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Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

WRG/130
Ser. 001082B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 06Nov45
To : 1800I, 07Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 8 November, 1945.

No. 47.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)
(C) Preliminary Examination of Japanese "Cannon"
Tank. (Submitted by NAVTECHJAP).
(D) Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese
Armored Personnel Carrier (Submitted by
NAVTECHJAP).
(E) Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese
Armored Reconnaissance Car (Submitted by
NAVTECHJAP).
(F) Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese
Self-Propelled 105mm Howitzer (Submitted by
NAVTECHJAP).
(G) Report of Preliminary Examination of Japanese
Medium Tank, Type 3 (1943) (Submitted by
NAVTECHJAP).
(H) Preliminary Report, Type 4, 75mm AA Guns
(Submitted by NAVTECHJAP).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under
our control.
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

SECRET

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

HAGI

HAGI Radio Station is owned and operated by the Japanese Broadcasting System. This station with a 50 watt output has been in operation for 3 years. The radio equipment is used to amplify broadcasts into privately owned radio sets and operates best on the 1000 - 1650KC. There are telephone connections with BOFU and TOKYO.

HAGI Police Station has been placed under surveillance. Several items of radio equipment were found at this station.

HAGI Dock Area. There are 30 large wooden craft in the canal which during the war were hired by the Japanese Army to transport bamboo to KOREA in return for beans. These operations ceased on 20 July 1945. Cargo aboard these craft has been stored and inventoried. Three ports adjacent to the Dock Area were mined by the Japanese during the war but the mines were cleared and the ports opened for operation on 15 June 1945. Due to shallow water, the harbor facilities are limited. The following vessels were located in the port areas at the time of this investigation.

DAI KOKU MARU. 2200 tons; steam-powered; speed 8 knots; complement, 54; presently owned by the Japanese Maritime Service.

SS#18. 780 tons; powered by a diesel twin-screw engine; speed, 12 knots; complement, 42. According to a representative of the Maritime Service, this vessel was used to take demobilized troops to KOREA but it made only 1 trip. Communications consists of short and long wave equipment. The call sign is JWM. The vessel was commissioned in September 1944.

SS #13 is the same as SS #18 except that the complement is only 20 men.

SECRET

YAWATA

MITSUBISHI Chemical Plant, Industrial Companies, Ltd., MAKIYAMA Plant. The wartime personnel was 3500 which included 900 students. The monthly wartime production capacity consisted of 80,000 panes of window glass, 13,000 tons of soda ash, 7,500 tons of caustic soda and 1,500 tons of sodium bicarbonate. At present the plant employs 1,800, of which 1,760 are employed in the production of 1,500 tons of soda ash daily, and 40 to patrol the area around the plant. Plans are being made for the production of caustic soda, sodium bicarbonate, and calcium chloride.

The KOBE Steel Company Ltd., MOJI Factory employed 1,928 people during the war in manufacturing 5,290 tons of copper alloy pipe, 8,400 tons of copper alloy plate, 12,720 tons of copper alloy bars, and 180 tons of magnesium forgings per year. This factory ceased operations in July or August 1945; exact date is not known. At present 186 civilians are employed in guard duty and maintenance of the factory. The following supplies and dumps were found at this factory: electrolytic copper 436 tons, electrolytic zinc 712 tons, zinc 374 tons, tin 69 tons, aluminum 2 tons, and copper alloy scraps 2,770 tons. Finished goods: copper alloy pipe 81 tons, copper alloy bars 280 tons, and copper alloy plate 81 tons. Semi-finished goods: copper alloy pipe 97 tons, copper alloy bars 457 tons, copper alloy plate 385 tons, and magnesium forgings 100 tons.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None to report.

(3) Subversive activities.

The incident of the lecturer TANAKA, Teishu, (see G-2 Periodic Reports #29 and #43) has been closed. It has been reported that no imperialistic doctrines are apparent in his lectures.

SECRET

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

The GOTO-RETTO KEMPEI TAI consisted of 6 men under the command of 2nd Lt. NAGAMATSU, Tsuruma and was demobilized 20 September 1945. Headquarters was in FUKAE

TOKUMU KIKAN. Both army and navy are reported to have maintained units of TOKUMU KIKAN in NAGASAKI City. The army unit was commanded by Major NISHIDA, (first name unknown), who had about 12 enlisted men under him as well as some civilians. NISHIDA is known to have been in NAGASAKI City since at least March 1944 and as late as May 1945. He was attached directly to the War Ministry and had no relationship with any local military unit. This information was secured through interrogation of Lt Gen TANIGUCHI, CG, 122nd IMB. The navy unit was commanded by MIUMI, Noriuki, who had a GUNZOKU (civilian with semi-military status) rating equivalent to that of a Navy Lieutenant Commander. Unit personnel were either civilians or GUNZOKU. Personnel numbered between 145 and 170. The unit was said to have come from the South Seas Wooden Boat Association, formerly located on HAINAN Island. This organization came to NAGASAKI in April 1945 where for about 15 days it was known as the KAIGUN UNYU HOMBU TOKUBETSU YUSOTAI. On 15 April 1945 the name was changed to KAIGUN TOKUMU KIKAN, MIUMI TAI. The unit was directly responsible to the Transport Department of the Navy Ministry. It had no connection with any intelligence section of the military service. The unit was engaged in the transport of military goods between points in Japan and the continent. Information was received through interrogation of TANAKA, Tsuneyuki, MOROTSU Toshio, and NOMURA, Shunzaku, all former members of the MIUMI unit. From present information it appears that the only connection between Navy KAIGUN TOKUMU KIKAN and TOKUMU KIKAN as an intelligence organization was in the similarity of names.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Technical Intelligence:

The following items of equipment (as reported in G-2 Periodic Report No. 24) were further investigated by

SECRET

NAVTECHJAF and found to be standard types and therefore not worthy of a detailed report:

Model 99, 80mm AA gun.
 Model 14, 10cm AA gun.
 Model 88, 75mm AA gun.
 Model 98, 20mm AA Automatic Cannon
 on twin mount.
 Model 96, 150mm howitzer.

The remaining items of equipment (as reported in G-2 Periodic Report No. 24) were further investigated by NAVTECHJAF and are reported on in Enclosures C through H. The original reports complete with pictures have been forwarded to Sixth Army through separate channels.

G. L. Mc Cormick
 G. L. MC CORMICK,
 Lieutenant Colonel, USMC,
 AC of 3, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifthFlt	1	CG 32ndInfDiv	10
CG Sixth Army	5	Attn G-2	
OIC JICPOA	1	" OOB	
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CG III Phib Corps	1	NAVTECHJAF	1
CG I Corps	1	USSBS TOKYO	1
CG X Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	AC of 3, G-3, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2	File	5

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

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8 November, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilization. The 5th Mar Div reports 98 demobilized during the period 5 Nov to 7 Nov. The 2nd Mar Div reports 17 personnel of the 122nd IMB and 10 personnel of the 134th AA Regt remain. The 32nd Inf Div reports the current strength of the KOKURA Mil Hosp is 53 staff-members and 253 patients.

2. Civilians attached to Military Units. This report concludes the study of civilians attached to units of the 16th Area Army.

UNIT	T/O	CIV	MIL	TOTAL
16th Area Army Hq	888	300	888	1,188
40th Army (Corps) Hq	399	101	399	500
56th Army (Corps) Hq	399	50	349	399
57th Army (Corps) Hq	399	70	379	449
Total	2,085	521	2,015	2,536
KURUME Div Dist Hq	421	200	249	449
1st Inf Regt Repl Unit	3,203	105	8,439	8,544
2nd Inf Regt Repl Unit	3,203	105	5,541	5,646
3rd Inf Regt Repl Unit	3,203	105	5,686	5,791
Arty Regt Repl Unit	761	75	2,925	3,000
Engrs Regt Repl Unit	742	25	2,191	2,216
Sig Co Repl Unit	347	30	773	803
Trans Bn Repl Unit	678	70	1,875	1,945
Total	12,558	715	27,679	28,394
KUMAMOTO Div Dist Hq	430	90	192	282
1st Inf Regt Repl Unit	3,203	137	7,363	7,500
2nd Inf Regt Repl Unit	3,203	137	3,065	3,202
3rd Inf Regt Repl Unit	3,203	137	2,263	2,400
Arty Regt Repl Unit	760	85	3,115	3,200
Engrs Regt Repl Unit	705	25	680	705
Sig Co Repl Unit	246	40	478	518
Trans Bn Repl Unit	660	70	1,630	1,700
Total	12,410	721	18,786	19,507
5th Hvy Arty Regt Repl Unit	1,099	22	1,377	1,399
6th Hvy Arty Regt Repl Unit	1,099	23	1,226	1,249
8th Hvy Arty Regt Repl Unit	1,003	19	1,017	1,036

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 1 -

SECRET

817

Order of Battle.

(Continued)

8Nov45.

SECRET

SASEBO Hvy Arty Regt Repl Unit	634	19	629	648
2nd Sig Regt Repl Unit	523	30	493	523
W. Army Dist Trng Unit	181	129	1,371	1,500
1st MC Training Unit	1,051	20	1,031	1,051
1st KURUME R.O. School	1,250	130	1,120	1,250
2nd KURUME R.O. School	360	100	260	360
Total	7,200	492	8,524	9,016
FUKUOKA Regt Dist	164	29	135	164
SAGA Regt Dist	75	17	58	75
NAGASAKI Regt Dist	118	20	98	118
KUMAMOTO Regt Dist	110	20	90	110
OITA Regt Dist	84	15	69	84
MIYAZAKI Regt Dist	84	12	72	84
KAGOSHIMA Regt Dist	110	20	90	110
All Prefect Dist	237	0	237	237
Total	982	133	849	982
KURUME Mil Hosp	550	120	430	550
FUKUOKA #1 Mil Hosp	70	15	55	70
OMURA Mil Hosp	70	15	55	70
SAGA Mil Hosp	32	6	26	32
OITA Mil Hosp	364	98	266	364
KUMAMOTO #1 Mil Hosp	720	130	590	720
MIYAKONOJO Mil Hosp	229	90	139	229
KAGOSHIMA Mil Hosp	268	97	171	268
OITA Mil Hosp	494	102	392	494
KIKUCHI Mil Hosp	40	12	28	40
119th LofC Hosp	359	26	333	359
99th LofC Hosp	359	36	323	359
Total	3,555	747	2,808	3,555
433rd Ind Inf Bn	1,036	0	1,036	1,036
434th Ind Inf Bn	1,036	0	1,036	1,036
435th Ind Inf Bn	1,036	0	1,036	1,036
Total	3,108	0	3,108	3,108

RECAPITULATION 16th AREA ARMY

TYPE UNIT	CIV	MIL	TOTAL
Army Hq	521	2,015	2,536
Major Inf Units (Div, Brig, Fort)	19,062	296,348	315,410
Ind AA Units	2,787	18,638	21,425
Ind Tks Units	2,410	8,083	10,493
Ind Arty & Mortar Units	14,600	20,652	35,252
Ind Engrs Units	4,746	5,792	10,538

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 2 -

SECRET

818

SECRET

Ind MT Units	1,595	1,637	3,232
Ind Sig Units	2,901	4,937	7,838
Suicide Boat Units	1,578	2,294	3,872
Service Units	19,458	17,477	36,935
Replacement Units	2,061	55,838	57,899
Hospitals	747	2,808	3,555
Unattached Inf Ens	0	3,108	3,108
Total 16th Area Army	72,466	439,627	512,093

It should be noted that these figures are exclusive of shipping, railroad, depot, MP, air, and army units in YAMAGUCHI Prefecture. It seems certain there were no civilians in the MP units. Break-downs of depot personnel are best represented in the reports submitted by the 2nd General Army to the Sixth Army. No data is available on the civilian question in re shipping and railroad units. However, in view of the situation in the 16th Area Army the fact that there were such personnel becomes a distinct probability. Warning: In spite of the fact that these figures are from the third report of the 16th Area Army, there is evidence that they may still be too high. A preliminary report from the 40th Army (Corps) does not jibe in any single respect with any previous report. The whole matter undergoing extensive investigations by our divisions. It is believed that these figures are valuable, however, in indicating the proportion of untrained personnel incorporated directly into combat and service units.

3. Repatriation.

SS HUTCHINSON arrived KAJIKI from DAVAO on 5 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 1,469 civilians.

SS TUFT arrived KAJIKI from DAVAO on 5 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 1,503 civilians.

SHIOKASE MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 4 November with 609 Army, 0 Navy, 29 civilians.

T 137 arrived HAKATA from AMAMI O SHIMA on 5 November with 157 Army, 461 Navy, 0 civilians.

KANE MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN, 0 Army, 0 Navy, 831 civilians.

ISAO MARU arrived HAKATA from TSUSHIMA with 1 Army, 4 Navy, 217 civilians.

DD MAKI arrived KAJIKI from MANILA on 1 November with 42 Army, 0 Navy, 205 civilians.

Transport 172 arrived KAJIKI from AMAMI O SHIMA on 1 November with 682 Army, 0 Navy, 0 civilians.

HASU MARU arrived HAKATA from CHINKAI on 6 November with 0 Army, 254 Navy, 0 civilians.

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

YUKAZE MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 380 civilians.

MAMIYA MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 61 Army, 0 Navy, 793 civilians.

MS 20 arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 50 civilians.

MS 19 arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 0 Army, 0 Navy, 73 civilians.

RIUHEI MARU arrived HAKATA from CHINKAI on 6 November with 0 Army, 453 Navy, 305 civilians.

UNZEN MARU arrived HAKATA from FUSAN on 6 November with 807 Army, 0 Navy, 842 civilians.

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 4 -

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted. Translations of local news items of possible interest are presented.

2. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN - 7 November 1945 (published in NAGASAKI). With the approaching winter, the war victims, large and small, are facing great difficulties. Since the work on Easy Homes is not progressing, only those with money can afford to do repairing in spite of the fact that they are compelled to pay overwhelming prices.....

One of these victims had this to say:

"My home was completely burned. Clothing nor anything else was salvaged. I was able to rent a small house, but the roof leaked, so I had to get a contractor. Only two or three squares were needed to be repaired, which took three men $\frac{1}{2}$ day each. I had to pay ¥500.00 for this work."

This is only one of the cases as "black market" is prevailing all over the city. The authorities are investigating and are intending to regulate with strict price control. The carpenters working on the Occupational Army projects are being paid ¥13.00 a day while the laborers get ¥9.00 a day.

The population of the city of Sasebo is estimated to be 150,000 at the present time as compared to 350,000 in previous years. However, the City's Reconstruction Committee sighted the need of speedy revival of a greater city and sent the following proposals to the Ministry of Interior for approval:

1. The total war torn area is 300,000 tsubo. With the addition of neighboring area, we intend to erect a new city with 500,000 tsubo, of which 50,000 tsubo will be planned for parks and play grounds and 450,000 tsubo will be planned as business and residential districts.

2. In general, all the roads and highways will be widened, making the national highways 35 meters instead of 20 meters and the other streets 15 meters wide.

3. All the buildings in the central section will be of reinforced concrete. No frame buildings will be allowed.

4. The business section, presently occupied by the Occupational Force, will be erected upon the relinquishing of the premises by the O.A.

5. The foregoing city planning with an area of 500,000 means an increase of 20 tsubo per man as compared to 15 tsubo per man prior to the bombing.

The closing ceremony of the Kyushu Area Administrative Government will be held on the 7th at 10:00 in the presence of Supt. Tozuka and the entire members of the staff.

3. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN - 7 November 1945 (published in FUKUOKA). The citizens of Sasebo, especially the women under middle age, are becoming very careless with the traffic regulations these days. The Marine Headquarters of the VAC in Sasebo, therefore, forwarded the following instructions to the Police Dept on the 1st.

1. All pedestrians must walk on the left side of the road.
2. More than two must not walk together where the traffic is heavy.
3. Freight wagons must pass on the extreme left side of the road.
4. Immediate right-of-way must be given to emergency cars.

The children of war torn Nagasaki are continuing their studies in the damaged school rooms and temporary school buildings toward the reconstruction of New Japan. Here are two excerpts gathered from the children's writings.

Nobuyuki Fujita, 5th grade, writes:

"We fought very hard, but Japan was defeated and the war ended on August 15th. I cannot forget the noon of that day forever.....Can the citizens of Nagasaki forget August 9th? We desire no war. War hurts the people and destructs humanity. When did the Greater East Asia expand to such an extent? If I think the war brings such sadness, I'd rather have peace.

Since the arrival of the occupational army, many things reflected on us. Their tractors cleaned the mess in few hours, and they extinguished a large fire before we could say, "ah". Everything they do is speedy. The newspapers say we are short of food, coal and other things. We are small, but we must do our best to help the crisis and build New Japan so that we can live in peace."

Miss Sumi Fuji, 6th grade, writes:

"The end of the war was announced by the Emperor on August 15th. Japan became a defeated nation. We don't know what to think of this defeat, as Japan's history was unblemished for the past 3,000 years. Japan is way back in civilization. We learned this through the activities of the occupational men. However, we must not cry over our defeat. We must study hard and work in order to rebuild Japan."

4. KUMAMOTO NICHU NICHU SHIMBUN - 4 November 1945 (published in KUMAMOTO). In order to introduce the real beauty of "Scenic Kumamoto" and promote American-Japanese friendship, the Kumamoto branch of Japan tourist Bureau has decided to introduce Mt. Aso with the assistance of the American Red Cross. Beginning the 5th, for two weeks, a group of 4 officers and 60 men will be taken up to the crater, stay overnight at the tourist hotel and will be taken back to Kumamoto the following day.

From the Investigation Bureau of the Cabinet came Mr. Kan Taniguchi to take office as the new Chief of Police of Kumamoto on the 2nd. He stayed in the Wataya Hotel that night, visited the shrine on the following morning at 8:30 and addressed his subordinates at the prefectural capitol at 9:00. He also paid visits to the various important government departments. In his interview, he said in part, "I am thinking of building a police station that the people can trust."

5. ASAHI SHIMBUN - 7 November 1945 (published in KOKURA). (Miyakonojo Dispatch) - U. S. Occupational Army of 1,200 men, commanded by Lt. Col. Holden, arrived at Takasu Harbor on three transports from Nagasaki, on the morning of the 5th. First unit of 80 men, led by Lt. Truck, arrived at Miyakonojo by train at 5:30 P.M. and immediately entered their quarters in former Western 61st Butai dormitory. The rest of the unit will continue to arrive during the night. (Kumamoto Dispatch) - The deaths from hunger are increasing in various parts of the country, but in Kumamoto prefecture 12 of these deaths have been reported since August 11th. Of these, the majority of them were aged people, over 50 years old, but a girl of 18 and a man of 25 were found dead on the road and depot, respectively.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE "CANNON" TANK.
(submitted by NAVTECHJAP).

1. General Information: The tanks examined were designated by no type number, but were referred to by personnel of the unit which operated them as "Cannon Tanks." They had the same hull, suspension system, engine and chassis as Type 97 Tanks, but mounted a special turret designed for the type 90 75mm gun.

2. Turret: The turret on the tank was designed so that the entire rear position and part of the top could be opened converting the weapon into a self propelled field gun. The gun is the same as the Type 90 field gun. It has a maximum elevation of forty five (45) degrees and traverses approximately fifteen (15) degrees in either direction. There is no provision for traverse of the turret. All operating mechanisms of the gun are located at the left of the breech. The sight is the standard panoramic type used with the field gun. A hatch located directly over the sight mount must be open to allow the sight to project above the top of the turret in order to manipulate the sight. There are two (2) horizontal and two (2) vertical vision slits on each side of the gun in the face of the turret. Armor thickness of the turret is approximately 5/8 of an inch.

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE ARMORED PERSONNEL
CARRIER.

(submitted by NAVTECHJAF)

1. General Information: The armored personnel carriers examined are full track laying vehicles and are part of a Japanese Armored Brigade. They are powered by four (4) cylinder diesel engines and are used for transporting troops and supplies under combat conditions. They carry no armament and are not designed for use as combat vehicles. No type number was assigned to the vehicles. They are referred to by the Japanese as Armored Wagons.

2. Body: The body is nine (9) feet eleven (11) inches long and six (6) feet eight (8) inches wide. It has a front armor plate .292 inches thick, side armor .265 inches thick and rear armor .185 inches thick. There are seats for twelve (12) persons in the body and two additional seats directly behind the drivers compartment. Beneath the floor boards there are compartments for carrying ammunition or supplies. There is an entrance hatch on each side forward of the seats and a double hatch at the rear. Entrance hatches are also provided for the driver and the two passengers who ride behind him.

3. Suspension System: The suspension system has four (4) large bogie wheels independently sprung. Drive sprocket is at the rear and idler at the front. There are two (2) return rollers.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE ARMORED RECONN-
AISSANCE CAR (submitted by NAVTECHJAP)

1. General Information: The reconnaissance cars examined are full track laying vehicles employed by Japanese heavy artillery organizations. They are reportedly not used as prime movers but are equipped with a towing hook and are said by the Japanese to be able to pull six (6) tons. They are used as advanced observation cars and as wire laying vehicles. The rear door to the vehicle is equipped with reels for the laying of communications wire. The car is powered by a four (4) cylinder diesel engine and has a reported speed of 40 k.p.h. on roads or 30 k.p.h. overland. It has a maximum cruising range of 200 kilometers or six (6) hours. It weighs three (3) tons, is 3-1/2 meters long, 2 meters high, and 2 meters wide. It is reported that the vehicle will climb an incline of 33 degrees at a speed of 6 k.p.h.

2. Body: The body is equipped to carry six (6) passengers. There is storage space for equipment behind the seats. An anti-aircraft machine gun is sometimes mounted on the forward portion. Overall armor thickness is .287 inches.

3. Suspension System: The suspension system has four (4) bogie wheels on each side mounted in pairs. The drive sprocket is mounted high and at the forward end of the track. There is a large trailing idler at the rear and two (2) return rollers. The track is eight (8) inches wide.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE SELF-PROPELLED
105mm HOWITZER
(submitted by NAVTECHJAP).

1. Information on this gun has been available previously and some of the weapons were captured in the Philippines, however all specimens located at FUKUOKA are in operational condition and may render some additional intelligence information. The chassis, hull, engine, and suspension system are identical to those of the Type 97 Medium Tank. The gun is the same as the Type 91 105mm howitzer. It is mounted in a high, open shield which is not capable of being traversed. The gun itself may be traversed approximately fifteen (15) degrees in either direction and elevated to forty-five (45) degrees. It is operated from the left of the breach and uses the standard panoramic sight. Firing capabilities of the weapon are considered to be the same as those for the Type 91 Howitzer and according to personnel of the unit which operated the weapon it was used as a field gun rather than a tank destroyer. Mobility characteristics are the same as for the Type 97 tank.

ENCLOSURE (F)

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE MEDIUM TANK,
TYPE 3(1943)(submitted by NAVTECHJAP).

1. General Information: The tanks examined were located in the tank park of a Japanese tank brigade at FUKUOKA, KYUSHU. Approximately thirty (30) tanks were found, all of which were operational or could be made operational with minor repairs. The tank was apparently developed from the type 97 medium tank but is much more heavily armed and armored. It is superior in construction and performance to any Japanese tank previously reported. According to information received from personnel of the unit which operated the tank it weighs approximately twenty (20) tons and has a maximum speed of 30kph on roads or 20 to 24 kph cross country.

2. Hull: The shape of the hull is similar to that of the type 97 tank except that it is more angular. The front surface consists of one flat surface tapered up toward the drivers window, rather than the ricochet plates used on the older tank. There is no cupola for the drivers seat. The engine compartment has squared corners rather than sloping plates. The hull is of bolted rather than riveted construction. Armor thickness of the front plates is 1.45 inches, the sides 1 inch, and the rear and top of the engine compartment 1/2 inch. A type 97 7.7mm machine gun is mounted at the left front.

3. Turret: The Type 3 tank mounts a 75mm gun in an electrically controlled turret. The shape of the turret is similar to that of the type 97 modified tank which carries a 47mm gun; however its size is much larger to accommodate the bigger gun. The gun is the same as the type 90 field gun which was the Japanese Army's most modern field piece. It has a maximum elevation of 45° and a maximum range of 1500 yards. Traverse is accomplished by movement of the turret which will traverse 360° in either direction. A fixed sight is used with the gun. There are racks for 40 rounds of ammunition in the turret. Armor thickness is approximately 1/2 inch at the top, 1 inch at the sides, and 1.8 inches on the front. The turret is eight (8) feet long, two (2) feet six (6) inches high and has a front face three (3) feet seven (7) inches wide.

4. Suspension System: The suspension system is identical to that of the type 97 tank. There are six (6) bogie wheels, two (2) independently sprung and four (4) mounted in pairs. Drive sprocket is at the front and idler at the rear. There are three (3) return rollers at the top.

5. Engine: The engine is the same as the six (6) cylinder diesel engine used in type 97 tanks.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRELIMINARY REPORT, TYPE 4, 75mm AA GUNS (submitted NAVTECHJAP)

1. These guns were discovered by personnel of NavTechJap Team #2 at FUKUOKA, JAPAN. They are guns that have not been captured or reported previously.

2. Descriptive Data:

- a. Type 4 (1944)
- b. Bore: 75mm
- c. Length in calibers: 53 (approx)
- d. Maximum ceiling: 39,360 feet
- e. Horizontal range: 17,500 yards
- f. Rate of fire: 6 rounds per minute
- g. Limits of elevation: 0 to 85 degrees

3. The construction and basic design of this piece follows that of the 8cm (88mm) Type 99, a JAPANESE Copy of the GERMAN Flak 36. A horizontal sliding wedge breech block functions semi-automatically in that the cartridge is ejected on counter recoil and closes automatically as a round is rammed home. No evidence of a power rammer is to be found. The top carriage is of the pedestal type, mounted on four (4) outriggers. The pedestal contains a vertical spring equilibrator connected to the two elevation racks by a chain.

4. These guns are intended to be director controlled, and each gun has selsyn receivers for fuze, angle of train and quadrant elevation. Data was set at the guns by means of zeroing lagmeters (i.e., volt meters). Mechanical dials are present for calibration purposes. The fuze setter has three (3) receptacles for ammunition. Also on the left hand side of the gun is the assembly for case 1 firing (local control) minus the sights. No optical gear for these guns had been received at FUKUOKA prior to the end of the war.

5. A trained crew is supposed to emplace one (1) of these guns in three (3) minutes. Figures for rate of fire were given by a Japanese Colonel who had not seen the guns fire. It is believed that the actual rate is substantially higher.

ENCLOSURE (H)

SECRET

From: 1800I, 7Nov45
To : 1800I, 8Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
0800, 9 November 1945.

No. 48.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle (Omitted)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations.

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO

3 Navy Warehouses near HIO (1 mile East of SASEBO) contain material for the repairing and maintenance of ships. This consists of various sizes of pipe, diesel and electric motors, insulation materials, electric welding rods, hand drills, rivets, dies, and pressure gauges.

SHIRATAKE Electric Works near HIU (1 mile East of SASEBO) produced parts for electric motors, generators and panel boards during the war. The plant consists of one two-story building containing 2 lathes and some motors which were under repair. There was formerly another building but it was destroyed by fire. The plant is shut down and no production figures are available.

SECRET

ODORIGAKURA Electrical Factory Workshops (3 miles East of SASEBO) were formerly operated by the Navy. Guards under commander YAMANOUCHI said that the plant had not been operating for the past four months, but prior to that electrical equipment was repaired here. The plant consists of one office building and a two story building containing 8 lathes, 8 drill presses and a storeroom of spare parts and other tools.

YAWATA

MITSUBISHI Chemical Industries Ltd Plant at KUROSAKI (a suburb of YAWATA) This report is in addition to and supersedes the report on this plant in our Periodic # 44. During the war this plant employed 6503 workers and employs at present 2890. During the war the main products were glass, synthetic rubber, and explosives.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) PRECIOUS METALS.

The 2nd Marine Division is holding 3.7 kilograms of gold chloride (48.5 to 50% pure) and 45.5 kilograms of silver chloride obtained from the Navy Paymaster Section Warehouse in the KORIGAWA Valley (near OMURA).

SECRET

for Lt. Colonel
G. L. MC CORMICK
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifthFlt	1	CG 32ndInfDiv	10
CG Sixth Army	5	Attn G-2	
OIC JICPOA	1	" OOB	
CG FMFPAC	1	MAG 22	1
Com5thPhib	1	CG FBC	1
CG III Phib Corps	1	NAVTECHJAP	1
CG I Corps	1	USSBS TOKYO	1
CG X Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
AFPAC HQ(MINILA)	2	File	5

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted. Translations of local news items of possible interest are presented below.

2. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) 6 November 1945. Fumio Mihara, Vice President of Mindanao Japanese Society, and native of Saiki City, returned on the U. S. Transport, Hutchinson and related as follows:

"As meals, we received 2 boxes of U. S. ration food per meal. Toward the end of the voyage, they gave us 4 boxes. The children and the grown-ups were treated alike. In addition, candies were given to the women daily, and we received a sufficient amount of cigarettes and plenty of water to drink. We had more than what we could eat, and were very well fed."

"We were also given a bed to sleep in and upon debarkation they gave a blanket to each of us. Everything they did for us was beyond our imaginations. We are very grateful."

3. SAGA SHIMBUN (published in SAGA) 8 November 1945. "The Engineer Unit of the O. A. has shown remarkable speed in its work of repairing highways. In less than a month, they completed the Arita-Tosu highway. In addition, they completed 4 bridges between Saga and Kanzaki, and one bridge between Kanzaki and Kurume."

"The combined meeting of the anti-TB organization branches in Kyushu-Yamaguchi area was held at Karatsu First Aid Station on the 5th and 6th. Supt. Tsunoda of Saga Sanitation Bureau, who attended this meeting said, "The main topic of this meeting was the measures to be taken on the demobilized men affected with TB and on those undernourished during the war. I think that we should establish anti-TB stations in this Prefecture immediately. At present, there are about 20,000 TB patients in this prefecture, and one thousand and several hundred are dying annually. Since April, BCG vaccine was injected into 23,060 persons. This good result is second to Fukuoka for the entire Kyushu, but we must improve our conditions and establish more caring stations."

4. HYUGA NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN (published in MIYAZAKI) 5 November 1945. Schools in MIYAZAKI. "What will become of the various commercial schools that were changed into industrial schools during the war? What is the new plan of the Miyazaki Vocational School following the abolishing of its aircraft course, etc etc? In order to know answers to the above questions, this

paper made a survey." This is the report:

"COMMERCIAL SCHOOLS. In the cities of Miyazaki, Nobeoka and Miyakonojo will probably be changed into commercial schools of former years from the present status of industrial schools. However, the Nobeoka Commercial desires a construction course."

"AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL. This will expand as farming is a big factor in rebuilding Japan. Students of the middle schools are begging to transfer to this school."

"MIYAZAKI VOCATIONAL has decided to abolish aircraft course. A machinery course has been substituted. It is planned to establish a construction course also."

"MISSIONARY SCHOOL was destroyed by the typhoon, but the Catholics are planning reconstruction."

5. OITA GODO SHIMBUN - 6 November 1945. "The U. S. Marine unit (300 men) who came to occupy the city of Oita on Oct. 12th, left for Sasebo on the 5th, under the command of Capt. Jones. Lt. Col. Collins, commander of the advanced detachment, left on the plane that morning. On his departure, he said, "We came to occupy with peace as our aim. Due to the cooperation of the people, no incidents came up and I am very glad of it. During our stay everything went on smoothly. The people must further cooperate with the American Army and build New Japan. I am also glad that the interpreters' strike was settled before my leaving."

"Following the departure of the U.S. Marines, the 32nd Division of the U.S. Army arrived to continue the Occupation. This group of 15 officers and 300 men is commanded by Lt. Col. Heenan. Lt. Col. Bortz is also with this outfit. The officers are quartered at the Maizuru Hotel in the city of Beppu, and the men are quartered at the former Boys' Aviation School."

WRG/rem
Ser 001094B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800I, 08Nov45
To : 1200I, 09Nov45

SECRET

No. 49.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 10 November 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

YAWATA

TOKAI Iron Works in TOBATA employed 350 workers in producing 50 tons of steel plate, 60 tons of roll stock and 50 tons of rail per day during the war. The war-time production of this plant was utilized by the armed forces. At present this plant is inoperative but employs 162 in the maintenance and guarding of the factory.

SHIROMIZUGUMI Iron Works at TOBATA employed 430 during the war in the production of gas and oil storage tanks. At present 242 are employed in the repairing of gas storage tanks.

SECRET

SAGA

SHIN-SHUKU Ammunition Factory (approximately 10 miles west of SAGA) employed 35 to 60 persons in making 50,000 nose and 50,000 base plugs per year for shells of an unknown caliber. Future plans call for the manufacturing of bicycle parts.

Warehouse near the above factory contains 28 two and one half ton 6x6 truck loads of signal equipment and 2 truck loads of aircraft parts.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

A recent survey of public opinion concerning women's suffrage was conducted by the 403rd CIC Detachment among business people, rural townspeople, and farmers in the SASEBO Area. Of 300 persons questioned 52 2/3% were in favor of women's suffrage, 4 1/3% against it, 34 2/3% had no opinion, and 8 1/3% had no knowledge of the subject. The interviewers noticed a great reluctance to discuss the matter on the part of women when there were Japanese men present.

SECRET

G. L. McCormick
 G. L. MC CORMICK,
 Lieutenant, Colonel, USMCR,
 AC of 3, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifthFlt	1	CG 32ndInfDiv(Attn G-2 OOB)	10
CG Sixth Army	5	MAG 22	1
OIC JICFOA	1	CG FBC	1
CG FMFPAC	1	NAVTECHJAF	1
Com5thPhib	1	USBS TOKYO	1
CG III Phib Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG I Corps	1	AC of 3, G-3, VAC	1
CG X Corps	1	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	File	5
CG 5thMarDiv	10		
AFFAC HQ(MANILA)	2		

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

10 November, 1945.

SECRET

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilized.

1. a) The following army personnel were demobilized during the period:

17th Hvy Arty Regt	2
134th AA Regt	5
KURUME Div Dist Hq	4
1st Inf Repl Unit	10
2nd Inf Repl Unit	11
3rd Inf Repl Unit	1
SAGA Regt'l Hq	7
SAGA Mil Hosp	2
Total	42

b) The following demobilization information is submitted by the 32nd Ind Div:

UNIT	STR. 15 AUG	PRESENT STR.	REMARKS
203 Land Duty Co	535	0	Completely demobilized 9Sep45.
204 Land Duty Co	544	0	" " 13Sep45.
205 Land Duty Co	537	0	" " 7Sept45.
11th Boat Depot	724	83	DUTY: Guarding munitions
38th Shpng Engr Regt	1000	0	Completely demobilized 9Sept45.
13th Sea Tpt Bn	1100	0	" " 9Sept45.
27th Sea Tpt Bn	500	0	Date of demobilization uncertain.
13th Sea Duty Co	748	0	Completely demobilized 5Sept45.
136th Sea Duty Co	477	0	" " 5Sept45.
Moji Dist RR Hq	108	24	Working on records of deceased Japanese soldiers.
1st Ind RR Bn	100	5	Turning over supplies.

2. Repatriation.

TATSUI MARU left MUROSAM HOKKAIDO on 20 Oct and arrived at HAKATA on 7 Nov carrying 3006 civilians and 436 army troops. Of the civilians, 1285 went to HONSHU; 129 to SHIKOKU; and 992 remained in KYUSHU. The destinations of the troops were as follows: MAYCHARHA 2; CHIBA 17; TOYAMA 2; TOTSUTORI 4; TOKYO 49; AOMORI 3; IWATI 2; AKITA 4; YAMAGATA 9; SENDAI 5; FUKUSHIMA 5; MITO 7; UTSUNOMIYA 6; URAWA 32; YOKOHAMA 22; SHIZUOKA 10; NAGOYA 15; GIFU 19; KOFU 9; NAGANO 8; NOGATA 6; FUKUI 5; TSU 14; NARA 9; WAKAYAMA 14; OHTSU 6; KYOTO 3; OSAKA 7; KOBE 11;

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 1 -

SECRET

838

SECRET

HIROSHIMA 39; OKAYAMA 7; MATSUYE 7; YAMAGUCHI 9; SAGA 3; NAGASAKI 4; KUMAMOTO 9; OHITO 5; KAGOSHIMA 6; HOKAIDO 5; SAITAMA 3; YAMANASHI 2; YAMAGAWA 1; SHIMANE 1; MIYAGO 2.

Vessel SHIOKAZA left FUSAN, KOREA on 6 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 6 Nov carrying 724 civilians. Of these, 226 went to HONSHU; 13 to SHIKOKU; and 485 remained in KYUSHU.

C.B. #192 left MIYAKO Island on 3 Nov and arrived at HAKATA-KO on 6 Nov with 62 civilians and 137 Army troops. 31 of the civilians went to HONSHU; 6 to SHIKOKU; and 25 remained in KYUSHU. The destinations of the Army troops were as follows: FUKUOKA 21; HIROSHIMA 3; SENDAI 11; OWOTO 18; KAGOSHIMA 13; KUMAMOTO 13; OSAKA 39; NAGOYA 16; TOKYO 2.

Vessel KOSAI left CHINKAI, KOREA on 5 Nov and arrived at HAKATA-KO on 7 Nov with 448 civilians and 433 naval troops. Of the civilians, 283 went to HONSHU; 14 to SHIKOKU, and 151 remained in KYUSHU. The destinations of the troops were as follows: FUKUOKA 21; SAGA 25; NAGASAKI 4; KUMAMOTO 26; OITA 22; MIYAZAKI 5; KAGOSHIMA 23; HIROSHIMA 76; OSAKA 36; NAGOYA 35; TOKYO 85; SENDAI 38; HOKAIDO 19 and SHIKOKU 18.

There were 9408 Koreans awaiting transportation in FUKUOKA CITY on 7 Nov. On that day 6596 Koreans arrived in the city to await transportation and 2767 were shipped home.

Repatriated troops from HONG KONG started unloading at 1130, 8 Nov 45 and completed unloading at 2015, 8 Nov 45. 700 troops debarked, 699 dispatched to HARIO Barracks, 1 remained at URAGASHIRO as a patient at the hospital.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's newspapers. Translations of local news items of possible interest are presented below.

2. HYUGA NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN (published in MIYASAKI) 6 November 1945. "Today there has come to be a gradual improvement in the condition of foodstuffs within the prefecture. But condition of supply of barley, sweet potatoes and so forth are no better than the low point reached immediately after the cessation of hostilities."

"Although we attained 103% supply in October of last year we have not exceeded 55% this year, and it is already November. It seems that there are farmers who consider the stagnation of the potato supply to be a question of price; however the principal cause in the case of both grain and potatoes is the uncontrolled black market."

"With Japan on the verge of economic death because of her failure to cope with this situation she is being directed by the occupation forces and the police force of the prefecture has commenced an all-out drive against the crooked brokers who handle the black market in rice, grain, potatoes, fish, and beef. At the Kobayashi Station, commencing with the large items handled by the northern area Kyushu black market dealers, the number of cases which have been considered has already mounted into the hundreds."

"An announcement has been made by the department of economic security of the controls handled in all the police stations of the three prefectures. In particular, under the guidance of the occupation authorities, intensive anti-black market controls have been instituted, and both the methods of control and the actual steps taken have been announced."

3. OITA GODO SHIMBUN (published in OITA) 7 November 1945. "The Koshindo group, who cleared about 2 cho (4.9 acres) of farmland on Taiheizan, Beppu City, and who, for the past thirty years of labor service, had stressed world peace and manifestation of Japanese culture, had taken steps to cope with the national conditions after defeat."

"With group leader YAMAMOTO and SHINOFUJI, Ichio, WADA, Yoshihiko, FUKUDA Shibaki, OGAMI Risaku, OHARA Mankichi, KATO Katsutoshi, MISHIMURA, Saburo as promoters, the Universal Farmers' Party has been organized and an oratorical meeting will be held in BEPPU City Hall at 6 PM on the 8th, when elevation of farmers posi-

tion in society, completeness of democratic ideas, opening of an international peace conference, establishment of permanent world peace, thorough study of politics, etc. will be stressed."

"A Young Men and Women's Party has also been established as a detached party to promote diffusion of political study to cope with extension of suffrage and spirit of labor service."

WRG/rem
Ser 001097B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 09Nov45
To : 1200I, 10Nov45

SECRET

No. 50.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 11 November, 1945

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SASEBO

MOJI Branch Transportation Office and Warehouse in HAIKI (3 miles southeast of SASEBO) consists of 6 two-story buildings containing the following: assorted water pipe and pipe tools, one set deep sea diver's equipment, 2 military radios, 5 civilian radios, crated diesel and electric pumps and motors and concrete mixers.

HAIKI Naval Barracks consists of 8 barracks, all in poor condition. The office safe contained 2,103,079.20 yen (Japanese count) and personnel records. The currency, according to the Japanese, is used to pay

SECRET

naval personnel being discharged.

Naval Barracks in HAIKI area consists of 11 buildings in good repair and equipped with electric lights and running water. There is also a warehouse full of medical supplies and another warehouse containing electrical and radio equipment.

OMURA

IWAYOSI Blacksmith Shop (7 miles east of OMURA) produce 10,000 small parts for torpedoes during the war. The factory is now producing farm tools from the scrap material. During the war 3 men were employed and at present 2 are employed.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

KEMPEI TAI. During a check of the demobilization of KEMPEI TAI in KUMAMOTO, it was ascertained that IMOTO, Yasuyoshi, former Warrant Officer and Chief Clerk of KUMAMOTO Provost, KEMPEI TAI, had prepared for mailing a list of all former members of NCO rank and above. A copy was to be sent to each person on the list together with a request that subject be notified of any change of address or success in finding civilian employment. IMOTO claimed that he had prepared the letter entirely on his own volition without official sanction and was merely attempting to act as a central clearance for members of the organization for purposes of social contact. All copies of the letter were burned and orders given that such further activity was prohibited.

SECRET

Relief Association and Occupational Guidance Association in NAGASAKI were reported by 498th CIC not to constitute a threat to the security of the Occupation Forces.

CHIKU TOKUSETSU KEIBITAI CIC reports that the CHIKU TOKUSETSU KEIBITAI was an organization of civilians, organized by the army and led by army officers. It was designed to assist the army in case of invasion. Little training was received and little work done to assist the army. The organization has been dissolved and no evidence has been disclosed to indicate that it presents a threat to the security of the Occupation Forces.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Lt. Col. KURIYA, Tsuginori was interrogated by CIC upon his arrival at KAJIKI. He had also been screened previously by the CIC in the Philippines. He was operations officer for Lt. General MUTO from 12 September 44 to 3 September 45, who was chief of staff for General YAMASHITA in the Philippines. No information relative to war atrocities was obtained.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

G. L. Mc Cormick
G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComFifthFlt	1	CG 32ndInfDiv	10
CG Sixth Army	5	Attn G-2	
OIC JICPOA	1	" OOB	
CG FMFPAC	1	MAG 22	1
Com5thPhib	1	CG FBC	1
CG III Phib Corps	1	NAVTECHJAP	1
CG I Corps	1	USSBS TOKYO	1
CG X Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
AFPAC HQ(MANILA)	2	File	5

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

11 November, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilization.

a. 32nd Infantry Division reports the following changes in the strengths of these units:

UNIT	PREVIOUSLY REPORTED STRENGTH	PRESENT STRENGTH
OITA Regt'l Dist Hq	58	56
SAEKI Naval Airbase	13	12
SAEKI Br. KURE NAVAL Munitions Depot	18	7
118th Ind Mixed Brig	78	91
OITA Army Hosp	54	47

b. The following military personnel were reported demobilized during the period by the 5th Marine Division:

NAGASAKI KEN:	OFF	ENL	TOTAL
HARIO Barracks	4	45	49
TAKASHIMA BANDAKE A/A Btry (Guards on installations)	1	6	7
YORIFUNE SL Position	0	8	8
KOKUZE SL Position	0	5	5
KUROSHIMA SL Position	0	4	4
YORIDAKE SL Position	1	3	4
NANATSUGAMA SL Position	0	4	4
MATSUSHIMA SL Position	1	6	7
SAKITO Lookout	0	8	8
MATSUSHIMA Btry	2	11	13
KUROSHIMA Btry	2	11	13
CHIWATA A/A Btry	0	5	5
SHISHIKI (SHIRADAKE) Lookout	0	4	4
MAKATSURA (HIRADO) Lookout	0	4	4
3d Special Attack Force Hq	5	3	8
Administrative Personnel:			
Communications Office	0	0	0
(Note: Joined this date: 2 Enl)			
Court Martial	0	0	0
(Note: Joined this date: 2 Off)			
KAWATANA Navy Dock Yard	1	0	1
SASEBO Naval Hospital	0	1	1
(Note: Joined this date: 2 Off)			
KAWATANA Special Attack Force	10	5	15
OMURA Air Base	11	42	53
Mine Sweeping Detail	1	0	1
(Note: Joined this date: 19 Enl).			

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 1 -

SECRET

845

SAGA KEN:

No change reported.

FUKUOKA KEN:

No change reported.

Total demobilized during period:

39	175	214
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2. Repatriation.

LSTs #998, 1017, and 1026 left SAISHU TO 6Nov45 and arrived SASEBO 1400, 8Nov45, carrying 1400 Army personnel aboard each. Elements of the 243rd Inf Regt, 15th Arty Regt, 6th Special Arty Regt, 244th Inf Regt, were landed. Complete breakdown report to follow.

ISAO MARU left IKI SHIMA 7 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 7 Nov with 310 civilians, 2 Army troops and 6 Navy troops. Of the civilians, 182 went to HONSHU; 90 stayed in KYUSHU; and 38 went to SHIKOKU. Destinations of the troops were as follows: 2 bound back to IKI Island; 2 to SHIKOKU; HIRO 1; OITA 1; SAGA 1; AHIMI 1.

C.D. 21 left ISHIGAKI Island 5 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 8 Nov carrying 301 Army troops. Destinations of these troops were as follows: FUKUOKA 53; NAGASAKI 22; SAGA 15; KUMAMOTO 24; OITA 21; MIYAZAKI 14; KAGOSHIMA 35; OKINAWA 1; HIROSHIMA 12; OSAKA 12; NAGOYA 12; TOKYO 4; SENDAI 14; HOKKAIDO 2; SHIKOKU 60.

Vessel YUKAZE departed FUSAN, KOREA 8 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov with 328 civilians. The destinations of these troops were as follows: HONSHU 148; KYUSHU 139; SHIKOKU 41.

UNZEN MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA 8 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov carrying 1805 civilians. Of these 1107 went to HONSHU; 642 stayed in KYUSHU; and 56 went to SHIKOKU.

Mine-Sweeper #20 departed FUSAN, KOREA on 8 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov with 71 civilians. Of these 39 went to HONSHU; 22 to KYUSHU; and 10 to SHIKOKU.

HOKURIU MARU departed FUSAN 8 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov carrying 2052 civilians. Of these 983 went to HONSHU, 1010 stayed in KYUSHU, and 59 went to SHIKOKU.

ISAO MARU left TSU SHIMA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov with 211 civilians and 1 Army. Of the civilians 69 went to HONSHU; 138 to KYUSHU and 4 to SHIKOKU. The one Army man was bound for FUKUOKA.

HOKUYU MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA 7 Nov and arrived at SENZAKI 8 Nov with 630 civilians. Of these 519 went to HONSHU; 93 to KYUSHU; 6 to SHIKOKU; and 12 to HOKKAIDO.

846

Order of Battle.

(Continued)

11Nov45.

SECRET

There were 9408 KOREANS awaiting transportation home in FUKUOKA City on 8 November. On that day 4510 arrived in the city and 1053 were shipped home on the MAMIYA MARU.

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 3 -

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted. Translations of local news items of possible interest are presented below:

2. SAGA SHIMBUN (published in SAGA) 9 November 1945.
"General Jinsaburo Mazaki returned to his native land for the first time since the termination of the war. He reached the Saga Station on the 6th at 6:23 PM and immediately entered the Matsumotoya Hotel. In his interview, he said:

'...I returned to help those who died in the battlefield. When I was the president of the Educational Society, last year, I talked to many prominent citizens of this prefecture regarding the situation, but I could not say very much at this time. Hereafter I can talk as much as I want to, so I am thinking of telling how the militarists plotted and started this war to the populace.'"

3. HYUGA NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN (published in MIYAZAKI) 7 November 1945. "The O. A. in Omuta built a hospital in the city of Arao as a present for the citizens of Omuta and Arao. It will be formerly opened soon with the cooperation of Lt. Jameson, Army doctor. The outstanding feature of this hospital is to carry on its business in American ways. Unlike the old-fashioned Japanese style, the doctors will enter the patients into the hospital, visit the patients at regular intervals, and use the hospital facilities to the fullest extent. Hospital fees will be taken from rich patients but absolutely no fee will be taken from the poor people. It is the intention of the management to make the people appreciative. Lt. Jameson will be the superintendant of this hospital. Several nurses will be sent from the Mitsui Hospital to assist him."

4. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN (published in NAGASAKI) 10 November 1945. "Arita-machi, Capitol of Crockery, is prospering daily since the arrival of the O.A. in selling souvenirs. However, the prices differ on some articles at the various factories and stores and some are selling at very high prices. This will defame Arita, so the Police Department called a meeting of all concerns to warn them. Prices will be strictly controlled."

WRG/rem
Ser 001099B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 10Nov45
To : 1200I, 11Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 12 November, 1945

No. 51.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

BOFU

TOA Alcohol Company produced liquors, whiskey, wine, an shocho before the war. During the war this company employed 107 workers for the production 120,000 gallons of alcohol per month. At present 90 are employed in the monthly production of 93,000 gallons of alcohol. This company has applied for a permit to produce their pre-war products.

OMUTA

KAWAGUCHI Iron Works employed 45 workers during the war in the production of warship repair parts which were delivered to NAGASAKI. They also made tank parts and

SECRET

pipes for MITSUI interests in OMUTA. The plant is controlled by MITSUI. At present, all employees (15 in number) are repairing the buildings.

KOA Workshop made parts for MITSUBISHI shipbuilding interests in NAGASAKI during the war and expects to continue this work. At present small farm tools are being turned out. There were 100 workers during the war as compared to 74 at present.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

The communication lines near KUMAMOTO Airfield, on the outskirts of KUMAMOTO city have had pieces cut out of them on three occasions. On November 9th the piece cut out was 160 feet long. A search in the vicinity failed to produce the missing wire. These overhead lines have been put up so that pilots landing at the airfield can contact the nearest Marine unit for transportation from the field.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

The following report concerning the attitude of Japanese Christians in the OITA Area is summarized from reports made by officers in that area: The majority of the Japanese say that with the end of the war there is an opportunity to carry out a number of reforms in Japan. However, most of them are unwilling to take any active part themselves or to express any out-spoken opinions; they feel that as soon as the American Forces leave OITA, the militarists and former officials will quickly return to power and take revenge on those who showed open approval of the reform policies. They do not expect American Occupation Forces to remain in this

850

SECRET

Area over an extended period. In this they appear to be influenced by the belief that pressure from the States for early return of troops will necessitate reduction of occupational police garrisons in outlying areas such as this one.

G. L. MC Cormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

12 November, 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilization.

a) The following units are reported demobilized:

12th Air Div, Br. depot	ASHIYA
Gannosu A/F	KASUYA GUN
351st Division Hq's	KOGA

b) The following Military personnel were demobilized during the period:

NAGASAKI KEN:	OFF	ENL	TOTAL
Administrative Personnel (non-combatants) (Note: Joined this date 1 enl)	8	3	11
Mine Sweeping Detail at EMUKAI	3	4	7
OMURA Army Hospital	10	45	55
HIRADO KEMPEI TEI Detachment	2	0	2
SAGA KEN:			151
FUKUOKA KEN (Z OF O): (Note: Joined this date 130 men)			19

Total demobilized during period: 23 52 245

2. Repatriation.

MEIYU MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 8 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 9 Nov with 2355 civilians and 1254 Army troops. Of the civilians, 1223 went to HONSHU, 970 to KYUSHU, and 162 to SHIKOKU. The destinations of the Army troops were as follows: KAGOSHIMA 162; TOKYO 488; OSAKA 176; NAGOYA 139; KYOTO 65; HIROSHIMA 96; NAGASAKI 88; SHIKOKU 40.

KAITO MARU departed CHINKAI, KOREA on 4 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 48 civilians. Of these, 21 went to HONSHU, 23 to KYUSHU, and 4 to SHIKOKU. Ship delayed by typhoon and also engine trouble. Stopped at TSU SHIMA Island.

TAIAN MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 274 civilians. Of these

12 Nov 45.

SECRET

138 went to HONSHU, 125 to KYUSHU, and 11 to SHIKOKU.

MAMIYA MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 893 civilians. Of these, 461 went to HONSHU, 404 to KYUSHU, and 28 to SHIKOKU.

C.D. 32 departed ISHIGAKA ISLAND on 7 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 317 Navy troops. All of them were patients destined for the OHMUREA Navy Hosp.

M.S. #19 departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 91 civilians. Of these 22 went to HONSHU, 68 to KYUSHU, and 1 to SHIKOKU.

S.C. #60 departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 10 Nov with 220 civilians. Of these, 87 went to HONSHU, 117 to KYUSHU, and 16 to SHIKOKU.

There were 12,865 KOREANS awaiting transportation home in FUKUOKA City on 9 November. On that day 4344 arrived in the city and 5140 were shipped home.

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 2 -

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's newspapers. Translations of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. HYUGA NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN (published in MIYAZAKI) 8 November 1945.

"Realizing that the English language is needed first in order to entertain the occupational men, the prefectural Commercial and Industrial Economics Commission is opening classes in conversational English in its three cities beginning the 12th. Each class is to have fifty students. The classes will be held for one hour daily, beginning at 5:30 PM, by Mr. Chiyoji Ohta and several others from the O.A. A fee of Y 5 will be charged."

"Mr. Kohei Murakoshi, king of the marathon world, suddenly made his appearance in this paper's office. This world-famous athlete talked together with the writer, Mr. Chihei Nakamura, managing editor of this paper, and others. He said, "Setting this year as the preparation period, I think that track meets, forgotten during the war, will be revived. I will proceed toward the reconstruction of New Japan from this angle." At the previous Olympic Games, he was known as 'Japan's Murakoshi'."

"He intends to stay at his home in Akaye-machi, Miyazaki for a few days and then return to Kobe to resume his work in the Kawasaki Aircraft Co."

"The first ship to return from Hong Kong was the British ship Buffalo. It arrived at Sasebo on the evening of the 8th with 700 Japanese naval officers and men. They landed at the Urado Quarantine Station. According to a few of the officers, the Japanese in Hong Kong are healthy, but they have difficulties."

"Of the 52 nurses in the Kumamoto U. Hospital, 35 went on strike, demanding better treatment, as of the 7th. Since the bomb due to the shortage of rooms in the hospital, the nurses were quartered outside the hospital which led to unfair ration and treatment by the business manager, their protest stated."

0193/130
Ser. 001104B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 11Nov45
To : 1200I, 12Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 13 November, 1945.

No. 52.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (Omitted)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)
(C) OMINE POW Camp #5. (Confidential)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A) (Omitted)
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A) (Omitted)
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

GOTO RETTO

GOTO RETTO patrol has returned and reports that all 96 islands of this chain have been checked and all military installations destroyed. These installations were all located on three of the principal islands:

FUKAE-SHIMA, NAKATORI-SHIMA and UKU-SHIMA.

The other islands were completely barren of military installations. All large guns were destroyed by demolition, and all automatic weapons were destroyed by being dumped at sea or by demolition. All

SECRET

ammunition was disposed of by dumping at sea. The radar station at TAMANOURA, previously reported in VAC G-2 Periodic 46, was completely destroyed by demolition. 6,126 rifles, 7,255 bayonets, 550 swords 138 pistols, and 40 spears were collected. The unserviceable items were dumped at sea and the remainder brought to SASEBO. The population of this chain of islands is approximately 250,000. Most of the people are engaged in either farming or fishing. The people of these islands were very cooperative and seemed pleased at the arrival of the Occupation Forces.

MIYAKONOJO

KAWASAKI Aircraft Plant was 40% destroyed by a B-24 bombing on 6 August 1945. At present the plant consists of 12 small wooden buildings and two concrete buildings. Equipment appears to be in good condition. During the war the plant produced airplane bodies and wings. It now makes aluminum ware and wooden furniture employing 250 men.

OMURA

YUE Shipbuilding and Iron Factory (11 miles East of OMURA) employed 120 workers; and during the war, built 7 ships having a tonnage of 70 to 150 tons. It is privately owned and has been in operation since 1910. At present 90 workers are employed and three ships are being repaired. All ships are sold to the NISHI NIPPON Coal Shipping Company. Present plans are to continue operations as before.

KASATO SHIMA

HATACHI Ltd, KASADO Works. There are ten submarines known as type number 1 in various stages of construction: 2 are 70% completed, 4 are 50% completed and 4 are 20% completed. The construction of two type number 1 submarines is complete. One type number 2 submarine is complete and afloat. The type no 1 submarines were being constructed on orders from the OSAKA Army Arsenal, and type No. 2 for the Army-Marine Headquarters. There are also 35 two-man submarines in various stages of construction: 2 are 90% completed, 5 are 50% completed, and 28 are 30% completed. These two-man submarines were being built for the Japanese Navy. All construction work

856

SECRET

SECRET

on these vessels was stopped on 15 August 1945.

FUKUOKA

KOGA Proving Grounds (7 miles north of FUKUOKA) contained the following equipment: 18 heavy mortars, 8 knee mortars, 43 machine guns, 206 Brin guns, 13 artillery pieces, 725 boxes of powder charges, 20 trucks, 70 two-wheeled ammunition carts, and ammunition for all weapons. Test firing commenced in June 1944 and ceased at the end of the war. During the operation of this proving ground there were four directors and 40 men stationed there.

KOGA Iron Works was established in December 1939 and manufactured railway transport cars, ball bearings, and axles. In July, 1942 a naval contract was received and they started production of 75mm shell casings, mortar shells, projectiles and parts for 75mm shells. At the cessation of hostilities work at the factory ceased. On 27 August 45, production of railroad cars, belt conveyors, and household utensils was started. During the war 1150 workers were employed; at present 199 are employed.

FURUKAWA Electrical Manufacturing Company (10 miles North of FUKUOKA) employed 570, including school children and part time workers, in producing 2,700,000 meters of electrical wire per month during the war. The greatest portion of this wire went to the military forces. At present 270 workers are employed in the production of 1,200,000 meters of finished wire and approximately 300 tons of raw material on hand.

NAKATSU

OKANA Valve Mfg Co. Ltd., located at YANADA (13 miles Northwest of NAKATSU) employed 650 during the war in the production of ten tons of valves and boiler fittings weekly. The total production of this plant went to the military forces. At present, 270 are employed in the production of 2 tons of valves and boiler fittings weekly which are used for repairing steam boilers for civilian use.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

- (1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.

SECRET

(2) Suspects.

None reported

(3) Subversive activities

None reported

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported

(5) Miscellaneous

The 94th CIC Detachment reports the following:
In connection with investigation of the blacklist of books in the KYUSHU Imperial University Library, agents discovered a magazine entitled "The 20th Century". A copy of the magazine was dated November 1944. It was published monthly by the 20th Century Publishing Company, 34 TA SHANGHAI LU, P.O. Box 771, SHANGHAI, CHINA. All editorial matter was addressed to Dr. KLAUS MEHNART, P.O. 4082, SHANGHAI, and was printed by W. SIDEL and Company, ABC Press, SHANGHAI. The magazine is a Nazi propaganda publication and the subscription and distributing agent for Japan were NIPPON DEMPO TSUSHINSHA, NISHI GINZA 7-CHOME, TOKYO. Dr. MEHNART was, prior to the outbreak of the war in 1941, a professor at the University of HAWAII and was under investigation at that time for potential subversive activities. He left HAWAII in 1941 and it was later substantiated that Dr. MEHNART was working for the Third Reich. Another one of the Articles in the magazine was entitled: "NIETZSCHE and Our Times" by Robert SCHINZINGER. At the time of the publication of the magazine in 1944, SCHINZINGER was a German philosopher living in TOKYO. This magazine has a wide circulation in the Orient.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

SECRET

G. L. Mc Cormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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CG III Phib Corps	1	USSBS TOKYO	1
CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. ASAHI SHIMBUN (published in KOKURA) 11 November 1945.

"In order to absolutely accomplish its role as the directive machinery of the people's opinion in these critical times, it is needless to say, but the newspapers themselves must clarify their war responsibilities. We therefore apologize our guilt to the people, and at this time let it be known, to whom it may concern, that the Asahi Shimbun's mission is to be the peoples representative."

"However, the reality of this paper's reform cannot be shown with a mere statement like this. With the fate of Japan, the future of this paper will be faced with difficulty. In order to realize our statement, we need constant practice and lots of courage. This statement is the opinion of all the members of this paper..."

"At present, Japan is facing the chaos of famine, unemployment, wanderers and politics. It seems the government is sleeping in regard to these matters. The people, on the other hand, facing these unheard of difficulties, have not been represented to express and execute their feelings, opinions and demands."

"The duty of the press, therefore, is to represent and lead the people. This is really the greatest task of this paper."

3. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) 11 November 1945.

"The prefecture of Miyazaki is proceeding with its agricultural plan toward the cultivation of approximately 5,000 Cho-Ho of land, formerly set aside for military use. However, a dispute between the farmers and ex-soldiers rose in re: 440 Cho-Ho of land (of which 200 Cho-Ho has been already cultivated) in Kobaisas Cho, Nishi Morogata-gun."

"The dispute rose when about 100 native farmers and Okina evacuees, upon request of the prefecture's farming authorities, tried to enter the premises but were blocked by more than ten demobilized men who claimed their rights of ownership. Upon request by Mr. Chotatsu Chinen, vice president of the Okinawa Reconstruction Society, Supt Aratake of the Agriculture Bureau is to investigate the situation on the 13th."

"How will this dispute be settled? According to the information received from the Army authorities, the demobilized men's labor aid society limited the cultivated area and its vicinity only for the men justifying their claim. On the other hand, the prefecture authorities claim the area is too large for the 10 and several others to handle. They also claim that this problem is how to settle the food problem instead of who has the right to the land, so they want to give the suitable lands to the farmers for wheat production."

4. OITA SODO SHIMBUN (published in OITA) 9 November 1945.

"In order to present American ways of living to the O. A. men, the city authorities of Beppu are now planning to build club houses in Hitogahama Beach and Rokkatsu Park for both the Army and Navy. The club houses are to have all kinds of recreational facilities as well as dining halls. It is also planned to install motor boat service and reopen the golf course on the southern end."

5. SAGA News (published in SAGA) 11 November 1945.

"On the 7th, about noon, a fire broke out in the home of a Korean living in OgiMachi, Kase Mura, Saga Gun. Just when it seemed that nothing could be done to save the house, Americans came to the rescue. Two Americans passing by in a jeep jumped from their vehicle; one climbed on the roof and one stayed below and both worked at extinguishing the blaze. Thus they not only saved the house but kept the fire from spreading."

"At Takahashi, in the same village, about 7PM some days ago, two students were waiting for a northbound bus. They waited and waited, but every bus was packed and would not let them aboard. An MP of the occupation forces saw them there and realized that they would soon be caught by darkness if they did not get a ride. Therefore he stopped an American jeep, and though it was going only as far as Koshiro had them driven off to (their destination in) the northern part of town. This kindly act inspired the thanks of all, for it made us realize the beauty and sympathy of the men's characters."

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

CONFIDENTIAL

OMINE POW CAMP
(at TAGAWA Mine (617.0-1238.0)
16 miles West of YAMAGUCHI, HONSHU)

This camp had a capacity of 700 prisoners. During operation 40 guards comprised the strength of the unit stationed there. On 20 September 45, while prisoners of war were still within the camp, rations were dropped by parachute to the prisoners in the camp. Two days later the prisoners were removed from the camp. An extensive investigation failed to reveal the location to which the POWs were moved. At the time the POWs were removed the camp was turned over to FURUKAWA Mining Company, which had been the owner of the property. The company now uses it as an office building. The company placed two guards over the rations for safe keeping until US troops arrived. As there were no guard personnel at the camp, further information could not be obtained. A number of wooden prisoner tags were found with a number and a name on each. Some of the tags were missing. The following is a translation of the number and name on the tags found:

6. GEORGE PERCY BREWS	63. GEORGE MONTIEU
7. WILLIAM PENDLETON	64. ROBERT RIDLEY
10. ERNEST WRIGHT	65. JACK BROWN
13. OLIVER RICHARD CAIN	67. KENNETH TONG
15. JAMES TOMINI	68. HUGH WRIGHT
20. ERNEST HENRY ED-----?	69. RICHARD FRANK FROST
22. JOSEPH WOLSEY	70. JOSEPH PATRICK COLE
23. JACK SIDNEY CARPENTER	73. EDWARD JAMES RUTTER
25. JOHN WILLIAM CLARK	74. GEORGE HUTTON
26. ALHUNT NORMAN HARVEY	75. JAMES RAY
28. ARTHUR JAMES RULE	77. FRED CHEMURST
30. THOMAS MC KONAKY	78. ALFRED WILLIAM CLAPHAM
33. WILLIAM WANS	80. JOSEPH O'CONNELL
35. WM SIDNEY COOK	83. JOHN ANTHONIS OKUMBACH
36. JOHN WEBB	84. JOHIGO LEONARD ROBBINS
38. ARTHUR DOUGLAS RIDER	86. RICHARD SIDNEY FROST
39. PHILLIP FRANCIS CROWE	87. NORMAN FELLER
40. FRANK SANTER	88. THOMAS RAFTERS
41. LEONARD DICEY	89. CLY OAKS
44. ARTHUR BOSCHWELL	90. ARTHUR OWENS
47. ALFRED ROBERT WILSON	92. JOHN EDGER FORK
48. GEORGE FREDERICK SMART	93. ARTHUR RODIN
50. CECIL JAMES GOSLING	96. MATHEW FRANK GIKSOL
53. FRANK E. MURPHY	97. JOHN HENRY MYERFRANDIS
54. PATRICK WM DAY	98. ROBT FRANCIS JUDGE
56. ALFRED DENNIS MAIL	99. FREDERICK WILLIAM MACAUSSEY
57. ALBERT MAYNARD	103. HALL ARTHUR GOSJOHN
59. JOHN STANLEY BAKER	104. JOHN WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM
61. WILLIAM HAY	105. BERNARD FRANK BRICE

ENCLOSURE (C)

- 1 -

CONFIDENTIAL

862

OMINE POW CAMP.

(Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

106.	ERNEST HERBERT ELKINGS	168.	LESLIE LIDDEL
108.	SAMUEL LAWRENCE CHIZNELL	169.	ERNEST WM ALEXANDER
109.	JOHN ARTHUR MILLS	170.	SIDNEY BAYFORD
110.	LESLIE SEIGER	171.	HARRY BYRD
111.	HUGH PIERCE	173.	OWEN ORNL
113.	REGINALD FRANK PEACH	175.	WM GODWIN STONES
114.	EDWIN GEORGE EITZ	176.	HENRY ERNEST KANGTON
115.	ALBERT DILLON	177.	JAMES AGMUS
116.	EDWARD JOE MEITZ	178.	DAVID BREWS
117.	COCKLOFT EDWIN SMITES	179.	MARK WILLIAM BARTLETT
118.	ALEX DOWNS	180.	FRANK THOMAS BAILEY
119.	JOHN DEWITT POLAND	181.	ARTHUR FREDERICK HALFORD
120.	PETER MAFFART	182.	JACK MANN FLIT
121.	ERNEST FREDERICK ELLIS	184.	FRANCIS GEORGE LOGAN
122.	CYRIL LARRY MEADOW	185.	GEORGE FREDERICK CLAPP
123.	JIMASEPH ASWORTH	186.	HENRY JAMES DRAYCOTTE
124.	FREDERICK BRAIR	187.	WM SAUNDERS
125.	RICHARDSON ANDREW LUM	188.	FREDERICK TRIGHS
127.	ARTHUR WM RILEY	189.	ROBERT JOHN TROTTER
128.	JAMES HENRY HAWTHORNE	190.	ROBAND ARTHUR BAYSOY
129.	JAMES HERBERT SAUNDERS	191.	ALFRED THOMAS FRANK
130.	JOHN CHARLES CLIFFORD HARVEY	192.	CUSHICORN RICHARD BRINODOF
131.	FRANK MOORE	193.	HANS CROOKS
133.	JAMES ARTHUR WATSON	194.	ALFRED HANCOCK
134.	STANLEY ARTHUR IRONSIDE	195.	WM GEORGE PEACOCK
136.	NORMAN CLIVE DREWITZ	196.	CHRISTOPHER OLDSFIELD
137.	JOHN KELLY	197.	WM ROBERT BURNS
138.	EDWARD H. ROSE	198.	BRICE WALK ROOINGTON
139.	NORMAN BOOTH	199.	EDWARD ALFRED MOORE
140.	W. FREDERICK RAY	200.	GARNER JAMES HALE
141.	HUGH JONES		
144.	T. WILLIAM PIKE		
145.	FREDERICK TAYLOR		
146.	M. ROGERS LONGMOOSE		
147.	ALEXANDER WM OGDEN		
148.	ARTHUR CHAS BALL		
149.	GEORGE EDWARD NOBLE		
150.	DOUGLAS HAROLD SAVAGE		
153.	ROBERT WALTER BASBY		
154.	WILLIAM FURST		
155.	HENRY JOHN HURSANT		
156.	ARTHUR STANLEY TERRING		
157.	GEORGE WILFRED BARTON		
159.	NELDON RICHARD WARTON		
160.	JAMES JOHN SKEMINO		
161.	EDWARD SISLIE KAMP		
164.	REEMUS QUARD		
165.	CHAS COOPER		

863

ENCLOSURE (C)

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

From: 1200I, 12Nov45
To : 1200I, 13Nov45

SECRET

No. 53.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 14 November 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)
(C) A Study of GOTO-RETTO (unclassified).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A).
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A).
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

FUKUOKA

NAJIMA Steam Power Plant consisted of 7 warehouses and one sub station. This plant is a branch of the KYUSHU SEHITIN Power Company of TOKYO. There are four steam turbines, but only two are in operation. All electrical power for FUKUOKA is routed through the NAJIMA Steam power plant. At present this plant employs 204 workers and has a production capacity 51,000 kilowatts per hour.

BOFU

BOFU Iron Works manufactured oil and water pumps before and during the war. During the war there were

SECRET

180 employed in the production of 8 tons of pumps per month. At present, 60 are employed in the production of pumps, cooking utensils, and farm implements.

OMUTA

MINATO Bromine Plant is a subsidiary of MIIKE Dye-stuffs Company. It has been in operation since 1943 producing ten tons of bromine per month until June 1945. Now it produces 200 kilograms of salt per day. The plant manager does not expect to resume bromine production. Wartime employees numbered 100; at present there are 15 employees.

MITSUMI Mining Company Schools in the OMUTA Area operates 5 schools, one at its head office and four others at various mines in the OMUTA Area. The first schools were started in 1921. They are for boys who have had at least six years previous education in the public schools. Each student received 18 hours of schooling per month before the war, and 12 hours per month during the war. The rest of their time was spent at work. They attend school in small groups, so that the school itself was in continuous operation. Subjects taught were: morals, civics, mining, electricity, and mining machinery. Military training was given during the war by discharged Army personnel who had full time jobs with the mining company. Industrial subjects were taught by employees working in those particular fields. There were 20 full time teachers. In December, 1941, there were 3,184 pupils; in August, 1945, there were 1,218. The school is continuing at present with the same subjects as during the war with the exception of military training.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

YOSHIMIZU, Toru, age 29, TOKYO, address YODOBASHI KU KASHI WAGI #92, evaded complete interrogation at KAJIKI on 9 November. He was on the foreign affairs

SECRET

staff of the Japanese embassy in Manila. He arrived at KAJIKI on 9 November aboard the YOIZUKI and departed for TOKYO before being completely interrogated. It is recommended that he be traced and further questioned.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Ship Sunk By Mine.

At 0840, 9 November, 1945, the HORAI MARU, carrying a crew of 36, struck a mine and sank instantly in the regular shipping lane, 10 miles west of MOJI. The vessel had departed HAKATA harbor 0800, 8 November, 1945, bound for OMI SHIMA. The following information has been reported by the Water Police at WAKAMATSU: A ship (name unknown) near the scene of the accident, rescued two of the crew who were badly wounded; and they were taken to the Seamen's Welfare Hospital in MOJI. The NAGASAKI MARU rescued 8 of the crew who are now in the hospital at WAKAMATSU. 4 were rescued by an unknown vessel. 22 of the crew are still missing.

(2) Black Market.

Startling reports of rice selling at 80 times the fixed government price and impending starvation of the poor were made by well-known SASEBO personages, who even involved local police and the Japanese Navy, when questioned concerning the black market by military government officials of the 5th Marine Division. First interviewed was TERADA, Kenichi, chairman of SASEBO Board of Education and one-time girls' high school principal, a man of distinctly liberal convictions.

SECRET

He implicated the local police and accused high official of encouraging the black market. Furthermore, he reported that since war's end the Japanese Navy had thrown considerable food, clothing and other supplies on the black market. He believes, an uncontrolled black market would ruin the future of the nation. KITAMURA, Tokutaro prominent in reconstruction work and long-time local banker was questioned next. It was his opinion that the black market is the inevitable result of an insufficient ration. The average adult receives 1040 calories per day and must patronize the black market to survive. (150 lb man not working or exercising requires 1800 calories per day.) As food supplies dwindle black market prices will rise. Rice has sold for 80 times its government-fixed cost. This winter may bring starvation for the poor who cannot afford these exorbitant prices. Unlawful buying is accomplished in the country by persons satisfying their own needs or by merchants who re-sell their produce in the city. Two reasons why control of the black market has been unsuccessful were cited by KITAMURA. Firstly, the armed forces have no respect for the law. In SASEBO the Navy openly and "officially" paid black market wages to employees and made extra food and supplies available to them. Secondly, the police made no effort to control prices. Early in the war sporadic, half-hearted attempts by the police to keep down costs were made but these have long since dwindled to inactivity. When the Navy was in power the police were recognized by the people as an oppressive instrument of the Navy and were traditionally hostile to civilian interests. Now with the Navy demobilized the police have lost face entirely with the populace. Asked if strong, vigilant police action was the solution to black market problems, KITAMURA's answer was an emphatic negative. The entire police system should be reorganized, said he.

TERADA was interviewed again with reference to KITAMURA's opinions. Rice prices reached a maximum of 20, not 80, times the official cost but are usually only 10 times as much, depending upon the market which one patronizes. He agreed on the other counts but was inclined to believe more black market transactions were executed in the city itself than in the country as KITAMURA claimed. Merchants bring contraband rice to the city and sell to a selected list of customers. He concurred with KITAMURA's

SECRET

opinion of the police, classifying them as uncultured, uneducated, and unable to cope with the problem. The present chief of the SASEBO police is typical, he volunteered. He is more interested in politics than in justice. Even the Mrs of the occupation forces are more popular with the people than local police officers. TERADA confirmed KITAMURA's statement that the Navy dispensed black market wages and supplies but seemed especially concerned with two other evils resulting from policies of the armed forces. The first: Former civilian employees of the Navy, pockets full of cash, are seriously endangering the economy of small communities. The second: Demobilized officers and NCOs, who have received huge bonus payments, consider themselves above work, and are living a life of playful inactivity. (Both the bonus and the inactivity mentioned in this statement have been checked against records and found to be entirely true).

Both the Mayor of SASEBO and the Deputy Mayor, when interviewed, expressed concern over certain conditions in JAPAN, recognizing the black market as both their cause and effect. They told of farmers selling their personal shares of rice on the black markets and of others who failed to declare the full amount of their harvest. To date only 47 percent of the expected rice crop has been reported.

Investigation of the black market in this Division's zone is continuing. Indications are that high Japanese officials take an active part in illegal exchanges of government equipment and food. Most transactions take place in metropolitan areas such as SASEBO, KURUME, and SAGA. Some sources link the control of these black market rings with a military underground consisting of both active and retired officers of the Japanese Military.

(3) GOTO-RETTO.

Enclosure (C) is a study of GOTO-RETTO compiled from reports of 5th Marine Division patrols. Some information was previously included in G-2 Periodic Reports #52.

SECRET

G. L. Mc Cormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

SECRET

14 November, 1945.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. Demobilization.

a. 32nd Infantry Division reports the following units completely demobilized:

UNIT	LOCATION	15 Aug. Strength
ASA Br, BOFU Naval Comm. School	ASA	?
Temporary Demobilization Center	OGORI	380
YAMAGUCHI Sp Guard Unit	YAMAGUCHI KEN	234
YAMAGUCHI Military Police Co.	YAMAGUCHI KEN	209

b. 2nd Marine Division reports the 21st Naval Air Arsenal completely demobilized.

c. 5th Marine Division reports the following personnel demobilized:

1.) NAGASAKI KEN:	
Administrative personnel	29
(Non-combatants	35
KAWATANA Sp Attack Force	17
M/S Detail of EMUKAI	12
2.) FUKUOKA KEN: (5th Mar Div ZofO)	3
TOTAL	96

2. Repatriation.

TENYU MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 11 Nov and arrived HAKATA on 11 Nov with 940 civilians. Of these 497 went to HONSHU, 334 to KYUSHU, and 103 to SHIKOKU.

UNZEN MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 11 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 12 Nov with 1894 civilians. Of these 1264 went to HONSHU, 590 to KYUSHU, and 40 to SHIKOKU.

HASU MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 11 Nov and arrived at HAKATA on 12 Nov with 110 civilians. Of these, 27 went to HONSHU, 74 to KYUSHU, and 9 to SHIKOKU.

KOAN MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and arrived at SENZAKI on 10 Nov with 4 Army, and 6759 civilians. The 4 Army troops went to TOKYO. Of the civilians, 4351 went to HONSHU, 1828 to KYUSHU, 540 to SHIKOKU, and 40 to HOKKAIDO.

CHOKI MARU departed FUSAN, KOREA on 9 Nov and

ENCLOSURE (A)

- 1 -

SECRET

870

arrived at SENZAKI on 10 Nov with 1065 civilians. Of these, 601 went to HONSHU, 258 to KYUSHU, 167 to SHIKOKU, and 39 to HOKKAIDO.

There were 17,319 KOREANS awaiting transportation home in FUKUOKA City on 11 November. On that day 2,693 arrived in the city and 8,259 were shipped home.

Report on repatriation shipping arriving at and leaving from KAGOSHIMA 11 November:

(1) Arrivals at KAJIKI:

The KIKU MARU arrived from KITA DAITO JIMA carrying 324 Army personnel.

Destroyer KAYA arrived from MANILA carrying 167 Army and 33 Navy.

Destroyer SHII arrived from MANILA carrying 183 Army, 16 Navy, and 1 Formosan civilian. The Formosan was transferred to the Destroyer KIRI at KAJIKI.

Destroyer KIRI arrived from MANILA carrying 4 Army and 195 Formosans. The Formosans did not disembark.

Destroyer KABA arrived from MANILA carrying 136 Japanese, 41 Formosans, and 96 Korean civilians. Only the Japanese disembarked.

(2) Departures from KAJIKI:

KIKU MARU and the CD 227 left for HIRO WAN carrying no passengers: scheduled to arrive 14 November.

Destroyer KAYA left for KURE carrying no passengers, scheduled to arrive 13 November.

Destroyer SHII left for HIRO WAN carrying no passengers, scheduled to arrive 13 November.

Report on repatriation shipping arriving at and leaving KAGOSHIMA on 11 November:

CD ETORO arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 62 Army, 81 Navy, and 157 civilians.

DD SUGI arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 182 Army and 18 Navy.

DD KASHI arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 190 Army and 10 Navy.

DD TSUTA arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 79 Army, 120 Navy and 1 civilian.

DD HAGI arrived at KAJIKI from MANILA carrying 116 Army and 84 Navy.

LST 754 left SAISHU TO 9 November 1945, arriving SASEBO 11 November 1945. Unloading began 1400, 11 November 1945, and was completed. 999 troops were unloaded at URAGASHIRA. 970 of these were dispatched to HARIO, 26 remain at URAGASHIRA, 3 aboard were dead. Units represented were: 262nd and 264th Regiments, Headquarters of 121st Division, detachment of Service Troops, 121st Hospital 64th Hospital, 4th Field Hospital, and 121st Artillery Regiment.

LST's 907 (707?) and 1013 departed SAISHU TO 7 November arriving SASEBO 1130, 9 November 1945. LST 807 had 1,400 Army personnel aboard. LST 1013 had 1,396 Army personnel aboard. Unloading completed 1455, 10 November.

Period 1700, 10 November 1945 to 0200, 12 November 1945, 409 Officers and 5,826 Enlisted dispatched from HARIO. Destination unknown.

LST 657, which left SAISHU TO 9 November and arrived SASEBO 11 November, began unloading at 1000, 12 Nov, and completed unloading at 1800, 12 November. 1200 Japanese Army personnel were unloaded and all but 1 dispatched to HARIO. The 1 remained as a patient at URAGASHIRA Hospital.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. KUMAMOTO NICHU NICHU SHIMBUN (Published in KUMAMOTO) 10 November 1945. "The neighborhood societies which have been the organ of government, in response to the voice of democracy, have lately undergone drastic changes. The societies which have carried out the functions of transmittal of imperial decrees concerning finance, fire fighting, and rationing of scarce items etc, because of the sudden end of the war and the rapid changing society have lost their official significance for the future. Therefore, public opinion demands the establishment of an independent organ for the benefit of the people. A change over to a people's cooperative of the neighborhood organizations as advocated by the Kagawa, Tomihiko group is being carried out as quickly as possible.

"Already the neighborhood societies are once again establishing independent organizations in response to existing conditions in each of their respective areas. Therefore, the department of interior, in accordance with the present trend, has adopted the policy which allows each group to operate unfettered."

"It is now necessary that a final definite and practical decision be made. Henceforth the neighborhood societies, which will be freed from the guidance by government authority, will fulfill only the minor functions of an instrument for liaison, rationing and mutual assistance. Furthermore, they will probably reappear as organs of society and government or else in the form of various cooperative associations."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN (Published in Nagasaki) 13 November 1945. "The total estimated yield of rice this year is 46,000,000 koku but the net yield will be far smaller. The farmers share of rice deposit is 30,000,000 koku, it was decided. Following the share of wheat, Irish potatoes and sweet potatoes, they are shouldering continuous hardships. Furthermore, in spite of shortage of farming implements, labor hands and with hardly any distribution of fertilizers, they have fought through all kinds of difficulties and bad weather to produce for the sake of their countrymen. We, the people, are very grateful."

"Truthfully speaking their efforts presented us with these foods, but on the other hand, with the exception of a certain class the farmers are the most fortunate class of people throughout the nation as far as livelihood is concerned. They not only increasing their wealth during the war from supplying the military, but they are also in the class with special priorities. The fact that considerable amount of money is flowing into the hands of the farmers from the "black market" buyers cannot be denied."

"This result is due to the government's ignorance of food management that shoved the people onto absolute famine line. However, there are some farmers with sympathy who are helping the sad situation of the people, it is said. We, therefore, request the farmers to cooperate with love toward botherhood and penetrate through these crisis."

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

16 November, 1945.

A STUDY OF GOTO-RETTO.

1. Importance.

This chain of Islands, 35 miles west of KYUSHU, contains 5 principal Islands: FUKAE-SHIMA, UKU-SHIMA, NAKADORI-SHIMA, NARU-SHIMA, WAKAMATSU-SHIMA, and 214 smaller islands. A majority of the people are either fisherman or farmers, growing rice and sweet potatoes. However, most of the terrain is too rugged for cultivation.

2. Population.

The population of GOTO-RETTO is approximately 250,000. On FUKAE-SHIMA and NAKADORI-SHIMA from 50 to 75 percent of the people are Roman Catholics, who are said to have come there to escape persecution of the SHOGUNATE. The population of the three principal cities is: FUKAE 30,000, TOMIE 25,000 and ARIKAWA 20,000.

3. Roads.

The road network on FUKAE SHIMA consists of a two-lane highway suitable for DUKW'S, and is suitable for military operation. On the other islands, roads are practically non-existent.

4. Military Installations and Defenses.

Most of these islands are natural military fortresses except FUKAE-SHIMA, UKU-SHIMA, and NAKADORI-SHIMA which have beaches suitable for landing operations. 96 of the islands were checked and all Military Installations were destroyed. All of these installations were on the five principal islands. Installations containing 8cm and 12cm guns were destroyed by demolitions. Automatic weapons were either dumped at sea or destroyed by demolition, and all ammunition was dumped at sea.

The Radar Station at TAMANOURA consisting of 2 screens in operating condition and covering the western approaches to the islands, was destroyed by demolition. Patrols to DANJO GUNTO found and destroyed radio equipment and a radar unit which covered the SW approach to KYUSHU.

5. Air Bases.

TAO Seaplane Base in TOMIE WAN was under construction at the end of the war, but was never put to use.

ENCLOSURE (C)

- 1 -

875

NOTOYAMA Airfield has a main airstrip 1300 meters long and a secondary strip 1200 meters long. The field is in fair condition and could be used as an emergency landing strip.

6. Counterintelligence.

The FUKAE-SHIMA thought control police (TOKKU SHITSU) consisted of one Police Officer and one policeman. It was disbanded on 13 October 1945.

The GOTO-RETTO KEMPEI TAI consisted of 6 men under 2nd Lt. NAGAMATS, Tsuruma and was demobilized on 20 September 1945.

7. Civilian and Military Attitudes.

The people of GOTO-RETTO were very cooperative and seemed greatly pleased at the arrival of the Americans. They expressed hopes that the Americans would stay and help in the reconversion of JAPAN.

The Chief of Police of FUKAE, HIGACHI Yochi, did not cooperate fully with our patrol. It was found that he had not done a thorough job of collecting weapons under his jurisdiction. He was reprimanded, and given 2 days to finish his collecting. At that time he produced 250 swords, 550 rifles, 75 shotguns, some machine guns and a few knee mortars. His excuse for failure to comply with orders was his transfer from SHISA to FUKAE only two weeks before, and he was not fully acquainted with FUKAE. His entire administration was lax.

8. Health and Sanitation.

The people of GOTO-RETTO seemed to be healthier, better fed, and also had larger and cleaner homes than the people of KYUSHU.

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Ser. 001112B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 13Nov45
To : 1200I, 14Nov45

SECRET

No. 54.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 15 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

Police Chief HIGACHI reported uncooperative (see Enclosure (C) our Periodic report #53.).

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KUMAMOTO

MITSUBISHI Heavy Industries Ltd #9 Aircraft Works is located approximately 1 mile from KUMAMOTO City. The estimated capital of this plant is 40,000,000 yen. During the war this plant employed 15,000 people including school children. Twin-engined bombers were produced for the Japanese Army. From September 1944 to April 1945 - 46 of these planes were produced, but the plant suffered heavy damage from bombings and in April 1945 had to shut down. At the present time 1600 people are employed making buckets, pots, and pans. The same number are now engaged in cleaning up the buildings and repairing machinery which is in very poor condition.

SECRET

SEIBUGUN KYOIKUTAI (Western Army NCO and Officers School) located at NISHIGOSHI (KUMAMOTO KEN) was used both as an officers training school for reserve (YOBIEKI) officers and as a squad leaders (BUNTAICHO) school for NCO's. Maximum capacity was 1300 to 1500 students with a staff of 200. The reserve officers school course was six months while the NCO school course was ten months. The school was directly under SEIBUGUN SHIREIKAN (Western Army Commander in Chief). It was dissolved on 1 September 1945 at which time the records and school books were burned. The above information was obtained from Captain KITAHARA, Hiroshi a member of the schools staff.

SAKITO Island (Approximately 15 miles SW of SASEBO)

SAKITO COLLIERY located on SAKITO Island adjoining KAKINOURA Island is owned by MITSUBISHI and covers an area of 27,110 acres. An estimated 106,000,000 tons of coal are still in the ground. At present two mines are worked by inclines and a third is worked by a shaft. Coal output during the past eight years has been 1,200,000 tons annually. Japanese Officials believe this mine to be the second largest in Japan. Present output is low due to labor and material shortages. In August, 1945, 6,601 men were employed and in September, 1945, only 2,974 were employed. SAKITO coal is high coking coal and is regarded as good quality coal except that the sulphur content (2.3%) is a little too high.

TAKATA (25 miles NW OITA)

DINKI Company at TAKATA employed 100 persons in the production of nuts and bolts for aircraft. During the war these parts went to the Japanese Army. At present 30 people are employed in the production of farm implements.

KOKURA

TAKASKI Iron Works located at KAWARA (15 miles S of KOKURA) employed 272 persons in the production of one hundred 75mm projectiles daily. At present 140 persons are employed in the production of mining equipment.

SECRET

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Small clubs are being organized in the various villages in KAGOSHIMA Prefecture to help improve the food situation and to institute governmental reforms. These clubs present no threat to the Occupation Forces, according to CIC.

KIHARA, Jitaro, wartime Japanese Consul at Manila was interviewed by 498th CIC regarding his knowledge of intelligence agencies and atrocities. He denied all knowledge of either.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) MIYAKONOJO

The following is an outline of the organization of the present MIYAKONOJO City Government. The records of all the sections are intact. The total number of people employed in the MIYAKONOJO City Government is 93:

MAYOR

1st Assistant

2nd Assistant

SECRET

SECTIONS UNDER 1st ASSISTANT.

- (a) General Affairs Section
- (b) Military Affairs and Censorship Section.
- (c) Agricultural Section.
- (d) Educational Section.
- (e) Finance Section.
- (f) Accounts Section.

SECTIONS UNDER 2nd ASSISTANT

- (a) Public Works Section.
- (b) Industrial Section.
- (c) Social Section.
- (d) Recovery Section.

G. L. Mc Cormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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Com5thPhib	1	NAVTECHJAP	1
CG III Phib Corps	1	USSBS TOKYO	1
CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. KAGOSHIMA NIPPO (published in KAGOSHIMA) 11 November 1945. "While disarming explosives under the jurisdiction of two American soldiers at the Gonohara bomb dump in this city, Kazuo Udo of KOZENJO, Kanoya City, who with 7 others and members of the Chon-ai-kai was working in a American labor unit, saw one of the incendiary bombs in a group of three or four others about 25 meters away start to emit smoke. He immediately dragged the bomb into a clearing, but the disarmed bombs had ignited and the bombs nearby exploded with a loud blast."

"The shrapnel and the blast caused 79 totally burned homes, 1 person killed, and 4 or 5 cows and horses killed. It also burned 10 cho of YAMABAYASHI. The soldiers and workmen were safe, as they had managed to evacuate earlier. Damage is estimated at 2,000,000 yen."

"The U.S. Forces notified the City Hall on the 9th that victims will be allowed the use of one of the former Japanese Naval buildings in the occupied zone."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN (published in NAGASAKI) 13 November 1945. "Due to the existence of a black market through the purchase of articles from occupation forces at a high price, and, especially in the cities, through their resale at an illegal price, the SASEBO police have received a request from the occupation force to crack down on the Black Market, and are confident of the thoroughness of their measures."

"On November 6, they arrested MATSUDA, Gentaro (52), of SASEBO City, TOYAMA MACHI, for purchasing 10 cartons of cigarettes for 500 yen from occupation personnel. He is under guard in FUKUISHI MACHI."

4. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) 13 November 1945. "Chief MITSUGAWA of the NAGASAKI Prefectural Police who attended the assembly of Japanese Police Chiefs opening at TOKYO on the seventh, returned to his duties on the twelfth and issued the following statement:"

"The main point was that the extension of rights which form one of our important duties is impossible unless barriers between the police and the people are eliminated. Therefore we shall endeavor to institute a police force which is truly representative of the population. Although the thoughts of one of us on this subject are of little avail, I am anxious for all of us to strive together. We are collaborating with the allied forces in regard to the handling of Chinese laborers, Korean laborers, and

are working for the rapid repatriation of foreign nationals in the prefecture. On the subject of trends in police training the foremost question has become the shift to a popular police organization, to which end an improvement in police methods is essential. This is a matter which at present is under discussion, in the Ministry of the Interior, and I believe concrete results will soon be forthcoming."

"In the past police training was carried on for the pitifully inadequate period of fifteen days, and so there was almost no indoctrination. From now on we are carrying on a recruit training program of four months. We have plans for refresher courses for all police personnel at a later date. We hope to proceed toward a rapid disposition of difficulties in the administrative orders and produce a police force which will be looked up to by the people. On the subject of disciplinary police, previous personnel have been of a low order, causing many infringements of personal rights. It is necessary to conduct a thorough study of this matter, in order that reorientation of the disciplinary police may be adequate. It is my belief that particular emphasis must be placed upon the inviolability of personal rights. It is necessary for the lives of all the people that the management of the economic police be handled with gravity. Particularly important is the extent of control over staples such as grain, fish, vegetables, and such items as have direct connection with the people. Under direct supervision interference with proper supply is being eliminated. Vigorous investigations are being carried out against the black market, which constitutes a menace to the people."

5. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN (published in FUKUOKA) 13 November 1945

Voice of the People Column.

When I reported to the officer in charge of the police station, I knew by the orders which had been placed upon the desk the reason for which I had been summoned. I answered fully the questions asked by the official-in-charge. He seemed surprised and rebuked me, "so, you have seen the orders". He turned to his subordinates and shouted, "why did you leave this secret document in front of that person?"

Upon my statement that the document contained nothing that should be held in secrecy and "isn't ours a problem that can be solved by cooperation?" he roared back.

"Don't make a fool out of me, Your attitude will be all the worse for you. I'll handle matters in my own manner."

He thinks that his as a secret police can be maintained by high-handed shouting. That is what he thinks!

"Don't you policemen know that there is a great difference in pre-armistice days and the present? You are still practicing the "hey, you" and "I'll beat you" principles without knowing that the people's anger, resentment and hatred are upon you. We are wondering when this type of police will be gone. I strongly feel that there exists the necessity for reeducating the present police, democratically."

(YOSHIMUKA Masumi, TOBATA City).

882

From: 1200I, 14Nov45
To : 1200I, 15Nov45

SECRET

No. 55.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 15 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (unclassified)
(C) Preliminary Report on Type 2, 12cm AA Guns.
(restricted).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under
our control.

Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during
the period.

HIDA (30 miles east of KURUME)

The KOKURA Arsenal in HIDA has two branches; the ARITA Factory and the KASUGA Factory. Both factories were used in experimental work but neither produced material in great quantity. The ARITA Factory employed 6200 at the close of the war but only 370 at present, closing out the factory. Contemplated production had been to produce 20mm machine guns and 40mm AA guns. The 40mm AA guns were exact copies of our 40 mm Bofor except for a few metallurgical differences. The KASUGA Factory contemplated production of 20mm machine guns and rifle.

SECRET

There were 7500 employed at the end of the war but only 400 at present closing out the factory.

OMURA

The OMURA Iron Works in OMURA made airplane parts for the Naval and Military Departments from the summer of 1941 to May 1945. During this period 7 tons of unidentified parts were produced. Equipment included 2 large drill presses and 2 large lathes. 5 men were employed. All records were burned when the war ended and the plant does not plan to reopen.

BOFU

TANAKA Shipbuilding Works (1 mile S of BOFU) produced small cargo vessels of 150 tons for civilian use before the war. During the war 20 people were employed making landing craft for the Japanese Navy. Amount of production during the war was 7 landing craft monthly. 4 completed landing craft are at present in the factor. At present this yard is inoperative. The manager is TANAKA, Kamaichi.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

SECRET

SECRET

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Prefectural Chamber of Commerce Information.

SHIMABARA Chamber of Commerce and Industry located in SHIMABARA City was organized 5 years ago as a branch of the NAGASAKI Prefectural Chamber of Commerce and Industry. SADAJI, Chief Secretary of the SHIMABARA branch, stated that there is a Chamber of Commerce and Industry in each Prefecture, with national offices in TOKYO. Membership is limited, but is practically a "must" for substantial businessmen and industrialists. The SHIMABARA branch has 853 members. During the war the function of the agency was to mobilize all war workers and industry. It was not a government agency but exerted considerable power in allocating contracts and material. At present it acts only in an advisory capacity for its members to develop and improve peacetime industry and to investigate financial and economic conditions. All records were destroyed at the end of the war.

(2) Preliminary Report on Type 2, 12cm AA Guns.

An ordnance technical intelligence report is submitted by NAVTECHJAP in Enclosure (C). The original report complete with photographs has been forwarded to Sixth Army through separate channels.

G. L. MC CORMICK
G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Informatic press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. NISHI NIPPON, 14 Nov., 1945 (FUKUOKA) "At about 8:30 P.M. of the ninth, a jeep (No. DMF 314) was stolen from the motor park at the air base at OMURA. Investigation is being carried out by the authorities, including the OMURA Police Office.

"One HAYASHIFUKU (43), a miner, from IRENO MACHI, HIGHASHIMATSU URA GUN, SAGA KEN, pilfered a pair of shoes belonging to a member of the occupation forces. The theft occurred at 8 in the morning, and so speedily did the authorities work that the culprit was in the hands of the local police (at IMARI) by 10 that morning."

3. NISHI NIPPON, 14 Nov., 1945. (FUKUOKA Edition) "The American refuse dumps at HIU in SASEBO have become known as the scene of activities for a whole city of beggars, it seems. Throngs of people crowd around to pick up or wheedle what they can: abandoned boxes, empty cans, wornout clothing, old containers, everything. This has come to such a sad pass that special police squads have had to be dispatched from the SASEBO force.

"Sympathy is of course extended to those who have been left poverty-stricken by war havoc. But since the occupation forces are apt to mistake these items salvaged by the people for stolen government property, an order has been issued forbidding all such conduct."

4. SAGA SHIMBUN (Published in SAGA) Nov. 14 1945. "At the request of the occupation force stationed here, the SAGA police conducted an inspection of 59 prostitutes. 17 entertainers, and 30 waitresses on November 11th. The results showed one prostitute and two waitresses afflicted with venereal disease. These three people were ordered to enter a hospital immediately."

5. MAINICHI SHIMBUN 14 Nov., 1945. (MOJI) "On November 12 at about 5:15 P.M. there was an explosion in the OCHIEI two-way tunnel which left no trace of the one hundred meter tunnel. About forty farm-houses in the vicinity were buried. The number of totally or partially damaged houses reached 50, and the village which had consisted of 90 houses was virtually destroyed. Dead have been recovered since the morning of the 13th. The dead out of a population of 450 included, as of noon on the 13th, NASU Akira (51 years old), chief of the SOEDA police station, his wife Masue (48 years old) and thirty other people. Sixty seriously injured and one hundred slightly injured people are being treated at the FURUKAWA DAICHO Factory Hospital.

"The HIDEHIKO R.R. station was damaged. On the morning of the 13th the passenger trains on the KONAI line were stopped because of damage to the rails, but they were running again by evening. The branches of the Post Office and Trade Union were damaged. The cause of this disaster was ammunition which had been stored in the tunnel for the defense of the homeland."

6.3 NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, 14 Nov., 1945. "The Welfare Ministry has for some time in order to avoid confusion in repatriation been carrying out a plan of transportation. However, because people not possessing repatriation passes have in the meantime been crowding into the SAIMONOSEKI, SENSACKI AND HAKATA (TN: FUKUOKA) districts, there are more than 25,000 people remaining there and no ships which can carry them. Not only this is causing great confusion, but lately even such contagious diseases as dysentery and typhus have broken out, and since there are indications that it will spread generally, at the request of the Commander of the Occupation Forces, the transportation of people returning to KOREA will be stopped from the 13th for an appropriate interval. Persons in transit will be stopped and held at respective railroad stations or ports of departure."

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

Preliminary Report on Type 2, 12cm AA Guns.

General Information: The six (6) guns are located at MIYATA position, approximately $33^{\circ}53'N-130^{\circ}51'E$, in the heart of YAWATA. The guns are still guarded by Japanese personnel, and all ammunition spare parts, range finding equipment and such are still at the battery position, with the exception of the director (Type 2) which has been removed. The MIYATA Battery had had a type 2 director and an S-24 Fire Control Radar as part of its equipment. Neither of these present any new feature. The Type 2 gun is an Army AA weapon and represents the best AA gun so far inspected by NAVTECHJAF on KYUSHU.

Descriptive Information: The guns are permanently emplaced in concrete mountings and have no tactical mobility. Appearance is characterized by large gun housings which completely cover the breech end of the gun, as well as nearly all of the personnel. A loading tray and power rammer are similar to the Japanese Navy Type 98, 10cm, AA gun, previously reported on. The method of fuze setting is also identical with the Type 98, consisting of a fixed rack which engages the toothed fuze gear as the loading tray pivots into position. Two (2) large recoil cylinders are located above the barrel and project slightly beyond the gun housing. Recuperator and counter-recoil buffers are smaller cylinders, located below the barrel, slightly to the right of center. Fuze, azimuth and elevation data are received electrically from the director and proper settings are obtained by zeroing a lagmeter (i.e., voltmeter). Mechanical dials are present for orienting purposes.

Characteristics of the gun:

- a. Type: 2 (1942)
Bore: 120mm
Length in calibers: 56 (6.72 meters)
Muzzle velocity: 2820 feet per second
Horizontal range: 21,800 yards
Maximum ceiling: 45,900 feet
Practical rate of fire: 15 rounds per minute*
Limits of elevation: -8° to plus 90°
Maximum fuze setting: 50
Length of recoil (maximum): 32cm

This data obtained from page 17A of supplement 1 to Flak Memo No. 4 (CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin 92-45) and from an inspection of the gun itself.

*Note: Battery personnel state a rate of fire of thirty (30) rounds per minute.

ENCLOSURE (C)

RESTRICTED

0202/130
Ser.001125B

G-2 Periodic Report

From: 1200I, 15Nov45
To : 1200I, 16Nov45

SECRET

No. 56.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 17 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle.(Omitted)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A). (Omitted)
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A). (Omitted)
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

FUKUOKA

IMAJIKU Naval Air Base (5 miles west of FUKUOKA) was under the control of the SASEBO Naval District. The base was built in February 1945. During the war the base was used for patrol seaplanes joint reconnaissance work in this area and nearby waters. There were 100 men stationed there, 40 of whom were pilots and mechanics and the remainder naval personnel and laborers. There is no field for land planes although there is a small beach for use by seaplanes. Inventory of this base revealed the following: 3 Zero type scout seaplanes, 2 type #94 scout seaplanes, 4 fighting seaplanes "KYORO", one type #2 fighting seaplane,

SECRET

3 Zero type observation planes, and same engine accessories, propellers, repair tools, ammunition and photographic equipment. The aircraft were not in operational condition.

KOKURA

The Japanese Chemical Industrial Co. in KOKURA is engaged in the production of sulphur gas and is producing 1050 liters daily. During the war this gas was produced for military arsenals and armories in this area. At present civilian iron works are their only customers. This company with an additional 5000 pressure tanks, could increase their production to 4000 liters daily. The plant employs 28 men; and according to Mr. IKEDA, the official in charge, the same number was employed during the war.

KOKURA Steel Works, part of the ASANO Heavy Industries Company, Ltd, had a wartime strength of 1100 workers. 254 tons of pig iron, iron bars, and iron products were produced daily during the war. The plant now employs 800 workers and is operating at about 10% of its wartime capacity.

NAKATSU

ITAGUCHI YAMA Arsenal located at YOKKAICHI (9 miles South East of NAKATSU) is a branch of the KOKURA Arsenal. There were 8136 employed during the war, in the production of the following items which were used by the Japanese:

Army: 20mm Aircraft MGs -- 250 per month
30mm Aircraft MGs -- 150 per month
37mm Aircraft Guns -- 75 per month
20mm Double controlled MGs -- 50 per month

It had been planned to convert the plant to peacetime commodities; but this is impracticable, present plans are to destroy or salvage the plant.

KARATSU

Coal Mine at TATSUKAWA (9 miles South of KARATSU) employed 700 KOREANS and 500 Japanese during the war. This one shaft mine produced 6,000 to 9,000 tons of coal per month. At present they employ

890

SECRET

445 Japanese in the production of 1,000 tons of coal per month. The mine has 2,400 tons of coal and 500 boxes (200 sticks per box) of dynamite on hand.

OMUTA

KAOSEITAN Stamp Forging Company in SETAKA (8 miles North of OMTA) was completed in May 1945, but never operated due to typhoon damage. It was the firm's intention to produce small parts for naval torpedoes. They now hope to manufacture machine tools and employ 80 workers.

HIRAI Casting Works in SETAKA, employed 130 workers during the war, making steam fittings. The plant consists of a foundry shop. At present, it employs 60 workers making iron kitchen ware and steam valves.

KYUSHU Airplane Parts Manufacturing Company - SETAKA Branch started tooling aluminum castings for plane parts in February 1945 in a former sake storehouse. Castings were received from the parent organization in FUKUOKA, machined and returned. During the war they utilized two shifts of workers: one of 150 adults during the day, the other of 100 school children who worked after school. At present, the plant is inoperative.

MIYAKONOJO

MIYAKONOJO East Airfield has a sod runway 3,405 feet long and 639 feet wide. Facilities include: one large steel hanger which is unfinished and apparently unused; a small hanger at the north-east end of the field which is in poor repair but undamaged by bombing; well dispersed revetments; and a few sheds built against hillsides which may have been used as camouflaged individual plane hangers. Plane repair was accomplished in the open. This field is being used as a collecting point for Japanese Army Air Force material. There are 65 damaged planes in the dump, mostly "Frank's", in addition there are 60 destroyed planes including about 25 old biplane trainers. According to Captain YAMAGUCHI, Tomoo who is in charge of guarding the dump, Japanese Air Force personnel got out of control when Japan surrendered and smashed Plexiglass, instrument panels, etc. He claims that radios in the planes were stolen.

SECRET

KAGOSHIMA

KAGOSHIMA Railroad Repair Works is owned by the government and managed by K. AOKI. The shops have suffered no bomb damage, but some damage was incurred by the typhoon of 17 September, 1945. All damage has been repaired and all facilities are in working condition. During the war 1500 men and women were employed; and, at present, 1300 are employed. Many railroad cars are now on the shop's rails, and it will take approximately two months to repair them. The shop is now relining and repainting passenger cars. Engines are also being repaired, but this work has been slowed down because of a lack of equipment and material.

Meteorological Station, located at KAGOSHIMA, is a government owned branch of the FUKUOKA Meteorological Station (our G-2 periodic #21) and reports each hour to TOKYO or FUKUOKA by wireless or telephone respectively. The station was unable to make reports during the period 17 June 1945 to 31 August 1945 due to bomb damage. This has been repaired and the station is now in full operation with 40 employees. The station has never been used directly by the Japanese Armed Forces, but information was relayed to the SASEBO Naval Headquarters by the FUKUOKA station.

KAGOSHIMA Prison contains 678 prisoners; although prior to 5 September, 1945, there had been only 100. The increase was caused by a number of men who were arrested for stealing food, blankets, and military clothing while loading ships in NAGASAKI. The prison does not contain any political prisoners.

NAGASAKI

NAGASAKI District Meteorological Observatory (ref. our periodic #14) is under the control of the Central Meteorological Observatory of TOKYO. There are thorough rain, temperature, humidity, wind, snow, and storm records for the NAGASAKI Area since 1876 to the present. They have incomplete records on the weather of China, Batavia, the Philippines, Manchuria, and the North Pacific. They are in constant communication with the Central office in TOKYO by radio, but claim to have a receiving set only. The meteorological station has the following installations, instruments and personnel: 5 buildings; horizontal and vertical

SECRET

seismographs (at present inoperational); rain, wind, temperature, humidity and other weather devices (most of which are at present operational); 13 employees (clerical and technical).

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

498th CIC Detachment reports that NISHIKAWA, Donki, prefectural vice-chief of general affairs and member of the repatriation board at KAJIKI, has been found to be uncooperative - if not subversive - in his activities. He has been ordered to report to the KAGOSHIMA CIC Headquarters for complete questioning and investigation, after which a recommendation as to his continued affiliation with the government will be made.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

ANDO, Tamotsu, former member of the OITA City Police department and in charge of the TOKKA KA of that department, was employed as secretariat of the Prefectural Police Department in OITA-KEN. CIC requested he be discharged, and this request has been complied with. He will be discharged 20 November, 1945.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Search of Safe Guards.

At 0900 15 November, 5th Marine Division search parties struck simultaneously at 41 shrines, temples, and

SECRET

school buildings in the SASEBO Area. These establishments which had, to date, been isolated from the surveillance of our forces by "off Limits" and "safeguard" signs. The raid was conducted in an effort to locate caches of weapons, documents, or military materiel. As of 1200, 15 November, there were 11 reports of contraband found, 23 negative reports, and 7 not heard from. At the Naval Cemetery documents were found enumerating men killed as follows: on the HATSUSE, IWATE, TOKIWA, and TOMOZURU; in the SHANGHAI Incident of 1932; in the Second Special Fleet; and on small craft in the vicinity of SASEBO. These documents are duplicated in the records on file at the SASEBO Naval Personnel Office. Certain of the schools yielded small amounts of weapons and wooden rifles. Certain shrines contained small amounts of swords and one had a pile of 125 burned rifles. One school had 2 eight-foot, 150 pound range finders in poor condition; assorted transformers and switches in a storeroom; semaphore flags; and maps of the Greater East Asia Co prosperity sphere. Another school had a military library containing about 300 volumes of military works of the MEIJI Reign (1867-1911). Searches of out of bounds installations in the SAGA and KURUME Area were executed concurrently. This headquarters has requested the 5th Marine Division to furnish details on the search to include: specific places and type of installation in which contraband was located; names and civil positions occupied by Japanese authorities responsible for reporting these items.

G. L. MC Cormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2

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CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

894

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. KUMAMOTO SHIMBUN (published in KUMAMOTO) 14 November, 1945. "According to the census taken on the 1st, the population of KUMAMOTO CITY is 180,621. The figure includes 84,932 males and 95,689 females, for a difference of 10,757 more women. In addition, the police office is hastening the compilation of an age group classification."

3. ASAHI SHIMBUN (published in KOKURA) 15 November, 1945. (MIYAZAKI) "Lt. Col. TATTMAN, battalion commander of the MIYAZAKI Occupation Force, realizing the sad plight of sanitary facilities here, brought a considerable amount of medical gear and supplies. He has set a precedent by offering it to the Public Sanitation Office, and requesting that it be fully utilized. He stated, furthermore, that surplus medical personnel will be used to better public health."

"The American occupation of MIYAZAKI has progressed smoothly without a single mishap. The devoted efforts of Major MUSSMAN, connected with the MIYAZAKI Military Government, have contributed to this. The major since his appointment, about a month ago has declined any meat offered to the military government on grounds that even a piece of meat supplied to the occupational troops will jeopardize the prefectural people's subsistence."

"One day during a party held in behalf of the major, a small amount of meat was placed before him. The major, however, left the meat in a separate dish and jokingly stated that it would hurt his conscience if he ate it, in view of the pressing food situation of the people, thus indicating his kind nature."

"In administrative matters relating to the city, however, he has issued strict orders and has conducted business with determination and drive, without wasting much time. The major, who has completed his giant task of supervising the occupation without a snag, is leaving for the NAGASAKI Hq on the 14th. At a farewell dinner with Mr. ISHIMARU, chief of the prefectural affairs dept. on the 13th, he stated, 'I'm happy the occupation was completed so smoothly. It was accomplished through an understanding with the prefectural government and people.'"

URAGA HARBOR FROM TRUK

0800 16th Nov. The DD HATSUUME carrying 2000 army personnel, 149 naval personnel and 151 naval workers.
1200 18th Nov. The DD KAKI carrying 100 army personnel, 400 naval personnel.
1200 18th Nov. The escort vessel SHIMUSHU carrying 100 army personnel with patient, 300 naval personnel with 3 patients.

895

ENCLOSURE (B)

MANILA TO KAGOSHIMA HARBOR.

15 Nov. The escort vessel #132 carrying 123 army personnel, including 56 Formosans, 7 naval workers.

15 Nov. The DD OTAKE carrying 188 army personnel, 1 naval personnel, 3 naval workers, 77 civilians, 27 Formosans.

"KAGOSHIMA has been newly appointed as the port of repatriation for the 750,000 demobilized personnel and civilians from Central and South CHINA. The first ships from SHANGHAI are scheduled to reach here on the 19th and the 28th with 1000 people each time."

"The directive from the Allied Forces states that the evacuation from Central and South CHINA should average 2500 persons per day and will require 10 months. Military personnel and workers who are natives of FORMOSA are included."

"The NAMIKAZE MARU carrying 433 demobilized personnel (8 officers, 2 WO's, 65 NCO's, and 358 EM) of Northern KYUSHU from MARCUS and WAKE reach KAJIKI Harbor on the 10th."

4. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) 15 November, 1945. (MOJI "Chief KOTSUNA of the SAGA Prefectural Police made the following statement at the Police Conference: that the police should not be feared by the people; rather that they are guardians of the right and should be admired.")

"Previously," he said, "police personnel have tended to overdo themselves in almost all situations. Henceforth, they must serve the people and help in preserving personal dignity, besides enforcing the literal provisions of the law. During the war it was at times necessary to use police of lower character and education, but from now on strenuous efforts will be made to improve the training of our men. Due to dire food shortages, we can expect to have some disorder, but we believe that we are prepared to meet emergencies. The police must also act vigorously in crushing black markets, but overzealousness should not take unreasonable forms. Order and not coercion is our job."

0190/rem
Ser. 001128B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 16 Nov 45
To : 1200I, 17 Nov 45

SECRET

No. 57.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 18 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)
(C) SASEBO Naval Supplies Allotted to Civilians.
(CONFIDENTIAL).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

Military personnel in KAGOSHIMA KEN seem anxious to fulfill surrender requirements but some have apparently received incomplete instructions. At BANSEI Airfield (18 miles SW KAGOSHIMA) near the town of OSAKI, there were found many anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns from which the breech blocks had not been removed. The Japanese officers in charge of the equipment had recently been ordered to the area and professed ignorance of the units that had delivered the weapons without removing the breech-blocks. They immediately put men to work removing them. A portable Army type Radar machine at this field was found to have been definitely sabotaged. A Naval Coast defense battery near KATAURA (24 miles SW KAGOSHIMA) was found to have been left under the surveillance of the local civilian police. Both of these cases have been reported to the Central Army and Navy Headquarters KAGOSHIMA Area.

At MIYAKONOJO Airfield (1 miles W of MIYAKONOJO), radio equipment had been taken out of the planes on the field, Major TATEIWA, in charge of the equipment, said this had been done by the 19th ISUSHINTAI under direction of Captain NAGAMUNE, who, TATEIWA believes is in KUMAMOTO.

SECRET

- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KOKURA

Wire Rope Manufacturing Co (2 miles S of KOKURA). During the war 1300 people were employed in the monthly production of 1300 tons of wire rope. At present 630 people are employed in the production of 430 tons of wire rope a month. These figures were obtained from KEIZO, Voda, official in charge of the Company.

KOKURA Steam Plant #1 in KOKURA City is a subsidiary of the JAPAN Electric Generation and Transmission Company, Ltd. During the war 400 people were employed, and at present the same number are employed. There are 4 turbines; two are capable of producing 50,000 kilowatts per day, and the other two capable of producing 25,000 kilowatts per day. No record is kept of the exact production figures; but SHIGETAKE, Gato, official in charge, estimated that 25,000 kilowatts were produced daily during the war and 20,000 kilowatts per day at present.

NAKATSU

KOBE Steel Company Ltd (1 mile E of NAKATSU) employed 4,419 people during the year and produced 1,200 tons aluminum alloy plate, 3,600 tons copper alloy plate, 7,200 tons aluminum alloy bars, 180 tons aluminum alloy forgings and 60 tons magnesium alloy forgings per year. The plant was constructed during the war, and all products went directly to the Japanese Army. It is inoperative at present, but 319 people are employed in the guarding and maintenance of the plant and equipment.

BOFU

The BOFU Mill of Military Woollens Depot. During the war 850 people were employed in the production of

SECRET

860,000 pounds of staple fibre per month. The shortage of coal forced the plant to cease production since the end of the war. However, 75 people are employed, at present, guarding and maintaining the equipment and property.

BOFU Branch of the CHUGOKU Electric Distributing Co. produces and distributes electrical power. It supplies the needs of homes and factories in the BOFU Area. During the war 40 people were employed in the production of 50,000 kilowatt hours per day. At present, the same number are employed producing 25,000 kilowatt hours per day.

KURUME

The YOSHII Airplane Stock Co. was in operation from June to August 1945 making wings for training planes. During the war the payroll was 120; at present it is 45 people. They are making prefabricated houses at this time.

SOGO TEKKO Metal Works Co. in YOSHII City (15 miles E of KURUME) employed 100 persons from October 1944 to August 1945 making shell cases. At present 40 people are employed making bicycle parts. During the war 50 percent of the people employed were student

KAGOSHIMA

KATAURA Coast Defense Battery (24 miles SW KAGOSHIMA) four 15cm Coastal Defense guns and six dual mount 20mm AA guns. The fire control center for the battery is located in three adjacent pits between the #2 and #3 guns. It consisted of two large spotting glasses, one range finder and a calculator. The local civilian police have been given the responsibility of maintaining a guard over the equipment.

OMUTA

The MIIKE Light Metals Co. in OMTA began operating in June 1943. It produced alumina, which was sent to KOREA for reduction to aluminum, and electrode paste, used for electric furnace electrodes. In 1944 production was 15,808 tons of alumina and 6764 tons of electrode paste. There is no bomb damage to the plant and they are now producing 2 tons of table salt per day. Number employed during the war was 1050; at present 550 are employed.

SECRET

SASEBO

The TAKEO Arms Manufacturing Co. (17 miles E of SASEBO) employed 300 men and 200 women during the war. They produced about 5 airplane floats and 30 wings per month. At present it employs 50 workers and by 20 November hopes to be in full operation with 80 employee's. They will produce bicycle accessories, construction scaffolding, milling machines, and will repair automobiles. The firm was established 23 March 1944, and has a 180,000 yen capital. At present they have on hand 3 floats and 20 wing-tips.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

The 32nd CIC Detachment reports on the following organization:

RIKKEN YOSEI KAI: (Ref G-2 Periodics #10, #18) a nationalistic party derived from the NISHIREN Section of Buddhism. TANAKA, Takuji, sought election to office in TOKYO as a candidate from this organization on a platform of militarism and extreme patriotism.

SEIKISEI KAI: Headed by Col HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, who, at present, is being held in TOKYO as a war criminal. This organization was strongly in favor of continuing the war. Membership of this organization was composed of ex-servicemen.

TANKEN OAKAI KISEI KAI: LtCol MITSUI, Sakichi, is the head of this organization. The society ordered a national movement to make the Japanese Emperor the Emperor of the World. MITUSI is a radical militarist and imperialist, and is now believed to be in TOKYO.

SECRET

BUNKA RENMEI: Northern KYUSHU Cultural association. This organization while ostensibly a cultural society has been used to spread extremist military propaganda. The leader of this organization is HINO, Ashihe, renowned Japanese author.

New JAPAN Young Men's Cooperative Federation: This organization is presently being formed. It is under the leadership of KOSHIMA, Suhife, who is notorious for his terroristic activities in local politics during the war.

National Patriotic Troops Association: This association was formed in July, 1945, for the purpose of better liaison between the troops and civilians. It was discontinued at the end of the war, and its members were incorporated into the neighborhood organizations.

ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI: This organization was formed about 7 years ago. Its chief purpose was to keep in contact with ex-servicemen for mobilization and training. This organization ceased to exist at the end of the war. AHONO, Heizaeman residing in DAIRI and at present councilman in MOJI, headed this group.

JOSHI SEINEN DAN (Young Womens Organization). The purpose of this organization was to educate Young Women between 14 and 20 in various military ideas and also train them to be nurse's aides.

DAI NIPPON FUGIN KAI: The chief purpose of this group was the organization of the women of JAPAN above the age of 20 years.

Free Discussion Club: This club consists of citizens interested in problems now facing JAPAN. Meetings are held semi-monthly. Under discussion during their last meeting was the behavior of the occupation troops and the food situation in JAPAN.

Upon investigation CIC has learned that TOKKO KA has been dissolved and the personnel discharged at SHISA, IMARI, ARITA, KASHIMA, and URESHINO.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

URSO, Luigi, and Italian national released from an internment camp near OGI (6 miles NW of SAGA) stated that in his

SECRET

opinion, the common people of Japan, the small farmers and merchants, the factory workers and the fishermen, are, generally speaking, persons of good will, friendliness and sincerity. He believes that the Allied Occupation Forces could rely on the word of these people. It is among the ranks of the militarists, civilian police, former members of secret civilian and military police societies and organizations, government officials who served during the war, and among the big businessmen that the "foreign-haters" are to found. These are the persons who are paying lip-service to democracy today, and who will be the Imperialists, militarists, jingoists and anti-democrats as soon as the occupation forces leave JAPAN. He said that most of the common people of JAPAN are now realizing that a Japanese victory in this war would have meant little more to them than a continuation of their state of political and economic slavery. The Allied Occupation of JAPAN has given to these people a chance to improve their lot, and they are duly grateful. However, at the present time, many of these people are hesitating to express themselves publicly for fear that the occupation of JAPAN will be of short duration, and that public statements and political action on their part now would mark them for later reprisals. He declared that democracy could not be established in JAPAN in the short period of 5 to 10 years, but that it would have to be nurtured for at least a generation.

In regard to the Emperor of JAPAN, he stated that before Democracy can be fully developed and reforms be permanently brought about, the Emperor must be removed and the Imperial myth destroyed. He did not think that the immediate removal of the Emperor would have beneficial results, because too many of the Japanese people still deeply revere the Emperor's person and implicitly believe in his divinity. Rather, the powers and wealth of the Emperor should be taken away gradually, and the prominence of the Imperial institution should be diminished in reverse proportion to the development of Democracy.

G. L. McCormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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CG Sixth Army	5	Attn G-2	
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Com5thPhib	1	NAVTECHJAP	1
CG III Phib Corps	1	USSBS TOKYO	1
CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of 3, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

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PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) 16 November 1945.

"Recently there have been many persons who have purchased tobacco, soap, etc., from occupation forces supplies and again have used these supplies for trading purposes. Since it occasions various difficulties for the occupation authorities, it will be severely dealt with by the NAGASAKI Prefectural Police Department. It has resulted in bringing about controls against this type of offense. From the first to the tenth of this month, two hundred and seventy-three (273) cases involving two hundred and ninety-seven (297) people have been uncovered. Among these, one hundred and eighty-nine (189) persons involved in one hundred and eighty-five (185) of the cases have received severe admonitions, and all of the remaining people (97) involved in similar cases are being retained for examination."

"Particularly offensive along this line is the tobacco procurement group which has been under the leadership of SAKAMOTO, Maruo of SHUZANCHO, OKAYAMA Prefecture. Theirs has been mostly a buying and selling tobacco business."

"Offenses of this type which are entered into by member of the allied services will be dealt with heavily by those forces. Current violators are receiving suitable punishments. From now on the prefectural police will enforce more strongly than ever strict controls relative to the above."

"There has been founded in SASEBO a group for the study of communism and its principles. NAKANISHI Inosuke, TOKUNAGA Massaru, NAKANO Omoji and HAKATA Mingi who are imbued with the spirit of the new era, have begun a movement called 'The Japanese Communist Party' and are striving for a SASEBO branch of the People's Cultural Federation and Reformation Group. The leaders of this group who are to inform the people of SASEBO are KAWABATA, Kumao of YAMAGAMI CHO, HIROOKA Yoshiake, a poet who resides in HAIKI MACHI, and SHITSUDO Maruhiro, a graduate of WASEDA, a student of National Literature and author of magazine KIROKU."

"All thirty members of the NAGASAKI Communist group study will hold their first membership meeting in SASEBO on the coming 20th. It is expected that they will pursue the study of the people literary movement and idealistic communism, and lecture concerning the publication of the organization's paper, 'People's Literature'. Moreover, this meeting will commemorate AYUKAWA Shizuka (who died of illness) and KAWAKAMI Ikensai (a war casualty), both of whom influenced progressive culture in KYUSHU."

3. KUMAMOTO NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN (published in KUMAMOTO) 15 November, 1945. "Repatriation ships from MANILA and North DAITOSHIM which put into the KACHIGI Harbor November 16th are the KIKUMARU (north DAITOSHIMA; 343 army personnel), the escort vessel No. 227 (MANILA: 199 army personnel) the destroyer KAYA (MANILA: 31 navy personnel, 160 army personnel, 9 military workers), the destroyer SHII (MANILA: 23 navy personnel, 180 army personnel, 6 military workers), the destroyer KIRI (MANILA: 163 navy personnel, 37 army personnel, 2 civilians). Moreover, on the 13th, the destroyers KEYAKI and KABA and escort vessel No. 207 are expected to put into harbor from MANILA."

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SASEBO NAVAL SUPPLIES ALLOTTED TO CIVILIANS.

The following investigations by the 5th Marine Division are the result of a report that the Japanese Navy had, at war's end, thrown quantities of food, clothing and supplies on the black market. (See Periodic Report No. 53).

The following interviews were conducted by military government officials and members of the G-2 Section, 5th Marine Division:

On 13 November, 1945 Captain CHUMA, who is the head of the SASEBO Citizens Consumers Association, was interviewed at his office and admitted having in his possession articles obtained from the SASEBO Naval Depot (KOSHO) during late August and from the Navy Supply Section (GUNJUBU) up to 20 September. Copies of two (2) bills presented by these organizations were obtained and are at the G-2 Office, 5th Marine Division. The itemized lists include 55,000 liters of fuel, rope, gauze, lubricating oil, cotton, silk thread, starch, clothing, etc. Captain CHUMA explained that these items had been partially paid for and that the organization had a large cash balance in the bank although much of this was in the form of a loan from the bank. He stated that the organization was non-profit making and that the items would be sold to members at cost. Members formerly were limited to Navy personnel and their families but now any resident of SASEBO is eligible.

Vice Admiral IWANARI, who is in charge of the SASEBO Naval Depot (KOSHO), on whose authority items were issued to the SASEBO Citizens Consumers Corporation, and Comdr OGASA were contacted at their office. The Admiral readily admitted turning over articles of a civilian nature between 15 August, 1945 and 21 September, 1945 to any civilian organization that asked for them and could transport them away. He said that very little fuel was released as he didn't have much, most of it being in the possession of the Navy Supply Section (GUNJUBU). He stated that only a negligible amount of the equipment had been paid for, although he expected that eventually all of it would be. The records are not up to date as a result of the "confusion" after the end of the war and bills are only now being prepared for most of the items.

On 14 November, 1945, the records of the SASEBO Naval Depot (KOSHO) were inspected in the presence of Comdr OGASA whose responsibility they are. A check of the receipts for items turned over to civilians between 15 August, 1945 and 21 September, 1945, revealed such items as cement, wire, transformers, canvas, paint, turpentine, tools, drills, steel plates, wire rope, rope, machine oil, grease, soap, candles, paper, mimeograph machines, ink, felt, leather, sheet rubber, pens, pencils, oil, clothing, blankets, auto parts, batteries, gasoline, bicycle tires and tubes, asbestos, radio tubes, light bulbs, pipes, zinc plates, electric cord, bolts, thumbtacks, ball bearings, piston rings, electric machines, typewriters, adding

ENCLOSURE (C)

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machines, office furniture, pumps, pig and scrap iron, and telephones. The organizations receiving the above include Post Offices, Mayors of numerous towns including the Mayor of SASEBO, schools, hospitals, fishing and farming cooperatives, newspapers, the MITSUBISHI Shipbuilding Yards in NAGASAKI, and many smaller plants and factories.

A check of the ledgers revealed that in many instances the date for the transfer of items had been tampered with. For example a "9" indicating September, had been frequently altered in such a manner as to appear as an "8", thus which would place the date of the transaction in August and hence before the official surrender.

Mr. NUMATA, Japanese Home Ministry representative in SASEBO, was interviewed in the G-2 Office at Marine Camp, AINOURA, on 14 November by military government officials and members of the G-2 Section, 5thMarDiv.

He reported that a meeting had been called by the Ministry of Transportation at FUKUOKA on 11 November and was attended by representatives of the Army (Col TAMURA), Navy (Captain SHIRASHI), Ministry of Transportation, Home Ministry and representatives from the KYUSHU Prefectures who in each instance were the heads of the Transportation Sections.

At the above meeting, the Japanese Army and Navy submitted reports on the status of their vehicles in KYUSHU. Mr. NUMATA indicated that the Army report appeared to be complete whereas the Navy's was very general.

These reports appeared as follows:

Army trucks:

8/15/45 to 9/22/45:

1 stolen

68 "missing"

157 given or sold to civilians

9/22/45 to 9/28/45:

785 turned over to occupation forces

159 given to HODOKAI (Japanese organization dealing with returning servicemen).

Available on 9/28/45:

496 useable

1,239 not useable

Army passenger vehicles:

8/15/45:

117 useable

146 not useable

8/15/45 to 11/11/45:

38 given to occupation forces

10 given to HODOKAI

14 given to civilians

907

SASEBO NAVAL SUPPLIES ALLOTTED TO CIVILIANS.

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2 sent out of KYUSHU
Available on 11/11/45:
53 useable
147 not useable

Navy figures (excluding Navy Air Corps) for KYUSHU, less KAGOSHIMA and MIYAZAKI KENS, as of 31 August, 1945. Mr. NUMATA explained that most of the vehicles should be in the SASEBO Area.

505 trucks
21 less than 2 1/2 ton trucks
37 fuel trucks
95 work trucks
25 wrecking trucks
13 auto-bikes
16 water trucks
16 trucks (with crane)
8 trucks to carry torpedos
39 fire trucks
51 small fire trucks
6 ambulances
26 misc. trucks
23 limousines
112 small limousines
39 Austins
1,035 Total

Mr. NUMATA indicated that there was no mention made of vehicles having been illegally turned over to civilians but it was tacitly understood by all present that this had occurred. He could not, however, give proof in any particular case. He said that soon after the end of the war many demobilized service personnel simply drove off with their vehicles and kept them for their own use.

He said that it had been decided on 11 November that a check should be made on the registration of all vehicles in KYUSHU. This check is already underway and is being conducted by the police while Mr. NUMATA believes will be accurate. The resulting reports are to be forwarded to the Ministry of Transportation in TOKYO.

In a further discussion of a general nature, Mr. NUMATA stated that he imagined that the Army and Navy Headquarters in TOKYO probably urged their various depots throughout JAPAN to turn over equipment to civilians when the Emperor declared the war was lost on 15 August. Again he had no proof that this was so nor could he prove they had actually done so. He said that of course dealing with the Navy was difficult in as much as they have run the show for many years and are not in a mood to turn over their equipment to the Home Ministry as they still feel it belongs to them.

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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 17Nov45
To : 1200I, 18Nov45

SECRET

No. 58.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 19 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
See Enclosure (A). (OMITTED).
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KAGOSHIMA

KAGOSHIMA Airfield has one north-south runway, 500 yards long and 75 yards wide. It is in fair condition and is now being used by American piper cubs. During the war the field was used by light bombers and a few fighters. 31 planes consisting of 5 light bombers, 19 trainers, and 7 fighters, all badly wrecked, were found in the vicinity of the air field. Facilities included the following: 3 main hangers, two of which are totally destroyed, one being 5% destroyed; two auxiliary hangers, one totally destroyed and the other partially destroyed; 8 barracks and administration buildings, 45% destroyed. The following items were found in the vicinity of the airfield: 7 airplane engines in poor condition, 200 auxiliary gas tanks,

SECRET

fifty 500 pound bombs, eighty 200 pound bombs, 296 fifty round bombs, 306 twenty five pound bombs, 1500 bomb bodies (approximately 10 pounds), 1500 nose fuses, and 145 fifty-five gallon drums of fuel.

OITA

SAKANOICHI Branch of TOKYO Arsenal was split into four plants around SAKANOICHI City (8 miles E of OITA), and all were engaged in the manufacture of explosives. On 15 August, 1945, these plants employed 3707 people; and at the present time 138 are employed. Colonel HODA, Y. is in charge of the Arsenal. A spot check of inventories showed no discrepancies with previous Japanese reports.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

There are two new political parties in the process of formation in KUMAMOTO Prefecture. They are the SHIN NIPPON JIUTU and the MIMPOAN TO. It is expected that they will nominate candidates for the lower house of the Imperial Diet in the near future.

During the investigation of local politics in KUMAMOTO it was learned that plans are being made in this KEN to bring all soldiers and sailor relief organizations under one agency. At the end of the war, the Government established in the army the FUKUIN HODO KAI, and in the Navy the FUKUIN ENGO KAI, to render assistance to demobilized servicemen. It is unofficially reported through local newspapers that GHQ has ordered

910

SECRET

these organizations abolished as they were headed by ex-military commanders. At the present time the following veterans' rehabilitation organizations exist in KUMAMOTO KEN:

1. GUNJI HOGOKU (Wounded Soldiers Protection Home)
2. GUNJI ENGO KAI (Wounded Soldiers Assistance Society)
3. ZAIDAN HOJIN FUKUIN SHOKUGYO HODO KAI (Organization for Guidance and employment of demobilized soldiers by a foundation). The

prefectural governor is the branch leader. It is planned that civilians who have not had any military background will constitute the majority of the executive officers. At the outset the object was to provide guidance in a group forming, truck transportation, assistance in locating jobs and assistance to families of deceased servicemen. Group forming and truck transportation have been discontinued. Observation and investigation of this activity is continuing.

NISHIKAWA, Denki (Periodic #56) was interviewed in connection with reports of his uncooperative attitude. Subject was found to have severely rebuked two English speaking women returning from Manila who had requested positions as interpreters for a short period. They had contacted the interviewing personnel of the American Forces instead of going direct to him. During the discussion, witnesses say that he told the women they should have gone to America if they liked Americans so well. NISHIKAWA has been dismissed by the prefectural government as recommended.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

Lt. Col. Robert S. Spencer, AC, a former resident of KYUSHU for 35 years, reports from conversation with old Japanese friends in the OITA Area, that reactionary elements are already saying that they will not have to wait more than a few years before the occupation troops leave and they will be able to again take over the government.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Precious Metals.

The following precious metals have been found at HIKARI Naval Arsenal (18 miles SE of BOFU):

55 white metal dishes

1400 grams

SECRET

77 white metal crucibles	1460 grams
68 white metal crucible covers	weight unknown
33 white metal plates	1115 grams
white metal line (good quality)	845 grams
white metal line (inferior)	662 grams
23 white metal electrodes	350 grams
95 plates and 41 bars of white metal	23 grams
silver grain	12970 grams
silver angular bars	7800 grams
diamonds	18 carats

There are no facilities available for verifying the above listed weights (which were submitted by the Japanese).

G. L. McCormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

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PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. ASAHI SHIMBUN (published in KOKURA) 17 November, 1945. (OITA dispatch) "There are many unregistered automobiles which were used by the military, but were unlawfully taken during the post-war confusion and are now being used. The prefectural transportation department will carry out the regulations with maximum thoroughness. Registered vehicles will paste a sticker on the windshield, and in the future, all unregistered cars will be stopped."

3. NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN (published in FUKUOKA) 17 November, 1945. "In NAGASAKI City, a roster of eligible voters based on the census taken 1-16 November is being quickly compiled. The total population is 142,748, showing a remarkable decrease from the 270,000 recorded in February, 1944. Among the causes of this decrease are the evacuation of civilians, the August 9 disaster, and the withdrawal of war workers and mobilized students. The grouping by sex shows 69,789 males and 72,959 females. The extent of war service is shown in the overwhelming comparison between women and men in the 24-30 year-old group; there are many more women."

"Classification by age shows age groups 2-6 and 13-21 are most numerous, over 3000 each. The oldest citizens are 99 years old (female) and 98 years old (male). There are relatively few in the 7-12 years-old group, less than 200, perhaps due to the August 9 catastrophe and the evacuation of school children."

4. OITA SHIMBUN (published in OITA) 15 November, 1945. "In the OITA Police Department, the number of hunting licenses issued up to December was: Class A (hunting) 18 first class, 102 second class, 110 third class; Class B (net traps) 3; there was no great change from the same period of last year but there has been a tendency for the number of those living in the city to decrease gradually while those in the country have been on the increase. This is because the food supply has decreased and because of their desire to be self sufficient."

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 18Nov45.
To : 1200I, 19Nov45.

SECRET

No. 59.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 20 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

MIYAKONOJO Area

KAWASAKI Aircraft Plant (previously reported in G-2 Periodic Report No. 52) is located about 2 miles east of MIYAKONOJO. From April, 1944 to August, 1945 it produced about ten airplane bodies (Type K1-100) per month. These were all sent to the MIYAKONOJO East Airfield for the installation of engines. Wartime employees numbered 5200, including 2600 men, 1000 school boys, 600 school girls, and 1000 women. Bomb and typhoon damage left the plant about 75% wrecked, so that the 200 people employed at present are engaged only in repairing this damage. Future plans are to convert to the manufacture of kitchen utensils. The main business offices of the company are at AKASHI (near KOBE).

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FUKUOKA Area.

NISHIHARA Iron Works employed 900 during the war and began producing airplane parts (including flaps, gas tanks, brake cylinders and accessories) in December, 1941. The plant is inoperative at present. Stock on hand includes 3 tons of aluminum and duraluminum, 22 tons of steel, and miscellaneous airplane parts.

Naval Gun Factory (6 miles east of FUKUOKA) was never completed, but had planned to undertake production of torpedo tubes and torpedoes. During the war about 300 workmen were used in construction.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Investigation by CIC of unauthenticated information relative to the construction of wooden, concrete-reinforced cargo submarines by the Japanese to evade submarine detectors has revealed the possibility that they were made at KURE Naval Base. An informant has stated that he had heard of these submarines and thought that they were made at KURE.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

Patrols returning from YOSHII (14 miles east of

915

SECRET

SECRET

KURUME) found 16 aircraft sound detectors in various public schools in that area. A complete check is being made as to how and why this equipment was distributed.

G. L. Mc Cormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. KAGOSHIMA DAILY, (Published in KAGOSHIMA) 16 Nov., 1945. The roads, rivers, and bridges of this prefecture have incurred severe damages because of the ravages of war. Also as a result of wind and water action, many other communication facilities have been damaged. A great inconvenience is now being felt throughout the prefecture in communications. The civil engineering bureau has been charged with the responsibility of returning communication facilities to their pre-war state of repair. At present there are 972 roads, 23 bridges, 99 rivers, 4 harbors, and 9 seacoasts that need immediate attention. Since among these especially the repair of KAGOSHIMA, MIYAKAWA, KOKUBO and FUKUJIMA is urgent, a subsidy of ¥ 9,500,000 will be required from the national treasury.

An inspector from the Department of Interior is expected to arrive within the prefecture in the very near future. His purpose will be to survey the damage outlined above. Restoration of Civil Engineering within the prefecture continues to be a great headache. Even though the war has ended, there is a great shortage of both skilled men and engineering materials. However, this will be a start in the decisive overall recovery of civil engineering.

LETTER FROM A STUDENT

"One day while going along the streets of a certain district I was suddenly halted by a call from a policeman who was wearing a C.F. (TN: the letters C.F. evidently bear the connotation of Civilian Police) armband. I was surprised by the brusque manner of the policeman who motioned for me to come back. "Where did you get this vehicle?" he screamed. "This is a military vehicle. The service forces are greatly troubled by the present lack of automobiles." He then jotted down my name and address in a notebook.

"I received this automobile from my brother," I answered.

"Since there is a complaint I must have this matter examined. Come to the police station with me," he ordered. I complied and we arrived at the station. Finally, after much argument I was able to reclaim the automobile which I had originally received from my brother. I was really perturbed! Is it possible that a civilian can be apprehended on the streets and his possessions taken from him by such a person as this?"

3. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Published in MOJI) NAGASAKI-SAGA, 18 Nov., 1945. Crimes committed by Japanese against occupation forces have been very numerous. These crimes include theft, fraud, embezzlement, and violation of the tobacco-sales laws. This

is a violation of the national mobilization law and the SAGA district attorney's office is cooperating with the various prefectural police departments in making arrests. Tobacco cases alone total over one hundred.

Headquarters of the Occupation Forces has prohibited all ordinary sales. They have also requested that Japanese violators be handed over to them for punishment. In addition, these crimes will be severely dealt with by Japanese courts. The sale of tobacco at high prices is a violation of both the tobacco monopoly law and the anti-profiteering law. Violators will be heavily punished. This warning is issued to all residents of the prefecture

4. KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN (Published in KUMAMOTO)

On 14 November, about 0800, FURUHAMA Sueki's elder son, Tadato (17 years of age), while playing with a dud in the living room of this home touched the fuze of the shell causing it to explode. Tadato's younger sister who was playing in the kitchen was instantly killed by a fragment of the exploding shell which pierced her abdomen. Tadato was seriously wounded in the leg and is now in TAKESHITA hospital in this city.

In this prefecture there have been almost a dozen such accidents. From now on, anyone who discovers a dud must report it to the police rather than attempt to handle it himself.

0190/130
Ser. 001138B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 19Nov45.
To : 1200I, 20Nov45

SECRET

No. 60.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
BASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 21 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information.
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KOKURA

NIFFON Soda Company Ltd. (3 miles S of KOKURA) during the war employed 2062 persons in the production of phenol for the Japanese Army. Production in 1943 was 88 tons, in 1944 460 tons and up to August 1945 151 tons. Present employment is 449, and the factory is being converted to the production of industrial salt, caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, liquid chlorine, bleaching powder and other chemicals.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

- (1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.

SECRET

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

The KURUME RIKUGUN KAIKOSHA (Army Officers Club) is a branch of the National Army Officers Club called RIKUGUN ZAIDAN HOJIN with headquarters in TOKYO. This was a chartered society in which membership of Japanese army officers is believed to have been compulsory, since its dues were directly extracted from Officers salaries. The position of each club member was the equivalent of his rank in the Army. Members of the local club claimed it's purpose was to provide a gathering place to discuss military matters and further their military education. The KURUME Club has recently withdrawn 40,000 yen from it's account for distribution to it's members. It denies any official affiliation with the military and the resultant exemption of its large assets from confiscation by the occupation forces. Disposal of the remainder of the clubs funds has been halted by CIC pending the arrival of information concerning the status of the national organization.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

Correction to Periodic Report No. 47. Change para. E (1) to read Model 99, 88mm AA gun, and, Model 14, 10cm (105mm) AA gun.

NOTE: Second Marine Division Periodic for period 19 Nov - 20 Nov was not received in time for inclusion in this report.

G. L. McCormick
G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR, 920
AC of S, G-2.

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CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN (published in FUKUOKA) 19 November 1945. "Forty-one guards at the KUMAMOTO Prison went suddenly on strike during the morning of the 16th. Then on the 17th and 18th, they assembled at the KUMAMOTO Higher Technical School and the SAIZEN Shrine where they carried on demonstrations. The terms of the strikers are rationing of government supplies to permanent employees, rationing of furniture, farming tools, bamboo miniatures, and shoes made at the prison, revision of the 24 hour duty policy, and improvement of treatment. Superintendent TAKEFUJI and his officials are negotiating with the strikers to reach a smooth solution fearing that the situation may become aggravated. The present watch system has been damaged by bombing and is inadequate. Since there are 500 or more long term prisoners confined, the department heads and other employees are guarding them carefully to prevent any outbreaks."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN (published in NAGASAKI) 19 November, 1945. "Since the main reason for the shortage of coal has been attributed to the tardiness and semi-mutinous attitude of the Chinese and Korean laborers who have been working in the mines for the Japanese government, the Government has deemed it wise to return these persons to their home countries as quickly as possible."

"Even though this movement has been slow, the government has decided that by utilizing its railroad communication facilities for transporting the laborers to collection depots, it will be able to accomplish the repatriation of the greater percent of them by the end of the year. Already 2,700 Chinese from among the 13,000 who served in Japan as laborers during the war have been returned to their native land. It is hoped that during the month of December, the repatriation of 4,200 more Chinese will be successfully accomplished. Furthermore, it was estimated that there were approximately 145,000 Korean laborers in Japan at the end of the war. (The above figure includes families of the laboring men). However, by the 13th of this month it was estimated that approximately half of that number, or 82,650 Koreans, had been repatriated. Of the 62,350 Korean laborers still within this country, approximately 1,000 daily are being transported to collection depots by rail from HOKKAIDO."

"In accordance with the wishes of Colonel BALLARD (BARA-DO), Finance Officer for the Military Government Section of the American Eighth Army, the repatriation of the laborers is proceeding according to schedule. An additional 4,300 Korean laborers were to be withdrawn from the areas in which they labored, and dispatched from NIIGATA to their home country on the 16th and 17th. It is hoped that public peace and order will be restored

to the mining communities as a result of the withdrawal of the unfriendly Chinese and Korean laborers."

"A Navy doctor, Lt. SATO, Ariyoshi, was arrested at his residence in NITCHO MACHI, SASEBO, and taken to the SASEBO Police Station. Lt. SATO, who formerly worked at SASEBO Naval Hospital, was charged with the embezzlement of approximately ¥ 7,500 worth of medical supplies. The stores taken included medicine, glycerine, and military postal supplies."

4. SAGA Shimbun (published in SAGA) 19 November, 1945.

"Recently a person calling himself a member of the 'Naval Security Unit' appeared at the TORISU STATION and searched naval discharges. Since these men had already had military equipment, etc., confiscated, the TORISU police thought this suspicious. Upon investigation this 'Security Agent', calling himself HAYASHI, Kajiro, 20, from MIZUMA GUN, EKAMI MURA, turned out to be HIYOSHIMA SHIGEO, a former naval P.O. He had heard of agents being sent to TORISU, and had gone there under false pretenses, stealing money and gear."

5. ASAHI SHIMBUN (published in KOKURA) 19 November 1945.

"About 11 o'clock on the morning of the 16th of November, the Navy Escort DAITO, during minesweeping operations in the IGI channel, struck a mine and sank. The crew at present is receiving aid."

0133/130
Ser. 061139B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 20Nov45
To : 21Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 22 November, 1945.

No. 61.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (UNCLASSIFIED)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information.
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KARATSU

DAI NIPPON Aircraft Factory Ltd. near KARATSU produced bomb racks and bomb releases during the war. The payroll during the war was 1199 persons. At the present time 130 are employed manufacturing bricks and auto trailers.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

- (1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.

SECRET

(2) Suspects.

MAZAKI (also translated MASAKI), Jinzaburo, General (retired) - translations from local Japanese newspapers reveal that the Japanese government has been ordered by SCAP to apprehend General MAZAKI as an alleged war criminal.

General MAZAKI is at present residing at the MATSUMOTOYA Hotel in SAGA and had been interrogated by 5th Marine Division CIC units prior to the issuance of the SCAP order for his arrest. MAZAKI had also published two newspaper articles "exposing" the Japanese militarists and stating the causes for Japan's defeat (see the English editions of MAINICHI for 16 and 17 November). In spite of MAZAKI's professed opposition to the policies of the Japanese leaders during the war, it was the opinion of the CIC agent investigating his case that this opposition was based on disagreement as to tactics and strategy and not on the principle involved. The General's son MAZAKI, Hideki is now in the Foreign Office in TOKYO and, although he is not a military man, he can give full information on his father's military career.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

OITA CIC reports that a circular compiled by the Home Ministry in TOKYO dated 30 Oct 45. was forwarded to the heads of the SHONAI KAI and TONARI GUMI (Small Type Neighborhood organizations) in OITA Prefecture. The circular listed precaution to be exercised by the people, and warned them that they must be careful because the character of the American Soldier is bad. Various responsible individuals were investigated by CIC. CIC feels that the circular was not distributed for the purpose of maliciously causing unrest in the community or friction between the Japanese civilians and American Soldiers.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

925

SECRET

SECRET

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

Nothing to report.

G. L. MC Cormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

HEADQUARTERS, V Amphibious Corps,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.
PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news items of possible interest are inclosed.

2. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published in KOKURA) 20 November, 1945.
"The first ship will leave SASEBO tomorrow to repatriate the Chinese and Korean laborers."

"It was decided to repatriate the Chinese and Korean laborers after a discussion with Allied Forces."

"It has been decided that 920 Chinese who were interned at NAGASAKI and 3000 Chinese who were waiting for repatriation at FUKUOKA will be sent home on the first shipment, and Korean laborers on the 2nd shipment."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI) 20 November, 1945.
"The training of the occupation force is held daily from 0900 at the former fisheries school ground which is located at ASAHI-MACHI, NAGASAKI."

"The training is mostly firing practice. 150 soldiers are busy doing the prone and kneeling positions facing the 10 targets. It is interesting to see the kneeling position and the ease with which it is assumed. Their movements are smart and everyone has a serious look, but when his turn is over he speaks pleasantly to the children who are watching the training."

4. SAGA SHIMBUN, (published in SAGA) 20 November, 1945. "How has the tendency for crimes become since the end of the war?"

"In this Ken, the number of incidents which occurred during October was in all 628. Compared to the 497 incidents of October of last year, it is an increase of 131. Among the crimes on the increase, the surprising record that the crime of theft has increased 3 or 4 times, reflects the various social conditions and the food situation which is now impoverished. If you look closely, the tendency of such crimes appears very much among clever youths. When you look at it, it is clear that of the crimes committed by youths, approximately 80 percent are thefts. Why have the juveniles crimes increased more after the war than during the war? As against an average of 45 men caught in criminal investigations from January to August, twice that number were caught in October."

"Among the crimes which broke out in October was one incident each of incendiarism and murder, but those were both committed by youths together with the increase of incidents of theft, the fact that tendency for various crimes as incendiarism and murder has become conspicuous is particularly a matter of concern. Concerning that, the following was said at the Ken criminal court."

"Whatever you may say the most important present question is the food question; increase in the number of thefts at the end of the war has that as its cause."

5. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN, (published in FUKUOKA) 20 November, 1945
"The People's Party of Japan at a meeting held on the 19th at the TSUKIJI office set up emergency committees for the study of the following matters: the fundamentals of democracy, with FUKUJI as chairman; planning council for the establishment of a democratic party, with SUZUKI as chairman; revision and/or abolishment of military law, with OKAMURA as chairman; international relations committee, with TOGANO as chairman; group to consider the problems of factory workers and agricultural districts, with OTOKU as chairman; and a committee to discuss the problems of the communications system with NOGUCHI as chairman."

"The principles of the party were discussed at great length and it was decided that in general they would conform with the following outline:

1. To continue the Emperor as the dignitary head of a democratic organization whose efforts would be directed toward maintaining world peace.
2. To establish an organization which would strive for the personal rights of the individual. Such rights would insure freedom of public discussion, and the freedom from want. Under this plan an individual would be able to engage in any type of work for which he felt himself best qualified.
3. To strive for the cooperative spirit among the individual members of the national society and direct their efforts toward maintaining world peace. This effort, if successful, would abolish world conflict."

0190/130
Ser.001140B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 21Nov45
To : 1200I, 22Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 23 November, 1945.

No. 62.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED)
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (OMITTED)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No Information.
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.
Nothing to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

- (1) Persons apprehended or interned.
None.
- (2) Suspects.
None.
- (3) Subversive activities.
None reported.

SECRET

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

G-2 5th Marine Division reports that the ashes of American Flier, which were taken from a crashed Grumman Airplane on 28 or 29 March 1945 by the Japanese, were turned over to G-1 5th MarDiv. by a patrol. They are to be interned in the 5th MarDiv cemetery and a routine report made to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

G. L. Mc Cormick
G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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CG III Phib Corps	1	USSBS TOKYO	1
CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5
AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

0190/130
Ser. 001142B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 22Nov45
To : 1200I, 23Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 24 November, 1945.

No. 63.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571)

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle (OMITTED)
(B) Press survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SAGA

The MITTO SHOGI Aircraft Manufacturing Co. at OGI (6 Miles NW of SAGA) (G-2 Periodic Report #22) manufactured wings, tails and fuselages for sea-planes during the war. There is enough equipment on hand to equip 50 sea-planes. During the war 20 wings, 5 tails and 5 fuselages were produced monthly. 218 men, 163 women and 719 part time school children were employed during the war. At present only 40 are employed making aluminum rice boxes, with the future intention of producing furniture, bicycle parts and pottery. The aircraft production started in Feb 1944 and ceased at the end of the war.

SECRET

KARATSU

MAIZURU ^{IRON} ~~Train~~ Works in KARATSU employed 230 people during the war. They produced nuts, bolts and small fuel strainers for airplane engines. At the present time 50 people are employed and are preparing to produce small parts for electric switches.

A branch of FUKU SEISAKUSHO formerly the KARATSU Aircraft Weapons Co. employed 93 people during the war. They produced gas generators for automobiles and parts for torpedoes. At the present time 36 people are employed, and are producing generators and small grain grinders.

KARATSU SEISAKUSHO is a machine shop and foundry. During the war, 120 people were employed producing steam valves. At the present time 47 people are employed and are producing small grain grinders and also repair engines of small vessels.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

Pursuant to orders from CG, 6th Army, TAKOMOTO, Isoji, and OGURA, Yasushi, were apprehended at 1030 21 November in the SHIMYOICHI Branch Office of the Bureau of Communications of the Japanese Government, at FUKAGAW. They stated that the currency in their possession (7,500,000 yen) belonged to the KEIJO (KOREA) Bureau of Communications), which was operated by the Japanese Government. They believed that the money was to have been used to pay railroad fares for Japanese employees of the KEIJO Bureau of Communications who were returning to their homes in Japan via the SENZAKI Ferry tunnel. A number of discrepancies were noted during the interrogation and these support the belief of the CIC agents that TAKOMOTO and OGURA may be withholding certain information which might implicate their superiors in an act of embezzlement. TOKOMOTO and OGURA have been placed in detention by Military Police in FUKUOKA. The currency is being placed in the Safety Deposit Vault in the Bank of Japan, FUKUOKA. Further investigation is in progress.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

932

SECRET

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

In the MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in MOJI) of 21 November 1945, a paragraph regarding the shooting of a Japanese woman by a sentry appeared. A further report from the 32nd Inf Division is awaited by this headquarters.

G. L. Mc Cormick
G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Published in MOJI) 21 Nov., 1945. "The 3,000 evacuees from the South Seas will return home, In view of the large number of Okinawans who were evacuated from the South Seas, or were deployed or demobilized, the OKINAWA, KAGOSHIMA and KYUSHU Administrative Offices have requested for ships to be dispatched to OKINAWA. On the 19th, a directive came from the KAGOSHIMA Military Government stating that all civilians except for demobilized personnel will be permitted to return under the Japanese Government Ship Distribution Plan. If the Ship Distribution Plan is approved, the 3,000 Okinawans who were evacuated from the South Seas will be returned first followed by the 3,800 deployed in KAGOSHIMA and the Okinawans throughout Japan. The OKINAWA Administration Chief, KETA, will report to TOKIO in the near future and contact the Central Government to make preparations for the distribution of ships."

3. SAGA SHIMBUN, (Published in SAGA) 21 Nov., 1945. "Recently there have been various offenses involving both residents of this prefecture and members of the occupation forces in illegal tobacco sales and purchases. The most frequent violations of the tobacco sales laws are theft, fraud and embezzlement. Already over one hundred cases have been uncovered and the offenders arrested. This has been accomplished only by the close liaison of the prefectural police office with the various local branch offices.

"Headquarters of the occupation forces has forbidden its personnel to engage in tobacco transactions with residents of the prefecture. All cases involving American military personnel will be prosecuted by military headquarters. Therefore, the prefectural police have been instructed to hand over all civilian personnel under their jurisdiction who become involved in crimes with members of the military forces occupying this prefecture to the occupation forces for prosecution. Persons who commit this type of offense will be punished by the prefectural police in addition to any punishment the offender might receive at the hands of the occupation forces. In addition, people who violate the national tobacco laws (e.g., selling tobacco at high prices to make large profits, etc.) will be tried by their local police courts."

4. HIRUGA NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN, (Published in MIYAZAKI) 19 Nov., 1945. "The American jeep, which runs through the city streets with the ease of a bouncing rubber ball, is very popular with the children. However, the worry of the driver is great because of the hordes of children who hang onto such vehicles. At such times when the jeep is being backed by the driver, it is very dangerous for children to be gathering around the vehicle and clinging to its sides. Many children have been hurt as a result of their own

PRESS AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS (Continued)

negligence. Warnings have been sent out by the occupation forces and are now in the process of being distributed by the prefectural police headquarters. The parents of families having naughty children should be very strict about warning their offspring to keep away from all American military vehicles.

0190/rem
Ser. 001143B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 23Nov45
To : 1200I, 24Nov45

SECRET

No. 64.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 25 November, 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translations. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.
No information.
- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.
No information.
- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
No change.
- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.
None reported.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

HIKOSHIMA

HANAYICHI Shipbuilding Company produced wooden coasta defence boats, tug boats, steel transports, steel oil tankers, and steam and diesel engines during the war. This company employed 4455 people during the war, and now employ 1106 men and 164 women. At present 25 ships are under repair, and the company is converting in order to build wooden and steel fishing boats up to 500 tons, engines up to 2000 HP, and to do all types of repair work. The machinery includes: 4 punching machines, 9 air compressors, 36 drilling machines, 18 milling machines, 20 shapers, 16 grinders 2 gear cut machines, 4 steel hammers, 4 bending rollers, 226 lathes, 7 boring machines, 9 planers, 12 slatters,

SECRET

2 face lathes, and 5 cupola furnaces.

OITA

TOYO Soda Company (9 miles east of OITA) produced soda ash, caustic soda, bromine, and various soda products before the war. During the war 2200 people were employed in the production of aluminum hydroxide at the rate of 150 to 250 tons per day. At present it employs 750 people in the production of commercial salt.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.(1) Persons apprehended or interned. 111

None.

(2) Suspects.

Investigation by the 496th CIC Detachment in KURUME proves conclusively that four local Japanese beat to death an American B-29 crewman in YOKOYAMA-MURA on 28 July 1945. According to a CIC report of investigation on this incident which is being forwarded through CIC channels, the American was not a prisoner at the time of his death but was resisting capture by Japanese civilians.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

TOKKO KA The TOKKO KA in MIYAZAKI KEN was dissolved 9 October, 1945. All TOKKO KA records have been inventoried and sealed by CIC.

G. L. Mc Cormick
G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2		

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

TRANSLATION OF NEWS AND PRESS SURVEY.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN, (published in FUKUOKA) 23 November 1944. "Construction of homes for those bombed out in SAGA KEN has advanced. Six of the seven houses in HIGASHI YOKAMURA outside of SAGA destroyed by the incendiary raid of August 12 have been rapidly completed and people have resumed living in them. Of the 67 houses in KURU of KUBOTA MURA, 22 had their walls collapse. In KURU, which is half fishing and half agricultural, the plan is that one house shall be nine TSUBO in area and that the unfloored part of the dwelling shall be an area of three TSUBO with space for two six-mat rooms. In addition to building outbuildings and small storehouses, a barracks-type warehouse of 20 square yards has been completed. The total cost of construction was 3000 yen. In NAKAMURA, which is purely a farming district, buildings for storing grain have been built. As for the special rebuilt houses of SAGA KEN, which cost about 2700 yen apiece and are about 45 square yards each in area, the authorities of the KEN boast that they are strongly built. In both villages, carpenters, masons, and tradesmen are all being mobilized and, since labor as well as the transportation of materials are being accelerated, progress is ahead of schedule."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI) 23 November 1945. "The SASEBO National Schools are carrying out an earnest experiment in democratic education and the City Education Board is planning to commence a lecture tour shortly. At YAMATO National School the democratic education experiment meeting was held on 21 Nov with SAKAIWA Hiroshi, principal of #2 Prefectural Middle School, as lecturer. Instructions on the experiment were given during the morning and a round table conference was held in the afternoon. Principal SAKAIWA lectured on the subject 'Democracy and Scientific Education'."

4. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published NAGASAKI) 23 November 1945. "Construction material for the use of bombed-out personnel, allotted to the city of NAGASAKI, is being distributed outside the police station as quickly as possible, and more will be received on the 23rd. By 25 Nov enough material for 21 houses is expected to arrive. The greatest number of houses it will be possible to construct by the end of this year is no more than 650, but it is believed that by next spring 1350 houses will be constructed."

5. MAENICHI SHIMBUN, (published MOJI) 23 November 1945. "Since the end of the war, returning veterans and evacuees have increased the number of people for whom goods must be issued by ration in SASEBO. On 21 Nov a statistical roster of 'Ration Population' was carried on in SASEBO. It was found that about 1300 people were listed who are not in town at all; this is probably due to confusion."

in handling names and tabulations and slowness in revising tables. As a result a very precise census will be carried out starting 1 Dec, to determine the exact number of consumers in SASEBO."

0190/rem
Ser 001148B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 24Nov45
To : 1200I, 25Nov45

SECRET

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 26 November, 1945.

No. 65.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Order of Battle. (OMITTED).
(B) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No change.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

None to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None reported.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

SECRET(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

Screening of Japanese repatriates at HAKATA Harbor revealed the following: Lt. General KOZUKI, Yoshio, formerly Commanding General of the 17th Japanese Army Group in KOREA, and Lt. General IHARA, Jurjiro, his Chief of Staff were interviewed. KOZUKI Commanded the 19th Japanese Division in Northern KOREA from December 1941 to July 1942, the Second Japanese Army Group in south MANCHURIA from July 1942 to August 1943; the Central Mongolian Japanese Army from August 1943 to November 1944; the 11th Japanese Army in Central CHINA from November 1944 to April 1945, and he held his present position until the surrender. KOZUKI and IHARA stated that there are about 2600 Japanese Army Personnel in the rear echelon assisting the American Forces in KOREA. In regard to Allied prisoner of war camps in KOREA, KOZUKI stated that they were controlled by the HORIO JOHO KIYOKU in TOKYO, Commanded by Lt. General KIYOSHI, Tamara and that local commanders were responsible for furnishing food and medical supplies that had been requested. The Commandant of the two Allied prisoner of war camps at JINSEN and KEIJI, Colonel YUZURU, Noguchi and officer personnel are at present undergoing investigation by the American Forces in KOREA. KOZUKI stated the 17th Japanese Army Group of KOREA was dissolved as of 24 Nov 45. KOZUKI and IHARA stated that the Japanese are now setting up a reception center for troops returning from KOREA. These two and other Japanese officers are quartered at the DAIMARU HOTEL, FUTSUKAICHI-SHI, FUKUOKA KEN. The offices for the reception center will be located in the TATARA Mfg Co. Bldg. FUKUOKA-SHI until all troops are returned from KOREA.

G. L. Mc Cormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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CG Sixth Army	6	Attn G-2	
OIC JICPOA	1	" OOB	
CG FMFPAC	1	NAVTECHJAP	1
Com5thPhib	1	USSBS TOKYO	1
CG III PhibCorps	1	AFFAC HQ (MANILA)	2
CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	941

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published in KOKURA), 24 November 1945.
"The SASEBO Naval Station combined funeral services for the late Rear Admiral OSE Hisao and other war dead of the Greater East Asia War will be held at the HIGASHI-HONGANTI Temple, SHIMASE MACHI, SASEBO City, at 0930, the 27th. This will be the last such combined funeral services and will also include services for war dead whose remains have not yet returned."

"The MONTETSU Office, at noon of the 23rd, has instructed all railroad stations under its jurisdictions to abolish sale of 2nd class train tickets for the time being."

"The Ministry of Education has instructed the KYUSHU Imperial University to recall the instructors who were branded "reds" and ejected from the university instructors' staff. The five instructors are SAGISAKA Hsuro, ISHIHAMA Tomoyuki, and TAKAHASHI Masao of the Department of Economics, and SASA Hiroo and IMANAKA Tsugimaro of the Law Department. It is expected that Mr. SAGISAKA will occupy the chair of economic principles; Mr. ISHIHAMA, economic history; Mr. TAKAHASHI, statistical dynamics; Mr. SASA, political science; and Mr. IMANAKA, international politics. This will mean that the golden age of the University's department of law and economics, which was established by radical social scientists at the end of the TAISHO period with Professor MINOBE as head, will be revived."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI) 24 November 1945.
"Diphtheria patients are increasing in SASEBO, and reached 60 on the 22nd. It is going on Winter now, and it appears likely that the disease will spread. Moreover, because of the lack of medical supplies, treatment cannot be thorough, and already a number of deaths have occurred. In view of these facts, the following provisions were put into effect on the 22nd, and all efforts are being made to prevent further spread. Especially families with children under ten should take precautions."

- 1) Have an examination if there is a bark-like cough.
- 2) Do not catch cold.
- 3) Avoid contact with those that are sick.
- 4) Gargle after visiting public places.
- 5) Inform the Department of Public Welfare when further cases occur.

0190/rem
Ser 7588

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 25Nov45.
To : 1200I, 26Nov45.

RESTRICTED

No. 66.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 27 November 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L 571).

Enclosure: (A) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified)

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

Nothing to report.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

Nothing to report.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

Nothing to report.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

G. L. MC Cormick

G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Com5thPhib	1	US3BS TOKYO	1
CG III PhibCorps	1	AFPAC HQ (MANILA)	2
CG I Corps	1	CO Corps Troops	1
CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI), 25 November 1945. "According to a release on the twenty-fourth from the American Headquarters' Liaison Office, Brigadier General KRAMER of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division, which is the occupation force for SHIKOKU, has issued the following strict orders to all policemen of SHIKOKU:

'Savage behavior of the local policemen will cease. Violent acts such as hitting a child with full force in the face must cease immediately. If such acts occur in the future, the American Military Police will immediately take the offending policeman into custody.'"

"The factories of SASEBO received little damage from air raid because they were away from the main district, but since the end of the war almost all seventy-three of them have been idle. However, forty-five of them have converted speedily from the manufacture of war materials. In the ITOKUMI Iron Foundry, even now pots and axes for family use are being manufactured. In the food factories, SKOYU and MISO (food sauces) are being made. Bicycle parts and boat repair parts are speedily being manufactured to accelerate transportation of vitally needed food products."

3. MAINICHI SHIMBUN (published in SAGA) 25 November 1945. "A workers meeting was held in HIKOSHIMA CHO, SHIMONOSEKI SHI. Following an eight hour discussion, an ultimatum demanding a increase in pay and an eight hour working day, together with eleven other points was presented to the company. The company had made no response to their demands by the twenty-fourth. At noon on the 24th the workers decided to go on strike immediately and did so."

"The KAGOSHIMA Police Department arrested a youth acting suspiciously while wandering through the streets at DO CHO, HANAGAI. It was the first crime for the jobless, homeless, SUGIMOTO TOMOHARU (Age 25)."

"At about the end of August in NAGASAKI, HIROBAJO CHO, he stole undershirts, army shoes, and blankets from a passing occupation forces truck. In the same city, in the OKAMASA Department Store, he stole a purse from a gentleman and his wife and took ¥200 from it, thus making the Japanese lose face in the eyes of the American occupation forces."

4. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN, (published in FUKUOKA) 24 November 1945. "The FUKUOKA Central Telegraph Company's group leader, including the workers, formed a reformation committee demanding the dismissal of dishonest officials, the equality of rationing and subsistence. The

944

ENCLOSURE (A)

committee presented President UCHIYAMA with an ultimatum, on the morning of the 23rd, but received no answer. It was decided to strike immediately."

"The KUMAMOTO City Fishing Association is lending a helping hand to the KUMAMOTO occupational forces plan for food self-sufficiency by raising rainbow trout in Lake ENOTSU. Rainbow trout is considered a delicacy by the American troops, and therefore one hundred thousand will be hatched and released. The water temperature of Lake ENOTSU is suitable for raising rainbow trout. The temperature is lower than that required for carp raising and therefore it is considered that rainbow trout will multiply faster than carp."

5. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published in KOKURA) 25 November 1945. "At a party held last Monday evening, five persons died from drinking poison alcohol. The party was given by a Mr. YAMAMOTO at a HIGASHI CHO Tavern in TORISU MACHI. The five men, who became suddenly ill while drinking and were rushed to the local aid station for treatment, were: YAMAMOTO (age 64); a farmer, MATSUGURA (54); a railroad employee, KAWAZAKI (35); a carpenter, TERAZAKI (32); and a factory worker, YOSHIYA (25).

From: 1200I, 26Nov45
To : 1200I, 27Nov45

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 67.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps,
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 28 November 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosure: (A) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

No information.

- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

No information.

- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

No information.

- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

NOGATA Area (9 miles SW of YAWATA).

MIYATA Ammunition Dump (1 mile S of NOGATA). The dump contains the following: 533,979 rounds of rifle ammunition; 66,476 rounds of infantry cannon shells; 4,587 -57mm tank gun shells; 998,905 rounds of heavy mg ammunition; 6,446 hand grenades; 1500-15cm howitzer shells, type #4; 20,074-37mm tank gun shells; 6,522-1C howitzer shells, type #91; 14,602 mountain gun shells, type #41; 67.5 kilograms of dynamite; 138 fuses, type #40; 1,900 safety fuses; 405 smoke candles; 167-37mm blank cartridges; 67 signal cartridges; 11,381 rifle practice rounds; 6,406 AA mb rounds; 3,996-75mm field cannon shells; and 4,100-47mm tank gun shells.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

TSURUSAKI (4 miles East of OITA) DIDO SAKO Steel Plant was completed in April 45, but bombs and typhoons damaged it so much that no steel was produced. In August 45, it employed 500 people. At present 116 are employed in reconverting and repairing the plant. If the plant

CONFIDENTIAL

reopens it plans to make automobile parts and farming implements.

BEPPU

BEPPU Geophysical Laboratory of the KYOTO Imperial University is located at BEPPU. Seven workers are employed here in the study of volcanic activity, earthquakes, and hot springs. The equipment includes a vertical and horizontal seismograph on which earthquakes can be detected as far away as South America. No research was done for the Army or Navy during the war.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None reported.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

G. L. MC Cormick
G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.

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CG X Corps	1	AC of S, G-3, VAC	1
CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section, VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published in KOKURA), 26 November, 1945.
"(SHIMONOSEKI) - Koreans returning to KOREA through YAMAGUCHI Prefecture will be quarantined from the 25th, and examined starting the 26th. The quarantining will be done at the YAMAGUCHI Red Cross Hospital, with 23 persons under Doctor ONISHI. After the 25th, all Koreans arriving will have a medical examination in the 2nd Class waiting room of the FUSAN-MOJI ferry pier. There they will be given preventive inoculations and vaccinations for cholera and typhus. There is a dispensary set up in the dining room to care for those who may have the disease already.

The examination will be carried out from the 26th on all Koreans leaving SHIMONOSEKI at the Special Gate for Korean Passengers. They will be allowed to keep only ¥1000 in cash (the rest in draft), weapons, explosives and other forbidden articles will be taken away from them."

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI), 26 November, 1945.
"21 arrests for bad violations of the monopoly laws were made by the AINOURA police station. The offenses consisted of the purchase of tobacco and other articles from occupation forces and their resale at an exorbitant price to Koreans who were being repatriated. The police are taking strict measures due to the prevalency of these offenses."

"On November 23rd at 8:30 p.m., a Chinese laborer started an argument over some trivial affair with a woman employee of the SHO-JIKU boarding house, YAMAGATA, SASEBO, in front of the boarding house. Two Japanese residents of SASEBO, KURIMATA, Shigekichi, 25, and KUROZAWA, Kiyoshi, 25, who attempted to intermeddle were assaulted by about 12 Chinese. The police to whom it was quickly reported soon quieted the affair. Furthermore, about 9 p.m. at the SHIEISAN BASHI Pier, MANOTSU, SASEBO, about seven or eight of the same Chinese began arguing with a woman, NAKAO, Chio, 24, and assaulted her. She also did violence to a Japanese stationed at the pier, SASAKI, Muto 47, of ANOURA."

"At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the cargo ship SHINSHO MARU (of 10 tons) which belongs to TANAKA YASUJIRO, who lives in OSAKA FU, SENNAN GUN, YOSHINO MACHI, while proceeding at approximately 200 meters to the east of MAPUSHI harbor near OKUURA of ITSUTSUSHIMA hit a floating mine and the hull was blown up into 11 pieces. Among the crew of 6, one was killed immediately and one was seriously wounded, two are missing, and two were lightly wounded.

ENCLOSURE (A)

From: 1200I, 27Nov45
To : 1200I, 28Nov45

SECRET

No. 68.

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 29 November 1945.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosure: (A) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified),

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

- (1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

No information.

- (2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

No information.

- (3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

Nothing to report.

- (4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

Japanese Army ammunition and supply dump (10 miles NNE of FUKUOKA) consists of 19 caves and 24 buildings containing the following equipment: one crane, one motor truck, 1,800,000 LMG bullets, 34,000 bomb fuses, 800 kg powder and 10,000 37mm shells.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

- (1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

KOKURA

AA Gun, Searchlight, and Radio Detector. (1 mile S of KOKURA). During the war this AA installation had 6 heavy AA gun emplacements, however the guns have been removed. Three radio detector units and one power plant are still located at this installation. During the war, 200 men occupied this installation, but were demobilized with the 132nd AA Regt on 30 Sept 45.

SASEBO

IMARI SEISA KUSHO at Imari (12 miles NE of SASEBO) employed 150 people during the war. They produced small

SECRET

parts for ships. At the present time, 30 people are employed making farm implements.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

(5) Miscellaneous.

SAKAMOTO, Yuhichi (ref our Periodics #31 and 37), former Captain in the Japanese Army and director of PW Camp #9 at MIYATA MACHI, KURATE Gun, was turned over to the SUGAMU Prison at TOKYO to stand trial as a war criminal in compliance with instructions.

INOUE, Hideo, administrative head of the MOJI neighborhood associations was interviewed as to the functions of the associations and the following information was disclosed pertaining to its duties:

- 1) To distribute food and supplies which are made available to them by the Prefectural Government.
- 2) Relay instructions to the people when they are received from the superior governmental agencies both local and national.
- 3) Report to superior governmental agencies what the people are thinking and in what ways they are reacting to specific conditions.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

SECRET*G. L. Mc Cormick*G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.DISTRIBUTION:

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN, (published in KAGOSHIMA), 24 November 1945
"I am the wife of a soldier who did duty on IWO JIMA. Nearly two and one-half months have passed since I received word that my husband was killed in the fighting there. However, sometime ago I noticed in a newspaper report that there are approximately 3,000 military persons remaining on that island. I have also heard the same report from many people. Since hearing the above I have been doing some very serious thinking. Wouldn't it be wise, without further delay, to publish a list of the names of the men who are still held on that island? Or furthermore, wouldn't it be possible to inform the families of such men, by telegram, that their loved ones are still alive? Why should we continue to live not knowing the fate of our men? With each passing day our troubles become greater and greater. I implore you to consider this carefully. Each day I pray to the gods that the people remaining on IWO JIMA will without further delay be returned safely to their homes."

(Wife of a Deceased Serviceman).

"According to a release from Supreme Headquarters of the Occupation Forces, General MACARTHUR'S Headquarters has ordered the Japanese Government to furnish allied occupation forces with a detailed report on the locations of bodies, graves, or remains of allied military personnel who met death in JAPAN during the war. Since American and allied searching parties are unable to ascertain the exact locations of graves and remains of allied military personnel, this order is being published in all newspapers. It is hoped that any person who has any knowledge of the location of graves or remains of allied military personnel will furnish such information to the Japanese Government. Such information will prove of great value in supplementing the incomplete records of our government concerning the above matter."

ENCLOSURE (A)

DKD/rem
Ser 0770B

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1200I, 28Nov45
To : 1200I, 29Nov45

CONFIDENTIAL

Hq, V Amphibious Corps
SASEBO, KYUSHU,
1200, 30 November 1945.

No. 69.

Map: Central JAPAN 1:250,000 (AMS L571).

Enclosures: (A) Press Survey and News Translation. (Unclassified).
(B) A Study of TSUSHIMA. (CONFIDENTIAL).

A. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT.

(1) Japanese military units hitherto unreported.

No information.

(2) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed.

No information.

(3) General attitude of military and semi-military units.

Nothing to report.

(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS.

(1) Intelligence targets placed under surveillance during the period.

SENDAI

ASAHI Rayon Factory (1 mile NW SENDAI). At present time only white rayon handkerchiefs and aprons are produced as silk and dyes are frozen. During the war 400 persons were employed. Some heavy material was made for the army. At present the factory employees number 200.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned.

None.

CONFIDENTIAL(2) Suspects.

None reported.

(3) Subversive activities.

None reported.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

None reported.

D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

No change.

*G. L. MC Cormick*G. L. MC CORMICK,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,
AC of S, G-2.DISTRIBUTION:

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CG 2ndMarDiv	10	Record Section; VAC	1
CG 5thMarDiv	10	File	5

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

PRESS SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS.

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, (published in MOJI), 28 November, 1945.
"Capt. BERRY, NAGASAKI MP Unit CO and Capt. SOWELL, who attended the NAGASAKI Prefecture Police Chief meeting of the 27th, expressed wishes that the following be complied with:

All offenses committed by occupation troops against civilians must be reported to MPs as soon as possible.

Evidences, such as the offender's features, clothing, rank, etc. must also be reported.

Japanese police must further tighten their control on offenses committed by Japanese against occupation troops, which are regrettably numerous.

Japanese police stations must handle the offenses committed by Formosans, Koreans and Chinese against Japanese civilian

3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, (published in NAGASAKI), 28 November, 1945
"Because of the many traffic accidents arising from carelessness on the part of pedestrians, 'keep to the right' traffic will be carried out in FUKUOKA and YAMAGUCHI Prefectures on the 5th by instructions of the FUKUOKA Sector Provost Marshal.

The gist of this order is that all high speed vehicles, such as automobiles, etc. will keep to the center; bicycles, carts, and horse-drawn carts will keep to the left. Pedestrians will keep off the road and keep to the right. However, this does not apply to streets with sidewalks and pedestrians can keep to either the right or the left then."

4. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN, (published in FUKUOKA), 28 November, 45
"Daily requests are received from the occupation forces for laborer to assist in essential construction work for the occupation forces, but they are scarce. On November 26th an urgent request for male workers was made by the occupation forces, and as a result, Mr. KAWAHARU, SASEBO Labor Department head, urges bringing in laborers from other places on a large scale.

Since SASEBO is the headquarters for all American troops in KYUSHU and the chief port where supplies are unloaded, it is an extremely busy place, and as a result a great many laborers are required. All available personnel in the SASEBO area have been gathered, including especially demobilized personnel, but in cases where other persons cannot be obtained to do the necessary work, there is no recourse under the order promulgated October 16th other than to put additional duties upon some persons.

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

A STUDY OF TSUSHIMA.

1. Importance.

This group of Islands (45 miles NW KYUSHU) consists of two principal islands and a number of small ones. All are extremely rugged and thinly populated. Cultivation is limited to narrow river valleys. Chief sources of livelihood are fishing and farming.

2. Population.

The population of the two principal cities is: IZUHARA 10,000 and KECHI 5,000.

3. Roads.

A fairly good road runs along the east coast of SHIMONO SHIMA from TSUTSU to TAKESHIKI. It is satisfactory for trucks. Cross island roads are suitable for jeeps only.

4. Military Installations and Defenses.

KUNOSHITA-SAKI (Northern tip of TSUSHIMA) 2 - 40cm Army Guns designed for Battleship were found here. These guns have a traverse of 360 degrees.

UNI-SHIMA (1 mile E of KUNOSHITA-SAKI) 4 - 15cm Army Guns were located here. One hydro-phone station. Also a Surface Radar Station not fully completed.

TOYO (1 miles S KUNOSHITA-SAKI) 4 - 75mm AA Guns (Army).

JODONO-SAKI (3 miles S of KUNOSHITA-SAKI) 2 - 15cm Guns (Army).

SAO-SAKI (10 miles SW of KUNOSHITA-SAKI) 4 - 15cm Guns (Army).

KECHI (4 miles N of IZUHARA) 4 - 28cm Howitzers (Army).
8 - 75mm Field Guns (Army).

ORISEBANA (4 miles NE of KECHI) 2 - 77mm Guns (Army) with 420 rounds ammunition. 6 - 28 cm Howitzers (Army).

TAKEZAKI (2 miles N of KECHI) 2 - 15cm Guns (Army).
6 - 75mm AA Guns (Army).

KAMOYOZE (1 mile SW of TAKEZAKI) 2 - 15cm Guns Army.

IZUHARA Radio station used as relay between TOKYO and KEIJO in KOREA. It has 4 inverted "U" towers 100 ft high, 2 power generators and an output of 1.2 kilowatts.

956

ENCLOSURE (B)

- 1 -

CONFIDENTIAL

A Study of TSUSHIMA. (Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

O-SAKI (2 miles S of IZUHARA) 2 - 15cm Guns (Army).

TATSUNO-SAKI (5 miles S of IZUHARA) 2 - 12cm AA Guns (Navy) with 400 rds. 2 - twin mount 30cm Guns (Army) with 360 degree traverse. These guns had elaborate powder magazines and elevators. 2 - 75 mm AA Guns (Army).

KO-SAKI (Very southern tip of TSUSHIMA) has the following installations: Surface Radar Station not fully completed. One Hydrophone Station. A Navy torpedo Station with 11 torpedoes capable of being fired from beach.

TSUTSU (3 miles W of KO-SAKI) 4 - 15cm Guns (Army) with 800 rds. 2 - 75mm Guns (Army).

GO-SAKI (10 miles NW of IZUHARA) 4 - 15cm Guns (Army). A Surface Radar Station. One Hydrophone Station. A Navy Torpedo Station with 9 torpedoes capable of being fired from the beach.

5. Harbors.

There are a good number of harbors, the principal ones being IZUHARA on SHIMONO SHIMA and HITAKATSU on KAMINO SHIMA. Beaches are generally narrow and poor access inland. There are no suitable sites for airfields.

6. Counterintelligence.

TOKKO KA units in the cities of IZUHARA and SASUNA were disbanded 13 Oct 1945. All records were burned by order of the NAGASAKI Prefectural Police.

KEMPEI TAI was composed of 33 men under 2nd Lt. TAKAMORE, Masakiko. As of 29 Sept 45, KEMPEI TAI on the island was completely disbanded.

7. Civilian and Military Attitudes.

Japanese Nationals on TSUSHIMA were at all times friendly and cooperative.

957

CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

- OCCUPATION OF JAPAN -

G-3 Report

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Annex DOG

CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

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30 November 1945.

From: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: G-3 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. PLANNING:

a. Introduction:

No sooner had the IWO JIMA operation been brought to its successful conclusion in late March, 1945, than staff conferences were held at PEARL HARBOR on 30 March relative to projected operations against MIYAKO JIMA in the southern RYUKYUS as a follow up of operations then in progress on OKINAWA. On 29 March, the new Corps command post had opened on MAUI, and by 12 April, rear elements of Corps Headquarters had arrived at MAUI to facilitate continued planning.

Late in April, when the preparation of initial studies and plans for the capture of MIYAKO JIMA had been completed, this Headquarters was directed to discontinue planning for that project and to turn over all assembled data to the III Amphibious Corps. Shortly thereafter, on 3 May, the Corps received warning orders for an operation to be executed in mid-August against the CHUSAN Archipelago and NINGPO Peninsula on the coast of CHINA. The new directive further indicated that if this operation were to be cancelled, it would be in favor of one against JAPAN itself, in October or November. The CHINA Coast plans were not only to be prepared by this staff for the VAC alone, but also on field army level for the entire operation (originally conceived for two corps) inasmuch as no higher landing force headquarters had then been designated. Planning progressed throughout May, with a preferred plan and several alternate plans under consideration, but on 27 May, this operation was indefinitely deferred and the new target for planning was to be JAPAN.

b. Planning for the Assault on Southern KYUSHU:

(1) Planning Agencies:

The principal commands associated with the V Amphibious Corps in planning and projected execution of the southern KYUSHU operation were as follows:

SIXTH Army (General Kraeger);

Annex DCG to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

CONFIDENTIAL

Fifth Amphibious Force (Fifth Attack Force, Vice Admiral Hill);

Amphibious Group 4 (Fifth Transport Group, Rear Admiral Reifsnider);

Amphibious Group 5 (Fifth Fire Support Group, Rear Admiral Wright);

2d Marine Division (Major General Hunt);

3d Marine Division (Major General Ersking);

5th Marine Division (Major General Bourke).

The SIXTH Army exercised command of expeditionary troops, while the Fifth Attack Force was to have been charged with the overall naval responsibility for landing this Corps. The Fifth Transport Group (PhibGp 4) was to conduct movement to the target, ship-to-shore movement, and naval gunfire and air support (during and after initial landings). The Fifth Fire Support Group (PhibGp 5) was designated to conduct preliminary bombardment, as well as all other advance amphibious operations off the Corps beaches.

Planning was conducted with all the foregoing commands throughout the Summer, and was greatly facilitated by the SIXTH Army and naval decision to permit joint planning directly between this Headquarters and the naval staffs enumerated.

(2) Planning Directives:

The Corps mission in the southern KYUSHU assault was to:

"...land on the west coast of southern KYUSHU in the KAMINOKAWA-KUSHIKINO area, secure a Corps beachhead to include SENDAI, protect the northwest flank of SIXTH Army, and block the advance of hostile forces from the north, along the west coast; then advance inland when directed and seize the general line KAGOSHIMA-KAWAKAMICHO-ICHIINO-SENDAI, in order to assist in the establishment of air and naval forces in southern KYUSHU for support of operations into the industrial heart of JAPAN."

This mission was derived from SIXTH Army field order for the operation,

CONFIDENTIAL

Earlier major directives, all by despatch, had successively directed the Corps Commander to report for planning purposes to the Commanding General, SIXTH Army (2 June); had substituted the 2d Marine Division for the 4th Marine Division in the troop-list for the southern KYU operation (15 June); and established a readiness-date of 1 November (30 June).

(3) Planning Narrative:

On 2 June when the Corps Commander reported despatch to the Commanding General, SIXTH Army on LUZON, distances between headquarters were so great that initially very little information was available for firm planning, although immediate steps were taken to assemble and digest all intelligence studies and material on hand in the HAWAIIAN area.

On 15 June, in accordance with despatch instructions from CINCPAC, the 4th Marine Division was deleted from the Corps troop-list and from planning for this operation, and the 2d Marine Division (then at SAIPAN, except for RCT 8, currently engaged on OKINAWA) substituted therefor. The Commanding General of that division reported to this Headquarters for planning purposes on 19 June. Meanwhile, on 18 June, the first conference with any of the Navy staffs concerned took place when Rear Admiral Wright, Commander Amphibious Group 5, with certain members of his staff, visited Corps Headquarters for exploratory discussions of the operation and to obtain access to intelligence material then available to Corps. It was learned that Amphibious Group 5 had been tentatively designated to conduct the amphibious operations preliminary to landing the VAC, to include underwater demolition, preliminary bombardment, hydrographic reconnaissance, and minesweeping.

With the arrival at this Headquarters, on 24 June, of a SIXTH Army staff representative, information as to tentative troop-lists, shipping, logistics and the Army scheme of maneuver became available, and it was possible to initiate the basic, if still tentative, tasks of planning. The SIXTH Army scheme of maneuver, insofar as it affected this Corps, entailed landings astride the KAMINOKAWA, on western KYUSHU beaches in the vicinity of IZAKU, by two Marine divisions abreast, with the initial mission of securing a Corps beachhead including SENDAI and then the general line KAGOSHIMA-KAWAKIMICHO-ICHIINO-SENDAI. Subject to unforeseen emergency, it was further planned to commit IX Corps, initially in floating reserve, about four days after initial landings, to secure the southern extremity of the KAGOSHIMA Peninsula, and the airdromes in the KAIMON-DAKE area.

During the last days of June, much thought had been given to the probable requirements of land-mass operations upon

CONFIDENTIAL

an Amphibious Corps which had heretofore operated entirely against limited, if bitterly-defended, island objectives. As an engineering problem, this meant that bridging, stream-crossing and rice-paddy crossing must be taken into consideration. With the Corps deployed on a wide front in rough terrain, rapid, long-range reconnaissance must be continuous; therefore measures were taken to mechanize division reconnaissance companies, until now organized and trained primarily for amphibious reconnaissance. Planning went forward to secure some self-propelled weapons for Corps and division artillery units. Despite the continuing paucity of detailed information as to the objective area and the lack of firm schemes of maneuver, naval gunfire planning progressed to the extent that the basic gunfire communication-plan (which was to survive in modified form even for the occupational landings) had been virtually completed.

On 28 June, after study of the tentative Army scheme of maneuver, the Chief of Staff, accompanied by selected staff officers, proceeded by air to SAN FERNANDO, LUZON, P.I., then the location of Headquarters, SIXTH Army. Enroute, conferences were held at PEARL HARBOR with Fleet Marine Force staff representatives and with Rear Admiral Reifsnider, Commander Amphibious Group 4. Upon arrival in LUZON, tentative echeloning of shipping was set up, the Corps communication-requirements and frequency-plan were discussed, and it was decided to plan for a preferred landing over the KUSHIKINO beaches, rather than astride the KAMINO-KAWA. This tentative plan was immediately referred to the Commanding General by despatch, and was by him concurred in. Close study of this area was immediately initiated at Corps Headquarters on MAUI.

Prior to the return of the Chief of Staff from LUZON, a despatch directive from CINCPAC, received on 30 June, directed the Corps to prepare for a target-date of 1 November. On 4 July, Rear Admiral Reifsnider, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, visited this Headquarters for further preliminary conferences, and, on 5 July, Engineer and Signal representatives of the Corps conferred respectively at PEARL HARBOR with CINCPAC engineer and Fleet Marine Force signal officers relative to stream and paddy-crossing expedients, and to signal supply and AAA communications.

Immediately upon the return to MAUI of the Chief of Staff and his party, on 6 July a meeting of all General and Special Staff Section heads was held, and the Chief of Staff outlined the discussions at SAN FERNANDO and MANILA, issuing additional information and instructions for planning purposes. Decisions were taken as to overall logistics, supply and resupply, as well as the Corps scheme of maneuver. This now firmly entailed landings on the KUSHIKINO beaches with 2d and 3d Marine Divisions abreast, 3d Marine Division on the left initially making the main effort to seize SENDAI and secure the line of the SENDAI-GAMA to the north, while the 2d Marine Division pressed inland to seize KAGOSHIMA. The 5th Marine Division in reserve

CONFIDENTIAL

would preferably be committed in the 2d Marine Division's zone, either to lend fresh impetus to the drive on KAGOSHIMA or to protect the Corps right (south) flank. Corps Artillery was to be divided into two groups, the stronger of which to the north would support the 3d Marine Division.

On 7 July, the Commanding General, accompanied by selected members of General and Special Staff Sections, departed by air for Headquarters, SIXTH Army, conferring enroute at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters, and on SAIPAN with the Commanding General and staff of the 2d Marine Division. The party arrived in LUZON on 11 July (East longitude date) and immediately commenced conferences with the respective commanders and staffs of SIXTH Army and of Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet (in USS ELDORADO, at anchor in MANILA Bay). The first day at SAN FERNANDO was largely devoted to presentation by appropriate SIXTH Army staff-officers, of the complete Army plan for the southern KYUSHU landings, while the second and succeeding days were taken up with individual meetings between the various staff-officers of Corps and Army, as well as with Navy staff-representatives at SAN FERNANDO or MANILA. On 13 July, the Commanding General and party left by air for the MARIANAS, where further conferences were held with the staffs of the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions relative to the LUZON meetings, and, on 17 July, the party returned to HAWAII, where steps were immediately set on foot to implement the decisions of the past week.

In the absence of the Commanding General, however, planning had not slowed, for, on 8 July, the SIXTH Army Tentative Field Order (dated 30 June) had been received, and, on the next day, the first tentative draft of VAC Operation Plan 1-45 was completed. During this week the desirability of obtaining tracked prime-movers for both Corps and division artillery had been under consideration, and a recommendation that this change be made was submitted to Fleet Marine Force Headquarters. Concurrently, artillery conferences were called by the ACofS, G-3, to bring together representatives of VAC Artillery, the 223d FA Gp, and the 477th FA Oban Bn, for joint planning and discussion of policy. The first of these was held on 17 July, and was followed on succeeding days by others.

On 18 July, under the impetus of the information and decisions brought back from LUZON by the Commanding General and his party, planning and staff-conferences progressed throughout the Headquarters. Rear Admiral Wright, of Amphibious Group 5, paid another visit to this Headquarters, again to obtain latest intelligence as well as information as to what had been accomplished during the LUZON conferences.

CONFIDENTIAL

Further conferences (engineer, air, signal, and naval gunfire) were held prior to 23 July, when at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters, the Commanding General and designated General and Special Staff Section heads presented the Corps plan, as then developed, to the commanders of the Fifth Amphibious Force, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and Amphibious Group 4, as well as certain representatives present from the staffs of CINCPAC and FMBSPAC. General discussion ensued, especially relative to the shortage of assault shipping-space available for lift of vehicles in the HAWAIIAN area, and to the possibility of adjusting the tentative target-date some three or four days to meet much more favorable conditions of tide calculated for 4 November.

The remainder of the month was devoted to individual conferences and further planning. A series of weekly newsletters wholly devoted to planning-matters was inaugurated on 28 July, and proved to be of great value. The lack of low-altitude aerial photographic coverage continued, however, to restrict progress in certain aspects of the plan (notably air and naval gunfire) as did the lack of definite information of the character of the landing beaches.

On 2 August, the tide of events was reflected in a CINCPAC despatch directing the Corps to be in a state of readiness by 15 September--or immediately, should JAPAN surrender--the first intimation that such a possibility might impend.

Nevertheless, planning was vigorously pursued and preparations made for presentation of the Corps plan, now well on to completion, to the respective division-commanders and their staffs on 6 August at this Headquarters on NAUI.

The conference of 6 August was attended not only by the division representatives, but by the Commanders, Fifth Amphibious Force, Amphibious Groups 4 and 5, TransRons 12 and 24; and the Commanding General, Corps Artillery, together with SIXTH Army representatives. The conference continued throughout a two-day period, in which not only the Corps, but all division plans were presented, and proved invaluable for the accomplishment of coordination during the so essential planning phase of an operation. Numerous small-group conferences were continued on 7 August emphasizing detailed ship-to-shore movements and control.

On 8 August, just preliminary to completion of Operation Plan-1-45 (and the accompanying Administrative Order 5-45), final conferences were held at PEARL between the Chief of Staff, accompanied by selected staff officers and representatives of Hq, FMB Pac,

CONFIDENTIAL

and Amphibious Group 4. On the following day, both the operation plan and administrative order were issued for the southern KYUSHU landings. And on 10 August, the Imperial Japanese Government sued for peace.

Between 10 and 13 August, although the Corps had been immediately directed by FMF Pac to be ready for movement on short notice, planning for the assault operation continued, while tentative schemes were already being shaped for the adaptation of the plans in hand to those for an unopposed or semi-opposed occupation. On 13 August, at a joint planning conference in PEARL, with the staffs of Fifth Amphibious Force, FMF Pac, VAC and Amphibious Groups 4 and 5 participating, it was determined that the major unfinished elements of the assault landing plan would be brought to completion, but that planning for an occupational landing would be initiated immediately pursuant to a Joint Staff Study which had been prepared for such an eventuality. This decision was ratified on 14 August by despatch instructions from FMF Pac directing this Headquarters to report for planning to SIXTH Army for the occupation of JAPAN.

(4) Plans Issued:

The preferred plan for assault landings (VAC Operation Plan No. 1-45) was issued with limited distribution on 9 August, less Annexes CHARLIE and DCG (Naval Gunfire and Air Support), neither of which could be brought to completion by that date, due to the lack of firm naval and air commitments and the fact that related naval operation plans had not yet been issued. Nevertheless both plans were virtually complete from the troop point of view. Alternate plans for the assault landings were never brought to completion.

c. Planning for the Occupational Landings:

(1) Planning Agencies:

Suspension of the assault operation in favor of occupation brought with it numerous changes of the command structure within which the Corps was operating. The most important of these were: (a) that Fifth Amphibious Force, rather than being charged with landing the VAC only, now was assigned similar responsibility for the entire SIXTH Army; (b) that Amphibious Group 5 no longer participated, the necessity for preliminary bombardment and heavy fire-support having ceased. As a result, Amphibious Group 4 (Rear Admiral Reifsnider) became the sole naval agency directly associated with the V Amphibious Corps, and assumed all responsibilities normal to that role. SIXTH Army remained the next higher echelon, but exercised command over a greatly enlarged zone of responsibility.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Planning Directives:

The basic Corps mission in the occupation of JAPAN was to:

"...land in the NAGASAKI-SASEBO area and rapidly occupy and establish control over the SASEBO area, extending occupation and control to include the NAGASAKI area as troops become available; then by overland and amphibious operations occupy and establish control over the SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA area, prepared for further operations, in order to assist in imposing on the Japanese Armed Forces and civil population those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action."

This mission was derived from SIXTH Army Field Order 75, dated 21 August. Directives which initiated occupational planning operations for the Corps had directed the Corps to be prepared to move on short notice (10 August); ordered the Corps Commander to report to the Commanding General, SIXTH Army for planning purposes for occupational operations (14 August); substituted the V Amphibious Corps for I Corps in the occupational scheme of maneuver (14 August); warned VAC to prepare for occupation of the SASEBO-NAGASAKI area about 4 September (15 August); indefinitely suspended the southern KYUSHU assault operation (16 August); directed the Corps to initiate direct amphibious planning with Amphibious Group 4 (18 August); and finally on 19 August placed VAC under operational control of SIXTH Army. The foregoing directives were subsequently modified to the extent that the 32d Infantry Division was substituted for the 3d Marine Division in the occupational troop-list (7 September), and that the firm date for initial landing in the SASEBO area was to be 22 September.

(3) Planning Narrative:

In the original joint Staff Study for the occupation of JAPAN, the VAC zone of responsibility had included south central HONSHU, but on 14 August, by CINCPAC despatch, this Corps was substituted for I Corps, which had been scheduled to land initially in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI area for eventual occupation of all KYUSHU and the western extremity of HONSHU. Implementation of this decision came the next day in a despatch warning order from SIXTH Army, directing that this Corps prepare to land the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions in SASEBO and NAGASAKI about 4 September; the 5th Marine Division, the warning order added, would be landed in the FUKUOKA-SHIMONOSEKI area at the earliest practicable subsequent date. At the same time official notification

CONFIDENTIAL

was received of Japanese acceptance of the terms of surrender.

First action by this Headquarters was the issuance on 15 August, the same day, of warning orders to all divisions and to Corps Artillery to prepare for combat-loaded occupational landing in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI area with the possibility of appreciable resistance. The 4th Marine Division and 2d Prov AAA Group passed at the same time to operational control of FMF Pac. What little information was at hand indicated that much of the content of the Southern KYUSHU assault landing plans (now suspended by SIXTH Army order) readily lent itself to "reconversion", and as matters turned out, the greater part of the structure of the occupational landing plan represented a series of progressive modifications of the earlier plans. This condition was especially noteworthy in such basic matters as signal task-organization, naval gunfire support (less preliminary fires), and (to some extent) air-support, which, however, found itself confronted with greatly increased utility tasks of a type not ordinarily encountered in combat.

Hardly had the first warning-orders been issued relative to the 5th Marine Division's prospective employment before analysis of the shipping situation dictated a revised priority for this division, and, on 16 August, by SIXTH Army order, the division was alerted for early loading and mounting out. Within the next two days, official confirmation reached this Headquarters that the naval command responsible for movement and landing of the Corps would be Amphibious Group 4, and, on 18 August, when a firm allocation of VAC shipping for the HAWAIIAN area had been received, joint planning was initiated with that staff.

On 19 August, pursuant to orders from Hq, FMF Pac, the VAC reported to SIXTH Army for operational control.

Planning continued in face of an ever-changing troop-list. Shipping initially allocated proved insufficient to lift vehicles in the HAWAIIAN area and thus necessitated leaving a considerable portion of 5th Marine Division transportation behind. Lack of sufficient LSTs dictated the decision at first to defer, and finally, to cancel movement of Corps Artillery and the 2d Provisional AAA Group to JAPAN. For the first time in any operation of this Corps, LVTs were not to be employed (thus permitting release of the 1st Provisional Amphibian Tractor Group).

On 21 August, SIXTH Army approval was received of the scheme of maneuver which, in somewhat modified form, was actually to be executed: occupation of SASEBO by 5th Marine Division; of

CONFIDENTIAL

NAGASAKI by 2d Marine Division; and of FUKUOKA (overland or seaborne movement) by the 3d Marine Division. Three days later, on 24 August, Operation Plan 2-45 (less Annexes) and Administrative Order 6-45, covering the initial occupation of KYUSHU, were issued. It is indicative of the pressures involved that these plans and orders were not issued some three days prior to receipt of SIXTH Army Field Order 7, which was not received at this Headquarters until 27 August. Early issue of the Corps directives was greatly facilitated, however, by the circumstance that a VAC G-3 representative had been at SIXTH Army Headquarters during mid-August, and was able to return to MAUI on 23 August with tentative drafts of the Army directives and with advance information upon which the Corps could safely act.

The balance of August was devoted to conferences on all levels and between all commands and staffs involved; the aim and effect of all of which was to ensure full understanding of the operational directives issued, to disseminate additional information, which of course continued to flow in, and to "shake down" the hastily-modified task-organization and troop-list in the face of daily, sometimes hourly changes. Dissemination of maps and intelligence material went on until the final hours of embarkation, and distribution of all annexes, at least in "firm-tentative" form, was achieved by 1 September, the date on which Corps Headquarters embarked and sailed from MAUI, T.H. in USS MOUNT MCKINLEY (AGC 7).

During the voyage to SAIPAN, planning continued, and, in view of many changes in the original concept of the operation and further additions or deletions to the troop-list, modifications to existing orders and plans were prepared for issue to subordinate units on arrival at SAIPAN. On 5 September, the deletion of the 3d Marine Division (followed, on 7 September, by substitution of the 32d Infantry Division) necessitated still further modification of plans.

In order to ensure that all participating units were fully up to date as to the current status of the plan, and to iron out the numerous last-minute questions which had arisen during the week enroute afloat, a Corps conference was held at SAIPAN on 14 September, aboard the USS MOUNT MCKINLEY, at which the commanders and selected staff officers of the following major organizations attended: VAC, 2d and 5th Marine Divisions 69th AAA Group, Amphibious Group 4 and Trans-Ron 22. After introductory remarks by the Corps Commander and Commander Amphibious Group 4, the Corps plan and general concept of the occupation of KYUSHU and southern HONSHU was outlined. This plan, although full responsive to the possibility of an opposed landing, or at least one in which eventual combat might develop, nevertheless differed considerably from any previously issued by this Corps in three major

CONFIDENTIAL

respects: (a) inclusion of a lengthy annex (NAN) dealing with enforcement and supervision of compliance with the terms of surrender; (b) the mass of civil and political intelligence matter, much of which would require troop-action for enforcement; (c) omission of an artillery annex.

Details of the landings planned for SASEBO and NAGASAKI were then outline, and, in addition, such occupational matters as military government, procurement of Japanese facilities, and disposition of enemy equipment were discussed.

Because the 2d Marine Division had completed loading in a time far exceeding expectations, partly due to early arrival of its shipping and partly due to efficient staging and cargo handling, it was decided to execute the NAGASAKI landing on 23 September only one day later than the 5th Marine Division's landing at SASEBO, instead of three days later, as had been originally contemplated. By now, as well, it was comparatively certain that landings against opposition would not be required; nevertheless detailed plans were complete for accomplishment of initial landings behind naval gunfire and close air-support. More complete information as the location and existence of Japanese minefields likewise prompted the decision to land the 2d Marine Division in the NAGASAKI harbor area, rather than on the TACHIBANA WAN beaches to the east of the city, as had been originally planned.

Further planning conferences were held at SAIFAN on 15 and 16 September, including one with the Chief of Staff of the 32d Infantry Division, who had on 15 September arrived by air from LUZON. A plan for the employment this division had been completed en-route to SAIFAN and was issued at this time. And at dusk on 16 September, seven months after it had cleared the same port for IWO JIMA, VAC sailed from SAIFAN for JAPAN.

(4) Directives Issued:

Although Operation Plan No. 2-45, issued on 24 August, embodied the great mass of information and supporting detail required for execution of the initial occupational landings, it was necessarily based upon early and incomplete information. Thus this plan was modified by successive alternate or supporting plans. The first of these, Operation Plan No. 2-45(A), dated 30 August, took cognizance of the possibility of unopposed landings and peaceful entry into SASEBO and NAGASAKI. Operation Plan No. 3-45, covering preliminary operations by a reinforced battalion from the 5th Marine Division to be

CONFIDENTIAL

despatched into the OMURA-NAGASAKI area in advance of the 2d Marine Division, was issued on 10 September, but was subsequently cancelled. Operation Plan No. 4-45, which covered the FUKUOKA-SHIMONOSEKI phase of Corps occupational operations, was issued on 12 September. The final operation plan (2-45(B)), second alternate, issued by despatch on 17 September, proved to be the one on which initial landings were actually carried out. The naval plans covering amphibious phases of the occupational operation were Operation Plans A411-45 and A412-45 of Amphibious Group 4.

2.

TRAINING:a. General:

Insofar as the occupational operation tested them, the training directives and SOP's of the V Amphibious Corps and Fleet Marine Force Pacific proved adequate in all respects. As of the end of the war, it is considered that this Corps was in the highest state of training and readiness ever attained.

b. Planning Narrative:

On 1 June the divisions had thoroughly rehabilitated from the exhaustion of IWO JIMA, and training had been initiated throughout the Corps under the terms of a Fleet Marine Force directive oriented toward land-mass operations on the mainland of Asia which had been projected for this Corps during May. When the decision was taken to execute the southern KYUSHU landings instead, it was fortunately possible to continue training in hand because of general similarities in the terrain to be encountered and because the most important training objective--that of reorienting all units toward large land-mass, rather than island, operations--remained unchanged. Occupation and defense of limited objectives, aggressive patrolling, river crossing procedures, the technique of night operations, and local defense of rear area units were especially stressed in addition to the subjects normally included in training for amphibious assault. Subject to availability of shipping, it was desired to afford all divisions an opportunity to conduct refresher amphibious training; this was accomplished during July by the 5th Marine Division, all BLT's of which were put through LVT-LST landing exercises. Shipping was tentatively set up for the 3d Marine Division, but the exercises were never completed.

Special emphasis was laid by the Corps in training all components of the supporting arms (Naval Gunfire, Artillery and Air). All NGF elements of the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions

CONFIDENTIAL

were concentrated in OAHU and underwent coordinated refresher training conducted by representatives of this Headquarters and by the Naval Gunfire Section, FMF Pacific. As a result of the lessons of IWO J similar measures were for the first time undertaken with regard to training of air liaison personnel of all divisions, who were brought back first to OAHU and subsequently to MAUI. Division and Corps liaison sections, tactical air observers, and air spotters, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 4, Marine Observation Group One and attached squadrons, and the Corps Air Delivery Section concurrently participated in intensive training periods. Aviation groups which were to participate in the assault and Occupation of JAPAN, were not, however, available for joint training. Standard field tests, arranged in progressive phases so as to cover all aspects of the employment of field artillery, were conducted by the Commanding General, Corps Artillery, for artillery regiments, while each regiment in turn conducted the prescribed battalion and battery tests. One battery of self-propelled 155mm guns was also received by Corps Artillery, and extensive field tests and special training were carried out in GUAM to determine the capabilities and most efficient employment of these new weapons.

Expenditure of two CinCPOA units of fire for all weapons was authorized for training. This proved to be insufficient, primarily due to the lengthy period of time for training. Additional ammunition was requisitioned and was approved except where shortages of particular types existed. VT fuzes were to be used for the first time and a training schedule was set up to indoctrinate troops in the use of this type of fuze. Additional factors which necessitated an increase in training ammunition over and above two (2) units of fire for all organic weapons were:

- (1) Use of LVT(A)(4)'s as artillery.
- (2) Forming of a new Rocket Detachment.
- (3) Experiments with flame throwers for pre-mixed fuel.
- (4) Low amount of 2.36" grenades for rocket launchers, 2.36", (2 per launcher) not sufficient to train a crew of the 2.36" rocket launcher.

Although all divisions executed command-post exercises in training for the southern KYUSHU assault, it was not

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possible to carry out any such exercise on the Corps level, due to the separation of all elements of the Corps. For all VAC units in the HAWAIIAN area, however, the Corps was able to conduct numerous communication-CFX's in which full radio communications were established on all Corps nets normally maintained in combat, and subsequent drills held. Other communication-exercises were carried out, as well, including one type of naval gunfire exercise described as a "firing drill" in which all naval gunfire elements of the Corps deployed in a limited tactical situation, established complete communications, and conducted actual fires from four to six destroyers continually in support.

Corps rehearsals were planned to be held in the MARIANAS (GUAM and Japanese held ROTA) during October, 1945, but were of course never executed.

3. ORGANIZATION:

a. Task Organization of the Corps:

For the task organizations of this Corps as established for the southern KYUSHU assault, as well as for occupational operations see VAC Operation Plans 1-45 and 2-45.

b. Permanent Occupational Task-Organization:

The task-organization which follows represents that presently planned for the Marine division remaining on extended occupational duty in KYUSHU after reduction of forces incident to disbandment of this Corps and of the 5th Marine and 32d Infantry Division. It is included as a matter of record to show the troop-requirements which the experience of this Corps indicates to be necessary under such conditions:

2d Marine Division

1 Corps Evacuation Hospital

1 Bomb Disposal Company

*1 Marine Observation Squadron (Augmented)

1 Naval Construction Battalion (Reinf)

1 Separate Laundry Platoon

CONFIDENTIAL

1 Military Government Group

1 Service Regiment (50% strength)

1 CUB (includes Boat Pool and Repair Unit, Special Construction Battalion Unit, Logistic Supply, Port Director Units) (50% strength)

(*) To be organized on provisional T/O and T/A as a 24-plane squadron.

c. Organization of the G-3 Section:

(a) Officers and duties:

Col. W. W. WENSINGER, USMC
LtCol. J. L. STEWART, USMC
LtCol. S. M. KELLY, USMC

Major R. FULLER, USMCR
Major E. W. CLARKE, USMCR
Major D. MILLER, USMCR

Capt. M. R. GUTHRIE, USMCR

1stLt. M. E. WILCOX, USMCR
1stLt. S. W. WHATLEY, USMC

ACofS, G-3
Executive Officer
Senior Operations Officer
(Training Officer)
Operations Officer
Operations Officer
Operations Officer
(Assistant Training Officer)
Training Aide (rear echelon)
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer

Naval Gunfire Section:

LtCol. R. D. HEINL, JR., USMC
#Major W. H. FIELDS, USMCR

#Lt(jg) E. W. BONN, USNR
#Lt(jg) M. J. SYLVESTER, USNR
Ens. J. K. NAJARIAN, USNR

Naval Gunfire Officer
Assistant Naval Gunfire Officer
Naval Gunfire Assistant
Naval Gunfire Assistant
Naval Gunfire Assistant

Air Section:

Col. J. S. E. YOUNG, USMC
Capt. T. V. BAILEY, USMCR
Capt. H. G. GATLIN, USMCR

Air Officer
Assistant Air Officer
Senior Air Observer

CONFIDENTIAL

Attached Officers:

Capt. R. G. REYNOLDS, USMC

Chemical Officer
(Assistant Operations Officer)

*Major F. O. WOLF, USMCR

Japanese Language Officer
Ship-movements, Repatriation, and Military Government advisor

*LtComdr. J. T. PEIRCE, USNR

- (*) Attached after initiation of occupation.
(#) Detached after initial landings.

As soon as it became apparent that landings and subsequent operations would be unopposed; it was decided not to employ Corps liaison officers as would have been normal in combat. A SIXTH Army liaison officer (a Marine officer attached to the staff of that command) joined this Headquarters in the MARIANAS and remained until completion of initial operations. When the need for naval gunfire and air support was no longer evident, the remaining officers of those sections functioned as operations officers.

It should be added that of the officers listed above, four field and two company officers, (over and above the naval gunfire officers) were either detached to other duties or transferred incident to demobilization, and that in fact the section was faced with a chronic shortage of officers during the bulk of the occupational operations.

From the outset of operations ashore, it became evident that a skilled, senior Japanese language officer would be continually required to deal with the numerous Japanese military, naval, and civil personnel (as well as the regularly-assigned Liaison Officers with whom this Section dealt; such an officer was therefore assigned from the G-2 Language Section, and has served continuously since. As the occupation progressed, this Section assumed many functions which would not ordinarily come within the purview of a G-3 section in combat, such as control of Japanese shipping, supervision of repatriation, control and guarding of seized banks, as well as many others. To meet this additional load, an officer versed in such matters was permanently assigned from the Military Government Section, and has handled these and related functions with marked success.

(b) Enlisted:

1. Chief of Enlisted Section:

1 1stSgt (Section Chief)

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2. Clerical Section:

1 StfSgt	(Assistant Section Chief, Chief Clerk)
1 Sgt	(Stenographer)
1 Sgt	(Worksheet)
3 Corp	(Files and Journal)
2 Corp	(Clerk, general)

3. Drafting Section:

1 StfSgt	(EF)	(Chief Draftsman)
1 Sgt	(EF)	(Draftsman)
2 Corp	(EF)	(Draftsman)

4. General Duty Section:

2 Corp
1 or more Pfc/Pvt

5. Chemical Warfare Section:

1 GySgt

6. Training Aids Section:

(rear echelon)

NOTE: Enlisted communication teams for the Naval Gunfire and Air Support teams were furnished provisionally from the VAC Signal Battalion and LFA SCU-4 respectively.

4. For the detailed sequence of occupational operations, see Appendix 4, G-3 Operations Reports.

5. Operational Comments and Recommendations:

a. The numerous overwater operations conducted by elements of the Corps demonstrated the continuing need of an organization similar to the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion. It is again recommended that such a battalion be reorganized and retained in the postwar organization of the Fleet Marine Force.

b. In view of the unusually heavy communication requirements placed upon an occupying force of Corps size, particularly when widely dispersed over some 18,333 square miles, it is recommended

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that a Marine division on occupational duty be provided with:

(1) A Carrier and Radio Relay Section of one officer and 32 enlisted technicians together with one complete 100 mile spiral four carrier system (AN/TCC-2) and one radio link system (2-AN/TRC-3, 3 AN/TRC-1) and 2 AN-TRA-1.

(2) One heavy construction platoon (T/O G-1130) with T/A allowance of equipment.

c. Although a satisfactory provisional naval gunfire team for this Corps was improvised by attachment of officers from higher headquarters and organization of an enlisted communication team from the Corps Signal Battalion, it is recommended that provision be made in appropriate T/O to meet this important need.

d. Occupational operations on the terrain of JAPAN with its broken country and substandard road-net fully confirm previous recommendations of this Headquarters that tracked prime-movers be obtained for all Corps and division artillery previous to combat on this terrain.

e. A VMO squadron (reinforced to 18 planes) and a provisional utility squadron should be provided for each division and Corps in future similar operations where poor lines of communications, such as in JAPAN, demand their assignment for more efficient execution of missions.

f. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the rapid dissemination of decisions and directives from higher headquarters, even if fragmentary in form, in an unprecedented operation such as this.

g. Although naval echelons cooperated to the fullest extent, the constant change and multiplicity of naval commands in this area somewhat restricted the realization of maximum efficiency.

h. Highly trained bomb disposal personnel are essential attachments in an operation in which disposition activities play such a large part.

i. The use of experienced field officers (empowered to make decisions) in charge of sizeable advance reconnaissance parties, which was the policy established in this Corps, proved highly valuable in occupying new areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

j. In view of the strong opposing trends of reduction and demobilization, it is considered that units of this Corps accomplished their deployment and full occupational commitments as planned in the face of many unusual difficulties and unprecedented situations.

J. L. Stewart

J. L. STEWART,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

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Appendix 1 to Annex DQG to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

NAVAL GUNFIRE REPORT

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0117/162

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

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30 November 1945.

From: The Naval Gunfire Officer.

To : The Commanding General.

Subject: Naval Gunfire Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. INTRODUCTION:

This report covers naval gunfire planning and operations of the V Amphibious Corps prior to and during the occupation of JAPAN. Planning was divided into two stages, one for the assault landings, and the second for occupation. In addition, prior to commencement of assault planning, initial plans and requirements were drafted for the CHINA Coast operation to which the Corps was tentatively committed during May of 1945.

2. PLANNING:

a. Southern KYUSHU Assault Planning:

(1) Planning Agencies: The principal commands associated with this Headquarters in planning and projected execution of naval gunfire support for the southern KYUSHU assaults were as follows:

a. Fifth Amphibious Force (Fifth Attack Force, Vice Admiral Hill), upon which rested overall naval responsibility for the amphibious phases (including gunfire support) of this Corps's landing.

b. Amphibious Group 4 (Fifth Transport Group, Rear Admiral Reifsnider) was to have executed all X-day fires, and, as finally planned, would have rendered all support after the landing, due to the decision that Amphibious Group 5 was to support the IX Corps landings at KAIMON-DAKE.

c. Amphibious Group 5 (Rear Admiral Wright), although designated as Fifth Fire Support Group and, originally intended to control all naval gunfire and air operations in support of the Corps, eventually retained responsibility for execution of preliminary bombardment only, as well as the other naval tasks normal to an advance force. This reduction in the role of Group 5 vis-a-vis VAC arose when a firm decision was made to land the IX Corps about X/4 on the southern tip of the KAGOSHIMA Peninsula, in the KAIMON-DAKE area, thus necessitating the services of an additional amphibious group to execute preliminary bombardment and continue support after the landings.

Appendix 1 to Annex DOG to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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d. The SIXTH Army did not participate in detailed naval gunfire planning and authorized this Headquarters to deal directly with the naval commands concerned.

(2) Planning Narrative: When planning for the southern KYUSHU assault landings was initiated, the wide separation between all staffs and echelons concerned with naval gunfire support rendered joint planning initially impossible. June was accordingly largely devoted to two purposes: preparation of a detailed Corps plan (less actual frequencies and certain other data) for naval gunfire communications; and determination of personnel and materiel requirements for the Corps naval gunfire team, for which adequate T/O and T/A allowance had never been made. On 16 June, both matters were discussed at length with the Naval Gunfire Officer, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, upon whom would fall the responsibility of providing all the officer-assistants needed for Corps team. The Corps Signal Officer had already signified his readiness to make the required enlisted communication personnel provisionally available from the Signal Battalion, VAC.

On 7 July, in company with other members of the Corps staff, the Naval Gunfire Officer proceeded to Headquarters, SIXTH Army, for operational briefing and conferences at that Headquarters and with the staff gunnery and communications officers, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, then present at MANILA. It was then learned that SIXTH Army, which had no Naval Gunfire Section, intended to authorize direct planning and operational relationships between this Corps and naval agencies which would render gunfire support.

It also became apparent that the allocation of MHF frequencies (TBX range) for control and conduct of naval gunfire would, as then projected, be entirely inadequate, being somewhat less than half the total number available during the IWO JIMA operation. Discussions were accordingly initiated with the Corps and Army Signal Officers as to the feasibility of "borrowing" suitable MHF frequencies from those temporarily unused by troop units in reserve. Agreement was reached that an arrangement would be established within the Corps whereby the minimum frequency-needs of naval gunfire support would be met in this way as follows:

NGF Control and Overload
SFC Spotting

2
12

TOTAL NGF (minimum for one Corps) 14

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Because of the acute shortage of TBX-range frequencies; and because all regimental naval gunfire liaison teams were now equipped with TCS radios, it was decided that the overload frequency would be chosen from the TCS-range (1500-12,000 kcs.) rather than the more constricted TBX-range. This selection would permit any station or party normally in the NGF Control Net to enter the overload. It was agreed that SCR-300 frequencies of the 5th Marine Division (while in reserve afloat) would be available at least until N+4 hours for intra-team use by SFCP of assault battalions, which would operate as necessary from offshore LVTs. In other than communication matters considerable detailed information not previously known was obtained, and draft plans and annexes of higher authority, including the tentative fire-support sectors laid out by ComPhibsPac were provided. Enroute to and from the PHILIPPINES, the Corps gunfire plan; insofar as it had progressed, was discussed with the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions, both in the MARIANAS.

On 18 July, after the Naval Gunfire Officer's return to MAUI, detailed planning of fires commenced in conjunction with staff gunnery officers of Amphibious Groups 4 and 5. Plans for the final rehearsal in the MARIANAS (with Japanese-held ROTA as the impact area) were initiated. Fire-support sectors were checked and with minor exceptions concurred in. A rough plan for ship-placement during X-day was agreed upon, and became the basis for all subsequent X-day layouts of ships and fires. As of this date, it appeared that the following ships would support the Corps during initial landings:

4 OBB
3 CA
4 CL
11 DD

(Probable gunboat assignment included 6 LSM(R)(2)s, 12 LCI(G)s, 12 LCI(M)s, 12 LCS(L)s, and 6 LCI(R)s).

From 23 to 25 July, a series of joint conferences was held at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters, with the gunfire officers of all three divisions, the Gunnery Officer of Amphibious Group 4, and the Naval Gunfire Officer, FMF Pac. The purposes of these conferences were (1) to acquaint division representatives with the plan for X-Day fires, and to secure their comment thereon; (2) to discuss the final training and rehearsals of naval gunfire elements of the Corps; (3) to continue, with assistance from the division officers, the detailed plan for X-Day.

The plan of fires for X-Day called for:

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) A general intensification of beach bombardment scheduled commencing at dawn; a lift of fires from N-55 to N-35 while, under cover of a massive air-strike, ships took station for prelanding fires.

(2) Landing behind a 5"-38 rolling barrage calculated upon the following assumptions: (a) MPI to remain 400 yards ahead of troops (b) rate of advance of LVT, 150 yards per minute (c) rate of troop-advance 100 yards/12 minutes (d) 20 minutes of troop-reorganization on beaches within an area 200-400 yards in depth, prior to commencement of advance inland.

The foregoing assumptions represented the consensus of all divisions, and were based upon experience with similar fires at IWO JIMA.

From 7-11 August, following receipt of firm advance drafts of the Fifth Attack Force operation plan, intensive detailed planning went forward at headquarters ashore of Amphibious Group 5 (PEARL HARBOR). Although satisfactory low-altitude aerial photographic coverage of the target-area had not yet been obtained, the existence of enemy defenses began to be verified, and it was possible to "stake out" preliminary bombardment schedules and establish relative priorities among known targets. On 8 August, the rehearsal plan for ROTA was agreed upon: SFOP (together with corresponding ALP's) would be embarked tactically divided among LCI's, establish communications and conduct fires against ROTA from these offshore observation posts. These and similar exercises were to be conducted for a period of five days (12-17 October), by all fire-support ships and troop naval gun-fire personnel. On 9 August plotting and timing of the N-hour rolling barrages was commenced aboard the USS PANAMINT (AGC 13), then flagship of Amphibious Group 4. Much thought was devoted to the full exploitation of rocket and mortar fires which would be available on X-Day. Conversion of this plan into detailed schedules for ships participating (the next step in preparation of such plans) had not been undertaken. On 10 August, further planning was interrupted by news that the Imperial Japanese Government had sued for peace, and, although some detailed projects then in hand were brought to completion, active gunfire planning for the southern KYUSHU landings was never resumed.

b. Planning for the Occupational Landings:

On 13 August, and subsequently on 23 August, the Naval Gunfire Officer conferred with staff gunnery representatives of Fifth Amphibious Force and of Amphibious Group 4, the latter being now the sole command responsible for provision of fire-support for this Corps during the occupation of JAPAN. As a result of these

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meetings, it was possible to salvage for appropriate modification much of the naval gunfire annex then in draft form for the southern KYUSHU assault. Because the assault frequency-assignments remained unchanged, the communication-plan survived virtually intact. On 25 and 26 August, final conferences were held at PEARL HARBOR with Group 4 representatives relative to the following matters: availability of VOF aircraft during occupational landings, decision to maintain the NGF Overload circuit, as had been planned for the assault landing decision to employ CSP 2156-C (the new Shore Fire Control Code then just being issued), efforts to secure LSM(R)(2)s for support of occupational landings, and final reconciliation of this Corps' naval gunfire annex with the gunnery annex of Amphibious Group 4. On 27 August, the Corps Naval Gunfire Annex (Annex CHARLIE to VAC Operation Plan 2-45) was issued, and by 1 September, all naval gunfire elements of the Corps had embarked in assigned shipping.

Enroute to the target-area, further planning and modification of plans was necessitated to meet changes in available fire-support ships and in support gunboats (the firm allocation of which was not known until arrival in SAIPAN, on 13 September). The major decision reached during this period was that relative to the procedure which would be followed during landings to require positive clearance of any fire-mission by the senior commander afloat, and yet enable fires required for troop-support to be delivered with minimum delay. This technique, which is considered to be of future value in semi-opposed or possible-opposed landings, consisted in establishment of an open radio net (the NGF Overload) of which the sole use, during initial landings would be clearance of fire-missions. SFCP were authorized to call for fires in the normal manner; and ships in support, while setting up problems on their computers, would report the call for fire via the open net to the OTC, who would then approve or deny the mission. Similar measures were planned for clearance of close-supporting fires by gunboat-types, in which it was also planned to embark troop-representatives (replacement NGF spotters and NLOs) to check missions for safety and assist gunboat unit-commanders in target designation.

In view of the fact that no opposition actually developed, omission to provide VOF air-spot services, as well as unavailability of LSM(R)(2)s or LCI(M)s, worked no actual harm. Nevertheless, it is considered that the absence of these two important elements from the naval gunfire support, despite the fact that they had been requested, greatly weakened the occupational plan. Had even sporadic resistance developed, VOF planes would have been invaluable for maintaining large areas under aggressive observation, while the rugged terrain of JAPAN would have rendered high-trajectory gunboat-fires not only valuable but essential.

CONFIDENTIAL3. ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING:a. Organization:

Organization of the naval gunfire elements of the Corps was substantially that which prevailed on IWO JIMA (now established in the "G" series T/O), with the exception of the Corps Naval gunfire team, for which T/O provision has never been made. Based on previous combat-experience, on analysis of the communications involved, and on the proposed distribution of Corps Headquarters afloat for the southern KYUSHU assault landings, it was determined that the following personnel would be required for the Corps team:

- Naval Gunfire Officer (LtCol, USMC) - 1
- Assistant Naval Gunfire Officer (Major, USMC) (1115) - 1
- *Naval Gunfire Assistants (Lt (jg) or Ens) - 4
- Enlisted Team Chief (S/Sgt) (783) - 1
- #Radio Supervisor (Sgt) (783) - 1
- #Radio Supervisor (Corp) (783) - 2
- Radio Operators (Pfc/Pvt (776) - 11

(*) One officer for coordination and planning of daily airspotting services.

(#) Act as senior operators for each watch.

Although not specifically provided by present T/O, enlisted personnel as listed were obtained from the Corps Signal Battalion; the officer-requirements were met by Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, which temporarily attached all officers required. The following echeloning of the naval gunfire section was planned during preliminary bombardment and movement to the target:

(1) Aboard the USS BLUE RIDGE (AGC 2), flagship of the advance fire-support group conducting preliminary bombardment, would be the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer with one Navy assistant from the Corps team, as well as the Naval Gunfire Officer of the 5th Marine Division (the reserve division). This employment of the reserve division gunfire officer during preliminary bombardment had been instituted with marked success at IWO JIMA in order to provide the Corps gunfire officer with an additional skilled assistant and to enable the division representative to be fully in touch with the naval gunfire situation prior to landing with his division.

(2) Aboard the USS AUBURN (AGC 10), with the Corps Commander, would be the Assistant Naval Gunfire Officer and two Navy assistants. This echelon would proceed to the target with the Corps Headquarters and establish necessary X-day nets and communications in

CONFIDENTIAL

company with the Attack Force gunnery staff.

(3) Aboard the USS PANAMINT (AGC 13), with the alternate Corps staff, would be one Navy assistant especially briefed in the X-day plan of fires, in case of a casualty to the AUBURN.

On the day of initial landing, the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer and the 5th Marine Division Naval Gunfire Officer would transfer in the transport area to the ship in which the Corps Commander was embarked, and would conduct the X-Day fires under direct supervision of the Commanding General, as had been done at IWO JIMA. The above organization was inapplicable, however, to the occupational landings, and personnel were distributed throughout available shipping, to be reassembled aboard the flagship of Amphibious Group 4 on the morning of A-Day.

b. Training:

Naval gunfire training for the southern KYUSHU assault embraced the following measures:

(1) Return of naval gunfire personnel from 2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions to temporary duty for refresher training and regrouping with the Naval Gunfire Section, FMF Pac, during May-July, 1945, as had been done after previous operations. In view of the extensive facilities required for effective naval gunfire training (ships, communication-installations, bombardment ranges, etc.), this method of coordinated training is considered to have been in large measure responsible for the high combat-efficiency of gunfire personnel within this Corps. Officers received training in naval gunnery, communications and conduct of fire (on the Shore Bombardment Range at KAHOOLAWE Island), while enlisted personnel were given applicable drills and instruction in communications and technique of fire.

(2) Two (2) firing CPXs to include all naval gunfire personnel of a two-division corps, with 4-6 DD delivering actual fires in a simulated tactical situation, were conducted on KAHOOLAWE Island between 31 May and 3 June (3d, 4th and 5th ASCOs) and between 7 and 10 July (4th and 5th ASCOs). 2d ASCO personnel were unable to participate in exercises above division level. This type of exercise, in which several thousand rounds of 5" ammunition was fired, and full tactical communications established and maintained, is considered the best overall training short of actual battle which can be imparted to gunfire personnel.

(3) Special emphasis in techniques which the nature of the operation would render important, such as: radio operation under conditions of maximum difficulty, sudden frequency-shifts; technique.

CONFIDENTIAL

of rapid, long-distance overland displacement; local security, judgment of masks, clearance and trajectories in broken, wooded terrain; use of VT fuze; checkouts in SCR-694 radio-sets (which it was anticipated would be available in lieu of TBX-8 radios), and full employment of gunboat-types.

4. NARRATIVE OF OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS:

a. Since landings at SASEBO and NAGASAKI were unopposed, naval gunfire support was not required, although all stations were manned, full tactical communications established, and fire-support ships (several DD and one CA) remained in readiness to fire. During the NAGASAKI landing, a special naval gunfire control-party containing representatives of the Corps and of Amphibious Group 4, reported aboard the USS CAMBRIA (APA 36) flag of TransRon 12, since that staff was not organized to direct naval gunfire support.

b. As soon as it was apparent that the occupation was to be without opposition, further requirement for naval gunfire support, as for artillery and air, disappeared. Navy and Marine officers and enlisted men, much needed for the manifold extra duties of occupation, were dispersed to such duties as procurement, disposition, billeting, and communications, in which they now remain.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. During these operations, naval gunfire support was retained under the G-3 section on the General Staff, rather than in the Corps Artillery Staff as provided by T/O. This organization, which has been employed in this Headquarters ever since the inception of troop naval gunfire support in combat, permits the Commanding General and G-3 full access to the Naval Gunfire Officer during planning, and, during operations, stations him in the Corps CP, rather than in the Corps Artillery FDC, from which he cannot as effectively control support. It is strongly recommended that present T/O be modified to recognize this fact, and place naval gunfire, like close air support, under the G-3 section. It is further recommended that T/O G-1100 (Signal Battalion, Amphibious Corps) be modified to include a Corps naval gunfire communication team in each Corps Signal Battalion, and that the officers required be added to T/O G-1011 (Corps Headquarters) as a part of the G-3 section.

b. In view of probable Marine Corps participation in future landings in which the extent of possible resistance is not known, it is recommended that the technique for command-clearance of naval fire-missions as outlined in para. 2.b., be incorporated in present doctrines for use under appropriate circumstances.

CONFIDENTIAL

c. It is recommended that an overall training program for naval gunfire personnel be initiated as soon as possible in order that the high degree of skill developed within the Fleet Marine Force in this respect may be carried over from war to peace.

d. One of the most serious handicaps imposed upon joint planning by the distances involved was that it was impossible to consult daily with the naval staffs concerned, as has always been the past practice of this Headquarters. As a result, higher-echelon naval gunnery annexes for the assault operation were issued without having been entirely shaped to troop-requirements and containing provisions and restrictions which in some instances countered established doctrines of this Corps or of the Fleet Marine Force. It is considered to be of utmost importance that naval gunfire support be planned in headquarters which are physically juxtaposed so that planning-liaison between echelons and commands is continual.

e. In preparation for assault operations, experiments were conducted with an LVT radio-equipped to serve as an advance echelon for the Corps naval gunfire team. This LVT was equipped with two TCS radios, two SCR-300s, an SCR-624, and an RCB, and would have provided a mobile naval gunfire radio-central during ship-to-shore displacement of the forward echelon of the Corps team, as well as for subsequent displacement ashore. Principal difficulties encountered were shielding the radio equipment, making provision for din-proof operation, and blacking-out for night work. It is considered that this LVT would have greatly increased the efficiency, flexibility, and continuity of naval gunfire communications, and it is strongly recommended: (1) that further experiment be undertaken to adapt or modify LVTs for this purpose for each Corps, and possibly each division naval gunfire team. (2) To incorporate such vehicles in Corps signal battalion and division ASCO T/A.

f. The importance of an overload frequency for naval gunfire control, initially demonstrated on IWO JIMA, was confirmed during this operation. Availability of such a frequency confers immeasurable flexibility upon all operations. In view of the fact that regimental liaison teams now have TCS radios, there would appear to be no reason why both the Naval Gunfire Control and Overload Frequencies cannot in the future be chosen from the much broader TCS rather than the limited TBX range.

g. Although the "G" Series T/O embody, for the first time, battle-tested, workable organizations for the respective shore fire control and naval gunfire liaison parties, it is considered that T/O G-88 (Assault Signal Company) could be improved in two

CONFIDENTIAL

respects: (1) By substitution of radio operators (776) for telephone linemen (641) wherever occurring in regimental teams and in the division team, because on echelons above battalion, naval gunfire wire communications are conducted over tactical lines; further, if telephone linemen are included in parties of the size now provided, the number of radiomen is insufficient. (2) Although the present strength of all teams is adequate for relatively short operations, the strain of prolonged combat would render these strengths inadequate; it is therefore recommended that in future T/O, the spotter-team and battalion naval liaison team be increased by one radioman each; that the regimental and division teams be increased by two radiomen each.

h. During the planning for the southern KYUSHU assault, authority was obtained by this Headquarters, based on experience of previous operations, to equip each regimental naval gunfire liaison team with an MZ vehicular radio (TCS-jeep), and arrangements were also made to obtain, through Army supply channels, SCR-694 radios in lieu of TBX sets now authorized. It is strongly recommended that the MZ vehicles be incorporated in ASCO T/A, and, as previously recommended by this Corps, that SCR-694 sets be made standard in lieu of TBX.

R. D. HEINL, JR.
R. D. HEINL, JR.

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Naval Gunfire Officer.