

Appendix 3 to Annex EASY

to VAC Operations Report

Occupation of JAPAN

MEDICAL REPORT

ENCLOSURE (C)

0187/189

OFFICE OF THE CORPS SURGEON,
HEADQUARTERS,
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO.

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30 November 1945.

From: The Corps Surgeon.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Medical Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.
Enclosure: (A) Embarkation Chart - Corps Medical Units.

1. PLANNING PHASE:

a. Medical planning for the occupation of JAPAN actually began on 1 June 1945 with planning for the assault of the Japanese Home Islands in SOUTHERN KYUSHU. Since the plans for the occupation of JAPAN developed from those set-up for the assault it is not possible to separate the stages in the planning. Operational and Administrative Plans for the assault were developed up until the actual surrender of JAPAN.

b. In preparation for the operation, numerous conferences were held with the medical representatives of the following commands:

- (1) FMF Pacific
- (2) Fifth Amphibious Corps
- (3) Attack Force
- (4) Amphibious Group 4
- (5) Sixth Army
- (6) 2nd Marine Division
- (7) 5th Marine Division

c. Conferences were also held with the Commanding Officers of the following units attached or assigned to the V Amphibious Corps for the operation:

- (1) V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion
- (2) Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1

d. Contact with the numerous Army augmentation units was through liaison officers at SIXTH ARMY Headquarters in LUZON, until the units arrived at the target area. This

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contact was unsatisfactory in all respects. While SIXTH ARMY assumed responsibility for staging and mounting out all Army units attached to the V Amphibious Corps, many medical problems, both tactical and logistical, were unsolved due to total lack of personal contact with these units.

e. During the planning phase for the assault on JAPAN numerous directives in the form of memoranda were prepared and forwarded to all medical units on the Troop List for that operation. These memoranda were designated to smooth out administrative difficulties which attend the handling of Navy and Marine casualties in Army hospitals and the treatment of Army personnel in Navy installations. Reports and returns, evacuation supply within the target area, clinical records, etc, were covered in these memoranda. With the surrender of JAPAN, the Troop List of Medical Units was cancelled and for a period of time the only hospital units that appeared available to the V Amphibious Corps were two (2) Corps Evacuation Hospitals and the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion. When the new Troop List was received it contained only three of the original units in a total of thirty-four (34) Army Medical Units assigned. Thus the occupation operation was begun with no contact of any nature between the Surgeon's Office and ninety percent of the medical units involved in the operation.

f. The plans for the occupation called for a minimum of 6 percent beds based on the troop strength in the V Amphibious Corps Zone.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. The organization of each of the two reinforced Marine Divisions and the one Army Division included their normal complement of attached medical troops plus one medical battalion per division. In addition, the V Amphibious Corps Occupation Force was to be supported by the following medical units:

- (1) VAC Medical Battalion (H&S and three (3) medical companies)
- (2) Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 (600)
- (3) Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3 (600)
- (4) Hq. & Hq. Det., 135th Medical Battalion,
(Sep)
- (5) Co. "B" 264th Medical Battalion

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- (6) Co. "C" 264th Medical Battalion
- (7) 692nd Medical Ambulance Company
- (8) 73rd Field Hospital (400)
- (9) 92nd Field Hospital (400)
- (10) 25th Evacuation Hospital (750)
- (11) 721st Medical Sanitary Company
- (12) 712th Medical Sanitary Company
- (13) 118th Station Hospital (500)
- (14) 123rd Station Hospital (250)
- (15) 122nd Station Hospital (500)
- (16) 13th General Hospital (1000)
- (17) 309th General Hospital (1000)
- (18) 47th General Hospital (1000)
- (19) 5th Army Medical Laboratory
- (20) 11th General Dispensary (Type 2)
- (21) 98th Veterinary Food Inspection Team
- (22) 108th Veterinary Food Inspection Team
- (23) 466th Dental Prosthetic Team
- (24) 556th Optical Repair Team
- (25) 62nd Medical Base Depot Company
- (26) 24th Malaria Survey Detachment
- (27) 201st Malaria Survey Detachment
- (28) 203rd Malaria Survey Detachment
- (29) 415th Malaria Survey Detachment
- (30) 36th Malaria Control Detachment
- (31) 74th Malaria Control Detachment
- (32) 75th Malaria Control Detachment
- (33) 76th Malaria Control Detachment
- (34) 83rd Malaria Control Detachment
- (35) 94th Malaria Control Detachment
- (36) 95th Malaria Control Detachment

These units were designated as the Provisional Medical Group under the command of the Corps Surgeon.

b. There was a strong possibility of armed resistance to the initial landings of the Occupation Force with its attendant casualties. For the handling of casualties, should such resistance materialize, AFA 30 (THOMAS JEFFERSON) was set up as a Casualty Receiving Ship and LSV 4 (SAUGUS) designated as a Casualty Evacuation Ship. In addition all APAs were prepared to receive casualties directly from the beaches.

3. EMBARKATION:

a. Embarkation of units of the Provisional Medical Group began on 22 August 1945 when the first serial of the VAC

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Medical Battalion boarded the AKA 39 (SAIETA) at MAUI. Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 loaded out from HAWAII in the AKA 41 (SELINUR) and Headquarters Provisional Group loaded out from MAUI in the LSV 4 (SAUGUS) and the Corps Surgeon in the AGC 7 (McKINLEY). These were the only Corps Medical Units scheduled to arrive at the target on A-day. Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3 loaded out of GUAM on LST 817 and was scheduled to arrive in the target area on A / 5. Hq. and Hq. Det, 135th Medical Battalion, (Sep) loaded out in the APA 132 (BARNWELL) from LUZON and was scheduled to arrive in the target area on A / 4. All other Corps Medical Units were to be transported in turn-around shipping. For details of embarkation, loading, arrival date in target area of all medical units, see Embarkation Chart (Enclosure A).

4. ENROUTE TO TARGET AREA:

a. All ships carrying 5th Marine Division and Corps Troops sailed in convoy from the HAWAIIAN Area and arrived at SAIPAN on 13 September 1945. Medical Plans were revised and integrated with military plans by conferences with various staff sections and by discussions between the Corps Surgeon and the Surgeon of Amphibious Group Force.

b. On 16 September 1945, an Advance Reconnaissance Party, including an officer from Headquarters Provisional Medical Group, departed for SASEBO in an APD. This party was to make a study of the target area prior to the arrival of the Occupation Force. The information obtained by the medical representative in this party proved very valuable in locating hospital installations ashore and in preparing to combat the poor sanitary conditions found in the target area.

c. The convoy sailed from SAIPAN on 17 September and arrived in the target area on 22 September 1945.

5. LANDING AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDICAL UNITS:

a. A-day was 22 September 1945 and at 0845 the 5th Marine Division Units began their landings at SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN. On 23 September 1945 the 2nd Marine Division began landing at NAGASAKI, KYUSHU, JAPAN.

b. During the initial stages, the medical services

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were those of the divisions. No casualties resulted throughout the entire landings.

c. Headquarters of the Corps Surgeon opened ashore on 23 September 1945.

d. On 24 September, Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 landed at SASEBO and opened at the Japanese Naval Arts Training School and on 28 September the first patients were received.

e. On 25 September the VAC Medical Battalion landed at SASEBO and was installed in the former SASEBO Naval Hospital. On 27 September the first patients were received by this unit.

f. On 30 September Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3 began landing in support of the 2nd Marine Division at NAGASAKI and moved to ISAHAYA where it was installed in the Naval Hospital. On 3 October this unit began receiving patients.

g. On 30 September the vehicles, supplies and equipment with a small personnel detachment of the 122nd Station Hospital arrived and unloaded at SASEBO. This unit staged at OKINAWA. On 8 October the remainder of the officers and men of this unit arrived at SASEBO, with the nurses of the hospital arriving by airplane on 22 October. On 16 October, the 122nd Station Hospital began its movement via motor and rail to KOKURA, NORTHERN KYUSHU and were temporarily established in a portion of the KOKURA Army Hospital. On 31 October this unit moved into MOJI occupying the Mitsui Building, Yusan Building and a portion of the Customs Building.

h. On 16 October APA 103 arrived at SASEBO from LUZON carrying the 25th Evacuation Hospital, 92nd Field Hospital, officers and men of the 123rd Station Hospital (without supplies and equipment), 108th Veterinary Food Inspection Team, 5th Army Medical Laboratory and 62nd Medical Base Depot Company less the bulk of medical supplies, 20 days supply for 75,000 men, which was to accompany this unit. The supplies and equipment of the above units arrived in such scrambled condition that it was necessary to unload everything into a central dump and spend the better part of a week sorting and segregating the supplies and equipment of the various units. No unit had a cargo manifest or a Unit Personnel and Tonnage Table.

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i. On 20 October LST 952 arrived at SASEBO from LUZON with vehicles and small personnel detachments of 5th Army Medical Laboratory, 108th Veterinary Food Inspection Team, 74th, 75th, 76th, and 83rd Malaria Control Detachments, 92nd Field Hospital, 556th Optical Repair Team and the 62nd Medical Base Depot Company. The 74th and 75th Malaria Control Detachments unloaded and proceed to FUKUOKA on 22 October reporting to control of Commanding General, 32nd Division, to be followed on 23 October by the 76th and 83rd Malaria Control Detachments which reported to the Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force. The 108th Veterinary Food Inspection Team was assigned to the 8th Service Regiment on 23 October. The 62nd Medical Base Depot Company was assigned to the 8th Service Regiment and together with the Medical Supply Section of that organization set up a Medical Supply Depot in a large warehouse on the grounds of the former SASEBO Naval Hospital. This unit began at once to receive large quantities of medical supplies coming into SASEBO in resupply shipping, and prepared to support all Corps Medical Units. The 92nd Field Hospital unloaded and was billeted at SASEBO at the Naval Arts Training School.

j. On 25 October the 123th Station Hospital (less nurses) with 5th Army Medical Laboratory and the 25th Evacuation Hospital departed for FUKUOKA and KOKURA respectively, reporting to Commanding General, FUKUOKA Occupation Force. The 123rd Station Hospital occupied the Postal Savings Bank Building at FUKUOKA. Having no equipment or supplies, except limited house-keeping gear, this unit set up housekeeping for its own personnel plus the nurses of the 25th Evacuation Hospital, the 122nd Station Hospital and 118th Station Hospital and later the nurse component of the 13th General Hospital. The 25th Evacuation Hospital occupied the Tamoya Building in KOKURA.

k. In the meanwhile, Company "B" 264th Medical Battalion, Company "C" 264th Medical Battalion, 712th Medical Sanitary Company, 721st Medical Sanitary Company and the 36th Malaria Control Detachment arrived at SASEBO in APA 58 and AKA 73 on 25 October and two days later began unloading. Cos. "B" and "C" 264th Medical Battalion moved by motor and rail to OMURA to establish an Air Holding Station and to support elements of the 2nd Marine Division. On 30 October, 712th Medical Sanitary Company and 721st Medical Sanitary Company moved by motor and rail to FUKUOKA reporting to Commanding General, 32nd Division

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and Commanding General, FUKUOKA Base Command respectively. The 36th Malaria Control Detachment moved via motor on 29 October and reported to Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division.

l. On 26 October, the 73rd Field Hospital arrived in SASEBO from LUZON on LST 916 and on 28 October its advance detachment moved via motor to KUMOMOTO, to be followed by the remainder of the unit via motor and rail on 30 October and 2 November. This unit reported to Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division for support of that division.

m. On 27 October, APA 97 and AKA 15 arrived at SASEBO from LUZON with 13th General Hospital, 692nd Ambulance Company, 415th, 201st, 203rd, and 24th Malaria Survey Detachments; 98th Veterinary Food Inspection Team; 11th General Dispensary less equipment and supplies, 466th Dental Prosthetic Team, 94th and 95th Malaria Control Detachments. Supplies and equipment were unloaded and on 29 October, 30 officers and 95 nurses of the 13th General Hospital were moved to FUKUOKA for billeting with the 123rd Station Hospital in the Postal Savings Bank Building. The 692nd Ambulance Company was billeted at SASEBO to await deactivation inasmuch as there was no need for this unit's services. The 94th Malaria Control Detachment and 415th Malaria Survey Detachment moved via motor on 30 October to NAGASAKI and were assigned to 2nd Marine Division. On the same date, the 95th Malaria Control Detachment and 203rd Malaria Survey Detachment were assigned to the 5th Marine Division at SASEBO. On 31 October 201st and 24th Malaria Survey Detachments departed via motor for FUKUOKA for assignment to 32nd Division and FUKUOKA Base Command respectively. The 98th Veterinary Food Inspection Team moved via motor to FUKUOKA on 2 November reporting to Commanding General, FUKUOKA Base Command. On 3 November, the 466th Dental Prosthetic Team was installed with Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at SASEBO.

n. On 31 October, the APA 168 arrived at SASEBO carrying the personnel of the 309th General Hospital less all supplies and equipment which had been left at TINIAN where this unit staged, and on 1 November, LSMs 103, 253, 112, and 122 arrived at SASEBO with 6 officers and 121 enlisted men and unit gear of the 118th Station Hospital. The nurses of this unit had arrived in the area via air on 22 October. The remainder of the personnel, 23 officers and 9 enlisted men were left at OKINAWA.

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o. On 29 October, on recommendation VAC Headquarters SIXTH ARMY Headquarters diverted the 47th General Hospital, then enroute to SASEBO from LUZON, and cancelled its assignment to the V Amphibious Corps. This was followed on 4 November by approval of VAC plans for utilization of hospitals in this area. The 309th General Hospital to be installed in the Postal Savings Bank Building at FUKUOKA, the 122nd Station Hospital to remain in operation in the Mitsui Building at MOJI, the 92nd Field Hospital to be installed in the SASEBO Naval Arts Training School upon departure from the area of Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 about 15 November 1945, the 118th Station Hospital to be installed in the SASEBO Naval Hospital upon the departure of the VAC Medical Battalion in December 1945. The 25th Evacuation Hospital, 13th General Hospital and the 123rd Station Hospital were scheduled for early deactivation. It was decided to house the latter three units in the Tamaya Building in KOKURA pending this deactivation. In keeping with the above plan, the 13th General Hospital departed via motor and rail on 5 November for KOKURA. The 118th Station Hospital began unloading on 5 November and were billeted with the 692nd Ambulance Company at SASEBO pending its installation in the SASEBO Naval Hospital.

6. EVACUATION:

a. No casualties were incurred during the landings either in the SASEBO or NAGASAKI Area.

b. Beginning on 27 September the Corps Surgeon assumed responsibility for evacuation and hospitalization within the V Amphibious Corps Zone of responsibility and for evacuation from the island of KYUSHU. The Headquarters Detachment, 135th Medical Battalion furnished the necessary officers and enlisted personnel to carry on this evacuation and their work was efficiently and smoothly handled throughout. Evacuation from KYUSHU was by air and water. Two railroad cars were converted into hospital cars, one a ward car capable of carrying 24 bed patients and the other was equipped with an emergency operating room and with a ward for 12 patients. These cars were invaluable in supporting the move of the advance echelon of the 32nd Division into the SHIMONOSKI-YOMOGUCHI Area of HONSHU where no other medical facilities were available. These cars were later used for the evacuation of patients from

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NORTHERN KYUSHU to SASEBO prior to establishment of hospitals in that area and for the movement of patients to SASEBO for evacuation off KYUSHU.

7. HOSPITALIZATION:

a. The total number of beds set up in the Troops List was 7,430. This was approximately 8 percent beds for the proposed troop strength of 96,000 in the V Amphibious Corps Area.

b. It was originally planned to set up 6 percent fixed beds in the area, but it was preceived early in the operation that this figure was excessive. For the first six weeks of the occupation, the total number of sick in hospitals throughout the area approximated 1 percent of the troop strength.

c. With the early installation of Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1, Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3, and the V Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion, there was at no time any threatened bed shortage. At no time was any one of these three installations filled to 50 percent of its capacity.

8. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT:

a. All units arrived at the target with a 30 day level of medical supplies.

b. Equipment and supplies were totally adequate in quality and quantity.

c. The 62nd Medical Base Depot Company arrived on the target with 20 days supply for 75,000 men. This was followed by resupply block shipments so that by the end of the first six weeks a total of 921 long tons of medical supplies and equipment had arrived in the area. These block shipments contained a large proportion of combat supplies and as a result there was a great amount of certain types of material accumulated that was of no value. This included over 2,000 litters, large quantities of battle dressings, plywood splints, blood plasma, saline and gluco-saline solutions and many other items for which there was

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little or no demand. This overburdened the Base Depot Company with its small personnel as well as needlessly filling-up limited storage facilities.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS:

a. The estimate of bed capacity for the occupation was excessive in the beginning. When this excess became more apparent many of the medical units on the Troop List could well have been cancelled. In spite of recommendations, to this effect, all units originally assigned were transported to the area.

b. Loading of almost all Army augmentation medical units was badly planned and carried out. Cargo was loaded into shipping in a haphazard manner and badly scrambled. No cargo manifests or unit personnel and tonnage tables were made up. It was seldom that a unit arrived at the target with any knowledge of the tonnage or cube of its organizational cargo.

c. Personnel of units were needlessly scattered among numerous vessels and in many cases arrived in the area in small detachments and on widely separated dates. Seldom was the arrival date of a unit known prior to the arrival in port, making any plans for its reception, unloading, and movement impossible.

d. On one occasion a group of nurses arrived in the area via air transport without any previous announcement and prior to the arrival of any part of the hospital to which they were attached.

e. Upon arrival at the target area it was found that all buildings suitable for office or billeting space were heavily infested with fleas, lice, and bedbugs. Details were set to work and all such structures were cleaned out, scrubbed and sprayed with DDT solution prior to occupancy.

f. Although there was a high incidence of bacillary dysentery in the civil population throughout the area, strict water discipline and rigid control of water processing prevented any cases of this disease in the troops of Occupation Force. By the end of the first six weeks, only five cases of dysentery

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had appeared among the ground forces in the entire area. During the last week in October an epidemic of bacillary dysentery broke out among the ships in the harbor, but was confined to these ships and did not make its appearance among the troops ashore.

g. The personnel of the 11th General Dispensary (Type 2) arrived at SASEBO without supplies, organizational equipment or housekeeping gear. The Commanding Officer of the unit had no idea where this gear was located not having seen it for several months. This unit was of no value whatsoever until it could be completely supplied and reequipped.

L. N. Hart
L. N. HART,
Capt. (MC) USN.

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UNIT	SHIPPING	STAGED	ARRIVAL PORT	DATE OF ARRIVAL
Hq. Provisional Med. Group	: SAUCUS (LSV 4) 2 off. : & 4 EM. MT. MCKINLEY : (ACC 7) (Corps Surg)	: Maui	: Sasebo	: 22 Sept 45
Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1	: SALINUK (AKA 41) Personnel & Cargo	: Hawaii	: Sasebo	: 22 Sept 45
Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3	: LST 817 Personnel & Cargo	: Guam	: Nagasaki	: 27 Sept 45
VAC Medical Battalion	: SARITA (AKA 39) Personnel & cargo : SAPPHO (AKA 38) Personnel	: Maui	: Sasebo	: 22 Sept 45
Hq. & Hq. Det., 135th Medical Bn. (Sep)	: BARNHILL (APA 132) Personnel and cargo	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 26 Sept 45
122nd Station Hospital	: 9 LCT's with cargo : FALLON (APA 81) Personnel : Air transport Nurses	: Okinawa	: Sasebo : Sasebo : Omura	: 30 Sept 45 : 8 Oct 45 : 22 Oct 45
123rd Station Hospital	: QUEENS (APA 103) Personnel : Personnel no cargo	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 16 Oct 45
118th Station Hospital	: Air transport nurses : LSM 112, LSM 122 Personnel : Personnel : LSM 103, LSM 253 Personnel : Personnel and cargo : 5 Officers via Air	: Okinawa	: Omura : Sasebo : Sasebo : Omura	: 22 Oct 45 : 2 Nov 45 : 1 Nov 45 : 8 Nov 45
73rd Field Hospital	: LST 916 Personnel and cargo	: Leyte	: Sasebo	: 26 Oct 45
92nd Field Hospital	: QUEENS (APA 103) : Personnel and Cargo : LST 952 : Personnel and Cargo	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 16 Oct 45 : 20 Oct 45
25th Evacuation Hospital	: QUEENS (APA 103) : Personnel and Cargo	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 16 Oct 45
309 General Hospital	: GAGE (APA 168) Personnel : Personnel : LST 874 Personnel and Cargo	: Tinian	: Sasebo	: 31 Oct 45 : 19 Nov 45

Enclosure (A)

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13th General Hospital	: DAUPHIN (APA 97)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 27 Oct 45
	: Personnel and Cargo	:	:	:
	: ANDROMEDA (AKA 15)	:	:	:
	: Cargo	:	:	:
712th Medical Sanitary Company	: APPLING (APA 58)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 25 Oct 45
	: Personnel	:	:	:
	: NEW HAMPSHIRE (AKA 73)	:	:	:
	: Cargo	:	:	:
"B" & "C" Co's. 264th Medical Battalion	: APPLING (APA 58)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 25 Oct 45
	: Personnel and Cargo	:	:	:
692nd Medical Ambulance Company	: DAUPHIN (APA 97)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 27 Oct 45
	: Personnel	:	:	:
	: ANDROMEDA (AKA 15)	:	:	:
	: Cargo	:	:	:
5th Army Medical Laboratory	: QUEENS (APA 103)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 16 October 45
	: Personnel	:	:	:
	: LST 952	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 20 Oct 45
	: Personnel and Cargo	:	:	:
62nd Medical Base Depot Company	: QUEENS (APA 103)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 16 Oct 45
	: Personnel	:	:	:
	: LST 952	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 20 Oct 45
	: Personnel and Cargo	:	:	:
108 Veterinary Food Inspection Team	: QUEENS (APA 103)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 16 Oct 45
	: Personnel	:	:	:
	: LST 952	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 20 Oct 45
	: Personnel and Cargo	:	:	:
98th Veterinary Food	: DAUPHIN (APA 97)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 27 Oct 45
	: Personnel	:	:	:
	: LST 952	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 20 Oct 45
	: Personnel and Cargo	:	:	:
11th General Dispensary (Type 2)	: DAUPHIN (APA 97)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 27 Oct 45
	: Personnel	:	:	:
466th Dental Prosthetic Team (1EL)	: DAUPHIN (APA 97)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 27 Oct 45
	: Personnel and Cargo	:	:	:
556th Optical Repair Det. (BG)	: QUEENS (APA 103)	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 16 Oct 45
	: Personnel	:	:	:
	: LST 952	: Luzon	: Sasebo	: 20 Oct 45
	: Equipment	:	:	:

Enclosure (A)

Appendix 3 to Annex B.5.1 to Occupation of JAPAN.

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36th Malaria Control Det.	:APPLING (APA 58) : Personnel and Cargo :	:Luzon : :	:Sasebo : :	: 25 Oct 45 : :
94th Malaria Control Det.	:DAUPHIN (APA 97) : Personnel :ANDROMEDA (AKA 15) : Cargo :	:Luzon : :Luzon : :	:Sasebo : :Sasebo : :	: 27 Oct 45 : : 27 Oct 45 : :
95th Malaria Control Det.	:DAUPHIN (APA 97) : Personnel :ANDROMEDA (AKA 15) : Cargo :	:Luzon : :Luzon : :	:Sasebo : :Sasebo : :	: 27 Oct 45 : : 27 Oct 45 : :
74th Malaria Control Det.	:LST 952 : Personnel and Cargo :	:Luzon : :	:Sasebo : :	: 20 Oct 45 : :
75th Malaria Control Det.	:LST 952 : Personnel and Cargo :	:Luzon : :	:Sasebo : :	: 20 Oct 45 : :
76th Malaria Control Det.	:LST 952 : Personnel and Cargo :	:Luzon : :	:Sasebo : :	: 20 Oct 45 : :
83rd Malaria Control Det.	:LST 952 : Personnel and Cargo :	:Luzon : :	:Sasebo : :	: 20 Oct 45 : :
24th Malaria Survey Det.	:DAUPHIN (APA 97) : Personnel :ANDROMEDA (AKA 15) : Cargo :	:Luzon : : : :	:Sasebo : : : :	: 27 Oct 45 : : : :
201st Malaria Survey Det.	:DAUPHIN (APA 97) : Personnel :ANDROMEDA (AKA 15) : Cargo :	:Luzon : : : :	:Sasebo : : : :	: 27 Oct 45 : : : :
203rd Malaria Survey Det.	:DAUPHIN (APA 97) : Personnel :ANDROMEDA (AKA 15) : Cargo :	:Luzon : : : :	:Sasebo : : : :	: 27 Oct 45 : : : :
415th Malaria Survey Det.	:DAUPHIN (APA 97) : Personnel :ANDROMEDA (AKA 15) : Cargo :	:Luzon : : : :	:Sasebo : : : :	: 27 Oct 45 : : : :

Enclosure (A)

Appendix 4 to Annex EASY
to VAC Operations Report
Occupation of JAPAN

ORDNANCE REPORT

ENCLOSURE (D)

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0107/244

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

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30 November 1945.

From: The Ordnance Officer.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Ordnance Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN...
Reference: (a) Corps Special Order No. 120-45, Serial #0737B, Confidential, dtd 1Nov45.

1. On 1 June, 1945 the V Amphibious Corps reported to SIXTH ARMY for planning the assault on JAPAN. Planning began immediately on the basis that five (5) CinCPOA units of fire for all weapons would be used for mounting out. This was not believed sufficient in certain types of mortar and artillery ammunition. V Amphibious Corps recommended ten (10) CinCPOA units of fire of 105mm artillery and mortar ammunition. It was believed at this time that the 60mm mortar illuminating should also be increased as this was the only type of illuminating ammunition available at that time. Standard preloads were made up for the various ammunition loads to be loaded on LST's, combat loaded.

2. Sixteen (16) LST's were to be provided each assault division.

a. Eleven (11) LST's were to have a standard preload of ammunition for the following types of weapons: Carbine, rifle, 37mm, 60mm mortars, 75mm howitzers, 81mm mortars, and grenades. Nine (9) were to be top deck loaded and two (2) bottom deck loaded.

b. Two (2) LST's top decks were to be provided for LVT maintenance.

c. One (1) LST top deck was to be provided for LVT(A)4 maintenance.

d. Four (4) LST's for division 105mm Artillery and were to be preloaded with four (4) units of fire of 105mm ammunition for these weapons.

e. Three (3) LST's for division 155mm Howitzer artillery and five (5) units of fire of ammunition for these weapons.

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f. The balance of the ammunition was to be loaded in AKA's or APA's.

3. Corps Artillery - twenty-one (21) LST's.

a. Nine (9) LST's for 155mm Howitzer Battalion and five (5) units of fire of ammunition.

b. Nine (9) LST's for 155mm Gun Battalion and five (5) units of fire of ammunition.

c. Three (3) LST's for one 8" Howitzer Battalion and five (5) units of fire of ammunition.

4. The Ordnance Officer visited SIXTH ARMY Headquarters and was notified that the mounting out figure was changed from CinCPOA unit of fire to AFPac unit of fire. This greatly eased the expected shortage of mortar and 105mm artillery ammunition as the AFPac unit of fire was considerably higher in these categories as shown in the table below:

	<u>CinCPOA</u>	<u>AFPac</u>	<u>No. of CinCPOA U/F in 5 AFPac u/f</u>
Carbine, Cal..30	46	50	5.4
Rifle, Auto., Cal..30	500	750	7.5
Rifle, Cal..30	100	100	Same
Machine Gun Cal..30	1500	1750	5.8
Pistol, Auto., Cal..45	14	10	3.6
Gun, Sub-machine, Cal..45	200	200	Same
Machine Gun, Cal..50	600	500	4.2
37mm Gun, AT	100	70	3.5
60mm Mortar	125	140	5.6
81mm Mortar	150	270	9.0

 Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious
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	<u>CinCPOA</u>	<u>AFPac</u>	No. of CinCPOA U/F in 5 AFPac u/f
75mm Gun, Tank	100	85	4.3
75mm How, Field or Pack	300	300	Same
105mm How, Field, M2A1	250	300	6
105mm How, SP, M2A1	100	225	11.3
155mm How, M1, Field	150	150	Same
155mm Gun, M1, Field	100	100	Same

a. In addition as there was no AFPac unit of fire for the below listed weapons the following was to be used:

(1) For 75mm Howitzer, LVT, the CinCPOA unit of fire of 150 rounds was to be used as a basis for mounting out.

(2) For 4.5" Barrage Rockets, 15,000 per Marine Division was to be taken.

(3) For 7.2" Rockets, 2,200 were to be sent to the Second and Third Marine Divisions.

b. The units to provide ordnance maintenance were the Division Ordnance Companies and the 8th Service Regiment. Army Augmentation units were to be supported by the following units:

(1) One (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.

(2) Two (2) Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies.

(3) One (1) Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company.

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(4) One (1) Evacuation Company.

5. Additional units were:

a. Bomb Disposal Company.

(1) One (1) platoon was to be attached to each of the two assault divisions.

(2) The Headquarters and one (1) platoon were to be attached to the Shore Brigade for Bomb Disposal activities.

b. Ammunition Companies, 8th Service Regiment.

(1) One (1) company to each of the two
(2) assault divisions and one (1) company to the Shore Brigade.

6. Ordnance General Supplies.

a. Class II and IV carried by assault units.

(1) Sixty (60) days by Marine Corps units.

(2) Attached Army units - Ninety (90) day supply.

7. Class V Ammunition Supply.

a. Five (5) AFPac units of fire for combat units.

b. Three (3) AFPac units of fire for service units.

(1) The exceptions listed below were made due to the fact that no provisions were made for these weapons in the AFPac unit of fire.

(a) 75mm Howitzer LVT (5 CinCPOA units of fire).

 Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious
 Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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(b) Rockets 4.5" Br., M7 - 15,000
 each division.

(c) Rockets, 7.2" - 1,100 each
 division.

c. The resupply of ammunition was to be
 five (5) units of fire on two (2) ships (2½ AFPac units
 of fire each) and ninety (90) days expenditure ammuni-
 tion based on figures set up by SIXTH ARMY, loaded ten
 (10) days on each of nine (9) ships.

8. Resupply shipping was to be available:

a. Class V (Ammunition) FM ships are 2½
 u/f ships
 GM ships were 10
 day expenditure.

(1) X to X / 15 1 FM
 2 GM

(2) X / 15 to X / 30 1 FM
 2 GM

(3) X / 30 to X / 60 4 GM
 X / 60 to X / 90 2 GM

b. Class II and IV.

(1) X to X / 15 15 days supply
 X / 15 to X / 30 30 days supply

9. The rates of expenditure for resupply were
 set up as given below:

Type Weapon	Rounds per Combat Weapon per Day	Type Weapon	Rounds per Combat Weapon per Day
Carbine	4	155mm Gun	25
BAR	65	155mm Howitzer	40
Rifle, M1903	3	8" Howitzer	35

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 Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious
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<u>Type Weapon</u>	<u>Rounds per Combat Weapon per Day</u>	<u>Type Weapon</u>	<u>Rounds per Combat Weapon per Day</u>
Rifle, M1	8	2.36" Rocket	.375
Machine Gun, Cal..30	100	4.5" Rocket	10
SMG, Cal..45	9	7.2" Rocket	30 per Div.
Machine Gun, Cal..50	25	Grenade, Rifle	.2
20mm AA	9	Flare Trip, M48, M49	.1875 per combat Co.
40mm AA	9	Signals all type (A1)	.30
90mm AA	15	Hand Grenades	.10 per combat EM
90mm SP	8	Shot Gun Shells	13
37mm AT	3	Mine, AT	150 per Div.
60mm Mortar	15	Mine, AP M2A1	10 per Div.
81mm Mortar	45	Mine, AP M3	15 per Div.
75mm Gun, Tank	8	Torpedo Bangalore	10 per Div.
75mm Howitzer, SP	15	Adapter	.4
75mm Howitzer, Pack	85	Proj. Pyrotechnic, M9	.25
105mm Howitzer M2A1	56	75mm Howitzer LVT	4
105mm Howitzer M2A1 Field	75		

10. All water cooled engines were to be winter-
 ized to $\neq 10^{\circ}$ Fahrenheit.

11. Reports.

a. Ammunition reports were to be turned in
 daily and were to be used as a basis for allocating the
 resupply of ammunition from the Corps dumps to Divisions.
 WD AGO Forms (580) were to be used with the active
 weapons listed on the reverse side. Facilities for re-
 supply by air were to be provided for critical ammunition
 and spare parts.

12. Training for the Assault.

a. Two (2) CinCPOA units of fire for all
 weapons were authorized for training. The training
 period was lengthened and consequently two (2) units of
 fire proved to be inadequate and it was found necessary
 to obtain additional ammunition.

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Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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b. Additional weapons which were new and were trained with in preparation for the assault and needed more than two (2) CinCPOA units of fire were as given below:

(1) Tank mounted flamethrowers of the POACWS design which were of three-hundred (300) gallon capacity and incorporated the flamethrower as well as the 75mm gun were to be provided nine (9) per division. Experiments were being conducted as to the best type of fuel for these weapons. Tests were being conducted with pre-mixed fuel and the most advantageous method of mixing the fuel. The AFPac unit of fire was only one (1) filling for these flamethrowers and recommendations were made to SIXTH ARMY to increase this to five fillings. This was approved and the unit of fire was changed to five (5) fillings.

(2) The LVT(A)4's were trained as artillery for possible initial use on landing. This required additional ammunition to train with these weapons in artillery methods and procedure of firing.

(3) The 57mm Recoilless was demonstrated by the Marine Corps Equipment Board team and was greatly desired by all personnel. This weapon's light weight and ease of maneuverability plus the size of the projectile made it a very desirable weapon. Recommendations were made to provide fifty-four (54) per division.

(4) 7.2" Tank Mounted Rocket launchers were to be provided on three (3) tanks per division and 1,100 rockets were to be provided per division.

(5) M40 motor carriages were given Corps Artillery. These weapons mounted 155mm guns and were trained with Corps Artillery.

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(6) The Division Reconnaissance Companies were provided with seven (7) half tracks M3 with 75mm guns and six (6) half tracks, M3 without the 75mm guns. The latter were to be used as personnel carriers.

(7) A new 4.5" Rocket detachment was to be set up so there would be one (1) 4.5" Rocket detachment per division each with thirty six (36) rocket launchers per division.

(8) VT fuzes were to be issued for the first time and training was undertaken with them. There were officers provided to Divisions who were trained in the use and functioning of the VT fuzes. There was a training schedule set up for these fuzes.

(9) Experiments were conducted by FMF to devise a standard type of armor for tanks which could be put on or taken off at will.

(10) Upon the recommendation of the 4th Marine Division, experiments were conducted with a smoke generator for the purpose of locating cave entrances. Major SKINNER of the Chemical Warfare Service came over from OAHU to MAUI to conduct these experiments.

(11) 75mm Pack Howitzers were to be provided each division as an additional weapon and one (1) unit of fire was provided them for training purposes.

13. Change from Operation to Occupation.

a. Upon notification that V Amphibious Corps would occupy the island of KYUSHU and YAMAGUCHI Prefecture of HONSHU the planning for this phase began. Due to the short time available, it consisted primarily in making changes to the plans for the assault operation. Units were to go in prepared for any eventuality and the ammunition and weapons were to be combat loaded.

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Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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b. The amount of ammunition that was to be carried was cut to three (3) AFPac units of fire for combat troops and one (1) AFPac unit of fire for service troops. The LVT's, Corps Artillery, and Anti-aircraft Artillery were deleted from the troop list. No VT fuzes were to be taken to JAPAN. Units which were notified after sailing did not unload these fuzes in JAPAN.

c. The Rocket Detachments were removed from the troop list. A great number of Army Augmentation units were deleted and consequently the need for Army Ordnance units was changed to two (2) MAM companies as it was anticipated that the majority of the maintenance would be on motor transportation and that all ordnance maintenance could be provided by Marine units. With the addition of the 32d Infantry Division and the deletion of the 3d Marine Division, the Army Ordnance units were assigned by SIXTH ARMY as listed below:

(1) One (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.

(2) Two (2) MAM Companies.

(3) One (1) Ammunition Company.

(4) One (1) Base Depot Company.

(5) One (1) Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank).

d. The following Marine units for Ordnance maintenance and supply were used in the occupation.

(1) Division Ordnance Companies to provide maintenance for their specific units.

(2) 8th Service Regiment.

(3) The 3d Platoon, Bomb Disposal Company was assigned initially to the 5th Marine Division and the Bomb Disposal Company Headquarters and two (2) platoons to the Shore Brigade. Platoons were later assigned to Divisions as occupation requirements indicated.

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e. Equipment and supplies were taken in as follows:

(1) Class II and IV.

(a) Thirty (30) days supply were carried by the Marine Corps units, and thirty (30) days for all Army Augmentation units.

(2) Class V.

(a) Three (3) units of fire for combat troops and one (1) unit of fire for service troops.

f. Reports.

(1) Reports on ammunition were rendered on the 15th and 30th of each month instead of daily as planned for the assault landing.

g. Resupply.

(1) Resupply of Class V was to be two (2) AFPac units of fire. After establishment ashore, it was found that no expenditure of ammunition was indicated, the stockage level for ammunition resupply was cut to three (3) units of fire for combat troops and one (1) unit of fire for service units, and all resupply was diverted. The expenditure of one (1) unit of fire for training purposes was authorized and stockage levels were to be maintained by having all deactivated and returned units leave all small arms ammunition behind.

(2) The 8th Service Regiment and the FUKUOKA Base Command were set up as the supply agencies. The difficulty in getting supplies in to FUKUOKA necessitated that all Ordnance Resupply would enter SASEBO and be transhipped by rail or road to FUKUOKA. The FUKUOKA Base

Enclosure DOG, Appendix 4 to Annex EASY to V Amphibious
Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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Command was to be the initial supply agency for the 32d Infantry Division and the majority of the Army Augmentation units. Consequently all Army ordnance units were assigned to the FUKUOKA Base Command with the exception of one (1) ammunition company which was assigned to the 32d Infantry Division. On 25 November, the FUKUOKA Base Command was disbanded and all service elements and logistic responsibilities in the FUKUOKA area were transferred to the 32d Infantry Division. On 15 December, an ASCOMO Base was established at FUKUOKA, and the 32d Infantry Division was relieved of all ordnance service responsibility in that area.

14. Japanese Ordnance Materiel.

a. The initial problem was compiling the inventories presented by the Japanese into a form which could be used by V Amphibious Corps units. The inventories were satisfactory except for the language difficulties which made them difficult to translate. Nomenclature was a problem. The Disposition Section was set up to provide for the disposition of this materiel.

A. M. Finkel
A. M. FINKEL.

Appendix 5 to Annex EASY
to VAC Operations Report
Occupation of JAPAN

DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIEL
AND EQUIPMENT REPORT

ENCLOSURE (E)

0140/244

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

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30 November 1945.

From: The Disposition Officer.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Disposition of Surrendered Materiel and
Equipment Report, Occupation of JAPAN.
Enclosure: (A) Inventory of Principal Ammunition Items.

1. Initially instructions relative to the disposal of surrendered materiels were meager and very general in character. From the landing of our forces on 22 September until the receipt of SIXTH ARMY Administrative Order 19/2 on 14 October no action was taken to dispose of any mass of materiel. Prior to that time such Japanese equipment as was required for occupation forces was picked up from Japanese sources and processed to the unit concerned by the Corps Procurement Section. Certain items were required for use by the Japanese Navy in connection with mine sweeping and repatriation operations. This materiel was also processed by the Procurement Section and turned over to the local Japanese Navy Officials. In addition certain emergency food supplies were turned over to local civil government for use by the civil population.

2. Upon receipt of SIXTH ARMY Administrative Order 19/2 the G-4 Section revised Annex KING to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 and issued it on 16 October. This annex and its appendices covered all current disposition instruction.

3. On 17 October, 1945 the Corps Disposition Section was established by Administrative Order No. 13-45. The Officer-in-Charge of this section was charged with general supervision of disposition throughout the Corps' Zone of Responsibility. In addition he was directly charged with the disposition of materiel, equipment, ammunition and explosives in the immediate SASEBO Port Area. This area included the following Japanese naval and military installations:

- a. The Naval Dockyard.
- b. The Naval Supply and Munitions Depot.

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Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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- c. The SASEBO Seaplane Base.
- d. The SASEBO Aircraft Factory.
- e. The Naval Fuel Depot.
- f. The Navy Submarine Base.
- g. Numerous AAA Positions.

4. WAR TROPHIES.

a. In addition to disposition matters the Corps Disposition Section was charged with the issuance of war trophies to personnel of Corps Troops and units operating directly under Corps control. Initially all swords, pistols, and binoculars were classified as controlled items pending allocation by higher headquarters. Rifles and bayonets were issued to all enlisted men leaving this area, initially the issue of swords was restricted to officers leaving the area, pistols were not issued and field glasses were restricted to general officers. On 9 November this Corps was given a definite allocation of these controlled items and sub allocations were made, on 29 November additional allocations were made. Division Commanders were directed to issue the more desirable items on a basis of overseas service, officers and enlisted men both to be considered in arriving at this basis. These controlled items were made available to subordinate commanders on an average of 62.8% of their commands.

b. One constant source of bother and annoyance was the matter of trophies for U.S. forces afloat. Initial SIXTH ARMY directive prohibited the issue of any Japanese Army trophies to U.S. Naval personnel, and present directives prohibit the issue of Japanese Army type controlled items (swords, pistols, and field glasses) for this purpose. Japanese inventories showed that approximately 2503 Japanese Navy swords were surrendered in this area. One thousand of these were turned over to CTF 55 in late October for issue as directed by him. The remaining 1503 have recently been turned over to forces afloat. These 2503 swords did not meet the demand for these items. Personnel afloat could not understand this action and the Corps Disposition Office was constantly placed in the position of

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Corps Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN. (Cont'd).

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turning down these members of the Naval Service.

5. Disposition required a considerable amount of paper work throughout the Corps. SIXTH ARMY required detailed weekly reports in six (6) copies. Division reports were segregated and properly bound together with V Amphibious Corps Area reports and forwarded to the SIXTH ARMY. In the local V Amphibious Corps Procurement and Disposition Zone the Procurement Section prepared the report of all material or scrap used for occupation troops or returned to the Japanese Home Ministry. These reports were made on separate forms such as the Engineer Report, Signal Report, Oil Report, etc.. Special Staff Sections of the Corps arranged for the destruction of materials falling under their speciality (except for Ordnance). It was the responsibility of the Disposition Section to bind all these reports together and forward them to SIXTH ARMY.

6. AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVE DISPOSAL.

a. To dispose of ammunition the Disposition Section was given the services of the 8th Marine Ammunition Company, the V Amphibious Corps Bomb Disposal Company (less 2 platoons) and Navy Bomb and Mine Team #4. Due to SASEBO being adjacent to deep water the most practical method of disposing of the mass of the local ammunition was by dumping at sea. Through the Japanese Central Liaison committee the services of the SASEBO Harbor and Transportation Company, Limited, was secured. This company furnished barges, tugs, laborers and locomotive and crane operators. American personnel supervised these operations which commenced on 17 October. On 12 November one barge load of ammunition exploded, exact cause unknown, at sea with the loss of eight (8) Japanese killed or missing, and six (6) wounded. Every effort has been made to prevent injury to American personnel. However, this Japanese ammunition was in extremely bad condition and had not been cared for in months. 13,100 tons of ammunition has been destroyed in the immediate SASEBO Port Area to date.

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7. TORPEDO DISPOSAL.

a. Several hundred 21 and 24 inch torpedoes were located in the local area. A Torpedo Team consisting of one (1) Army Engineer Officer, one (1) Navy Torpedo Officer, two (2) Marine Riggers, two (2) Army Crane Operators, ten (10) enlisted men of the 8th Ammunition Company and LST 865 was organized on 10 November. These torpedoes were without war heads but did, in most cases, carry a charged oxygen flask. They were loaded aboard the LST and taken to sea where they were dumped one at a time and fired upon with .50 caliber AP to insure their sinking. 540 torpedoes have been destroyed to date.

8. ORDNANCE DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY.

a. Ordnance items such as guns, small arms, searchlights, fire control equipment, range finders, range keepers, mounts, tanks and other numerous items were destroyed by whatever appeared to be the easiest means of damaging them beyond repair. Thermite was used for large pieces, acetylene torches were used to burn out vital parts or small items were laid out and run over by tracked vehicles. All resultant scrap was returned to the Japanese Home Ministry. To accomplish this work the Disposition Section employed two (2) officers and twenty (20) men of the Ordnance Company, 8th Service Regiment. These men supervised hired Japanese labor. 3030 weapons have been destroyed to date.

9. AIRCRAFT DISPOSAL.

a. The disposal of aircraft was normally done under the supervision of the Corps Air Officer. Planes were stacked to crane height and ignited through the use of Napalm and flame throwing tanks (American). 64 planes have been destroyed in this manner at the SASEBO Seaplane Base.

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10. Paragraphs 6. to 9. refer to the local SASEBO area. Units of the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions and the 32d Infantry Division varied these procedures to meet their local circumstances. In inland areas shells, powder, etc., had to be destroyed in place. In these cases the provisions of SIXTH ARMY directive were followed. These provisions generally followed the regulations contained in War Department TM 9-1904, Ammunition Inspection Guide.

11. For future references the following recommendations are submitted:

a. Forces about to occupy an enemy country where large stores of equipment may be expected to be found should be equipped with heavy excess allowances of:

- (1) Heavy Roller Conveyor.
- (2) Non-Ferrous Tools.
- (3) Thermite Grenades.
- (4) Lighting Equipment.
- (5) Finger Lifts.
- (6) Bay City Cranes.

b. Any occupation force should be plentifully supplied with extra bomb disposal personnel, at least 75% in excess of present Tables of Organization.

c. Several highly qualified explosive and demolition experts should be assigned to each Division and Corps Headquarters.

12. Enclosure (A) lists the principal ammunition items encountered.

J. P. Ferkeley
J. P. FERKELEY

INVENTORY OF PRINCIPAL ORDNANCE ITEMS
IN VAC ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY

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ITEM	:Inventori- ed 24Nov45:	:Destroyed to Date	: On Hand 24Nov45
Projectiles - Separate Loading, HE, Shrapnel & Incendiary, rounds	2438565:	806911:	1631654
Projectiles, Separate Loading, Chemical, rounds	772:	2:	770
Charges, Propelling, Bag Type, rounds	1464848:	1292555:	172293
Complete Rounds, Fixed & Semi-fixed, 37mm or larger, rounds	3950429:	469762:	3480667
Complete Rounds, Mortar, 50mm and larger, rounds	441808:	43368:	398440
Fuzes & Primers, Artillery & Mine, rounds	4486630:	1667736:	2818894
Mines, Anti-tank, Anti-personnel, Beach, rounds	37461:	16888:	20573
Rockets, all types, rounds	23773:	9195:	14578
Bombs, A/C, HE and Incendiary, rounds	938428:	359200:	579228
Bombs, A/C, Chemical, rounds	44535:	16497:	28038
Bombs, A/C, Rocket, rounds	501:	None:	501
Fuzes, Bomb, rounds	747022:	583912:	163110
Grenades, Hand & Rifle, HE & Incendiary, rounds	437403:	42442:	394961
Grenades, Hand & Rifle, Chemical, rounds	20986:	4661:	16325

INVENTORY OF PRINCIPAL ORDNANCE ITEMS
IN VAC ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY (CONT'D).

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ITEM	Inventoried 24Nov45	Destroyed to Date	On Hand 24Nov45
Flare, A/C, rounds	48695	9476	39219
Cartridges, Small Arms, 6.5mm to 9mm incl., rounds	60475971	22822965	37653006
Complete Rounds, Auto Cannon, 12.7mm to 40mm incl. rounds	3052291	363669	2688622
Explosives, HE Bulk including Black Powder, pounds	33584187	25999820	7584361
Powder, Smokeless, Bulk, pounds	1881429	289490	1591939
Rifles, each	199204	42439	156765
Machine Guns, each	21863	1931	19932
Aircraft Cannon, each	1823	396	1427
Field Artillery, each	1980	424	1556
Mortars & Grenade Dischargers, each	6979	928	6051
Rocket Launchers, each	244	234	10
Anti-aircraft Artillery	1085	126	959
Coast & Harbor Defense Artillery	420	353	67

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ENCLOSURE (A)

Appendix 6 to Annex EASY
to VAC Operation Report
Occupation of Japan

PROCUREMENT REPORT

ENCLOSURE (F)

08/225

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

30 November, 1945.

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From: The Commanding Officer, Procurement Section.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

a. During the planning phase of the operation, the Procurement Section, Fifth Amphibious Corps was not an organization. This precluded any planning as a section. Annex QUEEN to Fifth Amphibious Corps Administrative Order Number 6-45, dated 24 August, 1945, gave a general plan dealing with area and facility allocation. On 20 September, 1945, this Annex was revised to cover procurement of Japanese supplies, real-estate equipment and facilities.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. No training or organization was carried out by this section prior to landing in Japan. The enlisted personnel were transferred into the Procurement Section from Headquarters Company, Shore Brigade and had no previous training in procurement work. The officers were drawn from various other staff sections of the Corps Headquarters and were not familiar with the functions of a procurement agency.

3. NARRATIVE OF OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

a. The Procurement Section, Fifth Amphibious Corps, was formed on 28 September, 1945 in accordance with the provisions set forth in Corps Administrative Order Number 8-45, which made this Section the sole procurement agency for the City of Sasebo, including the Navy Yard proper and its surrounding installations, and assigned the responsibility of issuing and disseminating general instructions and policies governing the procurement of Japanese supplies, real-estate, equipment and facilities. The organization of this section was modified to conform with changing requirements. The organization as shown in enclosure (A) proved to be the most satisfactory.

b. Procurement of services, supplies and equipment from local Japanese civilian sources was negligible. This condition was brought about by the following two factors:

(1) The City of Sasebo was supported by and subordinated to the Japanese Navy and no surplus stocks of any commodity were carried. The population

Appendix 6 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

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consisted almost entirely of navy yard workers. Allied bombing had completely destroyed the greater part of the business district and part of the residential area of the city causing a critical shortage of housing facilities.

(2) The Sasebo Navy Yard has sustained little or no damage from Allied bombings, which made adequate housing facilities available to our forces. The Navy Yard contained numerous warehouses filled with supplies and equipment which were formerly the property of the Japanese Navy. These supplies were used by our forces, to fill operational requirements, thus causing the demands on the local civilians to be much less than might have been expected.

c. All requests for supplies, equipment, and real-estate from local civilian sources were made to the Sasebo Liaison Committee, which was very cooperative and exceedingly willing to comply with demands of the Occupation Forces in so far as it was physically capable. Some delay and confusion was encountered initially due to the lack of organization and coordination of this committee. While great improvements were made, it is believed that a certain degree of confusion will always prevail as long as there is an element of Japanese thinking concerned.

d. The Form PS-1, as shown in enclosure (B), was used for the execution of all procurements, and proved to be very satisfactory. It clearly presented the complete transaction in an accepted legal form. One completed copy was retained in the files of the Procurement Section and one copy was forwarded to the Liaison Committee.

e. The Form GPA-3, as shown in enclosure (C), was submitted to the SIXTH ARMY Procurement Office at the end of each month showing the estimated value of all procurements executed during the month.

4. MILITARY SUPPLIES

a. In view of the fact that initially this Headquarters received no instructions concerning the disposition of the military supplies contained in the Navy Yard warehouses, it was assumed that these supplies would be procured and furnished the Occupation Forces in accordance with operational needs. The Procurement Section was designated as the controlling agency, since it was determined unnecessary to consult the Liaison Committee in

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matters of military supply. The regular procurement form as shown in enclosure (B), was submitted to this section by the requesting unit. An endorsement indicating approval authorized the unit to pick up requested items, whereupon another endorsement was placed on the form showing supplies received. This form was filed in the Procurement Section where a complete record of all supplies used by our forces was maintained. This proved to be an adequate control over military supplies. In view of the fact that Marine sentries guarded all warehouses, no one could remove materials without a procurement form.

b. Navy units ashore and afloat submitted their requests through the Navy Liaison Officer who screened them before forwarding to the Procurement Section. This system worked very satisfactorily.

c. Although complete inventories of the contents of Japanese Military installations were submitted to our forces upon arrival, this section was never able to obtain a complete inventory at any one time. This was due to the fact that the inventory was submitted in Japanese, and since practically all words were of a technical nature, translation was very slow. This situation created an extra burden on the Procurement Section. When requests for certain items were received, an officer from the Procurement Section had to locate the materials before the request could be approved. This situation improved as the officers learned the general contents of each warehouse. In most cases the units making the request knew the location of the requested materials.

d. Some difficulties were encountered due to the fact that both the 5th Marine Division and Corps Procurement Sections were functioning in the Sasebo Area. The sentries guarding warehouses containing military supplies were 5th Marine Division personnel and were reluctant to release any materials upon the signature of Corps Procurement Officer, even though the area had been assigned solely to Corps. This was obviously the result of two agencies issuing instructions.

e. The Japanese Navy was directed by the Occupation Forces to carry out certain missions such as sweeping mines, dumping Japanese ammunition at sea, and repatriation of Japanese Nationals from China and Korea. To perform these tasks certain ship fittings and supplies were needed, all of which were stored in the Navy Yard warehouses. To obtain the release of these supplies, a request in the form of a letter was written by Japanese Naval Commanders to General Schmidt. These letters were answered by this section, over the signature of General Schmidt, directing the Japanese Naval personnel to report to the Procurement Section

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for delivery of the requested material. Although the Japanese Navy representatives usually knew the location of the supplies requested, an officer from the Procurement Section had to accompany them in order to clear the supplies from the buildings. Never were the requested supplies all in one building. In many cases a request as submitted in one letter would occupy the time of an officer from this section for a period of one week. This was especially true in the case of requests for coal where 50 tons or more was removed by hand in baskets. Since approximately three hundred such letters were received, many officers were constantly tied up and of little value to the section. Several remedies for the situation were attempted, but with the Japanese natural aversion to logic and organization, none proved successful.

f. In view of the large stocks of materials over and above the operational needs of our forces it was decided to release some of these supplies to the Home Ministry in accordance with the directives from the SIXTH ARMY. These stocks consisted of rice, clothing, bedding, and transportation. The Procurement Section was delegated the responsibility of releasing these stocks to the Japanese and obtaining a receipt from an authorized representative of the Japanese Home Ministry. This was accomplished without difficulty, because only material and supplies critically needed by the Japanese were released initially. Upon the establishment of the Fifth Amphibious Corps Disposition Section, with the mission of rapidly disposing of all Japanese military supplies and equipment, this problem became more acute. In view of the large stocks of military supplies on hand that were not classified as "Warfare Material", great quantities of these supplies were available for release to the Home Ministry. The Procurement Section accomplished this release and obtained the receipt. Since most of these warehouses containing the supplies were adjacent to the Navy Yard dock areas, where all available covered storage space was required for our supplies and installations, it was necessary to remove all supplies released to the Japanese to a less congested area. This was accomplished by Japanese labor and trucks under supervision of this section. A representative of the Procurement Section was present at the loading point to see that only the authorized supplies were loaded, and at the unloading point to obtain a receipt. The Procurement Section was never able to accomplish the release of the supplies and materials as fast as the Disposition Section made them available, due to unreliability of the Japanese trucks and labor, and vast amount of supplies on hand. A weekly report, by classification, on all supplies used by our troops and all materials and supplies returned to the Home Ministry, as shown in enclosure (D), was compiled by the Procurement Section and submitted to the Disposition Section for incorporation into their report to higher

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authority. It will be noted that 95% of the activities of the Procurement Section involve the handling of military supplies and it is believed should be under the control of the Disposition Section in order to definitely establish responsibility and facilitate decisions. Two separate sections attempting to divide the responsibility of one task seldom works favorably. Close liaison and coordination was accomplished between the two sections but was not considered adequate.

5. LABOR

a. Immediately following the arrival of the Fifth Amphibious Corps and Fifth Marine Division elements at Sasebo, KYUSHU, JAPAN, on 22 September, 1945, requests for laborers began. Advance elements had arranged with Japanese Naval Liaison Committee for labor to be furnished through that group initially. On 27 September, 1945, by Change Number 2 to Administrative Order Number 6-45, paragraph 9 of Annex MIKE was amended to provide a more comprehensive procedure for labor requisitions and attendance. Labor was thereafter obtained solely through the civilian labor procurement agencies, operating under Japanese authorities. Labor procurement, and all other labor then became the function of Fifth Amphibious Corps Procurement Section. Under Imperial Ordinance No. 542, as implemented by Welfare Ministry Order No. 41, dated 16 October, 1945, Japanese procurement then came under Labor Supplying Stations and agencies of Central Liaison Bureau.

b. With increasing operations in the Fifth Amphibious Corps areas, including the expansion of 2d Marine Division and 32d Army Division into their areas of responsibility, labor requirements rapidly increased to 20,000 workers per day, taxing the ability of existing Japanese labor agencies to keep up with the demand. Operations in the Sasebo area, due largely to increased ship discharge and cargo storage requirements, using 5,000 workers per day, presented a particularly serious problem in this regard.

c. With the exception of the Sasebo area, labor requirements were met. Abolition of the Japanese National Labor Mobilization Ordinance, and the consequent loss of the power to force Japanese to work, was advanced by the Director, Sasebo Liaison Office, as the reason for deficiencies in the Sasebo area. With the promulgation and implementation of Welfare Ministry Order No. 41, the legal authority to force Japanese to work, or face imprisonment came into existence. Shortages thereafter dropped off to a negligible number.

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6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. PROCUREMENT

(1) It is recommended that the Corps Procurement Section act as the coordinating agency among Division Procurement Boards; and not be assigned an area of responsibility for procurement.

(2) That the Procurement Section handle only such matters as pertain to the procurement of supplies and services from a Japanese civilian source.

(3) That two Procurement Sections not be assigned to the same area. Each section issues directives causing confusion to all concerned.

(4) That all military supplies and equipment be placed under control of the Disposition Section and not divide the responsibility of the control between two sections.

b. LABOR

(1) It is recommended in future operations that all using units be ordered to estimate their labor requirements for the next six (6) month period, showing projects by month, and to submit these estimates to higher authority for editing and consolidation.

(2) That Division Commanders place the consolidated requisitions with the ranking agency of the Governmental Labor Department in their respective areas, with an accompanying demand that they be filled.

(3) That unit commanders be charged with the responsibility for maintaining closer supervision over native labor assigned their using units so that increased efficiency of operation and reduction of workers can be effected.

(4) That liaison be established, and maintained with ranking Governmental Authorities to insure prompt and efficient distribution to local authorities and procuring agencies of all labor data, statistics, ordinance, orders, and other matter from higher military and governmental authorities.

(5) That labor procurement agencies be studied

Appendix 6 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan,
Contd.

C. CONFIDENTIAL

with the view of recommending, when necessary, changes in
personnel and organizations to higher military and govern-
ment authorities.

ENCLOSURES:

- "A" - Organization Chart
- "B" - PS-1 Form for Procurement.
- "C" - GPA Form 3 - Monthly Report Commodities Services.
- "D" - Report of Captured or Surrendered Supplies and
Equipment.

S. M. Kelly
S. M. KELLY

ENCLOSURE (A)

PROCUREMENT OFFICER
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

LtCol. S. N. Kelly, USMC.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

LtCol. R. S. Howell, USMC.

INTERPRETER

1stLt. J. L. Fischer, USMC.

SURRENDERED
MILITARY SUPPLIES

* Lt. A. W. Marshik, USNR
Lt(jg)R. E. Varney, USNR
1stLt.K. L. Margolis, AUS
Lt(jg)R. Bradshaw, USNR
Lt(jg)R. W. Nordstrom, USNR
Lt(jg)R. E. Costello, USNR
2dLt. R. E. Scott, USMC

ADMINISTRATIVE

* WO. H. B. Horn, USMC

REAL-ESTATE & APPRAISAL
SUPPLIES & SERVICES

* Capt. L. A. Westerberger, AUS
2dLt. L. E. Copeland, USMC

LABOR

* Capt. A. E. Warner, AUS
Lt. H. G. Ihrig, USNR
Mr. Hara (Interpreter)

LIAISON

Cmdr. J. B. Cline (SC) USN, CUB 18
Mr. Harada (from Sasebo Liaison Committee)

* Denotes Section Chief.

Hq VAC

11 November, 1945. (Date)

*SUBJECT: Request for Procurement of Japanese Supplies, Construction Real Estate, Equipment or Facilities.

TO: VAC Procurement Officer, Sasebo, Kyushu.
(Div., Corps, Army)

1. Type of Supplies, Real Estate, Equipment or Facility desired.

Coal

(3 tons washed steam coal)

2. Location Kekinoura

3. Owner (if known) Mr. Sago.

4. Quantity As shown above.

5. Condition (if known) Usable.

6. Method of Delivery Will pick up.

7. Date to be Delivered As soon as possible.

8. Purpose of which Desired To coal British Ship.

9. Unit for which Desired SS FORT BUFFALO

10. Remarks: Ship will anchor as close as possible to coaling dock and Japanese laborers will be required to transfer coal from shore to ship

S/ JOHN DOE,
Commanding.

1st Endorsement

Hq, VAC, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan,
(Div., Corps, Army)

12 November, 1945, To: Japanese Central Liaison Office, Sasebo,
(Date) (Location)

Japan.

1. Approved (or approved with exceptions as noted below).
2. You will cause the above to be delivered to the requesting agency and report when delivery has been completed.
3. Serial No. VAC-001 has been assigned to this demand.
4. Remarks (or exceptions)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCHMIDT, USMC

In triplicate

1 Copy to Procurement Sec File

PS-1 Form

S/ RICHARD ROE
Procurement Officer

(OVER)

2d Endorsement

Japanese Control Liaison Office, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, 13Nov45
(Date)

To: VAC Procurement Officer, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan,
(Div., Corps, Army) (Location)

1. Property covered by above demand is available and may be obtained by contacting Ichizo Nagasawa, at Sasebo Liaison Office
(Individual or Agency) 1339

2. Remarks:

In duplicate

1 Copy to Liaison Office Files S/ S. Sigachuri.
(Name) (title)
Japanese Control Liaison Office.

3d Endorsement

Hq, VAC, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, 13Nov45
(Div., Corps, Army) (Location) (date)

To: SS FORT BUFFALO, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan.
(Requesting Agency) (Location)

1. Property covered by basic request has been procured.
2. This is your authority for taking possession.
3. Remarks:

In Duplicate S/ RICHARD ROE Procurement Offi
(Div., Corps, Army)

4th Endorsement

Hq, SS FORT BUFFALO, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, 14Nov45
(Requesting Agency) (Location) (Date)

To: VAC Procurement Officer Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan.
(Div., Corps, Army) (Location)

1. Property covered by basic request has been received (or received with exceptions noted below).

2. Remarks (or exceptions):
Monetary value ¥2,650 per ton.

In duplicate X3 ton
¥7,950

Note: Both copies to be signed and returned S/ JOHN DOE
Commanding.

5th Endorsement

Hq, VAC, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, 14Nov45
(Div., Corps, Army) (Location) (Date)

To: Japanese Control Liaison Office Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan.
(Location)

1. Forwarded.

Single signed copy forwarded.

Signed copy retained in procurement Sec Files

S/ RICHARD ROE
Procurement Officer.
(Div., Corps, Army)

*Forward Requests in Quadruplicate to Procurement Officer Concerned.

MONTHLY REPORT COMMODITIES SERVICES

RECEIVED, MONTH ENDING 30 November 1945

TO: Office General Procurement Agent, AFPAC

FROM: VAC Headquarters
COMAND

1	2	3	4
	SUPPLIES	SERVICES	EMERGENCY CASH PURCHASES
1. Quartermaster	\$ 11,624.00		
2. Corps of Engineers	3,459.00	\$ 5,539.00	
3. Transportation			
4. Signal Corps		822.00	
5. Chemical Warfare Service			
6. Ordnance			
7. Special Services			
8. Medical Corps			
TOTAL	\$ 15,083.00	\$ 6,361.00	\$

S. M. KELLY,
LtCol., USMC.,
VAC Procure O.

GPA Form #3

This represents a typical monthly report as submitted to SIXTH ARMY for commodities, services, and real estate.

ENCLOSURE "C"

1391

JAP ARMY
JAP NAVY X
JAP ARMY AIR FORCE
JAP NAVAL AIR FORCE

REPORT OF CAPTURED OR SURRENDERED
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

** Sasebo AREA

VAC Headquarters
(Unit Reporting)

From 22 Sept TO 30 Nov., 1945,
Inc.

Class Ordnance (Qm, Ord, Sig, etc.)

ITEMS (1)	Rec. During Period -- This Report 24 November to 30 November, (2) Inc	Accumulative total (To include period of this Report) Rec'd Dispo-: Method: sed of: of Dis+ position (3) (4) *(5) (6)	Bal. on Hand		
Fuzes, primers, Artillery and Mine rds	0	60	60	RJ	
Bombs, A/C, HE, and Incend- iary (Inert) rds	57,700	57,700	57,700	RJ	
Explosives, lbs	0	3000	3000	RJ	
Telescopes ea	0	1	1	O	
Tractors, Prime movers ea	0	8	7	RJ	
Trailers ea	0	13	1	O	
Personnel Carriers ea	0	1	1	RJ	
Motorcycles ea	4	15	8	RJ	
Trucks ea	9	150	140	RJ	
Passenger Cars ea	0	12	12	RJ	
Automotive Equipment Tons	35	36	36	RJ	
Metal Founding Equip. Tons	2	2	2	RJ	
Scrap Iron Tons	165	385	372	RJ	
Scrap Aluminum Tons	1	1	13	O	
Scrap Copper Tons	0	28	28	RJ	
Torpedoes ea	178	183	183	ST*	

* Shipped to US for Intelligence purposes.

NOTE-1 Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report.

*NOTE-2 C-Used for Civilian relief; D - Destroyed;)- Used for Operations; RJ - Returned to Japanese; S-Scrapped; TIT-Trophies issued to troops; ST-Shipped to US for training purposes; SWT-Shipped to US as War Trophies. **Major Location, e.g.-Sasebo, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, etc.

JAP ARMY _____ REPORT OF CAPTURED OR SURRENDERED
 JAP NAVY X SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT
 JAP ARMY AIR FORCE _____
 JAP NAVAL AIR FORCE _____ **Sasebo AREA

VAC Headquarters From 22 Sept. TO 30 Nov., 1945,
 (Unit Reporting) Inc.

Class Quartermaster (QM, Ord, Sig, Etc.)

ITEMS (1)	(2) Inc	(3)	(4)	*(5)	(6)
Bands, f/wrestling, ea	0	:66	:66	RJ	:
Bags, misc., boxes	0	:200	:200	RJ	:
Bars, glass	0	:1424	:1424	RJ	:
Barley, tons	0	:3	:3	RJ	:
Baskets, misc., ass't., ea	1000	:9042	:8030	RJ	:
			:1012	0	:
Beds, each	0	:424	:422	RJ	:
			:2	0	:
Bedwarmers, each	0	:60	:60	RJ	:
Benches, wooden, ea	9	:668	:593	RJ	:
			:75	0	:
Blackboards, each	0	:52	:52	RJ	:
Blocks, wooden	0	:72	:72	RJ	:
Bottles, each	0	:1812	:1809	RJ	:
			:3	0	:
Bowls, cans, buckets, etc.	100	:10151	:9945	RJ	:
			:206	0	:
Boxes, wooden, assorted	0	:936	:886	RJ	:
			:50	0	:
Brushes, each	220	:389	:50	RJ	:
			:339	0	:
Canvas, pcs., bundles	0	:20	:20	RJ	:
Caustic Sodium, bottles	0	:199	:199	RJ	:
Cellophane, bales	0	:2	:2	RJ	:
Chalk, boxes	0	:4	:4	RJ	:
Chairs, each	97	:1223	:598	RJ	:
			:625	0	:
Chests, wooden	2	:165	:144	0	:
			:21	RJ	:
Chimneys, stove, ea	0	:20	:20	RJ	:
Clocks, each	0	:52	:30	RJ	:
			:22	0	:
Cloth, assorted, metres	375	:185834	:184984	RJ	:
			:850	0	:

NOTE-1 Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report.

*NOTE-2 C-used for civilian relief; D - Destroyed; O - used for operations; RJ - Returned to Japanese; S - Scrapped; TIT-Trophies issued to troops; ST-Shipped to US for training purposes; SWT-Shipped to US as War Trophies. **Major Location, e.g. Sasebo, Nagasaki, etc.

ITEMS (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Clothing, ass't, pcs.	0	69335	69260	RJ	
			75	O	
Coal, tons	173	26075	23503	O	
			2572	RJ	
Cooler, water	0	1	1	RJ	
Cord, rolls	0	2497	647	RJ	
			1850	O	
Cotton, mashie, boxes	0	35	35	RJ	
Covers, blanket, each	0	260	260	RJ	
Cups, bamboo, each	0	1500	1100	RJ	
			400	O	
Curtains, each, cloth	0	290	290	RJ	
Desks, wooden, each	11	775	345	RJ	
			430	O	
Dippers, metal, small, ea	0	70	70	RJ	
Dishes, pcs.	3567	196171	187995	RJ	
			8176	O	
Doors, each	0	22	22	O	
Drums, empty	0	1000	1000	RJ	
File, wooden, cabinet, ea	0	5	1	RJ	
			4	O	
Floats, net, bags	308	308	308	RJ	
Flour, bags	0	8	8	RJ	
Food, canned, case	0	1869	1869	RJ	
Freezer, ice cream, ea	0	3	3	RJ	
Funnel, small, ea	0	3	3	RJ	
Fuel, briquet, bundles	0	190	190	RJ	
Grease, tons	0	6	4	RJ	
			2	O	
Graters, wooden, ea	0	200	200	RJ	
Grills, wire, each	0	700	700	RJ	
Hangers, coat	0	100	100	O	
Individual Equipment, pcs.	0	2360	2360	RJ	
Ink, bottles	0	2583	12	O	
			2571	RJ	
kegs	0	600	600	RJ	
Inkstands, each	0	48	48	O	
Instruments, band	0	5	5	O	
Jars, misc., each	0	438	438	RJ	
Jugs, cork, aluminum lined	0	13	13	RJ	
Ladders, each	1	5	3	RJ	
			2	O	
Lifejackets, each	0	1600	1500	RJ	
			100	O	
Lime, chloride of, bags	0	39	34	RJ	
			5	O	
Linen, bales	0	42	42	RJ	
Lineoleum, rolls	3	13	10	O	
			3	RJ	
Locks, mortoise	0	268	268	O	
Lockers, each	26	77	77	RJ	
Marlin, bundles	0	24	24	RJ	
Mats, cases	0	179	174	RJ	
			5	O	
Measures, misc., ea	0	6	6	RJ	

ITEMS (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mirrors, large, cabinet, ea	0	31	28	RJ	
			3	O	
Nets, mosquito, box	0	8	8	RJ	
Office Supplies, misc., case	1765	1864	1851	RJ	
			13	O	
Oil, KL	19	200 $\frac{1}{2}$	180 $\frac{1}{2}$	RJ	
			20	O	
Oiled silk, crates	0	18	18	RJ	
Paddles, wooden, crates	0	20	20	RJ	
Pans, cookers, pots, etc.	47	1178	1178	RJ	
Paper, printing, rolls	0	5081	5066	RJ	
			15	O	
Paper, newsprint, bales	1	426	424	RJ	
			2	O	
Petroleum, KL	0	275	275	RJ	
Pitchers, metal, each	0	75	59	RJ	
			16	O	
Rags, bales	0	40	40	O	
Rice, tons	0	12	12	RJ	
Roller, mimeograph, lge, ea	0	1	1	RJ	
Rims, sieve-sifting, ea	0	48	48	RJ	
Rubber, lbs	0	5475	5475	RJ	
Rubber, rolls	9	50	50	O	
Safes, each	0	14	7	RJ	
			7	O	
Scales, each	4	56	54	RJ	
			2	O	
Screens, hospital	0	41	20	RJ	
			21	O	
Shades, each	0	376	376	RJ	
Shoes & Boots, assorted	0	1955	1955	RJ	
Silverware, pieces	0	200	200	RJ	
Soap, bundles	0	3	3	RJ	
Spit-kits, metal, each	0	71	71	RJ	
Spoons, wooden	0	2000	2000	O	
Stools, wooden, each	0	61	61	O	
Springs, bundles	0	101	101	RJ	
Sticks, misc., bales	0	3	3	RJ	
Stop-cocks, glass, ea	0	236	236	RJ	
Stoves, each	15	99	73	RJ	
			26	O	
Tables, wooden, ea	19	1073	324	O	
			749	RJ	
Tablets, heating	0	92	92	RJ	
Thermometers, each	3	5062	5035	RJ	
			27	O	
Trunks, each	0	100	100	RJ	
Tubs, wooden, wash, 25 gal	0	24	24	RJ	
Type, sets	0	64	64	RJ	
Typewriters, English Char.	0	4	4	RJ	
Typesetters, Japanese, ea	0	6	6	RJ	
Typewriters, Japanese, ea	0	26	26	RJ	
Urns, vases, etc.	0	326	326	RJ	

JAP ARMY _____
 JAP NAVY X
 JAP ARMY AIR FORCE _____
 JAP NAVAL AIR FORCE _____

REPORT OF CAPTURED OR SURRENDERED SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

**Sasebo AREA

VAC Headquarters
(Unit Reporting)

From 22 Sept. TO 30 Nov., 1945,
Inc.

Class Engineer (QM, Ord, Sig, etc.)

	Rec. During Period -- This Report: 24 November to 30 November;	Accumulative total (To include period of this report) Rec'd.: Dispo-: sed of: of Dis-: position	Bal. on Hand		
ITEMS (1)	(2) Inc	(3) (4) (5) *	(6)		
Asbestos Rope, ft.	0	53100	53100	RJ	
Asbestos, sheets	10	20	10	RJ	
			10	O	
Bearing, ball, bxs	5	18	16	RJ	
			2	O	
Belts, each	17	273	256	RJ	
			17	O	
Blocks, steel, each	14	80	60	RJ	
			20	O	
Boats, Japanese, ea	13	19	18	O	
			1	RJ	
Boiler, each	11	14	4	O	
			10	RJ	
Bricks, each	0	30015	30015	RJ	
Bulbs, electric, each	847	6657	5857	O	
			800	RJ	
Cable, feet	100	940831	932631	RJ	
			8200	O	
Cable accessories	0	2450	2450	RJ	
Carbide, kgs	0	450	450	RJ	
Cement, bags	400	1403	800	RJ	
			603	O	
Chain, feet	50	837	837	O	
Charts, books, tables	0	1915	1915	RJ	
Concrete Pipe, w/collars, pcs	0	200	200	O	
Copper & Copper Alloy, shts	15	99	67	RJ	
			32	O	
Dies, pipe, sets	0	3	3	O	
Drafting Equipment, misc. ea	0	457	457	RJ	
Dryers, hot air, each	0	4	4	O	
Electrical appliances	210	21361	20795	RJ	
			566	O	
Electrical Supplies, ea	217	12737	11259	RJ	
			1478	O	

NOTE-1 Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report. *NOTE-2 C-used for civilian relief; D-Destroyed; O-Used for operations; RJ-Returned to Japanese; S-Scrapped; TIT-Trophies issued to troops; ST - Shipped to US for training purposes; SWT-Shipped to US as war Trophies.
 **Major Location, e.g.-Sasebo, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, etc.

ITEMS (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Electrical Equipment, pcs.	432	4722	840	0	
			3882	RJ	
Emerywheel, each	20	194	88	0	
			106	RJ	
Equipment, diving, pcs.	7	115	107	RJ	
			8	0	
Equipment, fire fighting, pcs	1544	3514	1807	RJ	
			1707	0	
Equipment, plumbing, pcs.	10	216	210	RJ	
			6	0	
Engine, combustion, each	0	5	5	RJ	
Firebricks, tons	0	4	3	0	
			1	RJ	
Fireclay, kgs	0	600	600	RJ	
Gas, carbonic, bottles	50	50	50	RJ	
Gasket Material, sheets	0	5	5	0	
Gauges, each	8	188	180	RJ	
			8	0	
Gears, misc.	0	40	40	RJ	
Hand Tools, each	715	1583	618	RJ	
			968	0	
Hardware, misc. (Bolts, nuts, nails, rivets, screws) kegs	22	21222	8971	RJ	
			12251	0	
Hawsers, coils	15	19	12	0	
			7	RJ	
Hoists, each	0	19	12	0	
			7	RJ	
Hose, metres	1050	2826	1436	RJ	
			1390	0	
Iron, sheets, each	2560	3476	3446	0	
			30	RJ	
Lacing, belt, boxes	0	48	48	RJ	
Lanterns, each	0	134	116	RJ	
			18	0	
Lens, protective, each	0	1219	1219	RJ	
Lightstands, w/reflector	0	1	1	0	
Links, each	0	1560	1560	RJ	
Lumber, assorted, CuMet.	0	23	23	RJ	
BdFeet	43500	157300	124775	0	
			32525	RJ	
Lugs, soldering, each	0	144	144	0	
Machine Tools, each	28	56	27	RJ	
			29	0	
Machines, Utility, each	4	34	22	RJ	
			12	0	
Magnesium, kgs	0	100	100	RJ	
Meters, electrical	35	134	75	RJ	
			59	0	
Netting, wire, rolls	0	10	10	0	
Oil, linseed, gals	20	270	260	0	
			10	RJ	
Oilstones, ea	0	34	34	RJ	
Packing Material, misc., lbs	660	1387	1287	RJ	
			100	0	

ITEMS (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Paint, gallons	60	2705	1915	0	
			790	RJ	
Paper, building, sheets	0	1510	1500	0	
			10	RJ	
rolls,	49	1249	1249	0	
Panes, glass, ass't, ea	1150	4040	4040	0	
Parts, misc. (Bicycle, pump, etc)	0	557	557	RJ	
Pipe, assorted, feet	2474	9034	9034	0	
Plate Glass, pcs.	1	70	70	0	
Plumbing Supplies	0	25	25	0	
Plywood, sheets	1559	2009	2009	0	
Pulleys, each	0	895	893	RJ	
			2	0	
Pumps, each	18	68	22	0	
			46	RJ	
Putty, window, lbs	0	500	350	0	
			150	RJ	
Railway rolling stock	0	22	22	0	
Refrigerators, each	2	11	11	0	
Respirators, each	16	16	16	0	
Roofing Material:					
Tile, misc., truckloads	0	10	10	0	
Tar, barrels	2	29	29	0	
Paper, sqft.	0	3000	3000	0	
Rope, manila, coils	0	1078	78	0	
			1000	RJ	
feet	0	9675	9675	RJ	
Sand & Gravel, cu yds	0	6036	6036	0	
Sandpaper, sheets	0	3107	2800	RJ	
			307	0	
Sheet Metal, sheets	226	292	292	0	
Ship parts, misc. (Airports, beacons, buoys, shackles, etc.)	4157	14786	7037	RJ	
			7749	0	
Solder, lbs	400	737	495	0	
			242	RJ	
Spare parts, f/welding equip.	18	338	350	RJ	
			13	0	
Sprayer, paint, sets	1	2	2	0	
Springs, misc., ea	0	161	161	RJ	
Straps & wires, misc., ea	0	1430	1430	RJ	
Tanks, each	0	150	5	0	
			145	RJ	
Tape, rolls	27	150	150	0	
Tape, steel, ft.	0	100	100	0	
Tin, sheets	0	600	200	RJ	
			400	0	
Tools, electrical, ea	25	36	36	0	
Tools, misc., boxes	14	142	29	RJ	
			113	0	
Tools, hydraulic, ea	3	42	39	RJ	
			3	0	
Tools, pneumatic, ea	20	20	20	0	
Tools, f/bricklaying, ea	0	45	45	RJ	
Tools, f/sweeping mines	0	680	680	RJ	1398

ITEMS (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Torches, misc., each	0	3	3	0	
Tripod, surveyor, ea	1	2	2	RJ	
Tubes, copper & glass	0	8247	8247	RJ	
Tubing, ft.	2300	7690	7690	0	
Valves, each	212	237	237	0	
Varnish, gals	30	205	205	0	
Weights, misc., each	4	1964	1960	RJ	
			4	0	
Wire, assorted, ft.	1600	64150	64150	0	
metres	0	24510	24510	RJ	
Welding suits, each	0	3	3	0	
Woodworking Machines, ass't	10	29	29	0	
Wool, insulating, bundles	0	4	4	RJ	

JAP ARMY _____
 JAP NAVY _____
 JAP ARMY AIR FORCE _____
 JAP NAVAL AIR FORCE _____

REPORT OF CAPTURED OR SURRENDERED
 SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

** Sasebo AREA

VAC Headquarters
 (Init Reporting)

From 22 Sept. TO 30 Nov. 1945.
 Inc.

Class Signal (M, Ord, Sig., etc.)

ITEMS (1)	Rec. During Period -- This Report: 24 November to 30 November (2) Inc.	Accumulative total (to include period of this Report) Rec'd Dispo- Method sed of: of Dis- position (3) (4) *(5)	Balance on Hand (6)
Acid, sulphuric, gals	0	:40 :30 :10	RJ O
Amplifiers, each	0	:1 :1	O
Apparatus, recording	0	:4 :4	RJ
Apparatus, underwater Sig	0	:1 :1	O
Batteries, each	186	:4522 :4432 :96	RJ O
Bells, electric, each	0	:527 :77 :450	O RJ
Boards, insulating	1	:4 :4	O
Boxes, signal, misc., ea	0	:459 :448 :11	RJ O
Cable, rolls	0	:29 :28 :1	O RJ
Carbon rod, each	12000	:12000 :12000	RJ
Case, battery	0	:50 :50	RJ
Chargers, battery	0	:44 :6 :38	O RJ
Coils, each	0	:126 :100 :26	O RJ
Conduit, shielded, feet	0	:20 :20	O
Cord, electric, metres	0	:1100 :1100	RJ
Crystals, each	0	:20 :20	O
Fixtures, each	0	:1514 :1514	O
Fuses, each	17	:177 :110 :67	O RJ
Hydrophones, each	0	:7 :7	ST*
Insulators, each	0	:3702 :3009 :693	O RJ
Hydrometers, sets, each	1	:6 :5 :1	O RJ
Irons, soldering	8	:19 :14 :5	O RJ
*Shipped to US for Intelligence purposes			

NOTE-1 Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report.

*NOTE - 2- C-Used for civilian relief; D - Destroyed; O - Used for Operations; RJ - Returned to Japanese; S-Scrapped; TIT-Trophies issued to troops; ST-Shipped to US for training purposes; SWT-Shipped to US as War Trophies. **Major Location, e.g.-Sasebo, Nagasaki, Fukuoka

ITEMS (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Key, telegraph	0	5	3	0	
Lights, signal	0	4	4	RJ	
Magnetic Loop Detectors	0	3	3	0	
Plate Holders	0	10	10	ST*	
Plates, anti-gas	0	10	10	0	
Modulators	0	10	10	0	
Parts, communication, misc.	183	2339	2333	RJ	
Panels, each	0	1087	6	0	
Patchboards, antennae, ea	0	1	12	0	
Power Units, each	0	3	1075	RJ	
Oscilloscopes	0	2	1	0	
Ranging Equipment, echo, sets	0	3	2	0	
Radio	0	7	1	RJ	
Receivers, each	9	94	6	0	
Rectifiers, each	0	33	31	RJ	
Resistors, each	0	1062	63	0	
Rheostat, each	0	46	10	RJ	
Seizing wire, boxes	0	9	23	0	
Sets, telegraph	0	4	1062	RJ	
Speakers, each	75	90	1	0	
Soldering Wire, boxes	0	9	45	RJ	
Sterilizers, medical	0	6	9	0	
Switchboards, each	2	68	4	0	
Supplies, photographic, box	1	4	6	RJ	
Telephone, each	120	652	3	0	
Testing sets, each	20	51	1	RJ	
Tools, communication, misc.	15	15	216	0	
Transmitters, each	8	48	44	RJ	
Tripod Instrument	0	1	7	0	
Tubes, radio, each	7493	13977	15	0	
Units, control, field	0	155	2	RJ	
Units, line filter, each	0	1	46	0	
Units, thermal, each	0	42	1	RJ	
Water distilled, gals	0	50	13657	0	
Wire, electrical, feet	5250	271403	155	RJ	
			1	0	
			42	0	
			50	RJ	
			195102	0	
			73400	RJ	

JAP ARMY _____ REPORT OF CAPTURED OR SURRENDERED
 JAP NAVY XXX SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.
 JAP ARMY AIR FORCE _____
 JAP NAVY AIR FORCE _____ ** Sasebo AREA

VAC Headquarters
 (Unit Reporting)

From 22 Sept to 30 Nov 45.

Class Medical (QM, Ord, Sig., etc)

ITEMS (1)			Rec. During:		Accumulative total		Balance:	
			Period ---	this Report	(to include period of this Report)	on Hand		
			24 Nov.	30 Nov 45.	Rec'd	Dispo-	Method	
			to	(2) Inc.	(3)	(4)	*(5)	(6)
Narcotics (See List)			0					
Quinine & Derivatives	lbs		0		294	294	RJ	0
Bismuth Items	lbs		0		5	5	RJ	0
Drugs (All others)	lbs		0		443437	443437	RJ	0
Dressings	lbs		0		244094	244094	RJ	0
Surgical Instruments	pcs		0		1914	1914	RJ	0
Surgical Appliances (Electrical)	pcs		0		92	92	RJ	0
Surgical Appliances (Non Electrical)	pcs		0		75117	75117	RJ	0
Laboratory Equipment	pcs		0		1352	1346	RJ	0
Laboratory Equipment	pcs		0			6	O	0
Laboratory Glassware	pcs		0		12075	12075	RJ	0
Dental Instruments	pcs		0		253	216	RJ	0
Dental Instruments	pcs		0			37	O	0
Dental Equipment	pcs		0		572	572	RJ	0
Radiographic Equipment (See attached list)	pcs		0		40	40	RJ	0
Hospital Beds	pcs		0		742	742	RJ	0
Hospital cabinets	pcs		0		739	239	RJ	0
Hospital cabinets	pcs		0			500	O	0
Blankets	pcs		0		0	0	O	0
Sheets	pcs		0		0	0	O	0
Pillow cases	pcs		0		0	0	O	0
Towels	pcs		0		0	0	O	0
Div. Field Med. Units Equip	pcs		707		707	707	RJ	0
Platinum Items	lbs		0		0	0	O	0
Gold Items	lbs		0		0	0	O	0

NOTE - 1 Remarks required by any special situation or condition will be referred to on additional sheets attached to this report.

*NOTE - 2- C-Used for civilian relief; D- Destroyed; O -Used for Operations; RJ -Returned to Japanese; S-Scrapped; TIT-Trophies issued to troops; ST-Shipped to US for training purposes; SWT-Shipped to US as War Trophies. **Major Location, e.g.-Sasebo, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, etc

ITEMS (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Narcotics					
Codeine Phosphate lbs	0	5.0	0		5.0#
Tincture Opium lbs	0	9.46	0		9.46#
Opium-scopemina Vials	0	5610.0	0		5610 Vials
Opium Alkaloid 1.1ccVials	0	2100.0	0		2100 Vials
1.2ccVials	0	1110.0	0		1110 Vials
21.0ccVials	0	270.0	0		270 Vials
Morphine HC. Ampoules	0	200.0	0		200 amps.
Dovers Powders lbs	0	1.1	0		1.1 lbs.
Codeine Phosphate tabs	0	25800.0	0		25800 tabs
Morphine HC tabs	0	9700.0	0		9700 tabs
Codeine tabs	0	48900.0	0		48900 tabs
Codeine Phosphate oz.	0	13.0	0		13 oz.
Radiographic Equipment					
Generator X-ray	0	3	3	RJ	0
Tube X-ray	0	5	5	RJ	0
Cassettes	0	5	5	RJ	0
X-ray Unit Portable	0	2	2	RJ	0
Developing Tank	0	8	8	RJ	0
View Box	0	5	5	RJ	0
Film cutting rule	0	2	2	RJ	0
Flourescopic Screen	0	3	3	RJ	0
Film Markers (set)	0	3	3	RJ	0
X-ray Photographic Stand	0	1	1	RJ.	0
Kanetron Tube	0	3	3	RJ	0

Appendix 7 to Annex EASY
to VAC Operations Report
Occupation of JAPAN
LOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

ENCLOSURE (G)

HEADQUARTERS,
PROVISIONAL MOTOR TRANSPORT GROUP,
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945.

From: Corps Motor Transport Officer.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Motor Transport Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATORY PHASE:

a. Plans for the invasion of JAPAN were received and studied and subsequently these plans were altered to apply to the Occupation of JAPAN. Insofar as it pertained to Motor Transport, the change in plans did not materially effect this section. A Motor Transport Plan was formulated and distributed to organizations concerned. The plan specified that each unit would meet its own transportation requirements with organic equipment insofar as possible. Transportation problems beyond the capacity of units would be referred to the Corps Motor Transport Officer for co-ordination with other sources within the Corps.

b. List of vehicles to be lifted for the operation were submitted by the units. These lists were studied and the equipment shown was sufficient to perform the duties required. Due to lack of shipping in the initial echelon, units were directed to load all light vehicles including one-quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) ton trailers and a minimum of sixty (60) percent of heavy vehicles. Excess equipment to be lifted in turn-around shipping or rear echelon shipping. In the case of the Second Marine Division available shipping made it possible for their transportation to be loaded out 100%, while the Fifth Marine Division were required to leave approximately 40% of their transportation in the rear echelon.

c. Arrangements were made by this section to obtain additional transportation equipment from other sources to assist Corps units in loading out at MAUI. The Fourth Marine Division and the 18th Service Battalion rendered valuable assistance in that respect with the result that all times sufficient equipment was at our disposal. Corps units were loaded with a minimum of delay from the motor transport angle.

2. OPERATION PHASE:

a. Debarking at the target, a survey was made to locate suitable areas for motor transport units. Motor pools were established and functioning in a short period of time.

b. Unloading was simplified due to the availability of piers at SANSEBO. Piers were cleared of cargo as rapidly as it could be handled. Sufficient transportation was available to support the unloading.

c. Inasmuch as ship to shore unloading was unnecessary, DUKWS played a very minor role, being employed as cargo trucks to supplement the vehicles of the Fifth Marine Division until their motor transport was fully unloaded. In view of the foregoing circumstances, there are no special recommendations or suggestions at this time.

ENCLOSURE (G) APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX EASY TO VAC OPERATION REPORT "OCCUPATION OF JAPAN"

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d. Cargo Carriers, M29C (Weasels) were employed only as wire laying vehicles and for cross-country reconnaissance. Streets and highways were available for conventional vehicles thereby restricting the necessity of specialized equipment such as the "Weasel". Another factor in this respect, there were no wounded to transport, a very important function of both the DUKW and Weasel in hostile landings and a part so excellently performed by those two vehicles in previous operations. No unusual incidents were reported pertaining to "Weasel" therefore no recommendations are made.

e. Amphibian trailers were not brought to this area.

f. The motor transport in general was very satisfactory, having sufficient personnel, vehicles, repair facilities and spare parts. The only shortages were tire and tube repair material and these items were requisitioned by dispatch for air shipment. Condition of docks, streets and highways accounted for the large amount of tire failures. No casualties were suffered or equipment destroyed as a result of enemy action. Due to the nature of the operation, ample transportation was ashore at all times.

g. A Corps Motor Transport Group was provided to meet increased transport needs of Corps including reinforcements of Division as the situation required. Army units included in the Group were Headquarters and Headquarters Section 71st Quartermaster Battalion, 384th Quartermaster Truck Company, 4015th Quartermaster Truck Company, 3581st Quartermaster Truck Company, 3873rd Quartermaster Gas Supply Company, 3475th Ordnance M.A. Company, 3540th Ordnance M.A. Company. These units function as a part of the Group and during this time all transportation requirements were met and ample transportation was always ashore. Some difficulty was experienced in the early phases, in making repairs to Army Vehicles attached to Corps due to the lack of spare parts for vehicles peculiar to Army. These Army units are now attached to the 32nd Infantry Division doing convoy duty between SASEBO and FUKUOKA.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that whenever Army or Navy units are attached to Marine activities that provisions be made to insure that sufficient spare parts are available to make repairs on vehicles not common to the Marine Corps.

b. Inasmuch as the Occupation of JAPAN was similar to "house-keeping" on a large scale there are no further recommendations pertaining to motor transport at this time.

GUY E. TANNYHILL,
Lt. Col., USMC.

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Appendix 8 to Annex EASY
to VAC Operations Report
Occupation of JAPAN

SHORE BRIGADE REPORT

0145/227

SHORE BRIGADE
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

30 November, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.
Enclosures: (A) Task Organization of Shore Brigade for
assault landing on Southern KYUSHU.
(B) Task Organization of Shore Brigade for
Occupation.

1. ORGANIZATION.

Headquarters Company, Shore Brigade, V Amphibious Corps was organized on 4 August, 1945, with strength of six (6) commissioned officers, one (1) warrant officer, and eight (8) enlisted men, the personnel having been assembled beginning 12 July, 1945, with assignment of Colonel Francis I. FENTON, USMC, as Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade. The organization intended for the assault landing on Southern KYUSHU is shown in Enclosure A. The organization for the occupation is shown in Enclosure B.

2. TRAINING.

Training consisted of instructions in individual duties of officers and men; familiarization with Shore Party SOP for FMF and for separate Divisions; inspection of equipment of Pioneer Battalions; witnessing Shore Party demonstrations. Training of attached units of the task organization was conducted at distant stations and in no case was it prescribed by the Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade.

3. During the planning phase, 12 July, 1945, to 30 August, 1945, the Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade attended conferences of V Amphibious Corps and other Headquarters. Plans were made for employment of Shore Brigade components. Definitions relating to duties of component units of the Shore Brigade and restrictions on their employment are enumerated in Annex CHARLIE to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 and in V Amphibious Corps Operation Order 1-45 and 2-45.

Appendix 8 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

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4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. (1) On A-1, the Executive Officer came ashore in SASEBO as a member of a reconnaissance group and reconnoitered the area tentatively assigned to 8th Service Regiment. Headquarters Company, Shore Brigade, disembarked on 23 September, 1945 at SASEBO, JAPAN and established a CP at the HARBOR MASTER QUAY in the Navy Yard. Beginning upon landing liaison was established with the Beachmasters, Garrison Boat Pool, 8th Service Regiment, Garrison Beach Battalion, 5th Pioneer Battalion, Transportation Units, and CUB 18 Headquarters.

(2) During the initial landing period, 23-28 September, 1945, the Shore Brigade did not perform the duties for which designed. Its activities involved minor arrangements for boats, trucks, equipment, and working parties. Since only one Division Shore Party functioned in the immediate area the Shore Brigade did not at any time have operational control of the units performing unloading operations. On 28 September, 1945, functions of the Shore Brigade were discontinued and all personnel assigned to temporary additional duty in other organizations.

b. (1) Beginning 23 October, 1945, the Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade, by Corps General Order No 21-45, was assigned, quote "responsibility for the coordination and supervision of unloading (and of reloading where necessary) of all supply shipping at SASEBO, including the assignment of available personnel and equipment to specific ships. He will make timely requests for the withdrawal of empty vessels and for berthing vessels to be discharged. All agencies concerned with furnishing personnel and equipment and with disposition of cargo as unloaded will cooperate with the Commanding Officer, Shore Brigade in effecting the maximum utilization of the means available." Personnel available for the duty involved varied from two (2) officers and one (1) enlisted man to three (3) officers and three (3) enlisted men. Remaining officers and enlisted men were assigned to duty with Procurement Section.

(2) These responsibilities were assumed by carrying out the following procedures:

(a) Periodic conferences at three (3) or four (4) day intervals with following attendance:

1. Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and Transportation Officer of Shore Brigade.

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Appendix 8 to Annex EASY to Operation Report, Occupation of
JAPAN, (Contd).

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2. Corps TQM.
3. Commanding Officer, 12th Motor Force. (Corps Motor Transport Officer).
4. Commanding Officer and Supply Officer, CUB 18.
5. Commanding Officer, 1st Special Naval Construction Battalion.
6. 8th Service Regiment: Commanding Officer; Executive Officer; S-4, Supply Battalion; Officer-in-Charge Shipping and Receiving Department; General Supply Officer; Motor Transport Officer.
7. Commanding Officer, 360th Port Battalion.
8. Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, 5th Pioneer Battalion.

(b) Inspection of unloading at ships, in dumps, and warehouses.

(c) Requests for movements of vessels to fit unloading priorities.

(d) Arranging for traffic control, berths, labor, equipment, vehicles, boats, cranes, and buildings for use as warehouses.

(e) Assignment of stevedore crews.

5. RECOMMENDATION;

a. That the Shore Brigade be retained for the assault phase function for which designed.

~~W. A. REAVES~~
W. A. REAVES.

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Enclosure (A) to Appendix 8 to Annex EASY to Operation Report,
Occupation of JAPAN.

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1. Task Organization of Shore Brigade for assault
landing on Southern KYUSHU.

Shore Brigade
 Command Group
 HqCo Shore Brigade
 Shore Party Com Unit
 Com TransGrp FIVE Beachmaster
 8th Service Regiment (less Dets plus Assgd units)
 33rd Mar Dep Co
 36th Mar Dep Co
 43d Mar Dep Co
 8th Mar Ammo Co
 1st Salv Coll Co (Prov) (Less 3 Plats)
 1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
 1st Fum and Bath Co (Prov)
 1st & 2d Bkry Plats (Prov)
 2d Ammo Renov Plat
 Bomb Disp Co H&S Bn VAC (less 2 Plats)
 Hq & Hq Co 1131st Engr (C) Co
 773rd Engr Dump Trk Co (w/Dr Det)
 1474th Engr Pet Dist Co
 Det 781st Engr Pet Dist Co
 1st Plat 439th Engr Dep Co
 Hq & Hq Det 165th Ord Bn
 120th Ord MM Co
 410th Ord MM Co
 421st Ord Evac Co
 359th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Field Army)
 2nd Plat 99th Cml Serv Co
 Hq & Hq Det 327th QM Bn
 4493rd QM Serv Co
 4295th QM Gas Sup Co
 1 Plat (less 1 Sec) 558th QM Rhd Co
 369th QM Fum and Bath Co
 316th QM Bkry Co (less 2 Plats & 2 Secs)
 4th Plat 464th QM Ldry Co
 Det 588th QM Ldry Co
 Hq & Hq Det 693d QM Bn
 4076th QM Serv Co
 3873rd QM Gas Sup Co
 491st QM Dep Sup Co
 228th QM Salv Coll Co
 565th QM Rhd Co

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Enclosure (A) to Appendix 8 to Annex EASY to Operation Report,
Occupation of JAPAN, (Contd).

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62d Med Base Dep Co (556 Optical Rep Tm atchd)
102d Vet Food Insn Det
Second Division Shore Party
2d Pioneer Bn
43d NCB
24th Mar Dep Co 8th Serv Regt
Det 8th Serv Regt (Liaison)
35th Repln Draft
74th Repln Draft
6th Mar Ammo Co 8th Serv Regt
1st Plat Bomb Disp Co VAC
1st Plat 1st Salv Coll Co 8th Serv Regt
Transron 16 Beach Party
Third Division Shore Party
3d Pioneer Bn
52d NCB
42d Mar Dep Co 8th Serv Regt
Det 8th Serv Regt (Liaison)
67th Repln Draft
75th Repln Draft
10th Mar Ammo Co
2d Plat Bomb Disp Co VAC
2d Plat 1st Salv Coll Co 8th Serv Regt
Transron 12 Beach Party
Fifth Division Shore Party
5th Pioneer Bn
116th NCB
34th Mar Dep Co 8th Serv Regt
Det 8th Serv Regt (Liaison)
70th Repln Draft
78th Repln Draft
3d Plat 1st Salv Coll Co 8th Serv Regt
Transron 22 Beach Party
CUB 18 (Tentative)
Log Sup Cos (4)
NCB Sol (2)

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Enclosure (B) to Appendix 8 to Annex EASY to Operation Report,
Occupation of JAPAN.

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1. Task Organization of Shore Brigade for Occupation.
Task Organization
Shore Brigade
Command Group
HqCo Shore Brigade
Shore Party Com Unit
Com Philb Grp FOUR Beachmaster
8th Serv Rept (Reinf) (less dets)
24th Mar Dep Co
36th Mar Dep Co
42d Mar Dep Co
43d Mar Dep Co
6th Mar Ammo Co
10th Mar Ammo Co
1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)
1st Fum & Bath Co (Prov)
1st Bkry Plat (Prov)
Bomb Disp Co H&S Bn VAC (less 3d Plat)
Air Del Sec VAC SerCom
Hq&Hq Det 327th QM Bn
565th QM Rhd Co
44933 QM Serv Co
3242d QM Serv Co
Det 790th Ry Oper Co
1st Plat 120th QM Bkry Co
Hq&Hq Det 693d QM Bn
362d QM Serv Co
One Plat 369th QM Ldry Co (SM)
235th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
239th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)
3d Plat 120th QM Bkry Co
101st QM Graves Regr Plat
633d Port Co
153d Port Co
553d Sig Dep Co
62d Med Base Dep Co (556th Optical Rep
Tm Atchd)
Second Division Shore Party
2d Pioneer Bn
43d NCB
Transon 16 Beach Party
Third Division Shore Party

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3d Pioneer Bn
52d NCB
Transron 12 Beach Party
Fifth Division Shore Party
5th Pioneer Bn
116th NCB
33d Mar Dep Co
34th Mar Dep Co
8th Mar Ammo Co
3d Plat Bomb Disp Co H&S Bn VAC
Transron 22 Beach Party
CUB 18 (less dets)
(Principal Units as follows)
Garr Boat & Barge Pool
Garr Beach Bn #1
Mobile Comm Unit
1st Spl NCB
72d NCB
FOUR (4) Logistics Support Co's.
Port Director Unit.

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APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX EASY
TO VAC OPERATIONS REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

PERIODIC REPORTS

ENCLOSURE (I)

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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS⁰³⁹⁸
IN THE FIELD

- OCCUPATION OF JAPAN -

SIGNAL Report

Annex FOX

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Annex FOX to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

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Serial: 0775B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

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From: The Signal Officer.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Report by Signal Officer, Occupation of
Japan.

1. PLANNING

a. Planning Staff.

Planning for the seizure and occupation of KYUSHU began on 31 May, 1945. At that time the Corps Signal Section was composed of six officers who had participated in all phases of the Iwo Jima Operation, with the addition of four experienced officers who had recently joined the Corps. Colonel J. P. BERKELEY joined on 31 May, 1945, and relieved Lieutenant Colonel H. W. G. VADNAIS as Signal Officer on 18 July, 1945. Thus the new Signal Officer was present during the entire planning phase. The planning staff as finally assembled consisted of the following officers:

Col James P. BERKELEY	Signal Officer.
LtCol Henry J. REVANE	Executive Officer.
LtCol Robert HALL	CommunicationO.
LtCol Thomas F. FORRESTER	Shore Brigade CommO.
Capt John W. WEBBER	Signal Supply.
Capt Arthur I. CHAPPELL	Pers. & AdminO.
1stLt Rex A. COLLINGS JR.	Assistant CommO
1stLt Wayne R. JOHNSON	Archivist.

b. Detailed Plans.

(1) General.

The Signal Plan (Annex HOW to Operation Order No. 2-45) was in general a consolidation of the accumulated experiences of previous plans and operations adjusted to fit details as issued in the directives of higher echelons. It was decided that no Signal Operation

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Instructions would be issued, since the Signal Annex would contain all necessary orders and instructions.

(2) Evolution of the Plan.

The plan evolved in five steps as follows:

(a) Rough draft of Signal Annex for an operation in China, dated 9 May, 1945.

(b) First tentative draft of Signal Annex for an operation in Southern Kyushu, dated 9 July, 1945.

(c) Second tentative draft of (b) above dated 9 August, 1945.

(d) Final draft of (Annex How to Operation Plan No. 1-45), dated 9 August, 1945.

(e) Annex HOW to Operation Plan No. 2-45, for the Occupation of Kyushu and Southern Honshu, dated 24 August, 1945.

(3) Liaison.

Because of the complicated chain of command in an amphibious operation, the preparation of a communication plan requires coordination among a great many offices. All echelons must work concurrently since there is insufficient time for each echelon to wait until the next higher headquarters completes its plan. Excellent Signal liaison was maintained with the Headquarters, SIXTH Army through a Marine Signal Officer (LtCol Carl A. LASTER, USMC.), attached to the Staff of the Senior Marine Officer, SIXTH Army. Liaison was assisted through the medium of copies of journals and advance copies of orders and directives furnished by this liaison officer to the Corps Signal Officer. The Signal Officer and the Communication Officer both made trips to Luzon for conferences with SIXTH Army Signal officers.

Liaison could have been improved by attaching to Corps Headquarters a signal officer from the SIXTH Army.

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(4) Signal Plan (See Annex Able)

(a) Frequencies.

The problem of frequency assignment and control of frequencies has become more and more acute as operations have become progressively larger. This problem may be solved in part by cutting down the number of frequencies, by the use of crystals and by multiple use of VHF frequencies.

All three of these methods were used in this operation. The Signal Officer requested that 120 medium and high frequencies be assigned for the use of Corps and Divisions; 64 were provided. Crystals were procured on the basis of a preliminary draft of the SIXTH Army frequency plan received 5 August, 1945. These frequencies were correct in most cases. SIXTH Army planned to duplicate the use of VHF frequencies in each corps area except for a certain few reserved for Naval use.

(b) Call Signs.

Since SIXTH Army did not intend to use any landing force call signs listed in PAC 71, VAC used these call signs for its units. If no call was listed for a unit a spare call was assigned. The equivalent of a landing force revision of PAC 71 was prepared. In early drafts, call from PAC 71 were assigned to attached Army units though it had been planned to assign them from a block, later to be assigned from SIXTH Army SOI. As it turned out, the SIXTH Army SOI was received too late to use the calls therein. It was also planned to request that CINCPAC issue VAC calls as a change to PAC 71, but the change in plans due to the surrender of Japan did not allow sufficient time.

(c) Cryptographic Plan.

Major elements of the cryptographic plan included the following items:

Authentication between SIXTH Army and VAC was to be in accordance with the authentication in the Aircraft Code (CSP 1270). Since authentication to lower units was left up to Commander VAC, it was decided to continue to employ the Shackle Cipher (PAC-6).

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Annex FCM to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

Hagelin (CSP 1500/1607) was prescribed as the primary crypto system for tactical communications in all units.

Four ECM-CCM Channels were listed for communication between Corps and higher units.

The Joint Army Navy Strip (CSP 1145/46) was to be held by Corps and Divisions.

One Navy Strip Channel (CSP 1409/10) was also to be held by Corps and Divisions.

In addition, Corps and Divisions were to carry a complete class 5 allowance of crypto aids to be landed on order of the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.

It had been planned to carry the combined assault code (CCBP-0130), but at the last minute this idea was abandoned.

(d) Safehand Airplane Courier Service.

The SIXTH Army Field Order, as is Army normal procedure, provided for Safehand Airplane courier service to relieve congestion on electrical means of communications. This was the first time that the Corps had functioned under an Army and had such services available.

(e) Radio Link Communications.

The Corps Headquarters had been provided with a radio teletype team in the Iwo Jima operation to maintain communications with the Headquarters ship. Shortly after that operation the Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps, received its first radio link equipment. It was planned to use radio link equipment extensively as follows:

To SIXTH Army Headquarters (Ashore)
To each Division
To the USS McKinley (utilizing equipment to be furnished by the Navy).

The plan provided that RESTRICTED

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and CONFIDENTIAL traffic could be transmitted in the clear over radio link voice and teletype circuits. Traffic previously encrypted would of course require paraphrasing and assignment of a new date time group. Higher directives did not assign any frequencies for radio link, therefore the plan did not list necessary frequencies.

(f) Signal Intelligence.

Available Signal Intelligence was negligible and consisted largely of information from pre-war sources. A summary of available data was issued as a Signal Intelligence Bulletin on 29 August, 1945.

(g) Air Warning.

Information from higher echelons regarding Air Warning was so limited that only a skeleton plan (Annex Love to Operation Plan No. 2-45) was drawn up. This plan merely placed responsibility for air warning, and listed correct visual and sound signals.

(h) Plans of higher Navy units did not provide for joint communication center. Ground units were to guard Navy circuits until such time as Navy Shore Communications might be established. No base communication plan was ever received by this Headquarters.

(i) Last-minute Revisions.

The Signal Plan was slightly changed after issue due to directives from higher echelons and discovery of minor errors. Addendum Number 1, dated 29 August, 1945, deleted the 2nd Provisional AAA Group and changed frequencies to fit SIXTH Army SOI. Addendum Number 2, dated 12 September, 1945, deleted the 3rd Marine Division and substituted 32nd Infantry Division therefore.

2. TRAINING

a. General Training.

General training for the Corps was prescribed in Corps Training Order No. 3-45 dated 26 April, 1945. Training of the Corps in Signal Communications was directed by Annex Baker of the same order. This directive emphasized various training measures to improve communica-

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tions, prescribed frequencies not to be interfered with on training nets and provided training shackle alphabets and call signs. Frequencies for training had already been prescribed by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Later addenda to the training order established drill radio circuits with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, radio intelligence training, entrance of the Corps into the Amphibious Forces radio drill net, and entrance of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Group (Prov) into the Corps training nets.

During the months of July and August, extensive training in general combat was carried on, including combat swimming, booby traps, grenade throwing, firing of weapons, infiltration and village fighting.

Communication exercises were conducted in conjunction with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Group (Prov) during the month of June. Complete facilities for wire, message center and radio were established with the 4th Marine Division and the Tractor Group. Radio drill nets were maintained with the 5th Marine Division. Combat conditions were simulated. Another full scale communications exercise was held during the first part of August in which all possible facilities of wire, radio and message center were utilized under simulated combat conditions, with an attempt to approximate the terrain and general conditions likely to be encountered during the coming operation.

During these training periods it was generally possible for all men of the Signal Battalion to take part, except some key personnel necessary to run the installations at Corps Headquarters. However, such personnel were given the opportunity to at least visit the field installations and become acquainted with the operations. The training noted above was considered adequate in spite of interference from normal Corps Headquarters operations.

b. Radio Counter-measures Training.

A radio countermeasures training team was available during practically all of the training period. In April through June the team conducted intense classroom training visiting the 4th Marine Division, 5th Marine Division, 1st Amphibian Tractor Group and Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps. From that time on the team was used in

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connection with drill circuits of the Corps and Division. Both jamming and deception were used on various drill nets with no advance warning. Daily reports were submitted to the units involved. Such training is believed to be valuable, though there has been no testing of results in actual combat by this organization.

c. Carrier and Radio Link Training.

Carrier and radio link personnel and equipment were waiting for this Headquarters when it returned to MAUI from IWO JIMA. It was decided to utilize this equipment partly for training and partly in the normal camp communication system. Operations as follows were undertaken:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>RELAY</u>	<u>CIRCUITS UTILIZED</u>
VAC to 4th MarDiv	Carrier	0	2 Tp & 1TT
VAC to 1st ProvAmTracGp	Radio Link	0	2 Tp & 1TT
VAC to FMF, Pac	Radio Link	1	2 Tp & 1TT
VAC to 5th MarDiv	Radio Link	1	2 Tp & 1TT

3. ORGANIZATION

a. Task Organization (See Annex Able to Operation Plan Number 2-45).

Signal Bn, VAC Reinforced	LtCol SMART
Signal Bn, VAC	LtCol SMART
Hq Company	Capt GLEASON
51st Sig Opn Co.	Capt HYLAND
51st Sig Constr. Co.	Capt ETHERIDGE
52nd Sig Constr. Co.	Capt KUJOVSKY
1st Sep Radio Intelligence Plt	1stLt ERWIN
5th Sep Radio Intelligence Plt	1stLt SMITH
Co C, 60th Signal Bn	1stLt THOMPSON

b. 52nd Signal Construction Company.

This unit had been located at GUAM, attached to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, until 2 September, 1945, when it was returned to Operational control of V Amphibious Corps. It had performed considerable cable construction work in GUAM which aided its training. This company was in excellent operating condition and left GUAM fully equipped in time to land at SASEBO on 24 September, 1945.

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c. Company C, 60th Signal Battalion.

This Army unit arrived in SASEBO with little being known about its operating abilities or state of readiness. It is a heavy construction company and was utilized for installation of cable lines in SASEBO area until sent to FUKUOKA to perform missions in support of Fifth Fighter Command.

d. Radio Intelligence Platoons.

Because of lack of shipping it was necessary to leave a portion of one radio intelligence platoon (1 officer and 18 enlisted) plus all its equipment in MAUI. This platoon was later disbanded and the rear echelon never reached JAPAN, the forward echelon being absorbed by the 5th Radio Intelligence Platoon.

4. MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

a. Loading Plan.

<u>NAME OF SHIP</u>	<u>NO.OFFICERS</u>	<u>NO.ENLISTED</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>
AGC-7 USS MT.MCKINLEY	SigBn 9	49	4
LSV-4 USS SAUGUS	SigBn 13	116	32
APA-29 USS DAWSON	5th RI 0	12	
	SigBn 30	342	38
AKA-36 USS RENATE	SigBn 9	156	66
	1st RI 1	22	
	5th RI 0	22	
APA-30 USS JEFFERSON			
	SP Comm Unit 2	35	4
LST 112	5th RI 1	19	11
	5th MarDiv 0	6	
LST 950	52nd SigConstr 11	182	35
Rear Echelon	SigBn 1	49	21
	1st RI 1	18	13
TOTAL	18	1028	224

b. Operation Aboard USS MT. MCKINLEY.

(1) General.

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The V Amphibious Corps Message Center opened aboard the USS MT. MCKINLEY on 1 September, 1945. Signal Battalion personnel were divided as follows:

OFFICERS:

Signal Officer	1
Communication Officer	1
Radio Officer (Supply Officer)	1
Administrative Officer	1
Message Center&Coding Officer	5
	<u>9</u>

ENLISTED:

Radio	26
Radio Link (used as msgrs)	7
Message Center	3
Code Talker	4
Other	3
	<u>49</u>

The seven radio link, carrier personnel were used to operate radio link communication to Headquarters Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, as long as possible, then brought aboard the Headquarters ship with their equipment, since this was the last ship loaded.

Additional personnel were transferred from the USS SAUGUS to the USS MT. MCKINLEY on arrival in the objective areas as follows:

Radio Officer	1
Coding Officers	2
Message Center (enlisted)	7

(2) Message Center.

(a) Operation at Sea.

Until 15 September, the Naval Communication Center wrote up all traffic. After this time a four section watch was established with personnel on each watch as follows:

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CWO	Distribution of Secret and Top Secret.
Supervisor	Distribution of Confidential and lower.
Typist	
Tube Operator	
Runner.	

The outgoing traffic was logged by the Marine CWO after assignment of a date-time group by the Naval CWO, then returned to Naval CWO for later handling including write-up.

Traffic for VAC had increased greatly by 15 September, 1945. Some delays in the previous system were noticed; therefore, the Corps message center took over responsibility of handling all functions except coding. This system relieved the Navy section of some work and generally speeded up the handling of traffic. The co-operation of the ship's communication staff was excellent throughout.

(b) Operation at SASEBO.

Upon arrival at the objective, additional personnel were utilized plus personnel already available and a three section watch was established with personnel on each watch as follows:

- 1 CWO
- 1 Ass't CWO
- 1 Supervisor
- 2 Typists
- 1 Ditto Operator
- 2 Runners
- 1 Code Talker.

(c) Distribution.

Distribution was in general the same as at MAUI in accordance with Corps Special Order No. 36-45. Message delivery by boat was handled by the Officer Messenger Mail Center operating under the Corps Adjutant.

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(3) Radio.

Radio operation was routine except for the addition of the VHF-TBS circuit enroute to the objective for administrative traffic between Headquarters, auxiliary Headquarters and the 5th Marine Division. For information only, the circuits between SIXTH Army and the Second JAPANESE Army (14035, 14400) were copied.

Circuits manned included:

<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>TRANSMITTER</u>	<u>RECEIVER</u>
Army Command #1 (CW)	6020/3388	TDE	RBB
VAC Command (CW)	1580	TDE	RBB
VAC Command (V)	2108	TCS	RBS
VAC Command (FM)	28.4	SCR 608	SCR 608
VAC SP Lat (V)	2016	TCS	RBS
VAC Control (FM)	35.0	SCR 608	SCR 308
5thMarDivComd (FM)	27.8	SCR 508	SCR 308

(4) Training:

Training enroute was limited to general briefing because of the normal operation of communication facilities.

(5) Code Talkers (Navajos).

Code talkers were given practice by transmitting drill messages over a system of AE-8 telephones installed in various parts of the ship and over the Corps TBS net. With one exception, the talkers assigned to Corps Headquarters had not taken part in the re-standardization course held in Pearl Harbor during April and May of 1945, and they had received no refresher training since leaving a unit in which their services as talkers had not been extensively employed. However, as a result of extensive training enroute to the objective, their operation was satisfactory.

c. Operation Aboard USS S. AUGUS.

Initial plans for the southern KYUSHU operation envisioned the assignment of a standby command ship.

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This would not only provide a complete command ship in case the regular command ship was incapacitated; it would also provide overload facilities for staff officers who were not quartered on the Headquarters ship yet had to operate from it at the objective; it would provide a means for these staff officers to keep informed of the situation and it would furnish a complete advance command party ready to land at any time with full information. A landing ship vehicular would provide ample space to load the equipment and personnel needed in a Corps advance CP party, but is not suitable for an alternate command ship in that it lacks the facilities and space needed to accommodate a corps headquarters staff.

The SAUGUS (LSV-4) was assigned to this Corps to be used as an auxiliary command ship. Commander Fifth Amphibious Force requested the Administrative Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific, to install the following equipment on the SAUGUS:

Radio Link equipment and teletype equipment:

- 1 Telephone Terminal (CF-1A)
- 1 Telegraph Terminal (CF-2A)
- 1 Switchboard (BD-71)
- 1 Receiver (R-19/TRC-1)
- 1 Transmitter (T-14/TRC-1)
- 2 Ringing equipment (EE-101-A)
- 2 Teleprinter (TG-7A)

Radio Equipment

- 2 Receivers BC-312-M
- 2 Rectifiers RA-83-A
- 2 Receivers (BC-683)
- 2 Receivers (RBM)
- 2 Speakers (LS-3)
- 2 Transmitters (BC-191-F)
- 2 Transmitters (MBF)
- 5 Receivers (BC-779-B)

The SAUGUS arrived in KAHULUI, MAUI on 23 August, 1945. Neither the Captain nor the Communication Officer had been informed of the above request or the ship's

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mission in the operation. It was decided to put a crew of radio and radio link technicians from Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps, aboard the ship and have it ordered immediately to Pearl Harbor to procure the equipment.

The receiving equipment provided bore no relation to the Corps major frequency plan; so, Signal Battalion radios were installed where necessary. The radio link equipment was incomplete and a different type than that on the MT, MCKINLEY so could not be used.

Enroute to JAPAN communication with the MT, MCKINLEY and the USS WESTMORELAND (5th MarDiv) was maintained by using a TBS frequency and the MBF. At the objective, complete coverage of the major frequencies was provided.

The SAUGUS proved of little value as an auxiliary command ship since the occupation progressed so fast that it was unloaded immediately.

5. OCCUPATION OPERATIONS

a. Preliminary Reconnaissance.

Preliminary reconnaissance was negligible. The Signal Section was allotted one enlisted man in the advance party which left SAIPAN on 14 September and arrived at Nagasaki on 16 September. MTSgt. BOATRIGHT, Signal Battalion Wire Chief, was able to obtain some information on status of pole lines and general lack of long lines as of that date due to a recent typhoon. He brought back photographs of naval switchboards, maps of line routes and much general information that was of value to the Signal Officer.

b. Narrative of Occupation.

22 September, 1945. Small advance party ashore at 0900. Temporary message center established on beach. Radio communication using radio jeeps established by 1030.

23 September, 1945. NCO club at SASEBO Naval Station selected for Corps CP. Balance of advance

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message center ashore at 1000 and in full operation at 1400. Class 5 crypto allowances ashore at 1100. Visual tower in operation. Commanding General assumed command ashore at 1600. Complete MTC-2 switchboard installed by 2400.

24 September, 1945. Cable installed to 5th Marine Division. Radio teletype in operation to MT. MCKINLEY. Permanent radio station established in Headquarters building.

26 September, 1945. Two spiral four lines begun to OMURA. Cable to NAS SASEBO installed. Radio link installed to 2nd Marine Division at NAGASAKI.

27 September, 1945. MT. MCKINLEY sailed. Port Director ashore. Telephone directory issued. Japanese military and navy authorities ordered to furnish complete information regarding facilities in the Corps zone. Five pair cable completed to new 5th Marine Division CP at AINOURA. Executive Officer, Signal Section, to FUKUOKA with advance party.

28 September, 1945. 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions authorized to skeletonize ASCOS (291435). Cable laid to MT. SASEBO radio relay station. Radio link to OMURA complete.

29 September, 1945. SIXTH Army asked to assist in arranging telephone circuits to KYOTO (291150I). Telephone communication established to FUKUOKA and KANOYA through commercial facilities. Cable to OMURA completed.

30 September, 1945. Assumed guard for Port Director SASEBO on George Fox. Tiger Blue exchange in operation (BOQ). Radio relay station at MT. SASEBO complete.

2 October, 1945. FUKUOKA Occupation Force CP opened. Communication to 2nd Marine Division at NAGASAKI by commercial lines. Radio link detail left for FUKUOKA.

3 October, 1945. C Company, 60th Signal Battalion to FUKUOKA.

4 October, 1945. Radio link to FUKUOKA installed.

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6 October, 1945. OMURA-SASEBO spiral four line completed.

8 October, 1945. SIXTH Army 6M radio circuit opened (080850/I). Commercial line SASEBO to KUMAMOTO procured for use of 2nd Marine Division.

10 October, 1945. Extensive damage to NAGASAKI-SASEBO cable line by storm as well as to the KAGO-SHIMA-KANOYA commercial facilities. Other minor damage quickly repaired. V MarSol issued, cancelled Annex HOW to Operation Plan No. 2-45.

13 October, 1945. Commercial line FUKUOKA to YAMAGUCHI in use. LtCol Henry J. REYNOLDS relieved Col James P. BERKELEY as Signal Officer.

14 October, 1945. Fire alert system completed. Installation of telephone central using Japanese switchboard commenced.

16 October, 1945. Underwater line installed to USS WICHITA.

20 October, 1945. Directed all units stop amateur radio transmissions in their zones, (201503I).

22 October, 1945. Commenced installation of radio link to SIXTH Army, air reconnaissance made.

24 October, 1945. Ordered Corps units to coordinate requests for Japanese telephone lines through V Amphibious Corps. FUKUOKA Occupation Forces relieved of communication guard by 32nd Infantry Division.

25 October, 1945. NAGASAKI spiral four cable previously damaged by storm repaired and placed on carrier system.

28 October, 1945. BLT 1/127 at KANOYA secured from Corps command net and turned SCR-299 over to 2nd Marine Division (280915I).

30 October, 1945. GUSC recommended establishing naval radio station SASEBO to relieve

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VAC of naval base communication. (301056).

31 October, 1945. Commenced guarding Empire Love Fox at request of Com Fifth Fleet. (310225).

1 November, 1945. Ten additional lines laid to SASEBO commercial exchange, LtCol TF FORRESTER relieved LtCol HJ SMART as Commanding Officer, Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps.

2 November, 1945. Communication with SIXTH Army at KYOTO by commercial lines.

7 November, 1945. Conference between Signal Officer, Communication Officer CTF 51, Communication Officer Port Director arranged details for naval radio SASEBO which is now under consideration by U. S. Navy. Underwater line to USS CAMPBELL (SOFA Admin) in.

14 November, 1945. Japanese switchboard (500 drop) tried out with Tiger White and Tiger Blue lines but failed to work satisfactorily.

15 November, 1945. Entered SIXTH Army 6A radio circuit.

18 November, 1945. Radio Link to SIXTH Army in operation.

20 November, 1945. Issued changes to VMAHSOI.

25 November, 1945. Conference between Signal Officer 2nd Marine Division and Signal Officer V Amphibious Corps relieving carrier platoon when VAC relieved.

27 November, 1945. Commenced installation of TC-1 at Tiger exchange.

29 November, 1945. Commenced installation of radio link equipment on USS YOSEMITE. This equipment was taken from USS PANAMINT.

c. Operations.

(1) Radio and Visual.

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(a) General.

Radio facilities in this operation were highly satisfactory. Most of the Corps radio operators and supervisors had been in one or more of the Corps operations at TARAWA, ROI-NAMUR, MARIANAS, and IWO JIMA and were well versed in radio operations as performed by a corps headquarters.

Four radio jeeps and personnel accompanied the Executive Officer of the Signal Section when he landed on the morning of 22 September, 1945, and were used in communication with the Headquarters ship, and higher and lower echelons. These men and their equipment came from the auxiliary command ship (USS SAUGUS). The following day more radio jeeps, Mark IV vans and SCR-299's were brought ashore. The transmitter van was remotely controlled one-half mile from Corps Headquarters by two 5 pair cables. As soon as possible all receivers were placed in a radio room atop the Corps Headquarters building.

(b) Equipment.

All equipment performed in an excellent manner with one exception to be mentioned below. RAOs were largely used for medium and high frequency receiving positions and performed without trouble on low commercial voltage where other receivers could not be used. TCK transmitters were found to have a better signal and to perform better with distant stations than SCR-299's transmitter unit of SCR-299's.

Three SCR-299's had transformer failures (229613.3) one being a Signal Battalion set and two being Division sets. Replacement transformers were procured through the 8th Service Regiment. SCR-299's which were driven long distances over rough roads gave considerable trouble.

(c) Traffic. (See Appendix 7)

Traffic was exceedingly heavy. Point-to-point circuits averaged from 15,000 to 23,000 groups per day and 750 messages a day were copied over Fox schedules. Lower units and occasionally higher units lacked

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high speed radio operators needed for the amount of traffic. Guard lists were utilized for all stations to facilitate routing of traffic.

The Naval Base net was used constantly to clear relay traffic to Naval radio stations at OKINAWA and TOKYO. Fifth Fleet entered the secondary SIXTH Army Net and a considerable volume of traffic was cleared to them.

(d) Visual.

A visual tower with a 12-inch search light was set up on the roof of the Headquarters building. This circuit proved more valuable than local command nets in passing traffic to ships in the harbor. This was the first time Signal Battalion personnel had been utilized in the Corps Visual Station.

(2) Wire and Construction. (See Appendices 1 to 5 this Annex).

(a) General.

Initial wire and construction was considerably hampered by the fact that only a small portion of the wire platoon and no construction personnel were sent ashore until 24 September. This was due to high priority having been given unloading the 5th Marine Division. As a result the wire platoon was used to construct cable lines initially as well as perform its regular function. Most of this cable was laid hurriedly and was relaid later.

Unloading of equipment was not planned or coordinated. Equipment was ordered ashore without proper storage facilities being provided. As a result of the delay in assigning storage areas, much time that could have been used productively was spent in moving equipment to new warehouses as the storage plan was changed.

Closer coordination of the work of the wire platoon and the construction companies and determination of relative priorities to be assigned was obtained by assigning an officer of the Signal Section as

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Wire Officer. All wire work of any kind was cleared through this officer who maintained close liaison with the operation officer (S-3) of the Signal Battalion.

(b) Equipment.

The Corps established switchboards as follows:

<u>EXCHANGE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>TRUNKS</u>	<u>LOCALS</u>
TIGER	Corps Hq	MTC-2 & TC-1 later used to consolidate Tiger and Tiger White.	48	73
TIGER RED	Medical Bn	2BD72	2	34
TIGER WHITE	Corps Troops	MTC-2	27	76
TIGER BLUE	BOQ	Jap(50-drop)	3	20

The MTC-2 switchboard proved inadequate for a Corps in occupation duty. An average of 300 calls per hour were handled during office hours, and a peak of 1581 between 0800 and 1200 was reached many days on one MTC-2 alone. A TC-10 or equivalent would have been more suitable, and would have resulted in quicker service with less strain on personnel. A Corps request to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, dated 13 August, 1945, for a TC-10 switchboard had been disapproved before VAC left MAUI. A large Japanese military switchboard (500 drops) was finally procured and an attempt was made to put all TIGER lines in the one board. A portion of this work was completed on 14 November, 1945, but the board functioned so slowly and badly that the project was abandoned.

The alert system (MCT-1) was used as a fire alarm system over a large area of SASEBO. It proved entirely inadequate for this purpose because more phones were needed than available and some lines were too long for proper operation. Alert systems were utilized internally for G-1, Military Government and Signal Battalion interphone systems.

(3) Message Center.

(a) General,

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Message Center was established in a very convenient location on the ground floor of the Headquarters building.

(b) Personnel.

The Table of Organization for the Corps Signal Battalion provides 18 officers for the message center and 20 officers were assigned this duty when Corps landed. However, one was shortly assigned to duty with the FUKUOKA Occupation Force, two to other duty with the Signal Battalion and two returned to the United States for demobilization, leaving a total of fifteen actually in the Corps message center. These were supplemented on 4 October by two officers from CUB 18, and on 26 October by two officers from the 5th Marine Division making a total of 19 Officers in all. Even this number, proved inadequate in view of the exceedingly large volume of traffic handled.

Three watches of five officers each were provided, and because of the exceedingly heavy volume of traffic it was found necessary to have two CWO's on each watch. The duties of the five officers on watch were as follows:

CWO -- In charge of watch; handled all outgoing traffic, (logged, routed, and checked to ascertain that it was transmitted).

Ass't CWO -- In charge of all incoming and relay traffic.

CBO -- In charge of the coding board and write-up room.

Coding Officers (2) -- Coding duty.

The Table of Organization provides 68 enlisted men for the message center. There were 70 enlisted men in the message center platoon when it was established ashore. Fourteen were shortly assigned duty at FUKUOKA and four men returned to the United States for demobilization, leaving 52 men. To these were later added 18 men who returned from FUKUOKA. The enlisted men were assigned as follows: One message center chief, one

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platoon chief, three men for general messages and registered publications, two men for subject matter and receipt files, three drivers, one property and storeroom man, and three watches of 13 men each. The duties of the men on each watch were as follows: One supervisor, two runners, two teletype operators, one ditto operator, three typists, one code clerk, two file clerks and one man in charge of the agency status chart and transmission agency log. The number of personnel was inadequate and it was necessary to redouble duties and curtail liberty.

All personnel were well trained in their duties, but mistakes were made from time to time, principally due to inadequacy of personnel for the huge volume of traffic handled.

(c) Crypto Systems.

Corps ECM's were landed and set up on 23 September, 1945. Two additional ECMs were borrowed from the 5th Marine Division to make a total of four. The extra ECMs were used only on the few occasions of a mechanical break-down. However, the extra wheels were very valuable as time savers.

Hagelin and strips were used extensively as channels to the FUKUOKA Occupation Force and KANOYA Occupation Force as these were the only cryptographic aids held by those commands. Whenever possible, Navajo talkers were employed on voice circuits with FUKUOKA.

Many messages were transmitted classified which should have been unclassified. Typical of this were numerous messages received from higher Army echelons concerning ship movements. Such messages were classified as confidential while on the same dates, messages concerning the movements of the same ships were received from Naval forces unclassified and in plain language. Occasionally officers of this Headquarters have overclassified dispatches, resulting in unnecessary encryption. For example, a message about a Danny Kaye USO Show was sent as confidential, while an Army supply agency sent a message relative to a shipment of neckties as a confidential priority. In accordance with a SIXTH Army

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directive the following was used as a rule for handling classified matter:

1. The following indicated the maximum security classification which may be assigned to various communication means within SIXTH Army and subordinate units thereof:

a. Wire

RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET TOP-SECRET

Telephone	YES	NO*	NO*	NO
Teletype	YES	NO*	NO*	NO
Telegraph	YES	NO*	NO*	NO
Facsimile	YES	NO*	NO*	NO

b. Radio

Telephone	NO	NO	NO	NO
Teletype	NO	NO	NO	NO
Telegraph	NO	NO	NO	NO

c. VHF Multi-Channel Carrier:

Telephone	YES	YES	NO	NO
Teletype	YES	YES	YES	NO

d. Messenger:

All types	YES	YES	YES**	YES#
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* Confidential or secret classification may be assigned where lines and terminals are fully patrolled and manned by U. S. personnel.

** Only officer or authorized messenger outside command post.

Officer only.

(d) Radio.

During the first week of the occupation it was difficult to clear any messages of a precedence lower than operational priority due to the overload of channels during that period. However, as more circuits were opened, and as other means of communication

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were established, the backlog of messages awaiting transmission was eliminated.

(e) Teletype (Landline) (See Appendix 5).

Landline teletype was operated continuously to the 5th Marine Division, Port Director, and the 8th Service Regiment.

(f) Radio Teletype.

Radio teletype functioned well to 2nd Marine Division and MAG 22. The radio teletypes to the FUKUOKA Occupation Force and to the 32nd Infantry Division and SIXTH Army functioned fairly well.

One deviation from previous operations was that guard mail was handled by the Officer Messenger Mail Center operating under the Corps Adjutant. It would not have been possible for the message center to handle both guard mail and dispatch traffic efficiently due to shortage of personnel and heavy volume of dispatch traffic.

(g) Lack of Personnel.

One of the most serious problems faced was the lack of personnel. The T/O for the message center is based upon officers and men necessary to handle traffic for a corps headquarters, and headquarters units. Had the traffic handled by the communication center been limited to these units, the personnel on hand would have been adequate. However, as mentioned above, one officer and fourteen men were assigned to temporary duty at FUKUOKA. Then, this Headquarters assumed guard for all shore activities on KYUSHU and unofficially, but necessarily, functioned as Navy radio KYUSHU. VAC Headquarters was Radio and Coding Guard for the 5th Marine Division, 8th Service Regiment, MOG-1, LFASCU 4, PD Sasebo, CUB 18, 7th NC Regiment, NavTechJap, ComLSTF 37, and all Army units in the SASEBO area. VAC Headquarters acted as radio guard for the 2nd Marine Division, 32nd Infantry Division, MAG 22, the KANOYA Occupation Force, and all units located at FUKUOKA. The net result of handling communications for all these units was a tre-

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mendous burden of work upon the VAC communication personnel and a marked lessening of efficiency simply because there were not enough personnel to handle all the traffic. It should be noted that CUB 18 was the only unit to furnish any personnel (two officers) to supplement the VAC personnel until 26 October when the 5th Marine Division furnished two officers.

(4) Carrier and Radio Relay. (See Appendix 9, this report).

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO. RELAYS</u>	<u>DATE INS.</u>	<u>CIRCUIT</u>
***SASEBO-NAGASAKI(2ndDiv)	Rdo Link	1-0*	25Sept.	2TP&1TT
SASEBO-NAGASAKI(2ndDiv)	Carrier	1	25Oct.	3TP&1TT
***SASEBO-OMURA (MAG 22)	Rdo Link	0	28Sept.	2TP&1TT
SASEBO-OMURA (MAG 22)	Carrier	0	26Oct.	3TP&1TT
SASEBO-FUKUOKA(FOF-32dDiv)	Rdo Link	1-2**	12Oct.	2TP&2TT
VAC-USS WESTMORELAND	Rdo Link	0	24-26Sept.	1TT
VAC-USS WESTMORELAND	Rdo Link	0	15-22Oct.	1TP&1TT
SASEBO-KYOTO (6TH ARMY)	Rdo Link	5	18Nov.	2TP&2TT

* One of the relay stations at MT. SASEBO was eliminated later by installation of a spiral four line from there to Corps Headquarters.

** A second relay station was later installed to improve communication.

*** Used as emergency standby after installation of parallel spiral four carrier systems.

(b) Equipment.

Available equipment included:

- 3 100 mile spiral four carrier system (AN/TCC-2). (2 were without spiral four and all w/o maintenance parts and equipment.
- 6 Radio Terminal sets (AN/TRC-3)
- 9 Radio Relay Sets (AN/TRC-4)
- 6 Radio Amplifier (AN/TRA-1)

All of the listed equipment was in use as of the date of this report except 2 radio relay sets. Lack of maintenance equipment and spare parts made

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it necessary to utilize spare parts from the spare equipment provided to insure continuous 24-hour service. At times this hampered operations, making it necessary to make extensive repairs to a unit when the normal procedure would be a quick substitution of a spare.

Some equipment was damaged and inoperative when landing due to rough handling in transit. The explanation of this lies in the fact that no organizational transportation for carrier and radio link has been provided for the Signal Battalion and 75% of the equipment was handled as bulk cargo. (See Appendix 6 of this report for letter recommending a carrier and radio link company for an Amphibious Corps).

The need was often felt for telegraph terminals (TH-1/TCC-1) in addition to telegraph terminal (CF-2-B). Use of radio link with a terminal (CF-1-A) and terminal (CF-2-B) will provide 2 telephone channels, 4 teletype channels and 1 service channel. With the terminal (TH-1/TCC-1) it can provide 3 telephone channels, 1 teletype channel and one service channel. Normally a Corps only needs one teletype channel to its units and the additional telephone channel is very useful. In addition, the TH-1/TCC-1 is the equipment normally used by the Navy on command ships of various types.

Four transmitters (T-14/THC-1) were traded for four other modified transmitters at the request of the Radio Relay Officer of the SIXTH Army. Modification had been made to reduce distortion from about 20% to less than 2%, enabling a large number of relays to be used in a long radio link system. A total of seven modifications have been recommended for radio link equipment. None have been made to Signal Battalion equipment.

(c) Personnel.

The Signal Battalion Table of Organization provides for only 2 radio link officers and 22 carrier or radio relay personnel. However, some additional personnel had been assigned and a platoon was organized as follows for the operation:

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Carrier Officers	0
Radio Link Officers	3
Carrier Enlisted	28
Radio Link Enlisted	57
Other enlisted	4

Carrier officers were available within the battalion, but were utilized for other communication duties. At least one carrier officer should have been assigned to the section to increase the intelligent direction of the carrier personnel. There is a considerable tendency among communication officers untrained in carrier and radio link problems to regard them as one. Actually the two are separate and training of the personnel is entirely different.

(d) SASEBO-KYOTO

A radio link was completed between VAC at SASEBO and SIXTH Army at KYOTO on 18 November. This link, approximately 450 miles long, is believed to be the longest VHF radio link attempted in any theater of operation. The sites for relay stations were chosen after a preliminary reconnaissance with OY-1 airplanes. Five relay stations were used, two of which were on KYUSHU and manned by VAC personnel.

The circuit was very satisfactory, though there was naturally some background noise. Transmitters modified by SIXTH Army to decrease distortion were used. These modifications are similar to factory modifications in the T-14G/TRC-1 transmitter. Amplifiers (AN/TRA-1) were not needed since all stations were located at sufficient heights to make possible line of sight operation.

(5) Japanese Facilities.

(a) General.

Japanese commercial telephone facilities were used extensively by the Corps and its divisions. Facilities were procured by this Headquarters through the local manager of the commercial telephone facilities. He in turn would go through necessary higher Japa-

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nese channels. The Japanese were very cooperative about procuring channels, but not too fast. The various divisions also procured lines either through their local telephone manager or through this Headquarters.

Since the Japanese were not using the lines they had no means of checking them. When a line went out or became weak it was necessary that a Corps representative visit the Japanese exchange to request that the trouble be remedied. CONSTANT liaison was necessary since the commercial lines gave continuous trouble. This was later remedied by installations of direct wire lines between Japanese test office and occupation force switchboard.

(b) Wire facilities procured. (See Appendix 4 of this annex).

(c) Technical Problems.

Teletypes were tried out on various Japanese installations, but they only functioned over short distances and never were used over Japanese telegraph (single conductor, ground return) lines.

Japanese ringer systems were antiquated and gave considerable trouble over long lines. Successful use of ringing equipment (EE-101-A) was made on the long metallic line from SASEBO to KYOTO.

Japanese repeaters on the longer lines were inoperative much of the time. Such repeaters need to be adjusted frequently, but apparently did not receive routine preventive maintenance from the Japanese.

(d) Japanese Power.

Japanese power gave considerable trouble and was not reliable. The voltage dropped so low at times that finally radio, teletype and radio relay connections were rewired with low resistance wire and autotransformers were installed to control voltage. Since Japanese power failed frequently, a stand-by power system was maintained using a PE-84.

d. Personnel:

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(1) Demobilization and/or Rotation.

(a) Demobilization problem as it affects Communication Personnel.

There was decided lag in demobilization and rotation of eligible personnel due to the following factors:

Necessity of efficiently accomplishing the mission of the Corps.

Lowering of the point system without provisions for replacements from rear areas.

Lack of authority of the Corps Commander to effect intra-corps transfers of communication personnel made it impossible to readjust communication personnel of the Corps, so that full use of their training and specialties could be utilized.

(b) Progress of Demobilization:

OFFICERS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NO. DEMOBILIZED</u>	<u>NO. ELIGIBLE END OF MO.</u>	<u>PTS. REQUIRED END OF MONTH</u>
Aug.	0	23	75
Sept.	0	35	60
Oct.	17	20	50
Nov.	5*	15	50

ENLISTED

Aug.	0	114	75
Sept.	44	440	60
Oct.	144	470	50
Nov.	37*	484	50

* Transferred to 5th Marine Division which was to be returned to the U. S. A. in December -- 11 officers, 476 enlisted men.

SIGNAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT

1. Units mounted out with an initial and 30 days plus 15% of initial on wire and batteries.

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2. (a) Major items additionally authorized for Corps use were as follows:

- 3,000 2"x4"x20'
- 400,000 Cable, CC-345, Ft.
- 22,000 Cable, CC-355, Ft.
- 2 100, mile, Carrier and Radio Link Systems w/150 miles spiral four, with each system.
- 2 Telephone Central Office, Sets, TC-3.

(b) The above items arrived 48 hours prior to mounting out and the transfer from one ship to another had to be made on the deck. All equipment was manifested but due to lack of time, confusion in last minute loading, and space aboard ship, ships commanding officers refused to complete the loading as planned and approximately the following was left on the dock to be handled by the rear echelon:

- 1 Mk-4 Communication Unit.
- 2448 2"x4"x20'
- 300 Cable, Spiral four, miles.
- 288,000 Cable, CC-345, Ft.
- 4 Power Unit, PE-25
- 2 Direction Finders, DAU, in HO-17 mounted on 6x6 truck.

3. At the objective, supplies flowed ashore with negligible losses. Resupply shipments arrived on the scene unbeknownst to this office or the 8th Service Regiment. In many instances all the information available would be a "ships loading plan" furnished by the TQM after the ship's arrival. Batteries were far in excess of requirements, it was estimated there were enough "1945" batteries on hand to supply an Amphibious Corps for at least six months on an Amphibious operation against the enemy. There were more 1944 batteries than 1945 batteries. Spare parts as usual proved to be the only items that could not be readily supplied. The 5th Marine Division had more spare parts than any other organization but the particular parts that were needed were not on hand. At one time SCR-299's at SASEBO, FUKUOKA, KANOYA, and NAGASAKI were inoperative due to Power Transformer (229613.3) burning out, the Signal Battalion cannibalized one BC-610 for the

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KANOYA Task Force, the other transformers were eventually supplied from resupply shipments or by issuing complete new units.

4. The 553rd Signal Depot Co. arrived at SASEBO on 5 November. The mission of supplying all Army units with signal equipment was assigned that unit. One officer and 24 men were left at SASEBO and the CP was established at FUKUOKA. The harbor at FUKUOKA is still closed and all ships unload at SASEBO. Supplies are delivered by rail and truck convoy.

5. (a) The Signal Officer was responsible for the disposition of captured Japanese Military Signal equipment in the area established as VAC Headquarters area of responsibility. The largest concentration of this equipment was in the SASEBO Naval Station and vicinity.

(b) All Japanese radar, airforce, sonar, field telephones, and portable field transmitters were either used for operational purposes or destroyed. Equipment was spread out over a wide area and a tank recovery vehicle completed the destruction. In some instances, welding torches were used to insure complete destruction. After such operations all material was turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry for scrap. In nearly all instances Japanese signal equipment is definitely inferior to that used by the occupation forces.

(c) Vacuum tubes were found in many warehouses and were extensively used for recreational receivers.

(d) Radio receivers were not used to any great extent for recreational purposes and this office does not know of any case where they were used for operational purposes.

(e) The Japanese No. 1, small switchboard was used wherever available throughout the Corps. It is a 60-drop, local battery board, similar but slightly larger than the BD-14, complete with board, terminal frame, and accessory box. The Signal Battalion installed three, the FUKUOKA Base Command, and the Signal Division used one.

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6. Radio SASEBO (NLG) at the date of this report was setting up at VAC Headquarters building and connecting cable to transmitters approximately ten miles distant at HARIO, the Japanese Naval transmitting station for the SASEBO Naval Station. The HARIO station was not damaged by bombing, and had 26 transmitters installed and in operating condition. The transmitters varied from 500 to 5000 watts and covered all frequencies up to 20,000 kc. Two fifty-KW diesel units were available for emergency power. New antennae were not necessary as the Japanese had cut antennae for all USN Task Force Commander frequencies.

7. The local source of Japanese power is 100 volts AC and was ample for most installations but wasn't dependable. PE-95's and PE-84's were used as emergency power. It was necessary in Corps Headquarters to install Autotransformers in the teletype room, code room, and radio terminal and relay rooms to keep proper voltage on equipment.

8. Air Delivery of signal supplies was not requested.

9. After the IWO JIMA operation the Corps Signal Battalion had one Amtrac (LVT) and two Amphibious Trucks (DUKW's) but they were ordered to be turned in to the Supply Service. It was necessary to install telephone trunk lines from the Tiger Exchange to the SOPA afloat in the harbor and this could not be done with an LCVP or LCM except with extreme difficulty due to the fact that small craft lay too high in the water for personnel to work over the side. DUKW's were finally made available to the Signal Battalion from the 20th Amphibious Truck Battalion.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS

a. Planning.

(1) Use of a Signal Operation Instructions in place of the Signal Annex to the Operation Orders probably would improve the organization of signal communications of a Corps. Changes are made very simply and conveniently under the direction of the Signal Officer.

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(2) Liaison between an amphibious corps and higher echelons in the planning and operation stages would probably be greatly improved if an exchange of officers between the respective units were arranged. An officer of experience from the Army signal section should be assigned to the Corps and vice versa.

(3) Call signs for an operation should be issued in block and well in advance of the operation.

(4) An amphibious corps operating in any Army should hold the same codes and ciphers as the Army Corps. In lieu thereof all organizations concerned should be instructed as to exactly what joint codes are held by others.

b. Training.

(1) The camp communications unit in a rehabilitation base should be large enough to relieve tactical organizations of base communication responsibilities. A certain amount of base communication responsibility aids in the training of tactical personnel, but involved operations such as those undertaken at MAUI by the Corps Signal Battalion interfere with the training of the unit.

(2) RCM training is believed to have been of value and should be continued.

(3) It is evident that the proper use and understanding of the mission of Navajos has been generally lacking throughout units of the Marine Corps. There have been attempts to standardize their operation, the most notable being the restandardization course held in Pearl Harbor during April and May of 1945. However, nothing has been carried through to a completion of standardization and refresher training nor in the widespread indoctrination of unit commanders in their correct use and possible value to an assault organization. Through this lack of understanding the talker has been assigned to many duties foreign to those for which he was primarily intended; thereby causing a destandardization and deterioration of an element which otherwise could have been of considerable value to the Marine Corps, as it was proven to be in the cases where special interest was demonstrated.

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Navajos should be retained in centralized schools after each operation for a period of at least four weeks in order to maintain a standardization of their language and to assist in gradual improvement of their military vocabulary. If they are to be used in the future it is felt that a Navajo should be placed in charge of such schooling.

c. Morale.

(1) Morale in general during the occupation was the lowest in the history of the Corps Signal Battalion. The Signal Battalion on 1 November still had 301 enlisted men who had been overseas more than 24 months.

(2) Morale was lowered further by the point system which quickly made all personnel with over 75, then 60, then 50 points eligible for demobilization. As of 1 November there were 22 officers and 470 enlisted men with over 50 points. (18 officers and 188 enlisted men had already been sent to the U. S. since arrival at JAPAN.)

(3) Another long standing factor which has caused bad morale is the lack of promotions. Men feel that once designated as Communication Personnel, their chance of promotion is very limited. This is borne out by statistics in the Signal Battalion which show that only 31 CP promotions were authorized since September 1, 1944, for the 620 CP authorized for the Signal Battalion. Only one of these was from Private First Class to Corporal.

(4) Just the opposite picture is true in the Naval communication service. There, men are encouraged to strike for the next higher rating. Passing the proper examination and fulfilling necessary service requirements in rate, usually 6 months, entitles a man to the next higher rate. It is not uncommon to see Marine corporals working next to first class petty officers doing the same job in a less efficient manner than the Marine. Corporals are used as supervisors in the corps radio station where chief petty officers would be used in a similar Naval station.

(5) It is recommended that the Marine Corps adopt a system of promotions similar to that used in the Navy.

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(6) It is also recommended that Commanding Officers of Fleet Marine Force units overseas be authorized to promote all Privates with more than six months overseas to Privates First Class up to 100% of the total privates and privates first class.

d. Headquarters Ships.

(1) The TBS net maintained between the Corps and the 5th Marine Division enroute to the operation was a new idea. It is felt that this was a valuable improvement in communication.

(2) The Marine detachments (and Army detachments) placed on Headquarters ships have never been used by this Corps. It is felt that such detachments, since they are not used for the purpose intended, should be abolished.

(3) Command ship installations should be improved. They should be based on the fact that the landing force needs are of primary importance and not secondary to Naval requirements for communications facilities.

(4) Experiments with auxiliary command ships should be continued.

e. Carrier and Radio Relay.

(1) Appendix 7 of this Annex is a copy of a letter dated 27 July, 1945, which proposes a table of organization for a Carrier and Radio Relay Company.

(2) The Signal Officer still favors establishment of such a company. However, the substitution of a carrier platoon and a radio link platoon in place of the three operation platoons might well be considered. Carrier and radio link are entirely separate functions, even though they are used in conjunction with each other, and should be so considered.

(3) It is recommended that consideration be given for the addition of telegraph terminal (TH-1/TCG-1) in order to use Radio Teletype with ships.

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(4) It is recommended that spiral-four cable and construction accessories furnished with the 100 mile carrier system be issued separately to construction companies.

f. Division in Occupation.

If a Marine division is to remain on detached duty in JAPAN, supplemental personnel and equipment as follows are recommended:

(1) 6 SCR-299's (or equivalent). Personnel need not be provided since they can be obtained from lower units.

(2) One complete 100 mile Carrier System (AN/TCC-2) and one complete radio link (2 AN/TRC-3, 3 AN/TRC-4, 2 AN/TAA-1) with a carrier section consisting of one commissioned or warrant officer, carrier enlisted and radio link enlisted.

(3) One MTC-2 complete and 100 TP-6's.

(4) Six teleprinters EP-9's.

(5) One telephone central office set (TC-5).

(6) A radio intelligence section.

(7) Heavy construction equipment for one heavy construction platoon (T/O G-1130, T/L-1130). No personnel would be required since present personnel could be retrained.

g. Naval Communications:

An amphibious corps operating under an Army should not be made responsible for any naval base communications, and if such is necessary, the extra personnel should be attached to the corps. Naval activities should be served by a naval radio station.

h. Transfer of Personnel:

It is recommended that the Corps Commander


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in the field be given complete authority to execute intra-unit transfers of communication officers and personnel.

1. TC-10:

It is highly recommended that a Corps Signal Battalion be equipped with a TC-10 switchboard.




H. J. REVANE.

1455

LINE ROUTE MAP-SHORT LINES V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS


EFFECTIVE 0001, 11 NOV. 1945




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
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CIRCUIT DIAGRAM — COMMERCIAL INSTALLATIONS V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS


EFFECTIVE 0001, 11 NOVEMBER 1945



TELETYPEWRITER TRAFFIC DIAGRAM V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

EFFECTIVE 0001, 19 NOVEMBER 1945

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX FOX TO
VAC OPERATION REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN




RADIO CIRCUIT DIAGRAM V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

EFFECTIVE 11 NOVEMBER 1945

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX FOX TO
VAC OPERATION REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN



REPRO. TOPO. CO., VAC.

RESTRICTED
1461

1365-150-6
023/265
Ser. 0573B

HEADQUARTERS,
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 July, 1945.

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific.
Subject: Carrier and Radio Relay Company, authorization
of, recommendation on.
Reference: (a) CG, FMF, Pac Dispatch 201951Z, of May, 1945.
Enclosures: (A) Proposed T/O, Carrier and Radio Relay Company.
(B) Transportation for proposed Carrier and Radio
Relay Company.

1. The enclosures are based on the assumption that a Marine Amphibious Corps will require three carrier systems, AN/TCC-2, and three radio link systems, each consisting of two AN/TRC-3 radio terminals, three AN/TRC-4 relay sets and two AN/TRA amplifiers. This amount of equipment will permit radio link and/or carrier circuits to the subordinate units of the Corps and will also provide for sufficient terminating and relay equipment to tie into the prescribed circuits of the next higher headquarters.

2. At the present time, the Corps Signal Battalion has on hand three such carrier systems and one such radio link system. Specially trained personnel have been transferred to the Signal Battalion for handling this equipment. Personnel is now on hand in the following numbers:

	TRAINED	UNDER INSTRUCTION	TOTAL
Carrier Officers	4		4
Radio Link Officers	4		4
Carrier Enlisted Personnel	9	16	25
Radio Link Enlisted Personnel	36	2	38

3. Enclosure (A) is the Table of Organization proposed by this Headquarters to provide an organization capable of efficiently handling the three carrier and radio link

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Appendix 7 to Annex FOX to V Amphibious Corps Report, Occupa-
tion of Japan.

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Ltr. CG, VAC to CG, FMF, Pac Re: Carrier and Radio Relay Com-
pany, authorization of, recommendation on Serial 0573B (Cont'd)

3. (Continued).
systems desired. This table was drawn up to provide sufficient personnel to install, maintain, and operate the desired equipment over long distances and in fluid land warfare. Provisions have been made for sufficient personnel to operate 6 carrier terminals, 9 repeater stations, 6 radio link terminals and 9 radio relay stations, to properly handle the spare equipment and to perform 3rd echelon repair in the field.

This does not include personnel required for spiral 4 construction purposes. The number of personnel requested are necessary to initially install the radio link system in a rapid and efficient manner, to install the carrier as wire lines become available over the distance involved, and after the latter installation is complete, maintain the radio relay in a standby status, ready for immediate use, in event of casualty to the carrier wire lines. It is not considered feasible to utilize one set of personnel to operate both the carrier and the radio relay systems inasmuch as the choice of favorable locations for the radio link equipment will probably render such double employment impossible.

4. Transportation has been recommended in enclosure (B) on the basis that each repeater or radio relay station should be motorized, and each radio terminal station may be transported by the same transportation provided for the carrier terminal. This allocation of transportation is necessary to give each station sufficient mobility to effect rapid movements independent of the transportation requirements of the remainder of the Corps Signal Battalion. The above concept of the tactical employment of radio relay and carrier systems coincides with the employment made of these equipments in Europe and in other large scale operations.

5. Radio link and carrier systems constitute for the Marine Corps two new agencies of communication which should prove to be invaluable to providing rapid reliable communications over long distances. It is considered that the personnel for operating these agencies should be organized into a company which will be functional in nature, and will be adequate to permit full exploitation of the valuable features of these new agencies.

6. This Corps has had no experience in operating

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Ltr. CG, VAC to CG, F.F, Pac Re: Carrier and Radio Relay Com-
pany, authorization of, recommendation on Serial 0573B (Cont'd)

6. (Continued).
this type of equipment under combat conditions, although it is now in use. It is still a new piece of equipment that must prove its usefulness and reliability to the Commander and his staff. Successful combat operation of the equipment will establish that this equipment can replace man-laid wire circuits or that this equipment is a necessary addition to present communication agencies. If the former is the case certain wire construction personnel of the Corps Signal Battalion can be shifted to this type of work. If it is decided that this equipment is a highly desirable supplemental communication agency the T/O as recommended will be necessary. In any event the transportation indicated in enclosure (B) is a prime necessity.

7. This Corps has been informed that additional radio link equipment is to be furnished by 1 September, 1945. It is assumed that some trained personnel will be furnished at that time.

8. It is believed that the equipment under discussion should be subjected to test under combat conditions before definite recommendations are submitted for its future employment. In the meantime it is desired to carry personnel listed in paragraphs 2 and 7 in excess of allowances for the purpose of conducting these combat tests.

H. SCHMIDT.

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CARRIER-RADIO RELAY COMPANY
SIGNAL BATTALION

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
UNIT	SPECIALTY BRANCH	SSN	Headquarters Plt	Platoon Headquarters	Carrier Section	Radio Relay Section	TOTAL PLATOON	TOTAL COMPANY (Hq Plt & 3 Operation Platoon)
PART I - PERSONNEL AND INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS								
2 Captain			1					1
3 Company Commander		0508	(1)					
4 Lieutenant			1	1			1	4
5 Executive Officer		0200	(1)					
6 Platoon Commander		*0420		(1)				
7 TOTAL COMMISSIONED			2	1			1	5
8 Warrant Officer			1	1			1	4
9 Maintenance Officer		0420	(1)					
10 Ass't Platoon Commander		*0508		(1)				
11 TOTAL WARRANT			1	1			1	4
12 First Sergeant		585	1					1
13 Master Technical Sergeant			1					1
14 Communication Chief	CP	542	(1)					
15 Technical Sergeant			1	1			1	4
16 Mess	C	060	(1)					
17 Platoon chief	CP	*187		(1)				
18 Staff Sergeant					1	1	2	6
19 Carrier section chief	CP	187			(1)			
20 Radio section chief	CP	654				(1)		
21 Chief Cook	C	060	1					1
22 Sergeant			2		5	5	10	32
23 Carrier-repeater team chief	CP	187			(5)			
24 Property MCO; decontamination		566	(1)					
25 Radio Relay team chief	CP	654				(5)		
26 Signal Supply man	QM	581	(1)					
27 Field Cook	C	060	1					1
28 Corporal			3		10	10	20	63
29 Carrier repeater	CP	187			(10)			
30 Clerk, administrative		501	(1)					
31 QM Supply man	QM	821	(1)					
32 Radio relay technician	CP	654				(10)		
33 Signal supply man	QM	581	(1)					

CARRIER - RADIO RELAY COMPANY
SIGNAL BATTALION

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
UNIT	SPECIALTY BRANCH	SSN	Headquarters Plt	Platoon Headquarters	Carrier Section	Radio Relay Section	TOTAL PLATOON	TOTAL COMPANY (Hq Platoon & 3 Operation Platoons)
PART I - PERSONNEL AND INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS								
34 Assistant Cook	C	060	3					3
35 Private 1st Class/Private			16	1	10	10	21	79
36 Barber		022	(1)					
37 Carrier repeater man	CP	187			(5)			
38 Clerk, general		055	(1)					
39 Cooler		204	(1)					
40 Radio relay technician	CP	654				(5)		
41 Radio repairman	CP	174	(1)					
42 Stockman, general		735	(2)					
43 Truck driver, light		345	(2)	(1)	(3)			
44 Truck driver, heavy		245	(2)		(2)	(5)		
45 Supernumary for mess duty		000	(6)					
46 TOTAL ENLISTED			29	2	26	26	54	191
47 TOTAL MARINE CORPS			32	4	26	26	56	200
48 Carbine, .30-caliber, M1			32	4	26	26	56	200

CARRIER-RADIO RELAY COMPANY
SIGNAL BATTALION

RECAPITULATION OF SSN

OFFICERS				
SSN	Capt	Lieut	WO	TOTAL
0200		1		1
0420		*3	1	4
0508	1		*3	4

ENLISTED							
SSN	1	2	3	4	5	6&7	TOTAL
000						6	6
022						1	1
055						1	1
060		1	1	1	3		6
174						1	1
187		*3	3	15	30	15	66
204						1	1
245						23	23
345						14	14
501					1		1
542	1						1
566				1			1
581				1	1		2
585	1						1
654			3	15	30	15	63
735						2	2
821					1		1
TOTAL	2	4	7	33	66	79	191

* Either Radio-Relay or Carrier Spec.


TRANSPORTATION FOR PROPOSED CARRIER AND RADIO RELAY CARRIER

	Headquarters Platoon	Platoon Headquarters	Carrier Section	Radio Relay Section	TOTAL PLATOON	TOTAL COMPANY (Hq Plat & 3 Operation Platoons)
Trailer	2	1	3		4	14
$\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, cargo						
Truck						
$\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4	2	1	3		4	14
$2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6	2			3	3	11
*HO-17 Van on $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6			2		2	6

* Modified to support upright carrier bars.

ENCLOSURE (B)

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
MESSAGE CENTER WRITE-UP ROOM



CWO's OFFICE AND MESSAGE DISTRIBUTION ROOM



TELETYPE CENTRAL (TWO BD-100's IN BACKGROUND)



RADIO REPAIR SHACK




TIGER WHITE SWITCHBOARD (TC-2) IN HO-17




CABLE SPLICER AT WORK




TIGER SWITCHBOARD (TC-2)



TERMINAL BOARD AT TIGER




JAPANESE SWITCHBOARD TAKEN OVER BY TIGER



CENTRAL OFFICE REPAIRMEN AT WORK ON JAPANESE
SWITCHBOARD




CORPS VISUAL TOWER




INTERIOR CORPS VISUAL TOWER




RADIO RECEIVING CENTRAL



RADIO TRANSMITTING CENTRAL MK(IV VAN)



PORTION OF RADIO LINK INSTALLATIONS



RADIO RELAY STATION NEAR SASEBO



DISPOSAL OF JAPANESE SIGNAL EQUIPMENT BY DESTRUCTION




CRUSHING RADAR AND SONAR EQUIPMENT WITH TANK

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM-RADIO LINK INSTALLATIONS V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

RESTRICTED

EFFECTIVE 0001, 20 NOVEMBER 1945

APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX FOX TO
VAC OPERATION REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN



REPRO. TOPO. CO., V.A.C.

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HEADQUARTERS
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD

-OCCUPATION OF JAPAN-

0398

ENGINEER Report

Annex GEORGE

CONFIDENTIAL

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0174/212

OFFICE OF THE ENGINEER,
HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

30 November, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Corps Engineer.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Engineer Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.
Reference: (a) FMF Pac Gen Ord No. 60-45.
(b) Ltr Hq 6th Army AG 319.1 R-3 dtd 28Jun45,
subj: Engr Reports required from 6th
Army Engr Units.
(c) Dis 6th Army to CG VAC DTG 291351/I.
(d) Annex ABLE to VAC Special Order 120-45.

1. Preparation and Organization for Task.

a. Receipt of Warning Instructions. From 1 June until 14 August, 1945 this section was employed on the planning phase of the assault landing on the western beaches of KYUSHU. The warning order for the occupation of KYUSHU was received by the Corps Engineer at a conference of the V Amphibious Corps Staff on 14 August, 1945. Since V Amphibious Corps Headquarters was to embark on 1 September, 1945, it was apparent that there was insufficient time to receive complete instructions. Therefore, plans were based on such general directives as were available for the occupational operation including the adaptation of such information believed applicable from the plans for the assault landing. The directives on which planning was based are here listed together with the dates on which they were received.

- (1) Warning Order (Southern KYUSHU) - - 14 August - -
Announced by V Amphibious Corps Chief of Staff.
- (2) Parts II & III, Logistic Annex - - CinCPac-CinCPOA
Oper Plan 12-45 - - 22 August.
- (3) Annex 4 to Adm Order 19 - - Engineer Supply Plan
- - 28 August.
- (4) Occupation Construction Annex 4 - - 28 August.

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Annex GEORGE to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

Subject: Engineer Operations Report, Occupation of Japan

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- (5) Annex 8 to FO, Engr (Tentative) - - 29 August.
- (6) Occupation Engr Units, V Amphibious Corps - -
29 August - - Numerous revisions followed.
- (7) Annex 6 (Engr) to Logistic Instructions 4/WPAC
- - 13 September.
- (8) Annex 8 to FO 75, Engr - - 16 September.
- (9) Annex 8/1 to FO 75 - - 1 November.
- (10) Annex 8/2 to FO 75 - - 25 November.
- (11) SIXTH Army Construction Directive No. 12 - -
10 November, 1945.
- (12) Conferences with Liaison Groups - - Various Dates.

The various engineer units assigned to Corps were mounted out over a wide area. Where possible, liaison personnel were brought to Corps Headquarters for detailed briefing. Subordinate engineer units were advised of the engineer plan by Corps Operation Order No. 2-45 Annex MIKE (Revised) issued 19 September and of Administrative Policy by Corps Administrative Plan 6-45 Annex GEORGE issued 24 August, 1945. The plan of engineer missions was general because of the short time available for planning and the meager information available. This resulted in some hardship for subordinate units in the making of their specific plans. Because of the state of readiness and the experience of the units assigned, the staging was executed in a satisfactory manner.

- b. Formation of Engineer Staff. The Staff of the Corps Engineer Office was a working organization before the receipt of the Warning Order. It consisted of ten (10) officers and seven (7) enlisted men organized as follows:

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(Continued)

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<u>Rank</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Duty</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Lt.Col.	1	Corps Engineer	Also CO, Prov. Combat Engr Group.
Major	3	(1) Executive (1) Intelligence (1) Operations	Detached 6 Oct 45. Assigned Executive 6 Oct 45. Also Executive Prov. Combat Engr Group Reported 29 Aug 45.
Captain	2	(1) Operations (1) Administration.	Assigned to Procurement Section 28 Sep 45. Detached 21 Oct 45.
1stLt.	2	(1) Operations (1) Supply	Reported 23 Aug 45.
2ndLt.	2	(1) Intelligence (1) Adjutant Prov Combat Engr Group.	
Sgt.	2	(2) Draftsman.	
Corp.	3	(3) Clerk.	
Pvt.	2	(2) Clerk.	

This staff was considered, and later was demonstrated, to be inadequate to cope with the numerous problems arising as a result of the occupation. It was originally intended to utilize the 1161st Engineer (C) Group to reinforce the Corps Engineer Staff and to assume command of the Provisional (C) Engineer Group.

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(Continued)

30Nov45.

Subject: Engineer Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

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However, upon landing, the status of the Group, due to the demobilization program, was such as to preclude its use. The Provisional (C) Engineer Group was deactivated 2 November, 1945 by Corps Special Order 121-45. During the month of November, the following changes were made in personnel:

7Nov45 Corps Engineer detached, replaced by Lt.Col., former, CO, of 2d Separate Engineer Battalion. Engineer Section Administration Officer, Captain detached, replaced by 2d Lt., Adjutant of Provisional Combat Engineer Group. 1 1stLt. - 1 2dLt. assigned duties with operations, this section.

9Nov45 1 2dLt. assigned duties with operations, this section.

29Nov45 Major, Executive Officer detached - Replaced by Major, Operations Officer - Major, Operations, replaced by 1stLt.

1Dec45 1 2dLt. assigned duties with operations this section.

Enlisted Men

29Nov45 1 Sgt. draftsman - 1 Corp. typist detached from this section.

2Dec45 1 Corp. draftsman reported for duty this section.

4Dec45 1 Corp. typist detached from this section.

5Dec45 1 Pfc. typist reported for duty this section.

c. Engineer Combat Planning. Because the combat situation was vague, preparation was made to accomplish standard engineer combat missions as the primary task of all

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(Continued)

30Nov45.

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engineer units. In addition, the special aspects of the operation indicated that engineer reconnaissance and the inventory and adaptations of Japanese utilities and manufacturing facilities would be an important engineer mission. It was not anticipated that additional engineer equipment would be needed because the Engineer Troop List included special units that were capable of performing all tasks that were foreseen. Water supply requirements as set up by the SIXTH Army differed only slightly from standard Marine Corps practice and instructions necessary to obtain the required results were issued as Appendix No. 3 to Annex GEORGE to V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45. Maps, aerial photographs and intelligence bulletins of the target area were received 28 August, 1945 and could not be issued to subordinate units until they had boarded ship. Readiness reports indicated that subordinate units were properly supplied for expected missions. Additional assault and pioneer supplies and bridge materials in accordance with Annex 4 to SIXTH Army Administrative Order No. 19 were obtained prior to loading.

- d. Initial Construction Planning. Because of the short planning period, lack of information available as to the extent of enemy facilities that could be put to use and final troop disposition, the amount of engineer work required could not be estimated. Therefore, all site allocations, work schedules, material schedules etc. had to depend on reconnaissance made after the landing.
- e. Equipping of Units. Subordinate units were equipped with organic allowances upon receipt of Warning Orders.
- f. Comments.

(1) Planning for this Operation was handicapped by the following:

Subject: Engineer Operations Report, Occupation of Japan.

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- (a) The sudden change from combat to occupational landing with a new target and enlarged area of operations.
 - (b) The long distances separating higher and lower commands; for example, the SIXTH Army Engineer was located at LUZON; Corps Engineer at MAUI; 2d Engineer Battalion at SAIPAN and 1902 Aviation Engineer Battalion at IE SHIMA.
 - (c) Late receipt of Maps, Plans and Engineering Data.
- (2) The Marine Engineer Liaison Officer at SIXTH Army kept the Corps Engineer informed on engineering matters and decisions. However, liaison with subordinate organizations was inadequate. In some cases, the Corps Engineer had no contact until the organizational Commanding Officers had landed at the target.
- (3) Recommendations. The following recommendations are made for future preparation and organization for engineer missions of similar magnitude:
- (a) That constant liaison be maintained with subordinate as well as higher commands throughout planning, moving and operational stages.
 - (b) That all advanced echelons include engineer reconnaissance personnel.
 - (c) That the coverage of technical intelligence of installations of engineer interests be made available for more prolonged study. This especially applies to the economic and industrial capabilities of the territory to be occupied.

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(Continued)

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2. Loading of Engineer Personnel, Supplies and Equipment.

- a. Movement of Engineer Staff. The Corps Engineer and Intelligence Officer boarded the Command Ship AGC 7 which sailed from MAUI 1 September, 1945 and joined the convoy in which the remainder of the Staff were aboard the LSV 4 and APA 57.
- b. Loading of Engineer Assault and Reinforcing Supplies. Instructions based on expected needs, were given in Annex GEORGE (Engineer Plan) to Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 for Engineer Assault and Reinforcing supplies to be loaded by the Engineer organizations. Except for some difficulty in obtaining sufficient shipping space, loading was accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
- c. Loading Engineer Units. Divisional engineer organizations and attached Naval Construction Battalions loaded with their respective divisions. Corps Engineer units less the individual organizations within the 5201 Engineer Construction Brigade were loaded in LST's and LSM's and were available during the initial landing stages. Organizations within the 5201 Engineer Construction Brigade are being loaded and brought forward as shipping is available in accordance with established priorities. Loading plans were hampered by changes in shipping allocations. Thus, elements of the 7th Naval Construction Regiment, 5th Engineer Battalion and others were forced to leave equipment and supplies behind due to insufficient cargo space. The loading location and dates, for engineer organizations are shown in Annex ABLE.
- d. Preloading of Construction materials. Due to lack of shipping space and emphasis on making maximum use of Japanese materials, all organic construction supplies were not loaded. Bridging and Fortification materials were loaded with assault echelons as directed.

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- e. Plans for loading of additional construction materials. For the Southern assault landing, additional construction materials were to be loaded at the Base Depot, San Francisco, on Engineer Resupply ships in accordance with requisitions from SC FMF, approved by AFWESPAC and SIXTH Army. Lumber supply and POL materials were to be furnished by SIXTH Army. These resupply ships were directed to the new target area. Additional construction supplies were diverted from Pacific bases where they were no longer required.
- f. Comments.
 - (1) Loading was handicapped by changes in shipping allocations and insufficient cargo space.
 - (2) The following recommendations are made for future loadings:
 - (a) That engineer organizations in assault echelon be assigned adequate shipping space in LST's or LSM's to be loaded under engineer direction.
 - (b) That adequate shipping information including manifests for engineer resupply ships be provided to facilitate construction planning after arrival at the target.

3. Landing of Engineer Units and Supplies.

- a. Time of landings. The time of landing of engineer organizations is given in Annex ABLE.
- b. Difficulties encountered in landings. Since there was no opposition, no difficulties were encountered in the landing of personnel. However, restricted dock space and the diversion of equipment and supplies from other areas, thus requiring selective discharge, has retarded unloading of engineer ships.

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- c. Unloading and Control of Supplies. Physical control of supplies including engineer supplies was a function of the 8th Service Regiment during this Operation. The Corps Engineer exercises a check control over all engineer supply issue by use of an endorsement on all requisitions for engineer supplies. The speed of the operation caused some difficulty during the first days in the unloading of heavier engineer supply. With the subsequent clearing of the dock area and dump areas, unloading is progressing more favorably and control of engineer supplies is being maintained.

4. Combat Engineer Missions.

- a. Initial Preparation of Beaches. Reconnaissance groups landing first found the seaplane ramps at the Naval Air Station at SASEBO to be suitable beaches for the unloading of tracked vehicles and heavy equipment from LST's, LCT's and LSM's. At NAGASAKI, a small amount of dozer work cleared the beach sites for LST unloading.
- b. Access roads were, in general, very narrow and unsuited for the type traffic necessary. Initial dumps at all landing points needed clearing of debris and rubbish. The condition of abandoned machinery and piles of scrap around all landing areas became a major problem. Individual units such as the 7th Naval Construction Regiment used empty hangar space for initial dumps. Often these buildings were in such poor condition that they could be considered little more than open storage. Undoubtedly the bad condition of access roads retarded the initial unloading. Open clear areas for initial dumps were particularly hard to find and in some cases materials committed to open storage were piled along the sides of roads until dump areas could be cleared. It was only the expeditious clearing of these initial dumps that prevented a pile up of organizational supplies.

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c. Bridge and Ford construction and repair.

(1) Fixed bridges - Combat bridge construction was not necessary. Neither our military operation or Jap defensive measures had destroyed bridges. However, bridge capacity was variable and never adequate. Most bridges had to be reinforced to take even the lightest military traffic.

(2) Floating bridges - none.

(3) Use of fords - none.

d. Road construction and repair. Because of the condition of access roads as indicated in paragraph 4b, immediate and continuous maintenance and repair had to be carried on by each and every engineer unit to move organizations within their areas of responsibility.

e. Cub Strips. A Cub Strip at Green Beach (Naval Air Station, SASEBO) was immediately occupied and put in dry weather operation after the grass had been cut. A large parade ground at the Naval Training Station, SASEBO was also used as a Cub Strip. At NAGASAKI a Cub Strip was constructed for the use of the 2d Marine Division. At the end of the period of this report the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was ordered to rebuild the SASEBO Cub Strip to a 2600 x 100 runway of pierced planking.

f. Enemy Obstacles. The only enemy obstacles encountered were the tremendous amount of debris and machinery that littered dock areas, open storage areas and a number of buildings.

g. Demolitions. No demolitions were required except in the disposition of enemy equipment under the supervision of the Disposition Officer.

h. Use of Engineers in combat. None.

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(Continued)

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1. Surveying, reproduction, map storage and distribution. Surveying was carried on by the Topographic Company, V Amphibious Corps, to check Japanese City plans of SASEBO and to draft bomb damage on a revised city plan. City plans of SASEBO, NAGASAKI and FUKUOKA were given first priority and suitable city plans have been drafted and reproduced. City plans for SHIMONOSEKI-YAWATA area, OMURA, SAGA and UBE have been assigned second priority and are being drafted and reproduced. The Reproduction Platoon was initially used to reproduce mosaics of numerous areas in KYUSHU needed by reconnaissance parties and other miscellaneous jobs. The original stocks of maps were replenished by a stock received 23 October. These were immediately distributed to the using units and a small stock retained for miscellaneous distribution by the 2d Topographic Company. Construction units carried on routine surveying for construction planning on airfield, POL facilities and other major construction projects.
- j. Water Supply. Water was brought ashore in containers for the first five day period. However, many units had water points operating by 24 September. The Japanese water supply at SASEBO was tested and found unsatisfactory for drinking purposes. All drinking water has therefore been processed by mobile and portable units. At NAGASAKI the Japanese water source was found satisfactory with an increase in the chlorine concentration. Additional amounts of hypochlorite have been procured from Japanese sources.
- k. Camouflage. None.
- l. Comments. In an operation of this type where the engineer mission is of necessity very broad and the development rapid, the call for engineer work is immediate and extensive. For this reason engineer equipment should have a very high priority in shipping allocations. There was some tendency to give engineer equipment a secondary priority because of its bulk and weight. As the result of this procedure, the engineer

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effort has been impeded for the want of such equipment as rock crushers, graders, distributors, etc. It is therefore, recommended that in all future operations of this type, adequate engineer equipment and supplies be loaded on as few ships as possible, preferably LST's and LSM's, to insure accomplishment of missions.

5. Major Construction Missions.

- a. Airdromes. During this operation no airdrome has been constructed. The original Cub Strip at Naval Air Station, SASEBO is now being improved to a 2600' x 100' pierced plank runway. A suitable site has been selected by the 5th Air Force at HISHURUDA (ITAZUKE). Initial construction plans in accordance with the GHQ Construction Policy have been submitted for approval. Preliminary work has been started and complete plans are being prepared to be submitted to SIXTH Army. The work required consists of rehabilitation and additions to Japanese facilities already existing. In addition, preliminary and detailed reconnaissance of sites at OMURA and KUMAMOTO have been made for possible use as B-29 bases.
- b. Docks and Jetties. Dock and Jetty construction compared to dock facilities procured was extremely minor. At NAGASAKI, a wharf was cleared and repaired. At SASEBO, the clearing of debris from the dock area became a project of first priority and is continuing. With the acquisition of suitable tankage at SASEBO, a sea line for unloading petroleum was required and is under construction and is 90% complete. Good and much needed facilities at FUKUOKA were valueless during this operation because of the effectiveness of mine fields. For purposes of outloading 5th Marine Division and ease of transfer of material to rail for FUKUOKA area an additional LST' landing area to accomodate seven (7) ships was constructed and is 90% complete this date. At the close of this period the FUKUOKA Harbor is to be soon ready to receive LST's, and several are now

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being loaded.

c. Railroad and Railroad Bridge Construction. Railroad reconnaissance and operation was not an engineer function on this operation. Since no requests for construction or repair have been received by the Engineer Section, none has been accomplished.

d. Road and Bridge construction and repair.

(1) As noted above the first important engineer missions were those of access road rehabilitation. As soon as the initial movement stabilized, the road construction program resolved itself into individual jobs each of great importance. The detailing of jobs and areas of responsibility to subordinate units was automatically prescribed by the situation. The 2d and 5th Division Engineers improved the roads within their respective areas.

(a) Roads within the dock area at SASEBO were at all times of primary importance. Consequently all road building facilities of the 98th Naval Construction Battalion were thrown into that particular project.

(b) To facilitate communications between the 2d and 5th Marine Division areas, and the usable airport at OMURA, the road from SASEBO to OMURA was repaired for very light traffic which was the immediate concern. The 31st Naval Construction Battalion is now further improving and maintaining this road.

(c) The 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade, initially utilizing the 1688th Engineer (C) Battalion, was charged with the rehabilitation of roads within the 32nd Infantry Division area to facilitate the unloading and

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reception of that division when it arrived. With the accomplishment of this mission the 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade continued the improvement and maintenance of roads within the 32nd Infantry Division Area.

- (d) With the accumulation of troops in the FUKUOKA area and the continued closure of FUKUOKA harbor, the SASEBO-SAGA-FUKUOKA road became an important supply route. The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was therefore charged with the improvement and maintenance of this road. Bridge repair was extensive and 90% of the road had to be graded to make it capable of carrying even light military traffic (1W 15' 15T). The narrow right of way between dwellings and rice paddies prohibits the development of this road into a standard Corps road. As the engineer units attached to 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade arrived in the SASEBO Area they were ordered to the FUKUOKA area as soon as transportation became available. At present there are sufficient engineer troops in the FUKUOKA Area to carry on the missions as outlined in SIXTH Army Annex 8/2 to FO 75, and the 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade has been put under control of the 32nd Infantry Division.
- (e) With the movement of the 5th Division to AINOURA, and the likelihood of the camp becoming a permanent billet, the SASEBO-AINOURA road became an important line of communication and the 5th Engineer Battalion was charged with its improvement to a 2W 15' 40T road, and completed the project before being inactivated. With the readjustment of units at the end of the period of this report, areas of responsibility for road maintenance were reassigned as follows: to the 31st Naval

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Construction Battalion, roads of military importance within the SASEBO area from AINCURA to HAIKI; to the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion, the road from SAGA to HAIKI; and to the 32nd Infantry Division with 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade attached, all roads between there and north of SAGA.

- (2) All major projects were in constant use during construction.
 - (3) Dates of completion of major road projects are indefinite because of continuous improvement and heavy maintenance.
 - (4) Difficulties encountered in road construction were innumerable. Japanese bridge capacities are thoroughly inconsistent, and individual bridges reduce the capacities of long stretches of road. The narrow right of way through closely populated areas restricted the width to which main arteries could be developed. The fact that all routes are lined closely with rice paddies cause persistent unstable sub-grade conditions. However, the most serious difficulty is the absence of suitable gravel deposits within reasonable hauling distances to the projects. Small amounts of gravel in the beds of fast running streams are generally inaccessible and too small to warrant development. As noted above most rock crushers were lifted from organizational equipment in shipping allocations. This left one over-worked crusher in the SASEBO area. Road improvement has been accomplished but has been difficult because of the use of poor grade materials.
- e. Prescribed hospital facilities were procured almost 100% intact and usable. Small engineer jobs of clearing, carpentry, plumbing and improvement of access roads were required in every case and performed as expeditiously as the situation demanded. Additional

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Station Hospitals were unexpectedly assigned to the FUKUOKA area and additional rehabilitation will be necessary. This work was planned during this period and is ready to be executed.

- f. Sufficient bulk petroleum storage was obtained by the use of existing Japanese tanks at both SASEBO and NAGASAKI. The storage capacity available was above normal requirements at both ports. The most desirable and second most desirable tanks were thoroughly cleaned at both locations. Those at NAGASAKI were put to use after pipe line and pumps had been repaired. At SASEBO, it is necessary to lay a sea line in order to discharge directly from tankers. This line and distributing station are 90% complete this date.
- g. Construction work that falls into the miscellaneous category was considerably more extensive than on strictly combat operations. Due to the extensive facilities acquired, and their value to the operation it generally was advisable to expend effort to put them in operating condition; and on the other hand due to the poor state of repair and inexpertness of Japanese maintenance and construction, rehabilitation work often became an overburden. Plumbing, electrical work and carpentry were extensive and the individual items were too numerous to catalogue in this report.
- h. Comments. The opinions expressed and recommendations made under Combat Engineer Missions apply even more here. The fact that no opposition allowed the operation to move almost immediately into a stabilized situation, caused an urgent need for the heavier types of engineer equipment such as graders, rock crushers, distributors etc. and for engineer supplies needed for semi-permanent construction such as plumbing fixtures, electrical fixtures, and, most important, personnel skilled in base construction rather than combat missions. This last need was proved very pointedly during the last few weeks of the operation covered by this report when demobilization policy cut deeply into the

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skilled ranks of the Naval Construction Regiment and the Army specialized units assigned. The Army units were finally comparatively well stabilized at the end of the period but the Naval Construction personnel had deteriorated to one poorly balanced battalion.

6. Supply.

- a. The engineer resupply has created innumerable problems basically through lack of information on the entire supply phase. No manifests were available in sufficient detail until the actual arrival of the ship. The diversion shipping has not proved satisfactory. The innumerable pieces of heavy equipment of types not required have created unloading problems of such magnitude as to make unprofitable the unloading of supplies that could have been used. The restricted dump areas and backlog of shipping does not make SASEBO a port where selective discharge can be readily obtained. The opening of the FUKUOKA Port to at least ships of LST size will greatly improve this situation but it will not be completely alleviated until the port of FUKUOKA is completely opened.
- b. Liberal use was made of Japanese supplies such as paints, roofing slate, plumbing fittings, electrical fittings and lumber. Some tools and machinery were put into use, including Japanese saw mills; and some Japanese fire-fighting equipment was repaired and put into service. Small quantities of glass were used in the repair of existing buildings for troop billets. Material for road maintenance was utilized when available.
- c. Some organizations were unable to bring all of their spare parts trailers due to the lack of shipping space. In most cases, however, a 30-days supply of spare parts for ordnance, engineer equipment and vehicles was carried.

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- d. During the early stages, engineer dumps were located in the vicinity of the beaches. Due to the limited areas available for storage, engineer equipment was temporarily stored in a number of small dumps. This situation is being corrected as additional storage areas become available.
 - e. The movement of supplies to the site of construction within immediate area of SASEBO and NAGASAKI caused little trouble. The movement of supplies and equipment to FUKUOKA caused considerable trouble. The road limitations prohibited the carrying of more than fifteen (15) tons gross load and the towing of long bodied trailers. The overcrowded railroad could not successfully carry all supplies needed.
7. Engineer Units and Personnel.
- a. Training of units. The short planning period for this operation precluded any specific training program for this operation. The unusual possibilities of this type of operation called more for widely experienced engineer troops rather than those trained for a specific mission. This requirement has been forced because of the lateness of arrival of specialist organizations. The continuation of the occupation will result in the need of specialist of more experience than those found in combat or general engineer organizations.
 - b. Productivity of Units. Under the difficulties explained in paragraphs four (4) and five (5), the productivity of units was extremely surprising. As an example: working on an original estimate that it would require fifteen (15) Battalion months to place the SASEBO-FUKUOKA road in shape as a standard Corps road, the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion produced a road suitable for light military traffic to take care of the immediate needs of the 32nd Infantry Division in a period of approximately one (1) month, and maintained the road constantly open during construction. The 98th Naval Construction Battalion produced similarly in the

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SASEBO Dock area. Taking a job of clearing debris and improving dock roads in a congestion of material that seemed endless, this unit worked around the clock and effectively put all docks in favorable operating condition in a period of approximately three weeks. Here again all facilities were maintained in use during construction. Both these units also accomplished all work as assigned to them while working on these jobs. The miscellaneous construction described in paragraph five (5) is not apparent and the true productivity of units is mostly apparent to those who have checked closely on the numerous small jobs. The one large factor that has cut deeply into the productivity of units is the extensive demobilization of experienced personnel, most pronounced in the final six weeks of the operation covered by this report.

- c. Adequacy of Engineer Units for Mission. The units assigned as per the original troop list, as modified by recommended deletions, were adequate, but the almost immediate demobilization of some units upon landing has caused readjustment in units to effectively carry out the engineer missions assigned.
- d. Adequacy of Engineer Staff. The Corps Engineer Staff was inadequate in number of personnel to effectively control all phases of engineering required. A minimum of one construction group headquarters could have been used profitably. It is felt that a more adequate staff could have given more extensive advisory aid to units needing engineer assistance.
- e. Comments. On future operations carried on during a demobilization program it is recommended that engineer units be screened and combined into working units in the staging areas. This is especially true of engineer units where loss of experienced personnel is more important than the percentage of loss indicates.

8. Miscellaneous.

- a. Japanese labor has been used extensively during this

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operation on projects under Corps Control. All utilities within the area are maintained and repaired by Japanese labor under Japanese supervision and American control. Large details have been used for such projects as cleaning petroleum storage tanks and littered areas. Prefectural road maintenance crews have been organized by Prefectural Engineers and work under the direction of the units designated as responsible in that area. Engineer troops have been conserved for important assignments by procuring and detailing Japanese maintenance crews for minor repairs to individual buildings and areas. True business arrangements with Japanese were extremely difficult at first but the inherent problems have been worked out one by one.

- b. Weather, The main event of weather during this period was the passing of a typhoon near the area of the operation. The wind itself caused little damage or even inconvenience except for utility failures during the height of the storm. However, a very rainy period occurring in coincidence with the storm caused considerable extra labor to units working to put roads with poor subgrades into condition. In some cases a full week was lost towards the completion dates. However, subsequent dry, clear weather over a two week period enabled jobs to reestablish the old schedules. In general, the weather was good for the period of the operation.
- c. Enemy interference. There was no enemy interference to engineer work and in most cases a definite desire to aid was demonstrated.

JOHN C. BREWER
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Corps Engineer.

ANNEX ABLE

LOADING AND LANDING DATA FOR
ENGINEER ORGANIZATIONS

ORGANIZATION	STAGED FROM	TIME LOADED	TIME OF LANDING	REMARKS
<u>5201st Engr Const Brig</u>				
Hq&HqCo, 5201st Engr Const Brig	Manila	21Aug45	23Sep45	Fukuoka
198th Engr Dp Trk Co ***	Rosales	21Aug45		Showa Teako iron works. *Deleted by Dis
339th Engr Const Brig	Luzon			
546th Engr Pon Brid Co ***				
573rd Engr Dp Trk Co	Luzon			*Deleted by Dis
626th Engr Lt Eq Co ***	Luzon			*Deleted by Dis
689th Engr BEq Co	Luzon			Attached to 8th Service Regt.
773rd Engr Dp Trk Co	Luzon			*Deleted by Dis
841st Engr Avn Bn	Luzon			**Deleted by Dis
873rd Engr Avn Bn (Less Co A) ***	Okinawa		14Oct45	APC 331 Fukuoka
874th Engr Avn Bn	Luzon			*Deleted by Dis
1050th Engr Gas Gen Det ***	Manila	21Aug45		Sasebe
Hq&HqCo, 1052nd Engr FC&RC ***	Luzon		17Oct45	Kyushu, Sikoko
Hq&HqCo, 1177th Engr Const Bn ***	Luzon		4Oct45	Hakata NAS.
Hq&HqCo, 1112th Engr Gp ***	Luzon		25Sep45	Hakata NAS.
Hq&HqCo, 1161st Engr Gp ***			15Nov45	Fukuoka
1332nd Engr GS Reg	Luzon			*Deleted by Dis
1393rd Engr Const Bn ***				**Zasshonokuha, added by Dis
Hq&HqCo, 1409th Engr BDEp ***			8Oct45	Kyushu Sikoko
1485th Engr Maint Co ***	Luzon			Kyushu Sikoko
1487th Engr Maint Co ***	Luzon			Kyushu Sikoko
1505th Engr Water Sup Co	Luzon			*Deleted by Dis
1532nd Engr Dp Trk Co	Okinawa			Deleted 5Oct45
1541st Engr B Surv Co (1 Plt) ***	Luzon		4Oct45	Hakata NAS
1564th Engr Dep Co (Less 1 Plt) ***	Luzon			Sasebe
1688th Engr (C) Bn ***	Oahu	21Aug45	26Sep45	Fukuoka
1731st Engr Ut Det ***	Luzon		22Oct45	Hakata NAS
1777th Engr Const Bn ***	Luzon			Zasshonokuha
1876th Engr Avn Bn ***	Luzon			**Kyushu Air Fac **added by Dis.
1881st Engr Avn Bn	Luzon			*Deleted by Dis
1902nd Engr Avn Bn ***	Ie Shima		4Oct45	Kyushu Air Fac Highway #1
1913th Engr Avn Bn	Luzon			**Deleted by Dis
1979th Engr Repro Det ***	Luzon		4Oct45	Hakata NAS
2811th Engr Pet Dist Co ***	Luzon			Hakata NAS

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ORGANIZATION	STAGED FROM	TIME LOADED	TIME OF LANDING	REMARKS
2812thEngerPetDistCo(Det)***			3Dec45	Fukuoka
3073rdQRefigCo(1Plt)***				Hakata NAS
3076thEngerDpTrkCo	Okinawa		30Oct45	Hakata NAS
3124thEngerSerDet	Luzon			*Deleted by Dis
3138thEngerRefigMaintDet***	Luzon		22Oct45	Hakata NAS
3162ndEngerFireFtgPlt	Luzon			*Deleted by Dis
3228thEngerTechIntTeam***	Luzon		25Sep45	Sasebo
<u>7thNavalConstRegt.</u>				
43rdNCBn	Maui		23Sep45	Deactivated
98thNCBn	Maui		22Sep45	Deactivated
116thNCBn	Hawaii		25Sep45	Deactivated
31stNCBn (Formed from elements of 7thNCR)				Sasebo NAS
2ndSepEngerBn	Guam		25Sep45	Sasebo NAS
<u>2ndMarDiv</u>				
2ndEngerBn	Saipan		23Sep45	Nagasaki
43rdCBn	Maui		22Sep45	Nagasaki
1298thEnger(C)Bn***	Oahu	21Aug45	27Sep45	Nagasaki
<u>5thMarDiv</u>				
5thEngerBn	Hawaii		22Sep45	Sasebo
<u>32ndInfDiv</u>				
114thEngerBn	Luzon		20Oct45	Fukuoka

* Dispatch # 061107/I

** Dispatch dated 19 Oct 45.

*** 5201st ECB for Adm. only - VAC for operation and supply, as of 15Nov45

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HEADQUARTERS,
SECOND SEPARATE ENGINEER BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC, IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

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From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Engineer Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.
Reference: (a) Corps Engineer, VAC, Ser. 6934, dtd 12Nov45.

1. Preparation and planning for the operation.

- a. CP Location - - Target Square 360-H, Special Air and Gunnery Target Map of Guam, 1:25,000, Corrections made up to 1 January, 1942, Revised April, 1944.
- b. This organization was under the operational control of the Commanding General, Forward Echelon, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, during the period from 1 June, 1945, to 18 July, 1945. In accordance with an operational employment directive from that headquarters, this organization employed all available forces to assist the 40th Naval Construction Regiment of the 5th Naval Construction Brigade in the construction of Marine Corps camp facilities. The following work was accomplished by this battalion during this period:

- (1) Additional facilities, Marine Transient Center, Guam.

The construction of a 4,000 man camp, consisting of clearing 23 acres of land; the construction of 8-500 man tent areas containing 100 tent decks, 2 shower units, 3 latrine units, and 2 scrub-decks each; the erection of 2-1,000 man galley and mess hall units complete; the erection of 4-20' x 48' Quonset huts of special design; the construction of 5 miles of road; and the complete installation of the water and electrical distribution systems. This project was started on 8 May, 1945, and was completed 30 June, 1945.

- (2) Drainage system for Marine Transient Center, Guam.

This project consisted of clearing 120 acres and

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excavating 6,000 cubic yards of rock. The job was started 16 May, 1945, and was completed 21 June, 1945.

- (3) Roads for the Sixth Marine Division Base Camp, Guam.

This project was started on 14 May, 1945, and was completed on 23 June, 1945. The work consisted of clearing one hundred and twenty acres of land and moving 22,000 cubic yards of earth to construct the roads.

- (4) Ylig River Water Point, Guam.

The battalion installed two mobile purification units at a spring about 200 yards north of the bank of the Ylig River, about one and a half miles west of the mouth of that river (Target square 36C-I). During the period of 1 June, 1945 to 1 July, 1945, a total of 508,850 gallons was produced. This organization also operated the Ylig River Water Plant, which had been installed by the 48th Naval Construction Battalion, from 6 June, 1945 to 25 August, 1945, and produced 9,472,600 gallons. Water from these water points was used by the V Amphibious Corps Artillery Camp, the Third Amphibious Corps Camp, the Third Amphibious Truck Company, and the Second Separate Engineer Battalion.

- (5) 11th Motor Transport Battalion Base Camp, Guam.

This construction was completed 13 June, 1945. This project consisted of constructing two miles of road and a four acre motor park; one 24' x 98' repair and maintenance shop; two hundred and forty fabricated tent decks; four latrine units; four shower units; four scrub decks; one 48' x 100' Quonset hut; four 20' x 48' Quonset huts; one 20' x 96' recreation building; one 20' x 48' post exchange and post office; one 20' x 48' officers club; one 20' x 48' officers mess; one 30' x 120' mess

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hall; all galley and mess hall installations, and the installation of the water and electric distribution system.

(6) E - 20 Project, Guam.

Assistance was rendered the 26th Naval Construction Battalion by the loan of engineer equipment and operators to clear and grade a site for an LV repair camp. This work was done between 14 June, 1945 and 30 June, 1945.

(7) The base camp of the Second Separate Engineer Battalion was constructed and improved during this period.

(8) Engineer assistance was furnished the V Amphibious Corps Artillery, and the Third Amphibious Corps when possible.

c. The Commanding Officer was told the plans of the invasion of Japan on 4 July, 1945, by the Chief of Staff of the V Amphibious Corps. Further information was received, as it became available, through conferences between the Commanding Officer and the Commanding General, Third Marine Division.

d. Training of personnel of this organization began on 28 May, 1945.

(1) On 28 May, 1945, the construction, bridging, and camouflage section of Headquarters and Service Company was placed on a training schedule of four weeks duration. The first week was devoted to instructions on the use and erection of the Bailey bridge. The second week was devoted to the temporary pier bridge. During the third and fourth weeks, this section instructed the bridging section of Company "A" in the use and erection of the Bailey and temporary pier bridges.

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- (2) Company "A" was placed on a four week training schedule on 28 May, 1945. The first two weeks were devoted to basic and infantry training, covering the following subjects: rifle instruction, .30 and .50 caliber light machine guns, AT rocket launchers, grenades, chemical warfare, mines and booby traps, general demolitions, employment in infantry squad and platoons on offense and defense, interior guard, and physical conditioning. During the first two weeks, the company was trained intact under the direct command of the company commander. At the end of the second week, the company was divided into five groups; Demolitions, 35 men, Heavy Equipment, 35 men, Motor Transport, 35 men, Water Supply, 35 men, and Bridging, 50 men, approximately. Special instructors were assigned to these groups, and the third and fourth weeks were devoted to specialist training. The demolition course consisted of basic demolitions, assault demolitions, mines and booby traps, and technical demolitions. The heavy equipment course included all construction equipment organic to the company, and covered basic operation, maintenance, and actual operation. The motor transport course covered functioning, maintenance, rules of the road, night driving, convoy driving, and actual driving on earth moving projects. The water supply course devoted one week to purification and one week to distillation. The bridging course covered the temporary pier bridge, and the Bailey bridge. The company was freed from all outside work and normal battalion housekeeping assignments, and every man in the company was under instruction. The ponton bridge was not available for use during this period.
- (3) Company "B" and Company "C" were placed on a seven week training schedule beginning 2 July, 1945. The first week was devoted to weapons. The second week was devoted to weapons and infantry training. The third week was devoted to demolitions and mine and bomb neutralization. The last four weeks were

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devoted to specialist training. The same procedure of training as described in paragraph two (above) was followed in the training of these two companies, except that more time was devoted to each subject. These companies received training on the ponton bridge.

- (4) The sections of Headquarters and Service Company conducted continuous "On-the-Job" training.
- (5) The training program was ideal. The companies, when committed to training, were completely available for training and the company commanders were able to supervise the instruction and visualize the potential of the company and each individual; and the battalion was able to furnish excellent specialist officers to instruct special subjects. However, the desired results of the training program were not obtained, because it was necessary to rotate 287 men to duty in the U. S., during the period 1 June, 1945 to 1 September, 1945.

c. The Engineer Staff and Organization.

- (1) The engineer staff was adequate throughout the training and planning phase and during the operation until demobilization caused the loss of key officers and enlisted men. The continual shifting of personnel definitely affected the efficiency of the battalion.
- (2) The staff functioned according to normal standing operating procedure of an engineer battalion. The letter companies were organized and trained to operate as separate units on separate engineer missions. Headquarters and Service Company was organized and trained to install and maintain battalion facilities, to furnish maintenance personnel for utility installations installed by the letter companies, to furnish technical assistance to the letter companies, to supply the letter companies, and to augment the equipment and forces

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of the letter companies when needed. A mission of construction or installation would be assigned to a letter company, and Headquarters and Service Company would furnish equipment and men needed.

- f. This organization was placed under operational control of the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 18 July and on 19 July, 1945 passed to operational control Commanding General, Third Marine Division, and directed to plan on loading out intact on two LST's and four LSM's on or about 4 September, 1945. This shipping allowance was changed to five LST's by the Commanding General, Third Marine Division, to meet the needs of this organization. This organization was notified on 18 August that the invasion of Japan had been suspended and that all logistic and administrative information on that operation was to be used during the planning of the Occupation Operation.
- g. On 28 August, 1945, this organization received a copy of the Operation Order of the Provisional Combat Engineer Group, and a copy of the V Amphibious Corps Operation Plan was supplied by the Commanding General, Third Marine Division. From this information, the operation plan of this organization was formed.

2. Supply.

a. Supply during training and planning phase.

- (1) Rifle range and machine gun range supplies, flares, chemical grenades, and mines were not available to the battalion during the training period.
- (2) Approximately fifty per cent of the rocket ammunition allocated to the battalion was unserviceable.
- (3) The ponton bridge arrived late and was only available to two letter companies.
- (4) Only three twenty-five ton semi-trailers were available.

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- (5) The battalion carried two 3/4 cubic yard shovels and two 3/8 cubic yard shovels. The two 3/8 cubic yard shovels were substituted for the third 3/4 cubic yard shovel organic to the battalion which was not available.
- (6) Only 75% of the winter clothing necessary for the battalion was available.
- (7) Oil stoves were received on the basis of one for every five men with no replenishment allowance for either stoves or wicks.
- (8) The battalion requested substitution of the TD-14, 360° Tractor Crane for the TV-9 Tractor Crane, but these cranes were not available.
- (9) Tires and tubes were critical items, and the lack of these items caused motor transport and engineer equipment to be deadlined frequently.
- (10) The battalion was allowed one 60 cubic foot air compressor and one ten ton, three wheel roller, as special additional equipment.

b. Supply during the operation.

- (1) Tires, tubes, and hot patches were not available in sufficient quantity to keep the motor transport and engineer equipment from being deadlined for excessive periods. It was necessary to utilize the large ponton repair kit for patches. Although not as effective as regular hot patches, this kit prevented the motor transport of the battalion from being deadlined completely.
- (2) Three K-7 Dump Trucks and three additional self propelled road graders were furnished this battalion due to the nature of the mission assigned.
- (3) Two 24 head shower units were supplied to provide hot water facilities for two companies operating separately.

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- (4) Except for hydrovac brake units for M-5 trucks, all spare parts for K-7 dump trucks, and certain engineer equipment spare parts, the supply of spare parts has been adequate.
- (5) Stoves, and wicks for stoves have been inadequate.
- (6) With the above exceptions, the supply situation has been very satisfactory.

3. Loading of Engineer Personnel, equipment and supplies.

a. The loading plan:

- LST #830 - Headquarters and Service Company personnel and equipment, complete, except for special items and special personnel to be loaded on the supply ship, LST #800.
- LST #811 - Battalion Commander and Staff and Company "A", all personnel and equipment, combat loaded.
- LST #918 - Company "B", all personnel and equipment, combat loaded.
- LST #726 - Company "C", all personnel and equipment, combat loaded.
- LST #800 - Bulk cargo, Special Headquarters and Service Company equipment, and sufficient personnel to load and unload this ship

b. Loading and voyage.

- (1) On 27 August, 1945, this organization began moving equipment and supplies to the staging area at Apra Harbor, Guam, M. I. By 2400, 3 September, 1945, all equipment and supplies of this battalion were at the staging area, and the loading of LST's began on 4 September, 1945. On this date the Commanding Officer received orders to embark aboard

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the LST's and upon arrival at the destination to report to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps for Operational Control. The loading of all LST's was completed 7 September, 1945.

- (2) On 10 September, 1945, the battalion sailed from Apra Harbor, Guam, M.I., and reached Saipan, M.I. on 11 September, 1945, and remained there until 14 September, 1945, aboard ship. On 14 September, 1945, the battalion sailed from Saipan, M.I. and arrived at Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, on 22 September, 1945.

4. Landing, and unloading.

- a. The commanding officer reported to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 22 September, 1945, and was directed to report to the Commanding Officer, 13th Marines, for assignment of billeting and storage area in the Sasebo Aircraft Factory area. Suitable billets and storage areas were located for the battalion Quartermaster, Headquarters and Service Company, and Company "B" in this area; and after thorough investigation, suitable billets and storage areas were found in the Naval Air Station area for Company "A" and Company "C". CP Location - (1109.4-1178.7) Map of Kyushu, 1:250,000.
- b. The landing of the Engineer Units and supplies are shown below.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>LST</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Location</u>
1200	23Sept	918	"B"	Sasebo, Aircraft Factory Docks
1700	23Sept	811	"A"	Sasebo, Naval Air Station
2200	23Sept	726	"C"	Sasebo, Naval Air Station
0350	24Sept	918	"B"	Unloaded.
0855	24Sept	830	"H&S"	Sasebo, Aircraft Factory Docks
1030	24Sept	811	"A"	Unloaded.
1035	24Sept	800	"QM"	Sasebo, Aircraft Factory Docks
2030	24Sept	726	"C"	Unloaded.
2200	24Sept	830	"H&S"	Unloaded.
0500	25Sept	800	"QM"	Unloaded.

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No difficulties were encountered in landing; however, unloading the supplies and equipment into separate areas, approximately three miles apart, made the control of personnel and supplies difficult. The billets and storage areas assigned this battalion were within one mile from the landing point, and by 4 October, 1945, all quartermaster supplies were consolidated.

5. Engineer Operations.

a. 23 September, 1945 to 4 October, 1945.

During this period the battalion unloaded and consolidated engineer equipment and supplies, inventoried all Japanese materials and equipment in the battalion's assigned area, improved billeting areas, installed water points, (shown in paragraph (c) below), began engineer intelligence reconnaissance (shown in paragraph e below), furnished carpenter assistance to the 13th Marines to improve that organization's billeting areas, and furnished engineer equipment assistance to the 5th Marine Division.

b. Sasebo-Fukuoka highway. (4 October, 1945 to 31 November, 1945).

On 4 October, 1945 the mission of rehabilitating the 86 miles of highway from Sasebo to Fukuoka to take minimum military traffic of vehicles of not greater than 15 ton gross vehicle load was assigned this battalion. On 5 October, 1945, Company "B" moved equipment to the job site and began grading and surfacing the first 5 miles of the road from Sasebo towards Saga. On 6 October, 1945, Company "C" and Company "A" began moving equipment to Saga to new billets in that city. On 7 October, 1945, Company "A" began work on the road from Saga towards Fukuoka. Company "B" located bridge sites and spotted materials. All three companies continued work on the Sasebo-Fukuoka road from 8 October, 1945 to 30 November, 1945. On 10 October, 1945, Company "A" constructed a 40' single-single Bailey bridge 3.5 miles east of Saga. On 13 October, 1945, Company "A" began

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construction of a timber bent bridge 4 miles east of Saga. On 14 October, 1945, Company "A" completed work on the timber bridge 4.5 miles east of Saga. Several existing bridges were reinforced. Sign posting on the entire road was about 25% completed on this date. On 14 October, 1945, Company "A" replaced a timber bent on a bridge 10 miles east of Saga. 900 Jap laborers were used on road and bridge work. On 15 October, 1945, Company "A" opened a borrow pit near the Fukushima airfield. 150 Jap laborers were used on ditching work and 900 were used on other road work. Road between Tade and Tosu was closed because of washout, and a detour was reconnoitered from Tade to Kurume to Tajiro (2 miles above Tosu). On 16 October, 1945, Company "B" completed construction of the detour from Kitakata through Ogi, and Kubata to main road. Company "A" opened the Kurume detour for traffic and started maintenance work. Both detours became permanent parts of the road. On 17 October, 1945, Company "A" constructed a 90' double-single Bailey bridge 5.5 miles east of Saga. The road work from Sasebo to Saga was completed on this date. Maintenance was continued. On 18 October, 1945, Company "C" constructed a timber bent bridge 1 mile west of Yamaguchi. On 19 October, 1945, Company "A" replaced the deck of a timber bridge near the Fukushima airfield and improved the approaches to three existing Bailey bridges. On 23 October, 1945, Company "A" replaced the deck of a timber bridge on the road through Kurume, 4½ miles west of Kurume. 30 Jap laborers were used in this work. On 6 November, 1945, and 7 November, 1945, Company "B" constructed a 40' single-single Bailey bridge 5.9 miles east of Arita. Company "B" completed construction of a steel I-Beam, wood, bridge, 7 miles east of Arita. Japanese personnel and materials were used as far as possible and were obtained from the Saga Prefecture Engineer. Sign posting, road improvement and maintenance was continuous throughout this period.

Recapitulation of Statistics:

Total yardage of rock moved. 20,568 cu.yds.

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Bailey bridges constructed:

1 40' single-single - 3.5 mi. east of Saga.
 1 40' single-single - 5.9 mi. east of Arita.
 1 60' double-single - 4.5 mi. east of Saga.
 1 90' double-single - 5.5 mi. east of Saga.

Other bridges replaced or repaired.10
 Culverts repaired or replaced35

c. Water Supply: 26 September, 1945 - 31 November, 1945.

During this period this battalion set up and operated the following water points:

#Units	Type	Location	Installed	Secured
6	Mobile	(1277.1-1114.2)	24Sep45	
		(1277.1-1114.2)	26Nov45	
		(1111.7-1280.7)	24Sep45	50Oct45
		(1111.7-1280.7)	27Sep45	
		(1109.4-1278.7)	24Sep45	
		(1280.5-1110.8)	27Sep45	
		(1126.5-1336.8)	27Sep45	
3	Portable	(1126.5-1334.8)	27Sep45	
		(1101.9-1292.3)	15Oct45	
		(1110.0-1275.5)	6Oct45	

Total gallons produced to date. 1,192,550 gals.

d. Other Missions carried out by this battalion.

8Sep45 - 6Oct45 - Equipment assistance to 5th Engr.Bn. and maintenance of Sasebo Naval Training Station road (including quarrying operations).

90Oct45 - 12Oct45- Hauling for 1st Special NCB.

90Oct45 - 13Oct45- Cleared debris from Transient Officers BOQ.

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10Oct45 - 17Oct45 - Quarrying operations for 5th Engr. Bn., 1500 cu. yds rock moved.
15Oct45 - 20Oct45 - Cleared debris for VAC Med. Bn.
16Oct45 - 18Oct45 - Graded access road for Corps Evac. Hosp. #1.
16Oct45 - 9Nov45 - Cleared saw mill area at Naval Aircraft Factory, Sasebo. 2 Acres cleared.
18Oct45 - 8Nov45 - Ditched and graded 12th MT parking area.
18Oct45 - 31Oct45 - Cleared debris in center of Sasebo for Service Regiment.
31Oct45 - 2Nov45 - Filled and graded access road for Corps Evac. Hosp. #1.
4Nov45 - 5Nov45 - TD-9 W/Crane worked unloading LST at Green Beach One.
4Nov45 - 31Nov45 - Water trucks sprinkled roads in Sasebo area periodically.
12Nov45 - - 2 Semi-trailers worked for 8th Service Regiment.
13Nov45 - 14Nov45 - Extended air strip and graded road crossing at Sasebo Naval Air Station.
17Nov45 - - Cleared area for 8th Service Regt.
17Nov45 - 31Nov45 - TD-9 Crane worked for Navy BDO.
17Nov45 - 31Nov45 - Winterization of buildings for 92nd Field Hospital. 41,400 sq. ft. of ceiling.
20Nov45 - 28Nov45 - Erected road blocks at NAS, Sasebo.
28Nov45 - 31Nov45 - TD-9 Crane and TD-18 W/20 Ton Crane worked for Navy Procurement Officer.
28Sep45 - 31Nov45 - During this period all companies worked on camp improvements and winterizing of quarters.

e. Intelligence Missions:

This battalion carried out the following reconnaissance missions during the period 25 September, 1945 to 30 November, 1945:

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- (1) Hasty reconnaissance of roads leading from CP, 2d Separate Engineer Battalion to the city of Sasebo. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. A. Love on 25 September, 1945. Report was submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, on 25 September, 1945.
- (2) Detailed reconnaissance of roads leading from CP, 2d Separate Engineer Battalion to the city of Sasebo. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. A. Love, 25 September, 1945. Report was submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, on 25 September, 1945.
- (3) Detailed reconnaissance of battalion CP area, 2d Separate Engineer Battalion and tunnels in adjacent hills. Report covers inventory of Japanese materials in area. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. A. Love on 27-28 September, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 28 September, 1945.
- (4) Detailed report of battalion CP area, 2d Separate Engineer Battalion and road reconnaissance between Sato and Arita, via Haiki. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. A. Love, on 29 September, 1945. Report to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 30 September, 1945.
- (5) Hasty reconnaissance of route between Sasebo and Saga, via Haiki and Arita; and between Saga and Fukuoka, via Tosu and Futsukaichi. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. A. Love on 1-2 October, 1945. Report made to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 3 October, 1945.
- (6) Report of bridge reconnaissance made on route between Saga and Fukuoka of bridges that will not sustain a continued 10 tons in 1945. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. A. Love and Lt. H. V. Cappleman on 2-4 October, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 5 October, 1945.

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- (7) Hasty reconnaissance of alternate route between Kitakata and Fukuoka, via Ochi, Karatsu, and Maebaru. Reconnaissance was made by Capt. J. C. Carrigan and Capt. J. J. Butler, IV on 10 October, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 12 October, 1945.
- (8) Detailed reconnaissance of route between Sasebo and Omura, via Kawatana and Sonoli, by Capt. M. F. Rose on 13 October, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps 17 October, 1945.
- (9) Detailed reconnaissance of route between Sonoki, on the Sasebo-Omura highway and Takeo on the Sasebo-Fukuoka highway. Reconnaissance made by Capt. M. F. Rose on 24 October, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 27 October, 1945.
- (10) Detailed reconnaissance of bridges on the route between Sasebo and Fukuoka, via Arita, Saga, Tosu, and Futsukaichi. Report covers bridge descriptions, computed capacities, recommendations for reinforcing bridges, bills of material based on recommendations, and computed capacities of bridges after reinforcing. Reconnaissance made by Capt. J. C. Carrigan, Lt. H. A. Love and Lt. H. L. Capplemann on 15-20 October, 1945. Report was submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 31 October, 1945.
- (11) Reconnaissance of route between Saga and Fukuoka, via Oikeda and Magaributchi, and Kanzaki and Fukuoka, via Oikeda and Magaributchi. Both routes were found to be impassable. Report made to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps in special report dated 31 October, 1945. Reconnaissance made by Capt. J. C. Carrigan.

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- (12) Detailed reconnaissance of alternate route between Kitakata and Fukuoka, via Ochi, Karatsu, Hamasaki, and Maebaru. Reconnaissance made by Capt. J. C. Carrigan and Capt. J. J. Butler, IV, on 18-19 October, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps 1 November, 1945.
- (13) Detailed reconnaissance of route between Shitami on the Saga-Fukuoka highway and Wakamatsu, via Uchino, Iizuka, Kobukuro, Naogata, Ueki, and Orio. Reconnaissance made by Capt. J. C. Carrigan and Capt. J. J. Butler, IV on 24-28 October, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, on 6 November, 1945.
- (14) Detailed reconnaissance of one-way route east of Kitakata to Tokuma, via Ogi. Reconnaissance made, after road improvements and repairs were completed, by Lt. H. L. Cappleman on 14 November, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 15 November, 1945.
- (15) Detailed reconnaissance of route between Fukushima airfield and Tajiro, via Kurume. Reconnaissance made after road repair and construction were completed. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. L. Cappleman on 13 November, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 19 November, 1945.
- (16) Detailed reconnaissance of route between Kurume and Omuta, via Fukushima, Hainuzuka, Oshima, Setaka, Nankan, and Miike. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. L. Cappleman on 24-28 October, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 19 November, 1945.
- (17) Detailed reconnaissance of route between Saga and Orita, via Kurume, Hainuzuka, Oshima, and Setaka. Reconnaissance submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 19 November, 1945.

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- (18) Detailed reconnaissance of route between Omuta and Kumamoto, via Nagasu, Takase, Oshima, and Takahashi. Reconnaissance made by Lt. H. L. Cappleman on 24-28 October, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 19 November, 1945.
- (19) Detailed reconnaissance of route between Kurume and Kumamoto, via Yamaga. Reconnaissance was made by Lt. H. L. Cappleman, on 24-28 October, 1945. Report submitted to the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps on 19 November, 1945.

6. Comments and Recommendations:

a. During the planning phase; the below listed facts were a handicap to efficient and progressive planning.

- (1) The late arrival of the Corps Operation Plan and the Operation Order of the Provisional Combat Engineer Group.
- (2) The lack of engineer intelligence information.
- (3) The assignment of a general engineer mission in a general area.
- (4) The distance from the Battalion base of operation to the Corps Engineer's Headquarters.
- (5) The views, general or specific formation, and wishes of the Corps Engineer were not known to the Commanding Officer, except through written Corps Orders.

b. During the occupation and engineer operation phase, the below listed facts were a disadvantage to efficient operation:

- (1) The lack of tires, tubes, hot patches, and certain motor transport and engineer equipment spare parts.

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- (2) The lack of trained personnel to accomplish the large amount of specific engineer intelligence work.
- (3) The lack of sufficient Japanese interpreters.
- (4) The T.O. allowance of dump trucks and motor graders was not sufficient.
- (5) The wet cold weather which prevailed during the first two weeks of operation.
- (6) The demobilization of key officers and key enlisted personnel.
- (7) The traffic regulations and bridge capacities over the Sasebo-Fukuoka road were not strictly enforced by convoy leaders.
- (8) The lack of sufficient organic cargo trucks to overcome the logistic problem of engineer supply.

c. Recommendations:

- (1) That special trained engineer intelligence officers or non-commissioned officers be attached to Corps Engineer units when operating in occupation capacities on large land masses.
- (2) That an additional allowance of at least six cargo trucks, 2½ Ton, be assigned as organic equipment.
- (3) That adequate foul weather (wet weather) gear be furnished engineer personnel comparable to the foul weather gear furnished Navy or U.S. personnel.
- (4) That on all large land mass operations, the estimate of supply of tires, tubes, and hot patches be exaggerated.

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- (5) That personnel be rotated early in the rehabilitation period, so that rotation will not interfere with the training program and thus reduce efficiency.

A. T. FEASTER, III.

TOPOGRAPHIC COMPANY
HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTALION
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, IN THE FIELD
% FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

1 December 1945.

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OPERATION REPORT ON THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

1 June 1945 - 30 November 1945

A. ORGANIZATION

This unit, composed of four (4) operational platoons and one administrative headquarters platoon, functioned with The Engineer Section, V Amphibious Corps, but was a part of Headquarters and Service Battalion for administrative control. The four (4) operational platoons were as follows:

Photomapping Platoon
Reproduction Platoon
Surveying Platoon
Relief Mapping Platoon.

B. TRAINING PRIOR TO THE OPERATION

Due to the severe losses in key and experienced personnel, sent back to the States on rotation, a complete training program was necessary. The past training and experience of the new personnel had to be determined and a training program set up accordingly.

The Photomapping Platoon stressed precision drafting, free-hand lettering, conventional signs and military symbols and the preparation of black and white prints. Evening classes were held for these courses. The Reproduction Platoon was continually active reproducing charts, diagrams, mosaics, photographs, maps, cards and other miscellaneous jobs for the Staff Sections. The Survey Platoon was transit traverses, level lines, layouts of recreation fields, and operated with the Artillery Regiment of the 4th Mar Div, triangulating and extending control for fire control surveys. The surveyors also were schooled in setting up tide gauges in preparation for the forthcoming operation. The Relief Mapping Platoon had been preparing relief models for the 4th before joining this organization and therefore were well-trained and experienced in this work. Past experience

TopoCo, H&SBn, VAC Operation Report dated 1 December 1945.

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showed the need for experienced sign painters, so a part of the training program was used for developing satisfactory personnel for these jobs. Plaster molds were made and numerous rubber maps were painted.

Until the cessation of hostilities with Japan was announced this organization prepared maps, relief models and reproductions for the Olympic Operation. After the announcement ending hostilities, all time and work was converted to the Blacklist Operation. Maps, photographs and miscellaneous charts were drawn and reproduced.

C. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

It was decided to take all supplies and equipment on the operation, leaving no rear echelon. Just prior to embarkation a 23" paper cutter was received along with a supply of mapping paper. It was anticipated that the subsequent major items of supply would be procured from the 8th Service Regiment after disembarking in Japan. The Lithographic ink supply was not sufficient, but the 60th Engineer Topographic Battalion sent a nominal quantity of ink at the urgent request of this organization.

D. NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

This organization disembarked at Sasebo, Kyushu on 26 September 1945. All equipment and supplies were unloaded by 28 September 1945. The reproduction trailers were immediately set up and operation commenced on the 27th. Photo-mappers began revising the existing Japanese maps using aerial photographs and information gained through ground reconnaissance. The Surveying Platoon checked scales of existing maps, roads, buildings and railroads at Sasebo. The relief mappers were utilized as sign-painters for VAC Headquarters. A negative mapping report was submitted to the 6th Army on 28 September.

The mapping program as set up in V Philo's order, was followed. Sasebo, Fukuoka and Nagasaki city area maps were given priority followed by Omura, Ube, Yamaguchi and Iwata-Shimonoseki. A mapping report covering the month of October was submitted to the 6th Army on 30 October 1945 (See Enclosure "A" to Operation Report). Map storage and dis-

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tribution was taken over by this organization during the month of October. A final mapping report was submitted as of 26 November. (See Enclosure "B" to Operation Report).

E. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Due to the loss of experienced personnel by demobilization this organization operated with decreasing efficiency as personnel was detached. However, the mapping program progressed according to plan.

It is recommended that a 20" x 24" contact printer instead of the 11" x 14" contact printer now in operation, be supplied this and similar organizations for reproduction of large size photographs and mosaics.

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SEVENTH NAVAL CONSTRUCTION REGIMENT
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

14 December 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Acting Officer in Charge.
To : The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Engineer Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.
Reference: (a) Corps Engineer, VAC, Ser. 6934, dtd 12Nov45.

1. Preparation and Planning for the Operation..

- a. This organization was stationed on Maui, T. H. when directed to make preparations to load out on three LST's, one PA, and one APA. All construction work was secured 23 August, 1945, and preparations for embarking began. Engineer equipment was checked and put into shape for the operation. The necessary infantry gear was issued to personnel. Personnel were inoculated against diseases prevalent to the area of operations.
- b. The loading of gear and equipment on LST's began 24 September, 1945 and personnel began embarking the following day. Each LST was loaded with each type of equipment for operating independently, if required.
- c. On 1 September, 1945, the last ship containing personnel and equipment joined a convoy and departed for the ultimate destination.
- d. Three officers and seventy-nine enlisted men were left at Maui as the rear echelon of the activity.

2. Training and Organization.

- a. Training received in June included instruction and practice in handling and throwing hand grenades, one day of firing carbines, one-half day the Village Course, and one-half day on the Live Hand Grenade Course. The B.A.R. men and T.S.M.G. men practiced an additional one-half day with their weapons.

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- b. Training received by the Battalion personnel in August included two days of lectures and training films and five days on bivouac. Training at the bivouac consisted of Infiltration Course, Village Combat Course, Demolition Course, Carbine Range, Hand Grenade Range, Moving Target Range, Pistol and T.S.M.G. Range, 1000 inch Range, and defensive and offensive maneuvers.

3. Narrative of Occupational Operations.

- a. During the night of 22 September, 1945, the LST's were beached at Green Beach, Sasebo N.A.S., Kyushu, Japan, and unloading operations started. The following day personnel began coming ashore. Guards were posted at the existing warehouses and caves to safeguard large quantities of stored materials and instruments.
- b. There were no obstacles or enemy interference during the entire operation.
- c. Immediately upon landing work was commenced on facilities for billeting and messing personnel and storing equipment and supplies. Temporary frame screened buildings were erected for a galley and mess halls, and existing buildings were cleaned and decontaminated for quarters and warehouse space. The water in existing mains was found to be satisfactory for bathing purposes after being treated with chlorine. Distillation units were set up to purify water for galley use and drinking purposes.
- d. By 27 September, 1945 all personnel were ashore and billeted in existing buildings. There were no obstacles or enemy interference during the entire operation.
- e. Other operations in September included the remodeling and decontaminating of the Fifth Amphibious Corps Headquarters B.O.Q., grading and draining the road going north from Sasebo Naval Air Station to the National Highway, rerouting the road around the south end of the air strip at the Air Station, operation of an electrical sub station and maintenance of distribution system at the Air Station, and miscellaneous carpentry and plumbing work at the Fifth Amphibious Corps Hospital and CUB 18 area.

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- f. Operations in October consisted primarily of general maintenance work and rehabilitation. The main work projects were in the Sasebo area and consisted of grading and surfacing approximately ten miles of roadway and partially completing a petroleum storage and distribution system.
 - g. Considerable work was performed in October clearing the dock area in the Sasebo Navy Yard in order to provide space for roadways and to facilitate the unloading of ships. In clearing this dock area it was necessary to remove large quantities of scrap metal, heavy marine equipment, and other debris. A Japanese floating crane and Japanese barges together with approximately one hundred fifty Japanese laborers were employed in this task.
 - h. Other operations in October included dismantling an old hanger at Green Beach and the piling and burning of Japanese planes at Sasebo N.A.S.
 - i. Operations in November were primarily a continuation of maintenance and rehabilitation work in the Sasebo area. Work was continued on the petroleum storage and distribution system. Maintenance work was continued on the road from Sasebo Naval Air Station to the National Highway. Work was continued clearing the dock area.
 - j. Other operations in November consisted of grading and surfacing the shore road from Sasebo Naval Air Station to Item docks, constructing an LST landing, constructing Quonset huts at the Aircraft Factory, alteration and maintenance work at the Fifth Amphibious Corps Headquarters building and B.O.Q. building.
4. Comments and Recommendations.
- a. Suitable road material was scarce and at times unobtainable. Heavy clay mixed with a small amount of sand stone was often used. Although this material was not considered desirable for road surfacing in this locality, where heavy rains are prevalent, it was accepted where good drainage could be provided.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
FLAG OFFICE

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- b. Considerable use was made of available Japanese labor, equipment, and materials. Equipment used consisted mainly of electric generators, power saws and other wood working machinery, overhead cranes in existing buildings, and air compressors. Materials used consisted of a considerable quantity of lumber, sheet metal, clay pipe, and metal pipe. The use of local labor, equipment and materials greatly expedited construction operations.

J. W. RUSSELL

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