and be under the command of CinGARPac (General of the Army D. MacArthur). Headquarters of USASTAF at Guam closed at midnight on 31 December.
CinCAFPac was to maintain a mobile air striking force in the Pacific of such size and composition as might be prescribed from time to time by higher authority. He would also maintain staging bases in the Pacific for use by such air forces from without the area as might from time to time be temporarily assigned by higher authority to the Pacific Air Command for specific missions. ComGenPacAirCom was delegated the same administrative authorities by CinCAFPac as were delegated to the Commanders of other principal elements of his command of ground or naval composition.

On 9 December, ComGenSIXTHArmy announced that responsibility of the 5thPhibCorps for occupation missions would be transferred to the I Corps, effective at midnight on 31 December. ComGenEIGHTHArmy was requested to release the 5thPhibCorps for embarkation effective 1 January 1946. Upon embarking, the 5thPhibCorps units would pass to the control of CinCPac.

At 0000 GCT, 10 December, ComPhibsPac declared the following reorganization of PhibsPac to be effective:

(a) PhibGrp 8 — redesignated as PhibGrp 1 (Rear Admiral A. G. Noble).
(b) PhibGrp 11 — redesignated as PhibGrp 3 (Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers).
(c) PhibGrp 12 and the FIFTH Amphibious Force were dissolved.

This completed the dissolution of all amphibious groups and forces in the Pacific not designated for the post-war organization, except PhibGrps 9 and 14, which were in the process of dissolution, and the 7thPhibFor, which was to be dissolved in the near future, on 23 December.

On 13 December, Vice Admiral W. W. Smith was relieved as Commander Service Force Pacific by Rear Admiral O. C. Badger, who was promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral with the assumption of his new duties.

On 15 December, Fleet Admiral C. W. Nimitz relieved Fleet Admiral E. J. King as Chief of Naval Operations.

On 16 December, Vice Admiral F. C. Sherman was detached as Commander First Carrier Task Force.

On 18 December, Rear Admiral J. J. Ballentine was detached as FLTLOSChAP, and Rear Admiral C. B. Momsen was directed to report as FLTLOSChAP in addition to his regular duties as SCAJAP, on 20 December.

On 19 December, Rear Admiral A. R. McCann relieved Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, Jr., as Commander Submarine Force Pacific.

On 19 December, Rear Admiral T. L. Sprague was directed detached from duty as ComCarDiv 3 for duty as Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

On 20 December, Rear Admiral J. W. Roper assumed command of BatDiv 1.

On 20 December, CNO directed CinCPac to establish in Japan a Naval Command to be known as Commander Naval Activities Japan, with the short title "ComNavJap", providing that this was satisfactory to the Supreme Commander. This command was to be comprised of the following activities:
(1) Naval Shore Radio Installation; (2) SCAJAP; (3) FLTLOSCAP; (4) Port Director Establishments; (5) In addition, the following administrative duties then being performed by ComFIFTH Fleet: Shipping control, harbor surveys, mail and courier service, administration of naval personnel ashore in the Empire, demilitarization of enemy naval equipment, control of landing ships and craft engaged in intra-Empire operations and of such other vessels and naval activities and facilities as might be assigned from time to time.

"ComNavJap" would be under Cincpac for administration and under SCAF for operational control. CNO indicated that Rear Admiral R. M. Griffin (with the temporary rank of Vice Admiral) would be ordered as "ComNavJap". The headquarters would be established ashore in the Tokyo or Yokosuka areas as determined by "ComNavJap" after his arrival in Japan and as agreeable to SCAP.

On 30 December, however, CNO modified his directive to Cincpac calling for the establishment of "ComNavJap", as follows:

(a) FLTLOSCAP and SCAJAP were to be excluded from the new command.
(b) FLTLOSCAP was to be continued under Captain Smith-Hutton until such time as it should no longer be considered useful or necessary.
(c) SCAJAP would continue to function as previously.

On 24 December, Major General A. F. Howard, USMC, relieved Major General L. C. Shepherd, USMC, as Commanding General 6th Marine Division.

On 25 December, Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick (ComBatLant until his detachment on 13 November) was directed to report to Cincpac for duty as Deputy Cincpac-Cincpoa upon the detachment of Vice Admiral D. C. Ramsey. This assignment would be in addition to his regular duty as Chief of Staff to Cincpac-Cincpoa, which he would assume upon the detachment of Vice Admiral C. H. McMorris on 28 December. Vice Admiral McMorris reported on the latter date to the Navy Department for further assignment.

On 27 December, the control of Ulithi Atoll passed to IsCom Peleliu. All naval activities on the atoll were disestablished and abandoned on that date, with the exception of LORAN and necessary aerological and communication facilities.

On 28 December, Rear Admiral C. B. Momsen was relieved by Captain H. H. Smith-Hutton as FLTLOSCAP, but retained his title of SCAJAP.


In accordance with Executive Order No. 9666, signed by the President of the United States on 28 December, The U.S. Coast (with certain exceptions provided for in the Executive Order) was released from service in the Naval Establishment, and administration thereof was returned to the Department of the Treasury, effective at 0500 GCT, 1 January 1946.
ANNEX B.

UNCLASSIFIED

General.

With the publication of this report on the Surrender and Occupation of Japan, the general distribution of analytical reports by Cinopac-Cinpoa will be discontinued. The last monthly report of the kind (for August 1945) covered operations through the cessation of actual hostilities. Although actual combat operations were not found necessary in accomplishing the occupation of the Japanese Empire, many features of that monumental task are of general interest to the Naval Service, and have therefore been covered in some detail in this report.

Certain other post-war operations, some of them of considerable scope, such as the continuance of minesweeping in the western Pacific (partially reported to date in this publication), the "Magic Carpet" operation, and coastal transportation of Chinese troops, are still in progress, and may continue for some time. Such activities, however, do not require general study by the naval service as a whole, and future reports by the task force commanders involved do not require general distribution. Developments ashore in the course of the occupation are generally the province of the Army commanders concerned. Analytical reports of these activities by Cinopac-Cinpoa do not, therefore, seem appropriate or of particular value.

Reports covering the early periods of the war, which were given only very limited distribution at the time, have been reprinted and given the same wide distribution as later reports, thus making available to most naval commands a fairly complete file covering the Pacific war. This file should be retained for future study. Attention is again called to the fact that all such reports have been downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL.

Use of these Reports in Future Research.

For the benefit and guidance of those who may in the future consult the files of these reports, either in search of specific items or for general historical research, it is desired to point out certain facts in connection with their preparation and distribution.

These monthly reports were compiled mainly from the written action reports or war diaries received from all ships, units, and echelons of command, although to some extent from dispatch information when written reports were not received in time. Every effort was made to insure accuracy in compiling Cinopac's reports, but in this respect they could not be better than the source materials in the action reports themselves, which were often prepared hurriedly by commanders who had little time to give to "paper work" while under the stress of continuous operations.

Similarly, an effort was made to give due attention in these reports to the part played by all participants in each action or operation, but this was not easy to do, owing to the vast number of ships and units concerned. The total of the reports received for a major operation, as for example that at Iwo Jima, including
reports from several hundred ships plus those from unit, group, and force commanders, might easily run to 30 cubic feet of typewritten manuscript without duplication. From this it may be realized how difficult it was to digest this mass and condense it into a readable report from Cincpac-Cincpoa of 50 or 100 pages, and at the same time give recognition to every participant. Scant mention of the part played by any ship or organization is therefore not to be construed as in any way minimizing it.

It must further be realized that Fleet Admiral Nimitz, as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, naturally did not make an official report of the operations of forces not under his command, such as those of the Southwest Pacific Areas under General of the Army MacArthur, of the Strategic Air Forces responsible to General of the Army Arnold, or of British naval forces in the Indian Ocean. This applies also to naval vessels assigned to the SEVENTH Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid whose immediate superior was General MacArthur, and to the vessels of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet which were originally under Admiral Hart and later under an Admiral of the United Netherlands Navy. Some operations of the foregoing forces are touched on in Cincpac-Cincpoa's reports merely on account of their relation to the whole Pacific situation, but these references are not to be considered complete and authoritative reports for those forces. It must therefore be understood that Cincpac's monthly reports do not purport to give complete coverage of the entire war in the Pacific Ocean, but only of the operations of forces which were under his command and only at the level of detail which was considered practicable and desirable.

Historians and analysts of the future should bear these facts in mind, and should therefore consult also the original source material in the action reports submitted by ships and commanders. Complete files of the action reports from all ships and commanders in the Pacific Fleet will probably be found only in the Navy Department, to which copies of all reports from every source were forwarded. Type Commanders, such as ComAirPac, ComCruPac, ComDesPac, ComSubPac, and ComPhibsPac should have copies from all vessels or units of the type for which they had cognizance. Intermediate seniors in the chain of command—the commanders of divisions and squadrons and of task forces, groups, and units—generally received copies from all commanders under them in any action or operation.

The report from Cincpac for the month in which any action or operation occurred is believed accurate as to the ships, units, and commanders participating; and should therefore afford a key for finding the individual reports from which it was compiled, and which may be consulted if more detail is desired.

The earlier Cincpac reports usually were headed by a list of references to action reports which were used as source material. Somewhat later, it was the practice to include a "bibliography" of source material. These lists may be found of some assistance in a search for any particular report.

With the growth of the Pacific Fleet, and the consequent expansion of operations, action reports became so numerous as to make such lists of references impracticable. The covering letters with which the original action reports were periodically forwarded to CNO, however, contain lists of them which may be consulted for file numbers, titles, etc. of the individual reports.