PART 3 - 5TH MARINE DIVISION

OPERATION REPORT

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

ANNEX DOG - G-3 REPORT

01484
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945.

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.
To: The Commanding General.


1. Subject report is forwarded herewith with Appendices 1, 2, and 3 thereto.

F. R. Dowssett

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

Annex DOC to 5th FarDiv Opn Report - Occupation of Japan.

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C-3 Report

Occupation of Japan

(For details of day-by-day activities, see Appendix 3, C-3 Periodic Reports).

The execution of the operation, The Occupation of Japan, by the 5th Marine Division was in five phases as follows: (a) initial landing and occupation of initial zone of responsibility; (b) expansion of zone of responsibility; (c) inventory of Japanese materials; (d) disposition of Japanese materials and (e) withdrawal from the objective. Continuing throughout all phases of the occupation, the division, by use of guards, patrols, and inspection parties, maintained surveillance over the Japanese to insure compliance with the Terms of Surrender and the directives of this and higher headquarters. No armed action was necessary to execute the assigned missions.

The landing on 22 September, 1945, was executed in accordance with Operation Plan 253-45, which was the second alternate plan for the Occupation of Japan. The initial occupation of the Sasebo Area was somewhat hampered by the lack of adequate billeting areas, sanitary facilities, and by adverse weather conditions. The poor condition of roads restricted the movements of the Division within the Sasebo and outlying areas. Patrol activity outside the immediate Sasebo Area was commenced on 25 September.

For each major troop movement (i.e., Fukuoka, Sase, Yorume, Cita) in the expansion of occupation activities, the main body of troops was preceded to its new area by an advance party. This advance party made arrangements with the Japanese officials for billeting, comfort of troops, relief of Japanese guards, collection of arms, etc. Sanitary squads accompanied each advance party to prepare billeting areas. By working through Ken Officials, occupation of each area was facilitated as they were fully cooperative and they prepared the military and civilian populace for arrival of our troops.

As soon as the main body of troops arrived in each area, relief of Japanese guards was effected as soon as possible and patrol activity of the new area commenced. In some cases the occupation detachments in an
area were too small to relieve all Japanese guards so surveillance was exercised mainly through the use of patrols and inspection parties. Once the occupying detachment was established, patrols were sent to outlying areas to investigate the compliance with the Surrender Terms and to collect weapons from military guards and civilian police. In some instances, these patrols, which varied in size from a reinforced platoon to a few men, remained in small towns such as Kerate and Tosa for several days until collection of arms, investigations, and occupation missions were completed. Thereafter, outlying areas were covered periodically by routine patrols. Foot patrols were used to check remote areas on several occasions. In each town or village, occupation orders were issued to the civil police, mayors, and Ken officials and they were held responsible for the execution.

On 15 November, a raid was executed to investigate all schools, shrines, and temples in the Sasebo area to determine whether these places were used as receptacles for weapons and unauthorized equipment. These installations had been made "safeguards" and "off limits." A small number of weapons were located but for the most part Japanese officials were found to have complied with occupation directives.

Jeeps proved to be the most satisfactory vehicles for patrolling as they could negotiate all roads; dukws being used extensively but with difficulty while navigating the extremely narrow streets and sharp angle turns in Japanese villages. Vessels were also satisfactory but because of their tracks did considerable damage to the roads and therefore were used to a limited degree.

The Reconnaissance Company, less one platoon, was sent to Hirado Island to execute reconnaissance and surveillance missions on 2 October. The Company remained there for three days. For this movement, dukws were used for the overland movement from Sasebo to Finoura and then for the over water movement to the Island. The Reconnaissance Company returned to Hirado Island on 12 November and remained there for six days executing disposition missions. The small outlying islands around Sasebo Harbor were covered by patrols utilizing LCP's. The larger islands of Tsushima and Goto-Betto were covered by BLT 1/27 using LST's and LCI's; troops being billeted afloat during the execution of occupation and disposition missions on these islands. The delay in executing occupation missions to all of the Islands in the Division Zone of Responsibility was brought about by the fact that the waters around these islands had been mined and it was necessary that they be swept.
Annex D to 5th MarDiv Opn Reprt - Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd.)

The 13th Marines were used as infantry troops during the entire occupation and assigned a zone of responsibility. Elements of the artillery were constantly prepared for artillery operations if the need arose. Engineers were used for normal engineer missions such as road and camp construction and maintenance. The Pioneer Battalion was utilized to furnish work details for unloading resupply shipping. Tanks were never used even for "show" purposes as Japanese roads would not bear their traffic. Tanks were parked at the Sasebo Naval Air Station when landed and remained there for the period of occupation; the troops being used for guard, disposition, and unloading details in that area. "M" Company, 5th Tank Battalion, reinforced, under command of CO, 5th Tank Battalion, occupied Oita Ken from 8 October to 4 November when it was relieved by elements of the 32nd Infantry Division.

The 6th Marine War Dog Platoon was with the division until 27 October, 1945. Ten (10) dogs were used for night guard duties over coves in the zone of CT-27 with satisfactory results. The remainder of the dogs were being demilitarized and because of the fact that they had not been "agitated" for approximately three months, were of no real value for guard duty.

Most of the troop movements were made on short notice which necessitated a warning order to the units by dispatch, verbal orders to units, followed by complete written operation orders. Since armed action was never necessary, these movements were mainly administrative moves. With Division units widely separated, dissemination of orders and directives was difficult. Full use was made of OY planes for courier service.

Commencing on 1 November, an intensive training program was conducted in so far as it did not interfere with occupation duties. Educational types of training were stressed.

In summary, occupation mission were executed in accordance with the directives of higher headquarters. The Japanese in no way interfered with the execution of these directives. Division Headquarters remained in Sasebo during the entire period and controlled the occupation from there, at the maximum expansion of the Division zone of responsibility, major elements of the Division were deployed as follows:
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Annex DOC to 5th MarDiv 0-n Report - Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd.)

3dBN, 27th Marines and 27th Marines Headquarters at Kurume; 2dBN, 27th Marines at Saga; Co A, 5th Tank Battalion (Reinforced) at Oita; CT-28 (under VAC control) at Fukuoka; and remainder of the Division in the Sasebo area. The Oita occupation Group was withdrawn on 5 November. Commencing on 23 November, outlying Division elements were relieved by the 2d MarDiv and the 32nd Infantry Division, the Division then being concentrated in the Sasebo area; personnel were transferred to VAC and 2d MarDiv and personnel were received from those units; and the Division prepared to load out.

On 30 November, surrendered material to be destroyed was 90 percent destroyed; ammunition and explosives were 20 percent destroyed; and materials and equipment usable by the Japanese in peace time pursuits were 20 percent turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry. Occupational missions had been executed in a satisfactory manner by troops who were prepared and trained for combat; the primary factors which permitted the occupation to be successful were the excellent training of the troops, their aggressiveness and determination in undertaking the difficult and varied occupation duties, and the full cooperation of the Japanese.

Appendix 1 - Naval Gunfire Report.
Appendix 2 - Air Support Report.
Appendix 3 - Periodic Reports.
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Appendix I to Annex DOG to 5th MarDiv Opn Reprt - Occupation of Japan.

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NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. For Assault.

a. Training:

Shore Fire Control Parties of the 5th NSCO were ordered to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for a month of intensive refresher training on 20 April. The course consisted of communication and radar beacon drills, classes in lessons learned from previous operations, exchanges of experiences, instruction in specialized support craft, and sample novel gunfire problems of the CPX type.

Two (2) dry firing problems were conducted on KAUAI Island, T. H. in which all shore fire control elements executed call fire missions; planned and witnessed preparation, harassing and night illumination fires.

Routine training emphasized frequent changes in frequencies, transmitting and receiving through heavy interference, rapid displacement, proficiency in radio procedure, and perfecting conduct of fire.

Division air observers flying in organic CH planes were taught procedure of initiating and adjusting naval gunfire and they participated in several drills with shore fire control parties.

b. Planning:

No novel gunfire plan was drawn up, the Division being in reserve. The Division naval gunfire officer participated in planning of support for the 5th Amphibious Corps.

2. For Occupation.

a. Training:

Same as for assault. At Shima two communication drills were held with all naval gunfire radio terms in Division setting of radios aboard the transports and participating. Ships were actually requested and assigned utilizing screening destroyers in routine manner. The drill on the first day emphasized the need for such practice. The second day brought forth perfection of communications.

- 1 -
b. Planning:

The naval gunfire officer attended a short conference with the V Amphibious Corps naval gunfire officer the same day the Division CP closed at HAWII. At this time advance copies of the Corps naval gunfire annex were received. Naval gunfire was planned heavy to cover the possibility or an attempt by the Japanese to repulse our landing. If opposition developed, the naval gunfire plan would provide for the execution of fire-planned covering fires in all surrounding areas. Routine assignments of one shore fire control party per battalion were altered in the case of the one battalion whose plan called for the landing of two companies on two separated beaches. To accommodate this unit, two shore fire control parties were assigned, one to each company landing initially. This phase of the operation was later cancelled. The Division was assigned a cruiser for general support missions and all battalions landing in so-called "assault" had two fire support ships and a Division of LOS gunboats assigned. This plan was later modified and assignments of support ships were cancelled. The final plan called for echelons below division to maintain contact with Division headquarters via SCR-200 and request ships only if naval gunfire support was needed. The Division was in contact with the V Amphibious Corps Naval Gunfire Officer, Occupation Force gunnery officer, and all prospective fire support ships on the Naval gunfire control net. Frequencies were assigned by the previous plans. The whole framework for naval gunfire support was intact and ready.
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AIR SUPPORT REPORT

In order to utilize experience gained on IWO JIMA and because of the complete lack of information concerning the quantity and type of support aircraft, training for the assault was of a general nature. The pilots of VM-5 were gradually replaced beginning 10 June, 1945, and the new pilots received training in OY familiarization, map reading, navigation, orientation, artillery spotting and air observation. The Air Observers underwent basic and refresher training at Air Observers Training Center, which was supplemented, in the Division, by training in map reading, pencil interpretation, code and blenker, spotter and OOF spotting procedure, aerial photography, message drops and pickup, and experience in piloting the OY aircraft.

When ground troop training reached the stage that support aircraft could be expeditiously employed, i.e., BLT exercises, aircraft were obtained from Marine Air Support Group 55. The aircraft were controlled during the exercises by Leading Force Air Support Control Unit No. 4. Every effort was made to keep the training realistic. The support communication nets and the procedures used were standard combat doctrine and live strafing, bombing, and rocket runs were almost invariably employed. Other support features such as supply drops, smoke laying, message drops, message pickups, aerial photography, and aerial observation, were frequently demonstrated to acquaint ground commanders and troops with the capabilities of support aircraft. Critiques on the exercises disclosed that all the participating units benefited from this type of training.

Upon notification, on 19 August, 1945, of the intended occupation, training continued in a diminished degree and emphasis was placed on material readiness. VM-5 received 10 new planes and embarked on 25 August, 1945.

The intended air support plan was modified during the movement to the occupation zone so that at the time of debarkation air support would not be present, but would be obtainable upon request by the Division Commander. Upon debarking, necessity for aerial reconnaissance and transportation made the assembly of aircraft of prime importance. VM-5
Appendix II to Annex D of 5th MarDiv Opn Rep - Occupation of Japan.

(Cont'd.)

5 debarked on 22 September and made two OY's operational on 24 September. Alternate planes, as they became operational, were passed to VAC operational control, with a total of six assigned VAC by 7 October. Two OY's were destroyed in accidents on 29 September and 5 October with no casualties to personnel. VAC-5's mission throughout the occupation was to provide air courier service between the cities of SASEBO, OSAKA, KYOTO, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, and OITA. A landing strip constructed at Division Headquarters was effectively utilized. The OY was successfully employed for reconnaissance, freight transportation, aerial photography, and for the transportation of key personnel of VAC, 32d InfDiv, and the 5th MarDiv.

On 29 November, VAC-5 passed to operational control of 100G, having completed 1555 flights for a total of 1054.2 hours while attached to the 5th MarDiv during the occupation of Japan.

Comments and Recommendations.

(1)  The training and preparation as conducted for the assault were considered satisfactory.

(2)  The necessity and desirability of operational control of several light transport type aircraft has repeatedly presented itself throughout the occupation. Six planes of the GH or G3 type assigned to a VAC would greatly facilitate the air operations incidental to occupation duty.
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Appendix 3 to Annex DOG (G-3 Report) to 5th DerDiv Opn Report

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

G-3 Operation Reports

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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1300/I 21 September 1945
To: 1300/I 22 September 1945

No. 1

Map: KYUSHU; Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4043 III NE, 4043 IV,
4043 III SE, 4043 III NW, 4043 I SW, 4043 II SW.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. CT-26: BLT 1/26 at (76.4-13.3). BLT 2/26 at
      (79.4-10.4). CT CP at (79.1-08.9). BLT 3/26 afloat
      aboard APA 137.
   b. CT-27: BLT 1/27 commenced debarkation in dock area
      about 1500 and moved to assembly area at Naval Train-
      ing Station (71 - 14). Remainder of CT afloat.
   c. CT-28: BLT 2/23 is in the dock area reinforcing
      the SP. Remainder of CT afloat.
   d. Arty Gp: Arty Gp HQ, 1/13 and 2/13 located at Air-
      craft Factory. Remainder of Army Gp unloading at
      Aircraft Factory at end of period.
   e. Tk Gp: Located at Naval Air Station.
   f. Serv Gp: Afloat.
   g. Spt Gp: ADC and Group located at Sasebo Fortress
      Arty BR HQ. CG and Group and remainder of Spt Gp
      afloat.
   h. SP Regt: Located on docks in Sasebo.
   i. Engr Gp: Afloat.

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2. Weather and Visibility: Cloudy throughout the day; slight precipitation; visibility 8-10 miles; calm seas; winds moderate; average temperature 78°.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. CT-26: Landed on Green Beaches with first wave landing at 0850. Observation was to have been 0845. By 1022 CT-26 less BLT 3/26, Co A 5th MedBn, and Wons Co, completely ashore. CT-26 moved rapidly through its zone of action establishing guards over military installations, equipment and stores. Japanese guards were relieved and dispatched to their respective commanding officers as soon as reliefs could be effected. No opposition was encountered and Japanese personnel cooperated as directed.

b. CT-27: CT-27 remained afloat until 1300 at which time BLT 1/27 commenced debarking in the dock area. At close of period CT-27 was preparing to debark personnel and move to assigned areas.

c. CT-28: CT-28 remained afloat except for BLT 2/28 which was landed during the afternoon to reinforce the SP.

d. Arty Go: Arty Go Hq, 1/13 and 2/13 landed at the Aircraft Factory Beaches, moved to assigned areas in Aircraft Factory area, and established surveillance over military installations in that area. Remainder of group is unloading.

e. Tk Go: Began debarkation during the later afternoon and moved to assigned areas in Naval Air Station.

f. Spt Go: AJC and Group landed about noon at the Boat Basin, moved to the Sasebo Fortress Arty Bn Hq and established the Div Advan CP there. CG Group and remainder of Spt Go remained afloat.

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4. Casualties:
   a. Our casualties for the period - none.
   b. Enemy casualties for the period - none.

F.R. DOUGHERTY,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

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CJ VAC
CT-26
CT-27
CT-28
File (2)
G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800/I, 22 September 1945
To: 1800/I, 23 September 1945

No. 2.

Maps: KYUSHU; Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 IV SE, 4046 III SE, 4046 III NW, 4046 I SW, 4046 II SW.

1. Location of Troops:

a. 5th MarDiv: CP located at SASEBO Fortress Arty Bn Hq.


d. CT-28: CT CP afloat (APA 114). BLT 1/28 at (79.2-03.2). BLT 2/28 reinforcing SP in dock area. BLT 3/28 is in the Naval Training Station (71.0-14.2).

e. Arty Gr: Entire group at Aircraft Factory (80-10).

f. Tk Gr: Located at Naval Air Station.

g. Serv Gr: 75% unloaded and in assigned area in vicinity of (74.4-13.2).

h. Spt Gr: Located at SASEBO Fortress Arty Bn Hq (77.7-15.3).
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i. So Regt: Located at docks in SASEBC.

j. Engr Co: Located at Naval Air Station (78.6-08.6).

2. Weather and Visibility:

Slight precipitation in AM; clear with scattered clouds throughout the day; calm seas, slight winds, average temperature 80 degrees.

3. Our operations for the period:

a. CT-26: BLT 3/26 afloat will start debarking at 0600, 24 September. CT continued moving through its zone of action establishing guards over military installations, equipment and stores. No opposition was encountered and Japanese personnel continued to cooperate.

b. CT-27: BLT 1/27 was debarked at 221550I over the dock area. 3/27 was debarked on the dock area at 1200I. 2/27 was debarked at 1250I. Company "C" (reinf) departed for OMA at 0945I and arrived at 1315I no unusual occurrences. CT-CF was set up in the Naval Training Station at 1430I. CT-27 moved through its zone of action placing guards on military installations. No opposition was encountered.

c. CT-28: BLT 2/28 continued reinforcing SP in the dock area. BLT 3/28 completed debarking at Boat Basin at 0800I and are in the Naval Training Station area. 1/28 completed debarking at Green Beaches at 0825I and are in the Naval Air Station. CT CP is afloat on APA 114.

d. Arty Co: Entire group has debarked and is in the Aircraft Factory and Naval Air Station. Military installations have had a guard placed to guard them; no opposition encountered.
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e. **Tr Gp:** Completed debarkation at 222000I and is assembled in the Naval Air Station. No opposition encountered.

f. **Spt Gp:** Debarked and moved to Sasebo Fortress Arty Bn Hq. CG, 5th MarDiv assumed command ashore at 1338I.

3. **SP Regt:** Continuing unloading ships.

h. **Engr Gp:** Debarked and in assigned area at Naval Air Station.

i. **Serv Gp:** 75% unloaded and in assigned area.

4. **Casualties:**

a. Our casualties for the period - none.

b. Enemy casualties for the period - none.

F. R. DOWSETT,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
ACofS, G-3.

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CG VAC  
CT-26  
CT-27  
CT-28  
File (2)

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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION

SECRET

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800I, 23 September 1945
To: 1800I, 24 September 1945

No. 3.

MAPS: KYUSHU, Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4045 III NE, 4045 IV SE, 4046 III SE, 4046 III NW, 4046 I SW, 4046 II SW.

1. Location of Troops:

a. 5th MarDiv: CP located at SASEBO Fortress Arty Bn 3q (77.3-15.3).
b. CT-23: CT CP at (84.9-09.9), BLT 1/26 at (78.2-13.2) BLT 2/26 at (79.3-10.4), BLT 3/26 at (84.9-10.0).
d. CT-28: CT CP at (71.4-14.4) BLT 1/28 at (71.3-14.4), BLT 2/28 reinforcing SP in dock area. BLT 3/28 at (71.0-14.2).
e. Arty Gr: CP located at Aircraft Factory (30.8-10.9).
f. Tank Gr: CP located at Naval Air Station (79.1-09.9).
g. Serv Gr: CP located at (74.4-13.2).
h. Spt Gr: CP located at (77.3-15.3).
i. SP Rct: CP located at (75.3-12.9).
j. Engr Gr: CP located at (75.7-15.2).

2. Weather and Visibility:

Clear in AM to cloudy in PM; visibility excellent; calm seas, very slight wind, average temperature 70°.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. CT-23: BLT 3/26 landed near bivouac area and was completely debarked at 241030I. Moved to assigned area meeting no opposition. CT-26 moved CP to (84.9-09.9) at 1700. CT-23 ordered to patrol

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peninsula between 3/25 billeting area and the entrance to OMURA "AN. Co "A" 3d MP Bn (Prov) reverted to Division control as of 1500I. CT ordered to send patrol along route SASEBO to MIYAZAKI to IMARI to SASEBO. Patrol reported: Return trip was over same route. Road condition made it impossible to return by originally scheduled route.

Male Japanese were friendly and gave all information they could, women and children frightened. There were no military installations in this area. No troops encountered in large bodies. Road from SASEBO to HAISK is paved and in good condition. Road from HAISK to YOSHIFUKU is dirt and in fair shape and 24 feet wide. Road from YOSHIFUKU to IMARI is very poor and 10 feet wide. Use of DUKW's is impracticable. Roads are impassable. Bridges are very narrow and in some cases are out. Jeeps, weasels and one ton trucks are only recommended vehicles on this route.

b. CT-27: CT-27 continued moving through it's zone of action placing guards, on military installations, equipment, stores and relieving Japanese sentries. No opposition encountered. CT sent elements of BLT 1/27 into southern portion of their zone. This patrol found an ammunition vault with a large amount of naval ammunition and other installations. CT ordered to send patrol along route to AIMOURA to ICHINOSE to EJUKAE to HAINOURA to SASEBO. This patrol located Prisoner of War Camp in vicinity of EJUKAE. It has been empty since 14 September. Camp filthy and dirty and sanitation conditions very poor. When prisoners there, held between 200 and 250 on 3 September. The natives were friendly and seemed to be anxious to please. Gave information readily and it seemed fairly reliable. Their food and clothing was only in a fair condition. The last typhoon damaged rice crop. In all towns the Mayor was contacted and all were friendly. Many men in military uniforms but all were unarmed. They were apparently demobilized.

Channel crossing to KIRADO (See Map - KYUSHU, 1:500,00 (Coordinates: 1250.15-1100.30) has ferry
SECRETS

Patrols were active throughout entire regimental area.

c. CT-28: CT-29 established guards at the ammunition storage installation in the vicinity of (G4-13) at 1000I. 1/28 remained in reserve at Naval Training Station.

2/28 continued to reinforce SP in the dock area.

3/28 remained in Naval Training Station. The following information is in addition to that received from patrol sent out 24 September. A large Naval Hospital is in operation at URESHINO. At KAWATANA is located a large Naval Arsenal containing 6 guns (probably AA) and several torpedoes; near by is a Naval Barracks and hospital. At QSAKI YAMA were located several gun mounts.

d. Artillery Gp: All four battalions completed moving to new billeting area and conducted general policing of area. DUKW companies furnishing DUKW's for hauling cargo in and around SASEBO dock area. VJ0-5 made two flights.

e. Division Troops: 5th Tank En continued inventory check of all buildings at Naval Air Station; have 54 tanks operational. SP Regiment continued to unload ships. 5th MarDiv CP planning to displace to Naval Training Station 26 September.

f. Rear Admiral HAYASHI, Chief-of-Staff to Vice Admiral SUKAYAMA of the Japanese Navy, reported to G-3 at 1545 for purposes of coordination of relief of Japanese guards, turn over of equipment, etc. Admiral HAYASHI departed at 1610.

4. Casualties:

a. Our casualties for the period - none.
b. Our casualties to date - none.
c. Enemy casualties for the period - none.
d. Enemy casualties to date - none.
F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

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CT-26
CT-27
CT-28
File (C)
G-3 Operations Report

From: 18001, 24 September 1945
To: 18001, 25 September 1945

Maps: KYUSHU; Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4043 III NE, 4046 IV SE, 4046 III SE, 4046 III NW, 4046 I SW, 4046 II SW.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. BLT 1/26: CP located at SASEBO (73.4-17.1).
   b. BLT 2/26: CP located at SASEBO (73.6-11.7).
   c. 1st Bn 13th Mar: CP located at KARITATE (82.5-12.8).
   d. 2d Bn 13th Mar: CP located at KARITATE (82.5-12.8).
   e. 3d Bn 13th Mar: CP located at Aircraft Factory (30.8-10.9).
   f. 4th Bn 13th Mar: CP located at Aircraft Factory (39.8-10.9).
   g. 5th M't Bn: CP located at SASEBO (73.3-15.2).
   h. 5th Medical Bn: Naval Training Station (71.5-14.7).
   i. No change in other battalion CP's.

2. Weather and visibility:
   Clear with scattered clouds throughout the day, visibility excellent, calm seas, no wind, average temperature 80°.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-26: CT-26 continued patrolling in zone of responsibility. Reconnaissance Platoon carried out three patrols with the following results: all roads were passable for all military vehicles. Navy Separation centers at (35-07) are still functioning.
500 Naval personnel are still at the larger one. A Naval hospital area near OZAKI is functioning.

Throughout target squares (82-06), (82-07) and (82-08) there are numerous underground ammunition storage areas guarded by Japanese naval personnel. Quartermaster stores were located at (83.2-10.2). Other patrols found road from KAIKI to ARITA to be of hard surface and suitable for all vehicles. Other roads much narrower. Bridges between KAIKI and ARITA very good. A railroad station is located at TAKEO. People helpful but frightened.

b. CT-27: CT-27 sent a patrol to SHISA with the following results: Further investigation of ferry slip showed 2 ferries approximately 50 feet in length, powered by diesel engines and not capable for transporting vehicles. Also fishing boats hauling passengers to HIRADO. At HAINOURA there are entrances into the water for DUKW's and seems possible for them to land directly across the channel on HIRADO SHISA. The road from HAINOURA to MIJURUYA is in fair shape. Two way traffic is possible with the roads surfaced in some places. From MIJURUYA back to SASANO the roads are almost impassable due to mud and washouts. All bridges, with two exceptions will hold any vehicle up to and including tanks. These two bridges are located, one near IMABUKU and one in SHISA. DUKW's are considered most suitable means of transportation. At MIJURUYA there are four submarines anchored off shore. They are small, about 30 to 35 feet in length and have been stripped of everything on deck. There are adequate facilities for loading coal on to ships in the SHISA-IMABUKA area. Numerous coal shortages from this area east. There are aerial trains at SHISA for moving coal. The HAINOURA to IMARI railroad is operational. A hospital is located at HAINOURA.

Prisoner of War Camp No. 24 was investigated by S-2 personnel. At the time of repatriation, 237 POW's were at camp. A guard was placed over this camp. Japanese were discovered annotating maps of harbor area in residence at (78.9-14.8). Guards were posted.
which will hold 100-150 men in operation. Channel is approximately 60 feet deep and about 800 yards wide. No military installations were visible on hills overlooking channel. The current is very swift and natives say large ships never enter it. Railroad near the ferry ship is operational and carries civilians. Road on entire patrol are very poor. All are passable for vehicles up to and including M-5’s. Impassable for tanks. Bridges are all weak and many landslides make travel slow. Draining water causes many muddy stretches in road.

c. CT-28: CT CP located ashore at Naval Training Station at 1500I (71.4-14.4). BLT 1/28 displaced CP to Naval Training Station (71.3-14.4). BLT 2/28 continuing to reinforce SP in dock area. CT-28 in division reserve and will be prepared to move elements on division order to critical areas within a radius of 50 miles of SASEBO. CT ordered to send patrol along route to AINOURA to NIYAZKI to SONOKI to URESHINO to TAKEO to ARITA to SASEBO. This patrol reports: roads and bridges all passable, ninety percent can handle two way traffic. Pecret roads between MIYAZAKI and KAWATANA. Bridges all good with exception of those on road just east of SASEBO near rail yards. Attitude of Japanese excellent, some ran in houses others waved. At ARITA friendly Japanese said 400 40mm guns there. All installations dismantled and inoperative. At KAWATANA a Naval maintenance crew of 100 to 200 Japanese. Excellent power distribution system. All settlements have phones and electricity. All civilians cleaning up and making repairs.

d. Division Troops: Occupying billeting areas. SP continuing to unload ships at docks. VMG-5 has 2 planes in operation and made one courier hop to OIMURA for VAC.

e. All units ordered to immediately assume responsibility for their assigned billeting areas and assigned areas within SASEBO. Effective 242400I units will assume responsibility for areas within 5th MarDiv zone as assigned by assignment of initial zones of responsibility overlay.
SECRET

4. Casualties:
   a. Our casualties for the period - none.
   b. Our casualties to date - none.
   c. Enemy casualties for the period - none.
   d. Enemy casualties to date - none.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG VAC
CT-26
CT-27
CT-28
File (2)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 23 September, 1945

G-3 Operations Report

No. 5    From: L3001, 25 September 1945
To : L3001, 26 September 1945

Maps: KYUSHU; Scale 1:25,000 Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 IV 
SE, 4046 III SE, 4046 I SW, 4046 II SW.

1. Location of Troops:
   No change since last report.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   Cloudy and hazy during the entire day, visibility fair
to poor, no surf, no wind, average temperature 70°.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-33: Continued patrolling in assigned zone of
      responsibility. One patrol went on a reconnaissance
      along the following route: KAIKI, ARITA, TAIKO,
      TAKAHASHI, SAKASITA, KOMATSU, SARI, IMARI, SETO,
      YOKANO, IMARI, KAIKI. Road conditions varied from
good to very bad. A few washouts have ruined the
roads between SAKASITA and SARI. Between YOKANO
and IMARI the roads are so narrow, one jeep in
one way traffic permitted. Bridges are in accordance
with roads, most of them will support normal
operations. The people were helpful in locating
proper roads. One half mile from HANNO there are
70 troops of Army Motor Transport, still in unif-
iform, unarmed, and have 20 trucks. Another patrol
covered the following route: KAIKI, ZOSHU, IMARI,
KIRIKISHI, KUSHU, KURIKI, TAKAOSAKI,
IYABUKI, KACHA, SHISHA, MINOURA, SUMIKAN, TATSUMOTO,
SAGA, SAISHO, SASEBO, KAIKI. Roads are fair except
between IYABUKI and YAMASHITA where it is barely
passable for jeeps. The road between IYABUKI and
MINOURA is excellent. The bridges are more than
adequate to carry any traffic which the connecting
roads will carry. The 3rd Naval Guard unit is

- 1 -
commanded by Naval Lieut. (TAI) NAKAMURA has its headquarters at SHISA. This unit will be disbanded 23 September. In the bay between SHIRACHA and NAGONA (70.3-50.3) there are 4 moored submarines with periscopes and guns removed. At IRACSARI a ship building and midget submarine assembly plant is located. Construction was stopped in May. Several AA guns are stored in buildings here along with a few marine motors. People are very shy and seemed frightened but helpful.

b. CT-27: CT-27 conducted limited patrol activity throughout this area of responsibility. BLT 1/27 had active patrols throughout entire area. They established a guard near cable station and north side of SASEBO WAM.

c. CT-28: CT-28 has a guard placed over the ammunition dump located in area (34-15). Remainder of CT less 2/28 remained in division reserve at the Naval Training Station. BLT 2/28 reinforced the SP in the dock area.

d. Artillery Group: Conducted reconnaissance in KAWATANI Naval Stores Area. One battery of first battalion plans to displace to this area on 27 September. WO-8 has three planes operational. One plane was released to HOF-1. DUKW companies furnishing DUKW's to haul cargo in and around SASEBO dock area.

e. Division Troops: Conducting engineer reconnaissance and general hauling of cargo from dock area.

f. Issued Operation Order No. 25-46 (Task Organization).

4. Casualties:

a. Our casualties for the period - none.
b. Our casualties to date - none.
c. Enemy casualties for the period - none.
d. Enemy casualties to date - none.
SECRET

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG VAC (2)
CT-23
CT-27
CT-28
Arty Co
2d MarDiv
File (2)

SECRET

- 3 -
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 23 September, 1945.

No. 6 G-5 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 18001, 23 September 1945
To: 18001, 27 September 1945

Maps: KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 IV SE, 4045 III SE, 4045 III NW, 4045 I SW, 4045 II SW.

1. Location of Troops:

a. Headquarters 5th Marine Division displaced CP at 1400I to new location at AIMOURA Naval Training Station (71.3-14.3).

b. Support Group 5th Marine Division: CP located at (71.3-14.3).

c. BLT 2/27: CP located at (71.2-14.3).

2. Weather and Visibility: Rain throughout the day, visibility poor, no surf, no wind, average temperature 30 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. CT-23: CT-23 continued patrolling in zone of responsibility. One patrol reconnoitered the area: HAISKI-HARIO-SETO-FUKUODA-HATASU-USHINO-ITESCU. The road from SETO to USHINO is very bad, passable only for jeeps. Remainder of roads will support all types of our vehicles and equipment. Bridges were in accordance with road conditions. At CHIKO a dock 200 feet long can be used by small craft at high tide. No military installations of any type were seen. The people remain helpful but frightened.

Suggest no roads north of SHIOYA or ITESCU be used for military traffic. Jeeps are the only vehicles that will traverse these roads.

- 1 -
The Second Patrol reconnoitered the area: HAIKI, KOSHIN, KUSUKU, IKAKUKI, SHISA, SASHINAME, YUNCKI, CPA, SASEBO, BAIKI. All routes to SECHIBARA and YORCKI from the east are impassable. Numerous coal mines are located around the SECHIBARA-YUNCKI area. No military installations or units were found. The people assumed an air of curiosity and partial fright, but were on the whole very cooperative in every respect.

Remainder of OT is guarding military installations, equipment and stores in zone of responsibility.

b. CT-27: CT-27 sent a patrol to SECHIBARU via SASEBO-ICHINOSE. The roads to SECHIBARU are in poor condition and capable of supporting only light vehicular traffic. The road north of SECHIBARU to within 2 miles of SHISA is passable. SECHIBARU has a population of 2,100 with three doctors present but no hospital in operation. The SECHIBARU Naval Barracks is one mile north. This camp is only a litter over a year old and has 8 barracks capable of accommodating 120 men each. It is very clean and well kept up. No military equipment or installations were seen. The camp is guarded by three officers and thirty enlisted men. (Japanese).

The remainder of the OT continues guarding installations and equipment in zone of responsibility.

BLT 2/27 displaced CP to Naval Training Station (71.2-14.3).

c. CT-28: CT-28 continues to have a guard at the ammunition storage area (54-18). BLT 2/28 commenced movement of troops from dock area to Naval Training Station. Remainder of OT continued in division reserve.

d. Artillery Group: BAKER Battery moved to KAWATAMA (50-01.3) at 1400. Guards were established and preparations were made to take inventories tomorrow. A reconnaissance party went to AKUNURA where an ammunition plant at (85-08) is located. Remainder of artillery group conducting general police of area. DUKU's continue to haul cargo from docks.
SECRET

VMO-5 planes were grounded at 1015I. The planes lost contact at that time with the FUKUCKA reconnaissance party.

e. Division Troops: Conducting engineer reconnaissance and road repair in area.

f. Division headquarters displaced from SASEBO Fortress Artillery Bn Hq (77.3-15.3) to AINOURA Naval Training Station (17.5-14.3) at 1400I. Sent the sanitary detail and engineer road reconnaissance party to FUKUCKA by motor at 0700I. Lost contact with this party at 1015I when the planes were grounded because of weather.

4. Casualties:
   a. Our casualties for the period - none.
   b. Our casualties to date - none.
   c. Enemy casualties for the period - none.
   d. Enemy casualties to date - none.

F. R. Doysett,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGOF S, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG VAC (2)
CT-23
CT-27
CT-29
Arty 3-9
2d MarDiv
FILE (2)
C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 29 September, 1945

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800I, 27 September
To: 1800I, 29 September

No. Z

Maps: KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE, 4046 IV SE; 4043 I SW.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. BLT 2/23: CP now located at Naval Training Station (70.5-14.0).
   b. "K" and "L" Batteries, 13th Marines: CP now located at the Aircraft Factory (81.3-10.95).
   c. No changes for other units.

2. Weather and visibility: Clear and sunny, visibility unlimited, no surf, no wind, average temperature 70 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the period:
   a. CT-26: One patrol was made by Reconnaissance Platoon over the following route: HAIKI-ARITA-MIYANO-IMARI-HYAKUDOBARU-HIGASHI-UMENO-MIYASAKI-KURONDA.

   The roads along this route are passable for jeeps only except for a distance between ARITA and IMARI where the road will support all types of our equipment. Bridges are more than adequate to carry any traffic which the connecting roads will carry.

   No military personnel or installations were encountered by this patrol.

Remainder of CT is guarding military installations, equipment, and stores in zone of responsibility.
b. CT-27: A reconnaissance patrol was sent to KO-SASA via EMUKAE and SHISHIMACHI. The road is in fair condition but passable to light vehicular traffic only. The bridges are very lightly constructed. The entire area is a coal region.

A 1,000 ton collier was observed lying in a cove. On passing through ICHINOSE it was noted that about 25 to 30 Japanese flags were flying from houses. Also, in this same town, many red banners with two white characters were seen flying in front of houses.

Two additional warehouses installations were discovered in AINOURA and about 2 miles west of AINOURA. Contents are radio, electrical, and mechanical parts and equipment. Twenty-five bundles of what is believed to be pay records were in the latter place.

Remainder of CT continued patrolling assigned area in zone of responsibility.

c. CT-28: BLT 2/28 completed move from SASEBO dock area to Naval Training Station. Two platoons guarding ammunition storage area (64-19). Remainder of CT remained in division reserve at the Naval Training Station.

d. Artillery Group: First battalion completed inventory and general police of area. "B" battery starting inventory at KAWATANA. Second and third battalion conducting general police of assigned areas. Reconnaissance of fourth battalion reconnoitered the USHINE DAKE area ordnance branch (81-06), (31-07), (32-06). Area contains electrical equipment and bomb sights. Gun positions were seen at (81.0-07.3). "K" and "L" Batteries moved to new location at (81.3-10.95).

DUKW companies continued to furnish DUKWs for general hauling from the dock area.

Atomic bomb victims were found in a hospital near (91.9-01.9), about 2 miles west of KAWATANA.
SECRET

e. **Division Troops:** Conducting engineer reconnaissance and road repairs.

f. **OMURA Group:** OMURA Group is storing Japanese materials in consolidated areas. Also sending patrols out on reconnaissance.

FUJUKURA sanitary detail and engineer road reconnaissance party arrived in FUJUKURA at about 1600 on 27 September. They found the roads poor but passable. A portion of the party returned during the day, the remainder will return 29 September.

4. **Casualties:**

   a. Our casualties for the period – none.

   b. Our casualties to date – none.

   c. Enemy casualties for the period – none.

   d. Enemy casualties to date – none.

F. R. DOWETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACOFs, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: CG VAC (2) Arty Group
CT-23 2d MarDiv
CT-27 FILE (2)
CT-28

- 3 -
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

30 September 1945

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 9

From: 1800/I 23 September
To: 1800/I 29 September

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. 5th Engineer Bn: CP located at Naval Training Station (70.8-13.9).
   b. 5th Service Bn: CP located at Naval Training Station (70.8-13.8).
   c. 5th Motor Transport Bn: CP located at Naval Training Station (70.8-13.8).
   d. 5th Separate Laundry Platoon: CP located at (70.8-13.9).
   e. No change for other units.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear and sunny, visibility unlimited, no surf, no wind, average temperature 75 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-28: Patrolling missions continued. One patrol covered the route between ARIFUKU (83.9-09.9) and HIGASHINOURA (80.4-09.6). The people were fully cooperative. Searched warehouses and caves at (90.02-09.20). Caves contained only scraps of iron and warehouses only plywood, iron, rubber shoes, material for making gloves, and tin roof covering. In one warehouse were 3 rolls of movie film.

At (90.01-09.20) serveral gun emplacements were recovered. All weapons had been removed and no ammunition was discovered. Near by was an observation tower overlooking the harbor.
The road leading to HIGASHINOURA is in poor condition and only about 3 feet wide.

The remainder of the CT is guarding military installations, equipment, and stores in zone of responsibility.

b. CT-27: SECHIBARU (80-23) Naval Barracks was visited again. The road is steep, narrow, and winding making it impossible for anything larger than one-ton trucks to use the road. It is estimated that two one-ton trucks could remove all gear of a military nature. A reconnaissance party reconnoitered CHIODAKA (73.5-02.0) and discovered ordnance and ammunition. Only one 3.9 inch AA gun is actually mounted. Material other than the heavy ordnance can be recovered by small boats landing at Beach RED-1.

Remainder of CT continuing patrolling zone of responsibility and guarding military installations.

c. CT-23: Advance Billeting Detail of the FUKUOKA Occupation Force left at 0700I for FUKUOKA. Two platoons of BLT 3/23 guarding ammunition storage area at (34-19). Remainder of CT remained in division reserve at the Naval Training Station.

d. Artillery Group: First battalion completed inventory of Naval Stores Area. Second Battalion assisted First Battalion in this inventory. Third Battalion is guarding aircraft factory area. Fourth Battalion conducting general police of area and will start inventory 30 September.

DUKWs of DUKW company continued to haul cargo from dock area.

One OY plane fell into bay at NAS due to loss or air speed on take off at 1650. No one seriously injured.

c. Division Troops: Completing move to Naval Training Station. Engines re reconnoitering roads and bridges.
SECRET

f. Released "D" Co 3d MP Bn (Prov) to report to CG 2d MarDiv. They departed at 0730 I and arrived at NAGASAKI 1700I.

Issued Opn Order 30-45, "Occupation of FUKUOKA, BAKER ONE (Phase II)".

Prepared FUKUOKA Occupation Force to move to FUKUOKA, 30 September.

4. Casualties:
   a. Our casualties for the period - none.
   b. Our casualties to date - none.
   c. Enemy casualties for the period - none.
   d. Enemy casualties to date - none.

F. R. DOMSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG VAC (2)
CT-26
CT-27
CT-28
Arty Gp
2d MarDiv
File (2)
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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

1 October, 1945.

G-5 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 10

From: 18001 29 September 1945
To: 13001 30 September 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. 4th Bn, 13th Marines: CP located at Aircraft Factory (31.3-11.0).
   b. BLT 1/25: PUKUOKA.
   c. No change for other units.

2. Weather and visibility: Heavy rain in AM and cloudy in PM, visibility poor to fair, no surf, no wind, average temperature 60 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-23: Local patrols were sent out in the vicinity of MAIKI (31.1-07.0). BLT 1/23 and 3/25 continued guarding military installations and critical areas in zones of responsibility. BLT 3/23 sent one patrol to HIGASHINOKURA (30-09). Considerable quantities of shipping materials, small quantities of gasoline stores, building material and miscellaneous items were located in warehouses.

   A second patrol investigated the area in the vicinity of SATO (31.2-12.3), NAKORO (31.1-12.3), and KARITATE (35.0-12.5). The building at (31.5-13.0) was identified as the Headquarters of Japanese Corps Artillery. Neither arms nor ammunition were located by either patrol although empty gun positions were reported.
An additional cave was located at (84.55-09.95) containing explosives (3,000 kilograms) and detonators.

A third patrol reconnoitered the route from HAIKI (36 - 1 - 09.9) to end of road at (81.9-13.0). The road from RJ at (32.3-12.5) to the end of the road is very narrow. The people are friendly and curious. Two barracks in a narrow wooded draw at (81.75-12.85) were found unoccupied. Foundations for two other barracks are there also. No other military installations were located in the area.

Alcohol and chemicals were discovered in a cave at (84.4-09.3). Several pieces of machinery were found in a tunnel at (84.4-09.3). Numerous other caves were investigated which contained no material or equipment.

b. CT-27: Several guard posts were abandoned and turned over to the civilian police. These posts were railroad junctions, switches and civilian tax and ration offices. Remainder of guard posts are being maintained in CT-27's zone of responsibility.

c. CT-28: BLT 1/28 enroute to FUKUOKA as part of FUKUOKA Occupation Force. Two platoons guarding the Naval Ammunition Dumps in the vicinity of SUNZUNGA (34-19) report no unusual incidents and that the Japanese are very cooperative in assisting our units. The remainder of the CT remains at the Naval Training Station in division reserve.

d. Artillery Group: First and second battalions less "B" battery conducted general policing of the area. "B" battery continued inventory in KAVATAKA (92.9-01.5) area. Third battalion guarding Aircraft Factory area. Fourth battalion policing area.

DUKV companies furnishing DUKVs to haul cargo from dock area. 25 DUKVs from 5th Amph Truck Co with OHURA (1300.1-1035.8) group.
SECRET

e. Division Troops: Engineer battalion conducting camp maintenance and road repair.

f. C/MURA Group: Has moved about 75% of the Japanese ordnance stored at the Infantry Replacement Unit (02.35-34.35) to their warehouses and ammunition dumps and placed them under guard. All material has been inventoried.

g. Division issued Operation Order Number 31-45, (Assignment Areas of Responsibility).

Six war dogs and handlers were ordered to the 00 27th Marines for use in guarding caves.

VMC-5 has four planes operational.

4. Casualties:

a. Our casualties for the period - none.
b. Our casualties to date - none.
c. Enemy casualties for the period - none.
d. Enemy casualties to date - none.

F. R. DOMSETH,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2) 116th NC Bn (1)
2d MarDiv (1) 5th MT Bn (1)
CT-23 (4) C/MURA Group (1)
CT-27 (4) Div Staff (1)
CT-22 (4) War Diary (2)
13th Marines (4) G-3 Files (4)
5th Engineer Bn (1)
5th Tank Bn (1)
5th Medical Bn (1)
5th Service Bn (1)
G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 11  From: 1900I, 30 September, 1945
       To: 1900I, 1 October, 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and visibility: Rain in the morning and clouds in the afternoon, visibility one to three miles, no surf, no wind, average temperature 65°.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. CT-23: Reconnaissance Platoon patrolled area around (35-10). The caves in the area for the most part were air raid shelters. A cave located at (35-40-10.35) contained 200 cases of dynamite and several cases of primer cord.

      Another patrol covered the route: HAIKI-AKUNOURA-TAKI-NOCHI-IKUSHI-A-HARIO-URAGASHIRA. The roads are all serviceable for vehicles up to 1½ tons. AKUNOURA (34.5-05.4) contains barracks formerly used as a loading point for munitions to small ships. At HARIO (31.5-05.4) is located a powerful sending and receiving radio station still in operation. URAGASHIRA (31-10) is used for a quarantine station for ships' personnel. At present time it is quarantined because of typhoid fever. Several warships are in the dock area and a number of pieces of heavy equipment are present.

      Remainder of CT is guarding military installations and stores in zone of responsibility.
b. **CT-27**: Reconnaissance Platoon dispatched to reconnoiter vicinity of OHDKA (75.4-02.3).

First Battalion sent replacement platoon, "C" Co, by boat, to join OMURA Group at (1300.1-1085.3). War dogs and handlers were attached to "A" Co – no report on their conduct as yet.

Second Battalion located a cave at (76.5-13.3) containing blueprints of electrical conduits of SASEBO Dock area. Placed under guard.

Third Battalion enlarged area to include entire northern sector of regimental area of responsibility. Patrols were sent out in this section.

c. **CT-29**: GT less 1/23 remained in division reserve at OMURA Naval Training Station.

d. **Arty Co**: First Battalion conducting general police of area. "B" Battery at KAWATANA (92.9-01.5) continuing inventory of that area.

Second Battalion sent four patrols out in search of caves. One patrol found a rifle range at (82.6-13.2). Another patrol discovered a stone slab with a carved map and Japanese writing on it at (82.7-13.3).

Third Battalion continued guarding the SASEBO Aircraft Factory Area.

Fourth Battalion conducting inventories.

5th Amph Truck Co furnishing 15 DUKV's for reconnaissance of HIRADO Island.

Co "C" 20th Amph Truck Bn doing maintenance work.

e. **Division Troops**: 5th Engineer Bn doing maintenance work and repairs in Naval Training Station and distilling water at five water points.

VMO-5 has five planes operational.
SECRET

f. CIURA Group: Approximately 4/5 of the Japanese ordnance stored in warehouses at (02.35-84.35) has been moved to our area and placed under guard. A motor patrol reconnoitered the area to the southeast.

3. Division alerted Company "K" 28th Marines to move to SHIKOKUISHI about 4 October, to be under control of CG, FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

Reconnaissance Company less one platoon will make a reconnaissance of HIROYO Island, in accordance with Division Opn Ordor No. 39-45, from 2 October to 3 October.

A billoting party and sanitary detail will leave for SHIKOKUISHI at 0700I, 2 October.

4. Casualties:

a. Our casualties for the period - none.
b. Our casualties to date - none.
c. Enemy casualties for the period - none.
d. Enemy casualties to date - none.

F. R. COWSEY
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2) 5th Medical Bn (1)
2d MarDiv (1) 5th Service Bn (1)
CT-23 (4) 110th NG Bn (1)
CT-27 (4) 5th MT Bn (1)
CT-28 (4) CC H4 Bn (1)
13th Marines (5) CIURA Group (1)
5th Pioneer Bn (1) FUKUOKA Occupation Force (1)
5th Engineer Bn (1) Div Staff (1)
5th Tank Bn (1) War Diary (2)

- 5 -
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SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

3 October, 1945.

No. 12

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: 1:250,000, SASEBO Sheet 44;
KUUSHU: Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SW.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and visibility: Cloudy and intermittent rain, visibility 1 to 4 miles, rough surf, 12 knot wind about 1200 diminishing after nightfall, average temperature 60 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. CT-26: Reconnaissance platoon continued patrolling in zone of responsibility.

BLT 1/26 and 3/26 sent patrols out reconnoitering in assigned areas of responsibility. No military installations were encountered except a small amount of explosives and fuzes located in a warehouse at (83.35-10.20). Two warehouses in this area contained large quantities of sheet metal, pipe, wire and other unidentified supplies.

One patrol located a series of four interconnecting tunnels at (84.40-09.75), containing a quantity of unidentified chemicals. An electric air compressor in good condition was located at (84.40-09.75).

Another patrol located a quantity of dynamite and fuzes at (85.4-10.7) in revetted houses.

BLT 2/26 continued guarding military installations and stores in area of responsibility.

b. CT-27: Reconnaissance platoon investigated more thoroughly the OKADAKA area (75.4-02.6). An oil
line terminus exists at MARUSAKI-HAMA (76.8-03.6) into which oil is pumped from across the CHURA Strait. An old fort is located at (74.2-04).

BLT 1/27 located a cave at (72.9-05.7) containing twelve 1,000 pound mines, depth charges, and other explosive material. The war dogs attached to this battalion seem to be frightening the Japanese away from the vicinity of guard posts.

Remainder of CT continued guarding military installations and stores. One platoon was sent to SECHIBARI Naval Barracks.

c. CT-23: CT less BLT 1/28 remained in division reserve at the Naval Training Station.

d. Artillery Group: First battalion sent patrols through zone of responsibility. "B" Battery continuing inventory of KAWATANA.

Second Battalion and third battalion continued police and guard of Aircraft Factory.

Fourth battalion sent a reconnaissance patrol to TAKEO via HAIKI. At TAKEO it went south of URESHINO MACHIN-YAMABUCHI-KASHIMA-HAMA and then North to MURUSHIMA-KOHOKU-MURA-TAKA MURA. All roads and bridges are capable of handling 6 x 6 trucks. Little evidence of military installations was noted.

e. Division Troops: Continuing assigned mission. VIP-S has 6 planes operational.

f. CT-23 less 1/28 was alerted for move to FUKUOKA about 5 October. The advance billeting party and advance sanitary detail left BASEBO at 0800I 2 October for SHIMONOSEKI, arrived FUKUOKA 1700I 2 October. 5th Reconnaissance company less one platoon landed on HIRADO Island 1330I to make a reconnaissance of that island.

SECRET

F. R. DOMSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGefS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2) 5th Tank Bn
2d MarDiv 5th Medical Bn
32d InfDiv 5th Service Bn
CT-26 116th NC Bn
CT-27 5th MT Bn
CT-28 CO, HqBn
13th Marines OMURA Group
5th Pioneer Bn FUKUOKA Occupation Force
5th Engineer Bn Div Staff

War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

4 October 1945

No. 13

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and visibility: Cloudy and intermittent rain, visibility 3 to 7 miles, slight wind, no surf, average temperature 60 degrees.

3. Current operations for the period:

   a. CT-26: Reconnaissance Platoon reconnoitered the route from HAIXI to MYOJIKO HAWA (82.8-99.4). A radio station is located at (81.9-03.7) near TAIHO RA. The roads in this area are in poor condition.

   Another patrol found 400 25mm dual purpose guns and 13 mounts at the ARITA Technical School in ARITA.

   Civilian police are collecting all weapons and ammunition in the possession of civilians in this area.

   A radar station, four 120mm AA guns with 735 rounds of ammunition, and a range finder were located at (82.95-00.90). Four 15cm Coastal Defense guns were found at (83.85-00.85). A Japanese 1st Lt. is now caretaker of this area.

   b. 27th Marines: Third battalion relieved the guards of the 26th Marines at the ammunition dump located at (84-19). Second battalion established additional posts at warehouses in vicinity of (76.8-13.3). First battalion continuing guarding military installations and equipment in zone of responsibility.
c. 23rd Marines less 1/23: Continued in division reserve at Marine Barracks, AIMOURA. Preparing for move to FUKUOKA.

d. Artillery Group: Battalions improving billeting area and conducting inventories. The fourth battalion completed inventory of area (81.5-11.05). The second battalion sent a detachment to (13.17-10.75) to patrol this area.

One patrol from first battalion found numerous warehouses containing miscellaneous equipment and stores in area (86-09). Another patrol from the first battalion found two warehouses at (83.15-13.15) containing small arms and radio parts.

c. Division Troops: Continuing assigned missions.

f. General: Division released 3d Bomb Disposal Platoon at 1400 to V Phib Corps. OMURA Group will revert to parent control when relieved by elements of the 2d MarDiv on or about 4 October.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
27th Marines
CT-26
23rd Marines
Artillery Group
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th Medical Bn
5th Service Bn
116th NC Bn
5th MT Bn
CO HQ Bn
OMURA Group
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
Div Staff
War Diary
G-3 Files (4)
5 October 1945

No. 14

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 3 October 1945
To: 1800/1 4 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and visibility: Cloudy and scattered light rains, visibility 10 miles, slight wind, no surf, average temperature 55 degrees.

3. Our operations for the period:

a. CT-23: A patrol reconnoitered the route HAIKI-HIYAMA-HARIO. An investigation of the Naval Barracks area in HARIO (85.4-04.3) disclosed 12 warehouses. One warehouse contained bunks and tables, another one contained electrical equipment. Numerous drums of unidentified fuel were located in warehouses and in the open. The barracks will accommodate approximately 400 troops each. This Naval Station is a mustering-out point for military personnel.

Another patrol covered the route HAIKI to ARITA then south to ISHIKI (92.8-03.5). Roads and bridges are in good condition.

Remainder of CT guarding military installations and stores; inventories being conducted and Japanese weapons being collected to be centrally located and guarded.

b. 27th Marines: A patrol located a storeroom containing 5", 6", 8", 12" and 14" projectiles, some
of which are fuzed at (75.8-13.3). A guard was placed on mines and explosives in the vicinity of SHISA (70.7-30.5).

Remainder of CT guarding military installations and equipment. Civilian arms being collected and centrally stored under guard.

c. 28th Marines less 1/28, "X" Company and Detachments:

Remained in division reserve. Preparing for move to FUKUOKA on 5 and 6 October.

d. Artillery Group: First battalion is moving dynamite from (85.3-10.8) to battalion storage area. Three patrols were sent out in area (87-09). Small quantities of dynamite were collected and stored in battalion ammunition dump. A cave was located with several barrels of oil at (85.7-10.25). "B" battery continuing inventory at KAMATANA.

Second and third battalions continued guard of battalion area and Aircraft Factory.

A patrol from the Fourth battalion covered the URESHINO-MACHI area (1307.4-1106.4).

e. Division Troops: Continuing assigned missions.

f. General: OMURA Group relieved by elements of the 2d MarDiv at 1100/14 October. The OMURA Group then returned to SASEBO and reverted to parent control.

Issued Operation Order No. 36-45 "Movement of CT-28 to FUKUOKA".

4. Casualties: None.

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phil Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d TankDiv
CT-26
27th Marines
35th Marines
Artillery Group
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th Medical Bn
108th NC BN
5th MT Bn
CO, HqBN
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1300/1 4 October 1945
To: 1300/1 5 October 1945

Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000 KOKURA sheet 45.
KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000 sheet 4046 IV SE; 4046 I SW, 4046 III NE, 4046 II NW, 4046 III SE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II SE.

1. Location of troops:
   a. CT-26 (-) commenced movement to FUKUOKA. CP established at (East Park) at 1330/1 5 October. Remainder of CT will move to FUKUOKA on 6 October.
   b. No change for other units.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with scattered clouds, visibility excellent, no wind, no surf, average temperature 65 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-23: First and second battalions continued to guard military installations, equipment and stores in assigned area of responsibility.

   Third battalion sent a patrol to the O-SHIMA-YOKO-SHIMA Islands (84.5-02.5), no military installations were seen. Another patrol was sent around TAKE-SHIMA Island (81.3-09.5) and then on foot over the island. Another patrol covered the route between HAIKI-IMARI.

   b. 27th Marines: First and third battalions continued guarding military installations and equipment in zones of responsibility. Second battalion
preparing for movement to SAGA on 8 and 9 October.

c. **Artillery Group:** First battalion sent three patrols to cover the areas: (87-09) and (89.5-09.5). "B" battery at KAWATANA completing inventory of that area. Remainder of battalion maintained guards in its area.

Second battalion moved the detachment from ISAWAYA to KAWATANA. Maintained guard in battalion area with remainder of troops.

Third battalion continued guarding the SASEBO Aircraft Factory Area. One patrol reconnoitered the area northeast of MIKAWACHI (89.5-09.4).

Fourth battalion has nearly completed inventory of DAITO warehouses (9.11-10.9). Two patrols patrolled the area in the vicinity of TAKEO.

d. **Division Troops:** Continued assigned missions.

e. **General:** Reconnaissance Company returned from HIRADO Island at 0300/15 October. Will release 33d MarDep Co to VAC on 6 October.

Issued Operations Order No. 37-45 "Extension of Division Zone of Responsibility".

4. **Casualties:** None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3

**DISTRIBUTION:**

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
SECRET

FUKUOKA Occupation Force
CT-2S (4)
27th Marines (4)
Artillery Group (5)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Medical Bn
115th NC Bn
CO HQ Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

7 October 1945

No. 16

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 5 October 1945
To: 1800/I 3 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. Remainder of CT-29 displaced to FUKUCCA.
   b. No change for other units.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with scattered clouds, visibility unlimited, slight wind, no surf, average temperature 65 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-26: Reconnaissance Platoon sent to the Northern Area of CT's zone of responsibility. 1/26 and 2/26 continue guarding military installations and stores in battalion zones of responsibility. 3/26 sent one patrol to reconnoiter area around TAINOURA (80.5-02.5) and AIZITSO (80.6-03.0). Another patrol was dispatched along the route from HAIKI to TANOKASHIRO (82.5-03.4).
   b. CT-27: 1/27 relieved guards of 2/27 within zone of responsibility. 2/27 preparing for move to SAGA on 8 and 9 October. Advance billeting party and sanitary detail arrived in SAGA at 1430/I 8 October. 3/27 continued guarding military installations in battalion zone of responsibility.
   c. Artillery Group: First battalion maintained guard details and preparing for move to KAMATANA on 7 October. "E" Battery completed inventories.

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SECRET

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SECRET

Second battalion sent a patrol through the area in the vicinity of SHIRAMARU (87.8-08.6). Third battalion maintained guard over aircraft factory and sent one patrol to MIKAWACH (89.5-09.4). Fourth Battalion inventorying.

d. Division Troops: Continuing assigned missions.
e. General: Released 33d MarDep Co to VAC.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2) 5th Tank Bn
2d MarDiv 5th Lt Bn
32d InfDiv 5th Medical Bn
FUKUOKA Occupation Force 116th NC Bn
CT-25 (4) CO, Hq Bn
Artillery Gp (5) Div Staff
27th Marines (4) War Diary (2)
5th Pioneer Bn G-3 Files (4)
5th Engineer Bn
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

8 October 1945

No. 17

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 6 October 1945
To: 1800/I 7 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. 1/13 displaced CP to KAWATANA (92.9-01.5) at 1300/I 7 October.

   b. No change for other units.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with scattered clouds, visibility unlimited, no wind, no surf, average temperature 66 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-26: Reconnaissance Platoon returned from overnight patrol to OCHI (1305.8-1337.3). After leaving OCHI the patrol went as far north as YOBUKO (1295.2-1158.0) then returned to HAIKI. 1/26, 2/26, and 3/26 continued guarding military installations, equipment and stores in respective zones of responsibility.

   b. 27th Marines: 1/27 and 3/27 continued guarding military installations and patrolling areas of responsibility. 3/27 established a guard post near HOSHIKA (72.5-40.0) where a radio station is located. Advance billeting party of 2/27 located at SAGA sent a detachment at 1400/I 7 October to TOSU to quiet Chinese POW's (1 off and 40 men) who were reported to be rioting and looting.
The Chief of Police of TOSU informed the detachment that no trouble had occurred and that the Chinese POW's were on their way to someplace in the FUKUOKA Prefecture. The remainder of 2/27 displaces to SAGA on 8 and 9 October.

c. **Artillery Group:** First battalion moved to KAWATANA setting up their CP at 1600/17 October. Several Naval guns were brought ashore by the Japanese from ships and placed under guard at KAWATANA by our forces. The second, third and fourth battalions sent one patrol from each battalion to cover new zone of responsibility. The third battalion continued guarding the Aircraft Factory area.

d. **Division Troops:** Continued assigned missions.

4. **Casualties:** None.

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F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

**DISTRIBUTION:**

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
CT-23 (4)
Artillery Group (5)
27th Marines (4)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn

5th Tank Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, HqBN
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

9 October 1945

No. 18

From: 1800/I 7 October 1945
To: 1800/I 9 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Enclosure (A), Disposition of units of 5th Marine Division (As of 1800/I 8 October).

2. Weather and Visibility:

Overcast with continual light rains, visibility 3 to 7 miles, no wind, no surf, average temperature 55 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. CT-28: Reconnaissance Platoon dispatched on two day patrol to YCBUKU (1295.2-1159.0). Three patrols were active in third battalion's area of responsibility. Remainder of CT continued to inventory military equipment and stores and to guard military installations in zone of responsibility.

b. 27th Marines: 1/27 continued guarding military installations in area of responsibility. 3/27 patrolled area around Submarine and small boat repair base located at (62-24). Another patrol reconnoitered area around (74.5-20.3). Remainder of battalion guarding installations and conducting inventories. 2/27 moved "F" Company to SAGA at 1230/I 8 October. Remainder of battalion will displace to SAGA 9 October.

c. Artillery Group: "A" Battery moved to OGUSHI at 1200/I 9 October. No trouble was encountered. Remainder of 1/13 dispatched 3 patrols to area

- 1 -
SECRET

around (87-04). 2/13 dispatched 5 patrols to cover entire battalion area of responsibility. 3/13 continued guarding Aircraft Factory area. One patrol was active in battalion area. 4/13 dispatched one patrol to cover new battalion area.

d. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
CT-25 (4)
Artillery Gp (5)
27th Marines (4)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Medical Bn
116th NC Bn
C0, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)

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G - 3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 8 October, 1945
To: 1800/1 9 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. BLT 2/27 displaced to SAGA with CP located at (1336-1128).
   b. No change for other units.

2. Weather and Visibility:
   Overcast with intermittent rain, visibility 2 to 6 miles, gusts of wind up to 40 knots, rough surf, average temperature 50 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-26: Reconnaissance Platoon continued on second day of patrol to YOBUKO (1295.2-1159.0). BLT 1/26 sent a patrol to reconnoiter the area (86.47-18.90). BLT 2/26 and remainder of BLT 1/26 continued guarding military installations and equipment in zone of responsibility. BLT 3/26 continued patrolling and conducting inventories in battalion area.
   b. 27th Marines: Continued patrolling and guarding military installations in zone of responsibility. Inventories are being conducted. A new guard post was established over the HACHI-NO-KUBI battery (74.5-20.3).
   c. Artillery Group: 1/13 continued guard at KAWATANA Naval Base and OGUSHI. Three patrols were
dispatched to reconnoiter assigned area. 2/13 continued guard of Naval Stores Area. Patrols are active in area of responsibility. 3/13 and 4/13 continued guarding Aircraft Factory area and HIU Ammunition Depot respectively. A patrol was sent from each battalion to area of responsibility.

d. **SAGA Occupation Gp:** Battalion CP established at SAGA (1336-1128). Remainder of group arrived at SAGA 1800/19 October. Patrols reconnoitered SAGA and the approaches thereto.

e. **Division Troops:** Continued assigned missions.

4. **Casualties:** None.

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F. R. DOWSETT,

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,

AGofS, G-3.

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**DISTRIBUTION:**

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
SAGA Occupation Group
CT-23 (4)
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Group (5)
5th Pioneer Bn
8th Engineer Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Medical Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

11 October 1945.

No. 20

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 9 October 1945.
To: 1800/I 10 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and Visibility: Typhoon weather with high winds, heavy rains, visibility zero to one mile rough surf, average temperature 50 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. GT-26: Inclement weather limited patrol activity. Guards were maintained over military installations and equipment. Inventories continue to be conducted.

b. 27th Marines: Patrol activity was limited by the weather. Military installations and equipment were kept under guard in zone of responsibility. Inventories continue.

c. Artillery Group: Patrols were limited because of weather. Guards were maintained and inventories continue.

d. SAGA Occupation Co: Continued patrol and reconnaissance of immediate area of SAGA. A patrol was sent to reconnoiter KURUME.

e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.
F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
SAGA Occupation Group
CT-26 (4)
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
115th NC Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
COPY

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

12 October 1945.

No. 21

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 10 October 1945
To: 1800/I 11 October 1945

Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN; Scale 1:250,000 SASEBO Sheet 44.
KYUSHU; Scale 1:25,000 Sheet 4046 IV SE; 4046 I SW,
4046 III NE, 4046 II NW, 4046 III SE, 4046 II SW,
4046 II SE.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and Visibility: Overcast with light rain,
slight wind, visibility 5 to 8 miles, moderate surf,
average temperature 50 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. CT-23: The reconnaissance patrol to YOBUKO was
      unable to drive to the city because of road condi-
tions. It was necessary to walk the last mile
and a half. Two patrols from 3/26 reconnoitered
areas in battalion zone of responsibility. 1/26
and 2/26 continued patrolling and inventories in
assigned areas. CT-23 dispatched one platoon
to KARATSU at 1200/I 11 October to remain there
4 or 5 days.

   b. 27th Marines: 1/27 and 3/27 continued patrolling
and inventoring in area of responsibility.
Guards remain on military installations, equip-
ment and stores.

   c. Artillery Group: 1/13 continued guard of
KAWATANA Naval Base and OGUSHI Suicide Base.
The inventory at the Suicide Base is 80% com-
pleted. 2/13 remains on guard of Naval Stores
Area. 3/13 continued guard of SASEBO Aircraft

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SECRET

Factory Area. 4/13 guards HIU Ammunition Depot.

d. SAGA Occupation Gp: Patrols remained active throughout SAGA and approaches. One patrol reconnoitered route to KURUME and another patrol to KOKUSAI. Road reconnaissance started to OITA afternoon of 11 October.

e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F.R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGof3, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUKA Occupation Force
CT-26 (4)
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
115th NC Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (3)
13 October 1945

No. 22

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 11 October 1945
To: 1800/I 12 October 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with scattered clouds, slight wind, visibility 8 to 10 miles, no surf, average temperature 50 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. CT-26: Reconnaissance Platoon continuing patrolling and collecting of weapons in YEBUKO area. One patrol covered the route: HAIKI-IMARI-MIMASHA-ARITA-HAIKI. The road from IMARI to MIYANO was found to be impassable. Remainder of roads are in good condition. Another patrol was dispatched from HAIKI to IMABUKU via IMARI and SATO. Battalions continued patrolling activities in area of responsibilities. 2/2 and 3/26 continue inventories.

   b. 27th Marines: 1/27 and 3/27 continued patrolling and inventorying in area of responsibility. Guards remain guarding military installations, equipment and stores.

   c. Artillery Group: 1/31 has beached 50% of the PT and Suicide Boats at the Suicide Base. 2/13 dispatched 4 patrols to ROKKAKU area to remain until reconnaissance is complete. 3/13 continued guard of Aircraft Factory Area and sent one patrol to assigned area to reconnoiter. 4/13 dispatched one patrol to the HAMASHI area. Artillery Group prepared to exercise surveillance over the Japanese troops returning from KOREA.
SECRET

d. SAGA Occupation Gp: Continued patrolling and reconnoitering area of SAGA. One patrol dispatched to YAMAHA. Road reconnaissance party reached TSUYAMAKI at 1700/12 October. They found the roads from HIDA East in very poor condition.

c. Division Troops: Continue assigned missions. VMC-5 has 8 planes operational.

Issued Opn Order No. 38-45, "Extension of Occupation Operations".

4 Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACOF, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
CT-2 (4)
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th Engineer Bn

5th MT Bn
5th Medical Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, Hq Bn
SAGA Occupation Gp
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)

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SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

14 October 1945

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 23 From: 1800/I 12 October 1945
To : 1800/I 13 October 1945

Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000; SASEBO Sheet 44,
KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46; KYUSHU: Scale
1:25,000 Sheet 4045 IV 3E, 4046 I SW, 4046 III NE,
4046 II NW, 4046 III SE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II SE.

1. Location of Troops:
   a. OITA Occupation Group displaced to OITA, arriving
      at 1700/I 13 October, with CP located at (652.8-
      1123.8).

   b. No change for other units.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with scattered clouds,
wind 2 knots, visibility unlimited, no surf, average
temperature 55 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-26: Reconnaissance Platoon continued patrolling
      and collecting weapons in YOBUKO area. Remainder
      of CT continued inventories, patrolling, and guarding
      of military installations in zone of responsibility.

   b. 27th Marines: 1/27 sent a patrol to small island
      at (72.2-08.8). Remainder of battalion and 3/27
      continue inventories and guarding military installa-
      tions in zone of responsibility.

   c. Artillery Co: 1/13 maintains guard of KAWATANA
      Naval Base and OGUSKI Suicide Base. A patrol
      reconnoitered the area (86-02). 90% of the PT
      and Suicide Boats have been beached. 2/13 con-

d. SAGA Occupation Gp: One patrol dispatched to TOSU. Another patrol reconnoitered the vicinity of KIYAMA GUCHI (1359-1149). Remainder of Group guarding military installations in SAGA and approaches.

e. Division Troops: Continue assigned missions. 8th Mar Amm Co was released to VAC at 0800/1.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)  5th Tank Bn
2d MarDiv  5th Engineer Bn
32d InfDiv  5th MT Bn
FUKUOKA Occupation Force  5th Medical Bn
CT-26 (4)  116th NC Bn
27th Marines (3)  CO, HqBn
Artillery Group (5)  Div Staff
SAGA Occupation Gp  War Diary (2)
5th Pioneer Bn  G-3 Files (4)
C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

16 October 1945

No. 25

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 14 October 1945
To: 1800/I 15 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with unlimited visibility, no wind, no surf, average temperature 60°.

3. Current Operations for the Period:

a. CT-28: Reconnaissance Platoon returned from YOBUKO area after 3 day patrol and collection of weapons. The Platoon at KARATSU reports the following beach conditions in that area: Reference Info Bulletin Northern KYUSHU No. 132-45 dated August 23, 1945; KARATSU harbor proper does not offer any areas for landing operations by LST's or LSM's. Beach "P" offers a satisfactory landing area with uncovered storage space available. Small dock areas at HAYAN Basin are available for landings but there are numerous wrecked small craft present which will make operations difficult. Beach "O" is a wide sandy beach, easily negotiable by wheeled traffic with satisfactory beach exits present.

A patrol reconnoitered the HAICKI-SATO-KUSUKU-KUBARA-URANOSAKE-IMABUKU route. 1/28, 2/28 and 3/28 continued inventories and guarding military installations in zones of responsibility. 3/28 dispatched a patrol to the HARIO Separation Center.

b. 27th Marines: 1/27 and 3/27 continued conducting inventories and guarding military installations, equipment and stores in zones of responsibility.
SECRET

o. Artillery Group: All battalions continued guarding assigned areas in zone of responsibility. 1/13 sent a reconnaissance patrol to area (1280-1100). 2/13 dispatched 4 patrols to area north of KASHIMA (1316-1107). One patrol returned from the SUMINOE area (1327-1119), and 3 patrols returned from the ROKKAKU area (1319-1118). 3/13 sent one patrol to reconnoiter area in zone of responsibility. 4/13 dispatched 3 patrols to cover all Police Stations in area, the northeast section of battalion area (1320-1140), and the HAMASAKI area (1309-1148).

d. SAGA Occupation Grp: Continued patrolling and reconnoitering area around SAGA. Guards maintained over military installations.

e. OITA Occupation Grp: Patrols dispatched to OITA and BEPU. Policing of billeting area continues.

f. Division Troops: Continue assigned missions.

g. General: Completed processing and dispatching of first group of Japanese troops from KOREA at 152130/1. A total of 9495 troops were dispatched. The remaining troops are either sick or being retained by Japanese Army to assist in demobilizing of second group.

F. R. DIONNETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
CT-23 (4)
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Group (5)
SAGA Occupation Grp
OITA Occupation Grp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Tank Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Medical Bn
116th NC Bn
C0, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

17 October 1945

No. 23

From: 1800/I 15 October 1945
To: 1800/I 16 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear, visibility 6 to 10 miles, no wind, no surf, average temperature 60 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. CT-23: KARATSU patrol continuing activities in that area. Remainder of CT continued inventorying, patrolling and guarding of military installations, stores and equipment in zones of responsibility. Routine collection and storing of weapons continues.

   b. 27th Marines: 1/27 and 3/27 continued inventories and guarding military installations, equipment and stores in zones of responsibility. 3/27 dispatched a patrol to area south of SHISA (1276-1135).

   c. Artillery Group: All battalions continued guarding assigned areas in zone of responsibility. Another patrol reconnoitered the KATASHIMA Peninsula. Four patrols from 2/13 remain patrolling area with common billet and CP at (24,6-17,4). 3/13 dispatched one patrol in battalion zone. 4/13 sent one patrol to reconnoiter battalion zone. Patrols remain active in KANASAKI area (1509-1149).

   d. SAGA Occupation Gp: Dispatched patrols to KANZAKI, METABARU, and TOSU. Patrols reconnoitered the YAMAGAWA-SETAKA area (1350-1118). Collection and inventory of weapons continue.
SECRET

e. OITA Occupation Gp: Dispatched patrols to BEPPU and OITA to reconnoiter that area.

f. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,  
ACoF S, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)  
2d MarDiv  
32d InfDiv  
F'KUCCA Occupation Force  
CT-23 (4)  
27th Marines (3)  
Artillery Gp (5)  
SAGA Occupation Gp  
OITA Occupation Gp  
5th Pioneer Bn

5th Tank Bn  
5th Engineer Bn  
5th MT Bn  
5th Med Bn  
116th NC Bn  
CO, HqBn  
Div Staff  
War Diary (2)  
G-3 Files (4)  

SECRET
G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 16 October 1945
To: 1800/I 17 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear, visibility 6 to 10 mi., no wind, no surf, average temperature 60 degrees.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. CT-26: CT preparing to embark in ships of Trans Div 39 commencing 18 October and to turn over zone of responsibility to RCT-127 who will billet in CT-26 area. 1/26, 2/26, and 3/26 continued guarding military installations, equipment, and stores in zones of responsibility.

b. 27th Marines: 1/27 and 3/27 continued guarding military installations and equipment in zones of responsibility. Routine patrolling throughout area continues. Inventories being conducted.

c. Artillery Go: Battalions continued guard of assigned areas in zone of responsibility. 1/13 sent one patrol to area north of SONOKI (1298-1097), and another patrol to area surrounding HIRASE (1294-1108). 3/13 dispatched patrols to cover area of responsibility. 4/13 sent one patrol to the TAKUBARU-OGHI area (1307-1133). One patrol returned from the FUSIKAWA-MANA30 area (1317-1148). The road between these last two points is impassable to vehicular traffic.

d. SAGA Occupation Go: Patrols returned from 3 day reconnaissance of area surrounding KURUME and
SECRET

YANAGAMA (1347-1115). Additional patrols Reconnoitered area surrounding TANUSHIMARU (1376-1138).

c. CITA Occupation Gp: Reconnoitered the BEPPU-
    CITA area. Continued guarding military install-
    lations.

f. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ADfS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
CT-26 (4)
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Group (5)
RGT-127 (4)
SAGA Occupation Gp
CITA Occupation Gp

5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)

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C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 19 October 1945

No. 28 G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 17 October 1945
To: 1800/1 18 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: RCT-127 afloat. No change for other units.

2. Weather and Visibility: Overcast, light rain, visibility 3-5 miles, light variable wind.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. CT-26: Continued preparation for embarkation. KARATSU Patrol returned after thoroughly covering the KARATSU area both by vehicle and on foot.


   d. 127th Infantry: Commenced debarking.

   e. SAGA Occupation Group: Continued patrols and inventories in assigned zone of responsibility.

   f. OITA Occupation Group: Inspection of military installations continued. Patrols into eastern sector of zone. Improvement of airstrip undertaken.

   g. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.
SECRET

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
CT-26 (4)
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Group (5)
RCT-127 (4)
SAGA Occupation Gp
OITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Medical Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 20 October 1945

No. 29  G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 18 October 1945
To: 1800/I 19 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: Refer to daily location report No. 29.


3. Our Operations for the Period:


b. CT-27: Located previously unreported mine sweeping base two miles west of EMUKAE, (1236-1130). All weapons company personnel have been relieved from guarding explosives in SAGA coal mines and the guard over the AIMOURA area blockhouses have been relieved by civilian police. Two warehouses in SHISA area are being inventoried. General patrolling continues.


d. 127th Infantry: Assumed zone of responsibility and continued missions previously assigned to 23rd Marines. Estimated 90 per cent unloaded.

- I -

SECRET
SECRET

c. SAGA Occupation Gp: Established outpost at KANZAKI and continued patrolling in eastern portion of zone of responsibility. Continued collection of weapons in SAGA area.

d. OITA Occupation Gp: Moved CP to (354.5-1123.5) and continued assigned missions. Regular patrol established in OITA-BEPPU area.

e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOUGERTY,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACoF5, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2) 5th Pioneer Bn
2d MarDiv 5th Engineer Bn
32d InfDiv 8th T Bn
FUKUOKA Occupation Force 5th Med Bn
CT-26 (4) 116th NC Bn
27th Marines (3) CO, HqBn
Artillery Group (5) Div Staff
RCT-127 (4) War Diary (2)
SAGA Occupation Gp G-3 Files (4)
CITA Occupation Gp

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 21 October 1945
No. 30 G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 19 October 1945
To: 1800/1 20 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: Refer to daily location report No. 26.

2. Weather and Visibility: Overcast with light rain; visibility fair.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. CT-26: 26th Marines Reinforced, less BLT-226, reported to CG FMM PAC for duty at 201210/Z.
   b. CT-27: BLT 127 reconnoitered BLT 327's area. Patrolling and surveillance continued in assigned zones of responsibility.
   c. Arty Co: Patrolled in KASHIMA area and in OGI and HAMASAKI areas. Patrol dispatched to TAKASHIMA Island. Supervised debarkation of Japanese military personnel from 10 LST's that arrived today from INCHON. 1800 Jap troops debarked at J'AGASHI by 201630/Z.
   e. OTTA and SAGA Co's: Continued patrolling, inventorying, and guarding in assigned zones of responsibility.
   f. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.
SECRET

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:
7 Phib Corps (2)
32d InfDiv
21 MarDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
BLT-226
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT-197 (4)
SAGA Occupation Gp
OITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, H&BN
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (3)
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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 22 October 1945

No. 31 G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 20 October 1945
To: 1800/I 21 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: Refer to Daily Location Report No. 31.

2. Weather and Visibility: Scattered middle clouds; visibility good.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. CT-23: Reinforced less BLT 226 reported to CG F.I.F. PAC for duty at 203100/I. BLT 226 commenced debarking 210332/I and completed displacement to Marine Camp Aoinoura at 210500/I.

   b. CT-27: Advance echelon departed for KURUME at 210900/I. Continued patrolling and guarding in zone of responsibility.

   c. Arty Co: Supervised debarkation of Japanese troops and civilians, with 9000 ashore by 21 1300/I, of which 7500 had been sent to HARIO. Patrols in area SW of KASHIMA and in BEPPU-CGI area. Investigated TAKASHIMA (1304.1-1151.7).

   d. 127th Infantry: Continued patrolling and guarding in assigned zone of responsibility. Co B, 114th Engrs 75% unloaded at 211800/I.

   e. SAGA Co: Two day patrols to HAINUZUKA (1358-1121) and YANAGAWA (1347-1115). Continued execution of assigned mission.

   f. OITA Co: Reconnaissance south from OITA to INUKAI
and MIE was made.

g. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
32d InfDiv
2d MarDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Force
BLT-226
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT-127 (4)
SAGA Occupation gp.
OITA Occupation gp.

5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, Hqbn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
G C P Y

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 23 October 1945

No. 32 G-2 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 21 October 1945
To: 1800/I 22 October 1945

Note: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: Refer to Daily Location Report No. 32.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear; visibility fair.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT 2/23: Furnished Camp Guard.
   b. BLT 5/23: Departed AOJ 220300/I; arrived Marine Camp AIMC AA 221349/I.
   c. CT-27: less BLT 127 and BLT 227 was 63% displaced to KURUME at 221300/I. BLT 3/27's CP established at KURUME.
   d. Arty Co: Patrolled area SE of TAKEC and continued guarding installations and material. Detachment secured from URASHIMA. At 221300/I, 121 persons of DAITO group, and 2822 persons of KOREA group have been dispatched.
   e. 127th Infantry: Patrolled NE of SASEBO; continued guarding in assigned zone of responsibility.
   f. SAGA Group: Patrole in YANAGAWA (1357-1115) and vicinity; USHIMA (1353-1121) and vicinity.
   g. OITA Group: (for period ending 201300/I) made road and bridge reconnaissance SE from OITA to SAZKI. Continued assigned missions.
SECRET

h. Division Troops: Co A, 5th Engr Bn displaced from HAIKI to Marine Camp AIMOURA; completed at 221200/I. 3d Plt Co C displaced from MOJI to Marine Camp AIMOURA arriving at 221049/I.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOUSSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

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<th>Division</th>
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<td>BLT 203</td>
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<td>War Diary (2)</td>
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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

24 October 1945

No. 33

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 22 October 1945
To: 1800/1 23 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Enclosure (A), Disposition of units of 5th MarDiv (as of 1800/1 23 October).

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Current Operations for the Period:

   a. BLT 223 furnished camp guard.

   b. CT-27: less BLT 127 and BLT 227 was 63% displaced to KURUME at 231000/I.

   c. BLT 328: opened CP, Marine Camp Aincura at 230900/I.

   d. Arty Grp: Continued guarding and sent patrols into FUKUI (NW of SAGA) and TAKUBARU-COH areas.

   e. 127th Inf: Patrolled IMARI-KARATSU-CHIKOKU route and vicinity. Continued guarding.

   f. SAGA Grp: Continued patrolling and guarding in assigned zone.

   g. CITA Grp: (for period ending 211800/I). Sent patrols SW of CITA to TAKEDA for reconnaissance and surveillance. (For period ending 221800/I). Sent patrols east to CITA to SAGANSEKI. Continued assigned missions.

   h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

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SECRET

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
32d InfDiv
2d MarDiv
FUKUOKA Occupation Forces
BLT-226
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT-127 (4)
SAGA Occupation Gp
OLTA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th T Bn
116th NC Bn
5th Med Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
C O P Y
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

25 October 1945

No. 32

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1300/I 23 October 1945
To: 1800/I 24 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Daily Location Report No. 31.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT 223: Furnished Camp Guard.
   b. CT-27: Closed CP at Marine Camp Ainoura and opened CP at KURUME at 240900/I. Continued assigned missions.
   c. BLT 328: Prepared to assume Camp Guard.
   d. Arty Gp: Continued guarding and inventorying. Sent patrol south of KASHIWA and northeast of TAKEO, to KITAKATA. Patrolled FURUYU area.
   e. 127th Infantry: Patrol returning from IMABUKU area; patrols northeast of SASEBO.
   f. SAGA Gp: (As of 241655/I) Continued patrolling and surveillance.
   g. OITA Gp: Continued assigned missions.
   h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.
F. R. DOYETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
V Phib Corps (2)
324 Inf Div
2d Mar Div
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT-223
27th Marines (3)
BLT-329
Artillery Gp (5)
ACT-127 (4)
SAGA Occupation Gp
OITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
Co, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (1)
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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

26 October 1945

No. 36  G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 24 October 1945  
To:   1800/I 25 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with scattered clouds, visibility 8 miles, slight wind, no surf.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT 2/26: Preparing to disband on 31 October.
   c. BLT 3/28: Furnished Camp Guard.
   d. CT-27: Assumed control of SAGA Occupation Gp at 250300/I. Police of billeting areas continued. Local patrols reconnoitered KURUME Area.
   e. Arty Gp: Continued guarding and inventorying in zone of responsibility. Patrols active in area south of KASHIMA (17.6-07.2) and in area east of KITAKATA. One patrol returned to OGI (1323-1130) area to resume patrolling.
   f. 127th Inf: Patrolled area in vicinity of KARATSU.
   g. CITI Gp: Continued guarding military installations, and patrolling.
   h. SAGA Gp: Reverted to control of CT 6000/I.

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SECRET

1. **Division Troops:** Continued assigned missions. 6th War Dog Platoon preparing to embark aboard AKA 23 to depart SASEBO for U.S. on 27 October.

4. **Casualties:** None.

F. R. DOYSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

**DISTRIBUTION:**

V Phil Corps (2)
32d InfDiv
2d MarDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 226
BLT 1/27
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Co (5)
RCT-127 (4)
OITA Occupation Gp
6th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 25 October 1945
To: 1800/I 26 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.


3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT 223: Preparing to disband on 31 October.
   b. BLT 127: Effected disposition of Japanese material.
   c. BLT 323: Continued guarding and training.
   d. CT-27: Patrolled SE of KURUNE in vicinity of SETAKA and continued collection of control items.
   e. Arty go: Continued guarding; and patrolling NE of IMARI in CCHI vicinity and in KASHI
city. Supervised processing of Japanese repatriates.
   f. OITA go: Patrolled west of BEPPU.
   g. 127th Inf: Continued guarding, patrolling and disposition missions.
   h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, ACoFS, G-3
SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
32d InfDiv
2d MarDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 228
BLT 127
27th Marines (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT-127 (4)
OITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th Mt Bn
5th Med Bn
113th NC Bn
CO, HqBn
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C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

23 October 1945

No. 37

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 26 October 1945
To: 1800/I 27 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: Rear Echelon, 5th MarDiv detached and reported to CG, FMF, Pac for full administrative and operational control effective 25 October, 1945.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear, visibility 10 miles, wind 2 to 5 knots, no surf.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT 2/28: Preparing to disband on 31 October.
   b. BLT 1/27: Effected disposition of Japanese material.
   c. BLT 3/28: Continued camp guard and furnishing working parties.
   d. CT-27: One patrol dispatched from SAGA to MITSUSA (16 miles north of SAGA) via KANZAKI and HIROTAKI. 3/27 commenced relieving guards in KURUMI. Collection of control items continued.
   e. Arty Co: Continued guard of assigned area. Supervised processing of Japanese repatriates; 7600 troops ashore at 271 00/I. Destruction of Japanese war materials continued in assigned area. Patrols were active in vicinity of KASHIRA (26 miles east of SASEBO).
   f. RCT-127: Continued guarding, patrolling and disposition missions in zone of responsibility.
g. CITA Gp: Patrolled reconnoitered to JUMONJI and ISHIKARI HARA area west and north of BEPPU. Motor patrols dispatched to TAKATA (20 miles north of BEPPU), KITSUKI (15 miles north of CITA) and HIDA (35 miles west of BEPPU).

h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions. 6th Mar War Dog Plt detached 27 October.

4. Casualties:

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (3)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FU. OKA Base Command
BLT 2/23
BLT 1/27
BLT 3/28
CT-27 (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT-127 (4)
OITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MG Bn
5th Amd Bn
116th MC Bn
CC, 4qBN
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 6th MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

29 October 1945

No. 38

From: 1800/I 27 October 1945
To : 1800/I 29 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Statement No. 38.


3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT-226: Preparing to disband on 31 October
   b. BLT-127: Effected segregation-disposition of Japanese material.
   c. BLT-322: Continued assigned missions.
   d. CT-27: Continued guards and patrol in KANZAKI area and North of KURIUMI in TCSU area.
   f. RCT-127: Continued guarding and disposition of Japanese material.
   g. CITA-Co: Continued guarding, patrolling and collection missions in assigned zone of responsibility.
   h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.
SECRET

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACoS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 2/26
BLT 1/27
BLT 3/29
CT-27 (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT-127 (4)
OITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
113th NC Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)

- 2 -

SECRET

854
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 30 October 1945
No. 59  G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 28 October 1945
To: 1800/I 29 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Statement No. 39.

2. Weather and Visibility: Low overcast with showers; visibility poor.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT-226: Preparing to disband on 31 October.
   b. BLT-127: Continued disposition of Japanese materiel; estimated 85 percent of artillery and coastal guns in zone of responsibility have been destroyed.
   c. BLT-328: Continued guarding and training.
   d. CT-27: Continued collection and segregation of Japanese materiel north and west of KURUMI in TOSU and KANZAKI. Establishing central storage system to facilitate guarding.
   e. Arty Go: Patrol returned from KASHIMA area. Patrols dispatched to KARATSU and FURUYU area. Commenced unloading Japanese repatriates 29 1945/I. Continued disposal activities and guarding.
   g. OITA Go: (For period ending 281800/I) Dispatched patrol west to HIDA via MORI and BEPPU. Similar patrol sent north to KITSUKI via HIJI and KUSAN.
SECRET

(For period ending 291800/1) continued collection activities and other assigned missions.

h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DONSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUKA Base Command
BLT 2/26
BLT 1/27
BLT 3/29
CT-27 (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT-127 (4)
CITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th MC Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 29 October 1945
To: 1800/I 30 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Statement No. 40.

2. Weather and Visibility: Overcast with showers; visibility fair.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. BLT 226: Preparing to disband on 31 October.

   b. BLT 127: Continued disposition of Japanese material; estimated 90 percent of artillery and coastal guns in zone of responsibility have been destroyed.

   c. BLT 323: Continued guarding and training.

   d. CT-27: Patrolled SE of SAGA in vicinity of WATATSU and East of SAGA in vicinity of JOLIMA and KANGENUI. Continued collection of arms and central storage of Japanese material.


   f. OITA Group: Sent patrols south to SAZKI area and patrolled west of BEPPU in vicinity of MURI.
SECRET

h. Division Troops: Operational control of 5th Amphibious Truck Company passed to 5th Motor Transport Bn at 301102/1. Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACoS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
BLT 2/26
BLT 1/27
BLT 3/28
CT-27 (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT-127 (4)
CITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
118th NC Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 1 November 1945
No. 41 G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1300/I 30 October 1945
To: 1800/I 31 October 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Statement No. 41.

2. Weather and Visibility: Low broken clouds with good visibility; scattered showers.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT 223: Disbanded this date.
   b. BLT 127: Continued guarding and training.
   c. BLT 323: Prepared to assume RCT 127 zone of responsibility.
   d. CT-27: Continued collection of critical items and disposition. Sent patrols South and East of KURUZ.
   e. Arty Co: Patrolled NE of TAKEO and South of KISHIMA. Continued collection of critical items and disposition activities. Sixth group of Japanese repatriates commenced unloading at 311300/I.
   f. RCT 127: Continued guarding, and destruction of Japanese ordnance.
   g. CITI Gp: Sent patrols south to airfield in NAKA-TATSUGI area.
   h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.
SECRET

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Amphib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
BLT 3/28
CT-27 (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT 127 (4)
CITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4):
C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 2 November 1945

No. 42 G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 31 October 1945
To: 1800/1 1 November 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Statement No. 42.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT 127: Completed survey of radio equipment for disposition. Training continues.
   d. Arty Gp: Patrolled NE of TAKEO and continued collection of controlled items. Approximately 95 percent of assigned area has been covered by patrols.
   e. RCT-127: Continued guarding and disposition efforts. Prepared for FUKUOKA displacement.
   f. CTA Gp: Being relieved by 125th Fa Bn. Patrolled in vicinity of SAEKI.

3. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.
F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-5.

DISTRIBUTION:
V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUJUKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
BTA 3/29
CT-27 (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT 127 (1)
OITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th MG Bn
CO, HaBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 3 November, 1945.

No. 43 G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 1 November, 1945.
To: 1600/1 2 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Report no. 43.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. BLT 127: Completed disposal of scrapped guns in zone of responsibility. Prepared for displacement of reinforced company to GOTO-RETTO on 3 Nov.

b. BLT 328: Continued guarding and training.

c. RCT 27: Placed guards on ammunition dumps and continued destruction of Japanese ordnance.

d. RCT 28: BLT 228 and one-half of CT 28 headquarters opened CP at Marine Camp Aincuna at 011535/1.

e. Artillery Group: Completed 94% coverage of zone of responsibility by patrols. Continued collection, central storage disposition. Patrolled South and East of KARATSU also 3W of SAGA.

f. CITA Group: Relief by 32d InfDiv continues.

g. RCT 127: Continued guarding materiel and destruction of Japanese installations.

h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOYSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.
SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
BLT 328
CT-27 (3)
RCT 28 (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT 127 (4)
OITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NO Bn
CO, HQ Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
O-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

4 November, 1945.

G-5 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 44

From: 1800/I 2 November 1945
To: 1800/I 3 November 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See location report No. 44.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. G-5 Operations for the Period:
   a. BLT 127: Embarked 1/3 En for GOTC-RETTO Occupation.
   b. BLT 323: Continued guarding and training. Sasebo guard posts relieved by BLT 223 at 031700/I.
   c. RCT 27: Continued collection and disposition activities.
   d. RCT 23: Continued displacement from FUKUCKA.
   e. Arty Gp: Continued guarding, collection and central storage. Sixth gp repatriates unloaded at 031700/I.
   f. Cita Gp: Continued relief by 32d InfDiv. Patrode in vicinity of SAEKI-VAN.
   g. RCT 127: Continued destruction of Japanese installations and disposition. Displacement to FUKUCKA.
   h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGcfs, G-3.
SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
BLT 3/28
CT-27 (3)
RCT 29 (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT 127 (4)
CLFA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
115th NC Bn
CO, MqBn
Div Staff
Var Diary (?)
G-3 Files (4)
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

5 November, 1945.

G-3 Operations Report

No. 45

From: 1300/I 3 November, 1945.
To: 1300/I 4 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Report No. 45.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Operations for the Period:

   b. 4 29th Mar 4d and 3d Bn: Relieved 3d Bn, 29th Mar
   c. 3rd Bn, 22nd Mar: Relieved 2nd Bn, 127th Infantry at 041500/I.
   d. 27th Marines less 1st Bn: Continued assigned missions.
   e. Art Bn: Continued guards and destruction Japanese material. Patrolled 8 mi E of KARATSU in FUKUHAU vicinity. Assumed control of 1st FA Bn 050800/I.
   f. CITA QM: Relieved b 32nd InfDiv at 040300/I. Prepared for displacement to SAS2BC.
   g. 127th Infantry: Continued FUKUHAU displacement with 3rd Bn departing SAS2BC 040300/I.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.
SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
BLT 3/23
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (3)
Artillery Gp (5)
RCT 127 (4)
CITA Occupation Gp
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th Mt Bn
5th Med Bn
115th Med Bn
CC, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 6 November, 1945.

C-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 46 From: 1800/I 4 November 1945
To: 1800/I 5 November 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Report No. 46.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   b. 27th Mar less 1stBN: Continued disposition of Japanese ordnance and other material.
   c. 3dBN 28th Mar: Continued guarding and training. See (a) above.
   d. 1/2 23th Mar Hq plus 2dBN: Continued guarding Bn zone of responsibility.
   e. Arty Co: Continued guards. Loaded ammo aboard ship for dumping. Rcn patrol vicinity BEFU (8 mi NW of SAGA) and made aerial Rcn vicinity FURUYU (10 mi NW of SAGA).
   f. OITA Gp Personnel: Arrived SASEBO 051300/I; reverted to 5th Tank Bn control.
   g. 127th Inf: 1/2 127th Inf Hq with 3dBN, anti-tank Co, and Cannon Co arrived FUKUOKA 051500/I; passed 32d InfDiv control that time. 1/2 127th Inf Hq with 2dBN and remainder of attached units less 121st FA Bn loaded for FUKUOKA displacement.
   h. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.
SECRET

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
BLT 3/28
CT-27 (3)
RCT 23 (3)
Artillery Co (5)
RCT 127 (4)

5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
118th NC Bn
CO, HQ Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 7 November, 1945.

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 47

Fr m: 1800/1 5 November, 1945.
To : 1800/1 6 November, 1945.

None: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location report No. 47.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

(a) 1st Bn 27th Mar: Guards relieved by 3rd Bn 28th Mar. Co A
(Reinf) on GOTO-RETTO Occasion: (Period ending 051500/1)
RN patrol vicinity YAMASHURA (SV part FUKAE-SHIMA) also
air facilities vicinity of FUKI-DAKE (SE part FUKAE-
SHIMA). Disposition underway. (For period ending 061500/10.
Patrol destroyed radio and radar equipment on DAKJU GUNTO (50
miles SW of FUKAE-SHIMA). Surveillances of NARU SHIMA (NE
of FUKAE-SHIMA 8 miles) and KABA SHIMA (NE of FUKAE-SHIMA
7 miles) were made.

(b) 27th Marines less 1st Bn: Continued dispositions. Burned
ammunition and destroyed machine guns with acetylene torches.
Continued guards.

(c) 3rd Bn 28th Mar: Completed relief of 1st Bn 27th Mar 061600/1.

(d) 28th Mar less 3rd Bn: Remainder 28th Mar Hq plus 1st Bn arrived
SASEBO 061400/1. 2nd Bn continued guarding installations.

(e) Arty Co: Continued guarding. Disposition patrols vicinity
YAMAGUCHI (7 miles W of SASEBO). Patrols 8 miles E of SASEBO
vicinity ARITA.

(f) 127th Inf: Remainder 127th Infantry less 121st FA Bn arrived
FUKUOKA. 061300/1 passed 32nd InfDiv control that time.
SECRET

Division Tracs: Continued assigned missions.

F. R. DOYETT
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
40-FS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUXUCKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
RCT 28 (4)
Artillery Grp (5)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th HQ Bn
CO, HQBN
Div Staff
Mar Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLIGHT POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 8 November, 1945.

No. 48 G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 6 November, 1945.
To: 1800/1 7 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Report No. 48.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. 27th Mar less 1st Bn: Burned small arms ammunition and destroyed machine guns with acetylene torches. Continued guarding and central storage of materiel.

   b. 1st Bn, 27th Ar: 3d (Reinf) Bn continued to extend area of surveillance over GOTO-HETTO.

   c. 28th Mar: 3rd Bn reverted 28th Mar Control and relieved 1st Bn, 27th Mar of area of responsibility at 1700/1. 28th Mar zone of responsibility extended to include area formerly occupied by 1st Bn, 27th Mar. 1st Bn, 28th Mar relieved 3rd Bn and opened OP at Ono Barracks 1700/1. 2nd Bn continued routine guard.

   d. Arty Gp: Disposition patrols 10 mi. SE of Sasebo vicinity KAWATAMA and 22 mi. SSE of Sasebo vicinity KASHIMA also 6 mi. NW of SAGA vicinity OG1. Surveillance patrol 7 mi. WSW of SAGA vicinity YAMAGUCHI. MP patrol 17 mi. ENE of Sasebo in TAKAO. Disposition activities continues.

   e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

   F. R. DOWSETT,
   Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
   AdjCfs, G-3.

- 1 -
SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
RCT-28 (4)
Artillery Go (5)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, SqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.  

SECRET  

9 November, 1945.  

No. 49  

C-3 Operations Report  

From: 1600/I 7 November, 1945.  

To: 1600/I 8 November, 1945.  

Status: No change since last report.  

1. Location of Troops: See Enclosure (A). Disposition of Units of 5th MarDiv (As of 061800/I).  

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.  

3. Our Operations for the Period:  

   a. CT-27: Continued destruction of War Materiel. Food and clothing being turned over to the Home Ministry.  

   b. 1stBn, 27th Mar: Co A (reinf) continued occupation and disposition mission on GOTO-RETTO. Patrols sent to following islands 7 to 12 miles of SASEBO to destroy war materials: NAGASHIMA, KATSURO SHIMA, NAKAJIMA SHIMA, KUROSHIMA, and 23 miles WSW of SASEBO to 5NO SHIMA.  

   c. 28th Mar: Continued routine guard missions. 1stBn less B Co moved to HarCamp Aincure. B Co moved to SASEBO Fort. 2ndBn ran party patrolled HAIGI and vicinity.  

   d. Arty Co: Continued destruction of war materials at KATA SHIMA (1290.7-1095.2) and OGUSHI. Surveillance patrols sent to KASHIMA, FURUYA, and TAKABARI-HAI ASAKI areas. Small arms, radio equipment and war heads prepared for dumping at sea. Commenced unloading 9th group of repatriates from the F.J. Buffalo at 081755/1. Unloading completed at 082015/1. 700 Japanese Naval Troops were airdropped and were all processed and dispatched to KARIO Barracks except one patient.  

   e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.
SECRET

F. H. Shackelford
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
AOCf S, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (4)
Artillery Cp (5)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

10 November, 1945.

SECRET
No. 50

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800/1 8 November, 1945.
To: 1800/1 9 November, 1945.

Name: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Report No. 50.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. 27th lar less lstbn: Continued patrols and disposition activities in assigned zone of responsibility.
   b. lstbn, 27th lar: Co A (reinf) continued occupation of GOTO-RETTO. Co B sent patrols to destroy installations on following islands located 7 to 12 miles west of SASEBO: EURO SHIMA, TAKA SHIMA, TOKOI SHIMA, NO SHIMA, and I SHIMA.
   c. 28th lar: Continued routine guards. Established SASEBO area control posts at HAIKI and AI JOURA, for traffic control.
   e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

F. R. Dowsett,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACOF, G-3.
SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FUKUOKA Base Command
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (~)
Artillery Gp (~)
5th Pioneer Bn
5th Engineer Bn
5th HQ Bn
5th Med Bn
116th TC Bn
CO, Eq Bn
Div Steff
War Diary (2)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

11 November 1945

No. 51

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 9 November 1945
To: 1800/I 10 November 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Report No. 51.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   (a) 27th Mar Less 1stBn: Continued guarding and disposition of Japanese matériel. Sent patrols 16 miles S of KURUMA to MANKAI and investigated factories.

   (b) 1st Bn 27th Mar: Completed destruction of war matériel and installations on GOTO-ISETTA. All military personnel disarmed and demobilized.

   (c) 28th Mar: Continued routine guard and observed holiday routine.

   (d) Arty Gr: Completed unloading 5th group of 2796 repatriates from LST's 775, 807, and 1013 at 101455/I. Continued routine guards and patrols.

   (e) Division Troops: Holiday routine observed by all troops not required for execution of assigned missions.

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F. R. Dowsett,

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AOGbS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2) 5th Pioneer Bn
2d MarDiv 5th Engineer Bn
32d InfDiv 5th Tn
FUKUOKA Base Command 5th Med Bn
Blt 1/27 116th MC Bn
CT-27 (3) CO, HQBN
CT-22 (4) Div Staff
Artillery Gr (5) War Diary (2)

- 1 -
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 12 November 1945

No. 52 G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 10 November 1945
To: 1800/I 11 November 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See location report No. 52.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Operations for the Period:

   a. 27 Mar less latBn: Continued destruction of ammunition at rate of 500,000 rounds per day. Routine guards maintained.
   
   b. latBn 27 Mar: Co A (Reinf) completed disposition, disarmament, and demobilization activities on GOTO-RETTO. Co B completed disposition on following islands located 7 to 12 miles WNW of SASEBO. No Shima, Asa Shima, Tokoi Shima, Kujuku Shima.
   
   c. 23 Mar: Continued assigned missions in zone of responsibility.
   
   d. Arty Gp: Patrols East of SASEBO in TAKEO-ARITA area. Maintained routine guards and continued disposition activities. Commenced unloading 11th group of repatriates at 111510/I.

   e. Division Troops:

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACoR, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V. Phil B Corps (2)  CT-23 (4)  116th NC Bn
2d MarDiv  Arty Gp (5)  CO, Hqbn
32d InfDiv  5th Pion Bn  Div Staff
FEC  5th Engr Bn  War Diary (2)
BLT 1/27  5th MT Bn  9-3 Files (4)
CT-27 (3)  5th Med Bn

- 1 -
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET  G-3 Operations Report

No. 53  13 November, 1945.

To : 1800/I 12 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Report No. 53.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. 27th Mar less lstEn: Continued disposition activities. Maintained routine guards.

b. lstEn, 27th Mar: Completed disposition on KURO SHIMA AND TAKA SHIMA located 6 miles west of SASEBO.

c. 26th Mar: Replaced patrols 6 miles ESE of SASEBO vicinity ARITA and 6 miles N of SASEBO vicinity SEKITARA. Continued training and assigned missions.

d. 13th Mar: Sent disposition patrols to OGI located 5 miles NW of SAGA. Completed turning over all scrib at SHOTA (16 miles ESE of SASEBO) to Japanese Home Ministry. Completed unloading 11th group of repatriates at 121314/1.

e. Division Troops: Reconnaissance Company arrived HIRADO (17 miles NW of SASEBO) at 1212/1 to execute disposition directives. Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOUGETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACoF, G-3.

SECRET
SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (4)
Arty Gp (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Steff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

14 November, 1945.

No. 54 G-3 Operations Report

To: 1800/I 13 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Report No. 54.

2. Weather and Visibility: High overcast became low overcast late in the period; visibility, fair.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. 27th Mar less 1stBN: Surveillance patrol 14 miles E of KURUNE vicinity YOSHI. Destroyed guns at SEKITAKA and completed destruction of aircraft at METABARU airfield (6 miles W of KURUNE). Turned over food and clothing to Japanese at KURUNE.
   b. 1stBN, 27thMAR: Completed disposition on EN0 SHIMA located 23 miles S/W of SASEBO.
   c. 28thMAR: Patrole NE of SASEBO vicinity I ARI and 14 miles NW of SASEBO vicinity KURIVA. Continued disposition and guards.
   d. 13thMAR: Disposition continued at NIM0 Aircraft Factory located near USHI0 (5 miles S of SAGA). Patrole NW of SAGA vicinity OGI and S/W of SAGA vicinity KUSHIMA. Continued loading explosives for dumping at sea. 12th group of 2283 repatriates commenced unloading 131115/I completed unloading 131830/I.
   e. Division Troops: Recon Co., on HIRADO, disposed of small arms ammo. Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOYETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.
SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
OG, FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (4)
Arty Gp (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th HT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th MG Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

15 November 1945

No. 55

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 13 November 1945
To: 1800/I 14 November 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Report No. 55.

2. Weather and Visibility: Low overcast with rain, poor visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. All units continued gathering arms from Police Stations and other collection points.

b. 27th Mar less 1st Bn: Patrolled S of KURUME to HAINZUKA, SETAKA, and YANAGAWA. Continued destruction of ammo.

c. 1st Bn 27th Mar: Completed disposition on TAKA SHIMA (7 miles W of SASEBO).

d. 29th Mar: Patrols E of SASEBO vicinity ARITA-INARI; 23 miles NE of SASEBO vicinity KARASU; 10 miles N of SASEBO vicinity SHIBA.

e. 13th Mar: Patrols sent 20 miles NE of SASEBO vicinity OCHI, E of SASEBO vicinity TAKEO, and 23 miles NE of SASEBO vicinity HAMASAKI. Inventoried medical supplies at FURUYU (8 miles NNW of SAGA). Continued dumping explosives at sea.

f. Division Troops: Recon Co destroyed ammo and signal gear on HIRADO SHIMA. Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.
SECRET

F. R. DONETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CG FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (4)
Arty Gp (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
118th NC Bn
CC, HQBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

15 November, 1945.

No. 56

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1600/1 14 November, 1945.
To : 1600/1 15 November, 1945.

1. Location of Troops: See Location Statement No. 56.

2. Weather and Visibility: Broken clouds becoming overcast; poor visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. Units of this Division participated in a surprise investigation of shrines, temples and schools in Sasebo area. Small numbers of rifles, swords, records and documents were disclosed.

   b. 27th LAR (less 1st Bn): Carried out investigation of shrines, temples and schools in KURUME area. Patrolled E of KURUME to YOSHII. Continued disposition of ammunition.

   c. 1st Bn. 27th LAR: Completed disposition of ammunition on KUROSHIMA (6 miles NE of SASEBO).

   d. 26th Marines: Patrol from 2nd Bn which left 14 Nov 45 continued operations in vicinity of KARATSU.

   e. 13th Marines: Patrols active in HAIMOUSAKI (10 miles SE of SASEBO) to KAMATAKE to URESHINO (16 miles SE of SASEBO) areas; patrol to KASHIMA area; patrol to YAMAGUCHI to HIGASHI-TASHIRO area; patrol to KAMASAKI area. Search party to KITAKATA (12 miles W of SAGA) disclosed weapons in schoolhouse. Continued disposal at sea and loading of explosives in preparation for disposal at sea. Destroyed submarine at MIYAMOURA (5 miles SE of SASEBO).
SECRET

d. Division Troops: FUKUOKA Det 116th NC En arrived SASEBO and reverted to division control 142008/1. Co "C", 3rd MP En less 1st Platoon arrived SASEBO and passed division operational control 151408/1. 5th Recon Co carried out missions on HIRADO-SHIMA. 34th MarDepCo detached 5th MarDiv 150825/1; ordered 2nd MarDiv. Continued training program and assigned missions.

Casualties: none.

F. R. Dowsett,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACOFJ, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CG, FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (4)
Arty Gp (5)
5th Pict Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th SC Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET 17 November, 1945.

No. 57 G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 15 November 1945
To: 1800/1 16 November 1945

1. Location of Troops: See Daily Location Report No. 57.

2. Weather and Visibility: Low overcast with rain, visibility poor.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. 27th Mar (less 1stBn) Continued disposal of ammo at KURUME and LETABARU (Airfield 6 mi west of KURUME). Destroyed tank parts at FUKUSHIMA (6 mi South of KURUME) and MAKATSU (5 mi SE of SAGA). Completed checking of shrines, temples and schools in zone of 3dBN 27th Marines.

b. 1stBn 27th Mar: Continued routine guards. Carried out battalion training schedule.

c. 28th Mar: Continued training and routine guards. Patrolled area north of SASEBO. Sent 3 day patrol to KARATSU and vicinity.

d. Artillery Group: Carried out routine guards and training schedule. Continued disposal of war material, including destruction of two (2) submarines at MIYANOURA (5 mi SE of SASEBO), and turning over of scrap to Home Ministry at HAMASAKI (25 mi NE of SASEBO). Patrol to UKESHINO (17 mi ESE of SASEBO). 2 day patrol sent to vicinity of AZANIBARU and KAMAKADE (23 mi NE of SASEBO). Patrol sent to TAKEO (18 mi S of SASEBO). Continued loading of explosives and ammunition for subsequent disposal at sea.

e. Division Troops: 5th Recon Co collected war trophies at HIRADO SHI'A. Continued training and assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

- 1 -

SECRET
SECRET

F. R. DAVSETT
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
A/CofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CFO FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (4)
Arty Co (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, HoBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

16 November 1945

No. 56

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 16 November 1945  
To: 1800/I 17 November 1945

1. Location of Troops: See daily location report No. 56.

2. Weather and Visibility: Cloudy with slight precipitation at intervals during the period.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. GB-27: Continued disposal of surrendered materials and routine patrols; destroyed tank parts at FUTUSHIMA (8 miles of KURUME) and YAKATSU (5 miles SE of SAGA); radio spare parts at TOSU. Medical supplies and clothing turned over to Home Ministry representatives.

   b. 1st BN, 27th Mar: Continued routine missions. Made preparations for movement to TSUSHIMA on 18 Nov for execution of occupation and disposition missions.

   c. 26th Mar: Continued routine missions. Patrol from 2d BN remained at KARATSU.

   d. Arty Co: Continued guards, routine patrols, disposition, and training. 4th BN sets surveillance patrol to AZABIJARU (24 miles NE of SASEBO). Unloaded 52 Japanese repatriates at URAGASHIRA at 171110/I; completed unloading at 171145/I.

   e. Division Troops: Ron Co completed occupation and disposition missions on HIRADO SHIMA and prepared to return to Marine Camp Aincura on 18 Nov.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. Dowsett,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps.  

- 1 -  

SECRET
SECRET

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CG FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (3)
Arty Gp (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, HqBn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
C-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

No. 59

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1600/I 17 November, 1945.
To: 1600/I 18 November, 1945.

Naps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Daily Location Report No. 59.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear; visibility good.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. 27th Mar (less 1stBn): Continued inventory and disposal of war material. Surveillance petrol in vicinity of OBUOHI (18 miles SE of KURE) and KITAYABE (22 miles SE of KURE).
   b. 1stBn, 27th Mar: Loaded personnel and equipment aboard 2 LST's and 2 LCI's. Departed for occupation and disposition missions on TSUSHIMA (75 miles NW of SASEBO) at 181600/I.
   c. 28th Mar: Continued training, surveillance and routine guards. Disposition proceeding satisfactorily.
   e. Division Troops: 5th Rec Co returned to War Camp AINOURA at 181200/I after completion of mission on HIRADO-SHIMA (6 miles NW of SASEBO). No repatriation shipping in or out of area during period.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting, G-3.
SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MerDiv
32d InfDiv
CG, FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (3)
Arty Grp (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Staff
Var Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800/1 18 November, 1945.
To: 1800/1 19 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.
1. Location of Troops: See Daily Location Statement No. 60.
2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.
3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. 27th Marines (less 1st Bn): Burned ammo at METABARU (6 miles NW of KURUMA). Continued routing guards and training.
   b. 1st Bn, 27th Marines: Arrived at IZUHARA (1231.0-1232.0) 191000/1. Troops went ashore immediately. Hq at IZUHARA temporarily. Patrols sent to KAIINO SHIMA and SHIMONO SHIMA.
   c. 28th Marines: 1 officer, 25 men sent to SHISHICHACHI (12 Miles NW of SASEBO) to control coal mine strike by 177 Chinese laborers. Patrol sent to MIKAICHHI-URANOSAKI area (5 Miles E of SASEBO). 3-day patrol was sent to KARATSU. Road patrol in area North of SASEBO. Continued disposition of Enemy material, routing guards and training.
   d. Arty Gp: Patents from 2nd and 4th Bns checked police stations in respective areas. 1st patrol to TAKAO. Surveillance patrol in HIRAIYAMA-KaI (22 Miles NE of SASEBO) area. Division Inspector of disposition checked destruction of materials at the NITTO Aircraft Co at CGI (8 Miles NW of SAGA). Continued routine guards, training and disposal activities. Supervised movement of 372 Chinese repatriates from HASHIMA and TAKASHIMA to HARIO.
   e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.
4. Casualties: None.
SECRET

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CG, FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (3)
Arty Gp (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED

21 November, 1945.

No. 61

C-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/1 19 November, 1945.
To: 1800/1 20 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Daily Location Report No. 61.


3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. 27th Mar less 1st Bn: Destroyed ammunition and collected weapons. Patruls from UUBE went K to TOSU, 7.5 miles to KUZAKI, 9 miles to UATSU via JOJIN, and 8.10 miles to SETAN.

b. 1st Bn, 27th Mar: Set up CP at IZU-HARU SE portion of TSUSHIMA KUROKO 191704/1. Destroyed war material and installations vicinity IZU-HARU, and turned over material to JAPANESE.

c. 26th Mar: Patrul E of SASEBO to ARIZA then F to IZU-HARU. Patrul at KARASU (12 23 miles from SASEBO) continued disposition. Patrul found no evidence of Chinese coal miners riots reported at SHILIGHI (11 miles NW of SASEBO).

d. 13th Mar: Loaded warheads and projectiles at OGUSHI for sea disposal. Patruls to TARA 17 miles SW of SASEBO and to OGI (6 miles NW of SASEBO). Turned over supplies to Japanese vicinity SASEBO Naval Aircraft Factory. Completed unloading 13th Group of 2996 Japanese repatriates at 201615/1. 1st group Chinese repatriates completed unloading at 201230/1.

e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.
RESTRICTED

F. R. DOYSETT
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
AOGfS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CG, FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (3)
Arty Gp (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th NC Bn
CG, HQ BN
Div Staff
Mar Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

22 November 1945

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 92 From: 1800/I 20 November 1945
To : 1800/I 21 November 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. **Location of Troops:** See Daily Location Report No. 92.

2. **Weather and Visibility:** Low overcast with heavy rain; poor visibility due to fog.

3. **Our Operations for the Period:**
   
a. **27th Mar less lateEn:** Continued routine guards and patrols. Burned ammunition.

b. **1stEn 27th Mar:** Occupying TSUSHIMA KAIKYO; commenced disarmament and demobilization of troops. Completed disposal, by dumping, of all weapons and ammunition in IZUHARA area (SE TSUSHIMA). Disposition patrols N to KECHI and TAKASHIKI. Destroyed installations.

c. **28th Mar:** Patrol returning from KARATSU (25 mi NW of SASEBO). Patrolled area N of AIMOURA. Continued disposition activities and made preparations to release warehouses to 8th Serv Regt.

d. **15th Mar:** Turned 20 buildings and caves containing civilian goods over to the Home Ministry. Prepared to relieve 121st FA Bn on 23 November, 1945. Sent patrol to KASHIMA (20 miles SW of SAGA), and MP patrol to TAKEO. Patrols to OCHI (21 mi NE of SASEBO) and OGI (5 mi NW of SAGA). Commenced unloading 2d Chinese group of repatriates at 21400/I.

e. **Division Troops:** Continued assigned missions.
4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DONSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CG FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (4)
Arty Cp (5)
5th Fion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
118th NC Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION, 
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED 23 November, 1945.
N. 63 G-3 Operations Report

From: 1600/1 21 November, 1945.
To: 1600/1 22 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Daily Location Report No. 63.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clearing with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. 27th less 1st BN: Continued assigned missions.

b. 1st BN 27th BN: On TSUSHIMA KAIKYO. Destroyed ammunition, radar station, torpedo station, and armed rifles at sea. Completed turning over material to Japanese at KICHI (SE TSUSHIMA).

c. 26th BN: Sent surveillance patrol to SAGA (15 miles NE of SAASEBO). Continued guarding.


e. Division Troops: Co "C", 5th Medical BN arrived SAASEBO and reverted to parent control 212000/1. Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. E. DOSSERT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACOF, G-3.

- 1 -

903
Restricted

Distribution:
V Phil Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CG, FBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-26 (4)
Arty Gp (5)
5th Fion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Fed Bn
116th FO Bn
CO, Eq Bn
Div Staff
Mar Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED

24 November, 1945.

No. 64

C-3 Operations Report

To: 1800/I 23 November, 1945.

Kane: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Daily Location Report No. 64 and Enclosure (A), "Location of Troops as of 231800/I".

2. Weather and Visibility: Scattered clouds; good visibility.

3. Cur Operations for the Period:
   a. 27th Mar less latEn: Commenced transfer of personnel to 2nd MarDiv. Continued assigned missions.
   b. latEn, 27th Mar: Continued disarmament, demobilization and disposition missions on TSUSHIMA KAIKYO.
   c. 28th Mar: Patrols sent to SEGUMIARA (6 miles NNE of SASEBO), KARATSU (23 miles NE of SASEBO), NNE of SASEBO vicinity INARI, and W of ATACURA. Continued guards and disposition.
   d. 13th Mar: 121st FA Bn relieved 250900/I and commenced displacement to KURIME. Dog Battery assumed responsibility for 121st FA Bn zone. Patrols E of SASEBO vicinity ARITA, 20 miles NE of SASEBO vicinity YAKASUKI and CON. Continued turning over material to Japanese. 2893 repatriates arrived at 251700/I from TAKU, China. 2337 Chinese repatriates embarked for TAKU, China by 231745/I.
   e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

- 1 -

RESTRICTED

905
F. R. DOUSSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CG, FSC
ELT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-23 (4)
Arty Sq (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Nn
5th Med Bn
11th NC Bn
CC, Ma Bn
Div Staff
Var Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED 25 November 1945

No. 55  G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800I 23 November 1945
To: 1800I 24 November 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Daily Location Report No. 55.

2. Weather and Visibility: Clear with good visibility.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

   a. At 241000/I SAGA KEN responsibility passed to 2d MarDiv and FUKUOKA KEN responsibility passed to 32d InfDiv. 13th Mar and 28th Mar zones altered accordingly.

   b. 1stBn 27th Mar: Continued demobilization, disposition and destruction of installations on TSUSHIMA KAIKO.

   c. 2dBn 27th Mar: U.S.A. bound personnel displaced to SASEBO; arrived 241230/I.

   d. 27th Mar Hq plus 3dBn: Prepared to displace to SASEBO.

   e. 28th Mar: Disposed of enemy materiel. Patrolled NE of SASEBO vicinity I'ARI and KARATSU. Continued guarding and training.

   f. 13th Mar: Remainder of 121st FA Bn displaced to KURUME (ETA 241000/I), and reverted to 32d InfDiv control 241000/I. Patrolled from SASEBO, NE 21 miles vicinity OCHI and SE 10 miles vicinity KAVATANA. Disposed of one barge load of materiel at sea.

Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.
4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
38d InfDiv
CG, PBC
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (4)
Arty Co (5)
5th Pion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
115th MG Bn
CO, Hq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary
G-3 Files (4)
RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

23 November 1945

No. 63

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

From: 1800/I 24 November 1945
To : 1800/I 25 November 1945

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: See Daily Location Report No. 66.

2. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. 1st Bn 27 Mar: Continued disposition, demobilization and destruction of installations on TSUSHIMA KAIKYO.
   b. 2d Bn 27 Mar: Continued assigned missions.
   c. HQ 27 Mar plus 3d Bn: Completed displacement from KURUME 251300/I; opened CP at NAJIKI 251300/I.
   d. 28 Mar: Continued disposition, training and routine guards. Patrolled NE of SASEBO vicinity IMARI and KARATSU.
   e. 13 Mar: Continued assigned missions.
   f. Division Troops: First echelon of ASCO and HQEn det from FUK OKA arrived Marine Camp Ainoura 251900/I. Others continued assigned missions.

F.M. DOYSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
VPhib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

27 November, 1945.

No. 37

G-3 Operations Report

To: 1800/I 23 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.

2. Weather & Visibility: Low overcast; visibility - fair.

3. War Operations for the Period:

a. 27th Mar: Continued assigned missions. Policed and improved billeting area.

b. 1st En, 27th Mar: Continued disposition of TSUSASHIKA KAIKYO. Patrol returned from KAMIKO SHIMA (northern island of group).

c. 23rd Mar: Continued training, surveillance, and routine guards. Surveillance patrol active between INARI (12 miles NE SASEBO) and ARITA (10 miles W of SASEBO). Surveillance patrol active in area north of AINUKU. Commenced issuance of war trophies to personnel of regiment.


e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions. ASOC and HQ detachment completed movement from FUKUOKA 2515/1.

4. Casualties: None.

[Signature]

F. R. Duvett,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
AGofS, G-3.

- 1 -

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

CT-23 (4)
Arty Gr (5)
5th Pion En
5th Engr En
5th MT En
5th Med. En
118th MG En
CC, Hqbn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
RESTRICTED

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phil Corps (2)
26 Mar Div
506th Inf Div
1LT 1/27
72-27 (5)
CT-23 (4)
Art Co (5)
5th Fion Bn
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
116th MG bn
CC, HQ Bn
Div Staff
Var Diary (2)
33 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED

22 November, 1945.

No. 38

G-3 Operations Report

To: 1800-I 27 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.


3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. 27th Mar less lstEx: Continued assigned missions.
      One patrol active in vicinity of HAIRI.
   b. lstEn, 27thMar: Completed missions on TSUSHIMA re-
      turning to Har Camp AINOURA this date.
   c. 28th Mar: Continued disposition and surveillance.
      Patrol to SEC IMARU area (6 mi NNE of SASEBO).
      Patrol north of AINOURA. Relieved of guard on
      buildings on east side of SASEBO Harbor by 9th
      Service Regiment.
   d. Arty Go: Continued routine guards and disposition.
      Continued exchange of personnel with 10th Marines.
      Unloaded 3 LST's of Japanese repatriates and dis-
      patched them to HARIO Barracks.
   e. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

ENCLOSURE "A" OVERLAY

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3

- 1 -

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DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
BLT 1/27
CT-27 (3)
CT-28 (4)
Arty Go (5)
5th Flon En
5th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
118th NC En
CC, Eq Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-5 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION, 
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED 29 November 1945

G-3 OPERATIONS REPORT

No. 38

From: 1800/I 27 November 1945
To: 1800/I 28 November 1945

1. Location of Troops:
   1st Bn, 27th Marines at Marine Camp Ainciura (71.3-14.4). Arrived 231800/I.

   Other units - no change.

2. Weather and Visibility: Cool, clear, visibility good.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. 27th Mar: Continued training, and routine guards. One patrol active in AJNIKI area.
   b. 28th Mar: Continued assigned missions. One surveillance patrol to YUNOKI-SEOKIHARA area (3 mi NNW SASEBO). Surveillance patrol north of AIJICURA.
   d. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

P. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACoFS, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

I Phil Corps (2) Arty Co (5) CO, HqBn
2d MarDiv 5th Pion Bn Div Staff
32d InfDiv 6th Engr Bn War Diary (2)
FIL 1/27 6th MT Bn G-3 Files (1)
CT-27 (3) 6th Med Bn
CT-28 (4) 118th NC Bn RESTRICTED
HEAD QUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED

30 November, 1945.

No. 70 G-3 Operations Report

To : 1800/I 29 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No Change Since Last Report.

2. Weather & Visibility: Clear & cold; visibility - good.

3. Our Operations for the Period:
   a. 27th Mar: Continued routine guards and training.
   b. 28th Mar: Continued routine guards and training.
      One patrol dispatched to YONUKI-Seki-HARA area
      (5 Miles NNE of SASEBO). One patrol active north
      of AIKOHARA.
   c. 1st Mar: Continued routine guards, training and
      disposition. Continued exchange of personnel with
      10th Marines. 3rd BN established a guard on eight
      (8) warehouses just east of NAIZI which are the
      property of the HOJI branch of the transportation
      equipment department. 3004 Japanese repatriates
      were unloaded and dispatched to NAIC barracks.
      1259 Chinese were loaded on LST's 904 and 743 pre-
      paratory to return to China.
   d. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DC/SHTT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.
RESTRICTED

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)
2d MarDiv
32d InfDiv
CT-27 (3)
CT-23 (4)
Arty Gr (5)
5th Pion Bn
6th Engr Bn
5th MT Bn
5th Med Bn
113th MC Bn
CO, HQ Bn
Div Staff
War Diary (2)
G-3 Files (4)
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED

1 December, 1945.

No. 71

G-3 Operations Report

From: 1800/1 29 November, 1945.
To: 1800/1 30 November, 1945.

Maps: No change since last report.

1. Location of Troops: No change since last report.


3. Operations for the Period:
   a. 27th Mar: Continued routine guards and training.
   b. 28th Mar: Continued routine guards and training. "B" Company moved to Marine Camp AKUIBA from SASEBO Harbor area at 3013/0/1.
   c. 13th Mar: Continued disposition of Japanese material. Dispatched 60 men to HARIO to maintain control over disorder among the Koreans and Chinese repatriates in that camp. There were no serious results from the disturbance.
   d. Division Troops: Continued assigned missions.

4. Casualties: None.

F. R. DUETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACoFS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (2)      Arty Gp (5)      CC, Eq Bn
2d MarDiv            5th Pion Bn      Div Staff
32d InfDiv           5th Engr Bn      War Diary (2)
G-27 (3)              5th MT Bn        G-3 Files (4)
G-23 (4)              5th Med Bn

- 1 -

RESTRICTED
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION, IN THE FIELD.

DAILY LOCATION REPORT

No. 2 23 September 1945

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MAP: KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4045 III NE, 4046 IV SE, 4046 III SE, 4046 III NW, 4046 I SW, 4046 II SW.
F. R. DOUGGETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AcofS, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:
CG VAC
CT-28
CT-27
CT-23
File (2)
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3d Plat Rear Echelon
4th Plat AINOURA Naval Training Station
(70.7-15.5)
5th Plat Rear Echelon

Hdqtrs Bn AINOURA Naval Training Station
(71.4-14.4)
Eq Co AINOURA Naval Training Station
(71.4-14.4)
Sig Co AINOURA Naval Training Station
(71.4-14.4)
ASCO FUKUOKA
Ren Co AINOURA Naval Training Station
(71.4-14.4)

116th NC En SASEBO Aircraft Factory (90.6-
10.5) Det at FUKUOKA. Det
A Co SASEBO Aircraft Factory (90.6-
10.5) at NTS
B Co SASEBO Aircraft Factory (90.6-
10.5)
C Co SASEBO Aircraft Factory (90.6-
10.5)
D Co SASEBO Aircraft Factory (90.6-
10.5)

5th MP Co SASEBO (77.3-15.5)
A Co 3d MP Bn SASEBO (77.3-15.5)
C Co 3d MP Bn SASEBO (77.3-15.5)
1st Plat OMURA (1300.1-1085.8)
3d Plat FUKUOKA

VMO-5 Naval Air Station (79.2-09.5)

GIC Det No 403 AINOURA Naval Training Station
(71.3-14.4)
GIC Det No 495 AINOURA Naval Training Station
(71.3-14.4)

Recovery Team
#14 SASEBO (77.3-15.3)
8th MarAmmoCo SASEBO (75.45-12.6)
33d MarDepCo SASEBO (78.5-11.7)
34th MarDepCo SASEBO (78.5-11.7)
SECRET

3d Plat, Bomb Diap
Co, H&S Bn, VAC/AINOURA Naval Training Station
(70.9-13.9)
3d Plat, Bomb Diap
Co, H&S Bn, VAC/AINOURA Naval Training Station
(70.9-13.9)
6th MarWarDog
Plat/AINOURA Naval Training Station
(71.9-14.4)
Det JICPOA Team/AINOURA Naval Training Station
No. 29
(71.3-14.3)
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Mil Govt
SASEBO (77.3-15.3)
95th Hq&Hq Co Det,
Mil Govt/AINOURA Naval Training Station
(71.3-14.3)
3d Prov Rocket
Det/Rear Echelon

The following units have detachments in the rear echelon:
Hq Bn, 5th Serv Bn, 5th Med Bn, 5th Tk Bn, 5th Pioneer Bn,
5th Engr Bn, 5th MT Bn, 13th Marines, 26th Marines, 27th Marines,
28th Marines, 116th NC Bn, 6th Sep Laundry Plat,
5th Amph Trk Co, VMO-5

MAPS: KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4045 III NE, 4046
II SW, 4046 II NW, 4045 1 NE, 4045 1 SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE, 4046 IV SE, 4043 1 SW.

F. R. DENNETT
LtCol, U.S.M.C.
ACofS G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

CG VAC (10) A CO 3d MP Bn (2) Det JICPOA Team
CT-23 (15) C Co, 3d MP Bn (2) No. 29 (1)
CT-27 (15) CIC Det 406 (2) 94th Hq & Hq Co
CT-23 (15) CIC Det 496 (2) Det Mil Govt (1)
13th Mar (20) Recovery Team #14 (2) 95th Hq & Hq Co Det
5th Engr Bn (5) 8th Mar Ammo Co (1) Mil Govt (1)
5th MT Bn (5) 33rd Mar Dep Co (1) FILE (10)
5th Med Bn (7) VMO-5 (1)
5th Serv Bn (7) 84th MarDepCo (1)
5th Tk Bn (5) 3d Plat Bomb Diap Co,
5th Pion Bn (5) H&S Bn VAC (1)
Hq Bn (7) 6th Sep Ldry Plat (1)
116th NC Bn (7) 8th War Dog Plat (1)

- 5 -
# Daily Location Report

8 October, 1945.

No. 17  
(As of 1800/17 October, 1945)

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Maps: KYUSHU: Scale 1:250,000, Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SW, 4145 IV SW. CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000 KOKURA Sheet 45.
F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (10)
CG, FOF (10)
CT-26 (15)
27th Marines (10)
13th Marines (20)
5th Engr Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Service Bn (5)
5th Pion Bn (5)
116th NC Bn (5)
Supply Gp (2)
CIC Det 496 (2)
Provost Marshall (2)
File (10)

8th Mar Amm Co
34th Mar Dep Co
WMO-5
6th Separate Laundry Plat
6th War Dog Plat
Det JICPA Team No. 29
94th Hq & Hq Co Det Mil Govt
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Maps: KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SW, 4145 IV SW. CE TRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000 KOKURA Sheet 45.
SECRET

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

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Notes: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000, SASEBO Sheet 44, KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUSU: Scale 1:25,000; Sheets 4046 III NW, 4046 II SW, 4046 NW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NW, 4046 III SE, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SW, 4145 IV SW.
F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
AGefs, G-3.

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Det at FUKUOKA CITA & SAGA CT28
Det at SASEBO & SAGA
Det at KURUME & CITA
Det at AINOURA
Det at FUKUOKA CITA & SAGA Arr 19 Oct
SECRET

B Co, 107th Med Bn HAIKI (85.15-09.9) Arr 19 Oct
B Co, 114th Engr Bn AFLCAT
Det 32d QM Co SASEBO (78.05-11.55) Arr 21 Oct
Det 732d Ord Co SASEBO (78.05-11.55) Arr 21 Oct

The following units have detachments in the rear echelon:
Hq Bn, 5th Serv Bn, 5th Med Bn, 5th Tank Bn, 5th Pion Bn,
5th Engr Bn, 5th MT Bn, 13th Mar, 26th Mar, 27th Mar,
29th Mar, 15th NC Bn, 6th Sep Ldry Plat, 5th Amph Trk Co,
and VAC-5. Total officers and men in rear echelon, 1361.

Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000; SASEBO Sheet 44,
KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUSHU; Scale 1:25,000;
Sheets 4045 III NE, 4045 II SW, 4045 II NW, 4045 I NE,
4045 I SE, 4045 II NE, 4045 III SE, 4045 IV SE, 4045 I SW,
4045 IV SW.

NOTE: CT-23 has passed to operational and administrative
control of CG, TMC, PAC, therefore they will not be
shown on 5th MarDiv location report after this
date.

F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
AGofS, 3-3

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (10)
2d MarDiv (5)
CG FOF (5)
32d Inf Div (5)
27th Marines (10)
13th Marines (20)
127th Inf (15)
CITA Occupation Gp (5)
A Co 3d MP Bn (2)
Supply Gp (2)
CIC Det 403 (2)
CIC Det 496 (2)
Provost Marshal (2)
34th MarDep Co
VMO-5

SAGA Occupation Gp (5)
6th Engr Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Med Bn (5)
5th Serv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Hq Bn (5)
116th NC Bn (5)
6th Sep Ldry Plat
6th War Dog Plat
Det JICPOA Team No 29
94th Hq & Hq Co Det Mil Govt
95th Hq & Hq Co Det Mil Govt
Division Adjutant (2)
FILE (10)

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SECRET
# Daily Location Report

**No. 38**

(As of 0000, 28 October, 1945)

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Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000; SASEBO Sheet 44, KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000; Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SE, 4145 IV SW.

* Designation changed from 5th Amph Trk Co to Amphibian Truck Co, 5th Motor Transport Bn on 24 October, 1945.
F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
AOCfS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (10)
2d HarDiv (5)
32d InfDiv (5)
CG, FBC (5)
CT-27 (10)
13th Mar (20)
RCT-127 (15)
OITA Occupation Gp (5)
BLT 1/27 (5)
BLT 2/26 (5)
BLT 3/28 (5)
5th Engr Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Med Bn (5)
5th Serv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Hq Bn (5)
116th NC Bn (5)
File (10)

Supply Gp (2)
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GIC Det No. 496 (2)
Provost Marshal (2)
34th Par Dep Co
VNO-5
6th Sep Ldry Plat
Det JICFO Team No. 29
94th Hq & Hq Co, Det Mil Govt
95th Hq & Hq Co, Det Mil Govt
G-1
G-2
G-4
Disposition Officer
Division Adjutant (2)
Special Service Officer
Signal Officer
Postal Officer
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
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LAPSE: CENTRAL JPN: Scale 1:250,000; S SEBC Sheet 44, KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUSHU: Scale 1:250,000; Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 I SW, 4046 IV SW, 4046 I NW, 4045 I NW, 4045 I SW, 4045 II NE, 4046 II NW, 4046 III SW.

* Designation changed from 5th Amph Trk Co to Amphibian Truck Co, 5th Marine Transport Bn on 24 October, 1945.

F. R. DOUSET
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION:

V Phib Corps (10)
2d MarDiv (5)
32d InfDiv (5)
CG FBC (5)
CT-27 (10)
13th Mar (20)
RCT-127 (15)
OITA Occupation Go (5)
BLT 1/27 (5)
BLT 3/28 (5)
CT-28 (3)
5th Engr Bn (5)
5th Med Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Serv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Hq Bn (5)
116th MC Bn (5)
File (10)

Supply Go (2)
CIC Det N. 403 (2)
CIC Det N. 496 (2)
Provost Marshall (2)
34th InfDep C
VMC-5
6th Serv Ldy Plt
Det JICPA Team N. 29
94th Hq & Hq C, Det Mil Govt
95th Hq & Hq C, Det Mil Govt
G-1
G-2
G-4
Disposition Officer
Division Adjutant (2)
Special Service Officer
Signal Officer
Postal Officer
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Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000; SASEBO Sheet 44, KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUS-U: Scale 1:25,000; Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II S, 4046 II SW, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SE, 4145 IV SW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE.

SECRET

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5th Med Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Serv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Eq Bn (5)
116th MC Bn (5)
File (10)
Supply Go (2)
CIC Det No. 403 (2)
CIC Det No. 496 (2)
Provost Marshall (2)
34th SerDeP Co
V C-5
6th Sep Ldry Plt
Det JICPOA Team No. 29
94th Ha & Eq Co, Det 1st Govt
95th Eq & Eq Co, Det 1st Govt
C-1
C-2
C-4

Disposition Officer
Division Adjutant (2)
Special Service Officer
Signal Officer
Postal Officer
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION, 
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

19 November 1945

No. 59 DAILY LOCATION REPORT (As of 0000 18 Nov)

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Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000; SASEBO Sheet 44, KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUSHU: Scale 1:250,000; Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SW, 4145 IV SW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE.

F. R. DOWSEttT, 

DISTRIBUTION: 
V Ph1b Corps (10)  
2d MarDiv (5)  
32d InfDiv (5)  
CG FSC (5)  
CT-27 (10)
SECRET

13th Mar (20)
BLT 1/27 (5)
CT-22 (5)
5th Engr Bn (5)
5th Med Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th S&rv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Hq Bn (5)
118th NJ Bn (5)
File (10)
Supply Co (2)
CIC Det No. 403 (2)
CIC Det No. 496 (2)
Provoct Marshal (2)

6th Sep Ldry Plat
Det JTOCPA Team No. 29
94th Hq & Hq Co Det Mil Govt
95th Hq & Hq Co Det Mil Govt

G-1
G-2
G-4

Disposition Officer
Division Adjutant (2)
Special Service Officer
Signal Officer
Postal Officer
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED

23 November 1945

No. 66

DAILY LOCATION REPORT
(As of 1800 25 Nov)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<tr>
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<td>HAIKI (34.0-9.9)</td>
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<td>Designation changed from JICPA Team No. 29.</td>
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<td>SASEBO (77.3-15.3) Designation Changed from 94th Hq&amp;Hq Co Det Mil Govt.</td>
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F.R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

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V Phib Corps (10)
2d MarDiv (5)
32d InfDiv (5)
CT-27 (10)
13th Mar (20)
BLT 1/27 (5)
5th Engr Bn (5)
5th Med Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Serv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Hq Bn (5)
116th NC Bn (5)
Supply Gp (2)
CIC Det No. 403 (2)
CIC Det No. 496 (2)
Provost Marshal (2)
V4C-5
6th Sep Ldry Flot
Det NAVTECJAP
Nagasaki Ken Field Unit
G-1
G-2
G-4
Disposition Officer
Div Adjutant (2)
Special Service Officer
Signal Officer
Postal Officer
File (10)
PART 4 - 5TH MARINE DIVISION

OPERATION REPORT

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

ANNEX EASY - G-4 REPORT

01484
HEADQUARTERS
5TH MARINE DIVISION
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: G-4 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

Enclosures: (A) Appendix 1 - Transport Quartermaster Report.
(B) Appendix 2 - Quartermaster Report.
(C) Appendix 3 - Medical Report.
(D) Appendix 4 - Ordnance Report.
(E) Appendix 5 - Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment Report.
(F) Appendix 6 - Procurement Report.
(G) Appendix 7 - Motor Transport Report.
(H) Appendix 8 - Shore Party Report.
(I) Appendix 9 - Engineer Report.
(J) Appendix 10 - Periodic Reports.

1. GENERAL.

a. The 5th Marine Division was established in its Camp at Kamuela on the Island of Hawaii when positive orders to participate in the Occupation of KYUSHU were received on 18 August, 1945. Embarkation of the Division began on 22 August, 1945, and, except for the rear echelon, was completed on 27 August, 1945. The loading out was accomplished through the Port of Hilo, sixty-five (65) miles distant from the Division Camp.

b. Prior to the receipt of orders for the Occupation, the Division was engaged in the preparation of plans and the procurement and processing of equipment and supplies for the assault on Southern KYUSHU. While the advanced state of preparedness for the Assault was in itself invaluable in enabling the Division to load out for the Occupation on short notice, the same factors performed required that the logistical plans for the Occupation conformed in general to those developed for the Assault.

2. PLANNING AND PROCUREMENT.

a. The logistical plans for the occupation of KYUSHU were formulated originally for the assault upon Southern KYUSHU, adapted and modified as expeditious and practical in the light of
incomplete directives relating to the Occupation received prior to embarkation, and finally amplified as required to support the operations of the Division in the actual occupation.

b. (1) Planning for the assault on Southern KYUSHU began on 26 June, 1945, on the receipt of information from V Amphibious Corps which indicated that the Division would participate, and establishing a tentative readiness date of mid-September. The information available, while far from complete or firm, was sufficient to enable the Division to start processing equipment and supplies for loading out. It was indicated that the Division would be required to lift the following quantities of supplies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rations:</th>
<th>Type &quot;B&quot; - 10 days</th>
<th>Emergency Type - 21 days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water:</td>
<td>5 days at 2 gal/man/day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel:</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition:</td>
<td>5 U/F CINCPOA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II:</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV:</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subordinate elements of the Division were advised to submit requisitions immediately covering all deficiencies.

(2) Action was taken immediately to procure and prepare for embarkation the Division's FOB supplies. Anticipating that approximately one-third (1/3) of the rations would be palletized, the 17th Service Battalion, with technical assistance of a Division representative began the palletization of ten (10) days "10-in-1" rations. Water containers were steam cleaned, painted, marked and deadlined to await filling immediately prior to embarkation. Petroleum products were segregated and where necessary placed in appropriate containers. Pickets and barbed wire were palletized and concertina crated to facilitate handling. Beach matting was loaded on beach sleds. Segregation of combat ammunition was accomplished in the 17th Service Battalion dump and requisitions submitted to cover deficiencies. All equipment not required for training was prepared either for embarkation for combat or for storage in the rear echelon.
The Division and all subordinate elements were required to move equipment not required for training to the Hilo Area as expeditiously as possible in order that the final movement might be kept to a minimum in quantity.

(3) Studies of the theater indicated that clothing, bridge and road construction equipment and supplies, and transportation would require special consideration.

(a) Climatic conditions at the target were expected to be such that all hands would require wet-cold weather clothing for the landing. Climatic conditions would not, however, permit the wearing of this clothing enroute, yet it was considered essential that the clothing be individually fitted in order that the required protection might be obtained. It was not considered feasible to carry this clothing in bulk and attempt an issue immediately prior to landing, nor could personnel carry the clothing in their packs because of the great bulk. A solution was found in waterproof clothing bags. It was planned that the issue and fitting of wet-cold weather clothing be accomplished prior to embarkation and that each individual be supplied with a waterproof clothing bag in which the clothing would be carried as personal baggage.

(b) Intelligence studies of terrain in the target area showed it to be such as would place extreme emphasis on expeditious bridge and road construction and/or repair. Such conditions indicated that not only would high priority on construction equipment be essential but that unusually large quantities of construction materials would be required. A plan was developed by the Division Engineer and Division Transport Quartermaster in collaboration with the G-4 whereby adequate shipping space was made available on LST's and in the top hold loads of transports for the items of engineering equipment considered necessary. Bridging materials were procured and made ready for embarkation. Two machinery trailers were loaded with three hundred (300) feet of foot bridge; one hundred fifty (150) feet of Double Double Bailey Bridge, and the ponton bridge were preloaded on thirteen (13) trailers and twenty-six (26) 2½-ton trucks. It was requested that an additional
80,000 square feet of Mat, Beach Roadway, and 250,000 feet of lumber be furnished the Division for engineering purposes. It was planned to use the lumber from the prefabrication of five 100 foot, 40-ton, timber bridges.

(c) Motor transport was considered a problem of the first magnitude in that the Division would be operating on a scale which would put the maximum strain on transport facilities and over terrain which was ill adapted to the use of motor transport. A tentative vehicle list was prepared by G-4 in conjunction with the Division Motor Transport Officer and upon recommendations of the subordinate elements of the Division. Emphasis was placed upon establishing transport self-sufficiency, primarily in light vehicles, in the combat elements. It was anticipated that shipping limitations might require a reduction in the overall number of vehicles but it was felt that the above principle could be maintained. Carriers, Cargo, M290, were assigned on the basis of six (6) per Infantry and Artillery Regiment, four (4) per Signal Company, and one (1) to Commanding Officer, Shore Party Regiment; the remaining Carriers out of the number allocated the Division, one hundred four (104), were to be maintained in Motor Transport Battalion for allocation to combat elements as conditions might require.

(4) The introduction of changes in the Tables of Organization and Tables of Allowances coincident with the re-equipping and preparation of the Division for outloading and the formulation of plans for combat resulted in much confusion. It is strongly recommended that impending changes of major proportions either in the Tables of Organization of Tables of Allowances be held in abeyance if they materialize as plans are being crystallized for an operation. Such changes could be effected with a minimum of confusion during the ensuing period of rehabilitation.

(5) TransRon 24 was tentatively assigned to lift the Division. On 9 July, 1945, at a conference at the Division Camp, attended by the Commodore of TransRon 24 and his staff, tentative plans were made for the outloading of the Division. Arrangements were also made at this time for the
early attachment of TransRon and TransDiv Transport Quartermasters to the Division to assist in the preparation of loading plans. The establishment of early liaison with TransRon staff and the early assignment of Transport Quartermasters is heartily endorsed.

(6) On 13 August, 1945, Division Administrative Warning Order No. 1-45 was issued complete with the following Annexes:

ABLE - Breakdown of Rations by Embarkation Groups.
BAKER - Motor Transport Heavy Lifts and Engineer Equipment.
CHARLIE - Breakdown of Assault and Pioneer Supplies by Embarkation Groups.
DOG - Breakdown of Fuels and Lubricants by Embarkation Groups.
EASY - Preload of Artillery Ammunition (two 105mm Howitzer Battalions).

C. (1) The Division was alerted for an early movement overseas on 10 August, 1945. Although the readiness date for the assault operation was over a month distant at the time, the alert found the Division in a high state of logistical preparedness. The status as of 10 August, 1945, was as follows:

Rations: 10 days Type "B" (less certain components) earmarked at Army QM, Hilo. 10 days "10-in-1" palletized. 11 days emergency ("C" "D" "K") in hand.

Water: 20,000 Cans, 5 gallon expeditionary. 2,400 Drums, 55 gallon.

Petroleum Products: 20 days all types available at 17th Service Battalion.

Ammunition: 5 U/F available at 17th ServBn, except for certain shortages created by shift from CINCPAC to APTAC U/F, and segregated for embarkation.
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Engineer and Fortification Materials:

Requisite pickets, barbed wire, and concertina on hand and palletized or otherwise prepared for embarkation.

Bridging Materials - Truck and trailer mounted and ready for embarkation.

Mat, Beach Roadway - Prescribed allowance available and stowed on beach sleds or otherwise prepared for embarkation.

General Supplies:

98% complete.

Wet-cold weather clothing 100% on hand but not issued.

Vehicles:

100% complete except for:

1. Equipment required to mechanize Reconnaissance Company.


(2) On 18 August, 1945, at a conference at V Amphibious Corps Headquarters, attended by G-4, advice was received that on 22 August, 1945, the Division would begin outloading for the Occupation of KYUSHU. Lack of firm and complete directives from higher authority necessarily rendered the information available to the Division at this time extremely limited in character. The principal logistical changes (from the assault plan) were:

20 days "B" ration instead of 10.
3 U/F instead of 5.
Substitution of TransRon 22 for TransRon 24.

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Subject: G-4 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN (Cont'd).

(3) Because of the limited time and limited information available, the plans for the outloading had of necessity to be adapted from plans already formulated for the assault operation. Division Administrative Warning Order No. 1-45, issued for the assault outloading, was fortunately adaptable; changes as noted in subparagraph 2, above, were disseminated at a conference on 19 August. Division Administrative Warning Order No. 2-45 was subsequently published to incorporate these changes. The limited amount of shipping available in TransRon 22 rendered a revision of the vehicle list imperative. In conformity with the principle that subordinate elements should be kept as nearly self-sufficient in transportation as possible in order to effect supply below the regimental level to widely dispersed units, an exchange was effected whereby ten (10) trucks, 2½-ton, were made available to each Infantry Regiment in lieu of eighteen (18) trucks, 1-ton, organically assigned. The exchange not only effected a saving in shipping but materially increased the capacity available in regiments, which increase later proved of great value. The advance in target date eliminated the need for cold-weather protection; wet-cold weather clothing was therefore retained under Division control.

d. PROCUREMENT.

(1) Procurement for the assault/occupation of KYUSHU was effected through the following sources:

   Class I - Army.
   Class II & IV & V - Normal channels.
   Class III - Navy, through Marine Corps channels.

(2) Procurement was in general satisfactory. 17th Service Battalion, Hilo, served as the local procurement agency for materials procured through the Marine Corps. Stock levels maintained were adequate except in the case of vehicles and heavy equipment. The 17th Service Battalion was not equipped to convert or rebuild tanks, consequently all conversions or resupply had to be effected through 6th Base Depot, Honolulu. Adequate labor personnel was available in 17th Service Battalion to prepare FOG supplies for embarkation, and such trained supervisory personnel as necessary were provided by Division.
3. EMBARKATION.

a. The assignment of shipping and embarkation of the Division are covered in a separate report, Appendix I, Transport Quartermaster Report. However, certain comments relative to the outloading at Hilo are felt to be pertinent at this point.

(1) The limited time interval between the receipt of orders to outload and the arrival of the first TransDiv accentuated the need for a closed port and clear dock area for several days prior to commencing loading in order that "spotting" might be accomplished. Despite the fact that every effort was made by Port authorities to clear the dock area of civilian cargo this was not accomplished in sufficient time to allow complete "spotting" for the first TransDiv. Although extraneous shipping was barred from the port during the period of outloading, an unfortunate situation developed in that equipment and supplies to be lifted by the Division did not arrive in Hilo until loading had commenced. This necessitated an unloading over the same dock facilities being used for outloading with resultant confusion.

(2) The distance of the Division's camp from the port (four hours by motor convey), the limited rail facilities (a maximum of four 15 car trains per day), and limited dock facilities required that close supervision and exacting
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coordination be exercised in order that an expeditious loading might be accomplished. The strain on transportation facilities was particularly acute in the movement of troops to Hilo for embarkation since the lack of billeting facilities (see sub-paragraph (3) below) prevented their movement prior to the day of embarkation. The use of LSMs and LSTs for ferrying between Hapuna Bay (12 miles from Camp on West Coast) and Hilo greatly facilitated the movement of engineering equipment and tanks to the point of embarkation.

(3) One of the major difficulties encountered in loading out of Hilo was the lack of accessible billeting space for working parties and embarking troops. The Division had acquired during June and July the only two available camps for use during loading out period. These camps were adequate in size to billet the working parties necessary to the loading of a single TransDiv, but were located at Olaa, ten miles distant from the port. Much time was lost in effecting reliefs of working parties from such a distance and in addition a large amount of transportation needed for the movement of cargo had to be diverted for this purpose.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS.

a. The preparation of the administrative order was handicapped by circumstances which rendered complete and firm directives on certain of the more important phases of the occupation unavailable until after the occupation had begun. V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 was received on 29 August, 1945; however, annexes covering Disposition of Surrendered Material, Military Government, Area and Facilities Allocation, and Administrative Reports were not received until after arrival in the occupation zone.

b. Division Administrative Order No. 1-45, less Annexes "FOX" and "GEORGE", was issued on 12 September, 1945. Distribution was made to elements embarked in TransRon 22 at Saipan; distribution to elements embarked in LSMs and LSTs was not effected until arrival at the target. Annex "FOX" was distributed on 23 October, 1945 and Annex "GEORGE" on 22 September, 1945.
c. The handicap under which all echelons were laboring because of delay in preparation and distribution of orders is obvious. This unfortunate situation was relieved to a certain extent by the fact that V Amphibious Corps Headquarters was embarked in the same convoy with the Division thus making radiotelephone conferences between Corps and Division G-4's possible en route.

5. OCCUPATION.

a. General.

(1) Logistical plans for the initial phases of the occupation were hampered by the inability to secure accurate and complete information pertaining to conditions in the Sasebo Area and facilities there available for landing and establishing the Division. Despite the lack of firm information, adequate plans could be, and were, formulated for all possible schemes of landing. All plans for the logistical support of the landing were essentially similar in that regardless of the scheme put into operation, Combat Teams would be initially responsible for area logistical support with Division assuming responsibility for the support of detached units (Special Task Units). Planning for the unloading and establishment of the Division ashore was more difficult since details had of necessity to await the report of the advance reconnaissance party. This report, in fact, proved insufficient because of the limited time available to the party, thus requiring a physical reconnaissance by representatives of the G-4 and associated sections. On the basis of aerial photos and intelligence studies, area assignments for location of supply installations were made prior to arrival at the target.

(2) Logistical support of the occupation operation was accomplished without any outstanding departure from normal procedure. Unit distribution was placed in effect on a plus 1. Division assumed the responsibility for supply of smaller units detached for occupational duties in areas distantly removed from their parent organization, since all such supply was most easily accomplished by rail.
(3) The establishment of supply installations was handicapped by the lack of both open and closed storage. Open areas available for dumps were practically non-existent. In consequence, suitable locations had to be dozed out in the heart of the burned-out area of Sasebo. The procurement of closed storage was hampered by uncertainties as to the disposition of Japanese materials accumulated in all available space, plus the difficulties of physically clearing the areas.

(4) The procurement and preparation of adequate billeting areas present a problem of large proportions. Sanitary conditions encountered were such that a major decontamination job was required in each case before troops could be moved in.

(5) Maintenance of roads and bridges presented a major problem. Not only was the road net inadequate in scope to support the operations of the Division, but such roads as existed quickly disintegrated under military traffic. Heavy rainfall and lack of accessible materials aggravated this condition in the initial stages of the occupation. Rebuilding and maintenance of roads received a high priority throughout the occupation.

(6) The movement and resupply of elements of the Division on extended missions was beset by difficulties, attributable largely to the condition of the road net described above. It was necessary to rely on rail transportation for movements of any distance. In certain cases motor transportation was transported by rail for use in the new zone of responsibility. Such conditions rendered the logistical support of detached units uncertain, and required that greater stocks of supplies be kept on hand by the unit than would normally be necessary.

(7) Detachment of the Rear Echelon presented no insurmountable problems, although considerable confusion and inconvenience resulted particularly in the matter of records and personal baggage. Notice of impending detachment sufficiently in advance would have enabled the Division to establish a system of selective shipping whereby materials sent forward would have included essentials only.
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b. Landing.

(1) Personnel - All debarking personnel carried one (1) type "K" and one (1) type "D" rations and one (1) assault candy ration, two (2) filled canteens, one (1) unit of fire, plus normal arms and equipment. Baggage packs of personnel landing on "A" Day were held to be landed as unit baggage.

(2) Logistical Control - Division and Combat Team Logistical Control Officers were boated and prepared to assume control of the shoreward movement of cargo. These posts were secured upon the movement of ships into the dock area to discharge cargo.

c. Unloading.


(2) The congested and rubble-strewn conditions encountered in the dock area at Sasebo served to emphasize the close coordination which must exist between the Shore Party and the Division Quartermaster supply installations if an efficient unloading is to be accomplished. Movement of cargo out of dock or beach areas to Division Dumps must be carried on simultaneously with the unloading, not only to avoid a beachhead bottleneck but also to minimize damage to cargo.

d. Shore Party.

(1) The nature of the operation was such that the Shore Party functioned but limitedly as such. Details of the organization, training, and functioning are included in Appendix B, Shore Party Report.

e. Motor Transport.

(1) A complete report of motor transport activities is included in Appendix 7, Motor Transport Report. The following comments, however, are considered appropriate at this point.
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Subject: G-4 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN (Cont'd).

(a) The extensive dispersion of elements of the Division required by occupational duties emphasized the necessity of establishing transport self-sufficiency in lower echelons in order that tactical missions can be accomplished and supply effected below the regimental level.

(b) Pooling of transportation on all levels is highly desirable in order that maximum use can be made of all vehicles. The Division Motor Transport Officer should coordinate all organizational pools, drawing upon them as transport demands may dictate.

f. Engineer.

(1) Extremely heavy demands were placed upon engineer elements of the Division in the maintenance and improvement of roads and bridges and the construction and adaptation of billeting facilities and utilities.

(2) The established road net proved entirely inadequate to support military traffic. Extensive improvements were required on main supply roads and constant maintenance on all types. The nature of the terrain was such that large quantities of materials were required to effect improvements. Roads through or adjacent to rice growing areas were particularly difficult to maintain because of a lack of "bottom". Local resources were exploited to the fullest extent, but the availability of road construction materials was limited because of inaccessibility of material and lack of local quarrying and crushing equipment.

(3) Although Japanese military installations or buildings were used entirely for the billeting of occupation troops, extensive repairs and alterations were required in most instances. Japanese bathing and sanitary facilities, when present, were not acceptable by American standards of sanitation. Japanese galleys could not be utilized as such. The failure of the Japanese to retain details in military installations for the maintenance and operation of power systems resulted in delay and inconvenience and an additional burden on engineer personnel.

(4) Local water sources proved unsuitable for any purpose other than general washing and bathing. Purifica-
tion units were required for the treatment of all water used for drinking and cooking throughout the Occupation.

g. Ordnance.

(1) The occupational duties required extensive use of Ordnance personnel, in a technical capacity, in inventorying and distribution of enemy materials of war. A full report of these activities is included in Appendix 4, Ordnance Report.

h. Supply.

(1) Appendix 2, Quartermaster Report, comprises a full account of supply for the operation and during the occupation. Certain aspects of supply are considered of sufficient general interest to be included at this point.

(a) In general the assault supplies of the Division proved adequate and resupply through the 8th Service Regiment satisfactory. In the early stages of the occupation supplies of DDT and tire repair materials became critically short. Abnormal demands were responsible for the shortages in each, the demand for DDT resulting from the highly unsanitary conditions encountered throughout the area and that for tire repair materials from extensive operation of vehicles in destroyed or damaged areas.

(b) Emergency type rations were used more extensively than had been anticipated in occupational duty. Unfavorable sanitary conditions rendered the use of "B" type rations inadvisable until extensive decontamination had been effected and complete galley facilities installed. "B" type rations cannot replace the emergency type ration when the mission requires extensive patrolling and detached operations.

i. Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment.

(1) Appendix (5), Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment Report, covers this phase of the occupation in detail.
6. CONCLUSION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Changes in Table of Allowances:

(a) Comments: The introduction of major changes in Tables of Organization without supporting Table of Allowances during preparation for an operation creates much confusion and handicaps the equipping of the organization.

(b) Recommendation: That impending changes of major proportion either in Tables of Organization or Table of Allowances be held in abeyance if they are promulgated as plans for an operation are being developed, and made effective during the next period of rehabilitation.

(2) Personnel for Division Dumps.

(a) Comments: Inadequate provision is made in Tables of Organization for personnel and equipment to work Division Dumps. Attachment of Depot Companies and Ammunition Companies to the Shore Party is not an effective solution as these personnel are required in the beach area at the same time there is the greatest need for personnel in Division inland dumps, namely, when they are being initially established.

(b) Recommendation: That a labor unit be made available from Corps troops to Division QM Section in order to provide for the operation of Division dumps on a twenty-four (24) hour basis. This unit should be equipped with all necessary dump and warehouse cargo handling equipment.

(3) Shipping Requirements:

(a) Comments: There is a failure to correlate the allocation of shipping to shipping requirements. Tonnage limitations made necessary by the nature of the operation would have rendered it impossible for the
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Division to lift supplies and equipment in the quantities directed by higher authority.

(b) Recommendation: That the Division be granted an opportunity to determine the amount of shipping required to lift what higher echelon directs must be carried.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Advance Party.

(a) Comments: Inadequate time and personnel were allowed to prepare the area for the reception of the Division.

(b) Recommendation: That military government representatives and advance billeting details precede the arrival of occupation troops by a substantial period of time in order that full use can be made of enemy facilities, housing and labor.

(2) Rations.

(a) Comments: Type "B" rations are inadvisable in the early stages of an occupation because of uncertain sanitary conditions and can not replace emergency type rations when the mission requires extensive patrolling or detached operations on the part of smaller units.

(b) Recommendation: That rations carried in the initial shipping for an occupation be predominantly of the emergency type unless known factors eliminate the possibility of unsanitary conditions. In any event resupply shipping should not exclude the emergency type "C" and "10-in-1".

(3) Storage.

(a) Comments: Failure to utilize closed storage facilities in the area because of lack of directives
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The governing disposition of Japanese materials stored therein resulted in unwarranted weather damage to equipment and supplies of the Division.

(b) Recommendation: It is believed the recommendation contained in subparagraph (1)(b) above would provide a means whereby a situation of this type would be prevented.

(4) Procurement.

(a) Comments: The Division Quartermaster Section was designated as the administrative section for the Division Procurement Agency. The voluminous reports and the extensive liaison and reconnaissance required in the performance of these additional duties resulted in a severe burden on Quartermaster personnel.

(b) Recommendation: That in an operation where extensive use of enemy or foreign facilities and supplies is anticipated, an adequate and separate administration section be provided for such procurement agency as may be established.

F. A. STEVENS.
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5th Marine Division
In the Field
1 December, 1945

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT.

DIVISION TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. TRAINING PHASE:

a. As a result of the Iwo Operation, it was apparent that units were in need of more and better trained Transport Quartermaster personnel. To correct this deficiency, prior to the embarkation for another Operation, the Division Transport Quartermaster Section set up a schooling program which was designed to correct any errors which might have occurred and to give old and new Transport Quartermaster personnel the latest and most up to date loading procedure.

b. Two sessions were held, for both Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers. The first session extended from 27 April to 15 May, 1945, and the second extended from 2 through 13 July, 1945.

(1). The first session ran two (2) days per week for three (3) weeks. The following personnel were required to attend:

Officers:

Two (2) from each Regimental headquarters.
Two (2) from each Battalion, Service Troops.
One (1) from each Infantry Battalion.
One (1) from each Artillery Battalion.

Enlisted:

Each Regimental headquarters: four (4) NCOs.
Each Battalion, Service Troops: four (4) NCOs.
Each Infantry Battalion: four (4) NCOs.
Each Artillery Battalion: four (4) NCOs.

The scope of this session was to take up the Transport
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (CONT'D).

Doctrine, the FMF, Pec G-4 Standard Operating Procedure, and the drawing up of a complete set of loading plans. During this phase, a record of attendance was kept and students were graded on their work. At the conclusion, reports of the results were submitted to Division.

(2) The personnel who attended the previous class were required to attend the second session. The scope was to review the previous session's instructions and to familiarize all students with the new embarkation forms as promulgated by FMF, Pec. The last four (4) days of this session were to include the practical application of their loading instructions in the form of the actual loading of a small APA which had been obtained for this purpose. A typical combat load was drawn up by the Division Transport Quartermaster Section and given to the students, who in turn made up complete loading plans. The best loading plan, in the opinion of the Division Transport Quartermaster Section, was selected and that one reproduced in quantity and used as the actual loading plan.

(3) Provisions were made with the G-2 Section to take stills and motion pictures of the loading procedure, showing the correct method of adjusting slings, etc., for the purpose of using these as training aids for future instructional periods.

(4) Conclusions:

(a) As a result of this training period, a number of Officers and Enlisted men learned the rudiments of Transport Quartermaster work and formed a pool from which experienced TQ personnel became available for actual planning and out-loading.

(b) The experiences gained in the actual loading of a small APA show that it is the best form of instruction for this type of work.

(c) It is recommended that during future
training periods will be made available to Divisions for instruction in Transport Quartermaster procedure.

2. PLANNING PHASE:

a. Upon receipt of Warning Order for the assault operation, UP&Ts, Cargo Lists, Vehicle and Heavy Lift Lists were requested from all units. From this information the Division Transport Quartermaster Section was able to maintain accurate running records of the amount and type of supplies and equipment to be lifted for an operation. As a result of the cancellation of the assault operation, due to the cessation of hostilities, the information obtained previously then became a basis for the out-loading of the Division for the occupation of Japan. This was invaluable in that the time allotted for the accumulation of statistical data was so short that serious difficulties would have resulted. As a result, accurate plans for the occupation were drawn up two days prior to the arrival of the first TransDiv.

b. Shipping assignments were made as shown on Enclosure "ABLE" to this report.

3. LOADING AND UNLOADING PHASE:

a. Six (6) days were allotted to the Division for the loading of forty-three (43) ships, all classes. The loading summary is as shown on Enclosure "ABLE" to this report.

b. Unloading at Sasebo proved rather slow and difficult because of limited docking facilities and the condition of the roads, warehouses, dock space, etc. At the commencement of unloading, six (6) ships were tied up at the docks. The remainder began discharging in the stream via LCM's and LCP's, these latter unloading at Green Beaches, LSTs and LSMs unloading at Green Beaches and at King One. Due to the limited beaching areas, only a small number of craft were able to beach at one
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (CONT'D)

time. The unloading proceeded as shown on Enclosure "Baker".

c. Upon completion of unloading, the Transport Quartermaster Section became the liaison agency for the Division in obtaining water transportation from Navy and railroad transportation through 5th Amphibious Corps. Later, the Section was split up into a Records Section for disposition of Japanese materiel and a Section which carried on its normal functions.

ENCLOSURES: "ABLE" - Loading Summary.
"BAKER" - Unloading Summary.
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5th Marine Division,
In the Field.
1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

DIVISION QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. PLANNING

a. Upon return from Iwo Jima the Division Quartermaster Section immediately called for equipment status reports from all units of the Division. These unit reports were compiled into a Division report which became the basis for the resupply of the Division. All deficiencies and shortages were made the subject of requisitions to our servicing supply agency.

b. When it became known that the objective in our coming operation would be Southern Kyushu, supply machinery was immediately put into operation to determine and secure those items which were required due to the specific nature of our target. Into this category particularly fell cold weather clothing, heaters, anti-freeze solutions and other cold weather equipment.

c. In the preparation and supplying phase, our greatest obstacle was the adoption of the new "GEORGE" Series, Tables of Organization. The immediate problem occasioned by this change was the revision of certain tactical units and the creation of others for which no allowances had been authorized. Time being of essence, this office adopted as the yardstick of our supply of these units the proposed allowances as set forth in the proposed Table of Organization published by FIF, PAC Headquarters prior to the adoption of the new "GEORGE" Series.

d. Although the new "GEORGE" Series Tables of Organization were very similar to the proposed tables published by FIF, PAC Headquarters, the equipment allowances as finally approved by HHC varied greatly from the proposed equipment allowances. The absence of authorized allowances for certain units of the Division was the source of much extra, and as it proved, useless work. However, these changes were made at a time that the Division was hurriedly preparing for the invasion of Kyushu and it was neither practical nor advisable to
with the end of the war changing the nature of our operation from one of assault to one of occupation, the supply problem was not greatly altered. We had planned for the climate of Kunshu and naturally all such plans held good despite the fact that we would occupy rather than assault this island. The biggest change occasioned by the switch from assault to occupation was the decision to carry all cold-weather clothing under Division rather than unit control.

2. OPERATION

a. This Division began landing for the operation on 20 August, 1945. Maintaining close liaison with the Division Transport Quartermaster, this section moved to the Docks all Division Quartermaster stocks. Loding operations were completed on 27 August, 1945, and on that date this section boarded APA 104, USS WESTMORELAND, for transportation to our objective.

b. Early on the morning of 22 September, 1945, "A" Day, the Division Quartermaster had his entire section landed at Sasebo by the way of LCVP from the WESTMORELAND. This early landing afforded an opportunity to conduct both an intensive and extensive reconnaissance of possible dump sites. By 1500 on the 22nd of September, the Division Quartermaster had located suitable storage space to handle the Division's gear. A dispatch giving the location of the approved storage sites was sent to the Division Command Post aboard the WESTMORELAND and the Division Quartermaster was ready to receive discharged cargo. The storage sites were selected, approved, and ready before any cargo was discharged from ships in the Division Convoy. Unit distribution for all types of supplies commenced the morning of A plus 1, 23 September, 1945, and continued throughout the occupation.

c. Storage sites selected included four large warehouses located on the pier at Sasebo Harbor. The location of these warehouses provided the two-fold advantage of ready
CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

Division Quartermaster control in one limited area as well as easy accessibility to ships discharging cargo.

These four warehouses housed the following types of supplies:

1. A ration warehouse.
2. A water dump.
3. A miscellaneous supplies warehouse, encompassing General Supply, Ordnance and Motor Transport and Engineer items.
4. A unit storage warehouse where the Regiments and separate Battalions could store their gear until they could establish unit storage dumps.

In addition to the closed storage, an open fuel dump site was selected on the burned out area of Sasebo City. The ruins were bulldozed level and this dump was ready for operation when the first load of fuel arrived from the dock.

c. On 28 September, 1945, the Division Quartermaster moved about five-sixths of its supplies to Marine Camp Ainoura, retaining one large warehouse and the Division Quartermaster Office on the pier in Sasebo. This was occasioned by the removal of all warehouses in the Sasebo area with the exception of one from under Division control. The particular problem posed throughout the occupation was supply of widely scattered units and frequently moving units.

3. CONCLUSION

a. It is believed that it was inadvisable to change the Tables of Organization of a Division so close to an operation, particularly when no Tables of Allowances were authorized to equip the new and the revised tactical organization.

b. The "B" ration furnished this Division for the operation was very unbalanced and not well varied in menu. The meat component of the ten days "B" rations carried consisted
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT (Cont'd).

of two-thirds corned beef hash. In addition, there were no eggs or cereal.

c. Supply activities during the occupation further emphasized the extreme necessity for the creation within the Division of a Quartermaster establishment to be at the disposal of the Division Quartermaster. This element should contain sufficient trained supply personnel, engineering equipment and operators, transportation, fire-fighting equipment and communication facilities for any type of field operation.

d. Resupply of field rations had not been contemplated. This was of the utmost importance as "B" rations could not be constantly utilized. Patrolling, movement of troops, working parties, etc., constantly require field rations.

ENCLOSURE: (A) 5th Service Battalion (less Ordnance Company) Report.
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT.

5TH SERVICE BATTALION (less Ordnance Company) REPORT.

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation. To meet all contingencies it was decided to prepare to function in one or a combination of two or all of the following task organizations:

(1) Each type section (such as bakery) would function independently in support of a combat team or similar groupment.

(2) All type sections would combine to function as a type group (as supply under Division QM).

(3) Different type sections (such as chemical, supply bakery, etc) to combine as a support group in isolated situations.

(4) And to sub-divide into fractions of sections as the situation demanded.

b. Occupation Operation. The same plans as for an assault operation obtained, and therefore no change was necessary.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation. In view of the duties of the sections of the companies being essentially the same in combat as in rest it was practicable to train only in essential basic subjects. These were (1) functioning and firing of organic weapons, (2) Camouflage, (3) Field sanitation, (4) Cover and concealment, and (5) Fire team and squad tactics. This was augmented by fire team training with live ammunition; and by marches, water discipline, first aid, and physical conditioning.

b. Occupation Operation. Same as for the assault operation, except the following was held at night and aboard ship enroute: (1) The Japanese people - Their education, religion, family, government, customs and livelihood; and, (2) Information of Japan with regard to Topography, geography, climate and resources.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation. No task organization was made.

ENCLOSURE (A) - 1 - CONFIDENTIAL
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd).

b. Occupation Operation.

Task organization as of 0800, 26 August, 1945:

1st Platoon, Ordnance Company.
2nd Platoon, Ordnance Company.
3rd Platoon, Ordnance Company.
Tracked Vehicle Platoon, Ordnance Company.
Headquarters Company.
Service Company.
Supply Company.
Ordnance Company (less 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and Tracked Vehicle Platoon).

RCT 26.
RCT 27.
RCT 28.
Tank Group.
Service Group.
Service Group.
Service Group.

Subsequent changes in task organization by dates:

27Sep45. 2nd and 3rd Platoons, Ordnance Company.
Rejoined the Battalion from RCT's 27 and 28.
Attached to RCT 28 for operations out of FUKUOKA, JAPAN.

6Oct45. 3rd Platoon, Ordnance Company.
3rd Platoon, Service Company.
3rd Platoon, Supply Company.

Rejoined the Battalion from RCT 26.

13Oct45. 1st Platoon, Ordnance Company.

Rejoined the Battalion from RCT 26.

18Oct45. 1st Platoon, Service Company (less Chemical Section, Graves Registration Section, Post Exchange Section).
1st Platoon, Supply Company (less Platoon Headquarters, one-half supply section).

Rejoined the Battalion from RCT 28.

2Nov45. 3rd Platoon, Ordnance Company.
3rd Platoon, Service Company.
3rd Platoon, Supply Company.

Recap of task organization as of 15 November, 1945:
Service Battalion (less Tracked Vehicle Platoon of Ordnance Company).
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

NOTE:
1. 1/2 bakery section with 13th Marines at Aircraft Factory Area, and 1/2 bakery section with Pioneer Battalion at Sasebo Fortress Group.
2. Personnel of elements shown attached to RCT 26 on 13 October, 1945 have been detached from our rolls as RCT 26 (reinforced) has been detached from the division.
3. Supply Section of Supply Company are billeted and working under Division QM control at Sasebo Navy Yard.
4. The battalion (less elements) is billeted at Marine Camp, Ainoura, Kyushu, Japan.
5. A Rear Echelon of 8 officers and 142 enlisted was left on Hawaii. Subsequently, 2 officers and 9 enlisted have joined the forward echelon from the rear echelon.

4. OCCUPATION OPERATIONS.

(a) This battalion (less rear echelon) arrived at Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan on 22 September, 1945, and disembarked during the period 22 - 24 September, 1945. Disembarkation from APAs was at the Sasebo Naval Dock Yards (Navy Yard), and from the LST's at the aeroplane ramp at the Naval Air Station. No casualties. No hostilities. Operation was smooth and orderly. Equipment and supplies were transferred from ship to warehouses. Had the usual rein that accompanies all operations, making the work disagreeable and the roads and dock areas moderately difficult.

(b) Camps were established in Japanese buildings. Initial camp at Japanese Naval Workers barracks, KYUSHU 1:25,000 (74.4 - 13.3). On 27 September, 1945 displaced camp to Naval Recruit Training Station (now Marine Camp, Ainoura, Kyushu, Japan), KYUSHU 1:25,000 (70.8 - 13.9).

(c) All sections of the companies have been performing in their organic duties, except chemical sections whose personnel have been used to supervise Japanese labor parties working for the Division in this area.

(d) Worthy of note is the work of the war trophies agency of the Ordnance Company and the method of disposing of Japanese small arms, swords, etc. For details see Ordnance Company report.

ENCLOSURE (A)
(e) Graves Registration Section has established the
U. S. Armed Forces Cemetery No. 1, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan
(KYUSHU 1:25000, A/R L872: 86.2 - 12.5). It has buried the
ashes of 6 British and 53 nationality unknown Prisoners of
War, and the bodies of 5 members of the Allied forces who
have died since the occupation has started.

(f) The typhoon on 11 October, 1945 did insignificant
damage.

(g) Barracks, buildings, mess installations and heads
are very satisfactory. Hot showers were provided for the men
by a mobile unit, which has been augmented by a recent instal-
lation in the Jeb beth house.

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

The battalion was re-equipped and supplied up to 20
August, on which date it is estimated that it was 95% equipped
and supplied. Approximately two-thirds of our equipment was
left in the Rear Echelon. Equipment and supplies were adequate
for the task performed.

6. CONCLUSION.

a. ASSAULT OPERATION.

(1) COMMENTS. The split of Service and Supply Company
into two companies, the Service Company and the Supply Company,
without a Table of Allowances caused some difficulty in making
an equitable distribution of the old Service and Supply Company's
property, and it further caused difficulty in procuring office
equipment and transportation. These difficulties were only
partially solved. However, if the ASSAULT OPERATION had been
executed it is assumed that the foregoing difficulties would
have been eliminated.

(2) RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

b. OCCUPATION OPERATION.

(1) COMMENTS: None.
(1) COMMENTS. This operation has progressed very smoothly; however, there are two comments to make: (1) The Service Troops headquarters is carried on the rolls of this battalion and demands two jeeps and two trucks (1 ton 4 x 4) from this battalion. The two jeeps came from Headquarters Company and the two trucks came from Ordnance Company, as a result Headquarters Company had to borrow two jeeps—one from Ordnance Company and one from Supply Company. (2) The Tracked Vehicle Platoon is attached to the 5th Tank Battalion but requisitions supplies for their maintenance activities through this battalion, which procedure is believed to be wrong.

(2) RECOMMENDATIONS. It is therefore recommended that—

(1) The allowance of vehicles be increased to five (5) jeeps for Headquarters Company and by two (2) trucks (1 ton 4 x 4) for Ordnance Company;

(2) The Tracked Vehicle Maintenance Platoon be organically attached to Tank Battalion and that it process its requisitions through the Tank Battalion in any case.
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

MEDICAL REPORT

1. PLANNING
   a. Assault Operation.
      (1) Preliminary studies of theatre and estimate of situation begun.
      (2) Medical supplies critically examined.
      (3) Interrupted by cessation of hostilities.
   b. Occupation Operation.
      (1) Corps Medical plan received. Corps Evacuation Hospital Number One (1) to support the 5th Marine Division.
      (2) Medical companies ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE disposed as in assault operation with DOG, EASY, and M&S Companies given priority loading for early establishment of a hospital.
      (3) Routine immunization of all troops brought up to date and in addition all personnel immunized against typhus, plague, and cholera.
      (4) Medical officers and corpsmen briefed on known epidemiology of area of occupation. Malaria and Epidemiology Units pre-arranged for early setting up of medical units relative to use of D.D.T. powder and solutions.
      (5) Medical supplies brought up to state of readiness,
      (6) Medical departments inspected to determine state of readiness.

2. TRAINING
   a. Assault Operation.
(1) All medical replacements given special training in medical field work and field first aid.

(2) Participation of medical personnel in regiments, battalions, and medical companies ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE in field exercises.

b. Operation E.C.O.

(1) None.

3. OCCUPATION-OPERATION.

a. Enclosures (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) supply details of activity of the Medical Battalion, the Epidemiology and Malaria Control Unit, the 203rd Malaria Survey Detachment (Army), Division Dental application, and Venereal Disease Report.

b. Organization Medical Facilities.

(1) Supplies and Equipment.

(a) Adequate except as noted in enclosures (A), (B), and (D).

(2) Personnel.

(a) T/O strength reduced to twenty (20) hospital corpsmen per infantry battalion, and forty-five (45) hospital corpsmen per ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, DOG, and EASY Medical Companies. All corpsmen and medical officers were well trained.

(b) The present organizational set-up of the Office of the Division Surgeon presents difficulties in its operation. The Division Surgeon's Administrative Assistant and the Division Medical Supply Officer, are, with the enlisted assistants, attached to Headquarters Battalion. The Epidemiology and Malaria Control Unit, the Division Psychiatrist, and the Division Dental Officer are attached to the Medical Battalion. The Venereal Disease Control Officer has
been detailed from the Medical Battalion. A unified section of these officers with enlisted assistants attached to Headquarters Battalion would lead to better control of Division Medical Activities.

c. Health of the Command.

(1) In general it has been excellent. Standard practices of disease control have been rigidly enforced. Lectures once a week to unit organizations on topics of preventive medicine, sanitation, and hygiene have been given by unit medical officers. As will be noted in Enclosure (B), paragraph five (5), battalion sanitation squads have not been effective inasmuch as sanitation duties are not their primary functions, thus they are scattered or used other than under control of the Epidemiology Control Unit.

(2) A trained venereal disease control officer is a necessity. An occupation area is large and not only are professional prostitutes to be considered but the urgent desirability of living forces many women into this means of securing a livelihood. Educational measures including visual education must be resorted to and control measures checked.

(3) The need for a Division Psychiatrist continues during an occupation period. He has been found of inestimable value not only in purely professional fields but as an analyst of morale problems and solutions.

(4) It has become increasingly evident that well trained epidemiologists and sanitary officers with sufficient trained help are vital to the success of an operation.

d. Recommendations.

(1) Consideration by higher authority of the establishment of a completely equipped sanitary work component, numbering at least one hundred (100) men under control of a sanitary officer.
(2) Provisions for an officer trained in Venereal Disease Control as an assistant to the Division Surgeon.

(3) Change T/O to establish within the Medical Section of Division Headquarters and attached to Headquarters Battalion the following:

Division Medical Personnel Officer.
Four (4) Enlisted, USN
Chief Pharmacist's Mate  1
Pharmacist's Mate First Class  1
Pharmacist's Mate Second Class  2

Division Medical Supply Officer.
Five (5) Enlisted
Chief Pharmacist's Mate  1
Pharmacist's Mate First Class  1
Hospital Apprentice  3

Division Dental Officer.
One (1) Enlisted
Pharmacist's Mate Second Class 1

Division Malaria and Epidemiological Control Officer.
As now established  12

Division Venereal Disease Control Officer.
One (1) Enlisted
Pharmacist's Mate Second Class 1

ENCLOSURES:  
(A) Fifth Medical Battalion Report.  
(B) Malaria and Epidemiological Control Unit Number 103 Report.  
(C) 203rd Malaria Survey Detachment Report.  
(D) Division Dental Report  
(E) Division Venereal Disease Control Report.
ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT

1. PLANNING.
   a. Assault Operation.
      (1) ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE Companies were attached to CT's 26, 27, and 28 respectively.
      (2) DOG and EASY Companies were to establish Division Hospital on order.
      (3) Equipment and supplies were requisitioned to make up allowances and action taken to bring them to a state of readiness.
   b. Occupation Operation.
      (1) Medical Companies disposed as in Assault Operation.
      (2) Sixteen (16) additional dental officers with field operative dental units and a field prosthetic unit were included in the forward echelon. These were attached to R&S Company.

2. TRAINING.
   a. Assault Operation.
      (1) Replacements received special training in field work and field first aid.
      (2) Collecting sections of ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE Companies participated in field exercises with CT's 26, 27, and 28 respectively.
      (3) BAKER Company participated in a hospital movement exercise. ABLE and CHARLIE Companies were to follow when plans for occupation interrupted the program.
   b. Occupation Operation.
      (1) None.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.
a. ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE Companies were attached to CT's and embarked with 90% of their supplies and equipment. DOG and EASY Companies were embarked with 90% medical supplies and 50% of heavy equipment.

b. The Epidemiological Unit was ordered ashore 22 September, 1945, when reconnaissance details reported all buildings heavily infested with vermin. Testing of water supplies was immediately instituted and all water tentatively determined as unfit for human consumption within 24 hours.

c. DOG and EASY Companies were ordered ashore 23 September, 1945, to establish division hospital at Japanese Naval Base, AINOURA. The hospital was put into operation and receiving patients within 12 hours.

d. As of 2400, 30 November, 1945, there was a total of 666 admissions to the hospital. The most common communicable diseases received were Catarhal Fever, Acute, 151 cases and next in frequency were other respiratory infections as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pneumonia, Primary, Atypical</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronchitis, Acute</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonsillitis, Acute</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharyngitis, Acute</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the injuries received, the following were most prevalent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fracture, Simple</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fracture, Compound</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellulitis</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burns</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacerations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprains</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strains</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There have been 121 major and minor operations. Major procedures consisted of:
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

Appendectomy 8
Amputations, traumatic 3
Burns, debridement 7

The compound fractures were given supportive
treatment and evacuated to supporting hospitals.

4. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. Drugs, pharmaceuticals and surgical supplies
were found adequate in every respect.

b. The repeat sterilizer trailer has been found the
most practical and useful means of sterilizing operating
room linen. In addition it is a source of hot showers for
a hospital.

c. The autoclaves issued in Unit #12 Nukhed have not
been found practical nor serviceable in the field. Shields
are needed to prevent drafts and they foul easily. The per-
iod of serviceability is limited.

d. The 1-ton, 4x4 International ambulance has a high
center of gravity, is most uncomfortable for patients and
has not enough power for towing a trailer when required. In
clement weather conditions this ambulance is very little
protection. The 3/4-ton, 4x4 Dodge ambulance overcomes most
of these difficulties.

e. The refrigerators supplied are the 6.0 cubic feet
Kerosene type. These break down frequently due to a small
cone flame spreader which is almost impossible to procure in
the field. This cone burns out quickly if a high fraction
type kerosene is used. A mixture of 5 parts diesel fuel and
95 parts kerosene will lengthen the life of these cones. How-
ever, the size of these refrigerators is inadequate especial-
ly since biologicals must be stored. The 50 cubic feet re-
frigerator is an excellent step toward solution of this pro-
blem.

-3-
V CONCLUSION

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comments.

(a) The training of collecting sections with CT's in basic field combat training was done and is considered highly practical.

(b) The schooling in administration of plasma and venipuncture technic was stressed under field conditions. Its importance cannot be overemphasized.

(c) It is almost becoming doctrine that two medical companies, usually DOG and EASY, be used to establish division hospital. A more efficient organization could be established if these units were combined with H&S to form a hospital unit or group and be under one command. This would eliminate two unnecessary duplicate sets of reports and make the internal functioning of the hospital far more desirable.

(2) Recommendations.

(a) It is recommended that DOG, EASY, and H&S Companies be merged into one hospital unit under one command.

(b) That both sterilizer trailer be carried in the forward echelon of each medical company and not be omitted from the Table of Allowance. This should replace the standard autoclave.

(c) That the 50 cubic foot refrigerators be standard equipment and carried in the forward echelon because of its superiority in storage of biologicals and whole blood over the standard 6.0 cubic foot kerosene type.

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b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Comments.

(a) Medical companies establishing field hospitals are in a great need of their heavy equipment which includes laundry units, bath sterilizers, refrigerators and generators. DOG and EASY Companies established the Division Hospital which bore the brunt of medical care of the entire area until higher echelon units were opened on 30 September, 1945. These companies embarked with no laundry facilities, one (1) bath sterilizer and one (1) 7.4 KV generator between them. The lack of heavy equipment was a serious handicap overcome only by borrowing from attached medical companies.

(b) The medical battalion is streamlined to primarily care for battle casualties. In this type of operation the reverse is true. A peacetime census of patients both in number and type should be anticipated and was received.

(c) With the increasing number of electrified units such as 50 cubic foot refrigerators, x-ray, collective protectors, operating room equipment and laboratory equipment it is believed that the 7.4 KV electric generator allowed each company is not sufficient.

(d) Linen supplies in units are inadequate. These have been augmented by the Red Cross.

(e) Laboratory facilities are not adequate for running a peacetime hospital. There are no facilities for running blood chemistries or serological examinations.

(f) A repair shop and tools operated by adequate personnel would solve many problems in the field.
(g) It would be preferable to have "B" rations made available early. However, field rations with hospital accessory rations are surprisingly adequate.

(h) Little or no use has been made of Japanese medical equipment. Dependency on civilian hospitals was not necessary nor desirable.

(2) Recommendations

(a) It is recommended all hospital equipment be lifted if feasible.

(b) That the allowance of 7.4 KV generators be increased to two (2) for each medical company setting up the division hospital.

(c) That a sewing machine be added to the Table of Allowances for each medical battalion.

(d) That laboratory facilities be augmented in equipment and personnel to do blood chemistries and serological examinations.

(e) That a repair shop be added to the organization of the medical battalion and that each company be assigned an Electricians' Mate, a Machinists' Mate, and a Carpenter's Mate.

(f) Consolidation of DOG, EASY, and H&S Companies under one command would be efficacious here as in the assault phase.
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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT

MALARIA AND EPIDEMIC CONTROL UNIT NO. 103

1. PLANNING

a. The program followed was that as outlined in Commander Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area confidential letter A5/F5, Serial 02734, dated 1 April, 1945.

b. The Division Epidemiologist maintained close liaison with the Division Surgeon advising him of the extent and nature of measures indicated for disease prevention prior to and during the operation.

c. A survey of all cooks and bakers was completed and those found to be harboring enteric pathogens were treated. The carrier rate in this group was approximately 21%. Carriers of shigellosis and amoebiasis were apparently cleared of their infection by chemotherapy. Those carriers of Salmonella which did not respond to sulfadiazine were transferred to other duties.

d. No changes were necessary in changing to an occupation operation.

2. TRAINING.

a. Practical training was afforded the members of this unit by performing all the bacteriology, water analysis, insect control, and rodent control at Camp Tarawa.

b. A three (3) man sanitation squad from each battalion was trained by members of this unit in field sanitation, rodent control and insect control.

c. An augmentation unit of fifty (50) men from the 116th Naval Construction Battalion was given a two (2) weeks course in sanitary engineering and insect control methods. This detachment was to be attached to this unit upon arrival at the target.

d. No changes were necessary in changing to an occupation operation.
3. **SUPPLY, EQUIPMENT, AND LOGISTICS.**

a. In accordance with Fleet Marine Force, Pacific General Order No. 16-45, dated 1 March, 1945, a distribution list of quartermaster and medical supply items needed by each battalion and this unit for malaria and pest control was compiled. All items not on hand were ordered and received prior to embarkation by the Division Quartermaster.

b. This unit's equipment was combat loaded on one (1) 1-ton truck, one (1) 3/4-ton ambulance equipped with a power sprayer and one (1) 1/4-ton truck equipped with a pneumatic type sprayer. These vehicles were too loaded aboard ship and were ashore shortly after landing. Bacteriological media were preweighed and placed in vials. One hundred (100) gallons of 8% DDT in kerosene was prepared and carried in drums mounted on the trucks. These measures considerably reduced the amount of time required before this unit could begin to function upon arrival at the target.

4. **OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.**

a. All buildings in the Sasebo area were found to be heavily infested with lice, fleas, and other vermin. Until buildings could be sprayed, members of this unit dusted personnel with 10% DDT as they came ashore. All buildings were treated with DDT prior to occupancy by the troops.

b. Water samples were examined bacteriologically and recommendations made as to the treatment. All new water was found to be heavily polluted and a detailed report of this submitted to the Division Surgeon forty-eight (48) hours after landing. Samples have been found to contain the following pathogens:

1. Erbthella typhosa.
2. Shigella flexneri II.
3. Salmonella believed to be S. morgani.

Treated water was tested twice a week by the unit's laboratory.

c. Entomological surveys were conducted and specimens mounted to be sent to the National Naval Medical Center. Snails from this area were examined for schistosomiasis and no evidence of this disease found. Mosquitoes of the following varieties have been found.

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1010
Anopheles
Anopheles hyrcanus sinensis

Culicines
Culex (Lutzia) fuscanus var. vorax
Aedes tojoi
Culexquin-bibiens
Culex vallidothorax
Tripteroides barbiscua
Anonigerae obturbans

These species have been collected during the autumn months so that an accurate estimate of their density cannot be made.

d. A rat survey has been conducted and the main species found to be Rattus r. tananum and Rattus cercaco. No evidence of plague has been found in any of these animals. They are all infested with intestinal parasites, especially H. nana. A pleurocardo of Diphylllobothrium has been found in the liver of 90% of the field rats, R. cercaco. In addition leptospirosis are been found in several animals. It has not been possible to examine them for typhus fever.

e. Sanitation has been a major problem. The use of "night soil" is universal in this area. No sewage facilities exist, except for concrete collection vaults. The high water level has made the use of prefabricated heads difficult. These have been erected over pits were possible but are constantly breaking and in need of repair. In addition, lack of a screened ventilation shaft causes water to condense on the seats making them very untidy. The use of native food and Japanese foodhandlers has been prohibited in this division. Trash is disposed of by incineration and garbage is collected by the local farmers for use as swill. Measuring facilities have been adequate but immersion type water heaters are not effective and have had to be supplemented by steam heat or oil burners.

f. A plan for control of an epidemic of typhus fever in the Sasebo area has been prepared in conjunction with the A.H.G. public health officer. This plan is to be put in effect in the event of such an outbreak in the civilian population.
5. COMMENT.

a. There have been no cases of bacillary dysentery in this division. This is considered to be a remarkable record and is attributed to strict food and water discipline.

b. The functions of a malaria and epidemic control unit are not altered by conversion from an assault to an occupation program.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Unit commanders or medical officers be held responsible to assure procurement from the Division Quartermaster of insect and pest control supplies allotted to them. This equipment should be given a high priority and top-loaded aboard ship so as to be ashore and functioning at the earliest possible time.

b. Attachment of the fifty (50) man N.C.B. team to the malaria and Epidemic Control Unit prior to embarkation to assure their availability at the target.

c. Acquisition of six (6) portable type sprayers to be used by this unit. Equipment mounted on trucks is unsatisfactory for the DDT spraying of buildings of more than one deck.

d. Acquisition of a rodent control unit to carry out rat poisoning in areas recommended by this unit.

e. An allotment of DDT and spraying equipment should be set aside for use by this unit in controlling an outbreak of typhus fever. In addition vaccine and laboratory reagents should be available for such an emergency.

f. Prefabricated hoods should be constructed of sturdier material. The seats on the present type break off very easily. Screened ventilation pipes or holes in the sides are also recommended to prevent the condensation of moisture on the seats.
ENCLOSURE (C) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT

203d MALARIA SURVEY DETACHMENT

1. PLANNING.

a. Planning for unit operations as embellished upon T/O & E 8-500 dated 18 January, 1945 is as follows:

(1) Areas of Fifth Amphibious Corps to be surveyed:

(a) Marine Camp at AINOURA.
(b) SASEBO (5th Marine Division, VaC and attached units).
(c) KAMATANA (1st Bn 13th Marines).
(d) SAGA (2d Bn 27th Marines).

(2) Collection of larvae and mappng of proposed survey area:

(a) Collecting.
(b) Rearing of mosquito larvae.
(c) Identification of larvae and reared adults.
(d) Recording of results.
(e) Mapping of breeding areas.
(f) Submission of larvae to Army and Navy taxonomists in Washington, D.C..

(3) Results of survey:

(a) Discussion of survey results.
(b) Outline of control program based on survey.

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ENCLOSURE (C)
2. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

    a. This unit arrived SASEBO 30 October, 1945 and was attached to the 5th Marine Division by G4, VaC Diatctch 30I437/1 October, 1945. After a preliminary period spent accumulating material on the epidemiology of Kyushu, the unit began a systematic survey of the area set forth in paragraph 1. e. (1) above. One thousand one hundred seventy-four (1,174) culicine and forty-nine (49) anopheline larvae have been collected up to this date. The species and number of larvae found are as follows:

        Anopheles hyrcanus sinensis  49
        Aedes tojoi               665
        Aedes quin-pipiens        345*
        Culex quinquefasciatus   2**
        Culex pipiens pellens    2**
        Culex fusca vorax        75
        Culex sinensis           19
        Culex pallidithorax      7
        Trineroides bambusa     50
        Aedes species            28

    1,240

3. CONCLUSIONS.

    a. Only eight (8) species of mosquito larvae were found. Three of these species, Anopheles hyrcanus sinensis, Culex quin-pipiens, and Aedes tojoi are credited as the vectors of malaria, Japanese B Encephalitis and dengue, respectively. Anopheline breeding is slight and scattered. The presence of malaria among the civilians is possible but cannot be verified until a blood parasite series is completed.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

    a. No recommendations are set forth at this time.

* Cannot be separated in larval stage.
** Identified by genitalia of reared males.
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ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH NARDIV
OPERATION REPORT

DIVISION DENTAL REPORT

1. PLANNING.
   a. Assault Operation.
      (1) Ten dental officers were to accompany the forward echelon, (one per medical company, one per RCT plus division dental officer).
      (2) No facilities were to be provided for prothetic dental treatment.
      (3) Equipment, each dental officer to take Field Medical Unit #2 (Dental Officers Kit) and Field Medical Unit #35 minus case #3 (field desk).
   b. Occupation.
      (1) The following equipment was carried in the forward echelon:
         (a) Complete dental prothetic facilities.
         (b) Complete Field Medical Units #2 and #35, one per dental officer, and one Field Medical Unit #35A (prothetic).
      (2) Four dental officers and five enlisted technicians were left in the rear echelon.

2. TRAINING.
   a. Assault Operation.
      (1) Dental officers attached to medical companies were given one week refresher course in anaesthesia at Corps Evacuation Hospital #1.
      (2) No other specialized training of any type was given dental officers scheduled to accompany the forward echelon.
ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

b. Occupation.

(1) No training program was instituted prior to embarkation.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Dental officers assigned one per medical company and one per RCT as mentioned in 1. a. (1) above.

b. Occupation.

(1) Dental officers were dispersed to RCTs and BLTs indicated by demand for treatment and isolation from other dental facilities such as division dental clinic. Attempt was made to allow one dental officer per BLT in the area. These officers were retained attached to H&S Company, 5th Medical Battalion.

(2) Two additional dental officers were attached to ABLE Company, 5th Medical Battalion, to accompany 26th RCT on an isolated mission and detached from division control.

4. OCCUPATION OPERATION.

a. Frequent movements of units large enough to require dental facilities necessitated frequent shifts in the dental personnel. Dental coverage was attempted, particularly in units on isolated missions. AT NO TIME were units of battalion size or larger without dental facilities.

b. The personnel of H&S Company, 5th Medical Battalion debarked on 25 September. Operative dental treatment was rendered at the division dental clinic on 29 September with clinic in full operation on 1 October. Prosthetic dental treatment was first rendered on 2 October. The maximum number of dental officers operating in the division dental clinic at one time was nine. The remainder were dispersed to various units throughout the division.
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ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH NARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

5. CONCLUSION.

a. Comment on occupation operation.

(1) The dental section of H&S Company, 5th Medical Battalion consisting of twenty-one dental officers and sufficient enlisted permitted elastic distribution of dental personnel to individual units as indicated and required.

(2) The necessity for dental prosthetic facilities in the forward area has been demonstrated.

b. Recommendations.

(1) Assault Operation.

(a) No increase in dental personnel in the forward echelon is recommended.

(b) A small portable prosthetic unit capable of performing denture repairs should be carried in the forward echelon.

(c) More comprehensive training in anaesthesia, maxio-facial surgery and combat first aid be given dental officers prior to assault operation.

(2) Occupation Operation.

(a) The personnel required on an occupation mission should be governed by distribution of troops with priority given to the forward echelon.

(b) Complete dental prosthetic facilities in the forward area are necessary.

(c) The continuance of a dental section in H&S Company, 5th Medical Battalion is recommended.
ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH NA.DIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

(d) No special training for an occupation operation is indicated.

(c) All available supplies and adequate operating equipment should be carried in the forward echelon. Full field equipment should be carried for each operating dental officer.
ENCLOSURE (E) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 6TH MARDIV OPERATION REPORT.

VENereal Disease Control

1. PLANNING AND TRAINING.

a. There was no organized plan for venereal disease control in effect prior to occupation. This was due to the fact that the T/O did not include a V.D. Control Officer.

b. Upon conversion from an assault to an occupation program unit commanders did attempt to begin a teaching program which has been continued and amplified.

2. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. All known houses of prostitution were closed prior to landing. A Venereal Disease Control Officer was appointed and supervised the establishment of prophylactic stations. Contact forms were made out and distributed to the battalions. Condoms were not available until eight days after landing and on 25 October, 1945, were made available as a free issue.

b. Sixty prostitutes selected at random were examined and the following findings made:

(1) 71% had positive serological tests for syphilis and 7% doubtful reactions.

(2) 22% had positive smears for gonorrhea. More refined laboratory tests would undoubtedly show a higher incidence.

(3) 100% had at least one infectious skin disease. Scabies and impetigo were the most common infections.

3. COMMENT.

a. Since the beginning of occupation, the incidence of venereal disease has increased steadily as expected and has not stabilized as yet. Laboratory facilities for serological testing are inadequate. Although all known houses of prostitution are out of bounds, there are ample opportunities for sex contact outside of brothels in this area. The
sex contact form (i.e. Naval 171) is not applicable in an area such as this. The form used by the Army is likewise unsuitable.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. The T/O should be altered to include a Venereal Disease Control Officer and appropriate personnel and equipment. A trained laboratory man to do darkfield examinations and serological tests is needed in addition to an office clerk.

b. Condrums should be made available as soon after lending as possible.

c. Wide dissemination of information such as the findings on the prostitutes in Sasebo.
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT.

ORDNANCE REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) During the period 1 June – 20 August, 1945 the Division Ordnance Officer supervised the Ordnance activities of the Division. Requisitions for five (5) CINCPOA units of fire, of Combat Ammunition were submitted for the assault operation. It was contemplated that Combat Teams would carry three (3) units of fire and that two (2) units would be taken into the assault under Division control. The ammunition to be carried by each organization of the Division was broken down into cubic and weight and the units informed of these figures.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) When the operation was changed from an invasion to an occupation, ammunition requisitions were changed to three (3) APPAC units of fire. During the period the Division was loading for the movement to Japan (21 to 27 August) the issue of all ammunition and explosives to units and the allocation of ammunition to be carried by each vessel was made from the Division Ordnance Office. One (1) unit of fire was carried in the hands of troops and two (2) units under Division control.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) During the training period allotted for the assault operation the Division Ordnance Office received, stored and issued training ammunition and explosives. The original allotment of training ammunition was two (2) CINCPOA units of fire, this was later increased to three (3). Between 25 June and 18 July, 1945 an inspection of all ordnance items in the Division was held. This was done by the Division Inspector. All items found requiring repairs were
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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

taken care of at this time, any items beyond the repair facilities of the company were replaced.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) No special ordnance training was considered necessary for the occupation of Japan.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. Upon arrival at Sasebo, Japan, 22 September, 1945 a temporary ammunition dump was established in the burned out area of the city of Sasebo and all ammunition under Division control was centralized in this dump with the exception of two (2) units of fire for the Artillery Regiment (13th Marines) which was left in their area where good storage facilities were available. The Division Ammunition Dump was later moved to more isolated area where better storage was available (73.75 - 12.75) Kyushu, AMS, Scale 1:25,000.

b. From 23 September the Division Ammunition Dump issued ammunition to separate occupational units and explosives and accessories for the demolition of Japanese equipment.

c. The Division Ordnance Officer coordinated the assignment of technicians from the Division Ordnance Company to units of the Division requiring assistance in the demolition of Japanese ordnance and ammunition. No record was kept by this office of the number of items destroyed, the units responsible for the destruction maintained these records.

4. SPECIAL OPERATIONS.

a. On 10 October, 1945 the Division Ordnance Officer was made the Division War Trophies Officer in addition to his other duties and a Division War Trophies Warehouse was established. This activity functioned under the Division Disposition Officer and was charged with the receipt, storage, reconditioning and issue of all war trophies. The personnel to operate this section consisted of all members of the Ordnance Company except those employed in handling ordnance supplies, ammunition, company administration,
and the destruction of Japanese ordnance. For a detailed report of the activities of the Ordnance Company see enclosure "A".

5. CONCLUSIONS.
   a. Comment - None.
   b. Recommendations - None.
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT.

ORDNANCE COMPANY, 5TH SERVICE BATTALION, REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) In planning the assault operation the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons of the Ordnance Company were to operate with Combat Teams 26, 27, and 28 respectively. The Tracked Vehicle Maintenance Platoon would land with the Tank Battalion. The Ammunition Platoon was to take charge of all ammunition under Division control and establish a dump as quickly as possible. The Supply Platoon would handle the issue of replacement weapons from stocks on hand in the Division Quartermaster. Headquarters Platoon was expected to land about D plus 1 or as soon thereafter as possible with the heavy equipment carried by the company and assist the platoons with the special equipment carried.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) There was no change in plans for the employment of the units of the Ordnance Company when the operation was changed from assault to occupation.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Due to the amount of ordnance work performed during the period, 1 June to 20 August, 1945, no special training was possible, or given, since the company performed each day the same type of work required of it in combat — the repair of ordnance items.

(2) During this period, this organization repaired or sent to higher echelon, weapons of the 5th Marine Division and attached units as follows:

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

REPAIRED
5534 Small arms.
323 Artillery pieces.
952 Instruments.
717 Watches.

SENT TO HIGHER ECHELON
1978 Small arms.
2 Artillery pieces.
23 Instruments.
133 Watches.

(3) Inspection of all weapons in hands of troops was conducted by this organization under supervision of the Division Inspector during the period 25 June - 18 July, 1945.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) No special training was conducted for the occupation operation.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) The organization of the Ordnance Company is given below:

Headquarters Platoon
First Platoon
Second Platoon
Third Platoon
Tracked Vehicle Platoon
Ammunition Platoon
Supply Platoon

(2) The units of the company were employed as indicated in paragraph 1 (a).

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) The same organization was employed on the occupation as had been planned for the assault.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd).

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATION.

a. For the operation in Kyushu, Japan, the company was distributed in four ships embarking at Hilo, Hawaii during the period 23 - 27 August, 1945, for transportation to the target. The last element disembarked at Sasebo, Kyushu, on 24 September, 1945. During the period 24 September to 26 September, 1945, Company Headquarters was established in Sasebo, moving to Marine Camp, Ainours, on 27 September, 1945. The First Platoon was attached to the 28th Marines at Haeji, Kyushu, from 22 September, 1945 until 13 October, 1945, returning to Marine Camp, Ainours, 14 October, 1945. On 6 October, 1945, the Third Platoon was detached to the 28th Marines at Fukuoka, Kyushu, returning to Marine Camp, Ainours, on 2 November, 1945.

b. On 18 October, 1945, the company commenced furnishing mechanics for the destruction of heavy caliber guns. As these men operated under the jurisdiction of the Division Ordnance Officer and various elements of the Division, no record is kept by this office of the number of weapons so destroyed. For methods used in destruction, see Division Ordnance Officer's report.

c. The motor transportation of the company was serviced by mechanics of the company during the period covered by this report with exception of 3rd echelon maintenance which was performed by the 6th Motor Transport Battalion.

5. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

a. On 1 October, 1945, the company was charged with accepting and receipting for Class I and Class II War Trophies, from various elements of the division, under direction of the Division War Trophies Office, as follows:

Class I War Trophies: Sebers
                    Swords
                    Pistols
                    Watches
                    Binoculars and Field
                    Glasses
                    Small optical instruments
ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

Class II War Trophies: Beyonets, w/scabbard
Flags
Rifles
Empty shell cases
Personal (individual) equipment
Helmets
Buttons
Buckles
Pocket knives
Goggles
Machetes
Match cases
Medals
Insignia

b. The inventory of weapons as received from the Japanese was the responsibility of unit commanders turning same over to the War Trophies Officer.

c. At the start of this function the company was charged with furnishing the transportation of controlled items from collecting point to the War Trophies Warehouse. As the collection of weapons expanded it became apparent that this was beyond the transportation facilities of the company and was discontinued about 250ct45, after which time it became the collecting units' responsibility to furnish transportation to the War Trophies Warehouse.

d. On 60ct45, authorization was received from the Commanding General, 5th Division, to issue swords to officers and rifles to enlisted men leaving for the United States. Authority was also received to issue Class I and II War Trophies to Naval units and VAC units. The issue in all cases was controlled by written authority from the War Trophies Officer and later from the Division Disposition Officer when that Office was established.

e. For the purpose of storage and issue warehousing facilities were established in the Division Ammunition Dump.
ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

1. Total number of Class I and II War Trophies received, issued, and in storage, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Issued</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swords</td>
<td>65,910</td>
<td>5,198</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>1,972</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binoculars</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spears</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayonets</td>
<td>78,418</td>
<td>27,942</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>99,678</td>
<td>63,921</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms, Misc.</td>
<td>4,673</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade-dis. M39</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nambu MG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT

a. Supplies and equipment were found adequate for the occupation and it is believed they would have been sufficient for thirty (30) days combat.

7. CONCLUSION

a. There are no important comments or recommendations on either the assault or occupation operations.
5th Marine Division
In the Field
1 December, 1945

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 6TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT

DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT REPORT

1. GENERAL.

a. Initial orders received by the Division indicated that disposition of captured materiel and equipment constituted an integral part of the mission. Details were lacking, however, as to the method of disposition, the pre-disposition inventories which would be required, and the types of materiel and equipment involved. These questions were not clarified until the receipt of orders from higher echelon on 18 October, 1945. As a result, much of the effort spent by elements of the Division in inventorying captured materiel and equipment proved ineffectual.

b. A similar situation prevailed in the Division Staff, since each section had an interest in the disposition of captured materiel and equipment, yet no one section had overall cognizance. G-1 was interested in supplies for military and civil government use, G-2 was vitally interested from the standpoint of intelligence, G-3 in the accomplishment of the mission and the troops involved, and G-4 in materials for use by the occupying forces.

c. The Division Disposition Section, established on 18 October, 1945, in accordance with instructions from higher echelon, centralized in one agency overall responsibility for supervising the inventorying and disposition of all captured materiel and equipment.

2. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF THE DIVISION DISPOSITION SECTION.

a. The Division Disposition Section consisted of the Disposition Officer, an Inspector of Disposition, two assistants and the necessary clerks. The Division Ordnance Officer, War Trophies Section, and Division Transport Quartermaster Section, in its capacity as Records Section for Disposition,
were all under the supervision of the Disposition Officer. Each regiment, battalions within the regiments, and separate battalions organized a disposition section at that time. Battalions had one officer as Disposition Officer and the necessary enlisted personnel for clerks. Regimental Disposition Sections had a Disposition Officer and the necessary clerks.

b. The Disposition Officer coordinated and supervised all disposition and inventorying of Japanese surrendered material. He was aided by all the staff sections and their technical personnel including ordnance, signal and engineer specialists and equipment. All the records pertaining to disposition were maintained and processed by the Division Transport Quartermaster Section. Requests for Japanese equipment and supplies continued to be acted upon by the Division Procurement Officer. All inventories were inspected by the G-2 Section for possible intelligence items otherwise not reported. This organization was quite satisfactory and disposition progressed at a rapid rate. The fact that the Japanese Home Ministry appointed representatives to receive for material turned over to the Home Ministry, was an aid to our forces in disposing of material that was approved for return to the Japanese.

3. INVENTORY AND DISPOSITION OPERATIONS.

a. Material of a military nature either in an installation or in storage was inventoried by the unit responsible for that area. The inventories prepared by the Japanese were used as a guide but were not taken as the actual inventory. Guards were placed over these areas until complete disposition had been effected. A number of items were disposed of at the time of inventory, especially if the material was in an isolated area. If the material was of such nature that it could be moved, units moved it to a central storage area in order to minimize the number of guards. Approved items for return to the Japanese end scrap resulting from scrapping material was turned over to a representative of the Home Ministry who received for it and made arrangements to have it moved or guarded by Japanese. In cases where identification of technical
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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

materiel was required, units would contact the Division Disposition Officer and request assistance. The Division Disposition Officer would make arrangements for either U.S. or Japanese technical personnel to identify the materiel in question. Specialized equipment required for destruction was procured in the same manner.

b. Shipping required to transport ammunition and explosives to sea to be dumped was requested through the Division Transport Quartermaster Section, who in turn contacted the V Amphibious Corps Transport Quartermaster Section, for the necessary tugs and barges.

4. MEANS OF DISPOSITION.

a. This Division disposed of surrendered Japanese material by the following methods:

(1) Destruction - accomplished by burning or dumping at sea. (Ammunition and explosives).

(2) Scrapped - accomplished by smashing, cutting or using explosives. (Weapons, planes, military vehicles, etc.).

(3) Used for operations - procured through the Division Procurement Office. (Window glass, Manila line, hardware, office equipment and other items).

(4) Returned to Japanese - food, clothing, and equipment, of a non-military nature were turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry.

(5) Trophies issued to troops - rifles, bayonets, swords, sabers, pistols, binoculars, field glasses, and personal equipment were issued to officers and men for trophies in accordance with directives.

b. On 8 December, 1945 the 2d Marine Division assumed control of the 5th Marine Division zone of responsibility, thereby undertaking the disposition of the remaining surrendered Japanese materiel.

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6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. The largest single problem confronted by this Division in regards to disposal was the disposal of ammunition, large quantities of which were found at:

1. KOKURA Army Arsenal
2. HIU Ammunition Storage Area
3. USHINOURA Ammunition Storage Area and Arsenal
4. KAWATANA Arsenal
5. KUZASA Arsenal
6. OGUSHI Arsenal
7. TAWARABAURA Ammunition Storage Area.

b. Instructions for Inventorying and Disposition.

(1) Comment - The initial disposition and inventorying instructions were of such a general nature that the occupation troops were confused and when subsequent instructions were issued, quite often in opposition to former instructions, disposal was hampered and frequently had to be redone. For example - certain supplies and equipment were returned to the Japanese under one set of orders and a change in these orders required the occupation forces to take back the returned items and make different disposition.

(2) Recommendations.

(a) It is recommended that any organization anticipating occupation duty, to include disposition of surrendered enemy materiel establish a disposition section as far in advance of the target date as possible. This section should initiate the publishing of information as to inventories and disposition, together with the proper forms so that all troops are cognizant of all available material pertaining to the subject.

(b) It is recommended that a manual be written and published covering inventory and disposition
instructions for an occupation force, to aid the Commander in his task of disposition of surrendered enemy materiel. This manual should have an itemized list of every conceivable military item together with the method of disposition of that particular item or piece of equipment.

c. Zones of Responsibility.

(1) Comment - The shifting of areas of responsibility from one unit to another within the Division caused considerable loss of time in disposing of materiel due to turning over records and time required to become acquainted with the area by the new unit.

(2) Recommendation - Organizations should assign areas of responsibility to units with the intention of leaving them in that area until disposition is complete.

d. Identification of Japanese equipment.

(1) Comment - Identification of Japanese signal equipment and ordnance items, in many cases, presented a problem.

(2) Recommendations.

(a) Organizations should have a number of competent ordnance and signal personnel present to aid in disposal and identification of enemy materiel.

(b) Future surrender terms should have a clause added stating that the country's area Commanders, not demobilize certain technicians including ordnance, signal and naval. These technicians to be made available to the Occupation Forces Commander.

e. Labor.

(1) Comment - The shortage of labor was a serious hindrance to our forces in disposition activities.
(2) Recommendation - Future surrender terms should have a clause added stating that the country's area commanders either not demobilize a certain number of men or form labor battalions of either service men or demobilized personnel in certain designated areas.

f. Inspector of Disposition.

(1) Comment - The Inspector of Disposition has a very important function in regards to disposition.

(2) Recommendation - Organizations with a zone of responsibility should provide an Inspector of Disposition.
ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT

REPORT OF SURRENDERED SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT 5TH MARINE DIVISION**

**Note: This report shows the totals received, disposed of, and balance on hand of all Japanese supplies and equipment surrendered to the 5th Marine Division as of 30 November, 1945. Areas included are S.G. KEN, that portion of K.G. SANI KEN in the 5th Marine Division Area of Responsibility, TSUSHIMA, GOTO BETTO, HIRODO and nearby smaller islands. Those portions of OTTA and FUKUOKA KENs originally in the 5th Marine Division Area of Responsibility are not included as all reports on these areas were turned over to the 32d Infantry Division at the time of relief of 5th Marine Division in those areas.

CLASS: ORDNANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>DISPOSED OF</th>
<th>METHOD OF DISP'N</th>
<th>BALANCE ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Projectiles-separate loading, HE, Shrapnel &amp; Incendiary</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>190796</td>
<td>151200</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>39496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Projectiles-separate loading, Chemical</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>12007</td>
<td>11263</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Charges, propelling, bag type</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>209703</td>
<td>39335</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>170358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Complete Rs's-fitted &amp; semi-fixed, 37 mm or larger</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>495883</td>
<td>16764</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>479119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Complete Rs's-Mortar, 50mm &amp; larger</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>158352</td>
<td>8278</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>150254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fuzes &amp; Primers, Artillery &amp; Mines</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>957016</td>
<td>211054</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>745962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mines, Anti-tank, AP beach</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>22384</td>
<td>4408</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>17976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rockets, all types</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>31037</td>
<td>16493</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>14544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Bombs, A/C, Chemical</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>6473</td>
<td>6370</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Bombs, A/C, Rocket</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Fuzes, Bomb</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>13150</td>
<td>9290</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>121870</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Grenades-Hand &amp; Rifle</td>
<td>Rs's</td>
<td>334022</td>
<td>107396</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>226626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: D-Destroyed; O-Used for Operations; RJ-Returned to Japanese; TIT-Trophies issued Troops; NJ-NavyTechJap

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1035
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ASSEMBLED</th>
<th>DISPOSAL OF</th>
<th>METHOD OF DEPOT</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. Grenades-Handheld</td>
<td>Rds</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Flares, A/C</td>
<td>Rds</td>
<td>35683</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>35660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Signals, ground</td>
<td>Rds</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Cartridges, L., 6.5mm to 9mm incl</td>
<td>Rds</td>
<td>13141695</td>
<td>6778695</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>4368003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Complete Rds, Auto Cannon, 12.7mm to 40mm incl</td>
<td>Rds</td>
<td>402102</td>
<td>196358</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>205744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Explosives, F. bulk</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td>10558730</td>
<td>1205</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>1239630</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Explosives, Detonators</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td>286760</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>282760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Powder, smokeless, bulk</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td>109800</td>
<td>57029</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>52771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Blasting Caps &amp; Detonators</td>
<td>Rds</td>
<td>31999612</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>3129497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Rifles</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>9678</td>
<td>40206</td>
<td>ANN</td>
<td>26137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Pistols</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>1211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Machine Guns</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>1261</td>
<td>2370</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>10240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Ammunition, Shells</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>78416</td>
<td>16140</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>50413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26a. Ammunition, Shells</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>35910</td>
<td>4088</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>2594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Aircraft Cannon</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>19732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Field Artillery</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>1227</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Mortars &amp; Grenade Dischargers</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>1671</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Anti-aircraft Artillery</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Coast &amp; Harbor Defense Artillery</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012
ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO INDEX HAS TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT

CLASS: ORDNANCE (CONTD.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>DISPOSED OF</th>
<th>METHOD OF DISP'D</th>
<th>BALANCE ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33. Telescopes</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33a. Binoculars &amp; Field Glasses</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>TIT</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Aiming Circles</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Plotting Boards</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>36. Range &amp; Height Finders</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Gunner's Quadrants &amp; Clinometers</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>38. Sights</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Directors &amp; Computers</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>1523</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>1448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Fuse Setters</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Firing Tables</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Tanks</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>43. Armored Cars</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Tractors</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Trailers</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>4566</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>3561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>47. Motor Gun Carriages</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Motorcycles</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Bicycles</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Trucks</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>2085</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>2046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Passenger Cars</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>2046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Auto Repair Equip.</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>129.46</td>
<td>42.67</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Metal Founding Equip.</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>111.80</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>36.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>54. Lubricating Equip.</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>5750.05</td>
<td>71.05</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>5747.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. Cleaning &amp; Preserving Material</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>67.06</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>3.51</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO APPENDIX B to 5th MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

CLASS: ORDNANCE (CONT'D)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>DISPOSED OF</th>
<th>METHOD OF DISP'N</th>
<th>BALANCE ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61. Targets &amp; Target Equipment</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORDNANCE MISCELLANEOUS</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Underwater Ordnance</td>
<td>pcs</td>
<td>18867</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ferrous Scrap</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>5137.42</td>
<td>4348.27</td>
<td>RJ</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

CLASS: MEDICAL

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<th>UNIT</th>
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority: E.O. 13526  
By: NDC  
NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

Department of the Army  
5TH ARMY DIVISION  
OPERATION RECORD

Class: Signal

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<td>Tons</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>D</td>
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<td>11. Disinfectants</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>1086.1</td>
<td>1070.3</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>1070.3</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>12. Protective Clothing</td>
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<td>1388</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>619</td>
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<td>13. Detector Kit</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>521</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Training Aids</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Gas Generator</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>
## Confidential

**INCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT**

**CLASS: QUARTERMASTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>DISPOSED OF</th>
<th>METHOD OF DISP'TN</th>
<th>BALANCE ON HAND</th>
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<td>47496</td>
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<td>2a Underclothing</td>
<td>each</td>
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<td>pair</td>
<td>102954</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>each</td>
<td>9244</td>
<td>43713</td>
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<td>each</td>
<td>48571</td>
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<td>pair</td>
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<td>pair</td>
<td>11381</td>
<td>72241</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>21899</td>
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<td>3. Flags, battle</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>6148</td>
<td>5133</td>
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<tr>
<td>4a Coal</td>
<td>tons</td>
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<td>4b Gasoline</td>
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<td>4c Grease</td>
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<td>29151</td>
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<td>4e Alcohol</td>
<td>gals</td>
<td>19054</td>
<td>29063</td>
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<tr>
<td>4f Kerosene</td>
<td>gals</td>
<td>8085</td>
<td>7304</td>
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<tr>
<td>4g Charcoal</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>3403</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>11590</td>
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<td>5. Helmets, steel</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>6. Individual and Org. Equ.</td>
<td>dwt</td>
<td>25292.70</td>
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<td>7a Beans</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>1390.40</td>
<td>1666.30</td>
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<td>29.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7b Beer</td>
<td>case</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7c Cereal</td>
<td>gals</td>
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<tr>
<td>7d Fish and Meat</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>4635.90</td>
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<td>7e Tea</td>
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<td>186.30</td>
<td>182.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>7f Vegetables</td>
<td>cans</td>
<td>22703788</td>
<td>44296</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish &amp; Dry</td>
<td>lbs</td>
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<td>1700</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7g Rice</td>
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<td>29197.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>7h Koalions</td>
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<td>16611.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>7i Grains</td>
<td>tons</td>
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<td>11465.80</td>
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<td>75.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Machine, Ice Cream</td>
<td>each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

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**1045**
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<th>DISPOSED</th>
<th>METHOD OF DISP'N</th>
<th>BALANCE ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. Machine, Ice making</td>
<td>each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mechanical Refrigerator, 220 cuft.</td>
<td>each</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Electrical Kitchen Equipment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12a Tobacco</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
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<td>12b Soap</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td>350</td>
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<td>12c Cloth</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>259.50</td>
<td>33.50</td>
<td>RJ</td>
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</table>
5th Marine Division
In the Field
1 December, 1945

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

PROCUREMENT REPORT

1. GENERAL

a. Prior to the time the Division landed in Japan it was anticipated that there would be a need for various items of Japanese property in order to carry out the duties of the occupying forces and for the welfare of those forces. To provide for those activities a Division Procurement Agency and a set of instructions governing the procurement of Japanese property was established in Annex "KING" to Division Administrative Order No. 1-45.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. See enclosure "A".

3. DUTIES

a. The duties of the Division Procurement Agency have been as follows:

1. To receive and process all requests for supplies, real estate, equipment and facilities received from requesting agencies.

2. To initiate liaison with other Marine Corps activities, U.S. Government and Japanese Government activities where necessary to effect transfers of requested property to using organizations.

3. Maintain records of all transactions to permit accurate accounting of equipment, supplies and facilities procured.

4. Prepare and furnish reports of all transactions completed by the Procurement Agency.

4. OPERATIONS

a. Procurement of Japanese property began shortly after landing, and was carried out in accordance with instructions contained in Annex "KING" of Division Administrative Order 1-45.
b. Initially, procurement consisted of securing materials and supplies necessary for repair of roads, bridges and buildings used by U.S. troops. Extensive repairs of these facilities was immediately necessary because of heavy damage caused by a typhoon which struck Sasebo 16 September. Rain, which continued into the middle of October, and a typhoon which struck the Sasebo area the last of October, increased the requirements for road and building repair and correspondingly increased the requirements for Japanese material for that work.

c. As the occupation progressed, procurement of Japanese property increased to include Japanese privately owned buildings which were necessary for office space, and procurement of Japanese equipment and supplies for recreational purposes.

d. Generally the supplies and equipment secured were drawn from Japanese Government warehouse stocks. The procurement of civilian owned goods has been negligible. So far as has been observed Japanese Government owned materials here constituted the only adequate supply sources in the Fifth Marine Division zone of activity.

e. Upon representations made by the Japanese through the Amphibious Corps, substantial quantities of Japanese Government owned foodstuffs and clothing have been returned to the Japanese for their welfare, and, in addition, certain items of engineer supplies have been returned to carry out mine clearing tasks assigned them.

5. COMMENTS

c. The foregoing duties were largely carried out by the Division Quartermaster Office. Over three hundred (300) applications for Japanese property have been processed to date. The work involved, processing applications, has ranged from cases where only a signature was required to cases where it was necessary to establish liaison with the Japanese and pick up and deliver the required items.
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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

b. Language difficulties were continually apparent, the interpreters furnished by the Japanese Post War Liaison Office being generally of very poor caliber.

c. There were frequent instances of Japanese calling for material whose release had been authorized by V Amphibious Corps without having made arrangements for removal of the material. This lack of planning consisted principally of failure to provide for transportation and working parties.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. In view of the magnitude of work necessary in accomplishing procurement of Japanese materials it is recommended that a separate and adequate administrative organization be provided for the Procurement Agency.

b. It is further recommended that qualified interpreters with technical knowledge of Japanese products be available to the procurement office at all times.

ENCLOSURE (A) - ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 5TH MARINE DIVISION PROCUREMENT AGENCY.
5th Marine Division.
In the Field.
1 December, 1945.

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

1. PLANNING

a. It was recognized that the operation would place heavy demands upon transportation of all types. A tentative vehicle list emphasized logistical transportation, and its distribution within the Division in such a manner as to make subordinate elements as nearly self-sufficient as possible.

b. Preparation of Division Vehicles for cold weather operations was planned for, but the decision was made to carry sufficient Ethylene Glycol and winterize vehicles at the area of occupation.

2. TRAINING

a. A wrecker school was conducted by the Fifth Motor Transport Battalion to train operators from all units of the Division so there would be a minimum of two qualified drivers for each wrecker within the Division.

b. A limited number of men attended an Amphibian Truck School, Conducted by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific at FRAY.

c. Drivers throughout the Division were given instructions in preventive maintenance, and a system of spot checking of all vehicles checked the adequacy of their training.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATION

a. A location for a Division Motor Pool and Maintenance Center was picked at the Sasebo Dock Area by the advance party. As vehicles were unloaded from the ships they were immediately dispatched to unloading points to discharge their combat load and be made available for the transportation needs of unloading the Division.

b. All logistical vehicles of the Division were placed under the control of the Division Motor Transport Officer and
were made available upon landing. Other organizations established Motor Pools from which logistical vehicles were dispatched on call from the Division Motor Transport Officer.

4. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT:

(a) In general the spare parts stock was adequate for this operation with the exception of certain critical items:

(1) Clutches for 1/4-ton, 4x4, truck.
(2) Hub and wheel assemblies for 21/2-ton, 6x6, (1-5), truck.
(3) Front springs for 21/2-ton, 6x6, (1-5), truck.
(4) Tire pitching, both hot and cold pitching, was very critical due to tires picking up nails, bolts, etc., especially in the dock area. There were a minimum of twenty (30) thousand flat tires in this Division during the operation.

(b) The arrival of resupply shipping alleviated the lack of critical spare parts.

(c) Vehicular equipment was adequate for the Division as a whole. More Trucks, 21/2-ton, 6x6, cargo could have been used to an advantage as it was necessary to use all available trucks over extended periods in forced hauling.

(d) Maintenance of vehicles was a serious problem due to the fact that organizations having few vehicles did not operate with a Maintenance Margin. Because of this all vehicles were used as much as possible and very little preventive maintenance was done. Many mechanical failures would not have occurred had units been able to operate on a Maintenance Margin, therefore allowing time for proper maintenance.

5. CONCLUSION:

(a) Comments:

(1) More emphasis should be placed on pooling of vehicles within all organizations and making personnel available to operate same. This would alleviate transportation
shortages within practically all units.

(3) Recommendations:

(1) In general operating under vehicle authorization as allotted by G series T/O was satisfactory but it is recommended that one Truck Platoon be included in the T/O of each Infantry Regiment.
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

5TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION REPORT

1. PLANNING.
   a. Assault Operation. None.
   b. Occupation Operation None.

2. TRAINING.
   a. Assault Operation.
      (1) Operation and maintenance of Vessel.
      (2) Operation and maintenance of DUKWS.
      (3) Infantry training by all personnel.
      (4) Anti-Aircraft firing from vehicle mount.
      (5) Extended troop movement by convoy on a land mass operation.
   b. Occupation Operation.
      (1) There was no training done by this battalion for the occupation operation because routine administrative hauling and moving of the division took full time of the battalion.

3. ORGANIZATION.
   a. Assault Operation.
      (1) The Motor Transport Battalion is so organized that a part, or all, of one Truck Company can be attached to a Combat Team. The Automotive Repair Company of the Fifth Motor Transport Battalion can also attach a repair platoon to each Combat Team.
   b. Occupation Operation.
      (1) The Motor Transport Battalion was organized so
that one Truck Company would remain under Division control for administrative hauling. The other Truck Company was available to be assigned as needed in whole or part to task organizations. A portion of Automotive Repair Company can be organized into from one to three separate maintenance centers.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. Elements of the Fifth Motor Transport Battalion started landing at Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan on 22 September, 1945. Cargo vehicles started operating from a battalion pool in the dock area. A repair shop was set up in the dock area and begun operations on 23 September, 1945. On completion of initial unloading, Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Automotive Repair Company, less the first platoon, and "D" Company moved to Marine Camp, Ainoura, Kyushu, Japan. Company "B" and the first repair platoon, Automotive Repair Company moved to Sasebo Fortress, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, and carried on operation and maintenance under Battalion control from that location.

b. Company "C", 20th Amphibian Truck Battalion, was attached for Administrative (less personnel management), operational and disciplinary control on 18 October, 1945. DUKWS from this Company were used in the movement of personnel and gear in occupational duties, and also two mail DUKWS were furnished throughout the occupation.

c. Company "B" and the first platoon, Automotive Repair Company were detached to the 26th Marines on 18 October, 1945.

d. The Fifth Amphibian Truck Company was redesignated the Amphibian Truck Company, Fifth Motor Transport Battalion on 24 October, 1945. The Amphibian Truck Company joined and became an organic part of the Fifth Motor Transport Battalion as of that date. DUKWS of this company were attached to the 27th Marines at Saga and Kurume for routine hauling in that area. The remainder of the DUKWS were used mainly in ship to shore movement of troops and supplies to islands in the zone of occupation.
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd).

...The rear echelon composed of Company "A", Company "C", and the third and fifth platoons and Salvage Section of the Automotive Repair Company were detached to Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on 27 October, 1945.

...Additional vehicular equipment arrived from rear echelon on 4 November, 1945, and the 2½-ton Trucks were placed in "D" Company, giving them fifty (50) Trucks to operate for the remainder of the occupation period.

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. See part four (4), paragraph (a) of Motor Transport Report.

b. Equipment adequate except for comments noted under vehicle types below:

(1) Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, light repair.

(a) All light repair trucks of this battalion were equipped with forward and stern booms, which were of great value in the repair and the loading and unloading of gear. The frames of these vehicles are far too light in structure for their intended purpose and consequently, overloading or undue strain on the vehicles will cause the frame to buckle.

(2) Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, wrecking.

(a) This vehicle is adequate as a light wrecker but it is recommended that two (2) heavier wreckers, seven (7) to ten (10) ton capacity, be assigned to the Automotive Repair Company. The 2½-ton, wrecker was often inadequate for many jobs because of its limited capacity.

(3) Trailer, 2-ton, 2 wheel, Battalion Aid Station.

(a) This vehicle was not used much due to the fact that there was shelter available for an Aid Station. However in the field where no such shelter is available it is of great value.
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ENClOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

(4) Light Cargo Carrier, H-29-C. (Wiesel).

(a) This vehicle was operated very little over the terrain for which it was intended. It should be operated at a minimum over hard surface roads because of the damage done to the tracks.

(5) Truck, 2-ton, 4x4 radio equipped.

(a) These vehicles were of great value in keeping communications between the dispatcher and the docks or railhead. They made the movement and control of convoys much easier due to the fact they furnished direct communications as to times of movement.

(6) Trailer, 5-ton, 4 wheel, tire repair.

(a) This vehicle was left in the Rear Echelon but could have been used to a great extent in the repair of tires and tubes.

6. CONCLUSION

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comment. None.

(2) Recommendations.

(a) That all personnel and equipment except one Truck Company and one Platoon of the Automotive Repair Company should have been brought with the forward echelon. This is necessary to maintain Division equipment and to move troops and supplies over a land mass.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Comments.

(a) Equipment and personnel of the Motor Transport
CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

Battalion should be loaded aboard ships so that units of the Battalion will not be broken up.

(b) Maintenance was difficult due to the fact that many experienced mechanics were detached on points or over 35 years of age.

(c) Operations were difficult during initial occupation due to road conditions.

(2) Recommendations. None.
SHORE PARTY REPORT

1. COMPOSITION.

   a. Upon receipt of the plans for the assault operation, the
   following organizations were assigned from which to organize
   the Division Shore Party. The 5th Pioneer Battalion, 116th
   Naval Construction Battalion, 70th Replacement Battalion, 78th
   Replacement Battalion, Division Band, and the shore party com-
   munications teams of the 5th Assault Signal Company. A study of
   the beaches in the proposed landing area indicated the necessity
   of organizing a shore party organization flexible enough to have
   available a shore party company for each battalion landing team.

2. ORGANIZATION.

   a. On this basis, the Shore Party Regiment was organized
   into three shore party battalions and a Regimental Headquarters.
   To form a nucleus for this organization, Headquarters and Service
   Company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion, less detachments was used
   as Shore Party Regimental Headquarters, and each letter company
   was used as a nucleus for the shore party battalions. Each shore
   party battalion was further divided using the company headquarters
   as the shore party battalion headquarters, and each platoon as a
   nucleus for a shore party company. To these above nuclei, attach-
   ments from organizations assigned were made to round out the
   completed shore party organization. The final organization of
   the Shore Party Regiment was as follows. (See enclosure (B),
   Shore Party Organization Chart, Assault Operation).

3. TRAINING.

   a. Training for the 5th Pioneer Battalion was carried out in
   accordance with the shore party organization established for
   the assault operation. Training prior to the receipt of the
   assault operation plans had been predominantly the training of
   equipment operators and the indoctrination of replacements sent
   to the Pioneer Battalion after the Iwo Jima operation.

   b. As the replacement battalions had not been assigned to
   the shore party, no training for this personnel was possible. Key
   personnel from the Pioneer Battalion were trained in the duties
   of the various sections of the shore party companies so that
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APPENDIX B TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd):

attached personnel could be used to fill in. One week of schooling, consisting of lectures on shore party functions and demonstration by a skeleton shore party company organized from Pioneer Battalion personnel, was conducted for the Naval Construction Battalion and Assault Signal Company personnel. Ship to shore training in conjunction with the infantry was conducted in a series of eight BLT landing exercises. Naval Construction Battalion and Assault Signal Company personnel as attached to shore party battalions were included in these exercises. At this time the assault operation plans were cancelled and the occupation operation was substituted, and the shore party was informed that replacement battalion personnel would not be available to the shore party regiment.

4. COMPOSITION.

a. Upon receipt of plans to prepare for the occupation operation, the following organizations were assigned from which to organize the Shore Party Regiment. The 5th Pioneer Battalion, 116th Naval Construction Battalion less detachments (see enclosure (A) to Appendix 9 to Annex "EASY" to 5th Marine Division Operation Report), 35th Depot Company, 34th Depot Company, 6th Ammunition Company, and the shore party communications teams of the 5th Assault Signal Company.

5. ORGANIZATION.

a. The shore party regiment was organized into three battalions and a regimental headquarters, in an organization parallel to that formed for the assault operation. Ships platoons were, however, not formed from shore party personnel. Ships platoons were organized by each battalion landing team or provided by the Troop Commander of each ship. For final organization of Division Shore Party for this operation, see enclosure (B), Shore Party Organization Chart, occupation operation.

6. TRAINING.

a. Training for the 5th Pioneer Battalion, the 116th Naval Construction Battalion and the Assault Signal Company detachment was carried out during the training phase for the assault.
APPENDIX B TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

operation as detailed in paragraph 3 of the report on the assault operation. No training was conducted in conjunction with the Depot Companies or the 8th Ammunition Company.

7. EQUIPMENT.

   a. In addition to the organic Pioneer Battalion Shore Party equipment carried combat loaded on vehicles, the following items of mechanical and heavy equipment were carried on three LSMs, one LSM being assigned to each Shore Party Battalion:

   **SHORE PARTY EQUIPMENT**

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<th>Equipment Description</th>
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<th>3rd Bn</th>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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8. OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

   a. Prior to A-Day the 33d and 34th Depot Companies were detached from the Shore Party, and the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines substituted therefor.

   b. The Shore Party Commander and regimental headquarters debarked from APA 104 (Westmoreland) at 0800 on A-Day. After clearance from the control boat the regimental headquarters party
landed at Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, in the ship repair basin of the Naval dockyards. At 0930 the shore party regimental command post was established at 763-129 on the AMS L872, Kyushu 1:25,000 map.

c. The 1st Shore Party Battalion debarked from APA 109 (Grafton) and APA 137 (Bowie) and established the battalion command post in the drydock area at 1000 on A-Day. (See attached overlay).

d. The 2d Shore Party Battalion debarked from APA 103 (Queens) and APA 142 (Clearmont) and established the battalion command post in the ship repair basin area of the Naval dockyard at 1015 on A-Day. (See attached overlay).

e. The 3d Shore Party Battalion debarked from APA 177 (Kingsbury), APA 212 (Montrose), APA 233 (Savier), and APA 114 (Hamblin) and established the battalion command post in the ship repair basin area of the Naval dockyard at 1100 on A-Day. (See attached overlay).

f. By 1200 on A-Day all shore party units had landed in the Naval dockyard area and were ready for general unloading. Sectors of responsibility were occupied in accordance with the operation plan for the shore party. (See attached overlay).

g. At 1230 general unloading began with APAs and AKAs being handled initially in the ship repair basin where cargo was transferred directly to the docks. LSMs were handled on a ramp located at 768-131 on the AMS L872, Kyushu 1:25,000 map. Initially only one LSM at a time could be unloaded on this ramp, causing some delay in getting shore party equipment ashore. Heavy equipment and mechanical equipment of the 1st Shore Party Battalion was unloaded initially.

h. At 1400 two tractors, TD-18 with dozer, were dispatched to two burned out areas in the city in order to clear out fuel and ammunition dumps.

i. In accordance with a dispatch from Division Headquarters, a fifty (50) man working party from the 116th Naval Construction
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APPENDIX G TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

Battalion was sent to the Division Command Post at 1540. This group was not returned to the Shore Party.

j. During the balance of A-Day general unloading proceeded on four (4) APAs and two (2) AKAs in the repair basin.

k. At 0715 on A plus 1 the 8th Ammunition Company was detached from the Shore Party, and at 1640 on the same day a working party of two hundred (200) men from CT-27 reinforced the shore party battalions. General unloading continued in the ship repair basin, the drydock area of the Naval dockyard, and at the LSM unloading ramp. Provision was made to handle two LSMs at a time on the ramp, and the balance of the shore party equipment was brought ashore.

l. During A plus 2 and A plus 3 general unloading continued, and at 2050 on A plus 3, 500 men from the 116th Naval Construction Battalion were detached from the Shore Party. At 2400 on the same date all personnel were placed under parent control and the 5th Pioneer Battalion took over the Shore Party duties.

6. CONCLUSION.

a. Organization.

(1) Comment: Although the occupation operation was not carried out under combat conditions, the basic shore party organization established around the Pioneer Battalion as a nucleus proved a sound basis.

(2) Recommendation: All shore party organizations should be formed around the Pioneer Battalion, using a Pioneer Company as a nucleus for a Shore Party Battalion and a Pioneer Platoon as a nucleus for a Shore Party Company.

b. Shipping.

(1) Comment: When a mission is assigned to a Shore Party Regiment, the equipment necessary to most efficiently accomplish this mission should be calculated, and then the necessary shipping allocated to lift this equipment.
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APPENDIX B TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

(2) Recommendation: That a minimum of three (3) LSMs be assigned to each Shore Party Battalion to lift the normal equipment necessary to carry on shore party operations. Such a scheme allows for the maximum flexibility of the shore party organization making one (1) LSM available for each shore party company.

c. Transportation.

(1) Comment: The only actual shortage of equipment felt by the Shore Party Regiment initially was truck transportation to move material.

(2) Recommendation: That a minimum of twenty-five (25) trucks be assigned to each shore party battalion with a motor transport control section attached to the shore party regiment to carry the work through the initial landing phase until normal transport agencies can be established ashore to consolidate all transportation.

d. Dumps.

(1) Comment: Initially there is a definite merger of responsibility of the Shore Party and the quartermaster agencies in the initial established dumps. However, as the operation continues the responsibility of operating the dumps reverts to the quartermaster agencies.

(2) Recommendation: That a definite supply of personnel be allocated to the quartermaster agencies to operate the dumps after the initial phase. Such personnel should not be taken from the beach or unloading crews of any shore party organization.

e. Pilferage.

(1) Pilferage presents a definite problem in any shore party operation.

(2) Recommendation: A minimum of one (1) Military Police Company should be attached to a shore party regiment.
APPENDIX B TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

Enclosures: (A) Operation Report, 5th Pioneer Battalion.
(B) Shore Party Organization Chart, Assault Operation.
(C) Shore Party Organization Chart, Occupation Operation.
(D) Overlay of Naval Dock Yards Area.
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

6TH PIONEER BATTALION REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) When word was received of the proposed assault operation, a study was made of the prospective beach areas, which revealed the fact a shore party organization of three shore party battalions was needed to support the operation. On this basis plans were made to use Headquarters and Service Company to form the nucleus of the Shore Party Regimental Headquarters, and the letter companies as the nucleus for the three shore party battalions.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) When the assault operation was called off, and the occupation operation substituted no changes were made in the above plans for the organization of the Pioneer Battalion into the Shore Party Regiment.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Immediately upon our return from the Iwo Jima operation, indoctrination and reorganization of the companies was effected because of the newly received replacements. Heavy equipment and specialists schools were conducted to train new personnel in these jobs. When word was received of the proposed assault operation, schools were set up by each company to train the various special sections required in a shore party company organization. Upon completion of this instruction for the battalion personnel, a shore party school was established to train 116th Naval Construction Battalion personnel and the communication teams of the 5th Assault Signal Company (see Appendix C to Annex "EASY" to 5th Marine Division Operation Report).

b. Occupation Operation.

-1-
(1) The same training program as initiated above was continued upon the receipt of the word that the assault operation had been called off and an occupation operation substituted therefor.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Upon our return from Iwo Jima, the Pioneer Battalion was reorganized in accordance with the G-36, 39, and 40 Tables of Organization approved 1 May, 1945.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) No change in the organization of the Pioneer Battalion was adopted for this operation.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. For an account of the initial mission of the Pioneer Battalion on the occupation operation, see Appendix 8 to Annex "EASY" to 5th Marine Division Operation Report.

b. On 25 September, 1945, at 2400, the 5th Pioneer Battalion was released from the 5th Shore Party Regiment in accordance with a division message ordering all personnel under parent control. The pioneer battalion had assumed responsibility of the bivouac area in the Sasebo Fortress located at (773-153) on the AMS L879, 1:25,000, Kyushu map. This area had previously been occupied by Division Headquarters. The commanding officer of the 5th Pioneer Battalion assumed command of the Sasebo Fortress Group which included the Pioneer Battalion, Company "A" and Company "B" of the 3rd Military Police Battalion, the 5th Military Police Company and Company "B" of the 5th Motor Transport Battalion.

c. On 26 September, 1945, the advance party of the 5th Pioneer Battalion moved from the Naval drydocks area to the Sasebo Fortress assuming command of that area. As personnel of the Pioneer Battalion were released from the drydocks they transferred to the Fortress and construction and maintenance of the bivouac area began.
d. On 28 September, 1945, the commanding officer of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and the balance of pioneer personnel moved to the Sasebo Fortress. Maintenance and construction continued during the next three weeks, and working parties were furnished to the Division Quartermaster. A guard was furnished for the Division Fuel Dump and Ammunition Dump. Working parties were furnished for the fuel dump and for the division water points in Sasebo and at the Marine Camp Ainoura.

e. On 16 October, 1945, the Pioneer Battalion began the unloading of the USS DONALD MC LEAY, the unloading being completed on 27 October, 1945.

f. At 0200 on 4 November, 1945, the 5th Pioneer Battalion was placed under the operational control of the V Amphibious Corps Administrative control was retained by the 5th Marine Division.

g. At 1200 on 4 November, 1945, in accordance with an order from the V Amphibious Corps, two officers and eight enlisted were sent to Green Beach located at 793-083 on the AMS L379, 1:25,000 Kyushu map. This group was assigned the mission of a liaison group for the V Amphibious Corps Shore Brigade, to assist in and supervise all unloading operations on Green Beach.

h. On 6 November, 1945, the Pioneer Battalion began the unloading of the USS THOMAS MURRAY and on 7 November, 1945, the battalion began the unloading of the USS NIANTIC VICTORY. Company "A" of the Pioneer Battalion with attached personnel from Company "B" was assigned the USS THOMAS MURRAY, and Company "C" of the Pioneer Battalion with attached personnel from Company "B" was assigned the USS NIANTIC VICTORY.

i. On 15 November, 1945, work was completed on the USS THOMAS MURRAY, and Company "A" with the attached personnel was assigned the task of unloading the USS CAMERON.

j. On 16 November, 1945, work was completed on the USS NIANTIC VICTORY, and Company "C" with attached personnel was assigned the task of unloading the USS SEARLES.

k. Unloading of these vessels continued through 30 November.
ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. The equipment of the Pioneer Battalion is considered adequate to take care of the normal needs that may be required initially in any shore party operation with two exceptions. The Pioneer Battalion does not have enough 2½-ton Cargo trucks to furnish the transportation needs of a Shore Party Regiment in that they only have one (1). The ratio of small tractor cranes to large cranes is inadequate. We are equipped now on the basis of one (1) for one (1).

b. The supply agency of the Pioneer Battalion proved adequate to cope with the needs of the battalion, and also adequate to take care of the Shore Party Regiment. It is felt, however, that additional personnel would be required if the Pioneer Battalion were required to supply the Shore Party Regiment over a widespread area.

6. CONCLUSION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comments: During the planning phase of the assault operation, the Pioneer Battalion was re-equipped by a Table of Organization that was approved on 1 July, 1945. Many additions of heavy equipment were authorized, which greatly eliminated some of the problems and shortages that were experienced on the previous operation. Adequate heavy equipment was made available and organic to the organization to carry out most normal shore party missions.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) The Pioneer Battalion is equipped with 2½-ton Dump trucks. It is felt that these should be replaced by 2¼-ton Cargo trucks as they are more adaptable to shore party requirements.

(b) Definite provisions must be made to attach to the Pioneer Battalion, when it expands to perform the duties of a Division Shore Party, a motor transport
section to provide a control section and a minimum of twenty-five (25) trucks per shore party battalion to carry the operation through the initial landing phase until normal motor transport agencies become established ashore.

(c) Although sufficient heavy equipment is organic in the Pioneer Battalion to meet the initial requirements of any operation, a reserve of these items must be provided for replenishment, and in case abnormal conditions are encountered.

(d) It is felt that the present ratio of one (1) tractor crane to one (1) 5-ton crane should be increased to a ratio of at least three (3) tractor cranes to one (1) 5-ton crane.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Comments: The only actual shortage of equipment existed initially in truck transportation. Heavy equipment was not at a premium because the Division unloaded over the docks.

(2) Recommendations: No recommendations are submitted because it is felt that normal shore party operations would not be carried out in unloading a Division across docks.
**Shore Party Organization Chart**

**Assault Operation**

- **Shore Party Regiment**
  - 213 Off 4251 Enl
  - **Regimental Headquarters**
    - 18 Off 84 Enl

- **Shore Party Bn**
  - 65 Off 1389 Enl

- **Shore Party Bn HQ**
  - 17 Off 309 Enl

- **Shore Party Co**
  - 16 Off 360 Enl

---

**Shore Party Co**

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**Division Operation Report**

ENCL (B) TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
### SHORE PARTY ORGANIZATION CHART

**SHORE PARTY REGIMENT**

**Shore Party Regiment**
- 81 Off
- 2231 Enl

**Headquarters**
- Shore Party Regt
- 14 Off
- 93 Enl

**Shore Party Bn**
- 22 Off
- 713 Enl

**Shore Party Bn**
- 22 Off
- 713 Enl

**Shore Party Bn**
- 22 Off
- 713

**Shore Party Co**
- 3 Off
- 211 Enl

**Shore Party Co**
- 3 Off
- 211 Enl

**Shore Party Co**
- 3 Off
- 211 Enl

**Shore Party Co**
- 3 Off
- 211 Enl

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| SP Co         |            |             |              |              |             |              |              |
|---------------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| 5thPionBn     | 2          | 65          |              |              |              |              |
| 116th NCB     | 1          | 88          |              |              |              |              |
| 33d DepCo     | -          | 16          |              |              |              |              |
| 34th DepCo    | -          | 16          |              |              |              |              |
| 8th Ammo Co   | 3          | 211         |              |              |              |              |

**ENCLOSURE (C)**

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APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

DIVISION ENGINEER REPORT

1. The Division Engineer acted in a dual capacity as Division Engineer and the Commanding Officer of the 5th Engineer Battalion. In such capacity he coordinated all Engineer activities of the Engineer Battalion and the 116th Naval Construction Battalion, see enclosures (A) and (B).

Enclosure (A) 5th Engineer Battalion Report.
Enclosure (B) 116th Naval Construction Battalion Report.
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT.

5TH ENGINEER BATTALION REPORT

1. PLANNING.

   a. Assault Operation.

      (1) In July, 1945, a preliminary administrative and
operations order was received from V Amphibious Corps
Headquarters pertaining to the proposed Assault Operation.
One officer from this organization was sent to Corps Head-
quartters to obtain further information and directives per-
taining to engineering work. He returned with several
Sixth Army SOPs and directives. On it were based the rough
draft of the engineer annexes submitted by this battalion
to Division. A proposed list of engineer equipment to be
embarked was drawn up and submitted at this time. From the
little information available pertaining to the Assault
Operation it was decided to take all of this organization's
road construction equipment.

      (2) Combat planning covered the contingency of enemy
resistance although an unopposed landing and occupation
was anticipated. Organic and special equipment necessary
for the operation was planned on the basis of directives
from higher authority and available shipping. All plan-
ing for operations ashore were developed while at sea en-
route. Since the battalion personnel was embarked on many
different ships, with lettered companies and platoons
attached to combat and landing teams, respectively, there
was no opportunity for officers to hold conferences. Some
of the details for engineer operations such as water puri-
fication and supply were included in the Engineer Annex
to the Division Administrative Order No. 1-45, which was
based entirely on information contained in engineer annexes
to Corps Operations Order and Administrative Order, both of
which were received aboard ship en route to Japan. The
engineer annex to the Division Administrative Order for the
Assault Operation provided a basic pattern for the new
engineer annex.

   b. Occupation Operation.
ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

(1) Warning instructions for this operation were received at Marine Camp, Hawaii, T.H., while plans and training were underway for the Assault Operation. These warning instructions indicated the type of operation and location of the target but contained practically no information as to engineer missions.

(2) Upon receipt of these instructions, combat training was terminated and the entire battalion's efforts were directed toward preparing equipment and supplies for loading.

(3) Construction planning was based entirely on directives from Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, and tasks assigned to the several engineer units included in the Corps Operation Orders. No specific construction missions were assigned this battalion and there were no construction plans made.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Following the Iwo Jima operation emphasis in training and planning was placed on bringing this organization to full combat efficiency. Training schedules were conducted based on combat experience gained from the Iwo Jima operation. This battalion up to July, 1945, had received no information regarding the proposed target; however, based on written memoranda and directives from Sixth Army Headquarters, the training schedule was believed adequate. Training was conducted as follows:

(a) Extensive study and practice in disarming Japanese mines.

(b) Practice in reducing and closing natural and artificial caves in volcanic soil and rock with explosives.

(c) Some practice was had in filling anti-tank ditches and reducing anti-tank fortifications.
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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION ORDER (Cont'd).

(d) Practice in reducing heavy fortifications of the block-house type by using the T-3 and M-1 shaped charge and the C-2 pack against walls built of reinforced concrete and volcanic rock.

(e) Several landing team and combat team maneuvers with both infantry and engineers took place. Engineers gained experience with working with tanks and the clearance of mine fields.

(f) Extensive tank, infantry, and engineer training was completed as of the receipt of the rough draft of the Assault Operations Order.

(2) Sixteen (16) SCR-300 radios were obtained by this battalion and assigned on the basis of four (4) per H&S Company and four (4) per lettered company. This distribution was further broken down within the lettered companies on the basis of one (1) per platoon and one (1) in company headquarters. Some experimentation was made in placing TBX radios in armored tractors; however, this adaptation was never completely successful due to the lack of proper materials and radio equipment for installation. A TCS jeep was obtained for use in Battalion Headquarters.

(3) Communications among companies and between respective companies and Battalion Headquarters was obtained by use of TBX radios. The Battalion Communications Officer attached from Division Signal Company during this period of training carried on an extensive schedule for the training of radio operators and wiremen and other communications personnel.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) The Battalion Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 embarked on APA 103 on
25 August, 1945, and moved to Saipan. At Saipan, the Assistant Division Engineer moved from the Division Command Ship, APA 104, and joined the Assistant Division Commander and his staff aboard APA 175. The 5th Engineer Battalion Commander (Division Engineer) moved to the Division Command ship at Saipan. The Battalion Executive and his staff remained aboard the APA 103 and moved to Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan. The Battalion Executive and his staff landed in LCVPs at the dock area with the first Shore Party troops ashore in that area. The Division Engineer came ashore on A plus one after the APA 104 had docked.

(2) Lettered companies were attached to combat teams and loaded out with combat teams. The equipment and personnel of H&S Company were scattered over five APAs and one AKA. This made the billeting and loading problem extremely difficult since the loading plans of the various ships were continuously changing from time to time practically up to the hour of sailing. The troop TQMs on each ship were naturally concerned with their own supplies and equipment and a constant vigilance on the part of the engineer TQM was necessary to insure that engineer supplies and equipment were loaded. The three engineer jeeps loaded on the APA 103 with the engineer staff, required for early engineer reconnaissance, were given last priority and loaded in the bottom of holds beneath loose cargo. The infantry jeeps on the same ship were loaded so as to accompany the early waves ashore in LCVPs. H&S Company conducted all reconnaissance missions on foot for the first two days after landing.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATION.

a. Time and Date of Landing.

(1) Lettered company personnel landed with combat teams. Twenty-seven (27) men and four officers of H&S Company landed in an advance echelon at 0930, 22 September, 1945, in LCVPs in the dock area. The remainder of H&S Company landed on A day and the remainder by A plus one. No difficulties were encountered in landing.
b. Initial Preparation of Beaches.

(1) Troops and some equipment were landed at the docks in the vicinity of Sasebo. However, reconnaissance was conducted to select suitable landing beaches for assault landing craft such as LSTs, LCTs and LSMs to permit the unloading of tracked vehicles and heavy equipment. Suitable landing beaches were found at the Naval Air Station where seaplane ramps could be used as landing beaches.

c. Initial Access Roads and Supply Dumps.

(1) Access roads from the dock area to storage warehouses and supply dumps were few and in poor condition. Rubble and debris cluttered the roads and some of the roads were merely one-way passages leading from the docks to the main road. The main road leading from the warehouses to the heart of Sasebo was in a very poor state of repair, with many ruts and pock marks in the surfacing. Traffic had to travel very slowly over this route and impeded the progress of moving supplies from the dock area to the supply dumps.

d. Repair of Bridges.

(1) The repair and reinforcement of bridges on the Sasebo-Marine Camp Road was accomplished in one night when all work was halted and the bridging crew repaired and reinforced all bridges to 40-ton capacity on this road. This work was accomplished on 26 September.

e. Cub Strips.

(1) On 22 October, a cub strip was laid out, graded and marked by the engineers on the Division parade ground. This project was completed by the end of 24 October.

f. Water Supply.

(1) On 23 plus one, the Battalion Water Supply Officer and several enlisted men conducted a reconnaissance for a site for the water point in Sasebo. This point was set up.
and in production by A plus four. Several days later another point was established and put into operation at the Naval Training Station, Aincoura, (now Marine Camp, Aincoura, Kyushu, Japan).

(2) On 29 September, 1945, two new water points were put into operation by this organization. One point was established for the 28th Regimental Combat Team in the Haiki zone and the other was set up for the 28th Regimental Combat Team at Fukoka.

(3) A water point was set up and operated on 6 October, 1945, for LT-227 at Saga. Two portable purification units were in operation at this water point.

(4) Another point was established and put into operation at Oita for a detachment of the 27th Marines on 12 October, 1945.

(5) The water points in the Haiki zone were secured on 18 October, as a battalion of the 28th and a platoon of engineers were detached from the Division. The balance of the 28th Regiment and engineers moved to Marine Camp, Ainoura.

(6) On 22 October, 1945, "B" Company and the 27th Regimental Combat Team moved to Kurume and a water point was set up there with two portable purification units in operation.

g. Road Construction and Repair.

(1) Work was begun on the Sasebo-Marine Camp Road on 22 September, 1945. This road was the main access route to the camp, however, it was in a very poor state of repair, very narrow and winding. The main effort of the Engineer Battalion was to put this road into condition as soon as possible to enable the movement of the Division from Sasebo to Marine Camp, Ainoura. The road was to a 40-foot roadbed with crushed rock surfacing. The road in the beginning was an average 20 to 25 feet wide and topped with a mud-clay surfacing. Where the road passed through small villages,
the houses were within two to three feet on either side of the roads.

(2) Innumerable difficulties were encountered but at no time was work halted on the road except for the 26th of September when all traffic was halted to repair and reinforce bridges on this route. Progress was slow but steady even with much handicaps as heavy rains, continuous traffic, landslides, lack of fill and crushed rock for topping.

(3) On the 16th of October, the 116th Naval Construction Battalion undertook the maintenance of the Sasebo-Marine Camp Road and was supplemented by the Engineer Battalion.

(4) On 24 October, the rock-crushing plant and the portable rock-crushers arrived from the rear echelon and the rock-crushing plant was immediately set up to produce rock for road surfacing, and also to provide a stock pile of crushed rock for future needs both on the road and for camp maintenance.

(5) During the period 17-24 October, the Sasebo-Marine Camp Road was closed to all traffic and the final surfacing and grading was accomplished during this period. The road had to be constantly patrolled to keep it in a high state of repair.

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. Supply and Logistics.

(1) Logistical planning was begun when the mission of this battalion had become sufficiently developed to make it feasible. Involved were not only the supplies, equipment, and vehicles, which were organic to the battalion, but also those supplies, such as lumber, etc., which were to be carried wholly or in part by other organizations.

(2) In order to insure a complete coverage of all supplies, equipment, and vehicles of this battalion, a
CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

- - - - -

Total allowance of all companies as shown in the TA were listed item for item. Each item was then given the classification of forward echelon or rear echelon; all forward echelon material being further classified according to an assigned priority of unloading by the battalion.

(3) Special orders and memoranda to company commanders and H&S Company section leaders set forth the allocation of special equipment such as water supply tools, fittings, etc., to be carried by each unit of the battalion.

b. Equipping of Units.

(1) This battalion was fully equipped in accordance with T/O and TA allowance prior to receipt of the warning order. No special equipment was procured. Limited shipping space allowed the lifting of only 60% of the Battalion's vehicles and 80% of the heavy equipment.

c. Loading of Engineer Assault and Reinforcing Supplies.

(1) Assault and reinforcing supplies were loaded in accordance with plans set forth for the Assault Operation; however, some of these supplies were not available at the time of embarkation and the plan was only partially carried out.

d. Pre-loading of Construction Materials.

(1) Water supply equipment, and materials were pre-loaded aboard four 15-18 ton machinery trailers. Two machinery trailers were pre-loaded with 300 feet of foot bridge and pioneer and assault supplies. One hundred and fifty feet of Double-Double Bailey Bridge and the ponton bridge with T-4 bales were pre-loaded on thirteen (13) ponton trailers and twenty-six (26) 5th Motor Transport Battalion cargo trucks.

e. Plans for Loading of Additional Construction Materials for Completion of Engineer Missions.
(1) Plans were made for the balance of the engineer equipment and transportation in the Rear Echelon to be shipped on to the target area at a later date. However, the plans of the Division were changed and the equipment was shipped to the Engineer Battalion without advance notice.

f. Unloading and Control of Supplies.

(1) An engineer dump was established ashore on A-Day in the dock area. An engineer equipment park was not immediately available because the area was well built up and debris cluttered all open storage space. Engineer equipment and vehicles were initially parked along the sides of main streets and by A plus two an area was cleared in the vicinity of the engineer dump which provided a park for about one-half of the battalion's equipment.

(2) The docks were extremely narrow and congested with debris, steel stock, lumber and trash. All supplies unloaded had to be removed immediately to provide space for further unloading. As a result it was difficult to separate engineer supplies from general cargo and about one-half of the engineer supplies were removed to a Division warehouse with general supplies of all types. After eighty percent (80%) of the shipping was unloaded, the Battalion Quartermaster was finally able to begin separating engineer supplies from division general supplies. This situation did not hamper operations to any considerable extent; however, since an adequate amount of engineer materials and supplies were combat-loaded on vehicles to last until segregation was well started.

g. General Engineer Supply Problem.

(1) The engineer supply situation presented no major problem. All materials were either loaded on vehicles or trailers or were crated and available on call. Little, if any, supplies were lost in the unloading of the ships. Some supplies were misplaced in the early phase of unloading, however, they were soon recovered and available when needed by this unit.
CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVI-
SION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

h. Use of Local Materials.

(1) Liberal use was made of Japanese supplies such as paints, roofing tiles, plumbing and electrical fittings, and lumber. Some tools and equipment were put into use such as sawmills and a Japanese distributor. Japanese fire fighting equipment was serviced and put into operation at the Division Fire Barn.

i. Spare Parts: Engineer.

(1) Two of four spare parts trailers were left in Hilo at the docks because shipping space was not made available for them. The machine shop trailer of H&S Company was out of commission and therefore no spare parts could be machined. However, the spare parts that were on hand were sufficient to furnish all needs of this organization.

j. Location and Operation of Engineer Dumps.

(1) As was mentioned before, initial dumps were set up at Sasebo in abandoned factories and warehouses. After the Division moved to the Naval Training Station (now Marine Camp, Ainoura), the bulk of supplies were moved to this camp. The engineers maintained a warehouse at the waterfront to receive incoming supplies and equipment. Lettered companies maintained initial dumps in the Sasebo area; however, sub-dumps were maintained wherever the lettered companies were carrying on engineer missions. At no time, were the dumps too far from any engineer project.

k. Transportation of Engineer Supplies.

(1) Supplies were unloaded from the ships to the docks and had to be hauled to the warehouses and open storages from the dock area. The distance was short and transportation was sufficient to keep the dock area cleared of supplies.
(2) The location of supplies to be used on construction projects were located close enough to the projects that the movement of them presented no major problem.

6. CONCLUSION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comments: Due to the lack of sufficient shipping only 30% of the battalion's heavy equipment and 60% of the transportation could be lifted for this operation. It is felt that the T/A allowance of equipment and transportation is not sufficient enough to carry on all types of engineer missions; therefore, all equipment and transportation should be carried.

(2) Recommendations: If further occupation missions are contemplated, it is recommended that the Division Combat Engineer Battalion be allotted shipping space of its own, preferably the assault-type landing craft such as LSTs, LSMs, or LCMs. It is felt that such shipping would enable the swift unloading of equipment and supplies at the target area. It is further recommended that engineer personnel and supplies be dispersed on as few ships as possible to insure rapid consolidation of troops and supplies when the destination is arrived at.
CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX G TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

116TH NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) At the time the original operation was announced to the unit commanders, the Officer in Charge, 116th Naval Construction Battalion and the Division Engineer conferred on the subject, and it was decided to organize three road and bridge teams of fifty (50) men each. Equipment and tools were set aside and prepared for combat loading. The remaining personnel of the construction battalion were to be assigned to the Pioneer Regiment for shore party operations.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) In view of the limited information available, and in view of orders to proceed in the occupation combat-loaded, planning for the occupation was as outlined for the assault.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Training of the construction battalion followed as closely as possible the training schedule of the division which consisted primarily of field problems and conditioning exercises. No training was considered necessary in specialized construction methods, except that in connection with ponton and Bailey bridge erection. In addition, 871 men and 12 officers received seven days each of shore party training.

b. Assault Operation.

(1) Training for occupation was accomplished during movement from base to point of occupation. Each of 978 men received approximately fifteen (15) days of instruction. Subjects covered dealt with all phases of Japanese life and
customs. All men were acquainted with regulations then existing covering the occupation. In addition, key men were given instructions on logistics, i.e., availability and location of native construction materials.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Two plans were set up: (1) organization immediately after landing, which consisted of the shore party organization; (2) final organization, which formed the basis of the construction battalion organization as men were released from shore party.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) The plans for the occupation operation were the same as for the assault operation.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. Approximately 800 men were under the shore party organization and assisted in unloading ships and moving gear from docks to storage areas. The remaining men were not required by the Division Engineer and were used in preparing billet site for the battalion. The shore party group was released at the end of seven (7) days. Subsequent operations have consisted of road repair and construction, building repair and improvement, and repair and maintenance to public utilities.

b. A large portion of construction activities were necessary to adopt Japanese facilities and utilities to the increased load demand placed on them by American troop requirements. This was particularly true of existing roads, where it was necessary to practically rebuild gravel surfaced roads to withstand the military traffic. It was also necessary to revise electrical distribution systems at various substations in order to meet increased demands.

c. Sanitary facilities had to be completely revised or replaced. Japanese sewage disposal systems are designed to
CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

handle nothing but raw sewage. Many drains from heads to collection pits were completely filled with paper before this fact was discovered. It was necessary to overhaul completely every drainage and collection system used by the military forces.

d. Buildings were in fair condition. Most repairs were of a comparatively minor repair nature. The bulk of building construction was in connection with alterations and additions to adapt them to the new use to which they were placed.

e. In general, Japanese facilities and utilities were found to be in poor repair. This condition was probably due to:

(1) Lack of competent maintenance forces.

(2) Substandard materials and workmanship, as compared to American standards.

(3) Damage caused by typhoons which had not been repaired.

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. Supply has been good. Local materials have been available in sufficient quantities to allow construction forces to proceed on most assignments of work. Due to differences in construction methods, improvisations was often necessary, which usually resulted in some delay. Delays were encountered early in the occupation due to lack of knowledge of where to procure certain materials. This difficulty was soon overcome.

b. The construction battalion arrived at point of operation with equipment for road and bridge work only. The immediate demand was for repair of buildings and public utilities. As there were no tools or equipment accompanying the construction battalion to perform this type of work, local tools and equipment had to be procured. In most cases, adequate tools and equipment were found; however, considerable delay was experienced as a result of the time spent in locating local substitutes.

6. CONCLUSION.
a. Assault Operation.

(1) In view of the fact that this unit has never taken part in an assault operation, the Officer in Charge does not feel qualified to make comments or recommendations.

b. Occupation Operations.

(1) The occupation during its early phases proceeded with no great confusion or difficulty. However, as soon as billeting became paramount, the construction battalion was called on to perform practically every type of repair, alteration and addition to existing facilities. As pointed out above, the battalion was ordered out combat-loaded, and as a result, practically no carpenter hand tools and no pipe or electrical tools were lifted. Considerable delay could have been avoided had the construction battalion been allowed to carry hand tools for the initial landing.

(2) Considerable delay also resulted from the fact that the battalion had to change billet partially in the height of their construction operations.

(3) In future occupation operations, it is recommended that construction forces be allowed to go forward as completely equipped as feasible.
G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 1

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: See attached overlay.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations:
      (1) Organic units 17,586
      (2) Assigned or attached units 2,359
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 19,945

   b. Rations on Hand:
      "B" Type
      Emergency Type:
      D/S Ashore          D/S Afloat
      9                     1
      15                    1
      TOTAL D/S 24

   c. Class III on Hand:
      * Ashore * Afloat ** Daily Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft
          100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor 80 octane 4390 Drums 100 Drums 275 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 1355 Drums 60 Drums 45 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 650 Drums 27 Drums 0 Drums

-1-
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption is estimated on issues for first three days.

** Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

1. Medical:
   - DDT Powder, Concentrate: 2000 lbs
     - 5th MarDiv QM
     - Ltr Ser 2996
dtd 24 Sep 45 to
8th Service Regt.

   - 10% DDT Insecticide Louse Powder: 1000 lbs
     - Being requisitioned this date
     - from 8th Service Regt.

2. No other critical shortages.

3. Status of Evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelon: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. Satisfactory.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:
   b. Improvement of road and bridges between Dock Area and Naval Training Station has been initiated.

6. Miscellaneous:
   a. There has been no damage or losses of major items of equipment or supply stocks.

F. A. STEVENS
LtCol., USNCR,
ACofS - G-4.

-2-
SECRET

From: 0900 25 September, 1945
To: 0900 26 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf).

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 2

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations:

      (1) Organic units 17,586
      (2) Assigned or attached units 2,359
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 19,945

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "B" Type
      Emergency Type

      D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
      10  0
      13  0

      TOTAL D/S 23  0

   c. Class III on Hand:

      * Ashore * Afloat **Daily Consumption

      (1) Fuel, aircraft 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor 80 octane 3500 Drums 0 Drums 300 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 1100 Drums 0 Drums 60 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded range fuel 650 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums

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SECRETS

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption is estimated on issued for first four days ashore.

  d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages).
      (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of Evacuation:

  a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
  b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

  a. Satisfactory.
  b. See enclosure (A), attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:

  a. Improvement of road and bridges between Dock Area and Naval Training Station continued.

6. Miscellaneous:

  a. Losses in rations and general QM supplies were occasioned by pilferage and breakage during unloading; the extent of such losses cannot be determined until removal of supplies from docks to QM dumps is completed.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMC,
AGs - G-4.
**MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT**

**ENCLOSURE (A)**

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 25 September, 1945

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>182</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon cap.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, welding unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
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<tr>
<th>TRUCKS:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>1/4-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank, gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton 6x6, artillery repair, M3A1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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ENCLOSURE (A)
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

**TYPE** | ASHORE | OPERATIONAL
---|---|---
**TRUCKS* (Cont'd).**
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop M16A1 or A2 | 3 | 3
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12 | 1 | 1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M8A1 | 2 | 2
2 1/2-ton, 6x6 (DUKW) | 100 | 98
4-ton, 6x6, wrecker | 1 | 1
4-ton, 6x6, cargo | 2 | 2
Tractor Truck, 2 1/2-ton to 5-ton | 2 | 2
Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton | 1 | 1
Ambulance, 1/4-ton, 4x4 | 34 | 34
Ambulance, 1/2-ton, 4x4 | 5 | 5
Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4 | 3 | 3
Cars, 5-passenger | 2 | 2
Motorcycles | 6 | 6

**CARRIERS:**
Light Cargo, M29C (Weasel) | 30 | 29

**TRACTORS:**
Light | 7 | 7
Medium | 21 | 21
Heavy | 29 | 29
SECRET

From: 0900 26 September, 1945
To: 0900 27 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 3

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L272.

1. Location of service installations: Division CP closes at 77.5-15.3 at 1400 27 September, 1945 and opens at 71.3-14.3 at same time.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations:
      (1) Organic units 17,586
      (2) Assigned or attached units 2,359
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 19,945
   b. Rations on Hand:
      "A" Type
      Emergency Type
      TOTAL D/S 22 0
   c. Class III on Hand:
      *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 Octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor 80 octane 3040 Drums 0 Drums 300 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 1000 Drums 0 Drums 70 Drums

-1-

SECRET
SECRET

(5) Gasoline unleaded range fuel 620 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

3. Status of Evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. Satisfactory.
   b. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:
   a. Improvement of road and bridges between Dock Area and Naval Training Station continued.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
AGofS - G-4.

-2-
ENCLOSURE (A)  5th Marine Division (Reinf)  1600, 26 September, 1945

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure cleaning unit</td>
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<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
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<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburator and ignition</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
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<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, welding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laundry Unit, lightweight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, Chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUCKS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x5, S&amp;B</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x5, dump</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750 gallon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, M-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, M9A1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, Amphibian (DUKW)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENCLoure (A) (cont'd).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUCKS (cont'd):</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 5/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARRIERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Cargo, M29C (Weasel)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACTORS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>29</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

From: 0900 27 September, 1945
To: 0900 28 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 4

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AJS L672.

1. Location of service installations: Establishments of Rations and General QM Supply Dumps at Naval Training Station initiated.
   Coordinates: Ration Dump - 70.7 - 13.5
   General QM - 70.57 - 13.8

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations:
      (1) Organic units 17,586
      (2) assigned or attached units 2,359
      (3) Allied Internes and FOW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 19,945
   b. Rations on Hand:
      D/S ashore  D/S Afloat
      "E" Type  10 0
      Emergency Type  11 0
      TOTAL D/S 21 0
   c. Class III on Hand:
      *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 2900 Drums 0 Drums 300 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 960 Drums 0 Drums 70 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 600 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (list only critical shortages).
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. Necessity for making extensive road repairs and movement of
      Division CP placed severe strain on transportation.
   b. See enclosure (a), attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic
   Circulation:
   a. Improvement of road and bridges between Dock Area and Naval
      Training Station continued.
   b. Road reconnaissance to Fukuoka undertaken but no report avail-
      able to date.

F. A. Stevens,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS - G-4.
5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 27 September, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel grease</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water-300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, welding unit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, welding</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 2-wheel, PE-95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCKS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>115</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/4-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9-11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16 or A2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M38A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

1103
SECRET

From: 0900 28 September, 1945
To : 0900 29 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 5

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Organic units</td>
<td>17,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Assigned or attached units</td>
<td>2,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Allied Internes and P.O.W.'s</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Japanese Prisoners</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>19,945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Rations on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>D/S Ashore</th>
<th>D/S Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;E&quot; Type</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Type</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL D/S</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

c. Class III on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Afloat</th>
<th>Daily Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane</td>
<td>2200 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>300 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel, Diesel</td>
<td>900 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>70 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel</td>
<td>570 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>10 Drums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

---

* Figure computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

3. Status of Evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:
   a. Reconnaissance of Sasebo-Fukuoka route indicates road is passable but not suitable for heavy traffic. Loads on 2½-ton trucks should be limited to one (1) ton. Travel time - nine (9) hours.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
AGofS - G-4.
### MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

#### TRAILERS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water-300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, welding unit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, welding</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½-ton, 2-wheel, PS-95</td>
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<td>2</td>
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#### TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16al or A2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, M-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, M5al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, amphibian (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*ENCLOSURE (A)*
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 28-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel | 32 | 30 |

TRACTORS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Light</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (A)
REPORT NO. 6

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872

1. Location of service installations: Fuel DP established Oct 3-10 9.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations:
      (1) Organic units 17,586
      (2) Assigned or attached units 2,359
      (3) Allied Internes and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
         TOTAL 19,945
   b. Rations on Hand:
      *3* Type D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
      Emergency Type: 10 0
      Total D/S 9 0
   c. Class III on Hand:
      Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      Fuel, motor 80 octane 2620 Drums 0 Drums 250 Drums
      Fuel, Diesel 850 Drums 0 Drums 50 Drums
      Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 560 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.

** Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (list only critical shortages).
   (1) Tire repair materials.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic circulation:
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4.
ENCLOSURE (A)  
5th Marine Division (Reinf)  
1800, 29 September, 1945  

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel grassing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel welding unit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-ton, 4-wheel machine shop, unit #1&amp;2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-ton machinery</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-ton machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, welding</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½-ton, 2-wheel, PE-95</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4, radio eq.</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, M-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -  

ENCLOSURE (A)
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, M8A1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 3x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 2½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>3½</td>
<td>3½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 2½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel: 32 | 31 |

TRACTORS:
- Light: 7 | 7 |
- Medium: 21 | 21 |
- Heavy: 29 | 29 |
G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 7

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AHS L872

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations:

      (1) Organic units 17,586
      (2) Assigned or attached units 2,359
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 19,945

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "B" Type
      Emergency Type
      Total D/S 18

      *Ashore *Afloat
      D/S Afloat

   c. Class III on Hand:

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane
      (3) Fuel, motor 80 octane
      (4) Fuel, Diesel
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel

      0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      2495 Drums 0 Drums 200 Drums
      825 Drums 0 Drums 40 Drums
      335 Drums 0 Drums 53 Drums
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (list only critical shortages).
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic circulation:
   a. Crushed rock has been requested for improvement of roads in Naval Training Station.

F. A. Stevens,
LtCol., USHCOR,
ACofS, G-4
ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1900, 30 September, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water-300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel welding unit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 4-wheel carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, welding</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel, PE-95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4, radio eq.</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, storey repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, 6x6, K-12</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-ton, 6x6, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 ½-ton, 6x6, Amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo, N-29-C, Weasel               | 32     | 30          |

TRACTORS:
- Light                                     | 7      | 7           |
- Medium                                    | 21     | 21          |
- Heavy                                     | 29     | 29          |
From: 0900 1 October, 1945
To: 0900 2 October, 1945
Unit: 8th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No.: 8

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations:
      (1) Organic units 17,586
      (2) Assigned or attached units 2,359
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 19,945
   b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
      "B" Type 10
      Emergency Type 7 0
      TOTAL D/S 17 0
   c. Class III on Hand: *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 75 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor 80 octane 2395 Drums 0 Drums 150 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 805 Drums 0 Drums 30 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded range fuel 370 Drums 0 Drums 15 Drums
  -1-
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) The following critical items were reported on Periodic Report No. 1 for period 0900, 24 September, 1945 to 0900, 25 September, 1945, and have not as yet been furnished:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDT Powder, Concentrate</td>
<td>2000 lbs 5thMarDiv HQ ltr Ser 2996 dtd 24Sep45 to 8th ServRegt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% DDT Insecticide Louse Powder</td>
<td>1000 lbs Requisitioned 24Sep45 from 8th ServRegt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Status of evacuation:

a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelon: 0

b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges, (Including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:

a. No remarks.


SECRET
ENCLOSURE (A)  

5th Marine Division (Reinf)  
1800 1 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gal. cap.</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, Unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, welding</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry Unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlights</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRUCKS:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
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<td>2½-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
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<td>2½-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
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-1-  

ENCLOSURE (A)  

1118
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>TRUCKS (Cont'd):</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12</td>
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<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M8A1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian (DUKW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2 1/2-ton to 5-ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARRIERS:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Cargo, M29C (Weasel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRACTORS:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>46</td>
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</table>
SECRET

From: 0900 2 October, 1945
To: 0900 3 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 9

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: New Ammunition Dump site selected at 73.05 - 12.6.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      (1) Organic units 16,113
      (2) Assigned or attached units 2,334
      (3) Allied Internees and POW’s 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 18,447
   b. Rations on Hand:
      "B" Type 10 0
      Emergency Type 6 0
      TOTAL D/S 16 0
   c. Class III on Hand:
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 90 octane 2320 Drums 0 Drums 100 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 790 Drums 0 Drums 20 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded range fuel 341 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums
      **Daily Consumption

1120

SECRET
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously shown.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelon: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS, 
LtCol., USMC, 
ACofS - G-4.
ENCLOSURE (A)
5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 2 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gal. cap.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-ton pole</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-ton machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, welding</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Van Type Laundry</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TRUCKS:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>403</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
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<td>117</td>
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<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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<td>81</td>
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<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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<td>2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
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<td>2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
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<td>2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
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<td>2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750 gal.</td>
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<td>2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
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<td>2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
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<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, M-12</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUCKS (Cont'd):</td>
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<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, Amphibian (DUKW)</td>
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<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<td>Tractor Truck, 2 1/2-ton to 5-ton</td>
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<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 2-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 2-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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<td>CARRIERS:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<td>TRACTORS:</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Light</td>
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<td>Medium</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
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</table>
From: 0900 3 October, 1945  
To: 0900 4 October, 1945  
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)  

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 10

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units 16,113
      (2) Assigned or attached units 2,334
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 18,447

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "B" Type  
      Emergency Type

      | D/S Ashore | D/S Afloat |
      |------------|------------|
      | 10         | 0          |
      | 5          | 0          |

      TOTAL D/S 15 0

   c. Class III on Hand:

      | *Ashore | *Afloat | **Daily Consumption |
      |---------|---------|--------------------|
      | Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums |
      | Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums |
      | Fuel, motor, 80 octane 2270 Drums 0 Drums 70 Drums |
      | Fuel, Diesel 780 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums |
      | Gasoline, unleaded and range fuel 313 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums |

   - 1 -  

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- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.

** Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

   (1) 1300 Traps, Rat, requisition GS 7-46 to 8th Serv Regt
       Via VAC G-4.

3. Status of evacuation:

   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher
      echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and
   Traffic Circulation:

   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACorS - G-4.

-2-
5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 3 October, 1945.

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
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<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
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<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
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<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood Light</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, van type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRUCKS:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
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<td>118</td>
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<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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<td>1 1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>154</td>
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<td>2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, M-12 (Welding truck)</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, M8A1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, Ambitien, (Dukw)</td>
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<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
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<td>Tractor Truck, 21/2-ton to 5-ton</td>
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<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

| Light Cargo, N 29-C, Weasel         | 34     | 33          |

TRACTORS:

| Light                              | 15     | 15          |
| Medium                             | 37     | 37          |
| Heavy                              | 45     | 44          |
SECRET

From: 0900 4 October, 1945
To: 0900 5 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 11

Maps: KYUSUKU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      
      (1) Organic units
      (2) Assigned or attached units
      (3) Allied Internes and POW's
      (4) Japanese Prisoners
      TOTAL

      16,113
      2,334
      0
      0
      18,447

   b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
      
      "E" Type
      Emergency Type
      TOTAL D/S

      14
      0
      14
      0

   c. Class III on Hand: *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption
      
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane
      (4) Fuel, Diesel
      (5) Gasoline, unloaded, range fuel

      0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      2220 Drums 0 Drums 50 Drums
      770 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums
      235 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums

- 1 -
* Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously shown.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity)
   a. No remarks.

P. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4

Copy to: CC, VAC (4)
         CO, 8th Serv Regt (2)
         File (1)
ENCLlosure (A)  5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 4 October, 1945.

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>#SHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, lightweight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood Light</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, van type Laundry</td>
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<td>TRUCKS:</td>
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<tr>
<td>½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>118</td>
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<tr>
<td>½-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
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<td>149</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9 Al</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16 Al or A2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, M-12 (Welding truck)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, M6A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, Amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
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<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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- 1 -
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 7-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel                 | 34     | 33          |

TRACTORS:

Light                                      | 15     | 15          |
Medium                                     | 37     | 37          |
Heavy                                      | 45     | 44          |
From: 0900 5 October, 1945  
To: 0900 6 October, 1945  
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)  

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 12

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L972

1. Location of service installations: No changes.
2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      (1) Organic units 13,941
      (2) Assigned or attached units 1,978
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 15,919
   b. Rations on Hand:  
      D/S Ashore | D/S Afloat
      "B" Type | 10 | 0
      Emergency Type | 3 | 0
      TOTAL D/S | 13 | 0
   c. Class III on Hand:  
      *Ashore | *Afloat | **Daily Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 75 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane | 2180 Drums | 0 Drums | 50 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel | 760 Drums | 0 Drums | 10 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel | 229 Drums | 0 Drums | 10 Drums
SECRET

* Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously shown.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity)
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4
5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 3 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAILERS:</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel machine shop, unit #18#2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Laundry unit, light weight | 3     | 3           |
Fire fighting, chrysler | 3     | 3           |
Floodlight | 6     | 6           |
Van Type Laundry, 6-ton, 2-wheel | 3    | 3           |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRUCKS:</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 4x4, radio eq.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-t, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M36A1 or A2</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, M-12</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -

ENCLOSURE (A)
ENCLOSURE (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M8A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
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<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2 1/2-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
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CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Naasal: 34, 31

TRACTORS:
- Light: 15, 15
- Medium: 37, 35
- Heavy: 46, 44
SECRET

From: 0900 6 October, 1945
To: 0900 7 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 13

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872

1. Location of service installations: Movement of ammunition to new dump site (73.05-12.6) begun.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      (1) Organic units 13941
      (2) At least we attached units 1978
      (3) Allied Interned and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 15919

   b. Rations on Hand:
      D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
      "B" Type 9 0
      Emergency Type 3 0
      TOTAL D/S 12 0

   c. Class III on Hand:
      *Ashore **Afloat **Daily Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 2100 Drums 0 Drums 50 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 742 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 214 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums

- 1 -
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.

** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) Tire repair materials.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity)
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
         CO, 8th Serv Regt (2)
         File (1)

SECRET

- 2 -
ENCLOSURE (A) 5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 6 October, 1945

**MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water 300-gal. capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel machine shop, unit #1&amp;2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel carburetor and ignition</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting chrysler</td>
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<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel van type laundry</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TRUCKS:</strong></td>
<td>410</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4 radio eq.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
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<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 wrecker</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6x6 artillery repair, M9AL</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6x6 instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>6x6 machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>6x6 M-12 welding</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>6x6 M9A1</td>
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- 1 -  ENCLOSURE (A)
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel                | 34     | 31          |

TRACTORS:

| Light                                     | 15     | 15          |
| Medium                                    | 37     | 35          |
| Heavy                                     | 45     | 44          |
SECRET

From: 0900 7 October, 1945
TO: 0900 8 October, 1945
Unit: 8th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 14

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

(1) Organic units 13,941
(2) Assigned or attached units 1,978
(3) Allied Internes and POW's 0
(4) Japanese Prisoners 0

TOTAL 15,919

b. Rations on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>D/S Aboard</th>
<th>D/S Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;B&quot; Type</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Type</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL D/S 11

**Daily Consumption**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane</td>
<td>1164 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel, Diesel</td>
<td>732 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gasoline, unload-ed, range fuel</td>
<td>162 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1140
* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for proceeding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. Stevens
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4

Copy to: CG, MAC, (4)
          CO, 8th Serv Regt (2)
          File (1)
### MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 2-wheel machine shop unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>42-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel van type laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUCKS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4x4 radio eq.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 artillery repair M3Al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 H-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 M3A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 3x6 amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENCLOSURE (A)(Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2.5-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel 34 31

TRACTORS:
- Light 15 15
- Medium 37 35
- Heavy 45 44
SECRET

From: 0900 8 October, 1945
To: 0900 9 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 15

Maps: KYUSHU, scale, 1:25,000, AMS L872

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units 15,941
      (2) Assigned or attached units 1,978
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 15,919

B. Rations on Hand:

   "B" Type D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
   Emergency Type

   TOTAL D/S 7 3 0

   10 0

C. Class III on Hand: *Ashore *Afloat **Daily

   (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
   (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
   (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 988 Drums 0 Drums 150 Drums
   (4) Fuel, Diesel 704 Drums 0 Drums 25 Drums
   (5) Gasoline, unlead- ed, range fuel 150 Drums 0 Drums 15 Drums
SECRET

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*Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
**Daily consumption as estimated on issue for proceeding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) The following critical items were reported on Periodic Report No. 1 for period 0900, 24Sept45, to 0900, 28Sept45, and Periodic Report No. 8 for period 0900, 10Oct45, to 0900 20Oct45 and have not yet been furnished:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDT, Powder, Concentrate</td>
<td>2,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5thMarDiv QM ltr Ser/1 2995, dtd 24Sep45, to 8th Serv Regt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% DDT Insecticide Louse Powder</td>
<td>1,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requisitioned from 8th Serv Regt 21Sep45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Status of evacuation:

a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity):

a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4

Copy to: CG, VAC, (4), CG, 8th Serv Regt, (2), File, (1)

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SEC: ET

1145
ENVELOPE (A)  5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 8 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 1-wheel cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 1-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 1-wheel machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 1-wheel carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, van type laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRUCKS:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 4x4 radio eq.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 wrecker</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 machine shop, M9A1 or A2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 M-12 welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -  ENVELOPE (A)  1146
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel                        | 34     | 32          |

TRACTORS:

- Light                                              | 16     | 15          |
- Medium                                             | 37     | 36          |
- Heavy                                              | 45     | 44          |
Secret

From: 0900 9 October, 1945
To: 0900 10 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 16

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group).

(1) Organic units 13,941
(2) Assigned or attached units 1,978
(3) Allied Internes and POW's 0
(4) Japanese Prisoners 0

TOTAL 15,919

b. Rations on Hand:

"F" Type
Emergency Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>D/S Ashore</th>
<th>D/S Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;F&quot; Type</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Type</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL D/S</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

c. Class III on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>*Ashore</th>
<th>*Ashore</th>
<th>**Daily Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane</td>
<td>1084 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>150 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel, Diesel</td>
<td>668 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>30 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel</td>
<td>156 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>75 Drums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

*Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
**Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMC,
AGofS - G-4.

Copies to:
DG, VAC (4)
DG, 8thServRegt (1)
File (1)
ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 9 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE TRAILERS:</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel machine shop, unit #1&amp;2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel carburetor &amp; ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRUCKS:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4 radio eq.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1/2-ton, 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 M9A1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6 amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
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<td>99</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 wrecker</td>
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<td>4-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 6-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel
  - ASHORE: 34
  - OPERATIONAL: 30

TRACTORS:
- Light
  - ASHORE: 15
  - OPERATIONAL: 14
- Medium
  - ASHORE: 37
  - OPERATIONAL: 35
- Heavy
  - ASHORE: 45
  - OPERATIONAL: 44
SECRET

From: 0900 10 October, 1945
To: 0900 11 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 17

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AII L872.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      |                      |                   |
      |----------------------|-------------------|
      | (1) Organic units    | 13,941            |
      | (2) Assigned or attached units | 1,975 |
      | (3) Allied Internes and POW's | 0 |
      | (4) Japanese Prisoners | 0 |
      | **TOTAL**            | **15,919**        |

   b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat

      |                      |                   |
      | "E" Type             |                   |
      | Emergency Type       |                   |
      |                      |                   |
      | **TOTAL** D/S        | **8**             |


      |                      |                   |                |
      | (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums |
      | (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums |
      | (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane | 963 Drums | 0 Drums | 130 Drums |
      | (4) Fuel, Diesel | 666 Drums | 0 Drums | 30 Drums |
      | (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel | 162 Drums | 0 Drums | 15 Drums |
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) The following critical item was reported on Periodic Report No. 10 for period 0900, 3 October, 1945, to 0900 4 October, 1945, and has not as yet been furnished.

1500 Traps, rat, requisition

GS 7-46 to 8th Service Regiment via VAC G-4.

3. Status of evacuation:

a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of transportation:

a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity):

a. No remarks.

F. A. STEEVES
LtCol., USMC
AC of S - G-4.

Copies to: CG, VAC (4)
CG, 8th ServRegt (1)
FILE (1)
5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 10 October, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo, track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| TRUCKS:    |        |             |
| 1/2-ton, 4x4 | 410     | 400         |
| 1/2-ton, 4x4, radio eq. | 121     | 117         |
| 1-ton, 4x4, cargo | 83      | 78          |
| 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo | 8       | 8           |
| 2-ton, 6x6, cargo | 154     | 136         |
| 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base | 62     | 60          |
| 2-ton, 6x6, duma | 67      | 65          |
| 2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal. | 3      | 3           |
| 2-ton, 6x6, wrecking | 9       | 9           |
| 2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1 | 1      | 1           |
| 2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair | 4      | 4           |
| 2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M1A1 or A2 | 1      | 1           |
| 2-ton, 6x6, 4-12 | 1       | 1           |
| 2-ton, 6x6, 8-12 | 1       | 1           |
| 2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw) | 100     | 97          |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton, to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars-5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CARRIERS:**

Light Cargo, M-29-C, Vessel

**TRACTORS:**

Light

Medium

Heavy
G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 0900 11 October, 1945
To: 0900 12 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

Report No. 18

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Organic units</th>
<th>Assigned or attached units</th>
<th>Allied Internes and POW's</th>
<th>Japanese Prisoners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>13,941</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

b. Rations on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>D/S Ashore</th>
<th>D/S Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;E&quot; Type</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Type</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL D/S</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

c. Class III on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>*AsShore</th>
<th>*Afloat</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fuel, aircraft, 75 octane</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73 Drums</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel, Diesel</td>
<td>645</td>
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<td>21 Drums</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15 Drums</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USNCR,
ACoFS - G-4.

Copies to: CG, VAS (4)
CG, 8th Serv Regt (1)
FILM (1)
ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 11 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trailer3:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, lightweight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van-Type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Truck3:</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4 truck, 4</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 tank, 750-gal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 washing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 artillery repair, M1A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 machine shop, M1A1 or A2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 A-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 A-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6 amphibian, (31kW)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENCLOSURE (a)(Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel
  - Ashore: 34
  - Operational: 30

TRACTORS:
- Light
  - Ashore: 15
  - Operational: 15
- Medium
  - Ashore: 37
  - Operational: 36
- Heavy
  - Ashore: 45
  - Operational: 44
SECRET

From: 0900  12 October, 1945
To:   0900  13 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 19

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872

1. Location of service installation: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division Dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units 13,941
      (2) Assigned or attached units 1,978
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

         TOTAL 15,919

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "B" Type
      Emergency Type 3 6

   c. Class III on Hand:

      *Ashore  *Afloat  **Daily Consumption

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 855 Drums 0 Drums 125 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 631 Drums 0 Drums 25 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 195 Drums 0 Drums 40 Drums
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. Stevens,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4

Copies to: CG, VAC (4)
            CO, 8th Serv Regt (1)
            File (1)
ENCLOSURE (A)  

5th Marine Division (Reinf)  
1800 12 October 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel machine shop unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton 2-wheel Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TRUCKS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4x4, radio eq.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 short wheel base</td>
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<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6 artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
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<td>21-ton, 6x6 M-12 welding</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 M9A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6 amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 wrecker</td>
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<td>4-ton, 8x8 cargo</td>
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<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 4½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 6-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARRIERS:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Cargo, M-29-C, Wessel</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRACTORS:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
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</table>
S-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 20

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units
      (2) assigned or attached units
      (3) Allied Internes and POW's
      (4) Japanese Prisoners

      TOTAL

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "E" Type
      Emergency Type

      TOTAL D/3

   c. Class III on Hand:

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane
      (4) Fuel, Diesel
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel.

      "Ashore" "Afloat" "**Daily Consumption"
      0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      1,359 Drums 0 Drums 104 Drums
      631 Drums 0 Drums 23 Drums
      195 Drums 0 Drums 25 Drums

From: 0900 13 October, 1945
To: 0900 14 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

- 1 -

1164
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):


3. Status of Evacuation:

   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):

   a. No remarks.

   F. A. STEVENS,
   LtCol., USMC,
   AGofS - G-4.

Copies to: CG, W.O. (4),
            CO, 3th Service Regt (2)
            FILE (1)
## MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>89</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUCKS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gallon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M16A1 or A2</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M3A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Duck)</td>
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<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2 1/2-ton, to 5-ton</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton, to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 7/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Wessel    | 34     | 26          |

TRACTORS:

| Light                          | 15     | 15          |
| Medium                         | 37     | 34          |
| Heavy                          | 45     | 44          |
SECRET

From: 0900 14 October, 1945
To: 0900 15 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 21

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L672.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units 13,262
      (2) Assigned or attached units 1,655
      (3) Allied Internes and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 14,917

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "F" Type
      Emergency Type

      TOTAL D/S 5

   c. Class III on Hand:

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 1130 Drums 0 Drums 127 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 708 Drums 0 Drums 17 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 144 Drums 0 Drums 25 Drums

-1-
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:

a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

a. See enclosure (a) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges, (including weight capacity):

a. No remarks.

P. A. Stivers,
LtCol., USMC,
A3053 - G-4.

Copies to: CG, Wac (4).
CO, 8th ServRegt (1).
Pile (1).

SECRET
5th Marine Division (Reinforced)
1800 14 October, 1945

**MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TRAILERS</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, lightweight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRUCKS</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gallon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16al or a2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, H-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, M31al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, 6x6, armored (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ENCLOSED (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Carriers:**

| Light Cargo, M-29-0, Vesel                | 34     | 28          |

**Tractors:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Light</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

From: 0900 15 October, 1945
To: 0900 16 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 22

Maps: KUSUSHI, scale 1:25,000 AMS L672.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      - Organic units
      - Assigned or attached units
      - Allied Internees and POW's
      - Japanese Prisoners
      TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>D/S Ashore</th>
<th>D/S Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;B&quot; Type</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL D/S</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Rations on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>*Ashore</th>
<th>*Afloat</th>
<th>**Daily Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fuel, motor 80 octane</td>
<td>939 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>122 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel, Diesel</td>
<td>605 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>47 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gasoline, unleaded range fuel</td>
<td>229 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>29 Drums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) Following items remain critical and are required to prevent deadlining of motor vehicles: Tire patches, DivQM Req MT-215-45 of 28Sep45:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requested</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#6 2,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 2,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8 1,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9 1,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plate driven engine clutch DivQM Req MT 1-46 of 4Oct45:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requested</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Batteries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requested</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Status of evacuation:

a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon:

0

4. Status of Transportation:

a. See Enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity):

a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMC,
AGofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4); CO, 8th SerV Regt (1); FILE (1).
### MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

#### TRAILERS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, radio eq.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6; artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, M8A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2-1/2-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo; K-29-C, Weasel
  - 34
  - 28

TRACTORS:
- Light
  - 15
- Medium
  - 37
- Heavy
  - 45

ENCLOSURE (A)
SECRET

From: 0900 16 October, 1945
To: 0900 17 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 23

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

(1) Organic units
(2) Assigned or attached units
(3) Allied Internees and POW's
(4) Japanese Prisoners

TOTAL

14,917

b. Rations on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>D/S Ashore</th>
<th>D/S Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P&quot; Type</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL D/S</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Class III on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane</td>
<td>1569 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel, Diesel</td>
<td>569 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gasoline, unleaded range fuel</td>
<td>346 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -

SECRET

1176
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

   d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

      (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:

   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

   a. See Enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity):

   a. No remarks.

F. A. Stevens,
LtCol., US OR,
ACofS - G-4.

Copies to: CG, VAC (4).
CC, 8th Serv Regt (2).
FILE (1).
5th Marine Division (Reinf)  
1800 16 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, Chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUCKS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 8x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9Al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16Al or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M9Al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 8x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CARRIERS:**

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel           | 34     | 28          |

**TRACTORS:**

| Light                                 | 15     | 15          |
| Medium                                | 37     | 35          |
| Heavy                                 | 45     | 44          |
From: 0900 17 October, 1945
To: 0900 18 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No.: 24

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      (1) Organic units
      (2) Assigned or attached units
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's
      (4) Japanese Prisoners
      TOTAL

   b. Rations on Hand:
      "B" Type
      Emergency
      TOTAL D/S

   c. Class III on Hand:
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane
      (3) Fuel, motor, 20 octane
      (4) Fuel, Diesel
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel

TOTAL D/S 4

**Daily Consumption
SECNAV

- Figures computed in number of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 1
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (a) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F.A. Stevens,
LtCol., US CR,
ACOF, G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4).
    CO, 5th ServRegt (2)
    FILE (1)

- 2 -
SOGOT

1181
ENCLOSURE (a)  

5th Marine Division (Rein)  
1800 17 October, 1945

**NOTOR VEHICLE REPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 6x6, Van type laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **TRUCKS:** | | |
| 1/4-ton, 4x4 | 403 | 391 |
| 2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped | 121 | 120 |
| 1-ton, 4x4, cargo | 76 | 73 |
| 1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo | 8 | 8 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo | 148 | 141 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base | 62 | 62 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump | 67 | 63 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal. | 4 | 4 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking | 9 | 9 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair | 1 | 1 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2 | 3 | 3 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding | 1 | 1 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M9A1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibiian, (Dukw) | 100 | 100 |
| 4-ton, 6x6, wrecker | 1 | 1 |
| 4-ton, 6x6, cargo | 3 | 3 |
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel | 34 | 29 |

TRACTORS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Light</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: 0900 18 October, 1945  
To: 0900 19 October, 1945  
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 25

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.


   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Organic units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Assigned or attached units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Allied Internees and POW's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Japanese Prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Rations on Hand:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>D/S Ashore</th>
<th>D/S Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D/S Ashore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;B&quot; Type</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency type</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL D/S</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. Class III on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Afloat</th>
<th><strong>Daily Consumption</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane</td>
<td>1244 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>119 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel, Diesel</td>
<td>533 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>34 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel</td>
<td>569 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>21 Drums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

SECRET

1184
* - Figures computed in number of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 6
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4).
   CO, 8th Serv Regt (2)
   FILE (1).
ENCLOSURE (A)

Motor Vehicle Report

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 18 October, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trailers:</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trucks:</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
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<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gallon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, M2A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 21-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARRIERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Cargo, K-29-C, Weasel</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACTORS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

SECRET

From: 0900 19 October, 1945
To: 0900 20 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 26

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AIR L872

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units
      (2) Assigned or attached units
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's
      (4) Japanese Prisoners

      TOTAL

      |                | D/S Ashore | D/S Afloat |
      |----------------|------------|------------|
      | Organic units  | 6,553      |            |
      | Assigned or attached units | 4,838      |            |
      | Allied Internees and POW's | 0          |            |
      | Japanese Prisoners | 0          |            |
      | TOTAL           | 11,391     |            |

   b. Rations on Hand:

      |                                                  | D/S Ashore | D/S Afloat |
      |                                                  |            |            |
      | "E" Type                                     |            |            |
      | Emergency                                   | 3          | 0          |
      | TOTAL D/S                                   | 3          | 0          |

   c. Class III on Hand:

      |                        | *Ashore | *Afloat | **Daily Consumption |
      |------------------------|--------|--------|---------------------|
      | (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums |
      | (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane   | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums |
      | (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane     | 1666 Drums | 0 Drums | 125 Drums |
      | (4) Fuel, Diesel              | 523 Drums | 0 Drums | 27 Drums |
      | (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel | 554 Drums | 0 Drums | 21 Drums |

- 1 -
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. Stevens,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, MAC (4)
        CO, 8th Serv Regt (2)
        PFIE (1)
ENCLOSURE (A)
5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 19 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gallon capacity</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type Laundry</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/4-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gallons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton 2 2
Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton 1 1
Ambulance, 1-ton, 4x4 42 42
Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4 7 7
Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4 6 6
Cars, 5-passenger 3 3
Motorcycles 7 7
3/4-ton, 4x4 5 5

Carriers:
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel 34 30

Tractors:
- Light 15 14
- Medium 37 35
- Heavy 45 43
SECRE'T

From: 0900 20 October, 1945
To: 0900 21 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 27

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

(1) Organic units 10,711
(2) Assigned or attached units 4,341
(3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
(4) Japanese Prisoners 0

TOTAL 15,552

b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>D/S Ashore</th>
<th>D/S Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;B&quot; Type</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL D/S 8 0

c. Class III on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>*Ashore</th>
<th>*Afloat</th>
<th>**Daily Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane</td>
<td>1554 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>132 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel, Diesel</td>
<td>501 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>25 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel</td>
<td>536 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>24 Drums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

* = Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** = Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:

a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

a. See enclosure (a) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):  

a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMC,
AGofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
CO, 8thServRegt (2)
FILE (1)
ENCLOSURE (A)  
5th Marine Division (Reinf)  
1800 20 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 6x6, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 6x6, amphibian (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENCLOSED (a) (Cont'd).</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2 1/2-ton to 5-ton</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1-ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CARRIERS:**

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Seasel | 34 | 33 |

**TRACTORS:**

| Light                  | 15 | 15 |
| Medium                 | 37 | 35 |
| Heavy                  | 45 | 43 |
SECRET

From: 0900 21 October, 1945
To: 0900 22 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 28

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units 11,147
      (2) assigned or attached units 4,841
      (3) allied internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 15,988

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "B" Type
      Emergency

      D/S Ashore D/S Afloat

      "B" Type
      7
      5

      TOTAL D/S 12 0

   c. Class III on Hand:

      *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane
      (4) Fuel, Diesel
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel

      0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      1212 Drums 0 Drums 166 Drums
      486 Drums 0 Drums 26 Drums
      455 Drums 0 Drums 32 Drums

- 1 -

SECRET

1196
SECRET

* Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (a) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USA\CR,
AGofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
CO, 8thServRegt (2)
FILE (1)
ENCLOSURE (a) 5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 21 October, 1945.

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting; chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gallon.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16al or M2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, M9al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
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</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1-tion, 4x4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Cargo, M-29-0, Weasel</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TRACTORS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

From: 0900 22 October, 1945
To: 0900 23 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 29

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 a\&s L672.

1. Location of service installations: Continued movement of ammunition to new Division dump site.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units
          11,329
      (2) assigned or attached units
          4,921
      (3) allied Interncns and POW's
          0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners
          0

          TOTAL 16,250

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "B" Type
      D/S ashore  D/S Afloat
      "E" Type  6      0
      Emergency  5      0

          TOTAL D/S 11      0

   c. Class III on Hand:

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane
          0 Drums  0 Drums  0 Drums

      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane
          0 Drums  0 Drums  0 Drums

      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane
          1019 Drums  0 Drums  156 Drums

      (4) Fuel, Diesel
          455 Drums  0 Drums  24 Drums

      (5) Gasoline, unleaded range fuel
          473 Drums  0 Drums  21 Drums

-1-

SECRET
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 4
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMC,  
ACOF - G-14.

Copy to: CG, VA-C (4)
CG, 8thServReg (2)
FILE (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trailer</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trucks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gallon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M9A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, M9A1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
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<td>100</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Carriers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
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Tractors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
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</table>
SECRET

From: 0900 23 October, 1945
To : 0900 24 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 30

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AJS L672

1. Location of service installations: Movement of ammunition to new Division dump site completed.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

   (1) Organic units: 12,044
   (2) Assigned or attached units: 4,908
   (3) Allied Internees and POW's: 0
   (4) Japanese Prisoners: 0
   TOTAL: 16,952

b. Rations on Hand:

   "B" Type
   Emergency
   TOTAL D/S

   D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
   5          0
   5          0
   TOTAL D/S 10          0

c. Class III on Hand:

   (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
   (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
   (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 842 Drums 0 Drums 157 Drums
   (4) Fuel, Diesel 460 Drums 0 Drums 22 Drums
   (5) Gasoline, unleaded range fuel 436 Drums 0 Drums 27 Drums
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 3
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (a) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks

F. A. STEVENS, 
LtCol., USMC, 
AofS G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
   CO, 5th ServRegt (2)
   FILE (1)

- 2 -

SECRET
ENCLOSURE (A)  

5th Marine Division (Reinf)  
1800, 23 October, 1945

**MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo truck laving</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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**TRUCKS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, radio eq.</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/4-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/4-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/4-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/4-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, K9al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16al or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12 welding</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, M16al</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A)  

1206
ENVELOPE (A) (Cont'd).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Qty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Carriers:**
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Wesel

**Tractors:**
- Light: 15
- Medium: 37
- Heavy: 45
SECRET

From: 0900 24 October, 1945
To: 0900 25 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 31

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AS L872

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

   (1) Organic units 12,670
   (2) Assigned or attached units 3,105
   (3) Allied Internes and POW's 0
   (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

   15,775

b. Rations on Hand:

   D/S Ashore D/S Afloat

   "B" Type
   Emergency

   TOTAL D/S 10 0

   4 0

   6 0

   10 0

c. Class III on Hand:

   *Ashore *Afloat *Daily Consumption

   (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane
       0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums

   (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane
       0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums

   (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane
       649 Drums 0 Drums 169 Drums

   (4) Fuel, Diesel
       454 Drums 0 Drums 20 Drums

   (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel
       388 Drums 0 Drums 32 Drums

   - 1 -

1208
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 4
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMC,  
ACoFS-G-4.

Copy to:  CG, VaC (4)  
CO, 8th ServRegt (2)  
FILE (1)
**Motor Vehicle Report**

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 24 October, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>As Shore</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trailers:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trucks:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, radio eq.</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop M9A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, -wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2 1/2-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

| Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton | 1   | 1   |
| Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4        | 34  | 34  |
| Ambulance, 5-ton, 4x4          | 7   | 7   |
| Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4        | 5   | 5   |
| Car, 5-passenger               | 3   | 3   |
| Motorcycles                     | 7   | 7   |
| 3/4-ton, 4x4                   | 5   | 5   |

CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel

TRACTORS:
- Light
- Medium
- Heavy
SECRET

To: 0900 26 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 32

Maps: NYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AJS L672.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units 10,963
      (2) Assigned or attached units 4,778
      (3) Allied Internes and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 15,741

   b. Rations on Hand:

      D/S Ashore  D/S Afloat

      "M" Type
      "M" Type
      Emergency Type

      TOTAL D/S 10 0

   c. Class III on Hand:

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 933 Drums 0 Drums 164 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 436 Drums 0 Drums 20 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unloaded, range fuel 338 Drums 0 Drums 20 Drums

   - 1 -
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.
  d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
    (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (a) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

---

P. A. Stevens
LtCol., USMCR,
ACCS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
       CO, 3rd ServRegt (2)
       FILE (1)
ENCLOSURE (a)  

5th Marine Division (Reinf)  

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo, track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 3x6, dump</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, instrument repair,</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M9al or a2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, K-12 'holding'</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, M9al</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, amphibious, (Dunkv)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**ENCLOSURE (A)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton, to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton, to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car-5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcyclea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CARRIERS:**

- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Vessel
  - ASHORE: 34
  - OPERATIONAL: 33

**TRACTOR:**

- Light
  - ASHORE: 15
  - OPERATIONAL: 15
- Medium
  - ASHORE: 37
  - OPERATIONAL: 37
- Heavy
  - ASHORE: 45
  - OPERATIONAL: 43

---

- 2 -

**ENCLOSURE (A)**

---

1215
Report No. 33

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

(1) Organic units 10,863
(2) assigned or attached units 4,873
(3) Allied Internes and POW's 0
(4) Japanese Prisoners 0

TOTAL 15,741

b. Rations on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>D/S Ashore</th>
<th>D/S Afloat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;E&quot; Type</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Type</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL D/S 9 0

c. Class III on Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Afloat</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane</td>
<td>1099 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>151 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel, Diesel</td>
<td>419 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>13 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gas line, unleaded, range fuel</td>
<td>333 Drums</td>
<td>0 Drums</td>
<td>13 Drums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (a) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. Stevens,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
CO, 8th ServInf (2)
FIEL (1)
ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 26 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¾-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TRUCKS: |        |             |
| ¾-ton, 4x4 | 371 | 366 |
| ¾-ton, 4x4, radio equipped | 107 | 105 |
| 1-ton, 4x4, cargo | 52 | 51 |
| ¾-ton, 6x6 | 6 | 6 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo | 123 | 110 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, short wheel base | 52 | 62 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, dump | 67 | 66 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal. | 4 | 4 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, wrecking | 8 | 8 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, instrument repair | 1 | 1 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2 | 3 | 3 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding | 1 | 1 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, M6A1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw) | 100 | 100 |
| 4-ton, 6x6, wrecker | 1 | 1 |
| 4-ton, 6x6, cargo | 3 | 3 |
| Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton | | |

- 1 -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance 1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car—5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CARRIERS:**

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel               | 34     | 33          |

**TRACTORS:**

| Light                                     | 15     | 15          |
| Medium                                    | 37     | 35          |
| Heavy                                     | 45     | 43          |
SECRET

From: 0900 27 October, 1945
To: 0900 28 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 34

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L372.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      - (1) Organic units 11,089
      - (2) Assigned or attached units 4,433
      - (3) Allied Internes and PO's 0
      - (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      ____________
      TOTAL 15,522

   b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
      --- Type ---  --- Ashore ---  --- Afloat ---
      "E" Type 1 0
      Emergency Type 6 0
      ____________
      TOTAL D/S 7 0

   c. Class III on Hand: *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73, octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 1101 Drums 0 Drums 140 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 405 Drums 0 Drums 18 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 386 Drums 0 Drums 16 Drums

- 1 -
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption estimated on issue for preceding four days.

   d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

      (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 3
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

   T. A. Terril,
   LtCol., USMC,
   AGofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
       CO, 5th Serv Regt (2)
       FILS (1)
ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 27 October, 1945.

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**TRAILERS:**

| ½-ton, 2-wheel cargo | 201 | 169 |
| 2-ton, 2-wheel dump | 16 | 16 |
| 1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo | 76 | 76 |
| 1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing | 25 | 24 |
| 1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit | 7 | 6 |
| 1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom | 11 | 11 |
| 1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity | 25 | 23 |
| 2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo | 2 | 2 |
| 2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom | 9 | 9 |
| 3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower | 3 | 3 |
| 3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit | 4 | 4 |
| 5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 & #2 | 7 | 7 |
| 5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition | 1 | 1 |
| 6-ton, cargo track laying | 1 | 9 |
| 10-ton, pole | 1 | 1 |
| 16-ton, machinery | 12 | 11 |
| 25-ton, machinery | 1 | 1 |
| 45-ton, machinery | 1 | 1 |
| Laundry unit, light weight | 3 | 3 |
| Fire fighting, chrysler | 3 | 3 |
| Floodlight | 6 | 6 |
| 6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry | 1 | 1 |

**TRUCKS:**

| ½-ton, 4x4 | 376 | 361 |
| 2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped | 107 | 105 |
| 1-ton, 4x4, cargo | 54 | 53 |
| 12-ton, 4x4, cargo | 6 | 6 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, cargo | 124 | 110 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, short wheel base | 62 | 62 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, dumbo | 68 | 67 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal. | 4 | 4 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, wrecking | 8 | 8 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1 | 1 | 1 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, instrument repair | 1 | 1 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2 | 3 | 3 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, M2A2 welding | 1 | 1 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, M4 | 1 | 1 |
| 25-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (lukw) | 100 | 95 |
| 4-ton, 6x6, tracker | 1 | 1 |
| 4-ton, 6x6, cargo | 3 | 3 |
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¼-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel    | 34     | 33          |

TRACTORS:

| Light                          | 15     | 15          |
| Medium                         | 37     | 35          |
| Heavy                          | 45     | 44          |
SECRET
From: 0900 28 October, 1945
To: 0900 29 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

Q-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 35
Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of Service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka
      Occupation Group):
      (1) Organic units 11,039
      (2) Assigned or attached units 4,433
      (3) Allied Internes and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 15,522
   b. Ration on Hand:
      "B" Type
      Emergency Type
      D/3 Ashore 1 0
      D/3 Afloat 0 0
      TOTAL D/3 7 0
   c. Class III on Hand:
      *Ashore *Afloat Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 1059 Drums 0 Drums 143 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 400 Drums 0 Drums 17 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unloaded, range fuel 137 Drums 0 Drums 15 Drums

1224
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

3. Status of evacuation:

   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):

   a. No remarks.

P. A. STEVEN'S,
LtCol., USMC

Copy to: CG, W.C (4)
CG, 3th ServRegt(2)
FILE (1)
ENCLOSURE (a)  
5th Marine Division (Reinf)  
1800 28 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gallon capacity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, milk</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **TRUCKS:**                                                        |        |             |
| 1/2-ton, 4x4                                                       | 376    | 363         |
| 1/2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped                                      | 107    | 105         |
| 1-ton, 4x4, cargo                                                 | 54     | 53          |
| 1-ton, 4x4, cargo                                                 | 6      | 6           |
| 21-ton, 6x6, cargo                                                | 126    | 110         |
| 21-ton, 6x6, short wheel base                                     | 62     | 62          |
| 24-ton, 6x6, dumper                                               | 68     | 67          |
| 22-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.                              | 4      | 4           |
| 22-ton, 6x6, wrecking                                             | 8      | 8           |
| 22-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1                                | 1      | 1           |
| 22-ton, 6x6, instrument repair                                    | 1      | 1           |
| 22-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2                            | 3      | 3           |
| 22-ton, 6x6, M12 Welding                                          | 1      | 1           |
| 22-ton, 6x6, Amphibian, (Dukw)                                    | 100    | 95          |
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton, to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel       | 34     | 33          |

TRACTORS:

| Light                            | 15     | 15          |
| Medium                           | 37     | 35          |
| Heavy                            | 45     | 44          |
From: 0900 29 October, 1945  
To: 0900 30 October, 1945  
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 36

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      (1) Organic units 11,089
      (2) Assigned or attached units 4,433
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 15,522

   b. Rations on Hand:
      "B" Type
         Emergency
      TOTAL D/S 6 0

   c. Class III on Hand:
      *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 734 Drums 0 Drums 189 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 356 Drums 0 Drums 24 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 336 Drums 0 Drums 23 Drums

SECRET

1228
* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:
a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 1
b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
         CO, 8th Serv Regt (2)
         FILE (1)
### MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

**5th Marine Division (Reinf)**  
1800 29 October, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 3-wheel, Van Type Laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **TRUCKS:** |        |              |
| 3/4-ton, 4x4 | 333 | 375 |
| 3/4-ton, 4x4, radio equipped | 107 | 105 |
| 1-ton, 4x4, cargo | 59 | 58 |
| 1/4-ton, 4x4, cargo | 6 | 6 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, cargo | 127 | 111 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, short wheel base | 62 | 62 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, dump | 73 | 72 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gallon | 4 | 4 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, wrecking | 3 | 3 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1 | 1 | 1 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, instrument repair | 1 | 1 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M6A1 or A2 | 3 | 3 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding | 1 | 1 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, M9A1 | 1 | 1 |
| 23-ton, 6x6, amphibian (Dukw) | 107 | 95 |
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

| Light Cargo, M-29-C, Vessel                | 34     | 33          |

TRACTORS:

| Light                                      | 16     | 16          |
| Medium                                     | 38     | 36          |
| Heavy                                      | 47     | 46          |
SECRET

From: 0000 30 October, 1945
To: 0000 31 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 37

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units 10,804
      (2) Assigned or attached units 5,223
      (3) Allied Interness and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 16,027

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "P" Type
      Emergency Type

      D/3 ashore 0
      D/3 afloat 0

      TOTAL D/3 15

   c. Class III on Hand:

      * ashore * afloat **Daily Consumption

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 757 Drums 0 Drums 161 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 267 Drums 0 Drums 37 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 287 Drums 0 Drums 25 Drums

- 1 -
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 1
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. Stevens,
LtCol., USMC,
COF5 - G-4

Copy to: CQ, VaC (4)
CQ, 8th ServRegt (2)
FUSE (1)
ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 30 October, 1945.

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, grasing</td>
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<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, mac ine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flooding</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRUCKS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, ammo</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gallon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M2A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M2A1 or M2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, weld welding</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M2A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian (DUKW)</td>
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- 1 -

ENCLOSURE (A)
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

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<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car-5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Vessel: 34

TRACTORS:

- Light: 16
- Medium: 36
- Heavy: 46
096/129

From: 0900 31 October, 1945
To: 0900 1 November, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

C-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 38

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      (1) Organic units 10,616
      (2) Assigned or attached units 4,443
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 15,059
   b. Rations on Hand:
      "H" Type D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
      Emergency Type 8 0
      TOTAL D/S 14 0
   c. Class III on Hand:
      #Ashore #Afloat **Daily Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor 80 octane 1009 Drums 0 Drums 126 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 267 Drums 0 Drums 19 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded 233 Drums 0 Drums 25 Drums
SECRET

- Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelon: 0
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
AGofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
CO, 8th Serv Regt (2)
FILE (1)

-2-
ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 31 October, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, dump</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gal. cap.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, Unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
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TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750 gal.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, M-12 welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-ton, 6x6, Amphibian (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-1-
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUCKS (Cont'd):</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 2½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARRIERS:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Cargo, M29C (Weasel)</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRACTORS:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
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</table>
096/129

From: 0900 1 November, 1945
To: 0900 2 November, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 39

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L672.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):

      (1) Organic units 10,679
      (2) assigned or attached units 4,455
      (3) allied Internes and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 15,164

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "D" Type
      Emergency

      D/S ashore  D/S Afloat
      ---   ---   ---
      7    0
      6    0

      TOTAL D/S 13  0

   c. Class III on Hand:

      *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane
          0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane
          0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane
          1318 Drums 0 Drums 136 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel
          261 Drums 0 Drums 21 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel
          233 Drums 0 Drums 30 Drums
      (6) Kerosene
          228 Drums 0 Drums 6 Drums

SECRET
** - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 3
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuating to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

6. Miscellaneous:
   a. Following issues of winter-clothing have been made to Army Units to date:

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<tr>
<td>Jackets, Wool or Field</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caps</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweaters</td>
<td>Not issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undershirts, Wool</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawers, Wool</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>121ST FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Shirts, Flannel</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Caps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweaters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undershirts, Wool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawers, Wool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
F. A. Stevens, LtCol, USMCR, ACOFS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
        CO, 8th Serv Regt (2)
        WIRE (1)
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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
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<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
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<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
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<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, lightweight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type Laundry</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, distillation unit</td>
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<td>TRUCKS:</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>380</td>
</tr>
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<td>3-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
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<td>23-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
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<td>23-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
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<td>23-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
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<td>23-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
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<td>23-ton, 6x6, M6A1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
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<td>95</td>
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</table>

- 1 -
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance; ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2¾-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel             | 34     | 33          |

TRACTORS:
- Light                                   | 16     | 16          |
- Medium                                  | 41     | 39          |
- Heavy                                   | 53     | 52          |
096/129

From: 0900 2 November, 1945
To: 0900 3 November, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 40

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L672

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations: (Excludes Fukuoka Occupation Group):
      
      (1) Organic units 11,383
      (2) Assigned or attached units 4,535
      (3) Allied Internees and P07's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 15,918

   b. Rations on Hand:
      
      | Type    | D/S Ashore | D/S Afloat |
      |---------|------------|------------|
      | "B"     | 7          | 0          |
      | "E"     | 6          | 0          |
      | Total   | 13         | 0          |

   c. Class III on Hand:
      
      | Ashore | Afloat | Daily Consumption |
      |--------|--------|------------------|
      | Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums |
      | Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums |
      | Fuel, motor, 80 octane | 1458 Drums | 0 Drums | 137 Drums |
      | Fuel, Diesel | 261 Drums | 0 Drums | 19 Drums |
      | Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel | 225 Drums | 0 Drums | 22 Drums |
      | Kerosene | 226 Drums | 0 Drums | 3 Drums |

   - 1 -
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: ......... 6
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (a) attached.

5. Condition of roads; bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

6. Miscellaneous:
   a. Following issues of Winter-clothing have been made to Army
      Units to date:
   (1) No change from Report No. 39:

   P. A. STEVENS,
   LtCol., USMC,
   ACMOfS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VaC (4)
CG, 8th ServResgt (2)
FILE (1)
ENCLOSURE (A)  5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 2 November, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type Laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, distillation unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCKS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-ton, 4x4, radio eq.</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>116</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M3a1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16a1 or a2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, M3a1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-1-  ENCLOSURE (A)
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2-1/2-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:
- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel        | 34       |
- 2-ton, 4x2, Flat                    | 1        |

TRUCKS:
- 2-ton, 4x2, Flat                    | 1        |

TRACTORS:
- Light                               | 16       |
- Medium                              | 41       |
- Heavy                               | 53       |
SECRET

From: 0900 3 November, 1945
To: 0900 4 November, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 41

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations:
      (1) Organic units 11,383
      (2) Assigned or attached units 4,535
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 15,918
   
   b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
      "B" Type 6 0
      Emergency Type 6 0
      TOTAL D/S 12 0
   
   c. Class III on Hand: *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption
      (1) Fuel, aircraft 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor 80 octane 1622 Drums 0 Drums 125 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 235 Drums 0 Drums 22 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded range fuel 189 Drums 0 Drums 29 Drums

-1-

SECRET
SECRET

(6) Kerosene  222 Drums  0 Drums  4 Drums

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.

** - Daily consumption as estimated on issued for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:

   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 1
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):

   a. No remarks.

6. Miscellaneous:

   a. Following issues of Winter clothing have been made to Army Units to date:

      (1) No change from Report No. 39.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
CO, 8th ServRegt (2)
FILE (1)
**ENCLOSURE (A)**

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 3 November, 1945

**MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1⁄2-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1⁄2-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, van type laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, distillation unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TRUCKS: | | |
| 1⁄2-ton, 4x4 | 394 | 384 |
| 1⁄2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped | 107 | 106 |
| 1-ton, 4x4, cargo | 61 | 60 |
| 11⁄2-ton, 4x4, cargo | 8 | 8 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo | 129 | 114 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, short wheel base | 62 | 62 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, dump | 97 | 96 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gallon | 4 | 4 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, wrecking | 8 | 7 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, instrument repair | 1 | 1 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2 | 3 | 3 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding | 1 | 1 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, M8A1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2½-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw) | 100 | 95 |
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x2, flat</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CARRIERS:**

- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel: 34

**TRACTORS:**

- Light: 16
- Medium: 41
- Heavy: 53

---

ENCLOSURE (A)
SECRET

From: 0900, 4 November, 1945
To: 0900, 5 November, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 42

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 aMS L672

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations:

      (1) Organic units 10,725
      (2) Assigned or attached units 2,884
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 13,609

   b. Rations on Hand:

      | "E" Type |          |          |
      |          | D/S ashore | D/S afloat |
      | Emergency Type | 7          | 0          |
      | TOTAL D/S       | 6          | 0          |

   c. Class III on Hand:

      |          |          | **Daily Consumption |
      |          | Ashore   | afloat  |             |
      | (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums    |
      | (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums    |
      | (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane | 1607 Drums | 0 Drums | 102 Drums  |
      | (4) Fuel, Diesel | 221 Drums | 0 Drums | 18 Drums   |
      | (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel | 544 Drums | 0 Drums | 26 Drums   |
      | (6) Kerosene | 224 Drums | 0 Drums | 6 Drums    |
5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 4 November, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**TRAILERS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type Laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-ton, distillation unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TRUCKS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, machine shop, K16A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-ton, 6x6, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of evacuation:

a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):

a. No remarks.

6. Miscellaneous:

a. Following issues of Winter clothing have been made to Army Units to date:

(1) No change from Report No. 39.

F. A. STEVENS,
Lt Col., USMC.
AGFS 0-4.

Copy to:
CG, VaC (4)
CO, 8th Serv Regt (2)
FILE (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2 1/2-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/2-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3 1/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x2, Flat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARRIERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Cargo, M-29-C, Hessel</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACTORS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
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</table>
SECRET

From: 0900, 5 November, 1945
To: 0900, 6 November, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinfl)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 43

Maps: KUSUKU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L878

1. Location of Service Installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations:

      (1) Organic units 12,519
      (2) Assigned or attached units 1,769
      (3) Allied Internes and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0

      TOTAL 14,308

   b. Rations on Hand:

      "B" Type  D/S Ashore  D/S Arloct
      Emergency Type
      TOTAL D/S  6  0  0

   c. Class III on Hand:

      #Ashore  #Arloct  #Lackation

      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 107 octane  0 Drums  0 Drums  0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane  0 Drums  0 Drums  0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane  1489 Drums  0 Drums  122 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel  186 Drums  0 Drums  24 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel  516 Drums  0 Drums  29 Drums
      (6) Kerosene  311 Drums  0 Drums  5 Drums

      - 1 -

SECRET
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

a. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 1
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

6. Miscellaneous:
   a. Following issues of Winter clothing have been made to Army Units to date:
      (1) No change from Report No. 39.

   F. A. STEVENS,
   LtCol., USNCR,
   ADfS - G-4

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
        CO, 8thSrvRegt (2)
        File (1)

- 2 -
ENCLOSED

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 5 November, 1945

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAILERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¹⁄₂-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¹⁄₂-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water, 300-gallon capacity</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, distillation unit.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TRUCKS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, M3A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, Amphibian, (Duck)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, generator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x4, r.a.f.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

CARRIERS:

Light Cargo, M-29 C, Weasel        | 34     | 33          |

TRACTOR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: 0900, 31 October, 1945
To: 0900, 7 November, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division, (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT
Weekly Report No. 1

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations:

      (1) Organic units 11,996
      (2) Assigned or attached units 1,602
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 13,798

   b. Rations on Hand:

      |                  | D/S Ashore | D/S Afloat |
      |------------------|------------|------------|
      | "B" Type         | 5          | 0          |
      | Emergency Type   | 6          | 0          |
      | TOTAL D/S        | 11         | 0          |

   c. Class III on Hand:

      |                  | *Ashore    | *Afloat    | Consumption |
      |------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
      | (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums |
      | (2) Fuel, aircraft, 75 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums |
      | (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 1228 Drums 0 Drums 114 Drums |
      | (4) Fuel, Diesel 186 Drums 0 Drums 31 Drums |
      | (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 499 Drums 0 Drums 27 Drums |
      | (6) Kerosene 217 Drums 0 Drums 6 Drums |

- 1 -
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding seven days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

3. Status of evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 11
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):
   a. No remarks.

6. Miscellaneous:
   a. Following issues of Winter clothing have been made to Army Units to date:
      (1) 121st Field Artillery Battalion (Army Issue)
      Caps, wool  82%
      Drawers, wool  22%
      Jackets  35%
      Shirts, Flannel  78%
      Trousers  70%
      Sweaters  53%
      Undershirts, wool  57%

      (2) CIC Detachments No. 403 & 496 (Marine Corps Issue)
      Caps, wool  100%
      Drawers, wool  100%
      Jackets, Wool or Field  100%
      Shirts, Flannel  100%
      Trousers  100%
      Sweaters Not issued
      Undershirts, wool  100%
F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4.
5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 6 November, 1945

MOTIVR VEHICL REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAILERS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\frac{1}{2})-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\frac{3}{4})-ton, 2-wheel dump</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel cargo</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel greasing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 2-wheel water 300 gallon capacity</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit (#1&amp;#2)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, cargo track laying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-ton, pole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-ton, machinery</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-ton, machinery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry unit, light weight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting, chrysler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floodlight</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-ton, 2-wheel, Van type laundry.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-ton, distillation unit.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUCKS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\frac{1}{4})-ton, 4x4</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\frac{3}{4})-ton, 4x4, radio equipped</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(\frac{1}{4})-ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(\frac{1}{4})-ton, 6x6, short wheel base</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(\frac{1}{4})-ton, 6x6, dump</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>2(\frac{1}{2})-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(\frac{1}{2})-ton, 6x6, wrecking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(\frac{1}{2})-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(\frac{1}{2})-ton, 6x6, instrument repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(\frac{1}{2})-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(\frac{1}{2})-ton, 6x6, M-12 Welding</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(\frac{1}{2})-ton, 6x6, M6A1</td>
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<td>2(\frac{1}{2})-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, wrecker</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
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ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

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<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ASHORE</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton</td>
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<td>Ambulance, ¼-ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance, ¾/4 ton, 4x4</td>
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<td>Car, 5-passenger</td>
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<td>Motorcycles</td>
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<td>3/4-ton, 4x4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2½-ton, 6x6, distributor</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-ton, 4x2, Flat</td>
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CARRIERS:

- Light Cargo, M-29-C, Wessel               | 34     | 33          |

TRACTORS:

- Light                                     | 16     | 16          |
- Medium                                    | 41     | 39          |
- Heavy                                     | 53     | 52          |
From: 0900, 7 November, 1945
To: 0900, 14 November, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Weekly Report No. 2

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000 AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:
   a. Strength for Army field rations:
      (1) Organic units 13,045
      (2) Assigned or attached units 1,687
      (3) Allied Internnees and POW's 0
      (4) Japanese Prisoners 0
      TOTAL 14,732

   b. Rations on Hand:
      "B" Type D/S Ashore D/S Afloat
      Emergency Type 7 7 0 0
      TOTAL D/S 14 0

   c. Class III on Hand:
      "Ashore" "Afloat" **Daily Consumption**
      (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane 0 Drums 0 Drums 0 Drums
      (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane 906 Drums 0 Drums 123 Drums
      (4) Fuel, Diesel 80 Drums 0 Drums 15 Drums
      (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel 305 Drums 0 Drums 25 Drums
      (6) Kerosene 507 Drums 0 Drums 40 Drums

- 1 -
* Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.

** Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding seven days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):


3. Status of evacuation:

   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 14

   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

   a. Satisfactory.

5. Condition of roads, bridges (including weight capacity):

   a. No remarks.

6. Miscellaneous:

   a. Following issues of Winter clothing have been made to Army Units to date:

      (1) 121st Field Artillery Battalion (Army Issue)

         Caps, wool 82%
         Drawers, wool 22%
         Jackets 35%
         Shirts, Flannel 78%
         Trousers 70%
         Sweaters 53%
         Undershirts, wool 57%

      (2) CIC Detachments No. 403 & 446 (Marine Corps Issue)

         Caps, wool 100%
         Drawers, wool 100%
         Jackets, Wool or Field 100%
         Shirts, Flannel 100%
         Trousers 100%
         Sweaters Not issued
         Undershirts, wool 100%
(3) 94th Hq & HaCo, Det Military Government (Marine Corps Issue)

Caps, wool 100%
Drawers, wool 100%
Jackets, Wool or Field 100%
Shirts, Flannel 100%
Trousers 100%
Sweaters Not issued
Undershirts, wool 100%

(4) Det 95th Mal Control & Det 203d Mal Survey Team (Army Issue)

Caps, wool None
Drawers, wool 100%
Jackets, wool or field None
Shirts, Flannel None
Trousers None
Sweaters None
Undershirts, wool 100%

F. G. Stevens
LtCol., USMC, MC
ACofS, G-4.
From: 0900 14 November, 1945  
To : 0900 21 November, 1945  
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)  

**G-4 PERIODIC REPORT**

Weekly Report No. 3  

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations:
      
      (1) Organic units  
      (2) Assigned or attached units  
      (3) Allied Internees and POW's  
      (4) Japanese Prisoners  
      
      TOTAL 14,832

   b. Rations on Hand:  
      
      | Type            | D/S Ashore | D/S Afloat |
      |-----------------|------------|------------|
      | **"B" Type**    | 7          | 0          |
      | **Emergency Type** | 7         | 0          |
      
      TOTAL D/S 14

   c. Class III on Hand:  
      
      | Type                          | Ashore | Afloat | Consumption |
      |-------------------------------|--------|--------|-------------|
      | (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane| 0 Drums| 0 Drums| 0 Drums     |
      | (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane | 0 Drums| 0 Drums| 0 Drums     |
      | (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane    | 870 Drums| 0 Drums| 120 Drums   |
      | (4) Fuel, Diesel              | 351 Drums| 0 Drums| 13 Drums    |
      | (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel| 81 Drums| 0 Drums| 32 Drums    |
      | (6) Kerosene                  | 148 Drums| 0 Drums| 51 Drums    |

1269
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding seven days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of Evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 55
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. Satisfactory.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:
   a. No remarks.

FOOTNOTE: Correction to Weekly Report No. 1 Period 31 October to 7 November. Paragraph 2(c)(6) Number of Drums Ashore should be 415.

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4.

Copy to: CG, VAC (4)
        CO, 8thServRegt (2)
        FILE - (1)
Weekly Report No. [1]

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

   a. Strength for Army field rations:

   (1) Organic units  11,452
   (2) Assigned or attached units  1,505
   (3) Allied Internnees and POW's  0
   (4) Japanese Prisoners  0
   **TOTAL**  12,957

   b. Rations on Hand:

     | Type       | D/S Ashore | D/S Afloat |
     |------------|------------|------------|
     | "B" Type   | 11         | 0          |
     | Emergency  | 7          | 0          |
     **TOTAL**  | **18**     | **0**      |

   c. Class III on Hand:

     | Description        | *Ashore | *Afloat | **Consumption** |
     |--------------------|---------|---------|-----------------|
     | (1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums         |
     | (2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane  | 0 Drums | 0 Drums | 0 Drums         |
     | (3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane    | 792 Drums | 0 Drums | 99 Drums        |
     | (4) Fuel, Diesel             | 297 Drums | 0 Drums | 8 Drums         |
     | (5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel | 75 Drums | 0 Drums | 31 Drums        |
     | (6) Kerosene                | 290 Drums | 0 Drums | 23 Drums        |
SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding seven days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):
   (1) No critical shortages.

3. Status of Evacuation:
   a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 4
   b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:
   a. Satisfactory

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:
   a. No remarks.

F. A. Stevens,
LtCol., USMC,
ACofS - G-4.

Copy to:  CG, VaO (1)
CG, 8thSvrsRes (2)
FILM (1)
PART 5 - 5TH MARINE DIVISION

OPERATION REPORT

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

ANNEX FOX - SIGNAL COMMUNICATION REPORT
ANNEX GEORGE - 26TH MARINES REPORT
ANNEX HOW - 27TH MARINES REPORT
ANNEX ITEL. - 26TH MARINES REPORT
ANNEX JIG - 13TH MARINES REPORT
ANNEX KING - 5TH TANK BN REPORT

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OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SIGNAL OFFICER,  
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,  
C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.  

CONFIDENTIAL  

30 November, 1945.  

From:  
The Division Signal Officer.  

To:  
The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.  

Subject:  
Signal Communication Operation Report,  
Occupation of Japan.  

Reference:  
(a) DivSpecialOrder No. 355-1945.  

1. In accordance with reference (a), the enclosed  
Signal Communication report is submitted as Annex Fox to the  
5th Marine Division Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

[Signature]

J. Larson
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945.

ANNEX FOX TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT,
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION REPORT

1. PLANNING:

On 11 July 1945 the Signal Officer received information
of the mission assigned this Division in the assault on
Southern Kyushu, Japan. Initial information for briefing was
obtained through Division Liaison with Corps Headquarters and
documents from higher headquarters including the 5th Amphibious
Corps’ 1st tentative signal plan. On 23 July, the 5th Amph-
ibious Corps Signal Officer passed on to the Division Signal
Officer information that he had gathered through direct
personal contact with Sixth Army Headquarters. Although the
information obtained up to and including 25 July, was sparse,
it enabled the Signal Officer to formulate a skeleton plan
for use in connection with training and equipping the Division
in signal equipment.

On 28 July the 5th Amphibious Corps 2nd tentative Signal
plan was received. This plan was in the form of a complete
annex rather than an annex with Signal operation instructions.
From this plan the Division Signal Officer was able to obtain
the necessary information to formulate a plan for the Division.
Since certain information was lacking and some information
subject to change it was decided that an SOI (Signal Operation
Instructions) would be the most suitable due to the ease with
which changes could be made.

On 12 August the final draft of the 5th Amphibious Corps
signal plan for the assault on Southern Kyushu was received.
This plan contained some late changes and enabled the Division
Signal Officer to commence preparation of an SOI and Signal
Annex with fairly accurate information.

After the official acceptance of the surrender terms by
Japan on 14 August, 1945, the Division Signal Officer contacted
the Corps Signal Officer and obtained information that the

- 1 -

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Signal plan for the assault on Southern Kyushu was still effective. On 19 August information was received that the Division would participate in the occupation of Sasebo, Japan and at the same time be prepared to execute combat missions; however, the signal plan, as previously planned, remained in effect. As a result the SOI and Signal Annex for the Division order were prepared and issued during the period 20 August to 25 August.

The first elements of the Division began embarking aboard ships of Transport Squadron 22 on 22 August with the Division command post closing on Hawaii and opening on the USS WESTMORELAND (APA 104) at 1100 27 August 1945. Due to the rapidity with which the Division was required to embark, little or no opportunity for liaison with shore communication officers presented itself prior to embarkation. Details for communications while aboard ship had to be worked out at the time of embarkation.

While at Pearl Harbor during the rehabilitation period, 28 August to 1 September, the Corps Signal Plan for the occupation of the Sasebo area was received. This necessitated several changes in the Division Signal Plan. These changes were made orally at a conference of all communication officers of the Division called by the Division Signal Officer at Pearl Harbor for that purpose. During this conference communication officers were also briefed on the plan for the occupation of the Sasebo area. During the voyage to Saipan changes to the SOI and Signal Annex were prepared. Upon arrival at Saipan another conference of Division Communication Officers was held during which the changes to the SOI and Signal Annex were distributed and the latest information concerning the forthcoming operation was disseminated.

2. TRAINING:

At the time information was received relative to this Division's participation in the assault on Southern Kyushu, communication units of the Division were engaged in unit land exercises, landing exercises, and Division Command Post exercises with a large amount of emphasis on communication. It is believed that as a result of the Iwo Jima campaign all commanders within the Division had become, and were, "Communication Conscious". Consequently, the emphasis on communication
training by all units was of an intensive nature. Radio countermeasure, long lines of communication, difficult terrain, signal supply difficulties and moisture fungus proofing were stressed. Radio countermeasure training was conducted by a special countermeasure team furnished by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. This special training had just been completed when the Division received its instructions as to the assault on Southern Kyushu. The problems encountered by the 3rd Amphibious Corps on Okinawa were stressed in the latter phases of training since the assault on Southern Kyushu would in all probability present the same communication difficulties.

Control vessels were requested to conduct a ship to shore CPX but were not available. Division Command Post exercises (Communication) were conducted once a week. These CPXs included the Assault Signal Company with shore and beach party, Naval gunfire, and air liaison communication setups. But 15 August it was felt that communication units of the Division were ready for combat operations.

Upon leaving Pearl Harbor on 1 September 1945, after the rehabilitation period, training for communication personnel consisted of thorough briefing on the occupation of the Sasebo area. Included in this training was the study of Japanese phrases relative to communication equipment and operation. A thorough study of the divisional occupation area included the condition of Japanese wire lines, radio equipment, prospective command post locations for our own units, and wire routes for our own wire lines. Message Center procedure and security were stressed and radio procedure was improved by use of telegraph sets TG-5A. Navajo code talkers received additional instruction by means of transmitting messages over field telephone system aboard ship. Communication personnel were also instructed as to their duties in connection with the occupation of the Sasebo area including behavior towards the Japanese, neatness and military bearing.

3. PERSONNEL:

This Division left for the occupation of Japan with a shortage of 100 enlisted wire communication personnel. This
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Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv Orm Report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

A shortage was offset by line personnel who had been trained in wire communication schools established within the Division after the Iwo Jima campaign. In addition some radio personnel were used as wire communication personnel. Radio personnel within the Division had always been in excess of the tables of organization. Conversely, wire personnel had been continually understrength.

Prior to embarkation Navajo code talkers were assigned from the Signal Company on the following basis: 4 to each regiment and 6 to the Reconnaissance Company leaving 13 with the Signal Company. There were 35 Navajo code talkers in the Division upon embarkation or 3 less than authorized.

On 10 June 1945, a radio link team of 6 men and equipment was assigned to the Division by the 5th Amphibious Corps. This team installed radio link equipment for operation with Corps Headquarters. The equipment and personnel embarked with the Division but reverted to Corps upon landing at Saebode. During the voyage to Saebode, these personnel technically supervised ship board radio teletype with the Corps Headquarters ship.

The lack of temporary promotions for communication personnel within this Division since its activation has been a cause for much concern. In almost two years time the total temporary promotions have not exceeded 100, not including organizational promotions later changed to temporary. As a result, numerous men who have served earnestly and well, in and out of combat, have had very small possibilities for advancement within a period of the past three years. Further, the lack of promotions has failed to provide the appropriate commanding officer with a means of rewarding certain personnel whose services would deem such a reward desirable.

4. SIGNAL SUPPLY:

When the planning began for the assault on Southern Kyushu this division was in the process of moisture-fungus proofing all signal equipment of an electronic nature. This was accomplished by a special moisture-fungus proofing team from Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and was completed during the latter part of July. It is now a known fact that this processing definitely reduced failures of electronic signal.
equipment during the occupation of Japan.

During July 1945, the 5th Reconnaissance Company was equipped as an armored reconnaissance unit. This required additional signal equipment which was procured without undue delay.

During the latter part of July, 30-40 megacycle crystals for the SCR-610's of the artillery regiment were requisitioned. Also at that time, sufficient information was available to requisition crystals ground to assigned frequencies for all TCS/TBX radio nets within the division. These were received on 12 August, with few exceptions.

On 1 August signal supply within the division was 99% complete. This included 30 day replenishments plus an additional 15% of dry batteries and field wire with 10 days re-supply of expendable items carried by lower echelons. Only minor items were lacking, all of which were on back order. These deficiencies were of such a nature as to cause little or no hindrance to contemplated signal operations.

During the preparation for the assault on Southern Kyushu an LSM was assigned to this division for the purpose of lifting signal equipment exclusively. This assignment was cancelled for the occupational mission.

Loading of Division Signal Quartermaster equipment commenced at Hilo, Hawaii on 22 August. This equipment was dispersed equally between two APAs, namely the Assistant Division Commander's and the Commanding General's. Last minute instructions from Corps required embarkation of the WTC-9 switchboard and 50 TP-6 telephones then installed at Marine Camp, Hawaii. This was accomplished with little difficulty.

While at Pearl Harbor, during the rehabilitation period, 50 SCR-694 radio sets were obtained and loaded aboard ship in compliance with a directive from the Corps signal officer. Dry batteries for these sets were not available, however, the radios could be used for vehicle operation. The Division
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Annex- Fox to 5th MarDiv OBS Report, Occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

Signal Quartermaster also obtained and loaded aboard ships at Pearl Harbor sufficient crystal and coil sets for SCR-536s to fill deficiencies in that item.

Upon arriving at Sasebo, Japan, both ships containing signal quartermaster equipment were unloaded at the dock. Initially, closed storage space for this equipment was not available, although, space was made available shortly after unloading commenced.

After the Division's arrival at Sasebo, Japan, the requirements of subordinate units for resupply were, in most cases, filled through allowances carried by those units. This situation was due to the early construction of complete wire systems, thereby sharply reducing the use of radio equipment. About 60 miles of spiral 4 cable, WC549, with messenger was obtained from Corps for construction of long wire lines. The function of the Signal Quartermaster, after arrival in Japan, amounted only to small issues of field wire, dry batteries, and other expendable supplies. Signal supplies, in most cases, were in excess of requirements. The only requests made to higher supply echelons for additional equipment consisted of 1 power transformer for SCR-299 radio from the 8th Service Regiment and the 30 miles of spiral 4 cable and messenger from the Fifth Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion.

5. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS:

Signal operations during the occupation of the Sasebo Area of Japan, with few exceptions, were highly successful. Normal assault communications were strictly adhered to in the ship to shore movement beginning at NAM hour ABLE - day. Command posts of subordinate units were echeloned ashore without undue difficulty. Radio was used almost entirely for transmission of operational and administrative traffic until A plus 2 day when the wire system was sufficiently established to reduce radio traffic considerably. The Assistant Division Commander and his group established the forward division command post ashore at 1215 A-day at the Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks. Personnel and equipment of the forward command post were supplemented by all Signal Company personnel and equipment in the Division Command ship (USS WESTMORELAND) that were not required.

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Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

for communication duties aboard that ship. The forward command post group immediately established radio communication on all Division radio nets and wire construction to subordinate units was started. Many difficulties in wire construction were encountered. Due to the bombing of the City of Sasebo and a recent typhoon, Japanese electrical power and telephone lines were a broken down and tangled mass. Broken power lines still had power on, thus presenting the possibility of electrical shock which was not uncommon among wire personnel. Fortunately no fatal accidents of that nature occurred. Wire construction continued throughout the night of A-day through a drenching rain storm. By the afternoon of A-plus one day wire communication had been established with all subordinate units and doubling up of wire lines had commenced.

The Commanding General moved his Command Post from the USS WESTMORELAND to the Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks Area at 1300, A-plus one day. Scheduled messenger runs were established immediately and communications throughout the Division were satisfactory. Wire lines, as yet, were not dependable, consequently, all radio nets operated on a 24 hour a day basis.

On A-plus 3 days the Commanding General decided to displace his command post from the Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks Area to the Naval Training Station. The Division Command Post opened at the Naval Training Station at 1300 on A-plus 5 days. Prior to the opening of the Command Post in this new location, Division wire personnel had extended wire lines of subordinate units and wire communication within the new command post had been established by use of Japanese telephone and cable installations. A Japanese switchboard of 200 line capacity was present but was not used due to its state of ill repair. Instead an MTC-2 switchboard was installed using Japanese and TP-6 type telephones. Other communication facilities were installed and ready for use upon opening of the command post at the Naval Training Station.

After establishment of the Division Command Post at the Naval Training Station, AINOURA, KYUSHU, JAPAN, wire lines
were improved and, in the case of long lines, spiral four cable, WC548, substituted for existing field wire lines. Wire construction and the police of wire lines was seriously set back by the occurrence of a typhoon on 12 October 1945. By 20 October, however, the wire system was considered satisfactory except for a large amount of policing of the lines remaining. Changes in the wire system occurred frequently due to the shifting of subordinate units from one location to another. These changes were promptly made without difficulty. Japanese commercial telephone lines were utilized for direct communication with outlying units at Kurume, Saga, and Oita. The Japanese cooperated fully in the establishment of these connections.

After 15 October, radio communications were used in event of severance of wire lines and in the case of patrol activity. A special purpose net was operated by division headquarters for communications with units at Kurume, Saga, and Oita, with patrols under division control entering this net from time to time as required. SCR-299 and 399 radio sets were used for communication with the aforesaid outlying units.

In division headquarters the communication office and message center operated as a combined communication center under the supervision of the division communication officer. The communication center, besides handling dispatch traffic, also operated a scheduled motorized messenger service to subordinate units in the Sasebo area. Three trips were made daily, each trip involving a circuit distance of slightly more than 50 miles. For outlying units such as those at Kurume, Saga, and Oita, messenger and guard mail was handled by means of OY-1 aircraft and utilization of supply activities to these units. In addition personnel from these outlying units visiting division headquarters were utilized as messengers.

On Able plus 2 days, 24 September, the Fifth Amphibious Corps assumed radio guard for this division. Traffic to and from the division was passed via teletype. After 5 October radio with Corps was utilized only as an emergency means of communication in the event of teletype or telephone failure.

Details of the Signal Company and the Assault Signal Company operations are attached to this annex as appendix 1 and 2, respectively.
Signal repair for the occupation of Sasebo, Japan, was of a minor nature. The majority of repairs consisted of recreational radio repair. Technicians of the repair section were used in identifying signal equipment seized from the Japanese. Repairs for the SCR-510s and 528s of the Military Police Company made up the majority of repairs for military signal equipment.

Signal supply during the occupation was sufficient except for a few items, recommendations for which are given elsewhere in this report. Due to the extensive military police activity, requirements for 6 additional SCR-510s was met through utilization of that type of equipment from the 5th Tank Battalion for use by the Military Police Company. One pole line construction truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, M-5-M-8, was borrowed from the Corps Signal Battalion and used for approximately 10 days following the typhoon of 12 October. This truck was of tremendous value in rehabilitating the damage caused by high winds.

An extreme shortage of transportation occurred during the first month of the Sasebo occupation. This was especially true in the message center and wire platoon of the Division Signal Company as well as in lower echelons. However, after the wire system reached a dependable state, the transportation difficulty for communications units was not acute.

There was little use of Japanese signal equipment by communication units of this division during their occupation operations. Japanese telephones, telephone cable, meters, etc., were used in limited quantities with fair results. Japanese signal equipment as compared with United States standards was, for the most part, inferior. Equipment, in general, showed excellent workmanship but poor quality.

A special study was made of the Japanese Sasebo Naval Base air defense system by personnel of the Signal Company and JICPOA. The nerve center for this system was located in a huge underground command post located in Sasebo. Complete signal and plotting facilities were installed therein. Communication facilities with various outposts, radars, lookouts, etc., appeared to be excellent, however, methods of warning
and plane identification were inferior to our own in that
Japanese planes did not possess an IFF (Identification Friend
or Foe) and therefore had to be identified visually. A
written report, complete with photographs, covering the complete
underground command post was prepared and submitted to Corps
Headquarters on 10 October.

Large amounts of Japanese Signal equipment were discovered
stored in warehouses and caves. This equipment was inventoried,
processed, and disposed of in accordance with instructions from
higher headquarters. In addition numerous Japanese radar
installations and several large military radio installations
were located. Radar and radio stations were disposed of as
ordered by higher headquarters, however, a radio station at
Kurume and one at the Sasebo Naval Base were authorized by the
Supreme Commander Allied Powers for use by the Japanese in
connection with demobilization and repatriation of Japanese
military personnel. Some Japanese interference on our own radio
nets was encountered but it was fairly well established that
such interference was not intentional. Duplication or close
proximity of frequencies accounted for interference in almost
every case.

Line route maps and circuit diagrams were received from
subordinate units once a week. Likewise, these were consoli-
dated and submitted to Corps. Traffic diagrams were issued
at the time of each major change in the telephone system.
The presence of up to date traffic diagrams in all Division
staff offices and in lower echelons speeded the heavy telephone
traffic. A complete telephone directory was issued on 5
October with a new up to date directory being issued on
1 November.

6. CONTENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The decreases in tables of allowances as set forth
below should not apply for a Marine Division anticipating any
combat operations.

a. (1) Comment
Stabilized situations arising from occupation opera-
tions and extended telephone wire lines requiring the use of
a better means of transmission require the use of less field wire, W-110B, and assault wire, W-130, than used in combat operations.

(2) Recommendation

(a) Decrease assault wire, W-130 to 20% of present allowances.

(b) Decrease field wire, W-110B, to 70% of present allowances.

b. (1) Comment

Due to the usual over extended wire system occupation operations create a great need for rubber covered telephone cable, WC-548 and WC-534. This type of cable is capable of better transmission, it requires less maintenance, and when installed properly it gives satisfactory service over longer periods than field wire.

(2) Recommendation

Authorize 100 miles of rubber covered cable, WC-548, and 20 miles of rubber covered cable, WC-534 complete with necessary messenger wire per Marine Division.

c. (1) Comment

Broken down and tangled electrical wires are a source of great danger to wire personnel engaged in wire construction and trouble shooting. This was especially true in Japan with a result that numerous personnel received electrical shock due to the lack of proper protection.

(2) Recommendation

Establish an allowance of rubber gloves, electrical, LC-23, on the basis of 100 pair per Marine Division.
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Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv Own Report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

d. (1) Comment

During the past operation the telephone traffic at Division headquarters was tremendous. As many as 3500 telephone calls were made daily with most of these calls occurring between 0800 and 1700. The switchboard, TC-4, as presently authorized, cannot be operated with the speed required nor does it have the required capacity. A more desirable switchboard is the NTC-2 as used by this Division.

(2) Recommendation

(a) Delete two switchboards, TC-4, from present Signal Company allowance.
(b) Authorize 1 switchboard, NTC-2 per Signal Company, Marine Division.

e. (1) Comment

Long telephone lines require the use of boosters or repeaters to increase their transmission efficiency. Loading coil, C-114, are unsatisfactory for field use.

(2) Recommendation

(a) Delete present allowances of loading coils, C-114.
(b) Establish allowance of telephone repeaters, EE-89 as follows: 8 per Infantry and Artillery Regiment; 16 per Signal Company, Marine Division.

f. (1) Comment

The present pole line construction equipment is inadequate. During the occupation phase all wire lines were overheaded and all cable was constructed on messenger wire. The maintenance of such a wire system is difficult without proper equipment and transportation.

(2) Recommendation

(a) Authorize one pole line construction truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, M-5-K-6, per Division Signal Company.
(b) authorize 4 trucks, 3½ ton, 4x4, per Division Signal Company.
g. (1) Comment

Due to the probability of long distances between Division Headquarters and subordinate units and the poor state of repair of commercial telephone facilities, present equipment is not sufficient to cope with the difficulties arising therefrom.

(2) Recommendation

(a) Authorize one 100 mile radio link and carrier equipment, AN/TGC-2, plus necessary operating personnel per Signal Company, Marine Division.
(b) Increase present allowance of radio equipment, SCR-299 by 2 per Signal Company, Marine Division.
(c) Increase telegraph printer allowance by 3 per Signal Company, Marine Division.

h. (1) Comment

The requirements for portable radio operation were considerably less than for a combat operation, therefore, the numerous dry batteries landed with this Division, were excessive.

(2) Recommendation

Decrease allowances of all types of dry batteries by 30%.

i. (1) Comment

Navajo code talkers were used extensively in transmitting classified traffic over voice radio and telephone. They were especially useful in handling radio traffic during patrol activities.

(2) Recommendation

No change.
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Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

j. (1) Comment

Transportation difficulties were a problem during the first month of occupation. Long distances were included in message center runs and in wire construction and maintenance.

(2) Recommendation

Establish an allowance of trucks, 1/4 ton, 4x4 as organic equipment on the following basis: a total of 4 per communication platoon, 5th Signal Company, Infantry Regiment; 4 per Communication Section, 5th Battery, Artillery Regiment, and an increase of 6 per Signal Company, Marine Division.

Appendix 1 - Signal Company Operation Report
Appendix 2 - 5th Assault Signal Company Operation Report
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX FOX TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT,
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

SIGNAL COMPANY OPERATION REPORT

1. PLANNING:

The Commanding Officer was informed of the assault on Southern Kyushu on 15 July, 1945. Plans were formulated for advanced signal training and command post exercises. After the surrender of the Japanese Empire he was notified of the change to the occupation duty. The command post exercises ceased and it was felt that no additional specialized communication training was necessary. Planning from this date until the Division departed from Hawaii involved the assignment of personnel and equipment to their proper echelons and preparations for shipboard training when complete information regarding the operation became available.

2. TRAINING:

Upon being informed of the assault on Southern Kyushu, the Commanding Officer adopted a program of command post exercises in which the regiments were simulated by small detachments from this company. Between 15 July and 15 August four command post exercises were held in which the regimental communication sections participated. In the last CPX the Division and regimental staffs also took part. By 15 August it was felt that this company was 100% ready for an operation.

Prior to 15 July thirty-one Indian Code talkers had been withdrawn from the infantry regiments and were placed in the Message Center Platoon for training. They received daily training in the Navajo vocabulary, radio and wire communication, message center procedure, the organization of the Division, coding devices, semaphore, weapons and English spelling. In addition they trained a minimum of two hours a day on radio and wire nets. The aim of this training was to prepare each man so that he could transmit and receive operation orders and dispatch summaries with 100% accuracy. Tests proved that this was achieved.
A greater part of the shipboard training was devoted to facts concerning the operation such as the operation order, the administrative order, the mission of the company, the communication plan and the company operation order. Indian code talkers practiced transmissions on a telephone net and CW radio operators practiced on a TG-5 net. Training was conducted in the history and customs of Japan, words and phrases, and conduct of our troops on occupation duty.

3. PERSONNEL:

Casualties from the Iwo Jima operation were very light and few replacements were needed. On 15 July this company was at 97.3% of T/O strength. In anticipation of the assault on Southern Kyushu it was requested that the total enlisted personnel be increased by 45 men of whom 30 were to be wiremen and 15 message center men. When the assault operation was changed to occupation of Japan this request was discarded. Prior to departure for the occupation operation 4 Indian code talkers were transferred to each of the regiments of the Division and upon departure the company was at 97.9% of T/O strength.

Personnel for the occupation operation were divided into three groups, the CG echelon, the ADC echelon, and the Rear Echelon. The CG echelon had a total of 7 officers and 143 enlisted, of whom 43 were wiremen, 43 radio men, and 37 message center men, and 12 signal repair, quartermaster, and headquarters. The ADC echelon had a total of 5 officers, 143 enlisted, of whom 38 were wiremen, 38 radio men, 22 message center men, and 35 signal repair, quartermaster and headquarters.

Prior to 15 November personnel losses were 35 returned to the United States for discharge.

4. EQUIPMENT:

No logistic plans were made for the assault operation. For the occupation operation two complete communication teams were furnished for the forward echelon; unnecessary equipment was left in the rear echelon. The CG echelon carried; 150 miles of W-110, 10 miles W-130, 1 TC-4, 1 HTC-2, 50 telephones EE-6, 50 TP-6, 2 wire jeeps, 2 wheeled, 5 wire team chests,
Appendix 1 to Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv Operation report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd).

40 sets of climbers, 5 miles 5-pair cable rubber covered, 1 SCR-299, 5 TCSs, 1 SCR-193, 2 SCR-608s, 5 SCR-610s, 9 TBSs, 6 SCR-300s, enough batteries to supply all radio sets for 30 days continuous operation and message center and signal repair equipment. The ADC echelon carried; 150 miles wire W-110, 10 miles W-180, 1 TC-4, 50 telephones EE-8, 2 wire jeeps, 1 truck, 2½ ton, 1 weasel, 5 wire team carts, 40 sets of climbers, 1 SCR, 4 TCSs, 1 SCR-193, 1 SCR-608, 4 SCR-610s, 6 TBSs, 4 SCR-300s, enough batteries to supply all radio sets for 30 days operation, message center equipment, one message center jeep, and signal repair equipment. All vehicles were combat loaded.

5. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATION:

Enroute to Sasebo a communication office and a message center were operated aboard the CG ship and communications between the two VAC Headquarters ships and the Division Headquarters ship were furnished by visual agencies which were supplied and manned by the Navy, a TBS circuit supplied by the Navy which provided a voice channel for staff officers, and a radioteletype circuit.

A BD-72 was installed in the message center of the CG ship on A minus one and telephones were placed in the four radio rooms, the operations room (Division Command Post), the officers’ wardroom, the communication office, staff rooms, and the message center. At Nan minus four hours, A Day, runners were stationed at each of these locations. Radio silence was lifted at Nan minus four and at Nan minus three the command post was in complete communication with all units. This command post remained in operation until 1300 of A plus one.

An advance message center party debarked from the ADC ship at approximately Nan plus one hour and landed at the Sasebo Naval Air Station. Proceeding inland they established the advance command post at the Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks at 1205. The remainder of the ADC party proceeded from the Small Boat Basin, where they landed, to the Sasebo
Fortress Artillery Barracks and expanded the communication installations of that command post.

The Division command post closed aboard ship at 1300 of A plus one and opened at the Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks at the same time. At 1400 of A plus five it was moved to the Ainoura Naval Training Station.

Two wire teams went ashore with the advance message center party on A Day to construct lines to the Shore Party. Remaining wiremen from the ADC ship went direct to the Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks where they installed a TC-4 switchboard. Wire was in and operating to all units by the night of A plus one. A total of twelve trunk lines and thirty-two local lines served the Division Command Post.

On A plus 5 the command post was moved to the Ainoura Naval Training Station. It was originally planned to use the Japanese switchboard that was already installed there but it was in such a bad state of disrepair that it was replaced by a switchboard, NTC-2. From this board four trunk lines were run to the Shore Party board, two to the 27th Marines, two to the 26th Marines, and seventy-five local lines to serve the Division command post. An additional switchboard, a TC-4, was installed in Service Troops headquarters when that organization moved into the Training Station and was operated and maintained by personnel from this company.

Japanese poles were used to carry lines into the Training Station switchboard but following the storm which struck this area on 12 October many had to be replaced and those that were left standing had to be braced and repaired. Upon completion of these repairs all long field wire trunks were replaced by Spiral 4 cable and three additional trunk lines were installed to the Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks. In some places existing open wire lines were used after minor repairs were made.

Until A plus Two, when wire communications were fully established, radio carried the greatest part of the communication load. Initially ten radio nets were entered by the CG echelon, namely, three Corps command nets, three Division command nets, the Division special purpose net, the CG-ADC net,
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Appendix 1 to Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv Operation report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

the support air observer net, and the harbor control net. The ADC, operating in all but the harbor control net, landed and entered all nets ashore by 1600 of A Day. On A plus one the CG echelon landed and took over the ADC's radio installations.

Four radio nets — one Corps command net, Division command net "C", Division special purpose net, and the CG-ADC net — were secured on A plus four when it was noted that wire agencies were carrying a greater part of the load. The remaining nets were moved to the Ainsura Naval Training Station when the command post left the Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks on A plus 5, one week later. On a plus 12, the Corps command net (V-FM) and Division command net "B" were secured. On 10 October the remaining Corps command net was secured. Radios were held in readiness on all these nets, however, in the event that wire communications should fail. It must be noted here that there was not a single failure in radio communications from the time radio silence was lifted on A Day until the nets were secured.

A radioteletype net was established during the voyage for communications between the two VAC headquarters ships and the Division Headquarters ship. Navy radio teletypewriter writers were utilized for this purpose. This net was secured on A plus one and teletype communications were resumed the following day, A plus two, between the Division command post at Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks and the Corps advance message center.

The communications office and message center were in continuous operation throughout the voyage. At Nan minus four on A Day the message center was expanded to accommodate the traffic increase of the ship-to-shore movement, a message routing section was set-up, and runners were stationed at strategic positions throughout the ship. This message center was secured at 1300, A plus one, when the command post was moved to Sasebo Fortress Artillery Barracks, to augment the ADC message center. Scheduled messenger jeep runs were begun on A plus two to all units ashore and scheduled and special
messenger service continued uninterrupted. Three regular runs were made each day to 28 units covering a total of 150 miles daily.

When the Division command post was moved to the Aizuura Naval Training Station, the communication office and message center were consolidated into a Division Communication Center. The Division Communication Officer was placed in over-all charge of the Communication Center which consisted of an administrative message center handling all guard mail and messenger traffic and a communication office which handled dispatch traffic. The message center platoon furnished enlisted personnel as supervisors, clerks, typists, runners, and drivers. The radio platoon furnished the teletype operators in the communication office, and the former coding board furnished Communication Watch Officers. The communication center operated continuously.

6. CONCLUSION:

The communication services provided by the Signal Company were adequate and satisfactory throughout the occupation operation. Personnel were adequate, well trained and performed their duties in an excellent manner. Equipment and supply was sufficient except as noted in the Signal Annex.
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX FOX TO 6TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

5TH ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY OPERATION REPORT

1. PLANNING:

During the latter part of July when plans were being formulated for the Assault on Southern Kyushu, the Division Signal Officer had called upon the Commanding Officer to furnish him with probable frequency, crystal, and call sign requirements. It was decided the Commanding Officer would act as the Division Shore Party Communication Officer. It was further decided that the Executive Officer of AS CO would become a part of the support group for the operation acting in the capacity of a liaison officer between the Support Group and units of the AS CO, for administrative purposes.

During the planning and training for the Iwo Jima operation the Communication Teams had been attached to the various Battalion Landing Teams that the Shore Party was to support in combat rather than to the battalions of the Shore Party Regiment for when they were to provide communications. The disadvantages of this disposition soon became apparent in combat, and during the planning stage for the Assault on Southern Kyushu, attachment to and familiarization with the Shore Party Regiment, its officers, and its functions, were strongly emphasized. Shore and Beach Party Communication Teams were tentatively assigned directly to the three battalions and the Headquarters of the Shore Party Regiment at the rate of two per battalion and three to the Regimental Headquarters. (According to the new T/O AS CO rated nine, not ten teams. The tenth team had been previously disbanded to replace C.P. shortages within AS CO).

Reorganization in accordance with the new T/O G-88 had been effected and there were still a few shortages in communications personnel, however, effort were being made to obtain replacements. Officer personnel was up to T/O strength in all sections, except Air Liaison, and replacements for this section had been properly requested from G-1.
Administrative work, which prior to and during the Iwo Jima operation was overwhelming, had been greatly reduced since the ASCO had become an organic part of division. Field administrative forms, casualty cards, embarkation rosters, etc., were largely prepared by, or under the direction of, Headquarters Battalion.

Plans for an assault landing on the Japanese home islands were well underway when the Japanese officially accepted the Allied surrender terms. Shortly thereafter the Commanding Officer was informed that the 5th ASCO would accompany the Division to Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, where it would participate in a "Combat Prepared" landing involving readiness of Air and Naval Gunfire support. Time was short and preparations for embarkation began immediately.

Arrangements were made with the Division Signal Officer and the Commanding Officer Shore Party Regiment to boat all Communication teams with the respective Shore Party commanders. They were to become a part of the Task organization of the Shore Party Regiment upon embarkation.

Air Liaison Parties were attached in accordance with their S.O.P., i.e., one to each Battalion Landing Team, one to each Regimental Combat Team, and one to Division.

Shore Fire Control Parties were attached in the same manner as the ALPS except that the third Battalion, 28th Marines had in addition to its own SFCP, the SFCP of the First Battalion, 28th Marines.

The Rear Echelon was to consist of 17 men and one officer, which was considered the absolute minimum of personnel which could be left behind. Administrative personnel, including the First Sergeant, the Quartermaster Section, Motor Transport Repair Section, and cooks were all to be taken along as part of the Support Group under the direct control of the Executive Officer.

Conferences were held during the rehabilitation period at Pearl Harbor and at Saipan, during which S.O.P.'s and annexes to the operation plan were issued and discussed. In a Communic-
Appendix 2 to Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

Sections Conference with the Division Signal Officer specific plans for the establishment of Dock Communications were outlined.

2. EQUIPMENT:

Equipment for all sections of the ASCO for the occupation of Japan remained largely the same as for the Iwo Jima operation. The TES-8 radio set had completely replaced all TBS-5 radio sets. The inadequate lance poles previously used by the Communication Teams for overheading wire lines had been replaced by twenty feet two by four. (30 per team)

The radio equipped 1/4 ton trucks, type MAL, which had proved to be of little value at Iwo Jima were replaced by radio equipped 1/4 ton trucks, type AN/VRC-1 (SCR-193 & SCR-542). With only one or two exceptions, the entire lot had to be thoroughly re-worked before they were usable. The SCR-193 component performed very satisfactorily, but the SCR-542 (VHF) gave trouble upon the slightest provocation and was generally considered "two fragile" and "too temperamental" to be depended upon in combat. TES-8's and SCR-536's were carried by all teams as well as spare batteries, wire, and a few spare parts.

Only one of the four Radar Beacon sets, type OH-1, was to be carried by the Shore Fire Control Parties and this one was to be taken alone under the control of the Division Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer to be used "on call" only. The SCR-694's which were to replace the TES-8's in this section were not received in time to effect this greatly desired change. It was decided, however, to take them along to the target under Division control and substitute them there if the need occurred.

Due to the shortage of shipping space, ten jeeps, nine 1/4 ton trailers, three 1 ton trucks, and one lubricating trailer were left in the rear echelon.

Crystals previously requested for the Support Air Request, Logistical Control, Shore Party Lateral, and Naval Gunfire Common Nets were received and distributed just prior to embarkation.
During the Rehabilitation Periods at Pearl Harbor and Saipan two defective dynamotors for radio equipped 1/4 ton trucks, type AN/VRC-1 and one defective SCR-500 were surveyed at Base Deprts.

3. TRAINING:

Following the completion of the rehabilitation and recreation program embarked upon by all units of the 5th Marine Division subsequent to the assault and capture of Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, re-training of all sections of the ASCO commenced. The entire Shore Fire Control Section was ordered to Pearl Harbor for temporary duty with the Naval Gunfire Section, FNF, Pac., in connection with further training in Naval Gunfire procedure. During this special refresher course three CPX's were conducted, with the cooperation of DESPAC which furnished ships, placing emphasis upon the importance of using correct firing procedure. In the meantime, re-training of the Air Liaison Parties and the Shore Party Communication Teams was being conducted in accordance with the Division training program which provided for adequate coverage of all stages of training from individual and basic specialities to RCT and Division training. The need for a short, intensive, and up-to-date course covering all phases and capabilities of Aviation in Close Support of Infantry had become apparent during the Iwo Jima operation, and during the company stage training phase such a course was set up at MAUI by AIR, FNF, PAC. Attendance was limited to officers only and it is recommended that in the future such courses be altered to include enlisted personnel.

By late June all sections had successfully completed the special courses offered them and had been returned to 5th ASCO temporary duty completed. Pending receipt of orders for the Assault on Southern Kyushu, training for Shore Party Communication Teams, Air Liaison Parties, and Shore Fire Control Parties was conducted largely in accordance with the SOP for employment of such units. Commence CPX's were held regularly with all sections cooperating to simulate battalions, regiments, aircraft, and firing ships.

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Appendix 2 to Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

In July, during the Battalion Landing Team training phase of the Division, the Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire Sections were moved out of the ASCO area and into the areas of the Regiments and Battalions that they were to support in combat for familiarization and training purposes. Since the Shore Party Regiment had not been formed, the Shore and Beach Party Communication Teams remained in the ASCO area where supervised training continued; however, components of all teams were sent to the Pioneer Battalion (which was to be a nucleus for the Shore Party Regiment) for a week of familiarization and training. During this month and in the early part of August all elements of the ASCO participated in Landing Team Amphibious exercises with their respective Battalion Landing Teams and Regimental Combat Teams. Firing ships were not available, however, a certain amount of training with aircraft in close support of battalions was conducted. In some instances, Air Liaison Officers received direct control of aircraft, executing missions requested by battalion and regimental commanding officers. The value of this type of training is easily recognized and cannot be praised too highly. Although, as stated above, firing ships were unavailable on Lending Team Exercises, and had to be simulated, this deficiency was made up for in the monthly tactical firing exercises conducted by the Shore Fire Control Parties on the Island of Kahoolawe under the supervision of VAC.

The ASCO was about 90% trained when the news was received that the Japanese had officially accepted the Allied Surrender Terms. On 19 August, the Commanding Officer was informed that the ASCO would participate in the occupation of Sasebo, Japan, and at the same time be prepared to execute its combat functions. Training ceased immediately and preparations for embarkation were rushed.

Training aboard ship while enroute to Sasebo consisted of briefing and study of the operations order, study of Japanese communications, and instruction in the Japanese people - their customs and their language.
Appendix 2 to Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv OPn Report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

4. **LANDING AND OCCUPATION**:

It had become apparent by the afternoon of Able day that the Japanese had indeed laid down their arms and were not going to offer any physical opposition to the Allied Landing Forces. However, all sections of the ASCO landed with their respective Battalion Landing Teams as planned. No Air Support missions or Naval Gunfire missions were needed or called for.

The Headquarters Section remained aboard the USS WESTMORELAND in the capacity of Ship's Platoon. On Able plus four days, upon termination of Ship's Platoon duties, the Executive Officer of ASCO, accompanied by the Headquarters Section, proceeded to Ainsa Naval Training Station to make arrangements with the Headquarters Commandant for an organizational billeting area. By Able plus 8 days all units of all sections of the ASCO had reverted to ASCO control with the exception of two Communication Teams left in the Dock Area to maintain and operate Division Shore Party wire installations.

All Communication Teams except one were ashore and had established wire and radio communications by 1400 Item on Able day. An advance element of the Shore Party Regiment Headquarters communication section consisting of the Division Shore Party Communication Officer and one Communication team landed at 1200 Item on Able day. The second team landed early in the afternoon of Able day and the third team landed on Able plus one day.

Construction of wire lines to the pre-selected CPs of subordinate Shore Party Battalions began immediately after selection of the Shore Party C.P. It was decided to overhead all wire lines through the utilization of existing Japanese Poles and structures. The BD-96 switchboard was installed and in operation by 1300 Item on Able plus one day. Wire communications to all units became more or less stabilized on Able plus three days at which time a Shore Party traffic diagram and telephone directory were published.

Wire communications for the shore party in this landing were considered satisfactory. The BD-71 switchboards were, as
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Appendix 2 to Annex Fox to 5th MarDiv OPn Report, occupation of Japan (Cont'd)

in the Iwo Jima operation, inadequate and it is again recommend-
ed that they be replaced by the BD-72.

The TBX-8 radio sets authorized each communication team were more than adequate for the Shore Party Lateral and Logistical Control Nets during this landing. Practically all of the messages sent by radio were cleared over the Logistical Control Net and the Shore Party Lateral Net. The Shore Party lateral net was, as in the Iwo Operation, considered superfluous. Some difficulty was experienced in contacting the Division C.P. aboard the Westmoreland direct and messages for this Headquarters had to be relayed through the Division Logistical Control Officer. It is believed that the operators rather than the sets were at fault.

Neither the SCR-536 or SCR-300 nets were used.

Due to the rapidity with which wire and message center communications were established, it became unnecessary to pass traffic via radio by Able Plus one and on Able plus two days all sets were secured.

Message center operation was normal and adequate.

On 29 September the Commanding Officer was informed that certain elements of the 5th Marine Division would move north to Fukuoka where it would establish what was to be known as the Fukuoka Occupation Force. ASCO, minus the Naval Officers, two communication teams, the Division Naval Gunfire and Air Liaison teams, and a small administrative and Quartermaster Detachment, was to be one of these elements. Rail transportation to Fukuoka was arranged for 1 October.

Since the mission assigned was to furnish officer and enlisted personnel to the Headquarters of the Fukuoka Occupation Force for duties other than communication duties, it was decided to turn in all Signal equipment to the Division Signal Quartermaster prior to leaving.
On 30 September all Naval Officers except the Division Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer were ordered to Corps for temporary duty.

From 1 October on ASCO was engaged in occupation duties as a part of the Fukuoka Occupation Force, later re-designated as the Fukuoka Base Command. Both officer and enlisted personnel have shown a great deal of initiative, enthusiasm, and ability in performing duties for which they were, in most cases, untrained.
Annex GEORGE to 5th MarDiv Operation Report

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

23th Marines Report
HEADQUARTERS, 26TH MARINES (REINFORCED)
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

10 November, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.
Subject: Action Report on Occupation of SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN.
Reference: 5thMarDiv General Order No. 3A 18Jan45.

1. In compliance with the reference, the attached report of the landing at, and the occupation of, SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN by Regimental Combat Team 26, Colonel C. B. Graham, USMC, Commanding, is submitted here-with.

C. B. Graham

C. B. GRAHAM
**CT 26 REPORT**

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**APPENDICES**

1. CT 26 Opn Plan No. 2-45
2. Operations Overlay
PART I

BRIEF SUMMARY

Upon cessation of hostilities in preparation for the surrender of Japan, combat training was cancelled, and training for occupation duty and preparations for loading out were commenced. In view of uncertainty of Japanese reaction, plans required the usual combat loading and preparation for assault landings. Ship and personnel assignments, as well as ship characteristics were not received until just prior to loading, but a usable combat load was accomplished.

Though frequent changes in plans were received enroute to SASEBO, CT 26 landed approximately as prescribed in CT 26 Opn Plan No. 2-45 (Appendix 1.) on 22 September 1945 at the SASEBO Naval Air Station. No opposition was offered to the landing nor thereafter. Good cooperation was received from the Japanese.

The period from 22 September 1945 until 19 October 1945 CT 26 was employed within the assigned area of responsibility in establishing guards and outposts over Japanese installations, in collecting small weapons, in inventorying Japanese equipment and supplies, in foot and motor patrolling of unoccupied sectors, and in security and surveillance tasks in general. At considerable effort living conditions and facilities were made adequate at each billeting area.

On 17 October 1945, CT 26 (reconstituted on 13 October as 26th Marines (Reinforced)) began loading out in TransDiv 39, and on 19 October 1945, having been relieved in its area of responsibility by RCT 127, 52nd Army Division, all personnel were embarked. On 20 October 1945 the 26th Marines (Reinforced) was detached from the 5th Marine Division and sailed for the Palau Islands for garrison duty.
1. PREPARATION

In the absence of orders and information from higher authority, preliminary planning was reduced to a minimum. Loading and embarkation of troops was accomplished in the standard manner prescribed for combat loadings, insofar as the absence of detailed orders and detailed loading plans permitted. Organizational equipment and P.O.W. supplies could not be properly “spotted” prior to loading, due to the time element; and the indeterminate time of arrival of such supplies and equipment at the docks added to the problems of executing an ideal combat loading. Embarkation of troops was completed on 23 August 1945, and troop transports departed from HILO for PEARL HARBOR on that date. Ships lifting heavier equipment completed loading and rendezvoused with the Embarkation Group at PEARL HARBOR within the next few days. On 27 August 1945, while in PEARL HARBOR, the first tentative draft of 5th Marine Division Opn Plan No. 25-45 was received, and CT 26 Opn Plan No. 2-45 was then issued. Plans were subsequently modified a number of times, although the basic tactical plan continued in effect, with the exception that LT 126 (personnel only) was landed over GREEN Beaches in lieu of LT 326, whose debarkation was entirely over the docks on 24 September 1945. The zone of responsibility of LT 326 had been meanwhile reassigned to other Division units. Maps, photos, and studies of the area and its people were received and distributed in sufficient quantity to permit thorough briefing of all troops upon departure from PEARL HARBOR.

2. MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

CT 26, consisting of the following task organization, embarked at HILO, HAWAII on 23 August 1945:

1. 26th Marines, 5thMarDiv.
3. 1stPlt, Co "B", 5thMTBn, 5thMarDiv.
5. 1stBn, 13th Marines, 5thMarDiv.
8. Co "A", 3rdFBN.

NOTE: Above units were attached tactically but not administratively.
CT 26 REPORT, PRELIMINARIES

CT 26 was embarked as shown below:

Embarkation Group #3

APA 175 - KARNE

CO of Troops: LtCol D. C. Pollock, USMC

CT 26
1st Bn, 26th Mar
1st Plt, Co "A", 5th Eng Bn
Det, 5th ASCO, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div
Det, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

Tank Group
- Det, 5th Tank Bn

Support Group
- Det, Hq Co, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div
- Det, Sig Co, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div

Shore Party Group
- Det, 8th Mar Amm Co
- 33rd Mar Depot Co
- 34th Mar Depot Co

APA 109 - GRAFTON

CO of Troops: Major Amedeo Rea, USMC

CT 26
- H&Co, 26th Mar
- 2d Bn, 26th Mar
- Det, 5th ASCO, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div
- Det, 1st Bn, 13th Mar
- Det, 5th Med Bn
- Det, 5th Eng Bn

Tank Group
- Det, 5th Tank Bn

Support Group
- Det, Hq Co, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div
- CIC Det

Shore Party Group
- Det, Co "A", 5th Pion Bn
- Det, Hq Co, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div (Bd Soc)

Engineer Group
- Det, 5th Eng Bn

CT 26 REPORT, PRELIMINARIES

-3-
APA 197 - BOWIE

Co of Troops: LtCol W. K. Davenport, Jr., USMC

CT 26
3rd Bn, 26th Mar
3rd Plt, Co "A", 5th Eng Bn
Det, Co "A", 5th Med Bn
Det, 5th ASCO, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div
Det, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

Tank Group
Det, 5th Tank Bn

Support Group
Det, Hq Co, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div
Det, 5th ASCO, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div
Det, Sig Co, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div

Shore Party Group
Det, Co "A", 5th Pion Bn
Det, 116th NBC Bn
Det, 5th ASCO, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div

Engineer Group
Det, 5th Eng Bn

APA 81 - FALLON

Co of Troops: Maj. James F. Cuddy, USMC

CT 26
1st Bn, 13th Mar
Det, Wpns Co, 26th Mar
Co "A", 3rd Prov MP Bn
1st Plt, Ord Co, 5th Mar Div
Det, Co "A", 5th Med Bn

Tank Group
Det, Wpns Co, 26th Mar

Support Group
Plt, MP Co, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div

Shore Party Group
Det, Hq, 116th NBC Bn

CT 26 REPORT, PRELIMINARIES

RESTRICTED
CT 26 REPORT, PRELIMINARIES

AKA 75 - ALAMANCE

CO of Troops: Captain J. A. Conway, USMC

CT 26
Det, H&S Co, 26thMar
Det, WPNsCo, 26thMar
Det, Co "A", 5thModBn
Det, Co "A", 5thEngBn
1stPlt, Co "B", 5thMTBn

Engineer Group
Det, 5thEngBn

Service Group
Det, HqSec, Co "B", 5thMTBn
1stPlt, Auto Repair Co, 5thMTBn
Det, ServCo, 5thServBn
Det, SupplyCo, 5thServBn

Movement to SASEBO, KYUSHU, was accomplished under favorable conditions without important incident under the below schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTED</th>
<th>ARRIVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hilo, Hawaii, T. H.</td>
<td>23 Aug 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H.</td>
<td>18 Sep 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saipan, Marianas Islands</td>
<td>16 Sep 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PEARL HARBOR, OAHU, T. H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SAIPAN, MARIANAS ISLANDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART III

NARRATIVE

On 22 September 1945, assault troops of CT 26 landed over GREEN Beaches (Seaplane ramps of the SASEBO Naval Air Station). Reserve troops (IT 326), and general cargo of all ships, except the BOWIE, were unloaded at SASEBO docks between 23 and 25 September 1945. The BOWIE was unloaded at the seaplane ramps of the Aircraft Factory. The CP group of CT 26 followed closely the leading waves, and established the CT 26 Command Post at the headquarters of the SASEBO Naval Air Station at about 0930, 22 September 1945. No Japanese resistance was met at this time, or at any time during the occupation. In initial, as well as later contacts, the Japanese were most cooperative.

Upon moving into assigned areas, CT 26 units established surveillance and security over various types of Japanese installations and huge quantities of materiel. Guards and patrols were placed over wide areas at bridges, on railroads, gun emplacements, ammunition dumps, and naval and military stores of all types. Patrolling by foot, motor, and boat was commenced at once and continued, throughout the period of occupation, searching out all Japanese military installations and materiel. Inventory of stores and equipment was carried out, usually in conjunction with Japanese officers who, in most cases, had prepared inventory lists.

As inner areas bordering SASEBO Harbor were consolidated, motorized patrols were sent daily into the more remote areas of CT 26 zone of responsibility which were not actually occupied. Until disposition of materiel was begun in the areas occupied, no further extension of actual occupation into these remote areas was possible. (No orders were received during the CT 26 period of occupation which permitted disposition of materiel on a large scale.) These motorized patrols reported on road conditions, contacted local police stations and received small arms and other weapons collected by the civil police, reported previously unlocated installations and the general reaction of the Japanese people. A few of these patrols remained in northern areas for several days. In all cases the patrols were well received, and no opposition nor other disorder was found. Patrol coverage of HARIO ISLAND and adjacent small islands was considerably facilitated by the use of small landing craft.

CT 26 troops were billeted in Japanese barracks buildings, warehouses, and other existing structures. At most places, existing installations provided water suitable for washing purposes. For the most part, water for drinking purposes had to be transported from water points.
RESTRICTED

CT 26 REPORT, NARRATIVE

With the exception of a few days of clear weather, the entire period was rainy and cool (50°–60°). High winds developed about 10 October 1945, as a typhoon passed the SASEBO area, but no serious damage was caused.

Foul weather hampered road maintenance and communications. This fact, coupled with distances separating units, caused severe transportation problems. Available motor transportation was wholly inadequate at times.

About mid-October warning orders for embarking were received, and the preparation of equipment for loading was commenced. Actual loading of cargo began on 17 October 1945.

On 19 October 1945, CT 26 was completely relieved in its assigned area of responsibility by RCT 127, of the 32nd Division, U. S. Army. Inventories, existing orders, etc., were turned over to RCT 127, and guards and outposts relieved by that unit. On the same date, embarkation of CT 26 troops was completed, terminating the period of occupation of Japan for this regiment. On 20 October, just prior to sailing, the 2nd Battalion was detached to 5th Marine Division, and ordered ashore to be disbanded.
CT 26 REPORT, S-1

PART IV-1

S-1 SECTION REPORT

(a) ORGANIZATION and FUNCTIONING: The S-1 Section landed with the Regimental Commander at the SASEBO Naval Air Station, where the Regimental CP was placed in operation within a few minutes after the initial troops hit the beach. With the exception of slow transportation and communication difficulties due to bad roads and adverse weather, the functioning of the S-1 Section was satisfactory.

(b) REPORTS: In addition to the normal reports submitted, a daily strength report and a weekly periodic report were required. The latter was discontinued on A plus 10 on Division order.

(c) MORALE and RECREATION: Morale throughout the occupation was good, considering the adverse weather and living conditions. Few facilities, other than libraries and movies, were available because of the lack of space.

(d) CASUALTIES: There were no casualties due to enemy action during the period of occupation by CT 26.
(a) INDOCTRINATION: Intelligence publications of a general nature, covering the condition of the country and the customs and background of the Japanese were made available to the Combat Team prior to landing. School was held aboard ships enroute to the target, where all officers and men were briefed on the various aspects of the operation, in accordance with available information.

(b) GENERAL FUNCTIONING: Once established at the target, the S-2 Section coordinated the activity of inventory teams and was responsible for the compilation of the inventory records. It also maintained records of the areas patrolled and the patrol results. The two officers and four enlisted men attached to this section from the Language Department of the G-2 Section proved invaluable as interpreters. Periodic reports were submitted to G-2 daily.

(c) DEALINGS WITH JAPANESE: Civilian officials, as well as military and naval authorities, were cooperative in every respect, and, as far as could be determined, gave all requested information accurately. Working through the civil police proved very satisfactory, as they were most cooperative and gave us invaluable assistance.

(d) RADIO NET: The intelligence radio net was set up at 0003 hour minus 45 minutes and continued in operation until about 4 plus 5. It proved generally unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, the distances between units was beyond the range of SCR 300's, the target radio available to the section; and second, the radio waves were blocked by the surrounding high land masses.
There was no tactical map kept for this operation. The S-3 function was a matter of keeping a location map and recording the routes traveled by patrols each day.

Artillery, naval gunfire, air, and tank support were provided in readiness initially, but in the absence of opposition, were never employed. Attached units and liaison personnel reverted to parent organizations shortly after landing.

Engineers were not tactically employed, but were of great value in performing maintenance and construction tasks.
(a) QUARTERMASTER SECTION: All unloading was performed from ship-to-dock in regular commercial unloading manner. Equipment was stored initially in dock-area warehouses, and then transported to the respective units as soon as possible after security had been established. Initially, "K", "C", and "10 in 1" rations were supplied. "B" rations were made available as soon as they could be landed and necessary sanitary measures were installed in the messes. This was accomplished by A plus 7. Rations were adequate, but lacked variety. All the excess equipment of the battalions, Weapons Company, and H&S Company was held in the regimental dump.

(b) MOTOR TRANSPORT: The biggest problems presented were: first, the roads were washed-out regularly by heavy rains, were in poor repair, and were frequently too narrow for vehicles larger than jeeps; second, the great distances between all units of the Combat Team, and between CT 26 CP and the Division CP, resulted in a shortage of transportation.

(c) MEDICAL SECTION: The medical company attached to CT 26 set up a field hospital in the vicinity of the Regimental CP. There was no appearance of epidemic disease at any time in the area occupied by this Combat Team.
Communications were in general satisfactory. Abnormally scattered deployment of units rendered some radios unusable. Long distances, adverse weather, and, in some cases, careless handling of heavy equipment made the task of maintaining wire communication extremely difficult. Upon the occasions when wire connections broke down, communications were immediately re-established via TCS radio.
Since the operation was hastily organized, and was characterized by speed of execution at the expense of careful planning, most of the faults and failures which occurred can be traced to that cause. Detailed comment is therefore omitted.

Principal faults were:

(a) Lack of adequate information about the objective, including aerial photo coverage, adequate maps, condition of roads, available billets, probable attitude of the natives, etc. This resulted in many last minute changes in plans and consequent confusion.

(b) An excess of supply of heavy weapons, equipment and supplies which were not needed, and a critical shortage of many badly needed items, particularly transportation, complete rations, and personal baggage.

(c) The operation was further handicapped by the continuous transfer of high point personnel to the United States for separation from the service. This stripped the regiment of many of its best and most experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, and caused a constant reassignment of duties at a time of intense operational activity.

The requirement to leave a rear echelon behind, thus separating organizations and individuals from their equipment and baggage was a particular disadvantage in this operation, especially in view of the large number of transfers of personnel. It is recommended that no rear echelon be left behind except in operations of a strictly combat nature, and when there is prospect of an early return to base, or when the rear echelon can follow shortly the advance elements.
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File No. 0026\25745

RESTRICTED (Reduced from SECRET)

Opn Plan

No. 2-45

Map, Chart, Photos: See Annex BAKER (Intelligence) Div Opn Plan No. 25-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex ABLE (Task Organization).

1. a. See Annex BAKER, Div Opn Plan No. 25-45, and G-2 Studies and Summaries, as issued.

b. V Phib Corps, consisting of V Phib Corps Troops, 2dMarDiv(Reinf), 32ndInfDiv(Reinf), and 5thMarDiv(Reinf), in conjunction with Amphibious Group Four, will, in operations commencing on "A"-day, land in NAGASAKI-SASEBO area, and rapidly occupy and establish surveillance over the SASEBO area, extending occupation and surveillance to include the NAGASAKI area as troops become available; then on "C"-day, by overland and amphibious operations occupy and establish surveillance over the SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA area, prepared for further operations, in order to assist in imposing on the Japanese Armed Forces and civil population those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action. The 5thMarDiv(Rein) will:

(1) At NAM-hour on "A"-day land elements of BLT-328 on designated RED Beaches and secure the entrance to SASEBO WAF. Establish surveillance over IOKI-SAKI and progressively occupy critical areas controlling SASEBO Harbor and the passage into OMURA WAF.

(2) When the entrance to SASEBO Harbor is secure, and on Division order, land CT 26 on designated GREEN Beaches and secure SASEBO Naval Air Station; then advance that CT rapidly overland and secure SASEBO Harbor and dock facilities and that portion of SASEBO necessary to the uninterrupted landing of the remainder of the Division.

(3) When the SASEBO Naval Air Station and the SASEBO Harbor and dock facilities are secure, land the remainder of the Division in SASEBO Harbor area and secure the remainder of SASEBO and approaches thereto.

(4) Be prepared on Corps order to initiate overland operations to occupy and secure OMURA and approaches thereto, including the OMURA Seaplane Base and Naval Airdrome.

(5) After occupying OMURA, be prepared for further overland operations to occupy and secure NAGASAKI area on Corps order.

-1-
(6) Establish and maintain in assigned area of responsibility surveillance of the armed forces and civilian population and impose thereon the prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.

(7) At OBOE plus 30 land a Tank Group of 30 tanks on GREEN Beaches to support operations of CT 26.

(8) Be prepared for further overland and short range amphibious operations.

2. a. CT 26 land in column of battalions on GREEN Beaches at OBOE-hour, occupy and establish surveillance over the SASEBO Naval Air Station; send Reconnaissance Det to Aircraft Factory to reconnoiter and exercise surveillance over that area, report result of reconnaissance promptly and remain as security detachment until relieved by 13th Marines; then advance rapidly overland and occupy and establish surveillance over SASEBO Harbor and dock installations within assigned zone of responsibility. Occupy and establish surveillance over the approaches to SASEBO in assigned zone of responsibility. Establish Base of Opn in vicinity of (71.4-14.4). (See Annex BAKER).

b. NAN-hour--0800, OBOE-hour, PETER-hour, to be announced. "A"-day-22 September, "C"-day, to be announced.

c. For beaches, objectives, scheme of maneuver, zone of responsibility, billeting area, etc., see Annex BAKER (Operations Overlay).

3. a. LT-226 land at OBOE-hour on GREEN Beaches. Immediately occupy and establish surveillance in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 3. x. (13) and (14) below, over all installations and buildings as directed in annex LOVE of 5thMarDiv Opn Plan No. 25-45. Advance along the two main roads leading north from the Naval Air Station and occupy and establish surveillance over other critical areas and installations within the area of responsibility assigned LT-226. (See Annex BAKER).

b. LT-326 land on GREEN Beaches commencing at OBOE/45 minutes. Advance rapidly along the main road leading north from the Naval Air Station (extending from (79.20-08.45) to (79.35-10.50) to (79.55-12.10) and into the town of SASEBO passing through elements of BLT-226. Progressively occupy and establish surveillance in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 3. x. (13) and (14) below, over the gun installations at (76.3-13.2), (76.2-13.1), (76.0-13.2) and (75.8-13.5), the naval installations in the vicinity of the Naval Basin, the Post Office at (77.1-14.1), and other critical areas and installations within the area of responsibility assigned LT-326. (See Annex BAKER).

c. LT-126 lands on order of CT 26 at about OBOE/85 minutes on GREEN
Beaches. Follow immediately behind LT-326. Progressively occupy and establish surveillance in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 3, x. (13) and (14) below, over the mine and torpedo storage installations at (78.3-12.2), the railroad yards at (78.3-12.9), the bridges at (77.6-13.4), the Naval Construction Battalion installations at (77.5-13.2), the SASEBO Navy Yard Commandant's Headquarters at (77.1-13.5), and other critical areas and installations within the area of responsibility assigned LT-126. (See Annex BAKER).

d. Reconnaissance Platoon land on GREEN Beaches at OBOE plus 20. Proceed to the aircraft factory at (81.2-10.7) to reconnoiter and exercise surveillance over that area; report results of reconnaissance promptly and remain as a security detachment until relieved by the 13th Marines.

e. Regt Wns Co land on Regt order and support operations ashore as directed.

f. Co "A", 5thEngBn (less 3 plts) land on GREEN Beaches; be prepared to make a reconnaissance of the roads, bridges, and water supply; to repair and improve roads in zone of action of CT 26, and to execute other engineering missions as ordered.

g. 1stPlt, Co "B", 5thMTBn, land on order and support CT 26 as directed.

h. 1stBn, 13th Marines, land on order; be prepared to support advance of CT 26 to Sasebo town.

i. 1stPlt, OrdCo, 5thServBn, land on order at about OBOE/40; be prepared to support operations of CT 26 ashore.

j. Co "A", 3rd MP Bn land on GREEN Beaches on order at about OBOE plus 45, control traffic in Regt zone of action and perform other duties as directed.

k. Det ASCO land on GREEN Beaches; support operations ashore.

l. Co "A", 5thMedBn will land on Regt order and support operations ashore as directed.

x. (1) EBI's:

(a) Report conditions of roads.
(b) Report all means of local transportation.
(c) Report all arms or ammunition not previously destroyed.
(d) Determine whether the Japs will passively submit to the
initial landing of our occupation forces, offering no resistance, or offering disorganized resistance by military and/or civilian personnel in the form of sniping, booby traps, mines, etc., or whether the Japs will oppose our landing and occupation in force will all means at their disposal.

(c) Determine any difference in quality of resistance, active or passive, offered by naval personnel as compared to Army personnel.

(2) Maintain patrols in zone of action.

(3) Units report when important operations are initiated and objectives attained.

(4) All units will be prepared for further operations to seize and occupy NAGASAKI or other critical areas.

(5) All operations will be planned and conducted in such a manner that forces are constantly prepared for combat in event of a resumption of hostilities, treachery or sabotage.

(6) Unless directly attacked, no unit or individual will open fire on any aircraft.

(7) Unit commanders are responsible for the defense and control of occupied areas and installations within their assigned zones.

(8) All units will enforce passive defensive measures, particularly dispersal of ammunition and Class III dumps.

(9) Strict fire discipline will be maintained by commanders of all units. No firing will be executed except that requiring such military action in the imposition of the terms of surrender. The gravity of the premature use of fire power in the execution of occupation missions will be impressed on all individuals. Magazines will be filled, chambers empty.

(10) RCT Commanders only are authorized to issue orders for artillery, tanks, M-7 weapons carriers and 81mm mortars to open fire. RCT COs are authorized to issue orders for 60mm mortar, 37mm guns and small arms to fire. COs of companies making initial landings on Beach RED-1 and Beach RED-2 are authorized to issue orders for opening fire. The above Commanders will not, repeat not, issue orders for opening fire unless his unit is being fired upon or attacked by the enemy, and then only after a thorough investigation of the incident.
(11) All commanders will insure that Japanese and friendly stores, installations and equipment are safeguarded against pilfering and looting by members of our forces and by local inhabitants.

(12) Units report by fastest possible means any hostile use of firearms, or organized intervention in accomplishment of assigned missions.

(13) The following tasks are common to the operations set forth in this plan:

(a) Receive the surrender from Japanese forces of all arms, as directed.

(b) Supervise the execution of policies relative to Military Government.

(c) Supervise the disarmament and demobilization of Japanese armed forces in accordance with specific orders to be issued by this Headquarters.

(d) Recover, release, and repatriate allied prisoners of war and civilian internees without delay, as directed.

(e) Suppress activities of individuals and organizations which may be inimical to the operations and the occupation forces.

(f) Be prepared to protect and assume control of Japanese wire and radio communications facilities.

(g) Facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which contributes to the subsistence, clothing and shelter of the population.

(h) Destroy hostile elements which oppose by military action the imposition of surrender terms upon the Japanese.

(i) Prepare to impose terms of surrender beyond immediate military requirements as directed.

(j) Be prepared to extend control over the Japanese as required to implement the policies for a post-war occupation and government when prescribed.

(k) Take active measures to insure that adequate protection is afforded historical, cultural and religious objects and installations; impress all members of their respective
CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

commands with the fact that profanation of shrines and holy places, even if unintentional, will only prejudice our efforts to achieve a peaceful and firm occupation. The several Imperial palaces and all shrines will be especially protected from harm of any kind.

(14) In partial implementation of the general missions assigned in paragraph 3. x. (13) above, commanders within assigned zones of responsibility will exercise surveillance over the following Japanese installations:

(a) Military.

1. Military

b. Defense Installations:

1'. CD and AA batteries
2'. Fortresses
3'. Harbor defenses
4'. Radio and radar equipment

c. Airfields and airfield facilities:

1'. Headquarters buildings
2'. Operational aircraft
3'. Air dumps, repair facilities, and depots

c. Supply and service facilities including arsenals and ammunition, engineer, HQ, and signal dumps.

d. Major headquarters of all Army, Navy and Air units.

e. Residences of high ranking military personnel.

f. Internment camps for Allied PWS and civilians.

g. Headquarters of KEMPEI TAI (Military Police), TOKUMU KIKAN (Army-Navy Secret Intelligence Service), and similar organizations.

2. Civilian:

a. Headquarters of political, secret, and quasi-military societies and organizations actually or potentially inimical to the occupation forces including the following:
CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

1. KOKURYU KAI (Black Dragon Society)
2. DAI NIPPON SEJI KAI (Greater Japan Political Assn)
3. KOKU SUI-TO (Extreme Nationalist Party)
4. CHIZAKURA (Nationalist Party-Manchuria)
5. NISSHO, and related extremist and terrorist societies.
6. TEIKOKU ZEIGO GUNJIN KAI (Imp. Reserve Assn)
7. SOTEI DAN (Union of Able Bodied Men)
8. SHONEI DAN (Youth Assn)
9. SEIKEN DAN (Young Mens Assn)
10. Combat Corps
11. Peoples Volunteer Corps
12. GAKU DO TAI (Student Corps)
15. Patriotic Service Corps
17. Maritime Transportation Total Superintendence Section

b. Residences and offices of representatives of the Japanese puppet and subservient governments of:

1. China
2. Manchukuo
3. The Phillipine Islands
4. NEI
5. Burma
6. Siam (Thailand)

3 Critical strategic installations:

a. Munitions and armament factories, assembly plants and depots.

b. Governmental and private research and experimental laboratories.

c. Headquarters of scientific institutions such as:

1. Technical Boards
2. Japanese Technical Societies
3. Science Mobilisation Assn
4. All-Japan Science League

(b) Establish as necessary surveillance over and insure continuance in operation the following installations and instructions: -7-
CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

1 Government installations:
   b. Local and municipal government headquarters and bldgs.
   c. Police headquarters.
   d. HOKO headquarters (Neighborhood Control Organizations)

2 Transportation:
   a. Railway terminals, yards, stations, and equipment.
   b. Railway and highway bridges and tunnels.
   c. Airfields
   d. Bus transportation system.
   e. Port and shipping installations to include docks and warehouses.

3 Communications (See Annex HOM, Div Opn Plan No. 25–45)
   a. Telephone exchanges
   b. Telegraph and cable headquarters and installations.
   c. Radio stations.

4 Post Offices

5 Newspapers, periodicals, and publishing houses.

6 Public Utilities
   a. Dams
   b. Electric light and power plants
   c. Water plants
   d. Gas lines
   e. Fire fighting services
   f. Sanitation and public health facilities
CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

Such other factories, plants, storage warehouses, and similar installations as may be necessary to facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which contributes to the subsistence, clothing, and shelter of the population.

(c) Safeguard, as practicable, all documents, records, material and equipment contained within the installations listed in (a) and (b) above, and effect their disposition as directed by 0-2.

(d) Locate and maintain intelligence surveillance over the leaders and key personnel connected with the installations and organizations listed in (a) and (b) above.

(15) In carrying out the missions assigned in paragraph 3, x, (14) above, Unit Commanders, in their respective areas of responsibility will:

(a) Be guided by the following general policy:

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will issue all necessary instructions to the Japanese Emperor or to the Imperial Government and every opportunity will be given to the Government and the Japanese people to carry out such instructions without further compulsion. If necessary, however, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will issue appropriate orders to his subordinate commanders indicating the action to be taken by them to secure obedience by the agencies of the Imperial Government or Japanese people within the areas of their commands. In other words, the occupation forces will act principally as an agency upon which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may call, if necessary, to secure compliance with his instructions to the Japanese Imperial Government.

(b) Observe the obligations imposed on the occupation forces by international law and the rules of land warfare.

(c) Take all necessary steps to protect and preserve the records of:

1. All governmental agencies and quasi-governmental agencies, particularly records concerning Japanese individuals.

2. All Japanese political, patriotic, and secret societies.

(d) Register all nationals of countries with which any of the United Nations is or has been at War, except Japan and take
into protective custody the diplomatic and consular officials of such countries. Prompt reports of such action will be made to this Headquarters.

(e) Register all nationals of neutral countries and afford full protection to the persons, archives and property of the diplomatic and consular officials of such countries.

(f) Take all necessary steps to protect and preserve the property of the United Nations and their nationals.

(g) Arrange with the appropriate Japanese officials for the collection of all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population and their safe-keeping pending instructions as to their disposition from this Headquarters.

(h) Identify and collect all property looted from the governments and citizens of any of the United Nations and submit reports thereof to this Headquarters.

(i) Apprehend and detain, when directed by this Headquarters:

1. The members of terrorist and secret patriotic societies, officially identified as such by the Counter-Intelligence Corps.

2. Persons whose names or descriptions are contained in lists of actual or suspected war criminals.

3. Personnel administering or guarding prisoners of war and internment camps.

(j) Utilize Japanese military and civilian personnel and agencies to the maximum consistent with prescribed policies.

(16) All parts of this order not required for operations ashore will be destroyed prior to landing.

(17) Opn Plans for subsequent overland or amphibious operations will be issued later.

(18) "A"-day - day of landings in SASEBO area.

NAN-hour - hour of first landings on "A"-day.

OBOE-hour - hour of landing at SASEBO Naval Air Station. To be designated.
CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

PETER-hour - hour of landing in SASEBO dock area. To be designated by Division.

(19) This plan effective on Regtl order.

(20) All vehicles will drive on the left side of the road in accordance with JAPANESE customs.

(21) Personnel debarking from landing craft will not double time from boats in assault formations unless under fire.

(22) Tracked vehicles will be run on JAPANESE roads only in case of actual operational emergency.

4. See 26th Regimental Administrative Order No. 1-45.

5. a. See Annex HOW (Communication), Div Opn Plan No. 25-45.

b. Command Posts: Afloat:

5thMarDiv
CT 26
Tk Gp
Spt Gp
5thSFRegt
1st Bn, 26thMar
2nd Bn, 26thMar
3rd Bn, 26thMar
1st Bn, 13thMar

WESTMORELAND (APA-104)
GRAFTON (APA-109)
CALUSA (APA-74)
WESTMORELAND (APA-104)
WESTMORELAND (APA-104)
KARNES (APA-175)
GRAFTON (APA-109)
Bowie (APA-137)
FALLON (APA-81)

All units will report to Regiment location of CP's ashore.

c. Use zone minus nine (1) time, East Longitude Date.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL GRAHAM:

J. P. SAYERS,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

ANNEXES: 
ABLE Task Organization,
Baker Operations Overlay.

For information on subjects other than the above refer to the annexes of Division Operation Plan No. 25-45, shown below:
CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

ABLE Task Organization
BAKER Intelligence
CHARLIE Naval Gunfire Support
DOG Air Support
EASY Operations Overlay
FOX Embarkation
GEORGE Landing Diagram
HOW Signal Communications
ITEM Landing Schedule
JIG Password and Countersign
KING Landing Instructions
LOVE Concept of Operations Ashore
MIKE Replacement Plan
NAN Enforcement of Surrender Terms
XRAY Distribution

DISTRIBUTION:

CO LT-126 (5) CO APA-137 (1)
CO LT-226 (5) CO APA-175 (1)
CO LT-326 (5) CO AKA-75 (1)
CG 5thMarDiv (10) CO APA-61 (1)
CG VAC (2) CONTRANSDIV 72 (1)
CG, FMF, Pac (2) CONTRANSPAC (1)
CMC (1) CONTRANSPAC (1)
CONTRANSDIV 72 (2) War Diary (3)
CO APA-109 (1) CO, lst SP Bn (1)
CO, 5th Tk Bn (1) CO, lst Bn, 13thMar (2)
CO, lst Flt, Co "3", 5th MT bn (1) CO, Wps Co (1)
Each Ln (1) CO, Staff & Files (12)
CO, Co "A", 5th Med Bn (1)

DISTRIBUTION OF ANNEXES OF DIVISION OPERATION PLAN NO. 25-45:

ABLE Pa-81 2 Pa-109 1 Pa-137 1 Pa-175 1 Pa-75 1
BAKER 10 10 10 10 10
CHARLIE 10 15 15 15 1
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1331
CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

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OFFICIAL

ALBERT V. K. GARY,
Major, USMC OR,
S-3.

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CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

RESTRICTED (Reduced from SECRET) CT 26
File No. 0026B25745 In the Field
ANNEXABLE to CT 26 CNP PLAN NO. 2-45.

2200, 14 September 1945.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) CT 26(-)

H&SCo, 26th Marines
Co A, 5thEngBn (less 3 plats)
Co A, 5thMedBn (less 3 Coll Sec)
Det, 5th ASCO
Co A, 3d MP Bn
1stFlt, OrdCo, 5thServBn
Plt, Co B, 5thMTBn
WpnsCo, 26th Marines (less M-7 plat)

(b) LT-226

2ndBn, 26th Marines
2ndFlt, Co A, 5thEngBn
Det Coll Sec, Co A, 5thMedBn
Det, 5th ASCO

(c) LT-326

3rdBn, 26th Marines
3rdFlt, Co A, 5thEngBn
Det Coll Sec, Co A, 5thMedBn
Det 5th ASCO

(d) LT-126

1stBn, 26th Marines
1stFlt, Co A, 5thEngBn
Det Coll Sec, Co A, 5thMedBn
Det, 5th ASCO

(e) Artillery Group

1stBn, 13th Marines

BY ORDER OF COLONEL GRAHAM:

-1-

CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1 1333
CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

J. P. SAYERS,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as for CT 26 Opn Plan No. 2-45.

OFFICIAL

ALBERT V. K. GARY,
Major, USMCR,
S-3
CT 26 REPORT APPENDIX NO. 2

OPERATION OVERLAY

Reference: AMS 1571, Scale 1:250,000,
Sheets No. 44 and 45

Legend:

(1) TOTAL AREA WITHIN LANDING Zone OF RESPONSIBILITY COVERED BY FOOT PATROLS.
(2) ROUTES SHOWN IN RED COVERED BY HUNTING PATROLS.

1335
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1975

HEADQUARTERS,
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.

Subject: 27th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. Forwarded, approved.

2. There was no real planning for the assault of Southern Kyushu,
since up to the time of the surrender of Japan only two briefings of regimental
commanders had taken place. At the time of surrender, maps were just becoming
available.

3. Upon receipt of orders to load out at HILC for occupation duty
in Japan, advance details were sent to the dock area as directed. Housing for
this personnel was extremely unsatisfactory as were messing arrangements. In
addition, very heavy rain, both the night gear was spotted on the dock and the
night of loading, added to the unusual confusion.

4. Efforts were made to keep combat gear on the higher levels of
the holds, however the loads could hardly be called "combat". All ships, other
than the AKA, were loaded in an average of 24 hours. The pressure brought to
bear to expedite the loading of ships seems unwarranted in view of the days
subsequently lost swinging at anchor in Pearl Harbor. The trip to SASEBO was
uneventful except for numerous changes in orders which were caused by the
continuuous influx of valuable information. Upon landing, occupation proceeded
as scheduled with only one or two isolated incidents.

5. From time to time zones of responsibility were shifted as the
situation became clarified and the undersigned believes that all hands accom-
plished their tasks in an expeditious and completely satisfactory manner.

6. On 21 November, Colonel Thomas A. Wornham, who organized and
commanded this organization, was detached on orders from Headquarters, Marine
Corps, and on the same date the undersigned joined the organization as Command-
ing Officer.

ROBERT H. WILLIAMS

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1975/30B-tbm

HEADQUARTERS,
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MAR DIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

ENCLOSURES: (A) Overlay of original CT-27 Zone of Responsibility (SASEBO).
(B) Overlay of expanded CT-27 Zone of Responsibility (SASEBO).
(C) Overlay of CT-27 Zone of Responsibility (KURUMI).

APPENDICES: (1) Administration.
(2) Intelligence.
(3) Supply and Evacuation.

PLANNING:

Insofar as this regiment was concerned, planning for the assault on Southern Kyushu was never begun, as hostilities ended prior to the receipt of the Division Operation Plan. Planning for the occupation of Japan was begun 19 August upon receipt of information that this regiment would be a part of the occupation forces. Various operation plans were received from Division from time to time giving this regiment its initial zone of occupation and instructions as to how to conduct the occupation. The plan ultimately used and the initial area of occupation finally assigned was received in dispatch form two days prior to landing at SASEBO.

Throughout the planning, battalions and attached units were kept informed as to their part in the occupation as information was received at this headquarters. The final plan called for this regiment to detach a reinforced company from the 1st Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Donn J. Robertson, as the KURA Occupation Group. The combat team operation plan called for this combat team to land in the dock area in a column of battalions in the order 1st, 21 and 31.

TRAINING:

Training of all hands in occupational duties was begun upon departure from the Hawaiian area on 1 September. Training consisted of classes in Japanese words and phrases, customs of the Japanese people, history of the Japanese empire, type of terrain and weather which might be expected, military forces expected to be encountered, intelligence targets known to be located in this combat team's zone of responsibility, and the enforcement of surrender terms.

-1-
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MAR DIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (continued).

ORGANIZATION:

This combat team was originally organized for the occupation of Japan as follows:

BLT-1/27, 1st Bn, 27th Mar
1st 37mm Plt, Rwpns Co
1st Plt, "E" Co, 5th Engr En
Cpl Sect, "E" Co, 5th Med En
Det A300, 5th MarDiv

BLT-2/27, LtCol. John W. Antonelli
2d Bn, 27th Mar
2d 37mm Plt, Rwpns Co
2d Plt, "E" Co, 5th Engr En
Cpl Sect, "E" Co, 5th Med En
Det A300, 5th MarDiv

BLT-3/27, LtCol. George R. Stallings
3d Bn, 27th Mar
3d Plt, "E" Co, 5th Engr En
Cpl Sect, "E" Co, 5th Med En
Det A300, 5th MarDiv

RCI-27 (-), Colonel Thomas A. Wornham
Hq & Serv Co, 27th Mar
Rwpns Co (-)
"E" Co, 5th Engr En (-)
"E" Co, 5th Med En (-)
Flt, "E" Co, 5th MT En
2d Bn, 13th Mar
2d Plt, Ord Co, 5th Serv En
Det A330, 5th MarDiv
"C" Co, 31 MP En

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CONFIDENTIAL
MOVEMENT TO TARGET (SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN):

Loading of ships began on 23 August and troops were embarked on 25 August. The convoy sailed from HILO, Hawaii, T.H., at 0200, 26 August, and arrived at PEARL HARBOR, Oahu, T.H., at about 1700, 26 August. The convoy departed from PEARL HARBOR, Oahu, 1 September 1945 and arrived at SAIPAN 13 September. Departed from SAIPAN 15 September and arrived at SASEBO Harbor, Kyushu, Japan, on 22 September 1945. JT-27 began debarking in the dock area and moving to initially assigned zone of responsibility the afternoon of 22 September 1945. Debarking of troops was completed 23 September.

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS:

Immediately upon going ashore, each of the three Battalion Landing Teams proceeded to its assigned zone of responsibility (see attached overlay, marked enclosure (A)) and placed under surveillance all known Japanese military and naval installations, plus such civil installations as post offices, police stations, telephone exchanges, railroad stations and terminals, etc. From 23 September to 1 October units of this combat team guarded and inventoried Japanese supplies and installations in their assigned zone of responsibility and patrolled the area north and west of the regimental zone of responsibility in search of additional Japanese installations. On 5 October the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, was detached to Division control and the 27th Marines received an expanded area of responsibility (see attached overlay, marked enclosure (B)) upon receipt of Division Operation Order No. 37-45. This same date "C" Company reverted to parent control from the OKURA Occupation Group. The period 6 to 21 October was spent in collecting civilian arms and ammunition and in continuing to guard and inventory Japanese military and naval supplies and installations. On 21 October, Division Operation Order No. 40-45 ordered the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, to assume control of the entire regimental zone of responsibility and detach the 1st Battalion to Division control. The remainder of the 27th Marines, consisting of Regimental Headquarters and the 3d Battalion, was ordered to proceed to KURUMA in order to extend surveillance of U.S. Armed Forces over that area, and to assume control of the SAGA Occupation Group and its assigned zone of responsibility at 0800, 25 October. The period 25 October to 23 November was spent patrolling our assigned zone of responsibility (see attached overlay, marked enclosure (C)) in search of Japanese installations and caches of war supplies. Such Japanese supplies as were suitable for civilian use were turned over to Japanese Home Ministry representatives while such supplies and material which were of a strictly military nature were destroyed as rapidly.
as possible. On 17 November 1945, instructions were received to prepare to turn over the regimental zone of responsibility to relieving Army and Marine units upon receipt of Division order. This was accomplished on 25 November, at which time the 21 Battalion, 6th Marines, assumed responsibility for that part of SAGA KEN previously assigned to 27th Marines, and the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, 32d Infantry Division, assumed responsibility for that part of FUKUOKA KEN previously assigned to the 27th Marines.

The exchange of personnel between the 21 Marine Division and the 5th Marine Division began 23 November and was completed by 2400, 25 November. On 24 November 1945, 27th Marines commenced train and motor movement into the immediate vicinity of SASEBO; Regimental Headquarters and 3d Battalion moving from KURUMA to HAKI, and the 2d Battalion moving from SAGA to AINOURA. All movements were completed by 25 November 1945. On 30 November 1945, initial preparations for movement by ship to the United States were commenced.

COMMENTS:

1. Japanese compliance with surrender terms in the various zones of responsibility assigned to this regiment has, on the whole, been excellent. However, minor instances of unreported installations, and unreported caches of Japanese military supplies have been discovered.

2. It is felt that the initial use of occupational forces for guarding of civilian stocks of dynamite intended for coal mining resulted in unwarranted dispersal of occupational forces and a distinct hindrance to the Japanese civil economy.

3. Telephone service over Japanese cables was frequently interrupted and never good. From 5 November to 12 November, the one direct trunk to Division was completely inoperative. The trunk via 21 Battalion at SAGA to Division Headquarters had cross-talk from regiment to Division. This caused undue traffic on the radio.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In the future, zones of responsibility should be assigned so as to include entire political subdivisions of the area being occupied, as splitting of political subdivisions between two commands of the occupational forces results in needless confusion of the civilian population and doubles the number of contacts and interviews necessary for the occupational forces.

2. Once occupational forces are ashore and the bulk of enemy troops are disarmed, small arms ammunition should be the only ammunition in the hands of the occupying troops.
3. Where a unit is assigned a large zone of responsibility, additional motor transport is required to thoroughly and efficiently conduct the necessary patrols.

4. A Marine infantry regiment is not equipped to handle wire communications over a distance of 75 miles (Marine Camp, AINOURA -- KURUME). It is recommended that a radiotelephone or teletype be made available when a unit is sent out such a distance.

BILL C. BOND,
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,
S - 3.
CONFIDENTIAL

27th Marines
In the Field
30 November 1945.

To accompany map: Central Japan, Scale 1:250,000.

BILL C. BOND,
1st Lt., USMCR,
S-3.

ENCLOSURE (A)
Overlay of original Zone of Responsibility (SAEBO)
CONFIDENTIAL

27th Marines
In the Field
30 November 1945.

To accompany map: Central Japan, Scale 1:250,000.

BILL C. BOND,
1st Lt, USMCR,
S-3.

ENCLOSURE (B)
Overlay showing expanded Zone of Responsibility (SaJEBO)
27th Marines
In the Field
30 November 1945

To accompany map:
Central Japan, Scale 1:250,000.

Bill O. Bond,
1st Lt., USMC, 3rd Mar. 3rd.

ENCLOSURE (C)
Overlay showing Zone of Responsibility (KURUMI)
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HEADQUARTERS,
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

APPENDIX (1) (ADMINISTRATION) TO ANNEX HOW

A. PLANNING:

1. The only planning for the assault operation accomplished by the
   one section was the preparation of an initial embarkation plan, such plan
   becoming obsolete upon the cessation of hostilities and the subsequent
   assignment of this regiment to an occupation mission.

2. Planning for the occupation operation progressed as information
   was received from higher echelon. Planning consisted of the preparation
   of the Regimental Administrative Plan and the annexes thereto, with par-
   ticular emphasis on the preparation and submission of reports. A regi-
   mental provost marshal was appointed and an SOP covering provost marshal
   activities was published.

B. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS:

1. During the early phases of the occupation, there was little in
   the way of operations by the one section. All military government and
   provost marshal activities were under division control, with the exccep-
   tion of a portion of the area assigned to BLT-3/27. The work of the one
   section during this period consisted of bringing up to date all records
   and reports, preparation of drafts of personnel to be transferred to the
   United States for discharge and doing everything possible for the health
   and comfort of the troops.

2. On 5 October 1945, BLT-2/27 was detached to Division control and
   ordered to Saga in an expansion of the area assigned for the enforcement
   of surrender terms. A military government team was assigned to BLT-2/27
   on that date and proceeded with their assigned missions in Saga Ken with
   little difficulty. A battalion provost marshal was appointed and a plato-
   on of military police was attached to handle provost marshal activities.

3. On 21 October, BLT-3/27 and 3T Headquarters were ordered to
   KURUME, FUKUOKA Ken, and BLT-2/27 reverted to Regimental control on 25
   October. Another military government team was attached to BLT-3/27 for
   work in KURUME and vicinity.

-1-
C. JAPANESE COMPLIANCE WITH SURRENDER TERMS:

1. Excellent cooperation from the Japanese in compliance with the surrender terms was received. The Japanese Civil Police, Home Ministry representatives and Liaison Committees made every effort to comply with our directives. A few scattered cases of non-compliance occurred, but it is felt that these were due to a misunderstanding of our directives rather than an attempt to thwarting our plans.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That zones of responsibility be assigned on the basis of political subdivisions.

2. That an entire company of military police be assigned permanently to the combat teams.

3. That sufficient military government personnel be attached to allow for a liaison team with regimental headquarters.

4. That reports be kept to a minimum and that duplicity of reports be avoided.

E. MILITARY GOVERNMENT:

1. During the early phases of the occupation, all civil affairs and military government were under division control. One military government team was assigned to ERT-2/27 on 5 October for duty at SAGA and another military government team was assigned to ERT-3/27 on 21 October for duty at KURUG.

2. Upon the arrival of a team to their assigned area, the required surveys were completed and the procedure for the procurement of civilian labor was accomplished. Some difficulties were encountered because of the confusion existing within the Japanese Liaison Committees and because of their inability to maintain proper records.

3. It was noted that military government officers were somewhat hampered by a misunderstanding of command channels in Division and Corps Headquarters and by a lack of specific directives from those Headquarters.
CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX (1) (ADMINISTRATION) TO ANNEX NOW (Continued).  Page 3

F. PROVOST MARSHAL:

1. During the early phases of the occupation, all provost marshal activities were under division control.

2. Upon the assignment of BMT-2/27 to SAGA and BMT-3/27 to KURUME, each of these organizations appointed a provost marshal and augmented attached military police with line troops.

3. The following activities were handled by the various provost marshals:
   a. Traffic control -- by use of signs, motor patrols and traffic control posts.
   b. Military law and order -- by use of shore patrol, both motorized and on foot and enforcement of the 1300 curfew.
   c. Civilian law and order -- by directives to the Civil Police and by supervision over same; and by a civilian curfew.
   d. Enforcement of safeguards and off limit areas -- by periodic inspections during each period of 24 hours.

G. SPECIAL SERVICES:

1. The first program begun by special services was a regimental movie. Our projectors were unpacked, serviced and a movie was shown on the fifth day ashore. When organizations were detached from the regiment, Japanese projectors were rebuilt and put into operation. Movie theatres were used at KURUME and SAGA.

2. Athletic programs of all types were inaugurated and encouraged. Both indoor and outdoor basketball courts were used and in addition, badminton, volleyball, baseball, softball, and touch football fields were constructed.

3. On 10 November, the Marine Corps birthday, a beer party was held for all enlisted personnel.

4. It is suggested that a quantity of 16mm movies could be used to better advantage than a few 35mm.

- 3 -
H. ADJUTANT:

1. During the occupation period, the work of the adjutant consisted mainly of routine administration, preparation of reports and records for demobilization and the transfer of personnel to the United States for discharge.

2. The main difficulties encountered were a lack of sufficient typewriters and poor communication and main service due to the various areas in which the lower echelons of this regiment were stationed.

I. POST OFFICE:

1. Upon the arrival of this regiment at the Marine Camp, AINOURA, sufficient space was available in a centrally located position to enable adequate receipt and dispatch of mail and postal supplies. Upon the movement of the regiment to KURUME, another excellent building for the Regimental Post Office was available and used.

2. Some difficulty was encountered after first arriving at KURUME in the receipt of mail, in that there was a confusion in the orders issued regarding train schedules. However, this situation was eventually rectified and for the latter period of the occupation, the mail service was very good.

FRANK L. HOWARD,
Warrant Officer (PD), U. S. Marine Corps,
AS - 1.
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS,
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

APPENDIX (2) (INTELLIGENCE) TO ANNEX H...

A. PLANNING:

1. Planning for the invasion of Southern Kyushu was never begun because of insufficient material.

2. Maps, photographs, hydrographic, weather, terrain, and other information for the occupation of Japan was received only in time to deliver it to lower echelons and some of it never was received in time to be distributed before reaching the target.

3. Advance Reconnaissance of the objective:

   One staff NCO from this combat team accompanied the Division Inspector in his advance reconnaissance of the objective. Other than to give us a general idea of how the Japanese Liaison Committee was cooperating with us, this man brought back no information to aid us in setting up in our sector because our assigned zone of responsibility was changed after the advance party had left for the target.

B. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

1. Training consisted of indoctrinating troops as to Japanese customs, way of living, etc., and a brief study of the geography of Japan. Assigned language officers gave a 4-lesson course in the Japanese language to all officers while enroute to the target, which proved to be very beneficial. Picked enlisted men also received instruction in the language.

2. a. Provisional intelligence platoons were organized by the battalions to aid in locating and reporting Intelligence targets during the occupation.

   b. The two language officers and four enlisted linguists regu-

      larly assigned to a combat team were attached for the occu-

      pation to this Headquarters. Those of the enlisted men were then assigned, one to each Landing Team, the fourth remain-

      ing with CT Headquarters.
C. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING DURING OCCUPATION:

1. Battalions went ashore with lists of known intelligence targets. These were immediately checked, reported on and taken under surveillance. By contacting the Japanese officer in charge of each area, installation, or unit in the area, and receiving from him information on strength of units, diagrams of installations and inventories of equipment, the process of locating and checking targets was simplified. Nearly all installations were under guard by Japanese troops when we arrived and these troops remained there until relieved by our troops who took them under surveillance.

With the exception of inventories of equipment, all documents of Japanese Naval and Army units were burned during the period 15 to 20 August 1945, by orders of the Naval and Army Ministries respectively, at Tokyo, making it impossible to check on histories and TO's of units. Commanding officers of all units contacted concurred on the dates and orders for burning.

2. In almost every case, the Japanese had made complete inventories of all equipment. The equipment was segregated and labeled with amounts and names of each item. It was merely a case of checking these, giving them a receipt and taking over.

3. All new equipment encountered was covered by JICPOA and NAVECHJAP Intelligence teams who handled such material.

4. The liaison committees set up by the Japanese, in the cities of SaSeBO, Saga and KureME, handled all necessary liaison, both of military and civilian natures.

5. Civilian attitude has proved to be cooperative in general with only incidents of several policemen in SaSeBO area being arrogant toward Marine sentries on 27 October; discharged soldiers under the influence of liquor giving our outpost sentries trouble in the 1st Battalion zone of responsibility on 4 October; and numerous instances of people attempting to steal food, clothing and building materials from warehouses under our surveillance.
6. Language personnel assigned were never of sufficient number to handle all work requiring interpreters. The Japanese Liaison Committees had interpreters which were made use of and additional interpreters were picked up as English-speaking persons were encountered.

   a. Very few documents were encountered, thus no special system was devised nor were difficulties encountered.

   b. Interrogations, as were necessary, were conducted to gain specific information regarding units and installations. These were conducted by Marine linguists or Japanese interpreters as were available.

D. JAPANESE COMPLIANCE WITH SURRENDER TERMS:

   1. No specific instances of failure to comply with surrender terms have ever been reported. Several instances were encountered in which it was at first thought the Japanese were giving us incomplete information and in other cases certain officers or officials denied knowledge of installations and units in their area. It was later found that the Japanese did not understand exactly what we wanted or actually were unaware of certain installations.

   C. F. [Signature]

   Attn: KARL W. BEERG,
   First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,
   S - 2.
HEADQUARTERS,
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

APPENDIX (3) (SUPPLY AND EVACUATION) TO ANNEX NOW

Movement of supplies and equipment of CT-27 from Camp Tarawa to HILO, Hawaii, T. H., commenced on 21 August 1945. Ships were combat loaded, and sailed from HILO on 26 August. During the landing phase, the weather conditions were anything but agreeable. During the night of 23 August the rainfall was approximately 7 inches and the following night approximately 4 inches. This resulted in the loss of valuable records and equipment.

Unloading at the target, SASEBO, KYUSHU, Japan, commenced on arrival 22 September and proceeded in a normal fashion until completed. Again, adverse weather conditions hampered the work. Units landed with one unit of fire for organic weapons and sufficient emergency rations for four meals. Regimental dumps were set up and unit distribution began on 25 September.

On 4 October gallies were in operation and "B" Rations and fresh bread were available. Cold, wet weather clothing were also made available by the Division.

On 5 October the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, were detached to Division control and moved to SAGA. On 24 October the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, and Regimental Headquarters proceeded to KURUME. Supplies for both SAGA and KURUME were moved by Division via rail and this method functioned very smoothly.

A bakery was set up at KURUME on 27 October and fresh bread was made available from this date. "B" Rations were supplemented by fresh meat on 3 November and every second or third day thereafter.

The Medical Department embarked combat loaded with adequate supplies. While enroute to the occupation area, an epidemic of catarrhal fever or mild influenza was encountered with a total of approximately 225 cases. Recovery of these patients was normal and rapid and all hands were able to disembark by the time of actual landing.

In the occupation phase, the water and food supplies were well controlled and inspected and there were no cases of contagious or infectious diseases encountered. The venereal rate was very low except for a moderate number of gonococcus infections in one battalion.
Upon arrival at KURUME on 24 October disposition proceeded according to Annex FOX to 5th Marine Division Administrative Order 1-45.

Both the 2d Battalion at SAGA and the 3d Battalion at KURUME began transferring control items immediately to Division. Over 50,000 rifles and over 5,000 swords were sent to Division.

As rapidly as inventories could be made of warehouses and installations containing goods of use to the civilian population, these were turned over to the Home Ministry representative of this district.

Both battalions set up incinerators for burning small arms ammunition and over ten million rounds have been disposed of in this manner.

All airplanes at the KURUME and METABAHU airfields, which were in the 2d Battalion zone of responsibility, have been destroyed, with the motors blown up with dynamite and the planes piled together and burned.

Light and heavy machine guns were destroyed by using acetylene torches and over 300 have been destroyed in this manner.

Over 168 Japanese materials which meet the United States requirements for War Memorials and Museum pieces were found in the regimental zone of responsibility and are being held pending further instructions.

Disposition is proceeding at this rate and inventories, disposition reports, and stock record cards are being completed.

FRANCIS J. LUTZ,
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps,
S-4.
ANNEX ITEM
TO 5TH MAR. DIV. OPERATION REPORT

Occupation of Japan

28th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of Japan

22nd Sept. 45 to 30th Nov. 45
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 28TH MARINES
5TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCES,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

30 November, 1945

Annex ITEM to 5th Marine Division Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

28th Marines Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.
Subject: 28th Marines Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. The subject report is respectfully submitted herewith.

H. B. Liversedge.

H. B. LIVERSEDGE.
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 28TH MARINES
5TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

30 November, 1945.

BASIC REPORT

1. PLANNING
   a. Assault Operation.

   Planning for the assault operation against southern KYUSHU was started on 1 August, 1945. Maps, photographs, intelligence summaries, and a tentative operation order were received at this time. During the period 1-12 August, intensive study was made of all available material on the beaches, terrain, and enemy forces in Southwestern KYUSHU. However, on 12 August, planning was halted because of the imminence of the Japanese surrender.

   b. Occupation Operation.

   On 20 August, 1945, preliminary plans for the occupation of KYUSHU were received. Early sailing orders made necessary a concentrated planning period. All plans and preparations were made with the view of possible combat upon landing in JAPAN.

   Much planning, of necessity, was carried on enroute to the target and during that period three plans were evolved. All personnel were thoroughly briefed on all plans and on the surrender terms. Division Operations Plans 26, 25A, and 25B-45 were used as a basis for this planning. Necessary distribution of planning material to subordinate units was effected at various stops between HAWII and JAPAN.

2. TRAINING
   a. Assault Operation.

   After returning from the IWO JIMA Operation, a training program was commenced with the view to bringing the regiment back to normal fighting efficiency. This program commenced with individual training and carried through regimental combat team training.

   The 28th Marines, having been designated as a reserve unit for the assault operation on KYUSHU, had no definite objective assigned for that operation. Consequently no special training or rehearsals were necessary. The regiment merely had to be maintained in top fighting trim, prepared for any eventuality. The regiment did however participate in several field exercises involving movement over long distances and considerable maneuver of subordinate units.

   b. Occupation Operation.

   Insasmuch as little time was available between the time occupation orders were received and the sailing date, no special training was carried out in HAWII. However, aboard ship debarkation drills were held at frequent intervals, and personnel were thoroughly briefed on surrender terms.
CONFIDENTIAL

Classes in basic Japanese were available to all hands.

3. ORGANIZATION

a. Assault Operation.

RCT-28 was organized as follows for the assault on Southwestern KYUSHU:

28th Mar: (less M-7 Flt, Regt’l Wpns Co)
Co C, 5th Engr Bn
Plt, Co C, 5th MT Bn
Co C, 5th Med Bn
Det, 3d Prov Rocket Det
3d Plt, Co C, 72d Gnl Mort Bn
3d Sec, 6th Mar War Dog Plt
3d Plt, Ord Co, 5th Serv Bn
3d Plt, Sup Co, 5th Serv Bn
Det, ASCO, 5th Mar Div

The planning period for the assault operation was so short that the final task organization for BLT's had not been evolved at the time the Japanese surrendered.

b. Occupation Operation.

RCT-28 was organized as follows for the occupation of JAPAN:

BLT-128

Lt Col BUTTERFIELD

1st Bn, 28th Mar
1st Plt, C Co, 5th Engr Bn
1/3 Coll Sec, C Co, 5th Med Bn
Det ASCO, 5th Mar Div
Ln Pty, 5th Tk Bn
Det, 3d Bn, 13th Mar

BLT-228

Lt Col McDONOUGH

2d Bn, 28th Mar
2d Plt, C Co, 5th Engr Bn
1/3 Coll Sec, C Co, 5th Med Bn
Det ASCO, 5th Mar Div
Ln Pty, 5th Tk Bn
Det 3d Bn, 13th Mar

BLT-328

Maj SMOAK

3d Bn, 28th Mar
3d Plt, C Co, 5th Engr Bn
1/3 Coll Sec, C Co, 5th Med Bn
Det ASCO, 5th Mar Div
Ln Pty, 5th Tk Bn
Det, 3d Bn, 13th Mar
Plt, D Co, 3d Prov MP Bn
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CT-28 (-)

28th Mar (less 3 Bns & M-7 Flat)
C Co, 5th Engr Bn (less 3 Flats)
C Co, 5th Med Bn (less Coll Sec)
Det ASCO, 5th Mar Div
Ln Pny, 5th Tk Bn
Det, 3d Bn, 13th Mar
Co D, 3d Prov MP Bn (less 1 Plat)

Col LIVERSEDGE

4. ADVANCE RECONNAISSANCE OF THE OBJECTIVE

One NCO from CT-28 accompanied the Division reconnaissance group in the SASEBO area. He rejoined the combat team aboard the headquarters ship about 1100, 22Sept45, and rendered his report to Col Liversedge. The report was of some value in that it outlined road conditions and condition of the billets assigned to the combat team upon landing.

5. OCCUPATION OPERATIONS

a. The S-1 and S-4 sections performed normal functions of administration and supply throughout the occupation. S-4 also handled procurement of Japanese material and labor.

S-2 and S-3 operated jointly in executing and supervising all occupation missions falling under the purview of these two sections. Coordination of patrols investigating military and civilian targets was one of the main duties. Complete overviews and files covering all targets within the regimental zone were maintained. In addition, cases involving compliance with surrender terms were investigated and liaison with Japanese Military, Naval, and civilian authorities was maintained with the aid of attached linguists.

b. Narrative Summary of Operations Ashore

1800, 21Sept to 1800, 22Sept45

CT Hq remained afloat.

LT-128 remained afloat.

LT-228 landed at 1400 at the SASEBO docks. They were ordered to reinforce the Shore Party Bn, and assist in unloading. The CP opened in a warehouse at the SASEBO Dock Area (77.6-13.4).

LT-328 remained afloat.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 22Sept to 1800, 23Sept45

CT Hq remained aboard ship in the SASEBO Harbor. Col Liversedge and representatives of all staff sections went ashore at 0915 to reconnoiter the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

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Col Liversedge and party returned to APA 114 at 1500.

LT-128 landed at 0825 on Green beaches and established its CP at the Naval Air Station, SASEBO.

LT-228 continued to assist the Shore Party.

LT-328 landed in the JIG Area at 0800 and moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station (73.-13.).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 23Sept to 1800, 24Sept45

CT Hq and Wpns Co, landed at 1140 at JIG Area and moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station. The entire CT was then ashore.

LT-128 moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station at 1030.

LT-228 continued to assist Shore Party.

LT-328 sent a patrol to the MIYAZAKI, SONOGI, URESHINO, TAKED, ARITA Area.

G Co, 5th Med Bn landed and moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

Hq C Co, 5th Engr Bn landed with CT Hq at 1140 and moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 24Sept to 1800, 25Sept45

LT-128 remained in reserve.

LT-228 continued to assist the Shore Party.

LT-328 sent two rifle platoons to guard ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 25Sept to 1800, 26Sept45

LT-128 remained in reserve.

LT-228 continued to assist Shore Party in unloading ships and handling supplies ashore.

LT-328 remained at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.
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1800, 26Sept to 1800, 27Sept45

CT Hq received orders to send Col Williams, Major Wood and party on reconnaissance to FUKUOKA preparatory to occupying that area.

LT-128 remained in reserve.

LT-228 was detached from the Shore Party and commenced movement of troops to the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two Platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 27Sept to 1800, 26Sept45

CT Hq received verbal orders to prepare one LT and Wpns Co to move to FUKUOKA about 30Sept45. LT-128 was warned to be ready to move on this date.

LT-128 remained in reserve at AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-228 completed movement of troops to AINOURA Naval Training Station. Their CP opened in Bldg #46.

LT-328 remained at AINOURA Naval Training Station with two rifle Platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 28Sept to 1800, 29Sept45

LT-128 remained in reserve at AINOURA Naval Training Station prepared to move to FUKUOKA. Billeting Detail of FUKUOKA Advance Occupation Force left by train for FUKUOKA.

LT-228 remained in reserve at AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained in reserve at AINOURA Naval Training Station with two Platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

Wpns Co 28th Mdr(-) prepared to move to FUKUOKA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 29Sept to 1800, 30Sept45

LT-128 moved to FUKUOKA with one Platoon Wpns Co and a detachment from H&S Co, 28th Mdr. The LT passed to control of the FUKUOKA Advance Occupation Force.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.
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LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 30Sept to 1800, 1Oct45

CT Hq received orders to alert one Co to move by rail to SHIMONOSEKI about 40ct45.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons at SASA (64.-19.). Alerted KING Co for move to SHIMONOSEKI about 40ct45.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 1Oct to 1800, 2Oct45

CT Hq received orders to be prepared to move by rail and truck to FUKUOKA on 5 and 6Nov45. All units remaining at AINOURA NTS were alerted for this move.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

1800, 20ct to 1800, 30ct45

CT Hq made preparations to move to FUKUOKA on 5 and 60ct45.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station. The two platoons at SASA (64.-19.), ammunition dump, were relieved by elements of ITEM Co, 27th Marines at 1200.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 30ct to 1800, 40ct45

CT Hq continued preparations for move to FUKUOKA on 5 and 60ct45.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 (- KING Co) remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station. KING Co left camp at 0430, 40ct45 enroute to SHIMONOSEKI.

No casualties for the period.
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1800, 4Oct to 1800, 5Oct45

CT Eq left SASEBO 5Oct45 with these elements; 2d Bn, 28th Mar, C Co (less 1 pl at) 3d Prov MP Bn, and Wns Co, 28th Mar.

LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 5Oct to 1800, 6Oct45

CT-28 (less I and K Cos and LT-128) arrived at KASHII Station, FUKUOKA, JAPAN on the 5th and 6th of Oct, and the CT CP opened on 6Oct45 at the Ippotei, East Park, FUKUOKA. CT-28 was placed under FUKUOKA Occupation Force for operational control.

CT-28 had the following units attached: C Co (less 1 pl at) 3d Prov MP Bn, C Co, 5th Engr Bn, 3d Flat, Ord Co, 3d Flat, Serv Co, 3d Flat, Sup Co, B Co, 12th Force MT Bn, 2d Flat auto Repair Co.

LT-128 had been under FOF control since 30Sept45 and was now billeted at the KYUSHU Airplane School (48.9-74.6).

LT-228 was billeted at KASHII Station (49.5-73.5) and their CP opened there on 6Oct45.

LT-328 was billeted at KASHII Station (49.5-73.5) and their CP opened there on 6Oct45. LT-328 received verbal orders to prepare to move to MOJI on the 10th of October, 1945.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 6Oct to 1800, 7Oct45

CT-28 assumed control of LT-128 at 0800I.

LT-128 sent detachment of 1 officer, 31 men to maintain law and order in three Chinese PW Camps in the vicinity of IIYUKA (1370.4-1170.4), and one intelligence patrol to WAJIRO and CHIKUSEN-SHINGU.

LT-228 supervised movement of Japanese material in KASHII Warehouse Area.

LT-328 (less I and K Cos) continued preparations for movement to MOJI.

Wns Co, 28th Mar was released to FOF to act as MP for the area.

C Co, 5th Engr Bn, commenced improvement and maintenance of facilities in LT-128 and 228 billeting areas.

C Co, 5th Med Bn, began operation of hospital at the HAKATA Seaplane Base. (41.2-74.8)

No casualties for the period.
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1800, 7Oct to 1800, 8Oct45

LT-128 sent two (2) groups (1 NCO and 9 men each) to the vicinity of IIZUKA to take over two (2) additional Chinese POW Camps.

LT-228 continued improvement of KASHII Station.

LT-328 continued preparations for movement to MOJI.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 8Oct45 to 1800, 9Oct45

LT-128 sent out four (4) motorized patrols. Two (2) patrols were intelligence patrols in the SHINGU, KOGA, YAMADA, HOKOKAN School, KASHII Fort area (46.7-78.5). The other two patrols were sentry patrols, one in the northern sector of LT's zone of responsibility, and one in southern sector. The LT sent 1 officer and 47 men to reinforce the IIZUKA Chinese PW Camp Detachment. This group to maintain law and order in five (5) additional camps in the NAGATA, ORIO, TAGAWA District.

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols in the FUKUOKA, SУНIYOSHI, NINOSHIMA, TAKENOSHITA, OSHI, лIJIRI, KOKURA area. LT sent one sergeant and twelve (12) men to guard a new type Jap Plane located by CIC, three miles south of ITAZUKA (ZASSHONOKURA) District (53.0-62.3).

LT-328 continued preparations for movement to MOJI.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 9Oct45 to 1800, 10Oct45

LT-128 sent patrols as follows:
Patrol #1 Intelligence patrol from HAKATA WLAN Peninsula to the northern edge of FUKUOKA city limits.
Patrol #2 Intelligence patrol in the YAMADA, FUKUOKA, MIYAZAKI area.
Patrol #3 Sentry patrol in the northern sector of LT's zone of responsibility.
Patrol #4 Sentry patrol in the southern sector of LT's zone of responsibility.

Dispatched 1 officer and 12 men to exercise surveillance over Chinese PW Camp in the vicinity of UMI.

LT-228 sent two (2) patrols to reconnoiter new intelligence targets.
Dispatched 1 NCO and 10 men to assist in search of Western Army CP in the vicinity of FUTSUBACHI (50.70-50.55).

LT-328 plus 3d Flt, C Co, 5th Engr Bn, 3d Flt, B Co, 12th Force MT Bn and a det, H&S Co, 28th Med left KASHII Station 0956 by rail for MOJI. This LT was attached to POF for operational control.

No casualties for the period.
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1800, 100ct to 1800, 110ct45

CT-28 Hq held conference with Police Chief and harbor officials to make arrangement for searching craft coming from ports outside the home island of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the WAJIRO, MOTOMA, MINATO, SHINGU, MACHI, HIRA YAMA Area, and two (2) sentry patrols.

LT-228 sent three (3) intelligence patrols to the IMAJIKU, SUSENJI, DAIMORI, SHMOKEGO, TANI, TAJIMA, MIIGA, ITAZUKA, KASUGA Area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 110ct to 1800, 120ct45

CT-28 Hq conducted road reconnaissance to KURUME.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the KOGA, YUSHINAGUCHI, HANAMII, HAMAO-DOI, KOWA, TACHIBANAGUCHI Area and two (2) sentry patrols.

LT-228 sent three (3) intelligence patrols to the WAGIGANAGUCHI, HETA, KOTA, GHARA, YOKOHAMA, HIRATA, KASUGA, KIKI, SAGI, CSA-MURA, FABARU, AKASAKA, KOFURI, YOSHI Area.

Sent 1 sergeant and 17 men to guard KYUSHU Aircraft Factory at ZASSHONOKUMA (53.0-61.3).

Sent 1 sergeant and 13 men to guard KASUGA Weapons Factory at KASUGABARU Station (53.0-60.5).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 120ct to 1800, 130ct45

CT-28 Hq supervised and inspected Japanese troops arriving from KOREA.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the KASHII, HAMADA, SHIMO, IGA, CHOJABARU, SHINWACHI Area, and two sentry patrols.

LT-228 sent three (3) intelligence patrols to the IHARA, MISAIKA, HIAKE, HATAE, SETO, HIKI, IKIMAN, FUKAI, TORIKA, ROJI, MINO-SHIMA Area.

Sent 1 officer and 13 men to the HAKATA Harbor to search Japanese troops arriving by ship from KOREA.

No casualties for the period.

1200, 130ct to 1200, 140ct45

CT-28 Hq supervised debarcation of Japanese troops arriving from KOREA. Organized Examiner Teams for the purpose of "spot checking" Japanese personnel returning from ports other than those in the main islands of JAPAN. This team was organized as follows:
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1 Chief Examiner - 1 Lt to be in charge
1 Asst Examiner - 1 Lt to assist and provide relief for Chief Examiner.

2 Rifle Squads
2 Interpreters
1 CIC Det (2 special agents and 2 interpreters)
2 Medical Officers.

Also made preparations to send raiding parties to NAMAZUNDA, HOIYO, and ITZUKA Prisons to arrive at 1600, 150ct45 and determine if SCAP directive of 40ct45, to Jap government had been complied with.

LT-128 continued routine guard duty.

LT-228 sent 1 sergeant and 4 men on train to HOI as train guard. Left at 1430 to return on 150ct45.

No casualties for period.

1800, 140ct to 1800, 150ct45

CT-28 Hq sent advance billeting party to KURUME. Left at 0800 and returned at 1900, 150ct45. Continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside home islands of Japan.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to HAMAO, KURAMOTO, and TAKATA Area.

Sent 1 officer and 15 men to NAMAZUNDA Prison to guard and investigate records and prisoners. Left at 1100 to arrive there by 1600, 150ct45. They were accompanied by 1 interpreter (FOF).

LT-228 sent one (1) intelligence patrol to the HARA, JIRO-MARU, TOCHI, NOKE Area.

Sent 1 NCO and 3 men to ABURA-YAMA (41.5-57.3) to guard FOF Radio Relay Station. Left 1000, 150ct45.

Sent 1 officer and 6 men to ITZUKA Prison (1370.4-1170.4) to guard and investigate records and prisoners. Left 1100 to arrive there by 1600, 150ct45. Accompanied by 1 interpreter (FOF).

Sent 1 officer and 11 men to guard and investigate records and prisoners at HOIYO Prison. Left 1100 to arrive there by 1600, 150ct45. Accompanied by 1 interpreter (FOF).

1800, 150ct to 1800, 160ct45

CT-28 continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the HAMAO, FUTSUKAICHI, KATANO, DAIBU, HOGO, HAMAS, HIKAU, UMI, SUE, BEKA Area and 1 sentry patrol.

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the HOI, KEYAGI, DOTEN-SHU, SHIPO, OH, HAMU, TSUKO, YAMAK Area.

At 2330, 150ct45, ITZUKA Branch Prison patrol returned having been unable to locate said prison. This patrol to return to the ITZUKA Area when prison is located.

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No casualties for the period.

1800, 160ct to 1800, 170ct45

CT-28 continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the MISHIRO, NOTOGI, NOGATA, Veki, AYAMA, FUKUMA, YAMADA, HARA, HATSUM, TARE, FUKUMA Area, and one (1) sentry patrol.

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the MAEBARU, OISHI, SAKUDA, BABA, MOTOOKA, AMOYU, MITSUE, OURA, NEDA, NISHI, IRUBE Area.

Sent 1 officer and 1 man to IIZUKA to reconnoiter the area in an attempt to locate the IIZUKA Prison.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 170ct to 1800, 180ct45

CT-28 Hq continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN. Confiscated 6931 yen from returning troops.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the northern section of the LT's zone of responsibility and 1 sentry patrol.

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the FUKUOKA Higher School /raacry, IMAIKU Seaplane Base, SUSUMI Naval Air Base, "Chitose" Unit #32620 Ammunition Damp at MAEBARU, HAKUDA Collecting Point and the KITA Ammunition Damp.

IIZUKA Prison was located and the detail reinforced.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 180ct to 1800, 190ct45

CT-28 continued investigation of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN. Commenced impounding outgoing and incoming mail in HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 sent one intelligence patrol to the KAWASAKI, HONJO, NOGATA, IIZUKA Area and one sentry patrol.

One platoon was dispatched at 2115 to the IIZUKA POW Camp to act as a mobile reserve in case of a riot at the Chinese POW Camp. Nothing developed and the patrol returned to camp at 1300, 15ct45.

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the FUTSUKAICH, YOKI, SCHU, AMAGI, SHITANI, HONGO, TACHIBNA Area.

No casualties for the period.
1800, 190ct to 1800, 200ct45

CT-28 Hq continued investigation of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN. Impounded one bag of outgoing Japanese mail (approximately 3 pounds).

LT-128 sent no additional intelligence patrols since those of the 19th were to be two day patrols. Dispatched one sentry patrol.
    Sent two (2) billeting patrols to report to G-1 FOF for orders. These patrols left at 0800 and consisted of 1 NCO and 1 man per patrol.

LT-228 sent no additional intelligence patrols, since those of the 19th were two day patrols.
    The Guard Detachment, having completed its mission returned to camp at 1500, 200ct from the IZUKA Prison. No violations of the SCAP direct were found.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 200ct to 1800, 210ct45

CT-28 Hq assumed operational control of 126th Field Artillery Bn at 1200I. Continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 continued routine guard missions.

LT-228 continued routine guard missions. HOJYO Prison detail returned to camp at 2000. Found no violations of the SCAP directive.

126th Fld Arty Bn began improvement of KASHII Warehouse billeting area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 210ct to 1800, 220ct45

CT-28 Hq continued investigation of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent one intelligence patrol to the KMGU KOKE MIM KINRO Army Training School (1355.4-1197.5), and one sentry patrol.

LT-228 sent two (2) sentry patrols throughout their zone of responsibility.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improving KASHII billeting area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 220ct to 1800, 230ct45

CT-28 Hq continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.
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LT-128 sent one sentry patrol.
LT-228 continued routine guard.
126th Fld Arty Bn continued improving KASHII billeting area.
No casualties for the period.

1800, 230ct to 1800, 240ct45

CT-28 (- B Co, 12th Force MT Bn, and 1st Fld VAC Bomb Disp Co) passed from FOF control to 32nd Inf Div control at 0600I.
Continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent one sentry patrol. Continued routine guard missions.
LT-228 continued routine guard missions.
126th Fld Arty Bn continued improvement of billeting area.
No casualties for the period.

1800, 240ct to 1800, 250ct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 sent one sentry patrol in northern section of LT zone of responsibility.

LT-228 sent one sentry patrol in southern section of LT zone of responsibility.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improvement of billeting area. Sent one officer with each patrol from LT-128 and LT-228.
No casualties for the period.

1800, 250ct to 1800, 260ct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 sent one sentry patrol in northern section of its zone of responsibility.

LT-228 sent two (2) sentry patrols in its zone of responsibility.
Japanese personnel guarding dumps in zone of responsibility were relieved by Civil Police.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improving billeting area. Sent one officer with each patrol from LT-128 and LT-228.
No casualties for the period.
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1800, 26Oct to 1800, 27Oct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 Installations guarded by Japanese Naval personnel relieved by Civil Police.
   Chinese FW guard detachment returned from the ORIO, NOGATA, TAKAWA Area at 1600, having been relieved by the 127th Inf Regt.
   Patrol to the NAMAZU Prison completed investigation and returned to camp at 1030. Nothing unusual found at the prison.
   Sent one sentry patrol in the southern section of its zone of responsibility.

LT-228 sent one sentry patrol to check installations that were taken over by Civil Police, and one sentry patrol in the northern section of its zone of responsibility.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improving billeting area. Installations guarded by Japanese Naval personnel relieved by Civil Police.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 27Oct to 1800, 28Oct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 continued routine guard missions.

LT-228 continued routine guard missions.

126th Fld Arty Bn CO, and S-3 went to OITA, to reconnoiter billeting area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 28Oct to 1800, 29Oct45

CT Hq relieved guard of the 58th Air Service Group with one Civil Police. This guard was placed over Jap ordnance in the 58th Air Service Group area in ZASSHOKUNA. Continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 continued routine guard missions.

LT-228 relieved one NCO and twelve men from the KYUSHU Aircraft Plant and Jap "Fushe Plane" at 1030, in the ZASSHOKUNA District. Three (3) communication men were sent from this group to reinforce the guard at KASUGA Wpns Factory. (KASUGABARU Station)

126th Fld Arty Bn made advance preparations to move to OITA.

No casualties for the period.

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1800, 290ct to 1800, 300ct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 sent one sentry patrol to check sentries in zone of responsibility.

LT-228 sent one sentry patrol to check the southern section of the LT's zone of responsibility.

126th Fld Arty Bn loaded rail transportation in preparation for movement to OITA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 300ct to 1800, 310ct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.
Continued relieving with Civil Police Japanese military personnel guarding dumps. Received orders to be prepared to move to SASEBO on 2 and 5Nov45.

LT-128 relieved guards previously maintained by LT-228. Sent one sentry patrol in northern section of LT zone of responsibility.

LT-228 made preparations to move to SASEBO on 2Nov45.

126th Fld Arty Bn commenced movement by rail to OITA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 310ct to 1800, 1Nov45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 completed relieving guard previously maintained by LT-228. Sent one sentry patrol in northern section of LT zone of responsibility.

LT-228 completed loading rail transportation for movement to SASEBO.

126th Fld Arty Bn completed movement by rail to OITA. Detached from CT-28 at 0800, 1Nov45.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 1Nov to 1800, 2Nov45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

Made preparations to turn over all guards of CT to the 127th Infantry Regiment, 32nd Inf Div.

LT-128 sent out one sentry patrol in the northern section of LT zone of responsibility.
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LT-228 (-1 Flot) left in three (3) trains, 0810, 0925, and 1040 for SASEBO. Attached to 5th MarDiv for operational control.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 2Nov to 1800, 3Nov45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor, and continued making preparations to turn over all guards of CT to 127th Infantry Regiment.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 3Nov to 1800, 4Nov45

CT Hq Examiner Team checking incoming repatriates at HAKATA Harbor relieved by 127th Inf Rept.

LT-126 All guards except those at ILZUKA Prison Camp relieved by 1st Bn, 127th Infantry Regiment.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 4Nov to 1800, 5Nov45

CT Hq All guard posts relieved by 127th Inf Rept and CT zone of responsibility passed to the control of the 127th Inf Rept at 1500.

LT-126 made preparations to move to SASEBO.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 5Nov to 1800, 6Nov45

CT Hq completed movement of CT-28 (-1 Pns Co) to SASEBO.

LT-126 left FUKUOKA at 0810 and arrived at SASEBO at 1330. H&S Co, 28th Mar (-), 3d Fltr, Sup Co, C Co, 5th Engr Bn (-), 1 Fltr, 2d Bn, 28th Mar, departed from FUKUOKA at 1010 and arrived at SASEBO at 1530. Released all attachments to control of parent organization.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 6Nov to 1800, 7Nov45

CT Hq opened CF at 0800 in Bldg #23, Marine Camp, AIMOURA (AIMOURA Naval Training Station). Returned to control of 5th Marine Division. Inspected by General Krueger, CG, 6th Army, from 0840 to 1025.

1st Bn, 28th Mar relieved 3d Bn, 28th Mar of ten guard posts in the SASEBO area. Its CF opened at OMO Barracks (75.35-18.05), with "A", "B", and "C" Gcs, billeted at YAMANOTE Barracks (75.50-17.20). Commenced improvement of assigned billeting areas.
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2nd Bn, 28th Mar reverted to CT-28 control with its CP at the EAST SIDE NAVY YARD (78.1-11.5). Continued routine guard missions.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar reverted to CT-28 control. The battalion had been under operational control of the 5th Mar Div since its return from OKIN at 1541, 22Oct45 and was billeted in Bldg #22, Marine Camp AINOURA. Continued routine guard in area formerly occupied by the 2nd Bn, 27th Mar. Relinquished ten guard posts to the 1st Bn, 28th Mar.

Wpns Co (-) arrived from FUKUOKA at 1745, 6Nov and were billeted in Bldg #31, Marine Camp AINOURA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 7Nov to 1800, 8Nov45

CT Hq initiated a training program for personnel not on guard.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions. Hq Co, "A" and "C" Cos moved to Marine Camp AINOURA (Bldg #46). "B" Co moved to the SASEBO Fortress Headquarters. (77.3-15.3)

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol to reconnoiter the area around HAIKI. Continued routine guard missions.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions. Fire in warehouse (66.2-18.8) about 1700. The warehouse was used for storing dynamite. Fire fighting detail was sent out from Marine Camp, AINOURA. The warehouse blew up about 1930 with no resulting casualties. The fire fighting detail was secured and sent back to camp at 2015.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 8Nov to 1800, 9Nov45

CT Hq commneed disposing of Japanese materiel in CT zone of responsibility.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions. Established traffic control station just east of HAIKI.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions. Established traffic control station at the SASEBO, HIRADO, AINOURA road junction.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 9Nov to 1800, 10Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy material.
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1st Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 11Nov to 1800, 12Nov45

CT Hq conducted inspection of guard details in the western section of CT zone of responsibility. Supervised training program.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol in the SAISHI, YUNOKI, SECHIN. Re, KAI area. Continued training and routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol to IMARI and one patrol to MAIJI. The IMARI patrol was a two day patrol to return at approximately 1630, 13Nov45. Continued routine guard missions.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol in the northern section of Bn zone of responsibility. Continued training and routine guard missions. Two men were killed upon at 1115, 11Nov45 while walking around the weather deck of the old Japanese battleship anchored in the bay, northwest of Marine Camp AINOURA. The incident was investigated and a patrol searched the area north of the ship but nothing was discovered.

The remainder of Wpns Co arrived from FUKUOKA at 2012, 11Nov45 and were billeted in Bldg #31 Marine Camp AINOURA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 12Nov to 1800, 13Nov45

CT Hq continued disposing of Japanese materiel. Supervised training program.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol in the MIKAWACHI, YOSHIFUKU, YOSHUKU, SATO, URANOSAKI area. Continued training and routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued training and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol in the northern section of the Bn zone of responsibility. Continued training and routine guard missions.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 13Nov to 1800, 14Nov45

CT Hq continued disposing of Japanese materiel. Supervised training program.
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1st Bn, 28th Mar sent out one motorized patrol in the KURONDA, HIGASHI-UMEME, MIYANO, IMAKI Area. Continued training and routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent out one motorized patrol to KARATSU and vicinity. This was a two day patrol. Continued training and routine guard missions.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol in the EGUCHI, SHIMO, SHISA, NAKAMA, KURASHIO, SHIRAHAMA Area. Continued training and routine guard missions.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 15Nov to 1800, 15Nov45

CT Hq furnished eight officers and sixteen men to lead search parties checking shrines and schools in SASEBO to see if surrender terms had been complied with. Continued disposition of enemy matériel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training and routine guard. Two day patrol which left 14Nov45 was still operating in the vicinity of KARATSU.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1600, 15Nov to 1800, 16Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy matériel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. Sent a three day patrol to the area around KARATSU.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. Sent one road reconnaissance patrol to the area just north of SASEBO.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 16Nov to 1800, 17Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy matériel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. One patrol continued to operate in vicinity of KARATSU.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.
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1800, 17Nov to 1800, 18Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.
Patrol to KARATSU and vicinity expected to return late, 18Nov45.

3rd Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 18Nov to 1800, 19Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 26th Mar sent one patrol to the area of MIKAWACHI, YOSHINUKU, YOSHUKI, YANATE, SATO, and URANOSAKI. Continued training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 26th Mar sent one patrol to the area around KARATSU. This patrol to remain in that vicinity for three (3) days.

3rd Bn, 26th Mar sent one road reconnaissance patrol to the area north of SASEBO. Sent one (1) officer and twenty-five (25) men to SHISHIMACHI to maintain law and order among rioting Chinese laborers.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 19Nov to 1800, 20Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel. Lt Col Rich, 3d Bn 6th Marines and party arrived 1900, 19Nov45 to make preparations for relief of CT-28. Lt Col Rich was joined by Lt Col Fuller, Regt'1 Ex Officer, 6th Marines on the morning of 20Nov45.

1st Bn, 26th Mar sent one patrol to the MIKAWACHI, ARITA, MIMASAKA, IMARI, YUNOKI Area. Continued surveillance, training and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 26th Mar sent out patrol to all guard posts in the Bn zone of responsibility to determine the advisability of consolidating some of these posts. Patrol which left on 19Nov45 to the area around KARATSU continued its mission. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 26th Mar sent one patrol to the OGITA, INITA, KOTEDA, BOTHA, SHINO-GANE Area. The patrol which went to investigate the Chinese situation at SHISHIMACHI returned at 1315, 20Nov45. No proof existed of any physical violence which may have been created by the Chinese. The Chinese and Japanese were duly warned, and after evacuating the Chinese
CONFIDENTIAL

to the deck area, the patrol returned to camp. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1600, 20Nov to 1800, 21Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese matériel. Made preparations for turning over all remaining buildings in the LOVE, MIKE, MAN and OBOE Areas, SaSeBo Harbor, to the 8th Service Regiment.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued patrol to KARATSU. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to the area just north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 21Nov to 1800, 22Nov45

CT Hq Holiday Routine (Thanksgiving). Holiday routine for personnel not otherwise engaged.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, and routine guard. Holiday routine for personnel not otherwise engaged.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, and routine guard. Holiday routine for personnel not otherwise engaged.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance and routine guard. Holiday routine for personnel not otherwise engaged.

Sent one motorized patrol to the KOSASA-USUNOURA Area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 22Nov to 1800, 23Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese matériel. Began drawing war trophies for issue to personnel of this regiment.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to the MIKAWACHI, ZOSNIKU, YAMAYA, SATO, ARINOSAKI, SECHIURA Area. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to reconnoiter area between IMARI and KARATSU. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to cover area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.
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No casualties for the period.

1800, 23Nov to 1800, 24Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese material. Released that part of SAGA Ken to zone of responsibility to 2d Mar Div at 1000.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued patrol of the area between IMARI and KARATSU. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 24Nov to 1800, 25Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese material. Continued drawing war trophies for issue to personnel of the regiment.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar The patrol to the IMARI and KARATSU Area returned to camp at 1700, 25Nov45. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to the area just north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 25Nov to 1800, 26Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese material. Started issuing war trophies to personnel of this regiment. Trophies were issued to officers and enlisted men according to point system, regardless of rank.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to the KURONDA, ARITA, MIYANA, MIMASAKA, HIGASHI-UMEME, IMARI Area. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. Was relieved of guard in LOVE, MIKE, MAN, OBOE Areas, SASEBO Harbor, by 8th Service Regiment.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to cover the area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.
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1800, 26Nov to 1800, 27Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese matériel. Continued issuing war trophies to personnel of this regiment.

1st Bn, 26th Mar sent one patrol to the YUNOKI, SECHIHARA Area. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 26th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to the area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 27Nov to 1800, 28Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese matériel. Completed issuing war trophies to personnel of this regiment.

1st Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 26th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to the area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 28Nov to 1800, 29Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy matériel.

1st Bn, 26th Mar sent one surveillance patrol to YUNOKI, SECHIHARA Area. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 26th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to cover the area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. Reconnaissance patrol in area north of AINOURA discovered what looked like an Allied cemetery, (1270.5-1126.7) which bore the following names:

SKINNER, C.V. DONELLY, T. MC NAB, J.A.
WINCHESTER, F. BRIGHTWELL, T. BANKS, R.
HARRISON, F. WALSH, P. HART, L.
B. L. A. PARMER, J. DARE, I.
HONEYBALL, E. ASKEW, H. MANN, W.
HUGHES, T. FOXCRAFT, G.D. ROY, F.
DAGSHAW, R. LONG, J.E.

All bodies were buried in one grave, covered by a brick structure which probably contain their ashes. The position does not appear to be over one (1) year old.

No casualties for the period.

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1800, 29 Nov to 1800, 30 Nov 45

CT Hq continued disposing of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 26th Mar continued surveillance and routine guard. Commenced relief of 1st Bn guard in SASEBO.

No casualties for the period.

At the close of this report, the regiment is preparing for return to the states and subsequent demobilization. The 3rd Bn, 6th Marines will relieve the regiment at 1000, 10 Dec 45.
6. JAPANESE COMPLIANCE WITH SURRENDER TERMS

The Japanese were very cooperative in complying with surrender terms in both the FUKUOKA and SAIFUBO area. However, prior to actual occupation of JAPAN, during the period 15-18 August 1945, certain documents, records, etc., were burned on "orders from Headquarters, TOKYO."

After occupation began, minor instances where failure to comply with terms was evidenced were a result of a misunderstanding of orders. There was no evidence of actual intent to evade the terms.

7. SUPPLY, EQUIPMENT, AND LOGISTICS

Let it suffice to say that, with few exceptions, supplies, equipment, and logistics were satisfactory throughout the operations. For a more detailed discussion see Annex DOG.

8. SPECIAL FEATURES


Naval gunfire, air, and artillery support never progressed beyond the general planning stage in the regiment. During the voyage from HAWAII to JAPAN plans were laid for utilization of support as outlined in Division and Corps operation plans. None of the support was used or needed since the landing at SAIFUBO was made without opposition.

b. Procurement.

Procurement of Japanese labor and material was never arranged directly with Home Ministry officers, but with Military Government officers of higher command echelons. See Annex DOG.

c. Inventory, Safeguarding, and Disposition of Surrendered Material.

(1) While operating in the FUKUOKA area under 32d Division control the regiment handled disposition as follows:

(a) Upon locating dumps or warehouse of arms, ammunition, or supplies which had to be destroyed or turned over to the Home Ministry, a representative of the Civil Police Force was taken to the location and signed for the responsibility of guarding the material until disposition could be made. Police guards were inspected frequently by a Marine Officer for alertness and sufficiency of number requisite to the size of the dump.

(b) Then the Disposition Section was ready to dispose of the material, a Battalion Depot Control Group would inventory it and either supervise its destruction by Japanese laborers, or, in the case of foodstuffs and construction material not needed by Allied Forces, would turn it over to the Home Ministry.

(2) In general the same methods of inventory and disposition were used while operating under the 5th Marine Division in the SAIFUBO area. However, we were not permitted to use Civil Police Guards on uninventoried...
CONFOIDENTIAL

material. Initially, this made necessary the use of about 77% of the regiment on guard and outpost duty. As material was disposed of the guards were taken off. See Annex DOG.

d. Chinese Laborers.

(1) FUKUOKA area.

There were approximately 3,800 Chinese laborers divided among eleven mining camps in this area. The laborers were divided into three in- compatible factions: Nationalist (or Chiang Kai-Shek) Chinese, Communist Chinese, and volunteer laborers with no party affiliations. They were a constant source of trouble. Fighting was frequent, both among themselves and with the Japanese.

It became necessary on 7 October, 1945 to send Marine detachments to maintain law and order in the mining camps. There were minor difficulties thereafter, but the presence of Marines was usually sufficient to quell any disturbances.

Responsibility for maintaining law and order in the camp was taken over by the 127th Infantry when the regiment returned to SASEBO on 6Nov45.

(2) SASEBO area.

Only in one instance did the 28th Marines have any dealings with Chinese laborers in this area. On 19Nov45 a disturbance was reported in a mining camp at SHISHIMACHI where 177 Chinese were awaiting transportation to HAARO where they were to go aboard ship for CHINA. A detachment of one officer and twenty-five men was sent to the camp to maintain law and order during the night and until the Chinese left the camp for HAARO. No disturbances occurred and the detachment returned to Marine Camp, AIMOURA on 20Nov45.

e. Examinaiton of Japanese Repatriates.

While operating under FUKUOKA Occupation Force and 32nd Infantry Division control, CT-28 was responsible for examination of Japanese repatriates entering HAARO Harbor from ports outside of the main islands of JAPAN. To accomplish this mission, an Examiner Team was organized as follows:

1st Lt, Chief Examiner
1st Lt, Asst To Chief Examiner
2 Medical Officers
2 Special Agents (CIO)
2 Rifle Squads
4 Interpreters

Initially, the mission of the Team was to "spot-check" incoming personnel for loot, excess food, excess currency and securities, and to confiscate same; to supervise examination of repatriates by Japanese medical personnel; and to take into custody any suspicious personnel as directed by the CIC component of the Team.

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The Examiner Team functioned continuously from 13Oct45 to 4Nov45 when the 127th Infantry relieved CT-26. The Civil Police were used during this period to maintain order in the dock area and to see to it that all incoming personnel were checked by the Examiner Team. Two to five thousand repatriates were examined daily by the Team.

During the period the Team functioned, no loot, or excess food was found on repatriates. Some securities and a considerable amount of currency in excess of that authorized (200 yen enlisted, 500 yen officers, 1,000 yen civilians) were confiscated however, and turned over to a representative of the Japanese Government.

The regiment was not responsible for handling repatriates while operating in the SASEBO area.

9. CONCLUSION

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comments:

Thank God we didn't have to fight in JAPAN.

(2) Recommendations:

None.

(b) Occupation Operations.

(1) Comments and Recommendation.

(a) Having adequate shipping for the combat team from embarkation point to target proved its advantages from the planning phase to the actual landing. The maintenance of one BLT aboard one ship from embarkation to landing eliminated many personnel problems such as occur when complicated transfers are effected enroute to target.

(b) The necessity for joint operations by S-2 and S-3 makes it advisable to consolidate both offices to insure complete coordination.

(c) The T/O strength of the S-2 section was found excessive for operations as encountered in JAPAN. Total strength of two officers and six enlisted is recommended.

(d) The need for one enlisted and two officer linguists in Rept'Hq was never demonstrated during the occupation since a pool of civilian linguists was maintained by the FUKUOKA Occupation Force and 32nd Infantry Division, under which most of our operations were conducted. It is recommended that the pool system be instituted and continued within the Division language section and that one officer be attached to Rept'Hq to coordinate requests from each battalion. Battalion enlisted interpreters are necessary and should be continued in their present status.

(e) It is recommended that all questions involving liaison with Japanese officials (except problems purely local in nature) be handled exclusively by Division Headquarters. In some cases it was necessary for S-2.
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to request G-2 personnel and Japanese liaison officials in direct contact with G-2, to provide information which might better have been requested directly by G-2 from their own liaison officers. Verification of liaison reports can best be checked by regiment. The reports themselves should be the subject of direct intercourse between G-2 (or G-3) and the Japanese department concerned.

(f) It is recommended that regiment be informed in advance of steps taken by advance parties, such as seizure of documents or investigation of order of battle. Duplication of effort and consequent "loss of face" has resulted through the efforts of patrol leaders and staff officers who were not informed of similar previous efforts by other echelons.

(g) It is recommended that reports of disposition by any echelon within a particular regimental zone be submitted to the appropriate S-2 office in order that targets files may be kept accurate and up to date at all times.

(h) The unit mission made necessary procurement of a number of motor vehicles in addition to those organic to the regiment. This was accomplished without great difficulty but would have not been necessary if organic one ton trucks had accompanied the regiment. On many occasions it was found necessary to use M29C Cargo Carriers to tow water trailers and to transport patrols. Such use of these special purpose vehicles led to rapid breakdown, and, as a result, the majority were inoperational during most of the occupation. It is recommended that general purpose vehicles be given priority over special types on similar missions in the future.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVEREDGE

[Signature]

P. E. HAYNES, Captain, USMC, S-3.

ANNEXES: ABLE, Fertinent Operation Orders, Administrative Orders and Overlays Issued During Occupation.

BAKER, S-1 Report.
CHARLIE, S-2 Report.
DOG, S-4 Report.
EASY, Sig Com Report.

DISTRIBUTION: CG, 5th MarDiv (75) CG, 32d InFDiv (1)
            Ea Bn (2)        Ea StfSec (1)
            Wpns Co (1)    H&S Co (1)

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Annex ABLE to 26th Marines, Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN

Administrative Orders, Operation Orders and Sketch-overlays
Issued During Occupation

1. The following orders and sketch-overlays are included in this Annex:

   a. CT-26 AdmO 1-45
   b. CT-26 Warning O 3-45
   c. CT-26 AdmO 4-45
   d. Dispatch, 1020, 70et45, Concerning Chinese labor camps.
   e. Dispatch, 1500, 120ct45, concerning CT zone of responsibility.
   f. CT-28 Opn O 36-45.
   g. Dispatch, 1345, 8Nov45, concerning assignment of zone of responsibility in SASEBO Area.

2. Because of the frequent movement of troops on short notice and the constantly changing situation, most orders were issued verbally over the telephone or in conferences with CO's of units.
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HEADQUARTERS, 26TH MARINES
5TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

4 OCTOBER, 1945.

CT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

NUMBER..............1-45

Movement to Fukuoka Area.

Maps: War Dept. Map Kyushu - 1:500,000.
Reference: (a) CT Warning Order No. 3-45.

1. PERSONNEL.

(a) Uniform and Equipment - as set forth in reference (a).

(b) Rations - Unit distribution of rations to be carried by
individuals to all units of task organization by ROQ,
26th Marines, on 4 October 1945, at Bldg. 69, NTS, Ainoura.

(c) Movement to railhead - as set forth in Annex ABLE, except
drivers and passengers in road serials.

(d) Movement in road serials - as set forth in Annex BAKER.

(e) Billeting - as arranged by advance billeting detail in
accordance with instructions of Commanding General, Fukuoka
Occupation Force.

(f) Stragglers - Unauthorized sightseers and souvenir hunters:
   1. In Sasebo area - to be turned over to Provost Marshal,
      5th Nav Biv.
   2. In Fukuoka area - to be turned over to Provost Marshal,
      Fukuoka Occupation Force.

(g) Mail.

   1. Postal facilities for in-coming and out-going mail
to be furnished by postal section attached to 26th
Marines.
   2. All Navy and Marine Corps personnel will continue
to use current FPO addresses.

2. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

(a) Camp equipment, including all storage tents, flies, and
prefabricated latrines, will be carried by using organization.

(b) Movement to railhead.

   1. All units submit requests for required motor trans-
      portation of equipment and supplies to this office
      prior to 1200, 4 October 1945.
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2. Movement priorities - In accordance with personnel priorities as set forth in Annex ABLE.

3. SUPPLY.

   (a) Method of Supply. Initially, to all units of task organization through ROM, 28th Marines.

4. RESUPPLY.

   (c) Initially, all classes including medical, by rail from 8th Service Regiment, Sasebo, via ROM, 28th Marines.

5. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.

   (a) Routing.

      1. All 1/4 and 1-ton self propelled vehicles by most direct improved road route in road serials set forth in Annex BAKER.

      2. Minimum of two (2) passengers in each vehicle proceeding by road to Fukuoka.

      3. Vehicles over one (1) ton rated capacity and all trailers to be staged and rail car loaded at Sasebo railroad station on verbal movement orders from this headquarters.

      4. All rail loaded vehicles to have fuel tanks 3/4 full.

      5. Full combat loads for above vehicles in accordance with rated capacity.

   (b) Employment.

      1. Low priority vehicles - as directed by MTU, 28th Marines. To be released for combat loading four (4) hours prior to directed staging time.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

   (a) Current prohibitions regarding throwing of food to natives to be enforced by units during all phases of this movement.

   (b) Units to provide own guards for vehicles and equipment at staging point. Any pilfering of government property to be dealt with promptly and severely.
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(c) No food, clothing, or supplies of any nature to be given, sold, or bartered to Japanese civilians or members of Japanese Armed Forces.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERIDGE:

DISTRIBUTION:  CG, VAC (5)  CO, B Co, 5th BN (2)
  CG, 5th Div (2)  CC, Auto Repr. Co (2)
  CO, LT 228 (5)  CO, Serv Co 5th SvcBn (2)
  CO, LT 378 (5)  CO, Supp Co, 5th SvcBn (2)
  CO, H&S Co, 28th Mar (1)  S-1 (1)
  CO, "D" Co, 28th Mar (1)  S-2 (1)
  CO, C Co, 11th Engr Bn (2)  S-3 (2)
  CO, 5th Ord Co (2)  RNM (20)
  CO, C Co, 3d MFDn (2)  RTO (1)

OFFICIAL

/s/ J. W. LIEUXNEER
Capt, USMC
AS - 4.

ANNEXABLE TO:
CT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

RAIL MOVEMENT TO FUKUOKA
NUMBER:..............1-45

1. RCT-26 will on 5 and 6 October 1945 move by rail to Fukuoka according to the following schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Time Lv NTS</th>
<th>Time Lv Shosebo RR Stn.</th>
<th>No. Personnel</th>
<th>Unit Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>0430, 50ct</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>2d BN, 28th Mar S-1, Severance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>238</td>
<td>H&amp;S Co, 28th Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>0730, 50ct</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>2d BN, 28th Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td>1100, 50ct</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
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<td>Naylor</td>
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<td>437</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0430, 60ct</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
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<td>134</td>
<td>Hopkins</td>
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<td>0730, 60ct</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
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<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3d FL, Supp Co</td>
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<td></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>B Co &amp; 28th FL, Auto Rep Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>429</td>
<td>12 Force MT En</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL
#6 1100, 6Oct 1300 240 L Co, 28Mar Konover

2. Serial Commanders will be responsible for loading personnel in
   trucks on the east side of the NTS drill field, unloading troops at the
   Sepeo Railroad Station, loading baggage and personnel on trains, and
   unloading at Fukuoka.

3. I Co., 3d Bn, 28th Marines, will remain on the 4th Serial train
   and continue to Moji.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVEREDGE

DISTRIBUTION: CG, V/C (5) CO, B Co, 5th MT BN (2)
   CG, 5th MarDiv (2) CO, Auto Repr Co (2)
   CO, LT 228 (5) CO, Serv Co, 5th Serv Bn (2)
   CO, LT 328 (5) CO, Supp Co, 5th Serv Bn (2)
   CO, H&S Co, 28th Mar (1) S-1 (1)
   CO, 7th Co, 28th Mar (1) S-2 (1)
   CO, C Co, 5th Eng Bn (2) S-3 (2)
   CO, 5th Ord Co (2) RQW (2)
   CO, C Co, 3d MP Bn (2) RMTO (1)

OFFICIAL

/s/ J. W. DOHERTY,
Captain, USNCR
S-4

ANNEX BAKER TO:
CT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)
NUMBER........ 1-45)


   VEHICLE
   1/4 T, 4x4, Truck
   1/4 T, 4x4, Truck
   Cargo Carrier, M29C
   1/4 T, 4x4, Truck
   1/4 T, 4x4, Truck
   1/4 T, 4x4, Ambulance
   1 T, 4x4, Truck, cargo
   1/4 T, 4x4, Truck
   1/4 T, 4x4, Truck
   1 T, 4x4, Truck
   1 T, 4x4, Truck
   1/4 T, 4x4, Truck

   UNIT
   "C" Co, 3d MP Bn
   2nd Bn, 28th Mar
   2nd Bn, 28th Mar
   "Tpsn Co 28th Mar
   H&S Co, 28th Mar
   H&S Co, 28th Mar
   H&S Co, 28th Mar
   3d Flat, Ord Co
   "C" Co, 5th Eng Bn
   "C" Co, 5th Eng Bn
   "C" Co, 3rd MP Bn
   "C" Co, 3rd MP Bn

4 October, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL


1/4 T, 4x4, Truck
Cargo Carrier, M29C
3rd Bn, 28th Mar
1
1/4 T, 4x4, Ambulance
H&S Co, 28th Mar
2
1/4 T, 4x4, Truck
3rd Plt, Ord Co.
1
Cargo Carrier, M29C
H&S Co, 28th Mar
1

3. Serial I will form at 0730, 5October, 1945 in front of RQM Warehouse, 28th Marines Building No. 69. Convoy intervals and speed to be governed by serial commander.

4. Road signs will be followed scrupulously in making this convoy movement.

5. On arrival at KASHI station in Fukuoka Serial Commander will report with convoy to CO, Fukuoka Occupation Force or his representative.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSIDGE

DISTRIBUTION: CG VAC (5)
CG, 5thInfDiv (2)
CC, LT 228 (5)
CC, Auto Repr Co (2)
CC, H&S Co 28th Mar (5)
CO, Serv Co, 5th Serv Bn (2)
CO, Tpns Co 28th Mar (1)
CO, Supp Co, 5th Serv Bn (2)
CC, C Co, 5th Eng Bn (1)
S-1 (1)
CO, 5th Ord Co (2)
S-3 (2)
CC, Co Co 3rd Mt Bn. (2)
S-2 (1)
RQM (2)
RMTO (1)

OFFICIAL

/s/ J. W. DOTNER,
Capt., USMC
AS - 4

4 October, 1945.

Addendum #1 to:
CT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NUMBER . . . . . . 1-45)

1. Unloading - Fukuoka area.

(a) Initially under direction of S-4 BLT 228.

(b) To be directed by RQM, 28th Marines upon arrival in Fukuoka.

1389
(c) Working Party.

1. For organic equipment and supplies - unit responsibility.
2. For rations, water, and supplies - company strength working party to be provided by BLT 228 and 3rd Plat, Supply Company.

2. Dumps and Warehouses

(c) Location of temporary dumps and permanent organization warehouses or supply rooms to be as directed by Commanding General, Fukuoka Occupation Force.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEIDGE:

DISTRIBUTION:  
CC, VAC (5) CO, B Co, 5th MT Bn (2)
CG, 5thMarDiv (2) CO, Auto Repr Co (2)
CO, LE 228 (5) CO, Serv Co, 5th Serv Bn (2)
CG, LT 328 (5) CO, Supp Co, 5th Serv Bn (2)
CO, H&S Co, 28thMer (1) S-1 (1)
CO, Wns Co, 28th Mer (1) S-2 (1)
CO, C Co, 5th Engr Bn (2) S-3 (2)
CO, 5th Ord Co (2) RQM (2)
CO, C Co, 3rd MF Bn (2) RMTO (1)

OFFICIAL:

/a/ J. W. DOWNER  
Captain, USMC  
AS - 4.

3 October, 1945

CT WARNING ORDER: Movement to Fukuoka Area.

NUMBER......3-45

Reference: (a) Disp. 021147/1, CG, 5th MarDiv, ctd 200ct45.

1. GENERAL.

a. CT 28, less BLT 128, "K" Co, and attachments of those organizations, has been ordered to prepare for early movement to the Fukuoka Area by rail and motor transportation.
CONFIDENTIAL

b. Movement of personnel and supplies to entraining point, or to Fukuoka by motor serial, will be scheduled by this Headquarters in a forthcoming order.

II. PERSONNEL.

c. All elements of task organization set forth in reference (a), less rear echelon groups established by GQ, CT 28.

III. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

a. 5th MarDiv will lay down at entraining point all Class I, III, and V supplies necessary for mounting cut entire CT except following:

   One (1) U/F-all weapons-in hands of troops or in CT dumps.

b. Class II and IV (To be obtained through normal supply agencies).

   (1) Class II and IV - less Engineer and Cold Wet-Weather Clothing - 30 des.

   (2) Class II - Engineer.

   (c) Water Purification Supplies only - 30 des.

c. Equipment.

   (1) Organizational.

   (c) Minimum necessary to carry out assigned mission for period of thirty (30) days.

   (2) Water Purification Units.

   (a) "C" Co, 5th Engr Bn, less 1st Plt, will carry sufficient water purification units to provide water for entire task organization.

   (3) Chemical Warfare.

   (c) Gas masks, protective ointment, and eye-shields, plus 10 gas maintenance items, will be carried in unit supply.

IV. SUPPLY.

a. Method of supply to be covered in forthcoming administrative order.

V. RESUPPLY - All Class s.

a. To be covered in forthcoming administrative order.
VI. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

a. Uniform-Utility, w/steel helmets; leggings; cartridge belts, w/two (2) filled canteens; normal arms; field transport pack, w/ brown side of shelter-half cut.

b. Cots will be rolled inside bedding rolls and entrucked with troops; loading into baggage or freight cars at entraining point will be accomplished by unit working parties.

c. Officers' clothing rolls, bedding rolls, and trunks will be handled in the same manner as set forth in VI(b) above.

d. Units will issue one (1) "K" ration and one (1) "D" ration to each individual prior to movement.

e. Ammunition - One (1) U/F now in hands of troops.

VII. MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

a. Spray equipment and DDT in advance echelon or loading elements.

b. Adequate amounts of other medical supplies sufficient for 30 days.

VIII. VEHICLES.

a. Employment as prescribed in forthcoming administrative order.

b. Combat loaded if rail shipped.

c. Load limit one (1) ton for road serials.

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>CO, LT 226</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, LT 328</td>
<td>(5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO, H&amp;ES Co, 28th MFR</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO, 5th Ord Co</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO, C Co, 3rd MP Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO, B Co, 5th MT Bn</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<td>CO, Auto Repr Co</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<td>CO, Serv Co 5th Serv Bn</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, Sup Co, 5th Serv Bn</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICIALS:

/s/ J. W. DOTNER,
Captain, USMCR,
AS - 4.

-8- CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CT-28 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

Number.................4-43

Reference:  
(a) Annex KING, to VAC Administrative Order No. 6-45. 
(b) 32nd InfDiv Memo dated 27 October, 1945.  
(c) Attachment 3, 6th Army Administrative Order 19/2. dated 6 October, 1945.

1. GENERAL. 

a. Purpose - To accomplish all possible disposition and destruction of Japanese war materials in CT-28 area of responsibility. 

b. Classes - Such materials will be divided into the following general classes: 
   (1) Materials and equipment which can be used only for war purposes. 
   (2) Materials and equipment which can be converted to peacetime uses. 

c. Disposition - Materials not required for use of own units will be disposed of as follows: 
   (1) Class I 
      (a) Articles authorized by reference (e) as war trophies will be collected, inventoried, and centrally stored as directed by the CT Disposition Officer. 
      (b) All others - Destroy as directed in reference (c) and turn back resulting scrap to Japanese Home Ministry through CT Procurement Officer. 
   (2) Class II - Turn over to Japanese Home Ministry through CT Procurement Officer. 

2. DISPOSITION METHODS 

a. Personnel - The disposition and destruction of materials will be effected by the following CT personnel: 
   (1) A CT-28 Disposition Officer as appointed by the CT Commander with duty of carrying out all disposition as ordered by references and further directives.  
      The Disposition Officer will have no collateral duties and will be responsible for effective functioning of Depot Control groups. 
   (2) The 3rd Platoon, Ordnance Company, 5th WarDiv will be placed at the disposal of the CT Disposition Officer for use in effecting disposition of Japanese Ordnance material.
(3) Depot Control groups - Each battalion will form three
(3) Depot Control groups, each to consist of two (2)
non-commissioned officers for supervisory duties,
and two (2) privates first class or privates, record
clerks. Rosters of these groups will be submitted
to the CT Commander and the CT Disposition Officer
in triplicate. These groups will have no collateral
cuties and will function directly under the CT Dis-
position Officer.

(4) RCT Procurement Officer will be appointed to deal with
the Japanese Home Ministry through the Procurement
Officer, 32nd Inf Div. Dealing directly with above
ministry is expressly forbidden for any member of
this command.

(5) Labor - All labor used in destruction or disposition
will be Japanese, obtained through the CT Procurement
Officer.

b. Inventories will be made on Class I, War Trophies,
beginning with those at present in camps occupied by units. The CT Dis-
position Officer will submit these to the Disposition Officer, 32nd InfDiv
as individual warehouse inventories are completed. Inventories of destroyed
materials will be made concurrently with disposition and turned in to the
Disposition Officer, 32nd InfDiv with all records. Further inventories
need not be made of materials to be turned over intact to the Japanese Home
Ministry. The receipt obtained by the CT Procurement Officer will be turn-
ed over to the Disposition Officer to account for closing out of the dumps
concerned.

c. Records - Depot Control groups will maintain Stock
and Scrap Record Cards and Debit and Credit Vouchers as set forth in Section
IV, reference (a). The CT Disposition Officer will cause a master set of
the above records to be kept at CT Headquarters, turning over these kept
by individual control groups to the higher echelon when a dump is closed out.

d. Report - The CT Disposition Officer will render week-
ly reports of control groups to the Disposition Officer, 32nd InfDiv as re-
quired in Paragraph 3a, of reference (b).

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVEREDGE:

- 10 -
OPERATION ORDERS AND DISPATCHES

TO: DLT-128 1020, 7Oct45

1. You will send one officer and one NCO plus three groups of one NCO and nine men each to guard three FJ camps vicinity IIJUKA this date. On 8Oct45 three groups of one NCO and nine men will be sent to guard three more FJ Camps. Total of six groups with one officer in overall command. Men to leave this date will meet Maj Wood at CT Hq Bldg at 1300 this date. Maj Wood will provide orders and guidance. BLT-128 provides transportation and supplies. Suggest one jeep and trailer remain with officer commanding group. These groups should be relieved weekly. Group makes reports direct to Maj Wood. Men should take all personal gear and should carry at least one U/P.

TO: BLT 128, 228 1500, 12Oct45

2. 1. RCT 28's zone of responsibility has been extended as shown on enclosure (r)(See sketch - overlay showing zone fr 12Oct to 14Oct).
2. Units will continue execution of assigned missions and will initiate further missions in areas newly assigned.

HAYNES S-3
RCT - 28 (- 3d Bn)
In the Field
0800I, 24 October, 1945,

Opn Order)
Reassignment of Occupation Zone of Responsibility.
No. 36-45)

Map:
AMS L571, Central JAPAN, 1:250,000.

TASK ORGANIZATION:

(c) 1st Bn, 28th Mar
Lt Col BUTTERFIELD

(b) 2nd Bn, 28th Mar
Lt Col McdONOUGH

(c) 126th Fld Arty Bn
Lt Col KELANS

(d) RCT - 28 Ha Ge:
Col LIVEREDGE

28th Marines (-1st, 2d, 3d Bns, 126th Fld Arty Bn, Whs Co)
Co C, 5th Med Bn
Co C, 5th Engr Bn (-3d 31st)
3d Flt, Ord Co, 5th Serv Bn
3d Flt, Serv Co, 5th Serv Bn
3d Flt, Sup Co, 5th Serv Bn

1. a. Current intelligence summaries.

b. 32d Inf Div at 08001, 24Oct45, relieves FOF of all tactical responsibility and assumes command of assigned zone of responsibility and completes implementation of missions outlined in V.G Opn Iln 2-45 and instituted by FOF.

2. RCT-28 assumes command of assigned zone of responsibility 08001, 24Oct45; continues and completes implementation of missions outlined by FOF and 32d Inf Div. (See sketch-overlay showing zone fr 24Oct to 6Nov45)

3. a. 1st Bn, 28th Mar will:

(1) Continue execution of assigned missions in zone of responsibility.

(2) Execute further missions assigned by CO, RCT-28.
CONFIDENTIAL

b. 2nd Bn, 28th Mar will:

(1) Continue execution of assigned missions in zone of responsibility.

(2) Execute further missions assigned by CO, RCT-28.

c. 126th Flg Arty Bn will:

(1) Relieve as soon as practicable all other units of RCT-28 in assigned zone of responsibility.

(2) Execute missions assigned by CO, RCT-28.

d. RCT-28 Hq Gr will:

(1) Continue checking restricted Japanese entering MAKATI Harbor for loot, excess food, and weapons. Continue execution of other assigned missions in RCT zone of responsibility.

x. (1) Place special emphasis on:

(a) Prevention of looting.

(b) Execution of sanitary precautions in assigned billets.

(2) Dispose of enemy equipment in accordance with a disposition directive to be issued later.

4. No change.

5. a. Index 20, SOI, 20Sep45, 32d Inf Div.

b. Cs 32d Inf Div

20th Flg Arty Bn 126th Flg Arty Bn
1st Bn, 27th Mar 1st Bn, 28th Mar
2nd Bn, 26th Mar

RC-28

FUKUOKA

KISHI Station

NYUSHU Airplane School

KISHI Station

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

/s/ F. E. HAYNES,

Captain, USMC,

S-3.

ANNEX: ABL (Orn overlay)

DISTRIBUTION: 1st Bn (3) 2nd Bn (3) 126th Flg Arty Bn (3) F-1-L-E

Br StfSec (1) CG, 32d InfDiv (1) Co C, 5th MedBn (1)

Co C, 5th MedBn (1) 3d Plt, OrdCo (1)

3d Plt, ServCo (1)

3d Plt, SupCo (1)

1397
OPERATION ORDERS AND DISPATCHES (CONTINUED)

TO: 1st BN, 2nd BN, 3rd BN.
1345, 8Nov45

4. Enclosure: (a) Overlay showing Zones of Responsibility. (see sketch overlay showing zones fr 6Nov to 30Nov45)
(1) Effective upon receipt this msg, units assume responsibility of zones as shown on Enclosure (A)
(2) Responsibility includes: a. Exercising surveillance over zone. b. Posting guards as ordered by this Hq or as deemed necessary by BN C.O. c. Initiating patrols to cover assigned zone to insure that no military installations or storage areas exist that have been overlooked by previous patrols. Submit daily with Ops report on overlay showing routes covered by patrols. Use map scale 1:25,000 or 1:250,000.
(3) S-2,28 will furnish list of targets previously covered by patrols.
(4) Disposition of enemy material will be a function of this Hq and will be handled by the Regimental Disposition Officer and Depot Control Groups as organized at present.

HAYNES S-3

---

CONFIDENTIAL
EAST CHINA SEA

CT 28  CT 126 (Inf)

FUKUOKA

ASHIYA

FUKUDA

(BOUNDARY CONTINUES TO
SEA ALONG FUKUOKA KEN
BOUNDARY)

30NOV45

SKETCH-OVERLAY SHOWING
CT-28 ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY
24OCT - 30NOV45.

(126TH FLD ARTY BN WAS ATTACHED TO
CT-28 FROM 21OCT TO 1NOV45 BUT
NEVER PHYSICALLY TOOK OVER A BN ZONE
WITHIN THE CT ZONE).

MAP: ANG, L571 CENTRAL JAPAN SHEET 45
1:250,000.

P. E. HAYNES,
CAFT, USMC,
S-3.
Annex BAKER to 28th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

**S-1 REPORT**

During the planning phase for the OLYMPIC OPERATION, the S-1 section conducted school for its command post personnel, both in the office and in the field. Upon receipt of directives for the occupation of JAPAN, all personnel had been thoroughly trained, and embarkation plans were drawn up. The following table shows assignments to each of the ships allocated to CT-28:

### HAMBLE (APA-114)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CT-28 (Command Ship)</th>
<th>28</th>
<th>331</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C T-28, less 3 Bns &amp; M-7 Flotets</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Co C, 5th Engr Bn, less 3 Flotets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co C, 5th Med Bn, less Cell Section</td>
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<td>Det, ASCO, 5th Mar Div</td>
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### KINGSSURY (APA-177)

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### SEYLER (APA-233)

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-1-

CONFIDENTIAL

1403
MERRICK (AKA-97)

H& S Co.
1st Bn.
2d Bn.
3d Bn.
Co C, 5th Engr Bn
Co C, 5th Med Bn
3d Bn, 13th Marines

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Total CT-28 Troops Embarked
Attracted for transportation

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>1434</td>
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</table>

**Total Embarked:** 301 / 4936

2. Commanding Officers of Troops aboard each vessel were furnished sufficient Post Exchange supplies for health and comfort of personnel embarked, and the American Red Cross provided books, playing cards and other games suitable for shipboard use.

3. Assignment of Chaplains was made by the Division G-1, with a view to providing each ship with both a Catholic and a Protestant Chaplain.

4. Immediately upon arrival at Pearl Harbor, on August 28, 1945, and during the period the ships of CT-28 were anchored there, liberty was authorized for 50% of all personnel daily, from 0900 until 1800.

5. During the voyage from PEARL HARBOR to SAIPAN, all personnel of the S-1 Section were thoroughly briefed on the operation, and functioned normally with respect to administration. During the period September 13 to 16, inclusive, 1945, ships of CT-28 were at anchor at SAIPAN. Due to lack of recreational facilities ashore, no liberty was granted.

6. During the period September 22 to October 6, 1945 the CT Command Post was set up at the former Naval Training Station, AIMOURA, and personnel in that area were billeted in barracks thereat. Commencing 10Oct45 liberty in the SAEBR-AIMOURA Area was authorized for 25% of all personnel daily from 0900 to 1800. By coordination with S-4, trucks were provided for liberty parties to SAEBR, and return.

7. On 6 October, 1945, the Command Post was moved to FUKUOKA, and established in the ITOTEL Building in East Park, which also housed the FUKUOKA Occupation Force Co. Personnel were quartered in the Japanese Gymnasium in East Park. Liberty was granted daily from 0900 to 1800 for 33-1/3% of the personnel, which was later modified to provide one day liberty each seven days; on 30 October, liberty hours were extended to 2300.

8. On 6 November, 1945, the Command Post returned to Marine Camp, AIMOURA, all CT-28 Troops having returned to the SAEBR Area.

9(a) During the entire period covered by this report, the "I"-Section functioned normally, executing all administrative details devolving upon it.
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(b) Religious services were conducted at least once each week, the Chaplains moving from area to area in order to accomplish this.

(c) The American Red Cross representative distributed articles for health and comfort as they became available, and investigated family matters for officers and enlisted as required.

(d) No prisoners of war.

(e) No combat casualties.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVEREDGE

M. S. SMITH
1stLt, USMC
S-1

APPENDICES:

1. Special Service Report
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Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER (8-1 Report), to Operation Report, 28th Marines Occupation of JAPAN.

SPECIAL SERVICE REPORT

1. The Regimental Special Service section was formed on 29 September, 1945, pursuant to a directive from the Commanding General, 5th Marine Division, with First Lieutenant Harry B. Hierce (032051), U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, as officer in charge, and Second Lieutenant Richard A. Sprowls (044054), U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, as educational guidance officer. In accordance with the same directive, each battalion appointed a special service officer, and formed a Special Service section. All Special Service sections were fully staffed and in operation by 1 October, 1945.

2. While at Marine Camp, AINOURA, during the period October 1 to 5, inclusive, 1945, outdoor movies were held in the regimental area when weather permitted. When inclement weather prevailed, personnel attended the 5th Marine Division movies inside one of the camp warehouses.

3. Upon arrival at FUKUOKA on 6 October, 1945, the Regimental Special Service section sponsored or conducted the following program:

   (a) Movies held daily at 2d Bn area. Arrangements made for Japanese operators and projectors for movies at 1st Bn area and 3d Bn at MOJI. Films alternated among units.

   (b) Frequent contacts made for distribution of newspapers and magazines to all units.

   (c) Two representatives sent to SASEBO for Corps Educational Conference, October 21-27, 1945.

   (d) Daily mimeographed newspaper published.

   (e) Two boxing matches held at 1st Bn area. Prizes given to contestants; transportation provided for men wishing to attend from other areas; band concert before bouts.

   (f) Arranged for Division Band Concerts at 2nd Bn area; gave first group of high point discharges sent-off at KASHII Station.

   (g) Arranged for conducted tours through KYUSHU Imperial University.

   (h) Japanese Language School in progress at 2d Bn area when Regiment returned to SASEBO. Japanese instructor from KYUSHU Imperial University met with approximately 30 enrollees. Instructors' lesson plan mimeographed by Special Service.

   (i) Educational survey made of all men in 28th Marines and report made to Division, including (a) subject most interested in; (b) teachers available; (c) number taking correspondence courses from NCII and USAFI.
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(j) Textbooks issued battalions for self-study courses.

(k) Wrapping paper and twine furnished personnel for mailing packages.

(l) Arranged for personnel to use sailboats in 1st Bn area.

(m) Transportation furnished daily for liberty parties going to FUKUOKA.

(n) Sponsored Regimental Halloween Dance for officers October 31. Army Nurses were guests.

(o) Athletic field cleared and made suitable for three (3) softball fields in FUKUOKA.

(p) Basketball and volleyball tournaments held in 2d Bn area. 2d Bn invited Japanese teams and played games on Sundays.

(q) 1st Bn had advantage of adequate gymnasium facilities for indoor sports and movies. Japanese experts gave demonstrations in judo and kendo.

(r) 2d Bn had well-equipped Recreation Hall. Loudspeakers arranged for programs to be received in several different places. Published weekly mimeographed newsletter with a variety of games, newspapers, library books, reading materials, ping-pong tables.

(s) Sports equipment pre-rated to all battalions.

4. Upon moving to Marine Camp, AMOUR, on November 6, the following program was carried out:

(a) All personnel briefed on opportunities offered in Division School. Approximately 250 enrolled in the school.

(b) Lectures on Veteran Benefits given to all available personnel periodically.

(c) Four members, one from each battalion and H&S attending Corps Special Service School at SASEBO, November 17-23, 1945.

(d) Participated in field day on Marine Corps Birthday, November 10, 1945.

(e) 3d Bn operates beer hall for enlisted men.

(f) Battalion Special Service personnel made daily trip to receive and distribute current periodicals, newspapers, magazines, etc.

(g) 26th Marines movie operated in 2d Bn area.

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(h) 28th Marines won the softball tournament and competed in touch football and other sports.

(i) Arranged boxing smacker on 22Nov45.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEdge

[Signature]

M. L. SMITH
1st Lt, USMC
S-1
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER (S-1 Report, to Operation Report, 28th Marines, Occupation of JAPAN).

POST OFFICE REPORT

The Regimental Post Office was under the supervision of Captain Clarence S. Wick, (AIM), U.S. Marine Corps. The operating personnel were members of Headquarters Company, Headquarters Battalion, 5th Marine Division and all instructions concerning the Post Office were issued by the Division Postel Officer.

The personnel disembarked at SASEBO 24 September, 1945 and the regimental post office was installed in building #37, Marine Camp, AINOURA. Stamps were placed on sale 27 September, 1945, but no money order business was opened until after moving to FUKUOKA on 6 October 1945. This move caused the Post Office to be closed two days and business was resumed on 8 October, 1945, at which time both stamps and money orders were sold. While at FUKUOKA, a branch for the sale of stamps and mailing of letters was opened at the Base Force Headquarters building and packages were mailed at the KaSHII Warehouse Camp station where the main Post Office was located.

The Post Office was again moved to Marine Camp, AINOURA on 3 November 1945, leaving a branch with the Base Force at FUKUOKA, and business was reopened 5 November 1945.

$5,000 in postage stamps was normally carried on hand throughout the occupation operation.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

[Signature]

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ANNEX CHARLIE, to 28th MARINES Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN

INTELLIGENCE

A. Narrative of planning for assault and occupation missions.

1. Maps, photographs, hydrographic, weather, terrain and other information furnished, its accuracy and adequacy.

a. Assault.

Preliminary orders for the assault operation were received by this regiment on 1 August, 1945. On that date a conference room was established under guard for the use of the Regimental Staff, and planning commenced.

Sample maps of 1:250,000 and 1:50,000 scale, plus area studies of Southern KYUSHU, aerial photos of the VAC zone of responsibility and hydrographic charts of the VAC landing beaches were furnished the regiment in sufficient quantities for initial study.

On 12 August, due to the imminence of surrender by the Japanese Government, the assault plans were halted and all pertinent material was later recalled by the 5th Marine Division.

On 20 August, preliminary plans for the present operation were received and planning recommenced for the occupation of Northern KYUSHU.

b. Occupation.

Through the cooperation of the G-2 Mapping and Photographic section, the combat team was always well supplied in advance with adequate maps, photos and information material for each occupational mission. However, rapid changes in the regimental zone of responsibility while attached to FUKUSHA Occupation Force, made it difficult to maintain complete coverage in any single scale.

1:500,000 Road Map. This map was of little tactical value, but was useful to motor transport units operating over the main road net.

ANS L571, 1:250,000, Central JAPAN. This map was adequate for strategic purposes and was employed mainly for plotting battalion and regimental zones of responsibility. It was useful for patrols, only when covering improved highways.

ANS L772, 1:50,000, KYUSHU. Although this was used as the basic operations, patrol and situation map, its value was limited by the faulty editing and poor reproduction of certain sheets. Since it was not up to date, many installations, highways, etc., were not found as shown. In one case a battalion command post occupying reclaimed land appeared by coordinates to be several yards at sea.
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AMS L872, 1:25,000, KYUSHU. This map was profitably employed as a situation map covering concentrated areas both in SASEBO and FUKUOKA. It was used to augment the 1:50,000 map when complete coverage was not readily available. However, the same general criticisms apply as in the case of AMS L772, 1:50,000.

Aerial mosaics, town plans and information sheets furnished by G-2 in ample quantities were used extensively by advance billeting parties and for locating important targets in industrial areas. Continuance of their use is recommended.

2. Data furnished by advance reconnaissance detail.

Prior to debarkation in SASEBO Harbor this regiment was furnished with adequate information on the landing beaches, road conditions, billeting facilities, disposition of Japanese troops and local compliance with the surrender terms. The majority of information provided was of general, rather than intelligence value.

B. Training and organization of Intelligence Section for Occupational Mission.

1. Training.

Training films formed the basis of much of the intelligence section's instruction both prior to and following the enemy surrender. Motion pictures of everyday life in Japan, including government, home and social life, agriculture, industry, sports and recreation were augmented by lectures in general subjects such as civil government, military customs and courtesy and interior guard duty.

Attached linguists conducted instruction in civilian phrases before embarkation and while enroute to JAPAN. This training was accompanied by large-scale distribution of individual phrase books and lectures on Japanese psychology, customs and history.

Japanese maps were used in training, while road patrols and both topographical and area sketching were emphasized.

2. Organization.

To handle the numerous required reports and records, five additional typewriters, provided by G-2, were divided among the regimental and battalion intelligence sections and clerical ability was sought among replacements joining these sections.

The allowed T/O strength of three officers and twenty-two enlisted was found excessive for occupational duty since no patrols were required of the regimental intelligence section. Consequently, strength was reduced in October to two officers and eight men.

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C. Intelligence Functioning During Occupation.

1. Collection and verification of information from Jap Army, Navy, Air force.

The main function of the regiment in this regard was the physical checking of demobilization reports, inventories, and other information submitted directly to higher echelon by Japanese Army and Navy liaison officers. These investigations were accomplished by battalion patrols. In cases involving Order of Battle reports, the patrols were accompanied by G-2 linguists attached to regimental headquarters.

In certain instances, such as while exercising control over shipping in HAKATA Harbor, liaison was performed directly with Army, Navy, prefectural police and shipping officials by S-2 and S-3, using attached G-2 officer interpreters.

2. Inventorizing Jap equipment.

Actual inventorizing of Japanese equipment was not handled by the intelligence section. However, infantry patrol leaders were instructed to spot-check all major items encountered during their operations. Records of equipment thus reported, including the location, description, and amount, were maintained by this section for the information of disposition officers. In FUKUOKA these files, plus related maps and overlays were kept up to date and delivered to disposition officers of the 127th Army Regiment when our zone of responsibility passed to Army control. Similar records covering this regiment’s operations in SASEBO area were compiled and maintained on a day to day basis.

3. New equipment encountered.

Patrol leaders were not especially qualified to determine whether or not Jap equipment was new or hitherto unknown by our forces. However, since all items were reported to S-2 and S-3 through channels, any equipment of unusual interest was immediately reported by this regiment to higher echelon.

Visiting officers of special intelligence units such as NAVTECHJI, were furnished with maps by S-2 and directed through S-2 and S-3 channels to those installations which they sought to investigate in our zone. On occasion, the investigation of S-2 files by these officers proved helpful in checking aircraft, radar and other equipment previously reported in our zone.

4. Liaison with Japanese Forces.

Japanese liaison officials were available through 5th Marine Division Headquarters while the regiment was operating in SASEBO area, and through FUKUOKA Occupation Force and 32nd Infantry Division Headquarters while operating in the FUKUOKA area.
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Since these officers were in contact with Army, Navy and Prefectural Headquarters, they were able to assist greatly in the location of undemobilized units and in guiding patrols or staff officers to installations when exact locations were unknown.

Prior to and following the FUKUOKA phase, little need for liaison was necessary in the SASEBO area, since this regiment was initially in reserve and upon its return to MIYAKO most matters requiring dealings with the Japanese, except demobilization, had been accomplished by the two previous occupation regiments.

5. Civilian attitude.

Cooperation on the part of all Japanese civilians was uniformly excellent. Misunderstandings arose on some occasions due to the differences of language and the general Japanese tendency to avoid direct answers in conversation. Our advance patrols in each area were usually viewed with some concern, particularly in urban areas. In all cases, however, local officials and civilian police were cooperative even to the extent of feeding and entertaining the members of reconnaissance units in addition to providing all required information.


All linguists were used constantly as instructors during the planning phase and while enroute to our objective. Lectures in phrases, conversation, psychology, geography, etc., were delivered to all troops prior to landing.

For occupation, as for combat, two language officers and one enlisted linguist were attached to regimental headquarters from G-2, plus one enlisted linguist per battalion. On 7 November, an additional officer and enlisted interpreter, familiar with our zone, were attached to the regiment to aid in the disposition of surrendered material.

During both periods of occupation in SASEBO, this number was more than sufficient for patrol operations, maintenance and liaison.

While the regiment operated under FUKUOKA Occupation Force and 32nd Infantry Division control, the regimental language force was inadequate to handle numerous patrols and was augmented by the drafting of several English-speaking Japanese daily from a pool maintained initially by Force and later by the 32nd Infantry Division. Procurement was handled by attached language officers through intelligence channels.

So long as this civilian pool was available, one language officer in regimental headquarters was sufficient.

a. Handling of documents.
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No documents of intelligence value were translated within the regiment. Maps and inventories (many of which were in English) comprised virtually all documents handled by our attached interpreters and these were immediately forwarded to higher intelligence channels. Such information as had not already been burned by the Japanese or turned over directly to higher echelon officials was gained largely by interrogation. In some instances, necessary translations to and from the English were made by Japanese liaison personnel under the supervision of our linguists.

b. Interrogations.

Much valuable information was derived through patrol and investigative interrogations conducted by the two officer linguists. Neither the enlisted linguists nor the civilian Japanese interpreters possessed the vocabulary required for detailed military conversations.

All information thus derived was made the subject of periodic or special reports to G-2.


This section had no contact with Allied prisoners of war.

8. Repatriation of foreign nationals.

Koreans were the only foreign nationals repatriated from the regimental zone of responsibility, although close supervision was maintained over Chinese awaiting return to their homeland from mining camps in KYUSHU.

In the case of the Koreans, the regiment was not involved except to supervise civilian police and Korean liaison officials in the maintenance of law, order and sanitation.

Church detachments were maintained in the various mining camps occupied by Chinese laborers and close administration maintained.

The intelligence section was not involved in the repatriation of other foreign nationals, since none was encountered.


The only contact with repatriated Japanese experienced by this regiment occurred during operations in the FUKUOKA area. In this connection, joint supervision was maintained by S-2 and S-3 over all personnel and troops (Czechs in the NAHA Harbor from ports other than those in the Japanese home islands) during the period 14 October to 5 November, 1945. Several conferences involving S-2 and S-3 with local police and harbor authorities were necessary prior to the initiation of the program.

Under this plan, Examiner Teams, consisting of officers, interpreters and several enlisted men, inspected all incoming shipping to check compliance with SCA directives including searches for loot, securities and excessive amounts of currency. S-2 submitted daily reports including all facts concerning sailing orders, status, and destination of passengers, both military and civilian. Complete Order of Battle information was also reported on all military passengers.
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Commencing 18 October, this headquarters impounded several thousand pounds of mail from incoming and outgoing vessels in coordination with the 4th Advance Censorship Detachment and during the same period Examiner Teams confiscated approximately thirteen thousand excess yen in the hands of repatriated Japanese, which was later delivered by S-2 to local customs authorities upon orders from G-2, 32nd Infantry Division.

D. Japanese compliance with surrender terms.

Military forces and civilians in our zone appear to have complied with the surrender terms after the landing of our occupational forces. Prior to that date, however, notably during the period 15-18 August, when surrender intent became known locally, as in the case of officers at ASHIYA Airfield (1370,1-1200,5) and 4th AD Division Temporary Headquarters at TSUKUSHI (1361.5-1151,8), classified documents were burned, meteorological and other technical equipment destroyed or distributed, and looting, blamed on "civilians, children and the typhoon" took place at some military installations. No positive evidence of post-occupational evasion was discovered.

E. Comments and recommendations.

1. Occupational operations demonstrated the need for close coordination between S-2 and S-3, since guards, patrols, demobilization of Japanese forces and liaison activities usually involved joint supervision. It is recommended that the S-2 and S-3 officers and staffs be combined in battalion and regiment in future occupational assignments.

2. It is recommended that the S-2 Section be reduced in strength and organized as follows: Two officers, one section chief (capable of organizing, composing and supervising reports and records), two clerks, one draftsman, one assistant draftsman, and one runner. Total: Two officers and six enlisted.

3. In many instances, it was found that intelligence material had been collected with or without receipt by other units or technical specialists operating in the regimental zone. Without a standardized receipt form accompanied by instructions to the Japanese, it was impossible for patrol leaders to determine the truth of many of their statements concerning the previous confiscation or disposition of material. Unless all echelons are instructed to coordinate partial or complete disposition through intelligence channels, all records of installations and their contents are useless and the accuracy of Japanese inventories cannot be verified.

4. The need for maintenance of accurate up-to-date intelligence and disposition records by each unit cannot be overemphasized in these areas subject to constantly changing occupational forces. Very little information concerning the intelligence activities of previous units occupying the final SASEBO zone of responsibility was available. As a result, duplication of previous efforts was unavoidable.

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5. Since Japanese liaison officials were closely associated with Division headquarters, duplication of effort occurred in FUKUOKA on some occasions when the regimental S-2 was called upon to furnish strategic guard and demobilization reports. This necessitated borrowing the Japanese liaison officials who might better have submitted their reports directly to G-2. Therefore, in order to avoid such a duplication in the future, it is recommended that the regimental function be that of checking the accuracy and veracity of liaison reports but that the reports themselves be the result of direct intercourse between G-2 and the Japanese officials concerned.

6. Although the enlisted interpreters were constantly employed in each battalion, the need for three linguists in regimental headquarters was never demonstrated. It is suggested that the pool system be established in Division headquarters and that one officer, assisted by one enlisted linguist, be attached to each regimental S-2 section to conduct the procurement of interpreters for each battalion in addition to handling special interrogation assignments.

7. It is felt that documentary translation is beyond the scope of the regimental section and should be accomplished exclusively by higher echelon except in minor cases of tactical emergency.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEdge
W. C. O'Donnell
1stLt, USMCR
S-2.
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Annex DPG to 28th Marines Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

1. PLANNING  
   
   S-4 REPORT  
   30 November, 1945
   
   a. Assault Operation.

   S-4 planning for an intended assault on the Japanese islands began during July of this year with a preliminary study of weather, road, and beach conditions in the target area. During this period certain service personnel from units of the regiment, both officer and enlisted, were required to attend a familiarization class in nomenclature, fitting, and proper use of cold wet-weather clothing. Knowledge acquired in this class was of value to quartermaster personnel in ensuing operations. During the first two weeks of August, service personnel received practical training in supply matters during battalion and regimental landing exercises and field problems.

   b. Occupation Operation.

   Planning for the occupation was hurried and consisted largely of formulation of loading plans by the Transport Quartermaster (Appendix 1). Other S-4 planning was mainly determination of equipment separation into forward and rear echelon groups, such determination being based on directives from higher authority and study of the unit mission.

2. SUPPLY

   a. General.

   Initial supplies of all classes were placed aboard vessels transporting the RCT in quantities approximating those set forth in 5th MarDiv Administrative Memorandum No. 33-45. These were mainly supplies, ROE, and were spotted dockside on request of Transport Quartermasters, and loaded in such manner that each vessel had aboard a horizontal section of all supplies. Resupply after landing was through normal channels while in the SASEBO area and by rail direct from the 8th Service Regiment while in the FUKUoka Area. During the latter period the service elements of the regiment acted as supply agency for troops in approximately brigade strength, including some U.S. Army units. In spite of this increased load, supply functioning was efficient at all times and all difficulties arising were promptly overcome. On return to the SASEBO Area on 6 November 1945, supply was again taken up through normal channels and proceeded smoothly for the remainder of the operation.

   b. Class I

      (1) Rations

      Emergency type rations were issued to the troops prior to debarkation and they were subsisted on such during the initial stay in the SASEBO Area. "E" type rations were used during the first days
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in FUKUOKA; however, self containment was lost on this ration because of the great increase in the number of troops supplied and it was necessary to revert to emergency types until resupply could be effected. Adequate rations were provided at all times, although it became necessary to supplement the 10-in-1 type ration with an issue of 1/3 "O" ration in a few instances. Fresh bread was served for two days only, during the FUKUOKA phase destruction of the bakery by fire on the third day of its operation made further issue impossible. Replacement of ovens was never effected, but the lack of bread was partially compensated for by issuance of ingredients to unit galley. "A" type rations were issued on two occasions in the FUKUOKA Area and became a regular item upon return to SASEBO.

(2) Water

Sufficient portable water was carried in supplies, IOE, for all cooking and drinking purposes until water purification units could begin functioning. During the FUKUOKA phase purified water was supplied to approximately 5,000 U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine personnel on the basis of a minimum of 2½ gallons per man per day. No untreated water was issued for drinking purposes at any time during the operation.

c. Class 2

Class 2 supplies were generally adequate throughout the operation. Expenditure of allowances created temporary shortages from time to time but resupply was effected before curtailment of activities or hardship resulted.

d. Class 3

Supplies of this class were always ample and sufficient stocks always on hand in dumps to meet any eventuality.

e. Class 4

Critical shortages of items which would fall in this class developed on several occasions during the operation. The most notable were cold-weather clothing, screen wire, and DDT powder. Additional clothing was procured before hardship or danger to health was suffered and special measures taken to secure the other items which were required for health and comfort.

f. Class 5

Supplies of this class were carried in sufficient quantity at all times. Very little expenditure occurred except for normal loss on issues to troops, and demolitions used in disposition work.
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3. EQUIPMENT

Equipment carried by the regiment on this operation was generally adequate for all needs, with one or two exceptions. It is believed that one ton trucks, many of which were left in the base echelon, would have been of more value than the M29C Cargo Carriers which were carried. Engineer equipment was notable for its excellent performance and suitability for the mission; nothing was in excess and nothing lacking.

4. LOGISTICS

a. Transportation

Movement of units from place to place on KYUSHU was accomplished largely by rail during the initial stages of the operation. This was due to the condition of the roads and the fact that many bridges had to be rebuilt or repaired before heavy vehicles could use them. Rail transportation was efficiently handled at all times and troop movements made on schedules comparing favorably with similar moves on United States rail lines. Supply in the FUKUKA Area was over the same rail net and left nothing to be desired.

b. Drums and Pallets

Illicit drums were used extensively for organic supplies, equipment, and clothing on the various moves and were highly satisfactory, reducing pilferage and labor in handling. Pallets were used to some extent during the waterborne move to the target but were not used thereafter.

c. Traffic

Movement of traffic was generally satisfactory after Engineer repairs to roads and bridges had been made. No difficulty was experienced in reversing normal driving procedure, that is, driving to the left instead of right.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Assault Operation.

No comments or recommendations.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Rations

10-in-1 type rations were found to be highly satisfactory for use of patrols or small groups doing individual cooking, but were not suitable for use by unit galley because of the inequality of the menus as regards the mid-day meal. It is recommended that a higher
proportion of "B" or "C" rations be carried on this type operation, particularly where a cold, wet climate is to be encountered.

(2) Sanitary Supplies.

During the opening phases of the operation, and when units occupied new areas, heavy demands for DDT powder were encountered. This was due to infested condition of billets and was the proper agent for use in preparing them for occupation. However, requests were often made for excessive quantities of the powder; for example, a battalion requested an emergency issue of a quantity sufficient to make spray solution for 500 acres of floor space. It is recommended that four to six rifle company personnel be indoctrinated in proper use of this agent in preparing billets for occupancy.

(3) Transportation

The unit mission made necessary procurement of a number of motor vehicles in addition to those organic to the regiment. This was accomplished without great difficulty, but would not have been necessary if organic one-ton trucks had accompanied the regiment. On many occasions it was found necessary to use M29C Cargo Carriers to tow water trailers and to transport patrols. Such use of these special purpose vehicles led to rapid breakdown, and, as a result, the majority were inoperational during most of the occupation. It is recommended that general purpose vehicles be given priority over special types on similar missions in the future.

APPENDICES: 1. Transport Quartermaster
2. Quartermaster
3. Medical
4. Ordnance
5. Disposition
6. Procurement
7. Motor Transport
8. Engineer

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEIGE

[Signature]

Capt., USMC, E-4.
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 1 to Annex DOC (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th Marines Occupation of JAPAN.

TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. PLANNING

   a. Assault Operation.

      Planning for the assault operation had reached the stage of preparation of loading plans for base and target echelons when the mission was changed to occupation.

   b. Occupation Operation.

      This consisted of formulation of loading plans based on directives from higher authority.

2. TRANSPORT LOADING

   Preparations for loading of the CT began with spotting of TOE supplies and organic equipment and vehicles on the decks during the afternoon of 24 August 1945. Actual loading began soon after ships arrived on the morning of 25 August. Three (3) APA's and the AKA were loaded at the docks and one (1) APA was loaded in the stream by lighters. Average time for loading a modified combat load on the APA's was twenty-six (26) hours; loading time for the AKA was 40 hours. Average tonnage carried by APA's was 750 long tons; by the AKA 1500 long tons. All ships carried more than normal combat load, yet cargo was stowed in such manner that selective unloading would have been possible at the target if necessary.

3. UNLOADING AT TARGET

   Unloading was delayed somewhat because of lack of dock space and an initial scarcity of lighters. Three (3) APA's unloaded in the stream using several types of landing craft, plus LSM's as lighters. One (1) APA and the AKA were unloaded at dock as soon as space became available. Average time for unloading APA's was twenty-three (23) hours, while the AKA was unloaded in forty-two (42) hours.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

J. W. DOPFER
Capt, USMCGR,
S-4.
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 2 to Annex D-0 (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 26th Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. There was an adequate amount of all types of supplies initially. Resupply in the SASEBO area through normal channels was good. Storage space at AINPURA was sufficient.

2. Warehousing facilities in the FUKUSKA area were ideal. The rail unloading area was in the immediate vicinity of the RCT-28 warehouse. Resupply from the 6th Service Regiment was generally very good. The only critical shortages noted were Class 4 items. There was a shortage of DDT powder due to large expenditure of same during preparation of billets for occupancy. There was also a shortage of certain sizes of cold-weather clothing, mainly shoe-pacs. The Ordnance, Service and Supply platoons attached to RCT-28 efficiently effected the supply problem.

3. Upon return to the SASEBO area supply was operated through normal channels.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVEREDGE

W. J. DONELLY
1stLt, USMC
Sgt'tl QM
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 3 to Annex D.G (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th Marines, Occupation of Japan.

MEDICAL REPORT

1. TRAINING

a. There was no preliminary training for the Medical Units, except for normal reorganization after the 1st JIMA operation.

b. No particular preparations were made for the landing other than normal combat loading of Units 5 to 10. The remaining Units were carried half loaded for use upon establishment of a semi-permanent base of operations. Most preparations were based on verbal orders.

2. IN TRANSIT

Immunizations of the entire Regiment and attached units were brought up to date while aboard ship. There was an outbreak of influenza on board two of the APAs in the convoy, these carrying the First and Third Battalions, which commenced on the 11th of September and lasted until the 22nd.

3. SASEBO AREA

AIN URA Naval Barracks was furnished as quartering area for the 28th Regiment. It was clean, but most of the sanitary appliances would not function. The ground water table was eighteen inches below the surface, necessitating the construction of portable heels on old bomb shelters. Medical resupply was from the Division Medical Storeroom.

4. FUKUKA AREA

a. The units of the Regiment were divided between the KASHII Warehouse Area and the Industrial School Area. Sanitation was poor by military standards in both locations. This condition was corrected as rapidly as possible.

b. Due to the fact that the Medical Field Prophylactic Units were turned in to a Field Depot before the Regiment left Camp Traw, in accordance with Division orders, Prophylaxis Stations were not adequately stocked until gear could be brought from SASEBO.

c. All insect infested areas were sprayed with DDT before troops moved in.

d. On return to SASEBO, the Regiment was again billeted at AIN URA. Sanitation was adequate.
SUPPLY

Supply was adequate, but somewhat slow. The first and greatest deficiency was in Venereal Prophylactic material, but this was remedied. Routine medical resupply was difficult in FUKU.KA because of the lack of supply attached to F&F Command.

COMMENT

a. Medical supply was not well coordinated nor adequately planned for an occupation. It would have been adequate for an assault.

b. By removing the tops of old bomb shelters, adequate temporary latrines could be constructed.

c. Water for drinking was supplied by Division Water Points in adequate quantity and quality.

d. Cold weather clothing was late in arriving and distribution limited at first. However, few upper respiratory infections occurred.

RECOMMENDATIONS

a. The Medical Field Units removed from the Table of Organization for a Regimental Aid Station should be replaced; namely Units 22, 32, and 39, for use in occupation duty.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVEREDGE

WILLIAM F. LYNN
Lt. Comdr. (MC) USNR,
Reg'tl Surgeon
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 4 to Annex D.G (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

ORDNANCE

1. In the planning phase for the assault operation, orders were received that this CT would carry three (3) units of fire (CINCRA), and the 5th MarDiv would carry two additional units of fire (CINCRA) for the CT. For training we were allowed two units of fire (CINCRA), and upon these being exhausted, the training allowance was raised to three units of fire.

2. A complete inspection of all ordnance items was conducted by Division during June and July. All equipment which could be repaired was repaired by the Ordnance Co during this period. Equipment which could not be repaired by the company was replaced.

3. a. When the assault operation was changed to an occupation operation, the ammunition allowance was cut so that this CT carried one (1) unit of fire (AFFAC) and the 5th MarDiv carried an additional two units of fire (AFFAC) for the CT.

b. Allocation of ammunition per ship was done by Division and this CT carried the allotted amount. Loading of this ammunition was done by CT personnel.

4. During the operation in JAPAN this CT maintained an ammunition dump only once. This occurred when the CT was sent to occupy FUKUKA and the surrounding area. Upon completion of this mission the ammunition was turned into the 32d Div. The greatest ordnance function here has been supplying explosives and accessories for demolishing Japanese materiel, and preparing excess Marine Corps equipment for disposition pending return of the Regiment to the States.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

W. R. HENDERSON
1stLt, USMCGR
Ordnance Officer.
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 5 to Annex DOG to Operation Report, 28th Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT REPORT

1. GENERAL

   a. A disposition section was established on 29 October, 1945 in compliance with CT-28 Acm 0, No. 4-45, dated 28 October, 1945, and other existing directives.

   b. The purpose of the Disposition Section was to direct and control the processing and disposition of surrendered Japanese supplies, material and equipment located in the CT-26 zone of responsibility.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE CT DISPOSITION SECTION

   a. Headquarters Section (1)

      (1) CT Disposition Officer (Major) ------- 1
      (2) Ass't Disposition Officer (2ndLt) ------- 1
      (3) Clerks (ifo) ------- 2
      (4) Drivers (ifo) ------- 2
      (5) Interpreter ------- 1
      TOTAL 7

   b. Battalion Depot Control Group (3)

      (1) Depot control officer (2nd Lt) ------- 1
      (2) Depot control team leaders (2ndLt) ------- 5
      (3) Depot control teams 1cbs, ass't (Sgt) --- 6
      (4) Record clerks (ifo) --- 6
      (5) Drivers (ifo) --- 4
      (6) Interpreter --- 1
      TOTAL 23

3. FUNCTIONS OF THE CT DISPOSITION SECTION

   a. Battalion Depot Control Group.

      (1) Given area of responsibility within the CT zone of action.
      (2) Locate, inventory and dispose of all Japanese materials.
      (3) Disposition of material considered to be non-essential for use of Allied Forces end of no military value is turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry.
      (4) Materials termed essential for use of Allied Forces were held and stored in warehouses centrally located within the battalion zone of responsibility, pending requisition by higher echelon.
(5) Disposition of explosives and ammunition has been accomplished either by burning the powder when the type powder permits or by blowing up small quantities of the stores at one time. Whatever material remaining in either case is classified as Ferrous, Aluminum or Copper scrap and returned to the Japanese Home Ministry. Dumping ammunition at sea has not been accomplished to date due to lack of barges and other craft suitable for hauling the stores.

(6) Large caliber weapons (coastal guns) anti-aircraft guns, machine guns and other installation of a military nature have been rendered inoperative, converted to scrap and signed over to the Japanese Home Ministry according to the classification stated in (5) above.

(7) As each dump, warehouse, or military installation is cleared Disposition Report Forms are submitted for checkage, file and further distribution to the Hq Sections as prescribed by 5th Mar Div Standard Operating Procedure No. 251-1945, Inventory of, Accounting for, and Reporting Japanese Material. The only record kept by the central team being one copy of the inventory report of that dump.

(8) All handling of Japanese explosives whenever practicable and possible has been by Japanese technicians under the supervision of Marine demolition technicians.

b. Headquarters Section

(1) Coordinates activities of the three (3) battalion Depot Control Teams and maintains a central control over the disposition of Japanese surrendered materials.

(2) Maintains records on all dispositions made in the CT-28 zone of responsibility, giving location, amounts and signatures of persons (Officers) making the disposition.

(3) Maintains a situation map showing the locations and type of dumps in each of the three battalion zones of responsibility giving references to the inventories and disposition record.

4. ESTIMATE OF WORK DONE WITHIN CT-28 ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY

a. Material returned to Japanese Home Ministry

(1) Approximately eighty (80) percent of all materials that can be turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry as governed by existing regulations has been turned over as of 30Nov45.

b. Explosives and Ammunition destroyed—Approximately twenty (20) percent.
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d. Ordnance (with exception of explosives and ammunition), signal, engineer, medical and chemical materials not needed by occupation forces destroyed - approximately ninety (90) percent.

d. Controlled items to be issued to troops as war trophies ninety six percent (96%).

5. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY DISPOSITION SECTION.

a. Lack of Japanese transportation (trucks and barges).

b. Lack of qualified Japanese demolition and ordnance personnel.

c. No suitable areas for demolition of Japanese ammunition. The only Japanese ordnance material destroyed by demolition was located in remote areas and for the most part inaccessible to motor vehicles.

d. Inadequate records kept by the Disposition Section of organizations previously occupying areas taken over by this Regiment.

e. Japanese labor uncooperative.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. It is believed that a disposition section could have operated much more efficiently had the section been organized and prepared to function before the occupation forces landed. Had such a section been established prior to the initial landing, certain directives prepared by the disposition section would have saved much time and duplication of effort. One example: several inventories were made between the time of landing and the time the Disposition Section commenced operation. In all cases however, the inventories did not fulfill the needs of the Disposition Section and necessitated another inventory.

b. Establishing a section to overcome the obstacles and carry out the tasks of disposition efficiently, requires time and organization. A section cannot function properly when it is organized one day and expected to commence operations the next.

c. There should be close liaison among the Disposition Officers, Procurement Officer and Military Government. Procurement can give valuable information to the Disposition Officers concerning equipment and material needs for allied troop operations. At times this information was not available to the Disposition Officer and necessitated contacting the Staff and Special Staff section heads in higher headquarters. This situation resulted in a few instances releasing certain supplies and equipment to the Japanese Home Ministry when our own troops could have used them in operation. It is necessary to deal directly with Military Government in matters pertaining to labor and transportation.
CONFIDENTIAL

d. It is recommended that, when possible contracts be made with Japanese transport companies and similar organization for disposition of large ammo and explosive dump. Only supervisory personnel are required in this case and the risk to Allied Military personnel is greatly lessened.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

C. A. GILLILAND

Maj, USMC

Reg'tl Disposition Officer.
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 6 to Annex D G (S-4 Report) to Operations Report, 28th Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

PROCUREMENT REPORT

1. Procurement of Japanese labor, labor and services, and materials for use of this regiment was never arranged directly with the home Ministry offices, but with Military Government officers attached to higher echelons of command. Labor was procured and used on a daily basis by all units subsequent to 1 October 1945. This labor performed camp police work, unloading and moving of supplies, and generally took the place of Marine working parties. Labor and services were procured on three occasions for skilled work on a contract basis, such as installation of water line extensions and repairs to existing camp electrical facilities. Materials procured were in all cases from military stores and consisted mainly of construction, plumbing, and electrical supplies which were used in erection of buildings or facilities needed for health and comfort of troops. In every instance, request for the desired materials was made through the Military Government procurement officer and acknowledgment and inventory rendered upon receipt.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

J. W. LOWNES
Capt., USMC, S-4
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 7 to Annex DnG (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

1. During the entire period of the operation, organic motor transport of this regiment required augmentation by assignment of additional vehicles from higher echelons. The special nature of this operation, requiring widespread road reconnaissance patrols, and self-containment regarding rations, water, and fuel over various periods, made demands on motor transport extremely heavy. During the FUKUOKA phase one (1) company of Force Motor Transport, plus one (1) platoon of an Automotive Repair Company, was attached to the regiment. Both units proved invaluable during this period. Operational requirements could not have been met without them. On return to SASEBO these units were detached, and it was found necessary to request vehicles from the Division Motor Transport Officer to enable normal operations and disposition of enemy materials to proceed.

2. On the whole, most motor vehicles functioned in a satisfactory manner, one notable exception being the M29C Cargo Carrier. This is not a suitable general purpose vehicle. After the opening days of the operation very little could be done with these organic to the regiment. It is believed that additional one (1) ton trucks should have been carried in the shipping space taken up by the M29C’s.

3. The accident rate was not abnormal, in spite of narrow roads and streets and the change in driving customs. Poor conditions of the roads caused additional wear which was met to some extent by narrowing the period between servicings.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

J. W. DOWNER
Cpt, USMCR, S-4.
CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 8 to Annex DOC (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th Marines, Occupation of Japan.

ENGINEER REPORT

1. INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATION

Company "C" 5th Engineer Battalion embarked from HILO, Hawaii as engineer teams (reinforced) attached to the battalions of the 28th Marines Regiment. Their mission was clearly outlined as engineer or combat support such as was called for in the then uncertain occupation of northern KYUSHU, JAPAN.

2. FUKUUKA OCCUPATION

a. During the first phases of the occupation of FUKUUKA, Company "C" 5th Engineer Battalion reverted to Regimental control and was assigned all engineer responsibilities for that area and such outposts as were designated. Briefly their entire work is summed in four groups: water supply, road construction, camp maintenance, and utilization of Japanese engineer materials. It might be noted that to supply water the company had to use available equipment and men to maximum. An average of 15,000 gallons per day was used. Camp maintenance was simplified by the abundance of Japanese material and labor.

b. The engineer missions of Company "C" were absorbed by various Army units when the 32d Inf Division assumed control of FUKUUKA.

3. In SASEBO, from 6Nov45 to 30Nov45, no engineer unit was assigned to the regiment. Engineer missions were accomplished upon request to higher echelons.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

J. W. DOWNER
Captain, USMC
S-4.

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Annex EASY to 28th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION REPORT

1. TRAINING

a. Training for the assault on KYUSHU began on 30 April after the first group of replacements had arrived after return from the IWO JIMA Operation.

Training consisted of the following:

- Electricity and Magnetism
- Map reading and use of compass
- Security
- Phonetic alphabet
- Radio code, sending and receiving
- Message writing
- Codes and ciphers
- Message center procedure
- Message center logs, preparation and use of Visual Signaling
- R/T and V/T procedure
- SOI and SOP
- Installation, operation, and maintenance of switchboards
- Wire ties and splices
- Pole line construction
- Simplex and phantom circuits, including repeating and loading coils
- Field telephone circuits
- Installation, operation, and maintenance of field telephone,

EE-3

- Wire laying and tagging
- Switchboard procedure
- Line route maps, circuit and traffic diagrams
- Trouble shooting
- Local battery telephone systems
- Test stations
- Frequency modulation
- Installation, operation, and maintenance of radio equipment,
- TBX, TCS, SCR-605, SCR-300A, SCR-610
- Antennas and transmission lines
- Practice radio nets
- Installation, operation, and maintenance of telegraph set TG-54
- Radio anti-jamming defenses

All hands fired their weapons, and received instruction in field sanitation, hand grenades, first aid, gas defense, infantry tactics, identification, mines and booby traps.
CONFIDENTIAL

Conditioning hikes were carried out frequently.

In addition, each section was instructed in the work of the other sections.

There were no changes in training for occupational duty, since the instruction was largely technical and prepared the sections for any type of duty.

2. Installation, operation, and maintenance of signal communications was largely normal during the occupation operation.

3. During the FUKUOKA phase dividing regimental headquarters between FUKUOKA and KASHII Station (a distance of about 4 miles) necessitated the organization of Gamper Army exchange at KASHII Station to serve attached units and non-operational components of regimental headquarters. All trunk circuits were paralleled by spare circuits, and test stations were installed at frequent intervals to facilitate maintenance. All circuits were installed at least eighteen feet above the dock on existing Japanese mole lines. Where three or more circuits followed the same route, they were cabled. Wire -130 was used for all inside installations and for cabling from outside terminals to the "A" frame of the regimental switchboard. Altogether, more than 300 miles of telephone circuits were installed and operated by this regiment.

4. Message center operation was normal. Scheduled messenger runs were made to all units three times daily.

5. Little radio operation was done, the main reliance being on wire. One radio team was attached to the Third Battalion and one to the FUKUOKA Occupation Force to operate in force nets. "Gamper Company manned the radio sets of the military police while in the FUKUOKA area. Two radio teams were attached to the First Battalion to operate stations at outposts too far away for wire communications. Large patrols used TCS Radios to maintain contact with their battalion headquarters.

6. Signal supply was adequate. Initial extra supply of wire was obtained from Division, and no replenishment of any sort was required.

7. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATION

a. Radio equipment was more than adequate. Radio was used to maintain contact with motorized patrols and convoys, as primary means of communication with isolated outposts, and in the event of wire failure.

b. In a static occupation, wire is the primary means of communication. The allowance of insulators IN-25 should be increased to 300 per regimental headquarters, and 100 for each battalion. The same allowance should be made of brackets IF-57. Gloves LC-10 should be issued.
CONFIDENTIAL

on the basis of one per lineman's equipment MIE-1. Allowance of switchboards BD-72 should be increased to one per infantry battalion. Telephones, EE-8, should be increased to 60 per regimental headquarters and 40 per infantry battalion. Allowance of terminal strip TM-184 should be increased to 20 per regimental headquarters and 12 per infantry battalion. Increase in allowance of wire W-110B to 75 miles per infantry regimental headquarters and 35 per infantry battalion is advisable. An additional 25 miles of cable CD-553 and 8 cable stub CD-356 is advisable. The allowance of wire K-130 should be reduced to 3 miles per infantry regimental headquarters and infantry battalion.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

[Signature]

G. H. LOCKARD
Major, USMC
Reg'tl Com Officers
JRC/virz

HEADQUARTERS,
13TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
C/O PPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.

Subject: 13th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. In compliance with Division Special Order Number 355-1945, Annex J1G to Division Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN is submitted herewith.

J. A. BEAMS.
Arty Gp.
5th MarDiv (Reinf)
In the Field
30 November, 1945.


Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. PLANNING.

(a) Written information relative to the landing on the Southwest coast of KYUSHU, JAPAN was received 30 July, 1945. A conference room was established and key members of the staff were kept up to date on incoming information. Photographs and orders were studied, and staff conferences were held, but due to a change in plans written orders were not completed and dissemination was not made to subordinate units.

(b) Occupation.

This phase was accomplished aboard ship. The regimental staff was embarked aboard one ship and frequent conferences were held throughout the voyage. Regimental Operation Orders 25-45, 25A-45 and 25B-45 were prepared covering the preferred, first and second alternate plans. These were disseminated to the 1st and 2nd battalions at Saipan but distribution to other units was impossible due to their being embarked in separate convoy. Photographs of the SAEBBO Harbor area were studied and temporary billets, storage areas and unloading facilities were selected. Plans were initiated for expediting unloading of essential equipment and material for any expected contingency.

2. TRAINING.

(a) Assault.

Schools were organized in gunnery technique, chemical warfare, surveying, intelligence, air observation, Japanese language, photo interpretation, and difficult driving. Battery, battalion and regimental tests in tactics and gunnery were conducted to ascertain relative efficiency of the units, great stress being placed on discovered weaknesses.
Batteries conducted overhead firing exercises for each infantry battalion, and forward observer parties and liaison teams accompanied infantry companies and battalions on numerous field exercises to effect complete collaboration. G/Fs were conducted including one on a division level. A large terrain board was constructed and all officers were required to fire a minimum of all types of problems. Numerous day and night problems were conducted by flash and sound ranging teams. Available films relative to JAPAN were shown to all hands.

(b) Occupation

In the short time available prior to embarking aboard ship and during the voyage, intensive training in interior guard duty, courtesy and military customs, Japanese language, military government, and related subjects was conducted. Special stress was placed on the terrain, facilities, customs, and habits of the Japanese.

3. ORGANIZATION

(a) Organic four (4) battalions.

(b) 5th Amph DUKW Company.

(c) Company "C", 20th Amph Truck Battalion.

(d) VMO-5.

4. OPERATIONS ASHORE

22 September

Operations ashore commenced when elements of Headquarters established a CP at the SASEBO Aircraft Factory at 1030. First battalion landed at 1145, occupied position and was ready to fire by 1240 as an emergency procedure. Other battalions had started unloading by 1800, but did not occupy firing positions.

23 September

Unloading operations were continued and completed by the 1st, 2nd, and 4th battalions, VMO-5, and Co "C", 20th Amph Trk Bn.

24 September

First and Second Battalions began movement to Naval Stores Area (1282.8-1112.7) for guarding and billeting; completely established the following day. Other units occupied buildings in SaSEBO Aircraft Factory.

25 to 29 September

Following reconnaissance of previous day, "B" Btry, 1st battalion moved to KAWATNA, Naval Stores area (1292.9-1101.5) for guarding and billeting. Reconnaissance of and preparations for movement to HIU Ammunition Depot (1281.5-1111.0) were made by the 4th battalion.

29 September to 2 October

Fourth battalion began movement to HIU Ammunition Depot for guarding and billeting. Third battalion and Regimental HQ continue guarding SaSEBO Aircraft Factory. Orders were received assigning zone of responsibility for patrolling and uncovering Japanese war materials and breaches of Terms of Surrender.

2 to 7 October

Patrolling in assigned zone of responsibility was conducted. Second battalion established two patrols in conjunction with 10th Marines to execute surveillance missions in the southern zone of responsibility.

10, 11 October

Typhoon swept SaSEBO and vicinity inflicting heavy damage to numerous dwellings, communications and other facilities. No casualties were suffered.

12 October

Detachments were dispatched to Uragashiwa (1281.5-1105.2) and Haiko Naval Barracks (1285.0-1104.0) to execute surveillance and report on repatriation and demobilization of returning Japanese Military Forces of Korea (58th Army).

13, 14 October

Fourth battalion discovered remnants of 312th Japanese Army Division (Home Defense Unit) near Haiko Shima (1306.56-1173.51). Equipment was inventoried and placed under surveillance for later destruction. Demobilization of 9,956 returning troops began at Uragashiwa.

15 to 18 October

Regimental Educational Program initiated by establishing unit schools. Approximately twenty-five (25) percent of zone of responsibility had been completely patrolled.

18 October

Go "G" 20th Amph Trk Bn was detached from this regiment. Several hundred assorted weapons, including rifles, swords, shotguns, daggers, etc., had been collected in the zone of responsibility at this date. Demobilization of the second group of Japanese repatriates consisting of 332 personnel from Daiko Shima began.

19, 20 October

Demobilization of the third group, 10,242 military personnel from Korea, began.

21 to 25 October

Disposition of Japanese war materials and essential civilian commodities was commenced.

25, 26 October

Unloading and processing of 2,295 Japanese troops of the 58th Army from Korea began.
27 October

Elements of the Japanese 58th Army, numbering 9,798, began unloading at Urugashira, for demobilization.

28, 29 October

Repatriation of Japanese military forces from Korea continued. 8,405 were unloaded for demobilization.

30, 31 October

The assigned zone of responsibility for patrolling was eighty-three (83) percent completed. Unloading and processing of 5,808 returning troops of the 58th Army in Korea began.

1, 2 November

Large quantities of equipment of the 312th Division were destroyed by the Fourth Battalion. The regiment completed patrol of assigned zone of responsibility. Unloading of 9,808 Japanese troops of the 58th Army began at Urugashira.

3 November

The 121st FA battalion (Army) was attached to this regiment.

4 to 7 November

Forty (40) tons of ammunition were loaded for dumping at sea; equipment of the 312th Division and four (4) 15cm guns were destroyed. Third battalion began movement of airplane wings and spare parts from NITO Aircraft Factory.

7 November

"Spot Checking" of critical points in the zone of responsibility continued. Twenty-nine (29) warheads and six (6) anti-aircraft guns were destroyed.
Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupa-
tion of J.P.N. (Cont'd).

30Nov45

8 November

Commenced unloading three (3) LSTs returning 4,200 Japanese
Troops from KOREA and the S.S. FORT BUFFALO returning seven hundred
(700) Japanese Marines which had been a part of the defense forces of
HONGKONG.

9, 10 November

Twelve (12) buildings, containing civilian materials, were
signed over to the Japanese Home Ministry by the 1st Bn. Two (2) LSTs
unloaded 3,990 Japanese troops of the 111th Division at URUGASHIRA for
demobilization.

11, 12 November

Elements of the Japanese 96th Division of KOREA, totaling
2,199, were unloaded at URUGASHIRA for demobilization. Destruction of
war materials continued.

13, 14 November

The 2d and 3rd Bns destroyed several tons of aircraft parts
located at the NITO Aircraft Factory.

15, 16 November

Over 15,000 type 604 motor projectiles, 250 aerial bombs and
52 depth charges were loaded aboard ship for disposal at sea. The total
number of repatriates unloaded at URUGASHIRA was 69,761 at this date.

17, 18 November

Destruction of war materials continued. Liaison with relieving
units of 2d MarDiv established and preparations made for same.

19, 20 November

First group of 919 Chinese repatriates arrived at URUGASHIRA
from NAGASAKI area for transport to North China. 2,996 Japanese troops
arrived at URUGASHIRA for demobilization.
Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd.)

21 November

1,080 Chinese arrived at HARIO for repatriation. Three (3) ISTs unloaded 2,989 Japanese troops at URAGASHIRA for demobilization.

22 November

2,337 Chinese arrived at HARIO Naval Barracks to await transport to North China. Three (3) ISTs unloaded 2,980 Japanese troops at URAGASHIRA for processing and later demobilization.

23 November

121st Pa. Bn, relieved by 2nd Bn, began movement to KURUME for assignment with 32d InfDiv. 2,887 Chinese coal miners and laborers loaded aboard ISTs at URAGASHIRA for shipment to North China.

24 November

121st Pa. Bn completed movement to KURUME; detached from this unit. Disposition continued. Zone of responsibility in SAGA KEN released to control of 2d MarDiv.

25 November

Preparation made for exchange of personnel with 10th Marines. 2,594 Japanese troops from TAKU, China unloaded at URAGASHIRA for processing and demobilization.

26 November

Transfer of personnel between 4th Bn, 13th Marines and 4th Bn, 10th Marines and 1/5 H&S Batterys of 10th and 10th Marines effected. 1,968 Japanese Army troops, 227 Navy troops, and 860 civilians unloaded at URAGASHIRA.

27 November

Transfer of personnel between 2nd Bn, 13th Marines and 2d Bn, 10th Marines and 1/5 H&S Batterys of 13th and 10th Marines effected. 2,967 Japanese Army troops unloaded at URAGASHIRA for demobilization.

28 November

Transfer of personnel between 2d Bn, 13th Marines and 3rd Bn, 10th Marines and 1/5 H&G Battery of 13th and 10th Marines effected.

29 November

Transfer of personnel between 1st Bn, 13th Marines and 1st Bn, 10th Marines and 1/5 H&G Battery of 13th and 10th Marines effected. 3,006 Japanese troops from China unloaded at UragaSHIRA. 1,299 Chinese outloaded.

30 November

Transfer of 1/5 H&G Btry, 13th Marines with H&G Btry, 10th Marines effected. 2,856 Japanese Army troops unloaded at UragaSHIRA.

5. CONCLUSIONS

(a) During the period of occupancy from 22 September to 30 November, 1945 the following amounts (approximate) of Japanese war materials were destroyed: 188,350 assorted rounds artillery and mortar ammunition; 24,914 aerial bombs (filled and empty); 400 tons aircraft parts; 30 tons of signal equipment; 1,785 machine guns (assorted); 20 tons machine gun spare parts; 161 war making machines; 270 torpedoes; 649 tons torpedo parts; 1,518 mines; 3,485 depth charges; 83 artillery and AAA guns; 17 tons artillery and AAA gun parts; 60 tons explosives; 3,917 gas masks; 282 aerial cameras.

(b) An area of approximately 515 square miles was completely patrolled and investigated by elements of this regiment.

(c) Supervision of unloaded, inspection and demobilization or repatriation of 99,042 incoming Japanese troops or civilians and supervision of handling and loading of 6,135 foreign nationals and repatriation were effected by detachment of this regiment.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) For operations of this nature, it is recommended that a minimum of eight interpreters be assigned to an artillery regiment for language schooling while enroute and for operations ashore.

(b) It is recommended that any units moving into an occupational operation set up SOPs covering inventorying and disposition before, or at the earliest practical time after arrival at the zone of occupation.

(c) It is recommended that Japanese maps showing prefectural, shi, and machi boundaries and the town or city in each of these areas which provides Japanese control be distributed to subordinate units. Zones of responsibility for each unit could then be assigned from these maps using shi and machi boundaries which would facilitate liaison and control within these areas.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL RENIS.

E. C. FERGUSON,
LtCol, USMC,
Executive Officer.

APPENDIX: 1 - S-1 Report
APPENDIX: 2 - S-2 Report
APPENDIX: 3 - S-4 Report

DISTRIBUTION: G-3, 5thMarDiv (75); CO (1); ExO (1); S-1 (1); S-2 (1); S-4 (1); Each Bn (5); War Diary (5); FIE (10).

OFFICIAL

J. R. CROCKETT,
Major, USMC.
S-3.

-9-
CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 1 (S-1 Report) to Annex JIG to Fifth Marine Division Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. On 30 July, 1945, the date of commencement of planning for the Assault Operation, this regiment had an actual strength of 175 officers and 2,404 enlisted which included 9 officers and 57 enlisted Naval personnel. On 1 September, 1945, the date of departure from the Hawaiian Area, the actual strength was 172 officers and 2,422 enlisted, of which 7 officers and 202 enlisted were left with the rear echelon.

2. The artillery group landed and the regimental command post was established at the Naval Aircraft Factory, SASEBO, on 22 September, 1945. As soon as facilities could be made available, a post office, post exchange, and special service section was organized and commenced operations. The post exchange and post office were branches of the Division and managed by personnel furnished by Division Headquarters, assisted by personnel furnished from units of the regiment. These sections were serving all units of this regiment including those stationed at outlying localities. Due to the distance in certain cases, this arrangement was not entirely satisfactory, but could not be improved due to the lack of qualified personnel necessary to further extend these activities.

3. Special Service sections were organized within the regiment in accordance with present, G-series, Tables of Organization. These sections organized and supervised the various activities normally assigned. A schedule of athletic games and competitions was arranged. Movies and a very limited number of troop shows were obtained. In addition an education program was established with classes of instruction in various phases of law, mathematics, history, English, and agriculture, on both the battalion and regimental level.

4. Considering the very poor housing conditions, and limited liberty and recreation opportunities because of the need for personnel required in the performance of guard, patrol duty, disposal and penetration work during the period of occupation, morale was considered to be excellent.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL PEVIS

E. G. PEVIS,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Regimental Executive Officer

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]

P. W. POTTER,
Captain, U.S.M.C.
Rgmt 1st Adjutant.
APPENDIX 2 (S-2 Report) to Annex JIG to 5th Marine Division Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

A. Planning for assault operation commenced on 30 July, 1945 at which time the first information was received regarding the assault operation.

1. Maps, photos and other materials.

The map used was the A.S.S. L872, scale 1/25,000. This map was first received on 22 August. It was found to be suitable in all respects except that width of roads was not always accurately shown. Sufficient maps were received while enroute to the target. Two battalions which were transported in a separate convoy had only maps for planning purposes until after landing at Sasebo.

The map of Central Japan, scale 1/250,000 was also used in limited quantity. The A.S.S. L872, scale 1/50,000, was received several weeks after landing.

No photographs were received in sufficient quantity to distribute to battalions. The only photos received were a few vertical photos of beach areas.

Mecals, scale 1/25,000, were received in large quantity, but the terrain features were so indistinct as to make them useless. They were discarded.

No models or vectographs were received.

B. Training and Organization of the Intelligence Section for the Occupational Mission.

The Intelligence Section consisted of one (1) Captain, one (1) Lieutenant, two (2) intelligence clerks, one (1) draftsman, and two (2) radio operators.

Training for the Occupational Mission was conducted aboard ship while enroute to the target. This training consisted of a thorough briefing of the section on their duties upon landing, Surrender Terms, Geography of Japan, Customs of the Japanese People, Japanese Language, Military Government, etc.

C. Intelligence Functioning During Occupation.

1. Upon landing, as there was no opposition, the intelligence became concerned with reconstituting the area and making recommendations for the security of the area.
APPENDIX 2 (S-2 Report) to Annex JIG to 5th Marine Division Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

2. Inventorying Japanese Equipment.

Beginning 24 September, the Intelligence Section of each battalion commenced inventorying all Japanese military materials, equipment and installations. These inventories lacked accuracy because some equipment and materials could not be identified, and insufficient interpreters were available to determine the correct nomenclature and quantity.

In most cases the Japanese had prepared inventories covering each installation. Some of these inventories were in English and our forces merely made a physical check of the inventory, submitted by the Japanese.

The inventorying of all Japanese military materials, equipment and supplies was accomplished by 1 November, 1945.

3. New equipment encountered.

It was not determined whether or not any equipment encountered was new.

4. Liaison with Japanese Forces.

The liaison was conducted mainly by higher echelons.

5. Civilian Attitude.

The attitude of the Japanese civilians was one of unexpected friendliness, curiosity and willingness to cooperate with our forces. Many people displayed fear upon first encountering our forces. This gradually disappeared. The Japanese seemed very willing to give information of any kind and often volunteered information.


a. There were no language personnel with this regiment when landed which was a decided handicap. There were Japanese officials at the beach when the regiment landed, but because of the complete lack of linguists, practically no information could be obtained. Approximately one week after landing, an interpreter was attached to the regiment. Subsequently three more linguists were attached.
APPENDIX 2 (S-2 Report) to Annex JTG to 5th Marine Division Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

Many Japanese were found who could speak English. A number of these were hired through the Japanese Liaison Committee. This greatly aided liaison and relieved our shortage of interpreters.

b. Handling of Documents.

All Japanese documents were reported immediately to the S-2 of the regiment. These documents were then examined by an interpreter and if found to contain important information, they were reported immediately to G-2 for disposition.

c. Interrogation.

Organized interrogation was not conducted by this regiment however, at the repatriation center at Urgashira, high ranking Japanese officers returning from abroad were questioned upon landing in order to obtain order of battle information.


This regiment was not assigned the mission of releasing Allied Prisoner's of War.

8. Repatriation of Foreign Nationals.

On 12 October a detail of officers and men were stationed at Haric barracks and at Urgashira to supervise and report on the handling of outgoing and incoming repatriates. During the period 12 October to 30 November, a total of 95,042 Japanese troops arrived from abroad and were processed at these stations. During the same period there were 6,135 outgoing Chinese and Korean repatriates processed.

D. Japanese compliance with surrender terms.

Ashes were found which indicated that the Japanese had burned documents prior to our arrival. No other evidence of non-compliance with the surrender terms was noted.
CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 2 (S-2 Report) to Annex JIG to 5th Marine Division Operation
Report, Occupation of Japan.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL BEMIS

H. C. FERGUSON,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Regimental Executive Officer.

SIGNED:
D. W. BENNION
Captain USMC,
S-2
CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 3 (S-4 Report) to Annex JIG to Fifth Marine Division Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. QUARTERMASTER

Supplies were furnished by Division on an automatic supply basis. "C", "K" and "10 in 1" rations were supplied daily commencing 22 September. "E" rations were made available as soon as a suitable galley was constructed. First issue of "E" rations was made on 30 September. First issue of fresh meats was made on 29 October.

Issue of winter clothing was slow due to moving of Division Quartermaster warehouses. A full issue of winter clothing, with the exception of shoe items, was made. Shoe items were issued to only 75% of the personnel due to inability to obtain correct sizes.

Stationery supplies were inadequate for the large number of reports, inventories, and orders necessary in an operation of this type.

2. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

The medical Department of this organization was combat loaded aboard LSTs and APAs and landed at the target on A day. Sickbays were immediately set up by all units.

Supplies and equipment were adequate and no shortages were experienced. Quartermaster resupply was adequate at all times.

No specific medical problems were experienced and sanitation squads continuously maintained facilities. Japanese water supply was limited to external usage.

3. DISPOSITION

Disposition of Japanese War Materials and Equipment was initiated on 22 October, 1945, with the setting up of a Disposition Section as a separate staff section and the appointment of Commander Noble S. Martin, U.S.C. & G.S., as Regimental Disposition Officer.

Surrendered Materials were disposed of in accordance with instructions laid down in Annex "FOX" to Division Administrative Order No. 1-45.

Japanese labor, trucks, and ships, under Marine supervision were used exclusively in the handling of Japanese ammunition and explosives.

- 1 -
APPENDIX 3 (S-4 Report) to Annex JIG to Fifth Marine Division Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

All weapons seized were rendered inoperative with the exception of items classified as War Memorials or War Trophies. These items were turned over to Division War Trophy Section.

Inert projectiles and bombs were dumped at sea from U. S. Navy LSM's and LCT's utilizing Japanese Labor for working parties.

The regiment was allocated 202 swords, 42 Japanese medals, 67 pistols, 45 binoculars, and a sufficient number of rifles, carbines and shotguns to distribute one firearm to each man in the regiment. Officers and first pay grade NCO's received a sword, the remainder of the regiment received a rifle or carbine, and the rest of the war trophies were distributed by lottery to the men excluding officers and first pay grades.

The paper work involved in the disposition of Japanese war materials was a problem, as the order for the setting up of the forms for inventorying and disposition work were received on 23 October, one month after the regiment had landed in Japan, and after most of the actual physical inventorying of equipment had been completed. Since reports were to be submitted on required forms giving items in specified units, much duplication of clerical work resulted and many of the areas had to be re-inventoried.

4. MOTOR TRANSPORT

The transportation available was not sufficient due to the extensive patrolling necessary and heavy demands from division for transportation.

The number of flat tires was extremely high due to the poor condition of all roads. Due to this, the supply of tire patches, tubes, replacement valves, etc., was highly inadequate.

It was necessary to "dead line" many vehicles due to lack of spare parts.

On 29 November, 1945 the following vehicles were transferred to the Second Marine Division: one (1) station wagon; fifteen (15) 1/4 ton 4x4 trucks; thirty-five (35) 1 ton 4x4 trucks.

5. PROCUREMENT

Procurement of Japanese material for housekeeping and recreational purposes was handled in accordance with annex "KING" of Division Administrative Order Number 1-45 and modification No. 1 thereto.
CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 3 (S-4 Report) to Annex J16 to Fifth Marine Division Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

Numerous items of Japanese equipment and supplies were procured for use by the artillery group.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL BENIS

E. C. FERGUSON,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Regimental Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL:

D. S. CARMICHAEL,
Captain, USNCR.
S-4
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH TANK BATTALION,
DIVISION SERVICE TROOPS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.

Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

3 December, 1945.

1. This organization began the planning and training for the
assault on the Japanese empire immediately upon the completion of the re-
habilitation phase after the IWO JIMA operation. The planning and training
were both centered on two objectives: (1) The reorganization of the
Tank Battalion to meet terrain conditions in the Japanese empire. (2)
The revision of tactical employment as a result of experiences of tank
units on IWO JIMA and OKINAWA. Several organizational changes were ef-
acted such as the organization of a Flare Tank Company, however, the
effectiveness of these changes were never determined since a new Table
of Organization which was proposed while the unit was absent on IWO JIMA
was placed into effect prior to the departure of this unit from the Ha-
waiian Islands. The training was centered on three objectives. Pri-
marily Tank-Infantry training for all the Infantry of the Division in the
basic fundamentals and the standard operating procedure of Tank-Infantry
employment. This was necessitated by the fact that as a result of casual-
ties on IWO JIMA and the consequent replacements the infantry was not
experienced in Tank-Infantry tactics. Secondly training in tank tact-
cies which emphasized two points, defense against anti-tank measures and
the attack of anti-tank guns. Thirdly, tactical training in the forcing of
defiles, since due to the terrain factors of the Empire and the de-
pendency of supply upon a road not it was realized that the primary
mission of the tank unit would be to force the existing roads; defiles
in the existing road not were numerous and it was considered that they
would be well defended. In addition every effort was made to provide
from within the Tank Battalion a reconnaissance screen which is necessary
in large land mass operations.

2. The mission of this unit for the occupation of Japan was
to land with the assault elements and support any unit which encountered
resistance. Mounted reconnaissance units were furnished by this bat-
tallon to each infantry unit. They landed with the infantry unit and
via the radio reported no resistance over the entire division front.
On the night of the landing, the tanks went into bivouac at the SASEBO
Naval Air Station and remained there throughout the occupational period.

-1-
3. A detachment from this unit formed the OITA occupation group and carried out the imposition of the surrender terms in OITA KEN until relieved by elements of the 32nd Army Division. Throughout this period no difficulties were encountered and the cooperation of the Japanese left nothing to be desired. There was a significant factor noted that the Japanese operated most effectively when exposed to harsh dictatorial measures.

4. In addition to the detailed recommendations contained herein, there is a broad recommendation which applies to all Marine Corps units. It is believed by the undersigned that had an assault operation become necessary upon the Japanese empire that the organic transportation of a Marine division would have failed most miserably. The existing road net would not have stood the traffic of our two and one-half (2½) ton trucks or tanks. It is therefore recommended that in any such operation in the future that one (1) ton trucks be supplied and that the road building equipment of Engineer, Tanks, and Pioneer units be expanded materially. It is felt that instead of a Marine unit being given standard equipment to fight anywhere in the world, that the Tables of Organization should be revised to permit sufficient flexibility to permit a unit to adapt itself to the varying requirements of the target selected.

W.R. Collins
W. R. COLLINS
HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL AIR STATION COMMAND,
SASEBO AREA, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION, R.F.
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: S-3, 5th Tank Battalion.
To: The Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion.
Subject: Annexable to Annex King.

OPERATION ORDER: No. 1: Defense of Bivouac, Oita Occupation Group.

1. Plans for control and dispersion of any disturbance within the area under control of Oita Occupation Group.

   (a) The command is divided into five (5) tactical units of platoon size, the platoons being composed of machine gun sections and riflemen. In addition to these tactical units, there are several staff sections, medical section, engineer section, and communication section.

   (b) There is an established military police and security patrol consisting of thirty (30) men under the control of the Provost Marshall and an additional section of nine (9) men comprising the headquarters guard. The Military Police patrols are established on a twenty-four (24) hour basis with walking and mounted posts during daylight hours and mounted patrols during the hours of darkness.

   (c) In the event that any disturbances arise, these patrols will notify immediately the Oita Occupational Group Headquarters, the Commander of Troops, at the billeting area, the Civilian Police, and will insure that all men on liberty return immediately to duty. The Senior Officer present at the billeting area will cause the platoons to be assembled and armed immediately, providing for a mobile "riot squad" of two platoons to be entrucked with SCR 510 and sent upon order to the scene of any disturbance, the remainder of the troops to be held in mobile reserve, either for defense of the billeting area or for dispatch to any place needed. The engineer personnel will take all steps to safeguard the water distillation plant at the billeting area and the medical section will stand by in the sick bay. The communications section will take all steps to provide ample radio and telephone communications throughout the billeting area, outside the billeting area, and to higher echelons of command. Upon being notified of any disturbance or attack, the communications officer will inform the Commanding General, Fifth Marine Division via radio and keep channels open to that headquarters. Dispatcher will supply two 2½ ton trucks for "riot squad".

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(d) The following assignments of duty to officers will be in effect in the event of any emergency requiring action by our troops.

LtCol. COLLINS Commanding Officer.
Capt. BRUNS Executive Officer.
Capt. JONES Commander of Troops.
Capt. SANDS S-4
Lt. MOORE S-3
Lt. MORGAN Commander of barracks defense.
Lt. STEELEAU Commander of mobile riot squad.
Lt. JARVIS Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon, "B" Company.
Lt. DOWIE Platoon Commander, 2nd Platoon, "B" Company.
Lt. STEENOSKI Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon, "A" Company.
Lt. JONES Platoon Commander, 2nd Platoon, "A" Company.
Lt. EBAUGH Platoon Commander, 3rd Platoon, "A" Company.
Lt. SPAIN Commander of Military Police patrols and supervisor of civilian police activities.
Lt.(jg) ROBBINS Surgeon
WO. HILLS Communication chief.

(e) The first and second platoon of "B" Company are designated as the mobile unit. The first, second, and third platoons of "A" Company are designated as the reserve unit.

2. Plan for the defense of the billeting area of Oita Occupation Group in the event of an actual attack on that area:

(a) In the event of an actual attack on the billeting area of the Oita Occupation Group, the following plan will be put into operation.

(b) The billeting area is enclosed in a rectangular compound with earth revetments around all four sides. There are a number of small Japanese earthworks, built as air-raid shelters, throughout the compound, all gates to the compound, except the main entrance, will remain closed at all times. In the event of an attack the main gate will be closed and locked.
(c) The first platoon of "B" Company will be responsible for the north side of the compound, the second platoon of "B" Company for the east side, the first platoon of "A" Company for the south side, and the second platoon of "A" Company for the west side. These platoons will be so disposed as to give machine gun cover down the roads entering the compound, final protective lines along the earth revetments constituting the compound perimeter and riflemen posted in the upper stories of the buildings around the perimeter.

(d) The third platoon of "A" Company will be positioned generally in the center of the compound as reserve unit, prepared to deliver effective fire from earthwork positions in this area and also to lend aid to any section of the perimeter defense which should become hard-pressed.

(e) In the event of an attack on the billeting area or other disturbances, the Provost Marshall will insure that the Civilian Police are notified and that all available are dispatched to the scene of the disturbances.

(f) In the event of an extended siege, S-4, through available communication facilities will insure that higher headquarters are requested to supply Cina Occupation Group by air-drop.

(g) Blackout regulations will be in effect and sign and countersign will be as established in previous orders.

EDWARD H. SPLATT,
2ndLt., USMCR,
S-3.
HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL AIR STATION COMAND,
SASEBO AREA, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION, RIF,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CONFIDENTIAL 17 November, 1945

From: S-3, 5th Tank Battalion.
To: The Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion.

Subject: Annexable to Annex King.

OPERATION ORDER #2: Defense of Naval Air Station Area.

Maps:
(a) Sasebo - 1/22,900.
(b) Photographs - drawing of NaS.

1. (a) See annex BAKER to 5th Marine Division Operation
Plan 25-45 and Intelligence Studies and Summaries issued.

2. The Fifth Tank Battalion will be prepared to defend
against and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy any hostile groups
within its area of responsibility that interfere with the accomplishment
of its mission. It will further be prepared to support any separate unit
in the Sasebo area.

3. PLAN I

(a) Company "C", 5th Tank Battalion will on orders from
the Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion send out radio Operators to take
up positions where they can observe enemy action along routes of approach
to this area. Tanks will immediately take up defensive positions where they
can command these approaches.

(b) Company "B" will be on call to support Company "C"
as needed.

(c) Elements of "A", "B", and "C" Companies will have
unused tanks dug in at strategic positions and weapons manned to provide
a cross-fire for the immediate area of the Naval Air Station.

(d) Drivers will be available to supply Company "C" with
necessary replenishment tanks as may be needed.

(e) All available personnel will be dug in a strategic
point in a ring of defense.
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Annex Able to Annex King. (Cont’d)

PLAN II

(a) Company "C", 5th Tank Battalion will be prepared on order from the Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion, to proceed via selected route to any unit in the Sasebo area. Recon units will lead the way and control all traffic to insure least possible delay in movement.

(b) Company "B" will remain on call at present location. Recon units will proceed to strategic points so that traffic control can be instantaneous in the necessity of movement.

(c) H&S Company (Maintenance) and sufficient personnel to man (2 per tank) the remaining vehicles will be prepared to resupply any unit with new vehicles manned by original crews.

(d) All units will call for replenishment vehicles rather than endeavor to free one in rice paddies and delay support. Retriever and recovery teams will coordinate salvage work.

4. (a) Supply will be automatic from the Battalion C.P. (79:10-08:30) by truck to forward outposts. Replenishments of other than automatic supplies will be reduced into the Battalion C.P.

(b) Administrative reports will be submitted not later than 1600 to the Battalion C.P.

5. Communication will be by radio in accordance with 5th Marine Signal. 5th Tank Battalion C.P. will be in command vehicle and will advance in rear of assault company in Plan II. In Plan I, C.P. will be centrally located to rear of perimeter defense.

EDWARD H. SPLAIN
2nd Lt., USMCR
S-7.
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX BAKER OF ANNEX KING

Appendix 3 - Special Services

TRAINING PERIOD

(a) EDUCATION

Due to the fact that during this period military training was of prime importance, no formal classes were held in academic or vocational studies. However, correspondence study in the Marine Corps Institute and The United States Armed Force Institute was greatly encouraged. The battalion school tent was made available to all hands for study in the off hours and tutors were obtained from qualified officers and enlisted personnel in order to give all students as much assistance as possible.

(b) RECREATION

All available means for recreation were provided within the battalion and activities provided by the division were made readily accessible to all hands. This battalion provided the following recreational facilities:

1. Battalion recreation room with a beer canteen and ping pong tables, and facilities for playing cards and other similar indoor games.
2. Library for leisure time reading and letter writing.
3. Company swimming parties were held regularly at the beach.
4. Fishing parties.

The following divisional recreational facilities were made available to all hands:

1. Moving pictures (nightly).
2. USO Shows.
3. Red Cross Canteen.

(c) ATHLETICS

Within the battalion large competition was had in softball and volleyball, while within each company, a similar competition program was had between Platoons. Body building classes were held daily and results were very encouraging.
Seven members of the battalion participated on the Service Troops team of the Division baseball league. Attendance at these games by members of this organization was always high.

(d) PERSONAL AFFAIRS

Inasmuch as the war was still in progress during this period, post-war problems among personnel of this organization were practically nil. Personal affairs problems were well confined to emergency furnishers which were handled by the individual companies in cooperation with the battalion adjutant.

OCCUPATION PERIOD

(a) EDUCATION

A battalion school offering academic courses in high school level subjects was organized with first classes commencing 14 October, 1945. Instruction was offered in the following courses.

1. Basic Mathematics
2. Algebra I
3. Elementary Physics
4. Bookkeeping and Accounting
5. Fundamentals of Electricity
6. Livestock Production
7. Farm Management
8. American History

Enrollment in the battalion school was ninety-six (96). Instructors were obtained from officers and enlisted men in the battalion, who had either teaching experience or sufficient educational background in the classes which they held to qualify as good instructors.

In addition to the battalion school, correspondence study in the Marine Corps Institute and United States Armed Forces Institute was greatly encouraged. A Special Study Hall was made available as were tutors in all courses. Correspondence study enrollments in the organization at the time of this report totaled forty-three (43).

Interviews were held by the educational officer and the educational NCO in which personnel awaiting discharge were advised and helped to plan their educational programs after release from the service. Such interviews numbered nine (9).
(b) RICELATION

A battalion library was established in which the following facilities were made available to all hands:

1. Fiction and non-fiction books.
2. Current magazines.
5. Daily Spearheads.

A battalion recreation hall adjacent to the Post Exchange was established with facilities for drinking beer and coca cola, playing ping pong, and other various games such as acey ducy, card games, monopoly, etc.

A branch Post Exchange was installed.

The 5th Division Band was made available to play for our entertainment on two separate occasions, 5 November, and 19 November, 1945.

A Japanese entertainment group was procured and it presented shows on 5 November, and 15 November, 1945.

A quiz show, composed of local talent, was held on the evening of 10 November, 1945 and cash prizes were awarded to the participants. In addition to the above, each company had its own reading room which was used for study periods, reading and letter writing.

16mm Moving Pictures were held nightly commencing 22 September, 1945. Two showings were held each night to insure that every one in the battalion had an opportunity to attend.

Jap seacane floats were obtained for building boats and a great number of men spent their recreation hours building and sailing these boats.

A Jap fishing boat was put into operation and served as a crash boat and as a recreation boat for fishing and sightseeing trips.

(c) ATHLETICS

The following athletic facilities were constructed:

1. Softball diamond
2. Football field
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ANNEX BAKER OF ANNEX KING—Appendix 3—Special Services (Cont'd)

(3) Two volley wall courts
(4) Indoor, four wall, handball court.
(5) Body-building room.
(6) Boxing room

Round-robin league competition was held in softball with each company having a representative team, and to fill out the league teams were entered by neighboring Marine and Army units. In addition, the 5th Tank Battalion has a team entered in an area league sponsored by the 5th Amphibious Corps, and the same team has played games with the teams from Camp Minoura and from ships in the harbor. Attendance for the tank battalion team games was always high and enthusiasm was great. Volley ball competition was placed on the same basis as softball. Touch football was organized on the same basis. Boxing and body-building instruction was held regularly.

With the above mentioned athletic facilities made available to all personnel it is estimated that at least 50% of the tank battalion, or all personnel who so desired, were able to take an active part in athletics.

(4) PERSONAL AFFAIRS

Personal affairs lectures and interviews were held by the 5th Marine Division Personal Affairs Officer as well as by the Battalion Special Services Officer. The lecture phase was incorporated with the daily training schedule and interviews were made available at any time. New information was passed on to all hands as soon as it became available, through medium of bulletin boards, memorandums, and publications to all companies.

During the occupation period, interviews concerning the following were held:

(1) Civil Service references (7)
(2) Emergency Furloughs (2)
(3) G. I. Bill of Rights (14)
(4) Life Insurance (5)
(5) Income Tax (2)

CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX BAKER OF AUNEX KING

Appendix 5 – Adjutant’s Report.

31 May, 1945. The Tank Battalion was six (6) percent overstrength after joining replacements received on IWO JIMA. All replacements were trained at Track Vehicle Battalion, Special Training Regiment, San Diego.

The unit was under company administration with four (4) battalion clerks for the battalion administrative work, including 2 and 3 sections. The administrative unit was instructed in the reporting of casualties and the prognosis report.

The battalion left the training area on 25 August and embarked upon twelve (12) LSMs and three (3) APAs. Liaison teams of two (2) men and a jeep driver were assigned to and travelled with each infantry battalion.

All companies landed at Green Beach #1 in the SASEBO Naval Air Station Area on 22 September, 1945. The landing was made without incident, and Lieutenant Colonel W. R. COLLINS assumed command of the Naval Air Station Area.

On 1 October a centralized personnel section was established, company clerks being consolidated in a central office.

Upon the directive to have “A” Company, reinforced, move to OITA as the OITA KEN occupation group the administrative section was divided so as to fulfill duties of separate 1, 2 and 3 sections. Upon being relieved by a unit of the 32nd Army Division, “A” Company reinforced, returned to battalion control.

A directive was received to detach and transfer officers and enlisted men with less than 50 points to the Second Marine Division and units in the VAC, and to receive and join high point men from these organizations. On 25 November details began moving by rail to and from SASEBO to NAGASKAI and units of VAC. All transfers were completed on 29 November. Transfers and joinings were effected as listed below:

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<tr>
<th>JOINED</th>
<th>TRANSFERRED</th>
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<td>2d Tk Bn</td>
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</tr>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10</td>
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</table>

Total strength of Battalion, 30 Nov 45.

| Off | 18 |
| Enl | 522 |
| USMC | 1 |
| USN | 7 |
| TOTAL | 19 | 529 |
1975
NHS/gkb

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL AIR STATION COMMAND,
SASEBO AREA, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: S-2, 5th Tank Battalion.
To: The Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion.

Subject: Annex Charlie to Annex King.

Maps: KYUSHU AMS Scale 1:25,000.
KYUSHU AMS Scale 1:250,000.

17 November, 1945.

Upon return to the island of Hawaii after the Iwo Jima operation a
period of intensive training was initiated for the Battalion Intelligence
Section and all Reconnaissance and Liaison Personnel. This training enta-
iled the proper functioning of the Battalion Command Post, tank intelli-
gence information, map and aerial photograph reading, study of Japanese
Language, tactics and compass problems.

On 10 May, 1945, the intelligence section undertook the training of
all company Reconnaissance and Liaison teams. Extensive field problems
dealing with all phases of scouting and patrolling, field sketching,
route reconnaissance both mounted and dismounted, and compass problems
were prepared and conducted by this section.

On 13 May, 1945, this section published an order governing the marking
of tanks. Special numbers were used to indicate officers’ tanks and
flame thrower tanks. Each company used a definite block of numbers and
an indentifying color. The numbers were eighteen (18) inches high, were
plainly visible for several hundred yards and were painted on the sides
of the turret, on the bustle and atop the tank to aid in aerial observa-
tion.

During the period 11-15 June, 1945, a school in the fundamentals of
the Japanese Language was conducted by the S-2 Language Section. The in-
struction consisted of proper pronunciation, common phrases and a familiar-
ization with the Japanese place names. These classes were attended by all
officers, key non-commissioned officers and Reconnaissance and Liaison men.

Commencing 9 July, 1945, infantry men from all Regiments were br-
ought to the Tank Battalion to be trained as tank guides. This section
participated and instructed in the following subjects: Tank Intelligence
information, the proper use of tanks with infantry, the proper mine clear-
ing tactics and the capabilities and limitations of the tank.

During the period 19-20 July, 1945, this section conducted a Gas and
Decontamination School and all chemical personnel throughout the battalion
participated. The school stressed the use of decontaminating agents.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Annex Charlie to Annex King. (Cont'd)

Vacant kits, gas identification, use of the gas mask, and entry into the gas chamber.

Beginning 25 July, 1945, the Division Intelligence Section conducted a series of orientation lectures on the following subjects: Prisoners of War, Physiological Warfare, Japanese Documents and the Function of Language Personnel. These lectures contained much valuable information and were made part of the daily schedule.

During the period 18-20 July the Battalion Reconnaissance and Liaison Teams, under the direction of the Battalion Reconnaissance and Liaison Officer participated in a repetition of the Armored Force Problem stressing the screening phase composition and tactics of the screen were emphasized and the Air Observers were used to a decided advantage. Large white numbers were marked on the jeep hoods and by using this number the plane could direct a considerable number of jeeps easily. It was determined that at least one (1) reconnaissance vehicle must be used for every four hundred (400) yards of front in fairly smooth terrain and that armored cars or light tanks accompany the screen so as to disperse or capture any resistance encountered by the screen and to insure the uninterrupted advance of the main body.

The period from 11-26 August, 1945, was devoted to briefing and preparation for the coming operation. The operation of the battalion command post during a fast moving situation was especially emphasized. The intelligence section was briefed as thoroughly as orders permitted at that time. Also during this period all possible information on the forthcoming operation was collected into briefs to be opened by the various troop commanders at an appointed time.

During the voyage from HILO, HAWAII to SASEBO, KYUSHU a regular schedule of briefing and lectures on the pending operation and enforcement of surrender terms were conducted. Previously prepared intelligence information had been supplied Troop Commanders aboard the various vessels carrying this command. Additional information was distributed by courier whenever possible.

At approximately 1400 22 September, 1945, the Battalion Command Post landed and set up in the Administration Building of the Sasebo Naval Air Station (1278, 99-1108, 85 1/25000 AMS L872). Immediate steps were taken to contact Japanese Liaison Personnel to ascertain whether or not all the terms of surrender had been carried out. Everything proved satisfactory and the Japanese Liaison men rendered valuable assistance.

Combat Team 26 had also set up their C.P. at the SASEBO Naval Air Station and was the senior unit present. On 25 September, 1945, Combat Team 26 moved on and the tank battalion assumed tactical control of the SASEBO Naval Air Station.
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Subject: Annex Charlie to Annex King. (Cont'd)

Commencing 25 September, 1945, immediate steps were taken to guard all intelligence targets and patrols were sent out to reconnoiter this command's area of responsibility. Members of the section secured every target for intelligence value and all information was submitted in batch form and on periodic reports. Japanese Naval Technician Teams were present and cooperated to the fullest extent.

Inventories of all installations were conducted either by this command or subordinate units on the Air Station. Complete inventories were submitted through appropriate channels.

On or about 5 October, 1945, the Oita Occupation Group was formed by Division Order. The Battalion Intelligence Section with the exception of one (1) Intelligence Non-commissioned included in the group. The main body boarded a train on 13 October, 1945, and reached Oita on the same night.

Upon arrival, the Japanese Liaison Committee and the Allied Military Government Section of Oita KEW were contacted in regard to all information they had obtained prior to our arrival. Such information was consolidated by this section for further disposition to the 5th Marine Division.

All military personnel and civilians were very cooperative and eager to assist occupation forces. Cooperation on the part of the civilian police was all that could be desired. No trouble was encountered throughout the whole occupation period.

Active patrolling was performed to search for new intelligence targets and to place the occupation forces constantly in the public eye.

All remaining military units in Oita KEW were ordered to submit complete demobilization records, order of battle reports and inventories.

Six (6) man jeep patrols were sent to all outlying districts throughout Oita KEW to investigate all known intelligence targets, to search for unreported installations, and to insure that the demobilization of Japanese armed forces was being affected. These patrols proved very successful and received excellent cooperation from the Japanese.

Periodic shipping reports for all ports throughout Oita KEW were submitted to Division once weekly. These reports covered both entrance and departure and listed the ship's name, gross tons, type of ship, cargo, probable sailing date, destination and appropriate remarks. These reports were submitted to this section daily by liaison committee and were combined into weekly reports.

Daily demobilization changes were a part of the S-2 Periodic Reports. Once weekly the entire demobilization records of all Japanese Military units still functioning were submitted as an annex to the intelligence report. Other annexes included reports on war plants, new weapons, maps of military installations, reports on special units and patrol reports. Everything of even the slightest intelligence value was included in these reports.
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Annex Charlie to Annex King. (Cont'd)

On 31 October, 1945, an advance detail and Reconnaissance Party of three hundred and fifty (350) men from the 126th Field Artillery Battalion arrived by train and preparations were begun to relieve the Oita Occupation Group.

All documents and records were turned over to the relieving unit whose staff officers were indoctrinated into their tasks by the men who were being relieved. On 5 November, 1945, the Oita Occupation Group loaded aboard the train and returned to their parent organization at the Sasebo Naval Air Station.

Beginning 8 November, 1945, the Tank Battalion embarked on a regular forty-four (44) hour weekly schedule. The intelligence section participated as instructors in various subjects.

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In the opinion of this office the SCR-510 Jeep and portable radio is not suited to reconnaissance and liaison work. The radio is too large and too heavy to be carried when men are working with front line troops. The set must be dismantled and then it is a two man load. When put together the radio is too heavy to be carried by one man and two men would make excellent targets. It is recommended that a smaller lighter radio be used or a smaller radio that can contact the SCR-510 and can be carried into the front lines easily. The larger radio could be left at the Infantry Battalion Command Post and all information transmitted to it from the smaller radio.

2. There is no provision in the present Table of Organization for a screen whose duty it is to provide reconnaissance and protection for the main body. The 1/2 ton 4x4 (jeep) is not adequate because it carries very little fire power and no armor protection. It is recommended that light tanks or armored cars be used to provide protection and fire power to the screen. It is further recommended that the 1/2 ton 4x4 be replaced by the "Wessex" w/radio.

3. The intelligence and operations sections should be integrated in our opinion. The two and three sections work together very closely and all members of these sections should be able to do any of the jobs required. At present the Table of Organization strength of the sections are inadequate in the opinion of this section based upon actual battle requirements. The sections combined should number six (6) men with the following duties:

- Gunnery Sergeant: Chief of both sections.
- Platoon Sergeant: Chief of intelligence section.

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Subject: Annex Charlie to Annex King. (Cont'd)

Sergeant Clerk.
Corporal Operations Map.
Corporal Journal, work book.
Private First Class Intelligence Radio Operator.

At present there is no provision for an Intelligence radio in this battalion's Table of Organization. That should be remedied.

4. In the opinion of this office the enlisted men in the two and three sections are not adequately trained. All intelligence men should be graduates of Combat Intelligence School, at least, in addition to other appropriate schools.

5. The Reconnaissance and Liaison Personnel as prescribed by the present Table of Organization are far from adequate. A Tank Company is normally attached to an infantry regiment and must have liaison at the regiment, all the battalions and any other supporting unit. At least four (4) teams of five (5) men each are needed by each company. The four (4) teams go to regiment and each of the battalions. Five (5) men are required because two (2) men man the radio and three (3) serve as reconnaissance.

EDWARD H. SELDIN,
2nd Lt., USMC
S-2

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HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL AIR STATION COMMAND,
SASEBO AREA, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION, JMC,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

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From: S-3, 5th Tank Battalion.
To: The Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion.

Subject: Annex Dog to Annex King.

Maps: KYUSHU A/S Scale 1:25,000
      KYUSHU A/S Scale 1:250,000

17 November, 1945.

Upon return to HAWAII from the island of IWO JIMA a meeting of representatives from the first, third, fourth and fifth tank battalions was held at FMF, PAC in Pearl Harbor to standardize tank infantry coordination and to submit recommendations relative to the adoption of a suitable table of organization for the Marine Tank Battalion. As a result of this meeting, Fleet Marine Force Headquarters issued a Standardized Operation Procedure for tank-infantry training. A new table of organization was recommended by the meeting was forwarded for approval.

On 5 May the tank companies commenced a series of problems with the artillery regiments. These problems involved the movement of tanks under direct fire, the training of tank officers in the adjustment and technique of artillery fire and the training of Artillery Forward Observers in observing and adjusting fire from within a tank. This period of training lasted two weeks during which time the enlisted men and officers of this unit reached a suitable degree of proficiency in the directing of artillery fire.

On 13 May this battalion organized a Flame Company in expectation that such a company would be included in a new Table of Organization. Nine (9) flame tanks arrived, but the Flame Company was disbanded on or about 5 August when the expected Table of Organization proved different from what was anticipated. The flame tanks were then placed in the various companies, one to each platoon.

On 22 May the tank battalion undertook the training of the crews of the 17B1 Gun Carriages. This training involved vehicle maintenance and repair, driving, gunnery, and the tactical use of the 17B1 with a medium tank company and battalion.

Throughout the training period all the tank companies had their own tactical and firing problems involving the use of the flame throwers and tank dozers as well as the conventional tanks. On 28 May the tank dozer drivers and assistant drivers attended a bull dozer school conducted by the 5th Engineer Battalion.

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Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

During the period 14-20 June, 1945, (inclusive) a course of instruction covering mines and demolitions was conducted by the 5th Engineer Battalion. A total of ten (10) men per company attended this school. These men were members of tank dozer crews who were to assist and operate clearance of mines when so dictated by the situation.

During the week of 11 June, 1945, two (2) men from each company attended a field wire school. The men, although not communication personnel, received sufficient instruction to enable them to perform necessary telephone and field wire duties should the occasion arise during the coming operation.

Also during the first week in June problems were conducted incorporating tank-infantry coordination with all the infantry companies, the Engineers and the artillery included. Each infantry company received a minimum of one (1) days training with approximately nine (9) tanks, including a flame thrower tank and a dozer tank, participating. The mornings were devoted to a blackboard lecture by a tank officer who embraced visual signals, engine signals, the operation of the tank-infantry phone and a general discussion of the tank-infantry standard operating procedure as edited by this battalion. After the lecture the infantry men were given short rides in the tank and then practiced visual signalling and infantry tactics in connection with the tanks. During the afternoon a short problem was conducted featuring a situation in which a combined tank and infantry attack was stopped by a mine field, the mine field cleared by engineers, the tanks move through the infantry and attack positions heavily defended by small arms fire, encounter anti-tank fire and then pull into defiled positions to cover a general infantry attack. This was a firing problem during which the infantry men guided and directed tank fire, dummy mines with a small charge were used.

During the period 14-20 June, 1945, the Battalion Executive Officer conducted a series of problems involving indirect fire and the use of tanks as artillery. A firing battery of tanks was set up and a target, several hundred yards away brought under fire. Officers and senior enlisted men manning an Observation Post observed the fire and by radio sent back the changes using the same teams as used by the artillery. Another officer in command of the tanks computed and made the necessary adjustments until such time as the target became the center of the impact area. During this period all officers and senior non-commissioned officers received valuable training in the observing and adjusting of artillery fire.

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During the period 20-22 June, 1945, this battalion conducted an Armored Force Problem involving the movement of a tank battalion with supporting units 12 to 15 miles from their source of supply. The problem lasted three days and consisted of a mock landing with three (3) reinforced Battalion Landing Teams, the breaching of a belt of enemy resistance including a mine field and the capture of a small mountain which was heavily defended by our own men acting as the enemy. Approximately one hundred (100) of this battalion's men acted as enemy infantry and harassed the tank force with infiltration tactics throughout the night and while on the march.

The second day consisted of a twelve mile motor march, with a reconnaissance screen functioning ahead of the main body through hostile territory. The screen and the main body were harassed by small groups of enemy snipers all during the day until the main body of the enemy was again encountered late in the afternoon. After beating off the enemy a tactical bivouac was established for the night. Small groups of the enemy infantry again infiltrated during the night.

The third day consisted of a firing problem (without the enemy) simulating the attack and seizure of the enemy's main defenses. All during the problem Division Air Observers had been handicapped by bad weather but now the weather broke and they proved to be of great assistance during the attack. Individual tanks, and Platoons were guided to the enemy positions, also suitable routes of approach were selected by the Air Observers. The large numbers painted on the tanks were easily visible from the air and greatly aided the Observers in identifying the tanks. A tank radio (SCR 510) had been installed in the planes and worked out very well. The enemy positions were taken swiftly without any loss of movement. The Battalion Commander decided not to return to camp and for the next two days this battalion conducted problems on the use of the smoke shells, the spotting of targets by aerial observers and the direction of the jeop screen from the air. All problems were very satisfactory and upon completion the battalion returned to camp.

Commencing 2 July, 1945, a school for all officers and Staff Non-commissioned Officers (line) was conducted by this battalion for the purpose of acquainting our men with other units throughout the division and to further cooperation with these units. The officers giving the lectures were asked to speak on the problems entailed in a large land mass operation and how they could aid this command and how we could help them. The lecture given by a representative of the 5th Motor Transport Battalion

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Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

...entailed a blackboard problem in which Motor Transport had to supply fuel and provisions to the tanks over some fifty (50) land miles. The difficulties entailed were thoroughly discussed and several points on how we could be of assistance were brought out. Members of the G-2, G-3, G-4, the infantry company and battalion, the engineers, artillery, naval construction battalion, JA500 and many others contributed lectures along the same line.

On 3 July, 1945, two (2) men from each company attended a course in the operation and maintenance of the "Kneel", conducted by the 6th Motor Transport Battalion. At the time it was believed that this battalion might be issued vessels but such was never the case.

On 5 July, 1945, all wheeled vehicle and half-track drivers attended a mud obstacle course conducted by the 12th Force Motor Transport Battalion. The obstacle course simulated rice paddies and afforded valuable training in driving over boggy terrain and field expedients helpful in such terrain.

Commencing 9 July, 1945, two (2) men per infantry platoon from all regiments were brought to the tank battalion to live and to work with this command during a regular two week period. The first week was spent almost entirely in lectures and demonstrations within the battalion area. The future tank commanders were made thoroughly familiar with the tank including its capabilities and limitations. Lectures were given on tank-infantry standardized operating procedure, visual and engine signals, the operation of the tank-infantry phone, tank mines and how to discern them, tank markings and identification and necessary tank intelligence information. Also during the first week the guides spent a day in the field riding in the tanks where a practical demonstration of a tank's capabilities and limitations took place. During the second week the guides rode in the tanks as crew members throughout the whole week's schedule.

The battalion continued its practice of indoctrinating all personnel into the employment of tanks over large land masses. Problems were conducted for the battalion officers and men on the sand table and lectures were given by the Commanding Officer of this battalion.

During the week of 18 July, 1945, special emphasis was laid on defense of the bivouac in particular. Lectures and sand table demonstrations were held daily and problems were conducted utilizing one (1) tank company as enemy and demonstrating the defending the defense of the bivouac against enemy mechanized attack.

On 3 August, 1945, the battalion parade was conducted on IWO JIMA Field. Decorations and commendations were presented to men of this command by the Division Commander.
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Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

A Regimental Combat Team problem was conducted with the 28th Regiment on August 9-11 (inclusive). The Battalion Command Post, most of Headquarters and Service Company and "B" and "C" Companies participated. The problem was conducted by Combat Team 28 and the tanks were used as a supporting arm.

The period from 11 to 26 August (inclusive) was devoted to the Battalion Landing Team problems, inspections, and briefing and preparation for the forthcoming amphibious Operation was continued. On 26 August, 1945, the battalion began to load aboard ship.

During the voyage from HILO, HAWAII to S.S. EBO, KYUSHU a regular schedule of briefing and lectures on the pending operation and enforcement of surrender terms were conducted. The tank battalion was distributed over more than twenty (20) ships and the briefing had to be conducted by the senior tank officer present on each ship.

Formal attachment of Reconnaissance and Liaison Teams was affected prior to embarkation to Division and to each Regiment. A team of fifteen (15) men and two (2) officers landed at the Aircraft Factory (1280.35-1110.90) 1/25,000 AJS L872 which was the designated landing area for this unit. Reconnaissance proved the landing was impracticable and the tanks were ordered ashore on the green beaches after a reconnaissance of these beaches were made. The Tank Battalion Command Post was set up in the administration building of the Naval Air Station, (1278.99-1108.35 1/25,000 AJS L872).

No opposition of any kind was encountered and Japanese Liaison Officials were present to offer assistance to the occupying forces.

The tanks could not be moved from the Naval Air Station because of the poor roads and the Tank Battalion was ordered to remain. Lieutenant Colonel W. R. COLLINS was designated Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, Sasebo.

Surveillance and inventory of the Naval Air Station was begun on or about 25 September and complete inventories were submitted to C-2.

On or about 5 October, 1945, the Cite Occupation Group, consisting of "A" Company reinforced by Division Order, an advance detail consisting of two (2) officers and thirteen (13) men left for Cite by train on 12 October, 1945, to prepare the way for the main body. The main body arrived in Cite on 13 October, 1945.

The Occupational Command Post was established in the Kempo Tai building at (650.45-1120.39 AJS 1/250,000 Map of Central Japan). The troops were billeted at the 47th Regiment barracks (650.35-1120.30 AJS 1/250,000) and a defense plan was formulated.
Cooperation on the part of the military services and the civilian population was excellent. The police proved to be of great assistance in collecting controlled items.

A meeting with the Liaison Committee proved very satisfactory and all requests were supplied promptly. For a time the cooperation of the Navy was not all that could be desired, but after a consultation with Japanese Naval Officers matters rapidly improved.

Six (6) man jeep patrols were dispatched regularly to outlying districts of OITA KIR to gather all possible information. Forty-seven (47) major installations were uncovered and maps, orders of battle reports and inventories collected on each.

The Oita Naval Air Field was found to be operational and regular (OY) Plane courier runs were instituted between OITA and SANKEI on 16 October, 1945.

There were no incidents between men on liberty and civilians at all times the highest degree of friendliness and hospitality was extended to our troops.

On 31 October, 1945; an advance detail and reconnaissance party of three hundred and fifty (350) men from the 126th Field Artillery Battalion arrived by train and preparations were begun to relieve the Oita Occupation Group.

All documents and records were turned over to the relieving unit whose staff officers were indoctrinated into their tasks by the men they were relieving. On 5 November, 1945, "A" Company reinforced loaded aboard the train and returned to their parent organization at SANKEI. The Group Executive Officer remained until 9 November, 1945, to assist the relieving unit.

During the period 12 October to 5 November, 1945, the remainder of the Tank Battalion at SANKEI conducted a schedule embracing close order drill, ceremonies and inspections, educational programs and athletics.

Beginning 8 November, 1945, the battalion embarked on a regular forty-four (44) hour weekly schedule entailing subjects strictly military in nature, an extensive educational program, ceremonies, inspections, practice marches and group athletics.
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Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That a continuous study be maintained in peace time of tank employment and technological improvement of the vehicle itself. It is a prophetic and significant factor that the explosion of the first atom bomb and its effects was observed from a specially built lead lined tank.

2. That tanks be considered, and treated as primary offensive weapon and arm rather than a secondary supporting unit. This has been recommended by Divisional Commanders as a result of actual combat. It should be supplemented by instruction and indoctrination of officers by Marine Corps Schools.

3. That a suitable Table of Organization be drawn up for the Marine Tank Battalion which can be skeletonized in peace time, but which is capable of furnishing the structure for an adequate Marine Tank Battalion in combat. The Table of Organization now in effect weakens, rather than strengthens, the Tank Battalion, and if it had been necessary for tank units to use this Table of Organization in combat, such weakening would have become obvious.

4. That some allowance be made either in the Tank Battalion or as Division Troops to provide for a reconnaissance screen to insure the movement of troops and armored units over large land masses. The present Reconnaissance Company is not adequate, adequately equipped nor adequately trained to work with and for a mechanized unit. Such a unit must be highly mobile with sufficient armor and fire power to handle small skirmishes and small points of enemy resistance.

5. That the tracked vehicle platoon of the Ordnance Company be abolished as such. Sections of maintenance (so far as tank repair is concerned) has never functioned within the Marine Corps nor will it ever be feasible because of our size, composition, and mission. However such a platoon should be included in each tank battalion to perform all necessary maintenance as is dictated by the situation. This too should function in peace time as well as during war. At least a cadre should be formed within each battalion.

6. That more Communication Personnel be included in the Tank Battalion Table of Organization on the basis of having more radios than any other unit within a Marine Division. A definite increase in the number of radio maintenance and repair men is needed.
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Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

7. That there is at present no unit within a division directly responsible for mine clearance. Heretofore the Engineer Battalion has been made responsible, but after they have made their normal attachments to Regiments, Battalions etc, there is only those men of Headquarters and Service Company remaining intact. Also there are no men specifically trained for these duties only, now is there any unit within the present Engineer Battalion charged specifically only with mine removal.
Annex Easy of Annex King

Appendix 1 - Transport Quartermaster

Original plans for lifting the Tank Group, which includes the 17 Gun Carriages of the Infantry Regiments, called for fifteen (15) LSH's. Fourteen (14) LSH's were assigned to the Tank Battalion with space reserved on each of the fourteen (14) for one (1) Shore Party vehicle. The fifteenth (15th) LSH was assigned to the Shore Party but was under the control of the Tank Embarkation Group Commander. The plan proved to be not feasible because of the amount of Shore Party equipment to be lifted. Final plans assigned twelve (12) LSH's to the Tank Battalion and three (3) LSH's to the Shore Party. With the twelve (12) LSH's, the following vehicles were lifted: Forty-three (43) medium tanks, three (3) medium tanks with bulldozer, nine (9) flame tanks, four (4) tank recovery vehicles, twelve (12) 105mm gun carriages, four (4) .3 personnel carriers, nineteen (19) 2-ton 6x6 trucks, eighteen (18) 2-ton 4x4 trucks, five (5) 6x6 shop trucks, and fourteen (14) assorted trailers. In addition to the vehicles, forty thousand (40,000) "H" rations were loaded.

Appendix 2 - Quartermaster

On 12 May, 1945, the 4-Section of this organization began preparations for an assault operation. All equipment and supplies were inventoried and requests for additional equipment and supplies to bring the battalion up to authorized allowances were submitted. Re-supply began almost immediately and by the time this organization departed from the Hawaiian Area, all equipment and supplies were one hundred per cent (100%) of authorized allowance.

During the period 12 May, 1945, to 15 August, 1945, numerous requests for unauthorized equipment and supplies were submitted, of which approximately fifty per cent (50%) were acted upon. Recommendations were made for additional equipment such as F0A-3S Flame Tanks, tank mounting bulldozers, extended flame hose, T-18 periscopes, flails for tanks, weasels, and equipment for additional protection of tanks. The additional flame tanks were received (2) days prior to departure. The tank mounting bulldozers were received by the Rear echelon. The flame hose, T-18 periscopes, and additional protective equipment were received in time to be applied for use.

Prior to departure from the Hawaiian Area, excess items of all types and classes were turned in to the nearest supply agency.

On 12 August, 1945, ten (10) days prior to departure from the Hawaiian Area, TO 0-76, 0-79 and 0-80 became effective for this organization. Numerous changes in rolling stock and tracked vehicles affected current allowances, necessitating changes in allowances of approximately fifty per cent (50%) of all authorized items. Division Quartermaster Transfer Orders were issued to adjust equipment to authorized allowances.

The change from operational to occupation mission made only negli-
gible changes in types of equipment and supplies to be lifted by the forward echelon.

From 22 September, 1945, the landing date of this organization, to the present time, re-supply has been adequate and sufficient.

Appendix 3 — Medical

(a) Gear

Medical supplies were assembled for combat. Sufficient stocks of plasma, morphine, battle dressings and the like were divided between the Battalion Aid Station and the three (3) two- (2) man teams of corpsmen allocated to each tank company, so that each might act independently, if necessary. It was planned that the Battalion Aid Station would be both mobile and independent of supply for a week or more. The material of the aid station was loaded aboard a one-half (½) ton trailer so that it could be easily moved and rapidly set up in a new position.

(b) Personnel

Medical personnel received intensive training in first aid for casualties, first aid for chemical warfare cases and daily field exercises in working with tanks. Three (3) field bivouacs were held during the training period.

(c) Troops

The troops received repeated lectures on first aid for injuries and chemical warfare agents, on tropical diseases and their prevention and on venereal diseases and how to avoid them.

The medical supplies were altered to increase the stores for the Sick Bay. As much DDT as possible was procured.

(d) Installations at the Sasebo Naval Air Station were inspected. The barracks were sprayed with DDT prior to billeting the troops. Heads were erected, water samples taken, the Sick Bay set up and a Pro Station established.

(e) Occupation of Oita, 13 October, 1945, to 5 November, 1945.

A portion of the medical department was attached to the force comprising the Oita Occupation Group. At Oita, all buildings were sprayed with DDT prior to occupation by the troops, a Sick Bay was erected, two (2) Pro Stations were established and water samples were taken and sent to Sasebo for analysis. The Japanese military hospitals in the Ken were inspected, and a questionnaire submitted to them.

(f) Return to Sasebo Naval Air Station

Since return to the Sasebo Naval Air Station, the regular routine of the administration of the Sick Bay has prevailed.

Appendix 4 — Ordinance

When rehabilitation of this organization began, upon the return from Iwo Jima, twenty-five (25) tanks and three (3) tank recovery vehicles were on hand. New or rebuilt engines were placed in these tracked vehicles, new track was put on all tanks and all armament and turret mechanisms were overhauled. During the period 1 June to 25 August, twenty-seven (27) new tanks, one (1) new recovery vehicle and nine (9) flak
tanks were received. All new tanks were thoroughly checked and modifications of local manufacture were installed. Forward echelon combat vehicles consisted of twenty-three (23) old and rebuilt tanks, nine (9) new flame tanks, three (3) old recovery vehicles and one (1) new recovery vehicle.

Since arriving in the Sasebo Area, all tanks have been given a fifty (50) hour check and modified storage procedure has been carried out. Winterization of all vehicles has been completed.

Individual weapons of all personnel were inspected by the Division Ordnance Company prior to departure from the Hawaiian Area and all unserviceable weapons were replaced.

Appendix 5 - Disposition of surrendered materiel and equipment

Inventories of all surrendered materiel and equipment were submitted to Division. Disposition of all surrendered materiel and equipment in the Sasebo Naval Air Station area was undertaken by VAC and is now in progress. Assistance was furnished by the 5th Tank Battalion with the use of flame throwing tanks. These tanks were used to ignite piles of planes and other inflammable material.

Disposition of surrendered materiel and equipment in Oita Ken by this organization consisted of collection and shipment to the 5th Marine Division of twenty-three thousand nine hundred and seventy-five (23,975) articles appearing on the controlls. Items and war trophies list. Plans for destruction of surrendered aircraft and other war materiel were effected and steps were taken for the assembly of such items. Land and sea transportation for the disposal of surrendered ammunition was requested from the Home Minister of the Prefectural Government. This transportation was not furnished prior to departure from the Oita Ken area.

Appendix 6 - Procurement

Procurement of serviceable surrendered materiel has been satisfactory. Many items in the local area were put to use for the improvement of living conditions and appearances. For example, the local Fire Department is made up of surrendered vehicles.

Appendix 7 - Motor Transport

Motor Transport equipment landed with this organization has been sufficient for all purposes. Maintenance of motor vehicles has been difficult at times due to lack of parts and equipment. Parts should be more plentiful and available, and should not consist of sets of parts, but rather parts which have a high fatality rate.

Appendix 8 - Shore Party

Inasmuch as this organization does not have sufficient personnel or equipment for shore party work, no training or planning, except un-
loading of LST's was undertaken. Upon arrival at the Sasebo Naval Air Station, this battalion took over control of all beaches in the immediate area. Supervision of unloading, assignment of ships to beaches, assignment of storage area and temporary billeting of personnel were controlled by this organization. Navy SP Control Teams were not sufficient in personnel to lend assistance other than directing ships to the beaches. At least fifty per cent (50%) of all ships landing at the Sasebo Naval Air Station beaches did not have sufficient personnel to unload. The Officer-In-Charge of Troops did not know what to do or where to go and in most cases was unable to contact parent organizations. Information as to the location of temporary destinations should be made known to all concerned.

Appendix 10 - Periodic Reports

During the period May to August, 1945, the following reports were submitted:

(a) Monthly readiness report to Division.
(b) Monthly report reflecting status of material of this organization to G-4.

Reports submitted by this organization since arrival in Sasebo Naval Air Station are as follows:

(a) S-4 Daily Periodic Report to G-4. This was discontinued on 3 October, 1945.
(b) Daily Ammunition Report to G-4. This was discontinued on 3 October, 1945.
(c) Daily Motor Vehicle Report to Motor Transport Officer.
PART 6

Maps to accompany 5th Marine Division Operation Report, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Annex LOVE
MAPS
To Accompany
5th Marine Division Operation Report
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

All sheets enclosed are shown by index
plots on next two pages.