ITEM

153270

CTF 37 (BRITISH)

REPORT OF AIR & SURFACE STRIKES AGAINST THE JAPANESE EMPIRE, PREPARATION FOR AND INITIAL OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA, HONSHU, JAPAN, 6/28/45 TO 9/2/45
SECRET

Office of the Vice Admiral
Second in Command
British Pacific Fleet
1st October 1945

VAPYF No. 1092/44

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for your information reports from intelligence and authorities of the British Pacific Fleet who took part in the naval operations against Japan from 17th July until 2nd September, when the terms of surrender were formally signed.

A narrative of events, together with technical reports on gunnery, communications, aeroplane and fighter direction, are attached as appendices 1-5 to this letter.

2. As the overall picture of these final and unique operations of the 3rd Fleet shows, an overwhelming force of surface ships and naval air was brought to bear on a weakening Japanese Navy and Marine. That the British Pacific Fleet should have been a valuable substantial reinforcement is a source of gratification to us all, and the invaluable experience of participating in naval air operations on this grand scale will be of lasting benefit to the British Navy.

3. It was noted that the objectives of the 3rd Fleet were modified during the course of the operations, and that the remnants of the Japanese Navy and Japanese shipping were made the primary target rather than the remaining Japanese air strength. In the event, the plain fact stands out that, during those days, the Japanese Fleet was to all intents and purposes annihilated. It is difficult to see how, when the controls are lifted, it will be easy for Japanese militarists to whip up public enthusiasm for further military adventures or expenditure for any year.

In so far as their Fleet is concerned, these weeks should prove a considerable check to its morale, as well as to its reorganization, while the esteem in which the Japanese public hold their Navy at the beginning of the war is, I judge, nearly destroyed. The esteem was built up in the face of a not very ravelling, riveting, the Japanese Navy; its story at the beginning of the century, before the foolish hand of the Army costs was on them, was not unpalatable; it was still then inclined to copy the West in holding to a chivalrous attitude in sea warfare and it had gone some way to building a tradition to hold on to future generations, and this in a nation that had no naval tradition nor any word better than "sea soldier* to call its sailors. It will take more than words to re-establish in Japanese eyes, a Navy whose ending was so ignoble and so unequal. That is of some importance.

4. It was in itself inspiring to take part in a major operation where the plans were so flexible, and therefore adjustable, and where all forms of attack, whether air strike, bombardment, surface sweep, mine destruction, submarine operation or mining, all played their part at the right moment.

5. It was, however, a matter of great present anxiety to me that the number and speed of torpedoes available to the British Pacific Fleet did not allow enough to be kept permanently close to the scene of operations, and it was only by using every contrivance, coupled with a fair measure of good fortune, that we were, in fact, able to follow the changes of plan and the postponements due to weather, and still to use the part in every operation. In this I must give part or due to the Rear Admiral Fleet Staff in the ability to follow and anticipate the changes of plan and so warn his limited resources to the best advantage.

6. .........
6. I am in no doubt as to the great value of the broadcasting carried out, for whatever the results of scientific comparison of dead by air and land, the moral effect of sustained novel bombardment on our enemy was vast. I feel therefore no knowing whether the next one will come, in the event of our being engaged by an enemy air attack. The moral effect on the enemy would be immense. The bomb-burst and the “boss-bomb” would be effective if our forces were able to take advantage of them.

7. The situation of overseas theatre command of the British fleet was similar to that used during the Normandy operations, that is to say the Vice Admiral commanding the aircraft carrier squadrons assumed overseas command when aircraft from British carriers were in the air. The carriers under the command of Vice Admiral Victualling their efforts being the only ones never previously attempted in the British navy. The results soon proved that if had not been for the failure of the operation when 12th July was reduced to a “triumph” of the Allies in the closing stages of the operation, the remaining carrier appears to have made her presence felt right up to the last day.

8. In the Normandy operations, there is no evidence of the American lighter submarines and aircraft for everything that could be desired and the results obtained were of the highest order. Their values are not however to be measured solely by what they did, but by the great contributions they inspired in the events. In both these cases I am very grateful.

9. I would like to record now here my appreciation of the continuous co-ordination of the U.S. communication bases and in particular that of Lieutenant Commander J.B. Morris, U.S.N., who throughout all our operations, led the U.S. team in my behalf. The assistance given to me by Mr. D.C. Seaman, with whom I had been Senior Mission Officer to the British Pacific Fleet since the start of operation JUNEJUMP, was of outstanding value, and I am, as such, very grateful to him.

10. The entry into TOKYO harbour was a fitting climax to operations which had been planned and carried out for thousands of miles from their bases to arrive at the heart of Japan, and perhaps we all felt that we had at least contributed something towards her final defeat.

11. It is to be supposed that desultory engagements in both of our countries will now proceed at an ever increasing rate and time but few of those who have been obtained in the other and their single Commander, can hope to find themselves in that position again.

But I cannot come to this letter without saying something on the subject of which I know to be forecast in our climate - the hope that, even if those whom our future fleets are to meet are small or few, the two Nations will hold always these feelings towards each other which have been so manifest in those deciding weeks.

12. To me it has been a wonderful experience to see the growth of understanding, of respect and of sympathy, together with a frankness and openness running throughout which, was in no way continued to my single level in rank or rank. I cannot believe that this will........
that this will end as the last ships part enemy, but rather that something has been forced into between our two Fleets which neither politics, nor economics, nor short-sightedness, can break. To believe otherwise would suggest that these days have been in vain, and to that conception I am not prepared to subscribe.

So, looking back on all that has happened, I begin to see that the Britishmills is not the prize of the British contribution, or what we were able to do, but that it is our being a part of that for in which overarching everything else.

And since I hold that our Navies represent all that is best in our Nations, it seems but natural to me to believe that the Fleets under your command have left their mark in no uncertain way in a not very certain world. And this too I believe to be only the beginning.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

[Signature]

VICE ADMIRAL

Appendices

I = Narrative...p.45
II = Summary...p.42
III = Communications...p.44
IV = Report on enemy actions...p.49
V = Weather statement...p.60

Enclosures

1. S.O.1's No 0109/16/683 of 29th July 1945 - p.46
2. S.O.1's No 0109/16/923 of 23rd August 1945 - p.42
3. C.S.A.1's No 105 0730/3 of 25th August 1945 - p.44
4. Captain B.1's No 0117/7 of 10th September 1945 - p.42

[Signature]
Distribution

The Commander, United States 3rd Fleet - Covering letter.

The Commander, United States 5th Fleet - Covering letter.

The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet - Covering letter.

The Commander in Chief, British Pacific Fleet.

The British Admiralty Delegation, Washington.

The Fleet Officer Commanding, Naval Air, Pacific.

The Vice Admiral Commanding 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron, British Pacific Fleet.

The Vice Admiral Commanding Destroyers, British Pacific Fleet.

The Rear Admiral Commanding Fleet Tank, British Pacific Fleet.

The Rear Admiral Commanding 4th Cruiser Squadron, British Pacific Fleet.

The Rear Admiral Commanding 2nd Cruiser Squadron, British Pacific Fleet.

The Rear Admiral Commanding 30th Aircraft Carrier Squadron, British Pacific Fleet.

The Rear Admiral Commanding 1st Battle Squadron, British Pacific Fleet.

The Secretary, Australian Commonwealth Naval Board.

The Secretary, Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa.

The Secretary, New Zealand Naval Board.

Enclosures - 3 copies.

Enclosures - 1 copy.

Enclosures - 1 copy.

Enclosures - 1 copy.

Enclosures - 3 copies.

Enclosures - 2 copies.

Enclosures - 1 copy.

Enclosures - 2 copies.
On 28th June the British Pacific Fleet sailed from Singapore on its road northwards to a position 55° 50' North 140° 30' East and rendezvous there with the American Third Fleet before commencing Allied operations against Japan.

On arrival at 1100 on 14th July, the following signal was sent to the Commander Third Fleet reporting the British Pacific Fleet, now T.P. 37, ready for duty.

T.P. 37

Rear Admiral

Cominouchi, C. in C. R.N.R.

I hereby report T.P. 37 for duty with 3rd Fleet. We are most looking forward to this our first operation under your orders.

C.O. 040023g July

The following reply was received from Commander Third Fleet:

C.O. 37 (a) CinCOne Div. C.O. 36

Your 040023d acknowledged with pleasure. Please be prepared to board 040023f British destroyers at first rendezvous for operations conference. C.O. 38 will attend. I suggest you bring officers qualified to discuss detailed air plan.

E42407f July

On 6th July, after fueling the complete T.P. 37 sailed from 2005 for British S.P.T. (46° 10' North, 155° 50' East). Intensive exercises were carried out on exercise to the British fueling area which was reached on 15th July. Fueling there continued until the 19th when the Fleet proceeded to the rendezvous, sighting T.P. 38 early on 16th July. Its three tank groups were then oiling, the ship forming a striking line under cloudy weather.

In response to his welcome invitation, Vice Admiral W. H. S. G. St. George, Vice Admiral N.D.C., and their respective staff officers, boarded Admiral BEALE'S Flagship, the H.M.S. ARThUR, during the forenoon for a conference with his staff before sailing for operations on the next day. The principal points which were settled thereafter were the desire of the British to carry out operations in close co-operation with T.P. 38, conforming to their movements, and that it should take part in Similarly and Cruiser bombardments as well as in surface moves.

At 1600 T.P. 38 and T.P. 37 dispersed proceeding to the flying off position at 15 knots, course 250° and the two Allied fleets were at last in close company under the main Flag Officer Commanding. It may well be that 4 p.m. on the 16th of July, 1945 will prove a not unimportant milestone on the long road of the world's history.

The Fleet was formed in four groups in the order from North to South T.P. 37, T.P. 30.4, T.P. 30.3, and British Destroyers were detached for the first time.
OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 1 to WAR No. 1022/L. of 1st October, 1943)

PLANNING (Contd.)

Allied Objectives

The object of the Allied forces was to attack Japanese naval and air forces, shipping, shipyards, coastal and other objectives as and when assigned.

British Forces

The following British ships took part in the initial operations, H.M.S. COVENTRY (Flag of VICE-ADMIRAL), ANDALUSIA, H.M.S. FORTUNA (Flag of ROYAL)-H.M.S. JUPITER, H.M.S. LEITH, H.M.S. ALCESTER, H.M.S. COVENTRY (Captain PA), H.M.S. CLERMONT, H.M.S. SHORTHORNE, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS, H.M.S. WORCESTER, H.M.S. THOMAS JAMES (Captain ERRINGTON), H.M.S. GLOUCESTER, H.M.S. MALAYSIA, and H.M.S. ASWALD (Flag of ADC) to join later.

July 17th

Targets

The targets for the first two days' strikes were airfields, installations and shipping in the area north of TOKYO. At 0210 Toretsu and Kugehara (Fighter Direction Picket Destroyer Groups) were ordered by GDP 34 to proceed to their pre-arranged positions.

CAP and engaged Flown off

At 0530, in position 37° 10' North, 143° 19' East CAP and the first three armed strikes were flown off. At 0620 the fourth armed strike was flown off.

Ditched pilots recovered

At 0700 one of COVENTRY'S pilots baled out and was picked up by the U.S. Destroyer USS KNOX. Two other pilots baled out shortly afterwards and were picked up by destroyers from the screen. At 0950 Corair strike 5 and 6 flew off.

Press material

At 1130 an Avenger from VICTORIOUS passed press material to HMS COVENTRY by means of drop.

Mark position

36° 40' North, 143° 10' East.

Strikes cancelled

All targets assigned to T.P. 38 had been observed and the only two strikes flown off had been unable to find their targets. T.P. 37 aircraft found the weather over their targets slightly better although none were weathered out. As the day progressed the weather deteriorated and GDP 35 cancelled the remaining strikes.

Score for the day's strikes

Enemy losses

Destroyed

9 aircraft on the ground
1 Kansu
3 Locomotives
1 Junk sink

Damaged

9 aircraft on the ground
Kansu and attackers at HIRATA KASUHA SENTAI, KURASHIKI.

Sundry small craft
DESERT

OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 1 to W.A.T.V. No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

EXECUTIVE

(Contd.)

Conclusion

3 destroyers in contact to Flot, but pilots were saved.

3 destroyers in contact to Flot, but pilots were saved.

KING GEORGE V

At 1430 KING GEORGE V, screened by the destroyers

VANGUARD and VANGUARD

at 37° 54'.

Ships were detached from the main

body and joined the U.S. bombing group under Rear Admiral

Carr, taking up a position in line with and consisting of the battleships IOWA,

MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, NORTH CAROLINA and ALABAMA, together

with the cruisers MAJURA, DAVEN and 6 destroyers. On

joining the above force (X.U. 344.42) course and speed were

adjusted so as to arrive in the bombardment position at 2515.

The targets were in the coastal industrial area of

HITACHI (36° 43' North, 140° 43' East) and consisted of a

copper refinery, three engineering works, a steel factory and

an unidentified target (a factory), the latter being

allocated to KING GEORGE V.

Poor visibility

The weather in the target area was bad, low cloud,

heavy rain and visibility 3 to 5 miles, so that the

bombardment had to be carried out without the aid of

spotting aircraft. Navigation was by radar, Loran and

soundings.

The bombardment was opened at 2515 by KING GEORGE V at a mean

range of 14 miles, firing being continued until 0010 when

270 rounds had been fired. A similar amount was fired by

each of the five U.S. battleships, while the U.S. cruisers

engaged other coastal targets.

Withdrawal

No enemy opposition was encountered although hostile

aircraft were detected in the vicinity; at 0015 the

bombarding force retired unsighted at high speed to the

southward.

The following signal addressed to the bombarding force

was received from the Command 3rd Fleet:

Well done, which I pass on with the hope that the results

are what your performance deserves.

July 19th

Experiencing

Poor visibility.

Adverse weather

Adverse weather

Flying

Flying

Weather

Improves and flying

At 0040 the weather had improved a little, a CAP was

flown off, and at 1130 CET 30 ordered strikes to continue

flying off.
SECRET

OPERATIONS JUNE - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 1 to War Eff. No. 1032/14 of 1st October, 1945)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

INTELLIGENCE (Contd)

Decision to retire to a different fuelling position

Before flying commenced Commodore 3rd Fleet instructed that

owing to a typhoon threat in our next intended fuelling position, he would retire during the night to a new position, 31° 10' North 152° East for the fuelling on the 20th. As this meant leaving the operating area earlier than anticipated, the Commodore 3rd Fleet stressed the importance of the air strikes doing as much damage as possible in the limited time available.

At 1135 the first Seaman took off.

Mean position

35° 15' North, 142° 36' East

British

At 1217 a signal was made to the British oiling force to move forthwith to meet the Fleet in position 31° 40' North, 152° East at 0500 on 20th July, this position being 30 miles North of the new U.S. oiling position.

1230 - Second Seamen strike flown off.

1410 - Third Seamen strike flown off.

Bad weather

By 1530 the weather had again deteriorated and further strikes were cancelled.

Difficulties experienced

Throughout the afternoon difficulty was experienced in keeping in touch with TF 34.1 as the Fleet had to be constantly manoeuvred in an effort to find clear conditions in which to

fly the returning strikes, some of which were low in petrol.

The last strike was landed on at 1700.

At 1720 a bogey was reported high over Katcheg and U.S. fighters were sent out to intercept, but contact was not made with the aircraft owing to poor weather conditions.

CAP flown off

At 1750 a CAP of 4 Corsairs was flown off and were landed on again an hour later.

Score for the day

Enemy losses

Destroyed or probably destroyed

12 aircraft on the ground.

Destroyed

10 aircraft.

Wrecks, railway vans and hangars.

On loss in combat

2 aircraft, both pilots missing.

July 19th

CAP flown off

At 0545 a CAP was flown off but the weather deteriorating it was landed on again at 0520.
As the time schedule for Manning seemed likely to prove short, I asked permission from CTF 30 for 26-37 to proceed independently to the Manning area; this request being approved, course was set 120°; aged 50 knots.

From position
34° 15' North, 147° 50' East.

Time in
Repositioned
Area
At 0615, 17 July, the Manning rendezvous had meanwhile been shifted nearer to the next flying off position, the Commander 3rd Fleet intimated that the repositioned period would be extended 24 hours, i.e. until 1500 on 22nd July. This extension allowed the American ships to re-consolidate and was very acceptable to the British units, as it gave them time to get fully topped up with fuel from their slower turbine tankers.

As it was necessary for all tankers to refill at HST (1700 miles away), it had to be accepted from the outset that, with the small tanker available, and also of the "slow" type, it was only possible for the Harrold Admiral Commander Fleet Tanker to guarantee a total of 3 for each occasion of refuelling. To do this it would sometimes be necessary to forego consolidation and to send back non-vertue tankers to ensure the turn-around.

It was estimated that the average pumping capacity would allow 26-37 to be refuelled in 2 days of 14 hours daylight from 3 tankers.

Then Commander 3rd Fleet's full "Op Plan" was received during the passage north. It was realised that on two occasions a two-day refuelling, accompanied by long passage, was intended. Not HSTM, refuelling at SYRIAN, was therefore called forward, and the timely arrival of ORIO with her far higher pumping capacity and HSTT JUPITER helped to relieve the position. At the credit for the British force never making a days' operations east in the main to go to the typhoon area, remaining alterations to Commander 3rd Fleet's Plan, we gave us invaluable time.

July 20th

At 0220 the Commander Logistic Support Group was heard on the HST, but, as no contact was made by 0300, course was altered to the southward and a large group of vessels was sighted at 0300. These vessels turned out to be the British ciling group, as course was again altered to 170°.

At 0430 an attack was flown off to search for the British ciling group but shortly after it had flown off, vessels were detected to the east of the American Task Group. This proved to be the British ciling group.

The Force consisted of the carriers H.M.S. HOOD, H.M.S. AQUITANIA and H.M.S. WORLDS EDGE, the fresh replenishment shiit, H.M.T. HOPPER. Also, H.M.S. LIVERPOOL, H.M.S. PELICAN, H.M.S. ORION and H.M.S. TURKEY (Dras).

At 0830, 20 July, the repositioning operation was being conducted for the ciling group. The Force consisted of the carriers H.M.S. HOOD, H.M.S. AQUITANIA, H.M.S. WORLDS EDGE, the fresh replenishment ships, H.M.T. HOPPER, H.M.S. LIVERPOOL, H.M.S. PELICAN, H.M.S. ORION and H.M.S. TURKEY (Dras).

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

DECEAST


(Appendix No. 1 to OFFicials Weekly, 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945) 

DECEAST (Contd)

Oiling

Oiling continued at Sevastopol and AKLAK, HELLEND and UNDAUNTED began their R.O.S. routine round the Fleet.

Inter group mail service between ships of British

and American groups was ordered by CONS, GROVER being detached to collect correspondence from the American groups, whilst the U.S. Destroyer PENDLETON collected from the British Fleet.

Aircraft replenishment for the carriers was carried out by U.S. Navy.

Shorn position: 31° 20’ N, 150° 31’ W EST.

ABSENCE OF OIL SUPPLIES

Due to the fact that the British oilers were about 2,500 tons short of the amount required to fill ships of the British Fleet completely, and as I felt a distinct might prove very unpleasant later, I asked the Commander 3rd Fleet if he could recall three British cruisers. This request was immediately granted and WALES, WYVERN and HURICAN were directed to proceed to fuel from 7200, the U.S. 1st Logistic Group.

NAVIN

Wounded

The WOUNDED reported that her steering gear had broken down and KING GEORGE V took her in tow whilst her crew was required on board the Flagship. At 1820 the tow was released and NAVEN was instructed to continue the tow for the night.

HELLEN

Discontinued

At last light Helenny was discontinued, remaining in touch with the oiling force throughout the night.

July 21st

Oiling resumed

At 0430 oiling was resumed. OILENY operating on "O" Link with 32 RNl.

HELLEN

UNDAUNTED, HELLEND, and HURLER continued the U.S. routine transferring stores, correspondence, mails, press correspondents etc. to ships of the Fleet.

NAVIN

Required parts were fitted in NAVEN during the day.

Conference

Admiral GROVER with his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral CHILTON, and other U.S. Staff Officers arrived on board HEAVY CARRIER "ATLAS" for a conference, which included A.H.L. and A.E.O. This visit gave officers and men of my Flagship a valuable opportunity of seeing their Commander-in-Chief.

Shorn position: 30° 20’ W, 160° 30’ EEST.

APPEARANCE DUTY

No VISIT, having completed her aircraft replenishment duties, was called for U.S. nor escorted by "ATLAS". The future programme of the Fleet was not sufficiently clear to show that the paying capacity of the tankers could not always fuel the British Pacific Fleet in the time available even without heavy casualties. It was evident that by some means or other the capacity must be increased and I therefore instructed the Rear Admiral Commanding, Fleet Train to call attention as soon as possible after her arrival with all available aircraft replenishments and, at the same time, either with support from intern as that she could be used as an auxiliary "oiler." NAVEN was informed she would also be required for similar duty.
DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 1 to M.S.P. No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

LOGISTICS (Cont'd)

Missed April 27th

From

Doolin

After the three destroyers escorted by FURIOUS and
DOLLER disengaged and proceeded to KILOSTOK to refuel.

July 23rd

Replenishment

In order to maintain the destroyers who had the least
fuel capacity in a topped up condition, KING GEORGE V fueled
HINDE, HEPZIBAH, and KANGAROO.

KANGAROO supplied fresh provisions to HINDE, HEPZIBAH,
CALM and KING GEORGE V.

Conference on

July 24th

Together

KING GEORGE V

At 1045, the Rear Admiral Commanding Destroyers and the
Rear Admiral Commanding Fourth Cruiser Squadron were on board
KING GEORGE V for a conference with the Vice Admiral, Second-
in-Command, British Pacific Fleet.

Moon position

20° 43' North, 143° 33' East.

During the afternoon and evening the Fleet was
manoeuvred to maintain station with TF 30 groups and at 2000
picket destroyers were sent to their night positions.

KANGAROO sailed

H.M.S. DODGE with escort HINDE was sailed for
KILOSTOK; I was in no way willing to have this stout hearted
pug in the middle of the Pacific during the typhoon season.

July 23rd

Destroyers

During the early hours of the morning the American
timber continued topping up with fuel and opportunity was
taken to top up THUNDER, ULYSSES and UNICORN from KING
GEORGE V, FINLAND and FROSTY respectively.

Fueling was continued throughout the afternoon with
HORNET AND ULYSSES acting as additional "oilers" and
topping up THUNDER, THUNDEROUS, GRENVILLE, UNICORN,
HERCULES, NILE, and DUBLIN.

Moon position

25° 07' North, 135° 37' East

Fleet proceeds

During the afternoon and throughout the night the Fleet
proceeded towards the next day's flying off position,
manoeuvring as necessary to conform with the movements of
TF 30.

July 24th

Picket's rejoin

At 0120 the night picket destroyers rejoined.

Suicide strike

At 0145, in position 30° 51' North, 135° 11' East, the
first strike took off to attack airfields in the northeast
of TOLEDO.

General strike

Launched

At 0545 strike No. 2 was launched against the airfields
of TOLEDO. This was the first combined strike of the day.
OCTOBER-JULY-AUGUST

(Appendix No. 1 to J.A.O.F.A. No. 1052/24 of 1st October, 1945)

WARFACED (contd)

1st strike
The second combined strike, strike No. 3, was flown off at 0345 and was aimed at the shipping including a U.S.S. in SHIMIZU IN (North BAYOU)

4th strike
Strike No. 4, a combined strike again, flown off at 1145 and struck at JACUMO airfields.

Moon position
31° 44' North, 135° 16' East.

Last strike
The fifth and last strike of the day was flown off at 1445, aimed to attack the U.S.S. which had already been hit in the previous strike, as well as other shipping targets in the UMO area. In addition to the above combined strikes, individual strikes were flown against airfields and shipping targets in the area, 416 sorties being flown throughout the day, an "all time high" for Royal Naval Aviation.

All strikes landed on
All strikes have landed on by 1745.

All destroyer pilots moved out to their positions and the Bush was landed on at 1945.

Aircraft in operation
The Force did not disengage from the operating area for the night, point Optima course and speed being 060° 6 knots towards the flying off position for the next day. TF 37 was announced throughout the night so as to conform with the movements of the U.S. groups who were maintaining a 12-hour night fighter.

Score for the day

Every target

Destroyed
18 aircraft on ground
3 hangars
1 freighter transport, a small tanker, and a number of barges and junks sunk.

Probably destroyed
2 aircraft on the ground.

Dropped
31 plus aircraft on the ground, 1 ROM class escort carrier hit by many bombs and her bow believed to be broken.
Aircraft factory and a shipyard.
Train ferry, destroyers, many junks and barges shot up.

Aircraft losses in combat
4 aircraft

July 29th

Last strike off
The targets for the strikes were similar to those of the previous day and the first strike was flown off at 0330 in position 32° 14' North, 135° 16' East.
3rd strike: At 0610 a combined strike against shipping, barracks and installations at 1004 and 2306 was flown off, but this proved abortive because of bad weather.

4th struck: The primary target of the third strike, which was flown off at 0710 was shipping and installations at 1001.

5th strike: The fourth strike against TOSUKU riots, took off at 1100.

Further strikes cancelled: Owing to the weather over the targets deteriorating, the rest of the day's strikes were cancelled and the strike landed on at 1400.

Locn position: 32° 19' North, 136° 30' East.

False alarms: At 1400 the Force was alerted because of booby traps; no investigation these turned out to be a Fortress and a harbor.

Fleet withdrew: The Fleet withdrew during the afternoon towards the fuelling area.

Enemy detected: An unidentified aircraft was detected at 1735 and the Fleet was again alerted. It climbed the Fleet at great height and evaded the initial fighters which were vectored out. It was ultimately shot down at 1915 by fighters of TR 30

Parachutes shot down: Parachutes and balloons shot down: At 1900, just before landing on, a fighter shot down a parachute with a black box attached and some balloons. It is thought that the black box may have been a V/1700 dropped by the attacker.

More boats detected: Between 1042 and 1055 three groups of boats were detected coming from the North East (East of TOKYO) at 20,000 feet above and steering directly for the Task Force. Day fighters were being loaded on and TR 37 had only a few boats in the air. Night fighters took off from the American night carrier.

Three boats shot down: The first group closed straight in and was intercepted at 20,000 feet heeled by the four British night fighters. They reported an aircraft carrying torpedoes, three of which were shot down but the fourth made off believed damaged.

2nd group: The second and larger group worked round to the North and appeared to be in the neighborhood of the Task Force. One was shot down by American night fighters and the rest of the formation broke up after being engaged by gunfire from the picket destroyers. The 3rd group had turned away at 60 miles and no further attack developed.

Screen clear: The screen was clear by 2000.

Flak and M. Gun fire: At 2000 three picket destroyers were sent out M. M. GUN fire acting as pickets with 70 30's.

Established: The Force manoeuvred to conform with the movements of
TO 36 throughout the night, course being set for the fuelling area, speed 24 knots.

It had been intended to send on some cruisers and destroyers ahead of the main body so that they could start fuelling at daylight, but this was cancelled owing to the need for naval support in the bright moonlight conditions prevailing and, as the fleet had been sighted, the possibility of further attacks developing.

**Emergency losses**

**Destroyed**

2 aircraft on the ground.

Several small cargo vessels, and many junks, barges and small craft sunk.

Buildings, hangars, factories, a wireless station and a lighthouse destroyed or damaged.

**Probably destroyed**

One large and three medium freighter transports, and thirteen coasters including one small oiler and two corvettes.

**Burned**

6 Aircraft

Sunday shipping and buildings.

**Own losses in action**

**July 26th**

**Composition of oiling force**

0555 - Aircraft reported the oiling force bearing 150° 52 miles. The force consisted of the oilers CEDARDALE, CASSIA, SAYSABER, EAGLEDALE, V.B.T.S. GLAMISNEY, SAMMIKON ship HUNTER DONER, CRSA STEWART, JESLO STRIKER, ASCORTS RIVIERS, CARY, MATEM, XOMAN, NEAL, HAMIT, PHARLEY, TONET, PETE, LADCAST, EHRAD and MINIAD. OIL ARMOYANT, as relief for OILVALE, and with OIL2 on board was also not.

At 0600 oilers were formed up on the oiling course and fuelled commenced from a force which had been assembled as follows:- CASSIA, hurriedly converted at SYDNEY for above oiling only and now making her first appearance as a Fleet attendant oiler; EAGLEDALE, required at 04 hours at NEWEN after arriving from COLACO via the TORRES STRAIT with speed down to 2½ knots owing to a foul bottom and engine defects; SAYSABER, who had been ordered to proceed at best speed to refuel KANGAROO after her first fuelling on the passage North, and was now back to make a fourth oiler with CEDARDALE, who was the one experienced tanker of the party. EAGLEDALE proved able to fuel from one side only, and with a single hose astern, but just experienced her own the wisdom of not looking; light horses in the south.

**Conference in BEMOUS**

0930 - HEAL closed CONFERENCE V to take the Vice Admiral and staff officers to BEMOUS for an operational conference with the Commander 3rd Fleet. The past and forthcoming operations were discussed.
OPERATING JULY - AUGUST

(appendix No. 1 to ADMR No. 10/14 of 1st October, 1945)

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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

1700 - The Vice Admiral and staff officers returned from DUNKERQUE.

Fueling continued until 1030 when the Fleet disengaged from the fueling power remaining just ahead of the oriskan throughout the night.

July 27th

Oilers resumed Fuelling recommenced at 0015. As it had seemed evident that the oilers could not hope to complete the British ships in the available time, I had been forced once again to ask Admiral STANLEY for help which was at once forthcoming. Accordingly LINTON and MT FORREST who had been acting as the link between the two Fleets throughout the night, joined 34 of 35 kilos to 104. This brought the number of our vessels within 20 up to the official five and I tried hard to make you believe that there would be no further difficulties, but the prospect of the next day's offshoot following back was greeted, disturbingly close.

29/30 Operating Summary

General - HMAS STUART closed with HMAS VICTORIOUS, a total of 96 shells and 150 cases of ordnance being transferred.

VICTORIOUS and VICTORIOUS were detached for D.S.A. distribution to the Fleet.

0600 - At the request of the Commander Third Fleet, the Squadron Commander Offshore visited HMAS ANCHOR to discuss the subsequent long schedule to take place on the 29th.

0800 - HMAS BANBURY and HMAS BAAL advance to be fuelled by the fueling power.

1200 - In DUNKERQUE went over to fill on the 3rd Fleet in HMAS.

Moon position

20° 36' North 13° 54' East.

CT 3 ordered the Fleet to disengage from the fueling force at 1200, to 37 kilos with the exception of MT FORREST and 5 oilers who had not completed fuelling - they rejoined the Fleet at 1400.

Ship Movements after Fueling:

On completion of fueling, UBENDI sailed for ESCALANTE, then 26/27 and HUNI for HUNI, closing QM on route to HUNI in press matter.

26/27 and HUNI, after consolidating cargo into C. HUNI, sailed for HUNI, escorted by HUNI and ESCALANTE.
OPERATIONS JULY – AUGUST

(Assignment No. 1 to WTP No. 109/24 of 1st October, 1945)

MEDITATION (Contd)

The Fleet was unescorted by EVM and BARRATT sailed for
enroute to Roland and return to Service Area. EVM joined up
July 20th

The targets set for the day's strikes were aircraft, air installations, and shipping in the Eastern Inland Sea area.

At 0645, in position 31° 56' North, 135° 11' East, a
second strike was flown off.

VICTORIOUS' flight deck was out of action due to lift trouble but by 1145, when the
fourth strike was due to fly off, it was again in action.

1000 - VICTORIOUS reported that her flight deck was
out of action due to lift trouble but by 1145, when the
fourth strike was due to fly off, it was again in action.

CFL 34 had instructed all strikes to be landed on by
1500, and the fifth and last strike, which was scheduled to
return at 1730, was flown off at 1145. In addition to the
above combined strikes individual strikes were flown against targets in the area.

FORCES WITHDRAW

1915 - The force withdrew at 23 knots, course 190°
until 1930 when course was altered to 150°. The following
signal was received from Commodore Fleet on the day's operations:

"Mark well the 20th July. To Damo and Lifeguard, to C.P. and men of the surface ships, to the valiant
British force on the right flank, well done. For the
great flying fighters who fought it out over Japan to
a smashing victory I have no words that can add to
the glory of the factual record they wrote with their
courage, their blood, and their lives. WING COMMANDER."

A great deal seemed to have happened since 12 days ago
when the two fleets passed the first milestones together.

RESULT OF DAY'S STRIKE

Aircraft destroyed
6 aircraft on the ground.

Shipping sunk
3 small cargo vessels,
Several small ships and many junks.

SHIPPING probably sunk
2 large merchant ships,
1 smaller ship.
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SECRET
OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 1 to WASH No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

AIRCRAFT ATTACK
14 aircraft on the ground.

BOMBING AND INSTALLATIONS ATTACKED.

Many ships of various sizes including 3 destroyers of Destroyer escorts and numerous junks, barges, etc. Several shore installations.

Own losses in combat

0 aircraft (one pilot and aircraft lost)

JULY 23th

Hiro strike

No air strikes were planned for the day and the Fleet continued to withdraw throughout the afternoon.

Destroyers

0550 - the three destroyers UDEN, UNEBA and UNEBA, who were to accompany the bombing force against RUMBAU that evening, topped up with fuel from KING GEORGE V, HMAS MELBOURNE and HMAS respectively.

AT 0930, KING GEORGE V with UDEN, UNEBA and UNEBA, forming TUs 370 and 371, detached from the main body to join the American bombardment group, TUs 344 and 345, under Rear Admiral Job C. STERN in SOUTH RUPP, Station was kept 5 miles East of TU 344 until 1300 when a reharmon of the intended deployment was carried out.

Mon position

30° 49' North, 130° 15' East.

Approach to target

2007 - Lend detected by radar bearing 160° 60 miles.

2200 - The force ran into fog whilst deploying to the bombard. On turning back to the approach course, UNEBA and UNEBA collided. UNEBA after first reporting that she had stopped, later signalled that she could proceed at slow speed. UNEBA, who had sustained superficial damage only, was ordered to escort UNEBA back to the rendezvous at 0400. TU 344, 345 promptly and generously offered two of his destroyers to act as screen, but shortly afterwards UNEBA reported that her damage was not as severe as had been imagined and that she could maintain the necessary speed.

The bombardment

KING GEORGE V's target was the Japanese Musical Instrument company, now reported to be manufacturing aircraft propellers. Fire was opened at 2119. By this time the weather was good, bright moonlight and a clear sky enabling the air spotter to be employed successfully. The first salvo was reported by the spotting aircraft as being on the target, the remaining salvoes falling well in the target area. 265 rounds of 15 were fired and large fires were started which were pleasingly visible from the ship. The spotting aircraft reported that four buildings had been fired and that other results could not be assessed owing to smoke. No opposition was met, either from enemy aircraft or from shore batteries. UDEN had two short, if spirited blind engagements with possible groups of small craft which, although nothing was sighted, were reported as having turned back under fire. It seems likely these were fishing craft.
July 30th

Arms received
At 0030 30th July the Raumard Force withdrew at 23 knots, course 200°.

Possible Action
Several stations were reported in the vicinity of the Force, and at 0105 the ship went to Finish Red. No attack materialised however and at 0135 Flash White was passed.

British ships subjected
0430 - TU 37.1.2 was detached from TU 34.3.1 and steamed to rejoin TU 37.

Flying
The same flying programme as for the 28th was carried out against targets in South East and Inland and weather unfortunately thwarting out the first two attacks.

Submarine report
HMSIE reported a disturbance and bubbles in the water in position 33° 40' North 138° 05' East and at 0023 HUNTER and SHADOW were formed into a "hunter killer" group to investigate.

Friendly ship
At 0903 HUNTER reported that the cause of the disturbance in the water was a friendly ship and the group was ordered to rejoin.

Moon position
33° 30' North 138° 30' East.

Fleet probably reported by enemy aircraft
During the afternoon enemy aircraft were reported in the vicinity of the Fleet and although one smasher was shot down by British aircraft, it is almost certain that the Fleet was sighted and reported.

Air
At 1603 a Smasher was detected closing rapidly from the North and Flash Red was made.

Radar contact
At 1623 the Smasher, a Focke, was shot down by British fighters.

AT 17

Discharge
At 1817, all strikes having landed on, permission was given for TU 37 to disengage to the eastward and retire independently to the Fuelling area. This was done to attempt to gain additional fuelling time on the planned period of 24 hours called for a very tight program.

Losses for day

Heavy losses

- 6 aircraft
- 1 oil tank, 1 locomotive, warehouses etc.

Ship sunk
- 2 destroyers

Ship probably sunk
- 1 cruiser
- 1 large transport
- 1 small freighter
- 2 small coasters
- 4 barges
- 3 Nebel Kranen


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OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Atlantic L. 1 to W. L. 20, 1698/14. of 1st October, 1944)

CAPTURE (Cont.)

Fleet
6 aircraft on the ground
2 commanders and various shore installations

Fleet Action
1 DESTROYER class destroyer
2 other destroyers
3 old destroyers
4 destroyer escorts
1 landing freighter
several small vessels

Can lesse in action
3 aircraft - all pilots missing

July 1st

Contact made with 6205 aircraft off to search for the oilers
and at 0710 the oiling force was reported bearing 15° 61'

1000 - 20 37 commenced fuelling from an Logistic Group
U.S. Los Angeles continued to close TO 30

Ex position

The force consisted of the oilers MASS AGAMEMNON
CASPIA, CANADIAN, and U.S. KING, the ammunition ship
DISTANT JAMES and J. H. EDDY, the ammunition ship
LUTCHER, W. J. H. EXECUTIVE, radar maint. ship
AGASSIS, COLUMBUS, GRIFFIN, ULYSSES, BOWERS TUSCAN, SAVAGE, COLUMBUS,
FRED, VEDDER, WOODWARD, FOWLER, CLEWS and SOUTHERLAND

 AUG 1st

Ex position

1000 - HMT AGAMEMNON alongside the MASS AGAMEMNON
and commenced a fuelling 11' operation. In all, a total of
60 shells and 64 cases of ordnance were embarked successfully,
but it was necessary in the existing conditions of sea and
wind to keep head to the wind for the entire period of
embarkation. This tended to open the distance from the
next group and it was necessary to maintain the touch, ULYSSES
and WHITBY being sent out as links.

Ex position

U.S. MASS AGAMEMNON, SOUTHERLAND and FOWLER were detailed
for A.D. duties.

By position

20° 01' North 139° 00' East

Typhoon

The proximity of a typhoon reported to be moving towards
the CHINE coast along approximate latitude 31° North, gave
rise to a certain amount of thought lest it should curve
towards the mainland, and, as it happened, however reports
received throughout the day indicated that the typhoon was
moving slowly N.W., which made the situation less dangerous.
In order to give the storm as wide a berth as possible and to
the possible risk of delaying the strike schedule, the
Commander 3rd Flot ordered all groups to change course to
the South at midnight.
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By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

JUNE
OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST
Page 16

(Appendix No. 1 to V.JAY No. 1002/4 of 1st October, 1945)

FUELING (Contd.)

A difficult

A confused small craft made it difficult to determine the
best course for fuelling. Oilings commenced at 0620 on a
course of 120° and shifted ultimately to 190° which course
also allowed us to keep better touch with the American
groups who were fueling on 190°.

R.S.L.

SHENANDOAH, KENTUCKY, NORTH, KANSAS CITY and
SUNITAN dealt with the R.S. - E. runs between SE - SW ships,
whilst AUGUSTA was detailed to transfer correspondence to
MISSOURI and MICHIGAN.

noon position

27° 15' North, 139° 13' East

groups proceed
to fujikawa

With the typhoon still threatening the fueling
positions, the Commander Task Force 38 ordered all groups
to proceed to area KM 205 (29° North 137° East) and to
remain there, replenishing as necessary, until further
orders.

PLCST DISAGREE

Course was altered to 210° the Commander Logistic
Support Group being ordered to maintain 10 knots throughout
the night. Shortly before the PLCST disagreed however it
was learnt that TG 34,1 was making good 140°, 13 knots and
the course of the tankers was altered to 190° to conform.
Even at 10 knots however the AUGUSTA could not maintain
the necessary speed on account of the small and speed had to
be reduced to 8 knots. ZE.6 links with OIC60 were maintained
during the night in addition to those required to maintain
touch with TG 34,1.

AUGUST 2nd

tankers consolidate
cargo

In order to keep the tanker cycle going, it was
necessary to discard two of the four tankers as soon as
possible so as to give them time to load and return.
Instructions were given to OIC60 to consolidate cargoes at
first light, OIC10 GOVERNOR into OLGA and CARILLA into
OIC13 KINS.

Fueling

OIC30 - VICTORIOUS and IMMACULATE went alongside the
oilers for fuel and stores whilst the destroyers were topped
up. PORTLAND ashored bombs from OIC10, and VICTORIOUS
as soon ashored bombs from ROBERT MURPHY.

Provisioning:

OIC10, KINS GEORGE Y and BLACK BADGE drew provisions
from ELDORADO.
NARRATIVE (Contd.)

R-DEP On the 12th NO 15C and ORP CRUISER were sailed for D.2.3. station within the Force whilst QUALITY went to the Commander 3rd Fleet with correspondence.

Main position

Fueling

Completed and other

Refueled

TIE links

Strike postponed and

Fueling position changed

Nivdite to back up carriers on 3rd

Embarkation of bands

At first light VICTORIOUS commenced embarking bands from ROBERT MARSH in accordance with previous instructions. As before this demanded a steady course in the swell, which on this occasion meant that TF 37 had to steer West while the American groups were on a westerly course.

0330 - QUALITY topped up with fuel from KING GEORGE V.

With the strike day postponed until the 5th, the outlook on the fuelling situation as regards the British units was very disturbing and the following signals were made to TF 37.
SECRET
OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 1 to VAPNO No. 1092/71, dated 27th October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

TG 35.1
from C.T.P.

Message was received last night saying that next strike day was postponed to August 5th at earliest.

2. The oil position will be very acute when we oil on the 6th, and the utmost economy must be observed.

3. In any case the tankers on the 8th do not hold enough to fill up the Fleet.

and later

TG 35.1
from C.T.P.

Fuel position. Conservative calculations suggest that destroyers, except "Ta" should arrive at next fuelling position with a comfortable 0 tons in hand; "Ta" will be on their diesel, and NAPIER burning condite.

2. Somehow we must contrive to top up destroyers although the time table at present is very tight.

3. KING GEORGE V and heavy cruisers are to be prepared to oil destroyers from 0500 tomorrow Saturday.

IMG 030602Z August

Noon position
25° 10' North, 136° 27' East

Fleet manoeuvred in company with American group,
During the afternoon the Fleet rejoined the American group manoeuvring to conform with their movements. But the outstanding problem remained - how to keep reasonable station in the Task Force and yet fuel destroyers.

August 4th

Destroyers top up 0900 - Commoed fuelling destroyers from KING GEORGE V, ACHILLES, NEWFOUNDLAND, and GAMBIA. By 1015, TROUBRIDGE, TENACITY, TERRAPLAN, TEALIE, TERRIFICORE, NAPIER, UNDAUNTED and UNDEED had been dealt with. By then a "fuel remaining" balance had been struck between cruisers and destroyers.

Noon position
29° 02' North, 135° 53' East

Strike plan and change of fuelling position
About 1330, the Commander 3rd Fleet notified the Fleet that the next strike day would be on the 5th and that this change of plan required fuelling on 6th August in position 33° 36' North, 147° East. The British oiling force was diverted accordingly, and a disturbing problem resolved for this occasion.

B.F.P.L.O. to 3rd Fleet visits to KING GEORGE V
At 1000 the U.S. Destroyer BENLUM transferred the B.F.P.L.O. to the Commander 3rd Fleet, Commander Le Puma, to KING GEORGE V to discuss the general situation with the Vice Admiral, BENLUM joining the Task Force for the night.
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Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

(Records No. 1 to 3, P. W., 15/92/11 of 1st October, 1945)

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NAVIGATION (Contd)

11. July 4th

Arrival

2030 - C.S.N. S.M.N. D.O.M. arrived alongside H.M.S. GEORGV and entered the H. D.A.S. to the Commander 1st Fleet.

Flying training was carried out during the forenoon by the aircraft carriers.

Position

51° 00' North, 142° 35' East.

Course and speed

During the afternoon and evening course was maintained towards the British Pacific Fleet.

August 6th

Piloting

Piloting resumed at daylight and continued throughout the day at H.M.A.N. and C.O.M. with auxiliary off-take.

Composition of Force

The following comprised the Logistic group-

The off-take from C.S.N. S.M.N. D.O.M. to


Note

H.M.A.S. HUNTER, DUNCAN, TUG, A.G.L., H.M.A.S. DORADO and H.M.A.S. BEVERLY were detailed for R.A. duties, distribution of mails, transfer of personnel etc.

Position

35° 17' North 147° 51' East.

Piloting (Contd)

The work had been done on the 6th with no hold up; in the main, piloting was completed by 1800 (except for H.M.A.S. DORADO, C.O.M. and C.O.M. H.M.A.S. BEVERLY the remainder of the day was available for any further opportunity for keeping up with oil or provisions.)

Supplies of type of Armament

H.M.A.S. DORADO, C.O.M. C.O.N. H.M.A.S. BEVERLY, C.O.M. DORADO were sailed for H.M.A.S. with instructions to join H.M.A.S. and the composition ships at daylight on 7th August and fuel then before they too retired to F.J.U.I. These ships formed into a fast and a slow group on completion of piloting, and proceeded south on the 7th August. H.M.A.S. HUNTER, was for refit at H.M.A.S. as per orders received via C.O.M. so that urgent correspondence from the Vice Admiral, Western Pacific Fleet could be given to the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet who was at that time conferring with Admiral NELSON at his headquarters.

Amount of stores

Before she sailed, C.O.M. C.O.N. reported that during her stay with the Fleet, she had provisioned 77 ships and discharged 422 tons of stores at an average rate of 75 tons per hour - a very satisfactory contribution to the well being of the Fleet.
The force remained in convoy with the American task group, manoeuvring as necessary.
OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Agurize No. 1 to Vical No. 1032/1 of 1st October, 1945)

SUMMARY

(Request No. 1 to Vical No. 1032/1 of 1st October, 1945)

Interim (Cont.)

August 9th

At 0915 HU 37.10 consisting of 314 in HUNTER, CHARD, TOPIC, TITANIC, TITANIA and THISTLE were detached to join the U.S. escorting group which was scheduled to carry out a bombardment of somewhere that afternoon.

The targets for the air strikes were the same as those planned for the previous day, and aircraft were launched at 0610, 0910, 1010, 1110 and 1110 from the British flying off position 37° 43' North, 14° 9' 21' East.

The Commander 3rd Fleet intimated that the fueling position for the 11th had been altered, which necessitated a quick diversionary signal to the fueling group to proceed forthwith to position 34° North 160° East.

Moon position

37° 43' North 15° 50' East.

Russia declared war on Japan, and the second atomic bomb had been dropped by American and 2nd atomic aircraft on HONSHU.

As a result of the news that Russia had declared war on Japan, the Commander 3rd Fleet made the following signal:

In support of Russian attack TP 30 will continue operations against enemy air forces, aircraft installations, and targets of opportunity in Northern JAPAN, HOKKAIDO, for at least 2 days after 15th August. Continue present attacks tomorrow, fuel 11th and strike 12th and 13th in accordance with plan to be issued later. TP 37 advise us as to capabilities of TP 37 to participate.

DTE 090133 August

The answer was not only to give the targets lay any miles to the North and it had been the intention, after the strike on the 10th, for TP 37 to withdraw to Sydney etc., to replenish prior to OMEGA. Yachts movements to suit this were already under way and the refitting and replenishing programme had no time margin. I judged however that we must do our utmost to sustain an all out effort at this critical moment even if it meant that we could not be ready in quite such full strength for the first few days of OMEGA. As I knew too that the American oil position prevented our fueling from then in any quantity and that therefore our contribution could only be limited. The following reply was therefore made to the Commander 3rd Fleet:

While we cannot stay the whole course at full strength, I am diving at doing a full ton 12th.

2. After this, carriers and others must leave, but I hope to retain one GROUSE and 1 - 50 cruisers and destroyers for bombardment on 13th provided we can motor under your OIC.

3. Request approval.

DTE 091332 August
It was tragic to have to haul out but the oil situation made it inevitable. To remain for the bombardment introduced the risk that half of the screening destroyers would only make MANUS under tow. I saw no objection to that.

The Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet was informed of the programme as follows:-

C-in-C B.P.F. (R) CTF 111 from CTF 37

Present intention is one more strike day on the 12th then return. No more oil.

DOD 100307Z August

The Rear Admiral Fleet Train was also informed of the intended movements of the Fleet in the following signal:-

CTF 112 (R) CTF 111, C in C B.P.F.

A.C.I., S.B.N.O. MANUS CTF 37

Intend strike on 12th after fuelling 11th also possible strike on 13th. Then embark all remaining fuel and proceed South by most direct route to MANUS, perhaps in two groups separated by one day.

2. Sail forthwith WAVE GOVERNOR and next two available oilers through position 06° 00' North, 175° 12' East then to position 29° 00' North, 162° 00' East and await arrival of Task Force 37 groups or other instructions.

3. If necessary whole force will enter MANUS to fuel. Retain all mail at MANUS.

4. CTF 112 report intentions.

5. Signal routing instructions.

DOD 091430Z August

It seemed to be taking certain risks with the tanker position for WAVEGO but I judged it imperative to do so.

Dunk, the afternoon several bogies were splashed over the neighbouring American groups and one of the Tomcat destroyers was hit by a suicide.

The bombarding force returned and was in station soon after dunk when a following report on the bombardment was received from CTF 37.

2. Admire air spotter 2 from GLORIA from SOUTH DAKOTA and called for KIAOUTLAND destruction and large fire in TMA who reported much loot area.

3. Destroyers engaged opportunity targets.

4. No enemy reaction during bombardments.

5. Several bandits engaged during retreating - 1 shot down.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

JUXT

OCTOBER 1941 - AUGUST

(Appellate No. 1 to 1941 14 14 of 1st October, 1941)

INTELLIGENCE

THE Force amounted to 1500, speed 22 knots, and 2255 course was reviewed to bring the Fleet back to the operating area.

MAJOR NO. ONE

Delta

Airplane

4x aircraft on the ground (includes 17, probably destroyed and 11 shared with 30,)

Fighting and a few at MACMILLAN. 2 reconnaissance and freight craft.

At this stage:

2 destroyers (shared with 30)

1 30 destructor

1 sub chaser

1 freighter transport

2 small craft

2 launchers

(These ships were shared with American aircraft)

At this stage:

2 destroyers (shared with 30)

1 torpedo boat and two small craft.

Aircraft and installation destroyed

22 aircraft on the ground

Various ground installations.

Aircraft Aerial

1 30 destructor

2 destroyers

1 30 destructor escort

1 freighter transport

Very small craft including 9 coasters and 5 launchers.

Aircraft in action:

7 aircraft with 5 pilots missing.

AUGUST 10th

By air strike.

The air plan was a repetition of that of the previous day and all attacks throughout the day were flown off on schedule in poor weather - conditions over the targets were however, much better.

Machine defects were reported in KBG 300 which although of low standing had been repaired during the last few days. Since two ships were concerned I decided that the flight from an additional transport unit in the bombardment operation planned for the 13th. I accordingly notified the Commander 3rd Fleet in my 1000000 August

Due 3rd Fleet

From: ONS 37

Note: 11/0425, 504-202. Going to machine defect KBG 300 V is due to conclude from taking part in bombardment on 13th.
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3. I am advised therefore that T.S. 37 must retire after completion of operation on the 12th. DCG 1000912, August

Mission position: 15° 01' North, 160° 25' East.

Typhoon warning

During the afternoon a typhoon warning was received and at later reports gave its position as 26° 2' North, 117° 5' East at 1500, course 155°, 14 knots.

Fleet retiring

At 1400 the fleet had landed on and the Fleet began to retire to the fulling area.

DMID reports

Dissolved evacuation of 3rd force

Results of fleet's action

Entry losses

- Aircraft and installations destroyed:
  - 6 aircraft on ground including 1 probably destroyed.
  - 4 locomotives.
  - 2 ore cars.
  - 3 tank cars.

- Shipping sunk:
  - 3 freighters.
  - 2 cargo ships.
  - 5 small craft.

- Shipping probably sunk:
  - 1 freighter.
  - 2 tankers.

- Aircraft and installations destroyed:
  - 31 aircraft on ground.
  - Freight trains.
  - Materials, hangars and other installations

- Shipping damaged:
  - 2 destroyers.
  - 2 destroyer escorts.
  - 1 merchant vessel.
  - 6 small vessels.
  - 4 tankers.

- Con losses in combat:
  - 6 aircraft with 6 pilots and 2 aircrewmen missing.

At 0030 on the 12th

Fulling

At 1000 the Fleet commenced to fuel from the five tankers

AVON REGAL, OLIVE, ANN ARBOR, SAN ANTONIO and B.C. RUGBY.
DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

Object: JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 1 to V.S. T. 1, 1942/43 of 1st October, 1943)

RELATION (Contd)

Creation of

Also in company were the British Fleet, ADRIATIC, OCEANIC, JUAN BOOK, RAMIREZ, GURKHA, RODGER, DORANDO, HOBART, YUCCA, SIRAYCAY, NATURALEZA, "CASY" and the hospital ship HOSPITALIZATION. The Chief of Naval Operations invited the Vice Admiral and staff officers to a conference on board MIDWAY and at the same time suggested that KING GEORGE V should oil from the area to make the transfer easier. This was more than welcome and at 0340 after the Captain of the Fleet had transferred to MIDWAY, took over the fueling process for the rest of the Fleet. KING GEORGE V proceeded along with the others. The Vice Admiral and staff officers transferred to MIDWAY to meet Admiral Halsey and staff, the two Fleet Flagships oiling simultaneously, one each side of JASON, forming a notable night. It was perhaps another idyll.

It was with regret that we said goodbye to Captain E.H. W.V. W. Wilson, Liaison officer to the British Pacific Fleet, who had been transferred from MKO 30 to MIDWAY to take up his new assignment on the staff of VIF 30.

Strikes on 12th cancelled

In his signal 110232, Commander 3rd Fleet informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet that the strikes planned for the 12th were cancelled due to the typhoon threat, and that all forces would remain in the vicinity of 30° 30' North, 150° West unless otherwise ordered.

Ships armed to maintain V-111111.

Ships were armed to maintain V-111111, the Japanese threat was a very real, and the following orders were necessary to maintain F-111111.

Moon position

37° 55' North, 140° 44' West.

The hospital ship HOSPITALIZATION was instructed to return all possible convalescent patients to ships of the Fleet to make her ready for the evacuation of prisoners of war from JAPAN.

Admiral returns on board

At 1530 the Vice Admiral and staff returned on board and at 1600 KING GEORGE V cast off from the American oiler and proceeded to rejoin the rest of TP 37.

Reconstitution of Chiefs of Staff units

At 1700 a signal was received from the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet that a token force of 1 battleship, 1 carrier, 2 cruisers and necessary destroyers had been accepted by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific for incorporation in TP 37 for the naval occupation of JAPAN. I had learned that the American fuel positions were not sturdy and would remain so for 10 days or more. Nevertheless it seemed important that as many British ships and the carriers in particular should not be in at the death that my Chief of Staff returned to Osa. I returned to Osa, under the change of circumstances there were any hopes of more oil becoming available and to say that if it were possible justified in asking the entire Force might be retained. The overall picture there however left no doubt that matters must stand as ordered.
At 0645, King George V and HMAS Australia got under way and set course for the north.

At 0730, King George V and HMAS Australia continued on course, steering 030°, to make strikes on the town of Yokohama.

At 0800, HMAS Australia closed King George V and HMAS Australia got underway to join up with King George V at 0845.

At 1000, King George V, with the ships returning to MANAS, parted company.

At 1230, King George V was received by the Japanese surrender with the proviso that the Emperor, after consultation with his government, would continue to obey the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

At 1400, the Supreme Allied Commander ordered the token British Force to assume the designation of TG 34.7 and assigned to them, to proceed to the east of the main forces of the Fleet and to remain in contact with those forces, to report to TG 34.7 for temporary duty.

At 1500, the token force was received by the Supreme Allied Commander, ordering the token British Force to assume the designation of TG 34.7 and assigned to them, to proceed to the east of the main forces of the Fleet and to remain in contact with those forces, to report to TG 34.7 for temporary duty.

At 1600, King George V, with the ships returning to MANAS, parted company.

At 1700, King George V was received by the Japanese surrender with the proviso that the Emperor, after consultation with his government, would continue to obey the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

At 1800, the Supreme Allied Commander ordered the token British Force to assume the designation of TG 34.7 and assigned to them, to proceed to the east of the main forces of the Fleet and to remain in contact with those forces, to report to TG 34.7 for temporary duty.

At 1900, King George V was received by the Japanese surrender with the proviso that the Emperor, after consultation with his government, would continue to obey the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

At 2000, the Supreme Allied Commander ordered the token British Force to assume the designation of TG 34.7 and assigned to them, to proceed to the east of the main forces of the Fleet and to remain in contact with those forces, to report to TG 34.7 for temporary duty.

At 2100, King George V was received by the Japanese surrender with the proviso that the Emperor, after consultation with his government, would continue to obey the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

At 2200, the Supreme Allied Commander ordered the token British Force to assume the designation of TG 34.7 and assigned to them, to proceed to the east of the main forces of the Fleet and to remain in contact with those forces, to report to TG 34.7 for temporary duty.

At 2300, King George V was received by the Japanese surrender with the proviso that the Emperor, after consultation with his government, would continue to obey the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

The Commander-in-Chief, in HMAS Australia, escorted by HMAS Australia and HMAS Australia, left MANAS to join the 3rd Fleet.

August 13th

The targets for the day's strikes were in the TOKYO area, HMAS Australia's first strike taking off at 0615. Prior to this she had maintained a CAF.

The second strike was HMAS Australia's, taking off at 1315 but it proved to be abortive as the targets were found to be weathered in.

The high light of the day was the way in which the escort and patrol ships dealt with the Japanese aircraft, through daylight and after dark they intercepted and shot down 21 enemy aircraft approaching the Fleet. Most of those came singly but the precision of the interceptions and speed at which the pilots were shot down was remarkable. The whole was a most finished performance.
A message from 0923/14 of 1st October, 1945

ONCE AGAIN

On the previous day a signal from Cns. 3rd Fleet had ordered ships to prepare herding and dazzle watch around landings companies. The figure for TF 30/34 was read here as 2000, and as a result showed that weapons for 1,500 only were available; a signal to this effect was made to Cns. 3rd Fleet. His reply led to the discovery that the figure should have been read as 200. This in view of the preparations already made could obviously cause great disappointment and I represented this to Admiral HUSKY asking if he could see his way to raise our quota. He at once doubled it.

On 31st
All aircraft had landed on and at 0400 the Fleet commenced to return to the American fueling rendezvous in position 31° 45' North, 144° East.

On August 14th

Fueling from U.S. carriers
TF 30/34 were ret from the American Logistic Group and fueling continued throughout the day.

Sporadic attacks from Zeros failed to make hit on CVL's.

Position
32° 11' North, 144° 33' East.

At 1300 CST arrived on board for conference with the Vice Admiral, remaining until 1545.

Discovered from Bu. 30 groups towards the Flying, off position for the strikes planned for 15th August.

August 15th

First strike
At 0400 in position 34° North 142° East the first strike was flown off against targets in the TOKYO area.

Result of strike
DESMARA'S aircraft found their target weathered in but a concealed factory was observed and successfully bombed. The strike was intercepted by 12 Zekes, 4 of which were shot down, 4 were bombed but the remainder dropped, by the escorting fighters. One Zero failed to return and one Avengers was shot down and had to ditch.

Further strikes cancelled
At 0700 on instructions from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, all strikes were cancelled. No reason was given, but there were many theories.

NEXT
At 1100 news was received that the Japanese had accepted the Allied peace terms and that offensive operations against JAPAN were to cease.
OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 4 to V/AMT No. 602/4 of 1st October, 1943)

NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

At 1220, whilst the signal to cease hostilities against Japan was being flown, the beacons fell slow to INDIVIDUALLY; a JAPAN, owing to our now being close to JAPAN or 30° 30' East, so that this aircraft not in any case is not clear.

Maine position 34° 06' North 142° 30' East

Admiral Halsey's

At 1300, whilst Admiral Halsey was broadcasting to the Fleet by P.T. the five enemy aircraft were splashed by the Tarrant and watching CAP's. A copy of Admiral Halsey's speech is attached at Annex 1 to this narrative.

Meanwhile I had instructed the Fleet that, whilst the possibility of attack remained even after the Armistice was signed and after we had crossed harbour, I expected everything possible to be done to get back to our old standards of appearance and alertness and to remove camouflage painting.

I also asked the Commander-in-Chief that, whilst all ships were returned to their ships to be as close to Point HEY as possible for Point HEY, 32° 45' North 142° 30' East, to await further instructions.

The following signal was received from the Commander 3rd Fleet to the 3rd Fleet and all Task Group Commanders.

"All hands to splices the mainbrace"

The "Action Abbreviations" were subsequently amended to read "All-To Commanders, negative American Groups"

Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet in EURE

August 14th

The Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet in EURE ON TELEGRAPHICALLY to the War Cabinet and Naval Council joined at 0145H, the Vice Admiral, Second-in-Command, British Pacific Fleet and staff reporting on board her. The Vice Admiral, Second-in-Command, British Pacific Fleet remained in tactical control of the Group.

Operation TURBAN

During the Forenoon the three U.S. Task Groups and Task Group 30, which had been at sea between screens and were somewhat high speed by CTF 30 for Operation SHANGRI-LA - aerial photography of the 3rd Fleet by U.S. aircraft.

Maine position 32° 25' North 142° 30' East

Intelligence

In the afternoon the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet transferred to USS ENDEAVOUR, where he met Admiral Halsey with the Secretary of War.

Later, the Vice Admiral, Second-in-Command, British Pacific Fleet went aboard USS PER ar to broadcast a message to the 3rd Fleet. A copy of the speech is attached at Annex 2 to this narrative.

During the night an enemy course was maintained.

August 17th

NAUTILUS and TUNAB, fuelled from KING GEORGE V and DERBYSHIRE at daylight.

Operation TURBAN

During the Forenoon CTF 30 again again closed the groups to one mile carrying out high speed runs, while further aerial photographs were taken. TUNAB was unable to take part in these manoeuvres as her speed was limited to 20 knots by
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(Appendix No. 1 to VASHP No. 1092/4 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

a boiler defect. She was ordered to proceed independently to the fuelling area.

Noon position: 32° 00' North 146° 10' East

During the night an easterly course was maintained to meet Logistic Support Group in position British EMIR (32° 29' North 143° 30' East)

August 18th

Fuelling

The fuelling force was located by radar at 0200 repleishment beginning at daylight on a S.E. course.

The Logistic Support Group consisted of:-

Oilers: SAN ADOLPHO, SAN AGROSTIO, WAVE GOVERNOR.

OYSTER HULLER

Provision Ship: PORT HELLENGE

Esccorts: BRENNA, OYSTER, BURMESE, USK, IPSWICH, BALLARAT.

H.S.3 with escorr CRANE was also contacted.

Noon position: 31° 15' North 144° 00' East

Fuelling continued until 1700 when SAN AGROSTIO and SAN ADOLPHO, with escorrts USK and BURMESE, were sailed for LYTTEL to refil and report to CTF 112. The Logistic Group remained in contact during the night.

August 19th

Replenishment continues

Fuelling from WAVE GOVERNOR continued from dawn. The opportunity was taken to carry out an exchange visit of British and U.S. pilots between HOGGABRIEL and SHENYK-LA.

Noon position: 31° 06' North 143° 34' East

In the afternoon DUKE OF YORK closed to 38,4 and the Commander 3rd Fleet transferred to the British Flagship for a conference. Later Admiral ROSEY broadcast to the British Empire Force of DUKE OF YORK.

August 20th

Replenishment continued during the day.

Landin Force embark in H.M.L.

A warning signal to bring the 3rd Fleet Allied Landing Force to 8 hours notice had been sent by CTF 31, Rear Admiral LANDIGER, on the previous evening. Further signals during the night brought the Force to the "stand-by", and Captain BISH, Commander L.N., who was in charge of the British Landing Force transferred to KING GEORGE V for final instructions. During the Forenoon the three American A.F.D.'s HUGH, SHER and EVILIC, closed to 16,5 and embarkation by L.C.N. began. The congested scene on the quarter deck of KING GEORGE V with the Landing Party assembling gear etc., while at the same time provisions from GLENMARKET were being dumped in the mThMile of the team, was quite interesting. The weather was not by any means perfect and a confused and choppy sea made boat work difficult. Despite conditions the transfer of 37 officers and 599 men, complete with equipment, proceeded smoothly and was finished in less than three hours. The number suggests some stowaways had crept in.

Noon position: 31° 19' North 143° 28' East.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VADM No. 1092/4 of 1st October, 1945)

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NARRATIVE (Contd.)

Logistic Group movements

During the day H.M.S. SHEERAN with escort NUGENTHORPE arrived with aircraft replenishments. She was ordered to transfer all possible aircraft to INDOMITABLE and/, and to start preparing for the accommodation of replenishments from JUPITER; she subsequently played a prominent part in this work. JOHN was escorted by PEREGRINE and CHERNOCK joined the Logistic Group; and RANVAIR, GOVERNOR, escorted by ORION, joined to ULVITUS for rapid refuelling and return.

At 08.30

In the afternoon INDOMITABLE with TERRIBLE, TREMENDOUS, TRACER, TERRIBLES, NUCLEAR, NAGSHEAD and NASHORN detached from TG 38.5 and joined TG 36.4.

FUELS OF YORK, KING GEORGE V, MAAS, JUBILEE, NAIFAR, NELSON, ADRIAN and WAGNER joined TG 38.4 being designated TG 38.4.

August 21st

Meanwhile typhoon warnings had been coming in and, as the plotted course appeared likely to pass close to the Fleet operating area, all groups were ordered to proceed to the Southwest towards a new position 30° 30' North, 142° 00' East to continue replenishment.

Noon position

31° 06' North 143° 07' East

The British Logistic Group did not follow the Fleet but remained in the vicinity of British forces. NUGENTHORPE was despatched south to ULVITUS and MANUS to deliver mail and correspondence.

August 22nd

Operation UNTIL

Destroyers were topped up with fuel at daylight. During the forenoon operation UNTIL took place; this consisted of flying off all available aircraft to form up and fly over the Fleet area, thereby enabling a series of photographs to be taken by surface ships. The weather was not favourable and heavy rain interfered with the programme, but good photographs were obtained and all aircraft were landed on during the afternoon.

Noon position

31° 27' North 142° 30' East

Course for the night was set Northeast as the typhoon seemed closer.

August 23rd

At daylight the British destroyers in TG 38.4 topped up from KING GEORGE V and DUKE OF YORK.

Noon position

33° 35' North 144° 06' East

In the afternoon the signal to execute Commander 3rd Fleet's plan of entry into Japanese waters was received.

Reconnaissance of groups

In consequence DUKE OF YORK with WAGNER and WAGNER detached to form TG 30.2 and join MISSOURI who was TG 30.1. KING GEORGE V, NAIFAR, JUBILEE, NAIFAR and NELSON with USS BUNKER HILL and HASKAN formed TG 37 again and steamed to area BOGN. It was pleasant to have two U.S. destroyers as part of the Group.

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26th August

In convoy, The day was spent in area BOMON waiting the signal to execute the entrance plan. Opportunity was taken to continue painting the upperworks and remove some of the signs of a long period at sea. During the forenoon KING GEORGE V and cruisers were manoeuvred by flag signals, midshipmen taking charge of the ships; the destroyers under USS WHITMAN exercised independently.

Nom position \(34^\circ 56'\) North \(144^\circ 42'\) East

25th August

Destroyers including USS WHITMAN and ROGAL topped up from KING GEORGE V and cruisers at daylight.

Nom position \(34^\circ 47'\) North \(144^\circ 45'\) East

QUICKMARCH arrived from MUNUS during the daylight and fuelled from KING GEORGE V while transferring mail.

Typhoon

During the two days, two typhoons were anxiously plotted and watched; it appeared that Nature was determined to have her say on the date of entry and would not be hurried. Later a signal to proceed was received from the Commander 3rd Fleet and course for the night was set to arrive at Point MIBEST in the morning.

26th August

Cancellation of the advance towards Point MIBEST was received during the middle watch and TP 37 retired once again to area BOMON.

QUICKMARCH collected outgoing mail and was despatched to meet the Logistic Group to transfer and collect their mail and proceed South.

Nom position \(34^\circ 42'\) North \(144^\circ 17'\) East.

Instructions were received during the afternoon for the Fleet to enter SQUANT WH on the 27th August, and stating that the TOKYO BAY entry would be on the 30th August. Course was therefore set for Point MIBEST.

27th August

Entry into SQUANT WH

TP 37 took station astern of TP 35 to follow by the planned route into SQUANT WH, ships flying flags in accordance with the following signal:

TO 36.5 FROM C.P.O.

Flagship, personal flag at foremost head, White Ensign at mainmast head and at peak.

Cruisers and Corvettes, White Ensigns at mastheads and at peak or ensign staff, Dominion ships may fly Dominion Ensign at mainmast head instead of White Ensign.

Destroyers, Lite or Dominion Ensign at masthead, White Ensign at peak or ensign staff.

It was perhaps rather a small force to represent a large Empire but they had seen many omissions and known several enemies before they had joined their allies in the Pacific.
On arrival at 1650, KING GEORGE V, NEWfoundland, GAMBIA, NUSUM and NIMSHI anchored in their berths, whilst MALCOLM and DENMAN proceeded independently to rejoin TP 37.

28th August

A quiet day was spent in painting and cleaning while the coastline was kept under official and unofficial scrutiny for signs of life or resistance. The Hospital Ship METELKERA arrived at TSUSHIMA anchored in PAVIA WDN.

29th August

50th ANNIVERSARY

75 30.1 and 30.2, the American and British Flagship groups, weighed and proceeded into TOKYO BAY at daylight. During the Forenoon S.T. 7 35, Rear Admiral Jones, called on the Vice Admiral, British Pacific Fleet, and the return call was made in the evening.

30th August

C1s for arrives

... The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral NIMITZ, arrived at TOKYO BAY and hoisted his flag in USS SOUTH DAKOTA.

30th August

With the concurrence of the Commander 3rd Fleet, the number of British destroyers with TG 38.3 had been reduced from 6 to 5, and TERPINES and TERENCE, who had minor defects, entered TSUSHIMA WDN. QUALITY the first of the destroyers sent up from KURUS to relieve those with INTERLINKS arrived at daylight.

TP 37 enters TOKYO BAY

The Commander 3rd Fleet ordered part of TP 37 to enter TOKYO BAY. KING GEORGE V with QUALITY, NUSUM NIMSHI and TERPINES proceeded accordingly anchoring in the centre of the Bay ashore by YOKOHAMA. There was a satisfactory absence of smoke from the factory chimneys which told its own story and the waters of the Bay, normally crowded with ships and small craft, were utterly deserted.

Meanwhile the 3rd Fleet Allied Landing Force, under Rear Admiral BLANDON, had carried out an unopposed occupation of YOKOHAMA and the forts and islands in the vicinity and at the entrance to the Bay. The result of this was immediately obvious as when KING GEORGE V passed, the white ensign was already flying over the island known as "Fort Two"; it was hoisted by white flags on the shore opposite marking the deserted guns which in the end had proved so useless, and there was not a soul in sight. TERPINES and TERENCE entered TOKYO BAY securing alongside the British battleships.

QUALITY having fuelled was detached to join TG 38.3

SLENDER, who had been prepared as a Prisoner of War accommodation ship, entered TOKYO BAY and anchored.

1st August

Arrivals in TOKYO BAY:

CS 4 in NEWFOUNDLAND with GAMBIA from PAVIA WDN.

Areas United in SHORTSEND with NUSUM from TSUSHIMA.

NUSUM and NIMSHI from TSUSHIMA.

British Logistic Group from area SOCEY consisting of the others WAVE KING, GAMBIA, DINGLEDALE, GVE RULER,
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OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 1 to VHP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Provision ship PORTSMOUTH ESCORTS MISSOURI, CHUGOOG, CRUSA, IMPERIAL, DERO, PIRIE, CARRICK and KILMAR. Ships were fuelled whilst BUGEY began preparations to convert to and accommodation the ship for Prisoners of War.

1st September.

TENACIOUS, relieved by QUALITY, arrived from KG 38J. SQUIRES reported that embarkation of prisoners of war was proceeding favourably and that 35 officers and 560 other ranks had already arrived on board.

2nd September

Pilots at 9.30 on the formal ceremony of surrender took place on board USS MISSOURI, flagship of that Commander we had been so proud to follow, the war was ended.
The war is ended. You, in conjunction with your brothers in arms of all services, have contributed indissolubly to this final result. Our fighting men have brought in implacable, treacherous and barbaric foes to their knees in object surrender. This is the first time in the recorded history of the melting Japanese race that they, as a nation have been forced to admit to this humiliation.

I said in 1942 the time was no surnmen. You have helod write this on that estimate in 1945. Your names are written in golden letters on the pages of history - your face is, and shall be, immortal. Wherever you have the foe, on the sea on the land or in the air, you have been supreme. From the early days of fighting with every force and every string, to the finish of fighting with the mightiest combined fleet the world has ever seen, the results have been the same - victory has crowned your efforts. The forces of righteousness and decency have triumphed.

At this moment our thoughts turn to our happy and fortunate homeland to our loved ones. Deeply rooted in each and every heart is a desire, now that the result of war has ceased and victory - absolute and unconditional victory has crowned our efforts, to return to our homes.

A simple process of thinking will demonstrate how impossible this is at this moment. The horror, the homelessness, the periods of fear, the tragedy, the waste, the blood we have shed so freely, those have been endured by all with fortitude and brotherly understanding and gladly. This is a common and proud possession of each and every man and nation. We are and shall always remain a band of brothers tried in the fire of the greatest holocaust this world has ever experienced, and because of this, indivisible. The who have died and have died for their homes and country. That the results cannot be - must not be - transient, it must rest on firm foundations. The structure that we build must be so firm that the storms of all ages to come cannot touch its surface. Because of your fighting qualities and the fighting qualities of our brothers in arms of all services, our beloved land has not known the ravages of war, our door once at home have not been endangered.

Give praise to God Almighty for this end and give humble and grateful thanks that he saw fit to use us as his instruments.

Victory is not the end. Rather it is but the beginning. We must establish peace, a just, and an enduring peace - a peace that will enable all decent nations to live without fear and in prosperity; a peace that will abound the inherent dignity and nobility of mankind. Never again should this happen or shall this happen. Any public or in a civilized world. To attain this requires war. The enemy over the entire world is conquered and has been forced to his knees before to us, the victors. It is our cross, our duty, to make him recognize it. This can not be done in a day, it may take decades and generations. The present and immediate duty of the Third Front is crystal clear. We must, in conjunction with all Allied forces so employed, reduce Japan to military insignificance. We must keep them militarily important. Following this, it is imperative that instrumentality is to be set up to educate and divest the Japanese from their barbaric traditions, teachings and thoughts. This is a matter of common sense good judgment, policy and tenacity of purpose, and will require military might for implementation and very wise understanding.
The time necessary to attain this goal is unpredictable. Now that the fighting has ceased there must be no lassitude. We shall have long and trying periods of very monotonous waiting. . . . busy men are a weary men. It behooves all in authority to take this to heart. Plans should be in the formative stage now. Time to provide new men - to make provision for the replacement of our splendid ships but longer time for the morale of our inseparable fighting men.

I wish it were possible for me to meet, trust, and know each officer and man of our Fighting Third Fleet. Owing to its size and dispersion, this can not be. You shall always occupy a special and honoured place in my mind and heart. We have been through this trying time together. We have shared the same, we have shared the bed. We are brothers - blest by our active participation in combat operations in an unprecedented war.

When the time comes, may we return to civilian pursuits. Not the hobo, hobo. Join your forces in the pursuit of righteousness and peace. You have been tried in cruel crucible - you have, thank God, been proved not wanting, not a spot to dim. And yet, you have spared us. Your civic responsibilities will be great. Meet them with the same fortitude you have displayed during this war. Then shall our great land be safe and sound.

You that remain in the Navy, keep your swords sharp. You accept a great responsibility. The great traditions and the constant state of preparation of this our First Line of Defense are in your keeping. Maintain your pride and zeal, constant, unrelenting. The principles change but the principles of war are immutable. God grant that we may never have to apply them again. . . . ready and efficient fleet is one of the greatest deterrents to the horrors of war. To you all I say: I shall always be ready and glad within my home to render my advice, assistance, or succour.

To our fighting brothers of the British Pacific Fleet, my eternal gratitude. For your efficient and generous services. I am proud, I am proud, to have and you under my command during this last combat period of the western Pacific war on the seas. To whom now you expect great fighting qualities. Our expressions have been more than fulfilled. Your co-operative spirit, your armor of steel, and your spirit of anticipation, the way you have adopted and fallen into our scheme of manoeuvres, is little short of remarkable. The co-ordination of offensive and defensive fighting on the surface and in the air as well as in fractious and single fighting is a dream.

To those of us who have suffered injuries or been permanently disabled, we again do not fault them that you have been spared for possibly useful service. My regret that you must have, but forget the sacrifices you made for the good of all mankind.

To those of our brothers that have given their all - who rode the rough sea and air with us - the memory of which will never die. Your names and your deeds will rest with and be an inspiration to all decent mankind through all ages. To your loved ones my deepest sympathy. May the assurance your grief and bring a full realization of your dear ones in after life.

To all of you belong the credit, and I shall do all within my limited powers to see that you receive it. Again and again God bless you and all men.
SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Annex 2 to Appendix 1 to MVW No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

SPEECH BROADCAST TO THE THIRD FLEET
BY VICE ADMIRAL RAILINGS

Admiral Halsey, Flag Officers, Commanding Officers, Officers and men of the Third Fleet. Yesterday, after hearing Admiral Halsey's inspiring words to the Third Fleet, of which we have the honour to be part, I asked him if I might come to his flagship to say a few words to you all. I am not sure that with our voice transmission gear, we could carry sufficiently far to reach all units of the Third Fleet, and if I may so put it, I decided to take the bull by the horns and so asked him if I might come over to speak from his flagship in the centre of his Fleet.

A great deal seems to have happened since March, when I received orders to report for duty to Admiral Nimitz. The words I used then in placing my ships under his orders were that it was "with feelings of great pride and pleasure that the British Pacific Force joins the United States Naval Forces under your command."

Nothing that has happened since makes me wish to change one word of what I then said; the story of how the two Fleets have come together is quite simple and straightforward, which is as things should be among sailors.

It begins with Task Force 57 as we then were, operating under the orders of Admiral Spruance and we took it as a compliment that he just told us what he wanted and left us to get on with it. We look back on those decisive days in the battle for Okinawa with a feeling of pride. We never met our Admiral but we felt he understood us. Perhaps on the whole it was as well that we were then operating on our own as it gave us the chance to get used to an unaccustomed way of manoeuvring and sailing which was to stand us in good stead later.

With that behind us we joined the Third Fleet not only with keen anticipation but, I believe, with a little confidence that we knew enough to take our place in the line with the famous Fighting Third and so what Admiral Halsey said yesterday meant much to us.

The story is, perhaps, round its end in the last few days, when we have passed under the direct command of Vice Admiral Nimitz as Task Group 53.5 and so become an integral part of those vast Carrier Task Forces which have fought their way from the black days of 1941 to their present victory. It may not perhaps be fantastic to feel that the way our two navies have come together, welded and integrated, may point the manner in which our two great democracies will move forward togethet. In their amalgamation, neither Navy I hope, has lost its own character or individuality. It would be the greatest pity if they did so, for when all is said and done everything in the story of sea warfare shows that character and individuality are in the end the only things that really count. But with these words I must go that spirit of co-operation which these months have shown to be within our reach.

Perhaps I might add that I share to the full with Admiral Halsey the conception that the Navy is still the first line of defence for both our countries, and I believe, also, that the day when either of us abandon his sage advice to keep the naval sword sharp, will bring us the nearer to being again attached by such evil forces as these we have now subdued.

In so thinking may I quote you the opening sentence of the message sent by the Board of Admiralty to the British Fleet when Germany was broken; it begins: "For the second time since the Battle of Trafalgar..."
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OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST
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(App. 2 to Annex 1 to VWP No. 100/14 of 1st October 1945)

SPECIAL BROADCAST TO THE THIRD FLEET
BY VICE-ADMIRAL HODGKISS
(Cont'd)

...and Commonwealth and led to the decisive defeat of Germany..."

The story of the Third Fleet in which we have been privileged to lend a hand, provides during the last six weeks the perfect picture of the result of sea-power relentlessly applied in the waters of the Pacific.

Very many of us in both our navies will in the future be returning to civil life. To those who remain, may I say that I can conceive of no greater contribution to the future of the world than that our two navies should take a habit of meeting and working together from time to time. Perhaps those of you who will be leaving the sea will help to bring that about.

But to each one of you, whatever you may feel about that conclusion, whatever happens and whatever the future holds, I would suggest that each will be able to say to himself, "I fought in the third Fleet under Halsey", and, so saying, face up with greater courage to whatever to-morrow shall bring."
OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix 2 to V.P/P No. 1092/1 of 1st October, 1945.)

GENERIC

General

1. There were, regrettably, no engagements with enemy aircraft throughout the period of operations, with the exception of brief action with a single aircraft by cruisers and destroyers whilst detached to bombard. This lack of targets was in some ways unfortunate as it precluded any action trials of:

(a) the newly adopted V.T. fuse procedure
(b) the policy for self defence by aircraft carriers
(c) the efficiency of the AA Co-ordination system. Also, the increase in efficiency of the Fleet's AA summary, which had been hoped for as the result of more frequent and regular practices and intensive training, could not be proved.

Bombardment

2. Two night bombardments were carried out by H.M.S. KING GEORGE V in company with a U.S. Task Group and in accordance with the plans of the American Task Group Commander. Both of these provided a somewhat difficult navigational problem in radar fixing. "Plane ranging," which might have been a valuable aid, was not used. Aircraft were, however, instructed to orbit certain prominent features during the approach for the bombardment of IJNAMI, but radar data obtained from this source was not used owing to the difficulty of identifying the correct aircraft and because it was considered to be less accurate than that obtained from echoes of high land.

3. American ships fired full broadsides on each occasion. In accordance with CO 3033 (35) (Textbook of Naval Bombardment) Para. 70, H.M.S. KING GEORGE V did not comply with this procedure. 14 inch R.L. shells being fused with fuse No. 11f. In the first bombardment, salvoes of not more than one gun from each turret were fired, but approval was given to fire 3 gun broadsides at IJNAMI, and no premature occurred. This was before receipt of Admiralty's signal HQG 072595 August.

4. Owing to adverse weather, air spotting was not available at IJNAMI, but U.S. aircraft provided successful observation at IJNAMI.

5. Detailed reports of these bombardments have been forwarded under separate cover.

6. Reports of the cruiser and destroyer bombardment of IJNAMI are included in a G.S No. 079/3 dated 26th August. Satisfactory results were obtained by good Fire Control and excellent spotting by American fleet planes. The performance ofartillery was most satisfactory.

AA Co-ordination

7. The procedure of Fleet Target Indication and control of Fleet blind fire laid down in BPM 2006 (with certain minor modifications issued as amendments to that order) was exercised frequently and carried out during all air attacks. On no occasion however did the enemy penetrate to within gun range.

8. The duties of AA Co-ordinator were carried out by the Squadron Gunnery Officer in H.M.S. KING GEORGE V from the Air Defence Room, where he worked in close co-operation with the ship's T.I.O. and R.N.O.

9. From the results obtained in exercises it was clear that this system can furnish a satisfactory means of providing ships with the best available information about movements of enemy aircraft inside the gun deflected zone, and thereby assist target indication and the link-up between Gunnery andarming radar.
SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY – AUGUST

(Appendix 2 to VICE W.N., 1092/L of 1st October, 1944.)

GUNNERY (Contd.)

10. A V.H.F. circuit was used, which has the great disadvantage that tuning cannot normally take place owing to the need for H.F. silence, and in consequence communication was not always satisfactory with all ships. It is recommended that a V.H.F. circuit should be available for this important purpose.

11. The target indication grid plot proved quick and simple to use but is, of course, wholly inaccurate in certain cases when translating from “cartesian” to polar co-ordinates, owing to the necessity to report all ranges.

12. The performance of Type 293 in all ships has been noticeably greatly improved since Operation “Iceberg.”

Ammunition at Sea

13. The embarkation of 14 inch shell and charges under way was carried out by H.M.S. KING GEORGE V from A.S. Robert Makara on three occasions. The first of these was in the nature of a trial to test the method and gear. The purtinging method was employed at each end of the ship and proved highly successful.

14. A full report of this operation has been forwarded separately.

15. Whilst the transfer of 14 inch ammunition at sea is a practicable evolution with the existing gear, it is considered that the special fittings necessary to enable embarkation of two shell in each load are a battleship requirement as a long term policy.

Training and Practices

16. Long periods on passage and between strikes were used to the full to carry out AA firings and non firing practices. Aircraft from H.M.S. HULL were used almost extensively for this training and her efficient co-operation was most valuable. In addition to frequent AA throw off firings by all ships, several close range weapon practices were made possible by the provision of above targets from H.M.S. FORMIDABLE.

17. The lack of any formal training for AA practices has been keenly felt.

18. It is considered that a requirement exists for a wireless controlled target aircraft similar to the U.S. drone (T.D.D.) American cruisers launch and control these targets which afford the most realistic practice owing to their high speed and manouevrability, and foster the interest of all. The provision of a similar target in the Royal Navy is strongly recommended as necessary for training in war or peace.

Aircraft Recognition

19. The Fleet Recognition Officer spent a fortnight in H.M.S. CALEDONIA and since then has visited destroyers for periods of five or six days at a time. A series of aircraft recognition notes were issued to the Fleet to assist training in this difficult problem.

Conclusion

20. As the result of the short but valuable practice period obtained at Jervis Bay by most ships, and the intensive, almost daily, training programme carried out in the prevailing area on passage, it is considered that the gunnery efficiency of the Fleet has shown a marked improvement. In the event, however, the AA armament of the Force was given no real chance to prove itself.
SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix 3 to VADM No. 1092/1A of 1st October, 1942)

COMMUNICATIONS

General

1. During the period under review, Task Force 37 was acting, to all intents and purposes, as a Task Group of Task Force 38. This, as far as is known, is the first time in which a British force of this size has acted in each close tactical cooperation with an American Force, using the latter's methods and signal publications.

It was found that the American standards both in material and personnel were of a very high order, especially as regards the use of R/T for all purposes; no matter how many circuits were manned, a high standard of operating was always maintained. The same could not be said of British ships where, as far as the writer is aware, the fact that R/T is not yet universally adopted and taught a high standard of R/T operating could only be maintained in most ships provided not more than one or two circuits were manned.

2. The number of W/T circuits required when working with the Americans was far more than had been allowed for and without the timely loan of 20 AN/ARC sets for cruisers and above, the Force would have been hard put to it to maintain satisfactory communication. The generous manner in which this equipment was provided and maintained solved a difficult problem.

W/T and R/T Circuits kept in the Force

(a) W/T Circuits

1. How Fox. A high-speed FOX (30 words per minute) carrying traffic for task group commanders and above.
2. Jump Fox. Similar to How Fox but carrying traffic for ships. It was found essential for both How and Jump foxes to have four receivers on the same line. A choice of eight W/T frequencies was normally available, and by selecting four, it was found that signals were always strong.
3. Block Fox. A slow broadcast carrying traffic for Task Force and Fleet Commanders. This circuit was also available for shore traffic.

(b) R/T Circuits

1. Operational Intelligence Fox. A slow broadcast carrying intelligence traffic including the necessary information for Y parties.
2. Administrative Fox. Primarily for administrative and message traffic from authorities in Australia. It was also used for communications with the OOD/Cypher officer.

Recommendations

The American method of using a large number of W/T frequencies is strongly recommended. Not only does it allow for interference and fading but, if three or more receivers are used, it also ensures good reception so that high speed can be used.

The American policy of using typewriters for cyphering foxes in fully equipped foxes. Not only does it allow the higher speed on one circuit, but also ensures that a readable copy of the message is available to the OOD/Cypher officer.

(b) Task Group Circuits

1. Task Force Commander. An R/T circuit carrying traffic between task group commanders and above. This circuit was normally used when W/T silence was relaxed for messages in cypher.
2. Task Force Comms. A W/T - W/T circuit available for all ships as a standby for T.S.
3. Task Group Commander. A standby voice circuit in the 2 mg/s band, manned only at combat stations.
4. T.S. Primary. The most important circuit in the organisation maintained constantly by all ships and used for manoeuvring, contact reports.

and other tactical signals. It had been anticipated that a certain amount of congestion was bound to occur on this circuit and this in fact happened on several occasions, rendering signals being delayed by other groups "putting on the new" form.

(a) Administrative Circuits. Additional circuits for operational traffic such as flash reports and messages in cipher when 1/3 silence was in force.

Flag Officer Circuit. A VHF voice circuit for passing traffic between flag officers.

Inter Force B/C. A VHF or UHF voice circuit for traffic between groups (b/c), Tarot, Talzo etc.

Recommendations

The system of having all ships on one V.H.F. has the advantage that they can inter-communicate reports etc., and know what is happening in the adjacent group. But it is essential for each group also to have its own V.H.F. circuit on which to manoeuvre when the primary circuit is congested. This circuit can also be used as the administrative circuit. Owing to shortage of staff, 7's, and the fact that in certain ships, type 66 M were used on administrative circuit, but this was not altogether successful.

Little use was made of the M/M - L/F circuit together. It is considered that more use could have been made of this circuit when 1/3 silence was relaxed.

(c) Inter Force Circuits

1. V.F. Primary. See (b) above.

Administrative Circuit. Used for messages of a non-tactical nature. Type 66 M sets were used and proved to be unsuitable as it was found that, except for small units, they could not be relied on to provide a circuit for rapid manoeuvring, when U.S. Primary was congested.

2. Primary. This circuit is used as the main air warning circuit, fire situation reports and surface warning reports if ordered. Normally, ordinaries and above high accommodation destroyers were unable to do so owing to lack of equipment, and shifted to this circuit from administrative on receipt of Flash blue.

3. Inter B/Co. Named on receipt of Flash blue by ordinary and above for communication between B/Co. Owing to shortage of equipment the administrative circuit was used for this purpose.

4. Coordinator circuit. This circuit was used for A.A. co-ordination and control by the Class 14.6, using an L/F wave. Very little experience was gained in its use, but nevertheless sufficient to justify its retention (see appendix 2).

Recommendations

A second V.H.F. in all ships is essential: as essential as several pairs of V.H.F. are for radio signalling. The 66 M was not designed for inter-ship work and, in a large cruising formation, proved unsuitable owing to its limited range. The maintenance of the set and the lack of spares in no way assisted a difficult situation.

It is important that destroyers should be able to maintain watch on L/F primary to keep their air plots up to date. Certain ships fitted with receiver 927 were able to do so, but others fitted with an 86 M only could not as constant watch was required on an administrative circuit.

(d) V.H.F.

V.H.F. sets in aircraft were set up and used as follows:


Channel B. 140.56 m/s. Air/Sea Rescue. 238 Ranchos.

Channel C. 142.76 m/s. Strike and reconnaissance aircraft.
An H/P strike wave was available if required.

(c) SHIP - SHORE
The American ship to shore circuits were used and little difficulty was experienced. British stations with the exception of the base U/T ship at Manus and Australian stations could not be worked owing to their inability to authenticate.

(c) MISCELLANEOUS CIRCUITS
- (a) 500 k/c/s, Commercial wave.
- (b) 3000 k/c/s, General air warning Pacific area.
- (c) 4475 k/c/s, Life Guard H/P. A H/P D/P guard was also detailed for this circuit.
- (d) 140.58 MHz Life Guard. A VH/F D/P guard was also detailed for this circuit.

Press

3. An attempt was made during this operation to pass Press by U/T direct from the scene of action instead of the previous method of sending copy by sea in returning letters etc. The British administrative circuit was used together with any available British ship - shore circuits.

It was found early in the operations that communication with British stations was only possible from about 1700 local time onwards. Since U/T transmissions were normally secured by the Commander Third Fleet at about 1900, the time available for transmission was inadequate, and at no time was communication good enough to use the high speed equipment fitted. It was also extremely disappointing to all concerned that, although the transmitting ship's normal strength of signals was 4, the receiving station always reported interference strength five.

The transmitters type 27TH used by KING GEORGE V were poor on the higher frequencies and experience shows that although this set is excellent up to about 13000 k/c/s it falls off rapidly above that frequency. At no time could communication be established with New Zealand or Australia on 20,450 k/c/s.

It is considered that sufficient press was cleared to enable the British public to be kept informed and up to date with current naval affairs in the Pacific, but from remarks and letters from war correspondents it is quite evident that the individual newspapers were far from satisfied.

Visual Signals

4. Very little use was made of flag signalling as, in large circular disposition, this method of manoeuvring is too slow. The daylight signalling lamps were in continual use; but were not sufficiently powerful for ships on the screen to read them. A more powerful D.R.L. with a guaranteed range of 10 miles, readable without glasses, is a very urgent requirement.

Traffic Handled

5. Owing to shortage of personnel it was not possible to keep an accurate record of the amount of traffic handled in the various positions i.e., flag deck, D.R.R., for tactical circuits, and C.O.C. for faxes.

A normal day's traffic was approximately 250 messages by V/8, 350 in D.R.R., and 650 on the faxes, the latter representing about 40,000 groups, of which 90% was normally broken down.

Complement

6. Proposed complements for ships of the British Pacific Fleet have been already forwarded under cover of my No. 602/2 of 9th June to the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet.
The actual complement in the Force Flagship during these operations was:-

1 Commander (C)
2 Lieutenant Commander (C)
3 Lieutenant (C) under training
4 Lieutenant (CE)
5 Signal Officer
6 Combined Telegraphist
7 Cypher Lieutenant (Sp.Cy.)
8 Sub-Lieutenants (Sp.Cy.)
9 Lieutenant Commander (R.A.N.R.)
10 Lieutenants (R.A.N.R.) Cypher Officers
11 Chief Petty Officer R.A.N.

W/T
1 Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist
2 Petty Officer Telegraphist
3 Leading Telegraphists
47 Telegraphists, Ordinary Telegraphists and Boy Telegraphists.

1 Leading Color
2 Colors
3 Radio Mechanics

W/S
1 Chief Yeoman
2 Yeoman of Signals
3 Leading Signaller
4 Signaller, Ordinary Signallers and Boy Signallers
5 Colors

The above complement was just sufficient to cope with the traffic. The main burden fell upon the cypher staff both American and British and it is to their credit that they succeeded in keeping abreast of the traffic.

Air Conditioning

7. During the recent replenishment period air conditioning was fitted in the O.C.O. The improvement in temperature and humidity was most marked contributing greatly to the efficiency of the work of the O.C.O., and it is strongly recommended that this should be generally fitted. During operations in Iceberg there were 15 cases of ratings reporting to sick bay with some form of heat rash; during the present operations there was only one case. The temperature was normally kept at about 60°.

X-Section

8. Y-Section were embarked in FUCHSIA and MAUDELAND. Very little information was obtained from this source due in all probability to the lack of reaction on the part of the enemy and scarcity of enemy air attacks.

R.C.I.M.

9. Owing to the complete absence of R.C.I.M. equipment in ships of the Force it is not possible to remark on this important subject, which will be fully dealt with in the American report.

Maintenance

10. The greatest difficulty was experienced in maintaining the W/T equipment during these operations especially in Flagships. All sets were constantly in use and insufficient spare sets were available to allow any set being put out of action long enough to carry out efficient maintenance.
SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix 3 to UJHF No. 1092/43 of 1st October, 1945.)

COMMUNICATIONS (contd)

In this respect the VHF and T.D.S. sets gave the most trouble. The radio mechanic complement allowed to ships has not yet been implemented in the British Pacific Fleet but, even if it had been, it is considered that spare sets are essential if the unsatisfactory situation experienced in these operations is to be avoided in the future.

BATTERY

11. During this operational period, the ships of TP 37 became thoroughly familiar with the American communication methods, and were able to appreciate the efficiency of the organisation and the high standard of American equipment and operators. The handling of this very large Fleet was carried out almost entirely by means of VHF R/T. It was in this respect that the British Force was to some extent handicapped and the need was felt both for better VHF equipment for inter-ship work, and for many more highly trained R/T operators.

12. Detailed recommendations for future policy arising from this experience together with a report on material will be forwarded separately to the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet.
REPLACEMENT OF ALL KINDS AT SEA IS CONSIDERED OF SUCH IMPORTANCE THAT THIS REPORT HAS BEEN MADE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. IT CONSISTS OF A STORY OF EVENTS FOLLOWED BY A MUSING UP OF THE LESSONS LEARNED BY EXPERIENCE.

EARLY DAWN OF PEACE

6th July

HMS KING GEORGE V left HARBOR for the initial fuelling position. On 7th July, HMAS ALABAMA, HMAS CULLINAN, HMAS KANGAROO and HMAS ADAMINABULA tokee-up destroyers to ensure that having enough to reach the oilers. On this occasion HMAS CULLINAN supplied oil at the rate of 100 tons per hour, and the destroyers' rates varied from 60 to 120 tons per hour. Following up from battleships and cruisers have been carried out frequently since, and it has been found that by judicious connection of all available pumps and by rerouting their discharges into the hose in the right place, HMAS KING GEORGE V can deliver at 150 tons per hour and heavy cruisers at 100 tons per hour, on average figures.

13th - 15th July (32°10' N 155°30' W)

This was the first meeting with oilers prior to the first strike during the July-August operating period. Those present were SAN ANTONIO, AVRAKATZ, and BENGAL. It is the AVRAKATZ's first appearance in sea to fuel the fleet, and both her passengers and destroyer houses were in bad condition. Passengers were repeatedly carried away from the hold in, and destroyers burst from KING GEORGE V attempted to fuel. BENGAL's hose was in the same condition, and it was only ended to a third day beam unexpectedly available due to an alteration in the plane of the destroyer 3rd fleet, that at 37 was able to fuel in time. KING GEORGE V, after repeated pitting of passengers and burstings of buoyant hose, was forced to fuel alongside BENGAL, although she is not yet fitted with 60 ft. davits. For this purpose, fueling was successful, and no difficulty was encountered, except for battleships fuelling alongside with sea during operations. BENGAL delivered fuel at 400 tons per hour with no trouble of any sort. No spray was used. The Master of BENGAL was persuaded by the Captain of KING GEORGE V to keep station on HMAS CULLINAN and did so extremely well. No provision of ammunition ships were present in this occasion.

20th - 22nd July (32°12' N 152°0' W)

The Service Force consisted of SAN ANTONIO, HMAS ARLINGTON, HMAS BENGAL, and HMAS COLUMBIA. On this occasion, HMAS BENGAL and HMAS ARLINGTON joined VP 97, and had fuelled by the time the task force made contact with the oiler. HMAS BENGAL's hose had come up from the hold at high speed and had required more fuel than had been anticipated, and, in the total fuel available some 2000 tons less than VP 97's requirements. The Commander 3rd fleet, on request, agreed to supply oil, and HMAS COLUMBIA and HMAS BENGAL fuelled from HMAS ARLINGTON, oilers of 900 tons.

Again, burst hoses and low pumping rates so reduced the rate of fuelling that the task force would not have been in time for the next strike had not the oilin course been vectored, i.e., approaching the strike position.

KING GEORGE V was the only heavy ship to fuel alongside (SAN ANTONIO). COLUMBIA's first appearance in the Service Area was a great success. She gave fresh provisions to KING GEORGE V, HMAS ARLINGTON, HMAS BENGAL, and 17 destroyers and one motor boat and one motor-boat. The Master stated that, as he had no more oxygen, he preferred that warships except carriers should keep station on COLUMBIA. Carriers provisionally alongside had to lie so far ahead in order to embark provisions by using the crane back the island, that it was unreasonable to expect them to keep station. The Master further agreed to provide a 1,050 cruiser on one side simultaneously with a destroyer the other side.
This occasion of DESTRUCTION provisioning was the first instance of a carrier replenishing alongside.

26th - 27th July

The Service Force consisted of CENTAUR, CARELIA, LAVE ENERGIS, EAGLESMILE, GLENRIGG and ROBERT MAREE; this was CARELIA’s and EAGLESMILE’s first fueling at sea. With 50% of the oiling force having oiled heavy ships before there was little hope for a quick fueling. NOORDHOLLAND oiled from alongside CARELIA and reported that her gear was well rigged and tended, and that her experienced fater and very young chandlers and engineers showed great keenness. However, this could not overcome burst hoses and a pumpage rate of barely 300 T.P.H., even though NOORDHOLLAND was the only ship oiling.

CENTAUR was handicapped by having only a single bungay hose with a stern fitted and only the port side fitted for oiling abreast. The overall pumping rate was so low that NEPTUNEBAND and ACHILLES had to be sent to fuel from U.S. oilers of 20,000 tons as there was no hope of them being ready to leave on time otherwise.

On this occasion KING GEORGE V, NEPTUNEBAND and VICEROYCES all fueled alongside without difficulty and the practice was thus firmly established. None of the above ships used a spring or tow line and, in fact, none had ever been used by ships of 27,000 tons while oiling at sea; no provision for this need be made in the future.

After fueling on 26th July, KING GEORGE V went alongside ROBERT MAREE to embark 16 inch shells for trial; and disembark empty ordnance. ROBERT MAREE had previously been called alongside KING GEORGE V in VANES to check up on measurements etc.)

An 11 inch tow line was employed but its strength was quite inadequate. It parted and the operation was continued without it. On 27th July two hatchets were worked, the forward hatch transferring to KING GEORGE V’s forward screen Derrick and the after one to the ground. To work ROBERT MAREE’s after hatch, a shallow barge had to be cut down in width to suit her deck and enable shell to be transferred to the inboard derrick. This barge had to be built and 200 tons of ordnance were embarked. The exception was made at a rate of 15 shells per ship per hour. The operation was carried out in a small barge 25 feet long considered not too bad considering the equipment and the small number of hands thus no great difficulty in controlling such heavy weights, which were lifted from the hold and transferred to the inboard derrick (nearest KING GEORGE V) without any steering lines. Owing to crashing against ROBERT MAREE’s structure, several shell plugs became badly burred and difficult to remove.

A second oiling was carried out on 28th July.

21st July - 2nd August

The Service Force consisted of LAVE KUNG, CARELIA, LAVE GOVERNOR, GLENRIGG, ROBERT MAREE, NOORDHOLLAND and ARDUNA. This was CARELIA’s and LAVE GOVERNOR’s first appearance so that again we had 50% of the oilers new to the game. MAREE fueled 3 ships simultaneously at a combined rate of 1000 tons an hour and averaged over 700 tons an hour over the whole day’s oiling. She was not immediately ready however, to supply Argyll by the alongside method, and her cargo had been loaded so that far too high a proportion of it was baled oily ship’s cargo was not prepared to receive. The former short coming completely disturbed the whole oiling programme and added considerably to the carriers burdens.

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Due to her hurried sailing from NEWPORT, H.M.S. KING GEORGE V arrived in the Service Area 200 nautical miles ahead of the other ships of the Task Force, thereby enabling her to fuel one carrier only. There were frequent sightings of her prey, which were armed with her 5-inch guns, but no more than the inferior quality of the new British naval forces to which she was allied, and partly to the assistance of the Task Force being too few and too late. At one of these contacts she received the damage observed by H.M.S. KING GEORGE V when sailing alongside her. The bomb burst if full running pressure was put on. These accidents and the consequent reduction in running rate were a great disappointment and must have been also to the U.S.S.R. ships inefficient and energetic hunter. The whole operation of replenishment was carried out in a long and unpleasant typhoon swell which ran it right angles to the wind and sea. As the Force had to keep at 30 knots, they developed a considerable swell, at times higher than a crest and nose of the wave clear of the water. This made handling a difficult business, but all ships, from H.M.S. KING GEORGE V downwards, accomplished it at the cost of a few parts which were then lost to the Task Force or transferred on to another cruiser. H.M.S. DUKE OF YORK had the usual towing troubles but settled down satisfactorily. GUNNERAYE was again invaluable and supplied VICKERSON, GUNNA, DRISCOLL and a number of destroyers. On 31st July, H.M.S. DUKE OF YORK had to be detached to carry out repairs and supplied VICKERSON with the after pedestal and 6-inch shells and 66 cases of cartridges. H.M.S. ROYAL NAVY, using forward hatch only. On this occasion she was in at 21, 00 and full charges at 60, per ship per hour. In order to assist ROYAL NAVY in determining the division of her cargoes in the existing swell and with H.M.S. DUKE OF YORK alongside, a gyro repeater had been arranged in her. Her master, however, had not seen one before and was observed apparently rolling his watch by it. He then shook his head and returned it to H.M.S. DUKE OF YORK.

H.M.S. KING GEORGE V attempt to catch up from ROYAL NAVY on 1st August, but the latter was too small for existing swell conditions; GUNNERAYE, a larger ship, however, whose first appearance was made in the early hours of 5 August, took her to ROYAL NAVY.

Experience with the A.M.S. and GUNNERAYE showed that ships with in-water compartments had been successfully operated by heavy ships along side, in the case of ROYAL NAVY this varied from 7 to 15 degrees, with the roll and pitch. These accidents are considered to be of no essential but in the meantime it came into it all ships, except carriers, keep station on the store ships or ammunition carriers, although this is not easy under certain conditions. H.M.S. DUKE OF YORK for example, during replenishing had to vary her course from 10 knots to stop undue station keeping.

On 2nd August, however, the swell had gone down enough to enable ROYAL NAVY to complete handling up from ROYAL NAVY.

On 6th August, the radar ship, having arrived (VICKERSON and GUNNERAYE) had been able to discharge oil into ROYAL NAVY and H.M.S. KING GEORGE V before the replenishment arrival providing four working orders. H.M.S. KING GEORGE V, carriers and heavy cruisers had been warned to prepare their tanks to receive the maximum acceptable quantity of diesel oil, of which O.W.S. DUKE OF YORK was transferred to the Task Force and the carrier. Since the ships of the Task Force had sustained no action damage, no call was made on the Type 28 and Type 79 aerial gear which she carried.

6th - 7th August (24° 20' W 147° 00' E)

This was to have been a one-day fueling, but luckily the two full tenders having arrived (VICKERSON and GUNNERAYE) had been able to discharge oil into ROYAL NAVY and H.M.S. KING GEORGE V before the replenishment arrived providing four working orders. H.M.S. KING GEORGE V, carriers and heavy cruisers had been warned to prepare their tanks to receive the maximum acceptable quantity of diesel oil, of which O.W.S. DUKE OF YORK was transferred to the Task Force and the carrier. Since the ships of the Task Force had sustained no action damage, no call was made on the Type 28 and Type 79 aerial gear which she carried.
Oils could not supply excessive oil and diesel simultaneously. The changeover took 30 minutes to effect by use of two oilers.

All went smoothly except when DUNKIRK suffered from burst buoyant hoses to such an extent that fueling stopped. She was refueled by another. The oilers, however, had been called from HUNTS with hoses to fuel destroyers. After the changeover, they were able to deal with destroyers who would otherwise have had to be left behind when the Fleet left.

ROYAL NAVY made her final appearance, but had no fresh provisions except meals and stores. She had, however, dry and refrigerated provisions and proved a valuable horse. PORTSMOUTH, NEWPORT NEWS, GARDEN ISLAND, and 9 destroyers drew provisions from her, calling at GARDEN ISLAND for fresh provisions.

This was the latter's last appearance in the Service Area and the following is a brief summary of her activities:

-Vessels alongside - 77
-Solumes discharged - 422 tons
-Average discharge rate - 7.5 tons per hour

ROYAL NAVY volunteered to provide two ships simultaneously, with no reservations on size. Heavy ships and destroyers were therefore sent to her simultaneously and no difficulty was reported.

11th August (38° 00' N 145° 00' E)

The Service Force consisted of JAWS, INDIAN, GLEN, SAN FRANCISCO, SAN ANDRES, ROYAL NAVY, and NEWPORT NEWS. This was a one-day fuelling in which KING GEORGE V by invitation of Com., 3rd Fleet, went to fuel from 10.00 whilst the Vice Admiral and others were attending a conference in USS MISSOURI who was fuelling simultaneously the other side of the tanker. Consolation into GLEN and SAN FRANCISCO made all five tankers usable, with the result that TP 37 was fuelled by the end of the day and three escorts as well. JAWS, INDIAN, and GLEN worked all day. While fueling on GLEN's starboard side, had a steaming failure, with rudder jammed to port. Her port yardarm failed GLEN's starboard, and before she drew close to her port was raised and, with crews not on deck, she was turned to starboard. Her port gear was stopped, but there were no casualties, and USS's seaworthiness was unaffected. 700 tons; none 200 miles to the southward and moving in a N.W. direction, raised a small which increased throughout the day and put considerable pitching movement on the oilers by the afternoon.

ROYAL NAVY provided 9 destroyers, GLEN, INDIAN, and 9 destroyers.

14th August (37° 45' N 144° 00' E)

On 12th August TP 37 split, the majority of heavy ships going south, forming TP 37.1. The remainder, consisting of KING GEORGE V, INDIAN, A. FRANCISCO, GLEN, INDIAN, GARDEN ISLAND, ROYAL NAVY, and HUNTS, joined TP 30, forming TP 30.5. KING GEORGE V fuelled from USS INDIAN, who gave her 1,400 tons at a rate of 500 tons per hour. Apart from the high pumping rate of this oiler, the following were the most notable points:-

(a) The excellent station kept by this oiler.
(b) The convenience of the working deck/transferance of stores such as ladders, oil and gas cylinders.
(c) The seaworthy manner in which all gear was made up, used, and handled.
(d) The excellent method of the hoses which did not collapse when the oil was not being pumped through.
SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix 4 to NAVY No. 1099/4 dated 1st October, 1945)

PART I - DIARY OF EVENTS (Contd)

16TH - 17TH, August (31° 00' N 142° 00' E)

By this date TO 30.5 had been augmented by DUCHESS OF YORK, LANCER and
HURLE. The Service Force consisted of SAMUEL BOWES, SIR HOWARD, LION
GOVERNOR and PORT BANKEELL. This was DUCHESS OF YORK's first occasion
of firing at sea and she went alongside LION GOVERNOR and had a certain amount
of difficulty in connecting up the bonds. There was nothing further of
note. TO 30.5 provisioned all destroyers (12) for one hour each on
16th. HURLE pulled from TO 30.5.

On 16th NOTTINGHAM and CASSELL provisioned from PORT BANKEELL and
KING GEORGE V sailed from LION GOVERNOR.

20TH, August (32° 00' N 143° 00' E)

The Service Force present was LION GOVERNOR, CASSELL and PORT
BANKEELL. Destroyers only touched up.

It was intended to divide the day so that KING GEORGE V and
PORT BANKEELL each had half a day on PORT BANKEELL, but owing to the
necessity of the order to disembark landing parties into assault transports,
KING GEORGE V had to cast off from PORT BANKEELL at 1030. While
provisioning however, she worked two ships, one forward and one aft, and
succeeded in embarking 40 tons in 3½ hours - this being twice the average
speed it would in at Sydney.

In the late afternoon, TO 30.5 was dissolved. KING GEORGE V, DUCHESS
OF YORK, NOTTINGHAM, CASSELL, HURLE, HURLE and TO 30.5 formed to
30.4.6 and joined TO 30.6.
PART II - GENERAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Fueling**

A high pumping rate and good house which will stand high pressure is the answer to fueling at sea.

(a) (i) **Pumping rate - Armor Oil**. After a 4 ½ day strike period, (which includes the approach to the oceangoing and retirement to the Service Line), the average requirement of the Task Force was 22,000 tons of fuel. With three tankers whose pumping rates are 300, 300 and 350 tons/hour, as was the case in the first fueling, and assuming 12 hours of daylight available, two days are required to fuel the Task Force, if all goes well. For a one-day fueling, at least 5 tankers of a "AVO" type are required (12 hours x 350 tons/hour x 5 tankers = 21,000 tons discharged) or 6 "SAM" or "BNS" type (12 x 300 x 6 = 21,600). One heavy ship oiling singly from a "SAM" or "BNS" type can get 400 tons/hour, and about 850 tons/hour from "AVO" type. It pays therefore to fuel heavy ships singly from those low pumping rate tankers. "OILMA" proved herself to be a satisfactory oiler. Her arrival had been eagerly awaited and perhaps a little bit too much had been expected of her, on this her first major oiling at sea. She had not, unfortunately, prepared to give Avgas by the abeam method and this considerably delayed VICTORIA's completing and so disrupted the whole oiling program. Her overall average on her first day's fueling was 700 T.P.L.

Three "OILMA's" therefore would have fuelled the Task Force in one day (3 x 700 x 12 = 25,200 tons.)

"OILMA's" pumping rate dropped in later fuelings after experiencing four burst hoses simultaneously with BLACK PRINCE and a destroyer oiling either side.

It is suspected that one or the other of those oiler valves against "OILMA's" pumps, and as a result she is frightened of using full pressure.

Then she has settled down and overcome these oiling problems she will be an invaluable addition to the Fleet and it is hoped that although the war is now over, her sister ship "OILMAK" will be completed and put in commission.

(ii) **Avgas**. A high rate of pumping Avgas is an essential requirement of the modern tanker. 30 T.P.L. by the abeam method was always liable to delay a carrier's time of completion of fueling.

"OILMA's" rate of pumping by the abeam method proved satisfactory when she brought it into play.

**Fittings**

(b) **Oiler's fittings** are now standardized, are generally satisfactory, except for the quality of the hoses. U.S. M. 5" hoses appear better than our own. A working deck, as fitted in U.S. oilers, is a necessity. Although in fact the Fleet was never attacked in the fueling area, it became clear that quick release couplings were a necessity. It is suggested that a U.S. M. hose assistant fueling officer had good opportunities to inspect all U.S. gear for fueling at sea, is best qualified to advise on the most suitable type to put into production for fuel and Avgas. In April of 1945, it was noted that this type of hose, 470/45, was well recommended since it can be quickly coupled as well as released. This quality is very desirable, but not essential. It is understood that the couplings mentioned in A.P.O. 470/45 are for quick release only. No FLOUNDERA has quick release coupling similar to the U.S. M. type, but without the quick coupling device. Her R.O. considers that it was of somewhat too
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Page 7.
(Appendix No. 4 to V.F.M. Op. No. 10/21/L of 1st October, 1941)

PART II — GENERAL OPERATIONS AND REINFORCEMENTS (Contd)

Heavy construction and cordage could be made easier to handle and operate by
simplified modifications. If the quick release is operated, the length of
alloy which must disengage is such that the hook must be rigged so that
there is no bend in it for about a foot each side of the coupling.
Unless the coupling can pull out squarely along its axis, a bar is
likely to result. A separate report is being forwarded by this officer.

Consolidation

(c) It is essential that oilers are able to do this in order to
even out the fuel remaining. For next oiling. During the period under
review it was done by the same method twice. Going to be handled. The
idea would be to have the Fleet Oiler's (say four "OIL"s) with
freighters consolidating into them in the non-fuelling period.

R.R.L. Work and Submarine Stores

2. (a) Although oiling presented many problems to be solved on the
spot, these were completely overshadowed by the "headaches" of meeting
shortages of essential stores (chiefly fuel equipment) and transporting
them - when available - to ships requiring them. The general
organisation for distribution of mails, stores and correspondence was finalised as
follows:

(b) Three H.R.H. ships were detailed, one for the main body and one
for each half of the screen. In addition, it was found necessary to
allocate one, and sometimes two, destroyers to each for the transfer of
pilots and air stores from the replenishment carrier. (These air stores
on occasion, included some scores of drop tanks and several tons of
heavy gear such as oxygen cylinders.) Further, it was generally necessary to
send a destroyer to Cam. Zee Fleet for correspondence.

(c) Stores requirements were collected by signal the day before
fuelling started and a general signal was sent to ships in company
staging requirements. On the fuelling day, as much as possible was
made of H.R.H. for transferring stores between ships of their own
group. Otherwise transfers were made by destroyers immediately before or after oiling.

(d) Direct transfers were arranged whenever possible, heavy and
light cradles often going alongside battlehips and carriers. Even so,
destroyers generally had a hard time of it during fuelling periods.
Of 16 destroyers which rendered statistics, the following are the average
figures for 3 fuelling periods.

(i) Number of times fuelled from oilers - 13

(ii) Number of alongsides to ships other than oilers - 49

(iii) The highest number of alongsides made in any one day was

(iv) Corresponding figures for H.M.S. KING GEORGE V are -

(v) Ships alongside - 230.

(a) It will thus be seen that destroyers had little rest. A
The requirements to remedy this state of affairs are -
OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

(Appendix No. 4 to ORDER No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

PART II - GENERAL NOTES AND ADDITIONAL SPECIFICATIONS (Contd)

(1) That ships should be adequately stored before leaving base to avoid having to resort to what RON222 aptly christened 'The Task Force opportunity market.' Some idea of the shortages involved may be gained from the signals shown below of "wants," which, it is emphasised, was made of everything save essentials and drastically cut down before being send.

(1)1 That the Logistic Support Group should contain enough destroyers (Pirates and sloops are not fast enough) but "SMM" class destroyers would be most suitable) to take all M.S.S. work off destroyers of the Task Force.

(11) That Logistic Support Group should include, in addition to others, ships containing naval stores, victualling stores, ammunition and repair facilities of all kinds.

TO: GENERAL

Following required. Any ship able to supply inform C.M.O.

BY FORTUNO: 100 lbs. Green Gun.

BY VENTURAS
(a) Two Under Transformers 1327
(b) 100 Cubic feet Hydrogen
(c) Two tons Under Art Descounb
(d) Under crystals red ajet CV 103, 4 in number.

BY BELLMAR
(a) 2 quart Cautic Soda
(b) 2 gallons Artic Charcoal Navy Oil, or equivalent for Waldmark R.M.S.
(c) 2 1/7 gallons CV 1219 (MT 30)

BY BLACK PEARLS
(a) 100 Charcoal Brass Iodine or equivalent tablets
(b) Ten tablets neutral red stain.

BY IGNITABOL
(a) Armament broadcast Transformer Pattern 12522
(b) 112 lbs. Fireclay.

BY T. GOURANOS
(a) Field Coil for Mage Power 1 point 1 M.E.
(b) 220 volts 3 point 5 edge, maked Marshall and Wolf
(c) 2 gallons Colloidal Graphite
(d) 40 feet seven core rubber covered flexible cable Sperry type.

BY ORFINA
(a) Type 211 Transformer 4-1245 kw.
(b) One Carbon Pad Regulator 2 16850
(c) Two Striker Springs for 4 point 7 mark 92 star
(d) Three Boston Gun rods
(e) Two tubes waterfinding pastes
(f) 14 lbs. Grease for stern tube

BY NAUTEN
(a) Two Under Valves GV 1054.
(b) Contact Block Pattern 650 Chernikeef Log Submerged Mechanism
(c) Potentiometer Half-Watts Half-Watt 100/0.075 or 100/1.275.

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Provisioning

4. "GLENELG" and "POST ANGEL" were a great success and made just that difference to the Task Force's well-being which is essential during a prolonged period at sea. In view of reducing supplies and to enable supplies to be obtained at short notice, battleships, carriers and cruisers were directed to lodge with "GLENELG" maximum unit demands for provisions for one week. Ships could then signal for one or more units according to circumstances with the addition or subtraction of certain items according to their stocks at the moment, instead of having to signal a complete demand. The Victualling Store Officer in "GLENELG" reported that this system had proved very useful.

"POST ANGEL" carried very few fresh fruit and vegetables. These were essential to ships who have been several weeks at sea in a long, drawn out war. She did, however, work two holds when provisioning KING GEORGE V, which enabled a total of 10 tons per hour to be embarked. If "GLENELG" had worked two holds at once, her rate of 7.5 tons per hour would probably have been doubled. It is realised that this is a matter for ships themselves to arrange, and "GLENELG" would probably have done this if she had been told that "POST ANGEL" had managed to do so.

The outstanding lack throughout the entire operation was of eggs, potatoes, fresh vegetables, fruit and water.

Provisioning

4. (a) As will be seen from Part I of this report, KING GEORGE V carried out this operation on three occasions at sea, once for trial and twice in earnest. Before leaving UKUUS, "HMS ANSON" had been placed alongside in order to examine the relative position of hatches and davits.

(b) KING GEORGE V's experience at sea was that the U.S. "cornering" method is very satisfactory and can be carried out with existing ship's fittings.

The following are considered reasonable figures:

14 inch shell - 32 per hour per whip
300pdr - 60 Full charges per hour per whip,
hoisting 5 cases in each load.

(c) Weather conditions for the trial run were good, but for the other two occasions the wind was force 4 - 6, sometimes accompanied with heavy rain and squalls. The sea varied from 45 - 55 which caused "HMS ANSON" to pitch heavily.
OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

PART II - GENERAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

(4) Station-keeping. The disparity in size between KING GEORGE V (40,000 tons) and ROBERT MARSK (2,290 tons) made two things necessary:

(i) That the latter keep station on KING GEORGE V. This her
    Master did with great skill in spite of much motion on the ship.

(ii) That the towing spring be dispensed with. It was quite
    useless. To make the operation generally possible in any but
    a calm sea a much bigger AB is required, 6,000 tons being the
    minimum and the ships selected must have gyro compasses.

(c) Loading. As far as 14 inch shell are concerned, AB's should
    be loaded so that the ratio of forward to after hold is 2:4:1, since
    it is not practicable to transfer ammunition from FK to AX in ships of
    the KING GEORGE V Class.

(f) Manipulating. AB's must carry enough hands to be able to work
    forward and after holds, without a break in the operation, for all
    daylight hours. Cheerful and whole-hearted as they were, ROBERT
    MARSK’s crew could not have achieved this.

(g) Assumptions achieved. Those in KING GEORGE V were not fast
    enough. If they had looked at the same speed as ROBERT MARSK’s the rate
    of embarking shell would probably have been stepped up to 24 per hour.

(h) Cruiser assuptioning.

(i) Only one cruiser has embarked ammunition at sea. That
    was HMAS ANZAC, who carried out trials off MERSYS on 14th June
    1945, with ROBERT MARSK. UGANDA used burtons from the AB to three
    positions, FK, boat deck and AX, and achieved the following rates
    under ideal weather conditions:

    FK - 130 6" shell + 30 cases cordite per hour.
    AX - 90 6" shell + 40 cases cordite per hour.
    Total 220 6" shell + 70 cases cordite per hour.

    Boat deck - 120 cases 4" per hour, 9 cases per load, which were
    hauled over by hand. This was considered maximum good-weather load
    which could be manhandled across.

(ii) Difficulty was experienced with riding turns on the
    quarterdeck 1 ton winch drums. A warping drum or bigger head
    was required.

(iii) UGANDA used a towing spring successfully in this calm
    weather, but KING GEORGE V's experience in rough weather was that
    it was neither necessary nor desirable.

(iv) The necessity for maximum height for loads of weights into
    cruisers is stressed. When using the crane, the load should be at
    the head of the crane. For embarkation onto Forecastle and
    Quarterdeck, UGANDA recommends that special spars, 32 feet long, be
    supplied, with fitted positions for them almost "P" turret and the
    after screen.

(v) Except for small loads, burtoning is better than a
    jackstay.

Bombing up by Carriers

6. Reports of bombing up during Operation PERSEUS have already
    been forwarded by the Rear Admiral Commanding Fleet Train to the
    Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet.
PART II - GENERAL REMARKS AND ILLUSTRATIONS (Contd)

(b) It appears that 4-500 lb. bombs per hoist is the maximum load which can be conveniently handled, necessitating about 60 men manning the carrier's inhaul. A Clarkart or Ford tractor to take up the slack has been found effective.

(c) Rocket heads are conveniently hoisted in nets, 10 boxes per net.

(d) Rate of hoisting. Best rate achieved was by INDOMITABLE and was 120 bombs per hour, i.e., 60 loads per hour. INDESTRUCTIBLE embarked rocket heads at a rate of 34 loads i.e., 340 heads per hour, the loads coming in at the same rate as the bomb loads.

(e) Carriers inhaul. The best rig seems to be that used by INDOMITABLE namely 60 fathoms of 2½" wire tailed by 40 fathoms of 4" hump. This inhaul should be made up in such a manner that it will render through the leading blocks if it had to be let go in an emergency.

(f) Again it is emphasised that INDOMITABLE's rocket was short handed for this operation.

III. In all reports of proceedings and of replenishment at sea two factors stand out pro-eminent in those which make it possible. The first is the good average weather of the Eastern Pacific, and the second is the absence of any attack on the British Pacific Fleet in the Service Area. In making full use of the former and regarding the latter as a legitimate risk to take, we followed the example of the U.S. Fleet, and it paid handsome dividends.

7. It has been proved through our recent experiences that all previous conceptions of ships proceeding alongside one another whilst under way have broken down by the board. Thus in the United States Navy a battleship went alongside a battleship, MISSOURI transferring 250 men to SOUTH DAKOTA by 14 jackstays in about one hour whilst under way at 6 knots. In both Fleets heavy cruisers go alongside battleships to transfer gear and stores; battleships and aircraft carriers to oil and provision alongside; all this not only in calm weather but in the normal weather to be expected in an open ocean like the Pacific with winds force 4 to 6 and sea 4 to 5.

Recommendations derived from the above will be forwarded separately.
General

These operations have been the occasion of the largest purely Naval Fighter Direction and Air Control organisation of the year. The air over an ocean area of more than 5,000 square miles was effectively denied to the enemy. In addition to the usual problems of air warning and interception the number of separate formations operating, many miles apart, called for a central control which was far beyond anything previously required.

2. To the British assisted the following subjects were of particular significance and interest and this section has been divided into parts accordingly:

Part I The satisfactory results achieved in the defence of the Naval Base operating constantly within easy reach of the Japanese Metropolitan Air Force.

Part II The outstanding success of the specially fitted Fighter Direction Destroyers.

Part III The organisation for the central control of all aircraft movements, detections and interceptions.

Part IV The relationship of air and surface plotting.

Part V The general superiority of American radio equipment as at present fitted in ships.

Part VI The absolute dependence of the whole air defence organisation on reliable and flexible communications.

Part VII Results obtained:

3. Complete air superiority over the Third Fleet was achieved. The part played by the long war of attrition against the Japanese Air Force; the growing weakness of the sustained attacks by American Army Super Fortresses; and the local air superiority achieved over Japanese Air stations by the carrier borne strike aircraft, were major factors in obtaining this result. No doubt the Commander U.S. Third Fleet will be able to assess the relative importance of these factors.

4. The early warning given by the American Intelligence organisation and the prompt interception of search aircraft when enemy formations were expected to attack, further prevented any large scale attack being launched on the Fleet.

5. An abundance of search aircraft and of small parties of aircraft provided an ample test of the Fleet's fighter defences. Those that closed to within 50 miles of any unit and engaged were the rare exception, while a total of 44 Japanese aircraft were shot down by the fleet's air patrol in the vicinity of the Fleet.

6. The 40 "kills" were obtained as follows:

(a) Picket directed interceptions 26

(b) U.S. Carrier directed interceptions 12

(c) British Carrier directed interceptions 5

(d) Un-directed visual sightings by C.... 45 60
PART II. PIKETES

7. Three piketes were employed and were normally stationed 40 - 60 miles from the Fleet guide so as to provide remote cover over 180 degrees in the general direction of expected attack. The two piketes on either flank acted in addition as a rendezvous and examination station for returning strike aircraft.

8. Each pike composed of at least 4 destroyers of which one or more was fitted with Radar Type SP, the latest mark of SC, Type SE, a YE beacon, E.N.I equipment and all necessary communications. All destroyers on pike duty were fitted with adequate radar and carried fighter direction teams so that although the SP fitted ship acted as leader each was able to undertake some warning or interception duty.

9. The standard of both day and night interception by the piketes was equal to that of the Fleet carrier's and the prompt way in which interceptions were carried out deserved the highest praise.

10. It will be observed from the figures in para. 6 that the three piketes were responsible for 26 directed interceptions as compared with 17 controlled by some 16 Fleet carrier's. Even those figures favour the carriers since many of the carrier successes were against aircraft which approached from the side on which there were no piketes and were only shot down relatively close to the Fleet.

11. Previous experience when the British Force had been alone, had shown the importance of suicide aircraft being detected and intercepted as far from the main body as possible. The use of piketes was designed and effectively achieved this object.

12. The success of the piketes may be attributed to-

(a) Freedom from radar saturation, being stationed well away from the main force and its C.A.P.

(b) Having as their primary function the control of aircraft and being specially fitted and manned for that purpose.

(c) Constant action practice.

13. In the British Pacific Fleet, lacking destroyers fitted with any adequate equipment, enormous efforts were made to train cruisers to the necessary standards and their A.P.E. complement increased accordingly. Although the efficiency of the cruisers showed notable improvement, they could not have been expected to achieve the same proficiency as the SP fitted destroyers to whom Aircraft Direction is the primary duty of function.

14. The use of the piketes has not been restricted to carrier Task Force operations. On the occasion of each bombardment the force has included one SP pike destroyer which during the bombardment itself was stationed ten or more miles on the downwind side, having particular regard to freedom from land echoes. The pike controlled the fighters over the force by day and by night and provided warning which the bombarding ships lacked owing to land echoes. On each occasion the pike carried out its duties in a most efficient manner and set a standard which no battleship or cruiser - with their few opportunities for operational control - could hope to emulate.

15. Accounts of the occupation of Okinawa show that although taking heavy casualties, the piketes, acting as remote Fighter Direction and Radar warning stations, played a vital part in the success of that amphibious operation.
FIGHTER DIRECTION AND AIR WARNING (Contd)

16. It is difficult to judge where future developments may lie. It would however be rash to ignore the marked success of these specialist ships, without which the casualties to major units must necessarily have been much higher.

Part III. Force Organisation

17. For the purpose of force control and reporting the British Task Force 37 noted as a "group" of Task Force 38 and accepted the directions of Task Force 38 Force Fighter Direction Officer.

18. TF 38 Force Fighter Direction Officer

(a) Detailed the size of C.A.P. to be maintained by each group and exercised overlying control over their normal petrol positions.

(b) While not restricting the right of any group or platoon to initiate interceptions, exercised control with a view to preventing overall cover and to preventing confusion due to too many formations seeking to intercept simultaneously.

(c) Received reports from each group whenever C.A.P. aircraft were directed away from their petrol positions.

(d) Maintained an overall air plot based upon his own and other groups' radar reports and information of friendly movements received from other groups.

(e) Acted as a central evaluation for identification purposes.

It will be observed for the purposes of analogy, that the Force F.D.O. combined the functions known as the Royal Air Force as "Group Control" and "Movement Idiosyn".

19. In addition to the functions normally associated with Fighter Defence, the Force F.D.O., also

(a) Maintained a surface plot of the relative positions of all groups and platoons and issued periodic surface situation reports. This plot was maintained by groups reporting the relative positions of their neighbours and by radar fixes on the C.A.P.'s orbiting the platoons.

(b) Controlled the employment and direction of air sea rescue submarines and aircraft.

(c) Evaluated reports of interceptions of enemy radar and controlled the use of R.O.M.

20. All these activities were carried out on a single channel of communication.

21. In the result, this organisation gave the whole Force a very fair idea of what was going on in the area. With more than three times as many aircraft airborne, it could hardly be expected that the picture would be so clear as when a single group was operating alone. Certainly the British Group never achieved the clear air plot to which it had grown accustomed when operating alone off the KANGAROO GUNTO.

22. While it is probable that the British Force did not reap the full benefit of all the information available owing to unfamiliarity with the organisation and to the difficulties in relating air and surface plots referred to in Part IV of this appendix, it is considered that when so large a Force is operating a rather broader organisation is required to ensure that channels of communication are not overloaded and that all information received can be used.
24. The air reporting organization was based upon the American concept of the Combat Information Centre as a single room in which all air movements, surface movements, Radar, R.O.M. and "A" are plotted and controlled.

25. Hour reports of aircraft are received from ships or groups whose relative positions are constantly changing over a wide area, it is necessary, either that those reports be made by reference to a geographical grid or that the relative positions of the reporting stations be constantly and accurately plotted. Grid reporting, while possessing advantages for inshore work has never been found sufficiently accurate at sea.

26. In order to provide a constant surface plot, all Task Groups and Frigates regularly reported each other's positions and situation reports were broadcast by the Task Force R.O.M. in the same way as air situation reports are broadcast by the Carrier flagship under British Procedure.

27. In American ships the surface plot, being in the same room as the Air Plot, is readily available to Aircraft Direction personnel. The price however is a high noise level and a general level of 11 ft which may or may not always be satisfactory for the various Naco displays.

28. British carriers suffered from lack of adequate surface plotting arrangements in or adjacent to the A.D.R., while even in ships having the full A.I.O. the arrangements for relating surface to air were not turned to the best advantage.

29. A better appreciation of the surface requirements of aircraft direction is needed and the operations room should be responsible for providing the A.D.R. with "cold" surface plots in the same way as to the Bridge Plotting Room.

30. It is recommended that Surface Plots told to the A.D.R. should be plotted on an A.R.I. with the new Projected Grid to facilitate the transcription of air plots received from other ships. The latter can then be plotted on the M.A.D.R. in the ordinary way - a talling line being provided from the A.R.I. tables to the back of the M.A.D.R.

31. Experience in these operations suggests that while it might not be desirable wholly to merge the Operations Room and Aircraft Direction Room, the best arrangement for relating air and surface plots remains to be found.
Part V. Radar

32. These operations have provided an opportunity to compare the performance of British Naval Air Warning with its American counterpart. This comparison is for the most part made on the basis of what was in fact reported or not reported at the time.

33. It must be freely admitted that in general the American Air Warning Radar as fitted to-day presents a broader, clearer, and more accurate picture of aerial activity than that in British ships.

High Warning

34. Above 25,000 feet type 728B and, to a lesser extent type 281D, provide more reliable warning than type SK II. Once however, aircraft have closed to 50 - 60 miles, i.e., within the range of type SP, the latter gives much more accurate and reliable plots up to 35,000 feet. While this shortcoming at extreme range is overcome by the Americans by the use of Inrad Pickets fitted with SP, it is not always possible to provide pickets and the excellent High Warning given by these British sets is a valuable asset, particularly for search when types 728 and 281D are used in combination.

Medium Warning

35. The warning range of type SK II at heights below 15,000 feet has repeatedly been shown to be greater than comparable British Naval sets.

Low Warning

36. Types 728 and 281 have consistently provided greater range and more constant tracking than type 277.

Discrimination

37. The Vancouver Dean and other "shocks" of all American warning sets is a great advantage particularly in the saturated conditions around a large Task Group.

Height Finding

38. Type SP appears to give quick and reliable heights up to 35,000 feet or more. The limited range is discounted by the use of pickets. The Americans thus have little occasion to use the amplitude measurement method for which Type SK II is ill suited and which at best is never very reliable.

Land Shocks

39. With certain configurations of the land types 79 and 261 have a considerable advantage over type SK II, due to their lack of low cover.

General

40. It is recognised that the three basic Naval Sets 79, 261 and 277 are due for replacement. They have given good service in their time. If they are now outlawed by newer American equipment, nobody should be surprised.

Part VI. Communications

41. Whereas in the matter of Radar equipment, the superiority of the Americans was only a matter of degree, and the British force had little difficulty in maintaining a tolerable standard of warning at all times, the communications were a constant anxiety and at times threatened the organisation with complete breakdown.
FIGHTER DIRECTION AND AIR WARNING (Cont'd)

42. Complete reliability and flexibility of communications are essential to air defence. In the British Force, the number of available sets was barely sufficient to run the minimum number of channels required. In the result, sets have been in constant use and frequent breakdown of equipment, made good by uniting but hasty improvisations from inadequate resources, has, in the latter stages of the operation, been the rule rather than the exception.

43. In particular, the H.P. equipment of the British ships failed to maintain the necessary communications at ranges up to 60 - 70 miles, while the tedious process of tuning the transmitters was an offence to the Force as a whole.

44. The number of channels required in an operation of this magnitude is dealt with elsewhere in this report and it must suffice for the purpose of this Appendix to draw the contrast between the British equipment and that of American ships which was notable for its reliability, quick tuning, and the flexibility which enabled them to switch rapidly between any of ten VHF channels.
SUBJECT: OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST.

FROM: THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRON, SOUTH PACIFIC FLEET.

DATE: 29th July, 1945.

TO: THE VICE ADMIRAL, SECOND-IN-COMMAND, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

(Copies to: The Commanding Officers, H.M.S. Ships VICTORIOUS, POLARISABLE, INDESTRUCTIBLE, INDEFATIGABLE and INDOMITABLE)

Reports covering air operations carried out by Task Force 57, as a Task Group of Task Force 38, on 17th and 18th July and 21st and 25th July, 1945, are forwarded herewith.

17TH AND 18TH JULY

2. This period was distinguished by adverse flying weather, in the target area on 17th and in the operating zone on the 18th, on which day Seafires were near lost on two occasions whilst endeavour was made to find clear enough conditions in extensive fog to land on these low endurance aircraft.

Seafires

3. Following the failure of all the Brotherhood Air Compressors fitted in H.M.S. INDESTRUCTIBLE, 3 carriers only were available for these strikes, one of which was Seafire armed.

Since Seafire L.IIIIs, with which H.M.S. INDESTRUCTIBLE is equipped, cannot be effectively operated above 15,000 feet, they are not even available for the upper flight of the O.A.P. The problem which faces planners is how to employ them when operating tactically with the U.S. Carrier Task Force, which strikes normally, as on 17th July, 150 to 230 miles from assigned targets - distances outside the range of Seafires required for combat and strafing. In this instance, due to initiative on the part of Captain C.C. Hughes Elliott, C.B.E., R.N., H.M.S. INDESTRUCTIBLE, the Seafires carried 59 gallon overload tanks, which made it practicable to send them to the nearer targets. Even then they had no reserve.

/4 - Targets ........

68
SECRET

OPERATIONS JUL/AUGUST
(The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier
Squadron's No. 0109/19/98/3 of 29th July, 1943.)

June 5, 1943

(Contd.)

1. The targets offered our Air Squadrons on these two days were
reasonably - after the hard chase of KOKAIYA - for the richness of the
prizes which they offered. To take opportunity by the forelock in the
matter of destruction of grounded aircraft, careful study of recent
photographs is needed, since the best prizes are the best concealed and
such few aircraft as are obviously placed are difficult to distinguish
from a cockpit from the high class deck with which they are ranged.

On the 13th such a study was not practicable since the last minute
changes in target assignments, rendered necessary by the weather coupled
with the delay incidental in passing the originator's orders by B/T through
another Task Group on an overloaded line, left insufficient time for the
necessary briefing, if the departure of the strikes was not to be
unacceptably delayed.

VICTORIOUS - Petrol Failure

3. The striking power of the Task Group was seriously impaired on
18th July through the leakage of salt water into a petrol tank in VICTORIOUS,
which resulted in that ship being able to dispatch one strike of 3 Carriers
only during the day.

Sea of Japan

6. British aircraft paid their first recent visit to the Sea of
Japan on the 17th July when Carriers, which had been attacking the airfield
at HIRABA on the west coast, sighted and rushed with gun fires a 5,000 ton
Japanese tanker offshore.
SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST
(The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier
Squadron's No. 0102/16/265 of 29th July, 1943)

(Part 1)

SOUTH AND SOUTH JULL

Northward

3. On the 24th: rain squalls, occasional mist with fair intervals
at sea: conditions otherwise good.

On the 25th conditions were excellent at sea but the target areas
were closed right down in cloud for the greater part of the day, and it
was practicable only to attack such targets as were sighted in clear
patches.

Targets

2. Of the 402 sorties flown on the 24th, 131 were C.A.P., and 271
were offensive, of which 36 aborted due to thick weather.

The main weight of the attacks, both by fighters and bombers, was
thrown against airfields and their installations: the main airfields
were well protected by flak, which was reflected in the Seafire losses,
which had to be used for offensive missions (carrying the oversize jettison
tank).

Early in the day 5 had been reported lost to flak, the pilot being
lost, while 3 more had been ditched, classed as operational. Of these,
2 were probably combat, since the pilots had baled out or the aircraft
crashed on the return journey: evidence of flak hits, to which Seafires,
with their water-cooled engines, and too high a proportion of their petrol
in the drop tanks, are excessively vulnerable.

Thereafter the scope of their missions was restricted.

The bombing attacks on hangars and dispersals were carried out
according to plan: it is a disadvantage of this type of mission that
destruction to aircraft destroyed or damaged in the hangars and dispersals
cannot, for the most part, be assessed or claimed for lack of evidence.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

SITUATION

OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST
(The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier Squadron's No. 0109/16/53 of 30th July, 1945.)

31st and 32nd July (Contd.)

Cancelled Strike

10. In view of Commander Task Force 38's expressed intention to withdraw at 0300/23, I most reluctantly cancelled the strike due to take departure at 1430: in the event this was a bad decision as the combined forces were still in the operating area at 1530.

August

11. The maximum Avgas capacity of ILLUSTRIOUS class carriers is just not sufficient for 2 fifteen hour operating days; very early remedial action is required.

Abortive Dusk Attack 35th July

12. Credit is due to HM.S. FORMIDABLE for the direction of her night Hellcats, and to their pilots as prime movers, in the disruption of a group of Torpedo bombers which threatened the combined fleet at late dusk.

Guido

13. It was found, when enemy aircraft were in the vicinity, an embarrassment to have the command and guide of the Task Force in the carrier with the night fighters, since the fleet is immobilised in wind whilst the aircraft are being operated.

Carrier Operating

14. HM ships FORMIDABLE, VICTORIOUS, EAGLE and INDESTRUCTIBLE.

31 Jul 1945
VICE ADMIRAL

Pendennis:
See order.
OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST
(The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier
Squadron's No. 0109/16, 623 of 29th July, 1945.)

Explosions:

1. Summary of Strikes, p.71
2. VICTORIOUS No. 0217/6695 of 20th July, $945, p.78
3. VICTORIOUS No. 0217/3707 of 26th July, 1945, p.72
4. INDEFATIGABLE No. 142/7722/0019/9 of 25th July, 1945, p.94
5. IM HOGAN No. 07/2310 of 19th July, $945, p.95
6. IM HOGAN No. 07/2310 of 26th July, $945, p.84
7. FORMIDABLE No. 892/224 of 27th July, $945, p.118
## Summary of Operations

(Exclusion No. 1 to A.G.'s No. 0109/16/883 of 29th July 1945)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strike and Ship</th>
<th>Ordered</th>
<th>Placed Off</th>
<th>Reached</th>
<th>Main Target(s)</th>
<th>Bombs and Rocket Fired or Dropped on Target</th>
<th>Enemy Aircraft Damaged or Destroyed</th>
<th>Ships Sunk or Damaged</th>
<th>Other Damage to Enemy</th>
<th>Own Combat Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Total sorties will be less than that shown under Tonnage sorties, reported to C-in-C Combined Fleet in accordance with C-in-C's orders for offensive missions in any serials in which it is included. This reduction has not been allowed for.)</td>
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</table>

### 17th July

1. **Forward**
   - 16 Corsairs
   - Yashima
   - 32 x 500 lb.
   - 5 Dest.
   - Hangars and Buildings hit
   - 3 Corsairs (all pilots safe.)

2. **Displaceable**
   - 8 Fireflies
   - Niigata
   - 20 x 60 lb.
   - 1 Dest.
   - Trains and Hangars

3. **Victorious**
   - 16 Corsairs
   - Strike Abortive - Bad Weather

4. **Displaceable**
   - 12 Seafires
   - Strike Abortive - Bad Weather

5. **Forward**
   - 12 Corsairs
   - Hiroshima A/F
   - 13 x 500 lb.
   - 2 Dest.
   - Hangars and Buildings

### Note

(Only those which are known to have been caused by enemy action. The total does not represent total sum of aircraft lost during offensive missions.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Load</th>
<th>Destinations</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17th July</td>
<td>VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>12 Corsairs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10x500 lb.</td>
<td>1 Dest. 5 Dec. 1 Junk sunk Hangars and airfield buildings at HAKODA, SENDAI, HATANO, SINDA and KITAURA hit. Traps hit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th July</td>
<td>L.T.'s TOLD</td>
<td>73 78</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83x500 lb. 28x60 lb. 5 P.</td>
<td>9 Dest. Nil 3 Corsairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th July</td>
<td>16 Corsairs</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32x500 lb.</td>
<td>Airfield Bldg 1 Corsair (pilot missing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th July</td>
<td>8 Fireflies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28 R.P. x60 lb.</td>
<td>Airfield Bldg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th July</td>
<td>VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>- Strike Not Planned</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Water in Ships Petrol System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th July</td>
<td>12 Seafires</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Dest. 8 Dec. Junkin damaged Hangars unloaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th July</td>
<td>8 Corsairs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6x500 lb.</td>
<td>Buildings hit 1 Corsair (pilot missing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Damage</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th July</td>
<td>6 Seafires</td>
<td>KITAKAWA A/P</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aircraft attacked, believed all damaged</td>
<td>ENCL.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Corsairs</td>
<td>NARUZO A/P</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hangars hit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>57 56</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hangars and airfield buildings at NARUZO, OKAJIMA, YAMAMOTO, KITAKAWA hit.</td>
<td>2 Corsairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th July</td>
<td>12 Corsairs</td>
<td>KIRISHIMI A/P</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Factory damaged</td>
<td>1 Corsair (pilot missing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Corsairs</td>
<td>OKAJIMA A/P</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Workshop damaged</td>
<td>1 Seafire (pilot missing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Crew</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Damage</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>24th July</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>20 Avengers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TORISHIMA A/F</td>
<td>76x500lb M.C.</td>
<td>2 Dam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 Seafires</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Junks damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Fireflies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hangar and A/P installations damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Corsairs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Avenger (crew missing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>3 Corsairs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>KURASAWA A/P</td>
<td>14x500lb M.C.</td>
<td>1 Dam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>FUKUZAKI A/P</td>
<td></td>
<td>Junks damaged</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SUTA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IMPACTABLE</td>
<td>12 Seafires</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>TAKANAKURI</td>
<td>2 Dam.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>KANROJI</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>20 Avengers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Shipping including</td>
<td>28x500lb M.C.</td>
<td>1 Dam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Seafires</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CVE off NE</td>
<td></td>
<td>One hit on CVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Fireflies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Coast SHIBUKU</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 S.O.S</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Corsairs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 SD (sunk)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Junk</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PACIFICAN9</td>
<td>8 Corsairs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>FUKUZAKI A/P</td>
<td>8x500lb M.C.</td>
<td>3 Dam.</td>
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<td>SUTA</td>
<td></td>
<td>FEB damaged</td>
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<td>TAKEDA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IMPACIANT</td>
<td>12 Seafires</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Shipping off</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SHIBUKU</td>
<td></td>
<td>Junks etc. strafed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>21th July (contd.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Combined</td>
<td>20 Avengers</td>
<td>16 Av</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>TAKAMATSU A/F</td>
<td>64+5001b. H.C.</td>
<td>7 Dec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Seafires</td>
<td>10 Se</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>12x1201b.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Fireflies</td>
<td>8 Pl</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pray clusters</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Corsairs</td>
<td>4 Co</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>12 Corsairs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shipping - Inland Sea</td>
<td>20x5001b. H.C.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Combined</td>
<td>8 Avengers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Shipping - UNO Area (Inland Sea)</td>
<td>20x5001b.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Corsairs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Barge</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8 Fireflies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>54. INDOMITABLE</td>
<td>12 Corsairs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Shipping - Inland Sea</td>
<td>13x5001b.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. INVINCIBLE</td>
<td>8 Seafires</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>SUDA SS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 Dest.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>5D. ININDOMITABLE</td>
<td>12 Avengers</td>
<td>11 Av</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>KOBE class</td>
<td>43x5001b.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Seafires</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>
### SUMMARY OF STICKETS

(Enclosure No. 1 to A.C.1's No. 019/16/683 of 29th July, 1945.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th July (Contd)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAY'S TOTAL</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>304x500 lb.</td>
<td>31 plus 15 Des.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40x750 lb.</td>
<td>Tug, clusters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 CVE hit 4 times and 1 worksh.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>near miss Airfield and Ball.</td>
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<td>1 S/S sunk</td>
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<td>2 DD sunk.</td>
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<td>Buildings</td>
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<td>4 PTBs damaged.</td>
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<td>Damaged at F.</td>
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<td>FNC strafed. TAKAMATSU.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Tug sunk.</td>
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<td>2 Junks sunk.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Plus Junks</td>
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<td>damaged. 1</td>
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<td>Barge sunk.</td>
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<td>Damaged</td>
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<td>22nd July</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1A. FOG/IDARIF</td>
<td>12 Corsair</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Shipping Bacco.</td>
<td>16x500 lb.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Unidentified Factory hit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inland Sea.</td>
<td>R.C.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B. DEFLACABLE</td>
<td>12 Seafire</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shipping Bacco.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Junks damaged.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E. SHIKOKU</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1C. VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>12 Corsair</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Aborted - Bad Weather</td>
<td></td>
<td>Boms jettisoned on land.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25th July (Cont'd)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Combined</td>
<td>20 Averager</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Abortive - Bad Weather</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bombs jettisoned on land</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Seafire</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Firefly</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Corsair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>0 Corsair</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Abortive - Bad Weather</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bombs jettisoned on land</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. DEEPFATIGABLE</td>
<td>12 Seafire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Abortive - Bad Weather</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Seafire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Inland Area</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Firefly</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4 Corsair</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A. POCKETABLE</td>
<td>4 Corsair</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 500 lb. Aerial Shipping Goose, Inland Sea.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 SD) hit, 1 SD, and severely damaged.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3B. DEEPFATIGABLE</td>
<td>12 Seafire</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>JEMA SS, ZARA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 Dest. 6 Dam.</td>
<td>Barges hit, Hangar destroyed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Combined (ex: VICTORIOUS)</td>
<td>20 Averager</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>TOKYO AIRFIELD A/F</td>
<td>70x500 lb.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Torpedo sunk, Hangars at Airfield destroyed, 1 Averager (now safe)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>25th July (Contd)</td>
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<tr>
<td>40. VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 x 500 lb.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 SS damaged</td>
<td>Fishing Boats sunk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5A. POHOMO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5B. DELAGAINE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>220</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td>199 x 500 lb.</td>
<td>2 Dest.</td>
<td>6 Dam.</td>
<td>1 SC and 1 SS hit and severely damaged.</td>
<td>1 Avenger</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Factory, Warehouses and Harbour Works hit. Hangars at SOTA SS and TAKUMA and TOKUSHIMA Airfields destroyed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OPERATIONS, 17th/18th JULY 1945 - H.M.S. "VICTORIOUS"

SUBJECT:
1. 20th July 1945
   To: B.A.C., N.E.H. "VICTORIOUS"
   From: The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier Squadron.
   Date: 20th July 1945

Hereewith are forwarded reports on the operations of 17th/18th July 1945.

2. The Air Plan.

   Starting with only 54 Corsairs, it was extremely doubtful whether "Victorious" would be able to comply with the flight plan of the first day, which called for 80 Corsair sorties in 13 hours. Owing to curtailment of the day's programme, "Victorious" was not put to the best.

   On the second day the deplorable mischance of water contamination of the petrol only permitted "Victorious" to achieve 50 percent of what she was ordered to do in the short time that weather permitted flying operations.


   As so often happens, the presence of water in the petrol of fuelled aircraft was discovered almost by chance. This entailed a long and complicated investigation before the source of contamination was located and the aircraft could be refuelled with clean petrol; since not only does the aircraft's petrol systems have to be cleaned and tested but also the ship's fuelling system before normal operations can be resumed. As it was, by the afternoon, a sustained air effort by about two-thirds of "Victorious"' aircraft would have been possible - it was not until nearly sunset that full scale operations could have been resumed. In the past, in more calmer circumstances, it had taken more than 24 hours to restore full operational status. The cause of this was detailed in my message 19100J, and it is clear the portions of the Avgas tank system in the ship are now in urgent need of repair following on recent corrosive action.

4. Eleven of "Victorious"'s 44 fighter pilots had less than 200 hours' solo, and barely a dozen deck landings to their credit at the commencement of this operation. This useful inexperience showed itself, as is only to be expected, in a number of directions, viz.:
   (i) General untidiness in deck work in take-off and landing;
   (ii) General lack of co-ordination and inefficiency in recovery, far too many of these pilots required individual handling as the moment was critical;
   (iii) Very low standard of R/T training and knowledge of fighter direction techniques.

   These shortcomings had been foreseen and "Victorious" had done her utmost to provide training between coming off from Walloongaroo on 25th June and Day 5, with inadequate results.

5. Strikes.

   Strike 3 on 17th July jettisoned its bombs in the sea on its way back, having crossed the coast in fog without having found a hoped-for target of opportunity. It is regretted that this should have happened, and it has also been reiterated that bombs dropped blind on enemy territory have some chance of causing at least alarm and despondency.

6. The other two Strikes, Strike 5 on 17th July and Strike 3 on 16th July, led respectively by the Commanding Officer, 183rd Squadron, Acting Lieutenant Commander J.G. Baldwin, R.N., and the Air Group Leader, Acting Commander J.G. Schumack, R.N., were well conducted and accurate, and a very high standard of navigation was displayed. I think Lieutenant Commander Baldwin can claim to be the first Leader to fly a British offensive formation right across Japan to attack successfully a target on the far (West) side.

21 JUL 1945

78
### III. DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Enemy Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged by Own Aircraft</th>
<th>By Own Carrier gunfire (G) or by suicide near or on own Carrier (S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the air</td>
<td>On the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th July</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>DINAH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th July</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TWIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Unidentified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>BETTY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IV AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS EMBARKED FOR OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Embarked for Operations</th>
<th>Replacement Aircraft and Aircrews Received during Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Pilots</td>
<td>Aircraft No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>049</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14 Avenger I &amp; II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1534</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19 Corsair II &amp; IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1536</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18 Corsair II &amp; IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.S.R.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 Walrus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority: E.O. 13526  
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

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**DDF Form 466.**

**II. AIRCRAFT LOST, AND DAMAGED OR DESTROYED BEYOND REPAIR ON BOARD.**

Note 1. The time at which the damage or loss occurred should be recorded accurately, and the mission on which it occurred indicated where applicable.

Note 2. The damage categories of A.P.O. 6125/L are applicable here.

Note 3. The "Cause of loss or damage" should, where possible, distinguish between light and heavy flak, enemy fighters, engine failure, decklanding accident, other accidents, etc.

Note 4. Aircraft damaged on board e.g., by enemy aircraft or accident should be included.

Note 5. Include also flyable and non-flyable dads.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type of aircraft</th>
<th>Damage Category</th>
<th>Cause of loss or damage</th>
<th>Aircorw lost or wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.7.45</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>1236</td>
<td>Corsair KD.284</td>
<td>ZZ</td>
<td>Engine Failure</td>
<td>Pilot picked up injured by &quot;HXV/NW&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.7.45</td>
<td>1205</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>1336</td>
<td>Corsair JT.510</td>
<td>ZZ</td>
<td>Decklanding Accident</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.7.45</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>1336</td>
<td>Corsair JT.614</td>
<td>ZZ</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>0655</td>
<td>O.A.F.</td>
<td>1334</td>
<td>Corsair JT.266</td>
<td>A.F. ZZ Eng. 33</td>
<td>Decklanding Accident</td>
<td>Mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>O.A.F.</td>
<td>1336</td>
<td>Corsair JT.426</td>
<td>A/F ZZ</td>
<td>Decklanding Accident</td>
<td>Mil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both ditched in accordance with A.O. 2701, but the Power Plant of JT.426 retained.
# Aircraft Servicingability

A day by day account of servicingability at 0600 and dusk should be given for strike days, and at dusk only for non-strike days.

In addition, brief details of unserviceability are required under the heading "Cause", record "Engine", "Airframe", "Radio", "A.S.V.", "Guns", "Inspection", etc., noting how many aircraft were unserviceable for each cause.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type of A/c</th>
<th>No. Serviceable</th>
<th>No. Unserviceable</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 July 1945</td>
<td>0400</td>
<td>1834</td>
<td>Corsair</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>1 Crashed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>Corsair</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>2 Engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>849</td>
<td>Avenger</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>3 Crashed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A.S.R.</td>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>(1 Mitchell)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1 Airframe &quot;A&quot;)</td>
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<td>1000</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>Engine</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>M1</td>
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<td>M1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>A.S.R.</td>
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<td>M1</td>
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<td>A.S.R.</td>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>M1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Aircraft No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Method of take-off or landing</td>
<td>Time of take-off or landing</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Code Letter or Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0358</td>
<td>RAMSGD - Airfields in NUNSEI.</td>
<td>C 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0358</td>
<td>CAF over Fleet, 10,000 &amp; 20,000 ft.</td>
<td>C 1</td>
</tr>
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<td>0626, 0628</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0656, 0720</td>
<td>Ex Serial 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ex Serial 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0655</td>
<td>Strike - Airfields in NUNSEI.</td>
<td>C 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>C.A.P. over Fleet 10,000 &amp; 20,000 ft.</td>
<td>C 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0922, 0925</td>
<td>Ex C.A.P. and SUB. C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SUB. C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TIM</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>C.A.P. and SUB. C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SUB. C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SUB. C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1358</td>
<td>C.A.P. over Fleet 10,000 &amp; 20,000 ft.</td>
<td>C 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1429, 1435</td>
<td>Ex C.A.P. (Serial 6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1451, 1552</td>
<td>Ex SUB. C.A.P. (Serial 6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SUB. C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1511</td>
<td>Ex C.A.P. (Serial 6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1719, 1725</td>
<td>Ex C.A.P. (Serial 8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1812, 1814</td>
<td>Ex C.A.P. (Serial 10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SUB. C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SUB. C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SUB. C.A.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Aircraft No.</td>
<td>Method of take-off or landing</td>
<td>Time of take-off or landing</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Code Letter or Number</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/7</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>CAP over Fleet, 10000 &amp; 20000 ft.</td>
<td>C I</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>Ex Serial 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>L - Emergency engine trouble.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U (1354)</td>
<td>1403</td>
<td>CAP over Fleet, 10000 ft.</td>
<td>C I</td>
<td>T - Delayed by 2 W/S 8a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>Ex CAP, Serial 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>T - centre of range.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>Ex CAP, Serial 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>L - delayed by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>Ex Serial 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>L - delayed by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>CAP over Fleet (Emery, scramble)</td>
<td>C I</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1801</td>
<td>CAP over Fleet (Emery, scramble)</td>
<td>C I</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/7</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>04:19</td>
<td>CAP over Fleet</td>
<td></td>
<td>L - 1 landed in FORMIDAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>F/AU</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>05:40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table contains entries related to flying log entries, including dates, aircraft numbers, methods of take-off or landing, times of take-off or landing, missions, and code letters or numbers.
XX. ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SWEEPS AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

For each such mission, give such of the following details as are applicable:

(a) Date: 17 July, 1945  Mission: Attacks on Niigata Code Letter or Number Strike 6. A/F, Honshu

(b) Composition of Mission: 12 A/C of 1834 Squadron (of which 3 had to return before reaching the target.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Duty: e.g., Strike, Top Cover, etc.</th>
<th>RP, bombs, torpedoes etc., carried per plane, and fusing.</th>
<th>Total Quantity of Armament actually used.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Corsair</td>
<td>Fighter &amp; Fighter-bomber attacks on A/F.</td>
<td>2 x 500 lb. M.G. Mk.VII or XII Bombs. Fused: 10 x .50.</td>
<td>10 500 lb. M.G. Bombs. 2450 Rounds .50 Ammunition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Times, Heights, Distances of Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Departure</th>
<th>Time over Target</th>
<th>Time of Return to Fleet</th>
<th>Distance of Target from Carrier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0900</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>286 miles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Engagement with Enemy Aircraft in the Air.
### (a) The Attack

**General Description of Targets - Installations and dispersals**

**Nagoya A/F (Tgt No. 2889)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Target Area (sq. yds.)</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Average Height &amp; Speed</th>
<th>Average Angle of Release</th>
<th>Aircraft Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hangar and Workshop Area</td>
<td>500 sq. yds</td>
<td>4 Corsairs</td>
<td>4500 ft Steep Glide</td>
<td>57°</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Dispersal Area &amp; A/F on Nth &amp; Sth of Field</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 Corsairs</td>
<td>8000 ft</td>
<td>45°</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (b) Results (Relate to individual targets above by appropriate target number at left.)

- Hangar Area: Immediately Nth of a barrack building, explosion and smoke observed. Aircraft and two workshops were probably damaged.
- Workshop Area: None observed.
- Dispersal Area: Destroyed - left in flames.
- Barracks: None observed.

---

**86**
ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SWEEPS AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

For each such mission, give such of the following details as are applicable:

(a) Date: 16 July, 1945. Mission: Fighter-bomber attack. Code letter or number: Strike 7

(b) Composition of mission. A.G.I. and 1534 Squadron.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Duty: #E, Strike, Top Cover, etc.</th>
<th>RP, bombs, torpedoes etc. carried per plane and fusing.</th>
<th>Total Quantity of Armament actually used.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Corsair</td>
<td>Fighter bomber attack on airfields.</td>
<td>2 x 500 lb. M.C. Mk. VII bombs, Fused T.D.11.</td>
<td>10 Rounds 500 lb. M.C. bombs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5240 Rounds, 6 M.C. Ammunition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Times, Heights, Distances of Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Departure</th>
<th>Time over Target</th>
<th>Time of Return to Floats</th>
<th>Distance of target from Carrier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1415</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Engagement with Enemy Aircraft in the air: None.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target No.</th>
<th>Description of Target</th>
<th>Target Area (sq. yds.) or Tonnage &amp; Speed</th>
<th>Aircraft Attacking No.</th>
<th>Average Height or Range of Release</th>
<th>Type of Attack</th>
<th>Average Angle of Dive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Servicing and shop area at NARUTO.</td>
<td>600 x 500 yds.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Corsairs (bombe)</td>
<td>2500 - 3000</td>
<td>Steep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dispersals.</td>
<td>500 x 300 yds.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Corsairs (strafing)</td>
<td>3000 - 1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hangar at MIYAKO</td>
<td>400 x 60 feet.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Corsair (bombe)</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>Steep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dispersals &amp; Installations.</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Corsairs (strafing)</td>
<td>8000 - 7000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target number at left)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Hits Conservatively Assessed. (A no. yds. if confirmed by photographs.)</th>
<th>Damage Conservatively assessed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 bombs in target area.</td>
<td>Detailed results unobserved but burnout soon or close to several buildings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strike seen on hangar and aircraft.</td>
<td>Five aircraft left in flames.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 bombs on a hangar.</td>
<td>Damaged. Detailed results unobserved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Strike seen on two aircraft and on buildings.</td>
<td>Two aircraft damaged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES. FIGHTER BOMBER ATTACK ON AIRFIELDS.

For each such mission, give such of the following details as are applicable:

(a) Date: 17th July, 1945, Mission: Fighter bomber attack on Airfields Northern Honshu. Code Letter or Number: Strike 3.

(b) Composition of Mission. A.G.B. and 3836 Squadron.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft No.</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc.</th>
<th>RP, bombs, torpedoes etc., carried per plane, and Fusing.</th>
<th>Total Quantity of Aircraft actually used.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Barrage</td>
<td>Attack on Airfield.</td>
<td>2 x 500 lb. M.C. Bombs. VII and VIII Bomb Fuses. 8 x N. Inst. 6 x T.D.I.</td>
<td>16 500 lb. M.C. Bombs. (Jettisoned in sea)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Owing to weather conditions the Strike were forced to return without carrying out any attack.

(c) Times, Heights, Distances of Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Departure</th>
<th>Time over Target</th>
<th>Time of Return to Fleet</th>
<th>Distance of Target from Carrier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0358</td>
<td>0500</td>
<td>0520</td>
<td>0744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d), (e) and (f) N/A.
### Communications, ASV and Navigational Aids

The following details are required as a daily summary of the performance of the various radio and ASV equipments used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft set in use</th>
<th>No. of sets used</th>
<th>No. of failures</th>
<th>Best and worst ASV &amp; Beacon ranges on own forces reported.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th July, 1945.</td>
<td>S.C.R.522</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z.B.X. (or Z.B./A.A.)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60 m./7,000' YE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th July, 1945.</td>
<td>S.C.R.522</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z.B.X. (or Z.B./A.A.)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>NIL.</td>
<td>100 m./8,000' YE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Under No. of failures, the figures show sets reported defective, the set Bench tested, and the defect confirmed.

Figures do NOT show sets reported defective, and found at Bench testing to be functioning correctly.

**Remark on (a) Major causes of failures, and action to prevent recurrence.**

**Various causes:** Soft P/A Valve, stages needing trimming, etc.

**Action:** Careful maintenance and inspections.

(b) Enemy or friendly interference or jamming.

**Enemy:** None reported.

**Own:** Traffic not abnormal.
### METEOROLOGICAL SUMMARY

The following details are required daily at noon (local time)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Swell</th>
<th>Wind</th>
<th>Cloud over base</th>
<th>Cloud over Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Speed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Top</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Top</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**July 17th, 1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Swell</th>
<th>Wind</th>
<th>Cloud over base</th>
<th>Cloud over Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0600</td>
<td>&quot;2&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;1&quot;</td>
<td>100°</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from NNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000 6000</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(GAP</td>
<td>report)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KONJIMA</td>
<td>37° 22' N, 140° 24' E</td>
<td>at 0530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>&quot;5&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;1&quot;</td>
<td>135°</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from NNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1500 5000</td>
<td>7/10 3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(GAP</td>
<td>report)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**July 18th, 1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Swell</th>
<th>Wind</th>
<th>Cloud over base</th>
<th>Cloud over Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>&quot;3&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;1&quot;</td>
<td>320°</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from NNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300 600</td>
<td>5/10 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(wind</td>
<td>report)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>speed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35° 30' N, 140° 20' E</td>
<td>at 1530</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: OPERATIONS 24th-25th JULY 1945

From: THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "VICTORIOUS"

Date: 26th July 1945

To: The Flag Officer Commanding, Fleet Aircraft Carrier Squadron

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Hereewith are forwarded reports on the air operations of 24th and 25th July 1945.

2. The Air Plan

The Air Plan was found to be the easiest and most convenient to work to of any hitherto ordered for VICTORIOUS in the Pacific operations. This was largely due to the avoidance in it of crumbling deck parties from one end of the deck to the other frequently required by the earlier plans. In effect this would have enabled VICTORIOUS to provide more sorties than were asked for.

3. The ineptitude of the new pilots referred to in my last report has waning, though the inexperience in take-offs are still painful to watch. As a further illustration of current ineptitude, in one strike the formation leader was the only pilot who had ever operationally bombed a target before.

4. The 32,000 rounds fired by VICTORIOUS' Corsairs at ground targets on 26th July was an all-time high in this ship.

5. Strike

The following Strike and Raid rods account in bad weather each had their special interest.


The Strike proceeded direct to KURAMAI airfield, where heavy and medium flak was experienced on the run in. Bombs were dropped and caused damage to airfield buildings and one Betty. KURAMAI airfield was visited next, where one Francis was damaged and the dispersal areas and revetments strafed. The latter were well camouflaged and results could not be observed. At HANAMA, one 4-engined aircraft was damaged. The strike then proceeded to HINA airfield and damaged four 4-engined and three single-engined aircraft and destroyed one Mavis, all by strafing. On retirement one junk was sunk and others damaged. Temporary Sub-Lieutenant P.C.J. Hoppe, R.N.V.R., these bombs had not released, executed a perfect high dive attack on a concrete bridge with 4800 rounds, registering a direct hit.

This was a well-conducted small raid, which expended a lot of strafe ammunition to good effect.


Eight minutes from departure the Strike ran into bad weather and turned. To make the land it was necessary to climb through clouds which were thicker than anticipated and it became evident that the Sortie escort, already in difficulties with communications, would be of little use so they were ordered to act independently. It was unfortunate that more than half the Avengers and all but 2 Fireflies became separated during the climb and failed to R/V at HANAMA BAKI as ordered by the Air Group Leader. Only 6 Avengers (5 VICTORIOUS, 1 INCROYABLE), 2 Coraxs, and 2 Fireflies got near the target. After passing through a heavy squall line over SHIKOKU the Strike broke out into clear weather. The target assigned was shipping at UBE, but on sighting a T.E. at anchor in SHIKOKU W.N. the Air Group Leader rightly ordered the Avengers to attack multiple Squadron was deployed to port. Two Fireflies and two more planes were obtained by one stick of bombs.

It is felt that better results should have been achieved in view of the absence of flak. The return to the Fleet was without incident.
5. (b) Continued.

This is an example of a strike, largely disorganised by adverse weather, bearing good fruit thanks to those who pressed on and who showed good airmanship.


The start of this Strike was an interesting example of an early strike departure - at 15 minutes from commencement of take-off - with a formation of 3 separate units from 3 different carriers completed on passage at 40 miles from base in low visibility, cloud base sometimes as low as 300 feet. The Air Group Leader acted as shophog and rounded the formations up.

In view of the weather the Air Group Leader decided to carry out a low approach between SENGOKU and NISHI and to attack targets of opportunity on the West coast of HINISHI South of 34°30'N. Good bombing results were obtained at HUGO and KIWA and surrounding areas and a free-for-all ensued. One PBY, two PTOs were left burning, two SD damaged and wharves and factories, one of which, at KIWA, exploded, left on fire. One SD was sunk and one probably sunk at KIWA Bay.

On completion of the attack the Avengers carried out strafing attacks on opportunity targets such as trains etc., and a good time was had by all. In consequence the re-form was poor. No. 849 Squadron has since been cautioned with regard to over-embasure and general skylarking in an attack of this nature, for had there been any enemy aircraft airborne the escort would not have been able to protect them.

Fireflies were efficient in reducing medium flak.

It is considered that in view of the weather the Seafires and Fireflies did well in maintaining contact with the Strike.

(Sgd.) M M Denny

Rear Admiral
25th July, 1945.

No. 142/1722/00/10/9.


SIR,

I have the honour to forward the report of proceedings of H.M. Ship under my command during the operations of 24th/25th July, 1945, in accordance with H.P.T.M. 227.

2. We had some anxious moments during the 24th and 25th July while AVENGER aircraft were being escorted by my SEAPLANES to a range which ran the latter cut to the prudent limit of their endurance. Had any aircraft gone past it the prudent limit might well have proved to have been exceeded.

3. This situation was partly due to lack of practice on the part of my SEAPLANE pilots in flying with 90-gallon long-range tanks, and for this the quick passage north was in some measure responsible. But the main reason was the late supply and inadequacy of the parts to fit the tanks.

4. Once again, a ship's staff and squadron, instead of being supplied with the necessary tested weapons to meet operational requirements in this theatre, have had to improvise and carry out their own experiments.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your obedient Servant,

The Flag Officer Commanding,
First Aircraft Carrier Squadron,
British Pacific Fleet.

[Signature]

CAPTAIN,
Royal Navy.

CdO/18
SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report of proceedings for the first period of operation July/August.

2. The following Appendices are forwarded in accordance with British Pacific Fleet Temporary Memorandum No. 227.

Form 45: General
Form 45a: Enemy Intelligence
Form 45b: Daily Summary of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged
(Form 45c: Will be rendered at finish of operation)
Form 45d: Aircraft Lost, and Damaged or Detoiriated Beyond Repair on Board
Form 45e: Aircraft Serviceability
(Form 45f: Will be rendered at finish of operation)
Form 45g: Flying Log
Form 45h: Attacks on Shipping and Shore Objectives, Fighter Sweeps and Intruder Patrols
Form 45i: Air Interception - This report is blank
Form 45j: Communications, A.S.V. and Navigational Aids
Form 45k: Meteorological Summary

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

[Signature]

Captain, Royal Navy

The Flag Officer Commanding,
First Aircraft Carrier Squadron,
British Pacific Fleet

21 Jul 45
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO REPORT OF HOUGH.
(for completion by Carrier on Strike Duties)

I. GENERAL:
Aircraft Carrier: H.M.S. "Implausible"
Code Name of Operation: Operation "JULY/AUGUST 1945"
Base: Manus
Date of leaving Base: 6th July, 1945

II. DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE:

6th July 1945
H.M.S. "Implausible" left Manus on the morning of 6th July, 1945, with a complement of 48 Seafires, 12 Fireflies and 18 Avengers.

At 1335 the bearings and adjusting / of the port outer main engine were found to be overheating. The ship stopped for an hour while the turbine shaft was locked and then proceeded on three engines.

The H.P. thrust pads had failed and had affected the main H.P. turbine bearings of 3 engines. It was necessary to fit new thrust pads and new H.P. turbine main bearings, and to cleanse the lubricating system of their units.

7th July 1945
At 0600 on 7th July the ship stopped while 4 turbines were declutched. The ship then proceeded on 2 shafts with the starboard outer trailing and the port outer locked. Flying exercise was carried out on passage when the wind speed was sufficient, the ship's maximum speed being 14 knots.

11th July 1945
At 1510 on 11th July the ship stopped and the port outer shaft was allowed to trail. This enabled the lubricating system to be cleansed.

15th July 1945
Repulsing:
At 0445 H.M.S. "Implausible" commenced oiling from R.F.A. "Pinfold" by stern method, completing at 1305. H.M.S. "Quickmatch" acting as D.D., came alongside at 0800 and transferred 1 officer and 2 ratings for hospital.

14th July 1945
At 1000 on 14th July the two outer shafts were declutched up for a trial run, 1A being declutched again at 1830. The trial was conducted inside the screen at speeds up to 15 knots.

15th July 1945
The trial proved successful and the port outer shaft was finally declutched in at 1000 on 15th July.

16th July 1945
Task Force 30 was in company from 0900, and at 1045, H.M.S. "Implausible" flew off 4 Fireflies and 4 Seafires for Aircraft Recognition Training of the American ships.

17th July 1945
Seafires were maintained on C.A.P. from 0254 to 1315. There was no sign of enemy aircraft to intercept. Two RAMRODS were flown. RAMROD 1 at dawn consisted of 7 Fireflies and straffed MATSUSHIMA, SENDAI, and HIKOSAN airfields, also Radar, Radio and Railway installations and small shipping. The next (RAMROD 4) of 16 Seafires found themselves barred by thick cloud through which they could not penetrate to the target. There were no casualties. Two aircraft were damaged by flak.

/19th July, 1945/
DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE (CONTINUED).

18th July, 1944.

The C.R.P.s of each of 6 Beauforts, and R.A.A.F. No. 2, 4, 7 of 8 Fireflies, 11 Beauforts, 7 Beauforts respectively were flown from 1140.
The R.A.A.F. were not very successful. KO-RIKE, GUNAI, KAKURI, KITAKAMI and NARUKO airfields were visited, and numerous strafing attacks made.
Many dummies were observed, and unfortunately, many were attacked. Some of these dummies had grass growing from them. Mostly they were formed of bamboo slats resting on trestles and covered with fabric. In certain cases they were covered with camouflaged netting, and mixed in amongst the dummies were real aircraft similarly camouflaged.

However, several operational aircraft were definitely damaged, one of them a lighter. Other ground targets and a concentration of junks were also strafed.

Photographic sorties were flown on both days. The overcast conditions on 17th made photography abortive, and only oblique photography was attempted on the 18th. If the operations on 18th July had been able to start seven hours earlier as intended, the coverage obtained would, even from this small amount, have given sufficient information to enable dummies and U/S aircraft to be distinguished for the later R.A.A.F. It is suggested that with the camouflage and deception policy being used by the Japanese, photographic cover is essential, and an attempt will be made in later stages of these operations to get maximum coverage in the early morning. In this connection the best results should be obtained if the ship covering airfields in the early morning sweeps could continue to attack and cover the same airfields throughout the day. This would ensure continuity of intelligence from interpretation of photographs and interception of aircraft. It is appreciated that this may however, be impracticable for other reasons.
## II ENEMY INTELLIGENCE

### A. Estimated Enemy Order of Battle in Areas of Operations

(Note any important changes e.g. due to supply of reinforcements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No. of Operational airfields</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 Jul '45</td>
<td>SENDAI - Masuda (HONSHU)</td>
<td>Matsushima - Sendai</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Motor Launches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Makura</td>
<td>M1</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Small craft, junks etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul '45</td>
<td>MIYO - Chiburi</td>
<td>Konoha</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIYAKAWA (HONSHU)</td>
<td>Katori</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Miyakawa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Many junks along coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Naruto</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Unident.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kitaura</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. Estimated Carrier-borne Enemy Air Strength (where applicable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Carriers Identified (or No. &amp; Type of Carriers)</th>
<th>Estimated Air Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

98
### III. Daily Summary of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Enemy Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged by Own Aircraft</th>
<th>By Own Carrier gunfire(3) or bombing runs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By Own Aircraft in the air</td>
<td>or on own Carrier (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July '45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July '45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. AIRCRAFT LOST, DAMAGED OR DESTROYED BEYOND REPAIR OR RECOVERY.

Note 1. The time at which the damage or loss occurred shall be recorded accurately, and the mission on which it occurred indicated where applicable.

Note 2. The damage categories of A.P.O. 412a, are applicable here.

Note 3. The 'Cause of loss or damage' should, where possible, distinguish between light and heavy flame, enemy fighters, engine failure, deck landing accidents, other accidents etc.

Note 4. Aircraft damaged on board a.s. by enemy aircraft or accidents should be included.

Note 5. Include also flyable and non-flyable fails.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Damage Category</th>
<th>Cause of Loss or Damage</th>
<th>Aircraft Lost or Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 July '45</td>
<td>1233</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>A/F in Eng.</td>
<td>Sternlaird undercarriage collapsed on landing.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aircraft Serviceability

A day by day account of serviceability, at dawn and dusk should be
given for Strike days, only at dusk only for non-Strike days.

In addition, brief details of unserviceability are required:— under the
heading "Cause," record "Engine", "Airframe", "Radio", "AVI", "Guns", "Inspection," etc., noting how many aircraft were unserviceable for
each cause.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type of A/C</th>
<th>No. Servicable</th>
<th>No. Unserviceable</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 July '45 0630</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Underscarriage and mainplane damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Armoured sealing tubes damaged</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(2) Overload tank fails to suck.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Underscarriage failed to retract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July '45 2000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 - Airframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 - Engine</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 - Airframe</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 - Engine</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 - Guns</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 July '45 0600</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Airframe</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 July '45 2000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 - Airframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 - Engine</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 - Electrical</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 Flexible and.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 - Airframe</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 - Engine</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 - Electrical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**F 148G**

**LOG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Method of take-off or landing</th>
<th>Time of take-off or landing</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Code Letter or Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 Jul.</td>
<td>12 Benfire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0354 0359½</td>
<td>G.A.P. over Fleet Serial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T. 1 landed on 04/0 unserviceable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0355½ 0357</td>
<td>MACED - Sendai Area</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>T. 1 landed on 04/1 unserviceable.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0624 0626½</td>
<td>MACED - Sendai Area</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 569. Not sunk but fully moved up.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Benfire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0657 0625½</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>L: 1 crew out. No hit.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Benfire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0654 0709</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>L: 1 crew out. No hit.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0655 0710</td>
<td>MACED</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 569. Not sunk but fully moved up.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Benfire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0656 0858½</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 569. Not sunk but fully moved up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Benfire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0921 0936</td>
<td>MACED</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 569. Not sunk but fully moved up.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0927 0940</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 1692.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1120 1123½</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 1692.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Benfire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1123 1202</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 1692.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1349 1351½</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 1692.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Benfire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1430 1436</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 1692.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1653 1654½</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 1692. (Dropped, not sunk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1724 1735</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 1692.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1857 1815½</td>
<td>G.A.P.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>T. 1 unserviceable 1692.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES**

*All G.A.P. missions at 3,000', 5,000', and 8,000' over Fleet.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Method of take-off or landing</th>
<th>Time of take-off or landing</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Code Letter or Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 July 1945</td>
<td>12 Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1140 1142</td>
<td>D.C.A.P.</td>
<td>Serial 1</td>
<td>4 landed on at 1149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Firefly</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1142 1147</td>
<td>RAMROD (Kosolke Area)</td>
<td>2 T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1229 1230½</td>
<td>RAMROD (Kosolke Area)</td>
<td>4 T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1349 1350½</td>
<td>D.C.A.P.</td>
<td>Serial 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1350½ 1352</td>
<td>RAMROD (Miyakita Area)</td>
<td>6 T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Firefly</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1355 1444</td>
<td>RAMROD</td>
<td>2 L</td>
<td>Deck unserviceable for 38 minutes after crash into barrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1444 1504</td>
<td>D.C.A.P.</td>
<td>Serial L 1 Aircraft 1</td>
<td>crashed into barrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1458 1512</td>
<td>RAMROD</td>
<td>4 L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1550 1555</td>
<td>D.C.A.P.</td>
<td>Serial L 1 Flight 4</td>
<td>of D.C.A.P. landed on, one crashed into barrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1700 1704</td>
<td>D.C.A.P.</td>
<td>Serial L 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Seafire</td>
<td>U</td>
<td></td>
<td>1700 1708</td>
<td>RAMROD</td>
<td>6 L 2 burst tyres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BF Form 46h

X ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SCADES AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

For each such mission, give such of the following details as are applicable:

(a) Date: 17 July 1944
(b) Mission: RAMROD
(c) Code Letter or Number: 2

(b) Composition of Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc.</th>
<th>BF, bombs, torpedoes etc. carried per plane, and fusing.</th>
<th>Total quantity of Armament actually used.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Type</td>
<td></td>
<td>No. Type</td>
<td>No. Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Firefly</td>
<td>RAMROD</td>
<td>4 x 60 lb Rockets 20 mm. Cannon</td>
<td>28 R.P. with 60 lb. heads rounds 20mm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Time, Heights, Distances of Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Departure</th>
<th>Time over Target</th>
<th>Time of Return to Fleet</th>
<th>Distance of Target Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0600</td>
<td>0652</td>
<td>0630</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at Masuda</td>
<td>at Kinkasan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Engagement with Enemy Aircraft in the Air.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time first engaged</th>
<th>End of Engagement</th>
<th>Enemy A/o</th>
<th>Were Strike A/o engaged?</th>
<th>Enemy A/o destroyed or damaged</th>
<th>Own A/o destroyed or damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Type of Strike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own Damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own Loss or Damage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x i.e. A/o carrying bombs, torpedoes etc.
### Individual Targets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target No.</th>
<th>Description of Target</th>
<th>Target Area (sq.yds.) or Tonnage and Speed</th>
<th>Aircraft Attacking No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Average Height &amp;/or Range of Attack</th>
<th>Type of Attack</th>
<th>Average Angle of Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hangar, MASUDA Airfield.</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>150'-200'</td>
<td>R/P &amp; 20 mm.</td>
<td>15° - 20°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Hangar, SENDAI Airfield.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>150'-200'</td>
<td>R/P &amp; 20 mm.</td>
<td>15° - 20°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Aircraft, MATUSHIMA</td>
<td>1 Sally (?)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>150'-200'</td>
<td>2 R/P &amp; 20 mm.</td>
<td>15° - 20°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Junk</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>150'-200'</td>
<td>20 mm.</td>
<td>15° - 20°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Radio Station at SHINDA</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>150'-200'</td>
<td>2 R/P &amp; 15° - 20°</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Railway Train at KINSAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>150'-200'</td>
<td>20 mm.</td>
<td>15° - 20°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Small Coaster 200 tons.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>150'-200'</td>
<td>20 mm.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target Number at left.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target No.</th>
<th>Hits Conservatively Assessed. (Add &quot;P&quot; if confirmed by photographs.)</th>
<th>Damage Conservatively Assessed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2 or 3 R/P hits</td>
<td>Hangar damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Cannon and R/P hits.</td>
<td>Hangar damaged - probably destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Numerous strikes causing fire</td>
<td>One T/E Aircraft (Sally?) destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>(a) Hits observed and explosion heard</td>
<td>Damage caused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Cannon hits observed, Steam issuing from engine boiler</td>
<td>Engine damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Hits observed.</td>
<td>Damaged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SCREENS AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

(a) Date: 18th July, 1945.  
Mission: RAMROD  
Code Letter or Number: 3a

(b) Composition of Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc.</th>
<th>Fuze</th>
<th>Total quantity of Ammunition actually used.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Firefly</td>
<td>RAMROD</td>
<td>4 x 60 lb. Rockets, 20 mm. Cannon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Times, Heights, Distances of Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Departure</th>
<th>Time over Target</th>
<th>Time of Return to Fleet</th>
<th>Distance of Target from Carrier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1241</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>105 miles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Engagement with Enemy Aircraft in the Air.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Engagement</th>
<th>Enemy A/o No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Were Strike before A/o engaged?</th>
<th>Enemy A/o destroyed or damaged?</th>
<th>Type of Own Damage</th>
<th>Own A/o destroyed or damaged?</th>
<th>Type of Own Loss Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

---

N I L

---

* i.e., A/o carrying bombs, torpedoes etc.
The Attack

General Description of Target :-

**Individual Targets :-**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target No.</th>
<th>Description of Target</th>
<th>Target Area (Sq.yards) or Tonnage &amp; Speed.</th>
<th>Aircraft Attacking</th>
<th>Average Height &amp; Range of Attack</th>
<th>Type of Attack</th>
<th>Average Angle of Gun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Aircraft NUKUNE Airfield.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Fireflies</td>
<td>2000' - 3000'</td>
<td>R/P &amp; strafing</td>
<td>30°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Installations NUKUNE Airfield.</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Fireflies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target Number at left.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target No.</th>
<th>Hits conservatively assessed.</th>
<th>Damage conservatively assessed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>No definite R/P hits seen. Cannon strikes seen. Building hit by R/P.</td>
<td>Two aircraft damaged but probably damaged already.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>R/P and cannon hits seen on store building and barrack huts.</td>
<td>One small building destroyed. Hits damaged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

**RFP Form 46h**

**X ATTACKS ON SHIPPIING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SHIPS AND ANTI-SHIPPING MATERIAL.**

(a) Date: 18 July, 1945  Mission:  **RANKED**  Code Letter or Number: L

(b) Composition of Mission:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc.</th>
<th>RP, bombs, torpedoes etc., carried per plane, and Fusing.</th>
<th>Total quantity of Ammunition actually used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Seafires</td>
<td>20 mm, Cannon and Machine Gun.</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Time, Heights, Distances of Mission:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Departure</th>
<th>Time over Target 1st A/c</th>
<th>Last A/c</th>
<th>Time of Return to Fleet, Jet from Carrier approx.</th>
<th>Distance of Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1236</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Engagement with Enemy Aircraft in the Air:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time first engaged</th>
<th>End of Engagement</th>
<th>Enemy A/c</th>
<th>Fore Strike</th>
<th>Enemy A/c destroyed or Depr. A/c dest. damaged or damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Type of Enemy Aircraft, Type of Aircraft, Damage, and Damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N I I
### Individual Targets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target No.</th>
<th>Description of Target</th>
<th>Aircraft attacking No.</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Average Height a/c</th>
<th>Average Range of Attack</th>
<th>Average Angle of Dive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Aircraft on KONIGISSE Airfield</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strafing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Installations on KONIGISSE Airfield</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>30 Junka.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Warehouse.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target Number at left.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target No.</th>
<th>Hits conservatively assessed.</th>
<th>Damage conservatively assessed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Strikes seen on Betty and Zekos. (3)</td>
<td>1 Betty destroyed, possibly destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Strikes seen on hangar and store building. (6)</td>
<td>Zekos damaged, possibly destroyed. Damage to hangar and other buildings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Strikes seen on many Junka (9)</td>
<td>18 Junka damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Strikes seen (6)</td>
<td>Damage to Warehouse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**HFT Form 40h**

**ATTACK ON U-BOATS AND SHIP OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SQUADRON AND AIRFRAME PARTS.**

(a) Date: 18 July, 1945  Mission:  **RAMPED**  Code Letter or Number: 6

(b) Composition of Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Duty: e.g., Strike, Top Cover, etc.</th>
<th>RE, bombs, torpedoes etc., carried per plane, and fusing.</th>
<th>Total quantity of Ammunition actually used.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>RE, guns, machine guns.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Seafire</td>
<td>RAMPED</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cannon and machine guns.</td>
<td>5720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Times, Heights, Distances of Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Departure</th>
<th>Time after Target</th>
<th>Dist A/c</th>
<th>Time of Return to Fleet Target From Target</th>
<th>Distance of Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1355</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>1430 approx.</td>
<td>1520 approx.</td>
<td>95 miles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Engagement with Enemy Aircraft in the Air.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time first engaged</th>
<th>End of Engagement</th>
<th>Enemy A/c No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Were Strike A/c engaged?</th>
<th>Type of Strike or after Strike of A/c</th>
<th>Om A/c destroyed or damaged</th>
<th>Type of Om Damage</th>
<th>Om A/c lost or damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x 1/c A/c carrying bombs, torpedoes etc.
**HEP Form 45h (continued)**

(e) The Attack

**General Description of Target:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Targets:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Description of Target.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Aircraft on MIYAKAWA &amp; NAKUTO Airfields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Goods trucks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target Number at left.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target No.</th>
<th>Hits conservatively assessed. (Add &quot;F&quot; if confirmed by photographs)</th>
<th>Damage conservatively assessed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Strikes soon. (P)</td>
<td>Parked aircraft hit but believed to be daisies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Strikes soon. (P)</td>
<td>&quot;ZEKE DAMAGE&quot; POSSIBLY DESTROYED. Truck damaged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### AER OPD

#### (a) First Detection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detection No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Range (m.)</th>
<th>Bearing</th>
<th>Height</th>
<th>Enemy Aircraft</th>
<th>Estim. Ref.</th>
<th>Visual or Type of Radar used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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I. If detection was by an airborne aircraft, give range, rel. bearing of enemy from detecting A/S, and its height above (A) or below (B).
HEV Form 463

XII Communications, ASV and Navigational Aids.

The following details are required as a daily summary of the performance of the various radio and ASV equipments used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft set in use</th>
<th>No. of sets used</th>
<th>No. of failures</th>
<th>Best and worst ASV &amp; Beacon ranges on own forces reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 July '45</td>
<td>SCR 522</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Best beacon 20 miles at 1000 feet. ('Foridable's' beacon unserviceable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZBX</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July '45</td>
<td>SCR 522</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Very bad results on TCHIRAT's beacon. Best range 10 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZBX</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remark on (A) Major causes of failures, and action to prevent recurrence.

(b) Enemy or friendly interference or jamming.

--- NIL ---
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Swell</th>
<th>Wind</th>
<th>Cloud over base</th>
<th>Cloud over target</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Direct-</td>
<td>Speed (kts)</td>
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<td>17 Jul</td>
<td>'13</td>
<td>Smooth</td>
<td>Short,</td>
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<td>Low NE'ly</td>
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<td>(10/10)</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>'13</td>
<td>Rough</td>
<td>Short,</td>
<td>263°</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low SW'ly</td>
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</table>
STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
(For completion by Carriers on Strike Duties)

1. GENERAL
Advanced Base: MANUS.
Date of leaving Advanced Base: 6th July, 1945.
Date of arrival back at Advanced Base: --

DAILY NARRATIVE

Friday 20th July. REFUELLING.
1. 0615. Six Avengers were flown off to search for the Fleet Train.
2. 0712. Oiling and embarkation of AVGAS commenced from "WAVE MONARCH" by astern method.
3. Due to a defective pump in the "WAVE MONARCH", and to her oiling destroyers simultaneously, the rate of pumping was only 190 tons/hour average.
4. 1838. Oiling was completed and H.M.S. "Implacable" cast off.

Saturday 21st July. IN THE REFUELLING AREA.
1. 0602. Stopped for fifteen minutes to disconnect the port outer shaft to permit examination of repairs. The H.P. adjusting block was found to be in good condition.
2. 0630 - 0700. Adjusted complement of aircraft with "Arbiters" and "Rulers".
3. On completion total complement embarked was fifty Seafires, eighteen Avengers, twelve Fireflies.
4. 0900. Proceeded alongside "NICHIGA" to embark provisions and stores, casting off at 1215.

Monday 23rd July. ON PASSAGE.
7. 0945 - 1200. H.M.S. "Quadrant" and then H.M.S. "Undaunted" came alongside to oil.

Tuesday 24th July. IN OPERATIONAL AREA.
8. 0655. C.A.P. was maintained throughout the day without any enemy interceptors.

9. Three RAMRODS and four Combined Strikes were flown. The Ramrods were of Seafires, and for the strikes H.M.S. "Implacable"'s complement was Avengers with Seafires as escort in two cases, and a Firefly escort in the other two.

10. The area allocated for the Ramrods, TOUSHIDA Airfield and KAMATSUHIMA Seaplane Stations, was reconnoitred and attacked by the Ramrod. Five aircraft were found, so a three day old reconnaissance report and a flash report from an aircraft this day indicated that there were many flying boats and float planes at SOTA and TAMAU, the subsequent two runs were diverted there. The Seafires strafed and destroyed or damaged most of the aircraft there. One Seafire was lost from flash and two on the way back to the ship. The cause of these two losses is not known. All three pilots are missing.

11. The Avenger bombing in the Combined strikes caused considerable destruction and damage in the hangar, workshop and building areas of TOUSHIDA and TAMAU airfields, while the Seafire escorts strafed.

12. In all, Page 2, 116
10. In all four combined strikes the escorts went after shipping after the primary target had been attacked. One Firefly with its crew was lost whilst attacking a destroyer.

Wednesday 25th July. IN OPERATIONAL AREA.

13. CAGC. The day started badly when two Bregads of Seafires and one combined strike failed to penetrate to the target area of HATA SHINDO and the Inland Sea because of bad weather. The raiders both rode landfalls in visibility half a mile but could not penetrate along the coast, except for one Seafire which forced through and found clearer weather in the North of KII SHIDO.

14. On this Meteorological information a fresh appreciation of the weather was made and subsequent sorties were routed in to the East, where the cloud was found to be higher under the lee of the mountains. The third Seafire returned successfully in getting into the Northern basin of KII SHIDO, and the BAGA VAN, and attacked shipping. A Firefly escort to a combined strike also attacked shipping in the same area as also did the Seafire escort to another combined strike when it had to break off from its escort duties due to weather.

15. This latter combined strike (which included H.M.S. "Incredible's" Avengers) got in under the cloud, climbed to 6,000 feet in the clearer weather over the Inland Sea (but in full view of the prospective targets) and then attacked TOSHIKAN AIRFIELD. The defenders were ready and a very heavy reception was met, but for the loss of one Avenger (crew recovered by Lifeguard Submarine) and two aircrafI crew members wounded, a large amount of destruction was done to hangars and airfield installations.

16. C.A.F. of Seafires were again flown throughout the day without enemy interception. An interception on an unidentified at 23,000 feet which proved to be a Corsair brought the retaliation of the Corsair opening fire on the Seafire.

17. During the evening air attacks a M.N.K. crashed in flames two miles on the starboard beam at 1920, and two more aircraft were damaged in sight at 1940 and 1927.

REMARKS

(A) The policy of allocating a group of air bases to one ship proved its value in avoiding abortive sorties to targets reported unproductive by photographs and previous reconnaissance and enabling productive targets to be attacked systematically.

(B) It is suggested that the dam reveal requires at least 30 to 40 minutes over the target area from an hour after sunrise, so that good photographs and reconnaissance results may be obtained for subsequent attacks.

(C) The proportion of dock landing accidents was higher than is usual in this ship. The above average accident rate is due to two pilots each of whom had two barrier crashes.

(D) The Seafire pylon tanks were a great success, and it is the unanimous opinion of pilots that they made no difference to the handling of the aircraft after ten gallons had been expended.
SUBJECT.  OPERATION - JULY - AUGUST, 1945.

FROM THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "FORMIDABLE".

DATE 27th July, 1945.

No. 352/COL.

TO THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRON, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

SUBMITTED:

The following points of general interest are forwarded hereunder. The remarks of the Air Group Leader are included. British Pacific Fleet forms 45 - 46 are also attached.

Flying Practice.

2. Number of sorties on 24th and 25th July, 1945, were low as no Avengers were used. 25th July was the ship's biggest day and purely from the organization was the most successful, only two aircraft which might have completed their missions failed to do so through engine trouble. Once or twice this was short when preparing for the next range, through late landing of earlier sorties and if the new layout of the Flyday Programmes had not been in vogue, it is doubtful if they would have been ready. This arrangement, although entailing longer intervals into wind at any one time helps the deck and hanger organization tremendously.

3. At the beginning of the 26th July, due to enemy barrage, a shortage of aircraft was felt, but as a result of strenuous efforts on the part of the maintenance organisation, this was made up during the day, and if the last strike had not been cancelled when all was ready, the number of sorties would have commenced favourably with the 26th July, in spite of several aircraft lost. Maintenance personnel were tired after ten days of early starts and late nights but in good heart and should be capable of meeting similar calls for some time to come. A summary of flying is attached as Enclosure No. 1.

Forming Up and Striking.

4. The forming up time of combined strikes improved considerably, but could still be reduced further. If deck space and flying off conditions permit, time would be saved by flying off the Avengers before the escort, as the escort with their higher manoeuvrability and speed range can naturally form up quicker. It is essential that all the strike and escort aircraft get closed up on taking departure, as on one occasion close escort assured the Air Group Leader they were astern and closing, when in actual fact they were astern of the wrong strike.

5. It was found that owing to doubtful weather giving rise to many variables in the tactics to be followed, the escort should initially take up a "passage formation" until the Avengers had passed through the rough weather and reached clearer air. This is most easily accomplished by dispatching the fighters from beam to beam around the stern in their own squadron formations. Formations that get on the bow or in front cannot be expected to keep station and easily become detached. The only aircraft that need precede the bombers is the Air Group Leader's flight in order to do a weather reconnaissance.

As no air opposition was met, it is impossible to evaluate the efficiency of the escort, but the balance appraisal sound.

6. When the target area showed signs of being weathered in, or targets of doubtful size to be attacked, the Air Group Leader should go ahead and reconnoitre the situation and guide the strike in.

7. Providing the ...........

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7. Providing the Air Group Leader carries a camera, reasonable damage assessment photographs can return with the strike. Front gun films have been most unsatisfactory due to vibration of the guns firing and inexperience in full weather.

8. As regards airfield strafing, it was of tremendous assistance to have photographs of fields taken earlier in the day. It not only saves wasted effort in strafing derelict, but gives one a good idea of the flank and on which sectors to attack with the minimum risk and best possible results.

9. Badly damaged aircraft should be sent immediately to the nearest open sea, in order to avoid wasting valuable 'got-away' time in reforming which might result in a forced landing in enemy territory or a ditching too close to the coast.

10. Owing to the severe overloading of Channel DOG around the target area, it is recommended that flash reports be passed back on Button ABLE.

11. One nearly full overload tank on a Corsair was hit by tracers and, although petrol streamed out, no fire resulted.

12. Two sets of two photographs each are enclosed.

[Signature]
CAPTAIN.
ENCLoure No. 1 TO "PORTABLE"s Letter No. 852/02 Of 27/7/43

Victor Summary.

17th July, 1943.
Aircraft available at beginning of day, 25 Corsairs, 11 Avengers, 6 Hellcats.
62 aircraft took off. 4 Corsairs failed to take off.
3 Corsairs ditched due to enemy damage.
1 Corsair ditched from other causes.
2 Corsairs crashed barriers.
1 Corsair hit water near target and returned early.

18th July, 1943.
Aircraft available - 21 Corsairs, 11 Avengers, 6 Hellcats.
2 Corsairs shot down over target.

19th July, 1943.
Aircraft available - 34 Corsairs, 12 Avengers, 6 Hellcats.
1 Corsair
1 Avenger
1 Avenger fell into sea on take off.
1 Corsair ditched - shortage of petrol.
1 Corsair returned early. Engine trouble.
1 Corsair crashed on deck on landing due to enemy damage.
1 Corsair crashed on landing.

20th July, 1943.
Aircraft available - 30 Corsairs, 10 Avengers, 6 Hellcats.
67 aircraft took off.
1 Avenger failed to take off.
4 Corsairs returned early.

Total:
247 aircraft took off.
5 failed to take off.
6 ditched.
1 shot down.
4 returned early.
3 Barrier crashed.
1 crushed on deck due to enemy action.
Subject: Operation July/August

From: Fleet Admiral, British Pacific Fleet.

Date: 21st August, 1945.

To: Vice Admiral, Second-in-Command, British Pacific Fleet.

Re: Reports covering Air Operations between 28th July and 10th August, 1945, are forwarded herewith.

1. The opportunity afforded to work with the 2nd Carrier Task Force has been very gratefully appreciated, and valuable experience has been gained in the manner of operation in company of large numbers of Aircraft Carriers.

Enclosures:

1. Damage against Sorties and Bomb Load and Casualties. p.121.
8. DIAMOND/No. 3/01/05190/1 of 30th July, 1945. p.126.
10. DIAMOND/No. 3/01/05190/1 of 29th July, 1945. p.128.
11. DIAMOND/No. 3/01/05190/1 of 11th August, 1945. p.129.
ACCOUNT

Enclosure No. 1 to A.O. 1's letter No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945

DAMAGE AGAINST SORTIES AND HOPS LOAD

Successful Offensive Sorties 10,85
S.A.F. Sorties and A.S.H. 970

Total Successful Sorties flown by T.C. 37.1 20,55

Bomb Tonnage dropped plus 517 short tons

Total Enemy Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged 3.7
{ 6 splashed
  142 destroyed
  199 damaged

Combatant Ships Sunk or Probably Sunk 9 - 16,112 tons
Non-Combatant Ships Sunk or Probably Sunk 99 - 99,170 tons

Combatant Ships Damaged 21 - 35,462 tons
Non-Combatant Ships Damaged 160 - 216,014 tons

Total Ships Gobbled 309 - 356,376 tons

SHIP LOSSES

Aircrew losses (killed or missing)
Pilots 26
Observers 4
Air Gunners 2
Total 32

Aircraft losses
Combat 40
Operational (including those stripped and ditched in replenishment area) 51
Total 91
Flight Plan

The Standard Flight Plan issued for the 24th and 25th July was used without alteration thereafter.

2. The plan was designed to obtain the maximum possible number of offensive sorties subject to the requirements of the O.A.P. and Air Sea Rescue Service.

3. The number of sorties to be flown in each Strike were based on calculated availability, not on the standard load: i.e., the Strike was expected to (and generally did) consist of the number of aircraft shown in the plan.

4. The three hour sortie was obligatory in that this was the limit of Searles endurance: the timing cycle had to be related to the American plan, rather than to convenience, in order that, as far as was practicable, the British Force should be in line with the U.S. Force, flying 4 hour sorties. This was necessary for station keeping purposes.

5. It was accepted in the plan that the overlap for the relief of O.A.P. at the higher levels would be insufficient; this is allowable when acting in company with other Task Groups, relieving at different times.

The planned sequence was -

(a) Off new O.A.P.
(b) Off new Strike.
(c) On old Strike.
(d) On old O.A.P.

6. In point of fact, particularly in the later stages when the striking distances increased, (d) was often landed before (a), since the Strike was more than 3 hours away (except escort Searles who returned early).

7. It was a disadvantage of the Standard Plan that at certain periods of the day a single emergency landing would gravely delay the departure of a Strike, since, as all ships contributed either bombs, escort or the associated Haerod to the Strike, none had a clear deck while it was being ranged.

This would be overcome were a Night Carrier in company, who would act as spare deck.

8. Experience showed that whilst DECEASED was allotted rather more sorties than she could handle, other carriers had a shade in hand, provided aircraft returned without flank damage.

/9. INDESTRUCTIBLE
Flight Plan (Contd.)

9. INDESTRUCTIBLE provided fewer sorties than DESTRUCTIBLE because she carried fewer aircraft. DESTRUCTIBLE, however, proved to be over-loaded in her present state of training to the extent that she was subject to long delays on deck when matters proceeded not according to plan. For this reason the standard load for this class has been stabilised between the respective loads carried by DESTRUCTIBLE and INDESTRUCTIBLE: 45 Avengers, 12 Fireflies, 44 Seafires.

Flying Intensity

10. (i) A comparative analysis of the flying intensity of Task Force 37 and an American Task Group has been made.

(ii) For a standard strike day the Americans scheduled an average of 2:63 sorties per Night Intruder Aircraft Establishment (N.I.A.E.) to the British 1:7 sorties.

(iii) On the average, on a full strike day, the Americans obtained about 80% of successful to scheduled sorties. Task Force 37 obtained 85% successful sorties. The Americans therefore flew on a full strike day about 1.25 successful sorties per F.A.E. aircraft to the British 1.43 successful sorties.

Note: A successful offensive sortie is one which reaches the target.

(iv) The higher American figure may be attributed to:

(a) Better servicing and maintenance facilities on board.

(b) Clearer and larger flight decks.

(c) Newer aircraft.

(d) Longer endurance aircraft.

(e) Faster carriers, allowing 35 knots standard relative wind.

Factors (a), (b) and (c) above enabled aircraft to be ready again more quickly than in British carriers. Factors (b), (d) and (e) enabled larger ranges to be launched. As a result, the Americans could, and did, keep a larger proportion of their strength airborne.

11. The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS in paragraph 9 of his report of 14th August, states that his ship was flying more sorties per fighter than those in American figures. The American figures referred to were those of MIDWAY however, when Task Force 38 was operating generally for two days out of three and mainly covering amphibious landings; in these circumstances they had to plan for lower flying intensity in order to maintain their effort continually.

12. (i) The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS in paragraph 9 of his report of 14th August, states that his ship was flying more sorties per fighter than those in American figures. The American figures referred to were those of MIDWAY however, when Task Force 38 was operating generally for two days out of three and mainly covering amphibious landings; in these circumstances they had to plan for lower flying intensity in order to maintain their effort continually.
12. (1) The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS, in paragraph 3 of his report of 13th August, states that on 12th August his Dominie flew only three sorties short of requirements. The correct figure was seven. This was, however, creditable in the circumstances.

(4) VICTORIOUS, on the other hand, had a bad day. As is noted in paragraph 3 of the Commanding Officer's report of 14th August.

(11) An average of the two ships' figures should be taken to show the results to be expected on a second strike day.

Aircraft Direction

General

13. American practice was followed throughout the operations. Enemy offensive effort against the Task Forces was effectively countered by our offensive against their airfields, and these attacks which developed were easily dealt with.

14. There were always large numbers of friendly aircraft on the flight and good station keeping of the CAPs was necessary to avoid confusion. This point should be impressed on all fighter pilots.

15. The state of the air plot also made the location and hail of lost aircraft more difficult than in previous operations. Quick and correct action both in ships and aircraft was necessary as soon as any aircraft was in distress.

External Operations

16. One additional line, the Inter Group Fighter Direction Line, was continuously in use when in company with Task Force 34. This line was used by the U.S.N. Fighter Direction Division Officer on strike days.

In an all British Task Force of two or more Groups, the Group Fighter Direction Officers and those Fighter Direction Officers would each require a Deputy to man this line and assist them generally.

17. The inter-ship lines in the Aircraft Direction Room provide a quick and simple means of supplementing the central communication channels. They have been used increasing for this purpose. Nearly all the minor changes of flying programmes have been passed via the Aircraft Direction Room, and recently a large amount of reporting by returning Air Strike Leaders has come through also.

These additional communications were not allowed for in the existing set up, and the time is now ripe for a re-organization of the Aircraft Direction and Operational and Flying Control arrangements in carriers. Detailed recommendations will be forwarded to British authorities separately.

/ Air Tactics
ADVISORY ON AIR OPERATIONS

(Enclosure No. 2 to W.O. No. 0105/51/23 of 3rd August, 1943)

(April 4)

Air Practice

18. (4) The Air Tactical doctrine laid down in the First Aircraft Carrier Squadron Air Order proved generally satisfactory. Some revision of the instructions for deploying squadrons for strike and making the return voyage afterwards is required: these instructions will be rewritten.

(44) The ground striking doctrine in W.O. 76.3 was used with success. The instructions in this publication, modified to some extent, will be incorporated in First Aircraft Carrier Squadron Air Order.

Air Group Leaders

19. The Air Group Leaders fully justified themselves, each leading two 24-hour strike groups. In a few cases this operation as an Air Group Leader is indeed indispensable: the several components of the Strike have different endurance and different weapons, and clear direction from above is necessary if the best use is to be made of all.

Briefing

20. Owing to the lack of enemy airborne opposition the Task Forces were virtually free to operate anywhere off the coast of Japan. Target areas and targets were changed as was necessary to meet the operational situation and to suit the weather. This meant that instructions for strikes had to be produced quickly, at short notice, and that aircraft final briefing sometimes took place in the air.

21. Target areas and the main airfield and industrial targets were passed to ships as early as possible, so that briefing material could be prepared and general briefing of aircraft started. The primary and alternative targets for the first two or three strikes of the day were given to ships the evening before and were not changed. The fourth and fifth strikes were, at the beginning of the operation, also admitted targets overnight. It was found, however, that these targets were nearly always altered, and for the last three strike days, Strike four and five were not given targets until after the flashes from the earlier strikes had been received.

Strike Leaders' Reports

22. Flash reporting by Strike Leaders was poor at first, but improved towards the end of the operation. Instruction in flash reporting should be included in the training of senior pilots at the School of Air Warfare: succinct and accurate reports are not easy to draft, particularly in the stress of battle or bad weather flying.

Replacement Pilots and Aircraft

23. The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS, calls attention in his report of 14th August, to the age of the aircraft and the youth and inexperience of the replacement pilots. This situation is, however, being steadily modified, though much remains to be done.
PLANNING

SITUATION

REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS (Contd.)

The formation of spare carrier air groups in Australia will now permit at least one C.V.'s group to be replaced by a fresh and properly worked up team each major replenishment period. Aircraft arriving two days out in a better state than during EMERGENCIES, and the pilots which arrived towards the end of this operation were in better flying practice than the replacement pilots which joined earlier, though specialized training in Pacific Fleet attack methods is still inadequate.

AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS

25. Communications from aircraft to ships were satisfactory and no special technical difficulties were encountered. There were no usual complaints about the unnecessary chatter by some squadrons in the target area and transmitters were left on only once or two occasions, particularly in Avengers.

26. The four channel V.H.F. equipment now fitted is, however, inadequate for large scale operations and the new multi-channel set is urgently required. Paragraph 3 (a) of the Commanding Officer's H.M.S. INDOMITABLE's report of 14th August, and paragraph 4 of the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. FALKLAND's report of 17th August, are relevant.

There is a real need for a Flying Control Channel for each carrier, particularly in bad weather, and for a Strike Reporting Wave, the latter to ensure that Strike Leaders' flash reports are received without delay.

SHIPS' RADIO INSTALLATIONS

27. Much anxiety was caused by material failures in ships' radio equipment and circuitry. The 2K beacon in FORKLAND was out of action the whole time, and the modifications to enable the Type 72K beacon in INDEFATIGABLE and INDOMITABLE to transmit American sector letters had not been completed; the Force was consequently dependent on VICTORIOUS for a beacon which only just lasted the course.

V.H.F. and some H.F. voice circuits in FORKLAND also gave a lot of trouble and other ships were frequently required to act as link.

28. In order to operate with the American Task Groups, several extra sets had to be fitted, and this work, combined with dormant defects in FORKLAND, which became evident as the operations proceeded, proved too much for the very limited (materially) maintenance staff available.

Good V.H.F. communications are an essential part of Aircraft Direction and Control and carrier pilots must be able to keep these lines going during prolonged operations; at present there are not enough expert technicians to give all the equipment the attention it demands.

/Pilots' Cockpit

127
Pilots' Cockpits - Layout

29. The Commanding Officer, C.18. EAGLE, calls attention to the importance of developing pilot navigation. The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS, states that pilots who had flown four long sections in Corsairs in two days were physically worn out at the end of the second day.

30. It is essential that the pilots' cockpits of all future Naval single seater aircraft be so designed that the pilot can fly in comfort, navigate with precision and keep a record of his movements and operations during sorties of five or six hours.

31. It is recommended that full scale cockpits be fitted and tested at an experimental establishment, that a standardised layout be adopted and that aircraft designers be given more assistance in this matter by experienced operational pilots.

Air Sea Rescue

32. The Pacific Fleet Air Sea Rescue organisation was excellent. A notable rescue was effected by a Sea Plane of H.M.S. TUREK off the named Seafire pilots from positions only a few miles off the Japanese coast. The crew of Japanese pilot boats which attempted to capture those aviators had been previously shot by Seafires.

33. There were no cases during these operations of doomed aviators being lost because other aircraft did not remain to orbit them.

There were, however, several cases of incorrect reporting procedure and incorrect reports; in one case this comprised the code word of the Air Sea Rescue Data Point. It is believed that the failure of pilots to carry out correctly the very simple Standard Procedure is due to their being given insufficient drills in its use. It is not sufficient to lecture young pilots on procedures of this nature; they must also be given practical instruction.
### Table: Strike and Ship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strike and Ship</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Main Target</th>
<th>Bombs and Rocket Fired or Dropped</th>
<th>Enemy Aircraft Destroyed</th>
<th>Ships Shot or Damaged</th>
<th>Other Damage to Enemy</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ordered Off</td>
<td>Took Off</td>
<td>Reached Target</td>
<td>(Aircraft Marked as only those which carried out a direct attack at a genuine target.)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th July</td>
<td>12 Go.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shipping</td>
<td>12,500 lb.</td>
<td>2 Pos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offensive (Strikes)</td>
<td>1A. POIGNABLE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inland Soc.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 So.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shipping</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NII SUBDO</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Aircraft which landed on and subsequently were jettisoned.
**SUMMARY OF SORTIES**

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28th July (Ctd.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1C. VICTIOUS</td>
<td>12 Co.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Shipping Inland</td>
<td>14 x 500lbs ML.C.</td>
<td>1 Dec.</td>
<td>1 Dec.</td>
<td>Two small vessels damaged</td>
<td>1 Train damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Combined</td>
<td>20 Av.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>NARELA</td>
<td>62 x 500lbs ML.C.</td>
<td>1 Dec.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 SEM damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Ss.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Shipyards</td>
<td>2 x 120lbs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Pl.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C. VICTIOUS</td>
<td>d Co.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>AKASHI A/F.</td>
<td>12 x 500lbs</td>
<td>6 Dec.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Factory hit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D. INDEPENDE</td>
<td>12 Ss.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>SAMO and RMMO A/F.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Combined</td>
<td>20 Av.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>NADU Shipyards</td>
<td>68 x 500lbs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 S/L. Sunk</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Ss.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 PT. Damaged</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Co.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3E. FURIOUS</td>
<td>6 Co.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Shipyards</td>
<td>8 x 500lbs</td>
<td>1 Dec.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 DE. Damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F. LANCELOT</td>
<td>12 Ss.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>SAMO and RMMO A/F.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 T/E</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Combined</td>
<td>20 Av.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>NARELA Yard and Shipping</td>
<td>68 x 500lbs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 SL. probably damaged</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Ss.</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>1 PT. probably damaged</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Co.</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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*Note: SEM = Shrapnel Ejected Missiles.*
# SHARE OF SHIPS

(Enclosure No. 3 to M.O.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

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<tr>
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<th>6</th>
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<td>28th July (Ctd.)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AC. VICTORIOUS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Co.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>SWIC. PIGE.</td>
<td>16x500lb.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 H.D. possibly damaged.</td>
<td>Hits on A/F installations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Combined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Av.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Shipping PIGE.</td>
<td>76x500lb.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 DE ) all</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sc.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 SEL ) hit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 FL.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Kailakon ) and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Co.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>severely damaged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5A. PROPAGABLE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Co.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Shipping PIGE.</td>
<td>12x500lb.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 SC ) damaged</td>
<td>Warehouse destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5B. INFLATABLE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jk.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>HINATO Area.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 Dec.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 SBJ ) sunk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Dec.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Junk ) sunk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Junk ) damaged</td>
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**Day Total**

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<th>1</th>
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<th>5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Offensive</strong></td>
<td>260+</td>
<td>260+</td>
<td>234+</td>
<td>234+</td>
<td>234+</td>
<td>234+</td>
<td>234+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FL. and search</td>
<td>4 FL. and search</td>
<td>4 FL. and search</td>
<td>4 FL. and search</td>
<td>4 FL. and search</td>
<td>4 FL. and search</td>
<td>4 FL. and search</td>
<td>4 FL. and search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive</strong></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>428</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>370</td>
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131
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Details</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30th July</td>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td>Shipping: 12x500lb., 1 Trawler damaged, 2 Destroyer sunk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fischer out of targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Victorious: 4x500lb., Hangars damaged, Warehouse burned,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weathered in, Basha dropped by Kaiser on land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Weathered in, Basha dropped by Kaiser on land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>6 Co., 6x500lb., Hangars damaged, Warehouse burned, One Seafire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(with pilot) Trawler damaged, 1 Destroyer probably sunk, 1500 probably</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sunk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA. FOR IXILE: 8 Co., 6x500lb., Hangars damaged, 1 Seafire (with pilot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FLAT32</td>
</tr>
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</table>
**Bombing of Targets**

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.0.1's No. O109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>4. Combined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Av.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>YOKKAIGH</td>
<td>51 x 500lb.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 BP.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>KINGS. Harbours</td>
<td>48 x 120lb.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Fs.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Peng.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 St.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>4C. VICTORIOUS</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 St.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>SHIZUKU</td>
<td>15 x 500lb.</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INUKAI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 5. Combined      |   |   |   |   |   |
| 15 So.           | 15| 15| Shipping | 16 x 500lb. | - | 1 DD |
| 3 So.            | 8 | 8 | NAISHU area | - | 2 DD | - |
| 3 Mf.            | 6 | 6 | - | - | 1 DD | - |

**Note:** Avengers and Seafire escort cancelled to conform with Task Force 38 orders, weather deteriorating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day Total</th>
<th>12 3.4 4 PR.</th>
<th>12 3.4 4 PR.</th>
<th>18 3.4 4 PR.</th>
<th>18 3.4 4 PR.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td>212 + 4 PR.</td>
<td>212 + 4 PR.</td>
<td>188 + 4 PR.</td>
<td>188 + 4 PR.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defensive</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>322</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Plant/Ship/Location</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Weight</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd August</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>PO HOBART</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.</td>
<td>PO HOBART</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.</td>
<td>PO HOBART</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd August</td>
<td>D.</td>
<td>PO HOBART</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D.</td>
<td>PO HOBART</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>E.</td>
<td>PO HOBART</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd August</td>
<td>F.</td>
<td>PO HOBART</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd August</td>
<td>G.</td>
<td>PO HOBART</td>
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*Avenger (pilot lost)*
<table>
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<tr>
<td>23rd Aug</td>
<td>Shipping</td>
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<td>2 SLs damaged</td>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shipping and Status of Port: 72 x 500 lb., 4 SD sunk, 4 SD probably sunk, 2 ED damaged (later observed to be sunk by local or other attack).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shipping at Karachi: 66 x 500 lb., 4 SD sunk, 4 SD probably sunk, 1 FPC damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Karachi: 20 x 500 lb., 17 probably destroyed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Karachi: 20 x 500 lb., 17 probably destroyed, 2 ED probably sunk (also being attacked by Americans).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Karachi: 20 x 500 lb., 17 probably destroyed, 2 ED probably sunk (also being attacked by Americans).</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Combined</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Karachi: 20 x 500 lb., 17 probably destroyed, 2 ED probably sunk (also being attacked by Americans).</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Karachi: 20 x 500 lb., 17 probably destroyed, 2 ED probably sunk (also being attacked by Americans).</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Airfield Installations damaged:** 1 Camel (pilot missing)

**Total:** 135
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offensive [Strike]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1a. FOKKELAND</td>
<td>12 Co.</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>KETTISHA</td>
<td>13x 5001b.</td>
<td>1 S/B don.</td>
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<td>13. FOKKELAND</td>
<td>12 Co.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>KETTISHA</td>
<td>13x 5001b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13. VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>12 Co.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>KETTISHA</td>
<td>13x 5001b.</td>
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<td>2. Combined</td>
<td>20 Jt.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>KETTISHA</td>
<td>13x 5001b.</td>
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<td>12 Co.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>KETTISHA</td>
<td>13x 5001b.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>12 Co.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>KETTISHA</td>
<td>13x 5001b.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Damage Summary:**
- Poor station, barracks and barrack quarter destroyed, 4 locomotives destroyed.
- Hangars destroyed.
- Dispersal area installations damaged, 2 locos, and trains destroyed - Factory damaged.
- Hangars destroyed.
- Hangars destroyed.
- 4 trains and railway installations damaged.
- 3 tugs probably sunk.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>5. Combined</td>
<td>20 Av.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>KOITAI A/P</td>
<td>72x 500 lb.</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Combined</td>
<td>3 Sc.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>KOITAI A/P</td>
<td>16x 120 lb.</td>
<td>6 days</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Combined</td>
<td>3 Fl.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>KOITAI A/P</td>
<td>16x 120 lb.</td>
<td>6 days</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. KOKUSAI</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>KOITAI A/P</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. KOKUSAI</td>
<td>12 Sc.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>KOITAI A/P</td>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. VICTORIOUS</td>
<td>12 Sc.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>KOITAI A/P</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Combined</td>
<td>20 Av.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>KOKUMA</td>
<td>72x 500 lb.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Combined</td>
<td>3 Sc.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>KOKUMA</td>
<td>16x 120 lb.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Combined</td>
<td>3 Sc.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>KOKUMA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. KOKUSAI</td>
<td>12 Sc.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>KOKUMA</td>
<td>16x 500 lb.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dry Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td>233+</td>
<td>233+</td>
<td>224+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enclosure No. 4 to A.O. One's No. 0109/16/223 of 23rd August, 1945

SECRET

Subject

OPERATIONS - 29th & 30th JULY, 1945.

From THE COMMANDER 3 OFFICER, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS

Date 31st July, 1945.

No. 0217/4720

To The Flag Officer Commanding, 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron, British Pacific Fleet.

Hereewith are forwarded H.M.S. "Victorious" reports on the operations of 29th and 30th July, 1945.

P.143

(merged) M.E. Denny

Rear Admiral
From THE COMMANING OFFICER, H.M.S. "VICTORIOUS"

Date 14th August 1945

To The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier Squadron, British Pacific Fleet

Hereewith are forwarded VICTORIOUS' reports on the air operations of 9th and 10th August, 1945, together with a Statistical Summary, included as Appendix "A", on the same lines as those previously forwarded by VICTORIOUS.

2. 9th August was a good day. The change in fighter sorties occasioned by VICTORIOUS' Air Group Leader being sick and Rescue CAP increased the number of Corsair sorties required by the Air Force in the first half of the programme to the high figure of 56 in 7 hours. 54 Corsairs took off to time and the deficiency of 2 was subsequently redeemed by later providing 4 extra Corsairs and 3 extra Avengers for Strike 5.

The day totalled 63 Corsair sorties (3 abortive) and 19 Avengers, these having been flown by 53 Corsairs and 12 Avengers in 13 hours, and total flying time was 378 hours. This day constitutes a record for VICTORIOUS in operational flying.

3. 10th August was a bad day for Corsairs. 34 were available at N Hour; at N + 7 hours only 10 Corsairs had flown off, to meet commitments for 48 sorties, and 8 of these sorties were abortive requiring emergency or precautionary landings. The signal developed, and after providing a Rescue CAP of 2 Corsairs at 1200 the state was reached when free space in the Hangar was bogged down with 26 U/S Corsairs and not one serviceable in the ship to meet a requirement of 8 due at 1410. The situation was so overwhelming that the repair and logistic organisation was not able to cope with their normal success. In the event, 4 serviceable Corsairs were unearthed and after a monumental amount of shunting reached the flight deck and were flown off 16 minutes late on programme time.

The day totalled 51 Corsair (8 abortive), 18 Avenger and 1 Walrus sorties, a disappointing result. The amount of work put in to achieve this result was very much greater than that required for the far better performance of the preceding day, and provides an interesting illustration of the fact that one cannot overfly old aircraft without paying for it.


These presented new features: lamp called for a round trip of 500 nautical miles, with a 1000 lb. bomb load and long range tank, to be completed in three hours. This load affects fuel consumption and speed considerably. With a large formation an airspeed over 165 knots indicated at 10,000 feet is unsatisfactory - 160 knots is the maximum comfortable - and leads to straggling or excessive fuel consumption. Thus the narrowest of margins existed over the targets. When the assignment called for a number of separate targets, insufficient time was available for refuelling etc. to allow the mission to be fully executed. A number of cases of fuel shortage occurred, but good judgment by the leaders was shown and maximum offensive power developed in that the flights were extended to the limit.

5. Air Sea Rescue Flight, 10th August.

One Walrus escorted by one fighter took off at 1325. The Walrus sighted "Lifeguard" at 1515 but could see no survivors in the water. The "Lifeguard" dived on sighting the Walrus. Search of the area was carried out until P.L.P. and then course was set for base. After 15 minutes on the homeward leg, the fighter requested the Walrus to investigate "Lifeguard". The Walrus did this, thereby prejudicing its chances of reaching base.

At 1720 the engine out and the Walrus crash-landed. Prior to ditching it was in R/F touch with the U.S.N. C.A.F. over the "Lifeguard". The escorting fighter signalled to assist but during one dive pass over the Walrus its engine cut and he ditched.

Both crews were rescued by "Watchdog" at 1805, the Walrus being saved by gunfire.

6.
6. Communications

(a) In the final period VICTORIOUS had a number of temporary communication failures, mostly due to the continuous overloading and over-work of the A.C. system. The whole of this work is on a continuous overload owing to the many additions, fitted in the present state of fatigue can only be kept going by prodigious efforts of all concerned.

(b) YE Beacon: VICTORIOUS had the only satisfactory YE Beacon in the Force. Great credit is due to the Signal Staff in successfully nursing it the whole time aircraft were airborne. VICTORIOUS carries the oldest YE Beacon in the Royal Navy, and the equipment is now suffering somewhat from fatigue. Half the aerial counter-joise has been shattered off by vibration - there is no lower bearing at the base of the revolving structure - the gas-filled feeder is no longer gas-tight or gas-filled - and the control box has its inner keying troubles. Many hours were spent in maintenance and it may be of interest that a piece of cardboard bent to form an improvised spring permitted correct Morse symbols to be made which otherwise would have been unreadable.

7. Casualties

Temporary Sub-Lieutenant A. E. Newton, RNVR, No. 1836 Squadron, failed to return from Strike 40 on 31st August. He was last seen over KURIYAMA airfield at which time he was thought to be taking photographs. He failed to re-form at the rendezvous and has been reported missing.

Temporary Sub-Lieutenant H. L. Wright, RNVR, No. 183 Squadron, was killed on 10th August as a result of a forced landing at "Tosa-1". His aircraft had been badly hit by flak and was vibrating badly and was only able to turn to starboard. Unfortunately reports indicate that his wheels were down when he hit the water, which caused his aircraft to capsize. His T.A.G. was rescued unhurt.

Temporary Sub-Lieutenant P. D. Bennett, RNVR, No. 1836 Squadron, was lost on 30th July. He was one of the Air Group Leader's Division in Combined Strike 5 attacking shipping at KURIYAMA. His aircraft dived into the side of a hill on occupation of a strafing attack and burst into flames.

8. (a) As far as VICTORIOUS is concerned the "JULY/AUGUST" operation makes an interesting comparison with the cyclic of ZEEBRUGGE. Although the former contained only 3 strike days and the latter two 12 each, the aggregate air effort for "JULY/AUGUST" was approximately the same, but the effort expended in the target area was the greatest of the three operations, notably so in the case of the Corsair Wing.

(b) That it was possible to achieve this greater output in ground attack by the Corsairs was largely due to the more convenient Flight Plan worked during JULY/AUGUST, and, in a lesser degree, to a 6% reduction in CAP effort.

(c) The flight plan worked varied between an average of 4 sorties every strike day to 6 sorties per pair of strike days. The pilots took 2 and 2 sorties every strike day which were very tired at the end of the last day of the pair and were suffering considerably from body aches and cramps as a result of the long hours in the same uncomfortable cockpit of the Corsair.

(d) On the other hand, materially the fighters ended up in a much more robust condition, and could have continued for a number of further strike days without a rest period. This is due to -

(i) All operationally tired pilots were relieved before the JULY/ AUGUST operations commenced. This was not the case before the ZEEBRUGGE.

(ii) The satisfaction of holding the gap in this busy country and the finding of many and varied targets produced a considerable stimulus in comparison with the long drawn out, hard and target features of the ZEEBRUGGE COUTO.

(iii) The almost total elimination of periods "at readiness" in strike days.

(iv) The longer intervals between strike periods, allowing good recuperation.

(e) .................
(e) Against the above satisfactory features must be set the fact that in both the Fighter Wing and the TAC Squadron the accuracy of bombing attack was lower than customary. The newly-joined fresh young aircrew had had inadequate and in some cases no training in bombing before joining at Sydney and little opportunity in VICTORIOUS for practice before being sent out on strike missions.


(a) On three days only, out of the eight, were those losses of effort less or better than the Force 30 standards. On the other hand, fighter sorties per available aircraft on strike days were above the American figures.

(b) In the 669 deck landings, there were 3 deck landing write-offs, 5 others which produced flyable data and a further 4 which produced 13 hours unserviceability (10 of these 15 accidents were Corsairs). 90% of these accidents were due to pilots who had been less than 90 hours solo on type (30% of VICTORIOUS Air Group) and who were all new to Carrier operations. I regard these figures, though unpleasant, as what must be expected if untrained aircrew are employed in operational Carriers.

(c) The rather high figures of abortive sorties and non-starters among the Corsairs on 5 of the 8 strike days I consider mainly to be due to the age of the Corsairs and the long time they have spent in storage in tropical and sub-tropical climates. They are much older aircraft than the Americans would use.

10. The aggregate flying for the whole period of 36 days was ideal for sustained operations, sufficient to keep everyone in trim. The average of the 13 Corsair pilots who lost no opportunity through sickness or other cause was 7.3 sorties and 3.5 hrs. 10 min. flying. The best score was Temporary Sub Lieutenant (A) D. McCulloch RNVR, of 1034 Squadron with 19 sorties aggregating 47 hours flying; 6 pilots exceeded 40 hours.

The Aveliner Squadron Commander's crew executed 13 sorties aggregating 39 hrs. 25 min. (7 sorties to target area)

11. The increase in output which we have now worked up to is considered to be in keeping with the business of servicing and handling the aircraft in congested VICTORIOUS to meet the varied requirements is complicated by the number of types carried, viz.-

(a) Work - of high value as they have to occupy the most convenient billets in the hangar and usually stay there all day;

(i) Ordinary Corsairs (Marks I or IV);

(ii) Corsairs fitted with positive for banking;

(iii) Corsairs fitted with oxygen for high (CAP) aircraft are not interchangeable.

Although not aware of the tactical disadvantages of a "one type" Carrier load, I am not quite certain that what is now a good performance by way of producing 70 sorties a day from the present mixed bag of 33 aircraft carried in VICTORIOUS is equalled by an 80-90 straight-supported fighter sorties which would be possible from 53 aircraft of uniform type with the same expenditure of effort.

12. Replacements.

The aircraft replacement rate still fails to come up to expectations. The great majority of such aircraft flown on board are not operationally fit and cannot be flown in the next day's strikes. This tends to a reluctance to dispose of a "flyable Chad", the repair staff preferring to retain it and struggle with the defects of which they are aware than take the dive into the unknown defects and adjustments of the substitutes on their receipt. In either case the intention to reduce the servicing required in the Fleet Carrier by substituting good aircraft for bad is frustrated.

13. ..........
10. It is an interesting fact also, on the current state of British Naval aviation material that the only two planes available to *VICTORIOUS* for employing her fighters to track the enemy, were two, the use of aircraft fighters officially disappeared.

11. To the above somewhat acid comment might be added the wonder occasioned in *SHANTY* by the landing there of a south-eastern *Corsair* Mark 2

12. 487 of which was recognized as *VICTORIOUS* and special mention is made of such a machine being flown from the island of Perm in the Caspian Sea. However, *VICTORIOUS* is very keen on her Corsairs, and will no doubt be able to prove, in time, the fact that we use such old and scarce material to collaborate in her allies who are up to date.

13. Until the advent of these Corsairs such poor account of recreation and entertainment has been had by *VICTORIOUS*.

To this end, a committee has been formed, comprising a large number of officers and men, to organize some kind of off-duty entertainment for the men. The committee, consisting of Lieutenant Commander **T. P. R.** and **A. M. G. C.** and **A. M. G. C.**, has been given the task of including the officers as well as the men and the equipment for the games, which is being provided by the committee itself.

The chief officer of the *VICTORIOUS* has been allocated the task of supervising the committee and the equipment.

14. The men have been given the necessary information on the various games and activities, and the necessary equipment has been provided by the committee.

15. I believe that the committee will be able to organize a good operation which will be a great benefit to the men on board. The committee is composed of experienced officers and men, and the equipment is of high quality.

16. On the completion of the operation, *VICTORIOUS* is proud to be the first carrier to have operated a complete formation of planes in the Pacific. The operation was a success, and the planes and pilots acquitted themselves well. The weather was good, and the Pacific Ocean was calm. The pilots were well trained and experienced, and the operation was a complete success.

(Sgd) M. M. DENNY

Rear Admiral
## APPENDIX "A" to "VICTORY" Letter No. 0217/0773 of 14th August 1942.

H.M.S. "VICTORY" - STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS SUBMARINE

Period under review: Departure Helles 0335Z 6th July 1942 to 2935Z 10th August (East Indies area).

### I. AIRCRAFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average number aircraft</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number ratings</td>
<td>1030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### II. RESOURCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers at sea</td>
<td>44,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Fuel embarked at sea</td>
<td>36,082 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Fuel embarked at sea</td>
<td>10,412 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft embarked at sea</td>
<td>12,500 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft embarked at sea</td>
<td>164,500 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft embarked at sea, aviation</td>
<td>500 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft embarked at sea, aviation</td>
<td>200 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs embarked at sea</td>
<td>200 x 500 lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs dropped in attacks</td>
<td>50 x 150 lb, frag. clusters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft damaged</td>
<td>24 (including those due to weather)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft hang up</td>
<td>2 x 500 lb, 7 x 100 lb, frag. clusters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft gun ammunition fired</td>
<td>13,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft gun ammunition</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft gun ammunition, total</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft gun carried</td>
<td>3 items (6 per Corsair sortie)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### III. AIRCRAFT

143
APPENDIX "A" to "TUCSON" letter No. 0217/6775 of 16th August, 1945.

III. AIRCRAFT

(a) Original establishments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corsairs</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avengers</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Total number of individual aircraft of each type flown and serviced on board during period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corsairs</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avengers</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66 Total

(a) Serviceable as aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corsairs</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avengers</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) As a result of enemy action:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corsairs</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avengers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Flown on an emergency basis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corsairs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avengers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Total Corsair hours flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Hours flown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corsairs</td>
<td>1451 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>137 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aggregate, all types: 1688 hours 50 minutes

(e) Maximum hours flown by any Corsair aircraft: 109 hours 19 minutes

(f) Corsair drop tanks - dropped in flight: 102

Total expended: 126

IV. AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY

(a) Number of days in period: 36

(b) Total sorties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corsairs</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avengers</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walrus</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aggregate sorties: 684

Total sorties in combat area - Corsairs 239 (includes 10 abortive), Avengers 53 (includes 1 abortive), Walrus 2 (AAR)

Total sorties in Fleet area - C.A.R. 106 (includes 6 abortive), Search 3

/Total enemy and nuisance sorties............ 144
APPENDIX "A" to "VICKERSBURG" Letter No. 0247/0773 of 14th August 1945.

Total ferry and message drop sorties - Carrows 22
Average 5

Total anti-submarine and identification sorties - Carrows 76
Average 19
Walrus 1

Visitors - 2 on, 2 off.

V.(a) AIRCRAFT HANDLING THROUGH FIRE ACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely damaged</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly damaged</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V.(b) PERFORMANCE OF SHIPS' AND DAMAGE AIRCRAFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engine failure due to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engine failure or lack of petrol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deck landing accidents - classified as non-repairable</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deck landing accidents - flown off as flyable only</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI AIRCRAFT SEVERAL DAYS

State at 0000 on 1st day of each Strike period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strike period (day)</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st period (2 days)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd period (2 days)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd period (2 days)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th period (2 days)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th period (2 days)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State at end of last day of each Strike period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strike period (day)</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st period (2 days)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd period (2 days)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd period (1 day)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th period (1 day)</td>
<td>13</td>
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Total No. Corsair Hours: 3461.58

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Second: Ty. Lt. (A) H.A. Dick 44.89
Third: Ty. Lt. Cdr. (A) D.K. Evans 44.05
### AVMGER NOE. - 561 SQUADRON

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**Total Servies:** 1258

**Total Hours:** 785.68

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Total Sorties: ........... 5
Total Hours: ........... 9.50
SECRET

At 1430Z, the U-boat was observed at the entrance to the harbor, and at 1438Z, it was seen to be entering the harbor. The U-boat then proceeded to the north end of the harbor and was last seen entering the harbor at 1440Z.

From the U.S. Navy

To the Commanding Officer, U.S. Navy

Date: 16 August 1945

Subject:

Supplementary

Records of Operations

ENCLOSURE

[Signature]

205/5

RECEIVED

16 August 1945
SUBJECT - REPORT ON OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST 1945

FROM: THE COMING OFFICER, H.M.S. "POLARBEAR".

DATE: 11th August 1945.

TO: THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANING FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRON, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

SUBMITTED,

The strikes covered in this report are those carried out on 29th and 30th July and 9th and 10th August 1945.

2. Standard flying programme was in use and no difficulty was experienced in meeting it. Credit is due to the maintenance organisation for their efforts on 10th August. With nearly one-third of the Corvair complement lost or badly damaged by flak, programme requirements were still met with the exception of three sorties. One of these was a small failure just before take-off.

3. Although upsetting to the fleet programme, the enforced rest between July 31st and August 8th was good value to the maintenance ratings. All work was up to date and a very adequate rest period enjoyed. There appears no reason, given a rest period of this nature from time to time, why this type of operation should not be carried on indefinitely, legislation permitting. Aircraft were giving less trouble at the end than in the first strike period.

4. During bad weather it is suggested some relaxation in the ban on R/T for flying control might be made. Aircraft have difficulty in seeing the "Charlies" and R/T speeds up the land on.

5. It is considered a good number of aircraft were temporarily lost due to Tempest being in the wrong position or giving wrong vectors to aircraft. In view of the trouble and confusion this causes with the consequent diversion of A.A.I. from their proper function, it is considered a special effort should be made to correct this. A visual distinguishing feature between Tempest 1 and 2 and Watchdog would also help.

6. It is considered more damage to shipping would have been done if more rocket aircraft had been available. Avenger dive bombing of this type of target was not particularly successful. Partly this was due to lack of practice, but also because the avenger is not the best aircraft for this form of attack.

7. Flak intelligence was very good and a great help to the Squadrions.

8. It is to be hoped that Corvairs supplied at replenishments will soon all be bombers. It is bombers which are usually the lost or damaged aircraft, and the weight of attack is diminished as it becomes necessary to replace bombers by fighters in numbers and escorts.

9. It is still a considerable handicap that replenishment aircraft are not immediately operationally serviceable on arrival.

10. Nine PR.1's flown - all for the period 9th/10th August and photographs are enclosed.

CAPTAIN.

(Sgd) C. Hetherington.
SUBJECT: OPERATIONS, JULY - AUGUST, 1945.

FROM: THE CO-COMMANDER OFFICER, H.M.S. HOBART.

DATE: 30th July, 1945.

No. 143/175/S7/375/3

TO: THE F.L.A.S. OFFICER CONTROLLING NIGHT AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRON, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

B.P.L. Fuses 46 to 49 inclusive except 46a and 46b (blank) are forwarded herewith in respect of operations from 26th July to 30th July, 1945, in accordance with H.P.T.L. 227.

(Sgt.) W.D. GRAHAM
CAPTAIN
C.O.Y.T.

SECRET

...S. Indefatigable,
11th August, 1943.

No. 3/42/00190/3.

OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith the report of proceedings of H.M. Ship under my command covering the period 31st July to 11th August, 1943. Forms B.P.P. 46 to 48 inclusive, less 48a, which is blank, are attached.

2. The following remarks on points raised during this period of operations are forwarded:-

(a) On 30th July, having closed to within sixty miles of the Japanese coast to bring targets within range of our aircraft, their lack of an extra VHF channel necessitated their return via No. 1 Strike Picket. This picket was so placed that an extra sixty miles was added to the return journey of every aircraft - proof, if proof were needed, that the ten-channel VHF set is a high priority requirement.

(b) Fireflies, tied to Avenger escort duties, had no chance to carry rockets. Had there not invariably been a number of Seafires due to land on before them in each serial, it might have been practicable to arm Fireflies with one long-range tank and four rockets; but in any case the accuracy of their aim would have suffered against shipping, directly aero-bombed, armed with eight rockets each, would probably have done more damage than an equal number of Avengers, but they would not have been able to conform to a three-hour standard flying programme.

(c) On the sixth strike day, our squadron's deck-landing had greatly improved and, to a certain extent, their general air drill. But elementary mistakes were still being made in air actions which resulted in a reduction of damage done to the enemy and an undue number of requests for holding. Once again it must be emphasised that operations are not a substitute for training where airmen are concerned.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Adm.) G.D. Graham

The Flag Officer Commanding,
First Aircraft Carrier Squadron,
British Pacific Fleet.

CAPTAIN
Royal Navy.

152
SPECIAL SITUATION FOR REPORT ON PROGRAMME

(ASSIGNED BY CORRIDORS ON STRIKE DATES)

1. GENERAL


Advanced Base: [Blacked out]

Date of leaving Advanced Base: 6th July, 1945.

Date of Arrival Back at Advanced Base: [Blacked out]

DAY...DAY...DAY...DAY...

26th July, 1945. INTELLIGENCE DATA.

1. Complement of Aircraft was assembled during the day, flyable only being sent to H.M.S. "Striker" and replacements received from H.M.S. "Cheerful". The aircraft complement assembled was then 13 Aventures, 47 Seafires, 10 Fireflies.

27th July, 1945. INTELLIGENCE DATA.

2. OOSO - 1130. H.M.S. "HMSACTUALITY" released from H.M.S. ENTERPRISE by unannounced visit.

AUX JULY, 1945. INTELLIGENCE AGER.

3. OOSO. H.M.S. "HMSACTUALITY" provided air support in accordance with the Standard Flight Plan. - H.M.S. throughout the day, three groups of Seafires, two Fireflies assigned to combined strikes, and a complement sent to two other combined strikes of Aventures with Seafires as escort.

4. The Seafires were given the H.M.S., "HMSACTUALITY", "HMSACCUSATION", 5000 group of aircraft to cover. The main cruiser took photographs and good advantage of H.M.S. inflicted aircraft targets there for subsequent strikes although only one aircraft had been found by visual reconnaissance. Although cover was poor each cruiser projected a certain number of targets to the Seafires. Six Seafires were obtained and a master damper.

5. In all cases the Seafires attacked shipping after having destroyed their aircraft targets. Besides other targets they discovered and attacked two destroyers and an escort vessel at SAKO, which were finished off by subsequent strikes from other ships.

6. The Fireflies escorted two strikes to HMW shipyard, and escorted shipping, an oil storage tank, and other targets during the withdrawal.

7. Both combined strikes in H.M.S. "HMSACTUALITY" Aventures and Seafires took part sent to H.M.S. shipyard. The positions were good, and photographs obtained in the first strike showed aerial photo which had been damaged, and gave Adrian points for the second attack.

8. Although ships in the yard were taken as striking points in this second strike, the force to striking damaged from photographs is disappointingly low. This is probably due to the difficulty of localizing air striking in a yard. Very considerable damage done to the yard, however, as is shown by the photograph Interpretation Reports.

9. In all cases of reported strikes the escort was given strict instructions to remain with the ships until the aircraft were clear of the coast on the way back. This is in view of the previous experience of fighter opposition encountered by the Association 26th and again in the morning of this day. The effect on the escort was that they could only strike in the vicinity of the strike or patrol areas. No
Sunday 22nd July 1945

10. A G.A.P. was provided P.M.

10th July 1945

11. 0.30. The standard flight plan was worked again, with H.M.S. "Invincible" Firefly contribution dropping to five only out of the eight required for Strike 9 owing to (a) lack of replacements (b) operational losses.

12. The dawn Seafire rendezvous, which had been split in two to search for shipping off a convoy airfields, was battalied by fog to 1,000 feet, and returned to the ship. The first combined strike also found that layers of cloud down to the ground prevented an attack on MIKASA airfields, or on targets in the approaches to MIKASA, and eventually chased an A.S.A. through cloud. The well-known term "Instrument Bashing" can hardly be applied to this, but at least it is better than小伙子ing in the sea.

13. The noon Seafire rendezvous succeeded in penetrating to AKITA/KURU airfields and to the MIKASA, destroying aircraft and attacking small shipping. They did some air accidents...A fire at the airfield, and one Seafire with its pilot was subsequently lost.

14. The weather on the north side of the MIKASA area was reported clearer. A Firefly escort to a strike brought back photographs of good targets there, so the next strike of Avengers was accordingly ordered for that area. The weather however cleared momentarily in the MIKASA area, and the strike was ordered to go to MIKASA at very short notice. The shipping north while banking was seen, and the majority of aircraft bombed the nearby coal refinery and storage at MIKASA, and a factory.

15. The last Seafire and last Firefly escort were combined with other fighters and sent to the MIKASA area for the last strike of the day, and attacked shipping with success. The Avengers of the strike were ordered not to take off.

NOTE.

(a) Shipping targets in a shipyard are the most difficult type of ship targets to destroy, as they usually lack unarmoured quarters and above fire fighting in the yard. It is considered that if the immediate object is destruction of shipping, shipping that is in actual running use should be given as a target, and not that in a yard.

(b) It is thought that shipping below 5,000 tons is a bad target for Avenger glide bombing. It is suggested that the Firefly should be used in the anti-shipping role as soon as possible, with results. At the moment the choice is between range or results.

(c) On 20th July, in condition of heavy smoke, all Seafire deck landings were made without any damage from this cause.
Aircraft Carrier: H.M.S. "ESMARCH". Code Name of Operation: "OPERATION JULY/AUGUST, 1944."

Advanced Base: H.M.S.

Date of Leaving Advanced Base: 1st July, 1944.

Date of Arrival Back at Advanced Base: 6th July, 1944.

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE.

1st July. IN REPLENISHMENT AREA.

1000 - 1600. H.M.S. "DISPLACER" fueled from H.M.S. "OLNA" by alongside method.

Replenishment aircraft were embarked P.M. from H.M.S. "HERBERT" and "CHASER". On completion total number of aircraft embarked was 45 Seafires, 19 Avengers, 14 Fireflies.

1st AUGUST. P.M. A/S Patrols of Avengers were provided.

2nd AUGUST.

1. 1210 - 1650. H.M.S. "DISPLACER" embarked Avengers and oil fuel from "AVE CROSSER" in tandem method. A lack in the ship's starboard side which had caused damage to the refrigerators by flooding was stove today by shoring and cementing.

2. 4th, 5th AUGUST. A.M. Aircraft were provided for Fleet requirements and combined flying exercises.

6th AUGUST.

3. 0915 - 1145. Avengers and oil fuel were embarked from H.M.S. "OLNA" by alongside method and at 1720 H.M.S. "DISPLACER" proceeded alongside "HARRIET" and embarked provisions.

During the day replenishment aircraft were embarked from H.M.S. "CHASER" and "HERBERT". On completion total number of aircraft embarked was 50 Seafires, 19 Avengers, 14 Fireflies.

20th AUGUST. IN OPERATIONAL AREA.

4. 0410. H.M.S. "DISPLACER" provided aircraft as in the Seafires Flight Plan.

The dam Seafire Ranch was intended to sweep the coast from MATSUSHIMA Northward for shipping. It made a landfall too far South probably due to compass error caused by the length of time since they were last steaming, and the large change in latitude. No shipping was seen.

MATSUSHIMA Airfield was strafed, one pilot having to bail out owing to being hit by flak. The pilot was seen in his dinghy just off the coast in SEMPUI BAY, inside the enemy airfields. Japanese picket boats and Junks attempted to pick him up, but were driven off and set on fire by the Seafires, who waited over him until Nellie from the SUB C.A.P. took over.

5. The Seafires landed on after a three hour thirty minute flight. No.2 Combined Strike attacked MATSUSHIMA with great success. The attack took place at the same time as an American attack, and there was a queue of aircraft waiting to bomb. The bomb was left a burning shambles. The Seafire escort strafed.
DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE

Page 2.

6. No. 3 Reauro was directed to shipping and found two S.B.'s at Fudokousha in an inlet to the South-west of GHADDAWA. One was on fire and listing, the other well down. They also attacked WAKEHAMA airfield locating one Seafire. The pilot bailed out over the sea about two miles from the damaged aircraft. Both these pilots were rescued by an American D.H. aircraft.

The Seafires of this Rauro were left behind to mark the damaged pilot. They waited too long inshore and then on the way back to Fleet got lost. Both pilots had to bale out owing to lack of fuel. Their position could not be fixed accurately, but approximate places were obtained by both British and American forces. Searches for these pilots failed to find them and they are missing.

7. No. 4 Combined Strike was sent to attack shipping. They sunk one small shipping and brushed the harbour installations at WAKEHAMA. The Seafires escort of this Strike found two D.J.'s in the inlet to the North-west of GHADDAWA, near GHADDAWA farm and caused an explosion in one leaving it listing and on fire, and damaged the other. They also observed three N.F.'s in the inlet to the South-east of GHADDAWA which closed into the cliffs and was well camouflaged. This is the inlet where the D.J.'s attached by No.3 Rauro were found.

8. The next Rauro, No. 5, was the first of the D.J.'s attacked by the No.4 Combined Strike Seafires, on its side, funnel stanchion and the second beached, back apparently broken and quarterdeck smashed. They strafed small shipping and WAKEHAMA Airfield.

9. Firedly Escort to the other Combined Strike had considerable success in attacking ground targets and sinking small shipping. One Firedly with a petrol lead ditched at the front. The crew was rescued.

10th \"Nino.\"

10. Ohio. The Standard Flight Program was again used. The dam Reauro had as primary targets airfields inland, but owing to the distance of the Fleet from the coast the time required to reach the coast and return was two hours. As this was the total time allowed for the sortie, Raid No.4 had to be restricted to the secondary targets, a short stretch of coastline and WAKEHAMA Airfield. They found no shipping, and attacked hangars, the airfield being empty of aircraft.

11. No. 2 Combined Strike attacked shipping in the GHADDAWA area sinking small coasters with bombs. The Seafires strafed a D.J. and left it on fire.

12. No. 3 Rauro visited airfields in the KOHYAMA area and found a number of aircraft, mostly trainers.

13. The Firedly escort to No.3 Combined were not released to strafe until the retirement when they found a good train and severely damaged it.

14. No. 4 Combined also went to KOHYAMA Airfield and did some very good Avenger bombing amongst airfield buildings and dispersed aircraft. One Avenger was lost, probably due to fire. The Seafires escort to this strike had been changed to a Rauro and had been to PIANA and TARAMA airfields. These airfields had been previously reconnoitered by the dam Seafire Reauro in its coastal shipping sweep. Nothing was found, and only a few hangars and buildings were discovered not so the wooden dispersal areas were thoroughly strafed and set on fire.

15. The whole of No.2 Strike fighters were converted to anti shipping sweep. The Seafires set three huggers on fire and strafed two others. The Firedly sweeping the only reusable shipping in the GHADDAWA area being well attacked by other aircraft went ranging north up the coast, almost to TOTO SAKI, trying to find good targets. They left small coasters badly damaged.
OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST

Enclosure No. 12 to A.G.1's No. 3109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.

(23 PHOTOGRAPHS)
ONAGAWA WAM, Northern HONSHU. These photographs show the attack on the net layer at the entrance to the WAM. She was near-missed with bombs and then heavily strafed and left on fire. The large flame seen in the background is a hit on the patrol vessel seen on a previous photograph.
OWASHI, HONSHU. 25th July. A freighter of about 1,000 tons is seen on fire as a result of a direct hit.
MATSUSHIMA area, HONSHU. 9th August. After taking evasive action in cuttings this locomotive was finally hit and blew up.
POURIGEA A/F, SHOOGIL. 24th July. These Photographs show bombs bursting in the hangar and workshop areas and near dispersed aircraft. Extensive damage was done and at the end of the attacks the airfield was no longer a worthwhile target.
SHIDO WAN, SHIROMI, 21st July. "KORE" class CVE. This photograph was taken during the first attack, in which two direct hits were made and several near misses.
SHIDO WAN, SHIKOKU, 26th July. In this photograph, taken four days later, the carrier's flight deck appears to sag away and serious damage is evident forward.
HARIMA SHIPYARD, HONSHU. 28th July. This photograph shows the state of the yard at the end of the first strike. The target area is enveloped in smoke and a large freighter on the slips is likely to have been damaged.
SHIDO WAN, SHIKOKU, 28th July. In this photograph, taken four days later, the carrier's flight deck appears to sag away and serious damage is evident forward.
HARIMA SHIPYARD, HONSHU. 28th July. This photograph shows the state of the yard at the end of the first strike. The target area is enveloped in smoke and a large freighter on the slip is likely to have been damaged.
TAKAMATSU A/F, SHIKOKU, 24th July. Bomb burst in the barracks area.
SHANNOSHO SHIPYARD, INO SHIMA. 28th July. Bomb bursts are seen in the target area and debris is thrown out into the water. The ships alongside are 'HA' class LSTs.
28 July 45. 0630 (9) F46. 5". SAKOSHI BAY. HONSHU. REST.

FORM 15H 14. 28 July 45. 0715 (9) K20. 163 mm. HARI M SHIPYARD. REST.

SAKOSHI BAY, near HARI M; HONSHU. 23th July. These photographs show a
10,000 ton tanker, before, and during attack.
YAMADA WAN, Northern HONSHU, 9th August. The destroyer and patrol vessel lying offshore were attacked and set on fire. In the lower photograph the destroyer is seen resting on the bottom with her after deck awash.
MATSUSHIMA A/F, HONSHU. 9th August. The upper photograph shows smoke from burning aircraft following joint USN - RF attacks. In the lower photograph, hits in hangars are seen and smoke from 'Frag' clusters bursting among dispersed aircraft in the foreground.
OKINAWA HAN, Northern HIBARU. 10th August. These photographs show the destruction of four naval vessels. One destroyer capsized and the DE and patrol vessel are awash. The patrol vessel in the background was left well on fire.
Light Cruiser oiling from fleet carrier at sea.
Speed 15 knots. Swell moderate. Date 15 August.
SECRET.

office of Rear Admiral Commanding,
Fourth Cruiser Squadron.
26th August, 1945.

SECRET.

office of Rear Admiral Commanding,
Fourth Cruiser Squadron.
26th August, 1945.

Subject: Operations of Task Force 37.

The reports of H.M.S. "Norfolland" and H.M.S. "Gambia" only of the cruisers for the period of Task Force 37 operations from 26th July to 15th August are forwarded with my remarks. Copies of "Gambia"'s report will be forwarded to New Zealand Naval Board.

2. This period began with strikes against Southern HONSHU during which the action of Task Force 37 added their share to the heavy damage inflicted by Task Force 36 on airfields, industrial targets and shipping.

3. During the first week in August, while the Task Forces were moving North, replenishing and dodging bad weather, plans were made for a force of cruisers and destroyers from Task Force 37 to join U.S. Task Unit 54.8.1 which was to bombard AURORA in South HOKKAIDO or KANAIZH in Northern HOKKAIDO. On 8th August the Commander, 3rd Fleet, ordered the bombardment of KANAIZH for 9th August.

THE BOMBARDEMENT OF KANAIZH (25000-2).

Preliminary Movements.


5. I stationed my force close Southward of Task Unit 34.8.1 and was then directed by Rear Admiral Sharpless to close in "Norfolland" within half of "South Dakota". I told him that I hoped he would regard my force as part of his own for manoeuvring purposes and later made the following Cay signal to Task Unit 37.1.8.

"When deployed act as C.I. of 3.4.5.1. tactical signals even though only repeated to us. When stationed as now during approach or retirement I shall assume Task Unit 37.1.8 to conform to Task Unit 34.8.1."
Page 2 of Error Admiral Commanding, Fourth Cruiser Squadron's
Headquarters 0750/2, dated 23th August, 1943

Approach and Deployment

6. Paravanes were streamed by "Combin" only, "Newfoundland" having parted a 2/7 chain while streaming here. During the approach, which was made at 22 knots, I stationed Task Unit 27.1.8. ready for deployment which began at 1455 when the whole force was turned together to 1560, speed 13 knots, and formed single line ahead with the British cruisers leading. Land was sighted at this time, the visibility being moderate with haze ahead. After deployment the force turned to 0900 for the final run in.

7. The spotting aircraft were flown off promptly from U.S. Battleships and Cruisers when ordered except two which became unserviceable. Communications were quickly established between our cruisers and the spotter, furnished by "South Dakota" and "Indiana".

Bombardment

8. The force turned to the bombarding course, 1560, shortly before 1200 and the line of ships, 100 yards apart, was led by "Newfoundland" followed by "Combin" "South Dakota", "Massachusetts", "Indiana", "Anchor", "Chicago", "Boston" and "St Paul". The three British destroyers were ordered ahead, with the American destroyers disposed on the disengaged side and astern. The U.S. destroyers were sent to the entrance of MAIDEN Bay to engage shipping in the harbour and to intercept any small craft attempting to attack our force. A third destroyer was stationed ten miles to seaward and acted as fighter director ship for the G.A.A.R provided by Task Force 38, a 100 miles or more to seaward.

9. Fire was opened at 1253 and continued until 1447, two runs being made to the southward and two to the northward. Heavy smoke on shore resulting from the bombardment terminated observation, but in spite of this and in the face of moderate flak, the excellent work of the spotters, combined with good fire control in the cruisers, enabled the 329 rounds from "Newfoundland" and the 404 rounds from "Combin" to be fired in deliberate fire with good effect against warehouses, oil storage tanks, harbour installations, and shipping. There were no enemy reactions to the bombardment other than A/A fire. The mean range of our target was 12,000 yards and the bombarding course was close inshore often within 2 miles of the coast.

Retirement

10. At 1447 the force turned away from the land, increased speed and reformed the normal cruising disposition. Task Unit 37.1.8. took station close Southward of Task Unit 34.0.2. Turned into wind were then made and the spotting aircraft was recovered.

11. A JUDY approached the force from the Southward at 1600 and was driven off by gunfire. "Combin" reports that this aircraft was splashed.

12. Severe bogies were chased during this period and there was considerable air activity until about 1700. It is understood. . . . .
understood that a second enemy aircraft was destroyed on the further side of the U.S. force.

13. Task Unit 37.4.16 remained with Task Unit 36.8.2 during the retirement to the south lasting until 2200 then I parted company to rejoin Task Force 37 at dawn on August 10th.

14. The destroyers were well handled by the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Corpselchoro", Commander R.H. White, R.N. R.P. Permission was given during the later stages for the destroyers to engage targets of opportunity. This they did successfully and had good practice. The opportunities other than Japan were not obvious, nevertheless "Corpselchoro" claimed to have destroyed "the Governor's summer palace" (this was certainly a building on a hill), "furious" to have added to the fires in the town and "Jacqueline" claimed that she had blocked a coastal road ahead of a pedal cyclist, causing him to dive into a ditch.

P.S. 14.00 5TH AUGUST 1945.

15. At no time have cruisers found it difficult to join and work with an American formation and the same could be done with an Italian one, both having a similar training basis. The division into units at the beginning was more difficult for the reason that we had no opportunity to train together, nor did our own cruiser and destroyer training allow for this. However, for the first three or four months, our efficiency was very creditable.

16. cruisers were frequently called upon to act as linking ships with U.S. forces. With one or two cruisers there was no difficulty in this, provided that the ships were in good order and operators well trained. "Lansdowne" particularly distinguished herself in this respect and her R.M. efficiency was very creditable.

17. When the distance increased and several cruisers were involved the problem was more complicated, particularly if the U.S. Task Groups did not communicate. The volume of traffic can the American and was considerable and R.M. discipline and initiative among cruisers was important. It was important to ensure keeping you informed promptly without interfering with the flow of messages. The need for a special reporting procedure and for the key V.H.F. communication on separate channels, whose were improvised at the time.

*Signature*

(S.W.GREE)  
CIN.C.


178
On 26th July, 1945 and 27th July, 1945, U.S. Shin under:
up 200 and continued to operate with Task Force 57 which form-
part of the U.S. Third Fleet under Admiral Russell.

Air strikes against Northern areas were delivered on both
Days. The only enemy activity against the Fleet consisted of
oneотор, for the attack against one of the American groups
on 26th July or a "Vil" which was shot down and more in-efficient
attacking, in the course of which a "Enosh" was destroyed on 26th
July.

From 1st to 7th August the weather was bad and strike
from being launched, and in Fleet continued to remain in the
Argonaun area, returning to the strike on the 8th against an
enemy ship caused the strike to be cancelled.

At 0700 on the 8th, Admiral Russell, in the US.
Navy 1st CB, Task Force 57, General, arrived in the area of
Unit 371,8. The combined forces were insufficient for
launching to carry out a concentration of the harbour area and
considerable damage was a cost.

Russell went to Admiral C. N. L. J. E. on the 9th for
communication exercises with the battleship on 43.5, which
could be carried out by Admiral C. N. L. J. E. on the 9th and
ruled out. All operations were then started.

On 9th the aircraft from the battleship and P.T. boats
ran off between 1800 and 1900, and established the "Rear
Aircrew Concentration Area (RCCA) off the coast of the
harbour.

On 9th the first successful attack was by 500,000 tons
laid by the British in the area of

On 10th the first run against the area was by the
British unit, and on the 11th the first run was made.

During the second run, the fleet was hit with air attack
in the fall of 1945, during the "Enosh" and due to a
number of aircraft which were shot at the target and caused
serious injury.

Soon after the beginning of the second run, at 2000, the
enemy reported a large oil spill which was due to the
attack of mines and planes, and the planes were shot down, but
to the damage and extent not the damage to the damage and extent of the mines were seen in fall due to the
damage.

US 1945, NARROWBAND, 31.5.22, 31.5.22.
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<td>Snow field in center of marsh, mire.</td>
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Operations between July, 20th, and August 7th

On 20th July, 1944, Task Force 57 carried out strikes against Southern Honshu. In all, six A-bombs dropped by two ditched aircraft hit the Fleet at about 1700 and was shot down by a United States F-54G fighter before it came in sight.

On 30th July, 1944, Task Force 57 landed aircraft on Southern Honshu. At 1600 one aircraft reached the Fleet and was shot down by a British Fighter. At 1700 the Fleet was engaged in fuelling and cruising in a waiting position until weather conditions permitted a resumption of the offensive.

On 6th August the Fleet was cruising in the operating area to the north-eastward of Chichi Jima Island. Low visibility prevented flying operations.

Detached as part of Bodenwerk Force.

On 9th August, 1945, at 0520 "Thermopolis", "Calcutta", "Targis", "Tangier", "Terceira", were detached to Task Force 57.1.6 and proceeded to join T.P. 30.1.8 which was formed up to the northward of T.P. 30. At 0555 T.P. 30.1.8 was in station about three miles south of T.P. 30.1.1 and the whole Force proceeded to close "Calcutta" to carry out a daylight bombardment of the port.

The approach.

At 1100 the bombardment Force formed up on a line of bearing 160° at 3 cables internals and approached the bombardment position on a course of 260°. Land was first sighted at 1200 at a range of about 10 miles, visibility poor and headlands difficult to identify through the haze.

Spotters were detached from the ships of the United States Task Force between 3000 and 2000, and satisfactory co-ordination was established with U.S.N. "Indian's" relief spotter who had been allocated to "Calcutta". Communications remained very good throughout the operation, and the spotter carried out his duties with great skill. His co-operation and ready advice were excellent.

Fire Opened on Dock. At 1245 the Force was turned together on to the firing course, and at 1249 "Calcutta" opened fire on her primary target, Dock and an Industrial area. (N.B. reference 9551 1,1,1,6a) Seventy-two rounds were fired at this target during the initial run south. The spotting aircraft was being fired on and was unable to observe for over a minute, but when fire was opened at 1307, whilst course was being reversed, he reported large fires burning in the area making observation very difficult.

Target Shifted to Anti-Aircraft Battery.

During the turn the spotter was asked whether there was any shipping that could be fired at before replying however he called for fire on an active A.A. battery at 9500 Y. Then steaming on the northerly course at 1314, "Calcutta" engaged this new target, but after only four salvoes had been fired this target became obscured by smoke which made aircraft observation impossible.
At 0635, 14 November 1943, a formation of 16 small single-engine planes approached the Task Force. These planes were approximately 40 miles southeast of the Task Force, and the formation was taking an approach course. At 0640, the planes began firing at the Task Force, and the formation continued its approach. The planes were flying at an altitude of approximately 6,000 feet, and the Task Force was located approximately 10 miles away.

At 0642, the planes began dropping bombs on the Task Force, and the Task Forcewas engaged in a gun battle with the planes. The planes were flying at a speed of approximately 200 miles per hour, and the Task Force was firing back at the planes with its anti-aircraft guns. The planes were flying in a formation of four, and the Task Force was firing at each plane in the formation.

At 0645, the planes began dropping bombs on the Task Force again, and the Task Force was engaged in a gun battle with the planes. The planes were flying at a speed of approximately 200 miles per hour, and the Task Force was firing back at the planes with its anti-aircraft guns. The planes were flying in a formation of four, and the Task Force was firing at each plane in the formation.

At 0648, the planes began dropping bombs on the Task Force again, and the Task Force was engaged in a gun battle with the planes. The planes were flying at a speed of approximately 200 miles per hour, and the Task Force was firing back at the planes with its anti-aircraft guns. The planes were flying in a formation of four, and the Task Force was firing at each plane in the formation.

At 0651, the planes began dropping bombs on the Task Force again, and the Task Force was engaged in a gun battle with the planes. The planes were flying at a speed of approximately 200 miles per hour, and the Task Force was firing back at the planes with its anti-aircraft guns. The planes were flying in a formation of four, and the Task Force was firing at each plane in the formation.

At 0654, the planes began dropping bombs on the Task Force again, and the Task Force was engaged in a gun battle with the planes. The planes were flying at a speed of approximately 200 miles per hour, and the Task Force was firing back at the planes with its anti-aircraft guns. The planes were flying in a formation of four, and the Task Force was firing at each plane in the formation.

At 0657, the planes began dropping bombs on the Task Force again, and the Task Force was engaged in a gun battle with the planes. The planes were flying at a speed of approximately 200 miles per hour, and the Task Force was firing back at the planes with its anti-aircraft guns. The planes were flying in a formation of four, and the Task Force was firing at each plane in the formation.

At 0700, the planes began dropping bombs on the Task Force again, and the Task Force was engaged in a gun battle with the planes. The planes were flying at a speed of approximately 200 miles per hour, and the Task Force was firing back at the planes with its anti-aircraft guns. The planes were flying in a formation of four, and the Task Force was firing at each plane in the formation.
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The area described is the same as that described in this report.

The areas described in this report may be in error.

The plan shown on the map shown is that shown in this report.

This plan was indicated by the aircraft for areas shown on map as red. The areas shown in red follow a thin target area.
Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following brief report of proceedings of the destroyers for those periods of the July and August operations during which I was Senior Officer Destroyers, namely between 5th and 26th July and from 31st July until the end of the operations.

2. Destroyers were employed throughout these operations on screening, air-sea rescue and picket duties. The only offensive operations in which they were employed were the three bombardments carried out by H.M.S. KING GEORGE V and the Cruisers on 17th and 29th July and 5th August. H.M. Ships TAURUS, TIGER, TERRIBLE, TERROR, TAFFY, TYPHOON, TIRANNIA and TRINITY took part in these bombardments, though not all ships had an opportunity of opening fire.

3. An average number of about eighteen destroyers were in company with the Task Group until the forces split up after the Japanese surrender. Thereafter H.M. Ships TERRIBLE, TIGER, TERRIBLE, TERROR, RENOWN, TAFFY, DODO, NAPOLEON and H.M. Ships TIRANNIA and TRINITY remained in the forward area and the remainder went South. These remaining destroyers, with the exception of H.M. Ships TERRIBLE and TRINITY, were employed in the combined British/U.S. Task Group 353, in Task Unit 35.30 and on Mid Dog stations during the subsequent SHOAL operations and were detached singly from this Task Group to enter TURBO BAY between 1st and 5th September.

4. The three H.M. Class destroyers completed an average of about 87 days continuous steaming and travelled a combined distance of over 100,000 miles during this period. A report on the efficiency of the ships, equipment, machinery and remarks as to habitability etc are being forwarded separately.

5. Recommendations for Honours and Awards also form the subject of a separate submission.

I have the honour to be,

Your obedient servant,

[Signature]

The Vice-Admiral,
British Pacific Fleet.

Copy to:

The C-in-C (Destroyers),
British Pacific Fleet.
ITEM

153270

CTF 37 (BRITISH)

REPORT OF AIR & SURFACE STRIKES AGAINST THE JAPANESE EMPIRE, PREPARATION FOR AND INITIAL OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA, HONSHU, JAPAN, 6/28/45 TO 9/2/45