G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 18001, 06Nov45
To : 18001, 07Nov45

HQ, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0600, 8 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures:
(A) Order of Battle.
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)
(C) Preliminary Examination of Japanese "Cannon" Tank. (Submitted by NAVTECHJAP).
(D) Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Armored Personnel Carrier (Submitted by NAVTECHJAP).
(E) Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Armored Reconnaissance Car (Submitted by NAVTECHJAP).
(F) Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Self-Propelled 105mm Howitzer (Submitted by NAVTECHJAP).
(G) Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Medium Tank, Type 3 (1943) (Submitted by NAVTECHJAP).
(H) Preliminary Report, Type 4, 75mm AA Guns (Submitted by NAVTECHJAP).

A. DEMOLILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 47.  (Continued)

SECRET

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

HAGI

HAGI Radio Station is owned and operated by the Japanese Broadcasting System. This station with a 50 watt output has been in operation for 3 years. The radio equipment is used to amplify broadcasts into privately owned radio sets and operates best on the 1000 - 1650KC. There are telephone connections with SOFU and TOKIO.

HAGI Police Station has been placed under surveillance. Several items of radio equipment were found at this station.

HAGI Dock Area. There are 30 large wooden craft in the canal which during the war were hired by the Japanese Army to transport bamboo to KOREA in return for beans. These operations ceased on 20 July 1945. Cargo aboard these craft has been stored and inventoried. Three ports adjacent to the Dock Area were mined by the Japanese during the war but the mines were cleared and the ports opened for operation on 15 June 1945. Due to shallow water, the harbor facilities are limited. The following vessels were located in the port areas at the time of this investigation.

DAI KOKU MARU. 2200 tons; steam-powered; speed 3 knots; complement, 54; presently owned by the Japanese Maritime Service.

SS#18. 780 tons; powered by a diesel twin-screw engine; speed, 12 knots; complement, 42. According to a representative of the Maritime Service, this vessel was used to take demobilized troops to KOREA but it made only 1 trip. Communications consists of short and long wave equipment. The call sign is J.M.V. The vessel was commissioned in September 1944.

SS #13 is the same as SS #18 except that the complement is only 20 men.
MITSUBISHI Chemical Plant, Industrial Companies, Ltd., MAKIYAMA Plant. The wartime personnel was 3500 which included 900 students. The monthly wartime production capacity consisted of 80,000 panes of window glass, 13,000 tons of soda ash, 7,500 tons of caustic soda and 1,500 tons of sodium bicarbonate. At present the plant employs 1,800, of which 1,760 are employed in the production of 1,500 tons of soda ash daily, and 40 to patrol the area around the plant. Plans are being made for the production of caustic soda, sodium bicarbonate, and calcium chloride.

The KOBE Steel Company Ltd., MOJI Factory employed 1,928 people during the war in manufacturing 5,290 tons of copper alloy pipe, 8,400 tons of copper alloy plate, 12,720 tons of copper alloy bars, and 180 tons of magnesium forgings per year. This factory ceased operations in July or August 1945; exact date is not known. At present 186 civilians are employed in guard duty and maintenance of the factory. The following supplies and dumps were found at this factory: electrolytic copper 436 tons, electrolytic zinc 712 tons, zinc 374 tons, tin 69 tons, aluminum 2 tons, and copper alloy scraps 2,770 tons. Finished goods: copper alloy pipe 81 tons, copper alloy bars 280 tons, and copper alloy plate 81 tons. Semi-finished goods: copper alloy pipe 97 tons, copper alloy bars 457 tons, copper alloy plate 385 tons, and magnesium forgings 100 tons.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None to report.

(3) Subversive activities.

The incident of the lecturer TANAKA, Teishu, (see G-2 Periodic Reports #29 and #43) has been closed. It has been reported that no imperialistic doctrines are apparent in his lectures.
(d) Unfriendly organizations.

The GOTO-RETTO KEMEI TAI consisted of 6 men under the command of 2nd Lt. NAGAKATSU, Tsuruma and was demobilized 20 September 1945. Headquarters was in FUKAE.

TOKUMU KIKAN. Both army and navy are reported to have maintained units of TOKUMU KIKAN in NAGASAKI City. The army unit was commanded by Major NISHIDA, (first name unknown), who had about 12 enlisted men under him as well as some civilians. NISHIDA is known to have been in NAGASAKI City since at least March 1944 and as late as May 1945. He was attached directly to the War Ministry and had no relationship with any local military unit. This information was secured through interrogation of Lt. Gen. TANIGUCHI, CG, 122nd IMB. The navy unit was commanded by MIUWI, Noriuki, who had a GUNZOKU (civilian with semi-military status) rating equivalent to that of a Navy Lieutenant Commander. Unit personnel were either civilians or GUNZOKU. Personnel numbered between 145 and 170. The unit was said to have come from the South Seas Wooden Boat Association, formerly located on HAINAN Island. This organization came to NAGASAKI in April 1945 where for about 15 days it was known as the KAIGUN UNYU HOMBU TOKUBETSU YUSOTAI. On 16 April 1945 the name was changed to KAIGUN TOKUMU KIKAN, MIUWI TAI. The unit was directly responsible to the Transport Department of the Navy Ministry. It had no connection with any intelligence section of the military service. The unit was engaged in the transport of military goods between points in Japan and the continent. Information was received through interrogation of TANAKA, Tsuneuki, MOROTSU Toshiro, and NOKURA, Shunzaku, all former members of the MIUWI unit. From present information it appears that the only connection between Navy KAIGUN TOKUMU KIKAN and TOKUMU KIKAN as an intelligence organization was in the similarity of names.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Technical Intelligence:

The following items of equipment (as reported in G-2 Periodic Report No. 24) were further investigated by
NAVMETECHJAF and found to be standard types and therefore not worthy of a detailed report:

- Model 99, 80mm AA gun.
- Model 14, 10cm AA gun.
- Model 88, 75mm AA gun.
- Model 98, 20mm AA Automatic Cannon on twin mount.
- Model 96, 150mm howitzer.

The remaining items of equipment (as reported in G-2 Periodic Report No. 24) were further investigated by NAVTECHJAF and are reported on in Enclosures C through H. The original reports complete with pictures have been forwarded to Sixth Army through separate channels.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
AC of 3, G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECREn

8 November, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilization. The 5th Mar Div reports 99% demobilized during the period 5 Nov to 7 Nov. The 2nd Mar Div reports 17 personnel of the 122nd IMB and 10 personnel of the 134th AA Regt remain. The 32nd Inf Div reports the current strength of the KOKURA Mil Hosp ia 53 staff-members and 253 patients.

2. Civilians attached to Military Units. This report concludes the study of civilians attached to units of the 16th Area Army.

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ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 -
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<td>MIYAZAKI Regt Dist</td>
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**RECAPITULATION 16th AREA ARMY**

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ENCLOSURE (A) - 2 - SECRET
Order of Battle. (Continued) 8 Nov 45.

SECRET

Ind MT Units 1,595 1,637 3,232
Ind Sig Units 2,901 4,957 7,858
Suicide Boat Units 1,578 2,294 3,872
Service Units 19,458 17,477 36,935
Replacement Units 2,061 55,839 57,899
Hospitals 747 2,808 3,555
Unattached Inf Ens 0 3,108 3,108
Total 16th Area Army 72,463 439,627 512,093

It should be noted that these figures are exclusive of shipping, railroad, depot, KP, air, and army units in YAMAGUCHI Prefecture. It seems certain there were no civilians in the KP units. Breakdowns of depot personnel are best represented in the reports submitted by the 2nd General Arm to the Sixth Army. No data is available on the civilian question in re shipping and railroad units. However, in view of the situation in the 16th Area Army the fact that there were such personnel becomes a distinct probability.

Warning: In spite of the fact that these figures are from the third report of the 16th Area Army, there is evidence that they may still be too high. A preliminary report from the 40th Army (Corps) does not jibe in any single respect with any previous report. The whole matter undergoing extensive investigations by our divisions. It is believed that these figures are valuable, however, in indicating the proportion of untrained personnel incorporated directly into combat and service units.

3. Repatriation.

SS HUTCHINSON arrived KAHIKI from DAVAO on 5 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 1,469 civilians.
SS TIPF arrived KAHIKI from DAVAO on 5 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 1,505 civilians.
SHOELESS LARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 4 November with 609 Army, 0 Navy, 29 civilians.
T 137 arrived HAKATA from AMAMI O SHIMA on 5 November with 157 Army, 461 Navy, 0 civilians.
KANU NARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN, 0 Army, 0 Navy, 831 civilians.
ISAO NARU arrived HAKATA from TSUSHIMA with 1 Army, 4 Navy, 217 civilians.
DD MAKI arrived KAHIKI from MANILA on 1 November with 42 Army, 0 Navy, 206 civilians.
Transport 172 arrived JIKI from AMAMI O SHIMA on 1 November with 682 Army, 0 Navy, 0 civilians.
KASU NARU arrived HAKATA from SHINKAI on 6 November with 0 Army, 254 Navy, 0 civilians.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 3 - SECRET
YUKAZE HARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 380 civilians.
MAMIYA HARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 61 Army, 0 Navy, 793 civilians.
MS 20 arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 50 civilians.
MS 19 arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 73 civilians.
RIUHEI HARU arrived HAKATA from CHINKAI on 6 November with 0 Army, 453 Navy, 305 civilians.
UNZEN HARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 807 Army, 0 Navy, 842 civilians.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of
Information press news directive were noted. Translations of
local news items of possible interest are presented.

2. NAGASAKI SHINBUN - 7 November 1945 (published in
NAGASAKI). With the approaching winter, the war victims, large
and small, are facing great difficulties. Since the work on
Easy Homes is not progressing, only those with money can afford to
do repairing in spite of the fact that they are compelled to pay
overwhelming prices.......

One of these victims had this to say:
"My house was completely burned. Clothing nor anything
else was salvaged. I was able to rent a small house, but the roof
leaked, so I had to get a contractor. Only two or three squares
were needed to be repaired, which took three men ½ day each. I
had to pay $500.00 for this work."

This is only one of the cases as "black market" is
prevailing all over the city. The authorities are investigating
and are intending to regulate with strict price control. The
carpenters working on the Occupational Army projects are being
paid $15.00 a day while the laborers get $9.00 a day.

The population of the city of Gasebo is estimated to be
150,000 at the present time as compared to 350,000 in previous
years. However, the City's Reconstruction Committee sighted the
need of speedy revival of a greater city and sent the following
proposals to the Ministry of Interior for approval:

1. The total war torn area is 300,000 tsubo. With
the addition of neighboring area, we intend to erect a new city
with 500,000 tsubo, of which 50,000 tsubo will be planned for
parks and play grounds and 450,000 tsubo will be planned as
business and residential districts.

2. In general, all the roads and highways will be
widened, making the national highways 35 meters instead of 20 meters
and the other streets 15 meters wide.

3. All the buildings in the central section will be
of reinforced concrete. No frame buildings will be allowed.

4. The business section, presently occupied by the
Occupational Force, will be erected upon the relinquishing of the
premises by the C.A.

5. The foregoing city planning with an area of 500,
000 means an increase of 20 tsubo per man as compared to 15 tsubo
per man prior to the bombing.
The closing ceremony of the Kyushu Area Administrative Government will be held on the 7th at 10:00 in the presence of Supt. Tozuka and the entire members of the staff.

3. MITSUI NIPPON SHIMEUN - 7 November 1945 (published in FUKUOKA). The citizens of Sasebo, especially the women under middle age, are becoming very careless with the traffic regulations these days. The Marine Headquarters of the VAC in Sasebo, therefore, forwarded the following instructions to the Police Dept on the 1st.

1. All pedestrians must walk on the left side of the road.
2. More than two must not walk together where the traffic is heavy.
3. Freight wagons must pass on the extreme left side of the road.
4. Immediate right-of-way must be given to emergency cars.

The children of war torn Nagasaki are continuing their studies in the damaged school rooms and temporary school buildings toward the reconstruction of New Japan. Here are two excerpts gathered from the children's writings.

Kobayuki Fujita, 5th grade, writes:
"I fought very hard, but Japan was defeated and the war ended on August 15th. I cannot forget the noon of that day forever....Can the citizens of Nagasaki forget August 9th? We desire no war. War hurts the people and destroys humanity. When did the Greater East Asia expand to such an extent? If I think the war brings such sadness, I'd rather have peace.

Since the arrival of the occupational army, many things reflected on us. Their tractors cleaned the mess in few hours, and they extinguished a large fire before we could say, "ah". Everything they do is speedy. The newspapers say we are short of food, coal and other things. We are small, but we must do our best to help the crisis and build New Japan so that we can live in peace."

Miss Sumi Fuji, 6th grade, writes:
"The end of the war was announced by the Emperor on August 15th. Japan became a defeated nation. We don't know what to think of this defeat, as Japan's history was unblemished for the past 3,000 years. Japan is way back in civilization. We learned this through the activities of the occupational men. However, we must not cry over our defeat. We must study hard and work in order to rebuild Japan."
4. KUMAMOTO NICHIGI NICHIGI SHIMBUN - 4 November 1945 (published in KUMAMOTO). In order to introduce the real beauty of "Scenic Kumamoto" and promote American-Japanese friendship, the Kumamoto branch of Japan tourist Bureau has decided to introduce Mt. Aso with the assistance of the American Red Cross. Beginning the 5th, for two weeks, a group of 4 officers and 60 men will be taken up to the crater, stay overnight at the tourist hotel and will be taken back at Kumamoto the following day.

From the Investigation Bureau of the Cabinet came Mr. Kan Taniguchi to take office as the new Chief of Police of Kumamoto on the 2nd. He stayed in the Hotel that night, visited the shrine on the following morning at 6:30 and addressed his subordinates at the prefectural capitol at 9:00. He also paid visits to the various important government departments. In his interview, he said in part, "I am thinking of building a police station that the people can trust."

5. ASAHI SHIMBUN - 7 November 1945 (published in KOKURA). (Miyakonojo Dispatch) - U. S. Occupational Army of 1,200 men, commanded by Lt. Col. Holden, arrived at Takasu Harbor on three transports from Nagasaki, on the morning of the 5th. First unit of 80 men, led by Lt. Truck, arrived at Miyakonojo by train at 5:30 P.M. and immediately entered their quarters in former Western 61st Field Hospital. The rest of the unit will continue to arrive during the night.

(Kumamoto Dispatch) - The deaths from hunger are increasing in various parts of the country, but in Kumamoto prefecture 12 of these deaths have been reported since August 11th. Of these, the majority of them were aged people, over 50 years old, but a girl of 18 and a man of 25 were found dead on the road and depot, respectively.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE "CANNON" TANK.
(submitted by NAVTECHJAP).

1. General Information: The tanks examined were designated by no type number, but were referred to by personnel of the unit which operated them as "Cannon Tanks." They had the same hull, suspension system, engine and chassis as Type 97 Tanks, but mounted a special turret designed for the type 90 75mm gun.

2. Turret: The turret on the tank was designed so that the entire rear position and part of the top could be opened converting the weapon into a self-propelled field gun. The gun is the same as the Type 90 field gun. It has a maximum elevation of forty-five (45) degrees and traverses approximately fifteen (15) degrees in either direction. There is no provision for traverse of the turret. All operating mechanisms of the gun are located at the left of the breech. The sight is the standard panoramic type used with the field gun. A hatch located directly over the sight mount must be open to allow the sight to project above the top of the turret in order to manipulate the sight. There are two (2) horizontal and two (2) vertical vision slits on each side of the gun in the face of the turret. Armor thickness of the turret is approximately 5/8 of an inch.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER.
(submitted by NAVTECHJAF)

1. General Information: The armored personnel carriers examined are full track laying vehicles and are part of a Japanese Armored Brigade. They are powered by four (4) cylinder diesel engines and are used for transporting troops and supplies under combat conditions. They carry no armament and are not designed for use as combat vehicles. No type number was assigned to the vehicles. They are referred to by the Japanese as Armored Wagon.

2. Body: The body is nine (9) feet eleven (11) inches long and six (6) feet eight (8) inches wide. It has a front armor plate .292 inches thick, side armor .256 inches thick and rear armor .185 inches thick. There are seats for twelve (12) persons in the body and two additional seats directly behind the drivers compartment. Beneath the floor boards there are compartments for carrying ammunition or supplies. There is an entrance hatch on each side forward of the seats and a double hatch at the rear. Entrance hatches are also provided for the driver and the two passengers who ride behind him.

3. Suspension System: The suspension system has four (4) large bogie wheels independently sprung. Drive sprocket is at the rear and idler at the front. There are two (2) return rollers.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE CAR (submitted by NAVTECHJAP)

1. General Information: The reconnaissance cars examined are full track laying vehicles employed by Japanese heavy artillery organizations. They are reportedly not used as prime movers but are equipped with a towing hook and are said by the Japanese to be able to pull six (6) tons. They are used as advance observation cars and as wire laying vehicles. The rear door to the vehicle is equipped with reels for the laying of communications wire. The car is powered by a four (4) cylinder diesel engine and has a reported speed of 40 k.p.h. on roads or 30 k.p.h. overland. It has a maximum cruising range of 200 kilometers or six (6) hours. It weighs three (3) tons, is 3-1/2 meters long, 2 meters high, and 2 meters wide. It is reported that the vehicle will climb an incline of 30 degrees at a speed of 6 k.p.h.

2. Body: The body is equipped to carry six (6) passengers. There is storage space for equipment behind the seats. An anti-aircraft machine gun is sometimes mounted on the forward portion. Overall armor thickness is .287 inches.

3. Suspension System: The suspension system has four (4) bogle wheels on each side mounted in pairs. The drive sprocket is mounted high and at the forward end of the track. There is a large trailing idler at the rear end and two (2) return rollers. The track is eight (8) inches wide,
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE SELF-PROPELLED
105mm HOWITZER
(submitted by NAVTECHJAP).

1. Information on this gun has been available previously and some of the weapons were captured in the Philippines, however all specimens located at FUKUOKA are in operational condition and may render some additional intelligence information. The chassis, hull, engine, and suspension system are identical to those of the Type 97 Medium Tank. The gun is the same as the Type 91 105mm howitzer. It is mounted in a high, open shield which is not capable of being traversed. The gun itself may be traversed approximately fifteen (15) degrees in either direction and elevated to forty-five (45) degrees. It is operated from the left of the breech and uses the standard panoramic sight. Firing capabilities of the weapon are considered to be the same as those for the Type 91 Howitzer and according to personnel of the unit which operated the weapon it was used as a field gun rather than a tank destroyer. Mobility characteristics are the same as for the Type 97 tank.
HEADQUARTERS, V. AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE MEDIUM TANK,
TYPE 3(1943)(submitted by NAVTECHJAF).

1. General Information: The tanks examined were located in the tank park of a Japanese tank brigade at FUKUOKA, KYUSHU. Approximately thirty (30) tanks were found, all of which were operational or could be made operational with minor repairs. The tank was apparently developed from the type 97 medium tank but is much more heavily armed and armored. It is superior in construction and performance to any Japanese tank previously reported. According to information received from personnel of the unit which operated the tank it weighs approximately twenty (20) tons and has a maximum speed of 30kph on roads or 20 to 24 kph cross country.

2. Hull: The shape of the hull is similar to that of the type 97 tank except that it is more angular. The front surface consists of one flat surface tapered up toward the driver's window, rather then the ricochet plates used on the older tank. There is no cupola for the driver's seat. The engine compartment has squared corners rather than sloping plates. The hull is of bolted rather than riveted construction. Armor thickness of the front plates is 1.45 inches, the sides 1 inch, and the rear end top of the engine compartment 1/2 inch. A type 97 7.7mm machine gun is mounted at the left front.

3. Turret: The Type 3 tank mounts a 75mm gun in an electrically controlled turret. The shape of the turret is similar to that of the type 97 modified tank which carries a 47mm gun; however its size is much larger to accommodate the bigger gun. The gun is the same as the type 90 field gun which was the Japanese Army's most modern field piece. It has a maximum elevation of 45° and a maximum range of 1500 yards. Traverse is accomplished by movement of the turret which will traverse 360° in either direction. A fixed sight is used with the gun. There are racks for 40 rounds of ammunition in the turret. Armor thickness is approximately 1/2 inch at the top, 1 inch at the sides, and 1.8 inches on the front. The turret is eight (8) feet long, two (2) feet six (6) inches high and has a front face three (3) feet seven (7) inches wide.

4. Suspension System: The suspension system is identical to that of the type 97 tank. There are six (6) bogie wheels, two (2) independently sprung and four (4) mounted in pairs. Drive sprocket is at the front and idler at the rear. There are three (3) return rollers at the top.

5. Engine: The engine is the same as the six (6) cylinder diesel engine used in type 97 tanks.
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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO,

PRELIMINARY REPORT, TYPE 4, 75mm AA GUNS (submitted NAVTECHJAP)

1. These guns were discovered by personnel of NavTechJap Team #2 at FUKUOKA, JAPAN. They are guns that have not been captured or reported previously.

2. Descriptive Data:
   a. Type 4 (1944)
   b. Bore: 75mm
   c. Length in calibers: 53 (approx)
   d. Maximum ceiling: 30,380 feet
   e. Horizontal range: 17,500 yards
   f. Rate of fire: 6 rounds per minute
   g. Limits of elevation: 0 to 85 degrees

3. The construction and basic design of this piece follows that of the 8cm (88mm) Type 99, a JAPANESE Copy of the GERMAN Flak 36. A horizontal sliding wedge breech block functions semi-automatically in that the cartridge is ejected on counter recoil and closes automatically as a round is rammed home. No evidence of a power rammer is to be found. The top carriage is of the pedestal type, mounted on four (4) outriggers. The pedestal contains a vertical spring equilibrator connected to the two elevation racks by a chain.

4. These guns are intended to be director controlled, and each gun has seisyn receivers for fuze, angle of train and quadrant elevation. Data was set at the guns by means of zeroing lagmeters (i.e., volt meters). Mechanical diels are present for calibration purposes. The fuze setter has three (3) receptacles for ammunition, also on the left hand side of the gun is the assembly for case firing (local control) minus the sights. No optical gear for these guns had been received at FUKUOKA prior to the end of the war.

5. A trained crew is supposed to emplace one (1) of these guns in three (3) minutes. Figures for rate of fire were given by a Japanese Colonel who had not seen the guns fire. It is believed that the actual rate is substantially higher.

ENCLOSURE (H)
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 7Nov45
To: 1800I, 8Nov45

SECRERT

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
O800, 9 November 1945.

No. 48.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle (Omitted)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations.

A. DEMILITARIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO

3 Navy Warehouses near H10 (1 mile East of SASEBO) contain materials for the repairing and maintenance of
ships. This consists of various sizes of pipe, diesel and electric motors, insulation materials,
electric welding rods, hand drills, rivets, dies, and pressure gauges.

SHIRATAKE Electric Works near H11 (1 mile East of
SASEBO) produced parts for electric motors, generators
and panel boards during the war. The plant consists
of one two-story building containing 2 lathes and
some motors which were under repair. There was former;
another building but it was destroyed by fire. The
plant is shut down and no production figures are
available.

- 1 -

SECRET

830
CDORIGAKURA Electrical Factory Workshops (3 miles East of SASEBO) were formerly operated by the Navy. Guards under commander YAMANOUCI said that the plant had not been operating for the past four months, but prior to that electrical equipment was repaired here. The plant consists of one office building and a two story building containing 8 lathes, 8 drill presses and a storeroom of spare parts and other tools.

YAMATA

MITSUBISHI Chemical Industries Ltd. Plant at KURASAKI (a suburb of YAMATA). This report is in addition to and supersedes the report on this plant in our Periodic # 44. During the war this plant employed 6503 workers and employs at present 2880. During the war the main products were glass, synthetic rubber, and explosives.

C. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRECIOUS METALS.

The 2nd Marine Division is holding 3.7 kilograms of gold chloride (48.5 to 50% pure) and 45.8 kilograms of silver chloride obtained from the Navy Paymaster Section Warehouse in the KORIGAIA Valley (near CMURA).
G-2 Periodic Report No. 48. (Continued)

SECRET

G. L. MC CORMICK
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
AC of S, G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted. Translations of local news items of possible interest are presented below.

2. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in WOJI) 6 November 1945. Fumio Mineta, Vice President of Mindanao Japanese Society, and native of Saiki City, returned on the U.S. Transport, Hutchinson and related as follows:

   "As meals, we received 2 boxes of U.S. ration food per meal. Toward the end of the voyage, they gave us 4 boxes. The children and the grown-ups were treated alike. In addition, candies were given to the women daily, and we received a sufficient amount of cigarettes and plenty of water to drink. We had more than what we could eat, and were very well fed."

   "We were also given a bed to sleep in and upon debar- kation they gave a blanket to each of us. Everything they did for us was beyond our imaginations. We are very grateful."

3. SAGA SHIMBUN (published in SAGA) 8 November 1945. "The Engineer Unit of the O.A. has shown remarkable speed in its work of repairing highways. In less than a month, they completed the Arita-Tosa highway. In addition, they completed 4 bridges between Saga and Kanzaki, and one bridge between Kanzaki and Kurume."

   "The combined meeting of the anti-TB organization branches in Kyushu-Yamaguchi area was held at Karatsu First Aid Station on the 5th and 6th. Supt. Tsunoda of Saga Sanitation Bureau, who attended this meeting said, "The main topic of this meeting was the measures to be taken on the demobilized men affected with TB and on those undernourished during the war. I think that we should establish anti-TB stations in this Prefecture immediately. At present, there are about 20,000 TB patients in this prefecture, and one thousand and several hundred are dying annually. Since April, BCG vaccine was injected into 23,060 persons. This good result is second to Fukuoka for the entire Kyushu, but we must improve our conditions and establish more caring stations."

4. HYUGA NICHII NICHII SHIMBUN (published in MIYAZAKI) 5 November 1945. "Schools in MIYAZAKI. "What will become of the various commercial schools that were changed into industrial schools during the war? What is the new plan of the Miyazaki Vocational School following the abolishing of its aircraft course, etc etc? In order to know answers to the above questions, this
paper made a survey." This is the report:

"COMMERCIAL SCHOOLS. In the cities of Miyazaki, Nobeoka and Miyakonojo will probably be changed into commercial schools of former years from the present status of industrial schools. However, the Nobeoka Commercial desires a construction course."

"AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL. This will expand as farming is a big factor in rebuilding Japan. Students of the middle schools are begging to transfer to this school."

"MIYAZAKI VOCATIONAL has decided to abolish aircraft course. A machinery course has been substituted. It is planned to establish a construction course also."

"MISSIONARY SCHOOL was destroyed by the typhoon, but the Catholics are planning reconstruction."

5. OITA GOCHO SHIMBUN - 6 November 1945. "The U.S. Marine unit (300 men) who came to occupy the city of Oita on Oct. 12th, left for Sasebo on the 5th, under the command of Capt. Jones. Lt. Col. Collins, commander of the advanced detachment, left on the plane that morning. On his departure, he said, "We came to occupy with peace as our aim. Due to the cooperation of the people, no incidents came up and I am very glad of it. During our stay everything went on smoothly. The people must further cooperate with the American Army and build New Japan. I am also glad that the interpreters' strike was settled before my leaving."

"Following the departure of the U.S. Marines, the 32nd Division of the U.S. Army arrived to continue the Occupation. This group of 15 officers and 300 men is commanded by Lt. Col. Heenan. Lt. Col. Bortz is also with this outfit. The officers are quartered at the Maizuru Hotel in the city of Beppu, and the men are quartered at the former Boys' Aviation School."
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 08Nov45
To: 1800I, 09Nov45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
3ASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 10 November 1945.

SECRET

No. 49.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

YAWATA

TOKAI Iron Works in TOBATA employed 350 workers in producing 50 tons of steel plate, 60 tons of roll stock and 50 tons of rail per day during the war. The war-time production of this plant was utilized by the armed forces. At present this plant is inoperative but employs 162 in the maintenance and guarding of the factory.

SHIROMIZUGUMI Iron Works at TOBATA employed 430 during the war in the production of gas and oil storage tanks. At present 242 are employed in the repairing of gas storage tanks.
SHIN-3HUKU Ammunition Factory (approximately 10 miles west of SAGA) employed 35 to 60 persons in making 50,000 nose and 50,000 base plugs per year for shells of an unknown caliber. Future plans call for the manufacture of bicycle parts.

A warehouse near the above factory contains 28 two and one half ton 6x6 truck loads of signal equipment and 2 truck loads of aircraft parts.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.

(2) Suspects.
None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.
None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.
None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

A recent survey of public opinion concerning women's suffrage was conducted by the 403rd CIC Detachment among business people, rural townspeople, and farmers in the SASEBO Area. Of 300 persons questioned 52 2/3% were in favor of women's suffrage, 4 1/3% against it, 34 2/3% had no opinion, and 8 1/3% had no knowledge of the subject. The interviewers noticed a great reluctance to discuss the matter on the part of women when there were Japanese men present.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 49. (Continued)

SECRET

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant, Colonel, USMC,
AC of 3, G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

10 November, 1945.

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilized.

   a) The following army personnel were demobilized during the period:

   17th Hvy Arty Regt 2
   134th AA Regt 5
   KURUME Div Dist Hq 4
   1st Inf Repl Unit 10
   2nd Inf Repl Unit 11
   3rd Inf Repl Unit 1
   SAGA Regt 1 Hq 7
   SAGA Mil Hosp 2
   Total 42

   b) The following demobilization information is submitted by the 32nd Ind Div:

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<td>205 Land Duty Co</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; 7Sep45.</td>
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<td>38th Shpg Engr Regt</td>
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<td>15th Sea Tpt Bn</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; 9Sep45.</td>
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2. Repatriation.

TATSUI MARU left HUKUSAM HOKKAIDO on 20 Oct and arrived at HAKATA on 7 Nov carrying 3006 civilians and 436 army troops. Of the civilians, 1285 went to HONSHU; 129 to SHIKOKU; and 992 remained in KYUSHU. The destinations of the troops were as follows: MAYCHARHA 2; CHIBA 17; TOYAMA 2; TOTSUTORI 4; TOKYO 49; AOMORI 3; IWATI 2; AKITA 4; YAMAGATA 9; SENDAI 5; FUKUSHIMA 5; MIITO 7; UTABORITA 6; URAWA 32; YOKOHAMA 22; SHIZUOKA 10; NAGOYA 15; GIFU 19; KOFU 9; NAGANO 8; NAGATA 6; FUKUI 6; TSU 14; NARA 9; WAKAYAMA 14; OHTSU 6; KYOTO 3; OSAKA 7; KOBE 11;
Order of Battle. (Continued) 10 Nov 45.

SECRET

HIROSHIMA 3; OKAYAMA 7; MATSUYE 7; YAMAGUCHI 9; SAGA 3; NAGASAKI 4; KUMAMOTO 9; OHITO 5; KAGOSHIMA 6; HOKAIDO 5; SAITAMA 3; YAMANASHI 2; YAMAGAWA 1; SHIMANE 1; MIYAGO 2.

Vessel SHIOKAZA left FUSAN, KOREA on 6 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 6 Nov carrying 724 civilians. Of these, 226 went to HONSHU; 13 to SHIKOKU; and 485 remained in KYUSHU.

C.B. #192 left MIYAKO Island on 3 Nov and arrived at HAKATA-KO on 6 Nov with 62 civilians and 137 Army troops. 31 of the civilians went to HONSHU; 6 to SHIKOKU; and 25 remained in KYUSHU. The destinations of the Army troops were as follows: FUKUOKA 21; HIROSHIMA 3; SENDAI 11; OWOTO 16; KAGOSHIMA 13; KUMAMOTO 13; OSAKA 39; NAGOYA 16; TOKYO 2.

Vessel KOSAI left CHINKAI, KOREA on 5 Nov and arrived at HAKATA-KO on 7 Nov with 446 civilians and 433 naval troops. Of the civilians, 283 went to HONSHU; 14 to SHIKOKU; and 151 remained in KYUSHU. The destinations of the troops were as follows: FUKUOKA 21; SAGA 25; NAGASAKI 4; KUMAMOTO 26; OITA 22; MIYAZAKI 5; KAGOSHIMA 23; HIROSHIMA 76; OSAKA 36; NAGOYA 35; TOKYO 85; SENDAI 38; HOKAIDO 19 and SHIKOKU 18.

There were 9406 Koreans awaiting transportation in FUKUOKA CITY on 7 Nov. On that day 6596 Koreans arrived in the city to await transportation and 2767 were shipped home.

Repatriated troops from HONG KONG started unloading at 1130, 8 Nov 45 and completed unloading at 2015, 8 Nov 45. 700 troops debarked, 699 dispatched to HARIO Barracks, 1 remained at URAGASHIRO as a patient at the hospital.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's newspapers. Translations of local news items of possible interest are presented below.

2. HYUGA NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN (published in MIYASAKI) 6 November 1945. "Today there has come to be a gradual improvement in the condition of foodstuffs within the prefecture. But condition of supply of barley, sweet potatoes and so forth are no better than the low point reached immediately after the cessation of hostilities."

"Although we attained 103% supply in October of last year we have not exceeded 55% this year, and it is already November. It seems that there are farmers who consider the stagnation of the potato supply to be a question of price; however the principal cause in the case of both grain and potatoes is the uncontrolled black market."

"With Japan on the verge of economic death because of her failure to cope with this situation she is being directed by the occupation forces and the police force of the prefecture has commenced an all-out drive against the crooked brokers who handle the black market in rice, grain, potatoes, fish, and beef. At the Kobayashi Station, commencing with the large items handled by the northern area Kyushu black market dealers, the number of cases which have been considered has already mounted into the hundreds."

"An announcement has been made by the department of economic security of the controls handled in all the police stations of the three prefectures. In particular, under the guidance of the occupation authorities, intensive anti-black market controls have been instituted, and both the methods of control and the actual steps taken have been announced."

3. OITA GODO SHIMBUN (published in OITA) 7 November 1945. "The Koshindo group, who cleared about 2 cho (4.9 acres) of farmland on Taiheizan, Beppu City, and who, for the past thirty years of labor service, had stressed world peace and manifestation of Japanese culture, had taken steps to cope with the national conditions after defeat."

"With group leader YAMAMOTO and SHINOFUJI, Ichio, WADA, Yoshihiko, FUKUDA Shikani, OJAMI Risaku, OHARA Mankichi, KATO Katutoshi, MISHINURA, Saburo . . . promoters, the Universal Farmers' Party has been organized and an oratorical meeting will be held in BEPPU City Hall at 6 PM on the 8th, when elevation of farmers posi-
PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS. (Continued)

tion in society, completeness of democratic ideas, opening of an international peace conference, establishment of permanent world peace, thorough study of politics, etc. will be stressed."

"A Young Men and Women's Party has also been established as a detached party to promote diffusion of political study to cope with extension of suffrage and spirit of labor service."
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 12001, 09Nov45
To: 12001, 10Nov45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 11 November, 1945

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO

MOJI Branch Transportation Office and Warehouse in HAIKI (3 miles southeast of SASEBO) consists of 6 two-story buildings containing the following: assorted water pipe and pipe tools, one set deep sea diver's equipment, 2 military radios, 5 civilian radios, crated diesel and electric pumps and motors, and concrete mixers.

HAIKI Naval Barracks consists of 8 barracks, all in poor condition. The office safe contained 2,103,079.20 yen (Japanese count) and personnel records. The currency, according to the Japanese, is used to pay
naval personnel being discharged.

Naval Barracks in HAIKI area consists of 11 buildings in good repair and equipped with electric lights and running water. There is also a warehouse full of medical supplies and another warehouse containing electrical and radio equipment.

OMURA

IWAYOSI Blacksmith Shop (7 miles east of OMURA) produce 10,000 small parts for torpedoes during the war. The factory is now producing farm tools from the scrap material. During the war 6 men were employed and at present 2 are employed.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

KEMPEI TAI. During a check of the demobilization of KEMPEI TAI in KUMAMOTO, it was ascertained that IMOTO, Yasuyoshi, former Warrant Officer and Chief Clerk of KUMAMOTO Provost, KEMPEI TAI, had prepared for mailing a list of all former members of NCO rank and above. A copy was to be sent to each person on the list together with a request that subject be notified of any change of address or success in finding civilian employment. IMOTO claimed that he had prepared the letter entirely on his own volition without official sanction and was merely attempting to act as a central clearance for members of the organization for purposes of social contact. All copies of the letter were burned and orders given that such further activity was prohibited.
Relief Association and Occupational Guidance Association in NAGASAKI were reported by 498th CIC not to constitute a threat to the security of the Occupation Forces.

CHIKU TOKUSETSU KEIBITAI CIC reports that the CHIKU TOKUSETSU KEIBITAI was an organization of civilians, organized by the army and led by army officers. It was designed to assist the army in case of invasion. Little training was received and little work done to assist the army. The organization has been dissolved and no evidence has been disclosed to indicate that it presents a threat to the security of the Occupation Forces.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Lt. Col. KURIYA, Tsuginori was interrogated by CIC upon his arrival at KAJIKI. He had also been screened previously by the CIC in the Philippines. He was operations officer for Lt. General AUTO from 12 September 44 to 3 September 45, who was chief of staff for General YAMASHITA in the Philippines. No information relative to war atrocities was obtained.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilization.

   a. 32nd Infantry Division reports the following changes in the strengths of these units:

      | UNIT                               | PREVIOUSLY REPORTED STRENGTH | PRESENT STRENGTH |
      |------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|
      | CITA Reg'tl Dist Hq                 | 56                          | 58              |
      | SAEKI Naval Airbase                 | 12                          | 13              |
      | SAEKI Br. KURE NAVAL Munitions Depot| 7                           | 18              |
      | 118th Ind Mixed Brig                 | 91                          | 78              |
      | CITA Army Hosp                      | 47                          | 54              |

   b. The following military personnel were reported demobilized during the period by the 5th Marine Division:

      | MAGASAKI KEN:                        | OFF  | ENL  | TOTAL |
      | HARIO Barracks                       | 4    | 45   | 49    |
      | TAKASHIMA BANDAKE A/A Btry           | 1    | 6    | 7     |
      | (Guards on installations)            |      |      |       |
      | YORIFUNE SL Position                 | 0    | 8    | 8     |
      | KOKUZE SL Position                   | 5    | 5    | 5     |
      | KUROSHIMA SL Position                 | 4    | 4    | 4     |
      | YORIDAKE SL Position                  | 3    | 3    | 3     |
      | NANATSUGAKA SL Position               | 4    | 4    | 4     |
      | MATSUSHIMA SL Position                | 7    | 6    | 7     |
      | SAKITO Lookout                        | 8    | 8    | 8     |
      | MATSUSHIMA Btry                       | 11   | 11   | 13    |
      | KUROSHIMA Btry                        | 12   | 11   | 13    |
      | CHIWATA A/A Btry                      | 5    | 5    | 5     |
      | SHISHIKI (SHIRADAKE) Lookout          | 4    | 4    | 4     |
      | MAKATSURA (HIRADO) Lookout           | 4    | 4    | 4     |
      | 3d Special Attac Force Hq             | 3    | 3    | 3     |

   Administrative Personnel:
      Communications Office
       (Note: Joined this date: 2 Enl)
      Court Martial
       (Note: Joined this date: 2 Off)
      KAWATANA Navy Dock Yard
       (Note: Joined this date: 2 Off)
      SASABO Naval Hospital
       (Note: Joined this date: 2 Off)
      KAWATANA Special Attack Force
       (Note: Joined this date: 2 Off)
      OMURA Air Base
       42  53  53
      Mine Sweeping Detail
       (Note: Joined this date: 19 Enl)
Order of Battle:  (Continued)  11Nov45.

SAGA KEN:

No change reported.

FUKUOKA KEN:

No change reported.

Total demobilized during period:

39  175  214

2. Repatriation.

LSTs #998, 1017, and 1026 left SAISHU TO 6Nov45 and arrived SASEBO 1400, 8Nov45, carrying 1400 Army personnel aboard each. Elements of the 243rd Inf Regt, 15th Arty Regt, 6th Special Arty Regt, 244th Inf Regt, were landed. Complete breakdown report to follow.

TSAG MARU left IKI SHIMA 7 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 7 Nov with 310 civilians, 2 Army troops and 6 Navy troops. Of the civilians, 182 went to HONSHU; 90 stayed in KYUSHU; and 38 went to SHIKOKU. Destinations of the troops were as follows: 2 bound back to IKI Island; 2 to SHIKOKU; HIRO 1; OITA 1; SAGA 1; AKITA 1.

C.D. 21 left ISHIGAKI Island 5 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 8 Nov carrying 301 Army troops. Destinations of these troops were as follows: FUKUOKA 53; NAGASAKI 22; SAGA 15; KUMAMOTO 24; OITA 21; MIYAZAKI 14; FUKOCHIMA 15; OKINAWA 1; HIROSHIMA 12; OSAKA 12; NAGOYA 12; KYOTO 4; SENDAI 14; HOKKAIDO 2; SHIKOKU 60.

Vessel YUKAHEI departed FUSAN, KOREA 8 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov with 328 civilians. The destinations of these troops were as follows: HONSHU 146; KYUSHU 159; SHIKOKU 45.

UNZEN MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA 8 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov carrying 1805 civilians. Of these 1107 went to HONSHU; 642 stayed in KYUSHU; and 56 went to SHIKOKU.

Mine-Sweeper #20 departed FUSAN, KOREA on 8 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov with 71 civilians. Of these 39 went to HONSHU; 22 to KYUSHU; and 10 to SHIKOKU.

HOKURI MARU departed FUSAN 6 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov carrying 2052 civilians. Of these 983 went to HONSHU, 1010 stayed in KYUSHU, and 59 went to SHIKOKU.

TSAG MARU left TSU SHIMA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov with 211 civilians and 1 Army. Of the civilians 69 went to HONSHU; 138 to KYUSHU and 4 to SHIKOKU. The one Army man was bound for FUKUOKA.

HOKUYU MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA 7 Nov and arrived at SENZAKI 8 Nov with 630 civilians. Of these 519 went to HONSHU; 93 to KYUSHU; 6 to SHIKOKU; and 12 to HOKKAIDO.

ENCLOSURE (A)  - 2 -  SECRET
There were 9408 KOREANS awaiting transportation home in FUKUOKA City on 8 November. On that day 4510 arrived in the city and 1053 were shipped home on the MAMIYA MARU.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO  

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS  

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted. Translations of local news items of possible interest are presented below:

2. SAGA SHIMBUN (published in SAGA) 9 November 1945. 
"General Jinsaburo Kazaki returned to his native land for the first time since the termination of the war. He reached the Saga Station on the 6th at 6:23 PM and immediately entered the Matsumotoya Hotel. In his interview, he said:

'I...I returned to help those who died in the battlefield. When I was the president of the Educational Society, last year, I talked to many prominent citizens of this prefecture regarding the situation, but I could not say very much at this time. Hereafter I can talk as much as I want to, so I am thinking of telling how the militarists plotted and started this war to the populace."

3. HYUGA NICHIGI SHIMBUN (published in MIYAZAKI) 7 November 1945. "The C. A. in Omuta built a hospital in the city of Arao as a present for the citizens of Omuta and Arao. It will be formerly opened soon with the cooperation of Lt. Jameson, Army doctor. The outstanding feature of this hospital is to carry on its business in American ways. Unlike the old-fashioned Japanese style, the doctors will enter the patients into the hospital, visit the patients at regular intervals, and use the hospital facilities to the fullest extent. Hospital fees will be taken from rich patients but absolutely no fee will be taken from the poor people. It is the intention of the management to make the people appreciative. Lt. Jameson will be the superintendent of this hospital. Several nurses will be sent from the Kitaui Hospital to assist him."

4. ISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN (published in NAGASAKI) 10 November 1945. "Arita-machi, Capitol of Crockery, is prospering daily since the arrival of the C.A. in selling souvenirs. However, the prices differ on some articles at the various factories and stores and some are selling at very high prices. This will defame Arita, so the Police Department called a meeting of all concerns to warn them. Prices will be strictly controlled."
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 10Nov45
To: 1200I, 11Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 12 November, 1945

No. 51.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under
our control.

None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during
the period.

BOFU

TOA Alcohol Company produced liquors, whiskey, wine, and
shochu before the war. During the war this company em-
ployed 107 workers for the production 120,000 gallons
of alcohol per month. At present 90 are employed in
the monthly production of 93,000 gallons of alcohol.
This company has applied for a permit to produce their
pre-war products.

OMUTA

KAWAGUCHI Iron Works employed 45 workers during the war
in the production of warship repair parts which were
delivered to NAGASAKI. They also made tank parts and
pipes for MITSUI interests in OMUTA. The plant is controlled by MITSUI. At present, all employees (15 in number) are repairing the buildings.

KOA Workshop made parts for MITSUBISHI shipbuilding interests in NAGASAKI during the war and expects to continue this work. At present small farm tools are being turned out. There were 100 workers during the war as compared to 74 at present.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

The communication lines near KUMAMOTO Airfield, on the outskirts of KUMAMOTO city have had pieces cut out of them on three occasions. On November 9th the piece cut out was 150 feet long. A search in the vicinity failed to produce the missing wire. These overhead lines have been put up so that pilots landing at the airfield can contact the nearest Marine unit for transportation from the field.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

The following report concerning the attitude of Japanese Christians in the OITA Area is summarized from reports made by officers in that area: The majority of the Japanese say that with the end of the war there is an opportunity to carry out a number of reforms in Japan. However, most of them are unwilling to take any active part themselves or to express any outspoken opinions; they feel that as soon as the American Forces leave OITA, the militarists and former officials will quickly return to power and take revenge on those who showed open approval of the reform policies. They do not expect American Occupation Forces to remain in this
G-2 Periodic Report No. 51. (Continued)

SECRET

Area over an extended period. In this they appear to be influenced by the belief that pressure from the States for early return of troops will necessitate reduction of occupational police garrisons in outlying areas such as this one.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

12 November, 1945

1. Demobilization.

a) The following units are reported demobilized:

12th Air Div, Br. depot ASHIYA
Gannosu A/F KASUYA GUN
351st Division Hq's KOGA

b) The following Military personnel were demobilized during the period:

NAGASAKI KEN:
Administrative Personnel
(non-combatants) 8
(Note: Joined this date 1 enl)
Mine Sweeping Detail at EMUKAI 3
OMURA Army Hospital 10
HIRADO KEMPEI TEI Detachment 2
SAGA KEN:
FUKUOKA KEN (Z OF O):
(Note: Joined this date 130 men) 19

Total demobilized during period: 23 52 245

2. Repatriation.

MEIYU MARU departed PUSAN, KOREA on 8 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 3 Nov with 2355 civilians and 1254 Army troops. Of the civilians, 1223 went to HOKHSU, 970 to KYUSHU, and 162 to SHIKOKU. The destinations of the Army troops were as follows: KAGOSHI 182; TOKYO 488; OSAKA 176; NAGOYA 138; KYOTO 65; HIROSHIMA 96; NAGASAKI 88; SHIKOKU 40.

KAITO MARU departed CHINKAI, KOREA on 4 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 48 civilians. Of these, 21 went to HOKHSU, 23 to KYUSHU, and 4 to SHIKOKU. Ship delayed by typhoon and also engine trouble. Stopped at TSU SHIBA Island.

TAITAN MARU departed PUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 274 civilians. Of these
Order of Battle. (Continued) 12 Nov 45.

SECRET

138 went to HONSHU, 125 to KYUSHU, and 11 to SHIKOKU. MAMIYA MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 893 civilians. Of these, 461 went to HONSHU, 404 to KYUSHU, and 28 to SHIKOKU.

C.D. 32 departed ISHIGAKA ISLAND on 7 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 317 Navy troops. All of them were patients destined for the OHMUREA Navy Hosp.

M.S. #19 departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 21 civilians. Of these 22 went to HONSHU, 68 to KYUSHU, and 1 to SHIKOKU.

S.C. #60 departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 220 civilians. Of those, 87 went to HONSHU, 117 to KYUSHU, and 16 to SHIKOKU.

There were 12,865 KOREANS awaiting transportation home in FUKUOKA City on 9 November. On that day 4344 arrived in the city and 5140 were shipped home.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's newspapers. Translations of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. HYUGA NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN (published in MIYAZAKI) 8 November 1945.

"Realizing that the English language is needed first in order to entertain the occupational men, the prefectural Commercial and Industrial Economics Commission is opening classes in conversational English in its three cities beginning the 12th. Each class is to have fifty students. The classes will be held for one hour daily, beginning at 5:30 PM, by Mr. Chiyoji Ohta and several others from the O.A. A fee of Y 5 will be charged."

"Mr. Kohei Murakoshi, king of the marathon world, suddenly made his appearance in this paper's office. This world-famous athlete talked together with the writer, Mr. Chiihe Nakamura, managing editor of this paper, and others. He said, "Setting this year as the preparation period, I think that track meets, forgotten during the war, will be revived. I will proceed toward the reconstruction of New Japan from this angle." At the previous Olympic Games, he was known as 'Japan's Murakoshi'."

"He intends to stay at his home in Akaye-machi, Miyazaki for a few days and then return to Kobe to resume his work in the Kawasaki Aircraft Co."

"The first ship to return from Hong Kong was the British ship Buffalo. It arrived at Sasebo on the evening of the 6th with 700 Japanese naval officers and men. They landed at the Uredo Quarantine Station. According to a few of the officers, the Japanese in Hong Kong are healthy, but they have difficulties."

"Of the 52 nurses in the Kumamoto U. Hospital, 35 went on strike, demanding better treatment, as of the 7th. Since the bombing due to the shortage of rooms in the hospital, the nurses were quartered outside the hospital which led to unfair ration and treatment by the business manager, their protest stated."
0193/130
Ser. 0011045

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 11Nov45
To: 1200I, 12Nov45

SECRET

Hq, 7 Amphibious Corps,
SASEO, KYUSHU,
1200, 13 November, 1945.

No. 52.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (Omitted)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)
(C) CHINE POW Camp #5. (Confidential)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
   See Enclosure (A) (Omitted)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   See Enclosure (A) (Omitted)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
   No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
   None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

GO. O. RETTO

GOTO RETTO patrol has returned and reports that all 96 islands of this chain have been checked and all military installations destroyed. These installations were all located on three of the principal islands:

FUKAE-SHIMA, MAKATORI-SHIMA and UDU-SHIMA.

The other islands were completely barren of military installations. All large guns were destroyed by demolition, and all automatic weapons were destroyed by being dumbered at sea or by demolition. All
ammunition was disposed of by dumping at sea. The radar station at TAMANOURA, previously reported in VAC G-2 Periodic 46, was completely destroyed by demolition. 6,126 rifles, 7,255 bayonets, 560 swords 138 pistols, and 40 spears were collected. The unserviceable items were dumped at sea and the remainder brought to SASEBO. The population of this chain of islands is approximately 250,000. Most of the people are engaged in either farming or fishing. The people of these islands were very cooperative and seemed pleased at the arrival of the Occupation Forces.

MIXAKOJO

KAWASAKI Aircraft Plant was 40% destroyed by a B-24 bombing on 6 August 1945. At present the plant consists of 12 small wooden buildings and two concrete buildings. Equipment appears to be in good condition. During the war the plant produced airplane bodies and wings. It now makes aluminum ware and wooden furniture employing 250 men.

OMURA

YUE Shipbuilding and Iron Factory (11 miles East of OMURA) employed 120 workers; and during the war, built 7 ships having a tonnage of 70 to 150 tons. It is privately owned and has been in operation since 1910. At present 90 workers are employed and three ships are being repaired. All ships are sold to the NISHI NIPPON Coal Shipping Company. Present plans are to continue operations as before.

KASATO SHIMA

HATACHI Ltd., KASADO Works. There are ten submarines known as type number 1 in various stages of construction: 2 are 70% completed, 4 are 50% completed and 4 are 20% completed. The construction of two type number 1 submarines is complete. One type number 2 submarine is complete and afloat. The type number 1 submarines were being constructed on orders from the OSAKA Army Arsenal, and type No. 2 for the Army-Marine Headquarters. There are also 35 two-man submarines in various stages of construction: 2 are 90% completed, 5 are 50% completed, and 28 are 30% completed. These two-man submarines were being built for the Japanese Navy. All construction work
on these vessels was stopped on 15 August 1945.

FUKUOKA

KCOA Proving Grounds (7 miles north of FUKUOKA) contained the following equipment: 18 heavy mortars, 8 knee mortars, 43 machine guns, 206 3rin guns, 13 artillery pieces, 725 boxes of powder charges, 20 trucks, 70 two-wheeled ammunition carts, and ammunition for all weapons. Test firing commenced in June 1944 and ceased at the end of the war. During the operation of this proving ground there were four directors and 40 men stationed there.

KCOA Iron Works was established in December 1939 and manufactured railway transport cars, ball bearings, and axles. In July, 1942 a naval contract was received and they started production of 75mm shell casings, mortar shells, projectiles and parts for 75mm shells. At the cessation of hostilities work at the factory ceased. On 27 August 45, production of railroad cars, belt conveyors, and household utensils was started. During the war 1150 workers were employed; at present 199 are employed.

FURUKAWA Electrical Manufacturing Company (10 miles North of FUKUOKA) employed 570, including school children and part time workers, in producing 2,700,000 meters of electrical wire per month during the war. The greatest portion of this wire went to the military forces. At present 270 workers are employed in the production of 1,200,000 meters of finished wire and approximately 300 tons of raw material on hand.

NAKATSU

OKANA Valve Mfg. Co. Ltd., located at YANADA (13 miles Northwest of NAKATSU) employed 650 during the war in the production of ten tons of valves and boiler fittings weekly. The total production of this plant went to the military forces. At present, 270 are employed in the production of 2 tons of valves and boiler fittings weekly which are used for repairing steam boilers for civilian use.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.
The 94th CIC Detachment reports the following:
In connection with investigation of the blacklist of books in the KIUSHU Imperial University Library, agents discovered a magazine entitled "The 20th Century". A copy of the magazine was dated November 1944. It was published monthly by the 20th Century Publishing Company, 34 TA SHANGHAI LU, F.O. Box 771, SHANGHAI, CHINA. All editorial matter was addressed to Dr. KLAUS MEHNART, F.O. 4082, SHANGHAI, and was printed by W. SIDEL and Company, ABC Press, SHANGHAI. The magazine is a Nazi propaganda publication and the subscription and distributing agent for Japan was NIPPON DEMPO TSUSHINSHA, NISHI GINZA 7-Chome, TOKYO. Dr. MEHNART was, prior to the outbreak of the war in 1941, a professor at the University of HAWAII and was under investigation at that time for potential subversive activities. He left HAWAII in 1941 and it was later substantiated that Dr. MEHNART was working for the Third Reich. Another one of the Articles in the magazine was entitled: "NIETZSCHE and Our Times" by Robert SCHINZINGER. At the time of the publication of the magazine in 1944, SCHINZINGER was a German philosopher living in TOKYO. This magazine has a wide circulation in the Orient.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 52.  (Continued)

SECRET

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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- 8 -

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, 5 AMPHIBIOUS FORCES,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. ASAHI SHIMBUN (published in KOKURA) 11 November 1945.

"In order to absolutely accomplish its role as the directive machinery of the people's opinion in these critical times, it is needless to say, but the newspapers themselves must clarify their war responsibilities. We therefore apologize our guilt to the people, and at this time let it be known, to whom it may concern, that the Asahi Shimbun's mission is to be the peoples representative."

"However, the reality of this paper's reform cannot be shown with a mere statement like this. With the fate of Japan, the future of this paper will be faced with difficulty. In order to realize our statement, we need constant practice and lots of courage. This statement is the opinion of all the members of this paper..."

"At present, Japan is facing the chaos of famine, unemployment, wanderers and politics. It seems the government is sleeping in regard to these matters. The people, on the other hand, facing these unheard of difficulties, have not bee represented to express and execute their feelings, opinions and demands."

"The duty of the press, therefore, is to represent and lead the people. This is really the greatest task of this paper."

3. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) 11 November 1945.

"The prefecture of Miyazaki is proceeding with its agricultural plan toward the cultivation of approximately 5,000 Cho-Ho of land, formerly set aside for military use. However, a dispute between the farmers and ex-soldiers rose in rr: 440 Cho-Ho of land (of which 200 Cho-Ho has been already cultivated) in Kobaisas Cho, Nishi Morogate-gun."

"The dispute rose when about 100 native farmers and Okina evacuees, upon request of the prefecture's farming authorities, tried to enter the premises but were blocked by more than ten demobilized men who claimed their rights of ownership. Upon request by Mr. Chotatsu Chinen, vice president of the Okinawa Reconstructic Society, Supt Arateke of the Agriculture Bureau is to investigate the situation on the 13th."
Press Survey and News Translations. (Continued)

"How will this dispute be settled? According to the information received from the Army authorities, the demobilized men's labor aid society limited the cultivated area and its vicinity only for the men justifying their claim. On the other hand, the prefecture authorities claim the area is too large for the 10 and several others to handle. They also claim that this problem is how to settle the food problem instead of who has the right to the land, so they went to give the suitable lands to the farmers for wheat production."

4. OITA SODO SHIMBUN (published in OITA) 9 November 1945.

"In order to present American ways of living to the O. A. men, the city authorities of Beppu are now planning to build club houses in Hitogahama Beach and Rokketsu Park for both the Army and Navy. The club houses are to have all kinds of recreational facilities as well as dining halls. It is also planned to install motor boat service and reopen the golf course on the southern end."

5. SAGA News (published in SAGA) 11 November 1945.

"On the 7th, about noon, a fire broke out in the home of a Korean living in OgiMachi, Kese Mura, Saga Gun. Just when it seemed that nothing could be done to save the house, Americans came to the rescue. Two Americans passing by in a jeep jumped from their vehicle; one climbed on the roof and one stayed below and both worked at extinguishing the blaze. Thus they not only saved the house but kept the fire from spreading."

"At Takehashi, in the same village, about 7PM some days ago, two students were waiting for a northbound bus. They waited and waited, but every bus was pecked and would not let them aboard. An MP of the occupation forces saw them there and realized that they would soon be caught by darkness if they did not get a ride. Therefore he stopped an American jeep, and though it was going only as far as Koshiro had them driven off to (their destination in) the northern part of town. This kindly act inspired the thanks of all, for it made us realize the beauty and sympathy of the men's characters."
This camp had a capacity of 700 prisoners. During operation 40 guards comprised the strength of the unit stationed there. On 20 September 45, while prisoners of war were still within the camp, rations were dropped by parachute to the prisoners in the camp. Two days later the prisoners were removed from the camp. An extensive investigation failed to reveal the location to which the POWs were moved. At the time the POWs were removed the camp was turned over to FURUKAWA Mining Company, which had been the owner of the property. The company now uses it as an office building. The company placed two guards over the rations for safe keeping until US troops arrived. As there were no guard personnel at the camp, further information could not be obtained. A number of wooden prisoner tags were found with a number and a name on each. Some of the tags were missing. The following is a translation of the number and name on the tags found:

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171. HARRY BYRD
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178. JAMES AGUS
179. DAVID BREWS
180. MARK WILLIAM BARTLETT
181. FRANK THOMAS BAILEY
182. JACK MANN FLIT
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190. ROBAND ARTHUR BAYSOY
191. ALFRED THOMAS FRANK
192. CUSHIGOIN RICHARD BRINODOF
193. HANS CROCKS
194. ALFRED HANCOCK
195. WM GEORGE PEACOCK
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197. WM ROBERT BURNS
198. BRICE WALK ROOSTON
199. EDWARD ALFRED MOORE
200. GARNER JAMES HALE
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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 12001, 12Nov45
To: 12001, 13Nov45

SECRET

HQ, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 14 November 1945.

No. 53.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

FUKUOKA

NAJIMA Steam Power Plant consisted of 7 warehouses and one sub station. This plant is a branch of the KYUSHU SEHITIN Power Company of TOKYO. There are four steam turbines, but only two are in operation. All electrical power for FUKUOKA is routed through the NAJIMA Steam power plant. At present this plant employs 204 workers and has a production capacity of 51,000 kilowatts per hour.

BOFU

BOFU Iron Works manufactured oil and water pumps before and during the war. During the war there were
180 employed in the production of 8 tons of pumps per month. At present, 60 are employed in the production of pumps, cooking utensils, and farm implements.

**OMUTA**

**MINATO Bromine Plant** is a subsidiary of MIIKE Dye-stuffs Company. It has been in operation since 1943 producing ten tons of bromine per month until June 1945. Now it produces 200 kilograms of salt per day. The plant manager does not expect to resume bromine production. Wartime employees numbered 100; at present there are 15 employees.

**MITSUI Mining Company**, Schools in the OMUTA Area—operate 5 schools, one at its head office and four others at various mines in the OMUTA Area. The first schools were started in 1921. They are for boys who have had at least six years previous education in the public schools. Each student received 18 hours of schooling per month before the war, and 12 hours per month during the war. The rest of their time was spent at work. They attend school in small groups, so that the school itself was in continuous operation. Subjects taught were: morals, civics, mining, electricity, and mining machinery. Military training was given during the war by discharged Army personnel who had full time jobs with the mining company. Industrial subjects were taught by employees working in those particular fields. There were 20 full time teachers. In December, 1941, there were 3,184 pupils; in August, 1945, there were 1,218. The school is continuing at present with the same subjects as during the war with the exception of military training.

**C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:**

1. **Persons apprehended or interned.**

   None.

2. **Suspects.**

   **YOSHIMIZU, Toru**, age 29, TOKYO, address YODOBASHI KU KASHI WAGI #92, evaded complete interrogation at KAJIKI on 9 November. He was on the foreign affairs
staff of the Japanese embassy in Manila. He arrived at KAJIKI on 9 November aboard the YOIZUKI and departed for TOKYO before being completely interrogated. It is recommended that he be traced and further questioned.

(3) Subversive activities.
None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.
None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.
No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Ship Sunk by Mine.

At 0840, 9 November, 1945, the HORAI MARU, carrying a crew of 36, struck a mine and sank instantly in the regular shipping lane, 10 miles west of MOJI. The vessel had departed HAKATA harbor 0800, 8 November, 1945, bound for OMI SHIMA. The following information has been reported by the Water Police at WAKAMATSU: a ship (name unknown) near the scene of the accident, rescued two of the crew who were badly wounded; and they were taken to the Seamen's Welfare Hospital in MOJI. The NAGASAKI MARU rescued 8 of the crew who are now in the hospital at WAKAMATSU. 4 were rescued by an unknown vessel. 22 of the crew are still missing.

(2) Black Market.

Startling reports of rice selling at 80 times the fixed government price and impending starvation of the poor were made by well-known SASEBO personages, who even involved local police and the Japanese Navy, when questioned concerning the black market by military government officials of the 5th Marine Division. First interviewed was TERADA, Kenichi, chairman of SASEBO Board of Education and one-time girls' high school principal, a man of distinctly liberal convictions.
He implicated the local police and accused high officials of encouraging the black market. Furthermore, he reported that since war's end the Japanese Navy had thrown considerable food, clothing and other supplies on the black market. He believes an uncontrolled black market would ruin the future of the nation. KITAMURA, Tokutaro, prominent in reconstruction work and long-time local banker was questioned next. It was his opinion that the black market is the inevitable result of an insufficient ration. The average adult receives 1040 calories per day and must patronize the black market to survive. (180 lb man not working or exercising requires 1800 calories per day.) As food supplies dwindle black market prices will rise. Rice has sold for 80 times its government-fixed cost. This winter may bring starvation for the poor who cannot afford these exorbitant prices. Unlawful buying is accomplished in the country by persons satisfying their own needs or by merchants who re-sell their produce in the city. Two reasons why control of the black market has been unsuccessful were cited by KITAMURA. Firstly, the armed forces have no respect for the law. In SASEBO the Navy openly and "officially" paid black market wages to employees and made extra food and supplies available to them. Secondly, the police made no effort to control prices. Early in the war sporadic, half-hearted attempts by the police to keep down costs were made but these have long since dwindled to inactivity. When the Navy was in power the police were recognized by the people as an oppressive instrument of the Navy and were traditionally hostile to civilian interests. Now with the Navy demobilized the police have lost face entirely with the populace. Asked if strong, vigilant police action was the solution to black market problems, KITAMURA's answer was an emphatic negative. The entire police system should be reorganized, he said.

TERADA was interviewed again with reference to KITAMURA's opinions. Rice prices reached a maximum of 20, not 50, times the official cost but are usually only 10 times as much, depending upon the market which one patronizes. He agreed on the other counts but was inclined to believe more black market transactions were executed in the city itself than in the country as KITAMURA claimed. Morchah bring contraband rice to the city and sell to a selected list of customers. He concurred with KITAMURA's
G-2 Periodic Report No. 53.  (Continued)

opinion of the police, classifying them as uncultured, uneducated, and unable to cope with the problem. The present chief of the SASEBO police is typical, he volunteered. He is more interested in politics than in justice. Even the men of the occupation forces are more popular with the people than local police officers. TERADA confirmed KITAMURA's statement that the Navy dispensed black market wages and supplies but seemed especially concerned with two other evils resulting from policies of the armed forces. The first: Former civilian employees of the Navy, pockets full of cash, are seriously endangering the economy of small communities. The second: Demobilized officers and NCOs, who have received huge bonus payments, consider themselves above work, and are living a life of playful inactivity. (Both the bonus and the inactivity mentioned in this statement have been checked against records and found to be entirely true).

Both the Mayor of SASEBO and the Deputy Mayor, when interviewed, expressed concern over certain conditions in JAPAN, recognizing the black market as both their cause and effect. They told of farmers selling their personal shares of rice on the black markets and of others who failed to declare the full amount of their harvest. To date only 47 percent of the expected rice crop has been reported.

Investigation of the black market in this Division's zone is continuing. Indications are that high Japanese officials take an active part in illegal exchanges of government equipment and food. Most transactions take place in metropolitan areas such as SASEBO, KURUME, and SAGA. Some sources link the control of these black market rings with a military underground consisting of both active and retired officers of the Japanese Military.

(3) GOTO-RETTO.

Enclosure (C) is a study of GOTO-RETTO compiled from reports of 5th Marine Division patrols. Some information was previously included in G-2 Periodic Reports #52.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 53.  (Continued)

SECRET

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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<td>ComFifthFlt</td>
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<td>CG 32ndInfDiv</td>
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<td>CG Sixth Army</td>
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SECRET 869
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

14 November, 1945.

ORDER OF RATTLE

1. Demobilization.

a. 22nd Infantry Division reports the following units completely demobilized:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>15 Aug. Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASA Br, BOFU Naval Comm. School</td>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temporary Demobilization Center</td>
<td>OKORI</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAMAGUCHI Sp Guard Unit</td>
<td>YAMAGUCHI KEN</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAMAGUCHI Military Police Co.</td>
<td>YAMAGUCHI KEN</td>
<td>209</td>
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</table>

b. 2nd Marine Division reports the 21st Naval Air Arsenal completely demobilized.

c. 8th Marine Division reports the following personnel demobilized:

1.) NAGASAKI KEN:
   Administrative personnel 29
   (Non-combatants 35
   KAWATANA Sp Attack Force 17
   M/S Detail of EMUKAI 12

2.) FUKUOKA KEN: (5th Mar Div ZofO) 3

   TOTAL 96

2. Repatriation.

TENNYU MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 11 Nov and arrived HAKATA on 11 Nov with 940 civilians. Of these 497 went to HONSHU, 334 to KYUSHU, and 103 to SHIKOKU.

UNZEN MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 11 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 12 Nov with 1894 civilians. Of these 1264 went to HONSHU, 590 to KYUSHU, and 40 to SHIKOKU.

HASU MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 11 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 12 Nov with 110 civilians. Of these, 27 went to HONSHU, 74 to KYUSHU, and 9 to SHIKOKU.

KOKI MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at SENZAKI on 10 Nov with 4 Army, and 6759 civilians. The 4 Army troops went to TOKYO. Of the civilians, 4351 went to HONSHU, 1828 to KYUSHU, 540 to SHIKOKU, and 40 to HOKKAIDO.

CHOKI MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - SECRET
Arrived at SENZAKI on 10 Nov with 1065 civilians. Of these, 601 went to HONSHU, 256 to KYUSU, 167 to SHIKOKU, and 39 to HOKKAIDO.

There were 17,319 KOREANS awaiting transportation home in FUKUOKA City on 11 November. On that day 2,693 arrived in the city and 8,259 were shipped home.

Report on repatriation shipping arriving at and leaving from KAGOSHIMA 11 November:

(1) Arrivals at KAJIKI:

The KIKU MARU arrived from KITA DAITO JIMA carrying 324 Army personnel.
Destroyer KAYA arrived from MANILA carrying 167 Army and 33 Navy.
Destroyer SHII arrived from MANILA carrying 183 Army, 16 Navy, and 1 Formosan civilian. The Formosan was transferred to the Destroyer KIRI at KAJIKI.
Destroyer KIRI arrived from MANILA carrying 4 Army and 195 Formosans. The Formosans did not disembark.
Destroyer KABA arrived from MANILA carrying 136 Japanese, 41 Formosans, and 96 Korean civilians. Only the Japanese disembarked.

(2) Departures from KAJIKI:

KIKU MARU and the CD 227 left for HIRO WAN carrying no passengers; scheduled to arrive 14 November.
Destroyer KAYA left for KURE carrying no passengers, scheduled to arrive 13 November.
Destroyer SHII left for HIRO WAN carrying no passengers, scheduled to arrive 13 November.

Report on repatriation shipping arriving at and leaving KAGOSHIMA on 11 November:

CD ETORO arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 62 Army, 81 Navy, and 157 civilians.
DD SUGI arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 182 Army and 18 Navy.
DD FASHI arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 190 Army and 10 Navy.
DD TSUTA arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 79 Army, 120 Navy and 1 civilian.
DD HAUI arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 116 Army and 84 Navy.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 2 - SECRET 871
Order of Battle. (Continued) 

LST 754 left SAISHU TO 9 November 1945, arriving SASEBO 11 November 1945. Unloading began 1400, 11 November 1945, and was completed. 999 troops were unloaded at URAGASHIRA. 970 of these were dispatched to HARIO, 26 remain at URAGASHIRA, 3 aboard were dead. Units represented were: 262nd and 264th Regiments, Headquarters of 121st Division, detachment of Service Troops, 121st Hospital 64th Hospital, 4th Field Hospital, and 121st Artillery Regiment.

LST's 907 (707?) and 1013 departed SAISHU TO 7 November arriving SASEBO 1130, 9 November 1945. LST 807 had 1,400 Army personnel aboard. LST 1013 had 1,396 Army personnel aboard. Unloading completed 1455, 10 November.

Period 1700, 10 November 1945 to 0200, 12 November 1945, 409 Officers and 5,826 Enlisted dispatched from HARIO. Destination unknown.

LST 657, which left SAISHU TO 9 November and arrived SASEBO 11 November, began unloading at 1000, 12 Nov, and completed unloading at 1800, 12 November. 1200 Japanese Army personnel were unloaded and all but 1 dispatched to HARIO. The 1 remained as a patient at URAGASHIRA Hospital.

ENCLOSURE (A) SECRET

872
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO
PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. KUMANO NICHIGA NICHIGA SHIMBUN (Published in KUMANO) 10 November 1945. "The neighborhood societies which have been the organ of government, in response to the voice of democracy, have lately undergone drastic changes. The societies which have carried out the functions of transmittal of imperial decrees concerning finance, fire fighting, and rationing of scarce items etc., because of the sudden end of the war and the rapid changing society have lost their official significance for the future. Therefore, public opinion demands the establishment of an independent organ for the benefit of the people. A change over to a people's cooperative of the neighborhood organizations as advocated by the Kagawa, Tomihiko group is being carried out as quickly as possible.

"Already the neighborhood societies are once again establishing independent organizations in response to existing conditions in each of their respective areas. Therefore, the department of interior, in accordance with the present trend, has adopted the policy which allows each group to operate unfettered."

"It is now necessary that a final definite and practical decision be made. Henceforth the neighborhood societies, which will be freed for the guidance by government authority, will fulfill only the minor functions of an instrument for liaison, rationing and mutual assistance. Furthermore, they will probably reappear as organs of society and government or else in the form of various cooperative associations."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN (Published in Nagasaki) 13 November 1945. "The total estimated yield of rice this year is 46,000,000 koku but the net yield will be far smaller. The farmers share of rice deposit is 30,000,000 koku, it was decided. Following the share of wheat, Irish potatoes and sweet potatoes, they are shouldering continuous hardships. Furthermore, in spite of shortage of farming implements, labor hands and with hardly any distribution of fertilizers, they have fought through all kinds of difficulties and bad weather to produce for the sake of their countrymen. We, the people, are very grateful."

"Truthfully speaking their efforts presented us with these foods, but on the other hand, with the exception of a certain class the farmers are the most fortunate class of people throughout the nation as far as livelihood is concerned. They not only increasing their wealth during the war from supplying the military, but they are also in the class with special priorities. The fact that considerable amount of money is flowing into the hands of the farmers from the "black market" buyers cannot be denied."
Press Survey and News Translations: (Continued)

"This result is due to the government's ignorance of food management that shoved the people onto absolute famine line. However, there are some farmers with sympathy who are helping the sad situation of the people, it is said. We, therefore, request the farmers to cooperate with love toward brotherhood and penetrate through these crisis."
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

16 November, 1945.

A STUDY OF GOTO-RETTO.

1. Importance.

This chain of Islands, 35 miles west of KYUSHU, contains 5 principal Islands: FUKAE-SHIMA, UKU-SHIMA, NAKADORI-SHIMA, NARU-SHIMA, WAKAMATSU-SHIMA, and 214 smaller islands. A majority of the people are either fishermen or farmers, growing rice and sweet potatoes. However, most of the terrain is too rugged for cultivation.

2. Population.

The population of GOTO-RETTO is approximately 250,000. On FUKAE-SHIMA and NAKADORI-SHIMA from 50 to 75 percent of the people are Roman Catholics, who are said to have come there to escape persecution of the SHOGUNATE. The population of the three principal cities is: FUKAE 30,000, TOMIE 25,000 and ARIKAWA 20,000.

3. Roads.

The road network on FUKAE SHIMA consists of a two-lane highway suitable for DUKW'S, and is suitable for military operation. On the other islands, roads are practically non-existent.

4. Military Installations and Defenses.

Most of these islands are natural military fortresses except FUKAE-SHIMA, UKU-SHIMA, and NAKADORI-SHIMA which have beaches suitable for landing operations. 96 of the islands were checked and all Military Installations were destroyed. All of these installations were on the five principal islands. Installations containing 8cm and 12cm guns were destroyed by demolitions. Automatic weapons were either dumped at sea or destroyed by demolition, and all ammunition was dumped at sea.

The Radar Station at TAMANOURA consisting of 2 screens in operating condition and covering the western approaches to the islands, was destroyed by demolition. Patros to DANJO GUNTO found and destroyed radio equipment and a radar unit which covered the SW approach to KYUSHU.

5. Air Bases.

T AO Seaplane Base in TOMIE WAN was under construction at the end of the war, but was never put to use.

ENCLOSURE (C)
A Study of Goto-Retto. (Continued)

MOTOGAMA Airfield has a main airstrip 1300 meters long and a secondary strip 1200 meters long. The field is in fair condition and could be used as an emergency landing strip.

6. Counterintelligence.

The FUKAE-SHIMA thought control police (TOKKU SHITSU) consisted of one Police Officer and one policeman. It was disbanded on 13 October 1945.

The GOTO-RETTO KEAPEI TAI consisted of 6 men under 2ndLt. NAGAMATSU Tsuruma, and was demobilized on 20 September 1945.

7. Civilian and Military Attitudes.

The people of GOTO-RETTO were very cooperative and seemed greatly pleased at the arrival of the Americans. They expressed hopes that the Americans would stay and help in the reconversion of JAPAN.

The Chief of Police of FUKAE, HIGACHI Yochti, did not cooperate fully with our patrol. It was found that he had not done a thorough job of collecting weapons under his jurisdiction. He was reprimanded, and given 2 days to finish his collecting. At that time he produced 250 swords, 550 rifles, 75 shotguns, some machine guns and a few knee mortars. His excuse for failure to comply with orders was his transfer from SHISA to FUKAE only two weeks before, and he was not fully acquainted with FUKAE. His entire administration was lax.


The people of GOTO-RETTO seemed to be healthier, better fed, and also had larger and cleaner homes than the people of KYUSHU.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 13Nov45
To: 1200I, 14Nov45

SECRET

No. 54.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 15 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

Police Chief HIGACHI reported uncooperative (see Enclosure (C) our Periodic report #53.).

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KUMAMOTO

MITSUBISHI Heavy Industries Ltd #9 Aircraft Works is located approximately 1 mile from KUMAMOTO City. The estimated capital of this plant is 40,000,000 yen. During the war this plant employed 15,000 people including school children. Twin-engined bombers were produced for the Japanese Army. From September 1944 to April 1945 - 46 of these planes were produced, but the plant suffered heavy damage from bombings and in April 1945 had to shut down. At the present time 1600 people are employed making buckets, pots, and pens. The same number are now engaged in cleaning up the buildings and repairing machinery which is in very poor condition.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 54. (Continued)

SECRET

SEIBUGUN KYOIKUTAI (Western Army NCO and Officers School) located at TISHIGOSHI (KUMAMOTO KEN) was used both as an officer's training school for reserve (YOBIEKI) officers and as a squad leaders (BUNTAICHO) school for NCO's. Maximum capacity was 1300 to 1500 students with a staff of 200. The reserve officers school course was six months while the NCO school course was ten months. The school was directly under SEIBUGUN SHIREIKAAN (Western Army Commander in Chief). It was dissolved on 1 September 1945 at which time the records and school books were burned. The above information was obtained from Captain KITAHARA, Hirosh a member of the schools staff.

SAKITO Island (Approximately 15 miles SW of SASEBO)

SAKITO COLLIERY located on SAKITO Island adjoining KAKINOURA Island is owned by MITSUBISHI and covers an area of 27,110 acres. An estimated 106,000,000 tons of coal are still in the ground. At present two mines are worked by inclines and a third is worked by a shaft. Coal output during the past eight years has been 1,200,000 tons annually. Japanese Officials believe this mine to be the second largest in Japan. Present output is low due to labor and material shortages. In August, 1945, 6,601 men were employed and in September, 1945, only 2,974 were employed. SAKITO coal is high coking coal and is regarded as good quality coal except that the sulphur content (2.3%) is a little too high.

TAKATA (25 miles NW OITA)

DINKI Company at TAKATA employed 100 persons in the production of nuts and bolts for aircraft. During the war these parts went to the Japanese Army. At present 30 people are employed in the production of farm implements.

KOKURA

TAKASUGI Iron Works located at KAMARU (15 miles S of KOKURA) employed 272 persons in the production of one hundred 75mm projectiles daily. At present 140 persons are employed in the production of mining equipment.
C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.

(2) Suspects.
None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.
None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.
None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Small clubs are being organized in the various villages in KAGOSHIMA Prefecture to help improve the food situation and to institute governmental reforms. These clubs present no threat to the Occupation Forces, according to CIC.

KIHIRA, Jitaro, wartime Japanese Consul at Manila was interviewed by 498th CIC regarding his knowledge of intelligence agencies and atrocities. He denied all knowledge of either.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) MIYAKONOJO

The following is an outline of the organization of the present MIYAKONOJO City Government. The records of all the sections are intact. The total number of people employed in the MIYAKONOJO City Government is 98.

MAYOR
1st Assistant
2nd Assistant

- 3 -
SECTIONS UNDER 1st ASSISTANT.

(a) General Affairs Section
(b) Military Affairs and Censorship Section.
(c) Agricultural Section.
(d) Educational Section.
(e) Finance Section.
(f) Accounts Section.

SECTIONS UNDER 2nd ASSISTANT

(a) Public works Section.
(b) Industrial Section.
(c) Social Section.
(d) Recovery Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifthFlt 1 CG 32ndInfDiv 10
CG Sixth Army 5 8th Army 1
OIC JICPOA 1 " COB
CG FMFPAC 1 CG FBC 1
Com5thPhib 1 NAVTECHJAP 1
CG III Phib Corps 1 USSB3 TOKYO 1
CG I Corps 1 CO Corps Troops 1
CG X Corps 1 AC of 3, G-3, VAC 1
CG 2ndMarDiv 10 Record Section, VAC 1
CG 5thMarDiv 10 File 5
AFFAC HQ (MANILA) 2

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.
HEADQUARTERS, 5 AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. KAGOSHIMA NIPPO (published in KAGOSHIMA) 11 November 1945. "While disarming explosives under the jurisdiction of two American soldiers at the Gonchara bomb dump in this city, Kazuo Udo of KOZENJO, Kanoya City, who with 7 others and members of the Chonaike was working in an American labor unit, saw one of the incendiary bombs in a group of three or four others about 25 meters away start to emit smoke. He immediately dragged the bomb into a clearing, but the disarmed bombs before had ignited and and the bombs nearby exploded with a loud blast."

"The shrapnel and the blast caused 79 totally burned homes, 1 person killed, and 4 or 5 cows and horses killed. It also burned 10 cho of YAMABAYASHI. The soldiers and workmen were safe, as they had managed to evacuate earlier. Damage is estimated at 2,000,000 yen."

"The U.S. Forces notified the City Hall on the 9th that victims will be allowed the use of one of the former Japanese Naval buildings in the occupied zone."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN (published in NAGASAKI) 13 November 1945. "Due to the existence of a black market through the purchase of articles from occupation forces at a high price, and, especially in the cities, through their resale at an illegal price, the SASEBO police have received a request from the occupation force to crack down on the Black Market, and are confident of the thoroughness of their measures."

"On November 6, they arrested MATSUDA, Gentaro (52), of SASEBO City, TOYAMA MACHI, for purchasing 10 cartons of cigarettes for 500 yen from occupation personnel. He is under guard in FUKUI SHI MACHI."

4. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) 13 November 1945. "Chief MITSUGAWA of the NAGASAKI Prefectural Police who attended the assembly of Japanese Police Chiefs opening at TOKYO on the seventh, returned to his duties on the twelfth and issued the following statement:"

"The main point was that the extension of rights which forms one of our important duties is impossible unless barriers between the police and the people are eliminated. Therefore we shall endeavor to institute a police force which is truly representative of the population. Although the thoughts of one of us on this subject are of little avail, I am anxious for all of us to strive together. We are collaborating with the allied forces in regard to the handling of Chinese laborers, Korean laborers, and..."
Press Survey and News Translations.  (Continued)

are working for the rapid repatriation of foreign nationals in
the prefecture. On the subject of trends in police training the
foremost question has become the shift to a popular police organ-
ization, to which end an improvement in police methods is essential.
This is a matter which at present is under discussion, in the
Ministry of the Interior, and I believe concrete results will soon
be forthcoming."

"In the past police training was carried on for the pitifully
inadequate period of fifteen days, and so there was almost
no indoctrination. From now on we are carrying on a recruit train-
ing program of four months. We have plans for refresher courses
for all police personnel at a later date. We hope to proceed
toward a rapid disposition of difficulties in the administrative
orders and produce a police force which will be looked up to by
the people. On the subject of disciplinary police, previous
personnel have been of a low order, causing many infringements
of personal rights. It is necessary to conduct a thorough study of
this matter, in order that reorientation of the disciplinary po-
lice may be adequate. It is my belief that particular emphasis
must be placed upon the inviolability of personal rights. It is
necessary for the lives of all the people that the management of
the economic police be handled with gravity. Particularly im-
portant is the extent of control over staples such as grain, fish,
vegetables, and such items as have direct connection with the people
Under direct supervision interference with proper supply is being
eliminated. Vigorous investigations are being carried out against
the black market, which constitutes a menace to the people."

5. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN (published in FUKUOKA) 13 November 1945

Voice of the People Column.

When I reported to the officer in charge of the police sta-
tion, I knew by the orders which had been placed upon the desk the
reason for which I had been summoned. I answered fully the ques-
tions asked by the official-in-charge. He seemed surprised and
rebuffed me, "so, you have seen the orders". He turned to his sub-
ordinates and shouted, "why did you leave this secret document in
front of that person?"

Upon my statement that the document contained nothing that
should be held in secrecy and "isn't ours a problem that can be
solved by cooperation?" he roared back,

"Don't make a fool out of me, Your attitude will be all
the worse for you. I'll handle matters in my own manner."

He thinks that his as a secret police can be maintained by
high-handed shouting. That is what he thinks!

"Don't you policemen know that there is a great difference 1
pre-armistice days and the present? You are still practicing the
"hey, you" and "I'll beat you" principles without knowing that the
people's anger, resentment and hatred are upon you. We are wonder-
ing when this type of police will be gone. I strongly feel that
there exists the necessity for reeducating the present police,
democratically."

(YOSHIMUKA Masumi, TOBATA City).
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 14Nov45
To: 1200I, 15Nov45

HQ, V Amphibious Corps,
SA3EO, KYUSHU,
1200, 15 November, 1945.

No. 55.

Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Map:

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified).
(C) Preliminary Report on Type 2, 12cm AA Guns.
(restricted).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

HIDA (30 miles east of KURUME)

The KOKURA Arsenal in HIDA has two branches; the ARITA Factory and the KASUGA Factory. Both factories were used in experimental work but neither produced materiel in great quantity. The ARITA Factory employed 6200 at the close of the war but only 370 at present closing out the factory. Contemplated production had been to produce 20mm machine guns and 40mm AA guns. The 40mm AA guns were exact copies of our 40 mm Bofors except for a few metallurgical differences. The KASUGA Factory contemplated production of 20mm machine guns and ri
There were 7,500 employed at the end of the war but only 400 at present closing out the factory.

**OMURA**

The OMURA Iron Works in OMURA made airplane parts for the Naval and Military Departments from the summer of 1941 to May 1945. During this period 7 tons of unidentified parts were produced. Equipment included 2 large drill presses and 2 large lathes. 5 men were employed. All records were burned when the war ended and the plant does not plan to reopen.

**BOFU**

TANAKA Shipbuilding Works (1 mile S of BOFU) produced small cargo vessels of 150 tons for civilian use before the war. During the war 20 people were employed making landing craft for the Japanese Navy. Amount of production during the war was 7 landing craft monthly. 4 completed landing craft are at present in the factor. At present this yard is inoperative. The manager is TANAKA, Kamaichi.

**C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.**

1. **Persons apprehended or interned.**
   None.

2. **Suspects.**
   None reported.

3. **Subversive activities.**
   None reported.

4. **Unfriendly organizations.**
   None reported.

**D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.**

No change.
E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Prefectural Chamber of Commerce Information.

SHIMABARA Chamber of Commerce and Industry located in SHIMABARA City was organized 5 years ago as a branch of the NAGASAKI Prefectural Chamber of Commerce and Industry. S. I. NIJI, Chief Secretary of the SHIMABARA branch, stated that there is a Chamber of Commerce and Industry in each Prefecture, with national offices in TOKYO. Membership is limited, but is practically a "must" for substantial businessmen and industrialists. The SHIMABARA branch has 863 members. During the war, the function of the agency was to mobilize all war workers and industry. It was not a government agency, but exerted considerable power in allocating contracts and material. At present it acts only in an advisory capacity for its members to develop and improve peacetime industry and to investigate financial and economic conditions. All records were destroyed at the end of the war.

(2) Preliminary Report on Type 2, 12cm AA Guns.

An ordnance technical intelligence report is submitted by NAIVTECHJAP in Enclosure (C). The original report complete with photographs has been forwarded to Sixth Army through separate channels.

G. L. MC CORMICK,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.M.C.,  
AC of 3, G-2.

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PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Informatic press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. NISHI NIPPON, 14 Nov., 1945 (FUKUOKA) "At about 8:30 P.M. of the ninth, a jeep (No. DMF 314) was stolen from the motor park at the air base at OMURA. Investigation is being carried out by the authorities, including the OMURA Police Office.

"One HAYASHIFUKU (43), a miner, from TRENTO MACHI, HIGASHIMATSU URA GUN, SAGA KEN, pilfered a pair of shoes belonging to a member of the occupation forces. The theft occurred at 8 in the morning, and so speedily did the authorities work that the culprit was in the hands of the local police (at IMARI) by 10 that morning."

3. NISHI NIPPON, 14 Nov., 1945. (FUKUOKA Edition) "The American refuse dumps at HIU in SASEBO have become known as the scene of activities for a whole city of beggars, it seems. Throng of people crowd around to pick up or wheedle what they can: abandoned boxes, empty cans, workout clothing, old containers, everything. This has come to such a sad pass that special police squads have had to be dispatched from the SASEBO force.

"Sympathy is of course extended to those who have been left poverty-stricken by war havoc. But since the occupation forces are apt to mistake these items salvaged by the people for stolen government property, an order has been issued forbidding all such conduct."

4. SAGA SHIMBUN (Published in SAGA) Nov. 14 1945. "At the request of the occupation forces stationed here, the SAGA police conducted an inspection of 59 prostitutes, 17 entertainers, and 30 waitresses on November 11th. The results showed one prostitute and two waitresses afflicted with venereal disease. These three people were ordered to enter a hospital immediately."

5. MAINICHI SHIMBUN 14 Nov., 1945. (MOJI) "On November 12 at about 5:15 P.M. there was an explosion in the OCHIJI two-way tunnel which left no trace of the one hundred meter tunnel. About forty farm-houses in the vicinity were buried. The number of totally or partially damaged houses reached 50, and the village which had consisted of 90 houses was virtually destroyed. Dead have been recovered since the morning of the 13th. The dead out of a population of 450 included, as of noon on the 13th, NASU Akira (51 years old), chief of the SOEDA police station, his wife Masue (48 years old) and thirty other people. Sixty seriously injured and one hundred slightly injured people are being treated at the FURUKAWA DAICHO Factory Hospital.

ENCLOSURE (B)
"The HIDEHIKO R.R. station was damaged. On the morning of the 13th the passenger trains on the KONAI line were stopped because of damage to the rails, but they were running again by evening. The branches of the Post Office and Trade Union were damaged. The cause of this disaster was ammunition which had been stored in the tunnel for the defense of the homeland."

6. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, 14 Nov., 1945. "The Welfare Ministry has for some time in order to avoid confusion in repatriation been carrying out a plan of transportation. However, because people not possessing repatriation passes have in the meantime been crowding into the SAIMONOSEKI, SENSAKI AND HAKATA (TN: FUKUOKA) districts, there are more than 25,000 people remaining there and no ships which can carry them. Not only this is causing great confusion, but lately even such contagious diseases as dysentery and typhus have broken out, and since there are indications that it will spread generally, at the request of the Commander of the Occupation Forces, the transportation of people returning to KORIA will be stopped from the 13th for an appropriate interval. Persons in transit will be stopped and held at respective railroad stations or ports of departure."

ENCLOSURE (B) - 2 -
Preliminary Report on Type 2, 12cm AA Guns.

General Information: The six (6) guns are located at MIYATA position, approximately 33°53'N-130°51'E, in the heart of ZAWATA. The guns are still guarded by Japanese personnel, and all ammunition spare parts, range finding equipment and such are still at the battery position, with the exception of the director (Type 2) which has been removed. The MIYATA Battery had had a type 2 director and an S-24 Fire Control Radar as part of its equipment. Neither of these present any new feature. The Type 2 gun is an Army AA weapon and represents the best AA gun so far inspected by NAVTECHJAF on KYUSHU.

Descriptive Information: The guns are permanently emplaced in concrete mountings and have no tactical mobility. Appearance is characterized by large gun housings which completely cover the breech end of the gun, as well as nearly all of the personnel. A loading tray and power rammer are similar to the Japanese Navy Type 93, 10cm, AA gun previously reported on. The method of fuse setting is also identical with the Type 93, consisting of a fixed rack which engages the tooled fuse gear as the loading tray pivots into position. Two (2) large recoil cylinders are located above the barrel and project slightly beyond the gun housing. Recuperator and counter-recoil buffers are smaller cylinders, located below the barrel, slightly to the right of center. Fuze, azimuth and elevation data are received electrically from the director and proper settings are obtained by zeroing a lagmeter (i.e., voltmeter). Mechanical dials are present for orienting purposes.

Characteristics of the gun:

a. Type: 2 (1942)
   Bore: 120mm
   Length in calibers: 56 (6.72 meters)
   Muzzle velocity: 2820 feet per second
   Horizontal range: 21,800 yards
   Maximum ceiling: 46,900 feet
   Practical rate of fire: 15 rounds per minute
   Limits of elevation: -8° to plus 90°
   Maximum fuse setting: 50
   Length of recoil (maximum): 32cm

This data obtained from page 17A of supplement 1 to Flak Memo No. 4 (CincPac-CincPOA Bulletin 92-45) and from an inspection of the gun itself.

*Note: Battery personnel state a rate of fire of thirty (30) rounds per minute.
G-2 Periodic Report
From: 1200I, 15 Nov 45
To: 1200I, 16 Nov 45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 17 November, 1945.

No. 56.

Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Map:

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (Omitted)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A). (Omitted)

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A). (Omitted)

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

FUKUOKA

IMAJKU Naval Air Base (5 miles west of FUKUOKA) was under the control of the SASEBO Naval District. The base was built in February 1945. During the war the base was used for patrol seaplanes, joint reconnaissance, and work in this area and nearby waters. There were 100 men stationed there, 40 of whom were pilots and mechanics and the remainder naval personnel and laborers. There is no field for land planes although there is a small beach for use by seaplanes. Inventory of this base revealed the following: 3 Zero type scout seaplanes, 2 type #94 scout seaplanes, 4 fighting seaplanes "KYORO", one type #2 fighting seaplane,
3 Zero type observation planes, and same engine accessories, propellers, repair tools, ammunition and photographic equipment. The aircraft were not in operational condition.

KOKURA

The Japanese Chemical Industrial Co. in KOKURA is engaged in the production of sulphur gas and is producing 1050 liters daily. During the war this gas was produced for military arsenals and armories in this area. At present civilian iron works are their only customers. This company with an additional 5000 pressure tanks, could increase their production to 4000 liters daily. The plant employs 28 men; and according to Mr. IKEDA, the official in charge, the same number was employed during the war.

KOKURA Steel Works, part of the ASAHO Heavy Industries Company, Ltd, had a wartime strength of 1100 workers, 254 tons of pig iron, iron bars, and iron products were produced daily during the war. The plant now employs 800 workers and is operating at about 10% of its wartime capacity.

NAKATSU

ITAGUCHI YAMA Arsenal located at YOKKAICHI (9 miles South East of NAKATSU) is a branch of the KOKURA Arsenal. There were 8136 employed during the war, in the production of the following items which were used by the Japanese:

Army: 20mm Aircraft MGs -- 250 per month
30mm Aircraft MGs -- 150 per month
37mm Aircraft Guns -- 75 per month
20mm Double controlled MGs -- 50 per month

It had been planned to convert the plant to peacetime commodities; but this is impracticable, present plans are to destroy or salvage the plant.

KARATSU

Coal Mine at TATSUKAWA (9 miles South of KARATSU) employed 700 KOREANS and 500 Japanese during the war. This one shaft mine produced 8,000 to 9,000 tons of coal per month. At present they employ
445 Japanese in the production of 1,000 tons of coal per month. The mine has 2,400 tons of coal and 500 boxes (200 sticks per box) of dynamite on hand.

OMUTA

KAGOSIMA: Stemp Forging Company in SETAKA (8 miles North of OMUTA) was completed in May 1945, but never operated due to typhoon damage. It was then the firm's intention to produce small parts for naval torpedoes. They now hope to manufacture machine tools and employ 60 workers.

HIKARI Casting Works in SETAKA, employed 130 workers during the war, making steam fittings. The plant consists of a foundry shop. At present, it employs 60 workers making iron kitchen ware and steam valves.

KYUSHU Airplane Parts Manufacturing Company - SETAKA Branch started tooling aluminum castings for plane parts in February 1945 in a former sake storehouse. Castings were received from the parent organization in FUKUOKA, machined and returned. During the war they utilized two shifts of workers: one of 150 adults during the day, the other of 100 school children who worked after school. At present, the plant is inoperative.

MIYAKONOJO

MIYAKONOJO East Airfield has a sod runway 3,405 feet long and 639 feet wide. Facilities include: one large steel hangar which is unfinished and apparently unused; a small hangar at the north-east and of the field which is in poor repair but undamaged by bombing; well dispersed revetments; and a few sheds built against hillsides which may have been used as camouflage individual plane hangers. Plane repair was accomplished in the open. This field is being used as a collecting point for Japanese Army Air Force material. There are 65 damaged planes in the dump, mostly "Franks", in addition there are 60 destroyed planes including about 25 old biplane trainers. According to Captain YAMAGUCHI, Tomo, who is in charge of guarding the dump, Japanese Air Force personnel got out of control when Japan surrendered and smashed Plexiglass, instrument panels, etc. He claims that radios in the planes were stolen.
KAGOSHIMA

KAGOSHIMA Railroad Repair Works is owned by the government and managed by K. AOKI. The shops have suffered no bomb damage, but some damage was incurred by the typhoon of 17 September, 1945. All damage has been repaired and all facilities are in working condition. During the war 1500 men and women were employed; and, at present, 1300 are employed. Many railroad cars are now on the shop's rails, and it will take approximately two months to repair them. The shop is now relining and repainting passenger cars. Engines are also being repaired, but this work has been slowed down because of a lack of equipment and material.

Meteorological Station, located at KAGOSHIMA, is a government owned branch of the FUKUOKA Meteorological Station (our G-2 periodic #21) and reports each hour to TOKYO or FUKUOKA by wireless or telephone respectively. The station was unable to make reports during the period 17 June 1945 to 31 August 1945 due to bomb damage. This has been repaired and the station is now in full operation with 40 employees. The station has never been used directly by the Japanese Armed Forces, but information was relayed to the SASEBO Naval Headquarters by the FUKUOKA station.

KAGOSHIMA Prison contains 678 prisoners; although prior to 5 September, 1945, there had been only 100. The increase was caused by a number of men who were arrested for stealing food, blankets, and military clothing while loading ships in NAGASAKI. The prison does not contain any political prisoners.

NAGASAKI

NAGASAKI District Meteorological Observatory (ref. our periodic #14) is under the control of the Central Meteorological Observatory of TOKYO. There are thorough rain, temperature, humidity, wind, snow, and storm records for the NAGASAKI Area since 1878 to the present. They have incomplete records on the weather of China, Batavia, the Philippines, Manchuria, and the North Pacific. They are in constant communication with the Central office in TOKYO by radio, but claim to have a receiving set only. The meteorological station has the following installations, instruments and personnel: 6 buildings; horizontal and vertical
G-2 Periodic Report No. 56. (Continued)

SECRET

Seismographs (at present inoperational); rain, wind, temperature, humidity and other weather devices (most of which are at present operational); 13 employees (clerical and technical).

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

498th CIC Detachment reports that NISHIKAWA, Donki, prefectural vice-chief of general affairs and member of the repatriation board at KAJIKI, has been found to be uncooperative — if not subversive — in his activities. He has been ordered to report to the KAGOSHIMA CIC Headquarters for complete questioning and investigation, after which a recommendation as to his continued affiliation with the government will be made.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

ANDO, Teppei, former member of the OITA City Police department and in charge of the TOKWA KAP of that department, was employed as secretariat of the Prefectural Police Department in OITA KEN. CIC requested he be discharged, and this request has been complied with. He will be discharged 20 November, 1945.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Search of Safe Guards.

At 0800 16 November, 5th Marine Division search parties struck simultaneously at 41 shrines, temples, and...
school buildings in the SASEBO Area. These establishments which had, to date, been isolated from the surveillance of our forces by "off Limits" and "safeguard" signs. The raid was conducted in an effort to locate caches of weapons, documents, or military material. As of 1200, 15 November, there were 11 reports of contraband found, 23 negative reports, and 7 not heard from. At the Naval Cemetery documents were found enumerating men killed as follows: on the HATSUSE, I'ATE, TOKIWA, and TOMOZURU; in the SHANGHAI Incident of 1932; in the Second Special Fleet; and on small craft in the vicinity of SASEBO. These documents are duplicated in the records on file at the SASEBO Naval Personnel Office. Certain of the schools yielded small amounts of weapons and wooden rifles. Certain shrines contained small amounts of swords and one had a pile of 125 burned rifles. One school had 2 eight-foot, 150 pound range finders in poor condition; assorted transformers and switches in a storeroom; semaphore flags; and maps of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Another school had a military library containing about 300 volumes of military works of the MEIJI Reign (1867-1911). Searches of out of bounds installations in the SAGA and KURUME Area were executed concurrently. This headquarters has requested the 5th Marine Division to furnish details on the search to include: specific places and type of installation in which contraband was located; names and civil positions occupied by Japanese authorities responsible for reporting these items.

\[Signature\]

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2

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PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are enclosed.

2. KUMAMOTO SHIMBUN (published in KUMAMOTO) 14 November, 1945.
"According to the census taken on the 1st, the population of KUMAMOTO CITY is 180,621. The figure includes 84,932 males and 95,689 females, for a difference of 10,757 more women. In addition, the police office is hastening the compilation of an age group classification."

3. ASAHI SHIMBUN (published in KOKURA) 15 November, 1945. (MIYAZAKI)
"Lt. Col. TATTIAN, battalion commander of the MIYAZAKI Occupation Force, realizing the sad plight of sanitary facilities here, brought a considerable amount of medical gear and supplies. He has set a precedent by offering it to the Public Sanitation Office, and requesting that it be fully utilized. He stated, furthermore, that surplus medical personnel will be used to better public health."

"The American occupation of MIYAZAKI has progressed smoothly without a single mishap. The devoted efforts of Major MUSKMAN, connected with the MIYAZAKI Military Government, have contributed to this. The major since his appointment, about a month ago has declined any meat offered to the military government on grounds that even a piece of meat supplied to the occupational troops will jeopardize the prefectural people's subsistence."

"One day during a party held in behalf of the major, a small amount of meat was placed before him. The major, however, left the meat in a separate dish and jokingly stated that it would hurt his conscience if he ate it, in view of the pressing food situation of the people, thus indicating his kind nature."

"In administrative matters relating to the city, however, he has issued strict orders and has conducted business with determination and drive, without wasting much time. The major, who has completed his giant task of supervising the occupation without a snag, is leaving for the NAGASAKI Hq on the 14th. At a farewell dinner with Mr. ISHIMARU, chief of the prefectural affairs dept. on the 13th, he stated, 'I'm happy the occupation was completed so smoothly. It was accomplished through an understanding with the prefectural government and people.'"

URAGA HARBOR FROM TRUK
0800 16th Nov. The DD HATSUUME carrying 2000 army personnel, 149 naval personnel and 151 naval workers.
1200 18th Nov. The DD KAKI carrying 100 army personnel, 400 naval personnel.
1200 18th Nov. The escort vessel SHIMUSHU carrying 100 army personnel with patient, 300 naval personnel with 3 patients.

ENCLOSURE (B) - 1 -
Press Survey and News Translations.  (Continued)

MANILA TO KAGOSHIMA HARBOR.
15 Nov. The escort vessel #132 carrying 123 army personnel, including 56 Formosans, 7 naval workers.
15 Nov. The DD OTAKE carrying 188 army personnel, 1 naval personnel, 3 naval workers, 77 civilians, 27 Formosans.

"KAGOSHIMA has been newly appointed as the port of repatriation for the 750,000 demobilized personnel and civilians from Central and South CHINA. The first ships from SHANGHAI are scheduled to reach here on the 19th and the 28th with 1000 people each time."

"The directive from the Allied Forces states that the evacuation from Central and South CHINA should average 2500 persons per day and will require 10 months. Military personnel and workers who are natives of FORMOSA are included."

"The NAMIKAZE MARU carrying 433 demobilized personnel (8 officers, 2 WO's, 65 NCO's, and 359 EM) of Northern KYUSHU from MARCUS and WAKE reach KAJIKI Harbor on the 10th."

4. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) 15 November, 1945. (MOJI)
"Chief KOTSUNA of the SAGA Prefectural Police made the following statement at the Police Conference: that the police should not be feared by the people; rather that they are guardians of the right and should be admired."

"Previously," he said, "police personnel have tended to overdo themselves in almost all situations. Henceforth, they must serve the people and help in preserving personal dignity, besides enforcing the literal provisions of the law. During the war it was at times necessary to use police of lower character and education, but from now on strenuous efforts will be made to improve the training of our men. Due to dire food shortages, we can expect to have some disorder, but we believe that we are prepared to meet emergencies. The police must also act vigorously in crushing black markets, but overzealousness should not take unreasonable forms. Order and not coercion is our job."
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 16 Nov 45
To: 1200I, 17 Nov 45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 18 November, 1945.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

Military personnel in KAGOSHIMA KEN seem anxious to fulfill surrender requirements but some have apparently received incomplete instructions. At BANSEI Airfield (16 miles SW KAGOSHIMA) near the town of OSAKI, there were found many anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns from which the breech-blocks had not been removed. The Japanese officers in charge of the equipment had recently been ordered to the area and professed ignorance of the units that had delivered the weapons without removing the breech-blocks. They immediately put men to work removing them. A portable Army type Radar machine at this field was found to have been definitively sabotaged. A Naval Coast defense battery near KATAURA (24 miles SW KAGOSHIMA) was found to have been left under the surveillance of the local civilian police. Both of these cases have been reported to the Central Army and Navy Headquarters KAGOSHIMA Area.

At MIYAKONOJO Airfield (1 miles W of MIYAKONOJO), radio equipment had been taken out of the planes on the field, Major TATEIWA, in charge of the equipment, said this had been done by the 19th ISUSHINTAI under direction of Captain NAGAMUNE, who, TATEIWA believes is in KUMAMOTO.
(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KOKURA

Wire Rope Manufacturing Co (2 miles S of KOKURA). During the war 1300 people were employed in the monthly production of 1300 tons of wire rope. At present 630 people are employed in the production of 430 tons of wire rope a month. These figures were obtained from KEIZO, Voda, official in charge of the Company.

KOKURA Steam Plant #1 in KOKURA City is a subsidiary of the JAPAN Electric Generation and Transmission Company, Ltd. During the war 400 people were employed, and at present the same number are employed. There are 4 turbines; two are capable of producing 50,000 kilowatts per day, and the other two capable of producing 25,000 kilowatts per day. No record is kept of the exact production figures; but SHIGETAKE, Gésu, official in charge, estimated that 25,000 kilowatts were produced daily during the war and 20,000 kilowatts per day at present.

NAKATSU

KOBE Steel Company Ltd (1 mile E of NAKATSU) employed 4,419 people during the year and produced 1,200 tons aluminum alloy plate, 3,600 tons copper alloy plate, 7,200 tons aluminum alloy bars, 180 tons aluminum alloy forgings and 60 tons magnesium alloy forgings per year. The plant was constructed during the war, and all products went directly to the Japanese Army. It is inoperative at present, but 319 people are employed in the guarding and maintenance of the plant and equipment.

BOFU

The BOFU Mill of Military Woolens Depot. During the war 850 people were employed in the production of
G-2 Periodic Report No. 57. (Continued)

SECRET

860,000 pounds of staple fibre per month. The shortage of coal forced the plant to cease production since the end of the war. However, 75 people are employed, at present, guarding and maintaining the equipment and property.

BOFU Branch of the CHUGOKU Electric Distributing Co. produces and distributes electrical power. It supplies the needs of homes and factories in the BOFU Area. During the war 40 people were employed in the production of 50,000 kilowatt hours per day. At present, the same number are employed producing 25,000 kilowatt hours per day.

KURUME

The YOSHI Airplane Stock Co. was in operation from June to August 1945 making wings for training planes. During the war the payroll was 120; at present it is 45 people. They are making prefabricated houses at this time.

SOGO TEKKO Metal Works Co. in YOSHII City (15 miles E of KURUME) employed 100 persons from October 1944 to August 1945 making shell cases. At present 40 people are employed making bicycle parts. During the war 50 percent of the people employed were student

KAGOSHIMA

KATAURA Coast Defense Battery (24 miles SW KAGOSHIMA) four 15cm Coastal Defense guns and six dual mount 20mm AA guns. The fire control center for the battery is located in three adjacent pits between the #2 and #3 guns. It consisted of two large spotting glasses, one range finder and a calculator. The local civilian police have been given the responsibility of maintaining a guard over the equipment.

OMUTA

The MIIKE Light Metals Co. in OMUTA began operating in June 1943. It produced alumina, which was sent to KOREA for reduction to aluminum, and electrode paste, used for electric furnace electrodes. In 1944 production was 15,808 tons of alumina and 6764 tons of electrode paste. There is no bomb damage to the plant and they are now producing 2 tons of table salt per day. Number employed during the war was 1050; at present 500 are employed.
The TAKEO Arms Manufacturing Co. (17 miles E of SASEBO) employed 300 men and 200 women during the war. They produced about 5 airplane floats and 30 wings per month. At present it employs 50 workers and by 20 November hopes to be in full operation with 80 employee's. They will produce bicycle accessories, construction scaffolding, milling machines, and will repair automobiles. The firm was established 23 March 1944, and has a l80,000 yen capital. At present they have on hand 3 floats and 20 wing-tips.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) **Persons apprehended or interned.**

None.

(2) **Suspects.**

None.

(3) **Subversive activities.**

None reported.

(4) **Unfriendly organizations.**

The 32nd CIC Detachment reports on the following organization:

**RIKKEN YOSEI KAI:** (Ref G-2 Periodics #10, #18) a nationalistic party derived from the NISHIREN Section of Buddhism. TANAKA, Takuji, sought election to office in TOKYO as a candidate from this organization on a platform of militarism and extreme patriotism.

**SEIKISUI KAI:** Headed by Col HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, who, at present, is being held in TOKYO as a war criminal. This organization was strongly in favor of continuing the war. Membership of this organization was composed of ex-servicemen.

**TANKEN OAKAI KISEI KAI:** LtCol MITSUI, Sakichi, is the head of this organization. The society ordered a national movement to make the Japanese Emperor the Emperor of the World. MITUSI is a radical militarist and imperialist, and is now believed to be in TOKYO.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 57. (Continued)

SECRET

BUNKA RENMEI: Northern KYUSHU Cultural association. This organization while ostensibly a cultural society has been used to spread extremist military propaganda. The leader of this organization is HINO, Ashihe, renowned Japanese author.

NEW JAPAN Young Men's Cooperative Federation: This organization is presently being formed. It is under the leadership of KOSHIMA, Suhife, who is notorious for his terroristic activities in local politics during the war.

National Patriotic Troops Association: This association was formed in July, 1945, for the purpose of better liaison between the troops and civilians. It was discontinued at the end of the war, and its members were incorporated into the neighborhood organizations.

ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI: This organization was formed about 7 years ago. Its chief purpose was to keep in contact with ex-servicemen for mobilization and training. This organization ceased to exist at the end of the war. AHONO, Heizamen residing in DAIBI and at present councilman in KOJI, headed this group.

JOSHI SEINEN DAN (Young Women's Organization). The purpose of this organization was to educate young women between 14 and 25 in various military ideas and also train them to be nurses aides.

DAI NIPPON FUGIN KAI: The chief purpose of this group was the organization of the women of JAPAN above the age of 20 years.

Free Discussion Club: This club consists of citizens interested in problems now facing JAPAN. Meetings are held semi-monthly. Under discussion during their last meeting was the behavior of the occupation troops and the food situation in JAPAN.

Upon investigation CIC has learned that TOKKO KA has been dissolved and the personnel discharged at SHISA, IMARI, ARITA, KASHIMA, and URESHINO.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

URSO, Luigi, and Italian national released from an internment camp near OGI (6 miles NW of SAGA) stated that in his
G-2 Periodic Report No. 57.  (Continued)

SECRET

opinion, the common people of Japan, the small farmers and merchants, the factory workers and the fishermen, are, generally speaking, persons of good will, friendliness and sincerity. He believes that the Allied Occupation Forces could rely on the word of these people. It is among the ranks of the militarists, civilian police, former members of secret civilian and military police societies and organizations, government officials who served during the war, and among the big businessmen that the "foreign-haters" are to found. These are the persons who are paying lip-service to democracy today, and who will be the Imperialists, militarists, jingoists and anti-democrats as soon as the occupation forces leave JAPAN. He said that most of the common people of JAPAN are now realizing that a Japanese victory in this war would have meant little more to them than a continuation of their state of political and economic slavery. The Allied Occupation of JAPAN has given to these people a chance to improve their lot, and they are duly grateful. However, at the present time, many of these people are hesitating to express themselves publicly for fear that the occupation of JAPAN will be of short duration, and that public statements and political action on their part now would mark them for later reprisal.

He declared that democracy could not be established in JAPAN in the short period of 5 to 10 years, but that it would have to be nurtured for at least a generation.

In regard to the Emperor of JAPAN, he stated that before democracy can be fully developed and reforms be permanently brought about, the Emperor must be removed and the Imperial myth destroyed. He did not think that the immediate removal of the Emperor would have beneficial results, because too many of the Japanese people still deeply revere the Emperor's person and implicitly believe in his divinity. Rather, the powers and wealth of the Emperor should be taken away gradually, and the prominence of the Imperial institution should be diminished in reverse proportion to the development of Democracy.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, AS of S, G-2.

902
G-2 Periodic Report No. 57. (Continued)

**SECRET**

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*SECRET*
HEADQUARTERS, 5 AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJU) 16 November 1945.
   "Recently there have been many persons who have purchased tobacco, soap, etc., from occupation force supplies and again have used these supplies for trading purposes. Since it occasions various difficulties for the occupation authorities, it will be severely dealt with by the NAGASAKI Prefectural Police Department. It has resulted in bringing about controls against this type of offense. From the first to the tenth of this month, two hundred and seventy-three (273) cases involving two hundred and ninety-seven (297) people have been uncovered. Among these, one hundred and eighty-nine (189) persons involved in one hundred and eighty-five (185) of the cases have received severe admonitions, and all of the remaining people (97) involved in similar cases are being retained for examination."
   "Particularly offensive along this line is the tobacco procurement group which has been under the leadership of SAKAMOTO, Maruo of SHIZANCHO, OKAYAMA Prefecture. Theirs has been mostly a buying and selling tobacco business." 
   "Offenses of this type which are entered into by members of the allied services will be dealt with heavily by these forces. Current violators are receiving suitable punishments. From now on the prefectural police will enforce more strongly than ever strict controls relative to the above."

"There has been founded in SASEBO a group for the study of communism and its principles. YAMANISHI Inesuke, TOKUNAGA Massaru, NAKANO Omoji and HAKATA Ningi who are imbued with the spirit of the new era, have begun a movement called 'The Japanese Communist Party' and are striving for a SASEBO branch of the People's Cultural Federation and Reformation Group. The leaders of this group who are to inform the people of SASEBO are KAWABATA, Kuma of YAMAGAKI Cho, HIROOKA Yoshiake, a poet who resides in HAIDI MACHI, and SHITSUDO Maruhiro, a graduate of WASEDA, a student of National Literature and author of magazine KIROKU."

"All thirty members of the NAGASAKI Communist group study will hold their first membership meeting in SASEBO on the coming 20th. It is expected that they will pursue the study of the people literary movement and idealistic communism, and lecture concerning the publication of the organization's paper, 'People's Literature'. Moreover, this meeting will commemorate AYUKAWA Shizuka (who died of illness) and KAWAKAMI Ikenaai (a war casualty), both of whom influenced progressive culture in KYUSHU."

ENCLOSURE (B)
Press Survey and News Translations. (Continued)

3. KUMAMOTO NICHIGENSHINSHUN (published in KUMAMOTO) 15 November, 1945. "Repatriation ships from MANILA and North DAITOSHIMA which put into the KACHIGI Harbor November 16th are the KIKUMARU (north DAITOSHIMA; 343 army personnel), the escort vessel No. 227 (MANILA: 199 army personnel) the destroyer KAYA (MANILA: 31 navy personnel, 160 army personnel, 9 military workers), the destroyer SHII (MANILA: 23 navy personnel, 180 army personnel, 5 military workers), the destroyer KIRI (MANILA: 163 navy personnel, 37 army personnel, 2 civilians). Moreover, on the 13th, the destroyers KEYAKI and KABA and escort vessel No. 207 are expected to put into harbor from MANILA."
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

SASEBO NAVAL SUPPLIES ALLOTTED TO CIVILIANS.

The following investigations by the 5th Marine Division are the result of a report that the Japanese Navy had, at war's end, thrown quantities of food, clothing and supplies on the black market. (See Periodic Report No. 53).

The following interviews were conducted by military government officials and members of the G-2 Section, 5th Marine Division:

On 15 November, 1945 Captain CHUKA, who is the head of the SASEBO Citizens Consumers Association, was interviewed at his office and admitted having in his possession articles obtained from the SASEBO Naval Depot (KOSHO) during late August and from the Navy Supply Section (GUNJUBU) up to 20 September. Copies of two (2) bills presented by these organizations were obtained and are at the G-2 Office, 5th Marine Division. The itemized lists include 55,000 liters of fuel, rope, gauze, lubricating oil, cotton, silk thread, starch, clothing, etc. Captain CHUKA explained that these items had been partially paid for and that the organization had a large cash balance in the bank although much of this was in the form of a loan from the bank. He stated that the organization was non-profit making and that the items would be sold to members at cost. Members formerly were limited to Navy personnel and their families but now any resident of SASEBO is eligible.

Vice Admiral IWANARI, who is in charge of the SASEBO Naval Depot (KOSHO), on whose authority items were issued to the SASEBO Citizens Consumers Corporation, and Comdr OGASA were contacted at their office. The Admiral readily admitted turning over articles of a civilian nature between 15 August, 1945 and 21 September, 1945 to any civilian organization that asked for them and could transport them away. He said that very little fuel was released as he didn't have much, most of it being in the possession of the Navy Supply Section (GUNJUBU). He stated that only a negligible amount of the equipment had been paid for, although he expected that eventually all of it would be. The records are not up to date as a result of the "confusion" after the end of the war and bills are only now being prepared for most of the items.

On 14 November, 1945, the records of the SASEBO Naval Depot (KOSHO) were inspected in the presence of Comdr OGASA whose responsibility they are. A check of the receipts for items turned over to civilians between 15 August, 1945 and 21 September, 1945, revealed such items as cement, wire, transformers, canvas, paint, turpentine, tools, drills, steel plates, wire rope, rope, machine oil, grease, soap, candles, paper, mimeograph machines, ink, felt, leathert, sheet rubber, pens, pencils, oil, clothing, blankets, auto parts, batteries, gasoline, bicycle tires and tubes, asbestos, radio tubes, light bulbs, pipes, zinc plates, electric cord, bolts, thumbtacks, ball bearings, piston rings, electric machines, typewriters, adding
SASEBO NAVAL SUPPLIES ALLOTED TO CIVILIANS.  (Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

machines, office furniture, pumps, pig and scrap iron, and telephones. The organizations receiving the above include Post Offices, Mayors of numerous towns including the Mayors of SASEBO, schools, hospitals, fishing and farming cooperatives, newspapers, the MITSUBISHI Shipbuilding Yards in NAGASAKI, and many smaller plants and factories.

A check of the ledgers revealed that in many instances the date for the transfer of items had been tampered with. For example, a "9" indicating September, had been frequently altered in such a manner as to appear as an "8", thus which would place the date of the transaction in August and hence before the official surrender.

Mr. NUMATA, Japanese Home Ministry representative in SASEBO, was interviewed in the G-2 Office at Marine Camp, AIMOURA, on 14 November by military government officials and members of the G-2 Section, 5thMarDiv.

He reported that a meeting had been called by the Ministry of Transportation at FUKUOKA on 11 November and was attended by representatives of the Army (Col TAMURA), Navy (Captain SHIRASHI), Ministry of Transportation, Home Ministry and representatives from the KYUSHU Prefectures who in each instance were the heads of the Transportation Sections.

At the above meeting, the Japanese Army and Navy submitted reports on the status of their vehicles in KYUSHU. Mr. NUMATA indicated that the Army report appeared to be complete whereas the Navy's was very general.

These reports appeared as follows:

Army trucks:
3/15/45 to 9/22/45:
1 stolen
68 "missing"
157 given or sold to civilians
9/22/45 to 9/28/45:
785 turned over to occupation forces
159 given to HODOKAI (Japanese organization dealing with returning servicemen).
Available on 9/28/45:
496 useable
1,239 not useable

Army passenger vehicles:
8/15/45:
117 useable
146 not useable
8/15/45 to 11/11/45:
38 given to occupation forces
10 given to HODOKAI
14 given to civilians
SASEBO NAVAL SUPPLIES ALLOTTED TO CIVILIANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 sent out of KYUSHU
Available on 11/11/45:
53 usable
147 not usable

Navy figures (excluding Navy Air Corps) for KYUSHU, less KAGOSHIMA and MIYAZAKI KENS, as of 31 August, 1945. Mr. NUMATA explained that most of the vehicles should be in the SASEBO Area.

505 trucks
21 less than 2½ ton trucks
37 fuel trucks
95 work trucks
25 wrecking trucks
13 auto-bikes
16 water trucks
16 trucks (with crane)
8 trucks to carry torpedos
39 fire trucks
51 small fire trucks
8 ambulances
26 misc. trucks
23 limousines
112 small limousines
39 Austins
1,035 Total

Mr. NUMATA indicated that there was no mention made of vehicles having been illegally turned over to civilians but it was tacitly understood by all present that this had occurred. He could not, however, give proof in any particular case. He said that soon after the end of the war many demobilised service personnel simply drove off with their vehicles and kept them for their own use.

He said that it had been decided on 11 November that a check should be made on the registration of all vehicles in KYUSHU. This check is already underway and is being conducted by the police with Mr. NUMATA believes will be accurate. The resulting reports are to be forwarded to the Ministry of Transportation in TOKYO.

In a further discussion of a general nature, Mr. NUMATA stated that he imagined that the Army and Navy Headquarters in TOKYO probably urged their various depots throughout JAPAN to turn over equipment to civilians when the Emperor declared the war was lost on 15 August. Again he had no proof that this was so nor could he prove they had actually done so. He said that of course dealing with the Navy was difficult in as much as they have run the show for many years and are not in a mood to turn over their equipment to the Home Ministry as they still feel it belongs to them.
3-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 17Nov45
To: 1200I, 18Nov45

SECRETr
No. 58.

HQ, V Amphibious Corps
SAEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 19 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KAJOSHIMA

KAJOSHIMA Airfield has one north-south runway, 500 yard long and 75 yards wide. It is in fair condition and is now being used by American piper cubs. During the war the field was used by light bombers and a few fighters. 31 planes consisting of 5 light bombers, 19 trainers, and 7 fighters, all badly wrecked, were found in the vicinity of the air field. Facilities included the following: 3 main hangers, two of which are totally destroyed, one being 53 destroyed; two auxiliary hangers, one totally destroyed and the other partially destroyed; 8 barracks and administration buildings, 45% destroyed. The following items were found in the vicinity of the airfield: 7 airplane engines in poor condition, 200 auxiliary gas tanks,
fifty 500 pound bombs, eighty 200 pound bombs, 596
fifty round bombs, 206 twenty five pound bombs, 1500
bomb bodies (approximately 10 pounds), 1500 nose
fuses, and 145 fifty-five gallon drums of fuel.

OITA

SAKANOICHI Branch of TOKYO Arsenal was split into
four plants around SAKANOICHI City (6 miles E of
OITA), and all were engaged in the manufacture of ex-


15 August, 1945, these plants employed
3707 people; and at the present time 138 are employed.
Colonel HODA, Y. is in charge of the Arsenal. A
spot check of inventories showed no discrepancies
with previous Japanese reports.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

There are two new political parties in the process
of formation in KUMAOTO Prefecture. They are the
SHIN NIPPON JIUTU and the MINPOAN TO. It is expected
that they will nominate candidates for the lower house
of the Imperial Diet in the near future.

During the investigation of local politics in KUMAOTO
it was learned that plans are being made in this KEN
to bring all soldiers and sailor relief organizations
under one agency. At the end of the war, the Govern-
ment established in the army the FUKUIN HODO KAI, and
in the Navy the FUKUIN ENGO KAI, to render assistance
to demobilized servicemen. It is inofficially re-
ported through local newspapers that GHQ has ordered
these organizations abolished as they were headed by ex-military commanders. At the present time the following veterans' rehabilitation organizations exist in KURAMOTO KEN:

1. GUNJI HOJOKAI (Wounded Soldiers Protection Home)
2. GUNJI ENGO KAI (Wounded Soldiers Assistance Soc)
3. ZAIDAN HOJIN FUKUIN SHOKUGYO HODO KAI (Organization for Guidance and employment of demobilized soldiers by a foundation). The prefectural governor is the branch leader. It is planned that civilians who have not had any military background will constitute the majority of the executive officers. At the outset the object was to provide guidance in a group forming, truck transportation, assistance in locating jobs and assistance to families of deceased servicemen. Group forming and truck transportation have been discontinued. Observation and investigation of this activity is continuing.

NISHIKAWA, Denki (Periodic #56) was interviewed in connection with reports of his uncooperative attitude. Subject was found to have severely rebuked two English speaking women returning from Manila who had requested positions as interpreters for a short period. They had contacted the interviewing personnel of the American Forces instead of going direct to him. During the discussion, witnesses say that he told the women they should have gone to America if they liked Americans so well. NISHIKAWA has been dismissed by the prefectural government as recommended.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

Lt. Col. Robert S. Spencer, AC, a former resident of KYUSHU for 35 years, reports from conversation with old Japanese friends in the QITA Area, that reactionary elements are already saying that they will not have to wait more than a few years before the occupation troops leave and they will be able to again take over the government.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Precious Metals.

The following precious metals have been found at HIKARI Naval Arsenal (18 miles SE of BOFU):

- 55 white metal dishes: 1400 grams
77 white metal crucibles 1480 grams
68 white metal crucible covers weight unknown
33 white metal plates 1115 grams
white metal line (good quality) 845 grams
white metal line (inferior) 662 grams
23 white metal electrodes 350 grams
95 plates and 41 bars of white metal 23 grams
silver grain 12970 grams
silver angular bars 7800 grams
diamonds 18 carats

There are no facilities available for verifying the above listed weights (which were submitted by the Japanese).

G. L. MC CORRICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMcCR,
AC of 3, G-2.

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CG 5thMarDiv 10 File 5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA) 2

- 4 -
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. ASAHI SHIMBUN (published in KOKURA) 17 November, 1945. (OITA dispatch) "There are many unregistered automobiles which were used by the military, but were unlawfully taken during the post-war confusion and are now being used. The prefectural transportation department will carry out the regulations with maximum thoroughness. Registered vehicles will have a sticker on the windshield, and in the future, all unregistered cars will be stopped."

3. NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN (published in FUKUOKA) 17 November, 1945. "In NAGASAKI City, a roster of eligible voters based on the census taken 1-16 November is being quickly compiled. The total population is 142,748, showing a remarkable decrease from the 270,000 recorded in February, 1944. Among the causes of this decrease are the evacuation of civilians, the August 9 disaster, and the withdrawal of war workers and mobilized students. The grouping by sex shows 69,789 males and 72,959 females. The extent of war service is shown in the overwhelming comparison between women and men in the 24-30 year-old group; there are many more women."

"Classification by age shows age groups 2-6 and 13-21 are most numerous, over 3000 each. The oldest citizens are 99 years old (female) and 98 years old (male). There are relatively few in the 7-12 years-old group, less than 200, perhaps due to the August 9 catastrophe and the evacuation of school children."

4. OITA SHIMBUN (published in OITA) 15 November, 1945. "In the OITA Police Department, the number of hunting licenses issued up to December was: Class A (hunting) 18 first class, 102 second class, 110 third class; Class B (net traps) 3; there was no great change from the same period of last year but there has been a tendency for the number of those living in the city to decrease gradually while those in the country have been on the increase. This is because the food supply has decreased and because of their desire to be self-sufficient."
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 18Nov45.
To: 1200I, 19Nov45.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 20 November, 1945.

SECRET
No. 59.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (Omitted).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

MIYAKONOJO Area

KAWASAKI Aircraft Plant (previously reported in G-2 Periodic Report No. 52) is located about 2 miles east of MIYAKONOJO. From April, 1944 to August, 1945 it produced about ten airplane bodies (Type KI-100) per month. These were all sent to the MIYAKONOJO East Airfield for the installation of engines. Wartime employees numbered 5200, including 2600 men, 1000 school boys, 600 school girls, and 1000 women. Bomb and typhoon damage left the plant about 75% wrecked, so that the 200 people employed at present are engaged only in repairing this damage. Future plans are to convert to the manufacture of kitchen utensils.

The main business offices of the company are at AKASHI (near KOBE).
FUKUOKA Area.

NISHIHARA Iron Works employed 900 during the war and began producing airplane parts (including flaps, gas tanks, brake cylinders and accessories) in December, 1941. The plant is inoperative at present. Stock on hand includes 3 tons of aluminum and duraluminum, 22 tons of steel, and miscellaneous airplane parts.

Naval Gun Factory (6 miles east of FUKUOKA) was never completed, but had planned to undertake production of torpedo tubes and torpedoes. During the war about 300 workmen were used in construction.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Investigation by CIC of unauthenticated information relative to the construction of wooden, concrete-reinforced cargo submarines by the Japanese to evade submarine detectors has revealed the possibility that they were made at KURE Naval Base. An informant has stated that he had heard of these submarines and thought that they were made at KURE.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

Patrols returning from YOSHII (14 miles east of
KURUME) found 16 aircraft sound detectors in various public schools in that area. A complete check is being made as to how and why this equipment was distributed.

G. L. MC CORMICK, 
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, 
AC of S, G-2.

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1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Informat press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. *KAGOSHIKA DAILY*, (Published in KAGOSHIKA) 16 Nov., 1945
The roads, rivers, and bridges of this prefecture have incurred severe damages because of the ravages of war. Also as a result of wind and water action, many other communication facilities have been damaged. A great inconvenience is now being felt throughout the prefecture in communications. The civil engineering bureau has been charged with the responsibility of returning communication facilities to their pre-war state of repair. At present there are 972 roads, 83 bridges, 99 rivers, 4 harbors, and 9 seacosts that need immediate attention. Since among these especially the repair of KAGOSHIKA, HOKKAIDO, AOKI, and FUKUSHIMA is urgent, a subsidy of ¥ 9,500,000 will be required from the national treasury.

An inspector from the Department of Interior is expected to arrive within the prefecture in the very near future. His purpose will be to survey the damage outlined above. Restoration of Civil Engineering within the prefecture continues to be a great headache. Even though the war has ended, there is a great shortage of both skilled men and engineering materials. However, this will be a start in the decisive overall recovery of civil engineering.

**LETTER FROM A STUDENT**

"One day while walking along the streets of a certain district I was suddenly halted by a call from a policeman who was wearing a C.F. (T.N.: the later C.F. evidently bear the connotation of Civilian Police) armband. I was surprised by the brusque manner of the policemen who motioned for me to come back. "Where did you get this vehicle?" he screamed. "This is a military vehicle. The service forces are greatly troubled by the present lack of automobiles." He then jotted down my name and address in a note book.

"I received this automobile from my brother," I answered. "Since there is a complaint I must have this matter examined. Come to the police station with me," he ordered. I complied, and we arrived at the station. Finally, after much argument I was able to reclaim the automobile which I had originally received from my brother. I was really perturbed! Is it possible that a civilian can be apprehended on the streets and his possessions taken from him by such a person as this?"

3. *NAMICHI SHIMBUN* (Published in MOJI) NAGASAKI-SAGA, 18 Nov., 1945. Crimes committed by Japanese against occupation forces have been very numerous. These crimes include theft, fraud, embezzlement, and violation of the tobacco-sales laws. This
is a violation of the national mobilization law and the SAGA district attorney's office is cooperating with the various prefectural police departments in making arrests. Tobacco cases alone total over one hundred.

Headquarters of the Occupation Forces has prohibited all ordinary sales. They have also requested that Japanese violators be handed over to them for punishment. In addition, these crimes will be severely dealt with by Japanese courts. The sale of tobacco at high prices is a violation of both the tobacco monopoly law and the anti-profiteering law. Violators will be heavily punished. This warning is issued to all residents of the prefecture.

4. KUNAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN (Published in KUNAMOTO)

On 14 November, about 0800, FURUHANA Suski’s older son, Tadato (17 years of age), while playing with a dud in the living room of his home touched the fuse of the shell causing it to explode. Tadato’s younger sister who was playing in the kitchen was instantly killed by a fragment of the exploding shell which pierced her abdomen. Tadato was seriously wounded in the leg and is now in TMASHA hospital in this city.

In this prefecture there have been almost a dozen such accidents. From now on, anyone who discovers a dud must report it to the police rather than attempt to handle it himself.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 19 Nov 45.
To: 1200I, 20 Nov 45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 21 November, 1945.

No. 60.

Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Map:

Enclosures: (a) Order of Battle (OMITTED).
(b) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DISARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT:

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KOKURA

ALPON Soda Company Ltd. (3 miles S of KOKURA) during the war employed 2062 persons in the production of phenol for the Japanese Army. Production in 1943 was 58 tons, in 1944 460 tons and up to August 1945 151 tons. Present employment is 449, and the factory is being converted to the production of industrial salt, caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, liquid chlorene, bleaching powder and other chemicals.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.
(2) Suspects.
None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.
None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.
None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

The KURUME RIKUGUN KAIKOSHA (Army Officers Club) is a branch of the National Army Officers Club called RIKUGUN ZAIDAN HOJIN with headquarters in TOKYO. This was a chartered society in which membership of Japanese army officers is believed to have been compulsory since its dues were directly extracted from Officers salaries. The position of each club member was the equivalent of his rank in the Army. Members of the local club claimed it's purpose was to provide a gathering place to discuss military matters and further their military education. The KURUME Club has recently withdrawn 40,000 yen from it's account for distribution to it's members. It denies any official affiliation with the military and the resultant exemption of its large assets from confiscation by the occupation forces. Disposal of the remainder of the club's funds has been halted by CIC pending the arrival of information concerning the status of the national organization.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

Correction to Periodic Report No. 47. Change para. E (1) to read Model 99, 88mm AA gun, and, Model 14, 10cm (105mm) AA gun.

NOTE: Second Marine Division Periodic for period 19 Nov - 20 Nov was not received in time for inclusion in this report.

G. L. NO CORMICK
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR, 920
AC of S, G-2.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 60., (Continued)

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.  

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.  

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.  

2. NISHI NIHON SHIMBUN (published in FUKUOKA) 19 November 1945.  
"Forty-one guards at the KUMAMOTO Prison went suddenly on strike during the morning of the 16th. Then on the 17th and 18th, they assembled at the KUMAMOTO Higher Technical School and the SAIZEN Shrine where they carried on demonstrations. The terms of the strikers are rationing of government supplies to permanent employees, rationing of furniture, farming tools, bamboo miniatures, and shoes made at the prison, revision of the 24 hour duty policy, and improvement of treatment. Superintendent TAKEFUJI and his officials are negotiating with the strikers to reach a smooth solution fearing that the situation may become aggravated. The present watch system has been damaged by bombing and is inadequate. Since there are 500 or more long term prisoners confined, the department heads and other employees are guarding them carefully to prevent any outbreaks."

"Since the main reason for the shortage of coal has been attributed to the tardiness and semi-mutinous attitude of the Chinese and Korean laborers who have been working in the mines for the Japanese government, the Government has deemed it wise to return these persons to their home countries as quickly as possible."

"Even though this movement has been slow, the government has decided that by utilizing its railroad communication facilities for transporting the laborers to collection depots, it will be able to accomplish the repatriation of the greater percent of them by the end of the year. Already 2,700 Chinese from among the 13,000 who served in Japan as laborers during the war have been returned to their native land. It is hoped that during the month of December, the repatriation of 4,200 more Chinese will be successfully accomplished. Furthermore, it was estimated that there were approximately 145,000 Korean laborers in Japan at the end of the war. (The above figure includes families of the laboring men). However, by the 13th of this month it was estimated that approximately half of that number, or 82,650 Koreans, had been repatriated. Of the 62,350 Korean laborers still within this country, approximately 1,000 daily are being transported to collection depots by rail from HOKKAIDO."

"In accordance with the wishes of Colonel BALLARD (BARA-DO), Finance Officer for the Military Government Section of the American Eighth Army, the repatriation of the laborers is proceeding according to schedule. An additional 4,300 Korean laborers were to be withdrawn from the areas in which they labored, and dispatched from NIIGATA to their home country on the 16th and 17th. It is hoped that public peace and order will be restored.
Press Survey and News Translations. (Continued)

to the mining communities as a result of the withdrawal of the unfriendly Chinese and Korean laborers."

"A Navy doctor, Lt. SATO, Ariyoshi, was arrested at his residence in NITCHO MACHI, SASEBO, and taken to the SASEBO Police Station. Lt. SATO, who formerly worked at SASEBO Naval Hospital, was charged with the embezzlement of approximately ¥ 7,500 worth of medical supplies. The stores taken included medicine, glycerine, and military postal supplies."

"Recently a person calling himself a member of the 'Naval Security Unit' appeared at the TORISU STATION and searched naval discharges. Since these men had already had military equipment, etc., confiscated, the TORISU police thought this suspicious. Upon investigation this 'Security Agent', calling himself HAYASHI, Kajiro, 20, from MIZUMA GUN, EXAMI MURA, turned out to be HIYOSHIMA SHIGEO, a former naval P.O. He had heard of agents being sent to TORISU, and had gone there under false pretenses, stealing money and gear."

5. ASAHI SHIMBUN (published in KOKURA) 19 November 1945.
"About 11 o'clock on the morning of the 16th of November, the Navy Escort DAITO, during minesweeping operations in the IHI channel, struck a mine and sank. The crew at present is receiving aid."
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 20Nov45
To: 21Nov45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASLBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 22 November, 1945.

No. 61.

Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (UNCLASSIFIED)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
   No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
   No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
   No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
   None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

   KARATSU

   DAI HIPPON Aircraft Factory Ltd., near KARATSU produced bomb racks and bomb releases during the war. The payroll during the war was 1199 persons. At the present time 130 are employed manufacturing bricks and auto trailers.

C. COUNTERINTelligence.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
   None.
Suspects.

MAZAKI (also translated MASAKI), Jinzaburo, General (retired) - translations from local Japanese newspapers reveal that the Japanese government has been ordered by SCAP to apprehend General MAZAKI as an alleged war criminal.

General MAZAKI is at present residing at the MATSUMOTOYA Hotel in SAGA and had been interrogated by 5th Marine Division CIC units prior to the issuance of the SCAP order for his arrest. MAZAKI had also published two newspaper articles "exposing" the Japanese militarists and stating the causes for Japan's defeat (see the English editions of MAINICHI for 16 and 17 November). In spite of MAZAKI's professed opposition to the policies of the Japanese leaders during the war, it was the opinion of the CIC agent investigating his case that this opposition was based on disagreement as to tactics and strategy and not on the principle involved.

The General's son MAZAKI, Hideki is now in the Foreign Office in TOKYO and, although he is not a military man, he can give full information on his father's military career.

Subversive activities.

None reported.

Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

Miscellaneous.

OITA CIC reports that a circular compiled by the Home Ministry in TOKYO dated 30 Oct 45. was forwarded to the heads of the SHOKAI KAI and TONARI GUMI (Small Type Neighborhood organizations) in OITA Prefecture. The circular listed precaution to be exercised by the people, and warned them that they must be careful because the character of the American Soldier is bad. Various responsible individuals were investigated by CIC. CIC feels that the circular was not distributed for the purpose of maliciously causing unrest in the community or friction between the Japanese civilians and American Soldiers.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 61. (Continued)

SECRET

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

Nothing to report.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC,
AC of S, G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS, V FORBIDDEN CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.
PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

   "It was decided to repatriate the Chinese and Korean laborers after a discussion with Allied Forces."
   "It has been decided that 920 Chinese who were interned at NAGASAKI and 3000 Chinese who were waiting for repatriation at FUKUOKA will be sent home on the first shipment, and Korean laborers on the 2nd shipment."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI) 20 November, 1945. "The training of the occupation force is held daily from 0900 at the former fisheries school ground which is located at ASAHI-MACHI, NAGASAKI."
   "The training is mostly firing practice. 150 soldiers are busy doing the prone and kneeling positions facing the 10 targets. It is interesting to see the kneeling position and the ease with which it is assumed. Their movements are smart and everyone has a serious look, but when his turn is over he speaks pleasantly to the children who are watching the training."

4. SAGA SHIMBUN, (published in SAGA) 20 November, 1945. "How has the tendency for crimes become since the end of the war?"
   "In this Ken, the number of incidents which occurred during October was 628. Compared to the 497 incidents of October of last year, it is an increase of 31. Among the crimes on the increase, the surprising record that the crime of theft has increased 3 or 4 times, reflects the various social conditions and the food situation which is now impoverished. If you look closely, the tendency of such crimes appears very much among clever youths. When you look at it, it is clear that of the crimes committed by youths, approximately 80 percent are thefts. Why have the juveniles crimes increased more after the war than during the war? As against an average of 45 men caught in criminal investigations from January to August, twice that number were caught in October."
   "Among the crimes which broke out in October was one incident of incendiaryism and murder, but those were both committed by youths together with the increase of incidents of theft, the fact that tendency for various crimes as incendiaryism and murder has become conspicuous is particularly a matter of concern. Concerning that, the following was said at the Ken criminal court."
   "Whatever you may say the most important present question is the food question; increase in the number of thefts at the end of the war has that as its cause."
5. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN, (published in FUKUOKA) 20 November, 1945
"The People's Party of Japan at a meeting held on the 19th at the
TSUKIJI office set up emergency committees for the study of the
following matters: the fundamentals of democracy, with FUKUJI as
chairman; planning council for the establishment of a democratic
party, with SUZUKI as chairman; revision and/or abolition of
military law, with OKAMURA as chairman; international relations
committee, with TOGANO as chairman; group to consider the problems
of factory workers and agricultural districts, with OTOKU as chair-
man; and a committee to discuss the problems of the communications
system with NOGUCHI as chairman."

"The principles of the party were discussed at great length
and it was decided that in general they would conform with the
following outline:
1. To continue the Emperor as the dignitary head of a demo-
cratic organization whose efforts would be directed toward main-
taining world peace.
2. To establish an organization which would strive for the
personal rights of the individual. Such rights would insure
freedom of public discussion, and the freedom from want. Under this
plan an individual would be able to engage in any type of work for
which he felt himself best qualified.
3. To strive for the cooperative spirit among the individual
members of the national society and direct their efforts toward
maintaining world peace. This effort, if successful, would abolish
world conflict."
0190/130
Ser. 001140B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 21Nov45
To: 1200I, 22Nov45

SECRET

No. 62.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 23 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (OMITTED)

A. DE-MOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No Information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.
Nothing to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.

(2) Suspects.
None.

(3) Subversive activities.
None reported.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 62. (Continued)

SECRET

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

G-2 5th Marine Division reports that the ashes of American Flier, which were taken from a crashed Grumman Airplane on 22 or 29 March 1945 by the Japanese, were turned over to G-1 5th MarDiv. by a patrol. They are to be interned in the 5th MarDiv cemetery and a routine report made to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC,  
AC of S, G-2.

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0190/130 G-2 PERIODIC REPORT
Ser. 001142B
From: 1200I, 22Nov45
To: 1200I, 23Nov45
HQ, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 24 November, 1945.
No. 63.
Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)
Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle (OMITTED)
(B) Press survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS,

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SAGA

The KITTO SHOGI AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING Co. at CGI
(6 Miles N of SAGA) (G-2 Periodic Report #22)
manufactured wings, tails and fuselages for seaplanes during the war. There is enough equipment on hand to equip 50 seaplanes. During the war 20 wings, 5 tails and 5 fuselages were produced monthly. 218 men, 163 women and 719 part-time school children were employed during the war. At present only 40 are employed making aluminum rice boxes, with the future intention of producing furniture, bicycle parts and pottery. The aircraft production started in Feb 1944 and ceased at the end of the war.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 63. (Continued)

SECRET

KARATSU

MAIZURU Iron Works in KARATSU employed 230 people during the war. They produced nuts, bolts and small fuel strainers for airplane engines. At the present time 50 people are employed and are preparing to produce small parts for electric switches.

A branch of FUKU SEISAKUSHO formerly the KARATSU Aircraft Weapons Co. employed 93 people during the war. They produced gas generators for automobiles and parts for torpedoes. At the present time 36 people are employed, and are producing generators and small grain grinders.

KARATSU SEISAKUSHO is a machine shop and foundry. During the war, 120 people were employed producing steam valves. At the present time 47 people are employed and are producing small grain grinders and also repair engines of small vessels.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

Pursuant to orders from G3, 6th Army, TAKOMOTO, Isoji, and OGURA, Yasuhi, were apprehended at 1050 on November in the SHIMYOICHI Branch Office of the Bureau of Communications of the Japanese Government, at FUKAGAW. They stated that the currency in their possession (7,500,000 yen) belonged to the KEIJO (KOREA) Bureau of Communications, which was operated by the Japanese Government. They believed that the money was to have been used to pay railroad fares for Japanese employees of the KEIJO Bureau of Communications who were returning to their homes in Japan via the SENZAKI Ferry tunnel. A number of discrepancies were noted during the interrogation and these support the belief of the CIC agents that TAKOMOTO and OGURA may be withholding certain information which might implicate their superiors in an act of embezzlement. TOKOMOTO and OGURA have been placed in detention by Military Police in FUKUOKA. The currency is being placed in the Safety Deposit Vault in the Bank of Japan, FUKUOKA. Further investigation is in progress.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.
(3) Subversive activities.
   None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.
   None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.
   No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

In the MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) of 21
November 1945, a paragraph regarding the shooting of
a Japanese woman by a sentry appeared. A further re-
port from the 32nd Inf Division is awaited by this
headquarters.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:
ComFifthFt
CG Sixth Army
OIC JICPOA
CG FMFPAC
Com5thPhib
CG III Phib Corps
CG I Corps
CG X Corps
CG 2ndMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
AFCAP HQ (MANILA)

CG 32ndInfDiv 10
Attn 3-2
" OOB
CG FBC 1
NAVECHJAP 1
USSB3 TOKYO 1
CO Corps Troops 1
AC of S, G-3, VAC 1
Record Section, VAC 1
File 5
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Published in MOJI) 21 Nov., 1945. "The 3,000 evacuees from the South Seas will return home, in view of the large number of Okinawans who were evacuated from the South Seas, or were deployed or demobilized, the OKINAWA, KAGOSHIMA and KYUSHU Administrative Offices have requested for ships to be dispatched to OKINAWA. On the 19th, a directive came from the KAGOSHIMA Military Government stating that all civilians except for demobilized personnel will be permitted to return under the Japanese Government Ship Distribution Plan. If the Ship Distribution Plan is approved, the 3,000 Okinawans who were evacuated from the South Seas will be returned first followed by the 3,600 deployed in KAGOSHIMA and the Okinawans throughout Japan. The OKINAWA Administration Chief, KETA, will report to TOKYO in the near future and contact the Central Government to make preparations for the distribution of ships."

3. SAGA SHIMBUN, (Published in SAGA) 21 Nov., 1945. "Recently there have been various offenses involving both residents of this prefecture and members of the occupation forces in illegal tobacco sales and purchases. The most frequent violations of the tobacco sales laws are theft, fraud and embezzlement. Already over one hundred cases have been uncovered and the offenders arrested. This has been accomplished only by the close liaison of the prefectural police office with the various local branch offices.

"Headquarters of the occupation forces has forbidden its personnel to engage in tobacco transactions with residents of the prefecture. All cases involving American military personnel will be prosecuted by military headquarters. Therefore, the prefectural police have been instructed to hand over all civilian personnel under their jurisdiction who become involved in crimes with members of the military forces occupying this prefecture to the occupation forces for prosecution. Persons who commit this type of offense will be punished by the prefectural police in addition to any punishment the offender might receive at the hands of the occupation forces. In addition, people who violate the national tobacco laws (e.g., selling tobacco at high prices to make large profits, etc.) will be tried by their local police courts."

4. HIUSA NICHIBUN SHIMBUN, (Published in HIUSA) 19 Nov., 1945. "The American jeep, which runs through the city streets with the ease of a bouncing rubber ball, is very popular with the children. However, the worry of the driver is great because of the hordes of children who hang onto such vehicles. At such times when the jeep is being backed by the driver, it is very dangerous for children to be gathering around the vehicle and clinging to its sides. Many children have been hurt as a result of their own
negligence. Warnings have been sent out by the occupation forces and are now in the process of being distributed by the prefectural police headquarters. The parents of families having naughty children should be very strict about warning their offspring to keep away from all American military vehicles.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 12001, 23Nov45
To: 12001, 24Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,

No. 64.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassifed)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

HIKOSHIMA

HANAYICHI Shipbuilding Company produced wooden coasta defence boats, tug boats, steel transports, steel oil tankers, and steam and diesel engines during the war. This company employed 4455 people during the war, and now employ 1106 men and 164 women. At present 25 ships are under repair, and the company is converting in order to build wooden and steel fishing boats up to 500 tons, engines up to 2000 HP, and to do all type of repair work. The machinery includes: 4 punching machines, 9 air compressors, 36 drilling machines, 16 milling machines, 20 shapers, 16 grinders 2 gear cut machines, 4 steel hammers, 4 bending rollers, 226 lathes, 7 boring machines, 9 planers, 12 slatters,
2 face lathes, and 5 cupola furnaces.

OITA

TOYO Soda Company (9 miles east of OITA) produced soda ash, caustic soda, bromine, and various soda products before the war. During the war 2200 people were employed in the production of aluminum hydroxide at the rate of 160 to 250 tons per day. At present it employs 750 people in the production of commercial salt.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

Investigation by the 496th CIC Detachment in KURUME proves conclusively that four local Japanese beat to death an American B-29 crewman in YOKOYAMA-MURA on 28 July 1945. According to a CIC report of investigation on this incident which is being forwarded through CIC channels, the American was not a prisoner at the time of his death but was resisting capture by Japanese civilians.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKKO KA The TOKKO KA in MIYAZAKI KEN was dissolved 9 October, 1945. All TOKKO KA records have been inventoried and sealed by CIC.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifthFlt 1
CG Sixth Army 6
OIC JICPOA 1
CG FMFPAC 1
Com5thPhib 1
CG III Phib Corps 1
CG I Corps 1
CG X Corps 1
CG 2ndMarDiv 10
CG 5thMarDiv 10
AFFAC HQ (MANILA) 2
CG 32ndInfDiv 10
Attn G-2 1
" OOB 1
CG FBC 1
NAVTECHJAP 1
USFJS TOKYO 1
CG Corps Troops 1
AC of S, G-2, VAC 1
Record Section, VAC 1
File 5

937
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

TRANSLATION OF NEWS AND PRESS SURVEY.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN, (published in FUKUOKA) 23 November 1945: "Construction of homes for those bombed out in SAGA KEN has advanced. Six of the seven houses in HIGASHI YOKAMURA outside of SAGA destroyed by the incendiary raid of August 12 have been rapidly completed and people have resumed living in them. Of the 67 houses in KURU of KUBOTA MURA, 22 had their walls collapse. In KURU, which is half fishing and half agricultural, the plan is that one house shall be nine TSUBO in area and that the unfloored part of the dwelling shall be an area of three TSUBO with space for two six-ma rooms. In addition to building outbuildings and small storehouses, a barracks-type warehouse of 20 square yards has been completed. The total cost of construction was 3000 yen. In NAKAMURA, which is purely a farming district, buildings for storing grain have been built. As for the special rebuilt houses of SAGA KEN, which cost about 2700 yen apiece and are about 45 square yards each in area, the authorities of the KEN boast that they are strongly built. In both villages, carpenters, masons, and tradesmen are all being mobilized and, since labor as well as the transportation of materials are being accelerated, progress is ahead of schedule."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI) 23 November 1945: "The SASEBO National Schools are carrying out an earnest experiment in democratic education and the City Education Board is planning to commence a lecture tour shortly. At YAMATO National School the democratic education experiment meeting was held on 21 Nov with SAKAIWA Hiroshi, principal of #2 Prefectural Middle School, as lecturer. Instructions on the experiment were given during the morning and a round table conference was held in the afternoon. Principal SAKAIWA lectured on the subject 'Democracy and Scientific Education.'"

4. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published NAGASAKI) 23 November 1945: "Construction material for the use of bombed-out personnel, allott to the city of NAGASAKI, is being distributed outside the police station as quickly as possible, and more will be received on the 23rd. By 25 Nov enough material for 21 houses is expected to arrive. The greatest number of houses it will be possible to construct by the end of this year is no more than 650, but it is believed that by next spring 1350 houses will be constructed."

5. MAENICHI SHIMBUN, (published MOJI) 23 November 1945: "Since the end of the war, returning veterans and evacuees have increased the number of people for whom goods must be issued by ration in SASEBO. On 21 Nov a statistical roster of 'Ration Population' was carried on in SASEBO. It was found that about 1300 people were listed who are not in town at all; this is probably due to confusi
Translation of News and Press Survey. (Continued)

in handling names and tabulations and slowness in revising tables. As a result a very precise census will be carried out starting 1 Dec, to determine the exact number of consumers in SASEBO."
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 24 Nov 45
To: 1200I, 25 Nov 45

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 26 November, 1945.

No. 65.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.
None to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None reported.

(2) Suspects.
None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.
None reported.
(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Screening of Japanese repatriates at HAKATA Harbor revealed the following: Lt. General KOZUKI, Yoshio, formerly Commanding General of the 17th Japanese Army Group in KOREA, and Lt. General IHARA, Jurjiro, his Chief of Staff were interviewed. KOZUKI Commanded the 19th Japanese Division in Northern KOREA from December 1941 to July 1942, the Second Japanese Army Group in south MANCHURIA from July 1942 to August 1943; the Central Mongolian Japanese Army from August 1943 to November 1944; the 11th Japanese Army in Central CHINA from November 1944 to April 1945, and he held his present position until the surrender. KOZUKI and IHARA stated that there are about 2500 Japanese Army Personnel in the rear echelon assisting the American Forces in KOREA. In regard to Allied prisoner of war camps in KOREA, KOZUKI stated that they were controlled by the HOTOJO KIYOKU in TOKYO, Commanded by Lt. General KIYOSHI, Tama and that local commanders were responsible for furnishing food and medical supplies that had been requested. The Commandant of the two Allied prisoner of war camps at JINSEK and KEIJI, Colonel YUZURU, Noguchi and officer personnel are at present undergoing investigation by the American Forces in KOREA. KOZUKI stated the 17th Japanese Army Group of KOREA was dissolved as of 24 Nov 45. KOZUKI and IHARA stated that the Japanese are now setting up a reception center for troops returning from KOREA. These two and other Japanese officers are quartered at the DAIMARU HOTEL, FUTAGAKI-SHI, FUKUOKA KEN. The offices for the reception center will be located in the TATARA Mfg Co. Bldg. FUKUOKA-SHI until all troops are returned from KOREA.

G. L. MC CORMICK

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| OIC JICFOA | 1 |
| CG FMFPAC | 1 |
| Com5thPhib | 1 |
| CG III PhibCorps | 1 |
| CG I Corps | 1 |
| CG X Corps | 1 |
| CG 2ndMarDiv | 10 |
| CG 5thMarDiv | 10 |

CG 32ndInfDiv 10
Attn G-2 1
" COB 1
NAVTechJAP 1
USSBS TOKYO 1
AFFAC HQ (Manila) 2
CO Corps Troops 1
AC of S, G-3, VAC 1
Record Section, VAC 1
File 1

SECR 941
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published in KOKURA), 24 November 1945. "The SASEBO Naval Station combined funeral services for the late Rear Admiral OSE Hisao and other war dead of the Greater East Asia War will be held at the HIGASHI-HONGANTI Temple, SHIMASE MACHI, SASEBO City, at 0930, the 27th. This will be the last such combined funeral services and will also include services for war dead whose remains have not yet returned."

"The MONTETSU Office, at noon of the 23rd, has instructed all railroad stations under its jurisdictions to abolish sale of 2nd class train tickets for the time being."

"The Ministry of Education has instructed the KYUSHU Imperial University to recall the instructors who were branded "reds" and ejected from the university instructors' staff. The five instructors are SAGISAKA Haseo, ISHIHAMA Tomoyuki, and TAKAHASHI Masao of the Department of Economics, and SASA Hiroo and IMOYAMA Tsugimaru of the Law Department. It is expected that Mr. SAGISAKA will occupy the chair of economic principles; Mr. ISHIHAMA, economic history; Mr. TAKAHASHI, statistical dynamics; Mr. SASA, political science; and Mr. IMOYAMA, international politics. This will mean that the golden age of the University's department of law and economics, which was established by radical social scientists at the end of the TAISHO period with Professor MINOBE at head, will be revived."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI) 24 November 1945. "Diphtheria patients are increasing in SASEBO, and reached 60 on the 22nd. It is going on winter now, and it appears likely that the disease will spread. Moreover, because of the lack of medical supplies, treatment cannot be thorough, and already a number of deaths have occurred. In view of these facts, the following provisions were put into effect on the 22nd, and all efforts are being made to prevent further spread. Especially families with children under ten should take precautions."

1) Have an examination if there is a bark-like cough.
2) Do not catch cold.
3) Avoid contact with those that are sick.
4) Gargle after visiting public places.
5) Inform the Department of Public Welfare when further cases occur.

ENCLOSURE (B)
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 25Nov45.
To: 1200I, 26Nov45.

RESTRICTED

Hq, V Amphibious Corps, 3A3EBO, KYUSHU, 1200, 27 November 1945.

No. 66.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L 571).

Enclosure: (A) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.
Nothing to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
Nothing to report.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.
No change.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, 1AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifthFlt 1 CG 32ndInfDiv 10
CG Sixth Army 6 Attn G-2
OIC JICPOA 1 " 003
CG FMFPAC 1 NAVTECHJAP 1
Com3rdPhib 1 USSBS TOKYO 1
CG III PhilCorps 1 AFFAC HQ (MANILA) 2
CG I Corps 1 CO Corps Troops 1
CG X Corps 1 AC of 3, G-3, VAC 1
CG 2ndMarDiv 10 Record Section, VAC 1
CG 5thMarDiv 10 File 5

- 1 -

RESTRICTED

943
1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI), 25 November 1945. "According to a release on the twenty-fourth from the American Headquarters' Liaison Office, Brigadier General KRAMER of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division, which is the occupation force for SHIKOKU, has issued the following strict orders to all policemen of SHIKOKU:

'Savage behavior of the local policemen will cease. Violent acts such as hitting a child with full force in the face must cease immediately. If such acts occur in the future, the American Military Police will immediately take the offending policeman into custody.'"

"The factories of SASEBO received little damage from air raid because they were away from the main district, but since the end of the war almost all seventy-three of them have been idle. However, forty-five of them have converted speedily from the manufacture of war materials. In the ITOKUMI Iron Foundry, even now pots and axes for family use are being manufactured. In the food factories, SKOYU and MISO (food sauces) are being made. Bicycle parts and boat repair parts are speedily being manufactured to accelerate transportation of vitally needed food products."

3. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in SAGA) 25 November 1945. "A workers meeting was held in HIKOSIMA CHO, SHIMONOSEKI SHI. Following an eight hour discussion, an ultimatum demanding a increase in pay and an eight hour working day, together with eleven other points was presented to the company. The company had made no response to their demands by the twenty-fourth. At noon on the 24th the workers decided to go on strike immediately and did so."

"The KAGOSHIMA Police Department arrested a youth acting suspiciously while wandering through the streets at DO CHO, HANAGAI. It was the first crime for the jobless, homeless, SUGIMOTO TOMOHARU (Age 26)."

"At about the end of August in NAGASAKI, HIROBAJO CHO, he stole undershirts, army shoes, and blankets from a passing occupation forces truck. In the same city, in the OKAMASA Department Store, he stole a purse from a gentleman and his wife and took ¥200 from it, thus making the Japanese lose face in the eyes of the American occupation forces."

4. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN, (published in FUKUOKA) 24 November 1944. "The FUKUOKA Central Telegraph Company's group leader, including the workers, formed a reformation committee demanding the dismissal of dishonest officials, the equality of rationing and subsistence. The
Press Survey and News Translations. (Continued)

committee presented President UCHIYAMA with an ultimatum, on the morning of the 23rd, but received no answer. It was decided to strike immediately."

"The KUMAMOTO City Fishing Association is lending a helping hand to the KUMAMOTO occupational forces plan for food self-sufficiency by raising rainbow trout in Lake ENOTSU. Rainbow trout is considered a delicacy by the American troops, and therefore one hundred thousand will be hatched and released. The water temperature of Lake ENOTSU is suitable for raising rainbow trout. The temperature is lower than that required for carp raising and therefore it is considered that rainbow trout will multiply faster than carp."

5. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published in KOKURA) 25 November 1945. "At a party held last Monday evening, five persons died from drinking poison alcohol. The party was given by a Mr. YAMAMOTO at a HIGASHI CHO Tavern in TORI SU MACHI. The five men, who became suddenly ill while drinking and were rushed to the local aid station for treatment, were: YAMAMOTO (age 64); a farmer, MATSUGURA (54); a railroad employee, RAWAZAKI (36); a carpenter, TERAZAKI (32); and a factory worker, YOSHIYA (25)."
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 12001, 26Nov45
To: 12001, 27Nov45

CONFIDENTIAL

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 28 November 1945.

No. 67.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosure: (A) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No information.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

NOGATA Area (9 miles S of YAWATA).

MIYATA Ammunition Dump (1 mile S of NOGATA). The dump contains the following: 533,979 rounds of rifle ammunition; 66,476 rounds of infantry cannon shells; 4,597 57mm tank gun shells; 986,905 rounds of heavy mg ammunition; 6,446 hand grenades; 1600-15cm howitzer shells, type #4; 20,074-37mm tank gun shells; 6,522-1c howitzer shells, type #91; 14,602 mountain gun shells, type #41; 67.5 kilograms of dynamite; 138 fuses, type #40; 1,900 safety fuses; 405 smoke candles; 167-37mm blank cartridges; 67 signal cartridges; 11,381 rifle, practice rounds; 6,406 AA mb rounds; 3,996-75mm field cannon shells; and 4,100-47mm tank gun shells.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

TSURUSAKI (4 miles East of OITA) DIDO SAKO Steel Plant was completed in April 45, but bombs and typhoons damaged it so much that no steel was produced. In August 45, it employed 500 people. At present 116 are employed in reconverting and repairing the plant. If the plant
reopens its plans to make automobile parts and farming
implements.

BEPFU

BEPFU, Geophysical Laboratory of the KYOTO Imperial
University, is located at BEPU. Seven workers are
employed here in the study of volcanic activity, earth-
quakes, and hot springs. The equipment includes a
vertical and horizontal seismograph on which earthquake
can be detected as far away as South America. No
research was done for the Army or Navy during the war.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None reported.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.
HEMIDART 5 AMBIBIOUS CORPS,
FLXEE POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCEO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published in KOKURA), 26 November, 1945. "(SHIMONOSEKI) - Koreans returning to KOREA through YAMAGUCHI Prefecture will be quarantined from the 26th, and examined starting the 26th. The quarantining will be done at the YAMAGUCHI Red Cross Hospital, with 25 persons under Doctor ONISHI. After the 26th, all Koreans arriving will have a medical examination in the 2nd Class waiting room of the FUSAN-KOJI ferry pier. There they will be given preventive inoculations and vaccinations for cholera and typhus. There is a dispensary set up in the dining room to care for those who may have the disease already. The examination will be carried out from the 26th on all Koreans leaving SHIMONOSEKI at the Special Gate for Korean Passengers. They will be allowed to keep only ¥1000 in cash (the rest in draft), weapons, explosives and other forbidden articles will be taken away from them."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI), 26 November, 1945, "21 arrests for bad violations of the monopoly laws were made by the AINOURA police station. The offenses consisted of the purchase of tobacco and other articles from occupation forces and their resale at an exhorbitant price to Koreans who were being repatriated. The police are taking strict measures due to the prevalence of these offenses."

"On November 23rd at 8:30 p.m., a Chinese laborer started an argument over some trivial affairs with a woman employee of the SHOJIKU boarding house, YAMAGATA, SASEBO, in front of the boarding house. Two Japanese residents of SASEBO, KURIMATA, Shigekiichi, 25, and KUROZAWA, Kiyoshi, 25, who attempted to intervene were assaulted by about 12 Chinese. The police to whom it was quickly reported soon quieted the affair. Furthermore, about 9 p.m. at the SASEBO BASHI Pier, MANOTSU, SASEBO, about seven or eight of the same Chinese began arguing with a woman, NAKAO, Chio, 24, and assaulted her. They also did violence to a Japanese stationed at the pier, SASAKI, Muto 47, of ANOURA."

"At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the cargo ship SHINSHO MARU (of 10 tons) which belongs to TANAKA YASUJIRO, who lives in OSAKA FU, SENDAI GUN, YOHISO KAGI, while proceeding at approximately 200 meters to the east of KAFUSHI harbor near OKUURA of ITSUTSUHAMA hit a floating mine and the hull was blown up into 200 pieces. Among the crew of 6, one was killed immediately and one was seriously wounded, two are missing, and two were lightly wounded.
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 27 Nov 45
To: 1200I, 28 Nov 45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 29 November 1945.

No. 68.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosure: (A) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified),

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

Nothing to report.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Japanese Army ammunition and supply dump (10 miles NNE of FUKUOKA) consists of 19 caves and 24 buildings containing the following equipment: one crane, one motor truck, 1,800,000 LMG bullets, 34,000 bomb fuses, 800 kg powder and 10,000 27mm shells.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KOKURA

AA Gun, Searchlight, and Radio Detector. (1 mile S of KOKURA). During the war this AA installation had 6 heavy AA gun emplacements, however the guns have been removed. Three radio detector units and one power plant are still located at this installation. During the war, 200 men occupied this installation, but were demobilized with the 132nd AA Regt on 30 Sept 45.

SASEBO

IMARI SEISA KUSHO at Imari (12 miles NE of SASEBO) employed 150 people during the war. They produced small
parts for ships. At the present time, 30 people are employed making farm implements.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

SAKAMOTO, Yuhichi (ref our Periodics #31 and 37), former Captain in the Japanese Army and director of POW Camp #9 at MIYATA MACHI, KURATE Gun, was turned over to the SUGAMU Prison at TOKYO to stand trial as a war criminal in compliance with instructions.

INOUE, Hideo, administrative head of the KOJI neighborhood associations was interviewed as to the functions of the associations and the following information was disclosed pertaining to its duties:

1) To distribute food and supplies which are made available to them by the Prefectural Government.

2) Relay instructions to the people when they are received from the superior governmental agencies both local and national.

3) Report to superior governmental agencies what the people are thinking and in what ways they are reacting to specific conditions.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.
G-2 Periodic Report No. 68.  (Continued)

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, AC of 3, G-2.

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SECRET
1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN, (published in KAGOSHIMA), 24 November 1945
"I am the wife of a soldier who died duty on IWO JIMA. Nearly two and one-half months have passed since I received word that my husband was killed in the fighting there. However, sometime ago I noticed in a newspaper report that there are approximately 3,000 military personnel remaining on that island. I have also heard the same report from many people. Since hearing the above I have been doing some very serious thinking. Wouldn't it be wise, without further delay, to publish a list of the names of the men who are still held on that island? Or furthermore, wouldn't it be possible to inform the families of such men, by telegram, that their loved ones are still alive? Wouldn't we continue to live not knowing the fate of our men? With each passing day our troubles become greater and greater. I implore you to consider this carefully. Each day I pray to the gods that the people remaining on IWO JIMA will without further delay be returned safely to their homes."

(Wife of a Deceased Serviceman).

"According to a release from Supreme Headquarters of the Occupation Forces, General MACARTHUR'S Headquarters has ordered the Japanese Government to furnish allied occupation forces with a detailed report on the locations of bodies, graves, or remains of all military personnel who met death in JAPAN during the war. Since American and allied searching parties are unable to ascertain the exact locations of graves and remains of allied military personnel, this order is being published in all newspapers. It is hoped that any person who has any knowledge of the location of graves or remains of allied military personnel will furnish such information to the Japanese Government. Such information will prove of great value in supplementing the incomplete records of our government concerning the above matter."
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 28 Nov 45
To: 1200I, 29 Nov 45

CONFIDENTIAL

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 30 November 1945.

No. 69.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified).
(B) A Study of TSUSHIMA. (CONFIDENTIAL).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
Nothing to report.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SENDAI

ASAHI Rayon Factory (1 mile NW SENDAI). At present time only white rayon handkerchiefs and aprons are produced as silk and dyes are frozen. During the war 400 persons were employed. Some heavy material was made for the army. At present the factory employees number 200.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.
(2) Suspects.
None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.
None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.
None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.
No change.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, CR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:
ComFifthFlt  1  CG 32ndInfDiv  10
CG Sixth Army  6  Attn G-2
OIC JICFOA  1  " OOB
CG FMFPAC  1  NAVTECHJAP
Com5thPhib  1  USSBS TOKYO
CG III PhibCorps  1  APPAC HQ (MANILA)
CG I Corps  1  CO Corps Troops
CG X Corps  1  AC of S, G-3, VAC
CG 2ndMarDiv  10  Record Section, VAC
CG 5thMarDiv  10  File
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

"Capt. BERRY, NAGASAKI MP Unit CO and Capt. SOWELL, who attended the NAGASAKI Prefecture Police Chief meeting of the 27th, expressed wishes that the following be complied with:
All offenses committed by occupation troops against civilians must be reported to MPs as soon as possible. 
Evidences, such as the offender's features, clothing, rank, etc. must also be reported.
Japanese police must further tighten their control on offenses committed by Japanese against occupation troops, which are regrettably numerous.
Japanese police stations must handle the offenses committed by Formosans, Koreans and Chinese against Japanese civilian.

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI), 28 November, 1945
"Because of the many traffic accidents arising from carelessness on the part of pedestrians, 'keep to the right' traffic will be carried out in FUKUOKA and YAMASUCHI Prefectures on the 5th by instructions of the FUKUOKA Sector Provost Marshal.
The gist of this order is that all high speed vehicles, such as automobiles, etc. will keep to the center; bicycles, carts, and horse-drawn carts will keep to the left. Pedestrians will keep off the road and keep to the right. However, this does not apply to streets with sidewalks and pedestrians can keep to either the right or the left then."

4. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN, (published in FUKUOKA), 28 November, 4
"Daily requests are received from the occupation forces for laborer to assist in essential construction work for the occupation forces, but they are scarce. On November 26th an urgent request for male workers was made by the occupation forces, and as a result, Mr. KAWAHARU, SASEBO Labor Department head, urges bringing in laborers from other places on a large scale.
Since SASEBO is the headquarters for all American troops in KYUSHU and the chief port where supplies are unloaded, it is an extremely busy place, and as a result a great many laborers are required. All available personnel in the SASEBO area have been gathered, including especially demobilized personnel, but in cases where other persons cannot be obtained to do the necessary work, there is no recourse under the order promulgated October 16th other than to put additional duties upon some persons.

ENCLOSURE (A)
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

A STUDY OF TSUSHIMA.

1. Importance.

This group of Islands (45 miles NW KYUSHU) consists of two principal islands and a number of small ones. All are extremely rugged and thinly populated. Cultivation is limited to narrow river valleys. Chief sources of livelihood are fishing and farming.

2. Population.

The population of the two principal cities is: IZUHARA 10,000 and KECHI 5,000.

3. Roads.

A fairly good road runs along the east coast of SHIMONO SHIMA from TSUTSU to TAKESHIKI. It is satisfactory for trucks. Cross island roads are suitable for jeeps only.

4. Military Installations and Defences.

KUNOSHITA-SAKI (Northern tip of TSUSHIMA) 2 - 40cm Army Guns designed for Battleship were found here. These guns have a traverse of 360 degrees.

UNISHIMA (1 mile E of KUNOSHITA-SAKI) 4 - 15cm Army Guns were located here. One hydro-phone station. Also a Surface Radar Station not fully completed.

TOYO (1 mile S of KUNOSHITA-SAKI) 4 - 75mm AA Guns (Army).

JODONO-SAKI (3 miles S of KUNOSHITA-SAKI) 2 - 15cm Guns (Army).

SAO-SAKI (10 miles SW of KUNOSHITA-SAKI) 4 - 15cm Guns (Army).

KECHI (4 miles N of IZUHARA) 4 - 28cm Howitzers (Army).

8 - 75mm Field Guns (Army).

ORISEBANA (4 miles NE of KECHI) 2' - 77mm Guns (Army) with 420 rounds ammunition. 6 - 28 cm Howitzers (Army).

TAKEZAKI (2 miles N of KECHI) 2 - 15cm Guns (Army).

6 - 75mm AA Guns (Army).

KAMOYOZE (1 mile SW of TAKEZAKI) 2 - 15cm Guns Army.

IZUHARA Radio station used as relay between TOKYO and KEJO in KOREA. It has 4 inverted "U" towers 100 ft high, 2 power generators and an output of 1.2 kilowatts.

ENCLOSURE (B)
A Study of TSUSHIMA.

CONFIDENTIAL

0-SAKI (2 miles S of IZUHARA) 2 - 15cm Guns (Army).
TATSUNO-SAKI (5 miles S of IZUHARA) 2 - 12cm AA Guns (Navy) with 400 rds. 2 - twin mount 30cm Guns (Army) with 360 degree traverse. These guns had elaborate powder magazines and elevators. 2 - 75 mm AA Guns (Army).
KO-SAKI (Very southern tip of TSUSHIMA) has the following installations: Surface Radar Station not fully completed. One Hydrophone Station. A Navy torpedo Station with 11 torpedoes capable of being fired from beach.
TSUTSU (3 miles W of KO-SAKI) 4 - 15cm Guns (Army) with 800 rds. 2 - 75 mm Guns (Army).
GO-SAKI (10 miles NW of IZUHARA) 4 - 15cm Guns (Army). A Surface Radar Station. One Hydrophone Station. A Navy Torpedo Station with 9 torpedoes capable of being fired from the beach.

5. Harbors.

There are a good number of harbors, the principal ones being IZUHARA on SHIMONO SHIMA and HITAKATSU on KAKINO SHIMA. Beaches are generally narrow and poor access inland. There are no suitable sites for airfields.

6. Counterintelligence.

TOKKO KA units in the cities of IZUHARA and SASUNA were disbanded 13 Oct 1945. All records were burned by order of the NAGASAKI Prefectural Police.
KEPEI TAI was composed of 33 men under 2nd Lt. TAKAMORE, Masaaki. As of 29 Sept 45, KEPEI TAI on the island was completely disbanded.

7. Civilian and Military Attitudes.

Japanese Nationals on TSUSHIMA were at all times friendly and cooperative.
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS IN THE FIELD

- OCCUPATION OF JAPAN -

G-3 Report

Annex DOG
0177/217

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, G/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November 1945.

From: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: G-3 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. PLANNING:

   a. Introduction:

      No sooner had the TWO JJWA operation been brought to its successful conclusion in late March, 1945, than staff conferences were held at PEARL HARBOR on 30 March relative to projected operations against MIYAKO JIMA in the southern RYUKYUS as a follow up of operations then in progress on CHIANG. On 29 March, the new Corps command post had opened on MAUI, and by 12 April, rear elements of Corps Headquarters had arrived at MAUI to facilitate continued planning.

      Late in April, when the preparation of initial studies and plans for the capture of MIYAKO JIMA had been completed, this Headquarters was directed to discontinue planning for that project and to turn over all assembled data to the III Amphibious Corps. Shortly thereafter, on 3 May, the Corps received warning orders for an operation to be executed in mid-August against the CHUSAN Archipelago and NINGFO Peninsula on the coast of CHINA. The new directive further indicated that if this operation were to be cancelled, it would be in favor of one against JAPAN itself, in October or November. The CHINA Coast plans were not only to be prepared by this staff for the VAC alone, but also on field army level for the entire operation (originally conceived for two corps) inasmuch as no higher landing force headquarters had then been designated. Planning progressed throughout May, with a preferred plan and several alternate plans under consideration, but on 27 May, this operation was indefinitely deferred and the new target for planning was to be JAPAN.

   b. Planning for the Assault on Southern KYUSHU:

      (1) Planning Agencies:

         The principal commands associated with the V Amphibious Corps in planning and projected execution of the southern KYUSHU operation were as follows:

         SIXTH Army (General Krueger);

         Annex DG to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN
Fifth Amphibious Force (Fifth Attack Force, Vice Admiral Hill);

Amphibious Group 4 (Fifth Transport Group, Rear Admiral Reifsnider);

Amphibious Group 5 (Fifth Fire Support Group, Rear Admiral Wright);

2d Marine Division (Major General Hunt);

3d Marine Division (Major General Erskine);

5th Marine Division (Major General Bourke).

The SIXTH Army exercised command of expeditionary troops, while the Fifth Attack Force was to have been charged with the overall naval responsibility for landing this Corps. The Fifth Transport Group (Phib-Gp 4) was to conduct movement to the target, ship-to-shore movement, and naval gunfire and air support (during and after initial landings). The Fifth Fire Support Group (Phib-Gp 5) was designated to conduct preliminary bombardment, as well as all other advance amphibious operations off the Corps beaches.

Planning was conducted with all the foregoing commands throughout the summer, and was greatly facilitated by the SIXTH Army and naval decision to permit joint planning directly between this Headquarters and the naval staffs enumerated.

(2) Planning Directives:

The Corps mission in the southern KYUSHU assault was to:

"...land on the west coast of southern KYUSHU in the KIMINOKAWA-KUSHIKINO area, secure a Corps beachhead to include SENDAI, protect the northwest flank of SIXTH Army, and block the advance of hostile forces from the north, along the west coast; then advance inland when directed and seize the general line KAGOSHIMA-KAWASAKICHI-ICHINO-SENDAI, in order to assist in the establishment of air and naval forces in southern KYUSHU for support of operations into the industrial heart of JAPAN."

This mission was derived from SIXTH Army field order for the operation.
Earlier major directives, all by despatch, had successively directed the Corps Commander to report for planning purposes to the Commanding General, SIXTH Army (2 June); had substituted the 2d Marine Division for the 4th Marine Division in the troop-list for the southern KYU operation (15 June); and established a readiness-date of 1 November (30 June).

(3) Planning Narrative:

On 2 June when the Corps Commander reported despatch to the Commanding General, SIXTH Army on LUZON, distances between headquarters were so great that initially very little information was available for firm planning, although immediate steps were taken to assemble and digest all intelligence studies and material on hand in the HAWAIIAN area.

On 15 June, in accordance with despatch instructions from CINCPAC, the 4th Marine Division was deleted from the Corps troop-list and from planning for this operation, and the 2d Marine Division (then at SAIPAN, except for RCT 8, currently engaged on OKINAWA) substituted therefor. The Commanding General of that division reported to this Headquarters for planning purposes on 19 June. Meanwhile, on 18 June, the first conference with any of the Navy staff's concerned took place when Rear Admiral Wright, Commander Amphibious Group 5, with certain members of his staff, visited Corps Headquarters for exploratory discussions of the operation and to obtain access to intelligence material then available to Corps. It was learned that Amphibious Group 5 had been tentatively designated to conduct the amphibious operations preliminary to landing the VAC, to include underwater demolition, preliminary bombardment, hydrographic reconnaissance, and minesweeping.

With the arrival at this Headquarters, on 24 June, of a SIXTH Army staff representative, information as to tentative troop-lists, shipping, logistics and the Army scheme of maneuver became available, and it was possible to initiate the basic, if still tentative, tasks of planning. The SIXTH Army scheme of maneuver, insofar as it affected this Corps, entailed landings astride the KAMINOKAWA, on western KYUSHU beaches in the vicinity of IZAKU, by two Marine divisions abreast, with the initial mission of securing a Corps beachhead including SENDAI and then the general line KAGOSHIMA-KAWAKIMICHO-ICHIINO-SENDAI. Subject to unforeseen emergency, it was further planned to commit IX Corps, initially in floating reserve, about four days after initial landings, to secure the southern extremity of the KAGOSHIMA Peninsula, and the airdromes in the KAIMON-DAKE area.

During the last days of June, much thought had been given to the probable requirements of land-mass operations upon
an Amphibious Corps which had heretofore operated entirely against
limited, if bitterly-defended, island objectives, as an engineer-
problem, this meant that bridging, stream-crossing and rice-paddy
crossing must be taken into consideration. With the Corps deploy-
a wide front in rough terrain, rapid, long-range reconnaissance must
be continuous; therefore measures were taken to mechanize division-
reconnaissance companies, until now organized and trained primarily
in amphibious reconnaissance. Planning went forward to secure some self-
propelled weapons for Corps and division artillery units. Despite the
continuing paucity of detailed information as to the objective area
and the lack of firm schemes of maneuver, naval gunfire planning pro-
gressed to the extent that the basic gunfire communication-plan (which
was to survive in modified form even for the occupational landings)
had been virtually completed.

On 28 June, after study of the tentative Army
scheme of maneuver, the Chief of Staff, accompanied by selected staff
officers, proceeded by air to SAN FERNANDO, LUZON, P.I., then the lo-
cation of Headquarters, SIXTH Army. Enroute, conferences were held at
PEARL HARBOR with Fleet Marine Force staff representatives and with
Rear Admiral Reifsneider, Commander Amphibious Group 4. Upon arrival
in LUZON, tentative echeloning of shipping was set up, the Corps com-
monication-requirements and frequency-plan were discussed, and it was
decided to plan for a preferred landing over the KUSHIKINO beaches,
rather than astride the KASENO-KAWA. This tentative plan was immedi-
ately referred to the Commanding General by dispatch, and was by him
concurred in. Close study of this area was immediately initiated at
Corps Headquarters on MAUI.

Prior to the return of the Chief of Staff from
LUZON, a despatch directive from CinCPac, received on 30 June, directed
the Corps to prepare for a target-date of 1 November. On 4 July, Rear
Admiral Reifsneider, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, visited this
Headquarters for further preliminary conferences, and, on 5 July,
Engineer and Signal representatives of the Corps conferred respectively
at PEARL HARBOR with CinCPac Engineer and Fleet Marine Force signal offi-
cers relative to stream and paddy-crossing expedients, and to signal sup-
ply and AAA communications.

Immediately upon the return to MAUI of the Chief
of Staff and his party, on 6 July a meeting of all General and Special
Staff Section heads was held, and the Chief of Staff outlined the dis-
cussions at SAN FERNANDO and MANILA, issuing additional information
and instructions for planning purposes. Decisions were taken as to
overall logistics, supply and resupply, as well as the Corps scheme of
maneuver. This now firmly entailed landings on the KUSHIKINO beaches
with 2d and 3d Marine Divisions abreast, 3d Marine Division on the
left initially making the main effort to seize SENDAI and secure the
line of the SENDAI-GUN to the north, while the 2d Marine Division
pressed inland to seize KAGOSHIMA. The 5th Marine Division in reserve
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CONFIDENTIAL

would preferably be committed in the 2d Marine Division's zone, either
to lend fresh impetus to the drive on KAGOSHIMA or to protect the Corps
right (south) flank. Corps Artillery was to be divided into two
groups, the stronger of which to the north would support the 3d Marine
Division.

On 7 July, the Commanding General, accompanied
by selected members of General and Special Staff Sections, departed
by air for Headquarters, SIXTH Army, conferring enroute at Fleet
Marine Force Headquarters, and on SAIPAN with the Commanding General
and staff of the 2d Marine Division. The party arrived in LUZON on
11 July (East longitude date) and immediately commenced conferences
with the respective commanders and staffs of SIXTH Army and of Amphibi-
ous Forces, Pacific Fleet (in USS ELIZABETH, at anchor in HAYA
Bay). The first day at SAI FERNANDO was largely devoted to presenta-
tion by appropriate SIXTH Army staff-officers, of the complete army
plan for the southern KYUSHU landings, while the second and succeeding
days were taken up with individual meetings between the various staff-
oficers of Corps and Army, as well as with Navy staff-representatives
at SAI FERNANDO or HAYA. On 13 July, the Commanding General and
party left by air for the HARA'AAS, where further conferences were
held with the staffs of the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions relative to the
LUZON meetings, and, on 17 July, the party returned to HAYA, where
steps were immediately set on foot to implement the decisions of the
past week.

In the absence of the Commanding General, how-
ever, planning had not slowed, for, on 8 July, the SIXTH Army Tentative
Field Order (dated 30 June) had been received, and, on the next day,
the first tentative draft of VAC Operation Plan 1-45 was completed.
During this week the desirability of obtaining tracked prime-movers
for both Corps and division artillery had been under consideration, and
a recommendation that this change be made was submitted to Fleet Marine
Force Headquarters. Concurrently, artillery conferences were called
by the ACCFJS, G-3, to bring together representatives of VAC artillery,
the 223d FA Regt, and the 477th FA Oben En, for joint planning and dis-
cussion of policy. The first of these was held on 17 July, and was
followed on succeeding days by others.

On 15 July, under the impetus of the information
and decisions brought back from LUZON by the Commanding General and
his party, planning and staff-conferences progressed throughout the
Headquarters. Rear Admiral Wright, of Amphibious Group 5, paid another
visit to this Headquarters, again to obtain latest intelligence as
well as information as to what had been accomplished during the LUZON
conferences.
Further conferences (engineer, air, signal, and naval gunfire) were held prior to 23 July, when at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters, the Commanding General and designated General and special staff section heads presented the Corps plan, as then developed, to the commanders of the Fifth amphibious Force, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and Amphibious Group 4, as well as certain representatives present from the staffs of CINCPAC and PHIBSPAC. General discussion ensued, especially relative to the shortage of assault shipping-space available for lifting of vehicles in the JAPAN area, and to the possibility of adjusting the tentative target-date some three or four days to meet much more favorable conditions of tide calculated for 4 November.

The remainder of the month was devoted to individual conferences and further planning. A series of weekly newsletters wholly devoted to planning-matters was inaugurated on 28 July, and proved to be of great value. The lack of low-altitude aerial photographic coverage continued, however, to restrict progress in certain aspects of the plan (notably air and naval gunfire) as did the lack of definite information of the character of the landing beaches.

On 2 August, the tide of events was reflected in a CINCPAC despatch directing the Corps to be in a state of readiness by 15 September—or immediately, should JAPAN surrender—the first intimation that such a possibility might imply.

Nevertheless, planning was vigorously pursued and preparations made for presentation of the Corps plan, now well on to completion, to the respective division-commanders and their staffs on 6 August at this Headquarters on MAUI.

The conference of 6 August was attended not only by the division representatives, but by the Commanders, Fifth Amphibious Force, Amphibious Groups 4 and 5, TransRon 12 and 24; and the Commanding General, Corps Artillery, together with SIXTH Army representatives. The conference continued throughout a two-day period, in which not only the Corps, but all division plans were presented, and proved invaluable for the accomplishment of coordination during the so essential planning phase of an operation. Numerous small-group conferences were continued on 7 August emphasizing detailed ship-to-shore movements and control.

On 8 August, just preliminary to completion of Operation Plan-1-45 (and the accompanying Administrative Order 5-45), final conferences were held at FMRL between the Chief of Staff, accompanied by selected staff officers and representatives of Hq, FMF Pac,
and Amphibious Group 4. On the following day, both the operation plan and administrative order were issued for the southern KYUSHU landings. And on 10 August, the Imperial Japanese Government sued for peace.

Between 10 and 13 August, although the Corps had been immediately directed by FMF Pac to be ready for movement on short notice, planning for the assault operation continued, while tentative schemes were already being shaped for the adaptation of the plans in hand to those for an unopposed or semi-opposed occupation. On 13 August, at a joint planning conference in PEARL, with the staffs of Fifth Amphibious Force, FMF Pac, VaC and Amphibious Groups 4 and 5 participating, it was determined that the major unfinished elements of the assault landing plan would be brought to completion, but that planning for an occupational landing would be initiated immediately pursuant to a Joint Staff Study which had been prepared for such an eventuality. This decision was ratified on 14 August by dispatch instructions from FMF Pac directing this Headquarters to report for planning to SIXTH Army for the occupation of JAPAN.

(4) Plans Issued:

The preferred plan for assault landings (VaC Operation Plan No. 1–46) was issued with limited distribution on 9 August, less annexes CHARLIE and DOG (Naval Gunfire and Air Support), neither of which could be brought to completion by that date, due to the lack of firm naval and air commitments and the fact that related naval operation plans had not yet been issued. Nevertheless both plans were virtually complete from the troop point of view. Alternate plans for the assault landings were never brought to completion.

c. Planning for the Occupational Landings:

(1) Planning Agencies:

Suspension of the assault operation in favor of occupation brought with it numerous changes of the command structure within which the Corps was operating. The most important of these were: (a) that Fifth Amphibious Force, landing the VaC only, now was assigned similar responsibility for the entire SIXTH Army; (b) that Amphibious Group 5 no longer participated, the necessity for preliminary bombardment and heavy fire-support having ceased. As a result, Amphibious Group 4 (Rear Admiral Rafeiner) became the sole naval agency directly associated with the V Amphibious Corps, and assumed all responsibilities normal to that role. SIXTH Army remained the next higher echelon, but exercised command over a greatly enlarged zone of responsibility.
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(2) Planning Directives:

The basic Corps mission in the occupation of JAPAN was to:

"...land in the NAGASAKI-SASEBO area and rapidly occupy and establish control over the Sasebo area, extending occupation and control to include the NagaSaki area as troops become available; then by overland and amphibious operations occupy and establish control over the SHIYOMOSHI-FUKUOKA area, prepared for further operations, in order to assist in imposing on the Japanese armed forces and civil population those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action."

This mission was derived from SIXTH Army Field Order 75, dated 21 August. Directives which initiated occupational planning operations for the Corps had directed the Corps to be prepared to move on short notice (10 August); ordered the Corps Commander to report to the Commanding General, SIXTH Army for planning purposes for occupational operations (14 August); substituted the V Amphibious Corps for I Corps in the occupational scheme of maneuver (14 August); warned VAC to prepare for occupation of the Sasebo-NagaSaki area about 4 September (18 August); indefinitely suspended the southern KYUSHU assault operation (18 August); directed the Corps to initiate direct amphibious planning with Amphibious Group 4 (18 August); and finally on 19 August placed VAC under operational control of SIXTH Army. The foregoing directives were subsequently modified to the extent that the 32d Infantry Division was substituted for the 3d Marine Division in the occupational troop-list (7 September), and that the firm date for initial landing in the Sasebo area was to be 22 September.

(3) Planning Narrative:

In the original Joint Staff Study for the occupation of JAPAN, the VAC zone of responsibility had included south central HONSHU, but on 14 August, by CINCPAC dispatch, this Corps was substituted for I Corps, which had been scheduled to land initially in the Sasebo-NagaSaki area for eventual occupation of all KYUSHU and the western extremity of HONSHU. Implementation of this decision came the next day in a dispatch warning order from SIXTH Army, directing that this Corps prepare to land the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions in Sasebo and NagaSaki about 4 September; the 5th Marine Division, the warning order added, would be landed in the Fukuoka-ShiYomoshi area at the earliest practicable subsequent date. At the same time official notification
was received of Japanese acceptance of the terms of surrender.

First action by this Headquarters was the issuance on 15 August, the same day, of warning orders to all divisions and to Corps Artillery to prepare for combat-loaded occupational landing in the SASEBO-MAGASAKI area with the possibility of appreciable resistance. The 4th Marine Division and 2d Prov A&A Group passed at the same time to operational control of FMF FAC. What little information was at hand indicated that much of the content of the Southern KYUSHU assault landing plans (now suspended by SIXTH Army order) readily lent itself to "reconversion", and as matters turned out, the greater part of the structure of the occupational landing plan represented a series of progressive modifications of the earlier plans. This condition was especially noteworthy in such basic matters as sign-in, task-organization, naval gunfire support (less preliminary fires), and (to some extent) air-support, which, however, found itself confronted with greatly increased utility tasks of a type not ordinarily encountered in combat.

Hardly had the first warning-orders been issued relative to the 5th Marine Division's prospective employment before analysis of the shipping situation dictated a revised priority for this division, and, on 16 August, by SIXTH Army order, the division was alerted for early loading and counting out. Within the next two days, official confirmation reached this Headquarters that the naval command responsible for movement and landing of the Corps would be Amphibious Group 4, and, on 18 August, when a firm allocation of VAC shipping for the HAWAIIAN area had been received, joint planning was initiated with that staff.

On 19 August, pursuant to orders from Eq, FMF FAC, the VAC reported to SIXTH Army for operational control.

Planning continued in face of an ever-changing troop-list, shipping initially allocated proved insufficient to lift vehicles in the HAWAIIAN area and thus necessitated leaving a considerable portion of 5th Marine Division transportation behind. Lack of sufficient LSTs dictated the decision at first to defer, and finally, to cancel movement of Corps Artillery and the 2d Provisional A&A Group to JAPAN. For the first time in any operation of this Corps, LVTs were not to be employed (thus permitting release of the 1st Provisional Amphibian Tractor Group).

On 21 August, SIXTH Army approval was received of the scheme of maneuver which, in somewhat modified form, was actually to be executed: occupation of SASEBO by 5th Marine Division; of
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NAGASAKI by 2d Marine Division; and of FUKUCHA (overland or scaborne movement) by the 3d Marine Division. Three days later, on 24 August, Operation Plan 2-45 (less Annexes) and Administrative Order 6-45, covering the initial occupation of KYUSHU, were issued. It is indicative of the pressures involved that these plans and orders were not issued some three days prior to receipt of SIXTH Army Field Order 7, which was not received at this Headquarters until 27 August. Early issue of the Corps directives was greatly facilitated, however, by the circumstance that a VAC 3-3 representative had been at SIXTH Army Headquarters during mid-August, and was able to return to MAUI on 23 August with tentative drafts of the Army directives and with advance information upon which the Corps could safely act.

The balance of August was devoted to conferences on all levels and between all commands and staffs involved; the aim and effect of all of which was to ensure full understanding of the operational directives issued, to disseminate additional information, which of course continued to flow in, and to "shake down" the hastily-modified task-organization and troop-list in the face of daily, sometimes hourly changes. Dissemination of maps and intelligence material went on until the final hours of embarkation, and distribution of all annexes, at least in "firm-tentative" form, was achieved by 1 September, the date on which Corps Headquarters embarked and sailed from MAUI, T.H., in USS MOUNT MCKINLEY (AGC 7).

During the voyage to SAIPAN, planning continued, and, in view of many changes in the original concept of the operation and further additions or deletions to the troop-list, modifications to existing orders and plans were prepared for issue to subordinate units on arrival at SAIPAN. On 5 September, the deletion of the 3d Marine Division (followed, on 7 September, by substitution of the 22d Infantry Division) necessitated still further modification of plans.

In order to ensure that all participating units were fully up to date as to the current status of the plan, and to iron out the numerous last-minute questions which had arisen during the week enroute afloat, a Corps conference was held at SAIPAN on 14 September, aboard the USS MOUNT MCKINLEY, at which the commanders and selected staff officers of the following major organizations attended: VAC, 2d and 5th Marine Divisions 69th AAA Group, Amphibious Group 4 and TransRon 22. After introductory remarks by the Corps Commander and Commander Amphibious Group 4, the Corps plan and general concept of the occupation of KYUSHU and southern HONSHU was outlined. This plan, although full responsive to the possibility of an opposed landing, or at least one in which eventual combat might develop, nevertheless differed considerably from any previously issued by this Corps in three major
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respects: (a) inclusion of a lengthy annex (WAN) dealing with enforcement and supervision of compliance with the terms of surrender; (b) the mass of civil and political intelligence matter, much of which would require troop action for enforcement; (c) omission of an artillery annex.

Details of the landings planned for SASEBO and MAGASAKI were then outlined, and, in addition, such occupational matters as military government, procurement of Japanese facilities, and disposition of enemy equipment were discussed.

Because the 2d Marine Division had completed loading in a time far exceeding expectations, partly due to early arrival of its shipping and partly due to efficient staging and cargo handling, it was decided to execute the MAGASAKI landing on 29 September only one day later than the 5th Marine Division's landing at SASEBO, instead of three days later, as had been originally contemplated. By now, as well, it was comparatively certain that landings against opposition would not be required; nevertheless detailed plans were complete for accomplishment of initial landings behind naval gunfire and close air-support. More complete information as to the location and existence of Japanese minefields likewise promoted the decision to land the 2d Marine Division in the MAGASAKI harbor area, rather than on the TACHIBANA WAN beaches to the east of the city, as had been originally planned.

Further planning conferences were held at SAIFAN on 15 and 16 September, including one with the Chief of Staff of the 32d Infantry Division, who had on 15 September arrived by air from LUZON. A plan for the employment this division had been completed en-route to SAIFAN and was issued at this time. And at dusk on 16 September, seven months after it had cleared the same port for IWO JIMA, VN C sailed from SAIFAN for JAPAN.

(4) Directives Issued:

Although Operation Plan No. 2-45, issued on 24 August, embodied the great mass of information and supporting detail required for execution of the initial occupational landings, it was necessarily based upon early and incomplete information. Thus this plan was modified by successive alternate or supporting plans. The first of these, Operation Plan No. 2-45(A), dated 30 August, took cognizance of the possibility of unopposed landings and peaceful entry into SASEBO and MAGASAKI. Operation Plan No. 3-45, covering preliminary operations by a reinforced battalion from the 5th Marine Division to be
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despatched into the OKURA-NAGASAKI area in advance of the 2d Marine Division, was issued on 10 September, but was subsequently cancelled. Operation Plan No. 4-45, which covered the FUKUOKA-KISOSEKI phase of Corps operational operations, was issued on 12 September. The final operation plan (2-45(B)), second alternate, issued by despatch on 17 September, proved to be the one on which initial landings were actually carried out. The naval plans covering amphibious phases of the occupation operation were Operation Plans A411-45 and A412-45 of Amphibious Group 4.

2. TRAINING:

a. General:

Insofar as the occupational operation tested them, the training directives and SOP's of the V Amphibious Corps and Fleet Marine Force Pacific proved adequate in all respects. As of the end of the war, it is considered that this Corps was in the highest state of training and readiness ever attained.

b. Planning Narrative:

On 1 June the divisions had thoroughly rehabilitated from the exhaustion of IWO JIMA, and training had been initiated throughout the Corps under the terms of a Fleet Marine Force directive oriented toward land-mass operations on the mainland of Asia which had been projected for this Corps during May. When the decision was taken to execute the southern KYUSHU landings instead, it was fortunate possible to continue training in hand because of general similarities in the terrain to be encountered and because the most important training-objective—that of reorienting all units toward large land-mass, rather than island, operations—remained unchanged. Occupation and defense of limited objectives, aggressive patrolling, river crossing procedures, the technique of night operations, and local defense of rear area units were especially stressed in addition to the subjects normally included in training for amphibious assault. Subject to availability of shipping, it was desired to afford all divisions an opportunity to conduct refresher amphibious training; this was accomplished during July by the 5th Marine Division, all SMT's of which were put through LVT-LST landing exercises. Shipping was tentatively set up for the 5th Marine Division, but the exercises were never completed.

Special emphasis was laid by the Corps in training all components of the supporting forces (Naval gunfire, artillery and air). All NCF elements of the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions.
were concentrated in OAHU and underwent coordinated refresher training conducted by representatives of this Headquarters and by the Naval Gunfire Section, FMF Pacific. As a result of these measures, similar measures were taken for the first time, with regard to training of air liaison personnel of all divisions, who were brought back first to OAHU and subsequently to NAUI. Division and Corps liaison sections, tactical air observers, and air spotters, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 4, Marine Observation Group One, and attached squadrons, and the Corps Air Delivery Section concurrently participated in intensive training periods. Aviation groups which were to participate in the assault and occupation of JAPAN, were not, however, available for joint training. Standard field tests, arranged in progressive phases so as to cover all aspects of the employment of field artillery, were conducted by the Commanding General, Corps Artillery, for artillery regiments, while each regiment in turn conducted the prescribed battalion and battery tests. One battery of self-propelled 155mm guns was also received by Corps artillery, and extensive field tests and special training were carried out in OAHU to determine the capabilities and most efficient employment of these new weapons.

Expenditure of two CinCFOA units of fire for all weapons was authorized for training. This proved to be insufficient, primarily due to the lengthy period of time for training. Additional ammunition was requisitioned and was approved except where shortages of particular types existed. VT fuses were to be used for the first time and a training schedule was set up to indoctrinate troops in the use of this type of fuze. Additional factors which necessitated an increase in training ammunition over and above two (2) units of fire for all organic weapons were:

1. Use of LVTA(4)'s as artillery.
2. Forming of a new Rocket Detachment.
3. Experiments with flame throwers for pre-mixed fuel.
4. Low amount of 2.36" grenades for rocket launchers, 2.36", (2 per launcher) not sufficient to train a crew of the 2.36" rocket launcher.

Although all divisions executed command-post exercises in training for the Southern KYUSHU assault, it was not
possible to carry out any such exercise on the Corps level, due to the separation of all elements of the Corps. For all VaC units in the HAWAIIAN area, however, the Corps was able to conduct numerous communication-CFX's in which full radio communications were established on all Corps nets normally maintained in combat, and subsequent de-hold. Other communication-exercises were carried out, as well, including one type of naval gunfire exercise described as a "firing-off" in which all naval gunfire elements of the Corps deployed in a limited tactical situation, established complete communications, and conducted actual fires from four to six destroyers continually in support.

Corps rehearsals were planned to be held in the BORKANAS (GUAM and Japanese held RotA) during October, 1945, but were of course never executed.

3. ORGANIZATION:
   a. Task Organization of the Corps:

      For the task organizations of this Corps as established for the southern KYUSHU assault, as well as for occupational operations see VaC Operation Plans 1-45 and 2-45.

   b. Permanent Occupational Task-Organization:

      The task-organization which follows represents that presently planned for the Marine division remaining on extended occupational duty in KYUSHU after reduction of forces incident to disbandment of this Corps and of the 5th Marine and 324 Infantry Division. It is included as a matter of record to show the troop-requirements which the experience of this Corps indicates to be necessary under such conditions:

      2d Marine Division
      1 Corps Evacuation Hospital
      1 Bomb Disposal Company
      1 Marine Observation Squadron (Augmented)
      1 Naval Construction Battalion (Reinf)
      1 Separate Laundry Platoon
1 Military Government Group

1 Service Regiment (50% strength)

1 CUB (includes Boat Pool and Repair Unit, Special Construction Battalion Unit, Logistic Supply, Port Director Units) (50% strength)

(*) To be organized on provisional T/O and T/A as a 2½-plane squadron.

c. Organization of the G-3 Section:

(a) Officers and duties:

Col. W. W. Wensinger, USMC
LtCol. J. L. Stewart, USMC
LtCol. S. V. Kelly, USMC

Major R. Fuller, USMC
Major E. V. Clarke, USMC
Major D. Miller, USMC

Capt. H. R. Guthrie, USMC

1stLt. H. E. Wilcox, USMC
1stLt. S. W. Whatley, USMC

Naval Gunfire Section:

LtCol. R. D. Heinl, Jr., USMC
#Major W. H. Fields, USMCR

#Lt(jg) E. V. Bohn, USNR
#Lt(jg) K. J. Sylvester, USNR
Ens. J. K. Najarian, USNR

Air Section:

Col. J. S. E. Young, USMC
Capt. T. V. Bailey, USMC
Capt. H. G. Gatlin, USMCR

Acfs. G-3
Executive Officer
Senior Operations Officer (Training Officer)
Operations Officer
Operations Officer
Operations Officer (Assistant Training Officer)
Training Aides (rear echelon)
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer

Naval Gunfire Officer
Assistant Naval Gunfire Officer
Naval Gunfire Assistant
Naval Gunfire Assistant
Naval Gunfire Assistant

Air Officer
Assistant Air Officer
Senior Air Observer
As soon as it became apparent that landings and subsequent operations would be unopposed, it was decided not to employ Corps liaison officers as would have been normal in combat. A SIXTH Army liaison officer (a Marine officer attached to the staff of that command) joined this Headquarters in the MARIAMAS and remained until completion of initial operations. When the need for naval gunfire and air support was no longer evident, the remaining officers of those sections functioned as operations officers.

It should be added that of the officers listed above, four field and two company officers, (over and above the naval gunfire officers) were either detached to other duties or transferred incident to demobilization, and that in fact the section was faced with a chronic shortage of officers during the bulk of the operational operations.

From the outset of operations afloat, it became evident that a skilled, senior Japanese language officer would be continually required to deal with the numerous Japanese military, naval, and civil personnel (as well as the regularly-assigned Liaison Officers with whom this Section dealt; such an officer was therefore assigned from the G-2 Language Section, and has served continuously since. As the occupation progressed, this Section assumed many functions which would not ordinarily come within the purview of a G-3 section in combat, such as control of Japanese shipping, supervision of repatriation, control and guarding of seized banks, as well as many others. To meet this additional load, an officer versed in such matters was permanently assigned from the Military Government Section, and has handled these and related functions with marked success.

(b) Enlisted:

1. Chief of Enlisted Section:

1stSgt (Section Chief)
2. Clerical Section:

1 Staff Sgt (Assistant Section Chief, Chief Clerk)
1 Sgt (Stenographer)
1 Sgt (Worksheet)
3 Corp (Files and Journal)
2 Corp (Clerk, general)

3. Drafting Section:

1 Staff Sgt (EF) (Chief Draftsman)
1 Sgt (EF) (Draftsman)
2 Corp (EF) (Draftsman)

4. General Duty Section:

2 Corp
1 or more Ffc/Ivt

5. Chemical Warfare Section:

1 GySgt

6. Training Aids Section:

(rear echelon)

NOTE: Enlisted communication teams for the Naval Gunfire and Air Support teams were furnished provisionally from the VOG Signal Battalion and LF. SCU-4 respectively.

For the detailed sequence of occupational operations, see Appendix 4, G-3 Operations Reports.

5. Operational Comments and Recommendations:

a. The numerous overwater operations conducted by elements of the Corps demonstrated the continuing need of an organization similar to the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion. It is again recommended that such a battalion be reorganized and retained in the postwar organization of the Fleet Marine Force.

b. In view of the unusually heavy communication requirements placed upon an occupying force of Corps size, particularly when widely dispersed over some 18,333 square miles, it is recommended...
that a Marine division on occupational duty be provided with:

(1) A Carrier and Radio Relay Section of one officer and 32 enlisted technicians together with one complete 100 mile spiral four carrier system (AN/TRC-2) and one radio link system (2-AN/TRC-3, 3 AN/TRC-1) and 2 AN-TRA-1.

(2) One heavy construction platoon (T/O G-1130) with T/A allowance of equipment.

c. Although a satisfactory provisional naval gunfire team for this Corps was improvised by attachment of officers from higher headquarters and organization of an enlisted communication team from the Corps Signal Battalion, it is recommended that provision be made in appropriate T/O to meet this important need.

d. Occupational operations on the terrain of JAPAN with its broken country and substandard road-net fully confirm previous recommendations of this Headquarters that tracked prime-movers be obtained for all Corps and division artillery previous to combat on this terrain.

e. A VMO squadron (reinforced to 18 planes) and a provisional utility squadron should be provided for each division and Corps in future similar operations where poor lines of communications, such as in JAPAN, demand their assignment for more efficient execution of missions.

f. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the rapid dissemination of decisions and directives from higher headquarters, even if fragmentary in form, in an unprecedented operation such as this.

g. Although naval echelons cooperated to the fullest extent, the constant change and multiplicity of naval commands in this area somewhat restricted the realization of maximum efficiency.

h. Highly trained bomb disposal personnel are essential attachments in an operation in which disposition activities play such a large part.

i. The use of experienced field officers (empowered to make decisions) in charge of sizeable advance reconnaissance parties, which was the policy established in this Corps, proved highly valuable in occupying new areas.
J. In view of the strong opposing trends of reduction and demobilization, it is considered that units of this Corps accomplished their deployment and full occupational commitments as planned in the face of many unusual difficulties and unprecedented situations.

J. L. STEWART,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.
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Appendix I to Annex DGG to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan

NAVAL GUNFIRE REPORT
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

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30 November 1945.

From: The Naval Gunfire Officer.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: Naval Gunfire Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. INTRODUCTION:

This report covers naval gunfire planning and operations of the V Amphibious Corps prior to and during the occupation of JAPAN. Planning was divided into two stages, one for the assault landings, and the second for occupation. In addition, prior to commencement of assault planning, initial plans and requirements were drafted for the CHINA-Coast operation to which the Corps was tentatively committed during May of 1945.

2. PLANNING:

a. Southern KYUSHU Assault Planning:

(1) Planning Agencies: The principal commands associated with this Headquarters in planning and projected execution of naval gunfire support for the southern KYUSHU assaults were as follows:

   a. Fifth Amphibious Force (Fifth Attack Force, Vice Admiral Hill), upon which rested overall naval responsibility for the amphibious phases (including gunfire support) of this Corps's landing.

   b. Amphibious Group 4 (Fifth Transport Group, Rear Admiral Reifenider) was to have executed all X-day fires, and, as finally planned, would have rendered all support after the landing, due to the decision that Amphibious Group 5 was to support the IX Corps landings at KAIMON-DAKE.

   c. Amphibious Group 5 (Rear Admiral Wright), although designated as Fifth Fire Support Group and originally intended to control all naval gunfire and air operations in support of the Corps, eventually retained responsibility for execution of preliminary bombardment only, as well as the other naval tasks normal to an advance force. This reduction in the role of Group 5, vis-a-vis VAC arose when a firm decision was made to land the IX Corps about X-4 on the southern tip of the KAGOSHIMA Peninsula, in the KAIMON-DAKE area, thus necessitating the services of an additional amphibious group to execute preliminary bombardment and continue support after the landings.

Appendix 1 to Annex DOG to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.
d. The SIXTH Army did not participate in detailed naval gunfire planning and authorized this Headquarters to deal directly with the naval commands concerned.

(2) Planning Narrative: When planning for the southern KYUSHU assault landings was initiated, the wide separation between all staffs and echelons concerned with naval gunfire support rendered joint planning initially impossible. June was accordingly largely devoted to two purposes; preparation of a detailed Corps plan (less actual frequencies and certain other data) for naval gunfire communications; and determination of personnel and material requirements for the Corps naval gunfire team, for which adequate T/C and T/A allowance had never been made. On 16 June, both matters were discussed at length with the Naval Gunfire Officer, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, upon whom would fall the responsibility of providing all the officer-assistants needed for Corps team. The Corps Signal Officer had already signified his readiness to make the required enlisted communication personnel provisionally available from the Signal Battalion, VAC.

On 7 July, in company with other members of the Corps staff, the Naval Gunfire Officer proceeded to Headquarters, SIXTH Army, for operational briefing and conferences at that Headquarters and with the staff gunnery and communications officers, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, then present at MANILA. It was then learned that SIXTH Army, which had no Naval Gunfire Section, intended to authorize direct planning and operational relationships between this Corps and naval agencies which would render gunfire support.

It also became apparent that the allocation of MHF frequencies (TRX range) for control and conduct of naval gunfire would, as then projected, be entirely inadequate, being somewhat less than half the total number available during the IWO JIMA operation. Discussions were accordingly initiated with the Corps and Army Signal Officers as to the feasibility of "borrowing" suitable MHF frequencies from those temporarily unused by troop units in reserve. Agreement was reached that an arrangement would be established within the Corps whereby the minimum frequency-needs of naval gunfire support would be met in this way as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MGF Control and Overload</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFO Spotting</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MGF (minimum for one Corps)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Because of the acute shortage of TBX-range frequencies, and because all regimental naval gunfire liaison teams were now equipped with TOS radios, it was decided that the overload frequency would be chosen from the TOS-range (1500-12,000 kcs.) rather than the more constricted TBX-range. This selection would permit any station or party normally in the NGF Control Net to enter the overload. It was agreed that SCR-300 frequencies of the 5th Marine Division (while in reserve afloat) would be available at least until N/I hours for intra-team use by STCP of assault battalions, which would operate as necessary from offshore LVTs. In other than communication matters considerable detailed information not previously known was obtained, and draft plans and annexes of higher authority, including the tentative fire-support sectors laid out by ComhsubPac were provided. Enroute to and from the PHILIPPINES, the Corps gunfire plan, insofar as it had progressed, was discussed with the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions, both in the MARIANAS.

On 13 July, after the Naval Gunfire Officer's return to MAUI, detailed planning of fires commenced in conjunction with staff gunnery officers of Amphibious Groups 4 and 5. Plans for the final rehearsal in the MARIANAS (with Japanese-held ROTA as the impact area) were initiated. Fire-support sectors were checked and with minor exceptions concurred in. A rough plan for ship-placement during X-Day was agreed upon, and became the basis for all subsequent X-day layouts of ships and fires. As of this date, it appeared that the following ships would support the Corps during initial landings:

- 4 OBB
- 3 CA
- 4 CL
- 11 DD

(Probable gunboat assignment included 6 LSM(R)(2)s, 12 LCI(G)s, 12 LCI(M)s, 12 LCM(L)s, and 6 LCI(R)s).

From 23 to 25 July, a series of joint conferences was held at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters, with the gunfire officers of all three divisions, the Gunnery Officer of Amphibious Group 4, and the Naval Gunfire Officer, FMF Pac. The purposes of these conferences were (1) to acquaint division representatives with the plan for X-Day fires, and to secure their comment thereon; (2) to discuss the final training and rehearsals of naval gunfire elements of the Corps; (3) to continue, with assistance from the division officers, the detailed plan for X-Day.

The plan of fires for X-Day called for:

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(1) A general intensification of beach bombardment scheduled commencing at dawn; a lift of fires from N-55 to N-35 while, under cover of a massive air-strike, ships took station for prelanding fires.

(2) Landing behind a 6"-38 rolling barrage calculated upon the following assumptions: (a) MPI to remain 400 yards ahead of troops; (b) rate of advance of LVT, 150 yards per minute; (c) rate of troop-advance 100 yards/12 minutes; (d) 20 minutes of troop-reorganization on beaches within an area 200-400 yards in depth, prior to commencement of advance inland.

The foregoing assumptions represented the consensus of all divisions, and were based upon experience with similar fires at IWO JIMA.

From 7-11 August, following receipt of firm advance drafts of the Fifth Attack Force operation plan, intensive detailed planning went forward at headquarters ashore of Amphibious Group 5 (PANAMA HARBOR). Although satisfactory low-altitude aerial photographic coverage of the target-area had not yet been obtained, the existence of enemy defenses began to be verified, and it was possible to "stake out" preliminary bombardment schedules and establish relative priorities among known targets. On 8 August, the rehearsal plan for ROTA was agreed upon: ECPF (together with corresponding ALP's) would be embarked tactically divided among LCI's, establish communications and conduct fires against ROTA from these offshore observation posts. These and similar exercises were to be conducted for a period of five days (12-17 October), by all fire-support ships and troop naval gunfire personnel. On 9 August plotting and timing of the N-hour rolling barrages was commenced aboard the USS PANAMA (AGC 13), then flagship of Amphibious Group 4. Much thought was devoted to the full exploitation of rocket and mortar fires which would be available on X-Day. Conversion of this plan into detailed schedules for ships participating (the next step in preparation of such plans) had not been undertaken. On 10 August, further planning was interrupted by news that the Imperial Japanese Government had sued for peace, and, although some detailed projects then in hand were brought to completion, active gunfire planning for the southern KYUSHU landings was never resumed.

b. Planning for the Occupational Landings:

On 13 August, and subsequently on 23 August, the Naval Gunfire Officer conferred with staff gunnery representatives of Fifth Amphibious Force and of Amphibious Group 4, the latter being now the sole command responsible for provision of fire-support for this Corps during the occupation of JAPAN, as a result of these
meetings, it was possible to salvage for appropriate modification much of the naval gunfire annex then in draft form for the southern KYUSHU assault. Because the assault frequency-assignments remained unchanged, the communication-plan survived virtually intact. On 25 and 26 August, final conferences were held at PEARL HARBOR with Group 4 representatives relative to the following matters: availability of VOF aircraft during occupational landings, decision to maintain the NGF Overload circuit, as had been planned for the assault landing decision to employ OCF 2156-C (the new Shore Fire Control Code then just being issued), efforts to secure LSM(R)(2)s for support of occupational landings, and final reconciliation of this Corps' naval gunfire annex with the gunfire annex of Amphibious Group 4. On 27 August, the Corps Naval Gunfire Annex (annex CHARLIE to VAC Operation Plan 2-45) was issued, and by 1 September, all naval gunfire elements of the Corps had embarked in assigned shipping.

Enroute to the target-area, further planning and modification of plans was necessitated to meet changes in available fire-support ships and in support gunboats (the firm allocation of which was not known until arrival in SAIPAN, on 13 September). The major decision reached during this period was that relative to the procedure which would be followed during landings to require positive clearance of any fire-mission by the senior commander afloat, and yet enable fires required for troop-support to be delivered with minimum delay. This technique, which is considered to be of future value in semi-opposed or possible-opposed landings, consisted in establishment of an open radio net (the NGF Overload) of which the sole use, during initial landings would be clearance of fire-missions. SFCF were authorized to call for fires in the normal manner; and ships in support, while setting up problems on their computers, would report the call for fire via the open net to the OTC, who would then approve or deny the mission. Similar measures were planned for clearance of close-supporting fires by gunboat-types, in which it was also planned to embark troop-representatives (replacement NGF spotters and NCOs) to check missions for safety and assist gunboat unit-commanders in target designation.

In view of the fact that no opposition actually developed, omission to provide VOF air-spot services, as well as unavailability of LSM(R)(2)s or LCI(N)s, worked no actual harm. Nevertheless, it is considered that the absence of these two important elements from the naval gunfire support, despite the fact that they had been requested, greatly weakened the occupational plan. Had even sporadic resistance developed, VOF planes would have been invaluable for maintaining large areas under aggressive observation, while the rugged terrain of JAPAN would have rendered high-trajectory gunboat-fires not only valuable but essential.

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3. ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING:

a. Organization:

Organization of the naval gunfire elements of the Corps was substantially that which prevailed on IWO JIMA (now established in the "G" series T/O), with the exception of the Corps Navy gunfire team, for which T/O provision has never been made. Based on previous combat experience, on analysis of the communications involved, and on the proposed distribution of Corps Headquarters afloat for the southern KYUSHU assault landings, it was determined that the following personnel would be required for the Corps team:

Naval Gunfire Officer (LtCol, USMC) - 1
Assistant Naval Gunfire Officer (Major, USMC) (1115) - 1
*Naval Gunfire Assistant (Lt (jg) or Ena) - 4
Enlisted Team Chief (S/Sgt) (783) - 1
#Radio Supervisor (Sgt) (783) - 1
#Radio Supervisor (Corp) (783) - 2
Radio Operators (Pfc/Pvt (776) - 11

(*) One officer for coordination and planning of daily air spotting services.
(#) Act as senior operators for each watch.

Although not specifically provided by present T/O, enlisted personnel as listed were obtained from the Corps Signal Battalion; the officer requirements were met by Headquarters, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, which temporarily attached all officers required. The following echeloning of the naval gunfire section was planned during preliminary bombardment and movement to the target:

(1) Aboard the USS BLUE RIDGE (AGC 2), flagship of the advance fire-support group conducting preliminary bombardment, would be the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer with one Navy assistant from the Corps team, as well as the Naval Gunfire Officer of the 5th Marine Division (the reserve division). This employment of the reserve division gunfire officer during preliminary bombardment had been instituted with marked success at IWO JIMA in order to provide the Corps gunfire officer with an additional skilled assistant and to enable the division representative to be fully in touch with the naval gunfire situation prior to landing with his division.

(2) Aboard the USS JOHN HANCOCK (AGC 10), with the Corps Commander, would be the Assistant Naval Gunfire Officer and two Navy assistants. This echelon would proceed to the target with the Corps Headquarters and establish necessary X-day nets and communications in

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Company with the Attack Force gunnery staff.

(3) Aboard the USS PANAMAINT (AGC 13), with the alternate Corps staff, would be one Navy assistant especially briefed in the X-day plan of fires, in case of a casualty to the AUBURN.

On the day of initial landing, the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer and the 5th Marine Division Naval Gunfire Officer would transfer in the transport area to the ship in which the Corps Commander was embarked, and would conduct the X-Day fires under direct supervision of the Commanding General, as had been done at IWO JIMA. The above organization was inapplicable, however, to the occupational landings, and personnel were distributed throughout available shipping, to be reassembled aboard the flagship of Amphibious Group 4 on the morning of X-Day.

b. Training:

Naval gunfire training for the southern KYUSHU assault embraced the following measures:

(1) Return of naval gunfire personnel from 2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions to temporary duty for refresher training and regrouping with the Naval Gunfire Section, FMF Fao, during May-July, 1945, as had been done after previous operations. In view of the extensive facilities required for effective naval gunfire training (ships, communication-installations, bombardment ranges, etc.), this method of coordinated training is considered to have been in large measure responsible for the high combat efficiency of gunfire personnel within this Corps. Officers received training in naval gunnery, communications and conduct of fire (on the Shore Bombardment Ranges at KAOCHOW Island), while enlisted personnel were given applicable drills and instruction in communications and technique of fire.

(2) Two (2) firing CPXs to include all naval gunfire personnel of a two-division corps, with 4-6 DD delivering actual fires in a simulated tactical situation, were conducted on KAOCHOW Island between 51 May and 3 June (3d, 4th and 5th ASCCs) and between 7 and 10 July (4th and 5th ASCCs). 2d ASCC personnel were unable to participate in exercises above division level. This type of exercise, in which several thousand rounds of 5" ammunition were fired, and full tactical communications established and maintained, is considered the best overall training short of actual battle which can be imparted to gunfire personnel.

(3) Special emphasis in techniques which the nature of the operation would render important, such as: radio operation under conditions of maximum difficulty; sudden frequency-shifts; technique.

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of rapid, long-distance overland displacement; local security, judgment of masks, clearance and trajectories in broken, wooded terrain; use of VT fuze; checkouts in SCR-694 radio-sets (which it was anticipated would be available in lieu of TBX-8 radios), and full employment of gunboat-types.

4. NARRATIVE OF OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS:

a. Since landings at Sasebo and Nagasaki were unopposed, naval gunfire support was not required, although all stations were manned, full tactical communications established, and fire-support ships (several DD and one CA) remained in readiness to fire. During the Nagasaki landing, a special naval gunfire control party containing representatives of the Corps and of amphibious Group 4, reported aboard the USS Cambria (APA 36) flag of Taskon 12, since that staff was not organized to direct naval gunfire support.

b. As soon as it was apparent that the occupation was to be without opposition, further requirement for naval gunfire support, as for artillery and air, disappeared. Navy and Marine officers and enlisted men, much needed for the manifold extra duties of occupation, were dispersed to such duties as procurement, disposition, billeting, and communications, in which they now remain.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. During these operations, naval gunfire support was retained, under the G-3 section on the General Staff, rather than in the Corps Artillery Staff as provided by T/O. This organization, which has been employed in this Headquarters ever since the inception of troop naval gunfire support in combat, permits the Commanding General and G-3 full access to the Naval Gunfire Officer during planning, and, during operations, stations him in the Corps CP, rather than in the Corps Artillery FOC, from which he cannot effectively control support. It is strongly recommended that present T/O be modified to recognize this fact, and place naval gunfire, like close air support, under the G-3 section. It is further recommended that T/O G-1100 (Signal Battalion, Amphibious Corps) be modified to include a Corps naval gunfire communication team in each Corps Signal Battalion, and that the officers required be added to T/O G-1011 (Corps Headquarters) as a part of the G-3 section.

b. In view of probable Marine Corps participation in future landings in which the extent of possible resistance is not known, it is recommended that the technique for command-clearance of naval fire-missions as outlined in para. 2.b., be incorporated in present doctrines for use under appropriate circumstances.

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c. It is recommended that an overall training program for naval gunfire personnel be initiated as soon as possible in order that the high degree of skill developed within the Fleet Marine Force in this respect may be carried over from war to peace.

d. One of the most serious handicaps imposed upon joint planning by the distances involved was that it was impossible to consult daily with the naval staffs concerned, as has always been the past practice of this Headquarters. As a result, higher-echelon naval gunnery annexes for the assault operation were issued without having been entirely shaped to troop requirements and containing provisions and restrictions which in some instances countered established doctrines of this Corps or of the Fleet Marine Force. It is considered to be of utmost importance that naval gunfire support be planned in headquarters which are physically juxtaposed so that planning liaison between echelons and commands is continual.

e. In preparation for assault operations, experiments were conducted with an LVT radio-equipped to serve as an advance echelon for the Corps naval gunfire team. This LVT was equipped with two TCS radios, two SCR-300s, an SCR-624, and an RCB, and would have provided a mobile naval gunfire radio-central during ship-to-shore displacement of the forward echelon of the Corps team, as well as for subsequent displacement ashore. Principal difficulties encountered were shielding the radio equipment, making provision for dustproof operation, and blocking out for night work. It is considered that this LVT would have greatly increased the efficiency, flexibility, and continuity of naval gunfire communications, and it is strongly recommended: (1) that further experiment be undertaken to adapt or modify LVTs for this purpose for each Corps, and possibly each division naval gunfire team. (2) To incorporate such vehicles in Corps signal battalion and division ASCO T/A.

f. The importance of an overload frequency for naval gunfire control, initially demonstrated on Iwo Jima, was confirmed during this operation. Availability of such a frequency confers immeasurable flexibility upon all operations. In view of the fact that regimental liaison teams now have TCS radios, there would appear to be no reason why both the Naval Gunfire Control and Overload Frequencies cannot in the future be chosen from the much broader TCS rather than the limited TBO range.

g. Although the "G" Series T/O embody, for the first time, battle-tested, workable organizations for the respective shore fire control and naval gunfire liaison parties, it is considered that T/O G-66 (Assault Signal Company) could be improved in two
CONFIDENTIAL

respects: (1) By substitution of radio operators (776) for telephone linemen (641) wherever occurring in regimental teams and in the division team, because on echelons above battalion, naval gunfire wire communications are conducted over tactical lines; further, if telephone linemen are included in parties of the size now provided, the number of radiomen is insufficient. (2) Although the present strength of all teams is adequate for relatively short operations, the strain of prolonged combat would render these strengths inadequate; it is therefore recommended that in future T/O, the spotter-team and battalion naval liaison team be increased by one radioman each; that the regimental and division teams be increased by two radiomen each.

h. During the planning for the southern KYUSHU assault, authority was obtained by this Headquarters, based on experience of previous operations, to equip each regimental naval gunfire liaison team with an MZ vehicular radio (7CS-jeep), and arrangements were also made to obtain, through Army supply channels, SCR-694 radios in lieu of TBX sets now authorized. It is strongly recommended that the MZ vehicles be incorporated in ASCO T/A, and, as previously recommended by this Corps, that SCR-694 sets be made standard in lieu of TBX.

R. D. HEINL, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Naval Gunfire Officer.
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 2 to Annex DOG to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan

AIR SUPPORT REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

30 November 1945.

From: The Air Officer.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: Air Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. Introduction:

a. Air Support, as regards availability of aircraft, construction of airfields, close support, pre-bombardment missions and strategic bombing, was divided into two definite planning stages, the first of assault and the second of Occupation. In planning for the assault on JAPAN, the services of land-based aircraft for strategic and deep support missions, as well as eight CVEs for direct close support (with a total of approximately 240 carrier aircraft), were to be made available to this Corps. For the actual occupation of JAPAN, land-based aircraft for support missions, as might be required, were kept on call, as was one CVE with 30 aircraft.

b. Although available, air support, other than that furnished by CY and Army transport aircraft, was not required. In the early stages of occupation, several requests for DDT spraying, air-evacuation, and air-delivery were submitted to the SIXTH Army. The necessity for transmitting such requests through a lengthy chain of command resulted in very few of such requests being complied with.

2. Assault Plans For Southern KYUSHU:

a. Planning:

(1) During the planning phase for the assault on JAPAN, requests were submitted to higher headquarters covering aviation requirements of V Amphibious Corps. Some requests called for a general application of preliminary area bombardment and deep support missions. Other more detailed requests outlined direct support requirements, which defined specific areas and schedules of attack, and numbers and types of aircraft.

(2) Requirements forwarded to higher echelons included maintaining tactical air observers and artillery air spotters from all committed divisions and from Corps on station during daylight hours, with one tactical observer from V Amphibious Corps on station during the hours of darkness for night heckling and night Appendix 2 to Annex DOG to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.
observation missions. Other requirements were for continuous photographic coverage, DDT spraying, smoke missions, propaganda leaflet drops, air-delivery, and VMO employment.

(3) For the assault, land-based aircraft were to provide pre-aerial bombardment, strategic and deep support missions, while carrier-based planes from the eight CVEs assigned to V Amphibious Corps were to provide all direct support missions until such time as adequate land-based aircraft would be available on the target. The air plan for the assault on JAPAN, however, was never completed, and all requests to higher headquarters were later modified to conform to requirements for the occupation phase.

(4) Two units assigned to Corps to assist in air operations were: (a) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit #4, assigned as the direct air support control unit for this Corps, was scheduled to relieve CASCU afloat as soon as LFAASCU could be established ashore, the latter then to control all direct support aircraft in the Corps zone. (b) Marine Observation Group One, as a central administrative control for all VMO employment, was scheduled to maintain operational control of all CY strips in the V Amphibious Corps zone of responsibility.

(5) In the assault plan, arrangements were made for an CY strip to be constructed initially on KOSHUKI RENTO by the 40th InfDiv who was to take those islands in preliminary landings to provide employment of organic aircraft of the Corps units landing on KYUSHU as soon as practicable.

(6) For movement to the target, LFAASCU #4 and MOG-1 were to lift in Corps shipping. Sixteen CY-1s in fly-away condition, four from each division and Corps artillery, were to be loaded in supporting CVEs for use as soon as the first CY strip was operational. It was planned to stage the remaining CYs to OKINAWA for subsequent flight to KYUSHU. Remaining personnel and equipment of VMO squadrons were to lift in unit shipping. A total of 40 air observers and air-spotters were to be embarked in CVEs for initial operations in carrier-based aircraft until such time as ordered ashore in CY or carrier aircraft.

b. Training:

(1) During the rehabilitation and training period between the IWO JIMA Campaign and the planned assault on JAPAN, continuous air and ground training was conducted by air liaison parties, tactical air observers, and artillery air-spotters of the divisions attached to Corps, LFAASCU #4, MOG-1, attached VMO Squadrons, and the
Air Officer's Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

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Corps Air Delivery Section. Air strike groups which were to participate in the assault on Japan were not available for joint training.

(2) A rehearsal for the assault was scheduled for 16, 17 and 18 October in the Marienas, to include all of the direct air-support air and ground units. This of course, was not conducted.

c. Organization:

LFASCU #4 as air support control unit for Corps, and MOG-1 as a central administrative control for all VMO employment, were attached to V Amphibious Corps for the assault. It was planned that the Air Section of V Amphibious Corps would operate in conjunction with the Corps Supporting Arms Center, and a request was made for additional officer personnel to enable 24-hour watch standing.

d. Operations:

Air operations for the assault on Japan, up to the cessation of hostilities, were generally as planned. During and after the capture of Okinawa, land-based and carrier-based air attacks were directed against Kyushu with increasing frequency and strength.

e. Supply:

VMO squadrons, LFASCU #4, and MOG-1 were to be supplied by organic units, with automatic resupply fulfilling later needs. Corps and divisions were to provide messing, medical, communication and security facilities for LFASCU #4, MOG-1 and attached VMO squadrons.

3. The Occupation of Japan:

a. Planning:

(1) As in the assault, during the planning phase of the occupation of Japan all requests for air support desired by V Amphibious Corps were submitted to higher echelons. Air support requests and plans for the occupation were substantially the same as those for the assault; the modifications being fewer aircraft, and a change from an "on station" to an "on call" status for all supporting aircraft. The availability of both land-based and carrier-based aircraft was reduced in proportion to the estimated requirements of the occupation. Land-based aircraft were to provide pre-aerial...
bombardment, strategic and deep support missions if required, with carrier-based planes from three CVEs to provide all direct support missions until such time as adequate land-based aircraft would be available at the target.

(2) Air support requirements, as forwarded to higher echelons for approval, included: (a) Maintenance in carrier aircraft on call of Corps and Division tactical air observers and artillery air spotters; (b) Photograph, DDT spray, smoke and air-delivery missions; (c) The early employment of VMO aircraft after establishment of occupation forces ashore. No requests were made for night observation or night heckling.

(3) As was planned for the assault, LFASCU #4 was scheduled to relieve CASCU afloc as soon as LFASCU was established ashore, the latter then to control all direct support aircraft. MCG-1 in addition to exercising administrative control for all VMO employment, was to maintain operational control of the CY strip at Saipan to serve Corps Headquarters.

(4) For movement to the target, LFASCU #4, MCG-1, and VMO squadrons with CY aircraft of the committed divisions were to lift in unit shipping. All air observers and air spotters were to lift in unit shipping to Saipan, with sixteen observers disembarking there for further transportation to supporting CVEs in the target area. The remaining air observers and spotters were to continue to the target in unit shipping.

b. Training:

During the short period between initial planning for the occupation of Japan and movement to the target, little training was conducted in any phase of air-support. No rehearsals were scheduled for the occupation phase.

c. Organization:

Air support organization was much the same as set up for the assault, with LFASCU #4, MCG-1 and the VMO squadrons attached to Corps and organic units. In the occupation phase, the air section of V Amphibious Corps did not operate in a Corps Supporting Arms Center.

d. Operations:

(1) Air operations for the occupation of Japan were generally as planned. With some compromise, all V amphibious
Air Officer's Operation Report, Occupation of Japan

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Corps requests for air support were included in ComPhibPac Air Plan. In view of meager requirements for air support, as directed by the situation ashore in Japan, this air plan was considered adequate and satisfactory. Air support for the occupation was divided into maintaining surveillance and a show of force over Kyushu, and direct air support for V Amphibious Corps as required. Fast Carrier Task Groups and Fleet Air Wings were available for surveillance, a show of force, search and reconnaissance, and to assist in providing air cover for movement of the occupation forces. U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces and Far Eastern Air Force were theoretically available for general surveillance and a show of force, and to render active support as required.

(2) One CVE was assigned to Amphibious Group Four for air cover during the occupation. This CVE was prepared to provide limited assistance during initial landings and thereafter. However, no direct air support was employed by V Amphibious Corps for the initial occupation, other than the employment of CY aircraft after establishment of V Amphibious Corps ashore. No requests were submitted initially for direct air support, but in the later stages of the occupation requests for DDT spraying, air-evacuation, and air-delivery drop were made. However, these requests were filled only in part and with fair results. Shortly after arrival at target, requests were initiated by V Amphibious Corps to SIXTH Army requesting immediate air DDT spraying of areas to be inhabited by occupation troops. Requests initiated included necessary spraying aircraft and proper DDT spray. V Amphibious Corps requests were forwarded by the SIXTH Army, and eventually two A-4s were dispatched from the PHILIPPINE area, arriving at target approximately 21 days after the initial request was submitted. One spraying was completed, however, with fair results. In the later stages of the occupation, requests were made to SIXTH Army and 5th Fighter Command for evacuation of hospitalized personnel. Again, there was the customary confusion and delay, with instances of air-transportation arriving unannounced several days after patients had already been evacuated by other means.

(3) Control of air support by V Amphibious Corps was initially through ComAASCU 9, PhilGroup 4, and through LFASCU #4 on a plus 3. Air support for this Corps was subsequently taken over by the Fifth Air Force.

(4) VMC aircraft were employed for regular courier service, evacuation, reconnaissance, and surveillance throughout the V Amphibious Corps zone of responsibility.
(5) Japanese airfields on KYUSHU were reconnoitered and their serviceability reported.

(6) Courier air transportation throughout JAPAN was made available immediately by the Navy (seaplanes) and subsequently by the Army (landplanes).

(7) Certain Japanese aircraft were readied by TAIU and flown to SACP for air-intelligence use.

(8) V Amphibious Corps maintained close liaison with all air units and operational airfields in zone of responsibility.

(9) During the stages of disposition, all Japanese aircraft and aircraft materials in V Amphibious Corps' zone of responsibility not required by Technical Air Intelligence Units or for technical use by other service units were destroyed.

(10) In line with information on the subject received from SIXTH Army, this Corps, shortly after arrival at the target, initiated a request to SIXTH Army Headquarters for the assignment to V Amphibious Corps of one JRB and one R4D to be used for evacuation, courier service, and administrative traffic. Again, as was the case with requests for DDT spray and air-evacuation, numerous dispatches among various Army commands stemmed from V Amphibious Corps' initial request, but with no definite results. After receiving ten dispatches concerning these aircraft, one R4D finally arrived at MAB, OMURA, sixty-two days after submission of the initial dispatch request.

(11) Air observers were lifted to target in unit shipping and were not available for any operations prior to landing. However, they subsequently have operated with the VMQ squadrons to a limited extent.

(12) Marine Air Group 22 with three VMF squadrons and one VMF(N) squadron under operational control of the 5th Fleet, based at OMURA, JAPAN, commencing 20 September. This unit was to provide air support for V Amphibious Corps. However, such air support was never required and, in early November, MAG 22 was withdrawn from JAPAN. Upon withdrawal of this Group, however, authority was requested, and duly granted by Air Fleet Marine Force Pacific, to organize a provisional base air detachment of 8 officers and 70 enlisted, in order to retain OMURA in commission as a Marine Air Base, pending reduction of air-transportation and utility demands in western and central KYUSHU, which OMURA was ideally located to
serve. As of the closing date of this report, MAB, OMURA, remains in commission, and has rendered great assistance in the logistic and air support of this Corps.

e. Supply:

VMQ squadrons, LFASCU #4, and MQC-1 were supplied by organic units. Initially, there was a decided shortage of the proper type of aviation fuel and oil for VMQ aircraft. However, during the later stages of V Amphibious Corps occupation, such fuel has been made available to all squadrons in ample quantities, but to date the much-needed low viscosity oil has not been received.

4. Conclusions:

a. Air support, although available on call, was not employed by the Corps prior to landing in Japan.

b. Carrier-based aircraft available for the assault were insufficient in number.

c. Seaplane courier service, the only type of air support furnished by the Navy subsequent to the occupation, was satisfactory.

d. Air support of the Corps furnished by the Army was unsatisfactory during the initial phases of the occupation. This was due to lack of availability of Army aircraft for special flights, to the extreme irregularity of the Army Air Courier Service, and to poor communication facilities. Subsequently these conditions improved considerably, although it was 28 November before an airplane was assigned directly to VMQ by the Army.

3. VMQ squadrons proved invaluable in making possible early and continuous courier communications – mail and personnel – throughout the V Amphibious Corps zone of responsibility. The ability of the OY airplane to operate from reasonably small fields permitted a rapid and continuous liaison with all major units as they fanned out from their respective base headquarters. In addition, medical evacuation within the V Amphibious Corps zone of responsibility was provided by OY aircraft, although larger aircraft would have been more suitable for long hauls.

f. The most noticeable deficiency of air support during the occupation phase was the lack of any transport and/or cargo aircraft assigned directly to the operational control of V Amphibious Corps. Numerous calls for air transportation of
personnel and material, to include air evacuation of medical patients, arose from time to time which could be filled only by special aircraft kept on call for just such purpose. Even the SIXTH Army requested V Amphibious Corps to furnish air transport service. Minimum requirements to carry out these very important missions is one R4D airplane each for Corps and Division headquarters. Too much stress cannot be placed upon the necessity for providing each of these units, Corps included, initially with a squadron of small aircraft of the "Cub" type, and later, as large airfields become available, with one or more transport and/or cargo type airplanes for administrative operations.

JOHN S. E. YOUNG
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Air Officer.
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 3 to Annex DOG to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan

REPATRIATION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL 30 November 1945.

From: The Repatriation Officer, G-3 Section.
To: The Commanding General.


1. When the V Amphibious Corps landed in Japan on 22 September 1945, no concrete plans for repatriation existed, but on that day V Amphibious Corps was designated by SIXTH Army to receive from Commander 7th amphibious Force disarmed Japanese demobilized troop repatriates, and SASEBO was designated as a port to receive and process incoming Japanese arriving from overseas in U. S. LSTs. This represented the initial extent of repatriation plans and planning.

Because repatriation would involve the movement of large numbers of persons by foot, train and by ship, as well as the detail and organization of guards and supervisory teams, repatriation seemed more nearly a proper function of G-3 than of any other staff section. Consequently the G-3 section was assigned overall responsibility for supervision and planning in connection with repatriation throughout the Corps zone. It is interesting to note that, as an indication of the differing conceptions of staff responsibility in the various Headquarters when confronted by a totally new problem, repatriation was considered as a function of G-3 in 5th Marine Division, G-2 in the 2d Marine Division, G-1 and G-3 in the 32d Infantry Division, and as a function of the Military Government Section in the SIXTH Army. However, liaison and coordination between this Headquarters and both higher and lower echelons was excellent and continuous.

From the initial stages of occupation, in accordance with directives from SCAP to the Imperial Japanese Government, actual execution of repatriation was made the direct responsibility of Japanese authorities. These directives were likewise promulgated to V Amphibious Corps by dispatch and letter, in order that the necessary close supervision could be properly maintained. Unfortunately, many such directives reached this Headquarters a matter of weeks after they had been delivered to the Japanese authorities, so that on occasion our first information concerning some new detail of repatriation came from Japanese sources.

Soon after initial landings, investigation disclosed that the Japanese had commenced repatriation of Japanese from Korea, and Koreans back to Korea, using the port of HAKATA with KOJIROSHIMONOSEKI as a receiving and holding area. Small craft were...

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principally employed, and processing centers, records, sanitation, and so forth were conspicuous by their absence. Confronted by the first incoming groups of Japanese, the 5th Marine Division at Sasebo set up a repatriation center at Urugashira and shortly after 26 September were receiving and processing nearly 3,000 incoming Japanese demobilized troops per day. Hakata and the receiving area at Moji-Shimonoseki were soon operating under supervision of occupation forces, and repatriation plans began to take definite shape. The ports of Moji and Shimonoseki were not authorized for repatriation shipping due to heavily mined waters in that area. SCAP issued comprehensive directives to the Imperial Japanese Government covering repatriation centers, limitations on currency brought in and out of Japan by repatriates, necessary medical inspections, sanitation, minimum food requirements, etc., and estimates were compiled as to the total number of Koreans and Chinese in the islands of Japan. Best information indicated well over a million Koreans in Japan to be repatriated, and immediately action was initiated to set up additional repatriation ports and processing centers, as well as to increase the daily capacity of those already in operation, where such increase was possible. After investigation, the use of Senzaki, Hakata, Sasebo and Kagoshima as repatriation ports was determined, and the Japanese instructed to improve existing facilities and provide new ones as indicated. Meantime, SCAP was organized in Tokyo to authorize and control the use and movement of specified Japanese shipping to be employed in repatriation shuttles, and every effort was made to increase shipping space, which fell far short of the established capacities of the repatriation ports. Maximum daily capacities of these ports and their repatriation centers were established as follows:

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<th>IN</th>
<th>OUT</th>
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<td>5,000</td>
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In addition to Korean repatriates and incoming Japanese, it was found that there were some 40,000 Chinese Nationals of which about 6,000 were in Corps Zone, approximately 2,000 Formosan Nationals and 15,000 Ryukyu islanders also in the V Amphibious Corps Zone. Higher headquarters advised that the Formosans and Ryukyu islanders (who were demobilized soldiers which constituted one half the number) could not be repatriated until some future date, but authority was received to repatriate Chinese. This movement of Chinese commenced in early October from Hakata, using Japanese
Repatriation Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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shipping, and it was found necessary to place U. S. guard detachments on many ships in order to maintain some semblance of order. Of all the repatriates involved, the Chinese caused most difficulty, rioting, looting, and in some cases killing. The Japanese authorities were helpless when it came to handling Chinese, and careful supervision and firm action was necessary on the part of occupation troops. The Koreans were, on the contrary, docile and relatively quiet, and gave little trouble, with the exception of their constant drift out of nowhere into the repatriation centers and their total lack of any elementary concept of individual or collective sanitation.

2. By 30 October, the Japanese Government had placed the Prefectural Governors in charge of the overall problems of repatriation in their areas, directly under the Ministry of Welfare. A representative of the Ministry of Welfare was appointed to operate at each repatriation center, under the Prefectural Governor, and occupation force supervisory teams at these centers maintained liaison with the Japanese and close supervision of Japanese repatriation activities.

Reports that they were to be repatriated spread rapidly among the Korean nationals, and they began streaming into the Corps zone by any and all means available. The Japanese officials were directed to control this influx, but it was simply a matter of too many people and too few ships. Processing center facilities were strained far beyond capacity, and sanitary conditions were for a time virtually non-existent, and this among a people accustomed to extremely primitive living and sanitary conditions. A black market developed in food, as well as shipping, and repatriation centers with a capacity of 10,000 were forced to attempt to handle as many as 30,000 waiting repatriates. As it became apparent that the Japanese were entirely unable to curtail this flow of people, SIXTH Army was urgently requested in early November to institute rigid controls on movements through HONSHU to the Corps zone, until the ports could be cleared. This was done, and restrictions imposed, these restrictions to expire on 24 November.

During this hiatus, V Amphibious Corps was able to move out the majority of the many thousands awaiting repatriation, while SCaP proposed and placed into effect a plan to make more shipping available, so that the numbers of persons moved in and out of designated port areas more nearly approached the capacity of the repatriation centers concerned.

Basically the plan called for the use of some 80 LSTs, to shuttle from CHINA to SASEBO with Japanese repatriates, and to onload Chinese or Koreans from SASEBO; and to use KAGOSHIMA in the same manner. This plan was approved, and on 24 November the first
Repatriation Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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repatriates departed, some 2,800 Chinese, from SASEBO. The use of Kagoshima however, was delayed until after the closing date of this report. Some additional Japanese ships were authorized to operate in the repatriation shuttles, and in general it was found that the increased shipping space more nearly kept up with the actual flow of repatriates into V Amphibious Corps ports from the other areas in Japan.

During the period between 22 September and 30 November, over 570,000 Japanese repatriates returned to Japan through V Amphibious Corps ports, and over 300,000 repatriates were moved out of Japan. Repatriation into Japan will undoubtedly be a continuing program for many months, because of the large numbers in China and the Pacific islands at the close of the war. However, reports indicate that the repatriation of Chinese nationals will be virtually complete by the middle of December, and that another four months will see the return of the great majority of Koreans now in Japan.

J. T. PEIRCE,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve,
G-3 Repatriation Officer.
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Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

G-3 Periodic Reports

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1003
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD

SECRET

From: 1800 WV 24 August 1945
To: 1800 WV 25 August 1945.

No. 1

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters and VAC Troops MAUI, T.H.
VAC Artillery GUAM
5th Marine Division HAWAII, T.H.
3d Marine Division GUAM
2d Marine Division SAIPAN

2. Weather and Visibility (MAUI):

Partly cloudy skies with scattered clouds, visibility 8-10 miles. Moderate to strong surface winds from the Northwest with velocities from 14-22 knots. Maximum temperature 86°. Flying conditions good.

3. Operations for the period:

The status of units of this Corps at the end of this period were as follows:

(a) Has VAC and Corps Troops - 33% loaded.
(b) VAC Artillery - conducting training.
(c) 5th Marine Division - 75% loaded.
(d) 3d Marine Division - conducting training and preparing for embarkation.
(e) 2d Marine Division - conducting training and preparing for embarkation.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, SIXTH Army CG, 2d MarDiv
CG, FMF, Pac CG, 3d MarDiv CG, Corps Arty, VAC
ComPhibop 4 CG, 5th MarDiv CG, 1st Prov Am Trac

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBICUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

SECRET

From: 1800 VW 25 August 1945,
To: 1800 VW 26 August 1945.

No. 2

1. Location of Troops:
   No change.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   Partly cloudy skies. Visibility 10-15 miles, reducing to
   3 miles in widely scattered light shower activity. Moderate to
   strong surface winds from the Northwest with velocities from
   16-25 knots. Maximum temperature 84°. Flying conditions good.

3. Our Operations for the period:
   (a) Hqs VAC and VAC Troops 38% loaded.
   (b) VAC Artillery No change.
   (c) 5thMarDiv 60% loaded.
   (d) 3dMarDiv No change.
   (e) 2dMarDiv No change.

4. Casualties:
   None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, SIXTH Army CG, 3dMarDiv CG, Corps Arty, VAC
CG, FMF, Pac CG, 5thMarDiv CG, 1st Prov Amph Trac Gp
ComPhibOp 4 CG, 2dMarDiv Gp

SECRET

1005
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 OPERATIONAL REPORT

SECRET

From: 1800 VM 26 August 1945.
To: 1800 VM 27 August 1945.

No. 3

1. Location of Troops:
No change.

2. Weather and Visibility:
Partly cloudy skies. Visibility 10-15 miles, moderate to
strong surface winds from the Northwest with velocities from 17-24
knots. Winds aloft from the Northeast with velocities from 10-15
knots. Maximum temperature 86° F. Flying conditions good.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   (a) Hqs VAC and VAC Troops
       60% loaded
   (b) VAC Artillery
       No change
   (c) 5th MarDiv
       95% loaded
       CP closed at HAWAII 1100, 27 August 1945 and
       opened in USS WESTMORELAND (APA 104) same hour.
       All LSTs loaded and have departed for OAHU.
   (d) 3d MarDiv
       No change
   (e) 2d MarDiv
       No change

4. Casualties:
None.

W. W. WENGERGON,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

[Signature]

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
CorPltGp 4
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 3dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG Corps Arty VAC

1006
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD

G-3 OPERATIONAL REPORT

SECRET
No. 4

From: 1800 VV 27 August 1945
To: 1800 VV 28 August 1945

1. Location of Troops:
   VAC Headquarters and VAC Troops
   VAC Artillery
   5th Marine Division (afloat) enroute to
   3d Marine Division
   2d Marine Division

   Maui, T.H.
   Guam
   Oahu, T.H.
   Guam
   Saipan

2. Weather and Visibility (Maui):
   Moderate to strong surface winds from the North
   with velocities from 16-24 knots. Winds aloft
   from the Northeast with velocities from 15-20 knots.
   Maximum temperature 86° F. Flying conditions good.

3. Our operations for the Period:
   (a) Hqs VAC and Corps Troops
   70% loaded
   No change
   (b) VAC Artillery
   No change
   (c) 5th Marine Division
   100% loaded enroute to Oahu, T.H.
   No change
   (d) 3d Marine Division
   No change
   (e) 2d Marine Division
   No change
   (f) Army Augmentation Troops VAC OAHU
   Commenced loading during this period.

4. Casualties:
   None.

V. W. WEGSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGors, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG, SEABOOT Army
CG FMF Pac
CG Troop 4
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 3dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG Corps Arty VAC

1007
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

From: 1800 WT 28 August 1945,
To: 1800 WT 29 August 1945.

No. 5.

1. Location of Troops:

   Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops
   VAC Artillery
   5th Marine Division (afloat)
   3rd Marine Division
   24 Marine Division

   MAUI, T.H.
   GUAM.
   OAHU, T.H.
   GUAM.
   SAIPAN.

2. Weather and Visibility: (MAUI)

   Partly cloudy skies, visibility 10 - 15 miles. Moderate to strong surface winds from the North with velocities from 16 - 23 knots. Winds aloft from the Northeast with velocities from 16 - 23 knots. Maximum temperature 87° F. Flying conditions good.

3. Own Operations for the Period:

   a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops
      VAC Artillery
      5thMarDiv (afloat)
      3rdMarDiv
      24MarDiv
      Army Augmentation Units OAHU
      17 LST's departed OAHU for target during this period.
      16 LST's departed OAHU for SAIPAN 28 August 1945.

   b) 75% loaded.

   c) No change.

   d) No change.

   e) OAHU, T.H.

   f) OAHU, T.H.

   g) 10% loaded.

4. Casualties:

   None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonial USMC,
ACors, G-5.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FIFTH FRC
CG ComPhlSp 4
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 24MarDiv
CG 3rdMarDiv
CG Corps Arty VAC
G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800 W 29 August 1945,
To: 1800 W 30 August 1945.

1. Location of Troops:
No change.

2. Weather and Visibility: (MAUI)
Partly cloudy skies with lower scattered clouds at 3000 feet. Visibility 10-15 miles. Moderate to strong surface winds from the North with velocities from 16-25 knots. Winds aloft from the Northeast with velocities from 15-20 knots. Maximum temperature 86°F. Flying conditions good.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops 90% loaded.
(b) VAC Artillery
No change.
(c) 5th Marine Division
No change.
(d) 3d Marine Division
No change.
(e) 2d Marine Division
No change.
(f) Army Augmentation Units (OAHU) 20% loaded.

4. Casualties:
None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG, SIXTH Army
CG FIF Fac
ComFibGp 4
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 3dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG Corps Arty VAC

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

SECRET

From: 1800 VW 30 August 1945,
To: 1800 VW 31 August 1945.

No. 7

1. Location of Troops:
   No change.

2. Weather and Visibility: (MAUI)
   Partly cloudy skies with lower scattered clouds, at 3000
   feet. Visibility 10 - 15 miles. Moderate to strong surface
   winds from the North with velocities from 16 - 23 knots.
   Winds aloft from the Northeast with velocities from 10 - 15
   knots. Maximum temperature 87° F. Flying conditions good.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   (a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops 95% loaded.
   (b) VAC Artillery No change.
   (c) 5th Marine Division No change.
   (d) 3d Marine Division No change.
   (e) 2d Marine Division No change.
   (f) Army Augmentation Units (OAHU) 30% loaded.

4. Casualties:
   None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AOC, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
ComPhibGrp 4
C3 2dMarDiv
C3 3dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG Corps Arty VAC

SECRET
1010
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

SECRET

From: 1800 Wt 31 August 1945,
To: 1800 Wt 1 September 1945.

No. 8

1. Location of Troops:
   No change.

2. Weather and Visibility: (MAUI)
   Partly cloudy skies with from 3 - 5 tenths lower clouds at
   3000 feet. Visibility 10 - 15 miles. Moderate to strong
   surface winds from the Northwest with velocities from 16 -
   22 knots. Winds aloft from the Northeast with velocities
   from 15 - 20 knots. Maximum temperature 87° F. Flying
   conditions good.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   (a) Headquarters, VAC in MOUNT MC KINLEY departed MAUI
       1800 Wt to join 5th Marine Division convoy enroute
       SAIPAN.
   (b) VAC Troops
       98% loaded.
   (c) VAC Artillery
       No change.
   (d) 5th Marine Division
       Enroute SAIPAN.
   (e) 3d Marine Division
       No change.
   (f) 2d Marine Division
       No change.
   (g) Army Augmentation Units (CAHU)
       50% loaded.

4. Casualties:
   None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGfS, 6-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army  ComPhibGp 4  CG 3dMarDiv  CG Corps Arty
CG FMF Inc  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 5thMarDiv  VAC

SECRET 1011
031/318  
Ser. 00751B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

G-8 OPERATION REPORT

From: 1800 VV 1 September 1945,
To: 1800 VV 2 September 1945.

No. 2

1. Location of Troops:

Headquarters, VAC, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division  
(at sea) enroute. Noon position 19° 57.5' N; 160° 16.5'.  
Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Partly cloudy with scattered low and middle clouds. Low  
cloud bases at 2000 feet. Visibility 10-15 miles. Wind  
from East-Southeast backing in late afternoon to East-  
Northeast. Velocity 10-15 knots. Slight seas with  
Southeasterly swell.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops  
(in transition).

(b) Remainder of VAC Troops from HAWAIIAN  
100% loaded

(c) VAC Artillery  
No change

(d) 5th Marine Division  
No change

(e) 3rd Marine Division  
No change

(f) 2nd Marine Division  
No change

(g) Army Augmentation Unit (OAHU)  
100% loaded

4. Cautions:

None.

W. W. WENSTYGER,  
Colonel USMC,  
ACors, 3-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG FMF Pac  CG 3dMarDiv  CG 5thMarDiv  CG Corps Arty
CG ComPhib Gp4  CG 3dMarDiv  CG 5thMarDiv  VAC

SECRET 1012
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

SECRET

From: 1800 VW 2 September 1945,
      To:    1800 VW 3 September 1945.

No. 10

1. Location of Troops:
   Headquarters, VAC, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division (at
   sea) enroute. Noon position 19° 48.5' N; W 167° 05.3'.
   Remainder of VAC Troops (including Army Augmentation Units)
   mounting from HAWAIIAN Area, enroute target. Other units
   no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   Partly cloudy skies with scattered showers in the area dur-
   ing the morning, shower activity decreased in the afternoon.
   Visibility 10-15 miles, reduced in showers to 6-8 miles.
   Wind from East-Northeast. Velocity 15-20 knots. Moderate
   sea with low Easterly swell.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   (a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC troops
       (in TransRon 22). No change
   (b) Remainder of VAC Troops from HAWAIIAN
       Area (including Army Augmentation Units). Enroute
       target
   (c) VAC Artillery No change
   (d) 5th Marine Division No change
   (e) 3d Marine Division No change
   (f) 2d Marine Division No change
   (g) 9 LSTs departed Cahu for target during this period.
   (h) 8 LSTs departed HAWAI for target during this period.
4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  ComPhibOp 4  CG 3dMarDiv  CG Corps Arty  VAC
CG FMF Pac  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 5thMarDiv
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800 Wx 3 September 1945,
To: 1800 XY 4 September 1945.

SECRET

No. 11

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 8th Marine Division at
sea enroute. Noon position 10° 31' N; W 173° 46'.
Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Partly cloudy with light showers in the morning. Visi-

tility 10-15 miles. Wind from East-Northeast. Velocity

13-18 knots. Slight sea with low easterly swell.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops No change.
(b) VAC Artillery No change.
(c) 8th Marine Division No change.
(d) 3d Marine Division No change.
(e) 2d Marine Division No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. V. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army ComFlbGp 4 CG 3dMarDiv CG Corps Arty VAC
CG FMF Rec CG 2dMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv

SECRET

1015
031/116
Scr.00753B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD

G-3 Operations Report

SECRET
No. 12

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at
sea enroute. Noon position 19° 07' N; W 178° 27'.
Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Partly cloudy with scattered to broken middle clouds and
scattered low clouds. Visibility 10-12 miles. Wind from
East-Southeast. Velocity 15 knots. Slight sea with
low easterly swell.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops No change.
(b) VAC Artillery No change.
(c) 5th Marine Division No change.
(d) 3d Marine Division
Detached this date and reverted to the control of
Fleet Marine Force Pacific.
(e) 2d Marine Division No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. VENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Fac
ComfnibGp 4
CG 3dMarDiv
CG Corps Arty VAC
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv

SECRET
1016
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800 M 6 September 1945,
To : 1800 M 7 September 1945.

No. 13

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon position 18° 52' N; E 175° 10'.

2. Weather and Visibility:


3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops

No change.

(b) VAC Artillery

No change.

(c) 5th Marine Division

No change.

(d) 2d Marine Division

No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

________________________

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACors, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army ComPhib3p 4 CG 3dMarDiv CG Corps Arty VAC
CG FMF Fac CG 2dMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv

SECRET

1017
SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800 M 7 September 1945,
To: 1800 L 8 September 1945.

No. 14

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon position 17° - 59' N; E 169° - 33'. 32d Infantry Division at LUZON. Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:


3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops

No change.

(b) VAC Artillery

No change.

(c) 5th Marine Division

No change.

(d) 2d Marine Division

No change.

(e) 32d Infantry Division:

Effective 7 September, this division was attached to V Amphibious Corps. It is planned that the 32d Infantry Division will be loaded out for the target approximately 2 October, to arrive 16 October.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGorS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  ComPhibGp 4  CG 5thMarDiv  CG Corps Arty VAC
CG FJP Fac  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 32dInfDiv

SECRET 1018
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

SECRET

From: 1600 L 8 September 1945,
To : 1600 L 9 September 1945.

No. 15

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon position 160° - 50' N; E 164° - 20'1. Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:


3. Our operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops No change.
(b) VAC Artillery No change.
(c) 5th Marine Division No change.
(d) 2d Marine Division No change.
(e) 32d Infantry Division No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
ComPhibGp 4
CG 5thMarDiv
CG Corps Arty
CG FMF Pac
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
VAC

SECRET 1019
G-2 Operations Report

No. 16.

From: 1800 L 9 September 1945,
To: 1800 L 10 September 1945.

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon position 15° 15' N; E 159° 18'. Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Broken to overcast skies in the morning with scattered rain showers. Slightly decreasing middle cloudiness throughout the day. Visibility 10 miles, reduced to 4-6 miles in precipitation. Wind from East, velocity 12-15 knots. Slight sea.

3. Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops

(b) VAC Artillery

(c) 5th Marine Division

(d) 2d Marine Division

Commenced loading 0800 10 September and at the close of the period was 10% loaded.

(e) 82d Infantry Division

No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

/s/ W. W. WINNINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AOFs, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FIFTH Army
CG 5thInfDiv
CG Corps Arty
CG 82dInfDiv
VAC
COPY

HEADQUARTERS, V Amphibious Corps,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800 L 10 September 1945.
To: 1800 K 11 September 1945.

SECRET

No. 17

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon position 16° 00' N; 153° 44'. Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Broken to overcast skies with some clearing in the middle of the day. Showers and rain squalls throughout the period. Visibility 8-10 miles reduced to 2-4 miles in rain and occasionally to 1-mile in heaviest showers. Wind from northeast, velocity 15-20 knots with gusts to 30 knots in squalls.

Slight to moderate sea.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops
   No change.

(b) VAC Artillery
   No change.

(c) 5th Marine Division
   No change.

(d) 2nd Marine Division
   29% loaded at close of period.

(e) 32nd Infantry Division
   No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

/a/ W. W. WENINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  ComPhibgp 4  CG 5thMarDiv  CG Corps Arty
CG FMF FDC  CG 2ndMarDiv  CG 32ndInfDiv  VAC
G-5 Operations Report

From: 1800 K 11 September 1945.
To: 1800 K 12 September 1945.

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon position 14° 56' N; E 146° 41'. Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Overcast with intermittent light rain and occasional squalls. Visibility 10 miles, reduced in squalls to 2-4 miles. Some clearing in the middle of the day. Wind from East. Velocity 17-22 knots with gusts to 30 knots. Moderate sea.

3. Own Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops No change.
(b) VAC Artillery No change.
(c) 5th Marine Division No change.
(d) 26 Marine Division 445 loaded at close of period.
(e) 32d Infantry Division No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

/signed/ J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACofS, G-5,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army ComPhibGrp 4 CG 5thMarDiv CG Corps Arty
CG FIFTH FLEET CG 2dMarDiv CG 82dInfDiv VAC

SECRET 1022
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.


SECRET

No. 19.

From: 1800 K 12 September 1945.
To: 1800 K 13 September 1945.

1. Location of Troops:

VAAC Headquarters, VAAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at SAIPAN. Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:


3. Current Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters, VAAC and VAAC Troops

Arrived Saipan 0645 13 September 1945.

(b) VAAC Artillery

5th 155mm How Bn and 12th 155mm Gun Bn reverted to operational control of FMF Fac.

(c) 5th Marine Division

Arrived Saipan 0645 13 September 1945.

(d) 2d Marine Division

50% loaded at close of period.

(e) 32d Infantry Division

No change.


None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACoFS, G-3.
(Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
ComPhibGp 4
CG 5thMarDiv
CG Corps Arty
CG FIF Fac
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
VAC

SECRET 1023
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
II: THE FIELD.

3-3 Operations Report

From: 1800K 13 September 1945.
To : 1800K 14 September 1945.

No. 20

1. Location of Troops:
   No change.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   Overcast with light intermittent rain and showers.
   Visibility 8-10 miles reduced in rain to 3-5 miles. Wind
   from South. Velocity 10-15 knots, decreasing occasionally
   to 5 knots. Gusts up to 25 knots in showers.

3. Operations for the Period:
   (a) Headquarters and VAC and VAC Troops
   
   At anchor at SHIPAL. A conference was held
   aboard the USS LT MCHENLEY, attended by ComPhib
   Gp 4, the CG's of the 2d and 5th NarDivs,
   ConTransOn 22, and the CG's of the 59th AAA Gp
   and Corps Troops VAC.

   (b) VAC Artillery
   
   No change.

   (c) 5th Marine Division
   
   At anchor at SHIPAL.

   (d) 2d Marine Division
   
   60% loaded at close of period.

   (e) 32d Infantry Division.
   
   No change.

4. Casualties:
   None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACoFS, C-3.
(Acting)

DISTRIBUTION: CG SIXTH Army
ComPhib Gp 4
CG 5th NarDiv
CG Corps
CG FIF Pac
CG 2d NarDiv
CG 32d InfDiv
Arty VAC
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.
SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800K 14 September 1945.
To : 1800K 15 September 1945.

"G.31"

1. Location of Troops:
   No change.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   Mostly clear to partly cloudy with scattered low and
   high clouds. No rain. Visibility generally reduced
   to 6-8 Miles by surface haze. Wind from East. Velocity
   from 7-10 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   (a) Headquarters, VAC and VAC Troops:
      (1) At anchor off SAIPAN. Conference with various
      staff officers of the 2d and 5th MarDivs
      continued.

      (2) The Chief of Staff and Signal Officer from
      the 32d InfDiv arrived, were briefed on the
      proposed employment of that division, and
      were delivered copies of all pertinent plans
      and orders.

      (3) 8 LSTs (VAC) and 15 LSMs (5thMarDiv) departed
      SAIPAN for SASEBO on 14 September.

   (b) VAC Artillery
       No change.

   (c) 5th Marine Division
       No change.

   (d) 2d Marine Division:
       75% loaded at close of period.

   (e) 32d Infantry Division
       No change.

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SECRET

4. Casualties:

"None."

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACofS, G - 3.
(Acting)

DISTRIBUTION

CG SIXTH Army  ComPhibGp 4  CG 5thMarDiv  CG Corps Arty
CG FM Fac  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 32dInfDiv  VAC

SECRET

-3-
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
1" THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

SECRET

From: LSCCK 15 September 1945,
To: LSCCK 16 September 1945.

No. 23

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division underway for SASEBO at close of period. Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Partly cloudy in the morning; increasing low cloudiness in the afternoon. A few showers in the late afternoon. Visibility 10 miles. Wind from East-Northeast, velocity 10-15 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters VAC and VAC Troops

Underway for SASEBO 1730K.

(b) VAC Artillery.

No change.

(c) 5th Marine Division.

Underway for SASEBO 1730K.

(d) 3d Marine Division.

85% loaded at close of period.

(e) 32d Infantry Division.

No change.

4. Omitted.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC
ACofS, G-3 (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  ComPhibGrp 4  CG 5thMarDiv  CG Corps Arty VAC
CG FMF Pac  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 32d InfDiv  1027
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

SEC. From: 1800K 16 September 1945.
No.23. To : 1800K 17 September 1945.

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon Position 17° - 40' N; E 142° - 40'. Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility.


3. War Operations for the Period.

(a) Headquarters VAC and VAC Troops

No change.

(b) VAC Artillery

No change.

(c) 5th Marine Division

No change.

(d) 2nd Marine Division

Completed loading. LST-LSH Group departed S. IPSAN for NAGASAKI 1400K.

(e) 32d Infantry Division

No change.
031/217
Ser.00792B  G-3 Operations Report No. 23 (Continued)

SECRET

4. Omitted.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USHC,
ACofS, G-3 (acting)

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army  ConPhibGp 4  CG 5thMarDiv
CG FMF Pac  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 32d InfDiv

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800K 17 September 1945.
To: 1800I 18 September 1945.

No. 34.

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon Position 22° 05' N; E 140° 11'. Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Partly cloudy skies with low, middle and high clouds. Increased cloudiness in afternoon, with scattered showers. Visibility 10 miles, slightly reduced in showers. Wind from East-Southeast. Velocity 10-15 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) Headquarters VAC and VAC Troops

No change.

(b) VAC Artillery

No change.

(c) 5th Marine Division

No change.

(d) 2d Marine Division

Underway for NAGASAKI 1700K. Scheduled to arrive 0600I 23 September.

(c) 32d Infantry Division

No change.

SECRET
G-3 Operations Report No. 24 (Continued)

SECRET

4. Omitted.

J. L. STUART,
LtCol., USCG,
ACofS, G-3 (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  ComPhibGrp4  CG 5thMarDiv
CG FIF Pac  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 32d InfDiv
SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I 16 September 1945.
To: 1800I 19 September 1945.

No. 25.

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon Position 25° - 35' N; E 136° - 52'. 2d Marine Division at sea enroute.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Clear to partly cloudy in the morning. Increased cloudiness in the afternoon with a few light, scattered showers. Visibility 15 miles. Wind from South. Velocity 5-10 knots. Smooth sea with a low west-northwesterly swell.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

No change.

4. Omitted.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G-3 (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  ComPhibGp 4  CG 5thMarDiv
CG FIF Pac  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 32dInfDiv

SECRET
03L/217
Ser. 007963

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I 19 September 1945.
To: 1800I 20 September 1945.

No. 26.

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 5th Marine Division at sea enroute. Noon Position 28° - 10' N; E 132° - 50'. 2d Marine Division at sea enroute.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Partly cloudy with scattered low and middle clouds; a few light showers in the area. Visibility 10-12 miles. Wind from East. Velocity 8-12 knots. Slight sea.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

No change.

4. Omitted.

J. L. Stewart,
LtCol., USMC,
ACorS, G-5 (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  ConPhibGrp4  CG 5thMarDiv
CG FIF Fac  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 32dInfDiv

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operation Report

From: 1800I 20 September 1945,
To : 1800I 21 September 1945.

No. 27

1. Location of Troops:

VAC Headquarters, VAC Troops and 8thMarDiv at sea enroute. Noon
position 29° 45' N; E 128° 41'. 2dMarDiv at sea enroute.
Other units no change.

2. Weather and Visibility:

Partly cloudy with scattered low clouds and scattered to broken
middle clouds. Few light showers. Visibility 8-10 miles. Wind
from South - Southeast. Velocity 8-13 knots. Smooth sea.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

No change.

4. Omitted.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC
ACofS, G - 3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
ComPhibGp 4
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32InfDiv
CG 5thMarDiv

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

SECRET

From: 1800I 21 September 1945,
To: 1800I 22 September 1945.

No. 28

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. VAC Headquarters and VAC Troops afloat SASEBO Harbor.
   b. 5th Marine Division. The following elements of the 5thMarDiv have landed and are in the process of occupying their assigned area:
      - RCT 26
      - RCT 27 (-)
      - ELT 2/28
      - Div Arty Gr Hq
      - 1st & 2d Bns 13th Mar
      - 5th Tk Bn
      - Shore Party Gr
      - Co A 5th Med Bn
   c. 2d Marine Division at sea enroute to NAGASAKI.
   d. 52d Infantry Division - no change.

2. Weather and Visibility SASEBO Bay.

   Overcast skies with light, intermittent rain. Visibility 0-10 miles, except where reduced in precipitation to 3-5 miles. Wind variable, from Southeast, velocity 8-12 knots, smooth sea.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps landed units of the 5th Marine Division commencing at 0900 in the SASEBO Area according to the VAC Second Alternate Plan after preliminary arrangements had been made with Japanese representatives ashore by VAC advance party. By 1800 an estimated 10,000 troops of all arms had been landed without incident. At 0800 the Corps Commander interviewed the following Japanese officers aboard the AGO-7: Vice Admiral Abe, Commandant SASEBO Naval Base and Commander
Naval Forces, SaSEBO Area: Major General Koge, Vice Chief of Staff Western District Army; Rear Admiral Ishi, Chief of Staff Naval Base & District; Captain Itoh, Vice Chief of Staff Naval Base & District. The CG VAC left AGC-7 at 1345 and in company with General Krueger, Major General Decker and Major General Bourke, inspected the Naval Station, the City of SaSEBO and SaSEBO Naval Air Station. The Commanding General returned to AGC-7 (CP) at 1630.

b. 5th Marine Division landed in echelon at the Naval Air Station, Aircraft Factory and in the SaSEBO Harbor Area. Units ashore commenced establishing guards over military installations, arms and stores in assigned areas replacing Japanese guards. Movement to assigned areas was continuing at the end of the period. Shore parties were established for general unloading at the docks. Sanitary conditions of selected billeting areas ashore are deplorable and corrective measures are being taken to improve conditions prior to occupation of these areas. The Advance 5th Division CP was established ashore at 1215.

c. 2d Marine Division at sea enroute to NAGASAKI.

d. 32d Infantry Division - No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGofS, G-3.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

SECRET

From: 1800 22 September 1945,
To: 1800 23 September 1945.

No. 22.

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000 SASEBO Area.

1. Location of Troops:

(a) VAC CP ashore SASEBO. Corps Troops in process of
landing.

(b) 5th Marine Division ashore at SASEBO with the excep-
tion of ship platoons.

(c) 2d Marine Division at MaizAKI.

RCT 2 and RCT 6 ashore.

'Remainder of the Division continues landing.'

(d) 32d Infantry Division.

No change.

2. Weather and Visibility SASEBO Area:

Broken skies first of period, becoming partly cloudy by
afternoon. Visibility 8-10 miles. Wind, light northerly,
becoming northeasterly 10-15 knots in afternoon. State
of sea, smooth.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) V Amphibious Corps: During the night guards were
maintained over all military installations, equip-
ment and stores. No incidents. Landing of supplies
continued throughout the night. General unloading
satisfactory. At daylight, elements of Corps Troops
commenced landing and occupying their assigned areas.
VAC-5 ashore with two planes operative. CG VAC in-
spected shore installations at SASEBO during this
period. At 1600 CG VAC assumed control of forces
ashore in Corps zone of responsibility. Corps
shipping 30% unloaded.
08/147

SECRET

(b) 5th Marine Division continuing occupation of SaSeBO area and approaches thereto. Division Command Post closed in WEST GAKJiAND (APA 104) at 1338 and opened same time at SaSeBO Fortress Artillery Battalion, Company "C" (Reinf), 27th Marines, occupied GUKA at 1615. 5th Marine Division 60% unloaded at end of period; unloading continues.

(c) 2d Marine Division commenced landing in the Hata Seiko Area at 1500 without incident. At the end of period RCT 2 and RCT 6 were ashore with the remainder of the Division afloat. Landing and unloading continues.

(d) 32d Infantry Division:

No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. HENNINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACgs, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
CG PhibGrp 4
CG 32dInfDiv
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD

G-3 Operations Report

SECRET From: 1800 23 September 1945
No. 33
To : 1800 24 September 1945

Map: Kyushu 1:25,000 Sasebo Area.

1. Location of Troops:
   (a) VAC Crew ashore Sasebo.
   (b) Corps Troops ashore Sasebo.
   (c) 5th Marine Division - Sasebo.
   (d) 2nd Marine Division - Nagasaki.
   (e) 32nd Inf Division - No change.

2. Weather and Visibility Sasebo Area.

   (a) V Amphibious Corps: Maintained guards over military installations and stores. Continued unloading throughout the period. 33 VAC in Nagasaki to observe progress of the 2nd Marine Division. VAC courier flight to Okura at 1000.
   (b) 5th Marine Division: Guards maintained over military installations and stores, no incidents. 5th Division hospital opened at 000 at Naval Training Station (71.3-14.4). General unloading satisfactory. During the day troops patrolled outlying area of Sasebo. 3d Prov MP Bn Hq reverted to VAC control.

SECRET

(c) 2nd Marine Division: Continued unloading. Commenced survey Japanese Artillery installations in the vicinity of Nagasaki Harbor. Established guards in petroleum dumps in area of RCT 2 and RCT 8. All RCTs ashore by 1300. Division Artillery unloading Nagasaki and moving in echelon to Isahaya. Balance of Division continues unloading at Nagasaki.

(d) 32nd Infantry Division – No change.


None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, 3 - 3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF FFO
ComPhicGp 4
Cg 5thMarDiv
CG 2nd MarDiv
CG 32d InfDiv
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

24 September 1945.

No. 1

DAILY LOCATION REPORT

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>CP Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters VAC</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Corps Troops</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFASCU #4</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn</td>
<td>Afloat Sasebo Harbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VaC Signal Bn</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VaC Medical Bn</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bomb Disb Co</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th MarDiv CP</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCT 26 CP</td>
<td>Sasebo Fortress Arty Bn Hq (77.3-15.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 1/26</td>
<td>East of Sasebo Naval Air Station (84.9-09.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 2/26</td>
<td>(78.2-13.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLT 3/26</td>
<td>(79.3-10.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCT 27 CP</td>
<td>(84.9-10.0)</td>
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<td>BLT 3/27</td>
<td>Naval Training Station (71.2-14.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLT 1/27 (less Co C)</td>
<td>(71.2-14.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co C 27th Mar CP Omura</td>
<td>Naval Training Station (1300,1-1055.8)</td>
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<td>BLT 2/27</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base (76.5-13.2)</td>
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<td>RCT 28 CP</td>
<td>Naval Training Station (71.4-14.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLT 1/28</td>
<td>(71.3-14.4)</td>
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<td>BLT 2/28</td>
<td>Sasebo Dock Area</td>
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<td>BLT 3/28</td>
<td>(71.0-14.2)</td>
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<td>Arty Gp CP Aircraft Factory</td>
<td>Service Gp CP West of Sasebo</td>
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<td>Tank Gp CP Naval Air Station</td>
<td>Support Gp CP Naval Training Station</td>
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<td>Service Gp CP West of Sasebo Naval Base</td>
<td>(80.8-10.9)</td>
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<td>Arty Gp CP Naval Air Station</td>
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<td>SP Regt CP Sasebo Naval Base</td>
<td>(77.3-15.3)</td>
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<td>Sgr Gp CP Sasebo Naval Base</td>
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<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base (76.7-13.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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08/11a
Sr. 008013 Daily Location Report No. 1 (Cont'd).

SECRET

2d Marine Division CP
RCT 2
RCT 6
RCT 8
Div Arty
32d Infantry Division

Nagasaki (Afloat)
East side of Nagasaki Harbor (94.5-62.2)
West side of Nagasaki Harbor (92.6-61.3)
Isahaya
Enroute to Isahaya
Luzon.

W. W. WENSINGER
Colonel, USMC,
ACofs, 6-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
ComPhibOp 4
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
Gen Staff General & Special Staff Section.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 18001 24 September 1945
To: 18001 25 September 1945.

SECRET

No. 31

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement.

2. Weather and Visibility: SASEBO Area:


3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) V Amphibious Corps: Continued to carry out its assigned mission.

(b) 5th Marine Division continued surveillance over assigned area and expanded patrols into outlying districts of SASEBO.

(c) 2d Marine Division continued survey of Japanese artillery installations vicinity NAGASAKI Harbor. Division artillery at ISAHAYA, 2d Tank Bn at NAGASAKI. Balance of division continued unloading. At 0900 2dMarDiv CP moved ashore in Customs House at NAGASAKI and the Commanding General assumed control of ground forces ashore in zone of responsibility.

(d) 32d Infantry Division:

No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENINGER
Colonel, USMC
ACofS, J-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, SIXTH Army
CG, FMF Pac
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG, 32dInfDiv
ComPhibOp 4

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

25 September 1946.

DAILY LOCATION STATEMENT

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;S Bn, VaC</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq, Shore Brigade</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.5-12.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Service Regiment</td>
<td>Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base (78.3-12.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>24th Mar Dep Co</td>
<td>Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base (78.3-12.2)</td>
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<td>36th Mar Dep Co</td>
<td>Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base (78.3-12.2)</td>
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<td>42d Mar Dep Co</td>
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<td>43d Mar Dep Co</td>
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<td>6th Mar Ammo Co</td>
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<td>10th Mar Ammo Co</td>
<td>Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base (78.3-12.2)</td>
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<td>1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)</td>
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<td>1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)</td>
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<td>1st Bkry Flt (Prov)</td>
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<td>Bomb Diap Co, H&amp;S Bn, VaC</td>
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<td>2d Air Del Plat Ser Com</td>
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<td>Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base (78.3-12.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shore Party Com Unit</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.5-12.5)</td>
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<td>5201st Engr Cons Brig</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.6-14.0)</td>
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<td>Hq, 7th NC Regt</td>
<td>1 mi NE of SASEBO Naval Air Station (78.7-9.3)</td>
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<td>97th NC Bn</td>
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<td>2d Sep Engr Bn</td>
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<td>1112th Engr Cons' Gp</td>
<td>Adv. CP FUKUCA</td>
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<td>MCG-1</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Air Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prov MT Gp</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Air Station</td>
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<td>12th MT Bn (Prov)</td>
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<td>H&amp;S Co, 20th amph Trk Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Bn (76.5-13.9)</td>
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<td>&quot;G&quot; Co, 20th amph Trk Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Air Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;A&quot; Co, 20th amph Trk Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Air Station</td>
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<td>3656th QM Trk Co</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq Det Prov Med Gp</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
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<tr>
<td>93d Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
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<td>93d Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td>NAGASAKI (94.6-92.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>34th Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td>SASEBO Fortress Arty Bn (77.3-15.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

UNIT

95th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
37th Hq & Hq Co (Mil Govt)
29th Hq & Hq Co (Mil Govt)
2d Bkry Plq (Prov)
BLT 1/26

BLT 2/26

1st Bn, 13th Marines
2d Bn, 13th Marines
3d Bn, 13th Marines

4th Bn, 13th Marines
5th MT Bn
5th Reccon Co
5th Plq Bn
33d Mar Dep Co
34th Mar Dep Co
8th Mar Ammo Co
3d Plq Bomb Disps Co, H&S Bns V.C

CP LOCATION

SASEBO Fortress Arty Bn Hq (77.3-15.3)
SASEBO Naval Base
SASEBO Naval Base
Dock, SASEBO Naval Base
Moved to (78.4-17.1) 2½ miles N of SASEBO Naval Base
Moved to (78.6-11.7) SASEBO Ammunition Storage Area
Moved to (82.5-12.8) KARITE
Moved to (82.5-12.8) KARITE
Moved to (80.8-10.9) SASEBO Aircraft Factory
Moved to (80.8-10.9) SASEBO Aircraft Factory
(75.3-13.2) 500 Yds N of SASEBO Naval Basin
Naval Training Station (70.8-13.9)
(78.6-12.9) Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base
(78.6-12.9) Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base
(78.6-12.9) Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base
(78.6-12.9) Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base
(78.6-12.9) Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base
VH-6B
116th NC Bn
2d Mar Div

DIV Arty
2d Tank Bn

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
MC, G-3.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 18001 25 September 1945.
To : 18001 26 September 1945.

SECRET

No. 32.

Map: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 3.

2. Weather and Visibility:

(a) SASEBO:

Initially clear changing to low overcast as day progressed, with decreased visibility and drizzling rain. Surface winds northeast to east, Force, 15 knots. Smooth sea.

(b) MAKISHIKI:

Cloudy, with intermittent showers. Light surface winds generally northerly. Smooth sea.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) V Amphibious Corps continued execution of assigned mission. Corps shipping now completely unloaded except two AF's from LINGAYEN. The Commanding General and CTF 55 issued instructions to the Commander, SASEBO Naval District regarding utilization of ships for repatriation of Japanese from outlying islands and KOREA. The feasibility of utilizing FUKUoka harbor for the entrance of ships in this mission was discussed and the Japanese Commander was instructed to furnish further reports on the condition of FUKUoka harbor. The problem of maintaining Japanese vessels engaged in repatriation tasks was discussed and solved, CTF 55 concurring.

(b) 5th Marine Division continued occupation and reconnaissance of SASEBO and military installations in vicinity. Reconnaissance elements reached KAWATANA. At 10001 Division was 100% unloaded.

SECRET

-1-

1046
DECERT

(c) 2d Marine Division continued unloading and reconnaissance of enemy air and harbor defenses in NAGASAKI and vicinity. RCT 8 and VMO-2 bivouacked at ISAHAYA, and 2d Tank Battalion at FUKABORI.

(d) 32d Infantry Division, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

26 September 1945.

DAILY LOCATION STATEMENT

Map: ______ KYUSHU 1:25,000.

UNIT

A Co, 2d Sep Engr Bn
B Co, 2d Sep Engr Bn
C Co, 2d Sep Engr Bn
546th Engr Ponton Bridge Co
188th Engr (C) Bn

CP LOCATION

(76.7-9.3) 1 mile N of Sasebo Naval Air Station
(80.5-11.6) Sasebo Aircraft Factory
(80.8-11.8) Sasebo Aircraft Factory
(79.1-8.3) Sasebo Naval Air Station
(79.0-8.2) Sasebo Naval Air Station
Moved to FUKABORI

ISAHAYA

NAGASAKI

ISAHAYA

Correct line No. 3 of Daily Location Statement No. 1, dated 24 September 1945, to read as follows:

LFASCU #4

SEPSCO Naval Air Station (79.2-8.2)

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACorS, G - 3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
ComPhibGrp 4
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32d InfDiv
CG 8th Serv Regt
CG Corps Troops

Each General & Special Staff Section.

SECRET

1048
SECRET

No. 38.

Map: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 4.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. SASEBO
      Low overcast with intermittent rain and reduced visibility. Surface winds, easterly; force, 5-10 knots. Smooth sea.
   b. NAGASAKI:
      Steady light rain, with visibility limited. Surface winds, easterly; force, 4-8 knots. Calm sea.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned mission in zone of responsibility. An advance party composed of staff representatives of this Headquarters and of the 5th Marine Division departed via rail to FUKUOKA at 0500I. At 1000I, Shore Brigade CP closed at (77.5-12.5) and opened at (77.08-13.35). Observation aircraft in SASEBO area were grounded at 1005I by weather, and no further air operations were reported during the period.
   b. 5th Marine Division conducted further reconnaissance and patrol activity, executing engineer road-reconnaissance throughout zone. Btry "B", 18th Marines occupied KAWATANA, at 1400, Division CP closed at SASEBO Fortress Artillery Bn Hq (77.3-15.3) and opened at AIMOURA Naval Training Station (71.5-14.3).
   c. 2d Marine Division continued occupation of assigned areas, collection and storage of enemy matériel, and survey of enemy installations.
   d. 32d Infantry Division, no change.

4. Casualties:
   None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
AGF, G-3 (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army  CG 2dMarDiv  CG 32dInfDiv  CG FUKUOKA Force
CG FMF Fac  CG 5thMarDiv  ComPhibGp 4  CG MAB OMURA
OTF 55  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit  Each General Staff Sec

S
d1945T
DAILY LOCATION STATEMENT

27 September 1945

No. 4.

UNIT

Prov Med Gp
Corps Evac.Hosp #1
Hq, Shore Brigade

Shore Party Com Unit

Army Section VAC
Prov Combat Engr Gp
Hq, 3d MP Br (Prov)
B Co, 3d MP Br (Prov)
6th MarDiv

6th Med Bn

B Btry, 13th Marines
A Co, 3d MP Br (Prov)
C Co, 3d MP Br (Prov)
D Co, 3d MP Br (Prov)
5th Support Gp

5th Amph Trk Co
BMT 2/27

2d MP Co
20 Mar.WarDogsPlt
2d Engr Bn
2d Fltn Bn
2d Sig Co
2d MT Bn
2d Med Bn
2d Serv Bn
4th San Lndy Plt
7th Flt, 4th Salv Co
2d ASCO
43d MC bn

CP LOCATION

SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)
SASEBO W Dock Area (75.8-11.8)
Moved to (77.05-15.35) SASEBO Naval Base
Moved to (77.05-15.35) SASEBO Naval Base
SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)
SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)
SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)
Moved to AINOURA Naval Training Station (71.3-14.3)
AINOURA Naval Training Station (71.3-14.3)
Moved to KAGATAMA (1292.6-1101.1)
SASEBO Fortress Artty Br Hq (77.3-15.3)
SASEBO Fortress Artty Br Hq (77.3-15.3)
SASEBO Fortress Artty Br Hq (77.3-15.3)
Moved to AINOURA Naval Training Station (71.3-14.3)
SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.8-10.5)
Moved to AINOURA Naval Training Station (71.3-14.3)

1½ miles W of RUPPONMATSU (94.3-82.2)
1½ miles W of RUPPONMATSU (94.6-62.1)
1½ miles W of RUPPONMATSU (94.7-62.2)
1½ miles W of RUPPONMATSU (94.8-61.8)
2 miles SW of RUPPONMATSU (94.2-61.0)
2 miles SW of RUPPONMATSU (94.2-61.0)
3½ miles W of KOROGITSU (98.1-59.7)
3½ miles W of KOROGITSU (98.1-59.7)
FUKABORI (91.3-55.4)
10 miles NE of KOSEDO (92.9-61.3)
Daily Location Statement No. 4.  
(Continued).

SECRET.

Delete line No. 14 (9th Air Flot Plt Serv Gnm) of Daily Location Statement No. 2, dated 25 September 1945.

J. L. STEWART,  
LtCol., USMC.;  
ACDS, G-3.  
(Acting)

RESTRICTION:  
CG SINTT Army  
ComHqs 4  
CG 2d marDiv  
CG 32d InfDiv  
CG FMF Pac  
CG 5th marDiv  
Each Corps & Special Troop Unit  
Each General & Special Staff Section
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS.
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

S-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1300 I 27 September 1945,
To: 1300 I 28 September 1945.

No. 34

Map: No change

1. Location of Troops:
See Location Statement No. 5.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. S.S.P.0
      Clear and warm, visibility unlimited. Surface winds, Easterly, force, 5-7 knots. Sea, smooth.
   b. U.G.S.K.I
      Clear and warm, visibility approximately 15 miles. Surface winds, variable, force 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. Amphibious Corps at 1400I issued warning orders for movement by sea to U.G.S.K.I by Co "D", 3d BF 3n, 24th Marine Depot Co, and 2d Pltt, Bomb Disposal Co. Eight Japanese ships (1 L.S, 6 Coastal Patrol Craft, and 1 S.S.P.O) authorized to proceed to sea via FUNOKA on route to TSU-SHIMA to evacuate enemy military personnel. CTF 55 issued instructions to Commander Naval Station, S.S.P.0, preliminary to directing clearance of FUNOKA harbor by Japanese minecraft.
      At 1525I, CP of New Japan Jap opened at (75.4-12.24). LSM-4 reported complete establishment ashore and readiness to direct support air missions as requested.
   b. 5th Marine Division executed further reconnaissance and patrols.
      On a Group reconnoitered generally Eastward of O'BA Air Base.
      B-25 and P.B.2, dispatched to Naval Training Station, AMOURA. B-25 dispatched an OY airplane to survey approaches to FUNOKA. Roads to that area reported by ground reconnaissance detachments to be very poor but passable.
   c. 2d Marine Division investigated enemy radio installations at FUNOKA and ISHIMA, and conducted further patrolling and reconnaissance at 0610. Transit 12 and 2d Marine Division LST's were completely unloaded. 3656th Y Truck Co and 1283rd Bnt(6) Sn completely unloaded except heavy lifts from the LST.
   d. 32d Infantry Division no change.

- 1 -
SECRET

1052
4. Casualties: None.

L. S. Stewart
LtCol, USMC,
AGCS, G-3 (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FUMOKA Force
CG FIP Pac
CG 5thMarDiv
ComPhibOp 4
CG MAR CNURs
CIF 55
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section

SECRET
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>Hq, 93d Met CIC Unit</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)</td>
<td>VaC CF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq, 94th Met CIC Unit</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)</td>
<td>VaC CF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq, 95th Met CIC Unit</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)</td>
<td>VaC CF</td>
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<td>404th CIC A252 Det (Area)</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)</td>
<td>VaC CF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>468th CIC B3 Det (Combat)</td>
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<td>VaC CF</td>
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<td>Navtech Jap</td>
<td>SASEBO Dock Area (76.4-12.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5201st Eng Cons Brig</td>
<td>FUKUoka - near ITAZUKA Airfield</td>
<td>Adv CF</td>
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<td>1st Sep AI Flat</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.2-14.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Sep AI Flat</td>
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<td>173d Fin Disbursing Det</td>
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<td>4th Censorship Adv Det</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<td>BLT 2/36</td>
<td>AIMOURA Naval Training Station (71.3-14.3)</td>
<td>New CF</td>
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<td>AIMOURA Naval Training Station (71.3-14.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>406th CIC B3 Det (Combat)</td>
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<td>AIMOURA Naval Training Station (71.3-14.3)</td>
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<td>6th Mar Var Dog Flat</td>
<td>AIMOURA Naval Training Station (71.3-14.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Sep Loy Flat</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Air Station (94.6-62.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>64th CIC A252 Det (Area)</td>
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<td>Each Corps and Special Troop</td>
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<td>CG F.M Fac</td>
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<td>CTF 33</td>
<td>CG 32d InfDiv</td>
<td>Each General and Special Staff Section</td>
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SECRET

498th CIC B3 Det (Combat)  NAJASAKI (94.6-62.3)

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACorps, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:
G-3 OPERATION REPORT

From: 1300I 26 September 1945.
To: 1300I 29 September 1945.

No. 35

Map: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 6.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. SASEBO
      Hazy and humid, visibility 3-5 miles. Surface winds, Southernly; force 2-4 knots. Sea, smooth.
   b. HAGASAYI
      Clear and warm, visibility approximately 15 miles. Surface winds, Southernly; force 6-8 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. 7th Amphibious Corps executed assigned missions. Marine Air Base established at OURA with three VMF Squadrons and forward Norden elements. Field can if necessary accommodate 500 aircraft. At 2100I, 26 September, telephonic communications were opened with HAGASAYI; radio link service established with FUKUOKA. Co D, 3d OP 3n, 24th Marine Depot Co, and 2d Plt, Bomb Disposal Co, sailed from Green Beach 1, SASEBO, for HAGASAYI, arriving at 1700I.

   b. 5th Marine Division conducted further patrol and reconnaissance missions. Division engineer, service, and motor transport battalions displaced to permanent billets in HINOURI area.

   c. 2d Marine Division continued organization and occupation of billeting areas, as well as collection of enemy arms and ammunition in segregated dumps.

   d. 32d Infantry Division no change.

4. Casualties:
   None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
AOC Office, G-3 (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army
CG 2dMarDiv
CG FJMT Pac
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FUKUOKA Force
CG 5thMarDiv
COMPHIBOP 4
CG MAR CORVA
CTF 55
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section
**HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.**

**30 September 1945.**

**SECRET**

**LOCATION STATEMENT**

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<td>Armed Forces Rad Sta WVT0</td>
<td>CIURA</td>
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<td>VAC CP</td>
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<td>6th Sep Ldry Plat</td>
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<td>Hq &amp; Hq Det 693d QM Bn</td>
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<td>5th Engr Bn</td>
<td>AINOURA Naval Training Station</td>
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<td>5th MT Bn</td>
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<td>D Co, 3d MP BN (Prov)</td>
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**DISTRIBUTION:**

- CG SIXTH Army
- CG FMP Pac
- CTF 55
- CG 5thMarDiv
- CG 24MarDiv
- CG 32d InfDiv

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General and Special Staff Section

---

J. L. STEWART, LtCol, USAAC (Acting)
0117/215
Ser. 003273

HEADQUARTERS, V. AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

S B O T T

O-3 OPERATION REPORT
From: 16301 29 September 1945,
To: 18301 30 September 1945.

No. 35

Map: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 7.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. NASAKO
      Grey overcast and humid, with intermittent rain. Surface winds,
      negligible. Sea, flat calm.
   b. NASAKO
      Cloudy and overcast with light showers. Surface winds, negligible.
      Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. Amphibious Corps continued in execution of missions assigned at 16301,
      initiated seizure of SAKAI and FUKUOKA branches of Bank
      of Japan. Leading elements of FUKUOKA Occupation Force cleared
      SAKAI by rail at 06301; by road at 08301; last elements arrived
      FUKUOKA at 17301. CC, FUKUOKA Occupation Force opened his CP
      in Eastern part of that place at 14451. CCs, 2d and 5th Marine
      Divisions, were directed to investigate the feasibility of storing
      brochblocks of demilitarized fixed weapons in separated areas
      under guard.
   b. 5th Marine Division conducted further patrols and posted guards in
      assigned areas. 5th AD and 5th Plat. Co B, 12th MT BN, were
      attached to FUKUOKA Occupation Force. 4th BN, 13th Marines com-
      pleted movement to bivouac at 0635-1130.
   c. 2d Marine Division at 13301 dispatched by rail an advance party
      to KUBUOTO for initial reconnaissance prior to the occupation of
      that place and of OYIWA. Road, and air reconnaissance of routes to
      KUBUOTO were undertaken at 10001 by elements of the division
      Reconnaissance Company and by OY airplane. Air reconnaissance
      indicates that field east of KUBUOTO can accommodate aircraft up to
      R4D types and that road will accommodate 2½ ton trucks between
      ISHIKAWA and KUBUOTO.
   d. 32d Infantry Division, no change.
SECRET

4. Casualties:

None.

[Signature]

J. L. Stewart,
LtCol., USMC
A CoS, G-3, (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:
00 SIXTH Army
00 2d Armd Div
00 32d Inf Div
00 FUKUOKA Force
00 FIFTH PAC
00 5th Armd Div
00 ComPhibCom 4
00 1st MAR
00 55th CTG
00 55th CTG
00 G-2
00 G-3
00 S2

[Signature]
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<td>(78.5-12.3)</td>
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<td>FUKUOKA - near ITAZUKE airfield</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq 7th HC Regt</td>
<td>Adv CP ½ mile NW of SASEBO Hq</td>
<td>(78.7-9.3)</td>
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<td>98th NC Bn</td>
<td>½ mile NW of SASEBO Hq</td>
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<td>Prov Combat Engr Cp</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Sep Engr Bn (less Cos B &amp; C)</td>
<td>½ mile N of SASEBO Hq</td>
<td>(78.7-9.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co B 2d Sep Engr Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Aircraft Factory</td>
<td>(60.8-12.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co C 2d Sep Engr Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Hq (78.7-9.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1668th Engr (C) Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Hq (79.2-9.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>546th Engr Pon Bridge Co</td>
<td>SASEBO Hq (79.2-8.3)</td>
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LOCATION STATEMENT NO. 7. 

SECRET

MCR 3288t, Engr Tech Int
En (C)
Sig En, VAC
1st Sco, AI Plat
5th Sco, Al Plat
Co C, 50th Sig Ens En
Prov MT dp
10th MI En (Prov)
20th Engr En (Prov)
(less Cos A, B & C)
Hq Det, Prov Med Gp
3rd En, VAC
Corps Vac Hosp #1

Corps Vac Hosp #3
Hq & Hq Det 10th Med En
122d 9th Med
Hq, Prov Mill Govt Gp
32d Hq & Hq Det Mill Govt Gp
Hq & Hq Co, 37th Mill Govt Gp

5th MarDiv

RCT 26, (less BLT 1/26 & 2/26
BLT 1/26
BLT 2/26
RCT 27, (less Co. C
Co C, 27th Inf
RCT 28

13th Inf, (less 1st & 2d Ens)

- 3 -

REMARKS

SAEBO Naval Base (76, 7-14-0)
SAEBO Naval Base (77, 2-14-0)
SAEBO Naval Base (77, 8-14-0)
SAEBO Naval Base (77, 2-14-0)
SAEBO Naval Base (77, 5-14-1) VAC CF
SAEBO Naval Base (77, 8-14-0)
SAEBO NAS (60, 55-11-20)
SAEBO Naval Base (77, 5-14-1) VAC CF
SAEBO Naval Hospital (76, 4-14-0)
& mile S of SAEBO Dry Docks
(76, 4-11-0)
KANKEY Naval Hospital
(1811, 5-10788)
SAEBO Naval Base (77, 5-14-1) VAC CF
& mile S of SAEBO Dry Docks Nav CF
(75, 4-11-0)
SAEBO Naval Base (77, 5-14-1) VAC CF
SAEBO Naval Base (77, 5-14-1) VAC CP
FUKUKO
Moved
This date

USNR Naval Training Station
(71, 5-14-3)
FUKUKO (64, 6-9-0)
8 miles N of SAEBO Naval Base
(76, 1-17-1)
SAEBO Ammunition Storage Area
(78, 6-11-7)
USNR Naval Training Station
(71, 5-14-3)
O USA (1500, 1-10558)
USNR Naval Training Station
(71, 4-14-4)
SAEBO Aircraft Factory
(80, 8-10-0)
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<tr>
<th>Location Statement No. 7. (Continued)</th>
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<td>496th CSH 53 Det (Combat)</td>
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<td>94th Hq Cty Det Hq Govt Gp</td>
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<td>95th Hq Cty Det Hq Govt Gp</td>
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<td>RCT 2</td>
<td>2 Side of HAGASAKI Harbor (94.1-58.7)</td>
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<td>ACT 6</td>
<td>W Side of HAGASAKI Harbor (58.30-82.59)</td>
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<td>2d ENG BN</td>
<td>2 miles W of RUPPOH ATSU (94.2-61.0)</td>
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<td>2d MT BN</td>
<td>3/4 miles S of KOROGEISHI (95.1-59.7)</td>
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<td>2 miles S of RUPPOH ATSU (95.1-31.0)</td>
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<td>2d MED BN</td>
<td>1 1/2 miles W of RUPPOH ATSU (95.0-61.9)</td>
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<td>2d ACR BN</td>
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<td>2d RECON CO</td>
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<td>2d MP CO</td>
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<td>FUKASAH (90.4-60.0)</td>
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<td>3 miles SW of RUP. OGA ATSU (95.7-61.5)</td>
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<td>2d RCT</td>
<td>1 1/2 miles NE of KOSAKO (92.0-61.1)</td>
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<td>2d AFG CO</td>
<td>HAGASAKI (92.6-58.3)</td>
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<td>38InfDiv (less ELT 1/27)</td>
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<td>ELT 1/27</td>
<td>KAPOYA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**
J. L. Stewart, LtCol., USMC, S-5, Acting

**PARTICIPANTS:**
- CG 38th Arm Div
- CG 5th Arm Div
- CG 2nd Arm Div
- CG 38th Inf Div

Each Corps and Special Troop
Unit
Each General and Special Staff Section.
G-3 OPERATION REPORT

From: 1300I 30 September 1945,
To : 1300I 1 October 1945.

No. 37

Map: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 3.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. SASEBO
      Initially overcast and hazy, with steady rain, which lifted as the period ended. Surface winds, northwesterly; force, 8-12 knots.
      Sea, smooth, with medium swells.

   b. NAKASAI
      Low overcast at 1,000 feet, visibility 6-8 miles, except 1-2 miles in rain. Surface wind, South, shifting to North; force 20-25 knots.
      Moderate swells.

   c. FUKUOKA
      Cloudy, slight precipitation with limited visibility. Surface winds, northwesterly; force, 4-5 knots. Light swells.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps at 0730I requested CTF 55 for an early decision as to availability of FUKUOKA harbor for transfer and support of units for FUKUOKA-SASEBO area, in view of impossibility of effecting such operations overland from SASEBO. At 1030I, warning orders were issued to 5th Marine Division to initiate organization of SASEBO Occupation Group consisting of one rifle company (reinforced) with certain Corps attachments prepared to proceed to that place via FUKUOKA by 4 October. At 1214I, FUKUOKA Occupation Force was directed to seize Bank of CHOSUN branches at 1001 and FUKUOKA as directed by 6th Army KI972. At 1300I, one telephone-trunk opened for service between this Headquarters and Headquarters, FUKUOKA Occupation Force. All Corps units were directed to report any known instance of surrendered equipment or dumps not properly safeguarded. 5th Marine Division at 1500I was granted authority to shift civilian supplies of dynamite in the AMOURA area to military munition dumps for increased security against sabotage. At 1700I, a liaison party of Corps staff-representatives departed from KAG, AMOURA, for KAGOUA, arriving at 1750I.
b. 5th Marine Division reinforced 61st Unit, Occupation Group with one rifle platoon from 27th Marines, and continued patrolling and inventory of enemy material and supplies in zone of responsibility.

c. 2d Marine Division continued reconnaissance of OMTA and TAUOTO areas by elements of the 6th Marines. By nightfall, 30 September, 1st plat, division reconnaissance company, had reached TURUI; the 2d Plat, SAD. Road-net from ISANURA to SHIUKARA is reported not suitable for military use, nor is the SHIUKARA-ISUMI ferry. TURUI beaches are not considered practicable for LCI's and LST's. Further reconnaissance is being conducted.

5. Shinka. Occupation Force CP established at West Park (46.9-60.4). Patrols were dispatched to KAM1 Naval Air Station and to other airfields in vicinity. At 1430I, last remaining elements of Force arrived at SHIUKARA; last motor-convoy, at 1600I. At 1530I, a patrol cleared SHIUKARA for LCI to seize beach of Bank of SHIUKARA at that pl. At 1730I, seizure was executed without incident. Seizure of all banks in SHIUKARA-KOJU-SHOKAW area has now been accomplished as directed by higher authority.

3d. 32d Infantry Division, no chance.

4. Casualties:

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
SOGs, 6-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army CG 2dMarDiv CG 32dInfDiv CG FUKUIKA Force
CG I.F.Pac CG 5thMarDiv CG 1st BN, 127th Inf. 20 4th OUI
CLP. 55 10th Corps and Special Troop Unit Tech General Staff Section

SHORT
0137/162
Ser. 002362
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBICUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

1 October 1945.

No. 8.

LOCATION STATEMENT

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>HAIKI (85.1-9.9)</td>
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Arrived 30 Sept

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACorS, G-3,
(Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
CTF 55
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32d InfDiv
Each Corps and Special
Troop Unit
Each General and Special
Staff Section.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

3-3 OPERATION REPORT

From: 1800I, 1 October 1945.
To: 1800I, 2 October 1945.

No. 38

Map: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 9.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. SaHEBO:

      Overcast with occasional showers. Surface winds, southerly; force 8-12 knots, with 20-25 knot gusts. Sea, choppy.

   b. AMABILI:

      Overcast at 1300 feet, visibility 8 miles. Light to medium rains during forenoon, with heavy squalls during afternoon. Surface winds southeasterly; force, 10-15 knots, with gusts up to 24 knots. Sea, choppy.

   c. FUKUOKA:

      Cloudy with intermittent rain. Surface winds, southerly; force, 5-10 knots. Sea, choppy.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility, assuming control of VMCJA Occupation Forces as of 1 October. 2d Separate Engineer En was detached from support of 5th Marine Division as of 1800I, 2 October; 479th GIC Detachment and 55d GIC Area Detachment were deleted from Corps troop list. SHIMONOSEKI advance billeting and sanitary party cleared SAHEBO at 0800I, arriving FUKUOKA at 1720I.

SECRET

1069
b. 5th Marine Division reconnaissance company landed without incident on HIRADO ISLAND at 1330I. Warning order alerted 9CT 88 for movement to FUKUOKA commencing 5 October. Patrolling in zone of responsibility, and inventory of enemy material and supplies continues.

c. 2d Marine Division reconnaissance detachment returning by road from OMURA and KUMamoto to ISAHAYA. Collection and segregation of enemy arms continues, together with further movement of supplies to billeting areas and dumps.

d. FUKUOKA Occupation Force established communication with Force advance communication center, SHIMONOSEKI, at 1700I. 5th Fighter Command advance party arrived FUKUOKA to make preliminary survey of air facilities in that area. 5LT 1/28 patrolled FUKUOKA-ASHIYA area.

e. 32d Infantry Division, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

V. W. WEINGINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGof3, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army CG 2dMarDiv CG 32dInfDiv CG FUKUOKA Force
CG FMF Pac CG 3dMarDiv CG 1stInf Div CG, 1stSN, 127th Inf CG MAB OMURA
CTF, 55 Each Corps and Special Troop Unit Each General Staff Section

SECRET

-2-
SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

2 October 1945.

No. 9

UNIT

FUKUOKA Occupation Force

CP LOCATION

FUKUOKA (46.9-68.4)

REMARKS

Arrived 30 Sept 1945.

Other units – no change.

Correct the date on Location Statement No. 8 to read 29 September 1945.

W. W. Weinberger,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

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<th>CC 5TH ARMY</th>
<th>CG FLF Pac</th>
<th>CG 32nd Inf Div</th>
<th>CG FUKUOKA Occupation Force</th>
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<td>5thInfDiv</td>
<td>5thInfDiv</td>
<td>32ndInfDiv</td>
<td>CC Ground Force FANCY</td>
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<td>Each Corps and Special Troop Unit</td>
<td>Each Gen &amp; Spec Staff Sec</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1500Z, 2 October 1945.
To: 1500Z, 3 October 1945.

No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 10.

2. Weather and Visibility:

(a) SNAPE:

Low overcast with intermittent rain and falling temperature. Surface winds, southerly, shifting W and of force to northerly; force, 3-15 knots.

(b) NAGASAKI:

Intermittent light rain, with low overcast becoming scattered to broken and visibility increasing to 8 miles. Surface winds, northerly; force, 10-15 knots. Sea, light to choppy.

(c) FUJICHA:

Heavy overcast with heavy rains throughout period. Surface winds, northerly; force, 8-10 knots. Sea, choppy.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) V Amphibious Corps continued assigned mission in zone of responsibility. At 1500Z, effective as of 0800Z, 4 October, boundary between 2d and 5th Marine Divisions was changed in NAGASAKI by statute to conform to that shown in Annex EASY to the Operation Plan 4-45, and 2d Marine Division was directed to prepare to relieve 5th Marine Division elements at C.T.A. at the same time. At 1500Z, 5th Marine Division was directed to dispatch the 8th Marines (Reinforced) (less DtoS) by rail and road to

-1-
FUJUKUKA commencing 5 October, reporting upon arrival for operational control to GG, FUJUKUKA Occupation Force. Co "C", 60th Signal Construction Co; and 1st Flat, Bomb Disposal Co, H&Es, VAC were directed to proceed by rail and road to FUJUKUKA, commencing at 0700, 3 October, likewise reporting upon arrival to GG, FUJUKUKA Occupation Force for operational control; these units arrived by 1400I. Detachment of 552D M. Service Co proceeded by rail to FUJUKUKA reporting at 1427I to GG, FUJUKUKA Occupation Force for billets and local control. At 1550I, warning orders were issued to the 2d Marine Division, directing that the 8th Marines (Reinf) prepare to displace to KUKAOKO-OLUTA area commencing on 5 October. In view of the major health menace presented by bacillary dysentery cases in NAGASAKI area, 5th Fighter Command was requested to make three B-24 airplanes rigged for DDT spraying available to this Corps at HAB, OLURA. Controlled items of enemy material as enumerated in GG, KUKAOKO Army 0221001 were directed to be placed under guard by all units of this Corps. Detailed instructions were issued to the 5th Marine Division relative to the procedure for receipt and storage of ordnance material from demilitarized enemy shipping now in the OLUTA VAN, to be landed commencing on 5 October. At 1400I, 3d Flat, Bomb Disposal Co, H&Es, VAC reverted to control of 8th Service Regiment, and, at 1600I, Bomb Disposal Co, H&Es, VAC, less 1st and 2d flats, reverted from 8th Service Regiment to H&Es, VAC.

(b) 5th Marine Division zone of responsibility was at 0900I extended to include all of SAGA prefecture, as well as the city of KURUMA and approaches. Preparations were initiated to assist movement of the SHIMO-OSEKI Occupation Group on 4 October. Patrolling on HIRADO Island continued.

(c) 2d Marine Division reconnaissance elements returned from OLUTA and KUKAOKO at 2200I. 6th Marines (Reinf) initiated preparations for displacement to KUKAOKO.

(d) FUJUKUKA Occupation Force dispatched SHIMO-OSEKI advance billeting and sanitary party at 0345 by rail; party arrived at 0930. ADVANCE party proceeded and
117/147
C0a4e8

SECRET

returned to FUKUOKA by motor. Initial survey and
reconnaissance of ASHIYA airfield were completed.
Civil police guards were instructed to be posted
at ITAZUKI airfield. Landing areas practicable for
LST's and LST's were reconnoitered and selected in
the GANNOBU area.

(e) 32d Infantry Division, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. TENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army    CG 5thMarDiv    CO 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG FIP Pac       CG 32dInfDiv    Each Corps and Special Troop
CTF 55           CG FOF           Unit
CG 2dMarDiv      CG IAB OHSA     Each General Staff Section
0137/147  HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
Ser.008373 IN THE FIELD,  

3 October 1945.  

SECRET  LOCATION STATEMENT  
No. 10  

UNIT  CP LOCATION  REMARKS  

Co C, 2d Engr En  ISAHAYA (1016.7-1075.5)  
Hq & Hq Co, 5201st Engr  FUKUOKA (40.9-74.5)  
Cons Engr  Arrived  
3226th Tech Int Tm (C)  30 Sep 45  
SaSEBO Naval Base (77.3-14.1)  New CP  

Other units - no change.  

W. W. WEISINGER,  
Colonel, USMC,  
ACofS, G-3.  

DISTRIBUTION:  

CG SIXTH Army  CG 5thMarDiv  Each Corps and Special  
CG FMF Fac  CG 2dMarDiv  Troop Unit  
CIF 55  CG 32dInfDiv  Each Gen & Spec Staff Sec  
CG FOF  CO NAS CHURA  CO Ground Force KANOL 

SECRET  

1075
0117/218
Ser. 0051B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

SECRET

From: 1800I, 3 October, 1945
To: 1800I, 4 October, 1945.

No: 40

Map: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 11.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. SASEBO:

Intermittent rain with diminishing overcast, visibility 5-12 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly; force, 5-15 knots. Sea, calm.

b. NATASS:

Intermittent light rain during forenoon, afternoon hazy, becoming clear at end of period. Surface winds, northeasterly; force, 5-15 knots. Sea, light.

c. FUKUoka:

Cloudy and overcast, but no rain. Surface winds, northerly; force, 6-8 knots. Sea, choppy.

3. Our Operation for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions. At 2330I issued warning order to 2d Marine Division to prepare to release one infantry regiment (Reinf) to F.F. Peo for garrison duty on PELELIU; 6th Marines has been tentatively designated. At 1845I, 9th FUKUOKA Occupation Force was directed to inform the Governor of KYUSHU that occupation forces would enter O UTA and KUMAMOTO on 5 and 6 October. At 1845I, 37th Military Govt Hq and Hq Co was directed to proceed by rail to FUKUOKA on 4 October; reporting for operational control and later assignment to YAMAGUCHI prefecture when directed by CO, FUKUOKA Occupation Force. Party arrived and reported at 1132I. One reinforced company, 28th Marines, proceeded by rail from SASEBO to SAGURUSHI via FUKUOKA, passing at 1110I to operational control, FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

- 1 -

SECRET

1078
017/213
Ser. 00053B

G-3 Operations Report No. 40. (Continued)

SECRET

b. 5th Marine Division, upon change of boundary between division, at
C9001, initiated movement of former OYUWA Group (relieved by elements
of 2d Marine Division) to SASEBO. Patrolling and surveillance
continued throughout zone of responsibility.

c. 2d Marine Division conducted a motorized patrol of K.-SHIMA Island
(99.6-70.8) without incident. CP of 3d Bn, 10th Marines, opened in
OYUWA (CO. 74-04.4), at 1130I, the battalion having relieved elements
of 5th Marine Division remaining in 2d Marine Division's new zone of
responsibility. Further patrolling and reconnaissance continued.

d. FUKUOKA Occupation Force assumed operational control of the
SHIMOUZEKI Occupation Group at 1100I, and dispatched it to that
place by rail at 1130I. The group arrived without incident at 1350I.
FUKUOKA Occupation Force has radio communication with SHIMOUZEKI,
and, at 1600I, established wire communication with AOJI. Further
patrolling was undertaken along roads between FUKUOKA and ASHIYA.

e. 32d Infantry Division advance party arrived at FUKUOKA by rail at 1130I,
with elements following by road at 1430I. On 3 October, the following
airship arrived at LINCOTT. For the division: APA's SWYRE,
CASTLETON, CRUSADER, BOMBE, SHORE, KOPEL, and WHEELER; AKA's
AMPHIBUS, KIRK, AURELI, SAGITA, SAPPHO and WHITELAND. Loading
was immediately initiated.

4. Casualties:
None.

W. V. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
CofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIKIHA Army
CG FIF Pac
MFR 55
CG 2dMarDiv

CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FOE
CG 1st Bn 127th Inf

3d Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

4 October 1945.

No. 11.

LOCATION STATEMENT

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>New CP</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979th Engr Repro Det (Avn)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (40.9-74.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Gp</td>
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<td>Adv CP</td>
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<td>1541st Engr Base Surv Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (40.9-74.5)</td>
<td>Adv CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1112th Engr Cons Gp</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Units – No change.

W. W. WENSINGER, Colonel, USMC, ACofs, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

- CG SIXTY Army
- CG P'T Pac
- CTF 55
- CG FCF
- CG 6thMarDiv
- CG 2dMarDiv
- CG 32dInfDiv
- CC Ground Force WANA

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each Gen & Spec Staff Sec
CC Ground Force WANA
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

SECRET

From: 1800I, 4 October, 1945.
To : 1800I, 5 October, 1945.

No. 41

Maps: KYUSHU, 1:25,000.
KYUSHU, 1:500,000, 2d edition, AFPA C 2.
KAGOSHIMA, 1:1,000,000, Sheet 1267-1, from AHS series 5301,
EASTERN ASIA.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 12.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. SASAKI:

Partial cloud-cover at 1500-2000 feet, visibility over
8 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly; force, 8-15 knots.

b. KAGASAKI:

Scattered clouds at 1500 feet, visibility 8-12 miles,
Surface winds, northeasterly; force 15-25 knots, de-
creasing to 8-15 knots. Sea, light.

c. FUKUOKA:

Fair, with partial cloud cover, good visibility, and
variable light surface winds. Sea, moderate.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions. At
1945I, informed 5th Marine Division that present trans-
portation priorities indicate that BLT 2/27 cannot move
intact by rail to SAGA on 8 October, as previously
scheduled; one company can be lifted on 8 October, and
balance of the BLT can follow on 9 October. The
division was instructed to modify its plan accordingly.
At 2200I, Co B (less 3d Plat), 12th Motor Transport
En, Atchd, 2d Plat, Auto Repair Co, 12th Motor Transport
En, was directed to commence movement by rail and road
to FUKUOKA on 5 October, reporting on arrival for opera-
tional control to CG, FUKUOKA Occupation Force. At 1800I,
leading elements of this unit cleared SASABO, arriving FUKUoka at 1730I.

b. 5th Marine Division Reconnaissance Company returned from HINODE SHILOH at 0300I. RCT 28 commenced movement by rail to FUKUoka in three serials, leaving respectively at 0700I, 1000I, and 1300I. Division continued patrolling and surveillance of enemy installations.

c. 2d Marine Division despatched Co B, 8th Marines, to CHUTA, clearing HAGASAKI by rail at 0757I, and had arrived at the end of the period. 10th Marines patrolled from SAGAMI to FUKUDA (61-90) without incident, and RCT 2 patrolled south from TAMASHI. At 0800I, forward echelon of the 8th Marines (Reinf) cleared by rail for KUMOOTO.

d. FUKUoka Occupation Force established telephonic communication with SHIJOSEKI Occupation Group at 1845I. SHIJOSEKI Occupation Group posted guards over public buildings in that city, reconnoitered HOKSHU-KYUSU tunnels, and posted guards at ODZUKI airfield, 6 miles east of SHIJOSEKI. Strip is 5400 feet long and 240 feet wide, with suitable access roads, and is the only adequate strip for CV aircraft in the area. Three serials of RCT 28 arrived by rail at KASHII Station, FUKUoka at 1130I, 1430I, and 1715I, respectively. RCT 28 CP opened in East Park, FUKUoka (45.9 - 68.4) at 1330I. At 1330I, BLT 1/28 CP closed at former location and opened at KYUSU Airplane School (46.9 - 71.0), at same time.

e. KANSAI Occupation Force liaison officer reported this Headquarters at 0900I.

f. 32d Infantry Division continued loading.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGOFs, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FIFTH PAC
CTF 55
CG 2d MarDiv
CG 5th MarDiv
CG 32d Inf Div
CG FCF
CG LAB CHUTA

CG 1st Bn 127th Inf
Each Corps & Spec Troop Unit
Each Gen Staff Section

1080
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

5 October 1945.

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 12

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
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| 38th Mar Dep Co  
Co K, 28th Marines (Reinf)  
Hq & Hq Co 37th Mil Govt Gp  
Mil Govt Det, VAC  
Mil Govt Det, VAC  
Co C, 27th Marines | HAWAII  
SHIHONOSEKI  
FUKUOKA  
SAGA  
OITA  
AINOURA Nav Trng Sta (71.4-14.6)  
FUKUOKA, East Park  
CHURA (1300.74-1084.40)  
FUKUOKA, East Park (49.5-73.5) | Correction  
Ar 4 Oct  
Ar 4 Oct  
Ar 5 Oct  
Ar 5 Oct  
Ar 4 Oct  
Ar 5 Oct  |

RGT 28  
3d Bn, 10th Marines  
32dInfDiv

American Mil Govt Unit #1  
25th Port Surg Hosp  
Co A, 873d Engr Avn Bn  
101st Bomb Disp Squad  
623d QM Tnd Sec

KANOKA  
KANOKA  
KANOKA  
KANOKA  
KANOKA

Other units - no change.

W. W. WEECHINGER,  
Colonel, USMC,  
ACEFS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  
CG FIF Pac  
CTF 55  
CG FOF  
CG 5thInfDiv  
CG 2dMarDiv  
CG 32dInfDiv  
CG IAB CHURA

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit  
Each Gen & Spec Staff Sec  
CO Ground Force KANOKA

SECRET 1081
REPORT

6-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 5 October 1945.
To: 1800I, 6 October 1945.

No. 42.

SUBJECT: To change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 17.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Fair and warm, visibility unlimited. Surface winds, northerly; force, 0-12 knots. See light.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Scattered clouds at 2500 feet, visibility, 5-7 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly; force, 3-10 knots. See calm.

c. Southern KYUSHU:

Fair and warm, visibility, 6-10 miles. Surface winds, variable and moderate.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions. At 2130I, permission was granted to Vice Admiral Suzuki to send a liaison officer in coast-defense ship, SUMURI, to Japanese forces at GOI in order to arrange transportation for their repatriation; Vice Admiral Suzuki's request to land approximately 700 demobilized personnel from GOI at HAKOTE was likewise approved. At 0920I, a Far Eastern Air Forces liaison party reported to this Headquarters by dispatch from HOKUSHI, where party remains for the time being, due to inability to land 750 aircraft at 0930. Elements of 1902d Aviation Evac 3n, 209th Ordnance 3d, and 122d Station Hospital arrived at 0830 this date in the USS PALLIO (APA 31), and will be held here until ordered forward to FUTU at some future date. The following units were deleted from the Corps troop list as of 1600I, 5 October: 96 Strv, V-2
Arty; V.C. 6; 339th Engr Cons Bn; 1332d Engr General Service Rgt; 874th Aviation Engr Bn; 573d Engr Dump Truck Co; 1532d Engr Dump Truck Co; 1505th Engr Water Supply Co; 626th Engr Light Equipment Co; 312th Engr Service Det (Fire-fighting); 3162d Engr Fire-Fighting Plt. At 0900, Co B, 12th Inter Transport Bn, with attached elements of Auto Repair Co, 12th Inter Transport Bn, cleared SASEBO by rail for FUKUOKA.

b. 5th Marine Division continued surveillance over occupied areas in zone of responsibility. At 1000, on VAC order, released 33d Marine Depot Co to operational control of 5th Service Rgt. Advance billeting and reconnaissance party from ZLT 2/27 cleared SASEBO by road for SAGA at 0730.

c. 2d Marine Division dispatched boarding and search parties to six Japanese merchant ships anchored in outer harbor between FUKUOKA and NAGASAKI. The 800-foot OY airstrip now under construction at NAGASHI (93-66) is approximately 50% completed, and is expected to be commissioned in about five days. 6th Marines (Reinf) continued preparation for displace to WAKIJU. The advance billeting and sanitary party of the 6th Marines (Reinf) arrived without incident at WAKIJU at 1230, 5 October. CP of Co B, 8th Marines (Reinf) opened in O.K.U.A at 0500A (5010-0545). 10th Marines patrolled to KUCHIKONOSU (27-45) without incident.

d. 32d Infantry Division continued loading.

e. FUKUOKA Occupation Force dispatched Co I, 26th Marines, by road to KAWA, at 1230; company arrived without incident at 1430, at which time CO, SHIBUSAKI Occupation Group, assumed operational control. The airfield approximately 10 miles southeast of KAWA is called SOMI field, and is approximately 5,000 feet long and 150 feet wide, with concrete runway at present partially inundated. Daily air-courier service by OY aircraft was initiated between FUKUOKA and SHIBUSAKI at 1300. RCT 26 completed displacement to FUKUOKA in three serials, arriving at KAWA Station at 1130, 1615, and 1715 respectively; only certain cargo remains in SASEBO, to follow by rail on 7 October. Co C, 5th Medical Bn, deployed from FUKUOKA to KAWA to establish hospital facilities at that place. An advance billeting and sanitary party from 188th Engr Cons Bn arrived at FUKUOKA by rail at 1655.
0117/216  
Ser. 000633  
G-3 Operations Report Number 42.  
(Continued).

SITUATION

f. KAMO Occupation Force, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  
CG FIF Pac  
CG 55  
CG 2d arDiv  
CG 5th ParDiv  
CG 32d InfDiv  
CG FCF  
CG 1123 CHUR

CG 1st BN 127th Inf  
Each Corps A Spec Troop Unit  
Each Gen Staff Section
HEADQUARTERS, V MICHIHIDOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

6 October 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

It is

OF LOCATION

KSCOSHEM

KILLINAK

KIMIKO

KSBISO Naval Base

(75.40, 12.84)

FUKUOKA (49.74, 74.0)

NCT

OMTA

OTHER UNITS - NO CHANGE.

J. W. MURPHY,

Colonel, USMC,

MCOS, 3-5.

REORIG RANK:

CG SEIZKI Army
CG 5thInfDiv

CG 5thMarDiv

CG 5thMarDiv

CG 5thMarDiv

CG LT

CG LT
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1600I, 6 October, 1945.
To: 1600I, 7 October, 1945.

SECRET

No. 43

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No. 14.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   (a) Northern KYUSHU:

      Cloudy and overcast, visibility, 5 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly; force, 2 knots. Sea, calm.

   (b) Central KYUSHU:

      Overcast with warm, heavy haze gradually lifting toward end of period. Surface winds, northerly; force, 8-12 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   (a) V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Pursuant to instructions contained in SIXTH Army dispatch KK 10406, directed continued search by all units for valuable items and funds as specified. All units were directed to eliminate all hazardous training, consistent with current missions. FUKUOKA Occupation Force was directed to impound some 4,000 bags of Japanese outgoing overseas mail at KYUT, SHIMONOSEKI and FUKUOKA, and hold same for screening as directed by instructions from SIXTH Army.

   (b) 5th Marine Division dispatched 1st Bn, 13th Marines, to KAWATANA by road; at 1600I Bn CP opened at (92.9-01,6). At 1400I, the advance party of BLT 2/27 at SAGA sent a 40-man patrol to TOSU (50.8-40.05) to quell a reported outbreak of disorder and looting by
Chinese POW's. Upon arrival, local civil chief of police reported that Chinese "looting" had consisted of purchasing clothing without Japanese ration-board credentials. No other evidences of disturbance were found, and Chinese had already left.

(c) 2nd Marine Division dispatched advance elements of BLT 2/8 and 3/8 by rail from ISAHAYA to KUROIOTO at 0650I; party arrived without incident at 1230I. CP of BLT 2/8 opened in KUROIOTO at (60,25-70,40) in the former Military Academy. Co B, 8th Marines (Reinf.), assumed control of Chinese POW camps at OIYUTA. 8th Marines (Reinf.) relieved U. S. POW recovery teams 22, 24, 33 and 39 at OIYUTA.

(d) 32nd Infantry Division continued loading. Delayed reports indicate that CP of RCT 126 opened afloat in USS FOXTROT (APA 165) at 1550I, 5 October and that CP of RCT 127 opened afloat in USS GRAFTON (APA 109) at 1200I, 6 October; both CP's closed ashore at the same times.

(e) FUKUOKA Occupation Force established guards over Chinese POW camps at IIZUKA (70,4-70,4) with elements of RCT 28. At 0800I, control of BLT 1/28 reverted to RCT 28. SHIMOMORI and KJUT Occupation Groups continued surveillance and guarding of public buildings and intelligence targets in their areas. SOME airfield, 10 miles Southeast of KJUT, can definitely accommodate aircraft to include R4D types.

(f) KANOKU Occupation Group: No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACOF, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army CG 2dMarDiv CG FOF Da Corps & Spec Trp Unit
CG FIF Pac CG 5thMarDiv CO IAB OIYUTA Da Gen Staff Section
CTF 55 CG 324InfDiv CO 1st Bn 127th Inf
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

7 October 1945

No. 14.

LOCATION STATEMENT

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>Hq Corps Troops</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.2-13.9)</td>
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<td>H&amp;F Bn Corps Troops</td>
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<td>Hq 94th Mct CIC Unit</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (45.8-35.9)</td>
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<td>464th CIC A2BE Det (Area)</td>
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<td>Co A, 873d Engr Avn Bn</td>
<td>KANCYA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Bomb Disp Squad</td>
<td>KANCYA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>623d ORM Rnd Ssn</td>
<td>KANCYA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Det, 329th Ord En</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKUCKA Occupation Force</td>
<td>East Park, FUKUCKA (46.9-68.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIMONOSEKI Occupation Group</td>
<td>SHIMONOSEKI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 5thMarDiv  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CG FMP Pac  CG 2dMarDiv  Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
CTF 55  CG 32dInfDiv  CO KANCYA Occupation Force
CG FOF  CO 114TH OMURA
G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 7 October 1945.
To : 1800I, 8 October 1945.

No. 44

Maps: No change.
Enclosure: (A) Location Map, major troop-units, VAC.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No. 15 and Enclosure (A).

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Complete overcast with continuous light rain. Visibility
      1 mile. Surface winds, variable; force, 1-2 knots. Sea,
      calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Thick haze with intermittent rain, visibility 3-6 miles.
      Surface winds, easterly; force, 3-6 knots. Sea, calm.

   c. Southern KYUSHU:

      Hazy with intermittent rain. Surface winds, westerly;
      force, 1-3 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of
      responsibility. At 1812I directed 26 Marine Division to
      designate the necessary reinforcing elements for attach-
      ment to 6th Marines (Reinf), and to be prepared to initiate
      movement or that regiment on short notice. At 0800I, CG,
      FUKUoka Occupation Force was ordered to check Korean small
      craft carrying refugees into SHIMONOSEKI and HAKATA for
      contraband in possession of returning Japanese, and to im-
      pound any such materials discovered.
b. 5th Marine Division reported at 0810I that breachblocks of all fixed defenses in the division zone of responsibility had been collected and stored under guard in regimental dumps. At 1200I, Btry A, 13th Marines, displaced to OGUSHI, and opened CP at (35.8-01.2). At 1350I, Co F 27th Marines (Reinf), arrived by rail at SAGA.

c. 2d Marine Division continued surveillance of enemy installations. The following patrols were conducted without incident by the 2d Marines (Reinf): from NOROSHI-HAMA (36.15-35.10) to MOJI; vicinity of KOTONOC-YAMA (36.50-37.50); NAGASAKI to HIYAZURI (39.30-55.25).

d. 32d Infantry Division continued loading.

e. FUKUOKA Occupation Force established guards over two more Chinese PC camps at IIZUKA, as well as over impounded mail in post offices at FUKUOKA, SHIKONOEKI and MOJI.

f. KALOYA Occupation Force conducted a meeting with Chief of Staff of 57th Japanese Army relative to present status and future plans for demobilization of Japanese troops in that area. Patrolling and assigned missions continued.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH ARMY
CG FNM Pac
CTF 55 (less Enc (A))
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FO
GC MAB OKURA
CG 1st Bn 127th Inf
Each Corps & Spec Troop Unit (less Enc(A))
Each Gen Staff Section (less Enc(A))
0157/118  
Ser.00879B  
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

8 October 1945

SECRET

No. 15  
LOCATION STATEMENT

Map: ______ KYUSHU 1:25,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 13th Marines</td>
<td>KAWATANA (92.9-1.6)</td>
<td>Ar 7Oct45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Btry, 13th Marines</td>
<td>OGUSHI (1288.8-1101.2)</td>
<td>Ar 8Oct45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Co, 27th Marines</td>
<td>SAGA</td>
<td>Ar 8Oct45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C, 5th Med Bn</td>
<td>HAKATA SS (41.2-74.8)</td>
<td>Ar 7Oct45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. L. STEWART,  
LtCol., USMC,  
ACorS, G-3 (Acting)

---

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  
CG FFMF Pac    
CTF 55         
CG FOF         

CG 5thMarDiv  
CG 2dMarDiv    
CG 32dInfDiv   
CC MAB OKURA   

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit  
Each Gen & Spec Staff Section  
CC KANoya Occupation Force  

---

SECRET  
1097
0117/147  
Ser.003823  

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
IN THE FIELD,  

G-3 Operations Report  

From: 1800 I, 8 October, 1945,  
To: 1800 I, 9 October, 1945.  

SECRET  
No. 45  

Maps: No change.  

1. Location of Troops:  

See Location Statement No. 16.  

2. Weather and Visibility:  

(a) Northern KYUSHU:  

Heavy overcast with continuous rain at end of period, visibility, 1 mile. Surface winds, force, 10-15 knots. Sea, choppy.  

(b) Central KYUSHU:  


(c) Southern KYUSHU:  

Rain and fog, with rising winds, visibility 1 mile or less. Surface winds, 25-30 knots, with gusts in excess of 45 knots.  

3. Our Operations for the Period:  

(a) V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. At 2320 I, relayed instructions to 2d Marine Division that YAI'HURA MARU previously detained at NAHF SAKI has now been cleared for sailing by CTF 55. Investigation of TSU SHIMA and IKI SHIMA, SOTO RITTO and OSUNI RITTO is being held in abeyance pending clearance of ports by U.S. Naval authorities for entrance.  

(b) 5th Marine Division conducted active patrolling and reconnaissance in the SAGA area. 2d Bn, 27th Marines (Reinf) completed displacement by rail to SAGA; rear elements closed at 18Q21. Bn CP located north of town at (36-26).
(c) 2d Marine Division dispatched the balance of 1st and 3d Bns and Wpns Co, 8th Marines (Reinf), from ISAHAYA by rail to KUMAMOTO at 0800I; arriving at 1259I. Remaining vehicles of 3d Bn, 8th Marines (Reinf), cleared ISAHAYA by road at 2330I, and arrival had not been reported by end of period. 10th Marines conducted patrols to OBOA (KOJIMA) (29.5-62.0); KUCHINOTSU (38-46), and ARIE (39-54), without incident.

(d) 32d Infantry Division delayed reports indicate that division CP opened afloat in USS WESTMORELAND (APA 104) at 1615I, 6 October, and closed ashore same time. As of 1200I, 8 October, division was 100% loaded.

(e) FUKUOKA Occupation Force dispatched an additional platoon of 1st Bn, 28th Marines (Reinf), to assist in guarding the total of 10 Chinese POW camps now under guard in the IIZUKA area. SHIKONOSEKI Occupation Group initiated investigation of expedients for crossing Straits of SHIKONOSEKI by ferry, barge, or landing craft. Advance party of the 1409th Engr Base Depot arrived at FUKUOKA at 1800I, and reported for operational control to CG, 6201st Engr Cons Brig.

(f) KANOA Occupation Force initiated preparations and secured unit areas for typhoon predicted to pass over Southeast KYUSHU during night of 9-10 October.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WESNER
Colonel, USMC,
AdjCS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 5thMarDiv  CO 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG FMF Pac     CG 32dInfDiv  Ea Corps & Spec Trp Unit
CTF 55         CG FOF      Ea Gen Staff Section
CG 2dMarDiv    CO HAB OKURA

1099
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

9 October 1945.

SECRET

No. 16

LOCATION STATEMENT

Map ______ KYUSHU 1:25,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OF LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Director w/Comm Unit</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
<td>CUB 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat Pool</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
<td>CUB 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrison Beach Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
<td>CUB 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Spec MC Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base</td>
<td>CUB 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 2/27</td>
<td>SAGA (1336-1128)</td>
<td>Ar 9Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doc., BLT 1/28</td>
<td>HIZUKA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Mar Var Dog Plat</td>
<td>HAGASAKI (94.5-62.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Sep Ldry Flat</td>
<td>HAGASAKI (94.5-62.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Flat, 4th Salv Rep Co</td>
<td>HAGASAKI (94.1-61.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Amph Trk Co</td>
<td>ISAHAYA Airfield (13.3-75.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 3/8</td>
<td>KUMAMOTO</td>
<td>Ar 9Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements BLT 1/8</td>
<td>KUMAMOTO</td>
<td>Ar 9Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Units - No change.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DESTRUCTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 5th MarDiv  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CG FIFTH FUC  CG 2d MarDiv   Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
CG FD         CG 32d InfDiv  CC KANOKA Occupation Force
CG NUC        CG 11th CNUSA  

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 9 October 1945.
To: 1800I, 10 October 1945.

No. 46.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 17.

2. Weather and Visibility:

(a) Northern KYUSHU:

Heavy overcast with continued rain, visibility 0.5-1 mile. Surface winds, 10-14 knots from varying directions. Sea, rough and choppy.

(b) Central KYUSHU:

Heavy overcast with continuous heavy rain, visibility less than a mile. Surface winds, easterly; force, 40-45 knots, with 60 knot gusts. Sea, rough and heavy. Typhoon conditions prevail.

(c) Southern KYUSHU:

Continuous heavy rain with high winds, visibility zero. Surface winds, easterly; force, 50-60 knots, with gusts of considerably higher velocity. Typhoon passed through area.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Issued Operation Order Number 45-46, "Extension of Occupation Operations in Vicinity of Area of Responsibility".

(b) 5th Marine Division issued warning order to 5th Tank Bn to be prepared to despatch one reinforced company (less tanks) by rail to CITA on 14 October. SAGA Occupation Group sent a patrol by road to KURUMI, at 0730I.
0117/11C
Ser. 038938 Operations Report No. 46 (Cont'd).

SECRET

(o) 2d Marine Division patrolling and surveillance restricted by typhoon conditions.

(d) 32d Infantry Division delayed report indicates that division sailed in Transport 22 from LINGAYEN at 10001, 8 October.

(e) FUKUOKA Occupation Force posted guards over one more Chinese POW camp, in vicinity of UMI. SHIMONOSEKI-KOJI Occupation Group conducted patrols to northeast of SHIMONOSEKI, and investigated Hitagi zinc smelters and powder mills. Only means for surface crossing of SHIMONOSEKI Straits is ferry, which can carry not more than four jeeps, and requires 20 minutes per trip. The remainder of 3d Bn, 28th Marines (Reinf), cleared FUKUOKA for KOJI by road and rail, respectively, at 07151 and 09001, arriving similarly at 10001 and 12451. The advance party from the 893d Depot QM En arrived at FUKUOKA by rail at 15451.

(f) KANNOY Occupation Force weathered in by passage of typhoon.

4. Casualties:
None.

W. W. WESINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 5thMarDiv  CO 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG FIF Pac  CG 32dInfDiv  CO Corps & Spec Trp Unit
CTF 55  CG FOF  EA Gen Staff Section
CG 2dMarDiv  CO NA 611 URA
O137/162  HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
Ser.00887B  IN THE FIELD.
SECRET  10 October 1945.
No. 17.  LOCATION STATEMENT
Map ______ KYUSHU 1:25,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1409th Engr Base Dep Cpt</td>
<td>FUKUOKA, HAKATA SS (1341.0-1175.0)</td>
<td>Ar 9 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688th Engr (C) Bn</td>
<td>FUKUOKA, HAKATA SS (1341.0-1175.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th R/May Cons Tm</td>
<td>FUKUOKA, KASHII Station (49.5-73.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 3/28 (less Co K)</td>
<td>HOJI</td>
<td>Ar 10 Oct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Units - No Change.

DISTRIBUTION:

- CG SIXTH Army
- CG FMF Pac
- CTF 55
- CG FOF
- CG 5thMarDiv
- CG 2dMarDiv
- CG 32dInfDiv
- CG KAB CHURA
- Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
- Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
- CO KANoya Occupation Force

W. W. WEISINGER,
Colonel, USHC,
AGofS, G - 3.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 18001, 10 October 1945,
To: 18001, 11 October 1945.

SILENT
No. 47

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 13.

2. Weather and Visibility:

(a) Northern KYUSHU:

Overcast with heavy intermittent rain, visibility, 2 miles. Surface winds, variable; force, 15-20 knots.
Sea, choppy.

(b) Central KYUSHU:

Overcast with intermittent rain and drizzle, visibility 3-4 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly; force, decreasing to 10 knots with departure of typhoon. Sea, choppy.

(c) Southern KYUSHU:

Clear with scattered clouds. Surface winds, northwesterly; force, 9-13 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) V Amphibious Corps continued assigned mission in zone of responsibility. At 06101, all subordinate units having cognizance of Japanese airfields were directed to permit Japanese mechanics to service Japanese aircraft under direction of U.S. Technical Air Intelligence Units.

(b) 5th Marine Division dispatched one platoon from the 26th Marines (Reinf) to K-HATSU by road at 18001. Saga Occupation Group's patrol to KURUMI returned without incident at 19001.
(c) 2d Marine Division at 0700I assumed command of VAC Military Government Detachment, KUMAMOTO X.M., and at that time attached it to 8th Marines (Reinf). 2d Marines (Reinf) patrolled to SATO (70-85) and HOKO (1291-1040) without incident; 10th Marines patrolled to CHIISA (1328-1068) without incident. Two 21 airplanes landed on Atomic Field, NAGASAKI, at 1440I; field is not yet suitable for opening.

(d) 32d Infantry Division now enroute to target in Trans-Ron 22, except for elements at LINGAUX in LST's.

(e) FUKUOKA Occupation Force continued patrolling and surveillance of Japanese installations. SHIKOKU FUKUOKA Occupation Group dispatched one platoon of 3d Bn, 28th Marines (Reinf) at 1250I by rail to NIHARUGUCHI. At 2000I, Hq and Hq Det, 209th Ordnance Bn arrived by road at FUKUOKA, and reported to CO FUKUOKA Occupation Group for operational control at 0800I.

(f) KANOKA Occupation Force, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACOF, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army     CG 5thMarDiv     CO 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG FIJ Pac        CG 22dInflDiv   EA Corps & Spec Trp Unit
CTF 55            CG FOF           EA Gen Staff Section
CG 2dMarDiv       CO 1AB ONURA

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

No. 16.

LOCATION STATEMENT

Map __________ KYUSHU 1:25,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Det, 693d QM Bn</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>(Adv Party) Ar 10 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>362d ML Serv Co (less deta)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>Ar 10 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Det, 289th Ord Bn</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>Ar 11 Oct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Units — No change.

V. V. WENSINGER, Colonel, USMC, ACoF'S, G - 3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army        CG 5thMarDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CG FIF Pac           CG 2dMarDiv Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
CTF 55               CG 32dInfDiv CO KANOKA Occupation Force
CG FOF               CG 13B CNURA
G-5 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 11 October, 1945
To: 1800I, 12 October, 1945.

No. 46.
Maps: No Change.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. Location Statement No. 19.
   b. Weather and Visibility:
      a. Northern KUSU:
         Fair, broken clouds, visibility, 10-15 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 10 knots. Sea, calm.
      b. Central KUSU:
         Clear and colder, with partial cloud-cover, visibility, 5-12 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 4-8 knots. Sea, calm.
      c. Southern KUSU:
         Clear and colder, 3,000-foot broken ceiling, visibility, 6-30 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 12 knots.

2. For Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility.
   b. 5th Marine Division advance party cleared SAKA for GITA by rail at 0600I. Road-reconnaissance party between SAKA and GITA was last reported at TONEI at 1700I. Division issued Operation Order 58-45, "Extension of Occupation Operations."
   c. 5th Marine Division patrols (2d Marine (Reinf)) covered peninsula south of YAUSA, and examined town of HAGANA. 5th Marines (Reinf) completed displacement to KUSU area; regimental CP opened at that place at 1800I, and closed at old location at same time. 10th Marines patrolled to U. ZEN (1539-1035), OBAMA (KOHA A) (1539-1031), ARIZ (1439-1035), KUCHIKATSU (1427-1045), KAGUSA (1439-1049), KUSO A.M. (1525-1055), FUTATSU (1539-1079).
2. 52d Infantry Division, no change.

e. FUKUOKA Occupation Force posted guards over KASUGA Aircraft Manufacturing Company and KASUGE Weapons Factory.

Representatives of 3d Bn, 28th Marines (Reinf.), inspected harbor defenses and antiaircraft ships at IJN.

KAGOSHIMA detachment arrived on 11 October at 1100; CP opened at Itochun Hotel, UDA VILLAGE. On 11 October, at 1300, advance party of Garrison Beach Bn No. 1 arrived at FUKUOKA by road.

f. KANOYA Occupation Force delayed reports indicate that recent typhoon caused no major damage.

4. Casualties:

Tons.

W. W. USEH, C.M.
Colonel, USMC,
AGOFB, 2-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 11th A. Corp CG 6th InfDiv CG 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG P.T. Rec CG 32d InfDiv En Corps & Spec Tro Unit
CTF 55 CG FCT En Gen Staff Section
CG A.F.A. Div CG TAB CHURA

ACORE F

1108
SECRET

LOCATIONS STATEMENT

No. 19

Area—KYUSHU 1:25,000

Unit

Mar Det. YAGAGUCHI
Garrison Beach Bn

HCT-6

CP Location

YAGAGUCHI
FUKUOKA
KUMAMOTO

Remarks

Ar 11 Oct
Adv Party
Ar 12 Oct
Opened 12 Oct

Other Units - No change.

w. w. mcsinger
Colonel, USBM;
AGF 8, 08-8.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army CG 3rd ArmDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CG FIFTH Far CG 2nd ArmDiv Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
CG 35th CG 32ndInfDiv CO NANCY Occupation Force
CG FOF CO 191 U.S.A
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 12 October 1945,
To: 1800I, 13 October 1945.

No. 49

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No. 20.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Clear and cool, visibility, 15-20 miles. Surface
      winds, westerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Clear and warm, visibility 10-15 miles. Surface
      winds, northwesterly, 5 knots. Sea, calm.

   c. Southern KYUSHU:

      Ceiling and visibility unlimited. Surface winds,
      north-northwesterly, 10-13 knots.

3. Current Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone
      of responsibility, CF, 5th Fighter Command, Army Air
      Forces, opened in the former Japanese Western Army
      Headquarters at FUKUOKA, (44.3-36.2) at 1801I. At
      1536I, general dispatch instructions were issued to
      59th Infantry Division relative to the unloading and
      movement plan for elements of that division upon
      arrival in the SaSEBO area. At 1300I, issued verbal
      warning orders to 5th Marine Division to provide and
      prepare one reinforced regiment for PALAU garrison
      duty.

   b. 5th Marine Division at 0800I released 8th Marine
      Ammunition Co to VaC. OITA Occupation Group cleared
      SaSEBO by rail at 0710I. At 1300I, road-reconnaissance
      party reached OITA; between OITA and HIDA
      (00.2-30.6), roads are very poor.
c. 2d Marine Division has initiated OY air-courier service out of atomic field, Nagasaki; that field is not yet open for routine operations. At 0200, an airborne inspection party cleared Nagasaki for reconnaissance and inspection of Kyochi, Kakeshim, and Miyazaki. 2d Marines (rein) patrolled east of Nagasaki to coast.

d. 32d Infantry Division delayed report indicates that LST's sailed from Lingayen on 12 October as scheduled. Otherwise, no change.

e. Fukuoka Occupation Force conducted further patrolling and surveillance in zone of responsibility. Elements of the 28th Marines (Rein) supervised unloading and processing of Japanese military personnel repatriated from Okinawa. 3076th Engr Dp Trk Co arrived Fukuoka by road at 2:00. Co D, 3d MP Bn, arrived Fukuoka by rail at 1415. Yamaguchi detachment reports Senkani temporarily inaccessible by road or rail due to damaged bridges and washouts; route reconnaissance continues. No suitable site near Fukuoka is known in the vicinity of Senkani.

f. Kansai Occupation Force staff representative visited this Headquarters. Otherwise, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

Distribution:

CG 31XJH Army
CG FMF Pac
CTF 55
CG 2dMarDiv
CO 6thMarDiv
32ndInfDiv
CG FCF
CG 1st En 127th Inf
CC 1st En 127th Inf
La Corps & Spec Trp Unit
La Gen Staff Section

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

No. 20.

LOCATION STATEMENT

13 October 1945.

Map _____ KYUSHU 1:25,000

UNIT CP LOCATION REMARKS

3076th Engr Bn Trk Co FUKUOKA Ar 12 Oct
1st Plat, Co K, 28th Kar
KARATSU (1602–1148) Ar 11 Oct
Co D, 56 MP Bn (Prov) FUKUOKA Ar 15 Oct

Other Units – No change.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGofS, G - 5.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army CG 5thMarDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CG FIF Pac CG 2ndMarDiv Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
CTF 55 CG 3rdMarDiv CO KAROYA Occupation Force
CG TOF CG LAB GLURA
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 50. From: 13001, 13 October 1945.

No change.

To: 15001, 14 October 1945.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 21.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and cool, visibility, 15-20 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 5-7 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Light haze during early morning, visibility increasing to 8-10 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly, 8-10 knots.

c. Southern KYUSHU:

Clear and cool, visibility, 8-15 miles, ceiling unlimited. Surface winds, westerly, 6 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. 26th Marines (Reinf.) designated for garrison duties at FELELIU, in accordance with SIXTH Army instructions.

b. 5th Marine Division supervised repatriation processing of Japanese personnel returning from KOREA via USAJASHI; unloading of these personnel commenced from 10 LST's at 0255I, and, at the end of the period, approximately 5,300 of the estimated total of 10,135 had debarked. 3 Japanese had died enroute, and 13 are suspected of having communicable diseases. No contraband was discovered. Delayed report indicates that at 1700I, 13 Corps OP of TIA Occupation Group opened at (852.8-123.3). Naval air base, OIWA, is reported to have two grass runways sited along prevailing wind lines, 4255 and 5300 feet long respectively; the first is suitable for twin-engined aircraft, the second for CV's only. Drainage is good. Routine patrolling continues.

-1-

SECRET

1113
c. 2nd Marine Division delayed report indicates that airborne inspection party arrived at KAMCYA at 1020I, 13 October. 10th Marines patrolled to SHIKABA and AKI to investigate facilities for ferrying troops and equipment to HONDO (1023-1323) on SHIKO-JIMA.

d. 32d Infantry Division elements in TransRon 22 arrived SaSEBO at 0900I, and commenced unloading at 1500I. At 1500I, CG and selected staff officers reported to CG, VAC for conference and detailed instructions. As of end of period, ALT 1/128 had commenced embarkation in trains for further displacement overland in 3 serials to FUKUOKA.

e. FUKUOKA Occupation Force continued routine patrolling and supervision of repatriation of returning Japanese military personnel. At 0700I, CO, YAMAGUCHI Detachment cleared that place for BZAKI; combined movement by rail, motor and foot is contemplated, in order to bypass washouts and damaged bridges. At AJOI, Japanese harbor officials were interviewed relative to arranging tug and barge services for 32d Infantry Division. Delayed reports indicate that telephonic communications were established between FUKUOKA and YAMAGUCHI at 1630I, 13 October.

f. KAMCYA Occupation Force, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENNINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AGF of G-3.

---

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH ARM SY
CG FMF Pac
CTF 55
CG 2ndMarDiv
CG 3rdMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG FCF
CC MAB Omura

CC 1st Bn 127th Inf
3a Corps & Spec Trp Unit
Ea Gen Staff Section

SECRET

1114
C137/162
09820

HEADQUARTERS, 5 AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

LOCATION STATEMENT.

14 October 1945.

No. 21.

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq V Amphibious Corps</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
<td>245° Per int.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq Corps Troops</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.2-13.9)</td>
<td>Near Zhon MAUI, T. H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>H&amp;3 Bn Corps Troops</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.2-13.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Section, VAC</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.8-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq 50th Set CIC Unit</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.8-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>404th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>466th CIC B3 Det (Combat)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<td>4th Censorship Adv Det</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<td>173rd Fin Disbursing Let</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<td>Mobile Explosives Investi-</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (75.40-12.84)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Sep Ldry Plat</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Skry Plat (prov)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq Co Shore Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig En Vac (1st &amp; 5th</td>
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<td>RI Flats atchd)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bomb Disp Co H&amp;3 En Vac</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Less 1st &amp; 2d Flats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d MP En (Prov) (Less Cos</td>
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<td>A, C &amp; D)</td>
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<td>Lanfor Air Supt Contl</td>
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<td>Unit #4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hedron MCo #1</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Serv Aegt (Rear)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>404° Per int.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24th Mar Dep Co</td>
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<td>Near Zhon MAUI, T. H.</td>
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<td>33d Mar Dep Co</td>
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<td>36th Mar Dep Co</td>
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<td>6th Mar Ammo Co</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10th Mar Ammo Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Salv Coil Co (Prov)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Fum &amp; Bath Co (Prov)</td>
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<tr>
<td>45th Mar Dep Co</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

-1-

DEC 1115
Location Statement Number 21.

(SECRET)

1st Skry Plat (Prov)
Det 737th Ry Operating
Bn
124th Fort Co
153d Fort Co
CU 18
FD w/Com Unit
Fleet Pools
1st Spec NC Bn
72d NC Bn
Hq & Hq Co 5201st Engr
Cons Brg
Hq & Hq Co 1112th Engr
Cons Gp
Hq & Hq Co 1177th Engr
Cons Gp
Hq & Hq Co 1409th Engr
Base Depot Gp
1541st Engr Base Surv
Co (less 1 Plat)
1902d Engr Avn Bn
1973th Engr Repro Det
(avn)
Hq 7th NC Regt
98th NC Bn
Prov Combat Engr Gp
2d Sep Engr Bn (less
Co B)
Co B, 2d Sep Engr Bn
546th Engr Fdn Bridge Co
3223th Engr Tech Int
Im (C)
Prov MT Gp
12th MT Bn (Prov) (less
Co B)
20th amph Trk Bn (Prov)
(less Cos A, B & C)
Co B, 20th amph Trk Bn
(Prov)

SASEBO NA (78.6-12.1)
SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
SASEBO NA (78.1-11.2)
SASEBO NB (78.3-11.7)
SASEBO NB (77.6-12.6)
SASEBO NB (77.6-12.6)
SASEBO NB (77.6-12.6)
GUAM
FUKUOKA HAKATA SS (41.0-75.0)
FUKUOKA (40.9-74.5) Adv CP
FUKUOKA (40.9-74.5) Adv CP
FUKUOKA HAKATA SS
(1841.0-1175.0)
FUKUOKA HAKATA SS (41.0-75.0)
SASEBO N.A.S. (79.0-3.9)
FUKUOKA HAKATA SS (41.0-75.0)
¾ mile NW of SASEBO N.A.S.
(73.7-9.3)
SASEBO N.A.S. (78.7-9.3)
12 Per in RearCh MAUI,
T. H.
SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
SASEBO N.A.S. (78.7-9.3)
SASEBO Aircraft Factory
(80.8-12.0)
SASEBO N.A.S. (79.2-8.3)
SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
SASEBO NB (76.5-13.8)
SASEBO N.A.S. (80.55-11.20)
GUAM

Deleted from
Troop List

(SECRET)
Location Statement Number 21. (Continued).

HQ Det Prov Med Gp Med En VAC
Corps Evac Hosp #1
Corps Evac Hosp #3
HQ & HQ Det 135th Med Bn Fl3d Sta Hosp
HQ Prov Mil Govt Gp

S2d: HQ & HQ Det Mil Govt Gp
Mil Govt Gp VAC
Mil Govt Gp VAC
M11 Govt Gp VAC
M11 Govt Gp VAC
5th Engr Div

ACT 26
BLT 1/26
BLT 2/26
BLT 3/26 (less det)
Det, BLT 3/26
ACT 27 (less BLT 2/27)
BLT 2/27
13th Marines (less 1st & 2d Bns)
1st Bn 13th Marines (less A Btry)
A Btry, 13th Marines
2d Bn 13th Marines
5th Engr Bn (less Cos A & C)

SAEBEC NB (77.3-14.1)
SAEBEC Naval Hosp (76.8-13.4) No RearEch
1/4 mile SW of SAEBEC Dry Docks (75.2-11.8)
No RearEch
ISAHAYA Naval Hosp (1311.5-1076.3)
No RearEch
SAEBEC NB (77.3-14.1) No RearEch
1/4 mile SW of SAEBEC Dry Docks (75.2-11.8)
No RearEch
SAEBEC NB (77.3-14.1)

SAGA
CITA
KAGOSHIMA
IYAZAKI
KUMAMOTO

Marine Camp CANCUNA (71.3-14.3)

HAIKI (85.1-9.9)
2 1/2 miles SW SAEBEC NB (73.15-17.35)
SAEBEC Ammo Storage Area (73.5-11.55)
ARIFUKU (83.9-9.9)
KARATSU (1302-1146) Marine Camp CANCUNA (71.4-14.4)
SAGA (1336-1126)

SAEBEC Aircraft Factory (80.7-10.95) Div Arty
KA ATAMA (92.9-01.6) Div Arty
OGUSHI (1282.8-1101.2) Div Arty
KARITATE (82.9-12.9) Div Arty

Marine Camp CANCUNA (70.9-13.9)

1361 per in RearEch HawII T.H. TBD 19Oct
Location Statement Number 21.

SECRET

Co A 5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn (less Cos A, B & C)

Co A 5th MT Bn
Co B 5th MT Bn
Co C 5th MT Bn
5th Serv Bn (less dets)

5th Pion Bn
5th Recon Co

5th MP Co
5th Sig Co

5th Tank Bn (less Co A)
5th Amph Trk Co (Prov)

Co C 20th Amph Trk Bn
(Prov)

VM0-5

6th Mar War Dog Plat

6th Sep Ldry Plat

116th NC Bn (less dets)

34th Mar Dep Co
Co A and 1st Flat Co C
3d MP Bn (Prov)
403d CIC A2B2 Det (Area)

94th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
95th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp

5th Med Bn (less Cos A, B & C)

Co A 5th Med Bn
Co B 5th Med Bn
3d Prov Rocket Det
406th CIC B3 Det (Combat)

HAIIKI (85.15-09.9)
Marine Camp AINOURA
(70.8-13.9)

HAWAII
SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3) Correction

HAWAII
Marine Camp AINOURA
(70.8-13.9)

SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)
Marine Camp AINOURA
(71.4-14.3)

SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)
Marine Camp AINOURA
(71.4-14.4)

SASEBO N.A.S. (79.1-08.9)
SASEBO Aircraft Factory
(80.5-11.2)

SASEBO Aircraft Factory
(80.5-11.1)
SASEBO N.A.S. (79.2-08.5)
Marine Camp AINOURA
(71.9-14.4)

Marine Camp AINOURA
(70.9-13.9)

SASEBO Aircraft Factory
(80.6-10.5)
SASEBO NB (78.5-11.7)

SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)
Marine Camp AINOURA
(71.3-14.4)

SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)
Marine Camp AINOURA
(71.3-14.3)

HAIIKI (85.1-09.9)

SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)

HAWAII

Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-14.4)
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

SECRET

Location Statement Number 21. (Continued).

Mar Det CITA (Co A 5th Tank Bn)
2d MarDiv

CITA (652.8-1123.8) Ar 13 Oct
NAGASAKI Customs House (94.5-62.2) No RearEch
NAGASAKI Harbor (94.1-58.7)
NAGASAKI Harbor (93.3-52.6)

RTC 2
RTC 8 (less Co B)
Co 3.8th Marines
10th Marines (less 3d Bn)
3d Bn 10th Marines
2d Engr Bn (less Co C)
Co C 2d Engr Bn
2d MT Bn

2d Serv Bn

2d Med Bn

2d Pion Bn

2d Recon Co
2d MP-Co

2d Tank Bn
2d AECO
2d Sig Co

2d Amph Trk Co
Co A 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)

VAC-2
2d Mar War Dog Plat
4th Sep Ldry Plat
43d MO Bn

2d Plt. Bomb Disp Co
428 Bn VAC

3d Plt 4th Salv Rep Co
54th CTC A2BB Det (Area)
498th CTC B3 Det (Combat)
33d HQ & HQ Det Mil Govt Gp
1298th Engr (C) Bn
3658th QA Trk Co

-5-

SECRET

1119
Location Statement Number 21.

SECRETS

Hq FOF
RCT 28 (less BLT 3/28)
Det BLT 1/28
Co C 5th Engr Bn (-)

Co C 5th Med Bn
3d Plt 5th Ord Co
3d Plt 5th Serv Co
3d Plt 5th Sup Co
Det 116th NC BN

5th ASCO (less dets)
168th Engr (C) BN
Hq & Hq Det 205th Ord BN
Co C 3d MP BN (Prov) (less
1st Plt)
Co D 3d MP BN (Prov)
Co B 12th MT BN (Prov)
(2d Plt Auto Rep Co
atcd)
1st Plt Bomb Disp Co
H& S BN VAC
Hq 94th Net CIC Unit

Hq & Hq Co 228th Mil Govt
Co (less dets)
Co C 60th Sig Cons Co
(6th R/Way Cons Tm atcd)

Garrison Beach BN #1
3076th Engr Dp Trk Co
Hq SHIMONOSEKI - MOJI
CC Co
3d BN 28th Mar (less
CC K and det)
Co K 23th Marines
3d Plt Co C 5th Engr BN
2d Plt Co C 3d MP BN
(Prov)
3d Plt Co B 12th MT BN
Hq 93d CIC Net Unit
37th Mil Govt Hq Co
(less dets)

East Park FUKUCKA (46.9-68.4)
East Park FUKUCKA (46.9-68.4)
IIZUKA
KYUSHU Airplane School FUKUCKA
(46.9-74.0)

HAKATA SS FUKUCKA (41.2-74.8)
KASHII Sta FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
KASHII Sta FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
KASHII Sta FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
KYUSHU Airplane School FUKUCKA
(46.9-74.0)

KASHII Sta FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
HAKATA SS FUKUCKA (41.0-75.0) No RearEch
FUKUCKA

KEMII-TAI FUKUCKA (45.2-66.4)
FUKUCKA

KASHII Sta FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
KASHII Sta FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
YAHAMOTO Hotel FUKUCKA
(45.8-65.9)

CHYODA Bldg FUKUCKA (45.4-36.8)

KASHII Sta FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)

FUKUCKA

FUKUCKA

MCJI

MCJI

MCJI

MCJI

MCJI

SHIMONOSEKI

SHIMONOSEKI

SHIMONOSEKI

-6-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location Statement Number 21. (Continued).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**SECRET**

Det 116th NC Bn  
SHIMONOSEKI

Mar Det YAMAGUCHI (Det BLT 3/26)  
Matsuyad Hotel YAMAGUCHI

Hq KANOYA COE For  
KANOYA

1st Bn 127th Inf  
KANOYA

25th Port Surgical Hosp  
KANOYA

Co A 873d Engr Avn Bn  
KANOYA

101st Bomb Disp Squad  
KANOYA

623d QM And Sec  
KANOYA

32d InfDiv (--)  
APA 104 (WESTMORELAND)  
Ar SASEBO 14  
Oct

32d InfDiv  
FUKUOKA (46.8-73.5)  
APA 166 (FOND DU LAC)  
Ar SASEBO 14  
Oct

RGT 126  
APA 109 (GRAFTON)  
Ar SASEBO 14  
Oct

RGT 127 (less BLT 1/127)  
APA 40 (CUSTER)  
Ar SASEBO 14  
Oct

---

**W. W. WENSINGER,**  
Colonel, USA,  
ACofS, G - 3.

**DISTRIBUTION:**

- CG SIXTH Army  
CG 5thMarDiv  
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit

- CG FMF Pac  
CG 2dMarDiv  
Each Gen & Spec Staff Section

- GTF 55  
CG 32dInfDiv  
CG KANOYA Occupation Force

- CG FOE  
CG MAB CHUKA

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SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No: 5Φ. From: 18001, 14 October, 1945.
To: 18001, 15 October, 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 22.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Light overcast, visibility, 10 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Clear and cool, visibility 8-10 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly, 12-14 knots. Sea, choppy.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. 5th Marine Division was directed to designate and alert reinforcing elements for attachment to 26th Marines (Reinf) prior to oversea movement to FEUDAL; 2d Marine Division was directed to alert 6th Marines (Reinf) for movement by water to SASEBO on short notice. At 11151, passed instructions to CO, CUB-19, to ensure compliance by all Naval armed-guard detachments present with directions contained in CINCAPAC ZK 4766 relative to jettisoning of ammunition from merchantmen. Directed the JUKICHU Occupation Force to detach a supervisory detachment to FEUDAL with artillery.

   b. 5th Marine Division alerted 26th Marines (Reinf) to be prepared to embark for oversea movement on short notice. At 20551, debarkation of Japanese repatriated soldiers was completed without incident; a total of 9,956 had been processed through, 23 hospitalized, and 3 died en-route. At 11161 reported to YAL0 that the harbor of KASHIMIZU (302-143) does not contain suitable areas for landing LST's or LSM's, though adjacent beaches in vicinity of KOSOKA will accommodate such craft after clearance of wrecked craft currently fouling approaches and shoreline.

- 1 -
O117/218
Ser. 099285 G-3 Operations Report No. 51 (Cont'd).

SECRET

o. 2d Marine Division conducted routine patrolling east of MAGASAKI to the coastline. 19th Marines patrolled to SHINASAKA and KOKIYODA (355-375).

d. 32d Infantry Division continued unloading at SASEBO. Division advance billeting party arrived by rail at AKUSA at 2200, and at SHIN NOMEKI at 0300. BLT 1/128 at 0800 commenced movement by road and rail to FORUCKA in three serials, the first of which arrived without incident at 1600.

e. FORUCKA Occupation Force posted guards over VAC radio relay-station at AKUSA-YAMA. 23d Marines (reinforcement) despatched a billeting-party to AKUSA at 0800; party arrived without incident at 0940. CO, YANAGUCHI Detachment returned from SENZAKI at 2245. Re reports such seaborne traffic shifted to SENZAKI as a result of our mines. SENZAKI has received some 110,000 repatriated Japanese since the end of the war, whereas approximately 20,000 Koreans are reported to have passed through SENZAKI enroute home. Overland transportation to that place remains extremely difficult, and port facilities are poor.

f. KAMAOKA Occupation Force, no change.

e. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WEAVER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACOF, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CC 5th ARMDIV
CC 32d InfDiv
CC FCE
CC 2d ARMDIV

CC 1st En 127th Inf
La Corps & Spec Tro Unit
La Gen Staff Section

SECRET

1123
0137/217  
Ser.00321B  
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.  

SECRET  

No. 22.  
LOCATION STATEMENT  

15 October 1945.  

Maj. Gen. S. B. Parham,  
G-3, Corps Staff  

Map:__KYUSHU 1:25,000  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>No Change.</td>
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</table>

DISTRIBUTION:  

| CG SIXTH Army | CG 5th ArmdDiv | Each Corps and Special Troop Unit  
|---------------|----------------|----------------------------------|
| CG FIF Acn    | CG 2nd ArmdDiv | Each Gen & Spec Staff Section  
| CG 55         | CG 32d InfDiv  | CG XXVII Occupation Force  
| CG POF        | CG 4th Arm Div |                              |

SECRET
G-3 Operations Report

No. 52

From: 1800I, 16 October, 1945.

To: 1800I, 16 October, 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of troops:

   See Location Statement No. 23.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Clear and cool, visibility, 15-20 miles. Surface winds, easterly, 3 knots. Sea calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Warm and clear, visibility, 8-10 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 2-4 knots. Sea, calm.

   c. Southern KYUSHU:

      Clear and warm, visibility, 10-12 miles. Surface winds, southwesterly, 3-4 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility, motor echelon of 127th Station Hospital proceeded in one serial to FUKUoka at 0200I; balance of organization alerted to proceed by rail on 15 October. 5th Fighter Command C/O opened at KAMOGE Weapons Factory, FUKUoka at (53.0-80.5). At 1945I, all VAC traffic between SHIMIZUKI and NGI was directed to proceed via railroad tunnels in view of present mine-conditions in straits.

   b. 5th Marine Division patrols reconnoitered CITTA and SEPPU (644-129). 13th Marines despatched four (4) patrols to area north of KAMOGE (318-1097).

SECRET
c. 2d Marine Division continued routine surveillance and patrolling. 2d Marines (Reinf) patrolled south of AGASHIKI to YAKIMIBAKI (55-42) and NOHO (55-42). 10th Marines patrolled to SHIBASAKA, KOBASHI (CBASA), and MOJEN. No incidents reported.

d. 32a Infantry Division continued unloading. At 2334I, railserials of Hq Co., AT Co., and 1st Bn, 128th Infantry (Reinf) closed in SHINONSHIKI; motor serials closed at KOJI at 0430I. CP of 128th Infantry (Reinf) in SHINONSHIKI at 1600I.

e. FUKUOKA Occupation Force at 1601I, 15 October, initiated investigation and active surveillance of all prisons in zone of responsibility in compliance with current SCAP policies. YAMAGUCHI Detachment billeted advance party of 128th Infantry (Reinf).

f. FUKUOKA Occupation Force, no change.

4. Casualties:
None.

W. W. WINSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 5th MarDiv  CG 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG PAC FAC  CG 32d InfDiv  LA Corps & Spec Troop Unit
CTF 56  CG FCF  LA Gen Staff Section
CG 2d MarDiv  CG MAC Chiefs

-2-

1126
HEADQUARTERS, 5 AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

16 October 1945.

No. 23.

LOCATION STATEMENT

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000

UNIT

1st Bn, 126th Inf
Other units - no change.

CP LOCATION

SHIKOKUSEKI

REMARKS

Ar 15 Oct

W. W. WENSSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
Adjutant, G-6.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FIFTH PAC
CG 53D InfDiv
CG PRC
CG 56 Div

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
GC MACUSA Occupation Force

SECRET
SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 53.

From: 18001, 16 October 1945.
To: 18001, 17 October 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 24.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and warm. Surface winds, northwesterly, 12-14 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Warm and clear, visibility, 8-10 miles. Surface winds, easterly, 5-10 knots. Sea, calm.

c. Southern KYUSHU:

Clear and warm, visibility, 8-10 miles. Surface winds, east to northwesterly, 7-9 knots.

3. Current Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. At 18001, 16 October, directed 2d and 5th Marine Divisions, and FUKUSHIMA and KYOTO Occupation Forces, to maintain all Chinese PO's in their present camps, using such military surveillance as necessary, pending arrangements for repatriation. At 13191, directed 2d Marine Division to cancel the ready status of 5th Marines (Reinf) for movement by water to SHIBA. At 14191, 5th Marine Division was directed to proceed with destruction (by Japanese, under U.S. supervision) of suicide and PT boats at OSHUHI.

b. 5th Marine Division continued routine patrolling and surveillance, SAGA Occupation Group despatched patrols to KANAZAKI and TOSU (16 miles NE of SAGA), and to FUKUOKA and SEITAMA (12 miles SE of SAGA). OITA Occupation Group patrolled to BOFU. All patrols were completed without incident.
c. 2d Marine Division initiated movement of elements of the division reconnaissance company to KUHAKOTO, leading section arriving by rail at 1430I. 2d Marines (Reinf) patrolled without incident to ONO and HAKUSAIKI (12 miles N of HAGASAKI). 10th Marines established an outpost detachment at SHIIMARU (30 miles E of HAGASAKI) and patrolled without incident to KOHAMA (19 miles E of HAGASAKI) and KUCHINOTSU (20 miles S by E of HAGASAKI).

d. 32d Infantry Division continued unloading. USS SHELBY (APA 195) and CUSTER (APA 49) are now completely unloaded. At end of period, elements of division headquarters and of 32d QM Co had commenced unloading, and at 1030I, 16 October, division opened an advance CP and message center in Military Government Building, SASEBO, 2d BN, Serv Co, and elements of regimental headquarters, 125th Infantry (Reinf), and Co C, 107th Med Bn, initiated movement from SASEBO to SHIMOKOSHIKI by rail in three serials, clearing respectively O800, 1200I, and 1600I. First serial arrived without incident at 1535I.

f. FUKUCKA Occupation Force continued processing and surveillance of prisoners throughout zone. Co B, 3d MP Bn, cleared FUKUCKA by rail at O800I, and arrived at SHIMOKOSHIKI at 1500I. Efforts are continuing to get detachment through, but heavy washouts still impede progress. At 2330I, 3d San Bn, 8th Marine Division, arrived at FUKUCKA by rail and were billeted in East Park area. Throughout the period, a considerable bottleneck of northbound motor transportation built up at MCJI, due to present necessity of routing vehicles through AMMN tunnels instead of across Straits of SHIMOKOSHIKI, which are still mined.

4. Casualties:

None.

V. J. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACOFJ, G-3.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

17 October 1945.

SECRET

No. 24.

LOCATION STATEMENT

Map RUSARI 1:25,000.

UNIT

CP LOCATION

REMARKS

325th APU (Type C)
32d Field Hosp
26th Evac Hosp
133d Sta Hosp
5th Army Med Lab
32d Med Base Dep Co
103rd Vet Med Inesp Co

SASEBO HB (77.3-14.1)
SASEBO
SASEBO
SASEBO
SASEBO
SASEBO

2 Enl only
* Afloat SASEBO Harbor
* Afloat SASEBO Harbor
* Afloat SASEBO Harbor
* Afloat SASEBO Harbor

52d Inf Div
128th Inf
Anti-Tank Co 128th Inf

SHIKISHA
SHIKISHA

* Afloat SASEBO Harbor
Ar 17 Oct
Adv CP
Ar 16 Oct
Ar 16 Oct

Other units - No change.

* Ar 14 Oct.

W. W. VET SINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AOG SB, G - 3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG 5th Mar Div
CG FIF Pac
CG 2d Mar Div
CTF 55
CG 32d Inf Div
CG FCF

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
CG KMCOLA Occupation Force
CG 1AB CIUSA

SECRET

1130
0117/147
Ser. 00945B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 17 October, 1945,
To: 1800I, 18 October, 1945.

No. 54.

Kaps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 25.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Overcast, with intermittent rain, visibility, 2-4 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 8-10 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Warm and slightly overcast, with occasional showers, visibility, 6-10 miles. Surface winds, southeasterly, 4-6 knots. Sea, calm.

c. Southern KYUSHU:

Heavy rains, visibility, 4-6 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 3-5 knots.

3. Cur Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Requested 5th Fighter Command to delay as practicable arrival of shipping with embarked air units until 10 November or until further notice is received as to availability of FUKUOKA harbor. 122d Station Hospital departed 5a5EST for KOKURA by rail in two serials at 0730I and 1830I, 18 October.

b. 5th Marine Division continued routine occupational missions. At 0800I, on VaC order, division assumed operational control of 127th Infantry (Reinf) (less 1st Bn), with the following attachments: 121st F Aj Bn,
Det 32d M Co, Det 732d Ord Co, Co B, 107th Med Bn, and Co A, 114th Engr Bn. 13th Marines supervised debarkation and processing of Japanese military personnel being repatriated from DAITO SHIMA. At 1300I, 26th Marines (Reinf) commenced loading in TransDiv 39 for PALAU garrison-duty; the following reinforcing elements have been designated: Co B, 5th MT Bn; 1st Plt, Auto Repair Co, 5th MT Bn; 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Engr Bn; Co A, 5th Med Bn; 1st Band Sec and Postal Det, HQ Co, 5th Marine Division; 1st Ser Plt (less Chem Sec, Graves Reg Sec, and PX Sec); 1st Sup Plt (less 1 1/2 Sup Sec); 1 sec, 6th Sep Ldry Plt.

c. 2d Marine Division at 0740I dispatched a division reconnaissance party overwater for Hondo, on AMAKUSA Island (20 miles South of ISAHA YA). At 0815, 8th Marines (Reinf) dispatched a road reconnaissance party from KUNANOTO to KAGOSHIMA. 2d Marines (Reinf) patrolled area Southwest of MIYAZAKI. 6th Marines (Reinf) dispatched a patrol to IKE-SHIMA Island, (20 miles Northwest of KAGOSHIMA). 10th Marines patrolled the area KUCHINOSHU--KCIJIRO (15-18 miles E of ISAHA YA).

d. 32d Infantry Division continued unloading. At 1530I and 2330I respectively, the second and third serials of 2d Bn, 128th Infantry (Reinf), arrived at SHIMOKOSEKI by rail without incident. At 0600I, 127th Infantry (Reinf) (less 1st Bn) commenced unloading in the stream. At 0600I and 0730I respectively, vehicle convoys of 3d Bn, 128th Infantry (Reinf), and 129th FA Bn cleared BASEBO by road for SHIMOKOSEKI. At 0900I, vehicle convoys of 32d Signal Co and 32d QA Co departed for FUKUCA by road. As of end of period, USS GILLIAM (APA 57) was 100% unloaded.

e. FUKUCA Occupation Force continued prison investigations and surveillance, and physical inventory and centralization of Japanese equipment. CO, YAMAUCHI Detachment conferred with a GHQ representative relative to KOREAN repatriation-situation. CO, MCJI Occupation Group conducted interview with MCJI officials regarding collection of arms in civilian possession, as directed by current SCAP directives. MCJI Occupation Group collected controlled items from KOKUSA Arsenal and JCMO Branch of KOKUSA Military Ordnance Depot. As of 1600I, all vehicular elements of 1st Bn, 128th Infantry (Reinf) were across SHIMOKOSEKI Straits.
f. KAMOYA Occupation Force investigated billeting and harbor facilities in KAGOSHIMA for repatriation of Japanese personnel.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH army  CG 5thMarDiv  CC 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG FMF Pac    CG 32dInfDiv  Ea Corps & Spec Trp Unit
CTF 55        CG FCF       Ea Gen Staff Section
CG 2dMarDiv   CC AmE CHURA

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SECRET
LOCATION STATEMENT

18 October 1945

No. 26

Map: KYUSHU 1:250,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>SHIMONOSEKI</td>
<td>Ar 17 Oct</td>
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<td>Ar 17 Oct</td>
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<td>SHIMONOSEKI</td>
<td>Ar 17 Oct</td>
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</table>

Other Units — No change.


DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army          CG 5thMarDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CG 3dF Mf Pac          CG 2dMarDiv  Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
CTF 55                 CG 32dInfDiv
CG FCOF                CG 1AB CHURA CO KANCYA Occupation Force

SECRET
HEA DQ UAR T E S, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800, 18 October 1945.
To: 1800, 19 October 1945.

No. 55

Maps: To change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 26.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Light overcast in morning, clearing to 10-15 miles
visibility. Surface winds, northwesterly, 3-7 knots.
Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Overcast with 1,000-foot ceiling, clearing progressively,
visibility, 3-8 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly,
6-10 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone
of responsibility. Rear elements of the 122d Station
Hospital closed in KOKURA at 0200I. At 1100I, received
information from CTF 55 that KAGOSHIMA AIR is now open
to shipping. The following units have been added to the
VAC troop-list by SIXTH Army: 32d CIC Det and CIC Area
Det No 2. At 1705I, 18 October, an Army PBJ-type air-
craft from KOREA overshot the runway at SASEBO airstrip
during an emergency landing and landed in the water,
with no casualties to pilot or passengers. Salvage
operations are proceeding.

b. 5th Marine Division continued routine occupational mis-
sions and loading of 26th Marines (Reinf) for PALAUS.
As of the end of the period, 2d En, 26th Marines (Reinf)
was 100% loaded. At 1530I, 127th Infantry (Reinf)(less
1st Bn) assumed control of 26th Marines' zone of res-
ponsibility, while the 26th Marines' CP opened afloat at

- 1 -

SECRET

1135
that hour in USS CUSTER (APA 40) and closed ashore at the same time. 128th Infantry CP opened simultaneously ashore in the former 26th Marines' CP. At 0900I, Co C, 20th Amph Trk Bn, displaced to AIMOURA, and, at 1500I, 3rd Amph Trk Co displaced to KANTO (3 miles East of SASEBO).

c. 2d Marine Division airborne inspection party returned from KAGOSHIMA area at 1500I. Road-reconnaissance party from 8th Marines (Reinf) still enroute to KAGOSHIMA. Routine patrolling continued throughout zone.

d. 32d Infantry Division continued unloading and deployment. Motor serials of the 32d Sig Co and 32d Hq Co arrived in FUKUOKA at 2015I; those of 32d QM Co, at 2000I. At 2100I, elements of the 128th Infantry (Reinf) closed in HOKI by road, and cleared for SHINOKOSEKI by rail at 0900I. Elements of the 28th FA Bn closed in HOJI at 0200I, and cleared for SHINOKOSEKI at 1000I. 3d Bn, 128th Infantry (Reinf) cleared for YAMAGUCHI by rail in three serials, respectively, at 0800I, 1000I and 1600I. Elements of Div-Hq Co cleared SASEBO by road for FUKUOKA at 0900I. As of the end of the period, RCT 128 shipping was completely unloaded.

e. FUKUOKA Occupation Force completed investigation and inventory of KOKURA Arsenal and KOKURA and YAKINATSU Prisons, and withdraw all guards by 1200I. At 0900I, elements of the 128th Infantry (Reinf) relieved the YAMAGUCHI Detachment, and, at 1200I, CP, 128th Infantry (Reinf) opened in YAMAGUCHI at the Aviation School, closing in old location at the same time. A detachment of Co D, 3d IF Bn, left for SHIZOKI by rail at 1300I and arrived without incident at 1600I. At 1200I, HOJI Occupation Group directed YAKINATSU detachment (one officer and 25 Marines) to assist in maintaining order among Chinese displaced persons; investigation has revealed no disorders to date. At 2115I, one platoon of 1st Bn, 28th Marines (Reinf), was dispatched without incident to ITZUKA to reinforce guards over Chinese POW camps.

f. KANOKA Occupation Force, no change.
4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army CG 5th MarDiv CO 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG FIF Pac CG 32d InfDiv Ea Corps & Spec Trp Unit
CTF 55 CG FOF Ea General Staff Section
CG 2dMarDiv CO MAB CHURA
0137/147
Sep.00049b

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

19 October 1945.

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 25.

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000.

UNIT
Det, Cos A & C, 2d Sep
Line Bn
122d Sta Hosp
106th Vet Food Insp Tm
566th Optical Rep Det
5th Amph Trk Co
Co C 20th Amph Trk Bn
26th Marines (-)
2d Bn, 26th Marines

CP LOCATION
SAGA
KUKURA
SASEBO (75.2-11.6)
SASEBO

REMARKS
Ar 18 Oct
Afloat SASEBO
Harbor
Ar 19 Oct
Ar 19 Oct
SASEBO Harbor
Afloat SASEBO
Harbor
Ar 19 Oct
Ar 17 Oct
Ar 19 Oct
Ar 19 Oct
Ar 19 Oct
Ar 19 Oct

Other units - No change.

W. W. LESSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofs, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army
CG FILIPAC
CTF 55
CG CCF
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG KANOYA

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
CO KANOYA Occupation Force

SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, 
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 56. From: 1800I, 19 October, 1945
To : 1800I, 20 October, 1945

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 27.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Overcast with intermittent rain, visibility, 6-8 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly, 6-8 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Overcast and cool with light rains at end of period, visibility, 2-4 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   c. Southern KYUSHU:
      Overcast with light rains. Surface winds, south-south-easterly, 2-3 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. At 1615I, directed all divisions and occupation forces to take immediate action as directed by SCAP to confiscate assets and documents known or suspected to belong to the Nazi Party. At 1405I, in accordance with CG, F.F Pac, dispatch 190255, designated 2d BN, 25th Marines (Reinf) for disbandment and initiated action to debark this unit from TransDiv 39 prior to sailing for PALAUS. The following units have been added to VAC troop-list: 101st Ord Bomb Disp Co; 25th Port Surg Hosp; 274th Sig Hvy Cons Bn; one sec, 623d QM Rdh Co.

   b. 5th Marine Division completed loading of 26th Marines (Reinf) in TransDiv 39 at CGCOI. 15th Marines supervised debarkation and repatriation-processing of Japanese
troops which arrived SASEBO from Inchon in 10 LSTs at O600I; as of period's end, 1,943 had been debarked and processed. At 1415I, issued verbal warning orders to 2d Bn, 26th Marines (Reinf) to stand by to debark from USS SHELEY (APA 106).

c. 2d Marine Division reconnaissance party returned from Amakusa Island at 1345I. 6th Marine (Reinf) patrolled to Omadaka (20 miles N of Nagasaki) without incident. 8th Marines (Reinf) road-reconnaissance party returned from Aoshima at 1040I.

d. 32d Infantry Division continued unloading and deployment. As of 1715I, USS Renate (AKA 35) was 100% unloaded. At 1930I, 71st Amph Trk Co, with elements of Div Hq, arrived at Fukuoka by road. 3d Bn, 126th Infantry (Reinf) closed in Yamaguchi by rail at 2030I; 126th FA Bn closed in CJI by rail at 2400I, and CP opened at that time in the Moji Club. At 0500, 832d Ord Co cleared SASEBO for Fukuoka in one serial by rail and one by road. At 1600I, 126th FA Bn cleared SASEBO by rail for Fukuoka.

e. Fukuoka Occupation Force continued routine patrolling and occupational missions. At 0900I, Moji Occupation Group dispatched a detachment of one officer and 12 Marines to Fukuoka on request of Japanese civil police; this was purely a precautionary measure, and no untoward incidents have been reported to date from this or from the Naka Matsushita detachment. At 1500I, investigation at Nichiichi Prison was completed, and guard detachment was withdrawn. At 1615I, the former Yamaguchi Detachment closed in Shimonooseai by rail and rejoined 3d Bn, 26th Marines (Reinf). Senzaai detachment has initiated supervision and surveillance of Korean and Japanese traffic through the port, and now has telephonic communication with Shimonooseai; detachment CP is located at Hachiochi Hotel.
C-3 Operations Report Number 56. (Continued).

SECRET

f. KANOYA Occupation Force continued routine patrolling. On 19 October, conferred with representatives of 2d Marine Division relative to movement of elements of that division into KANOYA area.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G - 3.

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CG SIXTH Army</th>
<th>CG 5thMarDiv</th>
<th>CO 1st En 127th Inf</th>
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<tr>
<td>CG FMF Pac</td>
<td>CG 32dInfDiv</td>
<td>Each Corps &amp; Spec Troop Unit</td>
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<td>CTF 55</td>
<td>CG FCF</td>
<td>5a General Staff Section</td>
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<td>CG 2dMarDiv</td>
<td>CO MAB OKURA</td>
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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

20 October 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 27

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000.

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<td>1 Sec 3rd Aidry Flat</td>
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1142
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<td>Cannon Co 127th Inf</td>
<td>HAIKI (85.15-09.90)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B 114th Engr Bn</td>
<td>HAIKI (85.15-09.90)</td>
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<td>Co B 107th Med Bn</td>
<td>HAIKI (85.15-09.90)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KOJI</td>
<td>Ar 20 Oct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other units - No change.

DISTRIBUTION:

- CG SIXTH Army
- CG FIF Pac
- CG TIF 56
- CG FCF
- CO 5th MarDiv
- CO 2nd MarDiv
- CO 32d InfDiv
- CO KAMOZA Occupation Force
- Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
- Each Gen & Spec Staff Section
- CO MAC China

SECRET

-2-
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

S-3 Operations Report

From: 18001, 26 October, 1945
To: 18001, 21 October, 1945.

Maps: to change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See location statement of 26.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Overcast, visibility, 10 miles. Surface wind, north-northwesterly, 5-10 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Overcast and cool, visibility 8-10 miles. Surface wind, northerly, 5-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   c. Southern KYUSHU:
      Rain with broken overcast, visibility 8-10 miles. Surface winds, variable.

3. Operations for the Period:
   a. Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. 82d Special Services Co (less two platoons) commenced debarkation at 1100.
   b. 5th Marine Division at 0100 released 26th Marines (less) (less 26th) to operational and administrative control of W.P. Sec for duty in the MAMUS. 26th Marines commenced debarkation on order of 00, 26th, and 40th Div at 0500, and closed in battle at 1100 at 18001. At 00, the advance echelon of 38th Marines (less) cleared ASWO by road for YUSUKE. 10th Marines continued supervision of Japanese repatriates arriving from YOKOHAMA. As of the period's end, a total of 2,000 had been processed. 10th Marines patrolled without incident the area southwest of YUSUKE (20 miles N of ASWO).

--- 1 ---

SIGMA
C-3  Operations Report Number 57.  (Continued).

SECRET

b.  6th Marine Division airborne inspection party returned from HIGASHI area at 0830.  6th Marines patrolled to 2. 00 N.W.A. (20 miles S. of HAGASAMA); patrol remained in the area overnight due to landslides on return route.

c.  26th Infantry Division continued unloading and deployment.  26th En, 125th Infantry, cleared 25500 by rail in three seater at 0800, 1200, and 1600; first seater arrived without incident at 1400.  Rail serial of the 17th En in closed in FUKUOKA at 2300; motor elements of the battalion cleared 25000 for FUKUOKA at 0700.  Battalion headquarters opened at 0800; station at 1200; and battalion passed at 1200 to 26th Marines for operational control.  Vehicular serial of the 125th En in cleared 25000 for FUKUOKA at 1100.

d.  USAF Occupation force continued investigation of KITAKAMI and NAKAZIMA prisons.  Check of USAF prison was completed, and the detachment secured at 2000.  Detachments remain at KITAKAMI and NAKAZIMA, but no incidents have been reported.

e.  USAF Occupation force, no change.

4.  Incidents:

one.

/SIGMA

J. W. SHERMAN
Colonel, USA

[Signature]

DISTRICT MAP:

- 5th Arm Div
- 1st En 127th Inf
- 3rd En Inf Div
- CEF
- CTF 55
- NARA

1145
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

21 October 1945.

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 26

Map: KLUSHU 1:25,000.

UNIT CP LOCATION REMARKS

Hq V Amphibious Corps SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1) 855 Por in
Hq Corps Troops SASEBO NB (77.2-13.9) Rear Sch

H&S En VAC SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
Army Section, VAC SASEBO NB (77.2-13.9)
22d Sp Surf Co (less 3d & 4th Flats) SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)

229th Air (Type G) Afloat SASEBO Harbor
Hq 95th Horn CIC Unit SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
404th CIC A232 Det (Area) SASEBO NB (77.2-14.0)
468th CIC B3 Det (Combat) SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
4th Censorship Adv Det SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
173d Tin Disbursing Det SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #1 SASEBO NB (75.40-12.64)
Armed Forces Red Sta WVTO O'Hara (1300.0-1084.0)
Armed Forces Red Sta WLK Afloat SASEBO Harbor
6th Sup Lwry Flot SASEBO NB (77.2-14.0)
2d Lwry Flot (Prov) SASEBO NB (78.4-12.2)
Hq Co Shoco Frig SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
Sig En VAC (1st & 5th KI Flats atchd) SASEBO NB (77.2-14.0)
Bomb Dispo Co H&S En VAC SASEBO NB (77.2-13.9)
(less 1st & 2d Flats) SASEBO NB (77.2-14.0)
3d MP En (Prov)(less Cos A, C & D) SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
LFAECU #4 SASEBO NAS (79.2-6.2)
Red Engr Co #1 SASEBO NAS (78.98-8.80)
6th Sny Rgt (Reinf) SASEBO NB (78.3-12.2)

24th Inf Dp Co MAGASAKI
33d Inf Dp Co SASEBO NB (78.5-11.7)
35th Inf Dp Co Enroute from HAWAII to SASEBO
42d Inf Dp Co SASEBO NB (79.0-11.8)
6th Inf Amt Co SASEBO NB (78.9-11.7)
8th Inf Amt Co SASEBO NB (75.4-12.6)
10th Inf Amt Co SASEBO NB (78.2-11.1)
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<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (78.7-12.3)</td>
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<td>1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)</td>
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<td>1st Ftn &amp; Bch Co (Prov)</td>
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<td>45th Mar Dtr Co</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (78.7-11.8)</td>
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<td>1st Bkry Flot (Prov)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (78.6-12.1)</td>
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<td>Hq &amp; Hq Det, 327th CI BN</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
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<td>Det 757th RV Operating Bn</td>
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<td>Hq &amp; Hq Det, 356th Port Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>124th Port Co</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (78.1-11.2)</td>
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<td>156th Port Co</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (78.3-11.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>62d Hq Base Dep Co (556th Optical Rep Tm atchd)</td>
<td>SASEBO (75.2-11.8)</td>
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<td>GUS 18</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.6-12.6)</td>
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<td>PD w/Comm Unit</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.6-12.6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boat Pool</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.6-12.6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Spec NC BN</td>
<td>Enroute from Guam</td>
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<tr>
<td>72d NC BN</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (41.0-75.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 5201st Engr Cons Dtrg</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (40.9-74.5)</td>
<td>Adv CP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1118th Engr Cons Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (40.9-74.5)</td>
<td>Adv CP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (40.9-74.5)</td>
<td>Adv CP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Co</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1409th Engr Base Dep Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (41.0-75.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1541st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Flt)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (41.0-75.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1541st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Flt)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (41.0-75.0)</td>
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<td>1502d Inf Avn BN</td>
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<tr>
<td>1731st Engr Util Det (W)</td>
<td>SASEBO NAS (70.0-8.9)</td>
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<td>3138th Engr Refrigeration Maint Det (DG)</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
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<td>1978th Engr Repro Det (Avn)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (41.0-75.0)</td>
<td>1/2 mile NW of SASEBO NAS</td>
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<td>Hq 7th MC Rgt</td>
<td>SASEBO NAS (78.7-9.3)</td>
<td>12 per in rear ech</td>
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<td>TAURI, T.H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prov Combat Engr Gp</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Sep Engr Bn (less Co B &amp; det Cos A &amp; C)</td>
<td>SASEBO NAS (78.7-9.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co B, 2d Sep Engr Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Aircraft Factory (60.8-12.0)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>CP LOCATION</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det, Cos A &amp; C, 2d Sep</td>
<td>SAGA</td>
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<tr>
<td>546th Engr Tp Bridge Co</td>
<td>SASEBO NAS (79.4-8.3)</td>
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<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<td>Prov LT Gp</td>
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<td>13th LT En (Prov) (less Co B)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20th Amph Trk En (Prov) (less Cos A, B &amp; C)</td>
<td>SASEBO NAS (80.55-11.20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co B, 20th Amph Trk En (Prov)</td>
<td>GUAM</td>
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<td>384th Trk Co (W/Dr Det)</td>
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<tr>
<td>347th Ord Maint Co</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq Det Prov Med Gp</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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</table>
| Med En VAC | SASEBO Naval Hosp (76.8-13.4)  
4 mile SW of SASEBO Dry Docks (75.2-11.6)  
ISAFAX Naval Hosp (1311.5-1076.3) |  |
<p>| Corps Evac Hosp #1 | SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1) |  |
| Corps Evac Hosp #3 | KOKURA |  |
| Hq &amp; Hq Det 136th Med En | SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1) |  |
| 1206 Sta Hosp | SASEBO |  |
| 92d Field Hosp | Afloat |  |
| 25th Evac Hosp | Afloat |  |
| 125th Sta Hosp | Afloat |  |
| 5th Army Med Lab | Afloat |  |
| 100th Vet Med Inspt Tm | SASEBO (75.2-11.8) |  |
| 74th Med Contl Det | Afloat SASEBO Harbor |  |
| 75th Med Contl Det | Afloat SASEBO Harbor |  |
| 76th Med Contl Det | Afloat SASEBO Harbor |  |
| 83d Med Contl Det | Afloat SASEBO Harbor |  |
| Hq Prov Med Govt Gp | SASEBO NS (77.3-14.1) |  |
| 92d Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp | SASEBO NS (77.3-14.1) |  |
| 8th Med Div | Marine Camp AIMOURA (71.8-14.6) |  |
| 26th Marines (Reinf) (less 2d BN) | APA 40 (CUSTER) |  |
| 2d En 26th Marines | Marine Camp AIMOURA |  |
| 27th Marines (less BLT 2/27) | Marine Camp AIMOURA (71.4-14.4) |  |
| 2d En 27th Marines (Reinf) (less Detts) | SAGA. (1356-1128) |  |
| 2d Plt, Co L, 27th Marines | TCSU (1357-1141) |  |
| 1st Plt Co F, 27th Marines | KAMAZAKI (1354-1134) |  |
| 13th Marines (less 1st &amp; 2d Bns) | SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.7-10.95) |  |</p>
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<th>UNIT</th>
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<td>KAWATANA (92.9-02.5)</td>
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<td>A Btry 15th Marines</td>
<td>OGUSHI (66.6-01.2)</td>
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<td>2d Bn 13th Marines</td>
<td>KARITATE (82.8-12.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Engr Bn (less Cos A &amp; C &amp; 2d Flat Co B &amp; Dets)</td>
<td>Marine Camp AINCURA (70.9-13.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co A 5th Engr Bn (less 1 Plat)</td>
<td>HAIKI (85.15-09.9)</td>
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<td>1st Plat Co A, 5th Engr Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th MT Bn (less Cos A B C &amp; 1st Flat, Auto Rep Co)</td>
<td>Marine Camp AINCURA (70.8-13.9)</td>
<td>Rear Jch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co A 5th MT Bn</td>
<td>HAWAII</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co B 5th MT Bn</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Rear Jch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co C 5th MT Bn</td>
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<td>1st Plat, Auto Rep Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Scr Bn (less Sup Co &amp; Dets)</td>
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<td>Sup Co, 5th Scr Bn (less 1st &amp; 3d Plats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Sup Plat, 5th Sup Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Pion Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Recon Co</td>
<td>Marine Camp AINCURA (71.4-14.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th IP Co</td>
<td>SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)</td>
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<td>6th Sig Co</td>
<td>Marine Camp AINCURA (71.4-14.4)</td>
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<td>1st Band Scc, Hq. Co, 5th MarDiv</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Tank Bn (less Co A)</td>
<td>SASEBO YAE (79.1-08.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>V.O-5</td>
<td>SASEBO NAS (79.2-08.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Mar War Dog Flat</td>
<td>Marine Camp AINCURA (71.9-14.4)</td>
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<td>6th Sep Ltry Flat (less 1st Scc)</td>
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<td>1st Scc, 6th Sep Ltry Flat</td>
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<tr>
<td>118th &quot;J&quot; Bn (less dets)</td>
<td>SASEBO Aircraft Factory</td>
<td>(80.6-10.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>CP LOCATION</td>
<td>RELNKS</td>
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<tr>
<td>34th Mar Dep Co</td>
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<td>403d G1S MCHB Det (Area)</td>
<td>SASEBO Fortress (77.5-15.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>94th Eq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
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<tr>
<td>95th Hd &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
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<td>5th Inf Bn (less Cos A, B, &amp; C)</td>
<td>Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-14.4)</td>
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<td>Co A 5th Inf Bn</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co B 5th Inf Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO Fortress (77.5-15.3) Det CIT &amp; SAGA</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Prov Rocket Det</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Unit disbanded</td>
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<td>496th CITC B3 Det (Combat)</td>
<td>Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-14.4)</td>
<td>SAGA</td>
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<td>Mil Govt Det</td>
<td>CIT &amp;</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
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<td>Mil Govt Det</td>
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<td>Postal Det, Hq Co, 5th MarDiv</td>
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<td>Har Det CIT &amp; (Co A 5th Tank Bn)</td>
<td>CIT &amp;</td>
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<td>2d MarDiv</td>
<td>CITA (682.6-1123.8)</td>
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<td>2d Marines</td>
<td>HAKOSAKI (94.5-62.2)</td>
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<td>6th Marines</td>
<td>HAKOSAKI (94.1-56.7)</td>
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<td>8th Marines (less Co B)</td>
<td>HAKOSAKI (93.3-62.6)</td>
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<td>Co B 8th Marines</td>
<td>KUNIYUKI (81.9-77.0)</td>
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<td>10th Marines (less 3d Bn)</td>
<td>OHTA (50.5-97.3)</td>
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<td>3d Bn 10th Marines</td>
<td>ISHIYAMA airfield (16.3-75.1)</td>
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<td>2d Engr Bn (less Co C)</td>
<td>HAKURA (1300.74-1084)</td>
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<td>2d MT Bn</td>
<td>ISHIYAMA (15.7-75.5)</td>
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<td>2d Surv Bn</td>
<td>2 miles W of RUP-OHATSU (94.2-61.0)</td>
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<td>2d Med Bn</td>
<td>2.5 miles W of KOROGISHI (93.1-59.7)</td>
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<td>2d TDA Bn</td>
<td>2 miles SW of RUP-OHATSU (94.1-60.7)</td>
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<td>2d Recon Co</td>
<td>1 1/2 miles W of RUP-OHATSU (95.0-61.5)</td>
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<td>2d MP Co</td>
<td>KUNIYUKI</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Tank Bn</td>
<td>FUKABORI (91.1-55.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>CP LOCATION</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d ASCO</td>
<td>FUKAHORI (91.1-55.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Sig Co</td>
<td>2 miles SW of RUPPAHATSU</td>
<td>(94.1-61.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Amph Trk Co</td>
<td>ISAHSAYA Airfield (16.3-75.1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)</td>
<td></td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIC-2</td>
<td>ISAHSAYA Airfield (15.9-75.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Har Var Dog Flt</td>
<td>NAGASAKI (94.5-62.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Svy Lary Flt</td>
<td>NAGASAKI (94.5-62.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>43rd Inf Bn</td>
<td>1½ miles NE of KOSEDO</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Plat Bomb Disp Co H&amp;S Bn VIC.</td>
<td></td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Plat 21st Salv Rep Co</td>
<td>NAGASAKI (94.1-61.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)</td>
<td>NAGASAKI (94.5-62.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>498th CIC C3B3 Det (Combat)</td>
<td>NAGASAKI (94.5-62.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Md Bn &amp; Md Det Hq Govt Ge</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th Engr (C) Bn</td>
<td>WAKAYAMA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>365th QM Trk Co</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq Govt Det</td>
<td>HIYAZAKI</td>
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<td>Hq Govt Det</td>
<td>KUROSHITO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq FOF</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (46.9-68.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCT 28 (less BLT 3/28)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (48.9-68.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det BLT 1/28</td>
<td>IIZUKA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C 5th Engr Bn (-)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (48.9-74.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co C 5th Med Bn</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (41.2-74.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Plat 5th Ord Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (49.5-73.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Plat 5th Serv Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (49.5-73.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Plat 5th Sup Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (49.5-73.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det 113th IC Bn</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (49.5-73.5)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5th ASCO (loss det)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (49.5-73.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1683rd Engr (C) Bn</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (41.0-74.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Md Det 209th Ord Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co C 5d Hg Bn (Prov)(less 1st &amp; 2d Flts)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Co 3 12th Med Bn (Prov)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2d Plat Auto Rep Co at end)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Plat Bomb Disp Co H&amp;S Bn VIC.</td>
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</table>
SECRET

Hq 94th Hq CIC Unit - FUKUOKA (45.8-65.9)
29th Hq & Hq Co Mil Govt Gp - FUKUOKA (45.4-63.6)
Co C 501st Sig Cons Bn (6th R/Py Cons Br atchd) - FUKUOKA (49.9-73.6)
Hq & Hq Det 303d QM Bn - FUKUOKA
382d QM Serv Co (less dots) - FUKUOKA

Garrison Beach Bn #1 - FUKUOKA

3078th Eng Bn Trk Co - FUKUOKA
Hq Support Bn - KOJI Coo Gp - KOJI

3d Plt 3 Co C 5th Engr Bn (less dots) - KOJI
3d Plt Co C 3d MP Bn (Prov) - KOJI

3d Plt Co B 12th MT Bn - KOJI
Hq 95th CIC 1st Unit - SHIMOSOEKI
37th Hq, Bst Hq Co (less dots) - SHIMOSOEKI

Co D, 53 MP Bn (Prov) (less dot) - SHIMOSOEKI

Det 116th PC Bn - SHIMOSOEKI

Hq Det KAMIGUCHI (Det 123d PC/23d)

Mar Det, SEMZAKI - SEMZAKI
Hq KANOTA Ccc For 1st Br, 127th Inf - KANOTA
25th Port Surgical Hosp - KANOTA
Co A 275th Engr Avn Bn - KANOTA
101st Bn, 322nd Eng Disp Squad - KANOTA

632d QM Hq & Bn - KANOTA
32d Inf Div (-) - SASEBO Harbor

32d Inf Div - Adv CP

126th Inf - SASEBO Harbor

127th Inf (less 1st, 2d & 3d Bns) - HAIRI (85.1-09.9)

2d Bn, 127th Inf - SASEBO (76.15-17.95)
3d Bn, 127th Inf - SASEBO (76.05-11.55)

CO B, 116th Engr Bn - HAIRI (85.1-09.9)
Cannon Co, 127th Inf - HAIRI (85.1-08.9)
111th Engr Bn - HAIRI (84.0-09.2)

Co B, 107th Inf Bn - HAIRI (85.1-09.9)
Det 733d & Co - SASEBO Dock Area
Det 732d Ordn Co - SASEBO Dock Area
**Location Statement No. 28. (Cont'd).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP Location</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>128th Inf</td>
<td>YAIMAGUCHI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn 128th Inf</td>
<td>SHIMONOSEKI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn 128th Inf</td>
<td>SHIMONOSEKI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn 128th Inf</td>
<td>YAIMAGUCHI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannon Co 128th Inf</td>
<td>SHIMONOSEKI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C 107th Med Bn</td>
<td>SHIMONOSEKI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32d Sig Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
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<tr>
<td>32d HQ Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>129th FA En</td>
<td>HOJI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126th TI En</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>732d 2nd En</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st High Trk Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*W. W. WENSINGER, Colonel, US.C., ACoS, G-3.*

**DISTRIBUTION:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CG SIXTH Army</th>
<th>CG 5th Div</th>
<th>Each Corps and Special Troop Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG PTO</td>
<td>CG 2nd Div</td>
<td>Each General and Special Staff Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF 55</td>
<td>CG 32d Inf Div</td>
<td>CG KANOKA Occupation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG FOF</td>
<td>CG LAB CHURA</td>
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</table>

SECRET

1153
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 21 October 1945,
To : 1800I, 22 October 1945.

No. 58

Facts: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 29.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Cool and overcast, visibility, 8 miles. Surface winds,
      northeasterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   
       b. Central KYUSHU:
       Cool with light overcast, visibility, 6-8 miles. Sur-
       face winds, northeasterly, 8-10 knots. Sea, calm.
   
       c. Southern KYUSHU:
       Overcast with intermittent rain, visibility, 4 miles.
       Surface winds, northeasterly, 3-4 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone
      of responsibility. At 1531I, directed 5th Marine Divi-
      sion to disband 2d En, 26th Marines, in accordance with
      the provisions of CinCPac dispatch 182043. At 1800I,
      74th and 75th Malaria Control Detachments cleared EISEBO
      by road for FUKUOKA.
   
       b. 5th Marine Division at 1725I, 21 October, completed super-
          vision of unloading and repatriation-processing of
          Japanese personnel returning from L'CHON. At 2300I,
          127th Infantry (Reinf) (less 1st Bn) completed unloading.
          27th Marines (less 1st and 2d Bns) continued movement to
          KURIKU.
c. 2d Marine Division continued routine patrolling throughout zone. The 6th Marines' patrol to CHODAKA returned without further incident, and the 10th Marines dispatched a motorized patrol to ARIE to inventory and check factories at that place.

d. 32d Infantry Division delayed report indicates that the division CF closed afloat in USS WESTMORELAND (APA 104) at 0800I, 21 October, and opened at the same time in the Chioga Building, FUKUOKA, (45.4-66.8). Further delayed reports indicate that road serials of the following units closed in FUKUOKA at the following hours: 32d Inf Co, 1500I, 21 October; 32d Sig Co, 1600I, 21 October; 32d MP Fltn, 2100I. The CF, 126th FA Bn, opened in FUKUOKA at 1500I, 21 October, and closed at KASHII STATION at the same time.

e. FUKUOKA Occupation Force completed investigation of IKUSA prison, and detachment returned at 1100I. At 1800I, the 129th FA Bn relieved the H0JI Occupation Group and assumed control of that zone. At 1830I, the 3007th Ord Base Depot Co closed in FUKUOKA by rail, and was attached to the 209th Ord En. CF opened at KASHII STATION at 1900I; 3d Bn, 28th Marines, cleared FUKUOKA by rail at 0800I; one serial had arrived in SAHITO without incident at 1540I. At 1130I, 364th MT Trk Co closed in FUKUOKA by rail, and was attached to the 209th Ord En. CF opened at KASHII STATION 1200I.

f. KUFIYA Occupation Force continued routine occupational missions. CO, 1st Bn, 127th Infantry, interviewed Rear Admiral KOKUTAMA, Ijn., relative to Japanese naval demobilization and demilitarization matters in the KUFIYA-KOGUSHIMA area.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSTRUPPER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 8thInfDiv  CG  FOF  6th Corps & Sptn Tpr
CG FMF Pac  CG  8thInfDiv  CO KAB OKURA  Unit
CTF 55  CG  82dInfDiv  CO 1st Bn 127th Inf  Fd Gen Staff Section
6137/213
Ser. 00961B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

22 October 1945.

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 29

kap: ______ KYUSHU 1:25,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>384th QM Trk. Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>Ar 22Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3007th Ord Base Depot Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>Ar 21Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar Det, YAMAGUCHI</td>
<td>MOJI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Marines (Reinf)</td>
<td>APA 40 (CUSTER)</td>
<td>Enroute PELELIU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less 2dBN)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (45.4-66.8)</td>
<td>Opened 21Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32d InfDiv</td>
<td>KOKURA</td>
<td>Ar 21Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3dBN, 128th Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other units - No change.


DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 5th MarDiv  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CG FMF Pac    CG 2d MarDiv  Each General and Special Staff
CTF 55        CG 32d InfDiv  Section
CG FOF        CG MAB KOYOKA  CO KAROYA Occupation Force

SECRET
0117/147
SEAP.00374D
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 22 October 1945,
To: 1800I, 23 October 1945.

SECRET
No. 52

No change.

Enclosure: (A) Location Map, major troop-units, VAC.

l. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 30 and Enclosure (A).

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Cool and partially overcast, visibility, 6-10 miles.
      Surface winds, northwesterly, 10-15 knots. Sea, brisk.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Warm and clear, visibility, 12-15 miles. Surface winds,
      northerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone
      of responsibility. At 0630I, motor columns of the 75th
      and 63d Parachute Control Detachments cleared SASEBO for
      FUJUOKA.
   b. 5th Marine Division continued displacement of the 27th
      Marines (Rein) (less 1st and 2d Bns) to KURUJI. 3d Bn,
      28th Marines (Rein) closed in ATAFURA at 1649I, 22
      October. The 127th Infantry (Rein) patrolled the area
      MAJI-MABAKU (12 miles SE by N of SASEBO).
   c. 2d Marine Division conducted routine patrolling (by 2d
      and 6th Marines) throughout areas west and northwest of
      IMAISHI to coast. 10th Marines patrolled throughout
      the SHITAIBARA Peninsula (S of IMAISHI) and continued
      survey of ISHIYAMA and inventory of factories at IMAIZ.
   d. 32d Infantry Division delayed reports indicate that the
      CP, 126th Infantry, opened in HOKUWA (500, 7-200, 4) at
      1800I, 21 October. Road and rail serials of the 2d Bn

- 1 -
SECRET

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and Cannon Co, 126th Infantry, closed in KOKURA at 1700I, 22 October, and 2400I, respectively. 120th FA Bn closed in KOKURA at 0100I.

c. FUKUOKA Occupation Force initiated preparations for relief in zone of responsibility by 32d Infantry Division. The 129th FA Bn was directed to disembark crews and to retain only minimum Japanese shipkeeper detachments aboard the following naval vessels now lying fully manned at HOJI: two DD's, one PG, one SS, and one SC. Elements of the 128th Infantry (301st) patrolled to HAGI and KUSHIG-HARA (25 miles SE of YAMAGUCHI). The 275th Chem Sg Co closed in FUKUOKA by road at 1700I, 22 October.

d. KAJIMA Occupation Force patrols had, at the beginning of the period, returned from MIYAKOJO, AYUKAWA, and FUKUOKA areas.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WESINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ADfS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SAKA Army
CG F/J Tac
CTF 55 (less Encl (A))
CG 2dInfDiv
CG 5thInfDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FOF
Co IAB OBUSURA (less Encl (A))
Co 1st En 127th Inf

Da Corps & Spec Trp
Unit (less Encl (A))
Da Gen Staff Section
(less Encl (A))

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0137/147
Ser.009378

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

23 October 1945.

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 30

UNIT | CP LOCATION | REMARKS
--- | --- | ---
Garrison Boat Pool | SASEBO (77.7-12.5) | 
1st Spec RC En | SASEBO (76.6-13.4) | 
Spec Augmented Hosp #5 | SASEBO (75.3-11.8) | 
Logistic Sup Co | SASEBO (75.3-11.8) | 
Garrison Boat Pool | NAGASAKI | 
74th Inf Contl Det | FUKUOKA | Ar 22 Oct
75th Inf Contl Det | FUKUOKA | Ar 22 Oct
76th Inf Contl Det | FUKUOKA | Ar 22 Oct
83rd Inf Contl Det | FUKUOKA | Ar 22 Oct
5th Army Med Lab | SASEBO (75.2-11.8) | Ar 20 Oct
20th Arm Engrs Brn (Prov) | SASEBO (77.0-14.2) | Moved 21 Oct
5d Bn, 24th Marines | Marine Camp, AIKURA | Ar 22 Oct
Mar Det | MAKUABASHI | 
Cannon Co, 126th Inf | KOKURA | Ar 22 Oct
275th Chem San Plt | FUKUOKA | Ar 22 Oct
114th Engs Brn (less Co B) | KOKURA | Ar 22 Oct
32d Hq Plt | FUKUOKA | Ar 22 Oct
2d Bn 125th Inf | KOKURA (1390.7-1200.4) | Ar 22 Oct
120th FA Brn | KOKURA | Ar 23 Oct

Other units - No change.

W. W. WENSBINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army | CG 5thInfDiv | Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CG FIF Pac | CG 2dInfDiv | CG KAIJOYA Occupation Force
CTF 55 | CG 32dInfDiv | Each General and Special Staff
CG FOs | CG HAB CHURA | Section
G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 23 October 1945.
To: 1800I, 24 October 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 31.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and cool, visibility, 10-12 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 10-12 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Clear and cool, visibility, 12-15 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Delayed reports indicated that at 1630I, 23 October, the 78th and 33rd Malaria Control Detachments closed by road in FUKUZAKA.

b. 5th Marine Division at 1645I had completed processing and onward dispatch of 10,257 Japanese military repatriates from R & T barricades; twenty-one Japanese were retained for hospitalization. At 0800I, CP of 37th Marines (Reinf) opened at KUSUM and closed at AIKUN at the same time. Patrols of the 187th Infantry (Reinf) (less 1st Bn) returned from LEAD without incident. 13th Marines conducted routine patrolling in the areas north and east of SASSECA.

c. 2d Marine Division initiated preparations for relief of KAGA Occupation Force, and continued patrolling and surveillance throughout zone of responsibility.
d. 32d Infantry Division at 0800I assumed operational control of FUKUKA Occupation Force zone of responsibility, and operational control of the following units passed at that hour to the division: Co D, 3d AP Bn; 1st Plt, Bomb Disposal Co, VAC; Hq and Hq CoS, 25th and 37th Military Government Groups; 28th Marines (Reinf) (less 3d Bn). At 0700I, an advance billeting and sanitary detachment of 2d Bn, 128th Infantry (Reinf), cleared YAMAGUCHI for BPFU. At 1200I, 128th Infantry patrols returned from HAGI without incident, and the regiment conducted further patrolling to OTA (3 miles NE of YAMAGUCHI) and UBE (20 miles SW of YAMAGUCHI). The 1st Bn, 128th Infantry (Reinf), closed in KOKUSAI by road and rail at 1500I.

e. FUKUKA Occupation Force conducted routine occupational missions throughout zone of responsibility, and, at 0800I, in accordance with VAC Operation Order 47-45, passed control of zone of responsibility to 32d Infantry Division and disbanded as of that hour. At the same time, FUKUKA Base Command, consisting of certain elements of the former FUKUKA Occupation Force, was activated. (See Annex ABLE to VAC Opn O No. 47-45).

f. K.A.RY Occupation Force, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FMM Pac
CTF 55
CG 2d Mar Div
CG 5th Mar Div

CG 32d Inf Div
CG FOF
CC 3d C.M.USA
CC 1st Bn 127th Inf

Each Corps & Special Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
24 October 1945. 

LOCATION STATEMENT  

No. 51

UNIT  

CP LOCATION  

ARMS

22d Sq. Sq. Co. (less 3d & 4th Flats)  
SASEBO NB  
Ar 22 Oct

3d En, 27th Marines  
KURUME  
Ar 24 Oct

27th Marines (less 1st & 2d Bns)  
KURUME  
Ar 24 Oct

126th Infantry  
KOKURA  
Ar 25 Oct

1st En, 126th Inf  
KOKURA  
Ar 25 Oct

Other units - No change.

W. V. WENSLINGER,  
Colonel, USMC,  
AGoFS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:  

CG SIXTH Army  CG 2dMarDiv  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit  
CG FIE Pac  CG 5thMarDiv  CG KAMOKA Occupation Force  
CTF 63  CG 33dInfDiv  Each General and Special Staff  
CG FOF  CG 1AD CLUSA  Section
3-6 Operation Report

From: 1800I, 24 October 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 32.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Clear, visibility unlimited. Surface winds, easterly, 5-10 knots. Sea calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Clear with scattered high clouds, visibility, 8-12 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 12-16 knots. Sea, brisk.
   c. Southern KYUSHU:
      Clear and warm, visibility 11-14 miles. Surface winds, 2-4 knots. Sea calm.

3. Cur Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Advance Detachments of 28th Evacuation Hospital, 123d Station Hospital, and 5th Army Medical Lab departed 5830I by road for FUKUCHI at 0830I. The 4th Directors in KAMACHI and FUKUCHI were placed under the CG 2d MarDiv and the CG FBC respectively for operational control effective 1412I.
   b. 5th Marine Division completed displacement of the 27th Marines (Reinf) (less 1st and 2nd Bns) to KURUMI. 127th Inf (Reinf) (less 1st Bn) patrolled vicinity KURUMI and the 13th Marines patrolled to the east of that area with no incident.

SECRET
c. 2d Marine Division commenced loading the 2d Bn, 25 Marines on LSTs for movement to KAJOU. The 2d and 6th Marines continued routine patrolling throughout the areas west, northwest and southeeast of NASASHI to the coast. The 6th Marines dispatched a reconnaissance party for HITOYOSHI (1588-1002) at 0603I. The 10th Marines continued to patrol SHIMABARA PENINSULA.

d. 32d Infantry Division reported locating a military encampment at OTA with approximately 505 Japanese officers and men. It is estimated that demobilization of this group will be completed by 15 November. E Co 126th Inf closed BFU at 1201I, and preparations for movement there of the remainder of the 2nd Bn continued. An advance party of the 3d Bn 126th Inf was sent to investigate the conditions at five Chinese labor camps, three at SOTOJY (586-173), one at KATSUKI (378-194) and one at KOKATA (375-185). Delayed report received that the 74th BN Contl Det closed YAZUGUCHI at 241800I and the 75th BN Contl Det closed FUKUOKA at 261400I, at which times they reported to the CG 32nd Inf Div for operational control.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command assumed control of the Advance Detachment of the 28th Evac Hosp on its arrival in FUKUOKA at 1545I, and directed this unit to proceed at once to KOKURA.

f. KAJOU Occupation Force, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

[Signature]

W. W. UHLMANN
Colonel, USA
AGA, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG 32d Inf Div
CG FIFTH Fie
CG 128th Inf
CG 2d MarDiv
CG 8th MarDiv

CG 32d Inf Div
CG FSC
CG III COR
CG 1st Bn 127th Inf

Each Corps & Special Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section

-2-
LOCATION STATEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>Co C, 284th Inf Bn</td>
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Other units - No change.

W. V. MENSINGER, Colonel, USMC, Acqfs, 0-3.

1166
G-3 Operations Report

To: 1800I, 26 October, 1945.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 33.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and moderately cold. Surface winds, northerly, 2-3 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Warm with light overcast, visibility, 9-10 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

c. Southern KYUSHU:

Warm and clear, visibility 9-15 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 3-6 knots.

3. Cur Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Rail serial of the 123d Station Hospital cleared SASEBO at 0301, and arrived in FUKUOKA without incident at 1200I. Rail serial of the 26th Evacuation Hospital cleared SASEBO at 1215I; at end of period arrival had not been reported.

b. 5th Marine Division continued supervision of Japanese repatriation operations. Elements of the 27th Marines (Reinf) patrolled without incident southeast of KURUME in the vicinity of SETA-KA. 13th Marines patrolled without incident northeast of IMARI, in the vicinity of OCHI and KASHIMA. C122 Group patrolled west of BEPPU.

c. 2d Marin. Division continued routine patrolling and preparations for displacement of 2d Marines to KANOYA area. 2d BN, 2d Marines (Reinf) sailed for KANOYA at 1700I. 8th
Marines (Reinf) patrolled 10 miles northwest of KUMAMOTO without incident. 10th Marines patrolled the SHIMAURA Peninsula (Ed of Nagasaki) and augmented present outpost at SHIMAURA, which now numbers 3 officers and 58 enlisted.

a. 32d Infantry Division delayed report indicates that the 32d Ordnance Co closed in FUKUOKA at 15001, 25 October, at 21001, 32d Cav Rcn Trp closed in KOJI. At 13151, 3d BN, 128th Infantry (Reinf) closed in BOFU. At 14001, elements of 3d BN, 126th Infantry (Reinf), relieved guard detachments of the 25th Marines (Reinf) over Chinese labor camps in the GOTOJI area (15 miles S of YAMASHITA). Elements of the 128th Infantry (Reinf) patrolled without incident to CHINE (15 miles W of YAMASHITA).

b. FUKUOKA Base Command continued assigned missions. At 20001, the advance detail, 25th Evacuation Hospital, closed in FUKUOKA by rail. 327th QA BN closed in FUKUOKA by road and rail at 14301; CP opened at KASHII STATION at 15001. 374th Ord MUN Co closed in FUKUOKA by road and rail at 15001; CP opened at KASHII STATION at 15301. Co B, 12th Motor Transport BN (Atchd, 2d Plt, Auto Repair Co, 12th Motor Transport BN), passed to operational control of 32d Infantry Division at 08001.

c. KANoya. Occupation force continued routine patrolling and surveillance. An advance party from 2d BN, 24 Marines (Reinf) arrived during the period and initiated preparations for arrival of that battalion in the KANoya area.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
Chief G-3.

 DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army CG 32d InfDiv Each Corps & Special Troop Unit
CG FMF Pac CG FO
CTF 55 CG MA3 OHURA
CG 2dMarDiv CG 1st BN 127th Inf
CG 5thMarDiv

SECRETS
053/217
Ser.00290B
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

no.33

LOCATION STATEMENT

26 October 1945

UNIT

354th Crd Mbn Co
73rd Field Hosp
Hq & Hq Co 1112th Engr Cons Gp
1487th Engr Maint Co
565th QM Aid Co
5873rd QM Gas Sup Co
32nd QM Co (less Det)
39th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co
721st Med San Co
1st Flat Bomb Disb Co H&S En Va0
4th Flat 3069th QM Ldry Co
Hq 94th Med CIC Unit
107th Med Bn (less Cos A, B, C, and 1 Flat D)
62nd CIC A252 Det (Area)
Co C 114th Engr En
1 Flat Co C 107th Med En
Service Co 127th Inf
1st Flat Co K 128th Inf
Hq Co 128th Inf
8th Marines
1177th Engr Cons En
1641st Engr Base Survey Co
(less 1 Flat)
1731st Engr Util Det (SE)

CP LOCATION

Afloat SaSEBO Harbor
Afloat SaSEBO Harbor
Afloat SaSEBO Harbor
Afloat SaSEBO Harbor
Afloat SaSEBO Harbor
FUKUCKA (49.6-73.5)
FUKUCKA (46.4-66.8)
Afloat SaSEBO Harbor
FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
FUKUCKA (44.6-73.5)
FUKUCKA (45.8-65.9)
YAMAGUCHI
YAMAGUCHI
SHI.CHI1.CIKI (1403.4-1218.6)
SHI.CHI1.CIKI (1403.4-1218.6)
KAIKI
new CP
BCPU (660.4-1220.3)
KOKURA (39.4-20.2)
KoKoSHIKA
Hakata Ta3 (1175.0-1341.0)
Hakata Ta3 (1175.0-1341.0)
Hakata Ta3 (1175.0-1341.0)

Remarks

ar 25 Oct
ar 25 Oct
ar 25 Oct
ar 25 Oct
ar 25 Oct
ar 25 Oct

Other Units - No change.

Distribution:

CG SIX.AR Army
CG Far Fac
CTF 66
CG 2dMarDiv

CG 6thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FCF
CG 1stMar Div

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CO Ka Oka Occupation Force
Each General and Special Staff

Section

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

2-3 Operations Report

From: 18001, 26 October 1945,
To: 18001, 27 October 1945.

No. 53

Hq: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. Location Statement No. 34.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Clear and moderately cold, visibility unlimited. Surface winds, northwesterly, 5 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Warm with light easterly and haze. Surface winds, northerly, 2-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Operational For the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. As of 10371, 26 October, the Rear Echelon, VAC, was detached to administrative and operational control of HQ, FIF, Pac, as of 10331, 25 October. 27th Mar (Reinf) patrolled without incident to MITOUSA (15 miles N of SAGA). 13th Mar patrolled without incident to vicinity of NAKITA (25 miles E of SASEBO). By 14001, 4,200 Japanese military repatriates had departed under supervision of elements of the 13th Marines at TASHIBIRA. OITA Occupation Group dispatched patrols to TKITA (28 miles N of BEPPU), KITSUKI (15 miles N of OITA) and HIDA (36 miles W of BEPPU); no incidents were reported.
c. 2d Marine Division continued routine patrolling and surveillance.

d. 32d Infantry Division delayed report indicates that, as of 1600, 26 October, Chinese POW camp guard detachments from the 28th Marines (Reinf) were withdrawn from ORIO, NOGATA and YAGAMI areas (16 miles S of ZAMA). Elements of the 128th Infantry (Reinf) patrolled vicinity of WAKAMATSU and to ASHIYA airfield (8 miles SW of WAKAMATSU). 128th Infantry (Reinf) completed investigation of the SHIBOKE (branch of KAGAUCHI Prison, and patrolled without incident to OSORI (3 miles SW of KAGAUCHI), UTAM and USU (32 miles NNE of KAGAUCHI). As of 26 October, division assumed M1 air-courier service from FUKUOKA Base Command.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command continued occupational missions and base development.

f. KAMOYA Occupation Force continued preparations for relief by elements of the 2d Marine Division. Otherwise, no change.

4. Casualties:
None.

DISTRIBUTION:

CC 7th Army
CG 32d Inf Div
CG 3d Inf Div
CG 3d Inf Div
CG FOB
CG 24th Inf
CG 25th Inf
CG 11th Inf 127th Inf

-3-

SECRET

1171
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<td>Co &quot;I&quot; 128th Inf</td>
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<td>HAKATA</td>
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Other units - No change.

W. W. Wensinger,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

- CG SIXTH Army
- CG FMF Pac
- CTF 55
- CG 2dMarDiv
- CG 5thMarDiv
- CG 32dInfDiv
- CG FOF
- CG MAB CNUSA

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CO KANoya Occupation Force
Each General and Special Staff

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET
G-3 Operations Report

From: 18001, 27 October 1945
To: 18001, 28 October 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 35.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Clear and cold, visibility unlimited. Surface winds, northerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. 2d and 6th Marine War Dog Plato, detached to operational and administrative control of FMF Pac, embarked and sailed for SAN FRANCISCO in USS AURELIA (AKA23) at 14001.
   b. 6th Marine Division conducted routine patrolling and occupational missions. At 23001, debarkation of Japanese military repatriates was completed at Uragashira. Processing at that place and at HARIO Barracks continues.
   c. 2d Marine Division continued deployment into Southern KYUSHU. Elements of 1st Bn, 8th Marines, cleared KUMAMOTO by rail at 08001 and arrived in KAGOSHIMA at 14401. 2d Bn, 2d Marines, arrived in KANOYA by water at 13301, and commenced unloading immediately. Cos B and C, 264th Med Bn closed in OKURA by road and rail at 12161 and reported to 3d Bn 10th Marines for operational control. 10th Marines patrolled the SHIMABA RA Peninsula without incident.
C-3 Operations Report Number 64, (Continued).

SECRET

d. 32d Infantry Division conducted routine patrols and 3d Bn, 126th Infantry established outposts to guard Japanese dumps at AICURA (6 of YAMAGUCHI) and OMINE-SHAGASHIBUN (12 miles N of YAMAGUCHI.)

e. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base-development and occupational missions. 3540th Crd MAH Co closed in FUKUOKA by road and rail at 17301. Elements of 666th QM RHd Co and of 387th QM Gas Supply Co closed in FUKUOKA by road.

f. KANOYA Occupation Force continued preparations for relief by elements of 2d Marines Division.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
AG#58, 3-13.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army CG 5thMarDiv CG 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG FMF Pac CG 32dInfDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CTF 58 CG FBC Each General and Special Staff
CG 2dMarDiv CG MAS CMUSA Section
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

20 October 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 33

Map: ______ KYUSHU 1:25,000.

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SECRET

1175
C157/147
S.361002B Location Statement No. 36

SASEBO
Affloat SASEBO Harbor Ar 28 Oct
SASEBO NS (78.1-11.2)
SASEBO NB (78.3-11.7)
Affloat SASEBO Harbor Ar 28 Oct
SASEBO (75.2-11.8)
SASEBO NS (77.3-14.1)
SASEBO (77.0-13.7)
SASEBO (77.7-12.5)
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SASEBO (1st Lit 883) For FUKUOKA
NAGASAKI
SASEBO (76.8-13.4)
SASEBO (76.8-11.8)
SASEBO
SASEBO
SASEBO
SASEBO
FUKUOKA
SASEBO (75.3-11.8)
SASEBO
SASEBO
FUKUOKA (41.0-75.0)
FUKUOKA (41.0-75.0)
HAKATA NAS (117.0-1341.0)
FUKUOKA (41.0-75.0)
HAKATA NAS (117.0-1341.0)
Afloat SASEBO Harbor
HAKATA
FUKUOKA
HAKATA NAS (117.0-1341.0)
Afloat SASEBO Harbor
FUKUOKA (41.0-75.0)
SASEBO NAS (78.7-09.3)
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SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)
PAPUKA
SASEBO NAS (76.7-09.3)
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Location Statement No. 35. (Continued)

DATE

5th MT En (lack Cos A, C, & B Pl retire Co)
Co C, 20th Arph Trk In
(attachd 5th ST In)
116th EN (lack dots)
HQ En, 5th EnDiv
CIC Det # 405
CIC Det # 498 (lack dots)
Det JICEN. TM # 29
38th MP Det Co
Sup Co, Ser In (lack 3d Plt)
3d Plt, Sup Co, Ser In
Co A, 6th Tk In (Relink)
Det KG EN 6th Tk In
Det's CIC
Det Hq Co, Hq In
Det Co B, 6th Engr En
Det 6th Inf In
Det 41st Govt
5th Zian In
MP Co, 5th EnDiv (w/Co H, 3d HP Co attach)
Co C, 3d MP In (lack 1st Plt)
4th Hq & Hq Co Det, 41st Govt
9p
3d In, 27th Inf
Det Hq Co, 27th Inf
Det Hq Co, Hq In, 5th EnDiv
1st Plt Co C, 3d HP In
2d Plt Co E, 6th Engr En
Det Co C, 6th Inf
Det Sig Co, 5th MarDiv
Det 110th In
Det CIC Det # 488
Det 41st Govt
Co C, 17th Art In
2d MarDiv
2d Harthec (lack 2d in)
2d 2d Marines
2d 2d Marines
8th Marines
8th Marines (lack Co H)
Co H 8th Marines
10th Marines (lack 5th in & 2d in)

CP LOCATION

Har Camp MIGNOURA (70.8-13.9)
Har Camp MIGNOURA (71.1-13.9)
BAGELO Aircraft Factory
(50.3-10.5)
Har Camp MIGNOURA (71.1-13.9)
Har Camp MIGNOURA (71.3-14.3)
Har Camp MIGNOURA (71.3-14.3)
SASEBO (74.5-11.7)
SASEBO (76.35-12.35)
FUKUOKA
CITAE
SAGA - KURUME - CITAE
SAGA
CITAE
SAGA & CITAE
FUKUOKA, CITAE & SAGA
SASEBO (77.3-15.3)
SASEBO (77.3-15.3)
SAGA (1336-1123)
SAGA
SAGA
SAGA
SAGA
SAGA & CITAE
SAGA
SAGA - FUKUOKA - MIGNOURA
FUKUOKA & CITAE
FUKUOKA - CITAE - SAGA
NAKII
MAG. KI (94.8-62.2)
MAG. KI (94.1-59.2)
KAMOYA
MAG. KI (93.3-62.6)
MAG. KI (91.9-76.0)
MIUTA (50.3-47.3)
IHASHA airfield (16.6-75.2)

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<td>SHIM. AIR (45, 5-69.8)</td>
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<td>30th QM Trk Co</td>
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<td>Co C 20th Med BN</td>
<td>CHUR.</td>
<td>Atlv Schelon</td>
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- 8 -

SECRET
### Location Statement No. 36 (Continued)

#### UNIT

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<tr>
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<td>1st BN 127th Inf</td>
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<td>28th Port Surgical Hosp</td>
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<td>101st Divw Disp Squad</td>
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<tr>
<td>683d QM Rdw Doc</td>
<td>KANCY</td>
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**DISTRIBUTION:**

- CG SIXTH Army
- CG FWD Sec
- CTF 55
- CG FIC
- CG KANCY A CoC For
- CG 5th MarDiv
- CG 2nd MarDiv
- CG 32d Inf Div
- CG 3rd CHURA

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit Each General and Special Staff Section

---

**W. W. Wensinger**

Colonel, USCDC

CG, G-3.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET 3-3 Operations Report

No. 36.

From: 1800I, 28 October 1945.
To : 1800I, 29 October 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops.

See Location Statement No. 36.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:

   Clear and cool, visibility, 10-15 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 4-7 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

   Warm, with broken overcast and rain at end of period, visibility, 5-7 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 5-6 knots.

3. Cur Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Elements of the 73d Field Hospital cleared SASEBO by road at 0830I for FUKUOKA. Advance detail of the 15th General Hospital cleared SASEBO by rail for FUKUOKA at 1200I, and arrived without incident at 1630I.

   b. 5th Marine Division commenced further supervision and processing of 6,400 Japanese military repatriates who arrived at Uragashira by LST from SAISHU at 1848I. 15th Marines patrolled without incident to KASHIMA, and 27th Marines (Reinf) in the area south and east of KURUMI.

   c. 2d Marine Division continued occupational missions and deployment into southern KYUSHU. At 0600I, motor elements of 1st Bn, 8th Marines (Reinf) cleared KUMAMOTO for KAGOSHIMA. As of the end of the period, 2d Bn, 2d Marines (Reinf), had completed unloading at NAKOYA.
0117/162
0010142

(Continued).

SECRET

d. 32d Infantry Division conducted routine patrolling and
surveillance. 128th Infantry (Reinf) dispatched patrols
to GORI (6 miles SW of YAMAGUCHI), UTA and SUSA (32 miles
W of SENZAKI). Delayed report indicates that CP of the 32d
Cav Ren Trp opened at HAGI (10 miles N of SENZAKI) at
1300I, 27 October.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base-development missions.
At 1830I, CP of the 3540th Ord Hth Co opened in FUKUOKA at
(51.1-61.1). The advance detail of the 120th QM Bakery Co
arrived in FUKUOKA by rail at 1305I. At 1700I, the 568th
QM Rhd Co closed in FUKUOKA by road.

f. KAYOKA Occupation Force continued preparation for relief.

4. Casualties:
None.

V. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army CG 5thInfDiv CO 1st Bn 127th Inf
CG F J Pac CG 32dInfDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CTF 55 CG FBC Each General Staff Section.
CG 2dMarDiv CO III MAR

1185
053/147
Ser.001.0105

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

29 October 1945.

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 36

UNIT
565th QM Rhd Co
1st Plat, 120th QM Bkry Co
5873d QM Gas Sup Co
1 Plat, Co E, 126th Inf
1 Plat, 3d En, 128th Inf
1 Plat, 63d En, 128th Inf
2d Bn, 28th Mar
32d Recon Trp
Co B, 5th Med Bn
118th MC Bn (less dets)
36th Hq & Hq Co Det, Mil Govt
Co A & MP Det, 6th Mar
Other units - No change.

CP LOCATION
FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
NAKAMATSU (1386.0-1206.0)
OMINE-HIGASHIBUN
AICOURA
FUKUOKA (49.5-73.5)
HAGI
KURUME (1358.9-1132.9)
Mar Camp AIMOURA
(71.2-13.9)
Mar Camp AIMOURA
(77.3-15.3)
KAGOSHIMA

REMARKS
Adv elms
Ar 29Oct
Adv detail
Ar 29Oct
Adv elms
Ar 29Oct
Correction
Ar 27Oct
Correction
Ar 27Oct

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACoFS, G-3.

DESTRUCTION:

CG SIXTH Army CC 5thMarDiv CO KANOYA Occupation Force
CG FIF Pac CG 32dInfDiv Ea Corps and Spl Trp Unit
CTF 55 CG FBC Ea Gen and Spl Staff Section
CC 2dMarDiv CO IaB AIMOURA Ship & Rec Sec 8th Ser Regt

SECRET
G-5 Operations Report

No. 66.

From: 1800I, 29 October 1945
To: 1800I, 30 October 1945

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No. 37.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Overcast with intermittent rain, visibility, 1-3 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 1-5 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Warm and clear, visibility, 8-10 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 3-5 knots.

   c. Southern KYUSHU:

      Warm with broken overcast. Surface winds, light and variable.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. As of 1021I, NavTechJap afloat in USS BLACKFORD reported to Com5thFlt for full administrative control. At 1826I, VAC assumed custody of CHURA Airfield as directed in 6th Army dispatch 300928 of October.

   b. 5th Marine Division continued occupational missions. Elements of the 27th Marines (Reinf) patrolled to WAKATSU (5 miles SE of SAGA), the area JOJIMA-KANGEJU (10 miles E of SAGA), and FURUYU (10 miles NW of SAGA). 13th Marines patrolled without incident to HANASAKI and KASHIWA. At 0604I, 13th Marines had completed debarkation processing of repatriated Japanese military personnel at Uragashira. OITA Occupation Group patrolled to SAEKI (21 miles SE of OITA) and KORE (26 miles NW of OITA). As of the end of the period, 2d Bn, 28th Marines, Fleet Marine Force, was disbanded in accordance with current directives.

   -1-
c. 2d Marine Division continued deployment into Southern KYUSHU. At 0815I, remaining rear elements of 1st Bn, 8th Marines (Reinf.), cleared KUMAMOTO by road for KAGOSHIMA. At 1510I, control of KANCY Occupation Force zone passed to 2d Bn, 21 Marines (Reinf.). 10th Marines during the period established a detachment at UNZEN (on SHIMA-RA Peninsula).

d. 32d Infantry Division conducted routine patrolling and surveillance. 128th Infantry (Reinf.) dispatched a patrol to IWAKUNI airfield (40 miles E of YAMAUCHI). 126th Infantry (Reinf.) sent detachments for security and surveillance of dumps to the following places: NOGA (21 miles NE of FUKUOKA); TSUIKI (17 miles SSW of KOKURA); and the area seven miles south of MOJI.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base-development. At 2100I 1st and 3d Flats, 120th QM Bkry C closed in FUKUOKA; at the same time, Co CP opened at KAISHI STATION. Elements of the 10th General Hospital closed in FUKUOKA via road at 1630I; CP opened in the Postal Savings Building at that hour. As of the end of the period, the 3873d QM Gas Supply Co had closed in FUKUOKA.

f. KANCY Occupation Force continued loading of 1st Bn, 127th Infantry (Reinf.) in 4 LSTs. At 1510I, control of Force zone of responsibility passed to 2d Bn, 2d Marines, and KANCY Occupation Force disbanded as of that hour. 1st Bn, 127th Infantry (Reinf.) completed embarkation and prior to the end of the period sailed from KANCY for BASEBC.

4. Casualties:
None.

W. W. WENSLINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACFBS, G-3.
063/217

OFFICERS CORPS

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

30 October 1945.

UNIT

1st Plt 120th Bkry Co
525th QA Rfi Co
527th QA Gas Sup Co
73rd Field Hosp
15th Gen Hosp

UNIT

36th Med Conti Det
512th Gen Hosp

UNIT

712th Med Gen Co
721st Med Gen Co
C Co 14th Engr Bn
Hq 96th Med CIC Unit
74th Med Conti Det
1st Bn 127th Inf

LOCATION STATEMENT

OF LOCATION

FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
FUKUCKA (49.5-73.5)
KUMAMOTO
FUKUCKA

MIGASAKI
SASEBO

SHIKOKUBEI (1406.4-1213.6)
YAMATA (1380.3-1200.2)
YAMASUCHI

Remarks

Adv Echelon
Det 30 off and
95 nurses, re-
mainder at
SASEBO

Ar 23 Oct
Adv party of 1
off and 2 enl
men
Adv party
Adv party

Other Units — No change.

W. W. WENZINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
G-3 Operations Report

From: 18001, 30 October 1945.
To: 18001, 31 October 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 58.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Cloudy and moderately cold with intermittent rains, visibility, 5-10 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 5-10 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Clear and warm, visibility, 8 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 2-12 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. 1st Bn, 187th Infantry arrived in SaSEBO from KAOYA in four LSTs at 18001 and initiated preparations for disembarkation and entraining for FUKUKA.
   b. 5th Marine Division executed routine occupational missions. 27th Marines patrolled the area south and east of KURUME and the 13th Marines sent patrols to TAKEO (15 miles E of SaSEBO) and the area south of KASHIMA. 13th Marines continued processing of sixth group of Japanese military repatriates from KOREA, which arrived at URAgASHIRA in four LSTs. Oita Occupation Group prepared for relief by elements of the 32d Infantry Division, and patrolled without incident to MIMATSUGI (8 miles S of OITA).
   c. 2d Marine Division conducted routine patrols in the NAGASAKI and KURASHITO areas, and throughout the SHIMABARA peninsula. Deployment into southern KYUSHU continued without incident.
c. 32d Infantry Division continued deployment throughout zone of responsibility. 128th Infantry (Reinf) deepenshotted two 
patrols to YAKAI (in the east, E of BOFU), to KAI (20 
miles NE of BOFU), and to KAMITA (12 miles NW of 
YAKAGUCHI). 126th Infantry (Reinf) sent detachments to 
YOKUROSHI (15 miles S of KOKURA) and HACHI (30 miles SSE 
of KOKURA). At 1830, elements of the 712th Med San Co 
closed in FUKUOKA by road to route to YAKAGUCHI. A rail 
rolling comprising elements of the 128th Fd Bn and of Hq, 
Div Artillery, cleared FUKUOKA by rail for OTA at 0755.

d. FUKUOKA Base Command continued bas development missions. 
Rear elements of the 25th Evacuation Hospital cleared 
FUKUOKA by rail at 1100 and closed in KOKURA at 1515. 
At 1400, Co A 205th Ord Bn opened in new location at 
ZASS feintary (531-611), and closed in old location at the 
same time. Garrison Base Ps 1 closed in FUKUOKA by road 
at 1400, as did the 721st Med San Co at 1610; Co Cp 
opened at that hour at (473-377).

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,  
Colonel, USMC,  
G-3.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

31 October 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

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<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 31 Oct</td>
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<tr>
<td>126th FA BN</td>
<td>Enroute FUKUOKA to OITA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d BN 28th Marines</td>
<td>Disbanded 31 Oct</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Plt AT Co</td>
<td>(1399-1196.5) 7 mi S MOJI</td>
<td>Ar 30 Oct</td>
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<td>Det I &amp; R Plat</td>
<td>TSUKI (1407.0-1178.8)</td>
<td>Ar 30 Oct</td>
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<td>1 Cq Cannon Co</td>
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<td>Elms 1st BN 6th Marines</td>
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<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1112th Engr</td>
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<td>Cns Gp</td>
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Other units - No change.

W. W. WESINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G - 3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 5thMarDiv  CO KAMOYA Occupation Force
CG PIF Pac     CG 32dInfDiv  En Corps and Spl Trp Unit
CTF 56         CG FSC       En Gen and Spl Staff Section
CG 2dMarDiv    CO HAB CHURA  Ship & Rec Sec 6th Ser Regt
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SUBJ:
No.68

5-5 Operations Report

From: 18001, 31 October 1945.
To: 18001, 1 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No.39.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and warm, visibility, unlimited. Surface winds, northerly, 5-7 knots. Sea calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Cool and clear, visibility, 12-16 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly, 5-8 knots. Sea calm.

3. Cur Operations for the period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. As of 30 October, 47th General Hospital on Sixth Army order, was sent from operational control of VAC to X Corps. At 2115, 3d Flot, 4th Salvage Repair Co., was detached from VAC troop-list. A rail serial composed of elements of the 712th MA, 721st MED San Cos cleared 8A530C for FUKOKA at 0301. At 1005, the 101st MA Graves Registration Flot cleared 8A530C by road for FUKOKA. 1st BN, 127th Infantry, commenced unloading from LST's and prepared for movement by rail to FUKOKA.

b. 5th Marine Division conducted routine occupational missions. 3d BN, 26th Marines, relieved 3d BN, 127th Infantry, and control of zone passed to the former unit at 1200. 13th Marines patrolled the area northeast of 8A140 without incident, while elements of the CIA Occupation Group patrolled to 8A165 (20 miles NE of CIA). At the end of the period, the CIA group was in process of relief by 126th FL BN (Adinr).

SECRET

1193
c. 2d Marine Division delayed report indicates that rear elements of 1st BN, 8th Marines, closed in KAGUCHI by road at 1530I, 30 October. Division conducted routine patrolling in vicinity of X4T3N and X3H3-N. Otherwise, no change.

d. 32d Infantry Division delayed report indicates that rail serial of 128th F. En closed without incident in CIT at 1520I, 31 October; road elements of that battalion cleared FUKUCKA for CIT at 0730I. 128th Infantry (Reinf.) patrolled without incident to KAMACHI (10 miles NE of YAKAGUCHI). At 0800I, the 02 ZAI detachment of Co G, 3d MP BN, was relieved by 32d Cav Reen Trp, and cleared 02 ZAI for FUKUCKA by rail at 1430I.

e. FUKUCKA Base Command continued base-development missions. 26th and 35th Inf. Surv. Dets closed in FUKUCKA by road at 1730I, 31 October; CP's of both units opened at that time in the Postal Savings Building.

4. Casualties:

None,

[Signature]

[Name]

Colonel, U.S.M.C.,

ACOF, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG F.J. Pac
CG 3dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG FLG
CC 1st Bn 127th Inf
Luch Corps and 311 Trp
Enst General Staff Section

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

1 November 1945.

No. 32.

UNIT

Det 732d QM Co
96th Mnl Contl Det
203d Mnl Surv Det
Co G 27th Marines
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn (less dts) SASEBO NB
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn (77.3-14.1)
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
31st IC
24th Mnl Surv Det
201st Mnl Surv Det
1st Bn 8th Marines
Dlm 126th FA Bn
712th Hdr San Co
721st Hdr San Co
Det 129th Inf
Det 129th Inf
Det 129th Inf
Det 129th Inf
11th Sta Hosp (less advarty)

CF LOCATION

HAIKI (86.0-10.5)
Marine Camp ANICURA
(71.5-14.7)
Marine Camp ANICURA
(71.5-14.7)
TCSU
FUKUOKA
YaLAGUCHI
KOKURA
NGOJI
MAGASAKI
KURAMOTO
TCSU
CHURA
CITA
Afloat SASEBO Harbor
FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
KAGOSHIMA
CITA
FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA (47.8-67.7)
YAMA (near BOFU 10 miles
SE YaLAGUCHI)
KARAFU (12 miles NW
YAMAGUCHI)
YUKUSHI (15 miles S of
KOKURA)
HACHIYa (30 miles SSE
KOKURA)
Afloat SASEBO Harbor

REMARKS

Ar 30 Oct
Ar 31 Oct
Ar 31 Oct
Ar 29 Oct
1 off & 5 EM
1 off & 3 EM
3 EM
3 EM
1 off & 8 EM
1 off & 7 EM
1 off & 4 EM
4 EM
2 EM
Ar 31 Oct
Ar 31 Oct
Ar 31 Oct
30 Oct
Ar 31 Oct
Ar 31 Oct
Completed movement
Completed movement
Completed movement

SECRET

1195
SECNAV
Other Units - No change.

W. W. WENSLGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACors, G-5.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH ARMY CG 2dMarDiv CG FBC CG APF 929
CG Far Pac CG 5thMarDiv CG LAB CMRA
CG Far East CG 32dInfDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General and Special Staff Section
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O Fleet Post Office, San Francisco.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1200Z, 1 November, 1945.
To: 1200Z, 2 November, 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 40.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Clear and mild, visibility, unlimited. Surface winds, northeasterly, 8-10 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. At 0600Z, rail serial of the 756 Field Hospital cleared SASEBO for KUMAMOTO. At 0900Z, 329th Ambulance Co completed embarkation and went into temporary billets ashore in SASEBO. 1st Bn, 127th Infantry, completed entraining in two rail serials and cleared SASEBO for FUKUOKA at 1600Z.
   b. 6th Marine Division continued occupational missions. At 1040E, 2d Bn, 28th Marines with attached reinforcing and regimental headquarters elements, cleared FUKUOKA by rail in three serials, and closed in ARIMA without incident at 1535E. Elements of the 13th Marines patrolled east and south of KURATSU, and 27th Marines patrolled to the area 27 miles northeast of SAGA.
   c. 8th Marine Division continued deployment into southern KYUSHU. 2d Bn, 26th Marines (Reinf), patrolled without incident from FUKUOKA to ARIMA WH, and 20 miles northeast to SUEFUKI. 3d Bn, 26th Marines, throughout the

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SIGNED

1197
period conducted landing operations for displacement via LST for KURUKA. Elements of the 8th Marines (Reinf) patrolled to the area 12 miles northwest and 15 miles southwest of KURUKA.

c. 53d Infantry Division conducted routine patrolling and surveillance. Elements of the 128th Infantry (Reinf) began destruction of Japanese aircraft at OZUKI airfield (2 miles SE of SHIKIYOSHI); patrolled to FUKUGI (31 miles S of YAMAGUCHI), where two airfields with approximately 175 Japanese aircraft are currently under control; and patrolled to MIY (40 miles SE of YAMAGUCHI) and to the area 17-20 miles northeast of YAMAGUCHI. 2d BN, 128th Infantry (Reinf), relieved 127th FA BN at KURUKA as of 2000. Relief of the CIA Occupation Group by elements of the division continued, and, at 2330, 2d Flat, Co D, 60th En, closed in FUKUGI by rail from SEIZAKI.

d. FUKUGI Base Command continued base development missions. At 0200, 101st QM Graves Registration Flt closed in FUKUGI by road, and were attached to 335th QM En as of that hour. At 0300, Co C, 5th Med En, arrived in FUKUGI and passed from 2d Infantry Division to operational control of FUKUGI Base Command. At 1100, 168th Inf (C) BN passed from FUKUGI Base Command to 321st Inf Cons Brigade for operational control. 98th Veterinary Food Inspection Team closed in FUKUGI by road from SASEBO at 1430.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
Lt Col., USMC,
ACOF JS, G - 3.

(Dacting)

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SACT Army CG 5th MarDiv 4th Corps and 8th Troop Unit
CG PAC F&F CG 32d InfDiv 4th Gen & 8th Staff Section
GTF 55 CG FBC CO APU 929 CTG 55.2
CG 2d MarDiv CO HAB KURU Ship & Rec 8th Serv Regt

SECNAV

1198
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garrison Boat Pool</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (45.7-68.1)</td>
<td>Ar 31 Oct</td>
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<tr>
<td>126th FA Bn (w/elms Div Arty Hq)</td>
<td>OITA</td>
<td>Movement Complete</td>
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<td>Det 4th En 10th Mar</td>
<td>UNZEN (1354-1064)</td>
<td>Ar 31 Oct</td>
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<td>25th Hel Surv Det</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (44.1-36.6)</td>
<td>Ar 1 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Flat 3d MP En</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>Ar 1 Nov</td>
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<td>101st QM Gr Regr Plat</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1564th Engr Dep Co</td>
<td>SASEBO NAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>692d Ambulance Co</td>
<td>SASEBO (1279.7-1110.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elms 32d Recon Trp</td>
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<tr>
<td>123d Port Co</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
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<td>633d Port Co</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
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<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1161st Engr (C) Gp</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other units - no change.

J. L. STEWART, LtCol., USMC, ACoFS, G - 3. (Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army  CG 32d Inf Div  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CG FIF Fac    CG FBC              Each General Staff Section
CTF 55        CG NAS OKURA
CG 2d Mar Div  CG AFU 929
CG 5th Mar Div Ship & Rec 8th Ser Regt
0117/162
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 70.

From: 1800I, 2 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 3 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 41.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and cool, visibility, unlimited. Surface winds, northeasterly, 10 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Cold, with light haze, visibility, 6-8 miles. Surface winds, west-northwesterly, 12-18 knots. Sea, brisk.

3. Current Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned mission in zone of responsibility. 73d Field Hospital closed by rail in KUAMOTO without incident at 0300I, and passed at that hour to operational control of 2d Marine Division.

b. 5th Marine Division continued preparations and loading to send Co A, 27th Marines (Reinf), to GOTO RA2720 in order to execute current directives relative to disposition and surveillance. During the period, 2d Bn, 28th Marines (Reinf), initiated relief of 3d Bn, 127th Infantry.

c. 2d Marine Division conducted routine patrolling in the vicinity of KUAMOTO (8th Marines (Reinf)), and the SHIMABARA-ISAAYA area (10th Marines). 2d Marines (Reinf) continued deployment in southern KYUSHU.

d. 32d Infantry Division continued patrolling and surveillance. 126th Infantry (Reinf) destroyed Japanese aircraft at OZUKI Airfield, and patrolled without incident to KARAI (16 miles NW of YAMAGUCHI); KAJIHATA (20 miles NE of YAMAGUCHI); YASHAKI (22 miles NE of YAMAGUCHI); and KIBE (24 miles NE of
G-3 Operations Report No. 70. (Continued)

SECRET

YAMAGUCHI. Elements of the 126th Infantry (Reinf) patrolled to HARIZAKI (20 miles E of FUKUOKA) and HIKOSAN (26 miles S of KOKURA). At 21001, 1st Bn, 127th Infantry, closed by rail in FUKUOKA and as of that hour reverted to operational and administrative control of the division.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base development.

4. Casualties:
   None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army  CG 5thMarDiv  CO MAB OWURA
CG FWF Pac  CG 2dMarDiv
CTF 55  CG 32dInfDiv  Each Corps and Spl Troop Unit
CTG 55.2  CG FBC  Each General Staff Section
LOCATION STATEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>96th Det Food Inspection Tm</td>
<td>FUKUCKA</td>
<td>1 off 9 EJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323d Ord Amn Co</td>
<td>FUKUCKA</td>
<td>2 EJ Arriv 3 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>APU 925 (less det)</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td>Completed movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det APU 929</td>
<td>TAGASAKI</td>
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<tr>
<td>94th MA Co Contl Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>415th MA Alg Surv Tm</td>
<td>KUMAMOTO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>73d Fld Hosp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2811 Pot Dist</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 2 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>456th Dent Pros</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Approx 1/2 of Regt ar 2 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>25th Evac Hosp</td>
<td>NOJIT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Marines</td>
<td>Marine Camp AIMOURA</td>
<td>Ar 2 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bn 28th Marines</td>
<td>Marine Camp AIMOURA</td>
<td>Ar 2 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn 187th Inf</td>
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Other Units - No change.

DISTRIBUTION:

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<tr>
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<th>CO APU 929</th>
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<tr>
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<td>CG 32dInfDiv</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF 55</td>
<td>CG FBC</td>
<td>Each Corps and Spl Trp Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG 2dMarDiv</td>
<td>CG 2AB OAHU</td>
<td>Each General and Spl Staff Section</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET
No. 71

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 3 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 4 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 42.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Clear and cool, visibility, unlimited. Surface winds,
      northwesterly, 2-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Cool and clear, visibility, 12-15 miles. Surface winds,
      westerly, 4-6 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of
      responsibility. As of 0300I, 1140 assumed operational con-
      trol of 5th Pioneer Bn from 5th Marine Division.
   b. 5th Marine Division conducted routine patrolling and sur-
      veillance. At 0800I, 3d Bn, 127th Infantry, cleared
      SAS60 by rail for FUKUOKA. At 1606I, Co A, 27th Marines
      (Reinf), was despatched to GCTO RTTC to execute current
      directives relative to disposition and terms of surrender.
   c. 2d Marine Division continued occupational activities and
      carried on patrol-activities in the AGASA, KUMAMOTO and
      SHIMABARA areas. 3d Bn and elements of regimental head-
      quarters, 3d Marines (Reinf), cleared AGASA for KANCY,
      by 1ST: at 0800I.
   d. 32d Infantry Division completed relief of CITI Occupation
      Group (5th Marine Division) at 0300I with elements of the
      Division Artillery. 126th FA Bn now occupies CITI, and
      operational control of the 496th GCT Det passed from CITI
      group to division as of the hour of relief. Elements of
      the 128th Infantry continued destruction of aircraft at
      CZUBK airfield. 3d Bn, 128th Infantry, despatched de-
      tachments to 20FU (10 miles S of YAMAGUCHI), and to
      IWAKUNI airfield (40 miles E of YAMAGUCHI) to safeguard
      and dispose of captured material.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. W. Stewart
LtCol., 3rd Bn.,
405th Inf., 25th Div.
(Acting)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OF LOCATION</th>
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<td>H&amp;S Bn VAC</td>
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<td>Army Sec VAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>22d Spl Ser Co (less 3d &amp; 4th Plats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>929th AFU (Type G)</td>
<td>FU'UOKA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det 929th AFU (Type G)</td>
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<td>468th CIC B3 Det (Combat)</td>
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<td>4th Censorship Adv Det</td>
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<td>173d Fin Disbursing Det</td>
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<td>OKURA (1300.5-1084.0)</td>
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<td>Armed Forces Rad Sta WLKA</td>
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<td>2d Birry Plat (Prov)</td>
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<td>SASEBO NB (77.5-14.1)</td>
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<td>51g Bn VAC (less detts)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1st &amp; 5th Sep RI Plats atchd)</td>
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<td>3d Mf Bn (Prov)(less Cos A, C &amp; D)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>113th Field Hosp (400 beds)</td>
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<td>34th Hq Contr Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fukuoka Base Command</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>(48.9-38.4)</td>
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<td>Post Director Fukuoka</td>
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SIGHT

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1st Plt 1st Co 128th Inf
1 Squd Cannon Co 128th Inf
128th Inf
1st Bn 128th Inf
2d Bn 128th Inf
1 Plt 3d Co 128th Inf
1 Plt 3d En 128th Inf
1 Plt 3d En 128th Inf
Det 128th Inf
Det 128th Inf
2d Co 117th Inf
Co G 117th Engr Bn
Co G 117th Med Bn (w/1st Plt Co D)
2d Plt Co D 3d INF Bn
(Prov)
32d Recon Trp
Det 32d Recon Trp
28th Marines (Reinf) (less 2d & 3d Bns)
Det 32d Mar Hq
2d Bn 32d Mar
3d Bn 32d Mar
5th Mar Div (Reinf) (less det)
403d CTG, 128th Det (Area)
137th Inf (Reinf) (less 1st Bn)
1st Bn 137th Inf
121st Inf Bn
Det 32d Li Co
Det 783d Eng Co
Co B 107th Med Bn
Co B 117th Eng Bn (less 3d & 4th Platoons)
Co C 61st Mach Trk Bn
(Prov)
V.0.3
6th Sup Lry Flat
117th Inf Bn (less det)
34th Mar Div Co
Co C 61st Flat Co C 3d INF Bn (Prov)

OF LOCATION

13399.0-1186.5 (7 mi S of KOJI)
(1377.3-1188.2)
SHIZUOKA (1403.4-1218.6)
(1403.4-1218.6)
(10 mi SW KAMAGUCHI)
(12 mi NW KAMAGUCHI)
SHIZUOKA (1403.4-1218.6)
SHIZUOKA (1403.4-1218.6)
SHIZUOKA (1403.4-1218.6)
FUKUoka
HIGI
SHIZAKI
FUKUoka (48.9-68.4)
Marine Camp AINOura
Marine Camp AINOura
Marine Camp AINOura
Marine Camp AINOura
Marine Camp AINOura (71.4-14.3)
Marine Camp AINOura (71.3-14.3)
LIKI (65.1-08.6)
FUKUoka
LIKI (64.0-09.0)
LIKI (65.2-08.8)
SAEBO (78.1-09.8)
LIKI (65.2-09.2)
LIKI (65.5-09.7)
Marine Camp AINOura
SAEBO (79.5-06.5)
Marine Camp AINOura (70.9-13.9)
Marine Camp AINOura (71.2-13.9)
SAEBO (78.6-11.7)
SAEBO (77.3-15.3)

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<td>2d Art Trk Co</td>
<td>ISAHAYA Airfield (16.3-75.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

DISTRIBUTION:

- CG SED XII Army
- CG 3d InfDiv
- CG 1st InfDiv
- CTF 55
- CG 32d InfDiv
- CTG 55.2
- CG FBC

CO 3d Mar Div
CO 1st Inf Div
CG AFU 929
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General and Special Staff Sec
Ship & Rec 8th Serv Regt
G-3 Operations Report

From: 18001 4 November 1945,
To: 18001 5 November 1945.

No. 72

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No. 43.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Clear and cold, visibility, unlimited. Surface winds, northerly, 5-10 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Cool and clear, visibility, 12-15 miles. Surface winds, southwesterly, 5-7 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Elements of 15th General Hospital departed SASEBO by rail for KCKURA at 0945I. As of 31 October, 2d Separate Headquarters and Supply Company disbanded in accordance with FMF Pac dispatch 200207 of Oct. At 1600I, CG VaC returned from inspection of FUKUOKA area.

   b. 5th Marine Division conducted routine patrolling in the vicinity of SAGA. Former CITA Occupation Group cleared CITA in two rail serials for SASEBO at 0900I.

   c. 2d Marine Division units patrolled without incident the vicinity of NAGASAKI and the SHIMA-BARA Peninsula. At 1015I, 3d Bn and regimental headquarters, 2d Marines, arrived at KAWAYA by LST, and commenced unloading. At 1700I, 1st Bn, 10th Marines closed by road in NAGASAKI from ISABA; CP opened in KAMIGO Barracks at 0900I and closed at old location at the same time.
a. 32d Infantry Division continued normal occupational missions. 138th Infantry (Reinf) progressed with disposition of Japanese material at IWAKUNI Airfield, and patrolled without incident to UBE (19 miles SSW of YAHAGUCHI), ONODA (20 miles SW of YAHAGUCHI), and KIBE (14 miles NW of YAHAGUCHI). At 0855I, 120th FA Bn cleared FUKUOKA by road and rail for CITTA and closed without incident at 1400I. 3d Bn, AT Co and Cannon Co, 127th Infantry, closed by rail in FUKUOKA at 2230I, reverting to control of division as of that hour. Elements of the 126th Infantry (Reinf) patrolled the SHIBA–YAMATA–YAKAHATSU area and to KOISHIMARA (23 miles S of KOKURA).

b. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base-development missions. Delayed report indicates that CP of 122d Station Hospital now open in Hitsui Building, KOJI.

4. Casualties:
None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acctng).

---

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 8thMarDiv  CG MAB OKURA
CG TMT Pae    CG 2dMarDiv  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CTF 55        CG 32dInfDiv  Each General Staff Section
CTG 55.2      CG FEC

---
053/217
Ser.001052B
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.
SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT
5 November 1965.

No. 45.

Map: AMS L671 Central JAPAN, 1:250,000.

UNIT
3d Bn 127th Inf
120th FA Bn
AT Co 127th Inf
Cannon Co 127th Inf
2d Bn 128th Inf

CP LOCATION
FUKUOKA
CITA
FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
KOKURA

OTHER UNITS - No change.

J. L. STEWART,
Lt Col, USMC,
ACoPS, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army
CG Pac
CTF 55
CTG 55.2
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thInfDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FBC
CG MAB OOKURA
CG AFU 929
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each Gen and Special Staff Sec
Ship & Rec 8th Ser Aagt
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 73

From: 1800I, 5 November 1945,
To: 1800I, 6 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 44.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and cold, visibility, 15 miles. Surface winds, northernly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Cool and clear, visibility, 10-12 miles. Surface winds, westerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. At 0830I, 11th General Dispensary cleared SASEBO by road for FUKUOKA. At 1130I, advance detail of 309th General Hospital cleared SASEBO for FUKUOKA by road. At 1030I, the CC, SIXTH Army landed at NAS, OMURA, and proceeded to NAGASAKI, arriving at 1230I. At 1515I, he cleared NAGASAKI by road for SASEBO.

b. 5th Marine Division reconnaissance and disposition by Co A, 27th Marines are proceeding without incident on FUKAE SHIMA (GOTO REIC). At 1801I, Co A, 5th Tank Bn (Reinf) (former COTA Occupation Group) closed in SASEBO by rail. 1st Bn and elements of regimental headquarters, 26th Marines (Reinf), closed in SASEBO by rail from FUKUOKA at 1400I and reverted to division control.

c. 2d Marine Division conducted routine patrolling in the vicinity of KUHA OTO, IBASHAYA and NAGASAKI. 2d Bn, 2d Marines, initiated displacement to HIYAKOGOJO, while 1st Bn, 2d Marines, continues preparations for over-water displacement to HIYAZAKI. The CC, SIXTH Army was present in the division zone between 1230I and 1515I.
d. 32d Infantry Division executed normal patrolling and
surveillance south of KOKURA and CITA. Delayed reports
indicate that on 2 November elements of the 128th Infantry
(Reinf) reconnitered without incident the following
islands southeast of BOFU: SEN SHIMA, OTSU SHIMA,
O SHIMA, KASATO SHIMA, and NO SHIMA. Road and rail
serials of the 2d Bn, 127th Infantry closed in FUKUCKA
from Sasebo at 1300I and reverted to division as of
that hour.

c. FUKUCKA Base Command continued base-development missions.
3540th Ord Mkt Co cleared FUKUCKA by road at 0800I, and
closed in KOKURA without incident at 0955; Co CP is
located in KOKURA Arsenal.

4. Casualties:
None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SIXTH Army CG 2dMarDiv CC MAB, CHUDA
CG F/J/F Pac CG 6thMarDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CTF 55 CG 32dInfDiv Each General Staff Section
CTG 55.2 CG FSC

---

1218
063/317
Ser.001056B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

6 November 1945.

LOCATION STATE ETT

Map: A.S 1371 Central JAPAN, 1:250,000.

UNIT

2811th Engr Fst Dist Co
196th Engr Dp Trk Co
Co A, 307th Marines (Reinf)

309th Gen Hosp

11th Gen Disp
116th Sta Hosp
123d Sta Hosp
1st En 10th Marines

3540th Ord. Lah Co
13th Gen Hosp

3d En 52nd Marines

Other Units - No change.

CP LOCATION

FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
FUKAE SHIMA of
GOTO RETTO
Enroute SaSEBO to
FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
SaSEBO (1279.7-1110.8)
KOKIGI (57.8-56.2)
TAKASAKI (Kamigo
Barracks)
Enroute SaSEBO to
KOKURA
FUKOYA

REMARKS

Ar 4 Nov
Ar 4 Nov
Ar 4 Nov
Ar 6 Nov
Ar 6 Nov
Ar 5 Nov
Ar 5 Nov
Ar 5 Nov

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
Acting G-3,

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG FIFTH PAC
CG 5th MarDiv
CG 32d InfDiv
CG 3rd InfDiv
CG FIFTH PAC

CG 5th MarDiv
CG 32d InfDiv
CG 3rd InfDiv
CG FIFTH PAC

Each Corps and Special Troop Unit

Each Gen and Special Staff Sec
Ship & Rec 8th Ser Regt

SECRET

1219
From: 1800I, 6 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 7 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

Enclosure: (A) Location map, major troop units, VAC.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 45 and Enclosure (A).

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Clear and cold, visibility, unlimited. Surface winds, northwesterly, 8-10 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Cold and clear, visibility 12-15 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 5-8 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. The CG, SIXTH Army, arrived in SASEBO by road from NAGASAKI at 1801, inspected elements of the 6th Marine Division during the morning of 7 November, and, at 1816I, cleared SASEBO by road for FUKUKA. As of 7 November, the NAGASAKI Detachment, 8th Service Regiment, disbanded, and 1st Sep Hq and Sup Co (atend for operational and administrative control, 24th Marine Depot Co and 124th Port Co) passed to operational control of 2d Marine Division. 308th General Hospital cleared SASEBO by rail in two serials at 1200I and 1300I which arrived without incident at 1630I and 2000I, 7 November.
   b. 6th Marine Division disposition parties were active in the SASEBO and KASHIMA areas. Co A, 27th Marines (Reinf) continues disposition and surveillance in COTO RETTO. CP, 28th Marines (Reinf), opened in AIMOURA barracks, SASEBO, at 0800I; at the same hour, CP, 1st Bn, 28th Marines (Reinf), opened in CPO barracks, SASEBO.
G-3 Operations Report Number 74.  (Continued).

SECRET

c. 2d Marine Division continued routine occupational missions. 8th Marines (Reinf) patrolled the area 20 miles southeast of KUMAMOTO, while at 12451 an advance detail of 2d Bn, 8th Marines (Reinf), cleared KUMAMOTO by road for HITOGOSHI (41 miles S of KUMAMOTO). 2d Bn, 2d Marines (Reinf) (rather than 2d Bn, as stated in G-3 Operations Report No. 73) is now enroute to HIYAKONOJO.

d. 32d Infantry Division conducted routine patrolling and surveillance. 128th Infantry (Reinf) patrolled to KINJO (16 miles NW of YAMAUCHI) and KAMOKU (27 miles NW of YAMAUCHI). 128th Infantry sent patrols without incident to OKURA (20 miles S of YAWATA), HAKATSU (25 miles SE of OKURA) and HIDA (40 miles S of OKURA). At 15001, Ser Co, 127th Infantry, closed in FUKUOKA and reverted to control of division. CG, SIXTH Army arrived FUKUOKA at 17351.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command delayed report indicates that the 11th General Dispensary closed in FUKUOKA by rail at 11001, 6 November. Rear elements of 13th General Hospital cleared FUKUOKA by rail for KOKURA at 11001, and closed in KOKURA without incident at 13161. OP opened at 14001 in Tamya Building.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACorS, G-3,
(acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  CG 32dInfDiv  Ea Corps & Spec Trp
CG F&C Pac  CG F5C  Unit (less Encl (a))
CTF 55 (less Encl (a))  CTF 55.2  Ea Gen Staff Section
CG 2dMarDiv  CO Ma3 OKURA (less Encl (a))
CG 5thMarDiv  -  -

- 2 -

SECRET

1221
053/317
Ser. 001064 B
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

No. 45.

LOCATION STATEMENT

7 November 1945.

Map: M-571 Central U.S. 1:250,000

UNIT

Det at Co 126th Inf
Det at Co 126th Inf
Det at Co 126th Inf
Co D 4th MP Bn
26th Evac Hosp
308th Gen Hosp
2d Bn 127th Inf
Co B 107th Med Bn
2d Co B 14th Engr Bn
31st Sp L Co NC Bn
Det HS 3 Co 6th Tank Bn
26th Rad Bn
Hq & Hq Co 1052d PC&SR Gp
553d Sig Dep Co
28th Marines Hq
1st Bn 28th Marines
Elm 127th Inf Hq
2d Bn 127th Inf
2d Sep Hq & Sup Co (Prov)
Elm 5d Bn 2d Marines
Ser Co 127th Inf

Other Units — No change.

OP LOCATION

YUKUHUSHI (1403.0-1186.4)
YUMOSHI
HACHIIYA
FUKUOKA
KOKURA
FUKUOKA

REMARKS

Returned from SHIMONOSEKI

Adv elms. Remainder enroute from SASEBO

FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
SASEBO (76.8-13.4)
SASEBO Nas (79.1-08.9) Returned from OITA
SASEBO Nas (79.1-08.9) Returned from OITA

FUKUOKA
Afloat SASEBO Harbor Marine Camp AINOURA
Completed movement from FUKUOKA

Marine Camp AINOURA
FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
Disbanded 31 Oct 45
HIYAKOMOJO

FUKUOKA

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
AGf S, G-5,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army
CG F/F ArmFac
CG TF 55
CG 55, 2

CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32d InfDiv
CG FBC

CO NAS CMUSA
CO APU 529
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each Gen and Special Staff Sec
Ship & Rec 8th Bn Regt
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

From: 19001, 7 November, 1945,
To : 19001, 8 November, 1945.

SECRET
No. 75

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 43.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and cold, visibility 10-20 miles. Surface winds,
northerly, 2-4 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Clear and cold, visibility 10-12 miles. Surface winds,
northerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone
   of responsibility.

b. 5th Marine Division continued routine occupational mis-
   sions, 1st Bn, 28th Marines (less Co B, which displaced
to SaSEBO Fortress arty Hq), displaced from CMO barracks
to AIMOURA barracks, SaSEBO. 13th Marines patrolled
without incident to FURUYU and HAIMASAKI (55 and 20 miles
NE of SaSEBO, respectively).

c. 2d Marine Division at 09001 dispatched a patrol from 6th
Marines (Reinf) in USS LCT 954 to reconnoiter KAKINOURA
SHILA (15 miles SW of SaSEBO) and investigate reported
disturbances among Chinese on that island. At 18011, CP's
of 2d Marines (Reinf) and of 3d Bn, 2d Marines (Reinf),
opened in IYAKOJO. At 10451, a Japanese ammunition
dump in KAMOYA, adjacent to billets of 2d Bn, 2d Marines

- 1 -
(Reinf), exploded from unknown causes; no American casualties were sustained, and, as of 1848I, fires were under control, and explosions had ceased. Full report and investigation will follow. On 8 November, 4th Bn, 10th Marines, established an outpost of sixteen strength in KAZUSA (20 miles SE of IMAI-GUN, across TAIHEI-IWA); CP is located in KAZUSA Hotel.

d. 32d Infantry Division delayed report indicates that rear elements of Co E, 114th Engr Bn, closed in FUKUOKA by rail at 1200I, 7 November. 128th Infantry (Reinf) despatched Co E to IMAI-GUN airfield to assist in disposition of Japanese matériel, and elements of the regiment patrolled without incident to YAMA-IWA (13 miles NE of YAMA-UCHI), OGAMI (9 miles SW of YAMA-UCHI), and the islands 20 miles southeast of BOFU. 128th Infantry (Reinf) despatched reconnaissance patrols to KOK-2 (36 miles SE of JUKI), TAKAYAMA (37 miles SE of HOKI), and YOKKAIDO (37 miles SE of ICHI). Elements of Division Arty patrolled to JUKI (25 miles W of ICHI).

c. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base-development missions. At 1100I, the advance detail of 5th Sig Cons Bn closed in FUKUOKA by road. At 1200I, elements of the Garrison Boat Pool arrived in FUKUOKA by rail.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USA,  
ACofS, 25th (Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AFHQ HUBTACOM  32d InfDiv  CO  IAB, OKINAWA
CO 6th ArmDiv  CO  FSG
CO 5th ArmDiv  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CO 32d InfDiv  Each General Staff Section

SECRET
053/142  
Ser.001070B  
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
IN THE FIELD.  

8 November 1945

SECRET

No. 46  
LOCATION STATEMENT

Map: AMS L571 Central Japan, 1:250,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co B 114th Engr Bn</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>Completed movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Gen Hosp</td>
<td>KOKURA</td>
<td>Completed movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq 2d Marines</td>
<td>MIYAKONOJO</td>
<td>Completed movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn 2d Marines</td>
<td>MIYAKONOJO</td>
<td>Ar 8Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co G 5th Engr Bn</td>
<td>Marine Camp AINOURA</td>
<td>Completed movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B 107th Med Bn</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (1341.0-1175.0)</td>
<td>Adv Det 8 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>309th Gen Hosp</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>Loading for movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>553d QM Sig Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>to MIYAZAKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co E 128th Inf</td>
<td>IWAKUNI Airfield</td>
<td>Enroute to KAKINOURA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn 2d Marines</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td>SHIMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Recon Patrols 6th Mar</td>
<td>LST 954</td>
<td>Fwd echelon adv party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn 8th Marines</td>
<td>HITOYOSHI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. L. STEWART,  
LtCol., USMC,  
(acting)

DISTRIBUTION:

CG SIXTH Army  
CG F JF Pac  
CTF 55  
CTG 55.2  
GHQ AF Pac MANILA

CG 2dMarDiv  
CG 5thMarDiv  
CG 32dInfDiv  
CG FBC  
CO MAB OKURA  
CO AFU 929  
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit  
Each General and Special Staff Sec  
Ship & Rec 8th Serv Regt
0117/13a
0010773

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 76.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No. 47.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Clear and cold, visibility, 10-12 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 6-8 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Cool, and clear, visibility, 12-15 miles. Surface winds, northerly 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. As of 7 November, 1st Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon disbanded in accordance with F.F. Pac. dispatch C59041 of November. As of same date, 2d Flot., 22d Special Services Co., was detached from operational control of VAC by SIXTH Army. 1352d Engineer General Service Regiment was deleted from VAC troop list by SIXTH Army dispatch 161985T of October.

   b. 5th Marine Division patrols destroyed defensive installations on the following islands 7-12 miles west of SASEBO: KURO SHIMA, TAKA SHIMA, TOKOI SHIMA, NO SHIMA and A SHIMA. 1st Marines destroyed military material at SHIOTA (15 miles SW of SASEBO).

   c. 2d Marine Division reports relative to explosion at KAMOYA on 2 November indicate that a Japanese flare-stowage area was accidentally ignited, with a resultant fire and series of explosions which lasted for several hours; several houses were burned in a small forest fire which started as a result. 6th Marines patrol landed on KAKIMURA-SHIMA (15 miles SW of SASEBO) at 1549T, 6 November, and reports
SECRET

that the Chinese situation is well in hand. Elements of 3d BN, 8th Marines (Reinf), cleared KUAMOTO by road for MITSUYASHI (38 miles S of KUAMOTO) and arrived without incident at 1215I. Patrolling continued in the HAGASAKI and ISAHAYA areas.

d. 32d Infantry Division conducted routine occupational operations. 128th Infantry (Reinf) procurement and disposition teams were active within a 30-mile radius of HAGASAKI. Division Artillery at OITA dispatched a patrol to SAEKI (27 miles SE of OITA) without reported incident.

c. FUKUOKA Base Command carried out base development missions. 553d Sig Cons Co closed in FUKUOKA by road at 1500I; CP opened as of that time at KASHII STATION.

4. Casualties:

None.

[Signature]

J. L. STEWART, LtCol., USMC,        
Acting

DISTRIBUTION:

CHQ AFFAO HAKIMURA          CG 25thInfDiv          CC 447th, CHURA
CG SIXTH Army               CG 3rdMarDiv           CG PBC
CG FMF Pac                  CG 32dInfDiv           Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CTF 55                      CTF 55, 2               Each General Staff Section
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET
No. 47.

LOCATION STATEMENT

9 November 1945.

Map: AMS L571 Central Japan, 1:250,000

UNIT

1st Bn 2d Marines
Recon Patrol 1st Bn 6th Marines
Elms 553d Sig Dep Co
1 Plt 1564th Engr Dep Co
Co B 23rd Marines
2d Plt 22d Spl Serv Co

Other Units — No change.

CP LOCATION

Enroute Nagasaki to
KAKOYA ETD KAKOYA 100600/1
KAKINCURA SHIMA
FUKUOKA
FUKUOKA
SASEBO Fortress
Relieved from opnl
contl Vac

REMARKS

ar 8 Nov
ar 9 Nov
ar 8 Nov
ar 8 Nov
7 Nov

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
(acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac Manila
CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
CTF 56
CTG 55.2
CG 2d MarDiv
CG 6th MarDiv
CG 32d InfDiv
CG FBC
CG 3d MarDiv

CC Hq Omuta
CC AFU 929
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General and Special Staff Sec
Ship & Rec 8th Serv Regt

SECRET

1229
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

S-3 Operations Report

No. 77

From: 18001, 9 November 1945, To: 18001, 10 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No. 48.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Clear and cold, visibility, 10-12 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Clear and warm, visibility, 12-15 miles. Surface winds, northeasterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility and observed the 170th birthday of the Marine Corps this date.

   b. 5th Marine Division reports indicate that Co A, 27th Marines (Reinf), has completed missions on SHOPO Retto, and is preparing to return on 11 November. Elements of the 27th Marines (Reinf) patrolled without incident to KARA-KONACHI (15 miles S of Kurume) and HAINUZUKA (7 miles S of Kurume).

   c. 3d Marine Division, no change.

   d. 32d Infantry Division procurement and disposition teams initiated operations within a 20-mile radius of Bofu, and proceeded to SUSA (55 miles NNE of YAJAGUCHI). A demobilization-verification patrol from the 128th Infantry (Reinf) found all troops demobilized at YAFF (30 miles ESE of Bofu).

   e. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base-development missions.

      3875th W Gas Supply Co displaced from Zass Foundry to KISHI Station, where Co CP opened at 1801I.
4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
ACCTS, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

CHQ AFFAC MANILA
CG SIXTH Army
CG FIF Fac
CTF 35

CTG 55.2
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv

CO MAB CHURA
CG FSC
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section
SECRET

No. 48. LOCATION STATEMENT
Map: AMS L571 Central Japan, 1:250,000
UNIT

Co A 27th Marines
387th QM Gas Sup Co
1 Squad Co I 126th Inf
Other Units - No change.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

10 November 1945.

Completed mission
GCTC RETTO ETA SA5EBC 11 Nov
FUKUOKA

moved to
KASHII Sta
from ZASS
foundry

HADI (1401.0-1155.0)

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting).

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac HAMATA
CJ SIXTH Army
CG FMF Fac
CTF 55
CTG 55.2

CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FBU

CO HAB OMURA
CO AFU 929
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General and Special Staff Sec
Ship & Rec 8th Serv Regt

1232
0117/162
0010835
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.
SECRET
3-3 Operations Report

No. 78.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No. 49.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Clear and cold, visibility, 8-10 miles. Surface winds,
      northwesterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Warm and hazy, with intermittent showers, visibility, 8-10
      miles. Surface winds, northerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

   c. Southern KYUSHU:

      Warm and hazy, visibility, 10 miles. Surface winds,
      negligible. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of
      responsibility. VAC Chief of Staff inspected garrisons at
      KANOA, MIYAKONJO and KAGOSHIMA, and made an aerial recon-
      naissance of the KUSHIKINO-IZAKU-TOJIMBARA area, as well
      as of MIYAZAKI.

   b. 5th Marine Division detachment (Co A, 27th Marines, (Reinf))
      returned from SOTO RATTO at 1245I. Elements of the 27th
      Marines completed disposition on the following islands:
      (all 7-12 miles WN of SASEBO): ASA SHIMA, TOKISHIMA,
      KUJUKU SHIMA, and NO SHIMA.

   c. 2d Marine Division delayed report indicates that 1st Bn, 2d
      Marines (Reinf), arrived by LST at KANOA at 1030, 10 Nov-
      ember. Elements of the 2d Marines (Reinf) patrolled without
      incident to HOSHIKURA, NISHINOMURA, and KUKISHIMA (18 miles
      SE of MIYAKONJO). 6th Marines' patrol cleared KAKINOURA
      SHIMA for MATSU-SHIMA (18 miles SE of SASEBO) at 0840I.

-1-
G-3 Operations Report Number 78. (Continued).

SECRET

d. 32d Infantry Division continued routine occupational missions. Disposition teams of the 128th Infantry (Reinf) initiated operations at SASANAMI MURA (12 miles N of YAMAGUCHI). 127th Infantry (Reinf) began destruction of Japanese tanks and armored materiel, while elements of the 126th Infantry (Reinf) patrolled without incident in the area 30 miles south and east of KOKURA, reaching MORIZANA (32 miles SE of KOKURA).

e. FUKUCKA Base Command, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACoRs, G - 3.
(Acting)

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AFPAC MANILA CG 2dMarDiv CO MAB, OMURA
CG SIXTH Army CG 5thMarDiv CG FAB
CG FMF Pac CG 32dInfDiv Each Corps and Spl Troop Unit
CTF 55 Each Gen Staff Section
CTG 55.2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 49.</th>
<th>LOCATION STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Map: AMS L571 Central JAPAN 1:250,000</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq VAC</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hs Br VAC</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.2-13.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Sec VAC</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>32d Spl Ser Co (less 2d, 3d, 4th Plt)</td>
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<tr>
<td>939th APU (Type G)</td>
<td>FUKUCA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det 939th APU (Type G)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB</td>
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<tr>
<td>404th CIC A232 Det (Area)</td>
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<td>466th CIC B3 Det (Combat)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<td>4th Censorship Adv Det</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>173d Fin Disbursing Det</td>
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<td>Mobile Explosives Investigating</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit #1</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (75.4-12.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Rad Sta NWTC</td>
<td>CMURA (1300.5-1084.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Rad Sta WLKA</td>
<td>CMURA</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Sep Lary Plat</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.2-14.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Skry Plat (Prov)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (78.4-12.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq Co Shore Brig</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig Bn VAC (less Dts) (6th Sep Rl Flat atcl)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.4-14.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d MF Bn (Prov) (less Cos A, C, D)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFASCU #4</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (79.2-08.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hedron DGO #1</td>
<td>SASEBO NA (79.0-08.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12th MT Bn (Prov) (less Co B &amp; 2d Plat Auto Rep Co)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.0-14.2)</td>
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<td>20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov) (less Cos A, B, &amp; C)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Sep Engr Bn (less Co B &amp; det of Cos A &amp; C)</td>
<td>SASEBO NA (78.7-09.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>546th Engr Fnn Bridge Co (atcl to 2d Sep Engr Bn)</td>
<td>SASEBO NA (78.7-09.3)</td>
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<td>322th Engr Tech Int Tm (atcl to 2d Sep Engr Bn)</td>
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<td>Sasebo Aircraft Factory (80.3-12.0)</td>
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<td>Det Co &amp; 2d Sep Engr</td>
<td>Sala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det Co C 2d Sep Engr Bn</td>
<td>Sala</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Pltn Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO (77.3-15.3)</td>
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<td>8th Ser Regt (Reinf) (less dets)</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (78.3-12.2)</td>
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<td>3d Mar Dep Co</td>
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053/217
Ser. 001068
Location Statement No. 49 (Cont'd).

SECRET

UNIT

42d Mar Dep Co
43d Mar Dep Co
6th Mar Amm Co
8th Mar Amm Co
10th Mar Amm Co
1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
1st Fun & Bath Co (Prov)
1st Bury Plat (Prov)
Hq & Hq Det 360th Port Bn
135d Port Co
153d Port Co
635d Port Co
62d Med Base Dep Co (556th Optical Rep Tm atchd)
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn (less dete)
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
Det 737th Ry Operating Bn
Det 737th Ty Operating Bn
Det 737th Ty Operating Bn
Det 737th Ty Operating Bn
Det 737th Ty Operating Bn
Det 737th Ty Operating Bn
1684th Engr Dep Co (less 1st Plat)
CUB 18 (Reinf)
Port Director (w/Com Unit #480)
Garrison Boat Pool
Garrison Boat Pool
Garrison Boat Pool
1st Spl NC Bn
72d NP Bn
70th & 71st Logistical Support Cos
72d & 75th Logistical Support Cos
Spl Augmented Hosp #5

CF LOCATION          REMARKS
SASEBO NB (79.0-11.8)
SASEBO NB (78.7-11.8)
SASEBO NB (78.5-11.7)
SASEBO (78.4-12.6)
SASEBO NB (78.2-11.1)
SASEBO NB (78.7-12.3)
SASEBO NB (79.2-11.9)
SASEBO NB (78.4-12.4)
SASEBO NB (78.6-12.1)
SASEBO
SASEBO
SASEBO NB (78.3-11.7)
SASEBO
SASEBO (75.2-11.8)
SASEBO (77.3-14.1)
FUKUCKA
YAMAGUCHI
KOKURA
KCarthy
YAGASA KI
KUMANO TO
TOSU
CMURA
CITA
SASEBO NaS
SASEBO (77.0-13.7)
SASEBO (77.7-12.5)
SASEBO (77.7-12.5)
FUKUCKA (45.7-63.1)
SASEBO (78.8-13.4)
SASEBO (77.0-13.6)
SASEBO (78.8-13.9)
SASEBO (74.5-11.3)
SASEBO (75.3-11.8)

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SECRET

1236
UNIT

5201st Engr Cons Brig
Hq & Hq Co 1112th Engr Cons Gp
Hq & Hq Co 1177th Engr Cons Gp
Hq & Hq Co 1161st Engr (C) Gp
188th Engr Cons Bn (attd to Hq
188th Engr Cons Gp)
Hq & Hq Co 1161st Engr (C) Gp
1777th Engr Cons Bn
Hq & Hq Co 1408th Engr Base
Dep Gp
1st Plat 1564th Engr Dep Co
1564th Engr Base Surv Co (less
1 Plat)
Hq & Hq Co 1052d Engr PC&R GP
1902d Engr Avn Bn
198th Engr Dp Trk Co
3076th Engr Dp Trk Co
2311th Engr Fct Dist Co
1731st Engr Util Det (SE)
3138th Engr Refrig Maint Det
(DG)
1978th Engr Repro Det (Avn)
Hq 7th NC Regt
96th NC Bn
31st NC Bn
Hq Det Prov Med Gp
Med Bn VAC

Corps Evac Hosp #1
Hq & Hq Det 135th Med Bn
692d Med Amb Co
92d Field Hosp (400 bed)
118th Sta Hosp (500 bed) (less
nurse det)
308th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
108th Vet Food Insp Tm
466th Dant Pros Tm (Mol)
FUKUCKA Base Command
Fort Director FUKUCKA
Det Hq Co 5th MarDiv
Det Garrison Boat Pool
5th ASCO (less det)
Det 116th NC Bn
Garrison Beach Bn #1
Co C 3d MP Bn (Prov)(less 1
Plat)
SECRET

Co C 60th Sig Cons Bn (6th R/W, Cons Tm atctd)
Det Sig Bn VAC
Co B 12th MT Bn (Prov)(2d Plat Auto Rep Co atctd)
Language Det VAC
Co C 5th Med Bn
Hq & Hq Det 327th QM Bn
566th QM Rd Co
1st Plat 120th QM Bkry Co
556d Sig Dep Co
Hq & Hq Det 335d QM Bn
362d QM Ser Co
4th Plat 369th QM Ldry Co
3d Plat 120th QM Bkry Co
101st QM Gr Regr Plat
Hq & Hq Det 208th Ord Bn
347th Ord Hhld Co
354th Ord Hhld Co
364th QM Trk Co (w/dr det)
3873d QM Gas Sup Co
3007th Ord Base Dep Co
123d Sta Hosp (w/5th Army Med Lab atctd)
25th Evac Hosp
76th Hlth Contl Det
83d Hlth Contl Det
721st Med San Co
24th Hlth Surv Det
98th Vet Food Insp Tm
13th Gen Hosp (1000+bed)
11th Gen Disp (Type 2)
Hq 32d Inf Div
114th Engr Bn (less Cos A & C)
32d Sig Co
32d QM Co (less det)
732d Ord Co (less det)
29th Hlth Govt Hq & Hq Co
1st Plat Bomb Disp Co H&S Bn VAC
71st Amph Trk Co
4th Plat 3069th QM Ldry Co
75th Hlth Contl Det
201st Hlth Surv Det
275th CIC Det
SECRET

Co B 107th Med Bn
HQ 128th Inf
1st Bn 128th Inf
2d Bn 128th Inf (less Co E)
Co E 128th Inf
3d Bn 128th Inf
107th Med Bn (less Cos A, B, C & 1 Flat Co D)
Co B 107th Med Bn
Cannon Co 128th Inf
AT Co 128th Inf
74th Med Contl Det
62d CIC Det
Ser Co 128th Inf
Co C 114th Engr Bn
Co C 107th Med Bn
37th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co
1 Flat Co D 107th Med Bn
HQ 93d Med CIC Unit
Co D 54th Med Bn
Det 32d Recon Trp
712th Med San Co
32d Recon Trp (less Det)
HQ 127th Inf
1st Bn 127th Inf
AT Co 127th Inf
Cannon Co 127th Inf
2d Bn 127th Inf
3d Bn 127th Inf
HQ 126th Inf
1st Bn 126th Inf
2d Bn 126th Inf
3d Bn 126th Inf
126th FA Bn
Co A 107th Med Bn
HQ 95th Med CIC Unit
Ser Co 126th Inf
AT Co 126th Inf (less dets)
Det AT Co 126th Inf
Det AT Co 126th Inf
Det AT Co 126th Inf
Det Cannon Co 126th Inf
Co A 114th Engr Bn (less 2d Flat)
Det Cos I & L 126th Inf
Det Co I 126th Inf
1 Squad Co I 126th Inf
Det 732d Ord Co

FUKUOKA (1341-1175)
YAMAGUCHI
SHIMONOSEKI (1403.4-1218.6)
BCFU
IWAKUNI Airfield
YAMAGUCHI
YAMAGUCHI
FUKUOKA (1341.0-1175.0)
YAMAGUCHI
YAMAGUCHI
YAMAGUCHI
YAMAGUCHI
SHIMONOSEKI (1403.4-1218.6)
SHIMONOSEKI (1403.4-1218.6)
SHIMONOSEKI (1403.4-1218.6)
SHIMONOSEKI (1398.2-1214.4)
SHIMONOSEKI (1403.4-1218.6)
SHIMONOSEKI (1399.9-1213.2)
FUKUOKA (46.3-66.7)
SENZAKI
BCFU
HAGI
FUKUOKA (48.8-74.0)
FUKUOKA (1350.2-1159.8)
FUKUOKA (1350.9-1166.6)
FUKUOKA (1350.9-1165.6)
FUKUOKA (50.0-76.0)
FUKUOKA (1341.2-1175.1)
KOKURA (1390.7-1200.4)
KOKURA (1390.4-1200.4)
KOKURA (1390.7-1200.4)
KOKURA (1390.5-1200.4)
MOJI (1400.1-1210.2)
KOKURA (1390.5-1200.35)
YAWATA (1380.3-1200.2)
KOKURA (1390.5-1200.35)
KOKURA (1390.5-1200.35)
YUKUSHIMI (1403.0-1186.4)
HACHIYA
YUMOSHI
KOKURA (1390.5-1200.35)
KOKURA (1390.5-1200.35)
GOTOJI (1355.5-1740.0)
MIOGATA (77.6-86.2)
HADI (1401.0-1155.0)
KOKURA (1396.7-1200.4)
Det Regtl I&R Plat
Regtl I&R Plat (less det)
1 Flat Co E 126th Inf
126th Fa Bn
1 Flat Co A 114th Engr Bn
Elms Div Arty Hq
120th Fa Bn
Hq 5th MarDiv
Hq 27th Marines
1st Bn 27th Marines
Co A 27th Marines
2d Bn 27th Marines
2d Flat Co F 27th Marines
Co G 27th Marines
3d Bn 27th Marines
Hq 28th Marines
1st Bn 28th Marines (less Co B)
Co B 28th Marines
2d Bn 28th Marines
3d Bn 28th Marines
Hq 13th Marines
1st Bn 13th Marines (less Btry A)
Btry A 13th Marines
2d Bn 13th Marines
3d Bn 13th Marines
4th Bn 13th Marines
121st Fa Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th Engr Bn
2d Flat Co B 5th Engr Bn
3d Flat Co B 5th Engr Bn
Det Co B 5th Engr Bn
5th Ser Bn
Tracked Vehicle Flat Ord Co
5th Ser Bn
3d Flat Ord Co 5th Ser Bn
Sup Co 5th Ser Bn
6th Sep Ldry Plat
5th Med Bn (less Cos B & C)
Co B 5th Med Bn
Co C 5th Med Bn
5th Mtl Bn (less Amph Trk Co)
Amph Trk Co

TSUIKI (1407.0-1178.8)
Hachiyu
Wakakatsu
Oita
Oita
Oita
Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.3)
KURUME (1353.55-1332.9)
Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.5)
Returned from GOTO RETTO to SASEBO 111245
Saga (36.2-25.3)
KANZAKI (1346-1134)
TOSU (1357-1141)
KURUME (62.0-30.0)
Marine Camp AINOURA (71.0-14.1)
Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-15.3)
SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)
SASEBO (78.1-11.6)
Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-14.4)
SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.7-10.9)
Kawata (92.9-02.5)
CGUSHI (36.3-01.2)
KARIKATE (82.8-12.75)
SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.6-11.1)
SASEBO Aircraft Factory (81.5-11.05)
HAKKAI (84.2-10.9)
SASEBO NaS (79.1-08.9)
Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)
Saitama (1336.0-1128.0)
KURUME (1352-1131)
Oita
Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)
SASEBO NaS (79.1-08.9)
SASEBO NaS (79.1-08.9)
SASEBO (76.35-12.35)
Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)
Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)
KURUME (1358.9-1132.9) Dets at Saga, Oita
FUKUOKA
Marine Camp AINOURA (70.7-14.8)
KARIKATE (82.9-12.9) Det at Saga
056/217
Location Statement No. 49.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

SECRET

UNIT
Co C 20th Amph Trk Bn
116th NC Bn
5th MP Co
Co A 3d MP Bn
Co C 3d MP Bn (less 1st Plat)
1st Plat Co C 3d MP Bn
VMO-8
498th CIC A232 Det (Area)

498th CIC B3 Det (Area)

34th Mar Dep Co
94th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
95th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp

HQ 2d MarDiv
HQ 2d Marines
1st Bn 2d Marines

2d Bn 2d Marines
3d Bn 2d Marines
HQ 6th Marines
1st Bn 6th Marines
Recon Patrol 1st Bn 6th Marines

2d Bn 6th Marines
3d Bn 6th Marines
HQ 8th Marines
1st Bn 8th Marines (less Co B
(Rainf))
Co B (Rainf) 8th Marines
2d Bn 8th Marines
3d Bn 8th Marines
HQ 10th Marines
1st Bn 10th Marines
2d Bn 10th Marines
3d Bn 10th Marines
4th Bn 10th Marines
Det 10th Marines

CP LOCATION
Marine Camp AINOURa (71.1-13.9)
Marine Camp AINOURa (71.2- Dets at Sasebo & 13.9)
Sasebo (77.3-15.3)
Sasebo (77.3-15.3)
Fukuoka
Sasebo NAS (79.8-08.5)
Marine Camp AINOURa (71.4-14.3)
Dets at Saga & Sasebo

Sasebo (78.5-11.7)
Sasebo (77.3-15.3)
Marine Camp AINOURa (71.4-14.3)
Dets at Cita, Saga Fukuoka

Nagasaki (1284.5-1062.2)
MIYAKONJO (1417.5-0942.3)
Arrived Kanoya 101230. Adv
Det reached MIYAZAKI and
established CP there at 102230
Kanoya
MIYAKONJO (1417.5-0942.3)
Nagasaki (1293.32-1062.56)
Kagoshima (1293.32-1062.56)
Departed KAKINOURa SHIMA for
MATSU SHIMA 110250
Nagasaki (1293.32-1062.56)
Nagasaki (1293.32-1062.56)
KUHMOTO (1381.9-1077.0)
Kagoshima (1368.40-0923.07)
OMUTA (1315.00-1097.00)
KUHMOTO (1381.9-1077.0)
HITOYOSHI (1380.8-1000.2) or 9 Nov
ISHIMAJA airfield (1316.60-1075.20)
Nagasaki (Kamigawa barracks)
ISHIMAJA airfield (1316.60-1075.20)
OMURa (1300.74-1084.38)
ISHIMAJA airfield (1316.6-1075.2)
SHIMAJI a (1345.6-1069.8) 3 Off 58
UNZEN (1334.00-1064.00) 2 Off 26

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1241
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Location Statement No. 49. (Cont'd).

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>FUKAgori (1291.3-1055.6)</td>
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<td>2d 3er Bn</td>
<td>(93.1-59.7) (2 1/2 m i W of KOROGEISHI)</td>
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<td>73d Fld Hosp</td>
<td>KUMAMOTO</td>
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<td>Co B &amp; C 264th Med Bn</td>
<td>Okura</td>
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<td>V40-2</td>
<td>ISaHAya Airfield</td>
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<td>2d ASCO</td>
<td>FUKAgori (1291.1-1055.6)</td>
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<td>Co A 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)</td>
<td>NaGAzaki</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Sep lary Flat</td>
<td>NaGAzaki (94.5-62.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43d NC Bn</td>
<td>(92.9-61.3) (1 1/2 m i NE KOSEKO)</td>
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<td>2d Flat Bomb Disp Co H&amp;S BN VAC</td>
<td>NaGAzaki</td>
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<td>Corps Evac Hosp #3</td>
<td>ISaHAya</td>
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<td>54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)</td>
<td>NaGAzaki (94.5-62.2)</td>
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<td>498th CIC B3 Det (Combat)</td>
<td>NaGAzaki (94.5-62.2)</td>
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<td>1st Sep HQ &amp; Sup Co (Prov)</td>
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<tr>
<td>93d HQ &amp; HQ Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
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<td>Co C 2d Engr BN</td>
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<td>(95.0-61.6) (1 1/2 m i W of RUPPOMATSU)</td>
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<td>2d Pion BN</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Recon Co</td>
<td>(94.6-62.2) (1 1/2 m i W of RUPPOMATSU)</td>
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<td>(94.1-61.1) (2 m i SW of RUPPOMATSU)</td>
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1242
053/217  

Location Statement No. 49. (Cont'd).

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**SECRET**

**UNIT**  
2d Amph Trk Co

**CP LOCATION**  
ISaHaYa Airfield (16.3-75.1)

---

**DISTRIBUTION:**

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<th>CTG 55.2</th>
<th>CG FBC</th>
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<td>CG 5thMarDiv</td>
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<td>CG FMF Pac</td>
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<td>CG 32dInfDiv</td>
<td>Ea Corps &amp; Spl Trp Unit</td>
<td>Regt</td>
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J. L. STEWART, LtCol, USMC, ACOFS, G-3, (acting).
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.
SECRET
G-3 Operations Report
No. 79.

From: 1800I, 11 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 12 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 50.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Clear and slightly warmer, visibility, 8-10 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly, 4-6 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Warm and overcast, visibility, 8 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility.
   b. 5th Marine Division despatched 5th Rcn Co to HIRADO SHIMA to execute disposition missions; Co arrived without incident at 1200I. At 2012I, Wprns Co, 23rd Marines (Reinf), closed by rail in SaSEBO from FUKUOKA. 1st Bn, 27th Marines (Reinf), completed disposition missions on KURO and TAKA SHIMA (8 miles ENE of SaSEBO); and a disposition patrol from the 13th Marines went to OGI (5 miles NW of Saga).
   c. 2d Marine Division delayed report indicates that 3d Bn, 8th Marines (Reinf), closed in HITOYOSHI by road at 1215I, 9 November. 1st Bn, 2d Marines (Reinf), completed unloading at KANONOA and entrained for MIYAZAKI at 0300I; battalion advance CP is established at MIYAZAKI. 3d Bn, 2d Marines (Reinf), carried out patrols without incident in a 20-mile radius around MIYAKONOJO. At 1345I, 6th Marines' patrol returned from MATSUSHIMA to NAGASAKI by LCT. Elements of the 8th Marines (Reinf) patrolled to YOSHIHARA (35 miles NE of KUMANOJO).
d. 32d Infantry Division continued routine occupational missions. 126th Infantry (Reinf) despatched a disposition patrol to ASHIYA airfield, while the 127th Infantry (Reinf) sent reconnaissance patrols through the area 25 miles around FUKUOKA. Division Artillery disposition patrols operated in SAAGASEKI (15 miles E of CITA), SAEKI (27 miles SE of CITA) and HIJI (11 miles W of CITA). A detachment of the 712 Med San Co has been despatched to SENGAKI.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base-development missions. Elements of the 284th Ord Hvy Maint Co closed by rail in FUKUOKA at 1630I, 11 November; Cp opened at ZASS foundry at 1700I.

4. Casualties:

None.

[Signature]

S. L. STEWART, 
LtCol., USMC, 
ACoFS, G-3, 
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AFFAC MANILA  CTG 55.2  CO HAB, CHURA
CG SIXTH Army CG 2dMarDiv CG FBC
CG FMF Pac  CG 5thMarDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CTF 55  CG 32dInfDiv Each General Staff Section
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

12 November 1945.

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

Map: L971 Central JAPAN 1:250,000.

UNIT | CP LOCATION | REMARKS
---|-------------|-------
Cos A & C 1976th Avn Engr Bn Det 10th Marines | FUKUOKA | 2 Off 30 EM
Weapons Co 28th Marines | KAZUSA (1325.05-1048.80) Marine Camp AINOURA | Ar 11 Nov
284th Ord Hvy Maint Co (TK) | FUKUOKA | Ar 11 Nov
Recon Patrol 1st Bn 6th Marines | NAGASAKI | Returned
5th Recon Co | HIRADO SHIMA | 12 Nov


DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac MANILA  CTG 55.2  CG 2dMarDiv CO 5thMar Div
CG SIXTH Army  CG 2dMarDiv CO 5thMar Div  CO APF 929
CG F/J Pac  CG 5thMarDiv CO APF 929
OTF 55  CO 52dInfDiv CO Corps & Spl Trp Unit

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBICUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 80.

From: 12001, 12 November 1945.
To: 12001, 13 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 51.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Overcast and cool, visibility, 6-8 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 2-4 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Warm and cloudy, visibility, 3-5 miles. Surface winds, easterly, 1-3 knots.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. As of 3 November, on SIXTH Army Order, Co C, 60th Sig Cons Bn, was detached to AFWESPAC, less personnel and equipment, transferred to 274th Sig Hvy Cons Co.

b. 5th Marine Division continued routine patrolling and surveillance. Elements of the 27th Marines (Reinf) destroyed Japanese guns at SUTAKA (12 miles S of KURUME), and 1st Bn, 27th Marines, completed disposition on ENO SHIMA (23 miles SW of SASEBO). 13th Marines continued disposition at USHIZU (5 miles W of SAGA).

c. 2d Marine Division conducted regular occupational missions. Elements of the 2d Marines (Reinf) continued patrols in the area 20 miles around MIYAKOJO. The 8th Marines (Reinf) patrolled without incident to ICHINO (30 miles E of KURAKOJO).
d. 32d Infantry Division sent disposition patrols (123th Infantry (Reinf)) through the area 25 miles east and south of EOPU. 127th Infantry (Reinf) patrolled without incident in the area 20 miles northeast of FUKUOKA. Division Artillery patrols went to Naval Air Base, HETSUBI (7 miles SSE of OITA) and to HIJUDAI area (17 miles SE of OITA).

e. FUKUOKA Base Command, no change.

4. Casualties:

   None.

---------------------

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ APOC MANILA      CTG 55.2      CO MAB, CMURA
CG SIXTH Army         CG 2dMarDiv    CG FBC
CG FkF Pac            CG 5thMarDiv  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CTF 55                CG 32dInfDiv  Each General Staff Section

--------------------

SECRET
053/147
Ser.001098B
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

LOCATION STATEMENT

13 November 1945.

No. 51
Map: AMS L571 Central JAPAN, 1:250,000.

UNIT

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<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Elms 118th Sta Hosp</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 13 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co 1409th Engr Base</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Rear Echelon</td>
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<td>Dep Gp</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ar 15 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>384th QM Tk Co (w/det)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>Ar 12 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det 1st Bn 127th Inf</td>
<td>IIIZUKA</td>
<td>Relieved det AT Co 126th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Squad Co H 128th Inf</td>
<td>YUKUSHI</td>
<td>Relieved det AT Co 126th Inf</td>
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<td>1 Squad Co L 126th Inf</td>
<td>HACHIYA</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1 Squad Co L 126th Inf</td>
<td>UIOSHIMA</td>
<td>Replaced Corps Evac Hosp #1</td>
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<td>Det Co K 128th Inf</td>
<td>NAKATSU</td>
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<td>922 Field Hosp</td>
<td>SASEBO NE (75.2-11.8)</td>
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</table>

J. L. Stewart,
LtCol, USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting).

SECRET
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

No.81.

From: 1800I, 13 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 14 November 1945.

maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No.52.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Cold and rainy, visibility, 2-4 miles. Surface winds, northerly, 2-4 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Cold, with intermittent heavy rain, visibility, 2-4 miles. Surface winds, southwesterly, 8-12 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Cur Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. As of 12 November, on SIXTH Army order, the 122d Station Hospital passed to 32d Infantry Division for administration and supply; operational control remains with FBC.

b. 5th Marine Division continued patrolling, surveillance and disposition. 5th Rec Co destroyed weapons and communication gear on HIRADO SHIMA (17 miles WNW of SASEBO), while 1st Bn, 27th Marines, completed disposition missions on TAKA SHIMA (7 miles W of SASEBO). 13th Marines patrolled the area 20 miles northeast of SASEBO.

c. 2d Marine Division continued routine occupational missions. Elements of the 2d Marines (Reinf) patrolled to KOKUBU (25 miles NNW of KANoya). 6th Marines (Reinf) despatched an overwater patrol by two LCT's to investigate the location and present use of certain radio equipment at MIE (15 miles NW of NAGASAKI). 8th Marines (Reinf) patrolled the area 27 miles northeast of KUMAMOTO.
SECRET

a. 32d Infantry Division continued procurement and disposition
(128th Infantry (Reinf)) at OZUKI airfield (11 miles NE of
SHIKICHISO), INAKUNI airfield (40 miles E of YAMAGUCHI),
and in the immediate vicinity of SHIKICHISO. Elements of
the 127th Infantry (Reinf) patrolled 20 miles east of
FUKUOKA. The 126th Infantry conducted disposition at the
following places: ASHIYA airfield, NOKURA harbor, MOJI,
GRIC, YAMA TA and TOBATA. Elements of Division Artillery at
CITA supervised disposition at H1U (12 miles NE of CITA).

b. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base-development missions.
At 11301, elements of the 116th NC BN cleared FUKUOKA by
rail for SASEBO.

4. Casualties:
None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
AComS, 0-3,
(acting).

DISTRIBUTION:
GHQ, APFAC MANILA  CTG 55.2  CO MA B, OMURA
CG SIXTH Army  CG 2dMarDiv  CG FBC
CG FMF Pac  CG 5thMarDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CTF 55  CG 32dInfDiv Each General Staff Section

-2-
053/147
Ser.001101B
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

14 November 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 52

Map: AMS L571 Central JAPAN, 1:250,000.

UNIT

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<td>Departed SASEBO for NAGOYA 14 Nov</td>
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<td>2d Plat 22d Spl Ser Co</td>
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<td>NaCASU</td>
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<td>1 Squad Co K 126th Inf</td>
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<td>1 Squad Co L 126th Inf</td>
<td>SEIZAKI</td>
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<td>Det 712th Med San Co</td>
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<td>SASEBO</td>
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<td>L3354h Emer Cons Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det 116th PC Bn</td>
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Ar 14 Nov fr Fukuoka to rejoin parent org

J. L. STEWART, LtCol, USMC, ACOFS, G-3, (Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

| GHQ AF Pac MANILA | CG 2dMarDiv | CO APU 922 |
| CG SIXTH Army | CG 5thMarDiv | Ea Corps & Spl Trp Unit |
| CG FLF Pac | CG 32dInfDiv | Ea Gen & Spl Staff Sec |
| CTF 65 | CG FBC | Ship & Rec 8th Ser Regt |
| CTG 55.2 | CO MAB OKURA | |

SECRET

1252
0117/147
Ser. 001107B
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET
G-5 Operations Report
No. 22

From: 1800I, 14 November 1945,
To : 1800I, 15 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 58.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Cold with intermittent rain, visibility, 2-4 miles.
Surface winds, northerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Overcast and cool, with intermittent rains, visibility,
6-8 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly, 5-12 knots.
Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility.

b. 5th Marine Division at 1500I executed surprise searches of shrines, temples and schools in vicinity of SASEBO; swords, rifles, rangefinders, and various records and documents were seized. 1st Bn, 27th Marines, completed disposition on KURUSHIMA (10 miles WSW of SASEBO), and a disposition patrol of the 27th Marines (Reinf) operated in the vicinity of YOSHII (14 miles E of KURUSHIMA). Detachment from the 116th HC En closed by rail in SASEBO and reverted to division control at 2000I. Co C (less 1 Plt), 3d HP En, closed in SASEBO by rail from FUKUCKA and passed to division operational control at 1907I. 13th Marines destroyed a Japanese SS at HIYAKOURA (5 miles SE of SASEBO). Patrolling and disposition continued throughout entire zone.

c. 2d Marine Division conducted occupational missions. Co A, 2d Engr Bn arrived and is temporarily billeted at SHIBUSHI (18 miles S of HIYAKOCHO). A disposition detachment from the 8th Marines (Reinf) continued operations at MISURI (20 miles SW of KURAMOTO), and elements of the 8th Marines patrolled without incident 28 miles northeast of KURAMOTO.
d. 32d Infantry Division continued patrolling, surveillance and disposition. A patrol from the 128th Infantry (Reinf) checked demobilization between BOFU and MIROZUNE (27 miles SE of BOFU), and other elements of the regiment completed disposition at UBE (25 miles SW of YAMAGUCHI). A Division Artillery patrol continued disposition at SAEKI. At 0600I, Co D, 3d Inf BN, cleared FUKUOKA by rail for SASEBO.

c. FUKUOKA Base Command continued base development missions. 274th Sig Hvy Cons Co closed in FUKUOKA by rail from KURE at 0300I; CP opened as of that hour in ZAJS foundry, and Co passed to FBC for operational control.

4. Casualties:

None.

R. D. HEHNL, JR.,
LtCol, USMC,
ACofS, G-5,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac HONOLULU
CG SIXTH Army
CG FIFTH Pac
CTF 85

CTG 55.2
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv

CO MAR CHURA
CG FBC
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

No. 53.

LOCATION STATEMENT

15 November 1945.

Map: AMS L571 Central JAPAN, 1:250,000.

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<tr>
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<td>Co D 3d KP Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td>Ar 15 Nov</td>
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<td>274th Sig Hvy Cons Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA (52.9-61.1)</td>
<td>Ar 15 Nov</td>
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<td>Co C 60th Cons Bn</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
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<td>Cons Co 15 Nov</td>
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<td>Co A 2d Engr Bn</td>
<td>SHIBUSHI (18 miles S MIYAKOJO)</td>
<td>Ar 15 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disposition Det 8th Marines</td>
<td>MISUMI (20 miles SW KUMAMOTO)</td>
<td>Ar 15 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co I 8th Marines</td>
<td>HITOROYO</td>
<td>Ar 15 Nov</td>
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Other Units - No change.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

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<th>CO APU 929</th>
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SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 83. From: 1800 I, 15 November 1945.
To: 1800 I, 16 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 54.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Cold with intermittent rain, visibility, 2-4 miles. Surface
winds, northwesterly, 1-3 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Clear and cool, visibility, 6-8 miles. Surface winds,
northerly, 1-2 knots. Sea calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of
responsibility. 24th Marine Depot Co disbanded in accordance
with directives from higher authority. Elements of the
following units moved by rail from Sasebo to Fukuoka
and passed on arrival to control of 5201st Engr Cns Brig:
1486th and 1487th Engr Maint Cos, and 1596d Engr Cns Bn.

b. 5th Marine Division destroyed two Japanese SS at Miyanoura
(5 miles SE of Sasebo). 13th Marines despatched a two-day
patrol to Takumachi (23 miles ENE of Sasebo). Routine
patrolling and disposition continued throughout entire
zone.

c. 2d Marine Division conducted occupational missions. Ele-
ments of the 2d Marines (Reinf) continued disposition in
the vicinity of Kanoa, at Kokubu (15 miles W of Miyakonojo),
and at Shibushi (15 miles S of Miyakonojo). 2d Bn, 8th
Marines, patrolled without incident to Woyatsu (9 miles E
of Kumamoto) and to Naikan (21 miles NE of Kumamoto). One
platoon of Co A, 8th Marines established as an outpost at
320dAI (21 miles NW of Kadoshima).

SECRET
d. 32d Infantry Division continued patrolling, surveillance and disposition. 127th Infantry (Reinf) despatched patrols without incident throughout a 24-mile radius of FUKUOKA. Elements of the 126th Infantry (Reinf) patrolled to KANADA (12 miles S of KCKURA) and MCRI (45 miles SSE of KOKURA).

e. FUKUOKA Base Command, no change.

4. Casualties:
None.

R. D. HEINL, JR.,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac MANILA      CTG 55.2      CO MAB OKURA
CG SIXTH Army          CG 32dMarDiv   CG FUB
CG FmF Pac             CG 5thMarDiv   Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CIF 55                 CG 32dInfDiv   Each General Staff Section
053/147  
Ser. 001105.  
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

SECRET  

16 November 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 54

Rep: A1S L571 Central JAPAN, 1:250,000.

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<td>SENDAI</td>
<td>Ar 16 Nov.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elms 1486th Engr Maint Co</td>
<td>FUKUCKA</td>
<td>Ar 16 Nov.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elms 1487th Engr Maint Co</td>
<td>FUKUCKA</td>
<td>Ar 16 Nov.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1385d Engr Cons Bn</td>
<td>FUKUCKA</td>
<td>Ar 16 Nov.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24th Mar Dep Co</td>
<td>Disbanded</td>
<td>15 Nov.</td>
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__________________________
R. D. HEINL, JR.,
LtCol, USMC,
ACofS, G-5.

DISTRIBUTION:

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<th>CO APU 929</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG SIXTH Army</td>
<td>CG 5thMarDiv</td>
<td>Ea Corps &amp; Special Troop Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FIF Pac</td>
<td>CG 32dInfDiv</td>
<td>Ea General and Special Staff Sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TF 55</td>
<td>CG FBC</td>
<td>Ship &amp; Rec 8th Ser Regt</td>
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<tr>
<td>5TF 55.2</td>
<td>CO HAB OKURA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 84.

From: 1800I, 16 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 17 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 55.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Cold with intermittent rain, clearing toward end of the period, visibility, 5 miles. Surface winds, northwesterly, 1-3 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Clear and cool, visibility, unlimited. Surface winds, northerly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility.
   b. 5th Marine Division disposition patrols (27th Marines (Reinf)) were active at FUKUSHIMA, YAKATSU, and TOSU. 5th Rec Co completed disposition and reconnaissance on HIRADO SHIMA (15 miles NW of SASEBO), and initiated preparations for return on 16 November.
   c. 2d Marine Division despatched an advance reconnaissance party by CY aircraft to TANBGA SHIMA (OSUMI GUNTO) at 0830I. Elements of the 2d Marines (Reinf) continued disposition in the KANCYA-MIYAKONOJO area.
   d. 32d Infantry Division continued, routine disposition, patrolling and surveillance. CP of 128th Infantry (Reinf) destroyed by fire of undetermined origin during night of 16-17 November.
O117/217
Ser.001117B G-3 Operations Report No.84 (Cont'd).

SECRET

e. FUKUOKA Base Command, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

R. D. HEINL, JR.,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac MANILA CG 55.2 CC MAB CMURA
CG SIXTH Army CG 2dMarDiv CG FBC
CG FMF Fac CG 5thMarDiv Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
CTF 55 CG 32dInfDiv Each General Staff Section
053/147
Ser.0011163
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

17 November 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 55

Map: AMS L571 Central JAPAN, 1:250,000.

UNIT | OP LOCATION | REMARKS
--- | --- | ---
Hq & Hq Co 1052d PC&R Gp | FUKUOKA | Completed movement (less Det at SASEBO)
1876th Engr Avn Bn | FUKUOKA | 

R. D. HEINL, JR.,
LtCol, USMC,
AComS, C-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

| GHQ AF Pac MANILA | CG 2dMarDiv | CO AFU 929 |
| CG SIXTH Army | CG 5thMarDiv | Ea Corps & Special Troop Unit |
| CG FIF Pac | CG 32dInfDiv | Ea General and Special Staff |
| CTF 53 | CG FSC | Section |
| CTG 53.2 | CO HAB OMURA | Ship & Rec 8th Ser Regt |

SECRET

1261
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

SECRET

G-3 Operations Report

No. 85

From: 1800I, 17 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 18 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 56.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Clear and cold, visibility 6-8 miles. Wind, northeasterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Clear and cold, visibility unlimited. Wind, northerly 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. CG VAC and party returned by air from Hq, SIXTH Army in KYOTO at 1800/I.
   b. 5th Marine Division dispatched a 3 day disposition patrol to KARATSU. At 1800/I the 1st Bn, 27th Marines sailed for TSUSHIMA (75 miles NW of SASEBO) in 2 LSTs for reconnaissance, disposition operations, and demobilization verification. 5th Ron Co returned from HIRADO SHIMA (15 miles NW of SASEBO) at 1200 after completing disposition missions there.
   c. 2d Marine Division advance reconnaissance party at TANEGA SHIMA (OSUMI GUNTO) (75 miles SE of KAGOSHIMA) continued its mission. 2d Marines continued patrolling in vicinity of MIYAKONOGAJO and KANOTA.
   d. 32d Infantry Division continued routine disposition and patrolling. 126th Infantry (Reinf) dispatched a reconnaissance patrol to ANKATSU (25 miles SE of KOKURA).
c. FUKUOKA Base Command. 123d Station Hospital closed at KOKURA by road and rail at 1440/1 and opened its CP at the TAILAYA building at 1300/1.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEUART, LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G - 3.
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AFPAC MANILA
CG SIXTH Army
CG FIFPac
CTF 55

CTG 55.2
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 6thMarDiv
CG 52dInfDiv

CC IAB OMURA
CG FBC
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

18 November 1945.

No. 56

Map: AIS L571 Central JAPAN 1:250,000.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>H&amp;S Bn VAC</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.2-13.9)</td>
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<td>Army Sec VAC</td>
<td>SASEBO NB (77.3-14.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22d Spd Ser Co (less 2d, 3d &amp; 4th Flats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>929th APU (Type G)</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
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<td>2d Bkry Plat (Prov)</td>
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<td>Hq Co Shore Brig</td>
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<td>Slg Bn VAC (less dets) (8th Sep RI Plat atchd)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Sep Engr Bn (less Co B &amp; dets of Cos A &amp; C)</td>
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<td>SASEBO Aircraft Factory (60.80-12.0)</td>
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<td>SAGA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det Co C 2d Sep Engr Bn</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>SASEBO (77.3-15.3)</td>
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<td>123d Sta Hosp (w/5th Army Med Lab atchd)</td>
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<td>HIYAKOJO (1417.5-0942.8)</td>
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<td>2d Plt Bomb Disp Co H&amp;S</td>
<td>Nagasaki (1294.2-1059.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En VAC</td>
<td>ISHARA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Evac Hosp #3</td>
<td>ISHARA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th CIO ALEEP Det (Area)</td>
<td>Nagasaki (94.5-62.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49th CIO Bn Det (Combat)</td>
<td>Nagasaki (94.5-62.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sep Hq &amp; Sup Co (Prov)</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th Mar Dep Co</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124th Port Co</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93d Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td>Nagasaki (94.5-62.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92d Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td>SASEBO NO (77.3-14.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Location Statement No. 56

SECRET

UNIT

1296th Engr (C) Bn
3566th QM Trk Co (w/dr det)
Amer Mil Govt Unit #1
25th Port Surg Hosp
Co A 875th Engr Avn Bn
101st Bomb Disb Squad
623d QM Red Sec
36th Mil Ctrl Det
94th Mil Ctrl Det
Co C 2d Engr Br
2d MT Br
2d Pion Br
2d Recon Co
2d MP Co
2d Sig Co
2d Engr Br (less dots)
Co A 2d Engr Br
2d Div Hosp
2d Amph Trk

CP LOCATION

NAGASAKI (1285.5-1061.1)
NAGASAKI (1292.7-1061.6)
KANOYA
KANOYA
KANOYA
KANOYA
KANOYA
NAGASAKI
NAGASAKI
ISAIHAYA (16.7-75.5)
(94.2-61.0) (2 mi W of RUPEPOKATSU)
NAGASAKI (1294.2-1059.1)
KUAMOTO
(94.6-62.2) (1½ mi W of RUPEPOKATSU)
(94.1-61.1) (2 mi SW of RUPEPOKATSU)
NAGASAKI (1296.15-1063.4)
SHIBUSHI
NAGASAKI (1094.1-1060.7)
ISAIHAYA Airfield (16.3-75.1)

REMARKS

1 Off

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
AcOps, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

CHQ, AF Pac, HANALI
CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
CTF 56

CTG 55.2
CG 32ID
CG 32InfDiv

CG FBC
CG 2ndMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG AFU 929

Ea Gen & Sp Staff Sec
Ea Corps & Sp Trp Unit

SECRET
0137/147
Ser. 001123B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

3-3 Operations Report

SECRET

From: 1600I, 18 November 1945,
To: 1600I, 19 November 1945.

No. 86

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 57.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and cold, visibility 8-10 miles. Wind, northerly,
2-4 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Hazy and cold, visibility 6-10 miles. Wind, northerly,
3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone
of responsibility. The reinforced platoon of Garrison
Beach Bn #1 returned to SASEBO from FUKUOKA at 1400I by
rail and reverted to operational control of CUB 18.

b. 5th Marine Division (4th Bn, 13th Marines) dispatched
a 2-day patrol to OCHI (18 miles NW of SAGA) to carry
out reconnaissance and disposition missions. 13th
Marines patrols investigated and checked major police
stations in regimental zone. 1st Bn, 27th Marines,
arrived at TSUSHINA (75 miles NW of SASEBO) at 1000I to
begin disposition, reconnaissance, and demobilization-
verification. 2d Bn, 27th Marines completed inspection
of schools, shrines and temples in the SAGA area, find-
ing military posters, a few swords and a few pieces of
dismantled textile machinery.
c. 2d Marine Division advance reconnaissance party at TAEKWA SHIMA (OSUMI GUNTO) returned to NAGASAKI at 0700I. 6th Marines furnished a guard detachment aboard the YUGAO MARU while it was engaged in transporting North China repatriates from TAKA SHIMA (9 miles SW of NAGASAKI) and KAKINOURA SHIMA (12 miles SW of SASEBO) to SASEBO. 6th Marines dispatched a patrol at 0900I by LCT to KAKINOURA SHIMA to control loading out of Chinese repatriates for assembly at SASEBO. 6th Marines dispatched a 5-day patrol to SETO (19 miles NW of NAGASAKI) and OIADAHA (7 miles S of SASEBO).

d. 32d Infantry Division, no change.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command, no change.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. Stewart,  
LtCol., USMC,  
OGof S, G-3,  
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac MANILA  CTG 58.2  CG FBC  
CG SIXTH Army  CG 2dMarDiv  CO KAB CHURA  
CG FIF Pac  CG 5thMarDiv  Each Corps and Special Troop Unit  
CTF 55  CG 32dInfDiv  Each General Staff Section.
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

19 November 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 57

Map: AMS 571 Central JAPAN 1:250,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OF LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>311th QL Trk Co</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3381st QL Trk Co</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3242d QL Ser Co</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1777th Engr Cons En (less 1 plat)</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1050th Com Gen Det</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4495d QL Ser Co</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elms 138th Eng Cons Co</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Det 71st QL En</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th QL Lary Det</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236th QL Lary Det</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238th QL Lary Det (4th Plat)</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Flat 5075d QM Refrig Co</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5201st Engr Cons Brig</td>
<td>Afloat SASEBO Harbor</td>
<td>Ar 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 day patrol 2d En 28th Marines
2 day patrol 4th En 13th Marines
5 day patrol 3th Marines

KARATSU (23 mi NE SASEBO)
OCHI (16 mi NW SAGA)
SETO (7 mi S SASEBO)

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACoFs, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

CHQ AF Pac MANILA
CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
CTF 55
CTG 55.2

CG 2dMarDiv
gg 5thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CG FBC
CO NAB CHURA

CO AFU 929
Ea Corps & Special Troop Unit
Ea General & Special Staff Section
Ship & Rec 8th Ser Regt

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 87.

From: 18001, 19 November 1945.
To: 18001, 20 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No. 58.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Clear and cold, visibility 8-10 miles. Wind northwesterly
      2-4 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Clear and cold, visibility unlimited. Wind, northerly,
      1-3 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Cur Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of
      responsibility. Elements of the following organizations
      departed SASEBO for FUKUCHA by road and rail: 3242d QM Ser
      Co, 1777th Engr Cons Bn, 1060th Engr Gas Gen Det, Co C
      1395d Engr Cons Bn, 236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl), 239th
      QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl), 4th Plat 369th QM Ldry Co, 4493d
      QM Ser Co, 3581st QM Trk Co and Hq & Hq Det 71st QM Bn.
      236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl) reported to CO Prov Med Gp
      for operational control and for duty with 92d Field Hosp.
      236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl) reported to CO Prov Med Gp
      for operational control and for duty with 118th Sta Hosp.
      641st and 1913th Engr Avn Bns were deleted from the VA
      troop list; 1376th Engr Avn Bn and 1393d Engr Cons Bn were
      added to troop list. The latter two were assigned to the
      5201st Engr Cons Brig for operational and administrative
      control. Effective 19 November the U.S. Navy was relieved
      of responsibility for demilitarization of IWAKUNI (40 miles
      E of YAMYAUCHI) and responsibility assigned CG VA/C. 311th
      QM Trk Co aboard LST 524 in SASEBO Harbor remained embarked
      and was ordered to proceed to NAGOYA in same ship.
1975-50
O137/217 G-3 Operations Report No.87 (Cont'd).

RESTRICTED

b. 5th Marine Division continued routine disposition and patrolling.

c. 2d Marine Division continued patrolling in the KANOYA-MIYAKONJOC area. 6th Marines patrol completed its mission at KAKINOURA SHIMA (12 miles SW of SASEBO) and departed at 1232I aboard LCT 973 for C-SHIMA (12 miles SSW of SASEBO) to reconnoiter that island. The two LST-LCI groups composed of 1 LST and 2 LCI's each to support the SUMI and KOSHIKI-RETTO operations, departed NAGASAKI for KAGOSHIMA at 1230I to embark elements 2d Bn 8th Marines.

d. 32d Infantry Division continued routine disposition and patrolling. Fa Gp at CITTA dispatched a reconnaissance patrol to KITSIKI (22 miles N of CITTA).

e. FUKUOKA Base Command, no change.

4. Casualties:
None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac MANILA CG 55.2 CG FBC
CG SIXTH Army CG 2d-arDiv CG WAB OKURA
CG FMF Pac CG 5thMarDiv Each Corps and Special Trp Unit
CTF 55 CG 32dInfDiv Each General Staff Section

-2-
053/217  
Ser. 001126B  
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,  
IN THE FIELD.  

SECRET  

No. 59.  
LOCATION STATEMENT  

20 November 1945.  

Map: AMS L571 Central JAPAN 1:250,000.  

UNIT  

4th Plat Co A 8th Marines  
1st Bn 27th Marines  
Patrol 6th Marines  
LFA SCU #4  
Garrison Beach Bn #1  
Other Units - No change.  

CP LOCATION  

SENDAI  
TSUSHIMA  
KAKINDURA to  
O-SHIMA  
Departed SASEBO for PEARL HARBOR  
Departed SASEBO  

REMARKS  

Ar 20 Nov  
20 Nov  
20 Nov  

J. L. STEWART,  
LtCol., USMC,  
ACofS, G-3,  
(Acting).  

DISTRIBUTION:  

CHQ AF Pac MANILA  
CG SIXTH Army  
CG FMF Pac  
CTF 55  
CTG 55.2  
CG 2dMarDiv  
CG 5thMarDiv  
CG 32dInfDiv  
CG FBC  
CC MAB OMURA  
CO APF 929  
Ea Corps & Special Troop Unit  
Ea General & Special Staff Section  
Ship & Rec 8th Ser Regt  

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

3-3 Operations Report.

No. 86

From: 1800I, 20 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 21 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 59.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Warm with rain, visibility 1-2 miles. Wind northeasterly 1-3 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Overcast with light rain, visibility 1 mile. Wind, southeasterly, 6-8 knots. Sea, calm.

c. Southern KYUSHU:

Overcast with light rain, visibility 6 miles. Wind southeasterly 4-5 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. LFA3CU #4 departed SASEBO 20 November aboard USS TERROR (AK-5) for PEARL HARBOR. Remaining elements of Garrison Beach Bn #1 cleared SASEBO by ship for return to the United States and disbandment.

b. 5th Marine Division continued routine disposition and patrolling. 1st Bn, 27th Marines continued disarmament, demobilization and disposition missions on TSUSHIMA (75 miles NW of SASEBO). 28th Marines disposition patrol returned from KARATSU (23 miles NE of SASEBO). 15th Marines dispatched reconnaissance and disposition patrols to KASHIMA (20 miles E of SASEBO) and OCI (21 miles NE of SASEBO).

c. 2d Marine Division (6th Marines) patrol completed its mission at C-SHIMA (12 miles SSW of SASEBO) and departed aboard LCT 937 for HAKO-SHIMA (23 miles SSW of SASEBO)
at 1130J. 2d Marines dispatched reconnaissance and disposition patrols in vicinity of KANOKA, HIZAKANOJO and HIYAZAKI.

d. 32d Infantry Division (126th Infantry) dispatched reconnaissance patrols to MORI (43 miles SSE of KOKURA) and HIDA (37 miles S of KOKURA).

c. FUKUOKA Base Command. Elements of the following units closed FUKUOKA at 2200J and reported for operational control at that time: Hq & Hq Det 71st QM Bn, 4493d QM Ser Co, 3242d QM Ser Co, 238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl), 239th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl), 4th Plt 359th QM Ldry Co, 3581st QM Trk Co. 238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl) departed FUKUOKA at 2300J and arrived MOJI 0200J where it established CP at MITSUI Building. CP of 239th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl) established at Postal Savings Building, FUKUOKA. CPs of all other units mentioned above were established at KASHII Station, FUKUOKA.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
40 Corps, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac HAMARAYA
CG SIXTH Army
CG FIFTH Pac
CTF 55
CTG 55.2
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv

CG FBC
CG KAB CHURA
En Corps and Spl Trp Unit
En Gen Staff Section

RESTRICTED
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD.

21 November 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. 59

Map: AILS L571 Central JAPAN 1:250,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol 5th Marines</td>
<td>O-SHIMA to HAKO-SHIMA</td>
<td>Returned fr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol 2d Bn 28th Marines</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td>KARATSU 21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C 5th Med Bn</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td>Fr FUKUoka 21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B 12th Lt Bn (2d Plat Auto Rep Co etchd)</td>
<td>SASEBO</td>
<td>Fr FUKUoka 21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Det 71st QM Bn</td>
<td>FUKUoka</td>
<td>21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4493d QM Ser Co</td>
<td>FUKUoka</td>
<td>Ar 21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3242d QM Ser Co</td>
<td>FUKUoka</td>
<td>Ar 21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238th QL Ldry Sec</td>
<td>MCJI</td>
<td>Ar 21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239th QL Ldry Sec</td>
<td>FUKUoka</td>
<td>Ar 21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Plat 338th QM Ldry Co</td>
<td>FUKUoka</td>
<td>Ar 21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3881st QL Tn Co</td>
<td>FUKUoka</td>
<td>Ar 21 Nov.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other units - No change.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
AGofs, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GHQ AF Pac MANILA</th>
<th>CO 2dMarDiv</th>
<th>CO APU 929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG SIXTH Army</td>
<td>CO 5thMarDiv</td>
<td>Ea Corps &amp; Special Troop Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FMF Pac</td>
<td>CO 32dInfDiv</td>
<td>Ea General &amp; Special Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF 55</td>
<td>CG FBC</td>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG 55.2</td>
<td>CO LAB CHURA</td>
<td>Ship &amp; Rec 8th Ser Regt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD

CONFIDENTIAL

G-5 Operations Report

From: 1800I, 21 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 22 November 1945.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 60.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern HUSHU:
      Clear and cold, visibility 6-8 miles. Wind, northeasterly, 1-3 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central HUSHU:
      Clear and cold, visibility 6-8 miles. Wind, northerly, 1-3 knots. Sea, calm.
   c. Southern HUSHU:
      Light fog, visibility 3-5 miles. Wind, southwest to westerly, 6-8 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Delayed report states that elements of the following organizations arrived FUKUSKA and reported to Co, 5201st Engr Cons Brg for operational control at the times specified: 1050th Engr Gas Gen Det, 0900I, 21 November; Co C, 1396th Engr Cons Bn, 2130I, 20 November. Co B, 12th MT Bn (Prov) (2d Plt, Auto Rep Co attached) closed SASEBO 0030I and reverted to operational control 12th MT Bn (Prov) at that time.
   b. 5th Marine Division assumed operational control Co C, 5th Inf Bn upon arrival of unit SASEBO from FUKUSKA at 2000I. Patrols continued reconnaissance and disposition missions.
c. 2d Marine Division dispatched disposition patrols in the KANGYA-MINAMIKOJO area. 6th Marines patrol at HAKO SHIMA (25 miles SSW of SASEBO) returned to NAGASAKI at 1500I aboard LCT 973. Detachment 2d En, 8th Marines departed KAGOSHIMA 2100I for OSUMI RETTO (75 miles S of KAGOSHIMA) to carry out reconnaissance, disposition and demobilization verification missions. Another detachment 2d En, 8th Marines departed KAGOSHIMA 1300I for KOSHIKI RETTO (45 miles N of KAGOSHIMA) with the same mission.

d. 32d Infantry Division continued routine reconnaissance and disposition patrolling. 127th Infantry dispatched reconnaissance patrol within 15 mile radius of FUKUOKA.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command assumed operational control of 1st Plt 50754 MI Refrg Co upon arrival that unit FUKUOKA from SASEBO at 0100I.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART
LtCol., USA, 
ACofS, C-3, 
(ACTING).

DISTRIBUTION:
CHQ AT Pac (MANILA) CTG 56.2 CG FBC
CG SEVENTH Army CG 2d MarDiv CO 148B CHURA
CG FIFTH Pac CG 5thMarDiv E/ Corps and Spl Trp Unit
CTF 55 CG 32dInfDiv E/ Gen Staff Section
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, 
IN THE FIELD

22 November 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

Map: ANS L371 Central JAPAN 1:250,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>CP LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Plt 507th QM Refrig Co</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>At 22 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol of 8th Marines</td>
<td>Returned to KAGASHI</td>
<td>22 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fr HAKO SHIMA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det 1. En 8th Marines</td>
<td>Enroute KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>22 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det 2d. En 8th Marines</td>
<td>to KOSHIKI RETTO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enroute KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSUNI RETTO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Units - No change.

S. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACoFRS, 2-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac MANILA
2d Div
6th Div
45th Div
CTG 55
CTG 55.2

CC APU 929
En Corps & Special Troop Unit
En General & Special Staff
Ship & Rec 8th Ser Rgt
1975-50
0137/217

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

RESTRICTED

G-3 Operations Report

No.90. From: 1800I, 22 November 1945.
To : 1800I, 23 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No.61.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Clear and cool, visibility 15 miles to unlimited. Surface wind, northwesterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Clear and warm, visibility unlimited. Surface wind, northerly, 1-3 knots. Sea, calm.
   c. Southern KYUSHU:
      Clear and warm, visibility 10 miles. Surface wind, northwesterly 4-7 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Delayed report indicates elements of 1777th Engr Cons Bn arrived FUKUoka at 2000I, 19 November and reported to CG, 5201st Engr Cons Brig for operational control at that time. 1541st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1st Plt) was relieved from operational control of V Amphibious Corps and placed under operational control APPAC as of 10 November 1945 by SIXTH Army Gen O Number 253.

   b. 5th Marine Division began administrative transfers of Marine personnel between Hq 27th Marines and 3d Bn, 27th Marines at KURUME, and 2d Marines at MIYAKANOJO and MIYAZAKI in conjunction with the operational movements to relieve, progressively, the 5th Marine Division. Elements 121st Fa Bn deployed HAIKO by road at 0900I and proceeded to KURUME to begin relief of 27th Marines there. Disposition and reconnaissance patrolling continued.
1975-50
0137/217
G-3 Operations Report No.36
(Cont'd).

\[\text{Paragraphs c.-e.)}\]

c. 2d Marine Division began administrative transfers of Marine personnel between 2d Marines at MIYAKANOJO and MIYAZAKI and 27th Marines at KURUME. Delayed report indicates OSUMI RETTO detachment of 2d Bn, 8th Marines arrived TANEGASHIMA (75 miles S of KAGOSHIMA) at 0915I, 22 November. 2d and 8th Marines continued routine patrolling.

d. 32d Infantry Division continued routine reconnaissance and disposition patrolling.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command. No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

\[\text{Signature}\]

J. L. STEWART, \(\text{LtCol.}, \text{USMC, ACofS, G-3 (Acting)}\)

\[\text{DISTRIBUTION:}\]

| GHQ AF Pac, MANILA | CTG 55,2 | CG FBC |
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| CG FWF Pac        | CG 5thMarDiv | EA Corps and Spl Trp Unit |
| CTF 55            | CG 32dInfDiv | EA Gen Staff Section |

-2- RESTRICTED
2385-550
0182/147

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

RESTRICTED

25 November 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT

No. GL

UNIT
Language Det VAC
Det Hq En 5th MarDiv
Det 5th ASCO
D Btry 13th Marines
Hq 27th Marines
2d Bn 27th Marines
3d Bn 27th Marines
Det Cos I & L 126th RCT
Sqd Co I 126th RCT
Sqd Co L 126th RCT
121st FA Bn
2d Bn 6th Marines
Det 2d Bn 6th Marines
Det 2d Bn 8th Marines
692d Med Amb Co
873d Engr Avn Bn (less Co A at KANOYA)

CP LOCATION
SASEBO
AINOURA
HAIKI (84.0-09.0)
HAIKI
HAIKI
KOKURA (1390.5-1200.4)
KOKURA (1390.5-1200.4)
GOTOJI (1385.8-1173 0)
KURUIE
SAGA
SHIMO KOSHIKO SHIMA
TANEGA SHIMA
KOKURA
FUKUOKA

REMARKS
Fr FUKUOKA
Fr FUKUOKA
Fr FUKUOKA
Relieved
121st FA Bn
Returned fr
GOTOJI
Returned fr
NOGATA
Relieved 27thMar
65 mi W of
KAGOSHIMA
75 mi S of
KAGOSHIMA

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol, USMC,
AGfS, G-3,
(Acting).

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CO 5thMarDiv
CO 32dInfDiv
CO MAB CIJURA

CO APU 629
En Corps & Special Troop Unit
En General & Special Staff
Section
Ship & Rec 8th Ser Regt

RESTRICTED

1287
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

RESTRICTED

3-5 Operations Report

No. 91.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No. 62.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Clear and cold, visibility 10-15 miles. Surface wind,
northeasterly, 2-4 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Overcast and cold, visibility 1-3 miles. Surface wind,
southwesterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

c. Southern KYUSHU:

Clear and cold, visibility 8-12 miles. Surface wind,
variable, 10-15 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of
responsibility. Effective 24 November, 311th QM Trk Co was
relieved from operational control CG VAC and from adminis-
trative control 32d Inf Div and attached to ASCOMC same
time. 101st Ord Bomb Disp Sqd was relieved from attachment
to 32d Inf Div by CG SIXTH Army and placed under operational
control CG VAC and administrative control CG, 32d Inf Div as
of 24 November, this unit further assigned to CG. 2d Mar Div
for operational control as of the same date.

b. 5th Marine Division was relieved of the occupational respon-
sibility for SAGA Ken by 2d Mar Div at 16001 and of FUKUCKA
Ken by 32d Inf Div at 1001. Elements of 2d Bn, 27th Marines
arrived 3ASBO at 12301. 13th Marines dispatched reconna-
sance patrols within radius of 21 miles of 3ASBO. 1st Bn,
27th Marines continued operations on TSUSHIMA.

-1-
c. 2nd Marine Division (2d Marines) continued patrolling in the KANCYA-MIYAKONJO-MIYAZAKI area. 2d Bn, 6th Marines entrained at NAGASAKI for SAGA at 0800I. 2d Mar Div assumed occupational responsibility for SAGA Ken at 1600I. 10th Marines reconnaissance patrols landed on islands in OMURA VAN, 15 miles north of NAGASAKI along the coast between KOKITSU and ISAHAYA. Delayed report indicates elements 2d Bn, 5th Marines arrived without incident KOSHIKI NETTO O700I, 23 November.

d. 32d Infantry Division relieved 5th Mar Div of occupational responsibility in FUKUOKA Ken, and assumed operational control of 121st FA Bn at KURUME at 1000I. Guard detachment from I and R Platoon dispatched to NAKAHA (12 miles SW of KOKURA) 123rd Inf despatched a demobilization verification patrol to OTA (20 miles WNW of YAMAGUCHI). 127th Inf despatched reconnaissance patrols within 25 mile radius south of FUKUOKA.

e. FUKUOKA Base Command. No change.

4. Casualties:
None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
Acting G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:
GHQ AF Mac MANILA
CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Fac
CTF 55
CTG 55.2
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
CO MAB OMURA
CG FBC
Each Corps and Special Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section

RESTRICTED
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

RESTRICTED

G-3 Operations Report

No. 92.
Maps: No change.

From: 1900I, 24 November 1945,
To: 1900I, 25 November 1945.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 60.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Partially overcast and cold, visibility 3-5 miles. Surface
      wind, northwesterly, 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Partially overcast and cold, visibility 3-5 miles. Surface
      wind, northerly, 2-4 knots. Sea, calm.
   c. Southern KYUSHU:
      Hazy and cold, visibility 5-6 miles. Surface wind, 2 knots.
      Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of
      responsibility. Corps Evac Hosp No. 1 commenced loading
      aboard APA 2 (FLINTLOCK) at SASEBO Harbor in preparation
      for departure for USA on 27 November.
   b. 5th Marine Division (1st Bn, 27th Marines) continued dis-
      position, demobilization and destruction of installations
      on TSUSHIMA. Hq and 3d Bn, 27th Marines closed YAKKI (5
      miles SSE of SASEBO) at 1800I. CP, 27th Marines opened
      same place at 1300I. Elements 5th ASCC and Det Hq Co, Hq En
      closed AIMOURA from FUKUOKA at 1800I. 2d Bn, 27th Marines
      relieved by 2d Bn, 8th Marines at SAGA at 1200I.
   c. 2d Marine Division (2d Bn, 6th Marines) completely relieved
      2d Bn, 27th Marines at SAGA at 1200I and at same time as-
      sumed occupational responsibility for SAGA Ken instead of as
      reported in Operation Report No. 91. Co B, 8th Marines re-
      lieved by elements of 32d Inf Div at OJUTA at 1000I. De-
      layed report indicates that elements 2d Bn, 8th Marines
      arrived without incident SHIMO KOSHIKI SHIMA (33 miles W of
      KAGOSHIMA) at 0700I, 23 November; continued disposition op-
      erations on SHIMO KOSHIKI SHIMA in the same island group.
      10th Marines reduced the strength of detachments at
      SHINABARA, UNZEN and KAZUSA.
e. 32d Infantry Division dispatched demobilization verification teams to KOKURA, TOBATO, YAMATA and ORIO (5 miles N of YAMATA). Upon relief of FUKUOKA Base Command and elements of 2d Mar Div at 1000I, the division assumed control of and occupational responsibility for FUKUOKA Ken. Routine reconnaissance and disposition patrolling continued.

c. FUKUOKA Base Command was relieved by 32d Inf Div at 1000I and was disbanded at the same time. All subordinate units except Det Hq Co 5th Mar Div, 5th ASCO (less dots) and Language Det VAC (all of which departed FUKUOKA for BASEBC to revert to parent control 25 November) passed to operational control of 32d Inf Div at the same time.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART, LtCol, USMC, ACTng, G-3, (Acting).

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CO MAR CHURA

EA Corps and Spl Trp Unit

EA Gen Staff Section
1975-50
0137/217

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

G-3 Operations Report

No. 93.

To: 1800I, 26 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 60 and corrections thereto.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Overcast and cool, visibility 5-10 miles. Surface wind,
      northeasterly 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.
   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Overcast and cool, visibility 1-3 miles. Surface wind,
      northeasterly 1-3 knots. Sea, calm.
   c. Southern KYUSHU:
      Overcast and cool, visibility 5-6 miles. Surface wind,
      easterly, light. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of
      responsibility. BrigGen W. W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, VAC,
      departed OMURA at 0815I by air for conferences with Hq,
      SIXTH Army at KYOTO. Effective 25 November Co E, 554th
      Engr Boat and Shore Rgt located KOJOYA was placed under
      operational control of CG, VAC and administrative control
      of CG, 52d Engr Cons Brig by CG, SIXTH Army and ordered
      to proceed FUKUOKA.
   b. 5th Marine Division continued administrative transfers of
      marine personnel between Hq and 2d Bn, 13th Marines at
      SASEBO and Hq and 4th Bn, 10th Marines at ISANAGA. Routine
      reconnaissance and disposition patrolling continued.

-1-
c. 2d Marine Division continued administrative transfer of Marine personnel between Hq and 4th Bn, 10th Marines at ISAHAYA and Hq and 2d Bn, 13th Marines at SASEBO. 2d Marines continued reconnaissance and disposition patrolling in the KANoya-IYAZAKI area.

d. 32d Infantry Division (128th Inf) dispatched demobilization verification teams to KOGUSHI (15 miles N of SHIMONOSEKI) and TOKUSANAKA (20 miles NE of YAMAGUCHI). Reconnaissance patrols dispatched to UMASHIMA (4½ miles W of SHIMONOSEKI) and KAIHO SHIMA (8 miles W of SHIMONOSEKI). 137th Inf dispatched demobilization verification teams through KOKURA, AOJI, YAMATA, TOBATA, YAMAATSU and ORIO (5 miles W of YAMATA).

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
Lt Col., USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting)

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1975-50
0137/162

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

RESTRICTED
G-3 Operations Report

No. 94

From: 1800I, 26 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 27 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:
   See Location Statement No. 80 and changes thereto.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:
      Partly cloudy and cool, visibility 15-20 miles. Surface wind, northerly 2-4 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:
      Hazy and cool, visibility 3-5 miles. Surface wind, northerly to 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

   c. Southern KYUSHU:
      Rainy and cool, visibility 1-6 miles. Surface wind, calm to 4 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. BrigGen W. W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, VAC returned to SaSEBO by air from conferences with Hq SIXTH Army at KYOTO at 1700I. 692d Med Amb Co departed SaSEBO for FUKUOKA by road 1300I. Corps Evac Hosp #1 departed SaSEBO Harbor at dawn aboard PINKNEY (APA 2) for USA.

   b. 5th Marine Division continued administrative transfers of Marine personnel between Hq and 3d Bn, 13th Marines at SaSEBO and Hq and 2d Bn 10th Marines at ISAHAYA. Routine reconnaissance and disposition patrolling continued.

   c. 2d Marine Division continued administrative transfers of Marine personnel between Hq and 2d Bn 10th Marines at ISAHAYA and Hq and 3d Bn, 13th Marines at SaSEBO. 1st Bn, 6th Marine furnished guard detachment aboard YUGAO Maru to transport 582 Koreans from NAGASAKI to Repatriation Center at HaRIO (5 miles SE of SaSEBO). Detachments 2d Bn, 8th Marines
1975-50
0137/162

G-3 Operations Report Number 94. (Continued).

RESTRICTED

continued disposition activities in KOSHIKI RETTO (45 mi.
W of KAGOSHIMA) and OSUMI RETTO (75 miles S of KAGOSHIMA).
Routine reconnaissance and patrolling continued.

d. 32d Infantry Division (FA Gp OITA) dispatched disposition
teams to BUNGO Airfield near MIE (19 miles S of OITA).
Routine reconnaissance and disposition patrolling continued.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G - 3.
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac MANILA
CG SIXTH Army
CG FMF Pac
CTF 55

CTG 55.2
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv

CO MAB OMURA
CG X Corps
Each Corps and Spl Troop Unit
Each General Staff Section
1975-50
0137/217

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

RESTRICTED

G-3 Operations Report

No. 95.

From: 1800I, 27 November 1945.
To: 1800I, 28 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

Enclosure: (A) Location Map, major troop-units, VAC.

1. Location of Troops:

See Annex A and Location Statement No. 60 and changes thereto.

2. Weather and Visibility:

a. Northern KYUSHU:

Partly cloudy and cold, visibility 15-20 miles. Surface wind, northwesterly 2-4 knots. Sea, calm.

b. Central KYUSHU:

Partly cloudy and cool, visibility, unlimited. Surface wind, easterly 3-5 knots. Sea, calm.

c. Southern KYUSHU:

Partly cloudy and cool, visibility, unlimited. Surface wind, light, variable. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. The 116th NC BN reported to 30, 7th NC Regt for operational control at 1000I.

b. 5th Marine Division continued reconnaissance and disposition patrolling. 1st BN, 27th Marines returned to SASEBO from TSUSHIMA at 1800I, having completed disposition operations there. Administrative transfer of Marine personnel between 13th Marines and 10th Marines continued.
2d Marine Division (1st Bn, 6th Marines) furnished guard detachment aboard CHOBUKU MARU (substituted for YUGAO MARU which was reported in Operations Report No. 94) which departed NAGASAKI at 0810I for HARIO (6 miles SE of SaSEBO) with Korean repatriates aboard. Company B, 8th Marines closed KUMAMOTO from ONUTA at 0910I. 10th Marines furnished guard detachment aboard train transporting Korean repatriates which departed ISAHAYA for HARIO at 1230I. Routine patrolling continued. Administrative transfer of Marine personnel between 10th Marines and 13th Marines continued.

d. 32d Infantry Division (128th Inf) dispatched a reconnaissance patrol along coast line between HIKO SHIMA (1 mile SSW of SHIMONOSEKI) and ATAMA (29 miles NNW of SHIMONOSEKI). Co I, 128th Inf moved to KOTO-KURA (15 miles SW of YAMAUCHI) to begin disposition operations. Detachment (approx 100 men), 128th Inf dispatched to OGORI (3 miles SW of YAMAUCHI) to control Korean repatriation processing there. Delayed report indicates 373d Engr Avn Bn (less Co A) arrived FUKUOKA and reported to CG, 5201st Engr Cons Brig for operational control at 1300I, 24 November.

4. Casualties:
None.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

RESTRICTED

G-3 Operations Report

No.96.

From: 1800I, 28 November 1945.
To : 1800I, 29 November 1945.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

   See Location Statement No.60 and changes thereto.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Clear and cold, visibility 12-14 miles. Surface wind, northeasterly 5-7 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Overcast and cool, visibility 1-3 miles. Surface wind, northerly 1-3 knots. Sea, calm.

   c. Southern KYUSHU:

      Clear and cool, visibility 10-12 miles. Surface wind, northeasterly 2-3 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility. Co E, 534th Engr Boat and Shore Regt was placed under administrative control of CG, 4th Engr Spec Brig as of 25 November instead of CG, 5201st Engr Cons Brig as stated in Operations Report No.94. VMC-5 reported to CO, HAWKRON 2CG #1 for operational control at 1000I.

   b. 5th Marine Division continued administrative transfers of Marine personnel between 18th Marines at SASEBO and 10th Marines at ISAHAYA. 3d Bn, 18th Marines furnished a guard detachment for 8 warehouses east of HAIKI (5 miles ESE of SASEBO).
c. 2d Marine Division continued administrative transfers of Marine personnel between 16th Marines at Ie Shima and 13th Marines at Sasebo. 2d Marines dispatched reconnaissance and disposition patrols in the KAMIYA-KOYA-AKI-MIYA-KOJO area. 1st Bn., 8th Marines commenced loading aboard LSTs 1091 and 948 in preparation for movement to Sasebo Aircraft Factory. KOSHIGI RECO Det of 2d Bn., 8th Marines returned to KAGOSHIMA at 1100, having completed disposition operations at that place, and departed for KUMA-CTO at 1400. 8th Marines dispatched disposition teams within 15 mile radius of KUMA-CTO.

d. 32d Infantry Division (128th Infantry) dispatched a reconnaissance patrol to O-SHIKA (13 miles NW of YAMA-SUGI), 128th Infantry dispatched a reconnaissance patrol to YUYAMA (47 miles SSE of KOKURA). Other routine reconnaissance and disposition patrolling continued.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G-3,
(Acting).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ AF Pac MANILA
CG SIXTH Army
CG FIFTH Pac
CG X Corps

CTF 55
CTG 55.2
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv

CG 32dInfDiv
En Corps and Special Troop Unit
En General Staff Section

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1975-50
0137/217

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
IN THE FIELD.

RESTRICTED
No.97.

Maps: No change.

1. Location of Troops:

See Location Statement No.60 and changes thereto.

2. Weather and Visibility:

   a. Northern KYUSHU:

      Cloudy and cold with intermittent rain, visibility 5-8
      miles. Surface wind, northeasterly 4-6 knots. Sea, calm.

   b. Central KYUSHU:

      Overcast and cold, visibility 3-5 miles. Surface wind,
      northerly 3-6 knots. Sea, calm.

   c. Southern KYUSHU:

      Overcast and cool, visibility 6-8 miles. Surface wind,
      northeasterly 4-6 knots. Sea, calm.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. V Amphibious Corps continued assigned missions in zone of
      responsibility. Major General Decker, Chief of Staff,
      SIXTH Army, arrived at SASEBO NAS from KYOTO at 1100I for
      conferences with CG, VAC. In accordance with FMF directive
      the 1st Fumigation and Bath Co was disbanded 30 November.

   b. 5th Marine Division continued routine disposition missions.
      Co B, 28th Marines closed Har Camp AIMOURA from SASEBO at
      1300I. 18th Marines dispatched a 30 man patrol to HAIC
      (6 miles SE of SASEBO) to quell a disturbance between
      Korean and Chinese repatriates there. Administrative
      transfers of Marine personnel between 18th Marines at
      SASEBO and 10th Marines at IZAHAYA continued.

   c. 2d Marine Division continued administrative transfers of
      Marine personnel between 10th Marines at IZAHAYA and 13th
      Marines at SASEBO. Routine reconnaissance and disposition
      patrolling continued. Det 2d BN, 8th Marines continued
      disposition operations in CSUKI REITTO (75 miles S of
      KAGOSHIMA).

   -1-
d. 32d Infantry Division (FA Gp, CITA) dispatched disposition teams to MCRI (27 miles NW of CITA) and to TATEISHI (23 miles NW of CITA). 128th Inf dispatched a disposition team to CINC-YAMA on HIKUSHIMA Island (1 mile SW of SHIKOMUSEKI). Other routine reconnaissance and disposition patrolling continued.

4. Casualties:

None.

J. L. STEWART,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS, G-3.
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

- OCCUPATION OF JAPAN -

G-4 Report

Annex EASY
ANNEX EASY

to

VAC OPERATIONS REPORT

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

WITH NINE (9) APPENDICES

Appendix 1 - Transport Quartermaster Report.
Appendix 2 - Quartermaster Report.
Appendix 3 - Medical Report.
Appendix 4 - Ordnance Report.
Appendix 5 - Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment Report.
Appendix 6 - Procurement Report.
Appendix 7 - Motor Transport Report.
Appendix 8 - Shore Brigade Report.
Appendix 9 - Periodic Reports.
CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945.

From: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: G-4 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

References:
(a) Corps Special Order No. 120-45, dtd 1Nov45.
(b) CG, SIXTH Army TOP SECRET Dispatch 162323Z.
(c) SIXTH Army Administrative Order No. 19.
(d) V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

Enclosures:
(A) Appendix 1 to Annex EASY (Transport Quartermaster Report).
(B) Appendix 2 to Annex EASY (Quartermaster Report).
(C) Appendix 3 to Annex EASY (Medical Report).
(D) Appendix 4 to Annex EASY (Ordnance Report).
(E) Appendix 5 to Annex EASY (Disposition of Surplus Material and Equipment Report).
(F) Appendix 6 to Annex EASY (Procurement Report).
(G) Appendix 7 to Annex EASY (Motor Transport Report).
(H) Appendix 8 to Annex EASY (Shore Brigade Report).
(I) Appendix 9 to Annex EASY (Periodic Reports).

1. In compliance with reference (a), this report is hereewith submitted and is intended to present an overall synopsis of the major events and facts pertaining to the functioning of this Section in preparing for and executing the Occupation of JAPAN.

2. To support the general narrative account contained in this report, are compiled logistical and administrative statistics as shown in Enclosures (A) through (I) inclusive.


a. General.

(1) Upon receipt of the Warning Order assigning this Corps a mission for the assault landing on Southern KYUSHU, planning for the logistical support of this Corps was immediately initiated by the 4th Section. The 4th Section supervised and coordinated the planning of the related Special Staff Sections, screened all equipment and supplies to be embarked, and by conferences with representatives of the Commanding General, SIXTH Army, including one (1) at Army headquarters at LUZON in June, insured the general coordination of all supply activities. Constant liaison was maintained with Army Forces, MID-PACIFIC, to whom had been delegated the responsibility of furnishing the initial supplies to this Corps, and...

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for mounting out all Army Augmentation units who were located in the HAWAIIAN Area. Information on 4th Section matters was included in the weekly newsletters exchanged between the Headquarters and the SIXTH Army. Marine liaison officers serving with the 4th Section, Headquarters, SIXTH Army, were of material assistance in coordinating and assisting in the supply planning of the occupation operation. All logistic planning, including resupply, was closely coordinated with the Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and its operating agencies serving the Marine organizations involved. Throughout the planning phase the services and cooperation of the Service Command, particularly resupply, was uniformly excellent.

(2) Upon receipt of the Warning Order for the occupational landing on Northern KYUSHU, the 4th Section immediately began revision of previous logistical planning. Additional conferences were held with SIXTH Army and MID-PAC and the system of newsletters was continued. The chief change was a decrease in the amount of shipping to be made available to units of this Corps mounting from the HAWAIIAN Area. This situation was alleviated somewhat by a decrease in the amount of ammunition to be carried but still resulted in a reduction in the amount of supplies and equipment, particularly motor transport, that could be mounted out by the 5th Marine Division and Corps Troops elements in the HAWAIIAN Area. Plans were formulated through Fleet Marine Force, Pacific to set up turn-around shipping to lift the remainder of these units to the target as early as possible. Final assignment of shipping in the case of the 2nd Marine Division and Corps Troops in the HAWAIIAN Area was sufficient to mount these organizations in their entirety except for some non-essential items of the 43rd Naval Construction Battalion attached to the 2nd Marine Division. The responsibility for furnishing initial supplies and mounting out of Army Augmentation units assigned this Corps and located in the PHILIPPINE and HAWAIIAN Area was assumed by the SIXTH Army and Army Forces, MID-PACIFIC, respectively. The Transport Quartermaster Section of this Headquarters furnished a representative to assist in coordinating and supervising the mounting out of the Army units in these areas. With the substitution of the 32nd Infantry Division for the 3rd Marine Division, the SIXTH Army assumed the responsibility of arranging for its initial supplies and mounting out from the PHILIPPINE Area. Conferences pertaining to logistics for this unit

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were held by representatives of this Headquarters with the SIXTH Army at LUZON and with staff representatives of the 32nd Infantry Division at SAIPAN while enroute to the target.

(3) The command chain during the planning phase was from Army Forces, PACIFIC to SIXTH Army to V Amphibious Corps to Divisions and Corps Troops.

(4) The logistical chain of command during this phase was as follows:

(a) Marine Corps units - from Army Forces, Western PACIFIC to SIXTH Army to Fleet Marine Force, PACIFIC to V Amphibious Corps, Corps Troops and Marine Divisions.

(b) Army Augmentation units mounting from the HAWAIIAN Area - from Army Forces, Western PACIFIC to Army Forces, MID-PACIFIC to units concerned.

(c) Army Augmentation units mounting from the PHILIPPINE Area - from Army Forces, Western PACIFIC to SIXTH and/or EIGHTH Armies, to units concerned.

4. In accordance with references (b) and (c), reference (d) was issued, which set forth the overall supply and resupply administrative plans and directives.

a. Supplies and Equipment embarked.

(1) Supplies.

(a) Prescribed levels of supply (in days of supply).

1. Class I, II & IV (less Engr, Sig, Ord, and Cold and Wet Weather Clothing) - 30 D/S

b. Ration Breakdown:

1' "B" Type - 20 D/S

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2. Emergency Type 10 D/S
3. Supplementary Rations 20 D/S
4. See Enclosure (B) Quartermaster Report for further breakdown of ration types and special components of ration and supplements.

b. Water.
1. In cans, drums or other organization equipment.
   2 gal/man/day for five (5) days.

2. Class III 15 D/S
   a. See Enclosure (B) Quartermaster Report for further breakdown of fuel and lube requirements.

3. Class II & IV - Ordnance 30 D/S

4. Class II & IV - Engineer

5. Class II & IV - Signal.
   a. Marine Corps units 30 D/S
   1. Plus 15% of initial allowances of wire and dry batteries.

b. U.S. Army units.
   1. T/E equipment plus supplies authorized in ASF Catalog Sig 4-1 and components of sets of T/E equipment.

6. Class V.
   a. Combat units 3 U/F (AFFAG)
   4 - CONFIDENTIAL

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b. Non-divisional Service units

1 U/F(A

C. Gas.

1' No gas or tear gas was carried.

(b) Winter Clothing.

1. See Enclosure (C) to Appendix 2 to Annex Easy, Enclosure (B) Quartermaster Report.

(c) Voyage Rations.

1. The commanders of troops embarked on the various vessels were held responsible for the ensuring that sufficient voyage rations were available.

(d) Military Government Supplies.

1. See Enclosure (E) to Appendix 2 to Annex Easy, Enclosure (B) Quartermaster Report.

(2) Equipment.

(a) Organizational.

1. Chemical Warfare.

a. No protective clothing, either individual or organizational, was taken to the objective area.

b. Gas masks, protective ointment and eyeshields, plus 30 D/S maintenance items.

2. Water purification units and supplies.

a. All drive points, portable water purification units, and temporary storage tanks were mounted for the operation.

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b. Water purification supplies—30" d.

3. Well rigs, saw mills and rock crushers.
   a. See Engineer Report of Operations, Occupation of JAPAN.

4. Vehicles and weapons were carefully protected against immersion in salt water. After landing, waterproofing materials were removed.

5. Winterization:
   a. Vehicles.
      1. See Enclosure (G) Motor Transport Report.
   b. Weapons.
      1. See Enclosure (D) Ordnance Report.

6. All organic ambulances were embarked.

7. All light transportation and a minimum of 60% of heavy transportation was mounted for this operation.

8. All vehicles not lifted in the initial echelon were brought forward in turn around or rear echelon shipping.

(3) Palletization.

(a) Class I, II, III & IV supplies not over ten (10) percent of overall total by weight, were palletized. All palletized Type "B" and "10-in-1" rations and medical supplies were covered with waterproofing paper.

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(b) Class V.

1. Artillery Ammunition.

   a. Was prescribed by division or separate organizational commanders.

   b. Supply.

      (1) Method of occupation supply.

      (a) Ship to Shore.

         1. See Enclosure (B) Quartermaster Report, and Enclosure (A) Transport Quartermaster Report.

         (b) Initially divisions and separate units were responsible for their own supply from dumps established in vicinity of the beaches or docks.

         (c) Instructions for development of local resources, storage, and distributing points of water were set forth in the Engineer Administrative Plan (annex GEORGE to reference (d)). See Engineer Report of Operations, Occupation of JAPAN.

   (d) Air Delivery.

      1. A plan for Air Delivery was prescribed in Annex HOW to reference (d).

   (e) Resupply – All classes.

      1. See Enclosure (B) Quartermaster Report.

(2) Supplies to be landed with troops.

(a) Rations.

   1. A minimum of one (1) emergency ration was carried by each individual.
(b) Ammunition, landing, 1 U/F of all types.
(c) Water.
   1. All medical personnel carried two filled canteens.
(d) Medical Supplies.
   1. Adequate amounts of supplies were landed with organizational medical units.

(3) Dumps.
   (a) Initial supply levels were maintained in division and separate unit dumps were prescribed by organizations concerned.
   (b) Permanent storage areas were prescribed by Corps at the objective.

c. Evacuation.

(1) Casualties.
   (a) Personnel.
      1. See Enclosure (C) Medical Report.
   (b) Civilian casualties were not evacuated.

(2) Burial.
   (a) Instructions.
      1. See Enclosure (C) Medical Report.
   (b) Cemeteries.
      1. Were prescribed after arrival at the objective. An armed forces cemetery was established in each of the three main centers of occupation - NAGASAKI, SASEBO and FUKUOKA.

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(3) Salvage.

(a) Salvage of allied equipment was carried out in accordance with existing Army and War Corps SOPs.

(4) Surrendered materials.

(a) See Enclosure (E) Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment Report.

d. Ordnance Plan.

(1) See Enclosure (D) Ordnance Report.

ev. Engineer Plan.

(1) See Engineer Report of Operations, Occupation of JAPAN.

f. Transport.

(1) See Enclosure (A) Transport Quartermaster Report.

g. Personnel.

(1) For Administrative matters, see G-1 Report of Operations, Occupation of JAPAN.

(2) Shelter.

(a) Assignment of Corps and Division areas were made by Corps Commander. See Annex QUEEN to reference (d).

(b) Housing.

1. For limitations on construction, see Engineer Report of Operations, Occupation of JAPAN.

2. Camp Equipment.

(a) See Enclosure (D) to Appendix 2 to Annex EASY, Enclosure (B) Quartermaster Report.

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(3) Reports.

(a) G-4 Periodic Reports were covered in Annex PETER to reference (d). (See Enclosure (1). Enclosure (1) will accompany only the original copy of this report going to Headquarters Marine Corps.

h. Miscellaneous.

(1) Shore Parties.

(a) See Enclosure (H) Shore Brigade Report.

(2) Uniforms.

(a) Utility clothing for embarkation and debarkation was prescribed and worn.

(3) Baggage.

(a) Officers.

1. Field officers were authorized one (1) trunk, or footlocker; one (1) clothing roll or one (1) bag, clothing; and one (1) bedding roll.

2. All other officers; one (1) clothing roll, and one (1) bag, clothing; and one (1) bedding roll.

(b) Enlisted.

1. 1st paygrade: same as company grade officers.

2. All other enlisted personnel authorized one (1) bag, clothing.

(4) Sanitation.

(a) See Enclosure (C) Medical Report.

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(5) Military Government.
   (a) See Military Government Report of Operations, Occupation of JAPAN.

(6) Conservation of Supplies.
   (a) Instructions for conservation of supplies were carried out as set forth in reference (d).

(7) Clothing and Food for Repatriates.
   (a) See Annex N4N to reference (d).

(8) Unloading Priority.
   (a) Priorities were set up in Annex ABE to reference (d) and were adhered to as closely as possible.

(9) Miscellaneous administrative matters.
   (a) All units of this Corps left sufficient personnel in rear echelons to properly protect, maintain and embark such organizational equipment as not sent with assault echelon, consistent with requirements that maximum effective strength would be available at the objective.

5. G-4 REPORT (OPERATIONAL PHASE).

   a. General.

   (1) The plans and directives as set forth in paragraph 4. above (Planning Preparatory Phase), were executed in a very satisfactory manner. The G-4 Section had as its operational function the responsibility of the logistical support of this Corps. It maintained close supervision over the operations of the various related Special Staff Sections at all times during the occupational operation. It coordinated the unloading, transporting and storing of all supplies for units of this Corps. Assisting in this task were the following organizations and provisional groups: Shore Brigade, 8th Service Regiment, CUB 18, 7th Naval Construction Regiment, Provisional Medical Group, Provisional Motor Transport Group, Provisional Combat Engineer Group.
Representatives of this Section accompanied the group making the advance reconnaissance of the area to be occupied by elements of this Corps. These officers located and appraised all routes of communication, all warehousing and billeting spaces, and Japanese supplies for the use of occupational forces. From the information supplied by these officers, this Section was able to make tentative allocations of the various warehouses, billeting spaces and supply installations to the organizations concerned prior to the initial landing of troops.

b. The main difficulties encountered in the occupational operation were as follows:

(1) The failure of MID-PAC agencies, charged with the responsibility of furnishing Class I supplies for mounting out elements of this Corps, to supply balanced "P" ration components as this Headquarters had requested. The rations furnished also lacked variety in meat components.

(2) The failure of resupply ships carrying fresh provisions to arrive on schedule and to arrive with cargoes as previously planned.

(3) The failure of service agencies, who were charged with the responsibility of mounting out Army Augmentation units, to comply with administrative orders in mounting out the aforementioned units with the prescribed level of rations and water, thereby creating a drain on the stock levels set up by this Corps.

(4) The lack of suitable warehouses, cold storage, and open storage facilities and the lack of good routes of communication in the SASEBO Area created a congested condition in the dock areas, thereby hampering the unloading and distribution of vitally needed equipment and supplies. This situation was further complicated by reason of the Port of FUKUOKA being closed to our shipping due to mines. By close supervision and timely coordination of the various supply activities, the aforementioned problems were solved without retarding the progress of the occupational operation.

c. Ship to Shore Movement.

(1) The unloading of cargo of units of this
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Corps was facilitated by the presence of docks and cranes. The bulk of the cargo unloaded was handled in this manner, however, a few ships were required to discharge cargo in midstream into small boats which were landed over ramps at the aircraft factory and Naval Air Station Areas.

(2) The discharging of cargo was coordinated by this Section and the Transport Quartermaster Section to insure the proper routing and storing of all supplies and equipment.

(3) Transron 22 was given priority in unloading so that it could be used as turnaround shipping to lift the 32nd Army Division from the PHILIPPINES.

d. Adequacy of Supplies and Equipment.

(1) In general, there were sufficient supplies and equipment to enable this Corps to efficiently perform its mission as an operational force. However, Army units attached to V Amphibious Corps were late in receiving adequate issue of Wet and Cold Weather Clothing and tent stoves. This was due to their being brought forward in resupply shipping. Marine and Navy units mounted out with some stoves and all clothing being carried by organizations themselves. Remaining stoves required for Marine and Naval units arrived in early resupply shipping and distribution was effected by time cold weather set in.

(2) Initially there was a definite shortage of DDT and other disinfectants. They were needed in larger quantities than those brought ashore by the occupation forces due to extremely unsanitary conditions of the Japanese buildings to be used as living quarters. All billets required a thorough cleaning and disinfecting prior to being occupied by our forces.

(3) Immediately upon landing and for a period thereafter, there was a shortage of motor transport. This situation was caused by one (1) division of this Corps leaving in the rear echelon one-half (?) of the Division Motor Transport Battalion. This was caused by lack of shipping space. The situation never became critical however, as the Corps Provisional Motor Transport Group proved capable of meeting all necessary requirements. The availability and efficiency of motor transport in this Corps has been very satisfactory from the standpoint of complete utilization of vehicles and service facilities.

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e. Evacuation.

(1) See Enclosure (C) (Medical Report).

f. Transportation.

(1) See Enclosure (G) (Motor Transport Report).

g. Surrendered Supplies and Materials.

(1) Two (2) additional related Special Staff Sections, the Procurement Section and Disposition Section, were organized to deal with the problems of procuring Japanese supplies and equipment for the operational use of the occupational forces and for disposing of surrendered Japanese war supplies and materials. The Japanese liaison agencies were cooperative and very helpful in accomplishing these tasks.

(2) Certain Japanese Naval equipment and materials were evacuated from the SASEBO area by NAVTECHJAP. These materials consisted chiefly of noteworthy ordnance and signal items. These items were sent to INDIANHEAD, MARYLAND for intelligence studies. For further details, see Annex CHARLIE, G-2 Report to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

h. Activities.

(1) Operational Supply Plan from 22 September to 24 October, 1945.

(a) For the initial phase of the occupation, the main supply point was SASEBO, JAPAN and the sub-supply point was NAGASAKI. The greater bulk of unloading, of both supplies and troops, occurred at SASEBO. This included the unloading and distribution of the initial resupply.

(2) Operational Supply Plan from 24 October to 25 November, 1945.

(a) During this period, the main supply point remained at SASEBO. The FUKUOKA Base Command was formed the 24th of October. This organization consisted of Command and Staff which was formed from

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the 5th Marine Division and Corps Troops. This organization assumed all logistical responsibility for the FUKUOKA area and made preparations for the occupation of that area by the 32nd Infantry Division. NAGASAKI continued as a sub-supply point and functioned for the logistical support of the 2nd Marine Division zone of responsibility.

(3) Operational Supply Plan from 25 November, 1945.

(a) NAGASAKI continued to function as a sub-supply point. SASEBO remains the main supply point. The FUKUOKA Base Command was disbanded on 25 November and the 32nd Infantry Division assumed all logistical responsibility of the FUKUOKA area. All Army service elements, including the 5201st Engineer Brigade, in the FUKUOKA area operated under the 32nd Infantry Division during this period. The remainder of the Army service units landed at SASEBO and moved into the FUKUOKA area by rail and road. The Port of FUKUOKA (HAKATA) will be opened to LST’s and smaller craft on or about 6 December, 1945. From that date on supplies and equipment will be moved from SASEBO into the FUKUOKA area by water as well as rail and truck convoy. Included in present plans is the taking over by "ASOK-0" on or about 15 December, 1945, the logistical support of the island of KYUSHU. Their base supply point will be FUKUOKA with sub bases at SASEBO and NAGASAKI. The sub base at NAGASAKI will continue to function until such time as it is cleared of Army supplies and material.

(4) It is considered that the Corps was able to meet satisfactorily and successfully all logistical problems arising in the operational phase of the occupation.

6. G-4 OPERATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS.

These recommendations are submitted as being desirable for the successful functioning of a Corps when participating in an operation under conditions comparable to the Occupation of JAPAN.

a. It is considered essential that sufficient shipping be provided to permit motor transport, cranes, and other cargo handling equipment to be so loaded as to facilitate early landing on "A" Day. This is necessary to insure prompt removal

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of supplies and equipment from beach and dock areas, and is particularly important when no opposition to the occupation develops.

b. If at all possible, advance echelons composed primarily of representatives from the G-3 and G-4 Sections should be sent out in sufficient time in advance to survey and assign unloading facilities, billets and storage areas. This advance section should have definite authority to allocate such buildings and areas and require the local civilian government to prepare them for immediate use "A" Day.

c. Positive action must be taken by responsible agencies to insure that all units arrive at the target with sufficient rations as determined by plans and prescribed by orders.

d. When seasonal changes in the early stages of the occupation are indicated, it is recommended that all organizations mount out with clothing and equipment necessary to insure health and comfort of personnel. In this operation many units arrived without wet and cold weather clothing and heating stoves. The situation was further complicated by the late arrival of this equipment in resupply shipping.

e. When Marine units are used in occupation duty which involves the destruction or disposal of large quantities of enemy war supplies and materiel, they must be augmented by the assignment of trained ordnance personnel and with personnel specially trained in handling ammunition and explosives of all types. This is particularly true when the forces involved are spread over a large area with small units engaged in this duty.

f. When a Marine Corps, operating under an Army, is responsible for the logistical support of troops dispersed over a large area involving the large scale employment of railways and water transport, it is essential that it be augmented by the assignment of sufficient Army Transportation Corps personnel in its staff sections. The other alternative is the assignment of an ASCOh to the Corps to perform the necessary control and operating functions.

7. G-4 REPORT CONCLUSION.

a. The amount of supplies and equipment provided was sufficient, and the Corps organization was adequate to provide
the logistical support necessary for the operational requirements for the occupation of that part of Japan assigned as its zone of responsibility.

b. Throughout the planning, movement, and operational phases, the cooperation and assistance of the Sixth Army's corresponding staff sections was excellent. The assignment of officers from these sections for liaison with the corresponding sections of this corps was greatly appreciated and in all cases their performance of duty was highly satisfactory.

c. The comment expressed in paragraph b. above applies in equal extent to the assistance and cooperation of the Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. The services of its agencies in the various areas involved in furnishing the necessary supplies and equipment for mounting out was as complete as possible and greatly appreciated. The Service Command organization for the planning and establishment of resupply shipping was particularly outstanding.

d. The organization and functioning of the 8th Service Regiment as the principal logistical supporting agency for the Corps was adequate and very satisfactory. This organization contributed materially to the accomplishment of the logistical requirements for the support of the occupation mission and, in the early phases, under conditions of inadequate storage facilities and adverse weather conditions.

c. The functioning of CUB 18 in furnishing naval support for the operation of port facilities was adequate and satisfactory and, as in the case of the 8th Service Regiment, was accomplished under adverse conditions. In addition to supporting the Corps, this organization was required to furnish many services for U.S. Naval Forces afloat operating in the Kyushu Area. These duties were performed in a highly efficient manner and were of material assistance to the overall occupation mission.

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A. C. Horner,
Colonel, USMC

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY
TO VAC OPERATIONS REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER REPORT

ENCLOSURE (A)
0101/250.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER SECTION,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

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From: The Transport Quartermaster.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: Transport Quartermaster Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

30 November, 1945.

1. Planning for the assault on KYUSHU had been in progress for several weeks prior to reporting of the Corps to the SIXTH ARMY on 1 July. On the basis of information previously received, estimates as to shipping required for the movement of the Corps and attached army augmentation units were prepared and submitted to SIXTH ARMY, upon reporting, for their information in the allocation of shipping. Planning had progressed to the point that TransRons had been formed and assigned to lift specific units when word was received on 14 August that JAPAN had capitulated. Several days passed before definite information was received that the Corps would participate in the occupation. Individual ships of TransRons assigned for the assault on KYUSHU were being employed on other missions until the dates upon which they were to assemble. As the earliest of these dates was 1 September and as the target date for the landing was 22 September, it was found necessary to form provisional TransRons for the movement.

2. Provisional TransRon 22, consisting of 14 large, 4 small AAs, 3 large, 5 small AKs and 1 LSV, plus 17 LSTs and 15 LSMs; was assigned to lift the initial echelon of the 5th Marine Division and Corps Troops on 20 August, to commence loading on 22 August. Detailed planning was of necessity hasty and incomplete, resulting in considerable confusion in the actual loading operation. Some moderation was made in the amount of supplies to be lifted, but essentially the administrative order prescribing the equipment and supplies to be lifted for the operation against KYUSHU was adhered to. A notable exception was the reduction from 5 to 3 units of fire for artillery and infantry weapons. Loading commenced on 22
August and was completed on 31 August. Lack of time for proper preparation of loading plans, and the last minute delivery of supplies and equipment caused a few items to be left on the docks when loading was completed. The initial echelon of LSTs completed loading and sailed from the HAWAIIAN Area on 30 August via the great circle route direct to the target. TransRon 22 departed the HAWAIIAN Area on 31 August enroute to SASEBO via SAIPAN. LSMs were also routed via SAIPAN, departing 28 August. A second echelon of 17 LSTs departed the HAWAIIAN Area 3 September via the great circle route, arriving SASEBO three days after the initial landing. ComPhibGroup 4 and the operating staff of the 5th Amphibious Corps departed the HAWAIIAN Area on 1 September in the Mount McKinley, AGC-7, and rendezvoused with TransRon 22 on 3 September.

3. Enroute to SAIPAN radio silence and the blackout were lifted. A constant stream of messages was received. The 3rd Marine Division was deleted from the troop list and the 32nd Infantry Division was added. TransRon 12 (provisional), consisting of 15 APAs and 5 AKAs, plus 16 LSTs and 20 LSMs, was assigned to load the 2nd Marine Division at SAIPAN. A system of priorities was set up for the call forward of Army augmentation units. The troop list changed continually through the deletion or addition of augmentation units. Charts and photographs of SASEBO Harbor were studied and landing points and berths were selected.

4. TransRon 22 arrived at SAIPAN on 13 September. Liaison officers from the SIXTH ARMY came aboard with additional information as to augmentation units and resupply shipping. A conference was held with representatives of the 32nd Infantry Division relative to the mounting out of that organization. An advance party from Corps Headquarters embarked aboard APDs and departed for SASEBO. The 2nd Marine Division continued loading in TransRon 12, completing on 16 September. TransRon 22 fueled and departed on 16 September; TransRon 12 following on 17 September. Shipping provided in TransRon 12 was sufficient for the complete roll-up of the 2nd Marine Division.
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Appendix 1 to Annex EASY, O-4 Report of Operations, Occupation of JAPAN (Cont'd).

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5. The voyage from SAIPAN to SASEBO was uneventful, although thorough precautions were taken with respect to mines, beginning A-2. Upon arrival at SASEBO, on 22 September, RCT 26 was landed over Green Beaches, Sasebo Naval Air Station, by small boats without incident. RCT 27 in TransDiv 39 proceeded to the inner harbor and began unloading. Some alongside berths which had been selected by studies of photographs and charts were reported unsuitable by the advance reconnaissance party, and plans had to be revised accordingly. All docks were found to be extremely congested and littered with scrap and debris. Access roads were poor and dock aprons were unpaved. In spite of these handicaps the 5th Marine Division, which was given priority, completed unloading in 38 hours, and the entire TransRon was completed on 25 September. TransRon 22 (less Fallon and Golus) departed in echelons to load the 32nd Infantry Division at LINGAYEN.

6. The 2nd Marine Division in TransRon 12 landed at NAGASAKI on 23 September. Unloading conditions were even worse than those at SASEBO were found to exist. Only 3 alongside berths were available, and these were extremely poor from the standpoint of access roads and storage areas. The bulk of unloading was by small boat from the stream. The division completed unloading and TransRon 12 sailed on 25 September for MANILA.

7. Considerable work was necessary in order to clear the dock area at SASEBO of gear which had been unloaded by the troops. Troops, their supplies and equipment had to be moved by rail to occupy strategic points to the north. The highway system was found to be almost non-existent in the SASEBO Area, the elapsed time of a vehicle trip to FUKUOKA, about 65 miles, being approximately 9 hours. Bridge limitations were initially 6 tons. Consequently the entire burden of moving troops and supplies to the north was thrown upon the railroad. As SASEBO is not on a main line, the railroad facilities were taxed to capacity from the first.
8. The first resupply ship arrived 25 September and began discharging on 28 September. Discharge was extremely slow because of dock and dump conditions. It was necessary to discharge all cargo directly into vehicles as the dock aprons were so narrow that no space existed for the stockpiling of cargo on the docks. Although aprons have now been cleared of scrap and improved to the maximum extent practicable, this condition still exists. Docks facilities continued to be developed until 7 ships could be put alongside and unloaded simultaneously at the primary unloading point. Alongside berths for two ships were developed on the southwest side of the harbor but were not used except in case of emergency because of poor access and the long haul involved. Two (2) dry docks were used to a limited extent because of overhead crane facilities. Because of the stepped construction of the side of the dry dock, the use of ship's gear for unloading was limited by the distance which ships had to be held away from the apron.

9. Initially the responsibility for the unloading of resupply shipping was delegated to the 8th Service Regiment. For the task of unloading, this organization was reinforced by the attachment of 4 Army Port Companies, and had under their operational control a Special MCB. Under these arrangements a maximum of 11 resupply ships could be discharged simultaneously. The Corps Shore Brigade was reactivated on 23 October and took over the detailed coordination and supervision of the unloading of resupply shipping. It was discovered early in the unloading that the controlling factor in the maximum rate of unloading was to be the ability of the dumps to receive and process the cargo rather than the ability of the stevedores to get it off the ship. Warehouses had to be cleared of masses of machinery and scrap, and open storage areas had to be bulldozed in the burned out areas of the town. Warehouses in many instances were found to be unsuited to unloading because of entrances so low that trucks could not enter. The necessity for receiving cargo and making issues from the same warehouses further complicated the problems. This situation has now largely been overcome by the movement of thousands of tons of materials from these warehouses and areas, and because of the im-
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Appendix 1 to Annex EASY, G-4 Report of Operations, Occupation of JAPAN (Cont'd).

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provements which have been made in existing facilities. A peak in the backlog of ships to be unloaded was reached on 10 November when there were 35 ships in SAASEBO Harbor of which 32 were either unloading or awaiting discharge. This backlog has been reduced to the point that as of this date only 14 ships are discharging or awaiting discharge.

10. A number of ships which had been originally consigned to other ports were diverted to this area for unloading. The bulk of these contained Navy construction materials, equipment and portable housing which had been intended for SUBIC BAY. One of these ships contained 117 lifts which could not be handled by ship's gear, thereby creating a considerable unloading problem. This situation also occurred on some of the resupply vessels especially loaded for SAASEBO. Many tons of supplies and equipment had to be unloaded even though there was no foreseeable use for the particular items. The burden of discharging useless materials thrown upon a port with the limited facilities of SAASEBO created considerable difficulties and was accomplished at the expense of unloading of vitally needed supplies and equipment.

11. For the operation against KYUSHU it had been planned to use ULITHI as a regulating station for resupply shipping. This was changed following the surrender to make OKINAWA the regulating station. Then, in view of the delay in the opening of the harbors at FUKUOKA and SHIMONOSEKI, SAASEBO was selected as the regulating station. This arrangement was entirely satisfactory as the bulk of the unloading was of necessity at SAASEBO. From SAASEBO resupply ships were fed into NAGASAKI as they could be unloaded. As of the date of this report the opening of the FUKUOKA Harbor is still indefinite and the prospects of SHIMONOSEKI Harbor being opened to allied shipping in the immediate future are poor.

12. TransRon 22 (less Fallon and Colusa) lifted the 32nd Infantry Division at LINGAYEN during the period 3 – 9 October and arrived SAASEBO 14 October. Unloading was partially dockside, partially by small boat over Green Beaches, and
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was completed on 25 October. RCT 123 and RCT 128 proceeded to FUKUOKA by rail and motor serial upon completion of unloading. RCT 127 relieved RCT 28 of the 5th Marine Division at SASEBO and RCT 26 immediately embarked in 3 APAs, sailing for PEBBLE ISLAND on 1 October. Heavy vehicles and 2 units of fire of the 32nd Division were transshipped to 4 LSTs to await opening of FUKUOKA Harbor.

13. Army augmentation units were echeloned in by APAs, AKAs, LSTs, LSMs and LCTs. These units were landed primarily by small boats and landing craft over Green Beaches at the Sasebo Naval Air Station and proceeded to NORTHERN KYUSHU by rail and motor serial. Some heavy vehicles which could not be moved by rail or road were stockpiled at SASEBO awaiting opening of FUKUOKA Harbor. As of this date 6 LSTs loaded with supplies and equipment of the 32nd Division and augmentation units are standing by in SASEBO Harbor also awaiting the opening of FUKUOKA Harbor.

14. (a) The following is a recapitulation of the shipping discharged by the Corps in KYUSHU ports during the period 22 September - 30 November, 1945.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>LONG TONS</th>
<th>MEASUREMENT TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>APA</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>111,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LSV</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>4,450</td>
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<td>260</td>
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<td>117,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>360,262</td>
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<tr>
<td>513</td>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>354,414</td>
<td>1,017,032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The following is a recapitulation of railway activity resulting from the occupation of KYUSHU during the period 22 September - 30 November, 1945.

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Appendix 1 to Annex EASY, G-4 Report of Operations, Occupation of Japan (Cont'd).

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Total passenger car miles 139,167
Total net ton miles (freight) 3,492,573
Total tonnage shipped by rail from SASEBO 31,689
Total passenger cars dispatched from SASEBO 719
Total freight cars dispatched from SASEBO 3,243

15. The Corps Transport Quartermaster section was augmented by a rail officer and an air officer shortly after the Corps was established ashore. The section continued to handle amphibious shipping in the usual manner, but in addition was charged with the responsibility for collection of cargo information on resupply shipping and submission of required reports thereon, for the movement of all shipping consigned to the Corps, for the assignment of unloading berths, for the assignment of lighterage, and for the general coordination of all unloading activities. All movements by rail from SASEBO were booked through the rail officer, and all air travel, both passenger and freight was booked through the air officer. These modifications were found necessary in order to conform to Army procedure, and the section was modeled to some extent along the lines of an Army Transportation section. Close liaison with the Port Director and the Shipping and Receiving Section of the 5th Service Regiment was maintained by direct telephone.


(a) Shipping assigned for the lift of troops from the HAWAIIAN Area was inadequate. As a result it was necessary for the Corps, 5th Marine Division and 5th Service Regiment to leave large amounts of needed equipment in rear echelons. It is realized that shipping was being employed in other missions at the time of the surrender, however it is recommended that troops furthest distant from the target be given priority in movement and that steps be taken to provide adequate shipping in any future operation of this nature.
(b) This is the only occasion in the history of the Marine Corps in which Marines have been required to operate a port of the magnitude and activity of SASEBO. Because of the strictly tactical nature of the Corps there are no specialists or trained personnel available to perform duties similar to those performed by an Ascom Base. It is therefore recommended that an Ascom be provided in any future operation in which a Corps of Marines operates under Army control.

(c) The diversion of shipping loaded with ABCD equipment to SASEBO for unloading created serious handling and storing problems. It is recommended that this practice be discontinued in the future except in cases where such material has been specifically requested.

(d) Numerous problems also arose in the unloading of heavy lifts from ships which had been loaded by crane. It is recommended that no lift which cannot be handled by ship's gear be loaded on shipping coming into a combat area unless definite assurance has been received that facilities are available for handling such lifts.

(e) Partial discharges of reefer and engineer resupply ships have been necessary at this port. Because of lack of space to stockpile unwanted materials and reefer cargo pending reloading, this has also created a serious problem. It is therefore recommended that partial discharges be kept to a minimum in future operations.
0101/250
Appendix 1 to Annex EASY, G-4 Report of Operations, Occupation of JAPAN (Cont'd).

CONFIDENTIAL

[Signature]

C. L. GRANGER,
LtCol., USMCR.
Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operations Report
Occupation of JAPAN
QUARTERMASTER REPORT
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

0144/231

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Corps Quartermaster.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: Corps Quartermaster Report, Occupation of KYUSHU, JAPAN.

30 November, 1945.

References: (a) Corps Special Order No. 120-45, dtd 1 Nov 45.
(b) V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45.

Enclosures: (A) Ration Breakdown for mounting out.
(B) Class Three Breakdown for mounting out.
(C) Wet and Cold Weather Clothing Breakdown for mounting out.
(D) Camp Equipment Breakdown for mounting out.
(E) Military Government Supplies Breakdown for mounting out.

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a) to give a concise overall picture of the duties and functions of this section during the occupational operation of KYUSHU, JAPAN.

2. Enclosures (A) to (E) inclusive are in support of the narrative portion of this report.

3. PLANNING AND PREPARATORY PHASE.

a. General.

(1) A Corps Quartermaster was assigned to the G-4 Section of the Fifth Amphibious Corps Staff 20 July 1945, thereafter having been none. The decision to add a Corps Quartermaster Section was predicated on the fact that for the assault landing on Southern KYUSHU a considerable number of U. S. Army Quartermaster organizations and units were being added to the Corps and a Staff representative was desirable. The section consisted of three Officers (2 Marines and 1 Army Liaison) and three enlisted. It was purposely kept small so that its activities would be limited to staff functions and there would be less temptation to become involved in operational details which should properly be left to the organizations actually handling the supplies.
Enclosure BAKER, Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operations Report Occupation of JAPAN.

b. Planning.

(1) Plans covering initial supply and re-supply were formulated by higher headquarters. Corps plans involved only the proper distribution and utilization of supplies as received. These plans were promulgated as Annex EASY to Administrative Order No. 6-45. It is believed that this plan would have been adequate for assault operations inasmuch as it provided satisfactory logistical support during the Occupation of KYUSHU, JAPAN.

4. ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING.

a. Organization.

(1) The supply organization for the Corps consisted of two groups of about equal size performing almost identical functions. One group was organized according to Marine Corps and the other according to U. S. Army T/O's. Some very interesting comparisons may be drawn.

(2) The composition of basic units warrants further study. The Marine Corps units are based on T/O's drawn up in traditional form, a complete T/O being necessary for each administrative unit. Since operating conditions vary widely, and no two problems are the same, the T/O tries to provide a universal solution for variable conditions. The result is a ponderous, inflexible T/O which fits no condition well. Army T/O's, on the other hand, provide an ideal means to tailor the organization for the particular job. Each specific function is covered by a T/O of the optimum size to perform a unit of work, and the individuals constituting the unit are trained in their particular specialty. These units are not administrative, and have no function to perform other than their specialty. When it has been determined just what working units are required, a sufficient number of administrative units (QM Enndwtr, etc) are added to tie the organization together and supervise its activities. This system provides a highly flexible and efficient means of setting up complete supply organizations.

(3) Basic organization differs in one other fundamental respect. Under Army practice, unified overall supervision of the several technical activities is not carried in echelons below the G-4 staff section. There is no common head for technical operating activities, other than its own staff supply representative. It follows logically.
Enclosure BAKER, Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operations Report Occupation of JAPAN.

therefore, that G-4 himself takes over much of the operating supervision of the several technical services under him. This results in enormous staff sections, and the end result is that management functions are vested in the Board of Directors - a poor basis of operations to say the least. Marine Corps supply practice is on a more workable basis. The Commanding Officer of the Service Regiment acts as the operating representative of G-4. He assumes the functions of operational management, leaving the G-4 free for purely staff functions. This is considered as being much more efficient and more economical of personnel. Observation of the two systems operating side by side during the occupation of JAPAN, confirmed this belief.

b. Training.

(1) The training of the 8th Service Regiment and of the two Marine Division Quartermaster units was observed. They were well trained and accustomed to working together when they embarked for the occupation. On the other hand, the Army units were scattered from HAWAII to HOLLANDIA and the PHILIPPINES. Because of the distances and the wide dispersal there was no means of observing or integrating the training of these units, which joined the command at various times during the first 60 days of the occupation. Individually they were well trained in their specialties, but they were not trained to work together as a team. No administrative unit had the whole picture and none was competent to quickly organize a complete supply depot when they were thrown on their own resources. The very flexibility of Army T/O's fosters the tendency to neglect training in teamwork. A coach would soon lose his job if he sent his team into the Thanksgiving football game without a single scrimmage, but we were prepared to commit a major portion of our supply team to combat without any training in teamwork whatsoever. Fortunately the enemy was already knocked out, so it did no serious harm, but a pertinent lesson should be drawn from it.

5. Occupational operations with comments and recommendations.

a. Initial Supply.

(1) Deliveries of initial supplies were set up by the Service Command, FMF, Pac. Advance of embarkation date caused some confusion, but the majority of items were received in time. Exceptions noted were:
Enclosure BAKER, Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operations Report Occupation of JAPAN.

(A) Kerosene stoves. Fortunately these could be included in rear echelon shipments, but they were needed before they were received.

(B) Landing mat. This was on hand in the HAWAIIAN area several weeks before embarkation, but was not delivered to troop units. It was badly needed, and might have been extremely critical if an assault landing had been made.

(C) Mounting out rations were not properly balanced, and this caused considerable criticism, and some discomfort.

(2) Army units were not so well provided. They mounted out with no cold-wet weather clothing and no stoves. Many of the small miscellaneous units had no mounting out rations, or rations in insufficient quantities. This was the cause of much irritation and a tendency to blame the local supply agencies for the results of poor staff work in the mounting out agencies.

(3) Rear area supply headquarters and depots failed badly in one respect. Supply officers of combat organizations are vitally concerned to know the status of the many items which should be furnished them. Adequate paper routines exist to give everyone interested timely and prompt information, but this is almost wholly neglected. Division quartermasters, Service Regiment commanders, and G-4 staff officers vitally interested are left almost completely in the dark.

b. Re-supply.

(1) Plans for re-supply were just about perfect. Loadings had been started for assault and combat operations. They were changed wherever possible to provide for the needs of an occupation force. It was not known until some time after landing just how much opposition would be encountered, and how long troops would have to remain in KYUSHU nor under what conditions. Equipment and supplies were provided for almost any contingency, and since the smallest imaginable demands were met, large quantities of various items were unloaded which were not actually needed. It frequently was necessary to unload much cargo not wanted to get at some vital items in the lower holds.
Enclosure BAKER, Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operations Report Occupation of JAPAN.

(2) While re-supply plans were above criticism, the execution of those plans was not. Fresh provision ships did not arrive as planned, and in one or two cases stores intended for the KYUSHU area had been discharged at other points before arrival at destination. However, there at all times was plenty of canned rations, and, while variety was lacking, nobody suffered from lack of food through failure of supply lines. When fresh provision ships began to arrive, there was such a large quantity of fresh stores that it would have been impossible to prevent considerable spoilage had it occurred in the summer time. It cannot be too strongly urged that sufficient reefer barges be invariably provided to care for adequate stores for all the troops in an occupied area.

c. Post Exchanges Supplies.

(1) Marine Corps units habitually have trained post exchange personnel, and as a rule take PX supplies both in their advance and rear echelons, which permits setting up sales stores promptly. Army practice is at sharp variance with this procedure. They depend upon the accessory ration pack for luxury and morale items for long periods. Combat organizations lack any approved method of handling post exchanges as such and depend upon quartermaster sales items for certain supplies. These cannot be dispensed until sales stores are put into operation. Advance planning would have greatly facilitated opening of stores in this case.

(2) The supply of beer was in excess of requirements, due more or less to the cool weather encountered. The supply of coca cola was curtailed in anticipation of local bottling facilities which did not materialize. Ice cream machines would have decreased the demand for both these items, and take up less shipping space.

d. Housing.

(1) Japanese barracks were taken over for use by our troops wherever possible. They were universally vermin infested. This caused a heavy expenditure of DDT and other insecticides. Considerable quantities in excess of allowances had been provided, but the requirements far exceeded the supply. Future plans should provide ample supplies for all purposes.

(2) Rats are another major pest. The rat population of both warehouse and barracks areas is tremendous, and no adequate means has been found to cope with them. It is
anticipated that they will be a continuing and increasing problem of serious proportions which will cause appreciable losses in both food and equipment as well as being a danger to health.

e. Port Facilities.

(1) Although there are many ports on the island of KYUSHU only two were used primarily. Nagasaki provides limited berthing space, so was only used to a small extent. The port of Sasebo was suitable for landing the majority of supplies for troops of the Occupation Forces, and they were distributed by rail from there. The harbor itself is excellent, but warehousing and freight handling facilities are meager. The hills slope sharply into the bay so that there is no marginal space which could be developed into storage yards. The most suitable area for open storage was the burned out center section of the city of Sasebo, which the 8th Service Regiment bulldozed into shape, and converted into a storage yard. Prior to embarkation, estimates of the area required for warehouse and open storage had been submitted, but adequate allocations of space were not made on landing. Wharves and nearby areas were found to be piled high with junk and shops and warehouses were full of stores, equipment and machinery. Gradual improvements were made in the dock area, but vigorous action was not taken to clear the buildings and aprons so that cargo could be handled expeditiously, and the 8th Service Regiment was left largely to its own resources. It had neither the personnel nor the equipment to prepare the area as rapidly as required and all supply functions were seriously hampered by the congestion in the unloading area. The basic organization for port and stevedoring activities is believed to have been faulty and warrants careful study.

(2) Ships sailed from Army sources almost invariably lacked complete manifests and other ships' papers, and in several instances there were no papers at all. This is a serious oversight, and it caused much confusion and unnecessary effort. The consignee in a combat, or even an occupation zone, is a busy and harassed individual always operating under pressure. To fail to provide him with every facility possible is inexcusable.
(3) Marine Corps re-supply ships on the other hand furnished an excellent example of how it should be done. Each ship carried a super-cargo with complete papers and exact knowledge of the cargo and how it was loaded. A liaison group preceded the ships by air, bringing complete information, and they were prepared to set up an office and lay out stowage diagrams for handling the supplies ashore. Particular credit is due the Supply Service and the officers and men who performed this duty.

f. Air Deliveries.

(1) A few requests were made for critical supplies to be delivered by air. At the end of two months only one single shipment had been received by air.

g. Fukuoka Base Command.

(1) Inasmuch as the majority of activity of Army units was in the Fukuoka area, service troops were concentrated there as they reported in KYUSHU and put under the Fukuoka Base Command as a major supply point for the area. It proved to be difficult to build up a satisfactory level of supplies because of the fact that the port was closed by mine fields which were difficult to sweep. All supplies had to be brought in by rail or convoy from Sasebo and Nagasaki, and the rail capacity was limited both by size of rolling stock and train capacity. Refrigerator cars (icer type) were available for frozen products. A few tank cars for petroleum products were available. The troop population in the Fukuoka area was increased to the point where it required constant effort and full use of shipping facilities to keep them supplied.

L. S. SWINDLER,
Colonel, USMC.
Enclosure (a) to Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operations Report.

RATION BREAKDOWN FOR MOUNTING OUT

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1. CLASS I.

a. Rations, field.

(1) Type "S" 20 D/S
(2) Type "C" 5 D/S
(3) Type "D" 1 D/S
(4) Type "10-in-1" 5 D/S
(5) Assault Candy Rations 2 D/S
(6) Army QM Ration Accessory Pack 30 D/S

b. Special Ration Components 20 D/S

(1) Bulk Coffee - 8 lbs/100 men/day
(2) Canned milk - 10-143/4 oz. cans/100 men/day
(3) Sugar - 3 lbs/100 men/day
(4) Fruit - 1/2 pt/man/day
(5) Soup - 4 oz/man/day
(6) Fruit Juice - 4 oz/man/day

c. Bread Components. 20 D/S

(1) Jam - 2 oz/man/day
(2) Flour - 17 lbs/100 men/day
(3) Milk, dry, powdered, skim - 1/3 lb 100 men/day
(4) Lard, war style, - 1/3 lb/100 men/day
(5) Salt, - 1/3 lb/100 men/day
(6) Yeast - 1/6 lb/100 men/day
(7) Sugar - 1/2 lb/100 men/day

d. Hospital (Assault) Ration - 1 ration/hospital bed/day 30 D/S

c. Dog Rations - 1 ration/dog/day 30 D/S

f. Beverage pack, Aid Station, for following units in amounts indicated:

(1) 1 por Hq. Sec., M'd Det. Inf. Regt.
(2) 2 por Bn. Sec., M'd Det. Inf. Regt.
(3) 1 por other M'd Det.
(4) 5 por Corps & Div M'd Cos.

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Enclosure (B) to Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operation Report

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**CLASS III BREAKDOWN FOR MOUNTING OUT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Symbol or Spec No.</th>
<th>Per VMO Squadron</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avgas, 73 Octane</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>7,200 gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avlube, SAE 50</td>
<td></td>
<td>216 gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel, 50 Octane</td>
<td></td>
<td>gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogas, 80 Octane</td>
<td></td>
<td>gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White, gas</td>
<td></td>
<td>gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene</td>
<td></td>
<td>gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luboil, SAE 10</td>
<td>9110</td>
<td>gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luboil, SAE 30</td>
<td>9250</td>
<td>gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greasec, GP, No. 1</td>
<td>2-107</td>
<td>gal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luboil, SAE 90</td>
<td>9500</td>
<td>lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greasec, GP, No. 2</td>
<td>2-108</td>
<td>lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gearlube, SAE 90</td>
<td>VV-L-761</td>
<td>lbs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**CONFIDENTIAL**
Enclosure (C) to Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operation Report.

**WET AND COLD WEATHER CLOTHING FOR MOUNTING OUT**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>ALLOWANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHIRTS, flannel, each</td>
<td>2 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDERSHIRTS, woolen, each</td>
<td>2 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAWEERS, wool, grey, pair</td>
<td>2 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROUSERS, enlisted men's, winter, pair</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCKS, wool, cushion sole, C.O.D., pair</td>
<td>3 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCKS, wool, heavy, C.O.D., Army, pair</td>
<td>4 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCKS, ski, wool, pair</td>
<td>2 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOVES, wool, w/leather palm, pair</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACKET, field, M1943, ca. or Jacket, Field, O.D.</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEST, alpaca lined, each</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROUSERS, field, cotton, O.D., pair</td>
<td>2 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOTS, shoe pack, 12&quot;, pair, w/2 felt insoles</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPS, cotton, field, O.D., each</td>
<td>2 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOOD, jacket, field, M1943, each</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITTEN, shell, trigger finger, pair, w/trigger insert, trigger finger, or GLOVE, mitten, leather, fleece-lined, Marine Corps type, pair</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAG, sleeping, wool, w/water repellent case, ca.</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEATER, high neck, convertible collar, each</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUFFLER, wool, O.D., each</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSPENDERS, trousers, pair</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP, wool, knit, M1941, each</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSERT, wool, f/mitten, shell, trigger finger, ca.</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAG, clothing, waterproofed</td>
<td>1 per man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVERALL, protective, (two pc., Navy type, Arnenz cloth) (unimpregnated), each (Winter camouflage clothing)</td>
<td>2,500 per div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITTENS, over, white, pair (Winter camouflage clothing)</td>
<td>1,500 per corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERCOATS, parka type, pile lined, each</td>
<td>1,500 per 2nd, 3rd and 5th Mar Divs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELMET, combat, winter, each</td>
<td>Per T/A Allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACKET, combat, winter, each</td>
<td>Per T/A Allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROUSERS, combat, winter, pair</td>
<td>2,500 per div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPS, storm, skin or pile lined, each</td>
<td>1,500 per Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COATS, skin or pile lined, each</td>
<td>3,500 per 2nd, 3rd and 5th Mar Divs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enclosure (D) to Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operation Report.

CAMP EQUIPMENT FOR MOUNTING OUT

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(1) Tentage
(2) Tarpaulins
(3) Galley (Kitchen) and mess equipment
(4) Tent stoves
(5) Cots, field
(6) Bath and sterilization units
(7) Housekeeping supplies
(8) Portable and mobile generators
(9) Prefabricated Heads (latrines), galleys (kitchens) and mess halls.
(10) Recreational equipment
Enclosure (E) to Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to VAC Operation Report.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES FOR MOUNTING OUT

CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Class I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Canned Fish</td>
<td>50 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fats or Oils</td>
<td>10 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Rice</td>
<td>150 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Salt</td>
<td>7 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Soy Beans</td>
<td>75 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Sugar</td>
<td>8 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Class II - Engineer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Barbed Wire</td>
<td>8 L/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Class IV - Medical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) MMU, or CnD Basic Medical Units</td>
<td>18 L/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3 to Annex EASY

to VAC Operations Report

Occupation of JAPAN

MEDICAL REPORT

ENCLOSURE (C)
0187/189
OFFICE OF THE CORPS SURGEON,
HEADQUARTERS,
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Corps Surgeon.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Medical Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.
Enclosure: (A) Embarkation Chart - Corps Medical Units.

1. PLANNING PHASE:

a. Medical planning for the occupation of JAPAN actually began on 1 June 1945 with planning for the assault of the Japanese home islands in SOUTHERN KYUSHU. Since the plans for the occupation of JAPAN developed from those set-up for the assault it is not possible to separate the stages in the planning. Operational and Administrative Plans for the assault were developed up until the actual surrender of JAPAN.

b. In preparation for the operation, numerous conferences were held with the medical representatives of the following commands:

(1) FMF Pacific
(2) Fifth Amphibious Corps
(3) Attack Force
(4) Amphibious Group 4
(5) Sixth Army
(6) 2nd Marine Division
(7) 5th Marine Division

c. Conferences were also held with the Commanding Officers of the following units attached or assigned to the V Amphibious Corps for the operation:

(1) V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion
(2) Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1

d. Contact with the numerous Army augmentation units was through liaison officers at SIXTH ARMY headquarters in LUZON, until the units arrived at the target area. This

ENCLOSURE C, APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX EASY TO VAC OPERATIONS REPORT "OCCUPATION OF JAPAN".

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Enclosure C, Appendix 3, to Annex EASY to VAC Operations Report
"Occupation of JAPAN, (Cont'd):

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Contact was unsatisfactory in all respects. While SIXTH ARMY assumed responsibility for staging and mounting out all Army units attached to the V Amphibious Corps, many medical problems, both tactical and logistical, were unsolved due to total lack of personal contact with these units.

e. During the planning phase for the assault on JAPAN numerous directives in the form of memoranda were prepared and forwarded to all medical units on the Troop List for that operation. These memoranda were designated to smooth out administrative difficulties which attend the handling of Navy and Marine casualties in Army hospitals and the treatment of Army personnel in Navy installations. Reports and returns, evacuation supply within the target area, clinical records, etc., were covered in these memoranda. With the surrender of JAPAN, the Troop List of Medical Units was cancelled and for a period of time the only hospital units that appeared available to the V Amphibious Corps were two (2) Corps Evacuation Hospitals and the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion. When the new Troop List was received it contained only three of the original units in a total of thirty-four (34) Army Medical Units assigned. Thus the occupation operation was begun with no contact of any nature between the Surgeon's Office and ninety percent of the medical units involved in the operation.

f. The plans for the occupation called for a minimum of 6 percent beds, based on the troop strength in the V Amphibious Corps Zone.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. The organization of each of the two reinforced Marine Divisions and the one Army Division included their normal complement of attached medical troops plus one medical battalion per division. In addition, the V Amphibious Corps Occupation Force was to be supported by the following medical units:

(1) VAC Medical Battalion (H&S and three (3) medical companies)
(2) Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 (600)
(3) Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3 (600)
(4) Hq. & Hq. Det., 135th Medical Battalion, (See)
(5) Co. "B" 264th Medical Battalion

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(6) Co. "C" 234th Medical Battalion
(7) 692nd Medical Ambulance Company
(8) 73rd Field Hospital (400)
(9) 92nd Field Hospital (400)
(10) 26th Evacuation Hospital (750)
(11) 721st Medical Sanitary Company
(12) 712th Medical Sanitary Company
(13) 118th Station Hospital (500)
(14) 123rd Station Hospital (250)
(15) 122nd Station Hospital (500)
(16) 13th General Hospital (1000)
(17) 309th General Hospital (1000)
(18) 47th General Hospital (1000)
(19) 5th Army Medical Laboratory
(20) 11th General Dispensary (Type 2)
(21) 98th Veterinary Food Inspection Team
(22) 108th Veterinary Food Inspection Team
(23) 466th Dental Prosthetic Team
(24) 556th Optical Repair Team
(25) 62nd Medical Base Depot Company
(26) 24th Malaria Survey Detachment
(27) 201st Malaria Survey Detachment
(28) 203rd Malaria Survey Detachment
(29) 415th Malaria Survey Detachment
(30) 36th Malaria Control Detachment
(31) 74th Malaria Control Detachment
(32) 76th Malaria Control Detachment
(33) 76th Malaria Control Detachment
(34) 83rd Malaria Control Detachment
(35) 94th Malaria Control Detachment
(36) 95th Malaria Control Detachment

These units were designated as the Provisional Medical Group under the command of the Corps Surgeon.

b. There was a strong possibility of armed resistance to the initial landings of the Occupation Force with its attendant casualties. For the handling of casualties, should such resistance materialize, APA 30 (THOMAS JEFFERSON) was set up as a Casualty Receiving Ship and LSV 4 (SAUGUS) designated as a Casualty Evacuation Ship. In addition all APAs were prepared to receive casualties directly from the beaches.

3. EMBARKATION:

a. Embarkation of units of the Provisional Medical Group began on 22 August 1945 when the first serial of the VAC
Enclosure C, Appendix 3 to Annex EASY to VAC Operations Report, "Occupation of JAPAN". (Cont'd).

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Medical Battalion boarded the AKA 39 (SAIETA) at MAUI. Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 loaded out from HAWAII in the AKA 41 (SELINUR) and Headquarters Provisional Group loaded out from MAUI in the LSV 4 (SAUGUS) and the Corps Surgeon in the AGC 7 (MCKINLEY). These were the only Corps Medical Units scheduled to arrive at the target on A-day. Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3 loaded out of GUAM on LST 817 and was scheduled to arrive in the target area on A/4. Hq. and Hq. Det, 135th Medical Battalion, (Sep) loaded out in the APA 132 (BARNWELL) from LUZON and was scheduled to arrive in the target area on A/4. All other Corps Medical Units were to be transported in turn-around shipping. For details of embarkation, loading, arrival date in target area of all medical units, see Embarkation Chart (Enclosure A).

4. ENROUTE TO TARGET AREA:

a. All ships carrying 5th Marine Division and Corps Troops sailed in convoy from the HAWAIIAN Area and arrived at SAIPAN on 13 September 1945. Medical Plans were revised and integrated with military plans by conferences with various staff sections and by discussions between the Corps Surgeon and the Surgeon of Amphibious Group Force.

b. On 15 September 1945, an Advance Reconnaissance Party, including an officer from Headquarters Provisional Medical Group, departed for SASEBO in an APD. This party was to make a study of the target area prior to the arrival of the Occupation Force. The information obtained by the medical representative in this party proved very valuable in locating hospital installations ashore and in preparing to combat the poor sanitary conditions found in the target area.

c. The convoy sailed from SAIPAN on 17 September and arrived in the target area on 22 September 1945.

5. LANDING AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDICAL UNITS:

a. A-day was 22 September 1945 and at 0645 the 5th Marine Division Units began their landings at SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN. On 23 September 1945 the 2nd Marine Division began landing at NAGASAKI, KYUSHU, JAPAN.

b. During the initial stages, the medical services

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were those of the divisions. No casualties resulted throughout the entire landings.

c. Headquarters of the Corps Surgeon opened ashore on 23 September 1945.

d. On 24 September, Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 landed at SASEBO and opened at the Japanese Naval Arts Training School and on 28 September the first patients were received.

e. On 25 September the VAC Medical Battalion landed at SASEBO and was installed in the former SASEBO Naval Hospital. On 27 September the first patients were received by this unit.

f. On 30 September Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3 began landing in support of the 2nd Marine Division at NAGASAKI and moved to ISARAKA where it was installed in the Naval Hospital. On 3 October this unit began receiving patients.

g. On 30 September the vehicles, supplies and equipment, with a small personnel detachment of the 122nd Station Hospital arrived and unloaded at SASEBO. This unit staged at OKINAWA. On 8 October the remainder of the officers and men of this unit arrived at SASEBO, with the nurses of the hospital arriving by airplane on 22 October. On 16 October, the 122nd Station Hospital began its movement via motor and rail to KOKURA, NORTHERN KYUSHU and were temporarily established in a portion of the KOKURA Army Hospital. On 31 October this unit moved into MOJI occupying the Mitsui Building, Yusen Building and a portion of the Customs Building.

h. On 16 October APA 103 arrived at SASEBO from LUZON carrying the 26th Evacuation Hospital, 92nd Field Hospital, officers and men of the 123rd Station Hospital (without supplies and equipment), 108th Veterinary Food Inspection Team, 5th Army Medical Laboratory and 62nd Medical Base Depot Company less the bulk of medical supplies, 20 days supply for 75,000 men, which was to accompany this unit. The supplies and equipment of the above units arrived in such scrambled condition that it was necessary to unload everything into a central dump and spend the better part of a week sorting and segregating the supplies and equipment of the various units. No unit had a cargo manifest or a Unit Personnel and Tonnage Table.

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1. On 20 October LST 952 arrived at SASEBO from LUSON with vehicles and small personnel detachments of 5th Army Medical Laboratory, 108th Veterinary Food Inspection Team, 74th, 75th, 76th, and 83rd Malaria Control Detachments, 92nd Field Hospital, 556th Optical Repair Team and the 62nd Medical Base Depot Company. The 74th and 75th Malaria Control Detachments unloaded and proceed to FUKUOKA on 22 October reporting to control of Commanding General, 32nd Division, to be followed on 23 October by the 76th and 83rd Malaria Control Detachments which reported to the Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force. The 108th Veterinary Food Inspection Team was assigned to the 6th Service Regiment on 23 October. The 82nd Medical Base Depot Company was assigned to the 6th Service Regiment and together with the Medical Supply Section of that organization set up a Medical Supply Depot in a large warehouse on the grounds of the former SASEBO Naval Hospital. This unit began at once to receive large quantities of medical supplies coming into SASEBO in resupply shipping, and prepared to support all Corps Medical Units. The 92nd Field hospital unloaded and was billeted at SASEBO at the Naval Arts Training School.

2. On 25 October the 123rd Station Hospital (less nurses) with 5th Army Medical Laboratory and the 25th Evacuation Hospital departed for FUKUOKA and KOKURA respectively, reporting to Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force. The 123rd Station Hospital occupied the Postal Savings Bank Building at FUKUOKA. Having no equipment or supplies, except limited housekeeping gear, this unit set up housekeeping for its own personnel plus the nurses of the 25th Evacuation Hospital, the 122nd Station Hospital, and 13th Station Hospital and later the nurse component of the 13th General Hospital. The 25th Evacuation Hospital occupied the Temoya Building in KOKURA.

k. In the meanwhile, Company "B" 264th Medical Battalion, Company "C" 264th Medical Battalion, 712th Medical Sanitary Company, 721st Medical Sanitary Company and the 36th Malaria Control Detachment arrived at SASEBO in APA 58 and AA 73 on 25 October and two days later began unloading. Cos. "B" and "C" 264th Medical Battalion moved by motor and rail to KOKURA to establish an Air Holding Station and to support elements of the 2nd Marine Division. On 30 October, 712th Medical Sanitary Company and 721st Medical Sanitary Company moved by motor and rail to FUKUOKA reporting to Commanding General, 32nd Division.

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and Commanding General, FUKUOKA Base Command respectively. The 36th Malaria Control Detachment moved via motor on 29 October and reported to Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division.

1. On 26 October, the 93rd Field Hospital arrived in SASEBO from LUZON on LST '916 and on 28 October its advance detachment moved via motor to KUKOMOTO, to be followed by the remainder of the unit via motor and rail on 30 October and 2 November. This unit reported to Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division for support of that division.

m. On 27 October, APA 97 and AKA 15 arrived at SASEBO from LUZON with 13th General Hospital, 692nd Ambulance Company, 415th, 201st, 203rd, and 24th Malaria Survey Detachments; 98th Veterinary Food Inspection Team, 11th General Dispensary less equipment and supplies, 466th Dental Prosthetic Team, 94th and 95th Malaria Control Detachments. Supplies and equipment were unloaded and on 29 October, 30 officers and 95 nurses of the 13th General Hospital were moved to FUKUOKA for billeting with the 123rd Station Hospital in the Postal Savings Bank Building. The 692nd Ambulance Company was billeted at SASEBO to await deactivation inasmuch as there was no need for this unit's services. The 94th Malaria Control Detachment and 415th Malaria Survey Detachment moved via motor on 30 October to NAGASAKI and were assigned to 2nd Marine Division. On the same date, the 95th Malaria Control Detachment and 203rd Malaria Survey Detachment were assigned to the 5th Marine Division at SASEBO. On 31 October 201st and 24th Malaria Survey Detachments departed via motor for FUKUOKA for assignment to 32nd Division and FUKUOKA Base Command respectively. The 98th Veterinary Food Inspection Team moved via motor to FUKUOKA on 2 November reporting to Commanding General, FUKUOKA Base Command. On 3 November, the 466th Dental Prosthetic Team was installed with Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at SASEBO.

n. On 31 October, the APA 168 arrived at SASEBO carrying the personnel of the 308th General Hospital less all supplies and equipment which had been left at TINIAN where this unit staged, and on 1 November, LSMs 103, 253, 112, and 122 arrived at SASEBO with 8 officers and 121 enlisted men and unit gear of the 118th Station Hospital. The nurses of this unit had arrived in the area via air on 22 October. The remainder of the personnel, 23 officers and 9 enlisted men were left at OKINAWA.

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o. On 29 October, on recommendation VAC Headquarters, SIXTH ARMY Headquarters diverted the 47th General Hospital, then enroute to SASEBO from LUZON, and cancelled its assignment to V Amphibious Corps. This was followed on 4 November by approval of VAC plans for utilization of hospitals in this area. The 308th General Hospital to be installed in the Postal Savings Bank Building at FUKUOKA, the 122nd Station Hospital to remain in operation in the Mitsui Building at KOTO, the 92nd Field Hospital to be installed in the SASEBO Naval Arts Training School upon departure from the area of Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 about 15 November 1945, the 118th Station Hospital to be installed in the SASEBO Naval Hospital upon the departure of the VAC Medical Battalion in December 1945. The 25th Evacuation Hospital, 13th General Hospital and the 123rd Station Hospital were scheduled for early deactivation. It was decided to house the latter three units in the Tamaya Building in KOKURA pending this deactivation. In keeping with the above plan, the 13th General Hospital departed via motor and rail on 5 November for KOKURA. The 118th Station Hospital began unloading on 5 November and were billeted with the 692nd Ambulance Company at SASEBO pending its installation in the SASEBO Naval Hospital.

6. EVACUATION:

a. No casualties were incurred during the landings either in the SASEBO or NAGASAKI Area.

b. Beginning on 27 September the Corps Surgeon assumed responsibility for evacuation and hospitalization within the V Amphibious Corps Zone of responsibility and for evacuation from the island of KYUSHU. The Headquarters Detachment, 135th Medical Battalion furnished the necessary officers and enlisted personnel to carry on this evacuation and their work was efficiently and smoothly handled throughout. Evacuation from KYUSHU was by air and water. Two railroad cars were converted into hospital cars, one a ward car capable of carrying 24 bed patients and the other was equipped with an emergency operating room and with a ward for 12 patients. These cars were invaluable in supporting the move of the advance echelon of the 32nd Division into the SHIMONOSKI-YOKOGUCHI Area of HONSHU where no other medical facilities were available. These cars were later used for the evacuation of patients from

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NORTHERN KYUSHU to SASEBO prior to establishment of hospitals in that area and for the movement of patients to SASEBO for evacuation off KYUSHU.

7. HOSPITALIZATION:

a. The total number of beds set up in the Troops List was 7,430. This was approximately 8 percent beds for the proposed troop strength of 96,000 in the V Amphibious Corps Area.

b. It was originally planned to set up 6 percent fixed beds in the area, but it was perceived early in the operation that this figure was excessive. For the first six weeks of the occupation, the total number of sick in hospitals throughout the area approximated 1 percent of the troop strength.

c. With the early installation of Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1, Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3, and the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion, there was at no time any threatened bed shortage. At no time was any one of these three installations filled to 50 percent of its capacity.

8. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT:

a. All units arrived at the target with a 30 day level of medical supplies.

b. Equipment and supplies were totally adequate in quality and quantity.

c. The 62nd Medical Base Depot Company arrived on the target with 20 days supply for 75,000 men. This was followed by resupply block shipments so that by the end of the first six weeks a total of 921 long tons of medical supplies and equipment had arrived in the area. These block shipments contained a large proportion of combat supplies and as a result there was a great amount of certain types of material accumulated that was of no value. This included over 2,000 litters, large quantities of battle dressings, plywood splints, blood plasma, saline and gluco-saline solutions and many other items for which there was

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little or no demand. This overburdened the Base Depot Company with its small personnel as well as needlessly filling up limited storage facilities.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS:

a. The estimate of bed capacity for the occupation was excessive in the beginning. When this excess became more apparent many of the medical units on the Troop List could well have been cancelled. In spite of recommendations, to this effect, all units originally assigned were transported to the area.

b. Loading of almost all Army augmentation medical units was badly planned and carried out. Cargo was loaded into shipping in a hazardous manner and badly scrambled. No cargo manifests or unit personnel and tonnage tables were made up. It was seldom that a unit arrived at the target with any knowledge of the tonnage or cube of its organizational cargo.

c. Personnel of units were needlessly scattered among numerous vessels and in many cases arrived in the area in small detachments and on widely separated dates. Seldom was the arrival date of a unit known prior to the arrival in port, making any plans for its reception, unloading, and movement impossible.

d. On one occasion a group of nurses arrived in the area via air transport without any previous announcement and prior to the arrival of any part of the hospital to which they were attached.

e. Upon arrival at the target area it was found that all buildings suitable for office or billeting space were heavily infested with fleas, lice, and bedbugs. Details were set to work and all such structures were cleaned out, scrubbed and sprayed with DDT solution prior to occupancy.

f. Although there was a high incidence of bacillary dysentery in the civil population throughout the area, strict water discipline and rigid control of water processing prevented any cases of this disease in the troops of Occupation Force. By the end of the first six weeks, only five cases of dysentery

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had appeared among the ground forces in the entire area. During the last week in October an epidemic of bacillary dysentery broke out among the ships in the harbor, but was confined to these ships and did not make its appearance among the troops ashore.

In the personnel of the 11th General Dispensary (Type 2) arrived at SaSEBO without supplies, organizational equipment or housekeeping gear. The Commanding Officer of the unit had no idea where this gear was located, not having seen it for several months. This unit was of no value whatsoever until it could be completely supplied and reequipped.

[Signature]

L. N. HART,
Capt. (MC) USN.
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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SHIPPING</th>
<th>STAGED</th>
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<td>SAUCUS (LSV A) 2 off. &amp; 1 ER. MT. LCKINLEY (ACC 7) (Corps Surg)</td>
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Enclosure (A)
Appendix 3 to Annex EASY to Occupation of JAPAN.

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<td>LI 92</td>
<td>Luzon, Sasebo</td>
<td>20 Oct 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th Malaria Control</td>
<td>LI 92</td>
<td>Luzon, Sasebo</td>
<td>20 Oct 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83rd Malaria Control</td>
<td>LI 92</td>
<td>Luzon, Sasebo</td>
<td>20 Oct 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Malaria Survey</td>
<td>DAUPHIN (APA 91)</td>
<td>Luzon, Sasebo</td>
<td>27 Oct 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201st Malaria Survey</td>
<td>DAUPHIN (APA 91)</td>
<td>Luzon, Sasebo</td>
<td>27 Oct 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203rd Malaria Survey</td>
<td>DAUPHIN (APA 91)</td>
<td>Luzon, Sasebo</td>
<td>27 Oct 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415th Malaria Survey</td>
<td>DAUPHIN (APA 91)</td>
<td>Luzon, Sasebo</td>
<td>27 Oct 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure (A)
Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to VAC Operations Report

Occupation of JAPAN

ORDNANCE REPORT

ENCLOSURE (D)
0107/244

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

CONFIDENTIAL 30 November 1945.

From: The Ordnance Officer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.


Reference: (a) Corps Special Order No. 120-45, Serial #07373, Confidential, dtd 1Nov45.

1. On 1 June, 1945 the V Amphibious Corps reported to SIXTH ARMY for planning the assault on JAPAN. Planning began immediately on the basis that five (5) CinCPoA units of fire for all weapons would be used for mounting out. This was not believed sufficient in certain types of mortar and artillery ammunition. V Amphibious Corps recommended ten (10) CinCPoA units of fire of 105mm artillery and mortar ammunition. It was believed at this time that the 60mm mortar illuminating should also be increased as this was the only type of illuminating ammunition available at that time. Standard preloads were made up for the various ammunition loads to be loaded on LST’s, combat loaded.

2. Sixteen (16) LST’s were to be provided each assault division.

   a. Eleven (11) LST’s were to have a standard preload of ammunition for the following types of weapons: Carbine, rifle, 37mm, 60mm mortars, 75mm howitzers, 81mm mortars, and grenades. Nine (9) were to be top deck loaded and two (2) bottom deck loaded.

   b. Two (2) LST’s top decks were to be provided for LVT maintenance.

   c. One (1) LST top deck was to be provided for LVT(A)4 maintenance.

   d. Four (4) LST’s for division 105mm Artillery and were to be preloaded with four (4) units of fire of 105mm ammunition for these weapons.

   e. Three (3) LST’s for division 155mm Howitzer artillery and five (5) units of fire of ammunition for these weapons.

Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V-Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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1. The balance of the ammunition was to be loaded in AKA's or APA's.

3. Corps Artillery - twenty-one (21) LST's.
   a. Nine (9) LST's for 155mm Howitzer Battalion and five (5) units of fire of ammunition.
   b. Nine (9) LST's for 155mm Gun Battalion and five (5) units of fire of ammunition.
   c. Three (3) LST's for one 8" Howitzer Battalion and five (5) units of fire of ammunition.

4. The Ordnance Officer visited SIXTH ARMY Headquarters and was notified that the mounting out figure was changed from CinCPOA unit of fire to AFPac unit of fire. This greatly eased the expected shortage of mortar and 105mm artillery ammunition as the AFPac unit of fire was considerably higher in these categories as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CinCPOA</th>
<th>AFPac</th>
<th>CinCPOA U/F in 5 AFPac u/f</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carbine, Cal. .30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Auto., Cal. .30</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Cal. .30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun Cal. .30</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, Auto., Cal. .45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun, Sub-machine, Cal. .45</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, Cal. .50</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37mm Gun, AT</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>CinCPOA</th>
<th>AFPac</th>
<th>CinCPOA U/F in 5 AFPac U/F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75mm Gun, Tank</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm How, Field or Pack</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm How, Field, M2Al</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm How, SP, M2Al</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm How, ML, Field</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm Gun, ML, Field</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. In addition as there was no AFPac unit of fire for the below listed weapons the following was to be used:

1. For 75mm Howitzer, LVT, the CinCPOA unit of fire of 150 rounds was to be used as a basis for mounting out.

2. For 4.5" Barrage Rockets, 15,000 per Marine Division was to be taken.

3. For 7.2" Rockets, 2,200 were to be sent to the Second and Third Marine Divisions.

b. The units to provide ordnance maintenance were the Division Ordnance Companies and the 8th Service Regiment. Army Augmentation units were to be supported by the following units:

1. One (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.

2. Two (2) Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies.

3. One (1) Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company.
Enclosure DCG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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(4) One (1) Evacuation Company.

5. Additional units were:
      (1) One (1) platoon was to be attached to each of the two assault divisions.
      (2) The Headquarters and one (1) platoon were to be attached to the Shore Brigade for Bomb Disposal activities.
   b. Ammunition Companies, 8th Service Regiment.
      (1) One (1) company to each of the two (2) assault divisions and one (1) company to the Shore Brigade.

6. Ordnance General Supplies.
   a. Class II and IV carried by assault units.
      (1) Sixty (60) days by Marine Corps units.
      (2) Attached Army units - Ninety (90) day supply.

7. Class V Ammunition Supply.
   a. Five (5) ACPac units of fire for combat units.
   b. Three (3) ACPac units of fire for service units.
      (1) The exceptions listed below were made due to the fact that no provisions were made for these weapons in the ACPac unit of fire.
      (a) 75mm Howitzer LVT (5 CincPOA units of fire).

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Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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(b) Rockets 4.5" Br., M7 - 15,000 each division.

(c) Rockets, 7.2" - 1,100 each division.

c. The resupply of ammunition was to be five (5) units of fire on two (2) ships (2 1/2 A/Fac units of fire each) and ninety (90) days expenditure ammunition based on figures set up by SIXTH ARMY, loaded ten (10) days on each of nine (9) ships.

8. Resupply shipping was to be available:

a. Class V (Ammunition)

(1) X to X ≠ 15  1 F1H
   2 G1H

(2) X ≠ 15 to X ≠ 30  1 F1H
   2 G1H

(3) X ≠ 30 to X ≠ 60  4 G1H
   X ≠ 60 to X ≠ 90  2 G1H

b. Class II and IV.

(1) X to X ≠ 15  15 days supply
   X ≠ 15 to X ≠ 30  30 days supply

9. The rates of expenditure for resupply were set up as given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Weapon</th>
<th>Rounds per Combat</th>
<th>Type Weapon</th>
<th>Rounds per Combat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.30 Carbine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>155mm Gun</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>155mm Howitzer</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, 1908</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8&quot; Howitzer</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious
Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Weapon</th>
<th>Rounds per Combat Weapon per Day</th>
<th>Type Weapon</th>
<th>Rounds per Combat Weapon per Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, .30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.36&quot; Rocket</td>
<td>.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, Cal. 30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4.5&quot; Rocket</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, Cal. 45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.2&quot; Rocket</td>
<td>30 per Div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, Cal. 50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Grenade, Rifle</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm AA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Flare Trip, M48, M49</td>
<td>.1875 per combat Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm AA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Signals all type (A1)</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90mm AA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hand Grenades</td>
<td>.10 per combat EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90mm SP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Shot Gun Shells</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37mm AT</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mine, AT</td>
<td>150 per Div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mine, AP 32Al</td>
<td>10 per Div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Mine, AP H3</td>
<td>15 per Div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm Gun, Tank</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Torpedo Bangalore</td>
<td>10 per Div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm Howitzer, SP</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Adapter</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm Howitzer, Pack 85</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Proj. Pyrotechnic, M9</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm Howitzer, 122Al 56</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75mm Howitzer LVT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. All water cooled engines were to be winterized to \( -10^\circ \) Fahrenheit.

11. Reports.

a. Ammunition reports were to be turned in daily and were to be used as a basis for allocating the resupply of ammunition from the Corps dumps to Divisions. WD AGO Forms (580) were to be used with the active weapons listed on the reverse side. Facilities for resupply by air were to be provided for critical ammunition and spare parts.

12. Training for the Assault.

a. Two (2) CinCPAC units of fire for all weapons were authorized for training. The training period was lengthened and consequently two (2) units of fire proved to be inadequate and it was found necessary to obtain additional ammunition.
b. Additional weapons which were new and were trained with in preparation for the assault and needed more than two (2) CinCPac units of fire were as given below:

(1) Tank mounted flamethrowers of the POACWS design which were of three-hundred (300) gallon capacity and incorporated the flamethrower as well as the 75mm gun were to be provided nine (9) per division. Experiments were being conducted as to the best type of fuel for these weapons. Tests were being conducted with pre-mixed fuel and the most advantageous method of mixing the fuel. The AFPAC unit of fire was only one (1) filling for these flamethrowers and recommendations were made to SIXTH ARMY to increase this to five fillings. This was approved and the unit of fire was changed to five (5) fillings.

(2) The LVT(A)4's were trained as artillery for possible initial use on landing. This required additional ammunition to train with these weapons in artillery methods and procedure of firing.

(3) The 57mm Recoilless was demonstrated by the Marine Corps Equipment Board team and was greatly desired by all personnel. This weapon's light weight and ease of maneuverability plus the size of the projectile made it a very desirable weapon. Recommendations were made to provide fifty-four (54) per division.

(4) 7.2" Tank Mounted Rocket launchers were to be provided on three (3) tanks per division and 1,100 rockets were to be provided per division.

(5) M40 motor carriages were given Corps Artillery. These weapons mounted 155mm guns and were trained with Corps Artillery.
(6) The Division Reconnaissance Companies were provided with seven (7) half tracks M3 with 75mm guns and six (6) half tracks, M3 without the 75mm guns. The latter were to be used as personnel carriers.

(7) A new 4.5" Rocket detachment was to be set up so there would be one (1) 4.5" Rocket detachment per division each with thirty six (36) rocket launchers per division.

(8) VT fuzes were to be issued for the first time and training was undertaken with them. There were officers provided to Divisions who were trained in the use and functioning of the VT fuzes. There was a training schedule set up for these fuzes.

(9) Experiments were conducted by FMF to devise a standard type of armor for tanks which could be put on or taken off at will.

(10) Upon the recommendation of the 4th Marine Division, experiments were conducted with a smoke generator for the purpose of locating cave entrances. Major SKINNER of the Chemical Warfare Service came over from OAHU to MAUI to conduct these experiments.

(11) 75mm Pack Howitzers were to be provided each division as an additional weapon and one (1) unit of fire was provided them for training purposes.

13. Change from Operation to Occupation.

a. Upon notification that V Amphibious Corps would occupy the island of KYUSHU and YAMAGUCHI Prefecture of HONSHU the planning for this phase began. Due to the short time available, it consisted primarily in making changes to the plans for the assault operation. Units were to go in prepared for any eventuality and the ammunition and weapons were to be combat loaded.
b. The amount of ammunition that was to be carried was cut to three (3) AFPAE units of fire for combat troops and one (1) AFPAE unit of fire for service troops. The LVT's, Corps Artillery, and anti-aircraft Artillery were deleted from the troop list. No VT fuzes were to be taken to JAPAN. Units which were notified after sailing did not unload these fuzes in JAPAN.

c. The Rocket Detachments were removed from the troop list. A great number of Army Augmentation units were deleted and consequently the need for Army Ordnance units was changed to two (2) MAM companies as it was anticipated that the majority of the maintenance would be on motor transportation and that all ordnance maintenance could be provided by Marine units. With the addition of the 32d Infantry Division and the deletion of the 3d Marine Division, the Army Ordnance units were assigned by SIXTH ARMY as listed below:

(1) One (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.
(2) Two (2) MAM Companies.
(3) One (1) Ammunition Company.
(4) One (1) Base Depot Company.
(5) One (1) Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank).

d. The following Marine units for Ordnance maintenance and supply were used in the occupation.

(1) Division Ordnance Companies to provide maintenance for their specific units.
(2) 8th Service Regiment.
(3) The 3d Platoon, Bomb Disposal Company was assigned initially to the 5th Marine Division and the Bomb Disposal Company Headquarters and two (2) platoons to the Shore Brigade. Platoons were later assigned to Divisions as occupation requirements indicated.
Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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e. Equipment and supplies were taken in as follows:

(1) Class II and IV.

   (a) Thirty (30) days supply were carried by the Marine Corps units, and thirty (30) days for all Army Augmentation units.

(2) Class V.

   (a) Three (3) units of fire for combat troops and one (1) unit of fire for service troops.

f. Reports.

   (1) Reports on ammunition were rendered on the 15th and 30th of each month instead of daily as planned for the assault landing.

g. Resupply.

   (1) Resupply of Class V was to be two (2) AFPrac units of fire. After establishment ashore, it was found that no expenditure of ammunition was indicated, the stockage level for ammunition resupply was cut to three (3) units of fire for combat troops and one (1) unit of fire for service units, and all resupply was diverted. The expenditure of one (1) unit of fire for training purposes was authorized and stockage levels were to be maintained by having all deactivated and returned units leave all small arms ammunition behind.

   (2) The Sth Service Regiment and the FUKUOKA Base Command were set up as the supply agencies. The difficulty in getting supplies into FUKUOKA necessitated that all Ordnance Resupply would enter SASEBO and be transhipped by rail or road to FUKUOKA. The FUKUOKA Base
Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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Command was to be the initial supply agency for the 32d Infantry Division and the majority of the Army Augmentation units. Consequently all Army ordnance units were assigned to the FUKUOKA Base Command with the exception of one (1) ammunition company which was assigned to the 32d Infantry Division. On 25 November, the FUKUOKA Base Command was disbanded and all service elements and logistic responsibilities in the FUKUOKA area were transferred to the 32d Infantry Division. On 15 December, an ASCOMO Base was established at FUKUOKA, and the 32d Infantry Division was relieved of all ordnance service responsibility in that area.


a. The initial problem was compiling the inventories presented by the Japanese into a form which could be used by V Amphibious Corps units. The inventories were satisfactory except for the language difficulties which made them difficult to translate. Nomenclature was a problem. The Disposition Section was set up to provide for the disposition of this materiel.

A. M. FINKEL

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Appendix 5 to Annex EASY
to VAC Operations Report
Occupation of JAPAN

DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIEL
AND EQUIPMENT REPORT
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Disposition Officer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Disposition of Surrendered Materiel and Equipment Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

Enclosure: (A) Inventory of Principal Ammunition Items.

1. Initially instructions relative to the disposal of surrendered materiel were meager and very general in character. From the landing of our forces on 22 September until the receipt of SIXTH ARMY Administrative Order 19/2 on 14 October no action was taken to dispose of any mass of materiel. Prior to that time such Japanese equipment as was required for occupation forces was picked up from Japanese sources and processed to the unit concerned by the Corps Procurement Section. Certain items were required for use by the Japanese Navy in connection with mine sweeping and repatriation operations. This materiel was also processed by the Procurement Section and turned over to the local Japanese Navy Officials. In addition certain emergency food supplies were turned over to local civil government for use by the civil population.

2. Upon receipt of SIXTH ARMY Administrative Order 19/2 the G-4 Section revised Annex KING to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 and issued it on 15 October. This annex and its appendices covered all current disposition instruction.

3. On 17 October, 1945 the Corps Disposition Section was established by Administrative Order No. 13-45. The Officer-in-Charge of this section was charged with general supervision of disposition throughout the Corps' Zone of Responsibility. In addition he was directly charged with the disposition of materiel, equipment, ammunition and explosives in the immediate BASEBO Port Area. This area included the following Japanese naval and military installations:

   a. The Naval Dockyard.
   b. The Naval Supply and Munitions Depot.

Enclosure EASY, Appendix 5 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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Enclosure EASY, Appendix 6 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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c. The SASEBO Seaplane Base.
d. The SASEBO Aircraft Factory.
e. The Naval Fuel Depot.
f. The Navy Submarine Base.
g. Numerous AAA Positions.

4. WAR TROPHIES.

a. In addition to disposition matters the Corps Disposition Section was charged with the issuance of war trophies to personnel of Corps Troops and units operating directly under Corps control. Initially all swords, pistols, and binoculars were classified as controlled items pending allocation by higher headquarters. Rifles and bayonets were issued to all enlisted men leaving this area, initially the issue of swords was restricted to officers leaving the area, pistols were not issued and field glasses were restricted to general officers. On 9 November the Corps was given a definite allocation of these controlled items and sub allocations were made, on 29 November additional allocations were made. Division Commanders were directed to issue the more desirable items on a basis of overseas service, officers and enlisted men both to be considered in arriving at this basis. These controlled items were made available to subordinate commanders on an average of 62.8% of their commands.

b. One constant source of bother and annoyance was the matter of trophies for U.S. forces afloat. Initial SIXTH Army directive prohibited the issue of any Japanese Army trophies to U.S. Naval personnel, and present directives prohibit the issue of Japanese Army type controlled items (swords, pistols, and field glasses) for this purpose. Japanese inventories showed that approximately 2503 Japanese Navy swords were surrendered in this area. One thousand of these were turned over to CTF 55 in late October for issue as directed by him. The remaining 1503 have recently been turned over to forces afloat. These 2503 swords did not meet the demand for these items. Personnel afloat could not understand this action and the Corps Disposition Office was constantly placed in the position of
Enclosure ESBY, Appendix 5 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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turning down these members of the Naval Service.

5. Disposition required a considerable amount of paper work throughout the Corps, SIXTH ARMY required detailed weekly reports in six (6) copies. Division reports were segregated and properly bound together with V Amphibious Corps Area reports and forwarded to the SIXTH ARMY. In the local V Amphibious Corps Procurement and Disposition Zone the Procurement Section prepared the report of all material or scrap used for occupation troops or returned to the Japanese Home Ministry. These reports were made on separate forms such as the Engineer Report, Signal Report, QM Report, etc. Special Staff Sections of the Corps arranged for the destruction of materials falling under their speciality (except for Ordnance). It was the responsibility of the Disposition Section to bind all these reports together and forward them to SIXTH ARMY.

6. AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVE DISPOSAL.

a. To dispose of ammunition the Disposition Section was given the services of the 8th Marine Ammunition Company, the V Amphibious Corps Bomb Disposal Company (less 2 Platoons) and Navy Bomb and Mine Team #4. Due to SASEBO being adjacent to deep water the most practical method of disposing of the mass of the local ammunition was by dumping at sea. Through the Japanese Central Liaison committee the services of the SASEBO Harbor and Transportation Company, Limited, was secured. This company furnished barges, tugs, laborers and locomotive and crane operators. American personnel supervised these operations which commenced on 17 October. On 12 November one barge load of ammunition exploded, exact cause unknown, at sea with the loss of eight (8) Japanese killed or missing, and six (6) wounded. Every effort has been made to prevent injury to American personnel. However, this Japanese ammunition was in extremely bad condition and had not been cared for in months. 13,100 tons of ammunition has been destroyed in the immediate SASEBO Port Area to date.

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Enclosure EASY, Appendix 5 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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7. TORPEDO DISPOSAL.

a. Several hundred 21 and 24 inch torpedoes were located in the local area. A Torpedo Team consisting of one (1) Army Engineer Officer, one (1) Navy Torpedo Officer, two (2) Marine Riggers, two (2) Army Crane Operators, ten (10) enlisted men of the 8th Ammunition Company and LST 865 was organized on 10 November. These torpedoes were without war heads but did, in most cases, carry a charged oxygen flask. They were loaded aboard the LST and taken to sea where they were dumped one at a time and fired upon with .50 caliber AP to insure their sinking. 540 torpedoes have been destroyed to date.

8. ORDNANCE DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY.

a. Ordnance items such as guns, small arms, searchlights, fire control equipment, range finders, range keepers, mounts, tanks and other numerous items were destroyed by whatever appeared to be the easiest means of demaging them beyond repair. Thermit was used for large pieces, acetylene torches were used to burn out vital parts or small items were laid out and run over by tracked vehicles. All resultant scrap was returned to the Japanese Home Ministry. To accomplish this work the Disposition Section employed two (2) officers and twenty (20) men of the Ordnance Company, 8th Service Regiment. These men supervised hired Japanese labor. 3030 weapons have been destroyed to date.

9. AIRCRAFT DISPOSAL;

a. The disposal of aircraft was normally done under the supervision of the Corps Air Officer. Planes werestacked to crane height and ignited through the use of Napalm and flame throwing tanks (American). 64 planes have been destroyed in this manner at the SASEBO Seaplane Base.
Enclosure EASY, Appendix 5 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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10. Paragraphs 6, to 9, refer to the local SASEBO area. Units of the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions and the 32d Infantry Division varied these procedures to meet their local circumstances. In inland areas shells, powder, etc., had to be destroyed in place. In these cases the provisions of SIXTH ARMY directive were followed. These provisions generally followed the regulations contained in War Department TM 9-1904, Ammunition Inspection Guide.

11. For future references the following recommendations are submitted:

   a. Forces about to occupy an enemy country where large stores of equipment may be expected to be found should be equipped with heavy excess allowances of:

   (1) Heavy Roller Conveyor.
   (2) Non-Ferrous Tools.
   (3) Thermite Grenades.
   (4) Lighting Equipment.
   (5) Finger Lifts.
   (6) Bay City Cranes.

   b. Any occupation force should be plentifully supplied with extra bomb disposal personnel, at least 75% in excess of present Tables of Organization.

   c. Several highly qualified explosive and demolition experts should be assigned to each Division and Corps Headquarters.

12. Enclosure (A) lists the principal ammunition items encountered.

   J. Y. Berkeley
## INVENTORY OF PRINCIPAL ORDNANCE ITEMS
### IN VAC ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY

**CONFIDENTIAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Inventoried:Destroyed 24Nov45: to Date</th>
<th>On Hand 24Nov45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Projectiles — Separate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading, HE, Shrapnel &amp; Incendiary, rounds</td>
<td>2438565: 806911: 1631654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Projectiles, Separate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading, Chemical, rounds</td>
<td>772: 2: 770</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Charges, Propelling, Bag Type, rounds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Rounds, Fixed &amp; Semi-fixed, 37mm or larger, rounds</td>
<td>1464848: 1292556: 172293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complete Rounds, Mortar, 50mm and larger, rounds</strong></td>
<td>3950429: 469762: 3480667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fuzes &amp; Primers, Artillery &amp; Philo, rounds</strong></td>
<td>441808: 43368: 398440</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mines, Anti-tank, Anti-personnel, Beach, rounds</strong></td>
<td>4486630: 1667736: 2818994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rockets, all types, rounds</strong></td>
<td>37461: 16888: 20573</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombs, A/C, HE and Incendiary, rounds</strong></td>
<td>23773: 9196: 14878</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bombs, A/C, Chemical, rounds</strong></td>
<td>938428: 359200: 579228</td>
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<td>44535: 16497: 28038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fuzes, Bomb, rounds</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grenades, Hand &amp; Rifle, HE &amp; Incendiary, rounds</strong></td>
<td>747022: 583912: 163110</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grenades, Hand &amp; Rifle, Chemical, rounds</strong></td>
<td>437403: 42442: 394961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grenades, Hand &amp; Rifle, Chemical, rounds</strong></td>
<td>20966: 4661: 16325</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM</td>
<td>Inventoried 24 Nov 45</td>
<td>Destroyed to Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare, A/C, rounds</td>
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<td>9476</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cartridges, Small Arms, 6.5mm to 9mm incl., rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complete Rounds, Auto Cannon, 12.7mm to 40mm incl., rounds</td>
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<td>363669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives, HE Bulk including Black Powder, pounds</td>
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<td>25999820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powder, Smokeless, Bulk, pounds</td>
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<td>289490</td>
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<td>Rifles, each</td>
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<td>1823</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortars &amp; Grenade Dischargers, each</td>
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<td>928</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast &amp; Harbor Defense Artillery</td>
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<td>353</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (A)
Appendix 6 to Annex E-EY

to VAC Operation Report

Occupation of Japan

PROCUREMENT REPORT

ENCLOSURE (F)
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From: The Commanding Officer, Procurement Section.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.


1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

a. During the planning phase of the operation, the Procurement Section, Fifth Amphibious Corps was not an organization. This precluded any planning as a section. Annex QUEEN to Fifth Amphibious Corps Administrative Order Number 8-45, dated 24 August, 1945, gave a general plan dealing with area and facility allocation. On 20 September, 1945, this Annex was revised to cover procurement of Japanese supplies, real-estate equipment and facilities.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. No training or organization was carried out by this section prior to landing in Japan. The enlisted personnel were transferred into the Procurement Section from headquarters Company, Shore Brigade and had no previous training in procurement work. The officers were drawn from various other staff sections of the Corps Headquarters and were not familiar with the functions of a procurement agency.

3. NARRATIVE OF OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

a. The Procurement Section, Fifth Amphibious Corps, was formed on 23 September, 1945 in accordance with the provisions set forth in Corps Administrative Order Number 8-45, which made this Section the sole procurement agency for the City of Sasebo, including the Navy Yard proper and its surrounding installations, and assigned the responsibility of issuing and disseminating general instructions and policies governing the procurement of Japanese supplies, real-estate, equipment and facilities. The organization of this section was modified to conform with changing requirements. The organization as shown in enclosure (A) proved to be the most satisfactory.

b. Procurement of services, supplies and equipment from local Japanese civilian sources was negligible. This condition was brought about by the following two factors:

(1) The City of Sasebo was supported by and subordinated to the Japanese Navy and no surplus stocks of any commodity were carried. The population

Appendix 6 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.
Appendix 6 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan, Cont'd.

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Consisted almost entirely of navy yard workers. Allied bombing had completely destroyed the greater part of the business district and part of the residential area of the city causing a critical shortage of housing facilities.

(2) The Sasebo Navy Yard has sustained little or no damage from Allied bombings, which made adequate housing facilities available to our forces. The Navy Yard contained numerous warehouses filled with supplies and equipment which were formerly the property of the Japanese Navy. These supplies were used by our forces, to fill operational requirements, thus causing the demands on the local civilians to be much less than might have been expected.

(c) All requests for supplies, equipment, and real estate from local civilian sources were made to the Sasebo Liaison Committee, which was very cooperative and exceedingly willing to comply with demands of the Occupation Forces in so far as it was physically possible. Some delay and confusion was encountered initially due to the lack of organization and coordination of this committee. While great improvements were made, it is believed that a certain degree of confusion will always prevail as long as there is any element of Japanese thinking concerned.

(d) The Form PS-1, as shown in enclosure (b), was used for the execution of all procurements and proved to be very satisfactory. It clearly presented the complete transaction in an accepted legal form. One completed copy was retained in the files of the Procurement Section and one copy was forwarded to the Liaison Committee.

(e) The Form GP-2-3, as shown in enclosure (c), was submitted to the SIXTH ARMY Procurement Office at the end of each month showing the estimated value of all procurements executed during the month.

4. MILITARY SUPPLIES

(a) In view of the fact that initially this headquarters received no instructions concerning the disposition of the military supplies contained in the Navy Yard warehouses, it was assumed that these supplies would be procured and furnished the Occupation Forces in accordance with operational needs. The Procurement Section was delegated as the controlling agency, since it was determined unnecessary to consult the Liaison Committee in
Appendix 5 to Annex EASY to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan, Oct/Nov.

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matters of military supply. The regular procurement form as shown in enclosure (3), was submitted to this section by the requesting unit. An endorsement indicating approval authorized the unit to pick up requested items, whereupon another endorsement was placed on the form showing supplies received. This form was filed in the Procurement Section where a complete record of all supplies used by our forces was maintained. This proved to be an adequate control over military supplies. In view of the fact that Marine sentries guarded all warehouses, no one could remove materials without a procurement form.

b. Navy units ashore and afloat submitted their requests through the Navy Liaison Officer who screened them before forwarding to the Procurement Section. This system worked very satisfactorily.

c. Although complete inventories of the contents of Japanese Military installations were submitted to our forces upon arrival, this section was never able to obtain a complete inventory at any one time. This was due to the fact that the inventory was submitted in Japanese, and since practically all words were of a technical nature, translation was very slow. This situation created an extra burden on the Procurement Section. When requests for certain items were received, an officer from the Procurement Section had to locate the materials before the request could be approved. This situation improved as the officers learned the general contents of each warehouse. In most cases the units making the request knew the location of the requested materials.

d. Some difficulties were encountered due to the fact that both the 5th Marine Division and Corps Procurement Sections were functioning in the Sasabo Area. The sentries guarding warehouses containing military supplies were 5th Marine Division personnel and were reluctant to release any materials upon the signature of Corps Procurement Officer, even though the Area had been assigned solely to Corps. This was obviously the result of two agencies issuing instructions.

e. The Japanese Navy was directed by the Occupation Forces to carry out certain missions such as sweeping mines, dumping Japanese ammunition at sea, and repatriation of Japanese Nationals from China and Korea. To perform these tasks certain sizes fittings and supplies were needed, all of which were stored in the Navy Yard warehouses. To obtain the release of these supplies, a request in the form of a letter was written by Japanese Naval Commanders to General Schmidt. These letters were answered by this section, over the signature of General Schmidt, directing the Japanese Naval personnel to report to the Procurement Section.
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for delivery of the requested material. Although the Japanese Navy representatives usually knew the location of the supplies requested, an officer from the Procurement Section had to accompany them in order to clear the supplies from the buildings. Never were the requested supplies all in one building. In many cases a request as submitted in one letter would occupy the time of an officer from this section for a period of one week. This was especially true in the case of requests for coal where 50 tons or more was removed by hand in baskets. Since approximately three hundred such letters were received, many officers were constantly tied up and of little value to the section. Several remedies for the situation were attempted, but with the Japanese natural aversion to logic and organization, none proved successful.

f. In view of the large stocks of materials over and above the operational needs of our forces it was decided to release some of these supplies to the Home Ministry in accordance with the directives from the SIXTH ARMY. These stocks consisted of rice, clothing, bedding, and transportation. The Procurement Section was delegated the responsibility of releasing these stocks to the Japanese and obtaining a receipt from an authorized representative of the Japanese Home Ministry. This was accomplished without difficulty, because only material and supplies critically needed by the Japanese were released initially. Upon the establishment of the Fifth Amphibious Corps Disposition Section, with the mission of rapidly disposing of all Japanese military supplies and equipment, this problem became more acute. In view of the large stocks of military supplies on hand that were not classified as "Warfare Material", great quantities of these supplies were available for release to the Home Ministry. The Procurement Section accomplished this release and obtained the receipt. Since most of these warehouses containing the supplies were adjacent to the Navy Yard dock areas, where all available covered storage space was required for our supplies and installations, it was necessary to remove all supplies released to the Japanese to a less congested area. This was accomplished by Japanese labor and trucks under supervision of this section. A representative of the Procurement Section was present at the loading point to see that only the authorized supplies were loaded, and at the unloading point to obtain a receipt. The Procurement Section was never able to accomplish the release of the supplies and materials as fast as the Disposition Section made them available, due to unreliability of the Japanese trucks and labor, and vast amount of supplies on hand. A weekly report, by classification, on all supplies used by our troops and all materials and supplies returned to the Home Ministry, as shown in enclosure (D), was compiled by the Procurement Section and submitted to the Disposition Section for incorporation into their report to higher
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authority. It will be noted that 95% of the activities of the Procurement Section involve the handling of military supplies with its control, thus making it important to establish responsibility and facilitate decisions. Two separate sections were established to divide the responsibility of one task, seldom working favorably. Close liaison and coordination was accomplished between the two sections but was not considered adequate.

5. LABOR

a. Immediately following the arrival of the Fifth Amphibious Corps and Fifth Marine Division elements at Sasebo, KYUSHU, JAPAN, on 22 September, 1945, requests for laborers began. Advance elements had arranged with Japanese Naval Liaison Committee for labor to be furnished through that group initially. On 27 September, 1945, by Change Number 2 to Administrative Order Number 6-45, paragraph 9 of Annex MIKE was amended to provide a more comprehensive procedure for labor requisitions and attendance. Labor was thereafter obtained solely through the civilian labor procurement agencies, operating under Japanese authorities. Labor procurement, and all other labor, then became the function of Fifth Amphibious Corps Procurement Section. Under Imperial Ordinance No. 542, as implemented by Welfare Ministry Order No. 41, dated 16 October, 1945, Japanese procurement then came under Labor Supplying Stations and agencies of Central Liaison Bureau.

b. With increasing operations in the Fifth Amphibious Corps areas, including the expansion of 2d Marine Division and 32d Army Division into their areas of responsibility, labor requirements rapidly increased to 20,000 workers per day, taxing the ability of existing Japanese labor agencies to keep up with the demand. Operations in the Sasebo area, due largely to increased ship discharge and cargo storage requirements, using 5,000 workers per day, presented a particularly serious problem in this regard.

c. With the exception of the Sasebo area, labor requirements were met. Abolition of the Japanese National Labor Mobilization Ordinance, and the consequent loss of the power to force Japanese to work, was advanced by the Director, Sasebo Liaison Office, as the reason for deficiencies in the Sasebo area. With the promulgation and implementation of Welfare Ministry Order No. 41, the legal authority to force Japanese to work, or face imprisonment, came into existence. Shortages thereafter dropped off to a negligible number.
6. **COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

   a. PROCUREMENT

   (1) It is recommended that the Corps Procurement Section act as the coordinating agency among Division Procurement Boards, and not be assigned an area of responsibility for procurement.

   (2) That the Procurement Section handle only such matters as pertain to the procurement of supplies and services from a Japanese civilian source.

   (3) That two Procurement Sections not be assigned to the same area. Each section issues directives causing confusion to all concerned.

   (4) That all military supplies and equipment be placed under control of the Disposition Section and not divide the responsibility of the control between two sections.

   b. LABOR

   (1) It is recommended in future operations that all using units be ordered to estimate their labor requirements for the next six (6) month period, showing projects by month, and to submit these estimates to higher authority for editing and consolidation.

   (2) That Division Commanders place the consolidated requisitions with the ranking agency of the Governmental Labor Department in their respective areas, with accompanying demand that they be filled.

   (3) That unit commanders be charged with the responsibility for maintaining closer supervision over native labor assigned their using units so that increased efficiency of operation and reduction of workers can be effected.

   (4) That liaison be established, and maintained with ranking Governmental Authorities to insure prompt and efficient distribution to local authorities and procuring agencies of all labor data, statistics, ordinance, orders, and other matter from higher military and governmental authorities.

   (5) That labor procurement agencies be studi
Appendix 6 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan, Contd.

CONFIDENTIAL

with the view of recommending, when necessary, changes in personnel and organizations to higher military and government authorities.

ENCLOSURES:

"A" - Organization Chart

"B" - PS-1 Form for Procurement.

"C" - GPA Form 3 - Monthly Report Commodities Services.

"D" - Report of Captured or Surrendered Supplies and Equipment.

S. M. KELLY
ENCLOSURE (A)

PROCUREMENT OFFICER
WATERFRONT CORPS

LtCol. S. J. Kelly, USMC.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

LtCol. R. S. Howell, USMC.

INTERPRETER

1st Lt. J. L. Fischer, USCR.

SURRENDERED MILITARY SUPPLIES

* Lt. A. W. Harshik, USNR
Lt(jg) E. L. Varney, USNR
1st Lt. F. L. Largis, AUS
Lt(jg) R. Bradshaw, USNR
Lt(jg) R. W. Nordstrom, USNR
Lt(jg) R. I. Costello, USNR
2dLt. R. E. Scott, USCR

ADMINISTRATIVE

* WO. H. B. Horn, USMC

REAL-ESTATE & APPRAISAL SUPPLIES & SERVICES

* Capt. L. A. Vesterberger, AUS
2dLt. L. H. Copeland, USCR

LABOR

* Capt. A. H. Earley, AUS
Lt. H. G. Ihrig, USNR
1st Lt. Harada (Interpreter)

LIAISON

 Cmdr. J. B. Cline (SC) USN, OHR 18
1st Lt. Harada (from Sasebo Liaison Committee)

* Denotes Section Chief.
HQ VJ 

11 November, 1945 (Date)

SUBJECT: Request for Procurement of Japanese Supplies, Construction Real Estate, Equipment or Facilities.

10: VJ Procurement Officer, Sasabo, Kyushu.
(Div., Corps, Army)

1. Type of Supplies, Real Estate, Equipment or Facility desired.

Coal
(3 tons washed steam coal)

2. Location: Sasabo, Kyushu.

3. Owner (if known): Mr. Sato.

4. Quantity: As shown above.

5. Condition (if known): Washed.


7. Date to be Delivered: As soon as possible.

8. Purpose of which Desired: To coal British Ship.

9. Unit for Which Desired: 8B FORT SUGI LO

10. Remarks: Ship will anchor as close as possible to coaling dock and Japanes laborers will be required to transfer coal from shore to ship.

S/ JOHN DOE, Commanding.

1st Endorsement

HQ VJ Sasabo, Kyushu, Japan, (Div., Corps, Army) 

12 November, 1945 To: Japanese Central Liaison Office, Sasabo, Japan, (Location)

1. Approved (or approved with exceptions as noted below).

2. You will cause the above to be delivered to the requesting agency and report when delivery has been completed.

3. Serial No VJ-L-123 has been assigned to this request.

4. Remarks (for exceptions)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHULTZ, USMC

In triplicate
1 Copy to Procurement Sec File

PS-1 Form

S/ RICHARD DOE, Procurement Officer
(Over)
2nd Endorsement

Japanese Central Liaison Office, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, 13Nov45

To: V.C Procurement Officer, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan,
(Div, Corps, Army) (Location)

1. Property covered by above demand is available and may be obtained by contacting Ichizo Nagasawa, at Sasebo Liaison Office (Individual or Agency) 1939

2. Remarks:

In duplicate
1 Copy to Liaison Office Files

S/ S. Sigemori,
(Name) (Title)
Japanese Central Liaison Office.

3rd Endorsement

HQ, V.C.
(Div, Corps, Army) Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, 13Nov45
(Location) (Act.)

To: SS FORT BUFO. LO, Sasebo, Kyushu
(Requesting Agency) (Location)

1. Property covered by basic request has been procured.

2. This is your authority for taking possession.

3. Remarks:

In duplicate

S/ RICHARD ROE
(Div., Corps, Army) Procurement Officer

4th Endorsement

HQ, SS FORT BUFO. LO, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, 14Nov45
(Requesting Agency) (Location) (Act.)

To: V.C
(Div., Corps, Army) Procurement Officer, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan.
(Location)

1. Property covered by basic request has been received (or received with exceptions noted below).

2. Remarks (or exceptions): Monetary value ¥2,850 per ton.

In duplicate

¥7,950

Note: Both copies to be signed and returned. S/ JOHN DOE

Commanding.

5th Endorsement

HQ, V.C.
(Div, Corps, Army) Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, 14Nov45
(Location) (Act.)

To: Japanese Central Liaison Office, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan.
(Location)

1. Forwarded.

Signature signed copy forwarded.

S/ RICHARD ROE
Signed copy retained in procurement Sec Files.
(Div., Corps, Army) Procurement Officer.

*Forward Requests in Quadruplicate to Procurement Officer Concerned.
MONTHLY REPORT COMMODITIES SERVICES

RECEIVED, MONTH ENDING 30 November 1945

TO: Office General Procurement Agent, APOC

FROM: VAC Headquarters, COMAND

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SUPPLIES</th>
<th>SERVICES</th>
<th>EMERGENCY CASH PURCHASES</th>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Chemical Warfare Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ordnance</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Special Services</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Medical Corps</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: $15,083.00 $6,361.00

S. A. KELLY,
LtCol., USAG,
VAC Procure O.

GP. Form #3

This represents a typical monthly report as submitted to SIXTH ARMY for commodities, services, and real estate.

ENCLOSURE "O"
<table>
<thead>
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<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<th>(6)</th>
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<td>RJ</td>
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<td>RJ</td>
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<td>O</td>
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<td>O</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Passenger Cars ea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Automotive Equipment Tons</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
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</table>

* Shipped to US for Intelligence purposes.

**NOTE-1** Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report.

**NOTE-2** C-Used for Civilian relief; D - Destroyed; I-Used for Operations; R - Returned to Japanese; S-Scrapped; T-Trophies Issued to troops; St-Shipped to US for training purposes; Swt-Shipped to US as War Trophies. **Major Location, e.g.-Saeko, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, etc.**
**JAP ARMY**
**JAP NAVY**
**JAP ARMY AIR FORCE**
**JAP NAVAL AIR FORCE**

**REPORT OF CAPTURED OR SURRENDERED**
**SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT**

**Sasebo AREA**

**WAC Headquarters**
(Unit Reporting)

**From 22 Sept. to 30 Nov. 1945, Inc.**

**Class** Quartermaster (QM, Ord, Sig, Etc.)

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</table>

**NOTE-1** Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report.

**NOTE-2** C-used for civilian relief; D-Destroyed; O-used for operations; RJ-Returned to Japanese; S-Scrapped; TIT-Trophies issued to troops; ST-Shipped to US for training purposes; SWT-Shipped to US as War Trophies. **Major Location, e.g. Sasebo, Nagasaki, etc.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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**NOTES**

1. Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report.
2. O-used for civilian relief; D-Destroyed; C-Used for operations; RJ-Returned to Japanese; S-Scrapped; TIT-Trophies issued to troops; ST - Shipped to US for training purposes; SUT-Shipped to US as war trophies.

**Major Location, e.g.-Sasebo, Na asahi, Fumoko, etc.**
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<td>Wool, insulating, bundles</td>
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### Class Signal

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<tr>
<td>Amplifiers, each</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td>Fuses, each</td>
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<td>Hydrophones, each</td>
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<td>ST</td>
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<td>Insulators, each</td>
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<td>Irons, soldering</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>O</td>
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</table>

*Shipped to US for Intelligence purposes

**Note:** Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report.

- C-Used for civilian relief; D—Destroyed; O—Used for Conversions; RJ—Returned to Japanese; S—Scrapped; TTR—Trophies issued to troops; ST—Shipped to US for training purposes; SMT—Shipped to US as War Trophies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Transmitters, each</td>
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<td>196102</td>
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REPORT OF CAPTURED OR SURRERNDERED
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.

JAP NAVY XXX
JAP ARMY A.I.R. FORCE

VAC Headquarters (Unit Reporting)

From 22 Sept to 30 Nov 45.

Class Medical (M, Ord, Sig., etc)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
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<th>Accumulative Total</th>
<th>Balance</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Period:</td>
<td>(to include period</td>
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<tr>
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<td>on this Report)</td>
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<td>24 Nov:</td>
<td>Rec'd:</td>
<td>Dispo.-Method</td>
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<td>Disc'd of:</td>
<td>Disposition:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>to</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from:</td>
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<td>50 Nov 45.</td>
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<td>(2) Inc.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(3)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>*(5)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Narcotics (See List) lbs: 0 | 294 | 294 | RJ | 0
- Sulphur Derivatives lbs: 0 | 5 | 5 | AJ | 0
- Rations Items lbs: 0 | 44,343 | 44,343 | RJ | 0
- Drugs (All others) lbs: 0 | 24,409 | 24,409 | AJ | 0
- Surgical Instruments lbs: 0 | 191 | 191 | RJ | 0
- Surgical Appliances lbs: 0 | 92 | 92 | RJ | 0
- (Electrical) lbs: 0 | 75,117 | 75,117 | RJ | 0
- Surgical Appliances lbs: 0 | 1,802 | 1,802 | RJ | 0
- (Non Electrical) lbs: 0 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0
- Laboratory Equipment lbs: 0 | 1,207 | 1,207 | RJ | 0
- Laboratory Equipment lbs: 0 | 2,383 | 2,383 | RJ | 0
- Laboratory glassware lbs: 0 | 571 | 571 | RJ | 0
- Dental Instruments lbs: 0 | 40 | 40 | RJ | 0
- Dental Instruments lbs: 0 | 742 | 742 | AJ | 0
- Dental Instruments lbs: 0 | 739 | 739 | AJ | 0
- Dental Instruments lbs: 0 | 500 | 500 | 0 | 0
- Blankets lbs: 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
- Sheats lbs: 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
- Pillow cases lbs: 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
- Towels lbs: 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
- Div. Field Med. Units Equip lbs: 707 | 707 | 707 | RJ | 0
- Gold Items lbs: 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0

NOTE - 1 Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report.

NOTE - 2 - C-Used for civilian relief; D- Destroyed; O - Used for Operations; RJ - Returned to Japanese; S-Scrapped; TIT-Trophies issued to troops; ST-Shipped to US for training purposes; SWI-Shipped to US as War Trophies. **Major Location, e.g., Sasebo, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, etc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
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<th>(4)</th>
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<td>2100.0</td>
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<td>2100 Vials</td>
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<td>Generator X-ray</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>RJ</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>RJ</td>
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</table>
Appendix 7 to Annex EASY

to MAC Operations Report

Occupation of JAPAN

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

ENCLOSURE (6)
HEADQUARTERS,
PROVISIONAL MOTOR TRANSPORT GROUP,
AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
G/O FLEET POST OFFICE,
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

30 November, 1945.

From: Corps Motor Transport Officer.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: Motor Transport Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATORY PHASE:

a. Plans for the invasion of JAPAN were received and studied as subsequently these plans were altered to apply to the Occupation of JAPAN. Insofar as it pertained to motor transport, the change in plans did not materially affect this section. A Motor Transport Plan was formulated and distributed to organizations concerned. The plan specified that each unit would meet its own transportation requirements with organic equipment insofar as possible. Transportation problems beyond the capacity of units would be referred to the Corps Motor Transport Officer for co-ordination with other sources within the Corps.

b. List of vehicles to be lifted for the operation were submitted by the units. These lists were studied and the equipment shown was sufficient to perform the duties required. Due to lack of shipping, in the initial echelon, units were directed to load all light vehicles including one-quarter (1/4) ton trailers and a minimum of sixty (60) percent of heavy vehicles. Excess equipment to be lifted in turn-around shipping or rear echelon shipping. In the case of the Second Marine Division available shipping made it possible for their transportation to be loaded out 100%, while the 15th Marine Division were required to leave approximately 40% of their transportation in the rear echelon.

c. Arrangements were made by this section to obtain additional transportation equipment from other sources to assist Corps units in loading out at MUN. The Fourth Marine Division and the 15th Service Battalion rendered valuable assistance in that respect with the result that all times sufficient equipment was at our disposal. Corps units were loaded with a minimum of delay from the motor transport angle.

2. OPERATION PHASE:

a. Embarking at the target, a survey was made to locate suitable areas for motor transport units. Motor pools were established and functioning in a short period of time.

b. Unloading was simplified due to the availability of piers at MUN. Piers were cleared of cargo as rapidly as it could be handled. Sufficient transportation was available to support the unloading.

c. Inasmuch as ship to shore unloading was unnecessary, DEWES played a very minor role, being employed as cargo trucks to supplement the vehicles of the Fifth Marine Division until their motor transport was fully unloaded. In view of the foregoing circumstances, there are no special recommendations or suggestions at this time.

ENCLOSURES: (G) APPENDIX 7 TO 21 EX FAMY TO MAC OPERATION REPORT OCCUPATION OF JAPAN - 1 -
d. Cargo Carriers, M29C (Weasels) were employed only as wire laying vehicles and for cross-country reconnaissance. Streets and highways were available for conventional vehicles thereby restricting the necessity of specialized equipment such as the "Weasel." Another factor in this respect, there were no wounded to transport, a very important function of both the BUW and Weasel. Hostile landings and a part of excellently performed by those two vehicles in previous operations. No unusual incidents were reported pertaining to "Weasel" therefore no recommendations are made.

a. Amphibian trailers were not brought to this area.

e. The motor transport in general was very satisfactory, having sufficient personnel, vehicles, repair facilities and spare parts. The only shortages were tire and tube repair material and these items were requisitioned by dispatch for air shipment. Condition of docks, streets and highways accounted for the large amount of tire failures. No casualties were suffered or equipment destroyed as a result of enemy action. Due to the nature of the operation, ample transportation was always at hand.

f. A Corps Motor Transport group was provided to meet increased transport needs of Corps including reinforcements of Division as the situation required. Army units included in the group were Headquarters and Headquarters Section 71st Quartermaster Battalion, 384th Quartermaster Truck Company, 415th Quartermaster Truck Company, 3581st Quartermaster Truck Company, 3873rd Quartermaster Gas Supply Company, 3475th Ordnance M.A. Company, 3540th Ordnance M.A. Company. These units function as a part of the Group and during this time all transportation requirements were met and ample transportation was always at hand. Some difficulty was experienced in the early phases, in making repairs to Army vehicles attached to Corps due to the lack of spare parts for vehicles peculiar to Army. These Army units are now attached to the 52nd Infantry Division doing convoy duty between Sasebo and Fukuoka.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that whenever Army or Navy units are attached to marine activities that provisions be made to insure that sufficient spare parts are available to make repairs to vehicles not common to the Marine Corps.

b. Inasmuch as the Occupation of Japan was similar to "housekeeping" on a large scale there are no further recommendations pertaining to motor transport at this time.

GUY H. TATYHILL,
Lt. Col., USMC.

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Appendix 8 to Annex EASY
to VAC Operations Report

Occupation of JAPAN

SHORE BRIGADE REPORT
SHORE BRIGADE
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

30 November, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

Enclosures: (A) Task Organization of Shore Brigade for assault landing on Southern KYUSHU.
(B) Task Organization of Shore Brigade for Occupation.

1. ORGANIZATION.

Headquarters Company, Shore Brigade, V Amphibious Corps was organized on 4 August, 1945, with strength of six (6) commissioned officers, one (1) warrant officer, and eight (8) enlisted men, the personnel having been assembled beginning 12 July, 1945, with assignment of Colonel Francis L. FENTON, USMC, as Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade. The organization intended for the assault landing on Southern KYUSHU is shown in Enclosure A. The organization for the occupation is shown in Enclosure B.

2. TRAINING.

Training consisted of instructions in individual duties of officers and men; familiarization with Shore Party SOP for FHM and for separate Divisions; inspection of equipment of Pioneer Battalions; witnessing Shore Party demonstrations. Training of attached units of the task organization was conducted at distant stations and in no case was it prescribed by the Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade.

3. During the planning phase, 12 July, 1945, to 30 August, 1945, the Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade attended conferences of V Amphibious Corps and other Headquarters. Plans were made for employment of Shore Brigade components. Definitions relating to duties of component units of the Shore Brigade and restrictions on their employment are enumerated in Annex CHARLIE to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 and in V Amphibious Corps Operation Order 1-45 and 2-45.

Appendix 8 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.
   a. (1) On A-1, the Executive Officer came ashore in SASEBO as a member of a reconnaissance group and reconnoitered the area tentatively assigned to 8th Service Regiment. Headquarters Company, Shore Brigade, disembarked on 23 September, 1945 at SASEBO, JAPAN and established a CP at the HARBOR MASTER' QUAY in the Navy Yard. Beginning upon landing liaison was established with the Beachmasters, Garrison Boat Pool, 8th Service Regiment, Garrison Beach Battalion, 5th Pioneer Battalion, Transportation Units, and CUB 18 Headquarters.

   (2) During the initial landing period, 23-28 September, 1945, the Shore Brigade did not perform the duties for which designed. Its activities involved minor arrangements for boats, trucks, equipment, and working parties. Since only one Division Shore Party functioned in the immediate area the Shore Brigade did not at any time have operational control of the units performing unloading operations. On 28 September, 1945, functions of the Shore Brigade were discontinued and all personnel assigned to temporary additional duty in other organizations.

   b. (1) Beginning 23 October, 1945, the Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade, by Corps General Order No 21-45, was assigned, quote "responsibility for the coordination and supervision of unloading (end of reloading where necessary) of all supply shipping at SASEBO, including the assignment of available personnel and equipment to specific ships. He will make timely requests for the withdrawal of empty vessels and for berthing vessels to be discharged. All agencies concerned with furnishing personnel and equipment and with disposition of cargo as unloaded will cooperate with the Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade in effecting the maximum utilization of the means available." Personnel available for the duty involved varied from two (2) officers and one (1) enlisted men to three (3) officers and three (3) enlisted men. Remaining officers and enlisted men were assigned to duty with Procurement Section.

   (2) These responsibilities were assumed by carrying out the following procedures:

   (a) Periodic conferences at three (3) or four (4) day intervals with following attendance:

   1. Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and Transportation Officer of Shore Brigade.
Appendix 8 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN, (Contd).

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2. Corps TQ Officer.
3. Commanding Officer, 12th Motor Force. (Corps Motor Transport Officer).
4. Commanding Officer and Supply Officer, CUB 16.
5. Commanding Officer, 1st Special Naval Construction Battalion.
6. 8th Service Regiment: Commanding Officer; Executive Officer; S-4, Supply Battalion; Officer-in-Charge Shipping and Receiving Department; General Supply Officer; Motor Transport Officer.
7. Commanding Officer, 360th Port Battalion.
8. Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, 5th Pioneer Battalion.

(b) Inspection of unloading at ships, in dumps, and warehouses.

(c) Requests for movements of vessels to fit unloading priorities.

(d) Arranging for traffic control, berths, labor, equipment, vehicles, boats, cranes, and buildings for use as warehouses.

(e) Assignment of stevedore crews.

5. RECOMMENDATION:
   a. That the Shore Brigade be retained for the assault these function for which designed.

W. A. REAVES.
Enclosure (A) to Appendix 8 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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1. Task Organization of Shore Brigade for assault landing on Southern KYUSHU.

Shore Brigade
Command Group
HoCo Shore Brigade
Shore Party Com Unit
Com TransGrp FIVE Beachmaster
8th Service Regiment (less Dets plus Asqgd units)
33rd Mar Dep Co
36th Mar Dep Co
43d Mar Dep Co
6th Mar Amm Co
1st Salv Co (Prov) (Less 3 Plato)
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
1st Fm and Bath Co (Prov)
1st & 2d Mkry Plato (Prov)
10 Amm Recov Plato
Bomb List Co H&5 Bn VAC (Less 2 Plato)
Hq & Hq Co 113th Engr (C) Co
773rd Engr Darn Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
1474th Engr Pat List Co
Det 761st Engr Pet Dist Co
1st Plato 429th Engr Dep Co

Hq & Hq Det 155th Ord Bn
120th Ord Mk Co
410th Ord Mk Co
421st Ord Evac Co
359th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Field Army)
2nd Plato 99th Cal Serv Co

Hq & Hq Det 327th QM Bn
4493rd QM Serv Co
4295th QM Gas Sub Co
1 Plato (Less 1 Sec) 588th QM Rnd Co
589th QM Fm and Bath Co
316th QM Mkry Co (Less 2 Plato & 2 Secs)
4th Plato 464th QM Ldry Co
Det 588th QM Ldry Co

Hq & Hq Det 693d QM Bn
4070th QM Serv Co
3873rd QM Gas Sub Co
491st QM Dep Sup Co
228th QM Salv Co
588th QM Rnd Co
Enclosure (A) to Appendix E to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of JAFAS (Contd).

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62d Med Base Dep Co (556 Optical Rep Tm atchd)
106th Vet Food Insp Det
Second Division Shore Party
2d Pioneer Bn
43d MCB
24th Mar Dep Co 8th Serv Regt
Det 8th Serv Regt (Liaison)
35th Repln Draft
74th Repln Draft
6th Mar Amm Co 8th Serv Regt
1st Plat Bomb Disb Co VAC
1st Plat 1st Salv Coll Co 8th Serv Regt
Transon 16 Beach Party
Third Division Shore Party
3d Pioneer Bn
52d MCB
42d Mar Dep Co 8th Serv Regt
Det 8th Serv Regt (Liaison)
67th Repln Draft
75th Repln Draft
10th Mar Amm Co
2d Plat Bomb Disb Co VAC
2d Plat 1st Salv Coll Co 8th Serv Regt
Transon 12 Beach Party
Fifth Division Shore Party
5th Pioneer Bn
116th MCB
24th Mar Dep Co 8th Serv Regt
Det 8th Serv Regt (Liaison)
70th Repln Draft
78th Repln Draft
3d Plat 1st Salv Coll Co 8th Serv Regt
Transon 22 Beach Party
CUB 18 (Tentative)
Log Sup Cos (4)
MCB Snl (2)
Enclosure (E) to Appendix 9 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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1. Task Organization of Shore Brigade for Occupation
   Shore Brigade
   Command Group
   HqCo Shore Brigade
   Shore Party Com Unit
   Com Pib Grp FOUR Beachmaster
   8th Serv Rept (Reinf) (less deta)
   24th Mar Dep Co
   36th Mar Dep Co
   42d Mar Dep Co
   43d Mar Dep Co
   6th Mar Ammo Co
   10th Mar Ammo Co
   1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)
   1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
   1st Fum & Bath Co (Prov)
   1st Bkry Plat (Prov)
   Bomb Disp Co H/S En VAC (less 3d Plat)
   Air Del Sec VAC SerCom
   Hq&Hq Det 397th QM Bn
   565th QM Rhd Co
   44953rd QM Serv Co
   3492d QM Serv Co
   Det 760th Ry Oper Co
   1st Plt 120th QM Bkry Co
   Hq&Hq Det 633d QM Bn
   362d QM Serv Co
   One Plt 369th QM Ldry Co (3L)
   235th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Abl)
   236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Abl)
   237th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Abl)
   238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Abl)
   3d Plt 120th QM Bkry Co
   101st QM Graves Regr Plat
   633d Port Co
   153d Port Co
   553d Sig Dep Co
   62d Med Base Dep Co (556th Optical Rep
   Tm Atchd)
   Second Division Shore Party
   2d Pioneer Bn
   43d NGB
   Transaron 16 Beach Party
   Third Division Shore Party
Enclosure (B) to Appendix B to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN, (Contd).

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3d Pioneer Bn
52d NCB
Transron 12 Beach Party
Fifth Division Shore Party
5th Pioneer Bn
116th NCB
33d Mar Dep Co
34th Mar Dep Co
8th Mar Amm Co
3d Flot Bomb Disp Co H&S Bn VAC
Transron 22 Beach Party
CUB 15 (less det's)
(Principal Units as follows)
Garr Boat & Barge Pool
Garr Beach Bn #1
Mobile Comm Unit
1st Sp1 NCB
72d NCB
FOUR (4) Logistics Support Co's.
Port Director Unit.
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APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX EASY
TO VAC OPERATIONS REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

PERIODIC REPORTS

ENCLOSURE (I)
HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

- OCCUPATION OF JAPAN -

SIGNAL Report

Annex FOX
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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Signal Officer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Report by Signal Officer, Occupation of Japan.

1. PLANNING
   a. Planning Staff.

   Planning for the seizure and occupation of KYUSHU began on 31 May, 1945. At that time the Corps Signal Section was composed of six officers who had participated in all phases of the Iwo Jima Operation, with the addition of four experienced officers who had recently joined the Corps. Colonel J. F. BLAKELLY joined on 31 May, 1945, and relieved Lieutenant Colonel H. W. G. VANDAI as Signal Officer on 18 July, 1945. Thus the new Signal Officer was present during the entire planning phase. The planning staff as finally assembled consisted of the following officers:

   Col James P. BLAKELLY  Signal Officer.
   LtCol Henry J. RIVANCE  Executive Officer.
   LtCol Robert HALL  Communications.
   LtCol Thomas F. FORRESTER  Shore Brigade Commo.
   Capt John W. WEBBER  Signal Supply.
   1stLt Rex A. COLLINGS JR.  Assistant Commo.
   1stLt Wayne R. JOHNSON  Archivist.

b. Detailed Plans.

   (1) General.

   The Signal Plan (Annex HJ, Operation Order No. 2-45) was in general a consolidation of the accumulated experiences of previous plans and operations adjusted to fit details as issued in the directives of higher echelons. It was decided that no Signal Operation

   Annex FOX to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

   -1-

   CONFIDENTIAL
Instructions would be issued, since the Signal Annex would contain all necessary orders and instructions.

(2) Evolution of the Plan.

The plan evolved in five steps as follows:

(a) Rough draft of Signal Annex for an operation in China, dated 9 May, 1945.

(b) First tentative draft of Signal Annex for an operation in Southern Kyushu, dated 9 July, 1945.

(c) Second tentative draft of (b) above dated 9 August, 1945.

(d) Final draft of (Annex How to Operation Plan No. 1-45), dated 9 August, 1945.

(e) Annex HOW to Operation Plan No. 2-45, for the Occupation of Kyushu and Southern Honshu, dated 24 August, 1945.

(3) Liaison.

Because of the complicated chain of command in an amphibious operation, the preparation of a communication plan requires coordination among a great many offices. All echelons must work concurrently since there is insufficient time for each echelon to wait until the next higher headquarters completes its plan. Excellent Signal liaison was maintained with the Headquarters, SIXTH Army through a Marine Signal Officer (LtCol Carl A. LASTER, USMC.), attached to the Staff of the Senior Marine Officer, SIXTH Army. Liaison was assisted through the medium of copies of journals and advance copies of orders and directives furnished by this liaison officer to the Corps Signal Officer. The Signal Officer and the Communication Officer both made trips to Luzon for conferences with SIXTH Army Signal officers.

Liaison could have been improved by attaching to Corps Headquarters a signal officer from the SIXTH Army.
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Annex FOX to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

(4) Signal Plan (See Annex 46b)

(a) Frequencies.

The problem of frequency assignment and control of frequencies has become more and more acute as operations have become progressively larger. This problem may be solved in part by cutting down the number of frequencies, by the use of crystals, and by multiple use of VHF frequencies.

All three of these methods were used in this operation. The Signal Officer requested that 120 medium and high frequencies be assigned for the use of Corps and Divisions; 64 were provided. Crystals were procured on the basis of a preliminary draft of the SIXTH Army frequency plan received 5 August, 1945. These frequencies were correct in most cases. SIXTH Army planned to duplicate the use of VHF frequencies in each corps area except for a certain few reserved for Naval use.

(b) Call Signs.

Since SIXTH Army did not intend to use any landing force call signs listed in PAG 71, VAC used these call signs for its units. If no call was listed for a unit a spare call was assigned. The equivalent of a landing force revision of PAG 71 was prepared. In early drafts, call from PAG 71 were assigned to attached Army units though it had been planned to assign them from a block, later to be assigned from SIXTH Army SOI. As it turned out, the SIXTH Army SOI was received too late to use the calls therein. It was also planned to request that CINCPAC issue VAC calls as a change to PAG 71, but the change in plans due to the surrender of Japan did not allow sufficient time.

(c) Cryptographic Plan.

Major elements of the cryptographic plan included the following items:

Authentication between SIXTH Army and VAC was to be in accordance with the authentication in the Aircraft Code (ACP 1270). Since authentication to lower units was left up to Commander VAC, it was decided to continue to employ the Shackle Cipher (PAC-6).
Hagelin (CSP 1500/1607) was prescribed as the primary crypto system for tactical communications in all units.

Four LOM-GOM Channels were listed for communication between Corps and higher units.

The Joint Army Navy Strip (CSP 1145/46) was to be held by Corps and Divisions.

One Navy Strip Channel (CSP 1409/10) was also to be held by Corps and Divisions.

In addition, Corps and Divisions were to carry a complete class 5 allowance of crypto aids to be landed on order of the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

It had been planned to carry the combined assault code (CGBP-0130), but at the last minute this idea was abandoned.

(d) Safehand Airplane Courier Service.

The SIXTH Army Field Order, as is Army normal procedure, provided for Safehand Airplane courier service to relieve congestion on electrical means of communications. This was the first time that the Corps had functioned under an Army and had such services available.

(e) Radio Link Communications.

The Corps Headquarters had been provided with a radio teletype team in the Iwo Jima operation to maintain communications with the Headquarters shipment. Shortly after that operation the Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps, received its first radio link equipment. It was planned to use radio link equipment extensively as follows:

To SIXTH Army Headquarters (Ashore)
To each Division
To the USS McKinley (utilizing equipment to be furnished by the Navy).

The plan provided that Restricted
and CONFIDENTIAL traffic could be transmitted in the clear over radio link voice and teletype circuits. Traffic previously encrypted would of course require paraphrasing and assignment of a new date-time group. Higher directives did not assign any frequencies for radio link, therefore the plan did not list necessary frequencies.

(f) Signal Intelligence.

Available Signal Intelligence was negligible and consisted largely of information from pre-war sources. A summary of available data was issued as a Signal Intelligence Bulletin on 29 August, 1945.

(g) Air Warning.

Information from higher echelons regarding Air Warning was so limited that only a skeleton plan (Annex Love to Operation Plan No. 245) was drawn up. This plan merely placed responsibility for air warning, and listed correct visual and sound signals.

(h) Plans of higher Navy units did not provide for joint communication center. Ground units were to guard Navy circuits until such time as Navy Shore Communications might be established. No base communication plan was ever received by this Headquarters.

(1) Last-minute Revisions.

The Signal Plan was slightly changed after issue due to directives from higher echelons and discovery of minor errors. Addendum Number 1, dated 29 August, 1945, deleted the 2nd Provisional AAA Group and changed frequencies to fit SIXTH Army BOL. Addendum Number 2, dated 12 September, 1945, deleted the 3rd Marine Division and substituted 32nd Infantry Division therefore.

2. TRAINING

a. General Training.

General training for the Corps was prescribed in Corps Training Order No. 345 dated 26 April, 1945. Training of the Corps in Signal Communications was directed by Annex Becker of the same order. This directive emphasized various training measures to improve communic-
tions, prescribed frequencies not to be interfered with on training nets and provided training shackles and call signs. Frequencies for training had already been prescribed by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Later additions to the training order established drill radio circuits with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, radio intelligence training, entrance of the Corps into the Amphibious Forces radio drill net, and entrance of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Group (Prov) into the Corps training nets.

During the months of July and August, extensive training in general combat was carried on, including combat swimming, booby traps, grenade throwing, firing of weapons, infiltration and village fighting.

Communication exercises were conducted in conjunction with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Group (Prov) during the month of June. Complete facilities for wire, message center and radio were established with the 4th Marine Division and the Tractor Group. Radio drill nets were maintained with the 5th Marine Division. Combat conditions were simulated. Another full scale communications exercise was held during the first part of August in which all possible facilities of wire, radio and message center were utilized under simulated combat conditions, with an attempt to approximate the terrain and general conditions likely to be encountered during the coming operation.

During these training periods it was generally possible for all men of the Signal Battalion to take part, except some key personnel necessary to run the installations at Corps Headquarters. However, such personnel were given the opportunity to at least visit the field installations and become acquainted with the operations. The training noted above was considered adequate in spite of interference from normal Corps Headquarters operations.

b. Radio Counter-measures Training.

A radio countermeasures training team was available during practically all of the training period. In April through June the team conducted intense classroom training visiting the 4th Marine Division, 5th Marine Division, 1st Amphibian Tractor Group and Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps. From that time on the team was used in
connection with drill circuits of the Corps and Division. Both jamming and deception were used on various drill nets with no advance warning. Daily reports were submitted to the units involved. Such training is believed to be valuable, though there has been no testing of results in actual combat by this organization.

c. Carrier and Radio Link Training.

Carrier and radio link personnel and equipment were waiting for this Headquarters when it returned to MAUI from IWO JIMA. It was decided to utilize this equipment partly for training and partly in the normal camp communication system. Operations as follows were undertaken:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>RELAY</th>
<th>CIRCUITS UTILIZED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VAC to 4th MarDiv</td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 Tp &amp; 1TT</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAC to 1st ProvamTracGp</td>
<td>Radio Link</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 Tp &amp; 1TT</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAC to FMF, Pac</td>
<td>Radio Link</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 Tp &amp; 1TT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC to 5th MarDiv</td>
<td>Radio Link</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 Tp &amp; 1TT</td>
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3. ORGANIZATION

c. Task Organization (See Annex Able to Operation Plan Number 2-45).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signal Bn, VAC Reinforced</th>
<th>LtCol SMART</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signal Bn, VAC Hq Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>51st Sig Oph Co.</td>
<td>Capt GLEASON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Sig Constr. Co.</td>
<td>Capt HYLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52nd Sig Constr. Co.</td>
<td>Capt ETHERIDGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sep Radio Intelligence Plt</td>
<td>Capt KUROSKY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Sep Radio Intelligence Plt</td>
<td>1stLt ERWIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C, 60th Signal Bn</td>
<td>1stLt SMITH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1stLt THOMPSON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. 52nd Signal Construction Company.

This unit had been located at GUAM, attached to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, until 2 September, 1945, when it was returned to Operational control of V Amphibious Corps. It had performed considerable cable construction work in GUAM which aided its training. This company was in excellent operating condition and left GUAM fully equipped in time to land at SASEBO on 24 September, 1945.
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Annex FOX to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.


(c. Company C, 60th Signal Battalion.

This Army unit arrived in SASEBO with little being known about its operating abilities or state of readiness. It is a heavy construction company and was utilized for installation of cable lines in SASEBO area until sent to FUKUOKA to perform missions in support of Fifth Fighter Command.

d. Radio Intelligence Platoons.

Because of lack of shipping it was necessary to leave a portion of one radio intelligence platoon (1 officer and 18 enlisted) plus all its equipment in MAUI. This platoon was later disbanded and the rear echelon never reached JAPAN, the forward echelon being absorbed by the 5th Radio Intelligence Platoon.

4. MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

a. Loading Plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF SHIP</th>
<th>NO.OFFICERS</th>
<th>NO.ENLISTED</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGC-7 USS MCKINLEY</td>
<td>SigBn 9</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSV-4 USS SAUGUS</td>
<td>SigBn 13</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>APA-29 USS DAWSON</td>
<td>5th RI 0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SigBn 30</td>
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<td>SigBn 9</td>
<td>156</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1st RI 1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th RI 0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA-30 USS JEFFERSON</td>
<td>SP Comm Unit</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 112</td>
<td>5th AI 1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th MarDiv 0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 950</td>
<td>52nd SigConstr 11</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Echelon</td>
<td>SigBn 1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st RI 1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Operation Aboard USS M. MCKINLEY.

(1) General.
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The V Amphibious Corps Message Center
opened aboard the USS MT. MCKINLEY on 1 September, 1945.
Signal Battalion personnel were divided as follows:

OFFICERS:
Signal Officer
Communication Officer
Radio Officer (Supply Officer)
Administrative Officer
Message Center & Coding Officer

ENLISTED:
Radio
Radio Link (used as mangers)
Message Center
Code Talker
Other

The seven radio link, carrier personnel were used to operate radio link communication to Headquarters Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, as long as possible, then brought aboard the Headquarters ship with their equipment, since this was the last ship loaded.

Additional personnel were transferred from the USS SAUGUS to the USS MT. MCKINLEY on arrival in the objective areas as follows:

Radio Officer
Coding Officers
Message Center
(Enlisted)

(2) Message Center:

(a) Operation at Sea.

Until 16 September, the Naval Communication Center wrote up all traffic. After this time a four section watch was established with personnel on each watch as follows:
The outgoing traffic was logged by the Marine CWO after assignment of a date-time group by the Naval CWO, then returned to Naval CWO for later handling including write-up.

Traffic for VAC had increased greatly by 15 September, 1945. Some delays in the previous system were noticed; therefore, the Corps message center took over responsibility of handling all functions except coding. This system relieved the Navy section of some work and generally speeded up the handling of traffic. The cooperation of the ship's communication staff was excellent throughout.

(b) Operation at Sasebo.

Upon arrival at the objective, additional personnel were utilized plus personnel already available and a three section watch was established with personnel on each watch as follows:

1 CWO
1 Asst CWO
1 Supervisor
2 Typists
1 Ditto Operator
2 Runners
1 Code Talker.

(c) Distribution.

Distribution was in general the same as at MAUI in accordance with Corps Special Order No. 36-45. Message delivery by boat was handled by the Officer Messenger Mail Center operating under the Corps Adjutant.
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(3) Radio.

Radio operation was routine except for the addition of the VHF-TBS circuit enroute to the objective for administrative traffic between Headquarters, auxiliary Headquarters and the 5th Marine Division. For information only, the circuits between SIXTH Army and the Second JAPANESE Army (14035, 14400) were copied.

Circuits manned included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIRCUIT</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>TRANSMITTER</th>
<th>RECEIVER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Command #1 (CW)</td>
<td>6020/3390</td>
<td>TDE</td>
<td>RBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC Command (CW)</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>TDE</td>
<td>RBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC Command (V)</td>
<td>2108</td>
<td>T05</td>
<td>RBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC Command (FM)</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>SCR 608</td>
<td>SCR 608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC SP Lat (V)</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>T05</td>
<td>RBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC Control (FM)</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>SCR 608</td>
<td>SCR 508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5thMarDivComd (FM)</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>SCR 608</td>
<td>SCR 508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Training:

Training enroute was limited to general briefing because of the normal operation of communication facilities.

(5) Code Talkers (Navajos).

Code talkers were given practice by transmitting drill messages over a system of E-2A telephones installed in various parts of the ship and over the Corps TBS net. With one exception, the talkers assigned to Corps Headquarters had not taken part in the re-standardization course held in Pearl Harbor during April and May of 1945, and they had received no refresher training since leaving a unit in which their services as talkers had not been extensively employed. However, as a result of extensive training enroute to the objective, their operation was satisfactory.

c. Operation Aboard USS 8. KHUB

Initial plans for the southern KYUSHU operation envisioned the assignment of a standby command ship.
This would not only provide a complete command ship in case the regular command ship was incapacitated; it would also provide overload facilities for staff officers who were not quartered on the Headquarters ship yet had to operate from it at the objective; it would provide a means for these staff officers to keep informed of the situation and it would furnish a complete advance command party ready to land at any time with full information. A landing ship vehicular would provide ample space to load the equipment and personnel needed in a Corps advance CP party, but is not suitable for an alternate command ship in that it lacks the facilities and space needed to accommodate a corps headquarters staff.

The SAUGUS (L5V-4) was assigned to this Corps to be used as an auxiliary command ship. Commander Fifth Amphibious Force requested the Administrative Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific, to install the following equipment on the SAUGUS:

Radio Link equipment and teletype equipment:

1. Telephone Terminal (CF-1A)
2. Telegraph Terminal (CF-2A)
3. Switchboard (ED-71)
4. Receiver (R-19/TRC-1)
5. Transmitter (T-14/TRC-1)
6. Ringing equipment (EE-101-A)
7. Teleprinter (TG-7A)

Radio Equipment:

1. Receivers BC-312-M
2. Rectifiers RA-83-A
3. Receivers (BC-683)
4. Receivers (RBM)
5. Speakers (LS-3)
6. Transmitters (BC-191-F)
7. Transmitters (MBF)
8. Receivers (BC-779-B)

The SAUGUS arrived in KAHLUI, MAUI on 23 August, 1945. Neither the Captain nor the Communication Officer had been informed of the above request or the ship's
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mission in the operation. It was decided to put a crew of radio and radio link technicians from Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps, aboard the ship and have it ordered immediately to Pearl Harbor to procure the equipment.

The receiving equipment provided bore no relation to the Corps major frequency plan; so, Signal Battalion radios were installed where necessary. The radio link equipment was incomplete and a different type than that on the MT, MCKINLEY so could not be used.

Enroute to JAPAN communication with the MT, MCKINLEY and the USS WESTMORELAND (5th MarDiv) was maintained by using a TBS frequency and the MBF. At the objective, complete coverage of the major frequencies was provided.

The SAUGUS proved of little value as an auxiliary command ship since the occupation progressed so fast that it was unloaded immediately.

5. OCCUPATION OPERATIONS

a. Preliminary Reconnaissance.

Preliminary reconnaissance was negligible. The Signal Section was allotted one enlisted man in the advance party which left SAIPAN on 14 September and arrived at Nagasaki on 16 September. MTgt. BOATRIGHT, Signal Battalion Wire Chief, was able to obtain some information on status of pole lines and general lack of long lines as of that date due to a recent typhoon. He brought back photographs of naval switchboards, maps of line routes and much general information that was of value to the Signal Officer.

b. Narrative of Occupation.

22 September, 1945. Small advance party ashore at 0900. Temporary message center established on beach. Radio communication using radio jeeps established by 1030.

23 September, 1945. NCO club at SASEBO Naval Station selected for Corps CP. Balance of advance
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24 September, 1945. Cable installed to 5th Marine Division. Radio teletype in operation to MT. MCKINLEY. Permanent radio station established in Headquarters building.

26 September, 1945. Two spiral four lines begun to OMURA. Cable to NAS SASEBO installed. Radio link installed to 2nd Marine Division at NAASAKI.

27 September, 1945. MT. MCKINLEY sailed.
Port Director ashore. Telephone directory issued. Japanese military and navy authorities ordered to furnish complete information regarding facilities in the Corps zone. Five pair cable completed to new 5th Marine Division CP at AINOURA. Executive Officer, Signal Section, to FUKUOKA with advance party.

28 September, 1945. 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions authorized to skeletonize ASCOS (291435). Cable laid to MT. SASEBO radio relay station. Radio link to OMURA complete.

29 September, 1945. SIXTH Army asked to assist in arranging telephone circuits to KYOTO (2911501). Telephone communication established to FUKUOKA and KANoya through commercial facilities. Cable to OMURA completed.

30 September, 1945. Assumed guard for Port Director SASEBO on George Fox. Tiger Blue exchange in operation (BOQ). Radio relay station at MT. SASEBO complete.

2 October, 1945. FUKUOKA Occupation Force CP opened. Communication to 2nd Marine Division at NAASAKI by commercial lines. Radio link detail left for FUKUOKA.

3 October, 1945. C Company, 60th Signal Battalion to FUKUOKA.

4 October, 1945. Radio link to FUKUOKA installed.
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6 October, 1945. OMURA-SASEBO cable line completed.

8 October, 1945. SIXTH Army EM radio circuit opened (0008501). Commercial line SASEBO to KUMAMOTO procured for use of 2nd Marine Division.

10 October, 1945. Extensive damage to NAGASAKI-SASEBO cable line by storm as well as to the KAGOSHIMA-KANOYA commercial facilities. Other minor damage quickly repaired. V Marine Corps issued, cancelled Annex HOW to Operation Plan No. 2-48.

13 October, 1945. Commercial line FUKUOKA to YAMAGUCHI in use. LtCol Henry J. KRUMN relieved Col James P. BERKELEY as Signal Officer.


15 October, 1945. Underwater line installed to USS WICHITA.

20 October, 1945. Directed all units stop amateur radio transmissions in their zones, (2015031).

22 October, 1945. Commenced installation of radio link to SIXTH Army, air reconnaissance made.

24 October, 1945. Ordered Corps units to coordinate requests for Japanese telephone lines through V Amphibious Corps. FUKUOKA Occupation Forces relieved of communication guard by 32nd Infantry Division.

25 October, 1945. NAGASAKI spiral four cable previously damaged by storm repaired and placed on carrier system.

26 October, 1945. BLT 1/27 at KANOYA secured from Corps command net and turned SCR-299 over to 2nd Marine Division (220915I).

28 October, 1945. USN requested command establishing naval radio section aboard to relieve

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VAC of naval base communication. (301056).

31 October, 1945. Commenced guarding Empire Love Fox at request of Com, Fifth Fleet (310225).

1 November, 1945. Ten additional lines laid to SASEBO commercial exchange, LtCol TF FORRESTER relieved LtCol HJ SMART as Commanding Officer, Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps.

2 November, 1945. Communication with SIXTH Army at KYOTO by commercial lines.

7 November, 1945. Conference between Signal Officer, Communication Officer, CTF 61, Communication Officer Port Director arranged details for naval radio SASEBO, which is now under consideration by U.S. Navy. Underwater line to USS CAMPBELL (SOPAC) in.

14 November, 1945. Japanese switchboard (500 drop) tried out with Tiger White and Tiger Blue lines, but failed to work satisfactorily.


18 November, 1945. Radio Link to SIXTH Army in operation.

20 November, 1945. Issued changes to VMARSOI.

25 November, 1945. Conference between Signal Officer 2nd Marine Division and Signal Officer V Amphibious Corps relieving carrier platoon when VAC relieved.


29 November, 1945. Commenced installation of radio-link equipment on USS YOSUMITE. This equipment was taken from USS PANAMINT.

c. Operations.

(1) Radio and Visual.

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(a) General.

Radio facilities in this operation were highly satisfactory. Most of the Corps radio operators and supervisors had been in one or more of the Corps operations at TAHAWA, ROI-NAMUR, MAJUANAS, and IWO JIMA and were well versed in radio operations as performed by corps headquarters.

Four radio jeeps and personnel accompanied the Executive Officer of the Signal Section when he landed on the morning of 22 September, 1945, and were used in communication with the Headquarters ship, and higher and lower echelons. These men and their equipment came from the auxiliary command ship (USS SAUGUS). The following day more radio jeeps, Mark IV vans and SCR-299's were brought ashore. The transmitter van was remotely controlled one-half mile from Corps Headquarters by two 5 pair cables. As soon as possible all receivers were placed in a radio room atop the Corps Headquarters building.

(b) Equipment.

All equipment performed in an excellent manner with one exception to be mentioned below. RAQ's were largely used for medium and high frequency receiving positions and performed without trouble on low commercial voltage where other receivers could not be used. TCK transmitters were found to have a better signal and to perform better with distant stations than SCR-299's transmitter unit of SCR-160.

Three SCR-299's had transformer failures (229613.3) one being a Signal Battalion set and two being Division sets. Replacement transformers were procured through the 9th Service Regiment. SCR-299's which were driven long distances over rough roads give considerable trouble.

(c) Traffic. (See Appendix 7)

Traffic was exceedingly heavy. Point-to-point circuits averaged from 15,000 to 23,000 groups per day and 750 messages a day were copied over Fox schedules. Lower units and occasionally higher units lacked
Annex FOX to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

High speed radio operators needed for the amount of traffic. Guard lists were utilized for all stations to facilitate routing of traffic.

The Naval Base net was used constantly to clear relay traffic to Naval radio stations at OKINAWA and TOKYO. Fifth Fleet entered the secondary SIXTH Army Net and a considerable volume of traffic was cleared to them.

(d) Visual.

A visual tower with a 12-inch search light was set up on the roof of the Headquarters building. This circuit proved more valuable than local command nets in passing traffic to ships in the harbor. This was the first time Signal Battalion personnel had been utilized in the Corps Visual Station.

(2) Wire and Construction. (See Appendices 1 to 5 this Annex).

(a) General.

Initial wire and construction was considerably hampered by the fact that only a small portion of the wire platoon and no construction personnel were sent ashore until 24 September. This was due to high priority having been given unloading the 4th Marine Division. As a result the wire platoon was used to construct cable lines initially as well as perform its regular function. Most of this cable was laid hurriedly and was relaid later.

Unloading of equipment was not planned or coordinated. Equipment was ordered ashore without proper storage facilities being provided. As a result of the delay in assigning storage areas, much time that could have been used productively was spent in moving equipment to new warehouses as the storage plan was changed.

Closer coordination of the work of the wire platoon and the construction companies and determination of relative priorities to be assigned was obtained by assigning an officer of the Signal Section as
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Wire Officer. All wire work of any kind was cleared through this officer who maintained close liaison with the operation officer (S-3) of the Signal Battalion.

(b) Equipment,

boards as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXCHANGE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>EQUIPMENT</th>
<th>TRUNKS</th>
<th>LOCALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIGER</td>
<td>Corps HQ</td>
<td>MTC-2 &amp;</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TC-1 later used to consolidate Tiger and Tiger White.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIGER RED</td>
<td>Medical Bn</td>
<td>2BD72</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIGER WHITE</td>
<td>Corps Troops</td>
<td>MTC-2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIGER BLUE</td>
<td>BOQ</td>
<td>Jap (50-drop)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The MTC-2 switchboard proved inadequate for a Corps in occupation duty. An average of 300 calls per hour were handled during office hours, and a peak of 1581 between 0800 and 1200 was reached many days on one MTC-2 alone. A TC-10 or equivalent would have been more suitable, and would have resulted in quicker service with less strain on personnel. A Corps request to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, dated 13 August, 1945, for a TC-10 switchboard had been disapproved before VAC left MAUI. A large Japanese military switchboard (500 drops) was finally procured and an attempt was made to put all TIGER lines in the one board. A portion of this work was completed on 14 November, 1945, but the board functioned so slowly and badly that the project was abandoned.

The alert system (MCT-1) was used as a fire alarm system over a large area of NASLBO. It proved entirely inadequate for this purpose because more phones were needed than available and some lines were too long for proper operation. Alert systems were utilized internally for G-1, Military Government and Signal Battalion interphone systems.

(3) Message Center.

(a) General,
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Message Center was established in a very convenient location on the ground floor of the Headquarters building.

(b) Personnel.

The Table of Organization for the Corps Signal Battalion provides 18 officers for the message center and 20 officers were assigned this duty when Corps landed. However, one was shortly assigned to duty with the FUKUOKA Occupation Force, two to other duty with the Signal Battalion and two returned to the United States for demobilization, leaving a total of fifteen actually in the Corps message center. These were supplemented on 4 October by two officers from CUB 18, and on 26 October by two officers from the 5th Marine Division making a total of 19 Officers in all. Even this number, proved inadequate in view of the exceedingly large volume of traffic handled.

Three watches of five officers each were provided, and because of the exceedingly heavy volume of traffic it was found necessary to have two CWO’s on each watch. The duties of the five officers on watch were as follows:

CWO -- In charge of watch; handled all outgoing traffic, (logged, routed, and checked to ascertain that it was transmitted).

Ass’t CWO -- In charge of all incoming and relay traffic.

CEO -- In charge of the coding board and write-up room.

Coding Officers (2) -- Coding duty.

The Table of Organization provides 68 enlisted men for the message center. There were 70 enlisted men in the message center platoon when it was established ashore. Fourteen were shortly assigned duty at FUKUOKA and four men returned to the United States for demobilization, leaving 62 men. To these were later added six men who returned from FUKUOKA. The enlisted men were assigned as follows: One message center chief, one
platoon chief, three men for general messages and registered publications, two men for subject matter and receipt files, three drivers, one property and storeroom man, and three watches of 13 men each. The duties of the men on each watch were as follows: One supervisor, two runners, two teletype operators, one ditto operator, three typists, one code clerk, two file clerks and one man in charge of the agency status chart and transmission agency log. The number of personnel was inadequate and it was necessary to redouble duties and curtail liberty.

All personnel were well trained in their duties, but mistakes were made from time to time, principally due to inadequacy of personnel for the huge volume of traffic handled.

(c) Crypto Systems.

Corps ECM's were landed and set up on 23 September, 1945. Two additional ECM's were borrowed from the 5th Marine Division to make a total of four. The extra ECM's were used only on the few occasions of a mechanical break-down. However, the extra wheels were very valuable as time savers.

Hagelin and strips were used extensively as channels to the FUKUOKA Occupation Force and KAFUYA Occupation Force as these were the only cryptographic aids held by those commands. Whenever possible, Navajo talkers were employed on voice circuits with FUKUOKA.

Many messages were transmitted classified which should have been unclassified. Typical of this were numerous messages received from higher Army echelons concerning ship movements. Such messages were classified as confidential while on the same dates, messages concerning the movements of the same ships were received from Naval forces unclassified and in plain language. Occasionally officers of this Headquarters have overclassified dispatches, resulting in unnecessary encryption. For example, a message about a Danny Kaye USO Show was sent as confidential, while an Army supply agency sent a message relative to a shipment of neckties as a confidential priority. In accordance with a SIXTH Army
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The following was used as a rule for handling classified matter:

1. The following indicated the maximum security classification which may be assigned to various communication means within SIXTH Army and subordinate units thereof:

   a. Wire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>RESTRICTED</th>
<th>CONFIDENTIAL</th>
<th>SECRET</th>
<th>TOP-SECRET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teletype</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facsimile</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Radio

   | Method     | YES        | NO           | NO     | NO         |
   | Telephone  | NO         | NO           | NO     | NO         |
   | Teletype   | NO         | NO           | NO     | NO         |
   | Telegraph  | NO         | NO           | NO     | NO         |

   c. VHF Multi-Channel Carrier:

   | Method     | YES        | YES          | NO     | NO         |
   | Telephone  | YES        | YES          | NO     | NO         |
   | Teletype   | YES        | YES          | YES**  | YES#       |

* Confidential or secret classification may be assigned where lines and terminals are fully patrolled and manned by U.S. personnel.
** Only officer or authorized messenger outside command post.
# Officer only.

d. Messenger:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>YES**</th>
<th>YES#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All types</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES**</td>
<td>YES#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Radio.

During the first week of the occupation it was difficult to clear any messages of a precedence lower than operational priority due to the overload of channels during that period. However, as more circuits were opened, and as other means of communication...
were established, the backlog of messages awaiting transmission was eliminated.

(e) Teletype (Landline) (See Appendix 5).

Landline teletype was operated continuously to the 5th Marine Division, Port Director, and the 8th Service Regiment.

(f) Radio Teletype.

Radio teletype functioned well to 2nd Marine Division and MAG 22. The radio teletypes to the FUKUOKA Occupation Force and to the 32nd Infantry Division and SIXTH Army functioned fairly well.

One deviation from previous operations was that guard mail was handled by the Officer Messenger Mail Center operating under the Corps Adjutant. It would not have been possible for the message center to handle both guard mail and dispatch traffic efficiently due to shortage of personnel and heavy volume of dispatch traffic.

(g) Lack of Personnel.

One of the most serious problems faced was the lack of personnel. The T/O for the message center is based upon officers and men necessary to handle traffic for a corps headquarters, and headquarters units. Had the traffic handled by the communication center been limited to these units, the personnel on hand would have been adequate. However, as mentioned above, one officer and fourteen men were assigned to temporary duty at FUKUOKA. Then, this Headquarters assumed guard for all shore activities on KYUSHU and unofficially, but necessarily, functioned as Navy radio KYUSHU. VAC Headquarters was Radio and Coding Guard for the 5th Marine Division, 8th Service Regiment, NOG-1, LFASCU 4, FD Sasebo, CUB 18, 7th NC Regiment, NavTech Jap, ComLST Lot 37, and all Army units in the SASEBO area. VAC Headquarters acted as radio guard for the 2nd Marine Division, 41st Infantry Division, MAG 22, the KANOKA Occupation Force, and all units located at FUKUOKA. The net result of handling communications for all these units was a tre-
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The tremendous burden of work upon the VAC communication personnel and a marked lessening of efficiency simply because there were not enough personnel to handle all the traffic. It should be noted that CUB 18 was the only unit to furnish any personnel (two officers) to supplement the VAC personnel until 20 October when the 5th Marine Division furnished two officers.

(4) Carrier and Radio Relay. (See Appendix 9, this report).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NO. RELAYS</th>
<th>DATE INS.</th>
<th>CIRCUIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO-NAKASAKI (2nd Div)</td>
<td>Rdo Link</td>
<td>1-0*</td>
<td>25 Sept.</td>
<td>2TP &amp; 1TT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO-NAKASAKI (2nd Div)</td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25 Oct.</td>
<td>3TP &amp; 1TT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO-OMURA (MAG 22)</td>
<td>Rdo Link</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29 Sept.</td>
<td>2TP &amp; 1TT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO-OMURA (MAG 22)</td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26 Oct.</td>
<td>3TP &amp; 1TT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO-FUKUOKA (FOF-32 Div)</td>
<td>Rdo Link</td>
<td>1-2**</td>
<td>12 Oct.</td>
<td>2TP &amp; 2TT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC- USS WESTMORELAND</td>
<td>Rdo Link</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24-26 Sept.</td>
<td>1TT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC- USS WESTMORELAND</td>
<td>Rdo Link</td>
<td>15-22 Oct.</td>
<td>1TP &amp; 1TT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO-KYOTO (6th Army)</td>
<td>Rdo Link</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18 Nov.</td>
<td>2TP &amp; 2TT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One of the relay stations at MT. SASEBO was eliminated later by installation of a spiral four line from there to Corps Headquarters.
** A second relay station was later installed to improve communication.
*** Used as emergency standby after installation of parallel spiral four carrier systems.

(b) Equipment.

Available equipment included:

3 100 mile spiral four carrier system (AN/TCG-2). (2 were without spiral four ends and 1 w/o maintenance parts and equipment.

6 Radio Terminal sets (AN/TCG-3)
9 Radio Relay Sets (AN/TCG-4)
6 Radio Amplifier (AN/TRA-1)

All of the listed equipment was used as of the date of this report except 2 radio relay sets. Lack of maintenance equipment and spare parts made
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it necessary to utilize spare parts from the spare equipment provided to insure continuous 24-hour service. At times this hampered operations, making it necessary to make extensive repairs to a unit when the normal procedure would be a quick substitution of a spare.

Some equipment was damaged and inoperative when landing due to rough handling in transit. The explanation of this lies in the fact that no organizational transportation for carrier and radio link has been provided for the Signal Battalion and 75% of the equipment was handled as bulk cargo. (See Appendix 6 of this report for letter recommending a carrier and radio link company for an Amphibious Corps).

The need was often felt for telegraph terminals (TH-1/TGC-1) in addition to telegraph terminal (CF-2-B). Use of radio link with a terminal (CF-1-A) and terminal (CF-2-B) will provide 2 telephone channels, 4 teletype channels and 1 service channel. With the terminal (TH-1/TGC-1) it can provide 3 telephone channels, 1 teletype channel and one service channel. Normally a Corps only needs one teletype channel to its units and the additional telephone channel is very useful. In addition, the TH-1/TGC-1 is the equipment normally used by the Navy on command ships of various types.

Four transmitters (T-14/TGC-1) were traded for four other modified transmitters at the request of the Radio Relay Officer of the SIXTH Army. Modification had been made to reduce distortion from about 20% to less than 2%, enabling a large number of relays to be used in a long radio link system. A total of seven modifications have been recommended for radio link equipment. None have been made to Signal Battalion equipment.

(c) Personnel.

The Signal Battalion Table of Organization provides for only 2 radio link officers and 22 carrier or radio relay personnel. However, some additional personnel had been assigned and a platoon was organized as follows for the operation:
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carrier Officers</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio Link Officers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier Enlisted</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Link Enlisted</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other enlisted</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Carrier officers were available within the battalion, but were utilized for other communication duties. At least one carrier officer should have been assigned to the section to increase the intelligent direction of the carrier personnel. There is a considerable tendency among communication officers untrained in carrier and radio link problems to regard them as one. Actually the two are separate and training of the personnel is entirely different.

(d) SASEBO-KYOTO

A radio link was completed between VAC at SASEBO and SIXTH Army at KYOTO on 18 November. This link, approximately 450 miles long, is believed to be the longest VHF radio link attempted in any theater of operation. The sites for each station were chosen after a preliminary reconnaissance with OY-1 airplanes. Five relay stations were used, two of which were on KYUSHU and manned by VAC personnel.

The circuit was very satisfactory, though there was naturally some background noise. Transmitters modified by SIXTH Army to decrease distortion were used. These modifications are similar to factory modifications in the T-14G/TAC-1 transmitter. Amplifiers (AN/TRA-1) were not needed since all stations were located at sufficient heights to make possible line of sight operation.

(e) Japanese Facilities.

(a) General.

Japanese commercial telephone facilities were used extensively by the Corps and its divisions. Facilities were procured by this Headquarters through the local manager of the commercial telephone facilities. He in turn would go through necessary higher Japa-
Chinese channels. The Japanese were very cooperative about procuring channels, but not too fast. The various divisions also procured lines either through their local telephone manager or through this Headquarters.

Since the Japanese were not using the lines they had no means of checking them. When a line went out or became weak it was necessary that a Corps representative visit the Japanese exchange to request that the trouble be remedied. CONSTANT liaison was necessary since the commercial lines gave continuous trouble. This was later remedied by installations of direct wire lines between Japanese test office and occupation force switchboard.

(b) Wire facilities procured. (See Appendix 4 of this annex).

(c) Technical Problems.

Teletypes were tried out on various Japanese installations, but they only functioned over short distances and never were used over Japanese telegraph (single conductor, ground return) lines.

Japanese ringer systems were antiquated and gave considerable trouble over long lines. Successful use of ringing equipment (LE-101-A) was made on the long metallic line from SASEBO to KYOTO.

Japanese repeaters on the longer lines were inoperative much of the time. Such repeaters need to be adjusted frequently, but apparently did not receive routine preventive maintenance from the Japanese.

(d) Japanese Power.

Japanese power gave considerable trouble and was not reliable. The voltage dropped so low at times that finally radio, teletype and radio relay connections were rewired with low resistance wire and autotransformers were installed to control voltage. Since Japanese power failed frequently, a stand-by power system was maintained using a PI-84.

d. Personnel:
(1) Demobilization and/or Rotation.

(a) Demobilization problem as it affects Communication Personnel.

There was a decided lag in demobilization and rotation of eligible personnel due to the following factors:

- Necessity of efficiently accomplishing the mission of the Corps.
- Lowering of the point system without provisions for replacements from rear areas.
- Lack of authority of the Corps Commander to effect intra-corps transfers of communication personnel made it impossible to readjust communication personnel of the Corps, so that full use of their training and specialties could be utilized.

(b) Progress of Demobilization:

**OFFICERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NO. DEMOBILIZED</th>
<th>NO. ELIGIBLE END OF MO.</th>
<th>Pts. REQUIRED END OF MONTH</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ENLISTED**

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<th>NO. ELIGIBLE END OF MO.</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>37*</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Transferred to 5th Marine Division which was to be returned to the U. S. A. in December -- 11 officers, 476 enlisted men.

**SIGNAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT**

1. Units mounted out with an initial and 30 days plus 13% of initial on wire and batteries.

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2. (a) Major items additionally authorized for Corps use were as follows:

3,000 2"x4"x20'
400,000 Cable, CC-345, Ft.
22,000 Cable, CC-355, Ft.
2 100, mile, Carrier and Radio Link Systems w/150 miles spiral four, with each system.
2 Telephone Central Office, Sets, TC-3.

(b) The above items arrived 48 hours prior to mounting out and the transfer from one ship to another had to be made on the dock. All equipment was manifested but due to lack of time, confusion in last minute loading, and space aboard ship, ships commanding officers refused to complete the loading as planned and approximately the following was left on the dock to be handled by the rear echelon:

1 Mk-4 Communication Unit.
2448 2"x4"x20'
300 Cable, Spiral four, miles.
288,000 Cable, CC-345, Ft.
4 Power Unit, PE-9b
2 Direction Finders, DAU, in HO-17 mounted on 6x6 truck.

3. At the objective, supplies flowed ashore with negligible losses. Resupply shipments arrived on the scene unbeknownst to this office or the 8th Service Regiment. In many instances all the information available would be a "ships loading plan" furnished by the TQM after the ship's arrival. Batteries were far in excess of requirements, it was estimated there were enough 1945 batteries on hand to supply an Amphibious Corps for at least six months on an Amphibious operation against the enemy. There were more 1944 batteries than 1945 batteries. Spare parts as usual proved to be the only items that could not be readily supplied. The 5th Marine Division had more spare parts than any other organization but the particular parts that were needed were not on hand. At one time SCR-290's at SASEBO, FUKUOKA, KAGOYA, and NAGASAKI were inoperative due to Power Transformer (229613.3) burning out, the Signal Battalion cannibalized one BC-610 for the
KANOYA Task Force, the other transformers were eventually supplied from resupply shipments or by issuing complete new units.

4. The 553rd Signal Depot Co. arrived at SASEBO on 5 November. The mission of supplying all Army units with signal equipment was assigned that unit. One officer and 24 men were left at SASEBO and the CP was established at FUKUOKA. The harbor at FUKUOKA is still closed and all ships unload at SASEBO. Supplies are delivered by rail and truck convoy.

5. (a) The Signal Officer was responsible for the disposition of captured Japanese Military Signal equipment in the area established as VAC Headquarters area of responsibility. The largest concentration of this equipment was in the SASEBO Naval Station and vicinity.

(b) All Japanese radar, airforce, sonar, field telephones, and portable field transmitters were either used for operational purposes or destroyed. Equipment was spread out over a wide area and a tank recovery vehicle completed the destruction. In some instances, welding torches were used to insure complete destruction. After such operations all material was turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry for scrap. In nearly all instances Japanese signal equipment is definitely inferior to that used by the occupation forces.

(c) Vacuum tubes were found in many warehouses and were extensively used for recreational receivers.

(d) Radio receivers were not used to any great extent for recreational purposes and this office does not know of any case where they were used for operational purposes.

(e) The Japanese No. 1, small switchboard was used wherever available throughout the Corps. It is a 60-drop, local battery board, similar but slightly larger than the BD-14, complete with board, terminal frame, and accessory box. The Signal Battalion installed three, the Fukuoka Base Command, one, and the 5th Infantry Division used one.
Annex FOX to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

6. Radio SASEBO (NLG) at the date of this report was setting up at VAC Headquarters building and connecting cable to transmitters approximately ten miles distant at HARIO, the Japanese Naval transmitting station for the SASEBO Naval Station. The HARIO station was not damaged by bombing, and had 26 transmitters installed and in operating condition. The transmitters varied from 500 to 5000 watts and covered all frequencies up to 20,000 kc. Two fifty-KW diesel units were available for emergency power. New antennae were not necessary as the Japanese had cut antennae for all USN Task Force Commander frequencies.

7. The local source of Japanese power is 100 volts AC and was ample for most installations but wasn't dependable. PE-95's and PE-84's were used as emergency power. It was necessary in Corps Headquarters to install Autotransformers in the teletype room, code room, and radio terminal and relay rooms to keep proper voltage on equipment.

8. Air Delivery of signal supplies was not requested.

9. After the IWO JIMA operation the Corps Signal Battalion had one Amtrac (LVT) and two Amphibious Trucks (DUKW's) but they were ordered to be turned in to the Supply Service. It was necessary to install telephone trunk lines from the Tiger Exchange to the SOPA afloat in the harbor and this could not be done with an LCVP or LCM except with extreme difficulty due to the fact that small craft lay too high in the water for personnel to work over the side. DUKW's were finally made available to the signal Battalion from the 20th Amphibious Truck Battalion.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS

a. Planning.

(1) Use of a Signal Operations Instructions in place of the Signal Annex to the Operation Orders probably would improve the organization of Signal communications of a Corps. Changes are made very simply and conveniently under the direction of the Signal Officer.
(2) Liaison between an amphibious corps and higher echelons in the planning and operation stages would probably be greatly improved if an exchange of officers between the respective units were arranged. An officer of experience from the Army signal section should be assigned to the Corps and vice versa.

(3) Call signs for an operation should be issued in block and well in advance of the operation.

(4) An amphibious corps operating in any Army should hold the same codes and ciphers as the Army Corps. In lieu thereof all organizations concerned should be instructed as to exactly what joint codes are held by others.

b. Training.

(1) The camp communications unit in a rehabilitation base should be large enough to relieve tactical organizations of base communication responsibilities. A certain amount of base communication responsibility aids in the training of tactical personnel, but involved operations such as those undertaken at MAUI by the Corps Signal Battalion interfere with the training of the unit.

(2) RCM training is believed to have been of value and should be continued.

(3) It is evident that the proper use and understanding of the mission of Navajos has been generally lacking throughout units of the Marine Corps. There have been attempts to standardize their operation, the most notable being the restandardization course held in Pearl Harbor during April and May of 1945. However, nothing has been carried through to a completion of standardization and refresher training nor in the widespread indoctrination of unit commanders in their correct use and possible value to an assault organization. Through this lack of understanding the talker has been assigned to many duties foreign to those for which he was primarily intended; thereby causing a restandardization and deterioration of an element which otherwise could have been of invaluable value to the Marine Corps, as it was pictured to be in the days when special interest was demonstrated.
Navajos should be retained in centralized schools after each operation for a period of at least four weeks in order to maintain a standardization of their language and to assist in gradual improvement of their military vocabulary. If they are to be used in the future it is felt that a Navajo should be placed in charge of such schooling.

c. Morale.

(1) Morale in general during the occupation was the lowest in the history of the Corps Signal Battalion. The Signal Battalion on 1 November still had 301 enlisted men who had been overseas more than 24 months.

(2) Morale was lowered further by the point system which quickly made all personnel with over 75, then 60, then 50 points eligible for demobilization. As of 1 November there were 22 officers and 470 enlisted men with over 50 points. (18 officers and 188 enlisted men had already been sent to the U. S. since arrival at JAPAN.)

(3) Another long standing factor which has caused bad morale is the lack of promotions. Men feel that once designated as Communication Personnel, their chance of promotion is very limited. This is borne out by statistics in the Signal Battalion which show that only 31 CP promotions were authorized since September 1, 1944, for the 620 CP authorized for the Signal Battalion. Only one of these was from Private First Class to Corporal.

(4) Just the opposite picture is true in the Naval communication service. There, men are encouraged to strike for the next higher rating. Passing the proper examination and fulfilling necessary service requirements in rate, usually 6 months, entitles a man to the next higher rate. It is not uncommon to see Marine corporals working next to first class petty officers doing the same job in a less efficient manner than the Marine. Corporals are used as supervisors in the corps radio station where chief petty officers would be used in a similar Naval station.

(5) It is recommended that the Marine Corps adopt a system of promotions similar to that used in the Navy.
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Annex FOX to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

(6) It is also recommended that Commanding Officers of Fleet Marine Force units overseas be authorized to promote all Privates with more than six months overseas to Private First Class up to 100% of the total privates and privates first class.

d. Headquarters Ships.

(1) The TBE net maintained between the Corps and the 5th Marine Division enroute to the operation was a new idea. It is felt that this was a valuable improvement in communication.

(2) The Marine detachments (and Army detachments) placed on Headquarters ships have never been used by this Corps. It is felt that such detachments, since they are not used for the purpose intended, should be abolished.

(3) Command ship installations should be improved. They should be based on the fact that the landing force needs are of primary importance and not secondary to Navar requirements for communications facilities.

(4) Experiments with auxiliary command ships should be continued.

e. Carrier and Radio Relay.

(1) Appendix V of this Annex is a copy of a letter dated 27 July, 1945, which proposes a table of organization for a Carrier and Radio Relay Company.

(2) The Signal Officer still favors establishment of such a company. However, the substitution of a carrier platoon and a radio link platoon in place of the three operation platoons might well be considered. Carrier and radio link are entirely separate functions, even though they are used in conjunction with each other, and should be so considered.

(3) It is recommended that consideration be given for the adoption of telegraph terminal (TH-1/ TDC-1) in order to use radio teletype with ships.
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Annex FOX to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

(a) It is recommended that a signal four-cable and construction accessories furnished with the 100 mile carrier system be issued separately to construction companies.

f. Division in Occupation.

If a marine division is to remain on detached duty in Japan, supplemental personnel and equipment as follows are recommended:

1. 6 SCR-289's (or equivalent). Personnel need not be provided since they can be obtained from lower units.

2. One complete 100 mile Carrier System (AM/TCC-2) and one complete radio link (2 AN/TGC-5, 2 AM/ TGC-4, 2 AM/TRA-1) with a carrier section consisting of one commissioned or warrant officer, carrier enlisted and radio link enlisted.

3. One MTG-2 complete and 100 TF-5's.

4. Six teleprinters En-9K.

5. One telephone central office set (TO-5).

6. A radio intelligence section.

7. Heavy construction equipment for one heavy construction platoon (T/0 C-1130, T/5-1150). No personnel would be required since present personnel could be retrained.

g. Naval Communications:

An amphibious corps operating under an Army should not be made responsible for any naval base communications, and if such is necessary, the extra personnel should be attached to the corps. Naval activities should be served by a naval radio station.

h. Transfer of Personnel:

It is recommended that the Corps Commander
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Annex FOX to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

in the field be given complete authority to execute intra-unit transfers of communication officers and personnel.

1. TC-10:

   It is highly recommended that a Corps Signal Battalion be equipped with a TC-10 switchboard.

   H. J. REVANE.
LINE ROUTE MAP - SHORT LINES
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
EFFECTIVE 0001, 11 NOV. 1945

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX FOX TO
VAC OPERATION REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
1945-156-6
022/266
Ser. 0572B

HEADQUARTERS,
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 July, 1945.

From:
The Commanding General.

To:
The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific.

Subject:
Carrier and Radio Relay Company, authorization
of, recommendation on.

Reference:
(a) CG, FMF, Pac Dispatch 201951Z, of May, 1945.

Enclosures:
(A) Proposed T/O, Carrier and Radio Relay Company.
(B) Transportation for proposed Carrier and Radio
Relay Company.

1. The enclosures are based on the assumption that
a Marine Amphibious Corps will require three carrier systems,
AN/TGC-2, and three radio link systems, each consisting of
two AN/TRC-3 radio terminals, three AN/TRC-4 relay sets and
two AN/TRA amplifiers. This amount of equipment will permit
radio link and/or carrier circuits to the subordinate units
of the Corps and will also provide for sufficient terminating
and relay equipment to tie into the prescribed circuits of the
next higher headquarters.

2. At the present time, the Corps Signal Battalion
has on hand three such carrier systems and one such radio link
system. Specially trained personnel have been transferred to
the Signal Battalion for handling this equipment. Personnel
is now on hand in the following numbers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Type</th>
<th>Trained</th>
<th>Instruction</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carrier Officers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Link Officers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier Enlisted Personnel</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Link Enlisted Personnel</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Enclosure (A) is the Table of Organization pro-
based by this Headquarters to provide an organization capable
of efficiently handling the three carrier and radio link

- 1 -

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Appendix 7 to Annex FOX to V Amphibious Corps Report, Occupa-
tion of Japan.
Ltr, CG, VAD to CG, FVT, Rec Rec: Carrier and Radio Relay Company, Authorization of, recommendation on Serial 0573E (Cont'd)

3. (Continued).

systems desired. This table was drawn up to provide sufficient personnel to install, maintain, and operate the desired equipment over long distances and in fluid land warfare. Provisions have been made for sufficient personnel to operate 6 carrier terminals, 6 repeater stations, 6 radio link terminals and 9 radio relay stations, to properly handle the spare equipment and to perform 3rd echelon repair in the field.

This does not include personnel required for spiral 4 construction purposes. The number of personnel requested are necessary to initially install the radio link system in a rapid and efficient manner, to install the carrier as wire lines become available over the distance involved, and after the latter installation is complete, maintain the radio relay in a standby status, ready for immediate use, in event of casualty to the carrier wire lines. It is not considered feasible to utilize one set of personnel to operate both the carrier and the radio relay systems inasmuch as the choice of favorable locations for the radio link equipment will probably render such double employment impossible.


4. Transportation has been recommended in enclosure (B) on the basis that each repeater or radio relay station should be motorized, and each radio terminal station may be transported by the same transportation provided for the carrier terminal. This allocation of transportation is necessary to give each station sufficient mobility to effect rapid movements independent of the transportation requirements of the remainder of the Corps Signal Battalion. The above concept of the tactical employment of radio relay and carrier systems coincides with the employment made of these equipments in Europe in and other large scale operations.

5. Radio link and carrier systems constitute for the Marine Corps two new agencies of communication which should prove to be invaluable in providing rapid reliable communications over long distances. It is considered that personnel for operating these agencies should be organized into a company which will be functional in nature, and will be adequate to permit full exploitation of the valuable features of these new agencies.

6. This Corps has had no experience in operating
6. (Continued).
This type of equipment under combat conditions, although it is now in use. It is still a new piece of equipment that must prove its usefulness and reliability to the Commander and his staff. Successful combat operation of the equipment will establish that this equipment can replace man-laid wire circuits or that this equipment is a necessary addition to present communication agencies. If the former is the case certain wire construction personnel of the Corps Signal Battalion can be shifted to this type of work. If it is decided that this equipment is a highly desirable supplemental communication agency the T/O as recommended will be necessary. In any event the transportation indicated in enclosure (B) is a prime necessity.

7. This Corps has been informed that additional radio link equipment is to be furnished by 1 September, 1948. It is assumed that some trained personnel will be furnished at that time.

8. It is believed that the equipment under discussion should be subjected to test under combat conditions before definite recommendations are submitted for its future employment. In the meantime it is desired to carry personnel listed in paragraphs 2 and 7 in excess of allowances for the purpose of conducting these combat tests.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SPECIALTY BRANCH</th>
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* Modified to support upright carrier bars.
MESSAGE CENTER WRITE-UP ROOM

CWO's OFFICE AND MESSAGE DISTRIBUTION ROOM
TELETYPE CENTRAL (TWO BD-100's IN BACKGROUND)

RADIO REPAIR SHACK
TIGER WHITE SWITCHBOARD (TC-2) IN HO-17

CABLE SPLICER AT WORK
TIGER SWITCHBOARD (TC-2)

TERMINAL BOARD AT TIGER
JAPANESE SWITCHBOARD TAKEN OVER BY TIGER

CENTRAL OFFICE REPAIRMEN AT WORK ON JAPANESE SWITCHBOARD
CORPS VISUAL TOWER

INTERIOR CORPS VISUAL TOWER
RADIO RECEIVING CENTRAL

RADIO TRANSMITTING CENTRAL MK(IV VAN)
PORTION OF RADIO LINK INSTALLATIONS

RADIO RELAY STATION NEAR SASEBO
DISPOSAL OF JAPANESE SIGNAL EQUIPMENT BY DESTRUCTION

CRUSHING RADAR AND SONAR EQUIPMENT WITH TANK
CIRCUIT DIAGRAM—RADIO LINK INSTALLATIONS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX FOX TO
VAC OPERATION REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Note:
BARNACLE AND IVORY RADIO LINK
CHANNELS ARE USED AS STANDBY FOR
PARALLEL SPIRAL FOUR CARRIER SYSTEMS.

REPRO. TOPO.CO., VAC.
HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

-OCCUPATION OF JAPAN-

ENGINEER Report

Annex GEORGE
OFFICE OF THE ENGINEER,
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

30 November, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Corps Engineer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Engineer Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

Reference: (a) FIF Pac Gen Ord No. 60-45.
(b) Ltr Hq 6th Army AG 319.1 R-3 dtd 29Jun45, subj: Engr Recpts required from 6th Army Engr Units.
(c) Dis 6th Army to CG VAC DTG 291351/I.
(d) Annex AELE to VAC Special Order 120-45.

1. Preparation and Organization for Task.

a. Receipt of Warning Instructions. From 1 June until 14 August, 1945 this section was employed on the planning phase of the assault landing on the western beaches of KYUSHU. The warning order for the occupation of KYUSHU was received by the Corps Engineer at a conference of the V Amphibious Corps Staff on 14 August, 1945. Since V Amphibious Corps Headquarters was to embark on 1 September, 1945, it was apparent that there was insufficient time to receive complete instructions. Therefore, plans were based on such general directives as were available for the occupational operation including the adaptation of such information applicable from the plans for the assault landing. The directives on which planning was based are here listed together with the dates on which they were received.

(1) Warning Order (Southern KYUSHU) -- 14 August -- Announced by V Amphibious Corps Chief of Staff.

(2) Parts II & III, Logistic Annex -- CinCPac-CinCPOA Oper Plan 12-45 -- 22 August.

(3) Annex 4 to Adm Order 19 -- Engineer Supply Plan -- 22 August.

(4) Occupation Construction Annex 4 -- 28 August.

Annex GEORGE to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.
(5) Annex 8 to FO, Engr (Tentative) — 29 August.

(6) Occupation Engr Units, V Amphibious Corps — 29 August — Numerous revisions followed.

(7) Annex 6 (Engr) to Logistic Instructions 4/WPAC — 13 September.

(8) Annex 8 to FO 75, Engr — 18 September.

(9) Annex 8/1 to FO 75 — 1 November.

(10) Annex 8/2 to FO 75 — 25 November.


(12) Conferences with Liaison Groups — Various Dates.

The various engineer units assigned to Corps were
manned out over a wide area. Where possible, liaison
personnel were brought to Corps Headquarters for
detailed briefing. Subordinate engineer units were ad-
vised of the engineer plan by Corps Operation Order
No. 2-45 Annex MIKE (Revised) issued 19 September
and Administrative Policy by Corps Administrative Plan
6-45 Annex GEORGE issued 24 August, 1945. The plan
of engineer missions was general because of the short
time available for planning and the meager information
available. This resulted in some hardship for sub-
ordinate units in the making of their specific plans.
Because of the state of readiness and the experience
of the units assigned, the staging was executed in a
satisfactory manner.

b. Formation of Engineer Staff. The Staff of the Corps
Engineer Office was a working organization before the
receipt of the Warning Order. It consisted of ten
(10) officers and seven (7) enlisted men organized as
follows:

- 2 -
Subject: Engineer Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

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This staff was considered, and later was demonstrated, to be inadequate to cope with the numerous problems arising as a result of the occupation. It was originally intended to utilize the 1161st Engineer (C) Group to reinforce the Corps Engineer Staff and to assume command of the Provisional (C) Engineer Group.
However, upon landing, the status of the Group, due to the demobilization program, was such as to preclude its use. The Provisional (C) Engineer Group was de-activated 2 November, 1945 by Corps Special Order 121-45. During the month of November, the following changes were made in personnel:

7Nov45 Corps Engineer detached, replaced by Lt. Col., former, CO, of 2d Separate Engineer Battalion. Engineer Section Administration Officer, Captain detached, replaced by 2d Lt., Adjutant of Provisional Combat Engineer Group.
1 1st Lt. - 1 2d Lt. assigned duties with operations, this section.

9Nov45 1 2d Lt. assigned duties with operations, this section.

23Nov45 Major, Executive Officer detached - Replaced by Major, Operations Officer - Major, Operations, replaced by 1st Lt.

1Dec45 1 2d Lt. assigned duties with operations this section.

Enlisted Men

23Nov45 1 Sgt. draftsman - 1 Corp. typist detached from this section.

2Dec45 1 Corp. draftsman reported for duty this section.

4Dec45 1 Corp. typist detached from this section.

5Dec45 1 Pfc. typist reported for duty this section.

c. Engineer Combat Planning. Because the combat situation was vague, preparation was made to accomplish standard engineer combat missions as the primary task of all.
engineer units. In addition, the special aspects of the operation indicated that engineer reconnaissance and the inventory and adaptations of Japanese utilities and manufacturing facilities would be an important engineer mission. It was not anticipated that additional engineer equipment would be needed because the Engineer Troop List included special units that were capable of performing all tasks that were foreseen. Water supply requirements as set up by the SIXTH Army differed only slightly from standard Marine Corps practice and instructions necessary to obtain the required results were issued as Appendix No. 3 to Annex GEORGE to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45. Maps, aerial photographs and intelligence bulletins of the target area were received 28 August, 1945 and could not be issued to subordinate units until they had boarded ship. Readiness reports indicated that subordinate units were properly supplied for expected missions. Additional assault and pioneer supplies and bridge materials in accordance with Annex 4 to SIXTH Army Administrative Order No. 19 were obtained prior to landing.

d. Initial Construction Planning. Because of the short planning period, lack of information available as to the extent of enemy facilities that could be put to use and final troop disposition, the amount of engineer work required could not be estimated. Therefore, all site allocations, work schedules, material schedules etc. had to depend on reconnaissance made after the landing.

e. Equipping of Units. Subordinate units were equipped with organic allowances upon receipt of Warning Orders.

f. Comments.

(1) Planning for this Operation was handicapped by the following:

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(a) The sudden change from combat to occupational
landing with a new target and enlarged area
of operations.

(b) The long distances separating higher and
lower commands; for example, the SIXTH Army
Engineer was located at LUZON; Corps En-
geineer at NAUI; 2d Engineer Battalion at
SAIPAN and 1902 Aviation Engineer Battalion
at IE SHIMA.

(c) Late receipt of Maps, Plans and Engineering
Data.

(2) The Marine Engineer Liaison Officer at SIXTH Army
kept the Corps Engineer informed on engineering
matters and decisions. However, liaison with
subordinate organizations was inadequate. In some
cases, the Corps Engineer had no contact until the
organizational Commanding Officers had landed at
the target.

(3) Recommendations. The following recommendations
are made for future preparation and organization
for engineer missions of similar magnitude:

(a) That constant liaison be maintained with sub-
ordinate as well as higher commands through-
out planning, moving and operational stages.

(b) That all advanced echelons include engineer
reconnaissance personnel.

(c) That the coverage of technical intelligence
of installations of engineer interests be
made available for more prolonged study.
This especially applies to the economic and
industrial capabilities of the territory to
be occupied.
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2. Loading of Engineer Personnel, Supplies and Equipment.

a. Movement of Engineer Staff. The Corps Engineer and Intelligence Officer boarded the Command Ship AGC 7 which sailed from Maui 1 September, 1945 and joined the convoy in which the remainder of the Staff were aboard the LSV 4 and APA 37.

b. Loading of Engineer Assault and Reinforcing Supplies. Instructions based on expected needs, were given in Annex GEORGE (Engineer Plan) to Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 for Engineer Assault and Reinforcing supplies to be loaded by the Engineer organizations. Except for some difficulty in obtaining sufficient shipping space, loading was accomplished in accordance with these instructions.

c. Loading Engineer Units. Divisional engineer organizations and attached Naval Construction Battalions loaded with their respective divisions. Corps Engineer units less the individual organizations within the 5201 Engineer Construction Brigade were loaded in LSTs and LSMs and were available during the initial landing stages. Organizations within the 5201 Engineer Construction Brigade are being loaded and brought forward as shipping is available in accordance with established priorities. Loading plans were hampered by changes in shipping allocations. Thus, elements of the 7th Naval Construction Regiment, 5th Engineer Battalion and others were forced to leave equipment and supplies behind due to insufficient cargo space. The loading location and dates, for engineer organizations are shown in Annex Able.

d. Preloading of Construction materials. Due to lack of shipping space and emphasis on making maximum use of Japanese materials, all organic construction supplies were not loaded. Bridging and Fortification materials were loaded with assault scholons as directed.
c. Plans for loading of additional construction materials. For the Southern assault landing, additional construction materials were to be loaded at the Base Depot, San Francisco, on Engineer Resupply ships in accordance with requisitions from SC FMF, approved by AFWESPAC and SIXTH Army. Lumber supply and FOL materials were to be furnished by SIXTH Army. These resupply ships were directed to the new target areas. Additional construction supplies were diverted from Pacific bases where they were no longer required.

f. Comments.

(1) Loading was handicapped by changes in shipping allocations and insufficient cargo space.

(2) The following recommendations are made for future loadings:

(a) That engineer organizations in assault echelon be assigned adequate shipping space in LST's or LSM's to be loaded under engineer direction.

(b) That adequate shipping information including manifests for engineer resupply ships be provided to facilitate construction planning after arrival at the target.

3. Lading of Engineer Units and Supplies.

a. Time of landings. The time of landing of engineer organizations is given in Annex ABLE.

b. Difficulties encountered in landings. Since there was no opposition, no difficulties were encountered in the landing of personnel. However, restricted dock space and the diversion of equipment and supplies from other areas, thus requiring selective discharge, has retarded unloading of engineer ships.
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c. Unloading and Control of Supplies. Physical control of supplies including engineer supplies was a function of the 8th Service Regiment during this Operation. The Corps Engineer exercises a check control over all engineer supply issue by use of an endorsement on all requisitions for engineer supplies. The speed of the operation caused some difficulty during the first days in the unloading of heavier engineer supply. With the subsequent clearing of the dock area and dump areas, unloading is progressing more favorably and control of engineer supplies is being maintained.

4. Combat Engineer Missions.

a. Initial Preparation of Beaches. Reconnaissance groups landing first found the seaplane ramps at the Naval Air Station at SaSEBO to be suitable beaches for the unloading of tracked vehicles and heavy equipment from LST's, LCT's, and LSM's. At NAGASAKI, a small amount of dozer work cleared the beach sites for LST unloading.

b. Access roads were, in general, very narrow and unsuited for the type traffic necessary. Initial dumps at all landing points needed clearing of debris and rubbish. The condition of abandoned machinery and piles of scrap around all landing areas became a major problem. Individual units such as the 7th Naval Construction Regiment used empty hanger space for initial dumps. Often these buildings were in such poor condition that they could be considered little more than open storage. Undoubtedly the bad condition of access roads retarded the initial unloading. Open clear areas for initial dumps were particularly hard to find and in some cases materials committed to open storage were piled along the sides of roads until dump areas could be cleared. It was only the expeditious clearing of these initial dumps that prevented a pile up of organizational supplies.
c. Bridge and Ford construction and repair.

(1) Fixed bridges. Combat bridge construction was not necessary. Neither our military operation nor Jap defensive measures had destroyed bridges. However, bridge capacity was variable and never adequate. Most bridges had to be reinforced to take even the lightest military traffic.

(2) Floating bridges - none.

(3) Use of fords - none.

d. Road construction and repair. Because of the condition of access roads as indicated in paragraph 4b, immediate and continuous maintenance and repair had to be carried on by each and every engineer unit to move organizations within their areas of responsibility.

e. Cub Strips. A Cub Strip at Green Beach (Naval Air Station, SASEBO) was immediately occupied and put in dry weather operation after the grass had been cut. A large parade ground at the Naval Training Station, SASEBO was also used as a Cub Strip. At Nagasaki a Cub Strip was constructed for the use of the 2d Marine Division. At the end of the period of this report the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was ordered to rebuild the SASEBO Cub Strip to a 2600 x 100 runway of pierced planking.

f. Enemy Obstacles. The only enemy obstacles encountered were the tremendous amount of debris and machinery that littered dock areas, open storage areas and a number of buildings.

g. Demolitions. No demolitions were required except in the disposition of enemy equipment under the supervision of the Disposition Officer.

h. Use of Engineers in combat. None.

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1. Surveying, reproduction, map storage and distribution.
   Surveying was carried on by the Topographic Company, V Amphibious Corps, to check Japanese City plans of SASEBO and to draft bomb damage on a revised city plan. City plans of SASEBO, NAGASAKI and FUKUOKA were given first priority and suitable city plans have been drafted and reproduced. City plans for SHIMONOSEKI-YAWATA area, OKURA, SAGA and UBE have been assigned second priority and are being drafted and reproduced. The Reproduction Platoon was initially used to reproduce mosaics of numerous areas in KYUSHU needed by reconnaissance parties and other miscellaneous jobs. The original stocks of maps were replenished by a stock received 23 October. These were immediately distributed to the using units and a small stock retained for miscellaneous distribution by the 2d Topographic Company. Construction units carried on routine surveying for construction planning on airfield, FOL facilities and other major construction projects.

J. Water Supply. Water was brought ashore in containers for the first five-day period. However, many units had water points operating by 24 September. The Japanese water supply at SASEBO was tested and found unsatisfactory for drinking purposes. All drinking water has therefore been processed by mobile and portable units. At NAGASAKI the Japanese water source was found satisfactory with an increase in the chlorine concentration. Additional amounts of hypochlorite have been procured from Japanese sources.

k. Camouflage. None.

1. Comments. In an operation of this type where the engineer mission is of necessity very broad and the development rapid, the call for engineer work is immediate and extensive. For this reason engineer equipment should have a very high priority in shipping allocations. There was some tendency to give engineer equipment a secondary priority because of its bulk and weight. As the result of this procedure, the engineer
effort has been impeded for the want of such equipment as rock crushers, graders, distributors, etc. It is therefore recommended that in all future operations of this type, adequate engineer equipment and supplies be loaded on as few ships as possible, preferably LST's and LSM's, to insure accomplishment of missions.

5. Major Construction Missions.

a. Airdromes. During this operation no airdrome has been constructed. The original Cub Strip at Naval Air Station, SASEBO is now being improved to a 2600' x 100' pierced plank runway. A suitable site has been selected by the 5th Air Force at HISHURUDA (ITAZUKA). Initial construction plans in accordance with the GHQ Construction Policy have been submitted for approval. Preliminary work has been started and complete plans are being prepared to be submitted to SIXTH Army. The work required consists of rehabilitation and additions to Japanese facilities already existing. In addition, preliminary and detailed reconnaissance of sites at OMAHA and KULAMOTO have been made for possible use as B-29 bases.

b. Docks and Jettices. Dock and Jetty construction compared to dock facilities procured was extremely minor. At NAGASAKI, a wharf was cleared and repaired. At SASEBO, the clearing of debris from the dock area became a project of first priority and is continuing. With the acquisition of suitable tankage at SASEBO, a sea line for unloading petroleum was required and is under construction and is 90% complete. Good and much needed facilities at FUKUOKA were invaluable during this operation because of the effectiveness of mine fields. For purposes of outloading 5th Marine Division and ease of transfer of material to rail for FUKUOKA area an additional LST' landing area to accommodate seven (7) ships was constructed and is 90% complete this date. At the close of this period the FUKUOKA Harbor is to be soon ready to receive LST's, and several are now
being loaded.

c. Railroad and Railroad Bridge Construction. Railroad reconnaissance and operation was not an engineer function on this operation. Since no requests for construction or repair have been received by the Engineer Section, none has been accomplished.

d. Road and Bridge construction and repair.

(1) As noted above the first important engineer missions were those of access road rehabilitation. As soon as the initial movement stabilized, the road construction program resolved itself into individual jobs each of great importance. The detailing of jobs and areas of responsibility to subordinate units was automatically prescribed by the situation. The 2d and 5th Division Engineers improved the roads within their respective areas.

(a) Roads within the dock area at SASEBO were at all times of primary importance. Consequently all road building facilities of the 98th Naval Construction Battalion were thrown into that particular project.

(b) To facilitate communications between the 2d and 5th Marine Division areas, and the usable airport at OMURA, the road from SASEBO to OMURA was repaired for very light traffic which was the immediate concern. The 31st Naval Construction Battalion is now further improving and maintaining this road.

(c) The 6201st Engineer Construction Brigade, initially utilizing the 1688th Engineer (0) Battalion, was charged with the rehabilitation of roads within the 32nd Infantry Division area to facilitate the unloading and
receipt of that division when it arrived. With the accomplishment of this mission the 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade continued the improvement and maintenance of roads within the 32nd Infantry Division Area.

(d) With the accumulation of troops in the FUKUOKA area and the continued closure of FUKUOKA harbor, the SASEBO-SAGA-FUKUOKA road became an important supply route. The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was therefore charged with the improvement and maintenance of this road. Bridge repair was extensive and 90% of the road had to be graded to make it capable of carrying even light military traffic (1W 15' 15T). The narrow right of way between dwellings and rice paddies prohibits the development of this road into a standard Corps road. As the engineer units attached to 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade arrived in the SASEBO Area they were ordered to the FUKUOKA area as soon as transportation became available. At present there are sufficient engineer troops in the FUKUOKA Area to carry on the missions as outlined in SIXTH Army Annex 8/2 to FC 75, and the 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade has been put under control of the 32nd Infantry Division.

(e) With the movement of the 5th Division to AINUURA, and the likelihood of the camp becoming a permanent billet, the SASEBO-AINUURA road became an important line of communication and the 5th Engineer Battalion was charged with its improvement to a 2W 15' 40T road, and completed the project before being inactivated. With the readjustment of units at the end of the period of this report, areas of responsibility for road maintenance were reassigned as follows: to the 31st Naval
Construction Battalion, roads of military importance within the SASEBO area from AINOURA to HAIKI; to the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion, the road from SAGA to HAIKI; and to the 32nd Infantry Division with 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade attached, all roads between there and north of SAGA.

(2) All major projects were in constant use during construction.

(3) Dates of completion of major road projects are indefinite because of continuous improvement and heavy maintenance.

(4) Difficulties encountered in road construction were innumerable. Japanese bridge capacities are thoroughly inconsistent, and individual bridges reduce the capacities of long stretches of road. The narrow right of way through closely populated areas restricted the width to which main arteries could be developed. The fact that all routes are lined closely with rice paddies cause persistent unstable sub-grade conditions. However, the most serious difficulty is the absence of suitable gravel deposits within reasonable hauling distances to the projects. Small amounts of gravel in the beds of fast running streams are generally inaccessible and too small to warrant development. As noted above most rock crushers were lifted from organizational equipment in shipping allocations. This left one over-worked crusher in the SASEBO area. Road improvement has been accomplished but has been difficult because of the use of poor grade materials.

e. Prescribed hospital facilities were procured almost 100% intact and usable. Small engineer jobs of clearing, carpentry, plumbing and improvement of access roads were required in every case and performed as expeditiously as the situation demanded. Additional
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Station Hospitals were unexpectedly assigned to the FUKUOKA area and additional rehabilitation will be necessary. This work was planned during this period and is ready to be executed.

f. Sufficient bulk petroleum storage was obtained by the use of existing Japanese tanks at both SASEBO and NAGASAKI. The storage capacity available was above normal requirements at both ports. The most desirable and second most desirable tanks were thoroughly cleaned at both locations. Those at NAGASAKI were put to use after pipe line and pumps had been repaired. At SASEBO, it is necessary to lay a sea line in order to discharge directly from tankers. This line and distributing station are 90% complete this date.

g. Construction work that falls into the miscellaneous category was considerably more extensive than on strictly combat operations. Due to the extensive facilities acquired, and their value to the operation it generally was advisable to expend effort to put them in operating condition; and on the other hand due to the poor state of repair and ineptness of Japanese maintenance and construction, rehabilitation work often became an overburden. Plumbing, electrical work and carpentry were extensive and the individual items were too numerous to catalogue in this report.

h. Comments. The opinions expressed and recommendations made under Combat Engineer Missions apply even more here. The fact that no opposition allowed the operation to move almost immediately into a stabilized situation, caused an urgent need for the heavier types of engineer equipment such as graders, rock crushers, distributors etc. and for engineer supplies needed for semi-permanent construction such as plumbing fixtures, electrical fixtures, and, most important, personnel skilled in base construction rather than combat missions. This last need was proved very pointedly during the last few weeks of the operation covered by this report when demobilization policy cut deeply into the
skilled ranks of the Naval Construction Regiment and the Army specialized units assigned. The Army units were finally comparatively well stabilized at the end of the period but the Naval Construction personnel had deteriorated to one poorly balanced battalion.


a. The engineer resupply has created innumerable problems basically through lack of information on the entire supply phase. No manifests were available in sufficient detail until the actual arrival of the ship. The diversion shipping has not proved satisfactory. The innumerable pieces of heavy equipment of types not required have created unloading problems of such magnitude as to make unprofitable the unloading of supplies that could have been used. The restricted dump areas and backlog of shipping does not make SASEBO a port where selective discharge can be readily obtained. The opening of the FUKUOKA Port to at least ships of LST size will greatly improve this situation but it will not be completely alleviated until the port of FUKUOKA is completely opened.

b. Liberal use was made of Japanese supplies such as paints, roofing slate, plumbing fittings, electrical fittings and lumber. Some tools and machinery were put into use, including Japanese saw mills; and some Japanese fire-fighting equipment was repaired and put into service. Small quantities of glass were used in the repair of existing buildings for troop billets. Material for road maintenance was utilized when available.

c. Some organizations were unable to bring all of their spare parts trailers due to the lack of shipping space. In most cases, however, a 30-days supply of spare parts for ordnance, engineer equipment and vehicles was carried.
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a. Training of units. The short planning period for this operation precluded any specific training program for this operation. The unusual possibilities of this type of operation called for more for widely experienced engineer troops rather than those trained for a specific mission. This requirement has been forced because of the lateness of arrival of specialist organizations. The continuation of the occupation will result in the need of specialist of more experience than those found in combat or general engineer organizations.

b. Productivity of Units. Under the difficulties explained in paragraphs four (4) and five (5), the productivity of units was extremely surprising. As an example: working on an original estimate that it would require fifteen (15) Battalion months to place the SASEBO-FUKUOKA road in shape as a standard Corps road, the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion produced a road suitable for light military traffic to take care of the immediate needs of the 32nd Infantry Division in a period of approximately one (1) month, and maintained the road constantly open during construction. The 98th Naval Construction Battalion produced similarly in the
SASEBO Dock area. Taking a job of clearing debris and improving dock roads in a concretion of material that seemed endless, this unit worked around the clock and effectively put all docks in favorable operating condition in a period of approximately three weeks. Here again all facilities were maintained in use during construction. Both these units also accomplished all work as assigned to them while working on these jobs. The miscellaneous construction described in paragraph five (5) is not apparent and the true productivity of units is mostly apparent to those who have checked closely on the numerous small jobs. The one large factor that has cut deeply into the productivity of units is the extensive demobilization of experienced personnel, most pronounced in the final six weeks of the operation covered by this report.

c. Adequacy of Engineer Units for Mission. The units assigned as per the original troop list, as modified by recommended deletions, were adequate, but the almost immediate demobilization of some units upon landing has caused readjustment in units to effectively carry out the engineer missions assigned.

d. Adequacy of Engineer Staff. The Corps Engineer Staff was inadequate in number of personnel to effectively control all phases of engineering required. A minimum of one construction group headquarters could have been used profitably. It is felt that a more adequate staff could have given more extensive advisory aid to units needing engineer assistance.

e. Comments. On future operations carried on during a demobilization program it is recommended that engineer units be screened and combined into working units in the staging areas. This is especially true of engineer units where loss of experienced personnel is more important than the percentage of less indicates.

8. Miscellaneous

a. Japanese labor has been used extensively during this
operation on projects under Corps Control. All utilities within the area are maintained and repaired by Japanese labor under Japanese supervision and American control. Large details have been used for such projects as cleaning petroleum storage tanks and littered areas. Prefectural road maintenance crews have been organized by Prefectural Engineers and work under the direction of the units designated as responsible in that area. Engineer troops have been conserved for important assignments by procuring and detailing Japanese maintenance crews for minor repairs to individual buildings and areas. True business arrangements with Japanese were extremely difficult at first but the inherent problems have been worked out one by one.

b. Weather. The main event of weather during this period was the passing of a typhoon near the area of the operation. The wind itself caused little damage or even inconvenience except for utility failures during the height of the storm. However, a very rainy period occurring in coincidence with the storm caused considerable extra labor to units working to put roads with poor subgrades into condition. In some cases a full week was lost towards the completion dates. However, subsequent dry, clear weather over a two week period enabled jobs to reestablish the old schedules. In general, the weather was good for the period of the operation.

c. Enemy interference. There was no enemy interference to engineer work and in most cases a definite desire to aid was demonstrated.

JOHN C. BREWER
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Corps Engineer.

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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## Annex A(3) (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Staged From</th>
<th>Time Loaded</th>
<th>Time of Landing</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2812th Engr Pet Dist C (Det)**</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>30Oct45</td>
<td>*Deleted by Dis</td>
<td>Hakata NAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>3073rd QM Ref Co (1 Plt)**</td>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>22Oct45</td>
<td>*Deleted by Dis</td>
<td>Sasebo</td>
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<tr>
<td>307th Engr Depr, Co</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3124th Engr Ser Det</td>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>25Sep45</td>
<td>Sasebo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3138th Engr Refi Maint Det***</td>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>25Sep45</td>
<td>SaseboNAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>3162nd Engr Fire Pt Plt***</td>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>25Sep45</td>
<td>Sasebo</td>
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<tr>
<td>3228th Engr Tech Int Team***</td>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>25Sep45</td>
<td>Sasebo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Naval Constr Rgt</td>
<td>Maui</td>
<td>23Sep45</td>
<td>Deactivated</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>43rd COn</td>
<td>Maui</td>
<td>22Sep45</td>
<td>Deactivated</td>
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<tr>
<td>98th COn</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>25Sep45</td>
<td>Deactivated</td>
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<tr>
<td>116th COn</td>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>25Sep45</td>
<td>Sasebo NAS</td>
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<td>31st COn (Ferryed from elements of 7th NCR)</td>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>25Sep45</td>
<td>Sasebo NAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Seap Engr BN</td>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td>23Sep45</td>
<td>Nago-saki</td>
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<tr>
<td>43rd COn</td>
<td>Maui</td>
<td>22Sep45</td>
<td>Nago-saki</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1298th Engr C (0) BN***</td>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>21Aug45</td>
<td>Nago-saki</td>
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<td>5th Mar Div</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>22Sep45</td>
<td>Sasebo</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th MR BN</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>22Sep45</td>
<td>Sasebo</td>
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<tr>
<td>32nd MR BN</td>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>20Oct45</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Dispatch on 161107/I
** Dispatch dated 19 Oct 45.
*** 5201st EGA for adm. only - VAC for operation and supply, as of 15 Nov 45
ATF/212

HEADQUARTERS,
SECOND SEPARATE ENGINEER BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC, IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Engineer Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

Reference: (a) Corps Engineer, VAC, Ser. 6934, dtd 12Nov45.

1. Preparation and planning for the operation.

a. CP Location — Target Square 36C-H, Special Air and Gunnery Target Map of Guam, 1:25,000, Corrections made up to 1 January, 1942, Revised April, 1944.

b. This organization was under the operational control of the Commanding General, Forward Echelon, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, during the period from 1 June, 1945, to 16 July, 1945. In accordance with an operational employment directive from that headquarters, this organization employed all available forces to assist the 40th Naval Construction Regiment of the 5th Naval Construction Brigade in the construction of Marine Corps camp facilities. The following work was accomplished by this battalion during this period:

1) Additional facilities, Marine Transient Center, Guam.

The construction of a 4,000 man camp, consisting of clearing 23 acres of land; the construction of 8-500 man tent areas containing 100 tent decks, 2 shower units, 3 latrine units, and 2 scrub-deck areas; the erection of 2-1,000 man galley and mess hall units complete; the erection of 4-20' x 40' Quonset huts of special design; the construction of 5 miles of road; and the complete installation of the water and electrical distribution systems. This project was started on 8 May, 1945, and was completed 30 June, 1945.

2) Drainage system for Marine Transient Center, Guam.

This project consisted of clearing 120 acres and
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(3) Roads for the Sixth Marine Division Base Camp, Guam.

This project was started on 14 May, 1945, and was completed on 23 June, 1945. The work consisted of clearing one hundred and twenty acres of land and moving 22,000 cubic yards of earth to construct the roads.

(4) Ylig River Water Point, Guam.

The battalion installed two mobile purification units at a spring about 200 yards north of the bank of the Ylig River, about one and a half miles west of the mouth of that river (Target square 36C-1). During the period of 1 June, 1945 to 1 July, 1945, a total of 508,860 gallons was produced. This organization also operated the Ylig River Water Plant, which had been installed by the 48th Naval Construction Battalion, from 6 June, 1945 to 25 August, 1945, and produced 9,472,600 gallons. Water from these water points was used by the V Amphibious Corps' Artillery Camp, the Third Amphibious Corps Camp, the Third Amphibious Truck Company, and the Second Separate Engineer Battalion.

(5) 11th Motor Transport Battalion Base Camp, Guam.

This construction was completed 13 June, 1945. This project consisted of constructing two miles of road and a four acre motor park; one 24' x 98' repair and maintenance shop; two hundred and forty fabricated tent decks; four latrine units; four shower units; four scrub decks; one 46' x 100' Quonset hut; four 20' x 48' Quonset huts; one 20' x 96' recreation building; one 20' x 48' post exchange and post office; one 20' x 48' officers club; one 20' x 48' officers mess; one 30' x 120' mess
ATF/212 (Continued) 1Dec45.
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hall; all galley and mess hall installations, and the installation of the water and electric distribution system.

(6) E-20 Project, Guam.

Assistance was rendered the 26th Naval Construction Battalion by the loan of engineer equipment and operators to clear and grade a site for an LVT repair camp. This work was done between 14 June, 1945 and 30 Jun, 1945.

(7) The base camp of the Second Separate Engineer Battalion was constructed and improved during this period.

(8) Engineer assistance was furnished the V Amphibious Corps Artillery, and the Third Amphibious Corps when possible.

c. The Commanding Officer was told the plans of the invasion of Japan on 4 July, 1945, by the Chief of Staff of the V Amphibious Corps. Further information was received, as it became available, through conferences between the Commanding Officer and the Commanding General, Third Marine Division.

d. Training of personnel of this organization began on 28 May, 1945.

(1) On 28 May, 1945, the construction, bridging, and camouflage section of Headquarters and Service Company was placed on a training schedule of four weeks duration. The first week was devoted to instructions on the use and erection of the Bailey bridge. The second week was devoted to the temporary pier bridge. During the third and fourth weeks, this section instructed the bridging section of Company "A" in the use and erection of the Bailey and temporary pier bridges.
Company "A" was placed on a four week training schedule on 28 May, 1945. The first two weeks were devoted to basic and infantry training, covering the following subjects: rifle instruction, .30 and .50 caliber light machine guns, AT rocket launchers, grenades, chemical warfare, mines and booby traps, general demolitions, employment infantry squad and platoons on offense and defense, interior guard, and physical conditioning. During the first two weeks, the company was trained intact under the direct command of the company commander. At the end of the second week, the company was divided into five groups; Demolition, 35 men, Heavy Equipment, 35 men, Motor Transport, 35 men, Water Supply, 35 men, and Bridging, 50 men, approximately. Special instructors were assigned to these groups, and the third and fourth weeks were devoted to specialist training. The demolition course consisted of basic demolitions, assault demolitions, mines and booby traps, and technical demolitions. The heavy equipment course included all construction equipment organic to the company, and covered basic operation, maintenance, and actual operation. The motor transport course covered functioning, maintenance, rules of the road, night driving, convoy driving, and actual driving on earth moving projects. The water supply course devoted one week to purification and one week to distillation. The bridging course covered the temporary pier bridge, and the Bailey bridge. The company was freed from all outside work and normal battalion housekeeping assignments, and every man in the company was under instruction. The ponton bridge was not available for use during this period.

Company "B" and Company "C" were placed on a seven week training schedule beginning 2 July, 1945. The first week was devoted to weapons. The second week was devoted to weapons and infantry training. The third week was devoted to demolitions and mine and bomb neutralization. The last four weeks were
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devoted to specialist training. The same procedure of training as described in paragraph two (above) was followed in the training of these two companies, except that more time was devoted to each subject. These companies received training on the ponton bridge.

(4) The sections of Headquarters and Service Company conducted continuous "On-the-Job" training.

(5) The training program was ideal. The companies, when committed to training, were completely available for training and the company commanders were able to supervise the instruction and visualize the potential of the company and each individual; and the battalion was able to furnish excellent specialist officers to instruct special subjects. However, the desired results of the training program were not obtained, because it was necessary to rotate 287 men to duty in the U.S., during the period 1 June, 1945 to 1 September, 1945.

c. The Engineer Staff and Organization.

(1) The engineer staff was adequate throughout the training and planning phase and during the operation until demobilization caused the loss of key officers and enlisted men. The continual shifting of personnel definitely affected the efficiency of the battalion.

(2) The staff functioned according to normal standing operating procedures of an engineer battalion. The latter companies were organized and trained to operate as separate units on separate engineer missions. Headquarters and Service Company was organized and trained to install and maintain battalion facilities, to furnish maintenance personnel for utility installations installed by the latter companies, to furnish technical assistance to the latter companies, to supply the latter companies, and to augment the equipment and forces.
of the letter companies when needed. A mission of construction or installation would be assigned to a letter company, and Headquarters and Service Company would furnish equipment and men needed.

f. This organization was placed under operational control of the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 18 July and on 19 July, 1945 passed to operational control Commanding General, Third Marine Division, and directed to plan on loading out intact on two LST's and four LST's on or about 14 September, 1945. This shipping allowance was changed to five LST's by the Commanding General, Third Marine Division, to meet the needs of this organization. This organization was notified on 18 August that the invasion of Japan had been suspended and that all logistic and administrative information on that operation was to be used during the planning of the Occupation Operation.

g. On 28 August, 1945, this organization received a copy of the Operation Order of the Provisional Combat Engineer Group, and a copy of the V Amphibious Corps Operation Plan was supplied by the Commanding General, Third Marine Division. From this information, the operation plan of this organization was formed.

2. Supply.

a. Supply during training and planning phase.

(1) Rifle range and machine gun range supplies, flares, chemical grenades, and mines were not available to the battalion during the training period.

(2) Approximately fifty per cent of the rocket ammunition allocated to the battalion was unserviceable.

(3) The ponton bridge arrived late and was only available to two letter companies.

(4) Only three twenty-five ton semi-trailers were available.
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(5) The battalion carried two 3/4 cubic yard shovels and two 3/8 cubic yard shovels. The two 3/8 cubic yard shovels were substituted for the third 3/4 cubic yard shovel organic to the battalion which was not available.

(6) Only 75% of the winter clothing necessary for the battalion was available.

(7) Oil stoves were received on the basis of one for every five men with no replenishment allowance for either stoves or wicks.

(8) The battalion requested substitution of the TD-14, 360° Tractor Crane for the TV-9 Tractor Crane, but these cranes were not available.

(9) Tires and tubes were critical items, and the lack of these items caused motor transport and engineer equipment to be deadlined frequently.

(10) The battalion was allowed one 60 cubic foot air compressor and one ten ton, three wheel roller, as special additional equipment.

b. Supply during the operation.

(1) Tires, tubes, and hot patches were not available in sufficient quantity to keep the motor transport and engineer equipment from being deadlined for excessive periods. It was necessary to utilize the large ponton repair kit for patches. Although not as effective as regular hot patches, this kit prevented the motor transport of the battalion from being deadlined completely.

(2) Three K-7 Dump Trucks and three additional self-propelled road graders were furnished this battalion due to the nature of the mission assigned.

(3) Two 24 head shower units were supplied to provide hot water facilities for two companies operating separately.

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(4) Except for hydrovac brake units for M-5 trucks, all spare parts for K-7 dump trucks, and certain engineer equipment spare parts, the supply of spare parts has been adequate.

(5) Stoves, and wicks for stoves have been inadequate.

(6) With the above exceptions, the supply situation has been very satisfactory.

3. Loading of Engineer Personnel, equipment and supplies.

a. The loading plan:

LST #830 - Headquarters and Service Company personnel and equipment, complete, except for special items and special personnel to be loaded on the supply ship, LST #800.

LST #811 - Battalion Commander and Staff and Company "A", all personnel and equipment, combat loaded.

LST #918 - Company "B", all personnel and equipment, combat loaded.

LST #726 - Company "C", all personnel and equipment, combat loaded.

LST #800 - Bulk cargo, Special Headquarters and Service Company equipment, and sufficient personnel to load and unload this ship.

b. Loading and voyage.

(1) On 27 August, 1945, this organization began moving equipment and supplies to the staging area at Apra Harbor, Guam, M. I. By 2400, 3 September, 1945, all equipment and supplies of this battalion were at the staging area, and the loading of LST's began on 4 September, 1945. On this date the Commanding Officer received orders to embark aboard
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the LST's and upon arrival at the destination to report to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps for Operational Control. The loading of all LST's was completed 7 September, 1945.

(2) On 10 September, 1945, the battalion sailed from Apra Harbor, Guam, M.I., and reached Saipan, M.I., on 11 September, 1945, and remained there until 14 September, 1945, aboard ship. On 14 September, 1945, the battalion sailed from Saipan, M.I. and arrived at Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, on 22 September, 1945.

4. Lading, and unloading.

a. The commanding officer reported to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 22 September, 1945, and was directed to report to the Commanding Officer, 13th Marines, for assignment of billeting and storage area in the Sasebo Aircraft Factory area. Suitable billets and storage areas were located for the battalion Quartermaster, Headquarters and Service Company, and Company "B" in this area; and after thorough investigation, suitable billets and storage areas were found in the Naval Air Station area for Company "A" and Company "C". OP Location - (1109.4-1178.7) Map of Kyushu, 1:250,000.

b. The landing of the Engineer Units and supplies are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>LST</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>23Sept</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>&quot;B&quot;</td>
<td>Sasebo, Aircraft Factory Docks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>23Sept</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>&quot;A&quot;</td>
<td>Sasebo, Naval Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200</td>
<td>23Sept</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>&quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>Sasebo, Naval Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0300</td>
<td>24Sept</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>&quot;B&quot;</td>
<td>Unloaded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800</td>
<td>24Sept</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>&quot;H&amp;S&quot;</td>
<td>Sasebo, Aircraft Factory Docks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030</td>
<td>24Sept</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>&quot;A&quot;</td>
<td>Unloaded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1035</td>
<td>24Sept</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>&quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>Sasebo, Aircraft Factory Docks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>24Sept</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>&quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>Unloaded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200</td>
<td>25Sept</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>&quot;H&amp;S&quot;</td>
<td>Unloaded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0500</td>
<td>25Sept</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>&quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>Unloaded.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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No difficulties were encountered in landing; however, unloading the supplies and equipment into separate areas, approximately three miles apart, made the control of personnel and supplies difficult. The billets and storage areas assigned this battalion were within one mile from the landing point, and by 4 October, 1945, all quartermaster supplies were consolidated.

5. Engineer Operations.

a. 23 September, 1945 to 4 October, 1945.

During this period the battalion unloaded and consolidated engineer equipment and supplies, inventoried all Japanese materials and equipment in the battalion's assigned area, improved billeting areas, installed water points, (shown in paragraph (c) below), began engineer intelligence reconnaissance (shown in paragraph (c) below), furnished carpentry assistance to the 13th Marines to improve that organization's billeting areas, and furnished engineer equipment assistance to the 5th Marine Division.


On 4 October, 1945 the mission of rehabilitating the 86 miles of highway from Sasebo to Fukuoka to take minimum military traffic of vehicles of not greater than 15 ton gross vehicle load was assigned this battalion. On 5 October, 1945, Company "B" moved equipment to the job site and began grading and surfacing the first 5 miles of the road from Sasebo towards Saga. On 6 October, 1945, Company "C" and Company "A" began moving equipment to Saga to new billets in that city. On 7 October, 1945, Company "A" began work on the road from Saga towards Fukuoka. Company "B" located bridge sites and spotted materials. All three companies continued work on the Sasebo-Fukuoka road from 8 October, 1945 to 30 November, 1945. On 10 October, 1945, Company "A" constructed a 40' single-single Bailey bridge 3.5 miles east of Saga. On 13 October, 1945, Company "A" began...
construction of a timber bent bridge 4 miles east of Saga. On 14 October, 1945, Company "A" completed work on the timber bridge 4.5 miles east of Saga. Several existing bridges were reinforced. Sign posting on the entire road was about 25% completed on this date. On 14 October, 1945, Company "A" replaced a timber bent on a bridge 10 miles east of Saga. 900 Jap laborers were used on road and bridge work. On 15 October, 1945, Company "A" opened a borrow pit near the Fukushima airfield. 150 Jap laborers were used on ditching work and 900 were used on other road work. Road between Tade and Tosu was closed because of washout, and a detour was reconnoitered from Tade to Kurume to Tajiro (2 miles above Tosu). On 16 October, 1945, Company "B" completed construction of the detour from Kitakata through Ogi, and Kubata to main road. Company "A" opened the Kurume detour for traffic and started maintenance work. Both detours became permanent parts of the road. On 17 October, 1945, Company "A" constructed a 90' double-single Bailey bridge 5.5 miles east of Saga. The road work from Sasebo to Saga was completed on this date. Maintenance was continued. On 18 October, 1945, Company "A" constructed a timber bent bridge 1 mile west of Yamaguchi. On 19 October, 1945, Company "A" replaced the deck of a timber bridge near the Fukushima airfield and improved the approaches to three existing Bailey bridges. On 23 October, 1945, Company "A" replaced the deck of a timber bridge on the road through Kurume, 4½ miles west of Kurume. 30 Jap laborers were used in this work. On 6 November, 1945, and 7 November, 1945, Company "B" constructed a 40' single-single Bailey bridge 5.9 miles east of Arita. Company "B" completed construction of a steel I-Beam, wood, bridge, 7 miles east of Arita. Japanese personnel and materials were used as far as possible and were obtained from the Saga Prefecture Engineer. Sign posting, road improvement and maintenance was continuous throughout this period.

Recapitulation of Statistics:

Total yardage of rock moved. . . . . . 20,568 cu. yds.
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Bailey bridges constructed:

1 40' single-single - 3.5 mi. east of Saga.
1 40' single-single - 5.9 mi. east of Arita.
1 60' double-single - 4.5 mi. east of Saga.
1 90' double-single - 5.5 mi. east of Saga.

Other bridges replaced or repaired: 10
Culverts repaired or replaced: 35


During this period this battalion set up and operated the following water points:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Installed</th>
<th>Secured</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>(1277.1-1114.2)</td>
<td>24Sep45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1277.1-1114.2)</td>
<td>25Oct45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1111.7-1280.7)</td>
<td>24Sep45</td>
<td>27Sep45</td>
</tr>
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<td>(1111.7-1280.7)</td>
<td>27Sep45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1109.4-1278.7)</td>
<td>24Sep45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1280.5-1110.8)</td>
<td>27Sep45</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1126.5-1336.8)</td>
<td>27Sep45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Portable</td>
<td>(1126.5-1334.8)</td>
<td>27Sep45</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1101.8-1292.3)</td>
<td>15Oct45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1110.0-1275.5)</td>
<td>60Oct45</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total gallons produced to date: 1,192,550 gals.


d. Other Missions carried out by this battalion:

8Sep45 - 6Oct45 - Equipment assistance to 5th Engr. En. and maintenance of Sasebo Naval Training Station road (including quarrying operations).

9Oct45 - 12Oct45 - Hauling for 1st Special NCB.
9Oct45 - 13Oct45 - Cleared debris from Transient Officers BOQ.

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16Oct45 - 9Nov45 - Cleared saw mill area at Naval Aircraft Factory, Sasebo. 2 Acres cleared.
18Oct45 - 8Nov45 - Ditched and graded 12th MT parking area.
4Nov45 - 5Nov45 - TD-9 W/Can worked unloading LST at Green Beach One.
4Nov45 - 31Nov45 - Water trucks sprinkled roads in Sasebo area periodically.
12Nov45 - 2 Semi-trailers worked for 8th Service Regiment.
13Nov45 - 14Nov45 - Extended air strip and graded road crossing at Sasebo Naval Air Station.
17Nov45 - Cleared area for 8th Service Regt.
17Nov45 - 31Nov45 - TD-9 Crane worked for Navy BDC.
17Nov45 - 31Nov45 - Winterization of buildings for 92nd Field Hospital, 41,400 sq. ft. of ceiling.
20Nov45 - 28Nov45 - Erected road blocks at NA5, Sasebo.
28Nov45 - 31Nov45 - TD-9 Crane and TD-18 W/20 Ton Crane worked for Navy Procurement Officer.
28Sep45 - 31Nov45 - During this period all companies worked on camp improvements and winterizing of quarters.

e. Intelligence Missions:

This battalion carried out the following reconnaissance missions during the period 25 September, 1945 to 30 November, 1945:
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(1) Hasty reconnaissance of roads leading from CP, 2d Separate Engineer Battalion to the city of Sasebo. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. A. Love on 25 September, 1945. Report was submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, on 25 September, 1945.

(2) Detailed reconnaissance of roads leading from CP, 2d Separate Engineer Battalion to the city of Sasebo. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. A. Love, 25 September, 1945. Report was submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, on 25 September, 1945.


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6. Comments and Recommendations:

a. During the planning phase, the below listed facts were a handicap to efficient and progressive planning:

(1) The late arrival of the Corps Operation Plan and the Operation Order of the Provisional Combat Engineer Group.

(2) The lack of engineer intelligence information.

(3) The assignment of a general engineer mission in a general area.

(4) The distance from the Battalion base of operation to the Corps Engineer's Headquarters.

(5) The views, general or specific formation, and wishes of the Corps Engineer were not known to the Commanding Officer, except through written Corps Orders.

b. During the occupation and engineer operation phase, the below listed facts were a disadvantage to efficient operation:

(1) The lack of tires, tubes, hot patches, and certain motor transport and engineer equipment spare parts.
(2) The lack of trained personnel to accomplish the large amount of specific engineer intelligence work.

(3) The lack of sufficient Japanese interpreters.

(4) The T.O. allowance of dump trucks and motor graders was not sufficient.

(5) The wet cold weather which prevailed during the first two weeks of operation.

(6) The demobilization of key officers and key enlisted personnel.

(7) The traffic regulations and bridge capacities over the Saabok-Fukuoka road were not strictly enforced by convoy leaders.

(8) The lack of sufficient organic cargo trucks to overcome the logistic problem of engineer supply.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That special trained engineer intelligence officers or non-commissioned officers be attached to Corps Engineer units when operating in occupation capacities on large land masses.

(2) That an additional allowance of at least six cargo trucks, 2½ Ton, be assigned as organic equipment.

(3) That adequate foul weather (wet weather) gear be furnished engineer personnel comparable to the foul weather gear furnished Navy or O.P. personnel.

(4) That on all large land mass operations, the estimate of supply of tires, tubes, and patch sets be exaggerated.
(5) That personnel be rotated early in the rehabilitation period, so that rotation will not interfere with the training program and thus reduce efficiency.

A. T. FEASTER, III.
TOPOGRAPHIC COMPANY
HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTALION
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD
% FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

1 December 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION REPORT ON THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

1 June 1945 — 30 November 1945

A. ORGANIZATION

This unit, composed of four (4) operational platoons and one administrative headquarters platoon, functioned with the Engineer Section, V Amphibious Corps, but was a part of Headquarters and Service Battalion for administrative control. The four (4) operational platoons were as follows:

Photomapping Platoon
Reproduction Platoon
Surveying Platoon
Relief Mapping Platoon

B. TRAINING PRIOR TO THE OCCUPATION

Due to the severe losses in key and experienced personnel, sent back to the States on rotation, a complete training program was necessary. The vast training and experience of the new personnel had to be determined and a training program set up accordingly.

The Photomapping Platoon stressed precision drafting, free-hand lettering, conventional signs and military symbols and the preparation of black and white prints. Evening classes were held for these courses. The Reproduction Platoon was continually active reproducing charts, diagrams, mosaics, photographs, maps, cards and other miscellaneous jobs for the staff sections. The Survey Platoon ran transit traverses, level lines, layouts of recreation fields, and operated with the artillery Regiment of the 3rd, 9th Div., triangulating and extending control for fire control surveys. The surveyors also were schooled in setting up tide stages in preparation for the forthcoming operations. The Relief Mapping Platoon had been preparing relief maps before joining the organization and therefore were well-trained and experienced in this work, past experience.
showed the need for experienced sign painters, so a part of the training program was used for developing satisfactory personnel for these jobs. Plaster molds were made and numerous rubber maps were painted.

Until the cessation of hostilities with Japan was announced, this organization prepared maps, relief models and reproductions for the Olympic Operation. After the announcement ending hostilities, all this work was converted to the Blacklist Operation. Maps, photographs and miscellaneous charts were drawn and reproduced.

C. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

It was decided to take all supplies and equipment on the operation, leaving no rear echelon. Just prior to embarkation a 23" paper cutter was received along with a supply of mapping paper. It was anticipated that the subsequent major items of supply would be procured from the 8th Service Regiment after disembarkation in Japan. The Lithographic ink supply was not sufficient, but the 8th Engineer Topographic Battalion sent a small quantity of ink at the urgent request of this organization.

D. NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

This organization disembarked at Usabo, Kyushu on 26 September 1945. All equipment and supplies were unloaded by 26 September 1945. The reproduction trailers were immediately set up and operation commenced on the 27th. Photomappers began revising the existing Japanese maps using aerial photographs and information gained through ground reconnaissance. The Surveying Platoon checked scales of existing maps, roads, buildings and railroads at Usabo. The relief mappers were utilized as sign-painters for VAC Headquarters. A negative mapping report was submitted to the 6th Army on 28 September.

The mapping program as set up in V Philippines order, was followed. Usabo, Futabu and Nasasan City area maps were given priority followed by Omura, Ube, Saga and Isomats-Shimamostu. A mapping report covering the map in October was submitted to the 6th Army on 28 October 1945. (See Enclosure "A" to Operation Report). Map storage and dis...

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Distribution was taken over by this organization during the month of October. A final mapping report was submitted as of 26 November. (See Enclosure "8" to Operation Report).

E. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Due to the loss of experienced personnel by demobilization this organization operated with decreasing efficiency as personnel was detached. However, the mapping program progressed according to plan.

It is recommended that a 20" x 24" contact printer instead of the 11" x 14" contact printer now in operation, be supplied this and similar organizations for reproduction of large size photographs and mosaics.
JWR/212
SEVENTH NAVAL CONSTRUCTION REGIMENT
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

14 December 1945

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From: The Acting Officer in Charge.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Engineer Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

Reference: (a) Corps Engineer, VAC, Ser. 6934, dtd 12Nov45.

1. Preparation and Planning for the Operation.

a. This organization was stationed on Maui, T. H. when directed to make preparations to load out on three LST's, one APA, and one AFA. All construction work was secured 23 August, 1945, and preparations for embarking began. Engineer equipment was checked and put into shape for the operation. The necessary infantry gear was issued to personnel. Personnel were inoculated against diseases prevalent to the area of operations.

b. The loading of gear and equipment on LST's began 24 September, 1945 and personnel began embarking the following day. Each LST was loaded with each type of equipment for operating independently, if required.

c. On 1 September, 1945, the last ship containing personnel and equipment joined a convoy and departed for the ultimate destination.

d. Three officers and seventy-nine enlisted men were left at Maui as the rear echelon of the activity.

2. Training and Organization.

a. Training received in June included instruction and practice in handling and throwing hand grenades, one day of firing carbines, one-half day the Village Course, and one-half day on the Live Hand Grenade Course. The B.A.R. men and T.S.M.G. men practiced an additional one-half day with their weapons.

Appendix 3 to Annex GEORGE.
b. Training received by the Battalion personnel in August included two days of lectures and training films and five days on bivouac. Training at the bivouac consisted of Infiltration Course, Village Combat Course, Demolition Course, Gasline Range, Hand Grenade Range, Moving Target Range, Pistol and T-S-N-C. Range, 1000 inch Range, and defensive and offensive maneuvers.


a. During the night of 22 September, 1945, the LST's were beached at Green Beach, Sasebo N.A.S., Kyushu, Japan, and unloading operations started. The following day personnel began coming ashore. Guards were posted at the existing warehouses and caves to safeguard large quantities of stored materials and instruments.

b. There were no obstacles or enemy interference during the entire operation.

c. Immediately upon landing work was commenced on facilities for billeting and messing personnel and storing equipment and supplies. Temporary frame screened buildings were erected for a galley and mess halls, and existing buildings were cleaned and decontaminated for quarters and warehouse space. The water in existing mains was found to be satisfactory for bathing purposes after being treated with chlorine. Distillation units were set up to purify water for galley use and drinking purposes.

d. By 27 September, 1945 all personnel were ashore and billeted in existing buildings. There were no obstacles or enemy interference during the entire operation.

e. Other operations in September included the remodeling and decontaminating of the Fifth Amphibious Corps Headquarters B.O.1., grading and draining the road going north from Sasebo Naval Air Station to the National Highway, rerouting the road around the south end of the air strip at the Air Station, operation of an electrical substation and maintenance of distribution system at the Air Station, and miscellaneous carpentry and plumbing work at the Fifth Amphibious Corps Hospital and Cub 18 area.
f. Operations in October consisted primarily of general maintenance work and rehabilitation. The main work projects were in the Sasebo area and consisted of grading and surfacing approximately ten miles of roadway and partially completing a petroleum storage and distribution system.

g. Considerable work was performed in October clearing the dock area in the Sasebo Navy Yard in order to provide space for roadways and to facilitate the unloading of ships. In clearing this dock area it was necessary to remove large quantities of scrap metal, heavy marine equipment, and other debris. A Japanese floating crane and Japanese barges together with approximately one hundred fifty Japanese laborers were employed in this task.

h. Other operations in October included dismantling an old hanger at Green Beach and the piling and burning of Japanese planes at Sasebo N.A.S.

i. Operations in November were primarily a continuation of maintenance and rehabilitation work in the Sasebo area. Work was continued on the petroleum storage and distribution system. Maintenance work was continued on the road from Sasebo Naval Air Station to the National Highway. Work was continued clearing the dock area.

j. Other operations in November consisted of grading and surfacing the shore road from Sasebo Naval Air Station to Itojuku docks, constructing an LST landing, constructing Quonset huts at the Aircraft Factory, alteration and maintenance work at the Fifth Amphibious Corps Headquarters building and B.O.Q. building.

4. Comments and Recommendations.

a. Suitable road material was scarce and at times unobtainable. Heavy clay mixed with a small amount of sandstone was often used. Although this material was not considered desirable for road surfacing in this locality, where heavy rains are prevalent, it was accepted where good drainage could be provided.
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b. Considerable use was made of available Japanese labor, equipment, and materials. Equipment used consisted mainly of electric generators, power saws and other woodworking machinery, overhead cranes in existing buildings, and air compressors. Materials used consisted of a considerable quantity of lumber, sheet metal, clay pipe, and metal pipe. The use of local labor, equipment and materials greatly expedited construction operations.

J. W. RUSSELL