From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Commander FIFTH Fleet Action Report - The Occupation of Japan, 15 August 1945 to 8 November 1945.

References:
(a) PacFlt ltr. 1CL-45.
(b) CinCPac—CinCPac, Operation Plan No. 12-45, dated 14 August 1945.
(c) ComFIFTHFleet Operation Plan No. 6-45, dated 27 August 1945.
(d) ComFIFTHFleet Operation Plan No. 7-45, dated 2 September 1945.
(e) ComFIFTHFleet Operation Plan No. 8-45, dated 2 September 1945.
(f) ComFIFTHFleet Operation Plan No. 9-45, dated 18 September 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (a) is forwarded herewith in accordance with the requirements of reference (a).

2. The principal directives for the operation are contained in references (b) through (f).

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PART I

BRIEF SUMMARY

1. This report covers the participation of the Commander FIFTH Fleet in operations in connection with the occupation of JAPAN from the cessation of hostilities on 15 August 1945 to 8 November 1945, the date on which Admiral R. A. SPRUANCE, USN, turned over command of the FIFTH Fleet to Admiral J. H. TOWERS, USN. In the initial plans for the operation, Commander FIFTH Fleet was charged with the responsibility for operations in south-western JAPAN, including the INLAND Sea area and KYUSHU. On 19 September 1945, Commander FIFTH Fleet relieved Commander THIRD Fleet and Commander North PACIFIC Force of their respective responsibilities in eastern and northern JAPAN and assumed command of all naval operations in the Japanese Empire.
PART II

PRELIMINARIES

1. Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Operation Plan No. 12-45 directed Commander FIFTH Fleet and Commander Central Control Force to:

   (a) Occupy and control the coastal waters of JAPAN and the sea approaches thereto west of the 135th meridian.

   (b) Conduct reconnaissance within the area of air search responsibility described in Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Operation Plan No. 12-45.

   (c) Land and firmly establish ashore at locations in KYUSHU, SHIKOKU, and western HONSHU as ordered by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers designated elements of the SIXTH Army.

   (d) Establish and maintain in occupied areas naval facilities afloat as required for the support of the FIFTH Fleet.

   (e) Initiate the clearance of minefields in the TSUSHIMA Straits, INLAND Sea, BUNGO SUIDO, and KII SUIDO, and approaches to the planned points of landing of the SIXTH Army components.

   (f) Route and protect friendly shipping coming within the boundaries of own zone of responsibility as it may exist from time to time.

   (g) Support other forces basing, staging, or mounting in the OKINAWA group.

   (h) Notify Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Commander THIRD Fleet when ready to conduct naval operations east of the 135th meridian within zone of responsibility as directed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

   (i) When directed by Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, pass to Commander SEVENTH Fleet responsibility for naval operations within his prospective zone of responsibility as indicated in Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Operation Plan No. 12-45.

2. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, assigned similar missions to Commanders THIRD Fleet, SEVENTH Fleet and North PACIFIC Force with
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respect to their areas of responsibility. In general, the areas assigned to fleet commanders conform to the areas assigned to Army commanders as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Area</th>
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<th>Army</th>
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<td>Northern JAPAN</td>
<td>North PACIFIC Force</td>
<td>EIGHTH Army</td>
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<td>(northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO)</td>
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<td>Eastern JAPAN</td>
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<td>CHINA and KOREA</td>
<td>SEVENTH Fleet</td>
<td>XXIV Corps</td>
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All other forces of the Pacific Fleet were assigned supporting tasks. BAKER day, the day of the surrender of JAPAN, was set as 15 August 1945. Various landings throughout the Empire were scheduled to take place a certain number of days after BAKER day. Original landing dates were postponed due to difficulties in minesweeping operations and due to the fact that the surrender itself had been postponed. After a conference between Commander FIFTH Fleet and Commanding General, SIXTH Army in the PHILIPPINES, about 21 August 1945 the following schedule of landings within the FIFTH Fleet zone of operations was tentatively planned. These dates were subject to changes as circumstances altered.

2 September - KAGOSHIMA, KII WAN in support of occupation of KANoya Airfield.

22 September - SASEBO.

25 September - WAKAYAMA.

26 September - NAGASAKI.

3 October - NAGOYA.

3-13 October - HIRO WAN.

4 October - MATSUYAMA.
BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS

1. Eastern dates are used throughout the following chronological account:

1 August 1945  - ComFIFTHFleet (Admiral R. A. SPRUANCE, USN) at temporary headquarters, GUAM, engaged in preparing plans for the invasion of KYUSHU. Since the preliminary draft of CinCPAC's Joint Staff study on the occupation of JAPAN in the event of her collapse or surrender had been received on 27 July, this problem was also being considered by ComFIFTHFleet.

9 August 1945  - CinCPac issued Joint Staff study on the Occupation of JAPAN, to be implemented in the event of sudden collapse or surrender of JAPAN. This study, which assigned the naval phases of the operations primarily to the THIRD and FIFTH Fleets, stated that the THIRD Fleet would consist initially of fast carrier task groups and that the FIFTH Fleet would include the amphibious, support, and minesweeping forces. ComTHIRDFleet was to conduct the emergency occupation of the TOKYO Bay area, and ComFIFTHFleet was to be in command of forces in the INLAND Sea.

10 August 1945  - Received flash reports of JAPAN's surrender offer.

14 August 1945  - Received CinCPac and CinCPAC Operation Plan No. 12-45, effective for planning at 1200(-9), 14 August 1945.

15 August 1945  - Cessation of hostilities with JAPAN confirmed by the President, who announced that General of the Army Douglas MacARTHUR had been appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

CinCPAC declared his Operation Plan No. 12-45 effective, and ordered forces assigned to the FIFTH Fleet by this plan to report to ComFIFTHFleet for duty.

16 August 1945  - ComFIFTHFleet transferred his Flag to NEW JERSEY.
ComFIFTHFleet

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17 August 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet in NEW JERSEY departed GUAM for MANILA for conference with amphibious and Army force commanders.

ComFIFTHFleet ordered units as they reported for duty to proceed OKINAWA, where FIFTH Fleet support ships and mine craft were being concentrated.

21 August 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet arrived MANILA and began conferences with CinCPac, ComGen6thArmy, ComPhibsPac and Com5thPhibFor.

27 August 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet issued his Operation Plan No. 6-45 which directed naval operations incident to the occupation of southwestern JAPAN by the SIXTH Army.

28 August 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet in NEW JERSEY departed MANILA for OKINAWA.

30 August 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet in NEW JERSEY arrived OKINAWA, and conferred with ComBatRon 1 and ComMinPac in command of the FIFTH Fleet covering forces and mine forces respectively.

2 September 1945 - Ceremonies effecting the formal surrender of JAPAN took place aboard MISSOURI in TOKYO Bay.

Elements of the FIFTH AAF landed at KAGOSHIMA to set up emergency airfield facilities at KANOYA to cover movement of troops by air to TOKYO area.

3 September 1945 - FIFTH Fleet delegation headed by Chief of Staff flew to YOKOHAMA for two-day conference with Staff of Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) on the evacuation of Allied prisoners of war from southwestern JAPAN.

4 September 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet Operation Plans Nos. 6, 7, and 8-45 effective. Preliminary plans for evacuation of prisoners of war completed. 13 September 1945 set as initial date for recovery of Allied prisoners of war (REAMPS) from FIFTH Fleet area.

8 September 1945 - Commenced minesweeping in the approaches to NAGASAKI in preparation for evacuation of REAMPS from KYUSHU.
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9 September 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet assumed responsibility for zone east to 139 degrees east longitude in accordance with CinCPac Operation Plan No. 12-45.

11 September 1945 - Commenced minesweeping in KII SUIDO and approaches to WAKANOURA in preparation for evacuation of REAMPS from southern HONSHU.

REAMP evacuation group, under command of ComCruDiv 4 in WICHITA arrived NAGASAKI and established processing facilities for receiving REAMPS. Preliminary investigation of REAMPS indicated that there were no serious epidemics in the POW camps although some cases of typhoid and dysentery were present.

12 September 1945 - REAMP evacuation group, under command of ComCruDiv 12 in MONTPELLIER arrived WAKAYAMA and commenced evacuation operations.

13 September 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet in NEW JERSEY departed BUCKNER Bay for WAKAYAMA.

15 September 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet in NEW JERSEY arrived WAKANOURA. All prisoners of war from SHIKOKU and southern HONSHU processed and embarked in evacuation ships by end of day - a total of 2,575 men.

16 September 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet in NEW JERSEY departed WAKANOURA for YOKOSUKA.

A typhoon of severe intensity passed near BUCKNER Bay, OKINAWA, causing considerable damage to small craft and shipping.

17 September 1945 - ComFIFTH Fleet in NEW JERSEY arrived YOKOSUKA and held conferences with ComTHIRDFleet, ComNorPac, Chief of Staff to CinCPac, Fleet Liaison Officer to SCAP, and ComGen8thArmy preliminary to assuming command of all naval operations in the Empire.

18 September 1945 - ComTHIRDFleet reported to CinCPac that evacuation of REAMPS from eastern JAPAN had been completed and that a total of 19,000 men had been recovered.
ComFIFTHFleet

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19 September 1945 - At 1500, COT, ComFIFTHFleet relieved ComTHIRDFleet and ComNorPac of all tasks and responsibilities for naval operations in Empire waters as assigned by CinCPac and CinCPAC Operation Plan No. 12-45. ComFIFTHFleet at this time assumed responsibility for all naval operations in the Empire.

20 September 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet directed CNOB, OKINAWA, to submit a report recommending changes necessary in base development plans in order to take advantage of experience gained in the destructive typhoon of 16-17 September.

22 September 1945 - V Amphibious Corps (5thMarDiv) commenced landing at SASEBO.

23 September 1945 - Evacuation of REAMPS from NIAGASAKI essentially completed. A total of 9,061 men have been recovered.

25 September 1945 - Elements of the 6th Army commenced landing at WAKAYAMA. The 81st Infantry Division commenced landing at AOMORI.

ComFIFTHFleet reported to CinCPac that evacuation of REAMPS under naval cognizance from the Empire had been completed.

26 September 1945 - V Amphibious Corps (2ndMarDiv) commenced landing at NIAGASAKI.

29 September 1945 - Rear Admiral BEARY, USN, designated Commander Japanese Repatriation Group (CTG 50.3) and charged with the responsibility for the repatriation of Japanese nationals to the Empire using available Japanese shipping.

2 October 1945 - Rear Admiral Sample, ComCarDiv 22, and Captain McDonald, CO, SUWANNEE reported missing when PB in which they were passengers failed to return to base at WAKAYAMA. Searches which were continued until 18 October were all negative.

3 October 1945 - ComFIFTHFleet recommended that OMINTO Naval Base in the Northern JAPAN Area be turned over to the U.S. Army as soon as demilitarization had been completed. This recommendation was later approved.

Landings scheduled for NIJOYA and MATSUYAMA have been postponed due to minesweeping difficulties.
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- Elements of the IX Corps landed at HOKKAIDO.
4 October 1945

- Units of the IX Corps landed at OTARU.
5 October 1945

- Elements of the X Corps landed at HIRO WAN.
7 October 1945

- Center of intense typhoon passed very close to OKINAWA causing very heavy damage to ships and shore installations. Over 90 vessels were reported aground as a result of the typhoon. Air bases were rendered inoperative except for emergency landings. Processing of REAMPS was temporarily halted. Searches were ordered of the waters east of OKINAWA for survivors of vessels which founders during the storm.
9 October 1945

- CommFIFTHFleet conferred with ComGen6thArmy regarding mutual responsibilities for the demilitarization of the 6th Army zone of responsibility. CommFIFTHFleet established Naval liaison office with the 6th Army at KYOTO.
12 October 1945

- In accordance with orders received from CinCPac, CommFIFTHFleet departed YOKOSUKA for PEARL HARBOR by air. FIFTH Fleet administration remained in NEW JERSEY at YOKOSUKA. Senior officer present in the Empire was Vice Admiral WILKINSON, Com3rd-PhibFor in MT. OLYMPUS at YOKOHAMA.
20 October 1945

- Elements of the X Corps landed on SHIKOKU at MATSUYAMA.
22 October 1945

- 25th Infantry Division commenced landing at NAGOYA.
26 October 1945

- CommFIFTHFleet returned to NEW JERSEY at YOKOSUKA.
6 November 1945

- Admiral R. A. SPRUANCE, USN, turned over command of the FIFTH Fleet to Admiral J. H. TOWERS, USN.
8 November 1945

2. Although as of 8 November 1945, the major landings in the Empire have been completed, the following related operations are still in progress:

(a) Opening of ports through which U.S. Army will be supplied. These ports are: KOBE, OSAKA, KURE, HAKATA, and FUKUOKA.

(b) Sweeping of ocean minefields.
(c) Demilitarization of area within zone of naval responsibility.

(d) Shipping control for United States forces.

(e) Return of Naval, Marine, and Coast Guard separates.

(f) Redeployment of combatant shipping.

(g) Control of movement and employment of Japanese shipping.
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PART IV

ORDNANCE

1. No remarks.
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### PART V

**RECORD OF DAMAGE TO FIFTH FLEET SHIPS**

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### PART V

**RECORD OF DAMAGE TO FIFTH FLEET SHIPS**

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PART V

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* Sub-Board Insurv has recommended de-commissioning and stripping.

** Sub-Board Insurv has recommended repair and retention.
PART VI

SPECIAL REPORTS

1. Comments and information on particular subject matter are given as follows:

A - Intelligence
B - Ground Operations
C - Training
D - Gunnery
E - Logistics
F - Medical
G - Weather Summary
H - Communications
I - Administration
J - Navigation
K - Minesweeping
L - Air Operations
M - Demilitarization

SECTION A

INTELLIGENCE

1. Liaison with Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

Intelligence liaison with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is maintained through Fleet Liaison Officer to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (short title FItLoSCAP) whose offices are located at GHQ, TOKYO.

2. Radio Intelligence

Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet, Mobile Radio Intelligence Unit #6, consisting of Lieutenant Colonel B. Holcomb, USMC, Lieutenant John Ashmead, USNR, and nine enlisted men, performed its duties aboard the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY from 17 August 1945 to 8 October 1945, when this unit was disbanded by order of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Naval Technical Mission, JAPAN (NavTechJap)

The major portion of NavTechJap was originally established in the Empire under the administrative control of the V Amphibious Corps at SASEBO with the mission of investigating intelligence targets as directed by the Chief of
Naval Operations in "Intelligence Targets, JAPAN." The unit consists of approximately 137 officers and 211 enlisted men. Headquarters is now in U.S.S. BLACKFORD (APB). Administrative control of the unit was transferred to Commander FIFTH Fleet as of 30 October. The unit intends to establish control headquarters in TOKYO to provide coordination of NavTechJap activities with those of intelligence agencies under GHQ, and representation has been made to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for 3000 square feet of office space in close proximity to U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Far Eastern Air Force, GHQ Technical Sections and for billeting for 20 officers and ten enlisted men ashore.

4. Language officers

Language officers are not at present eligible for separation. Of 24 assigned to FIFTH Fleet, two have been assigned to Naval Technical Mission, JAPAN, two to U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, and one to Army forces in KOREA, leaving 19 still with FIFTH Fleet units. Twenty-one language officers transferred on temporary duty to Commander Naval Activities, YOKOSUKA, upon departure of the third Fleet are still on duty with that activity. They are distributed to the 4th Marines, Marine Air Station, YOKOSUKA, Eastern JAPAN Force (TF 53), Fort Director, YOKOSUKA, and Fleet Liaison Officer to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

5. Souvenirs and trophies

Task force commanders have been directed to establish procedures for distribution of suitable war trophy souvenirs to Naval personnel leaving the area.
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SECTION B

GROUND OPERATIONS

1. Landing of occupation forces

In the original plans of Commander Army Forces, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for the occupation of JAPAN and KOREA, the FIFTH Fleet was directed to operate in conjunction with the SIXTH Army and the 5th Amphibious Force and to conduct all landing operations in the FIFTH Fleet-SIXTH Army zone.

Planning progressed under the above directives and on 21 August 1945 direct liaison was established between Commanding General, SIXTH Army at San Fernando, P.I., and Commander FIFTH Fleet in U.S.S. NEW JERSEY at MANILA BAY.

The operation plans for the occupation of JAPAN contemplated landing the V Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions, in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI areas on Baker Day plus 20, or 4 September 1945. These landings were to be reinforced later by the 3rd Marine Division landing in the FUKUOKA-SHIMONOSEKI areas. The 3rd Marine Division was withdrawn from the plan and the 32nd Infantry Division substituted. The I Army Corps, consisting of the 33rd and 98th Infantry Divisions, was scheduled to land in the KOBE-Osaka areas commencing on Baker Day plus 23, or 7 September 1945. These landings were to be followed by landings of the 25th Infantry Division in the NAGOYA area. The 6th Infantry Division was to be held in reserve to land at either NAGOYA or WAKAYAMA, but was released to the XXIV Corps in KOREA. The X Army Corps, consisting of the 41st Infantry Division and the 24th Infantry Division, was scheduled to land in the KURE-OKAYAMA area and on SHIKOKU commencing on Baker Day plus 49, or 3 October 1945.

Because of the wide dispersion of assault shipping and the magnitude of the minesweeping problem, landing dates were postponed in most cases. Adverse weather affected the landings in some cases. The major delay occurred in the NAGOYA area, because of the difficulty of sweeping U.S. mines from that area. Landings at NAGOYA were made on 26 October 1945. With the landing of the 25th Infantry Division there, all major elements of the occupation forces were established ashore.

2. Evacuation of Allied prisoners of war from JAPAN

Upon landing of the first U.S. forces in JAPAN, it became apparent that the evacuation of Allied prisoners of war (REAMPS) from JAPAN must receive first priority as many of them were in poor physical condition. Evacuation of REAMPS on HONSHU by elements of the EIGHTH Army and THIRD Fleet commenced immediately. Representatives of the SIXTH Army and FIFTH Fleet flew to YOKOHAMA to confer with representatives of the Supreme Commander for the
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Allied Powers and Commanding General, EIGHTH Army on evacuation of REALPS from the SIXTH Army zone. The plan, briefly, was to permit the EIGHTH Army to extend its evacuation program to the west and to evacuate REALPS through OSAKA to TOKYO until relieved by FIFTH Fleet and SIXTH Army units. REALPS on SHIKOKU were to be ferried across the INLAND Sea to the mainland and then moved by rail through OSAKA to the TOKYO area. The FIFTH Fleet and SIXTH Army organized two evacuation forces consisting of suitable landing craft, hospital ships, transports, Army contact teams, truck companies, and Naval medical personnel. These forces commenced evacuation operations on 13 September 1945. One force, under command of Rear Admiral Riggs, landed at WAKAYAMA on schedule and by 1800 on 15 September had completed the processing of all REALPS in western HONSHU, a total of 2,575 men. The other force, under the command of Rear Admiral Fahrlin, landed at NAGASAKI and by 22 September 1945 had evacuated all REALPS in KYUSHU, a total of 9,041 men. Except for a few stragglers and the preparation of final reports, the REALPS evacuation program in the areas of responsibility of the FIFTH Fleet and SIXTH Army was completed on 23 September 1945. (For details of evacuation processing see Section F - Medical).
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SECTION C

TRAINING

The ever-changing situation during the early phases of the occupation operation precluded any attempt at training. After Commander FIFTH Fleet assumed command of all naval forces in JAPAN, and after the initial group of separatees was sent home, it became desirable to start a training program for morale purposes with emphasis on the training of replacements. Accordingly, a directive was sent out to sub-area commanders (CTF's 51, 53, 56, and CTG 58.2) to organize a training schedule for their area or force, including tactics, tracking and calibration exercises, damage control, and engineering casualty drills. Firing exercises were given a lower priority than "dry" exercises because of the large number of new and untrained personnel. The training program was handicapped by the continual separation of trained personnel and the redeployment of ships, but the importance of keeping ships and personnel occupied, keeping ships out of polluted harbors, and the urgent need for trained men to keep up with the rapid turnover of personnel demanded a training effort regardless of its continuity. As the U.S. Naval situation in Empire waters becomes stabilized, an improvement in the results of the training programs is expected.

SECTION D

GUNNERY

In preparation for the occupation operation, plans were drawn up to furnish fire support units to each of the landing forces in the original FIFTH Fleet zone of responsibility. To back up the fire support ships, two ammunition ships were stationed at OKINAWA loaded with reserve ammunition to fifty percent of the capacity of the fire support ships assigned. When it became apparent that landings would be unopposed, however, the two ammunition ships were released to the operational control of Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet, and Commander Service Squadron TEN was notified that the FIFTH Fleet would require no replacement ammunition. Nevertheless, a covering unit consisting of CVE's and other fire support ships was still assigned to each landing. The covering units were released shortly after H hour at each target. No ammunition was expended in support of landings.
1. Organization

At the beginning of the occupation operation Commander Service Squadron TEN and Service Divisions 103 and 104 were assigned to Commander FIFTH Fleet for logistic support. This plan was modified by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, on 25 August 1945, when Commander Service Squadrons SIX and TEN were ordered to operate directly under Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet.

Commander Service Squadron SIX was directed to provide replenishment at sea, Commander Service Squadron TEN to provide mobile base services in the RYUKUS, MARIANAS, MARSHALL-GILBERTS Area, and at LEYTE. Provision was made for the forward movement of elements of Service Divisions 103 and 102 at the direction of Commanders FIFTH and THIRD Fleets, respectively.

Much of the movement to TOKYO Bay had been completed by Service Division 102 prior to the relief of Commander THIRD Fleet by Commander FIFTH Fleet. Nearly all of the movements of Service Division 103 to SASEBO, NAGASAKI, the INLAND Sea, and NAGOYA took place late in September and in October, after Commander Task Force 51, (Commander Battleship Squadron ONE), had assumed responsibility for the Southwestern JAPAN Area.

Throughout the operation Commander Service Division 104, in OKINAWA, furnished extensive logistic support to FIFTH Fleet forces.

A small logistic group, assigned to Commander North Pacific Force at the beginning of the occupation, remained in the OMINATO area with Command Task Force 56 (Commander Cruiser Division FIVE). Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet, has referred to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, the question of making this group an element of Service Division 102.

On 1 October 1945, Commander Service Squadron TEN took over the logistic facilities and responsibilities of Commander Service Squadron SIX, and Service Squadron SIX was dissolved.

2. Supplies

(a) Fuel

Immediately after the surrender the supply of all types of fuel became plentiful. Distribution of diesel fuel was unsatisfactory, but operations were not adversely affected.

On 17 September, Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet, requested that all bulk deliveries be sailed directly to OKINAWA. On 15 October 1945, Commander Service Division 102 assumed responsibility for the
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resupply or onward routing of all black, diesel, and lubricating oil for all Service Divisions in advanced areas. Tankers were instructed to use the great circle route to YOKOHAMA, unless diverted.

Since fuel schedules are made up months in advance, it has been impossible to check the flow immediately. The cost of holding commercial tankers in JAPAN is considerable. Therefore, arrangements have been made to operate the Japanese Naval Fuel Depot on ASUMA Island, YOKOSUKA, for joint Army-Navy use. The Army will operate facilities, beginning early in November. Other fuel depots will be used for storage as soon as possible.

Issue of U.S. fuel to Japanese ships being used in repatriation or minesweeping has been authorized. Temporary accounting procedures have been issued pending receipt of instructions from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts or the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(b) Provisions

Because of insufficient reefer shipping the supply of fresh and frozen provisions has been inadequate throughout the operation. Dry provisions have, however, been plentiful in forward areas. In isolated instances there have been temporary scarcities caused by lack of sufficient supply vessels and dispersion of units. Supplies from larger vessels took care of many of these cases.

The present schedule of AP's and AK's will provide sufficient food for our vessels. Good food is a particularly important morale factor in this area, and an ample supply of fresh provisions must be maintained.

(c) Ammunition

An excess of ammunition and ammunition ships was available at the beginning of the operation. It soon became obvious, however, that no ready floating supply was needed and all ammunition ships were released.

(d) General stores

Deliveries of general stores have been satisfactory. No critical shortage developed. Demands for paint have increased, but are gradually being satisfied.

(e) Clothing and small stores

The supply of winter clothing has been ample to meet all needs. There is, however, a shortage of dress blue uniforms in the TOKYO area. The supply of clothing and small stores has been satisfactory, but there has never been an ample stock. Recent arrivals of supply vessels with extra units aboard are correcting the situation.

VI - E - 2
Ship's store stock

The supply has been scanty but is improving. Recent instructions have stopped the rationing of certain supplies such as fountain pens, wrist watches, and other luxury and gift articles. They will still be scarce in the forward areas until about the first of the year.

Currency

Original plans called for use of military type "B" yen currency by occupation forces. The introduction of U.S. currency in Japan was forbidden. Arrangements were made and funds obtained by air from Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet. The rate of exchange was set at 15 to 1. Distribution was made to task forces.

On 7 September 1945, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers requested that all type "B" military yen currency be withdrawn from circulation and exchanged for Bank of Japan notes. Instructions were issued to task forces after consulting the Funding Officer, Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific (Advance Headquarters). The procedure is for the disbursing officer to request funds from the Army Funding Officer, who then makes Bank of Japan notes available at the nearest local bank through Japanese sources. Exchange of or credit for type "B" yen is made only through the same officer at Tokyo.

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, on 11 October 1945 issued orders for the transfer of yen currency prior to departure to any disbursing officer, Navy, Army, or Marine. If this is impossible, cash shipment to the Funding Officer is authorized.

Procurement from the Japanese

The office of the General Procurement Agent has been established as a section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Its functions are to coordinate, control and issue regulations governing the procurement of supplies, equipment, materials, services, real property and facilities by forces of the Allied Powers in the occupied areas of Japan and Korea. There is a naval representative in this office.

The General Procurement Agent's Regulation No. 1 issued 27 September 1945 covers the procedure to be followed by all occupation forces regarding procurement.

Procurement offices will be established at the following locations with a naval officer attached to each office:

(1) Yokohama (for the Eighth Army)
(2) Osaka (for the Sixth Army)
3. Repair facilities

The principal base for support of FIFTH Fleet ships in Empire waters is OKINAWA. Maintenance and logistic support Southwestern JAPAN area, including Commander Minescraft, Pacific Fleet, vessels, is assigned to Commander Service Division 103 and for Eastern and Northern JAPAN to Commander Service Division 102. Facilities for Commander Service Division 103 were assembled in OKINAWA under Commander Service Division 104 until called forward, whereas those for Commander Service Division 102 were brought forward from ENIWETOK.

The following is the present distribution of the principal repair facilities:

OKINAWA - 3 AD, 3 AR, 4 ARB, 1 ARG, 2 ARL, 1 AG, 5 ARD, 4 AFD (1 aground), 1 AFDL (aground).

TOKYO Bay - 2 AD, 2 AR, 1 ARB, 2 ARL, 2 AG, 3 LSD, 1 ARD.

SASEBO - 1 AD, 2 ARG, 1 AG, 1 ARL, 1 LSD.

WAKAYAMA - 1 AD, 1 ARL, 1 LSD.

KURE - 1 AR.

NAGOYA - 1 ARG.

MATSUYAMA - 1 ARG.

OMINATO - 1 ARL, 1 LSD.

Because of adverse weather conditions and remoteness from operating areas, Commander Minescraft, Pacific, moved his operating base from OKINAWA to SASEBO. This requires additional repair facilities and it is planned to send another AD, an ARD, an AFD, and two spare parts barges from OKINAWA to SASEBO.

The general policy is to retain repair facilities afloat rather than to operate Japanese Navy yards. However, in order to reduce non-self propelled equipment in Empire waters to a minimum, emergency drydockings are done in the Japanese Navy yards. The repair facilities assigned are sufficient to maintain fleet units in a satisfactory condition.
4. Damage and salvage

The principal cause of damage to FIFTH Fleet vessels during the period of this report were the typhoons of 16 September and 7-9 October 1945. The typhoon of 16 September caused about 75 ships (LCT and larger) to be stranded at OKINAWA, two at KAGOSHIMA, KYUSHU, and seven at WAKANOURA. Most of these ships were refloated within ten days but 12 ships were so severely damaged that inspection by a Sub-Board of Inspection and Survey was ordered.

In the very severe typhoon of 7-9 October about 220 ships (LCT and larger) were stranded at OKINAWA. The salvage work was taken in hand vigorously and by 1 November all salvageable ships had been refloated except one ARD and 10 smaller ships which were expected to be floated on the high tide of 18 November. However, about 85 ships were considered beyond economical salvage and repair and were referred to Sub-Boards of Inspection and Survey for examination.

Salvage work in connection with typhoon damage at OKINAWA was under the direction of the Fleet Salvage Officer. Salvage ships and tugs and salvage personnel were sent to OKINAWA from the other Service Divisions to assist in this work. After the 7-9 October typhoon there was a total of 52 salvage ships and tugs in use at OKINAWA. Repair facilities of these ships of Service Division 104, and of Commandant Naval Operating Base, OKINAWA, were all largely devoted to making repairs to typhoon-damaged ships during this period.

In order to facilitate disposition of the large number of damaged ships, three semi-permanent Sub-Boards of Inspection and Survey were set up, two at OKINAWA and one at YOKOSUKA, JAPAN. These boards are assigned ships to inspect by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and they make recommendations directly to the Chief of Naval Operations (Board of Inspection and Survey).

Damaged ships referred to above are listed in Part V of this report.

5. Bases

During the early part of the occupation OKINAWA served as the major base for FIFTH Fleet forces. The movement forward of logistic facilities and the expansion of the FIFTH Fleet area to include all of JAPAN, together with the devastation of OKINAWA by two typhoons, have decreased reliance upon that base.

Except for air bases, port directors, and attached units, Commander Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA, is the only shorebased naval command in the Empire. Still in a transition period, this command provides a few service and recreation facilities, four unloading berths in a large drydock, and emergency docking.
6. Personnel

Replacement personnel were very scarce at the beginning of the operation and have continued scarce as far as rated men are concerned. Supply of non-rated men and seabees continues to arrive unannounced at ports where there is no room for them afloat or ashore.

Men being discharged on points were held up by an early shortage of transportation caused by the shipping requirements of the occupation. "Magic Carpet" spaces are more than ample now for Empire naval requirements.

7. "Guinea pig" minesweeping vessels

In response to a request from Commander Minecraft, Pacific, three damaged ships of Liberty and Victory type have been acquired for use in making safety check sweeps of channels in Japanese waters in the vicinity of U.S. pressure mines. The ships are manned by skeleton crews of about eight officers and 75 men, but crews are reduced to about four officers and 15 men for actual runs in the mined area. Volunteer crews only are aboard during these check runs. The ships are ballasted to minimize underwater damage. To eliminate the stationing of any personnel below the main deck level, the ships are provided with remote operating gear and gauges for machinery. Each man aboard either stands on mattresses or uses other means to minimize shock in the event of a mine explosion. The ships engaged in this service are MARATHON (APA 200), PRATT VICTORY, and JOSEPH HOLI. The services of the ROBERT WATCHORN, an undamaged War Shipping Administration ship, have been requested.

In addition to the above ships, it is planned to use two LST's for guinea pig check sweeps of certain channels in Northwest HONSHU where minefields permit clearance for use of LST's and smaller ships only. The ships selected for this purpose are LST's 553 and 768. Sweeping operations with these ships will start about 10 November at FUKUOKA.

8. Recommendations

(a) That the monthly allowance of fresh and frozen provisions in this area be increased from 1.75 to 2.0 cubic feet per person.

(b) That increased quantities of gift and luxury articles as well as standard ship's store stock be provided.

(c) That fast and reliable freight service to all service divisions, fleet units, and advance bases be established.

(d) That Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet, establish in JAPAN an agency to control and distribute replacement personnel and to allocate Magic Carpet shipping.
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Action Report, Occupation of JAPAN (Part VI - Special Reports)

SECTION F

MEDICAL

1. The Fleet medical plan was carried out in accordance with Annex J, Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 6-45. The scope and policy were planned initially to provide for the evacuation and hospitalization of naval forces under the control of Commander FIFTH Fleet and for the surface evacuation of sick and disabled Army forces within prescribed zones of responsibility.

2. The rescue and repatriation of United Nations prisoners of war became urgent and acute coincident with the signing of the terms of surrender on 4 September 1945. The great hue and cry created by the distressing conditions noted among the first recovered Allied military personnel elevated to the highest priority evacuation of all prisoners, hereafter referred to as REAMPS. Their physical condition was so poor that it became necessary to examine and to screen them on the assumption that all were ill. This was to be accomplished prior to the moving in of the SIXTH Army, which was scheduled to commence occupation of western JAPAN during the last week in September.

3. Two ports, WAKAYAMA and NAGASAKI, were established as evacuation centers for all western JAPAN. To the SIXTH Army belonged the responsibility of supervising the delivery of the REAMPS to these two ports. The medical examination and processing became the function of the FIFTH Fleet. This was accomplished by placing Navy medical teams at both ports and by assigning medical officers and corpsmen to accompany Army recovery teams into the various prisoner of war camps.

4. WAKAYAMA

The hospital ships CONSOLATION (AH 15) and SANCTUARY (AH 17) were stationed in WAKAYAMA under Rear Admiral R. S. Niggs in MONTPELLIER. The processing and evacuation of the REAMPS, accomplished in an orderly and highly efficient manner, were completed within six days - 12 to 18 September 1945. The CONSOLATION (AH 15) evacuated 1052, the SANCTUARY (AH 17) 1135, the CABILDO (LSD 16) 249 and the HOPPING (APD 51) 139 - a total of 2575. Of this number, 167 were litter cases, 281 hospital ambulatory, and 2127 troop ambulatory.

5. NAGASAKI

At NAGASAKI, the hospital ship HAVEN (AH 12), under Rear Admiral F. C. Fabrion, in WICHITA, was moored alongside the dock on 11 September 1945. The medical examination and processing station was established in a large warehouse nearby, but the HAVEN (AH 12) remained at the dock in the capacity of a station and screening hospital. She also supplied the processing station
with steam, hot water, general utilities, and food. Some Navy medical teams were stationed on the dock; others worked with Army recovery teams which went to the various prisoner of war camps. The medical screening was so planned that every prisoner was routed past a battery of trained nurses and interpreters, where a check-off questionnaire was made. This included a brief summary of military and naval experience, date of capture, sickness in camp, mistreatment or punishment in camp, quality and quantity of food, and occupation in camp. More than 9,000 personal statements were obtained.

Medical examinations and processing disclosed many instances of brutality. In fairness, however, close questioning often disclosed that the prisoner had been guilty of breaking some petty but strict prison rule. A considerable number of the older men stated that the camp treatment, although extremely rugged, was on the whole not too bad. They expected quick punishment when caught for infractions of rules and got it. All complained of the food, clothing, housing, and lack of heating facilities. Malnutrition was common. Many serious cases of beriberi and tuberculosis required hospitalization.

9061 REAMPS were evacuated at NAGASAKI. Of this number, 685 were stretcher cases or patients so weak as to require hospitalization. The rest, more than 92%, were able to proceed on transports as ambulatory troop passengers.

The release of the prisoners, accomplished by boat, motorcar, and train, and the medical examinations, delousing, processing, and screening has all been conducted in a remarkably smooth and efficient manner by 22 September 1945. (See pictures enclosed).

6. Atomic bomb

 Destruction at NAGASAKI by the atomic bomb was appalling. On 12 September 1945, many bomb victims were still being treated for burns, fractures, and a type of severe anemia said to be due to exposure to the radioactive gamma rays released by the bomb. Availability of the hospital ship HAVEN (AH 12) at the dock created the rarest opportunity for factual clinical findings, since the main hospitals and the NAGASAKI Medical College, including practically all medical equipment, had been destroyed. The facilities of the HAVEN (AH 12) permitted x-ray studies and a collection of valuable pathological specimens, biopsies, and autopsies to be made. Preliminary findings indicated that many victims did suffer from the radioactive gamma rays, which produced a delayed severe anemia. This was accompanied by a great reduction in white cells, simulating a type of pernicious leukopenia or agranulocytosis. These specimens have been forwarded by the HAVEN (AH 12) to the Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, for further examination and study.
7. Epidemiology

The Commander FIFTH Fleet relieved Commander THIRD Fleet and assumed command of all naval forces in Japanese waters on 20 September 1945. The epidemiology of JAPAN, following severe war conditions, became of great medical importance.

Health statistics gathered from the health department of NIIGASAKI, and from SHIKOKU, HONSHU, and HOKKAIDO reveals no diseases epidemic in scope to be prevalent in JAPAN except water-borne dysentery and acute enteritis. There is no cholera, no serious mosquito-borne diseases. Like ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES, JAPAN has come through the war with surprisingly low instances of epidemic disease. Large numbers of Japanese soldiers returning from the Asiatic mainland may alter this favorable picture. Louse-borne typhus must be seriously considered.

Water-borne diseases constitute the most serious menace to the health of the fleet. Naval forces ashore have been fortunate in maintaining a very low incidence of gastro-intestinal disease. When ships are concentrated in large numbers, as now at YOKOSUKA, the harbor water tends to become polluted. This necessitates the most rigid sanitary measures aboard ship to prevent and to control dysentery. Such measures have been instituted.

8. Venereal disease

Repression of prostitution and the prevention of venereal disease were the basic principles in an intensive educational campaign to meet the deplorable nationwide legalized prostitution and the high incidence of venereal disease in JAPAN.

Prostitution and widespread venereal diseases are age old in JAPAN. Prostitution is legalized and controlled by the Japanese government, licensed prostitutes being confined to restricted sections. Placing these institutions out of bounds does not solve the problem of venereal exposure, for in addition clandestine prostitution flourishes at all ports. The situation in YOKOSUKA is especially dangerous because of the large numbers of Navy ships present and the fleet activities ashore. In a vigorous attempt to prevent venereal disease, all of the waterfront and back street houses of prostitution were placed out of bounds. Prophylaxis stations were established at the very entrance to a Japanese police-controlled YASHUURA House, one at the center of the liberty zone, and another at the fleet landing. These were manned by well-trained hospital corpsmen under the supervision of a full-time venereal disease-prevention medical officer. A continuous educational campaign was carried out urging continence and warning of the dangerously diseased condition of all Japanese prostitutes; men were told that failure to take proper prophylactic immediately after exposure invited certain infection. These procedures resulted in a drastic lowering of the venereal diseases chargeable to the YOKOSUKA area.

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In keeping with the policy of the War and Navy Departments toward repression of prostitution, all houses of prostitution were placed out of bounds on 4 November 1945.

The venereal rate for the Fleet based at YOKOSUKA is very low. The estimate is as follows: 63,000 personnel, 11 admissions for a period of 21 days in October, 3.03 annual rate per thousand.

9. Casualties

There were no casualties resulting from enemy action during the landing of the occupational forces (SIXTH Army) in western JAPAN. Despite heavy weather much of the time, operational casualties were only minor.

Minesweeping, extensively carried out through all approaches to western JAPAN, has resulted in only minor operational casualties.

A severe typhoon struck OKINAWA on 7-9 October 1945. Many small ships in the harbor were lost or damaged, and facilities at the Naval Operating Base, including all hospital installations, were wrecked. 35 were killed, 25 are missing, and more than 100 were injured to the extent of requiring hospitalization.

Demolition of Japanese installations and dumping of enemy ammunition at YOKOSUKA have resulted in the accidental death of one enlisted man and serious injury to one officer and eight enlisted men.

10. Hospital ships and medical facilities

The FIFTH Fleet was well staffed in medical personnel and has had ample medical supplies. The hospital ship, BENEVOLENCE (AH 13) services the Fleet in TOKYO Harbor and has averaged a daily census of between four and five hundred patients. The SAMARITAN (AH 10) reported on 3 October 1945 and is stationed at SASEBO. The HAVEN (AH 12) and TRANQUILITY (AH 14) were released to "Magic Carpet" upon completion of the evacuation of REAMPS on 29 September 1945. The CONSOLATION (AH 15) has been stationed at WAKAYAMA and NAGoya. She was sent to OKINAWA to augment damaged hospital facilities resulting from the typhoon of 7-9 October 1945. On 1 November 1945, she too was released to "Magic Carpet".

A medical company of the FOURTH Regiment Marines is stationed in the former Japanese naval hospital at YOKOSUKA. They have surgical facilities and wards to meet emergency shore demands.

The G-4 Component of LION 9 has arrived in the harbor and is waiting decision as to whether it will be unloaded.
11. Fleet Medical Society

Bi-monthly medical meetings have been enjoyed by the Fleet medical and dental officers. Attendance ranges from one to two hundred doctors, depending on weather and availability of boats. Current disease topics and medical problems are presented and thoroughly discussed. The meetings are organized under the name of TOKYO Bay Medical Society, YOKOSUKA, JAPAN.

12. Recommendations

(1) Hospital Ships

When Fleet needs permit, recommend that the BENEVOLENCE (AH 13) be exchanged for the BOUNTIFUL (AH 9). (Estimated date of exchange is 1 December 1945). The BENEVOLENCE (AH 13) may then be released for "Magic Carpet" duty.

(2) Should the Medical Battalion of the FOURTH Regiment now stationed in YOKOSUKA be removed, the 6-4 Component of LION 9 now in the harbor should be established as a dispensary or small hospital ashore.
SECTION G
WEATHER SUMMARY

1. Typhoons and other weather phenomena

During this operation four typhoons affected the FIFTH Fleet area of responsibility, and four others passed south of the area on a westerly course, eventually to dissipate on the coast of CHINA. In tracking these typhoons, it is considered that the reports from weather reconnaissance aircraft provided the greatest aid in definitely locating them. It is recommended that planes continue to be made available for such duty in areas where it is normal to expect storms of typhoon intensity.

2. Weather broadcasts, forecasts, and advisories

Forecasts, advisories, and broadcasts of synoptic weather reports, including weather map analyses, originated by the Fleet Weather Centrals at GUAM, MANILA, and CHUNGKING, were of excellent quality and aided considerably in checking own analyses and in forecasting for the operating area. Although it was evident that some of the atmospheric pressures reported by stations included in the CHUNGKING broadcast were unreliable, the CHINA reports were most helpful, and particularly so were the upper air reports. In the same manner, synoptic reports from the Russian broadcasts were difficult to assimilate at times, but an improvement was noted during the period for which this summary is submitted.

3. Within the FIFTH Fleet area of responsibility the diversion of shipping to clear typhoon tracks was handled as follows:

(1) Commandant Naval Operating Base, OKINAWA, was designated diverting authority within his area of responsibility.

(2) Amphibious force commanders were delegated diverting authorities for their forces.

(3) Commander FIFTH Fleet maintained overall supervision and directed diversions as necessary.
COMMUNICATIONS

1. Communication planning

Communication planning for the occupation operation was necessarily hurried and unsatisfactory. Formulation of plans was complicated by several factors: first, the uncertainty in the minds of all concerned regarding enemy reaction, actual destination of groups and forces involved, and duration of the operation; second, plans had to be accommodated to previous commitments for the KYUSHU operation; and third, there was hesitancy in providing adequate mobile communication units to serve the port directors. The assembly of these units was started by Commander Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, who also controlled their assignment to destinations. This last control preferably might have been performed by Commander FIFTH Fleet. Moreover, the communication units were not large enough.

2. Similarly, planning for the permanent communication facilities was somewhat uncertain and in some respects too much material and too many men were provided for the job, whereas in other cases not enough was planned for. Establishment of essential permanent facilities was retarded because of the impracticability of issuing a firm directive, the uncertain arrival of personnel and equipment, and delays in unloading the same. In the case of utilization of Japanese Empire stations, the Japanese had made prior agreements with the Army Airways Communications System whereby the latter obtained a "lien" upon all the former Japanese naval radio stations. Not all of these facilities were needed by the Army Airways Communications System, and Navy requirements were cheerfully relinquished, but the process of inspection and rehabilitation took time.

3. As visualized by Commander FIFTH Fleet at the present time, the ultimate naval communication facilities for the occupied portion of the Japanese Empire will include:

(a) A comparatively large naval radio station at the YOKOSUKA Navy Yard serving all naval activities in the TOKYO area. This station will utilize a considerable amount of equipment formerly used by the Japanese Navy, installed and entirely operative, at the Japanese naval radio station near the town of TOTSUKA. The latter station will be shared with the Army Airways Communications System. This sharing of equipment presents no problem, for there is a long record of cooperation in joint communications effective for the Navy, the Army, and the Army Airways Communications System throughout the campaign in the Central Pacific.
(b) A secondary naval radio station on a smaller scale at SASEBO (NEG), also utilizing Japanese equipment.

(c) Communications for Navy Port Directors operating with the Army ship routing officers at the various ports which are to handle the major portion of the garrison shipping. These port directors must also be connected with the Army through the Army land-line teletype system into the headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at TOKYO.

4. Communications in the Empire must ultimately include the following circuits:

(a) The naval base net connecting the several port directors with the three Navy radio stations: NDI at OKINAWA, NEG at SASEBO and NDT at TOKYO (YOKOSUKA).

(b) Navy ship to shore series, at Radio NDT.

(c) Merchant ship to shore series, at Radio NDT.

(d) 500 kilocycles, at Radio NDI, NDT, NEG.

(e) 468 kilocycles for working merchantmen, at Radio NDI, NDT, NEG.

(f) Intercept of the GUAM Ship FOX and the Central Pacific Merchant ship FOX, Haiku, at all stations.

(g) Teletype from Radio TOKYO (NDT) communication to:

(1) GUAM
(2) OAHU
(3) SAN FRANCISCO

(h) Usual local circuits.

(i) Land line communications with various Army headquarters.

(j) Communication between Naval or Marine air stations in the occupied area.

5. **Naval communications afloat**

The reaction of Naval communications to the advent of peace was an enormous increase in the radio traffic load. Although the average length of messages decreased, many more messages were sent. This increased volume of traffic was largely plain language and was almost entirely administrative in character. The immediate effect was to overload the existing broadcast channels, so that it became necessary to institute other means of delivery.
It would have been desirable to institute a broadcast for the Empire itself, but there was no ship in the area having the facilities and personnel to do so. That deficiency was removed when the APPALACHIAN became flagship of Commander Task Force 51 (Commander Battleship Squadron ONE).

6. Various measures were tried in an attempt to solve the problems posed by existing conditions. Traffic was shifted as much as possible to mobile circuits. Eventually it became practicable to institute an Empire broadcast, using the APPALACHIAN as transmitting ship. The shore radio stations delivered considerable traffic by mail. None of these is entirely satisfactory but the overall result is reasonably effective. The frequencies available for the LOVE broadcast from the APPALACHIAN are not the best which could have been chosen, but were the best which could be found at this time. There was considerable noise on the channels selected and initially the transmissions from the APPALACHIAN were imperfect.

7. Increased use of radio teletype was a great assistance in the expeditious delivery of radio traffic. By means of it a large volume could be transmitted to and from the major commanders.

8. Developments during the operation accompanying the occupation of JAPAN have emphasized various factors affecting communications which should be mentioned at this time. Few commanders realize the effect which the demobilization will produce in the communication departments of ships and flag commands. For the last four years naval communications to a large extent have been administered and operated by reserve officers, few of whom intend to remain in the Navy. There are a negligible number of regular Navy officers, and virtually none in the ranks of Lieutenant and Lieutenant (jg), who possess other than a superficial knowledge of Naval communications. Since few regular Navy officers have the necessary technical background for communication duty, most of them are extremely reluctant to undertake it. Nor can they be blamed particularly, since it is a specialized form of duty for which the rewards are not always commensurate with the responsibilities. As demobilization progresses, communication efficiency can be expected to decline to a marked degree. Many discrepancies have already been observed, and almost all of them are traceable to inadequate and untrained personnel. It is considered essential that personnel being inducted into and trained in the Navy be assigned to communication training in large numbers if efficient naval communications are to be maintained. There is a fallacious belief in the minds
of many officers in the service that communications will reduce in volume. The actual reduction in volume is less in effect than the actual reduction in the size of the Navy. Few realize that there is a certain level of communication volume which accompanies the administration of the Navy as a whole regardless of the size of the Fleet. That volume has been attained. It is interesting to observe that the volume is about the same as it was in 1940, indicating that the enormously larger fleet does not, during the period of demobilization, utilize communications much more than did the pre-war fleet. However, it must be pointed out that similarly there is a minimum below which the communications staffs on ships and flag commands cannot be permitted to go. That minimum is being approached and as demobilization progresses, the permissible minimum will be passed. When that time comes communications must inevitably suffer.
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Serial: 0664

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Action Report, Occupation of JAPAN (Part VI - Special Reports)

SECTION I
ADMINISTRATION

1. Fleet administration base

At the outset of the occupation operation, OKINAWA was designated as the administration base for the FIFTH Fleet and all air and surface mail, air freight, personnel under orders, and replacements for FIFTH Fleet forces were directed there, to be moved forward to the occupied areas by seaplane and destroyer couriers. When Commander FIFTH Fleet relieved Commander THIRD Fleet and Commander North Pacific Force on 17 September 1945, the THIRD Fleet was based on ENIWETOK (and IWO JIMA for air mail) and the forces in northern JAPAN on the ALEUTIANS. Commander FIFTH Fleet established YOKOSUKA as the Fleet administration base for all forces in the Eastern and Northern JAPAN Force areas. On 10 October 1945 after the destructive typhoon at OKINAWA, YOKOSUKA was established as the Fleet administration base for all forces in the Empire.

2. Mail

(a) General

Mail service was for the most part satisfactory. Mobile LST post offices which had been outfitted for the KYUSHU invasion were used at principal occupation ports, supplemented by branch post offices, usually in seaplane tenders, in less active locations. In the initial stages of the operation, great difficulty was experienced in routing mail due to the lack of accurate information of location and prospective movements of ships, and the constant reorganization of forces engaged in the operation incident to the rapid withdrawal of Fleet units for return to the United States. Service for forces in the Southwestern JAPAN Force area was interrupted for a short period when the typhoon of 9 October destroyed all Fleet mail facilities at OKINAWA, which was at that time the mail base for these forces. Mail for forces in the Southwestern JAPAN Force area was immediately rerouted from GUAM through YOKOSUKA, after which YOKOSUKA became the mail base for all Naval forces in Empire waters. Mail was forwarded from YOKOSUKA to forces concerned by a system of destroyer and seaplane couriers which provided daily deliveries to all areas of Naval activity in the Empire. The details of the mail system as of 22 October 1945 are shown in ComFIFTHFleet serial 1438 (Copy inserted following this section).
(b) Flag mail

Handling of Flag mail was not satisfactory. When a flagship was changed and the former flagship withdrawn from the area, mail for the staff became very irregular for a considerable period. Checks of ships' pouches made it apparent that Service Force instructions which require mail for major Flag commands to be despatched in direct pouches to destination were not being followed. In combat operations or operations such as the present one, changes in flagships are frequent. The only way to insure adequate service for a Flag is to handle Flag mail separately from ships mail throughout the postal system.

(c) Officer messenger mail

Because of the general reduction in classification of mail, the officer messenger system handled very little secret or top secret mail. However, its services in handling restricted and non-classified directives and operation orders in cases where prompt and assured deliveries were required, justified its existence.

3. Personnel

(a) General

Insofar as possible, special requirements for personnel which arose among Empire forces were met from local resources. In implementing this policy, a broad field authority was assumed by Commander FIFTH Fleet, care being taken to keep all commands concerned advised of the action taken.

(b) Demobilization

Demobilization directives were vigorously implemented by FIFTH Fleet forces. After mid-September the general withdrawal of Fleet units to the United States was underway. Thereafter, no important backlog of personnel waiting transportation existed at any Empire port. Inasmuch as there were no permanent receiving ship facilities in the Empire, personnel were retained aboard ship until transportation became available and then transferred directly to the transporting vessel.

(c) Replacements

To assist in meeting the severe replacement shortage at the beginning of the operation, Commander FIFTH Fleet directed that all ships departing for the United States make available to the local service division commander all personnel who had been in the combat
area less than nine months and who had less than 41 points (three points below score required for separation), except such personnel as were required as a matter of military necessity for the return voyage. This directive was implemented by the service division commanders. By 23 October, arrivals of fleet replacements (mostly non-rated) plus approaching departure of the majority of long-service ships remaining in the area warranted cancellation of this directive. The authority of service division commanders to remove personnel from FIFTH Fleet ships to meet urgent local requirements, however, was confirmed and restated at that time. A critical shortage of suitable replacements for men in higher rates released for separation continues, with no prospect of relief except by fleet ing up through intensive on-board training.

(d) Officer personnel

Many requirements arose for officers for staffs of major Empire commanders, whose initial division staffs were inadequate for the volume of work required of them in area assignments. For the most part officers to fill these billets were obtained from ships and staffs leaving the area, and ordered as required for temporary duty pending confirmation of change of duty orders by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. It was appreciated at the outset that any attempt to meet such requirements by requests to rear areas would be subject to unacceptable delays.

(e) Release orders for officers

Demobilization of officers was impeded throughout the period of this report by lack of availability of commands authorized to issue release orders in the Empire area. For a short period, Commander Service Squadron 10 was located at TOKYO Bay, but ships in other areas in the Empire had no source of obtaining release orders without going through the mails – a procedure essentially unsatisfactory because of delays involved. A recommendation by Commander THIRD Fleet and Commander FIFTH Fleet at the outset that this authority be delegated to commanding officers of ships was rejected by higher authority. On 29 October, the Bureau of Naval Personnel authorized Commander FIFTH Fleet to issue release orders, and during the following few days, Commander FIFTH Fleet issued release orders to several hundred officers in the TOKYO Bay area. On 29 October, the Bureau of Naval Personnel further authorized type commanders to delegate their authority to issue release orders to senior type representatives in the field. In an effort to establish a releasing authority available to all ships in the Empire, Commander FIFTH Fleet proposed to Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet, that releasing authority be delegated by agreement between type commanders to the SOFA (Admin) at each principal port in the Empire. This recommendation is still pending.
COMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 1438

22 October 1945

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.

To: Distribution List.

Subject: Mail - FIFTH Fleet Area.

1. Instructions for handling mail in the FIFTH Fleet area are summarized herein for information and compliance by all concerned.

2. Postal facilities

Postal facilities have been established as indicated below. Additional facilities will be established as required by the opening of additional areas of naval activity.

(a) TOKYO BAY area

YOKOSUKA
FPO ashore
Seaplane terminal in SUISUN (AVP 53)
NATS terminal at KISARAIZU airfield

YOKOHAMA
Branch post office ashore

(b) OMINATO area

OMINATO
Seaplane terminal in TANGIER (AV 8)

(c) INLAND SEA area

WAKAYAMA
FPO in LST 50
Seaplane terminal in FLOYS BAY (AVP 37)

HIRO WAT - KURE
Seaplane terminal in YAKUTAT (AVP 32)
Branch post office in VANDENBURGH (APB 48)

MATSUYAMA
To be established

NAGOYA
To be established

(d) Western Japan area

SASEBO
FPO in LST 48
Seaplane terminal in PINE ISLAND (AV 12)
COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 1438  22 October 1945

Subject: Mail - FIFTH Fleet Area.

(e) OKINAWA

FPO ashore at BATEN KO
Seaplane terminal in CHINCOTEGUS at OKINAWA WAN

3. Routing of mail

(a) All airmail from the UNITED STATES for naval units in the Empire area is routed via GUAM to YOKOSUKA. FPO YOKOSUKA trans-ships mail via seaplane and destroyer couriers to FPO's WAKAYAMA, SASEBO, and OKINAWA and via seaplane to PO terminal at OMINATO. Area commanders are responsible for further distribution of mail within areas under their cognizance.

(b) Airmail from the UNITED STATES for units at OKINAWA is routed via GUAM to FPO OKINAWA.

(c) Mail is routed to locations as indicated in CinCPac serial 003300 of 5 September 1945 (held by FPO's) as corrected by a daily dispatch and as modified by ComMARIANAS and ComFIFTHFleet in accordance with latest operational information.

(d) To insure that latest operational information is available to those responsible for the distribution of mail, all routing authorities have been directed to include ComServPac, ComMARIANAS, FPO YOKOSUKA, and, where appropriate, CNOB OKINAWA, and ComPhil-SeaFron as information addresses of all ship movement orders and reports affecting routing of mail. (ComFIFTHFleet Communication Plan No. 10-45, para. 2510 (b)).

4. Transportation of mail

(a) Seaplane (schedules as of 23 October 1945)

YOKOSUKA-OKINAWA
-Departs YOKOSUKA 0600 daily. ETA WAKAYAMA 0820. ETA SASEBO 1130. ETA OKINAWA 1515.

OKINAWA-YOKOSUKA
-Departs OKINAWA 0600 daily. ETA SASEBO 0925. ETA WAKAYAMA 1235. ETA YOKOSUKA 1515.

WAKAYAMA-HIRO WAN
-Departs WAKAYAMA 1330 daily. Departs HIRO WAN 1500 daily.
Subject: Mail - FIFTH Fleet Area.

- YOKOSUKA-SASEBO
  - Departs YOKOSUKA 1230 daily. Departs SASEBO 0700 daily.

- YOKOSUKA-OMINATO
  - Departs YOKOSUKA 0900 daily. ETA OMINATO 1230. Departs OMINATO 0900 daily. ETA YOKOSUKA 1230.

- OMINATO-OTARU
  - First flight 19 October and every odd day thereafter. Departs OMINATO 0730. Departs OTARU 1100 same day.

Additional shuttle trips within areas as directed by task force commanders in accordance with local requirements.

(b) **Land plane**

NATS - two flights daily GUAM to KISARAZU (TOKYO BAY). Additional sections when required to clear current mail.

NATS to OKINAWA for units at OKINAWA.

(c) **Destroyer courier**

- YOKOSUKA - WAKAYAMA
  - Daily.

- WAKAYAMA - SASEBO
- WAKAYAMA - HIRO WAN
  - Twice weekly.

Additional shuttle trips within areas as directed by task force commanders in accordance with local requirements.

5. **Personnel**

All postal personnel in each area are under the control of the area commander and may be transferred between postal facilities within the area in accordance with operational requirements. Orders should be for temporary duty, with copy to ComFIFTHFleet and ComServPac. Additional FIFTH Fleet postal personnel are now in a postal pool at CIND, OKINAWA and are available for assignment to tenders or as required on request to Commander FIFTH Fleet.
6. Special instructions to postal officers in Japan area
   (a) Maintain close liaison with SOPA and port director for operational information.
   (b) Clear all mail daily. Never hold for air tomorrow what may be dispatched by surface today. If a backlog develops, apply to SOPA promptly for special air or surface transportation to clear.
   (c) FPO YOKOSUKA is mail center for all units in Japan area. Never hold mail for units of which the location is unknown. Return such mail to FPO YOKOSUKA.
   (d) Wherever possible, dispatch surface mail to destination direct. Apply to port director for transportation.
   (e) Clear mail for PHILIPPINES on shipping direct or through GUAM.
   (f) Clear mail for CHINA and KOREA through OKINAWA (seaplane connects OKINAWA - SHANGHAI; OKINAWA - JINSENN; SHANGHAI - TAKU. NATS connects OKINAWA - SHANGHAI.)
   (g) Clear officer messenger and official mail daily via courier seaplane. Have personal airmail ready for courier plane to load if lift is available.
   (h) Maintain close liaison with local Army base post office and Army courier service. Cooperate with Army post office in clearing inter-service official mail. Make arrangements direct to clear mail through Army system for isolated naval units not otherwise accessible.
   (i) Report all complaints of non-receipt of mail promptly to FPO YOKOSUKA, force commander, ComFIFTHFleet and ComMARIANAS stating date and place of last receipt of mail from U.S. by unit concerned. Review locator information to explain discrepancies.

7. SOPA(admin) at each locality is responsible for the operation of local postal facilities and shall issue instructions for the pick up and delivery of mail. He shall insure that such boats as are required for the expeditious handling of mail are made available to the CinCPFP.

8. The daily seaplane courier each way YOKOSUKA - WAKAYAMA - SASEBO - OKINAWA is established primarily to connect FIFTH Fleet task force commanders with a reliable inter-area official mail system. It is
Subject: Mail - FIFTH Fleet Area.

the responsibility of the SOFA in each terminal area to insure that this system is operating efficiently.

9. The cooperation of all hands is required to maintain the efficiency of the mail system. Task force, group, and unit commanders shall provide the local postal officer with operational information essential to the expeditious delivery of mail on hand.

D. C. RAMSEY,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution List: (Two (2) copies of each addressee except as indicated).

ComBatRon 1
ComCruDiv's 4, 12, 13, 17
ComEsCarFor
ComTaskFlet's 1, 3, 6
ComCarDiv's 3, 22
ComMinPac (5)

CFAW 17
HAMLIN, CHANDELEUR, PINE ISLAND, ST GEORGE

ComTHIRDPhibFor
ComPhibGrp's 4, 8, 11

ComServRon 10
ComServDiv's 102, 103, 104

Copy to:
CinCPac (5)
ComServPac (5)
ComMARIANAS (5)

ComSEVENTHFleet
CFAW 1
ComPhilSeaFron

ComMarCils

SCAP

C. F. BARBER,
Flag Secretary.

SCAJAP
ComFltActYOKOSUKA
ONOB OKINAWA, OMINATO

PD'S YOKOSUKA, YOKOHAMA, TOKYO
NAGASAKI, SASEBO, WAKAYAMA,
OMINATO, KURE, HAKODATE, OTARU,
AOMORI, MATSUYAMA.

PPO's YOKOSUKA, LST 50 (WAKAYAMA)
LST 48 (SASEBO), OKINAWA (5)

Postal Officers SUISUN, TANGIER,
FLOYDS BA, YAKUTAT,
CHINCOTEAGUE

ComGen6thArmy
ComGen8thArmy
ComGen V PhibCorps

PLTLOSCAP

PPO's SAIPAN, GUAM, MANILA
Airmail Center, GUAM

OMMC SAIPAN, GUAM, MANILA
1. Routes and reference points

(a) During the planning period at GUAM for the occupation operation, representatives of Commander FIFTH Fleet conferred with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, regarding the necessary revision to SOP-4. Commander FIFTH Fleet submitted shipping routes from U.S. bases to Japanese ports which were to be used for landing U.S. Army occupation forces. These routes and reference points were promulgated by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, in SOP-4A, which contained routes and reference points within the THIRD, FIFTH and SEVENTH Fleet areas, in addition to previously established routes in the MARIANAS and PHILIPPINE Sea Frontier areas.

(b) After a conference in MANILA with representatives of Commander Minescraft, Pacific, and Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, Commander FIFTH Fleet published his Operation Plan No. 6-45. In the Navigation Annex to this operation plan, approach routes to ports within the FIFTH Fleet area of responsibility were established from the terminal point of the shipping routes in SOP-4A to the inner harbor of the port concerned. Minesweeping plans, based upon these routes, provided for sweeping of channels at anchorage areas and inner harbors, as well as for the removal of known minefields in the proximity of routes and other areas to be used by U.S. shipping.

(c) After the Commander FIFTH Fleet relieved Commander THIRD Fleet and Commander North Pacific Force of their areas of responsibility and became commander of all Naval forces in JAPAN, it was apparent that additional coastal routes would be necessary to shorten existing shipping lanes. These were promulgated to the FIFTH Fleet by dispatch, and to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for inclusion in SOP-4A.

(d) In order to improve routing of ships between FIFTH and SEVENTH Fleet areas of responsibility, cross-over routes were established and changes made as necessary.

(e) As minesweeping progressed, routes were shortened by re-routing them through the areas that had been swept.

2. Convoy and routing

(a) During the initial phases of the occupation operation ships were sent in convoys with escorts. After shipping control authorities had been established in the various areas and minesweeping had progressed
sufficiently, however, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, discontinued the convoy and escort system, except that ships with 500 or more personnel embarked were required to be escorted or sailed in company with one or more ships. The convoy and routing system followed was as laid down in Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, serial 07052 of 18 August 1945 and changes thereto. Ships sailing for the Empire or OKINAWA from the West Coast were routed via great circle courses shortly after the occupation operation commenced. When ships entered the area covered by SOP-41, they were required to follow the established routes, all carefully selected to pass clear of minefields and other navigational hazards. From time to time individual ships without radar were furnished escorts through dangerous waters at night.

3. Ship locations and movements

(a) From the beginning of the occupation operation, the locations and movements of shipping were major problems. Daily movements were kept on a 24-hour plot for all shipping for which Commander FIFTH Fleet received routing instructions. Furthermore, the movements and locations of all combatant types of ships were recorded in a cardex system. Keeping records of smaller types of amphibious craft presented difficulties, however, because of their large numbers and wide diversity of operations. As the amphibious forces routed their own ships, it was sometimes difficult because of lack of information, to keep an accurate account of their movements. Improvement was achieved by directing that all task force and task group commanders, when routing shipping, make interested command information addresses on all movement dispatches.

(b) Commander FIFTH Fleet was charged with control of all shipping within his area of responsibility. Commandant, Naval Operating Base, OKINAWA, was named diverting and shipping control authority for waters adjacent to the Ryukyus. Amphibious force commanders retained shipping control of amphibious forces throughout the operation. Commander FIFTH Fleet retained shipping control within Empire waters because communication between port directors and area commanders was neither satisfactory nor positive enough to delegate such authority further.
1. The Minesweeping Plan, Annex F to Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 6-45, was prepared after conference at MANILA with representatives of the FIFTH Amphibious Force and Commander Minecraft, Pacific. Provisions were made for sweeping channels to ports through which the armed forces were to be landed or supplied, anchorage areas, and harbors. Established approach routes and areas to be swept were shown on charts appended to Annex B, Navigation Plan, Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 6-45.

2. The original plan directed Commander Minecraft, Pacific, to sweep the following ports, with completion dates as indicated:

   KAGOSHIMA - 2 September 1945; SASEBO - 22 September 1945;
   WAKAYAMA - 25 September 1945; NAGOYA - 2 October 1945;
   HIROSHIMA-KURE - 22 October 1945; KOCHI - 25 October 1945;
   TSUSHIMA Straits, when directed.

3. When the date for commencing evacuation of ex-POW's was advanced, the NAGASAKI-SASEBO area, KOCHI, and WAKAYAMA were ordered cleared by 12 September 1945. This date was met by concentrating on sweeping channels and such other areas as were required for evacuation purposes. The next major change in the sweeping plan occurred after conferences with Japanese made patent that the HIROSHIMA-KURE area was unsweeable. HIRO WAAN was selected as the landing point for the KURE area because sweeping could be accomplished in time for landing on 22 October. Another change in the sweeping plan resulted when the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers changed the landing point on SHIKOKU from KOCHI to MATSUYAMA. However, MATSUYAMA was cleared without much additional effort, as the INLAND Sea had already been swept to HIRO WAAN. The sweeping at KOCHI will yield returns to the Japanese but not to U.S. forces. In spite of changes, however, sweeping was slightly ahead of schedule by 15 September.

4. To shorten coastal routes, Commander Minecraft, Pacific, was directed to sweep VAN DIEHM, COLNETT, and VINCENNE Straits.

5. The typhoon of 16–18 September did considerable damage to minecraft and stopped all operations for several days. Although this delay put minesweeping operations behind schedule, landing dates in SASEBO and WAKAYAMA were met. This was made possible because of preliminary sweeping in connection with evacuation of POW's.
6. Commander Minecraft, Pacific, was unable to open ISE WAN-NAGoya by 2 October 1945 because of delays caused by the typhoon. A revised date of completion, 7 October, was set. Further delay resulted when a U.S. magnetic mine was exploded during exploratory sweeping on 3 November. The presence of U.S. magnetic mines was not expected. A revision of the sweeping plan was made and extensive magnetic sweeping commenced. All available magnetic sweepers were sent to ISE WAN to augment forces present. A new estimate of 15 October was made for the completion date. However, the typhoon of 7-9 October again delayed operations, and NAGOYA was not opened until 25 October. Sweeping at NAGOYA was continued after 25 October to widen channels and to explore additional areas. Test passes which were made by large ships, "Guinea Pigs", at NAGOYA produced negative results.

7. Although Commander Minecraft, Pacific, was uncertain about meeting the landing date at HIRO WAN, the sweeping operation was completed on time. "Guinea Pigs" ships were used to explore for pressure mines in sweeping the channel to HIRO WAN but with negative results. The employment of "Guinea Pigs" in the INLAND Sea was the first time this type of sweeping had been attempted. Commander Minecraft, Pacific, issued a warning to all ships to proceed with caution and at slow speeds when within the expected location of U.S. pressure mines. Ships continued to use swept channel into HIRO WAN without damage from mines until 31 October, when LSM 114 set off a mine nearby which killed one man and did moderate damage. The mine detonated was believed to be a pressure mine.

8. As a result of the extremely poor transportation in JAPAN, the Army was unable to supply many of its forces overland. It was necessary to add additional ports to the minesweeping plan from time to time. FUSAN in KOREA was opened for the SEVENTH Fleet. The channel to FUKUOKA, KYUSHU, was commenced ahead of schedule to assist the V Amphibious Corps.

9. On 20 September Commander FIFTH Fleet became commander of all Naval forces in JAPAN, and assumed responsibility for all minesweeping in the Empire waters. Since the minesweeping annex to Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 6-45 did not provide for sweeping throughout the Empire or for the employment of Japanese sweepers, a new minesweeping plan, Annex A to Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 9-45, was published. Commander Minecraft, Pacific, was directed to prepare plans for the sweeping of the following:

(a) Complete channel to FUKUOKA.
(b) KURE-HIROSHIMA, KOBE-Osaka.
(c) TSUSHIMA Straits.
(d) NIIGATA.
(e) TSURUGA.
(f) SKAGWAY and KLONDIKE.
(g) Assist SEVENTH Fleet as practicable.
(h) SHIMONOSEKI Straits.
(i) FORMOSA area.
U.S. forces were given primary responsibility for sweeping ocean minefields and for clearing ports through which U.S. forces would land or be supplied. Japanese forces were used to assist U.S. forces or to sweep areas of their own interest.

10. Commander Minecraft, Pacific, was given responsibility for the coordination of overall plans, sweeping procedures, and all related technical matters. Sweeping groups, while in the area of responsibility of the sub-area commander, (CTF's 51, 53, 56) were under the general operational control of the task force commander. Commander Minecraft, Pacific, was directed to supervise Japanese minesweeping. The allocation of Japanese sweepers to Japanese sweeping projects was made only when such forces could not be used to advantage in sweeping areas of U.S. interest.

11. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, issued QPY messages from time to time which notified all ships of restricted areas due to mining and of swept channels and other navigational instructions. Fleet commanders were directed to notify the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, when changes were desired. Commander FIFTH Fleet further directed Commander Minecraft, Pacific, to coordinate minesweeping information within the FIFTH Fleet area and to submit recommendations to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for changes to existing QPY messages or for new ones.

12. The following is the status of minesweeping within the Empire waters as of 31 October 1945:

(a) Areas completed under Commander THIRD Fleet:

TOKYO Bay, SENDAI, and adjacent areas; CHOSHI, ONO HAMA.

(b) Areas started by Commander North Pacific Force, but completed under Commander FIFTH Fleet:

TSUGARU Straits and OMINATO, AOMORI, and HAKODATE.

(c) Area swept under direction of Commander FIFTH Fleet:

KAGOSHIMA, WAKAYAMA, SASEBO, NAGASAKI, VAN DIEMAN, COLENET, and VINCENNE Straits.

(d) Sweeping in progress with estimated completion dates as indicated:

NAGOYA, BUNGO SUIDO, AKI NADA, TSUSHIMA Straits - indefinite.
KURE - 1 December 1945; FUKUOKA - late November 1945;
SKAGWAY and KLONDIKE - about 15 November 1945.
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(a) Area swept by Japanese:

HACHIKO JIMA - completed; east coast of KYUSHU - to be completed about 30 November 1945; NIIGATA - indefinite.

13. FIFTH Fleet sweep units are assisting Commander SEVENTH Fleet in the YELLOW Sea with completion dates indefinite. Commander Minecraft, Pacific, will provide units to Commander SEVENTH Fleet to sweep fields north of FORMOSA.
SECTION I

AIR OPERATIONS

1. The air operations conducted incident to the occupation of the Japanese Empire were performed by the following:

   Escort Carrier Task Force units.
   Fast Carrier Task Force units.
   Fleet Air Wing ONE (Relieved by Fleet Air Wing 17 at 24, CO,
   30 September 1945).
   Marine Air Wing TWO units.
   Battleship and cruiser aircraft.

2. Escort carrier operations

   Escort carrier task forces units provided air cover and surveillance flights for the amphibious force landings at SASEBO, WAKAYAMA, OMINATO, KURE, NAGOYA, and HATSUYAMA. No enemy resistance was encountered and no losses due to enemy action were suffered.

   The SIBONEY (CVE 112) and PUGET SOUND (CVE 113), last remaining CVE's in FIFTH Fleet, have been ordered to report to Commander SEVENTH Fleet on 15 November 1945.

3. Fast carrier operations

   On 16 September 1945, when Commander FIFTH Fleet relieved Commander THIRD Fleet, Commander SECOND Fast Carrier Task Force with Task Force 38 reported for duty. Task Force 38 became Task Force 58. Task Force 58 units engaged in routine surveillance flights until no longer required. At the present time only the LEXINGTON and INTREPID remain in the FIFTH Fleet.

4. Seaplane operations

   Fleet Air Wing ONE established seaplane bases for tender-supported operations at SASEBO, YOKOSUKA, and OMINATO, and conducted coastal searches and long range overwater searches in the FIFTH Fleet areas of responsibility. After the WAKAYAMA and KURE landings tender facilities were established at WAKAYAMA and HIRO WANG. Air courier service for passengers and mail was established, connecting TOKYO with OKINAWA, WAKAYAMA, HIRO WANG, SASEBO, and OMINATO.
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When it was found that the long range overwater searches revealed no unscheduled or unknown shipping, they were gradually reduced and, on 18 October 1945, were discontinued. At this time coastal patrols were combined with the air courier service flights. Patrol reports revealed no unauthorized movements of Japanese shippings.

Fleet Air Wings ONE and SEVENTEEN were reorganized effective 2400, 30 September 1945. Fleet Air Wing ONE reported to Commander SEVENTH Fleet and Fleet Air Wing SEVENTEEN reported to Commander FIFTH Fleet.

The Japanese Naval Air Stations at SASEBO, YOKOSUKA, and OMINATO were used by Fleet Air Wing SEVENTEEN for hauling out VF6 airplanes for maintenance when required.

During the typhoon of 16-18 September 1945, twenty-three airplanes of Fleet Air Wing ONE were damaged beyond repair at OKINAWA, one at OMINATO, and one at SASEBO. During the typhoon of 7-9 October 1945, six airplanes of Fleet Air Wing SEVENTEEN were damaged beyond repair at OKINAWA.

5. Marine air operations

For the purpose of establishing the Marine Air Base at OMURA an advance party of MAG 22 arrived there on 12 September 1945. As soon thereafter as the squadrons could be accommodated they were flown in. The ground echelons of MAG 22 for OMURA were not completely unloaded before the group was ordered returned to the U.S. by Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, on 30 October 1945. The V Amphibious Corps occupied the Marine Air Base, OMURA, on orders from Commanding General, SIXTH Army.

The Marine Air Base at IWAKUNI planned for the IWAKUNI-HIROSHIMA-KURE area was not established. It is expected that the V Amphibious Corps will occupy the IWAKUNI Air Base on orders from the Commanding General, SIXTH Army. Marine Air Group 21 squadrons VMF 353 and VMF 952, intended for IWAKUNI, were disposed as follows:

VMF 353 was ordered to GUAM,
VMF 952 was ordered to MAG 31 at YOKOSUKA.

MAG 31 was established at the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Base and under the operational control of Far Eastern Air Force, when Commander FIFTH Fleet relieved Commander THIRD Fleet on 16 September 1945. Commanding General, Far Eastern Air Force relinquished operational control of MAG 31 to Commander FIFTH Fleet on 7 October 1945.
6. Naval Air Transport Service

A naval air base was established at KISARAZU to function as the TOKYO area terminal for Naval Air Transport Service (NATS).

The NATS landplane facilities planned for OMURA, IWAKUNI, and OMINATO were not established because of the extensive improvements in existing facilities that would be required and because the intra Empire air courier passenger and mail service provided by Fleet Air Wing 17 appeared adequate to meet the Navy's needs for air courier communications within the Empire.

7. After arrangements are completed for the demilitarization of areas of naval interest in the northern JAPAN area by units of the EIGHTH Army, it is expected that Naval Air Base, OMINATO, will be occupied by Army forces.

8. Battleship and cruiser aircraft performed routine flights incidental to the missions of parent vessels.
SECTION M

DEMILITARIZATION

1. Organization

The Commander FIFTH Fleet and the Commanding Generals, SIXTH and EIGHTH Armies, are, under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, responsible for the demilitarization of JAPAN.

Commander FIFTH Fleet has delegated this task to the Areas Commanders, Commander Task Force 51 (Commander Battleship Squadron ONE), Commander Task Force 53 (Commander Cruiser Division SEVENTEEN), and Commander Task Force 56 (Commander Cruiser Division THIRTEEN). Within the limits of bases and airfields occupied by the Navy, and in the IZU Islands, this work is being done by the Navy; outside of these areas, the task force commanders have arranged with the corresponding Army commanders for demilitarization of naval installations, of which there are over 600 in the Empire.

To facilitate this operation in the SIXTH Army area, and to expedite the release of material from intelligence restrictions, a Naval Liaison Group has been established at SIXTH Army Headquarters, with liaison officers from the Naval Technical Mission, JAPAN (NavTechJap) at each corps and division headquarters.

2. Policy

Demilitarization policy is covered in SCAP Occupation Instructions Nos. 1 and 2. In general, except for intelligence items, enemy equipment of a purely military nature is either destroyed or scrapped; other enemy equipment is used by the occupation forces or turned over to the Home Ministry for use by the Japanese.

Suicide craft and midget submarines, except in YOKOSUKA, have been destroyed wherever found, but other Japanese craft, both naval and merchant, are being repaired and used to the maximum extent possible for Japanese repatriation, for lifting essential cargoes (under the supervision of the Administrator, Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine), for minesweeping, for ferry service, and for fishing. Even submarines, disarmed and not capable of diving, are being used for short daylight repatriation hauls.
3. Condition of Japanese ships

A survey of Japanese combatant ships by U.S. Naval forces showed the following to be the condition of the remaining units of the Japanese Navy:

Undamaged - 1 CV, 1 CVL, 2 CL, 32 DD, 53 SS, 62 escort vessels.

Damaged but towable - 1 BB, 1 CVL, 1 CVE, 1 CL, 11 DD, 19 SS, 31 escort vessels.

Uncompleted but towable - 3 CV, 1 DD, 10 SS.

Damaged and not towable - 3 BB (bottomed), 2 CV (1 bottomed), 1 CVE, 4 CA (2 bottomed), 1 CL (bottomed)
3 old cruisers (bottomed), plus minor units.

Most of the damaged ships listed above are in the KURE area. Almost all of the navigable vessels are in use in a demilitarized condition in repatriation service. A large number of navigable small units are engaged in minesweeping under the supervision of U.S. forces. The final disposition of Japanese combatant vessels has not yet been determined.

The status of the Japanese Merchant Marine as reported by the Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine follows:

Over 500 tons - 421 ships of 705,200 gross tons ready for use, additional 221 ships of 563,200 gross tons repairable.

100 to 500 tons - 1461 ships of 253,300 gross tons ready for use.

Under 100 tons - 11,400 ships of 301,000 gross tons ready for use.

Authorization for employment of both naval and merchant Japanese ships in repatriation and the operating schedules for these vessels are controlled by the Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine, Pacific Fleet.

4. Disposition of Japanese material

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Occupation Instructions No. 2 states that all materials seized by the armed forces are to be destroyed, scrapped, used by the occupation forces or turned over to the Home Ministry if useable for civilian purpose. Specific directives have been received to transfer directly to representatives of the Home Ministry fuels, scrap, automobiles, and Army and Navy foodstuffs which are spoiling.
786 silver ingots and 119 boxes of copper and silver coins found at the Naval Base, YOKOSUKA, early in the occupation, were turned over to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in accordance with instructions from the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Commander Task Force 51, on 11 October 1945, reported that 110,000 kg of tin, 12,000 kg of tungsten, and 3,000 kg of raw rubber had been found aboard two former German submarines at KOBE. Delivery of this material to Commander Task Force 51 for shipment to the U.S. was requested of the Commanding General, SIXTH Army. The request was originally approved but later rescinded on the advice of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who directed that it be impounded and held pending further instructions.

A considerable quantity of new Manila line was found among naval stores seized by the SIXTH Army at KURE. On 30 October 1945 authority was requested from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to obtain this line from the Army and to ship it for naval use. No reply has yet been received.

5. Recommendation

It is recommended:

(a) That if critical shortages of any of the materials listed above exist in the United States representations be made to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to procure their release.
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PART VII

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. No remarks.

PART VIII

LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. No remarks.
1. Sept. 11, 1945 -- The HAVEN is the first Allied ship to dock at Nagasaki after the surrender.
2. Note the American flag, on left, at former office of railroad and steamship company, Nagasaki. This office served at the time of this picture as headquarters for Col. Griffin, USA, in charge of prison camps and transportation of prisoners to Nagasaki from 25 camps at various locations on the island of Kyushu.
3. Upon arrival at Nagasaki, the dock and adjoining warehouse and railroad station were found in an unspeakable condition of filth and wreckage. Within 24 hours the debris was cleared, the place cleaned and honed down, largely with Japanese labor (as seen in picture), the entire premise powder sprayed with DDT to rid it of great swarms of flies. The stench was intolerable on the first day, but this disappeared with the cleaning. Chief Pharmacist Kittroll, USN, USS HAVEN, at left.
4. Japanese labor cleaning out the area in which showers were constructed.
5. Japanese labor gangs forming to clean out the railroad station.
6. Shower area has been cleared by Jap labor gang. Note shower equipment on pavement at right. Lt. Comdr. B. R. Harris, MC, USNR, USS HAVEN, at extreme right.
Sept. 12, 1945. -- Japanese railroad officials enter Col. Griffin's office for an all day conference to arrange train schedules which will bring 1,000 prisoners per day to Nagasaki by special trains.
8. Sept. 12, 1945 -- Crew from USS WICHITA rigging showers in front of the railroad station. The shower line became an important part of the processing of the prisoners. It was their first warm shower in years. Steam supplied by the HAVEN; water from the Nagasaki city water supply.
10. Just before debarking from train to Nagasaki platform. Note dazed expression on prisoner at left. Many were heard to remark: "Can this be real? Is this real? Let me touch something to see if it's real."
11. Having emerged from the train, a group of prisoners begin to be persuaded of the reality of their liberation.
12. As the train arrives, the USS WICHITA band strikes up "Hail, Hail, the Gang's all Here." Then, "Calif., Here we Come", "Beer Barrel Polka", "Picadilly" and other favorites, bringing tears of joy to the faces of prisoners as well as Navy crews.
13. The train is emptied and the prisoners crowd around the band before filing on to the first part of the line which is the Red Cross doughnut and coffee section.
14. While waiting their turns in the line, prisoners show souvenirs to a sailor.
15. While lining up for the processing, 1,000 prisoners per day were served doughnuts and coffee by the Red Cross.
16. Another view of the prisoners passing the coffee line. Note that they have discarded their unappetizing K rations.
17. Doughnuts and coffee just before entering the history line.
18. During the first two days of prisoner arrivals, Nurses from the HAVEN took preliminary medical histories on all prisoners. After the 2nd day, the nurses were recalled to the HAVEN to care for the prisoner sick who were rapidly filling the HAVEN's wards. They were replaced by corpsmen. After the 4th day, all the corpsmen were needed on the ship and were replaced by line officers and non-corpsermen ratings who had learned how to fill out the medical history forms. Several Dutch and other language interpreters were supplied from the prisoners who volunteered to assist in the compilation of some 9,300 histories that concerned dietary conditions, matters of malnutrition, camp sanitation, and other matters affecting health in prison camp life.
19. After undressing, all clothing and other personal articles of prisoner which he desires to keep are stowed in a sea bag and thoroughly sprayed with DDT.
20. Tagging the sea bag which is returned to prisoner when he has completed the process.
21. Soap is issued, and the prisoner proceeds thru the shower line. They found great pleasure in tarrying and scrubbing under warm showers.
22. Dried from the showers, he is now dusted freely with DDT powder.
23. Now he has a medical examination by HAVEN medical officers who decide whether he is to be issued clothing to proceed to a transport, or to be issued pajamas and sent aboard the HAVEN. Comdr. A. L. Duncombe, MC, USNR, USS HAVEN, in center.
25. Prisoners who have passed medical examinations are now dressing in new, clean clothing. Lt.Comdr. B. R. Harris, MC, USNR (New Haven, Conn.) and Lt. Howard L. Odel (MC) USNR (Rochester, Minn.) are at right.
26. Issuing complete war clothing outfits.
29. Nearly dressed. The sea bags are now returned to the "undressing" line.
30. Having dressed, the prisoner now passes the second Red Cross line where he receives a sack full of articles that contribute to his comfort, pleasure and personal needs. Sailors from the WICHITA helped the service in this line.
Having completed the process they now pass along the dock and are checked on the transport ships.
Some train loads contained 30 or more stretcher cases. After they were cleaned, and deloused on canvas cots in the dispensary on the dock, they by-passed the process line and were brought directly to wards in the HAVEN.
34. Many required extensive treatment on the HAVEN.
35. A case of beriberi. Note emaciation and pot belly with ascites. Malnutrition cases made up the bulk of the 1,000 admissions to the HAVEN.
36. This civilian American, from an internment camp, chose to remain in Japan (he has a Japanese wife and is in business in Japan), but he enjoys the first American food in nearly four years. Looking on are the Supply Officer of the HAVEN and two Red Cross workers.
37. A case of severe malnutrition. But there were many worse than this one. Photo taken at a prison camp.
38. Prison camp photo. Loss of both feet from brutal treatment at prison camp. This prisoner was admitted to HAVEN. He was made to squat for a period of 5½ hours with a bamboo stick between flexed knees. The blood supply was cut off, causing gangrene and his feet were amputated by the Japanese.
40. Liberation by Army team at a prison camp.
41. Interior scene at prison camp. Note severe malnutrition.
42. Prison camp. Ready to proceed to train to Nagasaki.
Hospital coach filled with POW's on way to Nagasaki.
45. Col. Griffin, USA arranging railroad schedule for POW's with Jap RR officials.

Commodore Willcutts and Lt. Gressitt, USN, seated at left.
46. The wards of the HAVEN are filled with POW's.
Beriberi cases on the HAVEN. Note emaciation; pot bellies. Unfortunately, the swollen ankles, incident to the nephritis complication of beri beri cannot be seen in this photograph.
49. The Jap civilian hospital at Nagasaki was destroyed by the Atomic bomb. Building shown here was a primary school, converted into a hospital after the atomic bomb. Following pictures are interiors of this building.
53. Severe burns from atomic bomb radioactive substances.