AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

OPERATIONS REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL  30 November 1945

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Via: (1) The Commanding General, SIXTH Army.
     (2) The Commanding General, Army Forces, Pacific.
     (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and
         Pacific Ocean Areas.
     (4) The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
         Pacific.


References: (a) PacFlt Conf Ltr 1CL-45.
            (b) SIXTH Army Sec Dis 291520 Oct.
            (c) SIXTH Army Rest Dis XX 11775, DTG 191610I Nov.

Enclosures: (a) Special Map of Japan, 1:600,000, VAC Zone of
             Occupational Responsibility, F 26
             (b) Special Map, KYUSHU, Western HONSHU, and out-
                 lying islands, 1:1,000,000. P. 30

1. The following operations report of the Occupation of
   Japan by the V Amphibious Corps is forwarded in compliance with the
   references. SECRET and TOP SECRET matter included in this report
   is hereby down-graded to CONFIDENTIAL.

2. PLANNING:

   (a) After the conquest of IWO JIMA, in late March
       1945, Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps established its command post
       at MAUI, T.H., and divisions of the Corps were located as follows:
       3d Marine Division, MAUI; 4th Marine Division, MAUI; and 5th Marine
       Division, HAWAII, T.H. During the month of April, detailed plans
       were made for a Corps landing on MIYAKO JIMA in the northern
       KYUKYUS, as an extension phase of the CHINA operation. This operation, however,
       was never executed, and all drafts and accumulated data were
       turned over to the III Amphibious Corps.

       During the month of May, planning was initiated
       for an assault against the Asiatic mainland, on the CHINA coast in
       the CHUSAN archipelago and the adjoining NINGPO peninsula. This
       Headquarters, functioning in a dual role, prepared plans for a corps
       landing, and concurrently drew up, on field army level, the overall
       plan (in several alternate versions) for a two-corps landing. On 23
       May, however, instructions were received that the CHINA coast land-
       ings had been indefinitely deferred, and, at the same time, a probable
       Corps readiness date of 1 September was established for operations
       in southern KYUSHU against the Empire of JAPAN.
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(b) On 2 June, the Corps Commander reported by dispatch for planning to the Commanding General, SIXTH Army, then located on LUZON. Distances between headquarters were so great that little information was initially available as to projected schemes of maneuver or even as to the objective itself. This difficulty was somewhat mitigated by arrival at this Headquarters on 24 June of a SIXTH Army representative bringing a tentative troop-list, logistic data (particularly on assault shipping), and the Army schemes of maneuver then under consideration. His departure was immediately followed, on 28 June, by a return visit of the Corps Chief of Staff and designated staff officers to SIXTH Army Headquarters in SAN FERNANDO, LUZON, where a tentative decision was made to land the Corps in the KUSHIKINO area of the KAGOSHIMA peninsula rather than astride the Kamino-Kawa.

At the recommendation of this Headquarters, approved by the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, action had meanwhile been taken on 15 June to substitute the 2d Marine Division (then on SAIPAN, except for RCT 8, currently engaged on OKINAWA) in the Corps troop-list for the southern KYUSHU landings, in lieu of the 4th Marine Division, which had participated very heavily in past operations.

Following the Chief of Staff's return from SAN FERNANDO, the Commanding General, with key members of the planning staff, proceeded to LUZON to establish further liaison between the two Headquarters and to obtain the complete picture of the SIXTH army plan. This trip was undertaken between 7 and 17 July, and much benefit was gained, not the least of which was because Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, was present afloat at the same time in MANILA BAY. An excellent opportunity also presented itself for conferences with the two Marine divisions (2d and 3d) in the MARIANAS.

Issue of the final plan (less certain annexes) for the southern KYUSHU assault was accomplished on 9 August. Three days before, on 6 August, the substance of this plan had been fully presented by the respective Corps and division staff officers at a Corps planning conference on NAUI. On 10 August, however, the Imperial Japanese Government sued for peace.

Between 10 and 14 August some uncertainty prevailed in all headquarters, although assault planning continued, but by that date the bona fide nature of JAPAN's offer had been established, and the V Amphibious Corps was directed to report for planning to the Commanding General, SIXTH Army, for the occupation of JAPAN.
(c) Although the unexpected surrender of Japan created many pressing and obvious problems, such as that of dropping one operational project and initiating another (not to speak of the logistic acceleration required to mount the Corps out weeks in advance of previous readiness dates), the real imperatives were to assess the enemy's good faith; to ascertain what degree of local non-compliance with Imperial instructions might be encountered; and, above all, to estimate correctly the probable degree of resistance which might develop in any phase of the occupation. From the outset, every effort was made to salvage as much as possible of the content of plans for the assault landing.

Confronted initially, by a target-date of 4 September, and by troop and shipping lists which seemed to change hourly, planning nevertheless progressed rapidly, and, on 1 September, the Corps command post opened afloat in the USS MOUNT MCKINLEY (AGC 7), which immediately sailed to join other Corps and 5th Marine Division shipping enroute from the Hawaiian area to Saipan, whence it was planned to proceed to western Kyushu for landings in the Sasebo-Kagoshima area on a target-date finally determined to be 22 September.

Planning continued enroute as the situation in Japan unfolded itself. Last-minute decisions began to firm in spite of such major changes as that which, on 5 September, substituted the 32d Infantry Division for the 3d Marine Division in the task organization. It now seemed probable that resistance would not be encountered, and progressive modification of the original plans (which had envisaged opposed landings) was undertaken accordingly.

At Saipan, final conferences were held with the 2d and 5th Marine Division staffs, as well as that of Amphibious Group 4, the naval command responsible for landing the Corps. The Chief of Staff of the 32d Infantry Division, who had reached the Marianas by air, was also briefed aboard the MOUNT MCKINLEY, and an operation plan for the employment of that division was issued.

At dusk, 16 September, TransRon 22, bearing the Corps Headquarters and the 5th Marine Division, sailed for Japan from Tanapag Harbor, Saipan. To the very hour, seven months had elapsed since this Headquarters had taken departure from the same port for Iwo Jima, and but fifteen months, since, on D+1 day of the battle of Saipan, units of the V Amphibious Corps had been in combat on those beaches.
3. **TRAINING:**

The separation of major units of the Corps between Hawaii and the Mariana Islands somewhat restricted the role of this Headquarters in supervision and guidance of training for the southern KYUSHU landings. This disadvantage was to some extent compensated by the considerable combat-experience of all divisions, two of which, the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions, had performed outstandingly at IWO Jima, while the 2d Marine Division, although (except for the 8th Marines) it had not been in serious action since the preceding August, could boast a record which included GUAM, NAVAL, TARAWA, SAIPAN and TINIAN. Numerous replacements had been absorbed in all units of the Corps.

Aggressive ground training was conducted by all divisions and Corps Troops, and every effort was made to obtain and absorb replacements during the Summer months. Command-post exercises were held in all divisions. Under the direction of this Headquarters, great emphasis was laid upon use of the supporting arms (Naval gunfire, air and artillery). More than two units of fire for all weapons were expended for training purposes, together with many thousand rounds of naval ammunition. By mid-August, when the Japanese sued for peace, it is considered that this Corps had reached a level of training not only adequate to any future mission, but unsurpassed in previous long experience.

Since so short a period elapsed between initiation of planning and date of mounting out for the occupation, little specific additional training was conducted after 15 August, other than intelligence and operational briefing, and it was essentially the training for invasion which prepared the Corps for the occupation of Japan.

4. **ORGANIZATION:**

(a) The organization of this Corps and of its augmentation units for the occupation of KYUSHU was substantially the same as that which had been set up for the southern KYUSHU landings, and was notable for the large number and variety of service troops and units provided for logistic support; most of these were army. Principal modifications in the assault troop-list in order to fit it for occupational missions were as follows: (1) Deletion of Corps artillery, all antiaircraft troops, and the 1st Provisional Amphibian Tractor Group; (2) addition of extra military government and CIC units, and substitution of the 32d Infantry Division for the 3d Marine Division. Total strength of the Corps as reinforced for the
southern KYUSHU assault landings would have been approximately 100,000; on initiation of the occupation, it was 24,000. The "g" series tables of organization, under which Marine units of the Corps had completed reorganization by mid-July, although never completely battle-tested, generally represented a consensus of combat experience and subject to minor changes are considered to have proven adequate.

(b) Because the occupation by nature differed considerably from past combat operations, it was inevitable that certain internal readjustments and redistribution of duties and staff functions would arise in face of changing requirements. For example, tw additional special staff sections, Procurement and Disposition, were organized to deal with the problems of procuring Japanese supplies, equipment and labor for the operational use of the occupational forces and for disposing of surrendered Japanese matériel. In other cases, established staff sections found themselves responsible for functions previously unthought of, such as the G-3 Section, which fell heir to such problems as control of repatriation of Japanese, Korean, Formosan and Chinese personnel; accounting for movements of Japanese shipping; seizure of banks; decisions as to retention or decommissioning of Japanese airfields; and many others. Another aspect in which occupation imposed differing requirements from those of combat was in the great number of minor supervisory duties required, such as assistant provost marshals, fire marshals, officers for verification of demobilization and supervision of repatriation, as well as many others too numerous to relate. Fortunately it was possible to augment the supply of available personnel by diversions from division ASCO's, whose plentiful supply of junior officers rendered them ideal in this respect. In order to meet the greatly increased troop needs for occupational garrison duties and guard, artillery and tank units were uniformly so employed by all divisions.

Army augmentation units and all service units not attached to divisions were organized into provisional groups under direct operational control of the Corps Commander, as follows:

(1) Provisional Medical Group.
(2) Provisional Motor Transport Group.
(3) Provisional Combat Engineer Group
(4) Shore Brigade.
(5) Seventh Naval Construction Regiment (less attachments to divisions).

(c) Numerous Army units were attached to this Corps for operational control only. The problem of determining the next higher administrative echelon was in many cases difficult. This difficulty was considerably eased when it became possible to attach all Army units to the 32d Infantry Division for administrative purposes. The Army Section (a detachment from Headquarters SIXTH Army, including an Army Finance section) attached to this Headquarters functioned in much the same manner as a Marine Detachment with a higher Naval or Army command, and rendered valuable services in advising upon and handling matters of Army organization and administration.

(e) Because of the considerable number of outlying places requiring garrisons of varying strength and composition, organization of many provisional task forces, groups and detachments was necessary. Regardless of strength and minor variations in composition, these units consisted generally of infantry units appropriate to the task required, reinforced by troops for logistic support, maintenance of communications and conduct of military government.

FUKUCA, one of the principal ports of JAPAN, was initially garrisoned by a special occupation force (later designated the FUKUCA Base Command) whose final mission after relief by the 32d Infantry Division became the development of the port and logistic support of air and ground units in the northern portion of the Corps zone. The composition of this force thus differed considerably from others maintained by the Corps in that it embodied a large proportion of construction and service units.

The KANOKA Task Force consisted basically of the 1st Bn, 127th Infantry (Reinf), which on 4 September was flown into southern KYUSHU to provide local protection for KANOKA airfield, at that time a key point in Army Air Force lines of communication into TOKYO. A number of Army service and communication units reached KANOKA during September for the support of the KANOKA Air Task Force, and were eventually attached to this battalion, which continued to function as a separate task force under Corps until 30 October, when relieved by elements of the 2d Marine Division.
5. **ADVANCE RECONNAISSANCE:**

(a) **Prior to southern KYUSHU assault landings:**

Advance reconnaissance planned for the southern KYUSHU assault landings consisted of normal UDT operations scheduled for preferred and alternate beaches on X-4 to X-2 days. In accordance with Corps doctrines, it was planned to include Marine liaison personnel from the assault divisions in amphibious reconnaissance of their beaches.

(b) **Prior to occupational landings:**

The following agencies conducted advance reconnaissance in the Corps zone of responsibility before occupational landings on 22 September:

1. POW recovery teams which, in conjunction with supporting combatant ships, hospital ships and hospital transports, beginning in early September, reached all POW camps and expedited evacuation of recovered personnel through the port of NAGASAKI; the Marine Detachment of the USS WICHITA (CA 45) and BILOXI (CL 80) were landed at that place about 14 September to furnish port patrols and local security in support of these operations and are believed to have been the first Marines to land in the Corps zone.

2. Scientific reconnaissance groups which reached NAGASAKI on 20 September to assess atomic bomb damages and effects.

3. Two VAC advance parties, one of which went forward from SAIPAN by air to NAGASAKI, under command of the Corps G-3, Colonel W. W. Wensinger, USMC; the other of which proceeded by APD to SAIPAN from SAIPAN under command of Colonel W. A. Raley, USMC, with Underwater Demolition Teams 6, 11 and 13. These parties included representatives from the following staff sections: G-2 (including language and hydrographic), G-3, G-4, Shore Brigade, Military Government, Signal and Surgeon, as well as staff officers from the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions and Amphibious Group 4.

The mission of the Corps advance parties was to facilitate smooth and orderly entry of U. S. Forces into the Corps zone of responsibility by making contact with key Japanese civil and military authorities; to execute advance spot checks on compliance with demilitarization orders; and to ascertain such facilities for reception of our forces as condition and suitability of docks and harbors; adequacy of sites selected by map-reconnaissance for Corps installations; condition of airfields, roads and communications.
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(c) On 14 September the first advance party departed by air for NAGASAKI via OKINAWA, arriving at NAGASAKI on 16 September. Interviews were held with and instructions issued to the Governor of NAGASAKI Prefecture, Major General Kyo, Vice Chief of Staff of the Western Area Army; Lieutenant General Tanaguchi, Commander NAGASAKI Army Forces; the Civilian Liaison Committee; and other Japanese staff officers and officials. Spot checks of coastal defenses were made as planned to insure compliance with the terms of surrender, while staff officers inspected harbor and dock facilities and made arrangements for procurement of warehouses, barracks, and suitable command post sites. On 18 September, Colonel Wensinger, accompanied by the Corps staff members of his party, departed NAGASAKI for SASEBO aboard the USS RALPH TALBOT (DD 390). 2d Marine Division staff officers remained in NAGASAKI. At SASEBO, Colonel Wensinger and his party issued instructions for preliminary arrangements to Japanese officers and civilian officials, including Rear Admiral Hayashi, Major General Kyo, and Vice Governor of NAGASAKI Prefecture, the Chiefs of Civil and Prefectural Police, and the Civilian Liaison Committee.

Meanwhile, the second advance party embarked for SASEBO at SAIPAN on 18 September and arrived on 20 September. At SASEBO they were met by Colonel Wensinger's party and completed the preliminary arrangements for the occupation. On 21 September, the USS AUBURN (AGC 10) flagship of Commander Fifth Amphibious Force, Vice Admiral Hill, with General Krueger embarked, arrived at SASEBO, and Colonel Wensinger reported aboard this vessel to the two commanders.

6. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS:

(a) General:

Occupational operations of the V Amphibious Corps fell into five general phases:

(1) Initial landings by the 5th and 2d Marine Divisions and the subsequent establishment of those organizations and of Corps Headquarters ashore in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI areas.

(2) Deployment of elements of the 5th Marine Division, and subsequently the 32d Infantry Division, into northern KYUSHU and western HONSHU.

(3) Deployment of the 2d Marine Division into central and southern KYUSHU.
(4) The progressive reallocation of areas and reduction of forces of the Corps incident to disbandment of the 6th Marine Division.

(5) Concurrently with the foregoing, a fifth phase of occupational operations was the series of expeditions by the Divisions to reconnoiter and demilitarize the numerous outlying islands which adjoin southern and western KYUSHU.

Taken as a whole, all occupational operations embodied certain common tasks and procedures; enumerated and briefly described below, they convey a picture of the military responsibilities which fell to our forces. It should be remembered, however, that probably the most influential factor which governed the nature of the occupation was the complete — almost abrupt — compliance of the Japanese with our instructions. In an operation opposed either by partisan or underground forces the measures which follow would of course be modified according to the military situation, and others would be added:

(1) Billeting and sanitation were matters of the first concern, the former being especially necessary because of the temperate, rather than tropical, climate, as well as the inclemency of the season; the latter because of poor sanitary conditions which generally existed. Buildings were usually verminous, plumbing where existent was inadequate and of novel design, and the national use of night-soil for fertilization contaminated sources of water supply, municipal purification of which had lapsed due to wartime shortages of chemicals. As a result units habitually organized their advance details to anticipate these situations, and every unit move was preceded by a billeting and sanitation detail. Despite poor Japanese sanitation and the bombed out condition of cities it is considered that the living conditions of troops were uniformly satisfactory and as good as could be expected in the circumstances.

(2) Supply and communications, always important, were here doubly so. It was essential that outlying garrisons establish rapid and adequate radio and wire communications, not only for security, but because of the general disintegration of Japanese facilities. Since the Japanese road net was entirely inadequate for American transportation, early supply via railheads became a matter of paramount importance.
(3) Disposition, described elsewhere in some detail, entailed the supervision of disposal, destruction, or otherwise rendering of no military usefulness, all Japanese war supplies and materiel, a most exacting and often dangerous business which went forward continually during the occupation.

(4) Demobilization verification and surveillance necessitated continuous patrolling to check dumps and former military installations to assure the occupying forces that Japanese demobilization in fact agreed with Japanese reports. From time to time surprise search would be executed, such as one check throughout the 5th Marine Division zone, of schools and shrines (normally exempt by safeguard), which netted rifles, swords, grenades and even a rangefinder, in addition to many documents. Of a related nature were similar checks made from time to time of all prisons and police stations to ascertain that police practices followed current instructions and that no prisoners were held except by due process of law. Finally, general military reconnaissance, check and correction of existing maps, and investigation of all intelligence targets, went forward concurrently.

(5) Supervision of repatriation, also described elsewhere, required that at all authorized ports of entry (SASEBO, KAGOSHIMA-KAJIKI, FUKUoka, SHIMONOSEKI and BENZAKI), local commanders set up the organization and machinery necessary to supervise the orderly, rapid, and sanitary processing for further movement by water and rail of incoming Japanese repatriates, as well as of outgoing Chinese, Korean and Formosan displaced persons. Nearly one million repatriates had passed through the above ports by 30 November. Outgoing Chinese, Korean and Formosan personnel presented continual problems. Eager for freedom and naturally resentful of their virtual enslavement under the Japanese, they caused frequent disturbances and riots. Their previous animal-like living conditions now made them a sanitary menace wherever assembled.

(b) Narrative summary:

Occupational operations of this Corps commenced in 22-23 September with the seizure of SASEBO and KAGOSHIMA, succeeded with minimum delay by overland extension of control to include first FUKUoka, and then the strategic SHIMONOSEKI-MOJI area of northern KYUSHU; deployment followed into central and southern KYUSHU when such inland cities as SAGA, KUMAMOTO and KITA-KUNAJO, and the outlying ports of OTSU, KAGOSHIMA and KAJIKI came finally under our control. Occupation of western HONSHU progressed concurrently as detachments fanned out from SHIMONOSEKI to YAMAGUCHI.
and SEJ’ZAKI. For the chronological sequence of all the foregoing operations, see Enclosure (B) which presents in graphic form the deployment of this Corps throughout its zone of responsibility.

Coincident with the overland extension of the VAC into all corners of KYUSHU, the major groups of outlying islands were reconnoitered and demilitarized with maximum rapidity: GETO RETTO on 11 November; TSU SHIMA on 29 November; KOSHIKI RETTO on 29 November; and OSUMI GUNTO operations continuing on the closing date of this report with estimated date of completion 6 December. It was a type of overwater operation (usually by LST, LCT or LCI) which lent itself to the amphibious reconnaissance techniques developed by this Corps during combat, and in which the amphibious reconnaissance Battalion, a Fleet Marine Force unit, was greatly missed.

At no time did Japanese resistance develop, and the only disorders which occurred in the VAC zone of responsibility were the disturbances previously described among Chinese, Formosan and Korean laborers in northern KYUSHU. No friendly casualties are known to have occurred, although several accidental deaths and injuries were reported incident to disposition operations.

In face of the rapid deployment of the Corps, the 5th Marine Division suffered partial depletion, when, on 18 October, the 26th Marines (Rein) (less 2d BN, subsequently disbanded) was detached on GHQ-AOC order for garrison duty in the PALAUS; as of 30 November, with the most exacting requirements of the operation completed, this division was preparing to embark for return to the United States in mid-December.

Incident to the return of the 5th Marine Division to the United States, and its relief in zone of responsibility by the 32d Infantry and 2d Marine Divisions, some 18,000 men were transferred between divisions in order to demobilize the maximum number of individuals so entitled. These transfers were accomplished progressively over a two-week period without interruption of any occupational missions or operation in progress. By 30 November, and excluding personnel to be returned with the 5th Marine Division, some 7,500 Marine and attached naval personnel had been returned to the United States for release and discharge.

7. **JAPANESE CONFORMANCE WITH TERMS OF SURRENDER:**

Prior to initial landings in JAPAN, the greatest
imponderable was, to what extent and how, if at all, the Japanese nation would comply with the terms of surrender imposed. Having encountered him mainly in battle (in which he was generally annihilated), Corps experience of the Japanese in surrender was necessarily meager. The only thing which could be predicted from the past was that the Japanese reaction would be unpredictable.

It was.

The entire military pattern and sequence of the Corps occupation was eventually keyed to the single outstanding fact that Japanese compliance with the terms was as nearly correct as could humanly be expected.

Beginning with the advance reconnaissance of key points in the Corps zone of responsibility (see para. 5, "Advance Reconnaissance"), when the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, representing the Corps Commander, issued his instructions to the military, naval and civil authorities at Sasebo and Nagasaki, Japanese behavior was uniformly compliant and subordinate. This relationship was greatly facilitated by operations of the Japanese Liaison Committees in the key centers occupied by our forces. These committees, headed by senior military or naval commanders present, maintained English-speaking staff officers at the Corps and other lower headquarters, as well as direct channels for wire communication between the American and the Japanese headquarters concerned, so that all business between commands could be efficiently canalized.

Outside of one incident in which the commanding officer of a Japanese man-of-war behaved with studied insincerity toward a U. S. naval inspecting party (for which he was promptly court-martialed and confined by the Japanese authorities), no single overt act of resistance has been recorded. In a few cases, minor evasion of surrender terms was encountered, such as concealment of small arms and ammunition in safeguarded buildings (see para. 8, "Occupational Operations"); or the attempt to build up an excessive supply of hydrographic charts by padded requisitions on Japanese depots in the Sasebo area. But such incidents were negligible when set against the correct behavior of the Japanese as a whole.

8. **SUPPLY, EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS:**

   Supplies, equipment and logistic support for the
occupation of JAPAN were considered adequate in all respects. A few difficulties were nevertheless encountered in execution of the occupation as follows:

(a) Unbalanced "B" ration components furnished in the HAWAIIAN Area lacked variety in meat components.

(b) Army augmentation units which in some instances arrived with insufficient levels of rations and water created a temporary drain on stocks set up by this Corps.

(c) Failure of resupply ships carrying fresh provisions to arrive at the target on schedule and to arrive with cargos as previously planned.

(d) The lack of suitable warehouses, cold storage, open storage and dock facilities, and the lack of good routes of communication created a congested condition in the dock areas, thus hampering the unloading and distribution of equipment and supplies. Nevertheless, although SASEBO was a naval repair base not inherently suitable as a commercial port, some 432 vessels of all types were anchored in SASEBO BAY by 30 November. The load on SASEBO was further heightened because the port of FUKUCHA proved to be completely closed to our shipping by mines, and unloading for boomerang from our air-blockade of JAPAN, a troublesome by-product of the congestion of the port of SASEBO proved to be that of controlling personnel ashore from the many ships present. Although cooperation between the Provost Marshal and the SCOPA (administrative) brought fairly satisfactory results, a definite liberty and recreation landing should be set aside under such circumstances, and applicable regulations governing personnel ashore should be communicated to incoming vessels before liberty is granted. Concurrently, harbor patrols should prevent ships' boats from making unauthorized trips or landings.

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(e) DDT and other disinfectants were required in larger quantities than initially brought ashore by the occupation forces because of unsanitary conditions of Japanese buildings to be occupied by our forces.

(f) Due to lack of shipping space one division of this Corps was forced to leave in the rear echelon one-half of the division motor transport battalion. However the transportation situation never became critical as the Corps Provisional Motor Transport Group was capable of meeting all requirements.

The following shipping by types, including initial shipments as well as merchant and resupply shipping, were unloaded in ports of the V Amphibious Corps zone by 30 November: 65 AKA, 32 AKA, 2 LSV, 260 LST, 62 LSM, 51 LCT and 41 merchant ships. From these ships the total cargo unloaded amounted to 354,414 long tons and 1,017,032 measurement tons.

For the first time in the history of this Corps, troops were paid in other than United States currency, Bank of Japan yen being employed in order to prevent inflation at the rate of 15 to 1 as the circulating medium for all transactions. Stringent limitations were placed upon the possession or circulation of United States money. Aside from the unfamiliar aspect of the Japanese notes, the only problem they presented was that of sheer bulk. Local banks were able to meet Corps fiscal needs without difficulty.

In general, there were sufficient supplies and equipment to enable this Corps efficiently to perform its mission as an occupational force. By close supervision and timely coordination of the various supply activities, the aforementioned difficulties were overcome without retarding the occupational operation. It is felt that the cooperation and coordination between the G-4 Section and its allied special staff sections was consistent with the overall plan and proved that a thorough understanding existed of the problems arising in an operation of this type.

9. SPECIAL FEATURES:

(a) Naval Gunfire:

Although no naval gunfire annex for the southern KYUSHU landings was issued, planning had been virtually completed by

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Mid-August when that operation was suspended. Naval gunfire support was available on call in all initial landings during the occupation, but was not employed. Throughout the planning phases of both assault and occupational landings, the practical desirability of retaining naval gunfire support as a special staff function under G-3 was again demonstrated, as was the necessity of T/O provision for a Corps naval gunfire team of the type provisionally organized.

(b) Air:

During the planning phase of both the assault and the occupation of Japan, requests were submitted to higher Headquarters covering aviation requirements of VAC Landing Force. The air plan for the assault on Japan was never completed, and all requests to higher authorities for active air support for the assault were modified to conform with requirements of the occupation phase. As allotted to VAC, carrier-based aircraft available for the assault would have been insufficient in number.

Air operations for the occupation were generally as planned. With some compromise, all VAC requests for air support were included in ComPhibsFao Air Plan. In view of meager requirements for air support as dictated by the situation ashore in Japan, this air plan was considered adequate and satisfactory. Air support, although available on call, was not employed by the Corps prior to landing.

During initial occupational operations, logistic (utility) air support of the Corps was unsatisfactory. This was due to lack of availability of Army aircraft for special flights, to the extreme irregularity of the Safehand Air Courier Service, and to poor communication facilities. The most noticeable deficiency was the lack of transport and/or cargo aircraft assigned directly to operational control of VAC. The numerous calls, including many from higher headquarters, for immediate air transport of personnel and material, to include medical air evacuation, could be filled only by special aircraft kept on call for just such purposes. None was available. In the meeting of the foregoing requirements, the CV aircraft of Marine Observation Squadrons Two and Five were invaluable. These light airplanes proved able to overcome the handicaps of impassable terrain and a primitive road-net by continually performing staff-liaison, air-evacuation, courier and supply missions.
Minimum requirements to carry out these important air transport missions is one R4D for each Corps and division headquarters. Too much stress cannot be placed upon the necessity for providing each of these units initially with a squadron of small aircraft of the C4 type, and later, as large airfields became available, with one or more transport and/or cargo type airplanes for administrative operations.

(c) Artillery:

Corps Artillery as reinforced for the assault landings consisted of two field artillery groups (1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, reactivation of which had been authorized in early August, and the 223d Field Artillery Group), one Field Artillery Observation battalion, and one Marine Observation squadron. Two distinct innovations planned were the employment of VT-fuzed ammunition, and the inclusion of 8" howitzers in an attached battalion. These would have been the heaviest mobile weapons ever employed ashore in support of this Corps.

In view of the slight possibility of Japanese resistance, as well as the amount of shipping required to mount out Corps Artillery from Guam, it was decided first to defer, and then to cancel movement of this unit to Japan, leaving the delivery of artillery fires to divisional artillery, and of heavy reinforcing fires, if required, to naval gunfire.

Both assault and occupational planning and training of this Corps was somewhat hindered because of the fact that Corps Artillery was in the Marianas while Corps Headquarters remained in Hawaii. At no time during the history of this Corps have these two headquarters been present in the same area except during combat operations.

(d) Intelligence:

From the outset of intelligence planning, difficulty was experienced in maintaining close liaison with the Sixth Army and attached divisions due to the great distances involved. The problem of maps for this operation was satisfactorily settled early in the planning phase whereby the Army Map Service would by 1 September forward direct to divisions all necessary maps. The 1:25,000 official battle map (prepared from a 1933 1:50,000 Japanese Imperial Land Survey) was the most accurate map ever furnished this Corps for an operation.
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Arrangements for photo-coverage, however, were not as satisfactory. Much difficulty was encountered in obtaining adequate low-altitude coverage early in the planning phase. By 1 August a satisfactory arrangement had been reached whereby Interprón Two, at GUAM, furnished VAC one copy of all photo missions flown in the KUSHIKING area and furnished the negatives to JICFOA, CAHU, for quantity printing. In this manner adequate coverage was eventually received and disseminated. Until the cessation of planning for the southern KYUSHU operation, considerable doubt existed at this Headquarters regarding the adequacy of coverage to be expected during the operational phase, as no air field was planned in the VAC beachhead area, and support photography flown from carriers had always proved unsatisfactory due to difficulties in briefing and delivery.

By the time planning had been discontinued for the southern KYUSHU assault, detailed beach and road studies were well underway, and excellent relief maps and terrain studies were available.

As soon as planning was initiated for occupation operations, maps of initial occupation areas were procured from JICFOA and distributed to the maximum extent practicable, but complete coverage was not obtained until VAC was well into the occupational phase. Upon embarkation, however, adequate intelligence information and material had been disseminated, and special CIC, Civil Censorship and JICFOA teams had received detailed instructions and reported to this Headquarters.

Enroute, orders limiting the proposed activities of the CIC and Civil Censorship Detachments were received. Upon departure from SAIPAN all changes and amplifying material had been duly promulgated and the intelligence picture crystallized.

As the occupation progressed, great strain was placed on Corps reproduction facilities. Much effort was expended in preparing city plans and military and civil intelligence target-folders for units entering new areas. Difficulty was encountered from an OCB and demobilization standpoint due to Corps responsibility for YAMAGUCHI Prefecture, which did not come under the Japanese Army command for KYUSHU. In addition the September and October typhoons considerably retarded submission of Japanese reports.

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Reports of subordinate units were for the most part timely and informative. Investigations and control of Chinese, Formosan and Korean nationals awaiting repatriation developed into a considerable problem. CIC played a large part in this work as also in investigation of Japanese secret and patriotic societies and general surveillance of Japanese compliance with directives. The 6th Corps made extensive surveys of mail and telecommunication facilities, reviewed all publications in the Corps zone and established international mail and telecommunication censorship offices at Fukuka. Upon arrival, JICFOA personnel were reorganized and reported to Fifth Fleet for operational control as NavTechJap, although this was not as desirable from the Corps standpoint as having a technical intelligence unit operating under its control, as had been the case in previous operations, this unit thoroughly exploited the VAC zone and its reports on radar, radio, new types of ordnance, combatant ships, aircraft, suicide boats, midget submarines, and human torpedoes should prove of great value. Nevertheless, detailed plans for the exploitation of intelligence targets by technical intelligence teams should be worked out and promulgated well in advance of occupation in order to prevent duplication of effort and confusion. Many intelligence teams initially operated at random throughout the Corps area, with much resultant confusion, while the large number of casual NavTechJap officers imposed some strain on facilities of this Headquarters.

It is believed that much valuable intelligence from a strategic standpoint has been gathered and that no serious subversive or military obstacle to continued peaceable occupation of the Corps zone exists.

(e) Procurement:

The Corps Procurement Section was organized in accordance with directives from SIXTH Army, with the mission of procuring from the Japanese, supplies and services necessary to meet the operational requirements of the occupation forces in the immediate area of SASEBO. It also exercised general supervision over procurement activities of the various division areas.

Procurement was very limited in the Corps zone of procurement responsibility. There were two basic reasons for this:
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(1) SASEBO had been devastated by Allied bombers, leaving the center of the city, including most of the business district, in complete ruins. Japanese in this city had insufficient supplies for their own food and shelter. Therefore any large scale procurement by our forces at this time would worsen an already disorganized situation and force even greater hardship on the Japanese people, already suffering from a serious local black market which required continued corrective action by this Headquarters. Since the entire population of SASEBO had been employed by and subordinated to the Japanese Navy for many years, their lack of initiative and organization for their own rehabilitation was marked.

(2) When Corps assumed control of SASEBO Naval Station and its supporting installations, there were adequate buildings to billet troops and set up offices and generally fill the housing requirements. In view of the large number of warehouses containing military supplies, formerly the property of the Japanese Navy, which were made available to units of the Corps and attached units, very little material remained to be procured from local civilians.

The Procurement Section was assigned the additional duty of performing the following functions in conjunction with the Disposition Section:

(1) Maintain records and submit reports to the Disposition Section on all military supplies, in the SASEBO Navy Yard Area, used by the occupation forces for operational needs.

(2) Maintain records on all military supplies returned to the Japanese Home Ministry in the above-mentioned area.

The performance of the additional duties as described above constituted ninety-five per cent of the work of the Corps Procurement Section.

Supplies and materials returned to the Japanese up to 30 November included 63 tons of food, 384 tons of medical equipment, 69,343 pieces of clothing, 35,356 items of electrical
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equipment, 1,015,331 feet of cable, 76 tons of bricks, 32,000 board feet of lumber, 187,995 dishes, 22,530 items of signal equipment, 584 tons of scrap metal, and large amounts of other materials.

Supplies and materials required by the occupation forces for operational needs included 1055 items of office equipment, 72,350 feet of cable, 2929 items of electrical equipment, and large amounts of other materials. Reports of subordinate divisions will describe procurement activities as applied to their respective areas.

(f) Inventory, Safeguard and Disposition:

(1) A Corps Disposition Section was organized to carry out the disposal of Japanese military supplies, equipment, material and ammunition in accordance with SIXTH Army directives. This section was charged with supervision of division inventory and disposition and in addition was directly responsible for disposition of material and ammunition in the immediate vicinity of the port of SASEBO.

Disposition was accomplished, and still continues: by destruction, dumping at sea, return to Japanese Home Ministry or delivery for use to occupational forces. All materials deemed suitable for a peaceful economy were returned to the Home Ministry. Although the Disposition Section took cognizance of all manner of material, (Engineer, Signal, Quartermaster, Medical, Chemical, and Transportation material), ordnance material proved to be the worst problem. Initially there were in the Corps zone of responsibility 78,610,118 rounds of all types of ammunition, 35,465,616 pounds of powder and 186,765 weapons of all types. Included in the weapons figure are 156,765 rifles which were issued as souvenirs or destroyed.

The handling of ammunition proved to be unusually hazardous. One barge exploded off SASEBO Harbor and killed 8 Japanese; a dump blew up at KAGAYA hitting several Japanese and destroying numerous houses. Near YAMAGUCHI one accident caused the death of 121 Japanese and destroyed 76 homes. Only three American casualties have occurred to date in connection with ammunition handling although American supervising personnel were required to be present at all times. All labor so employed was Japanese, and every effort, consistent with adequate supervision, has been made to keep the number of American personnel at an absolute minimum.
In addition to disposal procedures the Disposition Section supervised and coordinated the issue of war trophies. Rifles, bayonets, swords, pistols and field glasses were the usual war trophy items. Initially swords, pistols and field glasses were classified as "controlled items" and could be issued only on SIXTH Army directive. This control was maintained until inventories were completed and the actual quantities determined. These controlled items are now being issued to all personnel regardless of rank on a basis of length of service overseas and participation in combat. As a further check on distribution of souvenirs, not only was the issue of controlled items carefully limited to individuals about to be detached, but sales of legitimate civilian souvenirs were conducted throughout the Corps zone through Post Exchanges or shops especially established for operation with controlled priceceilings.

(g) Military Government:

Military Government activities in the Corps zone suffered initially from the effects of late basic decisions and numerous changes of plan and status. Many military government officers reported to this Headquarters under competent orders as individuals whereas the organizations to which they belonged were never attached. As of 22 September, some 96 officers and 2 enlisted, with no equipment of any kind, had collected at SAIPAN, while others were forward in SASEBO and NAGASAKI with units making initial landings.

Military government officers assigned and attached to VAC arrived on KYUSHU with the first troops, and the Military Government Section was established in conjunction with VAC Headquarters. This section handled personnel matters incident to reorganization of groups and detachments, and the dispatch of them to District Headquarters, Ken capitals and Shi (cities) in the Corps zone. The section coordinated the activities, reports, and surveys received from these groups and detachments, edited and forwarded the information in collated form to SIXTH Army.

Military government officers operating in Ken and Shi areas, beginning about mid-October, were integrated in general and special staff sections of the lower echelons of
command in those areas. In most instances military government officers arrived in outlying areas prior to the tactical troops, and, after passing to operational control of these troops, worked in advisory capacities in military government matters in addition to their original duties. After arrival in areas, military government groups established liaison with Japanese officials and have continued to work with tactical officers in this work, since integration.

After some experience had demonstrated the inclusive nature of military government, which extends during occupation into the operation of the entire Headquarters, the military government Section as such (which had been somewhat unwieldy in size) was reduced to only sufficient officers to control personnel, receive, process and edit reports, and maintain necessary files and indices. Military government officers were attached to other staff sections to serve in advisory as well as operational capacities. All military government officers are either assigned or attached to military government Groups or Companies for administration.

10. CONCLUSION:

With the occupation of JAPAN, the V Amphibious Corps has completed its final operation. Its Marines have fought at TARAWA, KWAJALEIN ATOLL, ENIWETOK, SAIPAN, TINIAN, GUAM and IWO JIMA. From the GILBERTS in 1943 to JAPAN in 1945, the Corps has sustained some 43,000 casualties and in return exacted some 85,000 of the enemy; for its 9,500 dead it has killed 75,000 Japanese. It has never been defeated. For TARAWA and for SAIPAN, two of its divisions have been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation; for IWO JIMA, eleven more of its regiments and 28 separate battalions have been recommended for Presidential Unit Citation or Navy Unit Commendation. Countless individual decorations have been won by its officers and men.

Throughout all operations, throughout the GILBERTS, throughout the MARSHALLS, throughout the MARIANAS, throughout IWO JIMA, the conduct of all personnel in all echelons of the V Amphibious Corps has been in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

H. SCHMIDT.

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ANNEXES:

ABLE: Operation Plans and Administrative Orders Issued after Occupation.

BAKER: O-1 Report.

CHARLIE: O-2 Report.

DOG: O-3 Report.

EASY: O-4 Report.

FOX: Signal Report.

GEORGE: Engineer Report.

DISTRIBUTION:

a. Advance Copies:

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet
Commandant of the Marine Corps
CINCPAC-CINCPACo (3 copies)
CG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Commander, Fifth Fleet
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Areas
CG, SIXTH Army (3 copies)
Commander, Amphibious Group 4
Commander in Chief, Army Forces Pacific

b. Regular:

Commander in Chief, Army Forces Pacific
CG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
CG, III Amphibious Corps
CG, 1st Marine Division
CG, 2nd Marine Division
CG, 3d Marine Division
CG, 6th Marine Division
Commander, Fifth Amphibious Force
Army-Navy Staff College, Washington
Naval War College, Newport, R. I.
Command and General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. (3 copies)
Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics, AAFTEC, Orlando, Fla.
Commander Amphibious Training Command Pacific
Commander Amphibious Training Command Atlantic
CG, Troop Training Unit Pacific, Camp Matthews
CG, Training Command, Camp Lejeune
CG, Training Command SDA, Camp Pendleton
Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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OIC Historical Div, HQMC, Washington
CG, Service Command, FMF, Pac.
WAR DIARY
FILE
Commander, Task Force 55 (less annexes).
Commander Task Group 55.2 (less annexes).
CG, Air Fleet Marine Force Pacific (less annexes).
Commander Third Fleet (less annexes).
Commander Seventh Fleet (less annexes).
Commander Third Amphibious Force (less annexes).
Commander Seventh Amphibious Force (less annexes).
Commander Amphibious Force Pacific (less annexes).
CG, Army Forces Middle Pacific (less annexes).
CG, Army Forces Western Pacific (less annexes).
Commander Service Forces Pacific (less annexes).
Commander Aircraft Pacific (less annexes).
Commander Marianas (less annexes).
CG, Strategic Air Force Pacific Ocean Area (less annexes).

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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

- OCCUPATION OF JAPAN -

VAC

Operation Plans 3-45 and 4-45
Operation Orders 41-45 to 49-45 inclusive
Administrative Orders 10-45 and 14-45

Annex ABLE
OPERATION PLAN
PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS OMURA-NAGASAKI.

Maps, Charts, Photos: See Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

1. a. (1) See Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

   (2) ASSUMPTIONS:

   (a) That the 2dMarDiv will arrive in the NAGASAKI Area on A 4 Day.

   (b) That landings over YELLOW and BLUE beaches will not be feasible due to the presence of mines.

   (c) That the cooperative attitude of the Japanese in the NAGASAKI Area will preclude the necessity for an assault landing in that area.

   (d) That the progress of the occupation operations in the SASEBO Area will warrant the release prior to A 3 Day of an adequate troop force from that area for reconnaissance and preliminary occupation of OMURA and the harbor area of NAGASAKI.

   (e) That OMURA will be required for early use as a NATS terminal.

   (f) That the NAGASAKI harbor and dock facilities will permit the debarkation of the 2dMarDiv within the harbor area.

b. See Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

2. a. V Amphibious Corps (Reinf), commencing on A 2 Day, will, with the OMURA-NAGASAKI Advance Gp, conduct preliminary operations in the OMURA-NAGASAKI areas by motor movement from SASEBO, establish reconnaissance and security detachments at OMURA and occupy the NAGASAKI harbor area, in order to expedite the utilization of the OMURA airfield and to facilitate the debarkation of the 2dMarDiv at NAGASAKI.

3. a. 5thMarDiv (Reinf) will:

   (1) Continue execution of missions assigned in Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).
(2) Release to the OMURA-NAGASAKI Advance Gp 5thMarDiv units indicated in annex ABLE hereto for assembly in the vicinity of the SASEBO aircraft factory (80.7-10.7 Map KYUSHU 1:25,000 sheet 4046 III NE) at daylight on A/2. Provide logistic support as required for all elements of this gp.

b. 3dMarDiv (Reinf) will:

(1) Be prepared to land on Corps order in NAGASAKI harbor area in accordance with schedule to be issued later.

(2) Upon landing assume control of area of responsibility and execute missions assigned (See Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred)).

c. See Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

d. See Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

e. See Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

f. Corps and Special Troops will continue to execute missions assigned in Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred) and will release to the OMURA-NAGASAKI Advance Gp Corps elements indicated in annex ABLE hereto for assembly with that Gp at the time and place indicated in 3.a.(2) above.

g. OMURA-NAGASAKI Advance Gp will:

(1) On A/2 organize and assemble the OMURA-NAGASAKI Advance Gp in the vicinity of the SASEBO aircraft factory (80.7-10.7; map KYUSHU 1:25,000 sheet 4046 III NE).

(2) When assembled, and on Corps order, proceed by motor movement along the SASEBO-OMURA highway and secure the Omura Seaplane Base and Naval Airdrome.

(3) Establish the advance OMURA Occupation Force as indicated in annex ABLE hereto at the OMURA Seaplane Base and Naval Airdrome.

(4) With remaining elements of the Advance Group, proceed by motor movement to NAGASAKI. Reconnoiter the NAGASAKI Harbor and adjacent land area. Establish control of the...
Operation Plan Number 3-45.

(Continued).

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NAGASAKI dock area. Insure the uninterrupted entry of
the 2dMarDiv into the NAGASAKI Harbor and facilitate its
debarkation.

(5) Expedite the initiation of special missions assigned in
separate directives to the Med Rcn Det, JICPOA Det, Kil
Govt Det, NAGASAKI Scientific Gp, CIC Det, Det Com Phib
Gp 4, Recovery Teams #10 and #15, and the Rcn Det, 7th
MC Rgt.

(6) When the CG 2dMarDiv has landed and assumed control
ashore in the NAGASAKI area, release Corps units to the
2dMarDiv as prescribed in Annex ABLE hereinafter. Reassemble
the advance group, less units released, at the OMURA
Naval Airdrome and await further orders.

x. (1) See Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

(2) Unless essential to the execution of an emergency mission
no unit or individual will enter the atomic bomb impact
area without express authority of this Headquarters.

(3) This plan is effective upon receipt for planning, and
for execution on order of this Headquarters.

4. a. See Administrative Order 6-45.

b. Gp logistics support through 5thMarDiv.

5. a. See Annex HOW to Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

b. OMURA-NAGASAKI advance group will enter Corps Command net
2108 kcs at 0500 A2.

c. Command Posts:

V Amphibious Corps
2dMarDiv
5thMarDiv
OMURA-NAGASAKI Adv Gp

USS MT MC KINLEY (AGC 7)
USS CAMBRIA (APA 36)
To be reported
To be reported

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

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C13/162
Ser. 00755B

Operation Plan Number 3-45. (Continued)

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ANNEX:


DISTRIBUTION:

See Annex XRAY to Operation Plan No. 2-45.

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/s/
W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AcofS, C & S.

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Ser.00755B

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V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

10 September 1945.

Annex ABLE to Operation Plan Number 3-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION OMURA-NAGASAKI ADVANCE GROUP

OMURA-NagaSaki ADV GP - Col R. H. Williams, USMC.

1st Bn 28th Mar
Det Wpns Co 28th Mar
Det Rcn Co 5thMarDiv
Co C 5th Tk Bn
Co C 5th Engr Bn
Co D 3d MP Bn (Prov)
Co A 12th MT Bn (Prov)
5th Amph Trk Co (Prov)
*2d Flot Bomb Disp Co VAC
*Recovery Team #10
*Recovery Team #15
Mil Govt Det (VAC)
*NaGaSaki Scientific Gp
*Special CIC Det
*Rcn Det 7th NC Regt
*Rcn Det Prov Med Gp VAC
*Det JICFOA Int Team #29
*Rcn Det Sig Bn VAC
*Det Com Phib Gp 4

* Units marked by asterisk will pass to control of CG 2dMarDiv when he has landed and assumed control of the Division ashore.

# ADVANCE OMURA OCCUPATION FORCE - to be designated.

1 Co (Reinf) 1st Bn 28th Mar
1 Plt Co D 3d MP Bn (Prov)
Recovery Team #15
Mil Govt Det (VAC)
CIC Det
Rcn Det 7th NC Regt

# Minimum Force to be established. May be increased by CO, OMURA-NagaSaki Advance Gp as situation demands.
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BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

See Annex XRAY to Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Preferred).

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/\/
W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ASCFS, G - 3.
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

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OPERATION: BAKER ONE (PHASE II).

MAPS, CHARTS, PHOTOS: See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan No. 2-45 (Intelligence).

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex ABLE (Task Organization).

1. a. (1) See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan No. 2-45 and G-2 Studies and estimates as issued.

(2) Assumptions:

(a) That the progress of the BakerDiv occupation operations in the OMURA-NAGASAKI area will permit the release of all 5th BakerDiv units from previously assigned missions in that area by 47.

(b) That ACT 27 organized as shown in Annex ABLE, can be assembled and prepared for overland movement to FUKUOKA by 49 Day.

(c) That preliminary reconnaissance will reveal that a motor movement to, and an effective occupation of, FUKUOKA can be expeditiously accomplished.

(d) That engineer equipment and construction material will be available in the FUKUOKA area for airfield development by 12 Day.

(e) That the 32d Infantry will be available for occupation operations in the AOJI-SHI-MONESEKI area on 16 October (O-Day).

(f) That amphibious landings in the AOJI-SHI-MONESEKI area will not be feasible due to the presence of mines.

(g) That preliminary reconnaissance will reveal that the occupation of the AOJI-SHI-MONESEKI area can be initiated by overland motor and/or rail movement from SAKABE.
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(b) That the progress of the 32dInfDiv occupation operations will permit that Division to assume responsibility for the FUKUKA area and relieve ACT 27 by about 1 November.

b. See Operation Plan Number 2-45 (Preferred),

2. a. V Amphibious Corps (Reinf), in operations commencing on *A2 G Day, will, by overland movement from SASEBC, progressively establish occupation forces in the FUKUKA area, the NOJI area, and the SHINOBUKI area, in order to extend Corps control in its assigned zone of responsibility and to further assist in imposing on the Japanese armed forces and civil population those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.


3. a. ACT 27 will:

1. Commencing at 0600 on A2 G Day proceed by motor movement from SASEBC to FUKUKA via the main highway SASEBC-SADA-TOSU-FUKUKA;

2. Establish and maintain control over the FUKUKA initial occupation area, to include the ITAZUKA medium bomber base, SAKUYA fighter landing strip and all other airfields and aircraft facilities (see Annex EASY).

3. Execute missions outlined in paragraph 3.x., Operation Plan Number 2-45. Establish and maintain control of the Japanese armed forces and civil population and impose therein the prescribed terms of surrender.

4. Assist the initiation of base development missions as directed.

5. Be prepared to release control of the FUKUKA area to the Commanding General 32dInfDiv on Corps order.
b. 33dInfDiv (Reinf) will:

(1) Upon arrival in the objective area and on Corps order, debark in SaSaEBC Harbor and assemble ashore in areas to be designated.

(2) When assembled ashore, and on Corps order, proceed from SaSaEBC to A0JI by motor and rail movement along the axis of the route SaSaEBC-LaCa-YaYaTu-A0JI. Establish control over the YaYaTu-KuKuYo-A0JI initial occupation area; then on Division order, proceed to SHIMOSEKI through the YaYaTu tunnel or by shore to shore movement and establish control over the initial occupation area of SHIMOSEKI. (See Annex EASY).

(3) As the situation in the SHIMOSEKI area permits, and on Division order, extend occupation and control over the Division zones of responsibility in that area (See Appendix Number 1 to Annex EASY).

(4) Be prepared, on Corps order, to relieve ACT 27 and extend Division control to include the FUKUoka area of responsibility (See Appendix Number 1 to Annex EASY).

(5) Execute missions outlined in paragraph 3.x, Operation Plan Number 2-45. Establish and maintain control of the Japanese armed forces and civil population and impose thereon the prescribed terms of surrender.

(6) Assist in the execution of prescribed base development missions as directed.

(7) Be prepared to land initially in the SHIMOSEKI area if mine sweeping operations permit amphibious operations in that area.

c. 5thMarDiv (Reinf) (less ACT 27) will:

(1) Continue execution of missions assigned in Operation Plan Number 2-45.

(2) Release ACT 27 to Corps control for execution of missions assigned in this Plan.
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(3) Assist and facilitate, as necessary, the orderly movement of RCT 27, 32dInfDiv and 3dMarDiv through the Division zone for execution of missions assigned to these units.

(4) As the situation permits, and on Division order, extend occupation and control inland in the Division zone of responsibility (See Appendix Number 1 to Annex A3Y).

(5) As prepared, on Corps order, to execute short range amphibious operations to occupy offshore islands in the Division zone of responsibility.

d. 3dMarDiv (.Inf) will:

(1) Continue execution of missions assigned in Operation Plan Number 2-45 and Operation Plan Number 3-45.

(2) On Corps order, extend occupation and control of strategic centers in the Division zone of responsibility by overland or short range shore to shore operations (See Appendix Number 1 to Annex A3Y).

e. 38th Atk Group: See paragraph 3.e., Operation Plan Number 2-45.

f. Corps and Special Troops: See paragraph 3.f., Operation Plan Number 2-45. Release elements to RCT 27 as designated in Annex A5LE.

x. (1) See Operation Plans Number 2-45 and 3-45, and Annexes thereto.

(2) This plan is effective upon receipt for planning, and for execution on order of this Headquarters.

4. See Administrative Order 8-45 and subsequent administrative orders as issued.

5. a. See Annex HO to Operation Plan Number 2-45.
Cl 13/12
Sr.007616 OpPlan Number 4-45. (Cont'd).

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b. Command Posts: To be reported.

BY Command of Major General Schmid:

W. W. Rogers,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE: Task Organization
BAKER: Intelligence (See Ann x BAKER to OpPlan No. 2-45).
CHARLOT: Naval Gunfire Support (later).
DOG: Air Support (later).
EASY: Operations Map

DISTRIBUTION:

CG Sixth Army (6) GCT 27 (4) Each Corps Special
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ComPhibGp 4 (2) CC H/S Bn VAC (6) Each General & Special
Each Division (6) CC X Corps (2) Staff Section (1)

OFFICIAL:

W. W. Mersingh,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.
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Annex APFL to Operation Plan Number 4-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION

V Amphibious Corps — Maj Gen Schmidt USMC

Corps Troops — Col Gladden USMC (Administrative)

* * *
En VAC (less Sigs)
1st BN VAC
2nd BN, Svc Co (less 3d & 4th Plato)
20th APU (Tyre G)
4d Bn, 92nd Rep 29th Repn En
Recovery Tms 16th, 16, 17, 16, 16, 20, 21
26th Metropolitan CIC Unit
16th Metropolitan CIC Unit
404th CIC, 16th MP & 16th MP, 16th MP, 16th MP
4th CIC, 16th MP, 16th MP
17th CIC, 16th MP, 16th MP
Scientific Cn
JIC/CA Int Tm #8
Armed Forces Fed Sta HAC
Armed Forces Fed Sta 'LV'
26th Sen Idty Plt
16th Svc Plt (Prov)
Co E 7th MP En (Prov)
1st Plt 1636 FP FM Prov Co
1/F 33CU #4
Headon VAC #1

Shore Brigade — Col Fenton USMC

* * *
Co 3d Shore Brig
8th Svc Rgt (Res) (less Sigs)
24th Mar Den Co
30th Mar Den Co
49d Mar Den Co
43d Mar Den Co
6th Mar Ammo Co
10th Mar Ammo Co
1st Svc Coll Co (Prov)

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1st Saly Ber Co (Prov)
1st Fum & Path Co (Prov)
1st Evry Plt (Prov)
Pond Des Co 75th En V&A (less 2d & 3d Plts)
2d Air Tel Plt Serv Cond
Ho & Fo Det 397th QM En
365th QM Fd Co
443d QM Serv Co
390d QM Serv Co
Det 737th Ev Operating En
1st Plt 120th QM Evry Co

Ho & Fo Det 652d QM En
389d QM Serv Co
3d Plt 389th QM Dry Co (SM)
236th QM Dry Serv (Fostr)(Ybl)
216th QM Dry Serv (Fostr)(Ybl)
236th QM Dry Serv (Fostr)(Ybl)
3d Plt 120th QM Evry Co

101st QM Graves Regr Plt

677d Fort Co
157d Fort Co
557d Sit Dom Co
332d Med Base Ten Co (556th Critical Rn Tm Atchd)

Shorearty Cmp Unit
CUP 19 (less Sets)

Engineer Troops

5901st Engr Cons Frig - Frigten Robinson USA
591st Engr Co 5901st Engr Cons Frig
582d Engr Co 1128th Engr Cons Co
591st Engr Co 1177th Engr Cons Co
373th Engr Cons En
1777th Engr Cons En

Ho & Fo Co 1400th Engr Base Dom Co
1541st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Plt)
1664th Engr Ter Co
Ho & Fo Co 1062d Engr FCR Co
1232d Engr CS Bngt
941st Engr Avn En
277d Engr Avn En (less Co A)
974th Engr Avn En
1881st Engr Avn En
1002d Engr Avn En

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-2-
Annex A for Operation Plan Number 445.

161st Engr Avn Co
380th Engr Base Train Co
166th Engr Dr Trk Co
573d Engr En Trk Co
777d Engr En Trk Co
1532d Engr En Trk Co
3076th Engr En Trk Co
1495th Engr Maint Co
1497th Engr Maint Co
1508th Engr Water Sup Co
2311th Engr Pet Dist Co
636th Engr Lt Equip Co
1771st Engr Util Det (Av)
329th Engr Serv Plt (Fire Plt)
3180th Engr Fire Plt (Avn)
1050th Engr Gas Gen Det
730th Engr Refrigeration Maint Det (Av)
1978th Engr Ferro Det (Avn)

To 7th NC Regt - Capt Andrews USN
25th NC En
other NC Enns as assigned

Prov Combat Engr Co - ItCol Lutz
3d Engr Co 11th Engr (C) Gr
93d Engr Fd En
1508th Engr (C) En
1509th Engr (C) En
546th Engr Tn Bridge Co
2026th Engr Tech Int Trm (Av)

Signal Battalion VAC (Reinforced) - ItCol Smart USVCS

Six En VAC (less dets)
1st Sen Pl Trk
5th Sen Pl Trk
Co C 50th Sig Cons En

Provisional Motor Transport Group - ItCol Schiehall USVCS

12th MT En (Prov)
90th Arm Trk En (Prov) (less Cos A, B, and C)
Fc & Fq Det 71st Q. En (Wbl)
764th Ctr Trk Co (w/Dr Det)

SECRET
ANNEX APLF to Operation Plan Number 4-45.

S. OR T.

386th En Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
311th En Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
358th En Trk Co (En)(w/Dr Det)
737th Cnsi Sup Co
746th Ord A Co
754th Ord W.A. Co

Provisional Medical Group - Dent Young USN

1o Det Tread Gen
2d Ed En Vac
Corra 1st Year Fl
Corra 2nd Year Fl
26th Ed En
Co A 386th Ed En
Co C 386th Ed En
Co D 386th Ed En
Co E 386th Ed En
73d Field Hos (400 bed)
90th Field Hos (400 bed)
95th Field Hos (400 bed)
501st Med San Co
710th Med San Co
11th Med San Co
12th Med San Co
12th Med San Co
13th Med San Co
10th Med San Co
79th Med San Co
7th Army Med Lab
11th Med Fl (Tune?)
9th Vet Food Instr Tm
10th Vet Food Instr Tm
48th Vet Food Instr Tm (21)
49th Vet Food Instr Tm
201st Vet Surv Det
201st Vet Surv Det
202nd Vet Surv Det
415th Vet Surv Det
73rd Vet Contl Det
74th Vet Contl Det
75th Vet Contl Det
76th Vet Contl Det
77th Vet Contl Det
78th Vet Contl Det
79th Vet Contl Det
80th Vet Contl Det

SECRET
PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT CROWN - Col Fough USMC

26th Marines
26th En 13th Marines
E Co 5th Tner En
E Co 5th Tn En
E Co 5th Med En
C Co 74th P En
571st Flot Bomb Tn Co VAC En VAC
5th Ammo Trk Co
5th Prov VT Gr (VAC)
5th Serv Co 5th Serv En
26th Flot Grd Co 5th Serv En
7th Co 74th En
7th Sig En VAC
Special Civil Censorship Tnt (VAC)
Special U.S. Cat (VAC)
7th Metropolitan CIC Unit
7th Service Recovery Tnt
7th Govt Tnt
7th Prov 1st (VAC)
7th Prov 2nd (VAC)

33rd Infantry Division (Reinforced) - MajGen Gill USA

33rd InfDiv
33rd CIC Assg Det (Areas)
33rd CIC Reg Det (Combat)
33rd Govt Grp
33rd Govt Det 33rd Govt Grp

5th Marine Division (Reinforced) (less 5CT 77) - MajGen Bourke USMC

5th MarDiv (less 5CT 77)
C Co 20th Ammo Trk En (Prov)
VAC 5
116th NC En
8th Adv Ammo Co
33rd Gnr Det 8th Adv Ammo Co
33rd Gnr Det 33rd Adv Ammo Co

SECRET
A. 3rd Flot Bomb Divn Co "B" En Y/C
   7th VP En (Prov) (less Cos F & C)
   6th VP VQ Doc Flot
   8th Sen Idrv Flot
   403rd CTC A/222 Flt (Area)
   403rd CTC Pk Flt (Combat)
   "11 Govt Cn
   "W" Flt 11 Govt Cn
   Recovery Tn "11"

B. 2d Marine Division (Reinforced) - MajGen Funt USMC
   2d Yard Div
   2d Amph Trk Co
   Co "50th Amph Trk En (Prov)
   Y/C-0
   7th NC En
   2d Yard For Flot
   4th Ser Idrv Flot
   3d Flot 4th Solv Ser Co
   45th CTC A/222 Flt (Area)
   45th CTC Pk Flt (Combat)
   "11 Govt Cn
   "W" Flt 11 Govt Cn

C. Corps Artillery
   As assigned

D. 20th AAA On - To be designated
   20th AAA On
   73rd AAA Gun En (S') (SPU attached)
   63rd AAA AV En

SECRET
031/47
Ser.00761P

Annex AE/F to Operation Plan Number 4-45.

SECRET

896th AAA AW En
Stry P 236th AAA S/I En (S') (SPU & ESMD atchd)
1674 AAA Corps Det

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHUMBT:

H. H. FOREST,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief Of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Operation Plan Number 4-45.

OFFICIAL:

W. L. HENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACoFS, S-F

SECRET
MAP OF JAPAN
SCALE 1:1,000,000

HEIGHTS AND DEPTHS IN METERS

SHEET NO. 1267-1
PREPARED BY 37TH ARMY MAP CO. IN JAPAN JULY 1945
PRINTED BY MK. ENG. DEPT. 37TH ARMY MAP CO. IN JAPAN

OPERATIONS MAP
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

APPENDIX:
DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Operation Plan Number 4-45.
OFFICIAL:

W. W. VERZIEN
Colonel, USMC, AGOFB, O-8.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012
016/118
Ser.008135

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

1900 27 September 1945.

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER:
Occupation of FUKUOKA, BAKER ONE (Phase II)
NUMBER...41-45

Maps, Charts, Photos: See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan No. 2-45,
Intelligence.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION FUKUOKA OCCUPATION FORCE: See Annex ABLE
(Task Organization).

1. (a) (1) See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan No. 2-45 and G-2
Studies and information issued separately.

(2) This order pertains specifically to the occupation
of the FUKUOKA area and initiates BAKER ONE (Phase
II) operation as outlined in VAC Operation Plan
Number 4-45.

(b) An advance party will proceed to FUKUOKA on 27 September
1945 for the purpose of making arrangements for the
entry into and occupation of that area by elements of
the V Amphibious Corps.

2. (a) V Amphibious Corps (rein), commencing at 0600 on 3-day,
Mill, by overland movement from SASEBO, establish occupation
forces in the FUKUOKA area, in order to extend
Corps control in assigned zone of responsibility.

(b) C-day: 30 September 1945.

(c) For initial center of occupation, FUKUOKA, see Annex
EASY to Operation Plan No. 4-45.

3. (a) FUKUOKA OCCUPATION FORCE will:

(1) Commencing at 0800 on C-day proceed by rail movement
from SASEBO to FUKUOKA.

(2) Establish occupation forces in the FUKUOKA area and
maintain surveillance over and supervise Japanese
armed forces and civilian population's compliance
with the prescribed terms of surrender.

(3) Expedite control over all airfields and aircraft
facilities in assigned zone. Extend area of occupa-
tion to include ASHIYA airfield facilities at earli-
est practicable time after occupying FUKUOKA.
(4) Execute missions outlined in paragraph 3.x. Operation Plan Number 2-45.

(5) Conduct engineering reconnaissance in accordance with directives contained in paragraph 2.c. of Annex HIIF (revised) Operation Plan 2-45 and assist the initiation of base development missions to be assigned.

(6) Release 1Lt Hq and Hq Co 5201st Engr (C) Bn to operational control Commanding General that Brigade upon arrival FUKUCKA.

(7) As representative of the Commanding General V Amphibious Corps, assume local control of all forces assigned the FUKUCKA area for the purpose of assignment of areas, procurement, civil affairs, military government, counterintelligence, military police activities and similar functions requiring overall coordination. Be prepared to release control of the area to the Commanding General 32d InfDiv or Corps order.

(i) 5thMarDiv (Reinf) (less des) will:

(1) Continue execution of missions assigned.

(2) Release 5thMarDiv elements to FUKUCKA Occupation Force as designated in Annex ABLE hereto and assist that unit in mounting out for the operation.

(c) 2dMarDiv (Reinf) will continue execution of assigned missions.

(d) Corps and Special Troops will continue execution of assigned missions and release elements to FUKUCKA Occupation Force as indicated in Annex ABLE hereto.

(x) (1) See Operation Plans Number 2-45 and 4-45 and effective annexes thereto.

(2) Special emphasis will be placed on (a) the prevention of looting and, (b) the execution of sanitary precautions in assigned billets.

SECRET
4. (c) See Administrative Order 6-45 and current administrative instructions as issued.

(b) V Amphibious Corps will supervise the administrative details and movement of the FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

5. (a) See Annex HOW to Operation Plan Number 2-45.

(b) The FUKUOKA Occupation Force will enter Corps Command Net, 1560 kcs upon arrival at FUKUOKA; use CSP 1500/1607 and CSP 1145/1146 for classified radio traffic.

(c) Command Posts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V Amphibious Corps</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5thMarDiv</td>
<td>AINOURA Naval Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ndMarDiv</td>
<td>Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUOKA Occupation Force</td>
<td>NAGASAKI Custom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To be reported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:
ABLE: FUKUOKA Occupation Force Task Organization.
BAKER: Omitted
CHARLIE: Omitted
DCC: Omitted
EASY: See Annex EASY Operation Plan 4-45 for FUKUOKA Area only.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army (6) CC Corps Troops (2) Each Gen & Spec
ConFirthP&bPer (2) CC H&S En Vac (6) Staff Sec (1)
ComPhibGp 4 (2) CG X Corps (2) War Diary (1)
Each Div (6) Each Corps Spec FILE (10)
CG FUKUOKA Occupation Force (6) Troop Unit (2)

OFFICIAL:
J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
AOGfS, G-3 (Acting).
SECRET

Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 41-45.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION FUKUOKA OCCUPATION FORCE

FUKUOKA Occupation Force — BrigGen Robinson, USMC.
Dot Hq Co 6thMarDiv
Dot Sig En VaC
94th CIC Metropolitan Dot
Language Dot VaC
Dot Hq & Hq Co 5201st Engr (C) Brig
28th Mil Govt Co
MLT 1/22 (Reinf)
1st Bn 28th Mar
1st Plat "C" Co 5th Engr En
31 Plat "C" Co 31 MP Bn (Prov)
Dot 116th NC Bn
Co "C" 5th Med Bn

NOTE: Present attachments and organization all division and other Corps units remain effective except as herein modified.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as Operation Order Number 41-45.

OFFICIAL:

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACoRS, C-3 (Acting),
OPERATION ORDER

SECRET

NUMBER... 42-45

Horns, Charts, Photos: See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan No. 2-45, Intelligence.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION SHINOSEKI OCCUPATION GROUP: See Annex ABEL.

1. (a) (1) See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan No. 2-45 and 2-2 Studios and information issued separately.

(2) This order continues BAKER OII (Phase II) operations and pertains specifically to the occupation of the city of SHINOSEKI and the approaches thereto.

(b) An advance party will proceed to SHINOSEKI on 2 October 1945 for the purpose of making arrangements for the entry into and occupation of that city by elements of V Amphibious Corps.

2. V Amphibious Corps (Rein), commencing at 0700 on 4 October will, by overland movement from Sasebo, establish occupation forces in the city of SHINOSEKI and approaches thereto in order to extend Corps control in assigned zone of responsibility.

3. (a) SHINOSEKI Occupation Group will:

(1) Commencing immediately, organize the SHINOSEKI Occupation Group in accordance with Annex ABEL.

(2) Commencing at 0700 on 4 October proceed by rail movement from Sasebo to SHINOSEKI via FUKUOKA.

(3) Establish occupation forces in the SHINOSEKI area and initiate action to maintain surveillance over and supervise Japanese armed forces' and civilian population's compliance with the prescribed terms of surrender.

(4) Report to CG FUKUOKA Occupation Force for operational control upon arrival FUKUOKA.

- 1 -
(b) FUKUOKA Occupation Force will:

(1) Continue execution of missions assigned.

(2) Assume operational control of SHIKINOSKEKI Occupation Group upon its arrival at FUKUOKA. Report to this Headquarters the time of assuming control. Make necessary adjustments in composition of Group from forces available.

(3) Initiate preparation for assisting occupation of SHIKINOSKEKI area by permanent occupation force to arrive later.

(c) 5th Marine Division (Reinf) (less duty) will:

(1) Continue execution of missions assigned.

(2) Effective immediately release 5th Marine Division elements to SHIKINOSKEKI Occupation Group as designated in Annex ABLE hereeto and assist that unit in mounting out for the operation.

(3) 26 Marine Division (Reinf) will continue execution of assigned missions.

(c) Corps and Special Troops will continue execution of assigned missions and effective immediately release elements to SHIKINOSKEKI Occupation Group as indicated in Annex ABLE hereeto.

(x) (1) See Operation Plan No. 2-45 and effective annexes thereeto.

(2) Special emphasis will be placed on (a) the prevention of looting and, (b) the execution of sanitary precautions in assigned billets.

4. (a) See Administrative Order No. 10-45 and current administrative instructions as issued.

(b) V Amphibious Corps will supervise administrative details connected with the movement of the SHIKINOSKEKI Occupation Group.

(c) CG FUKUOKA Occupation Force provides logistics support upon assuming operational control of SHIKINOSKEKI Occupation Group.
013/113
Ser.008373 Operation Order Number 42-45 (Continued).

SECRET

5. (a) See Annex HCO to Operation Plan No. 2-45.
(b) CG FUKUOKA Occupation Force will provide communication instructions upon assuming control of SHIMONOSEKI Occupation Group.
(c) Command Posts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V Amphibious Corps</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5thMarDiv</td>
<td>AINOURA Naval Training Station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26thMarDiv</td>
<td>NAGASAKI Custom House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUOKA Occupation Force</td>
<td>FUKUOKA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIMONOSEKI Occupation Group</td>
<td>To be reported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:
ABLE: Initial SHIMONOSEKI Occupation Group Task Organization.

DISTRIBUTION:

| CG SIXTH Army | (6) | CG SHIMONOSEKI Occupation Gp | (3) | Each Corps Spec Troop Unit | (2) |
| CGFifthPhibFor | (2) | CG Corps Troops | (2) | Each Gen & Spec | |
| CTF 55 | (2) | CG H & S Bn Vac | (6) | Staff Sec | (1) |
| Each Div | (6) | CG X Corps | (2) | War Diary | (1) |
| CG FUKUOKA Occupation Force | (6) | | | FILE | (10) |

OFFICIAL:

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACofS, G-3 (Acting).
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD.

1600 1 October 1945.

annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 42-45.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION SHIMONOSEKI OCCUPATION GROUP

SHIMONOSEKI Occupation Group - Maj Peatros

K Co 28th Mar
Det "C" Co 5th Engr Bn
1 Sqd 2d Plt "C" Co 3d MP Bn
Det H&S Co 3d Bn 28th Mar
Det 116th MC Bn
Det Hq Co 5th MarDiv
Det Sig Bn VMAC
93d CIC Metropolitan Det

NOTE: Present attachments and organization all division and other Corps units remain effective except as herein modified.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Operation Order Number 42-45.

OFFICIAL:

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
AGofS, G-3 (Acting).
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.
SECRET

18OCl 3 October 1945.

Organization: VAC,
Number: 43-45

The following organization of V Amphibious Corps is effective as of 0824CO/1:

TASK ORGANIZATION

V Amphibious Corps - MajGen Schmidt USMC

Corps Troops - Col Gladden USMC (administrative)

H&S Bn VAC (less des)  
Det Hq SIXTH Army  
22d Sp Serv Co (less 3d & 4th Plats)  
23d AP (Type G)  
Hq 95th Metropolitan CI C Unit  
404th CI C 4262 Det (Area)  
468th CIC 33 Det (Combat)  
4th Censorship Adv Det  
173d Fin Disbursing Det  
Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #1  
Armed Forces Adm Sta WFO  
Armed Forces Adm Sta NLKA  
8th Dep Lary Flat  
2d Bkry Flat (Prov)  
Hq Co Shore Brig  
3d MP Bn (Prov) (less Cos A, C & D)  
LanFore Air Supt Contl Unit #4  
Hacron AG #1

6th Service Bnpt (sastinf) (less des) - Col Griebel USMC

6th Serv Bnpt  
24th Mar Dep Co  
36th Mar Dep Co  
42d Mar Dep Co  
43d Mar Dep Co  
6th Mar Ammo Co  
10th Mar Ammo Co  
1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)  
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)  
1st Fum & Bath Co (Prov)  
1st Bkry Flat (Prov)  
2d Air Dtl Flat ServCmd  
Hq & Hq Det 327th QA Bn  
565th QA Rfi Co  
4403d QA Serv Co  
3242d QA Serv Co  
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn  
1st Flat 128th & Bkry Co
SECRET

Hq & Hq Det 693d QM En
332d QM Serv Co
4th Flat 369th QM Ldry Co (SM)
236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
239th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
5th Flat 1020th QM Bkry Co
101st QM Graves Regr Plat

Hq & Hq Det 350th Port Bn
123d Port Co
124th Port Co
153d Port Co
553d Sig Dep Co
62d Med Base Dep Co (556th Optical Rep Tm attached)

CUR 18 - Capt Wilson USN

Port Director (w/Com Unit)

2nd Pool

Garrison Beach BN
1st Special NC BN
Other units as assigned

Engineer Troops

5201st Engr Cons Brig - BrigGen Robinson USA

Hq & Hq Co 5201st Engr Cons Brig
Hq & Hq Co 1118th Engr Cons Grp
Hq & Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Grp
339th Engr Cons BN
1777th Engr Cons BN
Hq & Hq Co 1409th Engr Base Dep Grp
1541st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Flat)
1564th Engr Dep Co
Hq & Hq Co 1052d Engr PC&O Co
1532d Engr US Rgt
841st Engr Avn BN
873d Engr Avn BN (less Co A)
574th Engr Avn BN
581st Engr Avn BN
1902d Engr Avn BN
1913th Engr Avn BN
689th Engr Base Equip Co
196th Engr Dp Trk Co
759th Engr Dp Trk Co
773d Engr Dp Trk Co
1532d Engr Dp Trk Co
1485th Engr Maint Co
1487th Engr Maint Co
1505th Engr Water Sup Co
Cem 431st Field Dist Co
628th Engr Lt Eq 2p Co
1731st Engr Util Det (EE)
3184th Engr Serv Det (Fire Ftg)
3162d Engr Fire Ftg Flat
1050th Engr Gas Gen Det
3186th Engr Refrigeration Maint Det (DG)
1 Flt 3375d MI Refrigeration Co (Mbl)
1979th Engr Repro Det (Avn)

Hq 7th NC Regt - Capt Andrews USN
98th NC Bn
Other NC Bns as assigned

Prov Combat Engr Cp - LtCol Lytz USMC
Hq & Hq Co 1161st Engr (C) Gp
2d Sep Engr Bn
1666th Engr (C) Bn
546th Engr Pym Bridge Co
3288th Engr Tech Int Tm (C)

Signal Battalion VAC (Reinf) - LtCol Smart USMC

Sig Bn VAC (less dates)
1st Sep RT Plat
5th Sep RT Plat
6th P/Way Cons Trm

Provional Motor Transport Group - LtCol Schiesswohl USMC

12th HT Bn (Prov) (less Co B and 2d Plt Auto Rep Co)
30th Amph Trk Bn (Prov) (less Cos A, B, and C)
Hq & Hq Det 71st MI Bn (Mbl)
3354th MI Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
311th MI Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
3561st MI Trk Co (Hvy) (w/Dr Det)
3357d MI Gas Sup Co
3475th Ord Hvy Co
3540th Ord Hvy Co
284th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Tk)

Provional Medical Group - Capt Young USN

Hq Det Prov Med Gp
Med Bn VAC
Corps EVac Hosp #1
Corps Evac Hosp #3
Hq & Hq Det 135th Med Bn
Co F 284th Med Bn
Co C 284th Med Bn
692d Med Amb Co
73d Field Hosp (400 bed)
92d Field Hosp (400 bed)

- 3 -
Ser.008443  Operation Order Number 43-45  (Continued)

25th Evac Hosp (750 bed)
731st Med San Co
732nd Med San Co
116th Sta Hosp (500 bed)
123d Sta Hosp (250 bed)
122d Sta Hosp (500 bed)
13th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
309th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
47th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
5th Army Med Lab
11th Gen Disp (Type 2)
98th Vet Food Inspt Tm
108th Vet Food Inspt Tm
466th Dent Pros Tm (Hbl)
24th Hal Surv Det
201st Hal Surv Det
203d Hal Surv Det
415th Hal Surv Det
36th Hal Contl Det
74th Hal Contl Det
75th Hal Contl Det
76th Hal Contl Det
83d Hal Contl Det
94th Hal Contl Det
95th Hal Contl Det

Provisional Military Government Group - Col Hough USMC

Hq & Hq Co 92d Mil Govt Gp

a. 5th Marine Division (Reinforced) (less dets) - MajGen Bourke, USMC

5thMarDiv (less dets)
5th Amph Trk Co (Prov)
Co C 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
V10-6
6th Mar War Dog Plat
6th Sep Ldry Plat
113th NC Bn (less dets)
8th Mar Ammo Co
33d Mar Dep Co
34th Mar Dep Co
Co A and 1st Plat Co C 3d MP Bn (Prov)
403d CIC A225 Det (Area)
466th CIC B6 Det (Combat)
24th Hq & Hq Det III Govt Gp
7th Hq & Hq Det III Govt Gp

b. 2d Marine Division (Reinforced) - MajGen Hunt USMC

2dMarDiv
2d Amph Trk Co
Co A 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
V10-2

SECRET
Operation Order Number 48-46  (Continued)

2d Amer Div  Doc Flat
4th Spt Ldry Flat
48th PC bn
3d Flot Bomb Disb Co W/3 Bn VAC
Co D 3d MS Bn (Prov)
34th Flot 4th Sply Pan Co
54th CITC 4922 Det (Arms)
496th CITC 83 Det (Combat)
25th Hq & Hq Det 11 Govt Co
126th Engr (C) Bn
307th Engr Ld Trk Co
365th Ld Trk Co

324 Infantry Division (Reinforced) – MajGen Hill USMC

(less 1st Bn, 127th Inf)

32d Inf Div (less 1st Bn) 127th Inf
71st Amph Trk Co
Hq & Hq Det 236th Crd Bn
3007th Crd Bn 2nd Det Co
328th Crd Am Hq Co
236th Cpl Serv Flat
4th Flot 3563rd Ldry Co (S.)

PLBOKA Occupation Force – BrigGen Robinson USMC

24th Marines
Co G 6th Ldry BN
Co H 6th Ldry BN
4th Flot Div 1st Co
Co F Flot Serv Co
Co B Flot Serv Co
Det 116th FC Bn
Det Lr Co 8th Mar Div
6th ASCC (less Cts)
Co G 3d Flt BN (Prov) (less 1st Flot)
Co G 12th AT BN (Prov) 30 Flt Auto Rep Co stbd
1st Flot Bomb Disb Co W/3 Bn VAC
Hq 93d Metropolitan CITC Unit
Hq 94th Metropolitan CITC Unit
Hq & Hq Co 237th Mil Govt Co
Hq & Hq Co 26th Mil Govt Gp
Co G 26th Bn Cons BN
Det 116th Bn VAC

Language Det VAC
SECRET

c. KANCY Occupation Force - LtCol Fraser USA
   1stBn 107th Inf
   American 4th Govt Unit #1
   28th Fort Sura Hosp
   Co A 878d Engr Avn Bn
   101st Bomb Disp Squad
   683d QM Rhd Sec

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army (6)
COMFIFTH/III FORC (2)
CIF 55 (2)
EACH DIV (6)
CO X Corps (2)
CG FUKUJKA Occupation Force (6)
CG KANCY Occupation Force (3)
CG Corps Troops (2)
CG H&S Bn VAC (2)
Each Corps Spl Troop Unit (2)
EACH General & Spl Stf Sec (1)
Jar Diary (1)
F I L E (10)

OFFICIAL:

M. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AsCoSo, G - 3.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

1600 5 October 1945.

OPERATION ORDER

NUMBER...44-45

Maps, Charts, Photos: See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan Number 2
(Intelligence).

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Operation Order Number 43-45.

1. (a) See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan Number 2-45 and
G-2 information and studies issued separately.

(b) (1) This order pertains specifically to the occupa-
tion of the KANoya area and confirms verbal
instructions delivered to forces there by VAC
liaison officers at KANoya 1 October.

2. (a) V Amphibious Corps (Reinf) as directed by higher
authority assumes operational control of ground
forces in the KANoya area as of 010001 October in
order to extend operational control in assigned
zone of responsibility and to continue the execution
of assigned missions.

(b) KANoya area: Point 1391.5 - 902.7 point 1393-892
point 1408-892 point 1409-902 point
1404-903 point 1385-892.7 (Map of Central Japan
1/250,000 sheet 61 2d Edition).

3. (a) KANoya Occupation Force will:

(1) Be organized under the control of the Commanding
Officer, 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry in accord-
ance with VAC Operation Order Number 43-45 dated
3 October 1945, and issued separately.

(2) Execute applicable missions set forth in VAC
Operation Plan Number 2-45 and effective annexes
thereto with particular emphasis on the common
tasks set forth in paragraphs 5.x.(8) and (9) of
that plan.

(3) Maintain occupation forces in the KANoya area;
maintain security of the KANoya airfield and
facilities, and continue operations to maintain
surveillance over and supervise Japanese armed
forces' and civilian population in compliance
with the prescribed terms of surrender.
SECRET

(4) Initiate patrol surveillance of Southeastern KYUSHU South of a line HIIZAKI-MIYAKO-OKI-FUKUSHIMA all inclusive.

(5) Maintain liaison with Commander U. S. Army Air Forces in KAJIMA area and coordinate occupational operations so as to insure minimum interference with our own air activities. Make available to Commander Air Forces at KAJIMA, service unit facilities consistent with the requirements of the ground force.

(6) As representative of the Commanding General, 7th Amphibious Corps assumes local control of all forces assigned the KAJIMA area for civil affairs, military government, counterintelligence, military police activities, ground security, billeting areas and procurement.

(a) 5th Marine Division (Reinf) (less dates) will continue execution of assigned missions.

(b) 2d Marine Division (Reinf) will continue execution of assigned missions.

(c) FUKUSHIMA Occupation Force will continue execution of assigned missions.

(d) Corps and Special Troops will continue execution of assigned missions.

(1) See Operation Plan Number 4-45.

(2) Special emphasis will be placed on (a) the prevention of looting and (b) the execution of sanitary precautions in assigned billets.

(e) See Administrative Order Number 5-45 and current administrative instructions as issued.

(1) 7th Amphibious Corps assumes responsibility for logistical support of all forces in the KAJIMA area as arranged with SIXTH Army.
SECRET

5. (a) See Annex HOW to Operation Plan Number 2-45.

(b) Det Sig Ba Vac, with special communications elements, attached to KANOA Occupation Force upon arrival KANOA area. Enter Corps command at 1600 hrs.

(c) Command Posts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V Amphibious Corps</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5thMarDiv</td>
<td>AIRIURA Naval Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2dMarDiv</td>
<td>Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUOKA Occupation Force</td>
<td>HIROSHIMA Customs House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANOA Occupation Force</td>
<td>FUKUOKA Airfield</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SASEBO:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army (3) CG 32dInfDiv (3) CO KANOA Air Task Force (1)
ConFifthPhilDiv (2) CG FOF (3) CO KANOA Occupation Forces (3)
CTF 55 (2) CG X Corps (2) Da Corps & Spec Biz Unit (2)
CG 5thMarDiv (5) CO Corps Troops (2) Da Gen & Spec Staff Div (1)
CG 2dMarDiv (8) CO H&S En Vac (6) War Diary (1)

OFFICIAL:

W. W. WISE,
Colonel, 3d ACOF,
ACOFs, G-6.
OPERATION ORDER: Extension of Occupation Operations in VAC Area

NUMBER...45-45) of Responsibility.

Maps, Charts, Photos: See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan No. 2-45 and Annex EASY hereto.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex ABLE.

1. a. See current G & G Summaries and studies issued separately.
   b. SIXTH Army continues execution of assigned occupation missions.

2. a. V Amphibious Corps (12thInf), will at 110701 October initiate further occupation operations to extend control over VAC area of responsibility.

3. a. FUKUOKA Occupation Force will:

   (1) Continue execution assigned missions in areas previously occupied.

   (2) Commencing at 110701 Oct, initiate patrol surveillance over remainder of assigned area of responsibility (See Annex EASY).

   (3) Establish at YAMAGUCHI, capital of YAMAGUCHI KEN, a Marine detachment, commanded by an experienced field officer, to represent the Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force in the implementation of the missions assigned in VAC Operation Plan No. 2-45.

   (4) Provide supervisory personnel at each port of entry of repatriated Japanese nationals and conduct checks for weapons, loot and excess food as previously directed.

   (5) Be prepared to release control of assigned area to designated unit of the 32dInfDiv on VAC order.

   (6) See paragraph 5.x.(6), VAC Operation Plan No. 2-45.

   b. 5th Marine Division (Reinf)(less dets) will:

   (1) Continue execution assigned missions in areas previously occupied.
Operation Order Number 43-45. (Continued).

SECRET

(2) Commencing at 190700I initiate patrol surveillance over remainder of assigned area of responsibility on KYUSHU, prepared on Corps order to reconnoiter the remaining islands within Division boundaries (See Annex EASY).

(3) Establish at CITA, capital of CITA KEN, a Marine detachment, commanded by an experienced field officer, to represent the Commanding General 5thMarDiv in the implementation of missions assigned in VAC Operation Plan No. 2-45.

(4) Provide supervisory personnel at each port of entry of repatriated Japanese nationals and conduct checks for weapons, loot and excess food as previously directed.

(5) Be prepared to assume control 5thMarDiv elements assigned FUKUOKA Occupation Force when 32dInfDiv has relieved that force in assigned zone.

(6) See paragraph 3.x.(c), VAC Operation Plan No. 2-45.

c. 2d Marine Division (Reinf) will:

(1) Continue execution assigned missions in areas previously occupied.

(2) Commencing at 190700I initiate patrol surveillance over remainder of assigned area of responsibility. (See Annex EASY).

(3) Establish at MIYAZAKI and at KAGOSHIMA, capitals of MIYAZAKI and KAGOSHIMA KENS respectively, a Marine detachment, commanded by an experienced field officer, to represent the Commanding General, 2dMarDiv in the implementation of missions assigned in VAC Operation Plan No. 2-45.

(4) Provide supervisory personnel at each port of entry of repatriated Japanese nationals and conduct checks for weapons, loot and excess food.
Operation Order Number 45-45.

(Continued).

SECRET

(5) Initially coordinate surveillance of Southwestern Kyushu with CO KAN'GO Occupation Force in the patrol area assigned that Force in VAC Operation Order No. 44-45, prepared to assume operational control of that Force on Corps Order.

(6) See paragraph 3.x.(6), VAC Operation Plan No. 2-45.

d. KAN'GO Occupation Force will:

(1) Continue execution missions assigned by Operation Order No. 44-45.

(2) Coordinate patrol activity in assigned patrol zone with CG, 2nd ArDiv, prepared to pass to the operational control of CG 2nd ArDiv on Corps order (See Annex EASY).

e. 326 Infantry Division (Reinf) (less BLT 1/127 (Reinf)) will:

(1) Upon arrival at Sasebo, be prepared to land designated elements in Sasebo Harbor for overland movement in echelon to the SHIMONOSEKI, NOJI and FUKUOKA areas.

(2) Be prepared to transfer to LSTs, LSTs and LCTs and land all or part of the Division in FUKUOKA Harbor for further movement overland to assigned areas.

(3) Progressively relieve FUKUOKA Occupation Force and assume control of assigned area of responsibility (See Annex EASY).

(4) Complete the implementation of missions outlined in VAC Operation Plan No. 2-45.

(5) See paragraph 3.x.(5), VAC Operation Plan No. 2-45.

f. Corps and Special Troops will continue execution of assigned missions.

x. (1) Special emphasis will be placed on (a) the prevention of looting and, (b) the execution of sanitary precautions in assigned billets.
C12/162
CC8843

Operation Order Number 45-45. (Continued).

SECRET

(3) Field officers commanding detachments in Japan will be the senior representatives of occupying forces present and will assume command of Military Government units previously established in respective areas.

(3) The extension of occupation operations herein directed does not contemplate wide dispersal of major combat units. Commanders concerned will exercise surveillance of respective areas by the judicious use of patrols. Japanese authorities will be required to maintain adequate guards on installations, dumps and equipment except those involving prescribed items which require direct control by occupation forces. Keep this Headquarters advised of projected movements.

(4) Implementation of SCAF directive to the Japanese Government dated 4 October 1945, and passed to VAC units by dispatch on 6 October 1945, will be initiated by inspection of all prisons and places of detention within assigned areas and by assumption of control over all records of organizations abolished under the terms of the directive. Any effort on the part of any individual, group of individuals, or organization to circumvent the directive will be immediately reported to VAC Headquarters.

4. a. See Administrative Order No. 10-45. Divisions, FOE, and KOF will provide logistic support for subordinate units, detachments and patrols operating in their respective areas of responsibility.

b. V Amphibious Corps will supervise the administrative details and movement of the 32dInfDiv to the assigned area.

Operation Order Number 48-45. (Continued).

SECRET

b. Command Posts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Amphibious Corps</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOF</td>
<td>East Park FUKUOKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th MarDiv</td>
<td>AIMOURA Naval Training Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd MarDiv</td>
<td>NAGASAKI Custom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOF</td>
<td>KANoya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d InfDiv</td>
<td>To be reported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHRIEDT:

W. H. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

APPENDIX:

ABLE: Task Organization
BAKER: Chatted
CHARLIE: Chatted
DOG: Chatted
EASY: Operations Map

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army       (6) CG FOF       (3) Each Gen and
Com 6th Flt         (2) CG KOF       (3) Spec Staff
CG FIF Pac          (2) CG Corps Troops (2) Sec
CG 5th MarDiv       (3) CPO H&S En VAC (5) War Diary (1)
CG 2nd MarDiv       (6) Each Corps and Speres (10)
CG 32d InfDiv       (8) Spec Troop Unit (2) FILE

OFFICIAL:

W. W. ME. SINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACOF, 7 - 7.

-5-
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

Annex ASLE to Operation Order Number 48-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION

V Amphibious Corps - MajGen Schmidt USMC

Corps Troops - MajGladden USMC (Administrative)

8th En VAC (less data)
Det Hq SOUTHW Army
32d Sp Serv Co (less 3d & 4th Plts)
329th AFU (Type 8)
Hq 85th Metropolitan PCT Unit
404th CIC A2BB Det (Area)
468th CIC BS Det (Combat)
4th Censorship Adv Det
475th Fin Disbursing Det
Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #1
Armed Forces Ref Ste N756
Armed Forces Ref Ste MLNA
38th Sep Lrv Plts
1st Pky Plts (Prov)
12th Co (S) (Prov)

8th Sect VAC (less data)
1st & 5th Sep RI Plts, Atch A
3d LCI En (Prov) (less Cos A, C & D)
LandFor Air Sup Contl Unit #1

8th Service Bn (Reinf) (less data) - Col Griebel USMC

24th Mar Dep Co
36d Mar Lep Co
60th Mar Dep Co
441st Mar Dep Co
454th Mar Dep Co
6th Mar Ammo Co
10th Mar Ammo Co
1st Salv Call Co (Prov)
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
1st Fum & Bath Co (Prov)
1st Dgry Plt (Prov)
25th Air Del Plt Service

9th En Hq Det 327th QM En
335th QM Hld Co
4468d QM Serv Co
3242d QM Serv Co
Det 737th Ry Operating En
1st Plat 120th QM Btry Co
Annex AEBE to Operation Order Number 45-45. (Continued).

SECRET

HQ & Hq Det 623d QM Bn
362d QM Serv Co
4th Plt 368th QM Ldry Co (SM)
235th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
239th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
5th Plt 120th QM Bkry Co
101st QM Graves Repry Rpt

HQ 1st Hq Det 360th Port Bn
123d Port Co
124th Port Co
153d Port Co
633d Port Co
653d Sig Dep Co
62d Nasal Base Dep Co (655th Optical Rep Tm & Stckd)

CUE 35 - Capt Wilson USN

Port Director (w/Com Unit)

Boat Pool

Garrison Beach Bn

1st Special NC Bn

Other units as assigned

Engineer Troops

5201st Engr Cons Brig - BrigGen Robinson USA
HQ & Hq Co 5201st Engr Cons Brig
HQ & Hq Co 1112th Engr Cons Grp
HQ & Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Grp

1777th Engr Cons Brig
HQ & Hq Co 1409th Engr Base Dep Grp
1541st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Plt)
1554th Engr Dep Co
HQ & Hq Co 1052d Engr F&C Grp
841st Engr Avn Bn
873d Engr Avn Bn (less Co A)
1902d Engr Avn Bn
1913th Engr Avn Bn
689th Engr Base Equip Co
198th Engr Dp Trk Co
1458th Engr Maint Co
1487th Engr Maint Co

-2-
SECRET

461st Engr Pk Dist Co
103rd Engr Util Det (EE)
1080th Engr Gas Gen Det
3160th Engr Refrigeration Maint Det (DG)
1 Flt 2073rd FL Refrigeration Co (Mbl)
1973rd Engr Papro Det (Avn)
HQ 70th NC Regt - Capt Andrus USH
96th NC En
Other NC Engs as assigned
Prov Combat Engr Gp - LtCol Lytz USHCR
HQ & Hq Co 1161st Engr (C) Gp
2d Sep Engr En
566th Engr Pont Bridge Co
528th Engr Tech Maint Tm (C)

Provisional Motor Transport Group - Maj Huse USHCR

117th NC En (Prov) (less Co E and 3d Flt: Auto Rep Co)
206th Mph Trk En (Prov) (less Co A, B, and C)
HQ & Hq Det Flt QM En (MLL)
44th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
511th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
5561st QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
567th QM & Gas Sup Co
1475th Ord Hall Co
5540th Ord Hall Co
234th 3rd Aid Tmts Co (TL)

Provisional Medical Group - Capt Young USH

HQ Det Prov Med Gp
52d Med Yd
Corps Fwd Med #1
Corps Fwd Hosp #6
HQ & Hq Det 136th Med En
264th 264th Med En
264th 264th Med En
262d Med Amb Co
73d Field Hosp (400 bed)
82d Field Hosp (400 bed)
Annex ASEB to Operation Order Number 45-45. (Continued).

SECRET

25th Evac Hosp (750 bed)
721st Med San Co
712th Med San Co
118th Sta Hosp (500 bed)
123d Sta Hosp (850 bed)
122d Sta Hosp (500 bed)
13th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
309th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
47th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
5th Army Med Lab
11th Gen Disp (Type 2)
38th Vet Food Inspt Tk
108th Vet Food Inspt Tk
456th Dent Proc Tk (Mbl.)
24th Hal Surg Det
301st Hal Surg Det
205d Hal Surg Det
416th Hal Surg Det
36th Hal Contl Det
74th Hal Contl Det
75th Hal Contl Det
76th Hal Contl Det
85d Hal Contl Det
81st Hal Contl Det
76th Hal Contl Det

FUSOCHKA Military Government Group — Col Hough USMC
Ech C Ech Co 522d Mil Govt Gp

a. FUSOCHKA Occupation Force — Brig Gen Robinson USMC

28th Marines
C Co 5th Engr En
C Co 5th Med En
3d Plat Div Ord Co
3d Plat Div Svr Co
3d Plat Div Sup Co
Det 118th MC En
Det Hq to 5th Law Div
5th ASCO (less acts)
1686th Ingr (C) En
Hq & Hq Det 239th Ord En

SECRET
SECRET

Co C 3rd LP En (Prov) (less 1st Plat)
Co B 12th MT En (Prov) (2d Plat Auto Rep Co attd)
1st Plt Bomb Disb Co H&S En VAC
Hq 93d Metropolitan CIC Unit
Hq 94th Metropolitan CIC Unit
Hq & Hq Co 20th Mil Govt Gp
Hq & Hq Co 37th Mil Govt Gp
Co C 60th Sig Cons En (8th R/Way Cons Tm attd)
Det Sig En VAC
Language Det VAC

b. 5th Marine Division (Reinforced) (less acts) — MajGen Buzby, USMC

5thMarDiv (less acts)
53rd Amph Trk Co (Prov)
Co C 20th Amph Trk En (Prov)
VAC-2
5th War Dog Plat
5th Spt Ldry Plat
116th HC En (less acts)
4th War Ammo Co
44th Mar Dep Co
3d and 1st Plt Co 3rd LP En (Prov)
436d CIC A282 Det (Area)
436th CIC BS Det (Combat)
438th A & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
438th Engr & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp

C. 2d Marine Division (Reinforced) — MajGen Hunt, USMC

2dMarDiv
2d Amph Trk Co
Co A 90th Amph Trk En (Prov)
VAC-2
2d War Dog Plat
4th Spt Ldry Plat
43a HC En
2d Flat Bomb Disb Co H&S En VAC
Co E 8th MP En (Prov)
2d Plt 4th Salv Rep Co
44th CIC A282 Det (Area)
1286th CIC BS Det (Combat)
336d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
1296th Engr (C) En
5075th Engr Do Trk Co
3858th QM Trk Co

SECRET
Amher ABMN to Operation Order Number 45-45. (Continued.

SECRET

c. KANGA Occupation Force - LtCol Fraser USA

1st Bn 127th Inf
American Mil Govt Unit 71
25th Port Surg Hosp
Co A 873d Engr Avn Bn
101st Bomb Disp Squad
396th QM Med Sec

e. 32d Infantry Division (reinforced) - MajGen Gill USA
(less 1st Bn 127th Inf)

396th Div (less 1st BN, 127th Inf)
71st Army Inf Co
6097th 3rd Area Rep Co
324th 3rd Arm Co
278th Cal Serv Fd
4th Plat 3006th S/LARY Co (S.)

BY ORDER OF MAJOR GENERAL BUCHERT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff

DISPOSITION:
Same as Operation Order No. 44-44.

SPECIAL:

[Signature]

W. W. ROGERS,
Colonel, U.S.M.C.
ACtS, 4-44.
09/147
Ser.00692B

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.
1400, 11 October 1945.

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER:
Road Maintenance in SASEBO.

NUMBER: 46-45

Maps: See Annex BAKER to this Operation Order.

1. Effective upon receipt of this order, the responsibility for continuous maintenance of roads within the SASEBO area is assigned to:

   a. The 7th Naval Construction Regiment for roads within the area marked "A" Annex BAKER.

   b. The 5th Marine Division for all roads in the SASEBO area outside area marked "A" Annex BAKER.

2. All road maintenance will be conducted in accordance with paragraphs 3.a.(2), 3.i., and 4.f. of Annex NIKE (Revised) to Operation Plan No. 2-45, with maximum use being made of Japanese labor and construction materials and equipment. See Annex NIKE and Change No. 2 to Administrative Order No. 3-45 for procuring Japanese labor and Corps Memorandum No. 45-45, and Corps Special Order 53-45 for procuring Japanese material and equipment. Procedure for procurement of assistance from Japanese local authorities will be handled in accordance with existing procurement instructions.

   BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHLUETER:

   W. W. ROGERS,
   Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
   Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE: Omitted
BAKER: Road and Street Map of SASEBO.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG 5thMarDiv (10) OIC CUB 18 (5) En Gen Staff Sec (1) War
CG 6thServRegt (5) OIC 7th NC Regt (5) Engr Sec (1) Diary (1)
F I L E

OFFICIAL:

W. J. HITSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGOF, 3-3.
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER:

OPERATION ORDER:

NUMBER... 47-45)

Maps, Charts, Photos: See Annex BAKER to Operation Plan No. 47-45 and Annex EASY to Operation Order No. 46-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex ABLE.

1. a. See current G-2 Summaries and Studies issued separately.
   b. SIXTH Army continues execution assigned occupation missions.

2. V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS (Relief), will at 240800/1 (October):
   a. Establish the 32d Infantry Division (Relief) (less RCT 127) in the FUKUOKA - SHINGOSEKI area as the occupation force of that area.
   b. Relieve and disband the FUKUOKA Occupation Force.
   c. Organize the FUKUOKA Base Command.
   d. Continue occupation missions in assigned area of responsibility (See Annex EASY to Operation Order No. 45-45).

3. a. FUKUOKA Occupation Force will:
   (1) At 240800/1 (October), release occupational control of the FUKUOKA - SHINGOSEKI area to the 32d Infantry Division (Relief).
   (2) Pass control of elements of the FUKUOKA Occupation Force to Task Units indicated in Annex ABLE.
   (3) Disband the FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

b. FUKUOKA Base Command will:
   (1) At 240800/1 (October), organize in accordance with paragraph a. of Annex ABLE.
   (2) Be prepared to conduct the operation of the Port of FUKUOKA for resupply and general logistical support of ground and air forces in the FUKUOKA - SHINGOSEKI Occupation Area.
(3) Upon clearance of the port to U. S. vessels assume control of harbor facilities and regulate their use for Japanese repatriation and U. S. shipping.

(4) Coordinate the allocation of billeting and other facilities required by ground and air forces arriving in the FUKUOKA Area.

(5) Represent the Commanding General in matters relating to the Japanese Central Government of KYUSHU and the Japanese Western District Army (KYUSHU).

c. 32d Infantry Division (Reinf) (less 127th Inf (Reinf)) will:

(1) At 240000/I assume occupational control of the FUKUOKA - SHIMONOSEKI area (See Annex EASY to Operation Order No. 45-46).

(2) Exercise operational control over all units indicated in paragraph b. of Annex ABLE.

(3) Continue the execution of occupation tasks previously assigned the FUKUOKA Occupation Force (SeeVAO OpPlan No. 2-46 and supplementary instructions).

(4) Extend occupation operations as necessary to expedite control and prescribed disposition of Japanese war material.

d. 5th Marine Division (Reinf) (less 26th Mar (Reinf) and 28 Mar (Reinf) (less 3d Btn)) will continue execution of assigned missions.

e. 2d Marine Division (Reinf) will, continue execution of assigned missions, extend occupation operations in Southern KYUSHU as separately directed in my dispatch Order 221645/I (October).

f. KANOA Occupation Force will, continue execution of present missions, prepared to pass occupational control of assigned area to the 2d Marine Division (See my dispatch Order 221645/I (October).

g. Corps and Special Troops will continue execution of assigned missions.
Operation Order Number 47-45.

(Continued).

SECRET

x. See Operation Plan No. 2-45, Operation Order No. 45-45, and supplementary instructions issued.

4. a. The Commanding General, FUKUOKA Base Command will provide direct logistical support for units assigned to that command (See Annex ABLE) and upon assuming control of the port facilities of FUKUOKA, will provide general logistical support for all ground and air units in the FUKUOKA - SHIMONOSEKI Occupation Area.

b. Other Corps units see current administrative directives.

5. a. See V Mar SCI dated 10 October 1945.

b. Command Posts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V Amphibious Corps</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBC</td>
<td>East Park, FUKUOKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32dInFDiv</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5thMarDiv</td>
<td>AIJUNA Naval Training Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2dMarDiv</td>
<td>NAGASAKI Customs House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOF</td>
<td>KANoya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEX:

ABLE: Task Organization.
Operation Order Number 47-45.

(Distributed).

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
ComsthFlt
CG FMF Pac
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FOF
29 FBC
CG 5201st Engr Cons Brig
CO KO
CO H&S Bn VAC
CO 9th Serv Regt
CO CUB 18
CO Prov Med Grp

(8) CO Prov Mil Govt Grp
(2) CO LtASCU #4
(2) CO 7th NC Regt
(35) CO Prov Combat Engr Grp
(35) CO 3rd Inf Bn VAC
(35) CO 3rd MP Bn (Prov)
(3) CO Hedron MG #1
(20) CO 12th MT Bn Prov
(20) CO 20th Amph Tank Bn (Prov)
(3) Each Gen & Spl Staff Sec
(6) War Diary
(20) Spares
(10) F I L E

OFFICIAL:

W. W. WENSSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
G-3.
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET
22 October 1945.

Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 47-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION

V Amphibious Corps — Maj. Gen. Schmidt USMC

Corps Troops

H&S Bn Vac (less dets)
Army Sec Vac
22d Spl Ser Co (less 3d & 4th Flats)
929th AFU (Type G)
404th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
463d CIC B3 Det (Combat)
4th Censorship Adv Det
173d Fin Disbursing Det
Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #1
Armed Forces Rad Sta WVTO
Armed Forces Radar Sta MLKA
6th Sep Ldry Plat
2d Bkry Plat (Prov)
Hq Co Shore Brig
Sig Bn Vac (less dets) (1st & 5th Sep RI Flats atch’d)
3d HP Bn (Prov) (less Cos A, C & D)
LFASCU #4
Hedron NOG #1
12th MT Bn (Prov) (less Co B and 2d Flat Auto Rep Co)
208th Amph Trk Bn (Prov) (less Cos A, B & C)

8th Services Regt (Reinf) (less dets) — Col Griebel USMC

8th Ser Regt
24th Mar Dep Co
33d Mar Dep Co
36th Mar Dep Co
42d Mar Dep Co
43d Mar Dep Co
6th Mar Amm Co
8th Mar Amm Co
10th Mar Amm Co
1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
1st Fum & Bath Co (Prov)
1st Bkry Plat (Prov)
2d Air Del Plat Ser Comd
Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 47-46.  (Continued).

SECRET

Hq & Hq Det 360th Port Bn
123d Port Co
124th Port Co
153d Port Co
633d Port Co
62d Med Bn =c= Dep Co (556th Optical Rep Tm atchd)
Det '737th Av Operating Bn

CUB 18. (Heinl): Capt Wilson USN.

CUB 18
Port Director (w/Com Unit #40)
Garrison Boat Pool
1st Special NC En
*72d NC Bn
70th, 71st, 72d, and 75th Logistical Support Cos
Spl Augmented Hosp #5

Engineer Troops

5201st Engr Cons Brig - BrigGen Robinson USA
Hq & Hq Co 5201st Engr Cons Brig
Hq & Hq Co 1112th Engr Cons Grp
Hq & Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Grp
*1777th Engr Cons Bn
Hq & Hq Co 1400th Engr Base Dep Grp
15441st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Flt)
*1564th Engr Dep Grp
*Hq & Hq Co 1052d Engr PC&AR Grp
*341st Engr Avn Bn
*673d Engr Avn Bn
1902d Engr Avn Bn
*1913th Engr Avn Bn
*689th Engr Base Equip Co
*186th Engr Dp Trk Co
3076th Engr Dp Trk Co
*1485th Engr Maint Co
*1487th Engr Maint Co
*2211th Engr Pet Dist Co
*1731st Engr Util Det (EE)
*1060th Engr Gas Gen Det
*3138th Engr Refrig Maint Dist (DG)
1979th Engr Repro Det (Avn)

-2-
Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 47-45. (Continued).

SECRET

Hq 7th NC Regt - Capt Andrews USN
98th NC BN
Other NC Bns as assigned
Prov Combat Engr Gp - LtCol Lytton USMC
*Hq & Hq Co, 161st Engr (C) Gp
22d Sep Engr Bn
545th Tq & In Bridge Co
329th Engr Tech Int Tm (C)

Provisional Medical Group - Capt Young USN

Hq Det Prov Med Gp
Hq BN VAC
- Corps Evac Hosp No 1
- Hq & Hq Det 135th Med BN
- Co B 264th Med Bn
- Co C 264th Med Bn
- 92nd Med Amb Co
- 760th Field Hosp (400 bed)
- 32d Field Hosp (400 bed)
- 721st Med San Co
- 712th Med San Co
- 118th Ste Hosp (500 bed)
- 13th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
- 309th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
- 47th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
- 11th Gen Disp (Types 2)
- 98th Vet Food Insp Tm
- 108th Vet Food Insp Tm
- 466th Dent Pros Tm (Mb1)
- 24th Mal Surv Det
- 241st Mal Surv Det
- 203d Mal Surv Det
- 415th Mal Surv Det
- 36th Mal Contl Det
- 94th Mal Contl Det
- 95th Mal Contl Det

Provisional Military Government Group - Col Hough USMC

92d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 47-45. (Continued).

SECRET

a. FUKUCKA Base Command - BrigGen Robinson USMC

Det Hq Co 5th MarDiv
5th ASCO (less dets)
Det 116th NC Brn
168th Engr (C) Brn
Garrison Beach Brn #1
Co C 36th MT Brn (Prov)(less 1 Plat)
Co B 12th MT Brn (Prov)(2d Plat Auto Rep Co atchd)
*274th Sig Hyv Cons Brn
Co C 60th Sig Cons Brn (6th R/Way Cons Tm atchd)
Det Sig Brn 7AC
Language Det VaC
*HQ & Hq Det 327th QM Brn
  *566th QM Rd Co
  *4495d QM Ser Co
  *3242d QM Ser Co
  *1 Plat 6672d QM Refrg Co
  *1st Plat 128th QM Brnry Co
  *553d Sig Dev Co
HQ & Hq Det 693d QM Brn
  362d QM Ser Co
  *4th Plat 369th QM Ldry Co
  *235th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
  *236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
  *238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
  *239th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
  *3d Plat 120th QM Brnry Co
  *101st QM Gr Refrg Plat
HQ & Hq Det 209th Ord Brn
  *234th Ord Hvy Maint Co (TK)
  *3475th Ord MAM Co
  *3540th Ord MAM Co
  #334th QM Trk Co (w/Dr det)
  #311th QM Trk Co (w/Dr det)
  #3591st QM Trk Co (Hvy)(w/Dr det)
  #3373d QM Gas Sup Co
  3007th Ord Base Dep Co
*HQ & Hq Det 71st QM Brn (Mbl)
122d Sta Hosp
*123d Sta Hosp (5th Army Med Lab atchd)
*25th Evac Hosp
*76th Mal Contl Det
*83d Mal Contl Det
Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 47-45. (Continued).

SECRET

o. 32d Infantry Division (Reinf) (less 127th Infantry (Reinf))

- 32d Inf Div (less 127th Inf (Reinf)) - MajGen McBride USA

- 28th Har (Reinf) (less 3d En)
  - Co C 6th Engr Bn (less 3d Flat)
  - Co C 5th Med Bn
  - 3d Flat Div Ord Co
  - 3d Flat Div Ser Co
  - 3d Flat Div Sup Co
  - 71st Amph Trk Co
  - 323d Ord Ammo Co
  - 276th Cal Ser Plat
  - 4th Plat 3089th QM Lardy Co
  - Co D 3d WP Bn (Prov)
  - 1st Plat Bomb Disp Co H&S Bn VAC
  - 32d CIC Det
  - 62d CIC AEB Det (Areas)
  - Hq 93d Metropolitan CIC Unit
  - Hq 94th Metropolitan CIC Unit
  - Hq 95th Metropolitan CIC Unit
  - 29th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co
  - 37th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co
  - #74th Mil Contl Det
  - #75th Mil Contl Det

p. 5th Marine Division (Reinf) (less 28th Marines (Reinf) and 23d Marines (Reinf) (less 3d Bn)) - MajGen Bourke USMC

- 5thMarDiv (less 28th Marines (Reinf) and 23d Marine (Reinf))
  - 127th Inf (Reinf) (less 1st Bn) (less 3d Bn)
    - 121st FA Bn
    - Det 32d Hq Co
    - Det 732d Ord Co
    - Co B 107th Med Bn
    - Co B 114th Engr Bn
    - 5th Amph Trk Co (Prov)
    - Co C 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
    - VMC-5
  - 6th Har War Dog Plat
  - 6th Sep Ldry Plat
  - 116th NC En (less dets)
  - 34th War Dep Co
  - Co A and 1st Plat Co C 3d MP Bn (Prov)
Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 47-45.

SECRET

403d CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
496th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
94th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
96th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp

d. 26th Marine Division (heinf) - MajGen Hunt USMC

2dMarDiv
2d Amph Trk Co
Co A 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
VMO-2
2d Mar War Dog Flat
4th Sep Ldry Flat
43d NC Bn
2d Flat Bomb Disp Co H&S Bn VAC
Corps Avac Hosp #3
34th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
496th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
93d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
129th Engr (C) BN
3656th QA Trk Co (W/Tr det)

e. Kanoi Occupation Force - LtCol Fraser USA

1st Bn 127th Inf
American Mil Govt Unit #1
26th Port Surg Hosp
Co A 873d Engr Avn Bn
101st Bomb Disp Squad
823d QM Rhd Sec

* Will pass to operational control of indicated Headquarters on arrival assigned area.
# Will pass operational control 71st QM Bn (Mbl) on arrival of that unit.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. AGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Operation Order No. 47-45.

OFFICIAL:

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.
0137/147
Ser.0010938

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

13 November 1945.

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER:

NUMBER...48-45

1. The following organization of V Amphibious Corps is effective as of 151.200/I:

V Amphibious Corps — MajGen Schmidt USMC

Corps Troops

22d Bn VAC (less dets)
Army Sec VAC
27th Spl Ser Co (less 2d 3d & 4th Plato)
929th APU (Type C)
404th CIC A2E2 Det (Area)
466th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
4th Censorship Adv Det
173d Fin Disbursing Det
Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #1
Armed Forces Rad Sta NVTC
Armed Forces Rad Sta WLKA
8th Sep Ldry Plat
2d Bkry Plat (Prov)
Hq Co Shore Brig
Sig En VAC (less dets) (5th Sep RI Plat atchd)
3d IP En (Prov) (less Cos A C & D)
LF-SCU #4 (under orders to depart area)
Hedron MAC #1
12th MT En (Prov) (less Co B and 2d Plato Auto Rep Co)
30th Amph Trk En (Prov) (less Cos A, B & C)
3d Sep Engr En (3d30th Engr Tech Int Trm atchd)
5th Flot En
Det HAB CMUR
31st NO En

3rd Service Regiment (Reinf) (less dets) — Col Griebel USMC

5th Ser Regt
53d Mar Dep Co
55th Mar Dep Co
42d Mar Dep Co
45d Mar Dep Co
6th Mar Ammo Co

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SECRET
SECRET

8th Mar Ammo Co
10th Mar Ammo Co
1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
1st Fum & Bath Co (Prov)
1st Mkry Plt (Prov)
Hq & Hq Det 360th Port Bn
123d Port Co
155d Port Co
683d Port Co
62d Med Base Dep Co (556th Optical Rep Tm atchd)
Det 787th Hy Operating Bn
1564th Engr Dep Co (less 1st Plt)
**Co D, 3d MP Bn (Prov)

CUB 19 (Reinf) - Capt Wilson USN

CUB 16
Port Director (w/Con Unit #480)
Garrison Boat Pool
1st Special HC Bn
723d HC Bn
76th, 78th, 72d and 75th Logistical Support Cos
Sgl Augmented Hosp #5

Engineer Troops

5201st Engr Cons Brig - BrigGen Robinson USA
Hq & Hq Co 5201st Engr Cons Brig
Hq & Hq Co 112th Engr Cons Gp
Hq & Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Gp
Hq & Hq Co 1181st Engr (C) Gp
1688th Engr Cons Bn
1777th Engr Cons Bn
Hq & Hq Co 1409th Engr Base Dep Gp
1st Plt 1564th Engr Dep Co
1541st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Plt)
Hq & Hq Co 1052d Engr FC&R Gp
*841st Engr Avn Bn
*873d Engr Avn Bn
Cos A & C 1878th Engr Avn Bn
1302d Engr Avn Bn
*1915th Engr Avn Bn
689th Engr Base Equip Co
199th Engr Dp Trk Co
3076th Engr Dp Trk Co
*1487th Engr Maint Co (1485th Engr Maint Co atchd)
SECRET

2811th Engr Pet Dist Co
1731st Engr Util Det (EE)
*1080th Engr Gas Gen Det
3138th Engr Refrig Maint Det (DG)
1979th Engr Repro Det (Avn)
548th Engr Pcn Bridge Co
Hq 7th NC Regt - Capt Andrews USN
98th NC Bn
Other NC Bns as assigned

Provisional Medical Group - Capt Hart USN

Hq Det Prov Med Gp
Med Bn VaC
Corps Evac Hosp #1
Hq & Hq Det 135th Med En
692d Med Amb Co
92d Field Hosp (400 bed)
119th Sta Hosp (500 bed)
108th Vet Food Insp Tm
468th Dent Pros Tm (Mbl)

a. FUKUOKA Base Command - BrigGen Robinson USMC

Port Director FUKUOKA
Det Hq Co 5thMarDiv
Det Garr Boat Pool
5th ASCO (less dete)
Garr Beach Bn #1
*274th Sig Rvy Cons Co
##6th R/Way Cons Tm
Det Sig Bn VaC
Co B 12th MT Bn (Prov) (2d Plat Auto Rep Co atchd)
Language Det VaC
Co C 5th Med Bn
Hq & Hq Det 327th QM Bn
Hq & Hq Det 693d QM Bn
362d QM Ser Co
*4483d QM Ser Co
*3242d QM Ser Co
565th QM Rnd Co
#3873d QM Gas Sup Co
1 Plat 3073d QM Refrig Co
1st Plat 120th QM Bkry Co
352d Sig Dep Co

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SECRET

4th Plat 369th QM Ldry Co  
#233th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Hbl)  
#236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Hbl)  
#238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Hbl)  
#239th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Hbl)  
3d Plat 120th QM Sckry Co  
#384th QM Trk Co (w/dr det)  
#3411th QM Trk Co (w/dr det)  
#3558th QM Trk Co (Hvy)(w/dr det)  
101st QM Orm Regr Plnt  
*Hq & Hq Det 71st QM Bn (Hbl)  
Hq & Hq Det 208th Ord. Bn  
384th Ord Hyv Maint Co (Tk)  
3475th Ord MAH Co  
3540th Ord MAH Co  
3007th Ord Base Dcp Co  
122d Sta Hosp  
309th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)  
125d Sta Hosp (5th Army Med Lab atchd)  
25th Evac Hosp  
75th Mcl Contl Det  
83d Mcl Contl Det  
721st Med San Co  
24th Mcl Surv Dct  
95th Vet Food Insp Tm  
13th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)  
11th Gen Disp (Type 2)

b. 32d Infantry Division (Reinf) - BrigGen McBride USA

32dInfDiv  
71st Amph Trk Co  
323d Ord Amm Co  
275th Cal. Ser Plat  
4th Plat 3063rd QM Ldry Co  
1st Plat Bomb Disp Co H&S En VAC  
32d CIC Det  
62d CIC A232 Det (Area)  
Det 496th CIC 35 Det (Area)  
Hq 93d Metropolitan CIC Unit  
Hq 94th Metropolitan CIC Unit  
Hq 95th Metropolitan CIC Unit  
29th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co  
37th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co  
74th Mcl Contl Det  
75th Mcl Contl Det  
712th Med San Co  
201st Mcl Surv Dct  

- 4 -
c. 5th Marine Division (Reinf) (less 26th Marines (Reinf)) - MajGen Source USMC

5thMarDiv (less 26th Marines (Reinf) and 5th Fion BN)
Co C 29th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
VMC-5
6th Sep Ldry Plt
116th HC BN (less dets)
34th Mar Dep Co

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4th A and Co C 3d MP BN (Prov)
403d CIC AR 2 Det (Area)
45th CIC BS Det (Area) (less dets)
54th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
56th Hal Contl Det
203d Hal Surv Det

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5 marine
Division
(Reinf) - MajGen Hunt USMC

2ndMarDiv
Co A 29th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
VMC-5
6th Sep Ldry Plt
43d NC BN
23 Flat Bomb Disp Co H&H Bn VAC
Corps Evac Hosp #3
54th CIC A F Det (Area)
493th CIC BS Det (Combat)
93d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
92d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
96th Hq & H Det Mil Govt Gp
126th Engr (C) BN
1st Sep Hq & Sup Co (Prov)
24th Mar Dep Co
184th Port Co
3656th QM Trk Co (w/dr det)
73d Field Hosp
Co B & C 264th Med BN
Amer Mil Govt Unit #1
26th Port Surg Hosp
Co A 973d Engr Avn BN
101st Bomb Disp Squad
223d Wld Hq Sec
35th Hal Contl Det
24th Hal Contl Det
415th Hal Surv Det
SECRET

* Will pass to operational control of indicated Headquarters on arrival assigned area.
# Will pass operational control 71st Div (Mbl) on arrival of that unit.
** Company C will pass to operational control of 5th MarDiv upon arrival Sasebo on or about 16 Nov.
*** Will pass to operational control of indicated Headquarters upon arrival Sasebo on or about 16 Nov.
## Will be attached to 274th Sig Hvy Cons Co upon latter's arrival Fukuoka.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMITT:

W. J. ROGERS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army (6) CG FICO (3) Each General and
CTF 55 (2) CO Corps Troops (2) Special Staff
CG FIF (2) CO Hq 3rd VAC (6) Section (1)
CG 22dInfDiv (6) Each Corps and Special War Diary (1)
CG 5thMarDiv (6) Troop Unit (2) Spares (10)
CG 32dInfDiv (6) F I L E

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
G-3 Corps (Acting).

SECRET
0137/147
Ser. 001080B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

13 November 1945.

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER

NUMBR... 48-45

1. The following organization of V Amphibious Corps is effective as of 151500/1:

V Amphibious Corps - MajGen Schmidt USMC

Corps Troops

H&E Bn VAC (less dets)
Army Sec VAC
22d Sng Slr Co (less 2d 3d & 4th Plats)
929th APU (Type G)
404th CIC A2E2 Det (Area)
468th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
4th Censorship Adv Det
173d Fin Disbursing Det
Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #1
Armed Forces Rad Sta WYCO
Armed Forces Rad Sta WLKA
8th Sep Lry Flt
2d Ekry Flt (Prov)
Hq Co Shore Brig
Sig Bn VAC (less dets) (5th Sep RI Plat atchd)
5d IP En (Prov)(less Cos A G & D)
LF-SCU #4 (under orders to depart area)
Hedron HSC #1
12th MT En (Prov)(less Co B and 2d Plat Auto Rep Co)
20th Amph Tk En (Prov)(less Cos A B & C)
2d Sep Engr En (3238th Engr Tech Int Tm atchd)
31st Flm Flt
Det 1AAB CHUSA
31st NC En

8th Service Regt (Reinf)(less dets) - Col Griebel USMC

8th Ser Regt
33d Mar Dep Co
34th Mar Dep Co
42d Mar Dep Co
46d Mar Dep Co
6th Mar Amm Co

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0137/147
Ser.001043B Operation Order Number 48-45. (Cont'd).

SECRET

8th Mar Ammo Co
10th Mar Ammo Co
1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
1st Fum & Bath Co (Prov)
1st Brty Flt (Prov)
Hq & Hq Det 360th Port Bn
123d Port Co
153d Port Co
633d Port Co

62d Med Base Dep Co (556th Optical Rep Tm atchd)
Det 737th Ry Operating En
154th Engr Dep Co (less 1st Flt)
**Co D, 3d MP Bn (Prov)

CUB 16 (Reinf) - Capt Wilson USN

CUB 18
Port Director (w/Com Unit #480)
Garrison Boat Pool
1st Special NC Bn
72d NC Bn
70th, 71st, 72d and 75th Logistic Support Cos
Spl Augmented Hosp #5

Engineer Troops

6201st Engr Cons Brig - BrigGen Robinson USA
Hq & Hq Co 5201st Engr Cons Brig
Hq & Hq Co 1112th Engr Cons Grp
Hq & Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Grp
Hq & Hq Co 1181st Engr (C) Grp
188th Engr Cons Bn
1777th Engr Cons Bn
Hq & Hq Co 1409th Engr Base Dep Grp
1st Flt 154th Engr Dep Co
1541st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Flt)
Hq & Hq Co 1052d Engr PCDAR Grp
*641st Engr Avn Bn
*973d Engr Avn Bn
Cos A & C 1676th Engr Avn Bn
1302d Engr Avn Bn
*1915th Engr Avn Bn
689th Engr Base Equip Co
198th Engr Dp Trk Co
3076th Engr Dp Trk Co
*1487th Engr Maint Co (1485th Engr Maint Co atchd)
SER. 0010935

Operation Order Number 48-45. (Cont'd).

SECRET

2311th Engr Pet Dist Co
1731st Engr Util Det (EE)
*1050th Engr Gas Gen Det
3138th Engr Refrig Maint Det (DG)
1979th Engr Repro Det (Avn)
546th Engr Poni Bridge Co
Hq 7th NC Regt - Capt Andrews USN
96th NC Bn
Other NC Bns as assigned

Provisional Medical Group - Capt Hart USN

Hq Det Prov Med Gp
Med En VAC
Corps Evac Hosp #1
Hq & Hq Det 135th Med En
692d Med Amb Co
93d Field Hosp (400 bed)
118th Sta Hosp (500 bed)
108th Vet Food Inspect Tm
466th Dent Proc Tm (Mbl)

a. FUKUOKA Base Command - BrigGen Robinson USMC

Port Director FUKUOKA
Det Hq Co 5th Air Div
Det Garr Boat Pool
5th ASCC (less det)
Garr Beach Bn #1
*274th Sig Hvy Cons Co
##6th R/Wy Cons Tm
Det Sig En VAC
Co B 12th MT Bn (Prov) (2d Plat Auto Rep Co atchd)
Language Det VAC
Co G 5th Med Bn
Hq & Hq Det 327th QM En
Hq & Hq Det 693d QM Bn
322d QM Ser Co
*492d QM Ser Co
*3242d QM Ser Co
565th QM Rnd Co
*3878d QM Gas Sup Co
1 Plt 3073d QM Refrig Co
1st Plt 120th QM Bkry Co
553d Sig Dep Co

SECRET

104
4th Plat 369th QM Ldry Co
*283th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
*283th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
*283th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
*283th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp) (Hbl)
3d Plat 120th QM Envry Co
#384th QM Trk Co (w/âr det)
#311th QM Trk Co (w/âr det)
#3551st QM Trk Co (Hyv) (w/âr det)
101st QM Gr Rgr'g Plat
*Hq & Hq Det 71st QM Br (Hbl)
Hq & Hq Det 309th Ord Br
284th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Tk)
3475th Ord MAM Co
3540th Ord Maint Co
3007th Ord Base Dep Co
122d Sta Hosp
309th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
122d Sta Hosp (5th Army Med Lab. attd)
23th Evac Hosp
73th Ml Contl Det
23d Mbl Contl Det
721st Mbl San Co
24th Mbl Surv Det
98th Vet Food Inspr Tm
18th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
11th Gen Disp (Type 2)

b. 32d Infantry Division (Reinf) - BrigGen McRide USA

32d Inf Div
71st Amph Trk Co
323d Ord Amn Co
276th Cal Ser Plat
4th Plat 3069th QM Ldry Co
1st Flat Bomb Disp Co Hâs En VAC
32d CIC Det
62d CIC A222 Det (Area)
Det 496th CIC B3 Det (Area)
Hq 96d Metropolitan CIC Unit
Hq 94th Metropolitan CIC Unit
Hq 95th Metropolitan CIC Unit
29th Mbl Govt Hq & Hq Co
37th Mbl Govt Hq & Hq Co
74th Mbl Contl Det
75th Mbl Contl Det
718th Mbl San Co
201st Mbl Surv Det
SECURITY:

5th Marine Division (Reinf) (less 26th Marines (Reinf)) - MajGen Bourke USMC

5thMarDiv (less 26th Marines (Reinf) and 5th Lion En) Co C 20th Amph Trk En (Prov) VMF-5 8th Sep Ldry Flt 118th MC En (less det) 34th Mar Dep Co +4 Co A and Co C 3d LP En (Prov) 403d CIC A2E2 Det (Arse) 455th CIC ES Det (Arse) (less det) 84th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Op 95th Hal Contl Det 703d Hal Surv Det

21st Marine Division (Reinf) - MajGen Hunt USMC

21MarDiv Co A 20th Amph Trk En (Prov) VMF-5 4th Sep Ldry Flt 42d MC En 2d Flat Bomb Disp Co H2S En VAC Corps Evac Hosp #3 54th CIC A3S Det (Arse) 495th CIC ES Det (Combat) 92d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Op 92d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Op 95th Hal & Hq Det Mil Govt Op 1295th Engr (C) En 1st Sep Hq & Sup Co (Prov) 24th Mar Dep Co 134th Fort Co 3355th Hq Trk Co (w/dr det) 73d Field Hosp Co B & C 204th Med En Amer Hq Govt Unit #1 25th Fort Surg Hosp Co A 973d Engr Avn En 101st Bomb Disp Squad 823d Hq & Hq Sec 35th Hal Contl Det 54th Hal Contl Det 415th Hal Surv Det
0137/147
W.0010633 Operation Order Number 48-45. (Cont'd).
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SECRET

* Will pass to operational control of indicated Headquarters on arrival assigned area.
# Will pass operational control 71st MI En (Ndl) on arrival of that unit.
** Company C will pass to operational control of 5thMarDiv upon arrival CASEBO on or about 16 Nov.
*** Will pass to operational control of indicated Headquarters upon arrival CASEBO on or about 16 Nov.
## Will be attached to 274th Sig Hvy Cons Co upon latter's arrival FUKOKI.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army (6) CG FMC (8) Each General and Special Staff
CTF 55 (2) CG Corps Troops (2) Section (1)
CG FIF (2) CG H&I En VAC (6) War Diary (1)
CG 2ndMarDiv (6) Each Corps and Special (2) Spares (10)
CG 5thMarDiv (6) Troop Unit (2) F&I L.E
CG 324thDiv (6)

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACOF, (Acting).

SECRET
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER

21 November 1945.

Evacuation of the 5th Marine Division and Reallocation areas of Responsibility.

Maps, Charts, Photos:
- See Annex BAKER (Operations Map); VAC Occupational Zone, JAPAN, 1:500,000; Central JAPAN AMS L571, 2d Edition (AMS 2) 1944, 1:250,000; Map of KYUSHU AMS L372, 1:25,000; others as issued.

TASK ORGANIZATION:
See Annex ABLE (Task Organization).

1. a. See current G-2 Summaries issued separately.
   b. SIXTH Army continues execution of assigned occupation missions.

2. V Amphibious Corps (Reinf) commencing on 23 November and in accordance with the schedule set forth in Annex CHARLIE will:
   a. Progressively relieve the 5th Marine Division and evacuate that command from this area.
   b. Reallocate areas of responsibility to the 32d Infantry Division and 2d Marine Division. (See Annex BAKER).
   c. Disband the FUKUOKA Base Command and reassign the missions of that command to the Commanding General, 32d Infantry Division.
   d. Execute large scale administrative transfers of Marine personnel between divisions in conjunction with operational movements.
   e. Continue execution of assigned occupation missions.

3. a. 32d Infantry Division (Reinf) in accordance with Annex CHARLIE will:
   (1) Progressively relieve elements of the 5th Marine Division and 2d Marine Division in the FUKUOKA Ken and assume control of assigned area of responsibility (See Annex BAKER).
(2) At 1000/I 24 November assume control of the 121st FA Br, and at 1000/I 25 November assume control of the 5201st Engineer (C) Brigade and the additional units assigned in Annex ABLE from the FUKUOKA Base Command.

(3) Execute missions set forth in paragraph 3.b.(2), (3) and (4) of VaC Operation Order Number 47-45 dated 231000 October 1945. Supervise repatriation of non Japanese nationals as well as Japanese nationals passing through the Division area of responsibility.

(4) Be prepared to conduct occupation operations on IKI SHIMA and other outlying islands in Division area of responsibility when mine free and on Corps order.

(5) Continue execution of occupation missions previously assigned.

b. 5th Marine Division in accordance with Annex CHARLIE will:

(1) Progressively release control of current area of responsibility to the 32d Infantry Division and 2d Marine Division. Thoroughly brief relieving units and turn over all occupational information available to assist these units in assuming control.

(2) Effect the administrative transfer of personnel in conjunction with operational movements. Release control of the 121st FA Br to the 32d Infantry Division at 1000/I 24 November and the remainder of units to be detached upon relief by 2d Marine Division at 1000/I 10 December (See Annex ABLE).

(3) Embark the 5th Marine Division on shipping as arranged and depart this area as directed. Report on departure to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for operational control.

c. 2d Marine Division (Reinf) in accordance with Annex CHARLIE will:

(1) Progressively relieve elements of the 5th Marine Division in the SAGA and NAGASAKI Kens and assume control of assigned area of responsibility (See Annex BAKER).
(2) Release control of OMUTA SHI to 32d Infantry Division.

(3) Effect administrative transfers of personnel as separately ordered in conjunction with operational movements and assume control of additional units assigned in Annex ABLE at 1000/I 10 December 1945.

(4) Supervise repatriation of non-Japanese nationals as well as Japanese nationals passing through the Division area of responsibility.

(5) Continue execution of occupation missions previously assigned.

d. FUKUOKA Base Command in accordance with Annex CHARLIE will disband the FUKUOKA Base Command at 1000/I 25 November. 5th Marine Division elements and Language Detachment VAC of this command will revert to parent control. The remainder of the units presently attached will pass to the control of the 32d Infantry Division as indicated in Annex ABLE.

e. Corps and Special Troop Units will continue the execution of missions previously assigned. Indicated headquarters assume control of additional units assigned in Annex ABLE at 1000/I 10 December 1945.

x. (1) Subordinate commanders are authorized to deal direct in the execution of details of this order.

4. See Administrative Order Number 14-45 and current administrative instructions issued separately.

5. a. See V Mar SCI.

b. Command Posts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V Amphibious Corps</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBC</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32dInfDiv</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2dMarDiv</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5thMarDiv</td>
<td>AIMOURA NTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
013/147
Ser.0011273 Operation Order Number 49-45. (Cont'd).

SECRET

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE: Task Organization.
Baker: Operations Map.
Charlie: Schedule of Relief and Embarkation, 5th Marine Division.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH ARMY (6) CO H&H Bn VaC (2)
Com5thFlt (2) CO 8th Ser Regt (Reinf) (5)
CTG 55.2 (2) CO CUB 13 (5)
CG X Corps (2) CO Prov Med Gp (5)
CG FMF Pac (2) CO Sig Bn VaC (3)
CG 5thMarDiv (20) CO 3d MP Bn (Prov) (1)
CG 2dMarDiv (20) EA Gen & Spl Staff Sec (1)
CG 32dInfDiv (20) War Diary (1)
CG FBC (5) Spares (10)
CG 5201st Engr Cons Brig (5) F I L E (1)
CG V Fl Com (2)

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC
4Corps, G-3,
(Acting).
0137/147
Ser. 001127B

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET
21 November 1945.

Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 49-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION

V Amphibious Corps - MajGen Schmidt USMC

Corps Troops

H&S Bn VAC (less det)
Army Sec VAC
22d Spl Ser Co (less 2d 3d & 4th Plts)
229th AFU (Type G)
#405d CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
404th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
466th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
#466th CIC B3 Det (Combat) (less det)
4th Censorship Adv Det
173d Fin Disbursing Det
Mobile Explicatives Investigation Unit #1
Armed Forces Rad Sta NVTO
Armed Forces Rad Sta MLKA
8th Sep Lury Flat
2d Bkry Flat (Prov)
Hq Co Shore Brig.
Sig Bn VAC (less det) (5th Sep RI Plat atchd)
Hq 7th NC Regt - Comdr Bowers USN
98th NC Bn
#118th NC Bn
3d MP Bn (Prov) (less Cos A C & D)
Hedron MC #1
12th MT Bn (Prov)
20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov) (less Cos A & C)
2d Sep Engr Bn (3226th Engr Tech Int Tm atchd)
#31st NC Bn
Det MAB-CMRA

8th Service Regiment (Reinf) (less det) - Col Griebel USMC

8th Ser Regt
33d Mar Dep Co
36th Mar Dep Co
42d Mar Dep Co
43d Mar Dep Co
6th Mar Amm Co
8th Mar Amm Co
13th Mar Amm Co

- 1 -

SECRET

112
Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 49-45. (Cont'd).

SECRET

1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
1st Fum & Bath Co (Prov)
1st Brkry Plat (Prov)
Hq & Hq Det 360th Port Bn
  123d Port Co
  152d Port Co
  633d Port Co
62d Med Base Dep Co (556th Optical Rep Tm atchd)
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
1564th Engr Dep Co (less 1st Plat)
689th Engr Base Equip Co
#Co C 3d MP Bn (Prov)
Co D 3d MP Bn (Prov)

CUB 18 (Reinf) - Capt Wilson USN

CUB 18
  Port Director (w/Com Unit #480)
  Garrison Boat Pool
  1st Special NC Bn
  78d NC Bn
  70th, 71st, 72d and 75th Logistical Support Cos
  Spl Augmented Hosp #5

Provisional Medical Group - Capt Hart USN

Hq Det Prov Med Gp
  Med Bn VAC
  Corps Evac Hosp #1
  Hq & Hq Det 135th Med Bn
  692d Med Amb Co
  92d Field Hosp (400 bed)
  118th Sea Hosp (500 bed)
  108th Vet Food Inap Tm
  456th Dent Pros Tm (Mbl)
  236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
  236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)

  32d Infantry Division (Reinf) - BrigGen McBride USA

   32dInfDiv
   71st Amph Trk Co
   223d Ord Ammo Co
   275th Qml Ser Plat
0137/147
Ser. 001127B

Annex ABLE to Operation Order Number 49-45. (Cont'd).

SECRET

4th Plat 3069th QM Ldry Co
1st Plat Bomb Disp Co H&S Bn VAC
\#Det Sig Bn VAC
32d CIC Det
62d CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
Det 496th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
Hq 93d Metropolitan CIC Unit
Hq 94th Metropolitan CIC Unit
Hq 95th Metropolitan CIC Unit
25th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co
37th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co
74th Mil Contl Det
75th Mil Contl Det
712th Med San Co
201st Med Surv Det
\#Port Director FUKUOKA
\#Det Garr Boat Pool
\#274th Sig Hvy Cons Co (6th R/way Cons Tm atchd)
\#Hq & Hq Det 327th QM Bn
Hq & Hq Det 693d QM Bn
  362d QM Ser Co
  4493d QM Ser Co
  3242d QM Ser Co
  565th QM Rnd Co
  1 Plat 3075d QM Refrig Co
  1st Plat 120th QM Bkry Co
  3d Plat 120th QM Bkry Co
  553d Sig Dep Co
  4th Plat 369th QM Ldry Co
  238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
  239th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
  101st QM Gr Regr Plat
Hq & Hq Det 71st QM Bn (Mbl)
  384th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
  3581st QM Trk Co (Hvy)(w/Dr Det)
  3873d QM Gas Sup Co
Hq & Hq Det 203th Ord Bn
  284th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Tk)
  3475th Ord MAM Co
  3540th Ord MAM Co
  30C7th Ord Base Dep Co

\#182d Sta Hosp
\#308th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
Annex ABE to Operation Order Number 49-45. (Cont'd).

SECRET

#123d Sta Hosp (5th Army Med Lab atchd)
#25th Evac Hosp
#76th Mal Conti Det
#83d Mal Conti Det
#721st Med San Co
#24th Mal Surv Det
#98th Vet Food Insp Tm
#13th Gen Hosp (1000 Bed)
#11th Gen Dist (Type 2)
#5201st Engr Cons Brig - BrigGen Robinson USA
  Hq & Hq Co 5201st Engr Cons Brig
  Hq & Hq Co 1112th Engr Cons Gp
  Hq & Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Gp
  Hq & Hq Co 1161st Engr (C) Gp
  1396d Engr Cons Bn
  1686th Engr Cons Bn
  1777th Engr Cons Bn
  Hq & Hq Co 1406th Engr Base Dep Gp
  1st Plt 1564th Engr Dep Co
  1561st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Plt)
  Hq & Hq Co 1052d Engr PCR Gp
  *875d Engr Avn Bn
  1876th Engr Avn Bn
  1902d Engr Avn Bn
  196th Engr Dp Trk Co
  3076th Engr Dp Trk Co
  1487th Engr Maint Co (1485th Engr Maint Co atchd)
  2311th Engr Pct Dist Co
  1791st Engr Util Det (EE)
  1050th Engr Gas Gen Det
  3138th Engr Refrg Maint Det (DG)
  1979th Engr Repro Det (avn)
  546th Engr Pen Bridge Co

b. 5th Marine Division (less 26th Marines (Reinf)) - MajGen Bourke USMC

5thMarDiv (less 26th Marines (Reinf))
VMC-5
6th Sep Ldry Plat (less 1 Sec)

c. 2d Marine Division (Reinf) - MajGen Hunt USMC

2dMarDiv
  Co A 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
  #Co C 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)

VNH-2
4th Sep Ldry Plat
Annex APIE to Operation Order Number 49-45. (Cont'd).

SECRET

1st Plat Bomb Disp Co H&S Bn VAC
Corps Evac Hosp #3
54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
49th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
92d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
93d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
94th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
95th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
1298th Engr (C) Bn
1st Sep Hq & Sup Co (Prov)
34th Mar Dep Co
124th Fort Co
3656 QM Trk Co (w/Dl Det)
73d Field Hosp
Co B & C 264th Med Bn
Co A 873d Engr Avn Bn
623d QM Rnd Sec
63rd Med Contl Det
94th Med Contl Det
#95th Med Contl Det
#203d Med Surv Det
415th Med Surv Det
Det Sig Bn VAC
#Co A 3d MP Bn (Prov)

* Will pass to operational control of indicated Headquarters on arrival assigned area.

# Will report to indicated Headquarters for operational control and further orders.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Operation Order Number 49-45.

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACofs, G-3,
(Acting).
VAC OCCUPATIONAL ZONE, JAPAN

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD,
21 November 1945.

Annex BAKER to Operation Order Number 49-45.

OPERATIONS MAP
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT;

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Operation Order Number 49-45.

OFFICIAL:

J. L. STEWART,
LTG, USMC,
ACORP, S-3,
(Acting)
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

21 November 1945.

Annex CHARLIE to Operation Order Number 49-45.

SCHEDULE OF RELIEF AND EMBARKATION OF 5TH MARINE DIVISION

1. In execution of the relief and embarkation of the 5th Marine Division the following schedule of transfer of personnel as previously authorized, reallocation of areas of responsibility, movement of units and embarkation of the 5th Marine Division is effective for compliance on dates as indicated:

23 November: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from Headquarters, 27th Marines and 3d Battalion, 27th Marines at KURUME to 2d Marines at HIYAKONOGO and HIYAZAKI.

b. 5th Marine Division effect movement of the 121st Field Artillery Battalion from SASSEBO to KURUME.

c. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from 2d Marines at HIYAKONOGO and HIYAZAKI to 5th Marine Division at SASSEBO.

24 November: a. At 1000/1 52d Infantry Division relieve elements of 5th Marine Division in FUKUOKA Ken, assume control of and responsibility for the area assigned 5th Marine Division in that Ken. 121st Field Artillery Battalion reverts to control of 2d Infantry Division at same time.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, less personnel to be transferred to 5th Marine Division, to SAGA.

c. 5th Marine Division effect movement of personnel to be transferred from 2d Battalion, 27th Marines at SAGA to 2d Marines at MIYAKONOGO. Remaining personnel to be transferred will be released by 2d Battalion, 27th Marines to 2d Battalion, 6th Marines at SAGA.

d. Upon arrival main body 2d Battalion, 6th Marines at SAGA, 2d Marine Division relieve elements of 5th Marine Division in SAGA Ken and assume control of and responsibility for that Ken.

e. 5th Marine Division effect movement of reconstituted 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, from SAGA to SASSEBO.
Annex CHARLIE to Operation Order Number 49-45. (Continued).

SECRET

25 November: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of 2d echelon of personnel to be transferred from Headquarters, 27th Marines and 3d Battalion, 27th Marines at KURUME to 2d Marines at MIYAKONOJO.

b. 5th Marine Division effect movement of Headquarters, 27th Marines and 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, less transfer, from KURUME to SASEBO.

c. At 1000/1 32d Infantry Division relieve elements of 2d Marine Division and FUKUOKA Base Command in FUKUOKA Ken and assume control of and responsibility for that entire Ken. 5th Marine Division elements and Language Detachment, VAC of FUKUOKA Base Command return to SASEBO and revert to parent control.

d. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 2d echelon of personnel to be transferred from 2d Marines at MIYAKONOJO to 5th Marine Division at SASEBO.

e. 2d Marine Division effect movement of personnel of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines remaining at NAGASAKI to be transferred to the 5th Marine Division to that Division at SASEBO.

26 November: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of personnel to be transferred from 2d Battalion, 13th Marines and 1st echelon of Headquarters, 13th Marines at SASEBO to 10th Marines at ISAHAYA.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of the 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from 4th Battalion, 10th Marines and Headquarters, 10th Marines at ISAHAYA to 13th Marines at SASEBO.

27 November: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of personnel to be transferred from 3d Battalion, 13th Marines and 2d echelon Headquarters, 13th Marines at SASEBO to 10th Marines at ISAHAYA.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of the 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines and 2d echelon of Headquarters, 10th Marines at ISAHAYA to 13th Marines at SASEBO.

SECRET
28 November: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of personnel to be transferred from 4th Battalion, 15th Marines and 5th echelon of Headquarters, 15th Marines at SASEBO to 10th Marines at CMURA.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from 3d Battalion, 10th Marines and 3d echelon of Headquarters, 10th Marines from CMURA and ISAHYA to 13th Marines at SASEBO.

29 November: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of personnel to be transferred from 1st Battalion, 15th Marines and 4th echelon of Headquarters, 13th Marines at SASEBO to 10th Marines at ISAHYA.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from 1st Battalion, 10th Marines and 4th echelon of Headquarters, 10th Marines from NAGASAKI and ISAHYA to 15th Marines at SASEBO.

30 November: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of remaining personnel to be transferred from 13th Marines at SASEBO to 10th Marines at ISAHYA.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of final echelon of personnel to be transferred from the 10th Marines to the 15th Marines at SASEBO.

1 December: a. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines by LCT of LST from NAGASAKI to Naval Aircraft Factory, SASEBO.

b. 5th Marine Division effect movement of 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from 1st Battalion, 26th Marines at SASEBO to 8th Marines at KUAI'OOTO and KAGOSHIMA.

c. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from 8th Marines at KAGOSHIMA and KUAI'OOTO to 1st Battalion, 28th Marines at SASEBO.

2 December: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from 2d Battalion, 28th Marines at SASEBO to 8th Marines at KUAI'OOTO and HITOYOSHI.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 1st echelon of personnel to be transferred from 8th Marines at HITOYOSHI and KUAI'OOTO to 2d Battalion, 28th Marines at SASEBO.
Annex CHARLIE to Operation Order Number 49-45. (Continued).

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SECRET

3 December: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of final echelon of personnel to be transferred from 1st Battalion, 28th Marines at SASEBO to 8th Marines at KUAMOTO.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 2d echelon of personnel to be transferred from 8th Marines at KUAMOTO to 1st Battalion, 28th Marines at SASEBO.

4 December: a. 5th Marine Division effect movement of final echelon of personnel to be transferred from 2d Battalion, 28th Marines at SASEBO to 8th Marines at KUAMOTO.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of final echelon of personnel to be transferred from 8th Marines at KUAMOTO to 2d Battalion, 28th Marines at SASEBO.

c. 5th Marine Division effect movement of personnel to be transferred from 1st Battalion, 27th Marines at SASEBO to 2d Battalion, 2d Marines at KANOYA and VAC troops at SASEBO.

d. 2d Marine Division effect movement of final echelon of personnel to be transferred from the 2d Marines at KANOYA and MIKAKONOJO to 1st Battalion, 27th Marines at SASEBO.

e. VAC effect movement of personnel to be transferred from VAC troops to 1st Battalion, 27th Marines.

5 - 8 December: a. Complete movements and transfers of any personnel of units listed above not completed as scheduled.

b. 5th Marine Division complete 1st echelon loading plans.

9 December: a. 5th Marine Division commence loading 1st echelon consisting of 27th Marines and approximately 1/2 division troops.

b. 2d Marine Division effect movement of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines and Headquarters, 6th Marines from HIJASAKI to 5th Marine Division area, SASEBO. 1st and 3d Battalions, 6th Marines and Headquarters, 6th Marines exchange transfers with 3d Battalion, 28th Marines and Headquarters, 28th Marines.
SECRET

10 December: a. At 1000/1 2d Marine Division relieve 5th
Marine Division elements in NAAGASAKI Ken and assume control
of and responsibility for the entire Ken.

13 December: 5th Marine Division complete loading 1st echelon.

14 December: 5th Marine Division commence loading 2d echelon
consisting of 28th Marines and remainder of troops assigned
for evacuation.

18 December: 5th Marine Division complete loading of Division
and attached elements and depart area.

2. The transfer of personnel of division troops from each of the
2d and 5th Marine Division will be effected as follows:

a. Personnel to be transferred from respective Engineer
Battalions, Tank Battalions and Service Battalions will
be exchanged in four echelons as practicable on 23, 25, 27
and 29 November.

b. Personnel to be transferred from respective Motor Trans-
port Battalions, Pioneer Battalions, Medical Battalions,
and DUKW Companies will be exchanged in four echelons as
practicable on 24, 26, 28 and 30 November.

c. Personnel to be transferred from respective Headquarters
Battalions will be exchanged as arranged later between
this Headquarters and Divisions.

3. a. Prior to each operational movement to or assumption of
control of an area, advance parties will be sent to the
area and be thoroughly briefed by the unit being relieved
prior to the transfer of control. Minor changes in the
schedule are authorized to insure the smooth transfer of
control of assigned areas. Divisions are authorized to
deal direct in matters connected with the furtherance of
this order.

b. Advance billeting arrangements will be made prior to all
movements either operational or administrative.
Annex CHARLIE to Operation Order Number 49-45. (Continued).

SECRET

c. Divisions will keep this Headquarters informed of any major changes necessary in this schedule.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as Operation Order Number 49-45.

OFFICIAL:

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACoFS, G - 3,
(Acting).
1945-5-5
016/154
Serial: C0831B.

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
In the Field.
1600, 27 September, 1945.

SECRET
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NUMBER: 10-45

Maps: 
Photos: See Annex BAKER (Intelligence) to V Amphibious Corps
Charts: Operation Plan No. 2-45.

1. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE EMBARKED:

   a. Supplies.

      (1) The 5th Marine Division will furnish Class
         I, III & V Supplies for mounting the entire FUKUOKA
         Occupation Force as follows:

         (a) Class I.

            1. Rations

               a. "B" Type
                  5 D/S
               b. Emergency Types
                  5 D/S
               c. Army WM Accessory Pack
                  10 D/S

         2. Water.

            a. In cans, drums or other organizational equipment. 2 gal/man/day
               for five (5) days.

         (b) Class III.

            1. For purposes of mounting, the following figures will be used to determine
               requirement on a per man basis:

               | Item                  | Symbol or Spec. No. | Unit | Per Man |
               |-----------------------|---------------------|------|---------|
               | Diesel, 50 Octane     | gal.                | .6   |
               | Mogas, 80 Octane      | gal.                | .4   |
               | White gas             | gal.                | 1.4  |
               | Kerosene              | gal.                | .4   |
               | Lubecil, SAE 30       | 8250                | gal. |
               | Lubecil, SAE 50       | 9500                | gal. |
               | Grease, GP, No. 1     | 2-107                | lbs. |
               | Grease, GP, No. 2     | 2-108                | lbs. |
               | Grease, GP, No. 4     | 2-109                | lbs. |
               | Gearlube, SAE 50      | W-L-751              | lbs. |

SECRET
V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 10-45 (Cont'd).

SECRET

1. All fuel consuming vehicles to be carried on railroad flat cars will be embarked with fuel tanks three quarters (3/4) filled. Each vehicle will carry extra expeditionary cans.

(c) Class V.

1. Combat Units 2 U/F
2. Service Units 1 U/F
3. No gas or tear gas will be carried.

(2) Class II & IV (to be obtained from normal supply agencies by each unit comprising the FUKUKA Occupation Force).

(a) Class II & IV (less Engr), and Cold and Wet-Weather Clothing.

10 D/S

(b) Class II - Engr.

1. Water Purification Supplies only.

30 D/S

b. Equipment.

(1) Organizational.

(a) Minimum essential to carry out the assigned mission.

(b) Water Purification Units.

1. The 1st Plt, Co "C", 5th Engr Bn will carry water purification units to provide sufficient water for the entire FUKUKA Occupation Force.

(c) Chemical Warfare.

1. Gas masks, protective ointment and eyeshields, plus 10 D/S maintenance items, will be carried in Unit Supply.

SUPPLY.

a. Method of Supply.
SECRET

(1) Initially, distribution of all supply will be as prescribed by the Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

(2) Air Delivery.

(a) See Annex HOW (Air Delivery Plan) to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

(3) Resupply - All Classes.

(a) Initially, all resupply will be furnished by the 8th Service Regiment from S.SHEP and will be delivered by rail transportation to FUKUOKA.

b. Supplies to be carried by each individual (To be issued by parent organization).

(1) Rations.

(a) a minimum of one (1) emergency ration.

(2) Ammunition - 1 U/F.

(3) Water.

(a) Combat units and all medical personnel carry two (2) filled canteens.

(4) Medical Supplies.

(a) Adequate amounts of supplies will be carried with organizational and attached medical units.

c. Dumps.

(1) As prescribed by the Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

(2) Storage areas will be obtained in accordance with instructions set forth in Annex QUEEN (Area and Facilities Allocation Plan) to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

3. EVACUATION.

a. Casualties.
SECRET

(1) Personnel,
   (a) As prescribed by Co. "C", 5th Medical Battalion.

b. Burial.

(1) Initially in United States Armed Forces Cemetery Number 1, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan.

c. Salvage.

(1) Salvage of Allied equipment will be carried out in accordance with existing Army and Marine Corps SOP's.

d. Enemy Materiel.

(1) See Annex KING (Disposition of Enemy Materiel Plan), to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

(2) See V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45, subject: Procedure for inventory of, accounting for, and reporting enemy materiel.

e. Civilian Control.

(1) See Annex MIKE (Military Government Plan), to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

4. ORDNANCE PLAN.

   a. See Annex FOX to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

5. ENGINEER PLAN.

   a. See Annex MIKE to V Amphibious Corps Operation Plan No. 2-45.

6. ENGINEER ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN.

   a. See Annex GEORGE to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

7. TRAFFIC PLAN.

   a. To be prepared and issued by Headquarters, Fukuoka Occupation Force.
V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 10-45 (Cont'd).

SECRET

b. Traffic will drive to left.

8. PERSONNEL.

a. Stragglers.

(1) Unauthorized sightseers, and souvenir hunters, who will be considered as looters, will be arrested and turned over to the FUKUOKA Occupation Force Provost Marshal.

b. Mail.

(1) Postal facilities will be furnished by the Postal Section of the 5th Marine Division.

(2) Navy and Marine Corps Units will continue to use their current FPC addresses.

(3) Outgoing mail may be dispatched through either Army or Navy facilities.

(4) Army Units: Upon arrival in the objective area, personnel of all units, organizations and detachments (except those organically assigned to a higher unit which has a permanently assigned FPC, as for example, a division), will use for their address the FPC number indicated below:

(c) Units in V Amphibious Corps zone:

FPC 929

o. Shelter.

(1) Assignment of areas will be accomplished in accordance with Annex QUEEN (Area and Facilities Allocation Plan) to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

(2) Housing.

(c) For limitations on construction, see Annex GEORGE (Engineer Administrative Plan) to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

d. Reports.

(1) G-1 and G-4 Periodic Reports.

(e) See Annex FETER (Administrative Reports)
V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 10-45 (Cont'd).

SECRET

Plan to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

e. Replacements.

(1) Navy and Marine Corps.

(a) Supplies through normal Navy and Marine Corps channels.

(2) Army.

(a) Units will submit monthly personnel requisitions for loss replacements in accordance with provisions of letter, Headquarters, Sixth Army file AG 200.3 E, Subject: "Personnel Replacement Requisitions", dated 18 September, 1944.

f. Casualty Reports.

(1) None required other than administrative reports in individual cases normally required by higher authority.

g. Records.

(1) Marine Corps personnel evacuated from occupation zone will be transferred by Staff Returns as follows:

(a) Evacuated to OKINAWA, Staff Returns to FE, FMF, Pan, RIYUS.

(b) Evacuated to LEBANON, Staff Returns to TC, FE, FMF, Pac (DUVA).

(c) Evacuated to Destination Unknown, Staff Returns to TC, FMF, Pac (FRAX).

(d) Evacuated to UNITED STATES, Staff Returns to Department of Pacific, Marine Corps.

(2) Naval personnel as directed by ComSerFor.

(3) Army personnel as directed by Commanding General, Sixth Army.

(4) Two (2) copies of all embarkation rosters to be sent direct to Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
SECRET

(5) Identification tags to be checked and to be worn by all troops.

h. Payment of Troops.

(1) As prescribed by Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

i. Handling of Casuals.

(1) A Casual and Replacement Camp will be set up by the FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

(2) The Commander of the Casual and Replacement Camp will receive any and all casuals arriving at his camp and will process, equip and effect the prompt return of such casuals to their organizations.


(1) See Annex MAnn (Recovery and Repatriation of Personnel) to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 8-45.

k. Demobilization of the Japanese Army.

(1) See Annex MAnN (Enforcement of Surrender Terms) to V Amphibious Corps Operation Plan No. 2-45.

9. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Uniforms.

(1) Entrainment.

(c) Utility Clothing.

(2) Detrainment.

(a) Utility Clothing.

b. Baggage.

(1) Officers.

(c) Field Officers; one (1) trunk, or footlocker; one (1) clothing roll or one (1) bag, clothing; and one (1) bedding roll.

(b) All other officers: one (1) clothing roll.
and one (1) bag, clothing; and one (1) bedding roll.
(2) Enlisted.
(a) 1st Paygrade: One (1) clothing roll, and one (1) bag, clothing, and one bedding roll.
(b) All other enlisted personnel authorized one (1) bag, clothing.
(c) Pads for enlisted personnel will be carried with organic camp equipment.

c. Sanitation.
(1) See Annex JIG (Sanitation Plan) to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

d. Periodic Reports.
(1) For G-1 and G-4 Periodic Reports, see Annex PETER (Administrative Reports Plan) to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Plan No. 6-45.

e. Shoulder Sleeve Insignia.
(1) Shoulder sleeve insignias are authorized for wear by personnel of units in the objective area.

(1) See Annex MIKE (Military Government Plan) to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 as modified by change No. 2 thereto.

g. The Commanding General, Fukuoka Occupation Force will establish, on a temporary basis, a Procurement Section as set forth in Annex QUEEN to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45. This Procurement Section will function as a Subsection of the V Amphibious Corps Procurement Section. Attention is invited to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45, Subject: Organization of Procurement Section, V Amphibious Corps.

h. Conservation of Supplies.
(1) Conservation of equipment and supplies is a command responsibility.
(2) All organization Commanders will:
V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 10-45 (Cont'd).

SECRET

(a) Provide adequate guards for all supplies, and equipment enroute to the objective area.

(b) Post adequate guards over all supply dumps, with orders to prevent pilfering by military personnel and civilians.

(c) Insure that rations, clothing and other supplies are not given, sold or bartered to members of Japanese Armed Forces or civilians by personnel of his command. Only Military Government Agencies are authorized to make issue of supplies to civilians.

(d) Impress on all individuals the seriousness of pilfering our own or captured supplies.

(e) Take prompt disciplinary action in every case of looting or pilfering, and give publicity within his command to punishments imposed thereof. No looting of Japanese property will be tolerated. Civilian offenders will be handled in accordance with the policies set forth in Annex MIKE (Military Government Plan) to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 8-45.

(f) Insure that confiscation or requisitioning of Japanese property or facilities will be accomplished only by persons duly authorized to perform this function.

(g) Insure that unserviceable vehicles are not dismantled for reclamation of parts except by ordnance maintenance or automotive repair companies.

h. WARNING on use of lubricating oil.

(1) Only Japanese oil (Paraffin base) will be used in Japanese vehicles.

(2) DO NOT use Japanese oil in any U.S. motor equipment at any time.

i. Other Administrative Details - No change.

SECRET

- 9 -
V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 10-45 (Cont'd).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT;

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: Same as V Amphibious Corps Operation Order No.
41-45.

OFFICIAL:

M. C. HORNER,
Colonel, U.S.M.C.,
ACofS, G-4.
1940-5-5
105/211
Serial: 001138

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

To Accompany Operation Order No. 49-45.

Maps:
See Annex BAKER (Operations Map); VAC Occupational Zone, Japan, scale 1:500,000; Map of KYUSHU, scale 1:250,000. Map of Central Japan, 2d Edition, 1944, scale 1:250,000. Others as issued.

Photos:

Charts:


1. UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT.

a. Embarkation.

(1) Utility clothing.

(2) All individual equipment.

b. Debarkeation.

(1) Uniform, service, winter or as prescribed by the Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.

c. Baggage.

(1) As prescribed by the Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.

(2) Enlisted personnel will embark with rolls, bedding.

2. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE EMBARKED BY 5TH MARINE DIVISION:

a. Supplies.

(1) All of Classes II, IV and V supplies except those as listed in Annexes A, B, C, D, E and F hereto, all of Classes I and III and all small arms ammunition will be left in place and turned over to the relieving unit.

b. Equipment.

(1) All of Classes II, IV and V equipment except those as listed in Annexes A, B, C, D, E and F hereto. The 5th Marine Division and the 8th Service Regiment are directed to establish contact for the purpose of arranging for turn over of supplies and equipment which are necessary for units until actually embarked.
V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order Number 14-45 (Cont'd).

SECRET

3. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE LEFT AND TURNED OVER TO 2ND MARINE DIVISION, TO 8TH SERVICE REGIMENT AND INVOICED TO 32D INFANTRY DIVISION:
   a. To 2d Marine Division, see annex ABLE hereto.
   b. To 8th Service Regiment, see Annex BAKER hereto.
   c. To be invoiced to 32d Infantry Division, see Annex CHARLIE hereto.

4. TRANSPORT FOR 5TH MARINE DIVISION:
   a. Ships will be convoy loaded.
      (1). Loading of ships will be such as to assure speedy discharge at port of debarkation.
   b. Ships requested and tentatively assigned to lift 5th Marine Division.
      (1) First Echelon (Tentative loading date - 9 Dec 45)
         (a) 5 APA's Large
         (b) 2 AKA's Large
      (2) Second Echelon (Tentative loading date - 14 Dec 45)
         (a) 4 APA's Large
         (b) 1 AKA Large
         (c) 3 LST's
   c. Embarkation.
      (1) Ship assignment to be made later.
      (2) Ship loading.
         (a) As directed by the Commanding General, 5th Marine Division in conformity with Annex CHARLIE to Operation Order No. 49-45.
         (b) Loading Areas.
            1. For troops, general cargo and LSTs, KING Area.

SECRET
V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order Number 14-45 (Cont'd).

SECRET

2. For AKA loading, EASY Dock Area.

(c) See Transport Doctrine, Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, dated September, 1944.

(d) See Amphibious Forces Circular Letter Ale-Rev.2 - dated 18 March, 1944.


5. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 9-45 is hereby modified to the extent that upon the withdrawal of the 5th Marine Division, the V Amphibious Corps Procurement Section will take over all records and assume all functions of the Procurement Section of the 5th Marine Division. This will also include the procurement of Japanese labor.

b. V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 13-45 is hereby modified to the extent that upon the withdrawal of the 5th Marine Division, the 6th Marine Regiment will take over all the records and assume all functions of the Disposition Section of the 5th Marine Division.

c. Issue of War Trophies.

(1) The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division will issue war trophies to all personnel being transferred to the 2nd Marine Division and V Amphibious Corps. The issue of war trophies will be reported by letter, giving type of trophies issued, to the new commanding officer, an additional copy of this letter will be furnished the V Amphibious Corps Disposition Officer in the case of persons transferred to V Amphibious Corps units and to the 2nd Marine Division Disposition Officer in case of persons transferred to that Division.

(2) Commanding officers will collect these war trophies and place them under guard until the person concerned is ordered out of this area.

(3) The Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division and the Corps Disposition Officer will issue war trophies to all persons transferred to the 5th Marine Division from the 2nd Marine Division and V Amphibious Corps, respectively.
V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order Number 14-45 (Cont'd).

SECRET

(4) The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division will take such action as he deems appropriate to prevent issued trophies from becoming a means of barter prior to the embarkation of that organization.

d. 32nd Infantry Division responsibilities:

(1) Upon the disbanding of the FUKUOKA Base Command, the 32nd Infantry Division will assume the following missions and responsibilities within its area of responsibility:

(a) Be responsible for operation of supply point at FUKUOKA and the logistical support of its component parts and all attached Army troops, plus Air Force units, within the Division area of responsibility. (See annex ABE to Operation Order No. 49-45)

(b) Be responsible for all construction and engineering missions now assigned the 5201st Construction Brigade when that Brigade passes to its operational control.

(c) Be responsible for the construction and maintenance of all necessary roads within the Division zone of responsibility, with particular attention to the FUKUOKA-SASEBO Road.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE - Equipment to be turned over to 2d MarDiv.
BAKER - Equipment to be turned over to 8th ServRegt.
CHARLIE - Equipment to be invoiced to 32d InfDiv.

DISTRIBUTION: Same as V Amphibious Corps Operation Order No. 49-45.

OFFICIAL:

W. C. HORN
Colonel, USMC,
AC of S, G-4.
Annex ABLE to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 14-45

MATERIAL TO BE TURNED OVER TO 2ND MARINE DIVISION

1945-5-5
016-211
Serial: 0011368

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
In the Field.

SECRET
24 November, 1945.

GENERAL SUPPLY

Cots and pads in dispensary at AINOURA.
400 heaters, kerosene.
9 ovens, beke, w/accessories and bakery equipment.
2 trailers, laundry.
All band instruments not required by 5th Marine Division.
5 safes, field.

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

1 reefer, 50 cu.ft. at dispensary AINOURA.
1 reefer, 540 cu.ft.
7 household refrigerators, 3 cu.ft. (Servel)
2 trailers, 3-ton, water purification unit, mobile.
1 water purification unit, portable (SAGA).

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

1 telephone central office set kTC-2.
50 telephone TF-8.

MOTOR TRANSPORT

3 ambulances, 2-ton, 4x4.
55 trucks, 2-ton, 4x4.
50 trucks, 1-ton, 4x4.
2 sedans, 4x2.
3 station wagons, 4x2.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: Same as V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No.
14-45.

OFFICIAL:
M. C. HOFER,
Colonel, USMC,
AS of S, G-4.
Annex BAKER to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 14-45.

EQUIPMENT TO BE TURNED IN TO 8TH SERVICE REGIMENT.

1990-5-5
016/211
Serial: 0011363
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
In the Field.
SECRET
24 November, 1945.

GENERAL SUPPLY ITEMS

All cots in Division Quartermaster store.
All heaters, kerosene, not turned over to 2nd Marine Division.
All bake ovens, w/accessories and bakery equipment, not turned over to 2nd Marine Division or invoiced to 32nd Infantry Division.
All shoe packs.
All sleeping bags.
All excess winter clothing.
All summer clothing.
All field range accessories and spare part sets.
All housekeeping supplies.
All malaria and Pest control equipment.
All laundry trailers not turned over to 2nd Marine Division or invoiced to 32nd Infantry Division.

ORDNANCE MATERIAL

All Ordnance cleaning and preserving material.

ENGINEER MATERIAL

All water chemicals.
All acetylene and oxygen.
All 640 cu.ft. reefers and spare parts not turned over to 2nd Marine Division.
All household refrigerators not turned over to 2nd Marine Division.
All shower units, 24 head, not turned over to 2nd Marine Division or invoiced to 32d Infantry Division.
3 pull graders.
3 road graders, self-propelled.
2 shovels, 3/4 cu.yd.
3 shovels, 3/8 cu.yd.
3 TD 14, w/crane.
3 TD 9, w/crane.
1 rock crusher, 20-30 ton.
7 machines, ice making bulk, 1-ton.
1 machine, ice flakes (Yaak).
3 sterilization and bath units.
Annex EAKER to VAC administrative Order Number 14-45 (Cont'd).

MOTOR TRANSPORT

All automotive spare parts and accessories.
All excess tires and tubes.
All steam cleaners.
1 trailer, 5-ton, machine shop, carburetor ignition.
1 trailer, tire repair, w/tools, accessories and repair stock.
5 trailers, 2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom.
5 trailers, 1-ton, lubrication.
4 trailers, 1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom.
all trucks, tank.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: Same as V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 14-45.

OFFICIAL:

W. C. HORNER,
Colonel, USMC,
AC of S, G-4.

EQUIPMENT TO BE INVOICED TO 32ND INFANTRY DIVISION

1980-5-5
C16/211
Serial: 0011368

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
In the Field.

24 November, 1945.

SECRET

1 oven, bake, w/accessories and bakery equipment at KURUME.
2 water purification units, portable, at KURUME.
3 shower units, 24 head, 2 at KURUME, 1 at FUKUOKA.
2 trailers, laundry, light, 1 at KURUME, 1 at FUKUOKA.
6 sterilization and bath units, 1 at KURUME, 5 at FUKUOKA.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT:

W. V. ROGERS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: Same as V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 14-45,

OFFICIAL:

I. C. HORNBERGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AG of S, G-4.
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

- OCCUPATION OF JAPAN -

G-1 Report

Annex BAKER
From: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

The following constitutes the special action report of the G-1 Section and its several allied sections for the Occupation of Japan.

1. **CASUALTIES**

There were no battle casualties incident to the seizure and occupation of the V Amphibious Corps Zone of Action. Hospital facilities were more than ample for the care of personnel injured by accidents and for the care of the sick.

2. **MILITARY GOVERNMENT**

The original plan for military government envisaged an area where all customary civil authority had vanished and where we, as occupying forces, would have to establish and administer the country and its people. It was on this basis that military government officers were assigned to V Amphibious Corps.

Fortunately the Japanese government has been in operation continuously, and our principal task with regard to it has been one of supervision. The work of the military government officers was, to a large degree, liaison and survey in nature. Their liaison efforts were immediately valuable and their survey activity benefited higher echelons, since it was in the nature of departmental intelligence.

The military government section was hampered, during the early phases of the occupation, by a lack of enlisted personnel. It was impossible to provide sufficient clerks and typists from the Corps and none were provided initially from either the Army or Navy. The initial lack of office equipment was met by requisitions on the Japanese and by loan from other sections within the Corps.

3. **COMMAND POSTS**

The Corps Command Post closed at MAUI, T. P., on 1 September 1945, at 1030W, and opened on the USS MT. MC KINPLY (AGC-7) at the same time on the same date. There was also an

Annex EAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan
CONFLICTIAL
Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan

auxiliary command group on the USS SAUGUS (LSV-4). Two days after leaving MAUI voice radio circuit between the MT, MC KINLEY and the SAUGUS was established, and was of great value in liaison between the two staff groups. The circuit remained in use until just before entering SASEBO HARBOR.

The Corps Command Post closed on 23 September 1945, at 1600 on the MC KINLEY, and opened at the same time and date at the former Japanese Enlisted Men's Club, Naval Base, SASEBO, JAPAN.

Since the office equipment of the various sections had been, to a large extent, mobile loaded on the SAUGUS, the Corps Headquarters was able to go into full operation with a minimum of delay.

4. DECORATIONS, AWARDS, ETC.

Awards during the period consisted of those for the TWO JIMA operation, and those for meritorious achievement prior to V-J Day, to personnel who were about to be detached.

During the period covered by this report, the following decorations were awarded:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>NO. AWARDED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gold Star in lieu of a 2d Distinguished Service Medal</td>
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<td>Navy Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gold Star in lieu of a 2d Navy Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gold Star in lieu of a 2d Legion of Merit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Star in lieu of a 2d Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter of Commendation with Ribbon</td>
<td>3</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Annex BAKER to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

AWARD

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<tr>
<th>NAVY AND MARINE CORPS MEDAL</th>
<th>1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PURPLE HEART MEDAL</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Star in lieu of 2d PURPLE HEART MEDAL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. CEMETERIES AND GRAVES REGISTRATION SERVICE.

Since the Fleet Marine Force Graves Registration Service is organic to Division rather than Corps, no problem on Corps level occurs except with regard to attached troops. In this operation, the Second and Fifth Division took action as necessary for Corps elements in their areas.

Cemeteries were established by both Marine Divisions in accordance with SIXTH Army's Standing Operating Procedure. The 2nd Marine Division established their's at (1298.40-1059.35) in NAGASAKI, and the 5th Marine Division their's at (1203.3-1112.5) in SASABO, map of KYUSHU, 1:250,000. The 32nd Infantry Division did not establish a cemetery. In each case, the cemetery is named "U. S. Armed Forces Cemetery Number One," followed by the location.

It is planned to consolidate these cemeteries into the U. S. Armed Forces Cemetery No. One, at SASABO. This will be completed in December 1945.

6. MAIL

Mail is the subject of Appendix 7 to this G-1 Annex.

7. MORALE

The state of morale in the components of the Corps varied during the period covered by this report. Most individuals were interested in going to JAPAN on occupation duty.

After landing, morale suffered as a result of conditions which were not correctable by this Headquarters. Certain aspects of the situation will be discussed in detail together with remedial suggestions.

Some regular officers, particularly younger ones whose only service experience is in time of war have been out of the U. S. a long time, many are on their second tour of overseas

- 3 -
CONFI DENTIAL

Annex BAKTR to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

Duty, and see no prospect of early relief. Similarly, regular enlisted men want to know how long they might expect overseas duty. It is considered that a definite tour of duty and a rotation policy are essential to the highest morale of regular officers and enlisted men.

With regard to Reserve officers and enlisted men the situation is better. Letters of Instruction 1108 and 1109 provide usable methods and procedures for demobilization, but there has been until recently a lag between policies as announced to the general public and actual implementation of those policies in the field. When the announcement was made that 50 service credits were sufficient for demobilization, operational conditions in Japan made approximately 65 points a minimum necessary to send personnel home. This was difficult to explain to the men.

Another matter which adversely affected morale during the first two months of occupation was the almost total lack of recreation facilities except those brought to Japan. The destruction of the central part of SASEBO destroyed most of the legitimate places of amusement, stores, and shops. The imposition of an 1800 hour of liberty in the SASEBO area was felt to be necessary in view of the above mentioned existing conditions in the town. In many instances the troops considered the ensuing long evenings an unreasonable hardship in view of the liberty hours allowed in Army zones of occupation further north.

To compensate for the shortened evening liberty arrangements were made for more hours of liberty during daylight hours. Motion pictures were shown with early and late evening shows, athletics were encouraged, and available stage shows were held.

The facts concerning the poor incoming mail service will be discussed under the postal heading, but its morale effect will be considered here. A rapid and continuous delivery of mail at regular intervals is a greater morale factor than prompt payment of troops under conditions such as those existing during this occupation period. It ranks after food, quarters and clothing in the minds of the men. During one period of typhoon conditions it was impossible to deliver mail, however, aside from this period air mail from the U. S. arrived in periods varying generally from 12 to 20 days and averaged 15 days. Letters arrived out of the order of posting and delivery was sporadic. After the excellent
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Mail service during the TWO JIMA campaign the men individually felt that it had failed to attain the regularity and speed experienced under wartime and battle conditions.

The food during the initial phases of the occupation was adequate but it consisted of a rather monotonous repetition of menus. This was due to the outloading of large quantities of the same menu from the HAWAIIAN area. A lack of fresh foods existed until November at which time the food and menu improved rapidly.

3.

REPLACEMENTS AND DEMOBILIZATION.

The movement of troops incident to demobilization greatly hampered occupational duties. The transfers incident to withdrawal of the 5th Marine Division involved some 17,000 individuals moving over an area of 16,000 square miles. Many SSN specialties, upon whom the smooth functioning of the organizations depended, were returned to the U. S. for demobilization and rotation leaving less experienced and less well qualified men in their places. Administrative agencies were faced with the additional problems of preparing and closing records of men being transferred and joining. Certain small units and sections found themselves shorn of most of their personnel and were forced to join and train even key men while carrying on their assigned missions.

As of 30 November 1945 replacements have been received by units of this Corps since 1 June 1945 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>USMC OFF</th>
<th>USMC ENL</th>
<th>USN OFF</th>
<th>USN ENL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;S Bn, VAC</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Bn, VAC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Bn, VAC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Marine Division</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2162</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Marine Division</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 30 November 1945 the following personnel had been returned to the United States for release or discharge under all current directives:

- 5 -
Annex BAKER to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.


Naval Construction Units Attached: 7 off - 1332 Enl.

Total: 486 off - 6984 Enl.

9. STRAGGLERS.

No straggler problem occurred within the Corps until arrival in Japan. Here the difficulties were principally caused by visiting personnel who came ashore on sightseeing trips.

10. STRENGTH REPORTS.

See Appendix 10 to this report.

11. ARMY SECTION AND ARMY FINANCE SECTION.

The Army Section (Det. Hq., SIXTH Army) which joined this Corps Headquarters at S. SEBO late in September, has been invaluable in handling the many purely administrative matters that have arisen in Army units attached to Amphibious Corps for operational control. The carrying on of the SIXTH Army's readjustment plans has been a task of importance and has been well handled.

The section in its final form has an officer in charge, an AO representative and four enlisted men. This office force was adequate in most cases, although at times the work load was very heavy.

The Army Finance Section (173d Finance Disbursing Section) had a strength of one officer and twenty-two enlisted men. The largest part of the sections business was exchanging U. S. for Japanese currency for incoming Army troops and for transient members of the Merchant Marine.

12. TASK ORGANIZATION.

See C-3 Report.

13. LEGAL AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE.

The principal duty of the Legal Section was in connection with Legal Assistance and the determination of the action of subordinate commands on matters pertaining to Naval Courts and Boards.
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Annex BAKER to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

Two officers and one enlisted man joined the Corps just prior to departure from MAUI (31Aug45) to form the Legal Section of Corps. One of these officers was detached and ordered to return to Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in early October and the other officer was ordered on temporary duty to Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on 1 November. Thus the Corps has actually been without a legal section during the latter part of this period. Legal matters have been handled by the G-1 Section. Because of the above conditions appendix 8 is omitted from this report.

14. ORGANIZATION OF SECTION.

The section, during most of the period covered by this report, was gradually contracting in size. Its final components were the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, three Assistant G-1’s (Executive, Operations, and Administrative), an enlisted Chief of Section, and two clerks. The organization is considered satisfactory for this type of operation.

15. BILLETING AND QUARTERING.

Billeting and quartering during the period prior to departure from the HAWAIIAN Area were in no way difficult. However, the problem in JAPAN was initially acute for several reasons.

It was necessary to billet all troops in buildings because of expected cold weather. All buildings had to be sprayed with DDT and cleaned carefully, since with few exceptions they were filthy.

The billeting of enlisted men was comparatively easy, but officers, particularly those in a temporary duty and transient status, amounting to several hundreds in SASEBO, caused numerous difficulties. Many transients arrived without bedding or sufficient clothing, and as a result were uncomfortable in the Japanese billets to which they were assigned. These conditions were alleviated by issuance of available bedding, winter clothing and procurement of stoves.

The advantages of billeting in buildings were thoroughly demonstrated during the typhoon which lasted from about 1200/1, 10 October 1945 to about 0600/1, 11 October 1945, and attained a maximum wind velocity of seventy-five miles per hour. The wind was sufficiently strong to break glass in windows in buildings and would unquestionably have destroyed tentage exposed to it.

- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL
In general, billeting in buildings has been a very satisfactory solution to the housing problem.

16. ROTATION.

Rotation during the period covered by this report was limited. Its place was largely taken by discharges under the point system and the return of officers for separation from the service.

During the last two weeks covered by this report, lists of personnel due for rotation, discharge, and separation were compiled and transfers to the 5th Marine Division preparatory to its departure for the U.S. were effected.

17. DEMOBILIZATION AND "POINT" SYSTEM.

The system did not have a fair trial in this Corps until orders returning the 5th Marine Division to the U.S. were received, if the Army units attached to Corps are excepted. Directives limiting reduction in T/O strength to 90% caused a situation in which personnel were eligible but could not be relieved.

With the advent of orders to return the 5th Marine Division, the demobilization and point system assumed a real meaning for the officers and men. All personnel with the required time or points overseas were transferred to the 5th Marine Division and men from that Division without the home-going qualifications replaced them. In a few instances personnel were declared "essential," however; this list was kept to an absolute minimum. It is believed that the demobilization and point system is now functioning in a satisfactory manner, except that regular personnel are performing in a disadvantageous position.

18. ARMY AUGMENTATION UNITS.

Administration of Army augmentation units was handled by the Army Section (Det. Hq., SIXTH Army), VAC. Their report is appended hereto.

19. RECOVERY OF ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES.

These activities were handled by Recovery Teams which actually functioned under the operational control of SIXTH
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Army. Their work was largely completed prior to landing of assault elements of V Amphibious Corps.

In connection with Recovery Teams, in any future operations of this nature it is suggested that after their initial work is completed, a reduced number of these men be left in the area. In this zone they could have been used most effectively, to investigate reported plane crash locations, graves, and off-lying islands, relieving our combat units of work they were in many instances poorly prepared to undertake.

20. AMERICAN RED CROSS.

The activities of the attached Red Cross representative from 1 June 1945 until preparations for the occupation of Japan were begun during the early part of August 1945 were largely routine. Facilities for obtaining official confirmation of servicemen's home conditions were in constant use, loans to men going on emergency furloughs were arranged, and recreational supplies were given to the Red Cross Staff at the V Amphibious Corps hospital and the two Red Cross Clubs in the V Amphibious Corps area.

When the Corps embarked for Japan, Armed Forces editions of books, magazines, playing cards and small games were furnished to the men aboard ship for use while enroute.

After the arrival of the V Amphibious Corps Red Cross representative at SASEBO communications were set up with the American Red Cross Headquarters in Washington, D.C. to maintain the facilities for official confirmation of servicemen's home conditions. Recreation rooms were established and equipped by the Red Cross and small attached Corps units without Post Exchange facilities were supplied with necessities until other provisions could be made. Expansion of these activities is planned.

21. DISCIPLINE.

Discipline has been generally good. Because of the tendency to turn souvenir hunting into looting strict disciplinary action has been taken on such infractions resulting in a proportionately higher number of courts martial.

D. A. STAFFORD.
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Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS REPORT

PLANNING AND TRAINING PRIOR TO OCCUPATION

Military Government for the V Amphibious Corps' operation in JAPAN had its origin in NAUI. Subsequent to the IWO JIMA operation and prior to July 1945, Major Robert K. RYLAND, USMC, served as Civil Affairs Officer for the V Amphibious Corps. In July 1945, Colonel John F. HOUGH, USMC, was appointed Senior Military Government Officer of the Provisional Military Government Section of V.A.G. In addition to Colonel HOUGH, there were three officers and two enlisted men on duty with the section. All of them had previous experience in Military Government operations. The principal activity of the section was the publication of the first Annex H.I.K.E to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6–45, dated 24 August 1945. This plan was prepared without a definite statement of policy from the SIXTH Army, although numerous attempts had been made by the SHO to obtain such statements.

On or about 26 August 1945, the Military Government Officer requisitioned the following office equipment and supplies from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. PEARL HARBOR.

40 Typewriters
40 Chest, typewriter
40 Field Desks
40 Saplers
40 Perforaters
7 Machines, mimeograph

Military Government supplies which had been salvaged from the IWO JIMA operation were prepared for shipment to JAPAN. These supplies included such commodities as, buckets, kettles, tarpaulins, nails, insecticide, tools, cloth, screen wire, blankets, lanterns, sprayers, lister bags, rope, candles, soap, medical supplies, dungarees, shirts and camp equipment.

It was further planned that the following tonnages of supplies would be carried by Corps for the Military Government Officer:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Class I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Canned Fish</td>
<td>50 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fats and Oils</td>
<td>10 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Rice</td>
<td>150 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Salt</td>
<td>7 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Soy Beans</td>
<td>75 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Sugar</td>
<td>8 L/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subject: MilGovt Operational Report. (Cont'd).

b. Class II-Engineer
   (1) Barbed Wire 8 L/T

c. Class IV-Medical
   (1) MU, or CAD 18 L/T
   Basic Medical Units

The Senior Military Government Officer and his staff departed from NAUI for SAIPAN on 1 September 1945 with V.A.C. After arrival at SAIPAN, on 12 September 1945, Annex 8 to Administrative Order No. 19, Military Government, Headquarters, SIXTH Army dated 11 September 1945 was received and work began upon revision of the original plans for Military Government.

Annex MKE to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. S-45 was completed and published on 15 September 1945. This superseded the previously published Annex and became the Military Government plan to be put into effect in the V Amphibious Corps zone of operation.

At SAIPAN, on 15 September 1945, ninety-four Military Government Officers, who had departed from the U. S. on 27 August 1945, joined the V Amphibious Corps and certain lower echelons. Of this number, sixty-four were Army officers and the remaining thirty were Naval officers. These officers were assigned as follows:

1. The 92nd Hq. & Hq. Detachment, Military Government Group, consisting of eleven officers, was assigned to Headquarters V Amphibious Corps.

2. The 93d Hq. & Hq. Detachment, Military Government Group, consisting of eleven officers, was assigned to the 2d Marine Division.

3. The 94th Hq. & Hq. Detachment, Military Government Group, consisting of eleven officers, was assigned to the 5th Marine Division.

4. The 95th Hq. & Hq. Detachment, Military Government Group, consisting of eleven officers, was assigned to V Amphibious Corps and further attached to the 5th Marine Division.

5. The 37th Hq. & Hq. Military Government Company, consisting of ten officers, was assigned to Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps.

6. Forty casual Military Government officers were assigned to V Amphibious Corps, Staff.
After the arrival of Corps at SASEBO on 22 September 1945, sixteen Military Government officers reported from the SIXTH Army for temporary duty with the V Amphibious Corps. These officers had previously been stationed at C.A. H.S.A. and were transported by air to the PHILLIPINES then to SASEBO, JAPAN. Another unit, the 29th Military Government Hq. & Hq. Company had been activated in the PHILLIPINES under the SIXTH Army and were in SASEBO upon the arrival of Corps. This unit consisted of twelve Military Government officers and sixty-one enlisted men.

The Army and Naval officers, on duty with the Corps, had been well trained for Military Government in JAPAN, and represented a variety of specialized civilian fields of endeavor which qualified them for such duty.
Upon arrival in JAPAN, Corps had 126 military government officers, excluding those who had been assigned to divisions prior to leaving MAUI. The Military Government officer landed at SASEBO 23 September and immediately began setting up the military government office.

On 25 September 1945, eighty-one of the 126 military government officers were awaiting some definite assignment to duties which they were eager to undertake. Forty-two of this group were assigned to various duties with the Corps Military Government Section as indicated in Military Government Section Office Memorandum No. 1, dated 25 September 1945 (Appendix A). This was further revised on 28 September 1945 to include four additional officers.

The Military Government Section as organized came under G-1. The Staff was organized to conform with that organization proposed at CARSA during the training period. The following officers, sections and divisions constituted the organization:

Corps Senior Military Government Officer
Deputy Senior Military Government Officer
Assistant to the Deputy Senior Military Government Officer
Executive Officer
Assistant to the Executive Officer
Legal Section
Administrative Section
S-1 Division:
Officer in Charge
Personnel Section
Labor Section
Public Welfare Section
Displaced Persons Section
S-2 Division:
Officer in Charge
Public Safety Section
Public Relations Section
Information and Interpreter Section
Education and Fine Arts Section
S-3 Division:
Officer in Charge
Engineering Section
Medical and Public Health Section
Utilities Section
Port Liaison Section
S-4 Division:
Officer in Charge
Supply Section
Procurement Section
Resources and Industry Section
Price Control and Rationing Section
Property Control Section
Subject: MilGovt Operational Report. (Cont'd)

Agriculture Section
Transportation Section
Salvage Section
Fisheries Section
Accounting Section

At the first staff meeting the Deputy Senior Military Government Officer informed the staff that the only specific instructions for the functioning of military government at the Corps level were the general statements contained in Annex MIKE to the Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45. He directed the officers assigned to each section to prepare plans for section functioning based on these general statements.

The staff prepared check lists to be used as guides in conducting surveys of the various prefectures within the Corps Zone of operation. They conducted personal investigations of various fields in which their sections were interested, then prepared recommendations for action. It soon became obvious that there were many more officers on the staff than could be reasonably justified in terms of the amount of work called for from higher headquarters. On October 6 there were forty-seven officers on the staff and the advisability of further reduction in the staff was one of the principal problems which the Deputy Senior Military Government put to officers at the SIXTH Army when he visited that Headquarters on 24 October 1945. They offered no objection to recommendations to reduce the Corps Military Government Staff to the minimum number of officers needed to process reports and surveys, and to handle routine personnel and administrative matters.

Although reduction of the Military Government Staff began on 18 October 1945, it was not until 5 November 1945 that the staff was reduced to its present size. Between the 18th and 22nd of October, sixteen staff officers were assigned temporary duty with the FUKUOKA Occupation Force, the 2nd Marine Division, the 5th Marine Division and the 32nd Infantry Division. Further reductions in staff personnel were accomplished between the 2nd and 5th of November when twelve officers were assigned to duty with other general and special staff sections of Corps as liaison officers. One officer was assigned to each G-1, G-2, and G-3; two were assigned to TQM; five to the Procurement Section; and one officer each to the Legal Section and Public Information Section. These officers continued their work for military government in the section most closely allied to their particular field. Colonel Hough and one other officer were assigned to the Corps Inspectors Office as Corps Inspectors and assistant Corps Inspectors respectively. Five Naval officers and three Army officers were released under the readjustment program and one officer was transferred to the XXIV Corps. Thus, on 20 November 1945, eight officers were left on the Military Government staff and the section was organized in the following manner:

The Military Government Officer
Executive Officer
Subject: MilGovt Operational Report (Cont'd).

S-1 Division
Administration
Personnel
Education and Fine Arts
Supplies

S-2 Division
Legal
Displaced Persons
Public Welfare
Public Safety
War Diary
Weekly Occupation Activities Reports
Operations Reports

S-3 Division
Engineering
Utilities
Communications
Transportation
Port Liaison
Maps

S-4 Division
Price Control and Rationing
Civilian Supply
Agriculture
Fisheries
Resources and Industry
Forestry
Fiscal

On 1 November 1945, the Provisional Military Government Group was disbanded and deleted from the Task Organization, V Amphibious Corps. A Special Staff Section, Military Government was organized as of that date. The duties of the Military Government Special Staff Section were defined as follows:

a. To assist the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on Military Government matters as required.
b. To consolidate Military Government reports as required by Annex MIKE to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 (Military Government).
c. To supervise Military Government activities within the V Amphibious Corps area and make inspections as required.
d. To co-ordinate the assignment of Military Government personnel assigned to V Amphibious Corps in accordance with requirements and available personnel.
e. To maintain and supplement the Military Government information files applicable to the V Amphibious Corps area.
Subject: MilGovt Operational Report. (Cont'd).

Liaison officers to the various staff sections from the Military Government Section were continued.

After all officers were re-assigned to units in the field the following numbers of officers were on duty with various units as indicated:

1. 22nd Infantry Division
   29th M.G. Hq & Hq Co.  18
   37th M.G. Hq & Hq Co.  12

2. 2nd Marine Division
   92nd Hq & Hq Det. M.G. Group 10
   93rd Hq & Hq Det. M.G. Group 15
   95th Hq & Hq Det. M.G. Group 13

3. 5th Marine Division
   94th Hq & Hq Det. M.G. Group 15

4. Fukuoka Base Command  2

As of the date the 92nd; 93rd; 94th; and 95th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Government Groups arrived in JAPAN, they were assigned to SIXTH Army for Administration. The military government companies and groups had previously been assigned by Corps to divisions as shown above.
Subject: MilGovt Operational Report. (Cont'd).

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

On 26 September 1945, four military government staff officers were sent to FUKUOKA, the capital of the EIGHTH Administrative District, for purpose of obtaining essential information about Japanese civilian affairs in KYUSHU. These officers returned during the early part of October with extensive information which was later consolidated into a survey report and forwarded to SIXTH Army.

Just prior to 8 October plans were made for conducting comprehensive surveys of all the prefectures of KYUSHU, excluding those currently occupied by divisional troops. Each division within the military government staff prepared detailed check lists of items of information which they desired to obtain from these surveys (See Appendix B). Four officers were selected as a survey team for each of five prefectures not already covered, SAGA, OITA, KUMAMOTO, KAGOSHIMA, MIYAZAKI. Each four-man survey team was to proceed to their respective prefectures, establish themselves and set about collecting the information called for on the various check lists. Prior to leaving they were given detailed instructions on a letter from the Military Government Officer regarding the procedure they should follow and the manner in which they should conduct themselves. (See Appendix C.)

They were instructed to order Japanese officials in each of these prefectures to supply them with detailed information, provided for in the check list, regarding general civilian administration, fiscal conditions, communications, transportation, public utilities, trade and commerce, construction materials, salvage, public health, agriculture, food and clothing, forestry, manufacturing, mining, price controls and rationing, labor, police and fire protection, legal affairs and status of courts, public welfare, education, shrines, churches and monuments. Upon getting established each survey team reported the location of their headquarters to the military government staff section. The following headquarters locations were reported:

- SAGA Survey Team - MATSUKAWA YADOYA, SHIMBABA TORI
- OITA Survey Team - YASAKA BESSA, BEPPU-SHI
- KUMAMOTO Survey Team - Prefectural Building, KUMAMOTO-SHI
- MIYAZAKI Survey Team - Prefectural Building, MIYAZAKI-SHI
- KAGOSHIMA Survey Team - City Hall, KAGOSHIMA-SHI

These survey teams continued operations in their assigned areas and reported their findings to Corps until they were assimilated by divisions or other occupational forces which had physically taken over occupation of their respective areas.

A rather broad interpretation was made of paragraph 16 (a), item (6) "General status of civil administration", in preparing the Weekly Occupational Report. Each division within the staff was requested to prepare a list of questions which they considered significant for divisions to report upon each week in order that material might be obtained to include in the weekly report on status of civil administration.
Subject: MilGovt Operational Report. (Cont'd).

This resulted in a voluminous set of items and questions (see Appendix D) which were transmitted to divisions with instructions to furnish Corps with weekly reports thereon.

The S-3 Division of the staff was given the responsibility of analyzing these weekly reports as they were received and preparing summaries of them for transmission to SIXTH Army.

The S-1 Division, to which labor responsibilities were assigned, was responsible for receiving requisitions for native labor from Corps units, processing the requisitions and following through to see that laborers were delivered at the requested time and place. The numerous directives regarding labor which came down from higher echelons were interpreted and disseminated to echelons within Corps command. On 3 November 1945, labor functions were taken over by the Corps Procurement Section and officers who had previously been responsible for the work were transferred to the Procurement Section.

On 27 October, the practice of preparing a voluminous weekly supplementary report on the "general status of civil administration" to SIXTH Army was discontinued and special reports were submitted whenever pertinent information was obtained from divisions.

As of 30 November 1945, the following reports, based upon surveys and reports submitted to Corps by lower echelons, were processed, compiled and transmitted to SIXTH Army, in number as indicated:

- Kyushu District Reports: 40
- Prefectural and Related Surveys: 29
- Special Surveys: 11
Office Memorandum No. 1

1. Effective 0800, 26 September 1945, the following Military Government Section Staff assignments are effective:

Corps Senior Military Government Officer
Col. J. F. Rough 0-3998

Deputy Senior Military Government Officer
Lt. Col. E. J. Andrews 0-160741

Assistant to Deputy Senior Military Government Officer
Lt. Comdr. J. T. Peirce (D) USNR 83826

Executive Officer
Lt. Col. L. W. Glazebrook 0-488879

Legal Section
Lt. Col. E. W. Green 0-361658
Lt. Col. M. H. Miller 0-147637

Administration Section
Capt. W. T. Ellis, Jr. 0-286357
Capt. H. D. Haynes 0-1030983

S-1 Division
Division Officer in Charge
Lt. Comdr. J. P. Murphy
Personnel Section
1st Lt. T. A. Koolik 0-1798865
Labor Section
Capt. A. H. Harper 0-906663
Lieut. H. G. Ihrig, Jr. (D) USNR 126804
Displaced Persons Section
1st Lt. P. Silver 0-1060972
Public Welfare Section
Lt. (jg) H. H. Johnson (D) 1 375072 USNR

S-2 Division
Division Officer in Charge
Maj. G. H. Scott 0-192625
Public Safety Section
Lieut. R. B. King a (L) 235653 USNR
Public Relations Section
Lt. (jg) J. H. Koch D-V(S) 393670 USNR
Information and Interpreters Section
1st Lt. S. Freedman 0-1585468
Education and Fine Arts Section
Capt. J. D. Barnard 0-914367

APPENDIX (A)
Military Government Staff Assignments (Cont'd)

S-3 Division
Division Officer in Charge
Maj. M. B. Walker, Jr. 0-280016

Engineering Section
Maj. E. F. Saxon 0-304926
Lt. Comdr. R. S. Tenneson CEC 87741 USNR
Capt. C. A. Payne Jr. 0-304418

Medical and Public Health Section
Maj. S. B. Kirkwood 0-1685085
Capt. R. N. Jefferson 0-507359

Utilities Section
Maj. H. L. Brown 0-310288
Capt. C. C. McLelland 0-912842

Port Liaison Section
Lt. Comdr. J. D. Kriel 126215 USNR

S-4 Division
Division Officer in Charge
Lt. Col. R. H. Young 0-260795

Supply Section
Capt. R. S. Neenan 0-1576444

Procurement Section
1st Lt. W. H. Powell 0-1080809

Resources and Industry Section
Capt. C. B. Nines 0-365904
Lt. H. O. Kulberg (S) 152178

Price Control and Rationing Section
1st Lt. S. R. Dunnuck, Jr. 0-1553987

Property Control Section
Capt. M. F. Gruenberg 0-422104

Agriculture Section
Capt. F. M. Fitzgerald 0-1580942
Lt. (jg) R. M. Varney (S) 394105 USNR

Transportation Section
Capt. P. Gilmore 0-315060

Salvage Section
1st Lt. J. J. Frazee 0-1895577

Fiscal Section
Capt. W. J. Ellis 0-475890
Ensign R. B. Johnson (S) 373424 USNR

Fisheries Section
Lt. (jg) L. P. Woods (S) 295168 USNR

J. F. HOUGH
Colonel, USMC

Distribution:
1- Each Officer
5- File
APPENDIX (B)
CHECK LIST
EDUCATION AND FINE ARTS

1. List all schools by type, number and enrollment operating in the Ken prior to 1 January 1942.

2. List all schools by type, number and enrollment currently operating in the Ken.

3. List all schools by type, which are currently closed, giving reasons for being closed and, in general, what students formerly enrolled in these schools are now doing.

4. Report the number of qualified teachers by type of certification:
   (a) Who are currently available in the Ken.
   (b) Who are assigned to teaching positions in the Ken.
   (c) Who are needed for unfilled positions in the Ken.

5. What types of in-service training programs for teachers are now functioning in the Ken? Give the purpose of the program and number of teachers enrolled in each case.

6. What types of professional teachers' organizations are functioning in the Ken? Give the purpose of the program and the size of membership in each case.

7. Submit as accurate figures as possible for each of the following questions regarding school buildings and equipment:
   (a) How many additional buildings are currently needed to provide a minimum housing for schools in the Ken? List by types of schools.
   (b) How many school buildings are being used for other than school purposes? List by types of schools.
   (c) What measures are being taken by local communities to provide minimum schooling for school children where there is a shortage of school buildings?
   (d) What additional textbooks, if any, are needed to operate a minimum educational program in the schools of the Ken? List textbooks by kinds and numbers and indicate types of schools in which they are used.
   (e) What proportion of the schools are equipped with movie projectors? Give size of movie film used and report by types of schools.
   (f) What proportion of the schools are equipped with operable radios? Indicate by types of schools.
   (g) If radios or movie projectors have been removed from the schools, by what agency were they removed and for what purpose are they now being used?
   (h) What other shortages of essential school equipment currently exists in the Ken? Indicate by name and number of units the additional amounts of each unit needed to operate a minimum educational program in each type of school in the Ken.
8. How may, and what type of school inspectors are used for inspection of schools in the Ken?

9. What professional journals or periodic publications are commonly read by the various types of teachers in the Ken?

10. Submit to Military Government Section VAC Headquarters, copies of teachers manuals or guides for various subjects taught in the schools. If possible, submit English Translations.

11. Submit English translations of any currently used textbooks that might be available.

12. What directives have been received from the Ministry of Education regarding the future program of the schools? Obtain copies of these and transmit with report.

13. Since the conclusion of the war, what important changes in the schools have been initiated locally or by the Ministry of Education?

14. Submit any directories of national monuments, museums, temples, important shrines, art treasures and important libraries located in the Ken.

15. Indicate by number, name and location any of the following important cultural institutions which have been destroyed or damaged by bombing and the nature of the damage: shrines museums, libraries, temples, art collections, historical castles, monuments, and any other important types of cultural institutions.

16. What measures have been taken to protect institutions listed above to prevent looting or vandalism?
CHECK LIST
Medical & Public Health

OUTLINE FOR MEDICAL - PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS

I. Personnel, Facilities, Supplies, Equipment.
   a. Personnel
      1. Number of doctors, dentists, nurses, midwives, veterinary doctors in locality.
      2. Names of chief civilian health officials.
   b. Facilities.
      1. List of hospitals and sanatoria by name, location, type, bed capacity, present patient census condition.
      2. List of laboratories by name, location, type, condition.
      3. List of medical and dental schools by name, location, type, and condition.
      4. List of dental clinics by name, location and condition.
   c. Supplies and equipment.
      1. Adequacy of drugs and surgical supplies on hand.
      2. State of medical and surgical equipment.
      3. List of drug and equipment manufacturing companies by name, location, and condition.

II. Communicable Disease
   a. Number of cases of following acute infectious diseases:
      
      Dysentery
      amebic
      bacillary
      Cholera
      Typhoid
      Para-typhoid
      Epidemic typhus
      Scrub typhus
      Plague
      Trachoma

      Dengue
      Encephalitis (Japanese B)
      Meningitis
      Poliomyelitis
      Filariasis
      Malaria
      Schistosomiasis
      Influenza
      Pneumonia
      Diphtheria
      Small pox
CHECK LIST

LABOR

1. Is there a branch of the Japanese Bureau for People's Vocational Guidance located in the Shi?

2. If so, who is the head of it and what is the Bureau address?

3. If not, what town or village agency performs its labor functions? Who is its head and what is its address?

4. If not, what is the location of the nearest office (branch) of the Bureau? What are the locations of branches in the Ken, and what are their address and the names of the heads thereof?

5. What labor registration records exist, and as of what date were they compiled?

6. Is a new registration necessary to get an accurate, current, picture of present labor supply, its number and location?

7. Are various types of labor specifically indexed so that their qualifications and names are quickly available to the Japanese labor officer?

8. Is more detailed indexing desirable?

9. What rates of pay are paid, per day, to various labor classifications?

10. How much labor is presently available, physically and geographically, in the various classifications in the Shi and Ken? Particularize as to males and females and general age brackets.

11. What were usual hours of work before occupation, by classification, for males and females?

12. Do any conditions peculiar to this area exist? Are national labor laws being properly administered?

13. Are there any former part-time workers in the area? What percentage of workers fall in this class?

14. How many English speaking Japanese are available, and in what specialty fields could they be used?

15. Do workers, individually or in groups, or group leaders, report to the labor office for assignments, or through what means are they contacted and notified to report to the office or to a particular job?

16. Do Japanese officials understand that they are to pay transport and feed workers?
17. What transport and food is available for use of workers?

18. What unemployment, if any, existed before occupation, and what exists now?

19. Is housing and general rehabilitation necessary in the area to provide usual and adequate living conditions for the population?

20. What was the economic feature of the area under normal conditions, agriculture, fisheries, heavy, or light industry?

21. What percentage of workers were engaged in heavy industry, light industry, or other types of work prior to occupation?

22. What arrangements have been made for labor registration of discharged military personnel?

23. Approximately what will be the number of veterans available?

24. Are workers, or the civilians other than workers, paying for rations issued them? Are workers of any type issued an extra ration?

25. What agency controls and distributes rations to civilians in this area?

26. Have any type of workers received food on the job? If so, what workers and what ration?

27. What trades union have existed in the past and what is the present local trend towards unionism?

28. What is the strength of any existing unions and who were the union leaders?

29. Are workers in this area willing and cooperative?

30. What do you recommend from the standpoint of labor and/or economy in this Shi and Ken?

31. Have workers been paid by the Japanese authorities? If so, how much, how often, and by whom? When last paid?

32. What is the wage scale for the various labor classifications in the Shi and Ken?

33. Have labor instructions been received from Regional or National authorities? If so, obtain and forward copies to Corps Eq. (K.G. Section).
CHECK LIST

Public Relations

1. Number, name, ownership, frequency of publication, other pertinent facts on newspapers in Ken. Addresses of same.

2. Estimate of printing facilities in Areas.

3. Radio Broadcasting Facilities, and number of domestic receiving sets in area, extent of present operations.

4. Number of Movie Houses in Area.

   Plumbing equipment and facilities in Area.

Public Safety

1. Check number of Kebita1(Special Police) assisting local police. Please obtain comparative figures showing normal compliments of local Police and Kebita1 now stationed in the town or city.

2. Check the curfew hours for Japanese, if any curfew regulations exist.

3. Whether or not the fire department personnel and equipment is satisfactory and adequate for the vicinity.

4. The increase or decrease of the local population and reason for either.

5. Any incidents, working Japs vs. our troops or vice versa.

6. (Important) Check every jail including houses of detention (Hyuchizyo) and ascertain the number of prisoners confined in each. Ascertain how long each prisoner has been confined and the charge preferred against each. Please rush this report to S-2 Public Safety Section. The general conditions of the jail and the prisoners care should also be added to the report.
CHECK LIST

LEGAL

(Note: Much of the following information should be obtained indirectly, if possible, and not through direct question. Some items in the list are marked "Discretion", which means that tact should be used in obtaining the information and that it should not be obtained by direct questioning of government officials.)

1. Kinds of courts (appeals, district, local, police) in Ken and locations thereof, names of judges and procurators.

2. Offenses by natives against U.S. Forces: number and nature of offenses, names of offenders, and places of detention (if our troops are present).

3. Offenses by U.S. troops (if present) against natives: number and nature of offenses, names of offenders, and places of detention; also any action taken.

4. Possible claims against U.S. (Discretion!)

5. Number, locations, and capacity of jails or similar places of detention within Ken.

6. Disposition of property taken from governments or citizens of Allied nations.

7. State of disarming of civilians and service personnel in Ken.

8. Disposition of nationals of Allied powers, particularly diplomatic and consular officials.

9. Disposition of nationals of neutral powers.

10. Disposition of nationals of enemy powers (Germany, Italy, etc.) Have lists of such nationals been submitted to U.S. forces?

11. General information relative to price fixing and black market activities, and action taken to suppress later.

12. General information relative to activities of Emperor relative to surrender and maintenance of law and order. (Discretion).

13. Names and addresses of persons reputed to be war criminals. (Discretion!)
CHECK LIST

PRICE CONTROL AND RATIONING

1. By Paragraph 7, Annex Mike, VAC Administrative Order 6-45, prices, wages and salaries are fixed as of 15 August, 1945.

2. Report is requested on the following questions, information for which should be available at the Police Station:

   a. Can the Police certify that business community has been notified of, and understands, Paragraph 1. above?

   b. How is the price ceiling being enforced, especially on goods and services purchased by troops, such as souvenir merchandise and laundry service?

   c. Have wage scales on "Free Labor" (labor available for employment on temporary jobs) been fixed at the 15 August level? How enforced?

   d. Is the local black market increasing in flagrancy and importance?

3. If time allows, a conference with the Government Paymaster to determine labor price trends would be desirable.

4. Acheck on several sample merchandise prices in shops on two occasions several days apart to determine price trend would be desirable.
CHECK LIST

Displaced Persons

1. Are the police records on displaced persons complete and up to date?

2. Have the police checked to ascertain which displaced persons desire return to their home areas and the degree of urgency of their wishes in the matter.

3. General statement of statistics covering displaced persons including (1) number (2) nationality (3) location

4. Are there any special displaced persons problems in the particular area?

5. General statement of local situation pertaining to temporarily displaced persons who have fled from metropolitan areas due to fear of invasion forces or for other reasons.

6. Any general recommendations or requests by local officials in handling displaced persons problems.

7. Are transportation facilities adequate to move displaced persons to ports, railroad centers etc?

8. Are there any special problems arising from the presence of demobilized Military and Naval Personnel?
CHECK LIST
ADMINISTRATION

1. Location Report.
   (a) Detailed location statement, showing the location of all separate units.

   (b) The following procedure for submitting location statements will be followed:

   (1) One complete list to be submitted so as to reach this office by 1500 Sunday of each week.

   (2) Daily reports need not be submitted during the week unless there is a change of location, in which case the Duty Officer at this office will be notified immediately (VAC Tiger 45R2); written confirmation report to follow.

   (3) The following form will be used:

   Location Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>C P Location</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto M ile, Gov't, Det.</td>
<td>Kumamoto Prefectural Bldg.</td>
<td>80.75-72.45 (City Map)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


   Brief daily activity reports are to be consolidated into a weekly activity report to be submitted as of 2400 Saturday each week. The brief daily activity reports are to be attached to the weekly report submitted.


   (a) A weekly strength report will be submitted as of 2400 Saturday each week. If any change in strength occurs during the week, a separate report is to be submitted citing such change.

   (b) The strength report will reflect personnel in the following categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>Asgd Atchd from other units with other units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>asgd. ( ) TD (5) ( ) TD (5)</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>asgd Atchd from other units with other units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Army
   Navy
   Marine

4. All reports to be in sealed envelopes addressed to:
   Administrative Section,
   Military Government Section,
   V Amphibious Corps, Headquarters.
CHECK LIST
Port Liaison

1. In port areas what essential operations are functioning or if not functioning should be resumed?

2. What is the scope of operation of port activities? (e.g., in the case of fishing vessels, what are the grounds and the fish unloading points, in the case of "honey barges", where do they load and discharge, in the case of coastwise shipping, what are the ports of call and schedules; in all of the foregoing, what is the normal cycle of operation in hours or days?)

3. What is the nature of equipment used? (Number of vessels and type, fuel consumption and capacity, type of fuel used, loading capacity in time and quantity, speed, etc.)

4. If essential operations are not functioning what is obstructing their resumption? If fuel, spare parts, etc. are lacking, can they be obtained from any source in Japan?

5. What are the general facilities of ports? i.e.,
   a. Harbor Entrances—widths, depths, channels, navigational aids, etc.
   b. Mooring Facilities—character of buoys, size of berths, water depths, etc.
   c. Anchorage Facilities—same information as for mooring facilities
   d. Wharf, Quay, Pier—depths alongside, length and width, covered and uncovered adjoining storage in square feet, etc.
   e. Storage Area—covered and uncovered in square feet, location in relation to tide water, general description of area or structure, etc.
   f. Tank Farm or Other Oil Storage Facilities—mooring facilities for vessels loading or discharging, distance from mooring point to storage area, length and diameter of hose required, etc.
   g. Bulk Cargo Storage Facilities—bunkers for coal, elevators for grain, general description of facilities including mechanical or gravity loading and discharging equipment, etc.
   h. Heavy Lift Equipment—cranes, derricks, etc. with capacities, type and location indicated.
   i. Clearance—railway and road connections, etc.
   j. Administrative Buildings in Port Area—location, type, size, etc.

6. Other pertinent information.

(Note: It is not desired that negative reports be submitted covering the above items— in other words reports should be of a positive nature covering the actual facilities in a given port area.)
CHECK LIST

ENGINEERING (WATER SUPPLY)

1. Inquire as to source of water supply for larger urban areas. Obtain maps and plans. Get capacities.

2. Inquire in each instance as to treatment (sedimentation, filtration, chlorination, etc.)

3. Get plans and details of distributing systems in urban areas.

4. Find out if construction materials, piping, pumping machinery and power for pumps are in satisfactory supply.

5. Determine if systems are being properly maintained and if technical, skilled and unskilled labor is available and supplies such as chlorine are sufficient.

6. Get data on water tests where made.

7. Check governmental, organization for construction, improvement, operation and maintenance of water supply systems, with names where obtainable, names of companies or controlling organization are desirable.

8. Inquire as to damage by bombing and other causes.

ENGINEERING (ROADS)

1. Maps and Plans: Obtain as complete and up-to-date map as possible for roads, indicating width, type and condition. Note worst operating seasons and conditions. Report Conditions encountered on motor trips in area. No discrepancies in military road maps.

2. Check on governmental set-up for construction, improvement and maintenance of roads with names where possible.

3. For roads out of service, inquire as to cause and remedy necessary to restore.

4. Find out if maintenance of roads is functioning and kind of maintenance given.

5. Check to see if there is serious shortage of road building materials, equipment, and labor supply, skilled and unskilled.

6. Find out limiting loads and clearances on bridges and underpasses. Determine maximum widths, heights and lengths of vehicles with recommended maximum loading.
CHECK LISTS
ENGINEERING (SEWAGE)

1. Determine if night soil collection is functioning normally and if conditions are satisfactory, especially in larger urban areas. Determine if costs, etc. are sufficient.

2. Where sewage systems exist, obtain maps, with pertinent information as to construction, sizes of lines, grades, etc.

3. Determine if drain pipe and other construction materials are available and if there is a surplus for other areas.

4. Where damaged by bomb or other causes, inquire as to extent.
CHECK LIST

ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER

1. GENERATING STATIONS:
   a. Name and location of station.
   b. Name of company.
   c. Mailing address, and telephone numbers of officials in charge.
   d. Number of technical and non-technical employees.
   e. Is the station hydroelectric or steam. If steam, get amount of fuel used in last 90 days, amount on hand and estimated amount required for next 90 days.
   f. Generated voltage.
   g. Monthly output of plant if intermittent get operating periods and loads.
   h. Time of peak load.
   i. Time of minimum load. Obtain charts if possible.
   j. Standby power available.
   k. Frequency of generated voltage.
   l. Power factors.
   m. Methods of voltage regulation.
   n. Replacement equipment available or needed.
   o. Damage to installation.

2. TRANSMISSION LINES:
   a. Area served.
   b. Transmission voltage.
   c. Size of conductors.
   d. Capacity of line.
   e. Interconnection with other lines.
   f. Load at present created by line.
   g. Location and capacity of substations.
   h. Obtain copies of line maps.

3. DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM:
   a. Number of customers served.
      (1) Commercial
      (2) Industrial
      (3) Residential
   b. Distribution voltage.
   c. Consumer voltage.
   d. Vehicles available.
   e. Obtain copies of all electric service rates now in effect.
   f. Obtain copies of distribution maps.
   g. Is voltage regulated, if so by what means.

NOTE: *Obtain this information for all three sections.

CHECK LIST

GAS

1. Name of Company.
2. Headquarters of Company.
3. Name of Regional and/or local managers.
4. Phone numbers of regional and/or local managers.
5. Location of local company office.
Radio Broadcasting (Cont'd)

1. Number of non-technical employees.
2. Transmitter Frequency Range.
3. Present Broadcast Frequency.
4. Hours of operation.

4. Commercial Radiotelegraph and Radiotelephone
   a. Name of company.
   b. Location of company headquarters.
   c. Name of regional and local managers.
   d. Phone numbers of regional and local managers.
   e. Location of stations.
   f. Type of equipment.
   g. Make of equipment.
   h. Location of relay stations.
   i. Location of Japanese and foreign terminals.
   j. Condition of equipment.
   k. Transmitter Power output.
   l. Transmitter frequency range.
   m. Present operating frequency.
   n. Links at present inoperative.
   o. Reason for non-operation at those channels not in operation.
   p. Number of technical employees.
   q. Number of non-technical employees.

5. Cable (Inter-island and overseas)
   a. Name of company.
   b. Location of company headquarters.
   c. Name of regional and local managers.
   d. Phone number of regional and local managers.
   e. Location of Japanese and foreign terminals.
   f. Type of equipment.
   g. Make of equipment.
   h. Channels at present inoperative.
   i. Reason for non-operation of in-operative channels.
   j. Number of non-technical employees.
   k. Number of technical employees.
   l. Number of channels between each terminal.
CHECK LIST
FISCAL

I. Currency:

1. Are adequate military banking facilities available for the exchange of dollars into yen?
   a. List such facilities.
   b. List quantity of yen available for exchange.

2a. Have all banks been informed of the non legal status of the following types of currency:
   b. Bank of Taiwan currency.
   c. Military yen.
   e. U. S. Legal Tender.

2b. Has any bank any such currency on hand or in circulation? (See report A-1)

3. Have the banks an adequate supply of Bank of Japan and State Bank yen available for civilian requirements? (See report A-1)

4. Have all civilian banks been informed that they are prohibited from exchanging dollar currency into yen? Are any violations existing?

II. Banking:

1. How many banks are there in the area?
   a. List the number of banks, their location and the location of their branches if any. (See report B-1)

2. Are any of the banks in this area closed? If so who closed them and the date of closing.

3. What is the status of banking facilities for the local population? (See report B-2) This includes Central banks; ordinary and provincial banks; savings banks; trust companies; postal savings banks; foreign banks; industrial, agricultural and consumer credit institutions; insurance companies; stock and commodity exchanges.

4. Have you any suggestions or recommendations concerning the adequate control of banking facilities in your area?

III. Public Finance:

1. Is the administrative organization for public finance adequately functioning in your area (Administrative district, prefecture, county, shi, machi, mura or buraku)?

2. Obtain latest figures, and future estimates, of revenue and expenditures, classified by sources and types, in your area. Are budgets being currently prepared?

3. Have you any suggestions or recommendations concerning the adequate control of public finance in your area?
FISCAL (cont'd)

IV. Military Finance:

1. Are adequate facilities available in your area for the payment of Army, Navy and Marine personnel?

2. If not, do those affected know that such facilities may be contacted at Hq. VAC?

**FISCAL REPORT A-1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bank</th>
<th>Kind (paper or metal)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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**FISCAL REPORT A-2**

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<th>Bank</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Currency</th>
<th>Denominations</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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**FISCAL REPORT B-1**

Name of Bank

Location

No. of Branches in area and location of each, as:

1. ____________________________________________
2. ____________________________________________
3. ____________________________________________
4. ____________________________________________
5. ____________________________________________
6. ____________________________________________
7. ____________________________________________

Kinds of facilities available.

1. ____________________________________________
2. ____________________________________________
3. ____________________________________________
4. ____________________________________________
5. ____________________________________________
6. ____________________________________________
7. ____________________________________________
FISCAL REPORT B-2

Banking Facilities Available for Civilian Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Type of Bank</th>
<th>No. of Banks</th>
<th>No. of branches</th>
<th>Resources</th>
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3 October 1945.

From: VAC Military Government Officer.
To: OIC VAC Military Government Liaison Parties.

Subject: VAC Military Government Liaison Parties to Saga, Cita, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima instruction to-

1. The several parties will proceed to the prefectural capitals to which ordered and establish a headquarters and advise VAC (Mil. Gov't. Office) of the exact location. The means of communication for correspondence and the telephone or telegraph facilities to VAC headquarters will be furnished immediately they are ascertained.

2. Report will be made of the air field nearest to the prefectual capital giving its condition, distance from town, and types of planes it will accommodate. (Col. Young VAC Air Officer will brief senior officers of party prior to departure).

3. Contact will be made with the prefectural governors and other civilian governmental agencies to obtain full information on conditions presently existing. (Surveys to be made have been furnished separately).

4. Information of Japanese Military or Naval Forces will be reported but no instruction will be given to them or commitments of any description made. Any requests from such forces will be forwarded to this headquarters for action. Japanese Military or Naval Forces will be advised that instructions will be delivered to them by the Occupation Force Commander separately, through their appropriate Military or Naval Superior.

5. Maps of the areas will be carried and reports will indicate locations described in reports submitted.

6. Requests for rations or medical supplies for parties will be submitted to this headquarters (Mil. Gov't.) as necessary.

APPENDIX (C)
VAC Military Government Liaison Parties, Instructions to. (Cont'd).

7. All officers are expected to be fully conversant with current VAC policies including Military Government. These include labor procurement, areas and facilities procurement and present surveillance policies. In the event that occupation forces move into the respective areas full information of local conditions must be available to unit commander.

8. Reports submitted will be in detail, factual in all respects and submitted promptly. A copy of each report where appropriate will be forwarded to the Commanding General of the occupation forces concerned. (5th Mar Div, Saga, Oita) (2nd Mar Div, Kumamoto, Miyazaki and Kagoshima). If liaison officers from the respective divisions are sent to the prefectural capitals full information will be furnished to such officers. In the event that no division liaison officers from divisions are present, the Senior officer of the group is authorized to send an officer to report to the Division headquarters when information available is such as to indicate its desirability.

9. Military government officers will accept no invitations or presents of any kind from Japanese officials.

10. The uniform worn, general appearance and conduct at all times be such as to reflect credit on the U.S. Forces.

JOHN F. HOUGH,
Colonel, USMC,
Mil Govt Officer.
Weekly Occupation Activity Report.
Check-list for Supplementary Information.

A. LEGAL.

1. (a) Number of civilian offenders against the occupation forces held in custody under Par. 6 (b) (1) Annex like to VAC Adm. Order No. 6-48.

(b) The longest period any person now in custody under (a) above has been held with the name and address of such person and the character of offense with which such person has been charged.

2. (a) Number of military occupation forces personnel charged with:

(1) Offenses against the person or property of inhabitants of Japan.
(2) Offenses in violation of Military Government directives.

(b) The longest period any such case under 2 (a) (1) and (2) above, still undisclosed of, has been pending since the date of offense, with the name, grade, serial number and organization of the accused and character of the offense charged and present status of such case.

3. (a) Number of accidents or incidents which have occurred to date (not including purely procurement or requisition) of any kind involving the person or property of other than solely U. S. occupation forces which might give rise to claims for or against, the United States, the Allied Powers, or the Military Government of Japan.

(b) The number of cases under 3 (a) which have not yet been thoroughly investigated with a view to fixing responsibility and reports submitted.

(c) Length of time the oldest case under 3 (b) has been pending giving name and address of person concerned. Name, grade, serial number and organization of military person concerned and date, and nature of accident or incident.

4. Negative answers to all above, where applicable, are required.

B. Price Control and Rationing:

1. Is the supply of rationed commodities sufficient to fill the ration? In excess?

2. Can employers secure sufficient labor at official wage rates?

3. What weaknesses have developed in the Price Control system?

4. What are your recommendations to improve the Price Control situation?
Weekly Occupation Activities Report
Check list for Supplementary Information

C. Agriculture

1. Estimated Crop Damage in Prefecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name Crop Damaged</th>
<th>Cause of Damage</th>
<th>Percent Loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Critical Shortages of Farm Materials (Machinery, seed, fertilizer, etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tons Short</th>
<th>Location of Shortage Area</th>
<th>Amount Needed to Meet Minimum Farm Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Per Cent of Total Yield of Principal Food Crops Still in Storage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop of Crop</th>
<th>Percent of Total Yields Still in Storage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Fisheries

1. How many fishing vessels are now operating and what is the amount of catch for October?

2. Have the Ken Fisheries officials been informed by the Tokyo Bureau of Fisheries of "Temporary Regulations for Fishing Vessels" made according to orders of Allied Forces.
Weekly Occupation Activities Report
Check List for Supplementary Information

E. Forestry

1. In your area, what is the status of supplies on hand of domestic fuels (firewood, charcoal, and briquettes)?

2. Are local officials taking steps to augment domestic fuel supplies by increasing local production and by transporting such supplies from outlying areas?

3. Is production of fuelwood and charcoal by the farm Kumuai proceeding or has inability to move existent stockpiles had a retarding effect?

F. Engineering and Utilities:

1. Electric Power.
   (a) Report Areas having a serious shortage of power giving reasons and steps being taken to overcome same.

   (b) Report serious local distribution and transmission difficulties, with reasons and action taken to overcome them.

2. Roads.
   (a) Report important Routes interesting to the occupation as to general passability. Report serious road blocks giving reasons. Report when re-opened.

   (b) Report general condition of roads subjected to heavy military traffic and indicate repairs and maintenance by U. S. Forces.

   (c) Are roads apparently being maintained by the Japanese to the best of their ability? If not, give details.

3. Water.
   (a) Indicate areas having water supplies inadequate or unsatisfactory for occupational needs and minimum civilian requirements. Give details.
Weekly Occupation Activities Report
Check List for Supplementary Information

G. Displaced Persons

1. Are the police records on displaced persons complete and up to date?

2. Have the police checked to ascertain which displaced persons desire return to their home areas and the degree of urgency of their wishes in the matter?

3. General statement of statistics covering displaced persons including (1) number (2) nationality (3) location, shipped and ready to ship.

4. Are there any special displaced persons problems in the particular area?

5. Are shipping and transportation facilities adequate to move displaced persons to ports, railroad centers, and to their homes?

6. Are there any special problems arising from the presence of demobilized military and Naval Personnel?

H. LABOR

1. What rates of pay are paid, per day, to various labor classifications?

2. How much labor is presently available, physically and geographically, in the various classifications in the Shi and Ken? Particularize as to males and females and general age brackets.

3. What arrangements have been made for labor registration of discharged military personnel?

4. Are workers, or the civilians other than workers, paying for rations issued them? Are workers of any type issued any extra ration?

5. Are workers in this area willing and cooperative?

6. What do you recommend from the standpoint of labor an/or economy in this Shi and Ken?

7. Have workers been paid by the Japanese authorities? If so, how much, how often, and by whom? When last paid?

8. What is the wage scale for the various labor classifications in the Shi and Ken?

9. Have labor instructions been received from Regional or National authorities? If so obtain and forward copies to Corps Hq. (H.Q. Section).

10. What unemployment, if any, existed before occupation, and what exists now?
Weekly Occupation Activities Report
Check List for Supplementary Information

I. Public Welfare

1. Give number of people receiving public assistance.

2. Has any change of medium of assistance, increase or decrease in allowance, taken place since last report? If so, what?

3. What is status of housing, feeding and clothing generally speaking?

4. Describe any incident trends which materially effect future welfare picture.

5. Have sources of relief changed during period?

II. Port Operations

1. Report commercial Japanese port operations that have transpired during the period of this report, viz.,
   a. Arrivals and departures of vessels with a general indication of their size, type and employment, i.e., indicate size by reporting in groups determined by multiples of 500 gross tons; indicate type as passenger, cargo, etc.; indicate employment by the ports of call served and a reference to the type of cargo and passengers handled.

2. Report local harbor activity such as continuation, breakdown or resumption of ferry services, night soil disposal craft traffic, barge traffic, etc.

3. Report other items of interest respecting port operation, viz.,
   a. Administration - report pertinent information affecting port operation.

   b. Material - report matters of a critical nature in connection with fuel, repairing, etc.

   c. Matters of general nature which are obstructing resumption of normal service.
Weekly Occupation Activities Report
Check List for Supplementary Information

K. Fiscal

1. Have all banks been informed of the non legal status of the following types of currency?
   b. Bank of Tawian currency.
   c. Military yen.
   e. U. S. Legal Tender.

2. Have all civilian banks been informed that they are prohibited from exchanging dollar currency into yen? Are any violations existing?

3. Are any of the banks in this area closed? If so, who closed them and the date of closing.

4. Have you any suggestions or recommendations concerning the adequate control of banking facilities in your area?

5. Is the administrative organization for public finance adequately functioning in your area (Administrative district, Prefecture, county, shi, machi, mura or buraku)?

6. Have you any suggestions or recommendations concerning the adequate control of public finance in your area?

7. Are adequate facilities available in your area for the payment of Army, Navy and Marine Personnel?

8. If not, do those affected know that such facilities may be contacted at Hq. VAC?

L. Public Relations

1. Broadcasting Facilities: Name, Location, Strength, Personal Broadcasting Activities, Ownership, sources of Material and all other pertinent information.

2. Cinema Houses: Number, Location, Capacity, Attendance, ownership and source of films.

3. Newspapers: Number being published, frequency of issue and estimated circulation.
Weekly Occupation Activities Report
Check List for Supplementary Information

II. Education and Fine Arts

1. What instructions have prefectural authorities received from the Ministry of Education regarding changes to be made in the schools? Give date of receipt by various prefectures.

2. What action has been taken by prefectural authorities to put these instructions into effect?

3. What important problems have been encountered by the Schools in accomplishing instructions contained in these directives?

4. What proportion (in percent) of the various types of Schools are currently in session in each Ken?

N. Public Safety

1. A short concise report on any incidents, such as offences by Japanese against our Troops and by our Troops against Japanese.

2. A report on the inspection of Jails and Houses of Detention (Ryushizyoku) and ascertain the number of prisoners confined in each. The charges preferred against each prisoner, if any, and if not why the prisoner is being detained. Include in the report the length of time each prisoner has been confined. Also include a report on the general condition of the Jails and the prisoners and the care afforded prisoners.

3. A report of any large increase or decrease of the local population and the reason for either.

4. Report any change in officer personnel of the Police or Fire Departments and the reasons there for.

5. Does any activity of the local populace indicate or tend to indicate any subversive action by any person or group of persons.
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO. 

CONFIDENTIAL  

From: The Provost Marshal.  
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.  


Enclosures: (A) Total of Offenses for October and November,  
1945.  
(B) Criminal Investigations for October and November, 1945.  

1. Planning, Training, and Operation: On 1 June,  
1945, the date of reporting to the 6th Army for planning the  
assault on Japan, the VAC Provost Marshal was engaged in routine  
duties on the Island of Kauai. The Military Police of the 2nd,  
3rd and 5th Marine Divisions, 5th Service Regiment, H&3 Battle-  
lion, VAC, and the 3rd Military Police Battalion (Provisional)  
were directed to carry out intensive training programs, including  
Elementary Japanese Language, Traffic Patrols (Radio Jeep Tech-  
nique), Town and City Patrols, Traffic Control, Prisoner of War  
and Enemy Civilian Processing, and Straggler Control. This  
training was carried out in the immediate vicinity of the units  
concerned and was given under actual military police responsi-  
bility conditions for the Islands of Hawaii, Kauai, Saipan and  
Guam. All Military Police units had a minimum of two full months  
of specific preparation for the assault on Japan, prior to  
embarkation.  

2. Immediate Planning, Training and Organization:  
Plans for occupation of the target area were made in accordance  
with the Sixth Army Provost Marshal Plan, Annex 9 to Adm O 19,  
aboard ship en route from the Hawaiian area during the period  
26 August, 1945 to 13 September, 1945. On 16 September, 1945,  
a preliminary meeting was held aboard the AGC-7, at anchor in  
the Saipan harbor, at which the Fifth Amphibious Corps, Fifth  
Division, and representatives of the 2nd Marine Division, Pro-  
vost Marshals, were present. The Sixth Army directives were  
discussed and Division areas of responsibility in Provost matters  
were established.  

On 21 September, 1945, the Corps and 5th Marine  
Division Provost Marshals completed plans for the handling of  
military police and Provost duties in the Sasebo area. The  

Appendix 2 to Annex BAKFR to Operations Report, Occupation of  
JAPAN.
military police responsibility of the Sasebo area was delegated to the 5th Marine Division, and the V Amphibious Corps assumed the task of integrating and coordinating the military police of the two Divisions initially landed on the Island of Kyushu.

3. Occupational Operations Ashore: Upon disembarking on 22 September, 1945, immediate contact was made with the Chief of the Sasebo Prefecture Police, and close liaison has been maintained throughout the operation. Cooperation of the Civilian Police was quickly given when requested, and an order issued to the Civilian Police for dissemination, was found to be the quickest way to obtain prompt action from the Japanese Civilian population.

The Provost Marshal Office of the 2nd Marine Division was established at Nagasaki on 25 September, 1945 after the 2nd Marine Division had assumed control of this area. The 2nd Marine Division Provost Marshal was in telephonic communication with the Corps Provost Marshal on A plus 1, and has submitted all required reports covering the military police and Provost situation in the Nagasaki area.

A Provost Marshal Office was established with the Fukuoka Occupation Force in order to insure proper liaison between this area and the Corps Provost Marshal's office, located at Sasebo. The Fukuoka Occupation Force Office later became the Office of the Provost Marshal, 32nd Infantry Division, when that unit came ashore and assumed responsibility for the Fukuoka area. The 32nd Infantry Division replaced the 3rd Marine Division in the original task organization.

Due to the large number of naval personnel on daily liberty in the Sasebo area, it became apparent that the Naval Shore Facility would require a competent Shore Patrol to handle this situation. The Corps Provost Marshal was instrumental in coordinating the activities of the permanent Shore Patrol with the 5th Marine Division Provost Marshal.

The Provost Marshal of the 8th Service Regiment, attached to VAC, was charged with the military police responsibility of the dock and Quartermaster areas under Corps jurisdiction.

It was arranged that the Provost Marshals of the four major units mentioned above, namely: 2nd Marine Division, 5th Marine Division, 32nd Infantry Division, and 8th Service Regiment, would notify the Corps Provost Marshal immediately, of any important matter, especially if it involved death or injury. Similar reports were requested from the Navy Shore Patrol and
Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

Corps Troops, VAC. Monthly totals of criminal activities and investigations were forwarded to the Provost Marshal, Sixth Army, in accordance with instructions. Copies of these reports for the months of October and November, 1945, are appended.

One of the largest single problems confronting the VAC Provost Marshal was that of traffic control. Large convoys of troops and supplies were constantly traveling over the main roads between Fukuoka, Saeki and Nagasaki. Initially, roads in the Nagasaki Prefecture were uniformly bad, but improvements and continuous maintenance by Engineer troops, improved this situation rapidly. Several Japanese civilian deaths were incurred by military vehicles striking or running over pedestrians and bicyclists on the road. Investigation revealed that Japanese people have always walked on the left side of the road, WITH THE TRAFFIC, and it was felt that their lexicity and lack of alertness was largely responsible for such accidents. The possibilities of ordering the civilian population to walk on the other side of the road, FACING TRAFFIC, or of switching military traffic to the Right, were discussed. It was decided, after consultation with Civilian Police, that either change would cause too much confusion. Two courses of action lowered this accident rate. The civilian population, through the Civilian Police, were warned to be more vigilant, and all government vehicle drivers were sternly cautioned to observe all the rules of Safe Driving.

It was necessary to curtail drastically the circulation of Government vehicles on liberty, due to a large number of accidents involving military personnel not on official business. Anti-speed patrols, consisting of radio jeeps, were used effectively in reducing excess rates of speed on Japanese roads. The Corps Provost Marshal maintained an investigation staff to aid the 5th Marine Division Provost Marshal in establishing the facts in all cases requiring military police attention.

The prevention of friction between the armed forces and the Japanese civilian population was an additional problem confronting the Corps Provost Marshal. Several cases of looting and one of bank robbery, involving 28,000 Yen, were quickly solved by the Provost Marshal's Investigational Section. The wide publicity of court-martial findings in cases of this nature resulted in a prompt reduction of crime. Additional aids in the control of both civilian and military personnel were: Constant patrolling of congested areas and an 1800 curfew for military personnel.

Disposition of KP units under Corps Jurisdiction:
The 8th Service Regiment, and H&S Battalion, Corps Troops, each had a separate KP Company, and the 3rd Military Police Battalion

...
Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

(Provisional) was used to augment organizational N.P.'s where required. Company "A", attached to the 8th Marine Division, aided in the town and motor patrol of the Sasebo area. Company "B" was used in the Sasebo area on special details as requested by the Corps Provost Marshal. Company "C", less the 1st Platoon which was attached to the Saga Occupation Group, passed from the 5th Marine Division to the Fukuoka Occupation Force on 30 September, 1945. On 16 November, 1945, Company "C", less the 1st Platoon, was returned to Sasebo, reverting to the 5th Marine Division for operational control. Company "D", under the 5th Marine Division for operational control, landed at Sasebo on 22 September, 1945, and was transferred to the 2nd Division in Nagasaki on 30 September, 1945. On 17 October, 1945, Company "D" moved to Shimosa, under the operational control of the 32nd Infantry Division where it remained until 15 November, 1945. On this date, Company "D" was returned to Sasebo and attached to the 8th Service Regiment.

5. On 23 September, 1945, the Fifth Amphibious Corps Provost Marshal was assigned additional duties as VAC Fire Marshal. It was found that the existing Japanese fire fighting facilities were in such a state of disrepair that a U. S. Government system was necessary, although Japanese equipment was utilized to the fullest extent possible. Deputy Fire Marshals were appointed in all major areas and an alert telephone system was set up to coordinate the separate agencies. The Japanese Civilian Fire Department was tied into this system, and could be called to any large fire in the Corps area. The Language Section, G-2, VAC, relayed fire calls to the Japanese to insure efficient cooperation along this line.

6. Conclusion: (a) The training programs undergone by military police in the period of 1 June, 1945 to 1 September, 1945, were extremely valuable in obtaining the proper execution of duties in the actual occupation phase. All military police found their working knowledge of the Japanese Language a necessity. For instance, in the proper handling of an automobile accident, where all bystanders and potential witnesses were Japanese, proper control could be maintained only by some elementary understanding of the language by the Military Policemen on the job.

(b) The use of radio jeeps by military police on patrol enabled the Provost Marshal to get accurate reports of emergencies almost as soon as they occurred.

(c) The cooperation of all Provost Marshals in major areas of responsibility has been an important factor in preserving law and order in the VAC area and has kept offenses to the minimum.
Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

(d) The policy of using trained Military Police for strictly Military Police Duties, and NOT for interior guard posts, was stressed to all organizations concerned. As a result of this policy, marked success was achieved in the performance of Military Police Duties.

(e) With the individualistic duties required of Military Police, greater care should be exercised in selecting Military Police Personnel for such organizations.

(f) If and when an officer or an enlisted man of a Military Police organization has demonstrated that he is unfit for this particular type of duty, a policy should be established wherein such officers or enlisted men can be transferred immediately. There have been several instances where it was believed that officers as well as men, because of their general make-up, could have progressed better in units other than Military Police.

John B. Hill
**RESTRICTED**

PROVOST MARSHAL'S REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF October
UNIT Fifth Amphibious Corp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARRESTS AND OFFENSES</th>
<th>NO. PHIS IN CONFINEMENT</th>
<th>PRISONERS SENTENCED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MAJOR UNITS, BASES OR INSTALLATIONS**

- 2nd Marine Division
  - 1st Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 2nd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 3rd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)

- 3rd Marine Division
  - 1st Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 2nd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 3rd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)

- Army Division
  - 1st Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 2nd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 3rd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)

- 4th Service Regiment
  - 1st Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 2nd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 3rd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)

- 5th Service Regiment
  - 1st Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 2nd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)
  - 3rd Class Offense
    - (Alf 56, 57 & 60)

**TOTAL**

- 1: 528
- 2: 21
- 3: 1
- 4: 12
- 5: 12
- 6: 223
- 7: 75
- 8: 1245
- 9: 2160
- 10: 31
- 11: 21
- 12: 11
- 13: 2
- 14: 2
- 15: 2
- 16: 2
- 17: 2
- 18: 2
- 19: 2
- 20: 2
- 21: 2

ENCLOSURE (A)
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Number of civilians investigated.</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Number of criminal cases investigated.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Number of convictions resulting from investigations.</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Total estimated value of property reported lost or stolen.</td>
<td>111,700 Yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Total estimated value of property recovered.</td>
<td>100,446 Yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Total number of accidents reported involving U. S. vehicles.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Number of persons killed at the scene of accidents involving U. S. motor vehicles:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Military personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Civilian personnel</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Number of persons reported injured at the scene of an accident involving U. S. vehicles:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Military personnel</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Civilian personnel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Estimated cost of damage to non-military property following accidents in which U. S. vehicles were involved.</td>
<td>15,000 Yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Miscellaneous Offenses consist of:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. No ID Card,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Struggling from liberty party,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Being in restricted area,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Carrying firearms on liberty,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Looting,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Curfew violation,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Scandalous conduct,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. ALC,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Disorderly conduct,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Drinking on public street.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Provost Marshal's Report for the Month of November

### Unit V Amphibious Corps

**Arrest of U. S. Military Personnel by Offense**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arresting Organization</th>
<th>Against the Person</th>
<th>Against Property</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2nd Marine Division

- Murder: 0
- Mayhem: 0
- Maiming: 0
- Injury to Person: 0
- Damage to Property: 0
- Total: 0

### 5th Marine Division

- Murder: 1
- Mayhem: 0
- Maiming: 0
- Injury to Person: 0
- Damage to Property: 0
- Total: 1

### 3rd Army Division (Including:

- V Fighter Command & Atti Units
- 0

### OSS-12, U. S. Naval Facilities, Saipan

- Murder: 0
- Mayhem: 0
- Maiming: 0
- Injury to Person: 0
- Damage to Property: 0
- Total: 0

### 8th Service Regiment

- Murder: 0
- Mayhem: 0
- Maiming: 0
- Injury to Person: 0
- Damage to Property: 0
- Total: 0

### MoS En., V Amphibious Corps

- Murder: 0
- Mayhem: 0
- Maiming: 0
- Injury to Person: 0
- Damage to Property: 0
- Total: 0

### Total

- Murder: 1
- Mayhem: 0
- Maiming: 0
- Injury to Person: 0
- Damage to Property: 0
- Total: 1

**DECLASSIFIED**

**Authority:** E.O. 13526

**By:** NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL
FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

MONTHLY REPORT OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES

DATE 5 November, 19--

FOR THE MONTH OF October

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF CRIME</th>
<th>INVESTIGATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PERSONS</th>
<th>RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPLETED</td>
<td>NOT COMPLETED</td>
<td>INVOLVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandalous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looting</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thefts</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Entry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit &amp; Run</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. Govt. not at fault. Death self-inflicted by hanging.
2 persons awaiting trial by CGM.
1 case to 8-P, VA; 1 case, invest. revealed prop. confis., not stolen; 9 persons extg 60%.
5 persons auto CGM; 16 persons auto disc. action;
2 reprimands; 2 cases closed for lack of evidence.
1 CGM; 1 BQ; 2 auto disc. action.
Others cases closed for lack of evidence.
No grounds for charges.

ENCLOSURE (B)

JOHN B. HILL
Lt. Col., USMC
Provost Marshal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF CASE</th>
<th>Uncompleted at end of last month</th>
<th>New cases this month</th>
<th>Cases Completed this Month</th>
<th>Uncompleted cases End of Month</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOMICIDE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Confined to Army Hospital for mental obs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBBERY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSAULT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSON</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURGLARY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEBREAKING</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>Looting by occup. trps. offenders incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lARCERY</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>pending disc action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMBEZZLEMENT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>uncompleted cases contained insuff. ev. to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORGERY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>warrant investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECEIVING STOLEN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOODS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSSESSION OR USE OF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARCOTICS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESERTION</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMOL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>EK apprehended &amp; ret’d to his organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (2)

JOHN B. HILL, Lt Col, USMG, VAD Provost Marshal
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 3 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAP

SPECIAL SERVICE REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945.

From: The Corps Special Services Officer.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: Special Services Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

1. The Corps Special Services Section was formed on 26 September, 1945, and its activities were subsequently organized into the following sub-sections: Education, Personal Affairs, Recreation, Athletics, Supply, Special Services School, Special Services Company and the V Amphibious Corps News. The following is a brief operations report on each of the sub-sections.

EDUCATION

The V Amphibious Corps Education and Information program was emphasized more than any other phase of Special Services. The means used were:

1. ATP Educational Conference-VAC, 22-23 October 1945.
2. Systematic check on progress being made through unit reports.
3. Distribution of guidance material, manuals and texts for actual classwork.

The following is a summary of the classes held:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>No. of Classes</th>
<th>No. of Enrollments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Mar Div</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Mar Div</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Inf Div</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC Corps Troops</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following conditions were evident:

1. The 32nd Division more recently arrived, had not had sufficient time to organize a large-scale educational program.
2. Line units had more time to devote to this program and hence generally showed better results.
3. The main bottlenecks were supplies and texts but these ills were quickly remedied.

Appendix 3 to Annex BAKER to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan
The Personal Affairs Section attempted to effect the rapid dissemination of pertinent information of importance to high point men about to be discharge and to set up an authoritative reference center to which Special Service Officers could refer in seeking accurate information.

a. Means of dissemination information used:

2. Conversion of NSI Insurance (Mimeographed publication-200 copies printed and distributed).
4. Series of 20 lectures within the Fifth Division from 5 November to 9 November, 1945, on personal affairs.
5. Lecture and Forum on personal affairs within Corps Troops.

b. Formation of reference center:

1. For this purpose a classified file was set up covering all subjects under personal affairs. An attempt was made to get a complete set of Letters of Instruction pertaining to personal affairs.

Within the divisions the dissemination of information was carried out through the following means:

2nd Marine Division:

1. Series of ten films on vocational guidance.
2. Personal interviews on individual problems.
3. Lectures on the GI Bill of Rights.

5th Marine Division:

1. Conference room for personal consultations.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Printing of information on the GI Bill of Rights in the publication, "Recreation News."
4. Lectures.

32nd Infantry Division:
1. Lectures.
2. Personal consultations on individual problems.

RECREATION

The recreation and entertainment offered to the men has in very few cases exceeded the usual amount available under wartime conditions. It was expected that the efforts made would result in a greatly increased amount of recreation activities other than the routine programs already offered. A tendency toward this was seen in the attempts to establish outside facilities such as dance halls or taxi dances for the use of the men.

VAC CORPS TROOPS

Prior to 30 November 1945 two stage productions were shown within the Corps Troops and attached units. The Danny Kaye-Leo Durocher show was presented once and a Japanese vaudeville show was presented once. The film circuits were largely operated on a beg and borrow basis. There was a 35mm circuit showing 10 films daily and a 16mm circuit running 14 shows daily. The, "Stars and Stripes" was distributed on the basis of one newspaper for every five men.

2nd MARINE DIVISION

No stage productions were shown within the division. The film circuits consisted of 24 16mm shows daily and 2 35mm shows. A daily newspaper called the Nagasaki Press is printed by the Signal Company. One large recreation center has already been constructed and two are in the planning stage. Plans are being considered for the establishment of a taxi dance hall which would be turned over to Japanese management at a later date.
Special Services Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL

5th MARINE DIVISION

The 5th Division has shown the Danny Kaye-Leo Durocher show plus eight Japanese vaudeville shows. A 16mm circuit and a few 35mm movies are shown. A division newspaper called the Spearhead is being published daily. In addition the, "Recreation News", is published every Tuesday.

32nd INFANTRY DIVISION

The Red Arrow News, a division newspaper, is published daily. There is a 16mm film circuit within the division.

ATHLETICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sports Centers</th>
<th>Leagues</th>
<th>Supply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Mar Div</td>
<td>7 Large</td>
<td>5 Softball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Mar Div</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Basketball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Inf Div</td>
<td>None organized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Troops</td>
<td>2 Large</td>
<td>2 Softball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Volleyball 1 Touch Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Basketball Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Tennis Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Football Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Handball Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Horse shoe courts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUPPLY

Most units of the VAC expect further shipments to alleviate shortages in athletic equipment. Large supplies of textbooks are being received and being distributed as quickly as possible. Information manuals and pamphlets on personal affairs, especially those distributed through Special Services, F F, Pacific has not as yet been made available to all Special Service Officers of smaller units. Approximately eighty tons of athletic and recreational gear have been issued gratuitously to all the units of the V Amphibious Corps.
CONFIDENTIAL

Items: Portable phonographs, athletic supplies including baseballs, basketballs, footballs and equipment for tennis, ping pong, badminton and horseshoes; harmonicas, ocarinas, cards and various other indoor games.

22nd SPEcial SERVICES COMPANY (ARMY)

This unit had fitted itself very well into the operational scheme of the Special Services Section, VAC. Plans initiated by various staff heads are put into immediate operation through the use of technicians, equipment and material available through this unit. This is especially true in regard to construction and maintenance of athletic facilities, maintenance and operation of movie projectors, establishment and operation of a library and the initial distribution of athletic gear.

VAC NEWS UNIT NEWS-PERS

The VAC News was taken over by Special Services Section, VAC, on 29 October 1945. It is now published daily through the 22nd Special Services Company by a staff consisting of an editor and three assistants with an officer in charge. News sources are the VAC radio station, the Special Services Section and all units concerned. A total of 750 copies are distributed daily to all units attached to VAC Headquarters via the mail and message centers.

SPECIAL SERVICES SCHOOL - VAC

From 31 October to 16 November the Special Services Section operated the first Special Services School in the western Pacific. Its main purpose was to fill the need both for personnel trained in Special Services work and for information and manuals covering the various aspects of Special Services subjects. This was accomplished by taking students from each unit of the VAC, training them in the school and returning them to their units supplied with notes, books and manuals on all subjects covered. The staff of instructors consisted of 4 officers and 4 men specially selected by HQ to give the course of instruction in the Pacific. 61, men were trained under this program.

From 17 November to 24 November a specialized course in Personal Affairs and Education was given, in order to give special emphasis to the two subjects which were most in demand by the Special Service Sections of all VAC organizations.

William W. Stickney
Appendix 4 to annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
30 November 1945.

From: The Headquarters Commandant.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.


1. Preparation and planning by the Headquarters Commandant's section for an operation began on 1 June 1945. All general and special staff sections were requested to submit a list of their operational requirements. Working from these lists in conjunction with the Corps Engineer and the Corps Signal officer a proposed Corps Command Post was planned. From a scale model of this command post an estimate of all construction materials, property, and the priority of construction was drawn up. The preparations for the loading and movement of the headquarters were based upon this estimate.

2. The organization of the Headquarters Commandant's section during the planning and operation was as follows:

   1. Lieutenant Colonel - Headquarters Commandant
   2. Second Lieutenant - Assistant Headquarters Commandant
   3. Private First Class - Clerk and typist

The police and property sergeant was left with the rear echelon and a new one assigned about one week after the landing.

3. Upon the arrival of the V Amphibious Corps at Okinawa, Japan, on 22 September 1945, the Headquarters Commandant in company with the advance party landed and aided in the selection of a headquarters. Three (3) buildings were selected for offices and one large club plus 25 houses for officers quarters. A Transient officers quarters with a capacity of about 150 - as secured on A plus 5. The enlisted personnel were quartered in the office building and barracks in the Corps headquarters area. The advance echelon of Corps Headquarters moved into the CP ashore on A plus 1. The CP opened ashore on A plus 2. Security measures were set up and a guard was posted by the 3rd Provisional Military Police Battalion. A system of temporary passes issued at the main entrance of the Corps Headquarters was immediately placed in effect. The necessary passes were printed on board ship prior to arrival in Japan. On A plus 3 all officers' quarters and messes were placed under the direction of officers from special staffs which were broken up or consolidated after the unopposed landing. This procedure speeded up the establishment of messes and quartering of officers.
Appendix 4 to Annex E.A. to Operations Report, Occupation of J.M.

The officers mess opened about 2 plus 5 and the general mess opened at the same time in the Corps area. Buildings were found in a general state of disrepair from neglect and lack of material, and nearly all showed bomb damage. Vermin and lice were abundant necessitating the immediate and repeated application of insecticide and disinfectant. Straw floor mats and unneeded Japanese furnishings were disposed of through the Military Government Section and the Japanese liaison committees. All steam radiators, many electric light fixtures and some plumbing appeared to have been removed from the buildings a number of months prior to the end of the war. Electrical equipment and plumbing were in such a state of disrepair that the efficient operation of the building was impossible until repairs were effected. Begin about 2 plus 4 efforts were made to employ as a maintenance crew, Japanese who had previously worked in the buildings now occupied by the V Amphibious Corps. The employment of these people was carried out through the Military Government office and by 2 plus 10 a skeleton force was working. A Japanese working party of from 150 to 200 men daily was employed for six weeks cleaning up bomb damage, rehabilitating buildings and constructing a parking lot in the Corps Headquarters area. By 15 November 1945, rehabilitation of the V Amphibious Corps Office buildings was about 50% completed. Two Japanese baths capable of catering for 500 men daily, were in full operation as recreational features within the Corps Headquarters building, two volley ball courts were completed a barber shop was repaired and in operation by the first of November. A large recreation room for enlisted men was 75% completed on the last of November.

The following methods were employed in working the Japanese day laborers at the Corps Headquarters. For the first four days a marine interpreter was constantly with the war in part. After that an interpreter was requested for short periods when needed.

The Japanese section or group leaders were singled out and all orders were relayed through them. In many jobs the leader was shown the work and left to accomplish it in his own manner. By comparison with American methods they used few tools. The workers improvised carrying sticks and slings for much of the lifting and carrying. Injuries such as cuts, punctures and bruises received while working at the Corps Headquarters were treated promptly. A very firm policy consisting of, "you are here to work" was carried out. No threats, abuse, fractionalization, nor corporal punishment were necessary and none were resorted to. American and Japanese were never placed on the same working details however on certain kinds of work marines were used as supervisors. In obtaining and working the permanent or monthly employed the following system was used.
Appendix 4 to Annex BAKA to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan

Former building employees were contacted through a member of the Japanese Naval Liaison Group. The senior man was placed in charge as superintendent and all other regular Japanese employees were picked through him. The Japanese superintendent was held directly responsible for the conduct of those under him, the care of tools and the carrying out of instructions. In so far as possible he was told future plans affecting him. All matters of pay and welfare of the employees were handled through the superintendent. He acted as the employees' representative to the Headquarters Commandant and then to the proper authority in the Military Government Section.

Women were employed to work inside certain buildings as cleaners and to refill and clean oil stoves. Their work proved generally satisfactory and no trouble developed from having them in the buildings.

REMARKS:

1. The Headquarters Commandant's section should pre-load a truck, preferably a 2½ ton vehicle with sufficient housecleaning gear, disinfectant, insecticide, signs, tools and material for which a need is anticipated in setting up a CP. This would take care of the headquarters until such time as the quartermaster is ashore and operating.

2. Provisions must be made for the early landing of poison sprays, disinfectant and insecticide in localities where vermin are expected.

3. The following is a suggested T/O for the Headquarters Commandant's Section:

   1. Major or Lieutenant Colonel in charge.
   1. Lieutenant (assistant)
   1. Sergeant, police and property
   4. Privates First Class or privates for general duty

   [Signature]

   F. C. Cloke
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 5 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

ATTACHED SIXTH ARMY SECTION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
From: The Commanding Officer, Army Section.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

1. Planning done by the army section took place during early September while members of the section were still a part of Sixth Army Headquarters on Luzon. Planning consisted primarily of collecting reference materials and supplies which would be necessary for the operation of the section. Some difficulty was experienced in determining just what materials would be necessary.

2. Training as a section was not necessary. Each staff representative was a specialist in his field of military administration.

3. Organization: Originally, the section was comprised of the following personnel, duties indicated:

   Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Ellison, TME, Chief of Section.
   Major Peter H. Connors, PA, Asst Chief of Section.
   Captain Kendall C. Byrnes, JAGD, Judge Advocate.
   1st Lieutenant Ralph D. Ressler, AGD, Asst Chief of Section.
   Staff Sergeant Waldo S. Legrande (AG Sec).
   Sergeant Peter S. Prie (G-1 Sec).
   Sergeant Archibald Webster (JA Sec).
   Technician Fourth Grade Elmer L. Doeker (AG Sec).
   Corporal John H. Donnayor (G-1 Sec).

   When Major Connors and Captain Byrnes became eligible for return to the United States they were not replaced and the section continued to function without them. In as much as Sergeant Webster was a clerk for the Judge Advocate, he was returned to army headquarters when Captain Byrnes departed. Technician fourth grade Doeker was returned to army headquarters and was replaced by Private Graham.

4. Original plans for the section called for the administration of army units assigned direct to Sixth Army and placed under VAC for operations and for serving in an advisory capacity to the Commanding General VAC relative to army administration. One of the most important functions originally planned for was the consoli-
Appendix 5 to Annex Baker to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

Description of the G-1 reports as required by Letter, GC 500-E, Headquarters Sixth Army, Subject: Administrative Instructions to Units Composing Army Troops for Blacklist Operations, dated 19 August 1945. However, all these reports were rescinded by radio, Headquarters Sixth Army, dtd 27 September 1945.

Another function of the section was to handle the readjustment program for the Army troops. This function became one of enormous magnitude. Troops had to be shipped to the disposition center at Nagoya in large numbers on very short notice. This was complicated by the lack of adequate communications, the continuous arrival of units having high point personnel, and the movement of units within the VAC zone itself. Once the majority of the units were in and settled and the communication system fully established handling of this function became routine and no longer presented a problem.

Still another duty assigned to the Army Section was the issuing of emergency leave and furlough orders upon direction of the Commanding General, Sixth Army. This presented no particular problem.

Effective 15 November 1945 all army units of Sixth Army in the VAC zone passed to the control of the Commanding General, 32d Infantry Division for administration. This action eliminated most of the functions of the Army Section, leaving them to serve only in an advisory capacity to the Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps.

HENRY P. ELLISON

CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX 6
ADJUTANT REPORT

HEADQUARTERS,
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Corps Adjutant.
The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.


Subject: 16 December, 1945.

1. During the rehabilitation period in the Hawaiian Area, the Adjutant Section performed its Administrative duties and functions in accordance with existing directives and regulations. During this period and to the present date, a total of 15,642 pieces of correspondence have been logged in, and a total of 6,561 pieces of correspondence for the same period have been logged out. The preceding figures do not include correspondence with a classification of confidential or higher, which is handled by the Record Section, a sub-section of the Adjutant's Section.

2. The function of the Record Section is to maintain a complete and accurate filing system, make distribution of incoming and outgoing official documents, confidential and above in classification.

3. Since the Iwo Jima operation this office has handled nine thousand three hundred seventy seven (9,377) classified official documents. The breakdown of these documents in classification is shown below:

   Top Secret in          344
   Top Secret out         287
   Secret in              2627
   Secret out             806
   Confidential in        675
   Confidential out        004

4. While the 5th Amphibious Corps was on Maui, outgoing Officer Messenger Mail was sent to the Record Section, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for further distribution to units in the Forward Area and the United States.

5. Distribution of Officer Messenger Mail while enroute to Saipan from Maui was made four (4) times by destroyer to Corps Units in the convoy.

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Appendix 8 to Annex BAK 222 to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of Japan, continued.

6. Upon arriving at Sasebo, one (1) officer and one (1) enlisted man from the 5th Amphibious Corps Record Section were temporarily attached to the Commanding General, Fukuoka Base Command and maintained the Record Section for said Command.

7. While in the rehabilitation area, it was the responsibility of the Adjutant's section to arrange surface and air transportation for personnel of the V Amphibious Corps and attached units, co-ordinating with the Navy and Army representatives present. Passengers for which transportation and orders were issued, including personnel traveling under official orders, i.e., change of Station Orders; Temporary Duty Orders; Liberty Parties and Patients evacuated.

8. Prior to mounting out for the occupation of Japan, staff sections were canvassed and personnel requirements by SQW, were requested from Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for duty with the respective sections in accordance with the authorized allowance set forth in Tables of Organizations applicable to this command, in order that the maximum requirements of the section could be accomplished during the occupation.

9. The Mail Center, Adjutant Section, was established prior to leaving the Hawaiian Area, and its normal functions involved the handling of Officer-Messenger Mail and Guard Mail. Prior to the departure of this Headquarters for the occupation of Japan, this section was responsible for the delivery of all Officer-Messenger Mail and Guard Mail to units located on the Island of Oahu. Enroute to the zone of occupation, this section was responsible for the delivery of all mail between the Command Ship and Ships with V Amphibious Corps units embarked at the Staging Area. Upon arrival at Kyushu, Japan, this section has continued to carry out its assigned duties, coordinating with the appropriate agencies for the delivery of mail in the above categories, both incoming and outgoing. This sub-section has proved to be invaluable, as the fastest possible means of delivery and distribution of all correspondence, orders, and directives, issued by this Headquarters, made to units operating under this command.

10. Preparations for the forthcoming operation were made to include the complete Adjutant's Section (i.e. Personnel and Office Equipment), which in prior operations

Appendix 6 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of Japan, continued.

had proven desirable, because of the vast and varied amount of work handled by this section in the field. By combat loading the complete section for the present occupation of Japan, this section has been able to function in its full capacity because both personnel and equipment have been available.

11. While present in the occupation zone, this section has handled the shipping requirements and allocations of shipping to units of the V Amphibious Corps for eligible personnel being returned to the United States under the latest demobilization directives and for duty. Shipping requirements were coordinated with the TQM Section. Air Transportation as well as surface transportation is handled by this section for all personnel. Reservations for personnel are coordinated with the Air Transportation Officer of the TQM Section. Transportation for personnel destined to other localities within the Japanese Empire is arranged through this office with the issuance of the necessary travel orders.

H. D. Persons
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps.

Appendix 6 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 7 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

POST OFFICE REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE POSTAL OFFICER  
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

12 November, 1945.

1. On 8 August, the Corps Postal Officer was ordered to Pearl Harbor on temporary duty, for the purpose of attending conferences with Army and Navy postal officers, concerning planning for the invasion of Japan.

2. Announcement of the Japanese surrender was made during the course of these conferences. Because no official word was available at that time as to what section V Amphibious Corps would be taking in view of the surrender, no plans could be formulated. The Conferences were therefore terminated.

3. When plans for the movement of V Amphibious Corps to its assigned zone of occupation were completed and ready to be put into effect, embarkation rosters of the ships on which V Amphibious Corps was to embark were provided to the Postal Officer. From these rosters a file Appendix 7 to ATTEX BAKER to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.
Appendix 7 to ALEX BAKER to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (continued)

was created and set up at the Fleet Post Office in Pearl Harbor. Four men of this office were assigned to temporary duty with FMF PAC for the purpose of operating this file.

4. This detail intercepted all V Amphibious Corps mail on its arrival from San Francisco and after sorting it against the file dispatched the mail to the Rear Echelon and to the various ships on which Corps troops were embarked. Those ships which stopped at Pearl Harbor after leaving Maui received mail by calling at the Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor.

5. Upon the departure of these ships, mail for the Forward Echelon was flown to Saipan for delivery to them on their arrival at that point. The Postal Officer and one (1) Navy Mail Clerk travelled by air to Saipan to effect this delivery.

6. The delivery of mail began immediately upon the arrival of these ships and continued until their departure. 900 pounds of mail were put aboard during this time. Unfortunately, 5,000 pounds of mail, much of which
Appendix 7 to ANNEX BAKER to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (continued)

was directed for Corps, was delayed in Majuro by storms and this failed to arrive in Saipan in time to be put aboard the ships. This mail was later flown to Sasebo and delivered there.

7. The Corps Post Office was unloaded at Sasebo on 23 September. A location for the Headquarters Post was assigned by G-1; location for the Corps Troops Office was assigned by the Commanding Officer of Corps Troops. Financial and mailing services were inaugurated on 25 September.

8. Mail for dispatch was taken directly to the seaplane tender in Sasebo harbor from which point it was loaded on seaplanes bound for Okinawa. Incoming mail was picked up at the tender and brought to the Corps Post Office for sorting and distribution. The 20th Amphibious Truck Battalion supplied transportation for this operation.

9. On 27 September, LST 48 tied up at buoy 4, Sasebo, and began operating as Fleet Post Office, Navy #3912. All mail was thereafter channeled through that office.
10. A serious interruption in the mail service resulted when a typhoon struck the Sasebo area on 4 October. For a period of five (5) days, no mail was moved in or out of this area. When the storm subsided, service was resumed, though some few weeks were required to get back to what approached normal routine.

11. Although the five day stop during the typhoon is the longest time that the Corps has been completely without mail since its arrival in Sasebo, that service, even in good weather, has not been good. It is the opinion of this office that the condition is directly attributable to the curtailments, and in some cases complete cancellation, of cargo carrying air routes. It is felt that those changes were made too soon, considering the number of troops still to be served in this area.

12. Transportation of mail on the island of Kyushu has been effected largely by the use of the Japanese railway system. Upon the activation of the Fukuoka Occupation Force, the 5th Marine Division established a post office in that area. Guards were assigned by the Fukuoka Occupation Force to accompany the mail on the train to and from Sasebo. On 29 October this regular mail car run
Appendix 7 to AMEX BAKER to Op-eration Report. Occupation of Japan. (continued)

was established between Osaka and Sasebo. United States Rangers of the 6th Rangers were assigned as permanent guards.

Mail for the 2nd Marine Division, received through Sasebo Fleet Post Office has been transported to Nagasaki by mail, under guard of Navy mail Clerks from that division.

13. On several occasions, arrangements were made by the Air Officer of V Amphibious Corps whereby mail was brought by land planes to the air field at Omura. On such occasions guards were assigned from Corps and the 2nd Marine Division to report to that point, sort the mail, and to accompany it to its destination.

14. Considerable difficulty was experienced in getting replenishments for stamp stock; however, by promting throughout marine Units in this area, those requisitions which were received, all post offices were enabled to continue operations until sufficient stamp supplies were received from Honolulu. When it was learned, by the Corps Postal Officer, that Marine Air Group 22 was to return to the United States, a Navy Mail Clerk from this office was ordered to Omura to purchase all unused stamp stock from that organization. $3,518.60 worth of high denomination stamps were procured in this manner. These stamps were
Appendix 7 to AMEX BAKER to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (continued)

divided three ways among 2nd Marine Division, the 5th Marine Division and V Amphibious Corps.

16. Army units in this area were served by the V Amphibious Corps Post Office and those in the Fukuoka area by a unit of the 5th Marine Division Post Office until the arrival of AFC 929 on 27 October. It was agreed by the Army Postal Officer and the Corps Postal Officer that since the bulk of the Army troops were to be in the Fukuoka area, the main branch of the Army Post Office would be set up there and a small detachment left in the Corps Post Office to take charge of receiving and distributing mail for the Army units in the Sasebo area. The Corps Post Office continued to furnish financial service to all personnel in this area.

16. Adequate motor transportation has been furnished by the Motor Transport Company, Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps.

17. Cooperation among the various marine postal facilities in this area has been excellent.

JAMES HENNESSY, JR.
for
J. V. O'MAHONEY

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 9 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Public Information Officer.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: Public Information Operations Report, Occupation JAPAN.

1. The Public Information Section Operations Report, Occupation of Japan, is submitted herewith.

A. GENERAL PLAN

1. It is the responsibility of the Corps Public Information Officer to coordinate, facilitate and expedite news material gathering by civilian and service personnel assigned to coverage of Marine landing forces engaged in amphibious operation. It is the mission of the Corps Public Information section to give all possible aid and assistance within the bounds of security to speed the flow of news material to the Nation's press.

2. In July, 1945 Major D. W. Polivka submitted plans to the Headquarters Commandant for a Press headquarters and required supplies and material furnished through the headquarters Commandant for future operations. Enlisted personnel participated in a training program.

3. The undersigned was assigned to duty as Public Information Officer, V Amphibious Corps, on 12 August, 1945 vice Major Polivka, detached that date. Immediate attention was given to planning for operations growing out of the Japanese surrender. The Public Information Section was reorganized and reinforced. The undersigned was ordered to headquarters, Fleet Marine Force for a conference with the Public Information Officer. Plans and policies for occupation operations were discussed, and First Lieutenant E. J. Burman was ordered to V Amphibious Corps as Assistant Public Information Officer.

4. Plans were made to set up a press collecting point ashore as soon as troops were landed. News copy, photographic and radio material submitted by both civilian and service correspondents was to be expedited through official channels for censorship and disposition. Cooperation with civilian correspondents was to include transportation, billeting, messing and other measures to aid them in getting full coverage.

5. The Public Information Officer was prepared to advise the Corps Commander on Public Information matters and arrange for necessary or desirable interviews or statements. He was to maintain liaison with the Public Information Officer of subordinate echelons to insure a constant flow of Marine Combat Correspondent copy, pictures and radio material, supply replacements and coordinate their efforts to increase efficiency of coverage and prevent duplication of effort.
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Public Information Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

B. SPECIFIC PLAN

1. The original plan called for the Assistant Public Information Officer, with most of the section personnel to go ashore and set up a press collecting point. All copy, civilian and service, was to be processed by Army and Navy censors assigned by CINCPAC. An Army communications unit was to set up a mobile transmitter for the rapid dispatch of civilian copy. Service copy and material were to go through official channels as usual.

2. At such time as the Corps CP was set up and functioning in Sasebo, the Public Information section was to move its activities to headquarters. According to information from Major C. R. Payne at FMFPAC preparations were made to accommodate great numbers of civilian correspondents. The Marine Public Information Officer acting as liaison with General MacArthur's Public Relations staff indicated that as many as 150 civilian newsmen might be expected to cover the VAC landing and occupation of Kyushu. On the strength of this information plans were made to provide for a minimum of 24 civilians at Corps with others to be assigned to subordinate units.

3. The Corps Public Information Section was to carry additional writing, photographic and recording supplies to meet the needs of the divisions, should they need them.

4. In addition the Corps Public Information Section was to be responsible for coverage of activity within its own headquarters.

C. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

1. The Corps Public Information Officer was aboard the USS MOUNT MCKINLEY with one photographer and one administrative clerk. The photographer made documentary photographs of Corps aboard ship while on route to Japan and before going ashore.

2. No civilian correspondents joined VAC at Saipan. The Public Information Officers went ashore to confer with the Navy Public Information Officer, and learned that no civilian newsmen were expected there. The undersigned sent First Lieutenant R. H. Venn, Public Information Officer, to Guam via air, for the purpose of discussing the situation with Major John Sandberg, Marine Public Information Officer on CINPAC staff. At Saipan conferences were held both ashore and on the command ship between the Corps Public Information Officers and Captains Weldon James and Robert Jones of the Second and Fifth Marine Division.

3. From Saipan, combat photographers, Sergeant Claude Powe and Chester Ludka, were assigned to the advance party VAC, for photographic coverage.
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Public Information Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

4. Public Information was set up and functioning ashore at Sasebo by mid-morning of 22 September. As arranged, press and photographic material from both VAC and 5th Marine Division Public Information personnel was picked up by mid-afternoon. Well rounded coverage was provided by combat correspondents and photographers of this section.

5. Up to 22 September the undersigned had received no word from the 6th Army regarding either censorship and transmittal of copy or the assignment of civilian correspondents. On the above date the undersigned officer conferred with Major Paul A. Conlin, 6th Army Public Relations Officer, and Lieutenant Commander Rodney Sutton, Public Information Officer for ComFleetPhibForce, and was informed that neither Army or Navy censors were available to clear press material emanating from the VAC occupation. Since no civilian correspondents were assigned either to VAC or subordinate units, the principal matter of discussion was the handling and clearance of Marine Corps copy and pictures. Major Conlin agreed, in the absence of other instructions that Marine material should be transmitted under existing regulations according to policies suggested by the Public Information Officer, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. All operational copy was to be cleared by Naval Censor. Said instructions were put in writing and were to remain in effect until the procedure was clarified by either the 6th Army or CINCPAC on or about 1 October.

6. Daily Press Boat service was maintained to permit at least two copy runs daily. Volume copy increased daily after 24 September when the Public Information section moved into permanent offices at Corps headquarters.

7. After conferences with Marine Public Information Officers in Sasebo, Nagasaki and Omura, the undersigned was assured of complete coverage of all Marine activities in Kyushu.

8. The following material was forwarded to GHQ Public Relations Office, Marine Liaison Officer, Okinawa, from A-Day through 30 September.

- 225 news stories.
- 602 negatives (developed and undeveloped).
- 8500 feet motion picture film.

The above figures include material prepared by the Public Information Section of VAC, the 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions, the 8th Service Regiment and Marine Air Group 22.

9. Marine aircraft were not used for the transmittal of Public Information material. Lack of an airfield convenient to either Sasebo or Nagasaki made it advisable to forward all press and photographic material by Naval seaplane direct to Okinawa.
10. Until 19 October inclusive, all Marine Public Information material was transmitted via the Marine Liaison Officer, Public Relations Sections, Okinawa. On 20 October this office was informed that no such address existed. Therefore all subordinate units were instructed to forward material via FMFPAC for review by CINCPAC.

11. On 21 October instructions were received from FMFPAC to forward all Marine Public Information material for review and disposition direct to Marine Corps or Navy as appropriate. Simultaneously instructions were received from the Senior Marine Officer, Staff, Headquarters, 5th Army, to transmit all Marine editorial material via CINCPAC Advance to Tokyo. Accordingly a dispatch was sent to all units outlining new procedure which consolidated both orders.

12. During October the Public Information Section, together with the PI sections of the 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions, the 8th Service Regiment and Marine Air Group 22, transmitted the following totals:

- 563 news stories
- 848 still photographs
- 11 art works

13. The above tabulation does not include material forwarded by the Public Relations Section of the 32nd Army Division, which unit transmits all stories and pictures direct through Army channels without reference to VAC.

14. During November the following totals were submitted:

- 96 news stories
- 206 still photographs
- 700 feet movie film

15. Throughout the occupation Public Information personnel and facilities have been made available to staff section for work on special projects which required the service of writers, photographers, dark room technicians, artists, and radio recorders.

16. The Public Information Section strength at the time of the landing was two officers and 19 enlisted men. By 5 November, two officers remained and the enlisted strength was reduced to six men.

17. The only civilian correspondents to report to the VAC office were William Contenay, of the London Daily Telegraph, and Frank Harding, Official British Photographer. The undersigned provided transportation and other facilities to both men during their two-day stay in the Sasebo area.
18. On 4 November, Lieutenant (jg) John H. Koch, USNR, Public Information Officer of the Military Government, was transferred to the VAC Public Information Section as a liaison officer and handled relations with the Japanese press representative.

C. CONCLUSIONS

1. In spite of the many stories and pictures turned out by the Public Information personnel the U. S. public in general was uninformed on the activities of the Kyushu Occupation force. This was due to a combination of circumstances over which this section had no control.

2. Following the landings on Honshu, the occupation was old stuff to editors in the U. S. by 22 September there was complete lack of interest in the landings on other islands of Japan. That the occupation of Kyushu was anti-climactic, was demonstrated by the fact that of over 300 civilian newsmen who were in Tokyo at the time of MacArthur's arrival, many had returned to the States by mid-September. Not one newsman left Tokyo for long enough to cover the VAC landing on Kyushu.

3. This operation was the first Marine Amphibious landing in this war which was not covered by representatives of the press associations. Lack of any publicity can be laid to the fact that the civilian press was not on the scene. The wire service correspondent uses radio facilities, and his copy gets back while it is hot. It reaches the papers while it is still news. No civilians were assigned to VAC.

4. Marine Combat Correspondents and Combat Photographers handled every news angle that would have been covered by civilians. But the service copy and photo material had to be sent via the usual official channels and undoubtedly reached the U. S. too late to be newsworthy.

5. Newspapers and magazines in the States are giving minimum space to matters pertaining to the Occupation and maximum to reconversion and world affairs. The stories from Japan are those originating from Tokyo.

6. No representative of this Corps was able to meet with any of the correspondents and to persuade them to come to Kyushu on either professional or friendship basis.

7. The purpose of the Combat Correspondent program is to augment rather than supplement normal civilian news coverage. We are not permitted to send any material by radio. In this operation Marine writers were not permitted to use any material from classified documents. Civilians could have obtained this material through press conferences.
CONFIDENTIAL

Public Information Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

8. The undersigned was not informed that the Marine PI Liaison Officer, Public Relations Section, GHQ, Okinawa (through whom all material was to be routed) was never assigned.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that every effort be made to encourage civilian correspondents to cover future operations.

2. It is further recommended that special Marine Public Information Officers act as liaison with Public Relations in all higher echelons.

3. Marine Combat Correspondents copy should be sent via radio in the event there is no civilian coverage on an operation.

4. Censorship facilities should be setup on the scene if censorship is in force.

5. Elaborate plans should be made to ensure rapid transmittal of both civilian and service copy.

J. C. RICE
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 10 to Annex Baker to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan

G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS

CONFIDENTIAL
G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET

Unit: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco

From: 0800, 22 September 1945
To: 2400, 25 September 1945
Rendered: 1300, 26 September 1945

No. 1

1. Administrative Installations:

   Command Posts:
   Hq, V Amphibious Corps 1277.25-1114.1 SASERO
   2nd Marine Division 1294.0 -1062.16 NAGASAKI
   5th Marine Division 75.3 15.4 SASERO

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration: None.

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers:

   5th Marine Division

   Straggler lines operating throughout area of occupation. 81 stragglers apprehend and returned to organizations, and straggling reports made to parent organization.


7. Not included in report: Provisional Medical Group

   Signal Battalion, VAC, Reinf.

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copy to: G-2 CG, 2nd MarDiv CG, 5201st EngrCB CO, 7th NCR
G-3 CG, 5th MarDiv CO, CorTrs, VAC ProvCEGp
G-4 CG, 32d InfDiv CO, Shore Brigade CO, Sig Bn, VAC
   CO, ProvMTGp CO, Prov MG Gp CG, FOF
   CO, 8th Serv Regt

SECRET 238
STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

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G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET

Unit: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From: 0001, 26 September 1945
To: 2400, 2 October 1945
Rendered: 1300, 5 October 1945

No. 2

1. Administrative Installations:
   Command Posts:

   Hq, V Amphibious Corps 1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
   2nd Marine Division 1294.50-1032.18 NAGASAKI
   5th Marine Division 71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration: None

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers:
   2nd Marine Division: Army personnel 13, Navy personnel
   54; Marine Corps personnel 55.
   All personnel have been returned to their parent organization.

   5th Marine Division: Forty-three (43) stragglers were
   apprehended and returned to their organization. In each case a re-
   port was made to parent organization.


7. Included in this report not previously reported:
   Provisional Medical Group
   Signal Battalion, VAC, Reinf.

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC,
Asst CofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2 CO, 2d MarDiv CO, 5th MarDiv CO, 32d InfDiv CO, Prov. Top
G-3 CO, 2d MarDiv CO, 8th Serv Regt CO, Prov. Top
G-4 CO, 32d InfDiv CO, Prov. Top

SECRET
SECRET

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No. 2

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067/175
Ser. COOLE
G-1 PERIODIC REPORT
SECRET

Unit: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
    Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From: 0001, 3 October 1945
To: 2400, 10 October 1945
Rendered: 1500, 13 October 1945.

No. 3

1. Administrative Installations:
    Command Posts:
    Hq, V Amphibious Corps 1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
    2nd Marine Division 1294.60-1062.16 NAGASAKI
    5th Marine Division 71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration: 2nd Marine Division:
    Established U. S. Armed Forces
    Cemetery No. 1, NAGASAKI

    5th Marine Division: Established
    cemetery at 65.6-12.5 SASEBO

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers:
    2nd Marine Division: Fourteen (14) stragglers were
    apprehended and returned to their
    parent organization.

    5th Marine Division: No Stragglers apprehended.


7. Not included in this report: 1stBn, 127th Infantry (Kanoya)
    (Communications disrupted due to typhoon.)

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, U. S. M. C.,
Asst CofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2 CO, 2ndMarDiv CO, CorTrs, VAC CO, 7thMCRegt
G-3 CO, 5thMarDiv CO, 8thServRegt ProvCEGp
G-4 CO, 32InfDiv CO, Prov. Gp C, SigEn, VAC
    CO, Prov. MG CO, 2UB 18

SECRET

242
**SECRET**

**STRENGTH OF COMMAND**

**REPORTING UNIT:** V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS  
Enclosure (A) to Report No. 3

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G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET

Unit: V AMPHIBICUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco

From: 2001, 11 October 1945
To: 2400, 17 October 1945
Rendered: 1300, 18 October 1945.

No. 4

1. Administrative Installations:
   Command Posts:

   Hq, V Amphibious Corps
   2nd Marine Division
   5th Marine Division
   32nd Infantry Division
   1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
   1294.60-1062.18 NAGASAKI
   71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO
   USS WESTMORELAND (APA-104)

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration:

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4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers:
   2nd Marine Division: Eleven (11) Marine Corps personnel and three (3) Army personnel apprehended and returned to their parent organization.
   5th Marine Division: No stragglers apprehended.

- 1 -
SECRET
G-1 Periodic Report No. 4 (Continued).  19 October 1945.

6. Morale: Very satisfactory
   Six (6) Bronze Star Medals have been awarded to date.

7. Included in this report not previously reported:
   32nd Infantry Division

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC,
AastCofS, G-1.

Copies to:  G-2   CG, 2dMarDiv   CO, CorTrs, VAC   CO, 7th NCRegt
           G-3   CG, 5th MarDiv  CO, 8th ServRegt  ProvCEGp
           G-4   CG, 32d InfDiv CO, ProvMGp   CO, SigBn, VAC
           CG, FOF     CO, ProvMT gp  CO, CUB 18
STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS  Enclosure (A) to Report No. 4

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Ser. 00035B
G-1 PERIODIC REPORT
SECRET

Unit: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco

From: 0001, 18 October 1945
To: 2400, 23 October 1945

No: 5

1. Administrative Installations:
   Command Posts:
   Ho, V Amphibious Corps 1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
   2nd Marine Division 1294.60-1062.18 NAGASAKI
   5th Marine Division 71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO
   32d Infantry Division 1345.0 -1167.0 FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration:

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4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

One (1) Bronze Star Medal awarded

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC,
AsstGofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2  CG, 2dMarDiv CC, CorTcs, VAC CO, 7thMCRegt
G-3  CG, 5thMarDiv CC, 8thServRept ProvCEGp
G-4  CG, 32dInfDiv CC, ProvCGp CC, S11Bn, VAC
CG, FOF CO, ProvMTGp CO, CUB 18
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067/176
Ser. 001032B
G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET

Unit: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From: 0001, 24 October 1945
To: 2400, 30 October 1945
Rendered: 1300, 2 November 1945

No. 6
1. Administrative Installations:
   Command Posts:
   Hq, V Amphibious Corps 1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
   2nd Marine Division 1294.60-1062.18 NAGASAKI
   5th Marine Division 71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO
   32d Infantry Division 1345.0 - 1167.0 FUKUoka

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration:

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* Indicates Recovered Allied Prisoners of War bodies and ashes.

32d Infantry Division: Established cemetery at 1340.4-1160.6 FUKUoka

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

Fifty-One (51) Bronze Star Medals awarded

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC,
AsstCorps, G-1.

Copies to: G-2 CG, 2dMarDiv CO, CorTrs, VAC CO, 7th Arm Regt
G-3 CG, 5thMarDiv CO, 8th Serv Regt CO, Prov OE gp
G-4 CG, 32dInfDiv CO, Prov MG Gp CO, Sig Sbn, VAC
CG, FOF CO, Prov MT Gp CO, CUB 18

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067/215
Ser. 001073B
G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

G 4 G R I

Unit: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From: 0001, 31 October 1945
To: 2400, 6 November 1945
Rendered: 1300, 9 November 1945

No. 7

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Eq, V Amphibious Corps 1277.85-1114.1 BASILE
2d Marine Division 1294.30-1032.18 IAGAsAKI
5th Marine Division 71.3 - 14.3 BASILE
32d Infantry Division 1545.0 -1137.0 FUKUoka

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration:

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<th>Marine</th>
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4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

The following awards were made during the period:

32d Infantry Division:
Sixty-Five (65) Bronze Star Medals
Two (2) Oak-Leaf Clusters to Bronze Star Medals
Three (3) Silver Star Medals
One (1) Oak-Leaf Cluster to Silver Star Medal
One (1) Oak-Leaf Cluster to Air Medal
Subject: G-1 Periodic Report Number 7. (Cont'd)

2d Marine Division
One (1) Bronze Star Medal.

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC,
AsstCorS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2 CG, 2dMarDiv CO, CorTrs, VAC CO, ProvMedGp
G-3 CG, 5thMarDiv CO, 9thSrvRegt CO, 12thMTn
G-4 CG, 32dInfDiv CO, 7thCRegt CO, 20thAmphTrkBn
CG, FBC CO, SigBn, VAC CO, CUB 13
CG, 520lst Z(C)Erig.
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<th>EFFECTIVE STRENGTH</th>
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007/176
Ser. 001002

SECRET

Unit: V Amphibious Corps
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From: 0001, 7 November 1945
To: 2400, 13 November 1945
Rendered: 1500, 16 November 1945

No. 8

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps 1277.85-1114.1 SASEBO
2d Marine Division 1234.80-1002.18 NAGASAKI
3d Marine Division 71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO
32d Infantry Division 1345.0-1167.0 FUKUoka

2. Strength of Command: (see Enclosure (A))

3. Graves Registration:

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4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

The following awards were made during the period:

2d Marine Division:
Two (3) Bronze Star Medals

5th Marine Division:
Two (2) Bronze Star Medals

SECRET
SECRET

Subject: G-1 Periodic Report Number 8. (Cont'd)

32d Infantry Division:
One (1) Silver Star Medal
Forty-Two (42) Bronze Star Medals
One (1) Air Medal

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USAWC;
AsstCofs, G-1.

Copies to: G-2 (CQ, 2ndMarDiv, CC, CorTrs, VAC, CO, ProvHdGp)
        G-3 (CQ, 5thMarDiv, CO, 8thServRegt, CO, 12thInfBn)
        G-4 (CQ, 32dInfDiv, CO, 7thInfRegt, CO, 20thAmphTrkBn)
        CO, FBC
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<td>209 : 14625</td>
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<td>32d Infantry Division</td>
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SECRET
G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
From: COO1, 14 November 1945.
To: 2400, 20 November 1945.
Rendered: 1300, 24 November 1945.

No. 9

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps 1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
2d Marine Division 1224.60-1062.18 NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division 71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO
32d Infantry Division 1345.0 -1167.0 FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A))

3. Graves Registration:

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4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None


The Following awards were made during the period:

2d Marine Division:
Five (5) Bronze Star Medals.

32d Infantry Division:
Twenty-Five (25) Bronze Star Medals.
One (1) Oak Leaf Cluster to Bronze Star Medal.
SECRET

Subject: G-1 Periodic Report Number 9. (Cont'd).

7. Included in this report not previously included:

Marine Air Base (Umura).

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to:

G-2 CC, 2dMarDiv CC, CorTrs, VAC CO, PrevMedCP
G-3 CC, 5thMarDiv CO, 8th ServRegt CO, 12th MTBn
G-4 CC, 3dInfDiv CO, 7th NCRegt CO, 20th AmphTrkBn
CC, FPO CO, SigBn, VAC CO, CUB 18
Det, MAF, OUMURA 2d Sep EngrBn CO, 5201st E(C)Brig.
5th Fighter Command
**SECRET**

**STRENGTH OF COMMAND**

**REPORTING UNIT:** 5th Amphibious Corps Enclosure (A) to Report No. 0

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<td>1211 : 18044</td>
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<td>5th Marine Division</td>
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<td>941 : 16721</td>
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<td>32d Infantry Division</td>
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**SECRET**

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SECRET

067/215

Ser. 0011543

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

Fleet Post Office, San Francisco

From: 0001, 21 November 1945.

To: 2400, 28 November 1945.

Rendered: 1300, 1 December 1945.

No. 10

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps 1277.25-1114.1 SASABO
2d Marine Division 1294.60-1082.16 NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division 11.3 - 14.3 SASABO
32d Infantry Division 1345.0 -1167.0 FUKUOKA


3. Graves Registration:

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4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None


The following awards were made during the period:

2d Marine Division:
Six (6) Bronze Star Medals.

32d Infantry Division:
Ten (10) Bronze Star Medals.
Two (2) Oak Leaf Clusters to Bronze Star Medal.
SECRET

Subject: G-1 Periodic Report Number 10. (Cont'd)

D. A. Stafford,
Colonel, USMC,
AsstCOFS, G-1.

Copies to:
G-2 CG, 2dMarDiv CO, GcrTrs, VAC CO, ProvMedGp
G-3 CG, 5thMarDiv CO, 6thServRgt CO, 12thInfBn
G-4 CG, 2dInfDiv CO, 7thInfRegt CO, 20thAmphTrkBn
CG, FBC CO, SigBn, VAC CO, CUR 1b
Det, MAB, CMUSA 2d3epEngrBn CO, 5201st Engr Const Brg
5th Fighter Command

SECRET
SECRET

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS. (Enclosure (A) to Report No. 10

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SECRET

262
SECRET
057/260
Ser. 3462892

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: VII AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
       Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From: 0001, 20 November 1945
To: 2400, 4 December 1945
Rendered: 1300, 3 December 1945
No. 11

1. Administrative Installations:
   Command Posts:
   HQ, VII Amphibious Corps 1277.65-1114.1 CASERO
   2d Marine Division 1294.60-1062.18 TACASAPI
   5th Marine Division 71.3 - 14.3 TACERO
   32d Infantry Division 1346.0 - 1167.9 FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: See Enclosure (A)

3. Graves Registration:

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4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

The following awards were made during the period:
33d Infantry Division:
Six (6) Bronze Star Medals
Three (3) Oak leaf Clusters to Bronze Star Medal.

[Signature]

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC
AsstCG, G-1.

Copies to:
-2 CG, 2dMarDiv CG, CorTra, VAC CG, ProvMedCo
G-3 CG, 5thMarDiv CG, 6thInfRegt CG, 12th Tbn
G-4 CG, 32dInfDiv CG, 31st Regt CG, 20thMechTrk
Det, 17E, OCMHA CG, 17E, 1Bn
2dSepInfCo CG, 5201st EngConstPrig.
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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

- OCCUPATION OF JAPAN -

G-2 Report

Annex CHARLIE
CONFIDENTIAL

Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN

G-2 REPORT
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0189/268  HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
Ser 0768B C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL  30 November, 1945.

From:  The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
To:  The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

INTRODUCTION

In the following report an attempt has been made to present in a concise form, a picture of the work accomplished by the G-2 Section and the difficulties encountered during the planning phase for an assault on Southern KYUSHU, the planning phase for the occupation of a section of the Japanese Empire, and the actual occupation as it was carried out, together with recommendations which are submitted with a view to assisting intelligence sections in the planning and conducting of operations of this type in the future. This report of necessity is brief dealing with only the most important features in the text with more detailed information submitted as appendices. Appendix number 3 is a special report on all information that this Corps was able to obtain concerning the defensive organization on KYUSHU and the Japanese ability to have opposed the proposed allied landing thereon.

1. PREPARATORY PHASE FOR AN ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN KYUSHU.

a. General.

Upon reporting to the SIXTH Army for the planning of an assault on southern KYUSHU, work was immediately started on the collection and preparation of intelligence information. With the information that was available preliminary beach studies were prepared and planning maps distributed to major units. From the outset the difficulty of maintaining close liaison with the SIXTH Army and attached divisions, due to the great distances involved, was realized. Considerable delay was experienced in receiving

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material from the SIXTH Army and in turn in passing information on to divisions. Every effort was made, however, to expedite correspondence and through the medium of weekly newsletters, much information, although delayed to a certain extent, was interchanged. In planning operations of this sort when the units which are to participate are so widely dispersed, weekly newsletters, or some similar system, are considered essential.

In view of the fact that this was the first time that this Corps was to operate under an Army command many changes in procedure were necessary. A new intelligence SOP was therefore prepared early in the planning phase which conformed to SIXTH Army directives, and a number of differences in Army and Marine Corps procedures as to handling of documents, prisoners of war, counterintelligence, etc., were discussed and worked out to the satisfaction of all concerned at an early date. At the conclusion of hostilities, the preparatory arrangements for the assault were well in hand with a few details such as a firm aerial reconnaissance and photographic plan remaining to be arranged. Throughout the entire planning phase much assistance was received from the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) and Fleet Marine Forces Headquarters in the procurement of maps, relief models, and special intelligence information.

b. Maps.

All arrangements for the procurement of maps for the operation were made early in the planning phase and the following map request submitted:
MAP AND DISTRIBUTION REQUEST FOR ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN KYUSHU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>1:1,000,000</th>
<th>1:250,000</th>
<th>1:50,000</th>
<th>1:25,000</th>
<th>Road City Map</th>
<th>Plans 1:10,000</th>
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</table>

The 1:25,000 official battle map which was prepared from a Japanese Imperial Land Survey in 1938 was believed to have been the most accurate map ever furnished this Corps for an operation.

All maps, except the 1:10,000 and the road map were to be prepared by the Army Map Service and forwarded direct to divisions by 1 September. Oral arrangements had been made with JICPOA to blow up the 1:25,000 map of the immediate beach area to 1:10,000 and make distribution as indicated in the chart above. In addition SIXTH Army Headquarters was to furnish sketch maps and outline maps of the island of KYUSHU as well as a 1:500,000 road map. Although the above map distribution was considered very satisfactory, in so far as a supply for the actual operation was concerned the tactical maps were not available for the planning phase and consequently Corps enlarged the AMS 1:250,000 map to a 1:50,000 for the landing area and distribution was made to divisions. By 1 August a limited amount of advanced copies of the 1:50,000 map were also available for planning.

Rubber relief models were being prepared in three different scales and adequate distribution planned to provide each company with panels of maps.
its landing area. A 1:250,000 model was prepared by the War Department and limited distribution planned for divisions. JICFOA was preparing a 9 panel 1:25,000 model of southwest KYUSHU for wide distribution and FMF Pac prepared a 1-panel 1:5,000 model of the landing beaches. These models were excellent and a definite improvement over the plastic type which had been used in the past.

c. Photographs.

Unfortunately the arrangements for photographic coverage were not as satisfactory as the map situation. Much difficulty was encountered in obtaining adequate photographic coverage early in the planning phase for initially requests were sent to SIXTH Army and they in turn were dependent on the Far Eastern Air Forces. As this situation was still vague as to just what we could expect and when, during the latter part of July Corps G-2 stopped at GUAM on his way back to VAC from a conference at SIXTH Army and discussed the problem with Interpron 2. At that time arrangements were made whereby Interpron 2 would furnish VAC direct one copy of all photographic coverage flown in the KUSHIKINO area and in turn furnish the negatives of these coverages to JICFOA at OAHU for quarterly printing. Under this arrangement 23 copies of 21 different sorties were received and 6 copies of each sent to each division, 1 to Corps Artillery, 2 to G-2, SIXTH Army, and 2 retained at Corps. Although this coverage was adequate for planning purposes the coverage was not entirely complete and the scales of the various sorties varied from 1:10,000 to 1:20,000. There was a definite need for photographs of a scale not smaller than 1:5000 of the immediate landing area for the purpose of detecting defensive installations. A request for coverage of this scale was therefore submitted but the photographs had not been received at the time that the planning for this operation was discontinued and no definite photo-
graphic plan was ever received. There was also considerable doubt at this Headquarters regarding the adequacy of photographs that could be expected during the operational phase as no airfield was planned for our beachhead area and support photography flown from carriers had always been unsatisfactory due to the difficulty in briefing the delivery. Preliminary arrangements were underway for an airstrip of some type on the Corps beachhead but no definite site had been selected.

The SIXTH Army was preparing a 1:25,000 mosaic of the VAC zone at our request to supplement the lithograph mosaic which was to be printed on the reverse of the 1:25,000 msp. The negative with the original mosaic was to be forwarded to VAC and arrangements had been made with JICFOA to prepare 2000 of these for distribution to subordinate units. JICFOA had also agreed to make a limited number of contact prints of this mosaic for distribution.

500 copies of 1:10,000 Vestographs had been requested of the Corps landing area and the approaches to SEIDAI and KAGOSHIMA which were to be produced by the Fifth Air Force but no information was received as to how many would be furnished or when.

Plans had been initiated for the production of anaglyphs but nothing definite had been decided as the entire plan depended on the availability of viewing glasses which would have had to be furnished from WASHINGTON.

d. Intelligence Studies.

A detailed beach study was being prepared by VAC which was to include underwater profiles showing the landing conditions at the
Corps beaches for all types of landing craft at various stages of the tide, oblique freehand sketches of each beach with all known installations overprinted in red, cross section profiles inland from the beaches, and water level profiles of each beach which would depict the prominent landmarks for orientation on approaching the beaches. A brief narrative description of the beaches was also to have been included in this report which was to be similar to the study prepared by this Corps for the IWO JIMA operation.

A tactical terrain study was prepared for the Corps zone of responsibility and distributed to subordinate units. This study was to be supplemented by a detailed road study of the highways from KUSHIKINO to SENDAI and KUSHIKINO to KAGOSHIMA, showing characteristics, width, and condition of all bridges, the road profile, and a detailed study of the terrain on both flanks of the road in diagrammatic form. Both this study and the beach study were to be ready for distribution by 1 September.

Numerous other intelligence studies were received or were in the process of production in higher echelons such as the CINCPAC-CINCPACOA Information Bulletin No. 81-45 with a map supplement, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study No. 84, and Allied Geographical Section Terrain Studies.

In addition to the situation map which was to be included in the special beach study, arrangements had been made to prepare a last minute joint situation map at GUAM with representatives from Corps, all divisions and Interprn 2 compiling the map as a joint project and distributing it when the troops arrived in the staging area. This map was to be further corrected to show the actual defenses as they would exist upon the landing by sending
C-2 personnel forward with the advance Fire Support Group, with the mission of preparing a damage-assessment chart showing the damage inflicted by pre-A-day bombardment. It was planned to distribute these charts to the forces as they arrived in the target area.

e. **Order of Battle.**

Accumulation of order of battle data on KYUSHU was begun at the end of May. On 2 July a preliminary order of battle was published and distributed to subordinate units; this report covered the then known units, an analysis of Japanese replacement organization on KYUSHU, and a discussion of the potentialities for organizing civilians into defensive units. Subsequently, a complete order of battle file on KYUSHU was kept up to date until the time of surrender. It was planned to publish this information on 1 September. It was further planned to have a conference with order of battle representatives of subordinate units, lasting 3 or 4 days, about the end of August. The purposes of this conference were: (1) To make clear the known and unknown elements in our information. (2) To insure uniform procedure and evaluation of combat sources of identification. (3) To guarantee that all order of battle personnel had a clear picture of the work and reports of each echelon from division to army. It was also planned that the Corps order of battle officer would have a conference with the SIXTH Army order of battle section prior to the operation.

f. **Troop Training.**

As the planning for the assault on southern KYUSHU progressed it became more and more obvious that this was to be a much different type of operation from any in which VAC had partici-
pected in the past. Due to the extensive land areas to be occupied, it would be impossible to maintain a solid front and much emphasis would be placed on strong patrols and internal security. Consequently, Training Memorandum No. 7-45 was published outlining the state of training of intelligence agencies which was to be achieved prior to embarkation.

A special training program for aerial observers was carried out at this time which covered procedures and information desired by intelligence sections.

A special training program was also prepared and conducted by the VAC Language Section consisting of indoctrination lectures. Through arrangements with the G-3 Section, this program was made available to approximately four thousand troops. Five lectures were given on the following subjects:

1. Value of POW's.
3. Propaganda.
4. Souvenirs.
5. Importance of Captured Documents.

In connection with Propaganda, a series of field tests with the NEWCOMB Portable Sound System was carried on by the Corps Language personnel. Amplifying equipment suitable for voice propaganda had been sadly lacking in previous operations; consequently, this new sound system was procured and tested under conditions approximating those thought to exist on southern KYUSHU. These tests proved very satisfactory and a request was therefore submitted to procure additional sets for distribution to divisions.

2. PREPARATORY PHASE FOR OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

a. General.

On 12 August, 1945 the entire picture changed
and every effort was directed toward an intelligence plan for an occupation rather than an assault. It goes without saying that much uncertainty was experienced initially as to just what the extent of intelligence functions would be for an operation of this type. The entire tempo was considerably stepped up in order to accomplish an early occupation and the distance between SIXTH Army Headquarters and VAC was therefore even more keenly felt at this time due to the limited time available to formulate plans. Maps of a scale of 1:25,000 of the initial occupation areas were obtained and distributed to units after loading had commenced but complete coverage was not obtained until the occupation phase was well underway. Upon embarkation on 31 August special teams of the Counterintelligence Corps, (CIC) Civil Censorship (4th CAD) and JICPOA had received instructions and reported to VAC. The most valuable information to be received during this phase, insofar as intelligence of the target area was concerned, was the CINCPAC-CINCPOA Information Bulletin No. 132-45. This publication served as a constant reference. Several changes to initial instructions and amplifying information was received enroute and disseminated at the staging area. Upon notification that the 32nd Division would replace the 3rd Marine Division, instructions were issued to the latter directing the shipment of all intelligence material to the 32nd Division. Photographs, mosaics, city plans, and a booklet published by CINCPAC-CINCPOA entitled "Guide To Japan" were also received and distributed and an aerial reconnaissance plan submitted at the Staging Area.

Upon departure from JAPAN adequate intelligence information and material had been distributed for the initial phase of the occupation and the intelligence picture fairly well crystallized, but the entire planning period
had of necessity been characterized by haste and last minute directives and arrangements which had to be formulated in a minimum of time. Prior to departure from SAIPAN, two officers from the S-2 section were dispatched ahead as part of an advanced party which was sent into NAGASAKI and SASEBO on AF D's. Their mission was to obtain all possible information as to what could be expected upon landing, the location of troops and defensive positions, and all other possible information of an intelligence nature. These officers returned aboard the command ship upon its arrival at SASEBO and furnished valuable information which was limited only by the brief time available for reconnaissance and interrogation. The advanced reconnaissance proved most satisfactory and is definitely recommended for future occupation operations to be arranged and executed as far in advance as is possible, consistent with the situation.

b. Maps.

As has been pointed out above the shortage of time available for the procurement of maps was most serious. Initially it was necessary to reproduce the 1:250,000 map at a scale of 1:100,000 for planning purposes. However, just prior to departure map coverage at 1:25,000 of the initial landing areas and partial coverage of the entire area of NAGASAKI, SAGA, and FUKUOKA prefectures was obtained from JICPOA. A very limited number of AMS L772 scale 1:50,000 were also received at this time but the coverage was not complete and the supply not adequate. A 1:500,000 road map and city plans of 13 cities in the V Amphibious Corps zone of responsibility were received by Corps and divisions at the staging area. It may be said at this point that a 1:25,000 map is not considered necessary for an occupation of an area comparable with that assigned to divisions.
and Corps for this operation. The value received does not warrant printing and shipping the tremendous number of sheets which would be required. In fact the map most widely used was the 1:260,000 supplemented by good city plans and mosaics of urban areas.

c. Photographs.

During the planning phase, 5 sets of 27 different sorties were received by VAC from JICFOA, and 5 sets sent direct to each division. This coverage was very sketchy but did cover the immediate landing areas making it possible to prepare an excellent uncontrolled mosaic of the harbor area of SASEBO and NAGASAKI. Contact prints were made of these mosaics and distributed. Both proved of great value particularly during the initial phases of the occupation. 47 additional sorties, flown in the VAC Area, were received at the staging area and distribution made upon arrival at SASEBO. These coverages were later used for producing mosaics of the cities and towns of which coverage was available. It is believed that the only real need for aerial photography during an unopposed occupation is for the selection of initial landing beaches and the production of mosaics of urban areas.

d. Other Intelligence Material.

A situation map showing the location of Japanese installations in the SASEBO harbor area was prepared and distributed in addition to an Intelligence Plan and an Estimate of the Situation. A "Guide for Language Personnel" was also prepared and distributed to familiarize all language personnel with the differences to be encountered in handling documents, interrogation reports, etc. during an occupation as contrasted to an assault operation.
c. Order of Battle.

As soon as the occupation plan was known, an order of battle was prepared and published as part of the G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, dated 24 August, 1945. A supplementary order of battle was published on 15 September, 1945. These 2 reports combined with SIXTH Army report entitled "Japanese Military Units identified on Western HONSHU, SHIKOKU, and KYUSHU", dated 28 August, 1945 and Supplement Number One, dated 6 September, were felt to be adequate as preparatory information for the occupation. Unfortunately, there was no time for order of battle personnel to meet before the occupation. While this situation was inevitable under the circumstances, it resulted in a good deal of confusion in the first phase of the occupation. No order of battle information was obtained by the preliminary landing party.

f. Troop Indoctrination.

In an effort to familiarize the officers and men with the general characteristics, customs, and background material of JAPAN and the Japanese people, fifteen information pamphlets were written, edited, and reproduced by the Corps Language Section from personal experience and available written information.

Subjects covered were:

1. Psychology of the Japanese.
2. Education in JAPAN.
3. Propaganda and Press in JAPAN.
5. Geography of JAPAN.
6. Home Life in JAPAN.
7. History of JAPAN.
8. The TANAKA Memorial.
9. The Government of JAPAN.
10. The Kempei Tai.

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12. Hints, Suggestions and Cautions to Personnel of Occupation Forces in JAPAN.


15. The Japanese Calendar System.

These pamphlets were distributed to all Corps units and were made the basis of an intensive training program. Most of this training took place while the troops were enroute to JAPAN. Lectures based on these pamphlets were given on all ships by language personnel when available and were attended by both officer and men.

g. Section Organization.

Upon landing, the section was organized in accordance with current Tables of Organization plus the attached Counterintelligence Corps teams, a Civil Censorship Advanced Detachment, and technical intelligence personnel from JICPOA mentioned above. It became immediately apparent, however, that certain readjustments would be necessary. For example, the Aerial Photograph Interpretation section was re-organized and established as an Advanced Base Planning section to continue work on compiling information on areas remaining to be occupied, and a special Statistical section organized under the operations for the purpose of compiling reports on location and inventories of Japanese supplies and equipment. Both of these sections completed their missions within the first month of occupation and were disbanded allowing for some personnel in the section who fulfilled the requirements to return to the UNITED STATES. Throughout the occupation a considerable problem was encountered in the constant transfer of personnel in and out of the section in carrying out rotation policies which had been established. This re-
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acquired a constant training of new personnel and a consequent reduction in the overall efficiency of the section. It is believed that similar changes should be made prior to embarkation for future occupations.

3. OCCUPATION PHASE.
   a. General.

   From the outset the wholehearted cooperation of the civil populace and the excellent cooperation by the Japanese military and naval authorities was immediately apparent. From 22 September to 30 November no serious incidents occurred and the few that were reported were believed to be caused by a misunderstanding on the part of our forces, or the Japanese, due to the language barrier. Some instances were reported of weapons and supplies not being reported but this is thought to have been chiefly because of the confusing state of affairs insofar as the Japanese forces were concerned at the time of surrender. In general, no occupation force could expect more complete cooperation from a defeated enemy. Their every effort was directed toward trying to furnish our forces everything that was required of them and comply with all directives issued. This general attitude was undoubtedly prompted by a sincere desire to have things run smoothly in order that the occupation would be terminated at an early date.

   Japanese Liaison Committees were established in all areas of occupation which were contacted to provide information on demobilization, repatriation, and similar matters as well as furnishing a central agency which could be contacted for the purpose of passing instructions to the military and civilian personnel in any given area.
To meet a rapidly expanding situation, a great strain was placed on VAC reproduction facilities. Much effort was expended in preparing city plans and military and civil intelligence target folders for troops entering new areas in the zone of occupation on which little information had been previously available. A good deal of difficulty was encountered from an OOB and demobilization standpoint due to VAC's being responsible for YAMAGUCHI Prefecture which did not lie in the Japanese Army command for KYUSHU. In addition, the typhoon before VAC's arrival at SASEBO and the typhoon early in October slowed up Japanese reports on these matters considerably.

The reports of subordinate units to VAC were for the most part timely and informative. The investigations and control of Chinese and Korean nationals, awaiting repatriation, developed into a considerable problem. CIC played a large part in this work and also in the investigation of Japanese secret and patriotic societies and general supervision to assure Japanese compliance with directives from higher headquarters. The 4th Censorship Advanced Detachment made extensive surveys of mail and telecommunication facilities, reviewed all publications in the VAC zone of occupation, and established censorship offices at FUKUOKA for international mail and telecommunications. JICFOA personnel, upon arriving in the occupation zone, were reorganized and reported to 5th Fleet for operational control as the Naval Technical Mission, JAPAN (NAVTECHJAP). Although this was not as desirable from the Corps standpoint, as having a technical intelligence unit operating under its control, as had been the case in previous operations, this unit thoroughly exploited the VAC Area and its reports on radar, radio, new types of ordnance, combatant ships, aircraft, suicide boats, midget submarines, and human torpedoes should prove of great value. It is believed that much
valuable intelligence from a strategic standpoint was gathered and that no serious obstacles to the continued peaceful occupation of the VAC Zone of occupation exists.

b. Operations Section.

(1) General.

The organization and composition of the Operations Section in the initial phase of the occupation was essentially the same as that provided for the assault on southern KYUSHU.

At the beginning of the occupation this section included the following personnel:

- 2 Majors.
- 3 Captains.
- 2 1st Lieutenants.
- 1 2nd Lieutenant.
- 3 Clerk-Typists.

The above personnel were organized into two teams to provide for continuous compilation of reports, dissemination of information, and to take action on all intelligence, both incoming and outgoing. In addition to the two working teams mentioned, a Statistics sub-section, under supervision of one of the Majors, was set up to augment the division of assigned responsibility. Later, when the zone of occupation was physically covered, the Statistics sub-section was disbanded and the personnel were diverted back to the Operations Section.

A periodic report was prepared daily and included such information as demobilization and disarmament, intelligence targets or objectives, counterintelligence, and civilian and military attitudes.
flash situation summary was prepared daily and transmitted by radio to higher headquarters.

As the occupation progressed, the same general use of personnel was maintained. Due to rotation and readjustment, it became necessary to train new personnel but at all times a sufficient number of capable officers and men were available. One of the most important functions of this section was the continual evaluation of reports and information received from lower echelons and Japanese agencies which reported direct to VAC.

(2) **Exploitation of Intelligence Targets.**

From the date of our landing to the date of this report 748 intelligence targets were reported on by lower echelons of this command. These targets were reported in the Periodic Reports and Situation Summaries by all units and later reported to SIXTH Army. These included public utilities, transportation, industries, schools, airfields, military installations, weapons, encampments, governmental organizations, subversive and unfriendly organizations, prisons, both civil and former POW camps, and any other installations which had been, or could be employed against us.

A clear distinction could not be made between a military target and a civil target because many targets ceased to exist as such with the end of the war. All war production ceased at that time and many industries had converted to peacetime production. However, all targets were thoroughly exploited whether they had been inimical to our cause or were potentially capable of producing or being used against us.
During the initial phase of the occupation, the Statistics sub-section compiled lists of specific intelligence targets which were given to units prior to moving into an area. These targets, and others, were reported on by the lower echelons in the Situation Summary and more fully in the periodic report. City plans were made by the G-2 Advance Base Planning Section, and were given to units to use in conjunction with the list of intelligence targets prepared by Statistics. Other sources to locate intelligence targets were interrogations, volunteered information by the Japanese, translation reports, counterintelligence agents, technical intelligence personnel, and publications received from higher echelons.

(3) Technical Intelligence.

To supplement the organic organization of the Corps Headquarters, technical intelligence personnel from JICPOA were attached to, and under operational control of VAC. A short time after landing this unit was reorganized and subsequently became known as the Naval Technical Mission to JAPAN (NAVTECHJAP), and was placed under operational control of the Fifth Fleet. Due to lack of VAC control over this unit, a comprehensive account of its findings cannot be given. However, personal liaison was maintained, all technical intelligence matters were referred to them for action, and technical reports were submitted to VAC by the Military Division of NAVTECHJAP. With the exception of technical intelligence targets which were exploited by special field teams sent out from GHQ, such as United States Strategic Bomb Survey, Technical Intelligence Communications teams, Atomic
Bomb Scientific Group and others, NAVTECHJAP thoroughly exploited all technical intelligence targets in the VAC Area. These reports were included in the G-2 Periodic Reports as enclosures and thus the information was disseminated to the distribution list. The NAVTECHJAP reports on the following items of new Japanese equipment were received:

1. Preliminary Examination of Modified Type 7.7 mm Machine Gun (see G-2 Periodic Report #17).

2. Preliminary Examination of 28 Barrel, 12 cm Anti-Aircraft Rocket Launcher (see G-2 Periodic Report #17).

3. Preliminary Examination of Japanese Naval Type Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher (see G-2 Periodic Report #17).

4. Preliminary Examination of Modified Type 97 Japanese Medium Tank (see G-2 Periodic Report #17).

5. Preliminary Examination of Japanese Type 3, 8 cm Mortar (see G-2 Periodic Report #19).

6. Reports of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Army Type Experimental 7 cm Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher (see G-2 Periodic Report #19).


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13. Preliminary Report, Type 4, 75 mm AA Guns (see G-2 Periodic Report #47).
NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT

No.1-Vickers 7.7mm Machine Gun with wooden tripod mount.

No.2-28 barrel, 12cm Anti-aircraft Rocket Launcher.
NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT

No.3 - Navy Type Anti-tank Rocket Launcher.

No.4 - Modified Type 97 medium Tank.
NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT

No. 5 - Type 3, 8cm Mortar.
NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT

No.6 - Army Type experimental 7cm Anti-tank Rocket Launcher

No.7 - Short 15cm Mortar.
NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT

No. 8- "Cannon" Tank.

No. 9- Armored Personnel Carrier.
NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT

No.10 - Armored Reconnaissance Car.

No.11 - Self-propelled 105cm Howitzer.
NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT

No.12 - Medium Tank, Type 3, (1943)

No.13 - Type 4, 75mm AA Gun.
NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT

NO. 14 TYPE 2, 12 CM AA GUN
(4) Japanese Industrialization and Regeneration.

(a) Industrialization.

It has been found that Japanese industry reached two extremes. The Mitsubishi and Mitsubishi concerns, with extensive control over various widely scattered industries, were the pre-dominant leaders in industry and war production. Extensive decentralization of industry was seen in the many small, widely dispersed shops. These shops were as small as a single family project. These smaller industries manufactured parts for the larger factories which in turn assembled the finished products. School projects and military arsenals also added their share to the total industry of the country.

During the latter part of the war, the Japanese, in a further dispersal of industry, moved in great part to underground excavations and caves which could not be damaged by bombing. It can be seen that the results of Allied bombing caused a great disruption in industry due mainly to the interdependency of similar and dissimilar firms. Interdiction of the transport and transportation lines, plus the comparative inability to replace worn and damaged equipment, most seriously affected production and industry.

All war production ceased with the end of the war and many of the industries have converted, or are in the process of conversion, to peacetime production of goods to perpetuate and improve their normal economy.
(b) Reglementation.

People of all ages and all classes were thoroughly organized and banded together by the military during the war. With the advent of the occupation it can be seen that many of the civil organizations continue to exist as political organs of the government. The influence of the military has been removed and military regimentation has ceased to exist. JAPAN as a nation has not advanced as far as Western civilization, and until such time as a government is provided which will include a national and local control, regimentation similar to the cartel system will continue to exist.

During the war, conscripted labor was used in the war plants. A service draft existed to provide the services with personnel as needed. A military reserve included all able-bodied men of all ages who were not actually in military service. Military training was a part of the curriculum in the schools and industries under the guidance of the Army and Navy. Furthermore, the curriculum of each school was rigidly established by the national government. Youth associations existed comparable to our Boy Scouts and Cub Scouts; but these, too, were a part of the regimentation of the country. Uniforms were worn by boys and young men in all of the schools.

(5) Chinese Problem.

Information obtained from the KYUSHU Government indicates that there were 7300
Chinese nationals in the VAC zone of responsibility. This information was verified and the Chinese nationals were divided into two classes:

1. Those who came to JAPAN and established businesses, or intermarried with Japanese. This class totals 1740 and it is estimated that less than 5% want to return to CHINA.

2. Chinese prisoners of war and laborers totaling 5560. All in this class wish to return to CHINA immediately.

A general state of unrest prevailed in Chinese F.O.W. camps and settlements which constituted a serious menace to the peaceful execution of the mission of this command. Riots and looting have been reported and two Japanese were killed in different instances. Since the end of the war the prisoners and laborers have been well treated and are not working. Chinese Formosans have also caused disturbances and have raided Japanese supplies. The Japanese claim that these Chinese Formosans voluntarily enlisted as workers but now assert their Chinese ancestry because it is advantageous for them to do so. The Japanese want these Chinese repatriated immediately to avoid the possible outbreak of serious trouble.

The Chinese have reacted well to Allied investigation of their riots and in every instance have obeyed our orders and demands to cease rioting and give up arms, ammunition, and other articles looted from the Japanese.

(6) Korean Problem.

The Koreans as a whole have been peaceful and have not retarded the mission of this
occupation. The Koreans displayed a bewildered elation on the initial contact with our forces and many felt that any American could personally send them home immediately.

The Japanese disdain association with the Koreans and in cases where they were not especially mistrusted, the Japanese have discriminated against them.

Counterintelligence agents maintain surveillance over these Koreans and our forces control the repatriation at ports of embarkation.

(7) Repatriation.

The repatriation of Japanese nationals to JAPAN and Koreans and Chinese nationals to their respective countries has proved to be one of the major projects carried on by the occupation forces. The Japanese government is held responsible for conducting this movement but considerable supervision and reporting has been required by our forces. This project has been most extensive in the VAC zone of action as the majority of repatriation ports are in this Corps' Area. The Japanese are required to set up quarantine stations, arrange for feeding and quartering repatriates, and screening them for contraband. Our forces have been required to exercise general supervision over this activity and CIC agents have been screening incoming repatriates to determine general attitude. The repatriation responsibility in VAC has been divided between G-3 and G-2 with the G-2 Section arranging matters in regards to shipping, dates of arrival, and designation of repatriation ports. The G-2 has been responsible to submit all of
the required reports. In regard to reports, several directives have been received, the last as late as the middle of November, each requiring a different type of report. On the second of October a directive was received requesting that daily reports be submitted to SIXTH Army showing the total number of army, navy, and civilians, by ship, arriving at each port during each 24 hour period. These reports were also to be summarized in a weekly report to SIXTH Army. Another directive received on 1 November directing that after that date the weekly reports were to be discontinued and daily reports submitted direct from the repatriation ports to SCAF. This report differed in that the same information on repatriates leaving the Empire was also desired. Shortly thereafter a request was received for a complete recapitulation on both incoming and outgoing repatriates from the date of the initial Corps landing to 31 October. With the exception of the information that was already on hand from previous required reports, this entire information had to be obtained from the Japanese authorities with no possible means of checking their figures. On 11 November an additional weekly repatriation report was required. This report was to include the total military personnel arriving in the VAC Area by units, broken down into army, navy, and air forces. This report again was obtained from the Japanese as the specialized personnel required and facilities were not available at the repatriation ports for our forces to obtain this information. Considerable difficulty was encountered due to the continued change in reports required and it is therefore recommended that for future occupations, where repatriation will always be a major item, a definite policy,
and definite requirements for reports which are to be submitted, be established prior to the actual operation. In this manner it is believed that much more accurate reports will result.

The following tables show the total number of repatriates which passed through the VAC zone of action between 22 September and 30 November, 1945.

**ARRIVALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>CIVILIANS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. RYUKYU REITTO</td>
<td>4,371</td>
<td>4,195</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>8,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>5,601</td>
<td>6,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. KOREA</td>
<td>12,445</td>
<td>11,172</td>
<td>457,467</td>
<td>593,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TSUSHIMA</td>
<td>40,128</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>4,385</td>
<td>45,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. FORMOSA</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. CHINA</td>
<td>21,774</td>
<td>5,896</td>
<td>10,010</td>
<td>37,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Outlying islands including GOTO, HAISHU, TO DAIKO JIMA, IKI SHIMA</td>
<td>12,657</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>14,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>204,418</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,573</strong></td>
<td><strong>479,192</strong></td>
<td><strong>706,183</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEPARTURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>CIVILIANS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>KOREA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>264,106</td>
<td>264,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKINAWA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,984</td>
<td>4,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,186</td>
<td>4,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>273,276</strong></td>
<td><strong>273,276</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Order of Battle.

(1) General.

The primary mission of the section was to procure the order of battle of the Japan—
ese armed forces in the V Amphibious Corps area as of 15 August, 1945, and in addition to report on the demobilization as accomplished. The size of these assignments taxed the OB Section to the limit of its capacity necessitating priority one, being OB studies and two, demobilization. Consequently, the first month of the occupation was devoted primarily to obtaining accurate daily and weekly strength reports of Japanese military personnel. Once the first month had passed, proper liaison became well established and the mechanics of reporting became crystallized with the result that the section was able to devote the major part of its attention to order of battle work.

(2) Demobilization.

This Corps was required to report the demobilization of Japanese military personnel by units on a percentage basis from week to week. This method was found to be most difficult as it required, as necessary prerequisites that, all units be known and that their original strengths be known. These facts were not known and therefore had to be established from Japanese sources as a basis for the required reports. In a number of cases, units were totally demobilized before their existence was even discovered. As many of the Japanese records had been destroyed it was necessary to accept "estimated" figures from Japanese sources - many based on memory only. While such estimates are highly useful for intelligence purposes, they leave much to be desired as a basis for vital statistics. Over and above the difficulties inherent in the form of the report was the inability of the Japanese to demobilize efficiently. This inability
was caused partly by the language barrier, partly by the destruction of written records, partly by the circumstance that their demobilization was well under way by the time we arrived, and partly by the serious disruption of telephone, telegraph, and railway lines by typhoons in September and October. Once the Japanese authorities clearly understood what specific information was required, when it was required, and that it was to be required on time, every effort was made to cooperate and comply with the demands. The Japanese demobilization reports were, in the latter part of the occupation, supplemented with area inspection reports by our divisions. These reports consisted of actual physical checks by our personnel.

(3) Progress of Demobilization.

The Japanese had completed the demobilization of shipping, railroad, militia, and a large group of service personnel before our arrival. Naval personnel under control of the SASEBO Naval District were about 90 per cent demobilized on our arrival; and 97 per cent demobilized three weeks thereafter. Naval Air personnel were about 70 per cent demobilized on our arrival, but by the middle of October the figure reached 98 per cent. Naval personnel under control of the KURE Naval District were about 70 per cent demobilized on our arrival, and were brought to 98 per cent by the latter part of November. Army air personnel were 86 per cent demobilized on our arrival; and 99 per cent by the beginning of November. Army ground personnel under the control of the 16th Area Army, were about 60 per cent demobilized on our arrival. The demobilization of units under this command was seriously
hampered by the mid-October typhoon. However, by the first part of November, demobilization of all major combat units was virtually completed. Demobilization of the remainder of the personnel proceeded rapidly and without incident. By 1 December there remained approximately 20,000 army and navy personnel all of whom were employed in the general function of demobilization and repatriation, and the sundry duties of closing out the armed services. As of 1 December these remaining service personnel were transferred to a civilian status and placed under newly created ministries and bureaus to complete their tasks following a time schedule approved by SCAP. Their duties consisted of mine-sweeping, manning ships for repatriation, operating repatriation centers, guarding dumps and installations, and administration in connection with veterans, war dead, and their families.

(4) Order of Battle, compilation of.

In preparing a definite order of battle of the Japanese armed forces prior to the surrender, two major difficulties had to be overcome. The first was the fact that the Japanese had, as previously mentioned, destroyed a large part of their original strength reports. This meant that the order of battle had to be reconstructed from fragmentary sources. The second difficulty was the fact that a large number of units were never contacted by intelligence personnel. Consequently, checking on data about these units had to be done indirectly by considering their validity in the light of the pre-surrender tactical situation, by checking the time and place of their activation, the date they were tactically deployed, and the number of weapons that were on hand. Another useful check was developed by comparing the reports submitted by the Japan-
ese to different echelons of our own forces. Thus order of battle reports, obtained by GHQ from the Imperial Japanese Headquarters, were compared with those obtained by SIXTH Army from the Japanese 2nd General Army, by Corps from the 16th Area Army, and by divisions from various units in their areas. The duplication of reports undoubtedly caused the Japanese to feel they were performing their task several times over, but this minor chagrin was gainedsaid by the fact that it presented several different reports which could readily be compared. By so comparing them, the discrepancies and omissions could immediately be brought to the attention of the Japanese and thus force them into proving their statistics. The adopted procedure was time consuming and difficult but resulted in an OOB of far greater value and accuracy than one compiled from the initial Japanese reports.

d. Language Section.

(1) Personnel.

The organic language personnel of Corps Headquarters was augmented by additional personnel which were furnished by verbal agreement from NAVTECHJAP. These JICPOA personnel so assigned varied with the needs of Corps Headquarters and NAVTECHJAP. The greatest number assigned to Corps Headquarters was ten officers and five Nisei, with ten to fifteen also assigned to each division. This personnel proved adequate for ordinary language needs. However, during one period of 9 days, when the translation load was particularly heavy, 20 civilian Japanese were employed as translators on documents involving no security. As a general rule, it was found that the need for language personnel was much greater during the occupation than it had been for combat operations.
and without the help of NAVTECHJAF the language situation would have been acute, particularly in the case of the 32nd Division which arrived in the area with one language officer and seven Nisei.

(2) Documents.

Documents were handled in accordance with the provisions of Annex Baker to Operation Plan 2-45 and "Guide for Language personnel". Documents received at Corps level consisted largely of inventories, demobilization lists and other OOB material, maps and charts, legal documents (including laws recently repealed, health and sanitation laws, etc.), daily weather reports, nameplates from seized equipment, and newspapers. In addition, some correspondence was received in Japanese, and certain miscellaneous documents concerned with counterintelligence were translated.

(3) Translations.

Translations were usually prepared in triplicate, one copy being routed and filed in this Headquarters and two copies being forwarded to SIXTH Army. Translations (and Interrogation Reports) received from subordinate echelons were handled in the same manner. In some cases, translations were made of items which had only local interest; in such cases only the number of copies required by this Headquarters were prepared.

(4) Miscellaneous.

In order to facilitate the handling of Japanese labor and to reduce the calls for interpreters, a "Phrase Book for Working Parties" was prepared by Corps
Language personnel and distributed to all echelons. Eight (8) newspapers published in the Corps zone of responsibility were screened daily after the 4th Censorship. Advanced Detachment was transferred. Items dealing with thought trends and attitudes were translated, as well as items of local interest, and submitted as a daily report.

e. Advanced Planning Section.

As has been previously pointed out, the Aerial Photograph Interpretation Section was reorganized into the Advanced Planning Section shortly after landing. The duties of this section were to compile all possible information, maps, and photographs on areas which remained to be occupied, and furnish this information to the divisions concerned prior to their departure into new areas as the occupation gradually extended over the entire VAC area. In this manner information was being continually compiled on intelligence targets to be exploited while the remainder of the G-2 section concentrated their efforts on current intelligence work.

During the occupation phase 45 uncontrolled mosaics were prepared and distributed by the Advanced Planning Section and over 30 city plans were procured from the Japanese and reproduced for the divisions concerned. Field studies were also made by this section of harbors which were to be developed in FUKUOKA Prefecture. In general the establishment of this special section with a definite mission proved most satisfactory.

f. Counterintelligence.

Much of the work of intelligence section was directed to counterintelligence during the occupation of JAPAN. To assist in this work special CIC detachments were assigned to divisions and
In the sphere of subversive organizations, CIC in VAC did not confine itself to the investigation of the pre-war and wartime societies classed as subversive, such as the KOKURYU KAI or the DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI and the others set forth in Appendix 7, Annex Baker, Operation Plan 2-45 but directed its activities at all organizations of any appreciable strength or which would in any manner interfere with or operate against the orderly occupation by UNITED STATES Forces. In the instance of KEMPEI TAI, for example, the goal was not merely the historical approach to the nature, strength, duties and deployment of personnel, but more definitely to discover the present influence of KEMPEI TAI members in public positions, if such were the case. It was not only the strength of the past that was considered but the influence in the future.

In the same vein, a census was taken of all non-Japanese persons in the VAC zone of activity. Surveys were made of schools and universities with the purpose of determining the changes effected, if any, since the surrender. The Korean situation was surveyed. A study was made of the Mitsubishi influence on local government. Extensive studies were initiated, and in certain areas are still continuing, of neighborhood associations with a view to determining their control over the populace and the potentiality they present, if any, for effecting reform through supplying an organizational base. All of these matters were fitted into counterintelligence activity insofar as they affected or might effect orderly and successful occupation.

In a similar sense, CIC agents investigated Chinese labor camps in OMUTA, FUKUOKA-KEN with reference to the status of the laborers, con-
ditions at the camps and charges of the withholding of pay from the workers. Agreements were negotiated as to the disputed amounts owed to the Chinese laborers, a check was made of conditions, and remedies were suggested so as to insure the security of the area and the peaceful occupation by UNITED STATES forces. The same procedure was followed in the case of seven (7) Chinese labor camps in the vicinity of IIIZUKA, FUKUOKA-KEN. Both of these investigations were carried out at the request of the AC of S, G-2, VAC and the Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force respectively.

With the publication of the GHQ Directive of 4 October 1945, relating to the removal of restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties, an SOP was prepared. VAC CIC Detachments were instructed to investigate and interrogate to determine whether there had been compliance with the directive and, in the event of actual or attempted evasion, to report and investigate the same. Each detachment had a specific zone of action and was directed to report on: (a) The removal of the Chief of Police in each Ken in the VAC zone of action; (b) The removal of the Chief of Special Higher Police (TOKKO KA) in each Ken, and the head of this section and the members thereof in each subordinate police unit throughout the Ken, together with a check as to whether they were employed in any other police capacity; (c) The release of political prisoners and the interrogation of each one released where possible.

CIC contemplates checking continuously to see that the spirit as well as the letter of the GHQ directive is observed. It thus functions as a guardian of the civil liberties of the Japanese people.

The processing and screening activities of CIC were directed at the following individuals:
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(1) The police. This was done to check on the personal history of each member and to determine whether former members of KEMPEI TAI were functioning as policemen.

(2) Public officials of the Ken and of local governmental agencies.

(3) Prominent personalities in non-Japanese communities such as Chinese, Koreans, French and others.

(4) Japanese seeking employment as interpreters or laborers with the Corps or division Headquarters or with military Government as well as Japanese employed as civilian aides.

(5) Repatriated Japanese military personnel and civilians.

In the case of atrocity perpetrators, CIC: (a) Apprehended them under direction of higher headquarters; (b) Requested authority to hold in technical custody those who after investigation and interrogation, admitted certain acts which reflected cruel and severe treatment of POW's; (c) Submitted reports to higher headquarters through CIC channels for further action by authorities specifically designated to handle war crime prosecutions.

The continuing mission of counterintelligence in the VAC zone of activity is patently that of constant and determined vigilance with civil liberties its special province. Together with that, there must be a familiarity with the pulse of the people, and with the workings of their social or political groupings and institutions.

g. Civil Censorship.

See Appendix 2.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Discussion.

The G-2 OOB section of Corps, faced with the compilation of the Japanese Order of Battle and the reporting on demobilization, had too large a task for its authorized strength.

The demobilization functions were assigned to this section due to necessity because of its Order of Battle knowledge.

While the divisions handled these two subjects in a like manner some confusion was created by the assignment of demobilization to the G-1 section of the SIXTH Army.

As the repatriation function involved both intelligence and operations, the compilation of reports was the duty of the G-2 section in Corps and Divisions and the functions requiring operations were conducted by the G-3 sections. In Corps, it is considered advisable to keep the OOB and Demobilization section under the G-2 as the subject is the same, though the function differs.

It is considered more efficient to combine the Repatriation function of operations and the compilation of reports under one staff section, and as this function involves ship movements, guard details etc., it is believed that it is more of an operational rather than an intelligence activity.

b. Recommendation.

For a future, similar occupation, it is recommended that:

(1) The Order of Battle section compile only the order of battle records.
(2) A Demobilization section be organized consisting of 2 officers and a clerk typist.

(3) A Repatriation Section be authorized under the G-1 or G-3 to supervise this entire function.

(4) Each echelon of command, Army, Corps and Division have similar sections under similar staff sections to uniformly organize and standardize the duties.

c. Discussion.

Considerable confusion, duplication of effort, and some inefficiency resulted in the independent search for intelligence by separate specialized agencies such as:

(1) Naval Technical Mission to JAPAN (NAVTECHJAP),

(2) The Technical Intelligence Communications Team (TICOM),

(3) The Mine Explosives Intelligence Unit (MEIU).

(4) The Atomic Bomb Scientific group.

(5) The US Strategic Bombing Survey (US SBS)

d. Recommendation.

In a similar occupation, it is highly recommended that all such specialist intelligence agencies be placed under operational control of the Corps in whose zone they are to operate. If in isolated instances such a plan is not feasible, the specialized intelligence agency should operate through the G-2 of Corps, maintaining close liaison. All results, findings and reports should be recorded with the Corps for information if not for action. By such control Corps could:

(1) Develop a detailed list of intelligence targets in its zone of responsibility.

(2) Conduct or supervise a thorough exploitation of these targets.

(3) Maintain a complete record of the intelligence collected.
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(4) Maintain a detailed record of the disposition of intelligence materials.
(5) And thereby provide one responsible center for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence.

e. Discussion.

Considerable difficulty was occasioned by the fact that while this Corps zone of responsibility included all of KYUSHU and the southern prefecture of HONSHU, the Japanese Army and Navy Command on KYUSHU did not extend into southern HONSHU. It was therefore necessary to obtain COB as well as demobilization information from a Japanese Army and Navy Command in an area not under this Corps zone of responsibility.

f. Recommendation.

It is recommended that wherever possible, major units entering an area for occupational duty be assigned a zone of responsibility which coincides with the boundaries of the defeated unit for which the occupation force is responsible for supervision and demobilization.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USACR,
AC of S, G-2.

Appendix 1 - Counterintelligence Report.
Appendix 2 - Civil Censorship Report.
Appendix 3 - The Defense of KYUSHU.
Appendix 4 - Detailed Order of Battle VAC Area.
Appendix 5 - G-2 Periodic Reports.
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Appendix 1 to Annex CHARLIE to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPA
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT.

INTRODUCTION

The mission of the Counterintelligence Corps in the operation was set forth in Appendix 7 to Annex Baker of Operation Plan No. 2–45 dated 21 August 1945. Seven teams were organized and equipped at Schofield Barracks. They were as follows:

- 468th CIC Detachment: 3 officers, 11 Agents, 3 Nisei
- 496th CIC Detachment: 3 officers, 11 Agents, 2 Nisei
- 404th CIC Detachment: 3 officers, 11 Agents, 2 Nisei
- 403rd CIC Detachment: 3 officers, 11 Agents, 2 Nisei
- 93rd Metropolitan Unit: 3 officers, 10 Agents, 2 Nisei
- 94th Metropolitan Unit: 3 officers, 10 Agents, 2 Nisei
- 95th Metropolitan Unit: 3 officers, 10 Agents, 2 Nisei

The Counterintelligence Detachments (hereinafter referred to as CIC Detachments) attached to the Fifth Amphibious Corps for the operation reported to Corps at KAHULUI, MAUL, T.H. on 25 August 1945. Two Detachments, the 403rd and the 496th Detachments were attached to the Fifth Marine Division and reported to Division at HILO, HAWAII on 25 August 1945. The 497th Detachment and the 53rd Area team which were to operate with the Third Marine Division were withdrawn and attached to the EIGHTH Army; as of 17 October they were relieved from attachment to the EIGHTH Army and attached to the SIXTH Army. The 498th Detachment and the 54th Area team were organized and equipped at LEYTE, P.I. and were attached to the Second Marine Division. In mid-October the 32nd and 62nd CIC Detachments were attached to the 32nd Infantry Division and came within the VaC zone of activity.

It thus developed that there were five CIC Detachments attached to VaC Headquarters apart from the separate Detachments working in the VaC zone of activity but further attached to the 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions and to the 32nd Infantry

Appendix 1 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.
Division. These were the 468th and 404th Detachments which worked out of VAC Headquarters and the 93rd, 94th and 95th Metropolitan Units which worked out of SHINOHESEKI, FUKUOKA and YAMATA respectively. CIC activities in the VAC zone of activity were commenced on or about 23 September 1945.

In general CIC was to concern itself with subversive organizations, security, cases of treason, espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and any and all persons or incidents which might in any way endanger the security of the occupation forces. On 15 September 1945, the mission was extended to the extent that the stress was away from arrest, detention and seizure, to surveillance and recommendation for arrest, detention or search. CIC was to investigate, interrogate and, in the case of records, to secure. (Reference: Appendix 7, Annex Baker, Operation Plan 2-45, dated 16 September 1945).

Liaison was established immediately with Military Government, the Provost Marshal, the Censorship Unit and the Translator and Interpreter service as well as with the various staff sections working in Corps. This was extended also to the Second and Fifth Marine Divisions, and, at a later date, to the 32nd Infantry Division.

As an operating procedure, and not as an essential part of the mission, was the immediate establishment of liaison with the local police in each area with the assignment of an agent to the police desk to check every phase of local police activity.

In the preparation of daily activity reports, the CIC Detachments in the VAC area adhered to the form set forth in Annex Baker, to Operation Plan 2-45, par. 8c, d, e. In weekly reports and case reports, the regular counterintelligence forms were used and distribution was through CIC channels except in those cases where the information was specially requested. At all times, however, the AG of S, G-2 was kept abreast of all CIC activity.

1. The Mission.

a. In the sphere of subversive organizations, CIC in
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VAC did not confine itself to the investigation of
the pre-war and wartime societies classed as sub-
versive such as those set forth in Appendix 7,
Annex Baker, Operation Plan 2-45, but directed its
activities at all organizations of any appreciable
strength or which would in any manner interfere with
or operate against the orderly occupation by United
States Forces. There follows a brief statement on
the outstanding organizations investigated together
with an account of their present activities as of
30 November, 1945.

(1) DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI (Greater Japan Political
Association) Investigation disclosed that
this organization was formed in the period
May – June 1945. The purpose appears to have
been the development of a strong, unified
political association to exert influence and
guidance over Agriculture, Industry, Medical
Institutions, Public Morality and Inflation.
This, however, was secondary to insuring the
political position of the members of the Im-
perial Diet in the elections. It appears to
have been ineffectual and was met with very
little interest or enthusiasm. The associa-
tion was dissolved in September 1945.

(2) TEIKOKU ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI (Imperial Reserve
Association) This organization was started
in several different parts of JAPAN in 1910
but not until 1914 was it nationally organized
and officially sanctioned by the Emperor.
Its purpose seems to have been to keep all
men with previous military experience readily
available for re-entry into service and up
to date in military matters. Any veteran was
eligible and though the Army and Navy per-
sonnel ordinarily formed separate groups, in
communities where Navy veterans were few, they
often joined Army GUNJIN KAI.

The organization was well established, oper-
ated under Army supervision, and was subsidized
by appropriations from the imperial government. The veteran would ordinarily meet two or three times a month for drill, marksmanship practice or lectures. Twice a year representatives from the ken would come together for three or four days of intensive drill, shooting matches and address by prominent members. TEIKOKU was officially dissolved on or about 30 August 1945. However, the leaders are in a position to revive the organization and they are being watched.

(3) KOKURYU KAI: Information on this, the Black Dragon Society, comes as yet only from informants whose reliability has not yet been tested. The society was organized at least 50 years ago, possibly as long as 78 years ago, as a small political party numbering some 10,000 members. During the period of 1920 - 1935 most of the members came from FUKUOKA ken. Since Kokuryu had influence in high places, it was a rather powerful political party. It favored the empire form of government and advocated a more strict control of the general populace. Moreover, it favored restricting the franchise to male heads of families only and was anti-communist. An organization which is purported to have used the methods of Kokuryu, i.e. threats and violence, is the RIKKEN YOSEI KAI. The exact nature of this organization is not yet clear save that it is intensely nationalistic and the members almost fanatical. It is functioning as an active group and is holding meetings. These are being surveilled.

(4) TOKUMU KIKAN: In general, present intelligence indicates that this organization operated almost exclusively in occupied areas or areas outside of the Japanese islands. There was an Army and Navy Tokumu. Members operated in uniform or in civilian clothes. The function of Army Tokumu in occupied areas was to
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assume full control of the civil administration, economy, agriculture, finance, public utilities, press and radio and to obtain the full cooperation of the people in establishing a new order. It also selected collaborationists and set up an informant network. The Naval Tokumu was organized much the same as the Army. However, the Navy confined itself to the seacoast, harbors and rivers and did not penetrate inland. Its purpose was to get intelligence on shipping and commerce and the movement of surface traffic. The Naval Tokumu did not go into local politics or the economics situation to the same extent as did the Army. The Navy and Army Tokumu received their orders from and sent all information to the political and economic bureau (KOAIN); this later became the DAITOA (Greater East Asia Association). Investigation is continuing as to the nature and duties and deployment of this organization during the pre-war and the war period, the selection of personnel and related matters.

(5) KOKUMIN GIYU TAI (People's Volunteer Corps)
This organization was a function of the Home Ministry. The Army had no direct authority over it but acted in a advisory capacity. In case of an invasion, however, the Army would have taken over the organization and it would have been used as the Army saw fit.

The KOKUMIN was formed in June 1945. All males 14 to 65 years old and females 14 to 45 years old were required to join. Anyone could volunteer regardless of age or sex. Those in KOKUMIN GIYU TAI were to carry out non-combatant duties such as road repair, digging fortifications, increasing food production, etc. The more able-bodied members, males 15 - 60 and females 17 - 40 were to be organized into the KOKUMIN GIYU SENTO TAI, a civilian combat unit. They were to be armed with
bamboo spears and to be trained by returned Army officers. Their primary duties were to carry ammunition for the defense unit in the prefectural area and to assist the Army in whatever way might be required in case of actual invasion. Both KOKUMIN GYOU TAI and the SENTO TAI were dissolved after the surrender. As such, they do not presently constitute a threat to the security of the occupation forces.

(6) SOTEN DAN: The official name of this organization was SEI SHOYEN DAN (Youth Organization). It was formed by combining the SHOYEN DAN and the SEHAN DAN. In May 1945 the name of the society was changed to GAKU TO TAI (Students Corps). The main office of the association was maintained at the Ministry of Education in TOKYO. The lowest administration office was the principal's office in each school. Membership in the society included children between the ages of 10 and 17 whether attending school or not. It was formed primarily to have children assist in the war effort. The children would collect scrap metal, participate in thrift campaigns, and the home manufacture of certain products. No military training was given within the organization; this was included in the regular high school curriculum and was supervised by the military commander of the district. The organization was dissolved at the time of the Japanese surrender.

Comparable to the SEI SHOYEN DAN to a certain extent was the SANGO HOYOKU TAI, composed of school children of the ages of 16 and 17 who were employed by the factories. The structure and officials were the same as in the case of the SEI SHOYEN DAN.

(7) SHOKUGIO KODO KAI (Occupational Guidance Association). This was formed in an attempt to
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aid families of soldiers and to secure jobs for returning veterans. It is still in the process of investigation in order to determine whether military men are controlling the placement of discharged soldiers so as to keep military units together thus indirectly perpetuating military control.

(8) KEMPEI TAI: The mission of this organization was to control military personnel, prevent domestic disturbances and counterespionage. At special request, KEMPEI assisted the civil police and the Ministry of Justice. It did not exercise control over the Neighborhood Associations. Its personnel accompanied the Japanese Army in the field in which case its mission was assigned by the army tactical commander. In addition to intensive investigation, still continuing, as to the nature, strength, duties and demobilization status of the organization, effort is being made to discover the present influence, if any, of KEMPEI TAI members in public positions.

(9) CHIKU TOKUSETSU KEIBITAI (Area Mobilized Guard) This organization was formed in April 1945 at the order of the Army Ministry. The purpose of the Guard was to carry food for civilian and military personnel and to repair the roads. Plans had been made to institute training of the men as a beach guard; for self defense they were to be taught the use of the bamboo spears and in addition they were to be lectured on the Japanese spirit. The men had received only about 10 days training in all. The members were generally over 40; there were a few between the ages of 18 and 19. The guard was dissolved after the surrender.

(10) SUISAN HOKOKU KAI (Marine Patriotic Society) This is a branch of Nippon Sangyo Hokoku Kai (Japanese Industrial Society) the headquarters of which is in TOKYO. It is somewhat similar
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to the idea of our labor unions and is open to fisherman only. It was organized about four years ago and was named "Patriotic" because the country was at war. There were about 3,000 members but calls from the Army and Navy soon depleted its members and the organization now exists in name only.

(11) ZENKOKU SUIHEI SHA: There are reported to be 5,000,000 members of this society in JAPAN, 500,000 of whom reside on the island of KYUSHU and 10,000 of whom reside in FUKUOKA city. It is composed of members of the ETA class which was organized 300 years ago. The ETA have been treated as an outcast race based principally on the type of their work such as that of shoemaker, butcher and the like. SUIHEI SHA members emphasize freedom, equality and escape from present discriminations. The Japanese government had set up a rival ETA organization, to which only a few ETA's belonged, known as the DOWA KOKO KAI. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the government banned all meetings of the ZENKOKU. It is expected that this society will provide much of the drive in the gathering democratic movement.

(12) KOKOKU SEINEN SHOKO DOMEI (Imperial League of Young Officers) Information thus far uncovered is not sufficient to form conclusions as to the functioning of this organization in the VAC area.

It is to be noted at this point that the organizations referred to above do not constitute the full complement of societies which have been or will be investigated by CIC. There are organizations in the process of formation which will be surveilled; there are others which are described in several different ways and are known under several different names. To categorize such associations as these would be premature action.
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b. In order to determine the changes effected, if any, in the educational system since the surrender, CIC made a survey of schools such as the Sakai Middle School in SASEBO, the SHIMONOSEKI Middle School and Intermediate School and the KOKURA Middle School. It was found that military instruction or subjects related thereto such as fencing and judo had been discontinued. Principals and teachers were interviewed so as to determine their reaction to the occupation, their opinion as to military instruction and the initiative they showed in adapting their educational patterns to pending changes. The Meiji School of Technology and KYUSHU Imperial University were likewise visited. The investigation of schools and the examination of their curricula is a continuing CIC function insofar as education and the free political development of the Japanese people are related.

c. With a view toward preventing incidents that may lead to armed bloodshed CIC has kept a watchful eye in those communities where large numbers of Koreans are awaiting repatriation. Typical places are FUKUOKA and SHIMONOSEKI. CIC agents interviewed the leaders of several Korean societies in SHIMONOSEKI which claim to be supervising the return of Koreans to their homeland. In addition the President of the Korean Association in JAPAN has been furnishing a detailed report daily to the CIC office in SHIMONOSEKI. This is done so that CIC and VAC may be aware of any outbreaks which would adversely affect the security of the occupation forces. Three Korean societies dominate the Korean situation in the areas of FUKUOKA and SHIMONOSEKI. They are the RENMEI, the KYUGO KAI, and the KYUZAI KAI. RENMEI appears to be the strongest of the three and is trying to impose its will on the others, evidently hoping to deactivate them so that it can monopolize the politically potent job of returning displaced Koreans to their homes.

d. In a similar sense, CIC investigated Chinese labor
camps in OMUTA, FUKUOKA-Ken with reference to the
status of the laborers, conditions at the camps
and charges of the withholding of pay from the
workers. Agreements were negotiated as to the
disputed amounts owed to the Chinese laborers, a
check was made of conditions and remedies were
suggested so as to insure the security of the area
and the peaceful occupation by United States forces.
The same procedure was followed in the case of 7
Chinese labor camps in the vicinity of IIIZUKA,
FUKUOKA-Ken. Both of these investigations were
carried out at the request of the AG of S, G-2,
VAC and the Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation
Task Force Group respectively.

e. With the publication of the GHQ Directive of 4
October 1945 relating to the removal of restrictions
on political, civil and religious liberties, an
SOP was prepared. VAC CIC Detachments were in-
structed to determine whether there had been compli-
ance with the directive and, in the event of actual
or attempted invasion, to report and investigate
the same. Each Detachment had a specific zone of
action and was directed to report on (a) the re-
moval of the Chief of Police in each Ken in the VAC
zone of action; (b) The removal of the Chief of the
Special Higher Police (TOKKO KA) in each Ken and the
head of this section and the members thereof in
each subordinate police unit throughout the Ken,
together with a check as to whether they were em-
ployed in any other police capacity; (c) The re-
lease of civil prisoners and the interrogation of
each one released where possible.

Prior to the issuance of this directive, CIC had
initiated studies of the TOKKO KA in each Ken, the
TOKKO GAKARI or the special Higher Police in each
city and had been compiling lists of the members
of each section. These studies served as a guide
in the phase of the directive applying to the
abolition of the TOKKO.

CIC contemplates checking continuously to see
that the spirit as well as the letter of the GHQ
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directive is observed. It thus functions as a guardian of the civil liberties of the Japanese people.

f. An intensive study was made of the system of Neighborhood Associations insofar as they might be a negative influence in the free political development of the people. The effect of the Associations was to weld the people into a united group to support the war effort. At the meetings of the Associations, those present were required to worship "from afar the Imperial and the Shinto Shrine;" to pay silent tribute to the war dead and offer a silent prayer for the success of the war effort; to sing the national anthem; to listen to the reading of the Imperial Rescript of the Holy War.

It does not seem that they were required to, yet it is a fact that nearly every family did contribute to the financial support of the Shinto religion, the Imperial Reserve Association, and the Society for Serving the Country Behind the Guns, through the Neighborhood Associations.

The Associations do perform necessary and useful functions such as rationing and taking a periodic census. They likewise afford an effective means of informing and educating the people. They continue to function much the same as they did before the end of the war. While there is no evidence indicating that this system will operate to preclude the Japanese people from enjoying their new freedoms, it is well designed to suit such a purpose. Also its structure is such as to render it an effective instrumentality for espionage. The action to be taken as to this system or any change of policy which might call for the abolition of the Neighborhood Associations is a matter for command authorities.

g. In the case of atrocity perpetrators, CIC pursued three courses of action. The first type was to
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apprehend them under direction of higher headquarters. An example of this procedure is the following: On 30 October 1945 pursuant to instructions from the Commanding General SIXTH Army CIC agents set out to apprehend eighteen Japanese naval officers reportedly aboard the Japanese cruiser Yakumo in FUKUOKA harbor. Four agents, two interpreters and an MP complement boarded the Yakumo at 0315, 30 October, to secure the passenger list and ascertain the whereabouts of personnel. The passenger list was secured and it was learned that personnel had disembarked by 1500, 29 October. It was further ascertained that the naval personnel had not yet been demobilized and were reportedly at a central location. Agents were dispatched to locate the men.

At 0810 agents reported that several of the personnel had been located at ZASSHO NO KUMA Naval Barracks. Proceeding to that location, agents picked up 15 of the Japanese officers and turned them over to the Military Police at Dote-machi prison for safekeeping. At 1030 another of the three was apprehended and taken to Dote-machi prison. The remaining two Japanese naval officers were subsequently apprehended and at 1440 a dispatch setting forth the action taken and a list of names was sent to the Commanding General, VAC. Those apprehended were finally sent to YOKOHAMA for internment in the XIIth Corps stockade.

The second course of action consisted in requesting authority to hold in technical custody those who after investigation and interrogation either admitted certain acts which reflected cruel treatment of POWs or who could reasonably be suspected of the same. A typical instance is the case of SAKAMOTO, Yuhichi. Subject was originally reported by Recovered Personnel Teams as having been "severe and cruel" in his treatment of POWs. He was camp commandant of a number of POW camps the last of which was Camp #9 in FUKUOKA. As a result of interrogation and investigation by CIC agents he
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Signed sworn statements in which he admits acts of cruelty. As a result, authority to detain him was requested of the Commanding General, SIXTH Army. The same was granted. He is now being held in protective custody by the Provost Marshal in FUKUOKA pending instructions from higher authorities.

The third course of action was to submit reports to higher headquarters through CIC channels in such a manner as to supply evidential material to authorities specifically designated to handle war crime prosecutions.

h. The processing and screening activities of CIC were directed at the following individuals:

1. The police - this was done to check on the personal history of each member and to determine whether former members of KEMPEI TAI were functioning as policemen. This process was extended also to the KEIBI TAI or auxiliary police.

2. Public officials of the Ken and of local governmental agencies as well as former prominent military organizational or industrial leaders.

3. Prominent personalities in the Chinese and Korean communities as well as other non-Japanese persons such as French, British, etc.

4. Japanese seeking employment as interpreters, translators or laborers with Corps or Division Headquarters or Military Government as well as Japanese to be employed as Civilian Aids.

5. Repatriated Japanese military personnel and civilians. This was done by CIC agents at HAKATA, HARIO and KAJIKI. In the case of military personnel, the enlisted men and non-coms were for the most part spot - checked while the officers were interviewed. High ranking officers were questioned thoroughly.
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In the case of civilians, all were interviewed. Reports of the interrogations were submitted to higher headquarters through CIC channels.

1. When requested, CIC agents conducted physical security surveys of Corps and Division installations and reports containing recommendations were submitted. Typical examples of security measures taken are the following.

1. Arms Warehouse #2 was discovered by agents in MOJI. It was searched and found to contain anti-American and anti-British propaganda of a scurrilous nature. The S-2 of the 129th FA was notified and the documents were burned.

2. Through an informant, agents in MOJI learned of a Japanese Communications Center which was used to store radio equipment. The center was found to be empty but in an interview with a Japanese communications officer it was learned that the equipment had been moved to the MOJI Telephone Exchange. An inspection of the exchange revealed two rooms full of radio communication equipment. The rooms were ordered sealed and the S-2 of the 129th FA was notified.

3. The FUKUOKA Telephone Exchange was checked by CIC agents to determine whether or not facilities were available for monitoring telephone lines. It was learned that facilities were available and were being used by the Japanese to monitor commercial lines in FUKUOKA. It was also learned that all cable and telegraph records had been burned. The report of the investigation was submitted to the AG of S, G-2, FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

J. It is of course understood that in the performance of its mission CIC employed informants and directed much effort at the establishment of an informant network. Likewise, the G-2 was cognizant of other special assignments of CIC which are without the
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Scope of this report in view of its classification.

k. The continuing mission of counterintelligence in
the occupation of JAPAN is patently that of constant
and determined vigilance with civil liberties and
the untrammeled development of democratic institu-
tions its special province. Together with this,
there must be a familiarity with the pulse of the
people and the workings of their political and
social institutions to the end that the occupation
shall be unimpeached and the goals of the Allied
Powers realized.

2. Recommendations.

What was originally planned as an operation became
an occupational mission. For that reason any recom-
mandations as to the better functioning of CIC with
VAC under operational conditions would be irrelevant.

The matter of occupational duty was new and, in the
light of experience, much has been learned. The very
nature of counterintelligence work in this occupation
would seem to demand that CIC operate as a unit apart
from the physical control of Corps or Division save
for a coordination with such units through a liaison
officer. Counterintelligence work in JAPAN will be a
long tedious process calling for the utmost freedom of
movement; it will call for an independence of action
such as cannot be had under direct attachment to head-
quar ters of tactical units. If the AC of S, G-2, has
any particular assignment, that can be made articulate
through the liaison officer. The daily report might
readily eliminate the counterintelligence section since
the longer view of gradualness will obviate the need
for such a section. Under such a system only CIC channels
would be used and for purposes of exchange of information
and articulation with Division and Corps the liaison
officer would be sufficient. It is needless to say
that the problems of supply for CIC Detachments would
still be solved only by drawing them from tactical
units.
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CIVIL CENSORSHIP REPORT
C169/271
Ser.0728B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

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30 November, 1945.

CIVIL CENSORSHIP REPORT.

1. PREPARATION.

a. Activation.

Pursuant to AFFAC radio and TVX messages between GHQ, AFFAC and HC, AFMIDFAC, plans for civil censorship in JAPAN were consummated. Censorship of civilian communications was to be established under the policies of CINC, AFFAC by the Civil Censorship Detachment under the operational and policy control of the Chief of Counterintelligence, GHQ, AFFAC. It was to be operated in accordance with such directives as might be issued by GHQ, AFFAC, the War Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combined Chiefs of Staff. On 22 August 1945 the 4th Censorship Advance Detachment was activated and attached to the V Amphibious Corps for duty in the occupation of JAPAN.

b. Personnel.

The 4th Censorship Advance Detachment was composed of eleven (11) Army officers and thirty (30) Army enlisted men who were assigned to Civil Censorship Detachment, AFFAC. They were, for the most part, selected by a personal interview from a military censorship pool attached to the 13th Replacement Depot in HAWAII. In addition, two (2) Navy Officers, seven (7) Japanese linguists from JICPOA, and four (4) civilian War Department employees (Hisel). This group was placed on temporary duty with the V Amphibious Corps.

c. Mission.

The AFFAC Basic Plan for Civil Censorship in JAPAN, Appendix 2 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.
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dated 10 July 1945, was to assist through censorship, control of Japanese communications, in obtaining information of the Japanese and their military, economic, social, and political activities.

Its objectives were: to obtain information on the extent to which compliance is made with terms of the surrender instrument; to assist in enforcing free dissemination of news; to determine the extent of acceptance by the Japanese of educational material disseminated by occupational authorities; to develop information leading to the recovery of property seized by the Japanese; to assist in the maintenance of military security; to prevent passage of communications which would prove detrimental to the interests of the United Nations; and a number of similar activities.

Pursuant to a dispatch from GHQ, AFFAG, the following change was made in the Basic Plan: "During the initial phase the AFFAG Basic Plan for Civil Censorship in Japan will not apply excepting when specifically authorized by radio GHQ C10500. No civilian communication will be stopped or seized unless directed by CinC AFFAG."

The fluidity of the situation in Japan necessitated many changes as phases of the occupation progressed. Such changes were authorized in amendments to the Basic Plan, in letter from GHQ, AFFAG to Commanding Officer, 4th CAD dated 21 August 1945. The detachment was authorized to make surveys of the status of postal and telecommunications facilities in its area of responsibility, to investigate methods of Japanese censorship, and to obtain all available information on this subject. It was also to assemble information on local newspapers and other publications and on radio broadcasting stations, with a view toward possible assumption of responsibility for censoring press and radio at a later date. Instructions were also received to ascertain whether directives from the Japanese Board of Information were being complied with.
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d. Training.

On 31 August 1945 the 4th Censorship Advance Detachment boarded the U.S.S. Shelby (APA 105) and sailed the following day.

During the movement an intensive training program was carried out. Discussions to acquaint personnel with the detachment's mission of civil censorship in KYUSHU were conducted by the Commanding Officer, based on the AFPAC Basic Plan for Civil Censorship in JAPAN. Daily discussions regarding the target were held in the detachment's "Orderly Room" on the ship. Explanations regarding administrative orders, ground rules, and conduct of troops also were given.

Through the cooperation of the Commanding Officer, JICPOA Team #29, the officers and enlisted men attended daily one-hour lectures conducted by authorities on JAPAN on such subjects as "Prevalent Diseases in the Target Area", "Relationship with Inhabitants", "History and Geography of the Target", and "Personal Hygiene and Sanitation."

Daily language classes were conducted by the four civilians assigned to the detachment, with an advanced course in Japanese for the officers already familiar with the language, and an elementary course for the balance. Each officer gave a lecture on topics affecting the operations of the mission, including such subjects as "Relationships with CIC", "Liaison with Military Government", etc.

2. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. Policy changes.

A radiogram from GHQ, AFFC, 23 September 1945, directed the following instruction: "...detachment to censor civil communications to the extent personnel permits by observing, reviewing and reporting without seizure or stoppage...have check made local newspapers whether Japanese Board of Informa-
b. Surveys.

Postal and telecommunication surveys were made in the cities of SASEBO, KUMAMOTO, NAGASAKI, FUKUOKA, MOJI, and SHIMINOHASEKI. By order from GHQ, AFPAC a detachment was sent to SHIMINOHASEKI to set up tentative censorship operations of old mail which had been impounded there. Due to the limited number of translators and the volume of mail, it was necessary that only a screening spot check be made, and all foreign mail was impounded until its disposition was decided. The surveys were accomplished in an attempt to make an estimation of the amount of foreign mail leaving and entering the V Amphibious Corps area as well as to establish the most desirable location for censorship operations to be conducted. It was decided that FUKUOKA would be the most central point. Practically all mail entering KYUSHU at the present time is brought into FUKUOKA and then trans-shipped to other stations.

c. Movement to FUKUOKA.

(1) As soon as this location was established, the telecommunication section of the 4th CAD began to set up operations in FUKUOKA. The postal section was recalled from SHIMINOHASEKI, and augmented by personnel from the SASEBO headquarters.

(2) Advance Postal Censorship Group.

Office and billeting space was secured through the local procurement office and the 4th CAD Postal Section began operations. Due to the limited personnel these operations were still conducted only on a minor scale. Through a directive from higher headquarters, all terminal mail in MOJI, SHIMINOHASEKI, FUKUOKA, and NAGASAKI was impounded. A previous order...
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from APPAC directed the Japanese Postal authorities to route all foreign mail through the U.S. Army Civil Postal Censorship Station in TOKYO. This was subsequently changed so that all current foreign mail was sent via FUKUOKA to TOKYO, while all old foreign mail was held in FUKUOKA for action by the 4th CAD postal section.

3. Telecommunications.

(a) The telecommunication section, 4th CAD has been performing censorship on all active cable and wireless circuits in FUKUOKA since 20 October 1945.

(b) It was learned that one telephone cable circuit was in operation between FUKUOKA and KELJO, KOREA. This circuit operates from 0600 to 2300 daily and calls are censored with the aid of Japanese telephone operators. It was also learned that a telephone cable circuit, in good condition, runs from FUKUOKA to FUSAN, KOREA, but, according to the telephone company, it was not in operation, owing to the fact that they were unable to contact the operators at the other end, attempts to contact are censored. Censorship is being conducted on the wireless in operation between FUKUOKA and TAHOKU, FORYOSA.

(c) Since it was the practice of the company to destroy all traffic files at the end of each month, only files from 1 October 1945 were obtained. The total traffic during this period from 1 October to 30 October was approximately 12,000 messages.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite a state of uncertainty, caused by the fluidity
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of the military situation in JAPAN at the time of the arrival of the 4th CAD at SASEBO, and the rescinding and changing of the unit's mission and objectives by higher headquarters in regard to civil censorship in JAPAN, the unit performed its duties as well as possible. Held back by the lack of personnel, especially qualified translators and personnel trained in civil censorship schools in the UNITED STATES, and the knowledge that actual operations would be performed at some place other than SASEBO, it was not until very recently that the accomplishment of the mission got under way.

With the decision that operations for both postal and telecommunication censorship would be set up in FUKUOKA, all personnel were sent to that city except for a few held at V Amphibious Corps Headquarters to maintain an administrative section. This section was necessary as long as the 4th CAD was assigned on temporary duty with V Amphibious Corps for the routing of reports and coordinating of its two advance echelons, Postal and Telecommunications, in the field.

It is realized that the operation is the first of its kind, and therefore many changes were made. However, in future operations of this type, it is believed that instructions and regulations promulgated in the higher echelons as to missions and objectives should be forwarded, in written form, through command channels, so that all echelons will be made cognizant of civil censorship activities in their respective areas, such as impounding and routing of foreign mails, and scaling of telecommunication terminals other than those authorized and under proper censorship. Many of the orders under which we are presently operating were received orally and have never been confirmed in writing.
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Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF KYUSHU
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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

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30 November, 1945.

THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF KYUSHU

1. INTRODUCTION.

Since the initial landing of American forces in Japan was planned to be made on Southern KYUSHU by the SIXTH Army, of which this Corps was a part, it was considered of military and historical importance to prepare a brief study of the Japanese plan of defense and state of readiness, with pertinent conclusions relating to the possible course of events had such an attack been consummated. Upon arrival of the occupation forces it was found that the Japanese had destroyed most of their written plans and orders pertaining to the defense. All military units had been withdrawn from southern KYUSHU, and in accordance with SCAP directives, demobilization of their armed forces was already well under way. To reconstruct the facts it was necessary to compile the order of battle, often from the memory of Japanese officers, interview innumerable officers of various command echelons and to reconnoiter the terrain and general area of the zone of contemplated initial action.

Due to the destruction of Japanese orders and directives, dependency on individual memories for details, coupled with the general disorganization and demobilization of the Japanese military forces during our occupation, many conflicting statements have been received from the Japanese relating to their defensive plans. However, the intelligence submitted herewith has been carefully evaluated and is believed to be substantially correct.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE.

The defense of KYUSHU was assigned to five separate commands as follows: the 16th Area Army; the 6th Air Army; the SASEBO Naval District; the 5th Naval Air Fleet; and the KURE Naval District. The land defense was under the 16th Area Army, and the sea defense under the SASEBO and the KURE Naval Districts. Air defense was under the 5th Naval Air Fleet and the 6th Air Army, each operating individually in the same area, but under separate command.

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The 16th Area Army was the principle force involved. It comprised three armies, comparable to our corps, each of some 90,000 to 130,000 troops; one additional division as general reserve and two divisions in area reserve for Southern KYUSHU; several additional independent mixed brigades and "fortresses" for garrisoning smaller and less accessible areas; two depot or training divisions; and miscellaneous base and service troops. All naval shore-based personnel were to pass to 16th Area Army operational control in the event of invasion. Under the control of the "Depot Divisions" were the various prefecture's military companies. This group totaled from 30,000 to 35,000 men. Of these approximately two percent only were trained personnel, the remainder being local civilians. The SASEBO Naval District had no navy in the true sense of the word but did command three important groups of naval personnel. These were the SASEBO Combined Special Naval Land Force, which was an infantry unit of 10,000; the suicide boat; and the elements manning the Navy coast defense guns, some of which were under Army control.

The KURE Naval District maintained suicide boat units on both the KYUSHU and SHIKOKU sides of the BUNGO Straits. (As well as a number of coast-defense batteries), and also commanded a regiment of naval infantry in the SAEKI area.

Two large groups of army service personnel were not under control of the 16th Area Army. The first group were shipping personnel operating small boats from MOJI to AMADA O SHIMA to alleviate the transportation bottleneck caused by rail and road limitations. The second group were railroad service units whose mission was to keep the railroads operating.

In the event of invasion the 16th Area Army would have had under its direct command the following elements:

a. 56th Army

(1) Composition

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IKI Fortress
6th Artillery Command
4th Independent Tank Brigade
Plus independent service units

b. 57th Army

(1) Composition

86th Division
154th Division
156th Division
212th Division
98th Independent Mixed Brigade
109th Independent Mixed Brigade
1st Artillery Command
6th Independent Tank Brigade
Plus independent service units

c. 40th Army

(1) Composition

148th Division
298th Division
303rd Division
128th Independent Mixed Brigade
4th Artillery Command
6th Tank Brigade (Less 1 Regt)
Plus independent service units.

Note: *** Indicates divisions with new-type organization containing 4 Infantry Regiments.

d. SASEBO Naval District

SASEBO Combined Special Naval Land Force (Approximately 10,000 - 11,000)
Suicide Boat Units (Distributed)
Coast Defense Battery personnel (Distributed)

e. 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade
f. 128th Independent Mixed Brigade
g. 118th Independent Mixed Brigade
h. 107th Independent Mixed Brigade
i. TSUSHIMA Fortress Unit
j. Western District Army

(1) Composition

KUMAMOTO Division District
KURUME Division District

These so-called "Division Districts" were for recruiting, training, and replacements.

k. 16th Area Army Reserve

(1) Composition

216th Division General Reserve.
* 26th Division (Attached for administrative control to the 56th Army).
* 77th Division (Attached for administrative control to the 40th Army).

* Area Reserve for southern KYUSHU.

Threat of invasion of KYUSHU at the time of the termination of the war saw new troops and units enroute to KYUSHU with many partially organized units scattered throughout the area. Command relationships were vague, and normal liaison virtually non-existent. The following explanation is necessary to convey the general organization and unit terms.

a. Organization of land units. The three armies were organized on the same pattern, though the 57th was larger, as it had more territory to defend than the others. Each was composed of several infantry divisions and one or more independent mixed brigades or "fortresses", a tank brigade, an artillery
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group, suicide boat units, and additional supporting elements of engineer, transport, signal, medical, and duty personnel.

b. Infantry division. These units varied from 15,000 to 25,000. The Japanese T/O was extremely flexible and no generalizations are possible. A complete breakdown of individual divisions is included in Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie.

c. Brigades and fortresses. All of these units contained several battalions of infantry, a battalion of light artillery, a battalion of engineers, a signal company and a headquarters. In addition all the fortresses and certain of the brigades contained a "heavy artillery regiment", which was actually a coast defense artillery battalion. In general, a "fortress" was a defensive task-group of the combined arms.

d. Tank brigades. These units were composed of two tank regiments, a machine cannon company, a maintenance train, and a transport unit. Their weapons included light and medium tanks, and a limited number of self propelled guns.

e. Artillery groups. To offset the low firepower of their infantry divisions, the Japanese organized groups of independent artillery units. These groups consisted of an artillery command which functioned on the army level, an artillery intelligence regiment, and several independent artillery, mortar, and rocket units.

f. Suicide boat units. It was planned for each army to have two suicide boat squadrons and bases. Their mission was the same as that of their naval counterparts. However, no coordination existed between the two groups.

g. Independent supporting elements. To offset the scanty Japanese mechanization, available man power was increased by means of these additional independent units.

3. DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE FORCES

From the supporting maps and diagrams attached herewith the following general disposition of forces is apparent:

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a. 56th Army. - Northern KYUSHU with its principle strength distributed along the northwestern coast from KOJI to the area surrounding SASEBO, which was defended by naval infantry. It also controlled the fortress unit on IKI Island.

b. 57th Army. - Southeastern KYUSHU. Its zone of responsibility included nearly all of the southeastern half of KYUSHU including the OSUMI Peninsula. The principle strength was distributed along the coast from TSUNO south. Of this area the MIYAZAKI coast saw the heaviest concentration of forces. It also had jurisdiction over the 109th INF on TANEKA SHIMA.

c. 40th Army. - Southwestern KYUSHU, with its principle strength concentrated along the coast from SENDAI south on the SANSUMA Peninsula.

d. SASEBO Naval District. - This area included all of KYUSHU. The accompanying maps (b) and (d) show the location of the coast defense batteries and the suicide boat unit bases on the coast of KYUSHU.

The area surrounding the SASEBO Naval Base, including an irregular coast line with many protected anchorages, was defended by the SASEBO Combined Special Naval Land Force.

e. The 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade defended the NAGASAKI Area.

f. The 128th Independent Mixed Brigade defended AMAKUSA ISLAND and the approaches to the west central side of KYUSHU and its inland waterways.

g. The 118th Independent Mixed Brigade was distributed to cover the Bungo Straits, separating KYUSHU from SHIKOKU.

h. The 107th Independent Mixed Brigade defended FUKAE SHIMA in the GOTTO RETTO and the sea approaches to western KYUSHU.

i. The 109th Independent Mixed Brigade defended TANEKA SHIMA and the sea approaches to western KYUSHU.

j. The TSUSHIMA Fortress Unit defending TSUSHIMA also manned heavy coastal defense batteries of up to 40 cm. former BB guns, to sweep the channels and approaches to NW KYUSHU.
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k. The IKI Fortress Unit defending IKI SHIMA also covered
   the channels and approaches to northwestern KYUSHU.

l. The KURE Naval District also shared with the 116th IMB in
   the defense of the BUNGO STRAITS. Oddly enough they had
   a regiment of Naval Infantry at SAEKI, KYUSHU, and main-
   tained CD batteries on the KYUSHU side of the BUNGO STRAITS.

m. The Western District Army – Consisting of the KUMAMOTO and
   KURUME Division Districts adjacent to KUMAMOTO and KURUME
   respectively were, as has been stated, without normal
   tactical command. They were charged with recruiting,
   training, and replacements. However, if their area was
   threatened by the advance of invasion forces, the Commander
   of the KUMAMOTO Division District was to assume tactical
   command of the 126th IMB as well as of any other military
   units then present in KUMAMOTO Prefecture.

   In like manner, the Commander of the KURUME Division Dis-
   trict would assume tactical command of the 122nd IMB at
   NAGASAKI, the 118th IMB, and the regiment of naval infantry
   stationed at SAEKI, which was normally under the KURE
   Naval District, plus any other military units then present
   in OITA Prefecture, and in the southern parts of FUKUOKA,
   SAGA, and NAGASAKI Prefectures.

n. Reserves – The 16th Division was located near the city
   of KUMAMOTO as the strategic reserve for the 16th Area Army.
   The 27th Division, located just north of KAGOSHIMA WAN,
   was attached to the 40th Army for administrative control
   but was under operational control of the 16th Area Army as
   part of the Southern KYUSHU area reserve.

   Likewise the 26th Division, located in the vicinity of
   KOBAYASHI, was attached to the 57th Army for administrative
   control and under operational control of the 16th Area Army
   as the balance of the Southern KYUSHU area reserve.

o. The 6th Air Army had fields throughout KYUSHU, SHIKOKU,
   and CHUGOKU (roughly HONSHU from OSAKA west). However,
   most of its better aircraft were concentrated in northern
   KYUSHU, YAMAGUCHI Prefecture, HONSHU, and western SHIKOKU.
   Fields in southern KYUSHU had been abandoned as bases and
were only to be employed for staging suicide missions. Army fields in Korea were under command of the 5th Air Army. The 6th Naval Air Fleet had fields in the same area as the 8th Air Army and also in southern Korea. They planned to deploy their aircraft in northern Kyushu, southern Korea, western Honshu and Shikoku; however, at the time of the surrender, this had not been entirely accomplished, because the navy had not enough well-developed bases in the more protected northern zone. In addition, the Navy was in the process of preparing about 20 suicide take-off strips with underground hangers to be used but once in the initial "benzai" attack on the invading fleet.

In the selection of sites for the establishment of coast defense batteries, first priority was given to those sites covering critical water areas, such as straits, harbors and ports. Secondary priority was given to the allocation of coast defense batteries for defense of beaches and possible landing areas.

In sum, it will be noted that forces were principally distributed along vital coastal areas suitable for invasion landings and where our exploitation of beachheads would be most critical to the Japanese defense. Much of the rough forbidding coastline, unsuitable for landings, and the difficult forested terrain inland was virtually defenseless. Thus the middle of August saw the bulk of the Second General Army, charged with the Defense of Half of the Empire proper, deployed on Kyushu.

4. JAPANESE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The Japanese estimate of the situation was sound. There is little to indicate that it was based on actual intelligence of our plans. The estimate was apparently based on a good evaluation of our probable course of action.

Our advance westward across the Pacific to the Marianas and Bonins and northward from Australia to the Philippines and Okinawa, the establishment of great bases in the forward areas, the rapid accumulation of our forces and shipping at these bases, the destruction of their Navy, and shipping, the destruction of their air forces and finally the mounting crescendo of
our attacks on the FIRE itself were a graphic time table pointing toward the invasion of KYUSHU.

Japanese officers, including the CofS of the 16th Area Army believed that invasion would commence in November; however, there is intelligence that the Japanese war Department believed the invasion would come as early as the end of September or the first of October.

KYUSHU was considered to be our first objective. If the invasion was to come in the fall of 1945 they estimated our mission would be to secure KAGOSHIMA WAN for anchorage and port facilities and the terrain of southern KYUSHU most suitable for airfield construction.

They estimated our main landing effort would be directed against the southeastern coast adjacent to MIYAZAKI where there were good beaches and considerable low flat terrain inland suitable for extensive airfield development.

Secondary assaults were anticipated to be made at ARIAKE WAN to secure the KANOYA Airfield and along the southwestern coast at FUKUHAMA. It is of considerable interest to note at this point, that initially none of the officers questioned considered simultaneous landings at these three points possible or even likely. After three months of occupation, questioned officers claimed they did expect and had prepared for simultaneous landings. However, it is believed that they had revised their earlier statements after reading published invasion plan details.

Japanese intelligence estimated that 15 to 25 American divisions were available in the forward areas. No analysis was made of their types.

In the event the invasion was not launched until 1946 it was believed we would land on the northwestern coast in the FUKUOKA area, staging through KOREA and SATSU TO and GOTTO RETTO.

They believed that if invasion were to be delayed until 1946 we would subject the southern portion of KYUSHU to severe
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air attacks and that we would be prepared to mount and sustain a much larger effort. The invasion of the FUKUOKA area would have placed our invasion beachhead nearer the center of the empire, and would have jeopardized the principle ports, manufacturing areas, and vulnerable bases for all Japanese supplies of KYUSHU. The Second General Army would have been divided with its principle element, the 16th Area Army, cut off completely from the rest of the empire. They considered our ultimate objective to be the TOKYO area.

5. THE JAPANESE PLAN OF DEFENSE

Countless captured documents particularly from OKINAWA and IWO JIMA stressed "lessons learned" from our capture of SAIPAN. The perimeter defense was considered obsolete, and defense in depth was acknowledged essential. The disposition of artillery to cover only the landing-beaches was realized as unsound after the almost total capture and destruction of enemy batteries in the first two days of SAIPAN. The disclosure of concealed 60, artillery and AB gun positions to naval gunfire by early firing was considered unwise.

The defense of IWO JIMA and OKINAWA saw the new trend of desperate organization for defense utilizing these "lessons learned".

In light of these facts it is incomprehensible, but true, that the land defense of KYUSHU was planned along the same obsolete lines as SAIPAN.

The general plan for the defense of KYUSHU called for an all-out effort to be delivered against our task forces by air attacks and by enemy boat attacks.

At the end of the war Japan had approximately 12,725 planes of all types, 5551 Army and 7074 Navy. They were being conserved for the final effort. The air force plan expected the entire annihilation of this air force in the effort. Planes were to be released in waves of 300-400, at the rate of one wave per hour, against the invasion fleet. Sufficient fuel had been stored for this use, but only about 8,000 pilots were available.
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The principal objective of the attacks was to be directed against our transports. Suicide boats were to migrate from all bases in KYUSHU to the initial point of attack and to attack upon arrival. Their one-way range was estimated at 100 miles.

Island garrisons were not to be reinforced and were to defend until death.

It was planned that by these efforts the invasion forces would be sufficiently diminished to enable defending units to destroy them at the beach.

As has been pointed out in the disposition of forces, the three general areas prepared for attack were (1) the southeastern coast, (2) the southwestern coast, and (3) the northwestern coast. The three armies charged with the defense of these areas were disposed, except for their reserves, along the beach.

The general defense plan called for a rigid defense of the beaches with a major counterattack to be delivered within two weeks of our initial landing attack.

Coast defense and heavy artillery batteries covering straits such as the entrance to KAGOSHIMA WAN and ARIAKE WAN were to open fire on any vessels attempting to pass or enter. Otherwise coast defense and artillery batteries were to withhold their fire until landing craft came in range. Limitations of ammunition, the desire not to disclose their locations to counterbattery of our naval forces, and air attacks as well as the belief that most of their batteries were of too small a caliber to destroy or to duel with warships were cited as the reasons for withholding fire. The exception to this rule was that all batteries were to fire at minesweepers and reconnaissance craft (UDT).

There was no centralized control or fire-direction of these coast defense installations and artillery batteries.

The defense of the beach proper was the responsibility of the infantry. When beaches were wide and backed by flat
terrain affording minimum cover and concealment, as found at
MIYAZAKI and in the western part of ARIAKE WAN, small groups
of riflemen were to occupy and defend to death a series of
strong points near the beaches.

The main body of infantry were to be deployed on the first
commanding ground inland from the beach.

All units were to hold their ground and fight to destruction.

Artillery and mortar units were to be emplaced generally
on the reverse slope of the first ridges inland from the beach
and in caves further inland in the ranges of mountains. From
these emplacements, it was believed they could cover the entire
landing beach as well as the plains on which the attacking
infantry would expand. As the attackers progressed inland
the artillery fires would continue to cover the beaches to
interdict reinforcement and supply routes, but would also fire
on targets of opportunity behind the attackers' front lines.

There were a few instances of area coverage of artillery,
of particular interest in their relation to the beaches and
invasion areas actually selected by our forces.

The 43rd Army had a strong concentration of artillery and
heavy mortars on the western side of SAISHU Peninsula, south
of IUUM, in the 30th Division's zone of action. This con-
centration was closer to FUKUJIMA-AMANO than to the beaches
selected for the V Amphibious Corps.

The 57th Army had two areas of concentration. In these
cases, however, rather than a concentration of guns, there was
a distribution of batteries with a plan for an area coverage
by their fires.

It was conceded that the lowlands around MIYAZAKI and on
the western side of ARIAKE WAN would be difficult to defend
due to lack of cover and concealment. Anticipating the pro-
bability of our expansion of beachheads in these two areas,
artillery was concentrated inland on suitable surrounding
terrain to cover these areas.
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Northwest of the MIYAZAKI area the 6th Tank Brigade was principally based for the same purpose as outlined in the previous paragraph.

Curiously, the 5th Tank Brigade (under the 40th Army) was concentrated on the southern extremity of the SATSUMA Peninsula in the 128th INF's zone of action.

There was no established plan for the construction of obstacles or deliberate mine fields. The beaches were not mined nor were critical corridors or avenues of approach from the beaches to vital areas. Inquiry on this deficiency brought vague statements of "making mines later for the beaches" and "if American advance threatened a particular corridor the engineers would construct obstacles in depth as the situation dictated". Anti-tank guns and self-propelled artillery were to be used, but the primary defense against mechanized vehicles was to have been the use of hand placed charges by suicide troops.

The general plan called for the extensive use of night infiltration patrols, whose primary mission would have been to disrupt American communications and destroy valuable equipment. These units were to operate until discovered and then fight until all personnel of the patrols were killed. In addition to the patrols, there were to have been numerous, small-scale, night counterattacks by personnel armed with light weapons and demolitions.

Supporting weapons were to be used in accordance with previous Japanese doctrines.

Tanks were to be employed primarily as mobile artillery. One light tank unit of 30 tanks, in the MIYAMAJO area, was prepared for employment against airborne troops.

If the reserve division had to be committed, all tank units were to be reorganized and attached for the main counter-attack.

Mortars were to be employed in their normal role with considerable priority for employment given to medium and heavy mortars for the beach defenses.
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Medium and heavy artillery were to cover the landing craft approaches, the beaches and plain areas surrounding the beaches. There was no overall command or coordination for artillery fires and no apparent scheme or doctrine to mass fires of two or more batteries.

Japanese commanders realized the inadequacy of their communication net under combat conditions and considered the massing of fires a waste of ammunition. It was planned that when communications with the next higher unit broke down, each fire unit would carry out independent fire missions and control its own fires.

Fire was to be delivered at targets of opportunity. Pre-registration data was to be established for the initial positions. There seemed to be no real evidence of the selection of alternate positions, and it was furtively admitted that fire data was established for only the initial position. Artillery units were to fight until destroyed.

The artillery did not plan to use smoke or illumination shells. Plans for the employment of artillery seemed to combine the beach defense tactics employed on Saipan with some of the fixed defense plans employed on Iwo Jima. There was little evidence in their plan to indicate that they had benefited by or proposed to use "lessons learned" in the employment of artillery on Okinawa.

An airborne unit of some 2700 men was stationed on the 212th Division's area. However there was no plan for its use airborne due to its relatively small size and the anticipated difficulties of launching and supporting such an attack under our expected heavy air assault.

While the OOB included rocket launching units, there was no emphasis on their use in the general discussions. Apparent limited supplies of rocket motors precluded any mass use such as attempted at Iwo Jima.

While all units were alerted for defense against chemical warfare, active use of gas by the Japanese was not planned.
Reserve divisions under operational control of the 18th Area Army were to be employed as the situation dictated. The 77th Division, rated as A-1 by the Japanese, was under administrative control of the 40th Army and was held in reserve north of KAGOSHIMA WAN. It was to be prepared to support the 40th Army if a landing were forced on the western shore of SATSUMA Peninsula. The plan called for movement chiefly by foot and at night, along the shore road of KAGOSHIMA WAN, crossing the peninsula on the road system just west of KAGOSHIMA. This movement was predicted on the assumption that our landing would be made at FUDZAGE-HAMA. The estimated time for this movement was 6 to 7 days.

The 25th Division, also rated A-1 by the Japanese, under administrative control of the 57th Army, was held in reserve in the area of MIYAKONOJO. It was prepared to counter-attack in the MIYAZAKI area if our forces made a successful landing at that point. It likewise was to be moved chiefly on foot at night, the estimated movement time being 5 days.

Both the 25th and 77th Divisions were also to be prepared to move to the area east and south of MIYAKONOJO for a combined counterattack if the main invasion effort exploited this area. Neither division was to be moved or committed until it was apparent that the 40th or 57th Army could no longer contain our attack. It was believed sufficient forces had been allocated for the beach defenses to repel invasion at either point. If they could not prevent the establishment of beachheads, they were to die in the attempt, and then the 18th Area Army would mount its major counterattack.

The 216th Division was centrally located in reserve at KUMAMOTO, prepared to move to the north or south as the situation dictated. If our preliminary bombardment or early seizure of small islands to the south and southwest of KYUSHU definitely indicated an early invasion attempt on southern KYUSHU, the 216th Division was to be moved, principally on foot and at night, to the area of KIRISHIMA, northwest of MIYAKONOJO. This movement would have taken 7 days. Examination of the map, the distances involved, and the road system to be used by all three of the reserve divisions in their movement forward, leaves considerable doubt in the method of determination of these vital time and space factors.
Likewise if early indications pointed toward the invasion of southern KYUSHU the 57th Division of the 56th Army was to be withdrawn from the FUKUOKA area and moved by any and all methods available to the KIRISHIMA area.

The Fourth Independent Tank Brigade, attached to the 56th Army, was to be alerted for withdrawal and movement to southern KYUSHU when it was definitely established that our main effort was directed there.

A plan had also been worked out to shift coastal divisions in Army areas to meet a critical condition. For example, if the invasion force hit MIYAZAKI proper, the 57th Army was to withdraw the 212th Division on their left and commit it at the threatened point.

Likewise a plan existed to withdraw the 156th Division from the 57th Army and commit it in the 40th Army's area if the western beaches were attacked first.

The 40th Army was prepared to release the 206th Division to the 57th Army if the eastern beaches were the only ones attacked. Supplies and their distribution, being a critical item in the defense plan, warrant careful consideration.

A good portion of all supplies for KYUSHU originated in HONSHU. Large dumps and principal supply centers were established in northern and north central KYUSHU.

From such sources each Army was to build up central reserve and re-supply dumps of their own. Each subordinate command of each Army was to establish and maintain food, ammunition and general supply dumps, to a 90 day level for food and "one operations" supply of ammunition. This yardstick of measurement called for the following rounds per weapon; 1,000 rounds per field piece, 25,000 rounds per machine gun, and 240 rounds per rifle.

As no units had the planned supplies on hand, as of 15 August, unit distribution was to receive priority over the establishment of principal dumps.
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The principal supply channel was by rail. The secondary and
emergency route by small boat at night on the inland waterway
of YATSUSHIRO WAN of northern KYUSHU.

Realizing the vulnerability of the railroads, trucks and
carts were to be prepared to shuttle supplies where the rail
system was damaged. Under "worst conditions" they anticipated
they could continue to move one thousand tons per day. This
amount was not sufficient for battle requirements but, they
believed, would, with the supply dumps of each Army, furnish
sufficient supplies and ammunition to conduct the defense to
its termination.

It was planned to make full use of the terrain. Units on
reaching their assigned defensive areas were to dig in. It
was acknowledged that the time element would prevent the con-
struction of the elaborately formed fortification constructed
on IWO JIMA and OKINAWA.

No secondary or interior defense lines were selected or
planned. No defense in depth was ordered or planned. No cross-
island defense plan was selected or planned to block a north-
ward advance up KYUSHU in the event of successful establishment
of our southern beachheads.

The plan was to actively defend the few selected beach areas,
at the beach, to mass reserves for an all-out counterattack
if the invasion forces succeeded in winning a beachhead.

6. JAPANESE READINESS

Although elements of the 16th Area Army had moved into posi-
tions as previously indicated, they were, by the 16th of
August, far from ready for the defense.

Although no Army was completely ready, some were in worse
shape than others, their relative degree of readiness being as
follows: 56th Army; 57th Army; and last, the 48th. The average
for the whole 16th Army was estimated as sixty percent. In
brief, their deficiencies in preparation were as follows:

a. Many units were short of organic weapons.

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b. Some units were below T/O strength.

c. Virtually all units had insufficient supplies of ammunition.

d. Only approximately 30 days supplies of food were available, in southern KYUSHU, and not equally distributed.

e. Organic transportation was woefully weak.

f. Many units were considered in poor state of organization and training. The 303rd and 206th Infantry Divisions of the 40th Army were admitted particularly poor.

g. Very few defensive positions had been prepared by the individual units. Most of the initial effort had been directed, apparently, to the construction of air raid shelters, and ammunition and supply caves.

h. The thoroughly inadequate road system and its many small bridges had not been improved to facilitate the rapid movement of reserves, heavy equipment, and supplies.

i. Organic communications, telephones, and radios were short and there seemed to be no hope or plan to bring them up to the proper level. The commercial communication facilities were expected to carry the surplus load.

j. Liaison seemed particularly weak. It was stated that liaison officers had been appointed between Army, Navy and Air in the higher echelons of command, but there was no evidence of it. There were no liaison officers appointed between the 40th and 57th Army.

As a result of this lack of established liaison it was very apparent that many vital details between units and services were assumed but not worked out or thoroughly established or understood.

For instance, the doctrine for employment of coast defense batteries seemed quite confused. Nearly half of the CD batteries were manned by Navy but were under the Army unit in whose zone they happened to be already established. All Navy-operated
CD batteries were to be under Army operational command. It was, however, a Navy function to supply ammunition for all CD batteries on KYUSHU.

The Army expected to man and operate some of the suicide boat units and included it in their general defensive plan, but the Navy did not seem to know of the plan at all.

k. The excellent railroad system was expected to handle the bulk of supply and troop movement but its tortuous, generally single track course, through deep cuts and tunnels, and over many bridges, made it highly vulnerable to air attack.

l. Examination of their supply bases by the occupation forces disclosed inadequate stocks and general confusion in general organization.

m. The Japanese boasted of their morale. Both service personnel and civilian population were to rush to the defense in a great concentrated effort to expel the invader. However day-by-day translations and interrogations by the occupation forces reveal that the core was decayed. Many of the rank and file were disillusioned and saw no hope of victory. The great mass of the civilian population was war-weary, and secretly opposed to the military domination. They were not organized at all along the efficient lines indicated by the military and would apparently have disintegrated under attack as they did at OKINAWA.

The general opinion of both Japanese Navy and Army commanders was that by 1 November 1945, these sundry difficulties would have been overcome and rectified and that all would have been in readiness.

From the standpoint of this study the Japanese were overly optimistic.

Their dependency on the rail and commercial communication system was complete. Neither would have handled the load. Both were highly vulnerable to air attack. This statement was borne out by the extensive damage done to both by the September and October typhoons.
7. FACTORS FAVORABLE AND DETRIMENTAL TO DEFENSE.

a. Terrain.

Although all terrain in Southern KYUSHU is generally characterized by mountains through which many winding corridors serve as the only routes of communication, it is necessary to discuss the terrain surrounding each of the proposed landing beaches and routes of advance individually in order to present the various advantages and disadvantages to the defenders which would have been presented in different sections.

(1) MIYAZAKI Area.

The MIYAZAKI beaches are a wide strand of dark sand, behind which there is a series of low rolling sand dunes. The surf is high but in normal November weather is not excessive for the landing of small craft. The coastal plain in the MIYAZAKI area is approximately 30 miles long and extends approximately 10 miles inland. It is broken by many intermittent streams and by several unfordable rivers. All principal streams flow from west to east. Most of the plain is made up of cultivated land, much of which is terraced. Rice paddies in the area are usually dry during November, but they are easily flooded by rain or by irrigation. At the inland edge of the coastal plain, there is a narrow ridge of rolling hills which rise sharply into a range of high mountains through which there are two principal corridors; one is the valley of the OYOBKO-GAJA, the other runs southeast towards MIYAKANOJO and is the route of rail communications between MIYAZAKI and MIYAKANOJO. Both corridors are narrow and winding and are flanked by cliffs which in places are perpendicular. The cliffs are honeycombed with caves, presumably made to be used as air raid shelters.

The wide strip of sand dunes at the beach would have prevented the Japanese from digging any type of
emplacement along the beach unless they were of con-
crete or were heavily revetted. Cover and concealment
would have been difficult. There are no hills or
peninsulas from which flanking fire could have been
delivered on landing areas, and there was no natural
or artificial cover which would have given the de-
fenders protection from naval gunfire or tactical air
bombardment.

The defense of the coastal plain would have been
aided by the numerous streams, particularly the winding
rivers which separate the plain into compartments.
Artillery fire could be delivered from the low rolling
hills and observation from the mountains would have
been excellent. In the corridors through the mountains
the defenders would have the advantage of ready made
emplacements overlooking the routes of advance of the
attackers. They had their choice of numerous excellent
defensive areas in which they could emplace themselves
while the attacking forces advanced. Cover and con-
cellement is plentiful throughout the mountains and
artillery weapons could cover all routes of advance.

(2) ARIAKE WAN Area.

The beaches of ARIAKE WAN are similar to those in
the MIYAZAKI area, but the terrain of the peninsulas
which flank the bay is mountainous and in many places
there are cliffs dropping to the water's edge. Inland
there is a plateau extending west across the peninsula
to NANKA and north to the plains of MIYAKONOJO. This
plateau is made up almost entirely of rice paddies
and other cultivated land and is segmented by numerous
corridors and cross compartments through which winding
streams flow. A typical corridor is approximately 200
feet wide and has vertical cliffs approximately 50 feet
high. The inland plain around MIYAKONOJO is almost
entirely flat, is made up of rice paddies and marsh
land, and is broken by many streams. It is bordered on
the north, east, and west by rolling hills which build
up into high mountains. The plain is approximately.
ten miles wide and fifteen miles long.

The mountainous peninsulas flanking the landing beaches give the defenders the advantage of flanking fire upon landing craft approaching the beaches and upon the beaches themselves.

Emplacements at the beach itself would have to be made of concrete or be strongly revetted because of the sandy soil which extends inland. Artillery could cover the beaches from positions on the plateau.

The corridors in the plateau favor the defense because they present a limited area in which attacking troops can maneuver and afford the defenders opportunity of emplacing weapons where they have excellent fields of fire. The cross compartments favor the defenders primarily because their vertical cliffs present excellent natural obstacles to hinder the advance of attacking troops.

The plains of MIYAKONOJO afford inadequate cover and concealment to either side, but the rolling hills provide defenders with excellent sites for the emplacement of artillery. From these hills any point on the plain could be covered by Japanese medium artillery. Observation from the hills and mountains would be excellent.

The defense of the mountain areas would present the same problems and have the advantages as that described in the MIYAKI area. The maneuver area for offensive forces would be restricted, the defenders have their choice of ground on which to establish their lines, and fields of fire for defending units could cover the all routes of advance.

MINATOMACHI-SHIMABARA Area.

The beaches extending north and south from the town of MINATOMACHI on the western shore of SATSUMA Peninsula are wide strands which extend inland to a sharply rising ridge approximately fifty feet high.
In front of the northern beaches there are several long rock formations which extend several hundred feet into the sea. At low tide these obstacles are clearly visible, but at high tide some are submerged. The water is deep enough and the surf sufficiently low to permit assault boats to land close to the strand. The landing beaches are flanked on each side by small peninsulas. On the south TOSAKI-SAI extends seaward approximately one mile in a line perpendicular to the length of the strand. The peninsula is hilly and is heavily wooded. On the North, NAGA-SAI extends approximately one half mile out to sea. Between this peninsula and the beach there is a heavily wooded island of rock formation in which there are many crevices and natural holes which might be adapted to cave positions. The ridge which parallels the beach over the entire projected landing area varies in width from approximately 150 feet near the north end to approximately 900 feet south of the town of MINATOMACHI. It is heavily wooded with pine trees over its entire length. On the inland side, this ridge drops abruptly to a plain that is little above sea level. Behind the beaches north of the town the ground is fairly solid and is wooded; south of the town it is marshy and is broken by several streams, two of which are unfordable. The flat, open terrain extends inland approximately two miles, and is covered with terraces, rice paddies, and marshy plowed fields. The small plain is surrounded by the foothills of a range of mountains.

The terrain immediately inland from the beach on the northern route of advance, toward SENDAI, consists of terraced fields which have stone revetments forming the sides of the terraces. The GOTANDA-GAMA presents a natural obstacle in itself and the obstacle is enlarged by steep stone and concrete banks which line the river at many places. North of the river the route of advance leads through a corridor flanked by high mountains and vertical cliffs. Many of the cliffs have been faced with concrete to prevent erosion. Artificial caves, used by the civilians of the area as air raid shelters have been dug in the sides of the mountains. Terrain which is level enough for cultivation
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...and which has been cleared of woods is covered by groves of citrus fruit trees. Four miles south of SENDAI the mountain range tapers off into a series of rolling hills with a few jagged cliffs. Low ground in the area is made up of rice paddies, high ground, on which there are no buildings, is bare. This rolling terrain extends north to SENDAI and the SENDAI RIAWA.

The southern route of advance, leading eastward to the city of KAJOSHIKA, runs initially across a marshy plain and then enters a corridor through the mountains. This corridor, which extends all the way across the peninsula to the city itself, is a winding valley which follows the bed of several small streams. At many places the valley is less than 100 yards wide and cliffs on each side rise to a height of 200 to 300 feet. There are a number of oval pockets where the corridor is as much as a mile wide. The only cultivated ground along the route consists of rice paddies in such pockets. Underground shelters dug in the faces of cliffs consist of single straight tunnels about 15 feet deep, and of networks of similar tunnels connected by smaller man-made caves.

The ridge parallel to the beaches presents a natural obstacle to landing forces and could be used by the defending forces for protection against naval gunfire and provides solid ground into which emplacements for troops and weapons could be dug. Defending troops taking advantage of the reverse slope of the ridge could be reached only by high angle fire. The marshy ground east of the ridge is an obstacle to the attacking units but also exposes the defenders to small arms fire as there is little cover in the area. Unless completely neutralized, enfilade flanking fire could be brought to bear on the beaches from the hilly peninsula at the southern end and from the rocky island at the northern end.

Artillery fire from the hills and mountains could cover the beaches, the ridge, and the flat terrain inland. The GOTANDA-GAMA would delay attacking forces and give the Japanese north of that...
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line time to reorganize in the corridor leading to SENDAI. Any advance through that corridor would be under the same conditions as would have been experienced west of MIYAZAKI or north of MIYAKONOJO. The defending forces have the advantage of high ground, observation, choice of positions, and field of fire which would cover the entire route of advance. The southern route of advance would also favor the defenders.

In any case the defender would be severely limited in maneuverability and movement, particularly after he was committed to his defensive positions.

Certainly the defender had ideal terrain for a stubborn defense in depth.

The attacking forces would have been faced with the necessity of frontal assault and constricted routes of advance. Mechanized advance would have been extremely difficult and confined.

b. Roads and Railroad Systems.

Roads classified as National Highways or Prefectural Highways are the only routes over which any type of military motor transportation can operate. National Highways are classified on military maps as: "all weather trunk, over 4 meter wide roads", however the best highways in Southern KYUSHU were found to be winding, rocky, dirt roads, washed out in many places and almost completely closed by landslides in others. Prefectural roads are quite similar in condition but were found to be often less than half as wide. In flat country, such as rice paddy areas, all roads are built on fills, usually five to ten feet above the level of the fields. In mountainous regions roadbeds follow streams through corridors or follow the curvature of the sides of mountains. In the latter case roads are often hundreds of feet from the bottom of corridors and are built upon cuts and fills. Bridges at places are constructed of logs and lumber lashed together with rope. Mechanized and heavy motorized vehicles could not be advanced until such bridges had been repaired or replaced. Several bridges cross gaps
between mountains or across streams were as high as fifty feet above the bed of corridor. In the KAGOSHIMA area and in the MIYAZAKI area roads which follow the projected routes of advance lead through tunnels under mountain ridges. Roadbeds in all areas are fairly solid but would not be capable of carrying normal military traffic until they had been repaired and improved.

The use of even the best roads in the area for two-way traffic would be resorted to, only under absolute necessity. In the MIYAZAKI area the east-west road net is adequate and a traffic control plan could have been instigated to aid the movements of troops and supplies for either side. In the AMAKE-WAN-MIYAKONOGO area both north-south and east-west road nets are adequate. A prefectural road running north from the landing areas could be used by attacking forces as a main supply route and an alternate or return route could have been established approximately parallel to this road and less than three miles away. Japanese staff officers have stated that there was no plan for the destruction of bridges or demolition of the roads at any point.

In the western landing area the road net is entirely inadequate. The only road which traverses the route of advance is the National Highway leading from the landing beaches, through the corridor across the peninsula to KAGOSHIMA. Deviation from this route would have necessitated long detours over poor roads and trails in very mountainous terrain.

The railroad system in Southern KYUSHU is inadequate for military use under combat conditions. Japanese single track, 48-inch lines connect all the principal cities and towns in the area. The road bed is in good condition, but the numerous bridges and tunnels, over and through which the lines run, make them vulnerable to naval gunfire and aerial bombardment and would nullify their use after combat had begun. The lack of alternate routes would practically eliminate railroads as a means of reinforcement or resupply. Principal railroad yards at MIYAZAKI, KAGOSHIMA, MIYAKONOGO, and KUMAMOTO had been partly destroyed by bombardment prior to the end of the war and interdiction could have been completed during the battle if not before landings were attempted.
The deficiencies of the road and railroad systems would have been particularly detrimental to the defender. These systems were vital to bring all supply levels up to the required amount and after the battle started to maintain them. Likewise they were essential for the movement of reserves. The routes were long and exposed. The road system would have been detrimental to the attacking forces as their beachhead was expanded, and initial restrictions on our use of motorized movements would have been great.

c. Communications.

(1) Japanese Army

The army communications plan for KYUSHU exhibited every fault previously found in other areas. The basic means of communication was the commercial telephone system augmented by tactical wire and field radios. Communications between divisions, armies, and the 16th Area Army was planned to be only through commercial telephone and telegraph lines. Between battalions, regiments, and divisions, radio, telegraph, and telephone facilities were present, but the latter two were preferred. Communication to and between units lower than battalion was planned to be entirely by runner and visual signals. Communication between infantry and artillery units was only indirect. Requests for fire from infantry battalions would have to be sent first to division then to the artillery command, and then to the battery concerned. Such requests could be vetoed at regiment, at division, or at the artillery command. Telephone and telegraph lines were left entirely above ground, and there was no plan for burying any lines, either commercial or military. A large number of repairmen, organized into signal labor units, were deployed along the principal routes to repair any damage from bombing or from the weather. Commercial telephone and telegraph lines suffer from two basic defects—poor wire and inadequate power. This results in weak communications even under favorable conditions. The field wire was the same as that previously used by the Japanese and its durability and efficiency under combat conditions...
conditions is known to be poor. There was not a sufficient quantity of field radio equipment to meet the needs of the situation; the equipment on hand was of good quality; but obsolescent; however, reduced standards in the training program had resulted in a critical shortage of reliable radio operators in both the 40th and 57th Armies. Staff officers estimated that this situation could not be remedied.

(2) Japanese Navy.

Navy communications were primarily by radio and secondarily by line. As a result, the naval suicide boat units and air bases had adequate communication with Sasebo and Oita. There was no plan to coordinate navy and army communications, and no attempt to do so on the part of any one had been made by the time of the surrender.

d. Weather.

The weather in Southern Kyushu is generally clear during the months of November and December with occasional rainfalls. The duration of the average rainfall for that time of year is short, but the rate of fall is fairly intense. Average maximum temperature is from 70° to 80° Fahrenheit; minimum 40° to 50°. During daylight hours the temperature is quite comfortable but at night it is uncomfortably cold. There are few clouds and no fog to mar visibility. There is little wind, and tides at all landing beaches are suitable for the landing of assault troops.

The weather initially would be a disadvantage to the defenders because of the low winds and favorable tides which present no serious obstacle to landing. The absence of clouds or fog would be an advantage to both sides in that visibility is unlimited, but the defenders would profit more by this than would the attackers because they would previously have had an opportunity to take advantage of natural and artificial concealment and to select vantage points from which clear observation of the assault units could be maintained.

The occasional rains are sufficient to flood the rice fields and to convert sections of roads into pools of mud;
thus, considerably limiting the mobility of the attacking forces. The cold nights would tend to lower the morale of both sides, but probably would have bothered the Japanese less, because in spite of their poorer winter clothing, they have been accustomed to the weather in the area, and would have the advantage of previously prepared shelter. Because of the variations between the temperature in daylight and darkness hours, the moisture in the air and on the ground, and the abnormal exposures brought about by combat conditions, respiratory disease would probably have produced many non-battle casualties on each side.

e. Transportation.

Motorization of Japanese units was comparable to that found in all operations on large or relatively large land masses throughout the war. Although units were equipped with many vehicles, less than three hundred per Army were operational and those were in poor condition. Fuel supplies were low and resupply would be extremely limited. Capacity of the best trucks does not exceed 1 1/2 tons. In the area of the 57th Army there were many cavalry horses which were to be used as draft animals; however, the nature of the terrain and the condition of routes of communication made any movement of horse drawn vehicles excessively slow and their range of operation would be limited to roads and well defined trails. Any movement of units other than medium artillery units (which were equipped with diesel powered, full track laying prime movers) would necessarily have been accomplished by foot, and movement of artillery weapons into position would have been by man handling.

This inferiority of transportation would have been a distinct disadvantage to the defenders throughout all stages of the operation. It would prohibit the rapid movement of reinforcements to any of the landing areas; the evacuation of troops, weapons, or equipment to more favorable terrain; and the normal resupply for units in the line.

f. Civilians and Civilian Organizations.

Wherever possible, civilians were drafted into the armed
forces. Those male civilians who remained were organized into prefectural militia units, and these had very little training and almost no weapons. There was no expectation of correcting either deficiency. Existence of such militia was an advantage to the defenders in that added personnel for general duty was available, but due to the critical armament shortage and status of training, this advantage was greatly reduced. Untrained personnel under fire would present an obstacle to both sides. In addition, the Japanese had not prepared and did not intend to prepare, any plan for the evacuation of civilians or the declaration of open cities. The presence of disorganized civilian personnel in combat areas would be detrimental to both sides; however, the ultimate advantage gained from these circumstances would be to the defense, as the burden of collecting and evacuating civilians from cleared areas would fall upon the advancing forces.

8. CONCLUSION

It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened had the American Sixth Army landed according to the invasion schedule. This conclusion deals with the possible course of the action as deduced from a study of our operation plan, the Japanese plan of defense and other material reviewed in the preparation of this Appendix.

No attempt will be made herein to inject conjecture on the effects of the September and October typhoons. The discussion will deal solely with the proposed operation, defense and possible outcome.

First let us review our mission.

Briefly, the mission of the American Sixth Army was as follows: Following a sustained period of blockades and aerial bombardment of all Japan, and a heavy concentrated aerial and naval bombardment of the areas of the invasion beaches, the Sixth Army, in conjunction and as arranged with the Fifth Fleet and Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, and supported by the Far East Air Forces, was to seize and occupy Southern KYUSHU as far north as the general line TSUNO-SENDAI in order to permit the establishment
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therein of air and naval forces for support of further operations
into the industrial heart of Japan.

The operation was to have progressed as is outlined in the
following paragraphs:

On X minus 5 the 40th Infantry Division, reinforced, was to
land on KUCHINO-ERASU SHIMA, KURO SHIMA, KUSAKAKI JIMA, UJI
GUNTO; all of which are islands and island chains southwest of
Southern KYUSHU. The division was to secure these islands to
provide air warning facilities to aid in the main landings which
were to follow. Simultaneously the 158th RCT, afloat in the
OKINAWA area was to be prepared for landing on Northern TAMEGA
SHIMA, south of KYUSHU, to destroy hostile forces and assist in
clearing OSUMI-KAIKYO.

The 40th Division, on X minus 4 was to land in Northern and
Southern KOSHIKI BETTO to secure NAKAKISHI WAN, NAKAGAWARA
URA and other areas suitable for the establishment of emergency
anchorages, seaplane bases, and air warning stations.

On X day simultaneous landings were to be effected at two
points along the southeastern shore and at one point along the
southwestern shore of KYUSHU.

I Corps was to land in the YAMAZAKI MATSUMAKI Area of south-
eastern KYUSHU, capture MIYAZAKI and MIYAZAKI Airfield and se-
cure a corps beachhead to include FUKUSHIMA on the south bank
of HITOSUSE-GAWA.

XI Corps was to land in the SHIBUSHI-KASHIWABARU Area of APIKE
WAN, capture SHIBUSHI and the SHIBUSHI Airfield and to secure
a Corps beachhead.

V Amphibious Corps was to land with two divisions in assault
and one in reserve in the KAMINOKAWA-KUSHIKIN Area of South-
western KYUSHU and establish a beachhead.

IX Corps was to be prepared to reinforce other elements of the
Sixth Army in objective areas as directed, or to land on the
south coast of KYUSHU, west of KAIMON-DAKE, on or after X plus
3. At the same time the 158th RCT was to be prepared to rein-
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Force elements of the Sixth Army as directed.

After its beachhead had been secured and when so directed by Sixth Army, I Corps was to advance inland and secure the general line SADOHARA—HONJO—TAWAO—AOIDAKE and to establish early contact with XI Corps if possible. XI Corps, meanwhile, was to advance inland and secure the general line AOKI—IWAKAWA—TAKAKUMA—KANAYA and to attempt to establish early contact with I Corps.

V Amphibious Corps, when directed, was to advance with a division toward SENDAI and another division toward KAGOSHIMA. This Corps was to secure the general line KAGOSHIMA—KAWAKAMICHO—ICHINO—SENDAI. All Corps were to establish communications facilities and to construct and improve roads and airfields as directed.

The 11th Airborne Division, Sixth Army reserve, afloat off the objective area on X plus 22 was to have been prepared to reinforce elements of the Sixth Army as directed.

It is safe to assume that the preliminary naval gunfire and aerial bombardment would have:

a. Seriously impaired, if not completely destroyed, the rail system as the main artery of supply and movement.

b. Caused sufficient damage to the communication system of exposed wire and power plants, to have dangerously jeopardized the entire system.

c. Caused sufficient damage to supply depots and dumps to have made normal supply and resupply insufficient for battle requirements.

d. Caused sufficient damage to critical roads to have seriously hampered and slowed down supply and troop movement.

The combined effects would have had a normal reaction of demoralization, and confusion, which unquestionably would have effected morale, particularly of the civilian population.

It is probable that Japanese intelligence would have noted the assembly of our task forces at forward areas. Such intelligence
coupled with the increased tempo of the preliminary naval and aerial bombardment would, from past experience, have been the cue to our impending invasion.

The islands with which invasion would have begun had more outpost defenses with very few troops and would have been captured easily, except in the case of TANEGA SHIMA. This, to be assaulted by the 158 RCT, was defended by over 6000 Japanese with some CD guns. The defending force included the 109th IMB, seven separate infantry battalions, one independent field artillery battery plus an assortment of signal, medical, engineer, airfield, service, and naval AA personnel. They were disposed over the length of the island.

Our preliminary attack on the islands to the south and southwest of KUSHU, would have been definite confirmation of the coming invasion and might have been interpreted by the Japanese command as an indication that our landing was to be attempted on the south western coast.

On the other hand, the intensified preliminary naval and air bombardment of the MIYAZAKI and ARAKE W Ann as well as the western beach areas, should have been interpreted as an indication that all three areas were being "softened up" in preparation for invasion.

The difficulty of moving one reserve division, or both, over the bad road system to any or all of the threatened areas, during the period of intensified preliminary aerial bombardment, coupled with their original plan to hold the reserve divisions for a counter attacking force, would probably have resulted in no early movement of the 25th or 77th Divisions. The 216th Division at Kumamoto would have been alerted and possibly started south.

In spite of counter-measures the attacks directed against the task forces and transport areas would unquestionably have been serious and would have caused losses.

If the Japanese had adhered to their plan of opening fire from all coast defense weapons as the invasion craft came in range, their batteries would have been early disclosed and subject to naval counter-battery fire and probably destruction.

From a wealth of experience, it may be assumed that, under the shock and destructive effects of preliminary and covering
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naval gunfire, the landing forces would have carried the beach defenses.

a. I Corps—MIYAZAKI Area

Due to the surrounding plains, the beachheads of the MIYAZAKI and ARIAKE WAN areas, would probably have been expended and developed more rapidly than those on the west coast.

The strong concentration of Japanese divisions and the prepared plan to utilize the inland surrounding hills and mountains in the MIYAZAKI area, would have imposed heavy fighting on the I Corps.

However, I Corps was landing in a relatively concentrated mass with vastly superior supporting and organic fires at their disposal, than the 156th Division in defense could muster at the point of landing.

To support this threatened area the 57th Army could have withdrawn the 212th Division on their left flank and portions of the 154th Division not engaged, as per their original plan to commit them at the threatened point.

Likewise, in spite of their plan, the 16th Area Army could have ordered the 25th Division in central reserve, to the support of the 57th Army.

However, the extreme difficulties of this movement due to rail, road and communication difficulties, and in face of continuous aerial effort, would have unquestionably resulted in piecemeal and late commitments.

Inability to concentrate their divisions against our massed I Corps would have presented the opportunity for their defeat in detail.

b. XI Corps—ARIAKE WAN Area.

The XI Corps while having the disadvantage of flanking fires during their beach approach and after landing, had the strong advantage of mass against the extended 86th Division in defense.
A second advantage appears in that the XI Corps had considerable open country through which to maneuver and expand their beachhead, with a wide corridor leading north toward MIYAKONOJO and one running west to KANOYA and KAGOSHIMA WAN. The terrain study has pointed out the restrictions and limitations of these corridors, but their very size and extent would necessitate the defender being emplaced at sufficient distances and ranges to have given the XI Corps some opportunity to deploy for the advance and assault.

It should be remembered that the Japanese plan of defense of this area included covering the beach approaches and beaches with fire from their 30 batteries. It also called for the emplacement of artillery on suitable inland terrain to cover the wide corridors.

The early admitted deficiencies in Japanese communications, fire control and the lack of unified artillery command are so apparent in this study that it is a fair assumption that their batteries operating individually on targets of opportunity would have nullified the accomplishment of any concentration or massing of fires and would have exposed their individual locations for counter battery.

Avenues of approach for the Japanese 16th Area Army Reserve, either the 25th or 77th Division, were less difficult than to any other threatened area. While daylight movement would have been difficult due to planned air support, the open corridors would have facilitated night movements.

In all events, any 16th Area Army commitments of reserves would have weakened the reserves available to support the MIYAZAKI Area.

It is highly possible that the difficulties of movement and deficiencies of communication might have resulted in the establishment of a secondary defensive area for the 77th and the 26th Division when it arrived, in the vicinity of MIYAKONOJO.

V Amphibious Corps – WESTERN BEACHES.

The landing of the V Amphibious Corps on the western
beaches of SATSUMA Peninsula, and the accomplishment of its mission was faced with a series of complex difficulties. The ridge running parallel to the relatively narrow landing beaches initially offered some defilade for the defender. The mountainous, rough terrain inland provided innumerable advantageous sites for observation, the emplacement of weapons and for cover and concealment.

When the ridge paralleling the beach was captured it would, in turn, provide defilade for the attacker.

The 3rd and 2nd Marine Divisions, landing abreast, with the 2nd on the right, each confronted approximately one battalion in defensive positions to their front.

The expansion of the beachhead to the 0-2 line would have been a difficult task due to the initial ridge paralleling the beach, the narrow flat ground backing it, covered with rice paddies, dykes, and built up road banks, all of which, as has been stated, were dominated by mountainous and wooded commanding ground.

The corridor to SENDAI which was to have been forced by the 3rd Division was narrow and difficult and dominated by mountainous, forbidding terrain.

The corridor from the 2nd Division beaches to the city of KAGOSHIMA was generally wider than the SENDAI corridor, but was also dominated by commanding ground. It was of irregular width, the bulge sections being invariably cultivated with rice paddies.

In all probability elements of the 303rd Japanese Division on our left, having difficulties in daylight movement south, would have been committed piecemeal against our left flank or would have been forced to organize for defense north of SENDAI, the latter course being considered most likely.

The 16th Area Army plan for the commitment of the 77th Division which was in reserve, had called for movement south, chiefly on foot, along the shore roads of KAGOSHIMA WAN, cutting westward across the SATSUMA Peninsula just west of the city of KAGOSHIMA.
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This plan was based on the assumption of our landing at
FUJIAGI HAMA, which was considerably south of our actual
landing beaches. As has been stated, the movement would have
required from six to seven days.

In the light of our landing considerably north of where
they expected us to land and again because of the difficul-
ties of movement in the face of our proposed air support, it
seems obvious that the 16th Area Army would have been forced
to one of two of the following courses of action or a combina-
tion of both: (a) To establish an inland defensive area
between SENDAI and the northern end of KAGOSHIMA WAN or (b)
To move over the thoroughly inadequate road net directly to
our front to counter-attack.

Analysis of all the factors point toward the adoption of
the first course of action as the most probable.

It seems certain they would not have jeopardized any major
units by sending them south on the SATSUMA Peninsula where
there was an obvious possibility of their being pinched off
and trapped.

The extension of the beachhead forward and to the north
to include SENDAI would have been a difficult task of fight-
ing the defender and terrain. From here on the task would
have been magnified by the deployment of our forces and by
the advance into more difficult terrain.

The Japanese had the advantage of the choice of sites for
defensive weapons and troop disposition. Likewise they had
excellent observation of our advance. From this standpoint
the terrain favored the defender. Neither side had the
opportunity for maneuver. The Japanese, having been commit-
ted to a defensive role and restricted in movement would have
been exposed to destruction in detail. The 2nd Division,
on the right, had more open terrain to their front and right,
after crossing the initial ridge, than the 3rd Division on
their left.

However, the open country was marshy, full of rice paddies,
and reasonably short of cover and concealment. Sufficient
high ground surrounding the flats afforded the defender ample opportunity for continual observation and the establishment of covering weapons.

The situation in the zone of the 2nd Division on the other hand, particularly after leaving the O-2 line for KAGOSHIMA, presented an ever expanding flank to contain the 206th, and 146th Japanese Divisions and the 125th IMB.

While the Japanese plan called for no withdrawals, it seems certain that the impending severance of the only route of escape up the peninsula would have seen some elements endeavoring to cut their way through. Likewise any effort to employ uncommitted elements of the 206th Division or portions of the 146th Division would have undoubtedly subjected the right flank of our advance on the city of KAGOSHIMA, to severe pressure.

Had the IX Corps been committed on X plus 4 on the southern most beaches of SATSUMA Peninsula, the shock of this impact would have unquestionably caused an exodus to the north where the retiring Japanese elements would have added to the pressure of our right flank defense.

IX Corps - SOUTHERN BEACH AREA.

The disposition of the defending forces on X plus 3 at the southern end of SATSUMA Peninsula is hard to predict. It seems logical to assume that the 125th IMB, rated as an A-1 combat unit by the Japanese, would have held to their mission of guarding the southeastern end of the peninsula and the entrance to the KAGOSHIMA WAN.

The 6th Tank Brigade would very likely have been moved north by night, to cover the city of KAGOSHIMA and to attack our right flank.

The 146th Division, organized with 4 infantry regiments, might very likely have withdrawn one or even two regiments for reemployment against the VAC right flank. In all events the initial landing, made through cultivated lowlands, would have been flanked and faced with compressed defending ele-
ments made them more desperate by having their only escape route closed.

In theory the Japanese plan of defense was conceived to be and probably would have been, in the initial phases, a costly one for the invasion forces.

While the Japanese unquestionably would have been driven to a scattered defense in depth, their lack of initial planning and preparation for such a defense would have resulted in gradual annihilation in detail.

Fighting, in spite of lowered morale, would have been desperate due to the number of defenders that would have been compressed and trapped with all retreat cut off.

Blue movement north of KAGOSHIMA WAN to the initial army boundary would, by virtue of terrain alone, have been slow and difficult.

The accomplishment of the mission could hardly have been effected by the movement of the Japanese reserves from central and northern KYUSHU.

The difficulties of moving the 216th Division from KUMA-MOTO to the KIBISHIMA region would in all likelihood have been great. Their arrival would have greatly augmented the counterattack force.

Had our combined attack and simultaneous landings altered their mass counter-attack plan, as it is believed it would, it is likely that the KIRISHIMA area would have developed into a core of defense.

While such a belated stand might have been a difficult one to destroy, it could not have altered the accomplishment of the mission as it could be contained and bypassed and in all events it could not deny our use of the captured airfields, beachheads or KAGOSHIMA WAN.
SIXTH ARMY ORGANIZATION

1st Corps
25th INF. DIV.
33rd INF. DIV.
41st INF. DIV.

V PHIB. CORPS.
2nd MAR. DIV.
3rd MAR. DIV.
5th MAR. DIV.

XI CORPS
1st CAV. DIV.
43rd INF. DIV.
AMERICAN INF. DIV.

IX CORPS
77th INF. DIV.
81st INF. DIV.
98th INF. DIV.

40th INF. DIV. (REINF)
11th AIRBORNE DIV. (REINF)
(ARMY RESERVE)
158th RGT (REINF)
ARMY SERVICE COMM. - OLMPIC (ASCOMO)

SIXTH ARMY
PLAN OF ATTACK
SOUTHERN KYUSHU
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

DETAILED ORDER OF BATTLE VAC AREA
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, 
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO. 

CONFIDENTIAL 

30 November, 1945 

ORDER OF BATTLE REPORT 

UNIT 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16TH AREA ARMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th Area Army Hq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>40TH ARMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location: Southwest KYUSHU (west of KAGOSHIMA Bay and south of the 32nd parallel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission: To defend south KYUSHU in conjunction with the 57th Army.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 40th Army Hq | 399 | 451 | LtGen NAKAZAWA, N. | YO 21300 |
| 146th Inf Div Hq | 643 | 224 | LtGen TSURUSIMA, T. | " 22402 |
| 421st Inf Regt | 3,350 | 3,307 | Col WATAHABE, Y. | " 22403 |
| 422nd Inf Regt | 3,350 | 3,307 | LtCol FUKUZAKI, K. | " 22404 |
| 423rd Inf Regt | 3,350 | 3,307 | Col HOKASO, S. | " 22405 |
| 424th Inf Regt | 3,207 | 2,623 | LtCol SAZAKI, R. | " 22406 |
| Arty Bn | 508 | 508 | Unknown | " 42325 |
| AT Unit | 484 | 402 | Unknown | " 22407 |
| Trans Co | 235 | 300 | Col SUZUKI, J. | " 22409 |
| Sig Co | 484 | 225 | Capt KOMIYAMA, K. | " 22408 |
| Ordnance Duty Unit | 108 | 103 | 1stLt KAI, K. | " 22410 |
| Fld Hosp | 208 | 208 | Capt KOZUKI, M. | " 22411 |

Attatched: 
2nd Bn, 28th Med 
Arty Regt | 700 | 700 | Unknown | YO 14318 |
Div Total | 18,127 | 15,374 |

206th Inf Div Hq | 1,941 | 249 | LtGen IWAKIRI, H. | ASO 32402 |
510th Inf Regt | 4,474 | 4,074 | LtCol MORISHIMA, T. | " 32403 |
511th Inf Regt | 4,474 | 4,074 | Col YAMADA, S. | " 32404 |
512th Inf Regt | 4,474 | 4,074 | LtCol KUTSUKA, Y. | " 32405 |
206th Mtn Arty Regt | 2,496 | 1,782 | Maj TASHIMA, S. | " 14350 |
206th Mort Regt | 1,666 | 1,446 | LtCol OKAMOTO, N. | " 32406 |
AT Unit | 480 | 340 | Maj UCHIDA, S. | " 32407 |
MC Unit | 340 | 467 | Capt WATAHABE, S. | " 32408 |
Engr Regt | 1,003 | 999 | Maj OKAMOTO, T. | " 32409 |
Trans Bn | 436 | 407 | Maj KIMOTSUKI, K. | " 32411 |

Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CODE</th>
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</thead>
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<td>23413</td>
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<td>Vet Hosp</td>
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<tr>
<td>303rd Inf Div Hq</td>
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<td>Maj Gen NOSOE, S.</td>
<td>TAKA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>339th Inf Regt</td>
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<td>Rocket Bn</td>
<td>592</td>
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<td>805</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Capt ABURASAKI, S.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>300</td>
<td>1st Lt YOSHIDA, T.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>230</td>
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<td>Fld Hosp</td>
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<td>Div Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>125th Ind Mixed Brng Assn</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Maj Gen KURASHI, S.</td>
<td>KOTEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>749th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>1,006</td>
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<tr>
<td>750th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>Maj SHIBUYA, J.</td>
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<tr>
<td>751st Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>1,033</td>
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<tr>
<td>752nd Ind Inf Bn</td>
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<td>972</td>
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<td>753rd Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>970</td>
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<td>754th Ind Inf Bn</td>
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<td>CaptSANBUNO, H.</td>
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<td>951</td>
<td>521</td>
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<tr>
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<td>572</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>Capt YOSHIKAWA, R.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>224</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1st Lt YOSHIDA, Y.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Med Unit</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>Capt KANDO, Y.</td>
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<tr>
<td>attached:</td>
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<tr>
<td>435th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>Capt SUGIYAMA, Y.</td>
<td>YO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brig Total</td>
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<td>8,214</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Ind Tk Brng Assn</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>Col MATSUDA, T.</td>
<td>TO</td>
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<tr>
<td>37th Tk Regt</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>Attached to 5th Tk Brng, 57th Army</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Tk Regt</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>Maj OSO, J.</td>
<td>TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Unit</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>Capt SHINADAI, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Unit</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>Maj HIKITA, T.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Co</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>Capt SENI, H.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### 4th Army Command

#### Mobile Units:
- 9th Ind Fld Arty Regt
- 28th Med Arty Regt (less 2nd Bn)
- 20th Med Arty Bn
- 8th S-P Arty Bn
- 21st Med Mortar Bn
- 24th Med Mortar Bn
- 25th Med Mortar Bn

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CODE</th>
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<tr>
<td>13th Ind Tk Co</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Capt ONISHI, Y.</td>
<td>TO 12635</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brig Total</td>
<td>3,373</td>
<td>2,558</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Arty Cmd</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>MajGen FUJITA, C.</td>
<td>YO (none)</td>
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</table>

- 1,302 Scheduled transfer from KUHOTO on 25 August, 1945.
- In process activation at KUHOTO.
- Capt FUJITA, H. 14318

#### Coast Defense:
- 44th Ind Arty Bn

<table>
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<th>STRENGTH</th>
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<tr>
<td>44th Ind Arty Bn</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>Maj SUETSU, Y.</td>
<td>YO 12533</td>
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</table>

#### Under direct control 40th Army:
- 10th Ind Engr Bn
- 122nd Ind Engr Bn
- 43rd Sig Bn
- 35th Suic.Bt.Unit
- 36th Suic.Bt.Unit
- 5th Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit
- 6th Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit
- 16th Fld Duty Unit Hq

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CODE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th Ind Engr Bn</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>Capt NAKAZAKI, K.</td>
<td>YO 21735</td>
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<tr>
<td>122nd Ind Engr Bn</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>Capt HIRAYAMA, E.</td>
<td>&quot; 42353</td>
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<tr>
<td>43rd Sig Bn</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>Maj KIKEI, H.</td>
<td>&quot; 13379</td>
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<tr>
<td>35th Suic.Bt.Unit</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Capt TAJIMA, H.</td>
<td>&quot; (none)</td>
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<tr>
<td>36th Suic.Bt.Unit</td>
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<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>LtCol OIDE, D.</td>
<td>MITSU 2366</td>
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#### 4th Div units under control 40th Army:
- 2nd Bn, 131st Div
- 93rd Fld Bn (less 2nd Co)
- 4th, 5th Co's 21st NC Bn

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<th>Unit</th>
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<th>CODE</th>
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<td>435</td>
<td>SUI 8061</td>
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<tr>
<td>93rd Fld Bn (less 2nd Co)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th, 5th Co's 21st NC Bn</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>SUI 8083</td>
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#### Administrative control 40th Army, tactical direction 16th Area Army:
- 7th Inf Div Hq
- 93rd Inf Regt
- 99th Inf Regt

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
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<td>93rd Inf Regt</td>
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<td>3,100</td>
<td>Col OTA, G.</td>
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<tr>
<td>99th Inf Regt</td>
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<td>Col YAMASUCHI, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>T/O</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td>CO</td>
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<tr>
<td>100th Inf Regt</td>
<td>3,031</td>
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<td>LtCol UEHARA, S.</td>
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<td>77th Cav Regt</td>
<td>534</td>
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<td>Maj NITTA, T.</td>
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<td>Maj HWA, M.</td>
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<td>77th Trans Regt</td>
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<td>Chem. War. Unit</td>
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<td>491</td>
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<td>Capt HORI, A.</td>
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<td>1st Field Hosp</td>
<td>195</td>
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<td>Capt ARAKAWA, N.</td>
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<td>4th Field Hosp</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<td><strong>15,600</strong></td>
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<td><strong>40th Army Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>84,622</strong></td>
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**57th Army**

Location: Southeast KYUSHU (KAGOSHIMA Bay to NOBESOLA).

Mission: To defend south KYUSHU in conjunction with the 40th Army.

<p>| 57th Army Hq            | 599  | 465      | LtGen NISHIKARA, K. | HOKO 23590 |
| 36th Inf Div Hq         | 1,070 | 277      | LtGen YOSHIMIZU, W. | SEKI 15100 |
| 137th Inf Regt          | 3,031 | 3,072    | Col KAMISHI, S.     | &quot; 15102 |
| 138th Inf Regt          | 3,031 | 3,031    | Col ISHII, Y.      | &quot; 15103 |
| 139th Inf Regt          | 3,031 | 3,031    | Col KAMISHI, T.    | &quot; 15104 |
| 36th Field Arty Regt    | 1,103 | 1,103    | LtCol SAKEI, T.    | &quot; 15106 |
| AT Unit                 | 430  | 430      | Capt FUSHII, N.    | &quot; 15105 |
| 36th Engr Regt          | 732  | 732      | Maj ARITOSHI, T.   | &quot; 15107 |
| 36th Trans Regt         | 749  | 544      | Col SEKIZU, M.     | &quot; 15109 |
| Sig Co                  | 239  | 203      | Capt FUCHIKO, S.   | &quot; 15103 |
| Chem. War. Unit         | 35   | 35       | 1stLt MATSUZAKI, T.| &quot; 15113 |
| Ordnance Duty Unit      | 31   | 55       | Capt INAHARA, K.   | &quot; 15114 |
| Medical Unit            | 491  | 362      | LtCol NISHIDA, O.  | &quot; 15110 |
| 1st Field Hosp          | 195  | 172      | Capt NASUDA, K.    | &quot; 15111 |
| 4th Field Hosp          | 200  | 174      | Maj INAMOTO, Y.    | &quot; 15112 |
| Vet Hosp                | 52   | 49       | Capt ABF, I.       | &quot; 15115 |
| <strong>Attached</strong>            |      |          |                  |        |
| 364th Ind Inf Regt      | 3,207 | 3,207    | Unknown           | &quot; 23245 |
| <strong>Div Total</strong>           | <strong>17,932</strong> | <strong>16,637</strong> |               |      |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CODE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>154th Inf Div Hq</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>MajGen FUTAI, A.</td>
<td>GORO 22702</td>
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<tr>
<td>445th Inf Regt</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,323</td>
<td>Col HIRI, R.</td>
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<td>446th Inf Regt</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,223</td>
<td>LtCol SEINO, S.</td>
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<td>447th Inf Regt</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,223</td>
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<td>443rd Inf Regt</td>
<td>3,207</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>LtCol NAGAI, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery Bn.</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; (none)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT Unit</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>Capt FUJII, A.</td>
<td>&quot; 22707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Co</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>Maj OHARA, K.</td>
<td>&quot; 22709</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig Co</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Capt TONIYOSHI, H.</td>
<td>&quot; 22708</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordnance Dut Unit</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Capt HIRAI, S.</td>
<td>&quot; 22710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fld Hosp</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>Capt NISHI, Y.</td>
<td>&quot; 22711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Div Total</strong></td>
<td>17,429</td>
<td>15,643</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>156th Inf Div Hq</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>LtGen HIGUCHI, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>453rd Inf Regt</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>Col OTOKIRI, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>454th Inf Regt</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,246</td>
<td>Col KITOH, K.</td>
<td>&quot; 22304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>455th Inf Regt</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>Col OE, F.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,302</td>
<td>Col KO, T.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>503</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; (none)</td>
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<td>AT Unit</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>434</td>
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<td>&quot; 22307</td>
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<td>Trans Co</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>Col NAKAMURA, K.</td>
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<td>Fld Hosp</td>
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- **212th Inf Div Hq**
- **516th Inf Regt**
- **517th Inf Regt**
- **518th Inf Regt**
- **214th Mtn Art Regt**
- **216th Med Mort Regt**
- **AT Unit**
- **MC Unit**
- **Engr Regt**
- **Trans Co**
- **Sig Co**
- **Chem, War Unit**
- **Ordnance Dut Unit**
- **Med Unit**

- 1,041      | 255  | MajGen SAJURAI, T. | KIKUCHI 32602 |
- 4,434      | 4,336 | LtCol KINDE, T.   | " 32603 |
- 4,434      | 4,336 | LtCol HAMASHI, N. | " 32604 |
- 4,434      | 4,337 | LtCol NAKASHI, T. | " 32605 |
- 2,496      | 2,466 | Maj IMAMI, S.     | " 32606 |
- 1,666      | 1,666 | LtCol NAKASHI, T. | " 32607 |
- 439       | 430   | Maj ISHIHARA, H.  | " 32608 |
- 340       | 306   | Maj NISHI, K.     | " 32609 |
- 306       | 303   | Maj NISHI, K.     | " 32610 |
- 212       | 212   | Maj NISHI, Y.     | " 32611 |
- 147       | 147   | Unknown           | " (none) |
- 112       | 91    | 1stLt SHIMADA, T. | " 32613 |
- 1,109      | Not activated | | |
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07/35 appendix 4 to annex CII-III to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Flf Hosp</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>Not activated.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Flf Hosp</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Flf Hosp</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>Maj IZANAGI, O.</td>
<td>KIRUCHI 32613</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vet Hosp</td>
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<td>Div Total</td>
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<td>20,276</td>
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<td>575</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>MajGen KUROUSU, G.</td>
<td>KENSHI 7062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>664th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>Maj ISHIKAWA, T.</td>
<td>&quot; 7063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>665th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>Maj ARIZONO, T.</td>
<td>&quot; 7064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>666th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>Capt HARRISON, H.</td>
<td>&quot; 7065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>667th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>Capt HARRISON, N.</td>
<td>&quot; 7066</td>
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<tr>
<td>15th HVy Arty Regt</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>Col ISHIOKO, T.</td>
<td>&quot; 13560</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engr Co</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>1stLt TANAKA, K.</td>
<td>&quot; 7067</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Attached:

| 756th Ind Inf Bn         | 397 | 397       | Unknown                | SEKI 23365 |
| 766th Ind Inf Bn         | 397 | 397       | Unknown                | " 23366 |
| 767th Ind Inf Bn         | 397 | 397       | Unknown                | " 23367 |
| Brig Total               | 3,329 | 3,349 |                      |      |

| 5th Ind Tk Brig Hq       | 276 | 276       | Col TAKASIMA, H.       | YAKU 12530 |
| 13th Tk Regt             | 1,200 | 1,240 | Maj SHIRATA, T.       | " 12532 |
| 43rd Tk Regt             | 497 | 497       | Maj KATO, T.          | " 12549 |
| MG Unit                  | 556 | 556       | Maj HIROSE, H.        | " 12547 |
| Maintenance Unit         | 202 | 202       | Maj SHIMIZU, K.       | " 12574 |
| Trans Co                 | 377 | 377       | Capt TANAKI, K.       | " 12576 |

Attached:

| 37th Tk Regt             | 1,174 | 1,146 | Maj OKUDA, I.         | TO 12577 |
| 1st Sp Tk Unit           | ?     | 300    | Unknown                | Unknown  |
| Brig Total               | 4,235 | 4,644 |                        |      |

1st Arty Cmmd

Mobile Units:

| 6th Arty Intel Regt     | 637 | 690       | Maj KATO, K.          | " 12402 |
| 19th Ind Mtn Arty Regt  | 1,669 | 2,900   | LtCol TSUDA, S        | " 42349 |
| 23rd Ind Mtn Arty Bn    | 524 | 533       | Maj UEDA, H.          | " 14235 |
| 13th Med Arty Regt      | 1,669 | 2,095 | Col MAJO, M.         | " 12531 |
| 54th Med Arty Regt      | 1,669 | 2,100 | Col TSUSHI, K.       | " 12532 |
| 5th S-P Arty Bn         | 441 | 440       | Unknown                | 21760 |
| 7th S-P Arty Bn         | 441 | 441       | Unknown                | " 23249 |
| 2nd Rocket Bn           | 345 | 300       | Maj TANIGUCHI, Y.     | " 12332 |
| 4th Tr. Mortar Bn       | 1,407 | 1,430   | Capt BANGEN, T.      | " 36372 |

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0733B Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20th Tr. Mortar Bn</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>HOKO 23872</td>
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<tr>
<td>26th Tr. Mortar Bn</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>In process activation at HOKO</td>
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<td>28th Tr. Mortar Bn</td>
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<td>1,400</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Mobile Units</td>
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<td>14,344</td>
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<td>Coast Defense</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Ind Hyv Arty Bn</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Maj OZAWA, H.</td>
<td>HOKO 1023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Ind Hyv Arty Bn</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Maj SHIGETA, M.</td>
<td>HOKO 13561</td>
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<tr>
<td>43rd Ind Hyv Arty Bn</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>Maj SHILIZUKI, M.</td>
<td>HOKO 28338</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIYONAKA Nav. Btry</td>
<td>150</td>
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<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>KUSUGISHI Bay Nav. Btry</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIBUSHI Nav. AA Btry</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AM2 Nav. AA Btry</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Coast Defense</td>
<td>2,429</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Engr Cmd</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>MajGen KASAI, M.</td>
<td>HOKO 1271</td>
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<tr>
<td>72nd Ind Engr Bn</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>Maj SATO, J.</td>
<td>HOKO 15052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd Ind Engr Bn</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>Maj TAJI, M.</td>
<td>HOKO 27103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120th Ind Engr Bn</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>Capt YAMAZAKI, K.</td>
<td>HOKO 42392</td>
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<tr>
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<td>291</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>Total Cmd.</td>
<td>3,054</td>
<td>3,699</td>
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<td>7th Fld Trans Cmd</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Maj SHIBASHI, T.</td>
<td>HOKO 1144</td>
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<tr>
<td>34th Ind MT Bn</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>Maj SHIMIZU, K.</td>
<td>Matsu 5864</td>
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<td>56th Ind MT Bn</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Maj HIRAKUNI, K.</td>
<td>HOKO 6420</td>
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<tr>
<td>12th Tractor Co</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>1stLt OKUNO, H.</td>
<td>HOKO 2610</td>
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<tr>
<td>50th Fld Ed Const Unit</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>Capt HATSU, S.</td>
<td>Matsu 15550</td>
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<td>Total Fld Ed Const Unit</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>1,657</td>
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<tr>
<td>13th Fld Duty Unit Hq</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Maj HATSUMI, A.</td>
<td>HOKO 6916</td>
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<tr>
<td>No subordinate units allocated to this unit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>32nd Fld Duty Unit Hq</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>LtCol SUITSUGU, T.</td>
<td>HOKO 13643</td>
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<td>144th Land Duty Co</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>1stLt UMAZUMI, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>145th Land Duty Co</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>1stLt MATSUI, T.</td>
<td>HOKO 13550</td>
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<tr>
<td>146th Land Duty Co</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>1stLt MAKITA, N.</td>
<td>HOKO 13551</td>
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<td>147th Land Duty Co</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>1stLt SHIZUKI, T.</td>
<td>HOKO 13552</td>
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<td>148th Land Duty Co</td>
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<td>1stLt YAMAMOTO, S.</td>
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<td>149th Land Duty Co</td>
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<td>511</td>
<td>1stLt HAYASHI, M.</td>
<td>13554</td>
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<tr>
<td>150th Land Duty Co</td>
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<td>511</td>
<td>1stLt ARAI, Y.</td>
<td>135555</td>
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<td>Total Fld Duty Unit Total</td>
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Under direct control 57th Army:

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<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
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<td>1,300</td>
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<td>203</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>65th L of C G Co</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th L of C Hosp</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Maj HAK榆, M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>119th L of C Hosp</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>LtCol ISHI, Y.</td>
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## 4th Fld. Cons Unit Hq
T/O: 32
Strength: Scheduled for transfer from FUKUOKA at time of armistice.

## 45th Fld Cons Unit
T/O: 511
Strength: 450
Commander: 1stLt YAMAMOTO, K.
Code: MUTSU 5723

## 31st Suce. Bt. Unit
T/O: 96
Strength: 100
Commander: Unknown
Code: None

## 32nd Suce. Bt. Unit
T/O: 96
Strength: 100
Commander: Unknown
Code: None

## 1st Suce. Bt. Serv. Unit
T/O: 399
Strength: 400
Commander: Unknown
Code: None

## 2nd Suce. Bt. Serv. Unit
T/O: 399
Strength: 400
Commander: Unknown
Code: None

### 4th AAA Div units under control 57th Army:

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<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Code</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>136th AAA Regt (1943)</td>
<td>3rd, 6th, 11th Co's</td>
<td>2,577</td>
<td>2,221</td>
<td>LtCol SHIMURA, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th Ind AAA Co</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>130</td>
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<td>Capt. MAEDA, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>65th Ind AAA Co</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>176</td>
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<td>1stLt NAKATA, Y.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Ind RC En (1945)</td>
<td>1st Sp Hq Unit</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>Haj KOBAYASHI, E.</td>
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<td>2nd Sp Hq Unit</td>
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### Administrative control 57th Army, tactical direction 16th Area Army:

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<th>Strength</th>
<th>Commander</th>
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<td>1,053</td>
<td>LtGen KATO, R.</td>
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<td>14th Inf Regt</td>
<td>5,014</td>
<td>4,605</td>
<td>Col KITAGAWA, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>40th Inf Regt</td>
<td>5,014</td>
<td>4,605</td>
<td>Col AIKO, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Inf Regt</td>
<td>5,014</td>
<td>4,605</td>
<td>Col ISHIKAWA, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>75th Cav Regt</td>
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<td>1,043</td>
<td>Col OSHIMA, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15th Mtn arty Regt</td>
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<td>3,076</td>
<td>Col KIRA, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25th Engr Regt</td>
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<td>913</td>
<td>LtCol KITAGAWA, T.</td>
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<td>2,590</td>
<td>Col KITAGAWA, R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig. Co</td>
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<td>239</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chem. War. Unit</td>
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<td>227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance Duty Unit</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Unit</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Fld Hosp</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>277</td>
<td></td>
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**Div Total:** 25,920

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
0149/26:

Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

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<td>Total Force</td>
<td>5,868</td>
<td>6,079</td>
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Total 57th Army:

| KYUSHU         | 143,335 | 143,335 |
| TANGEBA SHIMA  | 5,868    | 6,079   |

Total 149,203 149,414

56TH ARMY

Location: Northwest KYUSHU (KOJI to KARA-YU Bay).

Mission: To defend north KYUSHU by repelling invasion of the vulnerable lowland area.

| 66th army Hq  | 399 | 399 | LtGen HICHIKO, I. | SO 13580 |
| 57th Inf Div Hq| 1,033 | 1,033 | LtGen YANO, K.     | OKU 7200 |
| 57th Inf Regt | 4,437 | 4,437 | Col KANAMURA, K.   | " 7202 |
| 117th Inf Regt| 4,437 | 4,437 | Col KANAI, Z.      | " 7217 |
| 132nd Inf Regt| 4,437 | 4,437 | Col HAYASHI, S.    | " 7232 |
| 57th Art Regt | 2,305 | 2,305 | Col YAMASAKI, S.   | " 7221 |
| 57th Engr Regt| 393  | 393  | Maj YABE, K.       | " 7277 |
| 57th Trans Regt| 1,315 | 1,315 | Col TAKEI, U.      | " 7235 |
| Sig Co        | 239  | 239  | Capt SAITOH, C.    | " 7230 |
| Ordinance Duty Unit | 133 | 133 | 1stLt ASH, J.    | " 7240 |
| 2nd Fld Hosp  | 300  | 300  | Capt HIRONO, S.    | " 7244 |
| Vet Hosp      | 195  | 195  | Capt ITO, S.       | " 7249 |

Div Total: 20,483 20,489
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<th>CO</th>
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**SHINONOSEKI Fortress Hq**

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<tr>
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<td>SHINONOSEKI Mil Hosp</td>
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**Fortress Total**

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<td>42nd Tc Brd</td>
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<td>Maj OKA, H.</td>
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<td>HQ Unit</td>
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<td>&quot; 12493</td>
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<td>377</td>
<td>Capt ENDO, A.</td>
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**6th Arty Comd**

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### Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan

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**0129/253**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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<td>1st Lt KAWASAKI, S.</td>
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**Duty Unit Total**

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**Under direct control 56th Army:**

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<tr>
<td>46th Tc Regt</td>
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<td>Maj SHIMIZU, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>69th Ind Tp Bn</td>
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<td>403</td>
<td>Maj YOSHIDA, S.</td>
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<td>71st Ind Enr Bn</td>
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**4th Ann Div units under control 56th Army:**

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<td>2,351</td>
<td>2,351</td>
<td>Col KAWASHIMA, H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Regt (less)</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>Maj SUZUKI, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Ind Ann Bn</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>Maj KITAI, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Ind Ann Bn</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>Capt OKADA, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Ind MC Co</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>Capt OKADA, T.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1st Sp MC Unit**

**7th Sp MC Unit**

**8th Sp MC Unit**

**9th Sp MC Unit**

**13th Sp MC Unit**

**17th Sp MC Unit** (Irregular units organized with personnel drawn from other units of the 4th Ann Div.)

**19th Sp MC Unit**

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0139/264
0736  Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
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<th>CO</th>
<th>CODE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20th Sp Hq Unit:</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Sp Hq Unit:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Sp Hq Unit:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Sp Hq Unit:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Sp Hq Unit:</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st Ind S-L Bn</td>
<td>596</td>
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<td>Capt SUGA, Y.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st Balloon Co</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>222</td>
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</table>

IKI Island Fortress Defense Unit under control 56th Army:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<tr>
<td>IKI Fortress Hq</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>MajGen CHIJII, K.</td>
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<td>1st Fort Inf Bn</td>
<td>325</td>
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<td>Capt HIIDA, M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Fort Inf Bn</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>Maj KIMIYAMA, K.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Fort Inf Bn</td>
<td>325</td>
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<td>Maj OKITO, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Fort Inf Bn</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>LtCol KUMIURA, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Fort Inf Bn</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>Maj KAGOSHI, M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Fort Inf Bn</td>
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<td>326</td>
<td>Maj YANAGI, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Fort Inf Bn</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>Capt IWII, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Fort Inf Bn</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>Maj OKITO, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Fort Inf Bn</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>Capt IWII, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hwy arty Regt</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>Col SEMI, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IKI Hill Hosp</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>113</td>
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<td>Fortress Total</td>
<td>9,263</td>
<td>9,319</td>
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</table>

Total 56th Army:

| KYUSHU                        | 104,395 | 93,622 |
| IKI Island                    | 9,263   | 9,319  |
| Total                        | 113,658 | 103,941 |

STRICT RULES - 16TH ARMY

Location: UTO MAJI, UTO GUN, MUKIYAMA Prefecture.

Mission: To reinforce any threatened area of KYUSHU.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CODE</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>216th Inf Div Hq</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>LtGen WAKANO, Y.</td>
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<tr>
<td>522nd Inf Regt</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>4,537</td>
<td>LtCol TOHTA, M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>523rd Inf Regt</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>4,837</td>
<td>LtCol HIRO, G.</td>
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</tr>
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DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012


### ISOLATED DEFENSE UNITS UNDER DIRECT CONTROL 16TH AREA ARMY

**Location:** MIyAZAKI City and vicinity.

**Mission:** Local defense.

**Attached:***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>Co</th>
<th>CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>524th Inf Regt</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>4,637</td>
<td>LtCol KATOHMA, T.</td>
<td>HIEI 10255</td>
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<tr>
<td>216th Fld arty Regt</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>LtCol NAGAWA, Y.</td>
<td>24305</td>
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<tr>
<td>216th Med Mort. Regt</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>Col HIYOSAWA, K.</td>
<td>10256</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT Unit</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>Capt OTSUKA, D.</td>
<td>10257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC Unit</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>Capt TUMEMOTO, S.</td>
<td>10253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr Regt</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>Maj ASARI, Y.</td>
<td>10259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Bn</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>Maj TAKEUCHI, I.</td>
<td>10261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Co</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>Capt TUTILA, Y.</td>
<td>10260</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chem/War Unit</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordnance Duty Unit</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>Capt CHIGAKI, F.</td>
<td>HIEI 10262</td>
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<tr>
<td>Med Unit</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>Not activated</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Fld Hosp</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>Not activated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2nd Fld Hosp</td>
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<td>Not activated</td>
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<td>4th Fld Hosp</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>Capt AKENI, A.</td>
<td>HIEI 10263</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vet Hosp</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Not activated</td>
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<td>Div Total</td>
<td>22,465</td>
<td>21,736</td>
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**Authority:** E.O. 13526  
**By:** NDC  
**NARA Date:** Dec 31, 2012

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**UNIT**  
**T/O STRENGTH**  
**CO**  
**CODE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location: SAGANOSEKI, TAKASHIMA, and SADAMISAKI, SHIKOKU.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission:</strong> Defense of the HINO STRAITS.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| 118th Ind Mixed Brig Hq 324  
  713th Ind Inf Bn 397  
  714th Ind Inf Bn 397  
  715th Ind Inf Bn 397  
  716th Ind Inf Bn 397  
  717th Ind Inf Bn 397  
  Arty Bn 320  
  14th Hyg arty Rgt 650  
  Engr Bn 372  |
| **Rocket Unit**  
  MajGen UCHIYAMA, F.  
  Capt AY, T.  
  Capt MATSUGITA, H.  
  Capt NOGUCHI, S.  
  Capt HAYAKURA, S.  
  Capt FURUMA, K.  
  Maj NAKA, A.  
  Col YAOI, Y.  
  Capt OIDE, Y.  |
| **Mutsu** 13613  
  27793  
  27794  
  27795  
  27796  
  27797  
  27798  
  27799  
  27800  |
| **Sigs Co** 224  
  Attached: SAGANOSEKI Mil Hosp 16  |
| **Brig Total** 7,145  
  6,145  |
| **Unknown** None |

**Location:** JALUUSA Island and SHIMIBARA Point.

**Mission:** Defense of the approaches to ARIAKE Sea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location: FUKAE SHIMA, GOTU RETTO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission:</strong> Local Defense.</td>
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</table>

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### 3. CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>STRENGTH</th>
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<th>CODE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>107th Ind Mixed Brig HQ</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>MajGen KUSE,</td>
<td>HO</td>
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<tr>
<td>636th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>LtCol UCHIDA, M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>637th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>Capt OZAWA, S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>638th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>LtCol TAKEMASA, S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>639th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>LtCol MURAYAMA, T.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>640th Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>LtCol KAWAMURA, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>641st Ind Inf Bn</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>Maj SASAKI, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arty Bn</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>Maj ARAI, H.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Maj SAZUKI, K.               |
- 1stLt MORI, K.               |

**Location:** TSUSHIMA.

**Mission:** Local defense.

**ATTACHED:**

- KECHI Hill Hosp
  - 1,756
  - 1,733
  - Maj MURAYAMA, T.

**Fortress Total:**
- 7,109
- 7,105

---

**SAGA Prefecture**

- 11th Ind MG Co
  - 114
  - Capt ISHIBASHI, K.

- 16th Sp MG Unit
  - Formed with personnel from other units of 4th AAA Div

**FUKUOKA Prefecture**

- 3rd, 5th Co's, 13th AAA Regt
  - 240

- 5th, 6th Co's, 13th AAA Regt
  - 240

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07269 Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st Ind AAA BN</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>Maj ITO, S.</td>
<td>SUI 8076</td>
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<tr>
<td>43rd Ind AAA BN (less 3rd Co)</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>Maj KUSUMOTO, K.</td>
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<td>OITA Prefecture</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Co, 122nd AAA Regt.</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Capt KIMAM, T.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4TH AAA DIV UNITS UNDER CONTROL KUMAMOTO DIV DISTRICT

KUMAMOTO Prefecture
| 2nd BN, 132nd AAA Regt (less 10th Co) | 675 | 675      | Maj KAJASHIMA, S.      | SUI 8062 |
| 6th Co, 136th AAA Regt               | 120 | 120      | Capt KUSUMOTO, S.      |      |

2nd Co, 95th Ind AAA BN
| 120 | 120 | 1stLt KONDO, H. | SUI 12469 |

UNITING UNDER DIRECT CONTROL 16TH AREA ARMY

| 11th Engr Cmd | 103 | 103 | Col MIZUMOTO, K. | NIPPO 13511 |
| 39th Ind Engr BN | 391 | 391 | Capt KAJASHIMA, K. | |
| 123rd Ind Engr BN | 391 | 391 | Unknown | |
| 124th Ind Engr BN | 391 | 391 | Unknown | |
| Cmd Total | 2,550 | 2,550 | |

| 9th Fld Trans Cmd | 37 | 37 | Col KAJASHIMA, Y. | |
| 84th Ind MT BN | 303 | 303 | Maj KAJASHIMA, M. | 7574 |

<p>| 3rd Sig Cmd | 33 | 33 | MajGen OZAKI, M. | 13566 |
| 7th Sig Regt | 1,098 | 1,098 | Maj FUJITA, H. | 5091 |
| 52nd Sig Regt | 1,098 | 1,098 | LtCol UMEKITA, K. | 13512 |
| 5th Early Wn Radar Un | 189 | 189 | LtLt TOKUNAI, Y. | 13514 |
| 1st Ind Sig Lab Unit | 302 | 302 | Unknown | 27390 |
| 2nd &quot; &quot; &quot; | 302 | 302 | LtLt FUJIBAYASHI, C. | 27391 |
| 3rd &quot; &quot; &quot; | 302 | 302 | LtLt SHISHIDO, H. | 27392 |
| 11th &quot; &quot; &quot; | 302 | 302 | Unknown | 36410 |
| 12th &quot; &quot; &quot; | 302 | 302 | Unknown | 36411 |</p>
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<th>CODE</th>
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<td>57th</td>
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<td>58th</td>
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<td>59th</td>
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</tr>
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<td>60th</td>
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<td>302</td>
<td>2ndLt SATO, R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>61st</td>
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<td>1stLt HORI, T.</td>
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<td>62nd</td>
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<td>1stLt SHIINO, A.</td>
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<td>63rd</td>
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<td>1stLt TAKAMATSU, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>64th</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>2ndLt YOSHIDA, A.</td>
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<td>65th</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>1stLt ODA, K.</td>
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<td>66th</td>
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<td>2ndLt NAKAO, K.</td>
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<td>67th</td>
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<td>2ndLt FUKUCHI, T.</td>
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<td>68th</td>
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<td>2ndLt TAMURA, N.</td>
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<td>69th</td>
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<td>302</td>
<td>2ndLt NAKAO, J.</td>
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<td>70th</td>
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<td>302</td>
<td>1stLt SATO, K.</td>
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<td>71st</td>
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<td>1stLt HINO, M.</td>
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<td>72nd</td>
<td>302</td>
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<td>1stLt KANbara, T.</td>
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<td>73rd</td>
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<td>74th</td>
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<td>1stLt ODA, K.</td>
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<td>75th</td>
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<td><strong>9,938</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>165th Land Duty Co</td>
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<td>511</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
</tr>
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<td>Duty Unit Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>512th Cons Duty Unit</td>
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<td>511</td>
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<tr>
<td>516th Cons Duty Unit</td>
<td>511</td>
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<tr>
<td>517th Cons Duty Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>104th Sp Land Duty Co</td>
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<td>2ndLt</td>
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<td>116th Sp Land Duty Co</td>
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<td>754</td>
<td>Capt</td>
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<tr>
<td>123rd Sp Sea Duty Co</td>
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<td>754</td>
<td>Capt</td>
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<td>27th Sea Trans En</td>
<td>530</td>
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<td>Capt</td>
</tr>
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<td>28th Sea Trans En</td>
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<td>Capt</td>
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<td>30th Sea Trans En</td>
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<td>59th L of C Sector</td>
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<td>Col</td>
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<td>59th L of C Duty Co</td>
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<td>37th Sui.Bt.Unit</td>
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<td>7th Sui.Bt.Serv.Unit</td>
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<td>13th Mtn Arty Regt</td>
<td>2,936</td>
<td>2,936</td>
<td>Col</td>
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</table>

**WESTERN DISTRICT ARMY**

<p>| EJWDA Dist. Army Hq        | 1,149 | 1,712 | LtGen | 1,149 | LtGen | ISHIKAWA, K.|
| EJWDA Div Dist Hq          | 421   | 449   | LtGen | 421   | LtGen | SOGO, W.  |
| 1st Inf Regt Rp Unit       | 3,203 | 4,544 | Col   | 3,203 | Col   | SHINAGA, T. |
| 2nd Inf Regt Rp Unit       | 3,203 | 5,646 | Col   | 3,203 | Col   | OSHIDA, B. |
| 3rd Inf Regt Rp Unit       | 3,203 | 5,791 | Col   | 3,203 | Col   | NISHIDA, A.|
| Arty Rp Unit               | 761   | 3,000 | Col   | 761   | Col   | AZUMI, K.  |
| Engr Rp Unit               | 742   | 2,216 | LtCol | 742   | LtCol | ISHIKAWA, H.|
| Trans Rp Unit              | 672   | 1,945 | Maj   | 672   | Maj   | ISHIKAWA, K.|
| Sig Rp Unit                | 347   | 803   | Capt  | 347   | Capt  | KOBAYASHI, K.|
| FUKUOKA Regt Dist Hq       | 219   | 219   | LtGen | 219   | LtGen | TAJIRI, T. |
| SAGA Regt Dist Hq          | 107   | 107   | LtGen | 107   | LtGen | OSHI, K.  |
| HACHIOJI Regt Dist Hq      | 156   | 156   | MajGen| 156   | MajGen| KAWAURA, T.|
| EJWDA Mil Hosp             | 550   | 550   | Col   | 550   | Col   | KUBODA, Y. |
| FUKUOKA #1 Mil Hosp        | 70    | 70    | LtCol | 70    | LtCol | SAKIYAMA, D.|
| OKURA Mil Hosp             | 70    | 70    | LtCol | 70    | LtCol | FUSUMA, T. |
| SAGA Mil Hosp              | 32    | 32    | Maj   | 32    | Maj   | KAWASHI, S. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
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6th Med Artly Regt Rp Unit
6th Med Artly Regt Rp Unite
SHIMONOSEKI Fort Hvy
Arty Regt Rp Unit
SASEBO Fort Hvy
Arty Regt Rp Unit
2nd Sgr Regt Rp Unit
1st HC Training Unit
West Dist Train Sch.
1st KUREBE R.O.S.
2nd KUREBE R.O.S.
KONURA Mil Hosp
FUKUOKA #2 Mill Hosp
BEPPU Mill Hosp
KUHAKO #2 Mill Hosp
TAKEDA Mill Hosp
KURASAKI #2 Mill Hosp
MITA BAHA Mil Hosp

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<td>Kokuha Hill Prison</td>
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<td>Hama POW Camp</td>
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<td>764</td>
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**RECAPITULATION 16TH AREA ARMY**

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**1ST SHIPPING TRANSPORT COMMAND**

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Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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WESTERN DISTRICT MP UNITS

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SPECIAL GARRISON COMPANIES (MILITIA)

Each company was a group of 200 - 400 civilians organized around a cadre of 2 - 10 regular army personnel. State of training and equipment was such that they could not be considered as military personnel.

FUKUOKA Prefecture: Co's 1 through 23.
KUSUSHIMA Prefecture: Co's 1 through 19.
KUMAMOTO Prefecture: Co's 1 through 17.
MIYAZAKI Prefecture: Co's 1 through 13.
NAGASAKI Prefecture: Co's 1 through 15.
OITA Prefecture: Co's 1 through 17.
SAGA Prefecture: Co's 1 through 10.
YAMAUCHI Prefecture: None reported.

SASEBO NAVAL DISTRICT

SASEBO Comb SNS Hq    | 439 | Wdn HII, K. |
SASEBO #11 SNLF       | 2,635| Cdr HIRAI, H. | Same.

REMARKS

Land defense of SASEBO & environs

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07333  appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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<td>10,490</td>
<td>Vadm ABE, K</td>
<td>To man CD, 7th Btry's under control SASEBO N.D. Personnel were concentrated (1) SASEBO Hbr (2) NAGASAKI Hbr &amp; TACHI-BAKA Bay (3) KAGOSHIMA Bay. Additional personnel, equipment turned over to 16th Area Army in south KYUSHU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Nav Def Unit</td>
<td>4,447</td>
<td>Capt KAMADA, T.</td>
<td>All minelaying, minesweeping activities in waters off west coast of KYUSHU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAIDA Hbr Nav Gd Force</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>Capt KAMIOKA, T.</td>
<td>Minesweeping, HAIDA Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI Hbr Nav Gd Force</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>Capt YAJIMAOTO, T.</td>
<td>Minesweeping, NAGAS, Hbr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSUSHIMA Nav Gd Force</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>Capt FUKUDA, T.</td>
<td>Coast defense TSUSHIMA and to assist TSUSHIMA Fortress in Int defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Sub'Base</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>Cmdr NAKA, M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Nav Comm Unit</td>
<td>2,919</td>
<td>Capt KITAJIMA, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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SUICIDE BOAT UNITS

SASEBO Sub'Base
SASEBO Nav Comm Unit
3rd Sp Attack Force Hq 166
KAGOSHIMA Assault Unit 143
3rd Assault Unit 1,243
34th Assault Unit 1,674

3rd Sp Attack Force Hq 132
32nd Assault Unit 4,137
33rd Assault Unit 1,031
35th Assault Unit 2,136

Force Total 9,437

5th Sp Attack Force Hq 132
32nd Assault Unit 4,137
33rd Assault Unit 1,031
35th Assault Unit 2,136

Force Total 7,535

TRAINING UNITS

SASEBO Nav Barracks 29,714
HAROI Nav Barracks 7,144
AIJOYA Nav Barracks 11,232

Total Training 47,346

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Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLES to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Nav Hosp</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>V Adm ISHIURO</td>
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<tr>
<td>URASHIMA Nav Hosp</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSHIMA Nav Hosp</td>
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<td>ISAHAYA Nav Hosp</td>
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**HEADQUARTERS, BASE, AND SERVICE PERSONNEL**

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<td>SASEBO Nav Dist Hq</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>V Adm SUGIYAMA, R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel Office</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>R Adm HISAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shipping Office</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Capt ISHIBASHI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport Office</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>R Adm ISHIURO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hkr Master's Office</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>Capt SHIMIZU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dockyard</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>V Adm SUGIYAMA, R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courts Martial Office</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>R Adm KUSUMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval prison</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Capt YAMAOKA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply Office</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>R Adm KUSUMA</td>
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<td>Stores Dept</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>R Adm YATSUJI</td>
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<td>Civ Engr Dept</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>Capt SADEHARA</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAWAI Dockyard</td>
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**KURE NAVAL DISTRICT**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHIMONOSEKI Nav Def Unit</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>Capt ISHIBASHI, Y.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Minesweeping, minelaying, CD, AI defense SHIMONOSEKI Str. Area.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAEKI Nav Def Unit</td>
<td>6,539</td>
<td>R Adm OKADA, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Mineelaying, anti-sub, CD, AI defense of the SINGO Straits.</td>
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**SUICIDE BOAT UNITS**

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Sp Attack Force Hq</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>R Adm KIYOKI, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Assault Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>(SUKUHO Bay, SHIKOKU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>23rd Assault Unit</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24th Assault Unit</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Capt OKADA, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Total (HIJIRI)</td>
<td>249</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2nd Sp Attack Force Hq)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGA Assault Unit</td>
<td>1,294</td>
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### UNIT STRENGTH CO CODE

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<th>CO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37th Ship Engr Brgt</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>Maj KUSAKI, E.</td>
<td>AMATSUKI 19332</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Mob Trans Co</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 16731</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th Mob Trans Co</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 16734</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th Mob Trans Co</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 16735</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Mob Trans Co</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 16738</td>
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<tr>
<td>16th Mob Trans Co</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 16762</td>
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<tr>
<td>17th Sea Trans Bn</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 19319</td>
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<tr>
<td>13th Sea Trans Bn</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>1,622</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 19320</td>
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<td>20th Sea Trans Bn</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 19343</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Mob Trans Bn</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 16767</td>
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<tr>
<td>69th Sea Duty Co</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>&quot; 12872</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Ship Engr Rp Unit</td>
<td>2,213</td>
<td>2,213</td>
<td>LtCol TAKAKI, Y.</td>
<td>&quot; 16169</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Ship Engr Rp Unit</td>
<td>2,213</td>
<td>2,219</td>
<td>Maj TORII, T.</td>
<td>&quot; 16170</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mob Trans Rp Unit</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>LtCol MASUCHI, H.</td>
<td>&quot; 16711</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sea Pursuit Rp Unit</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>LtCol KYU, T.</td>
<td>&quot; 16712</td>
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**Total Army**

- **13,267**
- **21,339**

### UNIT STRENGTH CO REMARKS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOOKIYa NaNal District</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOOKIYa Nav Def Unit</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>Capt SHIMIZU, T.</td>
<td>Minesweeping, Inland Sea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOOKIYa Nav Gd Force</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>Capt SHIMIZU, T.</td>
<td>CO, AA defense TOOKIYa Area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENZAKI Har Nav Gd Force</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>Capt OKA, M.</td>
<td>Minesweeping SENZAKI Har.</td>
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**SUICIDE BOAT UNITS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hldr</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Attack Force Hq</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>Rdm HARA, H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Katsushika Assault Unit</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>Capt HATSUMURA, T.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>OTSUSHIMA Assault Unit</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>LtCol INOUE, M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIRARI Assault Unit</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>Capt KAJIIWA, S.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HIRO Assault Unit</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>Capt SHIMURA, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force Total</td>
<td>4,396</td>
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073843 Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<tr>
<td>OTAKE Nav Barracks</td>
<td>11,679</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>SCFU Radio School</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCFU Br, Nav Academy</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yssel Br, Sub School</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>Capt HICHIRO, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTAKE Sub School</td>
<td>6,146</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAHIMI Br, Nav Academy</td>
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<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MAHIMI Nav Hosp</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOKUYAMA Br, KURE</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trans Dept</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td><strong>Total Navy</strong></td>
<td>31,291</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Air Army (KYUSHU and YAMAGUCHI Prefecture)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Location:** KYUSHU, SHIKOKU, and OCHIYAMA. Hq at FUKUOKA.

**Mission:** To defend KYUSHU from amphibious assault.

6th Air Army Hq 1,031 LtGen SUGAMURA, K.

12th Air Div Hq 450 Maj Gen HAMU, K.

44th Air Rgt 230 Maj KITAMURA, K.

47th Air Rgt 130 Maj OTSUDA, K.

59th Air Rgt 287 Maj HISHI, K.

71st Air Rgt 240 Maj AKAN, K.

83rd Ind Air Sqn 116 Capt OTSUKI, K.

6th Air Brig Hq 43 Col IMAI, K.

65th Air Rgt 213 Maj YOSHIKI, K.

66th Air Rgt 213 Maj FUJI, K.

**Air Div Total** 2,953

Air ground units under control 12th Air Div:

51st Air Sector Cond 45 LtCol OYAMA, K.

4th Airfield Bn 603 Maj IMAI, K.

235th Airfield Bn 603 Capt HIYOSHI, K.

245th Airfield Bn 603 Maj KANAMOTO, K.

64th Airfield Bn 603 Maj HIYOSHI, K.

65th Airfield Bn 603 Capt HAYASHI, K.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>Co</th>
<th>CODE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>193rd Airfield Bn</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>Capt Fujimiya, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194th Airfield Bn</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>Capt Urayama, H.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23rd Airfield Bn</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>Capt Sumida, T.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>82nd Airfield Co</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>Capt Komatsui, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Airfield Co</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>Capt Iwasaki, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>192nd Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>270</td>
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<tr>
<td>17th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>2ndLt Inomoto, S.</td>
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<td>270</td>
<td>2ndLt Hataishi, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27th A/F Cons Unit</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>Capt Ohira, N.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th A/F Cons Unit</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>Capt Sakai, S.</td>
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<td>16th A/F Cons Unit</td>
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<td>16th A/F Cons Unit</td>
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<td>1stLt Gosaku, H.</td>
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<td>14th Ground-Air Rad.</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>Capt Shigei, Yashiki, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Ind.Air NCO Co</td>
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<td>2ndLt Shingi</td>
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<td>8th Ind.Air NCO Co</td>
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<td>2ndLt Tashiro</td>
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<td>10th Ind.Air NCO Co</td>
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<td>Air ground TOTAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>30th Air Group HQ</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>MajGen Nissho, Y.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Air Brig HQ</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>LtCol Nakai, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st Air Brig HQ</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>Col Tashiro, H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17th Ind Air Sqn</td>
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<td>Capt Fujimiya, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Group Total</td>
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Air ground units under control 30th Air Group:

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<th>UNIT</th>
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<tr>
<td>41st Air Sector Comd</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Col Fujimiya, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>142nd Airfield Bn</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>Maj Ume, I.</td>
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<tr>
<td>172nd Airfield Bn</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>Maj Takemura, S.</td>
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<td>223rd Airfield Bn</td>
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<td>Capt Otsuka, S.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Capt Sugihara, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>199th Ind Maint Unit</td>
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<td>1stLt Hori, N.</td>
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<td>14th U-J Install Unit</td>
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<td>Maj Suka, H.</td>
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### UNIT

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<td>KUHMOTO Air Sector Corp</td>
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<td>603</td>
<td>Maj OYAMI, H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>174th Airfield Bn</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>Capt ONOZAKI,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229th Airfield Bn</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>Maj SUZUKI,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd Airfield Bn</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>Maj NAKATA, K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>239th Airfield Bn</td>
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<td>Capt SUZUKI, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>227th Airfield Bn</td>
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<td>Capt OKAI, H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>55th Airfield Co</td>
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<td>1stLt SUGI, H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>100th Ind Maint Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>110th Ind Maint Unit</td>
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<td>Capt KURODA, H.</td>
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<td>111th Ind Maint Unit</td>
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<td>Capt SHIYAMA, S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>114th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Capt KIYAMA, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>154th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Capt HIROI,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Maj HASEKA, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>311th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1stLt HONDA, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th A/F Cons Unit</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>Maj ISHIYAMA, H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142nd A/F Cons Unit</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>Capt OYAMA, Z.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Ind A/A Mk Co</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1stLt YAMASE, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Ind A/A Mk Co</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2ndLt MAKURO, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Ind A/A Mk Co</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1stLt YAMADA, Y.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52nd Ind A/A Mk Co</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1stLt ISHIHARA, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53rd Ind A/A Mk Co</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1stLt KURODA, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Ind A/A Mk Co</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1stLt SUZUKI, Y.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Command Total:** 7,395

**Total Air Ground:** 12,297

Units under direct control 6th Air Army:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60th Air Regt</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>LtCol ATSUMI, H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110th Air Regt</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>Maj KURODA, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Ind Air Regt</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>LtCol IRITA, H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1stLt TAKAHASHI, H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Capt KITAJIMA, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Capt MIYAIHARA, Y.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1stLt MIYAKE, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1stLt HIROI, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172nd A/F Const Unit</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Capt MIYAMA, H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd A/F Cons Unit</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Capt MIYASOKA, Y.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th U-2 Install Unit</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>Capt TAKABE, S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**CONFIDENTIAL**
07353   Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17th U-G Install Unit</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>Capt 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42nd Cons Duty Co</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Capt OKIYAMA, B.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Sig Comd</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Col MIKI, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Raiding Brig</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Col MAEKURA, I.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Air Sig Rgt</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Col NAKADA, Y.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Ground-air Rad.U.</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>Capt MAEKURA, M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st Ground-air Rad.U.</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>Capt ISHIKAWA, T.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd Ground-air Rad.U.</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1st Lt TOMITA, M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73rd Ground-air Rad.U.</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>Capt MAEKURA, A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th Ground-air Rad.U.</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1st Lt TSUZUKI, M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th Ground-air Rad.U.</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>1st Lt HIROTA, M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Navig. Aid Unit</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Maj KIKUO, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Meteor, Unit</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>LtCol HISAMIKI, M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 6th Air Arm 35,520

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD</th>
<th>PILOTS</th>
<th>TRAINES</th>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>AA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

NAVAL AIR PERSONNEL, KYUSHU AND YAMAUCHI PREFECTURE

KANAYA  73  0  10,537  2,550
Kusai  35  0  1,338  (included above)
KUSAI  103  0  3,582  (included above)
Takayama  121  0  1,352  143
KOKUBU #1  206  0  1,907  445
KOKUBU #2  85  0  1,428  192
KUSAIHIMA  90  0  2,052  427
IZUMI  71  0  3,367  597
HITOYOSHI  62  0  1,702  165
MIYAZAKI  125  0  1,255  446
TOMIZU  165  0  3,133  368
Sakurashima  40  0  464  0
TANAKASHIMA  164  0  1,143  143
OITA  131  0  6,074  1,073
US  180  0  3,322  7
TSUYUMI  320  0  4,925  420
Kuruma  327  0  2,077  0
FUKUOKA  274  0  3,025  0
OYAMA  243  0  1,645  65
OKUMA  353  0  5,707  xxxxxx*
Kawara  86  0  2,593  xxxxxx*

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CONFIDENTIAL
Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD</th>
<th>PILOTS</th>
<th>TRAINERS</th>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAeki</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>xxxx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usuki</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ochi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijudai</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K sluts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakiama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasugahara</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koschi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinohara &amp; Unzen</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hetsumi</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halkuni</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5,458</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Naval Air: 31,545

* A.A. defense by Saeki Nav Air Force, which see.

# A.A. defense by Saeki Nav Def Unit, which see.

**Army Depots**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka Army Supply Subdepot</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka Army Clothing Subdepot</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka Army Provisions Subdepot</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kofuha Army Ordnance Supply Depot</td>
<td>2,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka Army Med Supply Subdepot</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kofuha Army Vet Supply Subdepot</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kofuha Army Arsenal</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br's, Toto #2 Army Arsenal</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takadanobaba Frt Storage Depot</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Flt Remount Depot</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Army Air Depots**

Tachikawa Air Depot: 4,283

3rd, 4th Sections, 7th Air Apr Dep: 268

0344 Air Supply Subdepot: 360

12th Army Air Supply Depot: 250

**Navy Air Depots**

Iwakuni Br, 11th Navairenseal: 64

12th Nav Air Arsenal: 302

21st Nav Air Arsenal: 433

22nd Nav Air Arsenal: 7

Total Depots: 9,900

Figures are exclusive of civilian employees.
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Appendix 5 to Annex CHARLIE to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

0398

G-2 PERIODIC REPORTS

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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

0133/131

SECRET

No. 1.

From: 1800I, 21 Sept 45
To: 1800I, 22 Sept 45

Hq. V Amphibious Corps,
31390, KYUSHU (USN McKinley),
O800, 25 September 1945.

Map: Special G-2 Situation Map No. 1, attached.

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

   see Order of Battle - Enclosure (A).

2. Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   see Order of Battle - Enclosure (A).

3. General attitude of military and semi-military units.
   Military authorities have complied in every respect
   with all prescribed requirements and have cooperated to the fullest
   extent without making any attempt at evasion or violation of Allied
   terms. There have been no known acts of violence or destruction of
   arms and equipment.

4. Location, description and inventory of dumps under
   Allied control.
   (a) Ordnance.

KAS (31390)

100 Aerial bombs (unknown weight)
3000 100-lb. bombs
2500 200-lb. bombs
250 Rifles
20 M2 guns
10 5-inch guns
85 Airplane machine guns
Disarmed beach mines

31390 Fortress Artillery Headquarters
(Located in the north edge of the city proper)

10 Swords
502 Rifles
1 70mm field gun - long barrel
4 15cm arty mortars
4 Boxes attachments for sub-caliber firing of 24 cm howitzer

- 1 -
SECRET

1-2 Periodic Report No. 1. (continued)

(a) Arty triangulation instrument
36,525 rds 7.7 mm ammunition
9,000 rds machine gun ammunition
584 Bayonets
6 Heavy machine guns
2 Type 45, 24 cm howitzers
2 88 cm howitzers

(b) Aviation.

NAS (JASEBO)

31 Seaplanes in area near GREEN Beach
1 Land plane in area near GREEN Beach
32 Airplane trainers
95 Radial airplane engines
2 Aerial cameras
20 Airplane tail assemblies
60 Airplane engines
1 Link trainer

(c) Communications.

NAS (JASEBO)

30 Radios of six different types

JASEBO Fortress Arty Headquarters

3 Wireless key sets
40 Field phones
120 Reels of field wire

(d) Transportation.

NAS (JASEBO)

5 Railroad engines

JASEBO Fortress Arty Headquarters

8 Type 92 tractors
12 Large trailers

(e) Miscellaneous.

NAS (JASEBO)

3 210-gallon underground tanks of oil
3 Underground machine shops
B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

Naval Air Station (SASEBO) and 21st Naval Air Depot
SASEBO Navy Yard and Naval Headquarters
SASEBO Aircraft factory
City of SASEBO: Railroad station, post office, telephone exchange, sanitary and public health facilities

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

City of SASEBO: Telegraph exchange, police station, newspaper offices, HOKO Headquarters

C. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.

No information.

D. CIVILIAN POPULATION.

Civilian population has been acquiescent and docile with little expression of emotion or show of interest. There has been no evidence of unrest and no political trends have been noted.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Coastal defense and anti-aircraft positions. (See Situation Map attached)

AA and CD gun positions inspected by the V Amphibious Corps Advance Party indicated compliance with surrender terms. Breech blocks had been removed, ammunition had been removed from gun positions and white flags marked each installation.

(2) Present condition of the City of SASEBO. (From information furnished by Japanese city authorities.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total area of the city:</th>
<th>171,280 sq. km.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old section</td>
<td>53,520 sq. km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New section</td>
<td>117,760 sq. km.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total area destroyed by bombing: 17,700 sq. km.
Houses totally burned 1,038
Dead: 328
Wounded: 328

---

SECRET

- 3 -
Population prior to 29 June 1945: 300,000
Population at present: 166,642
   Old section: 119,809
   New section: 46,833
   War victims: 80,734

(3) Records.

Liaison officers of the 16th Area Army volunteered the information that all battalion and regimental records of army units on KYUSHU were destroyed about 1 August because of fear of imminent invasion. Reliability of this information has not been confirmed.

I. B. YANCEY,
Colonel, 330,
AC of 3, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifthFlt 1
CG Sixth Army 1
CIC JICPOA 1
CG FM Tac 1
Com5thFlt 1
ComFltGrp 4 1
CG III Flt Corps 1
CG 2ndMarDiv 5
CG 5thMarDiv 5
CG 32ndInfDiv 5
CO Corps Troops 1
ACors, G-3, VAC 1
Record Section VAC 1
File 5
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

23 September, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Order of Battle Situation, 22 September 1945.

NOTE: Most of the information contained in this report was
obtained by interview with naval and army representatives. Lt.
Comdr. ODAWA, Adjutant of the SASEBO Naval District was the prin-
cipal navy representative. A liaison team headed by Major General
Y. KUOJO, Vice Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army provided
the army information. Reconnaissance by the V Amphibious Corps
advance party and the 5th Marine Division have confirmed in all
areas investigated this information provided on the SASEBO area.

For current status of enemy forces in the forward area
see attached situation map.

The bulk of the enemy's forces in the SASEBO area both
before the end of the war and at the present time are naval. None
of the pre-occupation naval forces remain in existence as organized
units. Currently the naval troops are organized into three tempo-
rary groups: Security police (HOA'TAI), Service and Shipping.
The first group are acting as guards on all naval installations.
The second group are provisioning the HOA'TAI. The third group
is being detained near YAMA'TA as potential crews for shipping
removed from SASEBO Harbor to OMURA Bay. All naval ground per-
soneel in the SASEBO area are under the direct command of Vice
Admiral ABE, Yosio.

Within the 10-mile restricted zone are a total of 736,
about half of whom are guards and the remainder service personnel.
Vice Admiral SUGIYAMA, Rokuzo and Vice Admiral ABE have established
a small combined headquarters in the Girl's School in SASEBO for
liaison and demobilization purposes. Also within the 10-mile
restricted zone are 25 guard and liaison personnel from 951st Naval
Air Group, 14 similar army personnel under command of 1stLt.
SUGIMOTO, Masajiro from the SASEBO Heavy Artillery Regiment Re-
placement Unit are stationed in the barracks of the old SASEBO
Heavy Artillery Battalion. The remainder of the original two
companies moved to KOKURA on 17 September. A small MP detach-
ment commanded by Sgt. YOSHIMOTO, Seisaburo remains in SASEBO with
branches at AMURA, HARIOSHIYA, YOSHIT, and YAMATA -- all small
localities in the SASEBO area. The bulk of the original SASEBO NP
Unit have moved to KOKURA.
062/131

Order of Battle. (Continued)

SECRET

Outside the 10-mile restricted zone but in the Sasebo area, are 1,000 naval troops awaiting demobilization in the Shima District and 1500 seagoing personnel at Yawata previously mentioned.

A minimum of guard and maintenance personnel are reported at MKURA and Isahaya airfields. 200 HOKUTAI (Naval guards) are reported at Mokura airfield. The personnel of the 146th Infantry Regiment Replacement Depot have been recalled to Yuruma to aid the 65th Depot Division Headquarters in administrating demobilization.

A minimum number of military personnel are reported now stationed at AGASA'I. The AGASA'I Fortress was converted to the 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade with an original strength of 6,000. The bulk of this personnel were army but some naval personnel were manning part of the heavy guns on the peninsula south of AGASA'I. The unit has been demobilized, and only 72 remain in the city guarding arms.

The 313th Infantry Division (11,000-12,000 original strength) was located in the KARATSU area with headquarters located in KARATSU Town and the troops deployed around KARATSU Bay. The division is reported to be completely demobilized with the exception of a small detachment of unknown strength guarding arms at KARATSU.

According to Japanese representatives, who appear to be quite reliable, both navy and army units in rear areas of the V Amphibious Corps zone of occupation are approximately 90 percent demobilized as of this date.

2. Pre-Occupation Organization of Japanese Naval Units in the Sasebo Naval District. According to Japanese representatives, the defense of the Sasebo area was an entirely naval affair. All forces in the area were under command of Vice Admiral Abe. The principal units were as follows:

Sasebo HOKUTAI (Defense Unit): Duties were mine laying and mine sweeping.

Sasebo Combined SFL: An infantry force of 20,000 deployed within a 15-mile radius of Sasebo. Subordinate units were the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th SFLs.

Sasebo area AA Defense Unit (CHIKU HOKUTAI): Manned all AA guns in Sasebo area. Strength about 5,000.
SASEBO Naval Guard Force: Manned 88 guns in the SASEBO area. Unit was organized into "barracks" located at SASEBO, AT'OURA, HARIO and KAYATAI. Unit was commanded by Captain YAMADA.

Details of Suicide Boat Units have been reported to the 6th Amphibious Force and will not be covered in this report.

Sufficient details of the status of naval air units are not yet available. Vice Admiral KUSAKA, Ryunosuke CO of the 6th Air Fleet is reported by the Japanese to have gone from OKA to KAOYA to assist the 6th Army in its activities in that area.

The status of naval units in OITA, MIYAZAKI and YAMAGUCHI prefectures is not yet known, as this Corps has as yet been unable to contact a representative from the PUSA Naval District.

3. Army units on KYUSHU. The 18th Area Army Headquarters is the only organized army echelon remaining on KYUSHU. The 40th, 56th, and 57th Armies (corps) are reported to be disbanded. Their commanders are respectively Lt. General YAMAKEYA, Mitsuo, Lt. General SHICHIDA, Ichiro, and Lt. General TAKAHARA, Yosuke. Dispositions of divisions and brigades are substantially the same as previously reported. The following discrepancies are noted. All army units in South KYUSHU have been withdrawn north of an east-west line running a few miles north of KOHSHI in accordance with a 3rd Army directive. The KOHYO Fortress was converted to the 118th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 3rd Amphibious Brigade was converted to the 125th Independent Mixed Brigade and was located at IBUSUKI before being moved to HOTOYOSHII in accordance with 3rd Army directive. The 4th Independent Tank Brigade was located at OGATA; the 5th, at KOJO; and the 6th, at MIYAKOJO. Each brigade had about 200 light and medium tanks. Demobilization of the 4th Tank Brigade was completed 21 September.

4. The pre-occupation status of divisions on KYUSHU was as follows: Divisions in the 0-100 number block. "Old divisions"; fully equipped according to Japanese standards. Strength from 17,000 to 20,000.

Divisions in the 101-200 number block. Strength 15,000. Primarily intended for static defense. Inadequately equipped in all types of arms.

Divisions in the 201-300 number block. Strength 15,000; Primarily intended as mobile reserves. Inadequately equipped in all types of arms.

-3-
Division in the 301-400 number block. Strength 11,000 to 12,000. Primarily intended for static defense. Inadequately equipped in all types of arms.

5. Other Army Units. The 98th IME had a pre-occupation strength of 6,000 to 7,000 (8 battalions). The 167th IME had a strength of 6,000. These troops are now disarmed and awaiting transportation from FUKUSE SHIMA. The 109th IME had a strength of about 6,000. These troops are now disarmed and awaiting transportation from TAKEBA SHIMA. The 162nd and 163rd IMEs have already been discussed above. 6,000 members of the TSUSHIMA Fortress and 7,000 members of the IWI Island Fortress have been disarmed and are awaiting transportation.

As mentioned in connection with 145th Infantry Regiment Replacement Depot. Personnel from all regimental replacement units have been recalled to the 58th and 6th Depot Divisions at KURUME and KUMAMOTO respectively. The CG of the 6th Depot Division is Lt. General TSUCHIHASHI, Ichiji. His name was previously misread as DOBASHI.
3-2 PERIODIC REPORT

0155/131

From: 1800I, 22Sept45
To : 1800I, 23Sept45

HQ, V Amphibious Corps, SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 24 September 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Order of Battle - Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Order of Battle - Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of camps under
our control.

(a) Ordnance.

NAS (SASEBO)

More than 10,000 aerial bombs of various
types, all without fuzes or powder charges.

(b) Aviation.

NAS (SASEBO)

Preliminary inspection by TAI indicates
all aircraft are of standard types ex-
cept 5 experimental planes and 15 Kawanishi
Fighter seaplanes (code name REX).

(c) Miscellaneous.

SASEBO Area

100 suicide boats

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during
the period.
SECRET

3-2 Periodic Report No. 2. (Continued)

SAJEBO Area

Naval Personnel Office
Hydrographic Office
Research Laboratory
Naval District Office
Classified records repository
SAJEBO Naval District Commandant’s Office
Telegraph exchange, police station,
newspaper offices, HOKO Headquarters

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

None reported.

C. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

None.

D. CIVILIAN POPULATION

No change.

P. R. YANCEY,
Colonel, 33C,
AC of 3, 3-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifthFlt 1
C3 Sixth Army 1
OIC JICFOA 1
C3 FA/FAc 1
Com5thPhib 1
ComPhioGrp 4 1
C3 III PhibCorps 1
C3 2ndMarDiv 5
C3 5thMarDiv 5
C3 32ndInfDiv 5
C0 Corps Troops 1
ACof3, 3-3 VAC 1
Record Section VAC 1
File 5
062/158

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

23 September 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE


Lt. Col. MIYAZAKI, Isamu, CO of the 5TH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS reported in to the 5th Marine Division Headquarters with records and rosters of his unit. A summary of this information is contained below. This information supplements that reported in periodic report No. 1.

ORGANIZATION OF 5TH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
1 August 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T/C</th>
<th>1Fs</th>
<th>NF Ass'ts</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq 5AMC</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIRADO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIMURA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAWATARA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARIO</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total:</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61 of these men were demobilized 18 September. By 22 September only 15 men and MIYAZAKI remained. They are currently stationed at HIRADO supervising demobilization of 100 Army personnel. The armament of the 1F company included 906 pistols, 117 rifles, and 157 sabers.

According to MIYAZAKI, the Western District Military Police Headquarters is now operating at full strength at FUKUoka under command of Lt. Col. ISHIDA, Toku.

The cadre left by the 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade turned over a roster of current personnel (145 or 20 September) under the command of Lieutenant General TAKICHI, O., the CO of the former brigade. Documents indicate that the brigade contained the 17th Heavy Artillery Regiment and the 154th Anti-Aircraft Regiment.

ENCLOSURE (A)
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

0133/156

From: 16001 23Sept45
To: 16001, 24Sept45

SECRET

No. 3.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

None.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

No change.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO - Underground CP (radios still in operational condition).

NAGASAKI - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

None.

C. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.

None.

D. CIVILIAN POPULATION.

No change.

- 1 - SECRET
E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Destruction of documents by Japanese prior to our landings.

Extensive reconnaissance by 5th MarDiv reveals that careful and virtually complete destruction of all documents in the NAGASAKI Aircraft Factory and NA3 was completed sometime prior to our landing.

Rear Admiral TERAYAMA, Chief Naval Inspector at NAGASAKI, states that he destroyed all classified material on or about 18 August on the basis of a secret order from Naval Headquarters. This order was also destroyed. This was confirmed by other Japanese naval officers at NAGASAKI. The General Manager of the NAGASAKI Shipbuilding Division of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Limited states that all classified naval ship plans were received from and returned to TOKYO. All plans on hand at the end of the war were turned over to the Naval Inspector's Office. All of the Mitsubishi Company documents have been recovered and will be reported on after examination.

(2) Correction.

122nd IME previously reported in Periodic Report No. 2 as formed in February 1945 was actually formed in May 1945.

DISTRIBUTION:

| ComFifthFlt | 1 | CG 2ndMarDiv | 5 |
| CG Sixth Army | 1 | CG 5thMarDiv | 5 |
| OIC JICPCA | 1 | CG 32ndInfDiv | 5 |
| CG FIFPac | 1 | CG Corps Troops | 1 |
| Com5thPhib | 1 | AGofS, G-3 VAC | 1 |
| ComPhibCorp 4 | 1 | Record Section VAC | 1 |
| CG III PhibCorps | 1 | File | 5 |
S-2 PERIODIC REPORT

0133/131
Ser. 00810B
SECRET

No. 4.

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units at present unreported.
See Enclosure (A).
(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).
(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
See Enclosure (B).

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

JASSEBO Area
JASSEBO Fortress Arty in Hq
Naval drafting office
City hall
Underground machine shops
Radar and repair installations

NAGASAKI Area
Civil Aeronautics School

(2) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.

JASSEBO Area - HARIO barracks

C. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned. None.
(2) Suspects. None.
(3) Subversive activities. None.
(4) Unfriendly organizations.

JASSEBO Area

1
SECRE 434
Local police officials state that no Japanese terrorist or patriotic organizations exist in SASEBO at present. However, local organizations for relief of civilians and liaison with American forces exist at this time. The following information was obtained with respect to Japanese militaristic and nationalist organizations formerly in the SASEBO Area:

KEFÉI TAI was disbanded along with other Army units on or about 15 September. Lt. Col. MIYAZAKI and the 15 remaining enlisted members are now located at HIRADO (about 15 miles from SASEBO). Headquarters and records of this unit were destroyed in the bombing of SASEBO. MIYAZAKI and his unit are now engaged in other work. The KEFÉI TAI's duties appeared to have been strictly of an AF nature. The KEFÉI TAI investigated all thefts of government property regardless of whether military or civilian persons were involved. MIYAZAKI stated that the theft of government property by civilians is the only case when civilians are subject to KEFÉI TAI investigation. In conducting these investigations and surveillance of areas where government property was stored, the KEFÉI TAI investigators often wore civilian clothes and worked in an undercover capacity. All reports of investigations concerning military personnel were filed at the SASEBO Naval Headquarters. Reports regarding civilians were submitted to the civil police station in SASEBO and were filed under the suspects' name. Reports on pamphlets and charts concerning information regarding the KEFÉI TAI will be available as soon as they are translated.

TENKOKU ZAIGORIJIN KAI - This organization ceased to exist on or about 15 September on orders from Gen. MacArthur's headquarters. This was solely a military fostered organization and no information could be obtained from local inhabitants.

SHONEN DAN - This was quite active up until the time of the bombing but is reported quiescent at present. It was headed by the mayor of SASEBO and was reported to have been mainly a civic organization.

SEIHAN DAN - is reported to be similar to the SHONEN DAN and is also a civic organization headed by the mayor.

The following organizations did not exist in SASEBO according to local informants:

- TOKUKU KIKAN
- KOKU SHI-TO
- KOKURYU KAI
- NISSHO KAI
- SOTEI DAN

Investigation is being continued to obtain further information on the above listed organizations.
NAGASAKI Area

The assistant chief of the prefectural police reports that DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI began operating in NAGASAKI only one month before the end of the war. This individual stated that the SHINEN DAN and the SEIKEN DAN are one and the same organization in NAGASAKI and that the governor of the prefecture was the nominal leader and had the records.

Naval officers in charge of the ISAHAYA Naval Airbase appeared reticent when questioned regarding the ISAHAYA KEMPEI TAI detachment.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

Vice President of the SINWA Bank (SASEBO), NAKI Kenichi, states that in his opinion the occupation has been running very smoothly, that the Japanese people have noticed this fact, and that they are more than willing to cooperate with the occupation forces.

It is reported that the Japanese people in SASEBO would like to talk freely but that they still fear the Japanese government since no official word as to the attitude of that government toward freedom of speech has been received in this area.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) POW Encampments.

SASEBO Area

POW Camp No. 24 - This camp was located in the town of SENRYU about three miles SE of BUKAI. Before the war the camp was used as barracks for Koreans and Japanese laborers in the mines in that area. Allied POWs during the war were under the control of the Japanese army, with Major YAMAGUCHI, Keizo, as OIC. The only other officer in the camp was a Japanese Doctor, 2ndLt. FUKUI. Master Sgt. HUZUSHIMA was the ranking NCO in the camp. The total number of Japanese guards was 36, including both men and officers. The guards and the camp commander lived in buildings adjacent to the POW buildings. While the POWs were in the camp they worked for the Sumitomo Industrial Works. The majority of the POWs worked underground in the coal mine where work hours were from 0700 to 1300. About 20 or 25 worked above ground in the carpenter shop where working hours were from 0700 to 1600. There were 237 POWs when they left the camp to be repatriated. The majority appeared to be Australian and American, although some were said to be Dutch. The guards departed and control of the camp was turned over to the POWs about the second week in August.
The general condition of the camp was dirty by American standards but could not be called much worse than those of the average Japanese home. A small garden was worked by the POWs to supplement their diet. There were no records to be found in the camp. The above information was obtained from the manager of the Sumitomo office who said that the military took their records with them when they left in the middle of August.

NAGASAKI Area

Lt. Gen. TANIGUCHI, CO of the 122nd IMB, stated that the Army had no direct contact with POW camps in the NAGASAKI area. He said further that he had heard that there were two camps in the NAGASAKI area. One was located on KOYAGI Island in the KAWASAKI Dockyard. Initially it had 1400 men, but later only 400 men (mainly Australians, though a few other nationals were included). The other camp was said to be at the Mitsubishi shipyard. Initially it contained 500 POWs but later only 200 (mainly Australians). A concentration camp containing civilians, most of whom were women, was maintained near the local Catholic church. This camp was under the control of the prefectural government. This information on POW camps in the NAGASAKI area is hearsay information given us as stated by Lt. Gen. TANIGUCHI.

(2) Burning of documents.

Advance elements of the 5th MerDiv at OURA report that all documents and records of the OURA Naval Air Base and air units there were burned by orders of the OITA Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral UGAKI on 19 August 1945.

(3) Civil censorship.

Individuals in SASEBO state that there was no local censorship of domestic telecommunications during the war. There is no radio broadcasting station in SASEBO, but there is a RR telegraph system at the main RR station. An up-to-date map has been obtained which shows the telephone and telegraph systems in western KYUSHU and information concerning the breaks in those systems at present. Names of newspapers printed and/or distributed on the island of KYUSHU were also obtained.

T. R. YANCEY,
Colonel, 03C;
AC of 3, G-2.
062/158  HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.  

SECRET  25 September 1945.  

ORDER OF BATTLE  

1. Comdr. NISHIMURA, member of Admiral SUGIYAMA's staff reports the following naval ground strengths which are outside the SASEBO area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TSUSHIMA</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>Miscellaneous personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKI Island</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUE SHIMA, GOTÔ REJÔ</td>
<td>less than 55</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others, GOTÔ REJÔ</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOSHIKI REJÔ</td>
<td>about 6</td>
<td>Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANEGASHIMA</td>
<td>about 15</td>
<td>Miscellaneous personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others, TSUMUGUMÔ</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATAURA (31-25N 130-11E)</td>
<td>80 (20 Sept)</td>
<td>32nd Assault Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAJUKA JIMA</td>
<td>50 (20 Sept)</td>
<td>Eq. 5th Sp Attack Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABURATSU</td>
<td>220 (20 Sept)</td>
<td>33rd Assault Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOSOSHI JIMA</td>
<td>180 (20 Sept)</td>
<td>35th Assault Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Lt.Comdr. NISHIWAKI, liaison officer from the KURE Naval District, reports the following strengths on naval personnel in OITA KEN, FUKUOKA KEN north of the OSHOGAWA, and YAMAGUCHI KEN (administratively NIYAZAKI KEN is under the SASEBO Naval District):

- ŌGA (on BEPPU Bay): ?
- UBE: approx. 500 Detachment, 81st Mine Sweeping division.
- TOKUYAMA: approx. 500 Detachment, 81st Mine Sweeping division.
- WAKUNI A/F: demobilized
- MOJI-SHIMONOSEKI: approx. 2000 MOJI-SHIMONOSEKI Def. Unit (70 to 80 wooden minesweepers). Small administrative staff, who are in charge of remaining personnel MOJI Harbor Naval Guard Force.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 -
3. Comdr. NISHIMURA stated that the SASEBO SHLFs were numbered 11, 12, 13, 14 instead of 1, 2, 3, 4 as reported in VAC Periodic Report No. 1.

4. NISHIMURA also reported that all naval construction battalions in the SASEBO District are now demobilized. He said these units were activated by the naval district but were usually turned over to the jurisdiction of the various local airfield commanders, when the units were ordered to these places.

5. The 2nd Marine Division interrogated Naval Capt. FUKUDA, Officer in Charge KAHATA Airfield. Capt. FUKUDA and 3 other officers are all that remain of an original force reported to consist of 2,600 men. Capt. FUKUDA also reported that military police detachment at ISAMAYA (originally 20 men) and the NAGASAKI Civil Air School at ISAMAYA have been demobilized. Discussion of naval construction battalions will be omitted from this report to await clarification by the 2nd Marine Division.

6. Lt.Comdr. SUZUKI, Tatsuo, CO HARIO Separation Center, HARIO Barracks reported that all naval personnel at HARIO with the exception of 500 have now been demobilized. These 500 are shipping cadre to be utilized in repatriation of Japanese in foreign territory.

7. A liaison party consisting of Comdr. YAMATA, Tatsuto, Comdr. INO, KENICHI, Comdr. KOHATSU, Yoshihito from CHURA Airbase reports the following information. The CHURA Airbase was under the control of the 12th Air Flotilla (HAKATA) commanded by R. Adm. FUJITAKA until April, 1945 and by R. Adm. JORIKA thereafter. R. Adm. JORIKA is still in charge. The first air unit stationed at CHURA was the CHURA Naval Air Group, a training unit of about 2000; it was disbanded in May, 1945 when the 94th Naval Air Group arrived. This unit had a strength of about 2000 commanded by Capt. SENDA; it was equipped with from 67 to 100 fighter interceptors of the SHISEN type. Also at CHURA (arriving August 1944) was the 322nd Naval Air Arm with a strength of 1,200 commanded by Capt. SHIBATA; it was a night fighter unit equipped with 10 G6K6 night fighters and 20 Zero fighters modified for night operations. AA guns at CHURA were manned by a detachment of the SASEBO Naval Guard Force. Naval troops are about 90 percent demobilized with 392 left. This figure includes 150 men from the SASEBO district acting as guards.

8. Capt. SUGIKI, CO of the AIJUNA Naval Barracks reports that about 1200 men are still not demobilized. A breakdown of
Order of Battle. (cont'd) 26Sept45

SECRET

these are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EIUKAI</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HINOURA</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.KUURA</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECHIBARA</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOSHIH</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOSASA</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASA</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 1,193

9. Col. USHIMA, attached to the 147th InfRept Repl Unit reports the following information. At the present time, 90 officers and men are acting as a guard detachment at the regimental barracks in CHURA. 910 officers and men have been moved to KASHIMA (15 miles NE of CHURA) by order of the 58th Depot Division.

10. 1stLt. SUGIKOTO, officer in charge of the 3ASEBC Hvy Arty Rept Repl Unit detachment reported the following information. About 20 years ago, the unit was called the 3ASEBC Fortress Heavy Artillery Battalion, later changed to the 3ASEBC Heavy Artillery and in 1941 to its present title. The unit had a T/C of about 400 and consisted of a headquarters and two batteries. Unit had 2 24cm howitzers. It also serviced but did not man 4 26 cm howitzers at CKUBO, 3ASEBC City (No verification on existence of these weapons).
HEADQUARTERS, 7 AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

25 September 1945.

EQUIPMENT AT ATINOURA NAVAL BARRACKS (BASEBO) INVENTORY
BY FIFTH MARINE DIVISION

4,587 Rifles
14,400 Rounds 8.5 mm ammunition
5,970 Rounds 7.7 mm ammunition
12,000 Rounds 7.7 mm L.5 tracers
74 Revolvers
3,240 Rounds ammo for revolvers
4 Heavy MGs
5 LMGs
50 13 mm MGs (with accessories)
2 25 mm AA MGs (with accessories)
15 8 cm rocket guns
12 20 cm rocket guns
250 Steel helmets
16 8 cm trench mortars
2 15 cm trench mortars
2 Searchlights
1 Motor boat
63 Cutters (naval boats)
3 Torpedoes
4 Torpedo tubes (twin mount)
5 1½-ton trucks
163 Sebes

ENCLOSURE (B)
027/158
Ser. C003185

G-8 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 23 Sept 45
To: 1800I, 26 Sept 45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 27 September 1945.

No. 6.

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DISEMBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location description and inventory of dumps under our control.
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO Area

KAWATA'A Naval Arsenal
Headquarters, ARASHI ZUTAI used as torpedo boat training base.

NAGASAKI Area

Tunnel located at MITSUBISHI machine shop #7 where precision parts for torpedoes were made. The tunnel still contains 173 machines for making precision parts for torpedoes. The machines are in the process of being moved to MITSUBISHI Machine Shop #2 located at NORIKASCHI, NAGASAKI.

CHINESE Consulate which operated during
the war under the authority of the NANNING Puppet Government.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.
None to report.

C. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.

(2) Suspects.
None.

(3) Subversive activities.
None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

SASEBO Area

Investigation reveals that the SASEBO TCKKO KA is a special branch of the SASEBO Police Department responsible to the Chief of Police. It is known as "Thought Police", whose principal purpose is reported "to read and control the thoughts and conduct of the people". The duties of this department are of a detective nature and its personnel work both in civilian clothes and police uniform. They carry no weapons, except a sabre, when in uniform. TCKKO KA maintains order, is responsible for control of juvenile delinquency, and apprehension of certain criminals. There are twelve special agents in this special branch of the SASEBO Police Department. These special agents go among the people and inquire as to trouble makers and are also responsible for the prevention of crimes. Preliminary information indicates that the "Thought Police" is a criminal investigative agency (similar to a detective bureau in the American Police System) and is not a "Super Gestapo" as original information indicated. Investigation continues.

NAGASAKI Area

The SHOKEN DAW and the SEINEN DAW in NAGASAKI are combined and known as the SEI SHOKEN DAW. Preliminary investigation reveals that the SEI SHOWN DAW was organized January 1941 in the NAGASAKI Prefecture. School children from the ages of 10 to 17 were organized at the request of General TAKAO SUZAKI of the Ministry of Education in TOKYO. The prefectural governor was the
SECRET

nominal head, but Gunzi Nakayama, as secretary, was the actual head of the association. Nakayama is presently School Inspector for the prefectural government. The purpose of the SEI-MONEN DAI was to aid families of servicemen to raise additional food and make small articles such as rope which would aid the war effort. No military training was conducted. All organizational records were destroyed by fire following a bombing. Investigation continues.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

Cooperation continues excellent and there is no indication of civilian unrest.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

It has been noted that most of the Japanese commanders in the NAGASAKI area have recently been assigned here and are not familiar with the area.

Capt. Kitagawa, Navy, in charge of communications for the SASEBO Naval District delivered one code set, Code TEN-NINE, a general purpose Navy code which is re-enciphered with a strip method. Code TEN-NINE has been forwarded to the Chief Signal Officer, GSC, via Sixth Army. All other documents were burned 17 August 1945. On 3 September 1945 orders came, "Do not burn", but all burning had already been accomplished by this time.

Editions of Nishi Nippon Shinbun, NagaSaki Shinbun, and Mainichi Shinbun dated 26 Sept 45 were examined and contained no apparent violation of Japanese Board of Information Order on press news dissemination. General trend in papers indicate favorable Japanese impression of behavior of American troops in the NAGASAKI-SASEBO areas. The papers also indicate appreciation of the humanitarian efforts of American doctors in the NAGASAKI area. A telecommunication survey is continuing.


DISTRIBUTION:
Same as G-2 Periodic Report No. 1.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

26 September 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

In the SASEBO area, the 2 largest groups remaining to be
demobilized are those at the AINUROA Naval Barracks (CO: Captain
SUCHI, Kotaro) and at the MARIO Naval Barracks (CO: RearAdm. HAY-
ASHI). These are being returned to civilian life as rapidly as
possible.

A group of 75 officers and 165 enlisted men of the 3rd
Special Attack Force under RearAdm. SHIBUYA has been contacted
about 2 miles west of KAWATANA. In the same location are 48 PT
boats, 13 landing craft, and 210 suicide boats. About 1/4 mile
from 3rd Special Attack Force area, the ATASHI Unit has been con-
tacted. This unit was a torpedo boat training base. At the
present time, there are 200 Naval Personnel and 250 assault or
PT boats.

V. Adm. (Technical) ASAGUSA, Toshio commanded the
KAWATANA Naval Arsenal. Arsenal was used for the production of
small torpedoes with a maximum production peak of 80 torpedoes
per month.

Lt. IBUKIYAMA, Shiro is in charge of 2 groups of con-
struction personnel now located at ISAWAYA Airfield. The first
is the 202nd SHISETSUBUTAI with a current strength of 2 officers
and 30 men. The second is the 5215th Naval Construction Battalion
(SETSUBUTAI) with a current strength of 6 officers and 54 men.
Demobilization on these units is continuing.
C-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 26Sept45
To: 1800I, 27Sept45

SECRET

HQ, V Amphibious Corps, SASEBO, KYUSHU, 0800, 28 September 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISAPPEARANCE.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
   See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

   The attitude of Japanese military personnel continues to be satisfactory except for a single incident of non-cooperation as reported by Rear Admiral H. L. PEOY, USN, Commander of Cruiser Division Thirteen and Task Force 55. This report certifies that Lt.Comdr. HANZAWA, Yasuo commanding the coast defense ship TSUISHIMA (berthed at OKURA WAD), was non-cooperative and as insolent as possible short of open hostility to a party of American naval officers inspecting his ship. This officer had been notified in advance of this inspection and had failed to make proper preparations. Neither the officers nor the crew of his ship were assembled at their stations or standing at attention as has been the procedure followed by all other Japanese ships. Lt.Comdr. HANZAWA obeyed all further orders with obvious reluctance and maintained an attitude of insolence throughout the inspection. Rear Admiral PEOY has directed Vice Admiral R. SUGIYAMA (Commander, SASEBO Naval Station) to dismiss Lt.Comdr. HANZAWA from command and to give him no further active duty. Further punishment was left to Japanese officials in order to allow them to preserve discipline among their own subordinates.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

   Four submarines (with periscopes and guns removed) moored in the bay (1270.3-1150.6) on AIS L472, KYUSHU, 1:25,000 between SHIROYAMA and NAGOA were referred to NAVTOCHJAP for further study.

   An optical and periscope factory (under command of Lt.Comdr. AIDA) contains the following:
10 Submarine periscopes (all made in JAPAN)
8 Range finders (6 Japanese, 2 English)
74 Telescopes (various types)
Other optical equipment

2. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

BASEBO Area

Headquarters of the CIURA Detachments of the following organizations (now inactive) in the CIURA area:

KEKPEI TAI
TAIKOKU ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI
SEOJAI DAI
YU TAI

NAGASAKI Area

Headquarters of the NAGASAKI District of the KEKPEI TAI at ISAHAYA. All records had been destroyed prior to our occupation of the area. (See paragraph 3(4)).

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

None.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

- 2 -
0-2 Periodic Report No. 8. (Continued)

SECRET

KEPEI TAI - the NAGASAKI District of this organization is at present commanded by Lt. Col. Isamu TAKUNAGA (formerly Chief, War Production Security Branch, KEPEI TAI Headquarters, TOKYO), who replaced Col. KURUKAWA (present whereabouts unknown) on 31 August 1945. The organization formerly included 15 officers and 220 men distributed as follows:

NAGASAKI - 11 officers 120 enlisted
ISAHAYA - 1 officer  50 enlisted
CHIRA - 1 officer  50 enlisted
TSUSHIMA - 1 officer  30 enlisted
GOTO - 1 officer  30 enlisted

Auxiliary personnel were requisitioned from other military commands for traffic control and town patrol. Four officers and 12 men remain at ISAHAYA to assist in demobilization. All the others have been demobilized except an unspecified number from GOTO and TSUSHIMA who have not yet reported to ISAHAYA for demobilization.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Counterintelligence agents conducted a physical security survey of Corps installations. An investigation of the arms, equipment, and personnel of the SASEBO Civil Police was begun and 72 policemen have been interrogated and processed to date.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) POW Camps:

According to the NAGASAKI Civil Police a POW camp was organized on KOYAGI Island in about October 1942. The commanding officer was Major KITAJIMA, whose home is in FUKUOKA. He was replaced in June 1945 by Captain Kotohori KOBAYASHI, who went to his home in NAGASAKI CITY, HIFUMI-PYO, NAGASAKI-SHI, about 23 September 1945. It was further stated that the officers and NCOs had been sent from the Area POW Administration at FUKUOKA and the guards from the OKURA Regiment.

According to Polish Priests and a Scotchman (Charles Balharrie Kinnes), the Japanese confiscated one building of the Polish Chapel in NAGASAKI and interned about 45 civilians there. In addition to soldiers, the guards included five gendarmes:

- 3 -

SECRET
KCYA.A (in charge), CYA.A, Fukuda, Yasunaga, and CYATSU. These individuals are being investigated further.

(2) Civil Censorship.

The Civil Censorship Detachment secured information on the Sasebo Post Office, including national and international mail routes, data on handling of mail, a list of buildings and equipment, and regulations concerning censorship of civilian mail. Information gathered on the telephone and telegraph facilities of the Sasebo Railroad Station included the number of telegraph transmitters and receivers ordinarily in operation, and those operative at present; number of telephones; and the number of public telegraph messages transmitted daily in addition to those messages required for the operation of the railroad system.

Editorials in local newspapers continue to ask for public cooperation with the occupation forces, and suggest that future Japanese governmental policy be based upon constitutional law giving power to the people instead of to the army and navy. They have also emphasized that the civilian population has been particularly impressed by our mechanized power and now understand the part it played in the defeat of Japan.

T. R. Yancey,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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062/161

HEADQUARTERS, V Amphibious Corps,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco.

SECRET

27 September 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. The 5th Marine Division reports that the CHULA Marina Hospital has been reduced from 10 medical officers, 5 warrant officers, 10 corpsmen, 100 medical apprentices, and 110 Red Cross nurses to 10 medical officers, 5 warrant officers, 20 corpsmen, 20 hospital apprentices, and 16 Red Cross nurses. Personnel were paid off at the hospital and discharged.

2. The ISAHAYA Branch, BASECO Naval Hospital under the command of Captain (Medical) CHAC, Sunam, has a current personnel of 107 enlisted, 100 Red Cross nurses, 5 Red Cross workers, 2 clerks, maids, servants. There are a total of 24 doctors who divide their time between the CHULA Hospital and the ISAHAYA Hospital.

3. Captain SUCHI, CC of the AI CHULA Naval Barracks, reports that he has 78 men and 20 officers remaining under his command. Presumably this is all that remain of some 2,000 not demobilized 30 September.

4. The Motor Transport Section of the BASECO Naval Barracks in ISAHAYA formerly occupied 13 buildings. According to civilians, all personnel were demobilized or returned to BASECO prior to arrival of occupation forces into the area. No records remain at ISAHAYA.

5. The ISAHAYA Naval AA Battery had a former strength of 112 commanded by Lt.(jg) BAKIYAMA, Yutie. At the present time there are 5 men left as guard and liaison personnel. The records of the unit are reported to be destroyed.

6. Further information is now available on the HATAI Unit. The unit was part of the BASECO Naval Guard Force and is reported to have been responsible for the coastal defense of AGAKAI and HIYAZAKI Prefectures. Two batteries have thus far been encountered by the 2nd Marine Division; the first is the HATAI Battery at 1811.10-1005.70 formerly under command of Ensign HIDA, nakazaki, with 5 men; 2 men remain. The second is the AI Battery under command of Lt.(jg) HUMKINS, aided with 14 men; 7 men remain. Both detachments are currently under the charge of Lt.(jg) HUMKINS.

7. Further information on Army units in the HATAI area are not available as a result of investigation by the 2nd Marine.

DECL: (A) - 1 - FOB

450
Order of Battle. (Continued)  

--- SECRET ---

27 Sept 45

Division and Corps interviewed with Major FIGERO, liaison officer from the 15th Area Army Headquarters. According to Major FIGERO, the MACAATII Fortress originally consisted entirely of OD personnel. Then the unit was converted to the 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade, the old fortress actually became the 17th Heavy Artillery Regiment with a T/O of 397. To this it was planned to add 3 independent infantry battalions, the 755th through the 759th, the 134th AA Regiment (KOSHAHO FESTAI), a field artillery "battery", an engineer battalion and a communications company. Actually this plan was never fully realized as the following chart indicates.

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<tr>
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<td>897</td>
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<td>387</td>
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<td>Sig Co</td>
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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 27 Sept 45
To: 1800I, 28 Sept 45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0200, 29 September 1945.

No. 7.

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

NAGASAKI Area

(a) In NAGASAKI 15 dumps and army installations reported by the Japanese have been located and confirmed. These dumps and army installations contain the below-mentioned ordnance and equipment:

4 75mm mountain guns
5 100mm guns
4 10cm guns
4 280mm guns
8 7cm AA guns
11 Searchlights
1 Rangefinder

(b) The following equipment is located at an AA battery at ISAKAYA:

1 Neva radar (150km range)
4 Machine cannon (25mm)
5 Large rangefinders
5892 Rounds, 25mm MG
721 Rounds, 12cm DP guns
4 DP guns, 12cm

- 1 -

SECRET
G-2 Periodic Report No. 7.  (Continued)

SECRET

2 Searchlights, 150cm
1 Searchlight
1 LG, 13mm

(c) The following ordnance is located at a coastal defense battery at FUNATSU:

1 Short gun, CD, 12cm (mfgd. in 1945)
1 Light HS, .50 cal.
1 MG, 28mm
100 Rounds, 12cm, ammo

(d) Located in north outskirts of SASEBO:

4 5-inch guns
2 3-inch guns
1 3-inch gun

(5) At Mitsubishi dockyards a small submarine of the KORYU class was examined. It is a 65-ton (loaded) ship, is approximately 60 feet long, and carries a crew of five. It carries two torpedoes, takes on enough fuel for 1,000 miles, and dives to a maximum depth of 100 meters. It is constructed in eight prefabricated sections.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

Three assembly plant buildings in SASEBO with 90 planes in process of assembly.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

NAGASAKI Broadcasting Station
Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Co., NAGASAKI Ship-building Works Experimental Department
NAGASAKI Wireless Telegraph Office at ISAHAYA
AINO Radio Station at AINO, SE of ISAHAYA

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

A study of the local municipal organizations in SASEBO has been completed and maps obtained. There are 28 municipal sections and five adjoining districts, namely,
G-2 Periodic Report No. 7. (Continued)

SECRET

HAIKI, NAKAZATO, KAIZE, AINOURA, and GNO. A list has been compiled of the neighborhood associations SHONAI KAI and TONARI GUMI. Each TONARI GUMI includes about 10 houses. The larger of the two types of neighborhood associations, the SHONAI KAI, is usually composed of 5 or 6 city blocks. At the present there are 246 SHONAI KAI organizations. Before the bombing there were 280 such organizations. This information has been obtained from AKAGI, Ryozo, head of all local municipal organizations in SASEBO and outlying districts.

A press survey team interviewed TACHIBANA, Hiroshi, directing manager of the SASEBO newspaper distributing agency. He stated that the following is a complete list of newspapers published on the island of KYUSHU.

a. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN - NAGASAKI
b. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN - FUKUOKA
c. ASAHI SHIMBUN - KOKURA
d. MAINICHI SHIMBUN - HOJI
e. SAGA SHIMBUN - SAGA
f. CITA SHIMBUN - CITA
g. HIYAZAKI SHIMBUN - HIYAZAKI
h. KUMAMOTO SHIMBUN - KUMAMOTO
i. KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN - KAGOSHIMA

All of the above newspapers are published daily. An edition of MAINICHI SHIMBUN is printed in English in OSAKA. Of all editions of the newspapers examined, none were found to contain any apparent violation of the Japanese Board of Information Order regarding news publication. Acknowledgment of gratitude to the American occupation forces for specific courtesies was given some prominence in the newspapers of the SASEBO-NAGASAKI area.

According to WATANUKI, Ryoji, publisher of the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, there are only four radio stations on the island of KYUSHU. These are located at FUKUOKA, KUMAMOTO, KAGOSHIMA, and NAGASAKI.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDES.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

According to Lt. Gen. TANIGUCHI, CO 122nd IAR, KAINO SHIMA was a strong defensive link in the outer defenses
of NAGASAKI during the years 1935 - 1940. The defenses were controlled by the Navy and manned by Navy personnel. About 1940 the Navy withdrew and sent their heavier weapons to MIYAZAKI, TACHIARI, ORIO, CHIRAT, and MIYAKOJOJO. At this time the Army took over KAMINO SHIMA and installed the present defenses there.

DISTRIBUTION:

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062/131

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

28 September 1945.

1. Complete reports on status of all army and navy units in the V Amphibious Corps area have now been turned into this Headquarters by liaison officers from the various Japanese Headquarters concerned. Because of the sheer bulk of the material and due to an acute shortage of personnel, it is impossible to report all of this at the present time. As soon as the material can be reproduced, complete reports will be included in future G-2 Periodic Reports.

2. According to Colonel ŌSHIMA, CO of the ŌMURA Infantry Regiment Replacement Unit, 60 men of this unit remain in ŌMURA, while another 50 were transferred 17 September to KASHIMA where the bulk of the unit is being demobilized under the direction of Capt. ISOBE. Colonel ŌSHIMA reports that about 450 men remain to be demobilized at KASHIMA.

3. Remnants of the 7th 3L Co., 134th AA Regt. have been contacted by elements of the 2nd Marine Division. The CO is Capt. KAMANASHI, Kogou. One platoon of the unit was placed on IO Island, one platoon on KAMINO Island, one-half platoon on ABO Island, and one-half platoon on KOKOJI Island. At present four men remain on KOKOJI Island and four men on IO Island.

4. A naval gun crew of 36 men under command of (rank?) TAKETAI, Tamotsu, manned two triple-mount 25mm AA guns on KOKOJI Island. Four men remain.

5. The 1st Battery, 17th Heavy Artillery Regiment was located on IO Island with four 28cm howitzers. The 2nd Battery, 17th Heavy Artillery Regiment was also located on IO Island with four 10cm guns. The 3rd Battery, 17th Heavy Artillery Regiment was located on KAMINO Island and was equipped with (8?) 75mm guns. The IO Island batteries had an additional 350 rifles issued because of the emergency. Of all these units, only thirteen men remain under the charge of Captain SUGIHARA.
027/131
Ser. 00835B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 28 Sept 45
To : 1800I, 29 Sept 45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 30 September 1945.

SECRET
No. 8.

Map: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 (AMS L872).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Survey of troops in the KYUSHU District who
have not been demobilized.
(C) Demobilization status of the Fifth Air Fleet
(22 September 1945).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).
(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).
(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under
our control.

SASEBO Area

2 Twin-mount 127mm guns (without sights or
breechblocks)
2 Ammunition dumps (near above gun positions)
containing 1084 and 484 rounds of 127mm
ammo

NAGASAKI Area

9 Diesel motors (HP 950-1150)
2 Torpedo boats (constructed here and still
on the ways, with no equipment and only
the hulls completed - approx. 50' long
and 15' wide)
2 Small anti-sub boats (approx. 50' long and
18' wide with depth charge racks on the
stern. One is beached and has two V-12
diesel motors; the other is on the ways
and has twin screw propellers but no
motors). Civilian employees stated that neither of these boats were built at NAGASAKI, but were brought in for repairs.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO Area

Underground complex with gun and observation posts but no weapons.

NAGASAKI Area

Nippon Heavy Industry Co. (NAGASAKI Shipbuilding Works Experimental Office)
NAGASAKI Broadcasting Station
NAGASAKI Wireless Telegraph Office (at ISAHAYA)
AINO Radio Station

The FUKAHORI Shipyard and the shipyard on nearby KOYAGI SHIMA formed a single unit under the same administrative staff. Both built transports, with the FUKAHORI yard building 1,600-ton transports (average 7 per month, maximum 14 per month) and the KOYAGI SHIMA yard building 10,000-ton transports (average one per month).

NAGASAKI Newspaper Office – This office secured its domestic and foreign news from DOKHI. All back issues were burned as a result of the atomic bomb explosion.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

FUKUOKA

(The following list was given to the VAC units which are to enter FUKUOKA on 30 September)

NAJIMA Steam Power Plant
SHOWA Iron Works
SALBO Gas Co.
RIYUKI Optical Co.
NIPPON Rubber Co.
KANAGAFUSHI Spinning Mill
NATAKASE Iron Works
KYUSHU Ordnance Co.

- 2 -
C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

Civil authorities state that the NAGASAKI SEI SHONEI DANSUI is now entirely dissolved and that its wartime activity did not prepare its members for military service. The name of the organization was changed from GAKUTO TAI (Student’s Corps) in May 1945, but no change was made in organization or activities.

(5) Miscellaneous.

The TOWA Middle School in SASEBO (former military school for SHONEI DANSUI) is continuing a phase of its former militarism by requiring the children to sit at attention during all classes and by having student leaders bring them to attention for roll calls and reports.

Processing of the civil police in SASEBO was
continued, with 131 policemen processed to date. Processing was begun in AIMOURA with the interrogation of 35 policemen.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Civil Censorship.

The Civil Censorship Detachment completed its survey of postal facilities in SASEBO by securing information on the branches and substations of the main system. A survey of postal and telecommunication agencies in NAGASAKI was begun.

T. R. YANCEY,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of 3, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

| ComFifth Flt | 1 |
| CG SIXTH Army | 1 |
| CIC JICPOA | 1 |
| CG FIPPAO | 1 |
| Com5thPhib | 1 |
| ComPhibGrp 4 | 1 |
| CG III PhibCorps | 1 |
| CG 2ndMarDiv | 10 |
| CG 5thMarDiv | 10 |
| CG 3rdInfDiv | 10 |
| CG Corps Troops | 1 |
| ACoS, G-3 VAC | 1 |
| Record Section VAC | 1 |
| File | 5 |
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

29 September 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Enclosure (B) is a translation of a Japanese document prepared by the 16th Area Army Headquarters at the request of this Headquarters. The enclosure is a statement by the Japanese and should be evaluated accordingly. It is believed that generally speaking the report is true, but that some details may be in error due to the general state of inefficiency and disorganization in the Japanese military forces. According to Major IEGURO, liaison officer from the 16th Area Army, this is complete list of all existing or partially existing army units on IYUSHU.

2. Enclosure (C) is a translation of a Japanese document prepared by the 5th Naval Air Fleet at the request of this Headquarters. The enclosure is a statement by the Japanese and should be evaluated accordingly. It is not believed to be as accurate as Enclosure (B), as the 5th Fleet is in an advanced state of disorganization. Only information pertaining to the VAC area is included in Enclosure (C). Information pertaining to other areas was forwarded to Sixth Army in the G-2 Dispatch Summary No. 8.

3. The KANDA Bn referred to in VAC Dispatch Summary No. 9 arrived in KUCHINOBU, SHINABARA Peninsula 15 July 1945. It was commanded by Captain KANDA, Yukio, who is now in HONDO, AKAUSA Island. All arms (including rifles, heavy grenade discharges, and light machine guns) were returned to HONDO 15 September. Exact status of the demobilization of this unit will be reported in VAC G-2 Periodic Report No. 9 after further investigation by the 2nd Marine Division.

ENCLOSURE (A)
### Survey of Troops in the Kyushu District Who Have Not Been Demobilized

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Demobilization will be under spec. orders of War Minister.

Awaiting shipment out of KYUSHU.

Awaiting shipment out of KYUSHU.

Awaiting shipment out of KYUSHU.

Awaiting shipment out of KYUSHU.

Awaiting shipment out of KYUSHU.

Awaiting shipment out of KYUSHU.

MORISI - 1,415
KOKURA - 1,400
TOKUZU - 1,435
YAKITA - 1,435

Awaiting shipment out of KYUSHU.
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SURVEY OF TROOPS IN THE KYUSHU DISTRICT WHO HAVE NOT BEEN DEMOLISHED,
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ENCLOSURES (B)
### Survey of Troops in the Kyushu District Who Have Not Been Demobilized (Continued)

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<td>2nd SIGNAL REGiment REPL UNIT</td>
<td>SAGA</td>
<td>26 Sept 45</td>
<td>1 Oct 45</td>
<td>1 Oct 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL REINFORCEMENT DISTRICT HQS</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>740</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>240,938</td>
<td>229,057</td>
<td>116,755</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Because of the damage by the typhoon to the national railroads in the CHUOKU area, it is not expected that transportation will be available before October 15. It is anticipated that transportation of these troops will be completed in the last ten (10) days of October, 1945.

**ENCLOSURE:** (B)
### DEMOBILIZATION STATUS OF THE 5TH AIR FLEET
(22nd Sept. 1945)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>(PREFECTURE)</th>
<th>TOTAL PERSONNEL</th>
<th>PRESENT NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KANOHAYA</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAKAMOTOHARA</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUSHIRA</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWAKAWA</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1 KOKUSU</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2 KOKUSU</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAGOSHINA</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISHIKI</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HITOTYOZHI</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TONITAKA</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANEGASHIMA</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŌITA</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSUYUKI</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAKATA</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENKAI</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŌHARA</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAHAYA</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAKEI</td>
<td>ŌITA</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USUKI</td>
<td>ŌITA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUSACHI</td>
<td>ŌITA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGUZAI</td>
<td>ŌITA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAKATSU</td>
<td>ŌITA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAITAMA</td>
<td>ŌITA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASUGARAKU</td>
<td>ŌITA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŌGI</td>
<td>SAGA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ENCLOSURE (C)**
DEMOBILIZATION STATUS OF THE 5TH AIR FLEET (22nd Sept. 1945)  
(Continued)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>(PREFECTURE)</th>
<th>TOTAL PERSONNEL</th>
<th>PRESENT NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHIMA BARA</td>
<td>ISACASAKI</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSEN</td>
<td>ISACASAKI</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HETSUGI</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAKI</td>
<td>YANAGUCHI</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIHO</td>
<td>YANAGUCHI</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAKUSA</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (0)
C-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 23Sept45
To: 1800I, 30Sept45

Ha, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 1 October 1945.

No. 2.

Handwritten:

KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 (AMS L872).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (B) Report of (Naval Ground) Troop Strength on KYUSHU, 30Sept45.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Caves containing radar and photographic equipment have been located in the 5th Marine Division area.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO Area

Navigation instrument plant contains wind tunnel and two atmospheric chambers for testing aircraft instruments.

NAGASAKI Area

ISAHAYA Airfield
NAGASAKI Fortress Headquarters
NAGASAKI Post Office
MAHANA Lighthouse (IO Island)
G-2 Periodic Report No. 9. (Continued)

SECRET

NAGASAKI Cable Terminal
NAGASAKI Customs House
NAGASAKI Prefectural Office
KAWAMINAMI Shipyard
Standard Oil Company
  Number of tanks: 3
Oil Distribution Office
  Number of tanks and capacity: 1 - 5,000-ton, 1 - 900-ton, 1 - 90-kg.
MITSUI Oil Company
MITSUKISHI Oil Company
  Number of tanks and capacity: 2 - 6,000-ton, 1 - 300-ton.
Temple Island Commercial Warehouse. In this warehouse were found large supplies of cordite or ballasite, and dynamite.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

None to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

The CIC representative on the advance party to FUKUOKA reports that liaison with local and prefectural police chiefs has been arranged. According to SHIOTANI, Koro, Chief of Police of the Prefecture of FUKUOKA, there is a total of 3200 prefectural civil police and 450 local civil police. Colonel TAKATA, Chief of the FUKUOKA KEMPEI TAI was instructed to prepare a list of the 208 members together with their addresses.

- 2 -
Partial investigation of the Imperial Reserve Association reveals that membership in the organization was compulsory for all former servicemen not on active duty. Its aims were to keep alive the military spirit among the former military personnel. Orders for deactivation andurning of all records were received 27 August 1945. ISUKI, Motogoro, was the head of the organization in NAGASAKI. TOYOTOMI, Iatsura was head of the Association in the Prefecture.

In the NAGASAKI area partial investigation of the Greater Japan Political Association reveals that it was organized for the actual purpose of retaining HASHIMOTO, Tauijiro, as a member of the house of peers, while exhibiting a superficial purpose for the general welfare of the Japanese people. The organization was formed by a mass meeting 31 July 1945, which was poorly attended and which attracted very little interest generally. The Association was dissolved 14 August 1945; those in charge of the meeting were General IMAMI, retired of TOKYO, and HASHIMOTO.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

Civilian reaction remains unchanged.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

Maps were taken from the SASEBO Classified Document Repository and distributed at a rate of about 8 to 10 boxes per family in NAKASATO (a small town about six miles NE of AIMOURA). These maps were being used for paper, ceilings, etc.

It has been reported that there are cases of dynamite owned by civilians in the area around AIMOURA. Civil police have been ordered to investigate and report the identity of these civilians.

MISHIO, Yukio, superintendent of the KAWAINAMI Shipyards, stated today that in November or December 1944, the Communications Ministry ordered two 8,800-ton ships and four 3,100-ton ships, both cargo type vessels. At the time of the surrender, keels
G-2 Periodic Report No. 9.  (Continued)

SECRET

for three of the 3,000-ton ships had been laid. On September 27, 1945, a representative of the Communications Ministry visited the yard and verbally issued instructions for the six ships to be completed. NISHIC is uncertain whether these verbal instructions were issued on a basis of Allied approval.

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ComFifth Flt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC JICPOA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG F. F Fac</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com&amp; 5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com&amp; 5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com&amp; 5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III PhibCorps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 2ndMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 5thMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 32nd InfDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG Corps Troops</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACoS, G-3, VAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record Section VAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 1stBn 27thInf (KANYA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco.

SECRET

30 September 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Enclosure (S) is a translation of a Japanese document prepared by the SASEBO Naval District Headquarters at the request of this Headquarters. The enclosure is a statement by the Japanese and should be evaluated accordingly. However, it is believed that the report is generally true, though there may be occasional discrepancies. It should be noted the schedule of demobilization of all units in the SASEBO area (SASEBO NavEks, AINOURA NavEks, HARIO NavEks, SASEBO NavDef Unit, SASEBO Communications Unit and SASEBO Sub Base) have been proceeding more rapidly than the report indicates. In this connection, the totals quoted in VAC G-2 Dispatch Summary No. 10 should be regarded as the latest and best information.

2. Attention is also called to the fact that IYAZAKI Prefecture was transferred from the KURE Naval District to the SASEBO Naval District 1 July 1945. Consequently prior to demobilization IYAZAKI Prefecture contained troops from both KURE and NAIZURU.

3. No new units were identified or demobilized during the period.

ENCLOSURE (A) SECRET

475

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Status as of 1 August (1945)</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Numerical Strength</th>
<th>Principal Weapons (Figures in parenthesis denote number of rounds of ammo.)</th>
<th>Status as of 25 Sept. (1945)</th>
<th>Strength as of 30 Sept. 6 Oct.</th>
<th>Strength as of 25 September</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Crew:</em> 120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SASEBO Combined SELF</strong> 88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11th SELF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45 90 12 10 670</td>
<td>2,838 (12)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>SAENO</td>
<td>Naval Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>14th SELF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45 85 12 10 670</td>
<td>2,828 (12)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>SAENO</td>
<td>Naval Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12th SELF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45 90 12 10 670</td>
<td>2,736 (12)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>RIKU</td>
<td>Naval Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SASEBO Naval Base</strong> 107th SELF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>90 12 10 670</td>
<td>2,600 (12)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>MIZARA (1)</td>
<td>As shown on map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SASEBO Naval guard force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>90 12 10 670</td>
<td>2,600 (12)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td>Naval Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SASEBO Naval Barracks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>90 12 10 670</td>
<td>2,600 (12)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td>Naval Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HATASHI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>104 121 7,219</td>
<td>7,644 (12)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td>Naval Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIROU Self DEFENSE guard force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,288 (12)</td>
<td>11,088 (12)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td>Naval Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3rd Special Attack Forces</strong> Sq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 7 114 166</td>
<td>166 (12)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KARATAKA Assault Unit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>204 129 10,991</td>
<td>5,601 (12)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slat Assault Unit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60 25</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>1,243 (12)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>34th Assault Unit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63 37</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>1,674 (12)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Prepared by AG of S, O-se, VAG, 30 September 1946)
### Report of Naval Ground Troop Strength on Kyushu (Including the Goto Retto, the Osumi Gunto, and Tsushima But Excluding the Territory Under the Jurisdiction of the Kure Naval Base) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Numerical Strength</th>
<th>Principal Weapons (Figures in parenthesis denote number of rounds of amm.)</th>
<th>Status as of 1 August (1945)</th>
<th>Status as of 28 Sept. (1945)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Special Attack Force Sq</td>
<td>RAdm. Kowa Iwasaki, Nomurai</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>Torpedo boats</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Assault Unit</td>
<td>Capt. Wada, Tatsuo</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>Rifles: 87 (3,900)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>32nd Assault Unit (Tai-i-Ura &amp; Kati-Ura)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd Assault Unit</td>
<td>Capt. Gissi, Shinichi</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>Torpedo boats: 12</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>33rd Assault Unit (Ara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Assault Unit</td>
<td>Capt. Komura, Noro</td>
<td>2,072</td>
<td>Rifles: 684</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Naval Ground Troop Strength as of 25 September

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Numerical Strength</th>
<th>Principal Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>47 (17,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>20 (8,900)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedoes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth charges</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo boats</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crash boats (SHINTO)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>6 (13,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo boats</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>30 (1,140)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedoes</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 mm AA guns</td>
<td>4 (796)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>6 (13,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo boats</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>73 (189,480)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>924 (22,720)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 mm AA guns</td>
<td>4 (18,760)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedoes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crash boats (SHINTO)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-man controlled torpedoes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo boats</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-man controlled torpedoes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crash boats (SHINTO)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-man controlled torpedoes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crash boats (SHINTO)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spec. M4 motor boats</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedoes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedoes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-man controlled torpedoes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench mortars</td>
<td>3 (780)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>90 (47,989)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>850 (47,980)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedoes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crash boats (SHINTO)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Collection Point for Principal Weapons as of 25 September

- 14th Assault Unit (Kaliya)
- SAGA-KEN EIGOSHI-MATSU - U.S.A-GUN - KAIYA-MURA
- SAGA - KEN EIGOSHI - MABUNA - SAGA-MURA - GAITSU (1)
- SAKURASHIMA - KOUE
- ODOTSU
- SAKAMATSU
- MISHU
- HIBIKIGAKI
- INAKU SEA
- KALOGAMA
- SASEBO NAVAL DEFENSE UNIT
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Status as of 1 August (1945)</th>
<th>Principal Weapons (Figures in parenthesis denote number of rounds of ammo.)</th>
<th>Status as of 26 Sept. (1945)</th>
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<td>Defense Positions</td>
<td>Lt. Sakamoto, Shonai</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>MG</td>
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<td>KAGAWA</td>
<td>Kato, Hachioji</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>OKUMA</td>
<td>Lt(jg) Ochi, Shonai</td>
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<td>MG</td>
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<td>KUNIYOSHI</td>
<td>Mus. Kissui, Toyotomi</td>
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<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
<td>Lt. Akihito, Kinsai</td>
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<td>MG</td>
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<td>UCHI</td>
<td>Lt. Yamada, Takada</td>
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<td>MG</td>
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<td>Lt(jg) Miyashita, Kiyosaka</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>SEIYAMASA</td>
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<td>MG</td>
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<td>YAMAMOTO</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>SHIRAIYASHI</td>
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<td>HAYASHI</td>
<td>Capt. Kamio, Ichigo</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>1 (75)</td>
<td>Discharge (7) tubes</td>
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<td>HAYASHI</td>
<td>Capt. Tanaka, Takada</td>
<td>289</td>
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<td>HAYASHI</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>12 (50)</td>
<td>Trench mortars</td>
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<td>TOSHIHI</td>
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(Prepared by AC of S, 5-2, YAG, 30 September 1945)
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<th>UNIT</th>
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<td>KANAZAI Defense Post</td>
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<td>SADAGA Defense Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATSUDA, O SHIMA Defense Post</td>
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<td>OSUGO SHIMA Defense Post</td>
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<td>CHIRANE SHIMA Defense Post</td>
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<td>KOHOSIMA Defense Post</td>
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<td>UCHIKOMIGI Defense Post</td>
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<td>SASEBO Naval Communication Unit</td>
<td>Capt. HAYAKI, Komomitu</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAKIO Detachment</td>
<td>Lt. TAKAHASHI, Pukatama</td>
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<td>Lt. SATO, Kurasaki</td>
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<td>[ ] Detachment</td>
<td>Lt. SHIBAYAMA, Hiroshi</td>
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<td>Lt. SHIBAYAMA, Hiroshi</td>
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<td>KOKUSAI Detachment</td>
<td>Ens. KUMI, Kurasaki</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASEBO Naval Const. Bn.</td>
<td>Capt. TAKASHI, Shizuo</td>
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<tr>
<td>325th Naval Const. Bn.</td>
<td>Lt.(Sgt) ABE, Kiyoshi</td>
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<td>326th Naval Const. Bn.</td>
<td>Lt.(Sgt) KANAZA, Tokio</td>
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<tr>
<td>327th Naval Const. Bn.</td>
<td>Lt. (Sgt) SAKAGUCHI, Hiroshi</td>
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<td>Lt.(Sgt) SHIBAYAMA, Hiroshi</td>
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<td>329th Naval Const. Bn.</td>
<td>Lt.(Sgt) AMANO, Toshi</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Lt.(Sgt) TERASHIMA, Motomura</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Lt.(Sgt) TAKABE, Shiga-fuji</td>
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| Principal Weapons (Figures in parenthesis denote number of rounds of amm.) |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Rifles 102 (7,200)            |                  |                  |
| Rifles 118 (17,607)           |               46  | 245              |
| Rifles 50 (2,700)             |                 12 | 5                |
| Rifles 20 (1,800)             |                 18 | 22               |
| Rifles 3 (6,000)              |                 8  | 6                |
| Rifles 3 (600)                |                 8  | 6                |
| MG 2 (1,689)                   |                  |                  |
| Rifles 20 (9,200)             |                 10 | SASEBO            | 0             |
| Rifles 20 (4,400)             |                 145 (15,400) | SASEBO Naval Supply Office |
| Rifles 20 (6,000)             |                 10 | KITOYOSHI        | 0             |
| Rifles 100 (4,000)            |                 10 | SASEBO Naval Supply Office |
| NATO, 0, 9, 10                |                  |                  |

(Prepared by AC of S, O-Z, VAC, 30 September 1945)
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<td>223rd Naval Const. Br.</td>
<td>Lt(Nagre) SUGO, Minoru</td>
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<td>RISHI</td>
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<td>25th Naval Const. Br.</td>
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<td>TAKAHARA</td>
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<td>26th Naval Const. Br.</td>
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<td>Rifles</td>
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<td>MG Rifles 2 (8,450)</td>
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<td>826</td>
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<td>FUKUOKA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MG Rifles 4 (11,860), 5 (600), 70 (8,700)</td>
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<td>316th Naval Const. Br.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>778</td>
<td>Rifles</td>
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<td>SASEBO</td>
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(Prepared by AC of S, 8-2, VAC, 30 September 1945)
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 30 Sept 45
To: 1800I, 01 Oct 45

HQ, V Amphibious Corps,
Sasebo, Kyushu,
0800, 2 October 1945.

Map: AMS L872, Kyushu, 1:25,000.

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

SASEBO

In one storage area:

2 searchlights.
1 range finder.
1 radar setup.
1 electric automatic computer for fire direction.
2 10cm twin-mounted DP guns.
417 rds ammo. for above.
6 25mm guns
7,000 rds ammo. for above.
5 13mm guns.
4,000 rds ammo. for above.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

- 1 -

SECRET
G-2 Periodic Report No. 10. (Continued)

SECRET

FUKUOKA

HOKATA RR Station and yards.
Prefectural office.
Bank of CHOSEN.

MOJI

Bank of CHOSEN

SHIMONOSUKI

Bank of CHOSEN

SASEBO

Electrical Utilities Office - contains racks of blueprints which appear to be wiring diagrams.

Radio Station - partially destroyed, with receivers and transmitters in dug-in concrete and earth emplacements.

NAGASAKI

NAGASAKI Normal School (damaged by bombing) - used as storage for aerial torpedo parts by MITSUBISHI Arms Manufacturing Company.

NAGASAKI Municipal Commercial School (badly damaged by bombing and abandoned) used for piece work by MITSUBISHI Arms Manufacturing Company.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

None to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 10. (Continued)

SECRET

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

SASEBO

KOKORYU KAI (Black Dragon Society) exercised a sort of gangster rule in SASEBO and used both threats and coercion to force people to do their bidding and to extort large sums of money from local business concerns. Its leader in SASEBO was a third-rate newspaper publisher named Hasuo YOSHIDA, who is now reported living in OSAKA.

RIKKEN YOSHI KAI is reported as a political group led by Yuwaichi TATESHI, proprietor of a second-hand book store. Not much is known of the nature, functions, or organization of this group, but it is credited with widespread influence as evidenced by the fact that TATESHI was able to obtain a seat on the SASEBO City Council, allegedly on the voting strength of its membership.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

As previously ordered, civilians turned in the following weapons to their local police departments (the guns listed are of various calibers and are mainly antiques in poor condition):

SASEBO

| 62 rifles |
| 319 swords |

OMURA

| 42 shotguns and rifles |
| 4 pistols |

AINOURA

| 260 rifles (cal. 25) |
| 23 rifles (cal. 31) |
| 15 machine guns |
| 10 knee mortars |
| 174 bayonets |
| 133 shotguns |
| 473 swords |

- 3 - SECRET
G-2 Periodic Report No. 10. (Continued)

SECRET

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Civil censorship.

News in local papers continued to be focused on the food problem. No mention was made of General MacArthur's order to the Japanese Government to remove all shackles on the press. ASAHI and MAINICHI (both local editions of TOKYO newspapers) printed the picture of MacArthur with the Emperor; and though there was no accompanying story, the translators believe the mere appearance of this picture to be a revolutionary event in Japanese history, since a photo of the Emperor has never before been printed in a Japanese paper. News items concerning the occupation were limited to strictly factual renditions of American annoucements.

(2) Schools.

According to the civil government, the following schools in the NAGASAKI Area maintained a supply of infantry weapons and ammunition for training purposes (these weapons included rifles, bayonets, machine guns, knee mortars, and infantry guns; many of which are obsolete or made of wood):

**Elementary Schools**

KOSAKAKI  
TATEGAMI  
AKUHOURA  
ASAHI  
FUKUDA  
NISHIURAKAMI  
MINAMIOURA  
MORI  
HIYOSHI  
HAYASAKA  
OMIYA  
CHIFUJI

**Young Men's School**

HIGASHI  
TOMACHI MINAMI  
YAGAMI  
HINTI
G-2 Periodic Report No. 10. (Continued)

SECRET

Communications Training Institute.
NAGASAKI Municipal Commercial School.
NAGASAKI Prefectural Middle School.
KAISEI Middle School.
TORYO Middle School.
Prefectural Fisheries School.

T. R. YANCEY
Colonel, GSC,
AG of S, G-2.

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DISTRIBUTION:

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<tr>
<td>OIC JICPOA</td>
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<td>CG FMFPac</td>
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<tr>
<td>Com5thPhib</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG III PhibCorps</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 32nd InfDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG 22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO Corps Troops</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACoFS, G-3, VAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record Section VAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 1stBn127thInf(KANOYA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FOF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, 3-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

1 October, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. OIURA Area. The following information was obtained by interrogation of Vice Admiral NAKAMURA, Todomu, CO, 21st Naval Air Depot, Colonel OSHIHA, Dentaro, CO of the W-147 Infantry Regiment Replacement Unit, Captain TERADA, Yasutaro, Adjutant of the same unit, Lt. Comdr. SHIRAISHI, Yoshio, CO of the OIURA Branch of the SASEBO SHISETSUBU and concurrent commander of the 361st, 5213th, and 5215th Naval Construction Battalions (SETSUBAITAI). Lt. Comdr. OKADA, engineer officer from OIURA airbase, Comdr. KOKATSU, Yoshito, Operations Officer of the 352nd Naval Air Group (KOKUTAI).

   a. Army. The method of inducting personnel had not changed. The home designation of the 146th Infantry Regiment Replacement Unit had been changed from W-47 to W147 on or about April, 1945, and similar changes were made in other regimental depots of the KURUME Division. The demand for personnel was so great in the past year, that only 10 to 12 days training could be given to each man. Colonel OSHIHA estimated the yearly turnover was about 10,000. The following units were supplied and activated by this regimental depot since September, 1944:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>CURRENT LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>168th Inf Regt, 86th Inf Div</td>
<td>SEKI</td>
<td>KOYAMA, KAGOSHIMA KEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360th Inf Regt, 312th Inf Div</td>
<td>SHITOSE</td>
<td>KURUME, SAGA KEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>454th Inf Regt, 156th Inf Div</td>
<td>GOSEI</td>
<td>HIYAZAKI CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518th Inf Regt, 212th Inf Div</td>
<td>KIKUCHI</td>
<td>HIYAZAKI KEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal labor units (TSUSHIN SAGYOTAI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   At the time of surrender, there were 3,200 men at this regimental depot; 2,200 have been demobilized; 940 were sent to KASHIRA (10 miles NE OIURA) where they have been partially demobilized; 80 men remain at OIURA. The following personalities were identified:

   **NAME**
   - Lt. Gen. SCHEBE, Waichios
   - Col NISHIDA, Jun
   - Col OSHIHA, Dentaro
   - Col SHIBATA, Kamisaburo

   **Duty**
   - CG, KURUME Division
   - CO, W-146 InfRegtReplUnit (FUKUOKA)
   - CO, W-147 InfRegtReplUnit (OIURA)
   - CO, W-148 InfRegtReplUnit (KURUME)

   b. Navy. The 21st Naval Air Depot had a total strength
Order of Battle. (Continued) 1Oct45

SECRET

of 483 officers and men, 20,512 civilians. The depot has branches at all naval airbases in FUKUOKA KEN, SAGA KEN, and NAGASAKI KEN. The following factories will be found as indicated with a number designation within the series of numbers as set down under the air depot:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVAL AIR DEPOT</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>NO. FACTORIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1 to No. 9</td>
<td>TOKYO Area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 11 to No. 19</td>
<td>KURE Naval District</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 21 to No. 29</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval District</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21st at GMURA, 22nd at YAMZUKA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 31</td>
<td>KAIZU</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 41</td>
<td>OMINAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 51</td>
<td>CHINKAI</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 61</td>
<td>FORMOSA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About 800 men from the SASEBO Naval Guard Force formerly manned the AA guns in the GMURA Area. Construction units were as follows:

UNIT    | ORIGINAL CO | LOCATION | STRENGTH |
---------|-------------|----------|----------|
361st NCB | LtCdr SHIRAISHI | OMURA | 370 |
5213th NCB |Lt KIMURA | OMURA | 700 |
5215th NCB | LtCdr SHIRAISHI | ISAHAYA | AMAKUSA | 500 & 200 |

The current strength is 11 officers. Only arms were 10 rifles per battalion for guard duty. The command organization of the airbase was not centralized. Just prior to the surrender, all service personnel were removed from the air groups and placed in one new unit - the Western Sea Naval Air Group. A break down is as follows:

UNIT    | PERSONNEL | PLANES |
---------|-----------|--------|
343rd Naval Air Group | 300 | 10 Irving (maximum) |
352nd Naval Air Group | 150 | 100 Georges (maximum) |
West Sea NAG | 5,000 | X X X X |

Only a few officers will remain of this group on 30 September.

Following personalities were identified:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V. Adm UGAKI</td>
<td>Temporary CC, 5th Naval Air Fleet, OITA (in absence V. Adm KUSAKA, now at KAMOYA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Adm YAHAIOTO</td>
<td>CC, 72nd Air Flotilla, OITA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt GHII</td>
<td>CC, 352nd Air Group, GMURA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmrd YAIJADA, Tatsuo</td>
<td>CC, 343rd Air Group, GMURA (to Jul45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt SHIBATA</td>
<td>CC, 343rd Air Group, OITTA (fr Jul45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 2 -

SECRET
At the seaplane base there were 300 men with 10 reconnaissance planes from the 901st Air Group, SASEBO; the station was abandoned 1 June, 1945.

2. SASEBO Area. The following personnel remain on duty in the SASEBO Area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>NO. OFF</th>
<th>NO. ENL.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Barracks</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>Acting as guards on dumps etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative personnel</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>Includes general duty men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARIO Barracks</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>Authorized shipping personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 1,227, 2,812, 4,039

3. SHIMABARA Peninsula. The Western Section Special Guard Unit was responsible for air warden service and preinduction training of teenagers. It was commanded by ex-Colonel NAKASHIMA, now a resident of SHIMA BARA city. Unit had no real weapons and was completely dissolved by 10 September. Located at SHIMA BARA city is a shipping unit under the command of Major NAKADORI, Isutomu.

Breakdown is as follows:

PRE-SURRENDER
33 Officers
100 NCO's
1,000 Enlisted

CURRENT
6 Officers
5 NCO's
80 Enlisted (about)

Located at UNZEN Airfield is a Naval Air Training Group under the command of Capt TAKAHASHI, Shunsaku; the numerical designation is not known. Breakdown is as follows:

PRE-SURRENDER
36 Officers
7 WO's
107 Petty Officers
509 Enlisted

CURRENT
12 Officers
0 WO's
4 Petty Officers
3 Enlisted
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 1Oct45
To : 1800I, 2Oct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 3 October 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
   See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military Units.

Vice Admiral NAKAMURA, Todamu, located in CHURA, felt 
that the return of Japanese troops stationed in Chi-
inese and Lanchurian posts might create problems for 
peaceful occupation, since they are "narrow, haughty 
soldiers who have ... appropriated power to satisfy 
their own greed and have never tasted defeat".

In AIMURA 51 very arrogant newly returned overseas 
veterans released from MIYAZAKI confronted one of our 
patrols. One of these men was believed armed with a pistol. 
The Chief of Police is investigating this case and 
will confine the offenders.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under 
our control.

FUKUOKA

12,255 rds of 105mm mortar ammo.
2,251 rds of 81mm mortar ammo.
15,723 rds of 91mm ammo.
17,755 rds of 75mm arty ammo.
1,589 rds of 105mm ammo.
1,555 rds of 150mm ammo.
685 cases of black powder.
1,025 cases of dynamite.
1,016 cases of picric acid.
54 field pieces.

- 1 -

SECRET
3-2 Periodic Report No. 11. (Continued)

SECRET

500 knee mortars.
74 small calibre mortars.
60 biplanes.
40 crates of wings.
3,792 rifles.
5 self propelled guns.
16 heavy tanks.
56 medium tanks.
26 light tanks.
18 armored vehicles.
7,000 gallon light oil.
1,750 gallon tank mobile oil.

SASEBO

43 50 calibre machine guns.
18 30 calibre machine guns.
83 radial airplane engines.
1,145 aircraft tires.
12 searchlights.
35 large belly tanks.
196 cases of picric acid.
12 1,000 pound mines.
18 depth charges.
18 cases of detonators.
5 cases of safety fuze.
3 cases of electric caps.
12 cases of demolition charges.

YOSHINOURA

5,000 fuzes.
9,500 dynamite sticks.
23,700 caps.

3. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO Area

A Radio Station containing valuable equipment.
2 DP 5 inch guns in good condition on a cement foundation.
Underground power plant and ammo dump.
30 tubed rocket projector. It is 5 feet high by 5 feet and may be ship or vehicle mounted. NAVALTECH-JAP has information of this rocket projector and is making a study of it.

**NAGASAKI Area**

**NAGASAKI Telegraph Office.**

The NAGASAKI office is directly under the KUNAIOTO communications office. The head of the telegraph office has been elevated to the same level as the postmaster due to the importance of the NAGASAKI office.

*Volume of traffic (Pre-war):* Maintained worldwide service sending about 15,000 messages a day, of which about 4,000 were foreign. Present: About 2,000 telegrams are sent daily. Of this number only 400 to 600 go all the way by wire. The rest go by rail or phone.

**NAGASAKI Submarine Cable Station.** (Reported in Periodic Report #9)

The head of the operations department is YIGUCHI who has held this position since 11 September 1945. The following information is to the best of his knowledge correct but incomplete. The Submarine Cable Station is now located in the telegraph office and was formerly located in the post office building which was destroyed. There were four cables from NAGASAKI, all of which entered the water at the FC8 Cable House. The cables ran to SHANGHAI, Dairen, Ta. Sui, and TAIHEKU. Operations were carried on under the direction of the telegraph office and employees numbered about 100. During the war it became too dangerous to send out boats to make the necessary repairs. The head of the engineering repair unit was not available for questioning, so the present condition of the cables is not known. Operation to all four cities was suspended on the following dates: SHANGHAI 11 August 1942, DAIREN November 1943, TAIJOKI 21 December 1944, and TAIHEKU 14 May 1942. YIGUCHI states that to his knowledge the cables have not
operated since the above dates. None are operating at present.

**NAGASAKI Postal System. (Reported in Periodic Report #9)**

The city of NAGASAKI is divided into two main postal zones. One zone is under the main office which is located at UMEGASHI NOCHI. The other zone is under the I.CTO HAYAHA Branch. The latter burned down and the office was moved to DEKIDAIKU NOCHI. The central administration is at the UMAGASHI office.

**TANAKI Company.** Located outside ISAHAYA. Products are electrical parts, castings and resistance plates. At present this plant is non-operational.

**An Electric Power Plant.** It is complete with transformers and controls. Not in use at present.

**ISAHAYA Iron Works in ISAHAYA.** Non-operational.

**ISAHAYA Iron Works.** Non-operational.

**KATSUMOTO Works.** Located in ISAHAYA Electrical Plating Plant. Non-operational.

**ISAHAYA Metal Works.** Non-operational.


**Power House and Dry Dock.** Located in NAGASAKI. It is about 70% operational and has a normal output of about 10,000 KVA per 24 hour period.

**AKI-SUIHA Engine Works.** Located in NAGASAKI. Formerly employed 2,000 men producing marine engines and now employs between 300 and 1,000. All office records have been burned.

**MITSUBISHI Electric Manufacturing Company.** Located in NAGASAKI. There were 3,000 formerly employed. At present 400 are doing repair work. This company formerly manufactured electrical equipment.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 11.  (Continued)

SECRET

HAYASHI Engine Works. Non-operational.

The following targets in NAGASAKI have been investigated and are found to be of no intelligence value:

TOHOKU Telegraph Company. Destroyed.
NAGASAKI Gas Company. Destroyed.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

None to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

TATEISHI, Yuwaichi, proprietor of a second-hand book store in SASEBO, was reported by a confidential informant to be the sponsor of the RIKKEN KOSHI KAI.

HATSUJITO, fencing teacher in SASEBO, reported to be the local head of KOKUJIN GIGUTAI.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

Colonel TAKATA, Chief of the FUKUOKA KEMPEI TAI has submitted rosters to this office of the "Staff List of Western Military Police Unit" as of 1 September 1945. Since that time, changes have been made due to demobilization, abolition of conscription, and transfers.

TOKUSEI TSU KEMPEI TAI is described by an informant as a special squad of KEMPEI TAI which specializes in the detection of spies through the use of radio direction finders and investigation. As a rule personnel operated in civilian clothing.
KOKUIN GICUTAI (Nation's Volunteer Corps) is described by an informant as an organization formed in May 1945. A SASEBO Unit under KATSUKIOTO, see suspects above, was formed to aid in repulsing American landings prior to the end of the war.

All civil police in SASEBO and AINOURA have been processed. Additional personnel to be employed in expansion of the CIURA police force are being processed at present time.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

Copies of the NAGASAKI SHINBUN, NISHI NIPPON SHINBUN, ASAHI SHINBUN, HAINICHI SHINBUN, (all with circulation in SASEBO, and the SAGA SHINBUN were examined. Several articles mentioned the impending occupation in KUMAMOTO. Mention of the closing of banks was also made. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information Order on press news dissemination were noted.

At FURUSATO an S-24 Radar temporarily designated as Model 2, Modification 2, Mark 4, made at the Naval Technical Laboratory in December 1944 was installed with a battery of 4-155mm AA guns. A cryptographic error reported this radar as Model S-2 in our G-2 summary #11. The commander of the battery reports that this type radar is the newest type used by the Japanese. NAVTECHJAP is continuing its study.

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ComFifth Flt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG 5thMarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG 32nd InfDiv(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC JICPA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>G-2 FCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FIFTac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MAG 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com6thPac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG Corps Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com5thPac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ACofS, G-9, VAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComPhilGrp 4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Record Section VAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III PhibCorps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG 1stBr127thInf(KANOYA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 2ndMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>CG FOF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 6 -
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

2 October 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. No units demobilized during period.

2. 2nd Marine Division reports the 21st Naval Air Arsenal at ISAHAYA. This unit was originally located in CHURA but was moved to ISAHAYA in December, 1944 because of severe bomb damage to the original installations. Captain YASUKOTO, Takenosuke became commander of the unit in May, 1945. In CHURA, the unit was concerned with the manufacture of airplane engines, but in ISAHAYA its principal duties were the stowing, maintenance, and repair of plane parts and engines. The unit was largely demobilized 21 September, and the remaining 17 officers will be demobilized by 17 October.

3. Major General KCGO, Vice Chief of Staff, 16th Area Army reported the following on the TSUSHIMA Army garrison:

(1) Moved TSUSHIMA to HAKATA 30Sept 3,050
(2) Moved TSUSHIMA to HAKATA 01Oct 2,600
(3) Administrative personnel, TSUSHIMA 210
(4) Guard personnel, TSUSHIMA 166
(5) Demobilized, TSUSHIMA (residents) 244
Total 6,250

4. FUKUOKA Occupation Force reports that the national railways in CHUGOKU, HONSHU have been repaired and 20,000 army troops have passed from KYUSHU to HONSHU.

ENCLOSURE (A) SECRET
027/158
Ser. 00875E

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 18001, 02Oct45
To : 18001, 03Oct45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0200, 4 October 1945.

No. 12.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AHS L872).

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle:

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

HIU Dump (near SASEBO)

43 depth charge time devices.
240 1600 kg depth charges.
33 type 88 bursting charges.
32 12cm AA shells.
1,087 20cm naval shells.
410 12cm naval shells.
550 15cm naval shells.
1,140 14cm naval shells.
346 cases 25mm ammo.
2,600 kg K-2 powder.
200 boxes type 88 powder.
500 kg picric acid.
3,100 kg naphtholene.
1,500 boxes large caliber smokeless powder charges.

SASEBO

101 Type 4 Model 10 emergency aircraft accelerator propulsion units (at SASEBO Aircraft Factory).

-1-

STORYT
G-2 Periodic Report No. 12.  (Continued)

SECRET

4 6 inch coastal guns with 960 rds ammo.
4 25mm automatic AA guns with 40 rds ammo.
2 BC scopes.

Several caves near the SASEBO docks contained rifles, MGs, mortars, and bayonets which were rusted and had apparently been burned.

NAGASAKI

The NAGAURA Munitions Storehouses (near TONEBARU) consist of 29 well-dispersed warehouses which contain large quantities of fuses, primers, booster charges, shells, and shaped explosives for shells. The Naval Officer in charge stated that it was operated by 60 civilians under the supervision of a Naval Lieutenant. At present only the Naval Lieutenant and six civilians remain. This Jap Naval Lieutenant stated that munitions were brought there by boat from SASEBO to serve as a reserve dispersal area for the SASEBO Naval Base.

The 21st Naval Air Arsenal at ISAHAYA consists of more than 20 warehouses containing spare parts for aircraft, aircraft engines, and machinery for repairing aircraft engine parts. This installation formerly employed about 4,000 civilians and 50 naval officers.

FUKUOKA

30 small bomber fuselages.
32 two-ton trucks.
500 field pieces.
130 MGs.
2,274 bayonets.
10,000 hand grenades.
7,327 rifles.
29 70mm guns.
12 80mm guns.
6 100mm guns.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.
NAGASAKI

(The NAGASAKI Prison and MATSUYAMA Barracks have been completely destroyed.)

SHUTEI KCJC was formerly operated by MITSUBISHI as a small boat factory producing landing barges, motor torpedo boats, and motor launches. At present 50 men are employed in making beds.

MITSUBISHI Machine Shop No. 3, located in a tunnel, formerly employed about 300 and is believed to have produced hydraulic steering gears for ships. Only 100 are employed now and no production work is going on.

Interrogation reports have listed the following firms in the NAGASAKI area (except where noted) which manufactured materials for the Japanese Navy (only those firms whose produce was passed on by the NAGASAKI branch of the KYUSHU Naval Inspectors Office are included):

NAGASAKI Dock Yard (MITSUBISHI Heavy Industry Co. Ltd.) produced merchant vessels, steering mechanisms, turbines, boilers, marine diesel engines, torpedo boats, and coast defense ships.

NAGASAKI Arms Factory (MITSUBISHI) included OYASHI and MORINAGA Works and produced Airo-torpedoes, type I and II.

NAGASAKI Steel Works (MITSUBISHI Steel Co. Ltd.) produced wrought and cast steel material and bomb casings.

NAGASAKI Works (MITSUBISHI Electrical Engineering Co. Ltd.) produced electric motors, generator fans, and searchlight bodies.

KOYAGI JIMA Dockyard (KAWA MINAMI Industry Co. Ltd.) produced merchant vessels (discussed in our Periodic Report No. 8).

FUKACHI Dockyard (associated with the KOYAGI Dockyard and also discussed in our Periodic Report No. 8).
URANOSHI Dockyard (SAGA Prefecture) (KAWAKINAMI Industry Co. Ltd.) produced coast defense ships (type KO) and mechanical equipment for merchant vessels.

SENDAI Works (SENDAI) (KAWAKINAMI Co. Ltd.) produced 9 and 15 meter cutters and parts for merchant vessels.

NAGASAKI Iron Works (KAYASHIKANE Heavy Industry Co. Ltd.) included the "IKITSU", "IMASA", and "KIBACHI" Works and produced 115 and 250 horsepower semi-diesel engines.

SAIKAI Works Co. Ltd. (SASEBO) produced semi-diesel engines and parts for merchant vessels.

SASEBO Iron Works (SASEBO) (AOKI Industry Co. Ltd.) produced semi-diesel engines and parts for merchant vessels.

OGAMI Electrical Engineering Co. Ltd. (SAGA Prefecture) produced electrical equipment and instruments.

According to Mr. OGAWA (superintendent) and Mr. KATO (asst. superintendent) of the NAGASAKI ZOSENSHO (MITSUBISHI), the company used one company school and five NAGASAKI municipal schools as subsidiary machine shops manufacturing small parts and tools. In some cases company workers used the schools after hours, while in others the older students worked at the machines and were paid by the company through the school. These schools include:

MITSUBISHI SEIMAN GAKKO - this was the company's private school and was used for training.

FUCHI KOKUMIN GAKKO (Municipal Primary School) employed 100 of the older students as workers.

AKUNOURA KOKUMIN GAKKO (Municipal Primary School) used only regular company workers.

NAGASAKI ICHIRITSU JO GAKKO (Municipal Girls High School) employed about 100 of the older students.
KENRITSU MUGAKKO (Municipal High School) employed about 300 of the older students as workers.

MGA GAKKO (Municipal School) employed only company workers.

According to Mr. OGAWA other companies used schools for the same purposes, but he could give no further details.

FUKUCHA

GAKKOSU Airfield - has 3 commercial transports, 10 other planes, complete aviation radio equipment, and a functioning meteorological observatory.

Naval Coal Mine employed more than 3,000 workers under Rear Admiral [Engineer] EMAOTA and produced 70 tons of coal per day. No arms were found there.

HAKATA Iron Works produced 37mm projectiles and knee mortar base plates and projectiles. On hand are 4,000 rounds 37mm, 1200 rounds knee mortar ammunition, and 1200 knee mortar base plates. This plant is converting to bicycle parts.

KAIZA BACHI Airplane Dept. (HAKATA Factory) produced small civilian transports.

SHOWA Iron Works now produces steam radiators but has on hand 1000 hand grenade castings and 1000 81mm mortar castings.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

SHIKINOMAKI

(The following list was given to VAC units which are to enter SHIKINOMAKI on 4 Oct.)

TANOKUSI Shipyards.
ASAHI Oil Refinery.
OSAKA Iron Works.
MITSUBISHI Shipyards and Drydocks.
MITSUI Zinc Smelter
G-2 Periodic Report No. 12.  (Continued)

SECRET

Entrance to KAMIOX Tunnel.
HATABU RR Yards and Station.
Weather Observatory.
Court House.
Military reservation Hqs and barracks area.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
Nothing to report.

(2) Suspects.
Nothing to report.

(3) Subversive activities.
Nothing to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.
Nothing to report.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Four of the seven Chinese POW camps near IIIZUKA (FUKUOKA Prefecture) have been investigated and a serious state of unrest found to exist. Some of the Chinese held considerable quantities of small arms and had staged near riots outside their compounds with Japanese civilians. Conditions at the camps visited are as follows:

MITSUO YAMANO camp of about 577 POWs was visited and 76 rifles, 25 bayonets, 8 LMGs, 6 knee mortars, and 12 rounds small bore ammunition secured. These Chinese were quieted and instructed to remain within their compound.

TAKAO MIKIO camp (177 POWs) was visited 1 October and it was learned that a riot had occurred earlier in the day after a Jap civilian had cut off a finger of a Chinese POW following an argument over a purchase. Order was restored and the Japanese police were instructed to apprehend the civilian involved. One rifle and 18 bayonets in the camp were confiscated. A visit the next day found this camp in good order.
URUKO camp (250 POWs) was visited, but no arms were found and the camp was in good order.

OTSUJI camp (186 POWs) was found to be in a state of considerable unrest and four rifles with bayonets and a considerable store of rifle ammunition was secured. The POWs readily admitted killing a Chinese interpreter on 1 October because he had withheld $20.00 out of the $30.00 paid each prisoner by the Japanese for work performed.

Periodic POW camp inspections are being made and investigation of the above incidents is continuing.

The six Chinese labor camps (all in FUKUOKA Prefecture) listed below were also visited:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Mine</th>
<th>No. of Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIYAETSU FUTASE MINE, URUNA-KO</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; CHUO-KO</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; TAKAO-KO</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KITSUMI IIZUKA MINE</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HITSUMI YALANO MINE</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAIJIMA OTSUJI MINE</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total laborers: 1,617

All weapons were taken away from these Chinese and they were asked to maintain order among themselves. There have been no reports of trouble at the other five Chinese laborer camps in FUKUOKA Prefecture (these contain approximately 1,900 Chinese).

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

The civilians in the area continue docile and cooperative except for one incident in the vicinity of AIMOURA. There a routine patrol from the Fifth Marine Division was confronted by a surly group of demobilized Japanese soldiers, one of whom was thought to have had a pistol. The Japanese civil police were notified and told to take action. A full investigation is underway and details will be forwarded later.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 12. (Continued)

SECRET

(1) Civil censorship.

A survey of postal and telecommunications facilities has been concluded in NAGASAKI, and a similar survey will begin tomorrow in FUKUOKA, KOKURA, and KOJI. Local newspapers continue to carry strictly factual accounts and avoid any suggestion of opinion or comment that would reflect public feeling.

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CgFifthFlt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC JICFOA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FIFPac</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComPhibGrp 4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III PhibCorps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 2ndMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CG 5thMarDiv     10
CG 32ndInfDiv(c/o G-2 FCF) 10
HAG 22          1
CG 1stBn127thInf(KANOYA) 1
CG FCF           1
CG Corps Troops  1
AGoF S, G-3, VAC 1
Record Section VAC 1
File             5

T. R. YANCEY
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET 3 October 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. **SASEBO Area.** The 5th Marine Division reports the following demobilization during the period:
   
   a. Temporary Naval guards 19
   b. Naval Administrative 688
   c. Authorized Shipping Personnel 35
      (HARIO)
   
   Total 742

2. **SAGA Prefecture.** The SASEBO liaison committee reported the following information on the status of demobilization in SAGA Prefecture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCALITY</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>REMAINING PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YOBIKO</td>
<td>312th InfDiv</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KARATSU</td>
<td>312th InfDiv</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAKEO</td>
<td>312th InfDiv</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASHIMA</td>
<td>3rd InfRegtReplUnit</td>
<td>1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAEBARU</td>
<td>312th InfDiv</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGI</td>
<td>312th InfDiv</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAKAGISE</td>
<td>2nd SigRegtReplUnit</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANZAKI</td>
<td>312th InfDiv</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAHIYAMA</td>
<td>Branch, Provisions Depot</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAIH</td>
<td>134th Ind AA Bn</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METABARA A/F</td>
<td>(METATSUBARA A/F)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISHIMURA</td>
<td>18th Ind ArtyRegt</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOKI</td>
<td>123rd Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKAYA</td>
<td>21st AA Bn</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HATTEN</td>
<td>Naval AA Btry (SASEBO NGF)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEKOYAMA</td>
<td>Naval AA Btry (SASEBO NGF)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **TSUSHIMA.** Cmdr NISHIMURA, member SASEBO Naval District Headquarters reports the following information on naval personnel on TSUSHIMA:

   Demobilized HAKATA, KYUSHU 165
   Authorized Shipping 18
   Temporary Guards 27
   Total 210

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
4. NAGASAKI Area. No units demobilized during period.

5. Comparative tables of equipment of 733rd and 737th Independent Infantry Battalions, 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade.
(Source: 2nd Marine Division Interrogation of Lt. Gen. TANIGUCHI, CG, 122nd IMB.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICLES</th>
<th>NORMAL AMOUNT</th>
<th>733 Inf Div</th>
<th>ACTUAL AMOUNT</th>
<th>737 Inf Div</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95 Type sword</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Type bayonet</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>830</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 Type rifle</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>577</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Type pistol</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89 Type heavy grenade launcher</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 Type light MG</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 Type heavy MG</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light mortar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 Type infantry gun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7mm bullet (for rifles &amp; MG)</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>24,960</td>
<td>38,620</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Type pistol bullet</td>
<td>640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97 Type launching shell</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>324</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89 Type launching shell</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>576</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89 Type mortar shell</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 Type infantry gun shell</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>480</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88 Type cap (no time)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88 Type cap (time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 Type officer's saddle</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 Type MG harness</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telescope for mortar team</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Type binocular</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89 Type binocular</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 Type binocular</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 Type artillery telescope</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 Type range finder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 Type bugle</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools (for rifle)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools (for saddle)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamp</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97 Type harness</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Type harness</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare tongs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96 Type gas test equipment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98 Type uranium compass</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10m tape rule</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Type lamp</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Order of Battle (Continued) 30 Oct 45

**SECRET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICLES</th>
<th>NORMAL AMOUNT</th>
<th>733 Inf Div</th>
<th>737 Inf Div</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rope</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shovel (portable)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half Pick</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pick</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shovel (small)</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pick (small)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Axe</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log saw</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File (large)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone (for sharpening)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light wire cutter</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 Type telephone</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 telephone wire</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 telephone wire spool</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 telephone wire winder</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 telephone wire release equip.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather bag (large)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather bag (small)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97 Type V.A. meter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal flag</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy wire cutter</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 Type 5 style wireless</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 Type 6 style wireless</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 03Oct45
To: 1800I, 04Oct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 5 October 1945.

No. 13.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872).

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

To date 43 demobilized Japs have been jailed by civilian police, pending complete investigation of the pistol incident at AINOURA. These men were in the area reportedly awaiting transportation to HIRADDO and GOTO RETTO.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Located caves in SASEBO containing 250 kg. bombs, flares explosives, 20mm ammunition, parachutes, aerial cameras, bomb sights, and radar for planes. An inventory will be submitted later.

FUKUOKA

An ammo dump located KASHII MURA contains the following:

21,925 rds of 7.7mm.
5,260 rds of 12.7mm.
6,480 rds of 20mm.
56 100 kg bombs.
35 250 kg bombs.

A FUKUOKA dump contains:

18 S/E float planes.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 15.  (Continued)

20  250 kg bombs.
21  60 kg bombs.

An Army dump at MAEBARU contains:

3  47mm guns with 1046 rds ammunition.
2  12cm guns.
8  15cm guns.
17  4.7" guns with 259,280 rds of ammo.
79  LMG
99  Heavy grenade throwers with 9150 rds of ammunition.

2,634 rifles (7.7) with 301,240 rds of ammunition.
400  50 kg bombs.
1,250 kg of explosives.

Dump at SEIKAI Airfield contains:

2  biplanes.
1  Betty.
31  fighter fuselages.
13  bomber fuselages.
70  bomber wings.
20  37mm guns with 1,500 rds of ammunition.
100  machine guns.
600  rifles.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

ISAHAYA Prison. Approximately 100 guards, 210 non-prisoner personnel and approximately 780 prisoners. Used for both NAGASAKI and SAGA Prefectures. Small factories for making civilian articles are located within the prison.

KIBANO-KOTO Factory. Located KIKIZU. Produced semi-diesel marine engines and parts for airplanes. Japanese seemed reluctant to talk about a 150 HP engine designed for submarines. Employed 170 men during the war, now only 20.

OGURA KIKAI KOTA Factory. Located ISAHAYA. Produced airplane engines for 21st Naval Aerial Arsenal in ISAHAYA. Ceased operation June 1945.
MATSUYAMA Electrical Factory. Located ISAHAYA. Made electrical parts for airplanes, Ceased operation a few months ago.

FUKUOKA

ASHIYA Airfield (reported in G-2 summary #13 as ISAHAYA) has 72 planes including new type of fighter that Major SUYARI, commander of the field, reports has never been in combat.

An ammunition dump with:

- 64 motors (both in-line and air-cooled).
- 10 500 kg bombs.
- 20 250 kg bombs.
- 120 100 kg bombs.
- 384 50 kg bombs.

There is also a new aerial bomb never used in combat which is reported to be an AA bomb fired like a mortar shell on a rocket principle and has a parachute attached.

A fuselage and wing factory composed of 12 buildings built into a hillside and well camouflaged with sod. This plant was in operation only 2 months prior to the end of the war. This factory contained 20 new motors for twin-motored recon planes.

SAITOZAKI Airfield has 66 planes. Also an underground communications center with wire communications to SASEBO and FUKUOKA Naval Headquarters.

KANAGAFUSI Spinning Mill converted to an airplane assembly plant contains:

- 5 drill presses.
- 1 large metal press.
- 20 bomber fuselages.

NIPPON TUNGSTEN Company employs 150 men making contact points and tungsten filaments.

SASEBO
G-2 Periodic Report No. 13.  (Continued)

SECRET

HAIKI Storage Depot consisting of nine office buildings and three warehouses. It is an Army-Navy Relief Center under command of Capt. UCHIJIME, paymaster. 600 employees, men and women, are moving to HARIO and should be completely moved by 10 October 1945.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

KUMAMOTO

(The following list, located by coordinates, was given to VAC units which are to enter KUMAMOTO on 5 October 1945)

Military Police Unit Hqs.
Army NCO School.
6th Division Hqs.
Regimental Hqs.
6th Field Artillery Regiment.
13th Infantry Regiment Hqs.
6th Engineer Battalion.
TORUKU drill grounds & emergency airstrip.
6th Cavalry Regiment.
Engineer Corps training grounds.
Brigade Hqs.
MINAMI Police Station.
Postal System.
Telephone Station.
City Office & Communications Bureau.
Prefectural Office.
KUMAMOTO Tech College.
GOSHINOURA Radio Station.
ZOZO Radio Station.
KUMAMOTO Radio Station.
NE SHIMA Radio Station.
MIYADA (KAMI SHIMA) Radio Station.
MOBORITATE Radio Station.
FUKUURA (NAGA SHIMA) Radio Station.
KUMAMOTO Airfield.
MITSUBISHI Aircraft Factory.

OMUTA

(The following list, located by coordinates, was given to VAC units which are to enter OMUTA on 5 October 1945)
G-2 Periodic Report No. 13.  (Continued)

SECRET

TAMANA Airfield.
MITSUI Railroad Workshops.
MINATO Steam Power Plant.
Dock Masters Office.
Harbor Police Office.
Harbor Office & Customs Building.
OURA Steam Power Plant.
MIKI Smelter Works.
MITSUI Electrolytic Zinc Refinery & Coke Plant.
OMUTA Railroad Station.
OMUTA City Hall.
Electric Light Company.
Gas Company.
MIIKE Machinery Works.
MANDA Coal Mine.
MIYANOHARI Coal Mine.
OMUTA Prison.
NANAURA Coal Mine.
MITSUI Coal Liquification Plant.
MIIKE Dye Stuffs & Oriental High Pressure Company.
MITSUI Zinc Refineries.
OURA Coal Mines.
KATSUATE Coal Mines.
Probable MITSUI Synthetic Oil Plant.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None to report.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKUMU KIKAN. Several people were questioned to determine if this organization operated in SASEBO. None of them knew of its existence here but those who had heard of the organization stated that its headquarters was in TOKYO. To the best of their knowledge TOKUMU KIKAN did not function in JAPAN proper, but operated solely overseas.

Investigation was begun on TOKUSE TSU KEMPEI TAI, which was reported in our Periodic Report No. 11.
A prominent businessman in SASEBO stated that the local Rehabilitation or Reconstruction Committee is the most important organization in SASEBO. This informant stated that a form of government similar to that of Great Britain is advocated by the NEW JAPAN LIBERTY party. This political party is headed by Y. OZAKI, former Minister of Justice.

From a captured Japanese document it was learnt that the following Right Wing or Fascist Groups under the Greater Japan Political Association operated in OMUTA City.

   Nationalist League – District General Office, FUKUOKA.
     East Asia League.
     MITAMI Group.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

The civilian populace continues to be docile and cooperative. From interrogation of families in NAGASAKI, the civilian population appears to be emphatic in their satisfaction over the end of the war, and they continue cooperative.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) In the SASEBO ammunition storage area a new type hemispherical hollow charge mine, described by the Japanese as an attack mine, was reported. A 30 barrel rocket launcher and two types of 8cm short naval guns were reported. NAVTECHJAP is presently making a study of this ordnance and a complete report will be submitted later.

(b) The postal and telecommunications survey has been completed at KUMAMOTO. In addition to the previously mentioned newspapers having circulation in SASEBO and NAGASAKI, copies of the OITA SHIMBUN have been examined. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press directive was noted.

(c) Father YAMAGASHIRA, Gentaro, Catholic priest at OMURA, reports that during the war his sermons were subject to surveillance by the KEMPEI TAI. Criticism of the military or the progress of the war was not tolerated. He also stated that Civil Police were more active than KEMPEI TAI in "thought control" work.

SECRET
DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC JICPOA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FMFPac</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComPhibGrp 4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III PhibCorps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>CG 2ndMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 5thMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 32nd InfDiv (c/o G-2 FOF)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 1stBn 27thInf (KANOYA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>CG FOF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO Corps Troops</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACofS, G-3, VAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record Section VAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SASEBO Area. 5th Marine Division reports following demobilization of naval personnel within the period:

   Temporary guards  24
   Administrative     130
   Total              154

2. ISAHAYA Area. 2 types of semi-military organizations existed prior to surrender in this area. One was the BOEITAI, which consisted of underage and overage males. Unit was of the "last-resort-in-case-of-invasion" type and was equipped with bamboo spears. Another unit was the KEIBODAN, which was responsible for fire fighting and air raid warning.

3. NAGASAKI Area. The NAGASAKI Naval Inspectorate Office is headed by R. Adm. TERAYAMA, who replaced R. Adm. OKANO about June 1945. The office inspected and supervised the construction of all ships in the area. The office had a total of 145 personnel of whom 50 are left.

4. OKUTA Area.

   (a) Naval Units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIKE Br.</td>
<td>Capt. FUJINAGA, Saburo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Transportation, Naval materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Tpt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIKE Hbr.</td>
<td>Capt. FUJINAGA, Saburo</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Coast Guard, Shipping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br, SASEBO</td>
<td>Ens. NAGAMI, Hajime</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Coast Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NavGdForce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br, SASEBO</td>
<td>Ens. OKADA, Ichiyo</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Coast Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NavGdForce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Installation, Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Guards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
Order of Battle.  (Continued)  4Oct45

**SECRET**

(b) Army Units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st Ind AA Sn.</td>
<td>Maj. ITO, Saji</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>1stLt. KAJIWARA, Kiyomi</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>67cm AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>1stLt. TSUBOI, Yunihisa</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>68cm AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>1stLt. OTO, Isamu</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>38cm AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>1stLt. YOSHIZAKI, Tsunehiko</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>68cm AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>1stLt. UEYAMA, Toshiyoshi</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>57cm AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKUTA MP Co.</td>
<td>Capt. HONDA</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Reported moved to FUKUOKA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **IKI Island.** 4,217 Army troops from IKI Island were demobilized at FUKUOKA 3 October.

6. **Repatriation.** 2,176 Army troops (no navy or civilian) at FUKUOKA from KOREA 3 October. All demobilized and dispersed.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 04Oct45
To: 1800I, 05Oct45

SECRET
Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 6 October 1945.

No. 14.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location description and inventory of dumps under our control.

SASEBO

400 40mm AA guns at ARITA (VAC Periodic Summary No. 4) have now been determined by 5th Marine Division to be 25mm.

NAGASAKI Area

7 searchlights.
1 120mm coast defense gun.
7 short 12cm guns.
3 12cm cannon.
4 150mm cannon.
2 7cm AA guns.
5 12cm AA guns.
8 radar sets.
3 12.7cm guns.

21st Naval Air Arsenal near ISAHAYA (see VAC Periodic No. 12 and Enclosure (A) to VAC Periodic No. 11)
G-2 Periodic Report No. 14.  (Continued)

SECRET

contains the following:

3 Zero type fighters.
83 training planes.
5 type 96 small scout seaplanes.
57 airplane engines.
411 250 kg bombs.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

FUKUOKA Area

SHISOJIMA Airfield (6 miles SE of FUTSUKAICHI) has two concrete runways, each about a mile long and in good condition. Planes (all reported unserviceable by the Japanese) included:

31 fighters.
1 bomber.
6 reconnaissance.
17 trainers.
2 other planes.

Other equipment includes:

550 250 kg bombs.
200 50 kg bombs.
40 30 kg bombs.
100 type 33 rifles with 65,874 rounds ammo.
6,500 hand grenades.
30,000 rounds 7.7 ammunition.
19,280 rounds 12.7 ammunition.
7,302 rounds 20mm ammunition.
20 13mm machine guns.
15 20mm machine guns.

TACHIARAI Airfield has dirt runways and the following planes:

5 bombers.
45 fighters.
10 attack planes (used as bombers or fighter.
10 trainers.

- 2 -

SECRET

517
Equipment there includes:

26 20mm AA guns.
31 12.7mm machine guns.
2 storehouses of ammunition.

OZUKI Airfield (near SHIMONOSEKI) ia under guard pending an inventory.

The following targets in the city of FUKUOKA are now under our surveillance (the GENDARME Branch Office there has been destroyed by bombing):

Broadcasting station - privately owned, but all broadcasts originate in TOKYO and are directed by the government. Operates on a frequency of 910 kilocycles with a power of 500 kilowatts.

City Hall - employs 500 people and has city records stored in the basement.

City Prison - 1800 civil prisoners plus 100 guards and 50 workers. No military equipment in the area.

District Court - civil and juvenile court.

SEIKO Factory - formerly produced ammunition, but is converting to bicycles.

DENITSU Airplane Factory - formerly made belly tanks for planes but has converted to air hammers, air grinders, and air drills (producing 20 of each a day at present).

NAGASAKI Area:

NAGASAKI Youth Normal College (near ISAHAHA) offers a three year course for teachers. A small quantity of arms and military equipment were found here. Its president is BUMPEI, Miyogawa.

NAGASAKI Meteorological Station. Its director, NAKAMURA, Katsuji, reported that complete weather records for the NAGASAKI Area from 1876 to date and incomplete weather information on CHINA, the PHILIPPINES, MAN-CHURIA, BATAVIA, and the Northern Pacific up to 1940 are held here.
YANAGAWA SEISAKUSEI Company is a small plant near KIKITSU owned by YANAGAWA, Hatsuichi and KITA, Zengo. It produced parts of 20mm shells during the war but is not operational at present. All orders were placed and raw materials secured through the Navy.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

None.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TEIKOKU ZAIGO GUNJIN ZAI (Imperial Reserve Association) was headed in NAGASAKI KEN by Major General MATSUURA, Toyichi by virtue of his position as CO of the NAGASAKI Regimental District. He stated that all officers of the organization were active members of the army and that it was dissolved late in August on orders from TOKYO. The actual work of supervising the Association in NAGASAKI was delegated to Colonel HARA, Wasaburo (who also had charge of military training in the schools).

TOKUMU KIKAN - Captain SAITO, naval inspector at NAGASAKI, stated that he was a member of this organization in 1940 and was given an assignment investigating the mining industry on HAINAN. He stated that all TOKUMU KIKAN work was done in foreign countries but was unable to give further details because he was used only in a specialized capacity.

KEMPEI TAI - Lt. HATSUMOTO, CO of the ISAHAYA branch of this organization, stated that civilian informants
were used and were sometimes paid small tips; but
information was generally obtained by an appeal to
patriotic duty. Members did operate in civilian
clothes, but this did little good in small towns or
rural areas because they were too well known.

TOKKOKA (also TOKUKOKA or Special Higher Police) is
headed in NAGASAKI by NAKAMURA, Hiromasa, who stated
that this organization is still operative, but that
an order dissolving it is expected in the near future.
He further stated that it is an entirely civilian
organization which controlled the civilian population
in accordance with governmental policy by suppressing
communism, censoring newspapers, and supervising
religious activities. It also worked closely with the
foreign affairs section of the civil police in keeping
foreigners under surveillance and searching for
spies.

(5) Miscellaneous.

NAGASAKI Harbor Police - A branch of the civil police
directly responsible to the Police Superintendent of
NAGASAKI KEN. The duties of the 76 employees (including
61 policemen) include inspection and control of
shipping, fire-fighting and rescue work in the port.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

Investigation of the incident in the vicinity of AINOURA
(see VAC Periodic Reports No. 12 and 13) has been com-
pleted. It has been ascertained that a group of about 50
demobilized Japanese soldiers were involved. A thorough
search by Japanese Civil Police failed to uncover the
pistol which the 5th Marine Division patrol involved in
the incident thought one of the Japanese possessed. There
is now considerable doubt that the pistol actually existed.
The report of its presence probably came from the fact that
three of the Japanese soldiers made motions as if covering
pistols with their hands. The above three soldiers were
retained and questioned by the civil police but have now
been released. The Japanese civil authorities were very
cooperative in this matter and have given assurance that
there will be no further trouble. The Chief of Staff of
the 5th Marine Division, states that there has been no furth-
ern trouble and that in his opinion the incident is now consid-
ered closed.
E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Civil censorship.

A study of eight different KYUSHU newspapers (NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, SAGA SHIMBUN, NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN, ASAHI SHIMBUN, MAINICHI SHIMBUN, KUMAMOTO KICHINICHI SHIMBUN, OITA GODO SHIMBUN, and KAGOSHIMA NIPPO) has revealed no subversive or uncooperative indications. These papers printed very little local news and devoted most of their space to standard DOMEI releases.

One interesting story was written after the crash of an OKINAWA-based B-29 on 18 September off the MIYAZAKI coast. The crew drifted ashore on 26 September near the UDO Shrine in the vicinity of KAYA. Local villagers went to their assistance and two seriously wounded flyers were treated at the nearby SUZAKI Hospital. The interpreter from the KAYA Liaison Committee who reported the presence of the flyers to our forces stated that he was shown every courtesy by our occupation forces.

KITAJIMA, Tsunichi, head of the SASEBO branch of the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, states that newspaper censorship during the war was the responsibility of the TOKKA KA (Intelligence Bureau) of the prefectural government. The SASEBO civilian police censored all local news except that pertaining to the navy, which was censored by the SASEBO Naval Barracks. KITAJIMA states that he was once called before Captain MITSUI (censor at the SASEBO Naval Base) to apologize for having published a casualty list before it was released by the military. He added that the local police department issued directives to all newspapers indicating types of news stories that could be published. KIKUMOTO, Haruo was the local police inspector and news censor. He is now believed to be in FUKUOKA, where he holds a position with the government of KYUSHU.

The two unidentified weapons reported at AINOURA Naval Training Station with 6" muzzles and 3" breeches were examined by NAVTECHJAP and determined to be training pieces for 3" naval guns. They are of no intelligence value.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 14. (Continued)

SECRET


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRIBUTION:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC JICFOA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FarPac</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 5thPhibGrp</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III PhibCorps</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>CG I Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG X Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 2ndMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 5thMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 32nd InfDiv (c/o G-2 FOF)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG 22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>CO 1stBn 27thInf (KANOYA)</td>
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<td>CG FOF</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO Corps Troops</td>
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<td>Record Section VAC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>File</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 7 -

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

5 October, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SASEBO Area. The 5th Marine Division reports that 150 naval personnel were demobilized during the period.

2. KUMAMOTO Area. The following information on airfields in KUMAMOTO Prefecture was submitted in documentary form to the 2nd Marine Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ORIGINAL NO.</th>
<th>CURRENT NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KUMAMOTO Area Hq</td>
<td>HOTAKU GUN</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Air Regt Hq</td>
<td>HOTAKU GUN</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F*Unit</td>
<td>KUMAMOTO A/F</td>
<td>2,772</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F*Unit</td>
<td>KUMANOSHO A/F</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F*Unit</td>
<td>KUROISHI BARU A/F</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F*Unit</td>
<td>KIKUCHI A/F</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F*Unit</td>
<td>TAMANA A/F</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch Depot</td>
<td>KIKUCHI A/F</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Unit</td>
<td>KIKUCHI A/F</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>11,390</strong></td>
<td><strong>343</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. GOTO RETTO. 349 personnel from FUKAE SHIMA arrived at AINUURA during the period. Interrogation of 1st Lt. FURUKAWA, Togi, OIC indicated the 107th IMB had a T/O of 8 independent infantry battalions and a signal unit with code numbers 2700, 2701, 2702, 2703, 2704, 2705, 2706, and 2709 assigned to them. The group was activated at the SASEBO Hvy Arty Regt Repl Depot 11 April, 1945. Only 200 well trained men were in the group; the remainder were raw recruits. The infantry forces arrived at FUKAE 15 April and had completed their positions about 80 per cent when the war ended. About one third of the men lacked weapons. The commander is Maj. Gen. KU3E, Yasokichi.

4. IKITSUKI SHIMA. On this is land which adjoins HIRADO SHIMA, an artillery battery is reported by the 5th Marine Division.

5. IKI ISLAND. Demobilization of army forces was virtually complete with the arrival 2,803 personnel at FUKUOKA on 4 October.

*Combined flight, maintenance, construction, and AA personnel.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
Order of Battle. (Continued) 50ct45.

SECRET

5. Military Police. FUKUOKA Occupation Force reports the following information on the current status of military police in KYUSHU:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CURRENT NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUMAMOTO</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OITA</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOKURA</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGA</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The headquarters in FUKUOKA reports that these units will be demobilized only on special orders from TOKYO.

7. Repatriation. 1,948 Army troops, 0 Navy, and 111 civilians arrived at HAKATA from KOREA on 4 October.

8. Demobilization. The following information was supplied by Maj. Gen KOGO for the Army and Cmdr NISHIMURA for the SASEBO N.D.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE</th>
<th>ORIGINAL NO.</th>
<th>WEEK ENDING 50ct45</th>
<th>TO DATE</th>
<th>REMAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army (ground &amp; air)</td>
<td>581,986</td>
<td>137,097</td>
<td>480,662</td>
<td>101,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO N.D.</td>
<td>116,053</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>110,493</td>
<td>5,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KURE N.D.</td>
<td>56,160</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>48,262*</td>
<td>7,898*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Air Fleet</td>
<td>63,750</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>59,372*</td>
<td>4,378*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>817,949</td>
<td>138,143</td>
<td>698,789</td>
<td>119,219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*22 September figure.
027/rem
Ser. 008973

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT
From: 1800I, 05Oct45
To: 1800I, 06Oct45

SECRET
No. 15.

HQ, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 7 October 1945.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Bases for Midget Subs, Human Torpedoes, Suicide Craft.
(C) Status of Naval Airfields, SASEBO Naval District.

A. DE-MOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
   See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
   No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

FUKUOKA Area

Dump near NAJIMA contains:

- 28,000 rds 7.7 ammunition.
- 20,000 rds 15cm short howitzer ammunition.
- 7,540 hand grenades.
- 2,550 hand grenades of new type (under investigation by NAVTECHJAP).
- 24 15cm field pieces.

JUKOICHI Area Dump contains:

- 4,253 boxes 75mm shells.
- 10 boxes 30cm projectiles.
- 420 boxes 7.7 ammunition.
- 105 boxes 50mm shells.
- 52 boxes 150mm fire bombs.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 15, (Continued)

710 boxes of hand grenades.
75 boxes 75mm mountain gun rounds
240 10cm shells
160 boxes artillery fuzes
19 boxes AT mines.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

HOSHIZA Village (N of MUKURIYA). In this village a radio station, sound detection station, and a searchlight are mounted on a concrete generator house. There are also two underground generator rooms in the same vicinity. All are in good condition and there are many cases of spare parts and accessories.

USHINOURA Arsenal Area (82.5-06.0). It is now being cleaned and cared for by 40 civilians under Ensign YOKOYAMA and a warrant officer. An inventory will be submitted later.

SASEBO

Warehouses in SASEBO ammunition storage area. A mortar of new design manufactured in 1945 was located. This mortar was labeled 15cm but the actual bore diameter is 6.37 inches. It fires at a fixed elevation of 45 degrees, and has no elevating, traversing or recoil mechanisms. Another new type mortar labeled 9cm was also found. An incendiary hand grenade of a design hitherto unreported was found, however the grenade was manufactured in 1937 and is probably obsolete. NAVTECHJAP is making a study of these weapons.

SHIMONOSEKI

Warehouses at OHATA parade ground have:
5 24cm guns.
1 75cm guns.
6 28cm AA.

MARVO Fort has four 28cm guns (reported obsolete and last fired in 1914).
MOUNT JUZU Fort has one 28cm gun and one 70mm gun.

NAGASAKI Area

MONDO SOSOKAIHO Plant. Owner, ZISAKU, Kaheishiti. Employed 62 during war, now employs 10. Made nuts and bolts for MITSUBISHI. Ceased war operations 15 August 1945.

KYUSHU Pulp Works in ISAHAYA. The warehouses of this firm were used to store supplies for the 21st Naval Aerial Arsenal.

MITSUBISHI Ordnance Works. (Construction Section #1) Construction Section #1 of the MITSUBISHI Ordnance Manufacturing Company is divided into five divisions with five plants in the NAGASAKI Area.

Production: Construction Section #1 produced and tested 18" aerial torpedoes. Production totals were 270 per month or 3240 per year. The torpedoes were made in the NAGASAKI plant and shipped to SASEBO where the Navy loaded the war heads. Employees number almost 15,000. Some experiments were being made with rockets.

The section was divided into five divisions or plants which house machine shops, finishing shops, and assembly plants. To a great extent these plants were underground or in tunnels. There are still 1413 usable machines. The only damage is due to heavy rust, lack of oiling, and disuse. Many of the officials of the MITSUBISHI Ordnance Works were killed but four key officials remain. The above information was obtained by interrogation of HONDA, Yuseku, who is now in charge of the office.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

Bases for Midget Subs, Human Torpedoes, Suicide Surface Craft. See Enclosure (B).

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.
(2) Suspects.

TOKITA, Masaq. This subject is employed at the SASEBO communications center as an interpreter. TOKITA, an American citizen, was born in Pomona, California, in 1924. Investigation of this suspect to date has revealed numerous discrepancies in his stories. Investigation continues.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

MATSUURA, Hoichi, head of the NAGASAKI KEN Imperial Reserve Association (TEIKOKU ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI), claims to have known the following TOKUMU KIKAN officers during his tour of duty in CHINA (1939-1942).

SUZUKI, Shigeji, Major General, located at PAUTING, CHINA. (MATSUURA believes his home is near NAGOSA).

NAMAMOTO, Sozaburo, Major, located at NANTUNG, CHINA. His home is at AKASHI, HONSHU (near KOBE). The 5th Marine Division reports that the BUKOKU KAI was a compulsory organization for police officers. The program included Kendo and Judo.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Investigation revealed that the HIU neighborhood association, consisting of three groups, rations food, arbitrates domestic quarrels, arranges marriages, informs people of edicts and rulings and performs other related tasks.

According to the SASEBO Chief of Police a government license was required to operate any radio equipment in Japan. The National Post Office Department issued licenses to operate radio equipment. No licenses were issued for the operation of short wave equipment.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Press Survey of SASEBO.
Four of the nine daily newspapers published in KYUSHU have general circulation in SASEBO. They are the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, the NISHI NIFFON SHIMBUN, the ASAHI SHIMBUN, and the MAINICHI SHIMBUN. The leading newspaper is the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN which has a general circulation of 5,000 copies. All general news originates in TOKYO. What little local news there is remains uncensored at the present time.

The following article is quoted from a copy of the NISHI NIFFON SHIMBUN dated 6 October 1945. "It is more than ten days since the Allied Army arrived.... it is a big mistake if you think they are just chewing gum and chattering. With efficiency first as their policy, their work progresses rapidly by the control of buttons and handles. Even their bodies are like machines. Despite the rain or darkness, they complete every proposed detail within the estimated time. It is a fact that the machinery is the source of "speed" of these large projects, but we cannot overlook the efforts of the men behind the gun." (Pictures of trucks and a bulldozer accompanied this article).

The following article is quoted from a copy of the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN dated 6 October 1945. "The first unit of demobilized soldiers who were the defenders of GOTO returned to NAGASAKI on the 5th at 1100 on the CHOFUKU MARU. Headed by Captain KOSASA, they wore uniforms minus insignia and arms. After an inspection by MPs and Japanese police, they parted for their homes. KOSASA said, "We were doing our best for the defense of the battleground, but since hearing His Majesty's order on the termination of the war, I have no comment to make at this time. While living in GOTO, we tried to live on our supplies, but we ran into trouble for lack of vegetables. About two-thirds of the defenders are still on GOTO, but they will soon be demobilized." (Pictures of the landing accompanies the article).

(2) Report on HIRADO Shima.

There is sufficient food for the present but about 50% of the growing crops have been destroyed by a typhoon. There are ship building yards and a fish cannery on the island. Thirty nine unreported rifles were found in the Elementary School. It was explained that these
G-2 Periodic Report No. 15.  (Continued)

SECRET

were used to teach military drill and bayonet fencing. Ten years ago an order was issued from TOKYO to start this and calisthenics in all schools. Two to three hours of extensive drill were conducted each week. The SHONEN DAN and the SEINAN DAN used these weapons also to give additional drill outside of school hours. The last time these weapons were used or any drills held was 11 August 1945. Militarism still prevails in the schools and saluting, marching, and group formations were observed both in the school yard and classrooms. All civilian weapons will be ready for collection on 6 October 1945 when they will be taken up and sent to HINOURA for storage in the Town House.

(3) NAGASAKI Air Crew Training School

This school opened in April, 1942, in order to train youths as air crew members. Boys from 14 to 17 years of age from western Japan were chosen from many applicants by the TOKYO Air Office. Located at ISAHAYA Airfield in ONO, the school staff of 19 teachers taught their 350 regular students the middle school subjects during the five year course. During their fourth year, students were to have had training in the school's 11 primary and 8 secondary gliders. In the last school year, 5 primary and secondary training planes were to be used for demonstration in the maintenance and repair of aircraft. Commander TAKENAKA, Matsumo, of the ISAHAYA Air Unit, acted as liaison officer for the Navy, and most of the students would have eventually entered the Navy Air Force, although some would have remained in a civilian status as air technicians. This information was obtained from ONO, Matsuo, the head teacher of the school, who is now living in a house in ISAHAYA, which became official quarters for the teachers after the 8th Marines occupied the airfield area.

DISTRIBUTION:

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<tr>
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<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC JICPOA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG TFKPAC</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Com508PAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG 4 Corps</td>
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- 6 -

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, C-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

6 October 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

1. Enclosure (C) is a reproduction of an English document submitted to this office by Commander ETO, air officer on Admiral SUGIYAMA's Staff. A further detailed report in Japanese on persons only has been submitted by Lt. Comdr. ISHIHARA representative of the 5th Naval Air Fleet; the report is now in the process of reproduction and will be published shortly.

2. SASEBO Area. Naval personnel demobilized during the period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporary guards</th>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>473</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>597</td>
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Remaining 16 members of the SASEBO Military Police Company were demobilized at HIRADO during the period.

3. 5th Marine Division Area. As of 6 October, the following forces remain in that part of the 5th Marine Division Area not yet under our control.

a. Army forces remaining as of this date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF UNIT</th>
<th>NO. OF PERSONS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>312th InfDiv</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d SigRegtResUnit</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th SigRegt</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
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<tr>
<td>52d Sig Regt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134th Independent AA Bn</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Independent AA Bn</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGA DistRegtHq</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Administration Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGA Army Hospital</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KURUME Div Hq</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Administration Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st InfResUnit</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>Awaiting demobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d InfResUnit</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>Formerly of OMUTA City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EngrResUnit</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TransResUnit</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ArtyResUnit</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Res OfficerSchool</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Res OfficerSchool</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VetMaterialDepot</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Guardians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th Independent Tank Regt</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (A)  - 1 -

SECRET

531
### Order of Battle

**SECRET**

<table>
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<th>NAME OF UNIT</th>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th Independent MtnArtyRegt</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Overseas Trans Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43d Independent AA Bn</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32d Field Service Co.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUOKA Med Depot</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Machine Gun Bn</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Comm Hq</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUOKA Food Depot, Branch</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUOKA Goods Depot, Branch</td>
<td>60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUOKA Clothes Depot, Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>18th Independent Mix Arty Regt</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123rd Independent Engr Bn</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOKURA Arms Supply Depot, Branch</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132d AA Regt</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Serving as guards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OITA Dist Regt Hq</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Administration Personnel</td>
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<td>OITA Army Hospital</td>
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<td>TAKETA Army Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>118th IMB</td>
<td>109</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,648</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

b. Air Forces remaining as of this date:

- CHIKUGO Airport                     | 33             | Guards                   |
- USA Naval Air Base                  | 350            | Guards                   |
- BEPPU Naval Air Base                | 248            | Guards                   |
- HETSUKI Naval Air Base              | 100            | Guards                   |
- SAEKI Naval Air Base                | 249            | Guards                   |
- OKAMI Naval Air Base                | 208            | Guards                   |
- **TOTAL**                           | **1,188**      |                          |

c. Naval Forces remaining as of this date:

- BEPPU Naval Detachment              | 33             | KURE Garrison            |
- BEPPU Naval Hospital                | 974            |                         |
- BEPPU Naval Arsenal                 | 94             | Guards                   |
- 8th Special Attack Force            | 31             | Guards                   |
- SAEKI Naval Def Corps               | 3,024          |                         |
- SAEKI Munitions Depot               | 37             |                         |
- SAEKI Civil Engr Det                | 45             |                         |
- **TOTAL**                           | **4,189**      |                         |
- **TOTAL TROOPS**                    | **11,025**     |                         |

4. **NAGASAKI Area.** No units demobilized during period. The following additional report on the 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade was made by the 2nd Marine Division. Actually the only units that
Order of Battle. (Continued) 6Oct45

were completely mobilized and equipped were the 17th Heavy Artillery Regiment (composed of 3 batteries) and the 134th AA Regiment with 4 AA batteries and 2 3L Batteries. At the beginning of the war the regiment had 6 AA batteries but later 2 AA batteries were moved to other parts of KYUSHU. Of the brigade proper, only 2 infantry battalions, 1 engineers battalion, and 1 communication company were in NAGASAKI at the end of the war, having arrived on 6 August and 8 August. The remainder of the personnel were at OSAKA and have been demobilized there. One infantry battalion came without light machine guns, rifles or field guns and the other came without heavy machine guns or field guns; 2,000 rifles were dispatched from the KURUME supply depot, but the rest of the units' weapons are still in the OSAKA Area.

5. Repatriation. A total of 3,031 Army, 0 Naval, 0 Civilians arrived at HAKATA on 5 October aboard the KOGANE MARU and TOKUJO MARU from FUSAII. They were demobilized and dispersed as follows:

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<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<td>HAKATA</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>KYUSHU</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONSHU</td>
<td>2,606</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,031</td>
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- 3 - SECRET
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<tr>
<th>AIRFIELD</th>
<th>CHARGE</th>
<th>T. AUG.</th>
<th>METERS</th>
<th>HANGAR</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>MISSILES</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
<th>GUN</th>
<th>CARTRIDGE</th>
<th>BIVVY</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>M.G.</th>
<th>M.G.</th>
<th>Z.R.</th>
<th>B.O.</th>
<th>CARPET ROLL</th>
<th>RADIO</th>
<th>M.T.</th>
<th>N.V.C.</th>
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### Status of Naval Airfield in Sasebo N.D. (Cont'd)

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<th>HANGAR  (M)</th>
<th>BARACKS  (M)</th>
<th>BOMB  (2,000)</th>
<th>AERIAL  (M)</th>
<th>W &amp; M</th>
<th>A.G.</th>
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<td>TANUMIZU AIR</td>
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**NOTES:**
- AIRFIELD
- FLOATING AIRFIELD
- AMPHIBIOUS AIRFIELD
- TEMPORARY AIRFIELD
- AIR CORPS (NO AIRFIELD)
- UNDER CONTROL NAVAL NAVAL (NAVY) UNDER CONTROL NAVAL AIR FLIGHT

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PREPARED BY M.C. S-2, U.S. NAVAL AIR CORPS

PAGE NO. 2
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 060ct45
To: 1800I, 070ct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 8 October 1945.

SECRET
No. 16.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OoB DELAYED).
(B) NAVTECHJAP report on Jap radar on HARIO Island.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A). (OoB DELAYED)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A). (OoB DELAYED)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

SASEBO Area
NEKOYAMA Naval Battery consists of:

4 dual mount 12.7cm AA guns.
2 range finders (1 dismantled).
345 12.7cm shells.
1,350 fuzes for above shells.

FUKUOKA Area
8 150mm cannon with 265 rounds.
ammo. and 30 caissons.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.
NAGASAKI

YAMADA Steel Manufacturing Company—produced 115 HF Marine Engines for small naval cargo craft. It was under the direction of the Navy but is now non-operational.

FUKUOKA

NAJIMA Steam Power Plant—can produce 50,000 kilowatts per hour (FUKUOKA uses 8,000 kilowatts per hour). It now employs 250 and is a branch of KYUSHU SHITTIN Power Company of TOKYO.

OKAZAB Iron Works now makes farm implements, tools, conveyors, and belts. During the war it made mortar shell casings, carbine parts, machine gun parts, valves for 600s, and rocket parts. On hand are:

1,936 mortar shell casings—complete.
2,990 mortar shell casings— incomplete.
4,200 rocket ammo. parts—complete.
3,622 rocket ammo. parts—incomplete.

NAVTECHJAP has investigated the radar installations at an unidentified Jap camp near HAMAO (FUKUOKA Area). Work had ceased when the project was only about 75% completed, but it was apparent that the camp area (approximately 1/4 square mile) was designed to operate two different types of Jap Army air-search radars: one A (KO) type and one B (OSTU) type. One building had been erected for the B type radar, but the receiver and indicator were missing. Another receiving station was built underground but is only about 50% complete. A large radar transmitter frame and crates of antenna gear in the area have been smashed beyond repair (apparently by the crew when they abandoned the project). Crates of damaged tubes in the area include:

100 type QC-717-C high voltage mercury vapor rectifiers.
50 type TR-594A, U.H.F. oscillator tube for one of the radar transmitters.
2 type UV-812 radio frequency oscillator tubes probably for a communications transmitter.

Only about 50% of these tubes are in operational condition.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

3AGA

(The following list, located by coordinates, was given to VAC units which are to enter 3AGA on 8 October.)

TOGAMI Electric Works (See VAC Periodic Report No. 12).
Domestic Industrial Company.
Socony Plant.
Local Court.
District Court.
3AGA Station.
NIBUSHIMA Station.
GENDARME Office.
Meteorological Station.
Regimental No.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None.

(5) Miscellaneous.

(a) A marine group was dispatched to TOJU (north of...
KURUME) after the Jap Civil Police had reported that a group of Chinese POWs consisting of one officer and 40 men were rioting there. Investigation revealed that no rioting or looting had taken place, but that the Chinese had bought clothing for 400 people and refused to give ration tickets.

(c) MATSUMOTO, Jiichiro was interviewed at FUKUOKA in regard to the ZENKOKU SUMEIT SHA since he is the national president. This is an organization of the ETA class of Japanese citizens and claims to have 5,000,000 members in Japan (of which 500,000 are on KYUSHU and 10,000 in FUKUOKA City). Meetings were held monthly before the war but were banned upon the outbreak of hostilities. The group plans to begin meeting again soon.

The Japanese Government set up a rival ETA organization called the DOMA KOKOKAI, but was unable to enroll only a small number of members according to MATSUMOTO.

By virtue of his position as the elected head of this group, MATSUMOTO is a member of the DIET. He has been imprisoned three times by the Japanese Government for political activity among the ETA class - serving four months in 1924, two months in 1925, and three and a half years beginning in 1926.

E. MISCELLANEOUS

(1) Civil Censorship.

The commercial radio station in FUKUOKA is operating and is complying with all regulations that have been issued from TOKYO (see Intelligence Targets, VAC Periodic Report No. 14).

A press survey of FUKUOKA indicates that the following papers are circulated there (city of publication indicated in parenthesis):

- NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN (FUKUOKA)
- MAINICHI SHIMBUN (MOJI)
- ASAHI SHIMBUN (KOKURA)
- KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI (KUMAMOTO)
- YOMIURI (TOKYO)

- 4 -

SECRET
There are distributed by FUKUOKA HOI KYU SHO (newspaper agency) which is independent of all publishers but has its headquarters in TOKYO.

The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN claims that its prewar circulation of 400,000 papers in both its morning and evening editions was the largest in Western JAPAN. It publishes only one edition daily at present and has a circulation of 400,000 daily. This paper gets its releases from the new KYO DO TSUSHIM agency rather than from DOMAI. It also publishes two monthly magazines, GEKKAN NISHI NIPPON (a digest of news) and SEIREN KISHI (a technical magazine for young men).

A press survey of KOKURA reveals that ASAHI SHIMBUN has a branch printing plant there with a local circulation of 700,000. The headquarters for this paper are at OSAKA, and other printing plants are located at OSAKA and TOKYO. At present 90 percent of the news for the KOKURA edition comes from OSAKA and goes to TOKYO (the central office recently made an exchange contact with the New York Times and the Associated Press).

A press survey of MOJI reveals that MAINICHI SHIMBUN has a branch printing office there and a local circulation of 430,000 (500,000 before the war). MAINICHI also has its headquarters in OSAKA and other printing offices in OSAKA and TOKYO. MAINICHI has a new contract for the exchange of news with the Chicago Daily News and United Press. During the war, B. YOSHIMOTO, former editor, was forced to resign by Premier TOJO, because he had printed news given him by one of his reporters with the Navy which was said to be harmful to the government.

The following editorial is a translation from the 7 October issue of the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN:

"Following the resignation of Prince Higashi Kuni's Cabinet, Baron Kijuro SHIDEHARA was ordered to form a new cabinet. He is a veteran of the political and diplomatic world. However, it is practically 15 years since he retired from the face of the political and diplomatic world and his past record is unknown to the present generation. Then, what is the true object behind His Majesty's order for Baron SHIDEHARA to form a new cabinet in these times of national crisis?
"It is evident that most of the people were about to forget or had completely forgotten about Baron SHIDEHARA, so his re-entry into political life at this time following His Majesty's order, has a deep meaning. However, it does not require very much to explain this meaning.

"Why did Baron SHIDEHARA retire from the political world 15 years ago? It was like this. The time was December 1931, in the midst of the Manchuria incident when he was the Foreign Minister in the MAKATSUKI Cabinet. His opinion and diplomatic beliefs met the opposition of the War Council, originators of the incident. He then retired to the present existence.

"Although the time and space of developments differ in regard to the Manchuria incident, the China incident and the Great East Asia War, it is, needless to say, essentially the same. In other words, Baron SHIDEHARA, who sensed the coming of the Great East Asia War, held to his opinion and did not give in to the militarists. He was therefore "buried", but is now re-entering for the same reason. The object of his succeeding Prince Higashi Kuni resembles the entering of Foreign Minister YOSHIDA, who succeeded SHIGEMITSU on a previous occasion. It is therefore clear that we know what to expect from Baron SHIDEHARA.

Three teams from the 4th Censorship Advance Detachment have begun screening terminal mail at FUKUOKA, MOJI, and SHIMONOSEKI in accordance with Sixth Army's Directive (Dispatch 0517111).

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SECRET

542
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

7 October 1945.

1. The following report was submitted to VAC by NAVTECHJAP. The location of this radar set was carried in Paragraph E. of VAC Periodic Report No. 11. At present this installation is intact as described and still guarded by the Japanese.

NAVTECHJAP
NAVY No. 3912.
c/o FPO., San Francisco, Calif.

7 October 1945.

Subject: Special Examination of Radar at FURUSATO Battery, HARIO Island.

To: Oinc, Military Division, NavTechJap.

From: Oinc, Team M-10.

1. A team, consisting of Capt. BENNETT, Lt. LAMB, Lt. SCANLAN, a language officer and a photographer made a special inspection of FURUSATO and KIRISAKI Batteries, at the SE tip of HARIO Island on 7 October 1945.

2. A battery of 4 15cm guns and a battery of 4 12cm guns were found. Of particular interest was a Mark IV Model 2 Modification 2 (S-24) (Mark 21 series) AA fire-control radar. This instrument is described in detail on pages 1 - 307 and 1-308 of "Japanese Radar and RCM Equipment" published by CINCPAC in 15 May 1945, and on page 35 of CINCPAC-CINCPAC Bulletin 92-45 published 11 April 1945.

3. The radar installation was located in a crater-shaped depression on top of a hill and consisted of an antenna and pedestal mounted on a concrete foundation, with the indicating equipment and operators in a concrete room below ground level. The operating frequency is 200 megacycles, and separate transmitting and receiving arrays are used. It is believed that elevation and bearing accuracy is about plus or minus one-half degree and range is correct to about 50 yards. In general this equipment is similar to the U. S. Army SCR 268.

4. The radar was mounted between the FURUSATO and KIRISAKI Batteries about 400 yards from the FURUSATO Battery and about 50 yards from the KIRISAKI Battery. While all cabi:

ENCLOSURE (B) - 1 - SECRET
NavTechJap Report.  (Continued)

SECRET

had not been installed it is believed that this radar could have furnished present position data to the directors of both batteries: in the case of the KIRIJAKI Battery a Type 2 director, and in the case of the FURUSATO Battery a Type 3 director.

/s/

ALLEN BENNETT
Capt., CAC (USA)
CinC, Team M-10.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800 I, 07 Oct 45
To: 1800 I, 08 Oct 45

SECRET

No. 17.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AM3 L872).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) OMAURA, Materiel Report on.
(C) Preliminary Examination of Modified Type 7.7mm Machine Gun.
(D) Preliminary Examination of 28 Barrel, 12cm Anti-aircraft Rocket Launcher.
(E) Preliminary Examination of Japanese Naval Type Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher.
(F) Field Inspection of SASEBO AA Positions.
(G) Preliminary Examination of Modified Type 97 Japanese Medium Tanks.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

1200 bombs in vicinity of KITA KATA (between SAGA and SASEBO) mountain road. It is believed these were to be used for mining the road. They have all been disarmed.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO Area

- 1 -

SECRET
Small Dry Dock (in SASEBO) in disuse now, but can accommodate 2 small boats.

DAI NIHON KUKI Bomb Release Factory at ONIZUKA (SAGA KEN) consists of:

- 6 machine shops.
- 1 blacksmith shop.
- 1 electrical shop.

3 caves 1 to 1/4 mile long contain lathes, machine shops, and metal working tools. Also tons of rice are in the end of one cave. It is owned by KUROIWA, Ieamu and managed by HOUA, Toshio. Work ceased 16 August 1945.

Cave in SASEBO Area completely fitted out as a radio station. This was in operation until 1200 8 October 1945.

A Torpedo Boat Repair Station on an island north of SASEBO, in ASAMA- SHIMA group, is manned by 18 men under a Naval Commander and a Lieutenant. All the buildings are new, having been completed in July 1945. The above Japanese personnel were relieved by the 5th Marine Division.

**FUKUOKA**

SEIBU Gas Company. Manufactures gas with coke as a by-product. 9000 meters of gas and 10 tons of coke are produced each day. 160 persons are employed in the company.

MAMEYAMA Coal Mine controlled by MITSUBISHI from TOKYO. The manager is KIKUTAKE. Mine employs 700 civilians producing 90 tons per day.

**SHIMONOSEKI**

Railroad Marshalling Yard. They are slightly damaged but usable. There are 5 switch engines, double tracks, and 45 sidings. Employs 250 workers.

The Customs Office is now located in the post office and controls all shipping from SHIMONOSEKI.

SHIMONOSEKI NAEDA Power Plant. Undamaged. Employs 70 people and supplies SHIMONOSEKI Area.

Water Works. Employs 9 people. Has 4 tanks holding 10,000 litres each. Uses sand filters plus chlorine.

HAYASHIKANE Drydocks. 2 docks, 150 feet by 75 feet, operational. Will hold 1000 ton ships.

The Post Office and Court House are undamaged and continue to operate.

NAGASAKI

MOGI Cable Station. This station is located about 1 mile south of the village of MOGI. Equipment at the station includes telegraph sending equipment, cable testing equipment, voltmeters, an electric panel, and spare parts for testing equipment. The station is in good condition but not in use. (See G-2 Periodic report #11 on NAGASAKI Cable Station).

KYowa Steel Works. This factory was partially destroyed by the atomic bomb. It produced YAKIDAMA 115 HP engines for the Japanese Navy. There are now 20 large and small engines in the factory. It is now non-operational.

NAGASAKI Meteorological Station (receiving station). This was a sub-unit of the NAGASAKI Meteorological Station reported in VAC periodic #14. There are two radio towers still standing but most of the radio and weather equipment was damaged by the atomic bomb. It is now non-operational.

TANEKOBU Barracks. Completely destroyed by the atomic bomb.

(2) Intelligence target located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

MOGI

(The following list, located by coordinates, was given to VAC units which are to enter MOGI on
C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

KATO, Kaze Machi, OMURA, described by a confidential informant as making statements reflecting anti-American feeling.

YAMAKOTO. It was reported that on 2 October he stopped a 2nd Marine Division patrol in the town of NAGATA and asked the leader a number of suspicious questions. He is a member of the ISAHAYA Liaison Committee and a search is being made for him.

YAMAGUTI. A civilian who has been making suspicious inquiries regarding military installations in a regimental area near NASASAKI.

SUZUKI, Shigeyi, Major General. From Major General Matsuura, CO of NASASAKI Regimental District, it was learned that this suspect now believed to be in MALAYA, was a member of the TOKUMU KIKAN.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

KEMPEI TAI investigation is continuing at FUKUOKA. Interrogation of the local unit revealed that all...
records of KEMPEI TAI had been burned on 16 September 1945 by order of OKIDO, Senji, then Commander-in-Chief of KEMPEI TAI in TOKYO. OKIDO was preceded as KEMPEI TAI C0 by OKI, Shigeru. The present Commander-In-Chief is ITMURA, Minoru.

(5) Miscellaneous.

GUNPOKAIGI (Naval Police Court) was described by an informant as an organization before which disaffected Japanese exiles would be brought for trial. Investigation continues.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

Civilians remain cooperative and have learned that the Americans are not the brutal, stupid people the Militarists led them to believe.

A translation of Military Police order #267, dated 4 September 1945, classified SECRET, from Military Police Headquarters, TOKYO, is outlined briefly. The order expresses concern over possible disorderly conduct by discharged Japs and over unrest arising from post war hardships. It states that free speech and the publication of the particulars of the war will result in indignation against the Japanese Government, irreverence toward the emperor, a pro-American feeling, socialist or communist ideas, or general political and social unrest. The document closes stating a necessary strengthening of the police machinery of the Interior Department.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Press Survey.

Copies of all newspapers currently published on KYUSHU are now being received. Owing to transportation difficulties, only those papers originating in the immediately adjacent areas of the island (i.e., FUKUOKA, SAGA, and NAGASAKI prefectures) are available every day. The papers printed in the more distant prefectures of KYUSHU are received irregularly one to three days after publication. Complete daily coverage of the entire KYUSHU press is therefore not possible, but all of the published newspapers eventually get examined. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive
or evidences of subversive activity were noted. The following translations of news articles are presented.

a. MAINICHI SHIMBUN dated 8 October 1945. "Death Ray. With the commencement of the death ray experiment by Japanese scientists five years ago, it was barely developed by the end of the war, to the point of exterminating a mouse at a distance of 30 meters in 10 minutes. Realizing the tremendous possibilities of the experiment for the future, the Japanese are appropriating 100,000 yen for the year 1946 to cover the necessary funds for this purpose. American scientific research organizations are concentrating their attention toward the future possible development of this experiment. It was intended to employ the death ray to halt the Americans by means of quick extinction. If this experiment was successful it might have been applied to aircraft... The decision of the American scientific research organization is as follows: Should there be no technical improvement, the death ray is of no value as a military weapon... After being questioned as to the use of human beings for experimental purposes, the Japanese replied to the effect that one of the experimenters volunteered to undergo the trial in contact with the device. Within a few seconds he was overcome by dizziness and fatigue. The effects of the experiment remained from twelve to twenty-four hours."

b. SAGA SHIMBUN dated 8 October 1945. "Mary and Alice Yonekura, born in America are interpreters at the SAGA City Hall... From 9:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., going outdoors is strictly forbidden to Japanese civilians. Civilians may obtain special passage cards if trip is necessary."

c. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN dated 8 October 1945. "The U.S. Sixth Army, the Tenth Army, and the 41st Division landed at HIROSHIMA with 19,500 men on the 7th at 8:30 A.M. and are now stationed in the cities of HIROSHIMA, KURE, and KAITA." Editorial. "Time and again, we have stressed the continuance of regulating our country's postwar economic problem systematically. The recent order from the Allied
Army Commander to regulate our economic problems bears important object as well as something to comment on our government's plans. We are already facing economic difficulties with ugly inflation as the kernel. Strict control of wages and necessary articles and fair distribution of living necessities must be carefully planned to control our economy. However, the government does not seem to be doing its best toward the fair distribution of living necessities, although it seems a certain powerful capitalist group is moving them in the name of free economic revival. According to America's plan, which was previously clearly stated, it encourages the speedy revival of peaceful production and permits the production of living necessities in mass and superior manner, and also it permits the conversion of all factories for such production."

(2) A Report on POW Camp on KOYAGI SHIMA.

Two Koreans, HASHIMOTO, Kaneo and KANEYAMA, Tochun, reported that they had contact with Allied POW's in the Allied POW Camp on KOYAGI SHIMA. The Koreans worked in the KAWAMINAMI Shipyard on KOYAGI SHIMA where they had jobs as cement mixers. They estimate the 1,000 prisoners were marched to the shipyard daily by Japanese Army guards, and were then turned over to a Navy guard at the yard. Supervision of the POW's was not strict and HASHIMOTO and KANEYAMA were able to give them cigarettes and speak to some of the prisoners in Japanese. The prisoners told them that the diet at the camp was very poor and consisted almost entirely of soy beans. The Koreans say that the prisoners were very thin, when they were detected picking up orange peels or other garbage by the Navy guard of company employees detailed to watch them, they were taken into the Navy guard house and beaten with sticks, according to the Koreans. They insist that they can recall no names, either of the Navy guard or the company guard. Both begged their interrogators to keep their names secret and not to come directly to their homes, as the Japanese in the area would report them to the police. Both Koreans have lived at MATEGAURA, KOYAGI SHIMA, for the last three years. A further investigation is now being made.
(3) The Naval Technical Mission to Japan (NAVTECHJAP) has submitted technical reports to VAC 3-2. See Enclosures B through G.

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CG 2ndMarDiv     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
CG 3rdMarDiv     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
CG 32ndInfDiv    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
AG 22            |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
CO 1stBn 27thInf |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
CG FOI           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
CO Corps Troops  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
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Record Section VAC| |   |   |   |   |   |   |
File             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET  8 October, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SASEBO Area. The 5thMarDiv reports following
Naval personnel were demobilized during the period 1800 6 October
to 1800 8 October.

Temporary Guards  15
Administrative  167
TOTAL  172

2. NAGASAKI Area.

a. Report on demobilization of 122nd Independent Mixed
Brigade:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBORDINATE UNIT</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>DATE DEMOBILIZED</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig Hq</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>16Sept45</td>
<td>20 to KOREA; 252 to KYUSHU; 53 remain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>733rd II Bn.</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>16Sept45</td>
<td>all to OSAKA Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>737th II Bn.</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>16Sept45</td>
<td>all to HIMEJI Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engrs Bn.</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>16Sept45</td>
<td>all to TAKATSUKI Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm. Co.</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>16Sept45</td>
<td>all to OSAKA Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th HyvArtyRegt</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>16Sept45</td>
<td>362 to KYUSHU; 14 remain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134th AA Regt.</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>20Sept45</td>
<td>40 to KOREA; 1,578 to KYUSHU; 79 remain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253rd Sp M.P. Bn.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10Sept45</td>
<td>NAGASAKI Area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 253rd Bn was a special labor unit composed of local conscriptees who worked on the brigade’s defenses. The strength varied from time to time according to the size of construction activities.

b. NAGASAKI Regimental District Command. This was, according to Maj. Gen. MATSUURA, under the control of the Empire Defense Command and functioned as a local agency of the War Department, as the following diagram indicates:

NAGASAKI Regt Dist

CO: Maj. Gen. MATSUURA, Hoichi
Staff: Maj. MATSUZAKI, Temon
Capt.: TSIZAKI, Sakae

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
Order of Battle

(Continued)

8Oct45

1st Lt. AOKI

 Recruiting
OIC Col. KIMURA, Yukio

Claims & Pensions
OIC: Col. HARA, Noboru

School Training
OIC: Col. HARA, Wasaburo

126 military, 75 civilian personnel.

3. Corrections. The following corrections to Enclosure (B), G-2 Periodic Report No. 8 have been submitted by Major General KOGO:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IKI Fortress</td>
<td>7,443</td>
<td>7,020 already demobilized at FUKUOKA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109th IMB, TANEGASHIMA</td>
<td>5,517</td>
<td>Most recent check by 16th Area Army assigns this figure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 107th IMB, FUKAESIMA,   | 7,345    | 349 demobilized AINOURA, 70ct; 908 demobilized NAGASAKI 60ct; 828 dem-
| GOTO RETTO               |          | mobilized NAGASAKI 70ct; 676 residents to be demobilized at FUKAE; re-
|                          |          | maining 4,584 to be returned to KYUSHU about 120ct.                     |

Recheck of 126th IMB, MAKUSA Island is still going on.

4. Repatriation. The KOSAI MARU departed CHINKAI 50ct and arrived HAKATA 8 Oct with 0 Army, 427 Navy, 836 Civilians; military dispersed 97 to SHIKOKU, 164 to HONSHU, 166 to KYUSHU; civilians dispersed not reported. The KANASH MARU departed FUSAN 5 October and arrived HAKATA 5 October with 558 Army, 0 Navy, 0 civilians; these dispersed 347 to HONSHU, 16 KYUSHU, and 5 remain FUKUOKA. The NIPPON MARU departed FUSAN 60ct and arrived HAKATA 60ct with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 126 civilians. The TOKUJU MARU departed FUSAN 70ct and arrived HAKATA 70ct with 2,164 Army, 0 Navy, 0 civilians; these dispersed 1,438 to HONSHU, 380 to KYUSHU, 546 remain FUKUOKA.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 -
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

3 October 1945.

From:  Captain F. W. Lamb, Military Division, NavTechJap.
To:  Officer in Charge, Military Division, NavTechJap.

Subject:  OMURA, Material report on.

1.  The OMURA target consists essentially of the 21st Naval Air Depot and the 147th Infantry Regiment Replacement Depot under the respective commands of Vice Admiral Nakamura and Colonel Oshuna. This area was investigated during the period 26 September to 30 September 1945. The precise location of all material is on file at Headquarters OMURA Occupation Group. This organization has done a superb job in locating and exploiting all local targets.

2.  Material at the OMURA Target is predominantly aircraft supply; and Occupation group patrols discover daily additional stock-piles dispersed throughout adjacent areas. Material on hand includes the following items together with accessories.

a.  Bombs,

800 Kgm bomb
500 Kgm bomb
250 Kgm bomb
60 Kgm bomb
250 Kgm flame bomb, type 3
60 Kgm flame bomb, type 3
30 Kgm flame bomb, type 5, Mk. 3
60 Kgm rocket bomb
Flare bomb, type 0
1 Kgm training bomb, mod. 3
Target bomb (Navigational type)
Illumination bomb, type 0, model 2, modification 1
1 Kgm Signal smoke bomb, modification 4.

b.  Ammunition.

(1) Army.

8 8mm
30 caliber
7.7mm MG
50mm Mortar
76mm
70mm
37mm
Hand Grenades
Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines
Powder

ENCLOSURE (B) - 1 - SECRET
Subject: OMURA, Material report on. (Continued)

(2) Navy.
- 7.7mmMG
- 13mm MG
- 20mm MG (types 1 and 2)
- 25mm MG
- Flares

c. Armament.
- Swords
- Bayonets
- Rifles - types 30, 38, 99, Mo and I
- Pistols - types 14 and 96
- Mortars - types 89 and 10th year
- Light Machine Gun - types 96 and 99, also three Chinese LMG of Czechoslovakia manufacture.
- Heavy Machine Gun - type 92
- Rocket Discharges - 7cm
- 75mm guns type 38
- 70mm gun - type 92
- 37mm gun - type 94
- Light anti-aircraft guns
  - Single mount 13mm, M6, type 93
  - Single mount 25mm, MK3, type 96
  - Four gun mount, 13.2mm, Hotchkiss
  - Twin mount, 25mm, Model 1, model 3, type 96.
- Heavy anti-aircraft guns - 120mm and 80 or 100mm
- Machine guns, general
  - Fixed mount type 99, 20mm, MK1, model 11
  - type 3, 13mm MK 1

d. Chemical warfare.
- Navy gas masks - type 93 #3
- Army gas masks - types 91, 95, and 99
- Navy #3 base detector kit
- Decontamination pouches, type 96
- Oxygen gas mask (not necessarily CW)
- Mark 3 decontamination powder
- Incendiary pot for destroying and bombs
- Gas mask accessories

e. Radio gear.
- Army sending and receiving radios, MK5, MK5A, and MK6
- Radio station near railway depot
- Miscellaneous supplies and naval radios
- Note: The radar station was destroyed during air attack.

f. Miscellaneous
- Aerial torpedoes plus air compressors

ENCLOSURE (B) - 2 - SECRETS
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET: 3 October 1945.

From: Equipment Officer, Military Division, NavTechJap.
To: Officer in Charge, Military Division, NavTechJap.

Subject: Preliminary Examination of Modified Vickers Type 7.7mm Machine Gun.

1. General Information: The Vickers type machine guns examined were of the type used by Japanese Naval aircraft and had been modified for use on ground mounts. The modifications appear to have been installed according to a fixed plan and the modified guns seem much more practical than the normal Japanese improvisation. Approximately ten of the weapons were found in the equipment of the SASEBO Naval Guard Force.

2. Description of Modification:

   a. The principal disadvantage to the use of Vickers aircraft machine guns on ground mounts has been the difficulty in improvising a firing device which would replace the remote control plunger type trigger. This has been overcome by the addition of a trigger mechanism with wooden grip handles attached to the back plate and connected to the sear by a thin metal sheet. Pressure on the trigger pulls the sear to the rear and releases the operating parts.

   b. A wooden tripod with two fore legs and one trail has been added. No cradle has been added and the gun must be attached to the tripod head by a bolt. There is no elevating or traversing mechanism and the gun swings freely on its mount. The forelegs are one foot six and a half inches long. The trail leg is two feet eleven and a half inches long.

   c. Sight. An "M" type sight similar to the original sight on the US Carbine Caliber .30 M1 is situated just behind the receiver cover. It is graduated at 300 and 600 meters. The front sight is a blade type attached to the front receiver.

3. Operation: Operation of the piece has not been changed. It is cocked by action of an operating handle at the left of the receiver end is driven by an external spring at the right. Belt feed is from left to right.

/s/ GEORGE F. DONALDSON
Captain, Infantry.
Subject: OMURA. Materiel report on. (Continued)

SECRET

Telephones and assorted electrical gear
Vehicles
One obsolete light tank
Rifleman armor shields
Construction battalion engineer equipment
Individual equipment, i.e., helmets, etc.

3. The following probable new materiel was uncovered in this target area, and samples returned to Hq Navy Tech Jap:


b. MK VI Decontamination powder - this powder is used to purify water contaminated by bacteria or poison gases. It was stored at the extreme NW corner of the OMURA Naval Air Field.

4. There are in the vicinity of OMURA, three hospitals of which the Naval Hospital located to the SE is the only one of medical interest. This is a new (1½ years old) 1700 bed institution, reasonably well equipped, and originally designed as a tuberculosis center. It now cares for victims of the NAGASAKI bombing, but preparations are being initiated to convert this hospital to a Medical College for KYUSHU. This would replace the college destroyed at NAGASAKI.

5. There was only slight evidence of chemical warfare preparations either for offense or defense in this area. Gas masks were not available in sufficient number at any time to equip all personnel stationed at the Army or Naval bases; and very little collective protection existed. All personnel interviewed evinced no interest in, or technical knowledge of, chemical warfare. Any knowledge of preparations for bacteriological warfare was denied.

6. It is recommended that a bomb disposal squad and ordnance specialist further investigated the OMURA target area as soon as is practicable. It is also recommended that the 7cm rocket discharger and MK VI decontamination powder be studied in detail.

/s/ F. W. LAMB
Captain, MUS
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.  

SECRET  

3 October 1945.  

From: Equipment Officer, Military Section, NavTechJap.  
To: Officer in Charge, Military Section, NavTechJap.  

Subject: Preliminary Examination of 28 Barrel, 12cm Anti-aircraft Rocket Launcher.  

1. General Information: This weapon was previously described in a CINCPAC-CINCPACOA translation and a diagram was attached thereto. Complete information concerning the weapon was not given but preliminary examination substantiates what has already been known. Although it is known to have been designed for antiaircraft defenses aboard ships complete examples have been found assembled with the equipment of the SASEBO Naval Guard Forces and it is possible that they may have been intended for ground use. Electrical connections in the firing mechanism had severed, but all other parts seem to be in operable condition. The weapons were manufactured at SASEBO Naval Arsenal in 1944 and 1945.  

2. Physical Description: The rocket launcher has the appearance of a large rectangular, segmented box, mounted on a rotary pedestal. The rockets are arranged in five layers. Each of the top three layers hold six rockets; the lower two layers hold five. The troughs are four feet eleven inches long and approximately 5½ inches wide. Seats for the two operators are located on each side of the weapon. The entire weapon sits on a circular base three feet six inches in diameter.  

3. Operation: The multi-barrel rocket launcher is designed for two men operation. The gunner sits at the left of the weapon. He lays the gun for elevation and operates the firing mechanism by means of foot pedals. The assistant gunner sits at the right and operates the traversing hand wheel, a steering wheel like device directly in front of his seat. Sighting mechanism is a simple open type. Each gunner has a "T" shaped device with a sliding bar graduated from 0 to 10 laterally in both directions. The front sight is a simple bead mounted on a pedestal. The main gunner's rear sight has three peeps mounted vertically on a pedestal. The assistant gunner's rear sight is mounted similarly but has only one peep.  

a. The rockets are fired by electrically driven percussion type striker and are ignited in pairs. A switch located in a box 12" high and 7-7/8" wide at the right of the gunner acts as a safety device, as well as a means for arming the piece. When the handle at the top of the box is in its rearward position all circuits are broken even though the foot pedal is pressed. When the handle is forward the only break in the circuit is in the trigger.
device actuated by the foot pedal. When the gunner begins to track he must close the switch, then operate the elevating crank until his target is lined up and within range. Then by a pressure on a foot pedal he pulls the electrical trigger and fires all 28 rockets in sequence. Numbers on the rear of each striker indicate the firing order. There is no symetric plan for the order of firing. A diagram of the spacing of the numbers is shown below.

```
12 5 2 7 3 6  
9 13 10 14 11 8  
3 1 4 8 4 13  
6 14 10 1 11  
12 5 2 7 3  
```

b. The main electric cable runs through a box at the upper left rear of the piece where it is separated into five smaller cables which run to the various layers of rocket troughs.

c. The elevating arc at the left of the weapon is graduated from 0° to 90°, however the weapons seemed to be at least 5° below perpendicular when the indicator read 90°. The traversing circle is graduated from 0° to 180° in both directions.

/3/ G. F. DONALDSON
Captain, Infantry.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

3 October 1945.

From: Equipment Officer, Military Division, NavTechJap.
To: Officer in Charge, Military Division, NavTechJap.

Subject: Preliminary Examination of Japanese Naval Type Anti-tank Rocket Launcher.

1. General Information: This weapon is the first Japanese rocket launcher of its type to be reported. Previously, information had been received from German sources indicating that the Japanese were experimenting with anti-tank weapons similar to our rocket firing "bazooka" however the Japanese weapon was described as a copy of a similar German weapon and the launchers examined did not resemble any other known launchers. Thirty of the weapons were found in the equipment of the SASEBO Naval Guard Force.

2. Description: The launcher consists of two angular troughs bolted together at each side to form a hexagonal tube. Riders for the projectile are secured to the lower trough. At the left side of the weapon, immediately to the rear of center is a one piece, adjustable, bar type sight. The rear of the sight is an open peep circle with cross hairs. The firing mechanism consists of a spring activated, percussion hammer with striker. It is manually cocked and held in position by a latch. The latch is released by pressure on a pivoted trigger attached by a cable. The weapon has a wooden shoulder rest attached to its left side just aft of the sight bar.

Dimensions of the launcher are as follows:
- Length, overall: 4'10-3/4"
- Width of tube: 61"
- Height of tube: 5 3/4"
- Length of sight bar: 1' 3-3/4"
- Length of bipod: 1'0"

No ammunition was recovered with the launcher, but examination of the trough indicates that a projectile 7-8cm in diameter could be used.

/s/ GEORGE F. DONALDSON
Captain, Infantry.

ENCLOSURE (E)
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

5 October 1945.

Subject: Field Inspection of SASEBO AA Positions.

To: OicC, Military Division, NavTechJap.

From: OicC, Team M-3.

1. The following AA batteries have been inspected by a team composed of Capt. BENNERT, Lt. RO., Lt. DAVIN, an interpreter and a photographer. The inspections were made from 1 October through 4 October. The installations inspected are listed below:

   a. NEKOYAMA
   b. TENVIN
   c. MACHATA
   d. YUSHIKARI
   e. KAKUSHI
   f. FURUSATO
   g. IONINOURA
   h. OZAKI

   2. The NEKOYAMA Battery manned a searchlight with a sound locator which was unusual due to the fact that it was of German manufacture. The angular travel device consisted of two counter rotating disks, one of which turned in azimuth with the sound locator, the other turned by a handwheel. When the two disks were turning at equal speeds the correct angular travel rate was set up.

   3. The YAKIHIRA Battery had a type-3 director and an S-23 radar, and their 10cm guns had an unusual fuse setter. The type-3 director was also found at FURUSATO and IONINOURA Batteries so that the following description will apply to them.

   a. The Type-3 director is the newest and best Jap AA director. It consists of a computer and a tracking head, one separated from the other. Contrary to a previous assumption this director is not electronic, but is a mechanical director of the angular travel type. The computer received present position data from the tracking head or from a radar (in the case of the YAKIHIRA Battery an S-23 radar) or from both: range from the radar and azimuth and elevation from the tracker. This instrument was developed in 1943 but was not perfected and issued until 1945.
tracking head contained an integrally mounted type 98, 4.5 meter range finder.

b The S-23 radar has been captured previously and presented no new features.

c The method of setting fuze on the 10cm guns was both rapid and simple: the mount was equipped with two loading trays which pivoted into position. A the head of the loading trays (i.e. projectile) was a fixed rack which could engage the teeth of a geared ring on the outside of the fuze. A slight pressure was required to force the fuze gear onto the rack, and this pressure was provided by a protruding arm mounted above the rack and extending downward. The arm was moved, by a mechanical linkage, from the fuze setter's handwheel. The length of time for which the fuze gear was engaged by the rack, or by the position of the pressure arm. The fuze setter was graduated up to 40 seconds although new fuze setters were anticipated which would permit the unit to utilize 55 second combination fuzes to maximum advantage. Fuze dead time was reported as 1.7 seconds and fuze setting error as plus or minus 6.5 seconds.

4. The FURUSATO Battery consisted of 4 15cm (155mm) guns. Interrogation of battery personnel present at the time of examination disclosed that the guns had been removed from a Japanese cruiser, and that they had been installed in their present position in May, 1945. Three of the guns still retained their turrets. It was also disclosed that, to their knowledge, this was the only instance of this type of gun being installed with AA defense as its specific mission.

The guns had minus 3 degrees to plus 62 degrees as limits of elevation. The revetments were of concrete, measuring approximately 20 meters in diameter, and contained 14 ready boxes. No provision for power relaying had been made and it is felt that the rate of fire of these guns would be extremely low.

Fire control equipment consisted of a Type-3 director, similar to that found at the 10cm batteries at YUMIHARI and ISIMORIURA, and in addition a 4.5 meter Range Finder mounted separately. An S-24 Radar (Temporary Designation, Mark IV, Model 2, Modif 1 and 2 or S-24) was located about 420 meters from the fire control center. A searchlight, Type 96, 150cm, was located approximately 700 meters from the fire control center.
Subject: Field Inspection of SASEBO AA Positions. (Cont'd)

SECRET

Interrogation revealed that the installation of communication cables from the radar to the searchlight and fire control center, and from the fire control center to the individual guns of the battery had not been completed.

SUMMARY The battery layout and fire control equipment for the 8cm guns at TENJIN and the 12cm guns at MACHATA and KIRISHI were of the standard type such as has been found for those guns in the past. This also applies to the 12.7 cm battery at OZAKI.

At the NEKOMAMA Battery—two 12.7cm guns—a sound locator, made in KIEL, Germany, in 1937, was found together with a searchlight controller for the 150 cm searchlight.

An S-23 Radar was found at the 10 cm gun batteries at YUMIHARI and IOMINOURA.

An S-24 Radar was found at the 15 cm gun battery at FURUSATO.

Type-3 Directors were found at YUMIHARI, IOMINOURA and FURUSATO batteries.

ALLEN BENNETT
Capt. CGC (USA)
O1nC, Team #M-3.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

2 October, 1945.

SECRET

From: Equipment Officer, Military Division, NavTechJap.

Subject: Preliminary Examination of Modified Type 97 Japanese Medium Tanks.

1. General Information: Four of the tanks described herein have been recovered. They constitute part of the organizational equipment of the SASEBO Naval Guardforce and were found to be in good condition though inoperable unless repaired. Nameplates inside the tanks indicate that parts, if not the entire tank, were manufactured at KURE in 1945. Speedometer readings in all tanks show that they have been driven less than 400 kilometers.

2. Hull: The hull is identical to that of the standard type 97 tanks which were encountered throughout the war. It is made of riveted and welded steel plate, 5/8" thick on front, 7/8" on the sides, and 3/8" in rear.

3. Turret: The turret is similar in construction to that mounted in the improved Type 97 Medium Tank. It is rounded at the front and tapered on each side so as to form an elongated section permitting added recoil space for the turret gun. It is mounted a few inches right of center of the tank. Armor thickness is 5/8" in all sides and 3/8" on top. The turret is mounted on a geared track and may be traversed 360° in either direction. A large rectangular box containing spare parts and accessories is mounted on the flat rear surface.

4. Armament: The principal weapon of the tank is a short barreled 12cm naval type gun mounted in the turret. The guns examined were labeled Mark 5 and were manufactured at KURE. Translation of nameplates reveal that the gun is known as a self propelled long recoil type short 12cm gun. The mounting consisted of a concentric spring type recoil mechanism set in a rectangular steel plate. Single baffle muzzle brakes found on all guns appear to be modifications added after the gun was manufactured. The tube is of monobloc construction.

ENCLOSURE (G) - 1 - SECRET
Subject: Preliminary Examination of Modified Type 97 Japanese Medium Tanks (Cont'd)

---

(a) The breech block is an interrupted thread type which is hinged at the right. Firing mechanism is a spring driven, lanyard actuated, percussion type. There is a cylindrical well approximately two inches in diameter and 3/4 inch thick surrounding the firing pin aperture in the face of the breech block. A large steel plate bolted to the top of the breech ring apparently serves only as a counterweight for the muzzle brake.

(b) An interesting feature of the firing mechanism is a mechanical safety which locks the breech while the gun is being fired. The safety is activated by pulling the lanyard, is held in position until after the firing pin has been released.

(c) The operating handle is located directly under the breech ring and swings in an arc pivoted on the breech block hinges. When it is opened a cam rides in a slot in the handle forcing the firing pin guide housing to the rear cocking the piece. The sear is cammed forward into the sear notch in the firing pin shaft thus holding the pin in a retracted position until the lanyard is pulled.

(d) A single piece extractor located at the right of the breech ring is pivoted by the movement of the breech block.

(e) No sight was found but a sight mount and range drum graduated from 0 to 4,000 meters were located at the left of the breech. Traversing and elevating mechanism were also located at the left of the breech. Apparently the gun was manned by only one man.

(f) Ammunition racks were provided for 27 rounds of ammunition, but practice ammunition was the only type located. It was 24 3/4" long overall, had a shell case 11 3/4" long, was painted black, and had a well to receive a nose fuze.

(g) Characteristics of the weapon are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of bore</td>
<td>56 3/4&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of lands and grooves</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of rifling</td>
<td>45&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall length (without muzzle brake)</td>
<td>59 1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoil mechanism</td>
<td>Concentric spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of recoil</td>
<td>13&quot; (approx.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (G) - 2 - SECRET
Subject: Preliminary Examination of Modified Type 97 Japanese Medium Tanks. (Cont'd)

SECRET

Maximum elevation 20 degrees (approx.)
Maximum depression 10 degrees (approx.)
Traverse Turret traverse only (360°)
Breacher block Interrupted thread

(n) Secondary armament for the tank is one 7.7mm machine gun mounted forward at the left side of the hull. No machine guns were recovered but mountings indicate that the type used is the standard Type 97 tank gun.

5. Suspension System: The suspension system is the same as that of the standard Type 97 tank. There are six bogie wheels on each side, four mounted in pairs and two independently sprung. Drive sprocket is at the front and idler at the rear. There are three small return rollers on each side. No protective armor is provided for the steel tracks but the forward portions are covered by fenders of thin sheet metal.

6. Engine: No detailed examination was made of the engine compartment, but the engine is believed to be a 12 cylinder air-cooled type. There is a ventilator located directly above the engine compartment on the after portion of the hull. The tank is driven from the right side. Maximum speedometer reading is 60 kph.

7. Conclusions: The tank chassis and hulls have apparently not been modified and it is probable that the armament was converted from the 47mm gun after the tanks had been completed. The guns seem to have been designed for a different mount and examination of the tubes and the ammunition indicate that they may be the same as the 12cm Short Naval gun normally mounted on shipboard for anti-aircraft and anti-submarine use. It is probable that the tanks as they are now equipped were produced for use as mobile close support artillery weapons.

GEORGE P. DONALDSON
Captain, Infantry.

ENCLOSURE (G) - 3 - SECRET
027/rem  
Ser. 00909B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 16001, 08 Oct 45  
To: 16001, 09 Oct 45

SECRET  

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,  
SASEBO, KYUSHU,  
0800, 10 October 1945.

No. 16.

KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (A.M. L872).

Map:

Enclosures:
(A) Order of Battle.
(B) Civilian and Military Prisons in VAC Zone of Occupation.
(C) List of Military Hospitals within 16th Area Army Area of Responsibility.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed. See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units. See Enclosure (A).

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Dumps:

SASEBO Area:

4 3 inch guns.
6 HMG.
1 rangefinder.
1 searchlight.

HIU Storage Area:

5,000 rocket propellant charges.
1,830 rocket bursting charges.
17,940 boosters for rockets.
4,616 incendiary charges for rockets.
2,200 small land mines.
30 type 96 sea mines.

-1-

SECRET
3-2 Periodic Report No. 18.  (Continued)

SECRET

TOGAMI Electrical Company (See 3-2 Periodic Report No. 18) near SAGA yielded:

289 rifles,
6 7.7 machine guns,
4 50mm mortars.
A number of bayonets.

The local police stated that these weapons had been used by the company employees.

NAGASAKI Area

SEIBU Gas Company, Ltd. (in NAGASAKI) is now non-operational, but expects to resume production in February. The headquarters of the company is in FUKUOKA, TSUSHAKUSHARA, Yasumichi is president of the NAGASAKI Branch.

SHIMABARA Ordnance Mfg Company is intact and its 27 employees are beginning peacetime production of meat grinders. From 1940 until the end of the war this company made tap valves for airplanes engines at the rate of 6,000 to 10,000 per month. All production was sent to the 21st Naval Air arsenal at ISAHAYA.

SHIMABARA Naval hospital cared for tuberculosis patients but is now closed. No records were available.

3. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SAGA

A cleared strip of land 50 feet by 1500 feet west of 03I appears to have served as an emergency airfield.

SAGA Communications School and barracks has facilities for about 2000 troops. Before the war it was occupied by an infantry unit.
SHIMONOSEKI Area

SHIMONOSEKI Weather Observatory is in operation and its equipment is in good condition (except that its wireless set will not transmit, though it will still receive). It distributes weather reports to the surrounding area daily.

The SHIMONOSEKI Entrance to KAIJIN Tunnel is undamaged. It consists of two adjacent entrances, one for each direction of traffic. Nine employees maintain the entrance.

FUKUOKA Area

YAMADA Supply Depot contained two dismantled 12cm guns but no ammunition.

AKAHAMA Coal Mine employs 1000 workers and produces about 100 tons of hard coal a day.

KYUSHU Aircraft Factory produced a new twin-motor jet plane called the TOZAIXI. (NAVTECHJAP is studying the plans for this plane and will submit a detailed report later.) 18 completed and 9 partially completed bodies of these planes were on hand, plus 19 engines and 60 belly tanks.

KYUSHU Aircraft Limited is a navy plant inter-related with the KYUSHU Aircraft Factory. This plant produced the new pusher-type plane called the SUSEEI, which the Japs claim could attain a speed of 470 M.P.H. (NAVTECHJAP has the blueprints and test data on this plane and will also report on it.) Also on hand at this plant are 4 bomber trainers, 2 twin-motorized dive bombers, and a large wind tunnel.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

YASTAKE, Tomio - reported to be chief of the SAJA Prefecture "thought control" bureau. Investigation is continuing.
(3) **Subversive activities.**

None.

(4) **Unfriendly organizations.**

RIKKEI YOSEI KAI (see 3-2 Periodic Report No. 10) held a meeting on 2 October at the KAHODO Book Store (owned by its leader, TATSUHI, Yuichi) in SASEBO. This meeting was held without the knowledge or permission of military government. An advertisement in the local papers announced the meeting and stated that it was held by permission of the Minister of Home Affairs. The local chief of police knew of this advertisement but did not inform military government. Investigation is continuing.

(5) **Miscellaneous.**

The 498th CIC Detachment has submitted a report to Sixth Army via CIC channels on the beheading of an American Naval Lieutenant whose plane was shot down near KAPOYA Airfield in June, 1945. This information was furnished by a former Corporal in the Japanese army who acted as interpreter during the interrogatıon of the captured flyer.

D. **CIVILIAN ATTITUDE**

No change.

E. **MISCELLANEOUS.**

(1) **Civil Censorship.**

Investigation has revealed that ASAHI SHIMBUN has a branch office in SASEBO. The staff consists of a manager and four reporters who gather local news and phone it in to the main office in KOKURA.

Newspapers in this area continued to confine their releases to standard news items. Local papers made routine comments on the entrance of our advance parties into SAGA and YAMAUCHI.

The 4th Censorship Advance Detachment has begun a survey of the 1991 bags of mail confiscated in the
G-2 Periodic Report No. 18. (Continued)

SECRET

VAC area. This mail originated in TOKYO and KYUSHU and is marked for SUMATRA, JAVA, BORNEO, CHINA, KOREA, MANCHURIA, RUSSIA, and the Japanese Army and Navy. A more complete report will be submitted later.

(2) Schools.

The SHUGUKWAN Middle School in FUKUOKA had 477 assorted rifles on hand, 24 of which are serviceable. Other schools examined to date in FUKUOKA have contained no weapons.

(3) Precious Metals.

No stocks of gold, silver, or any other precious metals have been found to date in the VAC Zone of occupation.

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ComFifthFlt</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>CG 2ndMarDiv</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG 5thMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC JICFOA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG 32nd InfDiv (c/o G-2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FMFac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FOE</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MAG 22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComPhibGrp 4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG FOF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III PhibCorps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG KOF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG I Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG Corps Troops</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG X Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>A CofS, G-3, VAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Record Section, VAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>File</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 5 -

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

9 October, 1945.

1. SASEBO Area. 52 Naval personnel were demobilized during the period.

2. SAJA. 232 personnel of the 2nd Regiment Replacement Unit were demobilized during the period.

3. NAGASAKI Area. No units demobilized during the period.

4. Preliminary report on Army Units, YAMAGUCHI Prefecture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH END OF WAR</th>
<th>STRENGTH 5 Oct 45</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>231st Inf Div</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>demobilized 26Sep45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Regt Repl Unit</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAMAGUCHI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regt Dist Hq</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAMAGUCHI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil Hosp</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>as of 5 Oct, strength is 43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. 107th Independent Mixed Brigade. Interrogation by the 2nd marine Division reveals the 107th IMB was composed of the following units:

- 637th Ind Inf Bn
- 638th Ind Inf Bn
- 639th Ind Inf Bn
- 640th Ind Inf Bn
- 641st Ind Inf Bn
- 107th IMB Arty Bn
- 107th IMB Engr Bn
- 107th IMB Sig Co
- 107th IMB Ed Co
- 107th IMB Labor Unit

6. KANOYA. 1st Bn, 127th Inf reports the following strength at KANOYA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liaison Committee</th>
<th>242</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Navy Police</td>
<td>1,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Army Police</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
Order of Battle (Continued) 9 October, 1945

SECRET

7. 5th Naval Air Fleet. Lieutenant Commander ISHIHARA, representative from the 5th Air Fleet reports that his headquarters will demobilize 10 October. Remaining personnel at 5th Air Fleet fields will pass to the jurisdiction of the SASEBO and KURE Naval Districts. Inventories have been turned over to various Navy Air Depots and are in turn to pass to SASEBO and KURE and then to American Forces concerned. He has turned over a detailed report on 5th Air Fleet personnel, which will be included in the Periodic Report as soon as reproduction is complete. There are at the present time 3,042 5th Air Fleet personnel not yet demobilized in the VAC Area.

- 2 - SECRET
027/rem

HEADQUARTERS, V. AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

9 October, 1945

LIST OF MILITARY HOSPITALS WITHIN 16TH AREA ARMY (WESTERN DISTRICT) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

1. This information is from maps and charts compiled by Western District Army Headquarters as of 25 September 1945. In the following listing of hospitals there are some which are branches of a parent hospital. These are designated by letters.

Plain numbers are regular military hospitals.
Numbers followed by letters represent branch hospitals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Kokura Military Hospital</th>
<th>654</th>
<th>1500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Ashiya Branch Hospital</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fukuoka First Military Hospital</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Karatsu Branch Hospital</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rinji Fukuoka Second Army Hosp</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Tatsuta Branch Hospital</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Omura Army Hospital</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nagasaki Army Hospital</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Saga Army Hospital</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Furuyu Branch Hospital</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Kurume Army Hospital</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Haragaku Branch Hospital</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Tachiarai Army Hospital</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Kikuichi Army Hospital(Kumamoto Ref)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Kumamoto Second Army Hospital</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Tonoshita Branch Hospital</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kumamoto First Army Hospital</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Hinagu Branch Hospital</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Iriyoshi Branch Hospital</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Oguchi Branch Hospital</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Yoshimatsu Branch Hospital</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Kagoshima Army Hospital</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Miyakonojo Army Hospital</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Nittabara Army Hospital(Miyazaki)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Karasebara Army Hospital Pref</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Saganoseki Army Hospital</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Oita Army Hospital</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Beppu Army Hospital</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Shimonoseki Army Hospital</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Kotsuki Branch Hospital</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Tiki Army Hospital(Iki-Shima)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Kechi Army Hospital (Okino-Shima)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 6787 11270 576

ENCLOSURE (C)

SECRET
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 09 Oct 45
To: 1800I, 10 Oct 45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
Sasebo, KYUSHU,
0800, 11 October, 1945.

KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872)

Enclosure:
(A) Order of Battle.
(B) Preliminary Examination of Japanese Type 3 8cm Mortar.
(C) Reports of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Army Type Experimental 7cm Antitank Rocket Launcher.
(D) Preliminary Report of Japanese Short 15cm Mortar.
(E) Chart of Naval Land Forces in Kure Area (KYUSHU and YAMAGUCHI Prefecture only).
(F) Report on Existing Personnel and Original Strength, Fifth (Naval) Air Fleet Bases.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

NAGASAKI

Japanese ships in water off KAWAMINAMI Shipyards.

DAIMIE TOMOE MARU

Captain: OKADA, Yasutaro; crew, normally 27, now 14; tonnage 840; holds 2; speed 6-7 knots; five steam winches; one depth charge launcher aft, will

-1-

SECRET
(Continued)

SECRET

carry four depth charges; normally carried three
60mm mortars, two 10mm LMG's. Bases remain, weapons
turned in to MITUBISHI Shipyard; had small radio
shack, no radar; built December 1944; owner TOMOE
KOMI SS Company; last voyage 11 September 1945, from
MAKATA, KYUSHU, to NAGASAKI; used to haul salt and
has been as far as KOREA on salt runs.

ZUTUN MARU.

Captain: MIYAMOTO, Kozaburo; crew, normally 70, now
30; tonnage 10,042, length 143 meters; holds, 8
main cargo, had been hauling coal; converted from
oil burner to coal burner; speed 13½ knots top;
built December 1944; owner, KAKADA SS Company; last
voyage 21 January 1945, while on shake-down cruise
from HIRADO, hit by torpedo; stripped of all gear;
no small arms found; normal armament, sixteen 13mm
AA, ten 25mm machine cannon, one 20cm gun aft,
30 depth charges, all weapons reported by crew to
have been turned in to the MITUBISHI Shipyard on
20 August 1945; no radar found.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance
guring the period.

SAGA

NEGATSUBARA Airfield. There are 178 planes, mostly
fighters. The runs are now being removed from the
planes. This field had 450 troops when operating
but now has 6 officers and 32 men to be relieved.

SAGA SHIBEK Prison (see para. D). There are 400
men and 68 women civilian inmates, including 4 per-
sons convicted of murder. There are 65 civilian
guards. There appear to be no military or poli-
tical prisoners.

SAGA Broadcasting Station has ceased operations by
order of the Supreme Allied Commander. It has a
power of 50 watts.

NAGASAKI

Two cargo submarines. Located at KUCHINOTSU.
SHIMABARA Peninsula. Both submarines are approximately 65 feet long, are each driven by two 250 HP diesel engines and a battery system and normally carry a crew of 25 men. Each submarine normally has one mounted 7.7mm AA gun (removed from both submarines). Approximate dimensions of interior storage space are 16' x 6' x 4'. The submarines also have an open storage area on the weather deck for storing and transporting waterproof containers.

SHIMONOSEKI

HITSUI Zinc Smelter. Undamaged. Produces zinc, zinc sulphate, 96% sulphuric acid, and cadmium. At the close of the war it had a staff of 128 and 981 workers. It now has a staff of 120 and 600 workers and is still in operation.

HITACHIGI Shipyard. Undamaged. 7 merchant ships under 200 tons are being repaired and 5 are under construction. There are 5 dry docks.

Ferry Station. One ferry in operation taking 20 minutes each way and making 11 runs per day carrying a maximum of 4 jeeps. The ferry door is approximately 6 feet high. The ferry service operates between KOJI and SHIMONOSEKI.

FUKUOKA

The FUKUOKA Hotel, the Commercial Musem, Library, and Industrial School were destroyed by bombing.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

None to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

SUGANUKA, Shujiro. A retired Rear Admiral, Imperial Japanese Navy, and principal of the SAKAI Middle School. Suspect is said to have introduced strong
military and anti-democratic policies in his school. He was twice appointed leader of the Government Assistance Association in the NAGASAKI KEN.

**KUBOTA Totsuichiro.** Suspect was appointed leader of teachers in SAKAI Middle School. He organized resistance movements among students in anticipation of American landings.

**YATSUHAKU Toma** who claims he is chief of the SAGA "thought control" bureau, would not turn over his records to U.S. Forces. He said he had orders from TOKYO not to give them out. Our troops seized them and turned them over to GIC.

(3) **Subversive activities.**
None to report.

(4) **Unfriendly organizations.**
None to report.

(5) **Miscellaneous.**
A physical security check is being made of the headquarters of the FUKUOKA Occupation Force. A study of the Prefectural Government of FUKUOKA and the FUKUOKA SHI police department is being conducted.

D. **CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.**

At the SAGA SHOKEN Prison 4 rifles, 8 pistols, 100 rounds of ammunition, 2 knee mortars and 3 Nambu machine guns were seized after our forces had been told they had nothing but the pistols. The guards were allowed to retain 10 swords. Officials finally said the weapons were used for training purposes only.

A prominent SASEBO banker states that business was good during the war but now he fears a depression due to inflation resulting from Black Market activity. An anonymous letter from KARATSU reported the Black Market there. It stated that persons had in the past presented themselves as agents of the Ministry of the Interior but now they claim to be
connected with the Ministries of Transportation and Communication. The letter states a misappropriation of materials which should be used for repairs and reconstruction. The anonymous writer accuses the officials of the Harbor Construction Company. An investigation is being conducted.

In NAGASAKI conversations with Japanese civilians of all classes reveal a growing concern over the possible participation in the occupation of JAPAN by Russian, Chinese, and English troops. They also assert that JAPAN was defeated only by the UNITED STATES and therefore occupation by the other three countries is unwarranted. The Japanese are sure that other allied troops will not be as well controlled as the Americans.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Press Survey.

A copy of the SAGA SHIMBUN dated 10 October 1945 was examined and an excerpt of an editorial is presented. Demands for SHIDEHARA Cabinet: "SHIDEHARA is not very well acquainted with politics and political organizations. We feel as though it is not a great cabinet...It is true that the organization of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet gave the people hope and relief."

(2) The Naval Technical Mission to Japan (NAVTECHJAP) has submitted technical reports to VAC G-2. See Enclosures B through D.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifth Flt 1
CG Sixth Army 1
OIC JICPOA 1
CG FMFPac 1
ComPhilGp, 1
Com5thPhib 1
CG III PhiCorps 1
CG I Corps 1
CG X Corps 1

NAVTECHJAP 1
CG 2ndMarDiv 10
CG 5thMarDiv 10
CG 32ndInfDiv 10
MAG 22 1
CO KOF 1
CG FOF 5
CG Corps Troops 1
ACofS, G-3, VAC 1
Record Section VAC 1
File 5

581
ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Enclosure (E) is a translation of a Japanese document requested by this headquarters from the KURE Naval District representative. The report is a statement by the Japanese and should be evaluated accordingly. However, it is the best information that this headquarters has on the KURE Naval District units within the VAC Area. It should be noted that no construction battalions or SIRF's are listed in the Enclosure. This question will be ironed out whenever the new KURE representative arrives at SASEBO.

2. Enclosure (F) is a translation of a Japanese document requested by this headquarters from 5th Naval Air Fleet. The report is a statement by the Japanese and should be evaluated accordingly. It is by far the best report received by this headquarters on Naval Air Forces in the VAC Area. The additional information on SHIKOKU fields was given gratuitously by the Japanese, and is included because the 5th Air Fleet Hq is no longer in existence, and the information may be difficult to obtain.

3. SASEBO Area. The 5th Marine Division reports 54 Naval personnel demobilized during the period.

4. SAGA Area. 423 personnel of the 2nd Signal Regiment Replacement Unit were demobilized during the period.

   a. The 464th Motor Transport Company, hitherto unreported (See Enclosure (A), G-2 Periodic Report No. 15) has the following current strength:

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<tr>
<th>LOCALITY</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
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<tr>
<td>OKAMA</td>
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<td>IHARAI</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>KADEBARI</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>104</td>
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</table>

5. NAGASAKI Area. The following naval personnel remain in NAGASAKI Area:

   Miscellaneous guards, administrative, etc. 97
   Coast Guard Cutter 124 11
   21st Naval Air Depot 17

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 -
Order of Battle. (Continued) 10Oct45.

SECRET

ISAHAYA Airbase Personnel 65
ISAHAYA Naval Hospital 137
TOTAL 327

6. YAMAUCHI Prefecture. The following statistics on the KEMPEI TAI are reported by the FUKUOKA Occupation Force:

15 August 45 6 October 45
15 Officers 9 Officers
194 Enlisted 35 Enlisted
209 Total 44 Total

7. Repatriation. The TOKUJU MARU departed FUSAN 9 October and arrived HAKATA 9 October with 2,307 Army, 0 Navy, 0 Civilians. The JUHO MARU and the SHINNAN MARU departed FUSAN 7 October and arrived HAKA A 9 October with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 792 Civilians.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 2 - SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

11 October, 1945

SECRET

From: Equipment Officer, Military Division, NavTechJap.
To: CinC, Military Division, NavTechJap.

Subject: Preliminary Examination of Japanese Type 3 8cm Mortar.

1. General Information. The type 3 mortars examined are of a different design from the type 3 (1925) 8cm mortars which were used during the war. It is supposed that the designation indicates that the mortar was designed in 1943. Nine of the mortars were found in Warehouse 47 in the SASEBO Fuel and Munitions Depot Area. They were manufactured at YOKOSUKA Naval Arsenal in 1945. The weapons appear to have been made for use aboard ship or in a fixed emplacement as the base must be bolted down to achieve stability. Difficulty in disassembly and carrying of the weapon make it unsuitable for mobile ground use unless it is vehicle mounted. The freedom of traversing and elevating mechanisms indicates that the weapon may possibly be used to fire antiaircraft fire using a time fuzed projectile; however the elevating arcs on some of the weapons were graduated in meters of horizontal range; therefore it may be established that ground use was anticipated.

2. Construction: a. The tube is of standard design except that there is a collar for the attachment of the elevating clamps approximately 1' 6" above the base. The bore is 9 3/4" long. The base cap, spherical projection and fixed firing pin are similar to those of the U.S. 81mm mortar.

b. The base consists of three circular metal discs. The two exterior discs are 1' 10½" in diameter and are equipped with eight bolts for securing the weapon to the floor of its emplacement. The interior disc rotates within the outer discs. This provides complete freedom of the traverse. The elevating arc bracket and socket to receive the spherical projection of the tube are bolted to the inner disc. The outer disc is graduated in degrees and the angle of traverse may be read from these graduations as indicated by an index line on the inner disc.

c. The elevating bracket is a metal rack with two arcs through which the tube rides. Each arc has ten holes into which clamps attached to the tube project.

ENCLOSURE (3) - 1 - SECRET

504
Subject: Preliminary Examination of Japanese Type 3 8cm Mortar. (Cont'd)

SECRET

Graduations beside the holes indicate the angle of elevation, or, as previously stated the horizontal range. Range graduations are from 0 to 3200 meters which is the maximum range using the full propelling charge. The fastening clamps when pulled upward disengage from the holes allowing the tube to move freely in a vertical plane. Range is controlled by seating the clamps in the appropriate holes. There is a cylindrical rod approximately eight inches long, welded to the upper rear of the elevating bracket. This rod is used to facilitate traversing.

'd. The mortar has no recoil mechanism.

G. P. DONALDSON,
Capt., Inf.

ENCLOSURE (E) - 2 - SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET  
11 October, 1945.

From:  
Equipment Officer, Military Division, NavTechJap.

To:  
CinC, Military Division, NavTechJap.

Subject:  
Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Army Type Experimental 7cm Antitank Rocket Launcher.

1. General Information: The 7cm antitank rocket launcher examined was recovered in Warehouse of the Japanese 147th Infantry Regiment Replacement Depot at OMURA. The weapon is similar in design to the U.S. Antitank Rocket Launcher M1 and the German antitank launcher; however it is much heavier and therefore considerably less portable than the U.S. weapon and it fires a smaller projectile than does the German weapon.

2. Description: The rocket tube is cylindrical in shape and consists of two separate parts so that it may be disassembled for carrying purposes. When the launcher is placed in a firing position the two halves are clamped together by means of three adjustable bolts, hinged at the base of the front half, which overlap into hooks on the rear half. It was noted that the parts of different launchers are not interchangeable. A folding bipod is attached approximately eight inches from the rear of the front half of the tube. On the rear half are a pistol grip; a percussion type firing mechanism; a protective frame; a burlap shoulder rest and a loop, used in steadying the piece.

3. Operation: Because of the unusually heavy weight for a weapon of its type the launcher must normally be fired from the prone position or from an emplacement where the bipod may rest upon the ground. The firing mechanism is cocked manually and is released by means of a pull cable which extends forward of the pistol grip. The sight consists of an open poop and two blade sights aligned vertically. The theoretical range for the two blades is not known.

4. Accessories: A straw lined cushion back board with shoulder strap and straps for securing the launcher is provided to facilitate long distance movements of the launcher by one man. A burlap face piece serves as protection from the back blast of the rockets. There are eye holes cut into the face piece but no protection for the eyes is provided.

G. P. DONALDSON  
Capt., Inf.

ENCLOSURE (C)  
- 1 -  
SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

11 October, 1945

From: Equipment Officer, Military Division, NavTechJap.
To: OinC, Military Division, NavTechJap.

Subject: Preliminary Report of Japanese Short 15cm Mortar.

1. General Information: Six mortars of a previously unreported design were located in Warehouse 47, SASEBO Fuel and Munitions Depot Area. Nameplates on these weapons indicate that they are 15cm mortars; however the actual bore diameter measured 6.37" (163mm). They were manufactured at KURE in April 1945. There was no mechanism provided for traversing the weapon and range could be controlled only by variation of the propellant charge in the projectile as the mortar was designed to fire at a constant angle of elevation of 45 degrees, and there was no range control shaft in the tube. Cross level adjustments may be accomplished by use of a cross level bar and hinged yoke. The only sighting equipment found with the weapon was a plumb type bracket at the left of the barrel collar to indicate the 45 degree angle and sighting line on the tube.

2. Construction: The barrel is a typical mortar tube 4' 10 3/4" long but inside near the base is a jacket approximately 3/8" thick and 1' 1" long. The purpose of this interior liner is unknown. It is possible that it is present only to stop the downward movement of the projectile and thus prevent premature firing, or it may be used to form a recess for a variable sized propellant charge. The exterior base and spherical projection of the tube are of standard design. There was no firing mechanism with the mortars and apparently no firing pin aperture in the base of the tube; however there was a threaded well at the left of the base through which a percussion type firing mechanism or an electrical lead might be inserted.

a. The tripod is of standard design with legs 3' 11" long and a sliding bracket 1' 4 3/4" long. A collar mounted on the hinged yoke fits around the muzzle of the tube and clamps at the right side. On the left of the collar is the 45 degree indicator and a plate on which instructions in the use of the indicator were written. There is a perforated metal tray 1' long which extends forward from the tube mounted on the collar.

ENCLOSURE (D) - 1 - SECRET

587
Subject: Preliminary Report of Japanese Short 15 cm Mortar
(Cont'd)

SECRET

B. The base is a wooden block 2' 6\frac{1}{2}" square and 6\frac{1}{2}" thick, to which a circular base with socket is bolted. There are metal bands and carrying handles bolted to each end of the wooden base. When the mortar is in firing position the handles are in the front and rear positions rather than at the side as on mortars previously examined.

G. F. DONALDSON,
Capt., Inf.
### Chart of Naval Land Forces in Kure Area (Kyushu and Yamaguchi Prefecture Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Numerical Strength</th>
<th>Principal Ordinance</th>
<th>Status as of 22 Sept (1945)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Sakai guard unit** | Capt. Inagaki, Yoshio | 3,800 | 12 (180) 7 cm Mobile AA guns (ammx) | 7 28 899 923
| **Hiroshima defense unit** | Capt. SHINZU, Togi | 679 | 10 16 cm guns | 27 76 2,002 3,094
| **Takamatsu defense unit** | Capt. SHINZU, Togi | 352 | None | 23 40 391 684
| **Senkaku harbor & bay guard unit** | Capt. TAKADA, Toshihico | 157 | None | 10 10 90 110

**Reported by: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012**
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<th>PILOT OFF.</th>
<th>SP DUTY</th>
<th>NCO OFF.</th>
<th>SP DUTY</th>
<th>NCO RM</th>
<th>TRAINER OFF.</th>
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<th>NCO RM</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>874</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>874</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSUGUI</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>995</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAKAGI</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>154</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6,565</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>6,565</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6,565</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KINU</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4,538</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4,538</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,538</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL VAC AREA</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>2,578</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>72,142</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>15,866</td>
<td>72,142</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>72,142</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Repro TOPO CO. VAC.**
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT
From: 18001, 10Oct45
To: 18001, 11Oct45

SECRET
No. 20.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units:

The below listed staff officers of the Western District Army Headquarters in FUTSUKAICHI and nearby YAMA and Major General KISO, Misashi, a transient awaiting demobilization, were found to be carrying pistols.

Major HABA, Yasunobu.
Major OSHIMA, Yoshiro.
Major OYAMA, Akira.

Lieutenant General YOKOYAMA, commander of the Western District Army, was instructed by Headquarters FOF to place the above officers under arrest. The sentences given to these officers by General YOKOYAMA were confinement to quarters for thirty days and a reduction to half pay.

Lieutenant Colonel ABE, Kunio, who had been guilty of insubordination to an officer leading a patrol into the Western District Army Headquarters, was sentenced to 10 days confinement to quarters and a reduction to half pay. In addition, he was relieved of his duties as Liaison Officer for the Western District Army.

(4) Location description and inventory of dumps under our control.

- 1 -

SECRET

590
Dumps

FUKUOKA Area

At ZATSUS HONOKUMA Fort (branch of WATANABE Iron Works)

2 18cm AA guns.
9 25cm AA guns.
1 truckload of 12cm ammunition. (Ref: our
2 truckloads of 25cm ammunition, truck 6x6)

All mounts for the guns are outside the building. All guns
are cased except one.

HAKOZAKI-MATSUBARA Ammunition and weapons dump (NE of
FUKUOKA)

110 7.7mm MG; model 92.
11,700 7.7mm Rifles, model 99.
273 50mm Mortars, model 89.
280 7.7mm LG; model 99.
149 tons of model 99 Rifle Powder.
266 Kg. of type 46 Rifle Powder.
57. tons of type 89 Artillery Powder (in blocks).
170 tons of type 92 Machine Gun Powder.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during
the period.

SASEBO Area

Factory (between EMUKAE and IMARI) contains 4 midget
submarines (all inoperative) and sixteen 25mm guns.

The following communications installations (all North
of SASEBO) have been placed under surveillance:

A radio station.
A power plant.
Wireless station (including a power plant, radio equipment, and 3 radar
control towers).
A small factory at KANZAKI has converted
from glider parts to farm tools.
10 torpedo boats located just outside
of NAGOYA (near KARASU) have torpedo
tubes and depth charge racks.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 20, (Continued)

SECRET

NAGASAKI

SHIMIZU Shipyard employed an average of 49 men during the war and made deck fittings, and repaired and constructed wooden barges, tankers, and fishing boats for the SASEBO Naval Depot. It is not in operation now but may resume work in November.

OZAKI Shipyard (formerly the KANO Shipyard) employed 15 to 30 men during the war and repaired naval ships. At present only 4 or 5 are employed and no work is being done.

MASUDA Shipyard (combined with the OZAKI Shipyard until December 1944) formerly repaired wooden naval vessels. No work is being done at present.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

Torpedo boat base at SHIKAMOURA (KARATSU Area) — this was reported by Japanese civilians and has not yet been confirmed.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

Greater Japan Political Association — IZUKI, Motogora, a member of the Committee on General Affairs of this association, stated that it had no connections with the HOKO (Neighborhood organizations).

(5) Miscellaneous.

A representative of the DOMEI News Agency in SASEBO
expressed pleasure at the abolition of the TOKKOFKA, saying that he believes that people may now feel free to express their opinions. He also feels that the local government of SASEBO should be revised. In his opinion most of the Japanese soldiers returned from overseas are glad to get home and will not cause our forces any trouble.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.
No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Civil censorship.

The MAINICHI SHIMBUN of 8 October notified families having men who are in overseas units coming under the jurisdiction of the SASEBO Naval Base and who have changed their address during the war to contact the SASEBO Naval Personnel Department.

The MAINICHI SHIMBUN of 10 October tells of the arrival of two companies from the 5th Marine Division in MOJII on the 10th. The materials and equipment required for the occupation were loaded in more than ten trucks. The Marines brought brooms and immediately began cleaning and converting their quarters.

Another 10 October article in the same paper tells that though the censorship of communications by the Japanese government was abolished on 20 August, the Allied High Command will censor the mails and telegraphic and telephone communications. To explain this the Japanese cabinet issued the following:

"Chiefly international communications will be censored, but local communications will be censored from time to time as the occasion demands. However, the Allied Army has clearly stated that they will take utmost precautions in carrying out their orders smoothly so there will be no delay in communications."

(2) Schools.

Small quantities of weapons were found at the following schools:
NAGASAKI Area

TOISHUMURAS Primary School
TAYUI School

SHIMBARA Peninsula

CHIJIMA School
KOHMETZO School (in CHIJIMA)
KIDOMARI Primary School

(5) Cities.

Kakazu, in Saga Prefecture, has a population of about 7,000. There are no installations of any military value except the small factory listed in 1 above.

KURUMI now has a population of 77,191 according to the mayor. He also states that it is a rubber industry center and was heavily bombed on 11 August.

Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-2.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET  

ORDER OF BATTLE  

11 October, 1945.

1. SASEBO Area. The following Naval personnel were demobilized during the period.

Temporary guards 6
Administrative 18
Total 24

2. NAJASAKI Area. No units demobilized during period.

3. AMAKUSA Island. RCT 8, 2nd Marine Division reports the following from interrogation of KUMAMOTO military:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>ORIGINAL</th>
<th>CURRENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KUMAMOTO Dist 15th SpGd Co.</td>
<td>SEIBU 14,367</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUMAMOTO Dist 16th SpGd Co.</td>
<td>SEIBU 14,368</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUMAMOTO Dist 17th SpGd Co.</td>
<td>SEIBU 14,369</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These units were formerly located at HONDO, TOMIOKA, and USHIBUKU respectively.

4. KEMPEI TAI. The FUKUOKA Occupation Group reports the following as the status of the KEMPEI TAI on 8 October:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>NCO</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters W. Dist.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branches Headquarters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Squad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUMAMOTO MP Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OITA MP Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZAKI MP Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA MP Co</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOKURA MP Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAGA MP Co</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI MP Co</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Repatriation. The TOKUJU MARU arrived on 9 October at HAKATA from FUSAN with 2,307 Army, 0 Navy, 0 Civilians. The TOKUJU MARU and the SHINRAN MARU arrived on 10 October at HAKATA from FUSAN with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 792 Civilians. Coast Guard ship Noa. 49 and 60 arrived on 11 October at HAKATA from FUSAN with 469 Army, 0 Navy, 0 Civilians.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

To: 1800I, 12Oct45.

HQ, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 13 October, 1945.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Installations and Defense located in TOKUYAMA Area as reported by the Japanese Civil Government.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
   See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
   No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
   SASEBO Area.

A Tunnel with two entrances located 3 miles NE of SASEBO contains 5,000 55 gallon drums of 100A TANK KOBE aircraft oil.

A building located 1 mile west of SASEBO contains:
- 189 tons of Chinese copper coins in 200 boxes and 150 bags.
- 1500 railroad ties.
- 200 bags of cement.
- 75 bolts of silk.

KAWATAKE Arsenal. 10 practice torpedo heads arrived this arsenal 7 October 1945 from ISAHAYA and 8 type 95 torpedoes complete except for heads arrived 12 October 1945 from MAIZURO. 20 small craft not reported by the Japanese were located in inlets at this arsenal.
B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO Area

An aircraft wheel factory. Located at TOSU. It has been converted to the manufacture of kettles and bicycle pumps. It employs 600; the same number who were employed before the end of the war.

A self-sealing fuel tank factory. Located at TOSU. Formerly employed 1,200; now employs 160. It has converted to the manufacture of shell cans.

A Radio Station at (1288.3-1101.6), near KAWATAMA, in operating condition. It also has receiving equipment.

SASEBO Gas Works. This company furnishes coal gas to civilian residences of SASEBO at the rate of 6,000 cubic meters per day. 4,000 homes used gas before the war, but this has been cut to 2,000 due to damage to the pipe lines. This plant has a maximum output capacity of 20,000 cubic meters per day but this is 5,000 over the safety figure. Tar is extracted as a by-product and sold to a paint company. Their coal is obtained on 10 days notice from the YOSHINOURA Coal Mine near AINOUSA and the SASEBO Coal Mine on a nearby island. All coal supply is by water.

NAGASAKI Area

NAGASAKI Shipbuilding Corporation. This corporation was organized through the combination of the following 18 shipyards located in and around NAGASAKI:

At NAMINOHIRA MACHI:

NAMINOHIRA Shipyard
MISHIZAKI Shipyard
YAKAMOTO Shipyard
HIKICHI Shipyard
SUZUTA Shipyard
OKADA Shipyard
At KOKUBU MACHI:

KOBAISHI Shipyard
TAKEMOTO Shipyard
NOZAKI Shipyard
KOTAKE Shipyard
MABUCHI Shipyard

At TOMACHI:

IZUTSU Shipyard
KIMURA Shipyard
MUKAI Shipyard
KAMIO Shipyard
HIZUCHI Shipyard

WATANABE

At KIBACHI:

YAMAUCHI Shipyard

The president of the corporation is elected each year by the member shipyards. IZUTSU, Tomonosuke, has been elected president each year since the corporation began to function. During the war the corporation built and repaired wooden transports and small boats. At present the corporation is building one ship, a 250 ton transport at its YAMAMICHI Yard and is repairing 15 wooden ships in all its yards. During the war it employs about 50 a day. The headquarters of the corporation is located at NAGASAKI.

KOBAISHI Shipyard. At present the yard is building two wooden fishing vessels and one small wooden barge and employs 5 to 6 workmen per day. It is a member of the NAGASAKI Shipbuilding Corporation.

SHIMABARA City

It has been ascertained that prior to the war, SHIMABARA was primarily a resort city and a fishing center, with very little large scale industry. There were, however, a number of skilled workers who operated small shops. With the advent of the war the Japanese Government gathered these workers into groups and employed them in the factories which were constructed. The following factories...
listed are those which were constructed to meet the war emergency:

**JAPAN Raw Silk Manufacturing Company (SHIMABARA Branch).** Produces raw silk only and names of present customers not known. Assumed to have shipped their products to parachute manufacturing plants during the war. As of 30 September 1945 there were employed 316 persons. It is also believed the same number were employed prior to the end of the war.

**SHIMABARA Munitions Works.** Produced parts for airplane motors. Employed 101 people as of 31 July 45. Presently non-operational.

**SHIMABARA Woodworks Manufacturing Co. Ltd.** Produced tool boxes, tables, boxes for ammunition and guns, and similar equipment during the war. 61 workers employed as of 31 July 1945. Now reconverted to manufacture of household furniture. Number of people now employed believed to be fewer than in July.

**SHIMABARA Airplane-Torpedo Works.** Previously engaged in grinding and polishing shell-casing, under direct orders from KAWATANA. 101 workers were employed as of 31 July 1945. Now non-operational.

**UCHIJIMA Iron Works.** Produced internal-engines. 68 workers were employed as of 31 July 1945, now employ 42 as of 30 September 1945. Presently engaged in repair of railroad engines and equipment and material of similar nature.

**SHIMABARA Malleable Iron Works Ltd.** Produced farm implements and similar tools for military use, now producing farm implements for domestic use employing 25 persons.

**Pluto Iron Works Ltd.** Produced parts for torpedoes, with 24 employees as of 31 July 1945. Now non-operational.

**FUJIKOSHI Steel Works (SHIMABARA Branch).** Produced drills, gauges and other precision tools. 621 workers were employed as of 31 July. Now non-operational.
SHIKABARA Works (Munitions Ministry). Was engaged in the manufacture of alcohol products, under direct supervision and control of the Munitions Ministry. The warehouses were almost completely destroyed by incendiary bombs in July 1945. It is presently non-operational.

UKEKI Shipbuilding Yard. Produced wooden boats, the largest of 250 tons capacity, for transport purposes. There were 455 employees as of 31 July 1945, now 306 are employed in the production of wooden fishing boats, its pre-war business.

HAKAMURA Iron Works Ltd. Produced torpedo parts employing 26 people as of 31 July 1945. Now engaged in repair work on farm equipment, machinery and implements.

SHIKABARA Internal Combustion Engine Works. Produced engines for boats and made delivery as directed by the government. There were 34 employees as of 31 July 1945, now 42. Presently engaged in repairing and building motors for fishing boats.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None to report.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

Colonel TAI, head of the KYUSHU branch of KEMPEI TAI was interviewed by the FUKUOKA CIC detachment. He stated that the KEMPEI TAI will be completely demobilized on 1 November 1945.

Japanese newspapers say that the TOKKA KA warned them not to write anything concerning the progress.
of the war nor to report on unfavorable conditions in the city. This organization has since been disbanded.

(5) Miscellaneous.

All weapons and material confiscated from various Chinese labor camps in the vicinity of IIIZUKA were delivered to the Provost Marshal at FUKUOKA. The inventory included 66 rifles, 60 rifle barrels, 4 light machine guns, 2 light machine gun barrels, and 8 small mortars.

D. Civilian Attitude.

No change.

E. Miscellaneous.

(1) Investigation by CIC of the influence which the MITSUBISHI Heavy Industries Ltd. held over the government in the NAGASAKI area disclosed that the mayor and vice-mayor of NAGASAKI are required to be MITSUBISHI employees. They resign the position with MITSUBISHI when they take office. The present mayor, OKADA, Jukichi, was a MITSUBISHI official for about 30 years. Investigation is continuing to determine how the MITSUBISHI Company has been able to control the political situation.

(2) Three of four submarines previously reported anchored at MIKURIYA broke loose during the recent storm and battered against the sea wall. A considerable section of the sea wall was caved in and one of the submarines sank.

(3) Press Survey.

NISHI HIPPON SHIMEUN dated 11 October 1945. The following translations of news items are presented. "The man of the occupational force observe set prices..." We would regret it if the cost of living rise and cause the people additional trouble. Do not try to exchange articles for or with the Americans and try to keep the children away from them...More manure is required to increase food production. In order to utilize the damaged roof tiles blown off during the recent typhoon, MIYAZAKI prefecture is using them as fertilizer. This kills two birds with one shot.
as it not only serves the purpose of manure substitutes but also assists in cleaning up the typhoon wreckage at the same time."

KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN dated 11 October 1945. The following translation of interest is presented. "IMASHI means the beginning of the revival of NAGASAKI, otherwise known as the 'City of Fish'. On the morning of the 7th, a haul of 2000 boxes (32 lb. each) was put on the market, so the people had plenty to eat."

This was done to curb the black market."

NAGASAKI SHIMEUN dated 11 October 1945. The following translation of interest is presented. "IMASHI means the beginning of the revival of NAGASAKI, otherwise known as the 'City of Fish'. On the morning of the 7th, a haul of 2000 boxes (32 lb. each) was put on the market, so the people had plenty to eat."

Examination of impounded terminal mail at FUKUOKA revealed (2%) basis) that the majority contained personal matter of no interest.

(4) FUKUOKA METEOROLOGICAL OBSERVATORY

Dr. K'ANJI, Suda, the director of the observatory was interviewed by NAVTECHJAP. It was reported that there is no trigonometric data, that it would be at the Land Survey Bureau in TOKYO. Seismograph recordings were reported to the Earthquake Research Institute under the TOKYO Imperial University and the Department of Education. The FUKUOKA Meteorological Observatory is under the central Meteorological Observatory in TOKYO, which is a bureau of the Department of Communications. This office is the central meteorological bureau for KYUSHU, and weather forecasts are made here. The equipment four included seismographs, equipment for meteorological study (including raysonde equipment) and apparatus for receiving radio-telegraph reports from other weather stations. It is recommended that this observatory be investigated by the AAF meteorological experts.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 21.  (Continued)

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC JICFOA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FMFPac</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III Phib Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG I Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG X Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>CG 2ndMarDiv</td>
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<td>CG 5thMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 32ndInfDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO Corps Troops</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>File</td>
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</table>

-8-
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

12 October, 1945

1. **BASEEBO Area.** The 5th Mar Div reports 7 Naval personnel demobilized during the period.

2. **NAGASAKI Area.** No demobilization during period.

3. **Reintroduction.** The SASEBO KARU was the first of four ships from FUKAE, GOLO REITO arriving at NAGASAKI during the period to unload. 754 Army personnel were discharged and dispersed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIKARINOJO</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KITAZAKI</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIYOTO</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGA</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOSU</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KURUME</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

13 October, 1945

Installations and Defenses located in TOKUYAMA Area as reported by the Japanese Civil Government.

The below information was received from the Japanese Civil Government and should be treated accordingly. There has been no confirmation by, or information received from, the CHUSUKU Army in whose area of responsibility these installations are located. The coordinates used to locate the installations are from AMS L571, scale 1:250,000.

TOKUYAMA AREA:

Searchlight (150cm) and sound detector...Toda (60.68-1220.46)
Four 12.7cm AA guns with director,
one 150cm searchlight and ammo dump...OTSUISHIMA (60.79-
1210.54)

Four 12cm AA guns with director and
one 110cm searchlight...Sen Jima (70.40-
1220.10)

Two 8cm AA guns and one, 100cm search-
light with directory....EIGEN ZAN (70.20-
1220.50)

Four 12.7cm AA guns.....KITAISHA (70.85-
1220.50)

Ordnance and ammo dump, eight 40mm AA
machine guns, and thirty six 25mm
machine guns...TOKUYAMA CITY

Four 12.7cm AA guns with director and
one 110cm searchlight....HIKASHI YAMA (80.10-
1220.38)

One 150cm searchlight...YASHIRO (60.60-1229.70)

Four 10cm AA guns and two 150cm search-
lights...TAIKA SAN (70.85-
1210.65)

Two 8cm AA guns and one 150cm search-
light with director...MIZUTANI YAMA (70.71-
1210.52)

One 150cm searchlight with director...NO JIMA (60.60-1200.88)

ENCLOSURE (3) - 1 - SECRET
Installations and Defenses located in TOKUYAMA (Cont'd)

SECRET

Four 12.7cm AA guns and one 150cm searchlight with director.................. KASATO-SHIKA (70.91 1200.80)

Four 12cm AA guns with director.................. MIJIGAHAMA (80.91 1210.08)

Four 12.7cm AA guns with director, one 150cm searchlight with director, twenty two 25mm AA machine guns and Thirteen 13mm AA machine guns.................. OI (90.39-1210.08)

Four 12.7cm AA guns with director and one 110cm searchlight with director. SHINGU (90.39-1200.95)

One 150cm searchlight with director.................. AUROZUMI (90.43-1200.65)

ENCLOSURE (2)  - 2 -  SECRET
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800T, 18Oct45
To: 1800T, 18Oct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 14 October, 1945.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

SASEBO Area

Warehouse (near OGI) contains 400 cases of fish, 300 cases of beet, and 1000 bags of barley.

A large ammunition dump near KARATANA (SE of SASEBO) contains quantities of nitro-cellulose.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

FUKUOKA Area

KOFUJI Airfield (also called KAFURA Airfield) is at OISHI (West of UAFARU). This base was used for the fundamental training of glider pilots and turned out about 1000 students every 6 months. It began operating in May, 1944. There are 4 obsolete planes on the field. Naval Captain SANJO was found to be in charge and had 10 officers and 50 enlisted men under him.
SHIMONOSEKI Area

ASAHI Oil refinery can refine 2000 tons of oil daily and has 20,000 gallons of oil on hand. In general, the refinery's equipment is in good condition, and the company has been sending 10 tons of oil daily to small factories. There was no bomb damage in evidence or weapons of any kind. The company employs 14 office workers and 40 laborers.

TANOKUKI Shipyard made 1000 tons refrigeration ships and small parts for airplanes. There are two shipways in the yard, each capable of building one ship every four months. No bomb damage was observed. The firm employs 48 staff workers and 250 laborers.

NITTO Sodium Sulphate Company formerly produced 3000 tons of sodium sulphate and 2000 tons of sulphuric acid per month. Production has stopped because of a lack of raw materials. The plant has a staff of 18, plus 60 laborers.

ASA Powder Plant (at SHIMOZU, East of SHIMONOSEKI) contained the following: 103 tons of glycerine, 7 tons of Ethylene Glycol, 90 tons of nitric acid, 341 tons of sodium nitrate, 37 tons of Oleum, 8 tons of ammonium nitrate, 5 tons of potassium nitrate, and 22 tons of common salt.

OMURA Area

MIZUBUKARI Aircraft Factory (between OMURA AND ISAHAYA) began producing fighter planes for the Japanese Navy about a year ago and ceased operations at the end of the war (production figures are not available). It was directed by Lt. Comdr. UNAKA, Todo, who was supervised by Captain KATO and Vice Admiral NAKAMURA of the 21st Naval Air Arsenal in OMURA. The plant consists of 50 small buildings and 12 caves. During the war it employed 10 Naval Officers, 1000 men, 1,000 women, and 800 girls and 200 boys of middle school age.

SASEBO Area

NITTO Mfg. Co. (at OG1) made fuselages for airplanes and has enough parts on hand at present to equip 50 planes. Labor was furnished mainly by high school girls.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 22.  (Continued)

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Civil Censorship.

Today's local news was concerned mainly with typhoon damage. The MAINICHI SHIMUN of 12 October says that all electric power was off in FUKUOKA the night of the 10th but that most of the damage had been repaired by the next evening. Seven people were killed and one injured in the FUKUOKA Area. Electric power was also off in KOKURA, YAMATA, SHIMOKOSEKI, and IIZUKA.

MAINICHI of 13 October says that SHIZUKI Harbor is being prepared as a "winter receiving station" to take care of Japanese soldiers returning from MANCHURIA and KOREA. Approximately 15,000 cotton jackets, other warm clothing, and quantities of food are being collected there to welcome the returning countrymen.

A KURASHO dispatch in the same issue of ASAHI states that the production of raw silk for export has been resumed in order to aid in the reconstruction of Japan.

ASAHI also carried a MIJASAKI dispatch stating that MIJASAKI Prefecture will rush the erection of simple homes in three of its cities before December to sell or rent to individuals.

(2) Japanese People's Army.

According to Colonel HARA (see paragraph C. (4) above) the head of the people's army in Japan was the CHIKU SHIREISU BUIN (area headquarters). In NAGASAKI KEN this was headed by Major General MATSUURA (CO of the NAGASAKI Regimental District). The area headquarters was further divided into the CHIKU TOKUSETSU KEIBITAI (Area Mobilized Guard) and the KOKUMIN GUNMU TAI (People's Volunteer Corps). The Mobilized guard was made up largely of younger men who had not yet been drafted and those who were physically fit but had occup tional deferments. They were given some military training, weapons, and ammunition and were to be used whenever needed by the army. The People's Volunteer Corps was to be used for digging trenches and building fortifications.
Torpedo testing ground at KATASHIMA was formerly operated by the SASEBO Dockyard. It manufactured and tested 24 inch torpedoes for use by DD's, cruisers, and submarines. 50 torpedoes were tested a month, of which 25 passed the first test.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None to report.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKAI ZAIKO GUNJIN KAI (Imperial Reserve Association) Colonel HARA, Wasaburo, who supervised the activities of this organization in the NAGASAKI Area, stated that it was the Japanese equivalent of the American Legion except that it was directly under the control of Army Officers. (see G-2 Periodic Summary No. 22). The nominal head of this association in the NAGASAKI Area was Major General KATSURA, Toyichi by virtue of his position as CO of the NAGASAKI Regimental District, but Colonel HARA performed all administrative duties.

KEMPEI TAI - Captain YAMAGUCHI, Yoshio, stated that he was the head of the counterespionage department of the KEMPEI TAI in FUKUOKA. He states further that each office of this organization was divided into departments or sections, and that each office had a counterespionage or BOCHO section, though sometimes this BOCHO was combined with the SEIJI or foreign affairs section. YAMAGUCHI further declared that counterespionage was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the KEMPEI TAI.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 22. (Continued)

SECRET

(3) NAGASAKI Fishing Fleet.

According to KUME, Yokichi, president of the City Fresh Fish Distributing Association, there were about 350 sea-going fishing ships plus about 100 smaller inshore fishing boats operating out of NAGASAKI before the war. During the war the Navy took over most of the larger vessels so that at present the fleet is only about 20% of its prewar strength.

(4) Precious Metals.

Lt. Gen. YOKOYAMA, Commander of the Western District Army, states that as far as he knows there are no stocks of gold, silver, or platinum on KYUSHU.

Approximately 200 tons of Chinese copper coins have been located at KOJU (previously reported G-2 Summaries No. 22 and 23 to be at MIDOBARA (NW of YAMAGUCHI)). They were worth only about one hundred dollars and apparently were to be melted down for industrial use.

At the same location 50 bars of silver alloy were found. They are marked "SELEY" and their total weight is about 50 tons.

(5) Military Training in the Schools.

Interrogation of officials of the NAGASAKI Prefecture Education Department and an army officer of the NAGASAKI Regimental District Headquarters reveals that military training was conducted in all advanced schools beginning at the middle school level and that about three hours a week were spent in military training. Aviation Cadet training was inaugurated in the middle schools in the latter part of 1944.

T. R. YANCEY,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-2.
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<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC JECFCA</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>CG FIFPAC</td>
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<td>NAVTECHJAP</td>
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<td>File</td>
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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

13 October, 1945.

1. SASEBO Area. The 5th Marine Division reports 15 Naval personall were demobilized during the period.

2. NAGASAKI Area. No units demobilized during period.

3. Shonan Maru. The SHONAN MARU, second of 4 ships which arrived 14 October unloaded 770 Army personnel from GOTO RETTO during the period. These were dispersed 410 to TITA and 360 to KUMAMOTO.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800 I, 13Oct45
To: 1800 I, 14Oct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 15 October, 1945.

No. 23.

KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (A&amp;S L872)

(A) Order of Battle.
(B) Bases for Midget Submarines, Human Torpedoes and Suicide craft - KURE Naval District.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
   See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
   No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
   SASEBO Area

   Under camouflage approximately 10 miles SE SASEBO.

   36 - 50 gal drums of kerosene.
   4 - 50 gal drums of oil.

   12 large caves approximately 10 miles SE SASEBO.

   12 BAKA bombs, searchlights, navigation instruments, telescopes, compasses, and generators.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

   - 1 -

SECRET

614
G-2 Periodic Report No. 23. (Continued)

SECRET

OITA

OITA Naval Air Base has 100 planes semi-operational, 100 planes smashed, and one USAF B-25. The reason for the presence of the B-25 is unknown. NAVTECHJAP investigating all planes.

FUJUKOA

A former Naval Air Base 1/2 miles southwest of FUKAE (1318 - 1155) is located in a cemetery. The base has been abandoned. Four wrecked seaplanes stripped of weapons and instruments were found in the vicinity. A Korean living there said they were wrecked by a typhoon. In shelters in the area were 20' - 500 pound bombs, and 58 - 250 pound bombs.

FUJUKOA SEIKO SHO Company Ltd. This company produced bicycles before the war, Navy plane parts during the war, and now it is making plumbing supplies. There are 200 people employed, the same number who were employed during the war.

MOJI Port Facilities. The following resume is reported by a Coast and Geodetic Survey Officer. There are 9 or 10 Liberty Ships alongside berths in the port. No other alongside berths are suitable for ships drawing over 6 feet. There is protected anchorage for 1 Liberty Ship with mooring buoys suitable for 7 Liberty Ships. Lighterage distance to alongside LCM and LCVP unloading areas is less than 1 mile. The roads from 2 Liberty Ship quays are in fair condition but will require maintenance. There are 25 cranes with from 1/4 to 20 tons capacity; 6 are entwirling and 3 need repairs. The total storage area available is approximately 270,000 square feet. 160 ships have been sunk in this vicinity.

SHIKONOSEKI Port Facilities. There are 2 alongside berths for Liberty Ships and 2 suitable mooring buoys. There are 10 alongside berths for small army freighters and 8 protected anchorages. There are no protected anchorages for Liberty Ships. The railroad quay is in a very unsanitary condition. There are 7 cranes with from 1/4 to 5 tons capacity, two of which need repairs. There is about 100,000 square feet of covered storage area available.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 23.  
(Continued).

SHIMABARA - OBAMA Area

OBAMA Iron Factory. Produced 5 tons of nuts and bolts per month for MITSUBISHI during the war and employed 59 people. Ceased operations in August, 1945.

SHIMABARA NAMBU Iron Works. Produced parts for torpedoes during war employing 86 people. Finished products went to SASEBO. It now repairs small boats and makes farm implements employing 23 people.

KUCHINOTSU Customs House. There is an administration building and 5 warehouses. It was reported that during the war 60 ships a month went in and out of the harbor. They were employed in coastal trade.

YATSUSHIRO Oil Factory. Owned by Farmer's Association. Began operation 18 April 1942. It produced 100 gallons of oil per month. Processed oil from pine knots was used for planes during the war. It is now non-operational.

HOKKO Shipbuilding Company. It produces ships up to 300 tons employing 95 men. Three 300 ton coal barges are being repaired and one is under construction. With sufficient materials 5 to 6 such ships could be produced each year.

HYUGA Iron Works. During the war it produced plane fixtures for OMGURA Aircraft Factory No. 21, and employed 38 people. Now employs 15. It is not in operation at present but plans are being made to convert to the grinding of barley.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.

KUMAMOTO

MITSUBISHI Heavy Industrial Joint-Stock Company.
MITIO Airplane Parts Company (KUMAMOTO Plant).
FUKUSHI Airplane Company (HIYOSHI Plant).
SOUTH KYUSHU Airplane Company.
SHIRANICHI Airplane Company.
KUMAMOTO Iron Works.
SAKYO Airplane Company,
  a. KUMAMOTO Plant.
  b. YATSUSHIRO Plant.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 23.  (Continued).

SECRETS

JAPAN Rubber Industrial Company.
NIKKA Rubber Industrial Company.
SEIBU Gas Works (KUMAMOTO Branch).
KUMAMOTO Shipbuilding Company.
YATSUSHIRO Shipbuilding Company.
FURUSATO Shipbuilding Company.
USHIBUKA Shipbuilding Company.
TEIKOKU Compressed Gas Company (MINAMATA Works).
Electro-Chemical Industrial Company.
ASAJO Cement Company (OTSUKIJIMA Plant).
KYUSHI Implement Company.
HIGU Machinery Works.
KUMAMOTO Iron Works (CYE Plant).
TOKAI Electrodes Company.
TOHI Airplane Company.
SHOKA Agricultural Products Finishing Company.
MITSUI Chemical Industrial Company.
  a. Dye Works.
  b. ARAC Factory.
ASAJO Cement Company (YATSUSHIRO Works).
KUBAI Chinawares Company.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

1. Persons apprehended or interned.
   None.

2. Suspects.

   YAMAMOTO, Shindo, This person was reported as a suspect in our G-2 Periodic Report No. 17. By interview and investigation it was the decision of GIC that he is not a suspect.

3. Subversive activities.
   None to report.

4. Unfriendly organizations.
   None to report.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

   No change.

- 4 -

SECRETS
G-2 Periodic Report No. 23.  (Continued).

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) An ex-US Marine was found at SHIMIZU, north of OGIB, Edward ZILIG, age 82, showed evidence to prove that he was born in BASEL, SWITZERLAND; enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1888 at Philadelphia; honorably discharged 12 December 1893; reenlisted during the Spanish American War and won "The Admiral McNair Medal" which was presented to him aboard the USS OLYMPIA. He was a member of the American Company U.V.C. National Rifle Association in 1911 and received a medal for the highest score in competition. He has pictures and papers signed by Admiral McNair. From 1936 until he was bombed out he had lived in KAGASAKI. He has been married to his Japanese wife for 35 years.

(2) Postal Survey of FUKUOKA.

The organization of the postal system is divided into three zones, namely, HAKATA, FUKUOKA, and NICHIGI; of these HAKATA and FUKUOKA are first class postoffices and NICHIGI is a second class postoffice. There are a total of thirty special branches within the three zones.

The functions of the postoffice are:
1. Postal.
2. Savings and exchange.
3. Money orders.
4. Insured mail.
6. Postal telegram.
7. Personnel.

Statistics:

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<th>Personnel and equipment:</th>
<th>Pre-war</th>
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<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>879</td>
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Transportation:

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<td>Bicycles</td>
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Daily mail volume:

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<th>47,000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>133,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 5 -
G-2 Periodic Report No. 23. (Continued).

SECRET

Routes:

Internal: Major destinations are KYUSHU, TOKYO, and OSAKA.

Terminal:
To America - Through KOBE and SHIMONOSEKI.
To Manchuria and China - Through MOJI and SHIMONOSEKI
To Korea - Through SHIMONOSEKI
To South Seas - Through MOJI and YOKOHAMA.
To Formosa - Through MOJI
To Shanghai - Through NAGASAKI
To Russia and Siberia - Through TSURUDA

The mail was censored in the FUKUOKA post office, through which all incoming and outgoing mail passed. Prohibited subjects were military matters, economic activities, aerial activities, weather forecasts and ship movements. One percent of the mail was spot checked. All records of the FUKUOKA postal system have been burned.

(3) Press Survey.

The item of national news which attracted the most attention from all newspapers was the decision of the special Imperial Diet to revise the constitution to make the voting age 20 years of age and to extend the voting right to both men and women. Heretofore the voting age had been 25 years of age and confined to men only. Editorials were concerned with the problems of a democratic government and the constitution. Attention was directed in the local newspapers to typhoon damage and the food situation.

DISTRIBUTION:
ComFifthFlt 1
CG Sixth Army 1
OIC JICFOA 1
CG FMFCorps 1
Com5thPhib 1
ComPhibGrp 4 1
CG III PhibCorps 1
CG I Corps 1
CG X Corps 1

NAVTECHJAP 1
CG 2ndMarDiv 10
CG 6thMarDiv 10
CG 3ndInfDiv 10
MAG 22 1
CG POF 5
CG Corps Troops 1
AGFSG, C-3 VAC 1
Record Section 1
File 5

T. R. YANCEY
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, H-2.
062/130

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

15 October, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SASEBO Area.

a. The 5th Marine Division reports 84 Naval personnel were demobilized during the period.

b. AINCURA Naval Barracks. A completed study of this station revealed it was originally opened on 20 November 1941 under the title "Number two SASEBO Naval Barracks". Its name was changed in 1944 to "AINCURA Naval Recruit Training Station". The purpose of this station was to process recruits into general duty line sailors, and to further train those of excellent character and intelligence in the practical technical subjects of gunnery, torpedo and signaling. The average personnel on the station was 13,500. Since the opening of the station, about 141,000 sailors were graduated in 21 classes. The basic term of recruit training was six months for volunteers, and five months for conscripts. During the war, however, the term was shortened proportional to the war situation. Three months was the average course and one month was the shortest course on record. The ships used in training was the battleship SHIKISHIMA, the first class destroyer SUZUTSUKI, displacement 3,000 tons, and the destroyer YAGAMI. The destroyer was attacked 19 April 1945 by the American Air Forces off the northwest point of AMAKI, OSHIMA. Seriously damaged, it arrived at SASEBO on 21 April. After temporary repairs to prevent it from sinking, it was moored in its present location and used for training purposes.

2. Saga Area. No units demobilized during period.

3. NAGASAKI Area. 4 personnel of the 122nd IMB demobilized during period. 141 personnel of this unit remain.

4. AMAKUSA Island. There are guards remaining on the following installations of the SASEBO Naval Guard Force:

a. TOIOKA CD Btry
b. KAJISHIMA CD Btry
c. KOHATSUZAKI CD Btry

5. Chain of command of air units in KUMAMOTO Area:

ENCLOSURE (A)
Order of Battle (Continued) 15Oct45.

SECRET

AIR FORCES COMMAND
(Demobilized 10/1/45)
CO GEN. KARE, Shozo
(Now at air hq., Tokyo)

6th AIR FORCE
HQ. FUKUOKA
CO LtGen SUGA-
WARA, Michio

100th AIR
DIVISION HDQ.
TAKAMATSU

51st AIR
DIVISION
HQ. GIFU

30th FIGHTER
GROUP, HDQ.,
KUMAMOTO; Lt.
Col Tanaka,
Vidori

12th AIR
DIVISION
ADQ. OZUKI
NEAR SHI-
MONOSEKI

11th AIR
DIVISION
HDQ. OSAKA

KUMAMOTO
AIRFIELD
DUTY UNIT
Maj ONOZ-
AKI

KUMAMOSHO
AIRFIELD
DUTY UNIT
Maj CY-
ANAGI

KUROISH-
IPARA AIR-
FIELD DUTY
UNIT, Maj
SUZUKI

TAMANA
AIRFIELD
DUTY UNIT
Capt
SUZUKI

KIKUCHI
BRANCH
DEPOT, Ma.
TOMURA

41st AIR SECTOR
COMMAND HDQ.
MIYAZAKI KEN,
MIYAKO

KIKUCHI
TRAINING
UNIT, Col
YOSHIMURA

KAGOSHIMA

* Lt. Col Tanaka, Hodori Watanobe Ryokan,
Kumamoto Shi, Amida Machi.

Under 30th Fighter Group Hq. since the 27th Sept. for purpose of disarmament.
6. Repatriation.

a. NAGASAKI. The last of the 4 ship convoy from GOTO RETIO which arrived NAGASAKI 12 October were unloaded during the period. The CHIKUBU MARU debarked 730 Army personnel who were dispersed 669 to KUMAMOTO Prefecture and 61 to OITA Prefecture. The IKUNA MARU debarked 788 Army personnel who were dispersed 162 to YAMAGUCHI, 188 to HIROSHIMA, 41 to OKAYAMA, 16 to KOBE, 25 to OSAKA, 7 to KYOTO, 5 to NAGOYA, 2 to SHIZUOKA, 341 to TOKYO, 5 to NAGOYA, 1 to MOJI. The SAISHU MARU arrived on 14 October at NAGASAKI from FUKAD SHIMA, GOTO RETIO with 945 Army troops. These were dispersed 16 to SHIMONOSEKI, 4 to YAMAGUCHI, 74 to HIROSHIMA, 59 to OKAYAMA, 3 to KOBE, 2 to OSAKA, 36 to KYOTO, 58 to NAGOYA, 1 to SHIZUOKA, 589 to TOKYO, 55 to FUKUOKA, 59 to MOJI.

b. SASEBO as of 1600, 14 October, 5,331 Army troops had debarked from convoy of 10 LST which arrived during the period.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 14Oct45  
To: 1800I, 15Oct45

HQ, V Amphibious Corps,  
SASEBO, KYUSHU,  
0800, 16 October 1945.

SECRET

No. 24.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.  
(B) Military Training in Schools in NAGASAKI.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

SASEBO Area

Two dumps approximately 3 miles east of KARATSU contain:

- 5,400 50 gallon drums of gasoline.
- 260 15 gallon cans of motor oil.
- 6,900 rifles.
- 2 15cm howitzers.
- 2 8 inch cannons.
- 7 57mm field guns.
- 9,000 bayonets.
- 220 sabers.
- 80 knee mortars (approx).
- 80 machine guns (approx).
- 5 trucks (inoperative).
KOKURA Area

Arsenal at SCONE (South of KOKURA) is a branch of the Second Arsenal of TOKYO and during the war could turn out 26 tons of explosive each month. Its wartime staff included 9 army officers (an administrative group from TOKYO) and 600 civilians. The arsenal is inoperative at present and only the 9 officers and 90 civilians remain. Supplies on hand include:

- 1607 Tons TNT
- 86 Tons T.N. Powder
- 8 Tons Picric Acid
- 21 Tons Tri-Nitro-Naphtholene
- 760 Grams Tri-Methyl-Tri-Nitro-Amin (Reported as Tri-Methyl-Tri-Amin in G-2 Dispatch Summary No. 24)

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KUKA CTC

City Hall - at present 650 people are working there. A new city hall had been built next door to the present one, but it was bombed out. The mayor is ISHIZAKA, Shigeru and the assistant mayor KINIDA, Iyoji.

Communications Building - a government building under the direct control of TOKYO. This office coordinates and clears radio and telephone communications on KYUSHU. Its director is FUTARAKI, Y., and it employs 1600 people. It was not damaged by bombing.

City Telephone Exchange - in complete operation, as it had suffered only minor damage from strafing.

ISUMI Clothing Factory - employed 800 girls and produced 500 uniforms of all types per day during the war. It is now converting to civilian clothing. ISUMI, Sakata is the factory manager.
KUMANO Prison - before the bombing was one of the largest prisons in KUSHU, with a capacity of 800. Since about 40% of the prison was destroyed by bombs, its present capacity is only about 500. Four hundred eighty-two civilian offenders are confined there (no POW's or military prisoners have ever been confined here). The warden is LUTC, Wataru.

SEIBU Gas Company - still in operation after having repaired a tank damaged by strafing.

Railroad Station - all bomb damage has been repaired and the station is in full operation.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.

The locations of the following submarine detector stations were submitted to the 2nd Marine Division by the Japanese:

CHIKI SHIMA (island west of KOMUURA and NW of NAGASAKI) - contains sonic devices, electric batteries, and generators. IKE SHIMA - near the above island and with similar devices.

IC SHIMA (island off the mouth of NAGASAKI Harbor) - contains sonic devices, batteries, and generators (Previously investigated by NAVY ACHJAR but not yet under guard).

MOKO Point (near YAKURI ISAKI and SW of NAGASAKI) - contains sonic devices, batteries, and generators.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.
Unfriendly organizations.

DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI (Greater Japan Political Association) - An article in the 1 July, 1945 issue of the NAGASAKI SHINBUN carries a story of the inaugural ceremony for this organization in NAGASAKI. ICRI, Hajime was the chairman of the local committee which set up the organization. MINAMI, the national president, was present at the inaugural meeting and brought congratulations from Prime Minister SUZAKI.

The local officers included:

Chief of the Branch - WASHINOTC, Tatsujiro
General Affairs -
Members of Parliament - ICRI, Hajime (see below)
  BABA, Motoharu
  KAWAGOE, Takashi
  ISUKI, Motogora (see G-2 P.R. #20)
  NAKASE, Setsuo
  KOHSHITA, Yoshisuki
  KOURA, Sohei
  SUZUKI, Shigei

Chairman of the assembly of NAGASAKI Prefecture - INAMATSU, Shikata

Chief of secretary, Chairman of the assembly of NAGASAKI City - TSUTSUKI, Nakita

Regular Secretary - HONDA, Taugisaboro

ICRI, Hajime was interviewed and admitted that he was the local chairman of the Committee on General Affairs of DAI NIPPON and as such held the second highest position in this organization in NAGASAKI KEN. He denied any connection between DAI NIPPON and either the neighborhood associations or the YOKUSAAN SEIJI KAI (Statesmen's Political Party).

Miscellaneous.

According to the TCKC (Special Higher Police) record, the following political prisoners were released on 4 October from the KYUSHU prefectural prison (charges and sentences given in parenthesis):
KINKAI, Zaihön (For printing and distributing illegal propaganda - 8 months).

NISHIZATO, Tatsuo (For foreign sympathies - life).

HIDUMA, Hiroshi (For disrespect to the emperor - 3½ years).

OGA, Takashi (For disrespect to the emperor - 2 years).

These prisoners have already left for their homes, but efforts are being made to locate and interview them.

D. CIVILIAN POPULATION.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Civil Censorship.

The SAGA SHIBUN of 15 October announces that the Military Government Section of the 5th Marine Division has given 1500 bags each of beans and rice to the civilian population of SASEBO and that this act "has been a source of gratification to the destitute populace."

The NAGASAKI SHIBUN of 15 October carried the following article: "Next year's (1946) budget for SASEBO, which must now expend every effort in recuperating from war havoc, is now in discussion in responsible quarters; but the work of restoring the vast damage has piled up like a mountain and will require corresponding expenditures. The present hope is to cut down the balance by 800,000 yen from this year forward, by national taxes and surtaxes, and to slash outgo to the utter minimum. The result will be that next year's budget figure will be cut to 73,230,000 yen. Efforts to effect these stringent retrenchments are resulting in unusual difficulty in setting up the budget.

The GOTO SHIBUN states that applications to transfer to high schools and vocational school are being received from the students of army and navy schools. Up to the present, high school entries are the largest.
(2) **Technical Intelligence.**

**NAVTTECHJAP** is investigating the following items of new or important Jap equipment in the FUKUCHA area:

- *Type 4, 75mm AA gun with calculator control* (this gun is probably a copy of the German 88mm 44 gun).
- *Model 98, 20mm AA gun* (a fixed gun which appears to be a naval piece but is manned by army troops).
- *Model 14, 10cm AA gun* (an old model, but one which has not been previously encountered by any of our units.
- *Model 68, 75mm AA gun with calculator control* (previous captured specimens were all battle damaged).
- *Model 98, 20mm AA automatic Cannon* (adapted to a twin mount and fixed pedestal).
- *Model 97 Medium Tank (modified) mounting Type 90, 75mm (modified field piece).*
- *Cannon Tank (modified from medium tank) mounting Type 90, 75mm gun* (in fixed turret which cannot be traversed and gun has only limited traverse).
- *Self-propelled gun (modified from a medium tank) mounting a Type 61, 105mm gun* (adapted from the medium artillery piece).
- *Armored Personnel Carrier.*
- *Artillery Reconnaissance Car* (similar to French gun car).
- *Model 96, 150cm howitzer* (previously encountered specimens were all battle damaged).

Technical reports on these items will be submitted late by NAVTECHJAP.

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**DISTRIBUTION:**

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<thead>
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<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC JICPCA</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>CG FLPPAC</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Com3rdPhib</td>
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<td>60 of 3, 7-3, V40</td>
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<tr>
<td>File</td>
<td>5</td>
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629
SEVENTH FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

16 October 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SASEBO area. 10 Naval personnel were demobilized during the period.

2. CITTA area. The following current strengths reported by the CITTA Occupation Force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>118th Indixed Brig</td>
<td>SAGAMOSTKI</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEPPU Mil Hosp</td>
<td>BEPPU</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITTA Regt Dist Hq</td>
<td>CITTA</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
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</table>

This report is preliminary and does not cover all units located or formerly located in the area.

3. ISHIRT. 12 Naval air base personnel demobilized during the period.

4. Repatriation.

a. NAGASAKI. The 3rd MARCH KAI arrived on 15 October in NAGASAKI from FUKUOKA SHIKO, OCTO with 741 Army personnel. These were dispersed 478 to TOKYO, 85 to NAGOSUMI, 4 to OKAMOTO, and KYOTO, 1 to SHIZUOKA, 103 to HIROSHIMA, 6 to OSAKA, 12 to KOBE, 40 to KAMAKURA, 5 in KUROBE, and 5 remain in NAGASAKI.

b. FUKUOKA. The 12th TAI KAI, SHIROZAKI KAI, KOTOKU KAIU, and TOTOKU KAIU arrived 14 October at YAMATA from FUSAN with 5,108 Army, 6 Navy, and 6 Civilian. These were dispersed 106 to HIROSHIMA, 65 to TOKYO, 427 to SENDAI, 527 to OSAKA, 279 to NAKYU, 3 to SHIKOKUSHIKI, 499 to KYOTO, 190 to KAGOSUMI, 68 to SHIKOKU, 145 to KAGOSUMI, and 635 remain in FUKUOKA.

c. SASEBO. A total of 9,956 Army, 6 Navy, and 5 Civilian were unloaded from the LST convoy which arrived SASEBO 14 October.

5. Recapitalation. 107th IMB. According to Maj Gen KOGO liaison officer from the 16th Field Army, 170 personnel of this unit now remain on FUKUOKA SHIKO; the following is a recount by troop movement of this unit:

ENCLOSURE (1)
<table>
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<th>DATE</th>
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<th>NUMBER</th>
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<tr>
<td>5 Oct</td>
<td>AIMOURA</td>
<td></td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Oct</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td></td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td></td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Oct</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Oct</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td></td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td></td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Total repatriated: 6,883

Remaining: 170

Grand Total: 7,053

This does not agree with the first figure (6,565) given by the 16th Area Army, nor with the second figure (7,543). However, since 7,053 is based on a count of herds by American forces, it represents the most accurate statement. Generally speaking, all the information from the 16th Area Army suffers from the same difficulty, which apparently exists because of the lack of really accurate files in the 16th Area Army Headquarters.
HEADQUARTERS, V. AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, O-2,  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET  

16 October 1945.

MILITARY TRAINING IN SCHOOLS IN NAGASAKI.

a. Following information obtained from interrogations. Among those interrogated were officials of the NAGASAKI PREFECTURE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT: Nagat. Toriki, KUSB, Takae and Col. Hara, Wasaburo of the NAGASAKI REGIMENTAL DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS.

1. Supervision was divided between NAGASAKI Regimental District Headquarters and the KUREI Divisional District Headquarters.

2. The military assigned officers to the schools to carry out training programs. Orders were communicated directly from division or regimental headquarters to these officers. Two or three civilians worked under their direction because there were not enough officers to assign one per school.

3. Training consisted principally of wooden gun drill, calisthenics, etc. until third year of middle school. From third year on training included rifle practice, tactics, sentry duty, patrolling, and marching. About three hours a day were devoted to training.

4. In October 1944 the army inaugurated an Aviation Cadet program. The Navy inaugurated a similar program in March 1945. Cadets were usually selected from the third year of middle school. They were inducted into the Army and Navy and given preliminary training in flight and glider work.

5. Early in 1944 a program of student mobilization was started. It was fully developed in April of 1944. It included all students from third year middle school and up. Students were assigned war work, working ten hours a day, twenty-eight days a month. Aviation Cadets and physically unfit were exempt.

6. Students organized into unit known as the GAKUTO-CHI, formed along military lines. Would have fought as part of the GITU-SENGO-TAI in case of an invasion. School principals headed these organizations. The governor of the prefecture was the titular commander. Actually they were under the direction of the HOME Affairs Department.

ENCLOSURE (B)  

SECRET  

632
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 15Oct45
To : 1800I, 18Oct45

SECRET

Hq. V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 17 October 1945.

No. 25.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

NAGASAKI Area

OKURA Air Station. The following inventory of radar equipment was found on this air station and reported by NAVTECHJAP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>MARK</th>
<th>MODEL</th>
<th>MODIFICATION</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Transmitter</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>KU 6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>KU 6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>KU 6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>KU 6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(MAD)</td>
<td>1 Re-MOD2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic Coil Cov.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(MAD)</td>
<td>1 Re-MOD3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyro Units</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(MAD)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Coils</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecting Cables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Power Units</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(MAD)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At two nearby islands more of the same equipment and a large amount of radio equipment and searchlights

- 1 -

SECRET

633
G-2 Periodic Report No. 25. (Continued)

SECRET

was found. All equipment found in this area is of obsolete design.

SASEBO

HARIO Naval Separation Center contains:

1,949 rifles.
2 150mm mortars.
14 8cm rocket guns.
14 25mm machine guns.
55 13mm machine guns.
1 7.7mm machine gun.
15 6.5mm machine guns.
3 7.7mm light machine guns.
5 50mm grenade dischargers.
18 revolvers.

At a bomb store of the USHINOURA 21st Air Depot there are 10 aerial bomb sights.

On the eastern outskirts of SASEBO there are 18 completely assembled marine engines, all in good condition.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KARATSU Area

KAWAKAMI CHUZOSHO factory at HAMASAKI. Before the surrender navy airplane engines were produced by 70 female employees. The women and 29 men are now employed in the manufacture of farm implements. All airplane engines on hand at the time of the surrender were melted to get iron for use in making farm implements. The factory contains overhead drill units, hoists, lathes, drill presses and forges.

ITOHNAI NENOKI KOSAKUSHU Factory. Consists of 15 large well equipped buildings and formerly employed 90 workers. The office is elaborately furnished. Present strength of workers is 40. The factory made shovels and knives for the army and now produces the same items for farmers. A large supply of sheet iron
and stamp presses, hoists and lathes are among the factory equipment. A Japanese plane forced down nearby is in open storage at the factory.

ARAI KOJO Company of HAMASAKI. Employed 30 men during the war making washers and bolts for airplanes. The products were sent to the MITTOH KOKI in KARATSU. At present the plant is non-operative.

OITA

OITA Naval Air Station (previously reported in Periodic Report #23). Further inspection reveals 100% bomb damage to installations and buildings. Two planes were found painted white and marked with green crosses. One was a large bomber, and the other was an escort plane. Investigation revealed that the B-25 found intact on the field had made a forced landing sometime after the Japanese surrender. The entire crew had been evacuated. The plane carries an Indian Head insignia and a number 163. Survey of the planes at the field showed an uncounted number destroyed in the hangar and the following:

38 fighters, apparently operative.
3 bombers, apparently operative.
47 fighters, non-operative.
50 miscellaneous trainers and obsolete craft.

KUMAMOTO

KUMAMOTO Technical College. With the exception of several lathes and other tooling machinery, all equipment on the college grounds was used during the war solely for experimental and teaching purposes. These lathes and tooling machinery were used during the months of June, July and August of this year by MITSUBISHI workmen engaged in the production of parts for bomber planes. The school has a great deal of technical testing machinery and laboratories for chemistry, electronics and physics. The military course at the college was under the direction of Colonel ARITOMI, Chikayoshi, no longer a member of the faculty.

KYUSHU Radio Factory. This factory produced radio parts and possibly radar accessories and shipped them to SASEBO for assembly. 30 of its 67 employees were
civilians working for the Navy. Tentative plan for post-war activity is the manufacture of farm implements.

**SASEBO**

MORI Iron Works. This company was a small iron foundry and machine shop. It normally employed 43 people producing small parts for motors and certain types of machines. The wartime production of valves, flanges, bolts and gears went to the SASEBO Navy Yard. At present this plant is non-operative.

**SAGA**

Japanese Chemical Industrial Company located at MOROTOMI. Produces 94% hydrous alcohol for use as a motor fuel. 600 men were employed during the war, 200 at present.

**FUKAE**

Former Naval Air Base at FUKAE. This base is located on the beach west of FUKAE and has been abandoned. The base was under KOFUJI Airfield. This base was manned by the 1st YANAGASHIMA Force which left on 20 August 1945 to go to NAGOYA. In the vicinity there were 4 seaplanes that were wrecked by a typhoon and 20, 500 pound bombs and 140 bombs of 60 and 250 kg.

**Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.**

None to report.

**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.**

(1) **Persons apprehended or interned.**

None.

(2) **Suspects.**

None to report.

(3) **Subversive activities.**

The FUKUOKA Telephone Exchange was checked to determine...
whether or not facilities are available for monitoring telephone lines. It was revealed that facilities are available, and are being used by the Japanese to monitor commercial lines. It was also learned that all cable and telegraph records have been burned. The manager of the Telephone Exchange is SHIMADA, Suitaro.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

A SASEBO Police Station report, dated 15 October 1945, states that Police Chief TAKEHISA informed CIC that the TOKKA KA had received an order, dated 15 October 1945, from the NAGASAKI Prefecture which revealed that members of the TOKKO KA will cease functioning upon receiving the order. The head of the SASEBO TOKKO KA, HIGUCHI, and eleven other members are affected.

(5) Miscellaneous.

YOSHITAKE, Masato, a political prisoner released from the ISAHAYA Prison on 14 October 1945 was interviewed. He had served 3½ years of a 15 year sentence for violation of the military secrecy act and sacrilege toward the Emperor. In a broadcast from HONG KONG he had asked the Japanese people to cease the war with CHINA. He had also divulged the strength of the Japanese Army in the HONG KONG area to a British Major.

SUZUKI, Takuji, Chief of Police for the NAGASAKI Prefecture, has been removed from office in accordance with the Allied Commander's directive to the Japanese Government dated 4 October 1945. NAKAMURA, Hirohase, Chief of both the Foreign affairs section and the special higher police of NAGASAKI City and his entire sections have also been discharged.

Agents of the FUKUOKA Detachment have obtained a list of persons released from FUKUOKA under the terms of the 4 October 1945 directive. Each of these released prisoners will be interviewed when found. The SHIMONOSEKI Detachment reports that the records submitted by the SHIMONOSEKI Police Department disclose no evidence of detention for political reason.
SHONEN DAN and SEINEN DAN in the TOSU Area. The SHONEN DAN is a group which consists of boys and girls from the ages of eight to sixteen years. During the war it was strictly a military organization but has since been converted to the equivalent of our American Boy and Girl Scouts. Membership appears to be compulsory. There are about 2,000 members in TOSU and 7,000 in the suburban and farming area within a 10 mile radius. SEINEN DAN. Members of this organization were between the ages of 16 and 25 and consisted of males only. As soon as a boy was too old for the SHONEN DAN he automatically became a member of this unit. When the shortage of men became acute the SEINEN DAN from the vicinity of TOSU was formed into one military fighting unit. At the end of the war the unit was disbanded and the men have returned to their farms.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Press Survey.

The main items of national news were the proposed opening of another special Imperial Diet to clarify the policies of the new cabinet and the imminent disposal of the ZAIBATSU by Allied Headquarters. Other news ranged all the way from Chinese riots in MURORAN to the shortage of classrooms in NAGASAKI. Some mention was made of the movement and locations of our occupation forces. Extracts from the MAINICHI SHIMBUN dated 16 October 1945 are quoted. "According to a message from the Liaison Department of the MOJ, Occupational Force, an army unit will arrive in MOJI on the 21st... A second occupational detachment of approximately 600 men arrived at SHIMONOSEKI on the 16th under the command of Colonel Robenet."

(2) Prisons.

WAKAMATSU Prison

The warden is PANITA, Denjiro. He was appointed by the Emperor and holds a rank equal to that of Major General. On 15 August 1945 there were 1,228 prisoners and at present there are 832. The warden has been examining the records of the prison to determine those prisoners ready for release. The prison staff consists of 121 guards, 2 priests, and 1 doctor. The mess hall was examined at mealtime and it was found
that the prisoners were getting enough to eat. Marine guards have been placed on the records and further investigation has been ordered to determine the category of the prisoners. This information will be forwarded in a later report.

**KOKURA Prison**

The commander was Chief OROKI. There are 130 prisoners, 7 of whom were interrogated and their stories agreed with the records. Marine guards were placed on the prison and further investigation has been ordered to determine the category of the prisoners. This information will be forwarded in a later report.

**YAMAGUCHI Prison**

There are 610 prisoners confined for criminal offenses of these there are 408 Japanese and 104 Koreans. A total of 8 have been charged with murder. 12 political prisoners were released from this prison 10 October 1945. None of them were from YAMAGUCHI KEN but had been transferred from HIROSHIMA because of bombings.

(3) **Chinese Copper Coins.** The Chinese copper coins mentioned in Periodic Report #21 amount to 23 tons according to Commander GASA, Japanese Military Liaison Committee (paymaster). He stated that the coins were brought from SHANGHAI Agencies but that he did not have a record of the amount paid for them by the Japanese. He said the coins had more value as a metal during the war and that he did not know the value of these coins on the open market.

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**DISTRIBUTION:**

| ComFifthFlt | 1 |
| CG Sixth Army | 1 |
| OIC JICPOA | 1 |
| CG FMFpac | 1 |
| Com5thPhib | 1 |
| CG III PhibCorps | 1 |
| CG I Corps | 1 |
| CG X Corps | 1 |
| NAVTECHJAP | 1 |
| CG 2ndMarDiv | 10 |
| CG 5thMarDiv | 10 |
| CG 32ndInfDiv | 10 |
| MAG 22 | 1 |
| CG FO | 1 |
| CO KOF | 1 |
| CG Corps Troops | 1 |
| AC of 5, G-3, VAC | 1 |
| Record Section VAC File | 1 |

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T. R. YANCEY,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-2.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET 17 October 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SAZEBO Area. The 5th Marine Division reports 485 Naval personnel demobilized during the period.

2. KURUME The following information is reported by the 5th Marine Division Lt. Gen. SONOBE, CG, KURUME Depot Division reports his Hq has a current strength of 300. The Hq was formed from the 12th Div Hq in April, 1945.
   a. 1st Inf Regt Repl Unit (SEIBU 148) has a current strength of 500-1000; the depot is the main demobilization center for KURUME and the barracks for most of the guards in the area. CO is Col SHIBATA, Kamesaburo.
   b. 2nd Inf Regt Repl Unit (SEIBU 146) has a current strength of 500. This unit moved from FUKUOKA to KURUME recently.
   c. Tk Regt Repl Unit of the 4th Ind Tk Brig. No home designation. There are no tanks present. Current strength 500. It is believed this unit replaced the 18th Tk Regt as the 18th Tk Regt when that unit was activated into the 18th Tk Regt.
   d. Engrs Repl Unit (SEIBU 152) has a current strength of 30.
   e. Tpt Regt Repl Unit (SEIBU 154) is completely demobilized as a unit; however, the depot is being used as a motor park by various other units and their vehicles and drivers are currently stationed there. Current personnel numbers about 100.
   f. KURUME Mil Hosp currently has 200 patients.
   g. 1st KURUME R.O. School is now completely demobilized. Trained officers for Inf, Arty, Engrs, and Comm.
   h. 2nd KURUME R.O. School. Trained Tpt officers only.
   i. 2nd Co, 84th Ind MT Bn has a current strength of 150. According to our last reports, the Bn was located at SHONAI, KITA MOROKATA GUN, MIYAZAKI Prefecture.
   j. 312th Inf Div was activated at KURUME in July 1945 and then moved to KARATSU Area. Last reports indicate that what remains of this unit is scattered through HIGASHI MOROKATA GUN, SAGA Prefecture.
3. KUMAMOTO Depot Division. The following report is made by the 2nd Marine Division. The KUMAMOTO Depot Division Hq is commanded by Lt. Gen. TSUCHIBASHI; it had a former strength of 262 and a current strength of 128.

a. 1st Inf Regt Repl Unit (SEIBU 61). Former strength 2,400; current strength 1,300. Location KUMAMOTO SHI. CO is Col SETOGUCHI.

b. 3rd Inf Regt Repl Unit (SEIBU 16). Former strength 2,400; current strength 868. This unit formerly reported in KAGOSHIMA SHI has moved to MATSUBASE, SHIMO MASHIKI GUN, KUMAMOTO Prefecture. CO is Col KIYAKI.

c. Arty Regt Repl Unit (SEIBU 21). Former strength 2,200; current strength 114. Location KUMAMOTO SHI. CO is Col YOSHIDA.*

d. Engrs Regt Repl Unit (SEIBU 65). Former strength 505; current strength 33. Location KUMAMOTO SHI. CO is Col TAKU.*

e. Sig Regt Repl Unit (SEIBU 66). Former strength 518; current strength 135. Location KUMAMOTO SHI. CO is Maj MORI.

f. Tpt Regt Repl Unit (SEIBU 67). Former strength 700; current strength 90. Location KUMAMOTO SHI. CO is Maj MURAKAMI.*

g. KUMAMOTO Regt Dist Hq. Former strength 103; current strength 50. CO is Maj Gen. TSUDA.

h. 1st KUMAMOTO Mil Hosp. Former strength 451; current strength 112. Location KUMAMOTO SHI. CO is Maj SHIGENOBU.

1) FUJISAKIDAI Branch. Current strength 78.
2) HITOYOSHI Branch. Current strength 41.
3) HINAGU Branch. Current strength 40.

i. KIKUCHI Mil Hosp. Former strength 72; current strength 78. CO is LtCol OSAKA.

J. 2nd KUMAMOTO Mil Hosp. Current strength 122. Location TOSHIWA, KOTU GUN, MIYAZAKI Prefecture. CO is 2nd Lt YAMAZAKI.

*Note: Unit erroneously reported 100 per cent demobilized by 16th Area Army.
Order of Battle. (Continued) 17Oct45

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1) TAKASE Branch. Former strength 251 (832 patients); current strength 147 (26 patients). CO is Col YASUDA.

4. KUMAMOTO Depot Div Sp Garr Co's. The following Sp Garr Co's are reported by the 2nd Marine Division to be completely demobilized:

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5. Other units under control KUMAMOTO Div.

a. 9th Flt Tpt Hq, (MUTSU 3646) Former strength 47; current strength 0. Former location; KUMAMOTO SHI. Former CO Col Kawai.

b. 84th Ind MT Bn (MUTSU 7574) formerly reported to this Headquarters as being in MIYAZAKI Prefecture (See paragraph 2.1, above) with an original strength of 808 is now reported located in KUMAMOTO SHI with a former strength 463 and a current strength of 386.

c. 24th Flt Labor Unit (SEIBU 12560). (Note: it is believed that this title could be better translated, and this is being checked with 2nd Marine Division representatives at KUMAMOTO. Former strength 3,400; current strength 0. Former location SETA, KIKUCHI 36N, KUMAMOTO Prefecture. Former CO Lt. Col MINAMI.

d. 29th L of C Hq (MUTSU 7171). (Note: it is believed that this unit corresponds to the 58th L of C Unit located i...
Order of Battle. (Continued) 17Oct45

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the same place; this being checked by 2nd Marine Division). The
former strength 50; current strength 0. Former location HITOYOSHI.
Former CO 1stLt TANAKA.

e. 51st Fld Const Bn (MUTSU__). (Note: it is be-
   lieved that this is a Fld Const Unit; this data being checked by
   2nd Marine Division). Former strength 500; current strength 0.
   Former location HITOYOSHI. Former CO unreported.

6. 216th Inf Div and units under its control. 282 per-
   sonnel of the 216th Inf Div are reported by the 2nd Marine Division
to remain at UTQ. UTQ GUN, KUMAMOTO Prefecture. Code name is HIEI.
CG is LtGen NAKANO

a. 126th TMB. Former strength 7,000; current strength
   2,500. Location HONDO, AMAKUSA Island. CG MajGen HAYASHI.

b. 37th Suicide Boat Unit (Army). Former strength
   300; current strength 0. Former location HONDO, AMAKUSA Island.
   Former CO Capt UMEDA.

c. 11th Engrs Hq. (MUTSU 13511). Former strength 95;
current strength 4. Location NAGASU, TAMANA GUN, KUMAMOTO Pre-
fecture. CO Col MORIOTO.

d. Hq, 2nd Bn, 132nd AA Regt (SUI 8062). Former
   strength 67; current strength 0. Entire Regt was reported by 16th
   Area Army as being in KOKURA. This unit reported located TATSUTA-
   AGUCHI, KUMAMOTO SHI. CO Maj USHIJIMA.

e. 7th Co, 2nd Bn, 132nd AA Regt. Former strength
   147; current strength15. Location TAKI 35, CO Capt TSUKAMOTO.

f. 8th Co, 2nd Bn, 132nd AA Regt. Former strength
   190; current strength 9. Location KEN GUN, KUMAMOTO SHI. CO
   1stLt FUKIKAWA.

g. 9th Co, 2nd Bn, 132nd AA Regt. Former strength
   143; current strength 7. Location KEN GUN, KUMAMOTO SHI. CO 1stLt
   YOSHIDA.

h. 11th Co, 3rd (?) Bn, 132nd AA Regt. Former strength
   147; current strength 15. Location YATSUSHIRO SHI. CO Capt Captain
   KATSUMOTO.

i. 12th Co, 3rd (?) Bn, 132nd AA Regt. Former strength
   145; current strength 9. Location HITOYOSHI, KUMA GUN, KUMAMOTO
   Prefecture. CO 1stLt HIDA.
Order of Battle (Continued) 17Oct45

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7. KUMAMOTO MP CO. Former strength 48; current strength 11. Location KUMAMOTO SHI. CO COL OKA.
   a. Branch, AR4O. Former strength 8; current strength 0.
   b. Branch, V-IFU. Former strength 17; current strength 5.
   c. Branch, AKAUSA. Former strength 23; current strength 5.
   d. Branch, HITOYOSHI. Former strength 20; current strength 5.

8. The following Air units are identified by 2nd Marine division:
   a. West. Dist. Air Tng Unit (SEIBU 198). Former strength 1500; current strength 22. Location HISHIGOSHI, KIKUCHI GUN. CO COL TAKAHASHI.
   b. 55th Airfield, Co (SEIBU 18464). Former strength 420; current strength 22. Location SHISUI, KIKUCHI GUN. CO Capt ISOMI.
Order of Battle. (Continued) 17Oct45

SECRET

c. 173rd Airfield En (SEIBU 20903). Former
    strength 0; current strength 0. Location NISHIGOSHI, KIKUCHI GUN.

d. 40th Air Tng Unit (SEIBU 538). Strength unknown.
    Location SHISUI KIKUCHI GUN.

e. KIKUCHI Br, Army Observatory. Strength unknown.
    Location SHISUI KIKUCHI GUN.

f. KIKUCHI Br, KOKOGAWA Air Sig School. Former
    strength 2,200 (Note: 6th Air Arm repd this unit had for-
    mer strength of 1,200); current strength 18. Location SHISUI,
    KIKUCHI GUN. CO Capt YOSHIMURA.

g. KIKUCHI Br, TACHIBANA Air Depot. Unit not
    previously reported; will be investigated. Former strength 1,259;
    current strength 12. Location TOSAKI, KIKUCHI GUN.

h. 60th Fighter Unit (SEIBU 3379). Strength
    unknown. Location HIROHATA, NATAKU GUN. CO LtCol ATSUI.

i. 239th Airfield (SEIBU 19539). Former
    strength 650; current strength 0. Location HIROHATA, NATAKU
    GUN. CO Capt SUZUKI.

j. 28th Fld Airfield Const Unit (SEIBU 2409).
    Former strength 570; current strength 0. Location HIROHATA, NAT-
    AKU GUN. CO Maj ISHIKAWA.

k. 7th Repair En (SEIBU 631). Believe this unit
    is 7th Airfield En; checking. Strength unknown. Location HIROH-
    ATA, NATAKU GUN.

l. 199th Air Equipment En (SEIBU 19079). Check-
    in this terminology. Strength unknown. Location HIROHATA,
    NATAKU GUN.

m. 7th AA Sig Radio Co (SEIBU 18965). First
    identification strength unknown. Location HIROHATA, NATAKU GUN.

n. 110th Fighter Unit (SEIBU 19027). Former
    strength 650; current strength 0. Location SUGIKAMI, SHIMO
    MASHIKI GUN. CO Maj KUBAKARI.

O. 162nd Airfield En (SEIBU 19499). Former strength
    634; current strength 24. Location SUGIKAMI, SHIMO MASHIKI GUN.
    CO Maj O'AMAGI.
Order of Battle.  (Continued)  17Oct45

7th Underground Const Unit (SEIBU 19096).
Current Strength 0. Location UEKI, KAMI MASHIKI GUN.

197th Ind Mtnance Unit (SEIBU 19077). Strength unknown. Location SUGIKAMI, SHIMO MASHIKI GUN.

229th Airfld En (SEIBU 19388). Former strength 450; current strength 54. Location SHISUI, KIKUCHI GUN. CO Maj SUZUKI.

17th Underground Const Unit (SEIBU 12478).
Current strength 0. Location KUMAMOTO GUN. CO Capt ENDO.

Hq 30th Fighter Unit. Former strength 300; current strength 54. Location KUMAMOTO SHI. CO Col YAMAGATA.

16th Duty Co (MUTSU 8866). Former strength 17; current strength 0. Location YOSHIMATSU, KAMOTO GUN. CO LtCol OIDE.

238th Airfld En, (SEIBU 19537). Strength unknown. Location OHAMA, TAMANA GUN.

172nd Fld Airfld Const Unit, (MUTSU 7057). Strength unknown. Location KAWAZO1, AITA AMABE GUN, OITA Prefecture.

2nd Underground Const Unit. Former strength 650; current strength 0. Location AMENDO, SHIMOGE GUN, OITA Prefecture.

KURISOHIBARU Er, 8th Air Tng Unit. (SEIBU 542). Strength and location not reported.

KUMAMOTO Air Tpt Csd Tng Unit. Strength unknown. Location KUMAMOTO.

Following Depots identified by 2nd Marine Division.

KUMAMOTO Er, FUKUOKA Clothing Depot. Former strength 7; current strength 3. Location UEKI, KAMI MASHIKI GUN.

KUMAMOTO Er, FUKUOKA Provision Depot. Strength 6. Location KUMAMOTO.

KUMAMOTO Er, KOKURA Arsenal. Former strength 30; current strength 15. Location KUMAMOTO.
Order of Battle. (Continued) 17Oct45
SECRET

d. UEKI Er, KOKURA Arsenal. Former strength 100; current strength 77. Location UEKI, KAMI KASHIKI GUN.

10. Following shipping units identified by 2nd Marine Division:

a. MISUMI Er, 1st Ship Tpt Comd (MUTSU 61682). Strength unknown. Location MISUMI, UFO GUN.

b. Hq. 15th Ship Unit (AKATSUKI 2950). Type unit not specified. Strength unknown. Location MISUMI, UFO GUN.

c. 3rd Ship Engs Rgt (AKATSUKI 16760). Strength unknown. Location SASHIKI, ASHIKITA GUN.

11. Repatriation. The Subchasers No 493 and No 813 arrived on 15 October at HAKATA from FUSAN with 458 Army, 0 Navy, and 0 Civilians. These were dispersed 244 to HONSHU, 5 to SHIKOKU, 209 to KYUSHU. The KOSEI MARU arrived on 15 October at HAKATA from CHINKAI with 0 Army, 268 Navy, and 0 Civilians. These were dispersed 1 to KOKKAIDO, 189 to HONSHU, 21 to SHIKOKU 157 to KYUSHU.

12. Miscellaneous. Interrogation by the 5th Marine Division indicated that the Army personnel debarked at SASEBO from the LST convoy were members of the KEIJO Depot Div and the 120th Inf Div. The former had a T/O of 10,000, and the latter had a T/O of 12,000. The 120th Inf Div was activated in MANCHURIA about 4 years ago. It went to KOREA in March, 1945. It was shifted north during the Russian attack but never participated in battle. 5,000 have returned to JAPAN. 4,000 are awaiting transportation back, and 5,000 are under forced labor by the Russians.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 16Oct45
To: 1600I, 17Oct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 18 October 1945.

No. 26.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Report on KAWATANA ARASHI BUTAI (Enclosure to 6th Army only).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

   See Enclosure (A).

2. Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   See Enclosure (A).

3. General attitude of military and semi-military units.
   No change.

4. Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
   None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

1. Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

FUKUOKA

Cable station has cables in operation to FUSAN and KEIJO, KOREA. Each cable handles about 300 commercial messages a day.

Wireless station handles about 250 commercial messages a day to TAIHOKU, FORMOSA.

Spinning mill which was converted to an aircraft assembly plant during the war. It is inoperative at present but 100 people are still employed doing office work. The manager is K. KAWASE. On hand
were 200 airplane fuselages (believed to be the BETTY type) and equipment includes a large metal press, 5 drill presses, and a small machine shop.

KOKURA

The Naval Bureau Telegraph Station is still being operated by the Japanese Navy. It is used principally as a receiving set but is capable of transmitting.

OITA Area

Experimental radar station.

Torpedo storage and adjusting stations at DANOHARU and YUSUHARU.

Two transmitting and receiving stations.

Naval Air Station barracks and warehouses were moved in March 1945 after the original buildings had been completely destroyed by bombing.

City Prison operates as a branch of the police station. It now contains 125 prisoners, all of whom appear to be in good health.

SASEBO

AKOI Industries include the SASEBO Iron Works and the AOKI Sales Agency. The AOKI Sales Agency was established around 1896 and made local sales of iron products obtained from various companies (products made by the SASEBO Iron Works were not sold by this agency). During the war the agency branched out into the sale of all kinds of items, including food, clothing, and war materials for ships. The SASEBO Iron Works was established in 1930 and bought by AOKI Industries in 1938. This plant expanded from 100 to about 270 employees during the war. It produced various kinds of marine pumps, all of which were used on merchant ships. The navy controlled the distribution of these pumps, but they were sent directly to various shipbuilding yards (none went to the SASEBO Navy Yard). There are now only 100 employees and they are making small motorbus parts.
SHIKABARA Peninsula

MINAMI TOKAGI Factory (near KOJIRO but previously reported to be at YUE) began production of airplane parts (principally gears) about two years ago. It employed 36 people and produced about 1000 parts per month. The OMURA Naval Air Base furnished the material and received the finished parts. At present 13 are employed and are making fishing nets and repairing farm machinery.

TAIRA Provision Factory (near KOJIRA) produced about 15 tons a year of dried fish and vegetables, all of which was sold to the local governments at SASEBO and NAGASAKI. Employment during the war reached a maximum of 74 persons; 60 are employed at present. Production is continuing.

AIKAWA Iron Works (OBAMA) employs only one man and has never produced anything except farm machinery.

OMURA

NAGASAKI Technical School was moved to OMURA from NAGASAKI after the atomic bombing. Has no connection with the military and did not manufacture any war materials.

KUMAMOTO KEN

DAIGO College in KUMAMOTO has about 700 students and prepares them for entrance to universities. A Colonel SUGIMOTO (now retired) had charge of military training until the end of the war. MITSUBISHI began producing airplane bodies in the school gymnasium about three months before the end of the war, but only a few complete assemblies were turned out.

KUROIISHIHARA Airfield was used as a training field. There are 16 serviceable planes on the field, plus 25 damaged by the typhoon of 17 September.

KIKUCHI Airfield was also used as a training field. Seven of the eight hangars have been wrecked by bombing. There are a number of dummy aircraft in the revetments. A radio school adjacent to the field has not been used since it was bombed out in June.
TAKANA Airfield was used as a training field and an emergency landing strip. KAMIKAZE pilots were trained here during the last ten months of the war. There are 22 type 95 biplane trainers and 1 Navy fighter plane on the field. The trainers have a 50 gallon oil drum in the rear cockpit which held enough extra gas to enable the planes to fly to OKINAWA. The Japanese stated that this and the other small airfields around KUMAMOTO trained cadets who were sent to KUMAMOTO Airfield, where they were assigned to units and given flight missions. The planes on these outlying fields were used for training and in some cases for missions.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.

OITA Area

Several rockets are reported to be set up in the vicinity of OITA. They are said to have been taken off the aircraft carrier KAYO after she was damaged by a mine off the coast.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKKO KA in OITA was disbanded on 4 October. Its former personnel, SOTO, Harugoishi, TAKAYAMA, Minco, and SAKAMOTO, Yoshitake, are now inactive but are still on the payroll of the police department. This organization received its order from and made its reports to TOKYO.

TOKKO records and roster of personnel have been impounded in KUMAMOTO.
G-2 Feribdic Report No. 26. (Continued)

(5) Miscellaneous.

The following political prisoners were released on 8 October from the ISAHAYA Prison and have left for their homes (charges and sentences given in parentheses):

YASHIMA, Shuzo (Violation of preservation of public peace act - 3 years).

MOTOBA, Seikichi (attempted aid and comfort to the enemy, violation of military secrecy act - indefinite period of confinement).

FUJII, Hiroichi (Violation of military secrecy act - 1 year).

KYO, Seiketsu (Korean) (Violation of preservation of public peace act - 10 years).

KIN, Heigo (Korean) (Violation of preservation of public peace act - 8 years).

YANAKI, Shigeru (Korean) (Violation of preservation of public peace act - 2 years).

The SHIMABARA Branch of the NAGASAKI Prison was used only to hold prisoners awaiting trial by the SHIMABARA Court. The four prisoners who were detained there on 4 October have been sent to the ISAHAYA Branch of the NAGASAKI Prison. Only 8 prisoners have been kept in the SHIMABARA Branch since 1 August and none of these were confined for political offenses.

D. CIVILIAN POPULATION.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Civil Censorship.

The KAGOSHIMA NIPPO of 14 October reported that the dysentery epidemic decreased somewhat, but diphtheria has started to spread among the infants. To date there have been 684 cases of diphtheria reported in this prefecture, of which 20 died. It is very difficult to get serum because the only serum man-
ufacturing plant in KYUSHU was destroyed in the war. Negotiations were completed by the prefectural sanitary bureau with TOKYO and some serum was obtained. This will be distributed to the patients at either the sanitary bureau or the first aid stations in 11 localities.

The MAINICHI SHIBUN of 17 October reported that small American planes are flying from the bombed area in NAGASAKI to the surprise of its citizens. The old MITSUBISHI Grounds at MATSUYAMACHO was converted into an airfield for small planes within 10 days by bulldozers. It was named "Atomic Field." A similar field is also to be constructed in the city of KUMAMOTO.

The NISHI NIPPON SHIBUN of 17 October reported that there are many war victims and others who are living in temporary shacks and dug-outs in the city of SASEBO. In order to prepare for the coming winter, the city authorities decided to erect 200 simple houses for these people.

Previously the prefecture built 250 houses as an emergency measure, but due to material shortages etc. the construction was very poor which resulted in destruction by the twice-hitting typhoons.

These homes are to be a very small affair costing about 2,500 yen each. Materials will be furnished by the city to the applicants with low rate of interest financing.

Another 17 October article reported that according to the original plan, it was estimated that 300 simple homes for war victims in SAGA could be erected before the end of October, but to date only 14 houses have been completed due to the shortage of lumber. At this rate only 30 will be completed at the end of the month.

Originally they estimated to complete their plan by the end of October. With 80,000 koku of lumber on hand this would be possible, but due to wind and rain the roads and highways were damaged, stopping transportation which resulted in this incompleteness.
(Continued)

SECRET

T. R. YANCEY,  
Colonel, G3C,  
AC of 3, G-2.

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- 7 -  
SECRET 654
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, 3-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

18 October, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SASEBO Area. The 5th Marine Division reports 92 Naval personnel demobilized during the period.

2. KURUME Area. Following additional units are reported by the 5th Marine Division:
   a. 6th Co, 2nd Bn, 134th AA Regt. Current strength 110. Located at SHIMOWA, CHIKUSHI GUN, FUKUOKA Prefecture. Bn Hq located at KURUME SHI.
   b. TAJIRO Br, KOKURA Army Arsenal. Strength 203. Location TAJIRO, MIYAKI GUN, SAWA Prefecture. CO Capt NODA.

3. Army units OITA Prefecture. The following information was reported by the 5th Marine Division:
   a. 119th IMB. Current strength 76. Location SAGANOSEKI, KITA AMABE GUN.
   b. OITA Regt Dist Hq. Current strength 56. Location OITA SHI.
   c. OITA Mil Hosp. Current strength 58. Location OITA SHI.
   d. Iron Bridge AA Btry. Current strength 15. Location OITA SHI.
   e. SAGANOSEKI Mil Hosp. Current strength 2. Location SAGANOSEKI, KITA AMABE GUN.
   f. BEPPU Mil Hosp. Current strength 369. Location BEPPU SHI.
   g. HIDAB Br, KOKURA Army Arsenal. Current strength 143. Location HIDAB SHI.


2. Factory, YOKKAICHI, USA GUN, Current strength 35.

h. SAGANOSEKI Br, I 1 TOKYO Army Arsenal. Current strength 22. Location SAGANOSEKI, KITA AMABE GUN.

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 1 -

SECRET
Order of Battle (Continued) 18Oct45.

SECRET

   Location MOJI RR Hq. Strength 22. Location OITA SHI.

2. Navy units OITA Prefecture. The following information was reported by the 5th Marine Division.

   Location SAEKI SHI.

b. SAEKI Navel Def Unit. Current strength 1,037.
   Location SAEKI SHI.

c. OSA Assault Unit. Current strength 280. Location OSA; HAYAMI GUN.

d. BEPPU Navel Hosp. Current strength 240. Location BEPPU SHI.

e. 12th Nav Air Depot (Arsenal). Current strength 255. Location OITA SHI.

f. Miscellaneous Navel administrative offices. Total current strength 17 SAEKI SHI, 3 OITA SHI, 3 BEPPU SHI, 4 TSURUSAKI OITA GUN.

5. HITOYOSHI Navel Air Field. Following information reported by 2nd Marine Division.

a. HAKTA Air Group. Former strength 450. Current strength 0. CO was Capt. GIKOU, Takao.

b. KYUSHU Air Group. Former strength 1,335; current strength 86. CO is Lt. CHIYOS, Katozumi.

c. 3rd SEBO Eng. Dept. Former strength 450, current strength 0. CO was Lt. (Engrs.) KAWAI, Iwada.

d. 3rd SEBO Munitions Dept. Former strength 2; current strength 0. CO was Lt. (Fyrs.) KAWAI, Shinchi.

6. KURONISHIBARU Army Air Field. Following information reported by 2nd Marine Division.

a. KANAHITA Unit (31BUB 19388). Former strength 450;
current strength 54. CO Major HEICHI, Suzukai.

b. CHOSUN Air Unit. At the war's end 24 pilots training here.

7. Air units KUMAMOTO Area. The following additional information reported by the 2nd Marine Division.

a. 30th Fighter Unit. Strength on 1 Oct was 46. Location TATSUYAMA, HOTAKU GUN.
027/130  
Ser. 00957B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 17Oct45  
To: 1800I, 18Oct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 19 October 1945.

No. 27.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (AMS L872).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle (Omitted)  
(B) Tactical Disposition of Naval Units in VAC Area.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A) (Omitted)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A) (Omitted)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

SASEBO

The following equipment of the 312th Japanese Army Division has been collected and stored in a warehouse located approximately 4 miles SE of SASEBO.

6,928 rifles,
9,350 bayonets,
61 machine guns,
65 machine gun mounts,
159 light machine guns,
64 boxes M3 spare parts,
74 MG barrels,
112 knee mortars,
232 sabers
3 flame throwers,
1 box periscopes,
1 box field glasses,
1 box bugles,
14 survey tripods,
2 survey instruments.

- 1 -

SECRET 658
Two caves and one building located approximately 11 miles east of IMARI under Japanese guard contain ammunition for mountain guns, trench mortars, and small arms.

FUKUOKA Area

HARUDA Ammunition Dump located approximately 6 miles N of TOSU. An inventory revealed the following:

- 130 100lb. bombs.
- 360 250lb. bombs.
- 90 cases of 50 calibre and 20mm ammunition.
- 2 caves (180' x 8') of ammunition; calibre unknown.
- 500 55 gal. drums of high octane gasoline and ethyl alcohol.

KITO Ammunition Dump located approximately 4 miles N of TOSU. This dump contained:

- 2425 cases 75mm and 70mm ammunition. There are also 11 caves (180' x 8') whose total inventory includes 300 cases of fuse, 75mm and 105mm ammunition.

3. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

YAWATA

YAWATA Iron Works was thoroughly inspected and found to be 20% productive. 5 of the 12 furnaces are in operation prod ucing 5000 tons of pig iron daily and 8000 tons of steel daily. At the present time there is a shortage of ore. There are 32,800 employees.

OITA

OITA Naval Air Base (previously located in periodic No. 25). The following additional information on this air base was obtained from interviews with officers on the staff of Captain SADOHARA, the commanding officer. In 1942 the hangar area and the supply facilities were expanded but was
not used to base bombers and transports until January 1945. The field was primarily for fighters and torpedo bombers, and also trained pilots for the latter. With the exception of the runways, now being repaired, the field is pressed and rolled grass. There are adequate drainage facilities but no plane over 15 tons can land safely after heavy rains. Power lines to the field are in disrepair. Maintenance personnel, including 200 civilians, are located nearby. The seaplane station was used only for minor maintenance work and the buildings were never completed. The seaplane base was heavily damaged by bombing.

12th Naval Air Depot. This organization was forced to move from its former location when destroyed by bombs on 10 May 1945. At present the installations at headquarters include a hospital, barracks, storage dumps, warehouses and underground airplane parts shops. Nearby there are underground airplane body assembly plants and aircraft engine plants. Villages in the vicinity also contributed to this depot by producing engine parts, instruments, and other products of minor importance.

KUMAMOTO

Prefectural office. 95% of the government office buildings were destroyed by bombing. Only a part of one structure, housing agricultural offices, remains. The rest of the government activities that were once conducted in these buildings have been transferred to the Government Monopoly Building.

SUZUKIJI Railroad Station. Three fourths of this station has been bombed out, and only a small newly constructed waiting room and a small ticket office are located here.

Electric Sub Station. Only the main building remains. 12 men are presently employed.

Prefectural Sericultural Laboratory. The entire laboratory has been damaged and only one office and a few sheds remain. The work carried on here is of an experimental nature, dealing with the improvement and development of silk. 120 people were employed before the war, 100 during the war, and 90 at present.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 27.  (Continued)

SECRET

(2) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.

KAWAKAMI Power Plants located approximately 2 miles east of OGI. There are 7 plants which feed into the KYUSHU central power line.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

KoKai Tai. Agents have located the OITA headquarters. This organization is operating with a skeleton force pending final dissolution. A survey of the KoKai Tai in KUMAMOTO is being conducted. Complete rosters have been obtained with past and present strength.

TOKKO Ka. The BEI-FU branch of this organization was disbanded 4 October 1945.

Investigation of the Imperial Reserve Association in the KAGASAKI area reveals that this organization was composed of reserve and retired serviceman and was organized to keep the military spirit alive among its members. It was dissolved at the close of the war and there has been no indication of its reestablishment.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Agents are continuing to investigate the release of political prisoners under the 4 October 1945 directive.

Investigation of the "Arms Patriotic Society" in KAGASAKI, composed of boat owners and fishermen, reveals that it does not appear to be an organization which in any way suppressed freedom, and that it has not been especially militaristic.
SECRET

Investigation of the Chinese Community in NAGASAKI reveals no threat of subversive activity or danger to the occupation forces.

D. CIVILIAN POPULATION.

At WAKAMATSU four Japanese policemen who had been taken prisoner by a group of Chinese, were released. The Chinese were ordered to return the swords to the policemen and were given warning that any such future conduct would be sternly dealt with.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

National news was concentrated on the granting of amnesty by the Emperor and the mystery of NAGAKURA'S death. Editorials dealt with various national and political subjects. Local news was of the usual variety.

A copy of the NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN dated 18 October 1945 is quoted. "There are many fishing fans among the officers and men of the occupational force. Some of them are already fishing along the beach with rented fishing equipment. These scenes signify the friendliness of Americans and Japanese. In order to comfort these men FUKUOKA authorities are speeding the manufacture of fishing equipment."

A copy of the ASAHI SHIMBUN dated 18 October 1945 is quoted. "In answering the wishes of the occupational army the city of SASEBO opened its bazaar in the afternoon of the 17th at the old commercial and industrial Economics Bureau Building. The best sellers were the lacquer wares. There were also silk dresses, women's shoes and china ware."

A Copy of the KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN dated 16 October 1945 is quoted. "Demobilization of naval personnel is progressing rapidly. Among those discharged or the 15th were the Admirals IMUYE, Narumi, TSUKAHARA, Nishizo and NOMURA, Makuni. This makes a total of 164 officers discharged to date, leaving admiral of the Navy NAGANO, Osami, and three other admirals, OPAI, Mitsumasa, HASEGAWA, Kiyoshi and TOYATA, Youemu, on the active list."
G-2 Periodic Report No. 27. (Continued)

A copy of the SAGA SHIMBUN dated 17 October 1945 is quoted. The ministry of Education accepted the resignation of Admiral HAYAKU TAKE, Gengo, as dean of the KYUSHU Imperial University. NISHI, Hisamitsu, has been appointed his successor as of the 16th.

(2) SHIMIZU Internment Camp.

Internment Camp located at SHIMIZU (north of OG). Inmates had been billeted in about 50 small dwellings. Two of the internees, namely, Edward Zillig, and Horace Nutter, were interviewed and they state that they were not mistreated but that the rations were poor. They were released with the other foreign refugees on 6 September 1945. All of them returned to their homes except Edward Zillig, who expressed a desire to remain in the camp area. Zillig, an ex-US Marine (reported G-2 Periodic Report No. 25) submitted a statement about the kind treatment received as an internee.

The following list of foreign refugees interned at SHIMIZU was received from Horace Nutter and a similar list was received from Edward Zillig.

**No.** | (Head of Family) | Date of Birth | Nationality
---|------------------|---------------|-----------------|
1. | Joel Alfred Julius HOKANSON | April 21, 1872 | Swedish
2. | Edward Zillig | December 17, 1863 | Swiss
3. | Zeferino Francisco Xavier GONSALEZ | August 26, 1881 | Portuguese
4. | Maria Joanne Andrei MADEIRA de CARVALHO | October 1, 1900 | Portuguese
5. | Edmond SOKERS | July 30, 1873 | Belgian
6. | Peter Westbye ULDALE | May 30, 1879 | Danish
7. | Yvonne LEFICARD | August 8, 1897 | French
8. | Dick VIZZE | April 13, 1866 | Dutch
9. | Luigi URSO | October 1, 1900 | Italian
10. | Camillo URSO | March 15, 1910 | Italian
11. | Lucien BERNARD | March 7, 1876 | French
13. | Henri CAMEL | June 28, 1879 | French
14. | Jean BOE | February 3, 1881 | French
15. | Edward Benjamin MURCH | December 10, 1868 | British
16. | Alfred Frederick GABE | September 14, 1874 | British
17. | James Cecil SIRWARDEN | February 27, 1867 | British
18. | Horace NUTT | May 12, 1870 | British
19. | Roland Martin McKENZIE | June 20, 1873 | British
20. | Andre Marcel BOUGLY | April 12, 1879 | French
22. | Haruo Aiura (Trustee) | March 10, 1911 | Japanese
G-2 Periodic Report No. 27.  (Continued)

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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 18001, 18Oct45
To: 18001, 19Oct45

SECRET

No. 28.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 20 October 1945.

Map: KYUSHU, 1:25,000 (A&I L872)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (Omitted)
(B) Report on AINOURA Naval Recruit Training Station
(to Sixth Army only).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A) (Omitted)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A) (Omitted)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under
our control.

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during
the period.

SASEBO Area

Minesweeping base 2 miles west of EMUKAE (N. of
SASEBO) has a large radio station for communicating
with ships at sea. Its operating radius is reported
to be 250 miles. The base has 49 minesweepers,
3 of which are in EMUKAE for repairs. Present plans
call for use of these minesweepers until about
1 December.

DAIDO Iron works at OKAJA (the Japanese have com-
bines the towns of WAKATSU and ENOKITSU (SE of SAGA)
into the town of this name) made marine valves during the war.

"AKATSU Iron Works at OKA/WA made air compressors and steam locomotives during the war.

**NAGASAKI Area**

Suicide boat base at MAKI SHIMA (East of NAGASAKI) contains 50 damaged boats (confirming the Japanese inventory given in Enclosure (E) of G-2 Periodic Report No. 15).

OnURA Naval Relief Association sold rice, shoes, clothing, and other commodities to about 4,000 naval personnel. They now serve about 3,000 civilians. This organization is run by the navy and Lt. R. ASUDA is in charge with 3 naval officers and 150 civilians assisting him.

Submarine Detector Stations at OHKI SHIMA and IKE SHIMA have been found to be as reported in Paragraph B(2) of G-2 Periodic Report No. 24. The IKE SHIMA Station appeared to be the newer, since its buildings were relatively unweathered. The Japanese state that each island had a wartime garrison of 3 officers and 15 men. No military personnel are on either island at present.

**KOKURA**

KOKURA Branch, Tokyo Steel Corporation employed 700 workers and produced 500 to 600 tons of wire and steel cable per month during the war. On hand was found:

10 tons 2\(\frac{1}{4}\) inch cable.
164 tons 1\(\frac{1}{4}\) inch cable.
20 tons miscellaneous cable.

**C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.**

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.
(3) **Subversive activities.**

None.

(4) **Unfriendly organizations.**

Further investigation of DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI in NAGASAKI (See G-2 Periodic Report No. 24) reveals that its main purpose was to insure the political position of the members of the Imperial Diet in the coming elections. The association appears to have met with little response from the people. It was dissolved on 9 September and is not considered by CIC to be a threat to the occupation forces.

Records of the TOKKO KA in OITA and BEPPU were destroyed on 15 August on telephonic orders from the OITA Prefectural Police Headquarters. These records included names indexes of foreigners, Koreans and important persons investigated and reports relating to censorship.

(5) **Miscellaneous**

The chief of police and head of the Special Higher Police in FUKUOKA have retired as ordered by SCAF.

All prisoners in the NAKAHATSUMI and KOKURA prisons have been interrogated and their stories check with the prison records.

D. **CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.**

No change.

E. **MISCELLANEOUS.**

(1) **Press Survey.**

The **NIISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN** of 18 October reported the following. Recently among the citizens of SASEBO in spite of the fact that they have been repeatedly cautioned and forgetting their self respect as Japanese, there are some who approach the occupation forces when they want something. Further, parents cause their children to cajole the occupation troops for various things. Because the middle school students ask for tobacco and chewing gum, from now on the police of SASEBO Area will strictly control this misconduct.
Especially they will instruct the people to put into careful practice the following points:

Obey traffic regulations.
Do not stop to watch workers on the road under any circumstance.
See that your clothes are neat.
Under no circumstances go out after 9 PM.
See that doors are shut and do not leave one woman all alone at home.
Do not go near or enter a storehouse or storage space of the occupation force.
Do not give liquor or food to the occupation troops.

The OITA SODO SHIBUN of 17 October reports the following. The city of OITA held an emergency meet-of the various townships committees and decided to offer their services to the occupation army in their work about the barracks. Each town is pro-rated according to the number of homes and is designated to send out men between 17 and 50. To begin the service 10 men from KA SUGA-CHO and 5 school service members were sent to the Boys Aeronautical School and 75 men were sent from East OITA to the old Air Unit on the 16th.

(2) Precious Metals.

All gold in OITA was sent to the KUKAKOTO Branch of the Bank of Japan in 1939 on government order. Likewise all platinum and diamonds were ordered collected in 1944.

(3) POW Camps.

Japanese civilians have reported that about 150 Australians and English POW's were sent from FUKUOKA and other POW camps at unknown locations to work as laborers in a tin ore refinery at SAGANOSEKI (SE of OITA).

(4) Koreans.

On 18 October there were 7816 Koreans in FUKUOKA and 20,206 in SHIMONOSEKI waiting to be returned to KORE, 3100 left SHIMONOSEKI on the CHIAHAKU MARU and KOAN MARU. It is reported that approximately 5000 Koreans had previously left in small craft.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 28.  (Continued)

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T. R. YANCEL,
Colonel, G-2,
AC of 3, G-2.

SECRET
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 190ct45
To: 1800I, 200ct45

HQ, V Amphibious Corps
SA3EBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 21 October 1945.

No. 29

Enclosure: (A). Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Weapons and ammunition dump of CHITOSE unit #32630 located in WADABARU contains:

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<th>Quantity</th>
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<tr>
<td>HA3's</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMG's</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 rifles (approx.)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24 boxes of picric acid</td>
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The above weapons belonged to a special artillery battalion detached to the 312th Division. The dump is presently under Jap guard.

Along a road at a point approximately 14 miles north of SEPPU there are bombs scattered on either side of the road. There are 48-250 kg bombs and 95-60 kg bombs.

SA3EBO

Three caves in the southern edge of SA3EBO had been used for making high powered binoculars and telescopes.
They now contain lens grinders, cutting and polishing machines, and chemicals, all of which are in good condition. Up to this time the cave entrances had been flooded.

Four caves in the southern edge of SASEBO served as radio and machine shops. The caves contain 100 lathes and small tools in fair condition.

A small room under the road in southern SASEBO disclosed a large barrel of motion picture film. Subjects consist of coming construction and assembly, launching of destroyers, machinery and factory scenes, religious ceremonies, arsenal news, troops on the march and women at work. The film, formerly belonging to the SASEBO Naval Arsenal, is Eastman Kodak 35mm, printed on nitrate film, and for the most part labelled "Super-Sensitive".

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KUMAMOTO Area

Pharmacology College. There are 350 students. Courses include fundamental and advanced pharmacy. 50% of the college has been destroyed by bombing. Colonel AREDOMI, Shigê, and 1st Lieutenant ATASE, Retutaro were in charge of the military training during the war.

South KUMAMOTO JR Station employed 23 people before the war, 33 during the war, and 42 at present. About 15% of the station was destroyed by bombing.

A large machine shop factory is the largest of three shops belonging to the KUMAMOTO TEREOJO Joint Stock Company. Prior to the war the building was a school which was converted to a machine shop factory. During the war the firm was engaged in the manufacture of cases for shells, parts for ships and airplanes, and repair work. One-third of the buildings were destroyed by bombing. 300 people were employed during the war and 180 at present. The plant is in the process of re-converting into some activity dealing with the processing of food.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 29.  (Continued)  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SECRET

OMUTA Area

MITSUI AR workshops repair mining equipment and manufactures garden tools. Present employees number 250 persons. There are 150 gun sights on hand. Bomb damage has been slight.

The KINATO Steam Power Plant produces power for the industries in the dock area and the coal mines. The present output is 20,000 Kw.

Harbor Office and Customs Building. This office keeps the records of all goods arriving and leaving the port. In June 1945 the Japanese Government ordered all goods, except necessary foodstuffs, shipped out to orally designated ports as severe air raids were anticipated.

Electric Chemical Plant is a branch of the Electro-Chemical Industries. A department for the manufacture of explosives was set up a year ago, but was not put into operation. The present production is fertilizer. Present capital is 57,500,000 yen.

OMUTA AR Station. The buildings comprising the station were completely destroyed in raids. There are presently 3 small buildings which serve as a temporary station.

MANDA Coal Mine. Present production is about 200 tons per day. Chinese Camp #1 is located in buildings on the mine premises.

MIKE Dyeustuffs Company operates as the chemical works of the MITSUI Chemical Company. It is presently producing dyes and synthetic medicines:

Present production capacities:

Coke  32,000 kilo tons per month.
Dyes  990 kilo tons per month.
Drugs  410 kilo tons per month.
Industrial chemicals  3,992 kilo tons per month.
Explosives  688 kilo tons per month.
Ethyl fluid  25 kilo tons per month.
Bromine  10 kilo tons per month.

The plans are to produce chloropiricrin for fumigation.
purposes. Present research includes sulphur blue dyes, organic pigments, rubber salt from seawater, catalytic and high pressure studies, and agricultural chemicals. Capital: 121,500,000 yen of which 1,500,000 yen are controlled by MITSUI.

OURA Steam Plant is a subsidiary of MIKE Dyeatuffs Company. It is a MITSUI controlled plant. Present production is 25 tons of carbonic acid per month and 15 tons of phenol per month. Considerable bomb damage cut production from 250 tons. This plant was converted from a power plant some years ago but it still produces its own power.

MIKE Machinery Works produces light and heavy mining machinery. The plant was badly damaged in an air raid and is presently in a state of reconversion and repair. 2,000 people are employed.

MITSUI Zinc Refinery. Present production is 4 to 5 tons per day. There were 1,800 wartime employees and 1,200 at present. There was extensive bomb damage. 200 English POW's were used from July 1944 to July 1945. 100 Australian POW's were used from June 1945 to July 1946.

Oriental High Pressure Company produces ammonia, methanol, alcohol, thiacs, oxygen, hydrogen, and sulphur. Capital: 65,000,000 yen. There were 2,000 wartime employees and at present 1,700. MITSUI controls 35% of this company. It is stated that no POW's were ever used as laborers here.

YOTSUBAYAMA Coal Mine is producing 200 tons of coal per day employing 1,000 people.

YAWATA

YAWATA Iron Works employed 3,000 during the war and 2,000 at present. This company is controlled by the YAWATA Iron Works. There is 1 complete furnace for making steel and 2 are under construction. Each can produce 50 tons daily but at the present time no steel is made. There are 25 steel structure buildings and 26 of wood. There is 1 machine shop, 1 steel casting shop, and 1 foundry. The products now being made are carbon black for making rubber, carbon electrodes, oxygen, rivets and bolts, and 30,000 picks and rakes monthly.
TOKAI Steel works employed 250 persons during the war producing 5,000 tons of steel products monthly. Products included steel plate for ships, round steel bars, rods, angle irons, and light car tracks. The works was made up of 7 lathes, a milling machine, and a small foundry.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

TANAKA, Teishi. Home address: 36 Koraimon Hachi, HOKAROTO. His present whereabouts is unknown but he is believed to be in KYUSHU. (See Subversive Activities).

(3) Subversive activities.

It has been learned from a confidential source that TANAKA, Teishi, has been secretly disseminating imperialistic and militaristic propaganda in the middle and higher schools in Japan. Many school principals have refused his permission to lecture, but others, concurring in his teachings, have scheduled him.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

Sub-stations in TOKKO KA records in police sub-stations in NAGASAKI and the records in GAURA and ISAHAYA have been inventoried and sealed.

The NAGASAKI CIC Detachment reports that a special secret police section existed in all KREFEI TAI units. This section comprised about 10% of the unit's strength and was known as the KREFEI TOKUBETSU KOTO KEMITSU. Members were specially chosen. The duties of the members of this organization was to control thoughts among the military, to detect and suppress communism within the military, to investigate cases of draft evasion, to insure the security of war plants, and to investigate sabotage and espionage. This section did not exercise any power or arrest but after investigation turned its findings over to the regular KREFEI TAI, the local police, or the military commander for appropriate action.

- 5 -

SECRET
(5) Miscellaneous.

Interviews continued with released prisoners claimed to be Communists. One of them stated that there are about 200 Communists in FUKUOKA and several thousands in Japan. The main Communist headquarters is stated to be in TOKYO and all printed party material originated there. KYUSUKE, Takasu, is reported to be the head of the Communist Party in FUKUOKA which is controlled through TOKYO. The TOKYO leaders are stated to be TORUDA, Kyunichi, NOBUYASU, Seichika, and SANAMABE, Minabu.

President HIROMICHI of the KURUMA Chamber of Commerce declared the Japanese people are very happy that American Forces are occupying this area as they have great fear of the Russians and Chinese. The Japanese said they have no ill feeling toward the Americans and are willing to cooperate in every possible manner.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

National news was concerned with the food problem, the revival of the silk industry, the problem of retention of the Emperor as voiced by President Truman, and the Emperor's decision to repair the palace later. Local news was the usual run of items on food, and particular emphasis was placed on sanitary conditions by the NAGASAKI SHIBUN.

The NAGASAKI SHIBUN of Oct 20 reported the following. "It is expected that the people of NAGASAKI, returning from various foreign lands, will be landed in SASEBO in the future so the prefecture has decided to establish an office in SASEBO to help the returning citizens. It is expected that about 10,000 will arrive from KOREA soon."

"About 150 boys, 4th and 5th graders, of MITSUI Farming School in FUKUOKA, gathered at Mt. TAKARA and decided to discontinue attending the school in protest to injustices done to them by the school authorities. Some of the charges, of which more than 10 were forwarded to the principal, KATAYAMA, are: School authorities distributed school garden products to the teachers only...Upon the purchase of charcoal, the students were
used to deliver them to each of the teachers homes... wages due the students were still unpaid... In regard to the charges, Principal KATAYAMA had this to say... The students forwarded me their protest on the night of the 17th while I was out. Before I had a chance to explain, they stopped attending school. I am sure they will understand and re-attend the school if I make an explanation, because this matter is merely a misunderstanding."

T. R. YANG
Colonel, GSC,
AC of 3, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:
ComFifthFIt  1  CG 32ndInfDiv  10
CG Sixth Army  1  MA3 22  1
OIC JICPOA  1  CG FOF  5
CG FOFac  1  CO KOF  1
Com5thPhib  1  NAVFICCHJAP  1
CG IIIPhibCorps  1  CG Corps Troops  1
CG I Corps  1  AC of 3, G-3, VAC  1
CG X Corps  1  Records Section VAC  1
CG 2ndMarDiv  10  File  5
CG 5thMarDiv  10

- 7 -
SECRETS

677
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

21 October 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SATO Area. The 5th Marine Division reports the following naval personnel, demobilized for the periods indicated.

   17/18 October, 1945. . . . . . . . 29
   18/19 October, 1945. . . . . . . . 66
   19/20 October, 1945. . . . . . . . 880

2. OITA Area. The following was compiled by the Oita Occupation Group from documents submitted by Major UMEZAYASHI, staff officer 118th IMB, Units were demobilized 11-15 Sept 45. T/O as of August 1945: - 7,800.

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List of men left after demobilization of western District KEMPEI TAI Headquarters 18 October, 1945.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
Order of Battle... (Continued) 21 Oct 45

---

SECRET

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<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>NAGASAKI DIST.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>SASAKI DIST.</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>200</td>
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</table>

REFATRIATION

a. 5th Marine Division reports the following troops arrived Uragashimo from Okinawa Shima and Minami Daito Shima during the period 17/18 October, 1945.

From Okinawa Shima
Army
Navy

From Minami Daito Shima
Army
Navy

b. 1,800 troops (elements of the 120th Inf Div, 1st Air Training Command and the KIJO Div hospital arrived at Uragashimo from Korea. 500 of this total was dispatched to Hario during the period 19/20 October, 1945.

c. FUKUOKA OCCUPATION FORCES report the following troops repatriated during the period 18/19 October, 1945, 1,474 Army troops arrive HAKATA 17 Oct having left FUSAN 17 Oct on the TAIHO MARU. 27 of these went to SENDAI, 43 to TOKYO, 22 to NAGOYA, 14 to NIGOTA, 809 to OSAKA, 111 to HIROSHIMA, 45 to SHIKOKU, 46 to NAGASAKI, 82 to KAGOSHIMA, 61 to FUKUOKA. The remaining 213 were hospitalized.

3 Navy arrived HAKATA 17 Oct having left FUSAN 15 Oct on YETO MARU. 1,237 Army troops arrived HAKATA 18 Oct having left FUSAN 1 Oct on the KOGANE MARU. 32 of these went to NAGASAKI, 246 to KAGOSHIMA, 274 to SENDAI, 260 to TOKYO, 130 to OSAKA, 30 to SHIKOKU, 40 to NAGOYA, 65 to KYOTO, 8 to HIROSHIMA, 78 stayed in FUKUOKA. 266 Army troops arrived HAKATA 18 Oct having left FUSAN 17 Oct on the HANIBA MARU. 215 Army went KENSHU, 51 stayed in KYUSHU. 2,237 Army troops arrived HAKATA 18 Oct having left FUSAN 17 Oct on the 53-110 and 33-12 50 of these went to KAGOSHIMA, 60 to SENDAI, 40 to TOKYO, 200 to OSAKA, 20 to NAGOYA, 40 to KYOTO, 108 to HIROSHIMA, 80 to SHIKOKU, 100 to FUKUOKA, 120 TO TOTTORI, 370 to MATSUE, the remaining 1,032 are dispersing to various unknown islands. 111
Naval troops arrived HAKATA 18 Oct having left FUSAN 17 Oct on the TOYO haro. 71 to HONSHU, 42 stayed in KYUSHU.

d. FUKUOKA OCCUPATION FORCES reports the following troops repatriated during the period 19/20 Oct, 1945. 656 Army troops arrived HAKATA 17 Oct having left FUSAN 16 Oct on the SE-69, 21 of these went to SENDAI, 40 to NAGOYA, 33 to SHIKOKU, 18 to KAGOSHIMA, 28 to TOKYO, 71 to KYOTO, 60 to NAGASAKI, 248 to OSAKA, 68 to HIROSHIMA, 68 to FUKUOKA. 210 Army troops arrived HAKATA 18 Oct having left FUSAN 17 Oct on the SC-49, 9 of these went to KAGOSHIMA, 64 to SENDAI, 50 to TOKYO, 2 to OSAKA, 4 to NAGOYA, 46 to KYOTO, 1 to HIROSHIMA, 6 to SHIKOKU, 1 to NAGASAKI. 344 Army troops arrived HAKATA 19 Oct having left FUSAN 19 Oct on the TOKUJU haro, of these 11 went to KAGOSHIMA, 2 to SENDAI, 17 to TOKYO, 6 to NAGOYA, 198 to HIROSHIMA, 9 to NAGASAKI, 15 to FUKUOKA, 22 to OSAKA, 8 to KYOTO.
027/rem
Ser. 00976B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 20 Oct 45
To :  1800I, 21 Oct 45

HQ, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 22 October 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

CITA Area

4 large caliber guns and demolitions storage area
(5 miles SE of CITA).

The following are in the CITA area and are probably storage areas of the 12th Naval Air Depot:

Group of seaplane engines.
Aerial bombs scattered in an open field.

OAMUTA Area

The following weapons were collected from units in the YAMAGA Area and stored in the elementary school in the town of YAMAGA:

1800 rifles.
45 HiG's.
60 LtG's.
40 pistols.
3 75mm mountain guns.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 30. (Continued)

SECRET

MOJI Area

Vehicle and weapons dump at IOYOTSU (South of MOJI) contains:

39 M38 rifles.
7 M39 tractors.
1 M39 wireless car.
12 amphibious cars.
2 KISAI command cars.
10 Chevrolel command cars.
5 trucks.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

OITA Area

Radio station.
2 camouflaged airstrips near MIIE are being investigated and a further report will be made.

KAIATSU Area

2 coal mines near OCHT. One was once a large open pit mine but is now abandoned. The other is not being worked at present either.

NITIMAN Mining Company, Ltd.

(SHINJASHIKI) has an output of 3,000 tons of coal per month and expects to increase this to 15,000 tons per month by the first of the year. At present all of the output is being bought by the Japanese Government Railway.

Coal mine near IWAYA is part of the NITIMAN Company. It produces about 3,000 tons per month.

NAGASAKI Area

IO SHIKA Submarine Detector Station was inspected and found to be as reported in Paragraph 3(2) of G-2 Periodic Report No. 24. The station is located in OWAKIKA Village on IO SHIKA and was in operation from
early in 1942 until 25 August, 1945. Its wartime garrison consisted of 1 officer and 15 men. Investigation has not revealed any connection between this station and sea mine fields in the vicinity.

SHIMABARA City Airstrip (SHIMABARA Peninsula) is about 1,000 yards long and 75 yards wide. The field is owned by the city and was used as a play-ground and race track before the war, but was taken over by the navy as a training field in July, 1945. This field was controlled by the ISAHAYA Airfield. A small building near the field contains the parts of a smashed small plane. At present the strip is being cleared for use as a gardening area.

YAWATA Area

TOKAI Electrode Manufacturing Co. produced 30 tons of pitch coke and 2 tons of carbon black daily during the war. 135 people were employed here during war time, but at present the plant is inoperative so that there are only 14 employees. On hand are 400 tons of pitch coke and 300 tons of coal.

MISAB Liquid Fuel Co. (in YAKAMATSU) employed 200 during the war, but only employs 365 now. Products manufactured during the war and monthly production (in parenthesis) are as follows: gas (1,250 barrels), fuel oil (7550 barrels), semi-diesel fuel oil (2,500 barrels), pitch (8 tons), semi-coke (13,000 tons), and creosol (30 tons).

MIGI Coal Mine at AKAIKE (south of YAWATA) employs 3,000 people and produced 3,950 tons of coal in September. In April 15,000 tons were produced.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.
SECRET

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None.

(5) Miscellaneous.

The Special Higher Police in ARAO (near OKURA) and AMAKUSA (on AMAKUSA TO) were found to be dissolved as ordered by SGAP. Their records were impounded.

D. CIVILIAN POPULATION.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

The NHISHI MIPPO SHIMEUN of Oct 21 reported "Upon request of the OKURA occupation force, OKURA, SEIKO, and West OKURA schools will hold a combined field day with the American shortly."

"In order to meet the necessity of the English language in welcoming the occupation army, the city of YAMATA is opening a class in English at the City KOKUHAN School from Monday, 22nd, 3:00 to 5:00 PM daily. All interested in this class are welcomed. The instructor will be Miss TOSHIKO HUKAZU of the mayor's office."

"About five-hundred 250 kilo bombs and several thousand land mines turned over to the occupational force by OKURA Sector will be disposed of in the ARIAKE Sea. They will be transported by train to the shores of SHIBARAI city, from where they will be transferred to the barge and then to sea burial which will be performed in the presence of the occupation army."

The SAGA SHIMEUN of 21 Oct reports "110,000 tons of shipping and 1,500 freight cars are idle in the KAMON area. Of course the ships are waiting for the cleaning of the channel, but we are puzzled about the trains which should be handling coal, food, and lumber."

"A Col. Milson stopped into a barber shop in SHIOMI-MACHI, SEIKO, talked the proprietor out and started to cut the hair of the many American customers himself. He was once a barber by occupation so his venture became very popular."
The NISHI NIPPON SHIMUN reported "It has been decided in SAGA Prefecture on orders from allied occupation forces to prohibit Japanese nationals from going out between 9 PM to 5 AM the next morning commencing at 9 PM on the 25th, the object being to secure peaceful occupation. The areas affected by the curfew are SAGA City and KANZAKI CHO on its outskirts, WADATSUBARA and TORISU CHO, and TASHIRO CHO on its outskirts. Persons finding it necessary to travel during the curfew hours must carry travel permits issued by the Governor or police chief under his jurisdiction. Furthermore, temporary measures are being conceived for emergency cases, such as in cases of sudden illness or robbery or when there is insufficient time for obtaining travel permits as in the case of persons getting on or off trains."

(2) Japanese People's Army

The mayor of SHIMABARA (on SHIMABARA Peninsula) stated that the Peoples’ Volunteer Corps (KOKUKIN GIYU TAI) in that area was organized in the same manner as that in NAGASAKI (see paragraph E(2) in G-2 Periodic Report No. 22), except that no training of any kind had been given. In the event of an invasion members of this organization were to assist in road construction and in hauling supplies to the fighting troops.

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SECRET

685
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

22 October, 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SASEBO Area. The 5th Mar Div reported that 47 naval troops were demobilized during the period.

2. REPATRIATION. The following troops were debarked at URAGASHIMA during period: 24 Civilians, 539 Officers, 9653 Enlisted, dispatched to Hario Barracks.

The FUKUOKA Occupation Forces report that: 117 Army troops and 487 Civilians arrived HAKATA 19 Oct having left FUJIS 19 Oct on the KAMIYA MARU. Of the troops, 2 went to ISE, 1 to KYOTO, 8 to NAGOYA, 10 to OSAKA, 1 to ISHIKA, 1 to FUKUOKA, 1 to KYOTO, 3 to FUKUSHIMA, 6 to HIROSHIMA, 3 to SHIKOKU, 6 to KUMAMOTO, 3 to OITA. 70 troops went to the FUKUOKA 2nd Military Hospital as patients. Of the civilians, 249 went to KIYOSU, 188 to HONSHU, 50 to SHIKOKU, 1 Army arm and 20 civilians arrived HAKATA 19 Oct having left TAISHU, TSUSHIMA ISLAND 19 Oct on ASAHI MARU. 1 soldier went to SHIKOKU, 4 civilians stayed in KUSHU, the rest will debark at SHIMONOSEKI. 189 Army troops and 677 civilians arrived HAKATA 20 Oct having left CHIKOKAI 19 Oct on the RYUHEI MARU. Of the troops, 28 went to FUKUOKA, 10 to SAGA, 10 to NAGASAKI, 11 to KUMAMOTO, 10 to OITA, 5 to MIYAZAKI, 17 to KAGOSHIMA, 27 to SHIKOKU, 26 to OSAKA, 12 to NAGOYA, 16 to TOKYO. Of the civilians, 285 went to HONSHU, 321 went to KUSU and 71 to SHIKOKU.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 21 Oct 45
To: 1800I, 22 Oct 45

SECRET
Ho, V Amphibious Corps
BASE OF KYUSHU, O800, 23 October 1945.

No. 31.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (A): L571

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

FUKAE (near BEPPU WAN)

The following equipment of the OJI ARASHI BUTAI has been located at FUKAE. (See Enclosure B Periodic Report #23).

16 Human Torpedoes in excellent condition. Each has a range of 12,200 meters at a top speed of 30 knots and a range of 40,000 meters at a cruising speed of 20 knots.

10 Suicide Boats (dimensions 15 meters by 3 meters) propelled by Chevrolet engine. Each has a range of 190 miles at a top speed of 27 knots and a range of 230 miles at a cruising speed of 23 knots.
1 Motor Torpedo Boat with 2 diesel engines capable of carrying 2 torpedoes.

13. Human Torpedo War Heads with an explosive charge of 1.55 tons in each.

**NAGASAKI**

In the MAKANO SHIMA area, NAGASAKI, a NAVTECHJAP team reported finding "Radio Date transmitting and receiving equipment for fire control". According to Lt. General TERAGUCHI, C3, 122nd I.A.G., it is used in conjunction with MANK "TA" Model 3 Army Radar. The radar was located about 3 miles SE on KAMINO SHIMA. Intelligence obtained on the radar is formed into X, Y and Z coordinate units. The various batteries receiving this "present position data" correct to DX, DY and DZ in order to track and elevate on the target. Production was begun on this equipment in July 1944 at the Army Research Section, TOKYO. All of the units are marked SECRET. The crystal frequency is 5450 k.c.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.

**OHUTA Area**

The TOYO High Pressure Company.
DAISAN Bulb Industry Company.
The KOA Workshop Inc.
The KIKA Iron Works Inc.
The OHUTA Iron Works Inc.
The OAKAOTO Iron Works.
YAMAGUCHI Iron Works.
KATAYAMA Iron Works.
SAWA Iron Works.
TOKITSU Iron Works.
The GIAJUI Iron Works.
KAWAHARA Casting Works.
YAMAGUCHI Iron Works.
YAMADA Iron Works.
SHIMA Iron Works.
KIMURA Iron Works.
OHUTA Metal Equipment of Ships Company Inc.
OHUTA Shipyard Company.
SHIGYO Company.
TAKACHIHO Fuel Company.
3-2 Periodic Report No. 31.  

SECRET

OhUTA Pottery Company.  
OhUTA Motor Car Industry Company.  
VERMICELLI Manufacturing Company.  
OhUTA Gas Company Inc.  
OhUTA Ice and Cold Storage Company.  
Imperial Marine Products Control Company.  
HOSHINO Iron Works.  
OhUTA Metal Plates Manufacturing Company.  
OhUTA Clothing works.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None to report.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKKŌ KA. A translation of TOKKŌ KA documents concerning the Korean situation reveals that a close check was kept on all Koreans in Japan. The TOKKŌ KA supervised the forcing of Korean laborers to remain with the employer for whom they were contracted. They questioned all Japanese returning from Korea regarding conditions there. Further details have been forwarded to Sixth Army through CIC channels.

The chief of the KAGOSHIMA Prefectural Police, the chief of the TOKKŌ KA in KAGOSHIMA Prefecture, and all TOKKŌ KA personnel in the prefectural police and in the police departments of KAGOSHIMA City, SENDAI, and KANOA were discharged on 13-14 October 1945 and are to be excluded from any police positions in the future.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

Rene ROULLIER, a French priest from TOBATA, was interviewed. ROULLIER arrived in Japan in 1936. Although he was questioned many times by both the KEMPEI TAI and the civil police,
he was not imprisoned until 30 July 1945. He was released on 15 August 1945. In May or June of 1945 the Japanese burned ROULLIER's home, his church, and his primary school, giving as the reason, the necessity to clear fire breaks. ROULLIER alleges that other houses and buildings in the same area were not burned and that the burning of his house was only an act of discrimination. ROULLIER stated that the POW camp at TOBATA was badly run. Many deaths, he said, resulted from harsh treatment, undernourishment, and excessive demands on the strength of the POW's. He witnessed no ill treatment himself, but heard stories concerning ill treatment at the prison camp. He expressed the hope that the activities of returning Japanese military officers would be carefully watched, because he feels that a strong undercurrent of resentment and revenge still exists among the Japanese.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

Editorials were concerned with various economic and political problems, such as the food situation, abolition of plutocracy, and women's suffrage. Local news was of the usual variety.

The KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN of 20 October reported. "In the interest of promoting Japanese-American relations, a variety program is to be presented at the KAYA People's School in the city of KAYA on the 21st. On that day talented persons of various schools will present classical dances, the drum dance of OSAKI-MACHI, SUIJIN (water god) dance and other various contributions from different villages."

The OITA SODO SHIMBUN of 19 October reports. "Since the air attack on OITA City three months ago, restoration of the city is being put into effect in various localities. However, for some reason satisfactory results could not be obtained, so individuals are building temporary housing. Regarding reconstruction the local office in OITA City has not specified any definite plans, but it is their desire that bulldozers will be made available. However, the city must lead in the reconstruction and prepare for winter."

The NAGASAKI SHIBUN of 20 October reports. "Friendly relations between service men and civilians is made evident
everywhere as the days progress, particularly noticeable in this locality where mutual understanding has become apparent. The People's School in OMURA sponsored an athletic exhibition on the 18th commencing at 9:00 AM. Among the eager spectators of parents and friends was a group of servicemen. Showing much interest in sports they contributed their applause and rooting toward successful competitive exhibitions. When the time came for the spectators to compete in the relays, the servicemen mingled among them with much enthusiasm and the reception was a very favorable one. The servicemen displayed their athletic ability and impressed the spectators. After the program was over the principal of the school made a closing address, followed by a remark by an officer which was as follows. 'Having had the privilege of watching this athletic exhibition we were able to spend a very pleasant day. For this privilege we wish to express our sincere gratitude.' This remark caused much applause.

(2) KYUSHU POW Camps Information.

Captain SAKAIOTO, Yuhichi, former commanding officer of four POW camps on KYUSHU, was interviewed regarding his treatment of the prisoners under his command. He stated that Colonel FUKUOTO, Manjiro, who was in charge of all KYUSHU POW camps, issued orders that no prisoner should be mistreated. However, guards at times lost their temper and kicked or slapped the prisoners. Instructions were to punish the guards in such cases, but SAKAIOTO knows of no punishment actually given to the guards. He stated that all deaths of prisoners were due to natural causes, mainly dysentery. Further details have been forwarded to Sixth Army through CIC channels.
HEADQUARTERS 7th AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.  

SECRET  
23 October 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SAZBO Area. The 5th Marine Division reports that 204 naval personnel were demobilized during period. Japanese report states that 7,315 men were demobilized and were bound for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. TROOPS</th>
<th>PREFECTURE</th>
<th>No. TROOPS</th>
<th>PREFECTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>339</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>HIROSHIMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>SAGA</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>OSAKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>337</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>ISHIKAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>905</td>
<td>KUAMOTO</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>AICHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>440</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>TOKYOFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>TOCHIGI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360</td>
<td>OITA</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>FUKUSHIMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>KAGAHA</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>AKOMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>EHIME</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>KOCHI</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>HOKKAIDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>TOSUKUSHIMA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 7,315

2. SAGA Area. The 5th Marine Division reports 751 Army personnel demobilized during period.

3. FUKUOKA. FUKUOKA Occupation Force reports AMAGI Farm near RAIHA (1373, 8-1144, 7) as having been used for training 600 troops under command of Lt Col YASAMURA. There are 3 large barracks and 2 warehouses. Some blueprints of airplanes parts were found. The remains of 3 wrecked fighters were found at one end of the field. Since the fields are now under cultivation it could not be determined whether or not the field had been used as a landing strip. All training equipment has been turned into the TOTTORI Prefecture which is on HONSHU.

4. FUKAE. THE OGA ARAISHI BUTFAI at FUKAE (subordination unknown) had a 1/10 of 8 officers and 84 enlisted men.

5. REPATRIATION. 156 Army troops and 370 civilians arrived HAKATA 20 October having left FUSAN 20 October on 33-16. Of the troops, 15 went to KAGOSHIMA, 6 to SEIDAI, 19 to TOKYO, 28 to OSAKA, 12 to NAGOYA, 15 to KYOTO, 10 to SHIKOKU, 30 to NAGASAKI, 6 to FUKUOKA, 15 to HIROSHIMA. Of the civilians 482 went to HONSHU, 325 to KYUSHU and 35 to SHIKOKU. 147 Army and 519 Navy troops arrived HAKATA 21 October having left AMAMI SHIMA 19 October on the 33 172. 41 of these went to FUKUOKA, 4 to SAGA, 29 to NAGASAKI, 12 to KUAMOTO, 14 to OITA, 21 to MIYAZAKI, 31 to KAGOSHIMA.

ENCLOSURE (A)  
- 1 -  
SECRET

692
27 to HIROSHIMA, 126 to OSAKA, 23 to NAGOYA, 85 to TOKYO, 55 to SENDAI, and 88 to HOKKAIDO. 500 Army troops and 7,000 civilians arrived at ZAKI 20 October having left FUSAN on the KOON MARU. Their destination unknown.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 220ct45
To: 1800I, 230ct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KUSHU,
0900, 24 October, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
To change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

KURUZE Area

25 aircraft gas tanks stored in TAKEJO school at KURA.
ZENJOJI Arm. Storage Area (2 of KURUZE) contains office supplies, tires, mess supplies and electrical supplies.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SAGA Area

Stove factory near HAMA (14 miles SW of SAGA) made plane parts during the war but is now making stoves again.

OHUTA Area

KITSUI Light Metal Manufacturing Company, Ltd., at TLCSP (North of OHUTA) employed 1100 workers during
the war and processed aluminum oxide which was shipped to a branch plant in KOREA. The company is inoperative at present, but plans to begin salt production.

TASIMA TEKUKOSHO Factory at SETAKA (NE of OMURA) produced shell heads during the war but has converted to the manufacture of agricultural tools. The number of employees has been cut from the wartime 120 to 35 at present.

OITA Area

2 airstrips near MIE (see G-2 Periodic Report No. 30) have been examined. One runway is 30 by 1500 meters and the other is 30 by 1700 meters. Neither runway is surfaced. There are no aircraft at the first field but there are 6 trainers at the second.

KURUME Area

FUJUSHIMA airfield was a civilian field prior to the war and was taken over mainly for use as a training field. At present it is under the care of Captain SUGIHARA, Tomose, and 30 men. There is a N-S runway 1170 by 300 meters and a secondary E-W runway 1000 by 300 meters. Both strips are surfaced with red clay mixed with sand and are now overgrown with weeds. There are 103 planes on the field.

ITSUI Mining Company, Ltd. at ENOURA (North of KURUME) employed 105 army officers and 1,081 workers during the war and produced 20mm gun carriages, antitank guns, mortars, shells, tool gauges, and shell cases for large caliber guns. Production stopped on 15 August, but future plans are to make tools, mining machines, and bicycles.

OMURA Area

TAKEMICHICHI CO Iron Works began producing nuts, bolts and steel and aluminum fittings for the Navy in March 1944. All material was furnished by the navy and 10 men and 40 women were employed. Plans for the future are to produce agricultural machinery and ship motors.
TOBITA

ASAHI Glass Company is now a part of the MITSUBISHI chemical industry and employs 3,000 workers. It hired 500 more during the war, but these were all high school and college students and were laid off because of a drop in production. Present products are plate glass, soda ash, caustic soda, and sodium bicarbonate.

(3) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.

None.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or Interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None to report.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None to report.

(5) Miscellaneous.

GIC has completed investigation of all prisoners in KIAI, CTO Prefecture and found that no prisoners are now confined for political reasons.

KIAI, Zeikon, a released political prisoner, states that he and six other Koreans were arrested by KCKIC in April 1945. They were charged with a violation of the wartime censorship law because they had been discussing the American capture of SASEBO and the imminent defeat of JAPAN. They were taken to the ARAC Police Station (near ChUTA) where they were questioned and beaten. Three of the prisoners died during the questioning period either because of the beatings, malnutrition, or a combination of
the two. The other three were permitted to return
to Kure. KIKAII was sentenced to 8 months in prison
beginning 28 April. He was released on 8 October.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) NEWS SURVEY.

The KINICHI SHIMEN of 23 October reports "Since its
arrival, the occupation army has been lending a big
hand toward the transportation of much needed food in
Kure-SAI; now it is assisting the city in the reconstruction
of the various schools damaged by the atomic bomb and
typhoons. Major General of the headquarters granted the
authorities the use of bulldozers, tractors, and other
equipment for this purpose. The authorities are very
grateful for this equipment."

"The people of Kure are very grateful to the occupation
army for the reconstruction of its highways under the
supervision of Captain Cain. Another request to rebuild
the bridges in Kure-SAI county has been forwarded to the
Prefectural Engineering Department. Upon survey, they
expected to complete these projects in two hours,"

The ASAI SHIMEI of 23 October reports. "Approximately
1000 marines, under the command of Colonel I Furman, arrived
to occupy KURE on the 21st."

The CIT. OCDO SHIMEI of 23 October reported. "The
citizens of CIT. and ESB. had been very careless in
observing the traffic regulations. Despite the arrival
of the occupation army this carelessness still exists.
A warning was sent to the citizens of both cities upon
receipt of the following requests from the occupation
army: 1) Traffic is very irregular; automobiles are
passing both on the right and left sides. 2) The
children are playing on the streets menacing the traffic.
3) The pedestrians are careless and do not observe the
"Walk on the left" regulation, this invites danger. 4)
Stop the children from gathering around the occupational
force vehicles whenever they stop. 5) clean up the streets."
G-2 Periodic Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRIBUTION:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>CG 32ndInfDiv</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ComFifthFIt</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAG 22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td></td>
<td>CG FBC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC JTICEA</td>
<td></td>
<td>CG KOF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FLIFPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td>HyVICTHJAP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com5thPhib</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSBS TOKYO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III Far Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td>CO Corps Troops</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG I Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td>AC of S, G-3, Vac</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

G. L. MC CORMICK,
ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Recapitulation of troops demobilized during period as reported by 5th MarDiv:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>ENL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) NAGASAKI KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Naval Barracks</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Navy Police-guards on dumps and installations) (Note: Joined this date, 4 Officers, 4 Enlisted).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Personnel</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-combatants) (Note: Joined this date, 11 Enlisted).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Special Attack Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Note: Joined this date, 12 Enlisted).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAWAKAMA Special Attack Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okura Air Base</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZU. AZ Mine Sweeping Det.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) SAGA KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) CITA KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total demobilization during period:</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. FUKUOKA Occupation Force reports having investigated the KOKO KOKU KI KIRO Army training school (1356.4 - 1197.8) Lt. Gen. T. HIRAMATSU and Maj. Gen. T. ISHIDA, both retired, are in charge. The school is not now operating, but plans to open about 1 November. Its function is to teach occupational trades.

3. (a) 2nd MarDiv reports 3046 personnel demobilized from the 126 Independent Mixed Brigade. The 94 remaining personnel are in Brigade Headquarters.
   (b) A list submitted by Capt. MAHAT gives following figures for the AMANA Naval Air Unit as of 17 October, 1945.
Order of Battle.  

---(Continued)---

24 Oct 45

SECRET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>STRENGTH OF BASE PERS.</th>
<th>STRENGTH OF FLOATING PERS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Officers</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Repatriation.

FUKUOKA Occupation Force reports no military personnel repatriated during period. The following are repatriation figures for civilians:

1670 civilians arrived HAKATA 22 Oct. having left FUSAN 21 Oct. on the UNZER MARU. 976 of these went to KOSHU, 568 to KYUSHU, 108 to SHIKOKU. 18 went as patients to SAISIKAI hospital. 9085 civilians arrived HAKATA 21 Oct. having left FUSAN 21 Oct. on the TOKUJU MARU and SC-60, 1677 of these went to KOSHU, 1396 to KYUSHU and 12 to SHIKOKU. On 22 Oct. 4027 Koreans were awaiting transportation home. 2985 arrived that day and 3000 left on the TOKUJU MARU, KAHITA MARU and TAKU MARU. 14106 were waiting at SHIMONOGA on 22 Oct. 407 arrived that day and 1300 left on KOAI MARU 700 more left for other undetermined ports of embarkation.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 2 - SECRET
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 230ct45
To: 1800I, 240ct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,

Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (A&G L571)

A. DE-MOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Army Medical Supply warehouses located approximately 2½ miles NE of OGI contain pills, sakes, and other small medicinal supplies. There is also 1 ton of sodium sulphate in large crocks, and 6 cases containing pint bottles of chloropicrin. Before the war these warehouses were sake mills but since the end of the war they have been used as a collecting point for medical supplies. 10 civilians are presently employed.

Buildings and dumps in the vicinity of YOSHII contain:

780 HKG's.
50 Airplane Gas Tanks.
90 Aircraft Engines.

YAMASUCHI

Dumps and armories contain:

22,164 bayonets.
699 swords.

SECRET
4,924 rifles.  
16 flame throwers.  
30 LMG's.  
31 HMG's.  
4 tanks.  

BOFU  

Dumps at the BOFU Airdrome contain:  

43 13mm AA guns.  
25 20mm AA guns.  
10 500 kg bombs.  
140 250 kg bombs.  
200 100 kg bombs.  
340 50 kg bombs.  
55 30 kg bombs.  
308 15 kg bombs.  
140 50 kg AP bombs.  
101 30 kg AP bombs.  
261 training bombs.  
170 aerial flares.  
2,115 fuze caps.  
92,480 rnds 7.7 ammunition.  
60,340 rnds 12.7 ammunition.  
61,510 rnds 20mm ammunition.  
190 drums volatile oil.  
5 drums mineral oil.  
5 drums castor oil.  
2 tractors.  
5 gas tank trucks.  
2 rollers.  
1 crane cart.  

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.  

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.  

KOREKA A Aircraft Factory located near YUKUHASHI (SE KYUSHU). It began operation 11 February 1945 and ceased operation on 15 August 1945. 1500 people were employed producing 10 planes per month.  

BOFU  

BOFU Airdrome. There is a paved N-3 runway 50 by 1500
meters and a second dirt E-W runway 100 by 1200 meters. There are 81 planes on the field in various stages of disrepair but none of them are operational. For contents of dumps see para. 44.

**KUMAMOTO**

**KUMAMOTO Medical College and Hospital.** There are 900 students. This has been the average enrollment for several years. 90% of the buildings were destroyed during the war and the students are now using adjacent buildings. 100 doctors and 60 nurses are working at this hospital and college.

**NAGASAKI Area**

**TAKA SHIMA and HA SHIMA.** Coal mines controlled by MITSUBISHI Heavy Industries Ltd. are located throughout these islands. Carrier Strike rendered the mines non-operable in August 1945. Former production was 22,000 tons per month at HA SHIMA and 28,000 tons per month at TAKA SHIMA. The Japanese plan to resume normal production by January 1946. 1200 men and women are presently employed clearing rubble and repairing machinery.

(2) **Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.**

None to report.

**C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.**

(1) **Persons apprehended or interned.**

SHIMOGAMA, Masashiro, was taken into custody for questioning concerning the TOKUMU KIKAN.

(2) **Suspects.**

None to report.

(3) **Subversive activities.**

The radio jamming incident at SENZAKI reported in daily summary #33 has been found to be caused by our own forces. A member of the same command net was attempting to join the circuit.

[Page 3]
(4) **Unfriendly organizations.**

Translations of the records of the BEPPU TOKKO KA indicate that the unit was of minor importance. GOTO, Haruyoshi, the former head has been thoroughly questioned. The organization was officially disbanded 14 October 1945. All personnel were discharged and forbidden from any police duty.

The Prefectural Chief of Police and the chief of the TOKKO KA in IYAZAKI Prefecture have been removed from office. Investigation of police stations throughout the prefecture revealed that the members of the TOKKO KA had been released and their work discontinued. The greater part of the records were destroyed on 16 August 1945 in compliance with a directive from the TOKYO office.

(5) **Miscellaneous.**

KUMAMOTO City had approximately 8,000 members in the Imperial Reserve Association. In addition to this number the MITSUBISHI enterprises had a separate chapter of about 2,000 members. Head of the KUMAMOTO city branch is retired Major General HIRAOKA, Kameo. The head of the Imperial Reserve Association in southern KYUSHU is retired Major General MORIYAMA, Sadamu.

The SHIMONOSEKI CIA Detachment has interrogated the prisoners and inspected the records in the prisons at SHIMONOSEKI, WAKAMATSU, and KOKURA. No one was being detained on political grounds or without charge.

**D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.**

No change.

**E. MISCELLANEOUS.**

(1) **PRESS SURVEY.**

Editorials were concerned with the termination of war time finance and the inauguration of a new finance system, and the enforcement of education for self respect. Local news was of the usual variety.

The MAINICHI SHIBUN of 24 October reported: "Damage caused by the recent typhoon to the equipment of the fishing in-
dustries in SAGA was estimated at 3,000,000 Yen. The prefectural authorities are doing their utmost to restore the loss of equipment. However, Mr. NISHI, an engineer with the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, will arrive in SAGA to conduct a detailed investigation."

The SAGA SHIMBUN of 23 October reported: "In response to the requests made by the occupational forces, the SAGA authorities sent out the following notices to its people: (1) Stop using children to beg for cigarettes. It is a disgraceful sight. Offenders will be punished. (2) Leave the bicycles under the eaves instead of on the streets. They are a menace to the traffic. (3) Dolls, clothing, etc. are being sold to the occupational forces at black market prices. Offenders will be severely punished. (4) Remove the air raid shelters immediately. In addition no transactions in American money are to be made, to obey all orders and approach the occupational men courteously."

The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN of 24 October reported: "The war victims, having lost their houses and furniture, were accommodated in the houses previously occupied by OMURA arsenal workers. After making an examination of the area, Mr. KUTAKA, director of the welfare committee, said, 'There are about 2,000 houses that are not being occupied. These houses are purchased by the city of OMURA. The houses are built in two stories with two rooms on each story. These houses are under rental basis with preference given to the war victims of NAGASAKI and SASEBO.'"

G. L. MC CORWIG, Lieutenant Colonel, USMACR.
AC of 3, 3-2.

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**DISTRIBUTION:**

- ComFifthFlt 1
- CG Sixth Army 1
- GIC JICPOA 1
- G3 FMFPAC 1
- Com5thPhib 1
- G3 III Phib Corps 1
- CG I Corps 1
- CG X Corps 1
- CG 2ndMarDiv 10
- CG 5thMarDiv 10

CG 32ndInfDiv 10
MAAG 22 1
CG FBC 1
CO RF 1
NAVTECHJAP 1
U333S TOKYG 1
CO Corps Troops 1
AC to 3, 3-3, VAC 1
Record Section, VAC 1
File 5
ORDER OF BATTLE

25 October 1945.

1. SASEBO Area. The 5th Marine Division reports 69 naval personnel demobilized during the period.

2. NAGASAKI Area. The 2nd Marine Division reports that 2 naval personnel were demobilized during period.

3. YAMAGUCHI Area. The 32nd Infantry Division reports preliminary investigation of the following listed units now on guard duty, in the 126th RCT Zone of Responsibility revealed the following information as regards present strengths:

(1) YOSHIMI-SHIMONOSEKI Naval Defense Force 900
(1394.6-1226.9)
(2) YAMAGUCHI-YAMAGUCHI Naval District Depot 30
(645.2-1236.8)
(3) BOFU-BOFU Naval Warehouse School 276
(654.0-1223.4)
(4) OTSUISHIMA-OTSUSHIMA Shock Corps 113
(669.2-1214.7)
(5) TOKUYAMA-TOKUAMA Naval Defense Force 574
(677.5-1221.9)
(6) OSHIMA-KOZADA Shock Corps 0
(677.5-1215.0)
(7) HIKARI-KURE Naval Engr Sec HIKARI Dispatch 27
(691.0-1212.0)
(8) HIKARI-HIKARI Shock Corps 212
(9) YANAI-Sub School YANAI Branch 145
(708.0-1211.0)
(10) YANAI-HIRAO Shock Corps 108
(11) IWOKUNI-IWOKUNI Naval Air Base 100
(716.0-1234.5)
(12) IWOKUNI-11th Naval Air Factory IWOKUNI Branch 290
Total 2,775

1,254 Japanese guards of the 12th Air Div stationed at the OZUKI Airdrome (600.0-220.7) relieved and completely demobilized at 1000T, 21 October 1945.

4. REPARATION. 2,041 civilians arrived HAKATA-KO 23 Oct having left FUSAN 20 Oct on the TOKUJU MARU. 963 of these went to HOKKAI, 299 stayed in KYUSHU, 199 destined for SHIKOKU. 269 troops and 5 civilians arrived at HAKATA-KO at 1800T 23 Oct on the 56-192. 17 of these went to KURE, 9 remained in FUKUOKA, 249 including 17
medical corpsmen went to the military hospital, FUKUOKA. Two civilians went to HONSHU and 4 stayed in KYUSHU. 191 civilians arrived HAKATA-KO having left FUSAN, Korea 22 Oct on the 3C-49. 110 of these went to HONSHU, 64 stayed in KYUSHU and 17 went to SHIKOKU. 595 civilians and 324 troops arrived at HAKATA-KO 23 Oct having left CHINKAI, Korea 21 Oct on the KOSAI MARU. Troops were disposed as follows: 15 to FUKUOKA, 42 to SAGA, 15 to NAGASAKI, 27 to KUMAMOTO, 15 to OIDA, 10 to KAGOSHIMA, 13 to MIYAZAKI, 37 to HIROSHIMA, 27 to OSAKA, 21 to NAGOYA, 33 to TOKYO, 45 to SENDAI, 11 to HOKKAIDO, and 23 to SHIKOKU. Civilians were disposed as follows: 223 to HONSHU, 331 to KYUSHU, 37 to SHIKOKU and 4 patients. 404 civilians arrived at HAKATA-KO 23 Oct having left FUSAN, Korea 22 Oct on the RISHIN MAR. 230 of these went to HONSHU, 153 stayed in KYUSHU and 21 went to SHIKOKU.
3-2 Periodic Report

From: 1800I, 240ct45
To: 1800I, 250ct45

Hq., V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 26 October 1945.

Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (Air L571)

(A) Order of Battle. (Omitted).
(B) Ordnance Technical Intelligence Report: Attack Mine.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units high on the enemy's list for destruction.

See Enclosure (A) (Omitted).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A) (Omitted).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

OITA Area

SUHITOKO Chemical Manufacturing Company Ltd. manufactured TNT during the war but has since been converted to dye production.

SAGA

DIWA Cotton Spinning Company Ltd., SAJA Mill. The mill has 37,216 spindles, but much of the machinery is old and badly in need of repair. At present the mill is making khaki uniforms to be issued to demobilized soldiers. These suits are more of a utility
garment than a military uniform. The mill is equipped to process any type of narrow cotton goods. This type of work was carried on before the war.

KURUME Area.

Branch of the KOKURA Army Depot (NE of SETAKA) is a well camouflaged installation consisting of many small structures built so as to resemble a residential area. The depot is under the command of Lt. Col. ARIAKE; but Col. SAKAI, who is in charge of all of the Army Supply Depots on the island of KYUSHU, also has his headquarters here. Wartime strength of the depot was 14 officers, 1 warrant officer, 46 NCO's, and 409 men. There are 14 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 50 men on guard there at present.

KOAETAN Factory (near SETAKA) made stamp forgings for the Navy during the war and now plans to make farm machinery. The number of employees has been reduced to 9 from 140.

TETSUKHOJHA Factory (also in the SETAKA Area) is a machine shop employing 20 workers.

TOA Machine Shop at HAINUZUKA made boiler parts during the war. It employed 800 workers, but now makes farm implements with 60% of its wartime help.

ASAHI Machine Shop at HAINUZUKA employed 650 workers in the production of airplane parts. Now there is only a 20 man maintenance crew present.

MICHITSU Detonator Company (Chemical Industry Factory) near TOSU employed 92 workers during the war. At present this factory is not in operation but has 70 employees standing by in anticipation of the plant's re-opening. Present factory stocks include the following 541,471 No. 6 detonator caps (complete); 2,292,300 No. 6 detonator caps (incomplete); 4,201 No. 8 detonator caps (incomplete); 10,500 meters of safety cord fuze, 72,888 No. 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 tunnel detonator caps.

KARATSU Area

MOTOYAMA Coal Mines (8 miles South of KARATSU) produce 150 tons per day and have 740 employees. 600
KOREANS formerly worked there but only 11 are now present. All coal is sent to KARATSU where the Japanese Government Coal Mine Company buys it.

TATSUKAWA Coal Mine (8 miles South of KARATSU) employs 441 miners and produces 100,000 tons yearly. Sixty percent of the coal goes to the Japanese Government Railway, 40% to civilian use and paper mills. The mine is electrically operated, its equipment develops 100 horse power. 300 KOREANS formerly worked there but all have returned to KOREA.

Three Pit Coal Mine, 12 miles Southeast of KARATSU employs 235 miners and have a monthly production of 1500 tons.

OMURA

Abandoned Naval Radio Station located near OMURA was formerly operated by naval personnel but is abandoned at present. The station is built underground and is undamaged. One cave apparently was used to store supplies and spare parts. Another contains a transmitter which appears to be in working condition.

NAGASAKI Area

NOKE Point Submarine Detector Station was inspected and found to be as reported in G-2 Periodic Report No. 34. The equipment is in good condition and the underwater sound detectors are operational. Only 1 Japanese officer is on duty at the station at present. He states that the station was begun in December 1942 and completed by August 1944. It could detect submarines at a range of 25 to 26,000 meters and surface craft at 37,000 meters. The station maintained direct contact with Naval Headquarters in SASEBO, but had no direct communication with any submarines, airplanes, or destroyers in the NAGASAKI Area.

MOJI Area

A 200 ton oil tanker in the harbor is in running condition and all its equipment is in good order. However, it contains no oil in its tanks.

HEREKI Watchhouse contains signal equipment including
searchlights, buoy signal lights, 12cm binoculars on tripods, and an international flash set.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.

None to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

The Imperial Reserve Association (TEIKOKU ZAIGOKU GUN-JIN KAI) in KUMAMOTO Prefecture was headed by Major General HIRAOKA, Kameo (who also headed the KUMAMOTO City branch—See G-2 Periodic Summary No. 33). There were about 80,000 members of this organization in the prefecture. The organization was officially dissolved and all records burned during the latter part of August. There have been no reports of any attempts to revive it.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Investigation reveals that all political prisoners in KUMAMOTO KEN have been released as was ordered.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

Editorials concerned further expansion of people's ideas for a democratic government. Local news was concerned primarily with the establishment of the NAGASAKI Hospital.
the discontinuance of military education, and items on
traffic and food conditions. The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of
25 October reported; "At the meeting of the high school
principals within SASEBO City, to be held at the 2nd
High School on the 28th at 1:00 PM, plans will be
discussed as to the discontinuance of militaristic saluting,
weakening of leggings, and walking double file in the city."

A civilian hospital was erected at the former site of
the NAGASAKI Evacuation Center in TOKIWA MACHI, NAGASAKI
City. Beginning 25 October patients will be accepted.
Professor TOKAO will be installed as the director of the
hospital, Professor HOSHINO and others will conduct
medical examinations. There are approximately 200 beds,
medical instruments and the medicine are provided by the
occupation force. The hospital was named the NAGASAKI
Hospital', but it will be known to the occupation forces
as Blair General Hospital.

The SAGA SHIMBUN of 25 October reported; "Music presentation
was given to the citizens by the SAGA occupation force's
brass band. On October 24 at 3:00 PM the band paraded
through the streets from the headquarters to the municipal
building and gave a concert for 30 minutes to the delight
of young and old."

G. L. MC FARRICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMACR,
AC of 3, G-2.

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ORDNANCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ATTACK MINE

References:
(a) Diagram of Attack mine.
(b) 7 Photographs of Attack mine (Sixth Army only).

1. Physical Characteristics: This mine was first found at the Naval Ammunition Storage Area at NASEBO. It is an anti-tank mine cut out due to the light pull required to fire the fuze it could be employed as an anti-personnel mine. It has an overall color of flat black. The case is of pressed sheet steel (16 ga.). The mine is hemispherical, 3\(^{1/4}\)" tall and 6\(1/4\)" in diameter. The case is of pressed steel (16 ga.) with a 3 3/8" hemispherical cavity welded to the bottom plate. The bottom is fastened to the mine by four lag screws. These screws also fasten the wire "stability frame" to the mine. This wire frame will cause the explosive to position itself correctly by rolling it to the bottom so the cavity is pointing upward. The fuze seat is of turned steel 3\(1/4\)" in diameter and 1/8" thick. From one side of this piece a tube extends 3/4" - this receives the fuze. The center of the fuze seat on the inside of the case is a well into which is screwed (L.H.) the detonator. Above the detonator inside the fuze seat is a pellet of black powder to insure igniting the detonator. The fuze seat is fastened to the mine case by four lag screws.

The mine weighs 9.45 pounds and contains 5.5 pounds of picric acid.

2. Use: This mine was to be used as a hand placed charge. It has two fuzes, one with a white pull cord indicating a delay of approximately three seconds, and one with a red pull cord indicating a delay of one second. When a moving tank approached the mine was to be thrown underneath the body of the tank after the fuze was fired. On a stationary tank the mine was to be placed in the tank's lower portions and fired. This mine could undoubtedly penetrate the bottom of the tank and would cause casualties to the personnel inside.

3. Packaging: The mine is packed in a wooden box which holds four mines and eight fuzes. The fuzes are in a smaller wooden box surrounded by soft felt to protect them from shock.

4. Functioning: The fuze is a tube 2" long and 5/16" in diameter. At the top is a reiced, knurled section 1/4" long and just
below this is a threaded (R.H.) portion used to seat the fuze in the mine. The safety pin is inserted through the knurled portion of the fuze body and through the striker release pin. The striker is connected to the release pin by a notch and held backward by the force of the compressed spring which is trying to drive the striker into the percussion cap. Below the striker is a percussion cap which ignites the delay train. The lower portion of the fuze containing the percussion cap and delay is connected to the upper part of the body by internal threads.

5. Functioning: To fire the fuze a pull of from five to six pounds withdraws the release pin from the fuze body, releasing the striker which hits the percussion cap and ignites the delay train. When the delay burns through it flashes into the pellet of black powder just over the detonator. This pellet fires the detonator, which fires the booster of tetryl, and the booster fires the main charge. The two fuzes can be distinguished by their external markings. The three second delay has a white pull cord and a plain body while the one second delay has a red pull cord and a red strip painted over the delay at the base of the fuze.

Reported by Military Division, NAVTECHJAP.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

Diagram of a fuze section showing:
- Detonator
- Tetral Booster
- Fuse Seat
- Pellet of Black Powder
- Fuse Seat Tube
- Release Pin
- Fuze Body
- Striker
- Striker Spring
- Percussion Cap

Scale 3/4" - 1"

Section of Fuze

Scale 3" - 1"
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT
From: 1800I, 25Oct45
To: 1800I, 26Oct45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KUSHU

No. 35.

0800, 27 October 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AM$ L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(C) Plan of Air-Defense in NAGASAKI Prefecture.

B. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

Major General HAYASHI, Mahoto, CG TAIDEN Area (KOREA) who was responsible for the defense and the maintenance of TAIDEN, expressed a belief that JAPAN should and would follow a democratic trend in the future. He feels that militarism will disappear because the people will not tolerate its existence. HAYASHI has just recently returned from KOREA to be repatriated.

Major General KOMATSU, Yasutaka, CG SESHU Area (General KOREA), expressed a belief that there will be no future disagreements between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES and also that JAPAN would not be able to stand another war. KOMATSU has just recently returned from KOREA to be repatriated.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

In an area located approximately 9 miles SE of YAKATSU the following equipment and ordnance is located:

- 2 dynamotors
- 2 searchlights
- 2 rocket launchers
- 4 12 cm guns w/o breach blocks.
B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

TOBATA

KYUSHU Steel Plant produces manila rope, and has a daily productive capacity of 1800 pounds. The present daily production is 1500 pounds. 4000 pounds of hemp are on hand. During the war there were 34 employees as compared to 40 at present.

WAKAMATSU

The NIKEN Liquid Fuel Company produced semi-coke, motor gasoline, semi-diesel oil, fuel oil, pitch and crude cresol. The plant ceased operation 8 August 1945 due to damage caused by bombing. Tentative plans are to resume operations in 30 days. Fast employee strength or contemplated future strength is unknown.

USA

USA Leval Air Base. It has 1 good N-S runway 60 by 1800 meters. The other runways are damaged. The following damaged aircraft are at the field:

- 27 fighters.
- 14 bombers.
- 25 torpedo bombers.
- 46 trainers.

SAGA

SAGA Railroad Station has 1 railroad, 3 loading platforms, 1 switch control shack, and 1 telephone switchboard.

TOKANI Electric Works during the war produced voltmeters, transformers of all sizes, storage batteries, relay boxes, switches, wing assemblies for Navy planes, AA shell casings, mortar shells, fins, and fuses. This company is presently making electric hair clippers and small electrical appliances. 2,000 people were employed during the war and at present there are 400. There are 2 branch offices in TOKYO.
SAEKI

SAEKI Naval Base. In addition to the 7 midget submarines reported in Periodic Report No. 23, Enclosure (8), there are 3 torpedo boats. The following general data was obtained from Japanese sources:

- **Length**: 32 feet
- **Beam**: 14 feet
- **Weight**: 15 tons (approx.)
- **Speed**: 4 knots (one speed only)
- **Range**: 9,000 meters
- **Armorment**: 2 torpedoes of 1 ton each.

This boat is operated by a 2 man crew and propelled by compressed air in 4 tanks aft. No radio or control equipment is incorporated in this boat. Originally 20 such boats were constructed at the KURE Naval Base, 14 of them were sent to SAEKI and the other 6 were destroyed in bombings at KURE. Of the 14 sent to SAEKI, 11 were sunk in the harbor and the remaining 3 are partly dismantled on the dock. Another type torpedo boat has been located and the following data was obtained from Japanese sources:

- **Top speed**: 23 knots
- **Cruising speed**: 18 knots
- **Range at top speed**: 200 miles
- **Range at cruising speed**: 350 miles
- **Crew**: 6 men including 1 officer
- **Length**: 20 meters
- **Weight**: 20 tons
- **Height**: 5 meters
- **Fuel capacity**: 5 tons
- **Power**: 2 airplane units
- **Armorment**: 1 30mm gun (under investigation)
  - 6 depth charges
  - 2 3000 pound torpedoes.

2 of the above model boats boats at SAEKI are in fair condition and the crews are still in the area. 2 others have been sunk in the harbor.

**CITa Area**

The 2 airstrips near MIL (previously reported in Periodic
Reports #30 and 32) are camouflaged with hedgerow strips which make the fields resemble rice paddies. There are several hundred trees which can be moved onto the airstrips very quickly. In the same vicinity there are 3 dummy bamboo aircraft. Underground fuel and oil dumps are located in this area and all buildings on the grounds were built to resemble farm buildings.

SHIBAMURA

SHIBAMURA Railway Company Inc. This company absorbed the KUCHIOTSU Railway Company in 1945. Equipment consists of 10 locomotives, 75 freight cars, 47 passenger cars, and 10 gasoline cars. All of this equipment is in poor condition but future plans are to purchase new engines and several passenger cars. There is one trunk line running from ISAHARA to KAUSA, a distance of 78 kilometers. Future plans are to install new track from ISAHARA to AIKO. The company operates a bus line between OBAHA and KUCHIOTSU, each bus having a capacity of 27 passengers. The company also operates a 43-ton boat running between KUCHIOTSU and ISAKUSA carrying 100 passengers. There were 674 employees as of 30 September 1945.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None

(2) Suspects.

None

(3) Subversive activities.

None

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

Black Dragon Society. According to SHIMOYAMA, Hisakiro a suspect interned for questioning regarding the TOKUJU KIKUN, the Black Dragon Society was organized at least 50 years ago as a small political party numbering some 10,000 members. Most of the members were from FUKUSA Prefecture during the period between 1920 to 1925 when UCHIDA, Ryoake was the leader. TOKANA, Mitsuro is said.
to have been the power behind the society during the UCHIDA term. SHINGOGAMA stated that it was not a secret society and the members did not try to hide their affiliation with it. Though small, it was a rather powerful political party as it had influence in high places. It used terrorism to promote its political views and aims but threats were its principal weapon rather than actual violence. The society favored the empire form of government, a more strict control of the general populace, restricting the franchise to male heads of families only, and the defeat of communism. Further details concerning this interrogation have been forwarded to Sixth Army through CIC channels.

TOKKO KA. All members of the TOKKO KA in SASEBO, ATTOURA and HAKI have been dismissed. However, the members are being carried on the payrolls in a sort of unemployment compensation status. The SASEBO Chief of Police states that all TOKKO KA records were destroyed in the fire bomb raid 29 June 1945. He states that from that date to the end of the war, 3 or 4 air raid alarms were sounded daily.

(5) Miscellaneous.

KOSEKAI (KOREAN Welfare Association) All Koreans employed by the MITSUBISHI Dockyards were required to belong to the KOSEKAI. The company paid each individual's dues of 2 yen per year and most of them were unaware that they were members. The personnel officer in charge of Korean labor at the yards stated that as far as he knew, KOSEKAI did nothing for the benefit or welfare of the Koreans. They were treated the same as conscripted Japanese laborers but lived in separate barracks. Since the war ended, all but 64 have returned to KOREA. They were not forced to leave, but none of them chose to stay in JAPAN.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

Editorials were confined to the food problems of JAPAN. The national news was concerned with the statement of General YAMASHITA that he is innocent of war crimes. Cf
possible significance is the proposed NAGASAKI Atomic memorial mentioned below.

The NAGASAKI SHINBUN dated 20 October 1945 reported: "As announced previously, Mayor KURITA of SASEBO tendered his resignation... and notified the governor accordingly. In the meantime, the governor sent the resignation to the Minister of the Interior... Until investigation is completed, SASEBO will be without a Mayor."

"In memory of the victims and to remind the future generations of the value of the atomic bomb in restoring world peace, the city of NAGASAKI is planning to build a memorial tower with the fund of 250,000 yen by the late Mr. KUSABE, Tomisaburo and donations from the people. The intention of Mayor OKADA, who is sponsoring this project, is to make this town sacred with the souls of victims and make this memorial one of the famous sights of NAGASAKI. As for the upkeep of this tower, it is planned to charge admission and sell post cards."

"Due to the shortage of sweet potatoes in the city of NAGASAKI, seven ships were sent to the Island of IKI. The first of these, "FUCHIGETSU MARU" returned on the 24th with 12,000 kens (approximately 480 tons) of sweet potatoes."

"220 students of ISAHAYA Farming School forwarded three requests to the school authorities and suddenly refused to attend school on October 20. At first the students gathered at Mt. Chausu and they seemed very disorderly, refusing to conform with the school authorities. However, on October 25 they decided to hear the principal's explanation and in a conference, the students' delegates realized their error and apologized for their conduct. They agreed to attend the school starting October 26."

(2) SASEBO Naval Prison.

An investigation of this prison was made, and the warden, Lt. NAKA, Seiichi, was questioned. He states that prior to 5 October 1945 he received an order to free all political prisoners. In compliance with this directive he freed 13 Koreans and 1 Japanese. Of this number, all returned to their homes except 6 Koreans who were retained by the warden on the pretext that transportation to KOHAI would be provided for them in a few days. Upon the advise of an American Medical officer, these 6 men were placed in the SASEBO KOHAI KAI (former Naval Hospital) for temporary treatment."
These 6 Koreans were interrogated and it was learned that they had been taken in KORIA, mostly on the all-inclusive charge of violation of the rules of good order. After preliminary beating by regular police who took them into custody, they were turned over to the KEMPII TAI whose method of interrogation was to tie the prisoner to the ceiling with his arms above his head and his toes barely touching the floor. They were then beaten with clubs, rifle bolts, and leather slippers. At other times they were forced to assume the "Push-up position" and then they were beat about the head, back, buttocks, and legs with a 6 foot pole. They were given a Court Martial in KORIA but no defense by, for, or on their behalf, was provided or permitted. After sentencing of from 1 to 3 years of hard labor they were sent to SAMCHO for imprisonment. Here they were forced to sit in the Japanese manner and if any of them moved from this position it was considered reason for another beating. These 6 Koreans all report that Lt. YABANAKA told them that although the Japanese had lost the war, JAPAN would one day regain her military strength.

(3) Enclosure (B) is a more detailed report of the Chinese Nationals in the VAC Area as reported by dispatch 311322/1 in answer to Sixth Army TX 40717.

(4) Enclosure (C) is a translation of a document titled "Plan of Air-Defense in NAGASAKI Prefecture". The document is classified SECRET, dated 14 January 1944, and was found in the former Kevel Inspectorate office at the NAGASAKI Shipyards controlled by MITSUBISHI.

G. L. MC GORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCGR
AC of S, G-2.

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CG FBC 1
CG KOF 1
NAVTECHJAP 1
USSBs TOKYO 1
CG Corps Troops 1
AC of S, G-3, VAC 1
Record Section, VAC 1
FILE 5
ORDER OF BATTLE

1. SASEBO AREA. The 5th MarDiv reports 133 naval personnel demobilized during period 24/25 October.

   The 5th MarDiv reports following personnel demobilized during period: 25/26 October.

   NAGASAKI KEN: .........10
   OKINAWA KEN: .........29
   GIURA AIR FORCE: .......2
   Army: ................17

   The 2nd MarDiv reports 12 Army personnel demobilized.

2. KOCHI AREA. 24/25 October. The 5th MarDiv reports the KOKURA Army Depot located NE of SAKATA, 20 LtCol ARAIKE, actual in strength 470, present strength 65. Col SAKAI 30 all Army supply depots on KYUSHU has his headquarters here.

3. AMERICAN OCCUPATION. 32nd Inf Div reports.

   A. CIVILIAN POPULATION: 2398 civilians arrived at HAKATA-KO 23 Oct having left FUSAN, KORI 25 Oct on the TOKUJU. 959 of these went to KOSHI, 1286 remained in KYUSHU, and 153 are destined for SHIKOKU. 1329 civilians arrived at HAKATA-KO 25 Oct having left FUSAN, KORI 24 Oct on the KOGANE MARU. 643 of these went to KOSHI, 578 remained in KYUSHU, and 105 are destined for SHIKOKU. 643 civilians arrived at HAKATA-KO 25 Oct having left FUSAN, KORI 24 Oct on the LII MARU. 453 of these went to KOSHI, 343 remained in KYUSHU, 21 are destined for SHIKOKU, and 17 were patients for hospitalization at FUKOKA. 198 civilians arrived at HAKATA-KO 25 Oct having left FUSAN, KORI 24 Oct on the TAISEI MARU. 117 of these went to KOSHI, 47 remained in KYUSHU, and 34 are destined for SHIKOKU. 13 civilians arrived at HAKATA-KO 25 Oct having left TAI MARU, KORI 24 Oct on the SHIMATSU MARU and returned to their homes on KYUSHU. 273 civilians arrived at HAKATA-KO 25 Oct having left TAI MARU, KORI 24 Oct on the SAI MARU. 156 of these went to TAI MARU, 102 remained in KYUSHU, and 15 are destined for SHIKOKU. 23 boxes of first class mail and 43 boxes of 2nd class parcels were impounded for censorship from this ship. 1230 civilians arrived at HAKATA-KO 25 Oct having left FUSAN, TAI 24 Oct on the HANAYA MARU. 646 went to KOSHI, 501 remained in KYUSHU, and 83 are destined for SHIKOKU.

   At present there are 5579 Koreans in FUKOKA awaiting transportation home. Of these, 1408 Koreans arrived during the period covered by this report, while 4640 Koreans were shipped home aboard the SHITAN MARU.

ENCLOSURE (A)
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

27 October 1945.

Subject: Chinese Nationals in V Amphibious Corps Area of Responsibility.

1. Information obtained by the Kyushu General Government and verified by this office insofar as is possible indicates there are 7298 Chinese Nationals in the V Amphibious Corps area of responsibility.

2. Chinese Nationals may be divided into two classes:

(a) Those who came to Japan and established businesses or intermarried with Japanese. Of these there are approximately 1736

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<td>Fukuoka Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remainder Kyushu</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi Area</td>
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To obtain their origin in China would require a detailed survey. However, it is believed that less than 5% would want to return to China in the next six (6) months.

(b) Chinese Prisoners of War and laborers, all of whom want to return to China immediately. There are an estimated 5562 of these.

3. The breakdown of Chinese Prisoners of War and laborers is given on the following page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner's or Mine's Name</th>
<th>Japanese Camp Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Origin in China</th>
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<td>Unai-Machi Fukuoka Ken</td>
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<td>C. Kaijima Mine at Choura</td>
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<td>Kiyata-Machi Fukuoka Ken</td>
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<td>E. Central Mine of Mittetsu</td>
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<td>G. Mitsubishi's Izuka Mine</td>
<td>Mitsubishi Izuka</td>
<td>Izuka Fukuoka Ken</td>
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<td>I. Mitsui's Mine at Tagawa</td>
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<td>K. Mitsui Mine of Mike &amp; Miyaura</td>
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<td>M. R.R. Mining Co.</td>
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<td>N. Mitsui's Mine at Manda</td>
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*was a Chinese Camp. Not known whether any Chinese now there.*

TOTAL 5582
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET


Subject: Plan of Air-Defense in NAGASAKI PREFECTURE.

1. The Governor especially appointed the following mayors and village headmen to head air-defense committees:

   A. Mayors of NAGASAKI, SASANNO, OMURA, Shimazakura, ISAHAYA.

   B. Village headmen of SUKITO, KAWATAKA, SEGAWA, TAKASHIMA, TAKAHAMA, KOKAI.

The above mayors and village headmen must set up the defense plan for the year and must have the permission of the Prefectural Governor.

2. Air defense equipment is to be completely set up this year in cities and villages in the following order:

   A. SASANNO, NAGASAKI.

   B. OMURA, KAWATAKA, ISAHAYA, SUKITO, SEGAWA, TAKASHIMA, TAKAHAMA.

3. The heads of the police stations and fire brigade stations are to take into account loss of their members, and along with ensuring the necessary replenishment of personnel, as auxiliary air-raid personnel.

4. The areas in which air-raid training is to be carried out, in order of importance, are as follows:

   A. NAGASAKI, SASANNO.

   B. OMURA, KAWATAKA, ISAHAYA, SUKITO, SEGAWA, TAKASHIMA, TAKAHAMA, FUKUE, TOMI.

5. This year new air-defense observation stations will be established at KOI and KANADAKE.

6. The School Patriotic Societies of NAGASAKI Medical University and KASSUI Women's College are exempted from air-defense drafts, they will constitute rescue details.

7. Under orders of the Chief of Police, the head of the Police Station must order food and goods distributed to sufferers out, in NAGASAKI and SASANNO, mayors are responsible.
Subject: Plan of Air-Defense in NAGASAKI PREFECTURE (Cont'd)

8. Without Special authorized permission, nobody will be allowed to move into NAGASAKI or SASEBO.

9. This year, emphasis with respect to air-defense will be laid on the harbors of NAGASAKI, AIMOURA, and SAKITO.

10. Air-defense measures this year will be concentrated on Army and Navy controlled factories, and defense with respect to these factories will be strengthened.
027/130
Ser.C010132

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 18001, 26Oct45
To: 18001, 27Oct45

SECRET

HQ, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU

O800, 28 October, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO Area

URESIFU Naval Hospital is growing penicillin in three small jars. The doctors state that this is the only source the hospital has and that they use it in solution for external wounds only.

OITA Area

Rocket installations from the aircraft carrier KAYO (Previously reported in G-2 Periodic Summary No. 25) were inspected and found to consist of 2 disassembled rocket launchers, each consisting of 6 triple mounted tubes on a 25 mm gun base. The KAYO is off the coast near FUKAS at present.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 36. (Continued)

OMURA Area

OMURA Work Relief Association has been organized to relieve unemployment among laborers formerly employed at the OMURA Naval Aircraft Works. This organization plans to establish a civilian enterprise using the equipment and buildings belonging to the MIZUSUKARI Factory (see G-2 Periodic Report No. 22). They plan to employ 200 or more men and to engage in woodcutting, the manufacturing of wooden furniture, farm tools and kitchen utensils, and the repairing of electrical machines and instruments. Capital will probably be transferred from the OMURA Naval Aircraft Works. This association is also considering the manufacture of motorcycles, refrigerators, and duraluminum railroad cars.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.

None reported.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKUMU KIKAI. Further interrogation of SHIMOGAIA, Haseashiro (see G-2 Periodic Report No. 35) reveals that he was agricultural expert for TOKUMU KIKAI in HANKOU, CHINA during the years 1933 and 1939. He stated that at that time this organization was attached to both the army and the navy. Sections with the army were attached to the KIAITUNG Army and the North, Central, and South CHINA Expeditionary Armies. The TOKUMU KIKAI Headquarters in CHINA was divided into an administrative and clerical section, an intelligence
section, and a propaganda section. The Naval TÖKU MU
NIKA, was organized in such way except that
its specific job was to obtain intelligence on shipping
and commerce. Thus it was concerned chiefly with the
coastal, harbor, and river areas of CHINA and did not
penetrate very far inland. Both the army and navy
branches received their orders from and sent all
information to the Political and Economic Bureau
under Prince KOKOZYE during the informant's tour of
duty.

(5) miscellaneous.

CIC reports that all political prisoners at NAMTSU
and KUMA were released late in August. CIC has been
unable to find any of these people for interrogation.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

Editorials stated that the economic plan of Japan must
be decided at once. National news was concerned with
Admiral MAGANO's statement that he is responsible for the
Pearl Harbor attack. Local news was of the usual variety.

The NAGASAKI SHINBUN of 27 October reported, "The special
investigating committee under the direction of the
Education Ministry which arrived in NAGASAKI during the latter
part of September to survey the Atomic bomb casualties,
completed its assignment. This committee surveyed not only
the medical situation but also the conditions concerning
physics, geology, biology, buildings, machinery, farming,
fishing, forestry, animals and telecommunications. In the future the committee will continue its investigation."

It is planned to use twenty-one airfield buildings in
NAGASAKI, which were used as motor repairing shops during
the war, for the manufacture of machinery, electrical
supplies, stoves, farming implements and household
necessities. Auto repairing and printing are also
included in this plan. 2,000 employees of these shops
were left jobless at the termination of the war and it is
planned to use these employees in manufacturing needed
articles."
The SAGA SHIM-SUN of 27 October reported: "Beginning with
Mayor NACKATA, 14 officials of the city, county and
villages resigned as a result of the termination of the war.
Many of them resigned for the best interest of the new
form of government. It is believed that many other
officials will follow this step." (This article
portrays to FUKUOKA)

(2) Destruction of documents by the Japanese.

Captain SADOHARA, Chikamitsu, (Commanding officer of the
OIWA Naval Air Base) states that all secret documents
(including those held by individuals) were burned during
the period 18 - 20 August on orders from the Navy Minister,
the CO of the 5th Air Fleet and the Naval District CO.
SADOHARA states that he does not remember the contents or
dates of these orders as they also were burned.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC,
AC of S, G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2  
FLEET POST OFFICE, San Francisco

SECRET  
28 October, 1945

ORDER OF battle

1. The 5th MarDiv reports 68 naval personnel demobilized during period.

CB Changes.

The following changes should be made to VAC Demobilization Reports where-ever these units appear:

SHIMOCSET I Fortress

354th Garrison Bn  to  254th Garrison Bn  
355th "  "  to  255th "  "  
356th "  "  to  256th "  "  
357th "  "  to  257th "  "

LAI Fortress

318th Garrison Co.  to  218th Garrison Co.

REF: TRIATIC

1st InfDiv reports that during period 24/25 Oct 45 301 troops of 1st RCT Guard Detachment and 8 civilians left ISHIGAKI Island 20 Oct on the coast defense ship #59, arriving at HAKATA-KO 24 Oct. The troops were sent to URESHIMA Naval Hospital at SASSEBO for hospitalization and the civilians were returned to their homes throughout KYUSHU. 280 Naval patients, previously reported as arriving HAKATA on 24 Oct, and 21 Medical men departed HAKATA by rail at 0645 25 Oct for URESHIMA Naval Hospital at SASSEBO.

255 troops from the CHINKAI Naval Barracks arrived at HAKATA-KO 24 Oct, having left CHINKAI, Korea 23 Oct on DD HAKU. Destinations of troops as follows: 32 to FUKUOKA, 10 to SAGA, 14 to NAGASAKI, 15 to KUMAMOTO, 9 to CITA, 10 to HIYAZAKI, 19 to KAGOSHIMA, 32 to HIROSHIMA, 30 to OSAKA, 22 to NAGOYA, 9 to TOKYO, 8 to SEKAI, and 48 to YOKOHAMA. For period 26/27 Oct 45 207 civilians arrived HAKATA-KO 26 Oct having left FUSAI 25 Oct, on the CH #49. 1508 civilians arrived HAKATA-KO 26 Oct having left FUSAI 25 Oct on the TAIHEI MARU. 1003 civilians arrived HAKATA-KO 26 Oct having left FUSAI 24 Oct on the TAIHEI MARU. 247 civilians arrived HAKATA-KO 26 Oct having left FUSAI 19 Oct on the YOKOHAMA MARU. 210 civilians arrived HAKATA-KO 26 Oct having left FUSAI 25 Oct on CH #60. 152 civilians arrived HAKATA-KO 26 Oct having left FUSAI 24 Oct on the TAIHEI MARU. 350 civilians arrived at MOJI Harbor 26 Oct having left FUSAI 24 Oct on the HAKSEI MARU.

ECL. CLOSURE (A) - I - SICRET

732
Order of Battle. (Continued) 28 Oct 45

SECRET

5th MarDiv reports as of 1600 27 Oct 257 Army officers and 6,195 troops from KOREA and SAISHU SHIMA have debarked at URAGASHIRO, been processed, and sent to HARIO Barracks. 50 officers and 155 men have been discharged from HARIO demobilization center.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 18001, 27Oct45
To: 18001, 28Oct45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 29 October 1945.

No. 37.

Map: Central JAPAN l:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEOMILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

MAJASAKI

HISAKANI Shipyard operated by MITSUBISHI. During the war 37 shore guard craft were constructed, each with an 80 ton displacement and a length of 65 meters. In March, 1945, the yards ceased construction of these craft and began making submarines of the 8 man crew type. Work was started on 50 such vessels but only 3 had been completed by 15 August 1945 when all construction ceased. At present there are about 30 tons of raw steel in the yard. There were 710 employees during the war but at present none are employed.

FUJUKA

MITSUBISHI Electric Company produced flashlights during
the war. It is presently retooling to manufacture electric motors and mining implements. There are 3 buildings containing approximately 100 lathes in cosmol ine, 30 table drill presses, and 12 large machines which were not identified. Supplies belonging to the 52nd Infantry Regiment are located in 3 other buildings. The supplies consist of barbed wire, matches, clothing, shovels, lanterns, mule harness, etc. There are 3 civilian guards for these supplies. During the war the plant employed 150 men and 700 students. At present 150 men are being employed.

NIPPO Iron Works. During the war this plant processed metals but is now producing salt and gravel. Past and present employment figures were not available but will be submitted as obtained.

NAEDA Glider Factory is a branch of the NAEDA KOKEN Company previously reported. In a large building there are glider skeletons and wings, a few of which are crated. 2 civilian guards are posted at the factory.

TAGAWA

TAGAWA Coal Mine #5 is located at TAGAWA (a Japanese name for a combination of the cities of GOTOJO and IDA). Investigation disclosed 21 boxes packed for shipment which included US rations, US field glasses, rice, and equipment. These boxes were addressed to relatives of Japanese soldiers.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

SAKAHOTO, Yuhichi. (See G-2 Periodic Report #31 para E.2). This subject is being held in protective custody by the Provost Marshal in FUKUOKA. POW Camp #9 in FUKUOKA was the last camp of which he was commandant SAKAHOTO admitted that he slapped and kicked prisoners who, he stated, had been guilty of stealing. A complete report of the investigation and disposition of this subject will be submitted to Sixth Army through CIC channels.

(2) Suspects.

None to report.
(3) Subversive activities.
None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKUMU KIKAN. This information supplements that reported in G-2 Periodic Report #36 and comes from the same source, SHIMOGAMA, Naeshiro. He states that the mission of Army TOKUMU KIKAN was to assume full control of the civil administration, economy, agriculture, finance, press, radio, and public utilities of occupied territories and to obtain the full cooperation of the populace in establishing a complete new order, beneficial to themselves and to the Japanese.

(5) Miscellaneous.

MITSUBISHI Probation Farm School. Interrogation of SHIMOGAMA, Naeshiro, from whom information has been received regarding the Black Dragon Society and the TOKUMU KIKAN (see para. C4), submits the following information on a Probation Farm School operated by the MITSUBISHI Heavy Industries Company Ltd. SHIMOGAMA stated that from April to August of this year he was principal of this Probation Farm School to which were sent employees of the MITSUBISHI Heavy Industries Company Ltd. Only conscripted Japanese laborers were sent to the school, and no Koreans were among them. The term lasted for 30 days and consisted of ordinary farm work in the afternoon and lectures on the Japanese spirit in the morning and evening. Students were of two types: workers in need of physical strengthening, and reluctant workers or slackers. Failure to pass the course meant a prison sentence and successful completion of the course meant a return to their jobs with MITSUBISHI. There was a similar school at TAGAMI in NAGASAKI Prefecture for employees of the KAMAMINAMI Shipyards. Both schools have now been abolished by law. Further details have been forwarded to Sixth Army through CIC channels.

SAEBO agents report that investigation revealed that all civilian users of dynamite have either completely exhausted their supply or turned it over to the SAEBO Police station. Most stores of dynamite in the SAEBO area had been procured from TANAKA KAISHA. TANAKA claims that before withdrawing any dynamite from his
warehouse he must obtain permission from military
government authorities and the SASEBO Police.

In compliance with VAC dispatch 191729/I, directing
confiscation of negotiable assets and documents sus-pected or known to belong to the NAZI Party and now in the
hands of German Nationals, the FUKUOKA CIC Detachments
report no German Nationals living in SHIKONOSUKI. A
similar investigation is being made in UBE, NOJI, and
YAMAGUCHI.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

Editorials were concerned with the freedom of religion for
Japan and the changes of district officials. National
news stated that General MacArthur was to leave for home
soon. Local news was of the usual variety.

The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 28 October reported: "The prin-
ciples of all the middle schools in the city of NAGASAKI
met on the 27th to discuss various matters pertaining to
the new system of education as the result of the termina-
tion of the war. Some of the discussions were: (1) to pro-
mote ideal education. (2) Scientific education to be taught
at specified schools. (3) To change the teaching personnel
so only those with democratic and peace loving ideals can
teach in the schools."

The SAGA SHIMBUN of 28 October reported: "The headquarters
of the NOJI RR Food Production Department is planning the
erection of 'Great KOKUTETSU Farm Garden' in the city of
BEPPU using the JYUKOUNJI Plain and the old parade grounds
for wheat, sweet potatoes, and vegetable production."

The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN of 28 October reported: "The review
bureau of the YAME area in FUKUOKA Prefecture has adopted
the following principles for women's clubs as the first
step towards reconstruction: (1) People without love are
blind. (2) Community without perspiration is corrupt.
(3) Establish service policy. (4) Debut of Japan's beauty
and good Japanese. (5) Develop culture and develop physi-
cally. (6) Increase efficiency, advance science."
G-2 Periodic Report No. 37.  (Continued)

SECRET

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, CR
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

29. October 1945.

1. Demobilization. 5th Mar Div reports 14 Naval Personnel demobilized during period. 2nd Mar Div reports 2 demobilized, 12 remain at 13AHAYA Branch, NAGAZAKI MP Co.

2. KUKAMOTO Division. The 2nd Mar Div reports the following information obtained by Interrogation of Lt Gen TSUCHIBASHI and Maj YOSHITAKE. They consider the information reliable.

   a) The 6th Inf Div, also known as the KUKAMOTO Div, was formerly stationed in KUKAMOTO Prefecture. In 1936 it moved to CHINA where it participated in hostilities at HANG-CHOU (HANKOW). In 1942, the division moved to BOUGAINVILLE; the CG at this time was Lt Gen. KANDA.

   b) When the 6th Inf Div left JAPAN, the 6th Depot Div (KUKAMOTO HUSU DAI ROKU SHIDAI) was formed. Its composition was as follows:

      13th Inf Regt Repl Unit (RENTAI HOJUTAI)  KUKAMOTO
      14th Inf Regt Repl Unit (RENTAI HOJUTAI)  KAGOSHIMA
      23rd Inf Regt Repl Unit (RENTAI HOJUTAI)  MIYAKONOJO
      6th Arty Regt Repl Unit                     KUKAMOTO
      6th Engrs Regt Repl Unit                    KUKAMOTO
      6th Tpt Regt Repl Unit                      KUKAMOTO
      6th Sig Regt Repl Unit                      KUKAMOTO

      The mission of the 6th Depot Division was to supply and to train and furnish replacements to other Army units; it was never a tactic unit; its last CG, Lt Gen. KAYASHIta is now mayor of MIYAZAKI City.

   c) On 1 April, 1945 the 6th Depot Division was abolished and the KUKAMOTO Divisional District (KUKAMOTO SHIYAMUKU) was formed. Lt Gen. TSUCHIBASHI was recalled from two years of retirement to command it; its mission and composition were essentially the same as the 6th Depot Division as the following indicates:

      Divisional District Hq
      1st Inf Regt Repl Unit
      KUKAMOTO Regt Hq and KUKAMOTO Dist Hq
      2nd Inf Regt Repl Unit
      MIYAZAKI Regt Hq and MIYAZAKI Dist Hq
      3rd Inf Regt Repl Unit
      KAGOSHIMA Regt Hq and KAGOSHIMA Dist Hq
      OITA Regt Hq and OITA Dist Hq
      Arty Regt Repl Unit

      KUKAMOTO City
      KUKAMOTO City
      KUKAMOTO City
      MIYAKONOJO City
      MIYAZAKI City
      MIYAZAKI City
      KAGOSHIMA City
      OITA City
      KUKAMOTO City

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1.
Order of Battle. (Continued) 29Oct45

SECRET

Engrs Regt Repl Unit               KUMAMOTO City
Sig Co Repl Unit                   KUMAMOTO City
Tpt Regt Repl Unit                 KUMAMOTO City

It should be noted there is no cavalry or reconnaissance regiment. The regimental headquarters and the district headquarters (in actual fact combined units) mobilized the personnel and did the administrative work, while the replacement units did the training. The 6th Depot Division had no combat mission; in the event of invasion, its mission was the supply and replacement for tactical units in the area.

d) The 216th Inf Div arrived in KUMAMOTO in June, 1945; it was considered an area reserve under direct control of the 16th Area Army. The KUMAMOTO Division furnished parts of its supplies, but this was their only relationship.


Sub depot Hq
SHICHOJO*                     TOSU, MIYAKI-JUN, SAGA KEN
SHICHOJO                      MOJI City
SHICHOJO                      FUKUOKA City
SHICHOJO                      Vicinity IIIZUKA City
SHICHOJO                      OITA City
Perm Detach.                  KUMAMOTO City
Perm Detach.                  KARATSU City
Perm Detach.                  KURUME City
Perm Detach.                  HITOYOSHI, KUMAGUN

The SHICHOJO are larger than JOCHIN and are usually commanded by Majors. The KUMAMOTO Permanent Detachment supervised the purchase by Army units stationed in KUMAMOTO Prefecture of foodstuffs and liquor from local merchants.

4. Shipping. The 2nd Mar Div reports that according to Major YOSHIKAKE (Reliability: fair) all shipping units on KYUSHU are under control of the 1st Shipping Transport Command at MOJI. All personnel fall into two categories:

Transport personnel: permanently stationed at harbors.  
Shipping personnel: move about on ships.

This information helps explain the difficulty in obtaining the proper location of shipping units.

* As KAMJI are not available, no good translation can be made here.

ENCLOSURE (A)
Order of Battle. (Continued) 29Oct45

SECRET

5. TOKUJU KIKAN. The following information is reported by the 5th Mar Div obtained from interrogation of SHINOYAMA, Maseahiro, SHINOYAMA, now a farmer was a member of the TOKUJU KIKAN in 1938.

a) Organization of the TOKUJU KIKAN in 1938.

HSINKING  KWANTUNG Army, MANCHURIA Dist. TOKUJU KIKAN
PEIPING  N. CHINA Exped Army, N. CHINA Dist. TOKUJU KIKAN
CANTON  S. CHINA Exped Army, S. CHINA Dist. TOKUJU KIKAN

HANKOW  C. CHINA Exped Army
       (CO: LtGen MORIOKA, KO)

---

Political Aff.
Section (SEIJika)
   (CO: LtCol SAKURAI)

1st Section:
   Administration
   (CO: Col ?)

2nd Section
   Intelligence
   (CO: Col ?)

3rd Section:
   Propaganda
   (CO: Col ASAHI, Shinji)

Branch: KIUKANG

Branch: UCHIHAO

Branch: ICHANG

Branch: CHANGSHA

20
20
20
20

The duties of the TOKUJU KIKAN appeared to be primarily political, and all tactical or military information was turned over to the KEMEI TAI. Efforts were largely directed towards getting Chinese informers and persuading the civilian population to collaborate with the local military forces.

b) Naval TOKUJU KIKAN. These were Naval counterpart of the Army units. Their mission was to obtain intelligence on shipping, commerce, and the movement of surface traffic. There was a Naval TOKUJU KIKAN at HANKOW with a personnel of 50 men under the command of Naval Captain KURIHARA.

c) Both Navy and Army TOKUJU KIKAN were directly responsible to the General Affairs Section of the Political and Economic Bureau (KOANT) in the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

ENCLOSURE (A)
Order of Battle.  

SECRET

The officer in charge of the General Affairs Section was Lt Gen. YONAGAWA, Heisuke now deceased. Prince KONOYE as the then Minister of Economic Affairs was in charge of the Political and Economic Bureau (KOANIN), which had charge of all questions relating to CHINA except those involving military strategy. The KOANIN later became the Greater East Asia Association.

d) The following personnel were identified with the TOKUMU KIKAN:

KIN'AN JIN (Chinese): liaison agent 1938 at HANKOW
MIKAMI, : member. Resident TOKYO or SHANGHAI
KAYANO, : member. Resident TOKYO
AKUTAGAWA, : member. Resident YOKOHAMA
YAMADA, : member. Resident OITA
NAKAMURA, : member. Resident FUKUOKA
OKURA, : member. Resident NIIGATA

6. Repatriation.

a) OTAFUKU MARU left FUSAN on 17 October with 139 civilians. This vessel put in at IKI Island for a week due to inclement weather and 51 passengers disembarked there; the remainder departed at HAKATA 27 October.

b) UNZEN MARU arrived at HAKATA on 27 October from FUSAN with 2,119 civilians.

c) S319 arrived at HAKATA on 27 October from FUSAN with 878 civilians.

d) Escort 59 arrived at HAKATA on 27 October from FUSAN with 171 civilians.

e) ISO MARU arrived at HAKATA on 27 October from FUSAN with 171 civilians.

f) DD YUKAZE arrived at HAKATA on 27 October from FUSAN with 169 civilians.

g) MS 20 arrived at HAKATA on 27 October from FUSAN with 34 civilians.

h) TOKUJU MARU arrived at HAKATA on 27 October from FUSAN with 2,866 civilians.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 18001, 28Oct45
To: 18001, 29Oct46

HQ, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 30 October 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (A: S L571)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

   See Enclosure (A).

2. Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   See Enclosure (A).

3. General attitude of military and semi-military units.
   No change.

4. Location, description, and inventory of dumps under our control.
   Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

1. Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO Area

HOKOZU Factory at KAMATA. A received 8 torpedo mid-sections and 2 torpedo tail sections (all for the type 92 torpedo) by rail from HOKOZU on 24 October. These were consigned from ISHIYAMA in SHIGA Prefecture. Investigation reveals that these parts were shipped before the end of the war but were held up in transit by the disruption of the Japanese rail system and traffic jams at KAMATA Tunnel.

SAGA

Battery Factory 3 miles south of KASHIWA is owned by the Japan Electric Company and consists of 43 frame buildings approximately 30-40 feet by 60-80 feet with cement floors. The factory made the follow...
ING TYPE BATTERIES: 6-volt automobile batteries made under Navy contract, 2-volt single cell, 4-volt miners lamp batteries, and 6 or 8-volt fishing lamp batteries. They employed 100 expert electrical workers, 200 farmers, and about 400 students who worked part time. The plant was completed in July 1943. The machinery is still in the factory but there are no small tools or finished parts. It appears that the factory was lacking in equipment and produced little during the war. At present inoperative.

OCIITA

Dock Masters Office employed 167 men during war and 192 at present. Between October 1941 and March 1942, three hundred seventy six ships amounting to 1,068,235 tons docked there.

Sulphuric Acid Plant owned by HITSUI Industries produced 40 tons of acid per day during the war, present production 20 tons per day. It employed 800 workers during the war and 400 at present. Virtually all production was used by OCIITA Industries.

HITSUI Liquidification Plant employed 1814 workers in the production of synthetick oil and by products. The plant is not operating at present but expects to open in December 1945 with 1370 employees.

MIYANOURA Coal Mine produced 3500 tons of coal per day before the war, 2000 tons per day during the war, and 700 tons per day now. Pre-war employees 4500; wartime employees 3500; present employees 1800.

KARATSU

TSUIKI Airfield has a 300 yard concrete runway and was used as a training field. The following non-operational planes were found: 101 Zeros, 4 Bombers, and 55 training planes. Radio equipment was found in a hanger. U3 troops relieved civilian guards.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.
(2) **Susppects.**

None to report.

(3) **Subversive activities.**

None to report.

(4) **Unfriendly organizations.**

None to report.

D. **CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.**

No change.

E. **MISCELLANEOUS**

(1) **PRESS SURVEY.**

Editorials were concerned with the selection of prefectural governors, US foreign policy, and comments relative to the new educational system. Prominence was given to President Truman's speech. Local news was of the usual variety.

The SAGA SHIMBUN of 29 October reported; "The BEPBU branch of the Commerce and Industrial Economy Association has decided to open conversation classes for various city workers in order to eliminate inconveniences arising from language difficulty. Classes are divided into the hotel and restaurant business group and the sales business group."

The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 29 October reported; "The SASEBO Middle School, which has abolished the military salute, wearing of leggings, and the column marching in an effort to clean out militarism, has further abolished the wearing of the combat cap and students who have the former student cap in their possession are asked to wear them."

The KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN of 27 October reported; "For the purpose of maintaining order in KAGOSHIMA and cooperating with the Allied Occupation of KAGOSHIMA, the KAGOSHIMA Police Station has organized a guard force of 104 men under the Command of Police Chief KAMACHI."
3-2 Periodic Report No. 58. (Continued)

SECRET

G. L. MC CORNECK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC,  
AC of 3, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:
ComFifthFlt 1 CG 32ndInfDiv 10
CG Sixth Army 5 MAG-22 1
OIC JICFOA 1 CG F3C 1
CG FMFPAC 1 NAVTECHJAP 1
Com5thPhib 1 USSB3 TOKYO 1
CG III Phib Corps 1 CO Corps Troops 1
CG I Corps 1 AC of 3, G-3, VAC 1
CG X Corps 1 Record Section, VAC 1
CG 2ndMarDiv 10 File 5
CG 5thMarDiv 10

- 4 - SECRET

746.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT Chief OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

30 October, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Civilians attached to military units. A new basic report (the third to date) from the 16th Area Army indicates that a substantial number of civilians have been included in the original strength figures for all types of Army ground units. It is difficult to tell exactly what this attachment consisted of; however, the following facts are known: In divisions, brigades, and fortresses the civilians were attached to headquarters, transport units, signal units, chemical warfare units, ordnance duty units, water purification units, and hospital and medical units. No civilians are recorded as being attached to any infantry regiment or battalion. Civilians were attached to tank regiments, tank maintenance units, separate artillery regiments and battalion, and separate mortar units. Civilians were attached to field duty units, signal labor units, depots, and independent engineer and transport units. In most cases the original strength figures for Army ground units reported by this Corps have included these civilians. In view of the fact that their connection appears to have been more than casual, it is our opinion that these people were military in all but name and have been properly included in the demobilization reports. The following table shows comparative break downs of man or army units. Future periodic reports will contain further analyses.

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* NOTE: 16th Area Army includes 364th Inf Rct and 765th, 755th, 767th Ind Inf Bns as organic to 88th Inf Div.

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*NOT*: Japanese consistently report that 3 Inf Bns and Flak arty En of this unit were at SHURA. Japanese Report No. 3 gives a total of 3,951, for these units; this would bring the total figure up to 6,982, which is reasonably close to the Gen figure.

#NOT#: These figures are exclusive of the 3 Ind Inf Bns, 2 of which were located at AMAKUSA with 126th Inf 13th Inf 125th Inf.

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**TOTAL 4th AA Div** | **9,790** | **21,425** | **2,787** | **12,638** | **21,425**

*New identification*

**ENCLOSURE (A)**
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 16001, 29Oct45
To: 16001, 300ct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 31 October 1945.

No. 39.

Map:

Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AM3 L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (Omitted)
(B) Interrogation Report - KEMPEI TAI Schools for NCO's and Enlisted Men.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

Enclosure (A) (Omitted)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

Enclosure (A) (Omitted)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KANDA

KANDA Harbor was a coal shipping harbor which was rendered inoperable by bombings in August, 1945. There are 40 boats in the harbor with oil engines but they are not operating.

KOKURA

KOKURA Military Ball Manufacturing Company is a branch office of the Oriental Ball Company of TOKYO. The plant manufactures a special type of steel ball used in crushing coal and ore. At present there are 62 employees.
KOKURA Arsenal employed 7,000 people during the war but at present only 414 remain to inventory the Arsenal. During the war it produced aircraft guns, both 20mm and 37mm, field machine guns, automatic AA weapons, rifles, airplane parts, and projectiles. The plant is under guard by our own forces.

IWAKE Cement Company is producing 50 tons of cement daily, but the plant has a daily capacity of 1,000 tons.

AGANO Cement Works Company is producing 200 tons of cement daily. 9,000 tons of cement are on hand.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

The FUKUJUKA CIC Detachment has taken into custody the following Japanese officers who had deserted from the Cruiser YAKUHO. They are suspected to be atrocity perpetrators. They are confined by military police at the DOME NACHI PRISON, FUKUOKA, pending further instructions.

Lt. Otake, Toshio.
Lt. (jg) Takahashi, Seiji.
Lt. (jg) Yahagi, Shozo.
Lt. (jg) Maisuda, Kiyoshi.
Lt. (jg) Saito, Akira.
Lt. Baba, Atsuu.
WO Ochika, Sadamu.
Lt. Akiyama, Matsuo
Lt. (jg) Ishizaka, Nobuo.
WO Umino, Kurakichi.
Ens. (jg) Aida, Susumu.
WO Matsushita, Isamu.
WO Numura, Shigeo.
Lt. (jg) Watanabe, Toshiro.
Ens. (jg) Watanabe, Yoshiro.

(2) Suspects.

None to report.

(3) Subversive activities.

The principal of the IMARI High School, MAROHASHI, Ryuza, is reported to have stated in an address to his students that the Atomic Bomb, not bullets, caused...
the defeat of Japan; and that by the time the present pupils are old enough to be soldiers, JAPAN will be well on its way to her place among the military powers of the world.

(4) **Unfriendly organizations.**

**TOKUKU KIKAN.** According to TANAKA, Kinji, former Japanese Service employee in TIENSHIN, CHINA from 1941 to April 1946, the commanding officers of the TOKUKU KIKAN in TIENSHIN were Major General AMEIYA and Colonel MATUSUI.

TOKUKU AA sections in the Police Departments of OCHI and KARATSU, SAGA Prefecture, have been disbanded.

**RENRAKU-BU (Liaison Bureau) in CHINA.** Colonel OCHI, Tsurukichi, who was commander of an infantry reserve regiment in JAPAN, was placed in charge of the RENRAKU BU in NANKING in April, 1943. He stated that the RENRAKU-BU was the former TOKUKU KIKAN in CHINA, and that this change in name took place in March, 1943. Colonel OCHI stated he did not receive any special training or instructions for the new assignment. After 6 months in NANKING, he was transferred to the JOSHU RENRAKU-BU (WAIKAI Province), at which post he remained for about 1½ years. The RENRAKU-BU did not perform intelligence duties like the TOKUKU KIKAN, but acted merely as a liaison body between the Japanese Army and the Chinese people. It also advised city governments in matters of administration and received petitions and protests from the people. Colonel OCHI was the only military man at both NANKING and JOSHU; the remainder being Japanese civilians who had resided in CHINA for a number of years. Any business with the Chinese such as protests, employment, etc., was referred to the RENRAKU-BU. The head offices at NANKING and JOSHU both maintained sub-offices in their respective districts. Colonel OCHI does not know whether the TOKUKU KIKAN had become the RENRAKU-BU in MANCHURI or in other areas occupied by JAPAN.

E. **MISCELLANEOUS.**

(1) **PRESS SURVEY.**

Editorials were concerned with liberty, democracy, and education. The main items of national news were the revelation of the Japanese War Department's plan for
defense of the homeland and the problem of the disposal of the ZAIKATSU. Local news was of the usual variety.

The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN of 30 October reported; "The prefecture of NAGASAKI has planned hog raising with the use of food wastes to be obtained from the occupational army. Permission was granted by the occupation army, since it will take care of the waste disburining problem of the occupational army. They immediately bought 20 pigs to start with, but will increase to 100 pigs by next year. In three years, it is hoped that the citizens will have lots of pork."

The SAGA SHIMBUN of 30 October reported; "The 29th was the opening day of the nation-wide sale of the popular 'TAKARA-KUJI' (treasure lottery). Beginning with a Mr. FUKUCHI who bought 100 tickets, the SAGA branch of the KANKIN GINKO sold 5,018 tickets by the end of the day. At this rate the bank estimates that all the tickets will be sold within the next four or five days.

HISHUZAN, Japanese wrestler and native of SASEBO, who resigned from the NIPPON Wrestling Association last June, sent in his suggestion to entertain the occupational men with SUMO (Japanese wrestling) to the SASEBO Police Station. This show will be given on November 4th."

"A labor union will be formed in the city of YAMATA with Messrs. BUICHI AONO and NOBORU MATSUOTO as sponsors. They are connected with the NIPPON SHAKAI-I (Japanese Socialists)."

(2) Chinese Laborers at the NITTETSU SHIKAGACHI Mining Factory.

At this mining factory located 25 miles N.W of SASEBO, 177 Chinese laborers are located. They were brought here in November, 1944, and had either been conscripted from their farms in HOFEI, CHINA, or taken prisoner. 12 of them have died from malnutrition. Since the end of the war they have been treated well and are no longer working. It was claimed by the Japanese guards that these laborers were paid 5 yen per day which they could bank. The Chinese state that they received no such salary although they understood they were to be paid upon their departure. All of them are eager to return home.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 39.  (Continued)

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, RF, IN THE FIELD.

(YAC-7000)

17 October, 1945.

INTERROGATION REPORT

Interrogator: II-225.

Subject: KEMPEITAI Schools for NCO's and Enlisted Men.

1. According to Warrant Officer KOTO of the KUHAITO CHIKU KEMPEITAI A.G., the training of non-commissioned personnel was handled until about March 1945 by the RIKUCHI KEMPEI GAKO (first at SETAGAYA, then at NAKANO) in the TOKYO Area. However, at that time, due to the expansion of the KEMPEITAI and a desire to make widely separated areas as self-sufficient as possible in case an Allied invasion split apart the main islands, the school was divided among TOYO, OSAKA, FUKUOKA, possibly TAKAMATSU, SATO, TAIHOKU (YOKOHAMA), and KEIZO (KOKO). All of these cities were KEMPEITAI Headquarters.

2. About 10 July 45, a KEMPEI School was started at KUHAITO to supplement the one at FUKUOKA. On 15 July forty (40) non-commissioned officers started the course, and were joined on 16 July by twenty-seven (27) enlisted men who had completed about half of the six-months (?) course at FUKUOKA. These men were considered to be auxiliary (HOJO) H.P.'s, and were to become regulars upon completion of the course. However, the school was closed when the war ended, and in its brief period was disrupted by the necessity for taking cover from air raids and digging air raid shelters. The sixty-seven (67) students were demobilized with the other KEMPEI Personnel (see list previously sent in).

3. Though classes never really got under way at KUHAITO, some idea of KEMPEI GAKO courses may be obtained by a knowledge of the subjects studied by SHIGEMASA HAYASHI, Sgt. at the NAKANO School from December 1941 to April 1942. He had had six years of primary school education and had served about a year and a half as an infantryman before entering (KUJO 1st Inf. Regt.), though the requirements called for only one year of previous service. His curriculum included the following:

- Criminal Law — 20 hours
- Constitution — 12 hours
- Administrative Law — 2 hours
- Administrative Police — 20 hours
- English — 2 hours
- Chinese — 2 hours
- Counter-intel. — 10 hours
- Guard duties — 10 hours
- Higher police (TOYO) 10 hours
- Horsemanship — 20 hours
- Fencing — 20 hours

Plus a great deal of Physical exercise and drill.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 300ct45
To: 1800I, 310ct45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 1 November 1945.

No. 40.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SAGA Area

SHIMA Coal Company mines (SW of SAGA) produce about 600,000 tons per year and employ 4,500 men. The coal is sold to railroads and power plants. About 20,000 tons of coal are on hand at present.

SASEBO Area

KURO SHIMA (10 miles West of AINOURA) contains searchlight and gun positions including the following equipment:
G-2 Periodic Report No. 40. (Continued)

SECRET

2 15cm guns.
2 rangefinders.
6 25mm MG (single mount type).
2 searchlights.
1 radar.
1 sound locator.
1 base end tracking station with an electrical data transmission system to a central plotting station.

TAKA SHIMA (6 miles west of AINOURA) contains searchlight and gun positions including the following equipment:

2 12.7 cm guns (on twin mount).
1 rangefinder.
1 searchlight.
2 sound locators.
4 25mm MG (single mount).
1 base end tracking station with an electrical data transmission system to a central plotting station.

Japanese naval guards found on both TAKA SHIMA and KURO SHIMA state that there are no military installations on any of the other islands in this area.

FUKUOKA

NIPPON Rubber Factory employed about 3,000 people and produced 1,500 pairs of rubber boots and shoes per day during the war. The plant now employs 1,000 people and produces 1,000 pairs of footwear daily. The Japanese army ordered some of the footwear produced here during the war.

YAMATA

SAILUE Gasoline Company produces 3,200 gallons of gasoline daily and employs 20 men. Production and employment figures were the same during the war.

OMURA Area

MORI Iron works consists of two small factories which employed 40 people during the war and produced nuts, washers, bolts, and other small parts. The 500 aluminium and 1,000 iron parts turned out each week were all sold to the 21st Naval Aircraft Factory in OMURA.

- 2 -
SECRET

The plant is not operating now and the owner plans to sell the machinery and go out of business.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

The FUKUOKA CIC Detachment has taken the Japanese officers listed below into custody. These were confined at the DOTE KACHI Prison in FUKUOKA along with the 15 interned officers listed in G-2 Periodic Report No. 39.

WO CHIKA, Sazamu.
Lt KATSURA, Inmaneo.
WO YAMASHITA, Jeiju

These three complete the list of those ordered confined in Sixth Army Dispatch KK 11281.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

KEMPEI TAI - Special Sergeant Major OGURA, Mikiya, a former member of this organization, has been interrogated. He was with the KEMPEI TAI in KOREA until August, 1944 and states that in 1939 this organization began an investigation of espionage and sabotage in that country (working with the TOKKO KA). He further states that there were about 3,000 KEMPEI members in KOREA in August, 1941. OGURA remained in FUKUOKA for seven months after his transfer from KOREA and then went to the SAGA office. According to him all KEMPEI TAI units received their orders direct from TOKYO until eight branch offices were set up for JAPAN on 1 April, 1945. After this date units on KYUSHU were responsible to the FUKUOKA Branch Office.

(5) Miscellaneous.

An investigation of the local schools in SHIMONOSEKI reveals that prior to the end of the war the curriculum

SECRET

was rigidly fixed by the Department of Education in TOKYO. For that reason the Principals' and Teachers' Association held few meetings and teachers were not allowed to discuss changes in the course of study. Since the end of the war the local educators have shown some initiative by eliminating fencing, judo, and military training from the curriculum without instructions from TOKYO; but are awaiting directives from the Department of Education before making further changes.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

Editorials were concerned with Prince KONOYE and his renunciation of title, voting and education. The main items of national news were the reduction of government employees and the appointment of KOBAYASHI as Minister of State Affairs. Local news was of the usual variety.

The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 31 October reported; "SASEBO Police Station previously ordered the citizens to obey the traffic regulations, refrain from scandal and to stop entering the sentry posts, but there are still cases of robbery and the entering of sentry posts without permission, (injuries and deaths have resulted from this), so they requested further obedience of orders."

The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN of 31 October reported; "The Americans are very studious. Those who visit the city hall and police station of KURUME are very earnestly studying Japanese with the aid of dictionaries and interpreters. At this rate they will pick up Japanese faster than the Japanese are picking up English."

(2) Ships in NAGASAKI Harbor:

The following ships were launched in NAGASAKI Harbor and have never left it:

SECRET

759
DONAN MARU - A cargo craft which is 326 feet long, weighs 3,000 tons, and has a capacity of 4,700 tons. It is owned by the NIPPON KAISHA and was launched on 29 May.

HIRADO MARU - A coal carrier which is 492 feet long, weighs 10,000 tons, and has a capacity of 13,000 tons. It is owned by the OSAKA CHOSEN KAISHA and was launched on 8 April.

Neither of these ships has received any sailing orders as yet.


DISTRIBUTION:

| ComFifthFlt | 1 |
| CG Sixth Army | 5 |
| OIC JICPOA | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 |
| Com5thPhib | 1 |
| CG III Phib Corps | 1 |
| CG I Corps | 1 |
| CG X Corps | 1 |
| CG 2ndMarDiv | 10 |
| CG 5thMarDiv | 10 |
| CG 32ndInfDiv | 10 |
| MAG 22 | 1 |
| CG FBC | 1 |
| NAVTECHJAP | 1 |
| USS SS TOKYO | 1 |
| CO Corps Troops | 1 |
| AC of 5, 3-5, VAC | 1 |
| Record Section, VAC | 1 |
| File | 5 |
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>T/O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITTA</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. KIUSHU units of 2nd TOKYO Army Arsenal.

a. SAMUKOCHI Factory. This factory was started in February, 1940, expanded in November, 1941, and in full production by August, 1942. The CO was Col. NODA, Yoshio and the 15 August strength was 50 military and 2,562 civilians. The plant produced smokeless powder, gun cotton, and other explosives.

b. YAMAKUHI Construction Co. This unit consisted of 16 military and 254 civilians. The CO was Major KIYOSHI, Yoshinori. It was charged with the mission of constructing a bombproof munitions factory at KUSAMOTO, SHINOGE GUN, CITTA Prefecture. Work was started on 25 March but only a few saves have been started since then.

c. ARAC Factory. Unit reported by 5th MarDiv, but details not given.

3. 193rd Airfield En. This unit was organized 25 November, 1944 at OZUKI A/F, YAMAGUCHI Prefecture. The next month, the unit was transferred to GATOSU A/F, KASUYA GUN, FURUKTA Prefecture. On 28 July, 1945 the unit transferred to BUNGO A/F, KIA, OBE GUN, CITTA Prefecture. This field was not reported to us by the 5th Air Army. The 193rd Airfield En was under the control of the 51st Air Sector Command, which was in turn under the 12th Air (Flying) Division. A breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBUNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>ACTUAL ORIGINAL STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard Co</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Co</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Duty Co</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ENCLOSURE (x) - 1 - SECRET
5. **15th Shipping Group.** This unit was organized in March, 1945. Its primary mission was the transportation of men and supplies by small boats in South Kyushu. It's most important zone of action was the inland water areas of Arikake Sea, Shinarada Bay, and Matsushiro Bay, as land transportation in these areas was being halted by Allied Air attacks. Organic units were Shikoku, 31st Ship Engrs Regt, 40th Ship Engrs Regt, and 46th Ship Engrs Regt. The 145th Depot Co and the 148th Land Duty Cq were temporarily detached from the 32nd Fld Duty Hq and placed under the control of the 15th Shipping Group in June, 1945.

6. Other Shipping Units in South Kyushu. The following were not under the control of the 15th Ship Grp:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>MIL</th>
<th>CIV</th>
<th>PATIENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mitsubishi Br Off, 1st Ship Tct Comd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kyushu Br, 11th Fld Ship Depot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **KOKURA Army Arsenal.** This unit employed about 7,000 civilians during the war. The factory produced aircraft cannon, automatic 44 guns, rifles, airplane parts, and gas production for autos and projectiles.

8. **NAVY SUICIDE BOAT UNITS.** The following information was reported by the 5th MarDiv from interrogation of:

- Capt. HARA, Tameichi, CO KAWATANA Assault Unit
- Cmdr. TAKEUCHI, Koji, Exec.O. KAWATANA Assault Unit
- Cmdr. SHIKANO, Seinosuke, Sen.StaffOff 3rd Sp Att Force

ENCLOSURES (A) - 2 -
Order of Battle (Continued) 1 Nov 45

SECRET


a. KAWATANA Assault Unit. This unit was composed of 3 detachments:

USIBUKA, AMAKUSA Island. CO was Cmdr. HIRATA. Strength was about 800, 75 of which were boat crews. Equipment consisted of 5 torpedo boats and 25 large type suicide boats.

MAKISHIMA, TACHIBANA Bay (5 miles due S of NAGA AKI). CO was Lt. Cmdr. MIZUTANI. Strength was about 600, 100 of which were boat crews. Equipment consisted of 2 torpedo boats and 50 small type suicide boats.

OGUSAI, KAWATANA. (see next paragraph)

b. KAWATANA Storm Unit (KAWATANA ARASHI BUTAI). This unit was originally organized on 1 May, 1944 as a temporary Torpedo Boat Crew Training School with a strength of 15 Officer instructors, 300 maintenance unit, 400 R.O. Students and 800 enlisted students. On 1 September 1944, the training of suicide boat crews was begun. On 1 March, 1945 the name of the school was changed to the Navy Department to KAWATANA Storm Unit. The unit has always been a training rather than an operational base, though it had tactical control of the USIBUKA and MAKISHIMA detachments. Captain KARA has always been CO, except for a period from December, 1944 to April, 1945 when R.Adm. MATSUBARA, Hiroshi was in command.

c. Training program. Torpedo boat training courses lasted 2 months for enlisted personnel and 5 months for officers. The officer's course included 160 hours - torpedo, 200 hours - navigation, 40 hours engines, 40 hours - anti-submarine arms and depth charges, 120 hours AA guns, 90 hours - signal communication, 40 hours - tactics, and 70 hours unspecified. The suicide boat course included 60 hours - navigation, 90 hours - engines, 50 hours - suicide boat explosives, 25 hours - tactics, 150 hours - assault training - 35 hours miscellaneous, including spiritual training. 1300 suicide boat crewmen and 3,200 maintenance personnel were graduated from the school. Students came from all parts of JAPAN as volunteers. Selection was made by the Bureau of Personnel on the basis of physical fitness and seamanlike qualities. Average age was 18 to 19. Graduates were automatically promoted 1 rank or rate, had increased pay, more supplies, better than average living conditions, and other minor privileges.

d. Equipment. Suicide boats were built at NAGA AKI and were of two types. The small type boat had a crew of 1, 1 six-cylinder TO-D Full Truck motor and 1 propeller; for armament it had 2 12cm rockets mounted on crude wooden troughs and 1 270 kilogram
powder charge in the nose which could be exploded either by contact or by pulling a handle in the cockpit; maximum speed was 23 knots and maximum range was 70 to 90 miles at full speed without use of reserve tanks. The large type boat had a crew of 2, 2 six-cylinder TOYODA truck motors and 2 propellers; for armament it had 2 12cm rockets, 1 13mm AA MG, and 1 270 kilogram powder charge, maximum speed was 25 knots and maximum range was 100 miles at full speed without use of reserve tanks.

e. Tactics. Suicide boats always operated from land bases. They were organized into boat divisions with 24 large type craft and 48 small type craft. Night was considered the best time for assaults and top priority was given transports because of their light armor. The following estimate of the distribution of boat divisions from KAWATANA was made from memory:

PHILIPPINES about 4 divisions
KYUSHU about 15 divisions
SHIKOKU about 5 divisions
central HOKUSHU about 3 divisions
eastern HOKUSHU about 4 divisions
northeastern HOKUSHU about 1 division.

9. Repatriation.
KCAN MARU arrived at SENZAKI from FUSAN 26 October with 370 Army, 0 Navy, 6,143 civilians.
EKOSHIMA MARU arrived at HAKATA from TANKU, SHIKoku 23 October with 435 Army, 0 Navy, 2,803 civilians.
7 LSTs arrived SASEBO from FUSAN 27 October with 8,376 Army, 0 Navy, 0 Civilians.
KCAN MARU arrived at SENZAKI from FUSAN 29 October with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 6,565 Civilians.
TAKUMO MARU arrived HAKATA from MIYAKO JIMA 29 October with 1,296 Army, 0 Navy, 0 Civilians.
TOKUJU MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN 29 October 332 Army, 0 Navy, 1,944 Civilians.
KOSAI MARU arrived HAKATA from CHINKAI 29 October 294 Army, 0 Navy, 305 Civilians.
JIMU MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN 29 October with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 798 Civilians.
KAI MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN 30 October with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 276 Civilians.
HAKURYU MARU arrived from FUSAN 30 October with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 1,977 Civilians.
ISAO MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN 30 October with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 162 Civilians.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 18001, 31Oct45
To: 18001, 01Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU
0800, 2 November 1945.

No. 41.

Map:
Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle. (Omitted)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A). (Omitted)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A). (Omitted)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

AJISAKA (near KURUME)

In a shrine outside this town there are enough prefabricated parts to assemble an estimated 25 planes. At the school in this town there are 150 jettisonable aircraft fuel tanks and 44 propellers.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KANDA

KARITA Machine Shop employs 14 men in the manufacture of crude form tools. 15 tons of pig iron are on hand.

FUKUOKA Area

NIFFON Brewery Company consists of a large 4-story building and 5 warehouses. Found in the main building were 160 cases (12 bottles each) of chloropiperin.
KATA, the manager, explained that the chloropicrin was used for killing insects and vermin.

TAKENOSHITA Oil Refinery. This plant is making edible oil from rape-seed, and is operating under the jurisdiction of the FUKUOKA Agricultural Association. The plant is presently producing 500 gallons of edible oil per day. 23 persons are now employed as against 14 during the war.

OITA Area

HETSUJI Naval Air Base (3130) is located approximately 5 miles SE of OITA. It has a graveled surface runway 80 by 1,500 meters. There are no hangars and the field is now non-operational. Located at this field are 6 bombers and 4 fighters and 36 25mm AA guns stored in a warehouse near the field.

SAEKI

SAEKI Naval Base. The calibre of the gun found on the second torpedo boat is 13mm and not 30mm as reported in Periodic Report #35.

TAKATA Area

KUSAJI Airfield, near TAKATA, consists of 4 small hangars which contain 1 plane. The runway, not completed is 15 by 700 meters, running East to West. According to civilians, no unit has ever been based here and the field is for emergency use only. It is probably an outlying field of the USA Air Base.

(2) Intelligence targets located but not as yet placed under surveillance.

ONINE POW Camp (S17.66-1230.98)
HACHIYA Ordnance Factory - HACHIYA.
NOGATA Shell Case Factory - NOGATA.
Navy Arms Warehouses - SHIMONOSEKI Area.
MITSUBISHI Tunnel Warehouses - SHIMONOSEKI Area.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.
None to report.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKKO KA. The salaries which certain discharged members of the TOKKO KA in OITA have been receiving have been stopped. (See Periodic Report #26).

KEMPEI TAI. It has been further learned from Special Sergeant Major OGURA, Mikiyos, (See Periodic Report #40) that the main responsibility of the KEMPEI TAI at KURE was to keep civilians and Naval personnel alike from talking about ship movements. The KEMPEI TAI cooperated with the Navy in enforcing censorship regulations 10 days prior and 10 days subsequent to all ship movements. At SAGA the primary duty of the KEMPEI TAI was the determination of reasons for decreases in production at the various factories. This information in turn was passed to FUKUOKA for forwarding to TOKYO.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

The main items of national news were the announcement of the wealth of the Imperial Household, the appointment of new sub-ministers, and the shake-up of the educational system. Editorials dealt with politics and democracy. Local news was of the usual variety. The following are local news translations of possible interest.

SAGA SHIBUN dated 1 November 1945; "Beginning November 1, and ending December 31, the nation-wide postal savings campaign will be on. The SAGA Bureau's quota is 41,200,000. With the cooperation of the various organizations, the campaign will be conducted with 6 teams. Under the auspices of this paper, Mr. OUCHI, Keigo, of the faculty of the TOKYO Imperial University, has been invited to lecture on economics at the city's auditorium.
ium on November 11th at 1:00 PM as a part of the campaign. This campaign's chief aim is to block the people's ill spending. With 20 yen as the minimum, the postal savings runs up to 5,000 yen per share. At the end of one year, interest at the rate of 2.75% will be paid and anybody can withdraw his savings. However, the time is unlimited. For savings of more than 5 years, interest at the rate of 3.67% and for more than 10 years, 4.7% will be paid."

"The survey of population to determine the census for the coming election will begin on the 1st at zero hour throughout the country. Tourists and guests must also register at the place of the hosts."

G. L. MC Cormick
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
AC of S, G-2

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| CG FMFPAC         | 1  |
| Com5thPhib       | 1  |
| CG III Phib Corps| 1  |
| CG I Corps        | 1  |
| CG X Corps        | 1  |
| CG 2ndMarDiv      | 10 |
| CG 5thMarDiv      | 10 |
| CG 32ndInfDiv     | 10 |
| MAG 22            | 1  |
| CG FBC            | 1  |
| NAVTECHJAF        | 1  |
| USSB3 TOKYO       | 1  |
| CO Corps Troops   | 1  |
| AC of 3, G-3, VAC | 1  |
| Record Section, VAC | 1 |
| Files             | 5  |
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 01 Nov 45
To: 1800I, 02 Nov 45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 3 November 1945.

No. 42.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Omitted. (Order of Battle)
(B) Why We Lost the Battle for the Philippines
(Translation of a DOMAI release in an October
issue of the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
Omitted.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
Omitted.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under
our control.
None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during
the period.

FUKUOKA Area

NIPPON Iron Company (this information is in addition
to that given in G-2 Periodic Report No. 37) was
operated under this name during the war by the Japanese
Government, but is now known as the NIPPON Company.
During the war 200 people were employed in the produc-
tion of lithium phosphate and lithium carbonate, but
at present only 40 people are employed in the manu-
facture of salt from sea water. Salt troughs are
being constructed, and upon their completion it is
estimated that the output of this company will be 100 tons of salt per month.

SHINKIKAI Factory in MEINOHAMA (West of FUKUOKA) employed from 50 to 60 people during the war making machine gun bullets, but is now inoperative. The plant contains 21 lathes and 2 drill presses, all of which are electrically operated.

KYUSHU Airplane Corporation (MEINOHAMA Branch) employed 200 men during the war and produced tools and dies for the manufacture of airplane parts. The plant is now closed, but contains a representative stock of tools and dies, 14 lathes, 9 groovers (German made), 3 grinders, and approximately 20 tons of aluminum strips (used in making airplane fuselages and brought here at the end of the war from other plants).

YAMAUCHI KOKUKI Co. Ltd. (MEINOHAMA) employed 265 people in the production of dummy airplanes and ailerons for planes during the war. The plant now employs 61 people and produces chairs and rice scythes.

SAVARA Mine Co. Ltd. owns the MEINOHAMA Mine (reported as the MEINAHAMA Mine in G-2 Periodic Report No. 18) and a nearby branch mine. During the war these two mines employed 2300 men and produced 13,000 tons of coal per month. Both are shaft coal mines with veins 150 to 300 meters below sea level. The Company depended on electric pumps to keep water out of the shafts, but since bombings knocked out the source of electric power, leaving the pumps useless, the shafts became flooded. Four hundred men are now engaged in draining the shafts and getting the mines into operating condition. It is estimated that it will be six months to a year before production begins. On hand at the mines at present are 20,000 tons of coal, 8,000 sticks of dynamite, and 13,000 electric caps. There is a dock for loading coal near the main mine.

OMUTA

ITSUI Mining, Engineering, and Technical School is supported by the MIKKE Dyestuffs Company (see G-2 periodic Report No. 29). The present enrollment is 597 and there are 29 teachers. The school is the equivalent of a boys' middle school and offers courses in applied chemistry, mining and electrical and
mechanical engineering. Military subjects were taught until August. The highest 40 students each year are offered employment by the MIKE Dyestuffs Company.

Shipping Control Bureau (MIKE Branch) controls all large shipping in MIKE Harbor, supplies seamen for merchant ships, and supervises the loading and unloading of all ships in the harbor. During the war it employed 1500 seamen and 50 office workers; at present only 60 seamen and 70 office workers are employed. The manager is TAMADA, Masatsugu. Representatives of the local branch state that the Shipping Control Association controlled the movement of all Japanese steamships during the war. At present the movement of ships is ordered by the head office of the association in TOKYO (subject to government approval). The TOKYO and MOJI offices handle the booking of passengers, but the MOJI office maintains two permanent passenger booking agents at the local branch office. The rational organization of the Shipping Control Association is as follows:

TOKYO (Head Office)
President: UCHIDA, Shigru
Managing Director: YOKOSUI, Harutaro

KOBE Office
Director: HAMA, Yoshifusa

MOJI Branch Office
Manager: HARA, Toshiya

(2) Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.
None.

C. COURTFRIED INTELLIGENCE

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.

(2) Suspects.
None.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 42. (Continued.)

SECRET

(3) **Subversive activities.**

None reported

(4) **Unfriendly organizations.**

None to report

(5) **Miscellaneous.**

CIC has interviewed AOKI, Nesso, a demobilized Rear Admiral. He was engineer officer at TRUK from January to May 1945. AOKI stated that American bombings from the MARSHALLS and SOUGAINVILLE and shellings from our surface vessels caused such heavy damage that TRUK was neutralized as a base. He claimed that only 10 American planes were shot down during his tour of duty at TRUK and that he knew of no American prisoners of war confined there.

D. **CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.**

No change.

E. **MISCELLANEOUS.**

(1) **PRESS SURVEY.**

The main items of national and international news were KANAGAWA'S trial in Manila, the Imperial fortune, and the prospect of four power occupation of Japan. Editorials were concerned with national finance and the housing shortage. Local news was of the usual variety.

The SAGA SHIMBUN of 2 November reported, "In order to put their best efforts toward reconstruction, food distribution and requests made by the occupation Army, the employees of both the prefectural and municipal governments decided to work 7 days a week."

The MAIMICHI SHIMBUN of 2 November reported: "Two American planes which left KAGOSHIMA on the 31st at 4 P.M. for the city of KUMAMOTO were lost near the boundary of these two prefectures. Police departments of both cities are searching for the missing planes with the aid of firemen."

The KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN of 31st October reported: "Sympathy and aid are centering toward KAGOSHIMA, said to be the worst war-damaged prefecture in the country. At this
time, due to the negotiations of the KYUSHU Control Government, 30,000 kens of 'miso' will be sent from KURASHIOTO together with 350 kokus of 'shoyu' from KURASHIOTO and SAGA for war relief. In addition, special distribution of 5,000 gallons of 'shoyu' will be made by the KYUSHU SHOYU and MISO Control Bureau Branch."

(2) Rocket Experiments

A 12,000 pound base for a coastal gun to launch a jet-propelled projectile was found in the possession of IMAGA, Hiksuji, a professor at KURUSHI Government School, and head of the school's Fine Instrument Department since 1935. Professor IMAGA claimed it would take another year of experimenting to perfect the propelling charge for the shell. Experiments had been partly financed by the Japanese Ministry of Education. A small model, complete with batteries and transformer, an experimental shell, film, diagrams, and a book; all connected with the undertaking, have been confiscated.

(3) Precious Metals.

The 1.6 tons of silver located at the TOKYO Military Arsenal No. 2, ARM Factory near OKUTA (previously reported in VAC Dispatch 291214/I to Sixth Army) consisted of the following:

54 bars of silver (28 kilogrammes each)
1 box of silver ingots
1 small box of silver shavings

A chemical qualitative analysis of a sample from each of the above types indicates a high degree of purity, although the shavings contain a trace of iron.

(4) Interrogation of Navy Captain WACHI, Tsunozu reveals that he was formerly a naval attache in MEXICO and was later with the KURUSHI-NOMURA Mission to the United States in 1941. He was interned in the U.S. with other Japanese diplomats at the beginning of the war but was later exchanged. For a time he was Naval Defense Commander at IWO JIMA, where he supervised the erection of many fortifications. In November 1944 he was transferred to his present command, the 32nd Assault Unit at SAKURA JIMA (near KAGOSHIMA).
G-2 Periodic Report No. 42. (Continued)

SECRET

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, CR,
AC of S, G-2.

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Com5thPhib  1  USMC RESEARCH  1
CG III Phib Corps  1  CG Corps Troops  1
CG I Corps  1  CG of S, G-3, VAC  1
CG X Corps  1  Record Section, VAC  1
CG 8thMarDiv  10  File  5
CG 5thMarDiv  10

- 6 -

SECRET  
774
Why We Lost the Battle for the Philippines

(Translation of a DOMEI release in an October issue of the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN).

There were many times of critical decision in the Great Eastern War, but there should not have been so many of them. Many were fabricated by our army to cause the people to keep their fighting spirit. Strategically viewed, there is no doubt that the truly crucial point was in the Philippines after our army had retreated from Guadalcanal. Upon his departure from the Philippines, General Carver said, "I shall return." Although all the Filipinos believed this statement to be true and were awaiting the return of the American army, the Japanese there had forgotten their duty of defense and had lived idly for two years. Around February of 1944, the United States Army had captured Makin and Tarawa and were marching on toward the Philippine Islands. In spite of that, men and women in pre-war dress were chatting around ice-cream tables and listening to melodies from electric phonographs in the meat tea rooms and restaurants along the waterfront streets of Manila. Every night drunken soldiers and civilians attached to the service were singing loudly in the "pleasure" streets. Some Japanese and Filipinos looked in rapture at the tender, movie-house love scenes. There was no sign that they saw the next battle stealthily approaching. The view of the war situation taken by all soldiers, civilians attached to the service, and other citizens in the Philippines was that the enemy was still loitering in New Guinea and the Gilbert Islands.

Soldiers were indulging in sexual pleasures with their mistresses in Manila. Most of the girls of mixed Spanish and Philippine blood in Manila were living with the Japanese in order to make a living. Japanese dressed in gay American-made suits were enjoying their clandestine meetings and dinners. Soldiers dressed in white, devoted much time to making their toilets, and entered the commissary restaurants from fine cars. Many soldiers who drank too much sat absent-minded at their desks at headquarters. Though the smell of the thick powder smoke of the approaching battle was not pleasant to them, they seemed utterly unable to give up their habit of negligence. The commander at that time (Lt. General Kuroda), accompanied by several military police men confessed that they were quite sick of having been kept standing around all day long on hot days with nothing to do.

Rumor got around that the commander had brought his mistress from Saigon by plane. In order to provide himself with (fun for) amusement, he bought and sold various Army Club properties in the name of the Commander. It is not surprising that upper-circle
WHY WE LOST THE BATTLE FOR THE PHILIPPINES  (CONTINUED)

SECRET

atmosphere had its effect upon lower circles. Not a few scandals were noise abroad. But he did not strengthen defenses against the American Army's impending approach. Even in February he was loafing—a deaf ear turned to the military situation. His troops had fallen into the way of life there and were lax. Even the shallow-minded Filipinos held them in contempt. No sooner had the Japanese Army settled down among the inhabitants than they became a part of them and lost their spirit. Before they were aware of it they had lost the ability to defend themselves in the decisive battle in the Philippines. Such was the army selected to be stationed along Leyte Gulf where the Americans first landed. Within a few days after the American Army landed only three of fifty cannon were left—the rest had been carried back to the mountains. Those who had been in the Philippines for a long while had no one backbone, they were jellyfish. A good example is offered by the Davao Naval Unit, at the end of September they mistook our ammunition supply units for American landing craft and retreated from Davao after having burned it to the ground.

So that as it may, the regular plan of deploying the army was effected in May. The general plan of the operation was to draw the enemy close enough to smash him with one blow from the air; consequently plans to build more than a hundred necessary airfields in the Philippines were laid too late. Due to poor administration the public was upset, laborers did not come to work, and the quality of materials was very poor. Conditions were unsatisfactory. All residents were required to construct airfields, but no soldiers or civilians attached to the service were required to work in labor parties. As before they were surrounded by mines and women.

Meanwhile the entire army of the South began to speed up defense measures from Singapore to Manilla, but the Army of the South Headquarters got quite angry upon finding that the lazy Army of the Philippines had done nothing. Headquarters had the Army of the Philippines recklessly hasten the strengthening of defenses. At that time the enemy had begun to spy on Morotai, Palau, and Ley. The Navy got excited about completion of the defenses by October at the latest. Alas, 90 percent of our transports which came over to the Philippines were sunk. Moreover 90 percent of those which were dispatched from Luzon to Mindanao were heavily damaged. Our military strength was concentrated on Mindanao which was supposed to be the enemy's landing point. After leaving disposal of the defense of Mindanao for the time being, they were to set about installing defenses on Leyte and Samar Islands. Soon after, the American Army rushed upon Leyte like a typhoon. It was too late to prepare a defense of the Philippine Islands. At the end of August, General Yamashita majestically arrived here. The ground however, was too wet to permit him properly to show his ability. One failure in an operation leads to another, and he was finally compelled to retreat into the mountains of Luzon.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 18001, 02Nov45
To: 18001, 03Nov45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 4 November 1945

SECRET
No. 43.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

An investigation of 539 Chinese Formosan laborers
at HARIO (near SASEBO) was conducted. Of this number,
257 were formerly army laborers, 217 formerly navy
laborers, and 65 civilian workers (including 4 women).
The Japanese are extremely anxious to have these
Formosans repatriated. They claim the Formosans have
been raiding Japanese supplies and that the Formosans
had voluntarily enlisted as workers but now assert
their Chinese ancestry because it is to their
advantage to do so. The Chinese Formosans stated that
clothing and food problems had been solved to their
satisfaction as a result of our first inspection.
Outside of their desire to return to FORMOSA, they have
no complaints and have promised to adopt a more patient
attitude.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under
our control.

KURUME Area

Two tunnels at MISHIKE (22 miles SE of KURUME) are
part of a former gold mine. One tunnel now contains
machinery and the other contains a great amount of
explosives and ammunition including approximately
1,000 cases of estimated 155mm shells.
B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

OITA Area

SAEKI Naval Base - A further study of the torpedo boats located here (see G-2 Periodic Reports No. 35 and 41) reveals that the torpedo tubes are missing. The Japanese were reluctant to discuss these torpedo tubes, but it was finally learned that they had to be lowered into the water before the torpedoes could be fired.

SAGA Area

USHIZU (5 miles west of SAGA)

CHIYODA Printing Machine Parts Company was organized 26 June 1945. Power and machines were installed for the manufacture of field howitzer parts but there was no production. The firm has now converted and for the next 2 years plans to repair printing machines damaged by bombing. In the third year, they expect to start manufacturing new parts and to experiment with wood due to the scarcity of metal. The main offices are in TOKYO with this KYUSHU Branch employing 30 people.

NISHIURA Iron Works during the war manufactured 12,000 machine gun shells, 2,000 parts for rocket gun shells, and 10,000 small parts for naval torpedoes monthly. During the war 105 men and women, and 22 students were employed. With 53 men and women this company plans to manufacture 50 machines for draining ponds, 800 grass cutting machines, and 500 needle making machines monthly. The company has a capital of 650,000 yen.

SAGA ITAGAMI Company. This company produces more strawboard than any other similar concern in Japan. 337 workers are employed at an average salary of 100 yen per month. A profit of 100,000 yen each year has been realized since 1922. Products of this company have been shipped to the Orient and to Australia.
SHIMABARA

SHIMABARA Electric Company is a branch of the KYUSHU Electric Power Distributing Company. One half of the power brought into the city is from SAGA Prefecture and the other half comes from five small power plants in OJIWA. If either line fails, there is insufficient power to supply the needs of the city. Monthly consumption averages 842,000 kilowatt hours through metered outlets and 77,750 kilowatt hours through unmetered outlets. Rates are four sen per kilowatt hour for factories and 20 sen per kilowatt hour for private homes. The company has 56 employees.

MOJI Area

KAHOK Tunnel Warehouse is operated by the KOMORIHEI Branch Western Construction Bureau of the Japanese Government Railways. Employers number 191 warehouse workers and 80 office workers now and about the same number of people were employed during the war. The warehouse contains large supplies of railroad maintenance equipment, including pipe, valves, wire, electric lamps, cement, gasoline and machine oil, shovels, concrete mixers, motors, and transformers. The warehouse also contains the pumping station and the air compressors for ventilation of the tunnel.

(2) **Intelligence targets located but not yet placed under surveillance.**

None.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

(1) **Persons apprehended or interned.**

None.

(2) **Suspects.**

TAKAKA, Teijiru (Previously reported in Periodic Report # 29). This subject reportedly disseminated imperialistic and military propaganda in lectures to school children. He has been located and is being interrogated.
(3) **Subversive activities.**

None.

(4) **Unfriendly organizations.**

**KEMPEI TAI.** Captain YOKO, Yosoburo, commanding officer of the KURUKI KEMPEI TAI said that during the war his organization consisted of one captain, one first lieutenant, three second lieutenants, two sub-lieutenants, 27 NCO's and 88 other enlisted men. The functions of this unit were to exercise police control of military personnel, control sabotage among civilians, TOKO KA work among civilians and military, maintain security at military installations, apprehend deserters, and investigate absenteeism at factories. He further stated that all documents were burned on 17 and 18 August in compliance with orders from headquarters at FUKUOKA. This order was cancelled 8 October 1945.

**TOKUMU KIKAN.** An informant, formerly in the Japanese Army, stationed in KOREA stated that there were three zones or offices of the TOKUMU KIKAN at SHANGHAI, at HARBIN, and at NAGASAKI. Each office conducted a language school for the development of espionage agents. The office at SHANGHAI was directed against the Chinese, at HARBIN against the Russians, and at NAGASAKI against the ENGLISH and AMERICANS. The informant said that personnel for TOKUMU KIKAN were selected by regimental or division commanders on the basis of education and linguistic knowledge and sent to the nearest TOKUMU KIKAN branch office. According to him the TOKUMU KIKAN always operated in civilian clothes and had apparently unlimited funds. He knew of no distinctive credentials carried by their personnel. He was told by a friend that when the Russians entered the war and occupied the Harbin Area all TOKUMU KIKAN, because of their knowledge of the language, went to work for the Russians in that area. TOKUMU KIKAN personnel were very secretive about their work and often their own friends and families did not know they were members of the organization. He claimed that Japanese victories over the Chinese were due to intelligence work of the TOKUMU KIKAN. Personnel of TOKUMU KIKAN were usually Japanese although some White Russians and occasionally Koreans would be used.
E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 3 November reported: "On the 30th, a KOREAN was pulled in for questioning for not paying train fare by the police sub-station in HAKI. Upon hearing this the KOREANS in this neighborhood gathered in a mob with clubs and showed signs of rioting. Protest declaration signs were posted in the neighborhood stores by some of these KOREANS, but the Occupation Army MPs removed these signs, it is reported. The SASEBO Police, with the cooperation of the firemen, are on guard."

The HYUGA NICHII NICHII SHIMBUN of 31 October reported: "Mr. JIRO, Akiyama arrived on the morning of the 30th alone, to take his office as the new Chief of Police. He received his new assignment over the phone on the 27th in his former office as the chief of business of the FUKUCHIYAMA district, KYOTO, caught the train on the following afternoon and arrived here with much speed. After a short rest at the capitol, he visited the MIYAZAKI Shrine, called on various departments in the capitol, addressed his subordinates and retired to his quarters. He is full of pep and a very likeable chap. He is only 35 and is a graduate of the TOKYO Imperial University."

The OITA GODO SHIMBUN of 1 November reported: "As one of its plans to hear the voices of the people to uphold postwar peace, the attorney-general of the OITA district established a 'Choso shitsu' (appeal room). There were no 'customers' for the first two weeks after its establishments a month ago, but since then 83 'appeals' have come in. Most of the appeals were complaint about food control, side-tracking of military owned materials, government employees having access to food distribution, and corrupt civil affairs. Of these, 4 cases were settled, and 11 cases were forwarded to the Police Department to obtain necessary evidence. The rest of the cases are being investigated (to obtain the sources of these complaints) by Attorney-General MOKIYAMA and his staff. The Attorney-General urges the people to use this institution more freely and bravely, setting aside all personal matters and using it for constructive purposes."

(2) PRECIOUS METALS.
The SAGANOSEKI Refinery of the NIPPON Mining Company, located approximately 16 miles E of OITA, has on hand a quantity of precious metals. The following information was obtained from a report submitted to the OITA Occupation Group by TOSHIZUMI, Tochi, Assistant Head of the Accounting Department of this refinery. The Japanese claim that the total amount of precious metals on hand now is:

24,279,357 grams of silver (870 ingots) (reported as 24,279,267 grams in summary #43 in error). 61,718 grams of gold (half processed). 486.6 grams of processed platinum. (No facilities were available for the analysis of these metals).

32,961,023 grams of silver was consigned to the company 8 December 1944 by the TOKYO #1 Army Arsenal for refining and was to be sent to OSAKA Army Arsenal after it was refined. Of this quantity received, the following facts are noted in the report:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity received</th>
<th>32,961,023 grams.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade of silver</td>
<td>72.022%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents of silver</td>
<td>23,785,707 grams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction percentage</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction quantity</td>
<td>23,278,633 grams.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7,727 grams of copper separated from this silver was sent to the KOBE Steel Manufacturing Company, MOJI Factory, last April.

On 11 June 1945 - 1,996,440 grams of silver was sent to the Army Arsenal in "ARAS" City, KUMAMOTO Prefecture. (Our records show only the "ARAK" Army Arsenal in KUMAMOTO Prefecture. Silver found there has been confiscated and was reported in G-2 Periodic Report No. 42).

G. L. MC CORRICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ComFifthFlt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC JICPOA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III Phib Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG I Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG X Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 2ndMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 5thMarDiv</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CG 32ndInfDiv 10
MG 22 1
6G FBC 1
NAVECHJAP 1
USSBS TOKYO 1
CO Corps Troops 1
AC of S, G-3, VAC 1
Record Section, VAC 1
File 5782
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

4 November, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilization. (Period 31 October to 3 November)

   NAGASAKI Prefecture       186
   FUKUOKA Prefecture        4
   OITA Prefecture           267
   YAMAGUCHI Prefecture       605 (see paragraph 2.)
   TOTAL                     1,062

2. 110th Inf Regt, 110th Inf Div. 404 of the personnel reported demobilized in YAMAGUCHI Prefecture were reported to belong to this unit. The identification is not accepted as final by the 32nd Inf Div OBE officer. It is believed that this unit is being confused with one previously identified. This headquarters does not accept it at present, because of inadequate proof of its source.

3. Naval hospitals. Staff strengths of naval hospitals for 1 November are reported as follows:

   TSUHAYA Br, SASEBO Nav Hosp     277
   URUSHINO Nav Hosp                117
   ONURA Nav Hosp                   26

4. KYUSHU MP Units. New information which has been received on several MP units is summarized as follows:

   UNIT                  15 Aug STRENGTH  CURRENT STRENGTH
   W. Dist MP Hq         146                   1
   FUKUOKA MP Co
   Branch, KURUME       153                   0
   Branch, ITSUBA       128                   0
   Branch, OMURA        48                    0
   4th Sp Detail, FUKUOKA 41                0
   OITA MP Co           62                    43
   Branch, SAKIKI        22                  (figure includes
   Branch, YAMAGAWA     19                  branches).
   Subbr, YOKOHAMA       6
   Branch, BIFU          5
   Branch, HIDA         8
   Branch, SAKAIKU       6
   Branch, SAGAMICHI     4

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 -

SECRET
Order of Battle (Continued) 4 November 45.

SECRET

KAGOSHIMA MP Co
Branch, IZUMI
Branch, TSUSUKI
Branch, KOKUSU
Branch, KAYOYA
Branch, SHIBUSHI
Branch, TANEGASHIMA

160 (210)

0

The figure in parentheses represents the number of regular army personnel temporarily attached. The 100% demobilization is based on an oral report from 2ndLt TSURUTA, Hideo and has not been confirmed by the 2nd Mar Div. The OITA MP Co was originally organized in 1991 as the OITA Branch, KUMAMOTO MP Station. On 1 April, 1945, it was reorganized into the OITA MP Co, Western District MP Division.

5. The 118th IIM. (The following information is taken from a special report by the 5th Mar Div.) On 1 August, 1926, the BUNGU Straits Fortified Zone Headquarters was established to defend the entrance to the Inland Sea between KYUSHU and SHIKOKU with heavy guns emplaced on TAKASHIMA (island), OITA Prefecture, at TSURUMISAKI, OITA Prefecture and at SADAMISAKI, EHIME Prefecture, SHIKOKU. These included 4 12cm howitzers, and 4 90mm AA guns and 4 50cm howitzers at TAKASHIMA, 1 30cm dual-mount gun, 4 12cm howitzers, and 2 M38 field guns at SADAMISAKI, and 4 15cm guns, 2 M38 field guns, and 4 30cm howitzers at SADAMISAKI. In 1939, the 30cm guns were abandoned. On 17 November, 1941, an emergency war alert (KEIKYUSEMBI) was ordered. This was changed to a normal war alert (JUSEMBI) on 23 December, 1941 and the BUNGU Straits Fortress Artillery Regiment was organized. A test fire of the 30cm guns in January, 1942 resulted in the deaths of the regimental commander and 15 men, and these guns were therefore abandoned. In May, 1942 2 15cm cannon from the TSUGARU Straits Fortress and 2 from the IRAKO Drill Grounds, AICHI Prefecture were moved to TSURUMISAKI. In August, 1942 the T/O was revised, and 490 men transferred to the 9th and 10th Ind Hvy Arty Bn's of the KWANTUNG Army. At this time 2 of the 4 AA guns at TAKASHIMA were abandoned. In August, 1944 5 15cm cannon were moved from SADAMISAKI to KAGOSHIMA Prefecture. In March, 1945 2 field guns were transferred from TSURUMISAKI to NIIGATA Prefecture. On 8 July, 1945 the BUNGU Fortress was abolished and the 118th IIM was organized. The Fortress became the 18th Hvy Arty Regt and was the only unit in the brigade which could be classed as well trained. The following units of the brigade were activated in the NAGANO Div Dist on 8 July:

ENCLOSURE (A)
Order of Battle (Continued) 4 November 45.

SECRET
UNIT T/O 8 JULY STRENGTH

714th Ind Inf Bn 894 893
715th Ind Inf Bn 894 900
716th Ind Inf Bn 894 900
717th Ind Inf Bn 894 908
718th Ind Inf Bn 894 905
118th IAB Arty Bn 856 860
118th IAB Engrs Bn 568 570
118th IAB Sig Co 218 220

80 per cent of these troops were recruited in June, 1945; they were almost immediately incorporated into the brigade and never received adequate training. The Arty Bn never had any weapons; the signal Co was also short of equipment. On 1 August, a rocket Co was organized from the KURUKA Div Dist (T/O 151; 1 Aug Strength 175), but there were never any rockets. After the end of the war, demobilization of this unit was very rapid. A summary of the weapons actually possessed by the brigade on 15 August, 1945 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>3,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGD</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf gun</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm FA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90mm AA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12cm AA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12cm howitzer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15cm gun</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Civilians attached to military units. The following is a continuation of the report begun in 5-2 Periodic Report No. 38. All the information is taken from the 3rd basic report submitted by 16th Area Army:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>CIV.</th>
<th>MIL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71st Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>501</td>
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<tr>
<td>89th Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>491</td>
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<tr>
<td>97th Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>891</td>
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<tr>
<td>104th Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>420</td>
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<td>891</td>
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<tr>
<td>120th Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121st Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>891</td>
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<tr>
<td>122nd Ind Engrs Bn</td>
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<td>482</td>
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<td>123rd Ind Engrs Bn</td>
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<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124th Ind Engrs Bn</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>891</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) - 3 - SECRET

785
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>CIV</th>
<th>MIL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34th Ind MT Bn</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th Ind MT Bn</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th Ind MT Bn</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>808</td>
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<td>84th Ind MT Bn</td>
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<td>408</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Sig Comd</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Sig Regt</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>1,098</td>
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<tr>
<td>52nd Sig Regt</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>1,098</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Early Warning Rad</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>159</td>
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<tr>
<td>41st Sig Regt</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>1,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Sig Regt</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>1,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th Sig Regt</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>1,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Suicide Boat Unit</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Suicide</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
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<td>34th</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>35th</td>
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<td>37th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Suicide Boat Serv Unit</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>399</td>
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<td>2nd</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Repatriation.

? LST's arrived at SASEBO from SAISHU Island on 1 November with 7,401 Army, 0 Navy, 0 Civilians.

DD HAPU arrived at HAKATA from CHINKAI on 1 November with 265 Army, 0 Navy, 0 Civilians.

AM 21 arrived at HAKATA from CHINKAI on 1 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy 1,471 Civilians.

RYUKU MARU arrived at HAKATA from CHINKAI on 1 November with 0 Army, 242 Navy, 290 Civilians.

DE 59 arrived at HAKATA from FUSAN on 1 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy 273 Civilians.

TOKUJU MARU arrived at HAKATA from FUSAN on 2 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 161 Civilians.

TAMURA MARU arrived at HAKATA from FUSAN on 2 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 124 Civilians.
Order of Battle (Continued) 4 November 45.

SECRET

KOSUI MARU arrived at HAKATA from TSUSHIMA on 2 November O Army, O Navy, 124 Civilians.
TENYU MARU arrived at HAKATA from FUSAN on 2 November with O Army, O Navy, 876 Civilians.
KOAM MARU arrived at SENZAKI from FUSAN on 31 October with O Army, O Navy, 6,784 Civilians.

ENCLOSURE (A)
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 03Nov45
To: 1800I, 04Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 5 November 1945.

No. 44.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle. (Omitted).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

Omitted.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

Omitted.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

TOKATA

TAKATANI Iron Works, Ltd., consists of two plants which produced crushers, chemical manufacturing machinery, mining machinery, and cast parts for electrical machinery during the war. Production of these items is continuing, but the plant is operating at only about a third of its wartime capacity, so that only about 1½ tons of parts and machines are produced daily. The company had 304 wartime employees and is employing 112 at present. However, this drop in the number of employees did not come about abruptly at the end of the war, since the Japanese government had taken employees from the plant for their armed services and other purposes during the war.
MOJI

MOJI Telephone Company employs 136 people at present and services 360 phones. During the war 280 people were employed until 15 July when a large number of phones were knocked out by air raids. In the pre-war period there were 3200 telephones in this area.

KOKURA

OSAKA Soda Company employs 280 at present and employed the same number during the war. Its monthly production (both at present and during the war) is as follows: 500 tons of caustic soda, 28 tons of bleaching powder, and 350 tons of hydrochloric acid. Installations include 112 electrolytic cells, 20 bleaching powder chambers, and 6 synthetic hydrochloric acid plants.

YAWATA

MITSUBISHI Chemical Industries Ltd. has a plant at KURASAKI (a suburb of YAWATA) which was established in 1935. Its monthly production at present is as follows: 13,000 tons of coke, 900 tons of ammonium sulphate, 760 tons of nitric acid, 700 tons of sulphuric acid, 20 tons of dyestuffs, and 20 tons of urea glue. These figures represent only about a third of wartime production figures. During the war 2948 were employed and 1357 are employed at present. The site of the factory occupies approximately 750 acres and the floor space contained therein is 153,450 square meters.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None.
(5) Miscellaneous.

An interview with MURAKAWA, Takehisa, chief of the NAGASAKI branch of the SHOKOGIO HODO KAI (Occupational Guidance Association) disclosed that the full name of the organization is IZOKU SHOKU GUNJIN HOGO NARABIN TAI SHOKU GUNJIN SHOKOGIO KAI (Occupational Guidance Association and Protective Society for Families of Sick or Wounded Veterans). Officers of the association are appointed at its headquarters in TOKYO (located at MOTONO, NIKUGUNDAI, DAIGAKKO). The national head is HONJO Shigeru. MURAKAWA states that the association is not under any police control and that it has no connection with DENOKAI (Veterans Relief Association). The purpose of the SHOKOGIO HODO KAI is to aid the families of soldiers and to secure jobs for returning veterans.

Screening of the KURUME Police Department by CIC reveals that most of the policemen were not educated beyond primary school. Their primary concern seems to be the guaranteeing of the necessities of life for themselves and their families, but they also seem to have a good measure of devotion to police duty. Several of them expressed the belief that the increasing food shortage might bring an increase in crime. In general, knowledge of the KEMPETAI, the TOKKO KA, or other unfriendly organizations was lacking. These policemen indicated that the present function of the Neighborhood Associations is to distribute scarce food commodities and to aid in the work of reconstruction.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 4 November 1945 reported; "The pine root oil distillery of HIRADO-KACHI (in the northern part of NAGASAKI Prefecture) stopped its operation at the termination of the war. This fuel is of great necessity, especially to the fishermen as fuel for boat engines. The farmers who previously also needed this fuel are now not so keen about its production since they are getting heavy oil from the military authorities. On the other hand, the military's heavy oil is not being distributed to the fishermen, so they are requesting more production of pine root oil. They are expecting the Standard Oil Company, and other oil companies of America to come in to help."
The NISHI SHIMBUN of 4 November 1945 reported; "potato rice will make its debut in MIYAZAKI Prefecture soon. This potato rice is a product of the sweet potato, cut into small cubes, freed of acid with lime water, thoroughly dried and whitened, can be stored away like rice or wheat, as well as saving storage space of sweet potatoes. This experiment has been completed so the NOBUOKA Dry Vegetable Company will proceed toward its production with the aid of the prefectural authorities. This new food will be on the market not later than March or April of next year."

The same paper reports; "The submarine, TOKUI, with Comdr. SAKAE, Kihara and about thirty men enroute to OMURA from KURE, hit a mine off the shores of HIROSE-MURA, MIYAZAKI, and sank about noon 29 October, 1945. Three members of the crew were saved but the commander and the rest of the crew seem to have been lost. This sub was one of those newly built last summer. It carried a 15mm machine gun."

The MAINICHI SHIMBUN of 4 November 1945 reported; "According to a dispatch received by the MIYAZAKI police station from the SASEBO Naval Base, the submarines 'I-363' and 'I-111' and the sub-chasers, '19' and '20' scheduled to arrive in SASEBO two days ago have not been heard of since the 29th off MIYAZAKI when communications were stopped by a raging storm. The prefectural police immediately commenced a search."

G. L. MC COMMAN,  
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC,  
AC of S, G-2.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 04Nov45
To: 1800I, 05Nov45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SA380, KYUSHU,
0800, 6 November 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
   See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
   No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
   None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

NAGASAKI

MITSUBISHI Warehouse, near KOJIRO Village about 8.5 miles North West of SHIMABARA, contains boxes and crates of ships' hull parts, AA gun parts, and miscellaneous electrical equipment. There are 321 boxes and crates in all which had been sent from NAGASAKI City on 26 June 1945. TANI, manager of MITSUBISHI properties in the KOJIRO police district stated that in May, June, and July of this year MITSUBISHI removed surplus parts and materials to various small warehouses throughout the NAGASAKI Area and that the location of these warehouses were kept secret. When questioned as to why the existence of this warehouse had not been reported, the police stated that they...
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 45. (Continued)

SECRET

had been unaware of its existence. They were then instructed that they would be held responsible for the safety of the material. After the war ended TANI had been instructed by MITSUBISHI to submit to them a list of the material under his control. He complied with this order and assumed that the warehouse would be reported to the Occupation Forces by MITSUBISHI. He did not report it to the police due to the earlier requirement of secrecy imposed upon him.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKUMU KIKAN. The reasons for establishing this organization were to control the civilian population of China without having a military government since no declaration of war had been made at the time, and to exercise this control ostensibly in compliance with international law. TOKUMU KIKAN had four separate offices in China as follows:

1) North China (Hq at PEKING).
2) Central China (Hq at HANKOU).
3) South China (Hq at CANTON).
4) SHANGHAI.

In the HANKOW Area there were about 500 members. The source of this information was NAKAGAWA, Tara, who was in the education branch of the organization in HANKOW from May 1940 to December 1943. Personalities mentioned by NAKAGAWA as having connections with the army TOKUMO KIKAN were Col. ASAI, Col. TAKUSHIMA, Col. ASADA, Col. KUSE, 1st Lt. HORIKAWA, 1st Lt. KADOYAMA, and 1st Lt. SAITO. The latter three were in the HANKOW Branch. Another informant had placed the fourth Hq at HSINKING instead of SHANGHAI. (See OOB Enclosure to G-2 Periodic Report No. 37).
E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN of 5 November 1945 reported; "The shipyards in KIKOIMA-MACHI, SHIMONOSEKI (MITSUBISHI Section) formerly employed a total of 3,600 men, but of late the number has fallen off to 700, less than 20 percent of the former figure, so with so few hands the planned ship construction is out of the question. Therefore, the present plan is to induce as many workers as possible to enter the yards by such methods as extra rations, special treatment, etc. In this manner it is hoped that many demobilized men will take up this employment."

The SAGA SHIMBUN of 5 November 1945 reported; "The Western Mine Workers Union and the JAPAN Coal Miners Union joined forces, becoming the KYUSHU Miners' Union. On the first of the month, 37 interested persons gathered at the branch office of the Commerce, Industry, and Finance Association and held a preparatory meeting for organization. Early in December a general meeting for the organization of the union will be held in the city of ITZUKA."

The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN OF 5 November 1945 reported; "SASEBO food distribution agency criticized for 'officialism.' 'I bet there isn't a place more bureaucratic than the food distribution agency.' These words of discontent expressed by the bewildered SASEBO populace against the food distribution agency. For example, their official rest periods, cases where more rice was sold to one and less to another by a mere difference of one day. Families with both husband and wife working making it necessary to purchase during the lunch hour were refused attention because it was the rest period of the distribution office."

(2) MINE SWEEPING ACTIVITIES.

The SHIMONOSEKI Naval Defense Unit reports that in the past six months it has located 1,500 mines, of these 300 have been destroyed and 40 others removed. The area they swept, and are continuing to sweep, is along the coast line from SENZAKI to UBE. There are 10 special chasers, and 10 motor boats being used.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO. 45.  (Continued)

SECRET

at present to accomplish this mission. To date approximately 40 boats have been destroyed in the course of these operations.

G. L. MC CORNICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMACR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tr>
<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>OIC JICPOA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FMF PAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com5thPhib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III Phib Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG I Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG X Corps</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 2ndMarDiv</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 32ndInfDiv</td>
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<td>MAC-22</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSBS TOKYO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Record Section, VAC</td>
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- 4 -
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

6 November, 1945

1. Demobilization. 611 naval personnel were demobilized in NAGASAKI Prefecture during the period 1800, 3 November to 1800, 5 November.

2. Western Army Branch, Air Hq Accounts Office. The following information is reported by the 2nd Mar Div from interrogation of Lt. Col. ISHIKO, Rokuro, CO of the unit; they evaluate the reliability as fair. This unit was not a part of the 5th Air Army but during the war worked closely with the 6th Air Army Hq. It's principal mission was the supervision and administration of buildings, rovements, and air-raid shelters. It's zone of responsibility included KUMAMOTO, MIYAZAKI, KAGOSHIMA Prefecture and part of FUKUOKA Prefecture. Under its control were Special Labor Units (TOKUSETSU SAGYOTAI) which were mixed military and civilian units lent out on specific jobs to various contractors. These contractors were paid by the Branch Headquarters. Most of the equipment belonged to the contractors, though some machinery belonged to the Accounts Office. A breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUB-UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>MIL</th>
<th>CIV</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>STR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>LtCol ISHIKO</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1stLt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>124</td>
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<tr>
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<td>SHIMO MASUKI GUN</td>
<td>LtLt SAKAMOTO</td>
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<td>120</td>
<td>124</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YAME GUN</td>
<td>Ichihara</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lt. Col. ISHIKO and 7 officers will go to TOKYO on 20 November to report on the closing out of accounts. The remainder of the personnel are expected to be demobilized by 10 November.

3. OITA Regimental Headquarters. This unit was established in April, 1944 from a cadre of the FUJISUGIRO Regt Hq. Up to 1938, the unit was under the jurisdiction of the KOKURA Div; in

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
1938 it passed to the control of the KUMAMOTO Depot Division and then to the KUMAMOTO Divisional District. The unit has been located continuously at OITA City. It has supervised the mobilization of troops in OITA Prefecture for the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, the China War, and World War II. The unit had a T/O of 114 and an actual strength of 115. It was divided into 3 sections:

1st Section - mobilization
2nd Section - Active Service records
3rd Section - Reserves (Demobilization)

4. The 4th Naval Fuel Depot has been reported by the 32nd Inf Div as being located on the outskirts of FUKUOKA City. Of an original strength of 70, 15 remain. Also reported were FUKUOKA Nav Personnel Office (Strength 15Aug:20; current strength 49) and the Naval OIC at FUKUOKA (Strength 15Aug:15; current strength 4.)

5. Civilians attached to military units. The following is a continuation of the studies published in O-2 Periodic Report No. 38 and No. 45. Civilian complements of special garrison units (militia) have already been analyzed in the VAC demobilization reports. This report will cover army service troops.

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>T/O</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Order of Battle</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) 15,943 7,840 8,803 15,943
Order of Battle. (Continued)

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6. Repatriation.

KATOKU MARU arrived HAKATA from CHINKAI on 3 November with 0 Army, 250 Navy, 0 civilians.

SÔNAN MARU arrived HAKATA from CHINKAI on 3 November with 0 Army, 121 Navy, 0 civilians.

MABIKI MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 3 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 1,046 civilians.

SHIRASAKI MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 3 November with 100 Army, 6 Navy, 0 civilians.

ENCLOSURE (A)
Order of Battle.  (Continued)  6Nov45.

SECRET

KOMPIRA MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 3 November
with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 38 civilians.
SC 23 arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 3 November with
0 Army, 127 Navy, 0 civilians.
MS 18 arrived HAKATA from CHINKAI on 3 November with
0 Army, 30 Navy, 0 civilians.
KIKA MARU arrived KAJIKI, KAGOSHIMA Prefecture from
KITAI DAITO JIMA on 2 November with 329 Army, 4 Navy, 0 civilians.
ML SHISHA arrived KAJIKI from MANILA on 2 November with
0 Army, 0 Navy, 241 civilians.
6 CP's arrived KAJIKI from DAVAO and TACLOBAN with
0 Army, 0 Navy, 1,252 civilians.
CD 59 arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 4 November with
0 Army, 0 Navy, 264 civilians.
YUKIMA MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 4 November
with 2,134 Army, 0 Navy, 16 civilians.
HAYATOMO MARU arrived HAKATA from CHINKAI on 4 November
with 0 Army, 282 Navy, 148 civilians.
TOKUJU MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 4 November
with 2,981 Army, 0 Navy, 106 civilians.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 18001, 05Nov45
To: 18001, 06Nov45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 7 November 1945.

No. 46.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosure: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Location of Japanese Army and Navy Airfields.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) **Japanese military units hitherto unreported.**
See Enclosure (A).

(2) **Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.**
See Enclosure (A).

(3) **General attitude of military and semi-military units.**
No change.

(4) **Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.**
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) **Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.**

**KUMAMOTO Area**

Sheet Metal Works near KUMANOSHO (5 miles South of KUMAMOTO) made piston rings for automobiles and planes for MITSUBISHI Heavy Industries Ltd. during the war. It then employed 150, but employs only 6 at present who are making metal buckets. About 25% of the factory was bombed out.

**NAGASAKI Area**

SHIKIMI Radio Station at SHIKIMI (5 miles NW of NAGASAKI) is incomplete and has never been operated, but it is believed to have been designed for military use. This installation consists of 6 triangular
antenna, 2 receivers, 2 transmitters, a radio shack, and a barracks building. Construction on the station was begun on 28 June and halted on 8 August.

TOBATA

HIFON-SUISAN-KABUSHIKIGAIISHA employs 300 fishermen and 160 office workers and processes 1600 tons of fish daily. During the war it employed 1000 fishermen and the same number of office workers and processed 4000 tons of fish daily. The decrease in personnel was caused by men leaving for the military services. The company has 48 boats, 40 of which are being repaired and 8 which are operational. All boats are equipped with short-wave radios which could be contacted by the company radio station (has never been used for military purposes according to the Japs). The head office of this company is in TOKYO.

KOKURA

KUSHU Special Steel Company produced four tons of carbon steel and one ton of high speed steel daily during the war for the Japanese army. The wartime employee strength was 650, but at present only 110 are employed and the company turns out 50 rekes and 50 hoes daily.

FUKAE SHIMA (GOTO RETTO)

TAG Seaplane Base (on TOMIE WAI) was under construction when the war ended and was never put into use.

KOTOMA Airfield (just inland from TOMIE WAI) has a main landing strip 1300 meters long and a secondary strip 1200 meters long. The field was never used for anything more than an emergency landing strip. The two fighter planes on the main strip are in poor condition and the Japs state they were put there as decoys.

TAKANOURA Radar Station (at the SW corner of FUKAE SHIMA) consists of two screens which covered the western approaches to this island. The Japs state that one of the screens was destroyed by a U.S. submarine on 7 August. The remainder of the station is still in operating condition.
C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons arrested or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

IBUKI, Motogoro, a resident of NAGASAKI, has been investigated by CIC. He has been associated with potentially subversive organizations (including DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI - see G-2 Periodic Reports No. 20 and 24) and is a militarist, but there is no indication that he is now engaged in any subversive activities.

(3) Subversive activities.

None.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE

No change

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRESS SURVEY.

The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 6 Nov. 1945 reported: "After a careful survey of the municipal set-up in the light of the city's post war program, Mayor KOURA of SASEBO, made the following announcements on the 5th at 4 PM. According to this announcement auditor TAKAHIRA, who is well liked by the citizens, and three other bureau chiefs, KATAMURA, ISHII, and AKAGI are to retire. New appointees are former Mr. MIZUGUCHI, Rombo as the head of the Shrine Bureau and Engineer WATANABE as the Superintendent of the building department. Other announcements regarding changes in the set-up were: 1. Instead of the present 12 departments, 3 departments, liaison, reconstruction and finance will be newly organized. 2. These 12 departments which required 46 personnel will be changed to 8 bureaus with 38 personnel."
The ASAHI SHIMBUN of 6 Nov 45 reported; "To destroy the remaining war power of JAPAN 109 planes for military use were burned by the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment, 32nd Division of the C.A. at the OZUKI AIRFIELD in MAJUGUCHI - KEN on the 2nd. Scrap metal will be returned to the Japanese Government for the use by the people."

The same paper reports; "Against Bureaucracy, 'against Communists', and 'against Propagandists,' as their three slogans, a new young men's association was organized in KURUME on the 3rd with the aim to hold the nationwide young men's organizations into one unit...."

The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN of 6 Nov 45 reports; "As a result of conferences between Mayor OKADA and president HASHIMOTO of the Chamber of Commerce, a plan to organize a citizens' Company to be known as the Greater NAGASAKI Reconstruction Company, Ltd. was drawn. On the 5th at 2 PM the Mayor called a meeting of the City's Committee at which the announcement of this new plan was made..."

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**DISTRIBUTION:**

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| OIC JTCPGA | 1 |
| C3 FIFPAC | 1 |
| Com5thPhib | 1 |
| CG III Phib Corps | 1 |
| CG I Corps | 1 |
| CG X Corps | 1 |
| CG 2ndMarDiv | 10 |
| CG 5thMarDiv | 10 |
| APFAC Hq (MANILA) | 2 |
| CG 32ndInfDiv | 10 |
| Attn G-2 | 1 |
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| MAG 22 | 1 |
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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

7 November, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Annexes. (Sixth Army only) The following special reports were compiled by the 5th Mar Div:

Report of KOKURA Military Arsenal (14 Pages).
Japanese Naval Units in OITA KEN (Enclosures A through K).
SAEKI Defense Corps (7 pages).

Variations from standard terminology in these reports are as follows:

**VARIATION**
Special Attack Unit.
Assault Corps
Engineer & Construction Unit.
Aeronautical Arsenal
Defense Corps

**STANDARD**
Special attack force.
Assault Unit.
Naval Construction Battalion.
Naval Air Depot (Naval Air Area).
Naval defense unit.

Of special interest is the fact that the SAEKI Defense Unit proper was concerned primarily with mine sweeping and coast defense, but that attached to it was a naval "brigade". This brigade was in fact a reasonably well equipped infantry regiment. The SAEKI Defense appears to vary from the usual pattern of such units which are primarily concerned with sea mines. A logical explanation would be that the CD and AA elements (normally handled by naval guard forces) and the infantry elements (normally represented by SNLF's) were lumped under one command at SAEKI because of its geographical autonomy from the mother base at KURE.

2. At our request, a new order of battle for the 6th Air Army was submitted. This report covers only the V Amphibious Corps Area. According to Lt. Col. DOBA, 6th Air Army Staff Officer, 3 representatives from the 6th Air Army went to KYOTO about 1 November for liaison purposes. According to Col DOBA, there are now 47 left on the Hq staff at FUKUOKA. On 10 November, the 6th Air Army will be dissolved, but 10 officers will remain at FUKUOKA for an indefinite period to close out the business and settle any problems that might arise. This report varies considerably from a previous report submitted by the 2nd General Army to the Sixth Army. It is believed that the revised order of battle is more accurate, as it was compiled after the Japanese had rechecked and also because the disposition of the units in the new report is more logical in view of the military situation in August. All subordinate units of the 6th Air Army have now been dissolved as reported in VAC Demobilization Report Number 6. The strengths and locations quoted are for 15 August, 1945. A new type of unit not previously reported is the independent air regiment (DOKURITSU SENTAI); this unit was an en-

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET

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larded reconnaissance unit and was employed directly by the 6th Air
Army. It should also be noted that the 6th Air Brigade (HIKODAN)
was under the control of the 12th Air (Flying) Division (HIKOSHDAN)
and that the 7th and 21st Air Brigade Hq were under the 30th Air
group (HIKOSHDAN). This group has been reported by the 2nd Mar
Div as being primarily a suicide unit; this information tallies
with previous reports on this unit.

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ENCLOSURE (A)
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<td>Col YAMAGATA, Arimitsu</td>
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<td>SHINDAIBARA A/F</td>
<td>Maj INOUE, Ino</td>
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<td>Capt OGATA, Sakasato</td>
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<td>238th A/F Bn</td>
<td>CHIKUGU A/F</td>
<td>Capt SUGIHARA, Tomizo</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) - 3 - SECRET
Order of Battle. (Continued) 7Nov45.

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**SECRET**

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<td>Maj MATSUYAMA, Tomoshichi</td>
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<td>KUMANO TO</td>
<td>1stLt TANABE, Yozemon</td>
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**UNITS UNDER DIRECT CONTROL 6TH AIR ARMY**

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<td>KUHOKOSHO A/F</td>
<td>Maj KUSAKARI, Takeshi</td>
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<td>FUKUOKA A/F</td>
<td>LtCol INOTA, Minoru</td>
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<td>137th Ind Maint Unit</td>
<td>TACHIDARAI A/F</td>
<td>1stLt TAKEYAMA, Masaki</td>
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<td>197th Ind Maint Unit</td>
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<td>KUHOKOSHO A/F</td>
<td>Capt NISHIMURA, Yukimoto</td>
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<td>300th Ind Maint Unit</td>
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<td>YAMAGA</td>
<td>Capt IMADA, Matashi</td>
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<td>15th U/G Install Unit</td>
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**TCHIDARAI AIR**

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<td>SHIZUNO SEKI</td>
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<td>BOFU</td>
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<td>Capt YATOMA, Kuma</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) - 4 -
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<td>Maj GOTO, Nobone 323</td>
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<td>Maj KIKYOGAHARA, Nitaro 140</td>
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<td>Maj TANIGUCHI, Kazuo 126</td>
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<td>FUKUOKA</td>
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<td>Col NAKAMURA, Isamu 2,000</td>
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<td>Col NohEDA, Yoshi 1,800</td>
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<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>Capt NAKAMURA, Masatsugu 220</td>
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<td>Maj Kako, Kyoichi 180</td>
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<td>3rd Meteorological Unit</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>LtCol HISAMONI, Michio 415</td>
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3. **KURE N. D. Naval Construction Bns.** The KURE Naval District has finally turned over a list of the naval construction battalions formerly located in the V Amphibious Corps Area. According to this report, these units were totally demobilized on 23 October. This was one month after this headquarters had been established, and no report on these units was made during that period, according to Capt YOSHIDA, KURE member of the SaSEBO liaison committee, each battalion had 20 rifles which were turned in to the munitions department at the close of the war. Locations and strengths are for 15 August.
Order of Battle.  
(Continued)  
7Nov45.  

**SECRET**

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<tr>
<td>514th N.C. Bn</td>
<td>TSUYUKI A/F, FUKUOKA KEN</td>
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<td>HIKARI, KUMAGE GUN</td>
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The strengths of all of these units located at airfields and seaplane bases have been included in the strength reports for these fields; however, the 1,920 not located at airfields represent completely new personnel not previously reported.