CARRIER AIR GROUP
88

EIGHTY-EIGHT AND "FRIENDS"
YOKOSUKA A-F, 2 SEPTEMBER 1945

ACTION REPORT
16 AUGUST TO 2 SEPTEMBER 1945

147103 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT.
To: Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Via:
(1) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. YORKTOWN, CV10.
(2) Commander Task Group THIRTY EIGHT POINT FOUR (ComCarDivSIX).
(3) Commander, Task Force THIRTY EIGHT (ComSECOND CarTaskForPac.).
(4) Commander, THIRD Fleet.
(5) Commander-in-Chief, United States PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS.


Reference:
(a) PaeFlt Conf. ltr. 1CL-45.
(b) ComTHIRD Fleet dispatch 021410 of September 1945.
(c) ComTHIRD Fleet dispatch 221402 of August 1945.

Enclosure:
(A) Summary of Sorties.
(B) List of Airfields.
(C) List of P.O.W. Camps.

1. In accordance with references (b) and (c) this separate action report is submitted for the period 16 August to 2 September 1945.

2. No squadron ACA-1 Reports are submitted because no action with the enemy was involved.

3. Air Group EIGHTY EIGHT's operations during the subject period consisted of:
(a) Combat air patrols over Task Force 38 at sea, over United States and British Naval forces in and near Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay, and over Atsugi Airfield;
(b) Photographic and visual reconnaissance of Honshu Airfields lying South of 37° North and East of 135° East;
(c) Photographic and visual reconnaissance of prisoner-of-war camps in the above area of Honshu;
(d) Dropping of food, medicines, messages and supplies to the above prisoner-of-war camps.

4. In carrying out the above missions this Air Group flew 902 sorties, and visited 38 airfields and 29 prisoner-of-war camps.

5. Enclosure (A) consists of a statistical summary of the sorties flown.

6. Enclosure (B) consists of a list of the airfields reconnoitered.

7. Enclosure (C) consists of a list of the prisoner-of-war camps reconnoitered.

S. S. Searcy, Jr.,
Commander, U.S.N.,
Commander, CVG-88.

10 01408
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Air Patrols</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.F. 38</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.F. 31</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo B.Y</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;FLINT&quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atsugi A/F</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arago Channel</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Searches          | 8   |
| AIRFIELD AND P.O.W. RECCOS | 277 |
| MAPHOS            | 24  |
| Air Coordinators  | 8   |
| Air Observers     | 5   |
| Miscellaneous     | 3   |
| Air Exhibitions   | 167 |
| <strong>Total</strong>         | 902 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Airfield</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Airfield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2772</td>
<td>KOIZUMI</td>
<td>2777</td>
<td>MATSUYAMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2798</td>
<td>TATEBAYASHI</td>
<td>2764</td>
<td>KASHIWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2781</td>
<td>MORIYA</td>
<td>2783</td>
<td>NARIMASU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2780</td>
<td>MIYAKAWA</td>
<td>1407</td>
<td>SHOWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1463</td>
<td>KASHIMA S. S.</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>TOYOOKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>337</td>
<td>HANEDA</td>
<td>2788</td>
<td>OSAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2808</td>
<td>YOKOSUKA</td>
<td>2760</td>
<td>IRUMAGAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2797</td>
<td>SHIROI</td>
<td>1406</td>
<td>TOKOROZAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1416</td>
<td>MATSUDO</td>
<td>2797</td>
<td>SHIROI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1465</td>
<td>KONOHKE</td>
<td>1404</td>
<td>TACHIKAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2756</td>
<td>IKISU</td>
<td>2792</td>
<td>RYUGASAKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2809</td>
<td>YOKOTA</td>
<td>1466</td>
<td>KASUMIGAURA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2663</td>
<td>KOMATSU</td>
<td>1491</td>
<td>KASUMIGAURA S.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1415</td>
<td>TAKAHAGI</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>YATABE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2660</td>
<td>KAMAZAWA</td>
<td>2758</td>
<td>IMBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2794</td>
<td>SAKATO</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>EDOGAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2795</td>
<td>SHIMAZU</td>
<td>2786</td>
<td>NII JIMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2765</td>
<td>KATORI</td>
<td>2789</td>
<td>O SHIMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2768</td>
<td>KITOURA</td>
<td>1464</td>
<td>CHOSHI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**CVG-88**

**LIST OF P.O.W. CAMPS RECONNOITRED**

16 August - 2 September 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>LAT.</th>
<th>LONG.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>6</strong> AKASAKA WARD</td>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>139-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>38</strong> FUKAGAWA WARD</td>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>139-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>224</strong> TOKYO CAMP #5</td>
<td>35-28</td>
<td>139-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>235</strong> UENO PARK</td>
<td>35-42.5</td>
<td>139-46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>253</strong> YOKOHAMA YACHT CLUB</td>
<td>35-26</td>
<td>139-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>188</strong> SHIBA PARK (tentatively identified)</td>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>139-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>---</strong> No number or name.</td>
<td>35-43</td>
<td>139-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>---</strong> Across from south end breakwater.</td>
<td>35-28</td>
<td>139-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>---</strong> OMIYA TOWN</td>
<td>35-54</td>
<td>139-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>---</strong> Possibly Hitachi Mine</td>
<td>36-37</td>
<td>140-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>---</strong> Bearing 300°, 6 mi. from #298 Yokosuka (Look for large buddha shrine on hill and sharply curving R.R.).</td>
<td>35-22.5</td>
<td>139-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>---</strong> Bearing 350°, 2 mi. from #317 Haneda on small island.</td>
<td>35-35</td>
<td>139-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>OPUNA (Bears 310°, 1.5 mi. from YAMANOUCHI town).</td>
<td>35-20</td>
<td>139-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>TAKATONOBABA</td>
<td>35-42</td>
<td>139-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>DENEM CHOFU MONASTERY</td>
<td>35-35</td>
<td>139-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One camp 1.5 mi. west of #15 KAWASAKI</td>
<td>35-31</td>
<td>139-40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>248</td>
<td>YAMASHITA #1 bearing 130°, 1.5 mi. from YAMASHITA TOWN.</td>
<td>35-22</td>
<td>139-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>---</strong> No number or name.</td>
<td>35-22</td>
<td>139-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>---</strong> Across river from HITACHI refinery (2 camps, one in valley, the other on hillside).</td>
<td>36-36.5</td>
<td>140-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>---</strong> No number or name.</td>
<td>35-45</td>
<td>139-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>---</strong> Vicinity of Chara.</td>
<td>36-57</td>
<td>140-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>KAWASAKI BUNSHO #1, plus 3 Barracks bearing 060°, 1 mi. distant. *Also 1 camp 1.5 mi. west of Camp 75.</td>
<td>35-31</td>
<td>139-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>NARASHINO</td>
<td>35-42</td>
<td>139-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>152</strong> OMORI #8</td>
<td>35-35</td>
<td>139-44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>189</strong> SHIBAURA DOCKS</td>
<td>35-37</td>
<td>139-45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td><strong>192</strong> SHINONOMA #1</td>
<td>35-36.5</td>
<td>139-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>URAYMA</td>
<td>35-51</td>
<td>139-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Between OSAWA and MARIMASU; Tall radio tower west of camp</td>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>139-42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates supplies dropped.
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

(CVG-88)

18 August 1944 - 31 December 1944
1 January 1945 - 28 February 1945
1 March 1945 - 31 May 1945
1 June 1945 - 25 October 1945
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT
CAG-88/A12

Serial: 032


From: Commander Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT.
To: History Unit, Op-33-J-6; Office of Editorial Research, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.

Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Point.
     (2) Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: History of Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT to 31 December 1944.


Enclosure: (A) Subject History.

   1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (A) is submitted herewith.

S. E. Seary, Jr.
Commander, CAG-88.
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

C/o FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK, N.Y.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

HISTORY OF
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

PART ONE
(18 August to 31 December 1944.)

1. CHRONOLOGY

18 August 1944 Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT was formed and commissioned at NAS, Atlantic City, N.J., by Commander Seth S. Searcy, Jr., USN.

The three component squadrons had been commissioned on 15 August 1944, VF-88 at NAS, Atlantic City, N.J., VB-88 at NAS, Wildwood, N.J., and VT at NAS, Quonset Point, R.I. The latter squadron moved to NAAF, Martha's Vineyard, Mass., shortly after commissioning. As customary the Group was commissioned at the same station as the Fighting Squadron, and these two units remained together until the three squadrons assembled about mid-way through their training period.

Commander Searcy assumed command and reported to the Chief of Naval Operations, via Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Point, Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet.

Commander Searcy's home is in San Antonio, Texas, where he was born.

Also on board at the time of commissioning was the Administrative Officer, Lieut.Comdr., Roland Palmedo, USNR.

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ENCLOSURE (A)
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Plane complements at commissioning were 36 F6F, 36 SB2C and 18 TBF, (not including 4 VFN, the pilots for which were training separately and were not attached to the Group during the initial period of training).

Pilot complements at the time of commissioning were 150% of the number of planes assigned, plus 10% excess pilots if possible.

24 August 1944 Action was initiated to comply with instructions of Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, to increase VF squadron to 50 aircraft (excluding night fighters) and reduce VB squadron to 24 aircraft, pilot complements being changed from 54 to 75 and from 54 to 36 respectively, (10% excess pilots not included in each instance). All or a large part of the additional pilots needed by the VF squadron were to come from the VB squadron. Actually a total of 14 VB pilots were in this instance transferred to the VF squadron.

28 August 1944 The Recognition Officer, Lieut. Comdr., Albert Tilt, Jr., reported on board.

10 September 1944 The Ordnance Officer, Lieut. (jg), Edward H. Peterson, USNR, reported on board.

16 September 1944 The Landing Signal Officer, Lieut. (jg), George D. Carns, USNR, reported on board.

18 September 1944 The Flight Surgeon, Lieut. Comdr., David M. Marcey (MC), USNR, reported on board.

20 September 1944 The A.C.I. Officer, Lieutenant Harvey

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ENCLOSURE (A)
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NEW YORK, N. Y.

S. Reynolds, USNR, reported on board.

29 September 1944 The Aviation Equipment Officer, Lieut. (jg), Chester J. Serkland, USNR, reported on board.

1 October 1944 The Assistant Landing Signal Officer, Lieut. (jg), Franklyn L. Williamson, USNR, reported on board.

14 November 1944 The Group Staff, along with Fighting Squadron EIGHTY-EIGHT, moved from NAS, Atlantic City, N. J., to NAAF, Otis Field, Camp Edwards, Mass.

1 December 1944 Bombing Squadron EIGHTY-EIGHT, moved from NAS, Wildwood, N. J., to Otis Field.

9 December 1944 Torpedo Squadron EIGHTY-EIGHT, moved from NAAF Hyannis, Mass., where it had been temporarily located for specialized torpedo work, to Otis Field.

11 December 1944 Reorganization of squadrons of the group commenced in order to revise pilot and plane complements as directed by Commander, Fleet Air, Quonset Point. Plane complements were changed as follows: (a) from 50 F6F-5 to 32 F6F-5 and 37 F4U-1; (b) from 24 to 15 SB2C, and (c) from 18 to 15 TBM.

11 December 1944 The Radio-Radar Officer, Ensign Walter E. Hanson, USNR, reported on board.

25 December 1944 A despatch was received from Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Point, advising that effective 2 January 1945, complements of certain air groups, including Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT, had been modified to include 36 VF, 36 VBF, 15 VSB and 15 VTB; and directing that on that date VF squadrons
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE

affected be reorganized to include 28 F6F-5, 2 F6F-5E, F6F-5P,
4 F6F-5N aircraft; and that VBF squadrons (short title "Bom-
fitron") with same group number be commissioned with 37 F4U
aircraft (including ComCAG's plane). VF and VBF squadron
pilots are to be familiarized in both "Helldogs" and "Corsairs"
with approximately 10 hours in each type.

(Reference is made to the Histories of the component
squadrons for further details relating particularly to their
units.)

(2) NARRATIVE

Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT was formed as the Air Group
intended for the U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36). Its original composit-
ion was three squadrons, namely a Fighting Squadron, a Dive-
Bombing Squadron and a Torpedo Squadron. Several changes in the
complement of these squadrons were made during the first four
and one-half months of Squadron and Group Training, ended 31
December 1944, as recounted above. At the end of this period
a directive was received to form and commission a fourth squadron
of bomber-fighters ("Bomfitron"), as detailed above.

The period between the Commissioning of the Group and its
Squadrons and the embarking of the Group on board ship is in-
tended for the development of squadron and group tactics,
along with continued practice of gunnery, bombing, torpedo drop-
ping, night flying, navigation, rocket firing and other practices,
and indoctrination in recognition, survival, aerology, first

- 4 - ENCLOSURE (A)
aid, and other subjects. This training was conducted as prescribed by ComAirLant Confidential Training Syllabus serial 01124 dated 29 June 1943, ComFAir, Quonset Secret Operation Plan 2-43 and ComFAir Commissioning Manual for Carrier Squadrons.

During the first part of this training period, while the Squadrons were located at different fields, individual exercises and squadron tactics were pursued, whereas after the assembly of the squadrons at Otis Field, the primary emphasis was on group tactics, with ground school indoctrination continued on an unslackened schedule.

At Otis Field the Group attempted to hold group exercises on Tuesdays and Fridays. However, unfavorable weather conditions interfered considerably both with flying schedules and the maintenance and servicing of planes.

While the squadrons were at different fields, an element of the ANTIETAM CASD assembled at each field. Personnel were attached to the local CASU, and assisted the latter in maintaining and servicing the squadron planes. As the squadrons assembled at Otis Field, the CASD elements accompanied them, and were merged, coming under the command of CASU-26.

During the brief period the squadrons have been at Otis Field the handicaps to the maintenance of a close and crowded schedule of training under local conditions have been well demonstrated. Chief among these obstructions is the weather,
which throughout New England is general and in the Cape Cod region in particular, is adverse for flying during a long season from Fall through Winter until Spring. Low ceilings, poor visibility and high winds which directly prevent flying operations account for only a portion of the interference of weather with maximum accomplishment. Low temperatures, rain and snow seriously hamper the proper servicing and maintenance of aircraft, particularly when hangar space is inadequate and personnel limited and largely inexperienced. Snow covered and icy runways occasionally prevent take-offs and landings; sea conditions prevent torpedo dropping practice and carrier landing practice and qualification. The necessity of making aircraft secure for Storm Condition A, which occurred five (5) times during the period 15 November to 1 January, and the work of reversing this process, extended the periods of non-flying weather substantially.

Aside from the direct and indirect interference of the weather low aircraft availability caused flight operations to suffer considerably. A lack of adequate replacement parts, small tools, equipment, facilities, etc., was a contributing factor. Poor material condition of F4U aircraft received in December coupled with the fact that there were no F4U parts available at Otis Field and that the local CASU was unfamiliar with this type severely handicapped operations in this type. Numerous engine changes, due to the fact that 65% of the planes
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

C/o FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

received had more than 375 hours per engine, tended to hold down availability; and an insufficient number of engine pre-heaters delayed morning flights on cold mornings.

During the month of December several conferences were held between the Air Group Commander, Squadron Commanders, CASD Officer, and other Air Group Officers on the one hand, and the prospective Executive Officer, Air Officer, Assistant Air Officer and other officers of the U.S.S. ANTIETAM detail on the other hand.

Squadrons are required to submit to ComFAir, Quonset Point semi-monthly progress reports which include the following: stage of training practice or exercise (stated in terms of number of pilots qualified in each exercise, number expected to be ready in two weeks, and number expected to be ready in one month), description of crashes, statistics on flight operations and gunnery, report on physical training, etc. Detailed information concerning the squadrons during their training period may be found in these progress reports, as well as in the Squadron's war diaries and histories.

(3) APPENDICES

(No appendices are attached, inasmuch as the applicable important portions of directives received have been incorporated in the Chronology and Narrative above, and references have
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE


been made in the text to the instructions under which the group is training.)

Respectfully submitted,

Roland Palmedo,

(Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N.R.,)

Historical Officer, CAG-88.
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
FLEET AIR, QUONSET POINT

Naval Air Station,
Quonset Point, R.I.

25 JAN 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on
CAG-88 ltr. CAG-88/A12
Ser 032 of 1 January 1945.

From: Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Point.

To: History Unit, Op-33-J-6, Office of Editorial Research.

Via: Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: History of Carrier Air Group MIGHTY-EIGHT, Submission of.

1. Forwarded.

C. W. MC KEEVER
By Direction

Second endorsement to:
CAG-88 conf. ltr CAG-88/A12
Serial 032 dated 1 January 1945.

From: Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations (History Unit, Op-33-J-6, Office of Editorial Research).

1. Forwarded.

J. K. EWING
By Direction
From: Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT.
History Unit, Op-33-J-6; Office of Editorial Research,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.
To: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.

Via: Commander Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT.

Subject: History of Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT from 1 January to 28 February 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Subject History.

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (A) is submitted herewith.

D. S. Searcy, Jr.

Copy no. 2
Destroyed
3/1/45

Henry M. Dale
SC-6544

RECEIVED S-C FILES
Room 2055
3/13 1945

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

2/10 FLEET POST OFFICE

HISTORY OF
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT
PART TWO
(1 January to 28 February 1945)

(1) CHRONOLOGY

2 January 1945 In accordance with orders received by despatch from ComPAir, Quonset Point, and DuPers, Bombing Fighting Squadron EIGHTY-EIGHT (VF-88 or "BomFitRon") was commissioned by Lieut. Comdr. Hart, USNR, at Otis Field, Camp Edwards, Mass., with brief ceremonies held in the hangar. Lieut. Comdr. Hart was relieved as Commanding Officer of VB-88 by Lieut. Comdr. J. S. Elkins, USN, who had been Executive Officer of the squadron. Most of the pilots of the new squadron were transferred from VF-88 and one from VB-88.

This reconstituted the group with four component squadrons, and with complements of planes as stated in Group History, 28 December 1944.

23 January 1945 Mailgram was received from ComPAir, Quonset Point ordering Group to depart its present location at Otis Field on or about 10 February so as to arrive M.A.S., Alameda, on 15 February and report to CinCPac, the Group having become a spare group by designation of ComInCh.

26 January 1945 The Ordnance Officer, Lt.(jg) E. H. Peterson, who had been with the Group since just after its commissioning in August, received orders detaching him, due to the fact that the Group staff complement did not provide for an Ordnance Officer.

5 February 1945 A large majority of the officers and certain of the enlisted personnel departed to return their families to their homes, or to visit home for a few days en route to Alameda.

10 February 1945 A special Troop Train with the majority of the enlisted
men and a small number of officers departed Otis Field. Lieut. Comdr. Tilt, Staff Recognition Officer, was senior officer on board.

15 February 1945 The officers and men travelling under individual orders reported to CinCPac at Alameda.

16 February 1945 The Troop Train, which had been sent over a circuitous route and delayed, arrived at Oakland and personnel aboard reported to CinCPac at Alameda.

18 February 1945 The Group embarked as passengers on a CV.

20 February 1945 CV departed Alameda.

24 February 1945 CV arrived Pearl Harbor. A majority of the officers proceeded immediately to NAS, Hilo, by transport plane.

25 February 1945 The remainder of the officers and the enlisted personnel proceeded by transport planes to N.A.S., Hilo, except two officers and five men, who accompanied the Group's Gear on the U.S.S. SWAN (AVP).

26 February 1945 The U.S.S. SWAN arrived at Hilo Harbor. This small AVP could stow only about half the personal luggage in her hold. The remainder of the personal gear, and all the squadron and group boxes and crates were stowed on deck along the bulwarks from bow to stern, on the fantail and on the boat deck. On account of the low freeboard and inadequate tarpaulins, the equipment was badly soaked by rough seas and heavy rains, doing considerable damage to the wide variety of contents.

Flight and ground training was promptly resumed under what promised to be better weather conditions and more adequate facilities.

(NOTE: Reference is made to the Histories of the component squadrons for
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK CITY

further details relating particularly to their units.)

(2) NARRATIVE

Training. During January and until 5 February flight training was pressed, against extremely adverse weather conditions and inadequate facilities, in accordance with the training directives of ComAirLant and ComFAir, Quonset Point. The handicaps imposed by the weather, described in the last paragraph of page 5, of Part One of this War Diary, applied with increased effect during this training period.

Particular emphasis during this period was put on day and night carrier qualifications, air support training at the Impact Area, Ayer Field, and rocket firing. Up to 21 January, pilots of the Group had made a total of 1349 carrier landings with only 17 instances of material damage, and no serious personal injury.

Ground Training was continued, with particular emphasis on recognition.

Reorganization. The two December revisions of the complement of the group involved the following changes: a VBF squadron was added to the group, with a complement of 36 F4U type aircraft and 54 pilots; the VF squadron, which had been increased to a total of 73 aircraft (36 F6F-5 and 37 F4U-1) in mid-December, was reduced to 36 F6F-5 at the end of the month with proportionate changes in pilot complement; the VB squadron was reduced to 15 aircraft, less than half its original size, the pilot complement being reduced from an original 54 to 23.

By-products of these changes were the following: the creation of new squadron at a time when the original squadrons had four-and-a-half months of training, with the result that this squadron was far behind the others in training and organization; the assignment of many pilots to the new squadron who had
never flown F4U type planes, such pilots being in the majority, and of some pilots who had never flown fighter planes of any type before; a lowering of the esprit-de-corps and ambition of the pilots and other personnel of VB-38 to whom it seemed that successive reductions were bringing the squadron toward the vanishing point, and who suspected that their efforts to acquire a specialized technique were likely to prove futile, as they had for the many squadron-mates who had previously been transferred out of the squadron and out of the type; a discouragement to the pilots transferred out of the squadron and group, who reverted to a pilot pool; and a general disruption of the training program, which had progressed in a steady and coordinated fashion in spite of the handicaps of weather and facilities previously referred to.

It is realized that changes in complement of planes by types, and therefore in complement of pilots, as between squadrons, are dictated by tactical considerations, and that time is of the essence in bringing them about. The points mentioned in the paragraph above are brought out in order to emphasize some of the incidental effects of such changes, so that by taking them into consideration, their disruptive or demoralizing effect may be avoided or held to a minimum.

(Notes: Reference is made to the semi-monthly progress reports of the squadrons for this period, submitted to ComFAir, Quonset Point, for further details and comments, as well as to the Squadrons' war diaries and histories.)

(No documentation is included as the sense of applicable portions of directives received have been incorporated in the narrative above, to the extent required.)

(3) APPENDICES

Letter of commendation and citation was received from Commander Air Force,
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE

Atlantic Fleet for Lieut.Comdr. Roland Palmedo, U.S.N.R., home town, New York,
New York.

Respectfully submitted,

Roland Palmedo,
Lt.Comdr, USNR,
Admin.Off.CAG-55.
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT
CAG-88/
Al2

Serial: 046

To: Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT.

History Unit, Op-23-J-6; Office of Editorial Research,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.

Via: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: History of Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT from 1 March to 31 May 1945.


Enclosure: (A) Subject History.

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (A) is submitted herewith.

S. S. Searcy, Jr.
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

NEW YORK, N.Y.

San Francisco, Cal.


HISTORY OF
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT
PART THREE
(1 March to 31 May 1945)

(1) CHRONOLOGY

1 March 1945. At the start of this period (1 March 1945) the Group was located at N.A.S., Hilo, Hawaii, continuing flight and ground training, having recently arrived from Otis Field, Mass.

24 April 1945. Orders were received for the Group to report to the U.S.S. CURTISS for transportation to Saipan, departing Hilo 26 April, 1945, and upon arrival Saipan to report to AirPacSubComFord for duty. As the start of this movement coincided with scheduled flight operations from U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD the following movements were necessitated.

25 April 1945. Extra pilots left Hilo via transport plane for Ford Island and there embarked U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD.

Lieut. Comdr. D. M. Marcley (M0-C), Group Flight Surgeon, and Lieut(jg) W. E. Hanson, Electronics Officer, were detached.

26 April 1945. Planes and pilots departed for U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD. Ground Officers and enlisted personnel departed Hilo on U.S.S. CURTISS.

27 April 1945. U.S.S. CURTISS arrived Ford Island. Lieutenant J. A. Ariano reported as Radar Countermeasures Officer. Four enlisted personnel (one ART2c, one ART3c, two ARM3c) reported for duty in connection with radar countermeasures.

28 April 1945. Pilots returned to Ford Island by plane and went aboard USS CURTISS.

- 1 -
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT
e/o FLEET POST OFFICE NEW YORK N.Y.


29 April 1945 Lieutenant R. W. Reinertsen reported as Group Electronics Officer.

30 April 1945 U.S.S. CURTISS departed Ford Island.

NOTE: Reference is made to the Histories of the component squadrons for further details relating particularly to their units.

(2) NARRATIVE

Training at N.A.S., Hilo, proceeded under average favorable conditions. Availability of aircraft was good, except with respect to F4U's which, as at Otis Field, were in decrepit condition. Weather conditions were fairly favorable for daylight flying, although low clouds and very heavy rain fall largely prevented pre-dawn flying and only a small proportion of night flying could be performed. Maintenance and servicing of aircraft was good.

Living conditions at Hilo were very good. Quarters for senior officers very comfortable, for junior officers adequate. Food was good, water supply for drinking and bathing ample. Athletic and recreation facilities were varied, and included a swimming pool which was used for swimming practice and tests and survival check-outs.

Facilities at N.A.S., Narpi Point were under development at the time the Group arrived. The conditions of F4U aircraft was similar to that which prevailed at the two previous stations. Living conditions for both officers and men were adversely affected chiefly by the lack of adequate water for washing and showers, and for washing clothes, and by the limitations of the drinking water supply.

Officers of the Group, all of whom received individual orders to proceed
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT
CAG-88/
A12

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK, N.Y.

from Otis Field, Mass, to N.A.S., Alameda, Calif., have as yet bee unable to
collect any reimbursement for the transcontinental travel performed at their
own expense, although they were assured upon receiving their orders that
mileage and per-diem would be paid.

The form of the orders, which were phrased as for "Temporary Additional
Duty" coupled with the fact the the enlisted personnel travelled by Troop
Train, has made all disbursing officers contacted uncertain as to whether
reimbursement under the orders could properly be paid. In the hope of cor-
recting this unsatisfactory condition, appeal has been made to the Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts.

During March a report was received from ComFAir, Quonset Point (Serial
0191 of 5 March 1945) regarding the rocket training of the 88 Squadrons. This
showed the following figures for the training period ended about 1 February:

| No. practice Dry Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1592 | 2640 | 900 | 900 |
| No. rocket firing runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1305 | 1502 | 1078 | 762 |
| Hits under 10 Mils, 0° - 20° Dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | - | - | - | - |
| Hits under 10 Mils, 20° - 40° Dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | - | 23.4% | - | 23.4% |
| Hits under 10 Mils, 40° - 60° Dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 19.0% | 16.0% | 19.5% | - |
| Hits under 15 Mils, 0° - 20° Dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | - | - | - | - |
| Hits under 15 Mils, 20° - 40° Dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 51.6% | 35.7% | 40.3% | - |
| Hits under 15 Mils, 40° - 60° Dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 52.3% | 35.6% | 35.2% | - |
| Hits under 20 Mils, 0° - 20° Dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | - | - | - | - |
| Hits under 20 Mils, 20° - 40° Dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 72.4% | 32.2% | - | 55.0% |
| Hits under 20 Mils, 40° - 60° Dive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 86.5% | 43.5% | 56.7% | - |

(Reference is made to the histories of the component squadrons for further details
and comments. No documentation is included at the applicable portion of directives
received have been incorporated above).
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE

NEW YORK, N.Y.


(3) APPENDICES

A picture of the Air Group Staff unit taken at M.A.S., Hilo, Hawaii, in April 1945, is attached hereto.

Respectfully Submitted,

Roland Palmedo,
Lieut. Comdr., USNR,
Historical Officer,
CVG-88.
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

17 JUN 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
CAG-38 Conf. Ltr.
Serial 046, dated
1 June 1945.

From: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: History Unit, Op-33-J-6; Office of Editorial
    Research, Office of the Chief of Naval
    Operations, Navy Department.

Subject: History of Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-Eight
        from 1 March to 31 May 1945.

1. Forwarded.

Copy to: Com CAG 88

Copy No 2
destroyed
6/23/45
Henry H. Datz
Lieut. USNR.
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY EIGHT

25 October 1945.

CVG-88/
A12

Serial: 0176

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT.
History Unit, Op-33-J-6, Office of Editorial Research,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Via: (1) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: History of Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT, from 1 June to 25 October 1945.

Reference: (a) Manual for Historical Officers, (NavAer 00-250-26).
(b) Fleet Air West Coast Conf. ltr. No. 15-45.
(c) ComCVG-88 Conf. ltr. Serial: 046 of 1 June 1945,
to History Unit.

Enclosure: (A) Action Report of ComCVG-88 aboard U.S.S. YORKTOWN,
1 July to 15 August 1945, without enclosures.
(B) Action Report of ComCVG-88 aboard U.S.S. YORKTOWN,
16 August to 2 Sept. 1945.

1. Reference (c) carried the history of Carrier Air Group
EIGHTY-EIGHT up through 31 May 1945, on which date the Group and component
squadrons were located at N.A.B. Marpi Point, Saipan. In accordance with
the instructions of reference (a), submission of histories was discontinued,
during the period the Group was ship-based. This letter is being submitted
in accordance with reference (b).

2. CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - Group embarked as passengers on U.S.S.
MAKASSAR STRAIT at Saipan.

16 June 1945 - U.S.S. MAKASSAR STRAIT arrived Leyte Gulf.

17 June 1945 - Group transferred from U.S.S. MAKASSAR
STRAIT to U.S.S. YORKTOWN for operations.

23 October 1945 - Orders received to disembark and decom-
mision Group and component squadrons, which orders are in process of being
carried out as of the date hereof.

(Reference is made to the histories of the component
squadrons for further details and comments.)

3. Enclosures (A) and (B) are submitted herewith.

S. S. Searcy, Jr.
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT.
To: Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Via: (1) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. YORKTOWN, CV-10.
(2) Commander, Task Group THIRTY EIGHT POINT FOUR (ComCarDivSIX).
(3) Commander, Task Force THIRTY EIGHT (ComSECOND CarTaskForPac.).
(4) Commander, THIRD Fleet.
(5) Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS.

Subject: ACTION REPORT of Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT, Air Operations against SHIKOKU, HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, aboard U.S.S. YORKTOWN - Period 1 July to 15 August.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf. Ibr. 1G1-45.

Enclosure: (A) ACA-1 Report Nos. 1 - 36 of VF-68.
(B) ACA-1 Reports Nos. 1 - 43 of VBF-68.
(C) ACA-1 Reports Nos. 1 - 17 of VE-68.
(D) ACA-1 Reports Nos. 1 - 17 of VT-68.
(E) Summary of Combat Record of Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT.

I. PRELIMINARY.

These were CVA-63's first combat operations. The Group was commissioned 15 August 1944. After training at various "type fields" on the east coast the squadrons first assembled as a group at N.A.A.F., Otis Field, Camp Edwards, Mass., on 1 December and underwent group training at that field until 1 February 1945 when they departed for the west coast, arriving at Pearl Harbor from San Francisco on the U.S.S. INTREPID on 24 February, the group at once went to N.A.S. Hilo, Hawaii, and was based there for further training until the end of April. On 27 April the group embarked on the U.S.S. CURTIS for transportation to N.A.B. Harpi Point, Saipan, where it was based for four weeks and then embarked on the U.S.S. MARISSA STRAIT for transportation to San Pedro bay, Leyte, P.I., arriving there on 16 June, 1945.

II. EMBARKATION and SORTIE

The group embarked on the U.S.S. YORKTOWN at Leyte on 17 June, 1945. On 27 June the ship sortied for a one-day operation for the purpose of landing its Corsairs from the beach and familiarizing pilots with its flight deck procedure. On 1 July the YORKTOWN, as part of T.C. 38-4, sortied from San Pedro Bay for the subject operations, in accordance with C.T.C. 38-4 Op-Order 4-45.

III. OPERATIONS EN ROUTE TO TARGET AREA.

From 1 to 9 July, while the Task Group was en route to the launching point for D-Day, the Air Group conducted routine patrols and training exercises, including a dress rehearsal for the D-Day flight schedule. One SB2C and one FG-1D were lost due to operational causes. No personnel were lost. Both planes were replaced from the Replenishment Group prior to D-Day.
ACTION REPORT of Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT, Air Operations against SHIKOKU, HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, aboard U.S.S. YORKTOWN - Period 1 July to 15 August.

IV. ATTACK ON TOKYO AREA AIRFIELDS - DOG DAY (10 July).

The primary mission was the destruction of enemy A/C, airborne and on the ground. The airfields attacked were: KONOIKE, SHIROI, KOKODA, KASHIMAGURA, KATORI, TOWAROZAWA and IMRO. No airborne enemy planes were encountered. Rockets and VT fuzed fragmentation bombs were employed against grounded A/C, which were so widely dispersed and well camouflaged that it was extremely difficult, especially for pilots with no previous experience in this type of concealment, to see them or select a point of aim from above 4000 ft, at which altitude it was necessary to release bombs in order for the VT fuses to arm. This was not due to lack of information as to location of dispersal areas, for pilots had been thoroughly briefed on this subject and carried overlays and photographs of these areas. They also were informed of the latest available plane count on each field, and specific areas, and even particular revetments, were assigned as targets in carefully made tactical plans. However there was no way of knowing just where individual planes would be located on that particular day, and in several instances an assigned field was examined and passed over in favor of an alternate field because no planes could be seen on the former. Later inspection of photographs taken on the same flight often showed a considerable number of planes cleverly dispersed and hidden, but in no case were these photographs available to a subsequent flight attacking the same field. On a one-day strike, this is inevitable for the first three flights, but as for the last three flights there will normally be no reason why they should not have the benefit of photos taken on the earlier flights. Conversely, the fields attacked in the morning can be photographed in the afternoon for purposes of damage assessment. In this way both photo hops will have a definite tactical value. The maximum value of this procedure will be realized, however, only if the photo planes are based on the same ship as those planes composing sweeps and strikes, thereby enabling pilots on the latter actually to see the pictures of the planes assigned them as targets. It is felt that a pilot who has certain knowledge that there are one or more planes in a certain revetment, and who knows what they look like, will see them more easily and will press home his attack more effectively than will a pilot who is merely assigned a certain numbered revetment as a point of aim.

The characteristics of the VT fuzes used on these strikes render it impossible to claim certain damage or destruction to more than a few aircraft, and so they arouse little pilot enthusiasm. There were several instances where pilots thought that bombs so fuzed exploded at altitudes of from 1000 to 3000 feet, presumably as a result of falling close together, and there was suspicion without confirmation, that Ensign Emhoff's corsair, which crashed in flames, was destroyed by such a bomb rather than by flak. However in the opinion of most pilots the fuzes performed as intended and detonated 50 to 100 feet above the ground - effectively it is hoped.

In at least one instance, notably Strike C-2, target changes were ordered just before take-off and flights were ordered to attack fields which had not been previously assigned as their targets, instead of the fields on which their briefing and attack plans had been concentrated. It is felt that this should be avoided, in the absence of some compelling reason. In the case of
12 September 1945.

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Subject: ACTION REPORT OF Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT, Air Operations against SHIKOKU, HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, aboard U.S.S. YORKTOWN - Period 1 July to 15 August.

Strike C-2 the attack was diverted from Kasumigaura A/P, where a most careful assignment of targets had been made and where there were a known 109 aircraft, to Konoike A/P where there were only 49 - 50 planes. This air group had no D-Day photos of Konoike (which presumably had been photographed by some other air group) nor was it among the six alternative fields which had been assigned, and studied, as targets for the strike.

Two planes were lost to flak on the day's operations - one Corsair and one Hellcat. The Corsair pilot went down in flames over the target. The Hellcat pilot ditched near the task force and was rescued.

A summary of the day’s operations is as follows:

Sorties: Offensive - 122, Photo - 12, Patrols - 46, Total - 186.

Bombs Dropped: 46.3 tons.

Rockets launched: 140.

Own Losses to Flak: 1 Corsair and pilot, 1 Hellcat.

Damage from Flak: 3 Hellcats, location unknown, 1 Corsair at Tokorozawa, 1 Avenger and 1 Corsair at Kasumigaura, Total 6.

Ships Sunk: 1 Sugar Dog.

Enemy Aircraft Destroyed on Ground: 3 at Konoike, 3 at Shiroi, Total 6.

Enemy Aircraft Damaged on Ground: 5, plus an unknown number out of 10 in revetments saturated with bombs, at Konoike, 3 at Kokoda, unknown number out of 40 in revetments saturated with bombs at Kasumigaura, Total 8, plus possible 50 additional.

Ground Installations Damaged: 1 Hangar each at Katori, Shiroi, Imba and Tokorozawa, Total 4 Hangars.

V. ATTACKS AGAINST SHIPPING AND GROUND INSTALLATIONS ON HOKKAIDO AND NORTHERN HONSHU - DAYS - X-RAY AND XRAY PLUS ONE DAYS (14-15 July)

Following the strikes against the Tokyo Plain airfields on 10 July, the Task Force retired to the north-east and fueled on the 11th. On the 12th it was again underway to attack Hokkaido. During these two days the air groups operations were limited to routine combat air patrols, of which nineteen were flown. At 0330 on the 13th (X day) the YORKTOWN was at the launching point, ready to launch the first flight. However, thick fog blanketed the whole force and remained throughout the day. No air operations were possible and the Force Commander accordingly re-designated the 14th as X Day and ordered attacks to be carried out on that day in accordance with the original schedule.

On the 14th the weather was still thick but the ceiling had lifted to 1200 feet near the force and Sweeps A-1 and B-1 and Strike C-1 were launched according to schedule. The ceiling lowered to zero as the planes approached the target and it was necessary to climb through the overcast. On Strike C-1 Lt. Commander Richard E. Crommelin's plane collided with another, at low altitude, during such a climb and he has been missing since, without trace.

The primary targets assigned were aircraft and airfields, with shipping and the coke ovens of the Muroran Iron Works as alternate targets. The fog was
CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY EIGHT /1rb

12 September 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: ACTION REPORT OF Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY EIGHT, Air Operations against SHIKOKU, HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, aboard U.S.S. YORKTOWN Period 1 July to 15 August, 1945.

so thick over southwest Hokkaido that none of the assigned airfields could be found nor attacked. The coke ovens were reassigned as battleship bombardment targets. This left shipping as the sole remaining target. There were sufficient holes in the overcast at Utoro and Hakodate Harbors to permit masthead or shallow gliding attacks on the considerable number of IJN's, DD's DE's FF's, luggers and Sugar Dogs which were present. Additional targets of opportunity were railroad locomotives encountered on the line running along the coast of Uchinau Bay. Many of them were destroyed or damaged by strafing and rockets.

In view of the fact that the airfields were closed in, the second series of sweeps was cancelled, though the second strike was launched and attacked shipping.

On the 15th (X 1 Day) the weather was somewhat improved, though still heavily overcast, with great patches of fog, and launching of sweeps and strikes, according to plan, was begun at 0328 and continued through the day. Launchings were made at average ranges of 211 miles from Utoro, which meant that the distance to the assigned targets at Otaru was between 240 and 250 miles. All flights were airborne for more than five hours. Lt.(jg) Odom and Ensign Crumbo, who were circling a downed pilot, landed after 6 hours, 39 minutes in F6F's. But Lt.(jg) Roberts and Ens. Downing, also circling downed pilots, set the record by remaining in the air for 7 hours, 35 minutes in TG-ID's.

Otaru Bay, which was half covered from NE to S by a solid fog-bank proved to be a flak trep, the flak coming from shore batteries and also, with great accuracy, from frigates and other armed vessels in the harbor. Flak batteries took full advantage of the restricted course and limited altitude imposed on planes by the low overcast and encroaching fog bank. Two Corsairs and one Helldive were shot down over the bay, as well as one Shangri-la chicken. None of the pilots were saved. One crashed in flames, one drowned after getting out of his plane at low altitude and two are presumably prisoners of war since they were left drifting in rafts. No rescue was effected by cruiser seaplanes which were sent to their aid, but which for some reason never arrived, though the pilots in the water were constantly circled by relays of friendly fighters for over 7 hours.

The two days of operations at Hokkaido cost Air Group 28 a Squadron Commander, three other pilots and six aircraft, nearly all of which losses were directly or indirectly attributable to the weather.

A summary of the two-day operations is as follows:

Bombs Dropped: 613 tons.
Rockets Launched: 393.
Own losses: 3 Helldives and 2 pilots, 2 Corsairs and 2 pilots, 1 Avenger.
Ships Sunk: 1 old DD, 1 DE, 6 Luggers, 4 PTC, 13 SD, 1 Fishing
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: ACTION REPORT of Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT
Air Operations Against SHIMOKU, HOKSHU and HOKKAIDO, aboard
U.S.S. YORKTOWN - Period 1 July to 15 August 1945.

boat, 2 Tugs, 1 "TD, 1 Trawler, 1 SAS.

Ships Damaged: 2 PF, 4 FTC, 2 FTD, 8 Luggers, 1 FTB, 1 Small MV,
1 Fishing Boat, 10 SD, 1 SBS, 1 SAS, 2 Trawlers, 1 Tug.

Ground Targets Destroyed: 24 Locomotives, 2 Radar installations,
Stones, 4 Highway Bridges, several small buildings.

Ground Targets Damaged: 5 Locomotives, "Tanishi Iron Works and Coke
Ovens, "Tanishi Railroad Yards, Sarawa
Barracks, Oridashi RR Bridge, Factory at
Tomakomai, "Jorge Building in Hokuode, Pulp
Mill and Lumber Factory at Tomakomai, Control
Tower at Sapporo A/F, Factory and Warehouse
at Itanozawa, Roundhouse at Takakawa, Light-
house at Shiya Saki, Warehouse at Kodomori.

VI. ATTACKS ON TOKYO AREA AIRFIELDS AND AGAINST BB "NAGATO" AT YOKOSUKA
NAVAL BASE -- XRAY PLUS THREE DAY (18 JULY).

After retirement from the Hokkaido area on the evening of July 15
the Task Force spent the 16th refueling, and replenishing its aircraft. Air
Group 88 received as replacements six Hellcats, one SBD and one TBM. During
the night of the 16th the Task Force made its high speed run-in to the
launching point for the first fighter sweep on the 17th.

At 0350 (Itum) on the 17th the Task Group bore 248°, 129 miles from Konoike
Airfield in the Tokyo plain area, and Sweep A-1 was launched according to plan.
It arrived over the target area to find a solid overcast stacked up from
the dock to 12,000 feet. It was unable to make any sort of attack and returned to
base. Sweep B-1 found conditions even worse at 0445 and was obliged to turn
back before reaching the target area. The remaining sweeps against airfields
and the strikes against the BB Nagato at Yokosuka Naval Base were therefore
deflected, and a weather drop was sent in from the night carrier. Meanwhile rain
set in, the weather worsened and at 1230 all further sweeps and strikes were
canceled. CTF 38 announced his intention of carrying out his X / 3 Day plan
on the following day, the 18th. Sorties for the day were: Offensive - 24, Photo
- 4, Petrols - 40. Total 68.

The morning of 18 July was a repetition of that of the 17th. Early Flight
Quarters was at 0250, and again pilots were ready to man planes to carry out
the scheduled air operations. However the weather was still thick, with fog,
low ceiling poor visibility and occasional rain. The launching of Sweeps A-1
and B-1 against the Tokyo Plain airfields, and of Strike C-1 against the
"NAGATO" at Yokosuka, were successively deferred and pilots put in Condition
13, pending report from a special weather flight which had been launched to
investigate and report the weather at the targets. The weather planes reported
improved weather and increased ceiling over the targets. Sweeps A-1 and B-1
and Strike C-1 were ordered to be armed and launched as soon as possible. The
sweeps took off at 1125 and 1250, each consisting of 12 Hellcats or Corsairs,
armed with four HVAR. They attacked grounded aircraft and air installations at
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: ACTION REPORT of Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT, 
Air Operations against SHIKOKU, KONISHI and HOKKAIDO, aboard 
U.S.S. YORKTOWN - Period 1 July to 15 August 1945.

KASHIMA, KATORI, KONOIKE and KASUHIGA Airfields. Flak was accurate.
Enemy aircraft were degassed and thoroughly camouflaged and dispersed, so that
the number of planes definitely destroyed by burning was much smaller than had
been hoped. Rockets damaged or destroyed some air installations. But the experi-
ence of this day and of the 10th made it apparent that in the Tokyo area, and
presumably throughout the Japanese home islands, the complete destruction of
all aircraft and installations on a given field can no longer be expected to
be accomplished without undue losses except by throwing overwhelming power
against one field at a time, knocking out its AA defenses and air installations
by coordinated, concentrated attack, and thereby enabling VF to search out and
burn hidden planes with minimum altitude strafing. In this day's attack, which
resulted in only four grounded enemy aircraft certainly destroyed by burning,
two Corsairs were lost - one disintegrated by a direct hit by heavy AA over
Katori and the other missing over Kashima.

Strike 0-1, consisting of 11 F6F, 15 TB-1, and 15 SB2C, each carrying one
1000/2 G.P. bomb, took off with similar flights from each carrier in the Task
Force, at 1330 to attack the BB NAGATO. Interpretation of photos taken by
carrier planes on the 10th had shown very heavily concentrated AA defenses at
the Yokosuka Navy Yard. There was also a flak ship lying near the NAGATO direct-
ly on the line of pull-out. These heavy defenses, plus the fact that the
ship, lying docksie, could be effectively attacked only from within a 90°
quadren on the port beam, made the target look like a flak trap and it was
feared that casualties would be heavy. However a magnificent attack by CVG-85
on the AA positions with fragmentation bombs, and on the flak ship with thousand
pounders, disrupted the AA fire sufficiently to enable EIGHTY-EIGHT's planes
to press home their attack against the NAGATO without losing a plane. The attack
was commenced at 12,000 feet, in steep dives, all planes diving clean, at very
high speed, and pilots were most enthusiastic about the coordination and suc-
cess of the attack. VE and VB were able to observe that they had made a total
of Seven hits, and two misses close enough to have the desired mining effect,
but further observation was impossible since the ship was obscured from sight
by clouds of smoke. Evaluation of the extent of the damage can only be deter-
mained by post-attack photographs. Among the pictures taken by combat aircrews
during their pull-outs one shows a direct hit on the stern at the moment of
impact. In the others the ship is hidden by smoke. Damage to nearby install-
tions in the yard from misses is also indicated. In spite of the fact
that neither permitted only one strike against the Nagato to be made, instead
of the planned two strikes, the attack must be considered to have been highly
successful from the viewpoint of this Air Group, within the obvious limita-
tions of the bombs carried, since 1000/2 G.P. bombs clearly will not penetrate
battleship armor, though they may be expected to cause damage topside and to
the superstructure.

A summary of the day's operations is as follows:

Sorties: Offensive - 65, Photo - 8, Patrols - 12, Total 85.
Bombs Dropped: 20 Tons.
Rockets Launched: 72.
Own Losses: One Corsair and Pilot Lost.
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Own Flick damage: 1 Helldiver over Konoike, 4 Corsairs over Katori
1 Helldiver and 1 Avenger over Nagato.

Ship Damaged: BB Nagato by at least seven hits out of 40 1000s G.P. dropped, extent of damage unknown, ship obscured by flame and smoke.

Aircraft Damaged on Ground: 4 at Konoike.

Ground Targets Destroyed: 3 Locomotives.

Ground Targets Damaged: 1 Locomotive, 2 Hangars at Konoike, Navy Yard installations at Yokosuka.

VII. RETIREMENT AND REPLENISHMENT (19 - 23 JULY).

At the conclusion of air operations on 18 July the Task Force retired, refueled and replenished its aircraft at sea, consuming the 19th, 20th and 21st of July in so doing. Air Group 88 received as replacements four FG-1D aircraft. On 22 July Commander Task Force 38's On Order 3-45, ordering a further series of air operations against the Japanese homeland, was received and during that day and the 23rd the Task Force was underway for the launching point. The air Group's operations during the period 19-23 July consisted of 83 sorties of which 28 were air patrols, 54 were exercises and 3 were utility flights.

VIII. ATTACKS AGAINST WESTERN HONSHU AIRFIELDS, NAVAL VESSELS AT KURE NAVAL BASE, SHIPING IN KYUSHU, AND TSURUGI HARBOURS - ABLE AND BAKER DAYS (24 - 25 JULY).

On 24 July (Able Day) the weather over Honshu and Shikoku greatly hampered operations and prevented several flights from attacking their assigned targets, obliging them to attack either secondary targets or mere targets of opportunity. Since the weather tended to be better along the coast, more than one sweep whose primary target was aircraft and airfields found itself attacking coastal shipping, instead, as the only available target, and those sweeps which did reach and attack airfields found that their extreme distance from the launching point and the short time allotted for making the flight left them with insufficient time over the target in which to scatter or deceive and dispersed planes and make effective attacks on them. One pass at 4000 - 5000 feet or occasionally two passes were all that the available time permitted. The VT fused frog bombs, which had to be released at above 4000 feet to arm, and then offered danger to low-flying planes through influence detonation, tended to prevent pilots from pressing home the low-level strafing attacks which were and are necessary to destroy dispersed aircraft. In fact, where time permits only one pass, the VT fuse makes low strafing impossible. It is felt that rockets would be more suitable armament against dispersed aircraft.

ABLE Day's operations consisted of four fighter sweeps and two VF - VB - VT strikes. The early morning sweep found Iki airfield, on the north shore of Honshu, entirely closed in, as were all other fields in that area. The sweep attempted to reach its secondary target area near Osaka, but found the time too short and so was obliged to return to base, expending its bombs on wharves.
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on the southern coast rather than jettisoning them at sea. The ceiling lifted
for subsequent sweeps, however, and they succeeded in reaching the attacking
Hanshin, Itami, Kinoji, Tonago and Niiho infil fields. Few aircraft were seen and
it was not until photographs, taken on these flights were printed that large
numbers of planes were spotted, well hidden and dispersed, especially at Aragawa
and Niiho. Unfortunately, the pictures were available too late to permit pilots
on the last two sweeps to examine them, although an unsuccessful attempt was
made to divert the last sweep to Aragawa after it had departed for the target.
This again points up the desirability of planning the early photographic mis-
sions so that their results will be available to pilots, on the same ship, who
are to attack the same fields on later sweeps.

Two strikes were launched against naval vessels at Kure Naval Base, where
the BB Haruna and the CL Yyodo were assigned as the targets of this air group.
The Yyodo's position was known, but the Haruna's was not. No separate search
for her had been ordered and there was no time to conduct one by planes of the
strike. Heavy A/F was intense and accurate over the harbor area, which was
covered by broken clouds so that orientation was difficult and targets hard to
identify. The first strike did not sight the Haruna at all but made its attack
on the Yyodo, which was in her expected position, and on the Tone, which was
discovered anchored nearby. Six hits were scored on the Tone and eleven on the
Yyodo. Returning from this strike the first airborne opposition encountered by
this air group was met. It consisted of eight or ten Jacks waiting over Kongo
Shido, who jumped two VF. Two Jacks were shot down. One of the F6F's is missing.
Three other of our planes were lost in the attack on the Tone, due to flak. One
pilot was rescued from within 5 miles of Kobe harbor, by a daring Dumbo sea-
plane. The second strike attacked the old BB Satsuki (now disabled and classifi-
ced as an AG), under the impression that it was the elusive Haruna. Several hits
were scored but only superficial damage was observed from the G. P. bombs. One
Corsair pilot was lost in a mid-air collision with a plane from the Shangri-la.

A summary of the day's operations is as follows:

- Total Sorties: 191 (offensive - 125; Air Patrols - 52; Weather - 2)
- Rescue - 12)
- Bombs Dropped: 56.3 Tons.
- Rockets Launched: 67 HVAR.
- Aircraft Lost to enemy action: 2
- Aircraft Lost Operationally: 4
- Pilots Lost: 3
- Downed Pilots rescued: 3
- Wounded: 1 Aircrewm en
- Shins Sunk: 2 Sugar Dogs, 2 Luggers
- Ships Damaged: 5 Sugar Dogs, 1 Treador, 1 Sugaroble Sugar,
  2 Sugar Beker Sugars, 1 Tere Beker, 1 Fox Tere Cher-
  ile, AG SETTITU, CL Yyodo, CVL HOSHO, CL TONE
- Airborne Aircraft Destroyed: 2 Jacks, 1/2 Oscar (jointly with
  Couplins C.P).
- Ground AG Destroyed: 5
- Grounded A/C Probably destroyed: 1
- Grounded A/C Damaged: 15
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Ground Targets Destroyed: 2 Locomotives, 2 Oil Tanks.
Ground Targets Damaged: 3 Locomotives, 3 Hangars, 2 Wharves, 1 Warehouse.
Planes Damaged by Flak: 1 VT, 3 VB, 1 F6F.

BAKER Day's operations were even more hampered by heavy overcast weather, which permitted only four sweeps and one strike. Of these, one sweep was unable to reach or attack the target (Himeji A/F) and on the strike only the VT succeeded in breaking through the weather. It found that HIJIRU harbor was closed in, and so it attacked locomotives and railroad installations as the only visible targets of opportunity. The sweeps attacked aircraft and installations at Yonago and Icho Airfields. The most noteworthy event of the day was the rescue of Lieut. H. M. Harrison and a Shangri-La pilot from the Japan Sea off Mihô by a PBM Dauntless from Okinawa, which, escorted and encouraged by Lts. Proctor and Schloff of its escort VP, flew through instrument weather across the island of Honshu and through the flak of Mihô, made the rescue and then returned and ditched in the midst of the Task Force because of insufficient fuel to return to base.

The summary of the day's operations was:

Sorties Flown: 131 (Offensive- 79, Air Patrols 50, Weather 2.)
Bombs Dropped: 20 Tons.
 Rockets Launched 64, HVAR.
 Aircraft lost to Enemy Action - 1.
 Pilots Rescued: 1.
 Ships Probably Sunk: 1 Fox Terra Charlie.
 Ships Damaged: 2 Sugar Dogs, 5 Luggers.
 Grounded Aircraft Destroyed: 16.
 Grounded Aircraft Damaged: 33.
 Ground Targets Destroyed: 3 Locomotives, Roundhouse, Bridge, Tunnel Closed.
 Ground Targets Damaged: 6 Hangars, RR Yards, RR Station.
 Planes Damaged by Flak: 3 F6F.

IX. ATTACKS ON WESTERN HONSHU AIRFIELDS AND NAVAL VESSELS AT KURE
NAVAL BASE - ITEM D.Y. (28 JULY).

Following the operations on ABLE and BAKER Days the Force retired to the south and refueled on the 26th and 27th. Air Operations of this air group during these two days consisted of only five sorties (3 utility flights and disposing of 2 flyable duds) and the landing of 8 replacement aircraft from the Replenishment Force.

The Op Order of July 28th was designated as CHARLIE Day, with airfields in the Tokyo - Nagoya area as the targets. However on the 26th the plans for CHARLIE Day were cancelled and ITEM D.Y. plans were substituted instead. Targets for the two strikes were the BB Haruna and the CL Cyodo, both now known to be anchored at Kure. Targets for the sweeps were airfields in the Mihô and Osaka areas.
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The strikes were delivered in the face of intense flak from ships and shore which shot down one plane and damaged five. Five hits and four near misses were scored on the Cyodo and seven hits on the Haruna. The Cyodo capitulated as a result of the morning strike by this and other air groups and was not further attacked in the afternoon. Since the last planes to hit the Cyodo in the morning were VF. of this air group, they may well claim having administered the coup de grace. The Haruna was attacked by both strikes and set afire. Photographs taken during the second strike show the ship smoking, with her main deck and hull damaged at the bow, and aft of No. 4 turret, where the main deck is blown off from side to side for a distance of about 65' fore and aft. One gun is missing from the No. 2 turret and the superstructure is a mass of wreckage. Seven luggers and 2 Sugar Dogs were also damaged.

The sweeps attacked Yonago, Ika and Hanshin Airfields, destroying and damaging parked aircraft, hangars and other installations. Strike B-2 was particularly ably planned and led by Lt. Hall, who pin-pointed hidden and dispersed aircraft and analyzed AA positions so well that his flight was able to carry out its strafing attacks at low altitude and burn six aircraft at Hanshin (Osaka) and damage three; without loss to itself, as well as destroying 12 locomotives, 4 tank cars, a transformer station and other ground targets.

A summary of the day's operations is as follows:

Sorties: 167 (Offensive 101; Photo 8; Subcap 16; DCAP 16, RAPCAP 16)
Bombing Dropped: 534.4 Tons.
Rockets: 69.
Aircraft Lost: 1 SB2C-3.
Aircraft Damaged by flak: 5
Personnel Lost: 2.
Ships Sunk: CL Cyodo, capsized and lying on side.
Ships Damaged: BB Haruna, CA Tone, 1 Old CA, 1 BB or DD, 2 Sugar Dogs, 5 Luggers.
Grounded Aircraft Destroyed 11.
Grounded Aircraft probably Destroyed: 20.
Grounded Aircraft Damaged: 15.

X. ATTACKS AGAINST TOKYO PLAIN AIRFIELDS AND SHIPPING IN HAIJURU AND TSURUGA HARBORS - DOG DAY (28 JULY)

The Task Force retired southward on 29 July, during which day the air group flew 12 air petrols. During the night the run-in to the DOG Day launching position was made and launching on the 30th began in accordance with schedule. From this point, however, the actual operations bore little resemblance to the original plans, which were to concentrate all sweeps and strikes against airfields on the eastern Tokyo plain. Both of the first two sweeps found the
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The target area weathered in and were unable to reach their assigned targets.
They therefore made their attacks on targets of opportunity to the southwest
of Tokyo. These consisted of submarines and minor naval and merchant vessels
discovered in coves along the western shore of Sagami Nada, and factories in
the Fujisawa area.

Strike E-3 was diverted from the Tokyo airfields to shipping at Tsuruga
bath and damaged a Fox Tare Baker with at least one 500 lb G.P. hit and five
very near misses. Ground targets were also successfully attacked.

Sweep A-4 succeeded in attacking Utonomiya and Iida Airfields, destroying
five aircraft and damaging four. On the way back to base Sweep A-4 discovered
several nests of submarines at Taka, Koshihama and Shimada and sank one small
submarine and damaged seven others, large and small, with rockets and strafing.
Unfortunately they had no bombs. The two remaining strikes, one cut down to
fighters only, were directed against shipping at Haisuru and Tsuruga Wan.

One of the highlights of the day was provided by the offensive operations
of the escort fighters of two photo-mapping flights and of an air-sea rescue
Dumbo. These planes, in addition to their escort duties, found time to destroy
5 locomotives, 2 boxcars, one Jake, one Pavis and one Pete, as well as damaging
one large and six small submarines, one sub tender, four locomotives, one
electric train, two tugs, several small craft and a hangar.

The rescue from the Japen Sea, off Haisuru, of Lt. (jg) Penn and then of
Lt. (jg) O'Neare (who was a Dumbo escort shot down during the rescue of Penn)
by an Army PBY from Iwo Jima, piloted by lst Lt. John E. Rairich, USAAF, was
a performance meriting the highest praise. Rairich undertook the rescue
knowing that he would have insufficient fuel to return to base and that he
would have to ditch in the open sea in the dark upon his return to the task
force. He picked up Penn from the water under constant fire from an enemy
derstroyer and took off. Then, still under fire, he again landed and rescued
O'Neare, who was one of his escorting P6E-5(X) from the YORKTOWN, when
the latter was shot down by the destroyer while counter-attacking it in protection
of the Dumbo.

The days summary was as follows:

Sorties: Air Patrols 32, Searches 4, Photo Missions 24, Offensive
Missions 99, Dumbo Escort 4, Total 169.

Bombs Dropped: 42.8 Tons.

Rockets: 124.

Aircraft Lost to Flak: 2.

Down Pilots Rescued: 2.

Ships Sunk: 1 Fox Tare able, 1 Fox Tare Charlie, 1 Small
Submarine, 1 Sugar Dog, 1 Oil Barge.

Ships Damaged: 1 Sugar Able Sugar, 2 Fox Tare Charlie, 1 IV
Undetermined, 2 DE, 4 SS, 1 Sugar Charlie Sugar,
1 Fox Tare Dog, 5 Sugar Dogs, 1 Lugger, 3 Sugar
Charlie, 1 PT, 2 Tugs, 4 Patrol Craft.

Grounded Aircraft Destroyed: 8
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Grounded Aircraft Damaged: 4.
Grounded Installations Destroyed: 3 Hangars, 4 Locomotives.
Grounded Installations Damaged: 4 Factories, 4 Freight Cars, 1 Supply Depot, 2 Hangars, 2 Airfield Shop Buildings, 8 Locomotives, 1 Boxcar, 1 Electric Power Plant, 1 Radar Installation, 1 Electric Train, 1 Turntable, NR Marshalling Yards.

XI. ATTACKS AGAINST AIRFIELDS AND GROUND INSTALLATIONS ON HOKKAIDO AND CENTRAL HONSHU - GEORGE, GEORGE PLUS ONE, GEORGE PLUS TWO DAYS (8, 9, 10 AUGUST).

The period 31 July - 7 August was marked by repeated changes of plans. Following DOG Day the carriers retired and the air group began its plans and briefings for attacking the CV Hyotaka, CV Kusagi and CVL Iwaki, at Sasebo, and the airfields in the Kobe-Osaka-Nagoya areas, on EASY Day, 2 August. A typhoon forming to the southwest, however, forced the Task Force to proceed well south to avoid its anticipated track and EASY Day was postponed to the 3rd, to the 4th, to the 5th and then was cancelled entirely. Thereupon the air group made its preparations for attacks on the Tokyo plain airfields, on Fox Day, the 7th, but FOX Day was next cancelled and GEORGE Day operations against Hokkaido were ordered for the 8th. During this period, 31 July - August 7, air operations consisted of 217 sorties of which 38 were air patrols, 156 were tactical exercises and 23 were utility hops. One replacement aircraft was received.

GEORGE Day (8 August) - At 0400 Chitose A/F bore 322°, distant 210 miles, from the YORKTOWN. A sea-soup fog blew in gusts across the flight deck and at times it was impossible to see the after end of the flight deck from primary fly. However, planes were manned and engines started. But they were soon cut and all hands stood by, waiting for the fog to lift. Meanwhile two bogies approached to within 12 miles before turning away. At 0946 all strikes and sweeps were cancelled and a weather search of one VF(N) and one VT was launched. The fog gradually thinned in spots during the next few hours to the extent that a CAP of 8 VBF were launched at 1312, but the weather planes reported that the target area was still closed in with fog and at 1515 word was received that operations against Hokkaido were cancelled and that the next day's attacks would be against central Honshu. Twenty-five minutes later the CAP split-shote a Dinch, 35 miles from the ship, and then returned to base. A DCAP of 4 VBF(N) was later launched but had no contacts. This concluded the air operations for the day.

GEORGE PLUS ONE DAY (9 AUGUST) - Targets assigned to this Task Group were airfields in central Honshu, between Lat. 37° - 38° N. Information at those fields was very meagre. Twelve fields were known to exist but there were photos of only six. As to the remainder, the only information available was their approximate latitude and longitude. However, except for Sweep A-1, which was prevented from attacking Nishita A/F by a low overcast along the west coast, the two sweeps and four strikes found very good hunting. Iwaki, Koriyama and Harano Airfields were thoroughly bombed, rocketed and strafed and
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their hangers and other installations were very largely destroyed. Thirty-five grounded A/C were burned, 3 were probably destroyed, 40 were known to have been damaged. An indeterminable, but probably large, additional number were damaged out of 60 to 80 more A/C which were thoroughly worked over but refused to burn. Meanwhile, starting in the middle of the afternoon, the Kamikazes began attacking in earnest. Two succeeded in crashing Torpedo 31 and one narrowly missed the WSP. Of at least 20 shot down by the Force during the day the Yorktown's CAP had a chance at only two, both Graces, which were both splashed by VF-88's planes about 40 miles from the ship. It was on this day that Russia declared war on Japan.

The day's summary of air operations was:

Sorties Flown: 161 (Offensive - 122, Photo - 8, CAPS - 32).
Bomb Dropped: 32,9 Tons.
Rockets Released: 313 HVAR.
Planes Lost, Operational: 1 Corsair.
Pilots Rescued: 1.
Airborne Enemy A/C Destroyed: 2 Graces.
Grounded Enemy A/C Probably Destroyed: 3 - Iwaki.
Grounded Enemy A/C Damaged: 40 - Iwaki, plus an unknown number at Kuriyama and Horano.

Ground Installations Destroyed: 2 Hangars at Kuriyama, 2 Hangars at Iwaki, RR Bridge north of Iwaki.

Ground Installations Damaged: 3 Factories, and shops at Kuriyama, Hangers and Warehouse at Yabuki, Japan Refining Co. Buildings at Iwanuma.

Own Planes Damaged by Flak: 4 Hellcats, 4 Corsairs, 2 Avengers.

GEORGE PLUS TWO DAY (10 AUGUST) - Operations on the 10th were similar to those on the 9th, except that airfields in the southern Tokyo area, in addition to those of central Honshu, were included as targets. Weather again protected Niigata A/F from attack so the sweep attacked shipping in the harbor, which, with the low ceiling existing, proved to be a flak trap. Although considerable damage was done to shipping by the bomb-less fighters one Hellcat was shot down in flames and seven others were severely damaged. Kiserazu S.S. also was loaded with flak, as was Mobra. Two Corsairs were so badly shot up that they were barely able to get two miles off shore before ditching, where they were picked up by the Lifeguard submarine PERCH, and 8 others were damaged to a lesser degree. Other airfields that were attacked were Mincayama, Iwaki, Kuriyama and Horano.

The day's operations summarized as follows:

Sorties Flown: 156 (Offensive - 120, Photo - 4, CAPS - 32).
Bomb Dropped: 37,5 Tons.
Rockets Launched: 329 HVAR.

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Own A/C Lost to Flak: 2 Corsairs, 1 Helldiver, 1 Avenger (jettisoned as result of flak damage on the 9th).

Pilots Lost to Flak: 1
Down Pilots Rescued: 2, by PERCH.
Ships Damaged: 1 FTC, 1 FTG, 1 S/L, 1 Luger — all left dead in the water and burning, 1 FTC strafed, 2 luggers set afire.

Grounded A/C Destroyed: 20 — lasaki, 1 — Kisarazu.
Grounded A/C Damaged: 10 — Minazawa, 11 — Koriyama, 1 — Harano.

Ground Installations Destroyed: 5 Barracks, Chemical Plant, 1 Locomotive all at Koriyama, Oil Tank at Niigata.

Ground Installations Damaged: 2 Yagers at Minamata, Revetment Area Installations, Factory, Bridge, RR Station, Tunnel — all at lasaki, Hanger at Kisarazu and Yokosuka, 6 Barracks, Transformer Station, 2 Warehouses, Gas Works, Bridge — all at or near Koriyama

Own A/C Damaged by Flak: 9 Corsairs, 8 Helldivers.

XII.

ATTACK ON TOKYO PLAIN AIRFIELDS-FOX PLUS FOUR DAY (12 AUGUST).

The Task Force retired during the night of 10 August, August 11 — 12 were spent fueling and waiting out a typhoon. For these two days the air group’s operations consisted of only seven sorties, six of which were weather searches and one a utility flight. Throughout both days and until early morning of the 13th great uncertainty existed as to whether offensive operations would be continued on the 13th in view of the Jnp’s conditional acceptance of the "Potsdarn" surrender terms, the Big Four’s counter-proposition and the apparent imminence of the enemy’s surrender. However, after strikes had been ordered, countermanded and re-ordered, they were finally launched on schedule, although upon so little notice that it was impossible to arm the first sweep with either bombs or rockets.

Airfields attacked by the four fighter sweeps were Hysukurigahara, Yatobe, Hito, Taneyama, Kasumigaura, Kasumigusa SS and Kashima SS. One of the VF — VB — VT strikes attacked Takorozawa and Itsumogawa. The other strike was assigned the Tokyo Shibaura Electronics Plant No. 2, at Kawasaki, as its target but found it closed in with a thick overcast and so went searching for submarines, which had been reported hidden along the western shore of Sagami Wan. Not finding any, it attacked minor shipping and other targets of opportunity found at Shimoda and Inaoro.

A summary of the day’s air operations was as follows:


Bombs Dropped: 22 Tons.
Rockets Launched: 140 HVAR.
Own A/C Lost to Flak: 1 Helldiver.
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Pilots Lost to Flick: 1
Own A/C Damaged by Flick: 3 Hellcats, 7 Corsairs.
Ships Damaged: 3 SD, 6 Fishing Boats, at Inaoro; 1 Lugger, 7 Boats, at Shimoda.

Airborne Enemy A/C Destroyed: 1 Irving.
Grounded Enemy /C Destroyed: 16 - Tokorozawa; 1 - Hyakurigahara.
Grounded Enemy /C Damaged: 1 - Yatebe; 8 Hyakurigahara; 3 - Kasumigaura; 6 - Kasumigaura S.S.;
                     11 - Tokorozawa.

Ground Installations Destroyed: 2 Warehouses, 2 Buildings, Dock, at Shimoda. Hangers and shops at Kasumigaura, Hyakurigahara and Yatebe, Factory south of Kasumigaura
                     3 Locomotives south of Tokorozawa.

Ground Installations Damaged: Warehouse near Kasumigaura SS, Factory and warehouse at Kawaage, Factory and buildings at Kataura, Hangers at Mito, Yatebe and Hyakurigahara, Bridge near Shimoda.

XIII. VICTORY DAY - AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST TOKYO AREA (15 August)

The task Force retired on the night of the 13th, and refueled on the 14th. News of Japan's surrender was expected hourly. However, plans were made for continuing the offensive on the 15th and 17th and the Air Group Commanders of TG 38.4 met on the YORKTOWN to confer concerning future operations. During the 14th the air group flew 18 sorties of which 17 were CAPS and one was a message drop.

On 15 August launches commenced at 0415 according to plan. Six Hellcats of Sweep 3-1 had reached Atsugi /F and were circling prior to attack, at 0615, when they received orders to cancel all offensive operations and return to base. In compliance with this order they did not attack and returned to the ship. Still loaded with wing tanks and rockets they had proceeded about five miles when they were suddenly jumped by 15 - 20 Franks, Jacks and Georges. A melee ensued during which nine of the enemy were shot down, but when it was over four of our six planes were missing and the two which managed to return were badly shot up. Strike C-2, which was the last offensive flight launched, had not yet reached the coast when it was recalled and thus ended the offensive operations of this air group, one year exactly after the date of its commissioning. The President's announcement of the surrender of Japan was received at 0812.

Although hostilities had supposedly ceased at 0645, bandits continued to be splashed by CAPS near the Tomcats and the final combat action of Air Group 88 was supplied by a Dumbo C/P of VBF which shot down three Nerts, loaded with bombs, as they were taking off from Hokoda /F.
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Thus, ironically, the air group's numerically greatest air-combat successes and losses took place after the war had supposedly ended.

The summary of the Air Operations of August 15th was as follows:

Rockets Launched: 4 H/W.
Own A/C Lost in Aerial Combat: 4 Hellcats.
Pilots Lost in Aerial Combat: 4.
Airborne Enemy A/C Destroyed: 5 Franks, 1 Oscar, 3 Jacks, 3 Yurts.
Ground Installations Damaged: Lighthouse and Factory, Shimoda; Barracks, Choishi Point.

XIV. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Tail Markings on Carrier Based Aircraft: The lettered tail markings used at present on carrier based aircraft are not satisfactory. They are difficult to see at any appreciable distance and recognition is practically impossible at ranges greater than 100 yards. They are of no appreciable help in rendezvous as were the old type markings which could be seen at long ranges and recognized. It is extremely difficult to recognize the new markings from aboard ship even when aircraft are flying close aboard. It is recommended that the old style marking be reinstated immediately.

2. Rendezvous: It was found that rendezvous after take-off could be materially speeded if small, circular paths were flown by the first planes to reach the rendezvous area. Succeeding and following planes joined on the first arrivals and a large group formed as quickly as possible. This large group was more readily seen by planes enroute to the rendezvous area and there was no attempt to separate types by any appreciable distance. It was also found that a small (as small as practicable with adequate safety) circular path was superior to the recommended "race track" pattern which covers too much air space and tends to spread out the rendezvousing planes. Once all planes had arrived at the rendezvous and were positioned fairly well, types joined into standard formations and opened out until the completion of the rendezvous and departure for the Task Group rendezvous sector was taken.

3. Procedure at Tomsats: Frequently it was found that Tomsats would not give clearance to formations of aircraft after they had checked in and were circling. Under poor visibility conditions this practice is most undesirable and, at times, very dangerous. On one occasion there were at least twelve large formations circling the Tomsat under the overcast at 500 to 700 feet with a visibility of one quarter to one mile, and zero in rain squalls. Tomsat would not release the formations with the result that an extremely dangerous situation existed. In clear weather with sufficient ceiling this procedure is not dangerous, but often causes flights to be late in returning to base. Delays of as long as twenty minutes were experienced at times. It is recommended that Tomsats clear formations automatically upon completion of the recognition turn, especially when the weather is poor, the ceiling is limited and visibility is reduced.
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4. Boreight Pattern of V/F/VEF: Prior to sortie on July 1, 1945, VF-88 and VEF-88 obtained permission to change the boreight of the fighter aircraft to 2000 feet and 1500 feet respectively. This change in boreight was made in anticipation of the increased amount of strafing that V/F/VEF would be called upon to do. The assumption was correct and strafing of grounded aircraft was a primary mission of all fighter sweeps. This increased-range boreight was found to be more effective for strafing than the standard 900 foot range, and results obtained were good. However, all replacement aircraft come aboard with the 900 foot pattern already set up and since it is most difficult and, at times, impossible to change the boreight while underway, such change was not attempted. This mixture of fighter aircraft, some with a long range boreight and others with the conventional boreight, is not desirable from the pilot's standpoint. It is confusing to fly a plane with a 2000 foot boreight on one flight and one with a 900 foot boreight on another flight, later in the day. In addition, on the Hellcat it is mechanically difficult to maintain the 2000 foot boreight pattern accurately because of inadequate movement of the rear mounting post on the guns. This trouble is not experienced on the Corsair, set at 1500 feet. Because of the above difficulties both the VF and VEF Squadrons have voted in favor of retaining the 900 foot boreight pattern, although all agree that the extended range boreight is much more effective for strafing.

5. VT Fuzed Bombs: Many VT fuzed bombs were carried and dropped during this operation. It was this group's first experience with such fuzes. The 260 pound fragmentation bomb was the one most commonly used with the VT fuse (T50EL). These bombs were expended against revetted aircraft and concentrations of parked aircraft. On several occasions they were also used against AA positions. Damage to aircraft from these bombs was difficult to evaluate from the air, and the only results that could be observed were that the bomb fragments appeared to cover the assigned area, completely or partially, as the case might be. It was noted that, on several occasions, the use of VT fuzed bombs against land-based AA positions materially reduced the volume of fire. The pattern of the VT fuzed fragmentation bomb is noticeably a double lobe, or elongated figure-of-eight, the long axis being in the direction of dive of the dropping aircraft. An undesirable feature, except when area bombing is being conducted, is the fact that the release of the VT fuzed bomb must be accomplished above 4500 feet. (This relates to the T50EL fuse used on the fragmentation bomb and the T50EL fuse used on the 500 pound G.P. bomb.) Accuracy is reduced materially when dropping from this altitude if the pilot is attempting to hit a pin point target. For such purpose rockets are preferable. It is recommended that when VT fuzes are used the dropping aircraft pull out immediately after release and that pilots be cautioned against diving directly behind another plane. Also pilots must not release higher than a set maximum altitude in order not to endanger following planes which might be caught in the blast of a premature explosion. Doctrine of this group prohibited the release of VT fuzed bombs above 5000 feet over the target terrain. If a pilot wishes to continue to a lower altitude after release of hit VT fuzed bomb, it is recommended that he "stair-step" his plane and pick out a target beyond that on which he dropped his bomb. This action enables him to get well clear of his bomb so that he will not be affected by a premature burst.
6. VF and VBF Squadrons Employing Two Types of Fighter Aircraft: It is felt that an air group employing both the F6F and F4U type of aircraft runs into confusion and inefficiency not experienced by groups using only one type. This is particularly true of operations aboard a CV. When this air group reported aboard its parent carrier it was found that there were 24 F6F-5a's, 6 F6F-5P's, and 6 F6F-5N's, and 37 FG-1D's. The Air Group moved aboard with 54 VF pilots (including 6 night fighter pilots) and 54 VBF pilots. On board and attached to the staff were 6 F6F photo pilots and 3 night fighter pilots. During combat operations VF(N) planes could not be used except for night fighter flights and infrequent weather flights. The F6F-5P's could be used only for photo missions and occasional C.A.P. duties. In reality it therefore worked out that there were, for general offensive use, 24 F6F-5a's and 37 FG-1D's. This meant that, of necessity, the VBF pilots (Corsair) took the majority of the sweeps and strikes although the total pilot compliment was less than that of the VF (Hellett) Squadron. Complaints were received from the VF pilots that they were not getting enough of the offensive missions. Deck spot was always a problem because a Corsair pilot could not man a Hellett nor could a Hellett pilot man a Corsair. There was a continual reshuffling of fighter types on the flight deck and respot had to be carefully planned and much foresight used throughout the day and night. The take-off runs of the two types differs, which adds to the confusion. It is not believed that any material advantage is gained by using two different types of fighter aircraft and it is definitely a hardship on the Air Department of a CV. Engineering and Supply also suffer in that additional spare parts have to be carried aboard, and maintenance suffers temporarily while plane captains and mechanics become familiar with the new type coming aboard (the Corsair in this case). It is strongly recommended that air groups be furnished and trained in only one type of fighter aircraft for the VF and VBF Squadrons.

7. Comparative Notes on the F6F-5 and the FG-1D Aircraft: (a) Availability of both types was uniformly good. (b) The FG-1D is not as rugged as the F6F-5 for carrier-based operations, and numerous tail-wheel compression strut failures were experienced in the FG-1D. (c) The FG-1D makes a better landing aboard a CV than the F6F-5. The approach of the Corsair appears slower and it settles to the deck more easily than the Hellett. The visibility is better during the approach to landing in the Corsair than in the Hellett. (d) The FG-1D is quicker coming out of the gear than the F6F-5, primarily because of the positive action of the hydraulically controlled tail hook which is fast. (e) Spot forward after landing is accomplished more quickly with the Corsair because of the hydraulic wing folding feature which is accomplished while the plane is moving forward on the flight deck. It is not necessary to stop the plane and fold wings by hand as in the case of the Hellett. (f) Because of this feature there is less danger involved to flight deck personnel, as no wing-folding crews are needed. If a pilot forgets to close his wing flaps before folding his wings there is no harm done in the Corsair, which is not true of the Hellett. (g) The F6F-5 is more quickly launched than the Corsair because it can be drawn out of its dock spot and wings spread by hand immediately. With 30 knots or more of wind across the deck it is necessary to jockey the Corsair from side to side in order to utilize the wind to spread the wings. This takes time and delays launch. The take-off interval is definitely faster for Hellets than for Corsairs. (h) The hook action of the FG-1D appears more
positive in engaging wires than on the F6F-5. The position of the hook on the Corsair seems to be the reason. (h) In the air the Corsair is definitely faster than the Hellcat and acceleration is better. For distance covered the gasoline consumption of the Corsair is less than that of the Hellcat. Throughout this operation it was necessary, in mixed fighter sweeps (Corsair and Hellcat), for Corsair pilots to throttle back to allow the F6F to keep up with the formation. Otherwise the high power and R.P.M. settings required by the Hellcats ran them short of fuel. (i) The Hellcat is more accessible for metal work and engine repairs than the Corsair. (j) The F6F seems to be more ruggedly built than the FG-1D and is capable of absorbing a great deal of punishment by enemy AA and VF opposition. However, several Corsairs returned to the ship pretty well shot up, but still in one piece. (Note: Not a single Corsair fuselage was buckled in landing aboard. This was not the case before the fuselage was beefed up around the cockpit area. There were several cases wherein fabric tore off the Corsair's wings when it was subjected to high-speed dives.)

8. ASH Radar: It is recommended that ASH radar be carried on all sweeps and strikes if poor weather is expected in the target area or around the ship. Frequently when a large strike force reaches the enemy coastline after an approach above a solid overcast, it is virtually impossible to determine the position of the force. An efficient radar operator can obtain a reliable fix by noting shore line features and can thus relieve the strike leader's uncertainty as to where he is. It is also practicable to "area bomb" through the overcast when the target is located near easily recognized radar "reflectors" such as rivers, large airfields, etc. ASH radar is invaluable in returning to base with a minimum amount of lost time during poor weather. Weather fronts, line squalls and rain storms can be picked up and avoided. In extremely poor weather it is recommended that each VB and VT division leader carry ASH radar equipment.

9. Communications: Throughout this operation all aircraft communications were generally good. As all aircraft were equipped with the ABC-1 VHF radio transceivers, the problem of interference between Task Groups was greatly reduced. It was the exception rather than the rule when any one circuit was so jammed that it was not usable. The common VHF channel (4,75 kc.) was most reliable and although it was frequently jammed, or partially so, by the Japanese, it was nearly always possible to get air/sea rescue calls, flash and weather reports, and other messages through to the base. Some YE frequencies are set much too close together. It was a rare occasion when only one set of YE signals was picked up when trying to home on the Tomcats. Tuning of the Z3X cannot be maintained sufficiently sharp to prevent picking up a strong transmitter on a frequency only 15 kc. different from the station to which the Z3X is tuned. These "bestard" signals override and build up on the primary signals with the result that a pilot, if completely lost, is unable to determine just which course to steer. It is strongly recommended that YE transmitter frequencies be separated by at least 50 to 100 kc.

10. Radio Discipline: One obvious fault of many pilots is that of cutting into other transmissions, without waiting for the circuit to clear. Breakdown of radio discipline seems to be contagious. For long periods during a flight discipline will be good. All at once someone will make an unnecessary transmission, another will answer, and then everyone has something to say - always irrelevant. It is necessary for the strike/sweep leader to stop this
immediately. One recommended method is to order the air group which is most
guilty to return to base if the violation is not discontinued immediately.
This has proved most effective. Air/sea rescue calls must have top priority at
time. Most generally pilots respected this priority and these calls went
through without trouble. Occasionally, however, some pilot would cut into a
long rescue transmission and cut it out completely. This meant that the entire
call and message had to be repeated, relayed, etc., and much valuable time was
lost.

11. **Air/sea Rescue Plane Aboard TG Flagships:** It is recommended that
some type of amphibious aircraft be carried aboard the TG flagships for use
as Air/sea rescue planes. The JRP could be used although this plane is large,
bulky, slow and heavy. It takes up considerable space on a carrier deck and is
hard to handle. However, it is felt that even this model is worth its weight
and size if it can be available at a moment's notice to proceed on an air/sea
rescue mission. In several instances during this operation, had there been a
rescue plane attached to the TG flagship it could, in all likelihood, have been
launched with adequate VF cover (made up of VF pilots who had just returned from
a downed pilot and know exactly his position, state of sea, etc.), proceeded
to the scene and effected rescue with a minimum amount of lost time. This
holds true particularly when pilots were downed in the Inland Sea and the Sea
of Japan. Our pilot losses off Otsura Harbor, Hokkaido, were good examples of
cases where a carrier based air/sea rescue plane would have been invaluable.

12. **Need of Positive Doctrine for Foul Weather Rendezvous, Climb Through
Overcast, Etc.:** As poor weather was the rule, rather than the exception,
during this operation, it is strongly recommended that air groups have
a definite and simple doctrine for effecting rendezvous and for climbing through
the overcast. Rendezvous is the most difficult and there appears to be no
answer other than using assigned VF sectors at a specified altitude. Occasionally
this is impossible to rendezvous in the assigned VF sector. In such case
the flight leader must designate a new sector in the comparative clear, being
careful not to interfere with other groups rendezvousing. Large numbers of air-
craft climbing through an overcast can be extremely dangerous if a definite
procedure is not standard doctrine, known by all pilots. Separation of types,
courses and climbing speeds must be accomplished without delay or confusion or
mixing around will result. The foregoing applies equally to low down through
cuapy weather. On only one occasion was there an operational accident and loss
of pilot during a flight in poor weather, and in this instance group doctrine
was not adhered to.

13. **20 mm Guns for VF/VF:** Because of the greater effectiveness of the
20 mm gun in strafing attacks, it is recommended that VF/VF squadrons be equip-
pod with this gun. A suggested armament is four .50 caliber M/G's and two 20 mm
guns. Provide at least 400 rounds per 20 mm gun, even at the expense of am-
munition available for the 1/G. It is felt that two 20 mm cannon and four M/G
are more effective than six M/G for strafing purposes, especially against parked
and degassed enemy aircraft.

14. **Need of Larger VF/VF Sweeps:** It is felt that larger VF/VF fighter
sweeps would be more effective than the smaller sweeps now sent against the
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CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY EIGHT

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Subject: ACTION REPORT of Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY EIGHT, Air Operations against SHIKOKU, HOMSHU AND HOKKAIDO, aboard U.S.S. YORKTOWN - Period 1 July to 15 August, 1945.

It is realized that, in order to accomplish this, the number of sweeps would have to be reduced, but it is believed that a larger number of VF/VBF aircraft could more efficiently cover and blanket a given target area. Occasionally, for the sake of normal safety, it is necessary to keep one or two divisions of VF/VBF orbiting above the target area to prevent surprise attacks from enemy airborne aircraft. Communication relays are often necessary. Some few VF/VBF will not get off the deck, some will return to base because of mechanical trouble, etc. These and other factors all add up to a reduced number of offensive aircraft at the target area and it is recommended that the number of fighter aircraft participating in sweeps be increased over the number used during this operation.

15. Need for More Thorough Planning and Poresight for Special Offensive Operations: It is realized that sudden changes in the tactical situation may sometimes require last minute changes in flight schedules and the diversion of sweeps and strikes from previously assigned targets. However, if at all possible, it is strongly recommended that in such cases, when the new target is heavily defended and at a great distance from the base, more time, planning and foresight be given to such operations. A case in point is the VF/VBF sweep ordered against Kure Air Field - Yokosuka Air Station on August 10, 1945. Thirty six VF/VBF were scheduled to attack the above targets and destroy parked and revetted aircraft. The launching position (later changed) was 300 nautical miles from the target. CTG 38.1 ordered extra gasoline tanks installed (two 150 gallon pylon tanks on the Corsairs), which prevented any bomb load. Eventually all Corsairs were catapulted in order that six HVAR could be carried. At Yokosuka Air Station there were 110 barrels of heavy AA weapons which bore effectively on planes attacking the field. Planes within 13 miles of the station came within range of some of these guns. There were 97 barrels of automatic weapons on and around the field. At Kure Air Field there were 22 barrels of heavy AA weapons and 86 barrels of automatic weapons. Thirty six VF/VBF were scheduled for this mission. No fragmentation bombs could be carried for use against AA positions (as was done very effectively at the time of attack on the BB Nagato) and even had each plane on the sweep been assigned one battery of automatic weapons (forgetting completely about the heavy AA guns) there could not have been enough planes of actively to reduce the automatic weapon hazard. Of necessity, to be effective, a fighter sweep whose primary target is parked and revetted aircraft must get low and search out hidden and camouflaged planes. In the face of such concentrated AA as surrounded the above targets it is felt that an attack such as was ordered is impractical and unnecessarily hazardous, and that the results obtainable will not warrant the losses very likely to be encountered.

16. TIME OVER TARGET AREAS: In many flights planes had insufficient time over the target. The pressure to get back to the ship and land aboard at the scheduled time was so great that, at times, this seemed to be more important than damaging the enemy. It is hoped this situation can be improved either by launching the planes nearer the target or by allowing more time for flights.

17. USE OF WINDOW/ROPE, AND ELECTRONIC JAMMERS: On all strikes wherein targets were attacked which were defended by heavy AA, window, rope and electronic jamming were used to counter radar controlled fire. It is the
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opinion of the pilots of this group that these countermeasures were effective and heavy AA bursts frequently lagged behind and above the attacking force when rope and window were dispersed prior to push over.

XV. ACTION REPORTS OF SQUADRONS.

Enclosures (A), (B), (C) and (D), consist of the OA-1 reports of VF-88, VBF-88, VB-88 and VT-88 covering the subject actions. They are forwarded herewith.

XVI. SUMMARY OF AIR GROUP OPERATIONS.

Enclosure (E) consists of a statistical summary of the combat operations of this air group for the subject period.

Submitted by:

H. S. Reynolds,
Lt. Comdr. USNR,
ACI Officer, CVG-88.

APPROVED:

[Signature]

A. S. Searcy, Jr.
COMMANDER, CARRIER AIR GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander, Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT.
To: Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Via: (1) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. YORKTOWN, CV10.
(2) Commander, Task Group THIRTY EIGHT POINT FOUR (ComCarDivSIX).
(3) Commander, Task Force THIRTY EIGHT (ComSECOND CarTaskForPac).
(4) Commander, THIRD Fleet.
(5) Commander-in-Chief, United States PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS.


Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf. ltr. 1CI-45.
(b) ComTHIRD Fleet dispatch 021410 of September 1945.
(c) ComTHIRD Fleet dispatch 221402 of August 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Summary of Sorties.
(B) List of Airfields.
(C) List of P.O.W. Camps.

1. In accordance with references (b) and (c) this separate action report is submitted for the period 16 August to 2 September 1945.

2. No squadron ACA-1 Reports are submitted because no action with the enemy was involved.

3. Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT's operations during the subject period consisted of: (a) Combat air patrols over Task Force 38 at sea, over United States and British Naval forces in and near Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay, and over itsugai Airfield; (b) Photographic and visual reconnaissance of Honshu Airfields lying South of 37° North and East of 135° East; (c) Photographic and visual reconnaissance of prisoner-of-war camps in the above area of Honshu; (d) Dropping of food, medicines, messages and supplies to the above prisoner-of-war camps.

4. In carrying out the above missions this Air Group flew 902 sorties, and visited 38 airfields and 29 prisoner-of-war camps.

5. Enclosure (A) consists of a statistical summary of the sorties flown.

6. Enclosure (B) consists of a list of the airfields reconnoitered.

7. Enclosure (C) consists of a list of the prisoner-of-war camps reconnoitered.

SUBMITTED BY:

H. S. Reynolds,
Lt., Comdr., USNR,
A.C.I. Officer, CVG-88.

S. S. Scarry, Jr.
Commander, C.V.G-88.
### SUMMARY OF SORTIES FLOWN

16 August - 2 September 1945

#### COMBAT AIR PATROLS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
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<tr>
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<td>166</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.F. 31</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>TOKYO BAY</td>
<td>88</td>
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<td>&quot;FLINT&quot;</td>
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<td>ATSUGI A/F</td>
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#### SEARCHES

8

#### AIRFIELD AND P.O.W. RECOGS

277

#### MAPHOS

24

#### AIR COORDINATORS

8

#### AIR OBSERVERS

5

#### MISCELLANEOUS

3

#### AIR EXHIBITIONS

167

**TOTAL** 902
## LIST OF AIRFIELDS RECONNOITRED
16 August - 2 September 1945

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Airfield</th>
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<tr>
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<td>MORAGA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MIYAKAWA</td>
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<td>KASHIMA S. S.</td>
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<td>HANEDA</td>
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<td>FUKAGAWA WARD</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>YOKOHAMA YACHT CLUB</td>
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<td>*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Across from south end breakwater.</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Look for large buddha shrine on hill</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and sharply curving R.R.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>Bearing 350°, 2 mi. from #317 Haneda on</td>
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<td>OFUNA (Bears 310°, 1.5 mi. from YAMANOUCHI</td>
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<td>TAKATONOBABA</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>Across river from HITACHI refinery (2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>camps, one in valley, the other on hill-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>side).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>No number or name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>Vicinity of Ohara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>KAWASAKI BUNGO #1, plus 3 barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bearing 060°, 1 mi. distant. * Also 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>camp 1.5 mi. west of Camp 75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>NARASHINO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>OMORI #8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>SHIBAURA DOCKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>SHINJUWA #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>URAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Between OSAWA and NARIMASU; tall radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tower west of camp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates supplies dropped.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
CVG-88 conf. ltr.
serial 0176, dated
25 October 1945.

From:
Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.

To:
History Unit, Op-33-J-5, Office of Editorial
Research, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject:
History of Carrier Air Group EIGHTY-EIGHT, from
1 June to 25 October 1945.

1. Forwarded.

D. V. Tabor

D. V. Tabor,
Ass't. Flag Secretary.

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