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ACTION REPORT

Occupation of Western Japan

Commander Task Force Fifty-Five

and

Commander Cruiser Division Thirteen
23 November 1945.

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From: Commander Western JAPAN Force and Commander Task Force FIfty-Five (Rear Admiral M. L. DEYO, U.S. Navy, Commander Cruiser Division THIRTEEN).

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) Commander Task Force FIfty-One. (Vice Admiral J. B. OLDESTORF, U.S. Navy, Commander Battleship Squadron ONE).


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Reference: (a) Cominah Itr. serial 7752 of 29 October 1943.

(b) Pacific Fleet Confidential Itr. LCL-45 of 1 January 1945.


PART I. During the period from 5 September 1945 to 8 October 1945, Task Force FIfty-Five (Rear Admiral M. L. DEYO, U.S. Navy, Commander Cruiser Division THIRTEEN, U.S.S. SANTA FE (CL60), Flagship), functioned as the Western JAPAN Force and as such was charged with landing and firmly establishing ashore in the SASEBO - NAGASAKI - FUKUOKA - SHIMONOSEKI area, the FIfty-Fifth Amphibious Corps and other designated elements of the SIXTH Army.

PART II.

A. The composition of Task Force FIfty-Five, as initially assigned in Commander FIfty-Fifth Fleet Operation Plan No. 7-45, is given in Enclosure (A). On 4 September 1945, Commander FIfty-Fifth Fleet Operation Plan No. 7-45 was received, and at 0000, 5 September 1945, Rear Admiral DEYO assumed command of Task Force FIfty-Five. Commander FIfty-Fifth Fleet Operation Plan No. 6-45, upon which his Operation Plan No. 7-45 was based, had been received on 2 September 1945.

Minesweeping operations had already commenced and continued throughout the operation.

B. Accomplishment of assigned tasks.

(a) One group, operating separately, was charged with the sweeping of
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mains from the objective areas and approaches thereto. Minesweeping operations were commenced, prior to the formation of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE, by Task Force FIFTY-TWO (Rear Admiral A.D. STRUBLE, U.S. Navy, Commander Mine Craft, U.S. Pacific Fleet), in accordance with the directives of Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 6-45. Forces assigned to this task became a part of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE as of 10 September 1945. Assistance was received from the Japanese in this undertaking. The Japanese furnished sweeping craft, gear, personnel and much valuable information as to location of both their own and our minefields.

(b) The FOURTH Amphibious Force, commanded by Rear Admiral J. F. REIFSNIDER, U.S. Navy, transported the FIFTH Amphibious Corps from rear to objective areas. This group did not join the rest of the Task Force until the day of the actual landings at SASEBO. (22 September 1945).

(c) A Gunfire and Support Group was organized to cover the amphibious landings. Japan having formally surrendered weeks previous to the landings, and other landings having been made without opposition in HONSHU, HOKKAIDO and KOREA, it was considered that the landings on KYUSHU would be unchallenged, which was the case. However, fire and air support units were provided and stood by during the landings to render assistance if required.

(d) A fourth task assigned was the provision of support for the Minesweeping Group. Although the Japanese were not only-unresisting, but were actively cooperating in the minesweeping operations, supporting ships and aircraft, the latter under Rear Admiral W. D. SAMPLE, Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-TWO, were nevertheless provided and were ready for any emergency.

(e) The task of evacuating Allied prisoners of war and internees was stepped up in priority and was rushed with all possible speed. Rear Admiral F. C. PARRISON executed this task with an improvised group using such ships as could be made available by Commander FIFTH Fleet and Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE, including CVEs, CLs, APs, AKs, and even DDs for transportation to OKINAWA. In all over 9,000 of various nationalities were evacuated.

C. Command Relationships.

The basic conception, as outlined in Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 6-45, was that Task Force FIFTY-FIVE and Task Force FIFTY-SIX should together make up Task Force FIFTY-ONE, of which Vice Admiral OLDENDORF was the
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designated Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE, was therefore a semi-autonomous force operating within another Task Force. Task Forces FIFTY-FIVE and FIFTY-SIX were separately organized, however, under Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plans Nos. 7-45 and 8-45, respectively, and separate tasks assigned.

On 20 September 1945, Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 9-45 became effective, after Commander FIFTH Fleet's assumption of responsibility for the zones previously administered by Commander THIRD Fleet and Commander North Pacific Force. Under Operation Plan No. 9-45, the North Pacific Force was reconstituted as Task Force FIFTY-SIX and the forces formerly constituting Task Forces FIFTY-FIVE and FIFTY-SIX were consolidated into Task Force FIFTY-ONE. It was stated, however, that the Task Force FIFTY-FIVE designations remained available to Commander Task Force FIFTY-ONE.

Since Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 7-45 remained in effect, it was considered that the regrouping of Task Forces had in no way altered the mission of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE. This was confirmed upon receipt of Commander Battleship Squadron ONE (Commander Task Force FIFTY-ONE) Operation Plan No. 7-45, which specifically stated that Task Force FIFTY-FIVE would continue operations assigned by Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 7-45, but Units outside of Task Force FIFTY-ONE were unaware of the existence of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE and some confusion existed at first.

On 8 October 1945, Rear Admiral DEXO, having been ordered with his Flagship to SAKAYAMA to relieve Vice Admiral OLMENDORF of command of Task Force FIFTY-ONE, turned over command of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE to Commander Cruiser Division FOUR, (Rear Admiral F. G. FAHRION, U.S. Navy, U.S.S. WICHITA (CA-45), Flagship).

PART III.

SUMMARY AND RESUME OF THE OPERATION.

On 15 September 1945, Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE flew to NAGASAKI and inspected the operations of FIFTY-FIVE Point SEVEN, Rear Admiral FAHRION, engaged in the evacuation of Ex-Prisoners of War and Internes. This operation was functioning smoothly in cooperation with special Army Units. By 24 September evacuation was complete except for a few stragglers. Over 9,000 having been evacuated to OKINAWA and cared for. About 10% of this number required hospitalization aboard U.S.S. HAVEN and other AHS, CVEs, Cruisers, AKs and even Destroyers were used to speed the evacuation as there were no facilities for accommodating the Prisoners of War at NAGASAKI when they disembarked from trains. Condition of Prisoners of War varied from Poor to good. Their joy and gratitude were very touching.

A study of the harbor facilities at NAGASAKI was underway by the Port Director who was already present and representatives of Commander FIFTH
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Amphibious Corps. This was to facilitate the landings at NAGASAKI on 24 September. Berths for transports were limited due to the great amount of damage in the harbor area and crowded condition of the water front and piers.

The whole aspect was disorderly with the Japanese population in a dazed condition. Complete devastation existed in the Atomic Bomb area. All public utilities and facilities were at a low ebb though the attitude of the Japanese population was willing and completely non-resistant.

Minesweeping in the NAGASAKI - SASEBO area had progressed very satisfactorily under the local Command of Captain Farrow. Swept channels permitted entrance into both NAGASAKI and SASEBO and the harbors of both these ports were clear of mines. Fortunately no United States mines had been dropped in locations to interfere with operations here. An anchorage had been swept north of Matsu Shima. It had been planned originally to clear anchorages in Gotto Retto but this proved unnecessary due to the excellence and size of SASEBO harbor.

On 16 September, Rear Admiral DEVO embarked in RALPH TALBOT with Commander Destroyer Squadron FIVE, Captain McCORKLE, in FLUSSELL, proceeded to SASEBO to inspect the harbor and transmit orders for the landing to the Japanese Naval Authorities. This was the first entry of Men of War into the Japanese naval base which was rated as third in importance in the Japanese Empire. There were no evidences of war damage (as viewed from on board ship) in SASEBO Harbor which is an exceptionally fine location for a Naval Base, provided with excellent mooring buoys for berthing anything from minesweepers to the largest ship afloat.

Rear Admiral HAYASHI, Commandant of the Naval Base came on board and was instructed concerning preperations for landing of occupation troops, clearing of areas, and general arrangements. Representatives of FIFTH Amphibious Corps went ashore to make plans for billeting, and unloading, etc. Captain McCORKLE remained in SASEBO to make all arrangements for arrival of the FOURTH Amphibious Group.

After conference at OKINAWA with Vice Admiral OLDENDORF, Vice Admiral HILL and General KRUZER, (The two latter embarked in AUBURN), Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE arrived at SASEBO in SANTA FE 20 September 1945. Vice Admiral HILL arrived the same day. Vice Admiral HILL received Vice Admiral SUGIYAMA, Commandant of the SASEBO Naval District. The latter's attitude was entirely cooperative and helpful. During the landing and subsequent occupation Japanese authorities were always helpful and appeared to be making every effort to create a favorable impression.

Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE meanwhile had removed restrictions on Japanese fishing and also permitted a resumption of the operation of small commercial ships which are vital to the life of the communities in this area which depend so largely upon water transportation. The Japanese expressed great appreciation for this assistance as well as for the general conduct and behaviour of the U.S. Naval personnel.
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Landings were made very smoothly under the direction of Rear Admiral REIFSNIDER on 22 September as scheduled. By 1800, approximately 10,000 Marines of the FIFTH Division, including Headquarters of Major General SCHMIDT, Commanding FIFTH Amphibious Corps, were ashore without incident. Sanitary conditions ashore were very unsatisfactory and billeting was difficult because of the lack of undamaged buildings and the filthy condition of the ones which were found.

Although the water front was not damaged, the city of SASEBO, with a normal population of over 200,000 people had experienced a single incendiary air raid in July which had wiped out approximately half of the business and residential districts. The population lacked everything in the way of normal daily equipment for living. They were emaciated and dazed. No resentment of any kind and not the slightest indication of resistance was encountered except one case of insubordination, on the part of a Captain of a Japanese coast defense vessel when inspected, which was severely punished by Admiral SUGIYAMA.

Inspection and demilitarization of Japanese naval and merchant shipping in the SASEBO area was accomplished by Captain McCORKLE, Commander Destroyer Squadron FIVE. His organization inspected over 500 ships and craft. A great majority of these were small craft. Officers of NavTechJap also conducted technical inspections of ships and of naval material found ashore, the custody of which had been taken by Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force. An organization from Commander Submarines, U.S. Pacific Fleet, under Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN were given authority to inspect all Japanese submarines.

The three Japanese carriers present, namely JUNYO (HAKODATE), KASAGI and IBMUKI were all inoperable and had been practically demurred, before our arrival. Most of the other vessels were a few Destroyers, Submarines, many Coast Defense vessels, Small sub-chasers and Suicide craft. The operable Mine Sweepers were already engaged in sweeping moored mines, which operations had been placed under the control of Captain FARRON. The destroyer SUZUTSUKI was the only surface ship of any particular interest. She was inoperable due to bomb damage and had been put out of action the day the YAMOTO was sunk. She had some interesting features, including her large size and fine lines. Her torpedo equipment and reloading arrangements were superior to those of any United States Destroyer. All these features will be reported by NavTechJap, Captain GRIMES. The binoculars of all sizes, chiefly the large ones used for torpedo control, lookout, etc., are far superior to ours and many samples have been sent to proper authorities. Otherwise our equipment is very much superior to the Japanese in all types of ships. They have no conception of GIC set-up and methods such as ours.

SOPA Administrative functions were first performed by Commander FOURTH Amphibious Group, Rear Admiral REIFSNIDER, and after his departure on 27 September by Commander Unit "A", Service Division 103, Captain GIBBS.
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The only Naval Units set up on shore were CUB 18 (Partial), under Captain
WILSON, including the Fort Directors unit. Costody of the Naval Station and
all equipment on shore was taken over by Commander FIFTH Amphibious Corps,
General SCHMIDT. Later some naval recreation and club facilities were occupied
by Naval personnel.

Seaplane Service was established by a unit of Fleet Air Wing ONE and
later relieved by a unit of Fleet Air Wing SEVENTEEN. Service was provided
between SASEBO - NAGASAKI, OKINAWA, YOKOSUKA and was most useful.

On 23 September the SECOND Marine Division under Command of Commander
Transport Squadron TWELVE landed in NAGASAKI, the Naval supporting unit being
FIFTY-FIVE Point SEVEN, Rear Admiral FAHRION. This landing was also uneventful,
but more difficult of accomplishment because of the unfavorable conditions on
shore.

Repatriation of Japanese Military Personnel was concluded between this
Command, Commanding General FIFTH Amphibious Corps, and Vice Admiral SUGIYAMA
from KOREA and the islands of TSUSHIMA, KI, and GOTTO RETTO. Japanese Coast
Defense and Mine craft were used for this work which was expeditiously executed.

Occupation of FUKUOKA was intended to be made overland from SASEBO.
Occupation troops found the roads were in such bad repair as to be incapable
of taking heavy equipment. The railroad was the only reliable means of trans-
portation. There were tunnels however, which were too small to admit certain
essential heavy equipment such as bull dozers. Such men and equipment as could
be taken by rail were so transported but the need for opening the harbor of
FUKUOKA was soon apparent. The entrance and approaches had been stoned with a
great many magnetic and pressure mines dropped from B-29s by United States
Army Air Forces. Information on locations was none too definite, in many cases
being not within five miles or more. This interposed a very serious obstacle
as no satisfactory method of sweeping the pressure type mine has been developed.

FUKUOKA Harbor had been recently used by Japanese shipping but several ships
had struck mines up there. A survey was made by Commander Mine Craft, U.S. Pacific
Fleet and Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE representatives and plans were drawn
up for opening the harbor through one channel sufficiently for LSTs and other
Amphibious craft which would be staged from SASEBO. At the time of my relief
estimated time of opening was the end of October but subsequent difficulties
have delayed this time considerably. Pressure mines also kept United States
traffic from the Straits of SHIMONOSEKI and large portions of the Inland Sea.
Task Force FIFTY-FIVE was constituted this date with Rear Admiral DEYO in command. The Task Force Commander with the nucleus of the Force was on this date at Buckner Bay, OKINAWA, RYUKYUS, JAPAN. The transport units were still staging in rear areas. The minelayer units were already sweeping in Empire waters. Numerous combatant units were enroute from rear bases and had not yet reported.

Units of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE present at Buckner Bay this date were: ComCruDiv 13 in SANTA FE (CL60), BILOXI (CL80), MOBILE (CL63), BIRMINGHAM (CL62), ComDesRon FIVE in FLUSSER (DD368), SMITH (DD378), ComDesDiv TEN in COCHLIN (DD606), ComDesRon TWENTY-FOUR in ANTHONY (DD515), REEVE (DD471), WALDSORTH (DD516), DALY (DD519), ComDesDiv FORTY-EIGHT in VAN VALKENBURGH (DD656), AMBER (DD527) and ROCKS (DD602).

The THIRD Marine Division was withdrawn from the troop list by Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and the THIRTY-SECOND Infantry Division substituted.

Commander Cruiser Division/Operation Plan No. 11-45 was promulgated. The purpose of this plan was to organize Task Groups for support of minesweeping units and for Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMP) evacuation. The Operation Plan set up TG 55.4 under Rear Admiral FAHRION to support the minesweeping groups 52.3 and 52.4, and TG 55.7, also under Rear Admiral FAHRION, as the RAMP evacuation group. The Operation Plan is appended as Enclosure (B), and the detailed task organization may be obtained by reference thereto.


Operation Plan No. 11-45 issued yesterday was today modified, putting Rear Admiral SAMPLE in command of TG 55.4, and retaining Rear Admiral FAHRION at OKINAWA temporarily. The purpose of this change was to have Rear Admiral FAHRION available to proceed when ready to KAGASAKI to command the RAMP evacuation group.

At 1200 TG 55.4, under order of CTF 52 (ComInCh) departed OKINAWA for SHIMOKURA KAZAN.

Rear Admiral SAMPLE issued his Operation Order (ComCruDiv 22 No. 4-45) to TG 55.4 covering the tasks assigned that group by Commander Cruiser Division THIRTEEN Operation Plan No. 11-45.
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MUGFORD (DD389) reported for duty in Destroyer Squadron FIVE at OKINAWA.

BALDWIN (DD624) reported for duty in Destroyer Squadron FIVE by despatch from ENIWETOK.


TG 55.4 departed OKINAWA at dawn on minesweeping support mission assigned by Commander Cruiser Division THIRTEEN Operation Plan No. 11-45.

Despatch from CinCPac intercepted ordering Commander FIFTH Fleet to detach BIRMINGHAM (CL62) from the FIFTH Fleet and direct her to report by despatch to Commander U.S. Naval Forces Australia and New Guinea for duty.

A despatch from Commander FIFTH Fleet's Chief of Staff to Commander FIFTH Fleet was intercepted advising that there were 9,000 U.S. and 11,000 British NAMPS to be evacuated from the FIFTH Fleet area of responsibility, and recommending that the evacuation be implemented as much as possible. 12 September was later assigned by Commander FIFTH Fleet as the prospective date for commencement of the evacuation.

The sweeping of SHIMABARA KAIWAN was cancelled by Commander Task Force FIFTY-TWO (CominPac), and TG 52.4 directed to report to CTG 52.3 to sweep the approaches and channel to NAGASAKI, and the anchorage area there.

Commander FIFTH Fleet directed that CHENANGO (CVE28) be detached from TG 55.4 and returned to OKINAWA, where she was to fly off her planes and be available for inclusion in TG 55.7. In accordance with this directive, CHENANGO was sailed for OKINAWA at 1550, escorted by DALY (DD519).

GILMER (APD11), GREENE (APD36), WEBER (APD75), and HAVEN (AH12) were directed by Commander FIFTH Fleet to report for duty in TF 55. The three APDs reported individually by 1845 and were directed to further report to CTG 55.7 for duty.

Minesweeping of SASEBO area was scheduled to commence 9 September.

8 September 1945. A - 14 Day.

CTG 55.4 detached BIRMINGHAM (CL62) from TG 55.4 and ordered her to return to OKINAWA escorted by WADSWORTH (DD516). The ships arrived OKINAWA at 0930.

Dates set for landings at SASEBO and NAGASAKI as 22 and 26 September respectively.
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Ordered CHENANGO (CVE28) to report to CTG 55.7 for duty.

Commander FIFTH Fleet ordered RUTILICUS (AK113) to report for duty in TF 55.

A despatch modification to ComCruDiv 13 Operation Plan No. 11-45 was issued directing CTG 55.4 to assume operation control of TG 52.3 at 2400, 8 September, 24 hours earlier than originally scheduled.

MOBILE (CL63) was selected to replace BIRMINGHAM in TG 55.4, and was ordered to proceed at dawn 9 September, escorted by DALY (DD519), to report for such a rendezvous to be designated by CTG 55.4.

Ordered ComDesRon 5 to direct ComDesDiv 10 in MUGFORD (DD389) with SMITH (DD378) and ROOKS (DD804) to report for duty in TG 55.7.

Upon being advised by Commander FIFTH Fleet that SIXTH Army RAMP recovery teams were now at OKINAWA, directed CTG 55.7 to make necessary arrangements for their embarkation in ships of his group.

CORSON (AVP37) was ordered to report for duty in TF 55 by ComFairWing ONE upon authority of Commander FIFTH Fleet. Plan was to utilize her as a terminal at the objective area for seaplane service between OKINAWA and SASEBO-MIYAKO.

ComCortDiv 65 in STRAUS (DE408) with LA TRADE (DE409) reported for duty at 1710.

CORSON reported for duty at 1753 and was directed to further report to CTG 55.7.

TOTANATOMI (ATF109) was ordered to report for duty in TF 55 by ComServDiv 104 upon authority of Commander FIFTH Fleet, and did so at 1908. She was directed to further report to CTG 55.7.

Ordered HAVEN (AH12) to report for duty in TG 52.3 at 0621.


CTG 55.4 assumed operational control of TG 52.3 at 0621.

RUTILICUS (AK113) reported for duty and was directed to further report to CTG 55.7.

BIRMINGHAM (CL62) and WADSWORTH (DD516) arrived OKINAWA at 1010. At 1216 BIRMINGHAM reported by despatch to Commander U.S. Naval Forces Australia and New Guinea for duty.
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KILIAN BAY (CVE69) was directed by CinCPac to report to ComServPac for duty.

LIGLEY (DD866) reported for duty at 1:38. RALPH TALBOT (DD390) reported for duty at 12:25.

ARKANSAS (BB33) was directed to transfer a Marine detachment of 2 officers and 30 marines to NICHITA (CA45) for use in dock patrol at NAGASAKI during RAMP evacuation.

At 1845 JACK MILLER (DE410), STAFFORD (DE411), CORNESSER (DE438), and Mccoy REYNOLDS (DE440) reported for duty.

BIRMINGHAM was detached from the FIFTH Fleet at 1115.

At 2037 a typhoon warning was received from Commander FIFTH Fleet. The Typhoon was expected to pass the vicinity of OKINAWA within the next 48 hours.

10 September 1945. A - 12 Day.

At 0600 TU 55.7.1 and 55.7.2 departed OKINAWA for NAGASAKI: CTU 55.7.1

ComCrDiv 4 in NICHITA (CA45) with HAVEN (AH12), GORSON (AVP37), ComDesDiv 10 in HUDSPETH (DD389), SMITH (DD368), and WEBER (APD75): CTU 55.7.2, C.O. RUTILICEUS (AK113) with POKOHATOMI (ATF109) and GREENE (APD36).


At 0500 a tropical storm was reported moving in a North North Westernly direction from FORMOSA. At OKINAWA the weather was deteriorating.

At 0600 TU 55.7.3 and 55.7.4 departed OKINAWA for NAGASAKI: CTU 55.7.3

O.C. CHEMANGO (CVE28) with ROCKS (DD504); CTU 55.7.4, O.C. GILMER (APD11) with LSTs 819 and 674.

Commander FIFTH Fleet ordered ComServDiv 104 to direct MARATHON (APA200) to report for duty in Task Force 55.

At 1000 ordered WADSWORTH (DD516) underway from OKINAWA to HAGUSHI whence she was to escort LSTs 1029 and 795 to NAGASAKI, ETD approximately 1200. This group was organized as TU 55.7.5, CO WADSWORTH CTU.

BIRMINGHAM (CL62) departed OKINAWA for LEYTE at 1100.

Notification was received at 1215 that winds up to 30 knots could be expected at OKINAWA within the next 24 hours.

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Despatch received from CTF 52 that swept channel into SASEBO had been established.

LST 835 was ordered by Commander FIFTH Fleet to report for duty in TF 55.

Commander FIFTH Fleet was endeavoring to procure the services of the British Pacific Fleet Unit HMS SPEAKER to assist in the recovery and repatriation of RMFTS of British nationality at NAGASAKI.

CTG 55.7 reported arrival of his group at NAGASAKI at 1600. Two detachments of Marines were at once debarked from WICHITA (CA25), and immediately took over the DEMING dock area. The waterfront was found to be badly damaged, but a large building nearby was found which was suitable for administration of the evacuation. The custom house was found serviceable and the railroad operational. Some 3000 RMFTS were reported to be in the immediate NAGASAKI area - somewhat fewer than had been expected. CTG 55.7 suggested SANCTUARY (AH17) be sailed to NAGASAKI, and further reported that there were no warehouse facilities there wherein to store the supplies now in RUTILICUS (AK113) and that no actual need for these supplies existed. The Japanese were reported cooperative.

Commander FIFTH Fleet was directed by CinCPac to detach CombatDiv 5 in TEXAS (BB35) with ARKANSAS (BB33) and NEVADA (BB36) from the FIFTH Fleet and have them report for duty in the THIRD Fleet.

Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force requested Commander FIFTH Fleet to restrict movements of Japanese Naval vessels to SASEBO as much as possible to avoid congesting the harbor.

At 2223 WDsworth reported the sailing of TU 55.7.5 had been delayed because the LSTs had not been loaded on time. New ETD fixed at 1000 12 September 1945.

12 September 1945. A - 10 Day.

TU 55.7.5 departed NAGUSHI for NAGASAKI 1100.

CTG 55.7 reported over 10,000 RMFTs in general NAGASAKI area to be evacuated.

The Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP - General of the Army D.A. MacARRHUR) directed that the concentration of Japanese Naval vessels in SASEBO be delayed at the discretion of Commander FIFTH Fleet.

CTG 55.7 reported readiness to commence RMFT evacuation 13 September at about 1000 per day. TU 55.7.2 and 55.7.3 arrived NAGASAKI.
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Able Day for the landing at SASEBO confirmed as 22 September; King Day for the landing at NAGASAKI advanced one day to 25 September. King Day was later advanced to 23 September 1945.


Further reports from OCT 55.7 that a Japanese radiologist had pronounced the NAGASAKI area safe. Roads at NAGASAKI were found in poor condition but passable; the people frightened but cooperative. Japanese demobilization reported in progress. Battering space found to be very scarce at NAGASAKI.

Figure on number of RAMPS to be evacuated through NAGASAKI now set at 10,233, located in 17 POW camps in that general area.

Weather at OKINAWA moderated today.

Rear Admiral DEYCO made plans to sail to SASEBO via destroyer to inspect plans and arrangements for the berthing and disposal of Japanese Naval and merchant vessels, and also to choose a site for a seaplane base. These plans were later modified in that the Admiral was to fly to SASEBO, and break his flag in destroyers upon arrival there. Commander Destroyer Squadron FIVE was ordered to designate a destroyer for this purpose, and RALPH TALBOT (DD390) was so designated.

Made arrangements for OCT 55.4 to berth such of his vessels as were not needed for mine sweeping cover, in lower NAGASAKI Harbor.

HMS SPEAKER and MARIGOLD (OCC) were ordered by Commander FIFTH Fleet to sail to NAGASAKI and there report to OCT 55.7 for RAMPS evacuation duty.

In 55.7 reported 683 RAMPS evacuated onto CHENANGO (CVE28) and HAVEN (AH12), TU 55.7.4 arrived NAGASAKI.

Directive received from Commander FIFTH Fleet to establish as early as possible daily seaplane courier service between NAGASAKI, WAKAYAMA and YOKOHAMA.


STAFFORD (DE411), originally scheduled to sail to NAGASAKI with LST 792 as TU 55.7.6, sailed from OKINAWA alone at dawn, the LST having been withdrawn from TF 55.
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Received request from CTF 51 to provide a CVE, in place of KASAN BAY (CVE69) to embark air observers and spotters for the SASEBO area.

Commander FIFTH Fleet authorized the reduction of the covering force of TF 55 as necessary to facilitate RAMP evacuation.

Report received from CTF 55.7 that a total of 1508 RAMPs had so far been evacuated in the NAGASAKI area: 1239 embarked on CHENANGO (CVE28), 92 embarked on ROCKS (DD804), 187 on HAVEN (AH12). The evacuation program was proceeding very smoothly.

15 September 1945. A - 7 Day.

At 0600 CTF 55.7 sailed CHENANGO (CVE28) escorted by ROCKS (DD804) from NAGASAKI for OKINAWA to disembark RAMPs, then report to CTF 55 for return routing to NAGASAKI. This group was organized as a second TU 55.7.3. To prevent any further duplication of task designations, CTF 55.7 was directed to assign task unit designations 55.7.50 through 55.7.99 to groups proceeding from NAGASAKI to OKINAWA.

At 0832 Rear Admiral DEYO hauled down his flag in SANTA FE (CL60) and departed by air on temporary duty for JAPAN. Upon arrival there, he hoisted his flag in RALPH TALBOT (DD390) at NAGASAKI. Administration of Cruiser Division THIRTEEN and Task Force FIFTY-FIVE remained in SANTA FE, with Captain H. C. FITZ, U.S. Navy, her Commanding Officer, in temporary Command.

Weather at OKINAWA deteriorated throughout the day.

At 0947 Rear Admiral O. M. READ, U.S. Navy, assumed command of Battleship Division FIVE and hoisted his Flag in TEXAS (BB35).

CTF 51 promulgated by despatch at 1305 his Typhoon Plan XRAY for sortie of major units from OKINAWA upon signal.

Despatch orders received from REAR Admiral DEYO to sail FLUSSER (DD368) to SASEBO immediately. FLUSSER sailed at 1630.

TU 55.7.50 was formed by CTF 55.7. CTU, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. MOBILE (CL63) with SMITH (DD378) to proceed from NAGASAKI to OKINAWA with RAMPs, there report to CTF 55.
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23 November 1945.

At 1829 CTF 51 put ships under his command at OKINAWA on one hour's notice to carry out Typhoon Plan XRAY.

CTG 55.7 reported that a total of 2216 RAMPs had been evacuated to date from the NAGASAKI area.

Directive received from CTF 51 to furnish two marker ships for SASEBO channel.

16 September 1945. A - 6 Day.

Commander Battleship Division FIVE in TEXAS (BB35) with ARKANSAS (BB33) and NEVADA (BB36) reported to Commander THIRD Fleet for duty at 0312.

At 0650 Commander Service Division 104 put his typhoon plan into execution for ships under his command at OKINAWA. MIAMI (CL89) was present at OKINAWA without any tactical commander, and was ordered by CTF 51 to report for temporary duty in TF 55 for typhoon sortie. CTF 51 ordered execution of his Typhoon Plan XRAY and the Task Force sortier from BUCKNER Bay C600. The weather during the day and early part of the night was bad, with high winds and seas. TF 55 rode out the storm with no difficulty and no ship suffered any material damage. MIAMI lost one man over the side. Considerable damage was wrought by the storm to small craft and shore installations at OKINAWA. MARATHON (APA200) and JACK MILLER (DE410) joined TF 55 during the sortie and remained in company during the typhoon.

CTG 52.3 reported during the day that marker buoys had been placed along the entrance channel to SASEBO harbor.

Rear Admiral DEYO reported to Commander FIFTH Fleet that he had entered SASEBO in RALPH TALBOT (DB390); found the Japanese cooperative; the harbor satisfactory for berthing U.S. ships and for a seaplane area; that all Japanese ships and military personnel were disarmed.

A report was received from CTG 55.7 that a total of 3192 RAMPs had been evacuated. The Americans among them were reported to be in fair condition, but there were indications that they had received rougher treatment than the prisoners of other nationalities.


Weather off OKINAWA had moderated by morning and the ships which had sortied headed for port.

SANTEE (CVE29) was directed by her Task Group Commander to report to CTF 55 upon arrival at OKINAWA.

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At 0930, TU 55.7,8 was detached from TF 55 typhoon sectored group off Oкиnawa and departed for NAGASAKI, Commanding Officer MARATHON (APA200) CTU, with JACK MILLER (DE110).

Rear Admiral DEYO designated Captain F.D. McCORKLE, U.S. Navy, Commander Destroyer Squadron FIVE, as CTG 55.10 to act as CTF 55's representative at SASEBO upon the departure of the Admiral from that area.

TU 55.7,9 was formed, Commanding Officer BILoxi (CL80) CTU, with COGFLAN (DD606) to sail from Oкиnawa to NAGASAKI and there report to CTG 55.7 for duty. TU 55.7,9 was detached at 1300 off BUCKNER BAY entrance and proceeded to NAGASAKI.

TF 55 entered BUCKNER BAY at 1413 and resumed former berths.

TF 55 was placed on 12 hours notice to be RFS at 0600/19.

HOBILE (CL63) arrived Oкиnawa and reported for duty at 1443.

CTF 51 ordered CTG 55.7 to sail all LST's at NAGASAKI which were not required for RAMP evacuation to Oкиnawa there to report to CTF 53.

During the day conferences were held at NAGASAKI between Admirals OLENDORF, DEYO, STRUBLE; and FABRIKON, Colonel WENSINGER and Japanese authorities on matters connected with landings, minesweeping and FOW evacuation in SASEBO Area.

18 September 1945, A - 4 Day.

TU 55.7,3 arrived Oкиnawa 0730.

CTG 55.7 constituted TU 55.7.51, Commanding Officer HMS SPEAKER CTU, with GREENE (AP236), and TU 55.7.52, Commanding Officer CAPE GLOUCESTER (CVE109) CTU, with ConDeRon 10 in MUGFORD (DD389), both units to sail from NAGASAKI to Oкиnawa to unload RAMPs and report to CTF 55 for return routing.

CTG 55.10 in FLUSSER (DD368) departed NAGASAKI for SASEBO.

At 1300 Rear Admiral DEYO returned to Oкиnawa and hoisted his flag in SANTA FE (CL60), then attended conference with Vice Admiral OLENDORF and Vice Admiral HILL, (Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force) - subject projected landings at SASEBO and NAGASAKI.

S.S. NOTARY (AH17) was ordered by CTF 51 to be sailed to NAGASAKI and there report to CTG 55.7. MURPHY (DD603) was assigned by Commander Task Flotilla ONE as her escort.
A mail, passenger, and light freight service between OKINAWA and the NAGASAKI-SASEBO area was set up by CTF 55, employing McCoy REYNOLDS (DE440) and CORBET (DE438), each to make one round trip per week departing OKINAWA on Mondays and Thursdays commencing 23 September.

At 1900 Commander FIFTH Fleet issued his operation Plan No. 945 by dispatch.

TU 55.7.10 was formed, C.O. CHEMANGO (CVE29) CTU, with ROCKS (DD304) to sail from OKINAWA to NAGASAKI and report to CTF 55.7.

Issued directive to ConFairWing 1 to sail KENNETH WHITING (AV14) and one AVP from OKINAWA to SASEBO on afternoon of 19 September. This group was later designated as TU 55.1.1.

Ordered LA PRAD (DE409) to report to ConFairWing 1 for escort duty.

Arrangements were made for MOBILE (CL63) to embark Rear Admiral W. F. BLANDY, U.S. Navy, Commander Cruisers, U.S. Pacific Fleet, who was making a tour of the area, and transport him to NAGASAKI.

TU 55.7.11 was formed, C.O. MOBILE CTU, with SMITH (DD378) to sail from OKINAWA to NAGASAKI and there report to CTF 55.7.

Report received from CTF 55.7 that unshocks caused by the recent typhoon were delaying evacuation trains at NAGASAKI. A conference was held at NAGASAKI between Rear Admiral PARKIN and Colonel WENSTER, the latter departed later in the day for SASEBO embarked in RALPH TALBOT (DE390).

TU 55.1.2 was formed, C.O. NORTON SOUND (AV11) CTU, with LA PRAD (DE409), to sail to SASEBO.

19 September 1945. A - 3 Day.

TG 55.1 underway at 0700 from OKINAWA for SASEBO, constituted as follows: SANTA FE (CL60) with CTF 55 embarked, CONDOR (AV 65 in STRAUS (DE404), BALDWIN (DD624), HELM (DD368), and LAMSON (DD367).

TU 55.7.10 sailed from OKINAWA for NAGASAKI at 0800.

TU 55.7.53 was formed by CTF 55.7, C.O. BILLOXI (CL60) CTU, with WADSWORTH (DD516), to sail from NAGASAKI to OKINAWA for unloading, return of BILLOXI and availability for WADSWORTH. The task unit sailed at 1000.

Marker ships were established on approaches to SASEBO and NAGASAKI.
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SHEIKOF (AVP52) was designated by CTG 50.2 to accompany KENNETH WHITING (AVL4) to SASEBO.

TU 55.7.54 was formed by CTG 55.7 to sail from NAGASAKI to OKINAWA, C.O., LUNGA POINT (CVE94) CTU, with STAFFORD (DE411) and WEEDEN (DE797), latter for onward routing from OKINAWA, others for return.

Designated following ships available for support at SASEBO: For fire support group SANTA FE (CL60), ANTHONY (DD515), BEXILE (DD471), DALLY (DD519), VAN WALKENBURGH (DD656), AMHERST (DD527), RALPH TALLOUT (DD390), LUMSDELL and BALDWIN; for air support: ConCarDiv 22 in SWANNEE (CVE27), STRAUSS and JACK MILLER (DD410). COGHILL (DD606) was later substituted for J. MILLER, which was ordered to duty in TG 55.4.

At 1500 MOEILE (CL63), with Rear Admiral BLANDY embarked, escorted by SMITH (DD378), sailed from OKINAWA for NAGASAKI, constituted as TU 55.7.11.

At 1600 YOSEMITE (AD19), ELK (IX115), NUMITOR (AR17), and LCI 606 departed OKINAWA for SASEBO.

TU 55.1.1, C.O., KENNETH WHITING, with SHEIKOF, sailed at 1800 from OKINAWA for SASEBO.

TU 55.7.13 was formed to sail to NAGASAKI from OKINAWA, C.O., CAPE GLOUCESTER (CVE109) CTU, with ComDesDiv 10 in MUGFORD (DD389).

HMS SPEAKER and GREEENE (APD36) were organized as TU 55.7.12 to sail from OKINAWA to NAGASAKI and there report to CTG 55.7.

Operation Plan received by dispatch from CTF 51 (ComBatRon 1 No. 7-45). This plan was based on Commander FIFTH Fleet's operation Plan No. 9-45, and assigned TF 55 the same tasks as previously assigned by Commander FIFTH Fleet's Operation Plans No. 6-45 and 7-45.


At 0000 Commander FIFTH Fleet relieved Commander THIRD Fleet and Commander NORTH PACIFIC Force of their responsibilities in Empire Waters.

TG 55.1 arrived at SASEBO 1115. The port was already well organized by CTG 55.10 (Captain McCORKLE). Rear Admiral DEVO assumed duties as CTF.

STRAUSS (DE408) was sailed from SASEBO to NAGASAKI to report to CTG 55.5.

CTG 55.7 sailed LST 35 with PC 1080 and PGM 30 from NAGASAKI to SASEBO.
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as TU 55.7.99. LST's 926 and 1033 later were added to this unit.

TU 55.7.14 was formed, C.O. BILOXI (CL68) CTU, with McCoy REYNOLDS (DE440) to sail from OKINAWA to NAGASAKI. McCoy REYNOLDS then to proceed on to SASEBO and commence mail run from there on 23 September.

LST 1029, with LST's 647, 795 and 819 were sailed at 1500 by CTG 55.7 from NAGASAKI for OKINAWA, constituted as TU 55.7.55. CTG 55.7 estimated that 4000 RMPs remained to be evacuated from NAGASAKI, 7223 having already been removed.

ConDesRon 24 in ANTHONY (DD515), BELLE (DD471), DALY (DD519), ConDesDiv 48 in VAN VALKENBURGH (DD656), and AMMEN (DD527) were detached from TF 55.4 and directed to proceed from NAGASAKI to SASEBO for duty directly under CTF 55.

At 1226 ships present at SASEBO were permitted to secure from Condition III. At 1335 ConCrulDiv 13 Operationplan No. 11-45 was cancelled by dispatch and TF 55 was advised of the current Task Force organization.

At 1600 Vice Admiral H.W. HILL, U.S. Navy, Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force, arrived SASEBO in AUBURN (AGC10). Rear Admiral DEYK was directed to retain the function of Administrative SOFA, including protective and security features.

About 1730 a meeting was held aboard AUBURN by Admirals HILL and DEYK in which Vice Admiral SUGIKAWA, Commandant of the SASEBO Naval District was received and given instructions on various matters concerning the landing on September 22nd.

Other arrivals at SASEBO this date were CAVALLO (ATD128), BURDO (ATD133), KLINE (DD120), PC 1080.

TU 55.7.10 and 55.7.11 arrived NAGASAKI. CTG 55.7 sailed MARATHON (APA200) escorted by JACK MILLER (DE410) to OKINAWA from NAGASAKI, constituted as TU 55.7.54.


ConDesRon 24 in ANTHONY (DD515) with DALY (DD519), ConDesDiv 48 in VAN VALKENBURGH (DD656), BELLE (DD471), and AMMEN (DD527) arrived SASEBO at 0800 and reported for duty.

CTG 55.7 sailed LCI 1096 with LCI 1097 from NAGASAKI to SASEBO, as TU 55.7.98. The unit arrived at SASEBO and reported for duty.

ROCKS (DD804) arrived SASEBO at 1130, with Rear Admiral BLANDY embarked.
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At 1500 TG 55.5 got underway from NAGASAKI to take their air support stations for tomorrow’s landings.

In command of the group was ComCarDiv 22 in SUWANNEE (CVE27) with ComCorDiv 65 in SANTA FE (CL60) and COUGHLAN (DD606).

TU 55.7 departed OKINAWA 1245 for NAGASAKI.

Directed KLINE (APD120) to proceed NAGASAKI for duty in TG 55.7.

Ordered fire support ships less SANTA FE sortie from SASEBO and take their stations prior dark today.

Orders received from CTF 51 to sail on 24 September one cruiser other than SANTA FE (CL60) and either SUWANNEE (CVE27) or CAFE GLOUCESTER (CVE109) to NAGASAKI to report to CTF 51 for duty in the KURE covering force. DIXON (CL80) and SUWANNEE were designated subsequently.

Issued orders designating CTG 55.7 (Rear Admiral FAMISON) as representative of CTF 55 at NAGASAKI during the landings there, and assigning the following ships as available for fire support duties covering the said landings: WICHITA (CL45), ComDiv 24 in ANTHONY (CL51), BELLE (DL471), ANNEN (DD527), LST’s at NAGASAKI to OKINAWA to report to Commander Naval Operating Base, OKINAWA for duty.

LCI 1096 was stationed at entrance to OKINAWA VAN and LCI 1097 at entrance to SASEBO harbor to prevent unauthorized passage of Japanese craft.

Recommendation intercepted from Commander FIFTH Fleet that SASEBO be employed as an assembly point for Japanese Submarines.

TU 55.1.2 sailed from OKINAWA for SASEBO at 1800. Unit consisted of NORTON SOUND (AV11) with ComFleetDiv 1 embarked and LA JEDE (DE409).

HOOKS with Rear Admiral BLANDY embarked departed SASEBO in late afternoon to rendezvous with MOBILE (CL63), transfer Rear Admiral BLANDY, and proceed NAGASAKI. Rear Admiral BLANDY returned to OKINAWA in MOBILE.

CTG 55.7 reported the arrival of PC 803 and FS 155 at NAGASAKI at 1730 in poor operational condition. 7277 RAM’s reported evacuated. CAFE GLOUCESTER (CVE109) and DIXON (CL80) no longer required at NAGASAKI.

ComDesRon 24 was ordered to sail VAN WANKENBURGH (DD656) to SASEBO from fire support area at 1500 22 September to report for duty to CTF 55.

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22 September 1945. A Day.

MARATHON (AVL 200) was detached from TF 55 to report to CominPac for duty.

At 0600 Commander Amphibious Group 4 in MOUNT MCKINLEY (AGC 7) arrived and assumed the function of Administrative SPO.

At 0900 the landing of the FIFTH Marine Division at SASEBO started under the direction of Rear Admiral REIFSNIDER and proceeded in a very orderly fashion with no opposition. Rain fell during the morning but did not impede the smooth progress of the landings. By 1800 an estimated 10,000 Marines were ashore, without incident. Sanitary conditions ashore were reported most unsatisfactory. General unloading was commenced and seven large ships were docked by dark.

Directed YOSEMITE (AD 19) with ELK (IX 115), NUMITOR (ARL 17) and LCI 1606 proceed from OKINAWA to SASEBO.

At 1221 ConDesRon 13 in ROOSEBY (DD 437), with NIBLACK (DD 424), EDISON (DD 439), JOYCE (DD 317) and KIRKPATRICK (DE 318) reported to CTG 55.6 for duty. These destroyers had escorted the amphibious ships to SASEBO.

VAN VALKENBURGH (DD 656) arrived SASEBO and reported for duty at 1516. Issued orders to her at 1730 to proceed NAGASAKI at 1400, 23 September and report to ConDesRon 24 for duty in connection with the proposed landings at KURE.

Dispatch received from CTF 51 directing that LUNGA POINT (CVE 94) with air group embarked and escorted by INWIN (DD 794) he returned to him at WAKAYAMA prior 29 September.

Detached USS SPEAKER, to report to Commander FIFTH Fleet for further orders.

TG 55.2 was formed under ComCorDiv 22 in SUHANNEE (CVE 27) with DILOXI (CL 80) ConDesRon 24 in ANTHONY (DE 515), BEALE (DD 471), ROCKS (DD 694), ConDesDiv 48 in VAN VALKENBURGH (DD 656), AMEN (DE 527), and DALY (DE 519) to set 1 from NAGASAKI at 1400 24 September for WAKAYAMA, where the group was to report to CTG 51 for duty.

Report received from CTG 55.7 that total of 9042 RAMP's had been evacuated, and only stragglers remained. The harbor at NAGASAKI was being cleared for the arrival of the amphibious ships on 23 September.

At SASEBO planning continued for the inspection of Japanese naval vessels. Local commercial shipping and fishing was authorized to recommence. First units of Service Division 103 arrived. Seaplanes from Fleet Air Wing ONE commenced operations.

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At 0600 AUBURN (AGC10) with Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force and Commanding General SIXTH Army embarked, CAVALLO (APA128) in company, departed SASEBO for NAJASAKI via NAGASAKI.

TU 55.1.2 arrived SASEBO 0830.

CTG 55.7 formed TU 55.7, 58, consisting of HAMSPEAKER, GREENE (APA36) and ERNE (APA36) to sail from NAGASAKI to OKINAWA.

Japanese naval and merchant shipping at SASEBO was briefly inspected by CTG 55.10 and destroyer officers from his squadron and organization set up for detailed inspection.

EDISON (DD439) was designated to take Commanding General FIFTH Amphibious Corps from SASEBO to NAGASAKI and return on 24 September.

Marker ships HELM (DD388) and DAGLEY (DD386) were directed to leave their stations at dawn 24 September and report to ConDesRon 13 for duty.

Designated Captain W.C. BENSON, U.S. Navy, ConDesRon 13 in WOOLSEY (DD437) to assume the functions of CTG 55.6 upon the departure of ConDesRon 24 from NAGASAKI.

At 1600 Commanding General FIFTH Amphibious Corps assumed Command ahoare at SASEBO.

At 1300 the SECOND Marine Division commenced landing at NAGASAKI. This landing also proceeded without incident and by 2000, 7000 troops were ashore and 9 ships were in the inner harbor.

The FIFTH Marine Division was completely landed at SASEBO by 2000 and 60% of its support shipping unloaded.

No casualties were suffered in either landing. No unrest or disorder reported ashore.

TU 55.7, 59, C.O. MURPHY (DD603), with SANCTUARY (APA7) was formed by CTG 55.7 to sail from NAGASAKI to OKINAWA.

TU 55.7, 15, C.O. MOBLE (CL63), with SMITH (DD378) was formed to sail from OKINAWA to SASEBO and report to CTF 55.

Report received from CTG 55.7 that RAMP evacuation at NAGASAKI was virtually completed. Marine detachments were reembarked on NICHITA (CA45) and DILLIKT (CL80), Vice Admiral HILL and Lieutenant General KUEBNER inspected NAGASAKI area.
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24 September 1945. A 2 Day.

At 0500 ConCarDiv 22 turned over air support duties and command of TG 55.5 to CO CAPE GLOUCESTER (CVE109) and proceeded from NAGASAKI area to WAKAYAMA.

Inspection teams from FLUSSELL (DD368), LAMSON (DD367) and RALPH TALBOT (DD399), plus JICPOA (technical) personnel, commenced inspection of Japanese shipping at SASEBO.

TU 55.1.3 was formed, C. O. LUNGA POINT (CVE94) with INWIN (DD794) to sail from OKINAWA at 1400 26 September for WAKAYAMA and there report for duty to CTF 51.

CTG 55.7 reported completion of his task at NAGASAKI and recommended, that his group be withdrawn from that area.

At 1800 CTG 55.10 reported having completed the inspection of 39 Japanese ships and craft at SASEBO.

Ordered CTG 55.7 to proceed to SASEBO from NAGASAKI with WICHITA (CL45), CAPE GLOUCESTER (CVE95), MUGFORD (DD389), COGGHLAN (DD606), STRAUS (DE408), and RUTILICUS (AK114), and report for duty CTF 55.

HELM (DD388) was designated by CTG 55.6 to escort KENNETH WHITING (AV14) to OKINAWA.

Report received from CTG 54.3 that landings at NAGASAKI were continuing without incident; 13,000 troops and 10,000 tons of cargo had been landed ashore by 2000. 17 transports were docked and berthed in the inner harbor area.

Movement of amphibious craft from SASEBO-NAGASAKI area to LEYTE for reloading and turn around commenced today.

YMS 351, reported aground 2½ miles east of KURO SHIMA at 1630, was hauled clear of the reef in early evening. The mine craft group commander in charge (CTG 52.3) reported her fully operational and undamaged.

ConDeSoRon 5 reported completion of inspection of 17 Japanese ships and 169 suicide craft.

TU 55.7.60 was formed by CTG 55.7, CTU C.O. HAVEN (AH12) with GILMER (AD11), WEBER (AD75) and TATUM (AD81) to sail from NAGASAKI to OKINAWA. HAVEN was to report to Commander FIFTH Fleet, other ships to CTF 55, for further instructions.
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At C815 TG 55.7, sortied from NAGASAKI and proceeded to SASEBO, ETA 1200.

CTG 54.3 (Convoy) assumed duties of Administrative SRF at NAGASAKI.

Landings at WAKAYAMA commenced today under CTF 51.

Dissolved TG 55.7 at noon.

Orders were received from CTF 51 to sail TOTANAMI (ATF109) and LOI's to WAKAYAMA to report to ConservDiv 103.

Report received from CTG 54.1 as to status of JIFURA air field. The field was reported suitable for small planes; for large planes only in emergency; field probably dangerous in wet weather; no gasoline supply available.

At 0900 Commanding General SECOND Marine Division assumed command ashore at NAGASAKI. 1600 troops and 19,000 tons of cargo had been landed.

Boat pools were activated at SASEBO during the day, and port director facilities were expected to be established and operating ashore by tomorrow.

EURIYALE (AS22) escorted by C FER (AD62) were ordered by CTF 51 to SASEBO, EURIYALE to report to CTF 55. C FER for further routing to WAKAYAMA. Purpose of EURIYALE at SASEBO was to coordinate the inspection of Japanese submarines there present.

26 September 1945. A 4 Day.

In accordance with directive received from CTF 51, a route was promulgated to Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force for Japanese repatriation ships to follow on route SASEBO.

Convoy 22 departed SASEBO today for LEYTE with the remaining amphibious shipping. Commanding General FIFTH Amphibious Corps was ordered further unloading.

CTG 55.6 reported 284 Japanese small craft inspected at SASEBO to date, 155 remaining.

27 September 1945. A 5 Day.

An advance party was sent overland by rail today from SASEBO to FUKU-KI. to investigate the possibility of early employment of the port of FUKU-KI for landing of troops and supplies in the area. The alternative method was transportation...
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Overland from SASEBO, which was difficult because of poor roads and small rail-
tunnel. The difficulty lies in the large number of U.S. pressure and mag-
netic type mines dropped by B-29s in the harbor and vicinity.

Advised CTF 51 that Japanese vessels could now be received at SASEBO.
According to Japanese estimates, there were 82 such vessels desired to be moved
4 to SASEBO.

TG 55.8 was dissolved at 1200. Captain R.H. GIBBS, U.S. Navy, CO USS
YOSHIKITA (AD19) and Commanding Unit "A" of ServDiv 103 assumed function of Ad-
ministrative SOFA, constituted at CTG 55.8.1.

Commander Amphibious Group A Rear Admiral REIPSNIDER in MOUNT McKINLEY (AGC7)
deported SASEBO at 1200 for WAKAYAMA escorted by WALEVESON (DE316). CTF 55 -
relieved Commander Amphibious Support Group Commander.

Port Director, SASEBO, established his headquarters ashore today. The
Port Director at NAGASAKI was directed to assume the function of Administrative
SOFA at that port upon the departure of ComTransRon 12.

By 2000 unloading at NAGASAKI was virtually complete; 19,378 troops and
32,600 tons of cargo had been put ashore.

BALDWIN (DD624) was directed to report by despatch to CominPac for duty,
in accordance with a directive from CTF 51.

POTANOTAMI (ATF109) was ordered to report to Port Director NAGASAKI for
duty.

28 September 1945. 6 Day.

Arrangements made to sail COGHILL (DD606) and RALPH TALBOT (DD390) to
WAKAYAMA with personnel of NavTechJap embarked. NavTechJap was a scientific
group organized to conduct inspections of Japanese technical material.

Advised by CTF 51 that POTANOTAMI (ATF109) was needed at WAKAYAMA. Made
arrangements to have POTANOTAMI relieved at NAGASAKI by PAKANA (ATF108).

CTG 17.12 (ComSubRon 18) in EURYALE (AS22) reported for duty in TF 55
with COUCAL (ASR8).

Issued orders to ConCruDiv 4 in WICHITA (CA45) to sail to NAGASAKI escorted
by LAMSON (DD687). Presence of ConCruDiv 4 was needed at NAGASAKI to convene a
General Court Martial to try two enlisted men of the U.S. Coast Guard from U.S.S.
CAMBRIA for serious offenses at NAGASAKI against the Japanese Civilian population.

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During the day 8 Japanese Coast Defense ships sailed from SASEBO to
FUKUOKA on Japanese repatriation duty.

25 September 1945. A / 7 Day.

Authorized ships present at SASEBO to secure from Condition III.

Directed CORSON (CLV37) report to Commander Fleet Air Wing ONE for
court, her services being no longer required as part of TF 55.

EURYALE (AS22) and COUGAL (AS28) under ComSubRon 13 were organized as
TU 557.2. Function of this task unit was the inspection of Japanese
Submarines.

Reports of a typhoon off the east coast of HONSHU were received, all
shipping destined for OKINAWA and WAKAYAMA was held at SASEBO.

Inspection of Japanese ships at SASEBO was completed this date.


At 0800 ComDesRon 24 relieved ComDesRon 5 as CTG 55.6.

A despatch was received from Commander FIFTH Fleet advising Rear Admiral
DEVOE to be ready to take command of TF 51 as of 15 October.

In view of prospective typhoon at SASEBO typhoon anchorage plan WILLIAM
was promulgated by the Administrative Chief, assigning safe berths to all small
ships.

Advance party to FUKUOKA returned today. Consensus was that the
southern channel into FUKUOKA Harbor and the inner harbor area with a
moderate amount of sweeping, could be made reasonably safe for use of LST
types. Japanese were directed to thoroughly sweep said areas.

1 October 1945. A / 9 Day.

Plane in which Vice Admiral Charles A. LOCKWOOD, Jr., was flying to
SASEBO from OKINAWA was reported overdue. Directed CTG 55.6 to designate
two destroyers to be ready on 30 minutes notice to conduct search. BAGLEY
(DD386) and VANDERBILT (DD516) were designated.

Weather conditions at SASEBO deteriorated through out the day.

Advance elements of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps arrived by overland rail
and motor transportation at FUKUOKA at 1445 without incident.
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Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Western JAPAN.

Ten plane search was launched by JINN ISLAND (AV12) at C712 for Vice Admiral LOCKWOOD's plane.

At 0930 a despatch was received stating that Vice Admiral LOCKWOOD's plane had returned to OKINAWA yesterday and departed again for SASEBO at 0830. Air search and arrangements for destroyer search were cancelled.

Directed Port Director MAKASAKI to sail FUTOMATANI (ATP109) and 4 LCI's to WAKAYAMA earliest practicable to report to CTF 51 for duty.

Directed GUNNAR (CVE26) and MILER (DE388) sail from OKINAWA to SASEBO.

Directives received from CTF 51 to turn over command of TF 55 to Rear Admiral PAULSON and proceed in SAN TA FE (CL60) to arrive WAKAYAMA by 10 October.

CUGHLIN (DD606) and RALEIGH TALBOT (DD390) departed SASEBO today for WAKAYAMA with NavVechJap personnel embarked.

Typhoon passed well to Eastward of SASEBO impeding minesweeping and flying operations, but causing no damage. Excellent protected anchorage made the execution of any typhoon plan unnecessary.

Rear Admiral DEYOE conferred with Commanding General FIFTH Amphibious Corps regarding the movement of troops to FUKUOKA.

2 October 1945. A @ 10 Day.

Commanding General FIFTH Amphibious Corps advised that the small advanced FUKUOKA occupation force had established its Command Post; further that his further intentions were to occupy SHINANOSEKI with one reinforced company about 4 October.

Vice Admiral LOCKWOOD and party arrived SASEBO by plane from OKINAWA at 1200. Vice Admiral LOCKWOOD and Rear Admiral GUNTER conferred with Rear Admiral DEYOE aboard SANTA FE during afternoon.

At 1430 BALDWIN (DL624) departed SASEBO for OKINAWA to report to CominPac as previously directed.

FUTOMATANI (ATP109) and 4 LCI's constituted as TU 55, 58, 41, departed MAKASAKI 1500 for WAKAYAMA to report to CTF 51 as previously directed.

At 1630 word was received by radio that Rear Admiral William D. SMITH, U.S. Navy, ConComDiv 22 and Captain FIAHN K. MACDONALD, U.S. Navy, C.O. SULTANEE (CVE27) were missing on local HMM flight from WAKAYAMA. An intensive search was launched which continued for several weeks, interrupted by bad weather, but no trace of the missing plane or officers was ever found.
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Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Eastern JAPAN.

Made arrangements for return to U.S. of personnel at SASEBO eligible for discharge under current demobilization directives aboard ELIZABETH C. STANTON (AR69).

Issued orders at 2230 to NAGILE to sail at 0800, 4 October to MIKASAKI, escorted by WADDINGTON (DD516).

4 October 1945. A / 12 Day.

ROCKS (DD804) departed MIKASAKI 0745 for return trip to SASEBO. ETA1015.
SASEBO seacrome was reopened for traffic at 0800.

Vice Admiral LOCKWOOD and party departed SASEBO by plane at 1100 for OKINADA.

Repatriation of Japanese nationals from TSUSHIMA via Japanese ships completed this date.

Advised by Japanese that 30 October was earliest date they could clear FUKUOKA area of mines. Conference was called today aboard SANTA FE (CL60) to discuss this matter between Rear Admiral DEY, Vice Admiral SUGIYAMA, and Senior U.S. Mine Force representatives.

5 October 1945. A / 13 Day.

Movements of elements of FIFTH Marine Division from SASEBO to FUKUOKA by rail took place. Total of two battalions moved thus far.

Authorized ship's present SASEBO to grant regular liberty ashore commencing 6 October. Liberty area to be prescribed by Commanding General FIFTH Amphibious Corps.

Repatriation of Japanese nationals from IKI completed. Conference on FUKUOKA problem resulted in 22 October being estimated as completion date for necessary sweeping of harbor.

6 October 1945. A / 14 Day.

Startingly 4 in WACHTA (CL45) with LANNM (DL367) departed MIKASAKI for SASEBO at 0700 ETA 1030.

NALLY TADGET (DD390) and MUGFD (DD389) conducted inspection of Japanese special service patrol ship, auxiliary watch ships and special service subchasers located in EDIUS LNR at SASEBO this date.
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Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Western JAPAN.

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Requested Commanding General FIFTH Amphibious Corps to render permanently inoperative Japanese suicide craft including midget submarines which were located in areas of KYUSHU not occupied by U.S. Naval Forces: included were 200 suicide craft, 64 human torpedoes and 18 midget submarines.

CVEANGJ (CVE28) escorted by HELM (DD388) departed OKINAWA for SATO in accordance with previous instructions. ETA 1130, 7 October.

Completed arrangements for distribution of Japanese war souvenirs to Naval personnel.

8 October 1945. A / 15 Day.

Conferences held today at 1000 with Rear Admiral FARMAN and Staff preparatory to the turnover of command of TF 55.

Weather continued bad at SATO. The airfield was closed.

At 1000 Rear Admiral FARMAN assumed command of TF 55 relieving Rear Admiral DEVO. Status of TF 55 as of the time of turnover is fully covered in Enclosure (F).

PART V.

A. The modern Japanese torpedo control installations as found on the 3700 ton destroyer SUZUTSUKI is worthy of comment and investigation. The system is practically intact and appears to be of superior quality. There is one quadruple centerline mount with excellent provision in a rugged reloading box for four reload shots. The entire tube area is enclosed in a strong chamber very superior to anything we have. The torpedo director is located on each wing of the bridge in a position of unrestricted vision for control of the torpedoes. Twelve 8M binoculars are mounted on each director for visual tracking of the target. All torpedoes were stated by the Japanese to be fired with tube trained nearly 90° or 270° relative, using gyro angle shots. The entire system provided for rapidity of solution and ease in operation.

B. Binoculars: Japanese binoculars were found to be excellent optical instruments. Three classes were examined.

1. 18 CM fire control binoculars fixed to the directors in larger combatant ships.

2. 12 CM for lookouts in all classes of ships and for gun and torpedo control on destroyers and smaller types.

3. Hand binoculars rather like German X 50.

The larger type would be excellent for night spotting and tracking under all conditions. Another important use would be for day signalling.
PART VI  SPECIAL COMMENTS AND INFORMATION

A. Special Comment.

1. Communications.

(a) Radio.

(1) Radio Communications for Task Force FIFTY-FIVE were generally satisfactory. Certain delays, however, were experienced in delivering traffic to all addressees.

Initially the units of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE were widely dispersed. The Task Force Commander was at OKINAWA with several Task Groups in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI area and many units engaged in Prisoner of War evacuation enroute between NAGASAKI and OKINAWA. Direct communication on local circuits was impossible and to insure delivery a large percentage of messages had to be placed upon appropriate Fleet Broadcasts, generally the GEORGE Fox. The above practice tended to overload Fleet Broadcasts, resulting in unavoidable delays. During the time Commander FIFTY Fleet maintained the LOVE Fox for all FIFTY Fleet units, delivery of traffic was generally satisfactory. After the LOVE Fox was discontinued the overload on the GEORGE Broadcast caused a backlog of undelivered traffic to accumulate.

(2) To relieve the load on Fleet Broadcasts following steps were taken:

(a) Addressees were kept to a minimum.
(b) Local C/² and Voice Circuits were utilized to deliver traffic using relays whenever possible.
(c) Air courier and air mailgram delivery was used when possible to effect delivery.
(d) All units of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE were required to guard or arrange for guardship on the Task Force Common (2642 Kes) at all times.
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Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Western JAPAN.

(e) The Task Force Commander inspected the headings on messages on the MIKE and HOW broadcasts and passed them to appropriate units of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE on local circuits.

(3) Traffic on the Task Force Commanders Circuit (4535 Kcs) was very heavy at all times. Some evidence of poor circuit discipline was noted and the tendency existed to assign unduly high precedence to messages in order to ensure delivery. Overload on this circuit was reduced however, when the Naval Base Net was established between Naval Reporting Center at YOKOSUKA and all Port Directors in the Empire Area.

(4) It was found that the frequency assigned Task Force FIFTY-FIVE common (2642 Kcs 07/1) was too low to reach units further than 100 miles distant. To alleviate this condition the Task Group Commanders Frequency (2642 Kcs) was designated as the Task Force Common and proved much more satisfactory.

(5) The large increase in the number of Plain Language Messages and the use of Plain Dress Headings helped to shorten the length of messages, thus speeding up communications. Initially it was observed that Radio Operators have become so accustomed to copying five letter code groups that they experienced difficulty in copying Plain Language. Definite improvement is in evidence, however, as operators gain more experience copying Plain Language text.

(6) The use of unencyphered calls in headings and discontinuance of textdress resulted in many messages being received with incorrect or garbled calls necessitating frequent requests for repetitions of headings from other commands.

(7) It was noted that many commands continued to use encyphered messages when Plain Language would have sufficed.

(b) TBS and other voice circuits.

At OKINAWA it was observed that the TBS primary and local harbor voice circuits were used for traffic that should have been delivered by visual or guard mail. Circuit discipline
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was poor, resulting in many messages being read back for correction several times before receipt was acknowledged. At SASEBO, SOFA Administrative was directed to assume control of local voice circuits. Excellent discipline was maintained and messages were promptly delivered. Visual means was utilized to the maximum to reduce the load on Radio Circuits.

(c) Intercepts.

All radio messages bearing FIFTH Fleet Commands in the heading were intercepted. With the NIKE, HOW, GEORGE, and LOVE schedules in addition to 3 keyed circuits and 2 voice circuits a large volume of despatches was handled.

PART VIII. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS.

A. Conditions in KYUSHU.

The most impressive lesson learned in this operation was the cataclysmic result of losing a modern war. Nothing could be more impressive than the utter destruction of the resources of this country, carrying with it the loss of all will to resist and ability to defend themselves.

There is a good deal that we do not understand about the Japanese psychology. Two months before at OKINAWA their troops were fanatically fighting to the last man in a lost cause. Here in JAPAN there has been no evidence of any inclination to resist. On the contrary, every effort has been made by the Japanese officials to facilitate the work of demilitarization and to give the invader everything he asks. There is no show of resentment. The small children soon after occupation were waving their hands and shouting to the American Military. Offers of personal friendship by high Japanese Officials had to be tactfully repelled with some embarrassment. Ex-Captains of Men-of-War would turn over to United States Naval Officers their ships without any display of regret.

Three possible explanations of this attitude can be offered:

(a) The Japanese are all so war weary and convinced of their failure that they welcome the end of the war no matter what it involves.
(b) They are possessed of Oriental fatalism which accepts any existing condition, good or bad, so long as it appears to be inevitable.
(c) Their belief in the Emperor is so absolute that his word to comply with the terms of surrender are carried out in spirit as well as letter without question.
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Perhaps the answer is a combination of the three. It did not seem appropriate to question the Japanese themselves upon these matters.

The question which was uppermost in the minds of our officers after inspecting the SASEBO Naval Base was how it had been possible for the Japanese to do as well as they did with the primitive and meager tools and equipment available. They have no conception of quantity production methods nor up to date production. They are indeed very efficient in doing things with their hands and they contrive astonishing results with hand work performed in long hours of toil. They are years behind in industrial organization, equipment, and methods.

The Navy Yard itself was extremely disorderly with a vast amount of scrap and junk scattered apparently without any system and congesting the space in the yard.

Here as well as in all other areas in JAPAN their characteristic of hiding material in dispersed caves and dug-outs was apparent. Countless man-hours of labor was expended in hiding away all manner of equipment. This was often badly done with perishable material in wet caves which appeared to indicate the state of mind of the Japanese in the latter part of the war.

While there were some exceptions the general impression was that we had considerably over-rated the Japanese ability to produce up to date war equipment and that we should have had less trouble with them than we did. It would appear that only their great personal bravery and willingness to sacrifice everything for their Emperor, plus the vast distances our forces had to come, made it possible for them to carry on as long and as effectively as they did.

One other factor was also apparent. Judging by the difficult terrain; the scarcity and poor quality of the roads; the small size and capacity of the railroads and tunnels and the prevailing weather conditions, it was fortunate that the invasion of KYUSHU took place after the surrender and not before.

M. L. DEYO.

AUTHENTICATED:

W. AUGUSTUS BOWER,
Lieut. Comdr. USNR,
Flag Secretary.
FB3-13/A3-1

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER CRUISER DIVISION THIRTEEN
C/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

8 October 1945.

From: Commander Cruiser Division THIRTEEN.
To: Commander Cruiser Division FOUR.

Subject: Status of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE as of this date.

Enclosure: (A) A list of Officers with their respective duties in the Headquarters, SASEBO Naval Station.
(B) Memorandum of Lieut. (jg) GUSTAFSON, dated 1 October 1945.
(C) ComCruDiv 13 serial 338 of 26 September 1945.
(D) ComCruDiv 13 1tr. A3-1 dated 1 October 1945.

I. GENERAL SITUATION

A. Directives. The directives for Task Force FIFTY-FIVE are found in the following Operation Plans:

(1) CinCPac OpPlan No. 12-45.
(2) Com5thFlt OpPlan No. 6-45.
(3) Com5thFlt OpPlan No. 7-45.
(4) Com5thFlt OpPlan No. 9-45.
(5) ComBatRon ONE OpPlan No. 7-45.

These directives may be summarized as follows:

(2) Cover minesweeping.
(3) Provide Fire and Air Support for Lendings.
(4) Land and firmly establish ashore the VAC and designated elements of the SIXTH Army.

No other specific directives await completion. There are many general and implied directives which have come from various sources and which will be discussed below.

The area as applicable to this command (see paragraph 10, Annex B, ComFIFTY-FIVE Fleet 6-45) is not defined in OpPlan 7-45 or elsewhere, however, it has been the policy of the undersigned to assume responsibility for and take action on matters occurring in the coastal waters of Southern and Western KYUSHU, including KAGOSHIMA and SURINAMESEKI and naval matters within the Zone of Operations of the VAC. I shall attempt to clarify this situation by delineation of a specific area upon assumption of command of Task Force FIFTY-ONE.
B. Command Relations — The position of Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE is somewhat anomalous in that he is a Task Force Commander under a Task Force Commander (Commander Task Force FIFTY-ONE) and not directly under Commander FIFTH Fleet. The wording of Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 9-45 leaves doubt as to the continued existence of the force. This has resulted in some confusion and has necessitated careful checking of communications schedules for messages not addressed but requiring action. However, Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan 7-45 is still in effect and is in fact the reason for the existence of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE.

The basic document describing the command relations between Army and Navy in Supreme Commander for Allied Powers Occupation Instructions Number ONE, a copy of which was forwarded to you as Commander FIFTH Fleet Serial 1110 of 18 September (File 44-3(2p)). In connection with paragraph 3(c) of that document, there are no plans for occupation of SASEBO Naval Base by Naval Forces. It is now occupied by VIAC and all naval shore elements except NAVTECHJAP and NAE, OHURA are commanded by Captain WILSON of VUB 18 under the direction of General SCHMIDT. I have maintained close and direct liaison with Captain WILSON, since so many of his activities affect naval matters in the area. NAB, OHURA is occupied by MAG 22, and is commanded by Colonel SMITH, USMC, who until now has been Commander Task Group 51.8. Now he has been placed under operational control of FEFP. I have had contact with him (communication through Commanding General VIAC) and have provided logistics through Commander Unit A, Commander Service Division 103 (Captain GIBBS of U.S.S. YOSEMITE).

C. Dealing with Japanese Authorities.

(1) The senior Japanese Naval Officer in the Area is Vice Admiral SUGIYAMA, Commander in Chief, SASEBO Naval Station. (Official relations with him have been very satisfactory to date). Admiral SUGIYAMA is also Chairman of the Liaison Committee, which has general cognizance of the Japanese side of local US - Japanese relations. Enclosure (a) is a list of subordinate Japanese Naval Officers with their respective duties.

(2) Admiral SUGIYAMA may be contacted by any of the following means:

(a) By letter delivered to the Liaison Committee Headquarters, or to Commanding General FIFTH Amphibious Corps Headquarters for further delivery.
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(b) By visual despatch to the Port Director for further delivery.

(c) By visual despatch to Commander Destroyer Squadron FIVE,
(Captain McCORKLE) in the PLUSSE. The PLUSSE maintains
to communication with the Japanese Headquarters. Captain
McCORKLE, through his previous assignment as CTG 55.10, known
how to get in touch with any Japanese Naval Official in this
area.

(3) Communications from the Japanese to us usually are in the form
of numbered letters signed by Admiral SUGIYAMA, and delivered
in triplicate. Where General SCWIDT is concerned, the Japanese
also deliver a copy to him, indicating the fact at the end of
the letter. When the letter requires General SCWIDT's action,
the original goes to him with a copy to us. The action taken
on letters addressed to us may be forwarded to Admiral SUGIYAMA
either by return letter or by a despatch approving or disapproving
the letter by number. It is essential that we maintain close
contact with General SCWIDT on all matters of mutual interest.

(4) Communications are also sent to us in despatch form from the
Japanese, through either the Port Director or Commander Destroyer
Squadron FIVE. These are answered in the same manner.

(5) All letters and despatches between the Japanese and ourselves
are filed in special files which will be turned over to you. The
files are: Minesweeping, Ship Inspection, Local Vessels,
Repopulation, General Policies and General Information. I
suggest that these files be continued and kept up to date, so
that they will always be available to the U.S. Naval Area Commander
at SASEBO. My staff will go over these files with your staff upon
turning over command, so that doubtful points may be cleared up.

D. Pending Problems with Japanese.

(1) Minesweeping.

(a) Japanese coast defense ships, subchasers and other types have
been assisting U.S. mine forces in sweeping harbors and areas
in the Western Japan - Korea sector.
Status of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE as of this date.

(b) The senior U.S. minesweeping commander Captain FARROW (CTG 52.3) has been in general charge of these ships. I have referred all Japanese questions involving Jap minesweepers to him and he is authorized to give orders directly to them.

(c) Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE has been continually informed of movement and location of these ships by Admiral SUGIYAMA. Any change in plan has been immediately brought to the attention of Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE and permission for the change has in general been granted.

(d) The most important matter now pending is the sweeping of FUKUOKA harbor in preparation for the proposed Marine landing. Japanese are sweeping the harbor and approaches. CTG 52.3 will clear channel from SASEBO and later check harbor. The tentative date of completion for the FUKUOKA harbor channels is 22 October. Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE has not yet given final approval to this recommended route from SASEBO.

(2) Repatriation.

(a) Japanese ships are being used to repatriate Japanese personnel from the PHILIPPINES, KOREA, TSUSHIMA, IKI, and Pacific Island outposts. This is all decided by SCAP and I seldom receive any information except through the Japanese.

(b) The movement of vessels operating in the SASEBO area must be approved by Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE. Have recommended to Commander FIFTY-Five Fleet that an official approval signed by appropriate area commander be issued to all Japanese vessels on this duty.

(c) The evacuation of TSUSHIMA and IKI has just been completed by Japanese vessels. That from KOREA to SASEBO has begun. Japanese vessels are being made ready to participate in the evacuation of the PHILIPPINES.

(d) Schedule for overall repatriation of Japanese has not yet been received from Commander Task Group 50.3, but has been forwarded to SOPA SASEBO by airmail.
Subject: Status of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE as of this date.

(3) Local Commercial Shipping.

(a) Permission has been granted by me for Japanese Commercial shipping to make scheduled trips. The details are handled by CUB 18 under a plan approved by me.

(b) Japanese civilian authorities working under the Liaison Committee have submitted a complete list of ships involved with all necessary statistics.

(c) Mine ships listed run between SASEBO - MIJIMA - HIJIRI, and other nearby ports. Regulation of shipping outside the harbors of SASEBO and MIJIMA has been exercised by this command.

(d) Movement of Japanese shipping within the harbors of SASEBO and MIJIMA is authorized. Control of this, as of other traffic, has been vested in the Port Directors of those harbors.

(4) Logistics.

Logistics for the Japanese ships have been handled by their own agencies. They have almost no fuel left. U.S. fuel, both black oil and diesel is being supplied by the Japanese for:

(a) Repatriation
(b) Minesweeping. This is handled by the SOTA (Administrative), but the accounting is done through CUB 18 who works through a Procurement Committee who keep the accounts.

II. OPERATIONAL STATUS OF TASK FORCE FIFTY-FIVE.

(1) Ships of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE are listed in the current Task organization (my serial 361 of 30 September FB3-13/43-1).

(2) All ships are operational and at SASEBO with the following exceptions:

SUNANNE (CVE-27), BILOXI (CL-80), DALY (DD-519), AMMEN (DD-627) on detached duty with Task Force FIFTY-ONE.

STAFFORD (DE-411), JACK MILLER (DE-410), TATUM (APD-81) at OKINAWA. (TATUM has been made available to Commander Task Force FIFTY-ONE, but no orders have been received yet for her).
LA PRADE (DE 809) and CORDESIER (DE 438) making mail runs in accordance with my serial 320 of 18 September (FB3-13/6-4-L20).

(3) Six LCS and one LC (FF) are at SASEBO and six at NAGASKI. My recommendation that only six LCS be retained in this area has been approved by Commander FIFTY Amphibious Force, and orders have been issued to the Port Director SASEBO to sail the LC (FF) and 6 LCS to Pearl (via fueling ports) when weather permits. Four of the LCS at NAGASKI have been ordered to SASEBO.

(4) SANTA FE and WADSWORTH will sail WAKAYAMA the morning of 9 October.

(5) Since not more than one CVE is required here I recommend sailing the CAFÉ GLOUCESTER on about 12 October to OKINAWA. (For Commanding Officer desires to remain here until then to obtain some paint due here soon). On arrival at OKINAWA, he should get 7 days availability and then be recommended for return to his division now in the SEVENTH Fleet.

(6) CinCPac 060258 directs that Escort Division SIXTY-FIVE (which includes all of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE Destroyer Escorts except STAFFORD) be under P.A.R. by 15 October. Commander Escort Division SIXTY-FIVE is in STRATUS and MCCOY REYNOLDS are here now. LA PRADE is on a mail run and will arrive OKINAWA 9 October where she will be relieved by the STAFFORD and will return immediately to SASEBO. CORDESIER arrives here 10 October and Commander Task Group 55.4 (Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-FOUR) must be directed to relieve her on the mail run with a destroyer at that time. JACK MILLER is at OKINAWA and has been ordered to SASEBO. Thus all five ships of Escort Division SIXTY-FIVE will be in SASEBO well before 15 October. STAFFORD plus one destroyer will make the mail runs.

(7) After I have had an opportunity to study the local situation as KURE and WAKAYAMA I shall make recommendation as to the number of ships to be retained in the Task Force FIFTY-ONE area. This will probably result in two cruisers, one CVE, one squadron of destroyers, and one half division of DE's remaining in the Task Force FIFTY-FIVE Area.
Subject: Status of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE as of this date.

(8) None of the above pertains to minecraft in this area under the command of Captain FARRUT in SHANNON (DM25) presently at SASEBO. We will furnish you with the current mine sweeping situation and contemplated operations for minecraft.

III. PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS.

A. Landing.

(1) The Vac and 5th MarDiv have been landed in SASEBO.

(2) The 2nd MarDiv has been landed at MAGASKI.

(3) Elements of the 32nd Inf. Div. have been landed.

(4) Commanding General VAC has assumed command ashore in his zone of operations, including security and logistics for FEAF elements of KANOYA. Elements have advanced to FUKUOKA and SHINONOSHIKAI overland.

(5) Elements of CUB-81 have landed; they include a Special and Regular Construction Battalion, Port Directors for SASEBO and MAGASKI, and many miscellaneous service elements. Commanding General VAC has recommended that some elements of CUB 18 now en route from the U.S. be diverted and not land here (ComGenVAC 281630/1).

(6) The most important current matter is the method by which the 32nd Inf. Div. will reach FUKUOKA. General SCHMIDT declares that overland movement is impracticable. Roads will not support the traffic and railroad tunnels are too narrow for heavy equipment. A file of all pertinent dispatches and correspondence is attached. The harbor and approach situation is summarized by the attached memorandum from Lieutenant (jg) GUSTAFSON of my staff who made a personal investigation of the subject. (Enclosure(3)). The mine situation is in the hands of Captain FARLOW (CTG 52.3). We have been in close contact. Transor 22, with the 32nd Inf.Div arrises SASEBO from the Philippines about 16 October and the decision must be reached in time to permit off-loading of APA and AKAs into LCT, LSM and LST for movement to FUKUOKA. A delay in this date has been recommended to coincide with the preparation of FUKUOKA for the arrival of LST types.
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C/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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(7) On completion of unloading the 32nd Inf. Div., Transron 22 goes MAGAEKI for loading of one ACT of the 2nd Mar.Div for movement to PELELIU.

D. Minesweeping.

Captain PARROT will keep you up to date on progress of minesweeping in this area. Planned sweeping is now nearly complete, except for TSUSHIMA channels. SASEBO has been recommended and approved by this command as the base for sweeping in the East China Sea, KOREA, TSUSHIMA and SHIKISHIMA areas.

C. Disposition of Japanese Vessels and Naval Material.

All ships now present have been inspected by CTU 55,7,3 for compliance with surrender terms. His reports have been forwarded to ComFIFTH-Fleet via CTF 51. No irregularities were found except one case of absence on the part of the Commanding Officer of a ship. This matter has been dealt with through Vice Admiral SUGiyama and very promptly settled.

82 ships are due to arrive here from KURE and MAIZURE; time of arrival unknown. A list of these ships and proposed berthing plan will be found in SASEBO Memorandum of 27 September, included in the ships inspection file.

The only known policies in regard to disposition of Japanese vessels and naval material are summarized in Commander Cruiser Division THIRTEEN Operation Plan No. 10-45, Annex LOVE. Enclosure (C) is a copy of a letter to ComFIFTH-Fleet recommending procedure in this matter. No reply has been received. Enclosure (D) is a letter written to ComGenVAC asking that he undertake destruction of suicide craft and human torpedoes outside the SASEBO - OMURA area. This has been referred by him to ComGenSEVENTH Army.

D. Repatriation of Japanese Nationals.

SASEBO has been designated as the terminal point for discharge of Japanese Army personnel from KOREA. This evacuation is being undertaken by the request of CG XXIV Corps, using LSTs on completion of disembarkation of the 40th Inf.Div at PUSAN. A route for these ships has been recommended to ComSEVENTH PhibFor do will handle.
Subject: Status of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE as of this date.

routing (CTF 55 260158). They are to be routed to MANILA by Port Director SASEBO on completion unloading. (ComPhibGroup 13 260725, H5566).

E. SOPA.

The command of CTG 55.8, Administrative SOPA, SASEBO - NAGASAKI area is unassigned. The SOPA Instructions issued by ComPhibGroup 4 are effective for the entire area and are under revision by C.O. YOSEMITE at the present time. A file of all SOPA messages issued is included herewith.

F. Mail.

There has been much difficulty in getting prompt mail delivery. The mail for the force is being routed through OKINAWA. Port Director SASEBO, is sending daily ships present lists to Postal Officer, NOB OKINAWA, and he is the officer to contact in case of trouble. Mail is being flown by FAirWing 17 and carried by ships assigned to regular mail run.

G. Typhoon Plans.

SOPA Instructions specify two alternate plans:

- XRAY - Sortie and retirement.
- WILLIAM - All ships enter port and take Typhoon anchorage and berths.

The Japanese state that their ships always remained in port during typhoons. They recommend against berthing alongside piers.

I recommend that, in the event of threatening typhoon, the following steps be taken:

(a) Minecraft be recalled to port.

(b) Berthing be arranged through conference with the SOPA Administrative, Port Director, and representatives of each type present; Berths to be assigned by Port Director as a result of the
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conference. This was done under my supervision for the last threatened typhoon and is essentially correct for present harbor conditions. Commander HODGSKINS of PINE ISLAND plans to fly his planes off to SHANGHAI for typhoon shelter, though they can be made reasonably secure here.

H. Miscellaneous.

(1) The U.S.S. ESCATANA (AGC-27) is aground in KAGOSHIMA KAIWAN. All pertinent despatches are attached. ComSerDiv 103 (A) has dispatched LCI 606 to her with provisions, and Commander CURTIS, FIFTH Fleet Salvage Officer, is on the scene. CONSERVER (ARS-29) has been sent from SASEBO to assist.

(2) A unit of FAvRing 17 is based at SASEBO, commanded by Commander HODGSKINS, in PINE ISLAND, BERING STRAIT and ORSON are also present. SORA Administrative has been providing a PC or LCS as runway patrol to keep the area clear of shipping. This patrol operates as directed by CO, PINE ISLAND. The new SORA Instructions will show the location of those runways and should obviate the difficulties that have been experienced in the past.

This unit carries out searches prescribed by ComFIFTHFleet. It also makes scheduled passenger and mail flights between here and OKINAWA, WAKAYAMA, and YOKOSUKA.

IV LOGISTICS.

(1) Logistics in the SASEBO - NAGASAKI area is the responsibility of Unit Able of Commander Service Division 103. Unit Able is aboard the YOSEMITE (AD-19) at SASEBO. Captain R. H. GIBBS is the senior representative present of Commander Service Division 103. He is also SORA (Administrative) and Commanding Officer of the YOSEMITE.

Logistical Situation

(1) Fuel. Plenty available in fleet Oilers, ACGs, IXs, etc.

(2) Fresh provisions. GRAFFIAS (AF-29) arrived SASEBO October 6. Most ships are low on fresh provisions.

(3) Dry provisions. Most ships have sufficient on hand. The ASCELLA due SASEBO about 14th with dry.
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COMMANDER CRUISER DIVISION THIRTEEN
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(4) Clothing and Small Stores. Most ships short. The TOLEDO is due about 14th with replenishments.

(5) Jap Money. Commander Task Force FIFTY-FIVE obtains Bank of Japan notes for ships of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE that are the size of a destroyer escort and up. Only Bank of Japan notes are legal tender ashore. The disbursing officer of Task Force FIFTY-FIVE has been obtaining these notes from the disbursing officer of Commanding GENERAL FIFTH Amphibious Corps ashore. The rate of exchange is established at 15 yen to 1 U.S. dollar. There have been reports that because of failure of some ships to draw yen, personnel are purchasing them ashore at illegal exchange rates. A despatch has been sent out prohibiting this.

(6) Repairs.

(a) YOSEMITE - destroyer types.
(b) PAIAWAN - minesweepers exclusive.
(c) ARL - boats.

(7) Other. The move exchange and Post Office are on LST 48.

V. PERSONNEL.

(1) Transportation.

Transportation out of this area is divided into two parts. The Port Director handles surface transportation and the SOAP (Admin) handles air transportation. Lieutenant Commander E.S. DUNCAN, USNR., is the personnel officer of SOAP (Admin). Boatswain SMITH is in charge of surface transportation in the Port Director's Office.

(2) Discharge.

(a) At the present time the "MAGIC CARPET" operating is being handled by the Port Director's office. As of October 5 most of the Navy Personnel in the SASEBO area that are eligible for discharge are loaded on the STANTON (AP69) and it has been requested that
this ship be ordered by ComServPac direct to the states. There are approximately 4000 marines on the beach eligible for discharge. Of these 750 were loaded in the STANTON on 6 October.

(b) Enlisted men are generally sent from this area to a staging area and then transported to the states. SASEBO is not a staging area. The nearest is OKINAWA.

(c) Officers are sent from this area only if they have orders. An officer with points must request orders from his type commander or CNOB OKINAWA.

(d) Any surface transportation of personnel from this area should be handled through the Port Director's office only. The Port Director requires each ship sending discharges to the states to send sufficient mess gear and 50 copies of the loading list to the ship carrying them back to the United States.

(e) Replacement personnel. SOPA (Admin) authorized all requests for transfers in the area. Personnel replacements are short but expected to improve.

(f) Berthing Transients. SOPA (Admin) is expecting two APBx which will house any transient personnel or personnel awaiting assignment.

(3) Recreation.

(a) Officers Club. SASEBO Naval Officer Recreational Center located on sea wall west side of inner harbor vicinity of buoy 11. Only 25% of commissioned personnel can come from each ship per day. Ships over 2200 tons should provide a steward's mate. Each ship should bring own refreshments, and if possible, water and ice. No refreshments are available at the club. The submarine officers and FairWing 17 officers have each established their own clubs.

(b) Liberty. Regular liberty is being granted up to twenty percent of the crews daily. Liberty commences at 1300 and expires on the dock at 1700. All personnel must remain in the general vicinity of SASEBO city. Marines are placed throughout the city to prohibit entry into an "out of bounds" area. The personnel
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FB3-13/43-1

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 can go into stores open for business but must not go into
dwelling places. All houses of prostitution are "out of
bounds". Pictures may be taken in YASEBO city in the areas
authorized for liberty. Uniform for liberty is: Enlisted
men - Undress whites. Officers and CPOs - Uniform of the
day. Liberty parties go ashore and leave at pier JIG 3.

(c) Enlisted men's recreation center is located in the same
vicinity as the officer's club with other facilities at the
Air Station. Hours are 1300 to 1600 with 20 percent of comple-
ment permitted. Care must be exercised to ensure that personnel,
do not go on liberty after visiting the recreation center. To
this end, dungarees for recreation areas have been prescribed.

(4) Business ashore and on board Japanese Vessels.

(a) Commanding Officers of ships may write orders for officers or
enlisted men going ashore on official business.

(b) In order to protect Japanese ships for intelligence purposes,
personnel are forbidden on board them without written authorization
of SOPa or official authorization of NavTechJap. For the same
reason boating is forbidden in EBISU WAN.

M. L. DEYO.

Copy to:
(less enclosures)

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ComGenFIFTH PhibCorps
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