

April 20, 1942

Beach Defense positions same.

Weapons & ammo returned to Navy:

	1st Bn	2d Bn	3d Bn	Total
50 Cal MG (Air)		2	1	3
50 Cal Ammo (Batt/Batt)		4,000	2,000	6,000

2 BMG fr R-4 to South Dock Pillbox, 3d Bn (manned by USN)

Air Raids: 0837-0859

1015-1055

1100-1120

1211-1241

1243-1302

Artillery Shelling: 1913

2330

Casualties: (Shelling) - Christian, J. C. Pfc. WIA (Serious)

Gusman, W. G. Capt WIA Slight

Beaver, H. K. Corp " "

Myler, R. W. Pfc " "

Ludmore, W. B. Pfc " "

DeLaHunt, R. E. Pfc " "

0930

Signalling from top Filipino Bks below 3d Bn Lt.

Damage to materiel - negligible.

1 USA - KIA

April 21, 1942

0356

Breaker

Beach Defense positions same.

.50 cal MG emplaced & manned.

	Emplaced & Manned	To be emplaced	Total
1st Bn	16	1	17
2nd Bn	12	2	14
3rd Bn	14	4	18
Total	42	7	49

All drinking water to be boiled for 20 min otherwise use purifiers. (Chlorination).

Set raid alarms: 0824-0905

0921-0942

1056-1145 Gary & Topside.

Enemy light bombers active.

Artillery shelling: 1931 Bataan.

1-USN - WIA - Died later.

April 22, 1942.

- 0356 Breakwater Pt reports flashes on Cavite mainland & faint rumbles which might be artillery fire. Direction & character unknown.
- 2000 Gen Wainwright directed that all beach defense positions be particularly on alert tonight.

Paratroop Alert Detail at Golf Course taken over by USA.

Air raids: 0831-0856

1049-1104 - Hughes

1110-1117

8 light bombers operating.

Artillery shelling: 0147 (Bataan) Bottomside.

0645 (Bataan) James Ravine

1040 (Cavite) Gary's rail.

1856 Bottomside

1930 Coal Basin

2035 Middleside & Bhy Way

2100 Bottomside

2125 Hughes

Cpl. Gerald L. Moore 290277 died self-inflicted gunshot wound. Bd Investigation - Suicide - Temporary

April 23, 1942

- 1120 Dive bomber scored hit on small craft in South Harbor.
- 1415 Beach Defense Sector Commanders are reminded that any of the next four mornings just prior to daybreak namely 24, 25, 26 & 27 are especially suitable for landing operations against fortified islands from the point of view of moon, tide and darkness.
- 0105 Small craft "Eugenio" failed to answer challenge, unannounced & showing no lights. Challenged by sentries on 3d Bn 37 mm position & .50 cal position. Shot was then fired aimed across bow of boat. The boat then went to Engineer. H Station reported Skipper of boat was killed

1st Bn took over 5 BMG's fr Army.

2d Bn received fr Army 24,000 rds cal. 30 asstd belted
95 Belts BMG.

2d Bn Paratroop Detail Weapons fr Army:

Sevensong Field	1	BMG	3	BAR	3	Shotguns	1
Topside Khab Ground	"	2	"	2	"	"	5
Total	"	5	"	2	"	"	6
From QM							5

Paratroop weapons

Air raids: 0820-0839 Artillery Shelling

1046-1108

1326-1507

0203 Spanish H.

1913 Cove Topside

2014 Hughes

Pfc. Harold T. Matz died of ~~gunshot~~ gunshot wound. Bd of investigation pending.

April 24, 1942

2012 Navy 3 lb gun put out of commission by direct hit by Jap shelling. Barrel dented 12" fr muzzle. Sight blown away. 30 cal MG position demolished, gun salvaged, tripod + ammo demolished. Coal Basin Hill

Weapons changes: 1st Bn - 1 BMG, 2 TSMG fr QM.

2202 MG + 37 mm + mounts may be removed fr positions during daylight provided they can be readily replaced.

Air raid alarm: 0839 - 0854

0925 - 1052

1122 - 1134

Artillery Shelling: 0410 + 1505.

Two Marines wounded slightly this date.

1st Bn Damage: 1 BMG destroyed, Camp Pt.

Navy 3 lb gun + ammo 5 M's Beach destroyed. 50 cal MG Infantry Pt damaged.

1-USN MIA

3-USN WIA - 1 serious

4-USA - KIA

1-PAAC - KIA

8-PAAC - WIA - 4 serious

HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Fort Mills, P. I.

GENERAL ORDERS)

NO.

32)

24 April, 1942.

The Secretary of War, in the name of the President of the United States, has approved and will publish in War Department General Orders the following citation which is hereby published for the information of this command:

The Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, and Naval and Marine Corps units serving therein, United States Forces in the Philippines, are cited for outstanding performance of duty in action, during the period from March 14th to April 9th, 1942, inclusive.

Although subjected repeatedly to intense and prolonged artillery bombardment by concealed hostile batteries in Cavite Province and to heavy enemy aerial attacks, during the period above mentioned, and despite numerous casualties and extensive damage inflicted on defensive installations and utilities, the morale, ingenuity, and combat efficiency of the entire command have remained at the high standard which has impressed fighting men the world over.

On March 15th, approximately one thousand 240mm projectiles were fired at Forts Frank and Drum and large numbers of lesser caliber projectiles struck Forts Hughes and Mills. Again on March 20th, over four hundred 240mm shells were fired at Fort Frank and a lesser number at Fort Drum. Enemy air echelons made a total of fifty attacks on Fort Mills with heavy aerial bombs. During the entire period all units maintained their armament at a high degree of efficiency, while seaward defense elements executed effective counter battery action, antiaircraft batteries, firing at extreme ranges, exacted a heavy toll of hostile attacking planes, and Naval and Marine units from exposed stations assured the defense of the beaches and approaches to the fortified islands. By unceasing labor and regardless of enemy activity essential utilities were restored and the striking power of the command maintained unimpaired.

As a result of their splendid combined efforts, ruggedness and devotion to duty the various units and services comprising the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays have frustrated a major hostile attempt to reduce the efficiency of the fortified islands.

Included in the above citation are the following units:

59th Coast Artillery
60th Coast Artillery (AA)
91st Coast Artillery (PS)
92d Coast Artillery (PS)
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Harbor Defenses
of Manila and Subic Bays.

*Capt Moore:
Am sending all
copies to you
In distribution
A. R. E.*

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 32 (Cont'd)

Medical Detachment
Ordnance Detachment
Quartermaster Detachments (American & Philippine Scout)
Finance Detachment
1st Coast Artillery (PA) (less 2d Battalion)
Company "A", 803d Engineer Battalion (Avn)(Sep)
Detachment U.S.A.M.P. Harrison (American & Philippine Scout)
Fourth United States Marines
United States Navy Inshore Patrol, Manila Bay Area
Naval Force District Headquarters, Fort Mills, P. I.
Naval Force, Mariveles Area, P. I.
Battery "D", 2d Coast Artillery (PA)
1st Platoon, Battery "F", 2d Coast Artillery (AA) (PA)
2d Platoon, Battery "F", 2d Coast Artillery (AA) (PA)

By command of Lieutenant General WAINWRIGHT:

LEWIS C. BEEBE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Carl H. Seals
CARL H. SEALS,
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Fort Mills, P. I.

April 24, 1942.

Subject: War Department Citation.

To: All Members of this Command.

The following information received from the War Department April 22, 1942, is hereby published to this command:

"1. All units of the United States Army and Filipino Forces, United States Forces in the Philippines, have been awarded Battle Streamers for gallantry in action as authorized by Army Regulations 260-10, and all personnel of these units are authorized to wear the special service ribbons now being designed by the War Department.

"2. All units of the Military and Naval Forces of the United States and Filipino Forces, engaged in defense of the Philippine Islands since 7 December, 1941, will be included in a separate general citation to be issued by the Secretary of War, in the name of the President of the United States."

By command of Lieutenant General WAINWRIGHT:

Capd Moore

*Am sending all
Copies to you for
Distribution*

R. F. Ring Jr

Carl H. Seals
CARL H. SEALS,
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General.

April 24

Corp.	Walter W. Meyer, 301447	KIA	
Corp.	Martin B. Myers, 301141	KIA	
Corp.	William E. Morrill 241890	KIA	
Cpl.	Alwyn L. Greer 301285	KIA	
Cpl.	Iveng E. Holmes 250437	KIA	
Corp.	Vernon E. Putnam 263395	MIA	
Cpl.	Truman J. Fair 280021	MIA	
Maj.	Max Clark	WIA	Slight
1st Lt.	Alan S. Manning	"	"
Lt (MC) USN	Edward F. Fitter Jr	"	"
Cpl Sgt.	Henry Jenn 219490	"	"
Corp.	Carlton C. Scarborough 292200	"	"
Cpl.	William A. Coghlan 285138	"	"

April 25

Beach Defense positions same.

Air raid alarms:

0847-0905; 0925-0937; 1015-1035; 1151-1215;

1239-1310; 1313-1335.

Artillery Shelling: 1332 Cavite

1840 Bataan James Ravine

2201 "

Casualties - 2d Bn - USMC 1 enr. wounded slightly
Material damage: All telephone lines on
Malinta Hill cut.

0415 50 cal MG fire heard off Cabanalan shore to N.E.
1155 RJ 73 sighted 6 barges azimuth 30° magnetic N
proceeding direction Bataan peninsula; well
out on horizon.

2- USN - WIA - slight

Lt. George B. Nelson 279899 WIA - slight

Cpl. Kenneth V. Rice 271366 WIA "

April 26, 1942

Beach Defense positions same.

All US Army forces in Philippines awarded Battle Streamers for gallantry in action, although special service ribbon. All units of military & naval forces will be included in a special citation, Sec. War. (See USFIP ltr 24 Apr). 4th Mar included in citation for outstanding performance of duty in action, 14 March to 9 April, 1942. (See USFIP CO #32, 24 Apr).

Transferred to Navy:

	Regt	1st Bn	2d Bn	3d Bn	Total
.50 cal guns Water w/ mounts		1	1	2	4
.50 " " Air		2	1	2	5
Total		3	2	4	9
37 mm guns	1				1
Lewis MG.		2	2	2	6

.50 cal Ammo asstd belted 6,000 4,000 8,000 18,000

Transferred fr Navy to 3d Bn. Maslin MG.

Air raids: 0831-0854 Artillery shelling:

1000-1017

10333 (Bataan) Middle side

0603 " Tossie

2211 " Wagon Hill

2245 " Stockade Area

Ramsey Avenue

No USMC Casualties this date.

Material damage: Comm. lines, 92d Ltrage Area disrupted

Unidentified barcos leaving observed leaving Corregidor will be immediately challenged. If unanswered will be fixed on and sunk.

All ENI USN incorporated in Beach Defense Force today

Figures ~~as of 23 April~~ ^{as of 1 May 1942}

	Hq Co 4th		Ser Co		1st Bn		2d Bn		3d Bn		4th Bn		Temp Att	Navy
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Corregidor	14	77	7	68	16	339	14	300	17	413			1	14
Hospital		2				11		7		16				
Ft. Hughes	1							10	2	73				
Ft. Drum										14				
Btry. Indiana									1	38				
USFIP		2								3				
Prisoners of War		9	1	9		8	2	19	2	51				2
Kindley Fld														
Philippine Radio Sta.														
TOTAL	15	90	8	77	16	352	16	336	22	608	0	0	1	16
ATTACHED PERSONNEL														TOTAL
Navy Hospital	3	7		1	3	13	5	18	3	19	2	6	16	6
Navy	1	16		1	1	78	4	118	1	146	16	262	23	6
Naval Reserve		21				30		27		41				11
Army	1		1		26	286	19	98	27	146	9	2	83	3
Philippine Army	6	83			7	217	7	199	7	194			27	6
Air Corps						33		13		18				6
Philippine Scouts								20		11				3
Native Navy		4				22		46		80				14
Philippine Army														
Temp att		1												
Philippine Const					1	1		12		5			1	18
TOTAL	11	132	1	2	38	680	35	560	38	660	27	270	150	23
GRAND TOTAL	26	222	9	79	54	1032	51	896	60	1268	27	270		

Navy		Native Navy		NAVAL RESERVE		Army		Philippine Army Air Corps		Philippine Scouts		Philippine Army		Philippine Constabulary		TOTAL	
Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off
63	23	607	44	117	81	509	27	656		59		135	1	17		214	3399
		14		2	2	23		17		5		13		1		2	111
																3	84
																	14
																1	38
																	12
																7	96
																	8
																	5
64	23	621	44	119	83	532	27	693		64		148	1	18		227	3767

These Figures are up to and including
MAY 1, 1942.

Tempan - 1
 OFFICERS ENLISTE

Total Marines	77	1464
Total Navy	39	848
Total Army	111	1455
Total Regiment	227	3767

April 26 cont
3- USN - WIA slight
1- PAAC - WIA - slight

April 29, 1942.

Beach Defense positions same.

4 USN enlisted incorporated in Beach Defense Forces, this date.

Anti-boat barrier installed across North Harbor.

Six said alarm: 0030-0040.

Artillery shelling: 1922 (Cavite)
2023.

1 PAAC - WIA - Slight

1 USN - WIA - "

officers ~~Strength~~ Report 27 Apr 42

Marines	17	1446
Navy	39	848
Army	112	1456
Total Regt	228	3770
Hospital	6	89
H Hughes	3	84
H Drum		14
Btry Indiana	1	38
USFIP		12
P of W	7	96
Sandley Fld		9
Phil Rad Sta		5

April 28, 1942.

Beach Defense positions same.

Air raid alarms: 1050-1130.

Artillery shelling: 0012 (Bataan) Bottomside.

0844

1426 (Cavite) Bottomside

1850 (Cavite) Ft. Frank.

1830 Msg to all units: Warning to all bns. Tomorrow is a special Japanese holiday, the birthday of His Imperial Majesty. The enemy may celebrate by unusual aerial and artillery bombardment.

1850 Breakwater Pt. O.P. reports smoke, apparently from gun firing on Frank, azimuth 127° magnetic north.

off enl *Strength Report 28 Apr 42*

Maxines
Navy
Army
Total Regt
Hospital
St. Hughes
St. Dism
Btry Indiana
USFIP
Ref W
Gendley Fld
Phil Rad Sta

77	1464
39	848
113	1455
229	3767
3	87
16	67
3	84
	14
1	38
	12
7	96
	8
	5

April 29, 1942

Beach Defense positions same.

Sgt. Philip ²⁶⁶⁰ ~~W. H. Hems~~, killed in action this date by artillery shrapnel.

Boat barrier boom, Malinta Point-Engineer Dock completed.

Air raids: 0730-1008

0730-3 Dive bombers-H. Hughes & South Dock area.

0748-6 Dive bombers-Malinta Hill and 92nd Garage.

0913-High horizontal bombers.

0935-9 Heavy bombers.

1027-1059

1214-1307

1506-1620

1505-8 bombers-Topside.

1522-8 " - Ramsey Lane

Material damage: 1st Bn: 2-30 cal B.M.G. & 1 B.A.R.

2d Bn: 1-30 cal B.M.G.

3,000 rds 30 cal ammo.

30 Belts, B.M.G.

Artillery shelling: 0744 - (Bataan)

0800 - Enemy commenced a very intense barrage.

Corporal Ronald B. Smith - K/A - this date.

Btry Pt Beach Defenses battered by arty fire. Position & camouflage knocked out. Supplementary positions installed & manned by night.

Strength report 29 April.

Manned	77	1464
Navy	39	848
Army	113	1455
Total Regt.	229	3767
Hospital	3	87
H. Hughes	3	84
H. Drum		14
Btry Indiana	1	38
US & D		12
Prisoners of War	7	96
Lyndley Ltd.		8
Phil Rad Sta.		5

1 USN - KIA

2 USN - WIA slight

4 - USA - WIA

9 - PAAC - WIA

1 - PC - WIA

4 - PS - WIA

1 - PA - WIA

Major Francis H. Williams - WIA - Slight

Cpl. Orville E. Gilmore 273575 - WIA - Serious

Lt. Col. Samuel W. Freemy - WIA Slight

Maj. Max Clark " "

C. M. Sgt. William G. Smith 217391 ~~WIA~~ WIA Slight

1st Sgt. Joseph A. Adraesen 201983 " "

Cpl. Sgt. Leonard M. Andrews 230220 " "

Sgt. Felix J. McLoole 242450 " "

Mess Sgt. Don W. Lemmy 258488 " "

Cpl. Frank A. Gleschinski 295532 - WIA S

Cpl. Richard H. Olson 278027 WIA Slight

Cpl. Edward L. Stone 299987 " "

April 30, 1942.

Regt'l CP at Queen Tunnel.

R-1 Section rd Regt'l CP from James Garvine.
Beach Defense positions same.

3d Bn apprehended 3 Filipino civilians attempt-
ing to leave island. They were turned over to M. P.

Air raids: 0755-0848 - 3 Dive Bombers - St. Hughes.

0810 - 5 " " " "

0852-1005

0910 - 9 Heavy Bombers - Topside.

0920 - 2 Dive Bombers - South Harbor.

0922 - Heavy Bombers - St. Hughes.

1124-1134

1233-1312 - Govt. Garvine.

1534-1623

1540 - 9 Heavy Bombers - Topside.

1606 - 3 Dive Bombers - South Channel.

1612 - " " " - South Dock Area.

1724-1740 - 7 " " - White Hill Area.

Material damage: 1st Bn - 8 cases. 30 cal ammo.

1 PA - WIA

Major Francis H. Williams

Cy. Sgt. William A. Dudley - WIA - Slight

Strength report April 30

Marines	77	1464
Navy	39	848
Army	713	1455
Total Regt	229	3767
Hosp Comptroller	215	3483
Hosp	3	87
Lt Hughes	3	84
Lt Drum		14
Btry Indiana	1	38
VSFIP		12
Personnel War	7	96
Supply Fld		8
Phil Red Sta		5

Strength report May 1, 1942

Casualties:

Marines	214	77	1464
Navy		39	848
Army		111	1455
Total Regt		227	3767

Corregidor	214	3399
Hosp	2	111
H. Hughes	3	84
H. Duym		14
Bay Indiana	1	38
USFIP		12
Prisoners of War	7	96
Kindley Fld		8
Phil Rad Sta.		5

No material damage.

Artillery shelling cont - 0002 - Topside

0240 - Ordnance Pt & Malinta.

0400 - Cavalry Pt & Airfield.

0505 - (Bataan) - Middleside

2230

4 Filipinos apprehended on raft off Malinta Pt. trying to leave island. Turned over to Army.

During last few days Japs have augmented his supply of heavy bombers in this area. At least 15 heavy bombers in this area at present.


Rfc. Nathan Montgomery WIA - Slight

2 USA WIA

2 PAAC WIA

May 2, 1942

Sgt. Donald M. Shaul 244397 - KIA
 Lt. Col. Garvin L. Steele 243790 - KIA
 Pfc. Alvin J. Rivers 276493 - KIA
 St. Sgt. QM. Azelle D. Walker 270767 - WIA - Serious
 Pl. Sgt. William S. Vaiden 248226 - WIA - Slight
 Sgt. Morris V. Lucerst 266532 - " "
 Mess Sgt. Don W. Kenney 258488 - " "
 Sgt. Frank C. Pick 239021 - " "
 Pfc. Thomas A. Cragg, Jr. 295526 - " "
 Pfc. Verle D. Cutler 271015 - " "
 Pfc. John D. James, 290930 - KIA
 Corp. "I" "J" Lite, 278394 - KIA
 Pfc. Robert R. Mitchell, 291124 - WIA Slightly
 Pfc. Leo E. Estermler, 281081 - " "



Trench, D. M. Davis
 Southern Luzon Western Sheet
 Philippine Islands, C. & G. S. Map.

PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION, 4th MARINES 9th ATTACHED UNITS.

28 April, 1942.

	Column No.	Headquarters Company	Service Company		1 st Battalion		2 nd Battalion		3 rd Battalion		4 th Battalion (Tactical Only)		TOTAL	
			Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted
USMC	Total on Rolls	A	15	91	8	77	16	352	16	336	22	608	77	1464
	Detached Duty: Fort Hughes (Beach Def. & AA)	B	1						10	2	73		3	83
	Fort Drum (AA)	C									14			14
	Fort Mills: Btry 1 (AA)	D								1	38		1	38
	: USFIP	E		2							3			5
	Prisoners of War	F		9	1	9		8	2	19	2	51	5	96
	Total Detached (B+F)	G	1	11	1	9		8	2	29	5	179	9	236
USMC	Beach Defense Force, Fort Mills (AG)	H	14	80	7	68	16	344	14	307	17	429	68	1228
Attached Personnel														
US Navy (Mc) (bc)	Attached	I	3	7		1	3	13	4	18	3	19	3	64
	Det. Duty: Fort Hughes	J										1		1
	: Prisoners of War	K					1		1				2	
	Total (J+K)	L					1		1			1	2	1
USN (Mc) (bc)	Beach Defense Force, Fort Mills (I-L)	M	3	7		1	2	13	3	18	3	18	14	63
US Navy	" " "	N	1	17		1		78	4	118	1	146	22	624
US Naval Reserve	" " "	O		21				30		27		41		119
Phil. Insular Navy	" " "	P		4						29		11		44
US Coast Guard	" " "	Q					1						1	
US Army	" " "	R	1		1		26	286	21	99	27	146	85	533
PAAC	Attached	S	6	83			7	217	7	199	7	193	27	692
	Det. Duty: Fort Mills	T		20										20
PAAC	Beach Def. Force Fort Mills	U	6	63			7	217	7	199	7	193	27	672
Phil. Scouts	" " "	V						33		13		18		64
Phil. Army	" " "	W						22		46		80		148
Phil. Constabulary	" " "	X					1	1		12		5	1	18
RECAPITULATION														
Beach Defense Force	USMC	H	14	80	7	68	16	344	14	307	17	429	(Note)	68 1228
	USN (Mc) (bc)	M	3	7		1	2	13	3	18	3	18	3	6 63
	US Navy	N	1	17		1		78	4	118	1	146	16	264 624
	USN (Fleet Reserve)	O		21				30		27		41		119
	USN (Insular Force)	P		4						29		11		44
Corregidor P.I.	US Coast Guard	Q					1							1
	US Army	R	1		1		26	286	21	99	27	146	9	2 85 533
	PAAC	U	6	63			7	217	7	199	7	193		27 672
	Phil. Scouts	V						33		13		18		64
	Phil. Army	W						22		46		80		148
	Phil. Constabulary	X					1	1		12		5		1 18
	TOTAL	Y	25	192	8	70	53	1024	49	868	55	1087	28	272 218 3513
Detached Units & Personnel	USMC	G	1	11	1	9		8	2	29	5	179		9 236
	USN (Medical Corps)	L					1		1			1		2 1
	PAAC	T		20										20
	TOTAL	Z	1	31	1	9	1	8	3	29	5	180		11 257
Total on Rolls (Y+Z)			26	223	9	79	54	1032	52	897	60	1267	28	272 229 3770

NOTE: No. 1: 1 officer; Major Francis H. Williams, the Commanding Officer, 4th Bn; and 5 enlisted men are on temporary duty with the 4th Bn.

NOTE 2: U. S. Navy Attached Personnel (Column N) joined from the following Ships and Detachments:

1. U.S.S. S-38
2. NAD-CAVITE
3. FLAG-CINCAF
4. PAT WING 10
5. NYD, CAVITE
6. U.S.S. CANOPUS
7. U.S.S. HOUSTON
8. RADIO STA., CAVITE
9. U.S.S. HOLLAND
10. INSHORE PATROL
11. RECEIVING STA, CAVITE
12. U.S.S. TRABAJADOR
13. BASE FORCE, MARIVELES

14. HARBOR CRAFT
15. NAVY DET, MONKEY PT, Ft MILLS
16. NAVY SECT. BASE, MARIVELES
17. OFF. 16TH NAV DIST
18. U.S. S. VAGA
19. U.S.S. PIGEON
20. U.S.S. S-39
21. PATRON 102
22. U.S.S. S-178
23. U.S.S. OTUS
24. RAD.SCHOOL, NYD, CAVITE
25. U.S.S. ALDEN
26. U.S.S. PIKE

NOTE: No. 3.

U. S. Army attached personnel (Column R), joined from the following organizations:

21st. Infantry
22nd Infantry
23rd Infantry
31st Infantry
33rd Infantry
45th Infantry
51st Infantry
52nd Infantry
57th Infantry
21st Division
60th Coast Artillery
200th Coast Artillery
23rd Field Artillery
31st Field Artillery
88th Field Artillery
SPM FA Field Artillery
26th Cavalry
803 Engineers
CWS
2nd Chemical Co.
7th Chemical Co.
4th Seperate. Chem Co.
192nd Tank Bn.
194th Tank Bn.
17th Ordnance Co.
440th Ordnance Co.
690th Ordnance Co.
693rd Ordnance Co.
698th Ordnance Co.
724th Ordnance Co.
725th Ordnance Co.
Ordnance
Philippine Ord. Depot.
FEAF
ACFEF
AC Det

AC Weather Detachment
Prov. AC
Hq. Sq. 20th Aviation
19th Air Base Group
20th Air Base Group
23rd Air Base Group
16 Bomb. Group
16th Bomb. Sq.
17th Bomb. Group
19th Bomb. Group
19th Bomb. Sq.
27th Bomb. Group
27th Bomb. Sq.
91st Bomb. Sq.
17th Pursuit Sq.
21st Pursuit Sq.
24th Pursuit Group
2nd Obs. Sq.
5th Inter. Cmd.
5th Inter. Group
17th Inter. Group
7th Mat. Sq.
27th Mat. Sq.
28th Mat. Sq.
7th Maint Sq.
48th Mat. Sq.
QM Corps
PMTD, QMC
19th QM
PAASC
1st MT Bn.
USFIP Hq.

NOTE: No. 3.

Philippine Scouts:

- | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|
| 1. 26th CAVALRY | 5. 45TH INFANTRY |
| 2. 57TH INFANTRY | 6. 12TH QM BN. |
| 3. POST SERV. COM. | 7. DIV HQ, P.S. |
| 4. 66TH PACK TRAIN | 8. DET, QMC, PMT. |
| | 9. 86TH F.A. |

NOTE: No. 4.

Philippine Army:

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------|
| 1. OFFSHORE PATROL | 21. 31ST ENG. |
| 2. 1ST "Q" BOAT SQ | 22. PHIL M.T.Co. |
| 3. 42ND INFANTRY | 23. 41ST INFANTRY |
| 4. 2ND "Q" BOAT SQ | 24. 6TH PURS SQ. |
| 5. 31ST INFANTRY (PA) | 25. 4TH REGT. |
| 6. 51ST INFANTRY (PA) | 26. 6TH SCM.SQ. |
| 7. 53RD INFANTRY (PA) | 27. 1ST PHIL. DIV. |
| 8. 32ND INFANTRY (PA) | 28. 82ND INFANTRY |
| 9. 43RD INFANTRY (PA) | 29. 4TH A.B. SQ |
| 10. ORDN. SECT. 2ND DIV. | 30. 2ND DIV. |
| 11. 7TH SCHOOL SQ. | 31. 41ST ENG. |
| 12. 11TH A.B. SQ. | 32. QM, (PA) |
| 13. 51ST ENG. | 33. 41ST DIV. |
| 14. 202ND BN | 34. 1ST SEV.CO, QM |
| 15. HQ TRPS, AIRCORPS | 35. 51ST Sig. Co. |
| 16. 21ST ENG. | 36. 66RD INFANTRY |
| 17. 31ST DIV (PA) | 37. 1ST SCH. SQ. |
| 18. 3RD DEP SQ | 38. 51st MT. |
| 19. 51ST DIV. | 39. 2ND DEP. SQ. |
| 20. 21ST INFANTRY. | |

NOTE: No. 5.

Philippine Constabulary:

1. M.T. Co.
2. "D" Co.
3. 4TH INFANTRY (PC)

1975
DRN/aes.

NINTH DEFENSE BATTALION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
% FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

1 April 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer.
To : Commanding General, XIV Corps, BEVY.
Subject: Informal Report on Combat Operations.
References: (a) XIV Corps 1st End, (AG 370.2 of 16Mar43),
on USAFISPA of 12Mar43 in re informal
report on Combat Operations.
(b) Quarterly Report, AA Operations, transmitted
to CG XIV Corps by letter (2000-15 over
DRN/aes dated 20Mar43).
Enclosures: (3) (A) Memo of 8Sep42 in re Embarkation and De-
barkation.
MISSING (B) Bn General Order No.7-42, 1990-5 over
DRN/aes dated 31Oct42.
(C) SOPs No.'s 1 to 7 inclusive and No.9.

1. Attention is invited to report already submitted under reference (b) which is considered to be of particular value for dissemination to other AA organizations.

2. Attention is likewise invited to the enclosures which were closely related to the actual operations prepared for and conducted by this organization. Brief comment pertaining thereto follows:

(a) Embarkation and Debarkation plan (Enc (A)).

It is believed that regardless of the type of vessels furnished for movement, or the type of loading contemplated — combat or commercial — AA organizations can and should be prepared to not only furnish progressive AA protection to establish beaches or beach-heads, but to be ready to fight, within certain limitations, for the beach area on which AA defenses will be required. The planning therefore should include provisions for partial use of AA troops as infantry, if no regular infantry covering troops be readily available. In embarkation of the Ninth Defense Battalion, troops carried one day's supply of ammunition on their persons, issued prior to embarkation, for individual arms. (M-1 rifle, Reising gun, and pistol). Other items such as grenades, pyrotechnics, communication gear, 5-day's supply of "C" and "D" rations, were likewise embarked and readily available to the troops. Light AA weapons and belted ammunition were also made ready. This should be standard for AA troops landing in secured areas, or

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in support of a landing in force. It would be well to stress greater flexibility in the handling and landing of heavier AA units (guns) with a reasonable amount of radar fire control and warning service gear. Plans may call for a landing at a specific point, while enroute orders for diversions may take place. The original plan may contemplate a rear area landing whereas diversion orders may direct change to a forward, and perhaps very active, area (Ninth Defense Battalion experienced just such a situation). The best course for any AA commander is to plan to land in fighting form, regardless of the orders he receives or the types of vessels furnished him for the movement of his unit.

(b) With respect to enclosures (B) and (C) — in the light of later and actual experience — it is felt that the SOPs can be elaborated and improved upon to a great extent. SOPs are extremely valuable aids in this day of greater expansion of the armed forces and inexperienced officers.

3. Tactical dispositions on Guadalcanal from the time of landing provided:

(a) Light AA coverage on beaches during landing, with improvised infantry somewhat in depth.

(b) AA defense in depth with heavy gun (90mm), and automatic weapons (40mm, 20mm, and .50 cal).

(c) Ground beach defense (.30 cal Heavy BMGs) with some Army AT and infantry units attached.

(d) Installation of CA weapons (155mm guns).

4. (a) Enemy aircraft were engaged with radar control when atmospheric conditions did not permit illumination by searchlight. All actions were at night. Enemy planes were taken under fire (from 2Jan to 28mar) 27 times. A total of 2005 rounds of 90mm ammunition was expended in these operations and the statements of disinterested witnesses together with the finding of enemy planes indicates that 6 planes were shot down by the 90mm Group of the Ninth Defense Battalion on the following dates:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>DATE</u>
2110	14 Jan 43
0320	22 Jan 43
0430	27 Jan 43
0301	22 Feb 43
2040	11 Mar 43
0357	25 Mar 43

All these planes except one were flying at an altitude in excess of 21,000ft. During the past month the enemy has been making

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his attacks with planes flying at varying altitudes. One or two planes have been flying at altitudes of from 21,500 to 26,000 feet, perhaps to act as bait for the AA installations, while other planes have dropped their bombs from lower altitudes. One of these relatively low flying planes was shot down from an altitude of 10,500 feet on 25 March and fell into the sea in the vicinity of the S.S. TYLER. These tactics on the part of the Japs are good, as the natural inclination of AA gunners is to fire on the illuminated target and the chances of finding the low flying craft are relatively small. The chances of enemy success in this operation are greater on clear nights than when there is an overcast, for when radar control is used there is a greater chance of the various fire control radars picking up different targets than when visual methods are employed. So far no plane at any time flew low enough to be successfully engaged by automatic weapons.

(b) (1) Ground Defense: All 90mm gun batteries were organized as strong points; zone barrage tables were prepared for delivering 90mm fire (air bursts) against enemy personnel in landing craft off the beaches; automatic AA weapons were installed in the 155mm G.P.F. positions with the dual mission of anti-boat and anti-aircraft defense; 40mm guns were given a dual antiaircraft-antitank mission.

(2) A key (1500 yds) strip of beach was organized for decisive defense. Lack of troops prevented organization in depth by units of this battalion (No organic infantry is provided Marine Corps Defense Battalions). Defense in depth was provided by attachment of suitable Army troops.

(3) Beach defense positions were located to cover the wire with a final protective line, completely covering the area from Koli Point to Togoma Point. Guns were sighted with the thought in mind that a landing would be preceded by naval bombardment and the defense was therefore thickened so that no gun section covered more than 400 yards, thus allowing for 100% coverage even if 50% of the guns were knocked out. .30 cal MG sections were covered by riflemen. Gun emplacements were constructed in such manner that the water jacket of the BMG (heavy) was just above ground level and the firing slit was so situated that fire could only be directed through a small angle along the wire. This was done to prevent the gunner from engaging landing boats while they were waterborne as it is believed that debarking troops and troops attempting to breach barbed wire are a much more profitable target for .30 cal weapons than troops in armor shielded boats. It is also believed that fire directed at boats from the .30 cal positions would prematurely disclose the location of the emplacements. Emplacements were constructed from palm logs, covered by corrugated iron and sand. Beach

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22261

grasses and vines were planted on the emplacements with the result that they were indistinguishable from their surroundings from a distance of a few yards. Grenade pits were dug in front of the slits and the slits were covered by chicken wire. Telephones were installed in each emplacement with connections to other emplacements and to the Beach Defense CP. Guns were manned night and day with one man present at each gun at night and one man present at each section during the day. Telephones were tested every fifteen minutes. Our only regret is that the Japs failed to try them out.

5. Further reports will be made from time to time as operational conditions permit.

D. R. NIMMER

Copy to: CMC
CG IMAC

22261
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MARINE CORPS.
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R-2 REPORT

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: 1200 17 December, 1941.
To : 1200 18 December, 1941.

15962

Fourth U.S. Marines
Forward CP
1200, 18 December, 1941.

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WAR PLANS SECTION
MARINE CORPS

No. 1

Maps: Island of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line.-contact with enemy not made as yet.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary.-except for planes passing over area, quiet in this sector. No bombs dropped or attacks made by enemy planes. Enemy aircraft performing only reconnaissance missions in this area.

b. Operations of component elements.

(1) Aircraft.-Passed over this area from 1805 to 1815; no bombs dropped or attacks made; enemy aircraft believed searching for our planes in water.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Terrain not under our control.-Enemy land forces are located as indicated.

(1) VIGAN.-about 4,500 have landed here, commandeered transportation in vicinity, and moved north (unopposed) and occupied LAOAG. Last reported that none of enemy landed here is south of Vigan.

(2) APARRI.-8 transports are reported to have landed here and an air base established. The troops have moved south (unopposed) and occupied in succession, the following towns to the south: CAMALANTUGAN, GATTERON, and TUGUEGARAO (about 50 miles south of Aparri).

(3) LEGASPI.-a enemy force landed here and has moved (unopposed) up to the area opposite SAN MIGUEL BAY.

b. A reliable source reports that, in landing at LEGASPI, the enemy used U.S. flags to conceal their identity from civilians there.

c. Other sources report that Japanese bombs, because of faulty mechanism, sometimes do not explode for as long as several days after dropping; other bombs are purposely incorporated with a device which causes them to delay from a few seconds to as much as 60 hours before exploding.

d. The method of attack used by enemy planes to date and con-

S-E-C-R-E-T

firmed by other sources is as follows: The enemy aircraft passes over the target the first time without making any attack, merely observing the exact location of the target or targets. The planes then go about 5 or 6 miles away, suddenly reverse course, and head at top speed for their target, expending their ammunition carefully and conservatively. The planes then go about 5 or 6 miles away again and the procedure is repeated until either all targets are destroyed or all ammunition is expended.

Civilians, particularly, are inclined to erroneously conclude, that, after the planes first pass over without firing and get about 5 miles away, the danger is over.

R. F. RUGE,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2. II

Copies to:

C.O. 1st Bn. 4th ✓
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th ✓
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R-3 " ✓
R-4 " ✓
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C.O. HQ Co. 4th ✓
31st Div. HQ ✓
File ✓

R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 18 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 19 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines
Forward CP
1200, 19 December, 1941.

No. 2.

Maps: Island of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-Contact not gained with enemy, as yet.
- b. In other sectors.-No known changes from previous report.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.- No enemy operations.
- b. In other sectors.-
 - (1) Aviation.-A single enemy plane dropped a few light bombs on IBA causing no casualties or material damage.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. Other sources reliably report that, in land attacks, the enemy favors using wide enveloping movements rather than frontal attacks.

R. F. RUGE,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2. TR

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C.O. 1st Bn. 4th
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R-3 "
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31st Div. HQ
File

R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 19 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 20 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines
Forward CP
1200, 20 December, 1941.

No. 3.

Maps: Island of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-Contact with enemy not gained as yet.
- b. In other sectors.-No known changes from previous reports.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.
 - (1) Aviation.-1235-1245, 17 enemy planes (Navy) passed over this sector heading S.E. toward Manila; 1112-1135, single enemy plane circled over the area (believed on reconnaissance mission).
- b. In other sectors.
 - (1) Aviation.-1310, 3 enemy planes passed over Barrios Laoag and San Felipe dropping 3 bombs in sea. No damage or casualties. Planes were heading south.

R. F. Ruge
R. F. RUGE,

First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

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C.O. 1st Bn. 4th
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th
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R-3 "
R-4 "
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31st Div. HQ
Camp Commander Rear CP
File.

TH *MA*

S-E-C-R-E-T

R-2 REPORT

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: 1200, 20 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 21 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Forward CP,
1200, 21 December, 1941.

No. 4.

Maps: Island of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-Permanent contact with enemy not gained, as yet.
- b. In other sectors.-Enemy force is ashore at DAVAO on the island of MINDANAO; no known changes in landings at VIGAN, APARRI, and LEGASPI.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.
 - (1) Aviation.-0934 6 twin motored bombers dropped 4 bombs over FORT WINT. One man's hand injured; no other casualties or damage. AA fire from FORT WINT broke up formation although no planes were shot down.
- b. In other sectors.
 - (1) Land operations.-An enemy force of unknown strength has landed at DAVAO and is meeting strong resistance.
 - (2) Aviation.-At 1310, 20 December, 10 Japanese dive bombers dropped 5 bombs on and machine gunned the landing field at IBA.

DIST: C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
R-1 " "
R-3 " "
R-4 " "
C.O. Service Co. 4th,
C.O. HQ Co. 4th,
31st Div. HQ,
Camp Commander, Rear CP,
File.

R. F. RUGE,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

S-E-C-R-E-T

R-2 REPORT

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: 1200, 21 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 23 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Forward CP,
1200, 23 December, 1941.

No. 5.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-Permanent contact with enemy not gained, as yet.
- b. In other sectors.-At 0730, 22 December 10 Destroyers, 1 cruiser, and approximately 90 enemy transports were in LING-AYEN BAY; a large number of these troops are ashore near AGOO, ARINGAY, and CAVA (south of SAN FERNANDO LA UNION); many of the transports were not unloaded and may be used for landings elsewhere. No known changes in progress of landings at DAVAO, VIGAN, APARRI, and LEGASPI from last report.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.
 - (1) Aviation.-No activity except several times single planes (believed on reconnaissance missions) passed over sector.
- b. In other sectors.-Landing of force referred to in par. 1 a., was made on barges. An unknown number of tanks were landed. After landing it is reported that enemy was encountered by USAFFE forces equipped with tanks. Accurate results not known. Remaining, unloaded transports (last seen in LING-AYEN BAY); may attempt landing near BAGAC, OLONGAPO, or along western coast of ZAMBALES PROVINCE. Near DAVAO enemy is meeting strong resistance although exact progress of engagement is not yet clear.

DISTRIBUTION: (1) C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
(2) C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
(3) C.O. 31st Div.

R. F. RUGE,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

From: 1200, 23 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 24 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Forward CP,
1200, 24 December, 1941.

No. 6.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. In this sector.-No change. Contact with enemy ground troops not gained.
- b. In other sectors.-Enemy force landed at LEGASPI has moved northwest and occupied towns of NAGA and DAET. Total strength of enemy in this area estimated at 5,000. Enemy force landed at APARRI has moved southward (unopposed) and established an air base near TUGUEGARO. Total strength of enemy in this area estimated at 3,000-5,000. Situation regarding landing near ARINGAY, AGOO, DAMORTIS not clear. Our forces are resisting near DAMORTIS. No known changes in situation at VIGAN and LAOAG. Our communications from DAVAO on MINDANAO Island reported cut.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-No operations here other than aviation. At 1405 nine (9) Navy bombers of enemy passed over sector toward MANILA. At 1440 same planes passed over our sector heading in northern direction.
- b. In other sectors.-On land, enemy forces landed near ARINGAY, AGOO, and DAMORTIS are encountering resistance from our forces. Enemy force near TAGUDIN reported moving towards BONDOCO. An unknown number of enemy transports, supported by destroyers, are reported off BATANGAS in southern Luzon. On the northern front enemy planes are very active in strafing operations in supporting their land troops. Enemy land troops are sending out reconnaissance patrols (strength: 40-150 men) in advance of their main units.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. The Regimental Commander directs that all unit commanders of this regiment thoroughly disseminate the following information to all personnel of their respective units:
 - (1) In case of capture the only information a man is required to give to the enemy is his name, rank, and serial number.
 - (2) In case enemy planes undertake strafing operations our men will not return fire, but will lay flat and take cover as the planes approach; as soon as the strafing attack is over our men will quickly open fire and catch the planes with "going away fire" (this method of defense against ground strafing has been successful in other fields of operations). "L" shaped trenches afford excellent protection against strafing by enemy planes and will be utilized to the utmost in constructing defensive positions.
- b. The commander of the enemy forces operating in the Philippines is Lt. General ISAHARU. He is reported to have a deep feeling of resentment against ANGLO-SAXONS. He speaks English fluently.
- c. Reliable reports from MALAYA indicate that Japanese advances in that territory have been made by short thrusts on the part of mechanized forces, with a halt to permit infantry and machine gun units to close up. Other sources state that Japanese fight well under artillery and machine gun fire, but are not good against bayonet charges.

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- d. The Japanese soldier.-The average Japanese soldier is short and stocky and possesses considerable stamina. He is not particularly intelligent but works hard. In accuracy of fire of infantry weapons he is decidedly inferior to our soldier. The average Japanese soldier thinks he is a good shot if he can hit our marksmanship target from 200 yards, prone position. His accuracy of fire of infantry weapons rapidly diminishes at ranges greater than 200 yards. The enemy soldier wears a khaki uniform, a green helmet, similar in shape to the German helmet, and those observed to date are not equipped with gas masks.

DISTRIBUTION: C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
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C.O. Service Co. 4th,
R-1, "
R-3, "
R-4, "
C.O. 31st Div., USAFFE.

R. F. Ruge
R. F. RUGE,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

From: 1200, 24 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 30 December, 1941.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP,
1200, 30 December, 1941.

No. 7.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.
Map of Isle of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. In this sector.-Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet.
- b. In other sectors.-
 - (1) Northern Front.-The large enemy force which landed near ARINGAY, AGOO, and DAMORTIS now occupies STA. IGNACIA, GERONA, PURA, GUIMBA, MUNOZ, and SAN JOSE. The enemy force which landed at APARRI and GONZAGA and moved south and occupied the area as far south as TUGUEGARO apparently is making no attempt to move farther southward but is establishing air bases in that region. Likewise the enemy force which landed at VIGAN is not moving southward but is occupying most towns in that vicinity.
 - (2) Southern Front.-Enemy forces which landed at ATIMONAN and MAUBAN have moved westward and now occupies the towns of SARIAYA, TIAONG, and LUISIANA. The enemy force which landed at LEGASPI and moved northwest (unopposed) as far as DAET is apparently making no effort to move farther northwest.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. In our sector.-No enemy operations other than the following enemy air attacks: at 1537, on 24 December, 1941 eight (8) enemy bombers (navy) dropped four (4) bombs in the vicinity of the dock at OLONGAPO causing only slight damage; from 1230-1330 enemy navy planes bombed a French ship in MARIVELES Harbor killing two (2) and wounding four (4) members of this regiment who were standing guard duty aboard the vessel (the vessel sank several days later); from 1155 to 1430 on 29 December twenty seven (27) enemy bombers attacked FORT MILLS, FORT HUGHES, and FORT DRUM. Dive bombing, high altitude bombing, and strafing operations were employed. Serious damage was inflicted on buildings and supplies on CORREGIDOR. One 3" AA gun (Army) was destroyed and three (3) men killed. Five (5) enemy planes were definitely shot down. Six (6) others were reported shot down. One (1) Marine was killed and four (4) were wounded. Most of the enemy bombs (500, 220, and 110 lb. were used) were dropped from 15,000 to 20,000 ft. altitude.
- b. In other sectors.
 - (1) Northern Front.-The enemy force which landed at ARINGAY, AGOO, and DAMORTIS (estimated at two (2) divisions) during the period of this report moved approximately fifty (50) miles south in the face of opposition from our Philippine units. No artillery was employed during this drive but the enemy air forces were very active in ground strafing our infantry units. Light tanks with 37mm weapons were used.
 - (2) Southern Front.-The enemy forces which landed at ATIMONAN and MAUBAN during the period of this report have moved westward and left garrisons of approximately three hundred (300) men in towns enroute to LUISIANA and TIAONG (their farthest points inland). The enemy is expected to attempt to move northward on both the east and west sides of LAGUNA de BAY.


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S-E-C-R-E-T

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. An unconfirmed report states that an enemy force has landed at NASUGBU on the western coast of southern LUZON.

DIST: C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn. 4th,
C.O. 1st Separate Marine Bn.,
C.O. U.S. Navy Unit,
R-3,
Commanding General Fort Mills,
File.


G. D. HAMILTON,
Major, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

SECRET

R-2 REPORT

SECRET

From: 1200, 30 December, 1941.
To : 1200, 4 January, 1942.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental Command Post.
1200, 4 January, 1942.

No. 8.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.
Map of Isle of Luzon.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet.
- b. In other sectors.
 - (1) Northern Front.-Enemy front line now running approximately east and west in immediate vicinity of SAN FERNANDO.
 - (2) Southern Front.-Enemy on this front now occupied city of MANILA.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.


- a. In our sector.-No operations other than enemy air attacks. Almost continuously from 0953 to 1625 on 2 January the enemy conducted dive bombing operations through low, overhanging clouds, killing one (1) Marine and wounding two (2). One Army AA gun was destroyed. (enemy appears to be after our seacoast batteries on west end of CORREGIDOR). On 4 January enemy aircraft conducted high bombing and dive bombing operations directed at our seacoast batteries again. One (1) gun was hit (has already been repaired). The enemy attacked in two groups, the first having nine (9) planes and the second six (6) planes. A very large number of 500 lb. bombs were dropped. Three (3) enemy planes were definitely shot down. Two (2) others were reported shot down.
- b. In other sectors.
 - (1) Northern Front.-Enemy front line pushed south from STA. IGNACIA, GERONA, PURA, GIMBA, MUNOZ, and SAN JOSE to the vicinity of SAN FERNANDO. The enemy suffered a large number of casualties and were resisted stubbornly by our troops during their southward drive.
 - (2) Southern Front.-The enemy moved northward during this period and occupied the undefended city of MANILA.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (1) It is reported that Philippine Officers captured by the enemy are being shot if they refuse to work.
- (2) It is reported that many civilians on LUZON are being ruthlessly treated by the enemy.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.- It is expected that our forces in northern BATAAN will be contacted by the enemy about 5 January. It is believed that it will take about 5 more days for the enemy to bring up adequate equipment and supplies so that our forces will be actually engaged with the main body of the enemy about 10 January in northern BATAAN.

DIST: C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
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C.O. 3rd Bn. 4th,
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G. D. HAMILTON,
Major, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

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R-2 REPORT

SECRET

From: 1200, 4 January, 1942.
To : 1200, 7 January, 1942.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP, Fort Mills, P.I.
1200, 7 January, 1942.

No. 9.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.
Roads and Trails of Corregidor, 1" = 600'.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet. Enemy aircraft continued reconnaissance and bombing operations causing little damage to military objectives.
- b. In other sectors.
 - (1) Northern Front.-Enemy strength here estimated at 2-3 divisions or 45,000 with tanks and light artillery. Enemy front line running generally NW-SE about 6 kilometers north of HERMOSA. Our front lines follow near the GOUMAIN River.
 - (2) The occupation of JOLO and additional landings in MIN-DANAO indicate an effort to cut our overseas communication to the south.
 - (3) The towns of MARIVELES, LIMAY, and ORANI were subjected to bombing and strafing operations by enemy aircraft resulting in little damage to military objectives.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. In our sector.-Enemy aircraft continued daily reconnaissance and bombing operations over Fort MILLS. Damage to military objectives was very slight and casualties among our troops very few. Our AA batteries continue to be effective against the enemy.
- b. In other sectors.
 - (1) Northern Front.-On 4 January strong enemy forces including infantry, tanks, and artillery, and attack planes continued operations against our forces in the GUAGUA-PORAC position. The enemy's main effort was against our left flank at PORAC. Initial successes gained by the enemy were offset by counter attack by our 21st Division and the original line was restored. The Japanese suffered considerable losses in their assault of our position at PORAC. From concealed positions our forces fired shrapnel at point-blank range through several dense enemy columns inflicting heavy casualties. The PORAC line while spectacularly held is actually the O.P.L. A shallow withdrawal under cover of darkness was effected January 5th by our forces to the line of the GOUMAIN River.

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
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3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (1) During this period considerable damage was inflicted on non-military objectives on CORREGIDOR. Roads were bombed impeding traffic temporarily. Many shacks and vacated military quarters were seriously damaged. A church was completely demolished. Some communication lines, the pump station, and several warehouses near North Dock were destroyed. In addition one tank and barge of Deisel oil and about 50,000 sandbags were burned.
- (2) Enemy Mortar.-The mortar being used by the enemy has a very loud detonation and for this reason it sometimes is reported as 75mm artillery. The projectile is not as destructive as our own 81mm and a large percentage are duds.
- (3) Hand Grenades.-The burst is loud but the effect is slight. The grenades are not corrugated for fragmentation.
- (4) Rifle Grenades.-Range about 200 yards. They are corrugated for fragmentation but a large percentage are duds.
- (5) Enemy small unit tactics.-From all fronts on LUZON it is being continuously reported that in every encounter the enemy will always follow the principle of infiltration to locate flanks then rapid fire from all sides. This is confusing to untrained troops particularly when they find themselves fired upon from the rear. Consistent reports indicated inferior marksmanship by the enemy who seem to rely mainly on volume and rapidity of fire.

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G. D. HAMILTON,

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2. *TH*

R-2 REPORT

SECRET

From: 1200, 7 January, 1942.
To : 1200, 9 January, 1942.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.
1200, 9 January, 1942.

No. 10.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet; conspicuous absence of enemy aircraft operations here.
- b. In other sectors.
 - (1) BATAAN.-Enemy front line in immediate vicinity of HERMOSA with considerable troops and transportation in that town. Small enemy patrols are making their way through woods from HERMOSA to west. Civilians in many small towns in BATAAN were subjected to bombing and strafing from enemy aircraft.
 - (2) MANILA.-There are from 6,000-7,000 enemy troops reported to be in MANILA. There are very few tanks and little artillery. The troops are mostly infantry-men armed with .25 calibre bolt action rifles. There are no motorized units. The HQ for the MANILA Garrison is split between the MANILA and BAYVIEW Hotels. The QM is at JAI ALAI and troops are quartered at Army-Navy Club, SAN LAZARO Race Track, CENTRAL Hotel, FAR EASTERN University, and SANTA ANA Club. Many horses and ponies have been commandeered for an enemy cavalry unit in MANILA. Many airplanes (types unknown) are being moved to NICHOLS Field. The enemy is not commandeering private automobiles, but is taking all gasoline and oil from them. The food problem is quite serious for civilians since each person is allowed to purchase no more than $\frac{1}{2}$ ganta (about 5 lbs.) of rice at a time and must show a certificate before making the purchase. ($\frac{1}{2}$ ganta costs 50 centavos). Philippine currency is being accepted in the city of MANILA.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. In our sector.-None, except possible reconnaissance missions by a few enemy aircraft.
- b. In other sectors.
 - (1) BATAAN.-During the night of the 7th approximately 30 commandeered launches were used by the enemy to transport troops to HERMOSA from MALABON. The launches proceeded along the southern coast of PAMPANGA and landed behind the enemy's own lines, each launch carrying about 40 men. During the night of 8-9th the enemy attempted to land with a few small boats off PUERTO RIVAS (the enemy is believed to be attempting to locate our positions and may return at this beach with a much larger force; these tactics were used against HONGKONG). Sporadic fighting continues while the enemy moves troops toward the front lines.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (1) The Regimental Commander directs that the following information be thoroughly disseminated to their personnel by unit commanders:
 - a. Experience indicated that scattered narrow, slit trenches about 3 to 4 feet deep, not over 2 ft. wide, and 6 ft. long will accommodate 3 or 4 men. These afford the greatest

SECRET

protection to the largest number of men. Direct hits alongside such positions have left occupants unharmed. Large dugouts with overhead splinter proofing and built to accommodate 10-30 men are most vulnerable as direct hits endanger the lives of all personnel inside. This practice is prohibited.

b. Reports of large successes by our forces should be ignored until confirmed (this is one of the enemy's methods of trying to undermine our morale).

c. The smallest flashlight may be of considerable assistance to enemy aircraft at night. The practice of using lights at night (unless completely concealed) will be discontinued.

- (2) The Commander 26th Cavalry reports that the Japanese fire very rapidly but are very poor marksmen. After a battle of several hours Christmas day one horse was killed and one man wounded.
- (3) Unconfirmed reports from MANILA state that the Japanese are shooting all Filipino officers caught in khaki uniform. Enlisted men in blue denim uniform are set free.
- (4) Anti-aircraft defense of this area shows one plane brought down for each 130 rounds of ammunition expended.

G. D. Hamilton

G. D. HAMILTON,
Lt. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
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R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 9 January, 1942.
To : 1200, 15 January, 1942.

Fourth U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.
1200, 15 January, 1942.

No. 11.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet.
- b. In other sectors.-On the BATAAN front heavy fighting is in progress on the right flank of our battle position which extends generally west from near ABUCAY to north of BAGAC Bay. Enemy drive south is at present concentrated on our right flank. On our left flank there is no activity, other than sporadic fighting along our outpost line of resistance with small enemy patrols. One enemy battalion has infiltrated through on the right flank to our reserve line of resistance. A counter-attack by our forces is now underway to restore our original line. The remainder of our entire battle position is intact.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. In this sector.-Beginning at 1236, on 14 January 9 enemy bombers (navy) made 2 attacks on CORREGIDOR dropping most of their bombs near Middleside. Our OP's report observing 1 plane shot down and another plane out of formation and smoking (the latter headed towards MANILA at an altitude of about 5,000 ft.). A Marine AA battery at MARIVELES reported shooting down 1 enemy plane (believed to be same one observed by our OP's). In NAIC area (on south shore of MANILA Bay) enemy has 63 Bancas pulled back in woods near the shoreline. In addition, in this area there are approximately 500 enemy troops, 3 field pieces, and a small radio station. The enemy has collected approximately 200 motor boats in PAMPANGA area (north shore of MANILA Bay).
- b. In other sectors.-On the BATAAN front there has been heavy, effective artillery fire delivered by both sides. The enemy has succeeded in infiltrating several units through our main line of resistance. Counter-attacks by our forces have restored the original lines except that at present one enemy battalion behind our main line of resistance is being counter-attacked by our forces. Enemy aircraft are not particularly active in strafing our troops but are concentrating more in bombing our artillery positions and supply dumps. Both sides have received substantial losses in artillery with the enemy receiving more losses than its share. On the 14th our forces set a enemy tank on fire with anti-tank fire. The enemy continues to bring reinforcements to the BATAAN front.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (1) An enemy ship and 2 seaplanes have been observed in OLONGAPO and a small Japanese garrison has been established there.
- (2) An enemy hydrocyanic gas grenade has been discovered in BATAAN.
- (3) Enemy soldiers in BATAAN are equipped with gas masks.
- (4) The enemy has a cavalry regiment on the BATAAN front.
- (5) The enemy is using Thermite bombs in BATAAN.
- (6) Higher S-2 units estimate general distribution of enemy units at present as follows:

North LUZON-----4 divisions
South LUZON-----2 divisions
DAVAO-----1 division
JOLO-----1 brigade (reinforced)
BANGKOK-----1 division
SAIGON-----1 division
MALAYA-----4 divisions
CANTON-----1½ divisions

- (7) The enemy is believed to be attempting to use DAVAO as a base for operations against NEI. Many bombs and aircraft facilities are reported observed there.
- (8) The enemy is sending individual snipers through our lines in BATAAN. They are proving effective and are especially disturbing to untrained troops.

G. D. Hamilton
G. D. HAMILTON,

Lt. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
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R-2 REPORT

SECRET

From: 1200, 15 January, 1942.
To : 1200, 25 January, 1942.

4th, U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.
1200, 25 January, 1942.

No. 12.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In area of FORTIFIED ISLANDS.-Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet.
- b. In BATAAN.-Because of enemy pressure in the center of our Battle Position and enemy landings on the S.W. coast of BATAAN our forces are presently moving their Battle Position to a line extending generally along the PILAR-BAGAC Road. The enemy has an estimated 2 battalions ashore near AGLOLOMA Bay and a number of small forces of snipers in the area near PUCOT Hill and MARIVELES. Army units have contacted and expect to destroy the units near AGLOLOMA Bay while U.S. Navy and Marine units are taking action to remove the sniper menace near MARIVELES.
- c. In CAVITE and BATANGAS Provinces.-It is reported that there are no large, enemy forces in this area but that there are numerous, enemy patrols each consisting of approximately 1 officer and 25 men. There are yet approximately 300 enemy troops in and to the immediate west of TERNATE.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. In area of FORTIFIED ISLANDS.-No activity other than reconnaissance flights by enemy aircraft.
- b. In BATAAN.-The enemy continued infiltration tactics and heavy artillery fire concentrating more on the center of our Battle Position. An enemy force (estimated at 2 battalions) landed near AGLOLOMA Bay. These forces were sent from the SUBIC Bay area in landing boats. A small enemy group fired upon our O.P. on PUCOT Hill on the night of January 22/23 causing our men to withdraw from that position. The same night 2 armored, enemy landing boats were sunk by boats of our Inshore Patrol off the S.W. coast of BATAAN. Enemy aircraft continued dive bombing and strafing operations against our troops, artillery positions, and dumps. Enemy observation planes continued to enhance the accuracy of their artillery fire. Our artillery fire continued to do effective work. The enemy continued to bring reinforcements in the BATAAN-SUBIC Bay area.
- c. In CAVITE and BATANGAS Provinces.-Construction work by Philippine civilians under the supervision of enemy soldiers continues near TERNATE. Although no large calibre weapons have been observed, it is highly possible that emplacements are being constructed in defilade to the west of TERNATE. The Japanese are reported to have taken over the sugar refinery near NAGSUBU for the purpose of obtaining the alcohol.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (1) Enemy aircraft in this area are operating from NICHOLS, CLARK, DEL CARMEN, SAN MARCELINO, and ROSALES Fields. Higher S-2 units estimate the total strength of enemy aircraft in this area to consist of: 18 heavy bombers (2 squadrons), 18 dive bombers (2 squadrons), and 36 fighter planes (2 squadrons).
- (2) Enemy continues to use horsedrawn carts in lieu of motorized vehicles, in most cases, indicating a lack of gasoline on LUZON.

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- (3) The 2 Japanese landing boats referred to in par. 2 b., were sunk by our .50 calibre machine guns (.30 calibre ammunition will not penetrate the armor of these boats). The boats were 30-40 feet in length with armor in forward and rear parts and around the motor; coxswain's position is well forward; each boat has mounts for 4 machine guns. Two wounded men were captured while it is believed about 6 men went down with their boats. The captured men were engineers, about 24 years of age, with excellent physiques. Their uniforms consisted of coveralls; they possessed no rank insignia. A 1932-light machine gun (made in Belgium) was captured. The weapon is approximately .30 calibre, has a bipod mount and is similar in construction to our BAR.
- (4) During the night of January 23/24 approximately 40 lights floating on small rafts were found off the east coast of BATAAN near KITANG Pt. It is believed these lights were used to draw fire from our forces in BATAAN. The enemy may continue this practice and at a later date actually attempt to land in this area in boats with lights giving the same appearance from east coast of BATAAN. The Japanese practice a great deal of trickery.
- (5) Enemy air bombs used in MALAYA.-Usual weights in pounds are: 30, 100, 500, and 1000. The longest type of delayed action bomb was three hours. Two new types of enemy bombs have been seen: (1) A dual purpose, incendiary, anti-personnel bomb, weight 100 pounds, containing rubber pellets which ignite upon explosion. The pellets can be extinguished by water but will reignite when dry, during the following ten hours. (2) An anti-personnel bomb, weight about two pounds, length 10½ inches, effective radius 50 feet. Duds often explode from slight vibration or movement.
- (6) Enemy personnel have been captured from 3 different divisions on the BATAAN Front.
- (7) During this period patrols from our 41st Division found several hundred dead, enemy troops and much abandoned equipment near the SAMAL River to the north of our right flank in BATAAN (more indication of our effective artillery fire). There is reported to be a very heavy stench in this area because of the many dead, unburied bodies of the enemy.
- (8) Civilians report considerable of the enemy north of our right flank in BATAAN moving to the west.
- (9) During the morning of January 25 the enemy, using a loud speaker in front of our Battle Position in BATAAN, made the following announcement heard by our front line troops:
"FILIPINOS-we are not fighting you but the AMERICANS. We are your friends. We are moving towards SUBIC Bay."

4. CONCLUSIONS.-While the enemy is increasing his pressure on our northern front in BATAAN he is, at the same time, exerting considerable pressure on the west coast of the peninsula indicating a major effort from the north and west within the next, few days.

G. D. Hamilton
G. D. HAMILTON,

Lt. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-2.

Distribution: C.O. 1st Bn. 4th,
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R-3 4th,
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R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 25 January, 1942.

To : 1200, 10 February, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.
1200, 10 February, 1942.

No. 13.

Maps: (1) Coast and Geodetic Survey, Central Luzon Sheet.
(2) Sketch of Longoskawayan Point.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.-Enemy aerial activity has been limited to reconnaissance missions. On 6, 7 and 9 February enemy forces near TERNATE delivered artillery fire on the Islands causing little damage and few serious casualties. During the period enemy troop concentrations and gun positions in and near TERNATE were taken under fire by our batteries from Forts Drum and Frank. Reports indicate that our artillery fire was effective. There are an estimated eight (8) 105mm guns near TERNATE.
- b. In BATAAN.-Enemy front lines are generally in the same position as stated in last report. An enemy force (estimated at one battalion) made a wedge through the center of the front of our left corps. Our forces are counter attacking to restore our original MLR in this area. On our extreme right our patrols have pushed as far north as BALANGA finding no enemy in this area. The situation on the west coast has improved considerably. Except for a force estimated at about 400 men ashore near ANYASAN Bay, the enemy landing forces on the west coast have been either captured or destroyed. Despite frequent dive bombing and strafing attacks by enemy aircraft against our positions and supply routes, the morale of our officers and men in BATAAN continues to be good. Philippine Army units continue to show a marked improvement in fighting efficiency.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.-From 0855 to 1025 on 6 February, from 0900 to 1020 on 7 February and from 1102 to 1230 on 9 February, enemy forces to the immediate west of TERNATE delivered fire (believed to be 105mm) on and near the Islands. Most of the fire was directed at Fort Drum. The ammunition used contained very sensitive fuzes and was of high degree of fragmentation indicating the fire was directed against our personnel. Damage was negligible and serious casualties were few. During the period of this report on separate days our batteries on Fort Frank delivered effective fire on the following targets near TERNATE: (1) enemy troop concentrations near PALICPICAN Bay (2) enemy troop concentrations in TERNATE proper (3) enemy artillery batteries to the immediate west of TERNATE.
- b. In BATAAN.-On our front line the enemy continued infiltration tactics. Some penetrations were made but in every case (except as mentioned in par. 1b) our original lines were restored by counter attacks. On the west coast the enemy made numerous attempts to reinforce her units there but these were successfully repelled by our aircraft and beach defenses. A captured enemy mosaic and operation order reveal that the enemy landing force on the west coast had as its mission the cutting of the BAGAC-MARIVELES Road at a point approximately

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east of QUINAUAN Point. The enemy unit which landed on and near LONGOSKAWAYAN Point attempted to move east towards MARIVELES but was held back by our Navy battalion and two (2) platoons of Marines (one machine gun and one 81mm mortar). After several days fighting this enemy force was completely destroyed by a unit of the Philippine Scouts supported by the Navy and Marine units. The enemy forces in the AGLOLOMAN Bay area continued their dogged resistance until 8 February when the last of their forces were destroyed. The enemy force estimated at about 400 men ashore near ANYASAN Bay continue to resist our forces although they are completely encircled. Our forces effectively used tanks against the enemy in the AGLOLOMAN and ANYASAN Bay areas. During the night of 8/9 February an estimated Thirteen (13) small boats loaded with enemy troops attempted to land near ANYASAN Bay. It is reliably reported that few, if any of these troops, reached shore safely as they were taken under heavy fire by our beach defenses. During the afternoon of 9 February in a series of dogfights our aircraft destroyed four enemy planes in the air. One other enemy plane was forced to land near PILAR and was destroyed by our artillery fire. Our forces lost one plane during the fighting. During the night of 9/10 February a few enemy boats attempted to land near ANYASAN Bay. They too are reported to have been successfully repelled by our shore defenses (many Japanese were seen in the water).

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (1) Prisoners of War.-Enemy prisoners of war reveal that they have been told that they would be killed if they surrendered to our forces. Enemy prisoners of war further state that our artillery fire has taken a heavy toll among the Japanese.
- (2) Landing Boats.-The landing boats used by the enemy on the west coast of BATAAN recently have varied in capacity from 35 to 60 men each. Many of these boats were not armored and consisted of ordinary scows. It is believed the enemy is using inferior grade of boats in this area because their loss after landing is almost certain. They are believed to be saving their better grade landing boats for more important missions.
- (3) Tanks.-In BATAAN the enemy is using a medium weight tank (1930) (or 92(1932)) in TM 30-480. It has the following characteristics:
 1. Crew - 5 men (1 driver, 1 commander, 3 gunners).
 2. Armament - 37mm gun, 1 machine gun in turret, and 1 machine gun in hull fore.
 3. Ammunition - 5,000 rounds small arms and 300 rounds 37mm.
 4. Armor Thickness - .23 to .67 inches.
 5. Dimensions - length 17' 6", width 8' 4", height 8' 6".
 6. Weight - 11.31 tons.
 7. Maximum Speed - 27 miles per hour.
 8. Performance - climbs 38° slope.
- (4) Grenade Thrower.-In BATAAN the enemy has extensively used a grenade thrower (fired from the thigh) with the following characteristics (see model 89, TM 30-480):
 1. Weight (total) - 10.5 pounds.
 2. Length - 20".
 3. Length of Tube - 10".
 4. Caliber - 50mm (about 2").
 5. Ammunition - model 89 shell, time fuze hand grenade, signal grenade, smoke grenade, practice grenade.

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6. Range for Model 89 shell - 140 to 700 yards.
 7. Range for other Ammunition - 40 to 200 yards.
 8. Time of Explosion - 7.5 seconds after discharge or on impact.
 9. Rate of Fire, one man - 10 shots per minute; two men - 20 shots per minute.
 10. Effective Area of Burst - model 89 shell, 50 yard radius; time fuze hand grenade, 25 yard radius.
- (5) Supplies Dropped by Parachutes.-The enemy has dropped numerous supplies by parachutes intended for their troops operating behind or within our lines. These supplies consisted of food, cigarettes, medical equipment, etc. and are dropped in a brown case approximately 3' x 1½' x 10" in size. Nearly all of these supplies have been seized by our troops.
- (6) Enemy Tactics.-In fighting on QUINAUAN Point, as our forces made a final assault upon the few, remaining enemy troops there, the latter ceased firing their small arms and used their hand grenades (of which they had many) against our troops.
- In an attack against enemy troops defending LONGOSKAWAYAN Point (see attached sketch) one of our small forces approached from the NE. The enemy had machine guns well concealed and laid to deliver grazing fire up the slope as shown. Other enemy infantry units were in position as shown near B. When our troops moved forward into area A, enemy fire was withheld. Finally when a number of our troops had entered area A, fire was opened by the enemy from B. Some of our troops attempted to withdraw up the hill and the enemy machine guns then opened their grazing fire. Our troops, in order to withdraw had to pass through this machine gun fire with the result that a substantial number of casualties were inflicted on our troops.
- (7) Enemy Propaganda.-Enemy planes have dropped notes to our troops stating in substance as follows: "Bring this paper to our lines and you will be saved. You have only to strap your rifle over your back with barrel pointing down and proceed to our lines holding a white cloth above your head." Other propaganda sheets state in substance as follows: "Filipinos - lay down your arms. The American fleet has been sunk. The Americans are making you fight in the front lines while they seek safety in the rear." Another propaganda sheet bearing Mr. Vargas' name at the bottom asks the Filipinos "to surrender at once, as all is lost."
- (8) Enemy Fighting Efficiency.-Enemy troops resist to the bitter end. Many of them commit suicide to prevent capture (they have been led to believe that they will be killed if captured). Reports continue to be received stating that the enemy small arms fire is generally inaccurate.
- (9) Casualties.-In the fighting west of MARIVELES the enemy suffered approximately 250 men killed while our forces lost 22; in the AGLOLOMAN Bay region the enemy lost approximately 450 men to our 70. Enemy casualties near the front lines are difficult to determine accurately since many of their troops are killed behind their lines by our artillery fire.

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
BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD

Donald Curtis
DONALD CURTIS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-X.

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LONGOSAWAYAN PT. (SEE PAR. 3(7))



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R-2 REPORT

From: 1200, 10 February, 1942.
To : 0800, 20 February, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.
0800, 20, February, 1942.

No. 14.

Maps: (1) Coast and Geodetic Survey, Southern Luzon (Western Sheet).

Sketches: (1) A-Japanese Trench.
(2) B-Re Japanese Tactics.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.-Near CALUMPAN and LIMBONES are small enemy forces with the apparent mission of cutting the water supply of Fort FRANK. The enemy has artillery and beach defense positions to the immediate east and west of TERNATE. It is estimated that there are from 1500 to 2000 enemy troops in the CALUMPAN - TERNATE - NAIC - CAVITE Area. In the MANILA area the enemy has beach defenses to the immediate north and south of the city and has available a large number of motor launches and small inter-island vessels for possible landing operations against the Fortified Islands.
- b. In BATAAN.-The main enemy forces are several kilometers to the north of our Battle Position. Enemy front lines opposite our right are believed to follow along the ABOABO and TALISAY Rivers. New artillery positions near GUITOL and BANI and large troop concentrations in the same vicinity indicate preparations for an attack against the center or right center of our Battle Position.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.-From positions to the immediate west and immediate east of TERNATE the enemy delivered harassing 105mm fire on all of the Fortified Islands during the period. It is believed that the enemy has from 3 to 6 105mm guns in this vicinity. As has been the case in the past, the enemy shells contained highly sensitive fuzes and were of a high degree of fragmentation, indicating that the fire was directed against our personnel. The fire was delivered at irregular times, during both daylight and night hours, and was widely distributed over each of the islands. This fire was delivered upon one or more of the islands on the following dates: 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 February. It is estimated that on some of these dates 250 rounds (total) were fired. The enemy has constructed defenses along the beaches to the immediate east and west of TERNATE. During the period the enemy moved small forces to positions near CALUMPAN and LIMBONES with the apparent view of cutting the water supply of Fort FRANK. They have destroyed some of the pipe lines connected to the CALUMPAN Dam. In the vicinity of MANILA the enemy has recently collected a large number of motor launches and small inter-island vessels. Beach defenses consisting of machine guns and some artillery (reported to be 105mm) have been constructed on the beaches north and south of MANILA. Enemy aircraft operations on the Fortified Islands were limited to reconnaissance missions. On two occasions enemy aircraft contributed observation for their artillery fire directed on CORREGIDOR from TERNATE vicinity.
- b. In BATAAN.-The pocket near the center of our left corps has been entirely eliminated by our forces thus completing the restoration of our entire MLR. The enemy suffered an estimated 500

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dead in this area while several hundreds are known to have been wounded (approximately 150 of this group were killed or wounded by strafing fire and bombs from their own aircraft). The discovery of many buried machine guns, light artillery, flame throwers, and signal equipment indicates a large scale attack was contemplated in this area. During this period the enemy delivered heavy artillery fire along our MLR concentrating along the center and right of our Battle Position. He also increased the intensity of his bombing attacks both along the front lines and on the towns of ORION and CABCABEN to the rear. Fifteen (15) twin motored bombers commenced operations, mostly in our right corps area, during this period. The enemy has moved large quantities of supplies into the town of ORANI and has established a hospital there. He has also moved large numbers of troops from BALANGA into the LOURDES - BANI area.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (1) One Japanese soldier recently came over to our lines, voluntarily surrendered, and stated in substance "I'm fed up with this war. I was told the Filipinos would be fighting with us and not against us."
- (2) The total, counted enemy dead in operations on the west coast of BATAAN is reported to have been over 2000.
- (3) During this period the enemy dropped even more propaganda leaflets than in the past. The substance of most of the leaflets consisted of advice to the Filipinos to either surrender to the Japanese or to go and hide behind American lines. Many of the leaflets had lewd photographs of women on one side.
- (4) The enemy is using a muddy brown, colored mine in BATAAN. It has the shape of two (2) pie tins placed together with concave portions adjacent. It is about 10" in diameter and about 1½" thick and contains from 7 to 10 lbs. of TNT. Several of these mines can be carried by an individual soldier. The favorite position for these mines is under the dust on important roads or tank routes.
- (5) Captured Japanese machine guns and mortars are being used effectively by our troops. Buried near enemy captured machine guns and mortars, ammunition is often found.
- (6) A favorite type of trench used by the enemy is shown in sketch A. The D section is about 5' deep and about 2' in diameter. A, B, and C are each about 2½' deep, 1½' wide, and about 7' long. After firing from section D the soldier immediately crawls into A, B, or C depending upon which section affords the best protection from his enemy's fire. For example, if fire is expected from the direction of the arrow he would crawl into A section to preclude his receiving enfilade fire. The entire trench is well concealed and camouflaged.
- (7) Flame Throwers.-Several enemy flame throwers have been captured in BATAAN. They consisted of three (3) containers and a hose with a nozzle, giving the appearance of a fruit sprayer.
- (8) Enemy Tactics.-In creating the recent pocket near the center of our left corps the tactics used were as indicated in sketch B. Enemy troops infiltrated through the stream bed between A and B and set up machine guns to cover the trail towards C. Other Japanese troops infiltrated through this opening and dug trenches (with connecting tunnels) along the trail from C to D thus creating a well protected corridor for more troops to enter the area and fan out to the east and west. This fanning out by the enemy was prevented by infiltrating a larger number of our troops to positions to the east and west and later to the north of the corridor during the early stages of the Japanese infiltration. By converging from all directions with superior numbers the pocket was eliminated. Had the Japanese succeeded in fanning out their

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troops as planned, the results could have been extremely serious for our forces. Reports continue to be received indicating that enemy soldiers like to fire from one position, then immediately crawl to another position (under good concealment). Also more reports indicate that the Japanese often use fire crackers and a heavy, rapid fire not expected to be accurate, but expected to give the impression of the presence of a large number of Japanese troops. Unless our native troops realize this, panic and withdrawal sometimes follows.

- (9) Information from MANILA indicates that white internees in MANILA are being treated satisfactorily, although a food shortage appears imminent. White women are not being molested by Japanese troops. Considerable raping of Filipino women in smaller barrios is reported. It is said that white internees in MANILA are permitted to walk around the town during one (1) hour each evening.
- (10) Artillery Ammunition.-In BATAAN some 105mm ammunition has contained fuzes with delays varying from one (1) to twenty four (24) hours. In many cases the delayed explosions occurred "piece-meal".

4. ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES.

- (1) In Area of Fortified Islands.- Until seaborne reinforcements especially landing boats, with supporting naval fire are brought into the area, landing operations against the Fortified Islands are not believed likely. More reinforcements, including boats, near CALUMPAN will be a strong indication of an attempted landing on Fort FRANK, however.
- (2) In BATAAN.-The new location of the bulk of his artillery near GUITOL and BANI, the large concentration of troops in the LOURDES - BANI area, the large number of supplies recently moved into ORANI, and the increased intensity of his bombing and artillery fire along the MLR of our right corps indicate preparations for a large scale attack through our center or right center. Either or both of two corridors in this area are considered likely points of attack. They are the PANTINGAN Trail and the Old Pack Trail.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD


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DONALD CURTIS,

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
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
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SKETCH A



SKETCH B



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R-2 REPORT

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From: 1200, 20 February, 1942.
To : 0800, 5 March, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.
0800, 5 March, 1942.

No. 15.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Southern Luzon (Western Sheet).

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.--No change, except that the enemy has made available more small boats and barges in CAVITE and BATANGAS Provinces and SUBIC Bay, for possible landing operations against the Fortified Islands.
- b. In BATAAN.--Enemy front lines remain from one (1) to five (5) kilometers north of our Battle Position. The enemy has, temporarily at least, assumed defensive positions and limited his ground operations to light patrol activity. The presence of additional planes in the area are a strong indication that he plans to continue to intensify his air activity.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.--During this period the enemy artillery batteries on the mainland south of MANILA Bay have been conspicuously inactive. Reports show that the enemy plans to construct a new gun position about 7500 yards SE of Fort FRANK. Considerable enemy activity has been observed on the south side of MALAUAYAS Mt. (about three miles SW of TERNATE). Supplies, including large quantities of ammunition, and a considerable number of troops have been observed in this area. The enemy has destroyed the barrios and cleared the area around PANTUGAN of all civilians and posted sentries to prevent their reentering this area. The enemy has used impressed civilian labor to construct a road which leads from MARAGONDON SW to LOOC. Two separate air (bombing and strafing) attacks were made on Fort FRANK on 2 March, each by two (2) enemy dive bombers. In the first attack both bombs dropped missed the island. In the second attack one (1) bomb missed the island while the other slightly damaged a searchlight shed. No casualties were suffered. The enemy is said to be constructing an air base at CAVITE. The enemy continued almost daily reconnaissance flights over the islands during the period.
- b. In BATAAN.--Enemy operations during this period consisted of patrol activity along our OPLR, bombing of both our front lines and rear installations, and some artillery fire directed against our front line troops and artillery positions. During this period no large scale ground attacks were attempted by the enemy. The enemy air attacks were more intense than in the previous periods and such targets as artillery positions, motor pools, command posts, anti-aircraft batteries, and front line positions were subjected to level and dive bombing attacks. Many white phosphorous bombs were used. In addition, strafing operations were conducted along our MLR and lines of communications. In spite of these air operations, damage was slight and casualties few in proportion to the number and intensity of the attacks. During the period considerable enemy shipping arrived in SUBIC Bay. The enemy appears to be using the docks on GRANDE Island rather than the docks at OLONGAPO for shipping in SUBIC Bay. The enemy has 3" guns and machine guns on GRANDE Island for defense against our aircraft.

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3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy Tactics.

- (1) Reports from other units state that the Japanese, prior to launching their attack on the Island of SINGAPORE, used many ruses with a view to deceiving the defenders as to where their main landing would be made. Lighted cigarettes, fire crackers, moving vehicles, barking dogs, and other noises were all used opposite one of SINGAPORE'S likely landing beaches with a view to leading the defenders to believe that the main effort would be made at that point. Actually, the first landing, in force, was made on another side of the island where the defenders had as their defense only patrols.
- (2) Reliable sources from BATAAN repeat that Japanese snipers are alert to fire in the direction of any noise heard and that our personnel who skylark, talk, or make unnecessary noises will be fired upon instantly by the snipers. The same sources state that entrenched Japanese often attempt to throw back hand grenades thrown by our personnel or kick them into a pit in their trench. In the latter case, when the grenade explodes, the force of explosion and fragments go upward, thereby causing no damage or casualties.

b. MINDANAO - CEBU Area.-Reports from this area state that all of MINDANAO except the southern part, and CEBU are still held by our forces. A Japanese force has landed at ZAMBOANGA. DUMAGUETE and CEBU (both the city and port area) were taken under naval fire by an enemy cruiser and destroyer respectively on one occasion during the period.

c. Enemy Aircraft.-The following type enemy planes have operated at one time or another in the Philippines since the beginning of hostilities (the last digit of the number indicates the year of manufacture; For example, No. 97 heavy bomber was manufactured in 1937, while 100 fighter was manufactured in 1940):

- (1) 100 or zero type fighter.-This type is a single seat monoplane with hooded cockpit and retractable landing gear. It has two (2) fixed machine guns and two (2) 20mm wing guns. Its maximum speed is 307 knots and maximum ceiling is 10,000 meters. Its maximum range is 6-8 hours. It employs dive tactics but avoids acrobatics.
- (2) 97 observation and light bomber.-This type is the one used for the almost daily reconnaissance flights over the Fortified Islands. It is a slightly dihedral swept-back, round tip, cantilever, low wing monoplane. It has fixed and stream lined landing gear. It has two (2) seats, three (3) machine guns, and is capable of carrying 661.3 lbs. of bombs. Its maximum speed is 217.4 miles per hour. It has a maximum ceiling of 8,000 meters. The plane uses either of two types of engines. One engine permits a maximum range of six (6) hours at 180 miles per hour while the other permits a maximum range of seven (7) hours at 200 miles per hour.
- (3) Two (2) motored dive bomber.-This is a new type and is believed to be either 100 or 101 type. It is dark colored, has blunt wing tips, and retractable landing gear.
- (4) 97 dive bomber.-This type has wing flared at fuselage and is a low wing monoplane with retractable under carriage. It has retractable landing gear, single strut, also shock absorbent legs. Its crew consists of a pilot, second pilot, and radioman. It has a single, air-cooled radial motor with a maximum speed of 200 miles per hour.

- (5) 96 heavy bomber.-This type is a considerably swept-back tapered tip, cantilever, monoplane. It has a twin rudder tail section. The landing gear is retractable into engine nacelle leaving lower half of wheels protruding. Its armament consists of five (5) 7.7mm flexible machine guns in four (4) turrets (twin mounts in rear, single mount in nose above center and tunnel gun in rear of pilot). Its bomb load is 2200 pounds. It is a twin motored plane with maximum speed of 266 miles per hour. Its maximum radius of action is 725 miles with full load.
- (6) 97 heavy bomber (modified).-This type is a slightly swept-back, round tip, low wing, cantilever monoplane. It has retractable landing gear which fits into wing. It has four (4) flexible 7.7mm machine guns (one (1) in nose, one (1) in forward turret, one (1) in after turret, and one (1) in lower fuselage trap door). Some machine guns have been replaced by 20mm cannon. Its maximum bomb load is 3000 lbs. It is a two (2) motored plane and has a maximum speed of 230 miles per hour. Its maximum endurance is twelve (12) hours at 150 miles per hour. It has self sealing gas tanks and also oxygen tanks.
- (7) 98 heavy bomber.-This type is a low wing, cantilever, twin-motored, metal monoplane. It has three (3) 12.7mm machine guns forward (one (1) in nose and one (1) in dorsal, one (1) in belly). Its maximum speed is 252 miles per hour, maximum load 6613.8 lbs. The maximum range is 2400 miles with 2200 lb. load.
- (8) Messerschmitt (109F).-Planes of this type have been observed on reconnaissance missions only in this area to date. This type is a single motor, low wing monoplane with tapered, square tip. It has an enclosed cockpit and retractable landing gear. It has two (2) machine guns, fixed fuselage, and two (2) 20mm cannon, fixed wing. Its maximum speed is 354 miles per hour and maximum range at 298 miles per hour is 620 miles. At present in this area the following types are being used by the enemy: Zero fighter, 97 observation and light bomber, and both types of dive bombers.
- d. Conditions in MANILA and Surrounding Area.-It is reported that since the enemy's occupation of MANILA considerable trench construction has been undertaken with special emphasis having been placed on the area from CALOOCAN through SAN FRANCISCO, DEL MONTE and around east of the city to PASIG River. Some entrenchments have also been observed at approaches to SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA. The Japanese have reconstructed the bridges destroyed by our forces between MANILA and SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA. It is said that the Japanese Commanding General occupies the American High Commissioner's mansion in MANILA. The army of occupation in MANILA has offices at the Army-Navy Club, Elk's Club, Bay View Hotel, Fort SANTIAGO, and the Military Plaza. Because of lack of fresh vegetables, meats, and fish the Japanese troops are living mostly on rice and hard tack. Because of the consequent deficiency in vitamins many soldiers are reported to be suffering from malnutrition. It is also said that Malaria and Dysentery are prevalent among the enemy troops. Civilian internees continue to receive satisfactory treatment although assault cases continue to be reported from the provinces.

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It is said that Europeans and Americans are living in SANTO TOMAS University except women and children who have been released. It is said that the Philippine Red Cross is furnishing internees with two (2) hot meals daily. STA. ESCOLASTICA Convent is said to be the prisoner-of-war enclosure.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.-Although the enemy has augmented his supply of landing boats, it is felt that they are insufficient in number to attempt simultaneous operations against all of the Fortified Islands. Although it is more probable that, when the attack is made, it will be against all islands simultaneously, in view of the enemy's recent action in clearing civilians from the mainland south of Fort FRANK and his recent air attacks on that Fort, the possibility of an attack on Fort FRANK alone in the immediate future certainly cannot be ruled out.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD

Donald Curtis
DONALD CURTIS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-X.

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R-2 REPORT

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From: 0800, 5 March, 1942.
To : 0800, 19 March, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP, Fort Mills, P.I.
0800, 19 March, 1942.

No. 16.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Southern Luzon (Western Sheet).

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.-The results of the enemy bombardment of the Fortified Islands during the latter part of the period has been limited to damage to some of our materiel and batteries on Forts HUGHES, and FRANK. None of our personnel were killed. Our wounded have been few and those not serious.
- b. In BATAAN.-Light, exploratory attacks together with increased troop and supply movements by the enemy indicate methodical preparations for at least limited offensive action in this area. There are indications that the troop movements fall into the category of replacements rather than additional forces.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.-Except for a few "ranging-in" shots on Forts MILLS and HUGHES on the 9th, enemy artillery batteries were inactive from the 5th to the 15th. At about 7:35 AM on the 15th enemy artillery batteries on the south mainland opened fire on Fort FRANK. Later during the day Forts DRUM, HUGHES, and MILLS were also taken under fire. It is estimated that over 900 rounds were directed on the islands and that over 600 of these were directed on Fort FRANK. During the 16th, 17th, and 18th the enemy continued his fire on all the forts except MILLS. During these three days there was a marked decrease in the intensity of the enemy's fire. It is believed that the enemy used three-four gun batteries, one of which was approximately 240mm howitzers. The remaining guns were 105mm with possibly one or two 150mm guns. Damage to Forts MILLS and DRUM was negligible. Some of our batteries were damaged and a few personnel were injured (not seriously) on Forts FRANK and HUGHES. Poor visibility precluded accurate observation of the effect of our counter battery fire during these four days. In BATANGAS Province enemy patrols were particularly active in covering all trails and coves in the PICO de LORO area. The best available information indicates that there have been no large troop concentrations in this province. Enemy aircraft continued almost daily reconnaissance missions over the Fortified Islands devoting most of their attention to Fort FRANK.
- b. In BATAAN.-During this period enemy patrols continued to be active along our OPLR. Towards the end of this period the patrols were more aggressive. During the night of 15/16 an enemy force estimated at two companies launched an attack against our 21st Infantry in the II Corps Area. Our forces launched a counter attack with artillery support and restored the original OPLR. Enemy aircraft continued to be active, bombing sections of our MLR, artillery batteries, and air fields during the period. During the night of 8/9 six widely scattered tugs approximately 40,000 yards NE of ORION in PAMPANGA Bay directed artillery fire along the east coast of BATAAN from CABACABEN to LIMAY causing negligible damage.

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3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Conditions in MANILA, and Vicinity.

- (1) Supply and Ammunition Depots.-In Manila, the Philippine Refining Co., Manila Rope and Cordage Co., F.E. Zuellig & Co., and Madrigal & Co. bodegas, all near the Pandacan District, and the Balintawak Beer Brewery in Caloocan, appear to be the main depots; the Tanque Luma and Tanque Bago, Atlantic Gulf and Engineers Island are being used for large repair work or for the manufacture of small bombs. The Rizal Memorial Stadium and LaSalle College adjoining it have been used for troops, trucks and tank concentrations, and there is a possibility that LaSalle is also a hospital. Calamba (Laguna Province) appears to be the main supply point for the south, and San Fernando (Pampanga), Angeles, and Tarlac for the northern area. Of these three in the north, the main one is San Fernando. In the area near Lingayen, Agoo and Damortis have been reported as large bases for troops and supplies.
- (2) Commodities.-Food prices in Manila have gone up considerably. There is rationing of food and a limit to the price of the main commodity necessary for the local population, rice. Rice has fluctuated from P 14.50 per cavan to P 6.50, current rate; matches P 1.00 a box, etc.
- (3) Transportation.-Transportation is accomplished by calesas and the street cars operated by the Manila Electric Company. Some buses are operated, but all other gasoline vehicles are at a standstill because of the scarcity of gasoline. The railroad is now operated between Manila - San Fernando and Manila - Lucena.
- (4) Currency.-Japanese Army of Occupation money circulates freely, and is exchanged at a par with the peso. In some regions, the circulation of any currency with the exception of Army of Occupation notes is prohibited, but in Manila. Philippine Government notes and dollar bills are also allowed to circulate. All other money of Japanese-occupied territory, such as China and French Indo-China, and the Yen of Japan proper, is completely prohibited. All the bullion at the Philippine Treasury has been reported transferred to the Yokahama Specie Bank.
- (5) Prov. Government.-Civil government under the direct supervision of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Army of Occupation continues to function under the leadership of Jorge Vargas. The authority of this group is naturally limited to Japanese-controlled areas, only approximately one-third of the Philippines. With him in the civil government are practically all of the former leaders of the Commonwealth regime and all important bureaus like the Post Office, Plant Industry, and Health are functioning with their former directors and employees. Salaries of all government employees have been drastically cut.
- (6) Outgoing Supplies.-There has been considerable information obtained which indicated that the enemy is shipping out of the Philippines large quantities of foodstuffs, particularly rice, also motor transportation and other needed war supplies. The main shipping points from the Island of Luzon appear to be the Lingayen Gulf area, Mauban, Tayabas, Province, and Legaspi and Subic Bay.

b. Situations in Other Parts of Philippines.

- (1) North LUZON.-During the period of 25-28 February, 20 Japanese officers, an unknown number of enlisted men, and a Japanese Provincial Governor were reported killed by one of our Guerrilla units. (The governor is said to

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have been a fish peddler prior to the outbreak of the war). The same unit reported that 5 other attacks were made during the preceding month with exact damage and casualties to the enemy unknown. Another unit in North Luzon reports having recovered a coast and geodetic survey chart of Puget Sound, from the body of a dead Japanese Major. The same unit reports that about 400 of the enemy are working to repair the trail leading to the Lepanto Copper mine but that they are being resisted by our units.

- (2) MINDORO.-After having landed small units at Calapan, the enemy is reported to have landed troops from 5 transports at San Jose at 6:00 AM on the 16th.
- (3) MINDANAO.-During this period an enemy force estimated at 3,000 infantry reinforced with tanks and artillery landed and occupied ZAMBOANGA. This force is believed to have been a part of the Japanese force in DAVAO. On the night of the 11th a small force of ours made a surprise attack on the enemy forces at ZAMBOANGA. That the surprise was complete was evidenced by the fact that the Japanese did not return fire until over 5 minutes after the attack had been launched. The exact results of the attack are, as yet, unknown. Aside from the southern part of MINDANAO including DAVAO, DIGOS, and ZAMBOANGA the island remains under our control.
- (4) CEBU.-During this period an attempted landing by the enemy with a small force was repulsed. The enemy shelled coastal cities with naval gunfire and made one air attack on the city of CEBU.
- c. Enemy Wire Scaling Device.-During operations in Bataan the Japanese successfully used a device for climbing over barbed wire. It consisted of bamboo and was brought to the location of the wire in the form of a roll. The device was then unrolled and spread over the wire like a rug thus enabling their troops to successfully pass over the wire.
- d. Buried Enemy Ammunition & Equipment.-Buried Japanese equipment and ammunition is often marked as a grave. Considerable quantities of ammunition and weapons were found so marked in Bataan.
- e. Tactics of Enemy Land Forces.-It has been noted that Japanese penetrations, once made through our front lines, had the following characteristics: The frontages of the pockets were small compared to their depth, the front of one being about 200 yards compared to a depth of about 2500 yards; the penetrations were often made and the pockets well organized prior to discovery by our forces (this was accomplished by clever, well concealed, well camouflaged infiltration); the pockets were strongly fortified and prepared for "all-around" defense; each individual enemy soldier had several different fox holes affording him "all-around" defense also; the positions for fox holes and trenches were often so chosen as to take advantage of any existing cover such as logs, rocks, tree stumps, roots, etc; from the great number of fox holes it is evident that the Japanese followed the practice of "digging-in" well as they advanced. Once established the Japanese pockets were difficult to eliminate. Experience has shown that their elimination was best accomplished, not by withdrawing, but by holding our ground and infiltrating our own forces around to the enemy's flanks and rear. Having surrounded the pocket with superior numbers, fire power, and hand grenades, our forces then closed in, well concealed and camouflaged and successfully destroyed the pockets. When first fired upon with a heavy volume of fire from the pockets, our units often believed that they were surrounded and with-

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drew. (It should be remembered that the enemy's initial attack is made furiously with a heavy but not particularly effective volume of fire with a view to causing our forces withdrawal; succeeding attacks are less furious.) This withdrawal enables the enemy to advance and increase both the depth and frontage of his pocket. Actually, initially in nearly every case the enemy was in an ideal position to be surrounded by our forces. The grasping of these principles by our small units has greatly assisted in not only the stopping, but the elimination of enemy penetrations. Also, there were considerably less casualties among our personnel when these principles were applied.

Enemy movements During Route and Approach March.-While the individual enemy soldier practices excellent concealment and camouflage discipline, large troop columns often approach the battle area in close formation and without regard to concealment. Similarly, long columns of enemy trucks often move about behind the lines without camouflage, unconcealed, and poorly dispersed. Many of such troop and truck columns have proved extremely vulnerable to our artillery fire.

f. Tactics of Enemy Air Forces.-The following information on tactics has been procured from U.S. Combat pilots who have encountered Japanese air force units:

- (1) Heavy Bombardment.-Bombardment formations are generally Vees of three in V and in numbers varying from nine to fifty. Although formations are generally very close and apparently well flown, it has been noted that the formations loosen up considerably after dropping their bomb load making them particularly vulnerable to pursuit attack. Combat gunners have been noted to expend their ammunition on attacking pursuit which are considerably out of their range. It has been noted, the Japanese bombardment formations often split fifty to one hundred miles prior to reaching their objective and circle. They then assemble and attack the objective in mass splitting again into smaller units and assembling at a point on the route back to Formosa. The purpose of circling is to confuse our pursuit control personnel and to lure our pursuit into the air so that by the time the bombardment is ready to strike their objective, our pursuit has consumed most of its gasoline. Many times bombardment is accompanied by escorting pursuit who generally preceded the attack or remain above the bombardment formation in hopes of attacking our pursuit which might be pre-occupied with the hostile bombardment formation. It has been observed however, that in many instances Japanese escorting pursuits have been out of supporting distance of their own bombardment. Supporting pursuit have been practicing combat among themselves while bombers make their attacks.
- (2) Dive Bombing.-Upon completion of bombardment they generally strafe objectives in very loose formation. When our anti-aircraft is active, their accuracy is very poor and in some cases they do not dive prior to releasing their bombs.
- (3) Pursuit.-Japanese pursuit airplanes generally fly in two-ship element formation. They also employ "weavers" who fly about 1000 feet above and a mile behind the main formation. Formations are either very close or very loose and never are the airplanes so supported that each pilot is capable of delivering aimed fire at the target. Pursuit in accompanying bombardment flies either above or to the side of the formation. It has been observed that in many instances pursuit is out of supporting distance of their bombardment. Pursuit has been employed in strafing

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airdromes. Because the Zero type pursuit are lighter than our P-40 type, they invariably take advantage of quick-climbing characteristics or close turning characteristics in combating our pursuit. When our pursuit has been attacked by superior Japanese pursuit forces, it has been noted that the enemy splits its formation in such a manner that whichever way our pursuit turns, they will present a target to the enemy. It has also been noted that when enemy pursuit has been surprised, they invariably execute a steep chandelle or Immelmann. It is recommended that in combatting hostile pursuit the superior strength and duration of our equipment should be utilized to the utmost, i.e., our equipment can better stand steep and prolonged dives than that of the enemy. Therefore, when attacked by hostile pursuit formation, recommended tactics are to immediately execute a steep dive and pull out close to the ground, remaining at a low altitude. When attacking an enemy pursuit formation, it is advisable to make one swift attack.

4. **ENEMY CAPABILITIES.**-No changes from last report. However, the enemy is capable of bringing sufficient seaborne equipment and personnel into this area for attempted landing operations against the Fortified Islands within a very, short space of time. Also landing forces and landing boats could possibly be concentrated in and near such areas as SUBIC Bay, PAMPANGA Bay, MANILA Bay, BALAYAS Bay and in coves and rivers without our knowledge.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD

Donald Curtis
DONALD CURTIS,

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-X.

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R-2 REPORT

From: 0800, 19 March, 1942.
To : 0800, 6 April, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP, Fort Mills, P.I.,
0800, 6 April, 1942.

No. 17.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Southern Luzon (Western Sheet).

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.--Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet. Despite heavy aerial bombardment of Fort Mills and frequent artillery bombardment of all forts, the end of the period finds all units still able to perform their respective missions with practically no loss in efficiency. The enemy has made no attempts to land troops on Fortified Islands.
- b. In BATAAN.--The enemy has affected a sizable penetration through Sector "D" on the front of the II Corps. This penetration is estimated to be on a front of at least 3,000 yards, while the present depth varies in different sub-sectors, extending in some places to south of our RRL. Our forces are being employed to fill in the gap and counter attack. The MLR of other sectors in the II Corps and all sectors of I Corps remain intact.
- c. Latest strength estimates of Enemy Component Forces are as follows:

OPPOSITE I CORPS (BATAAN)

- (1) Infantry.--4 battalions in contact on front line; no reliable estimate can be made of the strength of the forces behind this covering force.
- (2) Artillery.--One 2 gun-155mm battery; one 2 gun-105mm battery, and four 4 gun-75mm batteries.

OPPOSITE II CORPS (BATAAN)

- (1) Infantry.--Four to five regiments.
- (2) Artillery.--Six 75mm batteries; four 105mm batteries. One artillery observation balloon of the sausage type has been observed.
- (3) Tanks.--The enemy is known to have at least 34 tanks, for this number has been observed near the front of the II Corps.

CAVITE and BATANGAS PROVINCES

- (1) Troops.--Various estimates of from 1,000 to 2,000 men have been reported. A troop concentration of unknown strength has been reported observed to the west of the SAPANG River (west of TERNATE).
- (2) Artillery.--It has been reported that enemy artillery located to immediate west of TERNATE has been moved to BATAAN. It is estimated that the enemy now has one or two 240mm howitzers and several 155mm and 105mm guns on the mainland south of the Fortified Islands. In Barrio ROSARIO (southwest of CAVITE) the enemy is known to have 2 artillery pieces, one of which is believed to be a 105mm gun.
- (3) Miscellaneous.--A number of enemy trucks, tanks, and supplies have been reported observed near Barrio PINAGSANGHAN (west of MARAGONDON).

ISLAND OF LUZON

- (1) Aviation.--46 heavy bombers (it is estimated that at least 10 of these have been grounded because of damage by our AA or in landing); 30 light bombers; and 20-30 dive bombers, observation, and pursuit planes.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

a. In BATAAN.

- (1) Aviation.-From the beginning of the period until 23 March (inclusive), the enemy restricted his aerial action to routine reconnaissance and observation flights accompanied by light bombing of infantry and artillery positions and dropping of propaganda leaflets. A few light bombing attacks were made in the CABCABEN area and on our airfields. From 23-26 March (inclusive) intensive air reconnaissance of the entire II Corps area was apparent. Since March 26, both light and heavy bombing of our Service Command installations (motor pools, airfields, and ordnance bodegas) and front lines was noticeably increased. The last few days of the period, the front lines, within "D" Sector II Corps area in particular, received intensive attacks from both light and heavy bombers.
- (2) Infantry.-From the beginning of the period until 30 March, operations were limited to patrol activity. On the night of 30 March, after heavy mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire, the enemy attacked the OPLR of the 43rd Infantry ("D" Sector, II Corps) at about 7:53 PM. This attack was repulsed by our artillery fire. At 8:25 PM the enemy resumed their attack with the bayonet and made a breach of about 75 yards in our OPLR. At 9:05 PM another push was started further to the west and heavy mortar fire was placed on the flanks of the breach to widen it. Our troops were ordered to withdraw to a position generally south of the TIAWER River. The above proved to be a limited objective attack. After several days of intensive artillery and aerial bombardment, in "D" Sector, II Corps, on the night of 3 April another more vicious attack was launched in this area. This attack was begun on a front of about 2,000 yards. During the first night several of our units were pushed back to our RRL. During the next day and night the penetration was widened to over 3,000 yards and extended in depth to south of our RRL in some sub-sectors.
- (3) Artillery.-From the beginning of the period until about 30 March, (inclusive) enemy artillery was not particularly active. Up until this date SAYSAIN and TILIM Points were the only areas to receive more than the usual amount of shelling. A few days before 30 March, patrols reported that the enemy was concentrating considerable artillery west of MABATANG. This report was definitely confirmed, for, from the evening of 30 March until the present, heavy enemy artillery was directed daily at our troops in "D" Sector, II Corps. During the nights of 3/4, 4/5, and 5/6 April, light artillery and machine gun fire was delivered toward the east coast of BATAAN from enemy craft operating in the northern part of MANILA Bay.

b. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.

- (1) Aviation.-During the period 19-23 March (inclusive) no aerial attacks were made on the fortified islands, enemy air action being limited to reconnaissance and observation missions. During 19-20 March (inclusive) our air warning service reported heavy aerial activity over airfields in and north of MANILA. On 24 and 25 March, Fort MILLS was subjected to severe, heavy bombing attacks. At one time, 27 heavy bombers and 17 light bombers were observed in the air. From 26 March to 2 April (inclusive) attacks were less severe. From 3 April until the end of the period, no aerial attacks were made. From 24 March to 2 April (inclusive) Fort MILLS was under air alarm, an average of about 8 hours out of every 24. Attacks were made during night as well as daylight hours. Bombs were well distributed over all parts of the island with the greatest concentrations landing in JAMES Ravine and Power House Ravine.

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- (2) Artillery.-On 19 March a few rounds of harassing fire was delivered from enemy batteries in CAVITE Province on Fort FRANK. On 20 March there was no shelling. On the 21st the islands were subjected to heavy fire again from the CAVITE shore. Fort FRANK received approximately 440 shells mostly of 240mm caliber, Fort DRUM approximately 50 shells, some 105mm and some 155mm caliber during that day. No enemy artillery fire was received on 22, 23 March. From 24 March to 2 April (inclusive), almost daily Fort MILLS was shelled concurrently with enemy aerial attacks with a few 105mm and 155mm shells. The purpose of this shelling appears to have been to silence our AA batteries during the aerial bombardment. From 3 April until the end of the period no enemy artillery fire was directed on the Fortified Islands.
- (3) Miscellaneous.-It is reported that a small beach defense force and patrol daily searches the coves off RESTINGA Point; other enemy patrols cover the trails leading to PICO de LORO for our troops and civilians. It is further reported that the enemy has been manning an observation post on Mount PICO de LORO continuously. On 5 April, 4 enemy destroyers were reported in LOOC Cove (north of NASUGBU). On 27 March approximately 40 bancas, which had been brought to the beaches of LIMBONES Cove, were destroyed by our artillery fire from Fort FRANK. No other new concentrations of boats or barges were reported on the south mainland during the period. Concurrently with the recent bombing attacks the enemy sent varying numbers of inter-island vessels to a point in MANILA Bay approximately 20,000 yards NE of Fort MILLS. Two possible reasons for this action are as follows: to draw fire from our artillery batteries and expose them to bombing attacks; to pick up Japanese aviation personnel who might become casualties from our AA fire.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. Enemy Troops.-Units formerly in BATAAN have been identified in BURMA and in MINDORO. Captured documents indicate that at least parts of 2 new divisions, the 4th and 21st, are now in BATAAN. The present troops in BATAAN appear to be older than the troops they replaced. The new troops seen to date were fine, physical specimens. Some bodies bore old wounds.
- b. Enemy Tactics.
- (1) Infantry.-Enemy troops often follow the practice of withholding their fire and remaining well concealed when our reconnaissance patrols pass by. On occasions, our patrols have unknowingly operated behind enemy lines for several days and returned to their own organizations without seeing or encountering any Japanese. These enemy tactics, when successful, naturally prevent our patrols from gaining the very information for which they were sent, i.e., the location of enemy front lines, strength and identity of enemy units, etc.
- (2) Air Forces.-The aerial tactics used on the 24th and 25th differed from previous tactics. Planes in groups of 9-8-25 made a single pass over the island rather than a series of consecutive passes. Starting on the 26th and continuing for the remainder of the period the enemy reduced the number of planes used in any attack over Corregidor to not more than 3 planes and sometimes only 1. He also made several attacks during hours of darkness. The night attacks have not been a very great success due to excellent work of our searchlights who have picked them up at extreme range and illuminated them in time to permit guns to open fire

at maximum range. Pick up and illumination has in all cases been superior. The result was in many cases the pilot dropped his bombs in the water and took off. The nature of the raids since the 26th has been harassing with small incidental damage. After losing two heavy bombers on the 30th March practically all attacks on Corregidor have been limited to one heavy bomber flying at extremely high altitude (around 30,000') and at great speed. Light bombers operating mainly over Bataan have generally kept between altitudes of 1500 and 2200 yards (4500' to 6600') and fly at a high speed. This is just beyond the effective range for .50 caliber machine guns and just below the effective range for 3 inch guns AA. The only weapon suitable at this altitude is the 37mm AA gun with which we are not fully equipped.

- c. **Enemy Technical Data.**-Some of the heavy bombers used in these attacks are of a new type. They are similar in appearance to HB #97 M but appear to be faster and to have a turret gun in the tail. They were effectively camouflaged in light gray paint. At least 27 of this new type have been seen in the sky at one time. At least 24 of the Light Bombers are of a new type. They are similar in appearance to the LB #97 but have a power turret in the tail, a heavier fuselage and greater wing surface. Some incendiary bombs have been dropped. It is estimated demolition bombs dropped were 60 Kilogram (133lb), 200 to 250 Kilograms (442 to 553 lb) and a few 500 Kilogram (1105 lb). Estimated speed of the new type heavy bombers, 275 to 300 miles per hour.
- d. **Enemy Propaganda.**-During this period the tenor of enemy propaganda was not unlike that of previous periods. One leaflet had on one side a picture of a Filipino Officer (who had deserted) with his wife and children in supposed happiness. On the reverse side was a message from the officer urging his "brothers-in-arms" to lay down their arms, surrender, and enjoy life as he was. Another leaflet showed a picture of a plane departing from Corregidor with General MacArthur and Mr. Sayre. On this leaflet was printed "MacArthur and Sayre ran away from the Philippines so now aim your rifle at the Americans and fight them bravely and you will win real liberty."
- e. **Enemy Losses in Aircraft.**-During the period 24 March - 5 April, the enemy has suffered 14 known losses (one of these was a seaplane, several light and dive bombers, and the remainder heavy bombers); 7 additional aircraft were damaged to the extent that they were classified as probable losses.
- f. **Transportation.**-During this period the MANILA railroad line, which had previously operated only up to SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, was extended to TARLAC. The train schedule shows 5 train departures from MANILA to TARLAC and 5 on the return trip. Way stations include CALOOCAN, BOCAUE, BIGAA, MALOLOS, SAN FERNANDO, SAN MIGUEL, and TARLAC. While strictly a military road, passes for certain parties whose services may be required by the military or the government can be secured from an office at the former Army and Navy YMCA. In BATAAN the enemy is said to have constructed parallel to and north of the PILAR-BAGAC Road, a new road connecting the East and West Road.
- g. **Situation on Other Fronts in the Philippines.**
 - (1) MINDORO.-No change.
 - (2) VISAYAN Area.-A report received indicates the enemy has landed a small force in the CALAMIAN group. On the island of MASBATE the enemy is said to have approximately 20 men.
 - (3) MINDANAO.-The enemy force at ZAMBOANGA is estimated not to exceed 1,500 men, 3 artillery pieces, and 3 tanks. In this area an enemy motorized patrol was ambushed on 23 March by our forces and suffered approximately 60 casualties. On the DIGOS and DAVAO fronts the enemy remains inactive. BUTUAN in northern MINDANAO has been attacked from the air. 22 buildings containing enemy materiel near MALALAG were destroyed by one of our raiding forces on 31 March.

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- h. Prisoners of War and Captured Documents.-One prisoner of war captured in BATAAN stated that he had lived in BATAAN for 2 years until 6 months before the outbreak of the present war, at which time he returned to Japan. Many captured maps of the Bataan area are more complete than our own.
- i. Weather and Visibility.-During this period the weather was generally clear and gradually getting warmer. Visibility was generally good. With the exception of a few cloudy periods the flying weather was also good.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

- a. In BATAAN.-Although the possibility of an attempted landing by the enemy on the east coast of BATAAN can not be ruled out, it appears more likely that, if an amphibious operation is attempted in BATAAN it will take place on the west coast of BATAAN in the general vicinity of SAYSAIN Point. It is very likely that the artillery fire delivered on the east coast was a feint and that a logical course of action open to the enemy would be to cut off the II Corps by a combination of an extension of his present penetration through the center of our front and a landing and advance inland from SAYSAIN Point vicinity.
- b. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.-Recent enemy operations in BATAAN are not necessarily an indication that the enemy's plans call for taking BATAAN and the Fortified Islands in succession. Time which is working against the Japanese may necessitate their attacking the Fortified Islands before completing the BATAAN campaign. For this reason an enemy landing attempt against the islands in the immediate future is not less likely than it was at the end of the last period.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD:

Donald Curtis
DONALD CURTIS,

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-X.

Distribution:

C.O. 1st Bn 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn 4th,
C.O. 3rd Bn 4th,
C.O. Regimental Reserve,
COMSIXTEEN,
Commanding General, HDM&SB,
Beach Defense Cmdr, Fort Hughes,
File.

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R-2 REPORT

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From: 0800, 6 April, 1942.
To : 0800, 2 May, 1942.

4th U.S. Marines,
Regimental CP., Fort Mills, P.I.,
0800, 2 May, 1942.

No. 18.

Maps: Coast and Geodetic Survey, Southern Luzon (Western Sheet).

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. In BATAAN.-On 9 April practically all resistance in southern BATAAN subsided enabling the enemy to gain control of the entire BATAAN Peninsula.
- b. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.-Contact with enemy ground troops not gained, as yet. Despite heavy aerial and artillery bombardment throughout the entire period, the end of the period finds all Beach Defense units able to perform their missions with no great loss in efficiency. Having received additional personnel, many Beach Defense units are now stronger than they were at the end of the last period.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. In BATAAN.-During the period 6-7 April the enemy extended the penetration through the front lines of the II Corps (referred to in our last report). During the morning of 8 April, enemy infantry, supported by a vicious aerial and artillery bombardment, were able to drive south and east and reach CABCABEN. During the remainder of 8 April advance enemy units, including tanks, drove west and entered MARIVELES. The swiftness with which the entire attack was executed caused the complete disorganization of our II Corps and left our I Corps in Western BATAAN entirely isolated. By the evening of 9 April all except desultory fighting ceased. These successful enemy operations are attributed largely to:
 - (1) The enemy's facilities for laying down on our troops and lines of communication extremely intense aerial and artillery bombardment.
 - (2) The poor physical condition of our troops resulting from their receiving extremely reduced rations during the previous 6 to 8 weeks.
- b. In the Area of the Fortified Islands.
 - (1) General.-Enemy artillery batteries on the north and south mainlands and aircraft based near MANILA heavily bombarded the Fortified Islands daily throughout the entire period. During this period neither enemy aircraft nor artillery appears to have concentrated particularly on our Beach Defenses, the most often and heavily attacked targets being friendly batteries and observation posts, located more inland. Insofar as Beach Defenses were concerned, enemy artillery fire was more effective than aerial bombardment during this period.
 - (2) Operation of Component Elements.

Aviation.- During the period 6-9 April the enemy's air activity over the Fortified Islands was comparatively light, his attention being devoted more to operations over BATAAN during these days. During 10-12 April, using heavy bombers, the enemy made many vicious attacks on Fort MILLS. During the period 12-27 April the enemy's air attacks on Fort MILLS were limited to occasional high altitude and dive bombing attacks. From 28 April until the end of the period attacks on Fort MILLS and HUGHES were noticeably more vigorous again. Both heavy bombers and dive bombers were used in these attacks which were made during daylight hours. During the entire period the other Fortified Islands and friendly craft in

MANILA Bay were subjected to occasional dive bombing attacks. Enemy strafing operations were limited to one attack directed at the top of MALINTA Hill by a single dive bomber. In the early part of the period many heavy bombers were used. It is believed that most of these were sent south after several days operations here. Toward the end of the period at least 15 of a different type of heavy bomber, No. 97 Heavy Bomber (MIKADO), made their appearance, and were especially active the last 4 days of the period. Other type enemy planes used during the period were No. 97 Heavy Bomber (modified); Nos. 97, 98 Light Bombers; and No. 98 Observation and Light Bombers.

Artillery.- During the period 6-8 April, comparatively light artillery fire was directed on the Fortified Islands from enemy batteries on the south mainland. On 9 April enemy batteries in BATAAN made their first appearance. From 9 April until the end of the period the Fortified Islands were taken under heavy fire daily by enemy batteries on either or both the north and south mainlands. During this part of the period up to and including 29 April the shelling from BATAAN gradually increased in severity. On 29 April, the birthday of the Japanese Emperor, an extremely intense bombardment was directed on all of these islands continuously for approximately 5 hours. During the period Fort HUGHES was bombarded mostly from enemy batteries in BATAAN. Forts DRUM and FRANK received artillery fire from only the south mainland and this was considerably less severe than that received during the period of our last report. In BATAAN in addition to an unknown number of 75mm guns, the enemy is known to be using approximately sixty other field pieces including 105mm, 150mm, 155mm guns and 240mm howitzers. The 240mm howitzers have been causing the greatest damage and casualties and are the most difficult to locate because of their well defiladed positions. It is believed that the enemy has at least two-4 gun batteries of these howitzers in BATAAN. On the south mainland the enemy is estimated to have one-4 gun battery of 105mm guns.

Miscellaneous.-

1. Enemy boat patrols.-During this period the enemy maintained continuous small boat patrols along the south mainland from CAVITE to Fort FRANK. It is believed that a similar patrol has been established along the southern coast of BATAAN.
2. NASUGBU.-During this period a number of enemy transports, destroyers, and submarines were observed to operate in and out of NASUGBU (south of Fort FRANK). These movements are reported to have been for the purpose of transferring troops to the Southern Philippines for operations.
3. During the period the enemy used, almost daily, 3 observation balloons in BATAAN for artillery observation.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Situation in Other Parts of Philippines.

(1) LUZON.-The only friendly resistance on LUZON at the end of this period consists of our guerrilla units operating near CERVANTES in the northern part of the island. It is reported that the enemy is sending two separate forces to the northern part of the island with the mission of completely eliminating these friendly units. SUBIC Bay and LINGAYEN Gulf continue to be the main enemy shipping

centers of the island. The former also serves as a refueling base for enemy seaplanes. NICHOLS Field near MANILA serves as an important refueling base for enemy planes proceeding south to the AUSTRALIAN Theater.

- (2) CEBU.-The enemy has occupied all important towns in CEBU, including CEBU City. Prior to landing on this island enemy warships and transports cruised from 24-28 hours in the vicinity reportedly for the purpose of securing complete information on all local tides and currents. Friendly resistance continues on this island in the interior near the TALISAY Mountains.
 - (3) PANAY.-The enemy now controls all important towns in PANAY including ILOILO. In landing on this island, some of the Japanese wore civilian clothes, indicating the enemy's intention to rapidly colonize and utilize the island's foods and supplies. Although resistance continues in the interior of the island, it is expected to be short-lived because of the limited supply of ammunition available to our forces operating there.
 - (4) NEGROS.-Latest information indicates that no enemy landing attacks have been made on this island to date, although one is expected in the immediate future. Enemy warships and transports were recently observed off the coastal town of BACOLOD. Camp CARMEN, BOHOL, and BACOLOD were bombed and strafed during this period.
 - (5) MINDANAO.-On 29 April 4,000 enemy troops landed from 7-8 transports and 2 destroyers near COTABATO and PARANG. Troops and tanks from this landing force appear to be moving towards the city of DAVAO. Our forces have organized a line about 4 kilometers west of PARANG. The enemy continues to control only the southern part of this island including the area in and near ZAMBOANGA and the area around DAVAO Bay.
 - (6) MINDORO.-The enemy has retained only enough troops on the island to control its airfields and sugar centrals.
 - (7) SAMAR, LEYTE.-These two important islands of the Philippine group remain under our complete control, although the airport at ORMOC, LEYTE was bombed and strafed on one occasion during the period.
- b. Tactics.
- (1) Enemy Aviation.-During this period high altitude bombings on Corregidor were conducted in most cases, at above 22,000 feet. Except near the end of the period, when attacks were made on our mobile 155 and seacoast batteries, heavy bombers were apparently "area bombing". During this period dive bombers released their bombs, in most cases, at between 1500-3000 yards. It is recalled that these same tactics were employed in BATAAN by enemy dive bombers with a view to remaining above the effective range of our machine gun fire and below the effective range of our 3" AA fire. Towards the end of the period enemy dive bombers were noticeably less cautious, often making almost vertical dives to as low as several thousand feet. In many cases bombs released in diving attacks on Forts FRANK, DRUM, and HUGHES and friendly vessels in MANILA Bay missed their mark.
 - (2) Enemy Artillery.-During this period accurate enemy artillery fire from CAVITE and BATAAN shores was directed on the Fortified Islands at irregular times, both day and night. Friendly observation posts, searchlights, seacoast batteries and concentrations of personnel seemed to be the chief targets of the enemy. The enemy followed the practice of continually shifting his batteries to new positions throughout the period.
- c. Possible Enemy Landing Craft in MANILA Bay Area.-Based on the best information available, the following is an estimate of possible enemy landing craft in the MANILA Bay area at the end of the period:

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>	<u>TOTAL CAPACITY</u>
Small Boats	83	(30-100)	5480
Barges	20	(150-200)	4500
Launches	21	(50-100)	1500
Rubber Boats	100	(20)	2000
Vessels	10	(120-800)	3940

Grand Total Capacity - 17,420

In addition to the above the enemy has an unknown number of craft in the SUBIC Bay area, NASUGBU, and BATANGAS (in southern LUZON). Except for the rubber boats it is believed that most of the craft in MANILA Bay were designed for transportation services and are unsuitable for use in landings except possibly during the latter stages of such operations, after a beach head has been established. Craft designed for landing operations are reported to be under construction in the Navy Yard at CAVITE.

- c. Bamboo Ladders.-An unconfirmed report states that the enemy has brought 10 truck loads of bamboo ladders into southern BATAAN. Japanese troops have reportedly used these ladders in previous operations when landing on islands having steep cliffs near the beaches.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

- a. To heavily bomb and shell the Fortified Islands into submission.
- b. To force the Fortified Islands into eventual submission by continuing the present, harassing attacks from artillery and the air; maintaining the present, effective blockade.
- c. To occupy the Fortified Islands by landing operations, employing sufficient forces supported by a preponderance of artillery and aircraft.

5. CONCLUSIONS.-Which of the three lines of action (enumerated in par. 4) the enemy will follow is dependent to a great extent upon his success in other theaters of the war. It is believed that the enemy plans to temporarily follow the line of action in par. b. If operations continue to progress satisfactorily for him in other theaters, and if he is able to overcome the remaining friendly resistance in the Southern Philippine Islands, it is believed the enemy will then shift to the line of action of par. c.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL HOWARD:

Donald Curtis
DONALD CURTIS,

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
R-X.

Distribution:

C.O. 1st Bn., 4th,
C.O. 2nd Bn., 4th,
C.O. 3rd Bn., 4th,
C.O. 4th Bn., 4th,
C.O. Regt'l Reserve,
R-3,
COMSIXTEEN,
C.G., HD M&SB,
Beach Defense Comdr, Fort Hughes,
File.

Headquarters, 4th Marines,
February 4, 1942.

15362
RECEIVED
AUG 13 1942
MARINE CORPS

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
Subject: Intelligence Summary.
Enclosure: (A) Intelligence Summary for the Period
8 December, 1941 to 1 February, 1942.

1. Enclosure (A) is submitted herewith.

S. L. HOWARD.

*These three Intelligence Summaries
have been previously submitted to C.M.C.
Copies were sent to CINCAF, CINCPAC*

GENERAL OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(PREPARED BY THE R-2 SECTION)

- I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.
- II. COMPONENT FORCES.
 - A. Land Forces.
 - (1) Equipment.
 - (2) Tactics.
 - (3) Miscellaneous.
 - (4) Conclusions.
 - B. Air Forces.
 - (1) Equipment.
 - (2) Tactics.
 - (3) Miscellaneous.
 - (4) Conclusions.
 - C. Landing Forces.
 - (1) Equipment.
 - (2) Tactics.
 - (3) Miscellaneous.
 - (4) Conclusions.
- III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.
- IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.
 - A. Equipment and Armament.
 - B. Tactics.
 - C. Miscellaneous.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RE-JAPANESE FORCES FOR PERIOD
DECEMBER 7, 1941 TO FEBRUARY 1, 1942

- I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.--The information submitted has been obtained from various sources. In addition to the information procured by this section and subordinate Bn-2 sections considerable information has been obtained from other S-2 units in this theatre of the war.
- II. COMPONENT FORCES.
- A. Land Forces.
- (1) Equipment and Armament.
- (a) Rifles.--One type has been observed frequently in the Philippines. This type is approximately .25 caliber, weighs about 5½ lbs., is shorter in length than, but closely resembles our 1917 Enfield type (Madystone). It has a place in the forestock for a cleaning rod. The rear sight is about 3" in front of the receiver and has no correction for drift or windage. The front sight is similar to that of the 1917 Enfield. It has a dust cap in front of the bolt head and loading slot, completely covering the bolt when closed. It is necessary to depress the follower in order to close the bolt (when the piece is empty) as is the case with the 1917 Enfield. The weapon appears rugged and well constructed. (except for weight this weapon compares with the ARISAKA rifle, model 1905 described in T.M. 30-480).
- (b) B.A.R.--This weapon is similar to our BAR but is shorter and approximately 4 lbs. lighter. It has a 20 round magazine, is .323 caliber, and fires a 7.92mm. shell. It is different from our BAR in that it has a bolt driving spring in the butt stock and a dust cap over the magazine and ejection slots. It is usually fired from a bipod mount. One weapon of this type was made in Belgium and marked 1932.
- (c) Machine Guns.--In the Philippines several different types have been observed. One is a .303 caliber, A.A. Lewis (English made) with a 97 round pan. Also a light (air cooled) .25 caliber machine to be carried and fired on the back of the soldier has been observed. (It is believed this is the Nambu type, model 1922). The new tripod (described in TM 30-480) has been observed.
- (d) Mortars.--The .60mm type have been used quite effectively. They have a loud detonation and for this reason are often confused with 75mm artillery. The projectile is not as destructive as our 81mm and a large percentage of the shells are duds.
- (e) Side Arms.--The Japanese officers carry many different types of side arms varying from .25 to .45 caliber. Lugers and Mausers have been seen. The most frequently used side arm is a .38 similar to our .45 colt in construction.
- (f) Artillery.--105mm guns have been used. Their accuracy has been enhanced by aerial observation. Enemy artillery fire has not been as accurate or effective as the fire of our 155mm guns operating without air observation. 75mm pack artillery have also been used by the enemy in the Philippines.

- (g) Rifle Grenades.--Those observed to date have a range of about 200 yards. They are corrugated for fragmentation but a large percentage are duds.
- (h) Hand Grenades.--The fragmentation grenades seen are not corrugated. They have a loud bursting noise but produce only slight effect. Heavy grenade thrower, model 89 (TM 30-480) has been observed. A hydrocyanide gas grenade was found in Bataan.
- (i) Tanks.--Light and medium tanks have been used but their details have not yet been available. Enemy tank operations in the Philippines have been severely hampered by our artillery fire.
- (j) Anti-Tank Weapons.--An anti-tank gun of approximately .60 caliber has been observed. It has a dual purpose mount which permits either anti-tank or anti-aircraft firing.
- (k) Gas Masks.--One was procured in the Philippines with the following markings: Canister-military model 1938; manufacturers number-9367; tube model-R 01939, number-56; face piece-model 1939 R 063. It contained a bottle of fluid to be used on lenses during sub-zero weather. It also has a container with poison which, when moistened, is used against mustard burns. Among the accessories is a lens case which contains five lenses to be used during sub-zero weather. It has a flutter valve-model 1939, number 58, head model-M33; protected by a perforated metal cover. This mask appears to be much lighter in weight than our mask.
- (l) Packs.--The ones observed are approximately 12" by 10 1/2" by 4 1/2" with a wooden frame inside. The side that rests against the back is covered with fur. It has straps to go over each shoulder for support.
- (m) Helmets.--Helmets captured are muddy brown shade and are similar to the German type. They are lighter in weight than ours but provide more protection for the sides and back of head. The helmet will fit inside of a tropical hat of somewhat similar shape which has a net that is camouflaged with grass, leaves, twigs, etc.
- (n) Uniforms.--Most prisoners captured wore green coveralls (with no insignia or rank) and medium weight split toe rubber soled shoes. Some near the front lines wore civilian clothes.
- (o) Rations.--The food of civilians in the Philippines have been looted freely. The food of special troops such as snipers and troops on patrol consists of small squares of concentrated foods approximately 1 1/2" by 1" by 1/2" of dried fruit, fish, cereal, candy, etc. packed in a small rectangular basket 6" x 4" x 4".
- (p) Water.--Some troops suck water from streams through a rubber tube which has a purifying device on the end. The device has two cloths one of which contains chemicals which purify the water while the other cloth contains a substance which removes the taste of the purifier.
- (q) Entrenching Tools.--A spade was captured approximately 30" long with two (2) peep holes in spade portion providing protection and concealment to soldier's face when protruding above a trench. The nose fits into a crease where the spade joins handle.
- (r) Shade.--Black screen 7" x 2" fitting across the face, above the mouth and over the eyes, (keeps dust from eyes). The screen is secured by means of a string which is tied in back of the head.

(a) **Radio Sets.**--A small portable radio set weighing about 10 lbs. was observed. This set could be carried in the soldier's pack and is reported to have a radius of action of 50 miles.

(2) **Tactics.**

(a) **Against Front Lines.**--Large forces on offensive missions are preceded by reconnaissance units varying in strength from 50 to 150 men until contact is made with the main body of the enemy. The success of offensive operations against front lines by the enemy in the Philippines to date is attributed largely to their ability to infiltrate by small groups either through or around the flanks of enemy lines. Any weaknesses in enemy observation are exploited, often at night. Having successfully infiltrated partially within enemy lines, fire is opened on their surrounded enemy simultaneously from many, if not all directions. Firecrackers are used to conceal firing positions and deceive the enemy. (To be fired upon from the flanks and rear is naturally demoralizing and confusing, particularly to partially trained troops). To accomplish the aforementioned infiltration, special troops, well skilled in the use of camouflage and deceptive measures are employed. These troops wear green coveralls similar in color to the terrain, and helmets covered with leaves and twigs. Many improve their concealment when stationary by covering themselves with green nets covered with artificial grass and twigs. There is a distinct tendency on the part of Japanese land forces to launch their attacks at night. The accuracy of fire of their infantry troops is only fair. They seem to rely more on a heavy volume rather than accuracy of fire. At ranges greater than 200 yards the accuracy of their fire rapidly diminishes.

(b) **Sniping Operations.**--Sniping operations well behind enemy lines are carried out by specially trained troops who are also particularly skillful in camouflage and deceptive measures. Many of these troops are able to speak English fluently. The snipers reach the area well behind the lines either by infiltrating around or through enemy lines by land or, when geographical conditions permit, they often proceed in boats by water to the enemy's rear or flanks. Having reached the area to the enemy's rear, the snipers search for officers and non-commissioned officers (particularly white). They locate command posts and staff cars. They often remain stationary in trees or on the ground, well camouflaged under green nets etc., for long periods. When opposing units approach they often hold their fire, remain quiet and motionless, and allow the enemy troops to pass through the area unmolested. At this time officers and NCO's are spotted. When the group has passed, fire is often opened on the enemy's rear. Confusion among their victims is a natural consequence.

On one occasion a patrol of American troops was given the mission of contacting and destroying some Japanese in a designated area. The latter, as our troops searched the area, withheld their fire and remained quiet and motionless and well concealed in trees and on the ground. Our patrol, failing to see any of the

Japanese, returned and the leader reported that there were no enemy troops in the area. Later operations by our units were conducted under the assumption that there were none of the enemy in this area. As a consequence the same Japanese (who had been overlooked) later attacked the rear of an American unit with telling effect. In addition to the deception explained heretofore, these troops successfully employ other, miscellaneous deceptive measures. One frequently used is to say in English "We give up." When their opponents raise up from the ground to approach the Japanese, they get a blast of machine gun fire. The Japanese will sometimes engage in conversation in English with each other to attract the attention of Filipino and American troops. The latter, believing they hear their buddies, approach not on their guard, and walk into enemy fire. In addition, these troops leave various objects such as fountain pens, flashlights, watches, rifles, helmets, and bayonets in the field which, if picked up or tampered with, may cause an immediate explosion or set off a mine resulting in casualties to nearby personnel.

(3) Miscellaneous.

(a) Japanese Soldier.-The Japanese soldiers observed to date average from 20-25 years of age. Most of them are fine physical specimens, possessing considerable stamina. They appear to be adaptable to hardships. The marksmanship ability of the average soldier is considered to be inferior to that of our troops. Principally because of initial successes not only locally but in all theatres of the war, their morale at present is very high. Some of them have committed suicide when their capture appeared imminent.

(4) Conclusions.-Instead of using heavy frontal attacks the enemy's tactics in the Philippines has been based more on infiltration and wide flanking movements enveloping either or both flanks. The rugged, heavily wooded terrain of Bataan (where the most active fighting has taken place) may be the reason for the enemy's employing these tactics. Where the geography permits, landings are made behind their opponents lines, often at undefended beaches, (believed unsuitable by the defender) at night. Sniping operations are carried out with effect behind the enemy's lines. The substance of the sniper's tactics appears to be to completely conceal themselves in trees or on the ground, allow the enemy to pass through an area unmolested, then open fire on the victims from as many directions as possible, concentrating on white officers. Experience indicates that the best results are realized against these sniper troops by using specially selected troops of our own, familiar with the sniper's tactics and deceptive measures. In cleaning out an area containing these snipers, trees, bushes, and all possible locations of the snipers must be covered with either small arms fire or grenades, whichever is more feasible. Advances must be made slowly, quietly and cautiously and troops must be kept well concealed as they advance. Snipers' and MG positions are frequently behind rocks or wood piles along roads and trails. For this reason operations against these snipers should not be conducted along roads, trails or often used routes.

B. Air Forces.

(1) Equipment and Planes.

- (a) Types of Planes.--The following types have been observed in the Philippines (all navy): heavy bombers--numbers 96, 97, types; light-2 motored bombers, with motors in line--used for attack, with estimated speed of 300 miles per hour in level flight. Two (2) new types observed include a low or midwing monoplane with fixed landing gear and a long bodied, single motor monoplane with single tail surfaces. (The cowlings of this type were painted black and a yellow band was observed around the fuselage near the tail).
- (b) Types of Bombs.--Usual weights in pounds are: 30, 100, 500, and 1000. The longest delayed action type observed was 3 hours. New types seen include: (1) a dual purpose incendiary, anti-personnel bomb, weight 100 lbs., containing rubber pellets which ignite upon explosion. The pellets can be extinguished by water but will reignite when dry during the following 10 hours. (2) an anti-personnel bomb, weight 2 lbs., length 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ " , effective radius--50 feet. Duds often explode from slight movement or vibration.

(2) Tactics.

- (a) High Altitude Bombing.--Heavy attacks are usually made by one or more squadrons of nine planes each. They often pass over the area first time without dropping any bombs and then proceed to point 5 or 6 miles away from their objective. They then suddenly reverse their course and return over their objective, this time dropping their bombs. (Civilians and untrained troops are often deceived by this procedure as, when the planes first pass over without attacking, many come out from behind their cover to observe the planes. When the planes suddenly return, many persons are thus caught unprotected and the casualties are heavy). This procedure is repeated until either all bombs are dropped or the mission has been accomplished. Altitudes for high bombing in this theatre of the war have varied from 15,000 to 22,000 feet. Accuracy of high bombing is classified, in general, as good.
- (b) Strafing.--One example of enemy strafing our planes on water showed high accuracy of fire. It is believed that their best personnel are used for strafing planes. Most attempts to strafe troops to date in Bataan have produced very few casualties. This is attributed to two factors. First, our troops are improving in the use of anti-strafing measures (using L shaped trenches). Secondly, planes conducting strafing operations recently have not been low enough to be effective. The 20mm shell with thermite has been used frequently. Accuracy is classified, in general, as fair.

(3) Miscellaneous.

- (a) Most large scale bombings in this theatre of the war have commenced about noon.
- (b) Unless direct hits are made, enemy bombs used to date in this theatre of the war will not harm occupants of trenches approximately 2 feet wide 6 feet long and 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep. Large splinter proofs with insufficient overhead protection occupied by a large number of personnel are most vulnerable to bombing.
- (c) Cases are reported where Japanese planes dropped leaflets and then soon afterwards dropped bombs, causing heavy casualties among personnel in the open attempting

to pick up the leaflets.

- (4) Conclusions.--Facilities and opportunities for close observation of enemy aircraft have been limited. Their offensive operations are marked by a tendency to be very methodical and cautious. When they meet difficulties they drop their bombs immediately and flee. Well placed AA fire greatly affects their operations.

C. Naval Landing Forces.

- (1) Equipment.--One landing boat observed in Manila Bay area was 30-40 feet in length, armored forward, aft, and around the motor, and believed capable of carrying 120-140 men fully equipped. The coxswain's position was well forward. There were mounts for four (4) machine guns. This boat was sunk by .50 caliber machine gun fire, (.30 caliber is believed not effective against this particular type of boat).
- (2) Tactics.--In the Far Eastern theatre of the war the Japanese have habitually followed the practice of making landings behind the enemy's lines. This was true in Malaya where large scale landings were made south of the British lines on numerous occasions; in the Philippines, where landings were made at Atimonan which is behind where our final defenses for the Legaspi landing was to be made; and, on a smaller scale, on the west coast of Bataan in rear of our main lines. The Japanese usually choose to land on undefended or weakly defended beaches (thought unsuitable by the defender). Landings were usually made during darkness.
- (3) Miscellaneous.
- (a) It has been reported that the Japanese in landing at Legaspi carried American flags with them.
- (4) Conclusions.--Thus far, the Japanese have not had to land on a well defended beach in the Philippine area. They were, however, on one occasion attacked by our air forces and in certain cases by some beach defenses and the landing was not successful. Many landings were made by transporting the troops ashore in barges in the face of little if any resistance from beach defenses. The small landings on the west coast of Bataan were made in armored landing boats and in some cases, in unarmored boats (bancas), (a Filipino type of canoe).

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

- A. Parachute Operations.--No parachute troops have been used in the Philippines to date. Supplies including food, ammunition, and cigarettes have been dropped to snipers operating in the rear areas in Bataan by parachutes.
- B. Many of the enemy observed in the Philippines are not equipped with gas masks.
- C. Enemy propaganda has appeared in the Philippines in the following forms:
- (1) Leaflets dropped by planes or distributed by hand among Filipinos stating in substance as follows: "Filipinos--we are not fighting you, we are fighting the Americans. We are trying to free you from the American yoke. Americans consider you to be an inferior people and employ you as servants. If you want to be saved - lay down your arms and stop fighting." "Surrender before it is too late."
- (2) It is reported that a loudspeaker, set up in front of the American-Filipino Battle Position in Bataan on January 25, 1942, broadcasted the following message: "Filipinos--we are not fighting you, we are fighting Americans. Lay down your arms we are moving to Subic Bay."

- D. Different sources report that the Japanese are distinctly lacking in adequate supplies of gasoline on Luzon. Gasoline is seized from private automobiles. Radio broadcasts are made by Japanese stating that gasoline brought for sale will be paid for in Japanese currency. Water transportation and horse drawn carts are used whenever possible by the Japanese.

IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.

- A. Equipment and Armament.--The enemy possesses modern equipment and armament for operations on land and in the air. With few exceptions, however, item for item and weapon for weapon ours are superior.
- B. Tactics.--He is deceptive, employing both lawful and unlawful ruses. On the ground, while on the offensive, his infiltration tactics coupled with sniper activity behind the lines stand out. A heavy volume rather than an accurate fire is employed. Attacks are often launched at night. In landing operations there is a distinct tendency to land at night at undefended beaches which the defender might consider unsuitable for landing. Information regarding tactics in the air has been limited, but there is a noticeable tendency for the Japanese to be careful and methodical in high altitude bombing and cautious in dive bombing and troops strafing operations. Every effort is made to conserve planes.
- C. Miscellaneous.--The enemy encountered in the Philippines to date is rugged, smart, aggressive, and thoroughly schooled in the advantages of deception and camouflage. Initial Japanese successes in all theatres of the war contribute to his present high morale. The accuracy of his fire of small arms is below that of our troops. Heavy, accurate artillery fire and favorable terrain have contributed greatly toward the effective American-Filipino defense in Bataan to date. Our artillery appears to be much superior to the Japanese

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Headquarters, 4th Marines,
February 20, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
Subject: Intelligence Summary.
Enclosures: (A) Intelligence Summary for the Period
2 February to 20 February, 1942, with
sketches A, B, C, D, E, F.

1. Enclosure (A) is submitted herewith.

S. L. HOWARD

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GENERAL OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Prepared by the R-2 Section)

I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

II. COMPONENT FORCES.

A. Land Forces.

- (1) Equipment and Armament.
- (2) Tactics.
- (3) Miscellaneous.
- (4) Conclusions.

B. Air Forces.

- (1) Equipment and Armament.
- (2) Tactics.
- (3) Miscellaneous.
- (4) Conclusions.

C. Landing Forces.

- (1) Equipment and Armament.
- (2) Tactics.
- (3) Miscellaneous.
- (4) Conclusions.

III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.

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SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RE JAPANESE FORCES FOR PERIOD
FEBRUARY 2 TO FEBRUARY 20, 1942

- I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.--The sources are the same as those of our last report.
- II. COMPONENT FORCES.
- A. Land Forces.
- (1) Equipment and Armament.
- (a) Grenade Thrower.--In the Philippines the enemy has been using the grenade thrower, model 89, described in TM 30-480. The ammunition is the same as that described in this same publication.
- (b) Hand Grenades.--The same model 89 shell described in TM 30-480 is being used as a hand grenade.
- (c) Tanks.--Reliable sources state that in BATAAN the enemy is using a medium weight tank corresponding to the 11.31 ton type (1930) (or 92(1932)) described in TM 30-480.
- (d) Flame Thrower.--The enemy has used a flame thrower in BATAAN which consists of three (3) containers and a hose with a nozzle giving the appearance of a fruit sprayer.
- (e) Mines.--The enemy has extensively used a type mine shown in sketch A. It is a muddy brown color and has the appearance of two (2) pie tins placed together with concave portions adjacent. A number of these mines are usually placed across a road or likely tank route. They are covered with dust to provide concealment. The mine contains from 7 to 10 lbs. of TNT and is capable of seriously damaging the wheels or belt of our 18 ton, medium weight, tanks.
- (2) Tactics.--In BATAAN, infiltrations (usually at night) through suitable corridors in our front lines coupled with clever sniper activities within or behind our lines continue to stand out in Japanese tactics. Excellent concealment and camouflage discipline are practiced at all times. As stated in our last report the Japanese often allow their enemy to pass through an area without firing upon him with a view to surrounding him and eventually inflicting more casualties. Therefore, the strictest precautions must be taken while in an area which possibly contains Japanese troops. As advances are made, bushes, trees, rock piles, and all other possible locations of these Japanese troops should be sprayed thoroughly with small arms fire or covered well with hand grenades, depending upon which is the more feasible. To effectively combat these snipers who are within or behind our lines, large quantities of small arms ammunition and hand grenades are required. Thompson sub-machine guns are suitable for operations of this nature. The following cases which actually occurred in BATAAN may somewhat clarify the statements made above.
- (a) See sketch B. This case illustrates one of the methods the enemy employed in an effort to end the Battle of BATAAN. A captured enemy mosaic and operation order reveal that an enemy force of approximately three (3) battalions with attached engineers and other special troops were to land near AGLOLOMAN Bay, move to the east, and cut the MARIVELES-BAGAC Road. Another small force was to simultaneously attack the front of the I Corps. Had not the landing operation been repulsed, the road would have been

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cut, and an entire corps would have had its line of communication cut since the MARIVELES-BAGAC Road is the only route in that vicinity to the rear areas.

- (b) See sketch C. In this case our forces were attempting to destroy a Japanese unit which had landed and gained a foothold on the point shown. The enemy had well concealed machine guns, layed to deliver grazing fire up the hill as shown. (The enemy were well protected from mortar and artillery fire by nearby caves; attack from the water was not feasible because of the enemy's control of the air). As our troops moved forward over and down the hill, the Japanese held their fire. Finally when a number of our troops had entered the area A, the Japanese opened with a heavy volume of fire from B. When some of our troops attempted to withdraw up the hill the machine guns opened their grazing fire. By attempting to withdraw through this grazing fire, our forces received considerable casualties. The enemy force was subsequently destroyed using the tactics recommended in the beginning of par. II A (2).
- (c) See sketch D. In this case one (1) enemy battalion affected a penetration through our lines. Had not our forces taken action in the early steps of this infiltration, considerably more of the enemy would have been infiltrated. A few Japanese infiltrated south through our MLR near the stream bed shown. Machine guns were set up near A and B to cover the infiltration of others who dug trenches between A, B and C. These troops in turn covered the entrance of still more Japanese into the corridor created. With a well protected corridor the enemy planned to fan out to the east and west. Fortunately this was prevented by timely infiltrations of our own forces. By employing a greater number of our forces, the Japanese were surrounded on all sides and their entire force was destroyed. During mopping up operations in this area, a large number of light and heavy machine guns, cannon (approximately 75mm), flame throwers, radio and signal equipment, and ammunition of different types were found indicating that more than a small operation had been contemplated.
- (d) See sketch E. In this case a 57mm anti-tank gun was exceptionally well camouflaged and concealed behind the bush X shown in the sketch. The gun crew, the ammunition, and the gun itself, less the barrel, were concealed and under cover in a pit on the north side of the bush. This bush was no larger than an ordinary waste basket. The barrel of the gun was completely concealed in the bush and was elevated to deliver fire up into the belly of any tank approaching up the road from the south. The concealment was so complete that a person a few feet to the south could not detect the position.

The artillery fire (105mm) directed against the Fortified Islands of MANILA Bay during this period has been of a harassing nature. The ammunition used has contained highly sensitive fuzes with a high degree of fragmentation. The fire was widely distributed over each of the islands and was conducted at irregular times during both daylight and darkness. In BATAAN some artillery ammunition used contained fuzes with delays varying from one (1) to twenty four (24) hours.

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(3) Miscellaneous.

(a) A favorite type trench of the Japanese is shown in sketch F. The D portion is about 2' in diameter and 4½' deep. Sections A, B, and C are each about 2' deep, 1½' wide, and 7' long. The soldier usually opens fire from D and then moves to section A, B, or C depending upon which section offers the most protection from his enemy's position. For example, if his enemy is located near E he would crawl (under good concealment) to A to preclude his receiving enfilable fire.

(4) Conclusions.--Same as those of our last report.

B. Air Forces.

(1) Equipment and Armament.--During this period the following type planes were observed in BATAAN: (1) Zero type fighter; (2) Number 97 bomber; and (3) A medium bomber with single air cooled motor, low wing monoplane, a rear machine gun, and markings consisting of a white band edged with red around the fuselage halfway between the fin and cockpit and two (2) red horizontal stripes on the rudder.

(2) Tactics.--No changes noted except that the enemy has been somewhat more bold in his strafing operations, conducting his firing at lower altitudes than before. Staff cars, trucks, and their occupants have been frequently strafed on roads to the rear of the front lines.

(3) Miscellaneous.--No new information.

(4) Conclusions.--Same as those of our last report except as noted in par. II B (2) of this report.

C. Landing Forces.

(1) Equipment and Armament.--Many different types of landing boats with varying characteristics have been observed. Many of the boats had armor only in the bow and this only sufficiently thick to prevent small arms ammunition from penetrating. The capacities of the boats varied from 25 to 140 men, fully equipped.

(2) Tactics.--No changes from last report.

(3) Miscellaneous.--No new information noted.

(4) Conclusions.--Same as those of our last report.

III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

A. Prisoners of War.--Captured Japanese prisoners of war reveal that they had been told that they would be killed by Americans if captured. Japanese prisoners also state that, if captured, they would never be permitted to return to Japan, even after the war. (These disclosures accounts for their tenacious resistance and many of them committing suicide to prevent being captured). Enemy soldiers seemed astonished when offered food, clothes, cigarettes, and medical treatment by our forces. One Japanese soldier recently came over to our lines, voluntarily surrendered, and said: "I'm fed up with this war. We were told the Filipinos would be fighting with us, not against us." Most prisoners state that our artillery fire has been very effective.

B. Supplies Dropped by Parachutes.--The enemy has dropped numerous supplies by parachutes intended for their troops operating behind or within our lines. These supplies consisted

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of food, cigarettes, medical equipment, etc. and were dropped in brown cases approximately 3' x 1½' x 10" in size. Nearly all of these supplies were seized by our troops.

- C. Propaganda.-During the period of this report the enemy intensified his propaganda campaign. Thousands of leaflets were dropped among our troops. Most of these advised the Filipinos to either surrender or to go well behind the American lines and hide. Many leaflets had lewd pictures of women on one side. Other leaflets stated that the entire U.S. fleet had been sunk and that all convoys to the Philippines had been destroyed. Other leaflets bore the signature of Mr. Vargas and asked the Filipinos to "lay down their arms since all is already lost."
- D. Captured Enemy Weapons.-Captured Japanese machine guns, mortars, and ammunition are being effectively used by our native forces. Enemy ammunition is usually buried near the weapons. Also, often light artillery and signal equipment (intended for later operations) are buried near their trenches.
- E. Conditions in MANILA.-Sources from MANILA state that white internees are being treated satisfactorily, although a food shortage appears imminent. The same source adds that white women are not being molested by Japanese troops. However, considerable raping of Filipino women in small barrios is reported. It is said that white internees in MANILA are permitted to walk around the town for one (1) hour each evening.
- F. Situation between MANILA and LINGAYEN Bay.-Reports have been received stating that the Japanese have constructed barricades in many positions along the road from MANILA to SAN FERNANDO (PAMPANGA Province). This road is also reported to be mined in places. It is also reported that the Japanese have constructed defensive positions from LINGAYEN Bay south to SAN FERNANDO (PAMPANGA Province).
- G. Reports indicate that all available small boats and inter-island craft have been assembled in the vicinity of MANILA and that from 1500 to 2000 troops have been assembled on the south shore of MANILA Bay. A captured operation plan indicated a landing attack supported by naval units against at least one or more of the Fortified Islands on or about March 5, 1942.

- IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.-The information obtained during the period of this report completely substantiates the conclusions drawn and stated in our last report. For emphasis, it is repeated that the basis of Japanese land tactics is infiltration. This is usually affected at night and is coupled with clever camouflage, concealment, and deceptive measures. When he has surrounded his enemy, the Japanese opens with a heavy volume of fire (not intended to be as accurate as rapid) from all sides with a view to making his enemy withdraw. The Japanese troops' concealment in trees, bushes, rock piles etc. is often so complete that our troops often pass nearby them unless these bushes, trees, and locations, etc. are thoroughly sprayed with small arms fire or hand grenades depending upon which is the more feasible. Fire is often withheld by Japanese troops with a view to causing our forces' entrance into a trap, from which es-


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
cape is almost impossible. In landing operations it is again emphasized that landings are usually made at night and at undefended beaches and often on points (thought to be unlikely landing beaches by the defender). Information received during this period substantiates the statement of our last report to the effect that Japanese small arms accuracy is well below our standards.

Sketch A


JAP mine



Sketch B




Sketch C




WATER.


SKETCH D



SKETCH E



SKETCH F



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Headquarters, 4th Marines,
March 14, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
Subject: Intelligence Summary.
Enclosures: (A) Intelligence Summary for the Period 20
February to 13 March, 1942.
1. Enclosure (A) is submitted herewith.

S. L. HOWARD.

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GENERAL OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Prepared by the R-2 Section)

- I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.
- II. COMPONENT FORCES.
 - A. Land Forces.
 - (1) Equipment and Armament.
 - (2) Tactics.
 - (3) Miscellaneous.
 - (4) Conclusions.
 - B. Air Forces.
 - (1) Equipment and Armament.
 - (2) Tactics.
 - (3) Miscellaneous.
 - (4) Conclusions.
 - C. Landing Forces.
 - (1) Equipment and Armament.
 - (2) Tactics.
 - (3) Miscellaneous.
 - (4) Conclusions.
- III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.
- IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.

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SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RE - JAPANESE FORCES FOR PERIOD
February 20 to March 13, 1942

- I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.--Aside from the sources of information re - tactics of Japanese air units the sources are the same as those of our previous reports.
- II. COMPONENT FORCES.
- A. Land Forces.
- (1) Equipment and Armament.
- (a) Hand Generator for Portable Japanese Field Radio Set.--The unit is contained in an aluminum case, outside dimensions 7" x 4" x 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Weight 15 lbs., with two adjustable leather carrying straps attached to case. It has a single handle hand drive, with ratchet attachment to the armature. This handle folds into the bottom of the case when not in use; on the back side of the case is a four prong outlet for plug and cable connection to the set itself. The hand drive unit is constructed for a hand driven speed of 70 rpm (turns easily), which through a gear ratio turns the armature at a speed of 5200 rpm. With these speeds and under "no load" conditions the generator has the following electrical characteristics: High voltage - 150 volts and 0.08 amperes; Low voltage - 6 volts and 1.0 amperes. Single scale voltmeter visible through top of carrying case, meter graduated from 1 to 10 volts.
- (b) Japanese Field Telephone Set.--The set is carried in a highly polished wood case approximately 5" x 5", x 10". By pressing a button the case is opened. The set has a one wire line and ground return. The ear-piece and mouth-piece were smaller and lighter in weight than ours. All sets captured were in excellent condition and were put to immediate use by our forces.
- (2) Tactics.--During this period it was noted that Japanese penetrations, once made through our front lines, had the following characteristics: The frontages of the pockets were small compared to their depth, the front of one being about 200 yards while its depth was almost 3000 yards; the pockets were strongly fortified and positions were prepared for "all-around" defense; there were an unusually large number of fox holes with connecting trenches; the positions for fox holes and trenches were often so chosen as to take advantage of any existing cover such as logs, rock piles, tree stumps, roots, etc; by clever, well concealed infiltration, the penetrations were often made and the pockets well organized before discovery by our forces; the penetrations were often made along trails; light artillery, radio equipment, and large quantities of ammunition were found buried in the areas in which the penetrations were made. During this period it was also noted that in advancing the Japanese moved slowly and "dug-in" well as they advanced. Individual enemy soldiers often had several fox holes with connecting trenches thus enabling them to fire from one fox hole and then immediately crawl to another, new position. Once established, the Japanese pockets were difficult to eliminate. Experience has shown that their elimination was best

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accomplished by infiltrating forces of our own around to both flanks and rear of the Japanese and then closing in on the enemy with superior numbers from all directions.

(3) Miscellaneous.

(a) Extracts From USAFFE Training Memorandum.-The following extracts from USAFFE Training Memorandum on Jungle Fighting, dated 26 February, 1942 are believed accurate and reliable:

(1) GENERAL. The following principles and methods based on recent successful operations of the 57th Infantry (PS) at Longoskawayan, Anyasan, and Silain Points, and of the 31st (US) Infantry in the wooded area on the left of the first battle position of the II Corps are published for the information of this command. Variations of these methods to fit local conditions should be worked out by commanders and individuals on the ground.

(2) Individual Equipment. The equipment carried by the soldier should be the minimum required for actual fighting. It will usually consist of his primary weapon plus cartridge belt, first aid packet, hand grenades, bandoleers of extra ammunition, entrenching tool and the bayonet if armed with a rifle. The stripped pack or blanket roll should be left behind as they materially impede progress in dense underbrush.

(3) FEEDING. During operations conducted by the 57th Infantry it was usually found that one cooked meal a day, served just before dark, was the most practical solution. This meal must be distributed to the troops by carrying parties operating in daylight both because of the difficulty of finding individuals at night and because the enemy often launches his initial attack about thirty minutes after complete darkness. It is also advisable when the country is unusually thick or prolonged close action can be foreseen to issue each soldier a canned ration. The method of feeding and the number of meals served will depend on the tactical situation and the density of the jungle.

(4) ATTACK. a. UNIT COMBAT PRINCIPLES. Preparations for an attack must be complete, a thorough reconnaissance must be made and responsibility for maintaining contact between adjacent units clearly placed. Even small gaps, fifty yards or less in extent, must be covered by vigorous patrolling. The enemy has proven himself adept at finding unprotected flanks and wide gaps and is quick to make use of this information.

Our advance may be necessarily slow but it should progress steadily and aggressively. Prepared machine-gun emplacements, dugouts, or foxholes containing more than one enemy can best be reduced by maintaining continuous fire on them while one or more individuals approach from the flanks and reduce the resistance by throwing hand grenades.

The forward movement of our attack should usually be halted for one hour and a half to two hours before darkness. A dug-in defensive position should be prepared; especially must contact between units and individuals be insured. The enemy invariably launches his initial attack, or counter-attack, shortly after dark. Additional attacks may be expected throughout the night.

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The 31st Infantry (US) while operating in the woods in central Bataan was attacked heavily at 12:30 AM; two other lighter attacks were experienced the same night, one at 3:30 AM and the other at 4:30 AM.

The initial enemy attack is furious and aggressive, but when met by heavy fire it is of short duration. Succeeding attacks are less intense and may be for the purpose of covering the removal of his wounded and dead.

b. INDIVIDUAL ACTION. Successful jungle fighting more than any other type of warfare depends upon the aggressive intelligent action of the individual soldier. Advantage must be taken of available cover, to do otherwise results in needless losses.

A count of "one thousand one," "one thousand two" should be made after releasing the safety spring of the grenade before throwing it, in order to obviate the possibility of the enemy picking it up and hurling it back. The tendency on the part of our soldiers to stop and examine enemy dead and material should be prohibited, however, great care should be exercised in ascertaining that apparent enemy casualties are in reality dead. In many instances individual enemy soldiers have shammed death only "to come to life" and hurl grenades or shoot into the backs of our passing troops. The only safe solution apparently is to consider each Japanese as potentially dangerous unless he has surrendered or is dead.

The individual soldier as he advances must be on the alert and closely observe the ground for enemy "booby" traps. These may be heavy grenades, tank mines (pancake type), and 3-inch trench mortar shells with the safety fork removed, all are dangerous both to tanks and personnel.

(6) SUPPORTING WEAPONS. a. MACHINE GUNS.--Machine guns should generally be employed against definitely located hostile machine guns. However, a section or platoon should be with advance elements to assist in the advance of the assault echelon.

b. MORTARS.--Mortars, except in dense woods, are extremely effective.

c. TANKS.--Tanks, if used, must be closely followed by six to nine infantrymen. Tank weapons cannot reach an enemy in a fox hole, nor can the tank crush him if the fox hole is narrow and dug into firm ground. The tank will keep the enemy down and the accompanying infantry must clean out the fox holes with rifle, bayonet, or grenade.

d. ARTILLERY.--Close support of field artillery is difficult. Distance between friendly and hostile lines is necessarily close. Therefore, effective artillery fire on enemy lines is practically impossible without an elaborate wire communication system down to and including the assault companies. Higher headquarters should place the artillery in direct support of battalions and leave the calling for artillery fire to battalion commanders. Artillery fire properly

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coordinated can be effectively used for reducing located centers of resistance. The enemy has repeatedly timed the firing of his own artillery, mortars and grenade throwers to that of our artillery fire in order to create the impression on friendly troops that our own artillery was falling short."

- (b) **Sniper Tactics.**--Reliable sources from Bataan report that the Japanese snipers are alert to fire in the direction of any noise heard and that our personnel who skylark, talk, or make unnecessary noises will be fired upon instantly by the snipers. The same sources state that entrenched Japanese often attempt to throw back hand grenades thrown by our personnel, or kick them into a pit in their trench. In the latter case, when the grenades explode, the force of explosion and fragments go upward, thereby causing no damage or casualties.
- (c) **Wire Scaling Device.**--During operations in Bataan the Japanese successfully used a device for climbing over barbed wire. It consisted of bamboo and was brought to the location of the wire in the form of a roll. The device was then unrolled and spread over the wire like a rug thus enabling their troops to successfully pass over the wire.
- (d) **Tactics During Route and Approach March.**--During the route and approach march the Japanese have a tendency to be careless. While the camouflage and concealment of the individual soldier is excellent, columns of trucks and troops often approach the battle area unconcealed, without any camouflage, and often poorly dispersed. (Many enemy truck and troop columns have been taken under accurate artillery fire by our forces).
- (e) **Bayonet Fighting.**--Reports continue to be received to the effect that the Japanese dislike bayonet fighting and avoid it whenever possible.
- (f) **Tenacity of Japanese Soldier.**--A recent report well exemplifies the tenacious fighting qualities of the Japanese soldier. The lone Japanese was surrounded by our troops and was out of ammunition. When asked to surrender, he refused, and kept his bayonet pointed at our troops, and challenged them to come and get him.
- (4) **Conclusions.**--No changes or additions except those stated in II A. (2) and II A. (3) above.

B. Air Forces.

(1) Equipment and Armament.

- (a) **Types of Aircraft.**--The following type planes have been observed in this theater since the commencement of hostilities:
 - Fighter, 100 or Zero Type.
 - Dive Bomber, No. 97 Type.
 - Observation and Light Bomber, No. 97 Type.
 - Dive Bomber, believed to be either 100 or 101 Type. (It is dark colored, has blunt wing tips, and retractable landing gear).
 - Heavy Bombers, 96, 97 (modified) and 98 Types.
 - Messerschmitt, 109F Type.

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- (b) Enemy Airfields.--The main activity has been reported at Nichols, Clark, and Nielson Fields. The following other fields have been used: San Rafael (Bulacan); San Ildefonso (Ilocos Sur); Villasis, San Fernando (Pampanga). Airfields are reported to be under construction at Cavite and at San Luis (south of Reina Mercedes, Isabella). An auxiliary field in the foothills between Olongapo and Dinalupihan has also been reported.
- (2) Tactics.--The following information on tactics has been procured from U.S. Combat pilots who have encountered Japanese air force units:
- (a) Heavy Bombardment.--Bombardment formations are generally Vees of three in V and in numbers varying from nine to fifty. Although formations are generally very close and apparently well flown, it has been noted that the formations loosen up considerably after dropping their bomb load making them particularly vulnerable to pursuit attack. Combat gunners have been noted to expend their ammunition on attacking pursuit which are considerably out of their range. It has been noted, the Japanese bombardment formations often split fifty to one hundred miles prior to reaching their objective and circle. They then assemble and attack the objective in mass splitting again into smaller units and assembling at a point on the route back to Formosa. The purpose of circling is to confuse our pursuit control personnel and to lure our pursuit into the air so that by the time the bombardment is ready to strike their objective, our pursuit has consumed most of its gasoline. Many time bombardment is accompanied by escorting pursuit who generally proceed the attack or remain above the bombardment formation in hopes of attacking our pursuit which might be pre-occupied with the hostile bombardment formation. It has been observed however, that in many instances Japanese escorting pursuits have been out of supporting distance of their own bombardment. Supporting pursuit have been practicing combat among themselves while bombers make their attacks.
- (b) Dive Bombing.-- Upon completion of bombardment they generally straffe objectives in very loose formation. When our anti-aircraft is active, their accuracy is very poor and in some cases they do not dive prior to releasing their bombs.
- (c) Pursuit.--Japanese pursuit airplanes generally fly in two-ship element formation. They also employ "weavers" who fly about 1000 feet above and a mile behind the main formation. Formations are either very close or very loose and never are the airplanes so supported that each pilot is capable of delivering aimed fire at the target. Pursuit in accompanying bombardment flies either above or to the side of the formation. It has been observed that in many instances pursuit is out of supporting distance of their bombardment. Pursuit has been employed in strafing airdromes. Because the Zero type pursuit are lighter than our P-40 type, they invariably take advantage of quick-climbing characteristics or close turning characteristics in combating our pursuit. When our pursuit has been attacked by superior Japanese pursuit

forces, it has been noted that the enemy splits its formation in such a manner that whichever way our pursuit turns, they will present a target to the enemy. It has also been noted that when enemy pursuit has been surprised, they invariably execute a steep chandelle or Immelmann. It is recommended that in combating hostile pursuit the superior strength and duration of our equipment should be utilized to the utmost, i.e., our equipment can better stand steep and prolonged dives than that of the enemy. Therefore, when attacked by hostile pursuit formation, recommended tactics are to immediately execute a steep dive and pull out close to the ground, remaining at a low altitude. When attacking an enemy pursuit formation, it is advisable to make one swift attack.

- (3) Miscellaneous.-The following extracts from British Intelligence Information Memorandum Number 6, dated 7 October, 1941 are quoted:

- (a) "The Japanese Naval Air Service is divided into two branches - shore based and ship borne units. In the organization of shore based units, in August, 1941, shore-based units consisted of about 96 squadrons. Each squadron has from 8 to 12 first-line aircraft according to type and in theory each squadron has an immediate reserve of 50%. A squadron is divided into two flights (Buntai). Recently, the allotment of ship borne aircraft has been substantially increased. As with shore-based units, aircraft in aircraft carriers and seaplane carriers are organized into squadrons and flights. The establishments are also the same, and 50% immediate reserves are normally held ashore. All squadrons except flying boat squadrons have 12 first line aircraft and 6 immediate reserve, and the flying boat squadrons have 8 first line aircraft and 4 immediate reserve. Battleships carry 3 aircraft each while cruisers of 8,000 to 10,000 tons carry 3 to 4 aircraft each according to the type of ship. Cruisers of 5,500 to 7,500 tons hold between 1 and 2 aircraft each according to type. An immediate reserve of aircraft amounting to 50% of the aircraft allotted to battleships and cruisers is held ashore.
- (b) In the organization of first line units, the units are normally all controlled by the Air Corps, or air division commander and comprise those air regiments shown in the order of battle. The basic unit is the squadron, and two to five squadrons form an air regiment. Some regiments are divided into battalions and when this is so a battalion consists of two squadrons and a regiment of two battalions. Regiments are again organized into brigades which may consist of from two to five regiments. Squadrons consist of from 8 to 12 first line aircraft according to type, with 25% immediate reserve. They are not sub-divided into flights. Squadron commanders are usually captains, though sometimes a major may be in command. Battalion commanders are either Lieutenant-Colonels or Majors. The establishment for aircraft in Army Air Service units is as follows:

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	<u>1st Line Aircraft</u>	<u>Immediate Reserve</u>
Single-seater fighter and light bomber squadrons	12	3
Heavy bomber squadrons	10	3
Reconnaissance squadrons	9	3

(Some light bomber squadrons consist of 7 twin-engine and 4 single-engine bombers; others of 12 single-engine light bombers).

Official figures are not available for the personnel, but a general estimate of the establishment of a typical air regiment is as follows - 38 officers, 35 Warrant Officers and NCO's 600 in other ranks, and 83 in civilian personnel. Of the 38 officers in a regiment, 16 are probably pilots; 3 employed on general duties, 10 as observers, 5 as technical officers, 3 as accountant officers and the remaining 2 are medical officers.

- (c) The monthly output of the Japanese aircraft industry probably lies between 300-500 aircraft per month. It is known that experiments in the construction of an electrically operated nose turret of very light metal fitted with a new type of light machine gun are in progress and that turrets are installed in naval heavy bombers.
- (d) If the opening Japanese air effort can be thrown back with considerable loss, it will place the Japanese Air Services in a dilemma from which they will take a long time to recover; a well-organized defense which can inflict initial losses disproportionate to the weight of attack will receive its reward in the form of breathing space, for the Japanese are most religiously "text-book"; they take time to ponder counter-measures; and they are most careful not to venture again into what has proved to be a dangerous area before they are satisfied that they can escape more or less unscathed. The Japanese fully realize the value of amphibious operations in their national strategy and have developed their methods and equipment to a high degree of efficiency. They have had more up-to-date experience in this type of warfare than any other nation. The Army is responsible for transportation and for the landing and also for erection of a temporary base ashore. The Navy is responsible only for convoy protection, for assisting the Army by gunfire and by provision of aircraft. A specially trained naval detachment may also be landed if necessary. This latter force is the most efficient Japanese unit employed in this type of operation. They are not deterred by difficult landing places, if by the use of them, strongly defended areas can be avoided. The wide front on which the Japanese land is notable. At Shanghai the distance between the wings was about 16 miles and at Hangchow and Bias Bay about 20. Success at any point is rapidly and fully exploited. In all major landings the speed of advance inland was very rapid. The infantry of the first flight push on to the utmost of their ability, using mountain guns for their artillery and apparently dispensing with tanks and M.T. till those can catch up. In most cases tanks appear to have been little used. They have ample material for combined operations which is both cheap to produce and is reliable to use. They have great reserves of suitable craft, which in peace are employed commercially and which, with their crews, is readily impressed when required. Full use is made of rivers and creeks and

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captured native craft to penetrate and turn the defense and as lines of communication. They have gained great knowledge of river warfare in the Hankow campaign. The speed of convoys appears to be from 8 to 12 knots. Ample time is allowed for the final advance, and a considerable period of time elapses between the arrival of the transports off the objective and the actual landing.

- (e) There are two main types of landing craft which are: large, 60 to 100 men, speed, 10-12 knots, and small 50 to 60 men, speed 8 to 10 knots. They draw about 27 inches. The majority have a flap in the bows to form an unloading ramp. In general, the landing craft make their final approach in line abreast. They drop stern anchors before grounding and haul off the beach by an engine driven winch when clear of troops.
- (f) The Japanese lag behind the other Powers in night operation of their carriers. Their bombing operations during the Sino-Japanese hostilities, many of which have been the work of carrier aircraft, have shown that they dislike night flying especially on moonless nights during which most of their landings have been staged. In several cases the Japanese have apparently valued surprise more than the preliminary bombardment which has not started until after the first flight has landed. On one occasion a preliminary bombardment of enemy positions was made at a range of 1,300 yards, and the covering fire was most accurate, the Japanese keeping only a short distance behind the bursting shells. This was done by destroyers who never fired at more than 2,000 to 2,500 yards, sometimes using howitzer fire on special areas by extreme elevation and a small charge. By this means shells were lobbed accurately for about 1,000 yards.
- (g) It appears to be the Japanese practice to anchor their transports off the point of attack at about 0230 and for the troops to reach the beaches about 0430, depending on the time of sunrise. In general, therefore, embarkation in landing craft is carried out in the dark, and the first troops landing in the dark just before the first light of dawn. The landing is staged two or three hours before high water, and on a moonless night if possible. The exceptions to this rule were probably dictated by strategical circumstances or navigational difficulties. It has been the practice of the Japanese to indulge in reconnaissance and bombing of areas subsequently attacked. On the other hand their successes against feeble opposition, which have followed careful espionage, bribery and meticulously detailed planning, may lead to failure if their plans can be dislocated. In this connection the importance of early location and destruction of their landing craft carrier or carriers is a matter of the utmost importance, for by this method their landing organization can be most seriously upset. The tactical composition of aircraft in carriers is normally about one-third fighters and two-thirds torpedo or dive bombers.
- (h) All Japanese cruisers carry aircraft and at least

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three submarines have been fitted to carry one aircraft each, also merchant vessels are being converted probably to seaplane tenders. The N.Y.K. liners "Kasuga Maru" (16,500 tons) launched in September, 1940, and "Idumo" launched July, 1941, also the "Kasivara Maru" launched 26th June, 1941, are in process of reconstruction as aircraft carriers.

- (1) All naval aircraft, with the exception of heavy bombers, are marked on the tail and fuselage with a letter of the Katakana Alphabet denoting the squadron, followed by the number of the individual aircraft. Identity of army units is shown by colored bands on the tail and fuselage. Squadrons are denoted by various symbols on the tail, for instance, the painting of an eagle; star, or some other Japanese emblem. It appears that aircraft operating in China, both of the army and naval service, have a white band on the fuselage near the tail."

- (4) Conclusions.--No changes or additions other than those stated in II B. (1) and II B. (2) above.

C. Landing Forces.

- (1) Equipment and Armament.--No changes or additions noted during this period.
- (2) Tactics.--Reports from other units state that the Japanese, prior to launching their attack on the Island of Singapore, used many ruses with a view to deceiving the defenders as to where their main landing would be made. Lighted cigarettes, fire crackers, moving vehicles, barking dogs, and other noises were all used opposite one of Singapore's likely landing beaches with a view to leading the defenders to believe that the main effort would be made at that point. Actually the first landing in force was made on another side of the Island where the defenders had only patrols as their defense. It is also reported that individual Japanese snipers swam from the Malay mainland to the Island of Singapore prior to the landing of the Japanese main forces. It also is known that Japanese swimmers were used in the attempted Japanese landings on the west coast of Batavia. These special troops are capable of swimming long distances and swim with their weapons, ammunition, and a limited amount of food with them. It is further reported that, in landing operations, some Japanese troops landed on beaches which had nearly vertical cliffs; that these cliffs were scaled by improvised ladders and successful infiltration inland accomplished.
- (3) Miscellaneous.--No changes or additions noted during this period.
- (4) Conclusions.--No changes or additions noted other than those stated in II C. (2) above.

III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

A. Enemy Information Re-Occupied Territory.

- (1) Shipping.--The following inter-island boats, which were sunk at Manila prior to the evacuation, are reported to be refloated: Ntra Sra De Guia, Ntra Sra De la Paz, Ntra Sra Del Rosario, Don Juan O, Naga and Alabat. Several launches formerly belonging to the Bureau of Customs have been seen patrolling in the

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north Manila Bay area, and appear to be armed with light caliber machine guns and possibly carry armor. In the Ternate-Male region, at Piers 3, 5, and 7 of Manila, and at Malabon, concentrations of bancas and barges have been reported. We have had a report from Mindoro station that bancas and barges are being built at Batangas for an invasion of Mindoro.

(Comment: If true, it would be more reasonable to suppose that the barges and bancas built there would be used for an assault on the Fortified Islands at the entrance of Manila Bay instead of Mindoro).

- (2) **Supply and Ammunition Depots:** In Manila, the Philippine Refining Co., Manila Rope and Cordage Co., F.E. Zuellig & Co., and Madrigal & Co. bodegas, all near the Pandacan District, and the Balintawak Beer brewery in Caloocan, appear to be the main depots, the Tanque Luna and Tanque Bago, Atlantic Gulf and Engineers Island are being used for large repair work or for the manufacture of small bombs. The Rizal Memorial Stadium and LaSalle College adjoining it have been used for troops, trucks and tank concentrations, and there is a possibility that La Salle is also a hospital. Calamba (Laguna Province) appears to be the main supply point for the South, and San Fernando (Pampanga), Angeles, and Tarlac for the northern area. Of these three in the north, the main one is San Fernando. In the area near Lingayen, Agoo and Damortis have been reported as large bases for troops and supplies.
- (3) **Construction-Field Works.**--In the latter part of January, large trench construction was reported around the city of Manila, with special emphasis on the area from Caloocan through San Francisco del Monte, and around the east of the city to the Pasig River. Some entrenchments have also been dug in the approaches to San Fernando, Pampanga. The enemy have been working extensively in the reconstruction of bridges which were destroyed on our withdrawal to Bataan, and the reconstruction has been done, in every case reported, by heavy timbers and wooden planks. The greatest number of reports on this work have come on the reconstruction of the Calumpit Bridge, a very important bridge for the Manila - San Fernando highway, and reports indicate that it should have been completed between February 20-25. If all the reports turned in are correct, every foot of the road between Dinalupihan and San Fernando, San Fernando to Manila, and San Fernando to Tarlac has been mined, and would be completely destroyed if the Japanese were forced to retreat. (Comment: Inexperienced agents may have mistaken routine repair for the mining of roads and bridges).
- (4) **Japanese High Command.**--The Japanese Commander in Chief is occupying the American High Commissioner's mansion for his headquarters and a recent report states he may be occupying a wing of Sto. Tomas University. The Army of Occupation have established Offices at the Army & Navy Club, the Elk's Club, the Bay View Hotel, Fort Santiago, and Military Plaza.
- (5) **Japanese Troops.**--Due to lack of vitamins (no fresh vegetables, fish or meat, and living on constant diet of rice and hard tack) soldiers are reported as suffering from malnutrition - some even complain of night blindness. Malaria is becoming common, because of lack of quinine. (Early arrivals were known to

carry quinine), and dysentery is prevalent.

- (6) **Internees.**--The civilians as a whole have been treated well in Manila, and the only reports of assaults have come from the provinces. Europeans and Americans are interned at Santo Tomas University, and latest reports indicate that some women and all children have been released. A prisoner of war who had been on M.P. duty at Santo Tomas stated that married families were occupying one building, and men and women without families were each installed in separate buildings. The Philippine Red Cross is reported to be furnishing the internees with two hot meals daily. Sta. Escolastica Convent is reported to be the enclosure for prisoners of war.
- (7) **Commodities.**--Food prices in Manila have gone up considerably. There is rationing of food and a limit to the price of the main commodity necessary for the local population, rice. Rice has fluctuated from P 14.50 per cavan to P 6.50, current rate; matches P1.00 a box, etc.
- (8) **Transportation.**--Transportation is accomplished by calesas and the street cars operated by the Manila Electric Company. Some buses are operated, but all other gasoline vehicles are at a standstill because of the scarcity of gasoline. The railroad is now operated between Manila - San Fernando and Manila - Lucena.
- (9) **Currency.**--Japanese Army of Occupation money circulates freely, and is exchanged at a par with the peso. In some regions, the circulation of any currency with the exception of Army of Occupation notes is prohibited, but in Manila. Philippine Government notes and Dollar bills are also allowed to circulate. All other money of Japanese-occupied territory, such as China and French Indo-China, and the Yen of Japan proper, is completely prohibited. All the bullion at the Philippine Treasury has been reported transferred to the Yokohama Specie Bank.
- (10) **Exec. Government.**--Civil government under the direct supervision of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Army of Occupation continues to function under the leadership of Jorge Vargas. The authority of this group is naturally limited to Japanese-controlled areas, only approximately one-third of the Philippines. With him in the civil government are practically all of the former leaders of the Commonwealth regime and all important bureaus like the Post Office, Plant Industry, and Health are functioning with their former directors and employees. Salaries of all government employees have been drastically cut.

B. **Outgoing Supplies.**--There has been considerable information obtained which indicated that the enemy is shipping out of the Philippines large quantities of foodstuffs, particularly rice, also motor transportation and other needed war supplies. The main shipping points from the Island of Luzon appear to be the Lingayen Gulf area, Mauban, Tayabas, Province, and Legaspi and Subic Bay.

C. **Buried Ammunition and Equipment.**--Buried Japanese equipment and ammunition is often marked as a grave. Considerable quantities of ammunition and weapons were found so marked in Bataan.

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IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS.-Information obtained during this period substantiates previous statements to the effect that the Japanese think only of the offensive and seek to avoid the defensive whenever possible. While enemy infiltrations are made with the cleverest camouflage and concealment, troop and supply columns often proceed carelessly, unconcealed, and poorly dispersed well within range of our artillery fire. Similarly enemy aircraft are often found on the ground poorly camouflaged and dispersed. Individual Japanese soldiers are rugged, aggressive, and resist tenaciously. Whenever the enemy soldier stops his advance he immediately digs in, makes use of any existing cover, and prepares his own position for "all around defense".