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I T E M

153270

CTF 37 (BRITISH)

REPORT OF AIR & SURFACE STRIKES AGAINST THE
JAPANESE EMPIRE, PREPARATION FOR AND INITIAL
OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA, HONSHU, JAPAN,
6/28/45 TO 9/2/45

24574
SECRET

Office of the Vice Admiral
Second in Command
British Pacific Fleet
1st October 1945

VABFF No. 1092/14

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for your information reports from ships and authorities of the British Pacific Fleet who took part in the naval operations against Japan from 17th July until 2nd September, when the terms of surrender were formally signed.

A narrative of events, together with technical reports on gunnery, communications, supplies and fighter direction, are attached as appendices 1-5 to this letter.

2. As the overall picture of these final and unique operations of the 3rd Fleet shows, an overwhelming force of surface ships and naval air was brought to bear on a dwindling Japanese Navy and Marine. That the British Pacific Fleet should have been a reasonable substantial reinforcement is a source of gratification to us all, and the invaluable experience of participating in Naval air operations on this grand scale will be of lasting benefit to the British Navy.

3. It was noted that the objectives of the 3rd Fleet were modified during the course of the operations, and that the remnants of the Japanese Navy and Japanese shipping were made the primary target rather than the remaining Japanese air strength. In the event, the plain fact stands out that, during these days, the Japanese Fleet was to all intents and purposes annihilated.

It is difficult to see how, when the controls are lifted, it will be easy for Japanese militarists to whip up public enthusiasm for further military adventures or expenditure for many years.

In so far as their Fleet is concerned, these weeks should prove a considerable stumbling block to its recrudescence, while the esteem in which the Japanese public held their Navy at the beginning of the war is, I judge, nearly destroyed. That esteem was built up in the face of a not very willing rival, the Japanese Army; its story at the beginning of the century, before the hideous hand of the Army caste was on them, was not ungallant; it was still then inclined to copy the West in holding to a chivalrous attitude in sea warfare and it had gone some way to building a tradition to hand on to future generations, and this in a nation that had no naval tradition nor any word better than "sea soldier" to call its seamen. It will take more than words to re-instate in Japanese eyes, a Navy whose ending was so supine and so complete. That is of some importance.

4. It was in itself inspiring to take part in a major operation where the plans were so flexible, and therefore adaptable, and where all forms of attack, whether air strike, bombardment, surface sweep, radio deception, submarine operation or mining, all played their part at the right moment.

5. It was, however, a matter of ever present anxiety to me that the number and speed of tankers available to the British Pacific Fleet did not allow enough to be kept permanently close to the scene of operations, and it was only by using every contrivance, coupled with a fair measure of good fortune, that we were, in fact, able to follow the changes of plan and the postponements due to weather, and still take part in every operation. In this I must give great credit to the Rear Admiral Fleet Train who did everything possible to follow or anticipate the changes of plan and so worked his limited resources to the best advantage.

6.

153270

The Commander,
United States Third Fleet

6. I am in no doubt as to the great value of the bombardments carried out, for whatever the results of scientific comparison of damage by gun and bomb, the moral effect of sustained naval bombardment on an enemy, who must feel there is no knowing where the next one will come, is beyond question. But whether assessments by area or "roof damage" gives a good picture of the actual effect is open to doubt. For example, if H.M.S. KING GEORGE V was hit by four sixteen inch shells which penetrated the upper deck, the "roof damage" would be about one three thousandth part of the area, but if each shell penetrated a boiler room the ship would be of no further immediate use.

7. The system of exercising tactical command of the British Task Force was similar to that used during the ICHERU operations, that is to say the Vice Admiral Commanding the aircraft carrier squadron assumed tactical command when aircraft from British carriers were in the air. The carriers under the command of Vice Admiral Vian did yeoman service, their efforts being on a scale never previously attempted in the British Navy. The results seem amply to have justified the effort and even when TF 37 was reduced to a "Token force" in the closing stages of the operation, the remaining carrier appears to have made her presence felt right up to the last day.

8. As in the ICHERU operations, the organisation of the American lifeguard submarines and aircraft was everything that could be desired and the results obtained were of the highest order. Their value is not however to be measured solely by what they did, but by the great confidence they inspired in the aircrews. In both these things I am very grateful.

I would like to record once more my appreciation of the continued good work of the U.S. communication teams and in particular that of Lieutenant Commander R.F. Morris, U.S.N.R., who, throughout all our operations, led the U.S. team in my flagship. The assistance given to me by Captain E.C. Owen, U.S.N., who had been Senior Liaison Officer to the British Pacific Fleet since the start of operation ICHERU, was of outstanding value, and I am, as then, very grateful to him.

9. The entry into TOKYO harbour was a fitting climax to operations which had taken the Allied Fleets thousands of miles from their bases to strike at the heart of Japan, and perhaps we all felt that we had at least contributed something towards her final defeat.

10. It is to be supposed that demobilisation in both our countries will now proceed at an ever increasing rate and thus but few of those who have just been Fleetmates one with the other under their single Commander, can hope to find themselves in that position again.

But I cannot close this letter without saying something on that which I know to be foremost in our minds - the hope that even if those who man our future Fleets are strangers or meet but rarely, the two Navies will hold always those feelings towards each other which have been so manifest in these deciding weeks.

11. To me it has been a wonderful experience to see the growth of understanding, of respect and of sympathy, together with a frankness and openness running throughout which was in no way confined to any single level in rank or rating. I cannot believe

that this will

that this will end as the last ships part company, but rather that something has been forged here between our two Fleets which neither politics, nor economics, nor shortsightedness, can break. To believe otherwise would suggest that these days have been in vain, and to that conception I am not prepared to subscribe.

So, looking back on all that has happened, I begin to see that what which matters is not the size of the British contribution, or what we were able to do, but that it is our being a part of that for which overshadows everything else.

And since I hold that our Navies represent all that is best in our Nations, it seems but natural to me to believe that the Fleets under your command have left their mark in no uncertain way on a not very certain world. And this too I believe to be only the beginning.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd) H. B. Lawrence.

VICE ADMIRAL

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- 2. A.C.1's No 0109/16/923 of 23rd August 1945-p.121
- 3. C.S.4's No 403 0798/3 of 26th August 1945-p.176
- 4. Captain D.24 No C.172/7 of 7th September 1945-p.184

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OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

Page 1.

(Appendix No. 1 to VARP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

NARRATIVE

Fleet leaves
SYDNEY

On 28th June the British Pacific Fleet sailed from SYDNEY on its road northwards to a position 39° 10' North 148° 30' East to rendezvous there with the American Third Fleet before commencing Allied operations against JAPAN.

Arrival at
HONOLULU

On arrival at HONOLULU on 4th July, the following signal was sent to the Commander Third Fleet reporting the British Pacific Fleet, now T.F. 37, ready for duty.

T.F. 37
reports itself
ready for duty
with 3rd Fleet

Com 3rd Fleet (R) CincPac (Both)
Cominch, C. in C. B.P.F. from CTF 37

I hereby report TF 37 for duty with 3rd Fleet.
We are much looking forward to this our first operation
under your orders.

DIG 040023Z July

The following reply was received from Commander Third Fleet:-

CTF 37 (R) CincPac Adv. CTF 38 from Com 3rd Fleet

Your 040023Z acknowledged with pleasure. Please
be prepared to board MISSOURI by British destroyer at
first rendezvous for operations conferences. CTF 38
will attend and I suggest you bring officers qualified
to discuss detailed air plans.

062107Z July

On passage

On 6th July, after fuelling was complete, T.F. 37
sailed from HONOLULU for British SWPA (34° 10' North, 155°
30' East). Intensive exercises were carried out on passage
to the British fuelling area which was reached on 13th
July. Fuelling there continued until the 15th when the
Fleet proceeded to the rendezvous, sighting T.F. 38 early
on 16th July. Its three Task Groups were then oiling, the
whole forming a striking and unforgettable picture.

Conference
with Admiral
HALSEY

In response to his welcome invitation, Vice Admiral
RADMIRAL, Vice Admiral VERN, and their respective staff
officers, boarded Admiral HALSEY's Flagship, the U.S.S.
MISSOURI, during the forenoon for a conference with his staff
before sailing for operations on the next day. The principal
points which were settled forthwith were the desire of the
British Task Force to work in close tactical co-operation
with T.F. 38, conforming to their movements, and that we
should take part in Battleship and Cruiser bombardments as
well as in surface sweeps.

Approach to
flying off
position

At 1600 T.F. 38 and T.F. 37 disengaged proceeding
towards the flying off position at 15½ knots, course 250°
and the two Allied Fleets were at last in close company
under the same Flag Officer Commanding. It may well be
that 4 p.m. on the 16th of July, 1945 will prove a not
unimportant milestone on the long road of the world's
history.

Formation

The Fleet was formed in four groups in the order from
North to South T.F. 37, TG 38.1, TG 38.4, TG 38.3, and
British picket destroyers were detached for the first time.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VAEFF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Allied object The object of the Allied forces was to attack Japanese Naval and air forces, shipping, shipyards, coastal and other objectives as and when assigned.

British forces participating The following British ships took part in the initial operations, HMS GEORGE V (Flag of VAEFF) FORMIDABLE (Flag of AC1) VICTORIOUS, PELLICABLE, HE FOUNDLAND (Flag of CS4) BLACK PRINCE, LUCYUS, ACHILLES, UGANDA, GADOLA, GREENVILLE (Captain D4) URBINE, UMANIA, URBINE, ULYSSES, UNDAUNTED, MULBERRY, MICKLETON, GULLITY, QUADRANT, TROUBRIDGE, (Captain D24) TENDRIOUS, TENDRAGHT, TENDRICHORE, TENDR with IDENTIFIABLE, CAREFUL, BRUNGER and BANGLER (Flag of RAD) to join later.

July 17th

Targets The targets for the first two days' strikes were airfields, installations and shipping in the area North of TOKYO. At 0210 Tomcats and Watchdogs (Fighter Direction Picket Destroyer Groups) were ordered by CTF 38 to proceed to their pre-arranged positions.

CAP and Ramrod flown off. At 0350, in position 37° 10' North 143° 19' East CAP and the first three Ramrod strikes were flown off. At 0620 the fourth Ramrod strike was flown off.

Ditched pilots recovered. At 0700 one of FORMIDABLE's pilots baled out and was picked up by the U.S. Destroyer JOHN RODGERS. Two other pilots baled out shortly afterwards and were picked up by destroyers from the screen. At 0850 Corsair strikes 5 and 6 flew off.

Press material At 1130 an Avenger from VICTORIOUS passed press material to HMS GEORGE V by message drop.

Noon position 36° 40' North, 143° 10' East.

Strikes cancelled All targets assigned to T.F. 38 had been obscured and the only two strikes flown off had been unable to find their targets. T.F. 37 aircraft found the weather over their targets slightly better although some were weathered out. As the day progressed the weather deteriorated and CTF 38 cancelled the remaining strikes.

Score for the day's strikes

Enemy losses

Destroyed

9 aircraft on the ground
1 Hangar
3 Locomotives
1 Junk sunk

Damaged

9 aircraft on the ground
Hangars and barracks at NIIGATA MASUDA SENDAI, MITSUBISHI
Sundry small craft

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(Appendix No. 1 to VANT No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Own losses

3 Corsairs in combat to flak, but pilots were saved.

KING GEORGE V
and screen
joins U.S.
bombarding
force.

At 1430 KING GEORGE V, screened by the destroyers QUALITY and GUERON as T.U. 37.1.6 detached from the main body and joined the U.S. bombarding group under Rear Admiral Oscar Badger U.S.N. and consisting of the battleships IOWA, MISSOURI, WISCONSIN, NORTH CAROLINA and ALABAMA, together with the cruisers ATALANTA, DAYTON and 6 destroyers. On joining the above force (T.U. 34.8.2) course and speed were adjusted so as to arrive in the bombarding position at 2300.

The target.

The targets were in the coastal industrial district of HITACHI (36° 43' North, 140° 43' East) and consisted of a copper refinery, three engineering works, arms factory and an unidentified target, (a factory), the latter being allocated to KING GEORGE V.

Poor visibility
makes spotting
difficult.

The weather in the target area was bad, low cloud, heavy rain and visibility 3 to 5 miles, so that the bombardment had to be carried out without the aid of spotting aircraft. Navigation was by radar, Loran and soundings.

The
bombardment

Fire was opened at 2315 by KING GEORGE V at a mean range of 14 miles, firing being continued until 0010 when 270 rounds had been fired. A similar amount was fired by each of the five U.S. battleships, while the U.S. cruisers engaged other coastal targets.

Withdrawal

No enemy opposition was encountered although hostile aircraft were detected in the vicinity; at 0015 the bombarding force retired unmolested at high speed to the Eastward.

The following signal addressed to the bombarding force was received from the Commander 3rd Fleet.

Well done, which I pass on with the hope that the results are what your performance deserves.

July 18th

Bombarding
force
rejoins

At 0400 OTU 34.8.2 turned the force to the Southward to rejoin carrier groups. At 0715 radar contact was made with TG 37.1 and KING GEORGE V was released from the bombarding group to rejoin her Task Force.

Bad weather
prevents
flying

On rejoining, the weather conditions were found to be unsuitable for flying and OTF 38 turned the whole force to the Southward to search for better weather.

Weather
improves and
strikes fly
off

By 0930 the weather had improved a little, a CAP was flown off, and at 1130 OTF 38 ordered strikes to commence flying off.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VAMP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Decision to
retire to a
different
fuelling
position

Before flying commenced Com 3rd Fleet intimated that owing to a typhoon threat in our next intended fuelling position, he would retire during the night to a new position 31° 10' North 152° East for the fuelling on the 20th. As this meant leaving the operating area earlier than anticipated, the Commander 3rd Fleet stressed the importance of the air strikes doing as much damage as possible in the limited time available.

At 1135 the first Barrad took off.

Noon position

35° 15' North, 142° 36' East

British
oiling force
diverted

At 1217 a signal was made to the British oiling force to move forthwith to meet the Fleet in position 31° 40' North, 152° East at 0300 on 20th July, this position being 30 miles North of the new U.S. oiling position.

1230 - Second Barrad strike flown off.

1410 - Third Barrad strike flown off.

Bad weather
again

By 1530 the weather had again deteriorated and further strikes were cancelled.

Difficulty
experienced
in keeping
in touch
with TG 38.1

Throughout the afternoon difficulty was experienced in keeping in touch with TG 38.1 as the Fleet had to be constantly manoeuvred in an effort to find clear conditions in which to fly on the returning strikes, some of which were low in petrol. The last strike was landed on at 1700.

At 1720 a bogey was reported high over Watchdog and U.S. fighters were sent out to intercept, but contact was not made with the aircraft owing to poor weather conditions.

CAP flown
off

At 1755 a CAP of 4 Corsairs was flown off and were landed on again an hour later.

Score for the
day

Enemy losses

Destroyed or probably destroyed

12 aircraft on the ground.

Damaged

18 aircraft.

Many junks, railway vans and hangars.

Own losses in Combat

2 aircraft, both pilots missing.

July 19th

CAP flown off

At 0415 a CAP was flown off but the weather deteriorating it was landed on again at 0528.

(Appendix No. 1 to VJTF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Detached from
TF 36.

As the time schedule for fuelling seemed likely to prove short, I asked permission from CTF 36 for TG 37 to proceed independently to the fuelling area: this request being approved, course was set 125° speed 20 knots.

Moan position

34° 16' North, 147° 58' East.

Time in
replenishment
area
extended

Owing to the fact that the fuelling rendezvous had meanwhile been shifted nearer to the next flying off position, the Commander 3rd Fleet intimated that the replenishment period would be extended 24 hours, i.e., until 1200 on 22nd. July. This extension allowed the American ships to re-armament and was very acceptable to the British units, as it gave them time to get fully topped up with fuel from their slower pumping tankers.

Fuelling
plan

As it was necessary for all tankers to refill at BERTON (1700 miles away) it had to be accepted from the outset that, with the small number available, and some of those of slow speed, it was only possible for the Rear Admiral Commanding Fleet Train to guarantee a total of 3 for each occasion of fuelling. To do this it would sometimes be necessary to forgo consolidation and to send back non-empty tankers to ensure the turn-round.

It was estimated that the average pumping capacity would allow TF 37 to be refuelled in 2 days of 14 hours daylight from 3 tankers.

When Commander 3rd Fleet's full "Op. Plan" was received during the passage North it was realised that on two occasions a one-day fuelling, accompanied by long passages, was intended. LAVE KING, refitting at SYDNEY, was therefore called forward, and the timely arrival of OLMU with her far higher pumping capacity and LAVE GOVERNOR helped to relieve the position.

But the credit for the British Force never missing a day's operations must in the main go to the typhoons which, requiring alterations to Commander 3rd Fleet's Plan, so gave us invaluable time.

July 20th

U.S. oiling
force
contacted

At 0220 the Commander Logistic Support Group was heard on the R/T but, as no contact was made by 0300, course was altered to the Southward and a large group of vessels was sighted at 0330. These vessels turned out to be a U.S. oiling group so course was again altered to 090°.

Air search
for oiling
group

At 0430 an Avenger was flown off to search for the British oiling group but shortly after it had flown off echoes were detected to the West of the American Task Group: this proved to be the British oiling group.

Composition
of
replenishing
force

The Force consisted of the oilers SAN ANTONIO, LAVE MONARCH, SAN ADOLPHO, the fresh provision ship GLENNARTNEY. Also RULER, AMSTER, STANGER (CVE's) MAPLE, HIZAM (DDs) MENDANT, PINDOWN, HENDEL, REDPOLE and GALLER (DEs)

REINFORCEMENT
join

REINFORCEMENT (CV) with BRUNGER and MACEFUL (DDs) from SYDNEY and MARPLEUR (DD) from HAUUS were also in company and were instructed to join TG 37.1.

REPAL (DD) had previously been despatched to order the hospital ship TITJALEXKA to a rendezvous on the 21st.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VASHT No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Oiling and
D.S.L.

Oiling commenced at 0545 and ALCEPUL, MANGLER and UNDAUNTED began their D.S.L. routine round the Fleet.

Inter group
mail service

An inter group mail service between ships of British and American groups was ordered by CTC 38, NEZAM being detached to collect correspondence from the American groups, whilst the U.S. destroyer SCOTT collected from the British Force.

Aircraft replenishment for the carriers was carried out by ARBITER.

Noon position

31° 20' North, 150° 31' East.

Shortage of
oil in
British
tankers.

Owing to the fact that the British oilers were about 2,500 tons short of the amount required to fill ships of the British Fleet completely, and as I felt a deficit might prove very awkward later, I asked the Commander 3rd Fleet if he could fuel three British cruisers. This request was immediately granted and UGANDA, GARCIA and ACHILLES were detailed to proceed to fuel from TG 30.8, the U.S. Logistic Group.

RAZEL
breaks down

The rescue tug RAZEL reported that her steering gear had broken down and KING GEORGE V took her in tow whilst her gear was repaired on board the Flagship. At 1820 the tow parted and RAZEL was instructed to continue the tow for the night.

Fuelling
discontinued

At last light fuelling was discontinued and the Fleet disengaged, remaining in touch with the oiling force throughout the night.

July 21st

Oiling resumed

At 0430 oiling was resumed, UGANDA acting as TIS link with TG 38.1.

D.S.L.

UNDAUNTED, ULYSSES, QUALITY and ISIDORE continued the D.S.L. routine transferring stores, correspondence, mails, press correspondents etc. to ships of the Fleet.

RAZEL

Repaired parts were fitted in RAZEL during the day.

Conference
on board
KING GEORGE V

Admiral HILBY with his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral GIBBY, and other U.S. Staff Officers arrived on board KING GEORGE V at 1130 for a conference which included A.C.I. and A.S.D. This visit gave officers and men of my Flagship a welcome opportunity of seeing their Commander-in-Chief.

Noon position

30° 28' North, 146° 50' East

ARBITER sails
for MANUS

ARBITER, having completed her aircraft replenishment duties, was sailed for MANUS escorted by NEZAM. The future programme of the Fleet was now sufficiently clear to show that the pumping capacity of the tankers could not always fuel the British Pacific Fleet in the time available even without hose troubles etc. It was evident that by some means or other the capacity must be augmented and I therefore instructed the Rear Admiral Commanding, Fleet Train to sail ARBITER as soon as possible after her arrival with all available aircraft replenishments and, at the same time, fit her with buoyant hose astern so that she could be used as an auxiliary "oiler." GIBBY was informed she would also be required for similar duty.

(Appendix No. 1 to VAFM No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Disengaged from oilers

At 1900 the three oilers escorted by FIDHOM and GALIER disengaged and proceeded to ENIETOK to refuel.

July 22nd

Replenishment

In order to maintain the destroyers who had the least fuel capacity in a topped up condition, KING GEORGE V fuelled TRAZER, TERPSICHORE and TROUBRIDGE.

GHENTHLY supplied fresh provisions to QUALITY, BEEFLEUR, GAMBIA and KING GEORGE V.

Conference on board KING GEORGE V

At 1045, the Rear Admiral Commanding Destroyers and the Rear Admiral Commanding Fourth Cruiser Squadron ^{and staffs} came on board KING GEORGE V for a conference with the Vice Admiral, Second-in-Command, British Pacific Fleet.

Noon position

29° 43' North, 143° 33' East.

During the afternoon and evening the Fleet was manoeuvred to maintain station with TF 38 groups and at 2000 picket destroyers were sent to their night positions.

GAZEL sailed

H.M. Tug GAZEL with escort HINDEEL was sailed for ENIETOK; I was in no way willing to have this stout hearted piggy in the middle of the Pacific during the typhoon season.

July 23rd

Destroyers topped up

During the early hours of the morning the American groups continued topping up with fuel and opportunity was taken to top up TENACIOUS, QUADRANT and ULYSSES from KING GEORGE V, DEPLACABLE and FORMIDABLE respectively.

Fuelling was continued throughout the forenoon with HEMPHREY and GAMBIA acting as additional "oilers" and topping up TERPSICHORE, TERPSICHORE, GREENVILLE, UNDAUNTED, WAGFUL, TRANGIER and URANIA.

Noon position

29° 07' North, 135° 37' East

Fleet proceeds

During the afternoon and throughout the night the Fleet proceeded towards the next day's flying off position, manoeuvring as necessary to conform with the movements of TF 38.

July 24th

Pickets rejoin

At 0420 the night picket destroyers rejoined.

Ramrod strike

At 0445, in position 31° 51' North, 135° 11' East, the first strike took off to attack airfields in the northeast of SHIKOKU.

Second strike launched

At 0545 strike No. 2 was launched against the airfields of TOKUSHIMA. This was the first combined strike of the day.

(Appendix No. 1 to VAST No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)Strike No. 3
Flown off

The second combined strike, Strike No. 3, was flown off at 0845 and was aimed at the shipping including a CVE in SHIMO AN (North SHIKOKU).

4th Strike

Strike No. 4, a combined strike again, flew off at 1145 and struck at TSUMATSU airfields.

Noon position

31° 44' North, 135° 16' East.

Last strike

The fifth and last strike of the day was flown off at 1445, briefed to attack the CVE which had already been hit in the previous strike, as well as other shipping targets in the UNO area. In addition to the above combined strikes, individual strikes were flown against airfields and shipping targets in the area, 416 sorties being flown throughout the day, an "all time high" for Royal Naval aviation.

All strikes
landed on

All strikes had landed on by 1745.

At 1900 destroyer pickets moved out to their positions and the dusk CAP was landed on at 1945.

Fleet remains
in operating
area

The Fleet did not disengage from the operating area for the night, point of departure and speed being 060° 6 knots towards the flying off position for the next day. TF 37 was manoeuvred throughout the night so as to conform with the movements of the U.S. groups who were maintaining a CAP of night fighters.

Score for the
dayEnemy lossesDestroyed

15 aircraft on ground
3 hangars
1 Freighter transport, a small tanker, and a number of luggers and junks sunk.

Probably destroyed

2 aircraft on the ground.

Damaged

31 plus aircraft on the ground.
1 KOME class escort carrier hit by many bombs and her back believed to be broken.
Aircraft factory and a shipyard.
Train ferry, destroyers, many junks and barges shot up.

Own losses in combat

4 aircraft

July 25th1st strike off

The targets for the strikes were similar to those of the previous day and the first strike was flown off at 0430 in position 32° 15' North, 136° 16' East.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VAMP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

RELATIVE (Contd)

2nd. strike At 0530 a combined strike against shipping, barracks and installations at JITA and TANUMA was flown off, but this proved abortive because of bad weather.

Fleet snooped The first snooper of the day was shot down by American aircraft controlled by the Tomcat patrol.

3rd. strike The primary target of the third strike, which was flown off at 0630 was shipping in UNO with a secondary target of the MITSUBISHI MISHIMA aircraft plant.

4th. strike The fourth strike against TOMUSHIMA took off at 1130.

Further strikes cancelled Owing to the weather over the targets deteriorating, the rest of the day's strikes were cancelled and the strike landed on at 1400.

Noon position 32° 19' North, 136° 30' East.

False alarms At 1445 the force was alerted because of bogies; on investigation these turned out to be a Fortress and a Mariner.

Fleet withdraws The Fleet withdrew during the afternoon towards the fuelling area.

"Dorsey" detected An unidentified aircraft was detected at 1735 and the Fleet was again alerted. It closed the Fleet at great height and evaded the initial fighters which were vectored out. It was ultimately shot down at 1815 by fighters of TG 36.1, crashing into the sea in flames inside the screen. Two Japanese bodies were picked up by THUNDERBOLTS. About the same time a number of balloons and parachutes were reported over the Fleet and there was some evidence of window.

Parachute and balloons shot down At 1900, just before landing on, a fighter shot down a parachute with a black box attached and some balloons. It is thought that the black box may have been a J/T beacon dropped by the snooper.

More bogies detected Between 1842 and 1855 three groups of bogies were detected closing from the North East (East of TOKYO) at 20,000 feet above and steering directly for the Task Force. Day fighters were being landed on and TF 37 had only 4 dusk Hellcats in the air. Night fighters took off from the American night carrier.

Three bogies shot down The first group closed straight in and was intercepted at 20,000 feet 30 miles, by the four British dusk Hellcats. They reported 4 aircraft carrying torpedoes, three of which were shot down but the fourth made off believed damaged.

2nd group closes. Dorsey splashed The second and larger group worked round to the North and appeared to wait in the neighbourhood of the Tomcat picket. One was shot down by American night fighters and the rest of the formation broke up after being engaged by gunfire from the picket destroyers. The 3rd group had turned away at 65 miles and no further attack developed.

Screen clear The screen was clear by 2000.

Pickets and T/S link established At 2008 three picket destroyers were sent out, EURNIAS acting as link with TG 36.1. The force manoeuvred to conform with the movements of

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(Appendix No. 1 to VASPF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

TF 38 throughout the night, course being set for the fuelling area, speed 24 knots.

It had been intended to send on some cruisers and destroyers ahead of the main body so that they could start fuelling at daylight, but this was cancelled owing to the need for mutual support in the bright moonlight conditions prevailing and, as the Fleet had been sighted, the possibility of further attacks developing.

The score

Enemy losses

Destroyed

2 aircraft on the ground.
Several small cargo vessels, and many junks, luggers and small craft sunk.
Buildings, hangars, factories, a wireless station and a lighthouse destroyed or damaged.

Probably destroyed

One large and three medium freighter transports, and thirteen coasters including one small oiler and two corvettes.

Damaged

6 Aircraft
Sundry shipping and buildings.

Own losses in combat

Nil.

July 26th

Composition
of oiling
force

0555 - Aircraft reported the oiling force bearing 150° 52 miles. The force consisted of the oilers CEDARDALE, CARELIA, WAVE EMPEROR, EAGLESDALE, V.S.I.S. GLENNHARTNEY, Ammunition ship ROBERT MAERSK, OVEs SPEAKER, TULER, STRIKER, Escorts PHEASANT, CRANE, HAPIER, NORMAN, NEPAL, PARRETT, MYALLA, PIRIE, LAUNCESTON, PLYM and REDFOLE. CL ARGONAUT, as relief for UGANDA, and with CS2 on board was also met.

Fuelling
begins

At 0900 oilers were formed up on the oiling course and fuelling commenced from a force which had been assembled as follows:- CARELIA, hurriedly converted at SYDNEY for abeam oiling only and now making her first appearance as a Fleet attendant oiler; EAGLESDALE, repaired at 48 hours at MANUS after arriving from COLOMBO via the TORRES STRAIT with speed down to 7½ knots owing to a foul bottom and engine defects; WAVE EMPEROR, who had been ordered to proceed at best speed to refuel at ENIATOK after her first fuelling on the passage North, and was now back to make a fourth oiler with CEDARDALE, who was the one experienced tanker of the party. EAGLESDALE proved able to fuel from one side only, and with a single hose astern, but past experience bore out the wisdom of not looking gift horses in the mouth.

Conference
in MISSOURI

0930 - NEPAL closed KING GEORGE V to take the Vice Admiral and staff officers to MISSOURI for an operational conference with the Commander 3rd Fleet. The past and forthcoming operations were discussed.

(Appendix No. 1 to VMSB No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

RECAPITULATIVE (Contd)

D.S.B.

The usual D.S.B. routine plied round the Fleet, distributing and collecting mail and correspondence and ferrying replacement pilots to the aircraft carriers.

Noon position

28° 35' North 139° 03' East

Ammunitioning at sea

On completion of fuelling, KING GEORGE V closed the ammunition ship ROBERT MARSH. As this was the first time that KING GEORGE V had attempted the transfer of 14" shells at sea it was decided to test the gear, at present untried, by passing over the empty cordite cases held on board. The gear proved satisfactory and one 14" shell was transferred successfully.

1500 - The Vice Admiral and staff officers returned from MISSOURI.

Fuelling continues

Fuelling continued until 1630 when the Fleet disengaged from the oiling force remaining just ahead of the oilers throughout the night.

July 27th

Oiling resumed

Fuelling recommenced at 0515. As it had seemed evident that the oilers could not hope to complete the British ships in the available time, I had been forced once again to ask Admiral HALSEY for help which was at once forthcoming. Accordingly, ACHILLES and NEPTUNE, who had been acting as TUS links between the two Fleets throughout the night, joined T.U. 30.10.1 to fuel. This brought the number of our unwise virgins to date up to the official five and I tried hard to make myself believe that there would be no further backsliders, but the prospect of the "one day" oiling the following week was coming disturbingly close.

14" Ammunition embarked

0543 - KING GEORGE V commenced embarking 14" shells from ROBERT MARSH, a total of 94 shells and 155 cases of cordite being transferred.

D.S.B.

QUINCY and ULYSSES were detached for D.S.B. distribution to the Fleet.

0900 - At the request of the Commander Third Fleet, The Squadron Gunnery Officer visited SOUTH DAKOTA to discuss the bombardment plan schedule to take place on the 29th.

CS2 and CS4 visit MISSOURI

CS2 and CS4 in GAMBIA went over to call on the Commander 3rd Fleet in MISSOURI.

Noon position

28° 35' North 138° 55' East.

OTF 38 ordered the Fleet to disengage from the oiling force at 1200, TF 37 complying with the exception of FORSTER and 3 destroyers who had not completed fuelling - they rejoined the Fleet at 1400.

Ship movements after fuelling

On completion of fuelling, UGANDA sailed for ESQUIMAULT via HILTON and STRIKER and HEPAL for MANUS, closing GUAM on route to fix in press material.

CHARDAL and LIGER, after consolidating cargoes into CAMELLA, sailed for MANUS, escorted by MYALLA and LUNSTON.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VANCE No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

AVE THORNTON escorted by FLIN and BARRETT sailed for ENIBETOK to reload and return to Service Area. H.M.A.S. HAPLER joined TF 37.

Fleet
manoeuvred to
conform with
American
groups

The Fleet was manoeuvred at high speed throughout the night to conform with the movements of the American groups, and to reach the flying off position for the following day's strikes.

July 20th

Target for
day's strike

The targets set for the day's strikes were aircraft, air installations, and shipping in the Eastern Inland Sea area.

At 0445, in position 31° 58' North, 135° 11' East, a raurod strike was flown off.

The second strike was flown off at 0545 and on its return at 0645 the third strike of the day was launched.

VICTORIOUS
flight deck
out of
action

1000 - VICTORIOUS reported that her flight deck was out of action due to lift trouble but by 1145, when the fourth strike was due to fly off, it was again in action.

Noon position 32° 02' North 135° 04' East.

CTF 38 had instructed all strikes to be landed on by 1600, and the fifth and last strike, which was scheduled to return at 1730, was flown off at 1445. In addition to the above combined strikes individual strikes were flown against targets in the area.

Force
withdraws

1915 - The force withdrew at 23 knots, course 190° until 1930 when course was altered to 150°. The following signal was received from Com 3rd Fleet on the day's operations: "Mark well the 20th July. To Dumbos and Lifeguard, to CAP and men of the surface team, to the valiant British force on the right flank, well done. For the great flying fighters who fought it out over JAPAN to a smashing victory I have no words that can add to the glory of the factual record they wrote with their courage, their blood, and their lives. ADMIRAL HALSEY."

A great deal seemed to have happened since 12 days ago when the two Fleets passed the first milestone together.

Result of
day's strike

Enemy losses

Aircraft destroyed

6 aircraft on the ground.

Shipping sunk

3 small cargo vessels.
Several small ships and many junks.

Shipping probably sunk

2 large merchant ships.
1 smaller ship.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VASIFF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Aircraft damaged

14 aircraft on the ground.

Shipping and installations damaged.

Many ships of various sizes including 3 destroyers or destroyer escorts and numerous junks, luggers, barges etc. Several shore installations.

Own losses in combat

8 aircraft (one pilot and aircrewman lost)

July 29th

No strike day

No air strikes were planned for the day and the Fleet continued to withdraw throughout the forenoon.

Destroyers top up

0550 - the three destroyers UINDIE, URANIA and ULYSSES, who were to accompany the bombarding force against HAMAMATSU that evening, topped up with fuel from KING GEORGE V, NEWFOUNDLAND and GAMBIA respectively.

KING GEORGE V and screen join bombarding force

At 0930, KING GEORGE V with UINDIE, URANIA and ULYSSES, forming TU 37.1.2, detached from the main body to join the American bombarding group, TU 34.8.1, under Rear Admiral J.F. SMITH in SOUTH DAKOTA. Station was kept 5 miles East of TU 34.8.1 until 1300 when a rehearsal of the intended deployment was carried out.

Noon position

30° 49' North, 130° 15' East.

Approach to target

2007 - Land detected by radar bearing 360° 60 miles.
2200 - The force ran into fog whilst deploying to the Westward. On turning back to the approach course, URANIA and ULYSSES collided. ULYSSES after first reporting that she had stopped, later signalled that she could proceed at slow speed. URANIA, who had sustained superficial damage only, was ordered to escort ULYSSES back to the rendezvous. CTU 34.8.1 promptly and generously offered two of his destroyers to act as screen, but shortly afterwards ULYSSES reported that her damage was not as severe as had been imagined and that she could now maintain the necessary speed.

The bombardment

KING GEORGE V's target was the Japanese Musical Instrument Company, now reported to be manufacturing aircraft propellers. Fire was opened at 2319. By this time the weather was good, bright moonlight and a clear sky enabling the air spotter to be employed successfully. The first salvo was reported by the spotting aircraft as being on the target, the remaining salvos falling well in the target area. 265 rounds of HE were fired and large fires were started which were pleasingly visible from the ship. The spotting aircraft reported that four buildings had been fired and that other results could not be assessed owing to smoke. No opposition was met, either from enemy aircraft or from shore batteries. UINDIE had two short, if spirited blind engagements with possible groups of small craft which, although nothing was sighted, were reported as having turned back under fire. It seems likely these were fishing craft

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(Appendix No. 1 to VASIFF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NEGATIVE (Contd)

July 30th

Force retires

At 0030 30th July the Bombarding Force withdrew at 23 knots, course 200°.

Possible bogies

Several bogies were reported in the vicinity of the force and at 0109 the ship went to Flash Red. No attack materialised however and at 0133 Flash White was passed.

British ships detached

0430 - TU 37.1.2 was detached from TU 34.6.1 and steamed to rejoin TF 37.

Flying programme

The same flying programme as for the 28th was carried out against targets in South West HONSHU and the Inland Sea, bad weather unfortunately weathering out the first two strikes.

Submarine report

HAPIER reported a disturbance and bubbles in the water in position 33° 40' North 130° 05' East and at 0823 HAPIER and BRUNCLER were formed into a "hunter killer" group to investigate.

Friendly whale

At 0903 HAPIER reported that the cause of the disturbance in the water was a friendly whale and the group was ordered to rejoin.

Noon position

33° 38' North 138° 38' East.

Fleet probably reported by enemy aircraft

During the afternoon enemy aircraft were reported in the vicinity of the Fleet and, although one snooper was shot down by American aircraft, it is almost certain that the Fleet was sighted and reported.

Bogey detected

At 1803 a bogey was detected closing rapidly from the North and Flash Red was made.

Bogey shot down

At 1823, the bogey, a Dimh, was shot down by British fighters.

TF 37 disengages from TF 36

At 1917, all strikes having landed on, permission was given for TF 37 to disengage to the Westward and retire independently to the fuelling area. This was done to attempt to gain additional fuelling time as the planned period of 24 hours called for a very tight programme.

Score for day

Enemy losses

Destroyed

6 aircraft.
1 oil tank, 1 locomotive, warehouses etc.,

Shipping sunk

2 luggers

Shipping probably sunk

1 destroyer
1 large transport
1 small freighter
2 small coasters
4 luggers
3 fuel barges

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(Appendix No. 1 to V-100 No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Damaged

6 aircraft on the ground
 Danvers and various shore installations

Shipping damaged

1 TESHIGAHAI class destroyer
 2 other destroyers
 2 old destroyers
 4 destroyer escorts
 1 medium freighter
 several small vessels

Own losses in combat

3 aircraft - all pilots missing

July 31st

Contact made
 with oilers

At 0625 aircraft were flown off to search for the oilers and at 0710 the oiling force was reported bearing 152° 61 miles.

1000 - TG 37 commenced fuelling from own Logistic Group. U.S. Logistic Group continued to close TF 30.

Composition
 of the
 Force

The force consisted of the oilers WAVE GOVERNOR, CARELLA, OLIV, and WAVE KING, the ammunition ships ROBERT MANSERK and COMBIDA, V.S.I.S. GILBERTIEY, radar maintenance ship ACUTUS, CVES SPANGLER, CHASER, RULER, Escorts ELM SAINT, REDPOLE, ODEANI, BERG, PINE, LODDCKOCK, NORMAN, CRATE and QUINBOROUGH.

KING GEORGE V
 ammunition

1000 - KING GEORGE V went alongside the ROBERT MANSERK and commenced unloading 14" ammunition. In all, a total of 60 shells and 64 cases of cordite were embarked successfully, but it was necessary in the existing conditions of sea and swell to keep head to the swell for the entire period of ammunitioning. This tended to open the distance from the next group and it was necessary to maintain TBS touch, JULIA and ACHILLES being sent out as links.

TBS links
 required

D.S.B.

CRATE, QUICKWATCH, QUINBOROUGH and NORMAN were detailed for D.S.B. duties.

Noon position

28° 04' North 139° 00' East

Typhoon
 reported

The proximity of a typhoon reported to be moving towards the CHINA coast along approximate latitude 31° North, gave rise to a certain amount of thought lest it should curve towards the fuelling area. As it happened however reports received throughout the day indicated that the typhoon was moving slowly N.N.W., which made the situation less dangerous. In order to give the storm as wide a berth as possible and at the possible risk of delaying the strike schedule, the Commander 3rd Fleet ordered all groups to change course to the South at midnight.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VEEF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Fuelling ceases

All fuelling ceased at 1900 and CS4 in HETFOURDLAND was ordered to take charge of the TIS links throughout the night adding ARCONAUT as the 4th link. The distance to the next group had by now opened to nearly 50 miles and the slow speed of the Logistic Group limited any attempt being made to close.

August 1st

A difficult fuelling

A confused swell made it difficult to determine the best course for fuelling. Oiling commenced at 0520 on a course of 120° and shifted ultimately to 190° which course also allowed us to keep better touch with the American groups who were fuelling on 100°.

D.S.L.

QUICKMATCH, QUEENBOROUGH, NORTH, TERPSICHORE and QUADRANT dealt with the D.S.L. runs between TF 37 ships, whilst TRAVLER was detailed to transfer correspondence to MISSOURI and SHANGRI LA.

Noon position

27° 15' North, 138° 13' East

Groups proceed to HURICANE

With the typhoon still threatening the fuelling positions, the Commander Task Force 38 ordered all groups to proceed to area HURICANE (25° North 137° East) and to remain there, replenishing as necessary, until further orders.

Fleet disengages

Course was altered to 210° the Commander Logistic Support Group being ordered to maintain 10 knots throughout the night. Shortly before the Fleet disengaged however it was learnt that TG 38.1 was making good 140° 13 knots and the course of the tankers was altered to 150° to conform. Even at 10 knots however the CARELIA could not maintain the necessary speed on account of the swell and speed had to be reduced to 8 knots. TIS links with CLSG were maintained during the night in addition to those required to maintain touch with TG 38.1.

August 2nd

Tankers consolidate cargoes

In order to keep the tanker cycle going, it was necessary to discard two of the four tankers as soon as possible so as to give them time to reload and return. Instructions were given to CLSG to consolidate cargoes at first light, WAVE GOVERNOR into OLMA and CARELIA into WAVE KING.

Fuelling once again

0830 - VICTORIOUS and IMPLACABLE went alongside the oilers for fuel and avgas whilst the destroyers were topped up. FORMIDABLE embarked bombs from CORINDA and VICTORIOUS commenced embarking bombs from ROBERT MAERSK.

Provisioning

ACHILLES, KING GEORGE V and BLACK PRINCE drew provisions from CLEWARTNEY.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VARIO No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

D.S.B.

REDPOLE, WOODCOCK, BRINGLEN were detailed for D.S.B. duties within the force whilst QUALITY went to the Commander 3rd Fleet with correspondence.

Noon position

25° 05' North, 137° 35' East.

Fuelling completed and oilers dispersed

At 1650 fuelling was completed and at 1700 GAMBIA, PIRIE and ULYSSES, the latter for collision damage repair, sailed for MANUS. WAVE GOVERNOR, escorted by ODZANI sailed for ENIWETOK for reloading and return. CSIG in PHEASANT with OLMA, WAVE KING, GLENGARTNEY, RULER, CHASER, NORMAN and CRANE were detached to proceed at 15 knots to the next fuelling area which was in position 34° 20' North 147° East. REDPOLE with ROBERT MAERSK, CORINDA, ARBUTUS, DERG and WOODCOCK followed CLSC at their best speed.

TES links

By this time the next American Group, TG 38.1, was 70 miles away from TF 37 and ARGONAUT, NEWFOUNDLAND, GRENVILLE, BLACK PRINCE, GAMBIA were being employed as TES links.

Strike postponed and fuelling position changed

At about 2000 orders were received from the Commander 3rd Fleet that the next strike would be on the 5th if weather conditions permitted, that point HURRICANE was shifted 25° North 136° 45' East, and that all groups were to top off destroyers during daylight on the 3rd August.

Decide to bomb up carriers on 3rd

This was something of a blow for, whilst on the original programme there had seemed to be a sporting chance of the Task Force contriving to take in enough oil in a one day fuelling to enable them to remain in the front line throughout the next strikes, the postponement ruled this out and for the first time the possibility that we should have to miss one day's strike began to rear its ugly head. It was clearly desirable to free the fleet before hand from as many requirements as possible in the service area and so leave them free to concentrate on getting in the oil and aircraft. Accordingly Commander 3rd Fleet having given permission to to part company, the Task Force pursued and intercepted the slow convoy which contained the ammunition ships etc., so that the carriers could get at their bombs.

August 3rd

Embarkation of bombs

At first light VICTORIOUS commenced embarking bombs from ROBERT MAERSK in accordance with previous instructions. As before this demanded a steady course into the swell, which on this occasion meant that TF 37 had to steer West while the American Groups were on a Easterly course.

0830 - QUALITY topped up with fuel from KING GEORGE V.

With the strike day postponed until the 5th, the outlook on the fuel situation as regards the British units was very disturbing and the following signals were made to TG 37.1

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(Appendix No. 1 to VABPF No. 1002/1, of 2nd October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

TG 37.1

from C.T.F.

Message was received last night saying that next strike day was postponed to August 5th at earliest.

2. The oil position will be very acute when we oil on the 8th, and the utmost economy must be observed.

3. In any case the tankers on the 8th do not hold enough to fill up the Fleet.

DTG 030021 August.

and later

TG 37.1

from C.T.F.

Fuel position. Conservative calculations suggest that destroyers, except "Ts" should arrive at next fuelling position with a comfortable 8 tons in hand; "Ts" will be on their diesel, and NAPIER burning cordite.

2. Somehow we must contrive to top up destroyers although the time table at present is very tight.

3. KING GEORGE V and heavy cruisers are to be prepared to oil destroyers from 0500 tomorrow Saturday.

DTG 030830Z August

Noon position

25° 18' North, 136° 27' East

Fleet manoeuvred
in company with
American groups

During the afternoon the Fleet rejoined the American groups manoeuvring to conform with their movements. But the outstanding problem remained - how to keep reasonable station in the Task Force and yet fuel destroyers.

August 4th

Destroyers top up 0500 - Commenced fuelling destroyers from KING GEORGE V, ACHILLES, NEWFOUNDLAND, and GAMBIA. By 1015, TROUBRIDGE, TENACIOUS, TERMAGANT, TEAZER, TERPSICHORE, NAPIER, UNDAUNTED and UNDINE had been dealt with. By then a "fuel remaining" balance had been struck between cruisers and destroyers.

Noon position

29° 02' North, 135° 53' East

Strike plan
and change
of fuelling
position

About 1330, the Commander 3rd Fleet notified the Fleet that the next strike day would be on the 8th and that this change of plan required fuelling on 6th August in position 33° 36' North, 147° East. The British oiling force was diverted accordingly, and a disturbing problem resolved for this occasion.

B.P.F.L.O.
to 3rd Fleet
visits KING
GEORGE V

At 1800 the U.S. Destroyer BENLUM transferred the B.P.F.L.O. to the Commander 3rd Fleet, Commander Le Fanu, to KING GEORGE V to discuss the general situation with the Vice Admiral, BENLUM joining the Task Force for the night.

(Appendix No. 1 to V.1.1.1. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NAVY (Contd)

August 5th

B.P.L.O. leaves

0915 - U.S.S. BEEHIVE came alongside KING GEORGE V and embarked the B.P.L.O. to the Commander 3rd Fleet.

Flying training was carried out during the forenoon by the aircraft carriers.

Noon position

31° 00' North, 142° 35' East.

Proceeding to fuelling area

During the afternoon and evening course was maintained towards the British fuelling area.

August 6th

Fuelling again

Fuelling commenced at daylight and continued throughout the day, ARBITER and CHESER acting as auxiliary oilers.

Composition of force

The following comprised the logistic group:-

The oilers, OLGA, WAVE KING, DINGLEDALE and SAN AMADO, V.S.I.S. PORT BRISCELL, and GLENMATHY, CVEs ARBITER, CHESER and WULF, escorts FLEASANT, JACQUE, NORMAN, GARD, BARRON, HILAN and WHITE. The hospital ship TAJALAN joined in due course.

D.S.

HILAN, NORMAN, JACQUE, TAZER, TROGANT and QUALITY were detailed for D.S. duties, distribution of mails, transfer of personnel etc.

Noon position

35° 17' North 47° 51' East.

Fuelling complete

What had been done on the 4th now paid dividends; in the main fuelling was completed by 1830 (except for PORT BRISCELL, OLGA and SAN AMADO who remained to be available for any further opportunity for topping up with oil or provisions.)

Dispersal of ships of support group

ARBITER, CHESER, GLENMATHY, NORMAN, WAVE KING, DINGLEDALE were sailed for MANUS with instructions to join BRIDPOLE and the ammunition ships at daylight on 7th August and fuel them before they too retired to MANUS. These ships formed into a fast and a slow group on completion of fuelling, and proceeded south on the 7th August. BLACK PRINCE, due for refit at SYDNEY, was ordered to proceed thence via GUAM so that urgent correspondence from the Vice Admiral, British Pacific Fleet could be given to the Commander in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet who was at that time conferring with Admiral HEMPT at his headquarters.

Amount of stores disembarked by GLENMATHY

Before she sailed, GLENMATHY reported that during her stay with the Fleet, she had provisioned 77 ships and discharged 422 tons of stores at an average rate of 7½ tons per hour - a very satisfactory contribution to the well being of the Fleet.

(Appendix B. 1 to JCSM 12. 1022/14 of 1st October, 1945)

REMARKS (Contd)

August 7th

Destroyers
topped up

Topping up of destroyers continued from OLFA and SAN
MADO and HILPOWERLASH closed PORT TUGWILL for provisions.

Fleet
disengaged
from sailing
force.

Fuelling was completed at 1130 and the Fleet disengaged
from the sailing force.

Moan position

37° 32' North, 147° 53' East

Atomic
bomb

News of the first atomic bomb which was dropped on the
Inland Sea city of NAGASAKI was received, causing much
speculation and considerable dissertations by all and sundry
on the theory of atomic energy. During the afternoon and
evening the Force was manoeuvred to conform with the movements
of the American groups en route to the flying off position
for strikes on the 8th August.

Skunks
reported at
75 miles

At 2150, JCHILDS obtained contact on skunks bearing
270° 75 miles. At 2245 she reported the number of ships to
be 20+ and at 2300 the Commander 3rd Fleet despatched a force
of cruisers and destroyers to engage them. No contact was
made however and it must be presumed that erroneous propagation
was responsible for these unfortunate reports.

August 8th

Target

The air targets were aircraft, air installations and
shipping in Northern HONSHU and KOKUJIDO but, on arrival in
the flying off position 40° North 144° 30' East, the weather
closed down and the launching of the first strike was postponed
as was the launching of GAF.

Strike
postponed

Airies
detected

At 0705 two enemy aircraft flying high were detected
approaching the Fleet and ships were alerted. As it was
thought that the Fleet might remain undetected in the low
visibility, orders were received not to open fire or fly off
aircraft in an attempt to intercept. The aircraft, after
passing over the Force continued to fly North and it is not
known whether the Fleet was actually detected or not.

Point action
shifted

At 0930 point action was shifted from 40° North 144°
30' East to 39° 57' North 145° East, course 180° speed 4
knots.

Moan position

39° 17' North, 145° 23' East

Air strikes
cancelled

As the target area was fogged in and as there was little
prospect of the weather improving, all strikes were cancelled
and Task Group Commanders were ordered to top up destroyers
with fuel.

Destroyers
top up

Fuelling from the larger ships commenced immediately,
continuing until 1700 when HILPER, HILAN, QULDRAUT, URANIA,
TLMAGANT, TANCIOUS and TANCICHON had completed.

The force remained in company with the American task
groups, manoeuvring as necessary.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VASFP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

August 9th

British
bombarding
force join
American
units

At 0315 TU 37.1.8 consisting of CS4 in NEWFOUNDLAND, GADSDIA, THESPICHORE, THESAGANT and TEMACIOUS were detached to join the U.S. Bombarding group which was scheduled to carry out a bombardment of KAMATSU that afternoon.

Targets and
air strikes

The targets for the air strikes were the same as those planned for the previous day and aircraft were launched at 0410, 0510, 0610, 1110 and 1410 from the British flying off position 37° 43' North, 144° 51' East.

Fuelling
position
altered

The Commander 3rd Fleet intimated that the fuelling position for the 11th had been altered, which necessitated a quick diversionary signal to the gilling group to proceed forthwith to position 38° North 148° East

Noon position

37° 48' North 140° 50' East.

RUSSIA declares
war on JAPAN
and 2nd atomic
bomb dropped

News was received that RUSSIA had declared war on JAPAN and that the second atomic bomb had been dropped by American aircraft on NAGASAKI.

Extension of
operations in
view of
RUSSIA's entry
into war

As a result of the news that RUSSIA had declared war on JAPAN, the Commander 3rd Fleet made the following signal.

CTF 36 (R) CTF 37, All TGC of TF 38 from Com 3rd Fleet

In support of RUSSIAN attack TF 38 will continue operations against enemy air forces, aircraft installations and targets of opportunity in Northern HONSHU, HONKAIDO, for at least 2 days after 10th August. Continue present attacks tomorrow, fuel 11th and strike 12th and 13th in accordance with plan to be issued later. CTF 37 advise me as to capabilities of TF 37 to participate.

DTG 090133Z August

The answer was not easy to give as the targets lay many miles to the North and it had been the intention, after the strike on the 10th, for TF 37 to withdraw to SYDNEY etc., to replenish prior to OLYMPIC. Tanker movements to suit this were already under way and the refitting and replenishing programme had no time margin. I judged however that we must do our utmost to sustain an all out effort at this critical moment even if it meant that we could not be ready in quite such full strength for the first few days of OLYMPIC. But I knew too that the American oil position prevented our fuelling from then in any quantity and that therefore our contribution could only be limited. The following reply was therefore made to the Commander 3rd Fleet:-

While we cannot stay the whole course at full strength, I am aiming at fielding a full team on 12th.

2. After this, carriers and others must leave, but I hope to retain KING GEORGE V and 3 - 6" cruisers and destroyers for bombardment on 13th provided we can nestle under your CAP.

3. Request approval.

DTG 091353Z August

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It was tragic to have to haul out but the oil situation made it inevitable. To remain for the bombardment introduced the risk that half of the screening destroyers would only make MANUS under tow. I saw no objection to that.

Commander-in-Chief, B.P.F. informed of intentions

The Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet was informed of the programme as follows:-

C-in-C B.P.F. (R) CTF 111 from CTF 37

Present intention is one more strike day on the 12th then return. No more oil.

DTG 100107Z August

RAFT informed

The Rear Admiral Fleet Train was also informed of the intended movements of the Fleet in the following signal:-

CTF 112 (R) CTF 111., C in C, B.P.F.
A.C.I., S.B.N.O. MANUS CTF 37

Intend strike on 12th after fuelling 11th also possible strike on 13th. Then embark all remaining fuel and proceed South by most direct route to MANUS, perhaps in two groups separated by one day.

2. Sail forthwith WAVE GOVERNOR and next two available oilers through position 05° 00' North, 142° 00' East thence North to arrive in position 18° 00' North, 142° 00' East and await arrival of Task Force 37 groups or other instructions.

3. If necessary whole force will enter MANUS to fuel. Retain all mail at MANUS.

4. CTF 112 report intentions.

5. Signal routing instructions.

DTG 091349Z August

It seemed to be taking certain risks with the tanker position for SYMPIC but I judged it imperative to do so.

Bogies over American groups

During the afternoon several bogies were splashed over the neighbouring American groups and one of the Tomcat destroyers was hit by a suicider.

Bombarding force returns

The bombarding force returned and was in station soon after dusk when the following report on the bombardment was received from CS4.

TU 37.1.8. bombarded industrial target of KAMAISHI from mean range of 14,000 yds between 1500 and 1700 to-day, Thursday.

2. Admirable air spotting provided for NEWFOUNDLAND and GAMBIA from SOUTH DAKOTA and aided for NEWFOUNDLAND and destruction and large fires in KAMA who reported much destruction in target area.

3. Destroyers engaged opportunity targets.

4. No enemy reaction during bombardment.

5. Several bandits engaged during retirement - 1 shot down.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VANCE No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Force withdraws The force commenced to withdraw at 1900, speed 22 knots, and at 2255 course was reversed to bring the Fleet back to the operating area.

Day's score

Enemy losses

Destroyed

44 aircraft on the ground (includes 17 probably destroyed and 11 shared with TF 38.)
Hangar and shops at KATSUJIMA.
2 locomotives and freight cars.

Shipping sunk

2 destroyers (shared with TF 38)
1 old destroyer.
1 sub chaser.
1 freighter transport.
2 small coasters.
4 junks.
2 launches.
(The above kills were shared with American aircraft)

Shipping probably sunk

2 destroyer escorts (shared with TF 38)
1 torpedo boat and sundry small craft.

Aircraft and installation damaged

22 aircraft on the ground.
various ground installations.

Shipping damaged

1 Destroyer.
2 destroyer escorts.
1 freighter transport.
Many small craft including 9 coasters and 9 luggers.

Own losses in combat

7 aircraft with 5 pilots missing.

August 10th

Day's strikes

The air plan was a repetition of that of the previous day and all strikes throughout the day were flown off on schedule in poor weather - conditions over the targets were however, much better.

Machinery defects were reported in KING GEORGE V which, although of long standing, had become aggravated during the last few days. Since two shifts were concerned I decided that she might prove an embarrassment to American units in the bombardment operation planned for the 13th. I accordingly notified the Commander 3rd Fleet in my 100051Z August

Com 3rd Fleet

from CTF 37

By 091353. Owing to machinery defect KING GEORGE V is precluded from taking part in bombardment on 13th.

(Appendix No. 1 to VMTF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

2. I am afraid therefore that TF 37 must retire after completion of operation on the 12th.

DTG 100051Z August

Noon position 138° 01' North, 144° 25' East.

Typhoon warning During the afternoon a typhoon warning was received and later reports gave its position as 26° 2' North 147° 5' East at 1500, course 180, 10 knots.

Fleet retires By 1800 all strikes had landed on and the Fleet began to retire to the fuelling area.

DOSEI reports Japanese acceptance of peace terms. At about 2100 news was received through the DOSEI news agency that JAPAN had offered to accept the DOSEI terms.

Results of day's strike

Enemy losses

Aircraft and installations destroyed

16 aircraft on ground including 1 probably destroyed.
4 locomotives.
2 coaches.
3 tank cars.

Shipping sunk:

3 freighter transports.
2 coasters.
3 small craft.

Shipping probably sunk

1 Freighter.
2 luggers.

Aircraft and installations damaged.

31 aircraft on ground.
Freight trains.
Factories, hangars and other installations

Shipping damaged

2 destroyers.
2 destroyer escorts.
1 merchant vessel.
6 small coasters.
4 luggers.

Own losses in combat

6 aircraft with 4 pilots and 2 aircrewmen missing.

August 11th

Fuelling At 0440 the Fleet commenced to fuel from the five tankers WAVE, JETTEROR, OLMA, SAN ADOLPHO, SAN AMADO and SAN AMEROSIO.

(Appendix No. 1 to VLFIT No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

RECAPITULATIVE (Contd)

Composition of
oiling force

Also in company were the V.S.I.S. FORT RUSSELL, CVE RULER, Escorts, PHILIPPA, GRACE, GERALDTON, JUANITA, FISHBONE, MARLE, USK, WILLIAMS, IRONIC and the hospital ship TJITJALENGKA.

KING GEORGE V
proceeds
alongside
American
oiler.

Admiral HALSEY invited the Vice Admiral and staff officers to a conference on board MISSOURI and at the same time suggested that KING GEORGE V should oil from the same tanker as MISSOURI was oiling from so as to make the transfer easier. This proposal was more than welcome and at 1030, after the Captain of the Fleet had transferred to HEMPHREY to supervise the fuelling programme for the rest of the Fleet, KING GEORGE V proceeded alongside the American oiler SAGE. The Vice Admiral and staff officers transferred to MISSOURI to meet Admiral HALSEY and staff, the two Fleet Flagships oiling simultaneously, one each side of SAGE, forming rather a notable sight. It was perhaps another milestone.

It was with regret that we said goodbye to Captain EMMET U.S.N., liaison officer to the British Pacific Fleet, who had been transferred from KING GEORGE V to MISSOURI to take up his new assignment on the staff of CTF 38.

Strikes on
12th
cancelled

In his signal 110232Z, Commander 3rd Fleet informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet the strikes planned for the 12th were cancelled owing to the typhoon threat, and that all forces would remain in the vicinity of 30° 30' North, 148° East unless otherwise ordered.

Ships warned
to maintain
vigilance.

Ships were also warned that the war with JAPAN was not over and that, in spite of peace feelers, great vigilance and alertness must be maintained in case the Japanese should attempt to repeat their PEARL HARBOR tactics.

Noon position

37° 55' North, 148° 44' East.

TJITJALENGKA
cleared of
convalescents

The hospital ship TJITJALENGKA was instructed to return all possible convalescent patients to ships of the Fleet to make her ready for the evacuation of prisoners of war from JAPAN.

Admiral
returns on
board

At 1530 the Vice Admiral and staff returned on board and at 1600 KING GEORGE V cast off from the American oiler and proceeded to rejoin the rest of TF 37.

Reconstitution
of British
units

At 1700 a signal was received from the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet that a token force of 1 battleship, 1 carrier, 2 cruisers and necessary destroyers had been accepted by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific for incorporation in TF 38 for the naval occupation of JAPAN. I had known that the American fuel position was not easy and would remain so for 10 days or more. Nevertheless it seemed so important that so many British ships and the carriers in particular should not be in at the death that my Chief of Staff returned to Com. 3rd Fleet to see if, under the change of circumstances there were any hopes of more oil becoming available and to say that if it were, I would feel justified in asking that the entire Force might be retained. The overall picture there however left no doubt that matters must stand as ordered.

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(Appendix No. 1 to V.A.S.P. No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

August 12th

Delivery and
collection of
mails.

0730 - WISFUL, URCHIN, QUADRANT, QUINTILOROUGH and TRIPOLI commenced collecting mail from ships remaining with TF 30 and distributing mail from the Flagship to ships leaving the area.

0830 - HAPIER closed KING GEORGE V and NIZAM closed HE FOUNDLAND to top up with fuel.

Noon position

37° 36' North 147° 40' East.

Force splits

At 1300 A.C.L. with the ships returning to MANUS parted company.

Surrender
accepted
conditionally

News was received that the Allies had accepted the Japanese surrender with the proviso that the Emperor would obey the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

Token force
designated
TG 30.5

At 2015 a signal was received from the Commander 3rd Fleet ordering the token British Force to assume the designation of TG 30.5 and WINJALISKA when I had offered to Com 3rd Fleet for the use of Allied prisoners was instructed to report to TG 30.8 for temporary duty.

Movement of
TG 30.5

TG 30.5 formed the northerly group of the Fleet and proceeded in company to the flying off position for strikes on 13th August. To come under the direct orders of Vice Admiral McCAIN, as one of his Task Forces, was some consolation for the fact that the British Pacific Fleet was now very depleted.

Composition
of TG 30.5

The composition of the token force was:- KING GEORGE V, INDISPATIGABLE, CAMELIA, HE FOUNDLAND, TRAUERIDGE, TERMACANT, TRIACIOUS, TRAZER, TRISICHOKE, WAPLEUR, HAPIER, NIZAM, WISFUL and FRANGLER. I had selected these as representatives of the Empire. The force seemed a little slender but there seemed no reason to give up our position in the right of the line.

Commander-
in-Chief
leaves GUAM

The Commander-in-Chief, in DUKE OF YORK, escorted by HELP and AGER, left GUAM to join the 3rd Fleet.

August 13th

Targets

The targets for the day's strikes were in the TOKYO area, INDISPATIGABLE's first strike taking off at 0815. Prior to this she had maintained a CAP.

Noon position

35° 25' North 142° 12' East.

Second strike

INDISPATIGABLE's second strike flew off at 1315 but it proved to be abortive as the targets were found to be weathered in.

Torcats and
Watchdogs
have a field
day

The high light of the day was the way in which the Torcats and Watchdogs patrols dealt with the Japanese aircraft. Through daylight and after dusk they intercepted and shot down 21 enemy aircraft approaching the Fleet. Most of these came singly but the precision of the interceptions and speed at which the bogies were shot down was remarkable. The whole was a most finished performance.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VASFP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Landing force
preparations

On the previous day a signal from Com. 3rd Fleet had ordered ships to prepare Marine and Bluejacket armed landing companies. The figure for TG 38.5 was read here as 2000, and as a count showed that weapons for 1,500 only were available, a signal to this effect was made to Com 3rd Fleet. His reply led to the discovery that the figure should have been read as 200. This in view of the preparations already afoot would obviously cause great disappointment and I represented this to Admiral HALSEY asking if he could see his way to raise our quota. He at once doubled it.

Fleet
withdraws

At 1815 all aircraft had landed on and at 1840 the Fleet commenced to return to the American fuelling rendezvous in position 31° 45' North, 144° East.

Score for
dayEnemy losses

4 luggers sunk.
Buildings, rolling stock and locomotives damaged.

Own losses in combat - Nil

August 14thFuelling from
U.S. tankers

For this oiling all the fuel requirements of ships of TG 38.5 were met from the American Logistic Group and fuelling continued throughout the day.

D.S.B.

WREGLER, WASSFUL and TRIPSICORE were detailed for D.S.B. duties.

Noon position

32° 11' North, 144° 33' East.

CS4 arrives on
board.

At 1300 CS4 arrived on board for a conference with the Vice Admiral, remaining until 1545.

Disengaged
from
oiling
group

At 1710 the Task Force disengaged from the oiling force and proceeded throughout the night in accordance with the manoeuvres of TF 38 groups towards the flying off position for the strikes planned for 15th August.

August 15th.First strike
off

At 0400 in position 34° North 142° East the first strike was flown off against targets in the TOKYO area.

Result of
strike

INDEPENDIBLE's aircraft found their target weathered in but a camouflaged factory was observed and successfully bombed. The strike was intercepted by 12 Zekes, 4 of which were shot down, 4 were probably shot down and the remainder damaged, by the escorting fighters. One Seafire failed to return and one Avenger was shot up and had to ditch.

Further
strikes
cancelled

At 0700 on instructions from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, all strikes were cancelled. No reason was given, but there were many theories.

PEACE

At 1100 news was received that the Japanese had accepted the Allied peace terms and that offensive operations against JAPAN were to cease.

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NARRATIVE (Contd)

Or was it?

At 1120, whilst the signal to cease hostilities against JAPAN was flying, two bombs fell close to INDEFATIGABLE: a JUDY, diving on her was shot down by Corsairs of TG 38.1. How this aircraft got in so close is not clear.

Noon position

34° 06' North 142° 30' East

Admiral HALSEY addresses ships of 3rd Fleet

At 1300, whilst Admiral HALSEY was broadcasting to the Fleet by R/T two more enemy aircraft were splashed by the Tomcat and Patchdog CAP's. A copy of Admiral HALSEY's speech is attached as Annex 1 to this narrative.

Getting back to normal and cleaning up.

Meanwhile I had instructed the Fleet that, whilst the possibility of attack remained even after the Armistice was signed and after we had entered harbour, I expected everything possible to be done to get back to our old standards of appearance and smartness and to remove camouflage painting. I also asked the Commander-in-Chief what overall colours he wished his ships to be.

Mainbrace spliced

The Fleet then set course for Point READY, 32° 45' North 143° 20' East, to await further instructions.

The following signal was received from the Commander 3rd Fleet to 3rd Fleet and all Task Group Commanders.

"All hands to splice the mainbrace"

The "Action Addresses" were subsequently amended to read

"All TG Commanders, negative American Groups"

August 16th

Commander-in-Chief British Pacific Fleet joins

The Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet in DUKE OF YORK with WHELP and WAGER as escorts joined TG 38.5, the Vice Admiral, Second-in-Command, British Pacific Fleet and staff repairing on board her. The Vice Admiral, Second-in-Command, British Pacific Fleet remained in tactical command of the Group.

Operation SNAPSHOOT

During the forenoon the three U.S. Task Groups and TG 38.5 closed to 1 mile between screens and were manoeuvred at high speed by CTF 38 for Operation SNAPSHOOT - aerial photography of the 3rd Fleet by U.S. aircraft.

Noon position

32° 25' North 142° 26' East

Investiture

In the afternoon the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet transferred to USS MISSOURI where he invested Admiral HALSEY with the insignia of the K.B.E.

Later, the Vice Admiral, Second-in-Command, British Pacific Fleet went on board USS MISSOURI to broadcast a message to the 3rd Fleet. A copy of the speech is attached as Annex 2 to this narrative.

During the night an easterly course was maintained.

August 17th

NAPIER and NISAM fuelled from KING GEORGE V and INDEFATIGABLE at daylight.

Operation SNAPSHOOT repeated

During the forenoon CTF 38 again closed the groups to one mile carrying out high speed turns, while further aerial photographs were taken. TERPSICHOE was unable to take part in these manoeuvres as her speed was limited to 20 knots by

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(Appendix No. 1 to VADP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

a boiler defect. She was ordered to proceed independently to the fuelling area.

Noon position 32° 08' North 144° 10' East

During the night an easterly course was maintained to meet Logistic Support Group in position British DRINK (32° 25' North 143° 30' East)

August 18th

Fuelling

The fuelling force was located by radar at 0200 replenishment beginning at daylight on a S.E. course.

The Logistic Support Group consisted of:-

Oilers SAN ADOLPHO, SAN AMBROSIO, WAVE GOVERNOR.
CVE RULER
Provision Ship FORT WRANGELL
Escorts PHEASANT, ODZANI, BURNIE, USK, IPSWICH, BALLARAT.

H.S.3 with escort CRANE was also contacted.

Noon position 31° 45' North 144° 00' East

Fuelling continued until 1700 when SAN AMBROSIO and SAN ADOLPHO, with escorts USK and BURNIE, were sailed for LEYTE to refill and report to CTF 112.

The Logistic Group remained in contact during the night.

August 19th

Replenishment continues

Fuelling from WAVE GOVERNOR continued from dawn. The opportunity was taken to carry out an exchange visit of British and U.S. pilots between INDEFATIGABLE and SHANGRI-LA.

Noon position 31° 06' North 143° 34' East

In the afternoon DUKE OF YORK closed TG 38.4 and the Commander 3rd Fleet transferred to the British Flagship for a conference. Later Admiral HALSEY broadcast to the British Empire from DUKE OF YORK.

August 20th

Replenishment continued during the day.

Landing Force embark in A.P.D.

A warning signal to bring the 3rd Fleet Allied Landing Force to 8 hours notice had been sent by CTF 31, Rear Admiral BADGER, on the previous evening. Further signals during the night brought the Force to the "stand-by", and Captain D7, Captain Buchanan, R.A.N., who was in charge of the British Landing Force transferred to KING GEORGE V for final instructions. During the forenoon the three American A.P.D.'s BARR, SIMS and PAVLIC, closed TG 38.5 and embarkation by L.C.M. began. The congested scene on the quarter deck of KING GEORGE V with the Landing Party assembling gear etc., while at the same time provisions from GLENARTNEY were being dumped in the middle of the team, was quite interesting. The weather was not by any means perfect and a confused and choppy sea made boat work difficult. Despite conditions the transfer of 37 officers and 499 men, complete with equipment, proceeded smoothly and was finished in less than three hours. The number suggests some stowaways had crept in.

Noon position 31° 19' North 143° 28' East.

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(Appendix No. 1 to VADP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

Logistic Group
movements

During the day H.M.S. SNEAKER with escort QUEENBOROUGH arrived with aircraft replenishments. She was ordered to transfer all possible aircraft to INDEFATIGABLE and RULER and to start preparing for the accommodation of repatriates from JAPAN; she subsequently played a prominent part in this work. CARELLA escorted by PERIE and CESSNOCK joined the Logistic Group; and WAVE GOVERNOR escorted by ODZANI were sailed to ULITHI for rapid refilling and return.

TG 38.5
dissolves

In the afternoon INDEFATIGABLE with TROUBRIDGE, TERMAGANT, TENACIOUS, TEAZER, TERPSICHOPE, BARFLEUR, WRANGLER and WAKEFUL detached from TG 38.5 and joined TG 38.3.

DUKE OF YORK, KING GEORGE V, NEWFOUNDLAND, GAMBIA, NAPIER, NIZAM, WHELP and WAGER joined TG 38.4 being designated TG 38.4.6.

August 21st

Meanwhile typhoon warnings had been coming in and, as the plotted course appeared likely to pass close to the 3rd Fleet operating area, all groups were ordered to proceed to the Southwest towards a new position 30° 30' North, 142° 00' East to continue replenishment.

Noon position

31° 06' North 143° 07' East

The British Logistic Group did not follow the Fleet but remained in the vicinity of British DRINK. QUEENBOROUGH was despatched south to ULITHI and MANUS to deliver mails and correspondence.

August 22ndOperation
TINTYPE

Destroyers were topped up with fuel at daylight. During the forenoon operation TINTYPE took place; this consisted of flying off all available aircraft to form up and fly over the Fleet unmasse, thereby enabling a series of photographs to be taken by surface ships. The weather was not favourable and heavy rain interfered with the programme, but good photographs were obtained and all aircraft were landed on during the afternoon.

Noon position

31° 27' North 142° 30' East

Course for the night was set Northeast as the typhoon seemed clear.

August 23rd

At daylight the British destroyers in TG 38.4 topped up from KING GEORGE V and DUKE OF YORK.

Noon position

33° 35' North 144° 08' East

In the afternoon the signal to execute Commander 3rd Fleet's plan of entry into Japanese waters was received.

Reorganisation
of groups

In consequence DUKE OF YORK with WHELP and WAGER detached to form TG 30.2 and join MISSOURI who was TG 30.1.

KING GEORGE V, NEWFOUNDLAND, GAMBIA, NAPIER and NIZAM with USS UHLAM and BENHAM formed TF 37 again and detached to area BOGIN. It was pleasant to have two U.S. destroyers as part of the Group.

(Appendix No. 1 to VASHT No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

24th August

In DOGAN

The day was spent in area DOGAN awaiting the signal to execute the Entrance Plan. Opportunity was taken to continue painting the upperworks and remove some of the signs of a long period at sea. During the forenoon KING GEORGE V and cruisers were manoeuvred by flag signals, midshipmen taking charge of the ships; the destroyers under USS UHLMANN exercised independently.

Noon position 34° 56' North 144° 42' East

25th August

Destroyers including USS UHLMANN and BENHAM topped up from KING GEORGE V and cruisers at daylight.

Noon position 34° 47' North 144° 45' East

QUICKMATCH arrived from MANUS during the dog watches and fuelled from KING GEORGE V while transferring mail.

Typhoons

During the two days, two typhoons were anxiously plotted and watched; it appeared that Nature was determined to have her say on the date of entry and would not be hurried. Later a signal to proceed was received from the Commander 3rd Fleet and course for the night was set to arrive at Point PRIEST in the morning.

26th August

Cancellation of the advance towards Point PRIEST was received during the middle watch and TF 37 retired once again to area DOGAN.

QUICKMATCH collected outgoing mail and was despatched to meet the Logistic Group to transfer and collect their mails and proceed South.

Noon position 34° 42' North 144° 17' East.

Instructions were received during the afternoon for the Fleet to enter SAGAMI WAN on the 27th August, and stating that the TOKYO BAY entry would be on the 30th August. Course was therefore set for Point PRIEST.

27th August

Entry into
SAGAMI WAN

TF 37 took station astern of TF 35 to follow by the planned route into SAGAMI WAN, ships flying flags in accordance with the following signal:-

TG 38.5

FROM: C.T.G.

Flagships, personal flag at foremast head, White Ensign at mainmast head and at peak.

Cruisers and Carriers, White Ensigns at mastheads and at peak or ensign staff, Dominion ships may fly Dominion Ensign at mainmast head instead of White Ensign.

Destroyers, White Ensign at mast head, White Ensign at peak or ensign staff.

It was perhaps rather a small force to represent a large Empire but they had seen many oceans and known several enemies before they had joined their Allies in the Pacific.

(Appendix No. 1 to VADPP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

NARRATIVE (Contd)

On arrival at 1450, KING GEORGE V, NEWFOUNDLAND, GAMBIA, NAPIER and NIZAM anchored in their berths, whilst ULLMANN and BENHAM proceeded independently to rejoin TF 35.

28th August

A quiet day was spent in painting and cleaning while the coastlines was kept under official and unofficial scrutiny for signs of life or resistance. The Hospital Ship TJITJALENGKA escorted by CRANI anchored in SAGAMI WAN.

29th AugustIn SAGAMI WAN

TG 30.1 and 30.2, the American and British Flagship groups, weighed and proceeded into TOKYO BAY at daylight. During the forenoon C.T.F. 35, Rear Admiral JONES, called on the Vice Admiral, British Pacific Fleet, and the return call was made in the evening.

CinC Pac arrives

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral NIMITZ, arrived at TOKYO BAY and hoisted his flag in USS SOUTH DAKOTA.

30th August

With the concurrence of the Commander 3rd Fleet, the number of British destroyers with TG 38.3 had been reduced from 8 to 6, and TERPSICHOPE and TEAZER, who had minor defects, entered SAGAMI WAN. QUALITY the first of the destroyers sent up from MANUS to relieve those with INDEFATIGABLE arrived at daylight.

TF 37 enters TOKYO BAY

The Commander 3rd Fleet ordered part of TF 37 to enter TOKYO BAY. KING GEORGE V with QUALITY, NAPIER NIZAM and TJITJALENGKA proceeded accordingly anchoring in the centre of the Bay ashore by YOKOHAMA. There was a satisfactory absence of smoke from the factory chimneys which told its own story and the waters of the Bay, normally crowded with ships and small craft, were utterly deserted.

Landing at YOKOSUKA

Meanwhile the 3rd Fleet Allied Landing Force, under Rear Admiral BADGER, had carried out an unopposed occupation of YOKOSUKA and the forts and islands in the vicinity and at the entrance to the Bay. The result of this was immediately obvious as when KING GEORGE V passed, the White Ensign was already flying over the island known as "Fort Two": it was echoed by white flags on the shore opposite marking the deserted guns which in the end had proved so useless, and there was not a soul in sight.

TERPSICHOPE and TEAZER entered TOKYO BAY securing alongside the British battleships.

QUALITY having fuelled was detached to join TG 38.3

SPEAKER, who had been prepared as a Prisoner of War accommodation ship, entered TOKYO BAY and anchored.

31st August

Arrivals in TOKYO BAY:-

CS 4 in NEWFOUNDLAND with GAMBIA from SAGAMI WAN.
ComRanCruRon in SHROPSHIRE with HOBART from OKINAWA.
WARRAJUNGA and BATAAN from OKINAWA.

British Logistic Group from area SOCONY consisting of the oilers WAVE KING, CARELIA, DINGLEDALE, CVE RULER,

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NARRATIVE (Contd)

Provision ship FORT WRANGELL Escorts MILESANT, WOODCOCK, CRANE, IPSWICH, DERG, PIRIE, CESSNOCK and MILLARAT.

Ships were fuelled whilst RULER began preparations to convert to and accommodate the ship for Prisoners of War.

1st September.

TENACIOUS, relieved by QUALITY, arrived from TG 38.3. SPEAKER reported that embarkation of prisoners of war was proceeding favourably and that 35 officers and 340 other ranks had already arrived on board.

2nd September

Finis

At 9.30 am the formal ceremony of surrender took place on board USS MISSOURI, Flagship of that Commander we had been so proud to follow.

The war was ended.

SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

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(Annex 1 to Appendix 1 to VEMP No 1092/14 of 1st October 1945)

SPEECH BROADCAST TO THE THIRD FLEET
BY ADMIRAL HILSON

The war is ended. You, in conjunction with your brothers in arms of all services, have contributed inestimably to this final result. Our fighting men have brought an implacable, treacherous and barbaric foe to his knees in abject surrender. This is the first time in the recorded history of the misbegotten Japanese race that they, as a nation have been forced to submit to this humiliation.

I said in 1942 the Japs were no supermen. You have helped write finis on that estimate in 1945. Your names are written in golden letters on the pages of history - your fame is, and shall be, immortal. Wherever you have met the foe, on the sea, on the land or in the air, you have been supreme. From the early days of fighting with a very frayed shoe string, to the finish of fighting with the mightiest combined fleet the world has ever seen, the results have been the same - victory has crowned your efforts. The forces of righteousness and decency have triumphed.

At this moment our thoughts turn to our happy and fortunate homeland, to our loved ones. Deeply rooted in each and every heart is a desire, now that the tumult of war has ceased and victory - absolute and unconditional victory has crowned our efforts, to return to our homes.

A simple process of thinking will demonstrate how impossible this is at the moment. The boredom, the homesickness, the periods of fear, the tragedy, the sweat, the blood we have shed so freely, these have been endured by all with fortitude and brotherly comradeship and gladly. This is a common and proud possession of each and every rank and rating. We are and shall always remain a band of brothers tried in the fire of the greatest holocaust this world has ever experienced, and because of this, indissoluble. That which we fought and bled and died for has become a reality. That reality can not be - must not be - transient, it must rest on firm foundations. The structure that we build must be so firm that the storms of all ages to come can not touch its surface. Because of your fighting qualities and the fighting qualities of our brothers in arms of all services, our beloved land has not known the ravages of war, our dear ones at home have not been endangered.

Give praise to God Almighty for this and give humble and grateful thanks that he saw fit to use us as His instruments.

Victory is not the end. Rather it is but the beginning. We must establish a peace, a firm, a just, and an enduring peace; a peace that will enable all decent nations to live without fear and in prosperity; a peace that will glorify the inherent dignity and nobility of mankind. Never again should be permit the enslavement of decent human beings - never again should tyrants be permitted to rise in a civilised world. To attain this requires unremitting toil over a period of years. The enemy over the entire world is conquered and has been forced to bow his collective knee to us, the victors. He is unregenerate. It is our cross, our duty, to make him regenerate. This can not be done in a day. It may take decades and generations. The present and immediate duty of the Third Fleet is crystal clear. We must, in conjunction with all Allied forces so employed, reduce Nippon to military impotency. We must keep them militarily impotent. Following this, it is imperative that instrumentalities be set up to educate and divorce the Japanese from their barbaric traditions, teachings and thoughts. This is a matter of common sense, good judgement, policy and tenacity of purpose, and will require military might for implementation and very wisest understanding at its core.

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(Annex 1 to Appendix 1 to WARP No 1092/14 of 1st October 1945)

SPECIAL BROADCAST TO THE THIRD FLEET
BY ADMIRAL HALSEY
(contd)

The time necessary to attain this goal is unpredictable. Now that the fighting has ended there must be no letdown. We shall have long and trying periods of very watchful waiting. A busy man is a happy man. It behooves all in authority to take this to heart. Plans should be in the formulative period now - plans to provide work, study, and recreation. This is not only constructively necessary for the upkeep and preservation of our splendid ships but imperative for the morale of our incomparable fighting men.

I wish it were possible for me to meet, greet, and know each officer and man of our fighting Third Fleet. Owing to its size and dispersion, this can not be. You shall always occupy a special and honoured space in my mind and heart. We have been through this trying time together. We have shared the good, we have shared the bad. We are brothers - blooded by our active participation in combat operations in an unprecedented naval war.

When the time comes, many will return to civilian pursuits. Keep the torch burning. Join your forces in the pursuit of righteousness and decency. You have been tried in a cruel crucible - you have, thank God, been proved not wanting. Let no man tear down that for which you have sacrificed so much. Your civic responsibilities will be great. Meet them with the same fortitude you have displayed during this war. Then shall our great land be safe and sound.

You that remain in the Navy, keep your swords sharp. You accept a great responsibility. The great traditions and the constant state of preparedness of this our first line of defence are in your keeping. Maintain your powder dry and anticipate every new development. The applications change but the principles of war are immutable. God grant that we may never have to apply them again. A ready and efficient fleet is one of the greatest deterrents to the horrors of war. To you all I say I shall always be ready and glad within my means to render my advice, assistance, or succour.

To our fighting brothers of the British Pacific Fleet, my eternal gratitude for your efficient and generous services. I am proud, very proud, to have had you under my command during this last combat period of the Western Pacific war on the seas. To you now you expected great fighting qualities. Our expectations have been more than fulfilled. Your co-operative spirit, your manner of meeting and anticipating our wishes, the way you have adapted and fallen into our scheme of manoeuvres, is little short of remarkable. The co-ordinated offensive and defensive fighting on the surface and in the air makes us in fact a single fighting team.

To those of us who have suffered injuries or been permanently maimed, my gratitude and thankfulness that you have been spared for further useful activeness. May a grateful country never forget the sacrifices you made for the good of all mankind.

To those of our brothers that have given their all - who made the supreme sacrifice - Hal! Rest with God. The memory of you will never die. Your names and your deeds will rest with and be an inspiration to all decent mankind through all ages. To your loved ones my deepest sympathy. May time assuage your grief and bring a full realization of your dear ones immortal fame.

To all of you belongs the credit. And I shall do all within my limited powers to see that you receive it. Again and again God bless you and well done.

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(Annex 2 to Appendix 1 to VEEF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

SPEECH BROADCAST TO THE THIRD FLEET
BY VICE ADMIRAL RAWLINGS

Admiral Halsey, Flag Officers, Commanding Officers, Officers and men of the Third Fleet. Yesterday, after hearing Admiral Halsey's inspiring words to the Third Fleet, of which we have the honour to be part, I asked him if I might come to his Flagship to say a few words to you all. I was not sure that with our voice transmission gear, we could carry sufficiently far to reach all units of the Third Fleet, and if I may so put it, I decided to take the bull by the horns and so I asked him if I might come over to speak from his Flagship in the centre of his Fleet.

A great deal seems to have happened since March, when I received orders to report for duty to Admiral Nimitz. The words I used then in placing my ships under his orders were that it was "with feelings of great pride and pleasure that the British Pacific Force joins the United States Naval Forces under your command."

Nothing that has happened since makes me wish to change one word of what I then said; the story of how the two Fleets have come together is quite simple and straightforward, which is as things should be among sailors.

It begins with Task Force 57 as we then were, operating under the orders of Admiral Spruance and we took it as a compliment that he just told us what he wanted and left us to get on with it. We look back on those decisive days in the battle for Okinawa with a feeling of pride. We never met our Admiral but we felt he understood us. Perhaps on the whole it was as well that we were then operating on our own as it gave us the chance to get used to an unaccustomed way of manoeuvring and signalling which was to stand us in good stead later.

With that behind us we joined the Third Fleet not only with keen anticipation but, I believe, with a little confidence that we knew enough to take our place in the line with the famous Fighting Third; and so what Admiral Halsey said yesterday meant much to us.

The story is, perhaps, reaching its end in the last few days, when we have passed under the direct command of Vice Admiral McCain as Task Group 30.5 and so become an integral part of those fast Carrier Task Forces which have fought their way from the black days of 1941 to their present victory. It may not perhaps be fantastic to feel that the way our two navies have come together, welded and integrated, may point the manner in which our two great democracies will now move forward together. In their amalgamation, neither Navy I hope, has lost its own character or individuality. It would be the greatest pity if they did so, for when all is said and done everything in the story of sea warfare shows that character and individuality are in the end the only things that really count. But with them to-day must go that spirit of co-operation which these months have shown to be within our reach.

Perhaps I might add that I share to the full with Admiral Halsey the conception that the Navy is still the first line of defence for both our countries, and I believe, also, that the day when either of us abandon his sage advice to keep the naval sword sharp, will bring us the nearer to being again attacked by such evil forces as these we have now subdued.

In so thinking may I quote to you the opening sentence of the message sent by the Board of Admiralty to the British Fleet when Germany was broken; it begins - "for the second time since the Battle of Trafalgar

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(Annex 2 to Appendix 1 to VLMF No. 1092/14 of 1st October 1945)

SPEECH BROADCAST TO THE THIRD FLEET
BY VICE ADMIRAL RAWLINGS
(Contd)

sea-power relentlessly applied has preserved and sustained our nation and Commonwealth and led to the decisive defeat of Germany".

The story of the Third Fleet in which we have been privileged to lend a hand, provides during the last six weeks the perfect picture of the result of sea-power relentlessly applied in the waters of the Pacific.

Very many of us in both our navies will in the future be returning to civil life. To those who remain may I say that I can conceive of no greater contribution to the future of the world than that our two navies should make a habit of meeting and working together from time to time. Perhaps those of you who will be leaving the sea will help to bring that about.

But to each one of you, whatever you may feel about that conception, whatever happens and whatever the future holds, I would suggest that each will be able to say to himself, "I fought in the Third Fleet under Halsey", and, so saying, face up with a greater courage to whatever to-morrow shall bring.

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Page 1.

(Appendix 2 to VABPF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

GUNNERY

General

1. There were, regrettably, no engagements with enemy aircraft throughout the period of operations, with the exception of brief action with a single aircraft by cruisers and destroyers whilst detached to bombard. This lack of targets was in some ways unfortunate as it precluded any action trial of:-

(a) the newly adopted V.T. fuze procedure

(b) the policy for self defence by aircraft carriers

(c) the efficacy of the AA Co-ordination system. Also, the increase in efficiency of the Fleet's AA gunnery, which had been hoped for as the result of more frequent and regular practices and intensive training, could not be proved.

Bombardment

2. Two night bombardments were carried out by H.M.S. KING GEORGE V in company with a U.S. Task Group and in accordance with the plans of the American Task Group Commanders. Both of these provided a somewhat difficult navigational problem in radar fixing. "Flare ranging," which might have been a valuable aid, was not used. Aircraft were, however, instructed to orbit certain prominent features during the approach for the bombardment of HITACHI, but radar data obtained from this source was not used owing to the difficulty of identifying the correct aircraft and because it was considered to be less accurate than that obtained from echoes of high land.

3. American ships fired full broadsides on each occasion. In accordance with CB 3033 (35) (Textbook of Naval Bombardment) Para. 78, H.M.S. KING GEORGE V did not comply with this procedure, 14 inch H.E. shell being fuzeed with fuzes Mark 118. In the first bombardment, salvos of not more than one gun from each turret were fired, but approval was given to fire 5 gun broadsides at HAMAMATSU and no premature occurred. This was before receipt of Admiralty's signal DTG 072359 August.

4. Owing to adverse weather, air spotting was not available at HITACHI, but U.S. aircraft provided successful observation at HAMAMATSU.

5. Detailed reports of these bombardments have been forwarded under separate cover.

6. Reports of the cruiser and destroyer bombardment of KAMATSU are included in 4 CS No. 0798/3 dated 26th August. Satisfactory results were obtained by good Fire Control and excellent spotting by American float planes. The performance of material was most satisfactory.

AA Co-ordination

7. The procedure of Fleet Target Indication and control of Fleet blind fire laid down in DPWO 2005 (with certain minor modifications issued as amendments to that order) was exercised frequently and carried out during all air attacks. On no occasion however did the enemy penetrate to within gun range.

8. The duties of AA Co-ordinator were carried out by the Squadron Gunnery Officer in H.M.S. KING GEORGE V from the Air Defence Room, where he worked in close co-operation with the ship's T.I.O. and F.D.O.

9. From the results obtained in exercises it was clear that this system can furnish a satisfactory means of providing ships with the best available information about movements of enemy aircraft inside the gun defended zone, and thereby assist target indication and the link-up between Gunnery and Warning radar.

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(Appendix 2 to VADFP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

GUNNERY (Contd.)

10. A H.F. circuit was used, which has the great disadvantage that tuning cannot normally take place owing to the need for H.F. silence, and in consequence communication was not always satisfactory with all ships. It is recommended that a V.H.F. circuit should be available for this important purpose.

11. The target indication grid plot proved quick and simple to use but is of course wholly inaccurate in certain cases when translating from "cartesian" to polar co-ordinates, owing to the necessity to report slant ranges.

12. The performance of Type 293 in all ships has been noticeably greatly improved since operation "Iceberg."

Ammunitioning at Sea

13. The embarkation of 14 inch shell and charges under way was carried out by H.M.S. KING GEORGE V from A.E. Robert Maorsk on three occasions. The first of these was in the nature of a trial to test the method and gear. The Burtoning method was employed at each end of the ship and proved highly successful.

14. A full report of this operation has been forwarded separately.

15. Whilst the transfer of 14 inch ammunition at sea is a practicable evolution with the existing gear, it is considered that the special fittings necessary to enable embarkation of two shell in each load are a battleship requirement as a long term policy.

Training and Practices

16. Long periods on passage and between strikes were used to the full to carry out AA firings and non firing practices. Aircraft from H.M.S. RULER were used almost extensively for this training and her efficient co-operation was most valuable. In addition to frequent AA throw off firings by all ships, several close range weapon practices were made possible by the provision of sleeve targets from H.M.S. FORMIDABLE.

17. The lack of any form of marking for AA practices has been keenly felt.

18. It is considered that a requirement exists for a wireless controlled target aircraft similar to the U.S. drone (T.D.D.) American cruisers launch and control these targets which afford the most realistic practices owing to their high speed and manoeuvrability, and foster the interest of all. The provision of a similar target in the Royal Navy is strongly recommended as necessary for training in war or peace.

Aircraft Recognition

19. The Fleet Recognition Officer spent a fortnight in H.M.S. GAMBIA and since then has visited destroyers for periods of five or six days at a time. A series of aircraft recognition notes were issued to the Fleet to assist training in this difficult problem.

Conclusion

20. As the result of the short but valuable practice period obtained at Jervis Bay by most ships, and the intensive, almost daily, training programmes carried out in the faelling area or on passage, it is considered that the gunnery efficiency of the Fleet has shown a marked improvement. In the event, however, the AA armament of the Force was given no real chance to prove itself.

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(Appendix 3 to VADP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

COMMUNICATIONS

General

1. During the period under review, Task Force 37 was acting, to all intent and purposes, as a Task Group of Task Force 38. This, as far as is known, is the first time in which a British force of this size has acted in such close tactical co-operation with an American Force, using the latter's methods and signal publications.

It was found that the American standards both in material and personnel were of a very high order, especially as regards the use of R/T for all purposes; no matter how many circuits were manned, a high standard of operating was always maintained. The same could not be said of British ships where, owing to the fact that R/T is not yet universally adopted and taught a high standard of R/T operating could only be maintained in most ships provided not more than one or two circuits were manned.

The number of V/H/E circuits required when working with the Americans was far more than had been allowed for and without the timely loan of 20 AN/ARC sets for cruisers and above, the force would have been hard put to it to maintain satisfactory communication. The generous manner in which this equipment was provided and maintained solved a difficult problem.

W/T and R/T Circuits kept in the Force

2. The following is a list of the circuits and their uses that were manned in the force:-

(a) FOXES (Broadcasts)

How Fox. A high speed fox (30 words per minute) carrying traffic for task group commanders and above.

Jump Fox. Similar to How Fox but carrying traffic for ships. It was found essential for both How and Jump Foxes to have four receivers on at the same time. A choice of eight H/P frequencies was normally available and, by selecting four, it was found that signals were always strength 5, an important matter when copying with a typewriter.

Moon Fox. A slow broadcast carrying traffic for Task Force and Fleet Commanders. This circuit was also available for ship to shore traffic.

Operational Intelligence Fox. A slow broadcast carrying intelligence traffic including the necessary information for Y parties.

British Administrative Fox. Primarily for administrative and Basegram traffic from authorities in Australia. It was also used for ship to shore traffic, mainly press.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The American method of using a large number of H/P frequencies is strongly recommended. Not only does it allow for interference and fading but, if three or more receivers are used, it also ensures good reception so that high speeds can be used.

The American policy of using typewriters for copying foxes is fully concurred in. Not only does it allow the higher speed on one circuit, but also ensures that a readable copy of the message is available to the coder/cypher officer.

(b) INTER GROUP CIRCUITS

Task Force Commanders. An H/P - CW circuit carrying traffic between Task group commanders and above. This circuit was normally used when W/T silence was relaxed for messages in cypher.

Task Force Common. A HF/M/F CW circuit available for all ships as a standby for T.D.S.

Task Group Commanders. A standby voice circuit in the 2 mc/s band, manned only at action stations.

T.D.S. Primary. The most important circuit in the organisation manned constantly by all ships and used for manoeuvring, contact reports, 44

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(Appendix 3 to VADP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

COMMUNICATIONS (Contd)

and other tactical signals. It had been anticipated that a certain amount of congestion was bound to occur on this circuit and this in fact happened on several occasions, manoeuvring signals being delayed by other groups "getting on the air" first.

A.D.S. Secondary. A.M.C.W. circuit for operational traffic such as flash reports and messages in cypher when W/T silence was in force.

Flag Officer Circuit. A W/T voice circuit for passing traffic between flag officers.

Inter Force P.D.O. A W/T or H/F voice circuit for traffic between group P.D.O's, Tamarcs, Watchdogs etc.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The system of having all ships on one T.D.S. has the advantage that they can intercept contact reports etc., and know what is happening in the adjacent group. But it is essential for each group also to have its own T.D.S. circuit on which to manoeuvre when the primary circuit is congested. This circuit can also be used as the administrative circuit. Owing to shortage of second T.D.S. in certain ships, type 86 M were used on administrative circuit but this was not altogether successful.

Little use was made of the M/T - L/T circuit together. It is considered that more use could have been made of this circuit when W/T silence was relaxed.

(c) Intra Force Circuits

T.D.S. Primary. See 2 (b) above.

Administrative Circuit. Used for messages of a non tactical nature. Type 86 M sets were used and proved to be unsuitable as it was found that, except for small units, they could not be relied on to provide a circuit for rapid manoeuvring, when T.D.S. primary was congested.

LAW Primary. This circuit was used as the main air warning circuit, air situation reports and surface warning reports if ordered. Normally cruisers and above kept constant watch, destroyers were unable to do so owing to lack of equipment, and shifted to this circuit from administrative on receipt of Flash blue.

Inter P.D.O. Manned on receipt of Flash blue by cruisers and above for communication between P.D.Os. Owing to shortage of equipment the administrative circuit was used for this purpose.

A.A. Co-ordinators circuit. This circuit was used for A.A. co-ordination and controlled by the Fleet T.I.O. using an H/F wave. Very little experience was gained in its use, but nevertheless sufficient to justify its retention (see appendix 2).

RECOMMENDATIONS

A second T.D.S. in all ships is essential: as essential as several pairs of signal flags are for flag signalling. The 86 M was not designed for inter ship work and, in a large cruising disposition, proved unsuitable owing to its limited range. The maintenance of the set and the lack of spares in no way assisted a difficult situation.

It is important that destroyers should be able to maintain watch on LAW primary to keep their air plots up to date. Certain ships fitted with receiver S27 were able to do so, but others fitted with an 86 M only could not as constant watch was required on administrative circuit.

(d) SHIP - AIR

W/T sets in aircraft were set up and used as follows:-

Channel A. Carrier Private Frequency - P.R.U. aircraft and bombardment.

Channel B. 116.1 mc/s. Force C.A.P. C.A.P. for radar pickets.

Channel C. 140.58 Air/Sea Rescue. I/S Patrols.

Channel D. 142.74 Strike and Reconnaissance aircraft.

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Page 3.

(Appendix 3 to VABEF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

COMMUNICATIONS (Contd)

An H/P strike wave was available if required.

(o) SHIP - SHORE

The American ship to shore circuits were used and little difficulty was experienced. British stations with the exception of the base W/T ship at Manus and Australian stations could not be worked owing to their inability to authenticate.

(f) MISCELLANEOUS CIRCUITS

W/T guards were maintained on the following circuits:-

(a) 500 kc/s. Commercial wave.

(b) 3000 kc/s. General air warning Pacific area.

(c) 4475 kc/s. Life Guard H/P. A H/P D/F guard was also detailed for this circuit.

(d) 140.58 MHz Life Guard. A VH/F D/F guard was also detailed for this circuit.

Press

3. An attempt was made during this operation to pass Press by W/T direct from the scene of action instead of the previous method of sending copy by sea in returning oilers etc. The British administrative circuit was used together with any available British ship - shore circuits.

It was found early in the operations that communication with British stations was only possible from about 1700 local time onwards. Since W/T transmissions were normally secured by the Commander Third Fleet at about 1900, the time available for transmission was inadequate, and at no time was communication good enough to use the high speed equipment fitted. It was also extremely disappointing to all concerned that, although the transmitting ship's normal strength of signals was 4, the receiving station always reported interference strength five.

The transmitters type 57DR used by KING GEORGE V were poor on the higher frequencies and experience shows that although this set is excellent up to about 13000 kc/s it falls off rapidly above that frequency. At no time could communication be established with New Zealand or Australia on 20,440 kc/s.

It is considered that sufficient press was cleared to enable the British public to be kept informed and up to date with current naval affairs in the Pacific, but from remarks and letters from war correspondents it is quite evident that the individual newspapers were far from satisfied.

Visual Signals

4. Very little use was made of flag signalling as, in large circular dispositions, this method of manoeuvring is too slow. The daylight signalling lamps were in continual use, but were not sufficiently powerful for ships on the screen to read them. A more powerful D.S.L. with a guaranteed range of 10 miles, readable without glasses, is a very urgent requirement.

Traffic Handled

5. Owing to shortage of personnel it was not possible to keep an accurate record of the amount of traffic handled in the various positions i.e. flag deck, D.R.R. for tactical circuits, and C.C.O. for foxes.

A normal day's traffic was approximately 250 messages by V/S, 350 in D.R.R. and 650 on the foxes, the latter representing about 60,000 groups, of which 50% was normally broken down.

Complement

6. Proposed complements for ships of the British Pacific Fleet have been already forwarded under cover of my No. 602/2 of 5th June to the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet.

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Page 4.

(Appendix 3 to VADP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

COMMUNICATIONS (contd)

The actual complement in the force Flagship during these operations was:-

| | |
|-----|---|
| | 1 Commander (C) |
| | 1 Lieutenant Commander (C) |
| | 1 Lieutenant (C) under training |
| | 1 Lieutenant (CE) |
| | 1 Signal Boatman |
| | 1 Commissioned Telegraphist |
| | 1 Cypher Lieutenant (Sp. Cy.) |
| | 5 Sub-Lieutenants (Sp. Cy.) |
| | 1 Lieutenant Commander (U.S.N.R.) |
| | 5 Lieutenants (U.S.N.R.) Cypher Officers |
| | 3 Chief Petty Officers U.S.N. |
| W/T | 1 Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist |
| | 6 Petty Officer Telegraphists |
| | 9 Leading Telegraphists |
| | 47 Telegraphists, Ordinary Telegraphists and Boy Telegraphists. |
| | 1 Leading Coder |
| | 10 Coders |
| | 3 Radio Mechanics |
| V/S | 1 Chief Yeoman |
| | 5 Yeomen of Signals |
| | 6 Leading Signallers |
| | 18 Signallers, Ordinary Signallers and Boy Signallers. |
| | 7 Coders |

The above complement was just sufficient to compete with the traffic. The main burden fell upon the cypher staff both American and British and it is to their credit that they succeeded in keeping abreast the traffic.

Air Conditioning

7. During the recent replenishment period air conditioning was fitted in the C.C.O. The improvement in temperature and humidity was most marked contributing greatly to the efficiency of the work of the C.C.O., and it is strongly recommended that this should be generally fitted. During operation Iceberg there were 15 cases of ratings reporting to sick bay with some form of heat rash; during the present operations there was only one case. The temperature was normally kept at about 80°.

Y Parties

8. Y parties were embarked in FORMIDABLE and NEWFOUNDLAND. Very little information was obtained from this source due in all probability to the lack of reaction on the part of the enemy and scarcity of enemy air attacks.

R.C.M.

9. Owing to the complete absence of R.C.M. equipment in ships of the force it is not possible to remark on this important subject, which will be fully dealt with in the American report.

Maintenance

10. The greatest difficulty was experienced in maintaining the W/T equipment during these operations especially in Flagships. All sets were constantly in use and insufficient spare sets were available to allow of any set being put out of action long enough to carry out efficient maintenance.

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Page 5.

(Appendix 3 to VADFP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

COMMUNICATIONS (contd)

In this respect the VHF and T.D.S. sets gave the most trouble. The radio mechanic complement allowed to ships has not yet been implemented in the British Pacific Fleet but, even if it had been, it is considered that spare sets are essential if the unsatisfactory situation experienced in these operations is to be avoided in the future.

Summary

11. During this operational period, the ships of TF 37 became thoroughly familiar with the American communication methods, and were able to appreciate the efficiency of the organisation and the high standard of American equipment and operators.

The handling of this very large Fleet was carried out almost entirely by means of VHF R/T. It was in this respect that the British Force was to some extent handicapped and the need was felt both for better VHF equipment for inter-ship work, and for many more highly trained R/T operators.

12. Detailed recommendations for future policy arising from this experience together with a report on material will be forwarded separately to the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet.

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OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

Page 1.

(Appendix 4 to VALHF No. 1092/14 dated 1st October, 1945)

REPORT ON SUPPLY MATTERS

Replenishment of all kinds at sea is considered of such importance that this report has been made somewhat full and recommendations are made in detail. It consists of a diary of events followed by a summing up of the lessons learned by experience.

PART I - DIARY OF EVENTS

6th July

TF 37 left MANUS for the initial fuelling position. On 7th July KING GEORGE V, NEWFOUNDLAND, GAMBIA, UGANDA and ACHILLES topped up destroyers to ensure them having enough to reach the oilers. On this occasion KING GEORGE V supplied oil at the rate of 100 tons an hour, and the cruisers' rates varied from 60 to 120 tons per hour. Topping up from battleships and cruisers has been carried out frequently since, and it has been found that by judicious connection of all available pumps and by carrying their discharges into the hose in the right place, KING GEORGE V can deliver at 150 tons an hour and heavy cruisers at 100 tons an hour, as average figures.

13th - 15th July (34° 10' N 155° 30' E)

This was the first meeting with oilers prior to the first strike during the July - August operating period. Those present were SAN AMADO, WAVE EMPEROR and DINGLEDALE. It was WAVE EMPEROR's first appearance at sea to fuel the Fleet, and both her messengers and buoyant hoses were in bad condition. Messengers repeatedly carried away when being hauled in, and hoses burst when KING GEORGE V attempted to fuel. DINGLEDALE's hoses were in the same condition, and it was only owing to a third day being unexpectedly available due to an alteration in the plans of the Commander 3rd Fleet, that TF 37 was able to fuel in time. KING GEORGE V, after repeated partings of messengers and burstings of buoyant hoses, was forced to fuel alongside DINGLEDALE, although she was not yet fitted with 60 ft. derricks for this purpose. Fuelling was successful, and set a precedent in the Royal Navy, for battleships fuelling alongside at sea during operations. DINGLEDALE delivered fuel at 400 tons an hour with no trouble of any sort. No spring was used. The Master of DINGLEDALE was persuaded by the Captain of KING GEORGE V to keep station on KING GEORGE V and did so extremely well.

No provision or ammunition ships were present on this occasion.

20th - 22nd July (32° N 152° E)

The Service Force consisted of SAN ADOLPHO, WAVE MONARCH, SAN AMEROSIO and GLENARTNEY. On this occasion, INDIANAPOLIS, MAELF and RANGLER joined TF 37, and had fuelled by the time the Task Force made contact with the oilers. INDIANAPOLIS's group, had come up from MANUS at high speed and hence had required more fuel than had been anticipated, making the total fuel available some 2000 tons less than TF 37's requirements. The Commander Third Fleet, on request, agreed to supply oil, and NEWFOUNDLAND, GAMBIA and UGANDA fuelled from U.S. oilers of AG 30.8.

Again, burst hoses and low pumping rates so reduced the rate of fuelling that the Task Force would not have been in time for the next strike had not the oiling course been westerly, i.e. approaching the strike position. KING GEORGE V was the only heavy ship to fuel alongside (SAN ADOLPHO).

GLENARTNEY's first appearance in the Service Area was a great success. She gave fresh provisions to KING GEORGE V, INDIANAPOLIS, GAMBIA, BURNALUS and 17 destroyers and was most efficient and co-operative. The Master stated that, as he had no gyro compass, he preferred that warships except carriers should keep station on GLENARTNEY. Carriers provisioning alongside had to lie so far ahead in order to embark provisions by using the crane abaft the island, that it was unreasonable to expect them to keep station. The Master further agreed to provision a 5.25" cruiser on one side simultaneously with a destroyer the other side.

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(Appendix 4 to VADP No. 1092/14 dated 1st October, 1945)

PART I - DIARY OF EVENTS (Contd)

This occasion of IMPLACABLE provisioning was the first instance of a carrier replenishing alongside.

26th - 27th July (28° 00' N 138° 30' E)

The Service Force consisted of CEDARDALE, CARELIA, LAVE EMPEROR, EAGLESDALE, GLENARTNEY and ROBERT MAERSK; this was CARELIA's and EAGLESDALE's first fuelling at sea. With 50% of the oiling force never having oiled heavy ships before there was little hope for a quick fuelling.

FORMIDABLE oiled from alongside CARELIA and reported that her gear was well rigged and tended, and that her experienced Master and very young Chief Officer and Chinese crew showed great keenness. However, this could not overcome burst hoses and a pumping rate of barely 300 T.P.H. even although FORMIDABLE was the only ship oiling.

EAGLESDALE was handicapped by having only a single buoyant hose astern fitted, and only the port side fitted for oiling abeam. The overall pumping rate was so low that NEWFOUNDLAND and ACHILLES had to be sent to fuel from U.S. oilers of TG 30.8 as there was no hope of them being ready to leave on time otherwise.

On this occasion KING GEORGE V, FORMIDABLE and VICTORIOUS all fuelled alongside without difficulty and the practice was thus firmly established. None of the above ships used a spring or tow line and, in fact, none has ever been used by ships of TF 37 when oiling at sea; no provision for this need be made in the future.

After fuelling on 26th July, KING GEORGE V went alongside ROBERT MAERSK to embark 14 inch shells for trial, and disembark empty cordite cases. (ROBERT MAERSK had previously been called alongside KING GEORGE V in MANUS to check up on measurements etc.)

An 11 inch tow line was employed but its strength was quite inadequate. It parted and the embarkation was continued without it. On 27th July two hatches were worked, the forward hatch transferring to KING GEORGE V's forward screen derrick and the after one to the crane. To work ROBERT MAERSK's after hatch, a shell barrow had to be cut down in width to suit her deck and enable shell to be transferred to the inboard derrick. This barrow and two grabs were sent across. 44 shell and 68 cases of cordite were embarked forward and 50 shell and 87 cases cordite aft at a mean rate of 13 shell per whip per hour. The operation was carried out in a swell big enough to give ROBERT MAERSK considerable motion. Her small number of hands thus had great difficulty in controlling such heavy weights, which were lifted from the hold and transferred to the inboard derrick (nearest KING GEORGE V) without any steadying lines. Owing to crashing against ROBERT MAERSK's structure, several shell plugs became badly burred and difficult to remove. GLENARTNEY provisioned INDEFATIGABLE, FORMIDABLE, ACHILLES, NEWFOUNDLAND and BLACK BRINC.

31st July - 2nd August (28° 00' N 138° 30' E)

The Service Force consisted of LAVE KING, OLNA, CARELIA, LAVE GOVERNOR, GLENARTNEY, ROBERT MAERSK, COMIDA and ARJUNUS. This was OLNA's and LAVE GOVERNOR's first appearance so that again we had 50% of the oilers new to the game. OLNA fuelled 3 ships simultaneously at a combined rate of 1000 tons an hour and averaged over 700 tons an hour over the whole day's oiling. She was not immediately ready however, to supply Avgas by the alongside method, and her cargo had been loaded so that far too high a proportion of it was diesel oil which ships were not prepared to receive. The former short coming completely disturbed the whole oiling programme and added considerably to the carriers burdens.

(Appendix A to VALER No. 1092/44 dated 1st October, 1945)

PART I - DIARY OF EVENTS (Contd)

Due to her hurried sailing from SYDNEY, WAVE KING arrived in the Service Area 750 tons of Avgas short thereby enabling her to fuel one carrier only. There were frequent partings of her buoyant hoses, which were ascribed partially to the inferior quality of the new British made hoses she was using, and partly to the seizings to the jackstay being too few and too weak. This hose weakness was observed by KING GEORGE V when oiling alongside her. The hose burst if full pumping pressure was put on. These mishaps and the consequent reduction in pumping rate were a great disappointment and must have been also to the WAVE KING's efficient and energetic Master. The whole operation of replenishment was carried out in a long and unpleasant typhoon swell which ran at right angles to the wind and sea. As oilers became lighter, they developed a considerable roll, at times lifting forefoot and most of the screw clear of the water. This made oiling alongside a difficult business, but all ships, from KING GEORGE V downwards, accomplished it at the cost of a few parted hoses and very slight damage to TENSIONERS on WAVE KING.

THE GOVERNOR had the usual teething troubles but settled down satisfactorily. GLENARTNEY was again invaluable and supplied PORTSMOUTH, VICTORIOUS, GAMBIA, BURNHAM and a number of destroyers. On 31st July, KING GEORGE V embarked 82, 14 inch shell and 64 cases of cordite from ROBERT MAERSK, using forward hatch only. On this occasion shell came in at 21, and full charges at 60, per whip per hour. In order to assist ROBERT MAERSK to determine the deviation of her compass in the existing swell and with KING GEORGE V, alongside, a gyro repeater was sent across to her. Her Master, however, had not seen one before and was observed apparently setting his watch by it. He then shook his head and returned it to KING GEORGE V.

VICTORIOUS attempted to bomb up from ROBERT MAERSK on 1st August, but the latter was too small for existing swell conditions: CORINNA, a bigger ship, however, whose first appearance it was, succeeded in transferring 40 - 500 lb. bombs to PORTSMOUTH.

Experience with the A.E.'s and GLENARTNEY showed that ships with magnetic compasses have been dangerously affected by heavy ships alongside, in the case of ROBERT MAERSK this varied from 7 to 15 degrees with the roll and pitch. Gyro compasses are considered to be absolutely essential but in the meantime it cases matters if all ships, except carriers, keep station on the store ships or ammunition carriers although this is not easy under certain conditions. KING GEORGE V for example during ammunitioning had to vary her revs from 10 knots to Stop whilst station keeping.

On 2nd August, however, the swell had gone down enough to enable PORTSMOUTH to complete bombing up from ROBERT MAERSK.

ALBATROSS "Radio repair ship" arrived on the scene with 8 urgently needed CV 12 valves for the Task Force's radar sets, also a few transformers. She also supplied one IBS set and two rectifiers for Type 86M. Apart from these items her lack of stores and repair facilities prevented her undertaking radar repairs at all and limited her usefulness to transferring stores which could be made available between ships of the Task Force. Since the ships of the Force had sustained no action damage, no call was made on the Type 231 and Type 79 aerial gear which she carried.

6th - 7th August (34° 20' N 147° 00' E)

This was to have been a one-day fuelling, but luckily the two full tankers having arrived. (DINGEMALL and SAN AMADO) had been able to discharge oil into OLMA and WAVE KING before the Fleet's arrival thus providing four working oilers. KING GEORGE V, carriers and heavy cruisers had been warned to prepare their tanks to receive the maximum acceptable quantity of diesel oil, of which OLMA carried some 4,000 tons. In this connection, it is of interest to note that carriers and KING GEORGE V were willing to accept any amount of diesel oil for burning in furnaces, and heavy cruisers were willing to take up to 400 tons. It was considered inadvisable to give diesel oil to light cruisers and destroyers except in extreme emergency.

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(Appendix 4 to VASFP No. 1092/14 Dated 1st October, 1945)

PART I - DIARY OF EVENTS (Contd)

Oilers could not supply furnace oil and diesel simultaneously. The change-over took 20 minutes to effect by SAN AMADO when fuelling KING GEORGE V.

All went smoothly except when DINGLEDALE suffered from burst buoyant hoses to such an extent that fuelling astern of her was almost suspended. CHASER and ARDITER, however, had been sailed from MANUS with hoses to fuel destroyers astern, and by using them, after they had completed their air chores, they were able to deal with destroyers who would otherwise have had to be left behind when the Fleet left.

PORT RANGELL made her first appearance, but had no fresh provisions except onions and parsnips. She had, however, dry and refrigerated provisions and proved a willing horse. POSSIBLE, NEPPOUNLAND, GAMBIA, ACHILLES, BUCALUS and 9 destroyers drew provisions from her, calling at GLENAMERY for fresh provisions.

This was the latter's last appearance in the Service Area and the following is a brief summary of her activities:-

Vessels alongside - 77
Stores discharged - 422 tons
Average discharge rate - 7.5 tons per hour

PORT RANGELL volunteered to provision two ships simultaneously, with no reservations on size. Heavy ships and destroyers were therefore sent to her simultaneously and no difficulty was reported.

11th August (38° 00' N 146° 00' E)

The Service Force consisted of LAKE IMPEROR, OLNA, SAN ADOLPHO, SAN AMERIGO, SAN AMADO and PORT RANGELL. This was a one-day fuelling, in which KING GEORGE V by invitation of Com. 3rd Fleet, went to fuel from TG 30.8 whilst the Vice Admiral and others were attending a conference in USS MISSOURI who was fuelling simultaneously the other side of the tanker. Consolidation into OLNA and SAN AMADO made all five tankers useable, with the result that TF 37 was fuelled by the end of the day and three escorts as well - USK, GERALDTON and IPSWICH. USK, while fuelling on OLNA's starboard side, had a steering failure, with rudder jammed to port. Her port yardarm fouled OLNA's starboard after derrick, and before she drew clear ahead her topmast had been carried away above the crow's nest and OLNA's stem had struck her port side a glancing blow. Much hose gear was parted, but there were no casualties, and USK's seaworthiness was unaffected.

A typhoon, some 500 miles to the southward and moving in a N.N. Westerly direction, raised a swell which increased throughout the day and put considerable pitching movement on the oilers by the afternoon.

PORT RANGELL provisioned VICTORIOUS, GAMBIA, BUCALUS and 9 destroyers.

14th August (31° 45' N 144° 00' E)

On 12th August TF 37 split, the majority of heavy ships going south, forming TG 37.3. The remainder, consisting of KING GEORGE V, INDEFATIGABLE, NEPPOUNLAND, GAMBIA, TROUBRIDGE, TERRACIOUS, TERRAGANT, TERPSICHOPE, TEAZER, MARTINAR, MAPLER, NINIV, RANGLER and WAGFUL joined TF 38, forming TG 38.5. KING GEORGE V fuelled from USS CANBY, who gave her 1,190 tons at a rate of 8 1/4 tons per hour. Apart from the high pumping rate of this oiler, the following were the most notable points:-

- (a) The excellent station kept by this oiler.
- (b) The convenience of the working deck/transference of stores such as lube, oil and gas cylinders.
- (c) The seamanlike manner in which all gear was made up, stowed and handled.
- (d) The good material of the hoses which did not collapse when the oil was not being pumped through.

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(Appendix 4 to VADP No. 1092/14 dated 1st October, 1945)

PART I - DIARY OF EVENTS (Contd)

18th - 19th August (31° 00' N 142° 00' E)

By this date TG 38.5 had been augmented by DUKES OF YORK, LAGER and WHELP. The Service Force consisted of SAN AMEROSIO, SAN ADOLPHO, WAVE GOVERNOR and PORT BRANGELL. This was DUKES OF YORK's first occasion of oiling at sea and she went alongside WAVE GOVERNOR and had a certain amount of difficulty in connecting up the hoses. There was nothing further of note. PORT BRANGELL provisioned all destroyers (12) for one hour each on 18th. NAPIER fuelled from RULER.

On 19th NEWFOUNDLAND and GAMBIA provisioned from PORT BRANGELL and KING GEORGE V oiled from WAVE GOVERNOR.

20th August (32° 00' N 143° 00' E)

The Service Force present was WAVE GOVERNOR, GAMBIA and PORT BRANGELL. Destroyers only topped up.

It was intended to divide the day so that KING GEORGE V and INDEFATIGABLE each had half a day on PORT BRANGELL, but owing to the receipt of the order to disembark landing parties into assault transports, KING GEORGE V had to cast off from PORT BRANGELL at 1030. While provisioning however, she worked two whips, one forward and one aft, and succeeded in embarking 40 tons in 3½ hours - this being twice the average speed it comes in at Sydney.

In the late afternoon, TG 38.5 was dissolved. KING GEORGE V, DUKES OF YORK, NEWFOUNDLAND, GAMBIA, NAPIER, NIZAM, WHELP and LAGER formed TU 38.4.6 and joined TG 38.4.

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(Appendix No. 4 to VABFF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

PART II - GENERAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Fuelling

A high pumping rate and good hoses which will stand high pressure is the answer to fuelling at sea.

(a) (i) Pumping Rate - Furnace Oil. After a $4\frac{1}{2}$ day strike period, (which includes the approach to the combat area and retirement to the Service Area), the average requirement of the Task Force was 22,000 tons of fuel. With three tankers whose pumping rates are 300, 300 and 350 tons/hour, as was the case in the first fuelling, and assuming 12 hours of daylight available, two days are required to fuel the Task Force, if all goes well. For a one-day fuelling, at least 5 tankers of "DAVE" type are required (12 hours x 350 tons/hour x 5 tankers = 21,000 tons discharged) or 6 "SAN" or "DALE" type (12 x 300 x 6 = 21,600.) One heavy ship oiling singly from a "SAN" or "DALE" type can get 400 tons/hour, and about 450 tons/hour from "DAVE" type. It pays therefore to fuel heavy ships singly from these low pumping rate tankers. "OLNA" proved herself to be a satisfactory oiler. Her arrival had been eagerly awaited and perhaps a little bit too much had been expected of her, on this her first major oiling at sea. She had not, unfortunately, prepared to give Avgas by the abeam method and this considerably delayed VICTORIOUS completing and so disrupted the whole oiling programme.

Her overall average on her first day's fuelling was 700 T.P.H. Three "OLNA's" therefore would have fuelled the Task Force in one day (3 x 700 x 12 = 25,200 tons.)

"OLNA's" pumping rate dropped in later fuellings after experiencing four burst hoses simultaneously with BLACK PRINCE and a destroyer oiling either side.

It is suspected that one or the other shut valves against "OLNA's" pumps, and as a result she is frightened of using full pressure.

When she has settled down and overcome these teething problems she will be an invaluable addition to the Fleet and it is hoped that although the war is now over, her sister ship "OLEANDER" will be completed and put in commission.

(ii) Avgas. A high rate of pumping Avgas is an essential requirement of the modern tanker. 20 T.P.H. by the astern method was always liable to delay a Carrier's time of completion of fuelling.

"OLNA's" rate of pumping by the alongside method proved satisfactory when she brought it into play.

Fittings

(b) Oiler's fittings are now standardised, are generally satisfactory, except for the quality of the hoses. U.S.N. 6" hoses appear better than our own. A working deck, as fitted in U.S. oilers, is a necessity. Although in fact the Fleet was never attacked in the fuelling area, it became clear that quick release couplings were a necessity. It is suggested that A.A.F.T., whose assistant fuelling officer had good opportunities to inspect all U.S. gear for fuelling at sea, is best qualified to advise on the most suitable type to put into production for fuel and Avgas. In Para. 4 (a) of A.A.F.T.'s letter No. 4151/390 dated 2nd August, 1945 Type A.B.C. is recommended since it can be quickly coupled as well as released. This quality is very desirable, but not essential. It is understood that the couplings mentioned in A.F.O. 470/45 are for quick release only. H.E. FOUNDLAND has quick release coupling similar to the A.B.C. type, but without the quick coupling device. Her E.O. considers that it was of somewhat too

(Appendix No. 4 to VANCEP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

PART II - GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Contd)

heavy construction and could be made easier to handle and operate by slight modifications. If the quick release is operated, the length of sleeve which must disengage is such that the hose must be rigged so that there is no bend in it for about 4 feet each side of the coupling. Unless the coupling can pull out squarely along its axis, a jam is likely to result. A separate report is being forwarded by this officer.

Consolidation

(c) It is essential that oilers are able to do this in order to even out the fuel remaining for next oiling. During the period under review it was done by astern method twice owing to bad weather. The ideal would be to have the Fleet Oilers (say four "OLMA's) with freighters consolidating into them in the non-fuelling period.

D.S.B. Work and Exchange of Stores

2. (a) Although oiling presented many problems to be solved on the spot, these were completely overshadowed by the "headache" of meeting shortages of essential stores (chiefly radar equipment) and transporting them - when available - to ships requiring them. The general organisation for distribution of mails, stores and correspondence was finalised as follows:-

(b) Three D.S.B. ships were detailed, one for the main body and one for each half of the screen. In addition, it was found necessary to allocate one, and sometimes two, destroyers to A.C.1 for the transfer of pilots and air stores from the replenishment carrier. (These air stores on occasion, included some scores of drop tanks and several tons of heavy gear such as oxygen cylinders.) Further, it was generally necessary to send a destroyer to Com. 3rd Fleet for correspondence.

(c) Stores requirements were collected by signal the day before fuelling started and a general signal was made to ships in company stating requirements. On the fuelling day, as much use as possible was made of D.S.Bs for transferring stores between ships of their own groups. Otherwise transfers were made by destroyers immediately before or after oiling.

(d) Direct transfers were arranged whenever possible, heavy and light cruisers often going alongside battleships and carriers. Even so, destroyers generally had a hard time of it during fuelling periods. Of 16 destroyers who rendered statistics, the following are the average figures for 8 fuelling periods.

(i) Number of times fuelled from oilers - 13

(ii) Number of alongsides to ships other than oilers - 49
(highest figure was QUALITY, with 95 alongsides.)

(iii) The highest number of alongsides made in any one day was by TROMBANT with a total of 20, but this "record" is known to have been exceeded.

Corresponding figures for H.M.S. KING GEORGE V are:-

(iv) Number of times fuelled from oilers - 10

(v) Ships alongside - 230.

(e) It will thus be seen that destroyers had little rest. The requirements to remedy this state of affairs are:-

(Appendix No. 4 to VADP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

PART II - GENERAL REQUISITS AND REQUISITIONS (Contd)

- (i) That ships should be adequately stored before leaving base to avoid having to resort to what HUNTER aptly christened 'The Task Force opportunity market.' Some idea of the shortages involved may be gained from the signal shown below of "wants", which, it is emphasised, was pruned of everything save essentials and drastically cut down before being made.
- (ii) That the Logistic Support Group should contain enough destroyers (frigates and sloops are not fast enough but "HUNT" class destroyers would be most suitable) to take all D.S.B. work off destroyers of the Task Force.
- (iii) That Logistic Support Group should include, in addition to oilers, ships containing Naval Stores, Victualling Stores, Ammunition and repair facilities of all kinds.

TO:- GENERAL

FROM:- C.T.F. 37.

Following required. Any ship able to supply inform C.T.F.

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| BY FORMIDABLE | 100 lbs Freon Gas. |
| BY VICTORIOUS | (a) Two Radar Transformers 1 3027 (b) 100 Cubic Feet Hydrogen (c) Two tins Radar Art Compound (d) Radar crystals red spot CV 103, 4 in number. |
| BY DELICABLE | 2 cwt Caustic Soda (a) 2 gallons Artic Charlie Heavy Oil, or equivalent for Haldmark D.A.R. (b) 2 1/2 valves CV 1219 (HT 35) |
| BY BLACK PRINCE | (a) 100 Charlie Charlie Drums Iodine or equivalent tablets (b) Ten tablets neutral red stain. |
| BY UNDAUNTED | (a) Armanent Broadcast Transformer Pattern 12522 (b) 112 lbs Fireclay |
| BY TROUBRIDGE | (a) Field Coil for Pump Motor 1 point 1 BHP 220 volts 3 point 5 amps, maker Harland and Wolf (b) 2 gallons Colloidal Graphite (c) 10 feet seven core rubber covered flexible cable Sperry type. |
| BY URANIA | (a) Type 291 Transformer 1 4245 A. (b) One Carbon Pile Regulator 1 1696 (c) Two Striker Springs for 4 point 7 mark 92 star (d) Three Coston Gun Rods (e) Two tubes waterfinding paste (f) 14 lbs Grease for stern tube |
| BY NAPIER | (a) Two Radar Valves CV 1054 (b) Contact Block Pattern 650 Chernikeef Log Submerged Mechanism (c) Potentiometer Half Megohm Half Watt 100/0075 or 100/1478. |

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PART II - GENERAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Contd)

BY TRINGLER

- (a) Radar Transformer M 8290 for Radar Amplifier M 68 or loan of Amplifier M 53 (R) M 53 in lieu.
- (b) Type 293 Transmitter Blower Motor M 9353

BY TELMAGANT

- (a) Type 242 Transformer Pattern 54666
- (b) Type 285 Transformer M 8827
- (c) Three Microphones Pattern 13321 for action intercom.

050930 August.

Provisioning

3. "GLENARTNEY" and "PORT MANGELL" were a great success and made just that difference to the Task Force's well-being which is essential during a prolonged period at sea. With a view to reducing signals and to enable supplies to be obtained at short notice, battleships, carriers and cruisers were directed to lodge with "GLENARTNEY" specimen unit demands for provisions for one week. Ships could then signal for one or more units according to circumstances with the addition or subtraction of certain items according to their stocks at the moment, instead of having to signal a complete demand. The Victualling Store Officer in "GLENARTNEY" reported that this system had proved very useful.

"PORT MANGELL" carried very few fresh fruit and vegetables. These are an absolute essential to ships who have been several weeks at sea in a long drawn out war. She did, however, work two holds when provisioning KING GEORGE V, which enabled a total of 10 tons per hour to be embarked.

If "GLENARTNEY" had worked two holds at once, her rate of 7.5 tons per hour would probably have been doubled. It is realised that this is a matter for ships themselves to arrange, and "GLENARTNEY" would probably have done this if she had heard that "PORT MANGELL" had managed to do so.

The outstanding lack throughout the entire operation was of eggs, potatoes, fresh vegetables, fruit and water.

Ammunitioning

4. (a) As will be seen from Part I of this report, KING GEORGE V carried out this operation on three occasions at sea, once for trial and twice in earnest. Before leaving MANUS, "ROBERT MAERSK" had been placed alongside in order to examine the relative position of hatches and derricks.

(b) KING GEORGE V's experience at sea was that the U.S. "Bartoning" method is very satisfactory and can be carried out with existing ship's fittings.

The following are considered reasonable figures:-

| | |
|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| 14 inch shell | - 20 per hour per whip |
| Cordite | - 60 full charges per hour per whip, |
| | hoisting 6 cases in each load. |

(c) Weather conditions for the trial run were good, but for the other two occasions the wind was force 4 - 6, sometimes accompanied by heavy rain squalls. The sea varied from 45 - 55 which caused "ROBERT MAERSK" to pitch heavily.

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(Appendix No. 4 to VABPP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

PART II - GENERAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Contd)

(d) Station-keeping. The disparity in size between KING GEORGE V (40,000 tons) and ROBERT MAERSK (2,290 tons) made two things necessary:-

(i) That the latter keep station on KING GEORGE V. This her Master did with great skill in spite of much motion on the ship.

(ii) That the towing spring be dispensed with. It was quite useless. To make the operation generally possible in any but a calm sea a much bigger AE is required, 6,000 tons being the minimum and the ships selected must have gyro compasses.

(e) Loading. As far as 14 inch shell are concerned, AE's should be loaded so that the ratio of forward to after hold is 60/40, since it is not practicable to transfer ammunition from FX to AX in ships of the KING GEORGE V Class.

(f) Manning. AE's must carry enough hands to be able to work forward and after holds, without a break in the operation, for all daylight hours. Cheerful and whole-hearted as they were, ROBERT MAERSK's crew could not have achieved this.

(g) Ammunition Winches. Those in KING GEORGE V were not fast enough. If they had worked at the same speed as ROBERT MAERSK's the rate of embarking shell would probably have been stepped up to 24 per hour.

(h) Cruiser ammunitioning.

(i) Only one cruiser has embarked ammunition at sea. That was H.M.S. UGANDA, who carried out trials off MANUS on 11th June 1945, with ROBERT MAERSK. UGANDA used burtens from the AE to three positions, FX, boat deck and AX, and achieved the following rates under ideal weather conditions:-

FX - 130 6" shell + 30 cases cordite per hour.
AX - 90 6" shell + 18 cases cordite per hour.
Total 220 6" shell + 48 cases cordite per hour.

Boat deck - 120 cases 4" per hour, 9 cases per load, which were hauled over by hand. This was considered maximum good-weather load which could be manhandled across.

(ii) Difficulty was experienced with riding turns on the Quarterdeck 1½ ton winch drums. A warping drum or nigger head was required.

(iii) UGANDA used a towing spring successfully in this calm weather, but KING GEORGE V's experience in rough weather was that it was neither necessary nor desirable.

(iv) The necessity for maximum heights for loads of whips into cruisers is stressed. When using the crane, the load should be at the head of the crane. For embarkation onto Forecastle and Quarterdeck, UGANDA recommends that special spars, 32 feet long, be supplied, with fitted positions for them abreast "B" turret and the after screen.

(v) Except for small loads, burtening is better than a jacksay.

Bombing up by Carriers

5. (a) Reports of bombing up during operation ICEBERG have already been forwarded by the Rear Admiral Commanding Fleet Train to the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet.

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PART II - GENERAL ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Contd)

(b) It appears that 4 500 lb. bombs per hoist is the maximum load which can be conveniently handled, necessitating about 60 men manning the carrier's inhaul. A Clarkat or Ford tractor to take up the slack has been found effective.

(c) Rocket heads are conveniently embarked in nets, 10 boxes per net.

(d) Rate of embarkation. Best rate achieved was by INDOMITABLE and was 120 bombs per hour, i.e. 30 loads per hour. INDEFATIGABLE embarked rocket heads at a rate of 34 loads i.e., 340 heads per hour, the loads coming in at the same rate as the bomb loads.

(e) Carriers inhaul. The best rig seems to be that used by INDOMITABLE namely 60 fathoms of 2½" wire tailed by 40 fathoms of 4" hemp. This inhaul should be made up in such a manner that it will render through the loading blocks if it had to be let go in an emergency.

(f) Again it is emphasised that ROBERT MLENK was short handed for this operation.

General

6. In all reports of proceedings and of replenishment at sea two factors stand out pre-eminently as those which made it possible. The first is the good average weather of the Western Pacific, and the second is the absence of any attack on the British Pacific Fleet in the Service Area. In making full use of the former and regarding the latter as a legitimate risk to take, we followed the example of the U.S. Fleet, and it paid handsome dividends.

7. It has been proved through our recent experiences that all previous conceptions of ships proceeding alongside one another whilst under way have gone by the board.

Thus in the United States Navy a battleship went alongside a battleship, MISSOURI transferring some 250 men to SOUTH DAKOTA by 14 jackstays in about one hour whilst under way at 8 knots. In both Fleets heavy cruisers go alongside battleships to transfer gear and stores; battleships and aircraft carriers to oil and provision alongside; all this not only in calm weather but in the normal weather to be expected in an open ocean like the Pacific with winds force 4 to 6 and sea 45 to 55.

Recommendations derived from the above will be forwarded separately.

SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

Page 1.

(Appendix No. 5 to VABFF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945.)

FIGHTER DIRECTION AND AIR WARNING

General

These operations have been the occasion of the largest purely Naval Fighter Direction and Air Warning organisation of the war. The air over an ocean area of more than 5,000 square miles was effectively denied to the enemy. In addition to the usual problems of air warning and interception the number of separate formations operating many miles apart, called for a central control which went far beyond anything previously required.

2. To the British participant the following subjects were of particular significance and interest and this appendix has been divided into parts accordingly:-

- Part I The satisfactory results achieved in the defence of a Naval Force operating constantly within easy reach of the Japanese Metropolitan Air Force.
- Part II The outstanding success of the specially fitted Fighter Direction Picket Destroyers.
- Part III The organisation for the central control of all aircraft movements, detections and interceptions.
- Part IV The relationship of air and surface plotting.
- Part V The general superiority of American Radar Equipment as at present fitted in ships.
- Part VI The absolute dependance of the whole air defence organisation on reliable and flexible communications.

Part I Results obtained

3. Complete air superiority over the Third Fleet was achieved. The part played by the long war of attrition against the Japanese Air Force; the growing vehemence of the sustained attacks by American Army Super-Fortresses; and the local air superiority achieved over Japanese Air stations by the carrier borne strike aircraft, were major factors in obtaining this result. No doubt the Commander U.S. Third Fleet will be able to assess the relative importance of these factors.

4. The early warning given by the American Intelligence organisation and the prompt interception of search aircraft when enemy formations were expected to attack, further prevented any large scale attack being launched on the Fleet.

5. An abundance of search aircraft and of small parties of suiciders provided an ample test of the Fleet's fighter defences. Those that closed to within 50 miles of any unit and escaped were the rare exception, while a total of 48 Japanese aircraft were shot down by the combat air patrol in the vicinity of the Fleet.

6. The 48 "kills" were obtained as follows:-

| | | |
|--|-----------|----|
| (a) Picket directed interceptions. | 26 | |
| (b) U.S. Carrier directed interceptions. | 12 | |
| (c) British Carrier directed interceptions | 5 | |
| (d) Undirected visual sightings by C.A.P. | 5 | |
| | <u>48</u> | 60 |

SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

Page 2.

(Appendix No. 5 to VADP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

FIGHTER DIRECTION AND AIR WARNING (Contd)

Part II Pickets

7. Three pickets were employed and were normally stationed 40 - 60 miles from the Fleet guide so as best to provide remote cover over 180 degrees in the general direction of expected attack. The two pickets on either flank acted in addition as a rendezvous and examination station for returning strike aircraft.

8. Each picket comprised at least 4 destroyers of which one or more was fitted with Radar Type SP, the latest mark of SC, Type SG, a YE beacon, RCM equipment and all necessary communications. All destroyers on picket duty were fitted with adequate radar and carried fighter direction teams, so that although the SP fitted ship acted as leader, each was able to undertake some warning or interception duty.

9. The standard of both day and night interception by the pickets was fully equal to that of the Fleet carriers and the prompt way in which interceptions were carried out deserved the highest praise.

10. It will be observed from the figures in para. 6 that the three pickets were responsible for 26 directed interceptions as compared with 17 controlled by some 16 Fleet carriers. Even these figures favour the carriers since many of the carrier successes were against aircraft which approached from the side on which there were no pickets and were only shot down relatively close to the Fleet.

11. Previous experience when the British Force had been alone, had shown the importance of suicide aircraft being detected and intercepted as far from the main body as possible. The use of pickets was designed and effectively achieved this object.

12. The success of the pickets may be attributed to:-

- (a) Freedom from radar saturation, being stationed well away from the main force and its C.A.P.
- (b) Having as their primary function the control of aircraft and being specially fitted and manned for that purpose.
- (c) Constant action practice.

13. In the British Pacific Fleet, lacking destroyers fitted with any adequate equipment, strenuous efforts were made to train cruisers to the necessary standards and their A.D.R. complements were increased accordingly. Although the efficiency of the cruisers showed notable improvement, they could not have been expected to achieve the same proficiency as the SP fitted destroyers to whom Aircraft Direction is the primary daily function.

14. The use of the pickets has not been restricted to carrier Task Force operations. On the occasion of each bombardment the force has included one SP picket destroyer, which during the bombardment itself was stationed ten or more miles on the disengaged side, having particular regard to freedom from land echoes. The picket controlled the fighters over the force by day and by night and provided warning which the bombarding ships lacked owing to land echoes. On each occasion the picket carried out its duties in a most efficient manner and set a standard which no battleship or cruiser - with their few opportunities for operational control - could hope to emulate.

15. Accounts of the occupation of Okinawa show that although taking heavy casualties, the pickets, acting as remote Fighter Direction and Radar warning stations, played a vital part in the success of that amphibious operation.

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OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

Page 3.

(Appendix No. 5 to VADFP No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

FIGHTER DIRECTION AND AIR WARNING (Contd)

16. It is difficult to judge where future development may lie. It would however be rash to ignore the marked success of these specialist ships, without which the casualties to major units must necessarily have been much higher.

Part III Force Organisation

17. For the purpose of force control and reporting the British Task Force 37 acted as a "group" of Task Force 38 and accepted the directions of Task Force 38 Force Fighter Direction Officer.

18. TF 38 Force Fighter Direction Officer

(a) Detailed the size of C.A.P. to be maintained by each group and exercised overriding control over their normal patrol positions.

(b) While not restricting the right of any group or picket to initiate interceptions, exercised control with a view to preserving overall cover and to preventing confusion due to too many formations seeking to intercept simultaneously.

(c) Received reports from each group whenever C.A.P. aircraft were directed away from their patrol positions.

(d) Maintained an overall air plot based upon his own and other groups' radar reports and information of friendly movements received from other groups.

(e) Acted as a central evaluation for identification purposes.

It will be observed for the purposes of analogy, that the Force F.D.O. combined the functions known to the Royal Air Force as "Group Control" and "Movement Liaison".

19. In addition to the functions normally associated with Fighter Defence, the Force F.D.O., also

(a) Maintained a surface plot of the relative positions of all groups and pickets and issued periodical surface situation reports. This plot was maintained by groups reporting the relative positions of their neighbours and by radar fixes on the C.A.P.'s orbiting the pickets.

(b) Controlled the employment and direction of air sea rescue submarines and aircraft.

(c) Evaluated reports of interceptions of enemy radar and controlled the use of R.C.M.

20. All these activities were carried out on a single channel of communication.

21. In the result, this organisation gave the whole Force a very fair idea of what was going on in the area. With more than three times as many aircraft airborne, it could hardly be expected that the picture would be so clear as when a single group was operating alone. Certainly the British Group never achieved the clear air plot to which it had grown accustomed when operating alone off the SHIKISHIMA GUNTO.

22. While it is probable that the British Force did not reap the full benefit of all the information available owing to unfamiliarity with the organisation and to the difficulties in relating air and surface plots referred to in Part IV of this appendix, it is considered that when so large a force is operating, a rather broader organisation is required to ensure that channels of communication are not overcrowded and that all information received can be used.

(Appendix No. 5 to VJCF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

FIGHTER DIRECTION AND AIR ARMING (Contd)

(a) While the advantage of passing all information on one channel is great, it resulted in these operations, in unacceptable delays. If relative surface movements were passed on a separate Action Information channel it is considered that the task of both air and surface plotters would be eased.

(b) There is a similar advantage in all information being received directly by the Force or Group FDO, provided that the volume of information is not so great as to make it impossible for him to deal with it all. In the British Group the U.S.N. Fighter Direction Liaison Officer acted for certain purposes as assistant to the Group FDO, and it is considered that the Air Complement of a Carrier Squadron Flagship should allow for such an assistant.

23. Murally controlled procedure is no less necessary on inter-group Fighter Direction Channels than on other channels. No small part of the congestion which at times existed on the one channel used was due to the "running commentary" style and general discussion in which groups were apt to indulge.

Part IV Surface Plotting in Fighter Direction

24. The air reporting organisation was based upon the American concept of the Combat Information Centre as a single room in which all air movements, surface movements, Radar, R.C.M. and 'Y' are plotted and controlled.

25. When reports of aircraft are received from ships or groups whose relative positions are constantly changing over a wide area, it is necessary, either that those reports be made by reference to a geographical grid or that the relative positions of the reporting stations be constantly and accurately plotted. Grid reporting, while possessing advantages for inshore work has never been found sufficiently accurate at sea.

26. In order to provide a constant surface plot, all Task Groups and Pickets regularly reported each other's positions and situation reports were broadcast by the Task Force F.D.O. in the same way as air situation reports are broadcast by the Carrier Flagship under British Procedure.

27. In American ships the surface plot, being in the same room as the Air Plot, is readily available to Aircraft Direction personnel. The price however is a high noise level and a general level of light which may not always be satisfactory for the various Radar displays.

28. British carriers suffered from lack of adequate surface plotting arrangements in or adjacent to the A.D.R., while even in ships having the full A.I.O. the arrangements for relating surface to air were not turned to the best advantage.

29. A better appreciation of the surface requirements of aircraft direction is needed and the operations room should be responsible for providing the A.D.R. with "told" surface plots in the same way as to the Bridge Plotting Room.

30. It is recommended that Surface Plots told to the A.D.R. should be plotted on an A.R.L. Table fitted with the new Projected Grid to facilitate the transposition of air plots received from other ships. The latter can then be plotted on the M.A.D.P. in the ordinary way - a telling line being provided from the A.R.L. table to the back of the M.A.D.P.

31. Experience in these operations suggests that, while it might not be desirable wholly to merge the Operations Room and Aircraft Direction Room, the best arrangement for relating air and surface plots remains to be found.

(Appendix No. 5 to VABIF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

FIGHTER DIRECTION AND AIR WARNING (Contd)

Part V. Radar

32. These operations have provided an opportunity to compare the performance of British Naval Air Warning with its American counterpart. This comparison is for the most part made on the basis of what was in fact reported or not reported at the time.

33. It must be freely admitted that in general the American Air Warning Radar as fitted to-day presents a broader, clearer, and more accurate picture of aerial activity than that in British ships.

High Warning

34. Above 25000 feet type 79B and, to a lesser extent type 281B provide more reliable warning than type SK II. Once however, aircraft have closed to 50 - 60 miles, i.e. within the range of type SP, the latter gives much more accurate and reliable plots up to 35000 feet. While this shortcoming at extreme range is overcome by the Americans by the use of Radar Pickets fitted with SP, it is not always possible to provide pickets and the excellent high warning given by these British sets is a valuable asset, particularly for search when Types 79 and 281B are used in combination.

Medium Warning

35. The warning range of type SK II at heights below 15000 feet has repeatedly been shown to be greater than comparable British Naval sets.

Low Warning

36. Types SM and SP have consistently provided greater range and more constant tracking than type 277.

Discrimination

37. The Manoeuvre Beam and water "echoes" of all American warning sets is a great advantage - particularly in the saturated conditions around a large Task Group.

Height Finding

38. Type SP appears to give quick and reliable heights up to 35000 feet or more. The limited range is discounted by the use of pickets. The Americans thus have little occasion to use the amplitude measurement method for which Type SK II is ill suited and which at best is never very reliable.

Land Echoes

39. With certain configurations of the land types 79 and 281 have a considerable advantage over type SK II, due to their lack of low cover.

General

40. It is recognised that the three basic Naval Sets 79, 281 and 277 are due for replacement. They have given good service in their time. If they are now outclassed by newer American equipment, nobody should be surprised.

Part VI. Communications.

41. Whereas in the matter of Radar Equipment, the superiority of the Americans was only a matter of degree, and the British force had little difficulty in maintaining a tolerable standard of warning at all times, the communications were a constant anxiety and at times threatened the organisation with complete breakdown.

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OPERATIONS JULY - AUGUST

Page 6.

(Appendix No. 5 to VADPF No. 1092/14 of 1st October, 1945)

FIGHTER DIRECTION AND AIR WARNING (Contd)

42. Complete reliability and flexibility of communications are essential to air defence. In the British Force, the number of available sets was barely sufficient to man the minimum number of channels required. In the result, sets have been in constant use and frequent breakdown of equipment, made good by untiring but hasty improvisation from inadequate resources, has, in the latter stages of the operation, been the rule rather than the exception.

43. In particular, the H.F. equipment of the British ships failed to maintain the necessary communications at ranges up to 60 - 70 miles, while the tedious process of tuning the transmitters was an offence to the Force as a whole.

44. The number of channels required in an operation of this magnitude is dealt with elsewhere in this report and it must suffice for the purpose of this Appendix to draw the contrast between the British equipment and that of American ships which was notable for its reliability, quick tuning, and the flexibility which enabled them to switch rapidly between any of ten VHF channels.

1092/14 16 Oct 5
SECRET

SUBJECT: OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST.

FROM: THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRON,
BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

DATE: 29th July, 1945. No. 0109/16/685.

TO: THE VICE ADMIRAL, SECOND-IN-COMMAND, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.
(Copies to:- The Commanding Officers, H.M. Ships
VICTORIOUS, FORMIDABLE,
INDEFATIGABLE, IMPLACABLE
and INDOMITABLE.)

Reports covering air operations carried out by Task Force 37, as
a Task Group of Task Force 38, on 17th and 18th July and 24th and 25th July,
1945, are forwarded herewith.

17TH AND 18TH JULY

2. This period was distinguished by adverse flying weather, in the
target area on 17th and in the operating zone on the 18th, on which day
Seafires were near lost on two occasions whilst endeavour was made to find
clear enough conditions in extensive fog to land on these low endurance
aircraft.

Seafires

3. Following the failure of all the Brotherhood Air Compressors
fitted in H.M.S. INDEFATIGABLE, 3 carriers only were available for these
strikes, one of which was Seafire armed.

Since Seafire L.IIIIs, with which H.M.S. IMPLACABLE is equipped,
cannot be effectively operated above 15,000 feet, they are not even
available for the upper flight of the C.A.P. The problem which faces
planners is how to employ them when operating tactically with the U.S.
Carrier Task Force, which strikes normally, as on 17th July, 150 to 230
miles from assigned targets - distances outside the range of Seafires
required for combat and strafing. In this instance, due to initiative
on the part of Captain C.C. Hughes Fallett, C.B.E., R.N., H.M.S. IMPLACABLE,
the Seafires carried 89 gallon overload tanks, which made it practicable
to send them to the nearer targets. Even then they had no reserve.

/ 4. Targets

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OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST
(The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier
Squadron's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July, 1945.)

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17TH AND 18TH JULY (Contd.)

Targets

4. The targets offered our Air Squadrons on these two days were reasonable - after the arid wastes of Sakishima - for the richness of the prizes which they offered. To take opportunity by the forelock in the matter of destruction of grounded aircraft, careful study of recent photographs is needed, since the best prizes are the best concealed and such few aircraft as are obviously placed are difficult to distinguish from a cockpit from the high class duds with which they are ranged.

On the 18th such a study was not practicable since the last minute changes in target assignments, rendered necessary by the weather coupled with the delay incidental in passing the originator's orders by R/T through another Task Group on an overcharged line, left insufficient time for the necessary briefing, if the departure of the strikes was not to be unacceptably delayed.

VICTORIOUS - Petrol Failure

5. The striking power of the Task Group was seriously impaired on 18th July through the leakage of salt water into a petrol tank in VICTORIOUS, which resulted in that ship being able to despatch one strike of 3 Corsairs only during the day.

Sea of Japan

6. British aircraft paid their first recent visit to the Sea of Japan on the 17th July when Corsairs, which had been attacking the airfield at NIIGATA on the West Coast, sighted and raked with gun fire a 4,000 ton Japanese tanker offshore.

Carriers Operating

7. The ships, POSSIBLE, VICTORIOUS, INFLAMMABLE.

/ 24TH AND 25TH JULY

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OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST
(The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier
Squadron's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July, 1945.)

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24TH AND 25TH JULY

Weather

8. On the 24th: rainsqualls, occasional mist with fair intervals at sea: conditions ashore very good.

On the 25th conditions were excellent at sea but the target areas were closed right down in cloud for the greater part of the day, and it was practicable only to attack such targets as were sighted in clear patches.

Targets

9. Of the 402 sorties flown on the 24th, 131 were C.A.P., and 271 were offensive, of which 36 aborted due to thick weather.

The main weight of the attacks, both by fighters and bombers, was thrown against airfields and their installations: the main airfields were well protected by flak, which was reflected in the Seafire losses, which had to be used for offensive missions (carrying the oversize jettison tank).

Early in the day 3 had been reported lost to flak, the pilots being lost, while 3 more had been ditched, classed as operational. Of these, 2 were probably combat, since the pilots had baled out or the aircraft crashed on the return journey: evidence of flak hits, to which Seafires, with their water-cooled engines, and too high a proportion of their petrol in the drop tank, are excessively vulnerable.

Thereafter the scope of their missions was restricted.

The bombing attacks on hangars and dispersal areas were carried out according to plan: it is a disadvantage of this type of mission that destruction to aircraft destroyed or damaged in the hangars and dispersals cannot, for the most part, be assessed or claimed for lack of evidence.

Cancelled Strike

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OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST
(The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier
Squadron's No. 0109/16/603 of 29th July, 1945.)

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24TH AND 25TH JULY (Contd.)

Cancelled Strike

10. In view of Commander Task Force 38's expressed intention to withdraw at 1630/23, I most reluctantly cancelled the strike due to take departure at 1430: in the event ~~this was a bad decision as the combined~~ forces were still in the operating area at 1830.

Avgas

11. The maximum Avgas capacity of ILLUSTRIOUS class carriers is just not sufficient for 2 fifteen hour operating days; very early remedial action is required.

Abortive Dusk Attack 25th July

12. Credit is due to H.M.S. FORLIDABLE for the direction of her night Hollants, and to their pilots as prime movers, in the disruption of a group of Torpedo Bombers which threatened the combined Fleets at late dusk.

Guide

13. It was found, when enemy aircraft were in the vicinity, an ~~embarrassment~~ to have the command and guide of the Task Force in the carrier with the night fighters, since the Fleet is immobilised in wind whilst the aircraft are being operated.

Carriers Operating

14. H.M. ships FORLIDABLE, VICTORIOUS, IMPLACABLE and INDEFATIGABLE.



VICE ADMIRAL.

Enclosures:

See over.

SECRET

OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST
(The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier
Squadron's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July, 1945.)

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Enclosures :

1. Summary of Strikes. - p.71
2. VICTORIOUS' No. 0217/8695 of 20th July, 1945. - p.78
3. VICTORIOUS' No. 0217/3707 of 26th July, 1945. - p.72
4. INDEFATIGABLE's No. 142/1722/00190/9 of 25th July, 1945. - p.94
5. IMPLACABLE's No. 0.7/2360 of 19th July, 1945. - p.95
6. IMPLACABLE's No. 0.7/2388 of 26th July, 1945. - p.116
7. FORMIDABLE's No. 852/024 of 27th July, 1945. - p.118

SUMMARY OF STRIKES

SECRET

(Enclosure No. 1 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July 1945)

Page 1.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|--|--|-----------|--|--------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Strike and Ship | Ordered | Flown Off | Reached Target | Main Target(s) | Bombs and Rockets Dropped or Fired at Targets | Enemy Aircraft Damaged or Destroyed | Ships Sunk or Damaged | Other Damage to Enemy | Own Combat Losses |
| (Total sorties will be less than that shown under offensive sorties reported to Com. 3rd Fleet in accordance with FC-TPI-2 as certain offensive missions e.g. Photo. sorties are not shown.) | (This shows number required by full flying programme. On second successive strike day number in any serial is reduced. This reduction has not been allowed for.) | | (Aircraft shown are only those which carried out an aimed attack at a genuine target.) | | | On Ground In Air | | | (Only those which are known to have been caused by enemy action. The total does not represent total sum of aircraft lost during offensive missions.) |
| 17th July | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. FOR IDABLE | 16 Corsair | 16 | 16 | MASUDA SENDAI MATSUSHIMA } A/P | 32 x 500 lb. | 5 Dest. 3 Dam. | - | Hangars and Buildings hit | 3 Corsairs (all pilots safe.) |
| 2. IMPLACABLE | 8 Firefly | 7 | 7 | MASUDA MATSUSHIMA } A/P | 28 R.Px 60 lb. | 1 Dest. | - | 1 Junk sunk | - |
| 3. VICTORIOUS | 16 Corsair | 16 | Strike Abortive - Bad Weather | | | - | - | - | - |
| 4. IMPLACABLE | 12 Seafire | 12 | Strike Abortive - Bad Weather | | | - | - | - | - |
| 5. FOR IDABLE | 12 Corsair | 10 | 10 | NIIGATA A/P | 13 x 500 lb. | 2 Dest. 2 Dam. | - | Hangars and Buildings | - 71 |

SUMMARY OF STRIKES

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(Enclosure No. 1 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July 1945)

Page 2.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|----|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----|------------------|---|
| 17th July (contd.) | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. VICTORIOUS | 12 Corsair | 12 | 9 | NIIGATA A/F | 10x500 lb. | 1 Dest. 5 Dam. | - | - | - |
| ALL'S TOLD | 78 | 73 | 42 | - | 83x500 lb. 28x60 lb.R.P. | 9 Dest. 9 Dam. | Nil | 1 Junk sunk | Hangars and airfield build- ings at MASUDA, SENDAI, MATSU- SHIMA and NIIGATA hit. Trains hit. |
| 18th July | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. POTENTIAL | 16 Corsairs | 16 | 16 | NOBARA) NARUTO) A/F CHOSI) | 32x500 lb. | - | - | - | Airfield Bldgs 1 Corsair (pilot missing) |
| 2. DEFACABLE | 8 Fireflies | 8 | 8 | KONOIKE A/F | 28 R.P.x60lb. | 2 Dam. | - | - | Airfield Bldgs |
| 3. VICTORIOUS | - | Strike Not Flam | | - | - | Water in Ships Petrol System | | | - |
| 4. DEFACABLE | 12 Seafires | 12 | 11 | KONOIKE A/F | - | 1 Dest. 8 Dam. | - | Junks damaged | Hangars strafed |
| 5. POTENTIAL | 8 Corsairs | 8 | 8 | KATORI) KANOEKE) A/F KITAURA SS | 8x500 lb. | 6 Dest. 3 Dam. | - | - | Buildings hit. 1 Corsair (pilot missing) |

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SUMMARY OF STRIKES

SECRET.

(Enclosure No. 1 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July 1945)

Page 3.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|--------------------|-------------|----|----|---|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------|---|
| 18th July (contd.) | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. IMPLACABLE | 8 Seafires | 7 | 7 | MIYAKAWA } NARUTO } A/F | - | Aircraft attacked believed all armies | | | |
| 7. VICTORIOUS | 12 Corsairs | 6 | 6 | NARUTO } MIYAKAWA } A/F | 10x500 lb. | 5 Dest. 5 Dam. | - | - | Hangars hit |
| DW'S TOTAL | 64 | 57 | 56 | - | 50x500 lb. 28x60 lb.R.P. | 12 Dest. 18 Dam. | Nil | Junks damaged | Hangars and air- field buildings at NOBARA, NARUTO, CHOSI, KONOIKE, KATORI, KITAURA and MIYAKAWA hit. |
| 24th July | | | | | | | | | |
| 1A. IMPLACABLE | 12 Corsairs | 12 | 11 | KURASHIKI } OKAYAMA } A/F TAKAMATSU } | 22x500 lb. M.C. | 2 Dest. 10 Dam. | - | - | Factory damaged |
| 1B. IMPLACABLE | 12 Seafires | 12 | 12 | KOMATSUSHIMA TOKUSHIMA | - | 1 Dest. 3 Dam. | - | - | Workshops strafed |
| 1C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Corsairs | 12 | 12 | TAKAMATSU A/F SUTA SS | 8x500 lb.M.C. | 1 Dest. 3 Dam. | - | 1 Junk sunk Others Dam. | Blags. hit |

SUMMARY OF STRIKES

SECRET.

(Enclosure No. 1 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July 1945)

Page 4.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
|---------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|-------------------|---|---|-------------------|---|--|--|--|
| 24th July (contd.) | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Combined. (ex VIOLOPIOUS) | 20 Avengers 12 Seafires 8 Fireflies 4 Corsairs | 19 Av 10 Se 8 Fi 4 Co | 19 9 7 4 | TOKUSHIMA A/F | 76x500lb. M.C. 12x120lb. Frag. clusters | 7 Dam. | - | 4 Junks damaged | Hangar and A/F installations damaged | 1 Avenger (crew missing) |
| 2C. VICTORIOUS | 8 Corsairs | 8 | 8 | KURASHIKI FUKUYAMA A/F SUTA | 14x500lb. M.C. | 1 Dest. 6 Dam. | - | Junks damaged | - | - |
| 2D. INDETERMINABLE | 12 Seafires | 12 | 11 | TAKAMATSU KANNONJI | - | 2 Dest. 4 Dam. | - | - | - | - |
| 3. Combined. (ex POSSIBLE) | 20 Avengers 8 Seafires 8 Fireflies 4 Corsairs | 20 Av 8 Se 7 Fi 4 Co | 6 - 7 2 | Shipping includ- ing CVE off NE Coast SHIMOKU | 28x500lb. M.C. 16x120lb. Frag clusters | - | - | One hit on CVE. 1 SOS } 1 SD } sunk 1 Junk } | - | 1 Firefly (crew missing) Note: This strike became much separ- ated in poor weather. |
| 3A. POSSIBLE | 8 Corsairs | 8 | 8 | FUKUYAMA KURASHIKI SUTA TAKUMA | 8x500lb. M.C. | 3 Dest. 4 Dam. | - | FTB damaged | - | - |
| 3B. IMPLACABLE | 12 Seafires | 10 | 9 | Shipping off SHIMOKU | - | - | - | Junks etc. struffed | - | - |

SUMMARY OF STRIKES

SECRET.

(Enclosure No. 1 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July 1945)

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
|--------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|-------------------|--|--|-------------------|---|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| 24th July (contd.) | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Combined (ex VICTORIOUS) | 20 Avengers 12 Seafires 8 Fireflies 4 Corsairs | 16 Av 10 Se 8 Fi 4 Co | 16 6 8 4 | TAKAMATSU A/P | 64x500lb. M.C. 12x120lb. Prag clusters | ? Dam. | - | - | 3 Hangars destroyed Bldgs damaged | - |
| 40. VICTORIOUS | 12 Corsairs | 12 | 12 | Shipping - Inland Sea | 20x500lb. M.C. | - | - | 1 SD sunk Luggers hit 1 FTC straffed | Factory and Railway Bldgs hit | - |
| 5. Combined | 8 Avengers 4 Corsairs 8 Fireflies | 8 4 8 | 8 4 8 | Shipping - UNO Area (Inland Sea) | 28x500lb. | - | - | 1 FTB dam. 1 Tug } sunk 1 Barge } | - | - |
| 51. FEARFUL | 12 Corsairs | 12 | 11 | Shipping - Inland Sea | 13x500lb. | - | - | CVE hit 2 FTB dam. | - | - |
| 5B. IMPATABLE | 8 Seafires | 7 | 7 | SUTA SS | - | 5 Dest. 1 Dam. | - | - | - | - |
| 5D. INEXHAUSTIBLE | 12 Avengers 8 Seafires | 11 Av 7 Se | 11 7 | KOBE class CVE | 43x500lb. | - | - | CVE hit twice and one near miss | - | - |

SUMMARY OF STRIKES

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
|-------------------|------------|-----|-----|--------------------------------|--|----------------------------|---|--|---|--|
| 24th July (Contd) | | | | | | | | | | |
| DAY'S TOTAL | 280 | 261 | 227 | - | 324x500 lb. 40x120 lb. frag. clusters | 15 Des. 31 plus Des. | - | 1 CVE hit 4 times and 1 near miss. 1 SOS sunk. 2 SD sunk. 4 PTB damaged. 1 SD sunk. 1 FTC strafed. 1 Tug sunk. 2 Junks sunk. 4 plus Junks damaged. 1 barge sunk. Luggers and barges damaged. | Factories, workshops, Airfield and Railway Buildings damaged. 3 Hangars des- troyed at TAKAMATSU. | 1 Corsair 1 Seafire 1 Avenger 1 Firefly |
| 25th July | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1A. FORMIDABLE | 12 Corsair | 8 | 8 | Shipping Recce. Inland Sea. | 16x 500 lb. M.C. | - | - | - | Unidentified Factory hit. | - |
| 1B. IMPLACABLE | 12 Seafire | 12 | 12 | Shipping Recce. E. SHIKOKU | - | - | - | Junks damaged | - | - |
| 1C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Corsair | 12 | - | Abortive - Bad Weather | | | | Bombs jettisoned on land. | | |

75

75

SUMMARY OF STRIKES

SECRET

(Enclosure No. 1 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July, 1945.)

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|--------------------------------|--|--------------------|-------------------|---|--------------------------|-------------------|---|---|--------------------------------------|
| 25th July (Contd.) | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Combined | 20 Avenger 12 Seafire 8 Firefly 4 Corsair | 18 11 8 1 | - | Abortive - Bad Weather | Bombs jettisoned on land | | | | |
| 2C. VICTORIOUS | 8 Corsair | 8 | - | Abortive - Bad Weather | Bombs jettisoned on land | | | | |
| 2D. INDEFATIGABLE | 12 Seafire | 6 | - | Abortive - Bad Weather | | | | | |
| 3. Combined (ex FORTIDABLE) | 20 Avenger 12 Seafire 8 Firefly 4 Corsair | 20 8 7 4 | 20 7 7 4 | Shipping Inland Sea Area | 77x 500 lb. H.C. | - | - | 1 FFB damaged. 2 FPC damaged. 1 SD sunk. Luggers sunk. | Warehouses hit FUG. |
| 3A. FORTIDABLE | 8 Corsair | 4 | 4 | Armed Shipping Recco. Inland Sea. | 8x 500 lb | - | - | 1 SB) hit 1 SC) hit and severely damaged. | - |
| 3B. INFLACABLE | 12 Seafire | 12 | 9 | SUMA SS. TAKEA | - | 2 Dest. 6 Dam. | - | Barges hit. | Hangar destroyed. |
| 4. Combined (ex VICTORIOUS) | 20 Avenger 12 Seafire 8 Firefly 4 Corsair | 20 12 6 2 | 19 9 6 2 | TOKUSHIMA A/P | 78x 500 lb. | - | - | 1 Tug sunk. | Hangars at Airfield destroyed. |
| | | | | | | | | | 1 Avenger (now safe) |

SUMMARY OF STRIKES

SECRET

(Enclosure No. 1 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/683 of 29th July, 1945.)

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
|--------------------------------|--|-----|-----|------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---|---|---|-----------|
| 25th July (Contd) | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4G. VICTORIOUS | 12 Corsair | 12 | 12 | Shipping Inland Sea | 20x 500 lb. M.C. | - | - | 3 SD damaged. Fishing Boats sunk. | Harbour Works hit. | - |
| 5. Combined (ex FORMIDABLE) | Cancelled to comply with Com Third Fleet's Retirement Schedule. | | | | | | | | | |
| 5A. FORMIDABLE | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| 5B. DEPLACABLE | | | | | | | | | | |
| DAY'S TOTAL | 220 | 155 | 110 | - | 199x 500 lb. | 2 Dest. 6 Dam. | - | 1 SC and 1 SB hit and severely damaged. 1 SD sunk. 3 SD damaged. 1 PTB damaged. 2 PTC damaged. 1 Tug sunk. Laggere sunk. Junkies, barges and fishing boats damaged and sunk. | Factory, Ware- houses and Harbour Works hit. Hangars at SUTA SS and TAKUMA and TOKUSHIMA Airfields destroyed. | 1 Avenger |

1
0107/15/683 29th June 1945 Subject

OPERATIONS, 17th/18th JULY 1945 - H.M.S. "VICTORIOUS"

From THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "VICTORIOUS"
Date 20th July 1945 No. 0217/8695
To The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier Squadron.

Herewith are forwarded reports on the operations of 17th/18th July 1945.

2. The Air Plan.

Starting with only 34 Corsairs, it was extremely doubtful whether "Victorious" would be able to comply with the Flight Plan of the first day, which called for 80 Corsair sorties in 13 hours. Owing to curtailment of the day's programme, "Victorious" was not put to the test.

On the second day the deplorable mischance of water contamination of the petrol only permitted "Victorious" to achieve 50 percent of what she was ordered to do in the short time that weather permitted flying operations.

3. Water in the Petrol.

As so often happens, the presence of water in the petrol of fuelled aircraft was discovered almost by chance. This entailed a long and complicated investigation before the source of contamination was located and the aircraft could be refuelled with clean petrol; since not only do the aircraft's petrol systems have to be cleaned and tested but also the ship's fuelling system before normal operations can be resumed. As it was, by the afternoon, weather permitting, a sustained air effort by about two-thirds of "Victorious" aircraft would have been possible - it was not until nearly sunset that full scale operations could have been resumed. In the past, in more obscure circumstances, it has taken more than 24 hours to restore full operational output. The cause of this was detailed in my message 190103/July, and it is clear that portions of the Avgas tank system in the ship are now in urgent need of refit following on recent corrosive action.

4. Eleven of "Victorious" 44 Fighter Pilots had less than 250 hours solo and barely a dozen deck landings to their credit at the commencement of this operation. This woeful inexperience showed itself, as is only to be expected, in a number of directions, viz. -

- (i) General unsteadiness in deck work in take-off and land-on;
- (ii) General lack of confidence and inefficiency in Beaconry, far too many of these pilots requiring individual heading when the Beacon was working efficiently;
- (iii) Very low standard of R/T training and knowledge of Fighter Direction technique.

These shortcomings had been foreseen and "Victorious" had done her utmost to provide training between casting off from Woolloomooloo on 25th June and Day 1, with inadequate results.

5. Strikes.

Strike 3 on 17th July jettisoned its bombs in the sea on its way back, having crossed the coast in fog without having found a hoped-for target of opportunity. It is regretted that this should have happened, and it has since been reiterated that bombs dropped blind on enemy territory have some chance of causing at least alarm and despondency.

6. The other two Strikes, Strike 6 on 17th July and Strike 3 on 18th July, led respectively by the Commanding Officer, 1834 Squadron, Acting Lieutenant Commander J.C. Baldwin, R.N., and the Air Group Leader, Acting Commander J.C.N. Shrubsole, R.N., were well conducted and accurate, and a very high standard of navigation was displayed. I think Lieutenant Commander Baldwin can claim to be the first Leader to fly a British offensive formation right across Japan to attack successfully a target on the far (West) side.

21 JUL 1945

III DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED

| Date | Enemy Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged by Own Aircraft | | | | | | By Own Carrier gunfire (G) or by suicide near or on own Carrier (S) |
|-----------|---|------|-----------------|---------------|---------------------------|------------------------|---|
| | In the air | | | On the ground | | | |
| | No. | Type | Damage assessed | No. | Type | Damage assessed | |
| 1945 | | | | | | | |
| 17th July | | | | 1 4 | DINAH Trainer | Destroyed Damaged | |
| 18th July | | | | 1 4 | TWIN Uniden- tified | Destroyed Destroyed | |
| | | | | 1 1 | TESS BETTY | Damaged Damaged | |

IV AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS EMBARKED FOR OPERATIONS.

| Squadron | Embarked for Operations | | | Replacement Aircraft and Aircrews Received during Operations | | | |
|----------|-------------------------|----------|--------------------|---|-------------------------------------|----------|------|
| | No. of Pilots | Aircraft | | Date received | No. of Pilots (F) or (TBR) | Aircraft | |
| | | No. | Type | | | No. | Type |
| 649 | 18 | 14 | Avenger I & II | - | - | - | - |
| 1834 | 22 | 19 | Corsair II & IV | - | - | - | - |
| 1836 | 23 | 18 | Corsair II & IV | - | - | - | - |
| A.S.R. | 2 | 2 | Walrus | - | - | - | - |

V. AIRCRAFT LOST, AND DAMAGED OR DETERIORATED BEYOND REPAIR ON BOARD.

Note 2. The damage categories of A.F.O. 6125/44 are applicable here.

Note 4. Aircraft damaged on board e.g. by enemy aircraft or accident should be included.

te 5. Include also flyable and non-flyable chuds.

Both ditched in accordance with A.C.O. 2701, but the Power Plant of JT.426 retained.

VII AIRCRAFT SERVICEABILITY

A day by day account of serviceability at dawn and dusk should be given for Strike days, and at dusk only for non-strike days.

In addition, brief details of unserviceability are required :- under the heading "Cause", record "Engine", "Airframe", "Radio", "A.S.V.", "Guns", "Inspection", etc., noting how many aircraft were unserviceable for each cause.

| Date | Time | Squadron | Type of a/c. | No. Serviceable. | No. Unserviceable. | Cause. |
|--------------|------|----------|--------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| 17 July 1945 | 0400 | 1834 | Corsair | 19 | NM1 | |
| | | 1836 | Corsair | 15 | NM1 | |
| | | 849 | Avenger | 14 | NM1 | |
| | | A.S.R. | Walrus | 2 | NM1 | |
| | 1900 | 1834 | Corsair | 16 | 3 | 1 Crashed |
| | | 1836 | Corsair | 7 | 8 | 2 Engine |
| | | 849 | Avenger | 14 | NM1 | 3 Crashed |
| | | A.S.R. | Walrus | 2 | NM1 | (1 Ditched) |
| 18 July 1945 | 0400 | 1834 | Corsair | 19 | NM1 | |
| | | 1836 | Corsair | 13 | 1 | Crashed |
| | | 849 | Avenger | 14 | NM1 | (Airframe ZZ) |
| | | A.S.R. | Walrus | 2 | NM1 | |
| | 1900 | 1834 | Corsair | 16 | 4 | 2 Engine |
| | | 1836 | Corsair | 9 | 5 | 1 Airframe |
| | | 849 | Avenger | 14 | NM1 | 1 Radio |
| | | A.S.R. | Walrus | 2 | NM1 | 1 Crashed |

FLYING LOG

| Date | Aircraft | | Method off or on | Time of take-off or landing | | Mission | Code Letter or Number | Remarks |
|------|----------|------|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|---|--------------------------------|---|
| | No. | Type | | 1st a/c | last a/c | | | |
| 17/7 | 8 | F4U | U | 0358 | | RAMROD - Airfields in HONSHU. | 1 C 1 | T |
| | 8 | F4U | U | | | CAP over Fleet, 10,000 & 20,000 ft | 1 C 1 | T |
| | 8 | F4U | U | | 0414 | RAMROD - Airfields in HONSHU. | 1 C 1 | Delay caused by L.R.T. of 12. - suction failure Spare U/S - blown starter breach. |
| | 1 | F4U | U | 0450 | | Ex Serial 1 | | L - Emergency. U/C not retrac- ing. |
| | 1 | F4U | U | 0517 | | Ex Serial 1 | | L - Emergency. U/C not retrac- ing. |
| | 4 | F4U | U | 0626 | | SUB. C.A.P. | 2 C 1 | T |
| | 4 | F4U | U | | 0628 | C.A.P. | 2 C 1 | T |
| | 24 | F4U | U | 0656 | 0720 | 22 ex Serial 1 2 ex Serial 2 | 3 C 1 | L 1 ex Serial 2 Emergency with engine trouble, 1 ex Serial 2 escort. |
| | 12 | F4U | U | 0855 | | Strike - Airfields in HONSHU. | 4 C 1 | T |
| | 5 | F4U | U | | 0900 | C.A.P. over Fleet 10,000 & 20,000 ft | 4 C 1 | T |
| | 6 | F4U | U | 0922 | 0925 | Ex C.A.P. and SUB. C.A.P. | 5 C 1 | L |
| | 6 | F4U | U | 1115 | | C.A.P. and SUB. C.A.P. | 6 C 1 & 11 | T |
| | 1 | TBM | U | | 1117 | Message Drop to CTF | | T |
| | 6 | F4U | U | 1151 | | Ex Strike & C.A.P. | 7 C 1 | L |
| | 1 | TBM | U | | 1215 | Message drop. | | |
| | 8 | F4U | U | 1358 | 1400 | C.A.P. over Fleet 10,000 & 20,000 ft | 8 C 1 | T |
| | 4 | F4U | U | 1429 | 1435 | Ex C.A.P. (Serial 6) | 9 C 1 | L |
| | 2 | F4U | U | 1451 | 1552 | Ex SUB. C.A.P. (Serial 6- | 9 C 1 | L |
| | 1 | F4U | U | 1611 | | Ex C.A.P. (Serial 8) | | Emergency - pilot sick. |
| | 4 | F4U | U | 1651 | 1656 | C.A.P. over Fleet 15,000 ft. | 10 C 1 | T Spare was not start, Spare burst tyre on spotting. |
| | 7 | F4U | U | 1719 | 1725 | Ex C.A.P. (Serial 8) | 11 C | |
| | 4 | F4U | U | 1812 | 1814 | Ex C.A.P., (Serial 10) | 13 C | C.A.P. cur- tailed by |

BPF Form 46g (continued)

FLYING LOG

| Date | Aircraft | | Method off or on | Time of take-off or landing | | Mission | Code Letter or Number | Remarks |
|------|----------|------|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|---|--------------------------------|---|
| | No. | Type | | 1st a/c | last a/c | | | |
| 18/7 | 8 | F4U | U | 1135 | 1138 | CAP over Fleet, 10000 & 20000 ft. | 1 C 1 | T |
| | 1 | F4U | U | 1235 | | Ex Serial 1 | | L - Emergency - engine trouble. |
| | 4 | F4U | U | { 1354 | { 1403 | CAP over Fleet, 10000 ft. RAMROD - Tokyo Plain | 2 C 11 | T) Delayed by 2 U/S in T) centre of range. |
| | 6 | F4U | U | | | | 2 C 1 | |
| | 7 | F4U | U | 1411 | 1440 | Ex CAP, Serial 1 | | L - delayed by Fleet turn out of wind before completion. |
| | 10 | F4U | U | 1540 | 1705 | Ex Serial 2 | | L - delayed by fog |
| | 4 | F4U | U | 1800 | 1801 | CAP over Fleet (Engcy. scramble) | | T |
| | 4 | F4U | U | 1843 | 1845 | 1800 CAP | | L |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| 19/7 | 4 | F4U | U | 0419 | 0420 | } CAP over Fleet { | | T L - 1 landed in FORMIDARI |
| | 3 | F4U | U | 0532 | 0536 | | | |

X ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SWEEPS AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

(a) Date: 17 July, 1945 Mission: Attacks on Niigata Code Letter or Number: Strike 6.
A/F., Honshu

| Aircraft | | Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc. | RP, bombs, torpedoes etc. carried per plane, and fuzing. | Total Quantity of Armament actually used. | |
|----------|---------|---|---|--|---|
| No. | Type | | | No. | Type |
| 12 | Corsair | Fighter & Fighter- bomber attacks on A/E. | 2 x 500 lb. M.C. Mk.VII or XIII Bombs. Fuzed:- 10 x T.D.11 | 10 2450 | 500 lb. M.C. Bombs. Rounds .5" Ammunition. |

| Time of Departure | Time over Target | | Time of Return to Fleet | Distance of Target from Carrier |
|----------------------|------------------|----------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | 1st A/G | Last A/C | | |
| 0907 | 1020 | 1025 | 1140 | 286 miles |

| Time first engaged | End of Engagement | Enemy A/C | | Were Strike* A/C engaged? If so, before or after Strike? | Enemy A/C destroyed or damaged | | | Own A/C destroyed or damaged | |
|--------------------|-------------------|-----------|------|--|--------------------------------|----------|-----------------|------------------------------|----------------|
| | | No. | Type | | Type of o/a | Own Type | Damage Assessed | Own Type | Loss or Damage |
| | | | | | | | | | |

85

(e) The Attack

General Description of Target:- Installations and dispersals
Nidgata A/F (Tgt No. 2889)

Individual Targets:-

| Target No. | Description of Target | Target Area (sq. yds.) or Tonnage & Speed | Aircraft attacking No. Type | Average Height & or Range of Release | Type of Attack | Average Angle of Dive |
|------------|---|---|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| 1. | Hangar Workshop and Barrack Area. | 500yds X 250 yds. | 4 Corsairs with bombs. | 4500 ft | Steep glide | 55° |
| 2. | Dispersal Areas & A/U on Nth & S.E. of field. | -- | 2 Corsairs straffing | 8000 - 1000 ft. | | 45° |
| 3. | | | | | | |

(f) Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target Number at left.)

Target Hits Conservatively Assessed, (Add "P" if No. confirmed by photographs.)

| | | |
|----|---|---|
| 1. | Bombing. One hit immediately Nth. of a barrack building (P) | prevents smoke/assessment of damage. |
| | One hit on a hangar and one in the workshop area are reported from observation. | Explosions and smoke observed. A hut and two workshops were probably damaged. |
| | 3 hits in dispersal area. | None observed. |
| 2. | Straffing One T/A, probably Dinah hit. 4 - 5 Trucks | Destroyed - left in flames. Damaged - strikes observed. |

REF: 1010 0011

ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SWEEPS AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

For each such mission, give such of the following details as are applicable :-

(a) Date : 18 July, 1945. Mission : Fighter-bomber attack Code letter or number :
on airfields. Strike 7

(b) Composition of mission. A.G.L. and 1834 Squadron.

| Aircraft | | Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc. | RP, bombs, torpedoes etc. carried per plane, and fusing. | Total Quantity of Armament actually used. | |
|----------|---------|--|--|--|--|
| No. | Type. | | | No. | Type |
| 6 | Corsair | Fighter bomber attack on airfields. | 2 x 500 lb. M.C. Mk. VII bombs. Fused T.D.11. | 10 3240 | 500 lb. M.C. bombs. Rounds .5 Ammunition. |

(c) Times, Heights, Distances of Mission.

| Time of Departure. | Time over Target | | Time of Return to Fleet. | Distance of target from Carrier. |
|-----------------------|------------------|--------------|--------------------------------|--|
| | 1st. a/c. | Last a/c. | | |
| 1415 | 1500 1510 | 1505 1515 | 1615 | 100 |

(d) Engagement with Enemy Aircraft in the air. None.

General Description of Target :-

Installations and aircraft at NARUTO and MIYAKAWA airfields.

Individual targets :-

| Target No. | Description of Target. | Target Area (sq.yds.) or Tonnage & Speed. | Aircraft attacking | | Average Height & or Range of Release. | Type of Attack. | Average Angle of Dive. |
|------------|---------------------------------|---|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|
| | | | No. | Type. | | | |
| 1. | Servicing and shop area NARUTO. | 800 x 300 yds. | 4 | Corsairs (bombs) | 2500 - 3000 | Steep Glide, | -40 |
| 2. | Dispersals. | | 6 | Corsairs (strafing) | 3000 - 1000 | | |
| 3. | Hangars at MIYAKAWA | 400 x 80 feet. | 1 | Corsair (bombs) | 3000 | Steep Glide | 50° |
| 4. | Dispersals & Installations. | | 6 | Corsairs (strafing) | 3000 - 700 | | |

(c) Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target number at left.)

| Target No. | Hits Conservatively Assessed. (Add "if" confirmed by photographs.) | Damage Conservatively assessed. |
|------------|--|---|
| 1. | 8 bombs in target area. | Detailed results unobserved but bursts seen at or close to several buildings. |
| 2. | Strikes seen on hangar and aircraft. | Five aircraft left in flames. |
| 3. | 2 Bombs on a hangar. | Damaged. Detailed results unobserved. |
| 4. | Strikes seen on two aircraft and on buildings. | Two aircraft damaged. |

X ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SWEEPS AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

For each such mission, give such of the following details as are applicable :-

(a) Date: 17th July, 1945. Mission: Fighter bomber attack on Airfields Northern Honshu. Code Letter or Number: Strike 3.

(b) Composition of Mission. A.G.L. and 1836 Squadron.

| Aircraft | | Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc. | RP, bombs, torpedoes etc. carried per plane, and fuzing. | Total Quantity of Armament actually used. | |
|---|-----------|------------------------------------|--|---|---|
| No. | Type | | | No. | Type. |
| 16 | Corsairs. | Attack on Airfield. | 2 x 500 lb. M.C. Mts. VII and VIII Bombs. Fuzed:- 8 x N. Inst. 6 x T.D.II. | 14 | 500 lb. M.C. Bombs. (Jettisoned in sea) |
| Owing to weather conditions the Strike were forced to return without carrying out any attack. | | | | | |

(c) Times, Heights, Distances of Mission.

| Time of Departure. | Time over Target | | Time of Return to Fleet. | Distance of Target from Carrier. |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Primary 1st a/c. | Target Last a/c | | |
| 0358 | 0503 Alternative 0535 | 0520 Targets. 0545 | 0714 | 150' |

(d), (e) and (f) Nil.

XIII Communications, ASV and Navigational Aids.

The following details are required as a daily summary of the performance of the various radio and ASV equipments used.

| Date | Aircraft set in use | No. of sets used | No. of * failures | Best and worst ASV & Beacon ranges on own forces reported. |
|---|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------|--|
| 17th July, 1945. | S.C.R.522 | 67 | 4 | |
| " | Z.B.X. (or Z.B./A.R.A.) | 55 | 1 | 60 m./7,000' YE. |
| 18th July, 1945. | S.C.R.522 | 22 | 3 | |
| " | Z.B.X. (or Z.B./A.R.A.) | 20 | Nil. | 100 m./8,000' YE. |
| <p>* Under No. of failures, the figures show sets reported defective, the set Bench tested, and the defect confirmed.</p> <p>Figures do NOT show sets reported defective, and found at Bench testing to be functioning correctly.</p> | | | | |

Remark on (a) Major causes of failures, and action to prevent recurrence.

Various causes :- Soft P/A Valve, stages needing trimming, etc.

Action :- Careful maintenance and inspections.

(b) Enemy or friendly interference or jamming.

Enemy :- None reported.

Own :- Traffic not abnormal.

Dir W-14k

XIII METEOROLOGICAL SUMMARY.

The following details are required daily at noon (local time)

| Date. | Sea. | Swell. | Wind. | | Cloud over base. | | | Cloud over Target | | |
|--------------------|------|--------------------|------------|-----------|------------------|------|-------------------------|---|------|--------|
| | | | Direction. | Speed kts | Amount | Base | Top | Amount | Base | Top |
| July 17th, 1945 | | | | | | | | KORIYAMA (37°22'N, 140°24'E) at 0530. | | |
| 0600 | "2" | "1" from WSW | 100° | 10 | 9/10 | 2000 | 4000 (CAP report) | 10/10 surface | | 5,500 |
| 1200 | "3" | "1" from WSW | 135° | 10 | 10/10 | 1500 | 5000 (CAP report) | 6/10 5000 | | 12,000 |
| July 18th, 1945 | | | | | | | | YACHIMATA (35°40'N, 140°20'E) about 1530. | | |
| 1500 | "4" | "3" from WSW | 320° | 18 | 7/10 | 300 | 600 (estimated) | 5/10 2000 | | 2,300 |

SECRET

Subject

OPERATIONS - 24th/25th JULY 1945

ENCLOSURE 113

3

TO A.C.F.'S

NO. 0109/16/683

29th July, 1943.

From THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "VICTORIOUS"

Date 26th July 1945

No. 0217/8707

To The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier Squadron

Herewith are forwarded reports on the air operations of 24th and 25th July 1945.

2. The Air Plan.

The Air Plan was found to be the easiest and most convenient to work to of any hitherto ordered for VICTORIOUS in the Pacific operations. This was largely due to the avoidance in it of trundling deck parks from one end of the deck to the other, frequently required by the earlier plans. In effect this would have enabled VICTORIOUS to provide more Corsair sorties than were asked for.

3. The inexperience of the new pilots referred to in my last report is waning, though the inequalities in take-offs are still painful to watch. As a further illustration of current inexperience, in one strike the formation leader was the only pilot who had ever operationally bombed a target before.

4. The 32,000 rounds fired by VICTORIOUS' Corsairs at ground targets on 24th July was an all-time high in this ship.

5. Strikes.

The following Strikes and Ramrods executed in bad weather each had their special interest.

- (a) Strike 2C, 24th July 1945. Led by Acting Lieutenant Commander J.G. Baldwin, R.N., (C.O., 1634 Squadron).

The Strike proceeded direct to KURASHIKI airfield, where meagre heavy and medium flak was experienced on the run in. Bombs were dropped and caused damage to airfield buildings and one Betty. OKINAWA airfield was visited next, where one Francis was damaged and the dispersal areas and revetments strafed. The latter were well camouflaged and results could not be observed. At FUKUYAMA one 4-engined aircraft was damaged. The strike then proceeded to SUTA airfield and damaged four 4-engined and three single-engined aircraft and destroyed one Mavis, all by strafing. On retirement one junk was sunk and others damaged. Temporary Sub Lieutenant(A) P.C. Jupe, RMVR, whose bombs had not released, executed a perfect high dive attack on a concrete bridge North of KOCHU, registering a direct hit.

This was a well-conducted small Ramrod, which expended a lot of strafing ammunition to good effect.

- (b) Strike 3, Combined Strike. 24th July 1945. Led by Acting Commander J.C.N. Shrubsole, R.N., (Air Group Leader) and Temporary Acting Lieutenant Commander(A) A.J. Griffiths, R.N.V.R., (C.O., 849 Squadron).

Eight minutes from departure the Strike ran into bad squally weather. To make the land it was necessary to climb through clouds which were thicker than anticipated and it became evident that the Seafire escort, already in difficulties with communications, would be of little use so they were ordered to act independently. It was unfortunate that more than half the Avengers and all but 2 Fireflies became separated during the climb and failed to R/V at KAMATA SAKI as ordered by the Air Group Leader. Only 6 Avengers (5 VICTORIOUS, 1 INDEPATIGABLE), 2 Corsairs and 2 Fireflies set course for the target. After passing through a heavy squall line over SHIKOKU the Strike broke out into clear weather. The target assigned was shipping at UNO, but on sighting a CTE at anchor in SHIDO WAN the Air Group Leader rightly ordered the Avengers to attack and the Squadron was deployed to port. Two hits and two near misses were obtained by one stick of bombs. It is felt that better results should have been achieved in view of the absence of flak. The return to the Fleet was without incident.

SECRET

Page 2

OPERATIONS - 24th/25th JULY 1945
(VICTORIOUS letter No.0217/8707 dated 26th July, 1945)

5. (b) Continued.

This is an example of a strike, largely disorganised by adverse weather, bearing good fruit thanks to those who pressed on and who showed good airmanship.

- (c) Strike 3, Combined Strike, 25th July 1945. Led by Acting Commander J.C.N. Shrubsole, R.N., (Air Group Leader) and Temporary Acting Lieut. Comdr. (A) A.J. Griffith, R.N.V.R., (C.O., 849 Squadron).

The start of this Strike was an interesting example of an early strike departure - at 15 minutes from commencement of take-off - with a formation of 5 separate units from 3 different carriers completed on passage at 40 miles from base in low visibility, cloud base sometimes as low as 300 feet. The Air Group Leader acted as sheepdog and rounded the formations up.

In view of the weather the Air Group Leader decided to carry out a low approach between SHIKOKU and HONSHU and to attack targets of opportunity on the West coast of HONSHU South of 34°30'S. Good bombing results were obtained at FUGE and KADA and surrounding areas and a free-for-all ensued. One FTB, two FIC were left burning, two SD damaged and wharfs and factories, one of which, at KADA, exploded, left on fire. One SD was sunk and one probably sunk at KURA SAKI. On completion of the attack the Avengers carried out strafing attacks on opportunity targets such as trains etc., and a good time was had by all. In consequence the re-formation was poor. No. 849 Squadron has since been cautioned with regard to over-exuberance and general skylarking in an attack of this nature, for had there been any enemy aircraft airborne the escort would not have been able to protect them.

Fireflies were efficient in reducing medium flak.

It is considered that in view of the weather the Seafires and Fireflies did well in maintaining contact with the Strike.

(Sgd.) M. M. DENNY

Rear Admiral

0109/16/683

27 JUL 1945

25th July, 1945.

No. 142/1722/00130/9.

OPERATIONS ON 24TH/25TH JULY, 1945.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward the report of proceedings of H.M. Ship under my command during the operations of 24th/25th July, 1945, in accordance with B.P.T.M. 227.

2. ~~We~~ had some anxious moments during the 24th and 25th July while AVENGER strikes were being escorted by my SEAFIRES to a range which ran the latter out to the prudent limit of their endurance. Had any airborne op position been encountered the prudent limit might well have proved to have been exceeded.


3. This situation was partly due to lack of practice on the part of my SEAFIRE pilots in flying with 90-gallon long-range tanks, and for this my quick passage north was in some measure responsible. But the main reason was the late supply and inadequacy of the parts to fit the tanks.

4. Once again, a ship's staff and squadrons, instead of being supplied with the necessary tested weapons to meet operational requirements in this theatre, have had to improvise and carry out their own experiments.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your obedient servant,



The Flag Officer Commanding,
First Aircraft Carrier Squadron,
British Pacific Fleet.

QDC/EB


CAPTAIN,
Royal Navy.

SECRET

SECRET.
No. O.7/2360.

ENCLOSURE 5
NO 0107/16/683

H.M.S. "Implacable".

19th July, 1945.

29th July, 1945.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report of proceedings for the first period of operation July/August.

2. The following Appendices are forwarded in accordance with British Pacific Fleet Temporary Memorandum No. 227.

Form 46 : General.
Form 46a : Enemy Intelligence.
Form 46b : Daily Summary of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged.
(Form 46c : Will be rendered at finish of operation).
Form 46d : Aircraft Lost, and Damaged or Deteriorated Beyond Repair on Board.
Form 46e : Aircraft Serviceability.
(Form 46f : Will be rendered at finish of operation).
Form 46g : Flying Log.
Form 46h : Attacks on Shipping and Shore Objectives, Fighter Sweeps and Intruder Patrols.
Form 46i : Air Interception. - This report is blank.
Form 46j : Communications, A.S.V. and Navigational Aids.
Form 46k : Meteorological Summary.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Captain, Royal Navy.

The Flag Officer Commanding,
First Aircraft Carrier Squadron,
British Pacific Fleet.

21 JUL 1945

STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.

(for completion by Carriers on Strike Duties.)

I. GENERAL

Aircraft Carrier :- H.M.S. "Implacable". Code Name of Operation :-
Operations July/August 1945.
Advanced base :- Manus.
Date of leaving Advanced Base :- 6th July, 1945.
Date of arrival back at Advanced Base :-

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE.

6th July, 1945.

ON PASSAGE.

H.M.S. "Implacable" left MANUS on the morning of July 6th, 1945, with a complement of 48 Seafires, 12 Fireflies and 18 Avengers.

At 1335 the bearings and adjusting / of the port outer main engine were found to be overheating. The ship stopped for an hour while the turbine shaft was locked and then proceeded on three engines.

The H.P. thrust pads had failed, and had affected the main H.P. turbine bearings of B engine. It was necessary to fit new thrust pads and new H.P. turbine main bearings, and to cleanse the lubricating system of that unit.

7th July, 1945.

At 1600 on July 7th the ship stopped while 'A' turbines were declutched. The ship then proceeded on 2 shafts with the starboard outer trailing and the port outer locked. Flying exercises were carried out on passage when the wind speed was sufficient, the ship's maximum speed being 21 knots.

11th July, 1945.

At 1515 on July 11th the ship stopped and the port outer shaft was allowed to trail. This enabled the lubricating system to be cleansed.

13th July, 1945.

REFUELLING.

At 0445 H.M.S. "Implacable" commenced oiling from R.F.A. "Dingledale" by astern method, completing at 1305. H.M.S. "Quickmatch" acting as D.S.B., came alongside at 0800 and transferred 1 officer and 2 ratings for hospital.

14th July, 1945.

At 1000 on July 14th the two outer shafts were clutched up for a trial run, 'B' being unclutched again at 1830. The trial was conducted inside the screen at speeds up to 15 knots.

15th July, 1945.

The trial proved successful and the port outer shaft was finally clutched in at 1000 on July 15th.

16th July, 1945.

Task Force 38 was in company from 0500, and at 1045, H.M.S. "Implacable" flew off 4 Fireflies and 4 Seafires for Aircraft Recognition Training of the American ships.

17th July, 1945.

STRIKING.

Seafires were maintained on C.A.P. from 0354 to 1815. There was no sign of enemy aircraft to intercept.

Two RAMRODS were flown. RAMROD 2 at dawn consisted of 7 Fireflies and strafed MATSUSHIMA, SENDAI, and MASUDA airfields, also Radar, Radio and Railway installations and small shipping.

The next (RAMROD 4) of 16 Seafires found themselves balked by thick cloud through which they could not penetrate to the target.

There were no casualties. Two aircraft were damaged by FLAK.

/18th July, 1945.

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE (CONTINUED).

18th July, 1945. STRIKING (Continued).

Two C.A.P.s each of 8 Seafires, and RAMRODS No. 2, 4, 7 of 8 Fireflies, 11 Seafires, 7 Seafires respectively were flown from 1140.

The Ramrods were not very successful. KONOIKE, CHOISI, KATORI, MIYAKAWA and NARUTO airfields were visited, and numerous strafing attacks made. Many dummies were observed, and unfortunately, many were attacked. Some of these dummies had grass growing from them. Mostly they were formed of bamboo slats resting on trestles and covered with fabric. In certain cases they were covered with camouflage netting, and mixed in amongst the dummies were real aircraft similarly camouflaged.

However, ~~several~~ operational aircraft were definitely damaged, one of them a flamer. Other ground targets and a concentration of junks were also strafed.

Photographic sorties were flown on both days. The overcast conditions on 17th made photography abortive, and only oblique photography was attempted on the 18th. If the operations on 18th July had been able to start seven hours earlier as intended, the coverage obtained would, even from this small amount, have given sufficient information to enable dummies and U/S aircraft to be distinguished for the later RAMRODS. It is suggested that with the camouflage and deception policy being used by the Japanese, photographic cover is essential, and an attempt will be made in later stages of these operations to get maximum coverage in the early morning. In this connection the best results should be obtained if the ship covering certain airfields in the early morning sweeps could continue to attack and cover the same airfields throughout the day. This would ensure continuity of intelligence from interpretation of photographs and interrogation of aircrews. It is appreciated that this may however, be impracticable for other reasons.

II ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

A. Estimated Enemy Order of Battle in Areas of Operations. (Note any important changes e.g. due to supply of reinforcements.)

| Date | Area | No. of Operational Airfields | Estimated Air Strength | | Estimated Shipping | |
|-------------|--|--|------------------------------|--|--------------------|--|
| | | | No. | Type. | No. | Type |
| 17 Jul. '45 | SENDAI - MASUDA (HONSHU) | Matsushima Sendai Masuda | 5 Nil | T/E | 10 6 | Motor Launches Small craft, junks etc. |
| 18 Jul. '45 | MITO - CHOSHI - MIYAKAWA (HONSHU) | Konolke Katori Miyakawa Naruto Kitaura | 7 15 2 1 3 16 | T/E S/E S/E S/E Unident. Seaplanes. | Many | junks along coast. |

B. Estimated Carrier-borne Enemy Air Strength (where applicable)

| Date | Carriers Identified (or No. & Type of Carriers) | Estimated Air Strength | |
|------|--|------------------------|------|
| | | No. | Type |
| | | | |

III DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED

| Date | Enemy Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged by own Aircraft | | | | | | By own Carrier gunfire(G) or by suicide near or on own Carrier (S) |
|------------|---|------|--------------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------|--|
| | In the air | | | On the ground | | | |
| | No. | Type | Damage Assessed | No. | Type | Damage Assessed | |
| 17 July.45 | - | - | - | 1 | T/E(Sally?) | Destroyed | - |
| | | | | 1 | T/E | Damaged | |
| 18 July.45 | - | - | - | 1 | Betty | Destroyed | |
| | | | | 2 | T/E | Damaged | |
| | | | | 78 | Zekes | Damaged | |

V AIRCRAFT LOST, AND DAMAGED OR DETERIORATED BEYOND REPAIR ON BOARD.

- Note 1. The time at which the damage or loss occurred should be recorded accurately, and the Mission on which it occurred indicated where applicable.
- Note 2. The damage categories of A.F.O. 6125/44 are applicable here.
- Note 3. The "Cause of loss or damage" should, where possible, distinguish between light and heavy flak, enemy fighters, engine failure, decklanding accident, other accidents etc.
- Note 4. Aircraft damaged on board e.g. by enemy aircraft or accident should be included.
- Note 5. Include also flyable and non-flyable duds.

| Date | Time | Mission | Squad'n | Type of Aircraft | Damage Category | Cause of loss or damage. | Aircraft lost or wounded |
|-------------|------|--|---------|------------------|-------------------|---|--------------------------|
| 16 July '45 | 1233 | Recognition 880 Training Exercise. | | Seafire | A/F IX Eng. SS | Starboard under- carriage col- lapsed on landing. | No. |
| 17 July '45 | 0655 | D.O.A.P. | 880 | Seafire | A/F IX Eng. IX | Deck Landing | No. |
| 18 July '45 | 1357 | RAISED | 1771 | Piccolo | A/F IX Eng. IX | Deck Landing (Ditched) | No. |
| ---" | 1446 | D.O.A.P. | 801 | Seafire | A/F IX Eng. SS | Deck Landing (Flyable dud) | No. |
| ---" | 1555 | D.O.A.P. | 801 | Seafire | A/F IX Eng. IX | Deck Landing (Ditched) | No. |

VI AIRCRAFT SERVICEABILITY

A day by day account of serviceability at dawn and dusk should be given for Strike days, and at dusk only for non-Strike days.

In addition, brief details of unserviceability are required :-
under the heading "Cause", record "Engine", "Airframe", "Radio", "ASV",
"Guns", "Inspection", etc, noting how many aircraft were unserviceable for each cause.

| Date | Time | Squadron | Type of A/c | No. Service- able. | No. Unser- viceable. | Cause. |
|-------------|------|----------|----------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---|
| 17 July '45 | 0630 | 880 | Seafire | 22 | 1 | Undercarriage and mainplane damaged. |
| | "- | 801 | "- | 22 | 2 | (i) Armoured cowling buttons damaged (ii) Overload tank fails to suck. |
| | "- | 828 | Avenger | 18 | - | -- |
| | "- | 1771 | Pirefly | 11 | 1 | Undercarriage failed to retract. |
| ----- | | | | | | |
| 17 July '45 | 2000 | 880 | Seafire | 15 | 6 | 4 - airframe 2 - engine |
| | | 801 | Seafire | 15 | 9 | 4 - airframe 4 - engine 1 - guns |
| | | 828 | Avenger | 18 | - | -- |
| | | 1771 | Pirefly | 10 | 2 | 2 - airframe |
| ----- | | | | | | |
| 18 July '45 | 0600 | 880 | Seafire | 20 | 1 | airframe |
| | | 801 | Seafire | 23 | 1 | airframe |
| | | 828 | Avenger | 18 | - | -- |
| | | 1771 | Pirefly | 11 | 1 | airframe |
| ----- | | | | | | |
| 18 July '45 | 2000 | 880 | Seafire | 14 | 7 | 5 - airframe 1 - engine 1 - electrics |
| | | 801 | Seafire | 16 | 7 | 1 Flyable dud. 1 - airframe 4 - engine 1 - electrics |
| | | 1771 | Pirefly | 11 | - | |
| | | 828 | Avenger | 18 | - | |
| ----- | | | | | | |

REF Form 46g

FLYING LOG

| Date | Aircraft | | Method off or on | Time of take-off or landing | | Mission | Code Letter or Number | Remarks |
|---|----------|---------|------------------|-----------------------------|----------|----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| | No | Type | | 1st A/c. | 2nd A/c. | | | |
| 17 Jul. 45 | 12 | Seafire | U | 0354 | 0355½ | C.A.P. over Fleet | Serial 1 | T 1 landed on 0405 unserviceable. |
| | 8 | Firefly | U | 0355½ | 0357 | RAMROD - Sendai Area | 2 | T 1 landed on 0414 unserviceable |
| | 16 | Seafire | U | 0624 | 0626½ | RAMROD - Sendai Area | 4 | T |
| | 11 | Seafire | U | 0627 | 0628½ | C.A.P. | Serial 2 | T 1 unserviceable in range. Jet tank not fully topped up. |
| | 11 | Seafire | U | 0654 | 0709 | C.A.P. | Serial 1 | L 1 Tore out hook and hit barrier |
| | 7 | Firefly | U | 0653 | 0710 | RAMROD | 2 | |
| | 15 | Seafire | U | 0856 | 0858½ | C.A.P. | Serial 4 | T |
| | 16 | Seafire | U | 0924 | 0936 | RAMROD | 4 | L 1 burst tyre |
| | 11 | Seafire | U | 0927 | 0940 | C.A.P. | Serial 2 | L 1 hit barrier |
| | 12 | Seafire | U | 1120 | 1122½ | C.A.P. | Serial 6 | T 1 landed 1100 |
| | 15 | Seafire | U | 1153 | 1202 | C.A.P. | Serial 4 | L |
| | 16 | Seafire | U | 1349 | 1351½ | C.A.P. | Serial 8 | T |
| | 11 | Seafire | U | 1430 | 1436 | C.A.P. | Serial 6 | L |
| | 12 | Seafire | U | 1653 | 1654½ | C.A.P. | Serial 10 | T 1 landed 1650 (Dropped jet tank) |
| | 16 | Seafire | U | 1724 | 1735 | C.A.P. | Serial 8 | L |
| | 11 | Seafire | U | 1807 | 1815½ | C.A.P. | Serial 10 | L |
| NOTE :- | | | | | | | | |
| All C.A.P. missions at 3,000', 5,000', and 8,000' over Fleet. | | | | | | | | |

BPF Form 46g

FLYING LOG

| Date | Aircraft | | Method off or on | Time of take-off or landing | | Mission | Code Letter or Number | Remarks |
|------------------|----------|---------|------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| | No. | Type | | 1st A/c. | last A/c. | | | |
| 18 July 1945. | 12 | Seafire | U | 1140 | 1142 | D.C.A.P. | Serial 1 | T 4 landed on at 1149 |
| | 8 | Pirofly | U | 1142 | 1147 | RAMROD (Konoike Area) | 2 | T |
| | 12 | Seafire | U | 1229 | 1230½ | RAMROD (Konoike Area) | 4 | T |
| | 8 | Seafire | U | 1349 | 1350½ | D.C.A.P. | Serial 4 | T |
| | 7 | Seafire | U | 1350½ | 1352 | RAMROD (Miyakawa Area) | 6 | T |
| | 8 | Pirofly | U | 1356 | 1444 | RAMROD | 2 | L Deck unserv- iceable for 38 minutes after crash into barrier. |
| | 8 | Seafire | U | 1444 | 1504 | D.C.A.P. | Serial 1 | L 1 Aircraft crashed into barrier. |
| | 12 | Seafire | U | 1458 | 1512 | RAMROD | 4 | L |
| | 4 | Seafire | U | 1550 | 1555 | D.C.A.P. | Serial 4 | L 1 flight of D.C.A.P. landed on. One crashed into barrier. |
| | 4 | Seafire | U | 1700 | 1704 | D.C.A.P. | Serial 4 | L |
| | 7 | Seafire | U | 1700 | 1708 | RAMROD | 6 | L 2 burst tyres |

BPF Form 46h

X ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SWEEPS AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

For each such mission, give such of the following details as are applicable :-

(a) Date: 17 July Mission: RAMROD Code Letter or Number: 2.

(b) 1945. Composition of Mission.

| Aircraft | | Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc. | RP, bombs, torpedoes etc. carried per plane, and fuzing. | Total quantity of Armament actually used. | |
|----------|---------|---|--|---|--|
| No. | Type | | | No. | Type |
| 7 | Firefly | RAMROD | 4 x 60 lb Rockets 20 mm. Cannon | 28 2775 | R.P. with 60 lb. heads. rounds 20mm. |

(c) Times, Heights, Distances of Mission.

| Time of Departure | Time over Target | | Time of Return to Fleet | Distance of Target from Carrier |
|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | 1st A/c | Last A/c | | |
| 0400 | 0452 at Masuda | 0528 at Kinkasan | 0630 | 106 |

(d) Engagement with Enemy Aircraft in the Air.

[illegible]

x i.e. A/c carrying bombs, torpedoes etc.

EPF Form 46h (continued)

(c) The Attack

General Description of Target :-

Individual Targets :-

| Target No. | Description of Target | Target Area (sq.yds.) or Tonnage and Speed | Aircraft attacking | | Average Height &/or Range of Release | Type of Attack | Average Angle of Aim |
|------------|--------------------------------|--|--------------------|---------|--------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| | | | No. | Type | | | |
| 1. | Hangar, MASUDA Air-field. | 1 Sally (?) | 6 | Firefly | 150'-200' | R/P & 20 mm. | 15° - 20°. |
| 2. | Hangar, SENDAI Air-field. | | 4 | Firefly | 150'-200' | R/P & 20 mm. | 15° - 20°. |
| 3. | Aircraft, MATSUSHIMA | | 3 | Firefly | 150'-200' | 2 R/P & 20 mm. | 15° - 20° |
| 4. | Junk. | | 2 | Firefly | 150'-200' | 20 mm. | 15°-20° |
| 5. | (a) Radio Station at SHINDA) | | 3 | Firefly | 150'-200' | 2 R/P & 20 mm | 15°-20° |
| | (b) Radar Station at KINKASAN) | | | | | 20 mm | |
| 6. | Railway Train at MIKATA. | | 2 | Firefly | | 20 mm | |
| 7. | Small Coaster 200 tons. | | 1 | Firefly | | 20 mm | |

(f) Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target Number at left.)

| Target No. | Hits Conservatively Assessed. (Add "P" if confirmed by photographs.) | Damage Conservatively Assessed. |
|------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| 1. | 2 or 3 R/P hits | Hangar damaged. |
| 2. | Cannon and R/P hits. | Hangar damaged - probably destroyed. |
| 3. | Numerous strikes causing fire | One T/E Aircraft (Sally?) destroyed. |
| 4. | Cannon strikes seen | Junk sunk. |
| 5. | (a) Hits observed (b) " " and explosion heard | Damage caused " " |
| 6. | Cannon hits observed. Steam issuing from engine boiler | Engine damaged |
| 7. | Hits observed. | Damaged. |

X ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SWEEPS AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

Code Letter or Number: 2.

| Aircraft | | Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc. | EP, bombs, torpedoes etc. carried per plane, and fuzing. | Total quantity of Armament actually used. | |
|----------|---------|---|--|--|--|
| No. | Type | | | No. | Type |
| 8 | Firefly | RAMROD | 4 x 60 lb. Rockets. 20 mm. Cannon | 28 28 2,900 | Motors, Rocket 60 lb. heads 20 mm. |

| Time of Departure | Time over Target | | Time of Return to Fleet | Distance of Target from Carrier |
|-------------------|------------------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | 1st. A/c | Last A/c. | | |
| 1200 | 1241 | 1246 | | 105 miles |

| Time first engaged. | End of Engagement. | Enemy A/c | | Were Strike ^x A/c engaged? If so, before or after Strike? | Enemy A/c destroyed or damaged | | | Own A/c dest. or damaged. | |
|---------------------|--------------------|-----------|------|---|--------------------------------|-----------|-----------------|---------------------------|----------------|
| | | No. | Type | | Type of E/A. | Own type. | Damage Assessed | Own Type | Loss or Damage |
| ----- N I L ----- | | | | | | | | | |

6

106

BFF Form 46h (continued)

(c) The Attack

General Description of Target :-

Individual Targets :-

| Target No. | Description of Target | Target Area (Sq.yards) or Tonnage & Speed. | Aircraft attacking | | Average Height &/ or Range of Release. | Type of Attack | Average Angle of Dive |
|------------|---------------------------------|--|--------------------|-----------|--|----------------|-----------------------|
| | | | No | Type | | | |
| 1. | Aircraft KONOIKE Airfield. | | 7 | Fireflies | 2000' - 3000' | R/P & strafing | 30° |
| 2. | Installations KONOIKE Airfield. | | 5 | Fireflies | | | |

(f) Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target Number at left.)

| Target No. | Hits conservatively assessed. (Add "P" if confirmed by photographs.) | Damage conservatively assessed. |
|------------|---|--|
| 1. | No definite R/P hits seen. Cannon strikes seen. Revetments hit by R/P. | Two aircraft damaged but probably damaged already. |
| 2. | R/P and cannon hits seen on store building and barrack huts. | One small building destroyed. Huts damaged. |

BPF Form 46h

X ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SWEEPS AND INTRUDER PATROLS.

(a) Date: 18 July, 1945 Mission: RAMROD Code Letter or Number: 4

(b) Composition of Mission.

| Aircraft | | Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc. | RP, bombs, torpedoes etc. carried per plane, and fuzing. | Total quantity of Armament actually used | |
|----------|----------|------------------------------------|--|--|----------------|
| No. | Type. | | | No. | Type |
| 11 | Seafires | RAMROD | 20 mm. Cannon and Machine Gun. | 1340 6250 | 20 mm. .303 |

(c) Time, Heights, Distances of Mission.

| Time of Departure | Time over Target | | Time of Re-turn to Fleet | Distance of Target from Carrier |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | 1st A/c | last A/c | | |
| 1236 | 1330 | 1350 approx. | 1425 | 100 |

(d) Engagement with Enemy Aircraft in the Air.

| Time first engaged | End of Engagement. | Enemy A/c | | Were Strike ^x A/c engaged? If so, before or after Strike? | Enemy A/c destroyed or damaged | | | Own A/c dest. or damaged | |
|--------------------|--------------------|-----------|------|--|--------------------------------|-----------|------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| | | No. | Type | | Type of Enemy Aircraft. | Own Type. | Damage Assessed. | Own Type. | Loss or Damaged |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
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BPF Form 46h (continued)

(c) The Attack

General Description of Target :-

Individual Targets:-

| Target No. | Description of Target | Target Area (Sq.yards) or Tonnage & Speed | Aircraft attacking | | Average Height &/ or Range of Release | Type of Attack | Average Angle of Dive. |
|------------|------------------------------------|---|--------------------|---------|---------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------|
| | | | No. | Type. | | | |
| 1. | Aircraft on KONOIKE Airfield. | | 11 | Seafire | | Straffing | |
| 2. | Installations on KONOIKE Airfield. | | 6 | Seafire | | | --"-- |
| 3. | 30 Junks. | | 5 | Seafire | | | --"-- |
| 4. | Warehouse. | | 1 | Seafire | | | --"-- |

(f) Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target Number at left.)

| Target No. | Hits conservatively assessed. (Add "P" if confirmed by photographs.) | Damage conservatively assessed. |
|------------|---|--|
| 1. | Strikes seen on Betty and Zekes. (P) | 1 Betty destroyed, possibly 6 Zekes damaged, possibly destroyed. |
| 2. | Strikes seen on hangar and store building. (P) | Damage to hangar and other buildings. |
| 3. | Strikes seen on many junks (P) | 14 junks damaged. |
| 4. | Strikes seen (P) | Damage to Warehouse. |

A. ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SHORE OBJECTIVES, FIGHTER SWEEPS AND
INTERIOR PATROLS.

(b) Composition of Mission.

| Aircraft | | Duty: e.g. Strike, Top Cover, etc. | RP, bombs, torpedoes etc. carried per plane, and fuzing. | Total quantity of Armament actually used. | |
|----------|---------|---|--|--|----------------|
| No. | Type | | | No. | Type |
| 7 | Seafire | RAMROD | Cannon and machine gun. | 910 5720 | 20 mm. .303 |

| Time of Departure | Time after Target 1st A/c. | Time after Target Last A/c. | Time of Re- turn to Fleet | Distance of Target from Carrier. |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| 1355 | * 1420 | 1430 approx. | 1520 approx. | 95 miles |

| Time first engaged | End of Engagement | Enemy A/c | | Were Strike ^x A/c engaged? of so, before or after Strike? | Enemy A/c destroyed or damaged | | | Own A/c dest. or damaged. | |
|--------------------|-------------------|-----------|------|--|--------------------------------|----------|-----------------|---------------------------|----------------|
| | | No. | Type | | Type | Own Type | Damage Assessed | Own type | Loss or damage |
| ----- N T L ----- | | | | | | | | | |

110

BPF Form 46h (continued)

(e) The Attack

General Description of Target :-

Individual Targets:-

| Target No. | Description of Target. | Target Area (sq.yds.) or Tonnage & Speed. | Aircraft attacking | | Average Height &/or Range of Release | Type of Attack | Average Angle of Dive |
|------------|--|---|--------------------|----------|--------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| | | | No | Type | | | |
| 1. | Aircraft on MIYAKAWA & NAKUTO Airfields. | | 3 | Seafires | | Straffing | |
| 2. | Goods trucks. | | 1 | Seafire | | --- | |

(f) Results (Relate to Individual Targets above by appropriate Target Number at left.)

| Target No. | Hits conservatively assessed. (Add "P" if confirmed by photographs) | Damage conservatively assessed. |
|------------|--|---|
| 1. | Strikes seen. (P) | Parked aircraft hit but believed to be dummies. |
| 2. | Strikes seen (P) | 1 ZEKE DAMAGE 1 POSSIBLY DESTROYED. Truck damaged. |

RP Form 461

XI AIR INTERCEPTION

(Use a new form for each day)

(a) First Detection

| Detection No. | Date | Time | Range (n.m.) | Bearing | | Height | Enemy Aircraft | | Estim. Rel. Speed | Visual or Type of Radar used |
|---------------|------|------|--------------|---------|------|--------|----------------|------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| | | | | True | Rel. | | No. | Type | | |
| 1. | - | - | - | - | - | - | NIL | - | - | - |
| 2. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. | | | | | | | | | | |
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| 9. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 11. | | | | | | | | | | |

NIL

X If detection was by an airborne aircraft, give range, rel. bearing of enemy from detecting A/C, and its height above (A) or below (B)

BPP Form 461 (continued)

(b) Interception and Result. (Relate Interception and Result to first detection number at left. If E/a destroyed by ships or suicide, note (G) or (S) under "Damage Assessed".)

| Detection No. | Time first Inter- cepted | Time Engage- ment ended. | Own aircraft intercepting | | Enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged | | | | Radar Accuracy (plus or minus for Enemy) | |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|------|--|------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|--|--------|
| | | | No. | Type | No. | Type | Damage assessed | Before or after En. attack? | No | Height |
| 1. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. | - | - | - | - | NIL | - | NIL | - | - | - |
| 3. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. | | | | | | | | | | |
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| 6. | | | | | | | | | | |
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| 9. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 11. | | | | | | | | | | |

NIL

XII Communications, ASV and Navigational Aids.

| Date | Aircraft set in use | No. of sets used | No. of failures. | Best and worst ASV & Beacon ranges on own forces reported. |
|-------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---|
| 17 July '45 | SCR 522 ZBX | 99 99 | 5 3 | Best beacon 20 miles at 1000 feet. (Formidable's" beacon unserviceable) |
| 18 July '45 | SCR 522 ZBX | 43 43 | 7 3 | Very bad results on TOMCAT's beacon. Best range 10 miles |
| | | | | |

(h) Enemy or friendly interference or jamming.

- - - N I L - - -

BPF Form 46k

XIII METEOROLOGICAL SUMMARY.

The following details are required daily at noon (local time)

| Date | Sea | Swell | Wind | | Cloud over base | | | Cloud over target | | |
|-------------|--------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------|--------|
| | | | Direct ion. | Speed (kts) | Amount | Base | Top | Amount | Base | Top |
| 17 Jul. '45 | Smooth | Short, low NE'ly. | 130° | 8 | (2/10 10/10) | 2000' 12000' | Unknown Unknown | 10/10 | Unknown | 6000' |
| 18 1. '45 | Rough | Short, low SW'ly | 265° | 24 | 6/10 | 1000' | 5000' | 2/10 - 1/10. | - | 10000' |

STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO -REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.

(for completion by Carriers on Strike Duties.)

I. GENERAL

Aircraft Carrier :- H.M.S. "Implacable". Code Name of Operation :-
Operations July/August 1945.
Advanced Base :- MANUS.
Date of leaving Advanced Base :- 6th July, 1945.
Date of arrival back at Advanced Base :- ---

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE.

Friday 20th July. REFUELLING.

1. 0425. Six Avengers were flown off to search for the Fleet Train.
2. 0712. Oiling and embarkation of AVGAS commenced from "WAVE MONARCH" by stern method.
Due to a defective pump in the "WAVE MONARCH", and to her oiling destroyers simultaneously, the rate of pumping was only 190 tons/hour average.
3. 1818. Oiling was completed and H.M.S. "Implacable" cast off.

Saturday 21st July. IN THE REFUELLING AREA.

4. 0602. Stopped for fifteen minutes to disconnect the port outer shaft, to permit examination of repairs. The H.P. adjusting block was found to be in good condition.
5. 0630 - 0700. Adjusted complement of aircraft with "Arbiter" and "Ruler". On completion total complement embarked was fifty Seafires, eighteen Avengers, twelve Fireflies.
6. 0900. Proceeded alongside "GLENARTNEY" to embark provisions and stores, casting off at 1215.

Monday 23rd. July. ON PASSAGE.

7. 0935. - 1200. H.M.S. "Quadrant" and then H.M.S. "Undaunted" came alongside to oil.

Tuesday 24th. July. IN OPERATIONAL AREA.

8. 0445. C.A.P. was maintained throughout the day without any enemy interceptions.
9. Three RAMRODS and four Combined Strikes were flown. The Ramrods were of Seafires, and for the strikes H.M.S. "Implacable's" component was Avengers with Seafires as escort in two cases, and a Firefly escort in the other two.
10. The area allocated for the Ramrods, TOKUSHIMA Airfield and KOMATSUSHIMA Seaplane Stations, was reconnoitred and attacked by the dawn Ramrod. Few aircraft were found, so a three day old reconnaissance report and a flash report from an aircraft this day indicated that there were many flying boats and float planes at SUTA and TAKUMA, the subsequent two ramrods were diverted there. The Seafires strafed and destroyed or damaged most of the aircraft there. One Seafire was lost from flak and two on the way back to the ship. The cause of these two losses is not known. All three pilots are missing.
11. The Avenger bombing in the combined strikes caused considerable destruction and damage in the hangar, workshop and building areas of TOKUSHIMA and TAKAMATSU airfields, while the Seafire escorts strafed.
12. In all./Page 2.

- (2) -

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE (Continued)

12. In all four combined strikes the escorts went after shipping after the primary target had been attacked. One Firefly with its crew was lost whilst attacking a destroyer.

Wednesday 25th July. IN OPERATIONAL AREA.

13. 0430. The day started badly when two Ramrods of Seafires and one combined strike failed to penetrate to the target area of EAST SHIKOKU and the Inland Sea because of bad weather. The ramrods both made landfalls in visibility half a mile, but could not penetrate along the coast, except for one Seafire who forced through and found clearer weather in the North of KII SUIDO.

14. On this Meteorological information a fresh appreciation of the weather was made and subsequent sorties were routed in to the East, where the cloud was found to be higher under the lee of the mountains. The third Seafire ramrod succeeded in getting into the Northern basin of KII SUIDO, and the OSAKA WAN, and attacked shipping. A Firefly escort to a combined strike also attacked shipping in the same area as also did the Seafire escort to another combined strike when it had to break off from its escort duties due to weather.

15. This latter combined strike (which included H.M.S. "Implacable's" Avengers) got in under the cloud, climbed to 6,000 feet in the clearer weather over the Inland Sea (but in full view of the prospective targets) and then attacked TOMISHIMA Airfield. The defences were ready and a very heavy reception was met, but for the loss of one Avenger (crew recovered by Lifeguard Submarine) and two aircrew members wounded, a large amount of destruction was done to hangars and airfield installations.

16. C.A.P. of Seafires were again flown throughout the day without enemy interceptions. An interception on an unidentified at 23,000 feet which proved to be a Corsair brought the retaliation of the Corsair opening fire on the Seafire.

17. During the evening air attacks a MYMT crashed in flames two miles on the starboard beam at 1820. and two more aircraft came down in sight at 1910 and 1927.

REMARKS.

18. (A) The policy of allocating a group of air bases to one ship proved its value in avoiding abortive sorties to targets reported unproductive by photographs and previous reconnaissance and enabling productive targets to be attacked systematically.

(B) It is suggested that the dawn ramrod requires at least 30 to 40 minutes over the target area from an hour after sunrise, so that good photographic and reconnaissance results may be obtained for subsequent attacks.

(C) The proportion of deck landing accidents was higher than is usual in this ship. The above average accident rate is due to two pilots each of whom had two barrier crashes.

(D) The Seafire pylon tanks were a great success, and it is the unanimous opinion of pilots that they made no difference to the handling of the aircraft after ten gallons had been expended.

4/109 4/582

29th July, 1945

SECRET

SUBJECT. OPERATIONS - JULY - AUGUST, 1945.

FROM THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "FORMIDABLE".
DATE 27th July, 1945. No. 852/024.
TO THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRON,
BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

SUBMITTED :

The following points of general interest are forwarded hereunder. The remarks of the Air Group Leader are included. British Pacific Fleet Forms 46 - 461 are also attached.

Flying Programme.

2. Number of sorties on 17th and 18th July, 1945, were low as no Avengers were used.
24th July was the ship's biggest day and purely from the organisation was the most successful, only two aircraft which might have completed their missions failing to do so through engine trouble.
Once or twice time was short when preparing for the next range, through late landing of earlier Serials and if the new layout of the Flying Programme had not been in force, it is doubtful if they would have been ready.
This arrangement, although entailing longer intervals into wind at any one time helps the deck and hangar organisation tremendously.

3. At the beginning of the 25th July, due to enemy damage, a shortage of aircraft was felt, but as a result of strenuous efforts on the part of the maintenance organisation, this was made up during the day, and if the last Strike had not been cancelled when all was ready, the number of sorties would have compared favourably with the 24th July, in spite of several aircraft lost. Maintenance personnel were tired after two days of early starts and late nights but in good heart and should be capable of meeting similar calls for some time to come.

A summary of Flying is attached as Enclosure No. 1.

Forming Up and Striking.

4. The forming up time of combined strikes improved considerable, but could still be reduced further. If deck space and flying off conditions permit, time would be saved by flying off the Avengers before the escort, as the escort with their higher manoeuvrability and speed range can naturally form up quicker.
It is essential that all the strike and escort aircraft get closed up on taking departure, as on one occasion close escort assured the Air Group Leader they were astern and closing, when in actual fact they were astern of the wrong strike.

5. It was found that owing to doubtful weather giving rise to many variables in the tactics to be followed, the escort should initially take up a "passage formation" until the Avengers have passed through the rough weather and reached clearer air. This is most easily accomplished by disposing the fighters from beam to beam around the stern in their own squadron formations.
Formations that get on the bow or in front cannot be expected to keep station and easily become detached. The only aircraft that need precede the bombers is the Air Group Leader's flight in order to do a weather reconnaissance.

As no air opposition was met, it is impossible to evaluate the efficiency of the escort, but the balance appeared sound.

6. When the target area showed signs of being weathered in, or targets of doubtful position are to be attacked, the Air Group Leader should go ahead and reconnoitre the situation and guide the strike in.

7. Providing the

- 2 -

7. Providing the Air Group Leader carries a camera, reasonable damage assessment photographs can return with the strike.

Front gun films have been most unsatisfactory due to vibration of the guns firing and inexperience in dull weather.

8. As regards airfield strafing, it was of tremendous assistance to have photographs of fields taken earlier in the day. It not only saves wasted effort in strafing dummies, but gives one a good idea of the flak and on which sectors to attack with the minimum risk and best possibilities.

9. Badly damaged aircraft should be sent immediately to the nearest open sea, in order to avoid wasting valuable 'get-away' time in reforming which might result in a forced landing in enemy territory or a ditching too close to the coast.

10. Owing to the severe overloading of channel DOG around the target area, it is recommended that flash reports be passed back on Button ABLE.

11. One nearly full overload tank on a Corsair was hit by tracers and, although petrol streamed out, no fire resulted.

12. Two sets of two photographs each are enclosed.

27 JUL 1945

W. P. RUCK-KENNEDY

CAPTAIN.

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 to "FORWARDABLE'S" LETTER NO. 852/024 of 27/7/45.

FLYING SUMMARY.

17th July, 1945.

Aircraft available at beginning of day, 35 Corsairs, 11 Avengers, 6 Hellcats.

62 aircraft took off. 4 Corsairs failed to take off.
3 Corsairs ditched due to enemy damage.
1 Corsair ditched from other causes.
2 Corsairs crashed barriers.
1 Corsair hit water near target and returned early.

18th July, 1945.

Aircraft available - 31 Corsairs, 11 Avengers, 6 Hellcats.
2 Corsairs shot down over target.

24th July, 1945.

Aircraft available - 34 Corsairs, 12 Avengers, 6 Hellcats.

1 Corsair)
1 Avenger) Shot down over target.
1 Avenger fell into sea on take off.
1 Corsair ditched - shortage of petrol.
1 Corsair returned early. Engine trouble.
1 Corsair crashed on deck on landing due to enemy damage.
1 Corsair crashed on landing.

25th July, 1945.

Aircraft available - 30 Corsairs, 10 Avengers, 6 Hellcats.

67 aircraft took off.
1 Avenger failed to take off.
2 Corsairs returned early.

TOTAL:

247 aircraft took off.
5 failed to take off.
6 ditched.
4 shot down.
4 returned early.
3 Barrier crashed.
1 crashed on deck due to enemy action.

1092/14² 16ct 5

SECRET

SUBJECT: OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST

FROM: FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRON,
BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

DATE: 23rd August, 1945. No. 0109/1/923

TO: VICE ADMIRAL, SECOND-IN-COMMAND, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET
(Copies to :- The Commanding Officers, H.M. Ships,
VICTORIOUS, PORBLINDIE,
INDISPENSIBLE, IMPLACABLE,
INDOMITABLE.)

Reports covering Air Operations between 28th July and
10th August, 1945, are forwarded herewith.

2. The opportunity afforded to work with the 2nd Carrier
Task Force has been very greatly appreciated, and valuable
experience has been gained in the manner of operation in company
of large numbers of Aircraft Carriers.



VIC ADMIRAL

Enclosures:

1. Damage Against Sorties and Bomb Load and Own Losses. - p.122
2. Remarks on Air Operations. - p.123
3. Summary of Sorties. - p.129
4. VICTORIOUS' No. 0217/8720 of 31st July, 1945. - p.133
5. VICTORIOUS' No. 0217/8773 of 14th August, 1945. - p.139
6. PORBLINDIE's No. 858/024 of 1st August, 1945. - p.144
7. PORBLINDIE's No. 872/024 of 11th August, 1945. - p.150
8. INDISPENSIBLE's No. 143/1746/00190/9 of 30th July, 1945. - p.151
9. INDISPENSIBLE's No. 3/40/00190/9 of 11th August, 1945. - p.152
10. IMPLACABLE's No. 0.7/2411 of 29th July, 1945. - p.153
11. IMPLACABLE's No. 0.7/2433 of 11th August, 1945. - p.155
12. Sets of Selected Photographs (23). - p.157

SECRET

Enclosure No. 1 to A.C.1's letter No.0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945

DAMAGE AGAINST SORTIES AND BOB LOAD

| | |
|--|---|
| Successful Offensive Sorties | 1483 |
| G.A.P. Sorties and A.S.R. | 970 |
| <hr/> | |
| Total Successful Sorties flown by T.G. 37.1 | 2453 |
| Bomb Tonnage dropped | plus 517 short tons 56 rockets |
| Total Enemy Aircraft Destroyed or Damaged | 347 { 6 splashed 142 destroyed on ground (199 damaged) |
| Combatant Ships Sunk or Probably Sunk | 9 - 16,100 tons |
| Non-Combatant Ships Sunk or Probably Sunk | 99 - 90,000 tons |
| Combatant Ships Damaged | 21 - 35,400 tons |
| Non-Combatant Ships Damaged | 180 - 214,200 tons |
| <hr/> | |
| Total Ships Clobbered | 309 - <u>356,760 tons</u> |

OWN LOSSES

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Aircrew losses (killed or missing) | |
| Pilots | 26 |
| Observers | 4 |
| Air Gunners | 2 |
| Total | <u>32</u> |
| Aircraft losses | |
| Combat | 40 |
| Operational (including those stripped and ditched in replenishment area) | 51 |
| Total | <u>91</u> |

SECRET

REMARKS ON AIR OPERATIONS

(Enclosure No. 2 to A.C.1's No.0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945)

(Page 1)

Flight Plan

The Standard Flight Plan issued for the 24th and 25th July was used without alteration thereafter.

2. The plan was designed to obtain the maximum possible number of offensive sorties subject to the requirements of the C.A.P. and Air Sea Rescue Service.

3. The number of sorties to be flown in each Strike were based on calculated availability, not on the standard load: i.e. the Strike was expected to (and generally did) consist of the number of aircraft shown in the plan.

4. The three hour sortie was obligatory in that this was the limit of Seafire endurance: the timing cycle had to be related to the American plan, rather than to convenience, in order that, so far as was practicable, the British Force should be in wind with the U.S. Force, flying 4 hour sorties. This was necessary for station keeping purposes.

5. It was accepted in the plan that the overlap for the relief C.A.P. at the higher levels would be insufficient; this is allowable when acting in company with other Task Groups, relieving at different times.

The planned sequence was -

- (a) Off new C.A.P.
- (b) Off new Strike.
- (c) On old Strike.
- (d) On old C.A.P.

6. In point of fact, particularly in the later stages when the striking distances increased, (d) was often landed before (c), since the Strike was more than 3 hours away (except escort Seafires, who returned early).

7. It was a disadvantage of the Standard Plan that at certain periods of the day a single emergency landing could gravely delay the departure of a Strike, since, as all ships contributed either bombers, escort or the associated Ramrod to the Strike, none had a clear deck while it was being ranged.

This would be overcome were a Night Carrier in company, who would act as spare deck by day.

8. Experience showed that whilst IMPLACABLE was allotted rather more sorties than she could handle, other carriers had a shade in hand, provided aircraft returned without flak damage.

/ 9. INDEFATIGABLE

SECRET

REMARKS ON AIR OPERATIONS

(Enclosure No. 2 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945)

(Page 2)

Flight Plan (Contd.)

9. INDEFATIGABLE provided fewer sorties than DEPLACABLE because she carried fewer aircraft - DEPLACABLE, however, proved to be overloaded in her present state of training to the extent that she was subject to long delays on deck when matters proceeded not according to plan: for this reason the standard load for this class has been stabilised between the respective loads carried by DEPLACABLE and INDEFATIGABLE, at 48 Avengers, 12 Firefly, 44 Seafires.

Flying Intensity

10. (i) A comparative analysis of the flying intensity of Task Force 37 and an American Task Group has been made.

(ii) For a standard strike day the Americans scheduled on average of 2.05 sorties per First Line Aircraft Establishment (F.A.E.) to the British 1.7 sorties.

(iii) On the average, on a full strike day, the Americans obtained about 80% of successful to scheduled sorties. Task Force 37 obtained 85% successful sorties. The Americans therefore flew on a full strike day about 1.65 successful sorties per F.A.E. aircraft to the British 1.45 successful sorties.

Note: A successful offensive sortie is one which reaches the target.

(iv) The higher American figure may be set down to :-

(a) Better servicing and maintenance facilities on board.

(b) Clearer and larger flight decks.

(c) Newer aircraft.

(d) Longer endurance aircraft.

(e) Faster carriers, allowing 35 knots standard relative wind.

Factors (a), (b) and (c) above enabled aircraft to be ready again more quickly than in British carriers. Factors (b), (d) and (e) enabled larger ranges to be launched. As a result, the Americans could, and did, keep a larger proportion of their strength airborne.

11. The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS in paragraph 9 of his report of 14th August, states that his ship was flying more sorties per fighter than those in American figures. The American figures referred to were those of ICEBERG however, when Task Force 58 was operating generally for two days out of three and mainly covering amphibious landings: in these circumstances they had to plan for lower flying intensity in order to maintain their effort continuously.

/ 12. (1) The Commanding Officer

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REMARKS ON AIR OPERATIONS

(Enclosure No. 2 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945)

(Page 3)

Flying Intensity (Contd.)

12. (i) The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. WOLFE, in paragraph 2 of his report of 11th August, states that on 10th August his Corsairs flew only three sorties short of requirements. The correct figure was seven. This was, however, creditable in the circumstances.
- (ii) VICTORIOUS, on the other hand, had a bad day, as is stated in paragraph 3 of the Commanding Officer's report of 14th August.
- (iii) An average of the two ships' figures should be taken to show the results to be expected on a second strike day.

Aircraft Direction

General

13. American practice was followed throughout the Operation. Enemy offensive effort against the Task Forces was effectively smothered by our offensive against their airfields, and those attacks which developed were easily dealt with.

14. There were always large numbers of friendly aircraft on the plot and good station keeping of the C.A.P.s was necessary to avoid confusion. This point should be impressed on all fighter pilots.

15. The state of the air plot also made the location and holding of lost aircraft more difficult than in previous operations. Quick and correct action both in ships and aircraft was necessary as soon as any aircraft was in distress.

External Communications

16. One additional line, the Inter Group Fighter Direction line, was continuously in use when in company with Task Force 38. This line was manned by the U.S.N. Fighter Direction Liaison Officer on strike days.

In an all British Task Force of two or more Groups, the Group Fighter Direction Officers and the Force Fighter Direction Officer would each require a Deputy to man this line and assist them generally.

17. The inter-ship lines in the Aircraft Direction Room provide a quick and simple means of supplementing the central communication channels. They have been used increasingly for this purpose. Nearly all the minor changes of flying programmes have been passed via the Aircraft Direction Rooms, and recently a large amount of reporting by returning Air Strike Leaders has come through also.

These additional commitments were not allowed for in the existing set up, and the time is now ripe for a re-organisation of the Aircraft Direction and Operational and Flying Control arrangements in carriers.

Detailed recommendations will be forwarded to British authorities separately.

/ Air Tactics

SUMMARY

REMARKS ON AIR OPERATIONS

(Enclosure No. 2 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1944)

(Page 4)

Air Tactics

18. (i) The Air Tactical doctrine laid down in the First Aircraft Carrier Squadron Air Orders proved generally satisfactory. Some revision of the instructions for deploying squadrons for a strike and making the rendezvous afterwards is required: these instructions will be rewritten.
- (ii) The ground strafing doctrine in U.S.F. 74B was used with success. The instructions in this publication, modified to some extent, will be incorporated in First Aircraft Carrier Squadron Air Orders.

Air Group Leaders

19. The Air Group Leaders fully justified themselves, each leading two 3½ hour strikes daily. In a free for all - as this operation was - an Air Group Leader is indeed indispensable: the several components of the Strike have different endurance and different weapons, and clear direction from above is necessary if the best use is to be made of all.

Briefing

20. Owing to the lack of enemy airborne opposition the Task Forces were virtually free to operate anywhere off the coast of Japan. Target areas and targets were changed as was necessary to meet the operational situation and to suit the weather. This meant that instructions for strikes had to be produced quickly at short notice, and that aircrews final briefing sometimes took place in the air.

21. Target areas and the main airfield and industrial target were passed to ships as early as possible, so that briefing material could be prepared and general briefing of aircrews started. The primary and alternative targets for the first two or three strikes of the day were given to ships the evening before and were not changed. The fourth and fifth strikes were, at the beginning of the operation, also allotted targets overnight. It was found, however, that these targets were nearly always altered, and for the last three strike days, Strikes four and five were not given targets until after the flashes from the earlier strikes had been received.

Strike Leaders' Reports

22. Flash reporting by Strike Leaders was poor at first, but improved towards the end of the operation. Instruction in flash reporting should be included in the training of senior pilots at the School of Air Warfare: succinct and accurate reports are not easy to draft, particularly in the stress of battle or bad weather flying.

Replacement Pilots and Aircraft

23. The Commanding Officer, R.M.S. VICTORIOUS calls attention in his report of 14th August, to the age of the aircraft and the youth and inexperience of the replacement pilots. This situation is, however, being steadily rectified, though much remains to be done.

/ 24. The formation

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REMARKS ON AIR OPERATIONS

(Enclosure No. 2 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945)

(Page 5)

Replacement Pilots and Aircraft (Contd.)

24. The formation of spare carrier air groups in Australia will now permit at least one C.V.'s group to be replaced by a fresh and properly worked up team each major replenishment period. Aircraft coming forward are in a better state than during ICEBERG; and the pilots which arrived towards the end of this operation were in better flying practice than the replacement pilots which joined earlier, though specialised training in Pacific Fleet attack methods is still inadequate.

Aircraft Communications

25. Communications from aircraft to ships were satisfactory and no special technical difficulties were encountered. There were the usual complaints about the unnecessary chatter by some squadrons in the target area, and transmitters were left on on one or two occasions, particularly in Avengers.

26. The four channel V.H.F. equipment now fitted is, however, inadequate for large scale operations and the new multi-channel set is urgently required. Paragraph 2 (a) of the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. INDEFATIGABLE's report of 11th August, and paragraph 4 of the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. FORMIDABLE's report of 11th August, are relevant.

There is a real need for a Flying Control Channel for each carrier, particularly in bad weather, and for a Strike Reporting Wave, the latter to ensure that Strike Leaders' flash reports are received without delay.

Ships' Radio Installations

27. Much anxiety was caused by material failures in ships' radio equipment working aircraft.

The I.E. beacon in FORMIDABLE was out of action the whole time, and the modifications to enable the Type 72D beacons in INDEFATIGABLE and DEPLACABLE to transmit American sector letters had not been completed; the Force was consequently dependent on VICTORIOUS' I.E. beacon which only just lasted the course.

V.H/F and some H/F voice circuits in FORMIDABLE also gave a lot of trouble and other ships were frequently required to act as links.

28. In order to operate with the American Task Groups, several extra sets had to be fitted, and this work, combined with dormant defects in FORMIDABLE, which became evident as the operations proceeded, proved too much for the very limited (numerically) maintenance staff available.

Good R/T communications are an essential part of Aircraft Direction and Control and carriers must be able to keep these lines going during prolonged operations; at present there are not enough expert technicians to give all the equipment the attention it demands.

/ Pilots' Cockpits

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REMARKS ON AIR OPERATIONS

(Enclosure No. 2 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945)

(Page 6)

Pilots' Cockpits - Layout

29. The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. I PLACABLE, calls attention to the importance of developing pilot navigation. The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS, states that pilots who had flown four long sorties in Corsairs in two days were physically worn out at the end of the second day.

30. It is essential that the pilots' cockpits of all future Naval single seater aircraft be so designed that the pilot can fly in comfort, navigate with precision and keep a record of his movements and operations during sorties of five or six hours.

31. It is recommended that full scale cockpits be fitted and tested at an experimental establishment, that a standardised layout be adopted and that aircraft designers be given more assistance in this matter by experienced operational pilots.

Air Sea Rescue

32. The Pacific Fleet Air Sea Rescue organisation was excellent. A notable rescue was effected by a Sea Hawk of U.S.S. TOPEKA of two downed Seafire pilots from positions only a few miles off the Japanese coast. The crews of Japanese picket boats which attempted to capture these aviators had been previously shot by Seafires.

33. There were no cases during these operations of downed aviators being lost because other aircraft did not remain to orbit them.

There were, however, several cases of incorrect reporting procedure and incorrect reports: in one case this compromised the code word of the Air Sea Rescue Data Point. It is believed that the failure of pilots to carry out correctly the very simple Standard Procedure is due to their being given insufficient drills in its use. It is not sufficient to lecture young pilots on procedures of this nature: they must also be given practical instruction.

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

(Page 1)

| Strike and Ship | Aircraft | | | Main Target | Bombs and Rockets Dropped or Fired at Targets | Enemy Aircraft Damaged or Destroyed | | Ships Sunk or Damaged | Other Damage to Enemy | Combat Air- craft Losses (not including aircraft which landed on and subsequently were jettisoned) |
|---------------------|---|-------------|-------------------|------------------------|---|--|--------|--------------------------------|---|--|
| | Ordered Off | Took Off | Reached Target | | | On Ground | In air | | | |
| | (This shows number required by full flying programme. On second successive strike day number in any serial is reduced. This reduction has not been allowed for) | | | | | (Aircraft shown are only those which carried out an aimed attack at a genuine target.) | | | | |
| 28th July | | | | | | | | | | |
| Offensive (Strikes) | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1A. FORMIDABLE | 12 Co. | 12 | 12 | Shipping Inland Sea | 12x500 lb. H.C. | 2 Dam. | - | | - | 2 Co. ditched (Flak). |
| 1B. DPLACABLE | 12 Se. | 12 | 9 | Shipping KII SUIDO | - | - | - | 1 DD 1 DE 1 FC } damaged | A/c and build- ings MINATO strafed. | - |

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

(Page 2)

| 1 | 2 | | | 3 | 4 | 5 | | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|-------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|---|------------------|---|---|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 28th July (Ctd.) | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Co. | 11 | 11 | Shipping Inland Sea | 14x 500lb. M.C. | 1 Des. 1 Dam. | - | Two small vess- els damaged. | 1 Train damaged. | - |
| 2. Combined | 20 Av. 12 So. 8 Fl. 4 Co. | 19 12 8 4 | 17 11 6 4 | HARIMA Shipyard | 62x 500lb. M.C. 24x 120lb. Frag. | - | - | 1 SBA damaged. | Much damage in Shipyard. | - |
| 2C. VICTORIOUS | 8 Co. | 8 | 6 | AKASHI A/F. | 12x 500lb. | 6 Dam. | - | - | Factory hit. | - |
| 2D. UNDEFATIGABLE | 12 So. | 8 | 8 | SATO and MINATO A/Fs. | - | Damages only. | - | Luggers strafed. | - | - |
| 3. Combined | 20 Av. 8 So. 8 Fl. 4 Co. | 19 8 7 4 | 18 6 7 4 | HABU Shipyard. | 68x 500lb. | - | - | 2 SD. Sunk. 2 FT. Damaged. | Factories in yard hit. | 1 Avenger ditched (Flak damage) |
| 3A. FORMIDABLE | 8 Co. | 7 | 7 | Shipping. FUKUYAMA A/F. | 8x 500 lb. | 1 Dam. | - | 1 DD. Damaged. | - | 1 Corsair ditched (Flak damage) |
| 3B. IMPLACABLE | 12 So. | 10 | 10 | SATO and MINATO A/Fs. | - | 2 T/E Des. | - | Barges dam- aged. | - | - |
| 4. Combined | 20 Av. 12 So. 8 Fl. 4 Co. | 19 12 7 4 | 17 11 7 4 | HARIMA Yard and Shipping. | 68x 500lb. | - | - | 1 SA.) Prob- 1 FTC.) ably Luggers. des. | Much damage in Shipyard. | 1 Firefly lost (with crew). |

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

(Page 3)

| 1 | 2 | | | 3 | 4 | 5 | | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|------------|------------------|---|---|----------------------------|---|
| <u>28th July (Ctd.)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Co. | 12 | 12 | SATO. FUGE. | 18x 500lb. | - | - | 4ID possibly damaged. | Hits on A/P installations. | - |
| 5. Combined | 20 Av. 12 So. 8 Pi. 4 Co. | 19 8 7 4 | 18 Nil 7 4 | Shipping FUGE | 76x 500lb. | - | - | 1 DE } all 1 SEL } hit 1 Kailsken } and severely damaged. | | - |
| 5A. FORGIDABLE | 12 Co. | 11 | 11 | Shipping FUGE. | 12x 500lb. | - | - | 1 SC } damaged Barges } | Warehouse destroyed. | - |
| 5B. IMPLACABLE | 8 Jc. | 8 | 7 | MINATO Area. | - | 3 Des. 4 Dam. | - | 1 SD) 1 Junk) sunk Junks damaged. | - | - |
| <u>Day Total</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Offensive | 200 + 4 PR. and search. | 260 + 4 PR. and search | 234 + 4 PR. and search | | | | | | | |
| Defensive | 144 | 135 | 132 | | | | | | | |
| Grand Total | 428 | 399 | 370 | | | | | | | |

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

(Page 4)

| <u>30th July</u> | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---|------------|------------------|---|---|--|
| <u>Offensive (Strikes)</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| 1A. FOR IDABLE | 12 Co. | 10 | 9 | Shipping HAIZURU Area. | 12x 500lb. | - | - | 1 TB 2 SC 2 DD } Damaged | - |
| 1B. DEPLACABLE | 12 Se. | 12 | | Weathered out of targets. | | | | | |
| 1C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Co. | 8 | 8 | EMMA Harbour | 14x 500lb. | - | - | Barges, etc. flamed. | Warehouses burned |
| 2. Combined | 20 Av. 12 Se. 8 Fl. 4 Co. | 18 8 7 4 | 18 8 6 3 | Weathered in. Bombs dropped by Radar on land. | | | | | |
| 2C. VICTORIOUS | 8 Co. | 8 | 6 | MIYEMAMA A/F. | - | 1 Des. 5 Dam. | - | - | - |
| 2D. INDEFATIGABLE | 12 Se. | 8 | 8 | Shipping NAGOYA Bay | - | - | - | 1 Trawler damaged. | One Seafire (with pilot) flak. |
| 3. Combined | 20 Av. 8 Se. 8 Fl. 4 Co. | 19 4 8 4 | 19 4 8 4 | Shipping HAIZURU | 74x 500lb. | - | - | 1 Destroyer probably sunk. 11TC } probably 1SD } sunk. | - |
| 3A. FOR IDABLE | 8 Co. | 8 | 8 | Shipping HAIZURU | 10x 500lb. | - | - | 3 DEs damaged. | - |
| 3B. DEPLACABLE | 12 Se. | 8 | 6 | AKENOGAILARA A/F | - | 5 Des. 1 Dam. | - | - | Hangars damaged 1 Seafire (with pilot) flak |

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

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| 1 | 2 | | | 3 | 4 | 5 | | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|--|-----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| 30th July (Ctd.) | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Combined | 20 Av. 12 B. 3 Pl. 4 Co. | 18 12 7 4 | 18 12 6 4 | YOKKAICHI KUMANA Harbours | 51 x 500lb. 48 x 120lb. Frag. | - | - | Oil barges damaged. | Oil Tanks damaged | - |
| 4C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Co. | 8 | 8 | MAIZURU } HAKODATE } /F | 15 x 500lb. | - | - | - | Hangars damaged | - |
| 5. Combined including Rangroda. | 16 Co. 8 B. 8 Pl. | 15 8 6 | 15 5 5 | Shipping MAIZURU Area | 16 x 500lb. | - | - | 1 DD) 2 ODD) damaged 1 DE) | - | 1 Corsair (with pilot) |
| <u>Notes:</u> Avengers and Seafire Escort cancelled to conform with Task Force 38 orders weather deteriorating. | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | |
|------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <u>Day Total</u> | | | |
| Offensive | 248 + 4 TR. and search | 212 + 4 PR. and search | 188 + 4 PR. and search |
| Defensive | 148 | 130 | 130 |
| Grand Total | 400 | 346 | 322 |

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

(Page 6)

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|---------------|--|---|--|--|
| <u>9th August</u> | | | | | | | |
| <u>Offensive (Strikes)</u> | | | | | | | |
| 1A. FOR IDABLE | 12 Co. | 12 | 10 | SHIOGAH | 5x 500 lb. | 9 Des. 11 Dm. | - |
| 1B. L PLACABLE | 12 Se. | 10 | 9 | MATSUSHIMA | - | - | 2 Picket boats destroyed. |
| 1C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Co. | 10 | 9 | Coastal Shipping North HONSHU | 10x 500 lb. | - | 2 SD sunk. |
| 2. Combined | 20 Av. 12 Se. 8 Pi. | 20 10 8 | 20 9 8 | MATSUSHIMA | 75x 500 lb. 72x 120 lb. Frag. Clus. | 11 Des. (possibly shared with Americans.) | - |
| 2C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Co. | 11 | 11 | Shipping North HONSHU | 14x 500 lb. | - | 1 DE damaged |
| 2D. INDEFATIGABLE | 12 Se. | 9 | 8 | KESSENUN. YAMADA S/S MACHINE A/P | - | 1 Des. 3 Dm. | Luggers and Launches sunk |
| 3. Combined | 20 Av. 12 Se. 8 Pi. | 20 12 8 | 20 10 8 | MATSUSHIMA | 76x 500 lb. 8x 120 lb. Frag. clus. | 2 Des. | - |
| 3A. FOR IDABLE | 8 Co. | 8 | 8 | ONAGAWA WAN | 20x 500 lb. | - | 1 ODD sunk 1 DE damaged 1 Boon defence vessel damaged. |
| | | | | | | | 1 Seafire |
| | | | | | | | Airfield installations damaged. |
| | | | | | | | 2 locomotives destroyed. Warehouses damaged. |
| | | | | | | | Hangars and installations severely damaged. |
| | | | | | | | 1 Avenger (pilot missing) |
| | | | | | | | 2 Corsairs (pilots lost) |

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

(Page 7)

9th August (Ctd.)

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--|---|-----------------------|---|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 3B. I PLACABLE | 12 Se. | 11 | 10 | Shipping North HONKAI | - | - | - | 2 DEs damaged | - | - |
| 4. Combined | 20 Av. 12 Se. 8 P.L. 4 Co. | 19 12 6 4 | 19 12 6 4 | Shipping and KOBAYASHI Port | 72x 500lb. | - | - | 1 SD sunk. 4 SD probably sunk. 2 DD damaged (later observed to be sunk from this or other attacks). | - | - |
| 4C. VICTORIOUS | 16 Co. | 19 | 15 | KOBAYASHI A/P. | 41x 500lb. | 8 Des. | - | - | Airfield install- ations damaged. | 1 Corsair (pilot missing) |
| 5. Combined | 22 Av. 12 Se. 8 P.L. 4 Co. | 21 9 7 4 | 20 9 7 4 | Shipping at OKOTSU and ONAGAWA WAN | 66x 500lb. 48x 120lb. Prag. Clus. | - | - | 1 small freight- er and 1 PTB sunk. 1 PTB and 1 DD damaged. | - | 1 Seafire missing (with pilot). |
| 5A. FOR IDABLE | 12 Co. | 11 | 11 | ONAGAWA WAN KOBAYASHI A/P. | 20x 500lb. | 17 prob. destroyed | - | 2 DE probably sunk. (also be- ing attacked by Americans). | - | - |
| 5B. I PLACABLE | 8 Se. | 7 | 7 | ATSUSHI A/P and Shipping. | - | 4 Des. | - | SDs damaged. | - | - |

Day Total

| | | | |
|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Offensive | 286 + 4 P.R. | 263 + 4 P.R. | 254 + 4 P.R. |
| Defensive | 145 | 140 | 137 |
| Grand Total | 431 | 407 | 391 |

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

(Page 8)

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--|------------|-----------------|---|---|------------------|
| <u>10th August</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Offensive (Strikes)</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| 1A. PORCUPINE | 12 Co. | 10 | 10 | MITSUBISHI HASUDA A/F | 18x 500lb. | 1 S/E des. - | - | Power station, hangars and barracks dam- aged. 1 loco- motive destroyed. | 1 Corsair |
| 1B. DEFLAGRANT | 12 So. | 10 | 9 | HASUDA | - | - | - | Hangars damaged. | - |
| 1C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Co. | 12 | 12 | KORIYAMA | 8 x 500lb. | - | - | Dispersal area installations damaged. 2 locos. and trains des- troyed - factory damaged. | - |
| 2. Combined | 20 Jv. 12 So. 6 Pl. 4 Co. | 20 10 4 4 | 19 9 4 4 | MITSUBISHI A/F OHAGATA WAI Shipping. | 72x 500lb. | 2 Des. | - | 2 DEs damaged. 1 SD damaged. 2 Freighters sunk. 1 freight- er damaged. | Hangars damaged. |
| 2C. VICTORIOUS | 8 Co. | 8 | 7 | OHAGATA WAI Shipping | 14x 500lb. | - | - | 4 trains and railway install- ations damaged. | - |
| 2D. INDEXTICABLE | 12 So. | 8 | 8 | YAMADA Area | - | 1 prob. des. | - | 3 luggers pro- bably sunk. | - |

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/925 of 23rd August, 1945.)

(Page 9)

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|-------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---|---|--|--|
| 10th August (Ctd) | | | | | | | |
| 3. Combined | 20 Av. 3 Se. 3 Fl. 4 Co. | 20 7 8 Nil | 20 7 8 Nil | KORIYAMA A/F | 72x 500lb. 16x 120lb. Frag. Clus. | 2 Des. 6 Des. (approx.) | - - - Airfield In- stallations damaged. |
| 3A. FORMIDABLE | 3 Co. | 8 | 8 | MITSUBISHI | - | 2 dest. | - - - 1 Corsair |
| 3B. REPLACEMENT | 12 Se. | 9 | 6 | KORIYAMA | - | 6 dest. 5 dam. | - - - |
| 4. Combined | 20 Av. 12 Se. 3 Fl. 4 Co. | 18 11 6 4 | 18 9 6 4 | KORIYAMA | 72x 500lb. | 4 dest. 16 dam. | - - - 1 Corsair 1 Avenger 2 Fireflies (all crews lost). |
| 4C. VICTORIOUS | 12 Co. | 6 | 6 | KORIYAMA | - | 2 dam. | - - - |
| 5. Combined | 20 Av. 12 Se. 3 Fl. 4 Co. | 20 9 7 2 | 20 9 7 2 | Shipping at NOKKAICHI and ONAGAWA WH. | 72x 500lb. 12x 120lb. Frag. Clus. | - - - 2 SD and 1 Freighter sunk. 2 DD damaged. | - - |
| 5A. FORMIDABLE | 12 Co. | 8 | 8 | KORIYAMA | 16x 500lb. | - - - | - - Factory damaged. Railroad trucks damaged. |

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

(Enclosure No. 3 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.)

(Page 10)

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------|---|-----------------|---|
| 10th August (Ctd) | | | | | | | |
| 5B. IMPLACABLE | 8 So. | 4 | 4 | Shipping | - | - | - |
| | | | | | | Luggers damaged | - |
| <u>Day Total</u> | | | | | | | |
| Offensive | 280 + 3 P.R. | 233 + 3 P.R. | 224 + 3 P.R. | | | | |
| Defensive | 148 | 136 | 133 | | | | |
| Grand Total | 431 | 372 | 360 | | | | |

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Enclosure No. 4 to A.C. One's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945
COPY. SECRET

Subject

OPERATIONS - 28th & 30th JULY, 1945.

From THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. VICTORIOUS

Date 31st July, 1945.

No. 0217/5720

To The Flag Officer Commanding, 1st Aircraft Carrier
Squadron, British Pacific Fleet.

Herewith are forwarded H.M.S. "Victorious" reports
on the Operations of 28th and 30th July, 1945.

-p.143

(sgd.) M.M. Denny

Rear Admiral

ENCLOSURE
NO. 0217/8773

23rd August, 1945

OPERATIONS, JULY/AUGUST, 1945

From THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "VICTORIOUS"
Date 14th August 1945 No. 0217/8773
To The Flag Officer Commanding, First Aircraft Carrier Squadron,
British Pacific Fleet

Herewith are forwarded VICTORIOUS' reports on the air operations of 9th and 10th August, 1945, together with a Statistical Summary, included as Appendix "A", on the same lines as those previously forwarded by VICTORIOUS.

2. 9th August was a good day. The change in fighter sorties necessitated by VICTORIOUS' Air Group Leader being sick and Rescue CAP increased the number of Corsair sorties required by the Air Plan in the first half of the programme to the high figure of 54 in 7 hours. 51 Corsairs took off to time and the deficiency of 3 was subsequently redeemed by later providing 4 extra Corsairs and 3 extra Avengers for Strike 5.

The day totalled 63 Corsair sorties (3 abortive) and 19 Avenger, these having been flown by 33 Corsairs and 12 Avengers in 13 hours, and total flying time was 378 hours. This day constitutes a record for VICTORIOUS in operational flying.

3. 10th August was a bad day for Corsairs. 31 were available at H Hour; at H + 7 Hours only 40 Corsairs had flown off, to meet commitments for 48 sorties, and 8 of these sorties were abortive requiring emergency or precautionary landings. The crisis developed, and after providing a Rescue CAP of 2 Corsairs at 1300 the state was reached when free space in the Hangar was bogged down with 24 U/S Corsairs and not one serviceable in the ship to meet a requirement of 8 due at 1410. The situation was so overwhelming that the repair and servicing organisation was not able to cope with their normal success. In the event, 4 serviceable Corsairs were unearthed and after a monumental amount of shunting reached the flight deck and were flown off 18 minutes late on programme time.

The day totalled 51 Corsair (8 abortive), 18 Avenger and 1 Walrus sorties, a disappointing result. The amount of work put in to achieve this result was very much greater than that required for the far better performance of the preceding day, and provides an interesting illustration of the fact that one cannot overfly old aircraft without paying for it.

4. Corsair Fighter-Bomber Ramrods.

These presented new features. Many called for a round trip of 500 nautical miles, with a 1000 lb. bomb load and long range tank, to be completed in three hours. This load affects fuel consumption and speed considerably. With a large formation an airspeed over 165 knots indicated at 10,000 feet is unsatisfactory - 160 knots is the maximum comfortable - and leads to straggling or excessive fuel consumption. Thus the narrowest of margins existed over the targets. When the assignment called for a number of separate targets, insufficient time was available for reforming etc. to allow the mission to be fully executed. A number of cases of fuel shortage occurred, but good judgment by the leaders was shown and maximum offensive power developed in that the flights were extended to the limit.

5. Air Sea Rescue Flight, 10th August.

One Walrus escorted by one fighter took off at 1325. The Walrus sighted "Lifeguard" at 1515 but could see no survivors in the water. The "Lifeguard" dived on sighting the Walrus. Search of the area was carried out until P.L.E. and then course was set for base. After 15 minutes on the homeward leg, the fighter requested the Walrus to investigate "Evergreen". The Walrus did this, thereby prejudicing its chances of reaching base.

At 1720 the engine cut and the Walrus crash-landed. Prior to ditching it was in R/T touch with the U.S.N. CAP over the "Lifeguard". The escorting fighter remained to assist but during one low pass over the Walrus his engine cut and he ditched.

Both crews were rescued by "Watchdog" at 1845, the Walrus being sunk by gunfire.

CHIEF OF STAFF, JULY/AUGUST, 1945

(VICTORIOUS Letter No. 0217/8773 of 14th August 1945)

6. Communications

(a) In the final period VICTORIOUS had a number of temporary communication failures, mostly due to the continuous overloading and over-work of the A.C. system. The whole of this runs on a continuous overload owing to the many additions fitted, and in its present state of fatigue can only be kept going by prodigious efforts of all concerned.

(b) YE Beacon : VICTORIOUS had the only satisfactory YE Beacon in the Force. Great credit is due to the Signal Staff in successfully nursing it the whole time aircraft were airborne. VICTORIOUS carries the oldest YE Beacon in the Royal Navy, and the equipment is now suffering somewhat from fatigue. Half the aerial counter-poise has been shattered off by vibration - there is no lower bearing at the base of the revolving structure - the gas-filled feeder is no longer gas-tight or gas-filled - and the control box has its minor keying troubles. Many hours were spent in maintenance and it may be of interest that a piece of cardboard bent to form an improvised spring permitted correct morse symbols to be made which otherwise would have been unreadable.

7. Casualties.

Temporary Sub Lieutenant(A) S. Newton, RNVR, No. 1836 Squadron, failed to return from Strike 4C on 9th August. He was last seen over KORIYAMA airfield at which time he was thought to be taking photographs. He failed to reform at the rendezvous and has been reported missing.

Temporary Sub Lieutenant(A) H.L. Wright, RNVR, No. 849 Squadron, was killed on 9th August as a result of a forced landing at "Tomcat 1". His aircraft had been badly hit by flak and was vibrating badly and was only able to turn to starboard. Unfortunately reports indicate that his wheels were down when he hit the water, which caused his aircraft to capsize. His T.A.G. was rescued unhurt.

Temporary Sub Lieutenant(A) P. Bennett, RNVR, No. 1836 Squadron, was lost on 30th July. He was one of the Air Group Leader's Division in Combined Strike 5 attacking shipping at LAISURU. His aircraft dived into the side of a hill on completion of a strafing attack and burst into flames.

8. (a) As far as VICTORIOUS is concerned the "JULY/AUGUST" operation makes an interesting comparison with the two cycles of ICEBERG. Although the former contained only 8 strike days and the latter two 12 each, the aggregate air effort for "JULY/AUGUST" was approximately the same, but the effort expended in the target area was the greatest of the three operations, notably so in the case of the Corsair Wing.

(b) That it was possible to achieve this greater output in ground attack by the Corsairs was largely due to the more convenient Flight Plan worked during JULY/AUGUST, and, in a lesser degree, to a 50% reduction in CAP effort.

(c) The fighter pilot effort varied between an average of 2 sorties every strike day to 3 sorties per pair of strike days. The pilots who did 2 sorties every strike day were very tired at the end of the last day of the pair and were suffering considerably from body aches and cramps as a result of the long hours in the somewhat uncomfortable cockpit of the Corsair.

(d) On the other hand, mentally the fighter pilots ended up in a much more robust condition, and could have continued for a number of further strike days without a rest period. This is due to -

(i) All operationally tired pilots were relieved before the JULY/AUGUST operations commenced. This was not the case before the ICEBERG.

(ii) The satisfaction of hitting the Jap in his home country and the finding of many and varied targets, provided a considerable stimulant in comparison with the long drawn out, dull and arid target features of the SAKISHIMA GUNTO.

(iii) The almost total elimination of periods "at readiness" in strike days.

(iv) The longer intervals between strike periods, allowing good recuperation.

(e)

(VICTORIOUS Letter No. 0217/8773 of 14th August 1945)

(c) Against the above satisfactory features must be set the fact that in both the Fighter Wing and the TBF Squadron the accuracy of bombing attack was lower than customary. The newly-joined fresh young aircrews had had inadequate and in some cases no training in bombing before joining at Sydney and little opportunity in VICTORIOUS for practice before being sent out on strike missions.

9. Operational losses, abortive sorties and non-starters.

(a) On three days only, out of the eight, were these losses of effort less or better than Task Force 38 standards. On the other hand fighter sorties per available aircraft on strike days were above the American figures.

(b) In the 669 deck landings, there were 3 deck landing write-offs, 5 others which produced flyable duds and a further 4 which produced about 12 hours unserviceability (10 of these 12 accidents were Corsairs). 90 % of these accidents were due to pilots who have had less than 150 hours solo on type (30 % of 'VICTORIOUS' Air Group) and who were all new to Carrier operations. I regard these figures, though unpalatable, to be what must be expected if untrained aircrews are employed in operational Carriers.

(c) The rather high figures of abortive sorties and non-starters among the Corsairs on 5 of the strike days I consider mainly to be due to the age of the Corsairs and the long time they have spent in storage in tropical and sub-tropical climates. They are much older aircraft than the Americans would use.

10. The aggregate flying for the whole period of 36 days was ideal for sustained operations, sufficient to keep everyone in trim. The average of the 33 Corsair pilots who lost no opportunities through sickness or other causes was 12½ sorties and 34 hrs. 10 min. flying. The top scorer was Temporary Sub Lieutenant (A) D.H. Mc Nicol, RNVR, of 1834 Squadron with 15 sorties aggregating 47 hours flying; 6 pilots exceeded 40 hours.

The Avenger Squadron Commander's crew executed 13 sorties aggregating 38 hrs. 25 min. (7 sorties to target area).

11. The increase in output which we have now worked up to is considered to be no mean achievement. The business of servicing and handling the aircraft in congested VICTORIOUS to meet the varied requirements is complicated by the number of types carried, viz.:-

- | | |
|--|---|
| (i) Walrus - of high nuisance value as they have to occupy the most convenient billets in the Hanger, and usually stay there idle all day; | |
| (ii) Ordinary Corsairs (Mark II or IV); | } From the operational aspect these aircraft are not interchangeable. |
| (iii) Corsairs fitted with pylons for bombing; | |
| (iv) Corsairs fitted with cameras; | |
| (v) Corsairs fitted with double oxygen equipment for high CAP; | |
| (vi) Avengers. | |

Although I am well aware of the tactical disadvantages of a "one type" Carrier load, I am now quite certain that what is now a good performance by way of producing 70 sorties a day from the present mixed bag of 53 aircraft carried in VICTORIOUS is equivalent to 85-90 straightforward fighter sorties which would be possible from 53 aircraft of uniform type with the same expenditure of effort.

12. Replacements.

The aircraft replacement system still fails to come up to expectation. The great majority of such aircraft flown on board are NOT operationally fit and cannot be flown in the next day's strike. This tends to a reluctance to dispose of a "flyable dud", the repair staff preferring to retain it and struggle with the defects of which they are aware than have to delve into the unknown defects and adjustments of the substitutes on their receipt. In either case the intention to reduce the servicing required in the Fleet Carrier by substituting good aircraft for bad is frustrated.

13.

OPERATIONS, JUNE/AUGUST, 1945

(VICTORIOUS Letter No 0212/5773 of 14th August 1945)

13. It is an interesting side light on the current state of British Naval aviation material that the only two methods available to VICTORIOUS for employing her fighters to bomb the enemy necessitated the use of aircraft fittings officially disapproved.

14. To the above somewhat acid comment might be added the wonder occasioned in SHANURI LA by the landing there of a moth-eaten Corsair Mark II with "boarding under-carriage" from VICTORIOUS. The idea of such a museum piece never having been seen in a Far East theatre of war is very curious. However, VICTORIOUS is very fond of her Corsairs, and no harm is done in recording the fact that we use much old and decrepit material in collaboration with Allies who are up to date.

15. During the period of operations, a large amount of recreation and entertainment has been provided for the ship's company.


To and from the exercises, physical training has been compulsory and voluntary, on every available day there has been a full programme of deck-hockey or flag-of-war inter-part matches. This has resulted in a very high percentage of the ship's company being fit and well during the operations.

During the operations, many films have been shown as far as possible, have been given, and a special cinema programme has been provided daily on the S.R. by a specially selected team of officers and crew.

The present state of health and morale of the ship's company is undoubtedly due in part to measures such as these which have provided the necessary change in a routine which might otherwise have become monotonous.

16. I believe that the operation of the 1st and 2nd operations from VICTORIOUS of 18th and 19th Squadrons, comprising Royal Fighter Wing (Corsairs), which started with the successful attack on VAMPITZ in Altenflund, must be unique in the history of Naval aviation. Their casualties have been heavy, and all the original aircrews have long since gone, but the record and spirit of the Wing have gone much to sustain the high proportion of very young and inexperienced pilots who joined at Sydney for the operations under report.

17. On completion of this operation, VICTORIOUS is proud to be the one Carrier to have operated throughout all the Fleet Aircraft Carrier Squadron operations in the Pacific, and that the tedious mending of her defective rudder, steering gear and centre shaft - a state of affairs aptly described by INDEPENDENCE as "the poor condition of a poor condition" - should have had their remedy.



(Sgd) M. M. DENNY

Rear Admiral

SECRET

APPENDIX "A" to "VICTORIOUS" letter No. 0217/8773 of 14th
August, 1945.

H.M.S. "VICTORIOUS" - STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
JULY/AUGUST.

Period under review: Departure 1812H 0355X 6th July 1945 to
2359L 10th August (last strike day).

I. PERSONNEL

Average number victualled: 190 officers,
1830 ratings,
2020 Total

Average daily sick list: 15.75

Flying personnel - Flying days lost
(sick or grounded): 108
(aircraft ditched): 13

II. LOGISTICS

| | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Provisions embarked at sea : | 41000 lbs. |
| Oil Fuel embarked at sea : | 5302 tons. |
| Oil Fuel expended : | 5512 tons. |
| Average embarked at sea : | 121500 gallons. |
| Average expended : | 166330 gallons. |
| Average embarked at sea : | 500 gallons. |
| Average expended : | 2495 gallons. |
| Bombs embarked at sea : | 200 x 500 lb. |
| Bombs dropped in attacks : | 575 x 500 lb. 40 x 120 lb. frag. clusters |
| Bombs ditched : | 94 (including those due to weather) |
| Bombs hung up : | 2 x 500 lb. 2 x 120 lb. frag. clusters. |
| Aircraft gun ammunition fired : | 134,265 0.5" |
| Aircraft gun ammunition stored : | 300 0.50" |
| Aircraft gun sorties : | 1440 (6 per Corsair sortie) |

/ III. AIRCRAFT

APPENDIX "A" to "VICINOUS" letter No. 0217/8773 of 14th August, 1945.

III. AIRCRAFT

- (a) Original establishment:- 37 Corsairs
14 Avengers
2 Walrus

- (b) Total number of individual aircraft of each type flown and serviced on board during period:

49 Corsairs
15 Avengers
2 Walrus

66 Total

- | | Co. | Av. | Va. |
|---|-----|-----|-----|
| (a) Serviceable at sunset final day: | 14 | 9 | 1 |
| U/S at end of period and | | | |
| reparable by ship : | 20 | 4 | - |
| Retained on board for repairs | | | |
| on shore : | 1 | - | - |
| Not returned from sorties : | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Ditched as non-reparable / : | 5 | - | - |
| Flown off as flyable duds / : | 5 | - | - |
| (✓ 2 as the result of enemy action remainder by accidents, barrier crashes, etc.) | | | |

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|-----------------------|
| (d) Total Corsair hours flown | : | 1451 hours 55 minutes |
| " Avenger " " | : | 373 " 05 " |
| " Walrus " " | : | 0 " 50 " |

Aggregate, all types : 1833 hours 50 minutes

- (c) Maximum hours flown by any Corsair aircraft : 59 hours 15 minutes
 " " " " " Avenger " : 41 hours 50 minutes

- (e) Corsair drop tanks - dropped in flight 109
written off -17

| | |
|----------------|-----|
| Total expended | 126 |
|----------------|-----|

IV AIRCRAFT SORTIES

- | | | |
|------------------------------|---|----|
| (a) Number of days in period | : | 36 |
| Non-flying days | : | 9 |
| Strike days | : | 8 |

- | | | | |
|-------------------|-----------|---|-----|
| (b) Total sorties | Comdr | : | 537 |
| | Passenger | : | 135 |
| | Volunt | : | 3 |

Aggregado sortien : 675

Total sorties to target area - Corsair 255 (includes 10 abortive).
 Avengers 85 (includes 1 abortive).
 Walrus 2 (ASR)

| | | |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------------------------|
| Total sorties in Fleet area | - U.A.P. | 182 (including 6 abortive) |
| | Search | 3 |

/Total ferry and message drop cartons 6

APPENDIX "A" to "VICTORIOUS" Letter No. 0217/6773 of 14th August 1945.

Total ferry and message drop sorties - Corsair 22
Avenger 8

Total end exercise and identification
sorties - Corsair 78
Avenger 39
Walrus 4

Visitors - 2 on, 2 off.

V (A) AIRCRAFT CASUALTIES THROUGH HOSTY ACTION

| | Corsair | Avenger |
|-------------------|---------|---------|
| Lost | 2 | 2 |
| Seriously damaged | 5 | 2 |
| Slightly damaged | 7 | 8 |
| Total | 14 | 12 |

V (B) DISPOSAL OF OPERATIONALLY DAMAGED AIRCRAFT

| | Corsair | Avenger | Walrus |
|--|---------|---------|--------|
| Not returned from sortie due to engine failure or lack of petrol | 2 | - | 1 |
| Deck landing accidents - ditched as non-repairable. | 5 | - | - |
| Deck landing accidents - Flown off as flyable dcd. | 5 | - | - |
| Total: | 10 | - | 1 |

VI AIRCRAFT SERVICEABILITY

State at 0400, on 1st day of each Strike period:

| | Corsair | Avenger | Walrus |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|--------|
| 1st period (17th July) | 34 | 14 | 2 |
| 2nd period (21st July) | 36 | 14 | 2 |
| 3rd period (28th July) | 36 | 14 | 2 |
| 4th period (30th July) | 34 | 13 | 2 |
| 5th period (9th August) | 35 | 13 | 2 |

State at sunset last day of each Strike period:

| | | | |
|---------------------|----|----|---|
| 1st period (2 days) | 24 | 14 | 2 |
| 2nd period (2 days) | 14 | 8 | 2 |
| 3rd period (1 day) | 18 | 4 | 2 |
| 4th period (1 day) | 13 | 5 | 2 |
| 5th period (2 days) | 14 | 9 | 1 |

(A) CORSAIR PILOTS OF No. 47 WING.

| Rank & Name. | Total Sorties. | Total Hours Flown. | Days Sick. | Remarks. |
|---|----------------|-----------------------|------------|---|
| A/Cdr. J.C.N. Shrubsole. | 15 | 42.45 | 1 | |
| A/Lt. Cdr. J.G. Baldwin. | 14 | 42.40 | | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) D.A. Dick. | 17 | 44.35 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) R.L. Goulden. | 19 | 24.45 | 9 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) E.J. Haviland-Davis. | 12 | 30.00 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) W.E. Eldridge. | 13 | 39.45 | | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) D.A. Baldwin. | 11 | 29.15 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) I.J. Brown. | 5 | 13.20 | | Rejoined Sqd'n 1 Aug., 1945. |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) G.F.G. Showell. | 12 | 34.30 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) J.W. Maybank. | 11 | 28.35 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) M.A. Harrison. | 10 | 23.50 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) T.P. Poocek. | 11 | 33.15 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) P.G. Jupe. | 13 | 35.35 | | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) P.G. Boomer. | 11 | 28.10 | | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) H.W. Marsh. | 10 | 24.40 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) F.K. Barlow. | 13 | 30.20 | 1 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) G.H. Rutton. | 12 | 36.15 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) D.H. McFicoll. | 15 | 47.00 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) A.R. Jones. | 11 | 25.00 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) B.L. Finch. | 4 | 11.50 | 2 | Discharged POWAP 20 July, 1945. |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) A.I.R. Jamieson | 11 | 22.50 | 12 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. A.R. McBain. | 2 | 6.20 | | Ashore 5 July, 1945 to 3 Aug., 1945. |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) R. Ward. | 11 | 33.20 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) J.A.H. Stevens. | 6 | 14.40 | | Joined Sqd'n 27 July, 1945. |
| Ty. A/Lt. Cdr. (A) D.K. Evans. | 15 | 44.05 | | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) D.T. Chute. | 13 | 31.55 | | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) H.A. Rhodes. | 15 | 35.50 | 3 | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) H. West. | 12 | 36.35 | 3 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) G.A. Bowser. | 12 | 34.30 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) R.W. Chamblor. | 12 | 31.00 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) P. Hemingway. | 10 | 29.40 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) J.C. Leddy. | 15 | 37.05 | 2 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) R. Watt. | 10 | 29.40 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) J.R. O'n. Martin. | 15 | 43.50 | 2 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) J.A. Shaw. | 14 | 28.10 | | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) S. Newton. | 6 | 16.40 | 3 | "Missing" 9 Aug., 1945. |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) A.P.A. Cargill. | 13 | 37.40 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) R. Brown. | 14 | 38.50 | 2 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) H.M. McEnery. | 11 | 33.00 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) I.R. Leslie. | 9. | 19.45 | 8 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) D.W.W. Allom. | 12 | 33.30 | 2 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) I. Webster. | 7. | 21.50 | 13 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) P.W.C. Griffith. | 14 | 38.40 | | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) G.G. McCrone. | 11 | 21.10 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) N.P. Prettojohn. | 12 | 27.45 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) G.W. Woodrow | 12 | 27.40 | 2 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) J.B. Nash. | 8 | 7.55 | | Rejoined Sqd'n 1 Aug., 1945. |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) P.D. Bennett. | 12 | 28.15 | 2 | "Missing Presumed Killed" 20 July '45. |
| Total No. Corsair Hours..... 2451.55 | | | | |
| Top Scorer :- Ty. S/Lt. (A) D.H. McFicoll.... | 47.00 | | | |
| Second :- Ty. Lt. (A) D.A. Dick..... | 44.35 | | | |
| Third :- Ty. A/Lt. Cdr. (A) D.K. Evans... | 44.05 | | | |

/IX. Cont'd AVENGER AIR CREWS..... 6.

UNITED STATES (B) AVIATION CORPS - 849 SQUADRON.

| Rank & Name. | Total Sorties. | Total Hours. Flown. | Days Sick. | Remarks. |
|---------------------------------|----------------|------------------------|------------|---|
| Ty. Lt. (A) R. P. Curran. | 13. | 38.25 | 3 | |
| Ty. A/Lt. Cdr. A. J. Griffiths. | | | | |
| P.O. (A) W. E. Richardson. | | | | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) R. E. Cumming. | 11 | 23.10 | 2 | |
| Ty. Lt. (A) A. J. Quinn. | | | | |
| A/P.O. (A) J. Turner. | | | | |
| S/Lt. (A) J. T. Stephens. | 7 | 16.05 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) P. Bott. | | | | |
| A/P.O. (A) H. T. Barnett. | | | | |
| Ty. Lieut. (P) M. C. Hare. | 8 | 17.10 | | |
| Ldg. Air. K. Glass. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) D. G. Frempton. | 6 | 19.10 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) A. S. Gardner. | | | | |
| W.O. (A) D. Gardner. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) F. Cawood. | 6 | 20.00 | 3 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) T. R. Artley. | | | | |
| A/P.O. (A) H. G. Ruttle. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) G. Goodchild. | 7 | 16.40 | 3 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) P. E. Leach. | | | | |
| A/PO. (A) G. Holmes. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) D. G. McGregor. | 7 | 23.30 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) D. R. Palengat. | | | | |
| Ldg. Air. W. W. Hamilton. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) A. J. Gill. | 7 | 17.55 | | |
| Ldg. Air. J. Gallantry. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) A. R. W. Inge. | 5 | 15.10 | 5 | |
| Ldg. Air. C. J. N. Dougherty. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) P. R. Watson. | 8 | 26.00 | | |
| A/P.O. (A) A. W. Lyon. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) G. L. Drummond. | 8 | 25.05 | 1 | |
| A/PO. (A) G. Clapnell. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) C. W. G. Drake. | 8 | 23.05 | 22 | |
| Ldg. Air. J. Day. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) E. C. Boyes. | 9 | 27.35 | | |
| Ldg. Air. J. Graham. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) R. W. T. Abraham. | 6 | 18.30 | | |
| A/PO (A) D. G. Foster. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) N. L. Wright. | 6 | 15.00 | | S/Lt. Wright "Killed" 10 August, 1945. |
| A/PO (A) T. Murphy. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) B. J. Smith. | 6 | 12.20 | 1 | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) B. W. Cook. | | | | |
| Ldg. Air. D. Elphick. | | | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) J. C. Arbutnot. | 9 | 21.15 | | |
| Ty. S/Lt. (A) J. E. Stubbings. | | | | |
| A/PO (A) J. E. Mullaney. | | | | |

Total Sorties..... 135.
Total Hours..... 578.05

/IX Cont'd VALUES SORTIES.....

WALROS SORTIES.

| <u>Rank & Name.</u> | <u>Total Sorties.</u> | <u>Total Hours Flown.</u> | <u>Days Sick.</u> | <u>Remarks.</u> |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Flt. Lieut. D.R. Howard. RAAF. } Ty. S/Lt. (A) J. Wilson. | 1 | 3.10 | | |
| F/O. B.L. Ada. RAAF. } Ty. S/Lt. (A) R. Humphries. | 1 | 4.00 | | |
| F/O. B.L. Ada. RAAF. } Ty. S/Lt. (A) A. Braithwaite. | 1 | 1.40 | | |

Total Sorties..... 3
Total Hours..... 9.50

ENCLOSURE 6
NO 0109/16/925 23/8/45

COPY

SECRET

Subject REPORTS ON OPERATIONS.

From THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. FORMIDABLE.
Date 1st August, 1945. No. 858/02.
To THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING FIRST AIRCRAFT
CARRIER SQUADRON, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

SUBMITTED :

With reference to A.C.T.M. 015, British Pacific
Fleet Forms 4.6 - 4.6k are forwarded herewith.

2. Points of general interest will be forwarded
at the end of the next Strike Period.

(sgd.) P. Buck Asene.

CAPTAIN.

0109/16/925

23 August '45

SUBJECT REPORT ON OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST 1945

FROM THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "FORWARDABLE".

DATE 11th August 1945. No. 872/024.

TO THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRON, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

SUMMARY.

The Strikes covered in this report are those carried out on 28th and 30th July and 9th and 10th August 1945.

2. Standard Flying Programme was in use and no difficulty was experienced in meeting it. Credit is due to the Maintenance Organisation for their efforts on 10th August. With nearly one third of the Corsair complement lost or badly damaged by flak, programme requirements were still met with the exception of three sorties. One of these was a small failure just before take off.

3. Although upsetting to the Fleet programme, the enforced rest between July 31st and August 8th was good value to the Maintenance ratings. All work was up to date and a very adequate rest period enjoyed. There appears no reason, given a rest period of this nature from time to time, why this type of operation should not be carried on indefinitely, logistics permitting. Aircraft were giving less trouble at the end than in the first strike period.

4. During bad weather it is suggested some relaxation in the ban on R/T for flying control might be made. Aircraft have difficulty in seeing the "Charlies" and R/T speeds up the land on.

5. It is considered a good number of aircraft were temporarily lost due to Tomcat being in the wrong position or giving wrong vectors to aircraft. In view of the trouble and confusion this causes with the consequent diversion of A.D.R's from their proper function, it is considered a special effort should be made to correct this. A visual distinguishing feature between Tomcat 1 and 2 and Watchdog would also help.

6. It is considered more damage to shipping would have been done if more rocket aircraft had been available. Avenger dive bombing of this type of target was not particularly successful. Partly this was due to lack of practice, but also because the avenger is not the best aircraft for this form of attack.

7. Flak intelligence was very good and a great help to the Squadrons.

8. It is to be hoped that Corsairs supplied at replenishment will soon all be bombers. It is bombers which are usually the lost or damaged aircraft, and the weight of attack is diminished as it becomes necessary to replace bombers by fighters in Ramrods and Escorts.

9. It is still a considerable handicap that replenishment aircraft are not immediately operationally serviceable on arrival.

10. Nine P.R.F. Forms 46 - 46A for the period 9th/10th August and photographs are enclosed.

(Sgd) R. H. H. H. H.

CAPTAIN.

150

Enclosure No. 2 to A.G. 1's No. 0109/15/923 of 1st August 1945.

SUBJECT: OPERATIONS, JULY - AUGUST, 1945.
FROM: THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. HINDUSTAN.
DATE: 30th July, 1945. No. 143/1746/00190/9
To: THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING FIRST AIRBORNE
CARRIER SQUADRON, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

B.P.F. Forms 45 to 49k inclusive except 46a and 46b (blank) are forwarded herewith in respect of operations from 26th July to 30th July, 1945, in accordance with B.P.F.M. 227.

(Sgd.) J. D. GRAHAM

CAPTAIN

CONF

SECRET

W.L.S. Indefatigable,

11th August, 1945.

No. 3/40/00190/9.

OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith the report of proceedings of H.M. Ship under my command covering the period 31st July to 11th August, 1945. Forms B.P.F. 46 to 46k inclusive, less 46a, which is blank, are attached.

2. The following remarks on points raised during this period of operations are forwarded:-

- (a) On 30th July, having closed to within sixty miles of the Japanese coast to bring targets within range of our aircraft, their lack of an extra VLF channel necessitated their return via No. 1 Strike Picket. This picket was so placed that an extra sixty miles was added to the return journey of every aircraft - proof, if proof were needed, that the ten-channel VLF set is a high priority requirement.
- (b) My Fireflies, tied to Avenger escort duties, had no chance to carry rockets. Had there not invariably been a number of Seafires due to land on before them in each serial, it might have been practicable to arm Fireflies with one long-range tank and four rockets; but in any case the accuracy of their aim would have suffered. Against shipping Firefly ramrods, armed with eight rockets each, would probably have done more damage than an equal number of Avengers, but they would not have been able to conform to a three-hour standard flying programme.
- (c) On the sixth strike day my squadrons' deck-landing had greatly improved and, to a certain extent, their general air drill. But elementary mistakes were still being made in air tactics which resulted in a reduction of damage done to the enemy and an undue number of requests for housing. Once again it must be emphasised that operations are not a substitute for training where aircrews are concerned.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) Q.D. Graham

The Flag Officer Commanding,
First Aircraft Carrier Squadron,
British Pacific Fleet.

CAPTAIN
Royal Navy.

10
207 August 1945.
BPP Form 46 (See BPP 227)

STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.

(for completion by Carriers on Strike Duties.)

I GENERAL

Aircraft Carrier :- H.M.S. "INDELABLE". Code Name of Operation :- OPERATIONS
JULY/AUGUST, 1945.

Advanced Base :- KURE.

Date of leaving Advanced Base :- 6th July, 1945.

Date of Arrival Back at Advanced Base :- ----

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE.

26th July, 1945. IN RECONNAISSANCE AREA.

1. Complement of aircraft was adjusted during the day, flyable dula being sent to H.M.S. "Striker" and replacements received from H.M.S. "Slinger". The aircraft complement embarked was then 18 Avengers, 47 Seafires, 10 Fireflies.

27th July, 1945. ON PASSAGE.

2. 0930 - 1130. H.M.S. "Indeable" refuelled from WAVE ENTEROR by astern method.

28th July, 1945. IN OPERATIVE AREA.

3. 0445. H.M.S. "Indeable" provided air sorties in accordance with the Standard Flight Plan, - C.A.P. throughout the day, three Banshees of Seafires, two Firefly escorts to combined strikes, and a component part in two other combined strikes of Avengers with Seafires as escort.

4. The Banshees were given the MINATO, TOJISHIMA, KOMATSUSHIMA, SANO group of airfields to cover. The dawn recon took photographs, and good coverage of MINATO indicated aircraft targets there for subsequent strikes although only one aircraft had been found by visual reconnaissance. Although camouflage was good each recon pinpointed a certain number of targets on the airfield. Six flares were obtained and a number damaged.

5. In all cases the Banshees attacked shipping after having destroyed their aircraft targets. Besides other targets they discovered and strafed two destroyers and an escort vessel at SATO, which were finished off by subsequent strikes from other ships.

6. The Fireflies escorted two strikes to HAWA shipyard, and strafed shipping, an oil storage tank, and other targets during the withdrawal.

7. Both combined strikes in which H.M.S. "Indeable's" Avengers and Seafires took part went to HAWA shipyard. The bombing was good, and photographs obtained in the first strike showed clearly areas which had been damaged, and gave aiming points for the second attack.

8. Although ships in the yard were taken as aiming points in this second strike, the damage to shipping assessed from photographs is disappointingly low. This is probably due to the difficulty of knocking out shipping in a yard. Very considerable damage was done to the yard, however, as is shown by the photographic Interpretation Report.

9. In all cases of escorted strikes the escort was given strict instructions to remain with the bombers until the latter were clear of the coast on the way back. This instruction was given in view of the reports of fighter opposition encountered by the Americans on 27th and again in the morning of this day. The effect on our escorts was that they could only strafe in the vicinity of the strike's retirement track.

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE.

Sunday 29th July, 1945.

10. A C.A.P. was provided P.M.

30th July, 1945.

11. 0830. The standard flight plan was worked again, with H.M.S. "Implacable's" Firefly contribution dropping to five only out of the eight required for Strike 5 owing to (a) lack of replacements (b) operational losses.

12. The dawn Seafire reconrod, which had been split in two to search for shipping and reconnoitre airfields, was baulked by fog to 1,000 feet, and returned to the ship. The first combined strike also found that layers of cloud down to the ground prevented an attack on SUZUKA airfield, or on targets in the approaches to NAGOYA, and eventually bombed an A.S.B. through cloud. The well-known term "instrument bombing" can hardly be applied to this, but at least it is better than jettisoning in the sea.

13. The next Seafire reconrod succeeded in penetrating to AIKINOYAHARA airfield and to the ISUZUKA, destroying aircraft and attacking small shipping. They met dense and accurate A.A. fire at the airfield, and one Seafire with its pilot was subsequently lost.

14. The weather on the North coast in the MAIZUMI area was reported clearer. A Firefly escort to a strike brought back photographs of good targets there, so the next strike of Avengers was accordingly briefed for that area. The weather however cleared momentarily in the NAGOYA area, and the strike was ordered to go to YOKKAICHI at very short notice. No shipping worth while bombing was seen and the majority of aircraft bombed the nearby oil refinery and storage at KUSABA, and a factory.

15. The last reconrod and last Firefly escort were combined with other fighters and sent to the MAIZUMI area for the last strike of the day, and attacked shipping with success. The Avengers of the strike were ordered not to take off.

REMARKS.

(A) Shipping targets in a shipyard are the most difficult type of ship targets to destroy as they usually lack combustible contents and shore fire fighting is at hand. It is considered that if the immediate object is destruction of shipping, shipping that is in actual running use should be given as a target, and not that in a yard.

(B) It is thought that shipping below 5,000 tons is a bad target for Avenger glide bombing. It is suggested that the Firefly should be used in the anti-shipping role as soon as possible, with rockets. At the moment the choice is between range or rockets.

(C) On 30th July, in conditions of heavy swell, all Seafire deck landings were made without any damage from this cause.

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STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.

(for completion by Carriers on Strike Duties.)

I GENERAL.

Aircraft Carrier: H.M.S. "IMPLACABLE". Code Name of Operation: -OPERATIONS
JULY/AUGUST, 1945.

Advanced Base :- MANUS.

Date of Leaving Advanced Base :- 6th July, 1945.

Date of Arrival Back at Advanced Base :- ----

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE.

31st JULY. IN REPLENISHMENT AREA.

1100 - 1600. H.M.S. "Implacable" oiled from H.M.S. "OLNA" by alongside method.

Replenishment aircraft were embarked P.M. from H.M.S. "SPEAKER" and "CHASER". On completion total number of aircraft embarked was 46 Seafires, 18 Avengers, 10 Fireflies.

1st AUGUST. P.M. A/S Patrols of Avengers were provided.

2nd AUGUST.

2. 1210 - 1650. H.M.S. "Implacable" embarked Avgas and oil fuel from "WAVE GOVERNOR" by stern method. A leak in the ship's starboard side which had caused damage to the refrigerator by flooding was stopped today by shoring and cementing.

3rd, 4th, 5th AUGUST. A.M. Aircraft were provided for Fleet requirements and combined flying exercises.

6th AUGUST.

3. 0915 - 1145. Avgas and oil fuel were embarked from H.M.S. "OLNA" by alongside method and at 1720 H.M.S. "Implacable" proceeded alongside "GLENARTNEY" and embarked provisions.

During the day replenishment aircraft were embarked from H.M.S. "CHASER" and "ARBITER". On completion total number of aircraft embarked was 50 Seafires, 18 Avengers, 10 Fireflies.

9th AUGUST. IN OPERATING AREA.

4. 0410. H.M.S. "Implacable" provided aircraft as in the Standard Flight Plan.

The dawn Seafire Ramrod was intended to sweep the coast from MATSUSHIMA Northward for shipping. It made a landfall too far South probably due to compass error caused by the length of time since they were last swung, and the large change in latitude. No shipping was seen. MATSUSHIMA Airfield was strafed, one pilot having to bale out owing to being hit by flak. The pilot was seen in his dinghy just off the coast in SENDAI BAY, inside the enemy minefields. Japanese picket boats and junks attempted to pick him up, but were driven off and set on fire by the Seafires, who waited over him until Hellicats from the SUB C.A.P. took over.

5. The Seafires landed on after a three hour thirty minute flight. No.2. Combined Strike attacked MATSUSHIMA with great success. The attack took place at the same time as an American attack, and there was a queue of aircraft waiting to bomb. The aerodrome was left a burning shambles. The Seafire escort strafed.

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE.

Page 2.

6. No. 3 Ramrod was directed to shipping and found two D.D.'s on Kaibokans in an inlet to the South-west of OMAGAWA W.B. One was left well on fire and listing, the other well damaged. They also attacked MATSUSHIMA airfield losing one Seafire. The pilot baled out over the sea a mile or two away from the downed airman from the down Ramrod. Both these pilots were rescued by an American Dumbo aircraft.

Two Seafires of this Ramrod were left behind to mark the downed pilot. They waited too long inshore and then on the way back to the Fleet got lost. Both pilots had to bale out owing to lack of fuel. Their position could not be fixed accurately, but approximate fixes were obtained by both British and American forces. Searches for these pilots failed to find them and they are missing.

7. No. 4 Combined Strike was sent to attack shipping. They sunk some small shipping and bombed the harbour installations at KASSHIMA. The Seafire escort of this Strike found two D.D.'s in the inlet to the North-west of OMAGAWA WAN, near OMAGAWA Town and caused an explosion in one leaving it listing and on fire, and damaged the other. They also observed three D.E.'s in the inlet to the South-west of OMAGAWA WAN close into the cliffs and well camouflaged. This is the inlet where the D.E.'s attacked by No.3 Ramrod were found.

8. The next Ramrod, No. 5, saw the first of the D.D.'s attacked by the No.4 Combined Strike Seafires, on its side, funnels awash and the second beached, back apparently broken and quarterdeck awash. They strafed small shipping and MATSUSHIMA Airfield.

9. Firefly Escort to the other Combined Strikes had considerable success in attacking ground targets and sinking small shipping. One Firefly with a petrol leak ditched at the Tenzat. The crew was rescued.

10th AUGUST.

10. 0410. The Standard Flight Programme was again used. The down Ramrod had as primary targets airfields inland, but owing to the distance of the Fleet from the coast the time required to reach the coast and return was two hours. As this was the total time allowed for the sortie, Ramrod No.1 had to be restricted to the secondary targets, a short stretch of coastline and MASUDA Airfield. They found no shipping, and attacked hangars, the airfield being empty of aircraft.

11. No. 2 Combined Strike attacked shipping in the OMAGAWA area sinking small coasters with bombs. The Seafires strafed a D.E. and left it on fire.

12. No.3 Ramrod visited airfields in the KORIYAMA area and found a number of aircraft, mostly trainers.

13. The Firefly escort to No.3 Combined were not released to strafe until the retirement when they found a goods train and severely damaged it.

14. No.4 Combined also went to KORIYAMA Airfield and did some very good Avenger bombing amongst airfield buildings and dispersed aircraft. One Avenger was lost, probably due to flak. The Seafire escort to this strike had been changed to a Ramrod and was sent to IWAKI and HARANO airfields. These airfields had been previously reconnoitred by the down Seafire Ramrod in its coastal shipping sweep. Nothing was found then, and only a few dummies and wrecks were discovered now, so the wooded dispersal areas were thoroughly strafed and set on fire.

15. The whole of No.5 Strike fighters were converted to anti shipping sweeps. The Seafires set three luggers on fire and damaged two others. The Fireflies seeing the only reasonable shipping in the OMAGAWA area being well attacked by other aircraft went ranging North up the coast, almost to TODO SAKI, trying to find good targets. They left small coasters badly damaged.

OPERATIONS JULY/AUGUST

Enclosure No. 12 to A.C.1's No. 0109/16/923 of 23rd August, 1945.

(23 PHOTOGRAPHS)



FORM 8J14 10 Aug 45 0640(9) K20.163mm. ONANAGAWA WAN. REST:

ONANAGAWA WAN, Northern HONSHU. These photographs show the attack on the netlayer at the entrance to the WAN. She was near-missed with bombs and then heavily strafed and left on fire. The large plume seen in the background is a hit on the patrol vessel seen on a previous photograph.

15-8



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FORM 15A 50 28 July 45 0645(9) F24.8 V. 8,000' OWASHI, HONSHU. REST:

OWASHI, HONSHU. 28th July. A freighter of about 3,000 tons is seen on fire as a result of a direct hit.



FORM 14D 9 25 July 45. 0700(-9) F24.8" v. 20,000' MATSUYAMA WEST 1/4
SHIKOKU, JAPAN



FORMI 6D

27

30 July 45, 0700(-) E52.36" 21,000' NISHINOMIYA A/F, HONSHU, JST:





FORMI 6D

13530 Jul 45 0700(-9) F52 36" 21,000' YOKAICHI 8/6 HONSHU
REST




MATSUSHIMA area, HONSHU. 9th August. After taking evasive action in cuttings this locomotive was finally hit and blew up.




TOKURENIMA A/F, SHIKOKU. 24th July. These Photographs show bombs bursting in the hangar and workshop areas and near dispersed aircraft. Extensive damage was done and at the end of the attacks the airfield was no longer a worthwhile target.



SHIDO WAN, SHIKOKU. 24th July. "KOBE" class CVE. This photograph was taken during the first attack, in which two direct hits were made and several near misses.




SHIDO WAN, SHIKOKU. 28th July. In this photograph, taken four days later, the carrier's flight deck appears to sag away and serious damage is evident forward.



IMP. NA. 24/9. 28 JULY 45. 0730 (-9) F24 8" V. 10,500' HARIMA.

HARIMA SHIPYARD, HONSHU. 28th July. This photograph shows the state of the yard at the end of the first strike. The target area is enveloped in smoke and a large freighter on the slips is likely to have been damaged.



SHIDO WAN, SEIKOKU. 28th July. In this photograph, taken four days later, the carrier's flight deck appears to sag away and serious damage is evident forward.




IMP. NA.24/9. 28 JULY 45. 0730 (-9) F24 8" V 10,500' HARIMA.

HARIMA SHIPYARD, HONSHU. 28th July. This photograph shows the state of the yard at the end of the first strike. The target area is enveloped in smoke and a large freighter on the slips is likely to have been damaged.



IMP NA 17/2. 24 JULY 45. 1345(-9) F24 14" V 9,000' TAKAMATSU.

TAKAMATSU A/F, SHIKOKU. 24th July. Bomb burst in the barracks area.



SHANNOSHO SHIPYARD, INNO SHIMA. 28th July. Bomb bursts are seen in the target area and debris is thrown out into the water. The ships alongside are 'HA' class ISTs.

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28 July 45. 0630 (-9) F46.5". SAKOSHI BAY, HONSHU. REST.



FORMI 5H 14. 28 July 45. 0715 (-9) K20. 163mm. HARIMA SHIPYARD. REST.


SAKOSHI BAY, near HARIMA, HONSHU. 28th July. These photographs show a 10,000 ton tanker, before, and during attack.



YAMADA WAN, Northern HONSHU. 9th August. 1630 (-9) K20.161mm O. YAMADA WAN.



YAMADA WAN, Northern HONSHU. 9th August. The destroyer and patrol vessel lying offshore were attacked and set on fire. In the lower photograph the destroyer is seen resting on the bottom with her after deck awash.



MATSUBISHI A/F, HONSHU. 9th August. The upper photograph shows smoke from burning aircraft following joint USN - RAAF attacks. In the lower photograph hits on hangars are seen and smoke from 'frag' clusters bursting among dispersed aircraft in the foreground.



ONAGAWA WAN, Northern HONSHU. 10th August. These photographs show the destruction of four naval vessels. One destroyer capsized and the DE and patrol vessel are awash. The patrol vessel in the background was left well on fire.





Light Cruiser oiling from fleet carrier at sea.
Speed 15 knots. Swell moderate. Date 15 August.

175
6

SECRET.

ENCLOSURE NO. 3 TO V.A.R.P.
No. 1092/1441 Oct 1945

Office of Rear Admiral Commanding,

Fourth Cruiser Squadron.

26th August, 1945.

LCS No. 0798/3

VICE ADMIRAL, SECOND IN COMMAND,
BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.

(Copies to:- Flag Officer Commanding,
First Aircraft Squadron,
British Pacific Fleet.
Rear Admiral (Destroyers),
British Pacific Fleet.
The Commanding Officers,
H.M. Ships "Newfoundland", "Black Prince",
"Euryalus", "Argonaut", H.M.N.Z. Ships,
"Gambia", "Achilles".
Captain (D), 2nd Destroyer Flotilla,
H.M. Ships "Terpsichore", "Terzagant", "Tenacious".)

REPORT OF OPERATIONS FROM
28th JULY TO 12th AUGUST 1945.

The reports of H.M.S. "Newfoundland" and H.M.N.Z.S. "Gambia" only of the cruisers for the period of T.F. 37 operations from 28th July to 12th August are forwarded with my remarks. Copies of "Gambia"'s report will be forwarded to New Zealand Naval Board.

2. This period began with strikes against Southern HONSHU during which the airmen of Task Force 37 added their share to the heavy damage inflicted by Task Force 38 on airfields, industrial targets and shipping.

3. During the first week in August, while the Task Forces were moving North, replenishing and dodging bad weather, plans were made for a force of cruisers and destroyers from Task Force 37 to join U.S. Task Units which were to bombard MURORAN in South HOKKAIDO or KAWAISHI in Northern HONSHU. On 8th August the Commander, 3rd Fleet, ordered the bombardment of KAWAISHI for 9th August.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF KAWAISHI (Times Zone -2)

Preliminary Movements.

4. At 0345 on 9th August, Task Unit 37.1.8, consisting of "Newfoundland", "Gambia", "Terpsichore", "Tenacious" and "Terzagant", detached from Task Force 37 and at 0630 met and reported for duty with the American bombarding force, Task Unit 34.8.1. This consisted of "South Dakota", Flagship of Rear Admiral Shafroth, U.S.N. who commanded the combined bombarding force, "Indiana", "Massachusetts", "Quincy", "Chicago", "Boston", "St. Paul" and ten destroyers.

5. I stationed my force close Southward of Task Unit 34.8.1 and was then asked by Rear Admiral Shafroth to close in "Newfoundland" within hail of "South Dakota". I told him that I hoped he would regard my force as part of his own for manoeuvring purposes and later made the following by signal to Task Unit 37.1.8.

"When deployed act on C.F.U. 34.8.1 tactical signals even though only repeated to us. When stationed as now during approach or retirement I shall manoeuvre Task Unit 37.1.8. to conform to Task Unit 34.8.1."

Approach 176

SECRET

Page 2 of Rear Admiral Commanding, Fourth Cruiser Squadron's
LCS No. 0798/3 dated 26th August, 1945

Approach and Deployment

6. Paravanes were streamed by "Gambia" only, "Newfoundland" having parted a P/V chain while streaming hers. During the approach, which was made at 22 knots, I stationed Task Unit 37.1.8. ready for deployment which began at 1145 when the whole force was turned together to 186°, speed 15 knots, and formed single line ahead with the British cruisers leading. Land was sighted at this time, the visibility being moderate with some haze. After deployment the force turned to 240° for the final run in.

7. The spotting aircraft were flown off promptly from U.S. Battleships and Cruisers when ordered except two which became unserviceable. Communications were quickly established between our cruisers and the spotters, furnished by "South Dakota" and "Indiana".

Bombardment.

8. The force turned to the bombarding course, 186°, shortly before 1300 and the line of ships, 100 yards apart, was led by "Newfoundland" followed by "Gambia", "South Dakota", "Massachusetts", "Indiana", "Quincy", "Chicago", "Boston" and "St. Paul". The three British destroyers screened ahead, with the American destroyers disposed on the disengaged side and astern. Two U.S. destroyers were sent to the entrance of KAWAISHI Bay to engage shipping in the harbour and to intercept any small craft attempting to attack our forces. A third destroyer was stationed ten miles to seaward and acted as Fighter Director ship for the C.A.P. provided by Task Force 38, a 100 miles or more to seaward.

9. Fire was opened at 1253 and continued until 1447, two runs being made to the Southward and two to the Northward. Heavy smoke on shore resulting from the bombardment hampered **observation**, but in spite of this and in the face of moderate flak, the excellent work of the spotters, combined with good fire control in the cruisers, enabled the 329 rounds from "Newfoundland" and the 404 rounds from "Gambia" to be fired in deliberate fire with good effect against warehouses, oil storage tanks, harbour installations and shipping. There were no enemy reactions to the bombardment other than A/A fire. The mean range of our target was 14,000 yards and the bombarding course was close inshore often within 2 miles of the coast.

Retirement.

10. At 1447 the force turned away from the land, increased speed and reformed the normal cruising disposition. Task Unit 37.1.8. took station close Southward of Task Unit 34.8.2. Turns into wind were then made and the spotting aircraft smartly recovered.

11. A JUDY approached the force from the Southward at 1600 and was driven off by gunfire. "Gambia" reports that this aircraft was splashed.

12. Several bogies were chased during this period and there was considerably air activity until about 1700. It is

understood /.... 6

SECRET

Page 3 of Rear Admiral Commanding, Fourth Cruiser Squadron's
LCS No. 0798/3 dated 26th August, 1945.

understood that a second enemy aircraft was destroyed on the further side of the U.S. force.

13. Task Unit 37.1.8 remained with Task Unit 34.8.2 during the retirement to the South Eastward until 2300 when I parted company to rejoin Task Force 37 at dawn on August 10th.

14. The destroyers were well handled by the Commanding Officer, R.N.S. "Terpsichore", Commander R.T. White, D.S.O., R.N. Permission was given during the later stages for the destroyers to engage targets of opportunity. This they did successfully and had good practice. The opportunities other than Japan were not obvious, nevertheless "Terpsichore" claimed to have destroyed "the Governor's Summer Palace" (this was certainly a building on a hill), "Tenacious" to have added to the fires in the town, and "Formagant" claimed that she had blocked a coastal road ahead of a pedal cyclist, causing him to swerve into a ditch.

TACTICAL CO-OPERATION WITH U.S. SURFACE FORCES.

15. At no time have cruisers found it difficult to join and work with an American formation and the ease with which this could be done was illustrated in the bombardment of KAI-AISHI. I think however a night sweep inshore, such as was contemplated at one time, would have been more difficult unless the chain of command was clearly established, for we had had no opportunity to train together, nor for that matter had our own cruisers and destroyers been able to practice.

16. Cruisers were frequently called upon to act as linking ships with U.S. forces. With one or two cruisers there was no difficulty in this, provided R.B.S. was in good order and operators well trained. "Laryalus" particularly distinguished herself in this respect and her R.B.S. efficiency was very creditable.

17. When the distance increased and several cruisers were required the problem was more complicated, particularly if the U.S. Task Groups did much manoeuvring. The volume of traffic at the American end was considerable and R/T discipline and initiative among cruisers was important to ensure keeping you informed promptly without interfering with the flow of messages. The need was felt for a special reporting procedure and for two way V.H./F communication on separate channels. These were improvised at the time.



S.P. Brind
(E.S.P. BRIND)
REAR ADMIRAL.

Enclosures:- "Newfoundland" No. 4044.100 of 25th August, 1945.
"Gambia" No. 660/5/02 of 11th August, 1945.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS PRO

28th JULY, 1945 to 10th AUGUST, 1945.

(Enclosure to NEWFOUNDLAND's Letter No. 4044/100 dated 25th August, 1945.)

On 28th July, 1945 and 30th July, 1945, H.M.S. under my command continued to operate with Task Force 37 which formed part of the U.S. Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey.

Air strikes against Southern Honshu were delivered on both days. The only enemy activity against the Fleet consisted of one attempted torpedo attack against one of the American groups on 28th July by a "Jill" which was shot down, and some inefficient anti-aircraft fire, in the course of which a "Dinah" was destroyed on 28th July.

From 1st to 7th August bad weather prevented strikes from being launched, and the Fleet replenished and cruised in the fuelling area, returning to the strike area on 11th August, when weather again caused the strikes to be cancelled.

At 0700 on 8th August, NEWFOUNDLAND, 2nd Flt. 2nd Div. Task Group, TARPICOR joined up with the American Task Force, Task Unit 34.8.1. The British Unit was given the title of Task Unit 37.1.8. The combined force then set course for the area to carry out a bombardment of the harbour area and specific targets as a locale.

Yonkers went to action at 1000 and at 1115 a communication exercise with the spotting aircraft on TARPICOR was carried out; 30 seconds of radio silence and the exercise was terminated.

Spotting aircraft from the office of the U.S. Task Force were detached off between 1215 and 1230 and communications were satisfactorily established with the TARPICOR's spotting aircraft. Communications were maintained throughout the bombardment.

At 1450 the force was ordered to enter the target area, with NEWFOUNDLAND in the lead. At 1500 AND on the fire at 1505 against warehouses and buildings in the area north-west of the river. (Map reference G41 P.1.V. - G451 P.1.V. - G452 and G453 A.1.G.) Sixty-six rounds were fired into this area during the first run; several salvos were under-fired owing to heavy A.A. fire, but the majority of the shots were seen to fall in the centre of the target area.

During the second run, the spotting aircraft had great difficulty in observing the fall of shot, due to heavy A.A. fire and also to a dense cloud of smoke which was obscuring the target and making visibility very bad.

Soon after the beginning of the third run, at 1615, the spotting aircraft reported a large oil spill in the area north-west of the river. Again smoke and anti-aircraft fire were observed, but towards the end of the run visibility improved and observation was easier. This is the fourth run; the majority of the shots were seen to fall well within the target area.

On 10th August NEWFOUNDLAND fired 300 rounds of 6-inch A.S.

71

| | | 15 | | 15 | |
|-----------|-------------------------------------|----------------|--------------|---------|--|
| Time | Reference and description of target | Range | True Bearing | Compass | Remarks |
| 1312-1313 | 1312-1313 IV - Warehouse | 14000 10000 | 201-303 | 66 | Shots fell in center of target area |
| 1314-1315 | 1314-1315 III, 0450 DE | 18700 | 328-278 | 137 | Shots fell in target area, observation was very difficult due to smoke and A. I. fire. |
| 1316-1317 | 1316-1317, Coal shed | 14000 | | | |
| 1318-1319 | 1318-1319 above | 13100 10900 | 273-316 | 54 | Most of the shots fell in target area due to smoke, A. I. fire and fire. |
| 1320-1321 | 1320-1321 above | 10000 10000 | 316-36 | 72 | All shots fell in target area, vicinity of 0450 DE |

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - U.S.S. "GAMBIA" FROM 28TH
JULY, 1945 - 7TH AUGUST, 1945

(Enclosure to "GAMBIA's" letter No. 668/5/52 of 11 August, 1945.)

Operations between July, 28th and August 7th

On 28th July, 1945, Task Force 37 carried out strikes against Southern Honshu. One Jill carrying a torpedo approached the Fleet at about 1700 and was shot down by a United States fighter cap, before it came in sight.

On 30th July, 1945, Task Force 37 carried out strikes against Southern Honshu. At 1045 one Bisho approached the Fleet and was shot down by a British Fighter cap.

Between 1st August and 7th August the Fleet was engaged in fuelling and cruising in a waiting position until weather conditions permitted a resumption of the offensive.

On 8th August the Fleet was cruising in the operating area to the north westward of Chichi Jima Island. Low visibility prevented flying operations.

Detached as part of Bombardment Force.

On 9th August, 1945, at 0320 "T.E. FORDLAND", "GAMBIA", "TENACIOUS", "TER AGENT", "TERPSICHOE" were detached to form Task Unit 37.4.8 and proceeded to join T.U. 34.8.1 which was formed up to the northward of T.F. 38.

At 0655 T.U. 37.4.8 was in station about three miles south of T.U. 34.8.1 and the whole Force proceeded to close KASAIISHI to carry out a daylight bombardment of the port.

The approach

At 1140 the bombardment Force formed up on a line of bearing 166° at 5 cables intervals, and approached the bombardment position on a course of 240°. Land was first sighted at 1200 at a range of about 10 miles, visibility was poor and headlands were difficult to identify through the haze.

Spotting Aircraft Fly Off.

Spotting aircraft were catapulted from the ships of the United States Task Force between 1215 and 1220, and satisfactory communication was at once established with U.S.S. "INDIANA's" relief spotter who had been allocated to "GAMBIA". Communications remained very good throughout the operation, and the spotter carried out his duties with great skill. His co-operation and ready advice were excellent.

Fire Opened on Docks.

At 1245I the Force was turned together on to the firing course, and at 1249 "GAMBIA" opened fire on her primary target, Docks and an Industrial area. (Map reference 9551 I,J,K,N,O.) Seventy two rounds were fired at this target during the initial run south. The spotting aircraft was being fired on and was unable to observe every salvo, but when fire was checked at 1307, whilst course was being reversed, he reported large fires burning in the area making observation very difficult.

Target Shifted to Anti Aircraft Battery.

During the turn the spotter was asked whether there was any shipping that could be fired at. Before replying however he called for fire on an active A.A. battery at 9550 Y. When standied on the northerly course at 1314 "GAMBIA" engaged this new target, but after only four salvos had been fired this target became obscured by smoke which made aircraft observation impossible.

Peron's Gold Under Air Attack

Final Retirement and Rendezvous with Task Force 37

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1092/14 4 1 Oct 1945

Office of Captain(D),
24th Destroyer Flotilla,
H.M.S. "CURSITOR",
7th September 1945.

No. O. 172/7

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following brief report of proceedings of the Destroyers for those periods of the July and August operations during which I was Senior officer(Destroyers), namely between 9th and 20th July and from 31st July until the end of the operations.

2. Destroyers were employed throughout these operations on screening, air-sea rescue and picket duties. The only offensive operations in which they were employed were the three bombardments carried out by H.M.S. KING GEORGE V and the Cruisers on 17th and 29th July and 6th August. U.N. Ships TERPSICORE, TENACIOUS, TENDRANT, QUILLERON, QUANTITY, ULYSSES, URANIA and UDDINE took part in these bombardments, though not all ships had an opportunity of opening fire.

3. An average number of about eighteen destroyers were in company with the Task Group until the forces split up after the Japanese surrender. Thereafter H.M. Ships THORNTON, TERPSICORE, TENACIOUS, TENDRANT, TEAZER, TARTAN, TATEFUL, WANGA and H.M.A. Ships NAPIER and NIZAM remained in the forward area and the remainder went South. These remaining destroyers, with the exception of H.M.A. Ships NAPIER and NIZAM, were employed in the combined British/U.S. Task Group 30.3, in Task Unit 30.3.2 and on pick dog stations during the subsequent FIX FLY operations and were detached singly from this Task Group to enter TOKYO BAY between 1st and 5th September.


4. The five "T" class destroyers completed an average of about 50 days continuous steaming and travelled a combined distance of over 100,000 miles during this period. A report on the efficiency of the ships, equipment, machinery and remarks as to habitability etc are being forwarded separately.

5. Recommendations for Honours and Awards also form the subject of a separate submission.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,



CAPTAIN,
Royal Navy

The Vice-Admiral,
British Pacific Fleet.
Copy to:-
The Rear-Admiral(Destroyers),
British Pacific Fleet

I T E M

153270

CTF 37 (BRITISH)

REPORT OF AIR & SURFACE STRIKES AGAINST THE
JAPANESE EMPIRE, PREPARATION FOR AND INITIAL
OCCUPATION OF THE TOKYO BAY AREA, HONSHU, JAPAN,
6/28/45 TO 9/2/45