

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

5 November, 1945.

No. 45

DAILY LOCATION REPORT
(As of 1800/14 November, 1945)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CP LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Hq, 5th MarDiv	Marine Camp AI OURA (71.4-14.3)	
Hq, 27th Mar	KURUME (1358.95-1132.9)	
H&S Co	KURUME (1358.95-1132.9)	
Wons Co	KURUME (1358.95-1132.9)	
1st Bn	Marine Camp AI OURA (71.4-14.5)	
Co A (Reinf)	GOTO-RETO	Arr 4 Nov
2dBn	SAGA (36.2-25.3)	
2dPlat F Co	KANZAKI (1346-1134)	
2dPlat E Co	SAGA (36.2-25.3)	Arr 29 Oct
G Co	TOSU (1357-1141)	Arr 29 Oct
3dBn	KURUME (62.0-30.0)	
28th Mar (less 1/2)	FUKUOKA	VAC Control
Hq, 2/28 and 3/28		
1/2 CT-28 Hq	Marine Camp AI OURA (71.0-14.1)	Arr 2 Nov
2dBn	SASEBO (78.1-11.6)	Arr 2 Nov
3dBn	Marine Camp AI OURA (71.3-14.4)	
Hq 13th Mar	SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.7-10.9)	
1stBn	KAWATANA (92.9-02.5)	
A Btry	OGUSHI (88.8-01.2)	
2dBn	KARITATE (82.8-12.75)	
3dBn	SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.6-11.1)	
4thBn	SASEBO Aircraft Factory (81.5-11.05)	
121st F. Bn	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	To 13th Mar
H&S Btry	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	on 3 Nov.
How Btry	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
A Btry	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
B Btry	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
C Btry	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
5th Tank Bn	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	
H S Co	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	Det OITA
A Co	OITA (654.5-1123.8)	
B Co	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	
C Co	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CP LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
5th Engr Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
H&S Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
A Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
B Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
2d Plat	SAGA (1336-1128)	
3d Plat	KURUME (1352-1131)	
Detachment	OITA (654.5-1123.5)	
C Co	FUKUOKA	CT-28
3d Plat	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
5th Pion Bn	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	Opn Contr 1
H&S Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	VAC 4 Nov
A Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
B Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
C Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
5th Service Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
Hq Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
Ord Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
Tracked Vehicle	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	
Plat		
3d Plat	FUKUOKA	CT-28
Supply Co	SASEBO (76.35-12.35)	
3d Plat	FUKUOKA	CT-28
Service Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
3d Plat	FUKUOKA	CT-28
Bakery Section	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.6-13.6)	
6th Sep Ldry Plat	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
5th Med Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	
H&S Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	
B Co	KURUME (1358.9-1132.9)	Dets at SAGA
		OITA
C Co	FUKUOKA	CT-28
D Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	
E Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	
5th FT Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
H&S Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
D Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.7-14.8)	
* Amph Trk Co	KARITATE (82.9-12.9)	Det SAGA
Auto Repair Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.7-13.5)	
C Co, 20th Amph Trk Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.1-13.9)	
116th MC Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	Det SAGA
		& FUKUOKA
Hq Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	
A Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	
B Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	

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
UNIT	CP LOCATION	REMARKS
C Co	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.2-13.9)	
D Co	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.2-13.9)	
Headquarters Bn	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.4-14.4)	
Hq Co	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.4-14.4)	Det OITA, FUKUOKA, SAGA.
Sig Co	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.4-14.4)	DET OITA, SAGA
Recon Co	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.4-14.3)	
5th MP Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
A Co 3d MP Bn	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
C Co 3d MP Bn	FUKUOKA	CT-28
1st Plt	SAGA (1336-1128)	
VMC-5	Naval Air Station (79.2-08.5)	
CIC Det N. 403	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.4-14.3)	Det SAGA SASEBO
CIC Det N. 496	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.4-14.3)	Det OITA, KURUMI
34th Harbor C	SASEBO (78.5-11.7)	
ASCO	FUKUOKA	Det at AINOUEA
Det JICPOA Team No. 29	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.4-14.3)	
94th Hq & Hq Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
Det Mil Gvt		
95th Hq & Hq Co	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.4-14.3)	Det OITA, SAGA, FUKUOKA
Det Mil Gvt		
1/2 Hq OCT-127	HAIKI (85.15-09.9)	
Hq Co	HAIKI (85.2-09.9)	
Serv Co	HAIKI (86-10.5)	
Cannon Co	HAIKI (83.75-09.85)	
A/T Co	HAIKI (83.7-09.8)	
2d Bn	SASEBO (78.15-17.95)	
B Co, 107th Med Bn	HAIKI (85.15-09.9)	
B Co, 114th Eng Bn	HAIKI (83.6-09.7)	
2d Plt	SASEBO (78.2-18.0)	
3d Plt	SASEBO (78.1-11.5)	
Det 32d Qd Co	HAIKI (85.2-09.8)	
Det 732d Qd Co	HAIKI (86.0-10.5)	Arr 30 Oct
Det 95th Mil Contl	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.5-14.7)	Arr 31 Oct
Det 203d Mil Surv	Marine Camp AINOUEA (71.5-14.7)	Arr 31 Oct

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Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000; SASEBO Sheet 44, KOCURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000; Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SW, 4045 IV SW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE.

* Designation changed from 5th Amph Trk Co to Amphibian Truck Co, 5th Motor Transport Bn on 24 October, 1945.



F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACFS, G-3.

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5th Med Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Serv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Hq Bn (5)
116th NC Bn (5)
File (10)

Supply Gp (2)
CIC Det No. 403 (2)
CIC Det No. 496 (2)
Provost Marshall (2)
34th MarDep Co
VMO-5
6th Sep Ldry Plat
Det JICPOA Team No. 29
94th Hq & Hq Co, Det Mil Govt
95th Hq & Hq Co, Det Mil Govt
G-1
G-2
G-4
Disposition Officer
Division Adjutant (2)
Special Service Officer
Signal Officer
Postal Officer

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HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

12 November, 1945.

No. 52

DAILY LOCATION REPORT
(As of 1800/I 11 November, 1945)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CP LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Hq, 5th MarDiv	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.3)	
Hq, 27th Mar	KURUME (1358.95-1132.9)	
H&S Co	KURUME (1358.95-1132.9)	
Wpns Co	KURUME (1358.95-1132.9)	
1st Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.5)	
2d Bn	SAGA (36.2-25.3)	
2d Plat F Co	KANZAKI (1346-1134)	
2d Plat E Co	SAGA (36.2-25.3)	
G Co	TOSU (1357-1141)	
3d Bn	KURUME (62.0-30.0)	
28th Marines	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-14.4)	Arr 6 Nov
H&S Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-14.4)	Arr 6 Nov
Wpns Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-14.4)	Arr 6 Nov
1st Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-14.4)	Arr 6 Nov
B Co	SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)	Arr 8 Nov
2d Bn	Navy Yard (78.1-11.4)	Arr 2 Nov
3d Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.3-14.4)	Arr 6 Nov
Hq 13th Mar	SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.7-10.9)	
1st Bn	KAJATANA (82.9-01.5)	
A Btry	OGUSHI (86.8-01.2)	
2d Bn	KARITATE (92.9-12.75)	
3d Bn	SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.6-11.1)	
4th Bn	SASEBO Aircraft Factory (81.5-11.05)	
121st FA Bn	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
H&S Btry	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
HOW Btry	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
A Btry	HAIKI (83.5-08.4)	
B Btry	HAIKI (82.2-07.0)	
C Btry	HAIKI (82.1-06.9)	
5th Tank Bn	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	
H&S Co	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	
A Co	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	Ret 5 Nov
B Co	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	
C Co	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	

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
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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CP LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
5th Engr Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
H&S Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
A Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
B Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
2d Plat	SAGA (1336-1128)	
3d Plat	KURUME (1352-1131)	
C Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	Ret 6 Nov
5th Pion Bn	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	Opn Cont VAC
H&S Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
A Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
B Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
C Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
5th Service Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
Hq Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
Ord Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
Tracked Veh Plat	Naval Air Station (79.1-08.9)	
Supply Co	SASEBO (76.35-12.35)	
Service Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
Bakery Section	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.6-13.6)	
6th Sep Ldry Plat	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.9-13.9)	
5th Med Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	
H&S Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	
B Co	Kurume (1358.9-1132.9)	Dets at SAGA, OITA.
C Co	FUKUOKA	VAC
D Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	
E Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	
5th MT Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
H&S Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.8-13.9)	
D Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.7-14.8)	
Amph Trk Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.7-14.8)	Det 27th Mar
Auto Repair Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (70.7-13.5)	
C Co, 20th Amphn Trk Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.1-13.9)	
116th NC Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	Det 27th Mar
Hq Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	
A Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	
B Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	
C Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	
D Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.2-13.9)	

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CP LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
headquarters Bn	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.4)	
Hq Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.1)	Det FUKUOKA, 27th Mar
Sig Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.4)	Det 27th Mar
Recon Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.3)	
5th MP Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
A Co 3d MP Bn	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
VMO-5	Naval Air Station (79.2-00.5)	
CIC Det No. 403	SASEBO (78.2-13.2)	Det MarCamp AINOURA
CIC Det No. 496	KURUME (1352-1131)	Det OITA
34th MarDep Co	SASEBO (78.5-11.7)	
ASCO	FUKUOKA	Det AINOURA
Det JICPOA Team No. 29	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.3)	
94th Hd & Hq Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
Det Mil Govt		
95th Hd & Hq Co	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.4-14.3)	Det FUKUOKA, 27th Mar
Det Mil Govt		
Det 95th Hal Contl	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	
Det 203d Hal Surv	Marine Camp AINOURA (71.5-14.7)	

Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000; SASEBO Sheet 44, KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUSU: Scale 1:25,000; Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SW, 4145 IV SW, 4045 I NE; 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE.


F. R. DOUGETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

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BLT 1/27 (5)
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5th Engr Bn (5)
5th Med Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Serv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Hq Bn (5)
116th NC Bn (5)
File (10)
Supply Gp (2)
CIC Det No. 403 (2)
CIC Det No. 496 (2)
Provost Marshall (2)
34th HarDev Co
V C-5
6th Sep Ldry Plat
Det JICPOA Team No. 29
94th Hq & Hq Co, Det Mil Govt
95th Hq & Hq Co, Det Mil Govt
G-1
G-2
G-4
Disposition Officer
Division Adjutant (2)
Special Service Officer
Signal Officer
Postal Officer

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

SECRET

19 November 1945

No. 59

DAILY LOCATION REPORT

(As of 1800 18 Nov)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CP LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Hq, 5th MarDiv	MCA (71.4-14.3)	
Hq, 27th Mar	KURUME (1358.95-1132.9)	
H&S Co	KURUME (1358.95-1132.9)	
Wpns Co	KURUME (1358.95-1132.9)	
1stBn	Afloat aboard LST's 1024 and 619 and LCI's 816 and 818.	At TSUSHIMA (1240-1280)
2dBn	SAGA (1335-1128)	
2dPlat F Co	KANZAKI (1343-1132)	
1stPlat E Co	SETAKA (1354-1114)	
G Co	TOSU (1358-1141)	
3dBn	KURUME (1362-1131)	
28th Mar	MCA (71.3-14.4)	
H&S Co	MCA (71.3-14.4)	
Wpns Co	MCA (71.3-14.4)	
1stBn	MCA (71.3-14.4)	
B Co	SASEBO Fortress (77.3-15.3)	
2dBn	Navy Yard (73.1-11.4)	
3dBn	MCA (71.3-14.4)	
Hq 13th Mar	SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.7-10.9)	
1stBn	KAWATANA (82.9-01.5)	
A Btry	OGUSHI (88.8-01.2)	
2dBn	KARITATE (92.9-12.75)	
3dBn	SASEBO Aircraft Factory (80.6-11.1)	
4th Bn	SASEBO Aircraft Factory (81.5-11.05)	
121st FA Bn	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
H&S Btry	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
HOW Btry	HAIKI (84.2-10.0)	
A Btry	HAIKI (83.5-08.4)	
B Btry	HAIKI (82.2-07.0)	
C Btry	HAIKI (82.1-06.9)	
5th Tank Bn	NAS (79.1-08.9)	
H&S Co	NAS (79.1-08.9)	
A Co	NAS (79.1-08.9)	
B Co	NAS (79.1-08.9)	
C Co	NAS (79.1-08.9)	
5th Engr Bn	MCA (70.9-13.9)	

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
<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CP LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
H&S Co	MCA (70.9-13.9)	
A Co	MCA (70.9-13.9)	
B Co	MCA (70.9-13.9)	
2d Plat	SAGA (1336-1128)	
3d Plat	KURUME (1352-1131)	
C Co	MCA (70.9-13.9)	
5th Pion Bn	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	Opn Control VAC
H&S Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
A Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
B Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
C Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
5th Serv Bn	MCA (70.8-13.9)	
Hq Co	MCA (70.8-13.9)	
Ord Co	MCA (70.8-13.9)	
Tracked Vehicle		
Plat	NAS (79.1-08.9)	
Sup Co	SASEBO (76.35-12.35)	
Serv Co	MCA (70.8-13.9)	
Bakery Sec.	MCA (70.6-13.6)	
6th Sep Ldry		
Plat	MCA (70.9-13.9)	
5th Med Bn	MCA (71.5-14.7)	
H&S Co	MCA (71.5-14.7)	
B Co	KURUME (1358-1132.9)	Dets SAGA, OITA.
C Co	FUKUOKA	VAC
D Co	MCA (71.5-14.7)	
E Co	MCA (71.5-14.7)	
5th MT Bn	MCA (70.8-13.9)	
H&S Co	MCA (70.8-13.9)	
D Co	MCA (70.7-14.8)	
AmphTrkCo	MCA (70.7-14.8)	Det 27th Mar
Auto Rep Co	MCA (70.7-13.5)	
C Co, 20th Amph		
Trk Bn	MCA (71.1-13.9)	
116th NC Bn	MCA (71.2-13.9)	Det 27th Mar
Hq Co	MCA (71.2-13.9)	
A Co	MCA (71.2-13.9)	
B Co	MCA (71.2-13.9)	
C Co	MCA (71.2-13.9)	
D Co	MCA (71.2-13.9)	

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CP LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Hdqtrs Bn	MCA (71.4-14.4)	
Hq Co	MCA (71.4-14.4)	Det FUKUOKA, 27th Mar
Sig Co	MCA (71.4-14.4)	Det 27th Mar
5th MP Co	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
Ren Co	MCA (71.4-14.3)	
A Co 3d MP Bn	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
C Co 3d MP Bn		
(less 1st Plat)	SASEBO Fortress	Ret 151400/I
VMO-5	NAS (79.2-08.5)	
CIC Det No 403	SASEBO (78.2-13.2)	Det MCA
CIC Det No 496	KURUME (1352-1131)	Det OITA
ASCO	FUKUOKA	Det MCA
Det JICPOA Team		
No. 29	MCA (71.4-14.3)	
94th Hq & Hq Co		
Det Mil Govt	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	
95th Hq & Hq Co		
Det Mil Govt	MCA (71.4-14.3)	Det FUKUOKA; 27th Mar
Det 95th Mal		
Control	MCA (71.5-14.7)	
Det 203d Mal		
Survey	MCA (71.5-14.7)	

Maps? CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000; SASEBO Sheet 44, KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000; Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4046 IV SE, 4046 I SW, 4145 IV SW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE, 4046 III SE.


F. R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

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V Phib Corps (10)
2d MarDiv (5)
32d InfDiv (5)
CG FBC (5)
CT-27 (10)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

13th Mar (20)
BLT 1/27 (5)
CT-28 (5)
5th Engr Bn (5)
5th Med Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Serv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Hq Bn (5)
116th NC Bn (5)
File (10)
Supply Gp (2)
CIC Det No. 403 (2)
CIC Det No. 496 (2)
Provost Marshal (2)
VMO-5
6th Sep Ldry Plat
Det JICPOA Team No. 29
94th Hq & Hq Co Det Mil Govt
95th Hq & Hq Co Det Mil Govt
G-1
G-2
G-4
Disposition Officer
Division Adjutant (2)
Special Servie Officer
Signal Officer
Postal Officer

- 4 -

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

RESTRICTED

23 November 1945

No. 66

DAILY LOCATION REPORT
(As of 1800 25 Nov)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CP LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Hq, 27th Mar	HAIKI (84.0-9.9)	Arr 25 Nov
H&S Co	HAIKI (84.0-9.9)	Arr 25 Nov
Wpns Co	HAIKI (84.0-9.9)	Arr 25 Nov
2dBn	ONO BKS (78.2-17.9)	Arr 24 Nov
3dBn	HAIKI (84.0-9.9)	Arr 25 Nov
13th Mar		
1stBn	KAWATANA (92.9-01.5)	Correction
2dBn	KARITATE (82.8-12.75)	Correction
D Btry	HAIKI (84.0-9.9)	
5th Med Bn		
C Co	MCA (71.5-14.7)	Arr 24 Nov
ASCO	MCA (71.5-14.3)	Arr 25 Nov
Hq Co	MCA (71.4-14.4)	FUKUOKA Det ret 25 Nov.
Det NAVTECJAP	MCA (71.4-14.3)	Designation changed from JICPOA Team No. 29.
NAGASAKI Ken Field Unit	SASEBO (77.3-15.3)	Designation Changed from 94th Hq&Hq Co Det Mil Govt.

DELETE: 95th Hq&Hq Co Det Mil Govt.

Maps: CENTRAL JAPAN: Scale 1:250,000; SASEBO Sheet 44,
KOKURA Sheet 45, OITA Sheet 46. KYUSHU: Scale 1:25,000;
Sheets 4046 III NE, 4046 II SW, 4046 II NW, 4046 IV SE,
4046 I SW, 4145 IV SW, 4045 I NE, 4045 I SE, 4046 II NE,
4046 III SE.

F.R. Dowsett
F.R. DOWSETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
ACofS, G-3.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

V Phib Corps (10)
2d MarDiv (5)
32d InfDiv (5)
CT-27 (10)
13th Mar (20)
BLT 1/27 (5)
5th Engr Bn (5)
5th Med Bn (5)
5th MT Bn (5)
5th Serv Bn (5)
5th Tank Bn (5)
Hq Bn (5)
116th NC Bn (5)
Supply Gp (2)
CIC Det No. 403 (2)
CIC Det No. 496 (2)
Provost Marshal (2)
VMO-5
6th Sep Ldry Plat
Det NAVTECJAP
Nagasaki Ken Field Unit
G-1
G-2
G-4
Disposition Officer
Div Adjutant (2)
Special Service Officer
Signal Officer
Postal Officer
File (10)

PART 4 - 5TH MARINE DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

ANNEX EASY - G-4 REPORT

01484

027/174

HEADQUARTERS
5TH MARINE DIVISION
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

CONFIDENTIAL

1 December, 1945

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: G-4 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.
Enclosures: (A) Appendix 1 - Transport Quartermaster Report.
(B) Appendix 2 - Quartermaster Report.
(C) Appendix 3 - Medical Report.
(D) Appendix 4 - Ordnance Report.
(E) Appendix 5 - Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment Report.
(F) Appendix 6 - Procurement Report.
(G) Appendix 7 - Motor Transport Report.
(H) Appendix 8 - Shore Party Report.
(I) Appendix 9 - Engineer Report.
(J) Appendix 10- Periodic Reports.

1. GENERAL.

a. The 5th Marine Division was established in its Camp at Kamuela on the Island of Hawaii when positive orders to participate in the Occupation of KYUSHU were received on 18 August, 1945. Embarkation of the Division began on 22 August, 1945, and, except for the rear echelon, was completed on 27 August, 1945. The loading out was accomplished through the Port of Hilo, sixty-five (65) miles distant from the Division Camp.

b. Prior to the receipt of orders for the Occupation, the Division was engaged in the preparation of plans and the procurement and processing of equipment and supplies for the assault on Southern KYUSHU. While the advanced state of preparedness for the Assault was in itself invaluable in enabling the Division to load out for the Occupation on short notice, the same factors perforce required that the logistical plans for the Occupation conform in general to those developed for the Assault.

2. PLANNING AND PROCUREMENT.

a. The logistical plans for the occupation of KYUSHU were formulated originally for the assault upon Southern KYUSHU, adapted and modified as expedient and practical in the light of

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Subject: G-4 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN (Cont'd).

incomplete directives relating to the Occupation received prior to embarkation, and finally amplified as required to support the operations of the Division in the actual occupation.

b. (1) Planning for the assault on Southern KYUSHU began on 26 June, 1945, on the receipt of information from V Amphibious Corps which indicated that the Division would participate, and establishing a tentative readiness date of mid-September. The information available, while far from complete or firm, was sufficient to enable the Division to start processing equipment and supplies for loading out. It was indicated that the Division would be required to lift the following quantities of supplies:

Rations:	Type "B" - 10 days Emergency Type - 21 days
Water:	5 days at 2 gal/man/day
Fuel:	30 days
Ammunition:	5 U/F CINCPOA
Class II:	30 days
Class IV:	30 days

Subordinate elements of the Division were advised to submit requisitions immediately covering all deficiencies.

(2) Action was taken immediately to procure and prepare for embarkation the Division's POE supplies. Anticipating that approximately one-third (1/3) of the rations would be palletized, the 17th Service Battalion, with technical assistance of a Division representative began the palletization of ten (10) days "10-in-1" rations. Water containers were steam cleaned, painted, marked and deadlined to await filling immediately prior to embarkation. Petroleum products were segregated and where necessary placed in appropriate containers. Pickets and barbed wire were palletized and concertina crated to facilitate handling. Beach matting was loaded on beach sleds. Segregation of combat ammunition was accomplished in the 17th Service Battalion dump and requisitions submitted to cover deficiencies. All equipment not required for training was prepared either for embarkation for combat or for storage in the rear echelon.

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The Division and all subordinate elements were required to move equipment not required for training to the Hilo Area as expeditiously as possible in order that the final movement might be kept to a minimum in quantity.

(3) Studies of the theater indicated that clothing, bridge and road construction equipment and supplies, and transportation would require special consideration.

(a) Climatic conditions at the target were expected to be such that all hands would require wet-cold weather clothing for the landing. Climatic conditions would not, however, permit the wearing of this clothing enroute, yet it was considered essential that the clothing be individually fitted in order that the required protection might be obtained. It was not considered feasible to carry this clothing in bulk and attempt an issue immediately prior to landing, nor could personnel carry the clothing in their packs because of the great bulk. A solution was found in waterproof clothing bags. It was planned that the issue and fitting of wet-cold weather clothing be accomplished prior to embarkation and that each individual be supplied with a waterproof clothing bag in which the clothing would be carried as personal baggage.

(b) Intelligence studies of terrain in the target area showed it to be such as would place extreme emphasis on expeditious bridge and road construction and/or repair. Such conditions indicated that not only would high priority on construction equipment be essential but that unusually large quantities of construction materials would be required. A plan was developed by the Division Engineer and Division Transport Quartermaster in collaboration with the G-4 whereby adequate shipping space was made available on LSM's and in the top hold loads of transports for the items of engineering equipment considered necessary. Bridging materials were procured and made ready for embarkation. Two machinery trailers were loaded with three hundred (300) feet of foot bridge; one hundred fifty (150) feet of Double Double Bailey Bridge, and the ponton bridge were preloaded on thirteen (13) trailers and twenty-six (26) 2½-ton trucks. It was requested that an additional

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80,000 square feet of Mat, Beach Roadway, and 250,000 feet of lumber be furnished the Division for engineering purposes. It was planned to use the lumber from the prefabrication of five 100 foot, 40-ton, timber bridges.

(c) Motor transport was considered a problem of the first magnitude in that the Division would be operating on a scale which would put the maximum strain on transport facilities and over terrain which was ill adapted to the use of motor transport. A tentative vehicle list was prepared by G-4 in conjunction with the Division Motor Transport Officer and upon recommendations of the subordinate elements of the Division. Emphasis was placed upon establishing transport self-sufficiency, primarily in light vehicles, in the combat elements. It was anticipated that shipping limitations might require a reduction in the overall number of vehicles but it was felt that the above principle could be maintained. Carriers, Cargo, M29C, were assigned on the basis of six (6) per Infantry and Artillery Regiment, four (4) per Signal Company, and one (1) to Commanding Officer, Shore Party Regiment; the remaining Carriers out of the number allocated the Division, one hundred four (104), were to be maintained in Motor Transport Battalion for allocation to combat elements as conditions might require.

(4) The introduction of changes in the Tables of Organization and Tables of Allowances coincident with the re-equipping and preparation of the Division for outloading and the formulation of plans for combat resulted in much confusion. It is strongly recommended that impending changes of major proportions either in the Tables of Organization or Tables of Allowances be held in abeyance if they materialize as plans are being crystallized for an operation. Such changes could be effected with a minimum of confusion during the ensuing period of rehabilitation.

(5) TransRon 24 was tentatively assigned to lift the Division. On 9 July, 1945, at a conference at the Division Camp, attended by the Commodore of TransRon 24 and his staff, tentative plans were made for the outloading of the Division. Arrangements were also made at this time for the

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early attachment of TransRon and TransDiv Transport Quartermasters to the Division to assist in the preparation of loading plans. The establishment of early liaison with TransRon staff and the early assignment of Transport Quartermasters is heartily endorsed.

(6) On 13 August, 1945, Division Administrative Warning Order No. 1-45 was issued complete with the following Annexes:

ABLE - Breakdown of Rations by Embarkation Groups.
BAKER - Motor Transport Heavy Lifts and Engineer Equipment.
CHARLIE - Breakdown of Assault and Pioneer Supplies by Embarkation Groups.
DOG - Breakdown of Fuels and Lubricants by Embarkation Groups.
EASY - Preload of Artillery Ammunition (two 105mm Howitzer Battalions).

c. (1) The Division was alerted for an early movement overseas on 10 August, 1945. Although the readiness date for the assault operation was over a month distant at the time, the alert found the Division in a high state of logistical preparedness. The status as of 10 August, 1945, was as follows:

Rations:	10 days Type "B" (less certain components) earmarked at Army QM, Hilo. 10 days "10-in-1" palletized. 11 days emergency ("C" "D" "K") in hand.
Water:	20,000 Cans, 5 gallon expeditionary. 2,400 Drums, 55 gallon.
Petroleum Products:	20 days all types available at 17th Service Battalion.
Ammunition:	5 U/F available at 17th ServBn, except for certain shortages created by shift from CINCPAC to AFPAC U/F, and segregated for embarkation.

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Engineer and Fortification Materials:

Requisite pickets, barbed wire, and concertina on hand and palletized or otherwise prepared for embarkation.

Bridging Materials - Truck and trailer mounted and ready for embarkation.

Mat, Beach Roadway - Prescribed allowance available and stowed on beach sleds or otherwise prepared for embarkation.

General Supplies:

98% complete.

Wet-cold weather clothing 100% on hand but not issued.

Vehicles:

100% complete except for:

1. Equipment required to mechanize Reconnaissance Company.
2. Equipment required for Company "C", 20th Amphibian Truck Company.
3. Kits, deep water fording.

(2) On 18 August, 1945, at a conference at V Amphibious Corps Headquarters, attended by G-4, advice was received that on 22 August, 1945, the Division would begin outloading for the Occupation of KYUSHU. Lack of firm and complete directives from higher authority necessarily rendered the information available to the Division at this time extremely limited in character. The principal logistical changes (from the assault plan) were:

20 days "B" ration instead of 10.

3 U/F instead of 5.

Substitution of TransRon 22 for TransRon 24.

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(3) Because of the limited time and limited information available, the plans for the outloading had of necessity to be adapted from plans already formulated for the assault operation. Division Administrative Warning Order No. 1-45, issued for the assault outloading, was fortunately adaptable; changes as noted in subparagraph 2, above, were disseminated at a conference on 19 August. Division Administrative Warning Order No. 2-45 was subsequently published to incorporate these changes. The limited amount of shipping available in TransRon 22 rendered a revision of the vehicle list imperative. In conformity with the principle that subordinate elements should be kept as nearly self-sufficient in transportation as possible in order to effect supply below the regimental level to widely dispersed units, an exchange was effected whereby ten (10) trucks, 2½-ton, were made available to each Infantry Regiment in lieu of eighteen (18) trucks, 1-ton, organically assigned. The exchange not only effected a saving in shipping but materially increased the capacity available in regiments, which increase later proved of great value. The advance in target date eliminated the need for cold-weather protection; wet-cold weather clothing was therefore retained under Division control.

d. PROCUREMENT.

(1) Procurement for the assault/occupation of KYUSHU was effected through the following sources:

- Class I - Army.
- Class II & IV & V - Normal channels.
- Class III - Navy, through Marine Corps channels.

(2) Procurement was in general satisfactory. 17th Service Battalion, Hilo, served as the local procurement agency for materials procured through the Marine Corps. Stock levels maintained were adequate except in the case of vehicles and heavy equipment. The 17th Service Battalion was not equipped to convert or rebuild tanks, consequently all conversions or resupply had to be effected through 6th Base Depot, Honolulu. Adequate labor personnel was available in 17th Service Battalion to prepare POE supplies for embarkation, and such trained supervisory personnel as necessary were provided by Division.

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(3) A late shift from ten to twenty days type "B" rations found the Army Quartermaster on Hawaii unprepared to furnish and even the ten days lifted were lacking in many desirable components. Army Quartermaster, Oahu, up until a few days prior to arrival of the first TransDiv insisted that no change of instructions had been received, and that 1 September was their delivery date. Hence some ration components were being unloaded from vessels bringing them from Oahu and being loaded directly into transports lifting the Division.

(4) Critical shortages were reported weekly to Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps and Commanding General, Service Command and every effort was made to meet them even to the point where items were dispatched by LST to arrive in Hilo during the embarkation.

3. EMBARKATION.

a. The assignment of shipping and embarkation of the Division are covered in a separate report, Appendix 1, Transport Quartermaster Report. However, certain comments relative to the outloading at Hilo are felt to be pertinent at this point.

(1) The limited time interval between the receipt of orders to outload and the arrival of the first TransDiv accentuated the need for a closed port and clear dock area for several days prior to commencing loading in order that "spotting" might be accomplished. Despite the fact that every effort was made by Port authorities to clear the dock area of civilian cargo this was not accomplished in sufficient time to allow complete "spotting" for the first TransDiv. Although extraneous shipping was barred from the port during the period of outloading, an unfortunate situation developed in that equipment and supplies to be lifted by the Division did not arrive in Hilo until loading had commenced. This necessitated an unloading over the same dock facilities being used for outloading with resultant confusion.

(2) The distance of the Division's camp from the port (four hours by motor convoy), the limited rail facilities (a maximum of four 15 car trains per day), and limited dock facilities required that close supervision and exacting

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coordination be exercised in order that an expeditious loading might be accomplished. The strain on transportation facilities was particularly acute in the movement of troops to Hilo for embarkation since the lack of billeting facilities (see sub-paragraph (3) below) prevented their movement prior to the day of embarkation. The use of LSMs and LSTs for ferrying between Hapuna Bay (12 miles from Camp on West Coast) and Hilo greatly facilitated the movement of engineering equipment and tanks to the point of embarkation.

(3) One of the major difficulties encountered in loading out of Hilo was the lack of accessible billeting space for working parties and embarking troops. The Division had acquired during June and July the only two available camps for use during loading out period. These camps were adequate in size to billet the working parties necessary to the loading of a single TransDiv, but were located at Olaa, ten miles distant from the port. Much time was lost in effecting reliefs of working parties from such a distance and in addition a large amount of transportation needed for the movement of cargo had to be diverted for this purpose.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS.

a. The preparation of the administrative order was handicapped by circumstances which rendered complete and firm directives on certain of the more important phases of the occupation unavailable until after the occupation had begun. V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 was received on 29 August, 1945; however, annexes covering Disposition of Surrendered Material, Military Government, Area and Facilities Allocation, and Administrative Reports were not received until after arrival in the occupation zone.

b. Division Administrative Order No. 1-45, less Annexes "FOX" and "GEORGE", was issued on 12 September, 1945. Distribution was made to elements embarked in TransRon 22 at Saipan; distribution to elements embarked in LSMs and LSTs was not effected until arrival at the target. Annex "FOX" was distributed on 23 October, 1945 and Annex "GEORGE" on 22 September, 1945.

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c. The handicap under which all echelons were laboring because of delay in preparation and distribution of orders is obvious. This unfortunate situation was relieved to a certain extent by the fact that V Amphibious Corps Headquarters was embarked in the same convoy with the Division thus making radio-telephone conferences between Corps and Division G-4's possible en route.

5. OCCUPATION.

a. General.

(1) Logistical plans for the initial phases of the occupation were hampered by the inability to secure accurate and complete information pertaining to conditions in the Sasebo Area and facilities there available for landing and establishing the Division. Despite the lack of firm information, adequate plans could be, and were, formulated for all possible schemes of landing. All plans for the logistical support of the landing were essentially similar in that regardless of the scheme put into operation, Combat Teams would be initially responsible for area logistical support with Division assuming responsibility for the support of detached units (Special Task Units). Planning for the unloading and establishment of the Division ashore was more difficult since details had of necessity to await the report of the advance reconnaissance party. This report, in fact, proved insufficient because of the limited time available to the party, thus requiring a physical reconnaissance by representatives of the G-4 and associated sections. On the basis of aerial photos and intelligence studies, area assignments for location of supply installations were made prior to arrival at the target.

(2) Logistical support of the occupation operation was accomplished without any outstanding departure from normal procedure. Unit distribution was placed in effect on A plus 1. Division assumed the responsibility for supply of smaller units detached for occupational duties in areas distantly removed from their parent organization, since all such supply was most easily accomplished by rail.

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(3) The establishment of supply installations was handicapped by the lack of both open and closed storage. Open areas available for dumps were practically non-existent. In consequence suitable locations had to be dozed out in the heart of the burned out area of Sasebo. The procurement of closed storage was hampered by uncertainties as to the disposition of Japanese materials accumulated in all available space, plus the difficulties of physically clearing the areas.

(4) The procurement and preparation of adequate billeting areas present a problem of large proportions. Sanitary conditions encountered were such that a major decontamination job was required in each case before troops could be moved in.

(5) Maintenance of roads and bridges presented a major problem. Not only was the road net inadequate in scope to support the operations of the Division, but such roads as existed quickly disintegrated under military traffic. Heavy rainfall and lack of accessible materials aggravated this condition in the initial stages of the occupation. Rebuilding and maintenance of roads received a high priority throughout the occupation.

(6) The movement and resupply of elements of the Division sent on extended missions was beset by difficulties, attributable largely to the condition of the road net described above. It was necessary to rely on rail transportation for movements of any distance. In certain cases motor transportation was transported by rail for use in the new zone of responsibility. Such conditions render the logistical support of detached units uncertain, and required that greater stocks of supplies be kept on hand by the unit than would normally be necessary.

(7) Detachment of the Rear Echelon presented no insurmountable problems, although considerable confusion and inconvenience resulted particularly in the matter of records and personal baggage. Notice of impending detachment sufficiently in advance would have enabled the Division to establish a system of selective shipping whereby materials sent forward would have included essentials only.

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b. Landing.

(1) Personnel - All debarking personnel carried one (1) type "K" and one (1) type "D" rations and one (1) assault candy ration, two (2) filled canteens, one (1) unit of fire, plus normal arms and equipment. Baggage packs of personnel landing on "A" Day were held to be landed as unit baggage.

(2) Logistical Control - Division and Combat Team Logistical Control Officers were boated and prepared to assume control of the shoreward movement of cargo. These posts were secured upon the movement of ships into the dock area to discharge cargo.

c. Unloading.

(1) The unloading of the Division is covered in detail in Appendix 1, Transport Quartermaster Report, and Appendix 8, Shore Party Report.

(2) The congested and rubble-strewn conditions encountered in the dock area at Sasebo served to emphasize the close coordination which must exist between the Shore Party and the Division Quartermaster supply installations if an efficient unloading is to be accomplished. Movement of cargo out of dock or beach areas to Division Dumps must be carried on simultaneously with the unloading, not only to avoid a beachhead bottleneck but also to minimize damage to cargo.

d. Shore Party.

(1) The nature of the operation was such that the Shore Party functioned but limitedly as such. Details of the organization, training, and functioning are included in Appendix 8, Shore Party Report.

e. Motor Transport.

(1) A complete report of motor transport activities is included in Appendix 7, Motor Transport Report. The following comments, however, are considered appropriate at this point.

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Subject: G-4 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN (Cont'd).

(a) The extensive dispersion of elements of the Division required by occupational duties emphasized the necessity of establishing transport self-sufficiency in lower echelons in order that tactical missions can be accomplished and supply effected below the regimental level.

(b) Pooling of transportation on all levels is highly desirable in order that maximum use can be made of all vehicles. The Division Motor Transport Officer should coordinate all organizational pools, drawing upon them as transport demands may dictate.

f. Engineer.

(1) Extremely heavy demands were placed upon engineer elements of the Division in the maintenance and improvement of roads and bridges and the construction and adaptation of billeting facilities and utilities.

(2) The established road net proved entirely inadequate to support military traffic. Extensive improvements were required on main supply roads and constant maintenance on all types. The nature of the terrain was such that large quantities of materials were required to effect improvements. Roads through or adjacent to rice growing areas were particularly difficult to maintain because of a lack of "bottom". Local resources were exploited to the fullest extent, but the availability of road construction materials was limited because of inaccessibility of material and lack of local quarrying and crushing equipment.

(3) Although Japanese military installations or buildings were used entirely for the billeting of occupation troops, extensive repairs and alterations were required in most instances. Japanese bathing and sanitary facilities, when present, were not acceptable by American standards of sanitation. Japanese galleys could not be utilized as such. The failure of the Japanese to retain details in military installations for the maintenance and operation of power systems resulted in delay and inconvenience and an additional burden on engineer personnel.

(4) Local water sources proved unsuitable for any purpose other than general washing and bathing. Purifica-

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tion units were required for the treatment of all water used for drinking and cooking throughout the Occupation.

g. Ordnance.

(1) The occupational duties required extensive use of Ordnance personnel, in a technical capacity, in inventorying and distribution of enemy materials of war. A full report of these activities is included in Appendix 4, Ordnance Report.

h. Supply.

(1) Appendix 2, Quartermaster Report, comprises a full account of supply for the operation and during the occupation. Certain aspects of supply are considered of sufficient general interest to be included at this point.

(a) In general the assault supplies of the Division proved adequate and resupply through the 8th Service Regiment satisfactory. In the early stages of the occupation supplies of DDT and tire repair materials became critically short. Abnormal demands were responsible for the shortages in each, the demand for DDT resulting from the highly unsanitary conditions encountered throughout the area and that for tire repair materials from extensive operation of vehicles in destroyed or damaged areas.

(b) Emergency type rations were used more extensively than had been anticipated in occupational duty. Unfavorable sanitary conditions rendered the use of "B" type rations inadvisable until extensive decontamination had been effected and complete galley facilities installed. "B" type rations cannot replace the emergency type ration when the mission requires extensive patrolling and detached operations.

i. Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment.

(1) Appendix (5), Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment Report, covers this phase of the occupation in detail.

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Subject: G-4 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN (Cont'd).

6. CONCLUSION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Changes in Table of Allowances:

(a) Comments: The introduction of major changes in Tables of Organization without supporting Table of Allowances during preparation for an operation creates much confusion and handicaps the equipping of the organization.

(b) Recommendation: That impending changes of major proportion either in Tables of Organization or Table of Allowances be held in abeyance if they are promulgated as plans for an operation are being developed, and made effective during the next period of rehabilitation.

(2) Personnel for Division Dumps:

(a) Comments: Inadequate provision is made in Tables of Organization for personnel and equipment to work Division Dumps. Attachment of Depot Companies and Ammunition Companies to the Shore Party is not an effective solution as these personnel are required in the beach area at the same time there is the greatest need for personnel in Division inland dumps, namely, when they are being initially established.

(b) Recommendation: That a labor unit be made available from Corps troops to Division QM Section in order to provide for the operation of Division dumps on a twenty-four (24) hour basis. This unit should be equipped with all necessary dump and warehouse cargo handling equipment.

(3) Shipping Requirements:

(a) Comments: There is a failure to correlate the allocation of shipping to shipping requirements. Tonnage limitations made necessary by the nature of the operation would have rendered it impossible for the

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Subject: G-4 Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN (Cont'd).

Division to lift supplies and equipment in the quantities directed by higher authority.

(b) Recommendation: That the Division be granted an opportunity to determine the amount of shipping required to lift what higher echelon directs must be carried.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Advance Party.

(a) Comments: Inadequate time and personnel were allowed to prepare the area for the reception of the Division.

(b) Recommendation: That military government representatives and advance billeting details precede the arrival of occupation troops by a substantial period of time in order that full use can be made of enemy facilities, housing and labor.

(2) Rations.

(a) Comments: Type "B" rations are inadvisable in the early stages of an occupation because of uncertain sanitary conditions and can not replace emergency type rations when the mission requires extensive patrolling or detached operations on the part of smaller units.

(b) Recommendation: That rations carried in the initial shipping for an occupation be predominantly of the emergency type unless known factors eliminate the possibility of unsanitary conditions. In any event resupply shipping should not exclude the emergency type "C" and "10-in-1".

(3) Storage.

(a) Comments: Failure to utilize closed storage facilities in the area because of lack of directives

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governing disposition of Japanese materials stored therein resulted in unwarranted weather damage to equipment and supplies of the Division.

(b) Recommendation: It is believed the recommendation contained in subparagraph (1) (b) above would provide a means whereby a situation of this type would be prevented.

(4) Procurement.

(a) Comments: The Division Quartermaster Section was designated as the administrative section for the Division Procurement Agency. The voluminous reports and the extensive liaison and reconnaissance required in the performance of these additional duties resulted in a severe burden on Quartermaster personnel.

(b) Recommendation: That in an operation where extensive use of enemy or foreign facilities and supplies is anticipated, an adequate and separate administration section be provided for such procurement agency as may be established.

F. A. Stevens
F. A. STEVENS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

5th Marine Division
In the Field
1 December, 1945

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT.

DIVISION TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. TRAINING PHASE:

a. As a result of the Iwo Operation, it was apparent that units were in need of more and better trained Transport Quartermaster personnel. To correct this deficiency, prior to the embarkation for another Operation, the Division Transport Quartermaster Section set up a schooling program which was designed to correct any errors which might have occurred and to give old and new Transport Quartermaster personnel the latest and most up to date loading procedure.

b. Two sessions were held, for both Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers. The first session extended from 27 April to 15 May, 1945, and the second extended from 2 through 13 July, 1945.

(1). The first session ran two (2) days per week for three (3) weeks. The following personnel were required to attend:

Officers:

Two (2) from each Regimental Headquarters.
Two (2) from each Battalion, Service Troops.
One (1) from each Infantry Battalion.
One (1) from each Artillery Battalion.

Enlisted:

Each Regimental Headquarters: four (4) NCOs.
Each Battalion, Service Troops: four (4) NCOs.
Each Infantry Battalion: four (4) NCOs.
Each Artillery Battalion: four (4) NCOs.

The scope of this session was to take up the Transport

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (CONT'D).

Doctrine, the FMF, Pac G-4 Standard Operating Procedure, and the drawing up of a complete set of loading plans. During this phase, a record of attendance was kept and students were graded on their work. At the conclusion, reports of the results were submitted to Division.

(2) The personnel who attended the previous class were required to attend the second session. The scene was to review the previous session's instructions and to familiarize all students with the new embarkation forms as promulgated by FMF, Pac. The last four (4) days of this session were to include the practical application of their loading instructions in the form of the actual loading of a small APA which had been obtained for this purpose. A typical combat load was drawn up by the Division Transport Quartermaster Section and given to the students, who in turn made up complete loading plans. The best loading plan, in the opinion of the Division Transport Quartermaster Section, was selected and that one reproduced in quantity and used as the actual loading plan.

(3) Provisions were made with the G-2 Section to take stills and motion pictures of the loading procedure, showing the correct method of adjusting slings, etc., for the purpose of using these as training aids for future instructional periods.

(4) Conclusions:

(a) As a result of this training period, a number of Officers and Enlisted men learned the rudiments of Transport Quartermaster work and formed a pool from which experienced TQ personnel became available for actual planning and out-loading.

(b) The experiences gained in the actual loading of a small APA show that it is the best form of instruction for this type of work.

(c) It is recommended that during future

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (CONT'D).

training periods a ship be made available to Divisions for instruction in Transport Quartermaster procedure.

2. PLANNING PHASE:

a. Upon receipt of Warning Order for the assault operation, UP&Ts, Cargo Lists, Vehicle and Heavy Lift Lists were requested from all units. From this information the Division Transport Quartermaster Section was able to maintain accurate running records of the amount and type of supplies and equipment to be lifted for an operation. As a result of the cancelling of the assault operation, due to the cessation of hostilities, the information obtained previously then became a basis for the out-loading of the Division for the occupation of Japan. This was invaluable in that the time allotted for the accumulation of statistical data was so short that serious difficulties would have resulted. As a result, accurate plans for the occupation were drawn up two days prior to the arrival of the first TransDiv.

b. Shipping assignments were made as shown on Enclosure "ABLE" to this report.

3. LOADING AND UNLOADING PHASE:

a. Six (6) days were allotted to the Division for the loading of forty-three (43) ships, all classes. The loading summary is as shown on Enclosure "ABLE" to this report.

b. Unloading at SASEBO proved rather slow and difficult because of limited docking facilities and the condition of the roads, warehouses, dock space, etc. At the commencement of unloading, six (6) ships were tied up at the docks. The remainder began discharging in the stream via LCMs and LCVPs, these latter unloading at Green Beaches. LSTs and LSMs unloaded at Green Beaches and at King One. Due to the limited beaching areas, only a small number of craft were able to beach at one

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (CONT'D)

time. The unloading proceeded as shown on Enclosure "BAKER".

c. Upon completion of unloading, the Transport Quartermaster Section became the liaison agency for the Division in obtaining water transportation from Navy and railroad transportation through 5th Amphibious Corps. Later, the Section was split up into a Records Section for disposition of Japanese materiel and a Section which carried on its normal functions.

ENCLOSURES: "ABLE" - Loading Summary.
"BAKER" - Unloading Summary.

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ENCLOSURE ABLE TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

RCT	SHIP	UNIT LOADING	LOADING				CU. FT.	SHORT TONS
			START		COMPLETION			
			TIME	DATE	TIME	DATE		
26	APA 137	3 - 26	0920	22Aug45	1430	23Aug45	112285	1013.4
	APA 175	1 - 26	0950	22Aug45	1830	23Aug45	94470	1016.0
	APA 109	2 - 26	1000	22Aug45	1535	23Aug45	107851	1097.2
	APA 81	1 - 13	1100	22Aug45	1400	24Aug45	106044	1183.4
	AKA 75	REGT- 26	1040	22Aug45	1600	25Aug45	219131	2214.0
27	APA 40	2 - 27	0945	24Aug45	1545	25Aug45	105017	1082.8
	APA 143	3 - 27	1000	24Aug45	1740	25Aug45	105017	1082.8
	AKA 85	REGT- 27	1030	24Aug45	1530	26Aug45	290854	2540.0
	APA 74	2 - 13	1045	24Aug45	1400	25Aug45	92735	653.5
	APA 103	1 - 27	1130	24Aug45	1400	25Aug45	121991	1255.4
28	APA 212	1 - 28	0940	26Aug45	1600	27Aug45	97454	989.5
	APA 233	3 - 28	1015	26Aug45	1600	27Aug45	98092	986.4
	APA 114	REGT- 28	1030	26Aug45	1830	27Aug45	161292	1125.3
	AKA 97	3 - 13	1120	26Aug45	1820	28Aug45	224899	1988.0
	APA 177	2 - 28	1200	26Aug45	1600	27Aug45	126588	1201.3
	APA 104	C. G. Group	1155	26Aug45	1730	27Aug45	112407	921.7

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ENCLOSURE A BLE TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

LST's

SHIP	UNIT LOADING	LOADING				CU.FT.	SHORT TONS
		START		COMPLETION			
		TIME	DATE	TIME	DATE		
1077	5th Dukw Co	0800	20Aug45	0200	22Aug45	15215	409.4
1082	4 - 13	0800	20Aug45	0200	22Aug45	1063	375.7
845	116th NCB	1400	21Aug45	0600	24Aug45	63514	620.2
1076	4 - 13	0830	22Aug45	0420	23Aug45	54418	405.6
1053	116th NCB	1100	22Aug45	1800	23Aug45	52656	459.1
1009	116th NCB	1115	22Aug45	1800	23Aug45	55927	420.0
488	5th Dukw Co.	1135	22Aug45	0420	23Aug45	48288	266.9
600	116th NCB	2100	23Aug45	1030	24Aug45	58484	403.4
1074	20th Dukw Co.	0325	23Aug45	1620	23Aug45	62526	336.2
685	2 - 13	0500	24Aug45	1515	24Aug45	57693	303.4
218	Serv Group	1100	24Aug45	0630	25Aug45	49166	396.0
222	REGT- 13	1100	25Aug45	0315	26Aug45	59872	291.9

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ENCLOSURE (A)
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ENCLOSURE ABL TO ANNEX EASY TO
5TH MARDIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

LSM's

SHIP	UNIT LOADING	LOADING				CU.FT.	SHORT TONS
		START		COMPLETION			
		TIME	DATE	TIME	DATE		
111	"A"Co5thTankBn	1200	26Aug45	1515	26Aug45	14373	261.9
474	"A"Co5th TankBn	1200	26Aug45	1400	26Aug45	16808	282.7
283	"B"Co5thTankBn	1530	26Aug45	1920	26Aug45	17728	308.0
80	"A"Co5thPionBn	1530	26Aug45	0915	27Aug45	31393	284.3
387	"A"Co5thTankBn	1530	26Aug45	1910	26Aug45	16357	232.5
76	"C"Co5thPionBn	1530	26Aug45	0700	26Aug45	28394	265.1
343	"B"Co5thTankBn	1800	26Aug45	2240	26Aug45	18075	312.1
322	"B"Co5thTankBn	1830	26Aug45	0015	27Aug45	15077	272.9
440	"B"Co5thTankBn	1950	26Aug45	2300	26Aug45	17201	229.3
344	"C"Co5thTankBn	2350	26Aug45	0305	27Aug45	15532	274.5
112	"A"Co5thTankBn	0400	27Aug45	0730	27Aug45	16136	282.3
467	"C"Co5thTankBn	0404	27Aug45	0700	27Aug45	15237	268.2
476	"C"Co5thTankBn	0725	27Aug45	1045	27Aug45	16309	282.5
386	"B"Co5thPionBn	0830	27Aug45	0940	27Aug45	32766	286.8
321	5thTankBn	1600	27Aug45	2145	27Aug45	20796	244.8

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ENCLOSURE BAKER TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

RCT	SHIP	UNIT	UNLOADING			
			START		COMPLETION	
			TIME	DATE	TIME	DATE
26	APA 137	3 - 26	1630	22Sep45	1200	24Sep45
	APA 175	1 - 26	1600	22Sep45	1800	23Sep45
	APA 109	2 - 26	1830	22Sep45	2200	23Sep45
	AKA 75	REGT- 26	1720	22Sep45	1000	25Sep45
	APA 81	1 - 13	1700	22Sep45	1800	23Sep45
27	APA 40	2 - 27	1000	23Sep45	1000	24Sep45
	APA 143	3 - 27	1000	23Sep45	1300	24Sep45
	AKA 85	REG T- 28	1410	22Sep45	0130	25Sep45
	APA 74	2 - 13	1500	22Sep45	0755	23Sep45
	APA 103	1 - 27	1700	22Sep45	0900	24Sep45
28	APA 212	1 - 28	1300	23Sep45	1200	25Sep45
	APA 233	3 - 28	0800	23Sep45	1900	24Sep45
	APA 114	REGT- 28	1000	23Sep45	0100	25Sep45
	AKA 97	3 - 13	0800	23Sep45	0930	26Sep45
	APA 177	2 - 28	0900	23Sep45	1900	24Sep45
	APA 104	C. G. Group	1700	22Sep45	1000	24Sep45

ENCLOSURE (B)
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ENCLOSURE BAKER TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY TO
5TH MARDIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

LST's

SHIP	UNIT UNLOADING	UN-LOADING			
		START		COMPLETION	
		TIME	DATE	TIME	DATE
488	5th Dukw Co	1700	22Sept45	2400	22Sept45
1076	4 - 13	1700	22Sept45	0635	23Sept45
222	REG T- 13	1830	22Sept45	2020	23Sept45
1053	116th NCB	2030	23Sept45	1600	24Sept45
1074	20th Dukw Co	1000	23Sept45	2130	23Sept45
1082	4 - 13	1045	23Sept45	0900	24Sept45
1077	5th Dukw Co	1300	23Sept45	0405	24Sept45
218	Service Group	1520	23Sept45	1020	24Sept45
845	116th NCB	1600	23Sept45	0900	24Sept45
685	2 - 13	0730	23Sept45	2020	23Sept45
600	116th NCB	1730	22Sept45	1715	23Sept45
1009	116th NCB	1200	24Sept45	0800	25Sept45

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ENCLOSURE BAKER TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY TO
5TH MARDIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

SHIP	UNIT UNLOADING	UNLOADING			
		START		COMPLETION	
		TIME	DATE	TIME	DATE
111	"A" Co 5th Tank Bn	1030	22Sept45	2015	22Sept45
474	"A" Co 5th Tank Bn	1050	22Sept45	2015	22Sept45
283	"B" Co 5th Tank Bn	1140	22Sept45	2400	22Sept45
80	"A" Co 5th Pion Bn	1300	22Sept45	1800	22Sept45
387	"A" Co 5th Tank Bn	1120	22Sept45	2400	22Sept45
76	"C" Co 5th Pion Bn	1300	22Sept45	1800	22Sept45
343	"B" Co 5th Tank Bn	1100	22Sept45	2400	22Sept45
322	"B" Co 5th Tank Bn	1200	22Sept45	2400	22Sept45
440	"B" Co 5th Tank Bn	1100	22Sept45	2015	22Sept45
344	"C" Co 5th Tank Bn	1040	22Sept45	2015	22Sept45
112	"A" Co 5th Tank Bn	1040	22Sept45	2015	22Sept45
467	"C" Co 5th Tank Bn	1200	22Sept45	2400	22Sept45
476	"C" Co 5th Tank Bn	1045	22Sept45	2015	22Sept45
386	"B" Co 5th Pion Bn	1300	22Sept45	1800	22Sept45
321	5th Tank Bn	1100	22Sept45	2015	22Sept45

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5th Marine Division,
In the Field.
1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT

DIVISION QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. PLANNING

a. Upon return from Iwo Jima the Division Quartermaster Section immediately called for equipment status reports from all units of the Division. These unit reports were compiled into a Division report which became the basis for the resupply of the Division. All deficiencies and shortages were made the subject of requisitions to our servicing supply agency.

b. When it became known that the objective in our coming operation would be Southern Kyushu, supply machinery was immediately put into operation to determine and secure those items which were required due to the specific nature of our target. Into this category particularly fell cold wet-weather clothing, heaters, anti-freeze solutions and other cold weather equipment.

c. In the preparation and supplying phase, our greatest obstacle was the adoption of the new "GEORGE" Series, Tables of Organization. The immediate problem occasioned by this change was the revision of certain tactical units and the creation of others for which no allowances had been authorized. Time being of essence, this office adopted as the yard stick of our supply of these units the proposed allowances as set forth in the proposed Table of Organization published by FMF, PAC Headquarters prior to the adoption of the new "GEORGE" Series.

d. Although the new "GEORGE" Series Tables of Organization were very similar to the proposed tables published by FMF, PAC Headquarters, the equipment allowances as finally approved by HQMC varied greatly from the proposed equipment allowances. The absence of authorized allowances for certain units of the Division was the source of much extra, and as it proved, useless work. However, these changes were made at a time that the Division was hurriedly preparing for the invasion of Kyushu and it was neither practical nor advisable to

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

wait for publication of the new authorized allowances.

e. With the end of the war changing the nature of our operation from one of assault to one of occupation, the supply problem was not greatly altered. We had planned for the climate of Kyushu and naturally all such plans held good despite the fact that we would occupy rather than assault this island. The biggest change occasioned by the switch from assault to occupation was the decision to carry all cold wet weather clothing under Division rather than unit control.

2. OPERATION

a. This Division began loading for the operation on 20 August, 1945. Maintaining close liaison with the Division Transport Quartermaster, this section moved to the Docks all Division Quartermaster stocks. Loading operations were completed on 27 August, 1945, and on that date this section boarded APA 104, USS WESTMORELAND, for transportation to our objective.

b. Early on the morning of 22 September, 1945, "A" Day, the Division Quartermaster had his entire section landed at Sasebo by the way of LCVF from the WESTMORELAND. This early landing afforded an opportunity to conduct both an intensive and extensive reconnaissance of possible dump sites. By 1500 on the 22nd of September, the Division Quartermaster had located suitable storage space to handle the Division's gear. A dispatch giving the location of the approved storage sites was sent to the Division Command Post aboard the WESTMORELAND and the Division Quartermaster was ready to receive discharged cargo. The storage sites were selected, approved and ready before any cargo was discharged from ships in the Division Convoy. Unit distribution for all types of supplies commenced the morning of A plus 1, 23 September, 1945, and continued throughout the occupation.

c. Storage sites selected included four large warehouses located on the pier at Sasebo Harbor. The location of these warehouses provided the two-fold advantage of ready

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

Division Quartermaster control in one limited area as well as easy accessibility to ships discharging cargo.

These four warehouses housed the following types of supplies:

1. A ration warehouse.
2. A water dump.
3. A miscellaneous supplies warehouse, encompassing General Supply, Ordnance and Motor Transport and Engineer items.
4. A unit storage warehouse where the Regiments and separate Battalions could store their gear until they could establish unit storage dumps.

In addition to the closed storage, an open fuel dump site was selected on the burned out area of Sasebo City. The ruins were bulldozed level and this dump was ready for operation when the first load of fuel arrived from the dock.

d. On 28 September, 1945, the Division Quartermaster moved about five-sixths of its supplies to Marine Camp Ainoura, retaining one large warehouse and the Division Quartermaster Office on the pier in Sasebo. This was occasioned by the removal of all warehouses in the Sasebo area with the exception of one from under Division control. The particular problem posed throughout the occupation was supply of widely scattered units and frequently moving units.

3. CONCLUSION

a. It is believed that it was inadvisable to change the Tables of Organization of a Division so close to an operation, particularly when no Tables of Allowances were authorized to equip the new and the revised tactical organization.

b. The "B" ration furnished this Division for the operation was very unbalanced and not well varied in menu. The meat component of the ten days "B" rations carried consisted

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

of two-thirds corned beef hash. In addition, there were no eggs or cereal.

c. Supply activities during the occupation further emphasized the extreme necessity for the creation within the Division of a quartermaster establishment to be at the disposal of the Division Quartermaster. This element should contain sufficient trained supply personnel, engineering equipment and operators, transportation, fire-fighting equipment and communication facilities for any type of field operation.

d. Resupply of field rations had not been contemplated. This was of the utmost importance as "B" rations could not be constantly utilized. Patrolling, movement of troops, working parties, etc., constantly require field rations.

ENCLOSURE: (A) 5th Service Battalion (less Ordnance Company) Report.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT.

5TH SERVICE BATTALION (less Ordnance Company) REPORT.

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation. To meet all contingencies it was decided to prepare to function in one or a combination of two or all of the following task organizations:

(1) Each type section (such as bakery) would function independently in support of a combat team or similar groupment.

(2) All type sections would combine to function as a type group (as supply under Division QM).

(3) Different type sections (such as chemical, supply bakery, etc) to combine as a support group in isolated situations.

(4) And to sub-divide into fractions of sections as the situation demanded.

b. Occupation Operation. The same plans as for an assault operation obtained, and therefore no change was necessary.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation. In view of the duties of the sections of the companies being essentially the same in combat as in rest it was practicable to train only in essential basic subjects. These were (1) Functioning and firing of organic weapons, (2) Camouflage, (3) Field sanitation, (4) Cover and concealment, and (5) Fire team and squad tactics. This was augmented by fire team training with live ammunition; and by marches, water discipline, first aid, and physical conditioning.

b. Occupation Operation. Same as for the assault operation, except; the following was held at night and aboard ship enroute: (1) The Japanese people - Their education, religion, family, government, customs and livelihood; and, (2) Information of Japan with regard to Topography, geography, climate and resources.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation. No task organization was made.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

b. Occupation Operation.

Task organization as of 0800, 26 August, 1945:

1st Platoon, Ordnance Company.	RCT 26.
2nd Platoon, Ordnance Company.	RCT 27.
3rd Platoon, Ordnance Company.	RCT 28.
Tracked Vehicle Platoon, Ordnance Company.	Tank Group.
Headquarters Company.	Service Group.
Service Company.	Service Group.
Supply Company.	Service Group.
Ordnance Company (less 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and Tracked Vehicle Platoon).	Service Group.

Subsequent changes in task organization by dates:

27Sep45. 2nd and 3rd Platoons, Ordnance Company.	Rejoined the Battalion from RCT's 27 and 28.
6Oct45. 3rd Platoon, Ordnance Company. 3rd Platoon, Service Company. 3rd Platoon, Supply Company.	Attached to RCT 28 for operations out of FUKUOKA, JAPAN.
13Oct45. 1st Platoon, Ordnance Company.	Rejoined the Battalion from RCT 26.
18Oct45. 1st Platoon, Service Company (less Chemical Section, Graves Registration Section, Post Exchange Section). 1st Platoon, Supply Company (less Platoon Headquarters, one-half supply section).	Attached to RCT 26 for full operational and administrative control.
2Nov45. 3rd Platoon, Ordnance Company. 3rd Platoon, Service Company. 3rd Platoon, Supply Company.	Rejoined the Battalion from RCT 28.

Recap of task organization as of 15 November, 1945:	
Service Battalion (less Tracked Vehicle Platoon of Ordnance Company).	Service Group.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

- NOTE:
1. 1/2 bakery section with 13th Marines at Aircraft Factory Area, and 1/2 bakery section with Pioneer Battalion at Sasebo Fortress Group.
 2. Personnel of elements shown attached to RCT 26 on 18 October, 1945 have been detached from our rolls as RCT 26 (reinforced) has been detached from the division.
 3. Supply Section of Supply Company are billeted and working under Division QM control at Sasebo Navy Yard.
 4. The battalion (less elements) is billeted at Marine Camp, Ainoura, Kyushu, Japan.
 5. A Rear Echelon of 8 officers and 142 enlisted was left on Hawaii. Subsequently, 2 officers and 9 enlisted have joined the forward echelon from the rear echelon.

4. OCCUPTION OPERATIONS.

(a) This battalion (less rear echelon) arrived at Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan on 22 September, 1945, and disembarked during the period 22 - 24 September, 1945. Disembarkation from APA's was at the Sasebo Naval Dock Yards (Navy Yard), and from the LST's at the seaplane ramp at the Naval Air Station. No casualties. No hostilities. Operation was smooth and orderly. Equipment and supplies were transferred from ship to warehouses. Had the usual rain that accompanies all operations, making the work disagreeable and the roads and dock areas moderately difficult.

(b) Camps were established in Japanese buildings. Initial camp at Japanese Naval Workers barracks, KYUSHU 1:25,000 (74.4 - 13.3). On 27 September, 1945 displaced camp to Naval Recruit Training Station (now Marine Camp, Ainoura, Kyushu, Japan), KYUSHU 1:25,000 (70.8 - 13.9).

(c) All sections of the companies have been performing in their organic duties, except; chemical sections whose personnel have been used to supervise Japanese labor parties working for the Division in this area.

(d) Worthy of note is the work of the war trophies agency of the Ordnance Company and the method of disposing of Japanese small arms, swords, etc.. For details see Ordnance Company report.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

(e) Graves Registration Section has established the U. S. Armed Forces Cemetery No. 1, Sasebo, Kvushu, Japan (KYUSHU 1:25000, AMS L872: 83.2 - 12.5). It has buried the ashes of 6 British and 53 nationality unknown Prisoners of War, and the bodies of 5 members of the allied forces who have died since the occupation has started.

(f) The typhoon on 11 October, 1945 did insignificant damage.

(g) Barracks, buildings, mess installations and heads are very satisfactory. Hot showers were provided for the men by a mobile unit, which has been augmented by a recent installation in the Jap bath house.

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

The battalion was re-equipped and supplied up to 20 August, on which date it is estimated that it was 95% equipped and supplied. Approximately two-thirds of our equipment was left in the Rear Echelon. Equipment and supplies were adequate for the task performed.

6. CONCLUSION.

a. ASSAULT OPERATION.

(1) COMMENTS. The split of Service and Supply Company into two companies, the Service Company and the Supply Company, without a Table of allowances caused some difficulty in making an equitable distribution of the old Service and Supply Company's property, and it further caused difficulty in procuring office equipment and transportation. These difficulties were only partially solved. However, if the ASSAULT OPERATION had been executed it is assumed that the foregoing difficulties would have been eliminated.

(2) RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

b. OCCUPATION OPERATION.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

(1) COMMENTS. This operation has progressed very smoothly; however, there are two comments to make: (1) The Service Troops headquarters is carried on the rolls of this battalion and demands two jeeps and two trucks (1 ton 4 x 4) from this battalion. The two jeeps came from Headquarters Company and the two trucks came from Ordnance Company, as a result Headquarters Company had to borrow two jeeps - one from Ordnance Company and one from Supply Company. (2) The Tracked Vehicle Platoon is attached to the 5th Tank Battalion but requisitions supplies for their maintenance activities through this battalion, which procedure is believed to be wrong.

(2) RECOMMENDATIONS. It is therefore recommended that-

(1) The allowance of vehicles be increased to five (5) jeeps for Headquarters Company and by two (2) trucks (1 ton 4 x 4) for Ordnance Company,

(2) The Tracked Vehicle Maintenance Platoon be organically attached to Tank Battalion and that it process its requisitions through the Tank Battalion in any case.

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5th Marine Division
In the Field
1 December, 1945

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT

MEDICAL REPORT

1. PLANNING

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Preliminary studies of theatre and estimate of situation begun.

(2) Medical supplies critically examined.

(3) Interrupted by cessation of hostilities.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Corps medical plan received. Corps Evacuation Hospital Number One (1) to support the 5th Marine Division.

(2) Medical companies ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE disposed as in assault operation with DOG, EASY, and H&S Companies given priority loading for early establishment of a hospital.

(3) Routine immunization of all troops brought up to date and in addition all personnel immunized against typhus, plague, and cholera.

(4) Medical officers and corpsmen briefed on known epidemiology of proposed area of occupation. Malaria and Epidemiology Units prepared for early landing and surveys planned. Instructions issued to all medical units relative to use of D.D.T. powder and solutions.

(5) Medical supplies brought up to state of readiness.

(6) Medical departments inspected to determine state of readiness.

2. TRAINING

a. Assault Operation.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd)

(1) All medical replacements given special training in medical field work and field first aid.

(2) Participation of medical personnel in regiments, battalions, and medical companies ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE in field exercises.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) None.

3. OCCUPATION OPERATION.

a. Enclosures (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) supply details of activity of the Medical Battalion, the Epidemiology and Malaria Control Unit, the 203rd Malaria Survey Detachment (Army), Division Dental application, and Venereal Disease Report.

b. Organization Medical Facilities.

(1) Supplies and Equipment.

(a) Adequate except as noted in enclosures (A), (B), and (D).

(2) Personnel.

(a) T/O strength reduced to twenty (20) hospital corpsmen per infantry battalion, and forty-five (45) hospital corpsmen per ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, DOG, and EASY Medical Companies. All corpsmen and medical officers were well trained.

(b) The present organizational set-up of the Office of the Division Surgeon presents difficulties in its operation. The Division Surgeon's Administrative Assistant and the Division Medical Supply Officer, are, with the enlisted assistants, attached to Headquarters Battalion. The Epidemiology and Malaria Control Unit, the Division Psychiatrist, and the Division Dental Officer are attached to the Medical Battalion. The Venereal Disease Control Officer has

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd)

been detailed from the Medical Battalion. A unified section of these officers with enlisted assistants attached to Headquarters Battalion would lead to better control of Division Medical Activities.

c. Health of the Command.

(1) In general it has been excellent. Standard practices of disease control have been rigidly enforced. Lectures once a week to unit organizations on topics of preventive medicine, sanitation, and hygiene have been given by unit medical officers. As will be noted in Enclosure (B), paragraph five (5), battalion sanitation squads have not been effective inasmuch as sanitation duties are not their primary functions, thus they are scattered or used other than under control of the Epidemiology Control Unit.

(2) A trained venereal disease control officer is a necessity. An occupation area is large and not only are professional prostitutes to be considered but the urgent desirability of living forces many women into this means of securing a livelihood. Educational measures including visual education must be resorted to and control measures checked.

(3) The need for a Division Psychiatrist continues during an occupation period. He has been found of inestimable value not only in purely professional fields but as an analyst of morale problems and solutions.

(4) It has become increasingly evident that well trained epidemiologists and sanitary officers with sufficient trained help are vital to the success of an operation.

d. Recommendations.

(1) Consideration by higher authority of the establishment of a completely equipped sanitary work component, numbering at least one hundred (100) men under control of a sanitary officer.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd)

(2) Provisions for an officer trained in Venereal Disease Control as an assistant to the Division Surgeon.

(3) Change T/O to establish within the Medical Section of Division Headquarters and attached to Headquarters Battalion the following:

Division Medical Personnel Officer.

Four (4) Enlisted, USN

Chief Pharmacist's Mate	1
Pharmacist's Mate First Class	1
Pharmacist's Mate Second Class	2

Division Medical Supply Officer.

Five (5) Enlisted

Chief Pharmacist's Mate	1
Pharmacist's Mate First Class	1
Hospital Apprentice	3

Division Dental Officer.

One (1) Enlisted

Pharmacist's Mate Second Class 1

Division Malaria and Epidemic Control Officer.

As now established 12

Division Venereal Disease Control Officer.

One (1) Enlisted

Pharmacist's Mate Second Class 1

ENCLOSURES: (A) Fifth Medical Battalion Report.
(B) Malaria and Epidemic Control Unit Number 103 Report.
(C) 203rd Malaria Survey Detachment Report.
(D) Division Dental Report
(E) Division Venereal Disease Control Report.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE Companies were attached to CT's 26, 27, and 28 respectively.

(2) DCG and EASY Companies were to establish Division Hospital on order.

(3) Equipment and supplies were requisitioned to make up allowances and action taken to bring them to a state of readiness.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Medical Companies disposed as in Assault Operation.

(2) Sixteen (16) additional dental officers with field operative dental units and a field prosthetic unit were included in the forward echelon. These were attached to H&S Company.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Replacements received special training in field work and field first aid.

(2) Collecting sections of ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE Companies participated in field exercises with CT's 26, 27, and 28 respectively.

(3) BAKER Company participated in a hospital movement exercise. ABLE and CHARLIE Companies were to follow when plans for occupation interrupted the program.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) None.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

a. ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE Companies were attached to CT's and embarked with 90% of their supplies and equipment. DOG and EASY Companies were embarked with 90% medical supplies and 50% of heavy equipment.

b. The Epidemiological Unit was ordered ashore 22 September, 1945, when reconnaissance details reported all buildings heavily infested with vermin. Testing of local water supplies was immediately instituted and all water tentatively determined as unfit for human consumption within 24 hours.

c. DOG and EASY Companies were ordered ashore 23 September, 1945, to establish division hospital at Japanese Naval Barracks, AINOURA. The hospital was put into operation and receiving patients within 12 hours.

d. As of 2400, 30 November, 1945, there was a total of 666 admissions to the hospital. The most common communicable diseases received were Catarrhal Fever, Acute, 151 cases and next in frequency were other respiratory infections as:

Pneumonia, Primary, Atypical	5
Bronchitis, Acute	5
Tonsillitis, Acute	12
Pharyngitis, Acute	3

Of the injuries received, the following were most prevalent:

Fracture, Simple	18
Fracture, Compound	8
Cellulitis	16
Burns	11
Lacerations	13
Sprains	11
Strains	5

There have been 121 major and minor operations. Major procedures consisted of:

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

Appendectomy	8
Amputations, traumatic	3
Burns, debridement	7

The compound fractures were given supportive treatment and evacuated to supporting hospitals.

4. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. Drugs, pharmaceuticals and surgical supplies were found adequate in every respect.

b. The bath sterilizer trailer has been found the most practical and useful means of sterilizing operating room linen. In addition it is a source of hot showers for a hospital.

c. The autoclaves issued in Unit #12 NavMed have not been found practical nor serviceable in the field. Shields are needed to prevent drafts and they foul easily. The period of serviceability is limited.

d. The $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4 International ambulance has a high center of gravity, is most uncomfortable for patients and has not enough power for towing a trailer when required. In inclement weather conditions this ambulance is very little protection. The $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton, 4x4 Dodge ambulance overcomes most of these difficulties.

e. The refrigerators supplied are the 6.0 cubic feet Kerosene type. These break down frequently due to a small cone flame spreader which is almost impossible to procure in the field. This cone burns out quickly if a high fraction type kerosene is used. A mixture of 5 parts diesel fuel and 95 parts kerosene will lengthen the life of these cones. However, the size of these refrigerators is inadequate especially since biologicals must be stored. The 50 cubic foot refrigerator is an excellent step toward solution of this problem.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

V CONCLUSION

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comments.

(a) The training of collecting sections with CT's in basic field combat training was done and is considered highly practical.

(b) The schooling in administration of plasma and vena puncture technic was stressed under field conditions. Its importance cannot be overemphasized.

(c) It is almost becoming doctrine that two medical companies, usually DOG and EASY, be used to establish division hospital. A more efficient organization could be established if these units were combined with H&S to form a hospital unit or group and be under one command. This would eliminate two unnecessary duplicate sets of reports and make the internal functioning of the hospital far more desirable.

(2) Recommendations.

(a) It is recommended that DOG, EASY, and H&S Companies be merged into one hospital unit under one command.

(b) That bath sterilizer trailer be carried in the forward echelon of each medical company and not be omitted from the Table of Allowance. This should replace the standard autoclave.

(c) That the 50 cubic foot refrigerators be standard equipment and carried in the forward echelon because of its superiority in storage of biologicals and whole blood over the standard 6.0 cubic foot kerosene type.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Comments.

(a) Medical companies establishing field hospitals are in a great need of their heavy equipment which includes laundry units, bath sterilizers, refrigerators and generators. DCG and EASY Companies established the Division Hospital which bore the brunt of medical care of the entire area until higher echelon units were opened on 30 September, 1945. These companies embarked with no laundry facilities, one (1) bath sterilizer and one (1) 7.4 KV generator between them. The lack of heavy equipment was a serious handicap overcome only by borrowing from attached medical companies.

(b) The medical battalion is streamlined to primarily care for battle casualties. In this type of operation the reverse is true. A peacetime census of patients both in number and type should be anticipated and was received.

(c) With the increasing number of electrified units such as 50 cubic foot refrigerators, X-ray, collective protectors, operating room equipment and laboratory equipment it is believed that the 7.4 KV electric generator allowed each company is not sufficient.

(d) Linen supplies in units are inadequate. These have been augmented by the Red Cross.

(e) Laboratory facilities are not adequate for running a peacetime hospital. There are no facilities for running blood chemistries or serological examinations.

(f) A repair shop and tools operated by adequate personnel would solve many problems in the field.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

(g) It would be preferable to have "B" rations made available early. However, field rations with hospital accessory rations are surprisingly adequate.

(h) Little or no use has been made of Japanese medical equipment. Dependency on civilian hospitals was not necessary nor desirable.

(2) Recommendations

(a) It is recommended all hospital equipment be lifted if feasible.

(b) That the allowance of 7.4 KV generators be increased to two (2) for each medical company setting up the division hospital.

(c) That a sewing machine be added to the Table of Allowances for each medical battalion.

(d) That laboratory facilities be augmented in equipment and personnel to do blood chemistries and serological examinations.

(e) That a repair shop be added to the organization of the medical battalion and that each company be assigned an Electricians' Mate, a Machinists' Mate and a Carpenter's Mate.

(f) Consolidation of DOG, EASY, and H&S Companies under one command would be efficacious here as in the assault phase.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT

MALARIA AND EPIDEMIC CONTROL UNIT NO. 103

1. PLANNING

a. The program followed was that as outlined in Commander Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area confidential letter A3/P3, Serial 02734, dated 1 April, 1945.

b. The Division Epidemiologist maintained close liaison with the Division Surgeon advising him of the extent and nature of measures indicated for disease prevention prior to and during the operation.

c. A survey of all cooks and bakers was completed and those found to be harboring enteric pathogens were treated. The carrier rate in this group was approximately 21%. Carriers of shigellosis and amoebiasis were apparently cleared of their infection by chemotherapy. Those carriers of Salmonella which did not respond to sulfadiazine were transferred to other duties.

d. No changes were necessary in changing to an occupation operation.

2. TRAINING.

a. Practical training was afforded the members of this unit by performing all the bacteriology, water analysis, insect control, and rodent control at Camp Tarawa.

b. A three (3) man sanitation squad from each battalion was trained by members of this unit in field sanitation, rodent control and insect control.

c. An augmentation unit of fifty (50) men from the 116th Naval Construction Battalion was given a two (2) weeks course in sanitary engineering and insect control methods. This detachment was to be attached to this unit upon arrival at the target.

d. No changes were necessary in changing to an occupation operation.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

3. SUPPLY, EQUIPMENT, AND LOGISTICS.

a. In accordance with Fleet Marine Force, Pacific General Order No. 16-45, dated 1 March, 1945, a distribution list of quartermaster and medical supply items needed by each battalion and this unit for malaria and pest control was compiled. All items not on hand were ordered and received prior to embarkation by the Division Quartermaster.

b. This unit's equipment was combat loaded on one (1) 1-ton truck, one (1) 3/4-ton ambulance equipped with a power sprayer and one (1) 1/4-ton truck equipped with a pneumatic type sprayer. These vehicles were top loaded aboard ship and were ashore shortly after landing. Bacteriological media was preweighed and placed in vials. One hundred (100) gallons of 5% DDT in kerosene was prepared and carried in drums mounted on the trucks. These measures considerably reduced the amount of time required before this unit could begin to function upon arrival at the target.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. All buildings in the Sasebo area were found to be heavily infested with lice, fleas, and other vermin. Until buildings could be sprayed, members of this unit dusted personnel with 10% DDT as they came ashore. All buildings were treated with DDT prior to occupancy by the troops.

b. Water samples were examined bacteriologically and recommendations made as to the treatment. All raw water was found to be heavily polluted and a detailed report of this submitted to the Division Surgeon forty-eight (48) hours after landing. Samples have been found to contain the following pathogens:

1. *Erbethella typhosa*.
2. *Shigella flexneri* II.
3. *Salmonella* believed to be *S. morganii*.

Treated water was tested twice a week by the unit's laboratory.

c. Entomological surveys were conducted and specimens mounted to be sent to the National Naval Medical Center. Snails from this area were examined for schistosomiasis and no evidence of this disease found. Mosquitoes of the following varieties have been found.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

Anopheles

Anopheles hyrcanus sinensis

Culicines

Culex (Lutzia) fuscus var. vorax

Aedes tojai

Culex quin-quefasciatus

Culex pallidothorax

Tripteroides bambusa

Armigeres obturbans

These species have been collected during the autumn months so that an accurate estimate of their density cannot be made.

d. A rat survey has been conducted and the main species found to be Rattus r. tanezumi and Rattus caraco. No evidence of plague has been found in any of these animals. They are all infested with intestinal parasites, especially H. nana. A plerocercoid of Diphyllbothrium has been found in the liver of 90% of the field rats, R. caraco. In addition leptospira have been found in several animals. It has not been possible to examine them for typhus fever.

e. Sanitation has been a major problem. The use of "night soil" is universal in this area. No sewage facilities exist, except for concrete collection vaults. The high water level has made the use of prefabricated heads difficult. These have been erected over pits where possible but are constantly breaking and in need of repair. In addition, lack of a screened ventilation shaft causes water to condense on the seats making them very untidy. The use of native food and Japanese foodhandlers has been prohibited in this division. Trash is disposed of by incineration and garbage is collected by the local farmers for use as swill. Messing facilities have been adequate but immersion type water heaters are not effective and have had to be supplemented by steam heat or oil burners.

f. A plan for control of an epidemic of typhus fever in the Gasebo area has been prepared in conjunction with the A.M.G. public health officer. This plan is to be put in effect in the event of such an outbreak in the civilian population.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

5. COMMENT.

a. There have been no cases of bacillary dysentery in this division. This is considered to be a remarkable record and is attributed to strict food and water discipline.

b. The functions of a malaria and epidemic control unit are not altered by conversion from an assault to an occupation program.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Unit commanders or medical officers be held responsible to assure procurement from the Division Quartermaster of insect and pest control supplies allotted to them. This equipment should be given a high priority and top-loaded aboard ship so as to be ashore and functioning at the earliest possible time.

b. Attachment of the fifty (50) man N.C.B. team to the Malaria and Epidemic Control Unit prior to embarkation to assure their availability at the target.

c. Acquisition of six (6) portable type sprayers to be used by this unit. Equipment mounted on trucks is unsatisfactory for the DDT spraying of buildings of more than one deck.

d. Acquisition of a rodent control unit to carry out rat poisoning in areas recommended by this unit.

e. An allotment of DDT and spraying equipment should be set aside for use by this unit in controlling an outbreak of typhus fever. In addition vaccine and laboratory reagents should be available for such an emergency.

f. Prefabricated hoods should be constructed of sturdier material. The seats on the present type break off very easily. Screened ventilation pipes or holes in the sides are also recommended to prevent the condensation of moisture on the seats.

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ENCLOSURE (C) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT

203d MALARIA SURVEY DETACHMENT

1. PLANNING.

a. Planning for unit operations as embellished upon T/O & E 8-500 dated 18 January, 1945 is as follows:

(1) Areas of Fifth Amphibious Corps to be surveyed:

- (a) Marine Camp at AINOURA.
- (b) SASEBO (5th Marine Division, VAC and attached units).
- (c) KAWATANA (1st Bn 13th Marines).
- (d) SAGA (2d Bn 27th Marines).

(2) Collection of larvae and mapping of proposed survey area:

- (a) Collecting.
- (b) Rearing of mosquito larvae.
- (c) Identification of larvae and reared adults.
- (d) Recording of results.
- (e) Mapping of breeding areas.
- (f) Submission of larvae to Army and Navy taxonomists in Washington, D.C..

(3) Results of survey:

- (a) Discussion of survey results.
- (b) Outline of control program based on survey.

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ENCLOSURE (C) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

2. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. This unit arrived SASEBO 30 October, 1945 and was attached to the 5th Marine Division by CG, VAC Dispatch 301437/I October, 1945. After a preliminary period spent accumulating material on the epidemiology of Kyushu, the unit began a systematic survey of the areas set forth in paragraph 1. a. (1) above. One thousand one hundred seventy-four (1,174) culicine and forty-nine (49) anopheline larvae have been collected up to this date. The species and number of larvae found are as follows:

Anopheles hyrcanus sinensis	49
Aedes tojai	665
Aedes quin-piapiens	345*
Culex quinquefasciatus	2**
Culex pipiens pallens	2**
Culex fuscans vorax	73
Culex sinensis	19
Culex pallidothorax	7
Trinoteroides bambusa	50
Aedes species	28
	<hr/> 1,240

3. COMMENTS.

a. Only eight (8) species of mosquito larvae were found. Three of these species, Anopheles hyrcanus sinensis, Culex quin-piapiens, and Aedes tojai are credited as the vectors of malaria, Japanese B Encephalitis and dengue, respectively. Anopheline breeding is slight and scattered. The presence of malaria among the civilians is possible but cannot be verified until a blood parasite series is completed.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. No recommendations are set forth at this time.

* Cannot be separated in larval stage.

** Identified by genitalia of reared males.

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ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT

DIVISION DENTAL REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Ten dental officers were to accompany the forward echelon, (one per medical company, one per RCT plus division dental officer).

(2) No facilities were to be provided for prosthetic dental treatment.

(3) Equipment, each dental officer to take Field Medical Unit #2 (Dental Officers Kit) and Field Medical Unit #35 minus case #3 (field desk).

b. Occupation.

(1) The following equipment was carried in the forward echelon:

(a) Complete dental prosthetic facilities.

(b) Complete Field Medical Units #2 and #35, one per dental officer, and one Field Medical Unit #35A (prosthetic).

(2) Four dental officers and five enlisted technicians were left in the rear echelon.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Dental officers attached to medical companies were given one week refresher course in anaesthesia at Corps Evacuation Hospital #1.

(2) No other specialized training of any type was given dental officers scheduled to accompany the forward echelon.

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ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

b. Occupation.

(1) No training program was instituted prior to embarkation.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Dental officers assigned one per medical company and one per RCT as mentioned in 1. a. (1) above.

b. Occupation.

(1) Dental officers were dispersed to RCTs and BLTs indicated by demand for treatment and isolation from other dental facilities such as division dental clinic. Attempt was made to allow one dental officer per BLT in the area. These officers were retained attached to H&S Company, 5th Medical Battalion.

(2) Two additional dental officers were attached to ABLE Company, 5th Medical Battalion, to accompany 26th RCT on an isolated mission and detached from division control.

4. OCCUPATION OPERATION.

a. Frequent movements of units large enough to require dental facilities necessitated frequent shifts in the dental personnel. Dental coverage was attempted particularly in units on isolated missions. AT NO TIME were units of battalion size or larger without dental facilities.

b. The personnel of H&S Company, 5th Medical Battalion debarked on 25 September. Operative dental treatment was rendered at the division dental clinic on 29 September with clinic in full operation on 1 October. Prosthetic dental treatment was first rendered on 2 October. The maximum number of dental officers operating in the division dental clinic at one time was nine. The remainder were dispersed to various units throughout the division.

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ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

5. CONCLUSION.

a. Comment on occupation operation.

(1) The dental section of H&S Company, 5th Medical Battalion consisting of twenty-one dental officers and sufficient enlisted permitted elastic distribution of dental personnel to individual units as indicated and required.

(2) The necessity for dental prosthetic facilities in the forward area has been demonstrated.

b. Recommendations.

(1) Assault Operation.

(a) No increase in dental personnel in the forward echelon is recommended.

(b) A small portable prosthetic unit capable of performing denture repairs should be carried in the forward echelon.

(c) More comprehensive training in anaesthesia, maxio-facial surgery and combat first aid be given dental officers prior to assault operation.

(2) Occupation Operation.

(a) The personnel required on an occupation mission should be governed by distribution of troops with priority given to the forward echelon.

(b) Complete dental prosthetic facilities in the forward area are necessary.

(c) The continuance of a dental section in H&S Company, 5th Medical Battalion is recommended.

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ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

(d) No special training for an occupation operation is indicated.

(e) All available supplies and adequate operating equipment should be carried in the forward echelon. Full field equipment should be carried for each operating dental officer.

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ENCLOSURE (E) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT.

VENEREAL DISEASE CONTROL

1. PLANNING AND TRAINING.

a. There was no organized plan for venereal disease control in effect prior to occupation. This was due to the fact that the T/O did not include a V.D. Control Officer.

b. Upon conversion from an assault to an occupation program unit commanders did attempt to begin a teaching program which has been continued and amplified.

2. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. All known houses of prostitution were closed prior to landing. A Venereal Disease Control Officer was appointed and supervised the establishment of prophylactic stations. Contact forms were made out and distributed to the battalions. Condrums were not available until eight days after landing and on 25 October, 1945, were made available as a free issue.

b. Sixty prostitutes selected at random were examined and the following findings made:

(1) 71% had positive serological tests for syphilis and 7% doubtful reactions.

(2) 22% had positive smears for gonorrhea. More refined laboratory tests would undoubtedly show a higher incidence.

(3) 100% had at least one infectious skin disease. Scabies and impetigo were the most common infections.

3. COMMENT.

a. Since the beginning of occupation, the incidence of venereal disease has increased steadily as expected and has not stabilized as yet. Laboratory facilities for serological testing are inadequate. Although all known houses of prostitution are out of bounds, there are ample opportunities for sex contact outside of brothels in this area. The

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ENCLOSURE (E) TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARDIV
OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd)

sex contact form (i.e. Navmed 171) is not applicable in an area such as this. The form used by the Army is likewise unsuitable.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. The T/O should be altered to include a Venereal Disease Control Officer and appropriate personnel and equipment. A trained laboratory man to do darkfield examinations and serological tests is needed in addition to an office clerk.

b. Condrums should be made available as soon after landing as possible.

c. Wide dissemination of information such as the findings on the prostitutes in SASEBO.

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5th Marine Division,
In the field.
1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT.

ORDNANCE REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) During the period 1 June - 20 August, 1945 the Division Ordnance Officer supervised the Ordnance activities of the Division. Requisitions for five (5) CINCPOA units of fire, of Combat Ammunition were submitted for the assault operation. It was contemplated that Combat Teams would carry three (3) units of fire and that two (2) units would be taken into the assault under Division control. The ammunition to be carried by each organization of the Division was broken down into cube and weight and the units informed of these figures.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) When the operation was changed from an invasion to an occupation, ammunition requisitions were changed to three (3) AFPAC units of fire. During the period the Division was loading for the movement to Japan (21 to 27 August) the issue of all ammunition and explosives to units and the allocation of ammunition to be carried by each vessel was made from the Division Ordnance Office. One (1) unit of fire was carried in the hands of troops and two (2) units under Division control.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) During the training period allotted for the assault operation the Division Ordnance Office received, stored and issued training ammunition and explosives. The original allotment of training ammunition was two (2) CINCPOA units of fire, this was later increased to three (3). Between 25 June and 18 July, 1945 an inspection of all ordnance items in the Division was held. This was done by the Division Inspector. All items found requiring repairs were

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT. (Cont'd)

taken care of at this time, any items beyond the repair facilities of the company were replaced

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) No special ordnance training was considered necessary for the occupation of Japan.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. Upon arrival at Sasebo, Japan, 22 September, 1945 a temporary ammunition dump was established in the burned out area of the city of Sasebo and all ammunition under Division control was centralized in this dump with the exception of two (2) units of fire for the Artillery Regiment (13th Marines) which was left in their area where good storage facilities were available. The Division Ammunition Dump was later moved to more isolated area where better storage was available (73.75 - 12.75) Kyushu, AMS, Scale 1:25,000.

b. From 23 September the Division Ammunition Dump issued ammunition to separate occupational units and explosives and accessories for the demolition of Japanese equipment.

c. The Division Ordnance Officer coordinated the assignment of technicians from the Division Ordnance Company to units of the Division requiring assistance in the demolition of Japanese ordnance and ammunition. No record was kept by this office of the number of items destroyed, the units responsible for the destruction maintained these records.

4. SPECIAL OPERATIONS.

a. On 10 October, 1945 the Division Ordnance Officer was made the Division War Trophies Officer in addition to his other duties and a Division War Trophies Warehouse was established. This activity functioned under the Division Disposition Officer and was charged with the receipt, storage, reconditioning and issue of all war trophies. The personnel to operate this section consisted of all members of the Ordnance Company except those employed in handling ordnance supplies, ammunition, company administration,

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT. (Cont'd)

and the destruction of Japanese ordnance. For a detailed report of the activities of the Ordnance Company see enclosure "A".

5. CONCLUSIONS.

- a. Comment - None.
- b. Recommendations - None.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT.

ORDNANCE COMPANY, 5TH SERVICE BATTALION, REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) In planning the assault operation the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons of the Ordnance Company were to operate with Combat Teams 26, 27, and 28 respectively. The Tracked Vehicle Maintenance Platoon would land with the Tank Battalion. The Ammunition Platoon was to take charge of all ammunition under Division control and establish a dump as quickly as possible. The Supply Platoon would handle the issue of replacement weapons from stocks on hand in the Division Quartermaster. Headquarters Platoon was expected to land about D plus 1 or as soon thereafter as possible with the heavy equipment carried by the company and assist the platoons with the special equipment carried.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) There was no change in plans for the employment of the units of the Ordnance Company when the operation was changed from assault to occupation.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Due to the amount of ordnance work performed during the period, 1 June to 20 August, 1945, no special training was possible, or given, since the company performed each day the same type of work required of it in combat -- the repair of ordnance items.

(2) During this period, this organization repaired or sent to higher echelon, weapons of the 5th Marine Division and attached units as follows:

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

REPAIRED

5534 Small arms.
323 Artillery pieces.
952 Instruments.
717 Watches.

SENT TO HIGHER ECHELON

1978 Small arms.
2 Artillery pieces.
23 Instruments.
133 Watches.

(3) Inspection of all weapons in hands of troops was conducted by this organization under supervision of the Division Inspector during the period 25 June - 18 July, 1945.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) No special training was conducted for the occupation operation.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) The organization of the Ordnance Company is given below:

Headquarters Platoon
First Platoon
Second Platoon
Third Platoon
Tracked Vehicle Platoon
Ammunition Platoon
Supply Platoon

(2) The units of the company were employed as indicated in paragraph 1 (a).

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) The same organization was employed on the occupation as had been planned for the assault.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd).

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATION.

a. For the operation in Kyushu, Japan, the company was distributed in four ships embarking at Hilo, Hawaii during the period 23 - 27 August, 1945, for transportation to the target. The last element disembarked at Sasabo, Kyushu, on 24 September, 1945. During the period 24 September to 26 September, 1945, Company Headquarters was established in Sasabo, moving to Marine Camp, Ainoura, on 27 September, 1945. The First Platoon was attached to the 26th Marines at Haiki, Kyushu, from 22 September, 1945 until 13 October, 1945, returning to Marine Camp, Ainoura, 14 October, 1945. On 6 October, 1945, the Third Platoon was detached to the 28th Marines at Fukuoka, Kyushu, returning to Marine Camp, Ainoura, on 2 November, 1945.

b. On 18 October, 1945, the company commenced furnishing mechanics for the destruction of heavy caliber guns. As these men operated under the jurisdiction of the Division Ordnance Officer and various elements of the Division, no record is kept by this office of the number of weapons so destroyed. For methods used in destruction, see Division Ordnance Officer's report.

c. The motor transportation of the company was serviced by mechanics of the company during the period covered by this report with exception of 3rd echelon maintenance which was performed by the 6th Motor Transport Battalion.

5. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

a. On 1 October, 1945, the company was charged with accepting and receipting for Class I and Class II War Trophies, from various elements of the division, under direction of the Division War Trophies Officer, as follows:

Class I War Trophies:	Sabers
	Swords
	Pistols
	Watches
	Binoculars and Field
	Glasses
	Small optical instruments

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

Class II War Trophies:	Bayonets, w/scabbard
	Flags
	Rifles
	Empty shell cases
	Personal (individual) equipment
	Helmets
	Buttons
	Buckles
	Pocket knives
	Goggles
	Machetes
	Match cases
	Medals
	Insignia

b. The inventory of weapons as received from the Japanese was the responsibility of unit commanders turning same over to the War Trophies Officer.

c. At the start of this function the company was charged with furnishing the transportation of controlled items from collecting point to the War Trophies Warehouse. As the collection of weapons expanded it became apparent that this was beyond the transportation facilities of the company and was discontinued about 25Oct45, after which time it became the collecting units' responsibility to furnish transportation to the War Trophies Warehouse.

d. On 6Oct45, authorization was received from the Commanding General, 5th Division, to issue swords to officers and rifles to enlisted men leaving for the United States. Authority was also received to issue Class I and II War Trophies to Naval units and VAC units. The issue in all cases was controlled by written authority from the War Trophies Officer and later from the Division Disposition Officer when that Office was established.

e. For the purpose of storage and issue warehousing facilities were established in the Division Ammunition Dump.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

f. Total number of Class I and II War Trophies received, issued, and in storage, are as follows:

	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
Swords	65,910	5,198	0
Pistols	1,972	779	0
Binoculars	550	295	0
Spears	537	121	0
Bayonets	78,418	27,942	0
Rifles	99,678	63,921	0
Firearms, Misc.	4,053	309	0
Grenade dis. M89	76	0	76
Nambu MG	4	0	4

6. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT

a. Supplies and equipment were found adequate for the occupation and it is believed they would have been sufficient for thirty (30) days combat.

7. CONCLUSION

a. There are no important comments or recommendations on either the assault or occupation operations.

5th Marine Division
In the Field
1 December, 1945

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT

DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT
REPORT

1. GENERAL.

a. Initial orders received by the Division indicated that disposition of captured materiel and equipment constituted an integral part of the mission. Details were lacking, however, as to the methods of disposition, the pre-disposition inventories which would be required, and the types of materiel and equipment involved. These questions were not clarified until the receipt of orders from higher echelon on 18 October, 1945. As a result, much of the effort spent by elements of the Division in inventorying captured material and equipment proved ineffectual.

b. A similar situation prevailed in the Division Staff, since each section had an interest in the disposition of captured material and equipment, yet no one section had overall cognizance. G-1 was interested in supplies for military and civil government use, G-2 was vitally interested from the standpoint of intelligence, G-3 in the accomplishment of the mission and the troops involved, and G-4 in materials for use by the occupying forces.

c. The Division Disposition Section, established on 18 October, 1945, in accordance with instructions from higher echelon, centralized in one agency overall responsibility for supervising the inventorying and disposition of all captured materiel and equipment.

2. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF THE DIVISION DISPOSITION
SECTION.

a. The Division Disposition Section consisted of the Disposition Officer, an Inspector of Disposition, two assistants and the necessary clerks. The Division Ordnance Officer, War Trophies Section, and Division Transport Quartermaster Section in its capacity as Records Section for Disposition,

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd)

were all under the supervision of the Disposition Officer. Each regiment, battalions within the regiments, and separate battalions organized a disposition section at that time. Battalions had one officer as Disposition Officer and the necessary enlisted personnel for clerks. Regimental Disposition Sections had a Disposition Officer and the necessary clerks.

b. The Disposition Officer coordinated and supervised all disposition and inventorying of Japanese surrendered material. He was aided by all the staff sections and their technical personnel including ordnance, signal and engineer specialists and equipment. All the records pertaining to disposition were maintained and processed by the Division Transport Quartermaster Section. Requests for Japanese equipment and supplies continued to be acted upon by the Division Procurement Officer. All inventories were inspected by the G-2 Section for possible intelligence items otherwise not reported. This organization was quite satisfactory and disposition progressed at a rapid rate. The fact that the Japanese Home Ministry appointed representatives to receipt for materiel turned over to the Home Ministry, was an aid to our forces in disposing of materiel that was approved for return to the Japanese.

3. INVENTORY AND DISPOSITION OPERATIONS.

a. Materiel of a military nature either in an installation or in storage was inventoried by the unit responsible for that area. The inventories prepared by the Japanese were used as a guide but were not taken as the actual inventory. Guards were placed over these areas until complete disposition had been effected. A number of items were disposed of at the time of inventory, especially if the materiel was in an isolated area. If the materiel was of such nature that it could be moved, units moved it to a central storage area in order to minimize the number of guards. Approved items for return to the Japanese and scrap resulting from scrapping materiel was turned over to a representative of the Home Ministry who receipted for it and made arrangements to have it moved or guarded by Japanese. In cases where identification of technical

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd)

materiel was required, units would contact the Division Disposition Officer and request assistance. The Division Disposition Officer would make arrangements for either U.S. or Japanese technical personnel to identify the materiel in question. Specialized equipment required for destruction was procured in the same manner.

b. Shipping required to transport ammunition and explosives to sea to be dunned was requested through the Division Transport Quartermaster Section, who in turn contacted the V Amphibious Corps Transport Quartermaster Section, for the necessary tugs and barges.

4. MEANS OF DISPOSITION.

a. This Division disposed of surrendered Japanese materiel by the following methods:

(1) Destruction - accomplished by burning or dumping at sea. (Ammunition and explosives).

(2) Scrapped - accomplished by smashing, cutting or using explosives. (Weapons, planes, military vehicles, etc.).

(3) Used for operations - procured through the Division Procurement Office. (Window glass, manila line, hardware, office equipment and other items).

(4) Returned to Japanese - food, clothing, and equipment, of a non-military nature were turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry.

(5) Trophies issued to troops - rifles, bayonets, swords, sabers, pistols, binoculars, field glasses, and personal equipment were issued to officers and men for trophies in accordance with directives.

b. On 8 December, 1945 the 2d Marine Division assumed control of the 5th Marine Division zone of responsibility, thereby undertaking the disposition of the remaining surrendered Japanese materiel.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd)

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. The largest single problem confronted by this Division in regards to disposition was the disposal of ammunition, large quantities of which were found at:

- (1) KOKURA Army Arsenal
- (2) HIU Ammunition Storage Area
- (3) USHINOURA Ammunition Storage Area and Arsenal
- (4) KAWATANA Arsenal
- (5) KUZASA Arsenal
- (6) OGUSHI Arsenal
- (7) TAWARABAURA Ammunition Storage Area.

b. Instructions for Inventorying and Disposition.

(1) Comment - The initial disposition and inventorying instructions were of such a general nature that the occupation troops were confused and when subsequent instructions were issued, quite often in opposition to former instructions, disposition was hampered and frequently had to be redone. For example - certain supplies and equipment were returned to the Japanese under one set of orders and a change in these orders required the occupation forces to take back the returned items and make different disposition.

(2) Recommendations.

(a) It is recommended that any organization anticipating occupation duty, to include disposition of surrendered enemy materiel establish a disposition section as far in advance of the target date as possible. This section should initiate the publishing of information as to inventories and disposition, together with the proper forms so that all troops are cognizant of all available materiel pertaining to the subject.

(b) It is recommended that a manual be written and published covering inventory and disposition

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd)

instructions for an occupation force, to aid the Commander in his task of disposition of surrendered enemy materiel. This manual should have an itemized list of every conceivable military item together with the method of disposition of that particular item or piece of equipment.

c. Zones of Responsibility.

(1) Comment - The shifting of areas of responsibility from one unit to another within the Division caused considerable loss of time in disposing of materiel due to turning over records and time required to become acquainted with the area by the new unit.

(2) Recommendation - Organizations should assign areas of responsibility to units with the intention of leaving them in that area until disposition is complete.

d. Identification of Japanese equipment.

(1) Comment - Identification of Japanese signal equipment and ordnance items, in many cases, presented a problem.

(2) Recommendations.

(a) Organizations should have a number of competent ordnance and signal personnel present to aid in disposal and identification of enemy materiel.

(b) Future surrender terms should have a clause added stating that the country's area Commanders, not demobilize certain technicians including ordnance, signal and naval. These technicians to be made available to the Occupation Forces Commander.

e. Labor.

(1) Comment - The shortage of labor was a serious hindrance to our forces in disposition activities.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd)

(2) Recommendation - Future surrender terms should have a clause added stating that the country's area commanders either not demobilize a certain number of men or form labor battalions of either service men or demobilized personnel in certain designated areas.

f. Inspector of Disposition.

(1) Comment - The Inspector of Disposition has a very important function in regards to disposition.

(2) Recommendation - Organizations with a zone of responsibility should provide an Inspector of Disposition.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EASY TO
5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT

REPORT OF SURRENDERED SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT
5TH MARINE DIVISION**

CLASS: ORDNANCE

ITEM	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	* METHOD OF DISP'N	BALANCE ON HAND
1. Projectiles-separate loading, HE, Shrap- nel & Incendiary	Rds	190796	151200 100	D RJ	39496
2. Projectiles-separate loading, Chemical	Rds	12007	11263	D	744
3. Charges, propelling, bag type	Rds	209703	39335	D	170368
4. Complete Rds-fixed & semi-fixed, 37mm or larger	Rds	495883	16764	D	479119
5. Complete Rds-Mortar, 50mm & larger	Rds	158532	8278	D	150254
6. Fuzes & Primers, Ar- tillery & Mines	Rds	957016	211054	D	745962
7. Mines, Anti-tank, AP beach	Rds	22384	4408	D	17976
8. Rockets, all types	Rds	31037	16493	D	14544
9. Bombs, A/C, HE, & Incendiary	Rds	565260	12186	D	553074
10. Bombs, A/C, Chemical	Rds	6473	6370	D	103
11. Bombs, A/C, Rocket	Rds	40	40	D	-
12. Fuzes, Bomb	Rds	131160	9290	D	121870
13. Grenades-Hand&Rifle	Rds	334022	107396	D	226626

*Note: D-Destroyed; O-Used for Operations; RJ-Returned to
Japanese; TIT-Trophies issued Troops; NTJ-NavTechJap

**Note: This report shows the totals received, disposed of, and
balance on hand of all Japanese supplies and equipment
surrendered to the 5th Marine Division as of 30 November,
1945. Areas included are SAGA KEN, that portion of
NAGASAKI KEN in the 5th Marine Division Area of Respon-
sibility, TSUSHIMA, GOTO RETTO, HIRADO and nearby smaller
islands. Those portions of OITA and FUKUOKA KENS
originally in the 5th Marine Division Area of Responsibil-
ity are not included as all reports on these areas were
turned over to the 32d Infantry Division at the time of
relief of 5th Marine Division in those areas.

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ENCLOSURE (1) TO ANNEX 5 TO ITEM 100 TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION
OPERATIONS REPORT.

CLASS: ORDNANCE (Cont'd)

ITEM	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISP	BALANCE OF HAND
14. Grenades-Hand-thrown					
Chemical	Rds	142	140	D	2
15. Flare, A/C	Rds	35688	20	D	35668
16. Signals, ground	Rds	121	120	D	1
17. Cartridges, L., 6.5mm to 9mm incl	Rds	13141698	8773695	D	4368003
18. Complete Rds, Auto Cannon, 12.7mm to 40mm incl	Rds	402102	196358	D	205744
19. Explosives, H4 bull incl-Black Powder	Lbs	18388730	17147895	D	
20. Explosives, Demo Blocks	Lbs	288760	1205	RJ	1239630
21. Powder, smokeless, bulk	Lbs	288760	6000	D	282760
22. Blasting Caps & Detonators	Rds	109800	57029	D	52771
23. Rifles	Each	3196612	86926	D	
		97678	189	RJ	3129497
			40200	TTT	
			25835	TTT-NAVY	
			7506	D	26137
24. Pistols	Each	1972	761	TTT	1211
25. Machine Guns	Each	12610	2370	D	10240
26. Bayonets, knives	Each	78418	18440	TTT	
			9565	TTT-NAVY	50413
26. Swords & Sabers	Each	65910	4088	TTT	
			2594	TTT-NAVY	
			7246	D	51982
27. Aircraft Cannon	Each	6	6	D	
28. Field Artillery	Each	1227	159	D	
			1	TTJ	1067
29. Mortars & Grenade Dischargers	Each	1634	810	D	
			1	TTJ	823
30. Rocket Launchers	Each	70	70	D	-
31. Anti-aircraft Art'	Each	571	23	D	548
32. Coast & Harbor Defense Artillery	Each	68	35	D	33

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EAS TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

CLASS: ORDNANCE (CONT'D.)

ITEMS	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISP'N	BALANCE ON HAND
33. Telescopes	each	158	101	D	57
33a Binoculars & Field Glasses	each	550	295	TIT	255
34. Aiming Circles	each	346	2	D	344
35. Plotting Boards	each	116	76	D	40
36. Range & Height Finders	each	172	128	D	44
37. Gunner's Quadrants & Clinometers	each	17	17	D	-
38. Sights	each	525	184	D	341
39. Directors & Comput- ors	each	1523	75	D	1448
40. Fuze Setters	each	-	-	-	-
41. Firing Tables	lbs	23	-	-	23
42. Tanks	each	4	1	D	3
43. Armored Cars	each	67	1	D	66
44. Tractors	each	8	7	RJ	1
45. Trailers	each	4568	984	D	
			3	RJ	3581
46. Personnel Carriers	each	-	-	-	-
47. Motor Gun Carriages	each	2	-	-	2
48. Motorcycles	each	22	19	RJ	3
49. Bicycles	each	222	75	RJ	147
50. Trucks	each	2085	23	D	
			3	O	
			13	RJ	2046
51. Passenger Cars	each	21	7	RJ	14
56. Auto Repair Equip.	tons	129.46	42.67	D	
			.30	O	
			50.12	RJ	36.37
58. Metal Founding Equip.	tons	111.80	15.80	D	
			.10	O	
			1.50	RJ	94.4
59. Lubricating Equip.	tons	5750.05	2.60	D	
			.04	RJ	5747.50
60. Cleaning & Preserving Material	tons	87.06	71.05	D	
			12.50	RJ	3.51

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

CLASS: ORDNANCE (CONT'D)

ITEMS	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISP'N	BALANCE ON HAND
61. Targets & Target Equipment	tons	5	5	D	-
<u>ORDNANCE MISCELLANEOUS</u>					
Underwater Ordnance	pcs	18867	100	MTJ	
			10508	D	8259
Ferrous Scrap	tons	5137.42	4348.27	RJ	789.15

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

CLASS: MEDICAL

ITEMS	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISPOS	BALANCE ON HAND
1. Narcotics:					
Procain	grams	60	-	-	60
Cocaine Hydrochloride	ampul	50	-	-	50
Atropen Morphine	ampul	13500	-	-	13500
Chloral Hydrate	kgs	240	-	-	240
Morphine:					
Solution	cc	4891	-	-	4891
0.01 Gram tablets	btls	548	-	-	548
0.03 Gram tablets	btls	100	-	-	100
Opium:					
Solution	cc	90	-	-	90
0.03 Gram tablets	btls	220	-	-	220
2. Quinine & Derivatives	lbs	388	388	RJ	-
3. Bismuth Items	lbs	94	94	RJ	-
4. Drugs	lbs	417358	331117	RJ	86241
5. Dressing	lbs	2920	2400	RJ	520
6. Surgical Instrumentx	pcs	91113	90779	RJ	
			5	0	329
7. Surgical Appliance, electrical	pcs	6	3	0	3
8. Surgical Appliance, non-electrical.	pcs	5021	5021	0	2
9. Laboratory Equip	pcs	1553574	109	0	
			2399	RJ	1551066
10. Laboratory Glassware	pcs	23216	240	0	
			8984	RJ	13992
11. Dental Instruments	pcs	-	-	-	-
12. Dental Equipment	pcs	4	4	0	-
13. Radiographic Equip	pcs	2	2	0	-
14. Hospital Beds	each	685	-	-	685
15. Hospital Cabinets	each	900	900	RJ	-
17. Sheets	each	300	-	-	300
18. Pillow Cases	each	-	-	-	-
19. Towels	each	-	-	-	-
20. Division Field Medi- cal Unit Equipment	each	10206	6084	RJ	4122

CONFIDENTIALE CLOSURE (A). TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

CLASS: ENGINEER

ITEMS	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISP'N	BALANCE ON HAND
1. Standard Hardware	tons	3943.40	3.95 171.90 817.77	D O RJ	2949.78
2. Hand Tools	tons	415.07	2.65 1.15 160.58	D O RJ	320.69
3. Machine Tools	each	6285	21 21 1096	D O RJ	5147
4. Electrical Equip.	tons	1994.26	2.45 8.70 388.30	D O RJ	1594.81
5. Construction & Engineer Equip	each	2671	25 8 233	D O RJ	2405
6. Welding Equipment	tons	703.80	1.50 .50 147.25	D O RJ	554.55
7. Roofing Material	tons	321.80	.90 306.20	O RJ	14.70
8. Lumber	BFM	3224236	57900 153302	O RJ	3013034
9. Cement	tons	414.30	133.50	RJ	280.80
10. Asphalt	tons	87.50	45.00 42.00	RJ O	.50
11. Steel	tons	832.25	20.00 315.05	D RJ	497.20
12. Explosives and Demolitions	lbs	6300	1500	RJ	4800
13. Water Purification Chemicals	lbs	655	500 10	D RJ	145
14. Dock Hardware	tons	8.00	2.00	RJ	6.00
15. Camouflage and For- tification Water	tons	27.20	5.00	RJ	22.20
16. Paint	gals	143657	5200 52502	O RJ	85955

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ENCLOSURE () TO : PLADIT 5 TO : INEC 1 SY TO 5TH : INEC DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT.

CLASS : ENGINEER - (Cont'd).

ITEM	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOS. OF	METHOD OF DISP'N	BALANCE OF HAND
17. Engineer Spare Parts	Tons	106.00	74.70 .10	RJ D	31.20
18. Special Engineer Equipment	Pos	13677	185 152 6043	D O RJ	54.97

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ENCLOSURE (1) TO LITELIN 5 TO LITELIN 10 5TH MARINE DIVISION
OPERATION RUMBLE

CLASS: SIGMAL

ITEM	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISP'N	BALANCE OF HAND
1. Battery, dry	Lbs	249502	5163	D	
			144236	RJ	100103
2. Battery, wet	Lbs	1234709	3174	D	
			85807	RJ	1145728
3. Cable, rubber cover	Lbs	389051	12610	D	
			54000	O	
			92730	RJ	229711
4. Cable, lead cover	Lbs	36857	52	D	
			3900	RJ	33005
5. Cameras, still	Each	1	1	D	-
6. Cameras, movie pic.	Each	227	200	D	27
7. Camera accessories	Lbs	22	2	D	20
8. Parts, communication apparatus	Lbs	236556	41710	D	
			100	O	
			58434	RJ	136192
9. Photo supplies	Lbs	500	-	-	500
10. Public Address Sets	Each	138	12	D	
			1	O	
			1	RJ	94
11. Radio Receivers	Each	579	220	D	359
12. Radio Sets	Each	543	224	D	324
13. Radio Transmitters	Each	308	28	D	
			5	RJ	853
14. Recording Apparatus	Each	13422	23	D	13399
15. Switchboard, tele- phone, field	Each	50	14	D	
			1	O	
			3	RJ	32
16. Switchboard, tele- phone, Commercial	Each	507	16	RJ	
			64	D	427
17. Telegraph Sets	Each	1352	764	D	
			224	RJ	364
18. Teletype Sets	Each	45	38	D	7
19. Telephone, com'ntry	Each	923	100	D	
			17	O	
			55	RJ	774
20. Telephone, field	Each	442	284	O	
			12	RJ	73
			73		

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNUAL REPORT TO
5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT

CLASS: SIGNAL - cont'd

ITEMS	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISP'N	BALANCE ON HAND
21. Telephone, lineman	each	279	82	RJ	297
22. Test Set, Instru- ment	each	134	6 1	D D	
23. Tool and Tool Sets	lbs	5612	1 15	RJ O	156 5597
24. Visual Signal Sets	each	4103	2155 227 11	O RJ	1710
25. Wire, Insulated, field.		263150	10500 102850 2515	D O RJ	147285
26. Wire, bare tele- phone	lbs	25720	24870	RJ	20650
27. Wire, laying appar- atus	each	658	191	D	467
28. Radar Sets	each	309	305	D	4

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO INTER-ASY TO 5TH ARCTIC DISTRICT 1944
OPERATION REPORT.

CLASS: CHLICAL

ITEM	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISPOSITION	BALANCE ON HAND
1. Bulk Toxics	Tons	200	-	-	200
2. Gas Masks	Each	26412	19270	D	7136
3. Gas Mask Access.	Tons	7513.5	7513.5	D	1
4. Screen's Smoke Candle	Each	4	-	-	4
5. Tear Gas Candles	Each	362	265	D	97
6. Vomiting Gas Candles	Each	-	-	-	-
7. Shells, Chem. Filled	Each	1	1	D	-
8. Grenades, Chem. Filled	Each	-	-	-	-
9. Army Bombs, Chem. Filled	Tons	-	-	-	-
10. Weapons	Each	466	466	D	-
11. Decontamination Agents	Tons	1086.1	5.5 10.3	D R	1070.3
12. Protective Clothing Suits	Suits	1388	120 649	O D	619
13. Detector Kit	Each	521	521	D	-
14. Training Aids	Each	-	-	-	-
15. Gas Generator	Each	1	1	D	-

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

CLASS: QUARTERMASTER

ITEMS	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISP'N	BALANCE ON HAND
1. Blankets	each	47496	33652	RJ	13844
2a Underclothing	each	57610	32333	RJ	25277
2b Uniforms	each	108864	53853	RJ	55011
2c Shoes	pair	102954	7	R	
			43713	RJ	59234
2d Raincoats	each	9244	2462	RJ	6782
2e Overcoats	each	48571	17043	RJ	31528
2f Socks	pair	91275	21032	RJ	70243
2g Caps	each	101190	7000	D	
			50	O	
			72241	RJ	21899
2h Gloves	pair	11381	100	D	
			6148	RJ	5133
3. Flags, battle	each	-	-	-	-
4a Coal	tons	933.25	309.50	O	
			34.00	RJ	589.75
4b Gasoline	drums	19387	16431	RJ	2956
4c Grease	tons	425.80	49.80	RJ	376.00
4d Oil	drums	29151	29063	RJ	88
4e Alcohol	gals	19054	9425	D	
			7304	RJ	2325
4f Kerosene	gals	8085	-	-	8085
4g Charcoal	tons	76.00	73.00	RJ	3
5. Helmets, steel	each	14993	3403	D	11590
6. Individual and Org- anizational Equip.	dwt	25292.70	170.29	D	
			1660.30	RJ	23462.11
7a Beans	tons	1390.40	1360.60	RJ	29.80
7b Beer	case	-	-	-	-
7c Cereal	pkgs	48705343	3092093	RJ	44813250
7d Fish and Meat	tons	4635.90	332.30	RJ	4303.60
7e Tea	tons	186.30	182.20	RJ	4.10
7f Vegetables	cans	22703768	442296	RJ	22261472
Fresh & Dry	lbs	1700	1700	RJ	-
7g Rice	tons	68869.50	39672.50	RJ	29197.00
7h Koaliang	tons	21069.90	18611.90	RJ	2458.00
7i Grains	tons	11540.80	11465.80	RJ	75.00
8. Machine, Ice Cream	each	-	-	-	-

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

CLASS: QUARTERMASTER (CONT'D.)

ITEMS	UNIT	RECEIVED	DISPOSED OF	METHOD OF DISP'N	BALANCE ON HAND
9. Machine, Ice making	each	-	-	-	-
10. Mechanical Refrigerator, 220 cuft.	each	3	-	-	3
11. Electrical Kitchen Equipment	each	35	-	-	35
12a Tobacco	tons	22	-	-	22
12b Soap	lbs	350	-	-	350
12c Cloth	tons	259.50	33.60	RJ	225.90

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5th Marine Division
In the Field
1 December, 1945

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT

PROCUREMENT REPORT

1. GENERAL

a. Prior to the time the Division landed in Japan it was anticipated that there would be a need for various items of Japanese property in order to carry out the duties of the occupying forces and for the welfare of those forces. To provide for those activities a Division Procurement Agency and a set of instructions governing the procurement of Japanese property was established in Annex "KING" to Division Administrative Order No. 1-45.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. See enclosure "A".

3. DUTIES

a. The duties of the Division Procurement Agency have been as follows:

1. To receive and process all requests for supplies, real estate, equipment and facilities received from requesting agencies.

2. To initiate liaison with other Marine Corps activities, U.S. Government and Japanese Government activities where necessary to effect transfers of requested property to using organizations.

3. Maintain records of all transactions to permit accurate accounting of equipment, supplies and facilities procured.

4. Prepare and furnish reports of all transactions completed by the Procurement Agency.

4. OPERATIONS

a. Procurement of Japanese property began shortly after landing, and was carried out in accordance with instructions contained in Annex "KING" of Division Administrative Order 1-45.

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

b. Initially, procurement consisted of securing materials and supplies necessary for repair of roads, bridges and buildings used by U.S. troops. Extensive repairs of these facilities was immediately necessary because of heavy damage caused by a typhoon which struck Sasebo 16 September. Rains, which continued into the middle of October, and a typhoon which struck the Sasebo area the 1st of October, increased the requirements for road and building repair and correspondingly increased the requirements for Japanese material for that work.

c. As the occupation progressed, procurement of Japanese property increased to include Japanese privately owned buildings which were necessary for office space, and procurement of Japanese equipment and supplies for recreational purposes.


d. Generally the supplies and equipment secured were drawn from Japanese Government warehouse stocks. The procurement of civilian owned goods has been negligible. So far as has been observed Japanese Government owned materials here constituted the only adequate supply sources in the Fifth Marine Division zone of activity.

e. Upon representations made by the Japanese through V Amphibious Corps, substantial quantities of Japanese Government owned foodstuffs and clothing have been returned to the Japanese for their welfare, and, in addition, certain items of engineer supplies have been returned to carry out mine clearing tasks assigned them.

5. COMMENTS

a. The foregoing duties were largely carried out by the Division Quartermaster Office. Over three hundred (300) applications for Japanese property have been processed to date. The work involved, processing applications, has ranged from cases where only a signature was required to cases where it was necessary to establish liaison with the Japanese and pick up and deliver the required items.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
5TH MARINE DIVISION PROCUREMENT AGENCY



————— Command
- - - - - Coordination

ENCLOSURE (A)

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd)

b. Language difficulties were continually apparent, the interpreters furnished by the Japanese Post War Liaison Office being generally of very poor caliber.

c. There were frequent instances of Japanese calling for material whose release had been authorized by V Amphibious Corps without having made arrangements for removal of the material. This lack of planning consisted principally of failure to provide for transportation and working parties.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. In view of the magnitude of work necessary in accomplishing procurement of Japanese materials it is recommended that a separate and adequate administrative organization be provided for the Procurement Agency.

b. It is further recommended that qualified interpreters with technical knowledge of Japanese products be available to the procurement office at all times.

ENCLOSURE (A) - ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 5TH MARINE DIVISION
PROCUREMENT AGENCY.

5th Marine Division.
In the Field.
1 December, 1945.

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

1. PLANNING

a. It was recognized that the operation would place heavy demands upon transportation of all types. A tentative vehicle list emphasized logistical transportation, and its distribution within the Division in such a manner as to make subordinate elements as nearly self-sufficient as possible.

b. Preparation of Division Vehicles for cold weather operations was planned for, but the decision was made to carry sufficient Ethylene Glycol and winterize vehicles at the area of occupation.

2. TRAINING

a. A weasel school was conducted by the Fifth Motor Transport Battalion to train operators from all units of the Division so there would be a minimum of two qualified drivers for each weasel within the Division.

b. A limited number of men attended an Amphibian Truck School, Conducted by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific at FRAY.

c. Drivers throughout the Division were given instructions in preventive maintenance, and a system of spot checking of all vehicles checked the adequacy of their training.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATION

a. A location for a Division Motor Pool and Maintenance Center was picked at the Sasebo Dock Area by the advance party. As vehicles were unloaded from the ships they were immediately dispatched to unloading points to discharge their combat load and be made available for the transportation needs of unloading the Division.

b. All logistical vehicles of the Division were placed under the control of the Division Motor Transport Officer and

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

were made available upon landing. Other organizations established Motor Pools from which logistical vehicles were dispatched on call from the Division Motor Transport Officer.

4. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT:

(a) In general the spare parts stock was adequate for this operation with the exception of certain critical items:

- (1) Clutches for $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4, truck.
- (2) Hub and wheel assemblies for $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, (M-5), truck.
- (3) Front springs for $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, (M-5), truck.
- (4) Tire patching, both hot and cold patching, was very critical due to tires picking up nails, bolts, etc., especially in the dock area. There were a minimum of twenty (20) thousand flat tires in this Division during the operation.

(b) The arrival of resupply shipping alleviated the lack of critical spare parts.

(c) Vehicular equipment was adequate for the Division as a whole. More Trucks, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, cargo could have been used to an advantage as it was necessary to use all available trucks over extended periods in forced hauling.

(d) Maintenance of vehicles was a serious problem due to the fact that organizations having few vehicles did not operate with a Maintenance Margin. Because of this all vehicles were used as much as possible and very little preventive maintenance was done. Many mechanical failures would not have occurred had units been able to operate on a Maintenance Margin, therefore allowing time for proper maintenance.

5. CONCLUSION:

(a) Comments:

(1) More emphasis should be placed on pooling of vehicles within all organizations and making personnel available to operate same. This would alleviate transportation

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT. (Cont'd).

shortages within practically all units.

(b) Recommendations:

(1) In general operating under vehicle authorization as allotted by G series T/O was satisfactory but it is recommended that one Truck Platoon be included in the T/O of each Infantry Regiment.

ENCLOSURE (A) 5TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION REPORT.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT

5TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation. None.

b. Occupation Operation None.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

- (1) Operation and maintenance of Weasel.
- (2) Operation and maintenance of DUKWS.
- (3) Infantry training by all personnel.
- (4) Anti-Aircraft firing from vehicle mount.
- (5) Extended troop movement by convoy on a land mass operation.

b. Occupation Operation.

- (1) There was no training done by this battalion for the occupation operation because routine administrative hauling and moving of the division took full time of the battalion.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

- (1) The Motor Transport Battalion is so organized that a part, or all, of one Truck Company can be attached to a Combat Team. The Automotive Repair Company of the Fifth Motor Transport Battalion can also attach a repair platoon to each Combat Team.

b. Occupation Operation.

- (1) The Motor Transport Battalion was organized so

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

that one Truck Company would remain under Division control for administrative hauling. The other Truck Company was available to be assigned as needed in whole or part to task organizations. A portion of Automotive Repair Company can be organized into from one to three separate maintenance centers.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. Elements of the Fifth Motor Transport Battalion started landing at Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan on 22 September, 1945. Cargo vehicles started operating from a battalion pool in the dock area. A repair shop was set up in the dock area and began operations on 23 September, 1945. On completion of initial unloading, Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Automotive Repair Company, less the first platoon, and "D" Company moved to Marine Camp, Ainoura, Kyushu, Japan. Company "B" and the first repair platoon, Automotive Repair Company moved to Sasebo Fortress, Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, and carried on operation and maintenance under Battalion control from that location.

b. Company "C", 20th Amphibian Truck Battalion, was attached for Administrative (less personnel management), operational and disciplinary control on 18 October, 1945. DUKWS from this Company were used in the movement of personnel and gear in occupational duties, and also two mail DUKWS were furnished throughout the occupation.

c. Company "B" and the first platoon, Automotive Repair Company were detached to the 26th Marines on 18 October, 1945.

d. The Fifth Amphibian Truck Company was redesignated the Amphibian Truck Company, Fifth Motor Transport Battalion on 24 October, 1945. The Amphibian Truck Company joined and became an organic part of the Fifth Motor Transport Battalion as of that date. DUKWS of this company were attached to the 27th Marines at Saga and Kurume for routine hauling in that area. The remainder of the DUKWS were used mainly in ship to shore movement of troops and supplies to islands in the zone of occupation.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd).

e. The rear echelon composed of Company "A", Company "C", and the third and fifth platoons and Salvage Section of the Automotive Repair Company were detached to Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on 27 October, 1945.

f. Additional vehicular equipment arrived from rear echelon on 4 November, 1945, and the 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton Trucks were placed in "D" Company, giving them fifty (50) Trucks to operate for the remainder of the occupation period.

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. See part four (4), paragraph (a) of Motor Transport Report.

b. Equipment adequate except for comments noted under vehicle types below:

(1) Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, light repair.

(a) All light repair trucks of this battalion were equipped with forward and stern booms, which were of great value in the repair and the loading and unloading of gear. The frames of these vehicles are far too light in structure for their intended purpose and consequently, overloading or undue strain on the vehicles will cause the frame to buckle.

(2) Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, wrecking.

(a) This vehicle is adequate as a light wrecker but it is recommended that two (2) heavier wreckers, seven (7) to ten (10) ton capacity, be assigned to the Automotive Repair Company. The 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, wrecker was often inadequate for many jobs because of its limited capacity.

(3) Trailer, 2-ton, 2 wheel, Battalion Aid Station.

(a) This vehicle was not used much due to the fact that there was shelter available for an Aid Station. However in the field where no such shelter is available it is of great value.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

(4) Light Cargo Carrier, M-29-C. (Weasel).

(a) This vehicle was operated very little over the terrain for which it was intended. It should be operated at a minimum over hard surface roads because of the damage done to the tracks.

(5) Truck, 1/2-ton, 4x4 radio equipped.

(a) These vehicles were of great value in keeping communications between the dispatcher and the docks or railroad. They made the movement and control of convoys much easier due to the fact they furnished direct communications as to times of movement.

(6) Trailer, 5-ton, 4 wheel, tire repair.

(a) This vehicle was left in the Rear Echelon but could have been used to a great extent in the repair of tires and tubes.

6. CONCLUSION

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comment. . None.

(2) Recommendations.

(a) That all personnel and equipment except one Truck Company and one Platoon of the Automotive Repair Company should have been brought with the forward echelon. This is necessary to maintain Division equipment and to move troops and supplies over a land mass.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Comments.

(a) Equipment and personnel of the Motor Transport

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

Battalion should be loaded aboard ships so that units of the Battalion will not be broken up.

(b) Maintenance was difficult due to the fact that many experienced mechanics were detached on points or over 35 years of age.

(c) Operations were difficult during initial occupation due to road conditions.

(2) Recommendations.

None.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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5th Marine Division
In the Field
1 December, 1945

APPENDIX A TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

SHORE PARTY REPORT

1. COMPOSITION.

a. Upon receipt of the plans for the assault operation, the following organizations were assigned from which to organize the Division Shore Party. The 5th Pioneer Battalion, 116th Naval Construction Battalion, 70th Replacement Battalion, 78th Replacement Battalion, Division Band, and the shore party communications teams of the 5th Assault Signal Company. A study of the beaches in the proposed landing area indicated the necessity of organizing a shore party organization flexible enough to have available a shore party company for each battalion landing team.

2. ORGANIZATION.

a. On this basis, the Shore Party Regiment was organized into three shore party battalions and a Regimental Headquarters. To form a nucleus for this organization, Headquarters and Service Company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion, less detachments was used as Shore Party Regimental Headquarters, and each letter company was used as a nucleus for the shore party battalions. Each shore party battalion was further divided using the company headquarters as the shore party battalion headquarters, and each platoon as a nucleus for a shore party company. To these above nuclei, attachments from organizations assigned were made to round out the completed shore party organization. The final organization of the Shore Party Regiment was as follows. (See enclosure (B), Shore Party Organization Chart, Assault Operation).

3. TRAINING.

a. Training for the 5th Pioneer Battalion was carried out in accordance with the shore party organization established for the assault operation. Training prior to the receipt of the assault operation plans had been predominantly the training of equipment operators and the indoctrination of replacements sent to the Pioneer Battalion after the Iwo Jima operation.

b. As the replacement battalions had not been assigned to the shore party, no training for this personnel was possible. Key personnel from the Pioneer Battalion were trained in the duties of the various sections of the shore party companies so that

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

attached personnel could be used to fill in. One week of schooling, consisting of lectures on shore party functions and a demonstration by a skeleton shore party company organized from Pioneer Battalion personnel, was conducted for the Naval Construction Battalion and Assault Signal Company personnel. Ship to shore training in conjunction with the infantry was conducted in a series of eight BLT landing exercises. Naval Construction Battalion and Assault Signal Company personnel as attached to shore party battalions were included in these exercises. At this time the assault operation plans were cancelled and the occupation operation was substituted, and the shore party was informed that replacement battalion personnel would not be available to the shore party regiment.

4. COMPOSITION.

a. Upon receipt of plans to prepare for the occupation operation, the following organizations were assigned from which to organize the Shore Party Regiment. The 5th Pioneer Battalion, 116th Naval Construction Battalion less detachments (see enclosure (A) to Appendix 9 to Annex "EASY" to 5th Marine Division Operation Report), 33d Depot Company, 34th Depot Company, 8th Ammunition Company, and the shore party communications teams of the 5th Assault Signal Company.

5. ORGANIZATION.

a. The shore party regiment was organized into three battalions and a regimental headquarters, in an organization parallel to that formed for the assault operation. Ships platoons were, however, not formed from shore party personnel. Ships platoons were organized by each battalion landing team or provided by the Troop Commander of each ship. For final organization of Division Shore Party for this operation, see enclosure (B), Shore Party Organization Chart, occupation operation.

6. TRAINING.

a. Training for the 5th Pioneer Battalion, the 116th Naval Construction Battalion and the Assault Signal Company detachment was carried out during the training phase for the assault

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

operation as detailed in paragraph 3 of the report on the assault operation. No training was conducted in conjunction with the Depot Companies or the 8th Ammunition Company.

7. EQUIPMENT.

a. In addition to the organic Pioneer Battalion Shore Party equipment carried combat loaded on vehicles, the following items of mechanical and heavy equipment were carried on three LSMs, one LSM being assigned to each Shore Party Battalion:

SHORE PARTY EQUIPMENT

	1stBn	2dBn	3dBn	TOTAL
Tractors, TD-18 w/dozer	4	4	3	11
Tractors, TD-14 w/dozer			1	1
Tractors, TD-14 w/crane	2	2	2	6
Tractors, T-9, crane	1	1	1	3
Cranes, 3/8 yd., Bay City	3	3	3	9
Trailer, 18-ton, machinery	1	1	1	3
Truck, 2 1/2-ton dump	4	4	4	12
Truck, 1-ton, 4x4	1	1	1	3
Truck, 1/2-ton, 4x4	2	1	2	5
Trailer, Athey, 6-ton	2	2	2	6
Water trailer, 300 gal.	1	1	2	4
Trailer, lubrication	1	1	1	3
Trailer, 1/2-ton, dump	2	1	1	4
High pressure cleaning unit			1	1
Trailer, spare parts and tool	1		2	3
Cargo Carrier, M29C		1		1
Trailer, floodlight	2	2	2	6

8. OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

a. Prior to A-Day the 33d and 34th Depot Companies were detached from the Shore Party, and the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines substituted therefor..

b. The Shore Party Commander and regimental headquarters debarked from APA 104 (Westmoreland) at 0800 on A-Day. After clearance from the control boat the regimental headquarters party

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 6TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

landed at Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, in the ship repair basin of the Naval dockyards. At 0930 the shore party regimental command post was established at 763-129 on the AMS L872, Kyushu 1:25,000 map.

c. The 1st Shore Party Battalion debarked from APA 109 (Grafton) and APA 137 (Bowie) and established the battalion command post in the drydock area at 1000 on A-Day. (See attached overlay).

d. The 2d Shore Party Battalion debarked from APA 103 (Queens) and APA 143 (Clearmont) and established the battalion command post in the ship repair basin area of the Naval dockyard at 1015 on A-Day. (See attached overlay).

e. The 3d Shore Party Battalion debarked from APA 177 (Kingsbury), APA 212 (Montrose), APA 233 (Sevier), and APA 114 (Hamblin) and established the battalion command post in the ship repair basin area of the Naval dockyard at 1100 on A-Day. (See attached overlay).

f. By 1200 on A-Day all shore party units had landed in the Naval dockyard area and were ready for general unloading. Sectors of responsibility were occupied in accordance with the operation plan for the shore party. (See attached overlay).

g. At 1230 general unloading began with APAs and AKAs being handled initially in the ship repair basin where cargo was transferred directly to the docks. LSMs were handled on a ramp located at 768-131 on the AMS L872, Kyushu 1:25,000 map. Initially only one LSM at a time could be unloaded on this ramp, causing some delay in getting shore party equipment ashore. Heavy equipment and mechanical equipment of the 1st Shore Party Battalion was unloaded initially.

h. At 1400 two tractors, TD-18 with dozer were dispatched to two burned out areas in the city in order to clear out fuel and ammunition dumps.

i. In accordance with a dispatch from Division Headquarters a fifty (50) man working party from the 116th Naval Construction

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

Battalion was sent to the Division Command Post at 1530. This group was not returned to the Shore Party.

j. During the balance of A-Day general unloading proceeded on four (4) APAs and two (2) AKAs in the repair basin.

k. At 0715 on A plus 1 the 8th Ammunition Company was detached from the Shore Party, and at 1640 on the same day a working party of two hundred (200) men from CT-27 reinforced the shore party battalions. General unloading continued in the ship repair basin, the drydock area of the Naval dockyard, and at the LSM unloading ramp. Provision was made to handle two LSMs at a time on the ramp, and the balance of the shore party equipment was brought ashore.

l. During A plus 2 and A plus 3 general unloading continued, and at 2050 on A plus 3, 500 men from the 116th Naval Construction Battalion were detached from the Shore Party. At 2400 on the same date all personnel were placed under parent control and the 5th Pioneer Battalion took over the Shore Party duties.

6. CONCLUSION.

a. Organization.

(1) Comment: Although the occupation operation was not carried out under combat conditions, the basic shore party organization established around the Pioneer Battalion as a nucleus proved a sound basis.

(2) Recommendation: All shore party organizations should be formed around the Pioneer Battalion, using a Pioneer Company as a nucleus for a Shore Party Battalion and a Pioneer Platoon as a nucleus for a Shore Party Company.

b. Shipping.

(1) Comment: When a mission is assigned to a Shore Party Regiment, the equipment necessary to most efficiently accomplished this mission should be calculated, and then the necessary shipping allocated to lift this equipment.

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

(2) Recommendation: That a minimum of three (3) LSMs be assigned to each Shore Party Battalion to lift the normal equipment necessary to carry on shore party operations. Such a scheme allows for the maximum flexibility of the shore party organization making one (1) LSM available for each shore party company.

c. Transportation.

(1) Comment: The only actual shortage of equipment felt by the Shore Party Regiment initially was truck transportation to move materiel.

(2) Recommendation: That a minimum of twenty-five (25) trucks be assigned to each shore party battalion with a motor transport control section attached to the shore party regiment to carry the work through the initial landing phase until normal transport agencies can be established ashore to consolidate all transportation.

d. Dumps.

(1) Comment: Initially there is a definite merger of responsibility of the Shore Party and the quartermaster agencies in the initial established dumps. However, as the operation continues the responsibility of operating the dumps reverts to the quartermaster agencies.

(2) Recommendation: That a definite supply of personnel be allocated to the quartermaster agencies to operate these dumps after the initial phase. Such personnel should not be taken from the beach or unloading crews of any shore party organization.

e. Pilferage.

(1) Pilferage presents a definite problem in any shore party operation.

(2) Recommendation: A minimum of one (1) Military Police Company should be attached to a shore party regiment.

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT (Cont'd).

Enclosures: (A) Operation Report, 5th Pioneer Battalion.
(B) Shore Party Organization Chart, Assault
Operation.
(C) Shore Party Organization Chart, Occupation
Operation.
(D) Overlay of Naval Dock Yards Area.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT

5TH PIONEER BATTALION REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) When word was received of the proposed assault operation, a study was made of the prospective beach areas, which revealed the fact a shore party organization of three shore party battalions was needed to support the operation. On this basis plans were made to use Headquarters and Service Company to form the nucleus of the Shore Party Regimental Headquarters, and the letter companies as the nucleus for the three shore party battalions.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) When the assault operation was called off, and the occupation operation substituted no changes were made in the above plans for the organization of the Pioneer Battalion into the Shore Party Regiment.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Immediately upon our return from the Iwo Jima operation, indoctrination and reorganization of the companies was effected because of the newly received replacements. Heavy equipment and specialists schools were conducted to train new personnel in these jobs. When word was received of the proposed assault operation, schools were set up by each company to train the various special sections required in a shore party company organization. Upon completion of this instruction for the battalion personnel, a shore party school was established to train 116th Naval Construction Battalion personnel and the communication teams of the 5th Assault Signal Company (see Appendix C to Annex "EASY" to 5th Marine Division Operation Report).

b. Occupation Operation.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION
OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd).

(1) The same training program as initiated above was continued upon the receipt of the word that the assault operation had been called off and an occupation operation substituted therefor.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Upon our return from Iwo Jima, the Pioneer Battalion was reorganized in accordance with the G-36, 39, and 40 Tables of Organization approved 1 May, 1945.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) No change in the organization of the Pioneer Battalion was adopted for this operation.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. For an account of the initial mission of the Pioneer Battalion on the occupation operation, see Appendix 8 to Annex "EASY" to 5th Marine Division Operation Report.

b. On 25 September, 1945, at 2400, the 5th Pioneer Battalion was released from the 5th Shore Party Regiment in accordance with a division message ordering all personnel under parent control. The pioneer battalion had assumed responsibility of the bivouac area in the Sasebo Fortress located at (773-153) on the AMS L879, 1:25,000, Kyushu map. This area had previously been occupied by Division Headquarters. The commanding officer of the 5th Pioneer Battalion assumed command of the Sasebo Fortress Group which included the Pioneer Battalion, Company "A" and Company "B" of the 3d Military Police Battalion, the 5th Military Police Company and Company "B" of the 5th Motor Transport Battalion.

c. On 26 September, 1945, the advance party of the 5th Pioneer Battalion moved from the Naval drydocks area to the Sasebo Fortress assuming command of that area. As personnel of the Pioneer Battalion were released from the drydocks they transferred to the Fortress and construction and maintenance of the bivouac area began.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT. (Cont'd).

d. On 28 September, 1945, the commanding officer of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and the balance of pioneer personnel moved to the Sasebo Fortress. Maintenance and construction continued during the next three weeks, and working parties were furnished to the Division Quartermaster. A guard was furnished for the Division Fuel Dump and Ammunition Dump. Working parties were furnished for the fuel dump and for the division water points in Sasebo and at the Marine Camp Ainoura.

e. On 16 October, 1945, the Pioneer Battalion began the unloading of the USS DONALD MC LEAY, the unloading being completed on 27 October, 1945.

f. At 0800 on 4 November, 1945, the 5th Pioneer Battalion was placed under the operational control of the V Amphibious Corps. Administrative control was retained by the 5th Marine Division.

g. At 1200 on 4 November, 1945, in accordance with an order from the V Amphibious Corps, two officers and eight enlisted were sent to Green Beach located at 793-083 on the AMS L879, 1:25,000 Kyushu map. This group was assigned the mission of a liaison group for the V Amphibious Corps Shore Brigade, to assist in and supervise all unloading operations on Green Beach.

h. On 6 November, 1945, the Pioneer Battalion began the unloading of the USS THOMAS MURRAY and on 7 November, 1945, the battalion began the unloading of the USS NIAN TIC VICTORY. Company "A" of the Pioneer Battalion with attached personnel from Company "B" was assigned the USS THOMAS MURRAY, and Company "C" of the Pioneer Battalion with attached personnel from Company "B" was assigned the USS NIAN TIC VICTORY.

i. On 15 November, 1945, work was completed on the USS THOMAS MURRAY, and Company "A" with the attached personnel was assigned the task of unloading the USS CAMERON.

j. On 16 November, 1945, work was completed on the USS NIAN TIC VICTORY, and Company "C" with attached personnel was assigned the task of unloading the USS SEARLES.

k. Unloading of these vessels continued through 30 November.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. The equipment of the Pioneer Battalion is considered adequate to take care of the normal needs that may be required initially in any shore party operation with two exceptions. The Pioneer Battalion does not have enough 2½-ton Cargo trucks to furnish the transportation needs of a shore party regiment in that they only have one (1). The ratio of small tractor cranes to large cranes is inadequate. We are equipped now on the basis of one (1) for one (1).

b. The supply agency of the Pioneer Battalion proved adequate to cope with the needs of the battalion, and also adequate to take care of the Shore Party Regiment. It is felt, however, that additional personnel would be required if the Pioneer Battalion were required to supply the Shore Party Regiment over a widespread area.

6. CONCLUSION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comments: During the planning phase of the assault operation, the Pioneer Battalion was re-equipped by a Table of Organization that was approved on 1 July, 1945. Many additions of heavy equipment were authorized, which greatly eliminated some of the problems and shortages that were experienced on the previous operation. Adequate heavy equipment was made available and organic to the organization to carry out most normal shore party missions.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) The Pioneer Battalion is equipped with 2½-ton Dump trucks. It is felt that these should be replaced by 2½-ton Cargo trucks as they are more adaptable to shore party requirements.

(b) Definite provisions must be made to attach to the Pioneer Battalion, when it expands to perform the duties of a Division Shore Party, a motor transport

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

section to provide a control section and a minimum of twenty-five (25) trucks per shore party battalion to carry the operation through the initial landing phase until normal motor transport agencies become established ashore.

(c) Although sufficient heavy equipment is organic in the Pioneer Battalion to meet the initial requirements of any operation, a reserve of these items must be provided for replenishment, and in case abnormal conditions are encountered.

(d) It is felt that the present ratio of one (1) tractor crane to one (1) 5-ton crane should be increased to a ratio of at least three (3) tractor cranes to one (1) 5-ton crane.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) Comments: The only actual shortage of equipment existed initially in truck transportation. Heavy equipment was not at a premium because the Division unloaded over the docks.


(2) Recommendations: No recommendations are submitted because it is felt that normal shore party operations would not be carried out in unloading a Division across docks.

SHORE PARTY ORGANIZATION CHART ASSAULT OPERATION

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ENCLOSURE (B)

ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT



Shore Prty Regt		
5thPionBn	40	660
116thNCB	16	841
5thASCo	9	180
(2) ReplBn	148	2480
DivBand	-	90
	<u>213</u>	<u>4251</u>

RegtHq		
5thPionBn	7	12
116thNCB	4	4
ReplBn	4	8
5thASCo	3	60
	<u>18</u>	<u>84</u>


Shore Prty Bn		
5thPionBn	11	216
116thNCB	4	279
ReplBn	48	824
5thASCo	2	40
DivBand	-	30
	<u>65</u>	<u>1389</u>

Shore Prty BnHq		
5thPionBn	5	21
	1	(med)
116thNCB	1	3
ReplBn	3	5
5thASCo	2	40
(2) ShipsPlts		
ReplBn	6	210
DivBand	-	30
	<u>17</u>	<u>309</u>

Shore Party Co		
5thPionBn	2	65
116thNCB	1	92
ReplBn	10	83
ShipsPlt		
ReplBn	3	120
	<u>16</u>	<u>360</u>

SHORE PARTY ORGANIZATION CHART OCCUPATION OPERATION

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SP Regt

5thPionBn	40	635
116th NCB	19	805
5thASCo	9	180
33dDepCo	3	150
34thDepCo	3	150
8thAmmoCo	6	235
BandSect	1	76
	81	2231

SP Regt Hq

5thPionBn	7	26
116th NCB	4	7
5thASCo	3	60
	14	93

SP Bn

5thPionBn	11	203
116th NCB	5	266
5thASCo	2	40
33dDepCo	1	50
34thDepCo	1	50
8thAmmoCo	2	78
Band	-	26
	22	713


SP BnHq

5thPionBn	5	8
116thNCB	2	2
5thASCo	2	40
33dDepCo	1	2
34thDepCo	1	2
8thAmmoCo	2	-
Band	-	26
	13	80

SP Co

5thPionBn	2	65
116th NCB	1	88
33d DepCo	-	16
34th DepCo	-	16
8th Ammo Co	-	26
	3	211

ENCLOSURE (C)



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5th Marine Division
In the Field
1 December, 1945

APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION
REPORT

DIVISION ENGINEER REPORT

1. The Division Engineer acted in a dual capacity as Division Engineer and the Commanding Officer of the 5th Engineer Battalion. In such capacity he coordinated all Engineer activities of the Engineer Battalion and the 116th Naval Construction Battalion, see enclosures (A) and (B).

Enclosure (A) 5th Engineer Battalion Report.

Enclosure (B) 116th Naval Construction Battalion Report.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT.

5TH ENGINEER BATTALION REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) In July, 1945, a preliminary administrative and operations order was received from V Amphibious Corps Headquarters pertaining to the proposed Assault Operation. One officer from this organization was sent to Corps Headquarters to obtain further information and directives pertaining to engineering work. He returned with several Sixth Army SOPs and directives. On it were based the rough draft of the engineer annexes submitted by this battalion to Division. A proposed list of engineer equipment to be embarked was drawn up and submitted at this time. From the little information available pertaining to the Assault Operation it was decided to take all of this organization's road construction equipment.

(2) Combat planning covered the contingency of enemy resistance although an unopposed landing and occupation was anticipated. Organic and special equipment necessary for the operation was planned on the basis of directives from higher authority and available shipping. All planning for operations ashore were developed while at sea en-route. Since the battalion personnel was embarked on many different ships, with lettered companies and platoons attached to combat and landing teams, respectively, there was no opportunity for officers to hold conferences. Some of the details for engineer operations such as water purification and supply were included in the Engineer Annex to the Division Administrative Order No. 1-45, which was based entirely on information contained in engineer annexes to Corps Operations Order and Administrative Order, both of which were received aboard ship en route to Japan. The engineer annex to the Division Administrative Order for the Assault Operation provided a basic pattern for the new engineer annex.

b. Occupation Operation.

ENCLOSURE (A)

-1-

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

(1) Warning instructions for this operation were received at Marine Camp, Hawaii, T.H., while plans and training were underway for the Assault Operation. These warning instructions indicated the type of operation and location of the target but contained practically no information as to engineer missions.

(2) Upon receipt of these instructions, combat training was terminated and the entire battalion's efforts were directed toward preparing equipment and supplies for loading

(3) Construction planning was based entirely on directives from Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, and tasks assigned to the several engineer units included in the Corps Operation Orders. No specific construction missions were assigned this battalion and there were no construction plans made.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Following the Iwo Jima operation emphasis in training and planning was placed on bringing this organization to full combat efficiency. Training schedules were conducted based on combat experience gained from the Iwo Jima operation. This battalion up to July, 1945, had received no information regarding the proposed target; however, based on written memoranda and directives from Sixth Army Headquarters, the training schedule was believed adequate. Training was conducted as follows:

(a) Extensive study and practice in disarming Japanese mines.

(b) Practice in reducing and closing natural and artificial caves in volcanic soil and rock with explosives.

(c) Some practice was had in filling anti-tank ditches and reducing anti-tank fortifications.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION ORDER (Cont'd).

(d) Practice in reducing heavy fortifications of the block-house type by using the T-3 and M-1 shaped charge and the C-2 pack against walls built of reinforced concrete and volcanic rock.

(e) Several landing team and combat team maneuvers with both infantry and engineers took place. Engineers gained experience with working with tanks and the clearance of mine fields.

(f) Extensive tank, infantry, and engineer training was completed as of the receipt of the rough draft of the Assault Operations Order.

(2) Sixteen (16) SCR-300 radios were obtained by this battalion and assigned on the basis of four (4) per H&S Company and four (4) per lettered company. This distribution was further broken down within the lettered companies on the basis of one (1) per platoon and one (1) in company headquarters. Some experimentation was made in placing TBX radios in armored tractors; however, this adaptation was never completely successful due to the lack of proper materials and radio equipment for installation. A TCS jeep was obtained for use in Battalion Headquarters.

(3) Communications among companies and between respective companies and Battalion Headquarters was obtained by use of TBX radios. The Battalion Communications Officer attached from Division Signal Company during this period of training carried on an extensive schedule for the training of radio operators and wiremen and other communications personnel.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) The Battalion Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 embarked on APA 103 on

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

25 August, 1945, and moved to Saipan. At Saipan, the Assistant Division Engineer moved from the Division Command Ship, APA 104, and joined the Assistant Division Commander and his staff aboard APA 175. The 5th Engineer Battalion Commander (Division Engineer) moved to the Division Command ship at Saipan. The Battalion Executive and his staff remained aboard the APA 103 and moved to Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan. The Battalion Exec and his staff landed in LCVs at the dock area with the first Shore Party troops ashore in that area. The Division Engineer came ashore on A plus one after the APA 104 had docked.

(2) Lettered companies were attached to combat teams and loaded out with combat teams. The equipment and personnel of H&S Company were scattered over five APAs and one AKA. This made the billeting and loading problem extremely difficult since the loading plans of the various ships were continuously changing from time to time practically up to the hour of sailing. The troop TQMs on each ship were naturally concerned with their own supplies and equipment and a constant vigilance on the part of the engineer TQM was necessary to insure that engineer supplies and equipment were loaded. The three engineer jeeps loaded on the APA 103 with the engineer staff, required for early engineer reconnaissance, were given last priority and loaded in the bottom of holds beneath loose cargo. The infantry jeeps on the same ship were loaded so as to accompany the early waves ashore in LVPs. H&S Company conducted all reconnaissance missions on foot for the first two days after landing.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATION.

a. Time and Date of Landing.

(1) Lettered company personnel landed with combat teams. Twenty-seven (27) men and four officers of H&S Company landed in an advance echelon at 0930, 22 September, 1945, in LCVs in the dock area. The remainder of H&S Company landed on A day and the remainder by A plus one. No difficulties were encountered in landing.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

b. Initial Preparation of Beaches.

(1) Troops and some equipment were landed at the docks in the vicinity of Sasebo. However, reconnaissance was conducted to select suitable landing beaches for assault landing craft such as LSTs, LCTs and LSMs to permit the unloading of tracked vehicles and heavy equipment. Suitable landing beaches were found at the Naval Air Station where seaplane ramps could be used as landing beaches.

c. Initial Access Roads and Supply Dumps.

(1) Access roads from the dock area to storage warehouses and supply dumps were few and in poor condition. Rubble and debris cluttered the roads and some of the roads were merely one-way passages leading from the docks to the main road. The main road leading from the warehouses to the heart of Sasebo was in a very poor state of repair, with many ruts and pock marks in the surfacing. Traffic had to travel very slowly over this route and impeded the progress of moving supplies from the dock area to the supply dumps.

d. Repair of Bridges.

(1) The repair and reinforcement of bridges on the Sasebo-Marine Camp Road was accomplished in one night when all work was halted and the bridging crew repaired and reinforced all bridges to 40-ton capacity on this road. This work was accomplished on 26 September.

e. Cub Strips.

(1) On 22 October, a cub strip was laid out, graded and marked by the engineers on the Division parade ground. This project was completed by the end of 24 October.

f. Water Supply.

(1) On A plus one, the Battalion Water Supply Officer and several enlisted men conducted a reconnaissance for a site for the water point in Sasebo. This point was set up

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

and in production by A plus four. Several days later another point was established and put into operation at the Naval Training Station, Ainoura, (now Marine Camp, Ainoura, Kyushu, Japan).

(2) On 29 September, 1945, two new water points were put into operation by this organization. One point was established for the 26th Regimental Combat Team in the Haiki zone and the other was set up for the 28th Regimental Combat Team at Fukuoka.

(3) A water point was set up and operated on 6 October, 1945, for LT-227 at Saga. Two portable purification units were in operation at this water point.

(4) Another point was established and put into operation at Oita for a detachment of the 27th Marines on 12 October, 1945.

(5) The water points in the Haiki zone were secured on 18 October, as a battalion of the 26th and a platoon of engineers were detached from the Division. The balance of the 26th Regiment and engineers moved to Marine Camp, Ainour

(6) On 22 October, 1945, "B" Company and the 27th Regimental Combat Team moved to Kurume and a water point was set up there with two portable purification units in operation.

g. Road Construction and Repair.

(1) Work was begun on the Sasebo-Marine Camp Road on 22 September, 1945. This road was the main access route to the camp; however, it was in a very poor state of repair, very narrow and winding. The main effort of the Engineer Battalion was to put this road into condition as soon as possible to enable the movement of the Division from Sasebo to Marine Camp, Ainoura. The road was to a 40-foot roadbed with crushed rock surfacing. The road in the beginning was an average 20 to 25 feet wide and topped with a mud-clay surfacing. Where the road passed through small villages,

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

the houses were within two to three feet on either side of the roads.

(2) Innumerable difficulties were encountered but at no time was work halted on the road except for the 26th of September when all traffic was halted to repair and reinforce bridges on this route. Progress was slow but steady even with much handicaps as heavy rains, continuous traffic, landslides, lack of fill and crushed rock for topping.

(3) On the 16th of October, the 116th Naval Construction Battalion undertook the maintenance of the Sasebo-Marine Camp Road and was supplemented by the Engineer Battalion.

(4) On 24 October, the rock-crushing plant and the portable rock-crushers arrived from the rear echelon and the rock-crushing plant was immediately set up to produce rock for road surfacing, and also to provide a stock pile of crushed rock for future needs both on the road and for camp maintenance.

(5) During the period 17-24 October, the Sasebo-Marine Camp Road was closed to all traffic and the final surfacing and grading was accomplished during this period. The road had to be constantly patrolled to keep it in a high state of repair.

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. Supply and Logistics.

(1) Logistical planning was begun when the mission of this battalion had become sufficiently developed to make it feasible. Involved were not only the supplies, equipment, and vehicles, which were organic to the battalion, but also those supplies, such as lumber, etc., which were to be carried wholly or in part by other organizations.

(2) In order to insure a complete coverage of all supplies, equipment, and vehicles of this battalion, a

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

total allowance of all companies as shown in the TA were listed item for item. Each item was then given the classification of forward echelon or rear echelon; all forward echelon material being further classified according to an assigned priority of unloading by the battalion.

(3) Special orders and memoranda to company commanders and H&S Company section leaders set forth the allocation of special equipment such as water supply tools, fittings, etc., to be carried by each unit of the battalion.

b. Equipping of Units.

(1) This battalion was fully equipped in accordance with T/O and TA allowance prior to receipt of the warning order. No special equipment was procured. Limited shipping space allowed the lifting of only 60% of the Battalion's vehicles and 80% of the heavy equipment.

c. Loading of Engineer Assault and Reinforcing Supplies.

(1) Assault and reinforcing supplies were loaded in accordance with plans set forth for the Assault Operation; however, some of these supplies were not available at the time of embarkation and the plan was only partially carried out.

d. Pre-loading of Construction Materials.

(1) Water supply equipment, and materials were pre-loaded aboard four 15-18 ton machinery trailers. Two machinery trailers were pre-loaded with 300 feet of foot bridge and pioneer and assault supplies. One hundred and fifty feet of Double-Double Bailey Bridge and the ponton bridge with T-4 balk were pre-loaded on thirteen (13) ponton trailers and twenty-six (26) 5th Motor Transport Battalion cargo trucks.

e. Plans for Loading of Additional Construction Materials for Completion of Engineer Missions.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

(1) Plans were made for the balance of the engineer equipment and transportation in the Rear Echelon to be shipped on to the target area at a later date. However, the plans of the Division were changed and the equipment was shipped to the Engineer Battalion without advance notice.

f. Unloading and Control of Supplies.

(1) An engineer dump was established ashore on A-Day in the dock area. An engineer equipment park was not immediately available because the area was well built up and debris cluttered all open storage space. Engineer equipment and vehicles were initially parked along the sides of main streets and by A plus two an area was cleared in the vicinity of the engineer dump which provided a park for about one-half of the battalion's equipment.

(2) The docks were extremely narrow and congested with debris, steel stock, lumber and trash. All supplies unloaded had to be removed immediately to provide space for further unloading. As a result it was difficult to separate engineer supplies from general cargo and about one-half of the engineer supplies were removed to a Division warehouse with general supplies of all types. After eighty percent (80%) of the shipping was unloaded, the Battalion Quartermaster was finally able to begin separating engineer supplies from division general supplies. This situation did not hamper operations to any considerable extent; however, since an adequate amount of engineer materials and supplies were combat-loaded on vehicles to last until segregation was well started.

g. General Engineer Supply Problem.

(1) The engineer supply situation presented no major problem. All materials were either loaded on vehicles or trailers or were crated and available on call. Little, if any, supplies were lost in the unloading of the ships. Some supplies were misplaced in the early phase of unloading, however, they were soon recovered and available when needed by this unit.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIVI-
SION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

h. Use of Local Materials.

(1) Liberal use was made of Japanese supplies such as paints, roofing tiles, plumbing and electrical fittings, and lumber. Some tools and equipment were put into use such as sawmills and a Japanese distributor. Japanese fire fighting equipment was serviced and put into operation at the Division Fire Barn.

i. Spare Parts: Engineer.

(1) Two of four spare parts trailers were left in Hilo at the docks because shipping space was not made available for them. The machine shop trailer of H&S Company was out of commission and therefore no spare parts could be machined. However, the spare parts that were on hand were sufficient to furnish all needs of this organization.

j. Location and Operation of Engineer Dumps.

(1) As was mentioned before, initial dumps were set up at Sasebo in abandoned factories and warehouses. After the Division moved to the Naval Training Station (now Marine Camp, Ainoura), the bulk of supplies were moved to this camp. The engineers maintained a warehouse at the waterfront to receive incoming supplies and equipment. Lettered companies maintained initial dumps in the Sasebo area; however, sub-dumps were maintained wherever the lettered companies were carrying on engineer missions. At no time, were the dumps too far from any engineer project.

k. Transportation of Engineer Supplies.

(1) Supplies were unloaded from the ships to the docks and had to be hauled to the warehouses and open storages from the dock area. The distance was short and transportation was sufficient to keep the dock area cleared of supplies.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

(2) The location of supplies to be used on construction projects were located close enough to the projects that the movement of them presented no major problem.

6. CONCLUSION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comments: Due to the lack of sufficient shipping only 80% of the battalion's heavy equipment and 60% of the transportation could be lifted for this operation. It is felt that the T/A allowance of equipment and transportation is not sufficient enough to carry on all types of engineer missions; therefore, all equipment and transportation should be carried.

(2) Recommendations: If further occupation missions are contemplated, it is recommended that the Division Combat Engineer Battalion be allotted shipping space of its own, preferably the assault-type landing craft such as LSTs, LSMs, or LCMs. It is felt that such shipping would enable the swift unloading of equipment and supplies at the target area. It is further recommended that engineer personnel and supplies be dispersed on as few ships as possible to insure rapid consolidation of troops and supplies when the destination is arrived at.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE
DIVISION OPERATION REPORT

116TH NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION REPORT

1. PLANNING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) At the time the original operation was announced to the unit commanders; the Officer in Charge, 116th Naval Construction Battalion and the Division Engineer conferred on the subject, and it was decided to organize three road and bridge teams of fifty (50) men each. Equipment and tools were set aside and prepared for combat loading. The remaining personnel of the construction battalion were to be assigned to the Pioneer Regiment for shore party operations.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) In view of the limited information available, and in view of orders to proceed in the occupation combat-loaded; planning for the occupation was as outlined for the assault.

2. TRAINING.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Training of the construction battalion followed as closely as possible the training schedule of the division which consisted primarily of field problems and conditioning exercises. No training was considered necessary in specialized construction methods, except that in connection with ponton and Bailey bridge erection. In addition, 871 men and 12 officers received seven days each of shore party training.

b. Assault Operation.

(1) Training for occupation was accomplished during movement from base to point of occupation. Each of 978 men received approximately fifteen (15) days of instruction. Subjects covered dealt with all phases of Japanese life and

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

customs. All men were acquainted with regulations then existing covering the occupation. In addition, key men were given instructions on logistics, i.e., availability and location of native construction materials.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Two plans were set up: (1) organization immediately after landing, which consisted of the shore party organization; (2) final organization, which formed the basis of the construction battalion organization as men were released from shore party.

b. Occupation Operation.

(1) The plans for the occupation operation were the same as for the assault operation.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

a. Approximately 800 men were under the shore party organization and assisted in unloading ships and moving gear from docks to storage areas. The remaining men were not required by the Division Engineer and were used in preparing billet site for the battalion. The shore party group was released at the end of seven (7) days. Subsequent operations have consisted of road repair and construction, building repair and improvement, and repair and maintenance to public utilities.

b. A large portion of construction activities were necessary to adopt Japanese facilities and utilities to the increased load demand placed on them by American troop requirements. This was particularly true of existing roads, where it was necessary to practically rebuild gravel surfaced roads to withstand the military traffic. It was also necessary to revise electrical distribution systems at various substations in order to meet increased demands.

c. Sanitary facilities had to be completely revised or replaced. Japanese sewage disposal systems are designed to

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY" TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

handle nothing but raw sewage. Many drains from heads to collection pits were completely filled with paper before this fact was discovered. It was necessary to overhaul completely every drainage and collection system used by the military forces.

d. Buildings were in fair condition. Most repairs were of a comparatively minor repair nature. The bulk of building construction was in connection with alterations and additions to adapt them to the new use to which they were placed.

e. In general, Japanese facilities and utilities were found to be in poor repair. This condition was probably due to:

- (1) Lack of competent maintenance forces.
- (2) Substandard materials and workmanship, as compared to American standards.
- (3) Damage caused by typhoons which had not been repaired.

5. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

a. Supply has been good. Local materials have been available in sufficient quantities to allow construction forces to proceed on most assignments of work. Due to differences in construction methods, improvisations was often necessary, which usually resulted in some delay. Delays were encountered early in the occupation due to lack of knowledge of where to procure certain materials. This difficulty was soon overcome.

b. The construction battalion arrived at point of operation with equipment for road and bridge work only. The immediate demand was for repair of buildings and public utilities. As there were no tools or equipment accompanying the construction battalion to perform this type of work, local tools and equipment had to be procured. In most cases, adequate tools and equipment were found, however, considerable delay was experienced as a result of the time spent in locating local substitutes.

6. CONCLUSION.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX "EASY TO 5TH MARINE DIV-
ISION OPERATION REPORT (Cont'd).

a. Assault Operation.

(1) In view of the fact that this unit has never taken part in an assault operation, the Officer in Charge does not feel qualified to make comments or recommendations.

b. Occupation Operations.

(1) The occupation during its early phases proceeded with no great confusion or difficulty. However, as soon as billeting became paramount, the construction battalion was called on to perform practically every type of repair, alteration and addition to existing facilities. As pointed out above, the battalion was ordered out combat-loaded, and as a result, practically no carpenter hand tools and no pipe or electrical tools were lifted. Considerable delay could have been avoided had the construction battalion been allowed to carry hand tools for the initial landing.

(2) Considerable delay also resulted from the fact that the battalion had to change billet partially in the height of their construction operations.

(3) In future occupation operations, it is recommended that construction forces be allowed to go forward as completely equipped as feasible.

SECRET

From: 0900 24 September, 1945
To: 0900 25 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division,
(Reinf.)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 1

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: See attached overlay.
2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations:

(1) Organic units	17,586
(2) Assigned or attached units	2,359
(3) Allied Internees and POW's	0
(4) Japanese Prisoners	<u>0</u>

TOTAL 19,945

b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat

"B" Type	9	1
Emergency Type	<u>15</u>	<u>1</u>

TOTAL D/S 24 2

c. Class III on Hand: *Ashore *Afloat ** Daily Consumption

(1) Fuel, aircraft 100 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(3) Fuel, motor 80 octane	4390 Drums	100 Drums	275 Drums
(4) Fuel, Diesel	1355 Drums	60 Drums	45 Drums
(5) Gasoline, un- leaded, range fuel	650 Drums	27 Drums	0 Drums

SECRET

- * - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- ** - Daily consumption is estimated on issues for first three days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) Medical:	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
DDT Powder, Concentrate	2000 lbs	5thMarDiv QM Ltr Ser 2996 dtd 24Sep45 to 8thServRegt.
10% DDT Insecticide Louse Powder	1000 lbs	Being requisitioned this date from 8thServRegt.

(2) No other critical shortages.

3. Status of Evacuation:

- a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelon: 0
- b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

- a. Satisfactory.


5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:

- a. See 5thMarDivEngr Road Reconnaissance Report dtd 24Sep45.
- b. Improvement of road and bridges between Dock Area and Naval Training Station has been initiated.

6. Miscellaneous:

- a. There has been no damage or losses of major items of equipment or supply stocks.

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



Co-Plat to accompany G-1 Periodic Report
 1000, 25 September 19
 Map of KUHND, Scale 1:100,000 and 1:250,000

1117



1117



SECRET

From: 0900 25 September, 1945
To: 0900 26 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division
(Reinf).

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 2

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations:

(1) Organic units	17,586
(2) Assigned or attached units	2,359
(3) Allied Internees and POW's	0
(4) Japanese Prisoners	0

TOTAL 19,945

b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat

"B" Type	10	0
Emergency Type	<u>13</u>	<u>0</u>

TOTAL D/S 23 0

c. Class III on Hand: * Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption

(1) Fuel, aircraft 100 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(2) Fuel, aircraft 73 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(3) Fuel, motor 80 octane	3500 Drums	0 Drums	300 Drums
(4) Fuel, Diesel	1100 Drums	0 Drums	60 Drums
(5) Gasoline, un- leaded range fuel	650 Drums	0 Drums	10 Drums

SECRET

- * - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- ** - Daily consumption is estimated on issued for first four days ashore.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages).

(1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of Evacuation:

- a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
- b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

- a. Satisfactory.
- b. See enclosure (A), attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:

- a. Improvement of road and bridges between Dock Area and Naval Training Station continued.

6. Miscellaneous:

- a. Losses in rations and general QM supplies were occasioned by pilferage and breakage during unloading; the extent of such losses cannot be determined until removal of supplies from docks to QM dumps is completed.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 25 September, 1945

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
<u>TRAILERS:</u>		
1/4-ton, 2-wheel, cargo	182	182
1/2-ton, 2-wheel, dump	16	16
1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo	74	74
1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing	23	23
1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit	9	9
1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom	10	10
1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300-gallon cap.	82	82
2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo	2	2
2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom	11	11
2-ton, 4-wheel, welding unit	2	2
3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower	3	3
3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit	4	4
5-ton, 4-wheel, Machine shop, Unit #1 & #2	5	5
5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition	1	1
6-ton, cargo track laying	6	6
10-ton, pole	1	1
16-ton, machinery	11	11
25-ton, machinery	1	1
45-ton, machinery	1	1
1-ton, 2-wheel, welding	7	7
Laundry Unit, light weight	3	3
Fire Fighting, Chrysler	3	3

TRUCKS:

1/4-ton, 4x4	350	347
1/4-ton, 4x4, radio equipped	117	117
1-ton, 4x4, cargo	66	64
1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo	8	8
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo	150	144
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base	63	63
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump	65	65
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank, gasoline, 750-gal.	2	2
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking	8	8
2 1/2-ton 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair	1	1

ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
<u>TRUCKS (Cont'd).</u>		
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop M16A1 or A2	3	3
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M8A1	2	2
2 1/2-ton, 6x6 (DUKW)	100	98
4-ton, 6x6, wrecker	1	1
4-ton, 6x6, cargo	2	2
Tractor Truck, 2 1/2-ton to 5-ton	2	2
Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton	1	1
Ambulance, 1/4-ton, 4x4	34	34
Ambulance, 1/2-ton, 4x4	5	5
Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4	3	3
Cars, 5-passenger	2	2
Motorcycles	6	6

CARRIERS:

Light Cargo, M29C (Weasel)	30	29
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TRACTORS:

Light	7	7
Medium	21	21
Heavy	29	29

SECRET

From: 0900 26 September, 1945
To: 0900 27 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division
(Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 3

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: Division CP closes at 77.3-15.3 at 1400 27 September, 1945 and opens at 71.3-14.3 at same time.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations:

(1)	Organic units	17,586
(2)	Assigned or attached units	2,359
(3)	Allied Internees and POW's	0
(4)	Japanese Prisoners	0

TOTAL 19,945

b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat

"B" Type	10	0
Emergency Type	12	0

TOTAL D/S 22 0

c. Class III on Hand: *Ashore *Afloat ** Daily Consumption

(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 Octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(3) Fuel, motor 80 octane	3040 Drums	0 Drums	300 Drums
(4) Fuel, Diesel	1000 Drums	0 Drums	70 Drums

SECRET

(5) Gasoline unleaded
range fuel

620 Drums 0 Drums 10 Drums

- * - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (List only critical shortages):

(1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of Evacuation:

- a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

- a. Satisfactory.
b. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:

- a. Improvement of road and bridges between Dock Area and Naval Training Station continued.

F. A. Stevens
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ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 26 September, 1945

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
<u>TRAILERS:</u>		
1/4-ton, 2-wheel, cargo	183	183
1/2-ton, 2-wheel, dump	16	16
1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo	74	74
1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing	23	23
1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure cleaning unit	9	9
1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom	10	10
1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gal. cap.	84	84
2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo	2	2
2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom	11	11
2-ton, 4-wheel, welding unit	2	2
2-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower	3	3
3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit	4	4
5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 & #2	5	5
5-ton, 4-wheel, carburator and ignition	1	1
6-ton, cargo track laying	6	6
10-ton, pole	1	1
16-ton, machinery	11	11
25-ton, machinery	1	1
45-ton, machinery	1	1
1-ton, 2-wheel, welding	7	7
Laundry Unit, light weight	3	3
Fire fighting, Chrysler	3	3

TRUCKS:

1/4-ton, 4x4	350	346
1/4-ton, 4x4, radio equipped	117	117
1-ton, 4x4, cargo	66	64
1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo	8	8
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo	150	146
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, SWB	63	63
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump	65	65
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750 gallon	2	2
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking	8	8
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2	3	3
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M8A1	2	2
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, Amphibian (DUKW)	100	97

ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd).

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
<u>TRUCKS (Cont'd):</u>		
4-ton, 6x6, wrecker	1	1
4-ton, 6x6, cargo	2	2
Tractor Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton to 5-ton	2	2
Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton	1	1
Ambulance, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4x4	34	34
Ambulance, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4	5	5
Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4	3	3
Cars, 5-passenger	3	3
Motorcycles	6	6

CARRIERS:

Light Cargo, M29C (Weasel)	30	29
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TRACTORS:

Light	7	7
Medium	21	21
Heavy	29	29

SECRET

From: 0900 27 September, 1945
To : 0900 28 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 4

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: Establishments of Rations and General QM Supply Dumps at Naval Training Station initiated.

Coordinates: Ration Dump - 70.7 - 13.5
General QM - 70.67 - 13.8

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations:

(1) Organic units	17,586
(2) Assigned or attached units	2,359
(3) Allied Internees and POW's	0
(4) Japanese Prisoners	0
TOTAL	19,945

b. Rations on Hand:

	<u>D/S Ashore</u>	<u>D/S Afloat</u>
"B" Type	10	0
Emergency Type	11	0
TOTAL D/S	21	0

c. Class III on Hand:

	<u>*Ashore</u>	<u>*Afloat</u>	<u>**Daily Consumption</u>
(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane	2900 Drums	0 Drums	300 Drums
(4) Fuel, Diesel	960 Drums	0 Drums	70 Drums
(5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel	600 Drums	0 Drums	10 Drums

SECRET

- * - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- ** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II & IV (list only critical shortages).

(1) No critical shortages other than previously reported.

3. Status of evacuation:

- a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
- b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon 0

4. Status of Transportation:

- a. Necessity for making extensive road repairs and movement of Division CP placed severe strain on transportation.
- b. See enclosure (A), attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:

- a. Improvement of road and bridges between Dock Area and Naval Training Station continued.
- b. Road reconnaissance to Fukuoka undertaken but no report available to date.

F. A. Stevens
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LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4.

MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
<u>TRAILERS:</u>		
2-ton, 2-wheel cargo	188	188
1-ton, 2-wheel dump	18	18
1-ton, 2-wheel cargo	83	83
1-ton, 2-wheel greasing	23	23
1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit	9	9
1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom	10	10
1-ton, 2-wheel, water-300-gallon capacity	84	84
2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo	2	2
2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom	11	11
2-ton, 4-wheel, welding unit	3	3
3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower	3	3
3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit	4	4
5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 & #2	5	5
5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition	1	1
6-ton, cargo track laying	6	6
10-ton, pole	1	1
16-ton, machinery	12	12
25-ton, machinery	1	1
45-ton, machinery	1	1
1-ton, 2-wheel, welding	7	7
Laundry unit, light weight	3	3
Fire fighting, chrysler	3	3
1 1/2-ton, 2-wheel, PE-95	2	2
<u>TRUCKS:</u>		
2-ton, 4x4	350	345
2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped	117	115
1-ton, 4x4, cargo	74	70
1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo	8	8
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo	150	147
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base	63	62
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump	67	65
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal	2	2
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking	8	8
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2	4	4
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M8A1	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)	100	98

SECRET

From: 0900 28 September, 1945
To : 0900 29 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 5

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872.

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations:

(1) Organic units	17,586
(2) Assigned or attached units	2,359
(3) Allied Internees and POW's	0
(4) Japanese Prisoners	0

TOTAL 19,945

b. Rations on Hand: D/S Ashore D/S Afloat

"E" Type	10	0
Emergency Type	10	0
TOTAL D/S	20	0

c. Class III on Hand: *Ashore *Afloat **Daily Consumption

(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(3) Fuel, motor, 80 octane	2800 Drums	0 Drums	300 Drums
(4) Fuel, Diesel	900 Drums	0 Drums	70 Drums
(5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel	570 Drums	0 Drums	10 Drums

SECRET

* - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.

** - Daily consumption as estimated on issue for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (List only critical shortages):

3. Status of Evacuation:

a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0

b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon: 0

4. Status of Transportation:

a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic Circulation:

a. Reconnaissance of Sasebo-Fukuoka route indicates road is passable but not suitable for heavy traffic. Loads on 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks should be limited to one (1) ton.. Travel time - nine (9) hours.

F. A. Stevens

F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4.

ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800 28 September, 1945.MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

TYPE	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
<u>TRAILERS:</u>		
1/2-ton, 2-wheel cargo	188	188
1/2-ton, 2-wheel dump	18	18
1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo	83	83
1-ton, 2-wheel, greasing	23	23
1-ton, 2-wheel, high pressure unit	9	9
1-ton, 2-wheel, stockroom	10	10
1-ton, 2-wheel, water-300-gallon capacity	84	84
2-ton, 4-wheel, cargo	2	2
2-ton, 4-wheel, stockroom	11	11
2-ton, 4-wheel, welding unit	3	3
3-ton, 2-wheel, sterilizing shower	3	3
3-ton, 4-wheel, water purification unit	4	4
5-ton, 4-wheel, machine shop, unit #1 & #2	5	5
5-ton, 4-wheel, carburetor and ignition	1	1
6-ton, cargo track laying	6	6
10-ton, pole	1	1
16-ton, machinery	12	12
25-ton, machinery	1	1
45-ton, machinery	1	1
1-ton, 2-wheel, welding	7	7
Laundry unit, light weight	3	3
Fire fighting, chrysler	3	3
1 1/2-ton, 2-wheel, PE-95	2	2
<u>TRUCKS:</u>		
1/2-ton, 4x4	350	342
1/2-ton, 4x4, radio equipped	117	114
1-ton, 4x4, cargo	74	71
1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo	8	8
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo	150	146
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base	63	63
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump	67	66
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal.	2	2
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking	8	8
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2	4	4
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M8A1	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, amphibian (Dukw)	100	98

ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd)

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
4-ton, 6x6, wrecker	1	1
4-ton, 6x6, cargo	2	2
Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton	2	2
Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton	1	1
Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4,	34	32
Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4	5	5
Ambulance ¾-ton, 4x4	3	3
Cars, 5-passenger	3	3
Motorcycles	6	6
1½-ton, 4x4, radio equipped	2	2
<u>CARRIERS:</u>		
Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel	32	30
<u>TRACTORS:</u>		
Light	7	7
Medium	21	21
Heavy	29	29

ENCLOSURE (A)

SECRET

From: 0900 29 September, 1945
To ; 0900 30 September, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 6

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872

1. Location of service installations: Fuel DP established
81.3-10.9.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations:

(1) Organic units	17,586
(2) Assigned or attached units	2,359
(3) Allied Internees and POW's	0
(4) Japanese Prisoners	0
TOTAL	19,945

b. Rations on Hand:	<u>D/S Ashore</u>	<u>D/S Afloat</u>
"B" Type	10	0
Emergency Type	9	0
Total D/S	19	0

c. Class III on Hand:	<u>*Ashore</u>	<u>*Afloat</u>	<u>**Daily Consumption</u>
(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(3) Fuel, motor 80 octane	2620 Drums	0 Drums	250 Drums
(4) Fuel, Diesel	850 Drums	0 Drums	50 Drums
(5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel	560 Drums	0 Drums	10 Drums

SECRET

- * - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- ** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for preceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (list only critical shortages).

(1) Tire repair materials.

3. Status of evacuation:

- a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
- b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher echelon. 0

4. Status of Transportation:

- a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity) and Traffic circulation:

- a. No remarks.

F. A. Stevens
F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS - G-4.

ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 29 September, 1945MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
<u>TRAILERS:</u>		
2-ton, 2-wheel cargo	188	188
1-ton, 2-wheel dump	18	18
1-ton, 2-wheel cargo	83	83
1-ton, 2-wheel greasing	23	23
1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit	9	9
1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom	10	10
1-ton, 2-wheel water, 300-gallon capacity	84	84
2-ton, 4-wheel cargo	2	2
2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom	11	11
2-ton, 4-wheel welding unit	3	3
3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower	3	3
3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit	4	4
6-ton, 4-wheel machine shop, unit #1	5	5
5-ton, 4-wheel carburetor and ignition	1	1
6-ton, cargo track laying	6	6
10-ton pole	1	1
16-ton machinery	12	12
25-ton machinery	1	1
45-ton machinery	1	1
1-ton, 2-wheel, welding	7	7
Laundry unit, light weight	3	3
Fire fighting, chrysler	3	3
1 1/2-ton, 2-wheel, PE-95	2	2
<u>TRUCKS:</u>		
2-ton, 4x4	350	345
2-ton, 4x4, radio eq.	117	115
1-ton, 4x4, cargo	74	71
1 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo	8	8
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo	150	146
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base	63	61
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, dump	67	65
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal	2	2
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, wrecking	8	8
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair	1	1
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2	4	4
2 1/2-ton, 6x6, M-12	1	1

ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd.)

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
2½-ton, 6x6, M8A1	1	1
2½-ton, 6x6, amphibian, (Dukw)	100	97
4-ton, 6x6, wrecker	1	1
4-ton, 6x6, cargo	2	2
Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton	2	2
Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton	1	1
Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4	34	34
Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4	5	5
Ambulance, ¾-ton, 4x4	3	3
Cars, 5-passenger	3	3
Motorcycles	6	6
1½-ton, 4x4, radio equipped	2	2
<u>CARRIERS:</u>		
Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel	32	31
<u>TRACTORS:</u>		
Light	7	7
Medium	21	21
Heavy	29	29

SECRET

From: 0900 30 September, 1945
To : 0900 1 October, 1945
Unit: 5th Marine Division (Reinf)

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT

Report No. 7

Maps: KYUSHU, scale 1:25,000, AMS L872

1. Location of service installations: No change.

2. Status of Supply:

a. Strength for Army field rations:

(1) Organic units	17,586
(2) Assigned or attached units	2,359
(3) Allied Internees and POW's	0
(4) Japanese Prisoners	0
TOTAL	<u>19,945</u>

b. Rations on Hand:

	<u>D/S Ashore</u>	<u>D/S Afloat</u>
"B" Type	10	0
Emergency Type	8	0
Total D/S	<u>18</u>	<u>0</u>

c. Class III on Hand:

	<u>*Ashore</u>	<u>*Afloat</u>	<u>**Daily Consumption</u>
(1) Fuel, aircraft, 100 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(2) Fuel, aircraft, 73 octane	0 Drums	0 Drums	0 Drums
(3) Fuel, motor 80 octane	2495 Drums	0 Drums	200 Drums
(4) Fuel, Diesel	825 Drums	0 Drums	40 Drums
(5) Gasoline, unleaded, range fuel	385 Drums	0 Drums	53 Drums

SECRET

- * - Figures computed in numbers of 55 gallon drums.
- ** - Daily consumption as estimated on issues for pre-
ceding four days.

d. Class II and IV (list only critical shortages).

- (1) No critical shortages other than previously
reported.

3. Status of evacuation:

- a. Number of casualties evacuated to higher echelons: 0
- b. Number of casualties awaiting evacuation to higher
echelon. 0

4. Status of Transportation:

- a. See enclosure (A) attached.

5. Condition of Roads, Bridges (including weight capacity)
and Traffic circulation:

- a. Crushed rock has been requested for improvement of
roads in Naval Training Station.

F. A. Stevens
F. A. STEVENS,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS, G-4

ENCLOSURE (A)

5th Marine Division (Reinf)
1800, 30 September, 1945MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
<u>TRAILERS:</u>		
2-ton, 2-wheel cargo	188	188
1-ton, 2-wheel dump	18	18
1-ton, 2-wheel cargo	83	83
1-ton, 2-wheel greasing	23	23
1-ton, 2-wheel high pressure unit	9	9
1-ton, 2-wheel stockroom	10	10
1-ton, 2-wheel water-300-gallon capacity	84	84
2-ton, 4-wheel cargo	2	2
2-ton, 4-wheel stockroom	11	11
2-ton, 4-wheel welding unit	3	3
3-ton, 2-wheel sterilizing shower	3	3
3-ton, 4-wheel water purification unit	4	4
5-ton, 4-wheel machine shop, unit #1	5	5
5-ton, 4-wheel carburetor and ignition	1	1
6-ton, cargo track laying	6	6
10-ton, pole	1	1
16-ton, machinery	12	12
25-ton, machinery	1	1
45-ton, machinery	1	1
1-ton, 2-wheel, welding	7	7
Laundry unit, light weight	3	3
Fire fighting, chrysler	3	3
1-ton, 2-wheel, PE-95	2	2
<u>TRUCKS:</u>		
2-ton, 4x4	350	341
2-ton, 4x4, radio eq.	117	111
1-ton, 4x4 cargo	74	70
1-ton, 4x4, cargo	8	8
2-ton, 6x6, cargo	150	145
2-ton, 6x6, short wheel base	63	61
2-ton, 6x6, dump	67	65
2-ton, 6x6, tank gasoline, 750-gal	2	2
2-ton, 6x6, wrecking	8	8
2-ton, 6x6, artillery repair, M9A1	1	1
2-ton, 6x6, instrument repair	1	1
2-ton, 6x6, machine shop, M16A1 or A2	4	4
2-ton, 6x6, M-12	1	1
2-ton, 6x6, M8A1	1	1

ENCLOSURE (A) (Cont'd.)

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
2½-ton, 6x6, Amphibian, (Dukw)	100	98
4-ton, 6x6, wrecker	1	1
4-ton, 6x6, cargo	2	2
Tractor Truck, 2½-ton to 5-ton	2	2
Tractor Truck, 5-ton to 10-ton	1	1
Ambulance, ½-ton, 4x4	34	33
Ambulance, ¼-ton, 4x4	5	5
Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4	3	3
Cars, 5-passenger	3	3
Motorcycles	6	6
1½-ton, 4x4, radio equipped	2	2
<u>CARRIERS:</u>		
Light Cargo, M-29-C, Weasel	32	30
<u>TRACTORS:</u>		
Light	7	7
Medium	21	21
Heavy	29	29