Appendix 3 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAP

SPECIAL SERVICE REPORT

0166/252

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

30 November, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Corps Special Services Officer.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: Special Services Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

1. The Corps Special Services Section was formed on 26 September, 1945, and its activities were subsequently organized into the following sub-sections: Education, Personal Affairs, Recreation, Athletics, Supply, Special Services School, Special Services Company and the V Amphibious Corps News. The following is a brief operations report on each of the sub-sections.

EDUCATION

The V Amphibious Corps Education and Information program was emphasized more than any other phase of Special Services. The means used were:

1. AEP Educational Conference-VAC, 22-23 October 1945.
2. Systematic check on progress being made through unit reports.
3. Distribution of guidance material, manuals and texts for actual classwork.

The following is a summary of the classes held:

	No. of Classes	No. of Enrollments
5th Mar Div	62	1339
2nd Mar Div	49	584
32nd Inf Div	0	0
VAC Corps Troops	14	420

The following conditions were evident:

1. The 32nd Division more recently arrived, had not had sufficient time to organize a large-scale educational program.
2. Line units had more time to devote to this program and hence generally showed better results.
3. The main bottlenecks were supplies and texts but these ills were quickly remedied.

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PERSONAL AFFAIRS

The Personal Affairs Section attempted to effect the rapid dissemination of pertinent information of importance to high point men about to be discharge and to set up an authoritative reference center to which Special Service Officers could refer in seeking accurate information.

a. Means of dissemination information used:

1. Bulletin and Lecture Outline on Veteran's Rights and Benefits. (Mimeographed publication-600 copies distributed).
2. Conversion of NSI Insurance (Mimeographed publication-200 copies printed and distributed.
3. Weekly articles in VAC News.
4. Series of 20 lectures within the Fifth Division from 5 November to 9 November, 1945. on personal affairs.
5. Lecture and forum on personal affairs within Corps Troops.

b. Formation of reference center:

1. For this purpose a classified file was set up covering all subjects under personal affairs. An attempt was made to get a complete set of Letters of Instruction pertaining to personal affairs.

Within the divisions the dissemination of information was carried out through the following means:

2nd Marine Division:

1. Series of ten films on vocational guidance.
2. Personal interviews on individual problems.
3. Lectures on the GI Bill of Rights.
4. Bulletin Board and printed notices.

5th Marine Division:

1. Conference room for personal consultations.

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2. Printing of information on the GI Bill of Rights in the publication, "Recreation News."
3. Posters on Bulletin Boards.
4. Lectures.

32nd Infantry Division:

1. Lectures.
2. Personal consultations on individual problems.
3. Bulletin Board.

RECREATION

The recreation and entertainment offered to the men has in very few cases exceeded the usual amount available under wartime conditions. It was expected that the efforts made would result in a greatly increased amount of recreation activities other than the routine programs already offered. A tendency toward this was seen in the attempts to establish outside facilities such as dance halls or taxi dances for the use of the men.

VAC CORPS TROOPS

Prior to 30 November 1945 two stage productions were shown within the Corps Troops and attached units. The Danny Kaye-Leo Durocher show was presented once and a Japanese vaudeville show was presented once. The film circuits were largely operated on a beg and borrow basis. There was a 35mm circuit showing 10 films daily and a 16mm circuit running 14 shows daily. The, "Stars and Stripes" was distributed on the basis of one newspaper for every five men.

2nd MARINE DIVISION

No stage productions were shown within the division. The film circuits consisted of 24 16mm shows daily and 2 35mm shows. A daily newspaper called the Nagasaki Press is printed by the Signal Company. One large recreation center has already been constructed and two are in the planning stage. Plans are being considered for the establishment of a taxi dance hall which would be turned over to Japanese management at a later date.

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5th MARINE DIVISION

The 5th Division has shown the Danny Kaye-Leo Durocher show plus eight Japanese vaudeville shows. A 16mm circuit and a few 35mm movies are shown. A division newspaper called the Spearhead is being published daily. In addition the, "Recreation News", is published every Tuesday.

32nd INFANTRY DIVISION

The Red Arrow News, a division newspaper, is published daily. There is a 16mm film circuit within the division.

ATHLETICS

	Sports Centers	Leagues	Supply
2nd Mar Div	20	3	Adequate
5th Mar Div	8 Large	5 Softball	
		1 Basketball	Adequate
32nd Inf Div	None organized in all sports planned		Adequate
Corps Troops	2 Large 5 Softball Diamonds 2 Volley Ball Courts 3 Basketball Courts 1 Tennis Court 1 Football Field 1 Handball Court 2 Horse shoe courts	2 Softball 1 Touch Football	Adequate

SUPPLY

Most units of the VAC expect further shipments to alleviate shortages in athletic equipment. Large supplies of textbooks are being received and being distributed as quickly as possible. Information manuals and pamphlets on personal affairs, especially those distributed through Special Services, FMF, Pacific has not as yet been made available to all Special Service Officers of smaller units. Approximately eighty tons of athletic and recreational gear have been issued gratuitously to all the units of the V Amphibious Corps.

CONFIDENTIAL

Items: Portable phonographs, athletic supplies including baseballs, basketballs, footballs and equipment for tennis, ping pong, badminton and horseshoes; harmonicas, ocarinas, cards and various other indoor games.

22nd SPECIAL SERVICES COMPANY (ARMY)

This unit had fitted itself very well into the operational scheme of the Special Services Section, VAC. Plans initiated by various staff heads are put into immediate operation through the use of technicians, equipment and material available through this unit. This is especially true in regard to construction and maintenance of athletic facilities, maintenance and operation of movie projectors, establishment and operation of a library and the initial distribution of athletic gear.

VAC NEWS UNIT NEWSPAPERS

The VAC News was taken over by Special Services Section, VAC, on 29 October 1945. It is now published daily through the 22nd Special Services Company by a staff consisting of an editor and three assistants with an officer in charge. News sources are the VAC radio station, the Special Services Section and all units concerned. A total of 750 copies are distributed daily to all units attached to VAC Headquarters via the mail and message centers.

SPECIAL SERVICES SCHOOL - VAC

From 31 October to 16 November the Special Services Section operated the first Special Services School in the western Pacific. Its main purpose was to fill the need both for personnel trained in Special Services work and for information and manuals covering the various aspects of Special Services subjects. This was accomplished by taking students from each unit of the VAC, training them in the school and returning them to their units supplied with notes, books and manuals on all subjects covered. The staff of instructors consisted of 4 officers and 4 men specially selected by HQIC to give the course of instruction in the Pacific. 81, men were trained under this program.

From 17 November to 24 November a specialized course in Personal Affairs and Education was given, in order to give special emphasis to the two subjects which were most in demand by the Special Service Sections of all VAC organizations.

William W Stickney
WILLIAM W. STICKNEY

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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT REPORT

0111/200

HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November 1945.

From: The Headquarters Commandant.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. Preparation and planning by the Headquarters Commandant's section for an operation began on 1 June 1945. All general and special staff sections were requested to submit a list of their operational requirements. Working from these lists in conjunction with the Corps Engineer and the Corps Signal Officer a proposed Corps Command Post was planned. From a scale model of this command post an estimate of all construction materials, property, and the priority of construction was drawn up. The preparations for the loading and movement of the headquarters were based upon this estimate.

2. The organization of the Headquarters Commandant's section during the planning and operation was as follows:

1 Lieutenant Colonel - Headquarters Commandant
1 Second Lieutenant - Assistant Headquarters Commandant
1 Private First Class- Clerk and typist

The police and property sergeant was left with the rear echelon and a new one assigned about one week after the landing.

3. Upon the arrival of the V Amphibious Corps at SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN on 22 September 1945, the Headquarters Commandant in company with the advance party landed and aided in the selection of a headquarters. Three (3) buildings were selected for offices and one large club plus 20 houses for officers quarters. A Transient Officers quarters with a capacity of about 180 was secured on A plus 5. The enlisted personnel were quartered in the office building and barracks in the Corps Headquarters Area. The advance echelon of Corps Headquarters moved into the CP ashore on A plus 1. The CP opened ashore on A plus 2. Security measures were set up and a guard was posted by the 3rd Provisional Military Police Battalion. A system of temporary passes issued at the main entrance of the Corps Headquarters was immediately placed in effect. The necessary passes were printed on board ship prior to arrival in JAPAN. On A plus 3 all officers' quarters and messes were placed under the direction of officers from special staffs which were broken up or consolidated after the unopposed landing. This procedure speeded up the establishment of messes and quartering of officers.

The officers mess opened about A plus 5 and the general mess opened at the same time in the Corps area. Buildings were found in a general state of disrepair from neglect and lack of material, and nearly all showed bomb damage. Vermin and lice were abundant necessitating the immediate and repeated application of insectide and disinfectant. Straw floor mats and unneeded Japanese furnishings were disposed of through the Military Government Section and the Japanese liaision committee. All steam radiators, many electric light fixtures and some plumbing appeared to have been removed from the buildings a number of months prior to the end of the war. Electric equipment and plumbing were in such a state of disrepair that the efficient operation of the buildings was impossible until repairs were effected. Beginning about A plus 4 efforts were made to employ as a maintenance crew, Japanese who had previously worked in the buildings now occupied by the V Amphibious Corps. The employment of these people was carried out through the Military Government Office and by A plus 10 a skeleton force was working. A Japanese working party of from 150 to 200 men daily was employed for six weeks cleaning up bomb damage, rehabilitating buildings and constructing a parking lot in the Corps Headquarters area. By 15 November 1945, rehabilitation of the V Amphibious Corps Office buildings was about 90% completed. Two Japanese baths capable of caring for 800 men daily, were in full operation as recreational features within the Corps Headquarters building, two volley ball courts were completed a barber shop was repaired and in operation by the first of November. A large recreation room for enlisted men was 75% completed on the last of November.

The following methods were employed in working the Japanese day laborers at the Corps Headquarters. For the first four days a marine interpreter was constantly with the working party. After that an interpreter was requested for short periods when needed.

The Japanese section or group leaders were singled out and all orders were relayed through them. On many jobs the leader was shown the work and left to accomplish it in his own manner. By comparison with American methods they used few tools. The workers improvised carrying sticks and slings for much of the lifting and carrying. Injuries such as cuts, punctures and bruises received while working at the Corps Headquarters were treated promptly. A very firm policy consisting of, "you are here to work" was carried out. No threats, abuse, frantonization, nor corporal punishment were necessary and none were resorted to. American and Japanese were never placed on the same working details however on certain kinds of work marines were used as supervisors. In obtaining and working the permanent or monthly employees the following system was used.

Former building employees were contacted through a member of the Japanese Naval Liaison Group. The senior man was placed in charge as superintendent and all other regular Japanese employees were picked through him. The Japanese superintendent was held directly responsible for the conduct of those under him, the care of tools and the carrying out of instructions. In so far as possible he was told future plans affecting him. All matters of pay and welfare of the employees were handled through the superintendant. He acted as the employees' go-between to the Headquarters Commandant and then to the proper authority in the Military Government Section.

Women were employed to work inside certain buildings as cleaners and to refill and clean oil stoves. Their work proved generally satisfactory and no trouble developed from having them in the buildings:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Headquarters Commandant's section should preload a truck, preferably a 2½ ton vehicle with sufficient housecleaning gear, disinfectant, insectide, signs, tools and material for which a need is anticipated in setting up a CP. This would take care of the headquarters until such time as the quartermaster is ashore and operating.

2. Provisions must be made for the early landing of power sprays, disinfectant and insectide in localities where vermin are expected.

3. The following is a suggested T/O for the Headquarers Commandant's Section:

1 Major or Lieutenant Colonel in charge.
1 Lieutenant (assistant)
1 Sergeant, police and property
4 Privates First Class or privates for general duty

F. C. Clagett
F. C. CLAGETT

Appendix 5 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

ATTACHED SIXTH ARMY SECTION REPORT

045/217 HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

CONFIDENTIAL 1 December 1945

From: The Commanding Officer, Army Section.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

1. Planning done by the army section took place during early September while members of the section were still a part of Sixth Army Headquarters on Luzon. Planning consisted primarily of collecting reference materials and supplies which would be necessary for the operation of the section. Some difficulty was experienced in determining just what materials would be necessary.

2. Training as a section was not necessary. Each staff representative was a specialist in his field of military administration.

3. Organization: Originally, the section was comprised of the following personnel, duties indicated:

Lieutenant Colonel Henry B. Ellison, INF, Chief of Section.
Major Peter B. Commas, FA, Asst Chief of Section.
Captain Kendal C. Byrnes, JAGD, Judge Advocate.
1st Lieutenant Ralph D. Meister, AGD, Asst Chief of Section.
Staff Sergeant Waldo S. Legendre (AG Sec).
Sergeant Pete S. Frio (G-1 Sec).
Sergeant Archibald Webster (JA Sec).
Technician Fourth Grade Elmer L. Decker (AG Sec).
Corporal John R. Donmoyer (G-1 Sec).

When Major Commas and Captain Byrnes became eligible for return to the United States they were not replaced and the Section continued to function without them. In as much as Sergeant Webster was a clerk for the Judge Advocate, he was returned to army headquarters when Captain Byrnes departed. Technician fourth grade Decker was returned to army headquarters and was replaced by Private Graham.

4. Original plans for the section called for the administration of army units assigned direct to Sixth Army and placed under VAC for operations and for serving in an advisory capacity to the Commanding General VAC relative to army administration. One of the most important functions originally planned for was the consoli-

dation of the G-1 reports as required by letter, AG 300-E, Headquarters Sixth Army, Subject: Administrative Instructions to Units Composing Army Troops for Blacklist Operations, dated 19 August 1945. However, all these reports were rescinded by radio, Headquarters Sixth Army, dtd 27 September 1945.

Another function of the section was to handle the readjustment program for the Army troops. This function became one of enormous magnitude. Troops had to be shipped to the disposition center at Nagoya in large numbers on very short notice. This was complicated by the lack of adequate communications, the continuous arrival of units having high point personnel, and the movement of units within the VAC zone itself. Once the majority of the units were in and settled and the communication system fully established handling of this function became routine and no longer presented a problem.

Still another duty assigned to the Army Section was the issuing of emergency leave and furlough orders upon direction of the Commanding General, Sixth Army. This presented no particular problem.

Effective 15 November 1945 all army units of Sixth Army in the VAC zone passed to the control of the Commanding General, 32d Infantry Division for administration. This action eliminated most of the functions of the Army Section, leaving them to serve only in an advisory capacity to the Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps.

Henry B. Ellison

HENRY B. ELLISON

APPENDIX 6

ADJUTANT REPORT

Appendix 6 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

HEADQUARTERS,
049/266 V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
Ser. 0800B. C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL 15 December, 1945.

From: The Corps Adjutant.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

1. During the rehabilitation period in the Hawaiian Area, the Adjutant Section performed its Administrative duties and functions in accordance with existing directives and regulations. During this period and to the present date, a total of 15,642 pieces of correspondence have been logged in, and a total of 5,551 pieces of correspondence for the same period have been logged out. The preceding figures do not include correspondence with a classification of confidential or higher, which is handled by the Record Section, a sub-section of the Adjutant's Section.

2. The function of the Record Section is to maintain a complete and accurate filing system, make distribution of incoming and outgoing official documents, confidential and above in classification.

3. Since the Iwo Jima operation this office has handled nine thousand three hundred seventy seven (9,377) classified official documents. The breakdown of these documents in classification is shown below:

Top Secret in	344
Top Secret out	267
Secret in	2627
Secret out	806
Confidential in	675
Confidential out	2004

4. While the 5th Amphibious Corps was on Maui, outgoing Officer Messenger Mail was sent to the Record Section, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for further distribution to units in the Forward Area and the United States.

5. Distribution of Officer Messenger Mail while enroute to Sasebo from Maui was made four (4) times by destroyer to Corps Units in the convoy.

Appendix 6 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of Japan, continued.

6. Upon arrving at Sasebo, one (1) officer and one (1) enlisted man from the 5th Amphibious Corps Record Section were temporarily attached to the Commanding General, Fukuoka Base Command and maintained the Record Section for said Command.

7. While in the rehabilitation area, it was the responsibility of the Adjutant's section to arrange surface and air transportation for personnel of the V Amphibious Corps and attached units, co-ordinating with the Navy and Army representatives present. Passengers for which transportation and orders were issued, including personnel traveling under official orders, i.e., change of Station Orders; Temporary Duty Orders; Liberty Parties and Patients evacuated.

8. Prior to mounting out for the occupation of Japan, staff sections were canvassed and personnel requirements by SCN, were requested from Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for duty with the respective sections in accordance with the authorized allowance set forth in Tables of Organizations applicable to this command, in order that the maximum requirements of the section could be accomplished during the occupation.

9. The Mail Center, Adjutant Section, was established prior to leaving the Hawaiian Area, and its normal functions involved the handling of Officer-Messenger Mail and Guard Mail. Prior to the departure of this Headquarters for the occupation of Japan, this section was responsible for the delivery of all Officer-Messenger Mail and Guard Mail to units located on the Island of Maui. Enroute to the zone of occupation, this section was responsible for the delivery of all mail between the Command Ship and Ships with V Amphibious Corps units embarked at the Staging Area. Upon arrival at Kyushu, Japan, this section has continued to carry out its assigned duties, coordinating with the appropriate agencies for the delivery of mail in the above catagories, both incoming and outgoing. This sub-section has proved to be invaluable, as the fastest possible means of delivery and distribution of all correspondence, orders, and directives, issued by this Headquarters, made to units operating under this command.

10. Preparations for the forthcoming operation were made to include the complete Adjutant's Section (i.e. Personnel and Office Equipment), which in prior operations

Appendix 6 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of Japn, continued.

had proven desirable, because of the vast and varied amount of work handled by this section in the field. By combat loading the complete section for the present occupation of Japan, this section has been able to function in its full capacity because both personnel and equipage have been available.

11. While present in the occupation zone, this section has handled the shipping requirements and allocations of shipping to units of the V Amphibious Corps for eligible personnel being returned to the United States under the latest demobilization directives and for duty. Shipping requirements were coordinated with the TQM Section. Air Transportation as well as surface transportation is handled by this section for all personnel. Reservations for personnel are coordinated with the Air Transportation Officer of the TQM Section. Transportation for personnel destined to other localities within the Japanese Empire is arranged through this office with the issuance of the necessary travel orders.

H. D. Persons

H. D. PERSONS,
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps.

Appendix 6 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

Appendix 7 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

POST OFFICE REPORT

OFFICE OF THE POSTAL OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

12 November, 1945.

From: The Corps Postal Officer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

1. On 8 August, the Corps Postal Officer was ordered to Pearl Harbor on temporary duty, for the purpose of attending conferences with Army and Navy postal officers, concerning planning for the invasion of Japan.

2. Announcement of the Japanese surrender was made during the course of these conferences. Because no official word was available at that time as to what action V Amphibious Corps would be taking in view of the surrender, no plans could be formulated. The Conferences were therefore terminated.

3. When plans for the movement of V Amphibious Corps to its assigned zone of occupation were completed and ready to be put into effect, embarkation rosters of the ships on which V Amphibious Corps was to embark were provided the Postal Officer. From these rosters a file

was created and set up at the Fleet Post Office in Pearl Harbor. Four men of this office were assigned to temporary duty with FMF PAC for the purpose of operating this file.

4. This detail intercepted all V Amphibious Corps mail on its arrival from San Francisco and after sorting it against the file dispatched the mail to the Rear Echelon and to the various ships on which Corps troops were embarked. Those ships which stopped at Pearl Harbor after leaving Maui received mail by calling at the Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor.

5. Upon the departure of these ships, mail for the Forward Echelon was flown to Saipan for delivery to them on their arrival at that point. The Postal Officer and one (1) Navy Mail Clerk travelled by air to Saipan to effect this delivery.

6. The delivery of mail began immediately upon the arrival of these ships and continued until their departure. 900 pounds of mail were put aboard during this time. Unfortunately, 5,000 pounds of mail, much of which

was directed for Corps, was delayed in Majuro by storms and this failed to arrive in Saipan in time to be put aboard the ships. This mail was later flown to Sasebo and delivered there.

7. The Corps Post Office was unloaded at Sasebo on 23 September. A location for the Headquarters Post was assigned by G-1; location for the Corps Troops Office was assigned by the Commanding Officer of Corps Troops. Financial and mailing services were inaugurated on 25 September.

8. Mail for dispatch was taken directly to the seaplane tender in Sasebo harbor from which point it was loaded on seaplanes bound for Okinawa. Incoming mail was picked up at the tender and brought to the Corps Post Office for sorting and distribution. The 20th Amphibian Truck Battalion supplied transportation for this operation.

9. On 27 September, IST 48 tied up at buoy 4, Sasebo, and began operating as Fleet Post Office, Navy #3912. All mail was thereafter channeled through that office,

10. A serious interruption in the mail service resulted when a typhoon struck the Sasebo area on 4 October, For a period of five (5) days, no mail was moved in or out of this area. When the storm subsided, service was resumed, though some few weeks were required to get back to what approached normal routine.

11. Although the five day span during the typhoon is the longest time that the Corps has been completely without mail since its arrival in Sasebo, the service, even in good weather, has not been good. It is the opinion of this office that the condition is directly attributable to the curtailments, and in some cases complete cancellation, of cargo carrying air routes. It is felt that these changes were made too soon, considering the number of troops still to be served in this area.

12. Transportation of mail on the island of Kyushu has been effected largely by the use of the Japanese railway system. Upon the activation of the Fukuoka Occupation Force, the 5th Marine Division established a post office in that area. Guards were assigned by the Fukuoka Occupation Force to accompany the mail on the train to and from Sasebo. On 29 October a regular mail car run

was established between Osaka and Sasebo. United States Rangers of the 6th Rangers were assigned as permanent guards. Mail for the 2nd Marine Division, received through Sasebo Fleet Post Office has been transported to Nagasaki by rail, under guard of Navy Mail Clerks from that division.

13. On several occasions, arrangements were made by the Air Officer of V Amphibious Corps whereby mail was brought by land planes to the air field at Omura. On such occasions guards were assigned from Corps and the 2nd Marine Division to report to that point, sort the mail, and to accompany it to its destination.

14. Considerable difficulty was experienced in getting replenishments for stamp stock; however, by prorating throughout Marine Units in this area, those requisitions which were received, all post offices were enabled to continue operations until sufficient stamp supplies were were received from Honolulu. When it was learned, by the Corps Postal Officer, that Marine Air Group 22 was to return to the United States, a Navy Mail Clerk from this office was ordered to Omura to purchase all unused stamp stock from that organization. $3,518.60 worth of high denomination stamps were procured in this manner. These stamps were

divided three ways among 2nd Marine Division, the 5th Marine Division and V Amphibious Corps.

15. Army units in this area were served by the V Amphibious Corps Post Office and those in the Fukuoka area by a unit of the 5th Marine Division Post Office until the arrival of APO 929 on 27 October. It was agreed by the Army Postal Officer and the Corps Postal Officer that since the bulk of the Army troops were to be in the Fukuoka area, the main branch of the Army Post Office would be set up there and a small detachment left in the Corps Post Office to take charge of receiving and distributing mail for the Army units in the Sasebo area. The Corps Post Office continued to furnish financial service to all personnel in this area.

16. Adequate motor transportation has been furnished by the Motor Transport Company, Corps Troops, V Amphibious Corps.

17. Cooperation among the various Marine postal facilities in this area has been excellent.

JAMES HENNESSY, JR.
for
J. V. O'MAHONEY

Appendix 9 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT

0158/214
Ser. 0799B.

HEADQUARTERS,
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 December, 1945.

From: The Public Information Officer.
To : The Commanding General.

Subject: Public Information Operations Report, Occupation JAPAN.

1. The Public Information Section Operations Report, Occupation of Japan, is submitted herewith.

A. GENERAL PLAN

1. It is the responsibility of the Corps Public Information Officer to coordinate, facilitate and expedite news material gathering by civilian and service personnel assigned to coverage of Marine landing forces engaged in amphibious operation. It is the mission of the Corps Public Information section to give all possible aid and assistance within the bounds of security to speed the flow of news material to the Nation's Press.

2. In July, 1945 Major D. W. Polivka submitted plans to the Headquarters Commandant for a Press headquarters and required supplies and material furnished through the headquarters Commandant for future operations. Enlisted personnel participated in a training program.

3. The undersigned was assigned to duty as Public Information Officer, V Amphibious Corps, on 12 August, 1945 vice Major Polivka, detached that date. Immediate attention was given to planning for operations growing out of the Japanese surrender. The Public Information Section was reorganized and reinforced. The undersigned was ordered to headquarters, Fleet Marine Force for a conference with the Public Information Officer. Plans and policies for occupation operations were discussed, and First Lieutenant E. J. Burman was ordered to V Amphibious Corps as Assistant Public Information Officer.

4. Plans were made to set up a press collecting point ashore as soon as troops were landed. News copy, photographic and radio material submitted by both civilian and service correspondents was to be expedited through official channels for censorship and disposition. Cooperation with civilian correspondents was to in include transportation, billeting, messing and other measures to aid them in getting full coverage.

5. The Public Information Officer was prepared to advise the Corps Commander on Public Information matters and arrange for necessary or desirable interviews or statements. He was to maintain liaison with the Public Information Officer of subordinate echelons to insure a constant flow of Marine Combat Correspondent copy, pictures and radio material, supply replacements and coordinate their efforts to increase efficiency of coverage and prevent duplication of effort.

B. SPECIFIC PLAN

1. The original plan called for the Assistant Public Information Officer, with most of the section personnel to go ashore and set up a press collecting point. All copy, civilian and service, was to be processed by Army and Navy censors assigned by CINCAFPAC. An Army communications unit was to set up a mobile transmitter for the rapid dispatch of civilian copy. Service copy and material were to go through official channels as usual.

2. At such time as the Corps CP was set up and functioning in Sasebo, the Public Information section was to move its activities to headquarters. According to information from Major C. R. Payne at FMFPAC preparations were made to accomodate great numbers of civilian correspondents. The Marine Public Information Officer acting as liaison with General MacArthur's Public Relations staff indicated that as many as 150 civilian newsmen might be expected to cover the VAC landing and occupation of Kyushu. On the strength of this information plans were made to provide for a minimum of 24 civilians at Corps with others to be assigned to subordinate units.

3. The Corps Public Information Section was to carry additional writing, photographic and recording supplies to meet the needs of the divisions, should they need them.

4. In addition the Corps Public Information Section was to be responsible for coverage of activity within its own headquarters.

C. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

1. The Corps Public Information Officer was aboard the USS MOUNT McKINLEY with one photographer and one administrative clerk. The photographer made documentary photographs of Corps aboard ship while en route to Japan and before going ashore.

2. No civilian correspondents joined VAC at Saipan. The Public Information Officers went ashore to confer with the Navy Public Information Officer, and learned that no civilian newsmen were expected there. The undersinged sent First Lieutenant R. H. Venn, Public Information Officer, to Guam via air, for the purpose of discussing the situation with Major John Sandberg, Marine Public Information Officer on CINPAC staff. At Saipan conferences were held both ashore and on the command ship between the Corps Public Information Officers and Captains Weldon James and Robert Jones of the Second and Fifth Marine Division.

3. From Saipan, combat photographers, Sergeant Claude Powe and Chester Ludka, were assigned to the advance party VAC, for photographic coverage.

Public Information Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

4. Public Information was set up and functioning ashore at Sasebo by mid-morning of 22 September. As arranged, press and photographic material from both VAC and 5th Marine Division Public Information personnel was picked up by mid-afternoon. Well rounded coverage was provided by combat correspondents and photographers of this section.

5. Up to 22 September the undersigned had received no word from the 6th Army regarding either censorship and transmittal of copy or the assignment of civilian correspondents. On the above date the undersigned officer conferred with Major Paul A. Conlin, 6th Army Public Relations Officer, and Lieutenant Commander Rodney Sutton, Public Information Officer for Com5thPhibForce, and was informed that neither army or navy censors were available to clear press material emanating from the VAC occupation. Since no civilian correspondents were assigned either to VAC or subordinate units, the principal matter of discussion was the handling and clearance of Marine Corps copy and pictures. Major Conlin agreed, in the absence of other instructions that Marine material should be transmitted under existing regulations according to policies suggested by the Public Information Officer, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. All operational copy was to be cleared by Naval Censor. Said instructions were put in writing and were to remain in effect until the procedure was clarified by either the 6th Army or CINCAFPAC on or about 1 October.

6. Daily Press Boat service was maintained to permit at least two copy runs daily. Volume copy increased daily after 24 September when the Public Information section moved into permanent offices at Corps headquarters.

7. After conferences with Marine Public Information Officers in Sasebo, Nagasaki and Omura, the undersigned was assured of complete coverage of all Marine activities in Kyushu.

8. The following material was forwarded to GhQ Public Relations Office, Marine Liaison Officer, Okinawa, from A-Day through 30 September.

285 news stories.
602 negatives (developed and undeveloped).
5500 feet motion picture film.

The above figures include material prepared by the Public Information Section of VAC, the 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions, the 8th Service Regiment and Marine Air Group 22.

9. Marine aircraft were not used for the transmittal of Public Information material. Lack of an airfield convenient to either Sasebo or Nagasaki made it advisable to forward all press and photographic material by Naval seaplane direct to Okinawa.

10. Until 19 October inclusive, all Marine Public Information material was transmitted via the Marine Liaison Officer, Public Relations Sections, Okinawa. On 20 October this office was informed that no such address existed. Therefore all subordinate units were instructed to forward material via FMFPAC for review by CincPac.

11. On 21 October instructions were received from FMFPAC to forward all Marine Public Information material for review and disposition direct to Marcorps or MarPac as appropriate. Simultaneously instructions were received from the Senior Marine Officer, Staff, headquarters, 6th Army, to transmit all Marine editorial material via CINCAFPAC Advance to Tokyo. Accordingly a dispatch was sent to all units outlining new procedure which consolidated both orders.

12. During October the Public Information Section, together with the PI sections of the 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions, the 8th Service Regiment and Marine Air Group 22, transmitted the following totals:

553 news stories
648 still photographs
11 art works

13. The above tabulation does not include material forwarded by the Public Relations Section of the 32nd Army Division, which unit transmits all stories and pictures direct through Army channels without reference to VAC.

14. During November the following totals were submitted:

96 news stories
206 still photographs
700 feet movie film

15. Throughout the occupation Public Information personnel and facilities have been made available to staff section for work on special projects which required the service of writers, photographers, dark room technicians, artists, and radio recorders.

16. The Public Information Section strength at the time of the landing was two officers and 19 enlisted men. By 5 November, two officers remained and the enlisted strength was reduced to six men.

17. The only civilian correspondents to report to the VAC area were William Cortenay, of the London Daily Telegraph, and Frank Harding, Official British Photographer. The undersigned provided transporation and other facilities to both men during their two-day stay in the Sasebo area.

18. On 4 November, Lieutenant (jg) John H. Koch, USNR, Public Information Officer of the Military Government, was transferred to the VAC Public Information Section as a liaison officer and handled relations with the Japanese press representative.

C. CONCLUSIONS

1. In spite of the many stories and pictures turned out by the Public Information personnel the U. S. public in general was uninformed on the activities of the Kyushu Occupation force. This was due to a combination of circumstances over which this section had no control.

2. Following the landings on Honshu, the occupation was old stuff to editors in the U.S. by 22 September there was complete lack of interest in the landings on other islands of Japan. That the occupation of Kyushu was anti-climactic, was demonstrated by the fact that of over 300 civilian newsmen who were in Tokyo at the time of MacArthur's arrival, many had returned to the States by mid-September. Not one newsman left Tokyo for long enough to cover the VAC landing on Kyushu.

3. This operation was the first Marine Amphibious landing in this war which was not covered by representatives of the press associations. Lack of any publicity can be laid to the fact that the civilian press was not on the scene. The wire service correspondent uses radio facilities, and his copy gets back while it is hot. It reaches the papers whicle it is still news. No civilians were assigned to VAC.

4. Marine Combat Correspondents and Combat Photographers handled every news angle that would have been covered by civilians. But the servie copy and photo material had to be sent via the usual official channels and undoubtedly reached the U. S. too late to be newsworthy.

5. Newspapers and magazines in the States are giving minimum space to matters pertaining to the Occupation and maximum to reconversion and world affairs. The stories from Japan are those originating from Tokyo.

6. No representative of this Corps was able to meet with any of the correspondents and to persuade them to come to Kyushu on either professional or friendship basis.

7. The purpose of the Combat Correspondent program is to augment rather than supplement normal civilian news coverage. We are not permitted to send any material by radio. In this operation Marine writers were not permitted to use any material from classified documents. Civilians could have obtained this material through press conferences.

8. The undersigned was not informed that the Marine PI Liason Officer, Public Relations Section, GHQ, Okinawa (through whom all material was to be routed) was never assigned.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that every effort be made to encourage civilian correspondents to cover future operations.

2. It is further recommended that special Marine Public Information Officers act as liaison with Public Relations in all higher echelons.

3. Marine Combat Correspondents copy should be sent via radio in the event there is no civilian coverage on an operation.

4. Censorship facilities should be setup on the scene if censorship is in force.

5. Elaborate plans should be made to ensure rapid transmittal of both civilian and service copy.

J. C. Rice
J. C. RICE.

Appendix 10 to Annex BAKER to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS

067/117 G-1 PERIODIC REPORT
Ser. 00817B

S E C R E T

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From : 0800, 22 September 1945
To : 2400, 25 September 1945
Rendered: 1300, 28 September 1945

No. 1

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1	SASEBO
2nd Marine Division	1294.6 -1062.18	NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	75.3 15.4	SASEBO

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A).

3. Graves Registration: None.

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers:

5th Marine Division ; Straggler lines operating throughout area of occupation. 81 stragglers apprehend and returned to organizations, and straggling reports made to parent organization.

6. Morale: Excellent.

7. Not included in report: Provisional Medical Group
Signal Battalion, VAC, Reinf.

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copy to: G-2, G-3, G-4, CG,2dMarDiv, CG,5thMarDiv, CG,32dInfDiv, CO,ProvMTGp, CG,5201stEngrGB, CO,CorTrs,VAC, CO,ShoreBrigade, CO,ProvMGGp, CO,7thNCR, ProvCEGp, CO,SigBn,VAC, CG,FOF, CO,8thServRegt

S E C R E T

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No. 1

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1194	20331	1178	20291	1174	20226
5th Marine Division	1206	20496	1212	19197	1212	19193
Others	776	7747	841	7663	778	7015
TOTAL	3176	48574	3231	47151	3164	46434
ARMY	283	1853	283	1833	285	1846
NAVY	157	3447	244	3437	214	3298

067/117
Ser. 00854B

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

S E C R E T

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From : 0001, 26 September 1945
To : 2400, 2 October 1945
Rendered: 1300, 5 October 1945

No. 2

1. Administrative Installations:
Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
2nd Marine Division	1294.60-1062.18 NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A).

3. Graves Registration: None

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers:
2nd Marine Division: Army personnel 13, Navy personnel 54; Marine Corps personnel 35. All personnel have been returned to their parent organization.
5th Marine Division: Forty-three (43) stragglers were apprehended and returned to their organization. In each case a report was made to parent organization.

6. Morale: Excellent.

7. Included in this report not previously reported:
Provisional Medical Group
Signal Battalion, VAC, Reinf.

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2, G-3, G-4, CG,2dMarDiv, CG,5thMarDiv, CG,32dInfDiv, CG,FOF, CO,CorTrs,VAC, CO,8thServRegt, CO,ProvMGGp, CO,ProvATGp, CO,7thMCR, ProvCEGp, CO,SigBn,VAC, CO,CUB 18

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No. 2

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1212	20720	1198	20680	1192	20600
5th Marine Division	1120	19020	1126	18721	1041	16769
Others	1168	14304	1164	13479	1089	12771
TOTAL	3500	54104	3488	51670	3322	50140
ARMY	342	2860	336	2835	315	2892
NAVY	314	5701	374	4967	348	4868

067/176
Ser. 009015

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

SECRET

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From : 0001, 3 October 1945
To : 2400, 10 October 1945
Rendered: 1500, 13 October 1945.

No. 3

1. Administrative Installations:
Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1	SASEBO
2nd Marine Division	1294.60-1062.18	NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3	SASEBO

2. Strength of Command: (See Inclosure (A).

3. Graves Registration: 2nd Marine Division:
Established U. S. Armed Forces
Cemetery No. 1, NAGASAKI

5th Marine Division: Established
cemetery at 83.3-12.5 SASEBO

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers:
2d Marine Division: Fourteen (14) stragglers were apprehended and returned to their parent organization.
5th Marine Division: No Stragglers apprehended.

6. Morale: Very satisfactory.

7. Not included in this report: 1stBn, 127th Infantry (Kanoya)
(Communications disrupted due to typhoon.)

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2, G-3, G-4, CG,2dMarDiv, CG,5thMarDiv, CG,32InfDiv, CG,FCF, CO,CorTrs,VAC, CO,8thServRegt, CO,ProvAGGp, CO,ProvMTGp, CO,7thNCRegt, ProvCEGp, CO,SigBn,VAC, CO,CUB 18

SECRET

S E C R E T

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No. 3

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1208	20214	1186	20233	1175	20170
5th Marine Division	1058	16832	1047	16052	924	14231
Others	1470	18020	1456	16892	1355	16308
TOTAL	3696	54329	3649	52440	3414	49972
ARMY	458	3384	445	3344	399	3297
NAVY	327	6092	448	5133	404	4963

S E C R E T

067/176
Ser. 00948B

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

S E C R E T

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From : 0001, 11 October 1945
To : 2400, 17 October 1945
Rendered: 1300, 19 October 1945.

No. 4

1. Administrative Installations:
Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
2nd Marine Division	1294.60-1062.18 NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO
32nd Infantry Division	USS WESTMORELAND (APA-104

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration:

Unit	Army Pers.		Navy Pers.		Marine Pers.		Others		Total	
	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U
2nd Marine Division (U.S. Armed Forces Cem. NAGASAKI	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	*3	*-
5th Marine Division	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers:
2nd Marine Division: Eleven (11) Marine Corps personnel and three (3) Army personnel apprehended and returned to their parent organization.
5th Marine Division: No stragglers apprehended.

6. Morale: Very satisfactory

Six (6) Bronze Star Medals have been awarded to date.

7. Included in this report not previously reported:
32nd Infantry Division

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2 CG,2dMarDiv CO,CorTrs,VAC CO,7thNCRegt
G-3 CG,5thMarDiv CO,8thServRegt ProvCEGp
G-4 CG,32dInfDiv CO,ProvMGGp CO,SigBn,VAC
CG, FOF CO,ProvMTGp CO, CUB 18

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No.4

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1208	20214	1188	20096	1180	19970
5th Marine Division	1058	16832	1047	16052	894	14030
32d Infantry Division	820	13216	937	13194	880	12898
Others	1350	17876	1415	17089	1265	15983
TOTAL	4436	68138	4587	66431	4219	62881
ARMY	1264	17098	1531	18413	1386	17877
NAVY	340	5634	461	5052	409	5137

067/176
Ser. 00985B

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

S E C R E T

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From : 0001, 18 October 1945
To : 2400, 23 October 1945
Rendered: 1300, 26 October 1945

No. 5

1. Administrative Installations:
Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1	SASEBO
2nd Marine Division	1294.60-1062.18	NAGASAKi
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3	SASEBO
32d Infantry Division	1345.0 -1167.0	FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration:

Unit	Army Pers. I	Army Pers. U	Navy Pers. I	Navy Pers. U	Marine Pers. I	Marine Pers. U	Others I	Others U	Total I	Total U
5th Mar Div (U.S. Armed Force Cemetery SASEBO)(83.3-12.5)	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

One (1) Bronze Star Medal awarded

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2 CG, 2dMarDiv CO, CorTrs, VAC CO, 7thNCRegt
G-3 CG, 5thMarDiv CO, 8thServRegt ProvCEGp
G-4 CG, 32dInfDiv CO, ProvMGGp CO, SigBn, VAC
CG, FOF CO, ProvMTGp CO, CUB 18

S E C R E T

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No.5

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	E
2d Marine Division	1208	20214	1218	20095	1208	1995
5th Marine Division	1001	16713	1115	16898	960	14815
32d Infrantry Division	642	10176	925	10905	837	10690
Others	1354	17129	1440	18461	4272	62664
TOTAL	4205	64232	4698	66359	4272	62664
ARMY	1262	18047	1766	20653	1582	19390
NAVY	345	6104	589	8035	501	7714

067/176
Ser. 001032B

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

S E C R E T

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From: : 0001, 24 October 1945
To : 2400, 30 October 1945
Rendered: 1300, 2 November 1945

No. 6

1. Administrative Installations:
Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
2nd Marine Division	1294.60-1062.18 NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO
32d Infantry Division	1345.0 -1167.0 FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration:

Unit	Army Pers. I	Army Pers. U	Navy Pers. I	Navy Pers. U	Marine Pers. I	Marine Pers. U	Others I	Others U	Total I	Total U
5th Marine Division							*57	*2	57	2

* Indicates Recovered Allied Prisoners of War bodies and ashes.

32d Infantry Division: Established cemetery at 1340.4-1160.6 FUKUOKA

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

Fifty-One (51) Bronze Star Medals awarded

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2 CG,2dMarDiv CO,CorTrs,VAC CO,7thMCRegt
G-3 CG,5thMarDiv CO,8thServRegt CO,ProvCEGp
G-4 CG,32dInfDiv CO,ProvMGGp CO,SigBn,VAC
CG, FOF CO,ProvMTGp CO, CUB 18

S E C R E T

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No. 6

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1209	20223	1208	18643	1193	18454
5th Marine Division	911	14961	998	15091	897	14171
32d Infantry Div.	773	12633	749	12621	658	12253
Others	1861	21327	2057	20911	1725	19390
TOTAL	4754	69144	5012	67266	4473	64268
ARMY	1698	20198	1699	20332	1468	19663
NAVY	464	8537	609	8695	560	8578

067/215
Ser. 001073B

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

S E C R E T

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From : 0001, 31 October 1945
To : 2400, 6 November 1945
Rendered: 1500, 9 November 1945

No. 7

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1	SASEBO
2d Marine Division	1294.80-1062.18	NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3	SASEBO
32d Infantry Division	1345.0 -1167.0	FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A)).

3. Graves Registration:

Unit	Army Pers.		Navy Pers.		Marine Pers.		Others		Total	
	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U
5th Marine Division			1		2				3	

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

The following awards were made during the period:

32d Infantry Division:
Sixty-Five (65) Bronze Star Medals
Two (2) Oak-Leaf Clusters to Bronze Star Medals
Three (3) Silver Star Medals
One (1) Oak-Leaf Cluster to Silver Star Medal
One (1) Oak-Leaf Cluster to Air Medal

Subject: G-1 Periodic Report Number 7. (Cont'd)

2d Marine Division
One (1) Bronze Star Medal.

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstChfS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2, G-3, G-4
CG,2dMarDiv
CG,5thMarDiv
CG,32dInfDiv
CG,FBC
CG,5201st E(C)Brig.
CO,CorTrs,VAC
CO,8thServRegt
CO,7thMCRegt
CO,SigBn,VAC
CO,ProvMedGp
CO,12thMTBn
CO,20thAmphTrkBn
CO,CUB 18

S E C R E T

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No. 7

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1209	19918	1226	18557	1207	18351
5th Marine Division	908	14625	915	14730	855	13086
32d Infantry Division	855	13949	675	13422	618	13097
Others	1932	23102	1908	20968	1836	19377
TOTAL	4904	71594	4724	67677	4516	63911
ARMY	1922	21666	1699	20468	1577	19590
NAVY	504	9922	481	9062	499	8147

067/176
Ser. 001109E

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

S E C R E T

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From : 0001, 7 November 1945
To : 2400, 13 November 1945
Rendered: 1300, 16 November 1945

No. 8

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1 SASEBO
2d Marine Division	1294.50-1082.18 NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3 SASEBO
32d Infantry Division	1345.0-1167.0 FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A))

3. Graves Registration:

Unit	Army Pers.		Navy Pers.		Marine Pers.		Others		Total	
	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U
32d Infantry Division (U.S. Armed Forces Cemetery SASEBO (83.3-12.5 - 5th MarDiv))	1								1	

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

The following awards were made during the period:

2d Marine Division:
Two (2) Bronze Star Medals

5th Marine Division:
Two (2) Bronze Star Medals

S E C R E T

Subject: G-1 Periodic Report Number 8. (Cont'd)

32d Infantry Division:
One (1) Silver Star Medal
Forty-Two (42) Bronze Star Medals
One (1) Air Medal

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2, G-3, G-4
CG,2dMarDiv; CG,5thMarDiv; CG,32dInfDiv; CG,FBC; Det,MAB;Omura
CO,CorTrs,VAC; CO,8thServRegt; CO,7thNCRegt; CO,SigBn,VAC; 2dSepEngrBn
CO,ProvMedGp; CO,12thMTBn; CO,20thAmphTrkBn; CO,CUB 18; CG,5201st E(C)Brig.

S E C R E T

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No.9

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1209	19918	1201	18289	1187	18085
5th Marine Division	908	14625	915	14730	838	13087
32d Infantry Division	865	14041	690	13084	636	12582
Others	1799	21068	1844	20228	1808	19107
TOTAL	4781	69652	4650	66331	4469	62861
ARMY	3908	22838	1709	20883	1610	20561
NAVY	521	10044	569	10017	590	8764

S E C R E T
0677215
Ser. C01137B

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From : 0001, 14 November 1945.
To : 2400, 20 November 1945.
Rendered: 1300, 24 November 1945.

No. 9

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1	SASEBO
2d Marine Division	1294.60-1062.18	NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3	SASEBO
32d Infantry Division	1345.0 -1167.0	FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: (See Enclosure (A))

3. Graves Registration:

Unit	Army Pers.		Navy Pers.		Marine Pers.		Others		Total	
	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U
2d Marine Division					4		1		5	
5th Marine Division	5								5	
32d Infantry Division (U.S. Armed Forces Cemetery SASEBO (83.3-12.5- 5th MarDiv))	4								4	

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory.

The Following awards were made during the period:

2d Marine Division:
Five (5) Bronze Star Medals.

32d Infantry Division:
Twenty-Five (25) Bronze Star Medals.
One (1) Oak Leaf Cluster to Bronze Star Medal.

257

Subject: G-1 Periodic Report Number 9. (Cont'd).

7. Included in this report not previously included:

Marine Air Base (Omura).

D. A. Stafford.

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to: G-2 CG,2dMarDiv CO,CorTrs,VAC CO,PrcvMedGp
G-3 CG,5thMarDiv CO,8thServRegt CO,12thMTBn
G-4 CG,32dInfDiv CO,7thNCRegt CO,20thAmphTrkBn
CG,FBC CO,SigBn,VAC CO,CUB 18
Det,MAB,OMURA 2dSepEngrBn CG,5201st E(C)Brig.
5th Fighter Command

S E C R E T

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS Enclosure (A) to Report No.

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1209	19918	1230	18277	1211	18044
5th Marine Division	911	12963	918	14669	841	12921
32d Infantry Division	940	14247	684	12975	613	12533
Others	2056	25171	1956	24494	1750	23698
TOTAL	5116	72299	4788	70415	4415	67196
ARMY	2183	24629	1715	23716	1538	22811
NAVY	528	10866	595	9684	483	9379

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

067/215

Ser. 001154B G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From: : 0001, 21 November 1945.
To : 2400, 28 November 1945.
Rendered: 1300, 1 December 1945.

No. 10

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.25-1114.1	SASEBO
2d Marine Division	1294.60-1062.18	NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3	SASEBO
32d Infantry Division	1345.0 -1167.0	FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: See Enclosure (A).

3. Graves Registration:

Unit	Army Pers.		Navy Pers.		Marine Pers.		Others		Total	
	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U
2d Marine Division					5		1		6	
5th Marine Division	4				5				9	

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory.

The following awards were made during the period:

2d Marine Division:
Six (6) Bronze Star Medals.

32d Infantry Division:
Ten (10) Bronze Star Medals.
Two (2) Oak Leaf Clusters to Bronze Star Medal.

Subject: G-1 Periodic Report Number 10. (Cont'd)

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to:

G-2	CG,2dMarDiv	CO,CorTrs,VAC	CO,ProvMedGp
G-3	CG,5thMarDiv	CO,8thServRegt	CO,12thMTBn
G-4	CG,32dInfDiv	CO,7thNCRegt	CO,20thAmphTrkBn
	CG,FBC	CO,SigBn,VAC	CO,CUB 18
	Det,MAB,CMURA	2dSepEngrBn	CG,5201st Engr Const Brig
	5th Fighter Command		

S E C R E T

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS. (Enclosure (A) to Report No. 10

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1198	19918	1316	19802	1297	19557
5th Marine Division	832	13004	850	13225	747	11462
32d Infantry Division	984	14834	835	13302	763	12982
Others	2236	29811	2041	24226	1888	24208
TOTAL	5250	77567	5042	70555	4695	68209
ARMY	2375	29541	1989	24900	1847	24816
NAVY	468	10223	513	8175	415	8141

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

067/260

Ser.001269=

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit : V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco
From: : 0001, 29 November 1945
To : 2400, 4 December 1945
Rendered: 1300 3 December 1945

No. 11

1. Administrative Installations:

Command Posts:

Hq, V Amphibious Corps	1277.95-1114.1	SASEBO
2d Marine Division	1294.60-1062.18	NAGASAKI
5th Marine Division	71.3 - 14.3	SASEBO
32d Infantry Division	1345.0 -1167.0	FUKUOKA

2. Strength of Command: See Enclosure (A)

3. Graves Registration:

Unit	Army Pers		Navy Pers		Marine Pers		Others		Total	
	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U	I	U
5th Marine Division	3								3	

4. Prisoners of War: None

5. Stragglers: None

6. Morale: Very Satisfactory

The following awards were made during the period.
32d Infantry Division:
Six (6) Bronze Star Medals
Three (3) Oak Leaf Clusters to Bronze Star Medal.

D. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, USMC.,
AsstCofS, G-1.

Copies to:
G-2 CG, 2dMarDiv CO,CorTrs,VAC CO,ProvMedGp
G-3 CG,5th MarDiv CO,8thServRegt CO,12th TBn
G-4 CG, 32dInfDiv CO,31st NCBn CO,20thAmphTrkBn
Det, MAG,OMUHA CO,SigBn,VAC CO,CUB 18
2dSepEngrBn CO,520lstEngrConstBrig.

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

REPORTING UNIT: V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, (Enclosure (A) to Report No.11

UNIT	AUTHORIZED OR T/O STRENGTH		ASSIGNED STRENGTH		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
2d Marine Division	1198	19918	1114	18309	1095	1806
5th Marine Division	832	13004	850	13225	737	12159
32d Infantry Division	1779	19757	1365	17584	1259	16745
Others	1426	25929	1296	20078	1235	20138
TOTAL	5249	78638	4625	69196	4326	67102
ARMY	2466	29845	1940	25446	1832	24965
NAVY	443	10402	398	7940	376	7829

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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

0398

-OCCUPATION OF JAPAN-

G-2 Report

Annex CHARLIE

Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN

G-2 REPORT

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0189/268 HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
Ser 0788B C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL 30 November, 1945.

From: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

INTRODUCTION

In the following report an attempt has been made to present in a concise form, a picture of the work accomplished by the G-2 Section and the difficulties encountered during the planning phase for an assault on Southern KYUSHU, the planning phase for the occupation of a section of the Japanese Empire, and the actual occupation as it was carried out, together with recommendations which are submitted with a view to assisting intelligence sections in the planning and conducting of operations of this type in the future. This report of necessity is brief dealing with only the most important features in the text with more detailed information submitted as appendices. Appendix number 3 is a special report on all information that this Corps was able to obtain concerning the defensive organization on KYUSHU and the Japanese ability to have opposed the proposed allied landing thereon.

1. PREPARATORY PHASE FOR AN ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN KYUSHU.

a. General.

Upon reporting to the SIXTH Army for the planning of an assault on southern KYUSHU, work was immediately started on the collection and preparation of intelligence information. With the information that was available preliminary beach studies were prepared and planning maps distributed to major units. From the outset the difficulty of maintaining close liaison with the SIXTH Army and attached divisions, due to the great distances involved, was realized. Considerable delay was experienced in receiving

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Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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material from the SIXTH Army and in turn in passing information on to divisions. Every effort was made, however, to expedite correspondence and through the medium of weekly newsletters, much information, although delayed to a certain extent, was interchanged. In planning operations of this sort when the units which are to participate are so widely dispersed, weekly newsletters, or some similar system, are considered essential.

In view of the fact that this was the first time that this Corps was to operate under an Army command many changes in procedure were necessary. A new intelligence SOP was therefore prepared early in the planning phase which conformed to SIXTH Army directives, and a number of differences in Army and Marine Corps procedures as to handling of documents, prisoners of war, counterintelligence, etc., were discussed and worked out to the satisfaction of all concerned at an early date. At the conclusion of hostilities, the preparatory arrangements for the assault were well in hand with a few details such as a firm aerial reconnaissance and photographic plan remaining to be arranged. Throughout the entire planning phase much assistance was received from the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) and Fleet Marine Force Headquarters in the procurement of maps, relief models, and special intelligence information.

b. Maps.

All arrangements for the procurement of maps for the operation were made early in the planning phase and the following map request submitted:

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MAP AND DISTRIBUTION REQUEST FOR ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN KYUSHU.

UNIT	1:1,000,000	1:250,000	1:50.000	1:25,000	Road Map	City Plans	1:10,000
2ndMarDiv	60	500	2500	2500	1500	350	1500
3rdMarDiv	60	500	2500	2500	1500	350	1500
5thMarDiv	60	500	2500	2500	1500	350	1500
CorpsArty	8	35	300	300	25	13	40
HqVAC	62	465	1200	1200	475	437	460

The 1:25,000 official battle map which was prepared from a Japanese Imperial Land Survey in 1938 was believed to have been the most accurate map ever furnished this Corps for an operation.

All maps, except the 1:10,000 and the road map were to be prepared by the Army Map Service and forwarded direct to divisions by 1 September. Oral arrangements had been made with JICPOA to blow up the 1:25,000 map of the immediate beach area to 1:10,000 and make distribution as indicated in the chart above. In addition SIXTH Army Headquarters was to furnish sketch maps and outline maps of the island of KYUSHU as well as a 1:500,000 road map. Although the above map distribution was considered very satisfactory in so far as a supply for the actual operation was concerned the tactical maps were not available for the planning phase and consequently Corps enlarged the AMS 1:250,000 map to a 1:50,000 for the landing area and distribution was made to divisions. By 1 August a limited amount of advanced copies of the 1:50,000 map were also available for planning.

Rubber relief models were being prepared in three different scales and adequate distribution planned to provide each company with panels of

its landing area. A 1:250,000 model was prepared by the War Department and limited distribution planned for divisions. JICPOA was preparing a 9 panel 1:25,000 model of southwest KYUSHU for wide distribution and FMF Pac prepared a 1-panel 1:5,000 model of the landing beaches. These models were excellent and a definite improvement over the plastic type which had been used in the past.

c. Photographs.

Unfortunately the arrangements for photographic coverage were not as satisfactory as the map situation. Much difficulty was encountered in obtaining adequate photographic coverage early in the planning phase for initially requests were sent to SIXTH Army and they in turn were dependent on the Far Eastern Air Forces. As this situation was still vague as to just what we could expect and when, during the latter part of July Corps G-2 stopped at GUAM on his way back to VAC from a conference at SIXTH Army and discussed the problem with Interpron 2. At that time arrangements were made whereby Interpron 2 would furnish VAC direct one copy of all photographic coverage flown in the KUSHIKINO area and in turn furnish the negatives of these coverages to JICPOA at OAHU for quarterly printing. Under this arrangement 23 copies of 21 different sorties were received and 6 copies of each sent to each division, 1 to Corps Artillery, 2 to G-2, SIXTH Army, and 2 retained at Corps. Although this coverage was adequate for planning purposes the coverage was not entirely complete and the scales of the various sorties varied from 1:10,000 to 1:20,000. There was a definite need for photographs of a scale not smaller than 1:5000 of the immediate landing area for the purpose of detecting defensive installations. A request for coverage of this scale was therefore submitted but the photographs had not been received at the time that the planning for this operation was discontinued and no definite photo-

graphic plan was ever received. There was also considerable doubt at this Headquarters regarding the adequacy of photographs that could be expected during the operational phase as no airfield was planned for our beachhead area and support photography flown from carriers had always been unsatisfactory due to the difficulty in briefing the delivery. Preliminary arrangements were underway for an airstrip of some type on the Corps beachhead but no definite site had been selected.

The SIXTH Army was preparing a 1:25,000 mosaic of the VAC zone at our request to supplement the lithograph mosaic which was to be printed on the reverse of the 1:25,000 map. The negative with the original mosaic was to be forwarded to VAC and arrangements had been made with JICPOA to prepare 2000 of these for distribution to subordinate units. JICPOA had also agreed to make a limited number of contact prints of this mosaic for distribution.

500 copies of 1:10,000 Vectographs had been requested of the Corps landing area and the approaches to SENDAI and KAGOSHIMA which were to be produced by the Fifth Air Force but no information was received as to how many would be furnished or when.

Plans had been initiated for the production of anaglyphs but nothing definite had been decided as the entire plan depended on the availability of viewing glasses which would have had to be furnished from WASHINGTON.

d. Intelligence Studies.

A detailed beach study was being prepared by VAC which was to include underwater profiles showing the landing conditions at the

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Corps beaches for all types of landing craft at various stages of the tide, oblique free-hand sketches of each beach with all known installations overprinted in red, cross section profiles inland from the beaches, and water level profiles of each beach which would depict the prominent landmarks for orientation on approaching the beaches. A brief narrative discription of the beaches was also to have been included in this report which was to be similar to the study prepared by this Corps for the IWO JIMA operation.

A tactical terrain study was prepared for the Corps zone of responsibility and distributed to subordinate units. This study was to be supplemented by a detailed road study of the highways from KUSHIKINO to SENDAI and KUSHIKINO to KAGOSHIMA, showing characteristics, width, and condition of all bridges, the road profile, and a detailed study of the terrain on both flanks of the road in diagrammatic form. Both this study and the beach study were to be ready for distribution by 1 September.

Numerous other intelligence studies were received or were in the process of production in higher echelons such as the CINCPAC-CINCPOA Information Bulletin No. 81-45 with a map supplement, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study No. 84, and Allied Geographical Section Terrain Studies.

In addition to the situation map which was to be included in the special beach study, arrangements had been made to prepare a last minute joint situation map at GUAM with representatives from Corps, all divisions and Interpron 2 compiling the map as a joint project and distributing it when the troops arrived in the staging area. This map was to be further corrected to show the actual defenses as they would exist upon the landing by sending

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G-2 personnel forward with the advance Fire Support Group, with the mission of preparing a damage-assessment chart showing the damage inflicted by pre A-day bombardment. It was planned to distribute these charts to the forces as they arrived in the target area.

e. Order of Battle.

Accumulation of order of battle data on KYUSHU was begun at the end of May. On 2 July a preliminary order of battle was published and distributed to subordinate units; this report covered the then known units, an analysis of Japanese replacement organization on KYUSHU, and a discussion of the potentialities for organizing civilians into defensive units. Subsequently, a complete order of battle file on KYUSHU was kept up to date until the time of surrender. It was planned to publish this information on 1 September. It was further planned to have a conference with order of battle representatives of subordinate units, lasting 3 or 4 days, about the end of August. The purposes of this conference were: (1) To make clear the known and unknown elements in our information. (2) To insure uniform procedure and evaluation of combat sources of identification. (3) To guarantee that all order of battle personnel had a clear picture of the work and reports of each echelon from division to army. It was also planned that the Corps order of battle officer would have a conference with the SIXTH Army order of battle section prior to the operation.

f. Troop Training.

As the planning for the assault on southern KYUSHU progressed it became more and more obvious that this was to be a much different type of operation from any in which VAC had partici-

pated in the past. Due to the extensive land areas to be occupied, it would be impossible to maintain a solid front and much emphasis would be placed on strong patrols and internal security. Consequently, Training Memorandum No. 7-45 was published outlining the state of training of intelligence agencies which was to be achieved prior to embarkation.

A special training program for aerial observers was carried out at this time which covered procedures and information desired by intelligence sections.

A special training program was also prepared and conducted by the VAC Language Section consisting of indoctrination lectures. Through arrangements with the G-3 Section, this program was made available to approximately four thousand troops. Five lectures were given on the following subjects:

1. Value of POW's.
2. Japanese Signs and Phrases.
3. Propaganda.
4. Souvenirs.
5. Importance of Captured Documents.

In connection with Propaganda, a series of field tests with the NEWCOMB Portable Sound System was carried on by the Corps Language personnel. Amplifying equipment suitable for voice propaganda had been sadly lacking in previous operations; consequently, this new sound system was procured and tested under conditions approximating those thought to exist on southern KYUSHU. These tests proved very satisfactory and a request was therefore submitted to procure additional sets for distribution to divisions.

2. PREPARATORY PHASE FOR OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

a. General.

On 12 August, 1945 the entire picture changed

and every effort was directed toward an intelligence plan for an occupation rather than an assault. It goes without saying that much uncertainty was experienced initially as to just what the extent of intelligence functions would be for an operation of this type. The entire tempo was considerably stepped up in order to accomplish an early occupation and the distance between SIXTH Army Headquarters and VAC was therefore even more keenly felt at this time due to the limited time available to formulate plans. Maps of a scale of 1:25,000 of the initial occupation areas were obtained and distributed to units after loading had commenced but complete coverage was not obtained until the occupation phase was well underway. Upon embarkation on 31 August special teams of the Counterintelligence Corps, (CIC) Civil Censorship (4th CAD) and JICPOA had received instructions and reported to VAC. The most valuable information to be received during this phase, insofar as intelligence of the target area was concerned, was the CINCPAC-CINCPOA Information Bulletin No. 132-45. This publication served as a constant reference. Several changes to initial instructions and amplifying information was received enroute and disseminated at the staging area. Upon notification that the 32nd Division would replace the 3rd Marine Division, instructions were issued to the latter directing the shipment of all intelligence material to the 32nd Division. Photographs, mosaics, city plans, and a booklet published by CINCPAC-CINCPOA entitled "Guide To Japan" were also received and distributed and an aerial reconnaissance plan submitted at the Staging Area.

Upon departure from SAIPAN adequate intelligence information and material had been distributed for the initial phase of the occupation and the intelligence picture ~~Fairly~~ well crystalized, but the entire planning period

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had of necessity been characterized by haste and last minute directives and arrangements which had to be formulated in a minimum of time. Prior to departure from SAIPAN, two officers from the G-2 section were dispatched ahead as part of an advanced party which was sent into NAGASAKI and SASEBO on AFD's. Their mission was to obtain all possible information as to what could be expected upon landing, the location of troops and defensive positions, and all other possible information of an intelligence nature. These officers returned aboard the command ship upon its arrival at SASEBO and furnished valuable information which was limited only by the brief time available for reconnaissance and interrogation. The advanced reconnaissance proved most satisfactory and is definitely recommended for future occupation operations to be arranged and executed as far in advance as is possible, consistent with the situation.

b. Maps.

As has been pointed out above the shortage of time available for the procurement of maps was most serious. Initially it was necessary to reproduce the 1:250,000 map at a scale of 1:100,000 for planning purposes. However, just prior to departure map coverage at 1:25,000 of the initial landing areas, and partial coverage of the entire area of NAGASAKI, SAGA, and FUKUOKA prefectures was obtained from JICPOA. A very limited number of AMS L772 scale 1:50,000 were also received at this time but the coverage was not complete and the supply not adequate. A 1:500,000 road map and city plans of 13 cities in the V Amphibious Corps zone of responsibility were received by Corps and divisions at the staging area. It may be said at this point that a 1:25,000 map is not considered necessary for an occupation of an area comparable with that assigned to divisions

and Corps for this operation. The value received does not warrant printing and shipping the tremendous number of sheets which would be required. In fact the map most widely used was the 1:250,000 supplemented by good city plans and mosaics of urban areas.

c. Photographs.

During the planning phase, 5 sets of 27 different sorties were received by VAC from JICPOA, and 5 sets sent direct to each division. This coverage was very sketchy but did cover the immediate landing areas making it possible to prepare an excellent uncontrolled mosaic of the harbor area of SASEBO and NAGASAKI. Contact prints were made of these mosaics and distributed. Both proved of great value particularly during the initial phases of the occupation. 47 additional sorties, flown in the VAC Area, were received at the staging area and distribution made upon arrival at SASEBO. These coverages were later used for producing mosaics of the cities and towns of which coverage was available. It is believed that the only real need for aerial photography during an unopposed occupation is for the selection of initial landing beaches and the production of mosaics of urban areas.

d. Other Intelligence Material.

A situation map showing the location of Japanese installations in the SASEBO harbor area was prepared and distributed in addition to an Intelligence Plan and an Estimate of the Situation. A "Guide for Language Personnel" was also prepared and distributed to familiarize all language personnel with the differences to be encountered in handling documents, interrogation reports, etc. during an occupation as contrasted to an assault operation.

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e. Order of Battle.

As soon as the occupation plan was known, an order of battle was prepared and published as part of the G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, dated 24 August, 1945. A supplementary order of battle was published on 15 September, 1945. These 2 reports combined with SIXTH Army report entitled "Japanese Military Units identified on Western HONSHU, SHIKOKU, and KYUSHU", dated 28 August, 1945 and Supplement Number One, dated 6 September, were felt to be adequate as preparatory information for the occupation. Unfortunately, there was no time for order of battle personnel to meet before the occupation. While this situation was inevitable under the circumstances, it resulted in a good deal of confusion in the first phase of the occupation. No order of battle information was obtained by the preliminary landing party.

f. Troop Indoctrination.

In an effort to familiarize the officers and men with the general characteristics, customs, and background material of JAPAN and the Japanese people, fifteen information pamphlets were written, edited, and reproduced by the Corps Language Section from personal experience and available written information.

Subjects covered were:

1. Psychology of the Japanese.
2. Education in JAPAN.
3. Propaganda and Press in JAPAN.
4. The Japanese People.
5. Geography of JAPAN.
6. Home Life in JAPAN.
7. History of JAPAN.
8. The TANAKA Memorial.
9. The Government of JAPAN.
10. The Kempei Tai.
11. The Japanese Civil Police.

12. Hints, Suggestions and Cautions to Personnel of Occupation Forces in JAPAN.
13. Investigation of the Japanese.
14. The Japanese Language.
15. The Japanese Calendar System.

These pamphlets were distributed to all Corps units and were made the basis of an intensive training program. Most of this training took place while the troops were enroute to JAPAN. Lectures based on these pamphlets were given on all ships by language personnel when available and were attended by both officer and men.

g. Section Organization.

Upon landing, the section was organized in accordance with current Tables of Organization plus the attached Counterintelligence Corps teams, a Civil Censorship Advanced Detachment, and technical intelligence personnel from JICPOA mentioned above. It became immediately apparent, however, that certain readjustments would be necessary. For example, the Aerial Photograph Interpretation section was reorganized and established as an Advanced Base Planning section to continue work on compiling information on areas remaining to be occupied, and a special Statistical section organized under the operations for the purpose of compiling reports on location and inventories of Japanese supplies and equipment. Both of these sections completed their missions within the first month of occupation and were disbanded allowing for some personnel in the section who fulfilled the requirements, to return to the UNITED STATES. Throughout the occupation a considerable problem was encountered in the constant transfer of personnel in and out of the section in carrying out rotation policies which had been established. This re-

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quired a constant training of new personnel and a consequent reduction in the overall efficiency of the section. It is believed that similar changes should be made prior to embarkation for future occupations.

3. OCCUPATION PHASE.

a. General.

From the outset the wholehearted cooperation of the civil populace and the excellent cooperation by the Japanese military and naval authorities was immediately apparent. From 22 September to 30 November no serious incidents occurred and the few that were reported were believed to be caused by a misunderstanding on the part of our forces, or the Japanese, due to the language barrier. Some instances were reported of weapons and supplies not being reported but this is thought to have been chiefly because of the confusing state of affairs insofar as the Japanese forces were concerned at the time of surrender. In general, no occupation force could expect more complete cooperation from a defeated enemy. Their every effort was directed toward trying to furnish our forces everything that was required of them and comply with all directives issued. This general attitude was undoubtedly prompted by a sincere desire to have things run smoothly in order that the occupation would be terminated at an early date.

Japanese Liaison Committees were established in all areas of occupation which were contacted to provide information on demobilization, repatriation, and similar matters as well as furnishing a central agency which could be contacted for the purpose of passing instructions to the military and civilian personnel in any given area.

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To meet a rapidly expanding situation, a great strain was placed on VAC reproduction facilities. Much effort was expended in preparing city plans and military and civil intelligence target folders for troops entering new areas in the zone of occupation on which little information had been previously available. A good deal of difficulty was encountered from an OOB and demobilization standpoint due to VAC's being responsible for YAMAGUCHI Prefecture which did not lie in the Japanese Army command for KYUSHU. In addition, the typhoon before VAC's arrival at SASEBO and the typhoon early in October slowed up Japanese reports on these matters considerably.

The reports of subordinate units to VAC were for the most part timely and informative. The investigations and control of Chinese and Korean nationals, awaiting repatriation, developed into a considerable problem. CIC played a large part in this work and also in the investigation of Japanese secret and patriotic societies and general supervision to assure Japanese compliance with directives from higher headquarters. The 4th Censorship Advanced Detachment made extensive surveys of mail and telecommunication facilities, reviewed all publications in the VAC zone of occupation, and established censorship offices at FUKUOKA for international mail and telecommunications. JICPOA personnel, upon arriving in the occupation zone, were reorganized and reported to 5th Fleet for operational control as the Naval Technical Mission, JAPAN (NAVTECHJAP). Although this was not as desirable from the Corps standpoint, as having a technical intelligence unit operating under its control, as had been the case in previous operations, this unit thoroughly exploited the VAC Area and its reports on radar, radio, new types of ordnance, combatant ships, aircraft, suicide boats, midget submarines, and human torpedoes should prove of great value. It is believed that much

valuable intelligence from a strategic standpoint was gathered and that no serious obstacles to the continued peaceable occupation of the VAC Zone of occupation exists.

b. Operations Section.

(1) General.

The organization and composition of the Operations Section in the initial phase of the occupation was essentially the same as that provided for the assault on southern KYUSHU.

At the beginning of the occupation this section included the following personnel:

2 Majors.
3 Captains.
2 1st Lieutenants.
1 2nd Lieutenant.
3 Clerk-Typists.

The above personnel were organized into two teams to provide for continuous compilation of reports, dissemination of information, and to take action on all intelligence, both incoming and outgoing. In addition to the two working teams mentioned, a Statistics sub-section, under supervision of one of the Majors, was set up to augment the division of assigned responsibility. Later, when the zone of occupation was physically covered, the Statistics sub-section was disbanded and the personnel were diverted back to the Operations Section.

A periodic report was prepared daily and included such information as demobilization and disarmament, intelligence targets or objectives, counterintelligence, and civilian and military attitudes. A

flash situation summary was prepared daily and transmitted by radio to higher headquarters.

As the occupation progressed, the same general use of personnel was maintained. Due to rotation and readjustment, it became necessary to train new personnel but at all times a sufficient number of capable officers and men were available. One of the most important functions of this section was the continual evaluation of reports and information received from lower echelons and Japanese agencies which reported direct to VAC.

(2) Exploitation of Intelligence Targets.

From the date of our landing to the date of this report 748 intelligence targets were reported on by lower echelons of this command. These targets were reported in the Periodic Reports and Situation Summaries by all units and later reported to SIXTH Army. These included public utilities, transportation, industries, schools, airfields, military installations, weapons, encampments, governmental organizations, subversive and unfriendly organizations, prisons, both civil and former POW camps, and any other installations which had been, or could be employed against us.

A clear distinction could not be made between a military target and a civil target because many targets ceased to exist as such with the end of the war. All war production ceased at that time and many industries had converted to peacetime production. However, all targets were thoroughly exploited whether they had been inimical to our cause or were potentially capable of producing or being used against us.

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During the initial phase of the occupation, the Statistics sub-section compiled lists of specific Intelligence Targets which were given to units prior to moving into an area. These targets, and others, were reported on by the lower echelons in the Situation Summary and more fully in the periodic report. City plans were made by the G-2 Advance Base Planning Section, and were given to units to use in conjunction with the list of intelligence targets prepared by Statistics. Other sources to locate intelligence targets were interrogations, volunteered information by the Japanese, translation reports, counterintelligence agents, technical intelligence personnel, and publications received from higher echelons.

(3) Technical Intelligence.

To supplement the organic organization of the Corps Headquarters, technical intelligence personnel from JICPOA were attached to, and under operational control of VAC. A short time after landing this unit was reorganized and subsequently became known as the Naval Technical Mission to JAPAN (NAVTECHJAP), and was placed under operational control of the Fifth Fleet. Due to lack of VAC control over this unit, a comprehensive account of its findings cannot be given. However, personal liaison was maintained, all technical intelligence matters were referred to them for action, and technical reports were submitted to VAC by the Military Division of NAVTECHJAP. With the exception of technical intelligence targets which were exploited by special field teams sent out from GHQ, such as United States Strategic Bomb Survey, Technical Intelligence Communications teams, Atomic

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Bomb Scientific Group and others, NAVTECHJAP thoroughly exploited all technical intelligence targets in the VAC Area. These reports were included in the G-2 Periodic Reports as enclosures and thus the information was disseminated to the distribution list. The NAVTECHJAP reports on the following items of new Japanese equipment were received:

1. Preliminary Examiniation of Modified Type 7.7 mm Machine Gun (see G-2 Periodic Report #17).
2. Preliminary Examination of 28 Barrel, 12 cm Anti-Aircraft Rocket Launcher (see G-2 Periodic Report #17).
3. Preliminary Examination of Japanese Naval Type Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher (see G-2 Periodic Report #17).
4. Preliminary Examination of Modified Type 97 Japanese Medium Tank (see G-2 Periodic Report #17).
5. Preliminary Examination of Japanese Type 3, 8 cm Mortar (see G-2 Periodic Report #19).
6. Reports of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Army Type Experimental 7 cm Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher (see G-2 Periodic Report #19).
7. Preliminary Report of Japanese Short 15 cm Mortar (see G-2 Periodic Report #19).
8. Preliminary Examination of Japanese "Cannon" Tank (see G-2 Periodic Report #47).
9. Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Armored Personnel Carrier (see G-2 Periodic Report #47).
10. Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Armored Reconnaissance Car (see G-2 Periodic Report #47).

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11. Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Self-Propelled 105 mm Howitzer (see G-2 Periodic Report #47).
12. Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese Medium Tank, Type 3, (1943) (see G-2 Periodic Report #47).
13. Preliminary Report, Type 4, 75 mm AA Guns (see G-2 Periodic Report #47).
14. Preliminary Report on Type 2, 12 cm AA Guns. (see G-2 Periodic Report #55).

NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT



No.1-Vickers 7.7mm Machine Gun with wooden tripod mount.



No.2-28 barrel, 12cm Anti-aircraft Rocket Louncher.

NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT



No.3-Navy Type Anti-tank Rocket Launcher.



No.4- Modified Type 97 medium Tank.

NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT



No. 5 - Type 3, 8cm Mortar.

NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT



No.6 - Army Type experimental 7cm Anti-tank Rocket Launcher



No.7 - Short 15cm Mortar.

NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT



No.8-"Cannon" Tank.



No.9-Armored Personnel Carrier.

NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT



No.10- Armored Reconnaissance Car.



No.11- Self-propelled 105cm Howitzer.

NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT



No. 12- Medium Tank, Type 3, (1943)



No. 13- Type 4, 75mm AA Gun.

NEW JAPANESE EQUIPMENT



NO. 14 TYPE 2, 12 CM AA GUN

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(4) Japanese Industrialization and Regimentation.

(a) Industrialization.

It has been found that Japanese industry reached two extremes. The Mitsui and Mitsubishi concerns, with extensive control over various widely scattered industries, were the predominate leaders in industry and war production. Extreme decentralization of industry was seen in the many small widely dispersed shops. These shops were as small as a single family project. These smaller industries manufactured parts for the larger factories which in turn assembled the finished products. School projects and military arsenals also added their share to the total industry of the country.

During the latter part of the war the Japanese, in a further dispersal of industry, moved in great part to underground excavations and caves which could not be damaged by bombing. It can be seen that the results of Allied bombing caused a great disruption in industry due mainly to the interdependency of similar and dissimilar firms. Interdiction of the transport and transportation lines, plus the comparative inability to replace worn and damaged equipment, most seriously affected production and industry.

All war production ceased with the end of the war and many of the industries have converted, or are in the process of conversion, to peacetime production of goods to perpetuate and improve their normal economy.

(b) Regimentation.

People of all ages and all classes were thoroughly organized and banded together by the military during the war. With the advent of the occupation it can be seen that many of the civil organizations continue to exist as political organs of the government. The influence of the military has been removed and military regimentation has ceased to exist. JAPAN as a nation has not advanced as far as Western civilization, and until such time as a government is provided which will include a national and local control, regimentation similar to the cartel system will continue to exist.

During the war, conscripted labor was used in the war plants. A service draft existed to provide the services with personnel as needed. A military reserve included all able-bodied men of all ages who were not actually in military service. Military training was a part of the curriculum in the schools and industries under the guidance of the Army and Navy. Furthermore, the curriculum of each school was rigidly established by the national government. Youth associations existed comparable to our Boy Scouts and Cub Scouts; but these, too, were a part of the regimentation of the country. Uniforms were worn by boys and young men in all of the schools.

(5) Chinese Problem.

Information obtained from the KYUSHU Government indicates that there were 7300

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Chinese nationals in the VAC zone of responsibility. This information was verified and the Chinese nationals were divided into two classes:

1. Those who came to JAPAN and established businesses, or intermarried with Japanese. This class totals 1740 and it is estimated that less than 5% want to return to CHINA.
2. Chinese prisoners of war and laborers totaling 5560. All in this class wish to return to CHINA immediately.

A general state of unrest prevailed in Chinese POW camps and settlements which constituted a serious menace to the peaceful execution of the mission of this command. Riots and looting have been reported and two Japanese were killed in different instances. Since the end of the war the prisoners and laborers have been well treated and are not working. Chinese Formosans have also caused disturbances and have raided Japanese supplies. The Japanese claim that these Chinese Formosans voluntarily enlisted as workers but now assert their Chinese ancestry because it is advantageous for them to do so. The Japanese want these Chinese repatriated immediately to avoid the possible outbreak of serious trouble.

The Chinese have reacted well to Allied investigation of their riots and in every instance have obeyed our orders and demands to cease rioting and give up arms, ammunition, and other articles looted from the Japanese.

(6) Korean Problem.

The Koreans as a whole have been peaceful and have not retarded the mission of this

occupation. The Koreans displayed a bewildered elation on the initial contact with our forces and many felt that any American could personally send them home immediately.

The Japanese disdain association with the Koreans and in cases where they were not especially mistreated, the Japanese have discriminated against them.

Counterintelligence agents maintain surveillance over these Koreans and our forces control the repatriation at ports of embarkation.

(7) Repatriation.

The repatriation of Japanese nationals to JAPAN and Koreans and Chinese nationals to there respective countries has proved to be one of the major projects carried on by the occupation forces. The Japanese government is held responsible for conducting this movement but considerable supervision and reporting has been required by our forces. This project has been most extensive in the VAC zone of action as the majority of repatriation ports are in this Corps' Area. The Japanese are required to set up quarantine stations, arrange for feeding and quartering repatriates, and screening them for contraband. Our forces have been required to exercise general supervision over this activity and CIC agents have been screening incoming repatriates to determine general attitude. The repatriation responsibility in VAC has been divided between G-3 and G-2 with the G-2 Section arranging matters in regards to shipping, dates of arrival, and designation of repatriation ports. The G-2 has been responsible to submit all of

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the required reports. In regard to reports, several directives have been received, the last as late as the middle of November, each requiring a different type of report. On the second of October a directive was received requesting that daily reports be submitted to SIXTH Army showing the total number of army, navy, and civilians, by ship, arriving at each port during each 24 hour period. These reports were also to be summarized in a weekly report to SIXTH Army. Another directive received on 1 November directing that after that date the weekly reports were to be discontinued and daily reports submitted direct from the repatriation ports to SCAP. This report differed in that the same information on repatriates leaving the Empire was also desired. Shortly thereafter a request was received for a complete recapitulation on both incoming and outgoing repatriates from the date of the initial Corps landing to 31 October. With the exception of the information that was already on hand from previous required reports, this entire information had to be obtained from the Japanese authorities with no possible means of checking their figures. On 11 November an additional weekly repatriation report was required. This report was to include the total military personnel arriving in the VAC Area by units, broken down into army, navy, and air forces. This report again was obtained from the Japanese as the specialized personnel required and facilities were not available at the repatriation ports for our forces to obtain this information. Considerable difficulty was encountered due to the continued change in reports required and it is therefore recommended that for future occupations, where repatriation will always be a major item, a definite policy,

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and definite requirements for reports which are to be submitted, be established prior to the actual operation. In this manner it is believed that much more accurate reports will result.

The following tables show the total number of repatriates which passed through the VAC zone of action between 22 September and 30 November, 1945.

ARRIVALS

	FROM	ARMY	NAVY	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
1.	RYUKYU RETTO	4,371	4,195	123	8,689
2.	PHILIPPINES	1,043	180	5,601	6,824
3.	KOREA	124,445	11,172	457,467	593,084
4.	TSUSHIMA	40,128	970	4,365	45,463
5.	FORMOSA	- -	- -	- -	- -
6.	CHINA	21,774	5,896	10,010	37,680
7.	Outlying islands including GOTO RETTO, SAISHU TO DAITO JIMA, IKI SHIMA	12,657	160	1,626	14,443
Grand Total		204,418	22,573	479,192	706,183

DEPARTURES

	ARMY	NAVY	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
To KOREA	0	0	264,106	264,106
To OKINAWA	0	0	4,984	4,984
To CHINA	0	0	4,186	4,186
Grand Total	0	0	273,276	273,276

c. Order of Battle.

(1) General.

The primary mission of the section was to procure the order of battle of the Japan-

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ese armed forces in the V Amphibious Corps area as of 15 August, 1945, and in addition to report on the demobilization as accomplished. The size of these assignments taxed the OOB Section to the limit of its capacity necessitating priority one, being OOB studies and two, demobilization. Consequently, the first month of the occupation was devoted primarily to obtaining accurate daily and weekly strength reports of Japanese military personnel. Once the first month had passed, proper liaison became well established and the mechanics of reporting became crystallized with the result that the section was able to devote the major part of its attention to order of battle work.

(2) Demobilization.

This Corps was required to report the demobilization of Japanese military personnel by units on a percentage basis from week to week. This method was found to be most difficult as it required, as necessary prerequisites that, all units be known and that their original strengths be known. These facts were not known and therefore had to be established from Japanese sources as a basis for the required reports. In a number of cases, units were totally demobilized before their existence was even discovered. As many of the Japanese records had been destroyed it was necessary to accept "estimated" figures from Japanese sources - many based on memory only. While such estimates are highly useful for intelligence purposes, they leave much to be desired as a basis for vital statistics. Over and above the difficulties inherent in the form of the report was the inability of the Japanese to demobilize efficiently. This inability

was caused partly by the language barrier, partly by the destruction of written records, partly by the circumstance that their demobilization was well under way by the time we arrived, and partly by the serious disruption of telephone, telegraph, and railway lines by typhoons in September and October. Once the Japanese authorities clearly understood what specific information was required, when it was required, and that it was to be required on time, every effort was made to cooperate and comply with the demands. The Japanese demobilization reports were, in the latter part of the occupation, supplemented with area inspection reports by our divisions. These reports consisted of actual physical checks by our personnel.

(3) Progress of Demobilization.

The Japanese had completed the demobilization of shipping, railroad, militia, and a large group of service personnel before our arrival. Naval personnel under control of the SASEBO Naval District were about 90 per cent demobilized on our arrival; and 97 per cent demobilized three weeks thereafter. Naval Air personnel were about 70 per cent demobilized on our arrival, but by the middle of October the figure reached 98 per cent. Naval personnel under control of the KURE Naval District were about 70 per cent demobilized on our arrival, and were brought to 98 per cent by the latter part of November. Army air personnel were 85 per cent demobilized on our arrival; and 99 per cent by the beginning of November. Army ground personnel under the control of the 16th Area Army, were about 60 per cent demobilized on our arrival. The demobilization of units under this command was seriously

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hampered by the mid-October typhoon. However, by the first part of November, demobilization of all major combat units was virtually completed. Demobilization of the remainder of the personnel proceeded rapidly and without incident. By 1 December there remained approximately 20,000 army and navy personnel all of whom were employed in the general function of demobilization and repatriation, and the sundry duties of closing out the armed services. As of 1 December these remaining service personnel were transferred to a civilian status and placed under newly created ministries and bureaus to complete their tasks following a time schedule approved by SCAP. Their duties consisted of minesweeping, manning ships for repatriation, operating repatriation centers, guarding dumps and installations, and administration in connection with veterans, war dead, and their families.

(4) Order of Battle, compilation of.

In preparing a definite order of battle of the Japanese armed forces prior to the surrender, two major difficulties had to be overcome. The first was the fact that the Japanese had, as previously mentioned, destroyed a large part of their original strength reports. This meant that the order of battle had to be reconstructed from fragmentary sources. The second difficulty was the fact that a large number of units were never contacted by intelligence personnel. Consequently, checking on data about these units had to be done indirectly by considering their validity in the light of the pre-surrender tactical situation, by checking the time and place of their activation, the date they were tactically deployed, and the number of weapons that were on hand. Another useful check was developed by comparing the reports submitted by the Japan-

ese to different echelons of our own forces. Thus order of battle reports, obtained by GHQ from the Imperial Japanese Headquarters, were compared with those obtained by SIXTH Army from the Japanese 2nd General Army, by Corps from the 16th Area Army, and by divisions from various units in their areas. The duplication of reports undoubtedly caused the Japanese to feel they were performing their task several times over, but this minor chagrin was gainssaid by the fact that it presented several different reports which could readily be compared. By so comparing them, the discrepancies and omissions could immediately be brought to the attention of the Japanese and thus force them into proving their statistics. The adopted procedure was time consuming and difficult but resulted in an OOB of far greater value and accuracy than one compiled from the initial Japanese reports.

d. Language Section.

(1) Personnel.

The organic language personnel of Corps Headquarters was augmented by additional personnel which were furnished by verbal agreement from NAVTECHJAP. These JICPOA personnel so assigned varied with the needs of Corps Headquarters and NAVTECHJAP. The greatest number assigned to Corps Headquarters was ten officers and five Nisei, with ten to fifteen also assigned to each division. This personnel proved adequate for ordinary language needs. However, during one period of 9 days, when the translation load was particularly heavy, 20 civilian Japanese were employed as translators on documents involving no security. As a general rule, it was found that the need for language personnel was much greater during the occupation then it had been for combat operations,

and without the help of NAVTECHJAP the language situation would have been acute, particularly in the case of the 32nd Division which arrived in the area with 1 language officer and seven Nisei.

(2) Documents.

Documents were handled in accordance with the provisions of Annex Baker to Operation Plan 2-45 and "Guide for Language personnel". Documents received at Corps level consisted largely of inventories, demobilization lists and other OOB material, maps and charts, legal documents (including laws recently repealed, health and sanitation laws, etc.), daily weather reports, nameplates from seized equipment, and newspapers. In addition, some correspondence was received in Japanese, and certain miscellaneous documents concerned with counterintelligence were translated.

(3) Translations.

Translations were usually prepared in triplicate, one copy being routed and filed in this Headquarters and two copies being forwarded to SIXTH Army. Translations (and Interrogation Reports) received from subordinate echelons were handled in the same manner. In some cases, translations were made of items which had only local interest; in such cases only the number of copies required by this Headquarters were prepared.

(4) Miscellaneous.

In order to facilitate the handling of Japanese labor and to reduce the calls for interpreters, a "Phrase Book for Working Parties" was prepared by Corps

Language personnel and distributed to all echelons. Eight (8) newspapers published in the Corps zone of responsibility were screened daily after the 4th Censorship Advanced Detachment was transferred. Items dealing with thought trends and attitudes were translated, as well as items of local interest, and submitted as a daily report.

e. Advanced Planning Section.

As has been previously pointed out, the Aerial Photograph Interpretation Section was reorganized into the Advanced Planning Section shortly after landing. The duties of this section were to compile all possible information, maps, and photographs on areas which remained to be occupied, and furnish this information to the divisions concerned prior to their departure into new areas as the occupation gradually extended over the entire VAC area. In this manner information was being continually compiled on intelligence targets to be exploited while the remainder of the G-2 section concentrated their efforts on current intelligence work.

During the occupation phase 45 uncontrolled mosaics were prepared and distributed by the Advanced Planning Section and over 30 city plans were procured from the Japanese and reproduced for the divisions concerned. Field studies were also made by this section of harbors which were to be developed in FUKUOKA Prefecture. In general the establishment of this special section with a definite mission proved most satisfactory.

f. Counterintelligence.

Much of the work of intelligence section was directed to counterintelligence during the occupation of JAPAN. To assist in this work special CIC detachments were assigned to divisions and

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Corps. For complete report see Appendix No. 1.

In the sphere of subversive organizations, CIC in VAC did not confine itself to the investigation of the pre-war and wartime societies classed as subversive, such as the KOKURYU KAI or the DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI and the others set forth in Appendix 7, Annex Baker, Operation Plan 2-45 but directed its activities at all organizations of any appreciable strength or which would in any manner interfere with or operate against the orderly occupation by UNITED STATES Forces. In the instance of KEMPEI TAI, for example, the goal was not merely the historical approach to the nature, strength, duties and deployment of personnel, but more definitely to discover the present influence of KEMPEI TAI members in public positions, if such were the case. It was not only the strength of the past that was considered but the influence in the future.

In the same vein, a census was taken of all non-Japanese persons in the VAC zone of activity. Surveys were made of schools and universities with the purpose of determining the changes effected, if any, since the surrender. The Korean situation was surveyed. A study was made of the Mitsubishi influence on local government. Extensive studies were initiated, and in certain areas are still continuing, of neighborhood associations with a veiw to determining their control over the populace and the potentiality they present, if any, for effecting reform through supplying an organizational base. All of these matters were fitted into counterintelligence activity insofar as they effected or might effect orderly and successful occupation.

In a similar sense, CIC agents investigated Chinese labor camps in OMUTA, FUKUOKA-KEN with reference to the status of the laborers, con-

ditions at the camps and charges of the withholding of pay from the workers. Agreements were negotiated as to the disputed amounts owed to the Chinese laborers, a check was made of conditions, and remedies were suggested so as to insure the security of the area and the peaceful occupation by UNITED STATES forces. The same procedure was followed in the case of seven (7) Chinese labor camps in the vicinity of IIZUKA, FUKUOKA-KEN. Both of these investigations were carried out at the request of the AC of S, G-2, VAC and the Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force respectively.

With the publication of the GHQ Directive of 4 October 1945, relating to the removal of restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties, an SOP was prepared. VAC CIC Detachments were instructed to investigate and interrogate to determine whether there had been compliance with the directive and, in the event of actual or attempted evasion, to report and investigate the same. Each detachment had a specific zone of action and was directed to report on: (a) The removal of the Chief of Police in each Ken in the VAC zone of action; (b) The removal of the Chief of Special Higher Police (TOKKO KA) in each Ken, and the head of this section and the members thereof in each subordinate police unit throughout the Ken, together with a check as to whether they were employed in any other police capacity; (c) The release of political prisoners and the interrogation of each one released where possible.

CIC contemplates checking continuously to see that the spirit as well as the letter of the GHQ directive is observed. It thus functions as a guardian of the civil liberties of the Japanese people.

The processing and screening activities of CIC were directed at the following individuals:

(1) The police. This was done to check on the personal history of each member and to determine whether former members of KEMPEI TAI were functioning as policemen.
(2) Public officials of the Ken and of local governmental agencies.
(3) Prominent personalities in non-Japanese communities such as Chinese, Koreans, French and others.
(4) Japanese seeking employment as interpreters or laborers with the Corps or division Headquarters or with Military Government as well as Japanese employed as civilian aides.
(5) Repatriated Japanese military personnel and civilians.

In the case of atrocity perpetrators, CIC; (a) Apprehended them under direction of higher headquarters; (b) Requested authority to hold in technical custody those who after investigation and interrogation, admitted certain acts which reflected cruel and severe treatment of POW's; (c) Submitted reports to higher headquarters through CIC channels for further action by authorities specifically designated to handle war crime prosecutions.

The continuing mission of counterintelligence in the VAC zone of activity is patently that of constant and determined vigilance with civil liberties its special province. Together with that, there must be a familiarity with the pulse of the people, and with the workings of their social or political groupings and institutions.

g. Civil Censorship.

See Appendix 2.

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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Discussion.

The G-2 OOB section of Corps, faced with the compilation of the Japanese Order of Battle and the reporting on demobilization, had too large a task for its authorized strength.

The demobilization functions were assigned to this section due to necessity because of its Order of Battle knowledge.

While the divisions handled these two subjects in a like manner some confusion was created by the assignment of demobilization to the G-1 section of the SIXTH Army.

As the repatriation function involved both intelligence and operations, the compilation of reports was the duty of the G-2 section in Corps and Divisions and the functions requiring operations were conducted by the G-3 sections. In Corps, it is considered advisable to keep the OOB and Demobilization section under the G-2 as the subject is the same, though the function differs.

It is considered more efficient to combine the Repatriation function of operations and the compilation of reports under one staff section, and as this function involves ship movements, guard details etc., it is believed that it is more of an operational rather than an intelligence activity.

b. Recommendation.

For a future, similar occupation, it is recommended that:

(1) The Order of Battle section compile only the order of battle records.

(2) A Demobilization section be organized consisting of 2 officers and a clerk typist.
(3) A Repatriation Section be authorized under the G-1 or G-3 to supervise this entire function.
(4) Each echelon of command, Army, Corps and Division have similar sections under similar staff sections to uniformily organize and standardize the duties.

c. Discussion.

Considerable confusion, duplication of effort, and some inefficiency resulted in the independent search for intelligence by separate specialized agencies such as:

(1) Naval Technical Mission to JAPAN (NAVTECHJAP).
(2) The Technical Intelligence Communications Team (TICOM).
(3) The Mine Explosives Intelligence Unit (MEIU).
(4) The Atomic Bomb Scientific group.
(5) The US Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)

d. Recommendation.

In a similar occupation, it is highly recommended that all such specialist intelligence agencies be placed under operational control of the Corps in whose zone they are to operate. If in isolated instances such a plan is not feasible, the specialized intelligence agency should operate through the G-2 of Corps, maintaining close liaison. All results, findings and reports should be recorded with the Corps for information if not for action. By such control Corps could:

(1) Develop a detailed list of intelligence targets in its zone of responsibility.
(2.) Conduct or supervise a thorough exploitation of these targets.
(3.) Maintain a complete record of the intelligence collected.

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(4) Maintain a detailed record of the disposition of intelligence materials.
(5) And thereby provide one responsible center for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence.

e. Discussion.

Considerable difficulty was occassioned by the fact that while this Corps zone of responsibility included all of KYUSHU and the southern prefecture of HONSHU, the Japanese Army and Navy Command on KYUSHU did not extend into southern HONSHU. It was therefore necessary to obtain OOB as well as demobilization information from a Japanese Army and Navy Command in an area not under this Corps zone of responsibility.

f. Recommendation.

It is recommended that whereever possible, major units entering an area for occupational duty be assigned a zone of reponsibility which coincides with the boundries of the defeated unit for which the occupation force is responsible for supervision and demobilization.

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

Appendix 1 - Counterintelligence Report.
Appendix 2 - Civil Censorship Report.
Appendix 3 - The Defense of KYUSHU.
Appendix 4 - Detailed Order of Battle VAC Area.
Appendix 5 - G-2 Periodic Reports.

Appendix 1 to Annex CHARLIE to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPA

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT

0189/271
Ser.0788B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

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30 November, 1945.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT.

INTRODUCTION

The mission of the Counterintelligence Corps in the operation was set forth in Appendix 7 to Annex Baker of Operation Plan No. 2-45 dated 21 August 1945. Seven teams were organized and equipped at Schofield Barracks. They were as follows:

468th CIC Detachment	3 officers	11 Agents	3 Nisei
496th CIC Detachment	3 officers	11 Agents	2 Nisei
404th CIC Detachment	3 officers	11 Agents	2 Nisei
403rd CIC Detachment	3 officers	11 Agents	2 Nisei
93rd Metropolitan Unit	3 officers	10 Agents	2 Nisei
94th Metropolitan Unit	3 officers	10 Agents	2 Nisei
95th Metropolitan Unit	3 officers	10 Agents	2 Nisei

The Counterintelligence Detachments (hereinafter referred to as CIC Detachments) attached to the Fifth Amphibious Corps for the operation reported to Corps at KAHULUI, MAUI, T.H. on 25 August 1945. Two Detachments, the 403rd and the 496th Detachments were attached to the Fifth Marine Division and reported to Division at HILO, HAWAII on 25 August 1945. The 497th Detachment and the 53rd Area team which were to operate with the Third Marine Division were withdrawn and attached to the EIGHTH Army; as of 17 October they were relieved from attachment to the EIGHTH Army and attached to the SIXTH Army. The 498th Detachment and the 54th Area team were organized and equipped at LEYTE, P.I. and were attached to the Second Marine Division. In mid-October the 32nd and 62nd CIC Detachments were attached to the 32nd Infantry Division and came within the VAC zone of activity.

It thus developed that there were five CIC Detachments attached to VAC Headquarters apart from the separate Detachments working in the VAC zone of activity but further attached to the 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions and to the 32nd Infantry

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Appendix 1 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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Division. These were the 468th and 404th Detachments which worked out of VAC Headquarters and the 93rd, 94th and 95th Metropolitan Units which worked out of SHIMONOSEKI, FUKUOKA and YAWATA respectively. CIC activities in the VAC zone of activity were commenced on or about 23 September 1945.

In general CIC was to concern itself with subversive organizations, security, cases of treason, espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and any and all persons or incidents which might in any way endanger the security of the occupation forces. On 15 September 1945, the mission was amended to the extent that the stress was away from arrest, detention and seizure, to surveillance and recommendation for arrest, detention or search. CIC was to investigate, interrogate and, in the case of records, to secure. (Reference: Appendix 7, Annex Baker, Operation Plan 2-45, dated 15 September 1945).

Liaison was established immediately with Military Government, the Provost Marshal, the Censorship Unit and the Translator and Interpreter service as well as with the various staff sections working in Corps. This was extended also to the Second and Fifth Marine Divisions, and, at a later date, to the 32nd Infantry Division.

As an operating procedure, and not as an essential part of the mission, was the immediate establishment of liaison with the local police in each area with the assignment of an agent to the police desk to check every phase of local police activity.

In the preparation of daily activity reports, the CIC Detachments in the VAC area adhered to the form set forth in Annex Baker to Operation Plan 2-45, par. 8c, d, e. In weekly reports and case reports, the regular counterintelligence forms were used and distribution was through CIC channels except in those cases where the information was specially requested. At all times, however, the AC of S, G-2 was kept abreast of all CIC activity.

1. The Mission.

a. In the sphere of subversive organizations, CIC in

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VAC did not confine itself to the investigation of the pre-war and wartime societies classed as subversive such as those set forth in Appendix 7, Annex Baker, Operation Plan 2-45, but directed its activities at all organizations of any appreciable strength or which would in any manner interfere with or operate against the orderly occupation by United States Forces. There follows a brief statement on the outstanding organizations investigated together with an account of their present activities as of 30 November, 1945.

(1) DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI (Greater Japan Political Association) Investigation disclosed that this organization was formed in the period May - June 1945. The purpose appears to have been the development of a strong, unified political association to exert influence and guidance over Agriculture, Industry, Medical Institutions, Public Morality and Inflation. This, however, was secondary to insuring the political position of the members of the Imperial Diet in the elections. It appears to have been ineffectual and was met with very little interest or enthusiasm. The association was dissolved in September 1945.

(2) TEIKOKU ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI (Imperial Reserve Association) This organization was started in several different parts of JAPAN in 1910 but not until 1914 was it nationally organized and officially sanctioned by the Emperor. Its purpose seems to have been to keep all men with previous military experience readily available for re-entry into service and up to date in military matters. Any veteran was eligible and though the Army and Navy personnel ordinarily formed separate groups, in communities where Navy veterans were few, they often joined Army GUNJIN KAI.

The organization was well established, operated under Army supervision, and was subsidized

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by appropriations from the imperial government. The veteran would ordinarily meet two or three times a month for drill, marksmanship practice or lectures. Twice a year representatives from the ken would come together for three or four days of intensive drill, shooting matches and address by prominent members. TEIKOKU was officially dissolved on or about 30 August 1945. However, the leaders are in a position to revive the organization and they are being watched.

(3) KOKURYU KAI: Information on this, the Black Dragon Society, comes as yet only from informants whose reliability has not yet been tested. The society was organized at least 50 years ago, possibly as long as 78 years ago, as a small political party numbering some 10,000 members. During the period of 1920 - 1935 most of the members came from FUKUOKA Ken. Since Kokuryu had influence in high places, it was a rather powerful political party. It favored the empire form of government and advocated a more strict control of the general populace. Moreover, it favored restricting the franchise to male heads of families only and was anti-communist. An organization which is purported to have used the methods of Kokuryu, i.e. threats and violence, is the RIKKEN YOSEI KAI. The exact nature of this organization is not yet clear save that it is intensely nationalistic and the members almost fanatical. It is functioning as an active group and is holding meetings. These are being surveilled.

(4) TOKUMU KIKAN: In general, present intelligence indicates that this organization operated almost exclusively in occupied areas or areas outside of the Japanese islands. There was an Army and Navy Tokumu. Members operated in uniform or in civilian clothes. The function of Army Tokumu in occupied areas was to

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assume full control of the civil administration, economy, agriculture, finance, public utilities, press and radio and to obtain the full cooperation of the people in establishing a new order. It also selected collaborationists and set up an informant network. The Naval Tokumu was organized much the same as the Army. However, the Navy confined itself to the seacoast, harbors and rivers and did not penetrate inland. Its purpose was to get intelligence on shipping and commerce and the movement of surface traffic. The Naval Tokumu did not go into local politics or the economics situation to the same extent as did the Army. The Navy and Army Tokumu received their orders from and sent all information to the political and economic bureau (KOAIN); this later became the DAITOA (Greater East Asia Association). Investigation is continuing as to the nature and duties and deployment of this organization during the prewar and the war period, the selection of personnel and related matters.

(5) KOKUMIN GIYU TAI (People's Volunteer Corps) This organization was a function of the Home Ministry. The Army had no direct authority over it but acted in a advisory capacity. In case of an invasion, however, the Army would have taken over the organization and it would have been used as the Army saw fit.

The KOKUMIN was formed in June 1945. All males 14 to 65 years old and females 14 to 45 years old were required to join. Anyone could volunteer regardless of age or sex. Those in KOKUMIN GIYU TAI were to carry out non-combatant duties such as road repair, digging fortifications, increasing food production, etc. The more able-bodied members, males 15 - 60 and females 17 - 40 were to be organized into the KOKUMIN GIYU SENTO TAI, a civilian combat unit. They were to be armed with

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bamboo spears and to be trained by returned Army officers. Their primary duties were to carry ammunition for the defense unit in the prefectural area and to assist the Army in whatever way might be required in case of actual invasion. Both KOKUMIN GIYU TAI and the SENTO TAI were dissolved after the surrender. As such, they do not presently constitute a threat to the security of the occupation forces.

(6) SOTEI DAN: The official name of this organization was SEI SHONEN DAN (Youth Organization). It was formed by combining the SHONEN DAN and the SEINAN DAN. In May 1945 the name of the society was changed to GAKU TO TAI (Students Corps). The main office of the association was maintained at the Ministry of Education in TOKYO. The lowest administration office was the principal's office in each school. Membership in the society included children between the ages of 10 and 17 whether attending school or not. It was formed primarily to have children assist in the war effort. The children would collect scrap metal, participate in thrift campaigns, and the home manufacture of certain products. No military training was given within the organization; this was included in the regular high school curriculum and was supervised by the military commander of the district. The organization was dissolved at the time of the Japanese surrender.

Comparable to the SEI SHONEN DAN to a certain extent was the SANGIO HOKOKU TAI, composed of school children of the ages of 16 and 17 who were employed by the factories. The structure and officials were the same as in the case of the SEI SHONEN DAN.

(7) SHOKUGIO HODO KAI (Occupational Guidance Association). This was formed in an attempt to

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aid families of soldiers and to secure jobs for returning veterans. It is still in the process of investigation in order to determine whether military men are controlling the placement of discharged soldiers so as to keep military units together thus indirectly perpetuating military control.

(8) KEMPEI TAI: The mission of this organization was to control military personnel, prevent domestic disturbances and counter-espionage. At special request, KEMPEI assisted the civil police and the Ministry of Justice. It did not exercise control over the Neighborhood Associations. Its personnel accompanied the Japanese Army in the field in which case its mission was assigned by the Army tactical commander. In addition to intensive investigation, still continuing, as to the nature, strength, duties and demobilization status of the organization, effort is being made to discover the present influence, if any, of KEMPEI TAI members in public positions.

(9) CHIKU TOKUSETSU KEIBITAI (Area Mobilized Guard) This organization was formed in April 1945 at the order of the Army Ministry. The purpose of the Guard was to carry food for civilian and military personnel and to repair the roads. Plans had been made to institute training of the men as a beach guard; for self defense they were to be taught the use of the bamboo spears and in addition they were to be lectured on the Japanese spirit. The men had received only about 10 days training in all. The members were generally over 40; there were a few between the ages of 18 and 19. The guard was dissolved after the surrender.

(10) SUISAN HOKOKU KAI (Marine Patriotic Society) This is a branch of Nippon Sangyo Hokoku Kai (Japanese Industrial Society) the headquarters of which is in TOKYO. It is somewhat similar

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to the idea of our labor unions and is open to fisherman only. It was organized about four years ago and was named "Patriotic" because the country was at war. There were about 3,000 members but calls from the Army and Navy soon depleted its members and the organization now exists in name only.

(11) ZENKOKU SUIHEI SHA: There are reported to be 5,000,000 members of this society in JAPAN, 500,000 of whom reside on the island of KYUSHU and 10,000 of whom reside in FUKUOKA city. It is composed of members of the ETA class which was organized 300 years ago. The ETA have been treated as an outcast race based principally on the type of their work such as that of shoemaker, butcher and the like. SUIHEI SHA members emphasize freedom, equality and escape from present discriminations. The Japanese government had set up a rival ETA organization, to which only a few ETAS belonged, known as the DOWA HOKO KAI. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the government banned all meetings of the ZENKOKU. It is expected that this society will provide much of the drive in the gathering democratic movement.

(12) KOKOKU SEINEN SHOKO DOMEI (Imperial League of Young Officers) Information thus far uncovered is not sufficient to form conclusions as to the functioning of this organization in the VAC area.

It is to be noted at this point that the organizations referred to above do not constitute the full complement of societies which have been or will be investigated by CIC. There are organizations in the process of formation which will be surveilled; there are others which are described in several different ways and are known under several different names. To categorize such associations as these would be premature action.

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b. In order to determine the changes effected, if any, in the educational system since the surrender, CIC made a survey of schools such as the Sakai Middle School in SASEBO, the SHIMONOSEKI Middle School and Intermediate School and the KOKURA Middle School. It was found that military instruction or subjects related thereto such as fencing and judo had been discontinued. Principals and teachers were interviewed so as to determine their reaction to the occupation, their opinion as to military instruction and the initiative they showed in adapting their educational patterns to pending changes. The Meiji School of Technology and KYUSHU Imperial University were likewise visited. The investigation of schools and the examination of their curricula is a continuing CIC function insofar as education and the free political development of the Japanese people are related.

c. With a view toward preventing incidents that may lead to armed bloodshed CIC has kept a watchful eye in those communities where large numbers of Koreans are awaiting repatriation. Typical places are FUKUOKA and SHIMONOSEKI. CIC agents interviewed the leaders of several Korean societies in SHIMONOSEKI which claim to be supervising the return of Koreans to their homeland. In addition the President of the Korean Association in JAPAN has been furnishing a detailed report daily to the CIC office in SHIMONOSEKI. This is done so that CIC and VAC may be aware of any outbreaks which would adversely affect the security of the occupation forces. Three Korean societies dominate the Korean situation in the areas of FUKUOKA and SHIMONOSEKI. They are the RENMEI, the KYUGO KAI, and the KYUZAI KAI. RENMEI appears to be the strongest of the three and is trying to impose its will on the others, evidently hoping to deactivate them so that it can monopolize the politically potent job of returning displaced Koreans to their homes.

d. In a similar sense, CIC investigated Chinese labor

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camps in OMUTA, FUKUOKA-Ken with reference to the status of the laborers, conditions at the camps and charges of the withholding of pay from the workers. Agreements were negotiated as to the disputed amounts owed to the Chinese laborers, a check was made of conditions and remedies were suggested so as to insure the security of the area and the peaceful occupation by United States forces. The same procedure was followed in the case of 7 Chinese labor camps in the vicinity of IIZUKA, FUKUOKA-Ken Both of these investigations were carried out at the request of the AC of S, G-2, VAC and the Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Task Force Group respectively.

e. With the public tion of the GHQ Directive of 4 October 1945 relating to the removal of restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties, an SOP was prepared. VAC CIC Detachments were instructed to determine whether there had been compliance with the directive and, in the event of actual or attempted invasion, to report and investigate the same. Each Detachment had a specific zone of action and was directed to report on (a) the removal of the Chief of Police in each Ken in the VAC zone of action; (b) The removal of the Chief of the Special Higher Police (TOKKO KA) in each Ken and the head of this section and the members thereof in each subordinate police unit throughout the Ken, together with a check as to whether they were employed in any other police capacity; (c) The release of civil prisoners and the interrogation of each one released where possible.

Prior to the issuance of this directive, CIC had initiated studies of the TOKKO KA in each Ken, the TOKKO GAKARI or the special Higher Police in each city and had been compiling lists of the members of each seotion. These studies served as a guide in the phase of the directive applying to the abolition of the TOKKO.

CIC contemplates checking continuously to see that the spirit as well as the letter of the GHQ

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directive is observed. It thus functions as a guardian of the civil liberties of the Japanese people.

f. An intensive study was made of the system of Neighborhood Associations insofar as they might be a negative influence in the free political development of the people. The effect of the Associations was to weld the people into a united group to support the war effort. At the meetings of the Associations, those present were required to worship "from afar the Imperial and the Shinto Shrine;" to pay silent tribute to the war dead and offer a silent prayer for the success of the war effort; to sing the national anthem; to listen to the reading of the Imperial Rescript of the Holy War.

It does not seem that they were required to, yet it is a fact that nearly every family did contribute to the financial support of the Shinto religion, the Imperial Reserve Association, and the Society for Serving the Country Behind the Guns, through the Neighborhood Associations.

The Associations do perform necessary and useful functions such as rationing and taking a periodic census. They likewise afford an effective means of informing and educating the people. They continue to function much the same as they did before the end of the war. While there is no evidence indicating that this system will operate to preclude the Japanese people from enjoying their new freedoms, it is well designed to suit such a purpose. Also its structure is such as to render it an effective instrumentality for espionage. The action to be taken as to this system or any change of policy which might call for the abolition of the Neighborhood Associations is a matter for command authorities.

g. In the case of atrocity perpretrators, CIC pursued three courses of action. The first type was to

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apprehend them under direction of higher headquarters. An example of this procedure is the following: On 30 October 1945 pursuant to instructions from the Commanding General SIXTH Army CIC agents set out to apprehend eighteen Japanese naval officers reportedly aboard the Japanese cruiser Yakumo in FUKUOKA harbor. Four agents, two interpreters and an MP complement boarded the Yakumo at 0315, 30 October, to secure the passenger list and ascertain the whereabouts of personnel. The passenger list was secured and it was learned that personnel had disembarked by 1500, 29 October. It was further ascertained that the naval personnel had not yet been demobilized and were reportedly at a central location. Agents were dispatched to locate the men.

At 0810 agents reported that several of the personnel had been located at ZASSHO NO KUMA Naval Barracks. Proceeding to that location, agents picked up 15 of the Japanese officers and turned them over to the Military Police at Dote-machi prison for safekeeping. At 1030 another of the three was apprehended and taken to Dote-machi prison. The remaining two Japanese naval officers were subsequently apprehended and at 1440 a dispatch setting forth the action taken and a list of names was sent to the Commanding General, VAC. Those apprehended were finally sent to YOKOHAMA for internment in the XIth Corps stockade.

The second course of action consisted in requesting authority to hold in technical custody those who after investigation and interrogation either admitted certain acts which reflected cruel treatment of POWs or who could reasonably be suspected of the same. A typical instance is the case of SAKAMOTO, Yuhichi. Subject was originally reported by Recovered Personnel Teams as having been "severe and cruel" in his treatment of POWs. He was camp commandant of a number of POW camps the last of which was Camp #9 in FUKUOKA. As a result of interrogation and investigation by CIC agents he

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signed sworn statements in which he admits acts of cruelty. As a result, authority to detain him was requested of the Commanding General, SIXTH Army. The same was granted. He is now being held in protective custody by the Provost Marshal in FUKUOKA pending instructions from higher authorities.

The third course of action was to submit reports to higher headquarters through CIC channels in such a manner as to supply evidential material to authorities specifically designated to handle war crime prosecutions.

h. The processing and screening activities of CIC were directed at the following individuals:

1. The police - this was done to check on the personal history of each member and to determine whether former members of KEMPEI TAI were functioning as policemen. This process was extended also to the KEIBI TAI or auxiliary police.

2. Public officials of the Ken and of local governmental agencies as well as former prominent military organizational or industrial leaders.

3. Prominent personalities in the Chinese and Korean communities as well as other non-Japanese persons such as French, British, etc.

4. Japanese seeking employment as interpreters, translators or laborers with Corps or Division Headquarters or Military Government as well as Japanese to be employed as Civilian Aids.

5. Repatriated Japanese military personnel and civilians. This was done by CIC agents at HAKATA, HARIO and KAJIKI. In the case of military personnel, the enlisted men and noncoms were for the most part spot - checked while the officers were interviewed. High ranking officers were questioned thoroughly.

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In the case of civilians, all were interviewed. Reports of the interrogations were submitted to higher headquarters through CIC channels.

i. When requested, CIC agents conducted physical security surveys of Corps and Division installations and reports containing recommendations were submitted. Typical examples of security measures taken are the following.

1. Arms Warehouse #2 was discovered by agents in MOJI. It was searched and found to contain anti-American and anti-British propaganda of a scurrilous nature. The S-2 of the 129th FA was notified and the documents were burned.

2. Through an informant, agents in MOJI learned of a Japanese Communications Center which was used to store radio equipment. The center was found to be empty but in an interview with a Japanese communications officer it was learned that the equipment had been moved to the MOJI Telephone Exchange. An inspection of the exchange revealed two rooms full of radio communication equipment. The rooms were ordered sealed and the S-2 of the 129th FA was notified.

3. The FUKUOKA Telephone Exchange was checked by CIC agents to determine whether or not facilities were available for monitoring telephone lines. It was learned that facilities were available and were being used by the Japanese to monitor commercial lines in FUKUOKA. It was also learned that all cable and telegraph records had been burned. The report of the investigation, was submitted to the AC of S, G-2, FUKUOKA Occupation Force.

j. It is of course understood that in the performance of its mission CIC employed informants and directed much effort at the establishment of an informant network. Likewise, the G-2 was cognizant of other special assignments of CIC which are without the

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scope of this report in view of its classification.

k. The continuing mission of counterintelligence in the occupation of JAPAN is patently that of constant and determined vigilance with civil liberties and the untrammeled development of democratic institutions its special province. Together with this, there must be a familiarity with the pulse of the people and the workings of their political and social institutions to the end that the occupation shall be unimpeded and the goals of the Allied Powers realized.

2. Recommendations.

What was originally planned as an operation became an occupational mission. For that reason any recommendations as to the better functioning of CIC with VAC under operational conditions would be irrelevant.

The matter of occupational duty was new and, in the light of experience, much has been learned. The very nature of counterintelligence work in this occupation would seem to demand that CIC operate as a unit apart from the physical control of Corps or Division save for a coordination with such units through a liaison officer. Counterintelligence work in JAPAN will be a long tedious process calling for the utmost freedom of movement; it will call for an independence of action such as cannot be had under direct attachment to headquarters of tactical units. If the AC of S, G-2, has any particular assignment, that can be made articulate through the liaison officer. The daily report might readily eliminate the counterintelligence section since the longer view of gradualness will obviate the need for such a section. Under such a system only CIC channels would be used and for purposes of exchange of information and articulation with Division and Corps the liaison officer would be sufficient. It is needless to say that the problems of supply for CIC Detachments would still be solved only by drawing them from tactical units.

Appendix 2 to Annex CHARLIE to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

CIVIL CENSORSHIP REPORT

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

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30 November, 1945.

CIVIL CENSORSHIP REPORT.

1. PREPARATION.

a. Activation.

Pursuant to AFPAC radio and TWX messages between GHQ, AFPAC and HQ, AFMIDPAC, plans for civil censorship in JAPAN were consummated. Censorship of civilian communications was to be established under the policies of CinC, AFPAC by the Civil Censorship Detachment under the operational and policy control of the Chief of Counterintelligence, GHQ, AFPAC. It was to be operated in accordance with such directives as might be issued by GHQ, AFPAC, the War Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combined Chiefs of Staff. On 22 August 1945 the 4th Censorship Advance Detachment was activated and attached to the V Amphibious Corps for duty in the occupation of JAPAN.

b. Personnel.

The 4th Censorship Advance Detachment was composed of eleven (11) Army officers and thirty (30) Army enlisted men who were assigned to Civil Censorship Detachment, AFPAC. They were, for the most part, selected by a personal interview from a military censorship pool attached to the 13th Replacement Depot in HAWAII. In addition, two (2) Navy Officers seven (7) Japanese linguists from JICPOA, and four (4) civilian War Department employees (Nisei). This group was placed on temporary duty with the V Amphibious Corps.

c. Mission.

The AFPAC Basic Plan for Civil Censorship in JAPAN,

Appendix 2 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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dated 10 July 1945, was to assist through censorship, control of Japanese communications, in obtaining information of the Japanese and their military, economic, social, and political activities.

Its objectives were: to obtain information on the extent to which compliance is made with terms of the surrender instrument; to assist in enforcing free dissemination of news; to determine the extent of acceptance by the Japanese of educational material disseminated by occupational authorities; to develop information leading to the recovery of property seized by the Japanese; to assist in the maintenance of military security; to prevent passage of communications which would prove detrimental to the interests of the United Nations; and a number of similar activities.

Pursuant to a dispatch from GHQ, AFPAC, the following change was made in the Basic Plan; "During the initial phase the AFPAC Basic Plan for Civil Censorship in JAPAN will not apply excepting when specifically authorized by radio GHQ C10500. No civilian communication will be stopped or seized unless directed by CinCAFPAC."

The fluidity of the situation in JAPAN necessitated many changes as phases of the occupation progressed. Such changes were authorized in amendments to the Basic Plan, in letter from GHQ, AFPAC to Commanding Officer, 4th CAD dated 21 August 1945. The detachment was authorized to make surveys of the status of postal and telecommunications facilities in its area of responsibility, to investigate methods of Japanese censorship, and to obtain all available information on this subject. It was also to assemble information on local newspapers and other publications and on radio broadcasting stations, with a view toward possible assumption of responsibility for censoring press and radio at a later date. Instructions were also received to ascertain whether directives from the Japanese Board of Information were being complied with.

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d. Training.

On 31 August 1945 the 4th Censorship Advance Detachment boarded the U.S.S. Shelby (APA 105) and sailed the following day.

During the movement an intensive training program was carried out. Discussions to acquaint personnel with the detachment's mission of civil censorship in KYUSHU were conducted by the Commanding Officer, based on the AFPAC Basic Plan for Civil Censorship in JAPAN. Daily discussions regarding the target were held in the detachment's "Orderly Room" on the ship. Explanations regarding administrative orders, ground rules, and conduct of troops also were given.

Through the cooperation of the Commanding Officer, JICPOA Team #29, the officers and enlisted men attended daily one-hour lectures conducted by authorities on JAPAN on such subjects as "Prevalent Diseases in the Target Area", "Relationship with Inhabitants", "History and Geography of the Target", and "Personal Hygiene and Sanitation."

Daily language classes were conducted by the four civilians assigned to the detachment, with an advanced course in Japanese for the officers already familiar with the language, and an elementary course for the balance. Each officer gave a lecture on topics affecting the operations of the mission, including such subjects as "Relationships with CIC", "Liaison with Military Government", etc.

2. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. Policy changes.

A radiogram from GHQ, AFPAC, 23 September 1945, directed the following instructions: "...detachment to censor civil communications to the extent personnel permits by observing, reviewing and reporting without seizure or stoppage...have check made local newspapers whether Japanese Board of Informa-

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tion order on press and radio news dissemination has been received...".

b. Surveys.

Postal and telecommunication surveys were made in the cities of SASEBO, KUMAMOTO, NAGASAKI, FUKUOKA, MOJI, and SHIMONOSEKI. By order from GHQ, AFPAC a detachment was sent to SHIMONOSEKI to set up tentative censorship operations of old mail which had been impounded there. Due to the limited number of translators and the volume of mail, it was necessary that only a screening spot check be made, and all foreign mail was impounded until its disposition was decided. The surveys were accomplished in an attempt to make an estimation of the amount of foreign mail leaving and entering the V Amphibious Corps area as well as to establish the most desirable location for censorship operations to be conducted. It was decided that FUKUOKA would be the most central point. Practically all mail entering KYUSHU at the present time is brought into FUKUOKA and then trans-shipped to other stations.

c. Movement to FUKUOKA.

(1) As soon as this location was established, the telecommunications section of the 4th CAD began to set up operations in FUKUOKA. The Postal Section was recalled from SHIMONOSEKI, and augmented by personnel from the SASEBO Headquarters.

(2) Advance Postal Censorship Group.

Office and billeting space was secured through the local procurement office and the 4th CAD Postal Section began operations. Due to the limited personnel these operations were still conducted only on a minor scale. Through a directive from higher headquarters, all terminal mail in MOJI, SHIMONOSEKI, FUKUOKA, and NAGASAKI was impounded, A previous order

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from AFPAC directed the Japanese Postal authorities to route all foreign mail through the U.S. Army Civil Postal Censorship Station in TOKYO. This was subsequently changed so that all current foreign mail was sent via FUKUOKA to TOKYO, while all old foreign mail was held in FUKUOKA for action by the 4th CAD postal section.

(3) Telecommunications.

(a) The telecommunications section, 4th CAD has been performing censorship on all active cable and wireless circuits in FUKUOKA since 20 October 1945.

(b) It was learned that one telephone cable circuit was in operation between FUKUOKA and KEIJO, KOREA. This circuit operates from 0800 to 2300 daily and calls are censored with the aid of Japanese telephone operators. It was also learned that a telephone cable circuit, in good condition, runs from FUKUOKA to FUSAN, KOREA, but, according to the telephone company, it was not in operation, owing to the fact that they were unable to contact the operators at the other end. Attempts to contact are censored. Censorship is being conducted on the wireless in operation between FUKUOKA and TAIHOKU, FORMOSA.

(c) Since it was the practice of the company to destroy all traffic files at the end of each month, only files from 1 October 1945 were obtained. The total traffic during this period from 1 October to 20 October was approximately 12,000 messages.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite a state of uncertainty, caused by the fluidity

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of the military situation in JAPAN at the time of the arrival of the 4th CAD at SASEBO, and the rescinding and changing of the unit's mission and objectives by higher headquarters in regard to civil censorship in JAPAN, the unit performed its duties as well as possible. Held back by the lack of personnel, especially qualified translators and personnel trained in civil censorship schools in the UNITED STATES, and the knowledge that actual operations would be performed at some place other than SASEBO, it was not until very recently that the accomplishment of the mission got under way. With the decision that operations for both postal and telecommunication censorship would be set up in FUKUOKA, all personnel were sent to that city except for a few held at V Amphibious Corps Headquarters to maintain an administrative section. This section was necessary as long as the 4th CAD was assigned on temporary duty with V Amphibious Corps for the routing of reports and coordinating of its two advance echelons, Postal and Telecommunications, in the field.

It is realized that the operation is the first of its kind, and therefore many changes were made. However, in future operations of this type, it is believed that instructions and regulations promulgated in the higher echelons as to missions and objectives should be forwarded, in written form, through command channels, so that all echelons will be made cognizant of civil censorship activities in their respective areas, such as impounding and routing of foreign mails, and sealing of telecommunication terminals other than those authorized and under proper censorship. Many of the orders under which we are presently operating were received orally and have never been confirmed in writing.

Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF KYUSHU

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30 November, 1945.

THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF KYUSHU

1. INTRODUCTION.

Since the initial landing of American forces in Japan was planned to be made on Southern KYUSHU by the SIXTH Army, of which this Corps was a part, it was considered of military and historical importance to prepare a brief study of the Japanese plan of defense and state of readiness, with pertinent conclusions relating to the possible course of events had such an attack been consumated. Upon arrival of the occupation forces it was found that the Japanese had destroyed most of their written plans and orders pertaining to the defense. All military units had been withdrawn from southern KYUSHU, and in accordance with SCAP directives, demobilization of their armed forces was already well under way. To reconstruct the facts it was necessary to compile the order of battle, often from the memory of Japanese officers, interview innumerable officers of various command echelons and to reconnoiter the terrain and general area of the zone of contemplated initial action.

Due to the destruction of Japanese orders and directives, dependency on individual memories for details, coupled with the general disorganization and demobilization of the Japanese military forces during our occupation, many conflicting statements have been received from the Japanese relating to their defensive plans. However, the intelligence submitted herewith has been carefully evaluated and is believed to be substantially correct.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE.

The defense of KYUSHU was assigned to five separate commands as follows: the 16th Area Army; the 6th Air Army; the SASEBO Naval District; the 5th Naval Air Fleet; and the KURE Naval District. The land defense was under the 16th Area Army, and the sea defense under the SASEBO and the KURE Naval Districts. Air defense was under the 5th Naval Air Fleet and the 6th Air Army, each operating individually in the same area, but under separate command.

Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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The 16th Area Army was the principle force involved. It comprised three armies, comparable to our corps, each of some 90,000 to 130,000 troops; one additional division as general reserve and two divisions in area reserve for Southern KYUSHU; several additional independent mixed brigades and "fortresses" for garrisoning smaller and less accessible areas; two depot or training divisions; and miscellaneous base and service troops. All naval shore-based personnel were to pass to 16th Area Army operational control in the event of invasion. Under the control of the "Depot divisions" were the various prefectural militia companies. This group totalled from 30,000 to 35,000 men. Of these approximately two percent only were trained personnel, the remainder being local civilians. The SASEBO Naval District had no navy in the true sense of the word but did command three important groups of naval personnel. These were the SASEBO Combined Special Naval Land Force, which was an infantry unit of 10,000; the suicide boat; and the elements manning the Navy coast defense guns, some of which were under Army control.

The KURE Naval District maintained suicide boat units on both the KYUSHU and SHIKOKU sides of the BUNGO Straits. (As well as a number of coast-defense batteries), and also commanded a regiment of naval infantry in the SAEKI area.

Two large groups of army service personnel were not under control of the 16th Area Army. The first group were shipping personnel operating small boats from MOJI to AMAMI O SHIMA to alleviate the transportation bottleneck caused by rail and road limitations. The second group were railroad service units whose mission was to keep the railroads operating.

In the event of invasion the 16th Area Army would have had under its direct command the following elements:

a. 56th Army

(1) Composition

57th Division
145th Division ****
312th Division
351st Division
SHIMONOSEKI Fortress

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IKI Fortress
6th Artillery Command
4th Independent Tank Brigade
Plus independent service units

b. 57th Army

(1) Composition

86th Division
154th Division ****
156th Division ****
212th Division
98th Independent Mixed Brigade
109th Independent Mixed Brigade
1st Artillery Command
5th Independent Tank Brigade
Plus independent service units

c. 40th Army

(1) Composition

146th Division ****
206th Division
303rd Division
125th Independent Mixed Brigade
4th Artillery Command
6th Tank Brigade (Less 1 Regt)
Plus independent service units.

Note: **** Indicates divisions with new-type organization containing 4 Infantry Regiments.

d. SASEBO Naval District

SASEBO Combined Special Naval Land Force (Approximately 10,000 - 11,000)
Suicide Boat Units (Distributed)
Coast Defense Battery personnel (Distributed)

e. 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade

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f. 126th Independent Mixed Brigade

g. 118th Independent Mixed Brigade

h. 107th Independent Mixed Brigade

i. TSUSHIMA Fortress Unit

j. Western District Army

(1) Composition

KUMAMOTO Division District
KURUME Division District

These so-called "Division Districts" were for recruiting, training and replacements.

k. 16th Area Army Reserve

(1) Composition

216th Division General Reserve.
* 25th Division (Attached for administrative control to the 56th Army).
* 77th Division (Attached for administrative control to the 40th Army).

* Area Reserve for southern KYUSHU.

Threat of invasion of KYUSHU at the time of the termination of the war saw new troops and units enroute to KYUSHU with many partially organized units scattered throughout the area. Command relationships were vague, and normal liaison virtually non-existent. The following explanation is necessary to convey the general organization and unit terms.

a. Organization of land units. The three armies were organized on the same pattern, though the 57th was larger, as it had more territory to defend than the others. Each was composed of several infantry divisions and one or more independent mixed brigades or "fortresses", a tank brigade, an artillery

group, suicide boat units, and additional supporting elements of engineer, transport, signal, medical, and duty personnel.

b. Infantry division. These units varied from 15,000 to 25,000. The Japanese T/O was extremely flexible and no generalizations are possible. A complete breakdown of individual divisions is included in Appendix 4 to Annex Charlie.

c. Brigades and fortresses. All of these units contained several battalions of infantry, a battalion of light artillery, a battalion of engineers, a signal company and a headquarters. In addition all the fortresses and certain of the brigades contained a "heavy artillery regiment", which was actually a coast defense artillery battalion. In general, a "fortress" was a defensive task-group of the combined arms.

d. Tank brigades. These units were composed of two tank regiments, a machine cannon company, a maintenance train, and a transport unit. Their weapons included light and medium tanks, and a limited number of self propelled guns.

e. Artillery groups. To offset the low firepower of their infantry divisions, the Japanese organized groups of independent artillery units. These groups consisted of an artillery command which functioned on the army level, an artillery intelligence regiment, and several independent artillery, mortar, and rocket units.

f. Suicide boat units. It was planned for each army to have two suicide boat squadrons and bases. Their mission was the same as that of their naval counterparts. However, no coordination existed between the two groups.

g. Independent supporting elements. To offset the scanty Japanese mechanization, available man power was increased by means of these additional independent units.

3. DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE FORCES

From the supporting maps and diagrams attached herewith the following general disposition of forces is apparent:

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a. 56th Army. - Northern KYUSHU with its principle strength distributed along the northwestern coast from MOJI to the area surrounding SASEBO, which was defended by naval infantry. It also controlled the fortress unit on IKI Island.

b. 57th Army. - Southeastern KYUSHU. Its zone of responsibility included nearly all of the southeastern half of KYUSHU including the OSUMI Peninsula. The principle strength was distributed along the coast from TSUNO south. Of this area the MIYAZAKI coast saw the heaviest concentration of forces. It also had jurisdiction over the 109th IMB on TANEGA SHIMA.

c. 40th Army. - Southwestern KYUSHU, with its principle strength concentrated along the coast from SENDAI south on the SATSUMA Peninsula.

d. SASEBO Naval District. - This area included all of KYUSHU. The accompanying maps (b) and (d) show the location of the coast defense batteries and the suicide boat unit bases on the coast of KYUSHU.

The area surrounding the SASEBO Naval Base, including an irregular coast line with many protected anchorages, was defended by the SASEBO Combined Special Naval Land Force.

e. The 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade defended the NAGASAKI Area.

f. The 126th Independent Mixed Brigade defended AMAKUSA ISLAND and the approaches to the west central side of KYUSHU and its inland waterways.

g. The 118th Independent Mixed Brigade was distributed to cover the Bungo Straits, separating KYUSHU from SHIKOKU.

h. The 107th Independent Mixed Brigade defended FUKAE SHIMA in the GOTTO RETTO and the sea approaches to western KYUSHU.

i. The 109th Independent Mixed Brigade defended TANEGA SHIMA and the sea approaches to western KYUSHU.

j. The TSUSHIMA Fortress Unit defending TSUSHIMA also manned heavy coastal defense batteries of up to 40 cm, former BB guns, to sweep the channels and approaches to NW KYUSHU.

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k. The IKI Fortress Unit defending IKI SHIMA also covered the channels and approaches to northwestern KYUSHU.

l. The KURE Naval District also shared with the 118th IMB in the defense of the BUNGO STRAITS. Oddly enough they had a regiment of Naval Infantry at SAEKI, KYUSHU, and maintained CD batteries on the KYUSHU side of the BUNGO STRAITS.

m. The Western District Army - Consisting of the KUMAMOTO and KURUME Division Districts adjacent to KUMAMOTO and KURUME respectively were, as has been stated, without normal tactical command. They were charged with recruiting, training, and replacements. However, if their area was threatened by the advance of invasion forces, the Commander of the KUMAMOTO Division District was to assume tactical command of the 126th IMB as well as of any other military units then present in KUMAMOTO Prefecture.

In like manner, the Commander of the KURUME Division District would assume tactical command of the 122nd IMB at NAGASAKI, the 118th IMB, and the regiment of naval infantry stationed at SAEKI, which was normally under the KURE Naval District, plus any other military units then present in OITA Prefecture, and in the southern parts of FUKUOKA, SAGA, and NAGASAKI Prefectures.

n. Reserves - The 216th Division was located near the city of KUMAMOTO as the strategic reserve for the 16th Area Army. The 77th Division, located just north of KAGOSHIMA WAN, was attached to the 40th Army for administrative control but was under operational control of the 16th Area Army as part of the Southern KYUSHU area reserve.

Likewise the 25th Division, located in the vicinity of KOBAYASHI, was attached to the 57th Army for administrative control and under operational control of the 16th Area Army as the balance of the Southern KYUSHU area reserve.

o. The 6th Air Army had fields throughout KYUSHU, SHIKOKU, and CHUGOKU (roughly HONSHU from OSAKA west). However, most of its better aircraft were concentrated in northern KYUSHU, YAMAGUCHI Prefecture, HONSHU, and western SHIKOKU. Fields in southern KYUSHU had been abandoned as bases and

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were only to be employed for staging suicide missions. Army fields in KOREA were under command of the 5th Air Army. The 5th Naval Air Fleet had fields in the same area as the 6th Air Army and also in southern KOREA. They planned to deploy their aircraft in northern KYUSHU, southern KOREA, western HONSHU and SHIKOKU; however, at the time of the surrender, this had not been entirely accomplished, because the navy had not enough well-developed bases in the more protected northern zone. In addition, the Navy was in the process of preparing about 20 suicide take-off strips with underground hangars to be used but once in the initial "banzai" attack on the invading fleet.

In the selection of sites for the establishment of coast defense batteries, first priority was given to those sites covering critical water areas, such as straits, harbors and ports

Secondary priority was given to the allocation of coast defense batteries for defense of beaches and possible landing areas.

In sum, it will be noted that forces were principally distributed along vital coastal areas suitable for invasion landings and where our exploitation of beachheads would be most critical to the Japanese defense.

Much of the rough forbidding coastline, unsuitable for landings, and the difficult forested terrain inland was virtually defenseless. Thus the middle of August saw the bulk of the Second General Army, charged with the Defense of half of the Empire proper, deployed on KYUSHU.

4. JAPANESE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The Japanese estimate of the situation was sound. There is little to indicate that it was based on actual intelligence of our plans. The estimate was apparently based on a good evaluation of our probably course of action.

Our advance westward across the Pacific to the MARIANAS and BONINS and northward from AUSTRALIA to the PHILIPPINES and OKINAWA, the establishment of great bases in the forward areas, the rapid accumulation of our forces and shipping at these bases, the destruction of their Navy, and shipping, the destruction of their air forces and finally the mounting cresendo of

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our attacks on the EMPIRE itself were a graphic time table pointing toward the invasion of KYUSHU.

Japanese officers, including the CofS of the 16th Area Army believed that invasion would commence in November; however, there is intelligence that the Japanese War Department believed the invasion would come as early as the end of September or the first of October.

KYUSHU was considered to be our first objective. If the invasion was to come in the fall of 1945 they estimated our mission would be to secure KAGOSHIMA WAN for anchorage and port facilities and the terrain of southern KYUSHU most suitable for airfield construction.

They estimated our main landing effort would be directed against the southeastern coast adjacent to MIYAZAKI where there were good beaches and considerable low flat terrain inland suitable for extensive airfield development.

Secondary assaults were anticipated to be made at ARIAKE WAN to secure the KANOYA Airfield and along the southwestern coast at FUGIAGI HAMA. It is of considerable interest to note at this point, that initially none of the officers questioned considered simultaneous landings at these three points possible or even likely. After three months of occupation, questioned officers claimed they did expect and had prepared for simultaneous landings. However, it is believed that they had revised their earlier statements after reading published invasion plan details.

Japanese intelligence estimated that 15 to 25 American divisions were available in the forward areas. No analysis was made of their types.

In the event the invasion was not launched until 1946 it was believed we would land on the northwestern coast in the FUKUOKA area, staging through KOREA and SAISHU TO and GOTTO RETTO.

They believed that if invasion were to be delayed until 1946 we would subject the southern portion of KYUSHU to severe

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air attacks and that we would be prepared to mount and sustain a much larger effort. The invasion of the FUKUOKA area would have placed our invasion beachhead nearer the center of the empire, and would have jeopardized the principle ports, manufacturing areas, and vulnerable bases for all Japanese supplies of KYUSHU. The Second General Army would have been divided with its principle element, the 16th Area Army, cut off completely from the rest of the empire. They considered our ultimate objective to be the TOKYO area.

5. THE JAPANESE PLAN OF DEFENSE

Countless captured documents particularly from OKINAWA and IWO JIMA stressed "lessons learned" from our capture of SAIPAN. The perimeter defense was considered obsolete, and defense in depth was acknowledged essential. The disposition of artillery to cover only the landing-beaches was realized as unsound after the almost total capture and destruction of enemy batteries in the first two days of SAIPAN. The disclosure of concealed CD, artillery and AB gun positions to naval gunfire by early firing was considered unwise.

The defense of IWO JIMA and OKINAWA saw the new trend of desperate organization for defense utilizing these "lessons learned".

In light of these facts it is incomprehensible, but true, that the land defense of KYUSHU was planned along the same obsolete lines as SAIPAN.

The general plan for the defense of KYUSHU called for an all-out effort to be delivered against our task forces by air attacks and by suicide boat attacks.

At the end of the war Japan had approximately 12,725 planes of all types, 5651 Army and 7074 Navy. They were being conserved for the final effort. The air force plan expected the entire annihilation of this air force in the effort. Planes were to be released in waves of 300-400, at the rate of one wave per hour, against the invasion fleet. Sufficient fuel had been stored for this use, but only about 8,000 pilots were available.

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The principle objective of the attacks was to be directed against our transports. Suicide boats were to migrate from all bases in KYUSHU to the initial point of attack and to attack upon arrival. Their one-way range was estimated at 100 miles.

Island garrisons were not to be reinforced and were to defend until death.

It was planned that by these efforts the invasion forces would be sufficiently diminished to enable defending units to destroy them at the beach.

As has been pointed out in the disposition of forces, the three general areas prepared for attack were (1) the southeastern coast, (2) the southwestern coast, and (3) the northwestern coast. The three armies charged with the defense of these areas were disposed, except for their reserves, along the beach.

The general defense plan called for a rigid defense of the beaches with a major counterattack to be delivered within two weeks of our initial landing attack.

Coast defense and heavy artillery batteries covering straits such as the entrance to KAGOSHIMA WAN and ARIAKE WAN were to open fire on any vessels attempting to pass or enter. Otherwise coast defense and artillery batteries were to withold their fire until landing craft came in range. Limitations of ammunition, the desire not to disclose their locations to counterbattery of our naval forces, and air attacks as well as the belief that most of their batteries were of too small a caliber to destroy or to duel with warships were cited as the reasons for witholding fire. The exception to this rule was that all batteries were to fire at minesweepers and reconnaissance craft (UDT).

There was no centralized control or fire-direction of these coast defense installations and artillery batteries.

The defense of the beach proper was the responsibility of the infantry. When beaches were wide and backed by flat

terrain affording minimum cover and concealment, as found at MIYAZAKI and in the western part of ARIAKE WAN, small groups of riflemen were to occupy and defend to death a series of strong points near the beaches.

The main body of infantry were to be deployed on the first commanding ground inland from the beach.

All units were to hold their ground and fight to destruction.

Artillery and mortar units were to be emplaced generally on the reverse slope of the first ridges inland from the beach and in caves further inland in the ranges of mountains. From these emplacements, it was believed they could cover the entire landing beaches as well as the plains on which the attacking infantry would expand. As the attackers progressed inland the artillery fire would continue to cover the beaches to interdict reinforcement and supply routes, but would also fire on targets of opportunity behind the attackers' front lines.

There were a few instances of area coverage of artillery, of particular interest in their relation to the beaches and invasion areas actually selected by our forces.

The 40th Army had a strong concentration of artillery and heavy mortars on the western side of SAISUMA Peninsula, south of IJUIN, in the 206th Division's zone of action. This concentration was closer to FUKIAGE-HAMA than to the beaches selected for the V Amphibious Corps.

The 57th Army had two areas of concentration. In these cases, however, rather than a concentration of guns, there was a distribution of batteries with a plan for an area coverage by their fires.

It was conceded that the lowlands around MIYAZAKI and on the western side of ARIAKE WAN would be difficult to defend due to lack of cover and concealment. Anticipating the probability of our expansion of beacheads in these two areas, artillery was concentrated inland on suitable surrounding terrain to cover these areas.

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Northwest of the MIYAZAKI area the 6th Tank Brigade was principally based for the same purpose as outlined in the previous paragraph.

Curiously, the 5th Tank Brigade (under the 40th Army) was concentrated on the southern extremity of the SATSUMA Peninsula in the 125th IMB's zone of action.

There was no established plan for the construction of obstacles or deliberate mine fields. The beaches were not mined nor were critical corridors or avenues of approach from the beaches to vital areas. Inquiry on this deficiency brought vague statements of "making mines later for the beaches" and "if American advance threatened a particular corridor the engineers would construct obstacles in depth as the situation dictated". Anti-tank guns and self-propelled artillery were to be used, but the primary defense against mechanized vehicles was to have been the use of hand placed charges by suicide troops.

The general plan called for the extensive use of night infiltration patrols, whose primary mission would have been to disrupt American communications and destroy valuable equipment. These units were to operate until discovered and then fight until all personnel of the patrols were killed. In addition to the patrols, there were to have been numerous, small-scale, night counterattacks by personnel armed with light weapons and demolitions.

Supporting weapons were to be used in accordance with previous Japanese doctrines.

Tanks were to be employed primarily as mobile artillery. One light tank unit of 30 tanks, in the MIYAKANOJO area, was prepared for employment against airborne troops.

If the reserve division had to be committed, all tank units were to be reorganized and attached for the main counter-attack.

Mortars were to be employed in their normal role with considerable priority for employment given to medium and heavy mortars for the beach defenses.

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Medium and heavy artillery were to cover the landing craft approaches, the beaches and plain areas surrounding the beaches. There was no overall command or coordination for artillery fires and no apparent scheme or doctrine to mass fires of two or more batteries.

Japanese commanders realized the inadquacy of their communication net under combat conditions and considered the massing of fires a waste of ammunition. It was planned that when communications with the next higher unit brokedown, each fire unit would carry out independent fire missions and control its own fires.

Fire was to be delivered at targets of opportunity. Pre-registration data was to be established for the initial positions. There seemed to be no real evidence of the selection of alternate positions, and it was flatly admitted that fire data was established for only the initial position. Artillery units were to fight until destroyed.

The artillery did not plan to use smoke or illumination shells. Plans for the employment of artillery seemed to combine the beach defense tactics employed on SAIPAN with some of the fixed defense plans employed on IWO JIMA. There was little evidence in their plan to indicate that they had benefited by or proposed to use "lessons learned" in the employment of artillery on OKINAWA.

An airborne unit of some 2700 men was stationed on the 212th Division's area. However there was no plan for its use airborne due to its relatively small size and the anticipated difficulties of launching and supporting such an attack under our expected heavy air assault.

While the 003 included rocket launching units, there was no emphasis on their use in the general discussions. Apparent limited supplies of rocket motors precluded any mass use such as attemped at IWO JIMA.

While all units were alerted for defense against chemical warfare, active use of gas by the Japanese was not planned.

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Reserve divisions under operational control of the 16th Area Army were to be employed as the situation dictated. The 77th Division, rated as A-1 by the Japanese, was under administrative control of the 40th Army and was held in reserve north of KAGOSHIMA WAN. It was to be prepared to support the 40th Army if a landing were forced on the western shore of SATSUMA Penninsula. The plan called for movement chiefly by foot and at night, along the shore road of KAGOSHIMA WAN, crossing the penninsula on the road system just west of KAGOSHIMA. This movement was predicted on the assumption that our landing would be made at FUGIAGE-HAMA. The estimated time for this movement was 6 to 7 days.

The 25th Division, also rated A-1 by the Japanese, under administrative control of the 57th Army, was held in reserve in the area of MIYAKONOJO. It was prepared to counter-attack in the MIYAZAKI area if our forces made a successful landing at that point. It likewise was to be moved chiefly on foot at night, the estimated movement time being 5 days.

Both the 25th and 77th Divisions were also to be prepared to move to the area east and south of MIYKONOJO for a combined counterattack if the main invasion effort exploited this area. Neither division was to be moved or committed until it was apparent that the 40th or 57th Army could no longer contain our attack. It was believed that sufficient forces had been allocated for the beach defenses to repel invasion at either point. If they could not prevent the establishment of beach-heads, they were to die in the attempt, and then the 16th Area Army would mount its major counterattack.

The 216th Division was centrally located in reserve at KUMAMOTO, prepared to move to the north or south as the situation dictated. If our preliminary bombardment or early seizure of small islands to the south and southwest of KYUSHU definitely indicated an early invasion attempt on southern KYUSHU, the 216th Division was to be moved, principally on foot and at night, to the area of KIRISHIMA, northwest of MIYAKONOJO. This movement would have taken 7 days. Examination of the map, the distances involved, and the road system to be used by all three of the reserve divisions in their movement forward, leaves considerable doubt in the method of determination of these vital time and space factors.

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Likewise if early indications pointed toward the invasion of southern KYUSHU the 57th Division of the 56th Army was to be withdrawn from the FUKUOKA area and moved by any and all methods available to the KIRISHIMA area.

The Fourth Independent Tank Brigade, attached to the 56th Army, was to be alerted for withdrawal and movement to southern KYUSHU when it was definitely established that our main effort was directed there.

A plan had also been worked out to shift coastal divisions in Army areas to meet a critical condition. For example, if the invasion force hit MIYAZAKI proper, the 57th Army was to withdraw the 212th Division on their left and commit it at the threatened point.

Likewise a plan existed to withdraw the 156th Division from the 57th Army and commit it in the 40th Army's area if the western beaches were attacked first.

The 40th Army was prepared to release the 206th Division to the 57th Army if the eastern beaches were the only ones attacked. Supplies and their distribution, being a critical item in the defense plan, warrant careful consideration.

A good portion of all supplies for KYUSHU originated in HONSHU. Large dumps and principal supply centers were established in northern and north central KYUSHU.

From such sources each Army was to build up central reserve and re-supply dumps of their own. Each subordinate command of each Army was to establish and maintain food, ammunition and general supply dumps, to a 60 day level for food and "one operations" supply of ammunition. This yardstick of measurement called for the following rounds per weapon; 1,000 rounds per field piece, 25,000 rounds per machine gun, and 240 rounds per rifle.

As no units had the planned supplies on hand, as of 15 August, unit distribution was to receive priority over the establishment of principal dumps.

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The principal supply channel was by rail, The secondary and emergency route by small boat at night on the inland waterway of YATSUSHIRO WAN of northern KYUSHU.

Realizing the vulnerability of the railroads, trucks and carts were to be prepared to shuttle supplies where the rail system was damaged. Under "worst conditions" they anticipated they could continue to move one thousand tons per day. This amount was not sufficient for battle requirements but, they believed, would, with the supply dumps of each Army, furnish sufficient supplies and ammunition to conduct the defense to its termination.

It was planned to make full use of the terrain. Units on reaching their assigned defensive areas were to dig in. It was acknowledged that the time element would prevent the construction of the elaborately formed fortification constructed on IWO JIMA and OKINAWA.

No secondary or interior defense lines were selected or planned. No defense in depth was ordered or planned. No cross-island defense plan was selected or planned to block a northward advance up KYUSHU in the event of successful establishment of our southern beachheads.

The plan was to actively defend the few selected beach areas, at the beach, to mass reserves for an all-out counterattack if the invasion forces succeeded in winning a beachhead.

6. JAPANESE READINESS

Although elements of the 16th Area Army had moved into positions as previously indicated, they were, by the 15th of August, far from ready for the defense.

Although no Army was completely ready, some were in worse shape than others, their realtive degree of readiness being as follows: 56th Army; 57th Army; and last, the 40th. The average for the whole 16th Army was estimated as sixty percent. In brief, their deficiencies in preparation were as follows:

a. Many units were short of organic weapons.

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b. Some units were below T/O strength.

c. Virtually all units had insufficient supplies of ammunition.

d. Only approximately 30 days supplies of food were available, in southern KYUSHU, and not equally distributed.

e. Organic transportation was woefully weak.

f. Many units were considered in poor state of organization and training. The 303rd and 206th Infantry Divisions of the 40th Army were admitted particularly poor.

g. Very few defensive positions had been prepared by the individual units. Most of the initial effort had been directed, apparently, to the construction of air raid shelters, and ammunition and supply caves.

h. The thoroughly inadequate road system and its many small bridges had not been improved to facilitate the rapid movement of reserves, heavy equipment, and supplies.

i. Organic communications, telephones, and radios were short and there seemed to be no hope or plan to bring them up to the proper level. The commercial communication facilities were expected to carry the surplus load.

j. Liaison seemed particularly weak. It was stated that liaison officers had been appointed between Army, Navy and Air in the higher echelons of command, but there was no evidence of it. There were no liaison officers appointed between the 40th and 57th Army.

As a result of this lack of established liaison it was very apparent that many vital details between units and services were assumed but not worked out or thoroughly established or understood.

For instance, the doctrine for employment of coast defense batteries seemed quite confused. Nearly half of the CD batteries were manned by Navy but were under the Army unit in whose zone they happended to be already established. All Navy-operated

CD batteries were to be under Army operational command. It was, however, a Navy function to supply ammunition for all CD batteries on KYUSHU.

The Army expected to man and operate some of the suicide boat units and included it in their general defensive plan, but the Navy did not seem to know of the plan at all.

k. The excellent railroad system was expected to handle the bulk of supply and troop movement but its tortuous, generally single track course, through deep cuts and tunnels, and over many bridges, made it highly vulnerable to air attack.

l. Examination of their supply bases by the occupation forces disclosed inadequate stocks and great confusion in general organization.

m. The Japanese boasted of their morale. Both service personnel and civilian population were to rush to the defense in a great concentrated effort to expel the invader. However day-by-day translations and interrogations by the occupation forces reveal that the core was decayed. Many of the rank and file were disillusioned and saw no hope of victory. The great mass of the civilian population was war-weary, and secretly opposed to the military domination. They were not organized at all along the efficient lines indicated by the military and would apparently have disintegrated under attack as they did at OKINAWA.

The general opinion of both Japanese Navy and Army commanders was that by 1 November 1945, these sundry difficulties would have been overcome and rectified and that all would have been in readiness.

From the standpoint of this study the Japanese were overly optimistic.

Their dependency on the rail and commercial communication system was complete. Neither would have handled the load. Both were highly vulnerable to air attack. This statement was borne out by the extensive damage done to both by the September and October typhoons.

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7. FACTORS FAVORABLE AND DETRIMENTAL TO DEFENSE.

a. Terrain.

Although all terrain in Southern KYUSHU is generally characterized by mountains through which many winding corridors serve as the only routes of communication, it is necessary to discuss the terrain surrounding each of the proposed landing beaches and routes of advance individually in order to present the various advantages and disadvantages to the defenders which would have been presented in different sections.

(1) MIYAZAKI Area.

The MIYAZAKI beaches are a wide strand of dark sand, behind which there is a series of low rolling sand dunes. The surf is high but in normal November weather is not excessive for the landing of small craft. The coastal plain in the MIYAZAKI area is approximately 30 miles long and extends approximately 10 miles inland. It is broken by many intermittent streams and by several unfordable rivers. All principal streams flow from west to east. Most of the plain is made up of cultivated land, much of which is terraced. Rice paddies in the area are usually dry during November, but they are easily flooded by rain or by irrigation. At the inland edge of the coastal plain, there is a narrow ridge of rolling hills which rise sharply into a range of high mountains through which there are two principal corridors; one is the valley of the OYOBO-GAWA, the other runs southeast towards MIYAKANOJO and is the route of rail communications between MIYAZAKI and MIYAKONOJO. Both corridors are narrow and winding and are flanked by cliffs which in places are perpendicular. The cliffs are honeycombed with caves, presumably made to be used as air raid shelters.

The wide strip of sand dunes at the beach would have prevented the Japanese from digging any type of

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emplacement along the beach unless they were of concrete or were heavily revetted. Cover and concealment would have been difficult. There are no hills or peninsulas from which flanking fire could have been delivered on landing areas, and there was no natural or artificial cover which would have given the defenders protection from naval gunfire or tactical air bombardment.

The defense of the coastal plain would have been aided by the numerous streams, particularly the winding rivers which separate the plain into compartments. Artillery fire could be delivered from the low rolling hills and observation from the mountains would have been excellent. In the corridors through the mountains the defenders would have the advantage of ready made emplacements overlooking the routes of advance of the attackers. They had their choice of numerous excellent defensive areas in which they could emplace themselves while the attacking forces advanced. Cover and concealment is plentiful throughout the mountains and artillery weapons could cover all routes of advance.

(2) ARIAKE WAN Area.

The beaches of ARIAKE WAN are similar to those in the MIYAZAKI area, but the terrain of the peninsulas which flank the bay is mountaneous and in many places there are cliffs dropping to the water's edge. Inland there is a plateau extending west across the peninsula to KANOYA and north to the plains of MIYAKONOJO. This plateau is made up almost entirely of rice paddies and other cultivated land and is segmented by numerous corridors and cross compartments through which winding streams flow. A typical corridor is approximately 200 feet wide and has vertical cliffs approximately 50 feet high. The inland plain around MIYAKONOJO is almost entirely flat, is made up of rice paddies and marsh land, and is broken by many streams. It is bordered on the north, east, and west by rolling hills which build up into high mountains. The plain is approximately

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ten miles wide and fifteen miles long.

The mountainous peninsulas flanking the landing beaches give the defenders the advantage of flanking fire upon landing craft approaching the beaches and upon the beaches themselves.

Emplacements at the beach itself would have to be made of concrete or be strongly revetted because of the sandy soil which extends inland. Artillery could cover the beaches from positions on the plateau.

The corridors in the plateau favor the defense because they present a limited area in which attacking troops can maneuver and afford the defenders opportunity of emplacing weapons where they have excellent fields of fire. The cross compartments favor the defenders primarily because their vertical cliffs present excellent natural obstacles to hinder the advance of attacking troops.

The plains of MIYAKONOJO afford inadequate cover and concealment to either side, but the rolling hills provide defenders with excellent sites for the emplacement of artillery. From those hills any point on the plain could be covered by Japanese medium artillery. Observation from the hills and mountains would be excellent.

The defense of the mountain areas would present the same problems and have the advantages as that described in the MIYAZAKI area. The maneuver area for offensive forces would be restricted, the defenders have their choice of ground on which to establish their lines, and fields of fire for defending units could cover the all routes of advance.

(3) MINATOMACHI-SHIMABARA Area.

The beaches extending north and south from the town of MINATOMACHI on the western shore of SATSUMA Peninsula are wide strands which extend inland to a sharply rising ridge approximately fifty feet high.

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In front of the northern beaches there are several long rock formations which extend several hundred feet into the sea. At low tide these obstacles are clearly visible, but at high tide some are submerged. The water is deep enough and the surf sufficiently low to permit assault boats to land close to the strand. The landing beaches are flanked on each side by small peninsulas. On the south TOSAKI-BANA extends seaward approximately one mile in a line perpendicular to the length of the strand. The peninsula is hilly and is heavily wooded. On the North, NAGA-SAKI extends approximately one half mile out to sea. Between this peninsula and the beach there is a heavily wooded island of rock formation in which there are many crevices and natural holes which might be adapted to cave positions. The ridge which parallels the beach over the entire projected landing area varies in width from approximately 150 feet near the north end to approximately 900 feet south of the town of MINATOMACHI. It is heavily wooded with pine trees over its entire length. On the inland side, this ridge drops abruptly to a plain that is little above sea level. Behind the beaches north of the town the ground is fairly solid and is wooded; south of the town it is marshy and is broken by several streams, two of which are unfordable. The flat, open terrain extends inland approximately two miles, and is covered with terraces, rice paddies, and marshy plowed fields. The small plain is surrounded by the foothills of a range of mountains.

The terrain immediately inland from the beach on the northern route of advance, toward SENDAI, consists of terraced fields which have stone revetments forming the sides of the terraces. The GOTANDA-GAWA presents a natural obstacle in itself and the obstacle is enlarged by steep stone and concrete banks which line the river at mahy places. North of the river the route of advance leads through a corridor flanked by high mountains and vertical cliffs. Many of the cliffs have been faced with concrete to prevent erosion. Artificial caves, used by the civilians of the area as air raid shelters have been dug in the sides of the mountains. Terrain which is level enough for cultivation

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and which has been cleared of woods is covered by groves of citrus fruit trees. Four miles south of SENDAI the mountain range tapers off into a series of rolling hills with a few jagged cliffs. Low ground in the area is made up of rice paddies, high ground, on which there are no buildings, is bare. This rolling terrain extends north to SENDAI and the SENDAI GAWA.

The southern route of advance, leading eastward to the city of KAGOSHIMA, runs initially across a marshy plain and then enters a corridor through the mountains. This corridor, which extends all the way across the peninsula to the city itself, is a winding valley which follows the bed of several small streams. At many places the valley is less than 100 yards wide and cliffs on each side rise to a height of 200 to 300 feet. There are a number of oval pockets where the corridor is as much as a mile wide. The only cultivated ground along the route consists of rice paddies in such pockets. Underground shelters dug in the faces of cliffs consist of single straight tunnels about 15 feet deep, and of networks of similar tunnels connected by smaller man-made caves.

The ridge paralleling the beaches presents a natural obstacle to landing forces and could be used by the defending forces for protection against naval gunfire and provides solid ground into which emplacements for troops and weapons could be dug. Defending troops taking advantage of the reverse slope of the ridge could be reached only by high angle fire. The marshy ground east of the ridge is an obstacle to the attacking units but also exposes the defenders to small arms fire as there is little cover in the area. Unless completely neutralized, enfilade flanking fire could be brought to bear on the beaches from the hilly peninsula at the southern end and from the rocky island at the northern end.

Artillery fire from the hills and mountains could cover the beaches, the ridge, and the flat terrain immediately inland. The GOTANDA-GAWA would delay attacking forces and give the Japanese north of that

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line time to reorganize in the corridor leading to SENDAI. Any advance through that corridor would be under the same conditions as would have been experienced west of MIYAZAKI or north of MIYAKONOJO. The defending forces have the advantage of high ground, observation, choice of positions, and field of fire which would cover the entire route of advance. The southern route of advance would also favor the defenders.

In any case the defender would be severely limited in maneuverability and movement, particularly after he was committed to his defensive positions.

Certainly the defender had ideal terrain for a stubborn defense in depth.

The attacking forces would have been faced with the necessity of frontal assault and canalized routes of advance. Mechanized advance would have been extremely difficult and confined.

b. Roads and Railroad Systems.

Roads classified as National Highways or Prefectural Highways are the only routes over which any type of military motor transportation can operate. National Highways are classified on military maps as: "all weather trunk, over 4 meter wide roads"; however the best highways in Southern KYUSHU were found to be winding, rocky, dirt roads, washed out in many places and almost completely closed by landslides in others. Prefectural roads are quite similar in condition but were found to be often less than half as wide. In flat country, such as rice paddy areas, all roads are built on fills, usually five to ten feet above the level of the fields. In mountainous regions roadbeds follow streams through corridors or follow the curvature of the sides of mountains. In the latter case roads are often hundreds of feet from the bottom of corridors and are built upon cuts and fills. Bridges at places are constructed of logs and lumber lashed together with rope. Mechanized and heavy motorized vehicles could not be advanced until such bridges had been repaired or replaced. Several bridges cross gaps

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between mountains or across streams were as high as fifty feet above the bed of corridor. In the KAGOSHIMA area and in the MIYAZAKI area roads which follow the projected routes of advance lead through tunnels under mountain ridges. Road-beds in all areas are fairly solid but would not be capable of carrying normal military traffic until they had been repaired and improved.

The use of even the best roads in the area for two-way traffic could be resorted to, only under absolute necessity. In the MIYAZAKI area the east-west road net is adequate and a traffic control plan could have been instigated to aid the movements of troops and supplies for either side. In the ARIAKE-WAN-MIYAKONOJO area both north-south and east-west road nets are adequate. A prefectural road running north from the landing areas could be used by attacking forces as a main supply route and an alternate or return route could have been established approximately parallel to this road and less than three miles away. Japanese staff officers have stated that there was no plan for the destruction of bridges or demolition of the roads at any point.

In the western landing area the road net is entirely inadequate. The only road which traverses the route of advance is the National Highway leading from the landing beaches, through the corridor across the peninsula to KAGOSHIMA. Deviation from this route would have necessitated long detours over poor roads and trails in very mountainous terrain.

The railroad system in Southern KYUSHU is inadequate for military use under combat conditions. Japanese single track, 42-inch lines connect all the principal cities and towns in the area. The road bed is in good conditon, but the numerous bridges and tunnels, over and through which the lines run, make them vulnerable to naval gunfire and aerial bombardment and would nullify their use after combat had begun. The lack of alternate routes would practically eliminate railroads as a means of reinforcement or resupply. Principal railroad yards at MIYAZAKI, KAGOSHIMA, MIYAKONOJO, and KUMAMOTO had been partly destroyed by bombardment prior to the end of the war and interdiction could have been completed during the battle if not before landings were attempted.

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The deficiencies of the road and railroad systems would have been particularily detrimental to the defender. These systems were vital to bring all supply levels up to the required amount and after the battle started to maintain them. Likewise they were essential for the movement of reserves. The routes were long and exposed. The road system would have been detrimental to the attacking forces as their beachhead was expanded, and initial restrictions on our use of motorized movements would have been great.

c. Communications.

(1) Japanese Army

The army communications plan for KYUSHU exhibited every fault previously found in other areas. The basic means of communication was the commercial telephone system augmented by tactical wire and field radios. Communications between divisions, armies, and the 16th Area Army was planned to be only through commercial telephone and telegraph lines. Between battalions, regiments, and divisions, radio, telegraph, and telephone facilities were present, but the latter two were preferred. Communication to and between units lower than battalion was planned to be entirely by runner and visual signals. Communication between infantry and artillery units was only indirect. Requests for fire from infantry battalions would have to be sent first to division then to the artillery command, and then to the battery concerned. Such requests could be vetoed at regiment, at division, or at the artillery command. Telephone and telegraph lines were left entirely above ground, and there was no plan for burying any lines, either commercial or military. A large number of repairmen, organized into signal labor units, were deployed along the principal routes to repair any damage from bombing or from the weather. Commercial telephone and telegraph lines suffer from two basic defects - poor wire and inadequate power. This results in weak communications even under favorable conditions. The field wire was the same as that previously used by the Japanese and its durability and efficiency under combat

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conditions is known to be poor. There was not a sufficient quantity of field radio equipment to meet the needs of the situation; the equipment on hand was of good quality; but obsolescent; however, reduced standards in the training program had resulted in a critical shortage of reliable radio operators in both the 40th and 57th Armies. Staff officers estimated that this situation could not be remedied.

(2) Japanese Navy.

Navy communications were primarily by radio and secondarily by line. As a result, the naval suicide boat units and air bases had adequate communication with SASEBO and OITA. There was no plan to coordinate navy and army communications, and no attempt to do so on the part of any one had been made by the time of the surrender.

d. Weather.

The weather in Southern Kyushu is generally clear during the months of November and December with occasional rainfalls. The duration of the average rainfall for that time of year is short, but the rate of fall is fairly intense. Average maximum temperature is from 70° to 80° Fahrenheit; minimum 40° to 50°. During daylight hours the temperature is quite comfortable but at night it is unconfortably cold. There are few clouds and no fog to mar visibility. There is little wind, and tides at all landing beaches are suitable for the landing of assault troops.

The weather initially would be a disadvantage to the defenders because of the low winds and favorable tides which present no serious obstacle to landing. The absence of clouds or fog would be an advantage to both sides in that visibility is unlimited, but the defenders would profit more by this than would the attackers because they would previously have had an opportunity to take advantage of natural and artificial concealment and to select vantage points from which clear observation of the assault units could be maintained.

The occasional rains are sufficient to flood the rice fields and to convert sections of roads into pools of mud;

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thus, considerably limiting the mobility of the attacking forces. The cold nights would tend to lower the morale of both sides, but probably would have bothered the Japanese less, because in spite of their poorer winter clothing, they have been accustomed to the weather in the area, and would have the advantage of previously prepared shelter. Because of the variations between the temperature in daylight and darkness hours, the moisture in the air and on the ground, and the abnormal exposures brought about by combat conditions, respiratory disease would probably have produced many non-battle casualties on each side.

e. Transportation.

Motorization of Japanese units was comparable to that found in all operations on large or relatively large land masses throughout the war. Although units were equipped with many vehicles, less than three hundred per Army were operational and those were in poor condition. Fuel supplies were low and resupply would be extremely limited. Capacity of the best trucks does not exceed 1 1/2 tons. In the area of the 57th Army there were many cavalry horses which were to be used as draft animals; however, the nature of the terrain and the condition of routes of communication made any movement of horse drawn vehicles excessively slow and their range of operation would be limited to roads and well defined trails. Any movement of units other than medium artillery units (which were equipped with diesel powered, full track-laying prime movers) would necessarily have been accomplished by foot, and movement of artillery weapons into position would have been by manhandling.

This inferiority of transportation would have been a distinct disadvantage to the defenders throughout all stages of the operation. It would prohibit the rapid movement of reinforcements to any of the landing areas; the evacuation of troops, weapons, or equipment to more favorable terrain; and the normal resupply for units in the line.

f. Civilians and Civilian Organizations.

Wherever possible, civilians were drafted into the armed

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forces. Those male civilians who remained were organized into prefectural militia units, and these had very little training and almost no weapons. There was no expectation of correcting either deficiency. Existence of such militia was an advantage to the defenders in that added personnel for general duty was available, but due to the critical armament shortage and status of training, this advantage was greatly reduced. Untrained personnel under fire would present an obstacle to both sides. In addition, the Japanese had not prepared and did not intend to prepare, any plan for the evacuation of civilians or the declaration of open cities. The presence of disorganized civilian personnel in combat areas would be detrimental to both sides; however, the ultimate advantage gained from these circumstances would be to the defense, as the burden of collecting and evacuating civilians from cleared areas would fall upon the advancing forces.

8. CONCLUSION

It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened had the American Sixth Army landed according to the invasion schedule. This conclusion deals with the possible course of the action as deduced from a study of our operation plan, the Japanese plan of defense and other material reviewed in the preparation of this Appendix.

No attempt will be made herein to inject conjecture on the effects of the September and October typhoons. The discussion will deal solely with the proposed operation, defense and possible outcome.

First let us review our mission.

Briefly, the mission of the American Sixth Army was as follows: Following a sustained period of blockade and aerial bombardment of all Japan, and a heavy concentrated aerial and naval bombardment of the areas of the invasion beaches, the Sixth Army, in conjunction and as arranged with the Fifth Fleet and Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, and supported by the Far East Air Forces, was to seize and occupy Southern KYUSHU as far north as the general line TSUNO-SENDAI in order to permit the establishment

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therein of air and naval forces for support of further operations into the industrial heart of Japan.

The operation was to have progressed as is outlined in the following paragraphs:

On X minus 5 the 40th Infantry Division, reinforced, was to land on KUCHINO-ERABU SHIMA, KURO SHIMA, KUSAKAKI JIMA, UJI GUNTO; all of which are islands and island chains southwest of Southern KYUSHU. The division was to secure these islands to provide air warning facilities to aid in the main landings which were to follow. Simultaneously the 158th RCT, afloat in the OKINAWA area was to be prepared for landing on Northern TANEGA SHIMA, south of KYUSHU, to destroy hostile forces and assist in clearing OSUMI-KAIKYO.

The 40th Division, on X minus 4 was to land in Northern and Southern KOSHIKI RETTO to secure NAKAKOSHIKI WAN, NAKAGAWARA URA and other areas suitable for the establishment of emergency anchorages, seaplane bases, and air warning stations.

On X day simultaneous landings were to be effected at two points along the southeastern shore and at one point along the southwestern shore of KYUSHU.

I Corps was to land in the YAMAZAKI MATSUSAKI Area of southeastern KYUSHU, capture MIYAZAKI and MIYAZAKI Airfield and secure a corps beachhead to include FUKUSHIMA on the south bank of HITOSUSE-GAWA.

XI Corps was to land in the SHIBUSHI-KASHIWABARU Area of ARIAKE WAN, capture SHIBUSHI and the SHIBUSHI Airfield and to secure a Corps beachhead.

V Amphibious Corps was to land with two divisions in assault and one in reserve in the KAMINOKAWA-KUSHIKINO Area of Southwestern KYUSHU and establish a beachhead.

IX Corps was to be prepared to reinforce other elements of the Sixth Army in objective areas as directed, or to land on the south coast of KYUSHU, west of KAIMON-DAKE, on or after X plus 3. At the same time the 158th RCT was to be prepared to rein-

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force elements of the Sixth Army as directed.

After its beachhead had been secured and when so directed by Sixth Army, I Corps was to advance inland and secure the general line SADOHARA-HONJO-TAWAO-AOIDAKE and to establish early contact with XI Corps if possible. XI Corps, meanwhile, was to advance inland and secure the general line AOKI-IWAKAWA-TAKAKUMA-KANOYA and to attempt to establish early contact with I Corps.

V Amphibious Corps, when directed, was to advance with a division toward SENDAI and another division toward KAGOSHIMA. This Corps was to secure the general line KAGOSHIMA-KAWAKAMICHO-ICHIINO-SENDAI. All Corps were to establish communications facilities and to construct and improve roads and airfields as directed.

The 11th Airborne Division, Sixth Army reserve, afloat off the objective area on X plus 22 was to have been prepared to reinforce elements of the Sixth Army as directed.

It is safe to assume that the preliminary naval gunfire and aerial bombardment would have:

a. Seriously impaired, if not completely destroyed, the rail system as the main artery of supply and movement.

b. Caused sufficient damage to the communication system of exposed wire and power plants, to have dangerously jeopardized the entire system.

c. Caused sufficient damage to supply depots and dumps to have made normal supply and resupply insufficient for battle requirements.

d. Caused sufficient damage to critical roads to have seriously hampered and slowed down supply and troop movement.

The combined effects would have had a normal reaction of demoralization, and confusion, which unquestionably would have effected morale, particularly of the civilian population.

It is probable that Japanese intelligence would have noted the assembly of our task forces at forward areas. Such intelligence

coupled with the increased tempo of the preliminary naval and aerial bombardment would, from past experience, have been the cue to our impending invasion.

The islands with which invasion would have begun had more outpost defenses with very few troops and would have been captured easily, except in the case of TANEGA SHIMA. This, to be assaulted by the 158 RCT, was defended by over 6000 Japanese with some CD guns. The defending force included the 109th IMB, seven separate infantry battalions, one independent field artillery battery plus an assortment of signal, medical, engineer, airfield, service and naval AA personnel. They were disposed over the length of the island.

Our preliminary attack of the islands to the south and southwest of KYUSHU, would have been definite confirmation of the coming invasion and might have been interpreted by the Japanese command as an indication that our landing was to be attempted on the south western coast.

On the other hand, the intensified preliminary naval and air bombardment of the MIYAZAKI and ARIAKE WAN as well as the western beach areas, should have been interpreted as an indication that all three areas were being "softened up" in preparation for invasion.

The difficulty of moving one reserve division, or both, over the bad road system to any or all of the threatened areas, during the period of intensified preliminary aerial bombardment, coupled with their original plan to hold the reserve divisions for a counter attacking force, would probably have resulted in no early movement of the 25th or 77th Divisions. The 216th Division at KUMAMOTO would have been alerted and possibly started south.

In spite of counter-measures the attacks directed against the task forces and transport areas would unquestionably have been serious and would have caused losses.

If the Japanese had adhered to their plan of opening fire from all coast defense weapons as the invasion craft came in range, their batteries would have been early disclosed and subject to naval counter-battery fire and probably destruction.

From a wealth of experience, it may be assumed that, under the shock and destructive effects of preliminary and covering

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naval gunfire, the landing forces would have carried the beach defenses.

a. I Corps-MIYAZAKI Area

Due to the surrounding plains, the beahheads of the MIYAZAKI and ARIAKE WAN areas, would probably have been expanded and developed more rapidly than those on the west coast.

The strong concentration of Japanese divisions and the prepared plan to utilize the inland surrounding hills and mountains in the MIYAZAKI area, would have imposed heavy fighting on the I Corps.

However, I Corps was landing in a relatively concentrated mass with vastly superior supporting and organic fires at their disposal, than the 156th Division in defense could muster at the point of landing.

To support this threatened area the 57th Army could have withdrawn the 212th Division on their left flank and portions of the 154th Division not engaged, as per their original plan to commit them at the threatened point.

Likewise, in spite of their plan, the 16th Area Army could have ordered the 25th Division in central reserve, to the support of the 57th Army.

However, the extreme difficulties of this movement due to rail, road and communication difficulties, and in face of continuous aerial effort, would have unquestionably resulted in piecemeal and late commitments.

Inability to concentrate their divisions against our massed I Corps would have presented the opportunity for their defeat in detail.

b. XI Corps - ARIAKE WAN Area.

The XI Corps while having the disadvantage of flanking fires during their beach approach and after landing, had the strong advantage of mass against the extended 86th Division in defense.

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A second advantage appears in that the XI Corps had considerable open country through which to maneuver and expand their beachhead, with a wide corridor leading north toward MIYAKONOJO and one running west to KANOYA and KAGOSHIMA WAN. The terrain study has pointed out the restrictions and limitations of these corridors, but their very size and extent would necessitate the defender being emplaced at sufficient distances and ranges to have given the XI Corps some opportunity to deploy for the advance and assault.

It should be remembered that the Japanese plan of defense of this area included covering the beach approaches and beaches with fire from their CD batteries. It also called for the emplacement of artillery on suitable inland terrain to cover the wide corridors.

The early admitted deficiencies in Japanese communications, fire control and the lack of unified artillery command are so apparent in this study that it is a fair assumption that their batteries operating individually on targets of opportunity would have nullified the accomplishment of any concentration or massing of fires and would have exposed their individual locations for counter battery.

Avenues of approach for the Japanese 16th Area Army Reserve, either the 25th or 77th Division, were less difficult than to any other threatened area. While daylight movement would have been difficult due to planned air support, the open corridors would have facilitated night movements.

In all events, any 16th Area Army committments of reserves would have weakened the reserves available to support the MIYAZAKI Area.

It is highly possible that the difficulties of movement and dificiencies of communication might have resulted in the establishment of a secondary defensive area for the 77th and the 216th Division when it arrived, in the vicinity of MIYAKONOJO.

c. V Amphibious Corps - WESTERN BEACHES.

The landing of the V Amphibious Corps on the western

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beaches of SATSUMA Peninsula, and the accomplishment of its mission was faced with a series of complex difficulties. The ridge running parallel to the relatively narrow landing beaches initially offered some defilade for the defender. The mountainous, rough terrain inland provided innumberable advantageous sites for observation, the emplacement of weapons and for cover and concealment.

When the ridge paralleling the beach was captured it would, in turn, provide defilade for the attacker.

The 3rd and 2nd Marine Divisions landing abreast, with the 2nd on the right, each confronted approximately one battalion in defensive positions to their front.

The expansion of the beachhead to the O-2 line would have been a difficult task due to the initial ridge paralleling the beach, the narrow flat ground backing it, covered with rice paddies, dykes, and built up road banks, all of which, as has been stated, were dominated by mountainous and wooded commanding ground.

The corridor to SENDAI which was to have been forced by the 3rd Division was narrow and difficult and dominated by mountainous, forbidding terrain.

The corridor from the 2nd Division beaches to the city of KAGOSHIMA was generally wider than the SENDAI corridor, but was also dominated by commanding ground. It was of irregular width, the bulge sections being invariably cultivated with rice paddies.

In all probability elements of the 303rd Japanese Division on our left, having difficulties in daylight movement south, would have been committed piecemeal against our left flank or would have been forced to organize for defense north of SENDAI, the latter course being considered most likely.

The 16th Area Army plan for the committment of the 77th Division which was in reserve, had called for movement south, chiefly on foot, along the shore roads of KAGOSHIMA WAN, cutting westward across the SATSUMA Peninsula just west of the city of KAGOSHIMA.

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This plan was based on the assumption of our landing at FUKIAGI HAMA, which was considerably south of our actual landing beaches. As has been stated, the movement would have required from six to seven days.

In the light of our landing considerably north of where they expected us to land and again because of the difficulties of movement in the face of our proposed air support, it seems obvious that the 16th Area Army would have been forced to one of two of the following courses of action or a combination of both: (a) To establish an inland defensive area between SENDAI and the northern end of KAGOSHIMA WAN or (b) To move over the thoroughly inadequate road net directly to our front to counter-attack.

Analysis of all the factors point toward the adoption of the first course of action as the most probable.

It seems certain they would not have jeopardized any major units by sending them south on the SATSUMA Peninsula where there was an obvious possibility of their being pinched off and trapped.

The extension of the beachhead forward and to the north to include SENDAI would have been a difficult task of fighting the defender and terrain. From here on the task would have been magnified by the deployment of our forces and by the advance into more difficult terrain.

The Japanese had the advantage of the choice ofsites for defensive weapons and troop disposition. Likewise they had excellent observation of our advance. From this standpoint the terrain favored the defender. Neither side had the opportunity for maneuver. The Japanese, having been committed to a defensive role and restricted in movement would have been exposed to destruction in detail. The 2nd Division, on the right, had more open terrain to their front and right, after crossing the initial ridge, than the 3rd Division on their left.

However, the open country was marshy, full of rice paddies, and reasonably short of cover and concealment. Sufficient

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high ground surrounding the flats afforded the defender ample opportunity for continual observation and the establishment of covering weapons.

The situation in the zone of the 2nd Division on the other hand, particularly after leaving the O-2 line for KAGOSHIMA, presented an ever expanding flank to contain the 206th, and 146th Japanese Divisions and the 125th IMB.

While the Japanese plan called for no withdrawals, it seems certain that the impending severance of the only route of escape up the penninsula would have seen some elements endeavoring to cut their way through. Likewise any effort to employ uncommitted elements of the 206th Division or portions of the 146th Division would have undoubtedly subjected the right flank of our advance on the city of KAGOSHIMA, to severe pressure.

Had the IX Corps been committed on X plus 4 on the southern most beaches of SATSUMA Peninsula, the shock of this impact would have unquestionably caused an exodus to the north where the retiring Japanese elements would have added to the pressure of our right flank defense.

d. IX Corps - SOUTHERN BEACH AREA.

The disposition of the defending forces on X plus 3 at the southern end of SATSUMA peninsula is hard to predict. It seems logical to assume that the 125th IMB, rated as an A-1 combat unit by the Japanese, would have held to their mission of guarding the southeastern end of the peninsula and the entrance to the KAGOSHIMA WAN.

The 6th Tank Brigade would very likely have been moved north by night, to cover the city of KAGOSHIMA and to attack our right flank.

The 146th Division, organized with 4 infantry regiments, might very likely have withdrawn one or even two regiments for reemployment against the VAC right flank. In all events the initial landing, made through cultivated lowlands, would have been flanked and faced with compressed defending ele-

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ments made them more desperate by having their only escape route closed.

In theory the Japanese plan of defense was conceived to be and probably would have been, in the initial phases, a costly one for the invasion forces.

While the Japanese unquestionably would have been driven to a scattered defense in depth, their lack of initial planning and preparation for such a defense would have resulted in gradual annihilation in detail.

Fighting, in spite of lowered morale, would have been desperate due to the number of defenders that would have been compressed and trapped with all retreat cut off.

Blue movement north of KAGOSHIMA WAN to the initial army boundary would, by virtue of terrain alone, have been slow and difficult.

The accomplishment of the mission could hardly have been effected by the movement of the Japanese reserves from central and northern KYUSHU.

The difficulties of moving the 216th Division from KUMAMOTO to the KIBISHIMA region would in all likelihood have been great. Their arrival would have greatly augmented the counterattack force.

Had our combined attack and simultaneous landings altered their mass counter-attack plan, as it is believed it would, it is likely that the KIRISHIMA area would have developed into a core of defense.

While such a belated stand might have been a difficult one to destroy, it could not have altered the accomplishment of the mission as it could be contained and bypassed and in all events it could not deny our use of the captured airfields, beachheads or KAGOSHIMA WAN.

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

CHAIN OF COMMAND OF PRINCIPAL ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR UNITS ON KYUSHU

LEGEND

——————— TACTICAL CONTROL

– – – – – – – – – – – ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

PREPARED BY AC of S, G-2, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

REPRO. TOPO. CO., VAC.

RECAPITULATION

	ARMY	NAVY	AIR
COMBAT	344,600	45,800	17,900
SERVICE	219,500	64,700	99,200
TOTAL	564,100	110,500	117,100
GRAND TOTAL			791,700

Diagram (a) Para 2, Appendix 3 to Annex Charlie

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

SIXTH ARMY ORGANIZATION

I CORPS

25th. INF. DIV.
33rd. INF. DIV.
41st. INF. DIV.

V PHIB. CORPS.

2nd. MAR. DIV.
3rd. MAR. DIV.
5th. MAR. DIV.

XI CORPS

1st. CAV. DIV.
43rd. INF. DIV.
AMERICAL INF. DIV.

IX CORPS

77th. INF. DIV.
81st. INF. DIV.
98th. INF. DIV.

40th. INF. DIV. (REINF)
11th. AIRBORNE DIV. (REINF)
(ARMY RESERVE)
158th. R C T (REINF)
ARMY SERVICE COMM. —
OLYMPIC (ASCOMO)

SIXTH ARMY
PLAN OF ATTACK
SOUTHERN KYUSHU

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DIAGRAM (a-1) PARA 3
TO
APPENDIX 3,
ANNEX CHARLI

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

DEFENSE SECTORS ASSIGNED TO PRINCIPAL JAPANESE COMBAT UNITS FOR DEFENSE OF KYUSHU AS OF AUGUST, 1945

ARMY FORCES-RED
NAVY FORCES-BLUE

XL—40th ARMY
LVI—56th ARMY
LVII-57th ARMY

DIAGRAM (a) PARA 3
TO
APPENDIX 3,
ANNEX CHARLIE

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

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

AIRFIELDS
KYUSHU AND ADJACENT AREAS

ARMY INSTALLATIONS - RED
NAVY INSTALLATIONS - BLUE

● AIRFIELD
○ LANDING GROUND
▲ SEAPLANE BASE

DOTTED LINE ENCLOSES PRINCIPAL STAGING AREA FOR AIR DEFENSE OF KYUSHU.

DIAGRAM(c) PARA 3
TO
APPENDIX 3 ANNEX CHARLIE

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

LEGEND

S = Suicide Surface Craft
H = Human Torpedo
M = Midget Submarine

Underlined letters indicate actual Boats or Weapons located there.

Encircled letters indicate facilities exist, but no Boats or Weapons present.

KYUSHU SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF BASES FOR MIDGET SUBS - HUMAN TORPEDOES - SUICIDE SURFACE CRAFT

DIAGRAM (d) PARA 3
TO
APPENDIX 3
ANNEX CHARLIE

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KUMAMOTO
KURUME
KURUME DIV
XXX
LVII
KUMAMOTO DIV
XXX
XL
LVII
XL
XX
XX
XX

Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

DETAILED ORDER OF BATTLE VAC AREA

0189/268
0788B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE REPORT.

UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO		CODE
		16TH AREA ARMY			
16th Area Army Hq	888	1,188	LtGen YOKOYAMA, I.	MUTSU	13500
		40TH ARMY			
Location: Southwest KYUSHU (west of KAGOSHIMA Bay and south of the 32nd parallel).					
Mission: To defend south KYUSHU in conjunction with the 57th Army.					
40th Army Hq	399	451	LtGen NAKAZAWA, N.	YO	21300
146th Inf Div Hq	643	294	LtGen TSUBOSHIMA, F.	GONAN	22402
421st Inf Regt	3,850	3,307	Col WATANABE, Y.	"	22403
422nd Inf Regt	3,850	3,307	LtCol FUKUSAKI, K.	"	22404
423rd Inf Regt	3,850	3,307	Col HOKASONO, S.	"	22405
424th Inf Regt	3,207	2,638	LtCol SAKAKI, R.	"	22406
Arty Bn	508	508	Unknown	"	42325
AT Unit	484	402	Unknown	"	22407
Trans Co	235	360	Col SUZUKI, J.	"	22409
Sig Co	484	235	Capt KOMAKI, T.	"	22408
Ordnance Duty Unit	108	108	1stLt KAI, K.	"	22410
Fld Hosp	208	208	Capt NOZAKI, M.	"	22411
Attached:					
2nd Bn, 28th Med Arty Regt	700	700	Unknown	YO	14318
Div Total	18,127	15,374			
206th Inf Div Hq	1,041	249	LtGen IWAKIRI, H.	ASO	32402
510th Inf Regt	4,434	4,074	LtCol MORISONO, T.	"	32403
511th Inf Regt	4,434	4,074	Col YAMAUCHI, S.	"	32404
512th Inf Regt	4,434	4,074	LtCol KUTSUKATA, Y.	"	32405
206th Mtn Arty Regt	2,496	1,782	Maj TASHIMA, S.	"	14350
206th Mortar Regt	1,666	1,446	LtCol OKAMOTO, N.	"	32406
AT Unit	480	340	Maj UCHIDA, S.	"	32407
MC Unit	340	467	Capt WATANABE, S.	"	32408
Engr Regt	1,003	999	Maj OKAMOTO, T.	"	32409
Trans Bn	436	407	Maj KIMOTSUKI, K.	"	32411

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO		CODE
Sig Co	293	300	Maj NAGATA, A.	ASO	32410
Ordnance Duty Unit	112	113	Unknown	"	32412
Medical Unit	1,109	Not Activated		"	32413
1st Fld Hosp	227	Not Activated		"	32414
2nd Fld Hosp	277	Not Activated		"	32415
4th Fld Hosp	277	216	Maj ARAKI	"	32416
Vet Hosp	125	Not Activated		"	32417
Div Total	23,239	18,541			
303rd Inf Div Hq	776	350	MajGen NOSOE, S.	TAKAMORO	21771
337th Inf Regt	3,042	3,500	Col ITO, Z.	"	21772
338th Inf Regt	3,042	3,500	LtCol HIRONAKA, U.	"	21773
339th Inf Regt	3,042	3,500	LtCol HIRAI, S.	"	21774
Rocket Bn	692	700	Capt KOBAYASHI, N.	"	21775
Engr Bn	806	700	Capt ABURASAKI, S.	"	21776
Trans Co	300	300	1stLt YOSHIDA, T.	"	21778
Sig Co	230	200	Capt YAMATO, N.	"	21777
Fld Hosp	232	250	Maj KAWAI, T.	"	21779
Div Total	12,212	13,000			
125th Ind Mixed Brig Hq	394	240	MajGen KURAHASHI, S.	KOTEN	42326
749th Ind Inf Bn	897	1,006	Maj MUKAI, K.	"	42327
750th Ind Inf Bn	897	985	Maj SHIBUYA, J.	"	42328
751st Ind Inf Bn	897	1,033	Maj ANDO, S.	"	42329
752nd Ind Inf Bn	897	972	Maj SUETOMI, T.	"	42330
753rd Ind Inf Bn	897	970	Capt HAMAZAKI, F.	"	42331
754th Ind Inf Bn	897	956	Capt WAKITANI, M.	"	42332
Arty Bn	551	521	Maj NAKAYAMA, T.	"	42333
Engr Bn	572	554	Capt YOSHIKAWA, R.	"	42334
Sig Co	224	196	1stLt YOSHIZAWA, Y.	"	42335
Med Unit	190	177	Capt KANEKO, Y.	"	42336
Attached:					
435th Ind Inf Bn	1,036	604	Capt SUGIMOTO, Y.	YO	42384
Brig Total	8,349	8,214			
6th Ind Tk Brig Hq	276	276	Col MATSUDA, T.	TO	12590
37th Tk Regt	1,198	Attached to 5th Tk Brig, 57th Army.			
40th Tk Regt	1,198	1,185	Maj ONO, J.	TO	12533
MC Unit	556	556	Capt SHIMADA, K.	"	12548
Maintenance Unit	202	202	Maj HIKATA, F.	"	12575
Trans Co	377	377	Capt SEKI, H.	"	12578

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO		CODE
Attached:					
13th Ind Tk Co	66	62	Capt ONISHI, Y.	TO	12635
Brig Total	3,878	2,658			
4th Arty Comd	119	102	MajGen FUJIYAMA, C.	YO	(none)
Mobile Units:					
9th Ind Fld Arty Regt	1,862	Scheduled transfer from KUMAMOTO on 25 August, 1945.			
28th Med Arty Regt (less 2nd Bn)	1,286	940	LtCol YAMANE, T.	YO	14318
20th Med Arty Bn	700	692	Maj OKAZAKI, A.	"	21794
8th S-P Arty Bn	481	382	___ YAMASHITA, H.	"	28292
21st Med Mortar Bn	1,407	In process activation at KUMAMOTO.			
24th Med Mortar Bn	1,407	1,407	Maj IWAMOTO, G.	"	15118
25th Med Mortar Bn	1,407	1,407	Capt FUJIMOTO, M.	"	42350
Total Mobile Units	8,550	4,628			
Coast Defense:					
44th Ind Hvy Arty Bn	453	451	Maj SUETSUGU, Y.	YO	12538
Under direct control 40th Army:					
104th Ind Engr Bn	891	849	Capt NONAKA, K.	YO	21735
122nd Ind Engr Bn	891	849	Capt HIRAKAWA, E.	"	42353
43rd Sig Regt	1,891	1,559	Maj KISHI, M.	"	13379
35th Suic.Bt.Unit	96	98	Capt TAMURA, H.	"	(none)
36th Suic.Bt.Unit	96	98	Unknown	"	(none)
5th Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit	399	400	1stLt NAGAKI, K.	"	(none)
6th Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit	399	400	Unknown	"	(none)
16th Fld Duty Unit Hq	17	17	LtCol OIDE, D.	MUTSU	8866
4th AAA Div units under control 40th Army:					
2nd Bn. 131st AAA Regt (less 8th, 9th, 11th Co's)	435	435	Capt INOUATA, H.	SUI	8061
98th Fld AAA Bn (less 2nd Co)	400	400	Maj TAKASE, G.	SUI	12469
4th, 5th Co's 21st MC Bn	400	400		SUI	8088
Administrative control 40th Army, tactical direction 16th Area Army:					
77th Inf Div Hq	1,036	450	LtGen NAKAYAMA, M.	MINORU	9254
98th Inf Regt	3,081	3,100	Col OTA, G.	"	9258
99th Inf Regt	3,081	3,100	Col YAMAGUCHI, T.	"	9260

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO		CODE
100th Inf Regt	3,081	3,100	LtCol UEHARA, S.	MINORU	9262
77th Cav Regt	534	700	LtCol OTAKA, S.	"	9264
77th Mtn Arty Regt	1,540	1,500	Col ICHIYANAGI, T.	"	9268
AT Unit	463	500	Maj NITTA, T.	"	9266
77th Engr Regt	732	850	Maj MIWA, M.	"	9269
77th Trans Regt	749	800	Maj ONO, K.	"	9272
Sig Co	239	300	Maj ANDO, E.	"	9270
Chem. War. Unit	85	150	Unknown	"	15577
Ordnance Duty Unit	81	100	1stLt NOMURA, J.	"	15578
Medical Unit	491	400	Capt MORI, A.	"	9274
1st Fld Hosp	195	200	Capt ARAKAWA, N.	"	9276
4th Fld Hosp	200	200	Capt AKASHI, M.	"	9273
Vet Hosp	52	150	Unknown	"	15579
Div Total	15,640	15,600			
40th Army Total	96,363	84,622			

57TH ARMY

Location: Southeast KYUSHU (KAGOSHIMA Bay to NOBEOKA).

Mission: To defend south KYUSHU in conjunction with the 40th Army.

57th Army Hq	599	465	LtGen NISHIKARA, K.	HOKO	23590
86th Inf Div Hq	1,070	277	LtGen YOSHINAKA, W.	SEKI	15100
137th Inf Regt	3,081	3,072	Col KANISHI, S.	"	15102
183th Inf Regt	3,081	3,081	Col ISHII, Y.	"	15103
189th Inf Regt	3,081	3,081	Col YAMAGATA, T.	"	15104
86th Fld Arty Regt	1,108	1,108	LtCol SAKAWA, T.	"	15106
AT Unit	480	480	Capt FUSHIMI, N.	"	15105
86th Engr Regt	732	732	Maj ARITOSHI, T.	"	15107
86th Trans Regt	749	544	Col SEGAWA, M.	"	15109
Sig Co	239	208	Capt FUCHIGAMI, S.	"	15108
Chem.War.Unit	85	85	1stLt MATSUZAKI, T.	"	15113
Ordnance Duty Unit	81	55	Capt IMAMURA, K.	"	15114
Medical Unit	491	362	LtCol NISHIDA, C.	"	15110
1st Fld Hosp	195	172	Capt MASUDA, K.	"	15111
4th Fld Hosp	200	174	Maj IWAMOTO, Y.	"	15112
Vet Hosp	52	49	Capt ABE, I.	"	15115
Attached:					
364th Ind Inf Regt	3,207	3,207	Unknown	"	23245
Div Total	17,932	16,687			

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO		CODE
154th Inf Div Hq	643	252	MajGen FUTAMI, A.	GORO	22702
445th Inf Regt	3,850	3,828	Col HORI, R.	"	22703
446th Inf Regt	3,850	3,828	LtCol SEMO, S.	"	22704
447th Inf Regt	3,850	3,828	LtCol SARAKI, I.	"	22705
448th Inf Regt	3,207	3,185	LtCol NAGANATSU, K.	"	22706
Arty Bn	503	503	Unknown	"	(none)
AT Unit	434	434	Capt FUJII, A.	"	22707
Trans Co	486	294	Maj OHIHARA, K.	"	22709
Sig Co	235	186	Capt TOMIYORI, H.	"	22708
Ordnance Duty Unit	108	73	Capt HIRAI, N.	"	22710
Fld Hosp	208	177	Capt YUASA, Y.	"	22711
Div Total	17,429	16,643			
156th Inf Div Hq	113	252	LtGen HIGUCHI, K.	GOSEI	22802
453rd Inf Regt	3,850	3,845	Col OTONARI, G.	"	22803
454th Inf Regt	3,850	3,845	Col AKITOMI, K.	"	22804
455th Inf Regt	3,850	3,845	Col OE, F.	"	22805
456th Inf Regt	3,207	3,802	Col KOGA, T.	"	22806
Arty Bn	503	503	Unknown	"	22812
AT Unit	434	434	Capt FUJIMARU, S.	"	22807
Trans Co	431	291	Col NAKAO, M.	"	22809
Sig Co	235	179	Capt KONO, T.	"	22808
Ordnance Duty Unit	108	77	1stLt YAMAMSAKI, T.	"	22810
Fld Hosp	203	179	Capt TAKAHASHI, T.	"	22811
Div Total	16,394	17,207			
212th Inf Div Hq	1,041	255	MajGen SAKURAI, T.	KIKUCHI	32602
516th Inf Regt	4,434	4,336	LtCol KANETA, T.	"	32603
517th Inf Regt	4,434	4,336	LtCol HIGASHI, N.	"	32604
513th Inf Regt	4,434	4,337	LtCol MATSUMURA, T.	"	32605
212th Mtn Arty Regt	2,496	2,496	Maj IWAKAMI, S.	"	32606
212th Med Mort.Regt	1,666	1,666	LtCol NAGATA, T.	"	32607
AT Unit	480	480	Maj ISHIDA, H.	"	32608
MC Unit	340	340	Maj NISHIDA, K.	"	32609
Engr Regt	1,003	1,003	Maj KAMIKAWA, K.	"	32610
Trans Co	436	306	Maj MATSUNAGA, S.	"	32612
Sig Co.	293	212	Maj MIZUNA, Y.	"	32611
Chem,War.Unit	137	137	Unknown	"	32613
Ordnance Duty Unit	112	81	1stLt SHIMADA, T.	"	32614
Med Unit	1,109	Not activated.			

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
1st Fld Hosp	277	Not activated.		
2nd Fld Hosp	277	Not activated.		
4th Fld Hosp	277	241	Maj WATANABE, O.	KIKUCHI 32618
Vet Hosp	125	Not activated.		
Div Total	23,426	20,276		
93th Ind Mixed Brig Hq	576	576	MajGen KUROUSU, G.	KENSHI 7062
664th Ind Inf Bn	393	393	Maj IMAMURA, T.	" 7063
665th Ind Inf Bn	393	393	Maj ARIZONO, T.	" 7064
666th Ind Inf Bn	393	393	Capt MARUONO, H.	" 7065
667th Ind Inf Bn	393	393	Capt MARUNO, N.	" 7066
15th Hvy Arty Regt	1,221	1,241	Col ISHIGURO, T.	" 13560
Engr Co	249	249	1stLt TOKUMARU, K.	" 7067
Attached:				
765th Ind Inf Bn	397	397	Unknown	SEKI 28365
766th Ind Inf Bn	397	397	Unknown	" 28366
767th Ind Inf Bn	397	397	Unknown	" 28367
Brig Total	3,329	3,349		
5th Ind Tk Brig Hq	276	276	Col TAKASAWA, H.	YAKU 12530
18th Tk Regt	1,200	1,200	Maj SHIRADA, T	" 12532
43rd Tk Regt	497	497	Maj KATO, T.	" 12549
MC Unit	556	556	Maj HIRANO, H.	" 12547
Maintenance Unit	202	202	Maj SHIMIZU, K.	" 12574
Trans Co	377	377	Capt TAZAKI, K.	" 12576
Attached:				
37th Tk Regt	1,174	1,136	Maj OKUMA, I.	TO 12577
1st Sp Tk Unit	?	350	Unknown	Unknown
Brig Total	4,236	4,644		
1st Arty Comd	117	110	MajGen TAKEDA, M.	HOKO 3370
Mobile Units:				
6th Arty Intel Regt	637	690	Maj KATO, K.	" 12402
19th Ind Mtn Arty Regt	1,669	2,900	LtCol TSUDA, S	" 42349
23th Ind Mtn Arty Bn	523	533	Maj UEDA, H.	" 14235
13th Med Arty Regt	1,669	2,095	Col MAKO, S.	" 12531
54th Med Arty Regt	1,669	2,100	Col EGASHIRA, K.	" 12532
5th S-P Arty Bn	431	430	Unknown	" 21760
7th S-P Arty Bn	431	431	Unknown	" 28249
2nd Rocket Bn	345	300	Maj TANIGUCHI, Y.	" 12382
4th Tr. Mortar Bn	1,407	1,430	Capt BANGEN, T.	" 36372

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
20th Tr. Mortar Bn	1,407	1,360	Unknown	HOKO	28372
26th Tr. Mortar Bn	1,407	In process activation at FUKUOKA.			
28th Tr. Mortar Bn	1,407	1,400	Unknown	"	42351
Total Mobile Units	13,724	14,334			
Coast Defense:					
9th Ind Hvy Arty Bn	533	673	Maj OZAWA, H.	HOKO	1023
40th Ind Hvy Arty Bn	392	450	Maj SHIGETA, M.	"	13561
43rd Ind Hvy Arty Bn	453	451	Maj SHIMAZAKI, M.	"	28338
MIYAZAKI Nav. Btry		150		None	
KAGOSHIMA Bay Nav. Btry		250		None	
SHIBUSHI Nav. AA Btry		300		None	
AKAE Nav. AA Btry		50		None	
Total Coast Defense		2,429			
3rd Engr Comd	167	166	MajGen KANAI, M.	HOKO	1271
72nd Ind Engr Bn	314	330	Maj SATO, J.	"	15052
82nd Ind Engr Bn	391	384	Maj FUJITA, N.	"	27403
120th Ind Engr Bn	391	379	Capt YAMAOKA, K.	"	42352
121st Ind Engr Bn	391	350	Unknown	"	15122
Comd Total	3,654	3,659			
7th Fld Trans Comd	37	37	Maj SHIBASHI, T.	"	1144
34th Ind MT Bn	303	740	Maj SHINANO, K.	"	5364
56th Ind MT Bn	303	450	Maj HIRANUTSU, K.	MUTSU	6420
12th Tractor Co	145	145	1stLt OKUNO, H.	HOKO	2610
50th Fld Rd Const Unit	304	285	Capt MATSUDA, S.	MUTSU	15550
Comd Total	2,102	1,657			
13th Fld Duty Unit Hq	17	17	Maj MATSUSHITA, A.	HOKO	6916
No subordinate units allocated to this unit.					
32nd Fld Duty Unit Hq	17	17	LtCol SUETSUGU, T.	HOKO	13543
144th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt UWAWATARI, K.	"	13549
145th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt WATANABE, T	"	13550
146th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt MAKISE, N.	"	13551
147th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt ONIZUKA, T.	"	13552
148th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt YAMAMOTO, N.	"	13553
149th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt HAYASHI, M	"	13554
150th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt AYABE, Y.	"	13555
Duty Unit Total	3,594	3,594			
Under direct control 57th Army:					
41st Sig Regt	1,321	1,300	LtCol USUI, T.	HOKO	13556
65th L of C Sector	203	203	Unknown	"	6711
65th L of C Duty Co	511	500	Unknown	"	6713
99th L of C Hosp	359	240	Maj NAKANUTA, H.	MUTSU	6946
119th L of C Hosp	359	240	LtCol ISHII, Y.	"	2206

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO		CODE
4th Fld Cons Unit Hq	82	Scheduled for transfer from FUKUOKA at time of armistice.			
45th Fld Cons Unit	511	450	1stLt YAMAMURA, K.	MUTSU	5728
31st Suic.Bt.Unit	96	100	Unknown	None	
32nd Suic.Bt.Unit	96	100	Unknown	None	
1st Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit	399	400	Unknown	None	
2nd Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit	399	400	Unknown	None	
4th AAA Div units under control 57th Army:					
136th AAA Regt (less 3rd,6th,11th Co's)	2,577	2,221	LtCol SHINOURA, S.	SUI	8001
55th Ind AAA Co	162	130	Capt NAGAOKA, T.	"	8045
56th Ind AAA Co	162	176	1stLt NOMATA, Y.	"	8046
21st Ind MC Bn (less 4th,5th Co's)	675	675	Maj KOBAYASHI, E.	"	8088
1st Sp MC Unit)	(1st Co, 21st Ind MC Bn disbanded and				
2nd Sp MC Unit)	(reorganized into these units.				
3rd Sp MC Unit)					
12th Ind MC Co	144	144	1stLt HIGASHI, T.	"	8044
26th Ind MC Co	144	144	Capt TANAKA, S.	"	8019
27th Ind MC Co	144	144	1stLt HIRENO, T.	"	8047
31st Ind MC Co	138	138	1stLt TAKAHASHI, Y.	"	8091
32nd Ind MC Co	138	130	1stLt TAKAHASHI, T.	"	8092
33rd Ind MC Co	138	138	2ndLt MURAKAMI, H.	"	8093
Administrative control 57th Army, tactical direction 16th Area Army:					
25th Inf Div Hq	1,033	1,033	LtGen KATO, R.	KUNI	4901
14th Inf Regt	5,014	4,605	Col KANAMURA, T.	"	4903
40th Inf Regt	5,014	4,605	Col AIKO, T.	"	4904
70th Inf Regt	5,014	4,603	Col ISHIKAWA, K.	"	4905
75th Cav Regt	1,043	1,043	Col TANABE, M.	"	4906
15th Mtn Arty Regt	3,076	3,076	Col HARA, S.	"	4907
25th Engr Regt	913	913	LtCol FUJIMURA, T.	"	4908
25th Trans Regt	3,590	2,590	Col NIIMURA, R.	"	4910
Sig Co	239	239	1stLt MINAGUCHI, Y.	"	4909
Chem.War.Unit	227	277	1stLt KITAMURA, H.	"	4911
Ordnance Duty Unit	112	112	Capt YASUDA, S.	"	4912
Med Unit	1,109	1,109	Col KAWAI, Y.	"	4934
1st Fld Hosp	277	277	Unknown	"	4935
Vet Hosp	125	125	Capt KURAGEI, T.	"	4913
Water S & P Unit	239	239	Maj TORIYAMA, H.	"	1208
Div Total	25,920	24,851			

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO		CODE
TANEGA SHIMA Defense Force under control 57th Army:					
109th Ind Mixed Brig Hq	244	120	MajGen SENDA, S.	KENSEN	13570
678th Ind Inf Bn	590	730	Maj TAKATA, K.	"	13571
679th Ind Inf Bn	590	730	Maj JIMI, T.	"	13572
680th Ind Inf Bn	590	730	Capt IBA, Y.	"	13573
681st Ind Inf Bn	705	705	Capt HAYASHI, T.	"	13574
682nd Ind Inf Bn	705	705	Capt YAMAMOTO, N.	"	13575
683rd Ind Inf Bn	705	705	Capt SATO, S.	"	13576
684th Ind Inf Bn	705	705	LtCol IZUMI, E.	"	13577
26th Ind Fld Arty Bn	528	528	Maj TANOUE, K.	"	13562
55th MC Unit	85	82	2ndLt UDONO, A.	"	12543
Engr Co	133	167	Capt OGAWA, F.	"	13578
Sig Co	163	115	1stLt AJISAKA, F.	"	13579
Med Unit	70	57	1stLt ODAWARA, S.	"	13581
Force Total	5,868	6,079			
Total 57th Army:					
KYUSHU	148,385	143,385			
TANEGA SHIMA	5,868	6,079			
Total	154,253	149,464			

56TH ARMY

Location: Northwest KYUSHU (MOJI to KARATSU Bay).

Mission: To defend north KYUSHU by repelling invasion of the vulnerable lowland area.

56th Army Hq	399	399	LtGen HICHIDA, I.	SO	13580
57th Inf Div Hq	1,083	1,083	LtGen YANO, M.	OKU	7200
57th Inf Regt	4,487	4,487	Col KAWARAMURA, K.	"	7202
117th Inf Regt	4,487	4,487	Col KANAKA, Z.	"	7217
132nd Inf Regt	4,487	4,487	Col KOBAYASHI, S.	"	7232
57th Arty Regt	2,305	2,305	Col TAKASE, S	"	7221
57th Engr Regt	898	898	Maj YABE, K.	"	7227
57th Trans Regt	1,815	1,815	Col TAKEI, U.	"	7235
Sig Co	239	239	Capt SAKAZUME, C.	"	7230
Ordnance Duty Unit	133	133	1stLt ABE, J.	"	7240
2nd Fld Hosp	300	300	Capt KITURA, S.	"	7244
Vet Hosp	195	195	Capt ITO, S.	"	7249
Div Total	20,429	20,429			

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
145th Inf Div Hq	643	593	LtGen OHARA, K.	GOSHU 22352
417th Inf Regt	3,850	3,863	Col AOYAMA, Y.	" 22353
418th Inf Regt	3,350	3,368	Col KIIBA, O.	" 22354
419th Inf Regt	3,850	3,863	Col MORIMOTO, J.	" 22355
420th Inf Regt	3,207	3,225	Col OGAWA, I.	" 22356
Rocket Bn	692	692	Capt ETO, K.	" 22357
AT Unit	484	484	Maj ITOGAWA, Y.	" 22357
Trans Bn	436	436	Maj KUHANO, U.	" 22359
Sig Co	235	235	1stLt HONDA, C.	" 22358
Ordnance Duty Unit	108	108	1stLt FUKUDA, N.	" 22360
Fld Hosp	203	203	Capt OBAYASHI, Y.	" 22361
Attached:				
29th Med Arty Regt	2,286	2,286	LtCol MORINAGA, G.	SO 13505
27th Med Mortar Bn	1,407	1,407	Unknown	" 15120
34th Suic.Bt.Unit	96	96	Unknown	None
4th Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit	399	311	Unknown	None
Div Total	21,801	21,735		
312th Inf Div Hq	776	776	LtGen TADA, T.	CHITOSE 32621
358th Inf Regt	3,042	3,047	LtCol UEHURA, S.	" 32622
359th Inf Regt	3,042	3,047	Col NOHURA, N.	" 32623
360th Inf Regt	3,042	3,047	Col OTSUKA, M.	" 32624
Rocket Bn	692	692	Capt TOBUSE, N.	" 32625
Engr Bn	806	806	Capt TADA, S.	" 32626
Trans Co	300	300	1stLt KAMADA, A.	" 32628
Sig Co	230	230	Capt INOUE, H.	" 32627
Fld Hosp	232	232	Maj OBA, T.	" 32629
Attached:				
19th Med Arty Bn	700	700	Capt KURAHITSU, H.	SO 21793
13th Comb. Co, 133rd AAA Regt	70	70	1stLt TAKAHASHI, Y.	SUI 8063
14th Comb. Co, 134th AAA Regt	70	70	1stLt HARA, T.	" 8064
119th Ind Engr Bn	891	891	Unknown	SO 15121
33rd Suic.Bt.Unit	96	96	Capt SAKAGUCHI, A.	None
38th Suic.Bt.Unit	96	96	Unknown	None
3rd Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit	390	394	1stLt ARIMURA, H.	None
8th Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit	399	399	1stLt KOIZUMI, S.	None
Div Total	14,933	14,943		

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
351st Inf Div Hq	776	776	LtGen FUJIMURA, K.	AKAGI	27730
328th Inf Regt	3,042	3,026	Col KATSUYA, F.	"	27731
329th Inf Regt	3,042	3,026	Col MURAOKA, Y.	"	27732
330th Inf Regt	3,042	3,027	LtCol ONO, K.	"	27733
Rocket Bn	692	692	Maj IBE, T.	"	27734
Engr Bn	806	806	Capt OGAWE, R.	"	27735
Trans Co	280	350	1stLt OGAWA, R.	"	27737
Sig Co	230	230	Capt NEGISHI, H.	"	27736
Fld Hosp	350	232	Capt NAZATO, T.	"	27738
Attached:					
12th Med Mortar Bn	1,407	1,407	Unknown	SO	21763
91st Ind Engr Bn	891	891	Unknown	"	36392
Div Total	14,608	13,713			
SHIMONOSEKI Fortress Hq	108	229	LtGen NAGANO, M.	None	
21st Sp Gar Inf Bn	853	1,025	LtCol MURAKAMI, S.	SO	7097
Hvy Arty Regt	1,025	1,025	Col HIKE, H.	"	2735
Attached:					
254th Gar Bn	550	(			
255th Gar Bn	550	(In process of formation, at time			
256th Gar Bn	550	(armistice.			
257th Gar Bn	550	(			
201st Sp Gar Engr Bn	930	)			
202nd Sp Gar Engr Bn	930	)			
203rd Sp Gar Engr Bn	930	)			
204th Sp Gar Engr Bn	930	)			
11th Tractor Co	145	145	Unknown	SO	2609
SHIMONOSEKI Mil Hosp	37	113	Unknown	None	
Fortress Total	7,908	2,537			
4th Ind Tk Brig Hq	233	276	Col IKOMA, K.	NOMI/SAKU	12491
19th Tk Regt	1,200	1,200	Maj OCHI, S.	"	12449
42nd Tk Regt	497	497	Maj KAWAHARA, Y.	"	12492
MC Unit	551	551	Capt WADA, M.	"	12493
Maintenance Unit	202	202	Maj KOSAKA, K.	"	12494
Trans Co	377	377	Capt ENDO, A.	"	12495
Brig Total	3,060	3,103			
6th Arty Comd	119	119	MajGen IHARA, H.	SO	23401
1st Arty Intel Regt	631	631	LtCol SHIBUYA, T.	"	1221
10th Med Arty Regt	1,669	1,637	Col USUMOTO, T.	"	1014
1st S-P Arty Bn	431	431	Maj SUGIYAMA, S.	"	3633
Comd Total	2,900	2,900			

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
31st Fld Duty Unit Hq	17	17	Col TAKENAKI, S.	SO	13540
137th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt YAMAGATA, M.	"	13541
138th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt KAWASAKI, S.	"	13542
139th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt HASHIMOTO, M.	"	13543
140th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt MOTOZONO, K.	"	13544
141st Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt KATO, M.	"	13545
142nd Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt KATAYAMA, T.	"	13546
143rd Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt OGATA, I.	"	13547
Duty Unit Total	3,594	3,594			
Under direct control 56th Army:					
46th Tk Regt	400	400	Maj SHIMIZU, S	SO	12546
68th Ind MT Bn	308	308	Maj KURODA, S.	"	4464
71st Ind Engr Bn	314	314	Maj MINOURA, T.	"	14173
44th Sig Regt	1,325	1,300	LtCol NAKANO, T.	"	13557
60th L of C Sector	203	203	Col YOSHIMURA, S.	"	5124
60th L of C Duty Co	511	511	Unknown	"	7173
8th Fld Cons Unit Hq	82	82	LtCol OHARA, H.	MUTSU	2622
33rd Fld Cons Unit	511	511	Capt NAGAI, H.	"	7852
4th AAA Div units under control 56th Army:					
4th AAA Comd	164	130	Maj Gen HISAMUKI, T.	SUI	8004
(NOTE: This unit was reactivated 9 June, 1945 as a coordinating unit for the AA units in SHIMONOSEKI, MOJI, TOBATA, YAWATA, and WAKAMATSU.)					
131st AAA Regt (less 3rd Co)	3,749	3,749	Col KARIYA, H.	SUI	8061
132nd AAA Regt (less 2nd Bn)	2,351	2,351	Col IIZUKA, K.	"	8062
133rd AAA Regt	1,610	1,610	Maj EGUCHI, K.	"	8063
23rd Ind AAA Bn	459	471	Maj KIYOHIYA, M.	"	8075
24th Ind AAA Bn	314	317	Capt OGAWA, T.	"	8078
28th Ind MC Co	144	144	2ndLt ITO, T.	"	8048

1st Sp MC Unit)
7th Sp MC Unit)
8th Sp MC Unit)
9th Sp MC Unit)
13th Sp MC Unit)
17th Sp MC Unit) (Irregular units organized with personnel drawn
18th Sp MC Unit)---(from other units of the 4th AAA Div.
19th Sp MC Unit) (

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
20th Sp MC Unit)					
21st Sp MC Unit)					
22nd Sp MC Unit)					
23rd Sp MC Unit)					
24th Sp MC Unit)					
21st Ind S-L Bn	596	596	Capt SUGA, Y.	SUI	3079
21st Balloon Co	222	222	Capt FUJII, T.	"	3069
IKI Island Fortress Defense Unit under control 56th Army:					
IKI Fortress Hq	369	280	MajGen CHIJIWA, K.	None	
1st Fort Inf Bn	826	826	Capt SHIMA, M.	SO	2745
2nd Fort Inf Bn	826	826	Maj KUHANOGO, K.	"	2746
3rd Fort Inf Bn	826	826	Maj OSHIGE, F.	"	2747
4th Fort Inf Bn	826	826	LtCol KAWAMURA, T.	"	2748
5th Fort Inf Bn	826	826	Maj KAGOSHIMA, M.	"	2749
6th Fort Inf Bn	826	826	Maj YAMADA, K.	"	2750
7th Fort Inf Bn	826	826	Capt ICHI, S.	"	15137
8th Fort Inf Bn	826	826	Maj OKAMOTO, T.	"	15138
9th Fort Inf Bn	826	826	Capt IRIE, T.	"	15139
Hvy Arty Regt	1,426	1,495	Col SEKI, T.	"	2737
IKI Mil Hosp	39	110	Unknown	None	
Fortress Total	9,268	9,319			
Total 56th Army:					
KYUSHU	104,895	98,622			
IKI Island	9,268	9,319			
Total	114,163	107,941			

STRATEGIC RESERVE, 16TH AREA ARMY

Location: UTO MACHI, UTO GUN, KUMAMOTO Prefecture.

Mission: To reinforce any threatened area of KYUSHU.

216th Inf Div Hq	1,041	1,041	LtGen NAKANO, Y.	HIEI	10252
522nd Inf Regt	4,234	4,587	LtCol TOMITA, M.	"	10253
523rd Inf Regt	4,234	4,587	LtCol HIRAI, S.	"	10254

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
524th Inf Regt	4,234	4,537	LtCol KATAOKA, T.	HIEI	10255
216th Fld Arty Regt	2,135	2,135	LtCol NAGAWA, Y.	"	24305
216th Med Mort.Regt	1,666	1,666	Col HATAGAWA, K.	"	10256
AT Unit	430	430	Capt OTSUKA, D.	"	10257
MC Unit	340	340	Capt TSUNEMOTO, S.	"	10253
Engr Regt	1,003	1,003	Maj ASARI, Y.	"	10259
Trans Bn	436	436	Maj TAKEUCHI, I.	"	10261
Sig Co	293	293	Capt TOMITA, Y.	"	10260
Chem.War.Unit	137	137	Unknown	None	
Ordnance Duty Unit	112	112	Capt CHIGAWA, E.	HIEI	10262
Med Unit	1,109	Not activated.			
1st Fld Hosp	277	Not activated.			
2nd Fld Hosp	277	Not activated.			
4th Fld Hosp	277	277	Capt ADACHI, A.	HIEI	10263
Vet Hosp	125	Not activated.			
Div Total	22,465	21,736			

ISOLATED DEFENSE UNITS UNDER DIRECT CONTROL 16TH AREA ARMY

Location: NAGASAKI City and vicinity.

Mission: Local defense.

122nd Ind Mixed Brig Hq	396	396	LtGen TANIGUCHI, G.	KENJO	13510
733rd Ind Inf Bn	897	893	Capt TASHIRO,	"	28282
734th Ind Inf Bn	897	) (In process activation at OSAKA at			
735th Ind Inf Bn	897	)-----(time of surrender.			
736th Ind Inf Bn	897	) (			
737th Ind Inf Bn	897	893	Capt SATO,	KENJO	28286
Arty Bn	320	In process activation at OSAKA at time of surrender.			
17th Hvy Arty Regt	337	337	Col MATSUOKA, H.	KENJO	2739
Engr Bn	572	577	Capt YOSHITAKI,	"	28283
Sig Co	224	224	Unknown	"	28289
Attached:					
134th AAA Regt (less 5th,6th, Co's)	1,530	1,297	LtCol CHIKARAISHI, S.	SUI	8064
Brig Total	3,414	4,667			

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
Location: SAGANOSEKI, TAKASHIMA, and SADAMISAKI, SHIKOKU.					
Mission: Defense of the BUNGO Straits.					
118th Ind Mixed Brig Hq	394	394	MajGen UCHIYAMA, F.	MUTSU	13518
713th Ind Inf Bn	897	839	Capt AE, T.	"	27793
714th Ind Inf Bn	897	839	Capt MATSUSHITA, H.	"	27794
715th Ind Inf Bn	897	839	Capt NOGUCHI, S.	"	27795
716th Ind Inf Bn	897	839	Capt NAKAMURA, S.	"	27796
717th Ind Inf Bn	897	839	Capt FURUKAWA, K.	"	27797
Arty Bn	820	820	Maj BABA, A.	"	27798
18th Hvy Arty Regt	650	649	Col YANO, Y.	"	2738
Engr Bn	572	572	Capt OHAE, Y.	"	27799
Rocket Unit	?	In process activation at KUMAMOTO at time of surrender.			
Sig Co	224	224	Capt TACHIBANA, I.	MUTSU	27800
Attached:					
SAGANOSEKI Mil Hosp	?	16	Unknown	None	
Brig Total	7,145	6,473			
Location: AMAKUSA Island and SHIMABARA Point.					
Mission: Defense of the approaches to ARIAKE Sea.					
126th Ind Mixed Brig Hq	394	250	MajGen HAYASHI, Y.	KEIJU	42337
755th Ind Inf Bn	897	897	Maj NAKASHIMA, T.	"	42338
756th Ind Inf Bn	827	850	Capt KANDA, Y.	"	42339
757th Ind Inf Bn	897	875	Maj UEDA, H.	"	42340
758th Ind Inf Bn	897	879	Capt TAKESHITA, A.	"	42341
759th Ind Inf Bn	897	877	Capt MATSUBARA, T.	"	42342
Arty Bn	820	820	Capt HACHIYA, S.	"	42343
Engr Bn	572	540	SHIMAGATSU,	"	42344
Sig Co	224	400	1stLt OMURA,	"	42345
Attached:					
433rd Ind Inf Bn	1,036	897	Capt NISHIDA, T.	MUTSU	42346
434th Ind Inf Bn	1,036	895	Capt MATSUI, K.	"	42347
Brig Total	8,567	8,103			
Location: FUKAE SHIMA, GOTO RETTO.					
Mission: Local Defense.					

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
107th Ind Mixed Brig Hq	774	90	MajGen KUSE,	HQ	2700
636th Ind Inf Bn	810	845	LtCol UCHIDA, M.	"	2701
637th Ind Inf Bn	810	845	Capt OZAWA, S.	"	2702
638th Ind Inf Bn	810	845	LtCol WATANABE, S.	"	2703
639th Ind Inf Bn	810	845	LtCol MURAYAMA, T.	"	2704
640th Ind Inf Bn	810	845	LtCol KAWAMURA, S.	"	2705
641st Ind Inf Bn	810	845	Maj SASANO, T.	"	2706
Arty Bn	575	920	Maj ARAI, H.	"	2707
Engr Co	173	280	Maj SATOMI, K.	"	2708
Sig Co	178	135	1stLt MORI, M.	"	2709
Fld Hosp	140	140	Unknown	None	
Brig Total	6,705	6,685			
Location: TSUSHIMA.					
Mission: Local defense.					
TSUSHIMA Fortress Hq	347	376	LtGen NAGASE, B.	None	
1st Inf Bn	826	826	Maj KOGA, S.	MUTSU	2730
2nd Inf Bn	826	826	Capt HATAGAWA, J.	"	2731
3rd Inf Bn	826	826	Maj HIROTA, S.	"	2732
4th Inf Bn	826	826	Capt YARIMIZU, K.	"	15134
5th Inf Bn	826	826	Capt WASAI, S.	"	15135
6th Inf Bn	826	826	Maj IGUCHI, I.	"	15136
Hvy Arty Regt	1,766	1,733	Col HAKIUCHI, Y.	"	77
Attached:					
KECHI Mil Hosp	40	40	Maj MURAYAMA, T.	None	
Fortress Total	7,109	7,105			
4TH AAA DIV UNITS UNDER CONTROL KURUME DIV DISTRICT					
SAGA Prefecture					
11th Ind MC Co	144	144	Capt ISHIMATSU, K.	SUI	8010
16th Sp MC Unit	Formed with personnel from other units of 4th AAA Div				
FUKUOKA Prefecture					
3rd, 5th Co's, 131st AAA Regt	240	240	Capt SHIRAISHI, F.	SUI	8061
5th, 6th Co's, 134th AAA Regt	240	240	Capt OISHI, S. and 1st Lt FUJINO, Y.	SUI	8064

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO		CODE
21st Ind AAA Bn	673	690	Maj ITO, S.	SUI	8076
43rd Ind AAA Bn (less 3rd Co)	403	415	Maj KUNITOMO, K.	"	8043
OITA Prefecture					
10th Co, 132nd AAA Regt	120	120	Capt MINAMI, T.	"	8062
4TH AAA DIV UNITS UNDER CONTROL KUMAMOTO DIV DISTRICT					
KUMAMOTO Prefecture					
2nd Bn, 132nd AAA Regt (less 10th Co)	675	675	Maj NAKASHIMA, S.	SUI	8062
6th Co, 136th AAA Regt	120	120	Capt KUSUMOTO, S.	"	8001
2nd Co, 98th Ind AAA Bn	120	120	1stLt KONDO, H.	SUI	12469
UNITS UNDER DIRECT CONTROL 16TH AREA ARMY					
11th Engr Comd	103	103	Col MORIMOTO, K.	MUTSU	13511
89th Ind Engr Bn	891	891	Capt KAWAMATA, K.	"	36390
123rd Ind Engr Bn	891	891	Unknown	"	36391
124th Ind Engr Bn	891	891	Unknown	"	42354
Comd Total	2,560	2,560			
9th Fld Trans Comd	37	37	Col KAWAI, Y.	"	3646
84th Ind MT Bn	808	808	Maj HASHIMOTO, M.	"	7574
Comd Total	845	845			
3rd Sig Comd	33	33	MajGen OZAKI, M.	"	13566
7th Sig Regt	1,098	1,098	Maj FUJITA, H.	"	5091
52nd Sig Regt	1,098	1,098	LtCol UMEKITA, K.	"	13512
5th Early Wn RadarUn	159	159	1stLt TOKIWAI, K.	"	13514
1st Ind Sig Lab Unit	302	302	Unknown	"	27390
2nd " " " "	302	302	1stLt FUJIBAYASHI, C.	"	27391
3rd " " " "	302	302	1stLt SHISHIDO, H.	"	27392
11th " " " "	302	302	Unknown	"	36410
12th " " " "	302	302	Unknown	"	36411

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
56th " " " "	302	302	Unknown	MUTSU	15124
57th " " " "	302	302	Unknown	"	15125
58th " " " "	302	302	Unknown	"	15126
59th " " " "	302	302	2ndLt TANOKITA, T.	"	15127
60th " " " "	302	302	2ndLt SATO, R.	"	15128
61st " " " "	302	302	1stLt HORI, T.	"	42355
62nd " " " "	302	302	1stLt SHONO, A.	"	42356
63rd " " " "	302	302	1stLt TAKAHATSU, K.	"	42357
64th " " " "	302	302	2ndLt YUEHARA, H.	"	42358
65th " " " "	302	302	1stLt ODE, H.	"	42359
66th " " " "	302	302	2ndLt NAGAO, M.	"	15129
67th " " " "	302	302	2ndLt FUKUCHI, T.	"	15130
68th " " " "	302	302	2ndLt TAMURA, N.	"	15131
69th " " " "	302	302	2ndLt NAKANO, J.	"	15132
70th " " " "	302	302	2ndLt SATO, K.	"	15133
71st " " " "	302	302	1stLt YOSHINAGA, S.	"	42360
72nd " " " "	302	302	1stLt HINO, M.	"	42361
73rd " " " "	302	302	1stLt KAMBARA, T.	"	42362
74th " " " "	302	302	1stLt SATO, K.	"	42363
75th " " " "	302	302	1stLt OMINATO, T.	"	42364
Comd Total	9,938	9,938			
33rd Fld Duty Unit Hq	17	17	LtCol FUKUMA, K.	SEIBU	12550
151st Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt YAMADA, H.	"	12551
152nd Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt NAGAI, I.	"	12552
153rd Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt MUKAI, I.	"	12553
154th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt KANAGUCHI, A.	"	12554
155th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt YOKOYAMA, K.	"	12555
156th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt ODA, S.	"	12556
157th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt SATO, S.	"	12557
65th Sea Duty Co	511	511	1stLt KANDA, K.	"	12558
66th Sea Duty Co	511	511	1stLt KODAMA, Y.	"	12559
Duty Unit Total	4,616	4,616			
34th Fld Duty Unit Hq	17	17	LtCol MINAMI, S.	"	12560
158th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt IRABARA, T.	"	12561
159th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt FUJITA, K.	"	12562
160th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt TAMURA, N.	"	12563
161st Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt SHIMIZU, K.	"	12564
162nd Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt NAKAMURA, T.	"	12565
163rd Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt NAKANISHI, S.	"	12566
164th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt KUSAMOTO, T.	"	12567

UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
165th Land Duty Co	511	511	1stLt ICHIMARU, K.	SEIBU 12563
Duty Unit Total	4,105	4,105		
502nd Cons Duty Unit	511			
512th Cons Duty Unit	511		----(Not activated.	
516th Cons Duty Unit	511			
517th Cons Duty Unit	511			
104th Sp Land Duty Co	754	754	1stLt TANABE, K.	SEIBU 8877
116th Sp Land Duty Co	754	754	2ndLt NAGAI, K.	" 3656
123rd Sp Sea Duty Co	754	754	Capt SAKINO, T.	" 2171
27th Sea Trans Bn	530	530	Capt HANINE, H.	MUTSU 15140
28th Sea Trans Bn	530	530	Capt NEMOTO, T.	" 42365
30th Sea Trans Bn	530	530	Capt HAGAWA, J.	" 29140
4th RR Handcar Co	72	72	1stLt HASEGAWA, T.	" 12318
4th Powerline Co	250	Not activated.		
59th L of C Sector	203	203	Col YOSHII, S.	MUTSU 7170
59th L of C Duty Co	511	511	1stLt TAKATA, S.	" 7171
37th Suic.Bt.Unit	96	96	Unknown	None
7th Suic.Bt.Serv.Unit	399	399	Unknown	None
18th Mtn Arty Regt	2,986	2,986	Col NAKAMATA, S.	MUTSU 15117
		WESTERN DISTRICT ARMY		
West.Dist.Army Hq	1,149	1,712	LtGen ISHIHARA, K.	None
KURUME Div Dist Hq	421	449	LtGen SONOBE, M.	None
1st Inf Regt Rp Unit	3,203	3,544	Col SHIBATA, K.	SEIBU 148
2nd Inf Regt Rp Unit	3,203	5,646	Col OSHIMA, D.	" 146
3rd Inf Regt Rp Unit	3,203	5,791	Col NISHIDA, A.	" 147
Arty Rp Unit	761	3,000	Col AZUMI, M.	" 151
Engr Rp Unit	742	2,216	LtCol ISHIMARU, H.	" 152
Trans Rp Unit	673	1,945	Maj ISHIZU, K.	" 154
Sig Rp Unit	347	803	Capt NOMIYAMA, K.	" 153
FUKUOKA Regt Dist Hq	219	219	LtGen TAJIRI, T.	None
SAGA Regt Dist Hq	107	107	LtGen OGUSHI, K.	None
NAGASAKI Regt Dist Hq	156	156	MajGen MATSUURA, T.	None
KURUME Mil Hosp	550	550	Col KURODA, Y.	None
FUKUOKA #1 Mil Hosp	70	79	LtCol SATO, D.	None
OMURA Mil Hosp	70	70	LtCol FUJIZAWA, T.	None
SAGA Mil Hosp	32	32	Maj KAWADA, S.	None

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
TACHIARAI Mil Hosp	364	364	LtCol IWAMOTO, M.	None
Div Dist Total	14,126	31,674		
KUMAMOTO Div Dist Hq	430	282	LtGen TSUCHIHASHI, C.	None
1st Inf Regt Rp Unit	3,203	7,500	Col SETOGUCHI, E.	SEIBU 61
2nd Inf Regt Rp Unit	3,203	3,202	LtCol JICHIK, N.	" 60
3rd Inf Regt Rp Unit	3,203	2,400	Col KISAKI, C.	" 18
Arty Rp Unit	760	3,200	Col YOSHIDA, Y.	" 21
Engr Rp Unit	705	705	Col TAKU, Y.	" 65
Trans Rp Unit	660	1,700	Maj MURAKAMI, T.	" 67
Sig Rp Unit	246	518	Maj MORI, T.	" 66
KUMAMOTO Regt Dist Hq	141	141	MajGen TSUDA, T.	None
OITA Regt Dist Hq	109	109	LtGen MUTO, K.	None
MIYAZAKI Regt Dist Hq	109	109	MajGen WAKAMATSU, H.	None
KAGOSHIMA Regt Dist Hq	141	141	LtGen ISA, K.	None
KUMAMOTO #1 Mil Hosp	720	720	Col TAJIRI, T.	None
MIYAKONOJO Mil Hosp	229	229	LtCol MATSUYAMA, K.	None
KAGOSHIMA Mil Hosp	263	263	LtCol TOYOSHIMA, T.	None
OITA Mil Hosp	494	494	LtCol SASE, I.	None
KIKUCHI Mil Hosp	40	40	LtCol OSATO, Y.	None
Div Dist Total	14,771	21,758		
5th Med Arty Regt Rp Unit	1,099	1,399	Col IWATA, E.	SEIBU 72
6th Med Arty Regt Rp Unite	1,099	1,499	Col MIYAKE, N.	" 73
SHIMONOSEKI Fort Hvy Arty Regt Rp Unit	1,003	1,036	Col HORI, H.	SEIBU 74
SASEBO Fort Hvy Arty Regt Rp Unit	634	648	LtCol ITANO, H.	SEIBU 195
2nd Sig Regt Rp Unit	523	523	Col OTA, S.	" 194
1st MC Training Unit	1,051	1,051	Col FUJIYAMA, S.	" 30
West Dist Train.Sch.	131	1,500	Col TANABASHI, S.	" 193
1st KURUME R.O.S.	1,250	1,250	Unknown	None.
2nd KURUME R.O.S.	360	360	Col MIYAJI, H.	None
KOKURA Mil Hosp	1,106	1,106	Col YASUDA, T.	None
FUKUOKA #2 Mil Hosp	611	544	Col NAKAMIZO, K.	None
BEPPU Mil Hosp	394	394	Col UNO, M.	None
KUMAMOTO #2 Mil Hosp	292	292	LtCol TOYOSHIMA, T.	None
TAKEDA Mil Hosp	103	103	LtCol OUCHI, K.	None
KARASEHARA Mil Hosp	94	94	Maj MISONOO,	None
NITTABARA Mil Hosp	40	40	Maj AIZAWA,	None

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
NAGASAKI Mil Hosp	17	17	Maj KOGA, H.	None	
KOKURA Mil Prison	357	357	Unknown	None	
FUKUOKA POW Camp	151	151	Col FUKUMOTO, M.	None	
2nd U-G Install,Unit	764	764	Maj IWABUCHI, S.	SEIBU	19091
7th U-G Install.Unit	764	764	Maj OTSUBO, K.	"	19096
10th U-G Install. Unit	764	764	Maj FUKUOKA, K.	"	19099
Total West Dist Army	42,703	69,305			

RECAPITULATION 16TH AREA ARMY

KYUSHU	465,692	462,266
Adjacent Islands	37,517	37,296
Grand Total	503,209	499,562

1ST SHIPPING TRANSPORT COMMAND

1st Ship Trans Comd	395	393	LtGen TANABE, S.
North KYUSHU Br, above			
14th Ship Grp Hq	77	77	MajGen HIGOKI, S.
35th Ship Engr Regt	1,099	1,099	Maj IIDA, Y.
37th Ship Engr Regt	1,099	1,099	Maj KUSAKI, E.
South KYUSHU Br, 1st Ship Trans Comd	101	101	LtCol MATSUMOTO, H.
15th Ship Grp Hq	61	61	Col MORIKI, A.
31st Ship Engr Regt	1,099	1,515	LtCol ODA, S.
40th Ship Engr Regt	1,099	1,101	Maj NAKAMICHI, K.
46th Ship Engr Regt	1,099	1,100	Maj KOBAYASHI, Y.
38th Ship Engr Regt	1,099	1,100	Unknown
13th Sea Trans Bn	1,391	1,391	Maj ARAKAWA, T.
14th Sea Trans Bn	1,391	1,391	Maj MATOBA, G.
16th Sea Trans Bn	1,391	1,233	Maj IIBA, Y.
17th Sea Trans Bn	1,391	1,579	Capt YAMASHITA, H.
18th Sea Trans Bn	1,391	1,315	Maj ABE, F.
20th Sea Trans Bn	1,391	1,165	Maj KAKIHARA, Y.

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
1st Rap Trans Bn	1,061	1,062	Maj KOBAYASHI, E.	
1st Sea Pursuit Bn	799	799	Maj TADA, Y.	
2nd Mob Trans Co	144	144	Capt YANAI, K.	
6th Mob Trans Co	144	144	Capt SAITO, Y.	
7th Mob Trans Co	144	164	Lt MUKO, J.	
10th Mob Trans Co	144	103	Lt MUGA, Y.	
11th Mob Trans Co	144	145	Lt SEKIYA, F.	
12th Mob Trans Co	144	145	Capt KAWASAKI, M.	
13th Mob Trans Co	144	145	Capt USHIKUBO, N.	
14th Mob Trans Co	144	103	Maj KAIYAMA, Y.	
16th Mob Trans Co	144	144	Lt NAGAI, K.	
18th Mob Trans Co	144	103	Capt HASHIGUCHI, T.	
21st Mob Trans Co	144	144	Lt SHIROYAMA, S.	
22nd Mob Trans Co	144	144	Lt IWAKI, H.	
134th Sea Duty Co	736	736	Lt SHIGA, M.	
203rd Land Duty Co	511	502	Lt OTOKI, G.	
204th Land Duty Co	511	502	Lt SAKAKI, M.	
205th Land Duty Co	511	502	Lt OKA, J.	
206th Land Duty Co	511	502	Lt KAWAMURA, K.	
207th Land Duty Co	511	502	Lt SHIRAI, S.	
56th Med Sect Hosp Ship	83	33	Capt AMANO, T.	
11th Fld Ship Depot	2,439	2,439	LtCol NODA, J.	
5th Ship Sig Bn	750	750	Maj MINAGAWA, M.	
2nd Ship Arty Regt	8,286	8,286	LtCol YOSHIMURA, S.	
2nd Ship MC Regt	4,983	4,983	LtCol OGAWA, H.	
Total 1st Ship Trans Comd	39,605	39,602		
		MOJI AREA RR COMD		
MOJI Area RR Comd	250	302	MajGen AIMACHI, Y.	
2nd RR Regt	1,800	2,545	LtCol KOSHIGAWA, S.	
1st Ind RR Bn	1,000	1,534	LtCol NARIISA, K.	
1st Ind RR Engr Unit	1,000	1,519	1stLt NISHIMI, Y.	
2nd Ind RR Engr Unit	1,000	1,522	1stLt NONAKA, H.	
3rd Ind RR Engr Unit	1,000	1,622	1stLt SUGINO, O.	
9th Ind RR Engr Unit	1,000	1,522	1stLt MIYAKI, K.	
12th Ind RR " Unit	1,000	1,524	1stLt SUZUKI, S.	
17th Ind RR " Unit	1,000	1,522	1stLt SHIMAMORI, T.	
144th RR Sta Comd	27	27	Col ICHIMURA, K.	

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
149th RR Sta Comd	17	17	Col SASAKI, S.	
160th RR Sta Comd	17	17	LtCol SATOYA, T.	
171st RR Sta Comd	27	27	Col HII, O.	
191st RR Sta Comd	27	27	Col MICHINIWA, K.	
Comd Total	9,165	13,727		

WESTERN DISTRICT MP UNITS

West Dist MP Hq	None	146		None
FUKUOKA MP Unit	"	191		None
4th Sp Detachment	"	41		None
KURUME MP Unit	"	153		None
IIZUKA MP Unit	"	121		None
TACHIARAI MP Unit	"	47		None
OMUTA MP Unit	"	48		None
KOKURA MP Unit	"	313		None
SAGA MP Unit	"	163		None
OITA MP Unit	"	126		None
SASEBO MP Unit	"	175		None
NAGASAKI MP Unit	"	212		None
KUMAMOTO MP Unit	"	114		None
MIYAZAKI MP Unit	"	111		None
KAGOSHIMA MP Unit	"	173		None
MP Total		2,144		

SPECIAL GARRISON COMPANIES (MILITIA)

Each company was group of 200 - 400 civilians organized around a cadre of 2 - 10 regular army personnel. State of training and equipment was such that they could not be considered as military personnel.
FUKUOKA Prefecture: Co's 1 through 23.
KAGOSHIMA Prefecture: Co's 1 through 19.
KUMAMOTO Prefecture: Co's 1 through 17.
MIYAZAKI Prefecture: Co's 1 through 13.
NAGASAKI Prefecture: Co's 1 through 15.
OITA Prefecture: Co's 1 through 17.
SAGA Prefecture: Co's 1 through 10.
YAMAGUCHI Prefecture: None reported.

SASEBO NAVAL DISTRICT

			(REMARKS)
SASEBO Comb SNLF Hq	499	VAdm ABE, K.	Land defense of SASEBO & environs
SASEBO #11 SNLF	2,635	Cmdr HIRAI, H.	Same.

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UNIT	STRENGTH	CO	REMARKS
SASEBO #12 SNLF	2,735	Cmdr MUKAI, H.	Same
SASEBO #13 SNLF	2,466	Cmdr TAKEMURA, I.	Same
SASEBO #14 SNLF	2,523	Cmdr OYA, M.	Same
SNLF Total	8,363		
SASEBO Nav Gd Force	10,490	Vadm ABE, K	To man CD, AA Btry's under control SASEBO N.D. Personnel were concentrated (1) SASEBO Hbr (2) NAGASAKI Hbr & TACHIBANA Bay (3) KAGOSHIMA Bay. Additional personnel, equipment turned over to 16th Area Army in south KYUSHU.
SASEBO Nav Def Unit	4,447	Capt YAMADA, T.	All minelaying, minesweeping activities in waters off west coast of KYUSHU.
HAKATA Hbr Nav Gd Force	359	Capt KAMIOKA, T.	Minesweeping, HAKATA Bay.
NAGASAKI Hbr Nav Gd Force	239	Capt YAMAMOTO, T.	Minesweeping, NAGAS, Hbr.
TSUSHIMA Nav Gd Force	1,020	Capt FUJITA, T.	Coast defense TSUSHIMA and to assist TSUSHIMA Fortress in Inf defense.
SASEBO Sub Base	1,359	Cmdr IMABA, M.	
SASEBO Nav Comm Unit	2,919	Capt KITAGAWA, K.	
		SUICIDE BOAT UNITS	
3rd Sp Attack Force Hq	166	RAdm SHIBUYA, K.	
KAWATANA Assault Unit	6,404	Capt HARA, T.	Primarily a training unit.
31st Assault Unit	1,243	Capt HIDA, K.	
34th Assault Unit	1,674	Capt KOGA, Y.	
Force Total	9,487		
5th Sp Attack Force Hq	132	RAdm KOMAZAWA, K.	
32nd Assault Unit	4,137	Capt WACHI, T.	
33rd Assault Unit	1,031	Capt OISHI, S.	
35th Assault Unit	2,136	Capt NOMURA, J.	
Force Total	7,536		
		TRAINING UNITS	
SASEBO Nav Barracks	29,314	Vadm ABE, K.	
HARIO Nav Barracks	7,444	RAdm HAYASHI	
AINOURA Nav Barracks	11,033	Capt SUCHI, K.	
Total Training	47,846		

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UNIT	STRENGTH	CO	REMARKS
		HOSPITALS	
SASEBO Nav Hosp	420	V Adm ISHIGURO.	
URESHINO Nav Hosp	120		
ONURA Nav Hosp	175		
ISAHAYA Nav Hosp	227		
		HEADUQARTERS, BASE, AND SERVICE PERSONNEL	
SASEBO Nav Dist Hq	275	Vadm SUGIYAMA, R.	
Personnel Office	324	Radm HISAE,	
Shipping Office	46	Capt TAKAHASHI,	
Transport Office	519	Radm ISHIHARA,	
Hbr Master's Office	375	Capt SHIMIZU,	
Dockyard	513	Vadm SOMA,	
Courts Martial Office	36	Radm KUSUDA,	
Naval prison	30	Capt YAMANAKA,	
Supply Office	60	Radm NAKAMURA,	
Stores Dept	244	Radm YATSUGI,	
Civ Engr Dept	2,022	Capt SADEKATA,	
KAWATANA Dockyard	156	VAdm ASATUMA,	
Total	4,600		
		KURE NAVAL DISTRICT	
SHIMONOSEKI Nav Def Unit	3,300	Capt INAGAKI, Y.	Minesweeping, minelaying, CD, AA defense SHIMONOSEKI Str. Area.
SAEKI Nav Def Unit	6,599	Radm OHARA, S.	Minelaying, anti-sub, CD, AA defense of the BUNGO Straits.
		SUICIDE BOAT UNITS	
8th Sp Attack Force Hq	49	Radm KIYODA, T.	
21st Assault Unit			(SUKUMO Bay, SHIKOKU)
23rd Assault Unit			(SUKUMO Bay, SHIKOKU)
24th Assault Unit	200	Capt ONADA, T.	
Force Total (KYUSHU)	249		
(2nd Sp Attack Force Hq)			
OGA Assault Unit	1,294		

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UNIT	STRENGTH	CO	REMARKS
		BASE AND SERVICE PERSONNEL	
BEPPU Nav Hosp	411	VAdm KABURAGI, K.	
SAEKI Br, KURE Mun.Dept	24	Cmdr NUKA, H.	
OITA Br, KURE Civ. Engr. Dept	1,501	LtCmdr NUMATA, H.	
SAEKI Br, KURE Civ. Engr. Dept	12	LtCmdr SHIGEMATSU, A.	
BEPPU Br, KURE Intend. Dept	3	Capt SHINODA, K.	
Service Total	1,956		

UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
231st Inf Div Hq	776	500	LtGen MORITA, T.	OKUNI	28343
346th Inf Regt	3,042	2,422	LtCol ASAKURA, H.	"	28344
347th Inf Regt	3,042	2,537	LtCol MATSUBARA, H.	"	28345
343th Inf Regt	3,042	2,770	LtCol NUKUSHIMA, H.	"	28346
Arty/Rocket Bn	692	Not activated.			
Engr Bn	306	606	Unknown	"	28348
Trans Co	230	427	Unknown	"	28350
Sig Co	230	222	Unknown	"	28349
Attached:					
18th Tr.Mortar Bn	1,407	1,400	Unknown	"	28347
Div Total	13,367	10,884			
124th Ind Mixed Brig Hq	394	193	MajGen ISHII, S.	KIJO	28359
744th Ind Inf Bn	897	133	Unknown	"	28360
745th Ind Inf Bn	897	173	Unknown	"	28361
746th Ind Inf Bn	897	212	Unknown	"	28362
747th Ind Inf Bn	897	140	Unknown	"	28363
748th Ind Inf Bn	897	146	Unknown	"	28364
Arty Bn	820	73	Unknown	"	28369
Engr Bn	572	Not activated.			
Sig Co	224	Not activated.			
Brig Total	6,995	1,130			
AA Unit (not specified)		300	Unknown	?	
		CHUGOKU DISTRICT ARMY)			
3rd Inf Regt Rp Unit	3,203	1,593	Col MIKAMI, K.	CHUGOKU	110
YAMAGUCHI Regt Dist Hq	?	196	MajGen KURUSHIMA, S.	None	
YAMAGUCHI Mil Hosp	?	220	Unknown	None	
26th Sea Trans Bn	530	534	Unknown	None	
215th Land Duty Co	511	439	Unknown	None	
217th Land Duty Co	511	432	Unknown	None	
218th Land Duty Co	511	452	Unknown	None	
219th Land Duty Co	511	501	Unknown	None	

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UNIT	T/O	STRENGTH	CO	CODE	
		(UJINA SHIPPING COMMAND)			
37th Ship Engr Regt	1,099	1,092	Maj KUSAKI, E.	AKATSUKI	19332
7th Mob Trans Co	164	150	Unknown	"	16731
10th Mob Trans Co	164	145	Unknown	"	16734
11th Mob Trans Co	164	143	Unknown	"	16735
14th Mob Trans Co	164	122	Unknown	"	16738
16th Mob Trans Co	164	150	Unknown	"	16762
17th Sea Trans Bn	1,590	1,580	Unknown	"	19319
18th Sea Trans Bn	1,590	1,622	Unknown	"	19320
20th Sea Trans Bn	1,590	1,130	Unknown	"	19334
1st Mob Trans Bn	353	961	Unknown	"	16707
69th Sea Duty Co	511	513	Unknown	"	12572
1st Ship Engr Rp Unit	2,213	2,213	LtCol TAKAKI, K.	"	16169
6th Ship Engr Rp Unit	2,213	2,219	Maj TORII, T.	"	16170
Mob Trans Rp Unit	?	3,300	LtCol MABUCHI, M.	"	16711
Sea Pursuit Rp Unit	?	5,550	LtCol RYU, T.	"	16712
Total Army	13,267	21,339			

UNIT	STRENGTH	CO	REMARKS
		KURE NAVAL DISTRICT	
TOKUYAMA Nav Def Unit	630	Capt SHIMIZU, T.	Minesweeping, Inland Sea.
TOKUYAMA Nav Gd Force	1,907	Capt SHIMIZU, T.	CD, AA defense TOKUYAMA Area.
SENZAKI Hbr Nav Gd Force	583	Capt OKA, M.	Minesweeping SENZAKI Hbr.
		SUICIDE BOAT UNITS	
2nd Sp Attack Force Hq	470	Radm NAGAI, M.	
KASADO Assault Unit	267	Capt HATSUBARA, T.	
OTSUSHIMA Assault Unit	570	LtCmdr ITAGURA, M.	
HIKARI Assault Unit	1,358	Capt NAKAMURA, S.	
HIRAO Assault Unit	1,631	Capt SAWAMURA, S.	
(OGA Assault Unit)			(KYUSHU)
Force Total	4,296		

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UNIT	STRENGTH	CO	REMARKS
		BASE AND SERVICE PERSONNEL	
OTAKE Nav Barracks	11,679	Unknown	
BOFU Radio School	3,293	Unknown	
BOFU Br, Nav Academy	203	Unknown	
YANAI Br, Sub School	920	Capt MICHINO, K.	
OTAKE Sub School	6,146	Unknown	
IWAKUNI Br, Nav Academy	?	Unknown	
IWAKUNI Nav Hosp	253	Unknown	
TOKUYAMA Br, KURE Trans Dept	1,371	Unknown	
Total Navy	31,291		

UNIT	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
6TH AIR ARMY (KYUSHU and YAMAGUCHI Prefecture)			
Location: KYUSHU, SHIKOKU, and CHUGOKU. Hq at FUKUOKA.			
Mission: To defend KYUSHU from amphibious assault.			
6th Air Army Hq	1,031	LtGen SUGAWARA, M.	
12th Air Div Hq	450	MajGen HABU,	
4th Air Regt	230	Maj HACHIDA, H.	
47th Air Regt	130	Maj OKUDA,	
59th Air Regt	227	Maj NISHI, S.	
71st Air Regt	240	Maj AYABE, I.	
83rd Ind Air Sqn	116	Capt ONISHI, H.	
6th Air Brig Hq	43	Col IMAZU, M.	
65th Air Regt	213	Maj YOSHIDA,	
66th Air Regt	213	Maj FUJI, G.	
Air Div Total	2,953		
Air ground units under control 12th Air Div:			
51st Air Sector Cond	45	LtCol OYAMA, N.	
4th Airfield Bn	603	Maj FUKUSHIMA, I.	
235th Airfield Bn	603	Capt MIYAMOTO, H.	
246th Airfield Bn	603	Maj ?	
64th Airfield Bn	603	Maj MIYAKE, G.	
65th Airfield Bn	603	Capt NAKAO, A.	

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UNIT	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
193rd Airfield Bn	603	Capt FUNOYAMA, M.	
194th Airfield Bn	603	Capt URAYAMA, M.	
233th Airfield Bn	603	Capt SUKIHORA, T.	
82nd Airfield Co	335	Capt KOBAYASHI, S.	
84th Airfield Co	330	Capt YAHIKI, S.	
192nd Ind Maint Unit	270	Unknown	
170th Ind Maint Unit	270	2ndLt HAYENO, S.	
175th Ind Maint Unit	270	2ndLt NAGASHIMA, T.	
27th A/F Cons Unit	706	Capt OKIBA, N.	
143th A/F Const Unit	170	Capt SAWADA, S.	
152nd A/F Cons Unit	170	Capt SASAKI, K.	
163rd A/F Cons Unit	270	1stLt GOSAKU, M.	
14th Ground-Air Rad.U	270	Capt SHIGEBAYASHI, K.	
7th Ind AA MG Co	120	2ndLt SEKINE,	
8th Ind AA MG Co	120	2ndLt HASHIMOTO,	
9th Ind AA MG Co	120	2ndLt HACHIYA, N.	
10th Ind AA MG Co	120	2ndLt HAMASHIMA, I.	
Air ground TOTAL	3,540		
30th Air Group Hq	220	MajGen MIYOSHI, Y.	
7th Air Brig Hq	46	LtCol TACHIBANA, S.	
21st Air Brig Hq	42	Col TANABATA, A.	
17th Ind Air Sqn	120	Capt KITAGAWA, T.	
Air Group Total	423		
Air ground units under control 30th Air Group:			
41st Air Sector Comd	66	Col FUJISAKI, H.	
142nd Airfield Bn	603	Maj IDE, I.	
172nd Airfield Bn	603	Maj TAKIIWA, S.	
228th Airfield Bn	603	Capt OTSUKA, S.	
238th Airfield Bn	600	Capt SUGIHARA, T.	
101st Airfield Co	120	Maj SASAMORI, I.	
107th Ind Maint Unit	300	Capt FUJITA, T.	
112th Ind Maint Unit	241	1stLt KASHIHARA,	
169th Ind Maint Unit	240	1stLt HORIKAWAA, T.	
30th A/F Cons Unit	706	Capt MITSUYA, H.	
151st A/F Const Unit	170	Maj MATSUYAMA, T.	
14th U-G Install Unit	650	Maj SUDA, M.	
Comd Total	4,902		

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UNIT	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
KUMAMOTO Air Sector Comd	45	LtCol YOKOTA, S.	
162nd Airfield Bn	603	Maj OYANAGI, H.	
174th Airfield Bn	603	Capt ONOZAKI,	
229th Airfield Bn	603	Maj SUZUKI,	
173rd Airfield Bn	603	Maj NUMATA, K.	
239th Airfield Bn	603	Capt SUZUKI, T.	
227th Airfield Bn	603	Capt OTAKU, H.	
55th Airfield Co	382	1stLt SOGAI, H.	
109th Ind Maint Unit	320	Capt YASUMI, S.	
110th Ind Maint Unit	200	Capt KANETADA, M.	
111th Ind Maint Unit	280	Capt SHIJIKATA, S.	
114th Ind Maint Unit	250	Capt KIKUTA, T.	
154th Ind Maint Unit	240	Capt HIKEDA,	
157th Ind Maint Unit	240	Maj HASEGAWA, J.	
311th Ind Maint Unit	280	1stLt HONDA, K.	
28th A/F Cons Unit	650	Maj ISHIYAMA, K.	
142nd A/F Cons Unit	170	Capt OYAMA, Z.	
22nd Ind AA MC Co	120	1stLt KAWASE, R.	
29th Ind AA MC Co	120	2ndLt NAKAMURA, T.	
30th Ind AA MC Co	120	1stLt WATANABE, Y.	
52nd Ind AA MC Co	120	1stLt DEI, M.	
53rd Ind AA MC Co	120	1stLt YASUDA, T.	
54th Ind AA MC Co	120	1stLt SUYAMA, Y.	
Comd Total	7,395		
Total Air Ground	12,297		

Units under direct control 6th Air Army:

60th Air Regt	750	LtCol ATSUMI, H.	
110th Air Regt	650	Maj KUSAKARI, T.	
12th Ind Air Regt	592	LtCol IRITA, M.	
137th Ind Maint Unit	241	1stLt TAKEYAMA, M.	
197th Ind Maint Unit	250	Capt KIMURA, T.	
199th Ind Maint Unit	250	Capt NISHIMURA, Y.	
200th Ind Maint Unit	241	1stLt NAKANE, S.	
300th Ind Maint Unit	241	1stLt MORI, T.	
172nd A/F Const Unit	450	Capt IMADA, M.	
173rd A/F Cons Unit	450	Capt MUROTA, K.	
15th U-G Install Unit	650	Capt TAKUBO, S.	

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UNIT	STRENGTH	CO	CODE
17th U-G Install Unit	650	Capt ?	
42nd Cons Duty Co	130	Capt OKIYAMA, B.	
1st Air Sig Comd	50	Col MIKI, K.	
1st Raiding Brig	2,000	Col NAKAMURA, I.	
19th Air Sig Regt	1,300	Col NOHEDA, Y.	
70th Ground-air Rad.U.	220	Capt MAKAMURA, M.	
71st Ground-air Rad.U.	233	Capt ISHIHARA, T.	
72nd Ground-air Rad.U.	209	1stLt TOMINAGA, M.	
73rd Ground-air Rad.U.	217	Capt WATANABE, A.	
74th Ground-air Rad.U.	205	1stLt TAMURA, M.	
75th Ground-air Rad.U.	228	1stLt HIROTA, N.	
8th Navig, Aid Unit	180	Maj KANO, K.	
3rd Meteor, Unit	415	LtCol HISAMONOI, M.	
Total 6th Air Army	35,520		

FIELD	PILOTS	TRAINEES	SERVICE	AA
NAVAL AIR PERSONNEL, KYUSHU AND YAMAGUCHI PREFECTURE				
KANOYA	73	0	10,587	2,550
KASANOHARA	35	0	1,368	(included above)
KUSHIRA	103	0	3,682	(included above)
IWAKAWA	121	0	1,852	148
KOKUBU #1	206	0	1,907	445
KOKUBU #2	85	0	1,428	192
KAGOSHIMA	90	0	2,052	427
IZUMI	71	0	3,367	590
HITOYOSHI	62	0	1,702	165
MIYAZAKI	0	0	125	446
TOMITAKA	165	0	3,183	368
SAKURAJIMA	46	0	464	0
TANEGASHIMA	0	0	164	143
OITA	131	0	6,074	1,073
USA	180	0	3,822	7
TSUYUKI	371	320	4,926	420
HAYATA	143	327	2,077	0
FUKUOKA	274	166	3,026	0
GENKAI	243	0	1,645	65
OMURA	353	0	5,707	xxxxxx*
ISAHAYA	86	11	2,593	xxxxxx*

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FIELD	PILOTS	TRAINEES	SERVICE	AA
SAEKI	0	0	250	xxxxxx #
USUKI	0	0	100	0
OCHI	0	0	100	0
HIJUDAI	0	0	400	0
NAKATSU	0	0	100	0
SAIKAWA	0	0	100	0
KASUGAHARA	0	0	100	0
KOSHIRO	0	0	100	0
SHIMABARA & UNZEN	37	29	600	0
HETSUGI	169	0	1,068	180
IWAKUNI	217	80	5,458	366

Total Naval Air 31,645

* AA defense by SASEBO Nav Gd Force, which see.

AA defense by SAEKI Nav Def Unit, which see.

ARMY DEPOTS

UNIT	STRENGTH
FUKUOKA Army Supply Subdepot	85
FUKUOKA Army Clothing Subdepot	90
FUKUOKA Army Provisions Subdepot	111
KOKURA Army Ordnance Supply Depot	2,049
FUKUOKA Army Med Supply Subdepot	363
KURUME Army Vet Supply Subdepot	86
KOKURA Army Arsenal	312
Br's, TOKYO #2 Army Arsenal	22
TAKARABE Frt Storage Depot	150
10th Fld Remount Depot	624

ARMY AIR DEPOTS

TACHIARAI Air Depot	4,283
3rd, 4th Sections, 7th Air Rpr Dep.	266
OSAKA Air Supply Subdepot	360
12th Army Air Supply Depot	250

NAVY AIR DEPOTS

IWAKUNI Br, 11th NavAirArsenal	64
12th Nav Air Arsenal	302
21st Nav Air Arsenal	433
22nd Nav Air Arsenal	?

Total Depots 9,900

Figures are exclusive of civilian employees.