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SECOND MARINE DIVISION

REPORT ON THE

Occupation of Japan

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

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From: The Commanding General.

To: The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Via:
(1) The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
(2) The Commanding General, Sixth Army.
(3) The Commanding General, Army Forces, Pacific.
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and
Pacific Ocean Area.
(5) The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

References:
(a) PacFlt Conf Ltr 1 CL-45, dtd 1Jla.45.
(b) VAC Special C No 12G-45, dtd 1Nov45.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.

1. In compliance with references, enclosure (A) is
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2. In order to preclude the necessity of forwarding
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of copies.

3. Copies of all Operation Orders, Administrative Orders,
and Staff Reports included in this report and annexes thereto, are
downgraded from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with reference
(b).

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LEOPOLD P. HUNT

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC.

REPORT OF OCCUPATION OF KYUSHU, JAPAN

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A. Kyushu, 1/25,000, AMS, L872, 1945
B. Central Japan, 1/250,000, Second Edition, L571, -
   AMS-2.

* Unit journals, dispatch summaries, periodic reports with copy
  for CMC only.

** Includes report of 2d Medical Battalion.

*** Includes report of 2d Motor Transport Battalion.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FIFTH
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

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PART I

COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT

a. Planning - On 22 June, 1945, this Division reported by dispatch to the Fifth Amphibious Corps in compliance with a Fleet Marine Force, Pacific dispatch received on 21 June, 1945. Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Amphibious Corps directed the commencement of planning for the invasion of Japan. Upon receipt of the first tentative draft of the Fifth Amphibious Corps plan, planning was commenced by this Division. During the planning phase, the G-2 Section, after a thorough study of all available material, held a number of conferences in order to orient the staff and regimental commanders relative to the target. After a study of all available intelligence material, the G-3 Section prepared the first tentative draft of the Division plan for invading Japan and receiving the approval of the Commanding General thereon. On 2 August, 1945, the Commanding General, accompanied by the G-3, G-2, G-5, and G-4 departed for HAUL and reported to Fifth Amphibious Corps to discuss this plan in conjunction with the Commanding General of the Fifth Marine Division, the Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps, and the naval commands involved. The Division Signal Officer had previously reported to the Fifth Amphibious Corps for signal planning. The plan was approved by Fifth Amphibious Corps and upon the return of the Commanding General and his staff officers on 11 August, 1945, more detailed planning began and continued until 15 August, 1945, when orders were received to cancel all planning and stand by for further orders. Planning did not get below the Division level although regimental commanders were cognizant of all Division plans.

b. Training - This Division, less RCT 8, returned from OKINAWA on 14 April, 1945 and after reestablishing camp inaugurated a new training program. A training directive was issued on 26 June, 1945, which set forth a training program in two (2) phases. The first phase from 1 July - 15 August, for individual training, and the second phase from 16 August - 15 September, for unit and combined training. The first phase was carried out, but the second phase was only partially completed. The limited terrain on SAIPAN not restricted by island development was not suitable for training problems for artillery and tanks, although some training for these weapons was accomplished there. It was found necessary to send artillery to AGRIHAN in the part of MARIANAS to fire service practices.
practice, and similarly tanks were sent to the island of Tinian for further training. Infantry training was carried out along normal lines. Owing to the cancellation of the invasion, combined training did not get beyond the battalion stage. Air-ground training, using live bombs and ammunition, was commenced as field exercises for battalions and regiments on Saipan, but was not quite completed due to the termination of the war, and the undesirability of conducting further hazardous training. Although hampered by a lack of facilities, the division prepared and used a number of rifle ranges and field firing ranges. Of particular interest was a surprise-target range which was of considerable value in training riflemen for combat. Photos and a description of this range were forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. On receipt of orders on 18 August, 1945 all plans for the invasion of Japan were cancelled and new plans for the occupation of Japan were prepared. These plans were based on the premise that the division would land in the Nagasaki area, prepared for a combat landing over beaches, or prepared to land over docks in the event that there was no opposition. Training for the occupation commenced shortly after receipt of orders and included training in the use of cold-weather clothing, duty of military police on occupation duties, and special schools such as Motor Transport, Cooks and Bakers, and orientation of personnel.

c. Organization - In general, the division was organized along the rather standard lines used in previous amphibious operations. The task organization included three (3) Regimental Combat Teams, Artillery Group, Second Tank Battalion, Engineer Group, Service Troops, and Division Troops. During this period, in accordance with a directive from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, assault platoons were organized and the Division Reconnaissance Company was reorganized and reequipped according to a new T/O sent out by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. The artillery regiment also reorganized two (2) of its battalions in accordance with directives from higher authority so that it had three (3) 105mm Howitzer battalions and one (1) 155mm Howitzer Battalion.

6. Advance Reconnaissance of the objective - It was learned from higher headquarters that it would be possible to send an advance party to the target area for the purpose of making preparations to receive the division on its arrival. On 16 September, 1945, an advance reconnaissance party from the division arrived in Nagasaki. This party consisted of one (1) officer from the G-3 Section, one (1) officer from the G-4 Section, one (1) Japanese language officer and one (1) officer from each Regimental Combat Team. This reconnaissance party accompanied a VMR reconnaissance party. Upon its arrival in Nagasaki, this party made preliminary preparations for the landing of the division in the Nagasaki area and established initial liaison with Japanese authorities. It also conducted a survey of selected landing areas, commenced selection and preparation of suitable billets, and collection of all available information on the water supply, electricity, sanitation and other local conditions.
PART I - COMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT (CONT'D)

a. Occupational Operations

(1) The Division commenced loading in ships of TRANSRON 12 on 10 September, 1945. Loading was completed and the Division sailed on 17 September, 1945. The Division arrived and commenced debarking at NAGASAKI on 23 September, 1945 after an uneventful voyage. The advance reconnaissance party reported aboard the USS CAMBRIA (Flagship) immediately on arrival of the Division and furnished much helpful information.

(2) Initially the plan called for the Division to occupy the NAGASAKI Harbor area and carry out its assigned mission in that area. The Division commenced unloading on 23 September, 1945 and completed the task on 29 September, 1945. The Division Command Post opened ashore in the NAGASAKI Customs House at 0900 on 25 September, 1945. Intensive patrolling was initiated throughout the occupied area and the development of plans for extending the zone of occupation continued.

(3) Upon completion of the necessary reconnaissance, Regimental Combat Team 8 was moved to HYAKUHO in Central KYUSHU. At this time a reconnaissance party of experienced field officers was sent to Southern KYUSHU to make a survey of facilities and Japanese forces and installations thereat with the view to extending the 8th Marines area of responsibility to include KAGOSHIMA KEN and to have Regimental Combat Team 2 occupy MIYAZAKI KEN and a small part of KAGOSHIMA KEN.

(4) Regimental Combat Team 2 commenced movement to Southern KYUSHU by echelon on 26 October, 1945 and completed the movement on 13 November, 1945. It should be emphasized that the movements of Regimental Combat Team 2 and Regimental Combat Team 8 were facilitated by the fact that advance reconnaissance had established the necessary liaison with the Japanese in the areas concerned and had provided the regiments concerned with much data relative to the mission at hand.

(5) By 14 November, 1945, the Division had completed occupation of its entire zone as initially assigned, and was continuing its mission of checking on compliance of the surrender terms and the disposition of enemy material and equipment on the mainland, and had further initiated action to execute the same missions on outlying islands. OSHIMI GUNTO was occupied on 22 November, 1945 and KOSHIKI REITO on 23 November, 1945. On 24 November, 1945, Regimental Combat Team 6 commenced to take over the area of responsibility of the First Marine Division, which move was scheduled for completion by 10 December, 1945. By 10 December, 1945, the Second Marine Division was
scheduled to have occupied all of KYUSHU and the outlying islands of
the south and west coasts thereof, with the exception of YUKOHA KEN
and OITA KEN. These two KENS were held by the 32d Infantry Division.

1. Japanese compliance with surrender terms - In general, the
Japanese compliance with surrender terms was found to be excellent,
and no trouble was experienced with the Japanese except for minor
difficulties occasioned largely by the lack of understanding on
the part of the Japanese of exactly what was expected of them, and
the language barrier.

f. Supply, Equipment, and I. stics -

(1) Planning -

(a) General -

(11) Logistical planning for the invasion of Japan
began on 26 June, 1945. During July and the early part of August,
information was received concerning tentative allocations of shipboard
preloads for landing ships, and general mounting instructions for
rations, engineer supplies, cold-weather clothing, and ammunition.
Based on the above information, preliminary estimates of supply and
shipping requirements for mounting the Division were made. The first
tentative draft of Fifth Amphibious Corps Administrative Order
Number 5-45, dated 4 August, 1945, was received on 13 August, 1945.
Planning for the invasion of Japan ceased immediately after the
cessation of hostilities against the Japanese.

(21) The planning phase for the occupation of Japan
began on 17 August, 1945, with the receipt of a dispatch containing
a warning order from the Commanding General, Sixth Army, to the
Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps with the Second Marine
Division as an ‘information addressee’. Information contained in the
above directive was such that a considerable amount of preliminary
planning could be completed prior to actual receipt of an order from
Fifth Amphibious Corps.

(31) On 26 August, this Division was informed by
Fifth Amphibious Corps that the Division would commence embarkation
about 20 September, 1945.

(41) Based on the above directives, and on Fifth
Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 subsequently received,
Division Administrative Order No. 32-45 was promulgated. In the
preparation of this order, attention was paid to the two possible
type of landing of the Division, the type, an assault landing across
beaches and unloading in a harbor alongside wharves. In general, the
principles of combat loading were adhered to. Division supplies were
carried by the regimental combat teams and each was so equipped,
supplied, and loaded as to be self sustaining if necessary.
(b) Division Quartermaster

(1') The Division Quartermaster had been informed as to the quantities and types of supplies and equipment to be carried, in accordance with the Sixth Army warning order. These supplies had been procured and most had been hauled to the staging areas prior to receipt of Fifth Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45. Such minor adjustments as were required were made upon receipt of the Corps order.

(2') In view of the disposition of Division supplies among the regimental combat teams, the distances which might separate the combat teams, and the anticipated difficulties of truck transportation over the inadequate road net in the NAGASAKI area, the supply plan provided for the following:

(a') Each Regimental Combat Team to establish its own dumps from supplies unloaded from its shipping and to subsist and supply itself from such dumps with the aid of attached supply and service personnel.

(b') Division Headquarter and Division Troops to be initially subsisted and supplied by one Regimental Combat Team.

(c') During the initial phase, the Division Quartermaster to exercise overall supervision of the issue of supplies, to anticipate future needs and to submit timely requisitions.

(d') At the earliest practicable date, after future employment of the Division became known, the Division Quartermaster would assume control over all Division supplies and resume normal operations.

(e') Upon the arrival of resupply shipping at NAGASAKI, the Division Quartermaster would take over all supplies unloaded and establish a Division dump.

(e) Motor Transport

(1') Subsequent to the OKINAWA operation, an extensive program of vehicle maintenance was carried out. As a result of this program, all vehicles in the Division were in good mechanical condition at the time of embarkation.

(2') At the time of embarkation, virtually all motor transport equipment was brought up to table of allowance strength.
(a) Engineer –

(1') Information available for engineer planning was meager. This was due to the lack of information regarding damage to the city of Nagasaki caused by the atomic bomb.

(2') Inasmuch as all organizational equipment of the Engineer Battalion was to be embarked, this battalion was prepared to execute any mission for which it might be designated.

(c) Transport Quartermaster –

(1) A school for unit transport quartermasters was conducted under the direction of the Divisional Transport Quartermaster. As a result, all units had officers trained in transportation duties for the preparation of loading plans and supervising of loading.

(2') Shipping allocations for mounting the Division were not made available until six (6) days before the commencement of embarkation. The limited time available was a distinct handicap in the planning of the loading.

(f) Shore Party and Ships' Platoons –

(1') Prior to embarkation, the Division Shore Party was organized from the Second Pioneer Battalion and the 43d Naval Construction Battalion to form two (2) shore party groups of three (3) teams each. The Pioneer Battalion, trained in shore party operations and organized to function as the nucleus of a Division shore party, formed one (1) shore party group. The 43d Naval Construction Battalion, trained in shore party operations prior to attachment to this Division, formed the second shore party group. Communication, medical evacuation, and military police personnel were provided by the 2d Assault Signal Company, 2d Medical Battalion, and 2d Military Police Company.

(2') Provisions were made for cargo handlers aboard ships (ships' platoons) to be provided from troops embarked aboard each ship on the basis of four (4) officers and eighty (80) enlisted on each AKA or APA, two (2) officers and twenty (20) enlisted on each LST, and one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted on each LSM.

(2) Supplies and Equipment –

(a) This Division arrived in Nagasaki on 23 September, 1945, with the following quantities of supply:

- Class I: 30 days supply
- Class II: 30 days supply
- Class III: 15 days supply
- Class IV: 30 days supply
- Class V: 3 U/F (APPAC)
Arrival of initial resupply shipping was as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>11 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>29 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>11 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>29 October</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Although this Division has never suffered from an acute shortage of vital supplies, the status of resupply has been somewhat less than adequate. Unexpected delays in arrival of resupply shipping resulted in critical shortages of certain items of Classes I, II, and III, principally housekeeping supplies and white gasoline. Lack of balance and variety in resupply shipments of Class I has resulted in shortages of some foods needed to provide varied menus. At times only six (6) of the usual fifteen (15) varieties of meat products in the "K" type rations have been available. Practically no fresh provisions were received during the first two (2) months of occupation. Some supplies, notably construction materials for repairing housing facilities and powdered bleach for water purification were requisitioned from Japanese sources.

(c) Adequate engineer equipment is available to perform all light construction and repair tasks which have been assigned. The engineer units are organized for combat tasks and are therefore not fully prepared to expeditiously perform large construction projects.

(d) The motor transport situation is satisfactory. The attachment of an Army Quartermaster truck company has augmented the organic divisional motor transportation to such an extent that each regimental combat team is provided with a much needed truck company, and sufficient transportation remains to render adequate support to ship unloading activities.

(e) The nature of the mission of this Division has required a considerable movement of troops from the NAGASAKI area to other localities. Troop movements have been successfully executed through the use of existing rail and water transportation facilities. Overland movement of troop units by vehicles has been necessarily reduced to a minimum in view of inadequate roads and bridges to support heavy traffic.

(f) Adequate logistical support of units outside the NAGASAKI area has been maintained principally by rail and by water. These lines of supply have been found sufficient to meet all supply requirements of the units concerned.
h. Special Features -

(1) Naval Gunfire -

(a) Naval Gunfire personnel were trained by the Naval Gunfire Training Section at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters.

(b) Plans were made for Naval Gunfire Support of this Division in accordance with Annex (C) to Operation Plan No. 2-45, Fifth Amphibious Corps. However, as a result of the peaceful attitude of the Japanese, the plan was modified by Commander Task Group 54.3 cancelling all ship assignments, fire support areas and zones of responsibility.

(c) When elements of this Division initiated landings at NAGASAKI, Naval Gunfire Support was available on call, under the control of Commander Task Group 54.3. Three (3) destroyers and one (1) cruiser were available.

(d) The Naval Gunfire Control net was secured at 1545 on Apr 1 Day (23 September, 1945) when it became apparent that there was no need for Naval Gunfire Support.

(2) Air Support -

(a) The first information as to the probable air support task organization for the operations was outlined in Annex (C) to Operation Plan No. 2-45, Fifth Amphibious Corps, and dated 7 September, 1945. The anticipated task force consisted of approximately eighteen (18) VF and twelve (12) VTB type aircraft to be available for A-Day strikes.

(b) On A-Day, Division SAR and SAO nets were opened with CTF 54.1.10 at 0930. No CAP was on station over target. All Air Support nets were secured at 1500 on A-Day. No requests for Air Support were received from Division units and no requests were made to COMASCU - 9.

(3) Artillery -

(a) Planning for the scheduled assault on Japan did not reach regimental level prior to the time that the assault was cancelled. Training, however, coincided with other Division training. The Tenth Marines were organized with one (1) battalion of 155mm howitzers and three (3) battalions of 105mm howitzers. While the Division was on SAIPAN, firing could be conducted by only one (1) battery at a time and this firing was confined to an extremely small area. Conditions were so congested that it became obvious that no artillery unit could possibly train satisfactorily on SAIPAN. To accomplish necessary service practices it was decided to attempt to conduct battalion service practices on some nearby sparsely inhabited island and a regimental practice in conjunction with Fifth
Amphibious Corps artillery on GUAM. As a result of this fact the S-3 of the Tenth Marines and the G-3 of the Division made an aerial reconnaissance of the Northern MARINAS in early July. This reconnaissance indicated that AGRIHAN ISLAND offered some possibilities for artillery training. The matter was discussed with COMMARINAS and authority granted to make a ground reconnaissance of the area under consideration. A reconnaissance party sailed for AGRIHAN on 14 July and returned on 21 July. The Second and Third Battalions of the Tenth Marines sailed for AGRIHAN on 30 July, conducted battalion firing problems thereon, and returned to SAIPAN on 16 August. Before further training could be conducted in this area the assault on Japan was cancelled and the Division artillery commenced training for the occupation of Japan. The Tenth Marines trained for the occupation along lines similar to the infantry organizations. Upon landing in Japan and finding no opposition likely, the Tenth Marines was assigned an area of responsibility and performed routine occupation duties.

(b) Had it been necessary for this Division to land in assault the artillery support would have been handicapped by two (2) factors. First, the artillery has insufficient opportunity to train and, second, the artillery had little or no opportunity to conduct firing problems in conjunction with the supported infantry.

(4) Intelligence -

(a) Mission - The change from plans for an invasion to plans for the occupation of Japan necessitated a considerable change in the mission assigned the intelligence agencies of this command. The primary mission of intelligence was redirected from securing purely combat intelligence to furnishing the intelligence necessary in establishing control of the Japanese armed forces and civil population and imposing therein the prescribed surrender terms.

(b) Intelligence Plan - On the basis of this mission a G-2 Plan was completed, outlining the duties of the G-2 and S-2 Sections as specifically as possible, and directing their efforts towards securing information concerning:

(1) The status of demobilization and disarmament of the Japanese forces.

(2) Intelligence targets, i.e., military, civil and industrial installations, personalities, agencies, and records.

(3) Counterintelligence data.
(4) The general attitude of the civilian population

(c) Organization - The G-2 Plan also included an explanation of the manner in which it was believed necessary to reorganize the G-2 Section to perform the mission with the personnel available.

(1) Operational Intelligence - The administrative or office personnel of the G-2 Section were given the responsibility of collating, processing and disseminating the intelligence secured by all agencies. This included preparation of daily reports, maintaining lists of intelligence targets which had been examined or which should be examined, dispatching detachments for special or routine investigations of intelligence targets, checking Japanese information for accuracy, examining political and economic trends, etc.

(2) Language Section - Anticipating the continuous and varied employment of the limited number of language personnel at the disposal of the Division, the Language Section was subdivided into various specialty groups as follows:

(a) Order of Battle.
(b) Civil Intelligence.
(c) Military Intelligence.
(d) Technical Intelligence.
(e) Headquarters Pool

In addition two (2) language officers and one (1) enlisted man were attached to each combat team.

(3) The API Section - This section was expected initially to process all aerial photographs received for unreported enemy information. API personnel were to be utilized in collating road, terrain, and defensive information. In addition, the section was assigned the responsibility of securing and distributing maps for the Division.

(4) The Scout & Observer Section - It was planned to use the Scouts and Observers for maintaining the G-2 Radio Net, and for special patrolling and reconnaissance, etc.

(5) Counter-intelligence Corps Detachment - The CIC Detachment was closely integrated with the functioning of the G-2 Section operating under instructions issued by higher headquarters.

(6) The Photographic Section - The Photographic Section was assigned a considerable number of intelligence missions
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PART I - COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT (CONT'D).

in addition to those required by the Public Information Section, Complete coverage of all military installations and many civil targets was planned.

(7') The Mapping and Reproduction Section: This group was prepared to provide the necessary revised mosaics, maps, and other material of like nature needed in preparation for and during the occupation.

(a) Functioning - In actual practice the plan and organization outlined above has proved extremely satisfactory with some changes. The orderly progression of the occupation, the greatly expanded zones of action of this organization, and practical experience in carrying out assigned missions have resulted in some modifications. Of these the following are most noteworthy:

(1') The Technical Intelligence Group was found unnecessary due to the appearance of specially trained Technical Teams from higher echelons.

(2') The lack of trained Language personnel and the constantly increasing demand for them necessitated that the Civil and Military Intelligence Groups be pooled and augmented with attachments from Corps. Personnel from either group has been used to perform any mission arising.

(3') Little use was found for the Scout and Observer Section, and the majority of the personnel have been used to augment the S-2 Sections of the Artillery Regiment.

(4') Although additional Language personnel have been assigned to the S-2 Section from Corps, the number available is still insufficient. This is particularly true since a number of the present personnel must be utilized for non-intelligence activities.

(5) Procurement -

(a) The Procurement Board was formed 24 September, 1945. The Board consisted of the G-4 as chairman, the Signal, Engineer and Medical Officers as members.

(b) On 1 October, 1945, a Secretary was added to the board. The Procurement Board was re-organized on 8 October, 1945. A Procurement Section was established consisting of a Lieutenant Colonel as Chief of Section, a Major as Executive Officer, a Captain in charge of the Real Estate Subsection, a Captain in charge of the Supply Subsection, a Transportation Subsection, and an Administrative Subsection.
(c) These subsections conducted surveys, investigated G-2 reports of critical materials and maintained a continuous check on the Liaison Committee's ability to comply with demands. Many instances were found where the War Council Government was not as well informed as to the amount and location of materials in the Ken as was the Supply subsection of Procurement. This lack of information is attributed to the desire of the Government to avoid using the materials of large concerns such as Mitsubishi, Misui and Kawanami.

(d) Difficulty was encountered with the Mitsubishi interests in that they would obey the Government orders only if they were a direct result of orders from the occupation forces.

(e) As of 31 October, 1945, the Division had procured from the Japanese Liaison Committee approximately $24,000 worth of materials and $10,000 worth of rentals.

(f) Inventory, safeguarding and disposition of surrendered material —

(a) Surrendered material of the Japanese Armed Forces in the area of responsibility of the Second Division was reported by location and inventory as required by the Terms of Surrender through the branch of the Japanese forces having cognizance of such materials. These reports were initially consolidated by the G-3 section and published in the G-3 periodic report. Intelligence sections in each RCT area of responsibility then checked locations and inventories as far as possible.

(b) Initially, all items in the Nagasaki area that could be moved, were collected in warehouses pending further instructions for disposition. These warehouses were placed under guard and records kept of all items received. Upon landing, stores of surrendered material were under Japanese guards. As the occupation forces expanded in their areas of responsibility certain installations were taken over and placed under guard by occupation forces. At present some dumps are still under Japanese guard.

(c) Japanese inventories in general were found to be correct. Numerous dumps have been discovered through patrol activity of which no report was made by Japanese sources. In most cases it is believed that such errors were unintentional.

(d) On 25 October, 1945, a Disposition Section was organized in the Division and one in each RCT. These sections have been issued definite instructions in regard to disposing of all Japanese surrendered material.

(e) In general, all weapons and material made for combat only are being destroyed; these materials that have a civilian use are either used by the occupation forces or are returned to the Japanese to assist in the reestablishment of their civilian economy.
(f) At present, the processing and disposition of surrendered material is being affected by RCTs in the division area under current instructions and by the Disposition sections. Japanese labor, transportation and material are being used to affect disposition of all surrendered stores. The disposition sections supervise Japanese labor and render weekly reports of progress which are consolidated by the Division Disposition Section and forwarded to V Amphibious Corps.

(7) Military Government -

(a) During the planning stage, there were assigned to the division a special staff section of four military government officers. Just prior to embarkation from Saipan an army military government group was assigned to augment this staff section. This group consisted of eleven (11) officers having various specialist ratings but lacked all organization equipment and all enlisted personnel provided for in its table of organization. Upon landing and assuming occupational duties, it became almost immediately evident that a military government organization embracing a separate staff and operational group and divided in the particular specialist categories provided for in this group was not suited to efficiently meet the occupational situation encountered. Accordingly all available military government personnel were integrated into a single special staff section and assignments made to fields where the services of military government officers were needed without regard to previous classifications. As the area of actual occupation was enlarged and separate areas of responsibility assigned to the different regiments, separate military government groups were organized and attached to these units and areas. To enable this expansion, additional military government officers were assigned to the Division by the V Amphibious Corps so that the Division finally had a total of about 35 such officers. These groups varied according to the particular needs of the unit and area and ranged from one to five (5) officers in each group. A specialist staff was maintained at Division Headquarters to exercise general supervision over these groups and insure uniformity of policy and operation. Because military government was to a large extent pioneering in the development of policies and methods of operation, the Division group continued to function as an operating group in regard to KYUSUI KEN, in addition to carrying out its supervisory functions. In this way, it was possible for this group to develop operational technique and then direct the application of this technique by the subordinate groups. This experimentation was made necessary by the absence of specific operational directives from higher headquarters in the field of military government.
(b) Military government operations to date have in general related to the following matters:

(1) Utilizing the resources of the local community to meet the needs of the occupation forces. At the very start, this consisted of the procurement of coolie labor for unloading the ships, cleaning up the areas occupied by the troops, and similar tasks. Later, the demand steadily increased for skilled laborers, such as carpenters, glaziers, plumbers, roofers, electricians and the like. Great difficulty was initially encountered in securing the services of an adequate number of skilled workers. In order to more efficiently utilize the available manpower, military government assumed the task of supervising projects as a whole, allocating previously procured materials and employing native architects and labor supervisors. During the greater part of this period, the occupation forces have employed in the NAGASAKI city area alone, from one to two thousand unskilled and from two to three hundred skilled workers daily. The units outside this area employ an equal or larger number of workers daily. In addition to supplying this labor directly through military government, the local municipal government required the private corporations owning certain buildings in which our troops were located to provide additional labor to make such buildings habitable. Several hundred skilled workers were utilized daily under military government supervision on these projects.

(2) Improving the health conditions of the area so as to prevent the outbreak of any diseases which might injuriously affect our troops. This program included water purification, instituting and supervising proper waste disposal systems for garbage and night soil, supervising the setting up of a workable medical reporting system, and the fitting out of a demonstration hospital where local medical personnel will work under the direction and supervision of military government. To enable the working out of this extensive public health program, the division surgeon assigned additional personnel to work under the direction of the military government medical officer.

(3) Complete survey of the industrial establishments, governmental structure, public utilities and educational institutions of the area.

(4) Assisting in the rehabilitation of the local economic structure in line with policies laid down by SCAP. The fishing industry was re-established and operations started within ten (10) days of the landing of the occupation forces. Local transportation was revived, including both inland sea transport, rail and motor transport. Numerous industries, ranging from salt manufacture, food processing and clothing manufacture to ship construction were assisted to recommence operations. Price control was exercised over all establishments patronized by members of the
PART I - COMMANDING GENERAL'S BACH REPORT (CONT'D).

occupation forces. Stories complying with all military directives were permitted to display signs denoting such approval. The rehabilitation of public utilities were supervised and assisted.

(5') Supervision of the local system insofar as Japanese are charged with offenses against the occupying forces. Each case is individually investigated and disposed of only under the close supervision and direction of military government.

(6') Supervising the carrying out of MCP directives and policies by the local government in connection with repatriation, education and similar fields. This involves checking all directives received by or made by the local prefectural governments, and also supervising the actual operations of the local authorities in carrying out these directives at ports of embarkation, in the schools and wherever such operations are carried out.

1. Conclusion

(1) In reviewing the difficulties and problems which confronted this division on its arrival in JAPAN, there are a number of matters which are worthy of particular attention.

(2) The first is the behavior of the command as a whole. No attempt need be made to describe the feelings that would be normal to a division arriving in JAPAN on occupation duty and the behavior that such feelings might be expected to produce in a victorious army. However, it is a matter of record that instances of crimes against Japanese nationals were so few as to be astonishing. There are a number of reasons for this, one of course being the inability of the average American to commit such crimes in cold blood. In addition to that characteristic there was another very important reason, namely; specific training for occupational duties. It is believed that the schools which were held on the duties of an occupation force and the formation of one trained military police company in each regiment were in no small way contributing factors to the lack of crime during the occupation. These schools included military police duties, military discipline and courtesy, and a study of the Japanese people, customs and geography.

(3) Special mention should also be made of the work of the division medical personnel and the remarkably low incidence of sick - less than one (1) percent previous training, plus the initiative and energy of the medical staff, produced results. Confronted with bomb shattered cities, a bewildered population, contaminated water supply, endemic diseases, and the operation of
of two repatriation ports — all the necessary items to produce an epidemic — the medical corps turned to and did an outstanding job. The low sick rate, a potable water supply and the establishment of a Japanese hospital in NAGASAKI under division direction all speak for the way in which the job was done.

(4) The task of disposing of enemy surrendered material, an enormous one at best, was further complicated by the reduction of the effective strength of the division and the transfer home of key personnel. The number of dumps to be guarded placed a strain on the division which was alleviated to a degree by the use of Japanese guards. The use of Japanese guards with surprise visits by Marine patrols did much to save manpower and still permitted effective accomplishment of the "...

(5) Language personnel, as mentioned elsewhere in this report, were insufficient. When a division is scattered as this one necessarily has been it is obvious that more language personnel should be provided in order to carry out the job assigned most efficiently.

(6) Maximum use of Japanese facilities, labor, and governmental organization consistent with the situation at hand has been made as directed by SCA. Inquestionably, the occupation has been simplified in this manner, and in general little trouble was experienced.
ANNEX (A)

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 00714
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 57
2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
3 October, 1945.

Map: See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Opn Plan No 14.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Opn Plan No 14.

1. See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Opn Plan No 14 and 4-2 Studies and information issued separately.

2. 2d Mar Div, Reinf, at 0900, on 5 Oct 45, extend zone of responsibility to include OMURA SHI and immediate vicinity and KUMAMOTO SHI and immediate vicinity, establish occupational control of OMURA SHI, and initiate movement of occupation troops to KUMAMOTO, in order to further carry out the enforcement of surrender terms. See Annex (A) (Operation Overlay).

3. (a) RCT 2 occupy assigned area of responsibility and continue to carry out assigned missions. Be prepared on order to occupy that area of responsibility now assigned to RCT 6.

(b) RCT 6 occupy assigned area of responsibility and continue to carry out assigned missions. Be prepared on order to move by ship from NAGASAKI Area. Assigned area of responsibility to be occupied by RCT 2 on order.

(c) RCT 8 at 0900, on 5 Oct 45, occupy OMURA with a minimum of one (1) company, reinforced, and establish occupational control of OMURA SHI and immediate vicinity; initiate movement of RCT 8, less one company, reinforced, to KUMAMOTO for the purpose of occupying KUMAMOTO SHI and immediate vicinity and carry out assigned missions.

(d) Arty Gp occupy the assigned area of responsibility and carry out missions previously assigned to RCT 8.

(e) 2d Tk Bn - Normal. Support RCT 2 on call in occupational duties.

(f) Engr Gp - Normal.

(g) Serv Trs - Normal.

(h) Div Trs - Normal.
Serial 00714
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 57

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(x) (1) Continue reconnaissance throughout areas of responsibility and locate all installations or dumps of military nature not previously identified or located. Guard (if required by paragraph 3. (x) (2) below), inventory and report same.

(2) Guard (continue guarding) any Japanese dump or installation of immediate or potential danger to our forces. Japanese guards will suffice when the installation has been rendered harmless (as in the case of Arty positions when breach blocks are in our custody, and small arms are removed).

(3) Maintain surveillance over Japanese guards by patrol, or otherwise if required.

(4) Maintain inventories and make surprise checks of items guarded by Japanese in order to insure the security of the guarded items.

(5) Secure, inventory, and guard controlled items of Japanese equipment as follows:

- Sabers, swords, pistols, watches, flags, binoculars. (This does not apply to personally owned watches).

Under no circumstances will these items be issued or disposed of.

(6) Prepare and forward to this Headquarters lists (five (5) copies) of all Japanese installations, dumps, and guards on same within areas of responsibility, and show thereon the following:

- Guarded by (Japanese Unit, Marine Corps Unit).
- Under surveillance by (Patrol, Fixed Guard Post).
- No guard (reason no guard required).

These lists are to be compiled upon the initial locating of the installation or dump, and will be kept up to date by the prompt forwarding of current corrections.
Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 57

(7) Neither civilians, nor their private dwellings will be searched except by Japanese Civil Police or on order of this Headquarters.

(8) Continue such activity relative to occupation, enforcement of surrender terms, and readiness for combat as laid down in 2d Mar Div Operation Plan No 14.

4. See Administrative Order No 58 and current instructions as issued.

5. (a) See Annex (H) (Signal Communication) to Ops Plan No 14.

(b) Command Posts:

2d Mar Div, Reinf - Customs House, NAGASAKI. (94.5-62.2)
RCT 2 - Kamigo Barracks, NAGASAKI. (94.1-58.7)
RCT 6 - Mitsubishi Shipyard Office Building, NAGASAKI. (93.3-61.3)
RCT 8 - Communication Building, ISAHAYA Airfield. (16.4-75.5)
Arty Gp - Naval Barracks, ISAHAYA Airfield. (15.3-75.1)
2d Tk Bn - FUJIBORI. (91.1-55.5)
Engr Gp - (94.85-61.45)
Serv Trs - (94.05-61.1)
Div Trs - (94.5-62.2)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. F. GGOOD, Jr.,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Annex:
(A) (Operation Overlay)
Serial 00714
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 57

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OFFICIAL:

TAXIS

3
Operation Order
82nd AR Div No. 58
7 October, 1945.

Maps: See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Operation Plan No 14.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Operation Plan No 14.

1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Operation Plan No. 14 and G-2 Studies and Information issued separately.

(b) Elements of the V Amphibious Corps continue to occupy additional areas and to enlarge that portion of KUSHU under surveillance and control of occupation forces.

2. The 82nd Mar Div, Reinf, in addition to developing the occupation of assigned areas of responsibility, will defend against and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy any hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:

(a) Maintaining at all times in each regimental area of responsibility a force of at least one (1) Battalion prepared to move on two (2) hours notice, with one (1) Company of such Battalion motorized, prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.

(b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the Division, a minimum of 75% of the command during hours of darkness.

(c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each separate billeting area, and area of responsibility.

(d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces, or prevent the execution of assigned missions.

For areas of responsibility, see Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order No. 57.

3. (a) RCT-2 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone will be attached to RCT for execution of this plan.
Serial 00716
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 58

(b) RCT 6 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone will be attached to RCT for execution of this plan.

(c) RCT 8 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone will be attached to RCT for execution of this plan.

(d) Arty Gp will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone will be attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan. Be prepared to move as directed and to provide Arty support to elements of the Div on order.

(e) 2d Tk Bn attached to RCT 2 for execution of this plan.

(f) Engr Gp attached to RCT 2 and RCT 6 in accordance with the area of responsibility in which billets are located.

(g) Serv Gp attached to RCT 2 and RCT 6 in accordance with the area of responsibility in which billets are located.

(h) Div Trs attached to Arty Gp, RCT 2, and RCT 6 in accordance with the area of responsibility in which billets are located.

(x) (1) Plans will divide the areas of responsibility into sectors, and will show for each area of responsibility the following:

Sector responsibility.
Unit retained within area of responsibility in accordance with this order.
Plan of billet defense.
Serial 00716
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 58

(2) Regiments will be prepared to move on order to the support of other divisional units, and to this purpose will conduct reconnaissance of road nets throughout respective and adjacent areas of responsibility.

(3) Plans to be submitted to this Headquarters prior to 12 October, 1945, and rehearsal of defense plans to be commenced by that date, and continued weekly thereafter.

(4) Where rehearsals of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese nationals to become unduly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of the drill.

4. See Administrative Order No 58 and current instructions as issued.

5. See Operation Order No 57.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUHAT,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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SECRET 30
Serial 00721
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div, Rein, 2d Mar Div No 69
In the field
11 October, 1945

Maps: See Annex (A) (Intelligence) (to be issued).

TASK ORGANIZATION
2d Mar Div, Rein - Maj Gen HOWT, USMC.

(a) RCT 2 - Col QUTAS, USMC.

2d Mar (less Vet as Directed)
Co C 2d MT Bn
Co B 2d Med Bn
Co A 2d Engr Bn
1st Plt Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plt Serv Co C 1st Serv Bn
1st Plt Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
2d Tk Bn

(b) RCT 6 - Col WILLIAMS, USMC.

6th Mar
Co A 2d MT Bn
Co A 2d Med Bn
Co B 2d Engr Bn
3d Plt Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
2d Plt Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
2d Plt Smp Co 2d Serv Bn
2d Plt Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
1 SP Com Party

(c) RCT 8 - Col McFARLAND, USMC.

8th Mar
Co B 2d MT Bn
Co E 2d Med Bn
Co C 2d Engr Bn
3d Plt Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
3d Plt Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
3d Plt Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
Det 2d Mar as Directed
Div Bn Co (less Vet)

Det 111 Mill Serv Teams at:
KUMAMOTO
MIYAZAKI
YAGOSHIIMA
Operation Order
27 Div Opn No 59

(a) Arty Grp - Col CLAY, USMC.

10th Mar
2nd Amh Trk Co
Co A 20th Amh Trk Bn (Prov)
1st Com Party
Det Div Rct Co

(e) Engr Grp - Lt-Col HARTER, USMC.

24 Engr Bn (less Co A, B and C)
43rd NCB
1206th Engr (C) Bn (USA)
20 Plt Engr
26 Plt Bomb Disposal Co USA Engr Bn

(f) Srvy Trg - Col HAVEN, USMC.

2d Srvy Bn (less Dets)
4th Sep Lardy Plt
2d Med Bn (less Dets)
3d Plt 4th Srvy Reg Co
2d LT Bn (less Det)
3658th QM Trk Co (USA)

(g) Div Trg - Lt-Col BUNNET, USMC.

Div Grp Bn (less Dets)
Co D 3d HP Bn (Prov)
28 12th Div Log Plt
54th OIC A232 Det (Area)
426th "C" IC Fd Det (Combat)
36d Fd & Fd Det MIL Govt Co

(h) WKO - Capt LEPPE, USNCR.

1. See Annex (A) (Intelligence) (to be issued) and G-2
   Studies and Information issued separately.

2. The 2d Div, Reinf, will:

(a) Continue execution of assigned missions in
    area now occupied;
(b) At 0700 on 11 October, extend zone of responsibility to include all of Southern KWASHI, less area assigned ANCYA Occupation Force, and initiate patrol surveillance of entire assigned area.

(c) Establish at NIYAZAKI and at KASHIMA, capital of KENS, Marine Detachments commanded by a field officer representing the Commanding General, 2d Mar Div, in carrying out assigned missions;

The above in order to further carry out the enforcement of Surrender Terms.

For areas of responsibility see Annex (B) (Operation Overlay).

3. (a) RCT-2

(i) Continue to carry out previously assigned missions.

(ii) Provide supervisory personnel at NAGASAKI, port of entry of restricted Japanese nationals, and conduct check for weapons, loot and excess food.

(b) RCT-6 - Continue to carry out previously assigned missions.

(c) RCT-8

(i) Continue to carry out previously assigned missions.

(ii) On order, extend area of responsibility to include SUMOTO KEN, NIYAZAKI KEN and KASHIMA KEN (less area assigned ANCYA Occupation Force) and initiate patrol surveillance of this area.

(iii) Establish detachments at NIYAZAKI and at KASHIMA, capital of KENS, to represent the Commanding General, 2d Mar Div, in carrying out assigned missions. NIYAZAKI Detachment to be made up of Detachment of RCT 2 attached to RCT 8.
Serial 007281
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 59

(4) Assume command of VAS Hill Govt units previously established at WAKABOTO, MIYAZAKI and KAGOSHIMA.

(5) Provide supervisory personnel at KAGOSHIMA, port of entry of restricted Japanese Nationals, and conduct check for weapons, loot and excess food.

(6) Initially coordinate surveillance of area of Southern KYUSHU assigned KAGOA Occupation Force with CO that force. Prepare to assume operational control of that force on order.

(d) Art'y Cp - Continue to carry out previously assigned missions.

(e) Engr Cp - Continue normal missions.

(f) Sery Trr - Continue normal missions.

(g) Div Trr - Continue normal missions.

(h) VQG-2 - Continue normal missions. Conduct reconnaissance of airfields in Southern KYUSHU on order, and as directed by this Hq.

(x) (1) Special emphasis will be placed on prevention of looting and the maintenance of a high standard of sanitation.

(2) Commanders concerned will exercise surveillance of areas of responsibility by judicious use of patrols. Minimum patrol strength beyond range of immediate support; one (1) platoon.

(3) Japanese authorities will be required to maintain adequate guards on installations, dumps, and equipment except those involving prescribed items which require direct control by occupation forces. See Annex (A) (Intelligence).
Serial 00731
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 59

(4) For missions relative to enforcement of Surrender Terms, see Annex (D) (Enforcement of Surrender Terms) to 2d Mar Div Operation Plan No 14.

(5) Annex (C) (Implementation of SCAP Directive to Japanese Government dated 4 Oct 45) will be initiated by inspection of all prisons and places of detention within assigned areas and by assumption of control of all records of organizations abolished under terms of that directive. Any effort in the part of any individuals or organizations to circumvent the directive will be immediately reported to this Hq.

(6) Task Group Commanders will keep this Hq advised of projected movements.

4. See Administrative Order No 59 and current instructions as issued.

5. (a) See Annex (D) (Signal Communication) (to be issued).

(b) Command Posts:

2d Mar Div, Reinl - Customs House, NAGASAKI
(1904.50-1062.00)
RCT 2 - Yanagi Barracks, NAGASAKI
(1904.10-1058.70)
RCT 6 - Mitsubishi Shipyard Office
Building, NAGASAKI
(1903.30-1062.50)
RCT 8 - FUKUI
(1901.90-1077.00)
Arty Go - Naval Barracks, ISAJAYA
Airfield
(1916.70-1075.10)
2d Tk Bn - FUKUI
(1901.30-1055.00)
Engr Go - NAGASAKI
(1996.15-1063.40)
Serv Trs - NAGASAKI
(1904.05-1061.10)
Div Trs - Customs House, NAGASAKI
(1904.50-1062.50)
Serial 00721
SECRET

Operation Order
of 15th Div 50 59

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. HUNT
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff

Annexes:
(A) - Intelligence (to be issued).
(B) - Operation Overlay.
(C) - SCAP Directive to Japanese Government dated 4 Oct 45.
(D) - Signal Communication (to be issued).

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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43d MCB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th Inf Div</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Mar Div</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Amph Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Diary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milit Govt Det</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F I L E</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICIAL:

TAXTS

3
Operation Order
3d Mar Div No. 80

ANNEX (A)

INTELLIGENCE

Date: 1300, 25th October, 1945.

1. Summary of Enemy Situation.

(a) See:

(1) CINCPAC-CINCPWG Information Bulletin No. 132-45, Northern KYUSHU.

(2) CINCPAC-CINCPWG Information Bulletin No. 31-45, Southern KYUSHU.

(3) 7-2, 2d Mar Div Order of Battle Information, Division Zone of Responsibility, dated 17 October, 1945, (Appendix No. 1, hereto).

(4) 7-2 Plan, 2d Mar Div, dated 2 September, 1945.

(5) 7-2, 2d Mar Div, Periodic Reports as issued.

Essential Elements of Information:

(a) Determine the location, type, amount and accessibility of all military, naval, and air force installations, material and equipment to be turned over to the Occupation Forces within the Division Zone of Responsibility.

(b) Determine the name, code name or number, war time and present strength, location, chain of command, T/O, T/A, and T/E, names of Commanding Officers and other personalities, and the mission of all military, semi-military, secret and terrorist units.

(c) Determine the number of Japanese officers and men demobilized daily within assigned zone of responsibility.

(d) Determine the location, type, personnel, products and activities, now and during the war, of all civil installations engaged in or connected with the war effort.

(e) Determine if all military material and equipment in the hands of civilians and civilian institutions have been collected by the local authorities.

(f) Determine the names, addresses and present and previous occupations of all personnel dismissed from governmental...
Operation Order
2nd Div No. 59 (Annex (A) - Intelligence).

office since 1 October, 1945.

(g) Determine the name, occupation, race, age, nationality, and charges against any political prisoner of JAPAN who was under protection and surveillance, or detention and imprisonment, and released since 1 October, 1945.

(h) Investigate prominent civil and military personalities for strategic intelligence information.

(i) Determine the general attitude of service and civilian personnel, with respect to cooperation, and acquiescence to surrender terms, or attempts at evasion or violation of Allied requirements.

3. Intelligence Missions:

(a) General Instructions.

(1) All units will:

   a. Secure, investigate and confirm the information listed in paragraph 2, above, within assigned zones of responsibility.

   b. Institute thorough patrolling within assigned zones of responsibility to locate, examine and seize any military, naval, or air force installations, equipment, or material not reported by the Japanese.

4. Measures for Handling Prisoners, Captured Documents and Material:

(a) Interrogation and evacuation:

(1) The assignment of temporary numbers and the custody and transportation of prisoners are the responsibility of the Provost Marshall.

(2) Language Personnel will assist the Provost Marshall in the preparation of POW and/or other tags, and in the compilation of rosters, in the capacity of interpreters only.

(3) Prisoners will be segregated as follows:

   a. Military personnel:

      (1) Commissioned.
Operation Order
1st Mar Div No. 59  (Annex (A) - Intelligence).

(2') Non-commissioned.
(3') Enlisted.

b. Irregulars (armed and semi-armed military civilians).

c. Civilian suspects (persons suspected of executing or contemplating overt or hidden resistance to the occupation, whether as individuals or members of societies).

d. Internees (civilians held solely for the military or technical information they possess).

e. Others (persons apprehended for resistance, disorderly or illegal acts, or other reasons not included in (c)).

(4) The primary objectives of interrogation will be, in the order of priority:

g. To determine the presence and location of Japanese military forces, equipment and supplies in the area.

h. To determine the presence of elements and activities which constitute a potential threat to orderly occupation.

i. To determine the organization and functions of police and other governmental agencies.

(5) The following types of persons will be interrogated as a matter of routine:

a. Selected Army, Navy, and Civilian personnel or disarmed Japanese possessing tactical and CIC information, and data pertinent to the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese forces.

b. Japanese Army, Navy and civilian personnel possessing information of possible CIC interest.

c. Suspects, either civilian or military, such as members of the Black Dragon and terrorist societies or other groups thought to contrive sabotage or secret resistance to the occupation.
Operation Order
3rd War Div No. 59 (Annex (A) – Intelligence).

b. Key personnel of police and governmental agencies.

c. Technical, scientific, economic, financial, etc., experts.

(5) Occupation units will normally interrogate only persons thought to have information of immediate bearing on the mission of the section concerned. Names, positions, and locations of other sections for detailed interrogation in the categories listed above will be reported promptly and regularly to 1-2.

(7) Interrogation procedures will conform to instruction and guides to be issued later.

(b) Documents and technical material:

(1) For the purpose of the occupation phase, documents shall include any and all types of files, records and plans of military, police, governmental, industrial research, and economic organizations and agencies, as well as records of political associations, institutes and societies, military, civil and industrial and scientific studies, manuals and instructions, code books and procedures of military or civilian communications units or departments, diaries and logs of military personnel or units and of scientific and industrial research activities: sketches, blueprints and diagrams of military and industrial installations, equipment and processes, technical photographs, microfilm, and motion pictures; and any other written or reproduced material which may contain information relative to any phase of the Japanese war effort and to the present status of the nations military, industrial, scientific, and political activities. Technical material includes all weapons, munitions, aircraft, vessels, vehicles, optical equipment, radio and electronic equipment, chemical equipment, and machinery of whatever nature employed by the military forces; and industrial and laboratory equipment, machinery and installations, samples, specimens, experimental models, devices of whatever nature employed in production and research by any agency associated with the military forces.

(2) Files, records and all other documents in any quantity, and technical material of any type will not be removed from the location where found until examined
Serial: 00721
SECRET

Operation Order
26 Nor Div No. 59 (Annex (A) - Intelligence).

by a qualified Language Officer. Locations of such items will be reported to C-2 as rapidly as possible. Installations containing such items will be placed under guard until final disposition has been made by or through this Headquarters.

(3) The personal appropriation of documents or technical material is strictly forbidden. Seizure of documents and material may consist of either removal or leaving in place under guard. All documents and material seized must be safeguarded.

a. For list of controlled items see paragraph 2 to Appendix (II) to Annex (J) to 26 Nor Div Adj C No. 58-45.

(4) Documents will be selected for immediate exploitation on the basis of their estimated importance to:

a. Operational intelligence, for information of tactical importance concerning the general Japanese military situation.

b. Intelligence planning, for information required to prepare for the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese military forces.

c. OOR for data on the locations, strengths, equipment and material of the Japanese military forces.

d. Technical intelligence, for information on secret, new or experimental weapons, equipment and material.

e. CIC and Military Government, for information required by these agencies in their establishment of Allied control.

f. Military Intelligence Research, for information necessary to confirm or modify previous intelligence estimates.

(5) Special effort will be made to secure all documents relating to the following:

Operational Order
New 21 Nov 45 (Annex 1) – Intelligence.

1. Scientific and research organizations sponsored by or working for the Japanese government or the military.

2. All police organizations, including security and political police.

3. Important economic and industrial organizations.

4. Institutes, bureaus and agencies devoted to racial, political and similar nationalistic research, education or propaganda.

5. Agencies and persons responsible for war crimes and atrocities.

6. Documents of purely G-2 interest will be made available promptly to G-2, who subject to authorization from G-2, may freeze such documents.

7. All intelligence agencies searching for documents will maintain records of the nature, quantity and location of the types of documents listed in 4 above which they may discover in the course of their search.

8. Documents required by the various Japanese governmental agencies, by essential services and by military organizations for administrative purposes pending demobilization will remain accessible to the Japanese authorities concerned even after seizure.

9. Only documents of immediate general importance to the occupation forces will be forwarded to G-2. They will be forwarded promptly and regularly. Such documents include:

   a. All information on Japanese military units and agencies in the area.

   b. Information on secret and experimental weapons.

   c. Information on individuals, groups, and associations which furnish a potential threat to peaceful occupation.

10. Documents confiscated and removed shall insofar as possible be kept intact in the order in which they are found, technical documents dealing with any piece of

- 6 -

SECRET

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equipment or machinery will not be separated from the material to which they refer.

(11) Documents which are not of immediate general importance to the occupation forces will be screened on the spot. A document report covering the general categories of the documents, place of location, and means of guarding will be forwarded to G-2.

(c) Miscellaneous:

(1) War Trophies:

a. See Appendix II to Annex JIG to 26 Mar Div Adm No. 58-46.

(2) Intelligence Credential Cards:

a. Members of Intelligence Sections within the Amphibious Corps will have in their possession at all times "OFFICIAL EXAMINER" Cards. These cards will be honored by all units of this Command and entitle the duly identified bearer the privilege of searching for and examining intelligence material.

b. Selected Technical Intelligence personnel within the Amphibious Corps have been issued "OFFICIAL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE" Passes. These passes will likewise be honored by all units of this Command and entitle the duly identified bearer the privilege of searching for, examining, and collecting intelligence material upon proper receipting for the collected articles.

c. Bearers of "OFFICIAL EXAMINER" and "OFFICIAL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE" Passes must carry a 26 Mar Div Duty Pass in all cases where for intelligence material is being searched for, examined or collected in restricted areas.

5. Maps and Photographs:

(a) Maps, photographs and other material will be issued without request. Additional information will be disseminated as it becomes available. Special distributions may be requested of G-2.
2. **Strategic Maps:**

- a. Japan Road Map, 1:1,000,000, (Apr 8, 1945).
- d. Central Japan, 1:200,000, (AIRS L571 1944).

3. **City and Town Plans:**

- a. Omura City Plan, 1:10,000, (AIRS 1944).
- c. Isahaya City Plan, 1:10,000, (AIRS 1944).
- d. Kuma City Plan, 1:10,000, (AIRS 1944).
- f. Fukuoka City Plan, 1:10,000, (AIRS 1945).
- h. Kiyosaki City Plan, 1:25,000, (copy of captured Japanese map), (G-2, 2nd Mar Div).

4. **Aerial Photos:**


5. **Counterintelligence Measures:**

(a) **General:**

- See paragraph VII, Div Gen C No. 53-48; Intelligence Doctrine, BCP.

(b) **Counterintelligence Corps personnel:**

- See Appendix No. 4 to annex (A) to 32 Mar Div Cpn Plan No. 14-48, Counterintelligence.
Public Information:

(1) Public Information functions will be conducted in accordance with the policies of GHQ. All elements will second to the accredited press and radio representatives, both organic and attached, every practicable facility.

(2) See Div Gen C No. 4-45, Public Relations SCP.

Reports and Distribution:

(a) Periodic Reports:

(1) 8-3 Periodic Reports will be rendered daily to cover the period 1200-1800, and to reach 8-2 as soon as practicable. (For form, type, and amount of information to be included in the 8-3 Periodic Report, see Appendix.)

(b) Weekly report:

(1) Weekly reports from all 3-3’s will be sent to 8-2 via electrical means each Friday to reach 3-2 not later than 1800. These weekly reports will contain the following information:

a. Total number of Japanese troops who have surrendered individually or in groups during the week.

b. Total number of Japanese troops disarmed and made prisoners during the week.

c. Weekly and cumulative totals of a and b above.

(c) Special reports:

(1) All 8-2’s will submit special reports on the following information to 8-2:

a. Location, description, and inventory of stocks of gold, silver, platinum, and foreign currencies found in military or naval installations.

b. Location, description, and inventory of all types of Japanese arms.
c. Reports on all Chinese Nationals in Regimental Zone of responsibility, to include place of origin, North, South or Central China.

4. Report of confiscation of all monetary and other negotiable assets, documents, pictorial records and film suspected or known to belong to the Nazi party, now in hands of German Nationals.

BY ORDER OF MAJOR GENERAL HUTT:

J. P. JUHA*
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Office:
(I) - C-2, 3d Mar Div Order of Battle Information, Division Zone of Responsibility, dated 17 October, 1945.
(II) - Form and Type of Information Required in C-2 Periodic Reports.

Distribution:
See Annex (X) (Distribution)

OFFICIAL:

JUHA*

SECRET
Operation Order
26 SEP T'61 No. 59.

(Annex (A) - Intelligence)

APPENDIX (A)

GROUP OF BATTLE INFORMATION

O.C.P. OF JAPANESE ARMY GROUND FORCES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Location</th>
<th>Probable Location Oct. 10th</th>
<th>Former Strength Oct 1st</th>
<th>Present Strength Oct 10th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26th Div. HIYOKYOJO Area</td>
<td>KOYAMAZU</td>
<td>12,589</td>
<td>15,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Div. HIYOGOSHI Area</td>
<td>KASUMI</td>
<td>13,366</td>
<td>13,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Div. HITA-慝IBASHI Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145th Div. KURASASHI-Chichi Area</td>
<td>OKUWAN</td>
<td>7,375</td>
<td>2,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154th Div. TSUKO-TAKA area</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,940</td>
<td>2,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th Div. KURASASHI Area</td>
<td>AMAGAKI</td>
<td>16,200</td>
<td>16,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Div. KOSAKI area</td>
<td>KASHI</td>
<td>14,250</td>
<td>14,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212th Div. NAGASAKI-TAKATA area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215th Div. SUKAMOTO area</td>
<td>TSUKO</td>
<td>11,244</td>
<td>2,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303rd Div. ISHI-MARU area</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,225</td>
<td>8,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th Div. YAMAVI area</td>
<td>KASUMA</td>
<td>10,918</td>
<td>10,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122nd Div. KAGAWA area</td>
<td>KAGAWA</td>
<td>5,638</td>
<td>5,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125th Div. OKA area</td>
<td>HITOGOSHI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Div. MAJUSA area</td>
<td>MAJUSA</td>
<td>4,455</td>
<td>4,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th Div. MAJUSA area</td>
<td>MAJUSA</td>
<td>7,513</td>
<td>7,513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A)(14-1)
**Operation Order**

23 Jan/Div 05, 59-45 (Annex (A) - Intelligence - Appendix (I)
Order of Battle Information.

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A. RAGOSHI PREFECTURE O.C.C.

(1) Breakdown of the larger army forces as reported to VAC by the Japanese.

(a) **77th Division** (Reported to be 15% demobilized as of 30 Sep 45)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>GUN or SHI</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>ISEME</td>
<td>AIRA County</td>
<td>1,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Infantry Regt</td>
<td>KOSHIGA</td>
<td>AIRA County</td>
<td>3,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Infantry Regt</td>
<td>ISHINARA</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Infantry Regt</td>
<td>LIAK</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Cavalry Regt</td>
<td>RAGOSHI</td>
<td>RAGOSHI City</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Mountain Infantry Regt</td>
<td>YATCHUZU</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Transport Regt</td>
<td>YOKOHAMA</td>
<td>AIRA County</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Engineer Regt</td>
<td>FUKUOKA</td>
<td>AIRA County</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank Unit</td>
<td>HIYOKA (1)</td>
<td>AIRA County</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Unit</td>
<td>NAGAHAMA</td>
<td>IZU I County</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance Duty Unit</td>
<td>SHIGEOI</td>
<td>Izu County</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Unit</td>
<td>SHO LO</td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Unit</td>
<td>SHO LO</td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Field Hospital</td>
<td>YOKOHAMA</td>
<td>AIRA County</td>
<td>155</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Field Hospital</td>
<td>NOBUKURA</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterinary Hospital</td>
<td>ISUZU</td>
<td>IZU I County</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Division Total 15,640**

(b) **86th Division** (Reported to be 69% demobilized as of 30 Sep 45)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISION HEADQUARTERS</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>GUN or SHI</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>187th Inf Regt</td>
<td>TATSUYAMA</td>
<td>SOKU County</td>
<td>1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190th Inf Regt</td>
<td>KOYAMA</td>
<td>SOKU County</td>
<td>3,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190th Inf Regt</td>
<td>HITAGATA</td>
<td>IRA County</td>
<td>3,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>344th Inf Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>765th Inf Inf En</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>765th Inf Inf En</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>767th Inf Inf En</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83rd Field Army Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Engineer Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Transport Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>480</td>
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<td>Communication Unit</td>
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<td>Chemical Unit</td>
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<td>Medical Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Field Hospital</td>
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<td>4th Field Hospital</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterinary Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) (I) = 2 Division Total 20,523

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### Division Order

**26th Div. No. 50 A** (Annex (A) - Intelligence - Appendix (I))

Order of Battle Information.

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#### (c) 146th Division (Reported 87% demobilized)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Guns or SHI</th>
<th>Strength (1-6ug15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>OKIUCHI</td>
<td>IMA County</td>
<td>943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>421st Inf Regt</td>
<td>HATSUSHI</td>
<td>PAWABE County</td>
<td>3,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>422d Inf Regt</td>
<td>INO</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423rd Inf Regt</td>
<td>HIASHIKAWA</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424th Inf Regt</td>
<td>KAZUKA</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Unit</td>
<td>KAWABE</td>
<td></td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank Unit</td>
<td>KAWABE</td>
<td>PAWABE County</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Unit</td>
<td>KAWABE</td>
<td></td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Unit</td>
<td>KAWABE</td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance Duty Unit</td>
<td>KAWABE</td>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Hospital</td>
<td>KAWABE</td>
<td></td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Division Total 17,427**

#### (d) 208th Division (Reported 18% demobilized)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Guns or SHI</th>
<th>Strength (1-6ug15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>KANAUCHI</td>
<td>HICHI County</td>
<td>1,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510th Inf Regt</td>
<td>KANAUCHI</td>
<td>HICHI County</td>
<td>4,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>511th Inf Regt</td>
<td>TSUKIYAMA</td>
<td>SAKATA City</td>
<td>4,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512th Inf Regt</td>
<td>YUNIOOTO</td>
<td>HICHI County</td>
<td>4,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208th Mountain Artillery Regt</td>
<td>YUNIOOTO</td>
<td>HICHI County</td>
<td>2,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208th Mortar Regt</td>
<td>HAGAYOSHI</td>
<td>HICHI County</td>
<td>1,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank Unit</td>
<td>MOCUEI</td>
<td></td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Unit</td>
<td>ISAKO</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun Co.</td>
<td>SHIRANTAJIRI</td>
<td></td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Unit</td>
<td>YUNIOOTO</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Unit</td>
<td>GOTZUKA</td>
<td></td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**Division Total 23,426**

#### (e) 393rd Division (Reported 10% demobilized)

<table>
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<th>Town</th>
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<th>Strength (1-6ug15)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>397th Inf Regt</td>
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<td>398th Inf Regt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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**Division Total 12,218**

---
### (f) Units presumed to be completely demobilized

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<th>Strength</th>
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<td>4th arty Comm</td>
<td>HAKAH</td>
<td>HIOKI</td>
<td>119</td>
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<td>6th Ind Field Arty Regt</td>
<td>ISHUNI</td>
<td>HIOKI County</td>
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<tr>
<td>20th Heavy Field Arty Regt</td>
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<td>IS. County</td>
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<tr>
<td>25th Heavy Field Arty Regt (31% demobilized)</td>
<td>SHISHI</td>
<td>IS. County</td>
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<tr>
<td>87th Machine Gun Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>37th Tank Bn</td>
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<td>SOC County</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Special Guard Co</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Special Guard Co</td>
<td>IZUMI</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>11thannon Co</td>
<td>ISHI</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>12thannon Co</td>
<td>ISHI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13thannon Co</td>
<td>ISHI</td>
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<tr>
<td>14thannon Co</td>
<td>ISHI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15thannon Co</td>
<td>ISHI</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16thannon Co</td>
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<td>17thannon Co</td>
<td>ISHI</td>
<td>300</td>
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<td>18thannon Co</td>
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### (g) Units partially demobilized (extent indicated by %)

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<th>TOWN</th>
<th>GUN or SHI</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>24th Medium Mortar En</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA City</td>
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<td>25th Medium Mortar En</td>
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<td>KAGOSHIMA City</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st Machine Cannon Co (83%)</td>
<td>CHIFU</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Engineer Unit (4%)</td>
<td>TAKASAGI</td>
<td>SOC County</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd Ind Engineer En (30%)</td>
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<td>SOC County</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62nd Ind Engineer En (29%)</td>
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<td>SOC County</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Ind Engineer En (14%)</td>
<td>TAKASAGI</td>
<td>SOC County</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122nd Ind Engineer En (14%)</td>
<td>TAKASAGI</td>
<td>SOC County</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83rd Signal Regt (5%)</td>
<td>TAKASAGI</td>
<td>SOC County</td>
<td>1,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Field Const. Bn. (16%)</td>
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<td>SOC County</td>
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<tr>
<td>35th Suicide Boat (6)</td>
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<td>AKA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>AKA</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Inf Repl Unit (75%)</td>
<td>TAKASAGI</td>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>50</td>
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</table>
Operation Order
22 Mar Div. No. 89 - Annex (a) - Intelligence - Appendix (I)
Order of Battle Information.

M.Y. ZAKI AREA C.O.B.

(1) A breakdown of our forces as reported to VAC by the Japanese.

(a) 25th Division (Hq in KOBA-YASHI, HISHI-MOROKA-TA GUN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>GUN</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Hq</td>
<td>KOBA-YASHI</td>
<td>HISHI-MOROKA-TA</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Inf Regt</td>
<td>TAKAHAMA</td>
<td>HISHI-MOROKA-TA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th Inf Regt</td>
<td>H.T.</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th Inf Regt</td>
<td>S.TOKA</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th CAV Regt</td>
<td>KOBA-YASHI</td>
<td>HISHI-MOROKA-TA</td>
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<tr>
<td>16th Mt Art Regt</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3,076</td>
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<tr>
<td>26th Eng Regt</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>913</td>
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<td>26th Tr Regt</td>
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<td>Medical Unit</td>
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<td>Chemical Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordnance Unit</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Field Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterinary Hospital</td>
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(b) 154th Division

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<th>STRENGTH</th>
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<td>KOYU GUN</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>466th Inf Regt</td>
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<tr>
<td>476th Inf Regt</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery Unit</td>
<td>TSUKA</td>
<td>KOYU GUN</td>
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<td>Communication Unit</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport Unit</td>
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<td>486</td>
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<td>Ordnance Unit</td>
<td>SUGIYASHI</td>
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(c) 156th Division (Reported 4; demobilized. Division Total 16,894)

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<tr>
<td>454th Inf Regt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery Unit</td>
<td>SHIYOSHI</td>
<td>LIYAZAKI County</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank Unit</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication Unit</td>
<td>KOJU</td>
<td>HISHI-MOROKA-TA County</td>
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<td>Transport Unit</td>
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<td>Ordnance Unit</td>
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<td>Field Hospital</td>
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(d) **212th Division (Reported 90% demobilized)**

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<th>Strength</th>
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<td>KOYU GUN</td>
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<td>516th Inf Regt</td>
<td>TSUNO</td>
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<tr>
<td>517th Inf Regt</td>
<td>SHINCHAKA</td>
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<td>4,434</td>
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<tr>
<td>518th Inf Regt</td>
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<td>4,434</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>TSUNO</td>
<td>KOYU GUN</td>
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<tr>
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<td>KOYU GUN</td>
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<td>Machine Gun Co</td>
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<td>KOYU GUN</td>
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<td>TSUNO</td>
<td>KOYU GUN</td>
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<tr>
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<td>TSUNO</td>
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<td>Transport Unit</td>
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<td>436</td>
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<td>1st Field Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Field Hospital</td>
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**Division Total: 23,426**

(e) **136th AA Regt (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by *)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>33rd Ind Machine Cannon Co</th>
<th>MIYAZAKI GUN</th>
<th>KITA-HORIYAMA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56th Ind Art Co</td>
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<td>''</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th Ind Art Co</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Ind Machine Cannon Co</td>
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<td>21st Ind Machine Cannon Co</td>
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<td>27th Ind Machine Cannon Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>31st Ind Machine Cannon Co</td>
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<td>''</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Ind Machine Cannon Co</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>''</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Ind Machine Cannon Co</td>
<td>KURONOKI</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI GUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Artillery Command Eq (6%)*</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI GUN</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Artillery Intelligence Regt*</td>
<td>YUBOTSUCHI</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI GUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Field Heavy Artillery Regt*</td>
<td>YASUSHI GUN</td>
<td>1,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Field Heavy Artillery Regt*</td>
<td>YASUSHI GUN</td>
<td>1,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Heavy Artillery Ind Bn*</td>
<td>HIROSE</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI GUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43rd Heavy Artillery Ind Bn*</td>
<td>UMEITA</td>
<td>KITA-HORIYAMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Field Artillery Bn</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>''</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Field Artillery Bn</td>
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<td>''</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Ind Inf Arty Bn</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Mortar Bn</td>
<td>HIROSE</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI GUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Mortar Bn (157)</td>
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<td>KITA-HORIYAMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Mortar Bn (157)</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI SHI</td>
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* These units are not under the 136th AA Regt.
Operation Order
28 Apr 45 (Annex (A) - Intelligence - Appendix (I))

(f) Independent Units (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by *)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>GUN or SHI</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>104th Ind Engineer Bn</td>
<td>IJUN</td>
<td>HIOKI GUN</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106th Ind Engineer Bn</td>
<td>MIYAKANOJO</td>
<td>YITA-KORAKATA GUN</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Ind I.T. Bn</td>
<td>SHONAI</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th Ind I.T. Bn</td>
<td>KOYASHI</td>
<td>NISHI-&quot;</td>
<td>808 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th Ind I.T. Bn</td>
<td>MIYAKANOJO</td>
<td>KITA-&quot;</td>
<td>808 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st Signal Regt</td>
<td>SHONAI</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>43rd Signal Regt</td>
<td>IJUN</td>
<td>HIOKA GUN</td>
<td>1,891 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th LofC Sector Unit</td>
<td>KOYASHI</td>
<td>NISHI-KORAKATA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Field Const Unit</td>
<td>SHONAI</td>
<td>KITA-&quot;</td>
<td>GUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Field Const Unit</td>
<td>SHONAI</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Field Duty Unit</td>
<td>YOSHI-TSU</td>
<td>HIASHI</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Land Duty Co</td>
<td>MIYAMOTO</td>
<td>KITA-&quot;</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159th Land Duty Co</td>
<td>YATSUSHIRO</td>
<td>HIASHI-&quot;</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11st &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th LofC Duty Co</td>
<td>KOYASHI</td>
<td>NISHI</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ind Auto Brigade</td>
<td>SHONAI</td>
<td>YITA-&quot;</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Suicide Boat Unit</td>
<td>TAI-KASHIRA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) Special Garrison and Guard Co (probably completely demobilize)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>GUN or SHI</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>204th Special Garr Co</td>
<td>NOBEOKA</td>
<td>NOBEOKA City</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Special Garr Co</td>
<td>ABURATSU</td>
<td>MIKANI NAKA GUN</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Special Guard Co</td>
<td>NOBEOKA</td>
<td>NOBEOKA City</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd &quot;</td>
<td>AKAMA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th &quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(h) MIYAZAKI Regt (of the Kamamoto Repl Div)

Regimental Headquarters | MIYAZAKI | MIYAZAKI City | 84 |
2nd Inf Repl Unit | MIYAKANOJO | KITA-KORAKATA GUN | 203 |

(A) (I) - & SECRET
Operation Order
2d Mar Div No. 59 (Annex (A) – Intelligence – Appendix (I)

(1) Army Hospitals (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>GUN or SHI</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Hospital</td>
<td>KAWANAM</td>
<td>KOYU GUN</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th LofC Hospital</td>
<td>TANO</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; (27)</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th LofC Hospital</td>
<td>KOBAYASHI NISHI MORANAKATA GUN (24)</td>
<td>359</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima Army Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. C.O.E. OF JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCES

A. Army Air Bases in KAGOSHIMA Prefecture

(1) BANSEI Airfield Unit (Reported 99% demobilized). Located in HIROKA County; strength as of 1Aug45 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilots</th>
<th>Trainers</th>
<th>Maintenance</th>
<th>AA Guard</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) CHIRAN Airfield Unit (reported 99% demobilized). Located in KAYAMA County; strength as of 1Aug45 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilots</th>
<th>Trainers</th>
<th>Maintenance</th>
<th>AA Guard</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) KANBYU Airfield Unit (Reported completely demobilized). Located in IBUSHI County; consisted of 30 AA Guard Personnel.

B. Army Airfields in MIYAZAKI KEN

(1) KARASEHARA Airfield Unit (reported 90% demobilized. Located in KOYU County.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilots</th>
<th>Trainers</th>
<th>Maintenance</th>
<th>AA Guard</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) KIWAKI Airfield Unit. Located in MIYAZAKI County.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilots</th>
<th>AA Guard</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) MIYAKANOJO, East Airfield Unit (reported 97% demobilized. Located in MIYAKANOJO City.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilots</th>
<th>Trainers</th>
<th>Maintenance, all 3 fields AA Guard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A) (I) - 8
(4) MIYAKANOJO, West Airfield Unit. Located in MIYAZAKI City (reported 78% demobilized).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pilots</th>
<th>AA Guard</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) NITABARI Airfield Unit (reported 90% demobilized). Located in KOYU County.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilots</th>
<th>Maintenance</th>
<th>AA Guard</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1460</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. JASERO NAVAL KEIPITAI LOCATIONS.

TAKESHITA TO UEKI - West Coast KYUSHU.

This is an incomplete list and will be corrected periodically, as new information is obtained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KEN AND/OR GUN</th>
<th>HIGHER ECHELON</th>
<th>STRENGTH 14 Oct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TAKESHITA</td>
<td>NISHISONOKI GUN</td>
<td>SASERO KEIPITAI</td>
<td>Off 1 5 Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MATSUBABA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITOHATA</td>
<td>NISHISONOKI GUN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MATSUBABA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMOZAKI</td>
<td>NAGASAKI KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NISHISONOKI GUN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPASHIMA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOGI</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSUNABA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUMATSU</td>
<td>NAGASAKI KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KITA GUN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKI</td>
<td>NAGASAKI KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ISAHAYA - SHI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AINO</td>
<td>NAGASAKI KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LINAMI-GUN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHITSA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARAYAMA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DACHI</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATOYAMA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOCHIKA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANASHIJA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatsuzaki</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KUMAKOTO KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURIGAHAMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIKA KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGATANI</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAKATOME</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEKI</td>
<td>KAGOSHIKA KEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) (1) 49
3. JAPANESE NAVAL KEISAN Locations, (Cont'd).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KEN AND GUN</th>
<th>HIGHER BATTALION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>14 Oct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>NAGASAKI KEN</td>
<td>SASEBO KEISAN</td>
<td>1 Off.</td>
<td>10 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A A</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>6 &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIMURA</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>4 &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHICHI</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIMURA</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISHIMA</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>6 men</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TATEKURA</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. LIST OF JAPANESE NAVAL GROUND FORCES.

a. Naval Forces in KAGOSHIMA Prefecture.

(1) Naval Ground Forces (Extent of demobilization indicated by %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GUN</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force Headquarters (7%)</td>
<td>SAKURA SHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Assault Unit (9%)</td>
<td>TAMAI YAMA &amp; KATAURA</td>
<td>KATAHABE 4,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39th IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>322 IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323rd IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>324th IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325th IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3211th IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3214th IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3217th IGS (100%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA 132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Naval Ground Forces in MIYAZAKI KEN. (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GUN</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36th Assault Unit</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>HIROSHI-USUKI GUN (53%) 2,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th IGS</td>
<td>NAGASAKI</td>
<td>NAGASAKI CITY (100%) 637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5812th IGS</td>
<td>ASAKUSA</td>
<td>ASAKUSA-NAGA 790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) (I) - 10 

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Order No. 59 (annex a) - Intelligence - Appendix (I)

i. C.O.S. of Japanese Naval Air Forces.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>TOTAL P.E.S</th>
<th>DATE (?)</th>
<th>PRESENT STRENGTH</th>
<th>SEPT. 29</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUSUKOHAHA</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUSHIRA</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAKIWA</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 1. KOKUBU</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 2. KOKUBU</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZUMI</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HITOGOSHI</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOMITA</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSUKUBA SHIMA</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLURA</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAHARA</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIINODA</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNZEJ</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Naval Air Bases in KAGOSHIMA KEN. (Extent of demobilized indicated by %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GUN OR SHI</th>
<th>STRENGTH (1 Aug 46)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA Airfield (96%)</td>
<td>KIMOTSUKI</td>
<td>13,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGATSUBA Airfield (62%)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUSHIRA Airfield (97%)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZAKI Airfield (93%)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOKUBU Airfield #1 (96%)</td>
<td>AIRA</td>
<td>2,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOKUBU Airfield #2 (96%)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA Airfield (89%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA City</td>
<td>2,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZUMI Airfield (95%)</td>
<td>IZUMI</td>
<td>4,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAKURA SHIMA Airfield (90%)</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Naval Air Bases in MIYAZAKI KEN. (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZAKI Airfield (99%)</td>
<td>MIYAZAKI City</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOMIZAKA Airfield (96%)</td>
<td>HIGASHI-USUKI County</td>
<td>3,716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A) (I) + 11

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Operation Order
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APPENDIX (II)

FORM AND TYPE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED IN 8-2 PERIODIC REPORTS

1. The following form is to be used for 8-2 Periodic Reports. Instructions concerning the type and amount of information required are contained herein:

Unit Heading

SECRET

8-2 Periodic Report

Date

From: 18001

To: 18001

References: (a)

Enclosures: (a)

Key(s):

1. Demobilization and disarmament.

(a) Japanese military units hitherto unreported, including regular and semi-military organizations such as home guard, civilian volunteer defense corps, military police etc. Information concerning these units should include location of headquarters, disposition, code name or number, pre-war strength, present strength, names of C.O.'s and staff officers, T/O's, T/A's and T/3's. If possible determine its plan for including zone of responsibility, final defensive line, etc., and make a separate report. More detailed information concerning units already reported should also be included in this paragraph.

NOTE: When the information listed above is too lengthy to be included in the report proper, it should be attached to the report as an OCB Annex. and referred to in this paragraph as such.

(b) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed during the period. Information should include number of personnel demobilized and disarmed, officer or enlisted, from what unit, former strength of unit, present strength of unit, names and ranks of demobilized personnel and their destinations, and from where demobilized.

(a) (II) - 1

SECRET
Operation Order
3d War Div No. 59 (Annex (A) - Intelligence;
Appendix (II) - FORM AND TYPE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED IN 3-2
PERIODIC REPORTS).

NOTE: If this information is too lengthy to include in
the Periodic Report proper it should be attached as an OOB
annex and referred to as such in this paragraph.

(c) General attitude of military and semi-military units.
Information includes extent of cooperation and acquiescence in
surrender and demobilization terms. Specific and detailed
reports will be made of acts of non-cooperation, attempts at
resistance, concealment, sabotage or destruction of arms and
equipment.

(c) Information includes: location, description, and
inventory of ordnance, signal, quartermaster, engineer dumps,
stores, or installations; of equipment in any factory, privately
or government owned, which is in use or can be put in use for
war; of all stocks equipment and material
which was formerly used or can be used for war (i.e., items of
food, clothing, transport, fuel, building materials, etc.); of
weapons and military or factory equipment found in schools; and
of any caches of gold, silver, platinum, or foreign currencies,
etc.

NOTE: Above information may be attached as an enclosure if
necessary and referred to as such in this paragraph.

3. Intelligence targets.

(a) Under surveillance (investigated)

Intelligence targets are defined as governmental and
municipal buildings and agencies; army, air and naval head-
quarters; schools, experimental and research stations; and other
similar military installations; and factories and plants engaged
in work of possible intelligence interest. This information
should be fairly brief but should include: nature of subject
under investigation, name of subject, location, function in past
and present, name of owner, superintendent or manager, present
and planned (future) activities, state of equipment, state of
ownership, government or military connection, and, in addition,
in the case of a factory or plant, what it produced in wartime,
what it plans to produce, output both past and present, and number
employed both past and present.

(c) Not yet under surveillance.

Under this sub-paragraph should be listed those intel-
ligence targets as defined above which have been located but not

(A) (XI) - 2
Operation Order

30 May 1946 (annex (a) - Intelligence;
Appendix (x) - POLIC AND MINE: OCTION REQUIRED ON A:\-2
ENHANCED RATIONS)

---

investigated. They should be by name with location by city or, in the case of a small town, by coordinates.

3. Counter-intelligence.

(a) Persons apprehended or interned.

Names of any other pertinent data concerning individuals on suspect lists, war criminals and others who were apprehended or interned during the period.

(b) Suspects.

Names of those (para 3. (e)) who have been located but not yet apprehended, and names of suspects not previously reported. Give reasons and details of latter.

(c) Subversive activities.

Jehogiste, sabotage and other subversive activities detected during period giving details.

(d) Unfriendly organizations.

Location, general description, activities and principal personalities of extremist, terrorist and espionage organizations both military and civilian seized or located during the period.

(e) Miscellaneous.

Names, addresses and case history of former political prisoners. Other miscellaneous data of counter-intelligence interest.

(c) Civilian population.

(a) General attitude, including extent of cooperation and attempts at evasion or violation of Allied requirements, our adherence in surrender terms, political trends insofar as they affect security, and evidence of unrest.

5. Miscellaneous.

(a) Any other matters of intelligence interest not specifically covered by the preceding subdivisions.

/s/ Signature.

(A) (X) - 3
Serial C0721
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 59

ANNEX (C)

SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT


BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUHASZ
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Opn C No 59.

OFFICIAL:

TAXIS

(C) - 1
SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 40CT46

The following information originates from SCAP (addressed to Joint Chiefs of Staff) and is quoted for your information and guidance. Message begins: The following directive was issued to the Japanese Government this date:

quote 1. "In order to remove restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties and discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion, the Imperial Japanese Government will:

(a) Abrogate operations of all provisions of all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations which:

(1) Establish or maintain restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government.

(2) Establish or maintain restrictions on the collection and dissemination of information.

(3) By their terms or their application, operate unequally in favor of or against any person by reason of race, nationality, creed or political opinion.

(b) The enactments covered in paragraph (a), above, shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(1) The peace preservation law (Chien Iji Ho), law number 54 of 1941, promulgated on or about 10 March, 1941.

(2) The protection and surveillance law for thought offense (Shiso Han Hogo Kansatsu Ho) law number 29 of 1936, promulgated on or about 29 May, 1936.

(3) Regulations relative to application of protection and surveillance law for thought offense (Shisahan Hogo Kansoku Ho Shikorei), Imperial ordinance number 401 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November, 1936.

(4) Ordinance establishing protection and surveillance stations (Hogo Kansoku - Jo Kansei), Imperial ordinance number 403 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November, 1936.
(5) Ordinance establishing protection and surveillance stations, (Higo Kansoku - Jo Kansai), Imperial ordinance number 403 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November, 1936.

(6) The precautionary detention procedure order (Yodo Koki Petsuzuki Rei), Ministry of Justice order, Shihosho Rei, number 49, issued on or about 14 May, 1941.

(7) Regulations for treatment of persons under precautionary detention (Yodo Kokki-In Shosu Rei), Ministry of Justice order, Shihosho Rei, number 50, issued on or about 14 May, 1941.

(8) The national defense and peace preservation law (Kokubo Hoan Ho) law number 49 of 1941, promulgated on or about 7 March, 1941.

(9) National Defense and Peace preservation law enforcement order (Yukudo Hoan Ho Shiko Rei), Imperial ordinance number 542 of 1941, issued on or about 7 May, 1941.

(10) Regulations for appointment of lawyers under peace preservation laws (Seinochi Shitei Kitei, Ministry of Justice order, Shihoserei,) number 47 of 1941, issued on or about 9 May, 1941.

(11) Law for safeguarding secrets of military material resources (Guayo Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho,) law number 25 of 1939, promulgated on or about 25 March, 1939.

(12) Ordinance of or the enforcement of the law for safeguarding secrets of military material resources (Gunyo Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho Shiki Tei), Imperial ordinance number 413 of 1939, issued on or about 24 January, 1939.

(13) Regulations for the enforcement of the law of safeguarding secrets of military material resources (Gunyo Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho Shiki Kisei), Ministries of War and Navy ordinance number 3 of 1939, promulgated on or about 26 June, 1939.
SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 40CT46, (Cont')

(14) Law for the protection of military secrets (Gunki Hogo Ho), law number 72 of 1937, revised by law number 58 of 1941.

(15) Regulations for the enforcement of the law for the protection of military secrets (Gunki Hogo Ho Shiko Fushin), Ministry of War ordinance number 59, issued on or about 12 December 1939 and revised by Ministry of War ordinance number 6, 20 and 58 of 1941.

(16) The Religious body law (Shukyo Dental Ho), law number 77 of 1939, promulgated on or about 8 April, 1939.

(17) All laws, decrees, orliers, ordinances and regulations amending, supplementing or implementing the foregoing enactments.

(c) Release immediately all persons now detained, imprisoned, under "protection or surveillance", or whose freedom is restricted in any other manner who have been placed in that state of detention, imprisonment, "protection and surveillance", or restrictions of freedom;

(1) Under the enactments referred to in paragraph 1. (a) and (b) above.

(2) Without charge.

(3) By charging them technically with a minor offense, when, in reality, the reason for detention, imprisonment, "protection and surveillance" or restriction of freedom, was because of their thought, speech, religion, political beliefs, or assembly. The release of all such persons will be accomplished by 10 October, 1945.

(d) Abolish all organizations or agencies created to carry out the provisions of the enactments referred to in paragraph 1. (a) and (b) above and the part of, or functions of, other offices or subdivisions of other civil departments and organs which supplement or aid them in the execution of such provisions. These include, but are not limited to:
SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 460745. (Cont'd)

(1) All secret police organs.

(2) Those departments in the Ministry of Home Affairs, such as the Bureau of Police, charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.

(3) Those departments, such as the special higher police (Tokubetsu Koto Keisai Tsu Bu), in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, the Osaka Metropolitan Police, any other Metropolitan Police, the police of the Territorial Administration of Hokkaido and the various Prefectural Police charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.

(4) Those departments, such as the protection and surveillance commission, and all protection and surveillance stations responsible thereto, under the Ministry of Justice charged with protection and surveillance and control of thought, speech, religion, or assembly.

(e) Remove from office and reemployment the Minister of Home Affairs, the Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, the Chief of Osaka Metropolitan Police Board, the Chief of any other metropolitan police, the Chief of Police of the Territorial Administrative of Hokkaido, the Chiefs of each prefectural police department, the entire personnel of the Special Higher Police Departments, the entire personnel of the Special Higher Police of all metropolitan, territorial, and prefectural police departments, the Guarding and Protecting officials and all other personnel of the Protection and Surveillance Commission and of the Protection and Surveillance Stations. None of the above persons will be reappointed any position under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Justice or any police organization in Japan. Any of the above persons whose assistance is required to accomplish the provisions of this directive will be retained until the directive is accomplished and dismissed.
SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 40CT45. (Cont.)

(f) Prohibit any further activity by police officers, members of police forces, and other government, national or local, officials or employees which is related to the enactments referred to in paragraph 1, (a) and (b) above and to the organs and functions abolished by paragraph 1, (d) above,

(g) Prohibit the physical punishment and mistreatment of all persons detained, imprisoned, or under protection and surveillance under any and all Japanese enactments, laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations. All such persons will receive at all times ample sustenance,

(h) Ensure the security and preservation of all records and any and all other materials of the organs abolished in paragraph 1, (d). These records may be used to accomplish the provisions of the directive, but will not be destroyed, removed, or tampered with in any way,

(i) Submit a comprehensive report to this headquarter not later than 15 October, 1945, describing in detail all action taken to comply with all provisions of this directive. This report will contain the following specific information prepared in the form of separate supplementary reports:

1. Information concerning persons released in accordance with paragraph 1, (c) above. (To be grouped by person or institution in which held or from which released or by office controlling their protection and surveillance).

a. Name of person released from detention or imprisonment or person released from protection and surveillance, his age, nationality, race and occupation,

b. Specification of criminal charges against each person released from protection and surveillance, his age, nationality, race and occupation,

c. Specifications of criminal charges against each person released from detention or imprisonment or reason for which each person was placed under protection and surveillance,
Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 52

2d Mar Div, Rein.
In the Field,
11 October, 1945.

ANNEX (D)

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. Frequency Assignment
(a) Principal Net

DIVISION COMMAND NET (TRX-TCS) (CM)
Guarded by Division, all RCT's, 10th Mar,
2d Tdn, Rcn Co, and other units as directed.

DIVISION COMMAND NET (608-610) (V)
Guarded as directed.

DIVISION COMMAND NET (300) (V)
Guarded as directed.

DIVISION INTELLIGENCE NET (SCR-300) (VOICE)
Guarded as directed by G-2.

RCT COMMAND NET (TRX-TCS)
2d Mar
6th Mar
8th Mar

DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE NET (TCS) (VOICE)
1376 Kcs.

DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMAND NET (TCS) (VOICE)
1670 Kcs.

DIVISION ARTILLERY AIR SPOT (TCS) (VOICE)
4755 Kcs.

(b) Internal Assignment.

RCT Wpns Co.
2d Mar
6th Mar
8th Mar

10th Marines

5665 Kcs.

2276

(c) SCR-300 Frequencies.

Division Command Net

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2d Mar</th>
<th>6th Mar</th>
<th>8th Mar</th>
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</thead>
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<td>H&amp;H Command</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>40.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st En Command</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd En Command</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd En Command</td>
<td>42.4</td>
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<td>41.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spare</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
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2d Mar Div No 59 (Annex (D) – Signal Communications)

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<td>27.0</td>
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<td>10th Marines Command</td>
<td>33.0 mc</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th Marines Internal</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Division Command</td>
<td>27.4</td>
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<tr>
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<th>2dMar</th>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bn Command</td>
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<td>TnCo Command</td>
<td>(A) 24.5 mc</td>
<td>(B) 24.3</td>
<td>(C) 26.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>TnSn Internal</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
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<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
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<td>2d MP Co Command</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>2d MT Bn</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Radio sets SCR 536, as issued to organizations, may be used on their pre-set frequencies, by those organizations.

2. Radio Call Signs.

(a)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 2D MAR DIV</td>
<td>JASCN</td>
<td>4XQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADC, 2D MAR DIV</td>
<td>SWEATMAN</td>
<td>8SC</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUPPORT GROUP</td>
<td>TIORESS</td>
<td>9AL</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCT 2</td>
<td>SOYBEAN</td>
<td>8Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 1/2</td>
<td>ROUNDTHEAD</td>
<td>7QY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 2/2</td>
<td>CARLEGAV</td>
<td>2GB</td>
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<td>BLT 3/2</td>
<td>JEMSHARP</td>
<td>4YL</td>
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<td>WEAPONS Co., RCT 2</td>
<td>FIRSTRATE</td>
<td>3VI</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCT 5</td>
<td>WARGLUB</td>
<td>9FP</td>
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<td>BLT 1/6</td>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>6VJ</td>
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<td>BLT 2/6</td>
<td>DAZZLER</td>
<td>3CV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 3/6</td>
<td>MONITOR</td>
<td>5TE</td>
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<td>WEAPONS Co., RCT 6</td>
<td>DIANA</td>
<td>3FE</td>
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<td>RCT 8</td>
<td>NONCON</td>
<td>6AH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 1/8</td>
<td>JINTAN</td>
<td>8QX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 2/8</td>
<td>PUEBLO</td>
<td>6QX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT 3/8</td>
<td>FLAGSTONE</td>
<td>3RD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS Co., RCT 8</td>
<td>SWALSKIN</td>
<td>7UX</td>
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<td>DIV ARMY (10th Marines)</td>
<td>CLOUBREAK</td>
<td>2RT</td>
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<tr>
<td>1ST BN, 10TH MAR</td>
<td>GUITAR</td>
<td>4YF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND BN, 10TH MAR</td>
<td>KITKAP</td>
<td>5DI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD BN, 10TH MAR</td>
<td>HAMBOE</td>
<td>4XT</td>
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<td>4TH BN, 10TH MAR</td>
<td>VIOLA</td>
<td>6AB</td>
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<td>WAC-2</td>
<td>LODESTAR</td>
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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 59 (Annex (D) - Signal Communications)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Voice Call</th>
<th>CW Call</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 8th Mar</td>
<td>SULTAN</td>
<td>8QX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A, 1st Bn, 8th Mar</td>
<td>SULTAN ABLE</td>
<td>8QX A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 10th Mar</td>
<td>GUITAR</td>
<td>4QF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry C, 1st Bn, 10th Mar</td>
<td>GUITAR BAKER</td>
<td>4QF B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Except where specifically noted, all calls indicate the Commanding Officer.

(c) Calls for the following, unless otherwise assigned in this annex are formed as indicated below:

(1) COMPANY and BATTERY voice calls are formed by adding "ABLE", "BAKER", "CHARLIE", etc., to the voice calls of the battalion or other parent organization. Company and battery CW calls are formed by adding "A", "B", "C", etc., to the CW calls of the parent organizations. Assume the example:
Operation Order
2d Her Div No 59 (Annex (D) - Signal Communications.

(2) PLATOON and SECTION calls are formed by adding "ONE", "TWO", "THREE", etc., to voice call and "1", "2", "3", etc., to CW calls of the parent organizations. Weapons companies use "ONE" and "TWO" for the 37mm platoons, and "FOUR" for the 105mm platoon. For individual gun call of the 105mm platoon, add the number "ONE", "TWO", "THREE", "FOUR" to the platoon number "FOUR".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Voice Call</th>
<th>CW Call</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co B, 1st Bn, 6th Mar</td>
<td>SUNDA FAMER</td>
<td>8QXS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Flt, Co B, 1st Bn, 6th Mar</td>
<td>SUNDA FAMER TWO</td>
<td>8QXE2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sct, 1st Bn, 10th Mar</td>
<td>SUNDA FAMER ONE</td>
<td>4JFB1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) REAR WAGON calls are formed by adding "REAR" to the unit voice call and "R" to the CW call. ADVANCED ECHelon calls are formed by adding "RA" to the unit voice call and "E" to the CW call.

(4) SHORT PARTY calls are formed by adding "PETER" and "P" to the Voice and CW calls respectively, of the unit to which attached.

(d) Collective Call

All Stations this net (circuit) CENTRAL 214

(e) "Call Signs and Code Names" are to be used within the Division as Radio Calls, and unit code names in text of dispatches in order to speed up traffic by use of modified clear text.

3. Telephone Switchboard Code Names

(a) BARNACLE, BALLOT, BILLY, BLUEBELL, BULL, BLANK, BLEED, BLINKER, BREAKER, BLISSFUL, BOONDE, BOLO, BOILER

(b) 2D MARINE DIVISION, 2D MARINES, 6TH MARINES, 8TH MARINES, 10TH MARINES, 2D TANK BN, 2D MEDICAL BN, 2D SERVICE BN, 2D MOTOR TRANSPORT BN, 2D ENGINEER BN, 2D PIONEER BN, 2D M-P Co, 2D ASSO
3. Telephone Switchboard Code Names (Cont'd)

BLADE  
MUSH  
BLOOM  
BROOK  
BUSHN  

DIV LOCALS  
43 FG BN  
29 SIG CO  

LED, WHITE, BURU or GREET, added to the telephone directory name of the regiment switching central indicates the switching central of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th (Reg't'1 Wpn's Co.).

Page 3: BALLOT BLUE is the directory name of the switch- 
cent of the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Marines.

(b) Prior to the opening hour, forward CP switchboard code 
name will be followed by the word "REMARK". Prior to the 
closure hour, rear CP switchboard code name will be followed 
by the word "REMARK".

(c) Telephone Switchboard Code Names will be separate and 
distinct from Aircraft Call Signs. Radio Call Signs will be used 
as the canonical Code names for units in modified plain language 
dispatches.

(d) Unit CP's will be identified by signs using Telephone 
Switchboard Code Names.

(c) Telephone Switchboard Code Names for other principal 
units of the 5th Amphibious Corps are:

\[ \begin{align*} 
\text{SIOIR} & \quad \text{VAC} \\
\text{COLUMBUS} & \quad \text{5TH MAR DIV} \\
\text{BANDIDO} & \quad \text{320 INF DIV} 
\end{align*} \]

4. Visual Signals

(a) Aircraft Maneuver Signals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signal</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>360 degree turn</td>
<td>Request CP Identification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate dips &amp; climbs</td>
<td>Request front line markings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rock Wings</td>
<td>Message understood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaw right &amp; left</td>
<td>Am going to drop message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360 degree right turn</td>
<td>Mission completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp &quot;3&quot; turn</td>
<td>Will support you-indicate target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circle right rocking wings</td>
<td>Message not understood - repeat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Panel Code:

(1) COPY-3 effective.  
(2) Panel Identification.

\[ \begin{align*} 
\text{V Corps} & \quad . \quad . \quad 7 \\
\text{2nd MarDiv} & \quad . \quad 2 \\
\text{32nd Inf Div} & \quad . \quad 3 \\
\text{5th MarDiv} & \quad . \quad 5 
\end{align*} \]
(c) Air Dropping Procedure:

(1) Panels will be displayed as shown below.

![Diagram showing the air dropping procedure.]

(2) One or more of the following methods of identification will be used:

a. Signal lamps, colored smoke or fires. These, when used, will be set up within the panel outline or the target area. Where colored smoke is to be used, the color will be specified in the request.

b. Outfits flown in the dropping plane.

c. The direction of air drop planes to the target by liaison type planes.

d. Air-ground radio, if air-ground radio is employed, channels, frequency, and call sign will be included in the air drop request.

(3) parachute Color Scheme:

BLUE ............... Rations and water.
WHITE ............... Weapons and demolitions.
YELLOW ............. 60mm, 81mm and 75mm ammo.
RED .................. All small caliber ammo and grenades.
GREEN ............... Medical, Signal & Misc. supplies.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J.P. Junah, 
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Comm 0 No 59.

OFFICIAL:

Currie

73
Serial C0789
SECRET

Change Number 1 to:

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 59.

2d Mar Div, Reinforcement.
In the field.
26 October, 1945.

1. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 2 add:
   "Det "A" Div Sig Co
   Det "B" Div Sig Co"

2. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 8 add:
   "Det "C" Div Sig Co
   Det "D" Div Sig Co"

3. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Serv Trs add:
   "Corps Evac Hosp #3
   Det 2nd Serv Regt"

4. Under Div Trs delete:
   "2d Mar Mar Dog Plt"

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. F. JUHAN,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Operation Order Number 59.

OFFICIAL:

TAXIS

74
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

23 OCTOBER, 1945

FROM: CO SECOND MARDIV
ACTION TO: RCT 2
CT 6
CT 8

INFORMATION OF:
ARTY CO
ENGR CO
VOC-2

CO V AMPH CORPS
CO 5TH MARDIV

CLASSIFICATION
Secret
Confidential
Restricted

PRECEDENCE
Routine
Deferred
Priority

THIS IS OPERATION ORDER NO 60 X RCT 2 INITIATE MOVE TO SOUTHERN KYUSHU AS FOLLOWS X RELIEVE 1ST BN 197TH INFANTRY AT YONAGA WITH ONE (1) BLT X SEND RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT MIYAZAKI MAKE IMMEDIATE REPORT RECOMMENDATION BILLET AVAILABLE ONE (1) BLT AND RCT HQ THAT VICINITY X UPON ARRIVAL MIYAZAKI CO RCT 2 MAKE FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS USE OF REMAINING BLT X RCT 8 ON ORDER ESTABLISH ONE (1) BLT AT KAGOSHIMA X ASSURE CONTROL THAT PORT X PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT U S FORCES ASHORE SOUTHERN KYUSHU AREA X SUPERVISE JAP REPARATION ACTIVITIES THROUGH KAGOSHIMA XAN X REGULATE SHIPPING USED TO DISPOSE OF JAP MILITARY EQUIPMENT AT SEA X RCT 8 COORDINATE REQUIREMENTS OF BLT 2/8 LOCATED IN KAGOSHIMA XEN INsofar AS REQUESTS ON JAPANESE CIVIL AUTHORITIES ARE CONCERNED X FOR BOUNDARIES SEE OPERATION OVERLAY TO THIS ORDER ISSUED SEPARATELY XX
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

31 October, 1945

FROM: CG SECOND MAR DIV

ACTION TO: RGT 2 ARTY CP DIV TRS
RGT 6 ENGR CP VMC-2
RGT 8 SERV TRS

INFORMATION TO: CG V AMPH CORPS
CG 5TH MAR DIV
CG 52D INF DIV

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
DEFERRED
PRIORITY
XXX

THIS IS OPERATION ORDER NUMBER 61 X RGT 2 LESS SECOND BATTALION
MOVE TO SOUTHERN KYUSHU AS FOLLOWS X RGT 2 HEADQUARTERS REGIMENTAL
WEAPONS COMPANY AND ATTACHED UNITS AS DESIGNATED BY COMMANDING
OFFICER RGT 2 COMMENCE LOADING AT NAGASAKI ON 1 NOVEMBER X FIRST
BATTALION SECOND MARINES AND REMAINDER ATTACHED UNITS RGT 2 X
COMMENCE LOADING ON ORDER SECOND MAR DIV X THEN LOADED MOVE TO
KAMOYA FOR FORTIFICATION OF MIYAZAKI AND MIYAZAKI X ARMY CP WILL
FURNISH ONE (1) BATTALION TO RELIEVE FIRST BATTALION SECOND MARINES
AND TAKE OVER ITS DUTIES IN THE NAGASAKI AREA ON ORDER FROM SECOND
MAR DIV X SUPPLIES X THIRTY (30) DAYS CLASS I AND III X TWO (2)
UNITS OF FIRE X CLASSES II AND IV AS AVAILABLE UP TO THIRTY (30)
DAYS X FOR BOUNDARIES SEE OPERATION OVERLAY TO OPERATION ORDER
NUMBER 60 XX
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION  
FLEET MARINE FORCEx

DATE 7 NOVEMBER, 1945

FROM: CG SECOND MARDIV  
ACTION TO: RCT 2 ARMY GHQ DIV TRS  
            RCT 3 ENG CP VMC-2  
            CT SERV TRS  

INFORMATION OF: CG VAM-H CORPS  
                CG 5TH MAR DIV  
                CG 32D INF DIV

CLASSIFICATION  
SECRET XXX  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE  
ROUTINE  
DEFERRED  
PRIORITY XXX

THIS IS SECOND MARDIV OPERATION ORDER NUMBER 32 X EFFECTIVE  
0608COI 10TH MARINES AREA RESPONSIBILITY EXTENDED TO INCLUDE  
AREA IN VICINITY OF NAGASAKI PREVIOUSLY TO RCT 2 AND AMAKUSA-TC  
PREVIOUSLY TO RCT 8 AS INDICATED ON OPERATION OVERLAY TO THIS  
ORDER ISSUED SEPARATELY X 1/10 MOVE TO KAMIO barrackS ON ORDER  
COMMANDING OFFICER 10TH MARINES EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIME X  
KAMIO barrackS PASSES TO OCHTROL COMMANDING OFFICER 10TH MARINES  
IMMEDIATELY X 1/2 CONTINUE TO PROVIDE GUARDS AND MILITARY POLICE  
AS DIRECTED BY COMMANDING OFFICER 10TH MARINES UNTIL 1/10 IS  
ESTABLISHED NEW LOCATION XX

79
Serial 00740
SECRET

Change No 1 to

Operation Order
8th Mar Div No 62.


1. Upon receipt of this change, all holders of Operation Order No 62 will immediately effect the change indicated by attached overlay.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUHAN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Opn Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]

TAXIS

81
Serial 00752
SECRET

Change No 2 to
Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 62.


1. Upon receipt of this change, all holders of Operation Order No 62 will immediately effect the change indicated by attached overlay.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

C. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Opn Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]
TAXIS
3
Serial 007473
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 53

2d Mar Div, Reinf, in the field.
8 November, 1945.

1. The following organization of 2d Marine Division, Reinforced, is effective as of 080000I:

TASK ORGANIZATION

2d Mar Div, Reinf - Maj Gen HUNT, USMC.

(a) RCT 2 - Lt Col C'ODONNELL, USMC.

2d Mar
Co C 2d MT Bn
Co B 2d Med Bn
Co C 2d Med Bn
Co A 2d Engr Bn
1st Plt Crd Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plt Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plt Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
Det Mecon Unit
Det A Div Sig Co
Det B Div Sig Co
415th Malaria Survey Det
Det VAC MIL Govt Team:
MIVATAXI

(b) RCT 6 - Col JUHAN, USMC.

5th Mar
Co A 2d MT Bn
Co A 2d Med Bn
Co B 2d Engr Bn
3d Plt Crd Co 2d Serv Bn
2d Plt Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
3d Plt Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn

(c) RCT 8 - Col McFARLAND, USMC.

8th Mar
Co B 2d MT Bn
Co E 2d Med Bn
Co C 2d Engr Bn
2d Plt Crd Co 2d Serv Bn
3d Plt Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
3d Plt Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
Div Ron Co (less Det)
Det C Div Sig Co
Det D Div Sig Co
SERIAL 00743
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 66

36th Med Control Det
Det VAC Mil Govt Teams at:
KUMANO
KAGOSHIMA

(d) Arty Co - Col CLARK, USMC.

10th mar
Co "A" 43d NC3
2d Amph Trk Co (less 1st Plat)
Co "A" 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
Det Div Rcn Co (1 Sgr, 12 men, 12 H.T.)
2d Tk Bn
Tracked Vehicle Flat Crd Co

(e) Engr Cp - Lt Col PARTRIDGE, USMC.

2d Engr Bn (less Co "A", "B" and "C")
43d NC3 (less Co A)
129th Engr (C) Bn (USA)
2d Pion Bn
2d Pld Bomb Disposal Co VAC

(f) Serv Trs - Lt Col MERKER, USMC

2d Serv Bn (less Dets)
4th Sep Idry Plat
2d M d Bn (less Dets)
2d MT Bn (less Dets)
365th WM Trk Co (USA)
Corps Evac Hosp "3"
Co "E" 264th Med Bn
Co "C" 264th Med Bn
73d Pld Hosp

(g) Div Trs - Lt Col McCWILLEN, USMC

Div Hq Bn (less Dets)
54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
498th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
498th CIC Det
3d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Cp
94th Med Control Det
1st Plat 2d Amph Trk Co

(h) VMC-2 - Lt WAILES, USMC.
Serial CO743
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 33

(i) Harbor Co - Lt Col Lloyd, USMC

1st Sep Hq & Sup Co (Prov)
124th Port Co, USA
14th Depot Co

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Cpn Order No 53.

OFFICIAL:

TAXIS

3
Serial 00755
SECRET

Change No 1 to
Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 3.

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
26 November, 1945.

1. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Div Trs delete:
   "49th CIC Det"

2. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Engr Gp delete:
   "2d Plt Bomb Disposal Co VAC"

3. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Harbor Gp delete:
   "24th Depot Co"

4. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 6 delete:
   "Co "A" 2d Med Bn"

5. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 6 add:
   "Det E Div Sig Co
   Port Surgical Hosp #1"

6. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Div Trs add:
   "62d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
   95th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
   Det Sig En VAC"

7. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Harbor Gp add:
   "34th Depot Co"

8. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 2 add:
   "Co "A" 873d Engr Avn Bn
   101st Crd Bomb Disp Sqd
   623d QM Rdh Sec"

9. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Serv Trs add:
   "2d Plt Bomb Disposal Co VAC"

10. Under Arty Co change "2d Amph Trk Co (less 1st Plat)
    to read "Amph Trk Co (less 1st Plat), 2d MT Bn".
ll. Under Div Trs change "1st Plt 2d Amph Trk Co" to read "1st Plt Amph Trk Co, 2d MT BN".

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Cpn Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:

IAXIS
3
Serial 00755
SECRET

Change No 2 to

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 53

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
4 December, 1945.

1. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Div Trs delete:
   "54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
   499th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
   1st Plat Amph Trk Co, 2d MT Bn"

2. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 2 delete:
   "Co A 873d Engr Avn Bn"

3. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Arty gp change:
   "Amph Trk Co, 2nd MT Bn (less 1st Plat)
   to read Amph Trk Co, 2nd MT Bn"

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,  
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Operation Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:

TAXIS

3

SECRET 90
Serial 00749
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 64.

2d Mar Div, Rein.
In the field.
14 November, 1945.

Maps: Kyushu, 1:250,000, AMS, L372, 1945,
Central Japan, 1:250,000, Second Edition, L571,
AMS-2.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Operation Order 2d Mar Div No 64.

1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Operation
Plan 2d Mar Div No 14 and G-2 Studies and Information
issued separately.

(b) Elements of the V Army Corps continue occupy
additional areas and to enlarge that portion of
KYUSHU under surveillance and control of occupation
forces.

2. The 2d Mar Div, Rein, in addition to developing
occupation of assigned areas of responsibility
will defend against and subsequently disperse, capture or destroy any hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:

(a) (1) Regiments with two (2) or more battalions
in the same locality will have one (1)
battalion prepared to move out on two (2)
hours notice with one (1) company of such
battalion motorized and prepared to move out
on one-half (1/2) hours notice.

(2) Battalions billeted separately, will have
one (1) company prepared to move out on one
(1) hours notice, motorized as practicable.

(b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the
Div, a minimum of 75% of the command during hours
of darkness.

(c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans
for the separate defense of each separate billeting
area, and the overall defense within each regimental
area of responsibility.

-1-
Serial 00749
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 64.

(d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces or prevent the execution of assigned missions. For areas of responsibility, see Operation Overlay to Operation Order No 62 and Change No 1 to Operation Order No 62.

3. (a) RCT 2 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone are attached to RCT 2 for execution of this plan.

(b) RCT 6 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone are attached to RCT 6 for execution of this plan.

(c) RCT 8 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone are attached to RCT 8 for execution of this plan.

(d) Arty Gp will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone (less WAC-2) are attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan. Be prepared to move as directed and to provide artillery support to elements of this Div on order.

(e) Engr Gp attached to Arty Gp and RCT 6 in accordance with the area of responsibility in which billets are located.

(f) Serv Trs attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan.

(g) Div Trs attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan.

(h) HQ-2 as directed by this Hq, and local defense.

(i) Harbor Gp attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan.
Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 64

(x) (1) Plans will divide the areas of responsibility into sectors and will show for each area of responsibility: Sector responsibility and plan of billet defense.

(2) Regiments will be prepared to move on order to the support of other divisional units and will conduct reconnaissance of road nets throughout respective areas of responsibility.

(3) Plans will be submitted to this Hq prior to 25 November, 1945, and rehearsal of defense plans will be commenced by that date and continued weekly thereafter.

(4) Where rehearsals of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese Nationals to become overly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of the drill.

4. See Administrative Order No 58 and current instructions as issued.

5. (a) See Annex (H) (Signal Communications) to Operation Plan No 14.

(b) Command Posts:

2d Mar Div, Reinfr - Customs House, NAGASAKI (94.5-60.2).

RCT 2 - HtYAKONOJO (1417650-094290)

RCT 6 - Mitsubishi Shipyard Office Building, NAGASAKI (97.3-62.6)

RCT 8 - KUMAMOTO (1381.90-1077.00)

Art. Go - Naval Barracks, ISAHAYA Airfield (16.3-75.1)

Engr. Go - (94.85-61.45)

- 3 -
Serial 00749
SECRET

Operation Order
26 Mar Div No 64

Serv Trs - (94.05-61.1)
Div Trs - (94.5-62.2)
VMO-2 - ISAHAYA (1315.9-1075.9)
Harbor Go - (94.5-69.9)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

C. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Operation Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:

TAXI'S
3
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1945

FROM: CG SECOND MARDIV
ACTION TO: RCT 6 X 16TH MAR

INFORMATION OF:
VAC X 5TH MARDIV X 32D INF
DIV X RCT 2 X RCT 8 X
TMGR GP X SERV TPS X DIV
TBS X VMF-2 X HAFBOR GP X

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
XXXXX
RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
RPPPD
PRIORITY
VXXXX

OP TO ACTION X ROUTINE TO INFR

THIS IS 2D MAR DIV OPERATION ORDER NO 65 X RCT 6 AND ARTILLERY
GROUP EXP AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO INCLUDE AREAS SHOWN ON
OPERATION OVERLAY TO THIS ORDER ISSUED SEPARATELY X CONTROL OF
NEW AREAS EFFECTIVE ON DATES INDICATED SAME OVERLAY XX

95
Serial C718
CONFIDENTIAL

Change Number 1 to

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 65

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the Field.
28 November, 1945.


1. Upon receipt of this change, all holders of Operation Order No 65 will immediately effect the boundary changes indicated by attached overlay.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Cpr Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:

AXIS

3

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

INFORMATION OF:

FROM: CG SECOND MARDIV
ACTION TO: PAT 6
10TH MAR
5TH MARDIV
VAC

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED

PRIO. PRIORITY
SOUTHWEST, DEPTED, PRIORITY

THIS IS CHANGE NUMBER 2 TO SECOND MARDIV OPN 0 NUMBER 66 X EFFECT

RELIEF ELEMENTS OF FIFTY MARDIV PROGRESSIVELY ON DATES AS
FOWLS X PAT 6 EXTEND AREA RESPONSIBILITY TO INCLUDE AREA
RESPONSIBILITY OF 13TH MAR (LESS 1ST BY 14TH MAR) AT 060000I
AND REMAINDER OF AREA ASSIGNED PAT 6 BY THIS OPN 0 AT 031000I X
FIFTY MARDIV RETAINS RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPATRIATION ACTIVITIES
UNTIL RELIEF ALL ELEMENTS FIFTY MARDIV COMPLETED X ANY OP
EXTEND AREA RESPONSIBILITY AS INDICATED THIS OPN 0 AND RELIEVE
1ST EN 13TH MAR AT 041200I XX
1980-70-10
JCS/Jol
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.


RESTRICTED

DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE

ORDER NUMBER 61-45) Organization of Disposition.

Section, 2d Marine Division.

Reference: (a) Annex (J) to 2d Mar Div Amd 0 No. 53-45.

1. Effective immediately, the Division Disposition Section, Headquarters, Second Marine Division is established as follows:

   Division Disposition Officer
   LtCol. E. B. GAMES, USMC.

   Executive Officer
   LtCol. C. J. SEIBERT, II, USMC.

   Ordnance Assistant
   1stLt. L. McN. GILLIS, USMC.

   Administrative Assistant
   1stLt. R. P. ARMSTRONG, USMC.

   Disposal Group
   2d Platoon, VAC Bomb Disposal Co.
   Ordnance Co., 2d Serv Bn (less tracked vehicles
   and ordnance platoons).

   The assignment of the above officers, units, and
   such clerical personnel as may be required will be promulgated by
   separate special order.

   The Division Disposition Officer will have general
   supervision of the disposition of surrendered material within the
   2d Marine Division Zone of Responsibility. In addition, this sec-
   tion will assume the direct responsibility for the disposition of
   material in the zones of responsibility of RCT-2 and RCT-6, as shown
   in Annex (E) to 2d Mar Div Opn 0 #59, as its area of sole responsi-
   bility.
4. Disposition of equipment and material in areas outlined in paragraph 3, above, guarded by units of the 2d and 6th Regiments, will be coordinated with the Commanding Officers of those regiments. 

5. All surrendered equipment and material that are to be requisitioned for operational needs of U. S. Forces will be released by the Disposition Officer having control of such items. 

6. The Heads of Special Staff Sections at this Headquarters will assist the Division Disposition Officer in the disposition of equipment and materials coming under their cognizance in accordance with U. S. Army classification of material and equipment. 

7. In order to expedite disposition, direct communication between the Corps and Division Disposition Officers is authorized. 

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT: 

J. P. JUHAN, 
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, 
Acting Chief of Staff. 

DISTRIBUTION: See Distribution Sheet. 

OFFICIAL: 

/s/ K. C. ZIEG, 

For J. G. GOLDBERG, 
LtCol, USMC, 
ACCS, G-4. 

Change No 1, CL-45 dated 31Oct45 
Incorporated in this reproduction.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

3 November, 1945.

RESTRICTED

DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE

ORDER NUMBER: 62-45

Procurement Section, Organization of.

Reference: (a) Annex (H) (Revised) 2d Mar Div Adm O No. 58-45.

1. Effective immediately, the Division Procurement Section, Headquarters, Second Marine Division is established as follows:

Division Procurement Officer
LtCol. R. L. STALLINGS, USMC

Executive Officer
Major W. S. MC LAUGHLIN, USMC

Real Estate Officers
Capt. E. F. SCHULTZ, USMC
2dLt. J.L. RUNDLE, USMC

Transportation Officer
1stLt. O. D. CHURCHILL, AUS, TC

Supply Officer
1stLt. J. D. HAMOND, USMC

Military Government Officer
Capt. W. T. ELLIS, CAC

2. The assignment of the above officers, and such clerical personnel as may be required will be effected by separate special order.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUEAN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: "3" and "5"

OFFICIAL:

J. O. GOLDENBERG,
LtCol. USMC,
ACofS, G-4.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION FMF
IN THE FIELD.

RESTRICTED

DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NUMBER 64-45

COLLECTION AND RETENTION OF CIVILIAN ARMAMENT.

12 November, 1945

1. The following policy concerning the collection and retention of civilian armament will obtain in the zone of responsibility of this Division.

2. Local Japanese authorities will be instructed to collect all revolvers, rifles, shotguns, and swords in the hands of civilians and deliver same to the headquarters of the local Occupation Forces.

3. Hunting guns will be returned to individuals only if the requirements outlined below are fulfilled:

   a. An individual desiring the return of his hunting gun must submit a written application in the form of an affidavit with supporting facts certifying that the gun is needed to provide a livelihood for the individual concerned and that the weapon was not utilized in any way for military purposes during the war.

   b. This application and affidavit will be submitted, via the Chief of Police of the Ken, to the CO of the Occupation Forces in the Ken concerned. Upon receipt of such application the Chief of Police will investigate the circumstances and in his forwarding endorsement state whether or not the request is legitimate.

   c. Once legitimacy has been determined Commanding Officers, or their designated representatives, will execute an approving endorsement on the application and return two copies to the Police Department. Upon receipt of this endorsement the Police Department will issue one copy of the approving endorsement and a license for retention of the gun to the individual concerned. Upon presenting his license and his copy of the approved application the individual will be issued his gun.

   d. Japanese police authorities will explain clearly to any person granted a license that that person will be held personally responsible in case of any deception in connection with the issuance of the license.
e. Police authorities will be required to maintain a registry of all weapons issued and such registry will be available at all times for inspection by Occupation Forces. Spot checks will be made without prior warning.

4. Swords will be returned to civilians only upon written application by the individual, and only if the application is accompanied by documentary evidence proving that the weapon is of very unusual artistic value, was not used in the war, and belongs to a bona fide civilian, not one who has been discharged from the armed services, nor to a family which had an immediate member on active duty at any time during the recent war.

5. Armament other than that indicated in paragraphs 3. and 4. above will be retained by occupation forces until further orders.

6. This order supersedes all previous directives concerning collection and retention of civilian arms.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: "B" and "D".

OFFICIAL:

J. G. GOLDBERG,
LtCol., USMCR,
ACorS, G-4.
Serial 0716
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX (B)

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT
CONFIDENTIAL

GRL-jfp
Serial: 0721
SECOND PLANE DIVISION, P. P.,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

From: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
To: The Commanding General.


I. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

1. Personnel.

a. During the period subsequent to the OKINAWA operation, full reports were rendered monthly by the division listing by specification serial numbers (SSN's) the personnel in the division. These reports gave a clear picture of the needs of the division with regard to both officer and enlisted personnel, line duty and specialists. Personnel reporting to the division for duty did not fill the existing needs for, although the division was up to T/O strength in numbers, there was a definite shortage of non-commissioned officers for line duty, and there were shortages in all the specialist branches except communications. Because of necessity, line duty personnel were placed in the specialist vacancies, where possible, and trained to fill the needs of the division.

b. An adjutant's and "1st" section school was held prior to the embarkation for this operation; attendance was required of all Adjutants, "1st", sergeants majors and acting sergeants majors in the division. This school was designed to train the administrative personnel of the division for combat. The training and subject matter covered in the school was prepared before the surrender of the Japanese, and so had equipped the administrative sections of the division for any eventuality. Schools were conducted within units for various specialist branches such as engineers, ordnance and communications, in an effort to alleviate the strain brought about by the shortage of specialists.

c. Very few authorizations for promotion of line duty enlisted personnel were received during the preliminary planning period, so there was no opportunity to fill the existing vacancies within the division.

2. General.

a. Original plans called for a minimum rear echelon, to take care of equipment which could not be handled in the initial lift. Administration plans called for all "paper work" elements to go forward with the initial lift, and all administration except that of the rear elements themselves would be taken forward with the division.
II. PLANNING PHASE.

1. Personnel.

a. Personnel available to the division indicated clearly that there would not be a 5% overage available. As the conditions under which the landings would be made became definite it was apparent that no readily available pool of replacements would be necessary during the progress of the operation. The expected casualties were small, and could be dropped by each individual unit with no risk of combat efficiency being impaired dangerously. No draft was made available for Shore Party work, so Ships Platoons were formed from the personnel embarked on each ship. The nucleus of the Shore Party was formed from the Pioneer Battalion, and the 43rd Naval Construction Battalion, attached for the operation.

b. Full preparations were made to handle casualties, including complete card index files of all personnel on the rolls of the division.

c. During the planning phase an excess of 55 officers existed in the division. This excess was distributed mainly in the infantry regiments (about 12%) and there was an 8% shortage in the artillery regiment, since there had not been enough qualified artillery officers ordered to the division to fill the existing needs. The division was brought down to T/O strength in officers just prior to embarkation, through the required transfer to the United States for discharge, eligible officers down to T/O strength. The infantry regiments still possessed a slight overage in officers (about 6%), and the artillery regiment was about 11% short.

2. General.

a. Accurate lists of the shipping assigned to the division were made available at such a late date that complete embarkation plans could not be prepared by division. Loading began just 60 hours subsequent to the initial receipt of ship assignments, and that assignment was not complete. In order to accomplish loading with the least possible delay, transients were assigned to regiments, and designated elements were assigned to the regiment for loading (as concerns personnel only). The C-1 office coordinated the flow of information from attached units to the regimental loading officers, and ship assignments were made embarkation plans were begun. The Complete Embarkation Plan was completed during the embarkation phase. Numerous last minute changes in the shipping assigned required many changes in the embarkation plan, however, on the sailing day the plan was complete, corrected to date, and had been distributed to all required addresses.
Serial: 0721

Subject: Annex (B), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

b. Shipping provided actually proved capable of lifting the entire division and no rear echelon was necessary.

III. EMBARKATION PHASE.

1. Personnel.

a. Two days after embarkation had begun, orders were received to transfer 790 enlisted personnel from the division. Some of these men had already embarked when the orders were received. Because some personal baggage had already been loaded in holds and could not be reached, about 150 men were transferred without their seabags, provision being made to ship the seabags after arrival at the target.

b. Three days after loading had begun, 921 replacements arrived and had to be allocated to the various units of the division. An officer messenger had been dispatched to the transhipment center at Guam, and the SSN cars of the replacements were available to the division about 24 hours before the draft actually arrived. By the time the 921 replacements had disembarked, complete plans were made for their assignment to units, and the men were taken directly to the ships on which they were to embark for the voyage. The replacements received were not the SSN's which had been ordered, and so further depleted the effective strength of the division, for reason of having many billets not filled with men possessing the proper capabilities.

c. Organization of the newly arrived enlisted men and placement with the proper units was completed two days prior to sailing time, and all embarkation rosters were corrected to include the additional personnel. All units immediately began training and briefing their replacements, in order to bring the division to the best possible state of efficiency.

IV. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING.

1. Personnel.

a. Efficient personnel functions were hampered since D-Day, due to the lack of knowledge regarding replacements of line and specialist personnel eligible under current directives for possible release from active duty. The lack of specialist personnel existing in the clerical, commissary, quartermaster, bookkeeping and auditing fields made more difficult the effective accomplishment of the occupation mission assigned to the division.
b. Since D-Day, directives received from higher
authority made eligible for release from active duty approxi-
mately 8,000 officers and men.

(1) Marines: These directives made eligible
for release from active duty personnel with 70, 60, and 50 dis-
charge credits respectively; also those 38 and 35 years of age
and over. Lastly, precedence for discharge was given all per-
sonnel with three or more children.

(2) Navy: Directives from higher Navy auth-
ority involved varied types of release from active duty from
this division of officers and men. First, men desiring to re-
enlist were granted leave to return to the U.S. Secondly, of-
fers and men with 44 points were eligible for discharge.
Thirdly, the critical score for enlisted men was dropped to 41,
39, and 36 respectively. Fourthly, enlisted men were returned
to the U.S. under a 18 months rotation plan. And lastly, the
T/O allowances for enlisted, were reduced from 948 to 643, making
it possible to return to the U.S. 305 enlisted men.

c. Since the division was ordered to maintain
strength not below 90% of the T/O allowances, and a total of
only 45 officers and 130 men were transferred to the division
as replacements for those 8,000 eligible for release, it was
impossible to release men during the first two months of occupa-
tion, although eligible.

d. On 22 October, 1945 a detail of 57 marine
officers and 1159 marine enlisted men having more than 70 dis-
charge credits, and 67 navy enlisted with 44 or more points,
embarked for the U.S., thus number bringing the division strength
to 90% of the T/O. Since then, on 3 Nov, 10 Nov, and 19 Nov,
151 navy enlisted men with three or more dependents, 82 men with
41 or more points, and 65 with 39 or more points respectively
were transferred to the U.S. for processing and possible dis-
charge. On 13 November a small detail of 40 marine officers and
471 marine enlisted, each of whom was either 35 years of age or
older, or who had three children, embarked for the U.S. The
strength of the division was then below that required by current
directives, with no probable replacements.

e. A plan was devised whereby personal eligi-
ble for return to the U.S. in this division, would be inter-
changed with personnel of the Fifth Marine Division not eligible
for return to the U.S. This plan was approved by higher author-
ity 16 November, 1945, making possible the return to the U.S. of
7,348 men and 305 officers in this division eligible for discharge
under current directives, and those having 24 or more months
overseas.
Serial: 0721
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Subject: Annex (B), Occupational Operations Report (Cont’d).

f. On 18 November, 1945 it was contemplated that the most expeditious method of carrying out the interchange of personnel was a mutual exchange by battalions, comprising with the separate battalions, followed by battalions within regiments, concluding with clerical personnel in each division headquarters. On 24 November, 1945 this plan is to be operative.

2. Deceased Allied Prisoners of War.

a. Army recovery teams operating in Kyushu prior to D-Day had recovered from all Japanese prisoner of war camps, four hundred and fifty-seven cremated remains of allied prisoners of war. These remains had either been cremated by the Japanese, or the recovery teams, and shipped to Nagasaki. After a thorough search, eighty-five additional individual remains were located in the Nagasaki area.

b. All cremated remains were counted and inventoried and lists containing all information were compiled and sent to the Army Recovery Section attached to the Fifth Corps, for additional information possibly included in their records.

c. Completed lists indicated the following nationality groups accounted for in this area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australians</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadians</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. According to Fifth Corps directive, all remains were to be listed and crated for shipment to Base X, Manila, with the exception of British subjects which were to be interred in the allied section of the division cemetery. On 6 November, 1945 the crated remains were ready for shipment to Manila, and a cemetery plot and proper ceremony were approved for the British subjects. However, on 19 November, 1945, telephonic information from Fifth Corps directed that the British remains be included with the shipment to Base X, Manila.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, VPW, IN THE FIELD, 1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B)

MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT

I. PLANNING PHASE

The personnel assigned to Military Government duties during the planning stage consisted of a special staff section of four officers. Just prior to embarkation from Saigon an Army Military Government unit, the 93rd M. and Hq. Det., Military Government Group, was assigned to the Division. This group consisted of eleven officers but was lacking all organizational equipment and all enlisted personnel provided for in its table of organization. The officers of this group covered the following specialist assignments: Industry and Resources, Legal, Medical, Interpreter, Salvage, Labor, Supply, Transportation Public Safety, Adjutant, and Personnel.

II. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING

1. Organization.

Upon landing and assuming occupational duties, it became almost immediately apparent that the organization of Military Government personnel, which had been planned for combat conditions, was unsuited to efficiently meet the actual situation encountered. Accordingly all available personnel were integrated into a single special staff section and assignments made to fields within which officers' services were required without regard to previous specialist ratings.

The organization of the Military Government Section continued to be maintained on a flexible basis and was changed from time to time as the division progressed with its general occupational plans. All changes in the Military Government organization were made within the framework of and in conformity to the organization of the division and its subordinate units. As each regiment was assigned a separate area of responsibility, a group of Military Government Officers were assigned to the regiment in accordance with its particular needs. Similar groups were in turn formed by the regiments and assigned to separate battalions or detachments as they assumed control over separately assigned areas of responsibility. Additional Military Government Officers were assigned to the division by the V Amphibious Corps to meet the expanding demands for Military Government services. The present organization of Military Government within the
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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (b) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

division is set forth on the chart attached hereto. This organization is based in general upon the following formula:

1. A division Military Government Officer, with an assistant who also acts as Liaison Officer with the local government, and an adjutant.

2. A specialist staff, who also act as a ken team for Nagasaki Ken.

3. A Regimental Military Government Officer for each of the four regiments of the division.

4. ken teams with headquarters at each of the ken capitals.

5. Military Government sections with each detached tactical unit.

About 1 November, 1945, two additional Army units, the 92nd and the 95th Hq. and Hq. Detachments, Military Government Groups, were assigned to the division. This change did not materially alter conditions, as most of the members of these groups had been previously attached to the division on temporary duty. These groups were not kept intact as separate operational units but the members worked into the division military Government organizational pattern.

Liaison with the local government was arranged through a Japanese Liaison Group which was organized prior to occupation. A representative of this committee with an interpreter was assigned office space in the Military Government offices at Division Headquarters building. Separate direct telephone connections over Japanese lines were installed for the use of this representative to the Governor's Office, to the Water Department, to the Electrical Department, and to other Japanese governmental agencies with whom frequent and prompt contact was deemed necessary. Later a Military Government Officer was installed as Liaison Officer with an office next to that of the Governor at the Ken Prefectural Building with a telephone connecting with the military communications system. This enabled speedy contact with the ken officials in cases where a personal presentation of a problem was deemed desirable. This officer also acted as the personal agent for the delivery of official communications between the military forces and the Prefectural Government. He also obtained for the use of the occupational forces translations of all official instructions received by the ken government through Japanese.
Governmental channels. It has been found that very often instructions reach the Ken government from the General Headquarters of the occupation forces through Japanese governmental channels considerably quicker than information concerning such instructions is received through military channels. This has contributed to the difficulty of properly supervising the activities of the local government and their compliance with the directives of the General Headquarters of the occupation forces. In several cases, it has thus become necessary to institute requests for confirmation through military channels of instructions received by the local government before machinery for proper supervision of the accomplishment of these instructions could be instituted.

2. Operations.

The Military Government Section commenced to function on 25 September, 1945.

a. Resources and Industry.

Resources and industry was divided into five main sections namely: 1. Heavy and light industry (except shipbuilding), mining. 2. Agriculture, fisheries, price and wage control. 3. Public utilities. 4. Motor and rail transportation, shipping. 5. Civilian supply, shipbuilding.

The officer in charge of each of the five main divisions proceeded to conduct general surveys relating to his division and compile facts concerning its operation and needs for rehabilitation.

Priority list of activities to be established was as follows: Food, fuel, clothing, and dwellings, and all efforts were directed to this program.

The fishing industry was re-established and operations started ten days after landing. Fishing regulations were set up under the direction of the Port Director. The fisheries officer of the Ministry was held responsible to carry out all regulations and to license all boats.

Available fuel was located and cargo boats were given permits to haul commodities between coastwise ports. The ferry service was re-established to provide food for peoples of outlying islands and to provide transportation for labor. All debris was searched for available building materials and fuel.
Clothing manufacturers were located and available. Japanese military clothing was either distributed or turned over to these factories to process for usable clothing. Japanese gas masks were converted to Japanese rubber shoes.

Available Japanese military and naval food stores were inventorized and turned over to the Prefectural Government for distribution, salt factories were re-established and encouraged to expand operations. The quota system was maintained in food production. Fish meal fertilizers and rotten grain was prepared for use by the farmer. Price and wage controls had been established as of 15 August, 1945 and were rigidly enforced. Central bazaars were established with controlled prices. The Mayor was told to establish a rehabilitation committee thru which stores which properly marked their merchandise and maintained the approved price levels were issued an "approved store" sign. The price control officer covered these stores as well as others frequently, checking on prices and methods of operation. Violators were closed by the Japanese police.

The Japanese tax on amusements was exempted for members of the occupation force from the beginning. By order of the Japanese Federal Government dated 16 October, 1945 the tax on manufactured commodities was exempted. This exemption was implemented by a Division Order authorizing the use of tax-exemption certificates. As a result of this exemption souvenir prices were lowered substantially.

Black market activity was present at all times during this period of occupation. Civilian police were ordered to be on the alert at all times for black market operations. The major items in black markets were cigarettes, beer, sake, and shellfish. The black market, by its nature, is not capable of complete removal until restored production permits widespread distribution of all commodities.

Shipbuilding, as authorized by higher authority, was started and regulations for their operation prepared and adopted. Repair and rehabilitation of fishing craft and small cargo craft were started and expedited to re-establish transportation.

Motor transportation was found in deplorable condition. Japanese military and naval transportation was acquired. thru Military Government, excesses of certain items former the property of Japanese Army and Navy forces, such as air compressors, grease, tires, etc, held by occupa-
tion forces and not needed by them, were turned over to the Prefectural Transportation Department. About twelve trucks and eight search light bases, formerly owned by Japanese armed forces, were demilitarized by the Japanese under occupation forces supervision, and, thru the Miltant Government, turned over by Disposition Board to said department. Depots were established and by cannibalizing and use of every available part many trucks were returned to service. The manufacture of two wheel carts was started and the first of these will be in service by 1 December. Automotive fuel was obtained in limited quantities from Japanese Military and Naval depots. All available trucks were pooled under the supervision of the Prefectural Chief of Motor Transportation.

Public utilities were inadequate due to war damage. An advisory program was adopted in conjunction with the Division Engineer. Repair and rehabilitation was encouraged, and electric and sewage services as well as roads were put into satisfactory operation. Water was delivered to all outlets in a purified palatable condition seven days after landing. Further improvements in all utilities are continuing.

b. Legal.

A survey of courts, judges, and the legal system throughout the Ken was made. The police were required to retain in custody any civilians arrested for criminal offenses against the occupying forces, until advised by Military Government as to disposition thereof. The police department was required to prepare and present, weekly, a report of such offenses, information of which was transmitted to Corps. This report was subsequently required every three days.

In conjunction with the Public Procuretor's Office, this district, a system of disposing of such cases was evolved. Under this system, minor cases are disposed of in weekly conference between the Military Government legal officer, and the Public Procuretor; such disposition consisted of offender being released, on probation, after varying periods of incarceration, suggested by the legal officer, dependent on the character and severity of the offense, or of offender being held for trial by the Japanese courts. Major offenses are held for disposition by higher authority. In cases thus far tried by the Japanese courts, the punishment ranged from six months to three years imprisonment.
c. Fiscal.

A survey covering currency on hand or in circulation, non-legal currency, and banking facilities, was secured from the Economic Section of the Ken. In the main, it showed an adequacy of banking facilities and legal currency for the area. It was found that banking institutions had not received sufficient official notices pertaining to prescribed types of non-legal currency. This delinquency was remedied by having the Economics Department circulate the proper information. A spot check of six main banks in Nagasaki City was made to ascertain any sizable supply of bullion (gold, silver, platinum), a small supply of silver coin was found. This section also supervises returning repatriates to insure enforcement of provisions as to the amount of currency brought into the country.

d. Public Safety.

The Prefectural Chief of Police submits a weekly report covering: 1. All incidents between civilians and members of the occupation force. 2. The general condition of all jails. 3. Any large increases or decreases in population. 4. Any indications of subversive activity.

The Special Higher Police Section, and the Foreign Affairs Section of the Prefectural Police Department were dissolved by order of SCAP. Police Chief Suzuki was relieved by SCAP directive and succeeded in office by Mikawa.

e. Repatriation.

Upon application of representatives of several large groups of Koreans for repatriation, unsuccessful efforts were made to secure craft for this purpose. As subsequently evolved, the Governor of the Ken was charged with the duty of repatriation.

Food and clothing were furnished and an increased ration allocation from the Ken arranged for several British subjects, resident in Nagasaki.

Military Government co-operated with G-2, Provost Marshall and native Harbor Police in screening returning, demobilized soldiers and starting them home as quickly as possible.
f. Public Welfare.

Shortly after landing a survey was begun thru the Relief Section of the Prefectural Government. Present relief laws were left in effect and restoration of relief agencies was encouraged.

g. Civilian Supply.

Survey made in accordance to order of Corps Military Government Officer regarding adequacy of food potential for period of December 1945 thru June 1946. At time of survey, it was established that, with the exception of sugar and salt, there would be sufficient food either in stock, to be harvested, or to be imported from neighboring prefectures to satisfy the existing ration system for the period. Accordingly, a request was placed with Corps for salt and sugar to cover this period.

Since the time of initial survey, however, bad weather has decreased the potential of harvestable foodstuff, and it is considered that March and April 1946 will be bad months unless food can be imported from China, Korea, etc.

A better system of control over the farmer is being presently planned whereby the quota for each farmer may be increased. Staple commodities are reaching the black market through the farmer. A more consistent method of control would greatly eliminate this undesirable practice. Further, the Prefectural Government is adding certain inducements to the farmers for increased production.

During initial period, fuel was greatly augmented through use of material derived from damaged and destroyed buildings. Fuel is now beginning to arrive from outlying areas which supply majority of Naha-saki's supply.

h. Education.

The educational mission of Military Government is to supervise the elimination of militarism and ultranationalism, in doctrine and practice, from all elements of the Japanese educational system and the inclusion of such new courses of instruction in school curricula as are necessary to accomplish the mission of proper dissemination of democratic ideals and principles.

In order to accomplish this mission the Educa-
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT (Cont'd).

National Officer arranged to have Military Government supplied with the National Department of Education and official information published at the prefectural level for the guidance of the schools.

As of this date the following schools have been inspected: Kwassui Women's College, Kwassui Girls High School, Nagasaki Girls High School, Nagasaki Middle School, Kiiho Middle School, Nagasaki Commercial School, Nagasaki Second Commercial School, Chinzai Middle School, Inabawshi Primary School, and the Katuyama Primary School. These inspections revealed that certain militaristic practices, such as saluting and military drill, still prevailed in some schools. Prefectural officials were informed of this situation and such practices have been discontinued.

In conjunction with the Military Intelligence a complete survey of teachers and textbooks is being conducted. Teachers are being interviewed to determine qualification. Textbooks are being translated in order to determine the pages or sections which should be deleted.

Ken officials have been advised to institute programs for the retraining and reeducation of the Japanese teachers. The curriculum of the normal schools is being revised in accordance with the objective of raising the teaching standards.

A questionnaire was prepared for the headmaster of every school by the Educational Officer and distribution was made through the Prefectural Education section. When these are accomplished and returned to the Military Government Office, the information supplied will furnish a working basis for long range educational operations.

i. Labor.

The initial function of the labor section was to supply coolie labor to the Shore Party to facilitate unloading of ships and storing of materials and gear.

As the occupation progressed demands for additional coolie labor and for many classifications of skilled labor were made by the occupying forces.

A system of permanent parties of both coolie and skilled labor was installed with the result that labor parties were dispatched automatically to the using unit eliminating the necessity of members of the occupation.
forces transporting the labor parties to the place of work.

At the end of the first month of occupation native labor employed numbered over two thousand daily and at the end of the second month totaled three thousand in Nagasaki shi alone. Skilled and unskilled labor pools were also established at Isahaya and Omura early in the occupational stages and at the end of the first two months an average of two hundred and fifty to three hundred unskilled laborers were used daily. An additional force to supplement the permanent parties in Nagasaki was assembled and dispatched daily to units needing labor for emergency and other details. A third force of skilled stevedores was assigned to the shore party on a 24 hour daily basis.

Skilled labor in Nagasaki was dispatched on a 'job' basis to the requesting unit with the approval of the Commanding Officer, Service Troops, and after proper insertion on a maintained priority list. Procurement of materials was facilitated by the usage of a chit system whereby requested materials were released from the engineer supply yards by the Labor Officers who correlated same with the supply of labor to the job. This system eliminates the dispatch of labor to units not having obtained the supplies necessary to proceed with the construction and ensures the continuity of work by a steady stream of both craftsmen and necessary materials.

To facilitate the initial procurement of material for construction purposes this office maintained on a full time basis an architect whose services were utilized to make job appraisals and estimates of supplies required.

Work inspectors were assigned to supervise the work proceedings and make proper adjustments of skilled labor needs. Two building contractors and five foremen supervised these details. One man in charge of coolie labor and two assistants were maintained on a full time basis in an office established at the central labor pool.

In the outlying districts the units were dispatched skilled labor on a like basis by the Military Government Officer present with the unit.

To increase the efficiency of future operations the following items of interest are noted herein. On debarkation into a devastated area the primary factor to be considered is the hasty preparation of lodging and mess.
areas and the subsequent renovation thereof. In order to accomplish this with the minimum of effort and at a maximum of efficiency the Labor Officer should immediately prepare and submit to the local government a list of skilled craftsmen that will be required and the approximate number thereof, in the interim and before such labor is utilized, common or manual laborers should be applied to cleaning the debris and preparing the billet areas. Further, a list of materials that may be needed should be given the local authorities and such should be located and secured by them for use by the occupying forces. These supplies should be utilized to the fullest extent possible before using those brought by the occupying forces. In order to facilitate the complete reconstruction the entire supply and labor situation must be correlated by one officer sufficiently staffed to maintain outside supervision and assignment in addition to the office procedure involved. Details deserving immediate consideration are the daily work hours, to include eight shifts, feeding of laborers of all types, salary and fringe wages and the payment thereof, transportation, and tools of all types. The latter factor, of prime importance, is one encountered in devastated areas where movement, fire and ruin have caused the loss of much time due to the failure of workmen to own or be able to secure the proper tools necessary for job completion. Lastly the human factor must be considered. In order to attain the maximum efficiency from labor of any type, the proper supervision is needed. Unit groups in their commands men with the proper labor supervisory backgrounds should assign such men in supervisory capacities in every instance including the supervision of ordinary manual laborers on any task. Failure of units to follow such practice results in time and labor loss and returns in great proportion the job results.


The following activities have been carried out, or are being carried out under this section of Military Government:

On 25 September, 1945 the Nagasaki water system was surveyed with the idea of determining whether or not it would be adequate, if chlorinated, to supply the whole of the city as well as the occupying forces. Survey of the bomb damage and the stock of bleaching powder at that time in the city indicated that the water could be made potable with relatively little difficulty. These measures were carried out, and the water was declared potable early in the first week of October. Since then, sufficient quantities of bleach-
ing powder have been imported to maintain the potability of the water for general consumption.

On 29 September, 1945 steps were taken to re-establish the night soil and garbage collection systems which had not been functioning at all since the date of the atomic bombing – 9 August, 1945 – and collection of these materials was begun. Since that time, it had gradually improved to a point where the city is beginning to show the effects of the cleaning up campaign. It is still far from perfect, but plans are in action at this date to accomplish the complete job and have a city-wide collection system functioning by December 15th. Special emphasis has been given from the first to areas occupied by our forces.

On 1 October, 1945 a survey was made of the hospitals, the numbers and quality of the doctors, the number of nurses and midwives, and other medical facilities to determine the damage from the atomic bombing. It was determined that there were no regular municipal hospitals functioning, and that the small hospitals of the numerous private doctors were in very bad state of disrepair. In addition, over 90% of the medicines and medical supplies which were not destroyed totally by the bombing, had been used up during the six weeks subsequent to the bombing to care for the more than 100,000 casualties of the bombing itself.

For the above reasons, it was felt that it was necessary to re-establish certain medical facilities through the Ken Headquarters and to set up a distribution system for the confiscated Japanese army and navy medical supplies found in the immediate area. To carry out these necessities, warehousing of all Japanese medical supplies was done in the Military Government warehouse, and plans were drawn up for the conversion of two school buildings into municipal hospitals, one to be the general hospital and the other the infectious disease hospital, and in addition the former Japanese Army hospital to be repaired under the direction of Military Government immediately, the expense to be carried totally by the Ken, which would set as a 100 bed (12 bassinette) receiving hospital for the poor of the city. As of this date, the two school buildings are nowhere near completion, and will probably be ready to open to receive patients not before 1 February, 1946. The hospital being repaired under Military Government direction to be known as Blair General Hospital will be ready to receive patients during the week of 20 November, 1945.

In addition to the above, the Japanese Naval
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT (Cont'd).

The hospital at Omura has been set up by the Japanese Nagasaki Medical School, whose facilities in Nagasaki were totally destroyed, as the home of the Nagasaki Medical School, and will be able to receive as an evacuation hospital any chronic cases from Blair General Hospital.

Beginning on 15 October, 1945, a daily reporting system for communicable diseases was established in Nagasaki Shi, and this has since been extended to include Isahaya, Omura, Kumamoto, Shimabara, and Obama-Unzen.

With a view to overcoming the health hazard in this area presented by the presence of large numbers of the common mosquito vectors of malaria, Japanese encephalitis, dengue, and filariasis, the Malaria Control Detachment (Army) which has been attached to this section has begun a sanitary cleanup of the city, as far as they are able to with their light equipment. Plans are in formulative stage for general cleaning up of the innumerable locations of mosquito breeding by the use of heavier equipment.
CONFIDENTIAL

DIVISION SMGO

DEPUTY MGO

ADJUTANT

DIVISION MILITARY GOVERNMENT STAFF

LOCAL REPAIATION FISCAL

EDUCATION

RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES SECTION

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SANITATION

TRANSPORTATION SHIPPING

FISHERIES PRICE-CONTROL WAGES

CIVILIAN SUPPLY PUBLIC WELFARE

PUBLIC UTILITIES

LABOR

2ND MARINES MGO

6TH MARINES MGO

KEN TEAM NAGASAKI

8TH MARINES MGO

10TH MARINES MGO

KEN TEAM KUMAMOTO

KEN TEAM KAGOSHIMA

MG SECTION ISAHAYA

MG SECTION OMURA

MG SECTION KAMIGO

MG SECTION NAGASAKI

MG SECTION MIYAKO

MG SECTION MIYAKO

MG SECTION HIYACHI

MG SECTION OKUTA

MG SECTION SHIMABARA

*Functions of Ken Team for NAGASAKI presently being performed.

NOTE: (1) Ken Team consist of four to six officers, as additional duties by members of Division MG Staff.

(2) MG Sections consist of one or two officers.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX II TO ARMN IX (B)
PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT

1. Preliminary Planning and Training Phase

a. During the Preliminary Planning Phase the Division
Military Police were largely occupied with routine duties. Company
training was centered on duties of the company during combat. The
Provost Marshal entered into the Preliminary Planning, along with the
Military Government Section, and G-2, to provide for proper deployment
of personnel of the Division, and to control contact with Japanese
civilians.

2. Planning Phase.

a. Planning for the Military Police include planning for
combat functions in the initial stages, subject to final determination of
opposition to be encountered during the landing. It was necessary to plan
for Military Police to guard beach dams, and to control traffic on the
beaches, and inland to regiments. Certain personnel of the Military
Police Company were made available to the Shore Party Commander for these
functions.

3. Embarkation.

a. Plans were made for augmenting the Division Military
Police Company by a section of the 3rd MP BN (Prov) when it became known
that a company of that Battalion would be attached to the Division some-
time after arrival at the Target Area.

b. (Div) MTCO embarked 10% understrength.

4. Movement to and Arrival at Target Area.

a. Because of the nature of the operation and the need for
coordination of Military Police and infantry elements of the Division,
control of the Military Police was passed to the G-3 section two (2) days
before arrival at the Target Area.

5. Occupational Operations

a. An advance party of one (1) officer and eight (8) en-
listed men from the Div MTCO landed on the morning of 24 September to
establish security of the Div CP and effect a reconnais-

(over)
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (B) - PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT, (Cont'd),

sense of the city of Nagasaki and vicinity, with emphasis on traffic problems. The main body of the Div MPo's landed 25 September and was deployed as follows:

1. Traffic Platoons - established traffic control on LPZ; and in landing areas.

2. Prisoner of War Platoons - took over local security of Div CP and adjacent area, and established a P.O.W. collecting point and Division Brig.

3. Straggler Platoons - established a straggler line through the city in front of landing troops. Installed details in five (5) of the more important Japanese Police Stations.

4. Men from all Platoons were used to guard duty on dumps and motor pools. Personnel were inadequate for the mission assigned.

b. This general plan was followed until the Div MPo's were organized and began to supplement the Div MPo in taking over partial traffic control and town patrol in Nagasaki, and within PCT zone of responsibility.

c. The straggler line was eventually consolidated around various restricted areas which were posted and patrolled by Military Police.

5. The Provost Marshal, upon establishment ashore, and after organization of the various Regimental MPo's, assumed supervisory role over Military Police activities throughout Division area of responsibility.

7. On 15 October, control of the Military Police was passed to the Ed. Commandant. On 7 November, the PCT 2 MPo was relieved of all duties in the Nagasaki area by the lst Ed., 10th Marines.

8. The investigation section was re-established and concerned itself with the following types of cases:

a. Offenses committed by allied personnel against personnel of Allied Governments.
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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.
APPENDIX II(a) TO ANNEX (B)
DIVISION FIRE MARSHAL REPORT

December, 1945.

1. Organization and Training.

a. On 13 October, approximately three weeks subsequent to initial landing at Nagasaki, a fire department comprised of Marine personnel was organized. The unit, consisting of one (1) officer and thirteen (13) enlisted men functions separately, but in cooperation with Japanese fire fighters.

b. Equipment includes two (2) motorized pump engines, procured from the Japanese government. Individual extinguishers were found to be in poor condition and all equipment had been partially neglected.

c. Regular classes are held in pump operation, ladder drill and maintenance. Prescribed routes to critical areas have been designated; all billets and storage spaces have been inspected; and fire drill is held regularly for troops. Each regiment and separate battalion have designated a fire marshal who works in conjunction with the division fire marshal.

d. In addition to responding to alarms in U. S. Government installations, the Fire Department renders assistance in combating fires in Japanese owned structures whenever circumstances require.

2. Operations subsequent to landing.

a. To date, the unit has responded to six (6) fire calls. Only one of the fires - a warehouse, was of prime importance. Fire hydrants are practically nonexistent and it is necessary to pump water from whatever source is available. Even in these areas where hydrants are found, water pressure is insufficient for effective fire fighting.

b. It has been noted that Japanese are relatively slow in responding to fire calls, and usually arrive at the scene of a fire much later than does this Marine unit.

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APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (E) - 'PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT' (Cont'd).

b. Offense committed by Allied personnel against Japanese nationals or the Japanese Government.

9. Offense by Japanese against Allied personnel or Allied Governments were referred to the Military Government Section.

10. The Table of Organization for a Div NCOs was soon found to be both inadequate and impractical for the mission assigned.

11. For employment and functioning of the PCT NCO's, see operation reports of the several PCT's.

12. The following recommendations are made:

a. That the Provost Marshal's Office and the Div NCO be organized as follows:


(2) Traffic Platoon: 50 enl - 2 Off.

(3) Straggler Platoon: 50 enl - 2 Off.

(4) Prison Platoon (Including P.O.W.): 50 enl - 1 Off.

(5) Investigation & Vice Control: 15 enl - 2 Off.

b. That the Div NCO be commanded by an officer of the rank of Major, with additional duty as Division Provost Marshal.

- 3 -

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APPENDIX III TO ANNEX (B)

SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT

I. ATHLETICS, RECREATION, AND SUPPLY.

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATION:

In anticipation of a future assault operation, which was later thought to be a possible operation of occupation, the following general preparations were made:

(a) Meetings of Unit's Special Services Officers were held to discuss problems and plans for athletics, recreation, and supply needs.
(b) Bulletins were issued pertaining to organization, schedule, and supplies.
(c) Athletic and recreation gear was distributed, and additional gear requisitioned.
(d) Sufficient reasonably up-to-date films were obtained to provide a three-weeks' schedule for the main units of the division.
(e) Interest was stimulated in the organization of Unit Shows, for the entertainment of division units.

2. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING:

The following operations relative to athletics, recreation, and supply have been conducted since arrival in Japan:

(c) General:

(1) A general survey has been made of existing facilities by Division Special Services Officers, and Unit Special Services Officers.
(2) A minimum of suitable buildings and storage spaces were secured by the Division for Special Services Officers and supplies upon arrival. Subsequently, this condition has improved due to added facilities.
(3) Division and Unit Special Services Officers attended a two-day conference at headquarters, W.A.C., on education and its relation to the whole program.
(4) The details of officers and enlisted men, selected for capabilities in special services activities, were instructed at a special services school conducted by W.A.C.
(5) The Division Special Services Officer, or his representatives, have contacted all division units, and

(1)
(Over) Confidential
attached Units to ascertain general conditions relating to athletics, recreation, and supply.

(b) Athletics:
(1) Suitable athletic fields have been constructed within the Division.
(2) A detail of officers is attending a special school, pertaining to athletics at Osaka. This school is being conducted by the Sixth Army.
(3) Schedules for various types of athletic competition have been prepared.

(c) Recreation:
(1) A Motion Picture schedule was in operation after the first week subsequent to arrival in Japan. By exchange of film on hand, this schedule has been maintained.
(2) Numerous suitable installations in all areas for the showing of Motion Pictures, and other entertainment have been utilized.
(3) A Taxi-Dance Hall has been established in Nagasaki, and others are planned in other areas occupied by this Division.
(4) Recreation halls are being constructed in all Division areas.
(5) Arrangements have been made for sight-seeing tours of Buddhist Temples and shrines throughout the division areas. Interpreters will act as guides.
(6) Rest Camps for the Division are being surveyed.
(7) The "Stars and Stripes", when received, have been distributed as far as practicable.
(8) There have been two performances of the USO Show "Kiss and Tell" in the Division Theatre, Nagasaki.

(d) Supply:
(1) Christmas cards in the amount of 100,000 have been printed and distributed to Division and Attached Units.
(2) Representatives of Special Services have contacted Special Services representatives at Saipan and Okinawa to obtain additional materials.

3. CONTENTS:
(a) No athletic and recreational supplies have been received since landing, prior to special trips to Sasebo,
and Okinawa.

(b) No facilities for a Motion Picture Exchange have been established in Okinawa since the arrival of troops.

(c) There is a serious lack of projector parts, (amps, exciter bulbs, etc.), affecting the successful showing of motion pictures. These have been requisitioned without avail.

(d) Local electric power has proved inadequate for operation of radios issued by Special Services.

(e) No USO show has been obtained. A real lack of adequate facilities to accommodate feminine members of the cast exists.

II. EDUCATION AND INFORMATION.

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATION:

Prior to cessation of hostilities, and later in anticipation of occupation duty, the following preparations were made for an extended education program.

(a) A survey of the current program with recommendation for expansion was made.

(b) The following materials were requisitioned: 7,000 text books for unit classes, school supplies (pencils, paper, etc.), application blanks and standard forms, guidance materials (catalogs).

(c) Unit Education organizations were strengthened.

(d) Units were advised on methods of organizing the materials.

(e) Surveys of educational interest were encouraged in all units and conducted in some.

(f) Bulletins, memoranda, and other materials were issued to assist Unit Education Officers in their preparations.

2. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING:

The following operations have been conducted by the Division Education and Information Office subsequent to landing:

(a) Recommendations were made to the 511 section on the basic program under occupation conditions.

(over)
APPENDIX III TO ANNEX (B) - SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT. (Cont'd).

(b) A meeting of all Unit Education Officers was held and plans were outlined and basic materials distributed. Unit classes were directed.

(c) Approximately 2,000 of the 3,000 texts received on requisition were distributed for use in Unit classes.

(d) School was established and supplies were and are still being procured locally. Distributions have been made as available.

(e) A meeting at V.A.O to outline the Army Education Training program was directed. Division Special Services officers attended this meeting.

(f) Classes are under way in Units furthering educational program. Total enrollment is approximately 1,000 within the Division, and attached units.

3. COMMENTS:

(a) Lack of adequate text books has been one of the factors impeding more rapid organization of classes. Of 7,000 texts requisitioned, only 3,000 have been received.

(b) In view of the contemplated expansion of the Education program as promulgated, additional personnel are required to carry out this feature.

III. PERSONAL AFFAIRS.

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATION:

In anticipation of Occupation and the expected discharge of personnel, the following plans were made:

(a) A survey was made of information available and the requesting of the latest material available for distribution.

(b) Materials on hand were distributed to all division and attached units.

(c) Organization of a program was partially completed prior to departure from Saipan.

2. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING:

The following operations relative to Personal Affairs have been conducted subsequent to arrival in Japan.

(a) Organization of program was completed and additional materials were secured and distributed in kits to all

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Division and attached Units.

(b) Transcriptions of the G. I. Bill of Rights have been scheduled for all units. Lectures, bulletin boards, and interviews have been aids to presenting information.

(c) All Division and attached Units are being visited by Special Services Officers.

(d) A meeting at VAC to outline the Personal Affairs program was directed, and was attended by Special Services Officers.
SECOND ARMY DIVISION, FIFTH
IN THE FIELD.

1 December 1945

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX (B)
HEADQUARTERS COMMAND POST REPORT

1. Because of shipping uncertainties immediately prior to the operation, it was difficult for the Headquarters Commandant to plan, other than tentatively, for movement of the command post. When shipping was allocated and did arrive, however, it was found to be practicable to boat almost the entire headquarters organization on the command ship.

2. Staff offices were in operation aboard ship at least six hours before it was necessary to close offices at the former command post.

3. Arrived at the Target, the Headquarters Commandant, in conjunction with the Chief of Staff and the Signal Officer, made tentative selection of a command post located adjacent to the docks. The building selected was large and in reasonably good condition, and had served as the Nagasaki Customs House.

4. In this connection, it is pointed out that hardly a structure in Nagasaki escaped effects of the atomic bomb—a fact which complicated the location of suitable billeting space for personnel.

5. Advance reconnaissance personnel had located and secured a sizable building for quartering headquarters personnel. This building proved inadequate for proper housing, and units were separated and moved to other billets as they were provided.

6. Practically every building procured was without windows and was in bad repair, resulting in unavoidable delay in their use as adequate billeting space. This condition was accentuated by the inaccessible approaches to the buildings. Roadways are steep, narrow and were designed for pedestrian traffic. The problem of supply and disposal of garbage disposal has been difficult and has necessitated extensive use of Japanese labor to make carriage by hand.

7. Necessary separation of units of headquarters battalion spread troops over a wide area and hindered control in the initial phases of the landing.

8. Each billet was organized under its own plan of defense, and the whole was integrated with the defense plan of the regiment in control of the area.
CONFIDENTIAL
1 December 1945.

APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (E)

ADJUTANT'S REPORT

1. Preparation and planning.

a. The sudden end of the war with Japan injected so many unusual factors into the administrative end of the division that very few if any valid deductions could be drawn from the occupation inspection being of any value to future operations. The entire cause for this unusual situation was the point system for discharge and the entire occupation of Japan up until this date. The question from this administrative end.

b. On 31 July 1945, fifteen days prior to the end of the war, and one week before the dropping of the first atomic bomb, this division received letter of instruction 2675, which gave the first indication that the Marine Corps was contemplating any sort of demobilization. It was reiterated that the action was imminent and that information desired was for planning purposes only. In view of this end of the approaching Olympic operation, no serious thought was given to this letter other than furnishing the desired information. Simultaneously with the close of the war a warning was received stating that this division could expect to take part in the occupation of Japan.

Two days after receipt of this warning order FIFTH PAC dispatch 23011 was received directing that action be taken on MARCORPS dispatch 312352 which stated that all men with 65 or more discharge credits were to be transferred to the United States for processing and discharge down to 90% of TO strength.

The above factors necessarily limited proper planning by this section for the occupation of Japan. However, steps were taken to include the following points:

(1) Casualty reporting.
(2) Speeding routing of dispatches during a combat operation.
(3) Operation with or without a rear echelon.

One factor from an administrative point of view is the difficulty of operating without a rear echelon, inasmuch as this division did go into the operation without such an echelon. The following factors had to be accounted for:

(1) The possibility of operating in a combat situation.
(2) The administering of the division from the forward area.
(3) The lack of shipping and office space onboard ship to have all files and equipment available during the voyage to the target.
(4) The desire of the Navy to withdraw shipping from the target as soon as possible.

In an attempt to solve some of the above problems the following steps were taken:

(1) Adjutant's section gear was divided into that absolutely necessary to the division for a period of 3 weeks and that which could be disposed with for that period.

(2) The necessary equipment was placed in the troop space and the other was stowed in the hold.

(3) The troops space gear had to be again divided into that which would be necessary for combat and that which would not be needed in combat.

(4) Follows a breakdown of equipment and men.

(a) Equipment necessary for 3 week period:

- 4 typewriters
- 4 field desk (fully equipped with stationery) with chairs.
- 1 alphabetical roster of entire division
- 1 skeleton Ellis-Drane File in locker box
- 1 Blackout Tent
- 1 Jeep

(b) Personnel for 3 week period:

- 1 Captain - Adjutant
- 1 Lieutenant - Casualty Report Officer
- 1 Sergeant Major
- 4 Clerks, correspondence
- 4 Runners

(c) Equipment necessary for combat:

- 2 typewriters (field)
- 2 field desks
- 1 Blackout Tent
- 1 Jeep

(d) Personnel necessary for combat:

- 1 Captain - Adjutant
- 1 Lieutenant - Casualty Report Officer
- 1 Sergeant Major
- 3 Clerks, casualty report
- 2 Clerks, correspondence
- 4 Runners
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APPENDIX V TO APPENDIX (B) - ADJUTANT'S REPORT. (Cont'd).

The above breakdown of personnel and equipment was found to be satisfactory and no serious difficulty occurred.

2. Operations subsequent to landing.

a. No attempt will be made to narrate the activities of this section during the occupation phase inasmuch as only routine administration was carried on in addition to transferring personnel to the United States for discharge. A separate report on demobilization by this division will be submitted at a later date.

b. One point however is worthwhile mentioning at this time incident to the occupation - the great distances involved, aggravated by faulty telephone communication. This was solved by two expedients:

(1) The use of CY aircraft as special couriers
(2) Close liaison between the Division Message Center and the Division Adjutant for radio communication.

3. Comments and recommendations.

Any far flung or new recommendations from the adjutant's section at this time would be premature. However, one fact stands out insofar as the adjutant's duties in routing correspondence to other members of the staff.

a. Many staff sections which heretofore have had relatively little importance in the war time staff structure have assumed new duties in occupation - namely, military government, provost marshal, disposition, and procurement. Very often these officers are not trained in staff procedure, or being from either the Army or Navy, are not familiar with Marine Corps staff work.

In view of the foregoing it is strongly recommended that frequent and thorough staff conferences be held so as to acquaint all members of the staff with their duties and responsibilities and to establish a better liaison between staff sections.

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POST OFFICE REPORT

I. Planning and Preparation.

1. Plans were made prior to embarkation to deliver mail at target through normal channels in the event of an assault landing and combat ashore. Post office personnel was instructed accordingly.

2. During embarkation, mail was delivered aboard ship. Embarkation rosters were used in sorting the mail according to ships.

II. Operations Subsequent To Landing.

1. After the division reached Nagasaki on 23 September, 1945, the first mail was obtained from a seaplane tender in Nagasaki harbor on 25 September, and delivery to addresses was begun the same day. Additional mail was obtained from the tender on 28, 29 and 29 September. After that date Nagasaki was left without direct air mail service and incoming and outgoing airmail was routed through Sasebo, the nearest air terminal. Destroyer Escorts were used to transport the mail between Sasebo and Nagasaki, semi-weekly service being provided. On occasions, Sasebo received no Nagasaki mail for four or more consecutive days. When the mail failed to reach Sasebo until after the third or fourth day, it failed to connect with semi-weekly DE and left Nagasaki without mail for a full week.

2. Commencing 15 October, 1945, the division began exchanging mail with Sasebo each day by utilizing military coaches on the Japanese railway. Two post office clerks accompany the mail, leaving Nagasaki at 0657, arriving Sasebo at 0645; leaving Sasebo at 1435, and arriving Nagasaki 1746. These clerks transport incoming and outgoing letter mail for all army, navy and marine personnel in the Nagasaki area.

3. During their stay at Sasebo between arrival and departure of daily trains, the clerks sort the division's mail sufficiently to permit them to make delivery to units at Okura and Ishaya on the return trip. Postal clerks from those units meet the train and take possession of the mail directly from the clerks aboard the train.

4. Mail for those elements of the division located at Kumamoto, Kagoshima, Okuta and Yanoya was also segregated at Sasebo and left with the postal clerks meeting the train at Ishaya. These clerks delivered the mail to these pilots leaving Ishaya at 0700 the following morning for Kumamoto, Yanoya, etc.
CONFIDENTIAL

5. Parcel post, registered mail and official funds were exchanged once a week between the division and the outlying units such as those at Kumamoto by having the clerks from the units make a weekly trip by rail to the division post office at Nagasaki.

6. By 11 November, 1945, the personnel at outlying points had increased to such an extent that air transportation of mail by VQO-2 planes was discontinued for lack of plane capacity.

7. To replace the airmail service to the outlying units, as well as the weekly exchange of parcel post, registered mail and official funds by rail, a postal car was set up in a combination baggage car-coach on 13 November, 1945. This car is in charge of two armed post office clerks. It is scheduled to leave Nagasaki for Miyakonojo every third day, and make direct exchanges with post office clerks at Omata, Kumamoto, Hitoyoshi and Miyakonojo. Mail for units stationed at Kanoa, Miyazaki and Shibushi is left with the post office unit at Miyakonojo, and those units exchange with Miyakonojo. At the present time, the units at Kagoshima exchange with their next higher echelon at Kumamoto.

8. When the volume warrants, direct care of parcel post will be made up for Kumamoto, Kagoshima, Miyakonojo, Kanoa and Miyazaki.

III. Recommendations.

1. There has always been an abnormal demand for embossed airmail envelopes during the early phase of assault operations, commercial stationery being unavailable. The same condition prevailed during the occupational operation. The volume of outgoing parcels was larger than during any phase of an assault operation; consequently, more large-denomination stamps were needed. Stamp stock actually sold by the division during the month of October was as follows:

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<td>$20.00</td>
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<td>$92,000</td>
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</table>

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APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX (B) - POST OFFICE REPORT. (cont'd).

\[\begin{array}{ccc}
700 @ 30c & - & 210.00 \\
2,700 @ 60c & - & 1,620.00 \\
3,450 @ 31 & - & 3,465.00 \\
100 @ 13c(§D) & - & 13.00 \\
142,300 @ 6c(AM) & - & 8,538.00 \\
126,000 @ 6c(AM) & - & 7,560.00 (In book form) \\
172,500 AM Env. @ 63c16 & - & 10,895.10 \\
\hline
\text{TOTAL} & $ & 56,002.10
\end{array}\]

2. The problem of transporting airmail envelopes to target in such a way as to prevent the gummed flaps from adhering to the body of the envelope was solved in the Okinawa and Nagasaki operations by packing the envelopes in Wilson drums, ten thousand envelopes and three bags of moisture-absorbent per drum. Adhesion which formerly resulted from exposure to rainfall, too hot, humid atmosphere, and from pressure exerted by other cargo was totally eliminated and the envelopes reached destination in perfect condition.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, F.M.F.,
IN THE FIELD.  
CONFIDENTIAL

1. DECEMBER, 1945.

APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (E)
LEGAL OFFICE REPORT

I. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

There was no preliminary planning done by the legal office. The functioning of said office was normal. Captain Anthony S. E. Bonc relieved Captain George S. Green on August 26, 1945, as Division Legal Officer.

II. PLANNING PHASE.

The work of the legal office was carried on as usual except that 50% of the office equipment was crated for loading so as to cause no delay, since the legal office was on a twenty-four hour standby.

III. EMBARKATION PLAN.

There were two general court martial cases already tried but the records thereof to be completed at the time of embarkation. The necessary office equipment to complete the pending records of the two general court martial cases was brought aboard ship with the office personnel. While enroute to the division destination, the records of the two cases were completed. On hand with the office personnel aboard ship were the necessary material to render legal assistance to the complement of the ship.

IV. OPERATION SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING.

a. On D plus 1 day, the legal office was set for normal operation. All pending work was expedited.

b. The legal officer has operated since D plus 1 day without an assistant legal officer. Captain Clay Nixon, who is division assistant legal officer has been engaged in two naval general court martial cases without being able to devote any of his time to division legal affairs.
ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B) - DEPOT OFFICE REPORT.

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GENERAL COURT MARTIAL

There have been a total of 28 general court martial cases during the period beginning June 26, 1945, to and including November 30, 1945.

The above mentioned 28 general court martials include the following offenses:

SLEEPING UPON HIS WATCH ........................................... 5

LEAVING HIS POST WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY RELIEVED 2

VIOLATION OF A LAWFUL REGULATION ISSUED BY THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY ............................................ 1

STEALING PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED
FOR THE NAVAL SERVICE THEREOF ................................ 3

WRONGFULLY AND KNOWINGLY DISPOSING OF PROPERTY
OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE NAVAL
SERVICE THEREOF ................................................... 1

WRONGFULLY AND KNOWINGLY DISPOSING OF ARMS OF THE
UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE NAVAL SERVICE THEREOF 2

WILFULLY DESTROYING PROPERTY .................................. 1

KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY APPLYING TO HIS OWN USE
PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE
NAVAL SERVICE THEREOF ........................................... 6

FAILING TO USE HIS UTMOST EXERTIONS TO DETECT,
APPREHEND, AND BRING TO PUNISHMENT AN OFFENDER 2

VIOLATION OF A LAWFUL GENERAL ORDER ISSUED BY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY ....................................... 1

DRUNKENNESS ................................................................ 7

CARELESSLY ENDANGERING LIVES OF OTHERS .................. 1

CONDUCT TO THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER
AND DISCIPLINE ....................................................... 8

STRIKING ANOTHER PERSON IN THE NAVY ................. 1

BREAKING ARREST .......................................................... 1
ENCLOURE (A) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B) - LEGAL OFFICE REPORT.

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL COURT MARTIAL (Ct. 8'd)

AWOL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3

DEserting his station and duty in time of battle - - - - 1

DEsertion in time of war - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

FALSEHOOD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3

CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN - - - - 4

DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE TO HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER - - - - - 1

TREATING HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER WITH CONTEMPT - - - - - 1

THREATENING TO STRIKE HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER - - - - - - - - 1

STRIKING HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER WHILE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

WRONGFULLY AND KNOWINGLY SELLING PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE MILITARY SERVICE THEREOF - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

INVolUNTARY MANSlaughter - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

TOTAL FENSES 58
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<th>COUNT</th>
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<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENTERING RESTRICTED AREA</td>
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<td>UNDER INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LEAVING POST WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY RELIEVED</td>
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TOTAL OFFENSES 169

NOTE: The total offenses listed does not indicate total SCM cases.
ENCLOSURE (C) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B) - LEGAL OFFICE REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECK COURT MARTIAL

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<td>DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS</td>
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TOTAL OFFENSES 233

NOTE: The total offenses listed does not include total DC cases.
ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (E) - LEGAL OFFICE REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

LEGAL ASSISTANCE

ACTIVITY: 2ndMarDiv

NAME OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE OFFICER: A. S. E. BONO

ADDRESS OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE OFFICE: HQ, 2ndMarDiv

PERIOD COVERED:
From: Jun 45
To: Nov 45

DETAILS OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE RENDERED

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<th>Document to Civil</th>
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<td>Admin., probate, etc.</td>
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GRAND TOTAL: 271

Civilian bar cooperation: EXCELLENT

Number civilian attorneys to whom matters have been referred: 16
ENCLOSURE (E) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B) - LEGAL OFFICE REPORT.

BOARD OF INVESTIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Boards of Investigation convened within this command during period beginning 26 June, 1945, to and including 30 November, 1945: TOTAL 8.

2. Administrative Reports within this command during period beginning 26 June, 1945, to and including 30 November, 1945: TOTAL 28.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, PIF
IN THE FIELD.  
1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VII TO ... PIF (B)
PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT

1. Preparation and planning for the operation.

Acting on instructions from VAC, plans were made to accommodate eight (8) civilian war correspondents for the assault operation. Arrangements were made with interested sections for their billeting, messing and transportation. About 2 August work was begun on a Division Press Book to serve as a reference for the civilian correspondents and for the Public Information Section's personnel. The book, completed just prior to the Division's embarkation from Saipan, contains a history of the Division, of the three Regimental Combat Teams and of the Tenth Marines, as well as the names and biographical sketches of the "commanding general", the Assistant Division Commander, the executive and staff officers of the Division, Divisional special staff sections, the commanding officers and executive officers of all units through battalion levels, the commanding officers of all companies and even twenty (20) Division "personalities". Preparation of the book, a bound volume completed with a two-color cover design by the Division's combat artist, entailed research into the unit histories to bring them up to date, interviews with all persons concerned, preparation of the biographical material, editing of all written material and considerable time in assembling and binding.

2. Training and organization.

Preparation of the press book, especially the interviewing involved, enabled the Combat Correspondents to become better acquainted with the units and the officers of the units with which they were to serve during the operation. Two weeks prior to the Division's embarkation from Saipan, the assignment of all men to the organizations with which

CONFIDENTIAL
they would serve during the operation was completed. The Public Information Officer, the Assistant Public
Information Officer, one (1) Combat Correspondent
(who could double as a battle broadcaster), one (1)
Radio Technician, two (2) drivers and guides for the
civilian correspondents and one (1) clerk were as-
signed to Division Headquarters. The Division Photo-
graphic Section was prepared to furnish photographic
still and movie coverage at Division Headquarters as
desired. Two (2) Combat Correspondents and one (1)
Photographer were assigned to the Second, Sixth and
Eighth Regimental Combat Teams; one (1) Combat Cor-
respondent and one (1) Photographer to the Tenth
Marines; one (1) Combat Correspondent and one (1)
Combat Artist to the Second Engineer Battalion; and
one (1) Combat Correspondent to the Second Pioneer
Battalion.

3. Operations subsequent to landing.

A. The fact that the operation became one
of occupation rather than combat necessitated little
change in plans. All assignments of Correspondents
and Photographers remained in force. The only change
was in the type of material prepared. Instead of
writing about, photographing and recording the
fighting and deeds of individual Marines, the Combat
Correspondents and Photographers were instructed to
cover general aspects of the occupation. Correspondents
were told to feature human-interest angles on
Marines in their units and on the Japanese in their
areas of occupation, the reaction of the Marines to
the Japanese people and their customs and the experi-
ences of liberated Allied nationals interned.
Stories about the atomic bomb were kept at a minimum
since much of this material was of a technical nature.
APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (B) — PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT (Cont'd)

and already had been covered extensively by civilian news agencies.

b. When the Division arrived on target, 23 September, two Navy hospital ships already were in the area, evacuating liberated Allied prisoners. Two (2) Combat Correspondents and two (2) Photographers were ordered to these ships to interview and write stories about the Marines aboard who had just been released from Japanese prison camps. The audience granted by the Commanding General to local Japanese officials for the purpose of issuing orders concerning the occupation was covered aboard the command ship by writers, photographers and recording technicians.

c. The anticipation that eight (8) civilian correspondents would accompany the Division on the operation never materialized; civilian correspondents who later visited the Division described this to a lack of information in Tokyo about the operation, and to the Navy's announcement that correspondents would soon revert to civilian status, which led most of them to begin making plans to return to the United States. As a result, there was no civilian press coverage of the initial phase of the operation, and all news stories, photographs, artwork, and radio programs on the landing and on subsequent events were produced by the Division's Public Information personnel. In late October and November, however, civilian correspondents began visiting the Division area, and the Public Information Section provided guides, transportation, information and other services to representatives of the British Fleet Newsreel Company, the London Daily Sketch, Australian newspapers, the North American Newspaper Alliance, and the Boston Globe (the latter a former Combat
CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (B) - PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT (Cont'd)

Correspondent who had served with the Division during the Tener and Saltpen operations.

d. During the time covered by this report, the DOublic Information Section has forwarded to Washington, D.C., for distribution to the nation's news services, newspapers, magazines, radio networks, radio stations and art exhibits the following material: a total of two hundred and seventy-seven (277) news and feature stories, one hundred and two (102) of which were accompanied by photographs; sixty-six (66) photographs with sections; thirty-seven (37) 50-foot magazines of 16mm. KODACHROME film and four (4) 100-foot magazines of 16mm. KODACHROME film, a total of 2,250 feet of film; six (6) film packs of KODACHROME Super XX; eleven (11) sheets of KODACHROME 4x5 film; four (4) hours of magnetic wire recordings containing thirteen (13) different radio programs; fifteen (15) water color paintings and thirty-six (36) pen and ink and pencil sketches.

4. Comments and recommendations

g. The work of the Combat Correspondents, Photographers, Artists, Technicians and Clerk of this section was done well. The sudden change from war to peace, the sudden change in the type of material available for news stories, photographs and recordings, did not decrease the amount or lower the quality of the work turned in. Because higher echelons instructed this section to forward its material to three different addresses and because two of these addresses were not provided with proper corps Public Information liaison officers, much of the material was needlessly delayed. Also, the unexplained slowness of mail service, causing material prepared by
this office to arrive at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, as such as 23 days after it was posted here, has greatly affected the value of much of this material.

b. Acting on advice from various Marine Divisions, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, has announced its intention of reducing the Public Information Section of a Marine Division to one officer, four enlisted correspondents and one artist. It is recommended that this reduction be affected immediately, as the amount of valuable Public Information work which can be done in this Division no longer requires a section of the present strength. It is recommended, also, however, that the Public Information Section still be allowed the services of two photographers provided by the Division's Photographic Section, and be assigned one driver and one clerk provided by Division Headquarters Company.
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B)

G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS
APPENDIX I. TO ANNEX (E) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORT (Cont'd).  

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

From: 1300, 23 September 1945.

To: 2400, 25 September 1945.

Date rendered: 2000, 26 September 1945.

No. 1

Maps: KYUSHU Aks L872 Scale 1:25,000 NAGASAKI NW Sheet.

1. Troop List Changes: See enclosure (A).

2. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CP (Map given in reference above) coordinates 1234.60 - 1062.18. This CP is in the "Customs House" in the town of Nagasaki. No Replacement, PW, or Casual Installations have been established.

3. Strength of Command: See enclosure (B).


5. Graves Registration: No casualties.

6. Replacements: See enclosure (D).

7. Prisoners of War: None.

8. Stragglers: None.


GLENN R. LONG
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

153
Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

Second Marines.
Sixth Marines.
Eighth Marines.
Tenth Marines.
Headquarters Battalion, Second Marine Division.
Second Tank Battalion.
Second Service Battalion.
Second Medical Battalion.
Second Motor Transport Battalion.
Second Engineer Battalion.
Second Pioneer Battalion.

Second Amphibian Truck Company.
Company "A", 20th Amphibian Truck Battalion.
Second Var Dog Platoon.
3rd Platoon, 4th Salvage and Repair Company.
4th Separate Laundry Platoon.
Marine Observation Squadron #2.
43rd Naval Construction Battalion.
1298th Engineer Combat Battalion (Army).
3076th Engineer Dump Truck Company (Army).
498th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.
93rd Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Military Government Detachment.
### STRENGTH OF COMMAND

**2000, 26 September 1945**

**REPORTING UNIT:** Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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<th>(3) ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
<th>(4) EFFECTIVE STRENGTH</th>
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|     | 190 | 2783 | 170 | 2783 | 170 | 2783 | 170 | 2783 |
|     | 194 | 20331 | 1178 | 20331 | 1178 | 20331 | 1178 | 20331 |
|     | 67  | 724 | 67  | 724 | 67  | 724 | 67  | 724 |
|     | 36  | 1292 | 36  | 1292 | 36  | 1292 | 36  | 1292 |

**Enclosure (B) to Report No.**
## APPENDIX L. TO AMEX (b) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS. (Cont'd).

### NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

**2000, 26 September 1945.**

**REPORTING UNIT:** Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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**Enclosure (C) to Report No. 2**
APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) — G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS. (Cont'd).

REPLACEMENTS.


REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforce

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TOTAL   |     |     |     |     |     |     |
APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) - C-1 PERIODIC REPORT (Cont'd).

CONFIDENTIAL

C-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

From: 2400, 25 September 1945.

To: 2400, 2 October 1945.

Date rendered: 1300, 3 October 1945.

Maps: KYUSHU A1S L872 Scale 1:25,000 NAGASAKI 1st Sheet.

1. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CP (Map given in reference above) coordinates 1294.60 - 1082.18. This CP is in the "Customs House" in the town of Nagasaki.


4. Graves Registration: No casualties.

5. Prisoners of War: None.

6. Stragglers: Army personnel 13; Navy personnel 64; Marine Corps personnel 35. All personnel have been returned to their parent organizations.


[Signature]

GLEN R. LOY
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS. (Cont'd).

CONFIDENTIAL

STRENGTH OF LOG, AND

1300, 2 October 1945.

REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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APPENDIX IX TO ANMX (B) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS (Cont'd)

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Serial: 00720

Unit: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

From: 2400, 2 October 1945.

To: 2400, 9 October 1945.

Date rendered: 1000, 10 October 1945.

No. 3

Maps: KYUSHU AMS L872 Scale 1:25,000 NAGASAKI NW Sheet.

1. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CP
   (Map given in reference above) coordinates 1294.60 -
   1032.18. This CP is in the "Customs House" in the town
   of Nagasaki.


   see enclosure (B).

4. Graves Registration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cemetery</th>
<th>Army Personnel</th>
<th>Navy Personnel</th>
<th>Marine Personnel</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Prisoners of War: None.

6. Stragglers: Marine Corps personnel 11; Navy personnel 3;
   Army personnel 0; All personnel have been returned to
   their parent organization.


Glenm R. Long
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
### NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

1300, 20 October 1945

REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforced

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</table>
**APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (5) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS**

**STRENGTH OF COMMAND**

2400, 9 October 1945.

**REPORTING UNIT:** Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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<thead>
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<th>(1) UNIT</th>
<th>(2) AUTHORIZED T/O STRENGTH</th>
<th>(3) ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
<th>(4) EFFECTIVE STRENGTH</th>
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</thead>
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**Enclosure (A) to Report No. 3**
NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

2400, 9 December 1945

REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforced

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TOTALS A | 21 | 209 |        | 21-209 |

ARMY A | 8 | 2 |        | 8-2    |

NAVY A | 2 | 2 |        | 2-2    |
CONFIDENTIAL

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

From: 2400, 9 October 1945.

To: 2400, 16 October 1945.

Date rendered: 1000, 17 October 1945.

No. 4

Maps: KYUSHU AMS L872 Scale 1:25,000 NAGASAKI NW Sheet.

1. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CP (Map given in reference above) coordinates 1294.60 - 1062.18. This CP is in the "Custom House" in the town of Nagasaki.


3. Casualties: No battle casualties. Non-Battle casualties see enclosure (B).

4. Graves Registration:

   Cemetery                Army Personnel Navy Personnel Marine Personnel Others Total
   U.S. Armed Forces
   Cemetery No. 1 Nagasaki 3 3

5. Prisoners of War: None.

6. Stragglers: Marine Corps personnel 11; Army personnel 3; Navy personnel 0. All personnel have been returned to their parent organization.


GLENN R. W3,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>(2) AUTHORIZED T/O STRENGTH</th>
<th>(3) ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
<th>(4) EFFECTIVE STRENGTH</th>
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REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.
### Non-Battle Casualties

2400, 16 October 1945.

**Reporting Unit:** Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (E) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS. (Cont'd).

CONFIDENTIAL

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

Fm: 2400, 16 October, 1945.


Date rendered: 1000, 24 October, 1945.

No. 5

Maps: KYUSHU A/M L672 Scale 1:25,000 NAGASAKI NW Sheet.

1. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CP (Map given in reference above) coordinates 1294.60 - 1062.18. This CP is in the "Customs House" in the town of Nagasaki.


3. Casualties: No battle casualties. Non-battle casualties see enclosure (B).

4. Graves Registration:

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<thead>
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<th>Personnel</th>
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5. Prisoners of War: None.

6. Stragglers: None.


8. Remarks: No remarks

GLENN R. LONG,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
### STRENGTH OF COMMAND

**2400, 23 October, 1945.**

REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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<th>(3) ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
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## NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

**REPORTING UNIT:** Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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Enclosure (B) to Report No. 5
APPENDIX IX TO AMNY (B) G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS (Cont'd)

CONFIDENTIAL

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: Second Marine Division, reinforced.

From: 2400, 23 October 1945.

To: 2400, 30 October 1945.

Date rendered: 1000, 31 October 1945.

No. 6

Maps: KYUSHU AF3 L972 Scale 1:25,000 NAGASAKI NV Sheet.

1. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CPO (Map given in reference above) coordinates 1294.60-1062.18. This CP is in the "Customs House" in the town of Nagasaki.


3. Casualties: No battle casualties. Non-Battle casualties see enclosure (B).

4. Graves Registration:

   Cemetery       Army Personnel   Navy Personnel   Marines Personnel   Others   Total
   U. S. Armed Forces
   Cemetery No. 1 Nagasaki                   3       3

5. Prisoners of War: None.

6. Stragglers: None.

7. Morale: Very Satisfactory: There have been fifty-one (51) bronze Star Medals issued and awarded since arrival in Nagasaki from 25 September to this date. These were all for previous operations.


[Signature]

Glen H. Long

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
### STRENGTH OF COMMAND

**2400, 30 October 1945.**

**REPORTING UNIT:** Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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<th>(3) ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
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## NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

2400, 29 October 1945.

REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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Enclosure (B) to Report No. _6_
APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS (cont'd)

CONFIDENTIAL

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

From: 2400, 30 October 1945.

To: 2400, 6 November 1945.

Date rendered: 1000, 7 November 1945.

No. 7

Maps: KUSHU ANS L872 Scale 1:25,000 MAGASAKI NW Sheet.

1. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CP (map given in reference above) coordinates 1,560 - 1062,18. This CP is in the "Customs House" in the town of Nagasaki.


3. Casualties: No battle casualties. Non-Battle casualties see enclosure (B).

4. Graves Registration:

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Marine Personnel</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

5. Prisoners of War: None.

6. Stragglers: None.

7. Morale: Satisfactory. One (1) Bronze Star Medal has been issued and awarded for the period covered by this report.


GLENN R. LONG
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
**STRENGTH OF COMMAND**

2400, 6 November, 1945.

**REPORTING UNIT:** Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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<th>(3) ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
<th>(4) EFFECTIVE STRENGTH</th>
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**CONFIDENTIAL**
APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) G-1 PERIODIC REPORT. (Cont'd)

CONFIDENTIAL

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

From: 2400, 6 November, 1945.

To: 2400, 13 November, 1945.

Date rendered: 1000, 14 November, 1945.

No. 8-

Maps: KYUSHU AM3L872 Scale 1:25,000 NAGASAKI NV Sheet.

1. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CP (map given in reference above) coordinates 1294.80-1064.18. This DP is in the "Customs House" in the town of Nagasaki.

2. Strength of Command: See enclosure (a).

3. Casualties: No battle casualties. "On-battle" casualties see enclosure (b).

4. Graves Registration:

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</table>

U. S. Armed Forces Cemetery No. 1 Nagasaki 3

5. Prisoners of War: None.

6. Stragglers: None

7. Morale: Satisfactory. Two (2) bronze Star Medals have been issued and awarded for the period covered by this report.


E. C. HUGHES,
Major, USMC,
Ass't G-1.
2400, 13 November, 1945.

**Reporting Unit:** Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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### Appendix IX to Annex (B) - G-1 Periodic Reports (Cont'd)

#### Non-Battle Casualties

Report Date: 13 November, 1945

**Reporting Unit:** Second Marine Division, Reinforcement

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**Enclosure (E) to Rep No. 8**
APPENDIX IX TO ANN. (E) -- G-1 PERIODIC REPORT (Cont'd).

CONFIDENTIAL

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

From: 2400, 13 November, 1945.

To: 2400, 20 November, 1945.

Date rendered: 1000, 21 November, 1945.

No. 9

Maps: KYUSHU AMS L872 Scale 1:25,000 NAGASAKI NW sheet.

1. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CP (Map given in reference above) coordinates 294.50-1082.18. This CP is in the "Customs House" in the town of Nagasaki.


3. Casualties: No battle casualties. Non-battle casualties see enclosure (B).

4. Graves Registration:

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U.S. Armed Forces Cemetery No. 1 Nagasaki

5. Prisoners of War: None.

6. Stragglers: None.

7. Morale: Satisfactory. Five (5) Bronze Star Medals have been issued and awarded for the period covered by this report.


GLenn R. Long,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS. (Cont'd).

CONFIDENTIAL

STRENGTH OF COMMAND

2400, 20 November, 1945.

REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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**APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS. (Cont'd).**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES**

2400, 20 November, 1945.

**REPORTING UNIT:** Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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Enclosure (B) to Report No. — 9 —

**CONFIDENTIAL**
APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS. (Cont'd).

CONFIDENTIAL

G-1 PERIODIC REPORT

Unit: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.


To: 2400, 27 November, 1945.

Date rendered: 1000, 28 November, 1945.

No. - 10 -

Maps: KYUSHU AMS L872 Scale 1:25,000 NAGASAKI NW Sheet.

1. Administrative Installations: Second Marine Division CP
   (Map given in reference above) coordinates 1294.60-1052.19. This CP is in the "Customs House" in the town
   of Nagasaki.

2. Strength of Command: See enclosure (A)

3. Casualties: No battle casualties. Non-battle casualties
   see enclosure (B).

4. Graves Registration.

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5. Prisoners of War: None.

6. Stragglers: None.

   have been issued and awarded for the period covered by
   this report.


GLenn R. Long,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Assistant Chief Staff, G-1.
APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS. Cont'd.

CONFIDENTIAL

STRENGTH OF COMMAND.

2409, 27 November, 1945.

REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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APPENDIX IX TO ANNEX (B) - G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS. (Cont'd).

NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

REPORTING UNIT: Second Marine Division, Reinforced.

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2400, 27 November, 1945
Serial: 0716
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX (C)

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF, IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

From: The Division Intelligence Officer.
To: The Commanding General.

1. General:

a. 7-2 Intelligence Planning for the invasion of Southern KYUSHU began on 22 June, 1945, with the initiation of a study of Order of Battle and defenses of Southern KYUSHU. From that date until 15 August, selected planning personnel from the 7-2 Section were engaged in preparing various intelligence studies and estimates, making aerial photograph interpretations, reproducing maps, mosaics, and other intelligence material, and briefing Staff and Regimental Officers, in the 7-2 Planning Room. Regimental Intelligence Planning commenced in late July when the first intelligence material was disseminated to Regimental Commanders.

b. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, similar intelligence planning was initiated for the Occupation of the "NAKASAKI" Area. This planning phase continued through 23 September when the Division arrived in "NAKASAKI." Intelligence material was disseminated to the Regiments for planning purposes almost as soon as it arrived at Division Headquarters in many instances.

c. Many problems were encountered during both planning phases. The lack of recent and up to date intelligence information, the late arrival of source material, and the inadequate large scale map and aerial photograph coverage of both Southern KYUSHU and the "NAKASAKI" Area combined to make the preparation of accurate briefing material extremely difficult.

d. It became evident early in the planning phase for the occupation of the "NAKASAKI" Area that changes in the organization of the 7-2 Section would be essential to meet the requirements of the revised intelligence missions. Therefore a 7-2 Plan was drawn up explaining the new organization and functioning. The plan prepared for close liaison between the 7-2 Section, the CIC Detachment, Provost Marshall, and the Military Government Detachment, to prevent duplication of effort in the various overlapping fields of activity.

e. It outlined the duties of the 7-2 and 8-2 Sections as far as possible with the information then available. Further it directed the efforts of all intelligence agencies towards securing information concerning: (a) The status of disarmament and demobilization of Japanese forces; (b) "Intelligence Targets" such as military, civil, and industrial installations, key
individuals in all types of work; (c) Subversive activities, and those organizations or actions inimical to or evading the orders of the occupation forces and other counter-intelligence data; and (d) The general reaction of the civil and military population to the occupation.

2. Training and Organization:

a. Training: Since the Intelligence Sections in the Division had completed thorough basic intelligence training prior to the OKINAWA Operation, it was felt that training thereafter should be directed towards more advanced subjects. To that end, beginning on 15 June, 1945 a series of schools were held by the Division and Regimental Intelligence Sections on special subjects. These schools included an Officers' School for all 3-2's in connection with reports, functioning, and special subjects such as Japanese Map Reading, use of the 3-2 Radio Net, etc., a Japanese Weapons School; a counter-mortar school, and special lectures on Japanese tactics and methods. In addition, the 3-2 Section organized a Coastline Observers' School for selected intelligence personnel and a Japanese Conversational Language School for selected regimental personnel. Within the 3-2 Section, all personnel received a review of basic intelligence subjects. Mainly, however, the subsections of the 3-2 Section were occupied in the performance of routine work and planning. The Scout and Observer Section conducted extensive OP and field training during the entire period from 26 June to 16 September, 1945.

b. Organization:

(1) Prior to 15 August, the 3-2 and 5-2 Sections were organized in accordance with Tables of Organization for the respective units.

(2) A study of the intelligence missions assigned for the Occupation of Japan indicated that it would be necessary to organize the Intelligence Sections, particularly the 3-2 Section, in a different manner. As noted above, the 3-2 Plan outlined the new organization in a general fashion. The breakdown of the 3-2 Section became substantially as follows:

(a) The Operational Intelligence Group was organized to direct and supervise the activities of all intelligence agencies. It had the responsibility of (1) handling the files and administrative duties for the Section; (2) supervising the necessary collection and collation of information, and making dissemination of intelligence in the form of reports and studies; (3) maintaining accurate lists of intelligence target material and issuing revised lists as needed; (4) initiating special or routine investigations as necessary; (5) maintaining a close surveillance of political and economic trends; and, of late,
(6) handling repatriation activities insofar as they pertain to the Division.

2-2, the Assistant 2-2, Administrative Officer, the Reports and Records Officers, the Intelligence Target Officer, and their enlisted assistants such as clerks, draftsmen, drivers, scouts and observers, etc., made up this group.

(b) The Language Section: The requirements of occupation duties necessitated that this group be greatly reorganized. It was augmented by the addition of several non-Language Personnel of perform necessary duties which do not require a knowledge of Japanese. The following subsections were set up by the 2-2 Plan:

1). The Order of Battle Section: The Order of Battle Officer was assigned four enlisted assistants. His original responsibility was to secure all information relative to the Japanese forces. At present, the immediate concern is determining the status of demobilization of the Japanese forces, and secondarily the investigation of Japanese plans, dispositions, defenses, etc., at the end of the war.

2). Civil Intelligence Section: Two officers and six enlisted assistants were assigned to this section to handle the investigation of Civil Intelligence Targets, maintain surveillance over civil activities, act as liaison with the civil authorities, and handle the civilian interpreter pool for the Division.

3). Military Intelligence Section: Two Officers and six enlisted assistants formed this section, which has been used to investigate military intelligence targets, issue instructions to the Japanese military authorities, and examine defensive installations and junks.

4). Technical Intelligence Section: One Officer and two enlisted assistants were originally given the mission of examining all military installations and certain industrial targets for material of technical intelligence interest to the occupation forces.

5). PGT Attachments: Two Language Officers and one Language enlisted were assigned to each Regimental Combat Team initially to perform intelligence duties requiring a knowledge of Japanese.

6). In addition, it was anticipated that certain sectional language personnel would be assigned the Division from higher echelon, to provide assistance as needed, and to perform the majority of the interrogations and translations required.
Subject: Annex (C), Occupational Operations Report, (Cont'd)

(c) The Aerial Photograph Interpretation Section: It was originally believed that this group would be employed during the occupation in verifying Japanese demobilization information. The section was given the responsibility of maintaining the Division map and mosaic library and handling all requests for such material. In addition, AFI personnel were directed to maintain information on roads, cities, and terrain in all parts of the Division Zone of Responsibility. At present, the section has been given the added duties of preparing studies of enemy defenses, and providing brief intelligence information for prospective areas to which units are to be sent for reconnaissance, occupation, and control.

(d) Scout and Observer Section: It was planned to utilize the Scouts and Observers for routine and special patrolling as required, manning the C-2 Radio Intelligence Net, and providing assistance and protection for investigating parties.

(e) Other: In addition to the C-2 Section proper, there were several other groups which the C-2 Section supervised:

1. CIC Detachment: Instructions for the employment of this Detachment were issued from higher echelons. Overlapping fields of interest and activity necessitated that the CIC personnel be thoroughly integrated with the C-2 Section.

2. Photographic Section: To insure as complete a coverage of the Division area of responsibility as possible, both from an intelligence and a Public Information point of view, photographers were assigned each regiment. These personnel were directed to secure pictures of all military and technical intelligence targets, and certain civil installations.

3. The Mapping, Relief Mapping, and Map Reproduction Sections: These sections, also under the supervision of C-2, were organized to handle such reproduction as was necessary prior to and during the occupation. All reproduction equipment was to be taken in the forward echelon in anticipation of extensive map and mosaic reproduction at MACASYI.

3. Narrative:

(a) The C-2 Section was set up ashore in MACASYI in the Customs House on 28 September, 1945. Adequate office space was secured for separate offices for the Operational Intelligence, Language, and API groups, as well as for the CIC, Photo, and Map and Reproduction Sections.

(b) In accordance with the C-2 Plan, the C-2 and S-2 Sections immediately initiated investigation of the status of the Japanese Armed Forces. It was quickly noted that Japanese demobilization
was well on its way to completion and this has proved true throughout the entire Division zone of responsibility.

(1) One of the first steps taken by all sections was to visit every known defense position and dump to ascertain whether the Japanese were carrying out surrender terms in respect to rendering weapons useless, and to verify the accuracy of the inventories provided for each dump and supply installation.

(2) Personnel from the Language Section and S-2 personnel commenced the investigation of all known intelligence targets, and secured information on many targets previously unknown. The Intelligence Target Officer in the S-2 Section organized a card index system covering all intelligence targets in every area to provide ready reference in case detailed investigation should be necessary.

(3) Various prominent personalities, including the Army, Navy and civil authorities were interrogated at great length to secure all available information concerning the organization of the armed forces, defensive plans, industrial activity, and the functioning of the civil government.

(4) The combined efforts of the CIC Detachment, and selected personnel from the Language group were directed towards securing all possible information of the several "secret" and "terrorist" societies reported to exist. Members of the organization were picked up and thoroughly processed to secure plans, membership, strength, and tenets of the activities. For a more complete description of the activities of the CIC Detachment, see Appendix No. 1, hereto.

(5) It was quickly determined that there was little or no interpretation to be done by the Aerial Photograph Interpretation Section. Therefore, the API personnel were directed to produce a revision of the original City Plan Map of "NAGASAKI," and to commence a study of the various defensive positions in and around NAGASAKI.

(6) Language personnel were utilized as interpreters for various staff sections. Documents and records of many installations including banks, industrial plants, police and governmental agencies, and military and naval headquarters were impounded and examined. In some cases, as for example, the MITSUBISHI Industries, complete translations were made of such documents.
Subject: Annex (C), Occupational Operations Report, (Cont'd)

C. The initiation of action to send units to KUKAMOTO KEN, KAGOSHIMA KEN, and MIYAZAKI KEN, on 11 October, 23 October, and 31 October respectively, greatly increased the number of missions assigned intelligence agencies throughout the Division. The most pressing difficulty was the need for additional language personnel, although the Language group had been augmented by some fifteen additional language personnel from Corps.

(1) It was evident from the beginning that a special Order of Battle Team would have to be sent to outlying areas to secure Order of Battle intelligence since the S-2 Sections of the Regiments were neither qualified nor equipped to handle such a problem. This was accomplished in KUKAMOTO KEN using the Order of Battle and Military Intelligence Officers. Later, this same team was dispatched to Southern KYUSHU to secure similar information in the zones of responsibility of the Japanese 40th and 57th Armies.

(2) It became necessary to send additional language personnel to assist the 10th Marines in completing the surveillance of the intelligence targets in that organization's zone of responsibility, particularly at OKURA. A further complicating factor arose from the Chinese-Japanese problem in OKUSA which required the presence of several language personnel.

(3) The most recent drain on language personnel has been in connection with repatriation activities at KAGOSHIMA. Two language officers and two enlisted personnel are performing interpreter duties at KAGOSHIMA and KAJIKI for the American units supervising repatriation there.

(4) The API Section completed a revised City Plan of NAGASAKI, and are in the process of finishing a plan of the defenses in the NAGASAKI Area at present. The Photographic Section has proceeded according to plan and produced a large file of pictures of intelligence targets as well as of activities throughout the Division Area of Responsibility. The Mapping and Reproduction Section has reproduced two types of City Plan Maps of NAGASAKI, and a number of mosaics, and other city plan maps, as well as a large quantity of forms for other staff sections.

4. Comments:

a. To date it is felt that the organization of the G-2 Section has proved satisfactory with some changes. As soon as the Division area of responsibility was expanded, it became necessary to combine the Civil, Military and Technical Intelligence sections with the attached personnel from Corps, in order to
provide the personnel for the varied requirements of the G-2 Section. It has become impossible to assign Civil or Military Intelligence personnel to their special types of targets alone because of the immediate necessity of conducting specific investigations requiring a large number of personnel. It became apparent shortly after landing that the Technical Intelligence Section was not fitted to perform the detailed examination of technical material, and special teams from higher headquarters have performed this function for the Division.

(1) There has been little use for the Scout and Observer Section as such. Therefore, the personnel who could be spared have been attached to the 10th Marines, now operating similar to the infantry regiments, to augment the five S-2 Sections in that organization.

(2) As of 30 November, 1945, the major items of Order of Battle information have been secured, and the status of demobilization satisfactorily verified within the Division Zone of Responsibility. (See Appendix No. 2, hereto.) In the NAGASAKI Area, and to a lesser degree in the KUMAMOTO Area, the main civil and military intelligence targets have been examined. In KAGOSHIMA and MIYAZAKI KENS, similar investigations have been organized and are proceeding satisfactorily.

(3) The investigation of secret societies and securing of counter-intelligence data is most advanced in NAGASAKI KEN, and is proceeding adequately in the other three prefectures within the Division Zone of Responsibility. The study of the attitude of the civilian and military forces is progressing similarly throughout the Division area.

b. In the light of plans for future utilization of the Division, it seems probable at this time that additional changes in the organization of the G-2 Section will be essential. Loss of trained personnel, continued expansion of the Division area, and more detailed and long range intelligence missions are anticipated.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, F.T., IN THE FIELD.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (C)

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

1. Preparation and Planning for the Operation.

The 496th CIC Detachment and 54th CIC Area Detachment arrived by LST from Leyte at Saipan and joined the 2nd Marine Division on 2 September 1945. All detachment equipment, mobile loaded, came with the detachments.

From 2 September to 18 September, when the division convoy departed from Saipan, time was spent making the following contacts and preparations:

a. Meetings were held with all Regimental and Battalion S-2's of the division in order to explain to them the mission of CIC in other operations and the expected mission in the occupation of Japan.

b. Liaison was established with the Military Government Officers and the Provost Marshall to orient each other on points of mutual interest and responsibility.

c. G-2 briefings were attended to seek methods of close cooperation between the CIC and other sections of the G-2 section.

d. Detachment personnel were oriented on all available information concerning the target area.

e. Cross-index files were compiled on all available information concerning personalities and organizations of a potentially subversive nature in the target area.

f. Detachment equipment was checked for serviceability and maintenance and brought to the best condition of efficiency possible.

2. Training and Organization.

a. No additional training was undertaken by the personnel of the detachment aside from reviewing previous instructions received at the CIC School in Manila and CIC Schools in the United States.

b. The two detachments combined had a total of four officers, twenty-one agents, and four enlisted interpreters. The detachments were pooled and then broken down into six teams of either two or three agents for purpose of operation. No concrete division of the detachment personnel was attempted in order that flexibility be maintained to meet conditions that might arise when target area was reached.
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (C) - COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

3. Narrative of Occupation Operations from 26 September 1945 to date.

On 26 September 1945, detachment office was established on the second floor of the Customs House Printing Shop, Dejima Wharf, Nagasaki-shi, Nagasaki-ken, Japan. Sub-detachment offices were established in Kumamoto-shi, Kumamoto-ken; Kagoshima-shi, Kagoshima-ken; and Miyazaki-shi, Miyazaki-ken, on 6, 24, and 26 October 1945 respectively. Each of the sub-detachments was made self-sufficient with equipment and personnel. Operations were conducted from the division echelon, with liaison and information copies of reports being sent to the S-2 concerned with the immediate area.

Investigations in the area were conducted mainly on those organizations which were considered to be potentially dangerous. The primary organizations investigated were:

TEIKOKU ZAIKO GUNJIN KAI (Imperial Reserve Association)
SHOMEN DAN and SHEINEN DAN (Youth's Organizations)
KEMPEI TAI (Japanese Military Police)
DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI (Greater Japan Political Association)
TOKUMU KIKAN (Army-Navy Secret Intelligence)
CHIKU SHIREIBU BUIN, CHIKU TOKUSUTSU KEIBITAI and KOKUMIN GIYU TAI (People's Volunteer Corps)
ENGO KAI (Veteran's Relief Association)
Marine Patriotic Association

Investigation of the above organizations failed to reveal that any of them constituted a threat to the occupation forces.

A special investigation was made to determine the extent of compliance by the Japanese with the SCAF directive of 4 October 1945, ordering the dissolution of the Special Higher Police (TOKKO), the revoking of certain laws restricting personal freedom, and the releasing of political prisoners. This investigation revealed that no attempt was being made to intentionally circumvent the directive. Certain cases of misunderstanding through errors of translation caused a certain amount of noncompliance which was immediately rectified.

An investigation was conducted concerning the alleged concealing of arms by Chinese FOW's at Omuta, Fukuoka-ken. Investigation revealed the accusations to have been made through political rivalries between the Central Chinese Government following and the Communist following. No violence of a serious nature broke out and the Chinese are being repatriated to China.
In general the CIC has found nothing to indicate that the Japanese are trying to sabotage the efforts of the occupation forces in this area at least at this time. There have been isolated instances of individual resentment but in no case has there been discovered an organized opposition. Much historical information concerning back activities of organizations has been uncovered and personalities of the organizations which might have been a potential threat, had they not been dissolved, have been investigated and are being watched. Personalities of the opposite nature have been discovered and are being cultivated and encouraged to aid in any political reformation which the occupation forces may undertake to make.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (C)

ORDER OF BATTLE

Enclosure: (A) Japanese Units in Division Area of Responsibility.

1. Planning Phase for invasion of Southern Kyushu.

   a. The C.O.B. sub-section had prepared itself for the planning phase
      for the invasion of Southern Kyushu by compiling and cataloguing
      all available information on troop dispositions in Japan. Card index
      files were initiated to standardize the collation of information, and
      the basic order of battle books were kept continually up to date.

   b. Using all available information, an order of battle estimate
      was compiled for the invasion of Southern Kyushu. In this
      estimate, the SATSUMA Peninsula section of southwestern Kyushu
      was given most attention, since this area included the Division's
      proposed zone of action. The following information comprised the
      bulk of the C.O.B. estimate for the Division Zone of Action.

ARMS GROUND FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45th Inf. Regt. Repl. Unit</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>2,500-3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA Bay Defense Arty. Unit</td>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>1,000-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two (2) u/1 Army Divisions</td>
<td>SENDAI-MIYANOJO</td>
<td>35,000-40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| ARMY AIR                            |            |           |
| BYU Army Airbase                    | BYU        | 1,000 ?   |
| CHIRAN army Airbase                 | CHIRAN     | 1,000 ?   |
| TOJIMA Army Airbase                 | TOJIMA     | 3,000 ?   |
| **Total**                           |            | 5,000     |

| NAVY GROUND AND AIR                 |            |           |
| KOKUBU (#1 and #2) Naval Airbase    | KOKUBU     | 4,000 ?   |
| KAGOSHIMA Naval Airbase             | KAGOSHIMA  | 10,000 ?  |
| 325 Naval C.E.                      | KAGOSHIMA  | 1,200     |
| 327 Naval C.E.                      | KAGOSHIMA  | 1,200     |
| IBUSUKI Seaplane Base               | IBUSUKI    | 4,000     |
| **Total**                           |            | 20,400    |

Estimated strengths for the rest of KYUSHU were reported on a basis of strength estimates made by higher echelons.

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(c) Examination of Japanese strength figures, and locations, obtained since the arrival of the Division in "NASAVEI", shows that the preliminary estimates were fairly accurate from a standpoint of the number of troops estimated to be in position to oppose the division. The following is an order of battle listing of units which were ascertained to have been position to oppose the division from the north, south, and east.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH (at end of war)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40th Army Hqs.</td>
<td>MIYAKADOJO</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Division</td>
<td>IRITU</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146th Division</td>
<td>OKUSHI</td>
<td>14,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303rd Division</td>
<td>KAWASHIMA</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th I.M.P.</td>
<td>HIMOYOSHI</td>
<td>7,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Tk Brig (less 1 regt)</td>
<td>YUBISHI'A</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Units</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphib. Attack Units</td>
<td></td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Units</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Units</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>65,726</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NAVAL UNITS

An approximate 10,000 Naval troops were found to have been in position to oppose the division. These troops were largely naval air-ground personnel, and came principally from the HATOSHIMA N.A.B.

(d) The grand total thus amounts to approximately 75,726 as compared with this division's estimate of 93,000-99,400.

2. Planning Phase for Occupation of Japan.

(a) Information available immediately after the surrender of Japan contained designations of most major echelons in all Japan. The O.O.R. sub-section collected, collated, and analyzed this information, and on 2 September, 1945, published its strength estimate on Japanese forces in KYUSHU.

(b) Order of Battle Estimate for Division Zone of Action.

(1) It was estimated that approximately 20,000 enemy troops were disposed throughout the Division area. The Division Zone of Action included the three peninsulas which join the mainland of KYUSHU at the city of TSUYAYA.

CONFIDENTIAL
(2) The principal centers of this estimated 20,000 troops were NAGASAKI and ISAHAYA. Particulars and strengths of units completely, or partially identified were as follows:

**NAGASAKI AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI Fortress Unit</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122 Independent Mixed Brigade</td>
<td>4,000-6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u/i Army Units</td>
<td>4,000-6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Guard Unit</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u/i Miscellaneous Naval Personnel</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL -NAGASAKI AREA</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,500-18,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ISAHAYA AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAHAYA Naval Air Base</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361 Naval Const. Bn.</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5216 Naval Const. Bn.</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL-ISAHAYA AREA</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,800</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOKITSU AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Suicide Attack Squadron #3</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL-TOKITSU AREA</strong></td>
<td><strong>250</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total: 20,550-24,550

Civilians organized into defense units in the NAGASAKI Area were estimated to total from 75,000 to 100,000.

(c) Actual Order of Battle Division Zone of Action:

Study of units after arrival of the division in NAGASAKI makes possible the following order of battle information:

**ARMY UNITS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122nd I.M.B.</td>
<td>5,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAHAYA Regt. (reservist, home guard, etc)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI DISTRICT FYIMENTAL HQ.</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEMPEI TAI Detachments</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OYURA 146th Inf Regt Repl Unit.</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,104</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (C) - ORDER OF BATTLE (Cont'd)

### NAVY UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>CREW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coast Defense Battery</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Matsusima, Kabajima, Mogi, Aba, Uki, Funatsu, Anio, Cijima, Pamayama, Tomitsu, Iwatoyma)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Battery</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Uragami, Akunoura, Yoyagizima, Isshaya)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor-boat Base</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Majiima, Matsushima, Yyodomari, Yabashima)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Base</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Otao)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch Station</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Nomozaki, Matushima)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Watch Station</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searchlight Station</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Masatsugama, Nageours, Honours)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki Harbor Garrison</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo Battery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Piwaraki, Yabashima)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isahaya Naval Aviation Base</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>2,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unzen and Shimabara Naval Aviation Base</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isahaya Naval Hospital</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Mine Station</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Officers Station</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector Station</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Defense Ship Number 124</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Naval Aerial Arsenal</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagours Munitions Stor-house</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 4 -
## APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (C) - ORDER OF BATTLE (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>C.P.E.M.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Suicide Attack Squad #3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKURA Naval Air Base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8,069</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The grand total thus amounts to 17,110 as opposed to the Division's estimate of 20,550-24,550.

Civilian defense. (?)

3. **Occupation Phase:**

(a) To handle the great number of units in the Division zone of responsibility, it was decided to increase the personnel in the O.O.R. sub-section from one (1) officer and one (1) private, to one (1) officer, two (2) "C.C.P.'s, and two (2) privates. This increase has enabled the O.O.R. section to keep abreast of the innumerable details in connection with vast organization and strength, chain of command, areas of responsibility, and status of demobilization of the many major and minor army, navy, and air units in the Division Zone of Action.

(b) The principal methods of reporting O.O.R. information during the occupation phase consist of:

1. The O.O.R. Annex to the daily C-2 Periodic Report in which new units, and other pertinent information is reported.

2. A strength report showing actual strength of units within the present Division Area of Responsibility at the close of the war, is appended as Enclosure (A).

(c) The collecting and indexing of demobilization information has proved a formidable one, largely due to the fact that an unexpectedly large number of miscellaneous units have been encountered. Involved chains of command have made it impossible to keep track of all these units through any one central headquarters, and thus separate strength reports for these various units constitute the only means of verifying the status of demobilization.

(d) As of 1 December, all remaining military personnel have presumably been demobilized, although this fact has not as yet been ascertained by a physical check. Ex-military, remaining as guards over military dumps and installations, in the capacity of civilians, total as follows:
### ARMY GROUND AND ARMY AIR GUARD FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREFECTURE</th>
<th>STRENGTH (24 Nov)</th>
<th>STRENGTH (1 Dec)</th>
<th>NO. DEMOBILIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
<td>5,567</td>
<td>3,456</td>
<td>2,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUMAMOTO</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>2,284</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI *</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>29 (increase)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The increase in the number of personnel is due to a rechecking of the NAGASAKI RENTAIKU SHIREIBU.

### NAVAL GROUND FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREFECTURE</th>
<th>STRENGTH (24 Nov)</th>
<th>STRENGTH (1 Dec)</th>
<th>NO. DEMOBILIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUMAMOTO</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI *</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NAVAL AIR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREFECTURE</th>
<th>STRENGTH (24 Nov)</th>
<th>STRENGTH (1 Dec)</th>
<th>NO. DEMOBILIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZAKI</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGOSHIMA</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUMAMOTO</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI *</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes personnel stationed at OMURA not previously listed.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX II TO APPENDIX (C)

JAPANESE UNITS IN DIVISION AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ACTUAL STRONGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40th Army</td>
<td>MIYAKONOJO</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th Army</td>
<td>TAKAKABE</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Division</td>
<td>KOPAYASHI PLAIN</td>
<td>25,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Infantry Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Infantry Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Infantry Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th Cavalry Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Artillery Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Mountain Artillery Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Engineer Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Division Signal Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Transport Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Division Ordnance Duty Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Division Medical Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Field Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Field Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Field Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Field Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Division Veterinary Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Division Water Supply and Purification Dept.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Division Decontamination Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Division</td>
<td>IBELE</td>
<td>15,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98th Infantry Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Infantry Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Infantry Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Cavalry Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Mountain Artillery Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Transport Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Engineer Regt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance Duty Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Field Hospital</td>
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| 423rd Inf Regt.           |          |                 |
| 424th Inf Regt.           |          |                 |
| Artillery Unit            |          |                 |
| Anti-Tank Unit            |          |                 |
| Communication Unit        |          |                 |
| Transport Unit            |          |                 |
| Ordnance Duty Unit        |          |                 |
| Field Hospital            |          |                 |

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| 454th Infantry Regt       |          |                 |
| 445th Infantry Regt       |          |                 |
| 447th Infantry Regt       |          |                 |
| 448th Infantry Regt       |          |                 |
| 154th Machine Cannon Unit |          |                 |
| 154th Transport Unit      |          |                 |
| 154th Ordnance Duty Unit  |          |                 |
| 154th Field Hospital      |          |                 |
| 28th Independent Field Artillery Battalion | | |
| 28th Mortar Battalion     |          |                 |
| One Co. of the 34th Independent Train Bn | | |
| 154th Communication Unit  |          |                 |</p>
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### NAVAL FORCES

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<td>22nd Naval Air Depot - Hitoyoshi</td>
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| Tashiro Battery (1) Batteries completely demobilized week No. 3 to Nov 10th. ARA, AINO, CHIMATA, HUATSH, ISAHAYA, YAYAKAWA, KAKUSHITA, NOMOZAKI, TOMITSU. (2) Watch Station at NAGASAKA completely demobilized. (3) Searchlight Stations at NOMOZAKI, YAMATSUWA completely demobilized.
**NAVY AIR**

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<tr>
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ANNEX (D)

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF, IN THE FIELD.

1 December 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.
To: The Commanding General.


23 September, 1945.

The Second Marine Division in ships of Transron 12 arrived at Point Livorno at 0730, Regimental Combat Teams 2 and 6 commenced landing in Nagasaki Harbor at 1300. All Battalion Landing Teams of the 2d Regimental Combat Team completed landing in the vicinity of the Customs Mill, on the east side of Nagasaki Harbor at 1545. Regimental Combat Team 6 landed in area 5 on the west side of Nagasaki Harbor. "M" Company of the Second Marines relieved the security guard of Marine Detachments from the USS ELOXI and the USS WICHITA at 1350.

24 September, 1945.

Unloading proceeded satisfactorily, considering that limited dock facilities restricted the operation considerably. Second Marines reported, "Civilian population cooperative... Exhibit fear, curiosity and confusion." Regimental Combat Team 8 commenced landing at Enigha Dock at 0835, and by 0830 had dispatched its advance echelon to Isahaya. It was not until 1515 that all elements of Regimental Combat Team 8 were ashore due to the fact that Third Battalion Landing Team was delayed by movement of ships in the harbor. The command post of Regimental Combat Team 8 opened in Isahaya at 1445. At 0440 the Second Tank Battalion and the M7 Platoon of Regimental Combat Teams 2 and 8 were ordered ashore in the vicinity of Yokoi Saki. The 10th Marines also began unloading on this date, but priority was given to the 9th Regimental Combat Team. The 2d Tank Battalion began unloading from LST's north of Fukuho at 1600. Regimental Combat Teams 2 and 6 commenced a survey of all Japanese artillery installations in the vicinity of Nagasaki Harbor. Guards were established over fuel facilities in their areas of responsibility. The Commanding General of V Amphibious Corps and members of his staff visited the Second Marine Division, along with the Commanding General, 6th Army.

25 September, 1945.

Unloading of troops and gear continued. The Division Reconnaissance Company was ordered to unload and move to Isahaya.
UNLOADING OF THE TANKS WAS COMPLETED AT 0530. 2D TANK BATTALION AND THE 117 PLATOONS OF REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAMS 2 AND 3 COMPLETED UNLOADING AND CIC WAS UNLOADED BY 0705.

The Division Command Post opened in the customs building at NAGASAKI at 0900 and closed aboard the USS CAMBRIA same time. 10th Marines Command Post opened in TISAHAYA at 1100.

From the 2d Lotor Transport Battalion, Company "C" was attached to Regimental Combat Team 2, Company "B" to Regimental Combat Team 8, and Company "A" to Regimental Combat Team 6.

Amphibious Corps granted authority to the Commanding General allowing personnel of the Second Marine Division to enter the bomb area.

The Command Post of Regimental Combat Team 6 was reported at 2015 in the warehouse at (123°.2-106°.3) Japanese Police were found guarding the Mitsubishi Shipyards when the 6th Marines began their initial investigation in connection with demobilization and disarmament. Besides blueprints of ship construction, submarines were found under construction.

The 9th Marines at TISAHAYA found eighty-two (82) fifty round bombs in a rice field and 1050 500-round and 600 100-round bombs in a warehouse. Three (3) airplane engines were found in a tunnel at ONO JIMA.

26 September, 1945.

Unloading continued. The survey of Japanese artillery installations in the vicinity of NAGASAKI Harbor continued. Guards were established over Japanese arms and ammunition stored in the vicinity of Japanese Army Headquarters.

27 September, 1945.

2d Engineer Battalion Command Post opened at 0930 in the school building at (129°.85-106°.45) in NAGASAKI.

Movement of supplies to dumps and billeting areas continued. Organization of billeting areas continued. Japanese military dumps and fuel storage areas were being kept under guard. Arms and ammunition were being collected from the Japanese and being stored in separate dumps. 9th Marines investigated radio stations at TISAHAYA and TINO.

28 September, 1945.

Unloading completed. The movement of supplies to separate dumps and billeting areas continued. Billeting areas were in the process of being organized.
At Isahaya three (3) VJ-I-2 planes were in commission for courier service by 1650.

Authority was received from V Amphibious Corps to skeletonize the 2d Tank Battalion and 2d ASCO. The following army attachments were made to the Division: 1288th Engineer Combat Battalion, 3076th Engineer Dump Truck Company, 3856th Quartermaster Truck Company.

In Isahaya the 8th Marines located four (4) 12 cm coast defense guns and six (6) warehouses containing airplane engines, gas masks and telephones.

29 September, 1945.

Japanese military dumps and fuel dumps remained under guard. Collection and storage of Japanese weapons and ammunition continued. Supplies were still being moved to separate dumps.

The organization of billeting areas continued.

The Division Hospital was in operation.

Quantities of Japanese rifles and swords were found in school houses at Isahaya.

30 September, 1945.

Guards were removed from AA guns and SL Battery at (99.20-62.30) following the removal of breech blocks.

Reconnaissance of military and naval installations continued. The Division Reconnaissance Company began checking all road nets from Isahaya to Kuma-moto, reporting them passable for 24-ton trucks.

1 October, 1945.

Reconnaissance of military and naval installations continued. Japanese military dumps remained under guard. Arms and ammunition continued to be collected and stored in separate dumps. Organization of billeting areas and the movement of supplies to dumps and billeting areas continued. The reconnaissance from Isahaya to Omuta and Kuma-moto continued.
2 October, 1945.

Japanese military dumps remained under guard. Reconnaissance of military and naval installations was continued. Japanese arms and ammunition continued to be collected and stored in separate dumps. Organization of billeting areas and the movement of supplies to billeting areas and dumps continued. Reconnaissance by the Division Reconnaissance Company and a Detachment of Regimental Combat Team 8 from ONATA and KUMAMOTO to ISAWAYA was completed. The Detachment of Regimental Combat Team 8 returned at 1850 and the Division Reconnaissance Company returned at 2105.

5 October, 1945.

Organization of billeting areas continued. Japanese military dumps remained under guard. Japanese arms and ammunition continued to be collected and stored in separate dumps. Reconnaissance of military and naval installations continued.

Reconnaissance of the LOGI area was conducted by a patrol from Regimental Combat Team 2.

At ISAWAYA two (2) 10-inch coast defense guns were found at 1310-1070. According to civilians, all military personnel had left the position two (2) months ago.

4 October, 1945.

Reconnaissance of military and naval installations continued. Japanese arms and ammunition continued to be collected and stored in separate dumps. The organization of billeting areas continued. A patrol searched from ISAWAYA to OSAYI, then TOYOTA north to SETAO to GYIJU to OCHI. A motorized patrol was conducted along the east coast of NAGASAWA peninsula to investigate roads south from TABUSHI. Motorized reconnaissance of KA-SHI Island was conducted. A patrol was sent from GYIJU south to OTAO. The Command Post of the Third Battalion Tenth Marines on 4 at ONATA at 1130.

5 October, 1945.

With the intent of occupying KUMAMOTO with the 8th Regimental Combat Team, the forward echelon of the 8th Regimental Combat Team left from ISAWAYA at 0800.

Reconnaissance of military and naval installations continued. Japanese military dumps remained under guard. Japanese arms and ammunition continued to be collected and stored in separate dumps. The organization of billeting areas continued.
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Subject: Annex (D), Occupational Operation Report
(Narrative). (Cont'd).

6 October, 1945.

Reconnaissance of military and naval installations continued. Japanese arms and ammunition continued to be collected and stored. Japanese military dumps remained under guard. Organization of billeting areas continued. Engineer projects were being initiated.

Construction of an air strip capable of receiving V-2 planes was commenced in the bombed out (atomic) area of NAGASAKI.

North of NAGASAKI a patrol was conducted along the NAGAYO River. Japanese ships anchored between TUKIPO and VOYAGI were searched. In ISAHAYA area one (1) patrol was conducted to KUCHINOTSU.

7 October, 1945.

Japanese arms and ammunition continued to be collected and stored. Reconnaissance of military and naval installations continued. Japanese military dumps remained under guard. Organization of billeting areas continued.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols southeast from NAGASAKI to KAMO Barracks.

"B" Company of the 8th Marines assumed control of the Chinese camp at OHUTA. American Recovery Teams #12, #14, and #16 were relieved at OHUTA. The 8th Marines Regimental Military Police Company was functioning at KUMAMOTO.

2 October, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 was moving to KUMAMOTO. Patrols were conducted to check on the general enforcement of the surrender terms. Regimental Combat Team 2 patrolled from NOSHI-YAMA (98.15-85.10) south of NOGI, in the vicinity of KOTOY-YAMA (98.70-75.50), and from NAGASAKI to MIYAZURI (98.30-55.25).

9 October, 1945.

Patrols were conducted from ISAKA to TAKISHTI, from NOSHI YAMA to TAKENO, in the vicinity of NAKADORI, south of KUMADORI, and on VOYAGI SHIMA. Caves were investigated near the road junction of the OHUTA-NAGASAKI-YABAYA Highway. Other patrols were at ISAKA, KUCHINOTSU, and ARIS.
10 October, 1945.

Due to stormy weather patrolling was restricted to search patrols north of NAGASAKI, from USAKA to GHIJU to TANEISHI to road junction at (96.50-51.00), YUKAGORI INABA (96-53), and NAGASAKI to NAGASE.

11 October, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 patrolled from NAGASAKI north to SAIITO and HAKADA, west from MYAZAKI (1401-1402) and HONGO to the coast. The 10th Marines conducted patrols to OJIMA, OBAMA, KATASHI, HUCHINOTSU, ARIO, NISHIKASHI, outlying sectors of ONOBA, island of USU SHIMA (1301,8-1021,1) and SHIMABARA. At 0700, the 2d Marine Division assumed command of V Amphibious Corps Military Government Team at YOKOMOTO.

12 October, 1945.

The Command Post of Regimental Combat Team 2 closed at 0800 in ISHATA and opened in KUMAMOTO (1301,9-1022) at the same time. Bad roads were reported to be exceedingly hard on vehicles and personnel. The southern tip of the peninsula south of NAGASAKI was patrolled. A search patrol was conducted in the town of NAKAGAWA. Patrols were conducted in the 10th Marines area of responsibility to UNZEN, OBAMA, ARIO, HUCHINOTSU, YAZUSA, KITO HARI, SUNATSU and outlying sectors of ONOBA.

13 October, 1945.

Air courier service commenced operating from Atomic Field, NAGASAKI.

One (1) patrol was conducted east of NAGASAKI to the coast by Regimental Combat Team 2. The 8th Regimental Combat Team continued to organize their billeting area in KUMAMOTO. The 10th Marines patrolled to SHIMABARA, the vicinity of ONOBA and KOJIRE. The Command Post of the 10th Marines closed at the Naval Barracks, in ISHATA and opened at the ISHATA Air Station at 1300. Regimental Combat Team 2 was alerted for movement to SASEBO. A division airborne inspection party, with 2-3 in charge, departed from NAGASAKI for KAMOYA and MYAZAKI at 0900. Arrived at KAMOYA at 1020.

14 October, 1945.

A reconnaissance patrol was conducted in the area southwest of KAMOYA Barracks. One (1) patrol was sent to SHIMABARA to check on factories in that vicinity.

15 October, 1945.

One (1) reconnaissance patrol was conducted east from NAGASAKI to the coast. An intelligence patrol was conducted in KUMAMOTO.
Patrols were also conducted to SONOKI, SHIMABARA, KOJIRO and USU SHIMA.

16 October, 1945.

A reconnaissance patrol was conducted east of NAGASAKI to the coast and south to WAKIMASAKI and NOHO. Patrols were sent to OBARA, SHIMABARA and KOJIRO to investigate known installations.

17 October, 1945.

Ambush Corps cancelled the tentative plan of having Regimental Combat Team 6 relieve Regimental Combat Team 26 of its guard duties at SARRO. Regimental Combat Team 6 had been in an alert status for this movement since the thirteenth. The first section of the Division Reconnaissance Company arrived at KUNA MOTO at 1430. The remainder of the Division Reconnaissance Company arrived at 1530. Patrols were conducted from NAGASAKI to WAKIMASAKI and NOHO. In the TSUHAYA area patrols were conducted to SONOKI, HIGASHI, SONOKI, OBARA, and KUCHINTOSI. An outpost was established at SHIMABARA.

A 4000 foot landing strip was laid out at KUN A MOTO.

16 October, 1945.

Patrols were conducted to TAI and KOROGUSHI by the 2d Regimental Combat Team. The 6th Regimental Combat Team conducted patrols to KOURA, on IKE SHIMA, and on OHIKI SHIMA. A road reconnaissance was initiated from KUNA MOTO to KAGOSHIMA. Patrols were conducted by the 10th Marines to KUCHINTOSI, KOJIRO and in SHIMABARA.

19 October, 1945.

One search patrol was conducted north of NAGASAKI to the coast of CHIRA WAN, another east of NAGASAKI to FUNATSU. An area from the western part of NAGASAKI and two (2) miles to the north was patrolled. Road reconnaissance to KAGOSHIMA continued. Patrols were conducted to OBARA, ARIE, KOJIRO and SHIMABARA. Japanese weapons were being collected at OBARA and ARIE. Part of the Division inspection party returned from SANGWA, KAGOSHIMA and NIYAZAKI at 1500.
20 October, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols at IO-SHIMA and east from NAGASAKI to the coast. Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted an overnight patrol to ONADAKA, twenty (20) miles north of NAGASAKI. The area north of NAGASAKI to the coast of ONURA WAN was patrolled. Regimental Combat Team 8 patrolled in the area between the northern division boundary and the line TSUKI-YOTOYOSHI-TOMITAKA. The road reconnaissance party returned from KAGOSHIMA at 1040. The 10th Marines were supervising the movement of Japanese arms from ISAFAYA. At OBAKA and KUHTOMOTSU Japanese weapons were collected. A patrol was conducted from SHIMABARA to the northern tip of the SHIMABARA Peninsula.

21 October, 1945.

The patrol of Regimental Combat Team 6 twenty (20) miles north of NAGASAKI remained overnight at ONADAKA due to a landslide over the road on the planned route of return along the west coast of the peninsula. Road reconnaissance was conducted by the 10th Marines within their area of responsibility. The remainder of the airborne inspection party returned from KANOYA, KAGOSHIMA and MIYAZAKI at 0630.

22 October, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 patrolled in the vicinity of NAGASAKI and two (2) miles to the north, TO TANAKA SHIMA, and nine (9) miles to the south of NAGASAKI to NOJO. The patrol of the 6th Regimental Combat Team left from ONADAKA at 0750 and arrived at NAGASAKI at 1115. A patrol was conducted from NAGASAKI to the west coast. The 10th Marines were conducting a topographical survey of ISAFAYA. A patrol was sent to ARUC to inventory factories. Patrols were conducted to KUHTOMOTSU and SHIMABARA to the north tip of the peninsula to check on the general enforcement of the surrender terms.

23 October, 1945.

Effective this date "7" Medical Company was attached to Regimental Combat Team 2.

Regimental Combat Team 2 patrolled in the vicinity of NAGASAKI and to the west coast of the peninsula. Regimental Combat Team 6 patrolled from NAGASAKI to three (3) miles northwest of NAGASAKI thence to the west coast of the peninsula. The 10th Marines were continuing an inventory in the ARIE district and sent two (2) overnight patrols to KUHTOMOTSU to check on observance of curfew regulations. One patrol was conducted at KUJO.
24 October, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted a patrol three (3) miles northeast of NAGASAKI and sent a motorized patrol four (4) miles south of NAGASAKI. Regimental Combat Team 6 investigated fishing craft at villages along the west coast of NAGASAKI peninsula. The 10th Marines patrolled to FUMATSU, KUCHINOTSU, SHIMABARA and KOJIRO.


Regimental Combat Team 2 patrolled in an area from NAGASAKI southeast to the coast. Battalion Landing Team 2/2 commenced loading aboard four (4) LSTs in preparation for movement to KANOYA. Regimental Combat Team 6 patrolled west of NAGASAKI to the coast and five (5) miles northwest of NAGASAKI. A reconnaissance party from Battalion Landing Team 3/8 left KUNAMOTO at 0600 for HITOYOSHI to reconnoiter the southern half of KUNAMOTO PEN. The 10th Marines patrolled to FUMATSU, SHIMABARA and KOJIRO.

26 October, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted a patrol of the NAGASAKI area southeast to the coast. Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted a patrol northwest from NAGASAKI to the coast. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted a patrol ten (10) miles northwest of KUNAMOTO. The 10th Marines strengthened the SHIMABARA outpost to total a complement of three (3) officers and fifty-eight (58) enlisted men. Patrols were conducted from ISAHAYA to OBAJA and to KUCHINOTSU. Battalion Landing Team 2/2 left NAGASAKI at 1900 in four (4) LSTs bound for KANOYA.

27 October, 1945.

Battalion Landing Team 2/2 arrived at TAYASHI (port for KANOYA) at 1330, beached one (1) LST and commenced unloading. All Regimental Combat Teams conducted local routine patrols. The 10th Marines sent patrols to SHIMABARA, KOJIRO and from ISAHAYA south to the coast.

28 October, 1945.

"B" and "C" Companies of the 264th Medical Battalion reported to the Commanding Officer of the 31st Battalion 10th Marines at 1215. Regimental Combat Team 2 reconnoitered the road net from NAGASAKI (over)
southeast to the coast. Remainder of "A" Company and the Military Police detachment of Battalion Landing Team 1/8 departed from KUMAMOTO at 0800 and arrived at KAGOSHIMA at 1440. The 10th Marines patrolled ten (10) miles north of ISAHAYA and also south to KUGHINOTSU.

23 October, 1945.

The advance echelon of the 73rd Field Hospital arrived at KUMAMOTO at 1400. Regimental Combat Team 2 was conducting a patrol to the southern tip of NAGASAKI peninsula inventorying weapons in Japanese police stations. Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted a patrol of the NAGASAKI area and sent a motorized patrol fifteen (15) miles to the northwest of NAGASAKI. The motor convoy of Battalion Landing Team 1/8 left KUMAMOTO for KAGOSHIMA at 0600. The 10th Marines patrolled in the vicinity of ISAHAYA and SWINABARA.

24 October, 1945.

The rear echelon of Battalion Landing Team 1/8 departed for KAGOSHIMA at 0818 and arrived at 1530. Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted a motorized patrol three (3) miles north of NAGASAKI to NICHINOMIA. Routine patrols were conducted east from NAGASAKI to the coast. Battalion Landing Team 2/2 completed unloading at TAKASU at 1550 and relieved 1st Battalion 127th Regiment at the same time. The motorized patrol of Regimental Combat 6 left SOTO at 0900 enroute to NAGASAKI. Routine patrols were conducted in the NAGASAKI area. The 10th Marines established a detachment of two (2) officers and twenty-six (26) enlisted men at UNZEN.

31 October, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 patrolled from NAGASAKI southeast to the coast. Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted patrols in the NAGASAKI area and from NAGASAKI north to the shore of OHURA WAN. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted patrols fifteen (15) miles north and ten (10) miles northeast of KUMAMOTO. The 10th Marines conducted routine patrols in ISAHAYA, SWINABARA and OBAMA.

1 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 patrolled north from NAGASAKI to OHURA WAN. Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted a patrol northwest from NAGASAKI to the coast. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted patrols ten (10) miles northwest of KUMAMOTO, four (4) miles north and twenty (20) miles southwest from KUMAMOTO. The 10th Marines patrolled in the SWINABARA district.

2 November, 1945.

Battalion Landing Team 2/2 patrolled east of KANOYA to ARIAKE WAN and northeast of KANOYA twenty (20) miles. Regimental Combat
Team 2, less the First and Second Battalions, commenced loading aboard LSTs in preparation for movement to KANOYA. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted patrols from KUMAMOTO twelve (12) miles northwest and fifteen (15) miles southwest. The 10th Marines conducted patrols in the SHIMABARA District and to KUCHINOTSU. Malaria Survey Detachment 415 was attached to Regimental Combat Team 2 and Malaria Control Detachment 36 was attached to Regimental Combat Team 8.

3 November, 1945.

The 73d Field Hospital reported to the Commanding Officer of Regimental Combat Team 8. A patrol was sent twelve (12) miles south from KUMAMOTO. On SHIMABARA Peninsula the 10th Marines patrolled to ARETE, KOJINO, OBAMA and the northern part of SHIMABARA Police District.

4 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 less the 1st and 2d Battalions departed from NAGASAKI at 0800 for KANOYA. Regimental Combat Team 6 patrolled in the area of NAGASAKI City and two (2) miles to the north. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted patrols twelve (12) miles northwest and ten (10) miles south from KUMAMOTO. The 10th Marines conducted patrols to TANZEN and SHIMABARA on SHIMABARA Peninsula.

5 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2, less the First and Second Battalions arrived at KANOYA at 1015. Battalion Landing Team 1/2 conducted a patrol southeast from NAGASAKI to the coast. Regimental Combat Team 6 patrolled in NAGASAKI and two (2) miles to the west and three (3) miles to the north. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted patrols twelve (12) miles north and five (5) miles south of KUMAMOTO. First Battalion 10th Marines completed its movement to KAMIGO Barracks in NAGASAKI to assume military police duties. Patrols were conducted at ISAHAYA and to KUCHINOTSU.

6 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2, less the 1st and 2d Battalions, commenced movement to MIYAKONOJO. CP opened at MIYAKONOJO at 1400. Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted a patrol five (5) miles northwest from NAGASAKI to the coast. Regimental Combat Team 8
sent patrols twelve (12) miles northwest and ten (10) miles southeast from KUMAMOTO. The 10th Marines were conducting an inventory of the 21st Naval Arsenal in ISAHAYA. Patrols were sent to CBAMA, UNZEN and SHIMABARA. The Commanding General, 6th Army, arrived NAGASAKI 1230 and departed for SASEBO at 1515. 7 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted a patrol three (3) miles north west of NAGASAKI. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted a patrol twenty (20) miles southeast of KUMAMOTO. The advance party of Battalion Landing Team 3/8 left KUMAMOTO at 1245 for HITOYOSHI. Time of arrival was 1645. The 10th Marines checked Japanese gun positions and collected weapons, patrols were conducted ARIE, SHIMABARA and the southern part of the CBAMA Police District. Regimental Combat Team 2, less 1st and 2d Battalions was at MIYAKONJO and had begun to collect Japanese weapons in that area.

9 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted a reconnaissance patrol to SHIBUSHI, northeast of KANKYA, continued search patrol of KANKYA airfield and checked military installations and weapons collecting points in the vicinity of MIYAKONJO. In the area of Battalion Landing Team 2/2 at KANKYA a Japanese ammunition dump blew up at 1045 when fliers were being removed for destruction. No Marine or Army casualties. Eight (8) Japanese were killed. Regimental Combat Team 6 embarked a patrol of four (4) officers and fifty-three (53) enlisted men aboard an LCT at 0830 enroute to KAKINURA SHIMA to investigate a reported Chinese disturbance and to dispose of Japanese military equipment on KAKINURA SHIMA, O-SHIMA MATSU SHIMA and other islands in the vicinity. Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted patrols five (5) miles northeast of KUMAMOTO and a motorized patrol thirteen (13) miles southeast of KUMAMOTO. Patrol arrived at KAKINURA SHIMA at 1440, the Chinese were under control and no arrests were necessary. The 10th Marines established an outpost at KAZUSA (1325-1049). Patrols were conducted to the north part of the SHIMABARA Police District and to the northern end of the CBAMA Police District.

9 November, 1945.

Battalion Landing Team 1/2 sailed at 0800 enroute to MIYAZAKI. Battalion Landing Team 2/6 conducted a patrol two (2) miles west of NAGASAKI and three (3) miles southwest. Warehouses were investigated in the villages of ARASHI and KIBACHI. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted a motorized patrol thirty-five (35) miles northeast of KUMAMOTO, nine (9) miles north and eight (8) miles southeast. The advance party of Battalion Landing Team 3/8 departed from KUMAMOTO at 0930 and arrived at HITOYOSHI at 1215. The 10th Marines destroyed a battery position at ISAHAYA. Patrols were conducted in the southern part of SHIMABARA Police District, in the vicinity of KATSUSA and to the southern part of the CBAMA Police District.
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Subject: Annex (D), Occupational Operation Report
(Narrative), (Cont'd)

10 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 6 and the 10th Marines were destroying Japanese guns and airplanes within their areas of responsibility. Battalion Landing Team 1/2 beached at 1030. The advance Command Post opened at MIYAZAKI at 2200.

11 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols to HOSHIMURA, NISHINOMURA (600-920) and MUKISHIMA (800-910). The patrol of Regimental Combat Team 6 left KAKINOURA SHIMA at 0850 for MATSU SHIMA. Regimental Combat Team 8 patrolled ten (10) miles north-east of KUNAMOTO.

12 November, 1945.

Battalion Landing Team 1/2 completed unloading and entrained for MIYAZAKI at 0300. Battalion Landing Team 2/2 continued its search of installations at KANOA airfield. Battalion Landing Team 3/2 conducted search patrols to KIYOTAKE, INAMACHI and KOBAYASHI. The patrol of Regimental Combat Team 6 returned from its search of the islands south of KAKINOURA at 1345 and conducted a patrol four (4) miles north of OYRA. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted a motorized patrol thirty-five (35) miles north-east of KUNAMOTO to YOSHINARE, SABAKURA and ICHINOO. The 10th Marines checked roads, gun positions and factories in the northern part of ARIZ Police District, the southern part of OBAJA Police District and KUCHINOTSU.

13 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 continued patrols in the vicinity of KIYOTAKE (685-957), INAMACHI (806-909), KOBAYASHI (1410-947) and KANOA Airfield. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted a motorized patrol thirty (30) miles east of KUNAMOTO to ICHINOO, five (5) miles east to ISHIHARA and twelve (12) miles east to SOHENO. The 10th Marines checked post offices and factories in TOYITSU. Patrolls were sent to ARIZ, the eastern part of KUCHINOTSU Police District, the northern part of OBAJA Police District and KAZUSA.

14 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted a reconnaissance patrol to KOKOBU, search patrols to the area of MUSHIRA airfield and
intelligence target patrols in the vicinity of MIYAZAKI. Regi-
mental Combat Team 8 sent a platoon in two (2) LCUs to 114E to
establish the location, use and ownership of radio equipment.
Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted a motorized patrol twenty-seven
(27) miles northeast of KUMAMOTO. Patrols were conducted twelve
(12) miles southeast and ten (10) miles northeast of KUMAMOTO.
The 106th Marines had patrols checking dumps of Japanese ammunition
in NAGASAKI. Patrols were sent to SHIMABARA and the northern
part of OBAMA Police District.

15 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols five (5) miles
east of KANOA to KUSHIRA, eleven (11) miles northeast of KANOA
to ABEGAUTO, and KANEHARI, twelve (12) miles northwest of KANOA
to TAKUMI at east KANOYA airfield and SHIBUSHI. Search patrols
were conducted in MIYAKONOJO and MIYAZAKI. Regimental Combat
Team 8 conducted patrols twenty-eight (28) miles northeast of
KUMAMOTO, fifteen (15) miles southwest of KUMAMOTO. "I" Company
of 3/8 left for UTOYOUSHI at 0830 by train and arrived at 1230.
The 106th Marines had patrols checking post offices in TOKITSU and YAGAMI.
Routine patrols were conducted in northern ARIE Police District, southern
OBAHA Police District and in the vicinity of KAZUSI.

16 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted searches and continued
guarding Japanese military installations and disposing of military
material five (5) miles east of KANOA at KUSHIRA, eighteen (18)
miles west of MIYAKONOJO at OCHU, eighteen (18) miles south
of MIYAKONOJO at SHIBUSHI, eleven (11) miles northeast of KANOA
at KANEHARI and ABEGAUTO, and at east KANOYA airfield. Regi-
mental Combat Team 6 destroyed Japanese military equipment in
the NAGASAKI area. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted patrols
twenty-eight (28) miles southeast of OTAMA in the vicinity of
OYATSU, seven (7) miles northeast of OHTA in the vicinity of
MANKAN, 4th Platoon of "A" Company 1st Battalion 8th Marines moved
twenty-one (21) miles northwest of KAGOSHIMA to SENDAI. The
106th Marines had patrols checking Japanese demobilization in
NAGASAKI and at MAKI SHIKA, five (5) miles east of NAGASAKI.
Routine patrols were conducted to SHIMABARA, southern OBAMA
Police District and at KUCHINOTSU.

17 November, 1945.

The G-3, in charge of a preliminary reconnaissance party to
OSUMI GUNTO departed from NAGASAKI by air at 0830 and arrived
UNIJO field, TANEGA SHIKA at 1100. Regimental Combat Team 2
conducted searches, continued guarding military installations and
disposing of Japanese material five (5) miles east of KANOA at
KUSHIRA Airfield, eighteen (18) miles south of MIYAKONOJO at
SHIBUSHI and twelve (12) miles northeast of KANOA at ABEGAUTO
and KANEMARY, ten (10) miles southwest of MIYAKONJO at IWAKAWA and at the east KANOA Airfield. A search patrol was conducted in the vicinity of MIYAKONJO. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted a patrol ten (10) miles northeast of KUHAMOTO to OTS\". The 16th Marines had patrols checking Japanese ammunition dumps reported to be in the NAGASAKI area. Patrols were conducted to the ARIE Police District, the western part of YUCHINOTS\' Police District and the central part of the OKINOK Police District.

18 November, 1945.

The preliminary air reconnaissance party to OSUMI GUNTO continued its mission, having spent the night of 17-18 November at MIYAKONJO. Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols eighteen (18) miles south of MIYAKONJO at SHIBUSHI, eleven (11) miles northeast of KANOA at ASAGAHI, ten (10) miles southwest of MIYAKONJO at IWAKAWA. Patrols were continued in the vicinity of KANOA Airfield and MIYAKONJO. Reconnaissance patrols were conducted to TIYAZAOISHI, SADORI, (633-010) and NAKAMURA (631-062). From Regimental Combat Team 6 one (1) officer and twelve (12) men left MAGASAKI at 2135 aboard the YUAD WANE as guard detail for North China repatriates from TAKA SHIMA and KATIMURA SHIMA. Headquarters Company of 3rd Battalion 8th Marines left for HITOGONSHI at 0930 and arrived at 1215. The reconnaissance party returned from OSUMI GUNTO to NAGASAKI at 1735.

19 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols eighteen (18) miles south of MIYAKONJO to SHIBUSHI, eleven (11) miles northeast of KANOA to ASAGAHI, five (5) miles east of KANOA to KUSHIRA airfield, seventeen (17) miles northeast of KANOA to IWAKAWA and twenty-four (24) miles northeast of KANOA to IWAMASHI. Regimental Combat Team 6 sent a patrol by LTC from OKR\, two and one-half (2\) miles west of NAGASAKI to KATIMURA SHIMA. Time of departure was 0900 and the time of arrival was 1430. Five (5) day patrols were sent nineteen (19) miles northwest of NAGASAKI to SETO and seven (7) miles south of SASERI \+ OHARAKA. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted patrols twelve (12) miles east and twenty (20) miles northwest of KUHAMOTO. Disposition patrols were conducted twenty (20) northwest of KUHAMOTO to ARAC and eight (8) miles south of KUHAMOTO to KAMASHI. The 16th Marines continued destruction of Japanese equipment on YOHI island, west of OKURA. A patrol made a final check on Japanese demobilization of SHIBARA Peninsula. A reconnaissance detachment was sent to HOND\, AMAKUSA-T\, eighteen (18) miles south of OSAI.
20 November, 1945.

The LST-LCI groups to support the OSKU and KOSHINKI operations, departed from NAGASAKI at 1250. Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols eighteen (18) miles south of MIYAKONOJO to SHIBUSHI, eleven (11) miles northeast of KANCYA to ABEOAito, seventeen (17) miles northeast of KANOYA to IVOKAN, five (5) miles east of KANOYA to KUSHIRA airfield, twenty-four (24) miles northeast of KANOYA to IMACHAI, five (5) miles west of KANOYA to FUKUNE and eight (8) miles west of MIYAZAKI to HONO. The patrol from Regimental Combat Team 6 aboard LCT 975 completed its mission at KAKINOURA WILLIAM and at 1232 left for O-SHIMA to reconnoiter that island. A patrol was conducted seven (7) miles south of SASEBO to OMADA to reconnoiter Japanese gun emplacements. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted patrols four (4) miles east of KAGOSHI to YOKE, twenty-three (23) miles north of YAGOSHI to MIYANNOJO and five (5) miles south of OUMITA to YUMATO. The 10th Marines conducted patrols to the western part of KUCHINOTO Police District, SHIMABARA and the southern part of OBARA Police District. The 2d Tank Battalion sent a patrol five (5) miles southeast of NAGASAKI to KONYAI WILLIAM and to 10 WILLIAM.

21 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols eighteen (18) miles south of MIYAKONOJO to SHIBUSHI, eleven (11) miles northeast of KANCYA to ABEOAito, five (5) miles east of KANOYA to KUSHIRA, twenty-four (24) miles northeast of KANOYA to IMACHAI, twelve (12) miles northeast of KANCYA to KANEHARU, seventeen (17) miles northeast of KAGOSHI to YOKE and fourteen (14) miles north of MIYAZAKI to TSUNAI. Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted patrols seven (7) miles south of SASEBO to the vicinity of OMADA and twelve (12) miles south of SASEBO to OHIKUSKI. The patrol aboard LCT 973 left from O-SHIMA at 1335 for HAKO-SHIMA. Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols five (5) miles southeast of OUMITA to the vicinity of YAMAGA and seven (7) miles northeast of OUMITA to the vicinity of NANKAN. A detachment from the Second Battalion Eighth Marines sailed from KAGOSHI for OSUMI WINTO at 2100. The 10th Marines had a patrol pick up curfew lists issued by civilian police in NAGASAKI, TOKITSU and NOKI. Patrols were conducted in the vicinity of KUCHINOTO, SHIMABARA and OBA to check on the general enforcement of the curfew terms. The 2d Tank Battalion conducted a similar patrol fifteen (15) miles southeast of NAGASAKI to HONO-SAKI.

22 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team Two conducted patrols twenty-four (24) miles northeast of KANCYA to IMACHAI, eighteen (18) miles south of MIYAKONOJO to SHIBUSHI, eleven (11) miles northeast of KANCYA to ABEOAito, twelve (12) miles northeast of KANCYA to KANEHARU, and five (5) miles east of KANCYA to KUSHIRA. A patrol from

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Regimental Combat Team 6 returned from HAKO-SHIKA aboard LCT 973 at 221500I. The OSUMI SUNTO detachment of BLT 2/8 sailed from KAGOSHIMA aboard LST 970 at 2142L and arrived TENAGA SHIMA at 220215I. The KOSHIKI BETTO detachment of BLT 2/8 sailed from KAGOSHIMA aboard LST 974 at 221330T and arrived KOSHIKI BETTO at 230200I. The 10th Marines operations were negative.

23 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols twenty-four (24) miles northeast of KANOA to IMAIACI, eleven (11) miles northeast of KANOA to ABEYAMA, five (5) miles east of KANOA to KANEMARU, eighteen (18) miles south of HIYAKOKO to SHIBUSHI, twenty-five (25) miles northeast of HIYAZAKI to TSUNA, eighteen (18) miles northeast of SHIBUSHI to OSI, and four (4) miles south of SHIBUSHI to BIRO ISLAND. Battalion Landing Team 2/6 is loading pending move to SAGA. Regimental Combat Team 3 conducted patrols ten (10) miles northeast of OHTA to the vicinity of TSUDA. The OSUMI BETTO detachment arrived at TENAGA SHIMA at 0015 and made initial reconnaissance. The disposition of three (3) dunos was started. Heavy rains at TENAGA SHIMA made most roads impassable. The 10th Marines patrolled the town of SHIBABARA in the eastern part of OMAKA Police District northeast of KAZUSA.

24 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 had patrols four (4) miles south of SHIBUSHI to BIRO ISLAND, eleven (11) miles northeast of KANOA to ABEYAMA, twelve (12) miles northeast of KANOA to KANEMARU, five (5) miles east of KANOA to KUSHIRA, eighteen (18) miles northeast of SHIBUSHI to OSI, twenty-four (24) miles northeast of KANOA to IMAIACI, at HIYAZAKI Airfield, and in KANOA. Battalion Landing Team 2/6 entrained for SAGA at 240800I. The rear echelon of Battalion Landing Team 3/8 departed for UTOKUSHI at 240900I, and arrived at 241215I. One (1) patrol of the 10th Marines landed on islands along the coast between TONITsu and ISAYA. Routine patrols were also conducted in OMAKA, KUCHINOKI, ARIE, SHIBABARA and KOJiro. Headquarters and Service Battery of the 10th Marines picked up curfew passes issued by the NAGASAKI Police.


Regimental Combat Team 2 sent patrols four (4) miles south of SHIBUSHI to BIRO ISLAND, ten (10) miles south of KANOA to KZEO.
twelve (12) miles northeast of KANOYA to KAMEWARU, five (5) miles east of KANOYA to KUSHIRA, eighteen (18) miles northeast of SHIBUSHI to OBI. Battalion Landing Team 2/6 relieved 2/7 at 281200I and assumed control of SAGA KEN. At 281000I elements of Regimental Combat Team 8 at OMUTA were relieved by elements of the 32d Infantry Division. A detachment of Battalion Landing Team 2/8 is continuing disposition operations on MAKI YOSHUKI SHIMA.

26 November, 1945.

In accordance with dispatch from Commanding General Sixth Army to Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, certain Japanese naval vessels that have been demilitarized are to be used in repatriation from the RYUVUS or NILA. These ships are to debark repatriates at KURE between 21 November and 28 November, and will use KURE, in the future, instead of KAGOSHIMA. Sufficient fuel for these ships is authorized at HIRO WAF. Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols twenty-five (25) miles north of MIYAZAKI to TSUNO, nineteen (19) miles north of MIYAZAKI to TSUMA, seventeen (17) miles northeast of KANOYA to INAKAWA, five (5) miles east of KANOYA to KUSHIRA, eight (8) miles northeast of KANOYA to SAKIZONA, twenty-four (24) miles northeast of KANOYA to IMAI SACHI, eighteen (18) miles northeast of SHIBUSHI to OBI. Regimental Combat Team 8 continued disposition patrols and repatriation activities. The 10th Marines continued to patrol their areas of responsibility.

27 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted patrols seventeen (17) miles northeast of KANOYA to INAKAWA, five (5) miles east of KANOYA to KUSHTHA, ten (10) miles southwest of KANOYA to YAZO, eight (8) miles northeast of KANOYA to SAKIZONA, eighteen (18) miles northeast of SHIBUSHI to OBI, twenty (20) miles southeast of MIYAPONOO to ASURATSU, four (4) miles northwest of MIYAPONOO to SHONAI. Battalion Landing Team 1/6 furnished a guard for five hundred eighty-two (582) Koreans aboard the YUGA WAF. The guard will remain aboard until delivery of the Koreans at HAPTO Barracks at approximately 281200I. Regimental Combat Team 8 conducted patrols seventeen (17) miles northeast of KUMANOTO to HOTO, twelve (12) miles northeast of KUMANOTO to INAKAWA, seven (7) miles northeast of HITOYOSHI to HATAN, seven (7) miles southwest of HITOYOSHI to TANO, and landings were made at KAMI YOSHUKI SHIMA. Battalion Landing Team 2/8 is continuing disposition activities in YOSHUKI BETTO and OSUI GUNTO. 10th Marines are continuing assigned missions.

28 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted disposition patrols eight (8) miles northeast of KANOYA to SAKIZONA, ten (10) miles
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southeast of KANOYA to KEZO, seventeen (17) miles northeast of KANOYA to TWAKANA, ten (10) miles east of KANOYA to KUSHIRA; search patrols to the vicinity of MIYAKONOJO; reconnaissance patrols nine (9) miles north of MIYAZAKI to SAKAYATA, thirty-seven (37) miles northeast of MIYAZAKI to MIYAZAKI, four (4) miles northeast of MIYAZAKI to MIYAZAKI. One (1) platoon of Regimental Combat Team 6 aboard the SHOKUKU MARU sailed at 0300 on 30th with two hundred sixty-nine (269) Korean repatriates for YALNO Barracks. Estimated time of arrival is 291500. The trip of the YU'GAO MARU was cancelled. The forward echelon of Command Post, Battalion Landing Team 1/6 moved at 200000 and arrived at Naval Aircraft Factory, SASEBO at 211500. A patrol from RCT 8 was in the vicinity of TSU'BAO YAMA, seven (7) miles south of TUCOYOSHI. "E" Company of Regimental Combat Team 8 left CHUNTA at 200000 and arrived at KUMAMOTO 290930. "B" Company will occupy the camp site located at (13492-0729) which was formerly occupied by the Third Battalion of Regimental Combat Team 2. The detachment on KOSHIKI RETTO completed its mission and is returning to KAGOSHIMA. The 10th Marines continued assigned missions and placed a guard on the trains with Korean repatriates which left ISAHAYA at 291231.

29 November, 1946.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted disposition patrols eight (8) miles northeast of KANOYA to SAKAYATA, ten (10) miles southeast of KANOYA to KEZO, seventeen (17) miles northeast of KANOYA to TWAKANA and KUSHIRA; reconnaissance patrols two (2) miles east of MIYAZAKI to SHI-BIU and to the vicinity of MIYAZAKI, eighteen (18) miles northeast of SHIBUSHI to SHI, twenty-two (22) miles south of MIYAZAKI to ASBRAKAI and the vicinity of MIYAKONOJO; search patrols are operating southeast of MIYAKONOJO. Regimental Combat Team 6 conducted a patrol twenty-four (24) miles northeast of SAGA to KARATSU. Battalion Landing Team 1/6 is loading on LST 1091 and 943 for movement to SASEBO. "E" Company of Battalion Landing Team 2/6 has established an outpost at 1051 which is fifteen (15) miles northeast of SAGA. Regimental Combat Team 8 had patrols four (4) miles south of KUMAMOTO to TAKASHI, twenty-one (21) miles northeast of KUMAMOTO in O-SUNI, nineteen (19) miles northeast of KUMAMOTO in YAMATA, sixteen (16) miles north of KUMAMOTO in WAIPI, five (5) miles to thirteen (13) miles northeast of KUMAMOTO to SUMITAKA, UEKI, KONOH, and TAKASE. The KOSHIKI RETTO detachment landed at KAGOSHIMA at 291100 and departed for KUMAMOTO at 291400. The Tenth Marines continued assigned duties.
30 November, 1945.

Regimental Combat Team 2 conducted disposition patrols ten (10) miles southwest of MIYAKONJO to IWAKAWA, ten (10) miles southeast of KANCA to KEZC, eight (8) miles northeast of KANCA to SAKIZONA and KUSHIRA, two (2) miles southwest of MIYAKONJO to TAKARANE, eighteen (18) miles northeast of SHIRUSHI to OBI, twenty-two (22) miles south of MIYAZAKI to ABURATSU; search patrols seventeen (17) miles north of MIYAZAKI to TAKANABE, nine (9) miles northwest of MIYAZAKI to YAMAZAKI, two (2) miles south of MIYAKONJO to MIYANURA, three (3) miles south of MIYAKONJO to NAKAMICHI, five (5) miles southwest of MIYAKONJO to NAKANISHI, and a civil intelligence patrol in the MIYAKONJO area. Regimental Combat Team Six (6) conducted disposition patrols fifteen (15) miles northeast of SAGA to TOSU and six (6) miles northeast of SAGA to KANZAKI. Battalion Landing Team 1/6 is loading at CURA aboard LSTs 943 and 1091 for move to the Naval Aircraft Factory, SASEBO. Regimental Combat Team Eight (8) conducted patrols four (4) miles southwest of HITOCOSHI to the vicinity of FUSAMI-YAMA, four (4) miles northwest of HITOCOSHI to the vicinity of WATARI. Disposition activities are completed in KOSHIKI RETTO. The KOSHIKI RETTO detachment, Battalion Landing Team 2/8, arrived in KUMAMOTO at 2200Z. The Tenth Marines are continuing their assigned missions.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX I DC ANNEX (D)

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. Training -

   a. The officers and scout-sergeants of the Shore Fire Control Parties were ordered on or about 5 July, 1945, to the Naval Gunfire Training Section, Fleet Marine Force Headquarters, to undergo extensive training in Naval Gunfire Procedure, the capabilities and limitations of naval gunfire, the various phases of naval gunfire support in an amphibious landing, and also for the purpose of actual spotting of destroyer-gunnery at Kahoolawe Island.

   b. An examination was given all officers and men at the completion of the course, and all were found to be well qualified to perform their respective duties.

2. Planning -

   a. Annex Baker to Operation Plan Number 14, 2d Marine Division was derived from applicable portions of Annex Charlie to Operation Plan Number 2-45, 5th Amphibious Corps.

   b. The division was tentatively assigned three battleships, five cruisers, sixteen destroyers, six destroyer escorts, and twenty-four LCS(L)(3)s under Commander Task Group 54.1.

   c. Fire support areas, zones of responsibility, and a list of probable targets were assigned to certain ships. Initial ship assignments and frequencies were assigned the assault battalions. (Refer to Appendices II, V and VI, Annex Baker, Operation Plan Number 14, 2d Marine Division)

   d. Two Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers, from the 2d Marine Division, were to be stationed aboard the flagships of Gunboat Units Able and Baker, Section 1. These officers were to advise their respective Gunboat Unit Commanders in selection and designation of targets, and in matters of troop, safety, retaining communication with the Corps NMF Officer via the Gunboat Control Circuit.

   e. Except in the most urgent situations, no missions were to be fired without obtaining clearance from the Corps Commander and Commander Task Group 54.1.

   f. Shore Fire Control Parties and fire support ships were issued air and runnery target maps, in addition to the regular 1/25,000 battle maps issued all units.
g. Coordination of supporting arms in accordance with directives set forth in 5th Amphibious Corps General Order 12-45. Commander Task Group 54.1 was to notify all ships via the Naval Gunfire Control Net when plans Victor or Negat applied.

h. For NCF Communications, see Appendix I to Annex Baker, Operation Plan Number 14, 2d Marine Division.

3. Operation -

a. However, as a result of the docile attitude of the Japanese toward allied troops in previous landings on Kyushu and Honshu, this plan was modified by Commander Task Group 54.1, canceling all ship assignments, fire-support areas and zones of responsibility.

b. When elements of the 2d Marine Division initiated landings at Nagasaki, naval gunfire support was available on call, under the control of Commander Task Group 54.3. Three destroyers and one cruiser were available, if needed.

c. The Naval Gunfire Control Net was secured at 1545 on A/1 Day (23 September, 1545), when it became apparent that the Japanese would offer no resistance to the landings in the Nagasaki Area.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX XI to AN EX (D)

PART I

AIR SUPPORT

1. Planning -

a. During the preliminary planning stages of the operation little definite information was available as to air support task organization or objectives.

b. 5th Amphibious Corps released their air support plan to the 2d Marine Division on 14 September, 1945. 5th Amphibious Corps air support annex was dated 7 September, 1945. The anticipated task force for air support of the B-2 operation (Sasebo - Nagasaki landings) consisted of approximately 18 VF and 12 VTB type aircraft to be available for A-Day strikes. Air support to be available A-Day and thereafter was scheduled to consist of 4 VF or CAP, 1 VT for air observation, and 1 VF or VT for air coordination. Responsibility for air support of 5th Amphibious Corps was to shift to 5th Fighter Command when established ashore and when so directed by higher authority.

c. Annex (D) to 5th Amphibious Corps Operation Plan 2-45 was issued as Annex (C) to 2d Marine Division Operation Plan Number 14.

d. On A-Day division SAR and SAC nets were opened with CTF 54.1.10 at CGSC. A representative of CTF 54.1.10 was aboard the division command ship in advisory capacity. It was indicated that the CVE furnishing aircraft for support was on station 50 miles from Nagasaki. No CAP was on station.

e. In view of the docile attitude of the Japanese and after it was determined that air support would not be necessary, all air support nets were closed at 1500 on A-Day. No requests for air observation were received from division units and no requests for air support were made to Com ASCU-9.
SECONO MUNIIE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (D)

PART II

OPERATIONS OF MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON TWO

1. Landing and Initial Operations —

a. VMG-2 disembarked at the city of Naha on A-Day and immediately commenced to set up operationally at Itahaya Airfield, twenty miles northeast of Naha.

b. Air operations commenced on 26 September. Missions included observation of area of responsibility, courier mail runs and passenger transport.

c. A site for a strip nearer the division command post was selected on A1 and construction started in that area of Naha destroyed and flattened by the atomic bomb. The strip was put in commission on 11 October, 1945.

d. With the deployment of division units throughout the entire zone of responsibility extensive courier and passenger flights were inaugurated during the early part of October.

e. The airplane strength of the squadron was reduced from twelve to eight aircraft when four aircraft were released to 5th Amphibious Corps. In spite of the shortage extensive aerial reconnaissance and observation flights were carried out in addition to courier, passenger, evacuation, and limited B-24 spraying flights.

2. Subsequent Operations —

a. A plan for an airfield reconnaissance of the division zone of responsibility was submitted to and approved by 5th Amphibious Corps. The plan was put into effect on 10 October. Landings were made at all serviceable fields to determine their future operational use and types of aircraft that could be accommodated.

b. A recommendation was made to 5th Amphibious Corps, upon completion of the reconnaissance, requesting that the following fields be retained for use by this division:

- OMURA
- ISAHAYA
- KUMAMOTO
- KAGOSHIMA
- KOROY
- MIYAKONJO
- NIYAZAKI
- UJICOSHI
- CHIRAN
- IZUMI
- TOMITAKA


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g. A daily courier service was inaugurated between Isahaya and Basebo on 7 October, covering sixty air miles. On 14 October, this courier run was extended to include Isahaya-Nagasaki-Omura-Basebo-Nagasaki and Isahaya-Kumamoto-Nagasaki, a trip of 165 air miles. Commencing 30 October, courier service was effected every other day between Nagasaki-Kumamoto-Karoshima-Kanoya-Nagasaki covering 355 air miles. On 8 November, this route was extended to include Miyakonojo increasing the total of this flight to 410 air miles.

3. **Summary**

a. The squadron has flown approximately 1240 hours and 37,200 air miles since arriving in Japan. The squadron operated during this period with an average of eight pilots and five planes (in commission). Pilots flew an approximate average of 155 hours during the 58 days period of the operation up to 30 November, 1945.

b. In view of the extensive flight schedules flown by VM-2 it was deemed necessary to operate the courier service somewhat along the lines of a small airline. All practicable precautions to prevent accidents. Single planes were not permitted to operate over the long legs of the run. Pilots were required to file departure reports, and these reports were transmitted operational priority (with precedence over other operational traffic). Schedules were published and maintained as practicable. Strict orders relative to safe flying weather were issued, and twice daily weather forecasts were obtained. At all times, the squadron was under the supervision of the Assistant G-3, Division Air Officer.

g. Larger aircraft were needed at all times, but as of the closing date of this report, none were available. On two occasions it was necessary to evacuate casualties from Miyakonojo to Isahaya by CV aircraft when a larger plane would have been more satisfactory and safer. The lack of any aircraft of the size and general characteristics of an R4D placed demands on VM-2 which were greater than the squadron should have had to meet.
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ANNEX (E)

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Assistant Chief of Staff, 3-4.
To: The Commanding General.


Reference: (a) Division Special Order Number 161-45, dated 9 November, 1945.

Appendices:
(1) Division Transport Quartermaster Report.
(2) Division Quartermaster Report.
(3) Medical Report.
(4) Ordnance Report.
(6) Procurement Report.
(7) Motor Transport Report.
(8) Division Shore Party Report.
(9) Periodic Report.
(10) Journal.

In accordance with reference (a), appendices (1) through (10) which constitute the 3-4 Section Operations Report for the occupation of Japan are transmitted herewith.

J. G. Goldberg

CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX I, TO ANNEX (E)

TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

a. The period 19 August to 10 September was utilized in
planning for the actual loading of the division. Staging areas, all
within a maximum of 1000 yards of the ships’ sides, were cleared. Cargo
assembled in the dumps of the staging area, and tentative storage plans
were completed. Tonnage estimates for all organizations of the division
were completed.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

b. The period 26 June to 16 July was utilized for organizing
and preparing a TQM school for the instruction of officers and NCO’s of the
division. The TQM school, for thirty-five (35) officers, was conducted
for five (5) weeks, six (6) days a week, six and one-half (6½) hours of
classes per day, from 16 July to 19 August. The NCO school was cancelled
due to insufficient time and the officers who had just completed the TQM
course were instructed to train the NCO’s from their respective organiza-
tions.

b. The TQM school for officers covered one week of general
and preparatory lectures, two weeks of APA, AKA, LST, and LSM loading
problems, and two weeks of practical work and instruction aboard ships
that were loading or discharging in Tanapag Harbor.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

b. General loading of the division began 0700, 10 September
and was completed 1430, 17 September. 15 APAS; 6 AKAS, 14 LSTs, and 20
LSMs were used to lift the division. The loading problem was complicated
due to the necessity of loading rear echelon equipment and supplies as
well as that required for an assault landing. APAS, AKA, LSTs, and LSMs
were combat loaded to the extent that ammunition, water, rations, and
petroleum products were readily available if required for an assault
landing. Vehicle priorities were maintained on all ships.
D. AVERAGE TONNAGE AND TIME FACTORS OF THE DIVISION LOADING AT SAIPAN ARE AS FOLLOWS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SHIP</th>
<th>AVERAGE TONNAGE (SHORT TONS)</th>
<th>AVERAGE TIME (HOURS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFAS</td>
<td>654.49</td>
<td>37.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKAS</td>
<td>1969.1</td>
<td>86.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSTS</td>
<td>503.6</td>
<td>36.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSNM</td>
<td>173.06</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


F. ON 19 OCTOBER, BY DIVISION MEMORANDUM, THE TQM SECTION WAS DESIGNATED THE AGENCY TO RECEIVE ALL REQUESTS FROM UNITS OF THE DIVISION FOR SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND SMALL BOATS FOR EITHER CARGO OR PERSONNEL.

G. ON 1 NOVEMBER, BY DIVISION GENERAL ORDER, THE DIVISION TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER BECAME DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROPER SUPERVISION AND COORDINATION OF ALL PHASES OF SHIP UNLOADING OF THE PORT OF NAGASAKI.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT SHIP TQMS, WITH THE LATEST SHIP CHARACTERISTICS PAMPHLETS, BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION AT LEAST TWO (2) WEEKS BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SHIPS FOR AN OPERATION.
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (E)
QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

a. Preparations for the accumulation of supplies for the invasion of Japan commenced during the early part of July, 1945. From the supply standpoint the Division was in a very good state of preparedness. Materials and supplies lost at Okinawa by units of the Division not actively participating in the campaign during the early part of April had been replaced 100%. Material and supplies expended as lost, were damaged or used in combat in actual operations on Okinawa by RCT-8 had been or were in the process of being requisitioned. Most of the requisitioned items were available and would be furnished by the local supply agency in a reasonable time.

As time passed it became apparent that the Division except for some articles of special equipment such as portable footbridges, secret type pierced plank, armor for bulldozers and demolition makes on which E.T.A.'s of about 1 September, 1945, had been established, would be in an excellent state of supply readiness.

The cessation of hostilities in Japan had little or no effect on the quantity or type of materiel and supplies being assembled for the mounting out of the Division. Defensive chemical warfare supplies were reduced slightly below the quantity that would have been carried on an operation and protective clothing was cancelled entirely. Considerable winter clothing arrived at Saipan just before the Division mounted out and extra efforts were exerted by the Supply Agency to furnish all available items to the Division.

In the period immediately prior to mounting out and while the Division stores were being assembled in the dock area preparatory to loading a certain amount of confusion existed with the Division Quartermaster's section because of uncertainty as to the size of the rear echelon. Plans continually had to be changed in regards to Division Quartermaster personnel and organic equipment. When finally it became apparent that no rear echelon at all would be left to secure the camp, the regiments and separate battalions proceeded to turn
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (E) -- QUARTERMASTER DEPT. (Cont'd)

In the Division Quartermaster in accordance with the evacuation order, huge quantities of serviceable and unserviceable items that for a time threatened to overcome the facilities and capabilities of the section. While supplies required for the mounting out were being forwarded to the dock area there was a continuous flow of trucks loaded with equipment and supplies from organizational areas to the Division Quartermaster Area. This equipment and supplies in turn had to be separated and sorted and turned in to the local supply agency.

It was necessary to strike all thoroughly serviceable pyramidal tents in the Division camp in order to furnish tentage for the entire Division at the target area. Scarcely any new tentage was available on Saipan. The tents had to be struck after personnel had embarked. Organizations cooperated fully in this with a minimum of confusion.

b) The Division Quartermaster stores were split into three equally sized lots and spotted in the SCT areas. Last minute arrival of stores were spotted in the SCT-8 area as this was the last SCT to be loaded. This caused SCT-8 to have a greater quantity of Division stores than the other two SCT's. The officers responsible for mounting out this SCT showed outstanding ability in loading their assigned shipping.

When it became apparent that the assigned shipping was not of sufficient tonnage to mount out all supplies and equipment that had been spotted, about 3% of the field fortification gear and some organic equipment was left on the dock in order to make room for items considered more essential at the target area. These stores were picked up by the supply agency on Saipan after departure of the Division and placed in stock. Organic equipment was to be forwarded to Nagasaki but has not yet arrived.

c) While enroute to Nagasaki and in view of the tactical situation that would exist upon landing of troops and stores, the Commanding General directed the SCT Commanders would be responsible for Division stores until such time as the Division Quartermaster could gain custody and control over the same. SCT Commanders were given full instructions regarding the unloading of stores and the security, storage and issue of same.

d) The Division mounted out with the following allowances of equipment and supplies in addition to that carried by the units:
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (E) - QUARTERMASTER REPORT. (Cont'd)

Water: 10 gallons per man. (The strength used for this computation was 74,400 in order to assure an adequate supply at the destination.)

Rations: "M" 70 days
"O" 60 days
"P" 1 day
"10 in 1" 5 days
"T" Accessory Pack 30 days
"Special" 40 days
"Bread" 20 days
"Candy Assortment" 2 days
"Hospital" 1,000 beds for 30 days or 21,000 rations

"Dog" 30 days

The above rations were assembled on an estimated strength of 22,510 in order to assure sufficient quantities at destination.

Class II Supplies 30 days
Class III Supplies Fuel 18 days, lubricants 30 days
Class IV Supplies Directed in the administrative order
Class V 3 units of fire all weapons plus explosives and mines as specified in administrative order

3. Training and Organization

a. Personnel under the control of the Division Quartermaster were divided into a headquarters section and four (4) operating sections that would be assigned to either a service or a supply platoon of the Service Battalion approximately thirty (30) days before the embarkation of the Division.

The headquarters section was comprised of the Division Quartermaster, the office personnel, officer section heads and key enlisted personnel.

The service platoons and supply platoons consisted of personnel in equal numbers from the following sections: General Supply, Engineering Supply, Chemical Supply, Salvage, Commissary, and Bakery, plus additional other personnel as needed. Each of these sections within the platoons was self-contained and under control of competent non-commissioned officers, capable of operating independently or as a platoon with a Regimental Combat Team. In accordance with the task
organization for this operation a service platoon and a supply platoon was attached to each regimental combat team. The service platoon and supply platoon remaining was assigned to Division Troops.

b. Prior to embarkation the senior non-commissioned officers in each section were thoroughly schooled in the probable duties of their section upon landing.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS.

b. The Division commenced landing operations on 29 September, 1945, by regimental combat teams under ideal conditions. All Division stores were under the control of the combat team commanders. The Division Quartermaster during the landing operation, maintained close contact with the regimental and separate battalion quartermasters and the shore party commanders and assisted in coordinating the distribution of water and emergency rations. A Division Quartermaster office was established initially on Bejeik wharf and later in the theater building. Sufficient office equipment was placed in operation for the use of officer personnel to transact necessary office routine. Emergency issues of supplies and equipment were made to units through maintaining close liaison with PCT quartermasters and S-4 officers.

All ships were unloaded initially under ideal weather conditions, but on the third and fourth day it rained incessantly. Store could not be entirely covered although every effort was made to do so. Many stores affected by water were damaged, in particular flour, sugar, salt, clothing and all purpose soap. Serious other than the water proof type disintegrated under the heavy soaking. The contents that were not spoiled by the action of water were gathered up and later issued. Of many warehouses used at first, roofs were badly damaged allowing water to seep through freely. All ships were unloaded in four and one half days. Stores were placed on the beaches as rapidly it was impossible to carry more than a fraction of them to warehouses. If this shipping had not been urgently needed for bringing in additional troops a more leisurely unloading would have saved a considerable quantity of stores from being lost due to the action of the elements.

The Bejeik dock area was in a very poor state of repair. The wharf itself was in fair condition, but the dock warehouses were badly damaged from bombing and were filled with Japanese stores, including badly rotted and decayed vegetables in sacks. The available room in these warehouses was insignificant. The immediate road net was narrow, rough and filled with debris.
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (E) - QUARTERMASTER REPORT. (Cont'd)

The 6th Marines and attached units including the 43rd Naval Construction Battalion landed on the west side of the bay. There excellent warehouse facilities were available and stores were quickly placed under weatherproof cover.

Within about one week after landing the Division Quartermaster secured control over all Division stores in the Nagoaki area on the east side of the bay. Steps were immediately taken to repair available warehouses. The 43rd Naval Construction Battalion supported by hundreds of native laborers and what native mechanics could be found were charged with improvement of the wharf and all nearby warehouses. The Division Quartermaster and his staff and available members of the Division Quartermaster sections were busy assembling stores, making issues to using units and assisting in repairing other warehouses. At one time approximately 1,000 Japanese were used for this purpose.

The Division supply of water lasted far beyond the anticipated length of time expected. As late as twenty days after debarkation, water brought from Saipan was still being issued to troops. This was possible because personnel were permitted by ships’ officers to board Division shipping and refill cisterns and water containers. City water was not considered safe for drinking until about three weeks after landing despite the efforts put forth by Engineer and Medical personnel of the Division, and the cooperation of native officials.

The Division Quartermaster secured adequate office space and additional warehouses through the Division procurement board. Dumps were worked over and arranged in orderly fashion. Unuseful buildings were demolished and removed for open storage. Bombed out areas were leveled by bulldozers for use as fuel dumps. An excellent commissary warehouse of good size was obtained for the storage of provisions.

The Division received its first re-supply of Classes I and III on 11 October. The Class I package consisted of 30 days "B" type rations for 40,000 men. These rations however were extremely unbalanced. About 3/4 of 1 percent were unusable, not including a large quantity of the flour which was full of weevils. A report on this was made to the Corps Quartermaster, 5th Amphibious Corps. A requisition to balance the ration was submitted to the 8th Service Regiment. Only a trickle of supplies has been received on this requisition. The Class III appeared adequate for 18 days, although no Yoga was on the ship.
On 18 October 7500 crates of potatoes were received. The potatoes were partially spoiled, but were inspected and passed by the Division Surgeon. This quantity is a 45 days supply.

On 12 October 40,000 lbs. of frozen beef were unloaded and immediately distributed to all units. This afforded a two days supply of fresh beef and was a welcome addition to the menu.

On 24 October approximately three million board feet of lumber was received. On 28 October sufficient fuel and lubricants were received to bring the Division Class III supplies up to about a 90 day level.

The first Class II and IV re-supply arrived on 30 October, about five weeks after the initial landing. Class II supplies had been critically short for some time before this, principally toilet paper and housekeeping items. The 8th Service Regiment had partially filled an emergency requisition to alleviate this situation and it was possible to procure a small amount of toilet paper locally.

On 2 November a small amount of fresh provisions were obtained from the A.P.A. 153, including 19,000 lbs. of fresh meats, 26,000 lbs. of excellent potatoes, 2600 lbs. of fresh onions and 1980 lbs. of butter. This was retained in storage and issued to messes for serving on the birthday of the Marine Corps, 10 November.

On 6 November 42,500 lbs. of turkey were received and the same are being held in storage until Thanksgiving.

Type "B" rations were again received on 13 November and 25 November.

As stated above the initial "B" rations were unbalanced, thus reducing the variety of food issued. Numerous complaints were received from Commanding Officers to this effect. The change in climate from tropical to temperate caused the men to have increased appetites and it was found that the Army ration allowances which had been adequate on Saipan were inadequate here. Allowances of food were increased up to 3 1/3% to afford additional quantities at each meal. In particular the meat items were in great demand and were consumed at a much greater rate than had been expected. As of 20 November the food situation appears much better and adequate fresh provisions are in the field. The men appear well nourished and are in a good state of health.
Bakeries were established in the Nagaesi area within ten days after occupation and as rapidly thereafter as possible in the outlying units, consistent with the tactical situation. The quality of the bread from the beginning was excellent. No difficulties in distribution were encountered. The allowance of bread per hundred men per day is now fifty (50) pounds. This is about 25% more than the allowance used on Saipan and is also attributed to increased supplies due to cold weather. The bakery section assigned to BCT-9 has further been broken down into smaller sections and are operating as battalion bakeries.

Distribution of clothing, especially winter clothing to the Division as a whole constituted a serious problem that now has largely been solved. As stated heretofore Division supplies were mounted out with the combat teams, divided equally in three parts. Upon landing and due to the rapidly changing tactical situation no combat team retained planned strength. The artillery regiment was established at Ishinya and was dependent upon BCT-8 for supply. When BCT-8 moved to Kusamoto a hasty division of clothing had to be made, BCT-6 had a strength of about 4,500 and BCT-8 about the same, and consequently these units had more Division clothing than could be used. Division troops in the Nagaesi area not assigned to combat teams numbered about 5,000 and had to be supplied with clothing. All of this lead to some confusion because while blocks of clothing could be moved about from unit to unit considerable difficulty was experienced in having correct sizes on hand for immediate issues. In addition it was found necessary to issue certain items of winter clothing to army units that were either attached to the Division or operating in the Nagaesi area. This issue had not been anticipated and was a drain on the initial supply of Division stores.

This problem will be similar for any future landing made under the same conditions, that is, troops moving from a tropical climate to a temperate climate at the beginning of the winter season, and not having been previously issued winter clothing, will be without winter clothing during the period that the clothing is being assembled, sorted and issued against requisitions.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

An early difficulty was experienced in obtaining adequate storage for Division stores. All structures either assigned to the Division Quartermaster by the G-4 or procured by requisition through the Division procurement board for storage had been partially destroyed by bombing and required extensive repairs. In addition the buildings were filled.
CONFDENTIAL

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (E) - QUARTERMASTER REPORT, (Cont'd)

with native stores that had to be removed before the buildings could be used. It was also necessary to have the interiors sprayed with DDT to kill noxious vermin.

While warehouses were being readied for use by the Division Quartermaster, organizations were billeting troops in buildings that were more or less in the same condition and requests poured in for cleaning materials and DDT for this purpose. Division stores of these items were exhausted almost immediately and all efforts were made to obtain re-supply. Some DDT was obtained by air shipment.

Glass and putty were required in prodigious quantities to replace windows. Scarcely any windows were intact in buildings in Nebeski occupied by the Division. These items had not been included in Division supplies and therefore had to be obtained locally.

Re-supply of Classes II and IV did not arrive promptly. For a period of about ten (10) days Division storerooms were almost devoid of any stock of these classes of supplies, except clothing and chemical supplies. Initial small quantities received from the 8th Service Regiment were issued immediately to using organizations.

The supply status of the Division at this time is considered good. Supply routes are fairly well established by road, rail or sea. Extensive use is being made of Japanese rail facilities.

Re-supply did not arrive in adequate quantities except for Class III until the middle of November.

Type "B" rations on hand are still unbalanced and it is therefore not possible to issue a well balanced variety or to build up a desired fifteen (15) day reserve supply level with the 2nd, 8th and 10th Marines.

Fresh provisions were not received in any quantity until approximately 20 November and it had not been possible to give the troops more than a few meals of fresh meats or vegetables except potatoes. Information has been received to indicate that steady shipments of fresh provisions may be expected from now on.

The stock of clothing on hand including winter clothing is adequate for the supply of the Division except for certain sizes which are being requisitioned.
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (E) - QUARTERMASTER REPORT. (Cont'd)

6. Re-supply for troops operating under conditions that existed in this area should be made promptly as planned. Supplies are exhausted at an abnormal rate especially housekeeping materials such as sponges, brooms, mops, dishwashing compound, germicidal rinses, disinfectant, line, toilet paper, towels, steel wool, etc. The allowance in the first re-supply of these items should be trebled.

Issue certain items of winter clothing such as boots, shoe pac, vest, alpaca liner, hege, sleeping; gloves, wool, leather Palm; shirts, flannel; and jackets, field; prior to embarkation of troops if practicable and time permits.
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December 1942.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX (E)

MEDICAL REPORT

1. Preparation and Planning for the Operation

a. A thorough and complete check up of all supplies was instituted by the commanding officer of each company and all existing deficits, if any, of 782 gear, organizational gear, clothing, medical and medical resupplies requisitioned.

b. Specific protection of the individual was instituted by:
   (1) Immunization:
       a. Small-pox
       b. Typhoid
       c. Cholera
       d. Plague
       e. Tetanus
       f. Typhus
   (2) Jungle kits containing:
       a. Atabrine
       b. Sulfadiazine
       c. Salt
       d. Iodine
       e. Halazone
       f. Sulfanilamide
       g. Razor blade
       h. Gauze
       i. Sanit - 2 bottles

2. Protection of individual equipment.

   (1) DDT spraying of shelter halves, ponchos and mosquito nets.

3. Specific Therapy.

   (1) Whole blood, by air delivery to each embarked Medical Co.
   (2) Penicillin - Available to all Medical Companies and battalions.
APPENDIX III TO ANNEX B

2. Training and Organization

2a. (1) Refresher course given corpsmen on handling and treatment of casualties.
(2) First aid reviewed.
(3) Sanitation instruction emphasized.
(4) Lectures on diseases endemic to the target area.
(5) Venereal disease control and prophylaxis stressed.
(6) Movies relative to above subjects shown.
(7) Training of 250 corpsmen in 14th Army General Hospital, Saipan in operating room technique and surgical nursing.
(8) Three men per company trained in insect and rodent control by NCOs Unit.

2b. Upon completion of training period each medical company secured its 7827 gear, respirator, to embarkation with its assigned regimental combat team.

2c. The division hospital was secured, all patients being transferred to 176th Army Station Hospital and 369th Army General Hospital for further treatment, if necessary.

2d. The division embarked at Saipan, 12 September 1945 and arrived at Nagasaki, Japan, 23 September 1945. The passage was uneventful with no serious illness or accidents.

3. Occupational Operations

3a. A preliminary reconnaissance on 24 September 1945, indicated the following priority of medical action:
(1) Supervision of filtration plants and chlorination of city water.
(2) Maintenance of strict water and food discipline.
(3) Establishment of division hospital.
(4) Control of flies and mosquitoes.
(5) DDT spraying of all barracks, mess-halls, and galleys.

3b. General unloading began 23 September 1945 and was completed on 27 September 1945.

3c. On 25th September 1945, the division hospital was prepared to receive medical and surgical cases; 50 bed capacity. Liaison with Corps evacuation Hospital No. 3 was established to facilitate extended hospital care and for the evacuation of patients. A daily ambulance service is maintained with Corps evacuation Hospital No. 3.
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4. Medical companies A, B, and E departed with their respective regimental combat teams and are now functioning as units in their assigned areas. "C" Medical Company is now serving as an auxiliary unit at Hanoya. The employment of attached U.S. Army Medical Units, 2nd Marine Division is as follows:

(1) 415 U.S.A. Malaria Survey Detachment: attached to RCT-2 on November 2, for duty in the Mayakonojo area - in connection with initial survey of southern Kyusyu.

(2) 36 U.S.A. Malaria Control Detachment: attached to RCT-8 on November 2, for duty with the 1st Battalion, 8th Regiment at Kagozama, Kyusyu, in connection with mosquito control in that area.

(3) 94th U.S.A. Malaria Control Detachment: attached on October 30 to Service Troops Division Headquarters for duty in connection with sanitary and malaria control, Nagasaki city.

(4) Holding Companies "L" and "C" of the 264 U.S.A. Medical Battalion attached to 3rd Battalion, 7th Regiment, U.S.M.C., Oct 20, for duty in connection with the evacuation of Army patients.

(5) 73 U.S.A. Field Hospital: attached November 3, to Service Troops, Second Service Battalion, Hanoya - non operational.

5. The 93rd Military Government Hq., Det., hq. 2nd Marine Division completed:

(1) Survey of Japanese hospitals as to facilities, number and quality of doctors, nurses and medicines, and made plans to re-establish hospitalization and medical care of the civilian population.

(2) Organization of military food and garbage collection systems was carried out.

(3) Reporting system for communicable diseases, births, and deaths was set up in Nagasaki, Isaniya, Omura, Kamakura, Chijimatsu, and Obama.

(4) Distribution system for Japanese Army and Navy drugs and medical supplies was originated.

(5) Malaria Control Unit (Army) directed to initiate a sanitary cleanup of the city by eradicating common vectors that constitute a health hazard in this area.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Training, embarkation and disembarkation proceeded smoothly and according to plan. There has been to date no case of serious dysentery or gastro-enteritis in this division.

b. Recommendations: None.
APPENDIX III (A) TO AMFRA (L) CORPS EVALUATION HOSPITAL #3 REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure: (A) diagram of organization.

(1) PLANNING

1. Only general planning was possible as no information regarding the operation and target was available until 15 September 1945.

2. Preparation for a nine hundred bed hospital was initiated on verbal order from the surgeon, II Amphibious Corps under whose operational control this unit was at the time.

(2) TRAINING

1. The unit stayed at Guam from 22 July to 17 September 1945, where organizational equipment and medical and surgical supplies were replenished after the Okinawa operation. Training was accomplished by temporarily ordering such medical personnel, as were not needed for construction and maintenance of camp and equipment to active medical activities on the island. A camp dispensary and dental clinic was established and operated under field conditions.

(3) COMMISSION

1. Although the identity of three surgical Platoons was maintained as outlined in the T/4, much emphasis was placed on operating the hospital as a single medically and surgically balanced unit because of the probability that the hospital would act in that capacity on participation in future operations. Under those conditions the organization was composed as outlined in enclosure (A).

(4) ADVANCE ANNEXATION OF OBJECTIVE

1. None.

(5) CONJUNCTUAL OPERATIONS

1. The entire hospital unit was loaded on an LST at Guam on 17 September to 20 September 1945. Dispersion on several ships was not considered necessary because of cessation of hostilities. The use of
APPENDIX III (A) TO AH 6148 (A) CORPS EVACUATION HOSPITAL #2 REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

one ship facilitated loading and unloading and also was instrumental in saving some property from being lost in that numerous dumps for storing, prior to loading were unnecessary.

2. The ship departed on 20 September and after an uneventful voyage, arrived at Nagasaki on 27 September 1945. The Commanding Officer reported to representatives of Fifth Amphibious Corps and was ordered by them to establish Corps evacuation hospital no. 3 in Isahaya branch of Sasebo Naval Hospital (Japanese) located at Isahaya, sixteen miles northeast of Nagasaki.

3. With our own trucks and trucks furnished by Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, unloading began on 28 September 1945. Equipment was placed in a dump one-half mile from the ship. On the same date equipment was started moving to Isahaya.

4. Vacating of the Japanese hospital of Japanese medical personnel was begun on 26 September and completed on 30 September. Fifth Amphibious Corps was notified that the hospital could receive emergency cases beginning 29 September. The first cases were admitted on 30 September. First dental treatments were begun 9 October 1945. Transportation of all equipment to Isahaya was completed on 4 October 1945. Two hundred beds were ready for occupancy 6 October 1945. Expansion of capacity has been kept about one hundred beds ahead of estimated number of admissions.

(6) JAPANESE COMPLAINTS WITH JAPANESE MEDICAL OFFICER

1. The Japanese Medical Officer in Command of the hospital and his staff were extremely cooperative in turning over the hospital. All directions were expeditiously complied with by them.

(7) SUPPLY, EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS

1. Rations for nine hundred patients for a period of sixty days were brought with the hospital from Guam. Provisions currently consumed are drawn from Tent Command of Second Marine Division, located three miles from the hospital. Occasional fresh stores are available. Fresh bread has been ample since 3 October.

2. Equipment and medical supplies transported from staging area have been adequate. There was negligible loss of supplies during transportation and occupation.

3. Water is pumped from a shallow well and filtered and stored by the original Japanese water plant.

4. An electric power and steam plant is located on the area and is being used in place of organizational equipment which, however, is hooked up to strategic parts of the hospital in case of failure of the local plant.
APPENDIX III (c) TO ADA A (b) COURS EVACUATION HOSPITAL 73 REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

(8) SPECIAL FEATURES

1. The hospital grounds consist of an area of about two hundred twenty-five yards by four hundred twenty-five yards. The main hospital building which was at one time a silk or cotton mill is, now, and consists of a corridor fifteen feet wide, and three hundred yards long, with eleven extensions from its east side, four of which are two story. Seven of these extensions can be used as wards and if the second stories of four of them are used there is a potential total of eleven wards, each of which will accommodate thirty-two beds or a total of three hundred fifty-two patients. There are nine barrack-style buildings in the area each of which could accommodate seventy-five patients. Four of these barracks are used to quarter officers and men attached to the hospital, leaving available five buildings for wards. Then the potential capacity of the hospital is in excess of seven hundred twenty-seven beds. The remaining four extensions from the corridor are used for galley, mess hall, recreation hall and operating rooms.


3. There are adequate and secure warehouses for storage of all materials and equipment.

4. Military Government has furnished abundant Japanese labor to police hospital and grounds, which were extremely filthy and unsanitary on original occupation.

5. Water is made potable by a concentration of eight parts of chlorine per million of water, measured daily at representative spigots.

6. Sewage is carried away by Japanese farmers twice weekly.

(9) Conclusion

1. The following is a tabulation of admissions and dispositions of patients and a summary of collateral technical work at this hospital to date.

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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Dispositions</td>
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257

(9)
### Appendix III (A) To Appendix (B) Corps Evacuation Hospital 
No. Patients Admitted: 4, 14, 92, 1, 0, 111
Highest Census: 137 Patients: 10 November 1945.

#### Number of X-rays
- Clinical: 339
- Dental: 97

#### Dental Procedures
- Patients treated: 148
- Sittings: 235

#### Laboratory Procedures
- Hematology: 364
- Kahn Tests: 1388
- Urinalysis: 311
- Bacteriological: 466
- Gastric analyses: 15
- Autopsies: 2

#### Anaesthesia
- 85

2. Considering the number of patients turned over at this hospital and the existence of an army hospital at Naksu, an army hospital at Nagasaki, an army holding hospital at Usaka, a second Marine Division hospital at Nagasaki, all within a forty mile radius of Isaya, and the complete and efficient medical facilities of the Eighth Regiment, within three miles of this area, it is not considered that the continued operation of this hospital is justified.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FM
IN THE FIELD.

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1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX TO APPENDIX B

ORDNANCE REPORT

1. UNPLANNED ACTIVITIES FOR THE OCCUPATION

a. Upon commencement of the planning phase for
the occupation of Japanese areas, we immediately instituted to
provide for the detention thirty (30) days ordnance supplies
and three (3) units of fire per weapon for mounting out. To
accomplish the above, supplies and ammunition as required
were drawn from the supply agency and assembled in the steag-
ing area. At the staging area all ammunition was separated
into regimental combat team units of fire to facilitate com-
batt loading of ships. Depolarized ordnance supplies of all units were filled in order that all organizations
would embark with the proper quantities of ordnance items in
their possession.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. The Ordnance Company was formed into five
(5) platoons of which three (3) were attached to regimental
combat teams and one attached to the Tank Battalion, while
the Headquarters Platoon remained under the operational con-
trol of the Service Battalion. Each platoon attached to a
regimental combat team and Tank Battalion was composed of
two (2) commissioned or warrant officers, ordnance special-
ists from each repair section, and ammunition personnel. The
Headquarters Platoon consisted of the remainder of the com-
pany officers, the company headquarters, and the supply sec-
tion.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

a. Immediately after arriving in Nagasaki seven
(7) groups each consisting of one (1) commissioned or
warrant officer and three (3) enlisted men, were organized
to inspect and disarm all guns in position in the Nagasaki
area reported by the Japanese. Three (3) centrally located
points with the best storage facilities were chosen for con-
solidating and storing the Japanese matériel. The
Japanese Army and Navy brought all small arms, all field guns,
and all ammunition to these three points, as directed by Divi-
sion Headquarters. Inspection of ordnance equipment were
made to segregate any articles needed for technical research

- 1 -

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purposes. The destruction of all remaining ordnance material commenced on 27 October 1945. Ammunition is being dumped at sea by Chinese laborers supervised by Marines. Large weapons and other ordnance items are being destroyed by burning, crushing, and cutting with acetylene torches.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, JAP,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX IV. ANNEX (E)

ORDNANCE REPORT

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

a. Upon commencement of the planning phase for
the occupation of Japan plans were immediately instituted to
provide for the division thirty (30) days ordnance supplies
and three (3) units of fire per weapon for mounting out. To
accomplish the above, supplies and ammunition as required
were drawn from the supply agency and assembled in the staging
area. At the staging area all ammunition was separated
into regimental combat team units of fire to facilitate com-
bat loading of ships. Depleted allowances of ordnance suppl-
ies of all units were filled in order that all organizations
would embark with the proper quantities of ordnance items in
their possession.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. The Ordnance Company was formed into five
(5) platoons of which three (3) were attached to regimental
combat teams and one attached to the Tank Battalion, while
the Headquarters Platoon remained under the operational con-
trol of the Service Battalion. Each platoon attached to a
regimental combat team and Tank Battalion was composed of
two (2) commissioned or warrant officers, ordnance special-
ists from each repair section, and ammunition personnel. The
Headquarters Platoon consisted of the remainder of the com-
pany officers, the company headquarters, and the supply sec-
tion.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

a. Immediately after arriving in Nagasaki sev-
en (7) groups each consisting of one (1) commissioned or
warrant officer and three (3) enlisted men, were organized
to inspect and disarm all guns in position in the Nagasaki
area reported by the Japanese. Three (3) centrally located
points with the best storage facilities were chosen for con-
solidating and storing surrender red Japanese matériel. The
Japanese Army and Navy brought all small arms, all field guns,
and all ammunition to these three points, as directed by Divi-
sion Headquarters. Inspection of ordnance equipment was
made to segregate any articles needed for technical research
purposes. The destruction of all remaining ordnance materiel commenced on 27 October 1945. Ammunition is being dumped at sea by Japanese laborers supervised by Marines. Large weapons and other ordnance items are being destroyed by burning, crushing, and cutting with acetylene torches.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None.
SECOND AMERICAN DIVISION, FIFTH ARMY, IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VI TO APPENDIX (E)

DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS MILITARY AND EQUITABLE WT REPORT.

Enclosures:  
(A) Organization Chart.  
(B) Accomplishment Report.

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION.

a. The Division Disposition Section was activated, on 25 October, 1945. No planning for the invasion or occupation of Japan, with regard to captured or surrendered equipment and supplies, was contemplated prior to the date of activation of this section.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION.

a. Upon receipt of V Amphibious Corps Administrative Order Number 13-45 on 22 October, 1945 the organization of a disposition system within the Division was initiated. In general the plan called for a Disposition Section in Division Headquarters and in each Regimental Headquarters. The Division Disposition Officer in addition to exercising his staff functions as a representative of the Commanding General in matters concerning the disposition of captured and surrendered material throughout the Division area, is charged directly with the disposition of material within Division Headquarters area (Nagasaki City and peninsulas North and South).

b. Each Disposition Officer has under him a varying number of "Depot Control Groups" each of which is directly in charge of processing the material in dumps or installations assigned it and of keeping the basic records from which weekly reports to V Amphibious Corps are compiled and consolidated successively by the Regimental and Division Disposition Officers.

c. The composition and area of responsibility of each Depot Control Group varies according to the material and extent of installations assigned and accumulations of material to be processed.
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EXHIBIT V TO ANNEX (J) - DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS MILITARY AND EQUIMENT IN CHARGE (Cont'd)

3. OCCUPATION OPERATIONS.

a Records are kept of all Japanese material passing through the disposition system. In general the accounting system is as follows:

Inventory submitted by the Japanese are checked against intelligence reports and are entered as debit vouchers in the records of the Depot Control Group concerned, subject to later physical inventory. A set of stock cards is prepared for each depot or installation and vouchers are posted to these cards. The material is disposed of, credit vouchers are entered against the inventories and on the stock records cards. Weekly reports of accomplishment covering Japanese Army, Navy, Army Air Force and Army Air Force in the classifications of ordnance, engineer, medical, QM, Signal and Transportation are prepared by each Depot Control Group and consolidated successively by regimental and division disposition officers and a report which is forwarded to commanding general, Amphibious Corps each Saturday. This report gives an accumulative total of material received and disposed of from the commencement of operations up to the date of the report.

b Material is disposed of by:

(1) Destruction or scrapping (D or S)
(2) Use by own forces (O)
(3) Return to Japanese (J)
(4) Use for relief of civilian population (C)
(5) Shipment to U.S. as war trophies (W T)
(6) Shipment to U.S. for training purposes (T)
(7) Issued to individuals as war trophies (I T)

Destruction or scrapping is done by Japanese under marine supervision. Weapons and material useful only for war purposes are reduced to scrap by the use of explosives, sledge hammers or cutting torches. Mobile weapons and equipment are destroyed in place and the resultant scrap is turned over to authorized representatives of the Japanese home ministry against receipts in triplicate. Mobile and portable weapons and equipment are similarly processed at central locations and explosives and ammunition are detonated, burned or dumped at sea from Japanese barges.
the latter being the preferred method. Material to be used by our forces is issued by Depot Control Groups to authorized representatives of organizations upon application.

(b) Material returned to Japanese is issued to authorized representatives of the Japanese Home Ministry. Physical inventory of this material is not made except to see that it is not material useful primarily for war purposes, or desirable for our own use, the original Japanese inventory being accepted for this purpose, with proper deductions being made for other disposition.

(c) Material to be used for relief of civilians is handled in the same manner as material being issued to own organizations except that authorized representatives of the Military Government receipt for it.

(d) Shipment to U.S. for war trophies and training use are self-explanatory.

(e) Small items are issued as war trophies to individuals returning to the U.S. under current directives.

4. Comments and recommendations.

a. No difficulty has been experienced in obtaining the prompt obedience of the Japanese authorities to directions for disposing of material or in obtaining receipts from the representatives of the Home Ministry for material returned to the Japanese.

b. Japanese inventories submitted to this office have been found to be correct in almost every instance. However, some confusion has developed over nomenclature and units of measure due to language difficulties. This might have been obviated had the Japanese originally been furnished with forms prepared by our forces on which to enter their inventories.

c. The rapid demobilization of Japanese forces has made it difficult for them to collect all material as Japanese military and naval authorities, having few troops under their control, must obtain labor from civilian sources.
d The densely populated nature of the country has made the use of explosives in destroying fixed installations somewhat hazardous, however, the cooperation of the Japanese police has made it easy to remove inhabitants to a safe distance while demolition is in progress.

e It is believed that certain procedures laid down by higher authority for the destruction of material are unnecessarily laborious. Much of the material encountered is extremely massive and is also obsolete. In such cases complete reduction to scrap seems to be warranted as serious damage to the equipment would serve the same purpose.
ENCLOSURE "A" TO APPENDIX V ANNEX EASY

Division Disposition Officer
Lt. Col.

Headquarters section
2Lt. Col., 4 Clerks
1 Lt., 2 Drivers

Nagasaki Depot Control Group

Nagaura Depot Control Group

Mobile Depot Control Group "A"

Mobile Depot Control Group "B"

Disposition Officer
10th Marines
Ishihara (Major)

Depot Control Group Omaura

Depot Control Group Ishihara
Air Base

Depot Control Group Ishihaya
Naval Barracks

Disposition Officer
4th Marines, Nagaoka (inactive) Lt.

Disposition Officer
6th Marines, Kumamoto
Major

Depot Control Group Kure

Depot Control Group Miyakonojo

Depot Control Group Miyazaki

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APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (B) DISPOSITION OF SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

JAP. ARMY

2ND MARINE DIVISION

So. KYUSHU Area

From 2409 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Dec 1945

Class ORDNANCE

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>RECEIVED DURING THIS PERIOD</th>
<th>Accumulative Total (to include period of this Report)</th>
<th>Balance On Hand</th>
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CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (B) DISPOSITION OF SURVIVED MATERIAl EQUIPMENT
REPORT (Cont'd).

JAP ARMY

2ND MARINE DIVISION

So. KYUSHU Area

From 2100 24 Nov 1945 to 2100 1 Dec 1945.

Class ORDNANCE

(Note: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ITEMS TO BE USED FOR REPORT REQUIRED BY PAT. 10
ADM O 11/2, Parts 3 & 4, Attachment 4, ADM O 11/2
254 rescinded.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (E) DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS INSTRUMENT AND EQUIPMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).**

**JAPANESE ARMY**

**2ND MARINE DIVISION**

So. KYUSHU Area

From 24th Nov 1945 to 24th Dec 1945.

**Class: ENGINEER**

(Note: CONSOLIDATED LIST

OF ITEMS TO BE USED FOR

REPORT REQUIRED BY PAT.

Ltr. ADDN 04/21, Parts 3 & 4

Attachment 4, dm 0 19/2

are rescinded.)

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**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**APENDIX V TO APPX (E) DISPOSITION OF SUBMISSION MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT DEP'T. (Cont'd).**

**JAI ARMY**

**2ND MARINE DIVISION**

St. YUSHU Area

From 24 Nov. 1 Dec. 1945.

**Close QUARTERMASTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>RECEIVED DURING THIS PERIOD</th>
<th>ACCUMULATIVE TOTAL (to include period of this report)</th>
<th>DISPOSAL OF ITEM</th>
<th>METHOD OF DISPOSAL</th>
<th>BALANCE ON HAND</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Blankets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>2675</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>334</td>
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<td>2 Clothing: Gloves</td>
<td>Pair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Underclothing</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>334</td>
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</tr>
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<td>b. Uniforms</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>344</td>
<td></td>
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<td>c. Shoes</td>
<td>Pair</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>RJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Raincoats</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>700</td>
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<td>e. Overcoats</td>
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<td>130</td>
<td>RJ</td>
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<td>f. Socks</td>
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<td>106</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>g. Caps</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>RJ</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4 Fuel:</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>b. Gasoline</td>
<td>Drum</td>
<td>3669</td>
<td>3669</td>
<td>RJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Oil</td>
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<td>5 Helmet, steel</td>
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<td>553</td>
<td>553</td>
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<td>553</td>
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<td>6 Individual &amp; Organizational Equipment</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>7 Nations</td>
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<td>3675</td>
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<td>Case</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Cereal - Rice</td>
<td>Pkr</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>20000</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Fish &amp; Meat</td>
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<td>63250</td>
<td>RJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Tea</td>
<td>lbs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Vegetables</td>
<td>Ctn</td>
<td>72000</td>
<td>72000</td>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>72000</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Machines, ice cream all sizes</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Machines, ice making</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mechanical Refrigeration, 220 cu ft &amp; under</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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(Signature)

Page 9

Page 272
### Appendix V to Annex (E) Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment (Cont'd).

#### 2nd Marine Division

From 24 Oct 1945 to 24 Nov 1945.

Class SIGNAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
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<th>Accumulative Totals (to include period of this Report)</th>
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<tr>
<td>3 Cable, rubber or fabric</td>
<td>lugs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>covered</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cable, lead covered</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>6 Cameras, motion picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Camera accessories</td>
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<td>8 Parts, communication</td>
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<td>1301</td>
<td>1322</td>
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<tr>
<td>apparatus</td>
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<td>9 Photo supplies</td>
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<td>10 Public address sets</td>
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<td>16 Switchboards telephone,</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17 Telegraph sets</td>
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<td>18 Teletype sets</td>
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<td>21 Telephone, linesmen</td>
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<td>203</td>
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<td>26 Wire, bare telephone</td>
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<td>28 PADAR</td>
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"CONFIDENTIAL"

"DECLASSIFIED"

Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012
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<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<td>4704</td>
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<td>241</td>
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<td>14. Training aids</td>
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Accumulative Totals (to include period of this report).

Balance on Hand.
APPENDIX V TO APPENDIX (E)  DISPOSITION OF SUPPLANTED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT  REPOUT. (Cont'd).

JAP AMY  
2ND MARINE DIVISION  
So. KYUSHU Area  
From 2400 24Nov 1945 to 2400 1Dec 1945.

Class  TRANSPORTATION

(Note: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ITEMS TO BE USED FOR REPOUT REQUESTED BY IAF 10  
ADM C 19/2, Pars 3 & 4  
Attachment 4, ADM 3 19/2  
are rescinded)

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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<td>Small Posts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landing Craft 40'</td>
<td>Each</td>
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Accumulative Totals (to include period of this report, Balance on Hand

Received  
Dispensed  
Method of Disposition

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\[\text{CONFIDENTIAL}\]
APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (E) DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIAL EQUIPMENT

JAP ARMY
2ND MARINE DIVISION
So. KYUSHU Area
From 24NOV 1545 to 24DEC 1945.

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<th>Balance on Hand</th>
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<tr>
<td>2 Quinine &amp; derivatives</td>
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<td>3 Bismuth items</td>
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<td>8 Surgical appliances, non-electrical</td>
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</tr>
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<td>12 Dental equipment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sheets</td>
<td>lbs</td>
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<td>18 Pillow or sea</td>
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<td>20 Divisional Field Medical Unit, Equipment</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
### APPENDIX V TO APPX (E) DISPOSITION OF SUPPLEMENTED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

**JAP ARMY AIR FORCE**  
2ND MARINE DIVISION  
**So. KYUSHU Area**  
From 2400 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Dec 1945.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class ORDANCE</th>
<th>RECEIVED DURING THIS Report (2)</th>
<th>Accumulative Total (to include period of this Report) (4)</th>
<th>Method of Disposition (5)</th>
<th>Balance on Hand (6)</th>
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277
### APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (B)  DISPOSITION OF SUPPLIED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

#### 2ND MARINE DIVISION

**JAP ARMY AIR FORCE**

2nd Marine Division

From 2400 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Dec 1945.

**Class**  ENGINEER

(Note: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ITEMS TO BE USED FOR REPORT

**EQUIPMENT BY P.T. Lc. ADM 0 15/2. Fers 3 & 4 Attach-**

-ment 4, Adm 0 15/2 are re- scinded)

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</tr>
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<td>3 Machine Tools</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Electric Equipment</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Construction &amp; Engineer Equipment</td>
<td>Each</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Welding Equipment</td>
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<td>7 Profiling Material</td>
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<td>8 Lumber</td>
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<td>11 Steel</td>
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<td>12 Explosives &amp; Demolitions</td>
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<td>13 Water purification Chemicals</td>
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<td>14 Deck Hardware</td>
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<td>15 Camouflage and Fortification material</td>
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<td>18 Special Engineer Equipment</td>
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<td>19 Miscellaneous Equipment and supplies</td>
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**Balance on Hand**
# ATTACHMENT V TO APPENDIX F

## DISPOSITION OF SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT DETECTED (Cont'd).

**JAPANESE AIR FORCE**

**2nd Marine Division**

**area: Kyushu**

**From 2100 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Dec 1945.**

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<td>28 (Additional items as desired)</td>
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Army AIR Force**

**2nd Marine Division**

From 2400 28Nov 1945 to 2400 1Dec 1945.

**Class**: Transportation

(Note: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ITEMS TO BE USED FOR UNIT REQUIREMENTS DURING THIS PERIOD. Accumulative Total (to include period of this Report). Balance on Hand.)

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<th>(4)</th>
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- 14 -

**CONFIDENTIAL**

281
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Note: Consolidated

End of Table

Class: CONFIDENTIAL
**APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (E) DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).**

**JAP NAVY**

**2nd MT'TN DIVISION**

From 2400 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Dec 1945.

Class: ENGINEERS

(Note: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ITEMS TO BE USED FOR REPORT REQUIRED BY PAT. 16, ADM 0 19/2. Para 3 & 4, Attachment 4, ADM 0 19/2 are rescinded.)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>(2) RECOV'D DURING REPORT</th>
<th>(3) ACCUMULATIVE TOTAL</th>
<th>(4) TO INCLUDE PERIOD OF THIS REPORT</th>
<th>(5) BALANCE ON HAND</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>8 Lumber</td>
<td>EM</td>
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<td>Tons</td>
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<td>150500</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>15 Camouflage and Fortification material</td>
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<td>16 Paint</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<th>Accumulative Total (to include period of this report)</th>
<th>Balance on Hand</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Under Clothing</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Uniforms</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Shoes</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Raincoats</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Overcoats</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Socks</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Caps</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Flag, battle</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Coal</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Gasoline</td>
<td>Drum</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Grease</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Oil</td>
<td>Drum</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Helmet, steel</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Individual &amp; organizational</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>WMT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Factions</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Tea</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Beer</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Cereal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Fish &amp; Meat</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Fats</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Vegetables</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Machin a, ice cream</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>all sizes</td>
<td>Each</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Machines, ice making</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-ton cap &amp; under</td>
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<td>9 Mechanical Refrig.</td>
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<td>10 Electrical Kitchen</td>
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<tr>
<td>equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Misc Camp And</td>
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<td>Barracks Equipment</td>
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## APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (E) DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT REPORTS (Cont'd)

### JAP NAVY

**Sr. KYUSHU Area**

**2ND MARINE DIVISION**

From 2400 - 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Dec 1945

Class SIGNAL

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<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>Accumulative Total (to include period of this Report)</th>
<th>Balance on Hand</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Batteries, dry</td>
<td>lb</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Batteries, wet</td>
<td>lb</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>646-0; 35-RW</td>
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<td>3 Cable, rubber or fabric covered</td>
<td>lb</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cable, lead covered</td>
<td>lb</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>1500</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Cameras, still</td>
<td>ea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2-0; 4-D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Cameras, motion picture</td>
<td>ea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2-0; 4-D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Camera accessories</td>
<td>lb</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Parts, communication apparatus</td>
<td>lb</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>75-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Photo supplies</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>75-0</td>
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<td>11 Radio receivers</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>12 Radio sets</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>13 Radio transmitters</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Recording apparatus</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Switchboards telephone, field</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Switchboards telephone, commercial</td>
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<td>17 Telegraph sets</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>18 Teletype sets</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Telephone, common battery</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Telephone, field</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Telephone, lineman</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Test sets, instruments</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Tools &amp; tool sets</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>24 Visual signalling sets</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Wire, insulated, filled</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>26 Wire, bare telephone</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>27 Wire laying apparatus</td>
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Total: 23
### DISPOSITION OF SUPPRESSED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT REPORT (Cont'd)

**2ND MARINE DIVISION**  
So. PELELIU Area

Class: CHEMICAL

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<td>2 Gas Masks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Gas mask accessories</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Screening smoke candles</td>
<td>Each</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Tear Gas Candles</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Vomiting Gas Candles</td>
<td>Each</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Shells, chemical filling</td>
<td>Sds.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Grenades, chemical filling</td>
<td>Each</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Army Bombs, chemical filling</td>
<td>Each</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Weapons</td>
<td>Each</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Decontamination Agents</td>
<td>Tons</td>
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<td>12 Protective Clothing</td>
<td>Suit</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Detector kits</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
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<td>14 Training aids</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Miscellaneous</td>
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**FROM 2400 24 Nov 1945 TO 2400 Dec 1945**
**APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (E) DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT REPORTS (Cont'd)**

**JAP NAVY**

**2ND MARINE DIVISION**

From 24N v1945 to 24N 1Dec1945

So. KYUSHU Area

**Class TRANSPORTATION**

(Nota: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ITEMS TO BE USED FOR REPORT REQUIRES BY PAR. 1, ADM 6 19/2, Para 3 and 4 Attachment 4, A'm 0 19/2 are rescinded)

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<th>Balance (5)</th>
<th>Disposal Method (6)</th>
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<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>D</td>
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<td>Motor Boats</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landing Barges</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Row Boat</td>
<td>ea</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutters</td>
<td>ea</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under Water Transport Craft 65</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Folding Boat</td>
<td>ea</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outboard Engines</td>
<td>ea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacements Parts</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>For submarine Vessel (1260</td>
<td>ton</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1260 ten Coast Defense Vessel,</td>
<td>ea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demilitarized and immovable in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaokaki Harbor).</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

- 26 -
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (E) DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).**

JAP NAVY  
So. KYUSHU Area  
2ND MARINE DIVISION  
From 2400 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Dec 1945.  
Class MEDICAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
<th>UNIT (2)</th>
<th>RECEIVED DURING THIS REPORT</th>
<th>Accumulative Total (to includes period of this Report)</th>
<th>Balance on Hand</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RECEIVED</td>
<td>DISPOSED</td>
<td>METHOD OF DISPOSITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Narcotics</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Quinine &amp; derivatives</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mammuth Items</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Drugs (all others)</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Dressings</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Surgical instruments</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Surgical Appliances</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Electrical</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Surgical Appliances</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Laboratory Equipment</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Laboratory glassware</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dental instruments</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dental Equipment</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Radiographic equipment</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Hospital Beds</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Hospital Cabinets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Blankets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sheets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Pillow Cases</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Towels</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Divisional Field Medical Unit, Equipment</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Gold Items</td>
<td>lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Platinum Items</td>
<td>lbs</td>
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*1 Narcotics
### Appendix V to Annex (E) Disposition of Submarine Material and Equipment U. OT. (Cont'd)

**JAP NAVY AIR FORCE**

**2nd Marine Division**

Class **ORANGE**

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
<th>Unit (2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>444</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>46</td>
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<td>47</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>212</td>
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</tr>
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<td>55</td>
<td>Tons</td>
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---

So. KYUSHU Area

From 2400 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Dec 1945.

---

(Note: Consolidated list of items to be used for inventory purposes by Jan. 10, 1946, and 15/2. Items 3 & 4 attached, 46 & 49/2 were recorded.)
### APPENDIX Y TO APPENDIX X

**DESTRUCTION OF SURPLUS MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT**

JAP NAVY AIR FORCES

2ND MARINE DIVISION

So. HYUGI Area

From 2400 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Feb 1946.

Class ENGINEER

(Note: Consolidated list of items to be used for report.

10th Engineer Detachment, IADG, 19/2, Apps 3 

Attachment 1, IADG 19/2 are included.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>RECEIVED (2)</th>
<th>SHIP CH GDP REPORT</th>
<th>Accumulative Total (to include period of this report)</th>
<th>Position of Disposal</th>
<th>Palance en Hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Standard Hardware</td>
<td>Tons 4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.75</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Simple tools</td>
<td>Tons 4</td>
<td>102.5</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>325</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Machine tools</td>
<td>Each 26</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>730</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Electric Equipment</td>
<td>Tons 13</td>
<td>237.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Construction and Engineer Equipment</td>
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<td>124</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>680</td>
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<td>6. Welding Equipment</td>
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<td>12.75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.75</td>
<td>12.75</td>
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<td>7. Roofing Material</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Timber</td>
<td>FBM 2120</td>
<td>54120</td>
<td>35800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15800</td>
<td>15800</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Cement</td>
<td>Tons 50</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Asphalt</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Steel</td>
<td>Tons 575</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>575</td>
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<td>12. Explosive &amp; Demolition</td>
<td>Lbs 2000</td>
<td>20400</td>
<td>20400</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Water purification Chemicals</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Tool Hardware</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Consumable &amp; Fortification material</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Paint</td>
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<td>37153</td>
<td>16680</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>83</td>
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<td>17. Engineer spare parts</td>
<td>Tons 83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Special Engineer Equip.</td>
<td>Each 10</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>19. Miscellaneous Equipment and Supplies</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metal Foundry Equip</td>
<td>Tons 49</td>
<td>49</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (IV) DISPOSITION OF SUPPLANTED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

JAP NAVY AIR FORCE
2ND MARINE DIVISION

So. FYUSHU Area
From 2400 24Nov 1945 to 2400 1Dec 1945.

CLASS QUANTITATIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>WGT</th>
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<th>(6)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Flannels</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>146</td>
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<td>2 Clothing:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Underclothing</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Uniforms</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Shoes</td>
<td>Pair</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Raincoats</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>143.5</td>
<td>143.5</td>
<td>143.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Overcoats</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Hoods</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Fuel:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Coal</td>
<td>Ton</td>
<td>24250</td>
<td>24250</td>
<td>24250</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Gasoline</td>
<td>Drum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Grease</td>
<td>Drum</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Oil</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Individual &amp; Organizational Equipment:</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Beans</td>
<td>Lb</td>
<td>24250</td>
<td>24250</td>
<td>24250</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Flour</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Cereal</td>
<td>Pkg</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Fish &amp; Meat</td>
<td>Lb</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Tea</td>
<td>Lb</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Machines, ice cream all sizes</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Machines, ice making 3-ton cap &amp; under</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mechanical Refrigr. 243 cu ft &amp; under</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Electrical kitchen equipment</td>
<td>Pes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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## Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment Report (Cont'd).

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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<td>1 Batteries, Dry</td>
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<td>2 Batteries, wet</td>
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<td>5700</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>2409</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Cable, rubber or fabric</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cable, lead covered</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31774</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Cameras, still</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Cameras, motion picture</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>1150</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Camera accessories</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Parts, communication</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4513</td>
<td>1500</td>
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<td>3018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Photo supplies</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Public address sets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Radio Receivers</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Radio sets</td>
<td>Each</td>
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<td>504</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Radio transmitters</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Recording apparatus</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Switchboards telephone</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Switchboards telephone,</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Telecrocch sets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Teletype sets</td>
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<td>202</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Telephone, common battery</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Telephone, field</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Telephone, lineansms</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Test sets, instruments</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Visual signalling sets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>2336</td>
<td>2336</td>
<td>2336</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 2336

---

**Note:** The total accumulative volume of material disposed of is 2336 units.
### APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (E) DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT REPORT. (Cont'd)

**JAP NAVY AIR FORCE**  
**2ND MARING DIVISION**  
**Class CHEMICAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Received During Period</th>
<th>Accumulative Total (to include period of this report)</th>
<th>Balance on Hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td>Disposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bulb Toxics</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gas Masks</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gas Mask Accessories</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Screening Smoke Cables</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tear Gas Candles</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Vomiting Gas Candles</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Shells, Chemical</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Grenades, chemical</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Army Bombs, chemical</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Decontamination Agents</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Protective Clothing</td>
<td>Suit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Detector Kits</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Training aids</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>By Item</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*So. KYUSHU Area*  
*From 24O0 24Nov45 to 24O0 1Dec45.*
### APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (E) DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT REPORT (Cont'd)

**JAP NAVY AIR FORCE**

So. KYUSHU Area

2ND MARINE DIVISION

Class TRANSPORTATION

From 24NOV1945 to 24DEC1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
<th>Unit (2)</th>
<th>RECEIVED DURING PERIOD THIS REPORT</th>
<th>accumulative Total (to include period of this Report)</th>
<th>Balance on Hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Engines</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tires, Automobile</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tires, airplane</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>3796</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats, Rubber, Collaps</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliders</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane Replacement Parts.</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, Gas Tank</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Pack, airplane service, 400 tons, twin screw, Fair and slightly damaged. Engine imperfect. each 1

---

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APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (E) DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT REPORTS (Cont'd)

JAP NAVY AIR FORCE  
2ND MARINE DIVISION  
From 2400 24 Nov 1945 to 2400 1 Dec 1945

### Class MEDICAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS (1)</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Received DURING PERIOD THIS REPORT</th>
<th>Received Disposal of Method of Disposition</th>
<th>Balance on Hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Narcotics</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Opioids &amp; derivatives</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Alkali items</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Drugs (all others)</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Dressings</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Surgical instr</td>
<td>Pcs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Surgical applicances electrical</td>
<td>Pcs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Surgical applicances non-electrical</td>
<td>Pcs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Laboratory equip't</td>
<td>Pcs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Laboratory glassware</td>
<td>Pcs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Dental instruments</td>
<td>Pcs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dental equipment</td>
<td>Pcs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Radiographic equip (give type)</td>
<td>Pcs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Hospital beds</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Hospital cabinets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Blankets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sheets</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Tissue cases</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Towels</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Divisional Field Medical Unit Equip</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Platinum items</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Gold items</td>
<td>Lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(*) 1 Narcotics,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Procain Hydrochlo-</td>
<td>Cs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Glucose</td>
<td>Cs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Optimum Alkaloid, acetylaine</td>
<td>Cs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Cocain Hypochlor-ides</td>
<td>Rs</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Opium Alkaloid</td>
<td>Cs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus: Stretcher, Bamboo</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF, 
IN THE FIELD.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX (E)

PROCUREMENT REPORT

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

   a. Administrative Order #58-45, dated 15 September, 1945, Annex (H), Area and Facilities Allocation Plan, provided for the procurement and assignment of various areas, buildings, storage spaces, port facilities, utilities and other facilities.

   b. Division Special Order #106-45, dated 24 September, 1945, established the Second Marine Division Area Allocation and Facilities Board.

   c. Administrative Order #58-45, dated 8 October, 1945, Annex (H)(Revised) provided for the establishment of the Second Marine Division Procurement Section to handle the procurement of Japanese supplies, real estate, equipment and facilities.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

   a. The Procurement Board was formed 24 September, 1945. The C-4 was the chairman of the board and coordinated the procurement for all the Division. The members of the board were the Division Signal Officer, Engineer Officer and Medical Officer. The board passed on all requisitions.

   b. Because of the absence of Military and Naval establishments in and around Nagasaki all buildings and materials had to be requisitioned from the civilian government. The volume of requisitions was so large that a secretary was added to the board on 1 October, 1945.

   c. The organization of the Procurement Section as set forth in Annex (H)(Revised) provided for a Lieutenant Colonel as Chief of Section, a Major as Executive Officer, a Captain in charge of the Real Estate and Construction Subsection, a Captain in charge of the Supply Subsection, an Administrative Subsection and a Transportation Subsection.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

   a. A monetary value of approximately $40,000.00 was established by the Procurement Section on 31 October, 1945 for all supplies and rentals procured by the Division from initial occupation up to that date.

OVER
APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX (E) — PROCUREMENT REPORT. (Cont'd)

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. None
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF, IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (E)

AUTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

a. Planning - In a diversity of probable types of employment of motor transport within a combat or occupation mission, it was the plan of this division to attach one (1) platoon of a Truck Company, Motor Transport Battalion to each Regimental Combat Team, for assistance in manning regimental supply trains. The remainder of Motor Transport Battalion cargo vehicles were to form a motor pool for the division supply train. This pool was to be supplemented, the tactical situation permitting, by organic 24-ton cargo vehicles of other units within the division. During the ash-to-shore phase, all vehicles were to be placed under the control of the Division Shore Party Commander; upon completion of this phase organic vehicles would return to unit control, and vehicles comprising the Division Motor Pool would be returned to the control of the Commanding Officer, Motor Transport Battalion, under whose supervision such pool would be maintained and operated. Each Shore Party Group was to be furnished, from MTbn., a liaison officer who would lend with Group Headquarters and assist the Groups Commander in the control and employment of transportation. Maintenance (3rd echelon and limited 4th echelon) would be provided for by attaching an Automotive Repair Platoon from Automotive Repair Company, Motor Transport Battalion, to each Regimental Combat Team. The remainder of the Automotive Repair Company would perform 3rd and 4th echelon repairs on all Division vehicles, less those organically part of an MT.

b. Preparation - In accordance with directives from higher echelon, all vehicles of this division were prepared for deep-water fording, insofar as kits, therefore, were available. Difficulty was experienced with the type of fording kit furnished (MV-3-A) and after testing, it was decided not to use these kits as they rendered vehicles incapable by causing undue condensation on electrical parts and resultant "Shorting-out". In addition, normal engine temperatures were found to melt the asbestos compound contained in these kits. All motor transport of this division was in "combat condition" prior to embarkation, despite the fact that some vehicles of the Second Motor Transport Battalion were used, literally, to the day of embarkation. Volatility of this division makes mandatory a ten per cent daily preventive maintenance "deadline", in addition to normal mechanical deadlines - a fact which contributed greatly to...
APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX (E) (Cont'd)

the "up-to-the-minute" readiness of its Motor Transport.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. Training - All unit training directly encompassed comprehensive driver-training schedules, with emphasis on maintenance personnel. Training was conducted by all organizations within the division that were charge with maintenance responsibility of 3rd echelon, or above. Practically, up until the cessation of hostilities very little training of maintenance specialists was required, inasmuch as selective-service personnel were being received as replacements, who were highly skilled in their particular specialties, prior to induction. In cases of personnel whose abilities and previous experience classified them as "helpers," they were apprenticed to more highly skilled men and, eventually, were developed into thoroughly competent personnel in the specialty for which they were trained.

At the present time, discharges have created an acute shortage of skilled maintenance personnel, and due to volume of work to be performed and shortage of personnel, it is virtually impossible to institute any comprehensive training program designed to qualify the almost totally unskilled personnel being received as replacements.

b. Organization - On 30 July, 1945, the Second Motor Transport Battalion was ordered organized in accordance with the "G" Tables of Organization. The increase of total personnel (approximately 62%) over the "F" T/O, was to be supplied, principally, by transfers from other organizations within the Division. Approximately 62% of this increase is made up by authorization of additional maintenance personnel; the other 38%, consisting of drivers and administrative personnel, was authorized by the authorization of an additional truck company. Overall, a Marine Division, under the "G" T/O, is authorized an increase of automotive maintenance personnel (excluding drivers & mechanics ) of about 27% over the "F" T/O. In view of the above reorganization, it was assumed that the Motor Transport Battalion was to assume responsibility for all 3rd echelon repair, and accordingly, as reflected in task organizations for the assault on the occupation of Japan, one (1) Automotive Repair Platoon of Automotive Repair Company, Second Motor Transport Battalion, was attached to each RCT, in addition to one (1) platoon of a truck company. The foregoing organization is in effect as the present time, except that each RCT now has attached to it an entire truck company of Second Motor Transport Battalion, leaving one (1) truck company for the Division Motor Pool.

-2-
APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX (E)

3. OCCUPATION OPERATIONS

a. On 23 and 24 September, 1945, personnel and vehicles of the Second Motor Transport Battalion were landed at Nagasaki, and immediately commenced unloading operations. Companies "A", "B", and "C", thereof, were engaged in debarkation operations of RCT-6, RCT-8, and RCT-2, respectively. On 25 September, "D" Company plus 3½-ton cargo and dump vehicles from Second Tank Battalion 3076th Army Eng. Dump Truck Company, Second Engineer Battalion, Second Pioneer Battalion, and 10th Marines, formed a 126 truck pool which was placed at the disposal of the Division Shore Party Commander, and was operated under the immediate supervision of the Commanding Officer, 2d MTBn.

b. Ship unloading operations were substantially completed by 1 October, and control of the Division Motor Pool reverted to the Commanding Officer, 2d MTBn. Considerable difficulty was experienced in locating suitable truck parks and dispatching facilities, and it is felt that an advance reconnaissance by the Division Motor Transport Officer, along with a representative of the Shore Party Commander, would have been of inestimable help in this respect. During the unloading period and average deadline of 103 was experienced. The work was encountered to a greater than normal degree, due to debris-littered roads and the resultant "picking-up" of nails and metal fragments. During the first two weeks of operations, approximately 6000 "hot-patches" had been used, as a result of the foregoing conditions. On this basis, an initial supply of 6000 patches is recommended for similar operations.

c. As previously indicated, the Army Eng. "A" Dump Truck Company, the 3076th, was placed under the operational control of the Commanding Officer, 2d MTBn. This organization joined Division on 23 September, 1945, and had an approximate complement of 4 officers, 104 enlisted, and 28 operative vehicles (Dump Trucks). The 3076th Eng. Dump Truck Co. was detached as of 10 October, 1945. On 29 September, 1945, the Division Motor Pool was further supplemented by the joining of the 3658th Army Quartermaster Truck Co., with a complement of 5 officers, 117 enlisted, and 43 operative 2½-ton cargo trucks.

d. As of 1 November, 1945, due to the fact that the Second Marine Division had been given the responsibility of operating the port of Nagasaki, a "ship Unloading" motor pool was ordered formed, under the direction of the Commanding Officer, 2d MTBn. The complement of this pool follows:
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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX (E) (Cont'd).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>2½-ton</th>
<th>CARGO TRUCKS</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3656 Army QM Truck Co.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Tank Bn.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Marines</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maintenance responsibility, for the aforementioned pool, has been assumed by 2d MTBn.

a. Generally speaking, operational and maintenance facilities, at the present time, are as complete as personnel limitations will permit. Adequate motor vehicle replacement part stocks are present, and due to a resupply shipment recently received, (30 October, 1943), it has been possible to effect replacement of unserviceable vehicles.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Personnel - It is the belief of the undersigned that the "Q" T/O provides adequate personnel for proper manning and maintaining of motor transport equipment within a Marine Division provided that actual strength can be maintained at no less than 90% of authorized. The burden of Motor Transport under the present occupation mission, has been increased disproportionately, as compared to previous garrison functions, due to widespread separation of units and repair facilities. The attendant and obvious difficulties of this situation make it mandatory that trained repair personnel, especially, be given prior consideration in requests for replacements.

b. Supply, Equipment and Logistics. Mounting out needs immediately prior to the present mission were adequately filled, insofar as both vehicles and replacement parts were concerned. Certain minor deficiencies existed, but were in no way of such magnitude as to affect seriously, present operations.

c. As of the present, spare-parts stocks are entirely adequate and vehicular equipment is present in sufficient numbers to accomplish the mission. Hand tool stocks, to a certain extent, have been depleted, and it is hoped that they will be included in the forthcoming resupply shipment. Some difficulty has been experienced in providing attached Army units with automotive spare-parts. Requisitions have been submitted to 8th Field Service Regiment for these parts and attempts apparently, are being made to obtain them from the nearest Army sources. This situation, is not, at present, critical because of Army Organizations being equipped with all new or near-new equipment.
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (E)

SHORE PARTY REPORT

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

a. The organic equipment of the Pioneer Battalion has been chosen for its usefulness on and in the vicinity of the beach in expediting the movement across the beach of the men, equipment and material of the landing force. Where the landing is unopposed and pier and ramp facilities of a harbor are available the equipment required is much the same. The operations as they concern shore party troops are essentially the same whether or not opposition is met. Consequently in preparing and planning for the occupation, no change was made in the equipment to be carried or in the functional training of the personnel involved.

b. The Naval Construction Battalion assigned to the division for shore party work was so trained and equipped that it could function as a duplicate of the Pioneer Battalion. As a result, no effort was made to use the Pioneer Battalion as the nucleus of the division shore party to be reinforced by the Construction Battalion. Instead each unit intact was prepared to function as a Regimental Combat Team shore party for each of the intended assault regiments.

c. All equipment was serviced and prepared for the operation and maintenance performed to continue it in a state of readiness throughout its use in the loading out phase of the operation.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. During the training stages, the division shore party was organized into two groups of three Shore Party Teams each. The Pioneer Battalion, trained in Shore Party Operations and organized to function as the nucleus of a Division Shore Party became Shore Party Group 1, to function with RCT-2. The Forty-third Naval Construction Battalion, trained in Shore Party Operations prior to attachment to the Division, became Shore Party Group 2, to function with RCT-6. Communications facilities were to be provided by the Second ASCO and the organic medical personnel of the Pioneers and the Naval Construction Battalion plus efforts of the Second Medical Battalion were to handle evacuation. Personnel from the Second Military Police company were operationally attached.
APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (E) - SHORE PARTY REPORT. (Cont’d)

The Division Shore Party Headquarters was constituted by personnel from the following organizations: Second Service Battalion, Second Pioneer Battalion, Second Medical Battalion, Second ASCO, and the Forty-third Naval Construction Battalion. A readjustment in personnel numbers and in equipment was made between the Pioneer Battalion and Naval Construction Battalion in order that the two Shore Party Groups would be equal in strength and similarly equipped. When it appeared as though three Shore Party Groups would be required the following arrangements were decided upon: Shore Party Group 1, formed on two Pioneer companies; Shore Party Group 2, formed on two Naval Construction Battalion companies; Shore Party Group 3, formed on one Pioneer company, and one Naval Construction Battalion company. Facilities for embarking personnel and equipment did not precisely permit the flexibility this arrangement would indicate. However, it was planned that an equitable disposition of personnel and equipment could readily be made according to Shore Party needs at the target.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

a. All Shore Party cranes, lighting equipment and personnel were involved in loading out the Division. All Shore Party equipment was embarked aboard four LST's and the personnel of four Shore Party Teams were embarked on these same LST's. A fifth LST was available for transportation of Shore Party personnel, but its load was Naval Construction Battalion equipment of a nature other than that which could be used for Shore Party work. Three Pioneer dozers and operators were embarked aboard a Motor Transport Battalion LSM. The remaining Shore Party personnel, one complete Shore Party Team and excess personnel from teams embarked on Shore Party LST’s were embarked aboard the USS Melette, an APA of RCT-2’s shipping. The Division Shore Party Headquarters was embarked aboard the Division Command ship.


c. Shore Party equipment landed in a pattern conforming to the landing of the personnel. Three Pioneer dozers landed and were employed immediately, 1400, 23 September, 1945. One Engineer crane landed about 1900, 23 September, 1945, and was employed on Dejima wharf.
Appendix VIII to Annex (E) - Shore Party Report
(Cont'd)

All remaining Shore Party equipment arrived by 1400, 24 September, 1945, and was immediately disposed at the various
landing points and dumps requiring its application.

d. The transports carrying the Division arrived at the target 24 hours prior to the arrival of the Shore Party
LST's. The only available personnel of the Shore Party for un-
loading on the 23rd of September, 1945, were those embarked
aboard the Meikle. These were divided into two groups upon
arrival at the beach and assigned to shipping of RCT-2 and
RCT-6. Native labor and personnel of the RCT's brought the
total labor involved in unloading and working the dump areas to
approximately seven hundred per RCT.

e. RCT attached transportation was used in each
instance. Only one T-9 Crane on Dejima wharf and a 12 ton
hammerhead crane (Japanese) at Akunoura Engine works were avail-
able initially. Additional crane facilities, increased trans-
portation, lighting equipment and personnel became available
with the arrival of the Shore Party LST's.

f. When the two hospital ships initially tied
up at Dejima wharf pulled off on the second day after the division
landed, landing points were available or developed for continous
unloading as follows: Accommodations on the east side of the
harbor included facilities for three AKA's, four LST's and many
smaller craft unloading simultaneously; accommodations on the
west side of the harbor included facilities for two AKA's, two
LST's and many smaller craft unloading simultaneously. Rhino's
were used in the latter stages of unloading from the seaward
side of the AKA's.

g. Control of the Shore Party Operation was
adapted to the circumstances of unloading at Nagasaki. All
dump control was assumed by the 3-4 of each RCT at the outset
and continued thus, for all cargo allotted to RCT shipping was
to be controlled by the RCT's. Traffic was controlled initially
by the RCT MP's, and later by the Division MP's. Subsequently,
the combat teams again took charge within their zones of respon-
sibility. All boat control was via the transon, transdiv, and
transport beach parties. A small boat pool was established
under the Division Shore Party via the transson beach party.
Control of this pool subsequently shifted to the Port Director
via the garrison force boat pool officer. Transportation con-
trol was initially under RCT dispatchers until a Division Motor
Pool was established under the Division Shore Party control.

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (E) - SHORE PARTY REPORT. (Cont’d)

All Division unloading equipment was initially under group control, but for proper exploitation, a pool was established under the Division Shore Party control. Shore Party labor (Pioneer and Naval Construction Battalion) was under the control of the Shore Party Group commanders. All Native labor was under Division Shore Party control. RCT personnel worked under RCT representatives.

2. General unloading had begun about 1900, 23 September, 1945, and all ships of the transarcon were unloaded by 0900, 28 September, 1945. All LST's and LSM's assigned to the Division were completed at this time with the exception of LST 817, a VA5 hospital unit that had arrived on 27 September, 1945.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Unloading areas were extremely congested because of lack of storage area, enclosed warehouse space and parking area. Road conditions in the confines of Nagasaki were extremely poor and but slight improvement was possible without destroying Japanese houses immediately abutting the streets.

b. A much more expeditious handling of unloading under occupational conditions requires the Shore Party to arrive prior to the arrival of the Division to lay out and execute plans for the unloading of all shipping. Such preparations as they regard landing points, dumps, access roads and native labor, would increase unloading efficiency immeasurably.
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ANNEX (F)

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT
From: The Division Signal Officer.
To: The Commanding General.

1. Planning Phase

a. The Signal Officer was given early access to the Operation Plans of higher echelons, which greatly facilitated signal planning within the Division. Preliminary information concerning items of Signal Operating Instructions and Corps Signal Plans was received from VAC Signal Officer in a conference at Saipan about the middle of July.

b. Tentative signal plans for the Division were prepared during August, and the final drafts were completed the first week in September. Last minute information was received from VAC Signal Officer on Mt. McKinley at Saipan on September 15th.

c. The frequency plan was adequate with but one exception; a VAC crystal frequency was not available for the Division Artillery Air Spot frequency and there was insufficient time to have crystals ground to the assigned frequency.

d. A conference of all regimental and separate battalion communication officers was held, just prior to embarkation, in which all points of the signal plan were covered.

2. Occupation Phase

e. Upon arrival Nagasaki, complete communication facilities with all elements of the Division went into operation aboard the Command Ship, U.S.S. Cambria. These consisted of medium frequency and VHF radio nets within the Division and medium frequency radio net to VAC, with a joint message center continuing in operation. These communications operated in excellent style, both during the time effort and during ship to shore movement of the regiments and separate battalions.
b. As soon as practicable, the Signal Officer and the Signal Company Commander went ashore to make preliminary reconnaissance for the communication facilities for Division Headquarters and for the communication system within the Division. Wire and wire-laying equipment were unloaded as rapidly as possible and wire lines were begun, including trunk lines to the four regiments and the separate battalions and locals within the Division CP at the Customs House, Nagasaki, and other installations as necessary. By 26 September, complete Division wire system had been installed and was operating, although it was found necessary to requisition two Japanese commercial open wire lines from Nagasaki to Isahaya in order to have telephone communication with the two regiments at Isahaya.

c. Vehicular radio sets were moved ashore on 24 September and on the 25th the complete Division radio network was set up with the forward echelon stations ashore operating in the nets. Due to the distance separating the regiments it was found necessary to secure the SCR-522 sets and depend entirely on medium frequency, high power, CW stations. When the Division CP moved ashore on the 25th a rear echelon station was left on the Cambria to provide ships to shore communication during the completion of the unloading; otherwise all Division communications were operated from the CP ashore. Radio communication was, in general, excellent and continuous to all echelons throughout. This proved to be of utmost value during the period that wire was being installed.

d. Radio Link communications between Division CP ashore and VAC Headquarters at Sasebo was established on 26 September and provided excellent talking circuits. Japanese lines from Sasebo to Nagasaki were requisitioned later but have not yet operated as satisfactorily as the Radio Link channels. Radio teletype was established to VAC on one of the channels of the Radio Link on 27 September and has since carried the greatest burden of traffic between the two headquarters, although the Corps CW radio net has continued to operate in excellent style and much traffic has been cleared over it.
2. Occupation Phase (Cont'd)

e. With the installation of the wire lines within the Division, the telegraph switchboard was installed in the Division Message Center and telegraph service instituted to the four regiments and to the 2D Engineer Battalion. This has been the main means for transmitting messages within the Division. The field wire lines, which were laid from Nagasaki to the 8th and 10th Marines at Isebaya and proved inadequate for telephone communications due to their length and for which Japanese commercial lines were substituted, proved to be excellent for telegraph communications.

f. The Division Message Center and the Division Coding Room were established in proximity to each other in the Division CP building. Both have an installed teletype operating on the same channel to VAC.

g. As the regiments were moved out into Southern Kyushu, communication facilities were expanded to take care of the new locations. Since it was impossible to utilize our own wire installations, Japanese commercial facilities were utilized and the complete installation as of this date is shown in Appendices 1, 2, and 3. Likewise, the Distances were too great for ordinary radios so each regiment in outlying areas, plus battalions which were at important locations, were equipped with SCR-299's and a long distance, high powered, medium frequency CW Division Command net was established. The station at the Division Command Post was established on top of a hill about three miles from the Command Post, a building was constructed to house it, and radios were installed therein. Teletype communication was established between the Message Center in the Customs House and the Radio Station. This station has operated perfectly and has handled a huge volume of traffic and the signals have been 5 X 5 between all stations at all times of the day and night. The radio network is shown in Appendix 4. The same efficiency cannot always be said for the telephone network as the Japanese wire lines have not been dependable and the distances involved are very great. However, by the use of amplifying telephones TF-9 it has been possible to have telephone communications.
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Subject: Annex (F), Occupational Operations Report (Cont'd)

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2. Occupation Phase (Cont'd)

to the 8th and 10th Marines most of the time and to the 2D Marines and battalions at Kegoshima and Kenoy's about 50 percent of the time.

h. As other units of the Division move out from Nagasaki, it is planned to expand our existing radio network and telephone system to include them.

3. Supply and Equipment

a. Supply has been excellent. Although the initial allowances were not sufficient to meet the expanding need of an occupation situation, the Division Signal Quartermaster had ample supplies to re-supply them with everything necessary. The first re-supply shipment arrived about thirty days after the 2D Marine Division landed, and both the amounts and types of signal gear contained therein took care of re-establishing Signal Quartermaster stock very nicely. Naturally, since this was a combat re-supply shipment there was a good amount of combat signal gear which was not needed, but this could not be helped, and it is believed that the Signal Section, Supply Service, FMF Pac, did an excellent job in planning this shipment.

b. For an occupation operation such as this where great distances are involved, additional signal equipment is needed by the Division. In this case, we have found it necessary to draw an additional 6 SCR 299's or equivalent, 4 Teletypewriters T-97, 4 SCR 193's, 2 TC-4's and several additional power units, such as the FE-95. Also, the Division could use a considerable amount more of Radio Link Equipment than the one station which it has at 5th Phib Corps Headquarters, if it were available. All of the above equipment, except the Radio Link, was quickly supplied to the Division by the 5th Phib Corps and the 8th Service Regiment at Sasebo.

c. Several Japanese Military Switchboards have been procured for use in small units in lieu of the FD-72. Likewise, a considerable number of military receivers have been utilized as recreation receivers.

George C. Ruffin Jr.

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ANNEX (3)

to

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Division Engineer.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: annex (G), Occupational Operations Report.

APPENDICES:
1. 43rd Naval Construction Battalion Report.
2. 1298th Engineer Combat Battalion Report.

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING.

a. The Engineers, Pioneers and Naval Construction Battalions attached to and part of a Marine Division are essentially combat organizations capable of road construction, water supply, bridge building, camouflage, demolitions, and shore party work. The latter companies of the Division Engineer Battalion normally reinforce an infantry combat team during accomplishment of the mission while the Division Pioneer Battalion and the attached Naval Construction Battalion initially constitute the division shore party.

b. With the division in a rear area for rehabilitation, the mission of all engineer units, aside from training, is the development, maintenance and improvement of camp facilities.

c. It was not known, at the time plans for the occupation of Kyushu were being made, what engineer units would be available to the division aside from its organic engineer units.

d. The duties of the engineers, when plans for the occupation were made, appeared to be essentially those encountered in a rehabilitation camp with water supply assuming paramount importance. Consequently, the routine duties of the engineers on Saipan dictated the needs to be met in the occupation. Planning was based on this premise and the materials required were on hand.

e. In as much as previous combat restrictions as to shipping had been lifted, no rear echelon was to be maintained and it was planned to move all organic equipment to the target.

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Subject: Annex (G), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

f. Equipment was serviced and anticipated needs in spare parts prepared to assure continued functioning of equipment under conditions expected at the target.

g. Detailed reports of the activities of the 2nd Pioneer Battalion and of the 2nd Engineer Battalion are included in Part III of the Second Marine Division Occupational Operations Report.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION.

a. All training had been directed initially toward participation in combat similar to that experienced by the military service in previous Pacific Operations.

b. During the interval between cessation of hostilities and the occupation, only training in orientation, military discipline, customs of the service and equipment maintenance was possible. The continued duties of camp maintenance at Saipan served the purpose of training for the occupational duties of the Engineer.

3. NARRATIVE REPORT OF OCCUPATION.

Upon arriving at the zone of operation on 23 September, 1945 the Assistant Division Engineer was immediately sent ashore to set up a central control for engineer work and to contact Officials of the Prefectural Engineer Branch. At this time, as throughout the occupation, one of the letter companies of the Engineer Battalion was with each of the Regimental Combat Teams leaving the Battalion H&S Company as the main engineer organization for the remainder of the division.

Each Letter Company had the task of performing engineer functions for its respective RCT while H&S Company took over the task of rehabilitating the utilities in the City of Nagasaki and in controlling the overall engineer picture in the Division zone of responsibility.

It was discovered upon landing that water was sufficient in quantity for the use of the Division but that it had been insufficiently chlorinated to come up to the specifications set by the Division Surgeon. Immediate steps were taken to remedy this situation and water supply was made the number one priority as had been planned during the planning phase of the operation.

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Aside from water supply, other existing utilities appeared in fair shape. The voltage in the electrical system was very low but was being put back to normal by the Japanese. To supplement the local electrical power, generators were set up where needed throughout the Division.

Roads and bridges throughout the zone of responsibility were in a usable condition. Roads showed a complete lack of maintenance and were covered with rubble. Bridges were classed by the Japanese as ten (10) ton capacity structures but inspection showed that the majority of them were capable of carrying twenty (20) tons.

On 26 September, 1945, all of the elements of the Engineer Battalion were ashore and set up to work. At this time H&J Company took over the complete supervision of the water supply of the city. The letter companies remained with their RCT's performing all the engineer functions.

On 27 September, the 1298th Army Engineer Combat Battalion joined the Division and was given the task of rehabilitating the Isahaya road, the rehabilitation of roads in the Division area north of the Division Headquarters and of constructing an airstrip for light planes in the bombed area.

On 29 September, the 43rd Naval Construction Battalion reverted from the control of the Shore Party to that of the Division Engineer and was given the jobs of rehabilitating the facilities at the Dejima Harf, construction of access roads from the various docks to the main routes of communications and the rehabilitation of petroleum storage facilities in the Nagasaki Harbor area.

On 2 October, 1945, the 2nd Pioneer Battalion reverted from control of the Shore Party to that of the Division Engineer. It was given, as a primary task, the rehabilitation of all routes of communication south of Division Headquarters.

As the various units came under the control of the Division Engineer a Division Engineer Group was formed with the Division Engineer in over all control of the various engineer elements. This made possible a central control over the work of the four battalions whose composition and capabilities varied considerably.
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Subject: Annex (G), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont’d)

Through this control it was possible to allocate tasks to those organizations best fitted for the work and it is believed that through this control greater cooperation was possible.

The initial tasks of the various units as set forth in prior paragraphs was, in most cases, of a type which necessitated constant supervision, roads needed constant maintenance, bridges had to be repaired from time to time and, in two cases, replaced. The petroleum storage facilities were extensive enough to require constant work and the Dejima Wharf was constantly in need of maintenance.

Added to the continuing jobs mentioned above other short range tasks constantly appeared. Stoves were designed and manufacturing began; refrigeration units were set up throughout the division; repairs of all types were necessary in various buildings; areas were cleared for open storage and work was constantly necessary in facilitating the unloading of ships. As the jobs appeared they were apportioned out to the various engineer organizations by the Division Engineer.

In order to facilitate the supply of various construction materials such as lumber, nails, cement and so forth, a central supply dump was set up, under the control and direction of the 2nd Engineer Battalion, from which supplies were drawn by the engineers and other elements.

In all works by the Engineer Group, maximum use was made of Japanese labor. Much of the work, such as water supply and highway maintenance, was accomplished through direct cooperation with the prefectural engineers and it was found that this scheme was quite workable in most cases.

The Japanese engineers in the Nagasaki Prefecture were totally without any adequate engineering equipment. This equipment, as well as supervision, was furnished by the Engineer Group and it is believed that this facilitated maintenance and other work in most instances.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Comments.
   (1) All of the elements of the Engineer Group were originally formed, equipped and trained for combat.
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Subject: Annex (G), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

Consequently, much of the work required by occupational operations, such as the inspection and operation of boilers and the repair of inside plumbing was not in line with the capabilities of the various organizations.

(2) No engineer officer was sent on the original reconnaissance of the area to be occupied. Consequently, the engineering data available at the time of the initial landing was not complete.

(3) The immediate requirements of the division necessitated too many tasks to proceed simultaneously and as a consequence, a job schedule could not be set up and maintained.

b. Recommendations.

(1) An engineer officer should be present on all initial reconnaissances.

(2) A base maintenance unit be assigned to zones where any lengthy occupation is contemplated.

(3) The letter companies of the engineer battalion should revert to the control of the Division Engineer as soon as the initial phases of an operation are over.

(4) Units of the Division should accomplish by their own initiative many of the minor tasks they call on the Engineers to perform.

J. H. PARTRIDGE.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APENDIX I TO ANNEX (G)

43rd NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION

1. SHORE PARTY OPERATIONS

a. The 43rd Naval Construction Battalion officially joined the Second Marine Division on Saipan during the latter part of August 1945 and was assigned as part of the Division shore party for the occupation of Nagasaki, Japan. The battalion proceeded to Nagasaki with the main elements of the Second Marine Division and landed in Nagasaki Harbor on 23 and 24 September. Five ships were used to transport the main body of the battalion, and its equipment, from Saipan to Nagasaki; LSTs 734, 887, 1073, LSM 406 and APA 156. A small amount of lumber and some personnel were transported by several other ships.

b. The first group, consisting of the executive officer, who acted as assistant shore party commander, and his staff plus a part of "O" Company, arrived in Nagasaki on Sunday, 23 September and immediately disembarked in the Dejima Harf area, later they were assigned the task of unloading AKA 101 which carried general supplies.

c. The remainder, and the greater part of the Battalion, arrived in Nagasaki on 24 September and beached LSTs 734, 887, and 1073 and LSM 406 on the west side of the harbor near the Mitsubishi Electrical Co. main plant. The battalion command post was immediately set up in the warehouse south of dry dock #3, and men, material, and equipment were started ashore as rapidly as possible. A parking lot for heavy equipment was located and established near the Mitsubishi Engine Works area. All other supplies and personnel were moved to the dock area, and into the large warehouse south of dry dock #3. LST 734 contained rolling stock only and in a matter of approximately six (6) hours it was unloaded. LSM 406 was also unloaded in a few hours. The other two LST's contained part rolling stock and part construction materials and boxed gear. They were rather slow in unloading since no place could be found to store the material due to extremely congested traffic conditions in the area. Unloading of all LST's was finally completed early on 28 September.
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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (G) - 43rd NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION

D. During the unloading of the battalion gear, equipment and personnel, the unloading of "KA 101" continued around the clock and it was finally unloaded and most of its cargo stowed in warehouses by 26 September.

E. During the unloading period the battalion established its personnel on the second and third decks of the large warehouse at the south side of dry dock #3, with the exception of the parties who remained on board the LSTs, and "A" Company, which camped in the open out near dry dock #3.

F. On 25 September, "C" Company was sent to the Dejima Wharf area to supplement the shore party working in that area unloading ships at the wharf. They completed their duty on 29 September.

G. Completion of the unloading operations on the west side of Nagasaki Harbor and the securing of "C" Company in the Dejima Wharf area marked the end of the shore party stage of the battalions occupation of Nagasaki.

2. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

A. Upon the completion of the shore party phase of the Nagasaki landings the 43rd Naval Construction Battalion was assigned various projects in the harbor area. The main projects and a brief discussion of each follows:

1) Rehabilitation of Dejima Wharf.
This work consisted of clearing, leveling, and generally repairing access roads to the wharf and the connecting roads within the area. Warehouses on the wharf, which were damaged by bombing attacks were also repaired in general. Repairing of concrete deck and the wooden fenders on the wharf. This work in now completed.

2) Improvement of LST, Landings.
A large amount of debris was removed and bulldozer work was done on the LST landing area just south of Dejima Wharf. This work is now complete and the area was expanded to accommodate at least four (4) LSTs landing simultaneously.

3) Repair of Division Commissary Warehouse.
General repair work was performed on this large warehouse. Partitions were strengthened and repaired, entrances on one side boarded up, and entire roof repaired. Work now is completed.
APPENDIX I to ANNEX (3) - 43rd NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION.

(4) Miscellaneous Work for Division HQ.
    Shelving in warehouses and a fence around the quartermaster storage yard are now complete.

(5) Road Repair, West Side of Nagasaki Harbor.
    Approximately four (4) miles of road paralleling the west bank of Nagasaki Harbor and running from dry dock #1 northerly to the main highway just beyond the Urakami-gawa, was generally required, rebuilt, drained, and cleared. This work is now complete and the road is being constantly maintained.

    Shortly after arrival in Nagasaki a survey of existing oil tanks in the harbor was begun, with the object of finding suitable tanks for fuel oil and gasoline storage. Several tanks in good condition were selected and cleaned, vise relaid to the waters' edge, and a pump installed for handling the motor gasoline storage. One (1) 42,000 bbl. tank now contains diesel oil; one (1) 42,000 bbl tank and one (1) 40,000 bbl. tank contain aviation gasoline; one (1) 40,000 bbl. tank and one (1) 25,000 bbl. tank are being filled with motor gasoline. A loading platform and piping have been installed for the dispensing of fuel at these tanks. A complete survey has been made of this area and a location map is now completed.

(7) Quarters for Strategic Bomb Survey Group.
    Work was started on the repair of a building for the strategic bomb survey group. After this work was approximately 35% complete it was taken over by Mitsubishi.

(8) Athletic Field for the 6th Marines.
    The leveling, grading, and surfacing of an athletic field for the 6th Marines, located near the Mitsubishi Electrical Industry buildings on the west side of Nagasaki Harbor is now complete.

(9) Armed Forces Radio Station at Omura.
    The armed forces radio station at Omura, Kyushu, which serves the Nagasaki-Sasebo area called on the 43rd NCN for assistance in building studios, erecting towers, etc. One platoon of "B" Company spent two weeks on this job and erected three (3) 85ft steel radio masts, constructed broadcasting studios, and generally required the buildings occupied by the group.
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APPENDIX I to ANNEX (3), 43rd NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION.

(10) Atomic Field Landing Strip Extension.
An extension to the atomic field landing strip is now in process of being made.

(11) Butler Warehouses for the Division.
Five (6) 40' x 100' Butler warehouses are under construction to be used as storage facilities for the Second Division.

b. Miscellaneous work for Second Marine Division Senior Officers' Quarters.

Miscellaneous carpenter and plumbing work has been done at the Senior Officers' Quarters.

c. Company 'A' is now on detached duty at Isahaya, Kyushu, working on road repair, heating buildings, and general carpenter work for the 10th Marine Regiment.

d. During the time the battalion has been in Nagasaki it has occupied two large warehouses successively as billeting areas. The first warehouse, located near dry dock #3, proved unsuitable for our needs so the battalion moved to a large three story building adjacent to dry dock #1. Considerable work has been put in on this building in order to make it liveable. All battalion offices, the battalion warehouse, galley, mess hall and various shops are also located on the first deck.
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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (3)

1296th ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION

1. Unit arrived at Honolulu, T.H. from U. S. on 8 August, 1945. Quartered at Schofield Barracks. Additional equipment and supplies were drawn and training was started in preparation for Olympic Operation. Processing, packing and training continued until 30 August at which time loading on LST’s 826, 390, and 870 took place.

2. Unit attached to V Amphib Corps for operations, left Pearl Harbor, Oahu, 3 September as part of convoy of 18 LST’s. Convoy arrived at Sasebo, Japan, 24 September but LST’s 826, 390 and 870 proceeded to Nagasaki the following morning. Upon arriving at Nagasaki, the unit was attached to Second Marine Division. A reconnaissance party was sent ashore 26 September for purpose of selecting a battalion bivouac site. All troops and equipment were disembarked 27 September. Troops were billeted at Oura School, approximately two miles east of downtown Nagasaki.

3. Upon landing at Nagasaki, the battalion was given the missions of repair and maintenance of the main roads and bridges from Northern Nagasaki to Southern Nagasaki, and construction of an air strip for liaison planes in the “atomic bomb” area, located in the northern section of the city.

4. A reconnaissance of the assigned roads and bridges was made 27 September and the over-all picture was that most roads were cluttered with debris, often to the extent of leaving a two-way road only sufficiently cleared for one-way traffic. The roads were generally full of pot-holes, and numerous flat flagstones had become loosened and removed. Several bridges were in need of repair, and one in the atomic bomb area failed, which necessitated a bypass which, in turn, created a bottle-neck in traffic circulation.

5. Each company was given a section of the city for repair of main roads and bridges and continuous maintenance of both. It was decided to put in a Bailey bridge adjacent to the site of the failed bridge in the atomic bomb area.
The bridge was to be a 110 ft. DD to carry 35 tons. Work was started 30 September. The soft, springy nature of the terrain made it necessary to make a 120 ft span and to use unusually large supports under the bearings. The approaches being of the same material required numerous loads of stone and brick in order to overcome the settling of the road bed. The bridge and approaches were completed and opened for traffic 1700, 2 October. Two platoons of "C" Company were used.

6. Work on the airstrip was started 30 September by one platoon of "A" Company. The strip was to be 800 ft long, all weather, for liaison planes. The site of the strip was an open air stadium with walls approximately 5 ft high. The long axis of the oval was 600 ft, which necessitated the removal of the walls at both ends. The entire area was strewn with debris. The subsurface within the stadium was of good material, but on the outside it was soft and spongy. Heavy equipment used were bulldozers, motorized graders, carryall scrapers, air compressors, sheepsfoot rollers and smooth roller. Nearby supplies of coarse gravel and cinders were used for surfacing. Rain in the ratio of two out of three days delayed operations, but the strip was open for operation 11 October. 350 Japanese laborers were used.

7. General repair and maintenance of roads and streets in Nagasaki was started 1 October and the nature of the work made it a continuous process. Repair of the road from Nagasaki RR station, running north to Mitsubishi Ordnance Plant, was largely a matter of removing debris from the sides of the road, which opened the way for two-lane traffic. The road from Nagasaki RR station east to Ishahayashi required himing gravel for filling rough spots and pot-holes. No available asphalt or suitable binder created a problem in the repair. Local Japanese labor places the gravel from the stock piles along the roads established by our trucks. The roads generally south through town from the RR station involved clearing debris, smoothing off rough stretches, filling pot-holes and replacing flat stones for surfacing.

8. 8 October, "C" Company was assigned the mission of reinforcing an existing timber trestle bridge located two miles east of Omura, bridge capacity to be increased to 12 tons. One platoon was used and bridge job was finished 2000, 11 October.

9. 16 October, "A" Company was assigned the mission of demolishing two reinforced concrete smokestacks in the vicinity of the air-strip.
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APPENDIX II to ANNEX (3), 1298th ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION.

One stack was 100 ft high and 28 ft in circumference at the base; the other 150 ft high and 36 ft in circumference at the base. Each was demolished by placing a 300 pound charge at the base. Job was finished 1600, 17 October.

10. 16 October, "C" Company was assigned the mission of resurfacing a steel trestle bridge located in the Nagasaki RR yard, 200 yds west of the Bailey bridge. Bridge was completed and open for traffic 1700, 17 October.

11. 17 October, the Battalion was given the missions of making a thorough reconnaissance of the Nagasaki area for Japanese construction supplies. Supplies were gathered at Division Dump.

12. 23 October, two missions were received from Division Headquarters; one the reconstruction of a rifle range at North Nagasaki; the other the construction of a radio house at a high point in East Nagasaki beyond this headquarters. The rifle range was to be of American design with 10 targets and firing points at 100, 200, 300, and 500 yards. The job was assigned "B" Company and work was started 24 October. The range was ready for use on 10 November. "C" Company was assigned the job of the construction of the radio house. Work was started 24 October and completed 6 November.

13. 24 October, the Battalion was given the mission of installing and operating a quarry in the vicinity of the airfield. Operation got under way 31 October.

14. 2 November, the mission of reinforcing and strengthening a timber trestle bridge at Hatsu Gawa, near downtown Nagasaki, was given to "B" Company. Bridge was in bad condition, rated at 8 ton capacity. It was repaired and increased to 20 ton capacity. Mission completed 6 November.

15. 2 November, "A" Company was given assignment of dismantling the Bailey Bridge which was constructed 30 September. Mission completed 5 November.

16. 7 November, "C" Company was given assignment of repairing a dance hall for Division use in downtown Nagasaki. Hall was the second story of a two-story structure, which necessitated the placing of additional supports. Much of the finished interior work was done by skilled native laborers. Job finished 9 November.

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APPENDIX II to ANNEX (G), 1298th ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION.

17. 12 November, the Battalion was assigned the job of remodeling a building for a Division Recreation building. The building, located approximately 800 yds south of Division Headquarters and 200 yds north of Matsue Sawa bridge, was a two-story dwelling. Practically the entire interior had to be torn out, additional supports added and the interior completely remodeled. "B" Company was assigned the job and work was started 12 November and was approximately 80% completed as of 30 November.

18. 12 November, work was started on the erection of storage huts in the Division storage area located one block north of the Bailey Bridge site. Job consisted of erecting 12 quonset type huts as soon as they were unloaded from ships. Each company was assigned a portion of the job and work on the foundations was started immediately. Upon unloading the ships, it was discovered the buildings were Butler storage huts, which necessitated changing the dimensions of the foundations. Work was approximately 30% completed as of 30 November.

19. Throughout the period of occupation (27Sept-30Nov), Japanese civilians at the rate of 150 per day were used on practically all jobs. Much was encountered the first two weeks of occupation but very little during the remainder of the period.

20. Continuous improvement was made in the billet area throughout the period of occupation. The original building was a simple two-story frame school house 30 ft by 50 ft with a few scattered shacks in the area. Improvement was made to the extent that all missing windows and glass were replaced and Japanese insulating material added. Four temporary kitchens, four temporary mess halls, latrines, shower room with hot and cold running water, movie building, post exchange building, three-quarter length football field, four volleyball courts and a basketball court were constructed for the comfort of the troops.

21. Water supply created a problem for the first two weeks of occupation due to the fact that it was impure, plus the fact that water pipes and pressure were insufficient to get water to billet area. About mid-October the reservoir water was chlorinated sufficiently and additional pipes were laid for a distance of about a mile which enabled the unit to have running water by merely inserting a gasoline driven pump in the main 100 ft from the billet area.

22. No enemy interference was encountered at any time during the occupation.
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OPERATIONS REPORT

of the

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

KYUSHU

by the

SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

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SECOND REGIMENT
SECOND MARINE DIVISION

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OPERATIONS REPORT

(A) Planning. P. 435

(B) Training.

(C) Organization.

(D) Advance Reconnaissance of the Objective.

(E) Occupational Operations.

(F) Supply, Equipment, and Logistics.

(G) Conclusions - Comments and Recommendations.

ENCLOSURE: (With Original Copy Only).

(A) Section Journals. (With supporting files of field messages and periodic reports.)

ANNEXES:

(A) Copies of Operation Plans and Orders issued since date of occupation. P. 443

(B) S-1 Report. P. 450


(III) Special Services Report.

(IV) Adjutant's Report.

(C) S-2 Report. P. 485

(D) S-4 Report. P. 489

Appendices: (I) Transport Quartermaster Report.

(II) Quartermaster Report.

(III) Medical Report.

(IV) Disposition of Surrendered Material and Equipment Report.

(V) Procurement Report.

(VI) Motor Transport Report.

(E) Communications Report. P. 497
OPERATIONS REPORT

(A) Planning. No detailed planning was accomplished by the regiment in connection with an assault landing on KYUSHU. Battalion commanders and members of the regimental staff were given a general picture of the terrain, and some conception of the type of combat to expect, in conferences held by both the regimental commander and division staff.

During the limited planning phase after cessation of hostilities, preparatory plans were made for early embarkation and movement to an assigned area of occupation. Upon receipt of 2nd Marine Division Operation Plan No 14 on 6 September, 1945, for the landing and occupation of the MAGASAKI area, final plans were drafted, which of necessity were very general in scope, and RCT 2 Operation Plan No 17 was issued on 8 September. Thereafter new information was disseminated by directives and frequent conferences, and units proceeded with preparations for landing. Transportation of supplies and equipment to the staging area at TANAPAG Harbor had commenced on 27 August, and loading of the ships assigned to RCT 2 started on 10 September, 1945. Detailed plans for the landing and unloading at MAGASAKI were withheld pending information on harbor facilities.

(B) Training. During the period just prior to the cessation of hostilities, the regiment was engaged in Phase III of the current combat training program, which consisted of advanced schooling and firing of all, infantry weapons, battalion field problems, regimental CPX's and coordinated training with supporting units.

When hostilities ceased the training schedule was completely revised and a program inaugurated emphasizing military police duties, close order drill, ceremonies, customs and courtesies, customs of the Japanese people, and other subjects that might better qualify troops for occupation duties. Few training manuals were available and experienced instructors limited, thus making it difficult to carry out satisfactory training in many of these subjects.

(C) Organization. A Regimental Combat Team was organized for the operation consisting of following units:

- 2d Marines
- "C", 2d MT Bn
- "B", 2d Med Bn
- "A", 2d Ener Bn
- 1st Plt Ord Co, 2d Serv Co
- 1st Plt Sup Co, 2d Serv Co
- 1st Plt Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn
- 1st Plt Auto Repair, 2d MT Bn
- 1st Band Sect

- 1 - CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

4 Air Ln Teams
4 SFC Parties
4 Arty Ln Teams
1 Tq Ln Team

All supporting units were maintained intact in the RCT Headquarters Group except that one Air Ln Team, one SFC Party, and one Arty Ln Party was assigned each BLT. In addition, BLT 2/2 and 3/2 were each assigned a 37mm Flakteam from the Regimental Weapons Company. As a precaution, all plans and attachments were made for coping with any possible Japanese resistance to our landing, or subsequently in the occupation phase.

At the time of sailing the regiment was approximately one-hundred and eighty under authorized personnel strength.

(2) Advanced Reconnaissance of the Objective. One officer from RCT 2 was attached to an advanced reconnaissance party which departed by air from SAIPAN for MAGASAKI on 14 September, four days before departure of the RCT, for the purpose of reconnoitering billeting areas and harbor facilities. On arrival of the Task Group and before landing, this officer joined the RCT with valuable information on landing facilities, staging areas for equipment and supplies, and billeting spaces for troops, which assisted the commanding officer in making final plans for the landing and unloading.

(2) Occupational Operations. RCT 2 sailed from SAIPAN on 18 September, 1945, on the ships comprising TRANSDIV 36, and arrived in the outer harbor of MAGASAKI at approximately 0600, 23 September. The commanding officer, RCT 2 received verbal orders from the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division, on board the command ship, to land in the vicinity of DEIJIMA Wharf, which was the Customs Dock of MAGASAKI, relieve the Marine guard established there by the USS "MICHIGAN" for POP evacuation, and commence unloading immediately.

BLT commanders, having been previously called on board the RCT command ship, were issued orders for a landing in column of BLTs, at various points adjacent to DEIJIMA Wharf, in the order of BLT 3/2 - 2/2 - 1/2, with boat waves in column, and boat waves within each wave in column. BLT 3/2 was ordered to land at 1300, the remaining two BLTs and RCT 2 Headquarters Group on call.

The first wave of BLT 3/2 landed at 1200; BLT 2/2 landed at 1340, and BLT 1/2 at 1530. RCT 2 CP opened on DEIJIMA Wharf at 1344 and at 1600 orders were issued for the movement of units to the assigned billeting area at KATMAO barracks, four and one-half (4½) miles south of MAGASAKI. A few vehicles were available from an Army Truck Company then present at MAGASAKI, but the majority of troops marched to the barracks. One AKA was brought alongside for immediate unloading, and all
other ships of the TAHITIAN commenced unloading into small boats.

The billeting area at KAPUGO Barracks offered sufficient space for all units of the RCT, but was in need of extensive cleaning and repair. Barracks had to be disinfected, drainage ditches cleared, heads emptied, and all buildings put into shape. Japanese labor was used to the maximum for all tasks, but it took several days to adequately billet personnel.

Initially, occupation operations were confined to insuring that all large calibre defense guns in the vicinity of NAUJATTI had been made inoperable, locating intelligence targets, and obtaining information on known Japanese installations. The RCT 2 area of responsibility, as assigned by 2nd Marine Division, was divided among the BLTs, and search patrols commenced operating throughout the area about 28 September, with the mission of locating any military installations, materiel dumps and utilities not previously reported by the Japanese. For the most part, foot patrols were required because of the generally inadequate road net, and lack of sufficient transportation, especially light vehicles suitable for the Japanese roads, the best of which were continually troublesome for heavier vehicles. Where necessary, guards were established on installations of potential value to our forces, and on explosive dumps of a nature dangerous to the success of the occupation. On previously reported installations the Japanese military were ordered to maintain a guard pending decisions in regard to the disposition of material. Whenever possible the Japanese civilian police were ordered to furnish guards in order to minimize the use of small detachments of Marines at widely scattered points. Once the search of a sector had been completed, routine surveillance patrols investigated it periodically.

Co "A" was designated as the Regimental Military Police Company, with the primary mission of furnishing Military Police details for the NAUJATTI area. This company was not charged with directly regulating the activities of the Japanese nationals, and any control measures that were imposed were made a responsibility of the Japanese police under Military Police supervision.

On 23 October 1945, orders were received to transfer one BLT to KOKUYA, KYUSHU, and relieve the 1st Bn 127th Inf (Army) which was part of a task force occupying the airfield near that city. BLT 2/2 embarked on four (4) LSTs, landed in the vicinity of KOKUYA, and assumed occupational control of that area on 30 October. At the same time the RCT commander reconnoitered the MIYAKOJO and MIYAZAKI areas for the purpose of determining the adequacy of billeting facilities for the remainder of the RCT.
On 3 November, 1945, the RCT Headquarters Group and BLT 3/2 commenced loading on four (4) LSTs for movement to MIYAKOJO. A landing was made at TAHASI, west of KAMCY, where BLT 2/2 had unloaded, and all personnel and equipment transferred to railroad cars for the remainder of the movement forty (40) miles to MIYAKOJO. An advance party was sent ahead by road to arrange billeting and speed up work of the Japanese laborers previously ordered to rehabilitate the Japanese 23rd Inf Army Barracks there. RCT 2/2 opened at MIYAKOJO on 6 November, 1945.

BLT 1/2, at NAGASHI, was ordered to commence loading on 5 November, 1945, and move by LST to TAMASHI thence by rail to MIYAKOJO, KYUSHU. This move was completed on 12 November. There again, the Japanese had been ordered to prepare the barracks in that city for occupation. In all cases the work done was invaluable, due to the exceedingly dirty and unsanitary conditions prevailing prior to arrival.

Before the separation of BLT 1/2 and 2/2 from the RCT, each was furnished detachments from Co "A" 2d Engr Bn, Co "G" 2d MT Bn, and the 1st Serv Platoon, in order to supply additional transportation, some water purification equipment, and a bakery unit. A Medical Company was also attached to BLT 2/2 at YAMAZU due to the extra personnel of the Army Air Force there, who came under control of BLT 2/2.

In general, the billets of all units in this new area were inadequate as to size and construction, but lacked any facilities approaching our standards. As was the case at NAGASHI, they were in need of extensive cleaning and repairs, part of which was done by the Japanese before our arrival. First and most important, in the occupation of any Japanese buildings, was to improve the existing sanitary conditions.

The area of responsibility of RCT 2, now including all of MIYAZAKI Prefecture and half of OKUSHIMA Prefecture, was again divided among BLTs, and by the middle of November the resumption of occupation duties was well underway. The size of the respective areas required more motorized patrols and the lack of sufficient organic transportation was a hindrance to the progress which might otherwise have been made in the occupation of the area. The great number of widely dispersed ammunition, weapons and materiel dumbs in each area necessitated patrols of several days duration. Inventories as turned in by the Japanese were verified and material destroyed or otherwise disposed of by Marines or by the Japanese, under supervision of Marine personnel. In some cases, ammunition and explosives located far inland had to be transported by rail to coastal towns and dumped at sea from small boats. Equipment or materiel of value to civilians was turned over to local Japanese government agencies for distribution. Many unreported installations and dumbs were discovered.
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(F) Supply, Equipment and Logistics. Beginning with the return of RCT 2 to NAZAKI in April following the OKINAWA operation, a continuous program was placed in effect to bring all units of the regiment up to top standards as to equipment, in anticipation of imminent combat operations.

This involved repairs, survey and reissue of individual equipment, weapons, ammunition and transportation in keeping with division directives, tables of basic allowances, and O-4 Standing Operating Procedure.

The continuous nature of the program and the time available for its accomplishment enabled the regiment to achieve a considerable degree of readiness, as to equipment, prior to departure from NAZAKI for NAZAKI.

Supply plans were not prepared for an assault landing on KYUSHU at the regimental level, at the time of the cessation of hostilities.

The general plan for transportation of all division supplies and equipment by Regimental Combat Teams was outlined at a meeting of Regimental S-4s and Executive Officers early in September, after the 2nd Marine Division was assigned an area of occupation.

Supply plans for the operation were based on Division Administrative Order No 68-45 and units were informed by Regimental Orders, conferences and memoranda. Specific instructions for supply at NAZAKI in the form of Division Memorandum A-1, dated 22 September, was issued Sunday, 22 September, the day of landing, at a conference on board the USS CONSTITUTION. According to this memorandum, regiments were directed to retain control of, and issue as prescribed, all division supplies and equipment unloaded from their ships. In compliance, RCT 2 unloaded all the division supplies which had been carried, direct from the ships to assigned warehouses south of DEVIMA Wharf. RCT 2 issued all supplies and equipment to regimental units, and to all division and attached units, until 7 October when the Division Quartermaster took over that function.

Logistical control of the supply of RCT 2 at NAZAKI was relatively simple, inasmuch as the whole organization was grouped at KANNOB Barracks, four and one-half (4½) miles southeast of the Division supply base and all hauling could be accomplished by truck in 30 minutes.

When RCT 2 was transferred to southeastern KYUSHU and BLTs dispersed to three billeting areas, at widely separated points, all several hundred miles distant from Division and Corps supply installations, the problem of supply became more difficult. BLT 1/2 at NAZAKI and BLT 2/2 at KAMOBA were authorized to send their respective periodic supply reports direct to the S-4. All
CONFIDENTIAL

regular requisitions for other than automatic supplies, which are based on the periodic reports, were funneled through the Regimental Quartermaster at MIYAZAKI.

Fresh supplies were shipped by rail in refrigeration cars from MIYAZAKI and SASAKI to the separate SLTs. Re-supply of regular items, fuel and equipment was shipped by water from MIYAZAKI and SASAKI, to YAMADU and thence by rail and truck to ENYSA, MIYAZAKI, and MIYAZAKI.

This arrangement necessitated RCT 2 sending a quartermaster unloading detail to ENYSA each time a re-supply ship landed, in order to supervise the distribution of supplies to the various units of the RCT.

This problem of re-supply might have been greatly simplified if supplies were shipped direct to each SLT by train. This method was used on one shipment of winter clothing, cleaning gear, stove and blankets to the Regimental Quartermaster at MIYAZAKI and was very successful, eliminating the double-handling which was necessary when a water shipment was made.

During November, six shiploads of supplies and equipment arrived at ENYSA by water, two of which were for the ENYSA Task Force and SLT 2/3 exclusively; the remainder a combined supply for all units. On this basis, four ships a month will be required to re-supply elements of RCT 2 adequately if ships are used exclusively.

(C) Conclusion - Comments and Recommendations.

1. The practice of sending an advance party to a new billeting area prior to the arrival of the main body of troops cannot be too strongly recommended. With sufficient time available, such a party can greatly expedite occupation by making billeting assignments, and suitable arrangements for the procurement of labor and material. In addition to facilitating the movement of troops in an orderly fashion, a more favorable impression is made upon the local populace with which the unit concerned will be carrying out their occupation duties. An Engineering Officer should be included in the party, with the specific mission of inspecting buildings to determine whether or not they are safe for use.

2. There always exists a very definite need for language personnel. Each RCT should have a minimum of ten qualified officer interpreters both for combat and occupation duties.

3. The general impression gained during the initial stages of the occupation was that the Japanese, both
civilian and military, were outwardly very cooperative. However, innumerable instances occurred of very incomplete reports and inventories being turned in by the Japanese. Many examples were evident of accurate reporting of obvious or bulky equipment, and upon interrogation, an absence of any knowledge of less obvious items, such as medical supplies, communication gear, or photography equipment. To complicate such questioning, Military and Naval personnel who previously had been in command of an area were transferred and outside personnel, without knowledge of existing conditions in that area, put in command prior to occupation by our forces. This was done ostensibly, to avoid embarrassing questioning.

4. Prior to occupation of enemy areas more time might well be spent on instruction in the purpose and function of Military Police. Marines without this background and having received only combat training, are ill-equipped to properly perform such duties during the early stages of an occupation. It might even prove advantageous to establish Military Police in an area prior to the arrival of main occupation forces, to ease the congested period of heavy traffic and increased activity during the unloading and movement of large bodies of troops, and create the proper "first impression" on the conquered peoples.

5. From the standpoint of TQMs, it is imperative that all equipment and supplies to be loaded out for an operation, regardless of whether commercial or combat loaded, be assigned a priority according to anticipated needs by the highest echelon being embarked. This should avoid loading and transporting items of doubtful value while others of a critical nature are left behind.

6. The problem of insufficient transportation constantly arises. Occupation of a large area in such terrain as this necessitates numerous motorized patrols requiring light vehicles suitable for all types of roads. Each BLT should have a minimum of 15 cargo jeeps and 5 one-ton trucks in order to function efficiently.

7. The present system of Disposition is an excellent one and although having a slightly unwieldy "bookkeeping system" it should be satisfactory.

8. Military Government personnel have been invaluable for the work required of occupation forces. However none of the sections had sufficient personnel to turn in an efficient job. By supplementing the Military Government Sections with extra Marines most of the sections are now functioning in a manner in which they were designed to operate. Once a Military Government unit has become established in an area, it is desirable that the transfer of personnel in such units be held to a
CONFIDENTIAL

minimum. Their knowledge of local conditions and liaison with public officials is immensely valuable when there are frequent changes in key Japanese personnel holding public office, as has been the case throughout southern KYUSHU.

9. The functioning of the Special Services were of tremendous value. However, because of the large area over which the units were spread, the equipment available was entirely inadequate to take care of all units. Motion picture film, which is one of the best morale builders, was difficult to obtain and the transportation system inadequate to distribute the few films available to the units in the field.

10. The continuous transfer of personnel for discharge has made the occupation duties difficult in that it has necessitated retraining personnel repeatedly for key positions. This has caused considerable delay in carrying out the duties of the occupation.

C. J. O'Donnell

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding Second Marines, Second Marine Division.
OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

Annex (A)

consists of
Copies of Operation Plans and Orders
Issued Since Date of Occupation
Serial O0107
SECRET

Operation Order
RCT 2 No 78

RCT 2, In the field.
0800, 1 Oct 45.

Map: 1/25,000 KYUSHU, A.M.S. L872, 1945. Sheets 4045 II NE,
II NW, II SE, and II SW.

TASK ORGANIZATION

RCT 2 - Col Cutts, USMC

(a) BLT 1/2 - Lt Col Totman, USMC
1st Bn 2d Mar

(b) BLT 2/2 - Lt Col Rovetta, USMC
2d Bn 2d Mar
RMC 2d Mar

(c) BLT 3/2 - Lt Col Layer, USMCR
3d Bn 2d Mar

(d) RCT Hq Gp
H&S Co 2d Mar
Co "B" 2d Med Bn
Co "A" 2d Engr Bn
Co "C" 2d MT Bn
1st Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plat Sup Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn

1. See RCT 2 Cqn Plan No 17.

2. RCT 2 will continue reconnoitering, searching out caves,
air-raid shelters and installations, and maintaining
security patrols throughout the area of responsibility.

3. (a) BLT 1/2, continue to carry out occupational duties
within assigned area of responsibility as shown by Annex
(A)(Operation overlay).

(b) BLT 2/2, with RMC attached, continue to carry out
occupational duties within assigned area of responsibility
as shown by Annex (A)(Operation Overlay).
Serial 00107
SECRET

Operation Order RCT 2 No. 18 (cont'd)

3. (cont'd)

(c) BMT 3/2, employing 2d Tank Battalion as available, continue to carry out occupational duties within assigned area of responsibility as shown by Annex (A) (Operation Overlay).

(d) Hq Grp, continue operations as directed.

(x) (1) All patrols will direct attention toward locating hidden installations, arms, explosives or material endangering success of the occupation.

(2) All installations will be checked to determine the accuracy of the information contained in enclosures (A), (F), (C), (D) and (E) to G-2 Intelligence Memorandum dated 28 September 1945.

(3) Breech blocks may be removed from guns and retained in custody where it is believed necessary to render the weapon inoperable. No steps will be taken to render any weapon permanently inoperable.

(4) Maximum use will be made of interpreters for interrogation of civilians.

(5) Civil police will be used when possible to avoid spreading unnecessary alarm among civilians.

(6) No civilian houses will be searched, nor will civilians be disarmed except by civil police.

(7) Installations guarded by civil police do not require a Marine guard unless a special situation warrants duplication in which case a report will be made to this Hq.

(8) Once an area has been searched, periodic patrols will be dispatched to maintain security, unless otherwise directed.

(9) Billeting of guard detachments will be arranged by the unit concerned.
Serial COLOR
SECRET

Plan

Operation Order RCT 2 No. 13 (cont'd)


5. Sig Com

   (a) RCT2 Command Post at FAYIGO Barracks.

   (b) Sig Com in accordance Annex (F) to Div Opn Plan No. 14 - 45.

       (1) 2016 kcs assigned additionally as-5 Frcl frequency.

       (2) 28.0 mos assigned Regtl WP Co.

   (c) Sig supply and repair normal.


BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

MC QUILLEN

X

Annexes:

   (1) - Operation Overlay

Dist: "B"

OFFICIAL:

JEWELL

3
Serial 00108
SECRET

Change No. 1 to
Operation Order
RCT-2 No. 18

1. The following change to RCT-2 Opn O No. 18 is effective this date:

   (a) Para 1 under TASK ORGANIZATION, Para (d) RCT Hq Gp, delete 1st Plat Sup Co 2d Serv Bn.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

MC QUILLEN
X

DIST:
   Same as RCT-2 Opn O No. 18.

OFFICIAL:

   Jewell
   JEWELL

SECRET
Serial 00115
SECRET

Change Number 2 to

Operation Order
RCT 2
No 18

RCT 2, In the field,
21 November 1945.

1. The following change to RCT 2 Opn
0 No 18 is effective this date:

(a) RCT 2 Orn 0 No 18 is hereby
designated as RCT 2 Orn Plan No
18, and will be referred to as
such in the future.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL:

R. R. "JILDE,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

DIST: Same as RCT 2 Orn 0 No 18.

OFFICIAL:

Jewell
JEWELL
Serial C0106
SECRET

Operation Plan
RCT 2
No 19

In the field.
9 October, 1945.

Maps: 1:25,000 KYUSHU, A.M. S. L972, 1945.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex (A).

1. (a) See Operation Order No 18 and Intelligence studies and Information since issued.

(b) Elements of the V Amphibious Corps continue to occupy additional areas and to enlarge that portion of KYUSHU under surveillance and control of occupation forces.

(l) The 2d Mar Div, Rein., in addition to developing the occupation of assigned areas of responsibility, will defend against and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy any hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:

(a) Maintaining at all times in each regimental area of responsibility a force of at least one (1) Battalion prepared to move on two (2) hours notice, with one (1) company of such Battalion motorized, prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.

(b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the Division, a minimum of 75% of the command during hours of darkness.

(c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each separate billeting area, and area of responsibility.

(d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces or prevent the execution of assigned missions.

2. RCT 2 will be prepared to initiate action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of responsibility. All troops within assigned zone will be attached to RCT 2 for execution of this plan.
3. (a) BLT 1/2, be prepared on order to occupy and defend assigned area of responsibility, and/or dispatch troops to any other part of RCT 2 area of responsibility in order to suppress hostile activity.

(b) BLT 2/2, be prepared on order to occupy and defend assigned area of responsibility, and/or dispatch troops to any other part of RCT 2 area of responsibility in order to suppress hostile activity. On even days of the month the BLT will be maintained in a standby status ready to move on two (2) hours notice, with one company motorized prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.

(c) BLT 3/2, be prepared on order to occupy and defend assigned area of responsibility, and/or dispatch troops to any other part of RCT 2 area of responsibility in order to suppress hostile activity. On odd days of the month the BLT will be maintained in a standby status ready to move on two (2) hours notice, with one company motorized prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.

(d) RCT Hor Cp, less Co "A", prepare a plan for defense of RCT 2 billeting area and be prepared to execute same on order. Co "A", be prepared to establish and maintain traffic control posts throughout Regimental zone of responsibility in order to facilitate all vehicular or troop movements and to revert to parent control on order. Co "C" 2d MT En be prepared to furnish transportation for motorized company as required by para 3. (b) and (c) above.

(e) 2d Tk En, prepare a plan for defense of billeting areas and be prepared to execute subsequent missions on order.

(f) Engr Cp, prepare a plan for defense of billeting areas. Comprise portion of area reserve and be prepared to move elements on order.

(g) Serv Cp, prepare a plan for defense of billeting areas. Comprise portion of area reserve and be prepared to move elements on order.

(h) Div Trs, prepare a plan for defense of billeting areas. Comprise portion of area reserve and be prepared to move elements on order.
Serial 00106

SECRET

Operation Plan

RCT 2 No 19

(x) (1) All RLTs will be prepared to move on order to the support of other units of the RCT, and will become familiar with road nets throughout RCT area of responsibility with this purpose in view.

(2) Defence plans to be submitted to this HQ by 12 October, 1945, and rehearsals to begin on that date and held weekly thereafter. Attached units will notify this HQ whenever drills are to be scheduled. RL Ts and RCT HQ Gp will hold drills at direction of RCT Commander.

(3) On receipt of orders to execute this plan, RLT Commanders will alert their units and await further orders. All other units will immediately execute plan of billet defense.

4. a. One (1) U/F for all .30 cal. weapons, and one-half (1/2) U/F for mortars will be maintained at the Reg'tal S-4 and Yellow Beach dumps.

b. All other supply -- normal.

5. Sig Comm

a. RCT 2 CP at KAVGO Barracks.

b. Sig Comm in accordance with Annex (F) to 2d Mar Div Opn Plan No 14.

c. All RL Ts, 2d Tk Bn, and Engr Gp check into Reg'tal Command net (4805 kcs) and maintain continuous watch in event of execution of this plan. This is a CF net.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTIS:

F. J. MCQUILLEN
Lt Col, U.S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer

Annexes:
(A) - Task Organization
(B) - Operation Overlay
Serial 00106  
SECRET

Operation Plan  
RCT 2  No 19

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JENELL

3
Operation Plan

RCT 2 - Col Cutts, USMC

(a) BLT 1/2 - Lt Col Totman, USMC
    1st Bn 2d Mar (less Co "A")

(b) BLT 2/2 - Lt Col Rovetta, USMC
    2d Bn 2d Mar
    1st Plat RVC

(c) BLT 3/2 - Lt Col Layer, USMCR
    3d Bn 2d Mar
    2d Plat RVC

(d) RCT En Gr - Maj La Grone, USMC
    Co "A" (RCT 2 MF Co)
    H&S Co 2d Mar
    Co "B" 2d Med Bn
    Co "A" 2d Engr Bn
    Co "C" 2d MT Bn
    1st Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
    1st Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
    1st Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
    RVC (less 1st & 2nd Platoons)

(e) 2d Tk Bn - Lt Col Williamson, USMC

(f) Engr Gr - (less Dets) - Maj Kirkpatrick, USMCR
    2d Engr Bn (less Cos A, B and C)
    1296th Engr (C) Bn (USA)
    2d Pion Bn
    2d Plat Bomb Disposal Co VAC

(g) Serv Gr - (less Dets) - Col Martyr, USMC
    2d Serv Bn (less Dets)
    4th Sep Ldry Plat
    2d Med Bn (less Dets)
Operation Plan

3d Flt 4th Salv Rep Co
2d MT Bn (less Deta)
3666th 21st Trk Co (USA)
Div Sig Co

(h) Div Trs (less Deta) -

Div Hq Bn (less Deta)
Co "D" 3d MP Bn (Prov)
2d Mar Var Dog Plat
WOC-2
54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
496th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
83d Hq & Hq Det 11th Govt Co

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

F. J. MCQUILLEN
Lt Col, U.S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer

Distribution:
Same as Operation Plan RCT 2 No 19.

OFFICIAL:

James J. Jowett

Dec 31, 2012
Serial COLORS

S1256

Change Number 1 to Operation Plan

Not 2

In the Field.

11 October, 1945.

1. In paragraph 2, add:

This regiment will also be prepared to move on order to the support of other divisional units, and to this purpose will conduct reconnaissance of road nets throughout respective and adjacent areas of responsibility.

2. In paragraph 8 (x) add:

(c) Where rehearsals of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese nationals to become overly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of the drill.

BY ORDER OF臺灣總督:

G. MILLER

Distribution:

Same as "Not 2" Op Plan No 10.

OFFICIAL:

J. MILLER

6
Serial 00109

SECRET

Operation Plan

RCT 2

In the field.

- 23 October, 1945.

Map: 1:25,000 KVUSH, A.M.S. L878, 1945.

TACTICAL ORGANIZATION

RCT 2 - Col. Gurt, USMC

(a) BLT 1/2 - Lt. Col. Lotman, USMC
1st Bn., 2nd Mar

(b) BLT 2/2 - Lt. Col. Fuentes, USMC
2nd Bn., 2nd Mar
C Co., 2d Mar
D Co., 2d Mar
1st Plt., C Co., 2d Mar
1st Plt., C Co., 2d Mar
D Det, 1st Plt, Serv Cpt, 2d Serv Bn
Det B Div Sig Co.

(c) BLT 3/2 - Lt. Col. Bennett, USMC
3rd Bn., 2nd Mar

(c) P/Co. - Maj. Luster, USMC
3rd P/Co., 2nd Mar

(c) RCT Bn. CP - Capt. Dierick, USMC

1st Plt., CP, 2d Mar
Co. "A", 2d Mar
Co. "C", 2d Mar (lnea unit)
1st Plt., CP, 2d Mar
1st Plt., Serv Co., 2d Serv Bn
1st Plt., Automatic Weapons Co., 2d Serv Bn
Det A Div Sig Co.

1. (c) See Intelligence Studies and G-2 reports as issued.

(b) Elements of 2nd Mar Div continue to occupy additional areas to extend control over that portion of NVUSHT assigned by Amphibious Corps.

-1-

SECRET
2. RCT 2, in addition to maintaining surveillance of present area of responsibility will continue development of newly assigned area of responsibility by:

(a) Movement of one (1) BTR to KAOX to relieve 1st BN 197th Infantry (Army).

(b) Reconnaissance of NT-2-J-AKI to determine availability of billet facilities for RCT as required.

(c) Employment of remaining BTR as necessary to carry out assigned missions.

3. (a) BTR 1/2 continue to carry out occupational duties in assigned area of responsibility.

(b) BTR 2/2 report on order by transportation to be provided to KAOX to relieve the 1st BN 197th Infantry and maintain occupational control of that area.

(c) BTR 3/2 continue to carry out occupational duties in assigned area of responsibility and remain prepared to execute movement to destination to be announced.

(d) R/2-Y-FW-2 resume immediate control of area of responsibility of BTR 2/2 and carry out occupational duties in that area.

(e) RCT 2/2 carry out normal missions.

(f) (1) BTR Commanders will acquaint themselves with current training procedures with a view to being able to function independently in that respect.

(2) Newly assigned BTR areas of responsibility be assigned at a later date.

(3) Unit commanders will follow SIKH ARMY SOP (to be issued) in the selection of Japanese ordinance material.

(4) Maximum use will be made of civil police in carrying out occupational duties. Civilian police will not be searched nor will civilians be observed by U.S. Armed Forces.
(5) Guards will be established over installations or dumps that are of intelligence value, or of nature can cause to success of occupation.

(6) Once an area has been searched, surveillance will be maintained by use of periodic patrols. (Minimum patrol strength beyond range of immediate support; one (1) platoon.)

(7) Special emphasis will be placed on prevention of looting and the maintenance of a high degree of sanitation.

(8) Annex (C) to 2d Mar Div Opn 0 No 59 (Implementation of SCAP Directive to Japanese Government of the Oct46) will be initiated by inspection of all prisons and places of detention within assigned areas and by assumption of control of all records of organizations abolished under terms of the directive. Any effort on the part of any individuals or organizations to circumvent the directive will be immediately reported to this Hq.

(9) Unit commanders are authorized to confiscate all monetary or other negotiable assets, documents, pictorial records and photographic film of the Nazi party now in the hands of German nationals.

(10) All Japanese training aids such as target frames, silhouette targets, tables, benches and equipment, found in installations will be conserved and reported to this Hq.

(11) Seizure of any precious metals or foreign currency will be reported to this Hq immediately.

4. Admin - BLT 2/2 twenty (20) days resupply; two (2) U/F. Other units - normal.

5. (a) See Annex (B) (Signal Communication)

(b) Command Posts:

RCT 2: KAIKO Barracks - to be announced.
BLT 1/2: KAIKO Barracks - to be announced.
SLT 2/2: KAIKO Barracks - KANOA.
BLT 3/2: KAIKO Barracks - to be announced.
R/One: KAIKO Barracks - to be announced.

(c) See ITEM line.
Serial 00109
SECRET

Operation Plum
RCT 8 No 70

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CULTS:

F. J. H. KILLEN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Annexes:

(A) Operation Overlay (to be issued later)
(B) Signal Communication

Distribution:

"B"

OFFICIAL:

JEWELL
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SECRET

Operation Plan
RT? 2  No: 00

ANNEX (B)

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. Sls Cm in accordance with Annex (B) to 2d MarDiv Opn Order No 59 as supplemented by this annex, and with
C. S. Navy Communication Instructions.

2. Radio:
   (a) See Appendix I for Div Comm Net Coverage.
   (b) Hm 2/3 maintain continuous watch on Div Comm
       Net. (609 209 provided for this purpose; TBV provided
       as list route set).
   (c) Additional frequency assignment:

       2800 kes. - Port 1 Patrol Freq (to be utilized
       for patrol Cm. Senor station guarding net
       is NCS).

   (d) R. M. 4432, Chapter 4, Section D, Communication
       Instructions, to be strictly followed...

   (e) Optimum use to be made of U. S. repair personnel
       and equipment provided by Div Sig C.

3. Wire:
   (a) See Appendix II for Japanese wire network.
   (b) Use existing Japanese wire network:

       (1) Japanese tel phone lines terminated in
           instruments at KAMOYA, MIYAKOJO, and MIYAZAKI.

       (2) Japanese telephone lines utilized to be
           jumped around Japanese switchboards.

       (3) Japanese to maintain all Japanese telephone
           lines.

       (4) Local lines may be obtained from Japanese
           through local procurement force.

       (5) Japanese lines other than locals on request
           to RC-bc.

   (B) - 1

SECRET
Operation Plan

RCT 2 No. 20

(Annex (B) - Signal Communications)

6. Japanese telephone supervisors:

KANNOYA - Mr. ARATA
MIYAZAKI - Mr. YAMAZAKI

(c) Installation of local Marine telephone lines with mixer.

(d) KANNOYA Air Task Force has radio link with VAC;
VAC has radio link with 3d MarDiv.

KANNOYA Air Task Force - FRISCO
VAC - - - - TIGER

4. Message Center

(a) See Annex III for Air Control C manuals.

(b) Air Control Service in accordance with Mar Div Memo No. 27645.

(c) Cryptography:

(1) CSP 1600/1607 is prescribed as the primary
    cryptosystem.

(2) Modified Clear (Use of radio voice calls for
    units and shackle either for numeroia) may be used where
    urgency or lack of secure cipher
    diessel.

(3) Shackle Cipher r-l ist five (5) from Dec 6(A).
    effective. Change #1 to 2d MarDiv Gen Order
    1933-44 and Div Memo 1933-45 govern.

(4) Plain language versions of encrypted dispatches
    will not be transmitted over regular or non-military
    wire circuits. Subject to the above limitations
    RESTRICTED and CONFIDENTIAL traffic may be trans-
    mitted in Modified Clear over radio link voice
    circuits. Should it become necessary to retransmit
    such traffic by radio, it must be paraphrased and
    a new date/time group inserted prior to trans-
    mission.

(c) Classified traffic may be sent by mail in this

SECRET - - - Encrypted
CONFIDENTIAL - - Modified Clear
RESTRICTED - - Modified Clear

(B) - 2

SECRET
Serial CC109
SECRET

Operation Plan
BCT 2  No. 30  (Annex (3) - Signal Communications)

(f) All units prepare destruction bills covering all cryptos in accordance with ENC 5.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

F. J. MC QUILLEN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Appendices:
(I) - Radio Net
(II) - Telephone Net
(III) - Air Courier

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3

(B) - 3  SECRET
TELEPHONE NET

OMURA
OMUTA
NAGASAKI
KUMAMOTO
MIYAZAKI
KASOSHIMA
KANAYA

TO KANAYA (AIR TASK FORCE)

ANNEX B APPENDIX 2
Serial: C17

Change Number 1 to:

Operation "Ian"

RCT 2

In the field

28 October 1945

1. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RL 2/2 change "Det Div Fd Bn" to read "Det 8 Div Sig Co"

2. Under RCT 2 Hq Gp, change "Det Div Hq Bn" to read "Det A Div Sig Co"

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COL. W. O'DONNELL

W. WILDE
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Distribution:

OFFICIAL:

SECRET
Operation Order
RCT 2 No 1-45

RCT 2
In the field.
0800, 1 November, 1945.


TASK ORGANIZATION

RCT 2 - Lt Col O'Donnell, USMC

(a) BLT 1/2 - Lt Col Totman, USMC

1st Bn, 2d Mar
Det Co "A", 2d Engr Bn
2d Flat, CO "C", 2d MT Bn
Det 1st Serv Flat, 2d Serv Bn

(b) BLT 2/2 - Lt Col Rovetta, USMC

2d Bn, 2d Mar
Co "C", 2d Med Bn
Det Recon, 2d Med Bn
1st Flat, CO "C", 2d MT Bn
Det Co "A", 2d Engr Bn
Det 1st Flat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn
Det "A", Div Sig Co

(c) BLT 3/2 - Lt Col Bennett, USMC

3d Bn, 2d Mar

(d) RCT Hq Gp - Maj Col Bustard, USMC

H&S Co, 2d Mar
HMG, 2d Mar
Co "A", 2d Med Bn
Co "B", 2d Engr Bn (less Dts)
Co "C", 2d MT Bn (less 1st & 3d Plts)
1st Flat Ord Co, 2d Serv Bn
1st Flat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn (less Dts)
1st Flat Auto Repair Co, 2d Serv Bn
Det "A", Div Sig Co

1. (a) See Intelligence Studies and G-2 Reports as issued.

(b) Elements of 2d MarDiv continue to occupy additional areas and extend control over that portion of KYUSHU assigned by V Phib Corps.
Operation Order
RCT 2 No 1-45

2. RCT 2 (less BLT 2/2) will move to MIYAZAKI KEN, occupy and carry out Enforcement of Surrender Terms in the assigned area of responsibility.

See Annex (A) (Operation Overlay)

3. (a) BLT 1/2 continue to carry out assigned missions in present area of responsibility. When relieved by the 1st Bn, 10th Marines, duties in present area, and on order of 2d Var Div move to vicinity of MIYAZAKI and occupy new area of responsibility as assigned.

(b) BLT 2/2 continue to carry out occupational duties in assigned area of responsibility.

(c) BLT 3/2 on order move to vicinity of MIYAKONJO, occupy and carry out Enforcement of Surrender Terms in assigned area of responsibility.

(d) RCT Hq Gp on order move to vicinity of MIYAKONJO and carry out normal missions.

(x) (1) All previous orders as pertain to occupation duties and enforcement of surrender terms in assigned areas of responsibility remain in effect.

(2) Attention is directed to Annex (J) (Disposition of Surrendered Material Plan) to Division Administrative Order No 58-45, and to the functions of the Regimental Disposition Officer and Depot Control Group as governed by that plan.

4. (a) Supplies - Class I, II - thirty (30) days. Class II, IV - up to thirty (30) days, as available. Ammo - 2 U/F.

(b) Uniform - Utility with steel helmets; transport racks.

5. (a) See Annex (B) (Signal Communications) to RCT 2 Opn Plan No 30.
Operation Order

(b) Command Posts:

RCT 2: KAVIJO Barracks - to be reported
BLT 1/2: KAVIJO Barracks - to be reported
BLT 2/2: KACYA
BLT 3/2: KAVIJO Barracks - to be reported

(c) Use ITEM time.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL

R. B. WILDE,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer

Annexes:
(A) Operation overlay

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G

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JEWELL
Serial CO 1111
SECRET

Change No 1 to

Operation Order

RCT 2 No 1-45

1. Under TASK ORGANIZATION, (b) LT 2/2, add
"3rd Plt PMO".

2. Under (d) RGT Hq Co, change second line
to read: "PMO, 2d Plt [ loses 3rd Plt]."

3. See overlay attached.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL:

H. E. WILDE,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

Distribution:
"C"

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]

JEWELL
Operation Order

RCT 2

In the field.

16 November 1945

Page: KYUSHU, 1/25000, AMS, L672, 1945.
1:250,000 CENTRAL JAPAN, Second Edition,
L571 AMS 2.

Task Organization:

RCT 2 - Lt Col C‘Donnell, USMC

(a) PLT 1/2 - Lt Col Totman, USMC

1st Bn, 2d Mar
Det Co "A", 2d Engr Bn
Det 1st Serv Plat, 2d Serv Bn

(b) PLT 2/2 - Lt Col Rivetta, USMC

2d Bn, 2d Mar
Co "C", 2d Med Bn
1st Plat Co "C", 2d MT Bn
Det Co "A", 2d Engr Bn
Det 1st Serv Plat, 2d Serv Bn
Det "B", Div Sig Co
3rd Plat RVC

(c) PLT 3/2 - Lt Col Bennett, USMC

3rd Bn, 2d Mar

(d) RCT Hq Co - Maj Bustard, USMC

H&S Co, 2d Mar
RVC, 2d Mar (less 3rd Plat)
Co "B", 2d Med Bn
Co "A", 2d Engr Bn (less Det)
Co "C", 2d MT Bn (less 1st Plat)
1st Plat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn (less Det)
1st Plat Auto Repair Co, 2d MT Bn
Det Moen (US Army)
Det "A", Div Sig Co

1. (a) See Intelligence Studies and Reports as
issued.

(b) Elements of the 2d Mar Div, Reinf, con-
tinue to occupy additional areas of KYUSHU.
2. RCT 2 in addition to carrying out enforcement of surrender terms and developing the occupation of assigned areas of responsibility, will be prepared to defend against and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy any hostile groups attempting interference with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:

(a) Maintaining at all times in each battalion area of responsibility one (1) company prepared to move on one (1) hour notice, with one (1) platoon of that company prepared to execute a motorized movement on thirty (30) minutes notice.

(b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the RCT, a minimum of 75% of the command during the hours of darkness.

(c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the defense of each separate billeting area and area of responsibility.

(d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups are forming or endangering our forces within the assigned area of responsibility.

(e) Being prepared to move in order to the support of other divisional units.

For areas of responsibility see Change No. 1 to Operation Order No. 1-45.

3. (a) RLT 1/2 prepare a plan showing initial action to be taken against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within the battalion area of responsibility.

- 2 - SECRET
Operation Order
RCT 2

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(c) BLT 2/2 prepare a plan showing initial action to be taken against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within the battalion area of responsibility. All ground forces within the assigned area are attached to the BLT for the execution of this plan.

(c) BLT 3/2 prepare a plan showing initial action to be taken against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within the battalion area of responsibility.

(d) RCT Hq Grp prepare a plan for defense of the RCT Command Post, Co "C" 2d MT En be prepared to furnish BLT 3/2 sufficient transportation for the movement of one (1) company in five (5) hours notice.

(x) (1) Operation Plan No. 19 is superseded by this order and may be destroyed without report.

(2) Plans to be submitted to this Hq by 28 November 1945, and rehearse of defense plans will be announced by that date and continued weekly thereafter.

(3) Where rehearsal of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese nationals to become unduly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of such activity.

(4) Battalions will be prepared to move to the support of adjacent units, and in this purpose will conduct a road reconnaissance of adjacent areas of responsibility.

4. (a) Uniform - steel helmets, normal arms.

(b) Ammunition - 1 U/P for all weapons to be maintained in unit dumps.
Serial 00113
SECRET

Operation Order
RCT 2

5. (a) See Annex (B) Signal Communications to RCT 2 Opn Plan No. 20.
   (b) Command Post:
       RCT 2 - KIYAKONOJO (1417.50-0942.80)
       BLT 1/2 - MIYAZAKI (0633.10-0962.70)
       BLT 2/2 - KANOYA (1399.50-0901.50)
       BLT 3/2 - KIYAKONOJO (1417.50-0942.80)

   BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL:

   R. B. WILDE,
   Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
   Executive Officer.

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"E" plus "A"

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for Amico
JEWELL
3
SERIAL 00114
SECRET

CHANGE NUMBER 1 TO

OPERATION ORDER

RCT 2 No 3-45

1. The following change to RCT 2 Opn 0 No 3-45 is effective this date:

   (a) RCT 2 Opn 0 No 3-45 is hereby designated as RCT 2 Opn 0 No 2-45, and will be referred to as such in the future.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL:

   R. B. TILDE,
   Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
   Executive Officer.

DISTR.
   Same as RCT 2 Opn O No 3-45.

OFFICIAL:

   Jewell
   Jewel
   JEBBIL

3
OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

ANNEX (P)

S-1 REPORT
consists of

APPENDIX (I) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT.
APPENDIX (II) - PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT.
APPENDIX (III) - SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT.
APPENDIX (IV) - ADJUTANT'S REPORT.
ANNEX (B)

8-1 REPORT

APPENDIX (I) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT

One Military Government Officer was attached to RCT 2 about two weeks prior to departure from the NAGASAKI area. These, the duties were mainly concerned with procurement and control of civilian labor.

A Military Government unit had been functioning for approximately a month in the MIYAZAKI Prefecture before the arrival of the RCT. During this time they had issued instructions to the Prefectural Government as pertained to enforcement of the Surrender Terms, and conducted surveys of the agriculture, industries, and economics of the area. Liaison had been established with public officials and much preliminary work accomplished toward development of the occupation.

With the arrival of RCT 2, the Military Government Officers were attached to the RCT and ordered to the various BLT locations, the Regimental Military Government Section being located at MIYAZAKI near the MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE Offices. Their work is primarily concerned with maintaining liaison between unit commanders and the local civilian governmental agencies. Through the Military Government, arrangements are made for releasing military supplies, such as food, transportation, clothing, fuel, and medical supplies.

Close liaison is necessary among the Military Government, Procurement, and Dispositions sections. At times their work involves common civilian or military agencies and conflicting policies must be avoided.
APPENDIX (II) - PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT

Company "A" was designated as the unit responsible for Military Police duties in the area of responsibility while RCT 2 was in NAGASAKI. On moving to SOUTHERN KYUSHU, each battalion appointed Military Police to function in its respective area.

In establishing Military Police control, close liaison with the Japanese civil police has been of the greatest importance in supervising and controlling the movements and activity of the civilian population.

The Military Police operated under the supervision of the Provost Marshal for each area. A Military Police Station was located in each town or city in which troops are billeted.

Since the primary purpose of the Military Police is to keep our personnel out of trouble, the greatest number of posts were placed in heavily populated sections within the limits of the liberty areas. A system of foot and jeep patrols was found to be the most satisfactory. Foot patrols were established in districts most frequented by our troops, with the telephone as a means of communication with the Military Police Station. Radio jeep patrols covered the remainder of the area.

Incidents of trouble between civilians and members of the U. S. forces were few in number. The greatest number of offenders were apprehended for entering restricted areas.
APPENDIX (III) - SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT

There was little damage and no loss of equipment during the move from SAIPAN to NAGASAKI. Immediately upon occupation of KAMIGO Barracks, movie equipment was set up in two locations within the camp area. Initially only old films were available and those were of doubtful entertainment value. Later on, however, some additional films were obtained.

Six loudspeakers were located throughout the camp area, and recordings broadcast three periods daily. At times relay of radio broadcasts was possible, dependent on reception.

There were three basketball courts, with cement decks available to all units, and one field suitable for softball or football. Improvement was underway on other fields at the time the RCT received orders to move. In addition, fishing facilities were available at a lake near KAMIGO Barracks, and a skeet shooting range was built adjacent to the camp area.

Prior to leaving the NAGASAKI area, an educational program had been planned with each unit organizing its own instruction periods and arranging for instructors under the supervision of the RCT Special Services Officer. Applications for the various subjects had been collected and at the time of moving to Southern KYUSHU, the program was ready to begin pending arrival of textbooks.

In the RCT area of responsibility in Southern KYUSHU, more space was available for athletic fields and conditions more favorable for all types of outdoor sports. Movie films, had to be supplied by courier plane from NAGASAKI, arrived irregularly and were inadequate for such widely separated units.

Transfer of personnel required reorganization of the educational program. A selected number of officers and men were sent to conferences at VAC Headquarters and Sixth Army Headquarters for brief training in connection with the program.
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APPENDIX (IV) - ADJUTANT'S REPORT

During the preliminary planning period 1 August, 1945 to 18 September, 1945, the S-1 Section was engaged in routine duties, and preparation for embarkation. An embarkation plan was formulated in conformance with the tactical plan for the operation. All supplies and equipment for an extended operation were obtained, created, marked and made ready for transport. Embarkation rosters were prepared in accordance with existing instructions as was a tentative embarkation schedule. Liaison was established between ships and embarking units. Embarkation of troops, which began 9 September 1945, was complicated somewhat by the detachment of two hundred and seventy (270) men for return to the continental limits of the United States for discharge.

Upon landing at NAGASAKI a detachment from the S-1 Section went forward with a reconnaissance party and arranged for the billeting of the RCT at KAMIGO Barracks. For two days, the section was engaged in setting up a forward CP, making permanent billeting arrangements and general coordination of staff functions with the rear CP. Following this came a period of several days of unremitting application in order to bring routine personnel and administrative records and reports up to date.

During the preliminary planning period for the movement to Southern KYUSHU approximately three hundred (300) more men were detached and transferred to the U. S. for processing and discharge.

Upon arriving in the MIYAKOJO area it was found that the Military Government Section had done commendable work in connection with preparation of quarters and storerooms. Billeting the units and making them comfortable in their quarters was greatly facilitated due to this factor. The S-1 Section immediately set up a CP and for several days was occupied in bringing the unit records and reports up to date.

On 18 November the S-1 Section began to prepare for the interchange of personnel with the 5th Division. Rosters of men eligible for return to the United States and subsequent discharge were prepared and sent to Division Headquarters. It was found that approximately fifty percent of the personnel of the regiment would be involved in the interchange. Arrangements were made for the transportation, billeting and assignment of incoming personnel. BLT 1/2 personnel, plus one third of the RCT Headquarters personnel were interchanged on 23 November, and BLT 3/2 personnel, plus one third of the RCT Headquarters personnel on 25 November, 1945. The interchange of BLT 2/2 and the remainder of the RCT Headquarters personnel was scheduled for 1 December. There will necessarily be a considerable amount of screening and reassignment of personnel within the regiment after the completion of the transfer in order that the personal needs of the different units may be best fulfilled by the material on hand.
OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

ANNEX (C)

S-2 REPORT
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ANNEX (C)

S-2 REPORT

On the return of RCT 2 from the OKINAWA operation, efforts were made to increase the number of Japanese language personnel in the regiment, through regimental language schools. A school was started with twenty (20) students at the end of June, 1945 and continued with this number until 5 September. After the surrender of JAPAN, special efforts were made to accelerate this course. Students spent full time five days a week in classroom study, and in practice at the Internment Compound, Camp Susau, SAIPAN. It was impossible to increase further the number of students because of a lack of suitable instructors. Instruction of all troops of the RCT in use of the "Handbook of Japanese" was held by G-2 language personnel prior to embarkation.

When it became known that this RCT would take part in the occupation of JAPAN, intelligence personnel throughout the regiment were given special instruction in the geography, history, customs, laws, and government of JAPAN as well as military police duty and allied subjects. Emphasis was placed on training in civil intelligence work. A shortcoming in this instruction resulted from a lack of source material. It was necessary to conjecture and speculate to a certain extent, and for the purpose of clarifying the anticipated duties as far as possible, frequent conferences of the Regimental S-2 with the G-2 and conferences of the Regimental and Battalion S-2's were held.

On arrival at NAGASAKI, the Intelligence Section sent an advance detail ashore with representatives of the G-1, G-4, and Communications Sections to reconnoiter routes to YAMAMOTO Barracks, the proposed billeting area, and dock and warehouse space. Preliminary intelligence work consisted of reconnoitering the road net and verifying maps, determining the attitude of civilians and military Japanese, and locating and investigating high priority intelligence targets. BLT S-2's were responsible for intelligence functions in their sectors of responsibility, while the RCT S-2 coordinated and supervised intelligence functions in the regiment, collected and collated information. In cases where BLTs located more intelligence targets than they could cut under surveillance, the RCT S-2 section lent assistance with its personnel.

By the time RCT 2 left NAGASAKI, all intelligence targets assigned by G-2 in the area of responsibility, and located by elements of the RCT had been investigated and reported on. Experience proved that the most efficient means of investigating known intelligence targets was by jeep patrol. An officer,
CONFIDENTIAL

Interpreter, and one other intelligence man could cover several intelligence targets in a day, traveling by jeep. Intelligence personnel were attached to search patrols whenever possible, and located many additional targets to be investigated more thoroughly by jeep patrols.

Civilian opinion was regularly sampled by both officer and enlisted interpreters. Information so obtained was seldom considered reliable since it was a characteristic of the Japanese to give the answer that they thought the occupation forces wanted.

Children of high school age spoke quite freely about local affairs and installations in many cases where older Japanese professed ignorance. Released internees who remained in Japan furnished fairly reliable information on Japanese "thought trends." It was noted that higher ranking officers spoke more freely than low ranking personnel, apparently because they knew more and had a definite idea as to how much information they intended to give.

Before the regiment moved to southern KYUSHU, a Japanese speaking intelligence officer made a reconnaissance of the area and contacted local Japanese authorities. He instructed them to prepare lists of installations, both civil and military, inventories, desired Order of Battle information, maps showing defensive installations, and locations of units, and to provide necessary liaison personnel.

This was found to save a great deal of time and effort, and placed necessary information at the disposal of occupation troops immediately upon arrival. Information thus furnished was verified before search patrols attempted to uncover unreported installations.

Japanese reports were found to be generally accurate. There were omissions and mistakes, however, resulting from poor liaison between branches of the Japanese armed forces and between various civilian agencies. Misunderstandings also arose from the fact that the Japanese considered that once they turned a list in to one agency of the occupation forces, all agencies were cognizant. Unfortunately this was not always true, and constant efforts were necessary to maintain proper liaison between Military Government, OIC, Dispositions Sections, and Intelligence Sections.

Proper liaison between echelons and between sections within echelons was one of the greatest problems throughout. Initially there was considerable duplication of effort, which was
CONFIDENTIAL

finally minimized by frequent conferences between the S-2, higher and lower echelons, and other agencies within the regimental echelon. An Intelligence Plan and an Intelligence Guide were published within the regiment to clarify the functions of Regimental and Battalion sections, and proved successful.

Language personnel were assigned to MIs as available, and Japanese interpreters were also used where practicable. It was found necessary to conduct Japanese language schools in the regiment after arrival at JAPAN in order to relieve language personnel from non-intelligence functions. Instructors in these schools were local Japanese. Initially at KAGUCO Barracks, it was necessary to have a language man on duty at all times in the regimental CP to handle routine liaison with the Japanese, but when proper Japanese liaison personnel and interpreters were made available, this was no longer necessary. One Marine interpreter was always kept available at the CP for intelligence work.

Demobilization and disarmament had been nearly completed by the Japanese prior to the arrival of occupation forces, and this fact hampered efforts to obtain necessary information from certain key personnel who had been demobilized and had left the area. Verification of demobilization and arms collection reports was extremely difficult, and it was generally necessary to take the word of the Japanese.

Experience showed that a large field section was not necessary on the Regimental level, but that more clerks, draftsmen, and interpreters were needed. Teams of intelligence field section men were made available to the battalions, where they were assigned to patrols sent out by rifle companies. The regimental field section was finally cut down to a minimum size and the field sections within the battalions built up until they were overstrength.
OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

ANNEX (D)

S-4 REPORT

consists of

APPENDIX (I) – Transport Quartermaster Report.
APPENDIX (II) – Quartermaster Report.
APPENDIX (III) – Medical Report.
APPENDIX (IV) – Disposition Section Report.
APPENDIX (V) – Procurement Section Report.
APPENDIX (VI) – Motor Transport Report.
APPENDIX (1) - TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER REPORT.

A. Loading and Embarkation - SAIPAN to NAGASAKI.

A regimental staging area was assigned by 26 Mar Div on 28 August. Hauling of supplies and equipment to this area commenced the following day in sufficient time to adequately arrange material for proper loading.

Div Administrative Order No 58-45 and shipping allocations were received on 8 September, four days prior to loading.

Ships TQI's came ashore on Saturday, 8 September, and cargo and personnel allocations were made that day. Paper loading plans were accomplished by troop and ship TQI's during the period from Saturday afternoon until Sunday evening.

Loading of ships commenced on Monday, 10 September at the docks at TANAPAG HARBOR, SAIPAN. The following table shows ships, loading dates, and major units embarked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>DATE LOADED</th>
<th>MAJOR UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS G-NIKE APA 172</td>
<td>10-11 Sept</td>
<td>RCT 2, HT GP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS WERTHWEINTE APA 203</td>
<td>10-11 Sept</td>
<td>BLT 1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS BRAHMA APA 158</td>
<td>10-11 Sept</td>
<td>BLT 2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS LAKEER APA 189</td>
<td>10-11 Sept</td>
<td>28 BN., 10th VAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS VAUKESHA AKA 94</td>
<td>10-13 Sept</td>
<td>RV/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS TK-ELL AKA 80</td>
<td>11-13 Sept</td>
<td>Co &quot;A&quot;, 2d Engr BN.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Embarkation of personnel was completed 13 September 1945. Due to lack of dock space at TANAPAG HARBOR, 11 ships assigned RCT 2 could not be loaded simultaneously.

Because of the late arrival of assigned ships, paper loading plans were hurried. Assignment of additional cargo to RCT 2 by Division after the original allocations were made, tended to complicate loading. The lack of a shore party also necessitated special arrangements on short notice immediately prior to loading.

B. Loading and Embarkation - NAGASAKI to TAKASU.

BLT 2 with attached units, was loaded out on four LSTs at
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NAGASAKI on 25-26 October and completed unloading at TAKASU on 30 October.

RGT 2 Headquarters with attached units and FLT 3/2 was loaded out on four LSTs on 1-2 November and completed unloading at TAKASU on 7 November. The size and equipment of the units embarked and the 30 days of organic supplies made the problem of loading on four LSTs difficult. There was no time available for proper loading the ships of any of the three units which left NAGASAKI.

FLT 1/2 remained at KAMISHIO Barracks and was relieved by units of the 10th Marines on 5 November. FLT 1/2 was loaded out on four LSTs at NAGASAKI on 5-6 November and completed unloading at TAKASU on 12 November.
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APPENDIX (II) - QUARTERMASTER REPORT.

Preparations for an assault operation by the Quartermaster section of RCT 2, included survey of all items of clothing and individual equipment to make each man's gear as complete as possible.

Two sets of dungarees, one blanket and two pairs of socks per man were impregnated in June to provide insect repellent clothing.

Shoes and web equipment were kept in good condition by continuous repair trailer unit up until the time of loading for NAGASAKI.

Frequent unit inspections were made in accordance with Division and Regimental directives to insure that organizational and individual equipment was maintained at high standards.

Change from assault to occupational preparations did not materially affect the Quartermaster clothing and commissary sections, except that the issue of heavy winter clothing was begun soon after occupation of the NAGASAKI Area.
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APPENDIX (III) - MEDICAL REPORT

Prior to leaving SAIPAN for the occupation of KYUSHU, all personnel who had not previously been immunized within the past five months were immunized with cholera, typhus, and plague vaccines. Routine immunizations of tetanus toxoid, triple typhoid boosters and smallpox vaccinations were also given.

Upon arriving in NAGASAKI and after the designation of KAMIGO Barracks as the billeting area for RCT 2, medical personnel were required to spray the buildings with DDT in kerosene or Xylene concentrate, before occupation by our troops. The area was generally in poor sanitary condition with mosquito and fly larvae prevalent, and the dirty buildings filled with flea-ridden straw mats. The Japanese type beds required emptying and deodorizing with chloride of lime and oil before using. Drainage ditches were stopped up in need of repair. Water was supplied by a large, well constructed reservoir about a half mile from the camp. At the time of our arrival the water was not being treated, but chlorination of two and one-half parts per million at the source for several days made it palatable. Until this was accomplished, all water was boiled before being used.

The regimental aid station and attached medical company were established in an old Japanese dispensary. Patients requiring further treatment, not available at the medical company hospital, were sent to a Corps Evacuation Hospital located about twenty miles away. There was no occurrence of epidemics, nor any venereal disease reported while at KAMIGO Barracks. Health of the command was excellent, with less than one percent ineflectives.

With the occupation of the new area of responsibility in southern KYUSHU, many of the same medical problems were encountered. By previous orders, the Japanese had commenced cleaning the barracks and improving the area generally. Early displace-ment of one BCT to KANoya necessitated attachment of an additional medical company to the RCT, which increased the medical facilities to adequately handle all units of the regiment in spite of the distance between locations. Evacuation of patients was accomplished by a hospital train every third day, or in emergency by plane.
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APPENDIX (IV) - DISPOSITION SECTION REPORT.

Organization for disposition of Japanese war material commenced with issuance of Regt Admin O 1-45 which directed that one Depot Control Unit be organized for each FLT. In each FLT the organization varied, but basically it was formed around the assault platoon in each case because of the knowledge of demolitions of the men in that organization. It is desirable to have each Depot Control Unit divided into several teams, each headed by an officer, in order to work different areas simultaneously.

One of the first things that needed to be done was to limit the number of people who could go to Japanese dumps and get material, especially trophy items. Passes were issued with a Japanese translation on the back, five to each Depot Control Unit, and an order issued to the Japanese Military and Naval forces and the civil police in the regimental area of responsibility concerning the safekeeping of dumps and storage areas not yet taken over by occupation troops. On this order was a facsimile of the pass.

In order to make use of Japanese army personnel for assisting in disposition, an order was issued the 57th Army on 15 November directing that a Japanese officer be furnished each Depot Control Unit to obtain labor, drivers, mechanics, and technicians as required, to arrange for rail and water transportation, and generally assist in disposition. The army was directed to provide 20 trucks for each Depot Control Unit initially with mechanics and maintenance facilities.

Complete demobilization was ordered by 1 December 1945 and the civil police have already been directed and plan to take over the guarding of Japanese dumps on that date.

Requests for Japanese war material for use of own troops were made through the S-4. Requests by civilians are made through the Ken Government concerned, via the military government to the Disposition Officer.
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APPENDIX (V) — PROCUREMENT SECTION REPORT.

Various types of Japanese civilian supplies have been procured by this organization in accordance with Annex K, (Revised), to Division Administrative Order Number 58-45, and the various subsequent revisions thereof, including Division Memorandum Number 258-45.

At KAMICO Barracks, NAGASAKI, all procurement by units of RCT 2 was handled by the Regimental S-4. Since dispersion of the PLTs, the First and Second Battalion have set up their own procurement boards in compliance with Division and Regimental directives and submit completed procurement forms to higher echelon for record.

The procurement officers of each unit function in close liaison with the Unit S-2 and military government officer in order to keep informed on all available sources of civilian supplies.

All over one-hundred procurement transactions have been completed by RCT 2 and subordinate units since the initiation of the procurement system. Virtually every type of supplies and equipment have been obtained when necessary, ranging from items of furniture to horses.

Most of the Japanese supplies which have been procured come within the general category of building and construction materials. The bulk of the lumber, nails, paint, plumbing and electrical fixtures, and metal used in the repair and building of the camps occupied by units of RCT 2 have been from Japanese sources.
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APPENDIX ("I") - MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT.

All vehicles of RCT 2 were maintained in readiness for combat operations, up until cessation of hostilities. This involved installation of machine gun mounts, camouflage painting, and waterproofing prior to loading.

Drivers schools for all vehicle-drivers of the Regiment including weasel-drivers, were held at SAIPAN to instruct personnel in proper vehicle operation and maintenance.

Second echelon maintenance was carried out in compliance with current directives and orders at SAIPAN and at MACASAKI, and is being carried out under the present circumstances which require that vehicles be sent from RCT 1/2 at MIYAZAKI to the Regimental Motor Transport Officer at MIYAKO MOJO, as spare parts, skilled mechanics and repair equipment are not available at the battalion billets.

Since the landing at MACASAKI, Co "C" 2d MT Bn have provided much-needed heavy transportation and third echelon maintenance facilities. However, the shortage of spare parts which has always been critical has been a constant problem and it is strongly recommended that an ample stock of parts be carried by the A&R Section of Motor Transport to shorten the period of down-lining a vehicle.

Tire patches have been another item of critical shortage and has handicapped occupation duties to some extent.
OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

ANNEX (1)

COMMUNICATIONS REPORT
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ANNEX (E)

COMMUNICATION REPORT

During the planning phase for an assault landing on KYUSU, training of communication personnel was marked by increased attention to field communication procedures. Team training was stressed during various command post exercises. On 22 July 1945, all communication sections within RCT 2 participated in a division communication command post exercise held in the field under combat conditions, and with planned, dummy traffic used to place maximum loads on communication channels. Further scheduled division command post exercises were cancelled at the cessation of hostilities with the Japanese.

Preparations were then begun for the occupation of Japan. All units within the combat team had been brought to excess of T/C strength by training line personnel to perform communication duties. All major items of signal equipment were made available. Communication annexes and signal operating instructions were issued in time for them to be passed to subordinate units and a series of conferences of communication officers demonstrated that the basic communication annexes were clearly written and contained the essential information.

The landing of the ship for the movement to JAPAN was conducted under the supervision of the assistant regimental communication officer. All gear needed for an assault landing and for five days operation ashore was placed so to be readily available. A joint Marine-Navy message center was established, while ship to ship communications was furnished by the Navy. During the shipboard movement to JAPAN all communication personnel were scheduled as to the general plan, the geography and location of the target, duties of occupational forces, and the details of the communication plan.

RCT 2 landed at NAGASAWI prepared for combat operations if necessary. Ship to shore control was provided by Marine radio nets. Initial contact ashore was by radio and runner only, but wire communication with the forward CP at KAMO Barracks was established the day after the landing. The rear CP remained at DEJIMA Wharf for three days. During this time an advance party consisting of the assistant regimental communication officer and half of each section proceeded to the billeting area and commenced installations there. The movement to KAMO Barracks was under routine communication procedure, and installations there were set up in accordance with the standard plan for a camp communication system. RCT 2 maintained contact with the 2nd Marine Division by utilizing three telephone lines, superimposing a telegraph channel on one of these lines, and maintaining a continuous watch on the division command net.
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Information as to the details of the movement of RCT 2 from KAMISO Barracks to the Southeastern part of KUREFU was available to communication officers in sufficient time to enable them to make plans for the unusual communication requirements imposed by the distance between the headquarters of both higher and subordinate units. This move was made by LSTs and normal loading, shipboard, and unloading procedures governed.

Radio equipment afforded the infantry regiment by the Tables of Allowances was not sufficient to provide adequate and reliable radio communications. To overcome this, the Division Signal Officer provided RCT 2 with two SCR-299 radios, one TBW radio, one SCR-193 radio, and ten additional TCS radios. This equipment, in addition to that normally allowed, proved sufficient to carry out the radio mission. Also the radio jeeps acquired by the disembarkment of attached ASCC teams proved of value for patrols and Military Police notes.

This regiment used telephone lines installed and maintained by the Japanese for communications between MIYAKOJO, NAGASAKI, KTIMOTO, MIYAZAKI, and KANUYA. These lines were unreliable at first but supervision by Marine communication officers increased their efficiency. RCT 2 was issued twenty three TP-9, amplifier telephones which afforded personal to person calls between division headquarters and RCT headquarters. These phones are seriously affected by unfavorable atmospheric condition, but nevertheless they are extremely valuable and are the only means by which direct telephone communication can be made with Division Headquarters at NAGASAKI.

Division provided an air courier service to KANUYA and MIYAKOJO every other day, and special plane service upon request. Message runs to MIYAZAKI were made by train.

It is felt that the normal allowances of communication personnel and equipment are sufficient to perform the missions assigned with the additional radio equipment aforementioned.
6TH MARINES OPERATIONS REPORT

ON

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

FROM

25 SEPTEMBER, 1945

TO

30 NOVEMBER, 1945.
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH MARINES,
2D MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

8 December, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division.


1. The subject report is submitted herewith in compliance with Division Special Order Number 181-45.
6TH MARINES OPERATIONS REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

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APPENDICES

1. Dispatch summaries (1 copy submitted)

2. Periodic reports (1 copy submitted)

3. OPN orders
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PART I PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

1. PREPARATION FOR THE OPERATION

   a. Preparation for the forthcoming operation had been proceeding on a combat basis prior to the termination of hostilities and the capitulation of the Japanese. After the cessation of hostilities, preparations had to be made for an "occupation" operation. As a result, the training trend changed on 31Aug45, when emphasis began to be placed on military police duties, military government and civil affairs and interior guard duty as well as normal military training.

   b. On 5Sep45, 2dMarDiv AdmO No. 58-45 was received and physical preparation for breaking camp and subsequent embarkation began.

   c. Quartermaster and T&G sections began to inventory and to spot gear on the docks during the same period in preparation for "loading out" the regiment.

    (1)  d. Additional "on the spot" occupation preparations were made when an advance party from RCT-6 landed at the target area on 16Sep45. The mission of this party was to locate suitable billeting, docking and storage areas and to make reconnaissance of the road net, and communication facilities.

    (2)  e. Several reconnaissances of the area were necessary before adequate storage and billeting areas could be located. Building and barracks selected were still being occupied by the Japanese. Orders were issued through the Prefectural Governor to vacate these structures by 23Sep45. One large ship outfitted warehouse was found to be large enough to accommodate all supplies of RCT-6 as well as certain additional amounts of Division gear. Docking areas for AKA's and APA's were obtained on 23Sep45 by the S-3 through cooperation with the Port Director. Roads which had been blocked by debris were cleared and made passable for two way traffic by the Japanese. Crane operators were made available by the Japanese and two hundred Japanese laborers were obtained on a twenty-four hour basis to assist in unloading the regiment.

2. PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION
a. The Regimental Planning Room opened on 6Sep45 following the receipt of 2MarDiv Operation Plan No. 14 on 6Sep45. All elements of the Regimental Staff were given access to the room. RCT-6 Operation Plan No. 3-45 and Regimental AdmO No. 3-45 were published and distributed by 8Sep45 to all units of the task organization.

b. Planning for the operation had to be "dualistic" in nature in as much as the status of the actual landing was in doubt. The Regiment had to be prepared to make an opposed landing against the enemy's homeland as well as an unopposed occupation landing. As the time for embarkation neared it became evident the Japanese resistance to the landings was improbable. Nevertheless, plans for both an opposed and an unopposed landing were retained.

PART II TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

1. TRAINING

a. Prior to the end of the war on 14Aug45, training of the regiment had been proceeding upon a normal combat preparation basis. Training had advanced as far as Regt CPX's, air-ground Liaison Problems and joint Tank-Infantry tactics.

b. Commencing on 24Aug45 and continuing through 12Sep45 training was planned with a view to acquainting all members of the regiment with the problems of occupation. During this period the following subjects were stressed: Military Courtesy and Disciplines, Military Police Duties, Military Government and Civil Affairs and Interior Guard Duties.

c. Following embarkation of RCT-6, training in what to expect from Japan and the Japanese continued. Normal military training continued but additional emphasis was laid on subjects calculated to provide the individual Marine with knowledge basic to his new role as a member of an occupying force. The following are some of the more important of the courses of instruction:

- Malaria and plague prevention and control.
- Rules of land warfare.
- Correct relations with the population of Japan and Japanese customs.
- Interior Guard Duty.
- Post embarkation responsibilities.
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2. ORGANIZATION

a. During the movement to Japan and the initial occupation stages therein, the RCT-6 Task Organization was composed of the following:

RCT-6, Reinf, Col Gregon A. Williams, USMC.

(a) BLT 1/6 - LtCol Richard D. Strickler, USMC
1stBn, 6thVar
AGL Team
SFC Party

(b) BLT 2/6 - LtCol James R. Clark, USMC
2dBn, 6thVar
AGL Team
SFC Party

(c) BLT 3/6 - LtCol George D. Rich, USMC
3rdBn, 6thVar
AGL Team
SFC Party

(d) RCT Weapons Group - Capt William L. Cerutti, USMC

(e) RCT Service Group - Capt Harris H. Davis USMC
Co B, 2dEngrBn
Co A, 2dMTBn
3rdPlat, OrdCo, 2dServBn
2dPlat, ServCo, 2dServBn
2dPlat, SupplyCo, 2dServBn
2dPlat, Automotive Repair, 2dMTBn

(f) RCT Hq Group - Capt Earl C. Dunn, USMC
Hq & ServCo, 6thVar
Scouts and Snipers Plt, 6thVar (MP)
AGL Team
SFC Party
A/Field Co

- 3 -
Following the initial occupation stages of the operation the necessity of maintaining some of the combat adjuncts of the Combat Team lessened and on 1Oct45 AGL and SFC teams were either transferred back to their parent organizations or absorbed into the 6th Marines. More recently the Task Organization has been further changed by the return of the 2d Field Supply Co to the 2d ServBn, on 2Nov45.

PART III OCCUPATION OPERATIONS NARRATIVE

1. Occupation operations of the 6th Marines have been conducted under the general guidance of both the S-2 and the S-3 staff sections. Digested patrol and operations reports are given chronologically in the following paragraph. Suitable notation has been made to differentiate between S-2 and S-3 reports. For full coverage of these operations reference should be made to the S-2 Periodic Report or to the S-3 Operations Report for the desired period.

2. The following is a digest of the S-2 and S-3 Operations reports, all map references are to KYUSHU: 1:25,000 A.M.SL 872.

23Sep45 S-2 Element of RCT-3, including 1/3, 2/3, 3/3, less rear echelons, landed on the west side of NAGASAKI, KO at 1300 in area of (1293-1061). The regimental CP was established in the warehouse at TATIGAMI Fitting out wharf. Unloading ships started immediately.

24Sep45 S-2 Inspection of coastal guns and searchlight at (1294.2-1053.20) in the company of S-2 officers revealed that the breech blocks had been removed and that the position was under guard.

24Sep45 S-3 All units of RCT-3 other than rear echelons and ships platoons ashore. Supplies and gear being unloaded.

25Sep45 S-2 A patrol was sent through sector of responsibility to prevent looting of intelligence items. Found triple AA mount, ammunition and extensive tunnels at (1292.61-1291.38). All gun positions have been checked and found to comply with the surrender terms.

25Sep45 S-3 Advance echelons of 2/3 and 3/3 moved forward, to their new and permanent billeting areas. Unloading continued.
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258cp45 S-2 Reconnaissance and inspection of intelligence targets was completed in two phases. The first, under the direction of the S-2, has been the verifying, locating, and inspecting of Japanese military positions. Positions at the following coordinates were checked:

1. (1288.00-1080.50)
2. (1290.00-1059.50)
3. (1290.00-1058.90)
4. (1293.60-1062.90)
5. (1290.30-1064.50)
6. (1292.20-1064.90)

The second phase has been the inspection of all buildings in this area for items of intelligence value. Documents were found and inspected by G-2 Language Personnel.

28csp45 S-3 all of 3/3 and 2/3, with the exception of one (1) Company each remaining as rear echelons, in new areas.

27csp45 S-2 Lt. BRIEDA accompanied by Capt OESUHA of the Japanese Navy inspected Naval dumps (1293.20-1061.70) and (1293.40-1052.40). Japanese were instructed to maintain a guard on the dump until further orders from this Headquarters. The documents found on 28csp45 were examined by a translation team from Division Language. Results turned in to G-2.

27csp45 S-3 Regimental Hq, 2/3/3 and 3/3/6 moved from warehouse to their new permanent billeting areas. Unloading completed and battalions squaring away.

28csp45 S-2 Party of one officer (Asst S-2) and Capt YAMAKOTA of the Japanese Navy inspected seven Japanese ammunition dumps in area (1292.70-1061.50). Overlay of ammunition positions checked and given to Division Headquarters. Captain YAMAKOTA knew nothing of any other dumps other than the seven mentioned above. Party of one officer and two men checked gun positions at (1292.50-1069.30). Found no guns. This was verified by natives of the immediate area. Found small underground factory at (1292.30-1059.40). It had been moved from the South after atomic bomb raid. Party of one officer and five enlisted men checked gun positions at (1292.30-1051.60); found weapons, extensive tunnels, and large quantity of ammunition.

29csp45 S-2 Checked gun positions at (1292.50-1069.30) and found no guns. Report considered false unless verified by Div Headquarters. Documents in building at (1293.30-1062.50) were checked by Division Language Officer. Possible valuable documents are being held by this Headquarters. Ammunition and guns located in dumps (See 28csp) were checked again. Information gained as to what ships they were taken from. Seven sealed cavs cut out of a total of nineteen at (1292.00-1052.50). Open caves revealed nothing. Sealed cavs will be investigated. Burned Japanese rifles found at (1290.6-1052.90) revealed no distinguishing characteristics other than regulation Japanese Arm, issue.
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30Oct45 S-2 Party of one officer and two men found guns and ammunition at (1293.95-1067.09). Position marked by white flag. Breach blocks removed and stored with guns in small building on reverse slope of hill.

S-3 Forward elements of 1/6 moved to their permanent billeting area.

100ct45 S-2 Checked intelligence targets in S-2 Intelligence Plan dated 28-Sep. Found all reports on industry and damage to be correct. Detailed report on conditions and changes made at all locations forwarded to Division S-2.

40ct45 S-2 An intelligence party of one officer and four enlisted men supervised the removal of all civilian arms from schools located at (1293.20-1061.21), (1293.25-1063.16), and (1293.85-1062.73) by the Japanese Police. Arms were stored in Police Station at (1293.60-1063.35). Marine KP's on post at station are guarding weapons. Current total of weapons collected is 1778. A patrol checked Japanese Army dump No. 1 and found everything in accordance with Japanese inventory of 23Sep. An aerial reconnaissance party of two officers checked roadnet from NAGASAKI-TOKITSU-NARAHATSU-NAGAURA-KATAMOT-KOIDAKE and GIUSKI.

30ct45 S-2 Patrol sent to Ks 1-0 SHI to check material at Japanese Army dump at HAGI. Everything accounted for as in Japanese inventory of 23Oct45. Patrol examined arms at FUKUDA School (1293.15-1062.49) and in school (1293.15-1062.49) at TOGASHI. Police given custody of weapons. Reported one YAMAGUCHI to CIC on his suspicious activities.

40ct45 S-2 Submitted statement to Chief of Police whereby he states that he has done everything in his power to find all civilian arms in this area. Located former Secretary of Military Affairs of FUKUDA. Reported name and address to CID.

50ct45 S-2 CIC reported to this office and then visited one YAMAGUCHI's place of business. (See 30ct) YAMAGUCHI had left for the day. Will investigate on 50ct. Collection of weapons at TOKI-TSU and SATO by Japanese Police began today.

30ct45 S-2 Weapons collected and stored in Police Station at (1293.30-1063.30). Under harbor guard. CIC reported on activities of one SHINODA former Secretary of Military Affairs at FUKUDA.

30ct45 S-2 Investigation of the looting and destruction of installations in the OHTA Shipyard area (1293.6-1060.3) is being conducted this date.

100ct45 S-2 Investigated village of SHI 1 and vicinity.

Found two abandoned 12.7cm gun positions at (1284.50-1937.70). Weapons here were collected and sent to STH by Japanese Police.

100ct45 S-3 Foot patrol from 3/6 made reconnaissance of battalion and regt le defense area.
CONFIDENTIAL

13Oct45 S-2 Following intelligence targets investigated:
1. Merchant Marine Barracks (1292-1061)
2. Tatogamimachi Barracks (1292-1060.5)
3. Shojukawa Barracks (1292.5-1060.60)
4. Kokukihana Oil Piers (1292.6-1059.6)
5. Hiraishi Engine Works (1293.7-1062.9)
6. Akunoure Engine Works (1293.1-1062.1)

Investigated report of rifle fire in area (1292.05-1050.3).

Unable to gain information.

S-3 All units of the regiment held billet defense rehearsals and tested billet defense plans which had been previously prepared.

14Oct45 S-2 Inspection of Submarine Cable Terminal and Repair Station at (129.5-1050.30) revealed the following info:

The station is a branch office of the YOKOHAMA-
TOKYO Imperial Cable Company and has 300 miles of cable on hand.

On SAKAI CO, the Chief Engineer, is in charge at present. The
cable is in operation between here and YOKOHAMA and OSAKA.

15Oct45 S-2 Routine checks of all previously inspected intelligence targets made to ascertain their present condition.

Everything remains the same as previously reported. Japanese
storage of land mines located at (1292.00-1050.30) investigated
and found dugout sealed. Suggest authorities be contacted
and situation investigated. All small boats on western shore of
NAGASAKI Bay have been inspected and found lacking of intelligence
information.

S-3 Rear echelon of 1/3 moved forward to their
permanent billeting area.

16Oct45 S-2 Check-up on Mitsubishi Electrical Company
(1293.50-1052.70) revealed present number of employees and also
number of employees during the war. Chief Engineer attended
school in the U.S. He informed us that the Japanese Navy had
ordered all documents curried after the surrender and had been
put into effect. Radio and receiver set located at (1293.90-1053.40).

17Oct45 S-3 Intelligence party checked on curriculum at
NAGAHI school (1293.80-1053.20). Everything adhered to surrender
terms.

18Oct45 S-2 Patrol checked the Submarine Detector Station
on IKE-SHIMA and OIYAMA.

3-5 Foot patrol from 3/3 made Ron at (1292.35-1053.40), (1293.7-1053.9). Foot patrol from 1/3 proceeded on foot N
on W Coast road to TEGUSA. Entire road was found passable for
6x6, but was quite narrow.

19Oct45 S-2 Reconnaissance of main coast road between CURA
and TEGUSA. Police notified to turn in all precious metals and
foreign currency and to state location where items were found.
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190ct45 S-3 Foot patrol from 3/6 made Rcn of (1292.2-1063.8) (1292.1-1064.2) and (1292.2-1063.4).

200ct45 S-2 Survey begun on all manufacturing and processing plants in this area to determine whether reconversion had begun, and what future plans were. Patrol dispatched to the Northern sector of the area. They will for three days contact all village officials and gather all intelligence information available. Chief of Police has started search for all precious metals in this area.

S-3 Foot patrol from 1/6 proceeded N on road from OURA to KOE, then NE on road to point Approx at (1289.3-1065.9), where road become a trail. Motorized overnight patrol, consisting of 10 1-Ton 4x4 trucks left Regt CP to proceed via the E Coast Road to OODAKA. Last Comm from patrol places them at OODAKA.

210ct45 S-2 Patrol in Northern sector has contacted villages on the West Coast of DOPU Peninsula today.

S-3 Motorized patrol went from OODAKA to SETO to KB1, where a landside interfered with further travel. Patrol returned to OODAKA to spend night.

220ct45 S-2 Patrol in Northern sector has contacted villages on the West Coast of DOPU Peninsula today.

S-3 Motorized patrol went from OODAKA to SETO to KB1, where a landside interfered with further travel. Patrol returned to OODAKA to spend night.

200ct45 S-2 Patrol in Northern sector has contacted villages on the West Coast of DOPU Peninsula today.

S-3 Motorized patrol went from OODAKA to SETO to KB1, where a landside interfered with further travel. Patrol returned to OODAKA to spend night.

S-3 Patrol which left for OODAKA on 20ct left OODAKA at 0735 and arrived at Nagasaki at 1145. All communities which they visited seemed friendly except SETO, and HAT WAGA, the chief of Police seemed somewhat hostile to the occupation forces. Foot patrol from 1/6 left CURA and went to (1290.3-1063.9), following good trail. Patrol in 1/4-ton truck from 3/6 went to (1292.3-1064.3), (1292.3-1064.3), and (1292.0-1062.0).

220ct45 S-3 Foot patrol from 3/6 went to (1293.7-1063.9), (1292.9-1063.1) and (1291.0-1064.7). Foot patrol from 3/6 reconnoitered (1291.75-1062.45) and (1292.30-1063.40). Foot patrol from 1/6 reconnoitered gun posi at (1239.7-1063.0), and radar posi at (1290.3-1064.7).

240ct45 S-2 One officer and enlisted interpreter interviewed former British POW at NAGURA. A full report on Mr. A. F. GABB, 70 years of age, was dispatched to Division Headquarters for action. Discovery of underground storage containing three tons of dynamite at (1290.50-1062.50). Complete inventory of public holdings in OUKUDA made by 1st Battalion, Sixth Marines.

S-3 Foot patrol from 1/6 inspected fishing craft at KOURA, KO1, TAKITOWARA, TEI1. All craft were found registered with Japanese, but none have received Info nor complied with Div order requiring registration with Mil Govt.

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26Oct45 S-3 Patrol, from 3/6 reconnoitered (1292,5-1054,2). Patrol from 5/5 reconnoitered (1292,3-1054,7). Patrol from 1/8 to KURU and thence NE to road beginning at (1283,1-1054,7).

23Oct45 S-4 Police Chief of FUKUDA reported lack of precious metals, etc. in his area. Intelligence men checking his reports. TOKITSU and SETO are still working on their report. Patrol covered small boats at FUKUDA.

S-3 Patrol from 1/8 found cinema (5-660) at (1287,30-1053,40). Patrol for 3/8 located 500-lb bomb at (1290,9-1051,61). Patrol from 5/8 inspected Go Defense Area at (1293,00-1058,00). Patrol from 5/6 checked boats at (1292,2-1053,9), (1292,9-1053,1), (1291,6-1054,7) and (1293,2-1053,9).

22Oct45 S-2 Raw metals dump at (1292,25-1055,75) was maintained by Mitsubishi and was under guard by Japanese. No metals have been removed since surrender. Road net information secured on NW coast road.

22Oct45 S-2 Routine patrolling throughout West shore area. No new information obtained other than launching of two ships at shi-ways (1293,00-1051,00). Investigation is underway to find information on ships. Authorized patrol to North sector as far as SETO. Still institute industrial survey in this sector.

S-3 authorized patrol left KAGASAKI and proceeded to TOKITSU, KURAMATSU and H6, returned from 1/8 to KURAMATSU and is planning to spend the night in SETO.

Patrol from 2/8 to Target square (90-60) and (91-61) to investigate area. Patrol from 3/8 to investigate caves in area.

30Oct45 S-2 Two ships launched on 29Oct east DOMIN HARU and HIRACO HARU. All information obtained as to owners, weight, for future use etc. British subject A. F. GAEB was contacted and he submitted statements to S-2. All information forwarded to CIC for thorough investigation of Japanese landing of supplies.

Patrol to SETO returned with road net information, and had instituted industrial survey.

S-3 authorized patrol mention on 28Oct45 left SETO at 0900 and proceeded to KURASAKI, KURASAKI, H6, and KAGASAKI. Patrol arrived at KAGASAKI at 1540. Patrol from 3/8 reconnoitered (1292,3-1051,4), (1293,3-1051,4), (1292,0-1052,8) and (1292,3-1051,9). Patrol from 5/8 reconnoitered target square (91-51). Patrol from 2/8 conducted reconnaissance in target square (92-37).

30Oct45 S-2 Check made on Army dump at (1292,00-1050,50). Everything found as listed. Arm positions located at (1290,50-1058,36). Received formal statement from former B2V A. F. GAEB who said that Japanese had arms, fuel, supplies, etc. in trucks that were not to be turned in to American forces of Occupation. CIC is in full charge of the case.
31Oct 45 S-3 Patrol from 2/6 investigated area (91-61) and found 75 air raid shelters. Patrol from 2/6 investigated area (92-51) and found one empty gun emplacement and two empty underground rooms. Patrol from 3/6 reconnoitered 9d nets in areas (70-89), (70-90), (58-90), (52-89), (51-59), (71-90).

1Nov 45 S-2 Routine patrol found everything in order on KAI KI I SHIMA.

S-3 Patrol from 1/6 to (58-90), (56-91), (58-90) and (58-91). Patrol from Wons 3 to (1299.5-1068.7). Patrol from 1/3 to (92-82).

2Nov 45 S-3 Patrol from 3/8 investigated area (59-39), (70-89), (70-90), (59-91). Patrol from 2/3 investigated area (59-39). Patrol from 2/6 reconnoitered area (91-55) and found 15 air raid shelters and 3 empty gun emplacements. Patrol from 2/6 reconnoitered area (92-56) and found 15 air raid shelters.

4Nov 45 S-2 Investigation began on location, size, etc. of any Japanese radio equipment. To date only one station has been located; the SHIMA station at (1285.50-1067.80).

5Nov 45 S-2 The presence of another radio station has been reported in vicinity of area (1280-1093). Industrial survey of Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd. now complete.

S-3 Patrol from 3/5 reconnoitered areas (1291-1067), (1292-1067), (1290-1068), (1291-1068), and (1292-1068). Patrol from 2/3 reconnoitered areas (1291-1064) and (1252-1064). Patrol from 2/5 reconnoitered areas (1291-1068) and (1292-1068).

3Nov 45 S-2 All information on industrial survey within limits of TOKYO district complete. Also report on Mitsubishi Electrical Company, Ltd. Patrol investigated KYUSHU Electrical Power Plant at (1292.90-1068.49) and obtained all necessary information.

S-3 Patrol from 1/3 went by LOC to SHIMA then to (1295.9-1068.70) to check barracks, then to EIKO. Patrol from 2/5 left for (1251.0-1068.27). Patrol from 2/3 reconnoitered area at (1253.0-1063.90). Patrol left from 1/3 and reconnoitered (1291.8-1070.31), (1291.8-1070.46), (1250.8-1070.3) and along trail from (1290.0-1070.3) to (1299.8-1070.0).

7Nov 45 S-2 Patrol discovered radio at (1299.80-1067.90). Japanese led patrol past the radio location and insisted that nothing of value was to be found in the house where radio was located. This is the first attempt at concealing information from our patrols. Radio located at HAYASHI Engine Works (1285.65-1068.03). Patrol reconnoitered town of EIKO. Underground tunnels located behind Mitsubishi Electrical Company. Total of 87 machines found. Investigation proved machines had been reported by Japanese.

S-3 Patrol from 3/3 proceeded to NISHIOI then through squares (1292-1068) and (1291-1068) and returned to 3/6 area at 1145.

Snow 45 S-2 Patrol found six dummy gun positions and two 40mm positions at (1292.13-1053.87).
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8Nov45 S-3 Patrol from 1/6 by LVT to KAKINOURA-SHIMA to accomplish mission as directed by 2dMarDiv dispatch 009491, 3 note: "THIS CONFIRMS AND AMPLIFIES MY TELEPHONIC ORDER OF 71947. X LOAD 2CN DETCH PLAT STRENGTH IN AN LOT X PREP TO LV FOR KAKINOURA-SHIMA AT 0500 I PROCEED TO SAKITO ON KAKINOURA-SHIMA X UPON DEDICATED LAND AND INVESTIGATE CHINESE DIS-
TURBANCES REPORTED THAT ISLAND X DISAPPEAR AND PLACE MARINE GUARD OVER ANY CHINESE DISTURBING PLACE X AUTHORITY WILL BE GRANTED BY THIS H Q TO EVACUATE CHINESE TO MAINLAND FOR REPAIRING IF REQUESTED X ....... CLEARATION BY THIS H Q FURTHER EXTEND OCCUPATION OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE ALL ISLANDS OFF COAST S OF C-SHIMA N OF KABA-SHIMA AND E OF A N - S LINE THROUGH KAK-
INOURA-SHIMA INCLUSIVE...." UNJUCTED X

S-3 Patrol from 5/6 conducted radio experiment from BLT 5/6 barracks to area in vicinity of (1093.5-1095.6) (Atomic-bombed area) with SCR 300, SCR 510 and TCS radios.

9Nov45 S-2 motorized reconnaissance to O. CDAK to take necessary action on reported radio in that area.

S-3 received the following dispatches from patrol which left 8Nov45 for KAKINOURA-SHIMA: 0100-010540 "Have arrived at SAKITO, KAKINOURA-SHIMA". 1400-010600/I "Posn same at SAKITO, KAKINOURA-SHIMA". 1515, "Chinese situation under control. No necessity to arrest anyone. Request permission to continue mission". 1600 "Patrol ordered to continue mission to Matsu-Shima, OKIN-SHIMA, IKI-SHIMA, then to return to OURS for further Insts". Patrol left 2/6 and proceeded to ABANOKI via KISAKI and KASIDO to investigate warehouses. Fire fighting equip found in warehouse in ABANOKI and 1000 blankets in KISAKI.

10Nov45 S-3 Patrol investigating Matsu-Shima, OKIN-SHIMA and IKI-SHIMA, according to Div orders.

11Nov45 S-3 Following dispatch received from patrol investigating islands N of NAGASAKI: "1140--Left for Matsu-
SHIMA"

1Nov46 S-2 Industrial survey of SIC TCB now completed. Patrols were dispatched to check the sources of power, types of buildings and the fishing industry at KIBIY (1991.50-1069.51), KOSUSC (1290.56-1050.1) and ABANOKI (1290.40-1059.40).

S-3 Patrol returned to OURS at 1345 from Matsu-
SHIMA aboard LVT 9814. Patrol from 5/6 reconnoitered (1292.3-1069.4), (1297.5-1069.91), (129.95-1069.95), (1297.0-1069.3), (1290.6-1059.9) and (1289.15-1069.50).

1Nov46 S-3 Patrol discovered large enlargement for search-
light and extensive underground passage at (1292.53-1053.40). An extensive search of small fishing craft along the docks in grid squares (1293-1063 and (1296-1063). Patrol instructed to look for radio equipment and foreign currency. Boarding parties continued to search ships in NAGASAKI harbor.
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14Nov45 S-2 Patrol checked three 18cm guns at (1293.20-1061.70) and found breach blocks still in guns. Japanese police informed of this position. Boarding party went aboard SEGA-MARU at (1293.25-1061.25) and gathered all information on following: Owner, where built, tonnage, length, type, cargo, damage to ship, crew wartime duties, future duty and last port of call. All ships are investigated in a like manner.

S-3 Patrol from 1/6 left for IE on 2 LCVTs to establish location, use and ownership of radio Eqq and to check on fishing boat licenses and registration.

15Nov45 S-2 Patrol searched building at (1294.35-1062.55) and discovered deck plan of Japanese cruiser ARA. Doctors examined contents of drug and narcotic report from SETO. Some drugs could not be identified.

17Nov45 S-2 Patrol located radio equipment on two Mitsubishi tug boats. Reported to military government.

18Nov45 S-3 Orders to 1/6 for patrol as directed 20MarDiv Dispatch 181915/L, Quote: "THIS CONFIRMS BY TELEPHONIC ORDER OF 181815 X SEND DETACHMENT OF ONE (1) OFFICER AND TWELVE (12) MEN ABOARD YUGAC-MARU PRIOR TO 181920 X THIS DETACHMENT WILL PROCEED TAKA-SHIMA IMMEDIATELY AFTER EVACUATION X UPON ARRIVAL THEREAT SUPERVISE AND CONTROL DEPARTURE OF 371 NORTH CHINA REPATRIATES X ON COMPLETION OF DEPARTURE PROCEED TO HARIO BARRACKS SASEBO CLEARING TAKA SHIMA NOT LATER THAN 192000 X UPON ARRIVAL HARIO BARRACKS DETACHMENT WILL TURN REPATRIATES OVER TO AUTHORITIES THERE AT X ON COMPLETION PROCEED ABOARD YUGAC MARU TO SAKITO KAKINOURA SHIMA CLEARING HARIO BARRACKS NOT LATER THAN 191600 X UPON ARRIVAL SAKITO SUPERVISE AND CONTROL DEPARTURE 372 NORTH CHINA REPATRIATES X PROCEED WITH REPATRIATES TO HARIO BARRACKS X UPON ARRIVAL TURN REPATRIATES OVER TO REPATRIATION AUTHORITIES X UPON COMPLETION OF DUTY RETURN TO NAGASAKI ABOARD YUGAC MARU AND REPORT TO UNIT X DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION TURNING OVER BOTH GROUPS OF CHINESE AT HARIO BARRACKS IS 201200 X INTERPRET IS ALREADY ABOARD YUGAC MARU X Unquots.

19Nov45 S-2 Patrol discovered commercial dynamite at (1299.70-1060.75).

S-3 Detail of 1 off and 12 men from 1/6 left NAGASAKI at 2135, 18Nov to act as guard detail aboard the YUGAC-MARU, which is to remove China repatriates from TAKA-SHIMA and KAKINOURA-SHIMA. Patrol from 1/6 left for KAKINOURA-SHIMA aboard LCT 975. Patrol arrived at KAKINOURA-SHIMA at 1400. 19Nov45. Patrol from 2/6 to SETO on 5-day patrol. Patrol from 3/6 to OGODAKA on 5-day patrol.
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20Nov45 S-3 Patrol which left for KAKINOURA-SHIMA and TAKA-SHIMA aboard the YUGAC-MARU docked at Customs Wharf at 1715 this date and proceeded to 1/6 area. Patrol which left for Run of KAKINOURA-SHIMA on 19Nov45 completed mission on that island and left for O-SHIMA for reconnaissance of that island. Transportation left at 1145 for SETO to bring back patrol sent 19Nov45, due to planned move of 2/6 on 24Dec45. Patrol from 3/6 (at ONODA) to look for gun emplacements in area.

21Nov45 S-2 Advance party left for SAGA at 0930. Past intelligence information on northern half of KYUSHU will be taken from 5tharDiv reports.

S-3 FollowingAGED received from patrol aboard (LCT 973) : (a) 201615 LEAVING O-SHIMA to spend night at SAKITO. (b) 210610 LEAVING SAKITO for O-SHIMA. (c) 211355 LEAVING O-SHIMA for HAKA SHIMA. (d) 211615 STORE FORCES US TO RETURN TO SAKITO. One officer and 50 men at patrol station at ONODA. FollowingAGED received: "210900 ALL WELL HERE X TWO PATROLS MADE YESTERDAY IN VICINITY OF ONODA X COASTAL DEFENSE BOSH FOUND X ONE OFF AND TEN MEN ON PATROL TO OKUSHI TODAY X WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL AFTER-MIDNIGHT X RESULT: LATER X 211455 PATROL LEFT ABOUT 0500 RETURNED 1500 X MADE RUN OF SMALL ISLAND OFF OKUSHI X FOUND ONLY OYSTER PARK X NO MIL OBJECTS X BAD WEATHER AND RDS CUT PATROL SHORT X ALL WELL X" The following is a condensed summary of verbal report of C/O of armed guard aboard YUGAC-MARU from 1Nov to 20Nov: Lv NAGASAKI 2150; Ar TAK-SHIMA 2350; Lv TAK-SHIMA 0745 19Nov w/372 repatriates aboard; Ar HARIO EKS 1640 19Nov--turned repatriates over to Majcroll; Lv HARIO EKS 1450 19Nov--Ar SAKITO; KAKINOURA SHIMA 1700 19Nov; Lv SAKITO, KAKINOURA-SHIMA 1950 20Nov w/372 repatriates aboard; Ar HARIO EKS 1320 20Nov--turned repatriates over to authorities; Lv HARIO EKS 1330 20Nov; Ar NAGASAKI 1715 20Nov.

22Nov45 S-2 Patrol checked on blinder activity at (1 23.23-1063.06). Possible blinder mount discovered but no equipment. A night patrol will be dispatched on 23Nov to set watch on position.

S-3 Patrol embarked aboard LCT 973 returned to 1/6 at 1300. Patrol had been to KAKINOURA-SHIMA, O-SHIMA AND HAKA SHIMA. Convoy returned from ONODA with patrol outpost of 1 Off and 50 men who had been stationed there. 2/6 loading for move to SAGA.

23Nov45 S-2 Patrol searched small villages on West shore in attempt to locate sabers, reported being sold in this area. No further blinder activity.

24Nov45 S-2 Patrol located commercial powder in revetted area at (128°35'-1204.20.). Patrol report of Onoda activities confusing and conflicting--correct report to follow.

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24Nov45 5-3 One (1) Off and three (3) men departed from 3/6 at 0700. Anticipated return 1700 25Nov45. 2/6 left NAGASAKI at Approx 0800 by Tr and freight train for new location and permanent site at SAGA. High point rear echelon of 2/6 remains in old location. Anticipate that this element will move by train to SASEBO on 25Nov45.

25Nov45 5-2 Corrected report on OKODA and vicinity turned in to this office. Gun positions, supplies and ammo plotted on map to accompany this. Patrol dispatched to KAKINOURA SHIMA, O SHIMA and HAKI SHIMA this date.

3-3 Rear Ech of 50-point men and above left NAGASAKI by train at 0830 for SASEBO. 2/6 relieved 2/27 at 1200 this date and assumed control of SAGA KEK for the 2dMarDiv. 3/6 patrol at OKODA scheduled to return at 1800 this date.


27Nov45 S-3 Boarding party searched following ship:
Destroyer HABU, Cargo vessel TAIHYOC-MARU, Mine layer KATOKU and Cargo ship KONAI-MARU. Everything conformed to surrender terms.

S-3 1/6 dispatched one (1) Flet to act as guard aboard the YUGAC-MARU for 522 Korean Repatriates. Scheduled to depart from NAGASAKI 0700 28Nov45 and arrive at KAIRO BKS 1200 29Nov45. Flat scheduled to embark board YUGAC-MARU between 1800 and 1900 this date.

22Nov45 S-2 Routine patrolling of area revealed no further intelligence information. Boarding party searched Navy Ship TSUKUSHI-MARU and submitted report to this office.

S-3 Ono (1) Off and Flet from 1/6 aboard CHOFUKU-MARU sailed at 0910 28Nov45 with 289-Korean Repatriates for KAIRO BKS, SASEBO AREA. ETA, 1300, 29Nov45. Fwd Ech of 1/6 CP moved to Naval Aircraft Factory, SASEBO. LV NAGASAKI 0800—AR SASEBO 1300.

29Nov45 S-2 Patrol checked schools on Western shore and found that all wooden rifles had been burned as ordered. Hand map of HOKARU showing important occupation points and industry found. Submitted map to Division Headquarters.

S-3 1/6 loading at CURA on LSTs 943 and 1091. Anticipated that LSTs will leave CURA on Sat, 1Dec45. 2/6 CP at (135°.0-1125.0). Outposts of on (1) Co established at TOSU (135°.0-1141.5). Flet at KARATSU (130°12-1160). 30Nov45 S-2 Patrol covered KAINO-SHIMA and found area in proper order.

S-3, 1/6 loading at CURA on LSTs 943 and 1091. Ono (1) Off and 10 men from 2/6 to TOSU at 0800 to return this date. Mission to assist FOX 20 in disposition work. One (1) Off and 4 men from 2/6 to KANZAKI to assist FOX 20-Detachment with disposition work. Returned 1300. Det at KARATSU consists of 3 Off and 44 men. Mission to carry out disposition work and to secure Intel data. Det at KANZAKI consists of 1 Off and Flat Mission to carry out disposition work and to secure Intel data.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That sufficient clothing of garrison type and facilities to maintain this clothing in proper condition be kept available in order to provide uniformity and a smart military appearance at all times among occupational troops.

2. That an advance party be sent to reconnoiter an area to be occupied with recovery parties and that this advance party be allowed sufficient personnel and sufficient time prior to landing of main unit to acquire and have native populace, clear, clean and initiate repair on billets, storage space, docking facilities and lines of communication. That a complete low vertical and oblique photo coverage be made of immediate areas of occupation in order to provide material for accurate API studies prior to dispatching an advance party.

3. That TO's and TBA's be adjusted to meet the requirements of occupation. The readjustment of TO's to include military police, Military Government, interpreters, Technical Intelligence personnel. The readjustment of TBA's to include the increased requirements for transportation due to the extended area allotted units.

4. That a study of the area of occupation be made to ascertain recreation facilities available and that an extensive recreation program be initiated at the earliest practicable moment.

5. That troops be kept cognizant of the overall picture of occupation and their part in the occupation. Unit Commanders through continuous handling of classified matter sometimes lose sight of what can be told the troops and what can't. It is therefore recommended that the Division through the Public Information Sections issue periodically an Information Sheet in sufficient number to allow distribution to each man. That this material be unrestricted and the men be permitted to send such material home.

CONCLUSIONS

1. It is believed that food initially was entirely adequate but that as time passed the men who in combat would find the food satisfactory felt that the lack of variety, absence of fresh food, and inadequacy of some items such as bread was unsatisfactory during an occupation. One contributing factor was that the initial ration did not allow for the increase in appetite of troops in a cold climate.

2. It is believed that the instruction given personnel in customs, habits, and industries of Japan prior to the occupation proved very beneficial.
APPENDIX NUMBER THREE

OPERATION ORDERS

FROM

23 SEPTEMBER, 1945,

TO

30 NOVEMBER, 1945.
O P E R A T I O N  O R D E R

R C T - 6
No. 17

T A S K  O R G A N I Z A T I O N:

See Change No. 2 and 3 to Opn Plan No. 6.

1. (a) See Annex (E) (Intelligence) to Opn Plan No. 6.

(b) While continuing to develop the occupation of assigned area the 2d Bn Div will be prepared for the defense of each separate billeting area.

2. RCT-6 will be prepared to initiate defense of each separate billeting area in order to repulse any incoming attack by hostile groups.

3. (a) BLT 1/6 will be prepared to initiate defense of OURA barracks.

(b) BLT 2/6 will be prepared to initiate defense of their billet.

(c) BLT 3/6 will be prepared to initiate defense of billets in immediate RCT-6 Headquarters area.

(d) RCT Vns Group will assemble in billet area and await orders as regimental reserve during billet defense.

(e) Co "A", 2nd MT Bn, 2nd Plt Automotive Repair, 2nd MT Bn attached, will be prepared to initiate defense of Truck Park during billet defense.

(f) 43rd MGs will be prepared to provide defense of their billet and regimental warehouse area.

(x) (1) For the purpose of this order attached or divisional units, except Co "A", 2nd MT Bn and 2nd Plt Automotive Repair, 2nd MT Bn, will be under operational control of the CO of the area in which they are billeted.

4. See Regt’s Administrative Order No. 3-45 and instructions issued subsequent thereto.

5. See Annex (E) (Signal Communications) to Opn Plan No. 6.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WILLIAMS

E. R. GAMES,
LtCol., USMC,
Executive Officer.
COPY

OPERATION ORDER

RCT-6 No. 18.

Maps: (1) ANS L672 IMPISHU 1:25,000 4045 II IV and 4045 II IV.
(2) ANS L571 CENTRAL JAPAN 1:250,000 Sheet 44 and 55.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Changes Nos. 2 and 3 to Opn Plan 8-45.

1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Opn Plan No. 8-45.

(b) While continuing to develop the occupation of assigned areas, the Task Force will defend against, and subsequently disperse, capture or destroy any hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

2. RCT-6, in addition to continuing to develop the occupation of its area of responsibility will:

(a) Maintain at all times one (1) battalion prepared to move on two (2) hours notice, with one (1) company motorized, prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.

(b) Maintain within each separate billeting area a minimum of 75% of the command during the hours of darkness.

(c) Establish and continue rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each billeting area (See Opn Order No. 17) and the area of responsibility.

(d) Initiate prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces, or prevent the accomplishment of assigned missions.

   For Sectors of Responsibility, See Annex (A) and (2) (Opn Overlays) to Opn Order.

3. (a) BLT 1/6, during area defense, will provide defense of VBRA Barracks and, as regimental reserve be prepared to move by water or overland to regimental final defensive area.

(b) BLT 2/6 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned sectors.
(c) BLT 3/6 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile forces which are forming or attacking the forces within assigned sectors. The CO, BLT 3/6, in addition, will have one (1) company motorized and prepared to move on thirty *(30)* minutes notice. The BLT will be prepared to furnish ten (10) 2½ ton and seven (7) 1 ton trucks to BLT 3/6 for use of the motorized company in time to allow the company to move on thirty (30) minutes notice. The CO, BLT 3/6 is authorized to make all necessary arrangements for the entrucking of such company with the RT0. Copies of all truck and vehicle assignment tables will be submitted to this Eq (Regt'1) S-3). BLT 3/6 will be relieved of warehouse guard during area defense by 43rd MCB's.

(d) Regt'1 Eqn Co 1 designated Regt'1 reserve, and upon initiation of area defense will assemble in billeting areas and await orders from the Regt'1 Commander.

(e) Co A, 2d MT Bn with 2d Plt Automotive Repair, 2d MT Bn will provide defense of truck park during area defense.

(f) Co B, 2d Ltrgn Bn will augment defense of Eq billeting area during area defense and be prepared to conduct engineering missions as directed.

(g) Co A, 2d Med Bn will be prepared to move from CURA Barracks either by water or overland to Regt'1 Warehouse area and receive patients.

(h) 43rd MCB's will provide one (1) company to relieve BLT 3/6 of warehouse guard during area defense. 43rd MCB's, less one (1) company will stand by in billeting area as area reserve.

(i) BLT's will prepared to move on two (2) hours notice on a rotation basis: BLT 1/6 from 1200, 12oc to 13oc, 13oc to 1200, 14oc to 1200, 1500 to 1200, 14oc to 1200, 15oc and then rotation in order.
Serial 00426
SECRET

Operation Order
RQT-5 - No. 18.

(2) Plans drawn by the BLTs will divide their areas of responsibility into sectors and will show for each sector of responsibility the unit responsible.

(3) BLTs will be prepared to move on order in support of other Regt'l or Division units.

(4) BLTs will provide for protection of property in billets during area defense.

(5) Plans will be submitted to this Hq (Regt'l S-3) by 1200, 1200ct45. Rehearsals of plans will commence on 1200ct45 at an hour to be designated later, and will be continued weekly thereafter. Rehearsals as directed will be limited to assembling of units, reconnaissance of area, and CRPs unless otherwise designated. Under no circumstances will gardens or other property be damaged unless otherwise directed.

(6) BLT CO's will be prepared, when directed, to send reconnaissance parties to study road nets in adjacent areas.

4. See Regt'l Administrative Order No. 3-45 and instructions issued subsequently thereto.

5. See Annex (H) (Signal Communication) to Opn Plan No. 8, RQT-6.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WILLS'S

J. B. WILLIAMS,
LtCol., USMC,
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Opn Plan No. 8, RQT-5.

C-F-I-I-C-I-4-L:

FULLER
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ANNEX (A) OPERATION OVERLAY
TO OPERATION ORDER NO. 18

Map: Tactical Map Kyushu
1:250,000 AMS 1:571
ANNEX (B) OPERATION OVERLAY
OPERATION ORDER NO. 18

Final Defence Area

Map: Tactical Map Kyushu
1:25,000 AMS L872

August 1945
CONFIDENTIAL

E R Y

6th Marines
In the Field
17 November, 1945

Operation Order
Number 19-45

Map: KYUSHU, 1:100,000

1. a. DOFU-DAKU Peninsula, the area of responsibility of the Sixth Marines, has been partially covered by water and motorized patrols.

   b. Stationing troops within certain outlying communities will assist in enforcing the Surrender Terms, and in impressing the Japanese with the fact of the occupation.

2. The Sixth Marines, within their zone of responsibility, will establish platoon-size patrol outposts at SETO and ONODAKA to carry out occupation missions.

3. a. First Battalion, Sixth Marines will continue their previously assigned patrol missions and be prepared to send an overnight patrol to KAKINAURA-SIMA weekly as directed by this HQ.

   b. Second Battalion, Sixth Marines will establish at SETO, when directed by this HQ, an outpost of platoon size, supplemented by the addition of two (2) corpsmen, a Com Sec Team of three (3) men and T68, one or more Intelligence Section personnel, and an enlisted interpreter. For area of responsibility see Annex A (Overlay).

   c. Third Battalion, Sixth Marines will establish at ONODAKA, when directed by this HQ, an outpost of platoon size, supplemented by the addition of two (2) corpsmen, a Com Sec Team of three (3) men and T68, one or more Intelligence Section personnel and an enlisted interpreter. For area of responsibility see Annex A (Overlay).

x. (1) Missions for patrols will be as follows:

   (a) Ren of road and footpath net.

   (b) Search for "Il Equip and supplies in area.

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(c) Enforce all occupation orders, including curfew regulations.

(d) Through presence of troops keep fact of occupation constantly before Japanese people.

(e) Accomplish such missions as may be assigned by Regtl S-2.

(f) Perform such other missions as may be directed by Regtl Comdr.

(2) Civilian and private dwellings will not be searched without adequate cause, and then only with the assistance of Japanese Civil Police.

(3) Units at patrol outposts will be relieved every tenth (10th) day.

4. a. Uniform as prescribed by Bn CO.

b. Normal arms, w/one (1) unit of fire.

c. Rations and water for one (1) day in excess of the estimated length of the patrol.

d. One (1) 1/4-Ton 4x4 truck w/driver and one (1) 1-Ton 4x4 truck w/driver will be available to each patrol outpost. Vehicles will be rotated when the patrol outposts are relieved. Motor transport for overnight patrols will be as requested by Bns and approved by this Hq.

e. Medical supplies as prescribed by the Regtl Surgeon,

f. Other necessary arrangements for supply and transport to be made by Bn COs with Regtl S-4.

5. a. Patrol outposts will maintain Com from 0700 to 1900 on the Regtl command net frequency (4075). Routine patrol reports and operations reports to be made at 1100 and 1500.

b. Positions of patrol outposts CPs to be reported when established.
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BY ORDER OF COLONEL JUHAN:

D. W. FULLER,
LtCol, USMC,
Executive Officer.

Annex:

A - Operation Overlay (Areas of Responsibility).

DISTRIBUTION: "C", "E", and "F".

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

SMITH

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CONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT TEAM Flight
OPERATION REPORT NUMBER 1-45

OCCUPATION
OF
JAPAN

KYUSHU
Operation Report
CT-8 No 1-45


OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

1. Planning -

(a) After a series of briefings conducted by the
G-2 Section during the latter part of August, for the Combat
Team Commander, Executive Officer, S-3, and S-2, the Combat
Team Planning Room was opened and the S-3, S-2, and API
officer devoted most of their time to preparation for the
planning phase of the forthcoming operation. Material re-
ceived from Division was all handled with the utmost secrecy
and an accurate set of filing and report folders were made
to prepare the foundation for further planning by the Combat
Team staff.

(b) After the briefing of the Combat Team Com-
mander, Executive Officer, S-3, and S-2, and after the pre-
liminary preparations were set in motion in the planning
room, the Landing Team Commanders and remaining staff mem-
ers were briefed in a series of lectures by the Combat
Team Commander, and then admitted to the planning room.
The first draft of Second Marine Division Operation Plan
Number 14 was received on 22 August 1945, and immediate
steps were taken for the preparation of the Combat Team
plan which was completed and available to all units of the
Combat Team on 9 September 1945.

(c) It is believed that there was adequate time
for the planning phase of the operation and that the
Landing Teams, by having their staff admitted to the plan-
ing room after the Landing Team Commanders had become
familiar with the situations, had ample time to give proper
attention to all plans issued by the Combat Team.

(d) For the purpose of planning prior to embarka-
tion, the photographic coverage of Northern and Southern
KYUSHU was considered to be very inadequate; and fairly good
of the AGASAKI area. Low oblique photos of possible
landing areas were not made available. Stereo-coverage of
the AGASAKI area was inadequate.

-1-
2. Training

(a) The period from 26 June 1945 to 3 July 1945, was spent on OKINAWA during which time the Combat Team was engaged in combat and preparations for the return to SAIPAN, MARIANAS islands. On 10 July 1945, this Combat Team reoccupied its former camp on SAIPAN, MARIANAS Islands.

(b) Training for future combat commenced shortly after the arrival of the Combat Team at SAIPAN. An extensive athletic program was carried out along with practical training consisting of surprise-target ranges, field problems, and zeroing of weapons.

(c) The Combat Team operations office made requests for the various ranges available during this period and assigned them to the units within the Combat Team. Schedules were so arranged that each Landing Team had access to the ranges and training areas an equal number of times. The infantry-tank problems were especially effective because of the cooperation between tank platoons and the infantry units working with them. However, training at SAIPAN was hindered due to limited training areas and facilities.

(d) Designated personnel attended the following schools during this period: "Preparation of Dehydrated Foods", "Countermortar School", and "Radio Countermeasures School".

(e) When the bayonet lug was added to the carbine, carbines were not re-zeroed because the Combat Team was unable to secure the range.

(f) The air-ground problem which had been scheduled for Combat Team Eight on 20 August 1945, was
never carried out because of a change in training policy resulting from the surrender of the Japanese. The infantry-artillery training scheduled for 23 August 1945, was cancelled for the same reason.

(g) Designated personnel attended a Combat Team Military Police School given by the members of the Military Police Company. The personnel selected for this school were persons who had served less than eighteen (18) months overseas in order that they could teach such schools within their respective Landing Teams before going home. The school was repeated a few days later to permit stragglers and any additional personnel who unit commanders desired to attend.

(h) Training schedules for the period 17 August 1945 to 15 September 1945, were in accordance with directives from Division. Such training included the following: Military Courtesy, Military Discipline, Close Order Drill, Ceremonies, Rifle Marksmanship, Military Government, Civil Affairs, and Interior Guard Duty. Training schedules were carried out entirely during the morning hours, and an intensive athletic program was carried out each afternoon. Conditioning hikes were numerous during this period.

(1) On 18 September 1945, the regiment left SAIPAN, MARIANA Islands, and sailed for KAGASAKI, KYUSHU, JAPAN, where it arrived on 23 September 1945. The training aboard ship consisted of a half day each day during which time Japanese History, Japanese Customs and Habits, and Japanese Government were covered thoroughly. Training to date, since landing on KYUSHU, commenced on 15 October 1945, with emphasis on Close Order Drill, Veterans' Benefits, Military Courtesy, Troop Inspection, Military Police Duties, Conditioning Exercises, and Organized Athletics. One hour each week was devoted to publication and review of Landing Team, Combat Team, and Division Orders currently in effect. A series of venereal disease inspections was accomplished weekly by the medical department.
3. Task Organization -

COMBAT TEAM EIGHT - Col T. G. McFarland, USMC

(a) LT 1/8 - Lt Col Hayward, USMC
   1st Bn, 8th Mar (-)
   2d Plat, Co "B", 2d MT Bn
   1st Plat, Co "C", 2d Engr Bn
   Det "D", Div Sig Co

(b) LT 2/8 - Lt Col Musbaum, USMCR
   2d Bn, 8th Mar
   Co "E", 1st Bn, 8th Mar
   Det Ragtl S--- Co

(c) LT 3/8 - Lt Col Wallace, USMC
   3d Bn, 8th Mar
   3d Plat, Co "B", 2d MT Bn
   3d Plat, Co "C", 2d Engr Bn

(d) Support Group - Maj Van Evera, USMC
   Wpns Co, 8th Mar

(e) CT Troops - Lt Mott, USMCR
   H&S Co, 8th Mar
   Co "B", 2d MT Bn (-)
   Co "C", 2d Engr Bn (-)
   Co "D", 2d Med Bn
   2d Plat, Ord Co, 2d Serv Bn
   3d Plat, Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn
   3d Plat, Auto Repair Co, 2d MT Bn
   Det "C", Div Sig Co

4. Advance Reconnaissance of Objective -

(a) On 16 September 1945, Combat Team 8-4 arrived at NAGASAKI with an advance party from Second Marine Division and V Amphibious Corps. On 18 September,
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at 0800, all Combat Team representatives were briefed and the following plans made:

(1) Priorities in landing were assigned to Combat Team Two, Combat Team Six, and Combat Team Eight, in that order.

(2) Combat Team Two would land over the DEJIMA Pier and adjoining areas.

(3) Combat Team Eight would not land until a suitable place was found for them, none being available in the Division zone of action.

(4) That since the disposition of Combat Team Eight was not known, but in the belief that they would not be landed in the NAGASAKI Area, the S-4, therefore, assisted Combat Team Six in the location of quarters, determination of traffic routes, and checked the suitability of docking areas.

(b) On Sunday, 23 September 1945, Combat Team Eight’s S-4 rejoined his organization. The situation at that time was:

(1) Combat Team Eight was to remain aboard ship until all other teams had been moved ashore.

(2) The senior officer of the Advance Party was to inform the Commanding General of the lack of quarters available for Combat Team Eight and recommend that the Combat Team remain on board ship until another area could be located for their use.

5. Occupational Operation (Narrative) -

(a) Combat Team Eight arrived within NAGASAKI WAN at 0800, 23 September 1945. Landing of troops was delayed one day due to a change in the billeting area. Landing Team 1/8 disembarked on the floats north of
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of Dajima Pier at 0700, 24 September 1945. Combat Team Eight set up Command Post in the Harbor Police building while an advance Command Post was established at the ISAHAYA Naval Air Base. Landing Team 2/8 and Landing Team 3/8 disembarked on order. Troops of this Combat Team were ashore by 1345, 24 September 1945.

(b) Trucks with troops of Landing Team 1/8 departed from NAGASAKI for ISAHAYA Naval Air Base 0730, 24 September 1945. Landing Team 2/8, Landing Team 3/8, Weapons Company and Headquarters and Service Company left NAGASAKI by train at 1510, 24 September 1945. All troops arrived at ISAHAYA by 1610 with the exception of working parties which remained at the harbor to unload the ships.

(c) Upon arrival at the ISAHAYA Naval Air Base, Combat Team Eight was billeted and preparations were made to improve the area. The water supply was inadequate and unsafe for use. The electrical system was in need of repair and expansion. Roofs had to be put on six (6) of the eight (8) hangars along with minor repairs to other buildings. General police of the area was activated. This work was done by Japanese labor which was procured through the Military Government.

(d) During the time of Combat Team Eight's stay at ISAHAYA, 25 September to 13 October 1945, inclement weather prohibited any extensive training. Training during this period consisted of close order drill and nomenclature and cleaning of individual and organizational weapons. A Military Police Company was formed, and posts were established in ISAHAYA during the day with roving radio-jeep patrols at night.

(e) Combat Team Eight's zone of responsibility was changed to include all of KUMAMOTO KEN. On 5 October 1945, an advance reconnaissance party consisting of appropriate staff members left ISAHAYA for KUMAMOTO to arrange for final movement of this Combat Team to the new area. On 15 October, all units of Combat Team Eight, with the exception of a rear echelon, were located in the KUMAMOTO area. Landing Team 1/8 was billeted at the former Japanese Sixth Field Artillery School. Landing Team 3/8 was billeted at the former Japanese Sixth Engineer Battalion area, and Landing Team 2/8, Weapons
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Company, Headquarters and Service Company, and attached units were located at the former KUMAMOTO Army Cadet Academy.

(f) Combat Team Eight's foot and mechanized patrols immediately began to patrol the KUMAMOTO area. Units which were not patrolling followed a program of regular garrison-routine with emphasis on military courtesy, bearing and discipline. When at this time a Disposition Section was formed, its main purpose is the disposition of Japanese military supplies.

(g) Combat Team Eight's zone of responsibility was enlarged to include KAGOSHIMA KEW. On 29 October 1945, Landing Team 1/8 was ordered to KAGOSHIMA. Its main duties were to receive and handle repatriates going to various home islands and returning to JAPAN, and disposition of Japanese material. On 9 November 1945, Landing Team 3/8 moved to HITOYOSHI for the purposes of disposition and patrolling distant area in KUMAMOTO KEW.

(h) Landing Team 2/8 continued to patrol areas around the city of KUMAMOTO and handle disposition in this area. The Division Reconnaissance Company maintained mechanized patrols in the outer zone of responsibility for Combat Team Eight. In KUMAMOTO the Military Police Company was enlarged by transferring all personnel of Weapons Company to the Military Police Company for duty.

6. Jap Compliance With Surrender Terms -

(a) In making a study of Japanese compliance with the surrender terms as laid down by the Allied Powers one must keep in mind the four salient points of these surrender terms which are as follows: (1) Ceasation of hostilities and prompt disarmament of Japanese armed forces and people wherever located, (2) Relinquishment of all power by the Japanese Government to the designated military commander. (3) Continuation of maintenance of law and order by constituted Japanese officials and police. (4) Relinquishment of war-making materials and installations and evacuation of personnel from Japanese occupied territories as directed by the designated military commander.
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(b) With the possible exception of a few minor drunken brawls between demobilized Japanese soldiers and Chinese Prisoners of War at OKUTA, there have been no instances where either the Japanese military or the people have failed to cease hostilities and disarm in Combat Team Eight's areas of responsibility.

(c) The voyage from SAIPAN to NAGASAKI was without interference from the Japanese Navy. The debarkation at NAGASAKI and the subsequent move to ISAHAYA, 23 September and 24 September, was made without incident.

(d) During Combat Team Eight's short stay at ISAHAYA it was noted that although they were confused in the initial phase of the occupation, the Japanese were most cooperative. The ISAHAYA Police were collecting all the arms from the civilians. The Japanese military and Naval Units in the vicinity contacted this Headquarters submitting demobilization reports and inventories of military supply dumps. A check was made by Intelligence Section personnel, and it was revealed that the Japanese information was correct.

(e) When the Combat Team moved to KUMAMOTO on 5 October 1945, the demobilization and disarmament situation in that KL was excellent. This was due mainly to the cooperation received from the Headquarters, KUMAMOTO Divisional District. Not only were very complete inventories and strength reports submitted, but overlays and maps showing the disposition of units and their matériel were added.

(f) On the whole the Japanese seemed very willing to disarm and exceptionally eager to return to their homes. It was only the confusing and indefinite orders, which emanated from higher Allied echelons, that slowed down the complete Japanese demobilization and disarmament.

(g) At both ISAHAYA and KUMAMOTO the Japanese Prefectural Governments relinquished their powers to the Commander. Combat Team Eight Liaison Committees were set up by the Prefectural officials. These committees kept in
constant touch with the Commanding Officer in order to receive his orders and pass them on to the government officials. The Liaison groups with their English-speaking and well-educated members helped to bridge the language and customs barriers that exist between the Japanese and Allied Forces.

(h) The Japanese Police with their very complete records proved invaluable in contacting or causing the arrest of persons wanted by this Headquarters either for apprehension or business purposes.

(i) Not only did the police assist along these lines but they exercised firm control over the civilians and demobilized military. Taking their orders from the Combat Team Commander they enforced curfew regulations, collected civilian weapons, and assisted our military police in routine traffic control. Information on civilian institutions such as factories, schools, hospitals, political organizations, and public utilities, was obtained by this Headquarters through the Japanese Police.

(j) In connection with the fourth and final pertinent point in the surrender terms, it has already been mentioned that the Japanese disarmed readily, but it is well to mention that not only were Japanese arms turned over to us, but also all military structures such as schools, barracks, warehouses, organic vehicles, communication equipment, foodstores, and quartermaster supplies.

7. Supply, Equipment, and Logistics -

(a) This Combat Team carried its organic equipment plus one-third (1/3) of the Divisions' supply or replenishment. This was redistributed by Division and spotted in Combat Team areas on the beach at Naval Operating Base, Tanapag Harbor, SAIPAN, Marianas Islands, by Division and Army transportation. Since this organization was the last of the Combat Teams to load out, it had large quantities of supplies which had been left behind by other units to load aboard at the last minute.
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(b) Due to the limited beach areas available for unloading, the lack of equipment available to clear the beach area, lack of lights necessary for the efficient conduct of night operations, and heavy rains throughout the loading period, a great deal of the supply was damaged by water and some through pilfering. Supplies were moved as rapidly as possible to the Combat Team area at ISAHAYA, and were there placed in what appeared to be the best possible storage areas. Heavy rains again overtaxed the drainage facilities and some of the supplies were wet for the second time. On arrival at KUMAMOTO, where excellent storage facilities were available, salvage operations were conducted with considerable success.

(c) Due to the dispersal of units, the transportation problem was considerable. A shipping and receiving section was formed at the Combat Team quartermaster area and supplies loaded onto rail or truck transportation and sent to the using organization.

(d) No particular supply difficulties have been encountered.

8. Special Features.

(a) Naval Gunfire, Air and Artillery - No training in either Naval Gunfire, Air and Artillery was undertaken by members of this Combat Team during the training phase for the occupation or assault of JAPAN.

(b) Intelligence

(1) At SAIPAN, shortly after the news of the Japanese surrender the Combat Team Intelligence Section received orders to open the planning room for the Southern KYUSHU operation.

(2) Maps and aerial photographs of KYUSHU were distributed to the landing teams and to staff members along with extensive studies of tentative areas of responsibility. The 8-2 section then proceeded to assist in the writing of the Operation Order by submitting overlays and
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inserting the necessary Intelligence Annexes.

(3) While aboard ship from the 18th of September 1945, the 6-2 section conducted a briefing program for all personnel covering such topics as areas of responsibility, general nature of terrain, climatic conditions, standard operating procedure, road networks, public utilities, and the Japanese people, their customs and habits.

(4) The Intelligence section comprised and integral part of the reconnaissance party that went forward to ISAHAYA to prepare that city for occupation by the Combat Team and through the medium of language personnel, contacted Japanese Government and military officials in the sector.

(5) From the 24th of September to the 5th of October 1945, Intelligence personnel located and investigated military dumps and installations. Inventories and strength reports were submitted to the section by the Japanese and in turn these reports and inventories were investigated. The local police were contacted, and the Section made certain that they collected all civilian weapons.

(6) The Section obtained and reported on extensive Order of Battle of Japanese units in the ISAHAYA and SHIMABARA Areas. A very close check on Japanese demobilized military personnel, which included names, ranks, units, and home addresses of discharges, was kept by the Section.

(7) Again, on the 5th of October, the Section assisted in the Reconnaissance of KUMAMOTO KEN, and even before the arrival of the main body at KUMAMOTO the Section had commenced to "process" KUMAMOTO KEN. Unlike the situation at ISAHAYA, opportunity for thorough investigations and wide expansion presented itself. This opportunity was seized as Intelligence parties, reinforced by more language personnel, reconnoitered OHUTA, KAGOSHIMA, HITOYOSHI, OTSU, MISUNI and ANAKUSA.
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(8) At present an Intelligence Section is permanently attached to Baker Company at OMAHA; the S-2 Section of Landing Team 5/6 is operating in HITOYOSHI; the S-3 Section of Landing Team 1/8 is covering KAGOSHIMA; while the S-2 Section of Landing Team 2/8 is working in KUMAMOTO.

(9) Since moving to KUMAMOTO, the Combat Team S-2 Section has been able to work in closer conjunction with the Counter-intelligence Corps in curtailling subversive activities, clearing interpreters, and investigating possible war criminals. Counter-intelligence Corps has proved extremely valuable in assisting in the processing of repatriates who are at present jamming the ports of KAJIKI and KAGOSHIMA.

(10) Military Government and the Combat Team S-2 Section have also worked hand in hand on civilian political and economic problems since the move to KUMAMOTO.

(c) Procurement – Procurement has been handled by a subsection of the Division Procurement Section, the Combat Team S-4 acting as senior member. So difficulties have been encountered to date with the exception of the problem of evaluating properties actually taken over. Most of the installations in use by the Combat Team and attached units were of a strictly military nature and were taken over as a part of the surrendered military property. The Japanese Liaison Committee has proved of great value in the location of scarce items.

(d) Inventory, Safeguarding and Disposition of Surrendered Material –

(1) The inventory, safeguarding and disposition of enemy material was initially taken over as a function of the S-4 section. Later, as the responsibility of that section increased, disposition tasks were transferred to the S-3 Section.

(2) An officer designated as Enemy Material
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Officer was given custody of a warehouse area connected with the Combat Team Quartermaster Area where controlled items, trophies for troops, museum and war memorial pieces are stored. A Records Section for the consolidation of all reports for submission to higher echelon is in operation, and nine (9) Depot Control Groups are in the field. One of these groups is stationed in each of the cities of Omuta, KumaHito, Isumi, Yatsushiro, Hikoyoshi, Minamata, Izumi, Sendai, and Kagoshima. Landing Team Commanders are responsible for the conduct of disposition activities in their areas of control.

(3) A school for the training of key personnel was held 4, 5, and 6 November 1945, at Combat Team Eight Headquarters. Personnel from each Landing Team attended.

(4) Safeguarding is also done under the direction of the Landing Team Commanders, and troops are sent into the areas where supplies are located for the purpose of supervising actual disposition carried out by Japanese labor.

(e) Military Government - Military Government Officers attached to Combat Team Eight have accomplished the following:

(1) Secured offices for Military Government.

(2) Secured eighty-seven (87) trucks from the Japanese Army. Forty-two (42) of these are now operable and thirty (30) are being used by the tactical troops to haul materials and labor. Twelve (12) of the trucks are used by the Prefectural Government to haul food and clothing, fuel and building materials into KumaHito from outlying areas. Sixteen (16) passenger cars were also secured, seven (7) are operable and in use by U. S. Forces.
(3) Supervised the turning over of Japanese Military, food, clothing, and medical supplies to the Prefectural Government, Home Ministry Department.

(4) Furnished labor, materials and supplies to rehabilitate the three (3) areas occupied by forces of this Combat Team.

(5) Conducted surveys of present status and organization in the following fields:

a. Transportation.
b. Fisheries.
c. Forestry.
d. Public Health and Sanitation.
e. Commerce and Industry, etc.

(Note: Additional periodical reports in these fields are made automatically by the Prefectural Officials to this office.)

(6) Accomplishes the objective of procurement of labor and supplies through close cooperation with the Liaison Committee.

(7) Secured forty-eight (48) interpreters, examined them for their ability, and had them screened by Counter Intelligence Corps. Supervises the interpreter pool used by tactical forces throughout Combat Team Eight's area.

(8) Instituted and maintains rigid control over rationing and price control in KUMAMOTO KEN.

(9) Set up Military Government in OMURA and HITOYOSHI to assist the Tactical Forces in these places.

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(10) Instituted curfew for Japanese civilians in compliance with instructions from Corps, in KUMAMOTO and other areas where there are American Military Forces. The curfew is being very satisfactorily enforced by the local Japanese Police under control of Military Government.

(11) Worked through Liaison Committee to establish KUMAMOTO Bazaar, to provide occupation troops an opportunity to purchase authentic Japanese articles of good quality at reasonable prices.

9. Conclusion - In conclusion the following recommendations are submitted:

(a) Due to the large area occupied, the short range combat communication equipment was found unsatisfactory; for this type of operation longer range communication facilities should be provided.

(b) A definite policy should be stated to clarify and simplify reports and methods of their submission.

(c) Provisions should be made to protect men from a sudden climatic change, which was known to exist, before the operation commenced.

(d) A definite policy on the treatment of water in all areas should be established prior to the operation.

(e) Definite, reliable, information relative to types and capacities of vessels as regards personnel accommodations should be given to units in time for proper planning.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND.

M. B. RABISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.
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Operation Report
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Annexes:

(A) - Copies of Operation Plans and Orders and Administrative Orders issued after occupation of KYUSHU.
(B) - S-1 Report.
(C) - S-2 Report.
(D) - S-3 Report.
(E) - S-4 Report.
(F) - Report by Signal Officer.
(G) - Report by Engineer Officer.

Distribution:

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[Signatures]

WARNER
Operation Report
CT-8 No 1-45 ANNEX (A)

COPIES OF OPERATION PLANS AND ADMINISTRATION ORDERS ISSUED AFTER OCCUPATION

1. The orders and plans issued by this Combat Team after the occupation are enclosed with this Annex as follows:

(a) Combat Team Eight Operation Plan Number 8-45

(b) Combat Team Eight Operation Orders Number 6-45, 7-45 and 8-45. Change Number 1 to Combat Team Operation Order Number 8-45.

(c) Combat Team Eight Occupation Orders Number 1-45, 2-45 and 3-45.

(d) Regimental Administrative Orders Number 17-45, 18-45, 21-45 and 22-45.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND.

M. S. RUSHER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

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Operation Plan
CT-8 No 8-45

Maps: KYUSHU - 1:250,000 KUMAMOTO - Sheet 56 and KOKURA - Sheet 45.
KYUSHU - 1:50,000 - Sheets 24 24 II, III, IV.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See CT-8 Opn Plan No 7-45.

1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to CT-8 Opn Plan No 7-45, G-2 Studies and Information issued separately.

(b) Elements of the Amphibious Corps continue to occupy additional areas and to enlarge that portion of KYUSHU under surveillance and control of occupation forces.

2. This CI, in addition to developing the occupation of assigned area of responsibility, will defend and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy all hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:

(a) maintaining at all times in the regimental area of responsibility a force of at least one (1) battalion prepared to move on two (2) hours notice, with one (1) company of such battalion motorized, and prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.

(b) maintaining at each separate billet of the CI a minimum of seventy-five per cent (75%) of the command during the hours of darkness.

(c) establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each separate billeting area, and area of responsibility.

(d) initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces, or prevent the execution of assigned missions.

For areas of responsibility, see Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to 2d Mar Div Opn O (o. 57.)
3. (a) LT 1/8 (less "E" CO) will, on order from this Hqs, assume responsibility for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the CT zone of action.

(b) LT 2/8 will, on order from this Hqs, assume responsibility for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the CT zone of action.

(c) LT 3/8 will, on order from this Hqs, assume responsibility for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the CT zone of action.

(d) 3/8 will augment LT 1/8 when the latter is charged with the responsibility for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the CT zone of action.

(e) CT Troops will be prepared at all times to carry out normal missions.

(f) 3/8 Rein will at all times be responsible for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the company zone of action, (South Area).

(x) (1) Units of this CT are assigned sectors of responsibility, for action subsequent to initial action against hostile groups, as shown on Annex (a) (Operation Overlay) to this Plan.

(2) Unit commanders will take whatever action is necessary, depending on the situation, to successfully defend against hostile troops.

(c) Passive defense measures will be en
forced. Attention will be paid to the dispersal of ammunition and fuel dumps.

(4) All units of this CT will be prepared to move on order to the support of other regimental or divisional units, and to this purpose will conduct reconnaissance of road nets throughout respective and adjacent areas of responsibility.

(5) Responsibility of the immediate defense of the CT area of responsibility will be rotated between the LFs weekly, assignments to be made by FdS Reg.

(6) By 12 October, 1945, and weekly thereafter, orders will be issued by this Hq creating imaginary situations requiring that immediate defensive action be taken by the unit charged with the responsibility of initial defense.

(7) Where rehearsals of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese nationals to become unduly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of the drill.

(8) The RmTO will be prepared to furnish the (10) 2½ ton and seven (7) 1 ton trucks to the duty LF for the use of the motorized company in time to allow the company to move on thirty (30) minutes notice. The CO of the duty LF is authorized to make all necessary arrangements for the entrucking of such company with the RmTO. Copies of all truck and vehicle assignment tables will be submitted to this Hq (Reg 3-5).

4. See Regimental Administrative Order 17-45 and current instructions as issued.
Serial 00615
SECRET

Operation Plan
CT-3 to 3-45

5. See 2d Mar Div Operation Order No 57.

5th ORDER OF COLONEL T. J. MC PARRA D.

M. S. R. H. I. E. R.
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

ATTACH:
(A) - Operation Overlay.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Annex (A) (Distribution) to CT-3
Operation Plan No 7-45.

OFFICIAL:

WARNER

-3-
Operation Order
CT-8 to 6-45

Maps: (a) Central JAPA, 1:250,000, Second Edition AMS-2, Sheets nos. 56 and 61.
(b) JAPA, 1:500,000, Second Edition APPAC-2, KYUSHU 1 3100 E 12920.

Task Organization:

(a) **LT 1/6** - Lt. Col. Hayward, USMC
   1st Bn, 8th Mar (-)
   2d Plat, Co "B", 2d MT En
   1st Plat, Co "C", 2d Engrs En
   Det Rgt. S-2 Sec
   Det "D" Div Sig Co

(b) **LT 2/8** - Lt Col. Pusbaum, USMCR
   2d En, 8th Mar
   Co "A", 1st En, 8th Mar

(c) **LT 3/8** - Lt Col. Wallace, USMC
   3d En, 8th Mar
   3d Plat, 2d MT Co
   3d Plat, C Engrs

(d) **Spt Co** - Maj Van Evers, USMC
   Wpns Co, 8th Mar

(e) **CT Trs** - Lt Mott, USMCR
   H&S Co, 8th Mar
   Co "B", 2d MT En (-)
   Co "C", 2d Engrs En (-)
   Co "A", 2d Med En
   2d Plat Ord Co, 2d Svy En
   3d Plat Svy Co, 2d Svy En
   3d Plat Automotive Repair Co, 2d MT En
   Det "C", Div Sig Co
SECRET

Operation Order
CT-8  to  8-45

1. See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to 2d Mar Div Opn Order No 59-45, and S-2 Studies and Information issued separately.

2. Combat Team Eight will:

   (a) Continue execution of assigned missions in area it now occupies.

   (b) On 28 October, extend zone of responsibility to include all of KUROMOTO KE, and that portion of KAGOSHIMA KE as shown by Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to this order.

   For boundaries and areas of responsibility see Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to this order.

3. (a) LT 1/8 will:

   (1) Execute the move to KAGOSHIMA in echelon as follows:

   a. 28 October - "A" Co and MP Sq
   b. 29 October - Motor Convoy
   c. 30 October - Remainder of LT

   (2) Provide supervisory personnel at KAGOSHIMA, port of entry of repatriated Japanese Nationals, and conduct check for weapons, loot, and excess food.

   (3) Initially coordinate surveillance of area of Southern KUSUKE assigned KANOY4 Occupation Force with CO of that Force.

   (4) Carry out extensive patrols in area of responsibility.

(b) LT 2/8 will:

   (1) Carry out extensive patrolling in assigned area.
(2) Carry out normal and previously assigned missions.

(c) LT 3/9 will:

(1) Carry out extensive patrolling in assigned area.

(2) Carry out normal and previously assigned missions.

(d) Spt 3p - Continue normal missions.

(e) CT Trs - Continue normal missions.

(x) (1) Special emphasis will be placed on prevention of looting and the maintenance of a high standard of sanitation.

(2) Commanders concerned will exercise surveillance of areas of responsibility by judicious use of patrols. Minimum patrol strength beyond range of immediate support; one (1) Pat. Two (2) copies of patrol plans and overlays will be submitted to Regtl 3-3 office forty-eight (48) hrs prior to execution of patrols.

(3) Japanese authorities will be required to maintain adequate guards on installations, dumps, and equipment except those involving prescribed items which require direct control by occupation forces.

(4) For missions relative to enforcement of Surrender Terms, see Annex (D) (Enforcement of Surrender Terms) to 3d Mar Div Operation Plan to 14.

(5) Annex (E) (SCAP Directive to Japanese Government) to this order will be initiated by inspection of all prisons and places of detention.
Operation Order

CT-6 To 6-45

within assigned areas and by assumption of control of all records of organizations abolished under terms of that directive. Any effort in the part of any individuals or organizations to circumvent the directive will be immediately reported to this Hq.

(6) Reports will be submitted in accordance with existing directives.

4. See current administrative orders and directives.

5. (a) Sig Com — Normal ir accordance with current directives.

(b) Command Posts:

CT Ho — (18619 - 10770)
LT 1/8 — To be announced
LT 2/8 — (18619 - 10770)
LT 3/8 — (18622 - 10723)

BY ORDER OF COL. EL T. G. MC FARLANE.

M. S. RANFORD,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

Annexes:
(A) — Operation Overlay Revised.
(B) — SCAP Directive to Japanese Government.

Distribution:

2d Mar Div — 10 Mil Govt Det (KAGOSHIMA) — 1
CO — 1 LT 1/8
RX — 1 LT 2/8
S-1 — 1 LT 3/8
S-2 — 1 Spt Gp
S-3 — 1 CT Trs
S-4 — 1 CT-2
S-10 — 1 CT-6
S-16 — 1 War Diary
Mil Govt Det (KUMAMOTO) — 1 F I L E

OFFICIAL:

WAR LTR — 4 —

SECRET
Operation Order
CT-8 to 6-45

ANNEX (B)

SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

1. The SCAP Directive to Japanese Government dated 4 October 1945, attached hereto, constitutes Annex (C) to CT-8, 2d Mar Div, Operation Order No 6-45.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND

M. S. RAHISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as CT-8 Operation Order No 6-45.

OFICIAL:

WARNER

SECRET
SECRET

SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 40CGT145

The following information originates from SCAP (addressed to Joint Chiefs of Staffs) and is quoted for your information and guidance. Message begins: The following directive was issued to the Japanese Government this date:

Quote 1. "In order to remove restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties and discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion, the Imperial Japanese Government will:

(a) Abrogate operations of all provisions of all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations which:

(1) Establish or maintain restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government.

(2) Establish or maintain restrictions on the collection and dissemination of information.

(3) By their terms or their application, operate unequally in favor of or against any person by reason of race, nationality, creed or political opinion.

(b) The enactments covered in paragraph (a), above, shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(1) The peace preservation law (Chien Iji Ho), law number 54 of 1941, promulgated on or about 10 March, 1941.

(2) The protection and surveillance law for thought offense (Shiso Ken Hogo Kansatsu Ho) law number 29 of 1936, promulgated on or about 29 May, 1936.

(3) Regulations relative to application of protection and surveillance law for thought offense (Shiso Ken Hogo Kansatsu Ho Shikosei), Imperial ordinance number 401 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November, 1936.

-1-
(4) Ordinance establishing protection and surveillance stations (Hogo Kansoku - Jo Kansai), Imperial ordinance number 406 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November, 1936.

(5) Ordinance establishing protection and surveillance stations, (Hogo Kansoku - Jo Kansai), Imperial ordinance number 406 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November, 1936.

(6) The precautionary detention procedure order (Yobo Koki Tetsuzuki Rei), Ministry of Justice order, Shihosho Rei, number 49, issued on or about 14 May, 1941.

(7) Regulations for treatment of persons under precautionary detention (Yobo Koki-In Shogu Rei), Ministry of Justice order, Shihosho Rei, number 50, issued on or about 14 May, 1941.

(8) The national defense and peace preservation law (Kokubo Hoan Ho), law number 49 of 1941, promulgated on or about 7 March, 1941.

(9) National Defense and Peace preservation law enforcement order (Kikudo Hoan Ho Shiko Rei), Imperial ordinance number 842 of 1941, issued on or about 7 May, 1941.

(10) Regulations for appointment of lawyers under peace preservation laws (Shingosho Shihai Kitai, Ministry of Justice order, Shihosarei), number 47 of 1941, issued on or about 9 May, 1941.

(11) Law for safeguarding secrets of military material resources (Gunyo Shigen Himitai Hogo Ho), law number 25 of 1939, promulgated on or about 25 March, 1939.

(12) Ordinance of the enforcement of the law for safeguarding secrets of military material resources (Gunyo Shigen Himitai Hogo Ho Shiki Tai), Imperial ordinance number 415 of 1939, issued on or about 24 January, 1939.

SECRET
(13) Regulations for the enforcement of the law of safeguarding secrets of military material resources (Gunyo Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho Shiki Kisciku), Ministries of War and Navy ordinance number 3 of 1939, promulgated on or about 26 June, 1939.

(14) Law for the protection of military secrets (Gunki Hogo Ho), law number 72 of 1937, revised by law number 58 of 1941.

(15) Regulations for the enforcement of the law for the protection of military secrets (Gunki Hogo Ho Shiko Kisciku), Ministry of War ordinance number 59, issued on or about 12 December 1939 and revised by Ministry of War ordinance number 6, 20 and 58 of 1941.

(16) The Religious body law (Shukyo Dentai Ho), Law number 77 of 1939, promulgated on or about 8 April, 1939.

(17) All laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations amending, supplementing or implementing the foregoing enactments.

(c) Release immediately all persons now detained, imprisoned, under "protection or surveillance", or whose freedom is restriction in any other manner who have been placed in that state of detention, imprisonment, "protection and surveillance", or restrictions of freedom:

(1) Under the enactments referred to in paragraph 1, (a) and (b) above.

(2) Without charge.

(3) By charging them technically with a minor offense, when, in reality, the reason for detention, imprisonment, "protection and surveillance", or restriction of freedom, was because of their thought, speech, religion, political beliefs, or assembly. The release of all such persons will be accomplished by 10 October, 1945.

(d) Abolish all organizations or agencies created to carry out the provisions of the enactments referred to in paragraph 1, (a) and (b) above and the part of, or
functions of, other offices or subdivisions of other civil departments and or those which supplement or assist them in the execution of such provisions. These include, but are not limited to:

(1) All secret police organs.

(2) Those departments in the Ministry of Home Affairs, such as the Bureau of Police, charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.

(3) Those departments, such as the special higher police (Tokubetsu Koto Kaisa Tei Bu), in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, the Osaka Metropolitan Police, any other Metropolitan Police, the police of the Territorial Administration of Hokkaido and the various Prefectural Police charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.

(4) Those departments, such as the protection and surveillance commission, and all protection and surveillance stations responsible therefor, under the Ministry of Justice charged with protection and surveillance and control of thought, speech, religion, or assembly.

(c) Remove from office and reemployment the Minister of Home Affairs, the Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, the Chief of Osaka Metropolitan Police Board, the Chief of any other Metropolitan police, the Chief of Police of the Territorial Administration of Hokkaido, the Chiefs of each prefectural police department, the entire personnel of the Special Higher Police Departments, the entire personnel of the Special Higher Police of all Metropolitan, territorial, and prefectural police departments, the Guiding and Protecting officials and all other personnel of the Protection and Surveillance Commission and of the Protection and Surveillance Stat-
SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 40GT46. CO. T'D

ions. None of the above persons will be reappointed any position under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Justice or any police organization in Japan. Any of the above persons whose assistance is required to accomplish the provisions of this directive will be retained until the directive is accomplished and dismissed.

(g) Prohibit any further activity by police officers, members of Police forces, and other government, national or local, officials or employees which is related to the enactments referred to in paragraph 1. (a) and (b) above and to the organs and functions abolished by paragraph 1. (d) above.

(h) Prohibit the physical punishment and mistreatment of all persons detained, imprisoned, or under protection and surveillance under any and all Japanese enactments, laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations. All such persons will receive at all times ample sustenance.

(i) Ensure the security and preservation of all records and any and all other materials of the organs abolished in paragraph 1. (d). These records may be used to accomplish the provisions of the directive, but will not be destroyed, removed, or tampered with in any way.

(j) Submit a comprehensive report to this headquarters not later than 15 October, 1946, describing in detail all action taken to comply with all provisions of this directive. This report will contain the following specific information prepared in the form of separate supplementary reports:

(1) Information concerning persons released in accordance with paragraph 1. (d) above. (To be grouped by prison or institution in which held or from which released or by office controlling their protection and surveillance).

a. Name of person released from detention or imprisonment or person released from protec-
tion and surveillance, his age, nationality, race and occupation.

2. Specification of criminal charges against each person released from protection and surveillance, his age, nationality, race and occupation.

3. Specifications of criminal charges against each person released from detention or imprisonment or reason for which each person was placed under protection and surveillance.
SECRET

Operation Order
CT-8 No 7-45

BY DISPATCH

FLAGSTONE, V No. COM

INFORMATION TO JASON SUMAT: PUEBLO SEALSKY SOYBEAN

"THIS IS TO COM OPERATIONS ORDER NUMBER SIX. DASH FOUR FIVE A A, EASPE REVISIT AND A, EX PAKER TO CO COM OPERATIONS ORDER. SIX DASH FOUR FIVE APPLIES THIS ORDER X FLAGSTONE COMMAND MOVE TO HIJOYOSHI OF FIFTH NOVEMBER IN ECHILO. X ADVANCE PARTIES MOVE OUT OR ORDER COMMANDING OFFICER FLAGSTONE. DASH TWO X PARAGRAPH THREE XRAY COMMAND FOUR COMMAND AND FIVE TO CO COM OPERATIONS ORDER NUMBER SIX DASH FOUR FIVE APPLY X REPORT TIMES OF DEPARTURE KUNAMOTO AND ARRIVAL HIJOYOSHI OF ALL ECHILO. X BT"

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. MC FARLANE D.

M. B. HAHN
Lieutenant Colonel, 4th Marine Corps, Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as enclosed in message.

OFFICIAL:

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SECRET
Operation Order
CT-8 No 8-45


TASK ORGANIZATION

COMBAT TEAM EIGHT - Col T. G. McFarland, USMC

(a) LT 1/8 - Lt Col Hayward, USMC
1st Bn, 8th Mar (-)
2d Plat, Co "B", 2d MT Bn
1st Plat, Co "C", 2d Engr Bn
Det "D", Div Sig Co

(b) LT 2/8 - Lt Col Musaam, USMCR
2d Bn, 8th Mar
Co "B", 1st Bn, 8th Mar
Det Regtl 8-2 Sec

(c) LT 3/8 - Lt Col Wallace, USMC
3d Bn, 8th Mar
3d Plat, "B" MT Co
3d Plat, "C" Engr

(d) Spt Gp - Maj Van Evers, USMCR
Wpns Co, 8th Mar

(e) CT Trs - Lt Mott, USMCR
2d Bn, 8th Mar
Co "B", 2d MT Bn (-)
Co "C", 2d Engr Bn (-)
Co "E", 2d Med Ln
2d Plat, Ord Co, 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat, Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat Automotive Repair Co, 2d MT Bn
Det "C", Div Sig Co
1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 2d Mar Div No 14, and 3-2 and 8-2 Studies and information issued separately.

(b) Elements of 2d Mar Div continue to occupy additional areas as assigned.

2. CT-8, 2d Mar Div Rein, in addition to developing occupation of assigned area of responsibility will defend against and subsequently disperse, capture or destroy and hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:

(a) Battalions designating one (1) company prepared to move out on one (1) hour's notice, motorized as practicable.

(b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the regiment a minimum of 75% of the command during hours of darkness.

(c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each separate billeting area, and the overall defense within each battalion area of responsibility.

(d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces or prevent the execution of assigned missions.

For areas of responsibility see Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to this Order.

3. (a) LT 1/8 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone are attached to LT 1/8 for execution of their plan.

(b) LT 2/8 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone are attached to LT 2/8 for execution of their plan.
Serial 00546
SECRET

Operation Order
CT-8  Fo 8-46

(c) LT 3/8 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone are attached to LT 3/8 for execution of their plan.

(d) Spt Gp continue normal missions.

(e) CT Fra continue normal missions.

(x) (1) Plans will divide the areas of responsibility into sectors and will show for each area of responsibility the sector of responsibility and the plan of billet defense.

(2) Battalions will be prepared to move on order to the support of other Regt units and will conduct reconnaissance of road nets throughout respective areas of responsibility.

(3) Plans will be submitted so as to reach this Hq prior to 1200, 21 November 1945, and rehearsal of defense plans will be commenced by that date and continued weekly thereafter.

(4) Where rehearsals of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese Nationals to become unusually excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of the drill.

4. See current Administrative Orders and current instructions as issued.

5. (a) See current Signal Communications directives.

(b) Command Posts:

CT-8  - KIMAKOTO (1381.90-1077.00)

LT 1/8  - KAJOSIMA (1366.40-0923.07)

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Serial 00546
SECRET

Operation Order
CT-8  no 8-45

LT 2/8     - KUMAMOTO     (1381.90-1077.00)
LT 3/8     - HITOYOSHI    (1388.05-1001.05)
Spt Gp     - KUMAMOTO     (1381.90-1077.00)
CT Trs     - KUMAMOTO     (1381.90-1077.00)
Div Ron Co  - HITOYOSHI    (1388.05-1001.05)

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND

M. S. RAHEISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer

ANNEX:
(A) Operation Overlay

Distribution:
Same as CT-8 Operation Order no 6-45.

OFFICIAL:

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SECRET
Serial 00546
SECRET

Change No 1 to

Operation Order
CT-8 No 8-45


1. In Task Organization under LT 1/8 delete "Det Regtl S-2 Sec". Add under LT 2/8 "Det Regtl S-2 Sec".

2. Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) - Effect the change indicated by attached overlay.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND.

M. S. RAHISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Executive Officer.

Distribution:
Same as CT-6 Operation Order No 6-45.

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-3-

Copy No 2
SECRET
Serial 00546

CT-8, 2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field,
29 November 1945.

Change No 2 to

Operation Order
CT-8 No 8-45


1. In paragraph 5. (b) change "Div Ron Co - HITOYOSHI
(1388.05-1001.05)" to read, "Div Ron Co - KUMAMOTO
(1382.20-1072.80)."

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND.

P. S. RAISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

Distribution:
Same as CT-8 Operation Order Number 6-46.

OFFICIAL:

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-8-

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HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH MARINES, SECOND MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD.

25 September 1945.

RESTRICTED

REGIONAL OCCUPATIONAL ORDER

NUMBER: ......................1-45)

Reference: (a) Addendum No 1 to Div Gen O No 31-45.

1. All units will submit an operations report following the form as outlined in reference (a).

2. This report will be submitted at 1800I as of 1800I daily.

3. This report will include data for the entire unit, less elements attached to other units.

BY ORDER OF COL. T. G. MC FARLAND.

M. S. HADDEN
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus 2d Mar Div two (2).

OFFICIAL:

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HEADQUARTERS,
COMBAT TEAM EIGHT, SECOND MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD.

28 September 1945.

REstricted

COMBAT TEAM OCCUPATION ORDER)
NUMBER...................2-45)

Enclosure: (A) Overlay. Map of KYUSHU 1:25,000. Sheets 4145 IV SW, 4145 III NE, 4145 III NW.

1. Unit S-2 sections will patrol areas as shown in enclosure (A).

2. These patrols will search all caves, air raid shelters, and other likely places for military stores, installations, or documents.

3. Written reports must be submitted to Regtl S-2 by 1800 daily, beginning 29 Sept 1945. These reports will include the following elements of information:

   a. Location of military stores, documents, or installations.
   b. Size or amount of store, documents, or installation.
   c. Any other intelligence data obtained.

   BY ORDER OF COU EL T. G. MC FARLa: D.

   M. S. RAMISER,
   Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
   Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:
"Special"

OFFICIAL:

ReSTRICTED
HEADQUARTERS
COMBAT TEAM EIGHT, SECOND MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD.

Serial 00514 3 October 1945.
SECRET

COMBAT TEAM OCCUPATION ORDER)

I. TROOP MOVEMENT.

II. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

References: (a) CT-8 Con Plan No 7-45.
(b) Annex (A) and appendices thereto to
2d Mar Div Con Plan No 14-45

I. TROOP MOVEMENT.

1. Attention is called to sub-paragraph 3. (x)
(14) reference (a), for compliance by all units. That
reference is quoted herein for information.

"Except under combat conditions, troop move-
m ents through any populated area will not be
executed without prior reconnaissance and
suitable warning to and arrangement with
local authorities."

2. The above reference (a) is interpreted to
include organized hikes.

3. Units of this command conducting such move-
m ents will notify the Regt S-3 office at least twenty-
four (24) hours prior to the movement, and will supply that
office with the following information:

- Organization involved.
- Purpose of the movement.
- Route to be traveled.
- Size of troop body.
- Expected time of departure and time of
  arrival at destination.

II. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

1. An incident encountered by a unit of this
command is quoted herein for information.
"On scheduled sight-seeing hike company patrol as stopped at train station on the outside of HIGASHI WAGATA (1315.70–1077.43) about 1400 by an individual who claimed to be liaison committee of that city. This individual, evidently promoted by the citizens of HIGASHI WAGATA, wanted to get from us the following information: 1) What was our organization? 2) Where was our destination? 3) Was permission granted by Colonel McFarland to be in that area? 4) What was our business? 5) Would we or would we not go into that city?

"It was apparent from his attitude that our presence in that vicinity was causing a great deal of alarm for him and the town-people.

"Being uninformed as to the correct procedure in such a situation we answered a number of his questions and continued on our planned route. We did not enter the city of HIGASHI WAGATA but continued on to our objective, FUKUTAO."

2. Had proper arrangements as outlined in paragraph 1 been made, this incident would probably have been avoided.

3. In any event where Japanese through their actions or statements are suspected of actions inimical to the success of the Allied Occupation, the person making the observation should immediately make a detailed report of his observations to the 5–2 so that action as set forth in reference (b) may be taken.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL W. S. MCFARLAND.

M. S. RATHSER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

"3" plus 2d War Div (2)

OFFICIAL:

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SECRET
Copy No. 6611

REGIMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

To accompany Opn. Plan #7, RCT-8, 2nd Mar Div, Rein.

In The Field,
10 September, 1945

NUMBER: 17-45

MAPS: Same as Opn. Plan #7, RCT-8.

CHARTS: Same as Opn. Plan #7, RCT-8.

PHOTOS:

References: (a) Div Adm C #58-45 (Accompanying Opn. Plan #14)
(b) Div Adm C #57-45 (Embarkation Order)
(c) Div Adm C #60-45 (Camp: Evacuation Order)

1. UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT

(a) All troops land with:
1. Utility clothing,
2. Steel helmets, w/camouflage cover.
3. Normal armp. w/one u/f.
4. Filled canteens
5. Field Transport Pack.

(b) All troops be prepared to land with field transport packs. If tactical situation requires, assault troops land with marching pack.

(c) Authorized baggage, with low unloading priority, not to exceed:
1. One (1) bag, clothing, and one (1) pack, w/protection, per man. Pad and protector will be kept in troop space for use on route. Clothing bags will be stowed as cargo.
2. One (1) clothing roll; one (1) bag, clothing (c foot locker) and one (1) bedding roll, per field officer, officer and lst pay Grade NCO.

a. Extra trunks, locker, authorized for field officers, will be carried as organizational equipment and turned over to their organizational quartermaster or property officer.

(d) Equipment and Supplies:
1. Supplies - High priority, top loaded.
   a. Water: two (2) gallons per man.
   b. Rations: one (1) day's "C" rations per man.
   c. Ammunition: One (1) u/f.

2. SUPPLY

(a) Fire - regimental dumps to lower echelon, as required.

Location of dumps to be announced.

(b) General:
1. All organic equipment to be carried. No rear echelon anticipated.

-1-

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3. **EVACUATION**

(a) **Casualties:**
   1. Div. SOP 4-6 (Non-Casualty)
   2. Div. SOP 4-4 (Casualty)

(b) **Burial:**
   1. Div. SOP 4-6 (Burial and Grave Registration)
   2. Cemeteries: To be prescribed.

(c) **Salvage:**
   1. All units are directly responsible for collection.
   2. Collecting vehicles will be announced.
   3. All empty guns and refillable compressed gas cylinders shall be returned to the issuing agency by first available transportation.

4. **TRAFFIC**

(a) **Circulation:**
   2. Cleared and track laying vehicles: Use separate routes alongside existing roads, or as indicated by signs.

(b) **Traffic Priorities:**
   a. Messenger vehicles
   b. Wire-laying vehicles
   c. Ammunition
   d. Gasoline
   e. Nations and water
   f. Ambulances

(c) **Restrictions:**
   1. Maximum speed will be as follows:
      - Jeeps - 20 MPH
      - Trucks - 20 MPH
   2. Traffic will drive to the left.
   3. Railroads will be used only on "Division order.

(c) **Precautions:**
   1. Drivers will be constantly on the alert for land mines.
   2. Traffic Signs will be installed by 2nd Eng. En. in coordination with the Division Provost Marshall.
SECRET

RCT-8, 2d Mar Div, Rein In The Field,
10 September, 1945

REGIMENTAL ADMIN. ORDER NO. 1-45; to accompany Opn. Plan #7, RCT-8, 2nd Mar Div

(a) Control
(1) Beach areas — By Military Police (See Annex 6)
(2) Inland:
   a. By Division MP.
   b. By CTs (forward of own CP)
   c. By Bns. (in own zone of action)
(3) Traffic Control Points:
   a. As directed by the Provost Marshal.
(4) Construction and Maintenance of Routes:
   (1) By 2nd Eng. bn.
   (2) Priorities:
      a. Beaches and routes inland.
      b. MSR'S.
      c. Bridges and General maintenance.

5. TRANSPORT AND SHORE PARTY
   (b) Beaches:
      (1) Beaches will not be used as bivouac or supply dump areas. Supplies landed on the beach will be moved immediately to Shore Party Dumps.
   (c) Trains:
      (1) Routine transportation augmented by one 175 Platoon of eight (8) 2½-ton trucks from 2nd 175 Battalion.

6. PERSONNEL
   (a) Stragglers:
      (1) Sighted armed and souvenir hunters, who are to be considered as looters, will be arrested and turned over to Division Provost Marshal.
   (b) Mail:
      (1) The troop Commander on each ship will appoint one or more mail orderlies to receive mail at rendezvous and staging areas.
      (2) Initial distributions will be made from a designated ship. Later distribution will be made from an established Fleet Post Office.
   (c) Shelter: Camps and billeting areas will be assigned.
      (1) Heavy Tents: Carried by organizations.
      (2) Shelter tents: In packs.
      (3) Native Housing: Authorized by RCT Commander.
   (d) Reports:
      (1) Information regarding reports to be furnished later.
      (2) Period covered: 0001-0400 daily.
REGIMENTAL ADJ. ORDER NO. 17-45: To accompany Opn Plan #7, RCT-8 2MD

(e) Administration of Personnel: Div Gen Order #35-45 as applicable.

(f) Repatriations: Supplied through normal Navy and Marine Corps channels.

(g) Records:
   (1) Casualties: Extracted from the Target: See Div Gen Order # 29-45 and 31-45.
   (2) Embarcation Rosters: Div Memo #61-45. (Embarcation and Debarcation Rosters). Fifteen (15) copies to be delivered to representative of the Div. Adm. on dock.

(h) Payment of Troops:
   (1) Personnel will be paid on target as consistent with the situation and as directed by this headquarters.

7. MISCELLANEOUS ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

(a) Troop Commanders on LST's and LSM's will insure that troops embarked have sufficient PX supplies for use enroute.

(b) Organization Equipment, T/A:
   (1) All RCT-8 organizational equipment, vehicles, except Chemical Warfare, Protective clothing, and camouflage materials.
   (c) Waterproofing: Neither vehicles nor weapons will be waterproofed.

(d) Lubricating Oils:
   (1) Only Japanese Paraffin-Based lubricating oil will be used in surrendered vehicles.
   (f) Do not use Japanese oil in any U.S. equipment at any time.

(e) Winterization:
   (1) Vehicles: All organizations will winterize cooling systems to withstand a temperature of 10 degrees Fahrenheit upon order from Regimental Headquarters. Anti-freeze compound (Prestone) will be furnished by the Regimental Quartermaster.
   (2) Weapons: Jacketed water cooled machine-guns will be winterized against freezing on order from Regimental Headquarters. This will be accomplished by filling jackets with a anti-freeze mixture of two (2) parts anti-freeze compound (Prestone) and six (6) parts water. Recoil oil and lubricants will be used as prescribed by War Department. Lubricating Orders for use below freezing temperatures.
SECRET
Copy No
Serial 00511

REGIMENTAL ADJ. ORDER NO. 17-45: To accompany Opn. Plan #7, RCT-8 2MD

(f) Conservation of Supplies:
(1) Conservation of equipment and supplies is a command responsibility.
(2) All unit commanders will:
   a. Provide adequate guards over all supplies and equipment enroute to the objective area.
   b. Post adequate guards over all supply dumps, with orders to prevent pilfering by military personnel and civilians.
   c. Insure that rations, clothing, etc. other supplies are not given, sold, or bartered to members of the Japanese armed forces or civilians by personnel of the command. Only Military Government Agencies are authorized to make issue of supplies to civilians.
   d. Impress on all individuals the seriousness of pilfering our own or captured supplies.
   e. Take prompt disciplinary action in every case of looting or pilfering, and give publicity within his command to punishment imposed thereon. No looting of Japanese property will be tolerated. Civilian offenders will be handled in accordance with policies set forth in Army "G", Military Government).

(g) S-4 Periodic Reports:
(1) Information desired as shown on forms to be distributed later.
(2) Period Covered: See Div Gen Order #31-45.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T.G. MC FARLAND

M.S. RAHLSEL,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex "X", Opn Plan CT-3 No 7-45.

O-F-I-C-I-A-L

H.W. COULTER, JR.
Major, USMCR

583
1. General

(a) The objective lies within the temperate zone and has an extreme temperature range of from 76 to 12°F. The area is generally mountainous with a limited but well tilled coastal plain. Health conditions are excellent as regards to climate, food, natural drainage and endemic diseases. The diseases of major importance to occupying forces will be respiratory infections, intestinal parasites, dysentery and venereal disease. Plague, cholera, typhoid and encephalitis may be encountered in proportion to the mass dislocation of the populace and the bomb damage sustained.

2. Responsibility

(a) General and special sanitary measures are a command responsibility in all echelons. The basic rules of camp sanitation as outlined in FM 8-40 and FM 21-10 will be observed.

3. Water

(a) Initial. Water brought in by division will be used for drinking. Washing and bathing in local is forbidden, until treated and approved by Division Headquarters.

4. Waste Disposal

(a) Human excreta.

(1) Straddle trenches.

(2) Prefabricated heads.

(b) Garbage and rubbish.

(1) Bury, burn, or dump at sea.

5. Messing

(a) Priority will be given sanitary installations in the following order:

(A) - 1.
Regimental Administrative
Order Number.............17-45

(1) Flyproof heads.
(2) Screened galleys.
(3) Showers.
(4) Screened mess halls.

(b) The discarding of empty ration boxes and tin cans other than in designated receptacles is forbidden.

6. Local Vegetables, Processed Foods, and Fruit
   (a) The use of all local foods is initially forbidden.
   (b) The eventual use of local foods will be by division order.

7. Venereal Diseases
   (a) All preventative measures will be observed.

8. Civilians
   (a) Medical officers will be initially guided by humanitarian
       instincts. Sanitary and medical facilities will be established by
       Military Government as soon as practicable.
   (b) Subsequent care in accordance with Military Government direc-
       tives and special division orders.

9. Local Buildings
   (a) All buildings will be sprayed or dusted with DDT before troo
       are billeted therein.

10. Care of the dead
    (a) Bodies will be sprayed, both back and front, with 5% DDT in
        Kerosene or 1% solution of Sodium Arsenite (Pentone) in salt or
        fresh water.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T.G. Mc FARLAND

M.S. RHACI:
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

OFFICIAL:

M.A. COULTER, JR.
Major, USMC
S-4
Organization

(a) Battalions and separate Battalion Medical Sections in accordance with T/O.

Evacuation Policy

(a) Initially:

1. Immediate evacuation of all friendly casualties to hospital facilities afloat.

(b) Later:

1. 60 days, when adequate hospitals are established ashore.

(c) Air Evacuation:

1. Will commence when airfield facilities become available

(d) All Medical Units will provide markers on evacuation routes to indicate location of such units.

Medical Supplies

(a) Initially:

(1) Thirty days supply, combat load embarked.

(b) Strict property exchange will be adhered to. When exchange is not possible, a memo receipt will be issued.

Hospitalization

(a) Medical Units will make maximum use of existing buildings in order to reduce construction efforts. Division approval prior to occupation of any building is mandatory, except when the tactical situation demands immediate action.

(b) U.S. Civilians and all United Nations civilian subjects will be cared for in civilian hospitals under military jurisdiction, or in military hospitals, if the former are not available.
(c) U.S. and other United Nation Prisoners of War will be extended all occupation medical facilities.

(d) Following the installation of Corps Hospital facilities, major surgical procedures, except of a life saving nature, will not be performed in units forward of observation hospitals.

(e) No Japanese civilians or military personnel will be cared for in U.S. Military Medical Installations.

(f) Health Records will be carried by all units. NAVMED form FA will be prepared on all patients in accordance with existing instructions. Transfer of patients from Division to Corps installations will be accomplished on NAVMED form 8.

5. Sanitation:

(a) See Annex "A" to RCT-9 Administrative Order 17-45.


(a) Disposition of the dead will be in accordance with SOP 4-5. (Burial and Graves Registration).

7. Records and Reports.

(a) Accurate, detailed records will be kept of all sick and wounded for casualty and medical treatment reports.

(b) "First Case Form" "Daily Recap of Patients in Hospital," will be submitted to Division in accordance with instructions on the reverse of that form.

**IN ORDER OF COLONEL T.G. MC FARLAND**

**N.S. RAUSCH**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS**

**ANNEX (B)**

**EXECUTING OFFICER**

H.W. COULTER, JR.
Major, USMC
S-4

587
HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH MARINES, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD

9 September, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

REGIMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER) CAMP EVACUATION.
NUMBER..............18-45 )

1. GENERAL:

(a) All units will be prepared to evacuate, on
short notice, this day, and all facilities now occupied,
(b) All surplus equipment and supplies will be
turned in to the Regimental Quartermaster on the receipt of this
order.

2. CAMP AND AREA:

(a) Clean and secure all buildings. Remove all
pictures, decorations and notices from the bulkheads.
(b) All tentage, except that marked for striking,
will be left standing. Any unframed tents will be struck and turned
in to the Regimental Quartermaster for further turn in to Division
Quartermaster. All serviceable paunits now on hand will be loaded
as organic equipment.
(c) Galley:
(1) Remove all stored food.
(2) Clean buildings thoroughly, including the
removal of all grease and smoke accumulation from inner surface and
ribs of Quonset huts.
(3) Clean grease traps and garbage racks.
(4) Clean and shut off all 600 cu. ft. refrigeration.
(5) Crate and carry as organic equipment, all
servel refrigeration.
(d) Electric Generators and Wiring:
(1) All electric generators will be carried.
(2) 30 KWH camp generator is permanent camp
equipment and will be left intact.
(3) All hat globes and shades will be re-
moved and carried by units.
(4) All fixtures, switch boxes, fuse boxes, 
electric wiring and insulators will be left intact.
(e) Water and sewers:
(1) Close all valves and drain all lines.
(2) Sewer heads and valves will be removed
and carried by units.
REGIMENTAL ADM. ORDER NO. 18-45,  (CONT'D)  9 September, 1945

(f) Heads:
   (1) Clean, scrub, and disinfect all hands.
   (2) Spray inside with Beniz (Sodium arsenite.)
   (3) Secure all seats and screen doors.

(g) Garbage and Trash Disposal: In accordance with Division Memo No-45, dated 20 April, 1945. This dump will be closed by Division troops.

(h) General Police of Areas: Waste disposal to be in accordance with Division General Order Number 19-44,
   (1) All fires will be extinguished and dry refuse dumps policed prior to departure of troops.
   (2) Leave all fire barrels filled with water. Buckets on fire barrels will remain. Barrels will be treated without by each battalion,
   (3) Areas will be thoroughly policed prior to departure of troops.

3. SUPPLIES:

   (a) Commissary: Upon vacating camp, all commissary supplies will be turned in by units to the Division Commissary Officer.

   (b) Fuel: All gasoline, kerosene, and oil remaining in camp will be turned in to the Division Quartermaster by units just prior to evacuation.

4. SALVAGE: (In accordance with SOP 4-1)

   (a) Battalion Quartermasters, with necessary enlisted assistants, will conduct efficient salvage of all material, clothing, usable personal effects, equipment, and other articles of value in their respective areas.

   (b) Salvaged material will be turned in to the Division Salvage Dump.

   (c) Homemade furniture in good condition may be stored in one mess hall by each unit, for use of future occupants of camp.

5. INSPECTION:

   (a) Unit Commanders will notify the Regimental Executive Officer when the provisions of the above order have been carried out and their area is ready for inspection. The Regimental Executive Officer will then inspect all areas and assure himself that the above orders have been executed.

6. REMARK: Present plans do not call for a rear echelon. If, however, due to lack of shipping space, it becomes necessary to leave a rear echelon, the following additional provision will apply.
REGIMENTAL ADV ORDER NO. 19-45. (CONT'D) 9 September, 1945

(a) Personnel:
(1) The personnel left in Rear Echelon will be carried on the rolls of the 2nd Marine Division Rear Echelon, to be activated by Division Headquarters.
(2) Such personnel will be quartered in the present Service Battalion Area.

(b) Property:
(1) All property, including baggage not authorized for assault echelon shipment, will be stored in rear echelon area.
(2) Such baggage will be inspected in accordance with Letter of Instruction #128, as published in Division Memo 219-44.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T.G. W. PARLAND

M.S. KAISER
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION "A"

OFFICIAL:

H.W. COULTER, JR.
HEADQUARTERS
COMBAT TEAM EIGHT, SECOND MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, IJF FIELD.

13 November 1945.

RESTRICTED

REGIMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER) : Disposition of Enemy Material.
NUMBER............... 21-45

Map: Central JAPAN, 1:250,000 2d Edition Ads-2, sheets No 45, 46, 56, 57, 61.

References: (a) 2d Mar Div Adm O No 58-45, Annex "J"
(b) SOP for dispensing of Enemy Ordnance Material
   (Attachment 3, Adm O 19/2 attached as Annex "K")
(c) CT-3, Opn O . O 6-45, and changes thereto.
(d) CT Tng Manc No 2-45.

1. General

(a) The disposition section as established in
    this Hq will supervise, coordinate, and report to higher echelon on matters pertaining to disposition of Japanese Military,
    Naval, and Air Force Material.

(b) Each LT will establish a disposition section
    within its Zone of Responsibility to supervise and coordinate
    all matters pertaining to disposition.

2. Operational Control

(a) General operational control for the CT Area
    of Responsibility will be the responsibility of the CT disposition officer.

(b) Operational control of disposition within
    LT Zones of Responsibility, as established by Reference (c),
    rests with the LT CO.

3. Depot Control Groups

(a) LT's will sep all rifle Plat Ldrs and all
    rifle Plat ACC's, covering all subjects as listed in Reference
    (d).

(b) Depot Control Groups will be sent out at
    the discretion of the LT CO. However, Depot Control Groups will
    be established at the following locations by LT concerned:

- 1 -

RESTRICTED 591
(1) CMUTA (1350-1025)
(2) KUMAMOTO (1380-1070)
(3) YATSUSHIRO (1370-1036)
(4) IZUMI (1347-992)
(5) HITOYOSHI (1389-1091)
(6) MIFAMATA (1350-998)
(7) SENDAI (1340-951)
(8) MAGOSUMA (1360-920)
(9) MAKURAIYAKI (1350-983)

(c) CT Depot Control Groups will be established at the following locations:

(1) CT Dump Area (KUMAMOTO)
(2) MIZUMI (1355-1050)

(d) The Depot Control Group at MIZUMI will arrange for disposition of all material that is to be dumped at sea. Depot Control Groups will dispose of this material by rail shipment to the group located at MIZUMI. Rail Transportation to be arranged by Regtl S-4.

4. Control Depot

(a) The CT Depot Control Group located at the CT dump area will be the CT control depot.

(b) All controlled items, war trophies, museum pieces, and goods required for distribution to our forces for their immediate use will be forwarded to this control depot.

5. Reports

(a) Reports will be rendered weekly, closing at 2400, Sunday and will be delivered to the Regtl Disposition Office the following Tuesday, at 0800.

(b) Material inventoried and collected and method of disposition will be reported on separate sheets according to the seven (7) subdivisions as follows:

(1) Ordnance
(2) Engineering
(3) Chemical
(4) Quartermaster
(5) Medical
(6) Transportation
(7) Signal

These sheets will be assembled in separate sections under the following groupings:
(1) Japanese Army
(2) Japanese Navy
(3) Japanese Army Air Force
(4) Japanese Navy Air Force

(c) Reports as prescribed above will be accom-
panied by a report showing separately the estimated tonnages of
ferrous scrap (iron, pig iron, etc.), aluminum and copper (all
other non-ferrous scrap) products of scrap returned to the
Japanese during the period covered by the report.

(d) Each unit disposition section will establish
and maintain its own file of stock record cards at the Head-
quartes concerned. Disposition sections will require daily
reports from the several control groups and all records
will be kept up on a daily basis.

(e) All disposition sections will have scrap
metal record cards to be retained at the Headquarters concerned
as the personal file of the unit. These cards will remain with
the Headquarters concerned until called for by higher echelon.
Scrap metal cards will be set up to show the estimated tonnages
of scrap metals recovered as follow:

(1) Card "A" - Ferrous scrap
(2) Card "B" - Aluminum
(3) Card "C" - Copper and copper alloy scrap
   (other non-ferrous scrap).

(f) Forms from Regtl disposition office will be
issued to each disposition section on request.

6. Disposition Units and Functioning

(a) LTT Commanders will within their Zones of
Responsibility:

(1) Immediately cause the Japanese to cease
the production of all arms, ammunition, explosives, aircraft
and naval and military equipment of all kinds, including the
construction of all naval vessels.

(2) Close and/or secure all manufacturing
plants, shops, warehouses, storage areas, and arms and munitions
depots engaged in whole or in part in manufacturing, storing or
processing items purely of a military nature. Where a doubt
exists, the facility will be closed and/or secured until the
correct status can be determined.

- 3 -
(3) Close all scientific research laboratories and secure all papers, drawings, models and other information found therein.

(4) Seize and secure stockpiles of critical raw materials such as rubber, tin, chromium, nickel, manganese and like.

(5) Send out required Depot Control Groups and additional Depot Control Groups as deemed necessary, as soon as possible.

7. The provisions of Reference (a) will be strictly complied with. Japanese labor will be requisitioned through appropriate military government channels.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. C. Mc Fadda.

M. S. RAHLER
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

CO - 1
ExecC - 1
S-1 - 1
S-2 - 1
S-3 - 10
S-4 - 2
M11 Govt - 2
S-16 - 1

1/3 - 8
2/3 - 8
3/3 - 8
H& H Co - 2
Wns/3 - 2
2d Mar Div - 2
3-10 - 1
RATC - 1

OFFICIAL:

JOHN W. KIMBER, JR.
Major, U. S. Marine Corps;
Regtl Disposition Officer.
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NUMBER........22-45

Mats: Central Japan, 1:250,000, 2nd Edition, (AMS 2) 1944

References: (a) RCT-8 Adm. C 20-45

1. General.

(a) Regimental Combat Team Eight Administrative Order No. 20 dated 25 October, 1945, is hereby rescinded.

(b) The Procurement Section, as authorized in Ltr. 2nd Mar. Div. to CO, RCT-8, JCG/CWL/DCM, dated 5 October 1945 will be maintained.

(c) Geographical location referred to in these instructions will be by grid coordinates on the reference map.

(d) Form PG-1 hence by declared obsolete.

2. Procedure for requisitioning agencies.

(a) GPA Form #2 will be completed and submitted to the Japanese Liaison Committee, a Duplicate.

(1) In the case of Battalions outside the Kumamoto Area, and in the case of "B" Co. at Onuma, one additional copy will be made and forwarded to the Regimental Procurement Office.

(b) Upon receipt of the supplies or services requested GPA Form #2 will be completed in duplicate. Original will be delivered to the Japanese Liaison Committee. One copy will be retained by the requesting agency; the remaining copies will be forwarded to the Regimental Procurement Officer. (Note: Column 4 will give the money value of the item received, in yen. Column 5 will show money value in dollars.)

(c) Monthly Report. (GPA Form#3)

A monthly report signed by the subordinate unit commander, will be submitted to the Regimental Procurement Officer covering the period from the close of the last report to the 26th of the month for which the report is submitted. It shall arrive at the Regimental Procurement Office not later than the 2nd of the month. Money value will be shown in all cases. (Note: Rents will be carried under "Quartmeister"; Leased commercial telephone lines under "Signal Corps"; all building materials, plumbing, electric wiring, etc. under "Engineers").
(a) Appraisal

The monetary value of all land, goods, and services shall be arrived at by the process described in Section 3, below.

3. Determination of Value.

(a) Appraisal work sheets shall be completed for all transactions involving land and buildings.

(1) Land Only:

Form PS-3 in sextuplicate will be used. Location will be described by coordinates on the reference map. "Ha, chia" will not be used. Caution must be exercised to ensure that land is described in percentage rather than by simply checking the terms which adequately describe it. Lines one (1) through seven (7) will be filled in by the subordinate unit. (Note: Line 7; one sub area equals 6 square feet.) Lines eight (8) through fifteen (15) will be filled in by the Japanese Liaison Committee. The form will then be completed by the local Procurement Office.

(2) Building and Plots (Form PS-4)

(Submitted to Regiment in quintuplicate)

Lines one (1) through seven (7) will be filled out by the subordinate unit. Line 1 will show location by coordinates on reference map. Line 2 will list acreage, toilets, etc. Line 3 will show location in the respect that the location affects the value of the property. Example "Near main thoroughfare", "Top of mountain", etc. Line five (5) will show addition made after occupation. Line (6) will show the number of men used in maintenance per month. Lines eight (8) through twelve (12) will be completed by Japanese Liaison Committee. Lines thirteen (13) through seventeen (17) will be completed by the Procurement Office.

(2) Appraisal Work Sheet PS-5.

(Submitted to Regiment in quintuplicate)

Lines one (1) through fifteen (15) will be completed by the subordinate unit. Lines sixteen (16) through nineteen (19) will be completed by Japanese Liaison Committee. Line twenty (20) will be completed by the Procurement Office.

(4) Appraisal Work Sheet PS-6.

(Used in collaboration with Form PS-5. Submit in quintuplicate.) Fill out one Form PS-6 for each building taken over. Lines one (1) through nine (9) are completed by the subordinate unit. Line ten (10) is filled in by the Japanese Liaison Committee. Line eleven (11) will be filled in by the Procurement Officer.
Inventorv and Appraisal Work Sheet (Form PS-7)

(Supplied to Regimental Procurement Officer in Quintuplicate) Form PS-7 may be used either by itself or in conjunction with Form PS-3 to 6. Lines one (1), two (2), and three (3) with the body of the table, will be filled in by the subordinate unit. In line four (4) the date of inventory taken by the subordinate unit will be inserted in the space marked "Army". In the event of a discrepancy between the subordinate unit and Liaison Committee figures, the Procurement Officer will determine the reconciliation figure. In line five (5), check one.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T.G. MC FARLANE

M.S. RAHISER
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORP
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Distribution: "G"

H.W. Coulter, Jr.
Major, USMC
S-4
Serial CS08
CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Report
CT-8 No 1-45

ANNEX (B)

S-1 REPORT

1. The function of the regimental S-1 section was routine administration. There were no combat casualties, inasmuch as there was no combat. The administrative burden was excessively heavy due to a preponderance of vague orders, and the frequent changing of the voluminous directives promulgated by higher echelons. The need for an overall supervision of all services was most evident—we are presently submitting reports which are not self-explanatory and for which no explanation of meanings of the abbreviations contained therein could be obtained. The continued practice of changing the required reports with each operation and of requiring duplicate reports of the same information does not tend for increased efficiency of the administrative sections.

2. Further, the practice of assigning units to organizations upon arrival at the target or upon embarkation is particularly undesirable from an administrative point of view. In such cases, it is an extremely difficult problem to account for the personnel, provide for their supply, billeting and messing. The solution would seem to be to assign to the regiment the personnel the regiment will have in combat and let them be carried by the regiment at all times. If located in a base camp, the problem of administration of units in a detached status could be much more easily reconciled then can the attachment in an already confused situation.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. Mc FARLAND.

M. S. RAHISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

APPENDICES:

Appendix (I) - Mil Govt Report.
Appendix (II) - Prov Marshal Report.
Appendix (III) - Special Service Report.
Appendix (IV) - Hq Comdt Report (Omitted).
Appendix (V) - Atchd XIXTH Army Sec Report (Omitted).
Appendix (VI) - Adj Report (Omitted).
Appendix (VII) - Post Office Report (Omitted).
Serial 0508
CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Report
CT-8 No 1-46 (Annex (B) - S-1 Report)

Appendix (VIII) - Legal Office Report (Omitted).
Appendix (IX) - Public Info Report (Omitted).
Appendix (X) - S-1 Periodic Report (Omitted).

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as CT-8 Operation Report No 1-45.

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]
WARLIER
-3-

(B) - 2
CONFIDENTIAL
Operation Report
CT-6
To I-45 (ANNEX (B) - S-1 REPORT)

APPEAEDIX I

MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT

1. Preparation and Planning for the Operation -

(a) The occupation of that portion of JAPAN that is under the direct control of Combat Team Eight was accomplished with a minimum of preparation and planning insofar as military government activities were concerned. In the closing weeks of the war, events moved so swiftly that practically no time was available to bridge the gap between individual training and the process of occupation, much less the preparation of plans and operating procedure.

(b) Aside from the incidental planning and preparation made by each officer during his passage to JAPAN, nothing like a concrete plan was developed. The individual officers who were to compose the military government group attached to Combat Team Eight had never had an opportunity to become more than casually acquainted with each other prior to arrival at the target area, and what little planning and preparation had been accomplished was for an entirely different area than that finally assigned.

2. Training and Organization -

(a) The School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, the comparable Naval school at Princeton and six Civil Affairs Training Schools located at as many leading universities were established to provide training in military government subjects. Selected officers of all arms and services were ordered to the School of Military Government for a six weeks indoctrination course in the background and fundamentals of military government and civil affairs. Following completion of that course, each officer was given intensive training for an additional six months at one of the Civil Affairs Training Schools. The Naval officers followed a training program somewhat paralleled except the Princeton course was for three (3) months and only a handful of specially qualified officers were sent to the Civil Affairs Training Schools for further training.

(b) (I) - 1

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(b) Upon the completion of the Civil Affairs Training School course officers were assigned to the Civil Affairs Staging Area at Presidio of Monterey, California, for further training, physical conditioning and processing. During this period, officers not previously qualified Prepared for Overseas Replacement were so prepared. During the second week in August 1945, officers were assigned to newly authorized Table of Organization at Table of Equipment Headquarters and Headquarters Military Government, groups or companies on the basis of individual specialties. With some variation groups and companies included, in addition to a Senior Military Government Officer, a specialist in each of the following fields: public safety, engineering, commerce, and trade, resources and industry, law, public health and sanitation, labor, supply, and military administration.

(c) In order to provide tactical commanders of occupation troops with staff officers trained along military government lines, the two ranking officers in each group and company were hastily flown to the Pacific area where, in time, they were attached to troop units scheduled to enter JAPAN in the initial landings. On 27 August 1945, four (4) groups, two (2) companies and forty-eight (48) unattached military officers, without any enlisted men or organizational equipment, departed from Civil Affairs Staging Area under priority orders for overseas service. All officers, including group, company and unattached, were assigned to duty with Fifth Amphibious Corps and were under instructions to report without delay. Leaving Vancouver Barracks, Washington on 31 August 1945, via S.S. CHIRIKOFF, the group arrived Honolulu, Hawaii on 9 September 1945. From Honolulu all officers were flown to SAIPAN, arriving on 15 September 1945. At that place the 23rd Headquarters and Headquarters Military Government Group was attached to the 2nd Marine Division for duty and ordered aboard APA 129 for transportation to division headquarters at NAGASAKI. The group left SAIPAN 18 September 1945, and went ashore at NAGASAKI.
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on 25 September 1945. Division Headquarters had been established in the Custom House, and the Military Government Group, under Commander Lynch, Senior Military Government Officer, became the Military Government Section of 2nd Marine Division Headquarters. Other groups, companies and unattached officers were disembarked at SASHIKO and later attached to various tactical units.

3. Occupational Operations -

(a) On the morning of 25 September 1945, following a conference between the Commanding Officer of Combat Team Eight, 2nd Division Chief of Staff and 2nd Division Senior Military Government Officer, it was agreed that a Military Government Officer was necessary in connection with activities of the Eighth and Tenth Marine Regimental Combat Teams then stationed at the Civil Air Training School at ISAHAYA. Captain William H. Fippin, (CAC), U. S. A. a member of the 93rd Headquarters and Headquarters Military Government Group was selected by Commander Lynch for this assignment and reported on the same day to the Commanding Officer, Combat Team Eight at ISAHAYA for duty as Military Government Officer.

(1) Initial problems were: improvement of a newly established Japanese Liaison Committee, organization of a civilian labor procurement service, and procurement of supplies and materials necessary for the preparation of proper troop billets and facilities. From 26 September to 30 September 1945, an increasing number of civilian workers were procured, and averaged over eight hundred (800) per day for that period. The water supply and light systems were repaired and extended. Several major buildings were re-boarded and re-roofed. Compound grounds were policed, drainage improvements started, roads repaired, interpreters provided for headquarters and other official uses, and the Liaison Committee organized to provide twenty-four (24) hour service.

(2) In cooperation with one of the Division
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Military Government officers, the food supply of NAGASAKI was augmented by the shipment of over twelve hundred (1200) bags of potatoes which were secured and shipped from the ISAHAYA district on dead-head trucks returning to NAGASAKI.

(3) Two (2) enlisted men were detailed by Combat Team Eight to assist the Military Government Officer. One (1) (Corp Robert Jensen) acted as clerk, and the other supervised the collection, loading, and dispatch of potatoes from a warehouse in ISAHAYA.

(4) On 30 September 1945, a Military Government Officer from NAGASAKI was attached for duty to the Tenth Marines in anticipation of the departure of Combat Team Eight.

(b) On 30 September 1945, the Military Government Officer was detailed as one of a party to make a reconnaissance trip to KUMAMOTO for the purpose of inspecting, selecting and arranging for suitable billets for Combat Team Eight. The reconnaissance was completed on 2 October 1945, and a report rendered to the Commanding Officer. On 3 October 1945, the Military Government Officer was returned to KUMAMOTO by plane to continue necessary arrangements for the housing of Combat Team Eight. A driver and jeep and Corp Jensen were sent to KUMAMOTO next day to assist the Military Government Office. During the period 3 to 15 October 1945, the three areas selected were cleaned, buildings repaired, electric and water systems put in operating condition, office and other furniture and fixtures secured and installed, latrines dug, necessary contacts with civilian authorities developed and channels for procurement of labor and supplies established. During initial stages, over three thousand (3000) civilian workers per day were employed. An office was established at headquarters of Combat Team Eight and constant contact maintained with the battalions and attached unit components and with civilian authorities both KEM and SHI.

(c) On 4 October 1945, a Military Government Team
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composed of Lieutenant Commander J. P. Murphy U.S.N.R.,
Captain Charles W. Roush (AC), J. S. A., First Lieutenant
Alvin H. Kadish (040), U. S. A. and First Lieutenant Al-fred
H. Ferguson (Infantry), U. S. A. arrived in KUMAMOTO under
instruction from Fifth Amphibious Corps headquarters and
commence operations in that city. No advance information
relative to this movement was available either to the team
or to Combat Team Eight and for a period of a few days
the team and the Military Government Officer of Combat Team
Eight worked independently. By 10 October 1945, a correlat-ed
working arrangement between the several Military Govern-
ment officers was evolved whereby the team, with officers
established in the Prefectural Building, took on the labor
and supplies procurement aspects of supplying Combat Team
Eight. Requests were channeled from all units of the
Combat Team thru its Military Government office to the
Military Government team who in turn assumed responsibility
for the procurement from civilian sources. This arrange-
ment continued until 22 October 1945. On 14 October 1945,
Captain Roush was assigned as Military Government Officer
with "Saker" Company, First Battalion, Eighth Marines and
reported to ONUA for duty.

(d) On or about 4 October 1945, a second Military
Government team composed of Lieutenant Colonel Larkin W.
Glazebrook (CGH), U. S. A., Captain Charles A. Warner (AC),
U. S. A., Lieutenant A. A. Latvala U. S. A. R. and First
Lieutenant Joseph Murphy (CMH), U. S. A. arrived in KAOS-
SHIMA to establish a headquarters and commence military
government supervision and control. The team was under
control of Fifth Amphibious Corps and submitted periodic
reports direct to that headquarters until 20 October 1945.
At that time all Military Government Officers and activi-
ties within the area of responsibility of Combat Team Eight
were attached to the Combat Team for duty. To improve
coordination and supervision over Military Government
activities Lieutenant Colonel Glazebrook was transferred
from KAOSHIMA to KUMAMOTO and appointed Senior Military
Government Officer for Combat Team Eight. Lieutenant
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Commander Murphy was assigned to KAGOSHIMA and Captain
Fippin transferred from Combat Team Eight headquarters
building to the City Hall as Executive Officer. Lieutenant
Henry H. Soulen (AC), U. S. A., reported for duty 22
October 1945, and was assigned to Headquarters, Combat
Team Eight, to carry on the procurement of labor and
materials for the troops located in KUMAMOTO. On 31
October 1945, Lieutenant Kadish was transferred to Div-
ision Headquarters at NA ASAKI. On 26 October 1945,
Lieutenant Commander Harry O. Kulberg (S), U. S. N. R.,
reported for Military Government duty with Combat Team
Eight and was sent to CMUTA as Military Government Officer.
Captain Roush returned to KUMAMOTO on 31 October 1945. On
2 November 1945, Lieutenant Commander Murphy was detached
from Combat Team Eight and departed from KAGOSHIMA. On
7 November Lieutenant Colonel Glazebrook departed for Corps
Evacuation Hospital at ISHIHARA for observation and disposition
and was relieved from attachment to Combat Team Eight
on 12 November 1945. On 8 November 1945, Captain Roush was
assigned as Military Government Officer with Third Battalion
Eighth Marines and departed for HIJOYOSHI to take up his
duties at that place. On 6 November 1945, Lieutenant (jg)
Loren P. Woods, U. S. N. R., and on 15 November Lieutenant
(jg) Herbert H. Johnson (DL), U. S. N. R., and Captain Juleo
H. Enrich (MC), U. S. A., were attached to Combat Team Eight
for duty and were assigned to the Military Government in
KUMAMOTO. With the departure of Lieutenant Colonel Glaze-
brook on 12 November 1945, Captain Fippin was designated
as Senior Military Government Officer for Combat Team Eight.

(a) Acting under instructions thru the Commanding
Officer, Combat Team Eight the Military Government staff
has served as the point of contact between occupation
troops and civilian authorities. Activities have been
numerous and varied, and in spite of the high rate of turn-
over in Military Government officers, with its attendant
disruptions, significant progress has been made. The follow-
ing is a partial list of activities or accomplishments:

1. Secured offices for Military Government in
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the Prefectural Building.

(2) Conducted surveys of present status and organization in the following fields:

a. Transportation
b. Fisheries
c. Forestry
d. Public Health and Sanitation
e. Commerce and Industry, etc.

Additional periodical reports in these fields are made automatically by the Prefectural Officials to this office.

(3) Furnished labor, materials and supplies to rehabilitate the three areas occupied by forces of Combat Team Eight.

(4) Secured eighty-seven (87) trucks from the Japanese Army, forty-two (42) of these are now operable and thirty (30) are being used by the tactical troops to haul materials and labor. Twelve (12) of the trucks are used by the Prefectural Government to haul food, clothing, fuel and building materials into KUMAMOTO from outlying areas. Sixteen (16) passenger cars were also secured; seven (7) are operable and in use by United States Forces.

(5) Supervises the turning over of Japanese Military food, clothing, and medical supplies to the Prefectural Government, Home Ministry Department.

(6) Secured forty-eight (48) interpreters, examined them for their ability, and had them screened by Counter Intelligence Corps. Supervised the interpreter pool used by tactical forces throughout the Combat Team Area.

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(7) Instituted and maintain rigid control
over rationing and price control in KUMAMOTO KEN.

(8) Instituted curfew for Japanese civilians,
in compliance with instructions from Corps, in KUMAMOTO,
and other areas where there are American Military Forces.
The curfew is being very satisfactorily enforced by the

(9) Set up Military Government in OMUTA and
HITOYOSHI to assist the Tactical Forces in these places.

(10) Made arrangements to supply adequate
amounts of tax free bear for Combat Team Eight.

(11) Maintains close contact with the Japanese
Liaison Committee and either thru this committee or direct-
ly as best serves the purposes, exercises control and super-
vision over governmental and civilian activities and func-
tions.

(12) Submits weekly reports to higher author-
ity on all aspects of Military Government activities.

(13) Supervises the Military Government
activities of Military Government officers located in OMUTA,
HITOYOSHI and KAGOSHIMA.

4. Comments and Recommendations - Military Government
activities have been severely handicapped in its operations
due to at least two major factors:

(a) Because of sudden ending of the war, and to
the need for rapid movement from staging to target areas,
little or no advance planning or preparation was possible.
Military Government teams were hastily organized and ship-
pped out without enlisted personnel, organizational equip-
ment or any file of operational directives, orders and
memoranda necessary to become familiar in detail with Mil-
itary Government policy in the field. Last minute changes
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in target area and in personnel further tended to confuse
the final objective. The officers initially attached for
duty in the area of Combat Team Eight (with one exception)
were not members of one team, and there was little or no
coordination in their several activities.

(b) Numerous changes in officer assignment have
kept both the teams and the civilian authorities in a
continual state of uncertainty and confusion. At this
date further changes have been ordered and it is certain
that four (4), of the eleven (11) officers presently
attached will be replaced by 1 December 1945. It appears,
however, that this group will be permanently attached
for duty to the occupation troops of this area, and that
consistent progress in Military Government activities can
be expected.
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APPENDIX (II)

PROVOST MARSHAL'S REPORT

1. The Military Police Company for Combat Team Eight was activated on 27 September 1945, with Major Byron V. Thornton, USMC, as Commanding Officer and Provost Marshal, at the former Japanese Naval Air Base, ISAHAYA, KYUSHU, JAPAN.

2. Military Police posts and patrols were established in the towns of ONO and ISAHAYA, "Out of Bounds" and "Off Limits" areas as defined by higher authority, were posted, and "Safeguard" signs placed at all Japanese religious edifices.

3. The operation of the Military Police Company while at ISAHAYA was confined almost entirely to routine patrol and sentry duties.

4. Arrests and apprehensions were principally for entering "Out of Bounds" or "Off Limits" areas and for absence from camp without authority after liberty hours.

5. Traffic reports and investigations involved only cases of vehicles having slight accidents, or running off the road due to the poor conditions of roads in the area, and to the extremely rainy weather.

6. During the period of operation in ISAHAYA from 27 September 1945, to 5 October 1945, the following number of arrests were made:

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<td>MISC</td>
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7. On 5 October 1945, the Military Police Company, Combat Team Eight was relieved of the responsibility in the ISAHAYA area, by the Tenth Marines, Second Marine
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Provost Marshal's Report):

Division, and was sent to KUMAMOTO, KYUSHU, JAPAN, as an
element of the advance echelon of Combat Team Eight.

8. On 14 October 1945, the Military Police Company,
formerly activated on 27 September 1945, was transferred
to the Weapons Company, Combat Team Eight, and Major David
A. Van Evera, USMC, Commanding Officer, was designated
Provost Marshal.

9. The town of KUMAMOTO was surveyed, a Military
Police Plan proposed and approved, and "Out of Bounds",
"Off Limits" and "Safeguard" areas posted. Liberty for
personnel of Combat Team Eight was started on 17 October
1945.

10. The Weapons Company is billeted at the Combat
Team Eight Camp, the former Japanese Military Academy,
KUMAMOTO, with the Military Police Guard of the Day operating
from Military Police Headquarters at the Prefectural
Building in KUMAMOTO.

11. With but a limited number of personnel on liberty,
the activity of the Military Police for the first three
weeks of operation in KUMAMOTO was concerned almost en-
tirely with routine patrols and sentry duty. Arrests and
apprehensions for this period were principally for violation of
liberty regulations and for being in "Out of
Bounds" and "Off Limits" areas.

12. Conduct of Marine personnel on liberty and out-
side the limits of established camps has been very satis-
factory and no cases of disturbances or of violence were
reported to the Provost Marshal's office for action during
the period 17 October to 14 November 1945.

13. Despite the poor conditions of the roads, the
stubborn tendency of Japanese nationals to walk in the
center of the streets, and their reluctance to give way
to military vehicles, no traffic accidents, of serious
nature, were reported to the Provost Marshal's office
during the first month. On one or two occasions, trucks
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Provost Marshal's Report).

had slid off the roads or been bumped by Japanese street
cars with little or no damage to either party.

14. On 17 November 1945, two traffic accidents were
reported which involved Marine personnel and Japanese
nationals. (One accident resulted in the death of one
Japanese and injury to another when struck by a Military
Police radio jeep while on patrol duty). The other acci-
dent involved the striking of a Japanese woman by a Marine
on a motorcycle. The woman sustained no serious injuries.

15. Traffic violations have been rigidly enforced
but the poor conditions of the roads has been the prime
factor in keeping the speed of military vehicles within
safe limits.

16. The Provost Marshal's office has operated in
close liaison with the Japanese Civil Police authorities.
Daily reports are received from the Japanese Civil Police
on incidents involving Marine personnel, and reports and
instructions are given to the Civil Police for their ac-
tion and enforcement.

17. Cases reported to the Provost Marshal by Ja-
panese authorities have been principally concerned with
petty theft of such desired items as sake and watches.
These have been investigated, and in the majority of
cases the offenders have been located, and the case re-
ferred to commanding officers for disciplinary action.

18. No serious cases involving Marine personnel and
Japanese nationals such as rape, murder, or riots have
arisen to date. The closest approach being a case of
two (2) intoxicated Marines who entered a private home
with apparent intent to assault a Japanese woman but who
were forestalled by the woman's escape. These Marines
were apprehended by the Military Police.

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19. The Japanese Civil Police have been extremely cooperative in their relations with the Military Police, furnishing civil police, interpreters, maps, charts, and other essentials on request.

20. The outlying towns of OTSU and WAIFU are periodically contacted by Military Police patrols in addition to the liaison maintained through the Japanese Civil Police.

21. On 16 November 1945, two special Military Police posts were established in the town of WAIFU and the approaches thereto. This is the only other town besides KUMAMOTO regularly patrolled by Military Police.

22. During the period of operation in KUMAMOTO from 14 October to 17 November 1945, the following number of arrests have been made:

(a) AWOL and AOL 51
(b) Loss of property 2
(c) Drunk on duty 1
(d) Misbehavior of a sentinel 1
(e) Miscellaneous 6
(f) Theft 3

TOTAL 64

23. The function of the Military Police in the present occupation phase has resulted in duties which are very much different than Military Police duties previously performed in a combat status. The accent has been on police functions more nearly comparable to civil police in any metropolitan area than on military police function in a theater of operation.
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24. The nature of the present duties has revealed a lack of personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, with adequate knowledge of the operation of civil police in the matter of arrests, investigation, reports, and clerical procedure.

25. It is recommended that units performing military police duties during the occupation of JAPAN be either furnished with trained or experienced personnel or else sufficient material in the way of instruction manuals, doctrine, and instructors, to enable units to be trained in the field.
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APPENDIX III

SPECIAL SERVICE REPORT

1. The Special Service Section during the month of July, 1945, began to function and plan on a much larger scale than previously. The large Regimental theatre on SAIPAN was nearly completed and was used for numerous stage shows as well as movies when the movement to JAPAN became a reality. A contest was held to name the theatre with the winner receiving a war bond.

2. Looking forward to the day when the Combat Team would land in JAPAN and have more time for recreation, this section purchased from the Division Special Services Office some four thousand dollars ($4000.00) worth of gear to carry the organization through the initial landing and organizing period. This supply was figured to last approximately four (4) months, and brought the total value of the Special Services' gear up to approximately ten thousand dollars ($10000). Previous to leaving SAIPAN, approximately twelve hundred dollars ($1200) worth of gear was surveyed by the Regimental Council and destroyed. The Division Special Services Section is the source of replenishment and has met the greater share of the demands of this Combat Team.

3. During the initial landing in JAPAN the Special Services gear was roughly treated. The electrical gear such as radios and phonographs, especially were constantly exposed to the inclement weather and mud and only through diligent and painstaking work was the greater part of this gear repaired. Much of the Special Services' gear rendered unserviceable due to overexposure to the weather. Most of it has since been salvaged and is now usable.

4. Due to the short stay at ISA AYA the only thing accomplished was the collection of gear and its preparation for further shipment to a new location. Due largely to the crowded conditions of the camp, no accommodations, other than storage space, were provided to the Special Service
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Section.

5. Upon arrival at KUMAMOTO an ideal situation was immediately made available. A large auditorium with provisions for ample office space and storage was put to use. Within a few days movies were shown and additional gear issued to Landing Teams to expedite their programs. Within two (2) weeks each Landing Team had ample gear to carry on any kind of athletic program.

6. Additional gear has been requisitioned from Division as the need for such gear arises. The problems of supply has worked no hardship on this department to this date.

7. Leagues and regularly scheduled games in all types of athletics are now carried out in this Combat Team. The movement of Landing Teams has necessitated some changes and will provide many problems which will demand adjustments in the present program.

8. All Landing Teams in this Combat Team have ample playing facilities for athletics and are constantly improving the facilities now available.

9. One of the highlights of the Special Services program was the celebration of the Marine Corps Birthday, 10 November, 1945. Athletic events and varied contests were held and generous prizes awarded the respective winners.

10. Since arrival at KUMAMOTO the personnel of Special Services Section has been increased to meet the growing demand on the section. Special Services Section now has a full time Education Officer and an Assistant Special Services Officer. Each of the Landing Teams have full time Recreation Officers. Efforts are being made to enable these personnel to attend Special Services School at NAS ESO, along with their enlisted assistants.

11. In the opinion of this office the following points...
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would benefit Special Services in the future:

(a) A higher priority should be given Special Services in the movement of gear. This will bring about a speedier setting up of facilities and enable the section to reach men during a period particularly critical to morale.

(b) A better system of exchanging films should be devised in order to gain the fullest advantage from moving pictures.

(c) An effort should be made to establish a workable program that will provide adequate facilities for personnel who wish to further their education or receive vocational training.
After a short period of training which followed the Regiment’s return from OKINAWA, the Intelligence Section received orders to open the planning room. From the latter part of August until the embarkation date, 18 September, the section distributed maps and photos, made extensive studies of target areas and assisted in the writing of the operation order.

A briefing program was set up aboard ship and all hands were briefed on the terrain, road networks, standard operating procedure, public utilities and native habits.

Upon debarking at NAGASAKI on the 24th. of September, the Intelligence Section accompanied the reconnaissance party to ISAHAYA and contacted Japanese military and government officials at that city.

During the short stay at ISAHAYA, the section investigated and reported on all military dumps and installations in that area. Japanese unit commanders were contacted and CCR was obtained. The local police were contacted and the section supervised their collecting of all weapons belonging to civilians.

On the 5th. of October, intelligence personnel went forward with a reconnaissance party and contacted Japanese authorities at KUMAMOTO and began an investigation of Intelligence Targets in and around that city.

At present similar investigations are being carried out by an intelligence detachment at OMURA by S-2, 3rd. battalion at HITOGOSHI and by S-2, 1st. Battalion at YAGOSHIKA.

The Regimental and battalion intelligence sections are working in conjunction with the CIA on counter-intelligence activities, and with the Military Government on Japanese Civil, Political and Economic affairs.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND

M. S. RAWISER
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
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APPENDICES:
(I) - Counter-Intelligence - Omitted.
(II) - Civil Censorship - Omitted.
(III) - Special OCB Reports - Omitted.
(IV) - C-2 Periodic Report - Omitted.

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as CT-8 Opn. Report No. 1-45.

OFFICIAL:

D.V. NAHRANG,
CAPT., USMCR.,
S-2.
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AREA (D)

S-3 REPORT

1. From 22 August 1945, the date this Combat Team received Division Operation Plan Number 14, until 24 September 1945, the date this Combat Team disembarked at NAGASAKI, no periodic reports were submitted.

2. (a) On 24 September 1945, Combat Team Eight began submitting their periodic reports as directed by Division. This Combat Team commenced landing in a column of Landing Teams at 0625, 24 September 1945. Landing Team 1/8 was the first to land, followed by Landing Teams 2/8 and 3/8 in that order. All units of this Combat Team were ashore by 1455, 24 September 1945. Upon landing a tentative command post was established at the Harbor Police building in NAGASAKI. This command post was moved to ISAHAYA after all troops had been transported to the new camp at ISAHAYA at 1830 the same day.

(b) The first few days in the new camp at ISAHAYA were devoted to the police and setting up of the camp, while at the docks in NAGASAKI units of this Combat Team were engaged in the task of unloading our ships. On 15 September 1945, Company began functioning as a Military Police Company at OHOJIMA and ISAHAYA.

(c) The unloading of ships was completed on 29 September 1945, but the working parties remained in NAGASAKI as permanent details to assist the Quartermaster personnel in the handling of our equipment and stores. There were heavy rains at ISAHAYA during this period which caused damage to quartermaster supplies and personal equipment, as well as retarding efficient construction and police of the camp.

(d) On 29 September 1945, the Intelligence Section commenced patrolling their assigned areas. The following day there were heavy rains again which rendered
many roads impassable except for vessels. Once again, inadequate drainage caused damaged to organizational and individual equipment. A reconnaissance party was sent out on 30 September 1945, to reconnoiter KUMAMOTO and OKUTA. Two platoons of the Division Reconnaissance Company embarked the same day on a road reconnaissance to KUMAMOTO and OKUTA.

(a) The reconnaissance party returned from KUMAMOTO, and the operations office made a detailed report to the Commanding Officer. The road reconnaissance party returned the same day and forwarded a similar report on road conditions to the Commanding Officer. Following these reports, two forward echelons were formed and sent to KUMAMOTO and OKUTA on 5 October 1945. The Military Police duties in ISAHAYA were assumed by the Tenth Marines. At OKUTA the forward echelon from Combat Team Eight relieved American Recovery Teams twenty-two, (22), twenty-four (24), thirty-three (33), and thirty-nine (39) and received control of the Chinese camp there.

(f) Forward echelons from the Landing Teams were sent to their new areas in KUMAMOTO KEN when they had been assigned. Generally speaking, the weather during this movement from AAGASAKI to KUMAMOTO was not conducive to troop movements. All vehicles from the Combat Team moved under their own power over the roads previously reconnoitered. The troops at KUMAMOTO were engaged in police of the new camps, while the main body at ISAHAYA was preparing for completion of the move to KUMAMOTO. The movement of troops to KUMAMOTO, except for a very small rear echelon, was completed 12 October 1945, after a twenty-four (24) hour delay because of a hurricane warning.

3. (a) Upon arrival of all troops at KUMAMOTO on 13 October 1945, the first few days thereafter were devoted to the general police of the respective camps. On 13 October 1945, this Combat Team was reasonably settled with Landing Teams 1/8 (less Baker Company), 2/8, and 3/8, and Weapons Company, Headquarters and Service Company in the immediate vicinity of KUMAMOTO. Baker Company was the only
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outlying detachment at this time and had their command post at OHTA.

(b) On 17 October 1945, Landing Team 1/8 (less Baker Company) sent its forward echelon to KAGOSHIMA to prepare the camp for the main body. Intelligence patrols of targets in KUMAMOTO KEN were started the same day. A road reconnaissance party reconnoitered from the northern division boundary south to line IZUMI, HITOYOSHI and TOMITAKA, from 20 September 1945 to 23 September 1945. Landing Teams started patrolling their assigned areas on 19 October 1945, and have carried out patrols to this date.

(c) The division band arrived at KUMAMOTO on 27 October 1945, and remained with this Combat Team until 5 November 1945. During their stay with Combat Team Eight the band was scheduled to appear at the Landing Teams of this Combat Team to be used at the discretion of the Landing Team Commanding Officer. Many ceremonies, including guard mounts and parades, were held in conjunction with the band as well as band concerts for the troops.

(d) Landing Team 1/8, after having sent a reconnaissance party and advanced echelon to KAGOSHIMA, completed movement to that city on 30 October 1945. On 28 October 1945, a drill employing the use of a motorized company was held by "G" Company, Landing Team 1/8. This drill and others have been held in the Combat Team as required by Combat Team Operation Plan Number 8-45. On 3 November 1945, Seventy-Third (73rd) Field Hospital was established at the camp formerly occupied by Landing Team 1/8.

(e) On 9 November 1945, the forward echelon of Landing Team 3/8 left KUMAMOTO for HITOYOSHI which is the site of their new camp. On 14 November 1945, Disposition Team Number One arrived at MIZUNI which is the site of one barge loading point. Due to transportation difficulties and the unsuitability of the campsite at HIYOYOSHI, Landing
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Team 3/8 accomplished their movement in echelons of about company strength. The Fourth Platoon of "A" Company moved on 17 November 1945, to SANKAI where they are engaged in disposition of enemy material. On 20 November 1945, the Third Platoon of "A" Company moved to MIKAMOJO where they will carry out a similar mission in regards to disposition.

(f) On 22 November 1945, a detachment from Landing Team 2/8 arrived at TANEGA-SHIMA to occupy that island which lies in this Combat Team's zone of responsibility. A similar detachment from Landing Team 2/3 arrived at KAGOSHIMA on 21 November 1945, where they boarded an LST on 22 November 1945, and proceeded to KOSHIRI RETTO for occupational and disposition duties. The KOSHIRI RETTO Detachment returned on 29 November 1945, having completed their mission.

4. On 28 November 1945, Baker Company (attached to Landing Team 2/8), stationed at OMTA, was relieved by Able Battery of the Thirty-second Army Division. Baker Company returned to KUMAMOTO the same day and established their camp at the site formerly occupied by Landing Team 3/8.

5. Patrols are being carried out daily, except Sundays and holidays, throughout this Combat Teams zone of responsibility. The weather, since arriving in KUMAMOTO, has been excellent for this time of year except, of course, for occasional light showers. Such weather is conducive to efficient patrolling and a well-rounded training program.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. Mc FARLAND

M. S. RAHISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Executive Officer.

Appendices:
(I) - AGF Report (omitted)
(II) - Air Support Report (omitted)
(III) - Periodic Reports (omitted)

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OPERATION REPORT
CT-P No. 1-45

ANNEX (E)

S-4 REPORTS

1. The S-4 reports covering the occupation of NAGASAK AREA and the subsequent moves to ISHIHARA, KUMAMOTO, and KAGOSHIMA consist of and are set forth in, the appendices to the Annex.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T.G. MC FARLAND

M. S. RAMISER
MAJORENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

APPENDICES:

(I) TQM Report
(II) Quartermaster Report
(III) Medical Report
(IV) Ordinance Report
(V) Disposition of Surrendered Material and equipment Report
(VI) Procurement Report
(VII) Motor Transport Report
(VIII) Omitted
(IX) Periodic Report

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R.W. COULTER, JR.,
MAJOR, USMC
S-4.
OPERATION REPORT
CT-8 No.1-46

ANNEX (E)

APPENDIX (I)

"TRANSPORT QUANTITATIVE REPORT"

1. LOADING PHASE

Loading of Combat Team Eight on Trans Div 34 began 11 September, 1945. All supplies and ammunition were in the dump area and so arranged that maximum efficiency could be obtained in the minimum amount of time. The troops and equipment of Combat Team Eight were loaded at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan.

The planning for Trans Div 34 was done under difficult conditions. No characteristics for one ship was available and were obtained only when the ship came into the harbor. Ship's characteristics furnished by Division TQM section were not correct and resulted in revising several loading plans. UPT tables submitted by some attached units were incomplete and incorrect and changes in their UPT tables were not reported.

The loading progressed in a fair manner. Since Combat Team Eight was the last to load, supplies left behind by other Combat Teams and which had high priority, had to be carried by CT-8. This resulted in working several dumps instead of one dump. Also, during loading various other supplies, in addition to those left behind by other Combat Teams, had to load because of high priority. With all this extra charge, the original loading plans could not be followed. The labor necessary for stevedore work was furnished by CT-8. The harbor and all other port facilities at Saipan were excellent and no difficulties were encountered. The schedule for loading was met and completed 17 September, 1945.

All the ships were over-loaded and the loads carried by each was more a commercial load than a combat load. All holds were filled with gear up to the strong backs and much underpinning was used. More gear than was shown on the UPT tables was brought by all units.

In addition to the two AKA's and four APA's used, two LST's and one LSM were assigned to CT-8. The loading of the LST's progressed very satisfactorily and no trouble was encountered. All LST's arrived as scheduled. The LSM arrived unannounced and when it was docked, the RTQM was notified. Troops were alerted and gear was brought to the deck and loaded in a very short time.
2. UNLOADING PHASE

The unloading of CT-8 progressed in a confused manner. Beaches were not big enough to take incoming supplies; landing craft with cargo were tied up for long periods of time; facilities for unloading heavy supplies were practically nil. Due to the situation, two new beaches were opened but these were littered with debris and necessitated the use of bulldozers to clean them up. To add to the confusion, CT-8 was unloading at the same time as CT-2 and as a result gear from CT-8 was being brought to CT-2's beach and vice-versa. At Roger Beach, after a heavy rainfall, the entire area was a quagmire. Men working were up to their knees in mud and traffic was bogged down. Supplies were sunk into the mud which resulted in great damage to cargo.

In spite of the difficulties encountered, the unloading was accomplished in the minimum amount of time possible.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

The forms required to make a loading plan are repetitive and overlapping. To an inexperienced Troop TGM, these forms tend to increase errors and add to the confusion. The Cargo and Loading Analysis is a duplication of the Storage Plan in another form. The Cargo and Loading Analysis could be omitted and the loading plan still achieve the same results.
Preparations for the move from Saipan to Japan started on the return of the Combat Team from the Okinawa operation. A report of all shortages was made to the Division Quartermaster on 25 July, 1945, and this served as requisition for the filling of all these shortages.

A subsequent list of shortages was submitted to Division Quartermaster about 1 September, 1945 and most of these shortages were remedied.

Packing and hauling to the dump area began at about 1 Sept., 1945, and as one truck load of material was packed and ready, it was hauled to the staging area immediately. Equipment and supplies amounting to one-third of the Division Supplies were carried by this Combat Team. All were spotted on the beach before loading operations were begun.

The camp and all remaining facilities were turned over to 11th Service Battalion prior to the HQ's departure from the area.

Unloading began at Nagasaki on 24 September, 1945. The difficulties encountered in this unloading are discussed in Appendix I, this report.

Since the area assigned to this Combat Team was some 20 miles miles from the dock area, hauling of all supplies could not be accomplished. Secondary dumps were established and a guard unit of 160 men maintained in Nagasaki for purposes of security.

Heavy rains plus inadequate drainage hampered movement and turned our largest dump into a quag, from which, it was impossible to drain the water. This resulted in great losses of cleaning materials and clothing. Other supplies, though thoroughly wet, could be and were salvaged.

At Ishaya the storage facilities provided were most inadequate. A large, roofless airplane hanger was given the AQM for his site, and held all stores except commissary, which was packed in a separate dump area. The rain continued and it was impossible to dry out any of the supplies which had been wet at Nagasaki, so damage from water continued.
APPENDIX II to ANNEX "E"............."QUARTERMASTER REPORT"

On moving to Kumamoto, the Quartermaster took over 4 modern brick warehouses and what was formerly the Kempai-Tai Headquarters. The best imaginable storage facilities exist here, and due to its convenient location with respect to railroads and highways, makes a very convenient place for handling incoming and outgoing shipments.

A Shipping and Receiving section has been established, in charge of which is a line 2nd Lieutenant. All transportation of incoming and outgoing shipments are arranged through him, as is personal transportation on the railroad.

An Enemy Material section, in charge of a line 2nd Lieutenant has also been established for the control, preservation and issue of captured material in accordance with current directive.

Eighteen hundred cubic feet of refrigerator space is set up in the QM compound, and an additional twenty-five hundred cubic feet is available at the local civilian ice plant.

Supply of cutlery units is made by rail transportation. Rations are sent directly to the Battalion Quartermaster at Kagoshima, and Hitoyoshi from Division Quartermaster. Fresh bread and other fresh foods as available are sent by special freight or in the mail car, as their quantity makes it advisable.
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OPERATION REPORT
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ANNEX (E)

APPENDIX (III)

1. OCCULATION PHASE

This phase was preceded by an epidemic of Catarrhal Fever, involving 10% of all personnel. The epidemic continued thru the occupation phase and was abated by this date. The sudden onset of this epidemic was due to a number of factors, sudden change in climate, contaminated rain, insufficient and inadequate clothing and no heating facilities. There were no outbreaks of dysentery. During the period two cases of Gonorrhea were contracted although a thorough and extensive anti-venera program was carried out.

Our medical supplies were very limited for most of the early occupation phase because of the distance involved and transportation. The medical facilities made available were adequate to handle the situation and the chain of evacuation satisfactory, although distance again was a factor.

Water supply our biggest problem and there was an acute shortage of water, alleviated only by setting up a flocculation-chlorination apparatus. The shortage of water would not have occurred if a definite policy of the treatment of all water in occupied areas had been established.

2. The following recommendations are therefore made:

1. Provision should be made to protect men from a sudden climate change, which was known to exist, before an operation is started.

2. A definite policy on the treatment of water in all occupied areas should be established.
OPERATION REPORT
CT-8 No.1-45

APPENDIX ( IV )

"ORDNANCE REPORT"

During the period 8 July to 31 July, 1945, the Small Arms Section of Ordnance Co., 2nd Service Battalion inspected and made necessary repairs to all small arms of the Regiment.

All MWO's were completed except MWO B-23-7. This was not completed because there was insufficient time to re-zero the weapons.

Second Platoon, Ordnance Company, Ordnance Section was loaded and unloaded without incident, as all of their material was pre-loaded on trucks and trailers.

Second Platoon, Ordnance Co. proceeded to Ishaya by road, and on the move from Ishaya to Kumamoto, also went by road, in convoy. Two springs of the Ordnance Trailer were broken, causing a 36-hour delay. It is believed that the poor condition of the roads, combined with the heavy load, were the reason for this.

On arrival at Kumamoto, a shop was established in the Quartermaster area, where small-arm maintenance is performed, war memorial and museum pieces of Japanese material are maintained, and certain Japanese war materials are destroyed.
On 20 October, 1945, inventory was started on enemy war material in warehouses in Kumamoto City, under orders of Regimental S-4. At that time no written order was issued, therefore there were no specific forms to fill out and inventory methods were left up to the discretion of Officer in Charge.

One of the main difficulties encountered, was the fact that the warehouses containing enemy material, were taken over by the R.Q.M. and enemy gear was removed hurriedly and therefore in a disorderly fashion by the Japanese, making inventory difficult. Japanese inventory sheets were used as a guide, but were at times inaccurate, necessitating further accurate count by our personnel. Lack of a standard nomenclature between Japanese and our weapons necessitated the procurement of ordnance men who were familiar with Japanese weapons. Interpreters were necessary at all times to bridge the difference in language, since the majority of Japanese inventory sheets were not in legible English.

After initial inventory had progressed for a few days, V Amphibious Corp Administrative Order No. 9-45 was issued, specifying an inventory form to be filled out.

This inventory form was used until Annex "K" to Div Adm C 58-45 came out with different inventory methods and forms nullifying a vast majority of the previous inventory work.

From 5 November, 1945 to 7 November, 1945, a school directed by Regimental S-4, was conducted at Regimental Headquarters to acquaint personnel assigned to inventory and disposition with methods to be used.

On 9 November, 1945, S-3 was designated as Disposition Officer Vice S-4. It has proved that this division of the extra duties of Procurement and Disposition, incident to occupation, has increased the efficiency of both, considerably.

A depot for the storage and maintenance of controlled items and materials is maintained by the Regimental Quartermaster.

a. Depot Control groups are in the field at such places as there are concentrations of material.

b. The provisions of existing disposition orders are being carried out.
OPERATION REPORT
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ANNEX (E)

APPENDIX ( VI )

"PROCUREMENT REPORT"

A Subsection of 2nd Division Procurement section was estab-
lished 10 October, 1945. The membership consisted of 3-4 as Senior
Member, the Regimental Surgeon, Regimental Communication Officer, and
Commanding Officer, "C" Co., 2nd Engineer Battalion.

This board functioned in the procurement of such services
and supplies as were needed by the Regimental Combat Team.

A change in membership was made on 27 October, 1945, at
which time a Military Government Officer, with civilian engineer ex-
pense, was substituted for the officer from "C" Co., 2nd Eng. En.

Working in close cooperation in the matters relating to
procurement is the Japanese Liaison Committee of Kumamoto, who have
proved of considerable assistance in the procurement and related paper
work.

The discontinuation of the use of Form PC-1 was of great
assistance to us, as the filling of the cumbersome form and the sub-
sequent routing of same placed a great deal of unnecessary and still
important work on a section already badly strained and suffering from
insufficient clerical personnel. Form GPA-1 and 2 are far simpler,
may be made out more quickly and have eased our clerical problem con-
siderably.

Initially, a large number of requisitions required filling,
but now that all construction materials have been pooled for issue by
RQM, along with other supplies, and troops are well shaken down, the
amount of business handled by Procurement Section has dropped off con-
siderably.
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OPERATIONS REPORT
CT-8 No. 1-45

ANNEX (E)

APPENDIX (VII)

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

In preparation for future operations, Regimental Motor Transport Section of the Eighth Marine Regiment held a Motor Vehicle Driver's School on Saipan during the last two weeks of July, 1945. This school was attended by all the drivers in the Eighth Regiment. Among the subjects covered were: Difficult terrain operation, use of pioneer tools, traction devices, stream crossing, cold weather operation, decontamination of vehicles, waterproofing, use of deep water fording kits and starting "Drowned out" engines.

During the month of August, 1945, the Eighth Regiment was given an additional twelve Light Cargo Carriers, L-29-C (Neasels). These vehicles had proven very valuable in traversing swampy ground in past operations, and the Regiment now has twenty-four such "Neasels".

The Eighth Combat Team was formed on paper in preparation for the approaching operation. "Baker" Motor Transport Company and the Third Automotive Repair Platoon were attached to the Eighth Combat Team.

All vehicles were painted and preparations were being made to "waterproof" the Regimental Vehicles when the war ended. The vehicles were not waterproofed for the occupation of Japan. Vehicles were loaded aboard ships along with the personnel of each unit. The driver of each vehicle serviced his vehicle while aboard ship.

Vehicles were unloaded at the docks in Nagasaki and were driven to the Eighth Combat Team Camp in Isahaya. The Eighth Combat Team was unloaded from ships and moved inland by a large fleet of Marine and Army trucks.

The Eighth Combat Team moved from Isahaya to Kumamoto. The vehicles moved overland by means of convoy and were fully loaded with gear of various units.

Upon arriving at Kumamoto, this Combat Team took over approximately 116 Japanese Army trucks and fifteen assorted sedan automobiles for the use of the camp.
APPENDIX II to ANNEX "B",........Motor Transport Report

The Third Automotive Repair Platoon set up a shop in Kumamoto and serviced all attached units there. The "Baker" Motor Transport Company split up and had its Platoons attached to the Battalions where they moved to various cities. The trucks were attached to "B" Company stationed at Omuta. Eight trucks were attached to the Third Battalion at Kitoyoshi.

Japanese trucks are used actively by the Combat Team Units. A minor handicap was the fact that these vehicles are equipped with the steering wheel on the right side because of the left hand drive in Japan. This difficulty was overcome shortly by our drivers after a little driving.

Spare parts and accessories are available from Division at Nagasaki. The Japanese roads are very narrow and quite rough. A small number of vehicle accidents have resulted from the narrowness of the roads and the fact that civilians are not used to so many vehicles on the road.

Proper maintenance of vehicles attached to Eighth Combat Team units in the outlying cities is being carried out by mechanics attached to each unit. When major repairs are required, the vehicle is towed to the Automotive Repair Platoon Shop in Kumamoto. A complete report of all repairs done on vehicles is phoned into the Regimental Motor Transport Officer weekly by these units. The Regimental Grease Unit is dispatched weekly to one of the three outlying units and the vehicles there are given a complete check-up along with a thorough lubrication. A representative of the Regimental Motor Transport Officer is sent with the grease unit to give drivers tests and to inspect the general condition of the vehicle maintenance. Spare parts are also sent along with the grease unit.
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Operation Report
CT-8 to 1-45
AN. EX (F)

COMMUNICATION REPORT

1. During the period from 26 June until this Combat Team went aboard ship, the Communication Section spent all of its time training and servicing equipment. The training carried on at that time followed as closely as possible current directives for Communication Training.

2. As soon as it was anticipated that this Combat Team would embark, this section started waterproofing and packing all equipment not considered. At the same time, the Communication Section installed a switchboard and phones connecting our various loading areas with the dock and camp area. The Maintenance Shop closed, except for emergency repairs, on 21 August 1945. All normal radio repair work was done by Division Signal Maintenance Shop. Division Signal Quartermaster made every effort to make available to this Combat Team enough of all types of equipment and supplies for any type of operation. This section was warned of the possibility of difficult resupply problems and drew enough expendable items to offset this possibility. Division Signal Quartermaster at that time also made available to this section various types of maintenance equipment for most types of signal equipment that a Combat Team is authorized.

3. The Communication Section went aboard ship on 14 September and disembarked at NA ASAKI on 24 September 1945. The time aboard ship was spent in studying the Signal Annex of the Operation Order.

4. Upon landing, Combat Team Eight proceeded to ASAKA. There this section was employed in installing the wire system and maintaining a radio net with Division and the beach. Difficulty was experienced from the beginning with the wire from Division to Combat Team. Wire W-110 was laid and it was found that the range was too great. Later, a Japanese commercial line was taken over and proved satisfactory.

5. About 10 October 15+, the advance detail for

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KUMAMOTO left ISAAYA. As soon as it arrived, radio communication was established with Division and the rear echelon of Combat Team Eight. For this purpose, Division Signal Quartermaster furnished a Radio Set SCR-299 which is still in use and working well. A line was requested from the Japanese between KUMAMOTO and YAS at SADSD. This was completed about the 13th of October and has worked fairly well since then. Division asked for one line from MURASAKI to KUMAMOTO; this line was first in operation about 28 October and has not been satisfactory for continuous communication. On 29 October, Division requested two more lines from MURASAKI to KUMAMOTO, but these lines have never been installed satisfactorily. A line to OMUYA from KAGOSHIMA was taken over from the Japanese and has been very satisfactory. Two lines to KAGOSHIMA are in operation, but usually only one of them is good. Two lines to HIPUSAMI have been taken over and are working well to date.

6. At present, this section has no great supply problem. Most repair work has been effected by the maintenance shop in this section. On the few occasions when parts were not available, Division Signal Quartermaster furnished them as soon as possible.

7. During the time covered by this report this section has not had any problems concerning personnel. The Communication Section has always been up to full strength or over.

8. It is believed that the amount of communication traffic cleared by this organization is proof that the system is satisfactory in so far as equipment and distance permit.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. FARLAND.

W. S. RAHISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

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Operation Report
CT-8  No 1-45  ANNEX (3)

ENGINEER OPERATING REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

1. Company "C", Second Engineer Battalion, was attached to Combat Team Eight just before the Second Division moved from SAIPAN. It's first task was to procure and load onto an LST the Combat Team's unit of assault and pioneer equipment, some one hundred and eighteen (118) tons of lumber, bonded wire, sandbags, and tools.

2. Upon disembarking at ADAKI on 24 September 1945, the assault and pioneer equipment was unloaded and hauled to the Combat Team dump. The company with its own equipment then joined the Combat Team stationed at the ISAHAYA Naval Air Base. The supply of pure drinking water was of primary importance, and two (2) portable water purification units and one (1) mobile unit were set up immediately to supply the Combat Team's needs from nearby Japanese wells. The terrain was so flat that drainage was impossible, and the heavy rains left the entire area and roads in extremely poor condition. The main road was crowned and ditched, permitting some drainage. Slab- to shale rock, obtained by blasting an adjacent rock pit, was used to fill the deep holes in the roads.

3. On 12 October 1945, the company moved by train to the new Combat Team area at KUMAMOTO. The jobs undertaken to the present date may be divided into four groups:

(a) Roads and earth-moving work -

(1) A gravel pit was opened near the camp and some seven hundred (700) cubic yards of gravel hauled in for the immediate improvement of the muddy camp roads. Several short fill roads were constructed. A Japanese pit of pure river gravel was used to furnish material for storage area hardstands. The motor patrol crowned, ditched, and graded all camp roads and the two main arteries into town.

(2) A small airstrip was built on the site of the TANAKU Emergency Field, and two (2) softball fields.
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Operation Report
CT-9 No 1-45 (Annex (G) - Engineer Operation Report)

were cut out and leveled in the same area. A third gravel pit was developed north of the city and is in present use for the miscellaneous earth jobs, especially fill-work at the downtown quartermaster area. At this time work is going on at the rifle range where, in addition to making the target frames, a firing line at five hundred (500) yards is being built - a fill of approximately two thousand (2000) cubic yards. The first platoon of "C" Engineers is on detached duty with Landing Team One-Eight and is constructing an LST landing ramp and road at KAGOSHIMA.

(b) Building Construction - Recreation facilities being of high priority, carpenters began repairing a building to serve as the Combat Team Post Exchange. Interior work was done on the Red Cross Canteen, also. Prefabricated heads were erected and a Combat Team Brig built. Several buildings were refurbished with ceilings. Backstops were built for the two softball fields. Work is now in progress on an enlisted men's barracks at the downtown Quartermaster Area.

(c) Water Supply - A portable water purification unit was set up at Landing Team Three-Eight's area and supplied that unit until it was recently discontinued. The city water system was taken over and made safe by direct chlorination of the water at the pumping station. Tests made at various points in the area show the chlorine content to be between five-tenths (0.5) and one and five-tenths (1.5) of a point per one million (1,000,000).

(d) Miscellaneous Jobs - A portion of the carpenter section set to work painting signs for the restricted areas and safe-guards, and about fifty (50) per day were completed. The local lumber yards were investigated and a stock pile of usable lumber was established at Combat Team Eight's Headquarters. Reefer boxes were installed at the Quartermaster area, and small repairs were made. The local heating plant in the Headquarters area was brought into operation, and hot water showers installed throughout the camp.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. C. McFarland.

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Operation Report
O-8 To 1-45 (Annex (G) - Engineer Operation Report)

M. S. RAUSCHER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

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10th Marines

Occupational Operations Report
HEADQUARTERS, TENTH MARINES,  
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
IN THE FIELD.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.

To: The Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division.

Subject: 10th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

1. In compliance with Division Special Order Number 181-45, Tenth Marines Operation Report, Occupation of Japan is submitted herewith.

S. T. CLARK.
CONFIDENTIAL

Anty Co
2nd MarDiv (racinf)
In the Field
30 November, 1945.

File No. 01

TENTH MARINES OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

1. PLANNING.

(a) Invasion

No written orders were received on this phase. However, a planning room was constructed and facilities made available for conferences, planning, study of intelligence material and for the security of classified documents, in preparation for the receipt of such orders.

(b) Occupation

On 7 September, 1945, this Regiment received 2d Mar Div Operation Plan No. 14, dated 6 September, 1945. This plan embraced the occupation of a portion of Kyushu following a landing in the Nagasaki Area. The plan also provided for (1) an opposed landing over beaches and (2) an unopposed landing using available harbor and docking facilities.

Conferences were held for the battalion commanders and key staff members of the regiment and battalions. All orders, maps, photos, and intelligence information were made available for study and plans were formulated for embarkation, debarkation, landing and occupation. Preparations were made to embark on short notice. Battalions moved supplies and material to unit assembly areas in the vicinity of the docks at Tanapag, Saipan. At this time, tables of organization were drawn up to permit the conversion of any artillery battalion into either a military police or infantry battalion, should such necessity arise.

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On 10 September, 1945, the regiment commenced loading and on 12 September embarkation was completed.

2. TRAINING

(a) Assault

Due to the congested conditions and the nature of the terrain on Saipan, it was impossible to conduct normal artillery training on a battalion or regimental scale. The area assigned for firing problems and service practice permitted the normal firing of only one battery at a time, the impact area being approximately 800 yards wide and 1100 yards long. This range was used primarily for Infantry-Artillery training in overhead fire, although several service practices were conducted. Battery RSCP's and battalion CPAs were held when suitable areas were available.

During the period 30 July - 15 August, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions and a portion of H & S Strys, 10th Marines, trained on Agrihan, Marianas Island. This training consisted of service practice, survey, and communication problems. The extremely rugged terrain of volcanic Agrihan and the total lack of roads prohibited maneuver and displacement exercises. However, Phase I and II artillery tests were conducted for both battalions. Plans to send the 1st and 4th Battalions to Agrihan for training, around 15 August, were cancelled when hostilities ceased. A regimental field exercise (firing), scheduled to be held on Guam during the period 2 September - 14 September, was likewise cancelled for the same reason.

An eight-weeks school for Junior Officers was conducted from 7 June to 5 August.
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Tenth Marines Operation Report, Occupation of Japan (Cont'd). 30 Nov 45.

The subjects of gunnery, tactics, and matériel were covered in detail and examinations were held weekly. Other schools were conducted during the six-weeks period prior to embarkation on such subjects as Japanese language, intelligence, counter-mortar, operation of the target information center, survey, gunnery, communications (including air-ground), sound and flash ranging, military police, and field expedients for motor transport.

The calibration of all howitzers was completed by 15 August, 1945. All carbines, M-1 rifles and M-3's were zeroed and approximately 92% of enlisted personnel had fired the rifle (carbine) range at least once in the past six months.

On 7 September, all units ceased training, by Division order, and prepared to embark. During the voyage and while aboard ship, units conducted schools in military police duties, interior guard, military government, geography of Kyushu; customs, government, history of Japan.

3. ORGANIZATION

Artillery Group

10th Marines

2nd Amph Trk Co

Co "A" 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
Tenth Marines Operation Report, Occupation of Japan (Cont'd). 30Nov45.

4. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

23 September

At approximately 0600, the regimental Commander landed at Dejima Wharf. The Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, was ordered to take charge of all 10th Marines personnel and materiel unloading on West shore of Nagasaki Harbor. The Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, was ordered to take charge of 10th Marines personnel and materiel being unloaded on the East shore (Dejima Wharf). The Regimental Operations Officer and one (1) N C O. landed and reconnoitered the road to Isahaya and the proposed regimental billeting area there. Unloading commenced about 1730.

24 September

The Regimental Executive Officer led reconnaissance and billeting parties of Regimental H & S, 1st, 2nd and 4th Battalions to the Isahaya Naval Barracks to reconnoiter the regimental billeting area and route therefrom. The unloading of material continued over the docks on both the east and west shore of Nagasaki Harbor. During the afternoon, advance parties of regimental H & S, 1st, 2nd and 4th Battalions moved to Isahaya Naval Barracks.

25 September

The remainder of Regimental H & S and 1st Battalion moved to the Isahaya Naval Barracks. Unloading was completed at the docks on the West Shore of Nagasaki. The 3rd Battalion and the firing batteries of the 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion arrived aboard
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Tenth Marines Operation Report, Occupation of Japan (Cont'd).

30 Nov 45.

the LST’s and commenced unloading on the East shore of the Harbor. At 1100, the CP of the Regiment opened at Ishiaya Naval Barracks.

26 September – 30 September

The debarkation of all 10th Marines personnel and material was completed and all personnel billeted in the Ishiaya Naval Barracks. As a result of prolonged rains and due to the fact that the barracks were built in what had been a rice-paddy, the roads throughout the billeting area soon became impassable to all but tracked vehicles, and the billeting area in general became a quag-mire.

The enforcement of surrender terms was initiated immediately after the billet was occupied. Liaison was established with the local Japanese authorities.

1 October – 30 November

This period was devoted entirely to the enforcement of surrender terms. As the zone of occupation of the 2d Division was extended, elements of the Regiment took over successively, the areas formerly assigned the 2nd, 6th, and 8th Regiments. The 3rd Battalion, on 4 October, moved to Omura, relieved elements of the 5th Division there, and occupied Omurakuma. On 6 November, the 1st Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines of military police and interior guard duties in Nagasaki and performed these duties in conjunction with the 2nd Military Police Company.

On 8 November, the 2nd Tank Battalion was assigned to the Artillery Group for operational
Tenth Marines Operation Report, Occupation of Japan (Cont'd.)

control. The Tenk Battalion was assigned an area of responsibility southeast of Nagasaki for the purpose of enforcing the terms of surrender.

5. COMMENTS and RECOMMENDATIONS

It is doubtful that the present prime movers in a Marine Artillery regiment would be satisfactory in an assault operation over terrain such as that found in Kyushu. The narrow roads and wet, marshy ground do not support heavy wheeled vehicles. Amphibious tractors are recommended for use in the initial phase of the landing or until high firm ground is reached.

The need for qualified language personnel for occupation duty can scarcely be overemphasized. A minimum of one (1) language officer or enlisted man per battery (company) and three (3) in the battalion headquarters is recommended. The native interpreters cannot always be relied upon for truth or accuracy.

It is recommended that units assigned occupation missions prepare SCP's for collecting, inventorying, and disposing of enemy military materiel and equipment. This SCP should be placed in effect as soon after occupation of an area as practicable.

Some difficulty was experienced when the boundaries between occupation units divided or split a Japanese prefecture, district, precinct, or township. It was found wise to leave areas of police jurisdiction intact, in order to disturb the local government and chain of police command as little as possible.

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Tenth Marines Operation Report, Occupation of Japan (Cont'd.) 30Nov45.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CLARK

E. H. FORNEY,
LtCol., U.S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

Annex:
A. S-4 Report

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Corkhart

Wm. C. CORKHART,
LtCol., USMC
S-3.

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ANNEX (A)

S-4, TENTH MARINES OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

1. **TQM Report**

   The unloading of the Artillery Regiment at Nagasaki commencing on 23 September, proceeded slowly from ship to shore due to limited harbor facilities. On 24 September, a material failure caused one (1) 5-Ton machine shop trailer, to break away from its prime mover (TD 14 tractor) and plunge into forty (40) feet of water. The trailer was later recovered by the 43rd N.C.B.

2. **QUARTERMASTER**

   Quartermaster supplies were ample and distribution was effected rapidly. The use of railroad facilities has contributed to the conservation of vehicles. Provisions during the period 23 September to 30 November were sufficient in quantity with the exception of bread. It has been found desirable to increase the bread ration up to 50 lbs. per 100 men per day. The arrival of fresh provisions during November has improved both the quantity and quality. Fuel and clothing were sufficient.

3. **MEDICAL**

   Health of the Regiment during the period 23 September to 30 November has been excellent. Careful water discipline contributed immeasurably. Venereal infection has been low.

4. **ORDNANCE**

   Ordnance supplies were sufficient during period 23 September to 30 November.

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5. DISPOSITION

The disposition of surrendered property proceeded in an efficient manner. All ammunition in the Tenth Marines area except that located at Omura and in newly assigned areas has been disposed of. All heavy guns have been destroyed with the exception of four (4) 15 cm guns located at Kuchinotsu and those guns located in newly assigned areas. The destruction of all enemy aircraft nears completion. The returning of non-warlike equipment and supplies (not needed by occupational forces) commenced during the latter part of November. The problem of disposition will continue for a period of at least six (6) months.

6. PROCUREMENT

The Tenth Regiment has had efficient delivery of buildings required for billeting detachments throughout its assigned area of responsibility.

7. MOTOR TRANSPORT

Leak of spare parts and hot patches deadlined vehicles from 23 September to early November. Spare parts availability improved markedly during the latter half of November. Painting of all vehicles and trailers was commenced during this period and will be completed in late December. All 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance was performed by regimental motor transport personnel.

8. PERIODIC REPORTS

Periodic reports were submitted in accordance with G-4 instructions.
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Annex (A), S-4, Tenth Marines Operation Report, Occupation of Japan (Cont'd.)

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that in any future (non-combat) ship movement of the Division, that the Artillery Regiment load out as a unit rather than load with ACTs. This would expedite loading and unloading, both for the Artillery and the ACTs.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CLARK

E. H. FORNEY,
LtCol., U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL

WM. C. CAPEHART
LtCol., U.S.M.C.

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SECOND TANK BATTALION
OPERATION REPORT

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

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SECOND TANK BATTALION
OPERATION REPORT
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### SECOND TANK BATTALION

**OPERATION REPORT**

**OCCUPATION OF JAPAN**

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SECOND TANK BATTALION,
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

OPERATION REPORT
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

CHAPTER I

PURPOSE OF THE REPORT AND SYNOPSIS OF MISSION ASSIGNED.

1. This Action Report is submitted in order that a complete record of the Second Tank Battalion's participation in the Occupation of Japan be available to interested echelons.

2. The Second Tank Battalion was directed to be prepared on Division order to land on designated beaches and support attack as directed. On landing Company "C" attached RCT 2, Company "B" attached RCT 5.

CHAPTER II

TASK ORGANIZATION.

2d Tps - LtCol. WILLIAMSON, USMC.

(a) Co "A", 1stLt. SMITH, USMCR.
(b) Co "B", Capt. REYNOLDS, USMCR.
(c) Co "C", 1stLt. WEAH, USMCR.
(d) Co "D", Capt. JACKSON, USMCR.

Tr Vn 1Lt Ord Co, 2d Serv Bn - WO MASSEY.

CHAPTER III

PLANNING AND TRAINING.

1. 3-1 Section:

a. Personnel:

(1) At the time embarkation began this battalion was at authorized strength. During the embarkation phase thirty-five (35) enlisted men were transferred out of the battalion and twenty-seven (27) enlisted men were joined.

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(2) A total of forty-eight (48) enlisted replacements were joined between 15 August, 1945 and the date of sailing (17 September, 1945). Of this number 48% were trained for tank units. At the time of sailing this battalion was 30% understrength in NCO's; the majority of the deficit in the first three pay grades.

(3) This battalion was at authorized strength in Communication Personnel.

(4) Present allowances of personnel are adequate if they can be supplied with specialty and rank.

b. Administration.

(1) Prior to embarkation, instruction in Casualty reporting was held for Officers and NCO's.

c. Welfare and Morale.

(1) Post Exchange supplies were furnished by the Division Post Exchange prior to embarkation.

2. 8-2 Section:

a. General.

(1) From 15 June, 1945 until 15 August, 1945, the section was engaged in the typical intelligence training. Reviews in map reading, aerial photograph interpretation, aircraft recognition, and tank reconnaissance, were conducted. Also members of the section were sent to Division schools; Japanese weapons, Camouflage, Military Police.

(2) From 15 August, 1945, until the battalion embarked aboard ship, the section and the entire battalion conducted classes on Japanese history, folklore, mores, and the rudiments of the Japanese language. Each man in the battalion received one (1) copy of TM 30-641.

(3) Division Language Officers conducted a school for the officers of the battalion on 22, 23, 24, and 25 August.

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The mission of the school was to teach the officers the pronunciation of the Japanese language, to provide a background in Japanese customs, and to teach the officers the employment of the Japanese phrase book—TM 30-341. The instruction provided by this school was most helpful.

b. Orientation and Dissemination of Information.

(1) Due to the fact that maps for the operation were not received until 3 September, 1946, and aerial photographs were not received until the battalion was aboard ship, there was no opportunity to brief platoon leaders regarding the terrain.

(2) Due to the fact that the battalion was embarked aboard twelve (12) different ships, there was no opportunity to brief platoon leaders subsequent to embarkation. To make the best of a bad situation platoon leaders were given a copy of the operations order and such S-2 studies and reports as were available for distribution, and they were instructed to brief their troops on all information distributed.

(3) All orders, maps and orientation material, were made available to company commanders as soon as same were received. Each company commander received and was briefed on the operation order of the BCT to which his company was attached.

c. Maps and Aerial Photographs.

(1) Supply of the following maps was adequate:

- 1:25,000 Tactical Map.
- 1:250,000 Road and Planning.
- 1:500,000 Planning, Orientation.
- 1:2500 City Plan.

(2) The supply of aerial photographs was inadequate. Only one (1) set of photographs was received, and then after the battalion had embarked. Because of this fact, both, company commanders and platoon leaders were denied opportunity to make a careful study of the area through which they may have been called upon to operate.

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Aerial photographs should be distributed to a tank battalion at the rate of at least one set per company, and preferably one set per platoon.

3. S-3 Section:
   a. General.
      (1) Upon return of the Battalion from Okinawa, preparation and planning for further employment of the Battalion in another operation commenced. During the period 1 July to 15 August the following training was covered by individual tank crewmen:

   a. Subjects for Training.
      1. Gunnery School.
         (A) Nomenclature and Functioning of 76mm Tank and .30 caliber machine guns.
         (B) Principles of Tank Gunners, Direct Fire.
      2. Loaders School.
         (A) Tank Communications:
            1. Operation of SCR-508, 528 300 Radios and sound powered phones.
         (B) Turret Installations:
            2. Homelite Unit: Purpose, operation, preventative maintenance.
            3. Ammunition: Type and stowage.

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3. Driving School:
   (A) Familiarization of Students with M4A2 Tank.
   (B) Preventative Maintenance and Inspections.
   (C) Study, Functioning of M4046 Series 71 Tank engine.
   (D) Tank Electrical system.
   (E) Tank power train.
   (F) Engine warm up procedure.

4. Assistant Driver School:
   (A) Tank flame-thrower, E4-5.
   (B) Tank evacuation.
   (C) "ater-proofing of tanks.
   (D) Care and repair of periscopes.

5. Tank Commanders School:
   (A) Fire Orders.
   (B) Terrain Appreciation.
   (C) Camouflage.
   (D) Tank Tactics.
   (E) Tk-Inf Tactics.
   (F) Tanks in Amphibious operation.

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(3) Enemy anti-tank devices.
(4) Enemy Mines.

6. General Schools:
(A) Military courtesy and discipline.
(B) Individual protection.
(C) Voss (M1 Rifle, Carbine and Pistol)
(D) Military Sanitation and First Aid.
(E) Elementary Mapping.
(F) Demolitions.
(G) Defense against Chemical Warfare.
(H) Wet-cold weather clothing.

(2) During the period 16 August to 15 September the following Tank unit and combined training with infantry was to be covered, however oral orders from Division secured this training:

1. Tk Driving - Object to familiarize drivers and crew members with terrain and proper gear selection.

2. Tk Gunnery - Improvement of gunners indirect fire, fire on moving targets, and enemy fortified positions with 75mm gun and .30 caliber MG.

3. Tk Flame Thrower - Dozer Tactics; Object to train teams for the neutralization of enemy fortifications with flame thrower tanks and dozer tanks.
4. Tk Unit Problems — Problems for Tk Platoons and Companies in attacks on fortified positions, and enemy armored units.

5. Tk — Artv Fire — Coordination of Tk support fire of Artv with indirect fire from 75mm gun.

6. Tk — Inf Tactics — Objet to impress on all hands the importance of coordination of Tk and Inf units, and to thoroughly indoctrinate FEs in methods used to obtain such coordination. Try will of necessity be with small units due to limited Trp areas.

7. CPXs — One (1) Tank Battalion CPX was held. Further ones are scheduled.

b. Ordnance.

(1) Personnel of the Battalion embarked aboard ship carried the weapon authorized by current Table of Organization. No unexpected difficulties were encountered in acquiring and loading the normal and special types of tank ammunition.

(2) The tanks comprising the Battalion were not committed, consequently no vehicles were damaged and there were no malfunctions. Maintenance aboard ship was routine. The spare parts carried were believed to be adequate.

CHAPTER IV
LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

(1) This battalion was assigned eleven (11) Landing Ship Mediums to transport personnel and equipment to the target area. The Battalion Staff and overflow personnel from the eleven (11) LSH's were transported aboard APA 172.
(2) The eleven (11) LSM's were loaded during the day and night of 10 September, 1945. Loading went without incident. The LSM's carried an excessive amount of vehicles and cargo making it impossible to combat load. The following is the vehicle breakdown by LSM's:

**LSM#1**
- 5-Tank Medium M4A2
- 3-Truck 6x6 2½ ton cargo
- 1-Automotive Repair Unit 6x8
- 3-1 ton Truck 4x4
- 3-1 ton, Trailer, Cargo

**LSM#2**
- 1-Tank Medium Bulldozer
- 5-Tank Medium M4A2
- 2-Truck 6x6 2½ ton Cargo
- 2-Truck 4x4 ½ ton
- 2-Trailer 1 ton 2whl Cargo
- 2-Trailer 2 ton Stockroom
- 1-Truck 1½ ton Ambulance

**LSM#3**
- 4-Tank Medium M4A2
- 1-Tank Retriever
- 2-Truck 6x6 2½ ton Cargo
- 1-Truck 6x6 Machine shop
- 3-Trailer 1 ton 2 whl cargo
- 1-Trailer 1 ton 2 whl 4FC
- 1-Truck 4x4 3½ ton
- 1-Truck 4x4 ½ ton SCR 508

**LSM#4**
- 5-Tank Medium M4A2
- 6-Truck 4x4 ½ ton
- 3-Truck 6x6 2½ ton Cargo
- 1-Truck 6x6 2½ ton Cargo

**LSM#5**
- 4-Tank Medium M4A2
- 1-Tank Retriever
- 2-Truck 6x6 2½ton Cargo
- 1-Truck 2½ton Machine shop
- 1-Truck 4x4 4ton TCS
- 1-Trailer 1 ton 2 whl 4PC
- 3-Trailer 1 ton 2 whl Cargo

**LSM#6**
- 1-Tank Medium w/Bulldozer
- 5-Tank Medium M4A2
- 4-Truck 4x4 ½ ton
- 2-Truck 6x6 2½ ton Cargo
- 2-Trailer 1 ton Stockroom
- 2-Trailer 1½ ton 2 whl Cargo

**LSM#7**
- 4-Tank Medium M4A2
- 1-Tank Retriever
- 3-Truck 6x6 2½ ton Cargo
- 3-Trailer 1 ton 2 whl Cargo
- 2-Truck
- 1-Trailer 1 ton 4PC

**LSM#8**
- 5-Tank Medium M4A2
- 3-Truck 6x6 2½ton Cargo
- 1-Truck 6x6 2½ton Machine shop
- 2-Trailer 1 ton Cargo
- 1-Truck 1 ton 4x4 Cargo
- 1-Trailer 1 ton Grease
- 1-Trailer 1 ton Water
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LSM#9
1-Tank Medium w/Dump dozer
5-Tank Medium M4A2
2-Truck 4x4 1/4 ton
2-Truck 6x6 1/4 ton Cargo
2-Trailer 1/4 ton Cargo
1-Trailer 1 ton Water
1-Trailer 1 ton Stockroom
1-Truck 4x4 1 ton

LSM#10
6-Tank Medium M4A2
2-Truck 4x4 1/4 ton
2-Truck 6x6 1/4 ton Cargo
2-Trailer 1/4 ton Cargo
2-Trailer 1 ton Water
1-Truck 4x4 1/4 ton

LSM#11
5-Tank Medium M4A2
3-Truck 6x6 1/4 ton Cargo
1-Truck 4x4 1/4 ton
1-Truck 2 1/4 ton welder
2-Trailer 1 ton Water
1-Trailer 1 ton Grease
1-Trailer 2 ton Welder

3. Liaison teams were embarked with the RCTs with which the various companies were employed.

(3) About 15 August, 1945, oral orders were received from Division to prepare for Occupation duty. Training from 15 August to embarkation on 10 September included training in Military Police Interior Guard Duty, Military Courtesy, Courtesies and Customs of the Service, Ceremonies, Japanese History, and Geography of Japan. Division language officers conducted a series of language schools for all personnel of this battalion. The required school on wet-cold weather clothing was completed.

(4) Due to lack of a definite plan no detailed planning was undertaken nor was any attempt at detailed terrain study made. As quickly as information was received from higher echelons it was disseminated to the various company commanders. The battalion Operation Order (No. 6-45) was issued on the day of embarkation (10 September, 1945.)

4. S-4 Section:
   a. General.

   (1) In accordance with Battalion Orders, directives and SOP's were issued prior to the planning phase setting forth pertinent information regarding supply requirements of
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a normal and specialized nature. This section in conjunction with other staff sections of the Battalion commenced planning and preparation on or about 15 August, 1945.

(2) On 2 September, 1945, this section in compliance with a Battalion Order submitted the Battalion Administrative Order which set forth the procedure to be followed during the operation.

(3) With the exception of a few incidental and in- consequential items of equipment, the battalion was by 20 August, 1945, completely equipped and supplied in accordance with normal and special allowances in items of General Supply, Motor Transport, Engineer and Ordnance. Also by 20 August, 1945, all equipment and supplies not necessary to the functioning of the Battalion was properly boxed and crested preparatory to loading.

b. Embarkation and Movement to Objective.

(1) Loading of equipment and supplies aboard ship was completed on order. With the exception of one (1) one ton, two whl, 600 gal water trailer left on Saipan no major losses of equipment were suffered by this Battalion.

c. Transportation.

(1) The transportation taken along by this Battalion was adequate and satisfactory. Although this organization was not committed for use it is believed that transportation would have proved adequate if the Division Motor Transport had sufficient spare parts to keep it operative.

CHAPTER V

MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

(1) The LSM flotilla stood out to sea 17 September, 1945 and arrived at Nagasaki on 24 September, 1945. The Battalion Staff aboard APA 172 and the liaison groups stood out to sea 18 September, 1945, and arrived at Nagasaki, Kyushu, Japan 23 September, 1945.
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(2) Maps of the target area were displayed throughout the ships and personnel were schooled on the mission assigned. Tank maintenance was carried on daily to insure waterproofing and performance of all tanks.

(3) The commanding officer of troops of each LSM conducted training specified in DivTrgDemo #116 and 117-45.

(4) Upon arrival APA 172 Reconnaissance party reported forward DivCP for assignment of billeting area and then conducted reconnaissance of billeting area and unloading point. Unloading of LSM's commenced at 1500, 24 September, 1945.

CHAPTER VI

OCCUPATION

1. 8-1 Section:

a. Personnel.

(1) From the date of debarkation (24 September) to 20 November, 1945, this battalion transferred six (6) officers and one hundred and forty-three (143) men, approximately twenty-five (25) percent of the command. Half of these transfers were to the United States for discharge, the other half to various units within the Division. No replacements were received. The majority of the men transferred were tank crewmen, leaving the Battalion thirty-five (35) percent understrength in the tank crew.

(2) The Battalion was at authorized strength in Communication Personnel.

(3) Present allowances of personnel are adequate if they can be supplied by specialty and rank.

b. Administration.

(1) All administration reports were routine and were handled in accordance with directives from higher echelon.

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c. Welfare and Morale.

(1) Post Exchange supplies were furnished by the Division Quartermaster until 18 October, 1945 when the Battalion Post Exchange began operation. Post Exchange supplies were adequate.

(2) A recreation program was initiated during the first week of operation. Recreation facilities are extensive and have been constantly improved.

ANNEXES TO S-1 REPORT DURING OCCUPATION

SEE ANNEX (A) RECREATION
SEE ANNEX (B) SIX ARMY REPORT
SEE ANNEX (C) STATION LIST
SEE ANNEX (D) SUMMARY OF JOININGS AND TRANSFERS

2. S-2 Section:

(1) During the period 23 September, 1945 until 1 October, 1945, this section devoted all of its time and energy to routine intelligence work. All Japanese installations that represented a threat to the security of this Battalion were located and summarily disarmed or made ineffective.

(2) Between 1 October, 1945 and 2 November, 1945 the Battalion was attached to RCT 2. During the above period the section investigated and reported on intelligence targets designated by the S-2 of the 2nd Marines. As of 8 November, 1945, this Battalion was attached to the Arty Co. Since that date the section has conducted such patrols, investigations, etc. as ordered by the S-2 Arty Co; 10th Marines.

3. S-3 Section:

a. General.

(1) During the occupation period this Battalion was attached to either RCT 2 or Arty Co, hence the function of this section was to execute such orders and directives as were issued by the headquarters of the unit to which the Battalion was attached.

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(2) This Battalion was ordered to debark at the Kowaminami Shipyard, north of the village of Fukuohri. Unloading operations were completed by 0200, 25 September, 1945.

(3) Three (3) barracks formerly employed by the Kowaminami Shipyard as billets for its labor, were assigned to billet the Battalion. One (1) large Japanese messhall was assigned. Barracks were cleaned, repaired, treated with D.D.T. and ultimately occupied on 28 September, 1945. The entire Battalion area was enclosed with concertins.

(4) Initially this Battalion was billeted in the zone of Responsibility of RCT 2 and under the latter's direction patrolling designated areas. As of 1 October, 1945, the Battalion was formally attached.

(5) Guard detachments were placed on Japanese fuel dumps at Hagami and Loinokubi on 23 September, 1945, relieving a detachment from 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines. This guard was secured on order of 2nd Regiment on 16 October, 1945.

(6) During the period 23 September, 1945 to 1 November, 1945, Reconnaissance patrols were placed at the disposal of the S-2 section for the investigation of Intelligence targets assigned by RCT 2.

(7) As of 8 November, 1945, the Battalion was attached to the 10th Regiment (Arty 3d). Since that date daylight and night patrols have been assigned the patrol of designated areas for the purpose of enforcing all Division orders as regards curfew (while in effect), liberty, etc. Frequent checks were made by reconnaissance patrols upon all Japanese intelligence targets within the Battalion area of responsibility.

(8) Every day beginning as of 17 October, 1945, until 7 November, 1945, this Battalion furnished a guard detachment of thirty-six (36) men and two (2) officers to the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines for guard duty in the city of Nagasaki. Every other day beginning as of 8 November, 1945 this Battalion furnished seventy-five (75) men and one (1) officer to the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines for guard duty in the city of Nagasaki.

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(9) Beginning as of 5 October, 1945, a Military Police detachment of eight (8) men and two (2) Jeeps was organized for the purpose of patrolling the villages located in the Battalion's liberty area. This patrol continues to operate during the hours of liberty.

(10) This Battalion formulated a plan of defense of the Battalion Area, published under the heading of Battalion Operation Order No. 7-45, and held periodic area defense drills.

(11) As of 28 November, 1945, this Battalion was assigned a section of the Nagasaki area Guard by the 10th Regiment. This assignment requires sixty (60) men per day.

(12) Constant liaison with local Japanese Police Chief, located at Fukashori, who has authority over entire area of responsibility, has been maintained. As a direct result of close liaison, enforcement of Division Orders directed for compliance to the Japanese people, has been greatly facilitated.

(13) During the period of occupation this Battalion has in no way called upon to use its armor. However, heavy equipment such as tanks require constant maintenance by trained crews. Due to the fact that the greater part of the personnel have been employed either on patrols or on guard duty, it has been difficult to maintain the same standard of maintenance that was heretofore required.

b. Communications.

(1) Radio. During the period of debarkation the Battalion command post net employing SCR-510, 508, and 528 was used for intra-battalion control. The TOS MZ guarded the Division Command Net during that period. As of 24 September, 1945, until 4 November, 1945, the TBR was employed to guard the Division Command Net. As of 4 November, 1945 the latter was secured and telegraph was substituted therefore.

(2) Wire. Two (2) trunks were run to Division to the Battalion CP on 27 September, 1945. While the Battalion was attached to RCT 2, the Battalion had direct wire communications with the latter via lateral trunk. When the Battalion was attached to the 10th Marines (Arty Grp) the same lateral trunk was employed to contact the CP of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines.

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(3) Maintenance. As of 25 October, 1945 the interphone extension kits on the tanks began to disclose deterioration due to the weather. The section removed all sets and stored same. During the entire period of occupation all radios in the Battalion were subjected to a weekly test.

(4) Pursuant to Operation Order No. 7-45, wire and radio communication was provided from all company CP's to the Battalion CP.

(5) During the period of occupation the signal Officer advised the S-2 and S-3 sections on Japanese communications and inventoried all Japanese communication equipment that was discovered by Battalion patrols.

4. S-4 Section:

      (1) The transportation authorized this Battalion has been proven to be adequate during the occupation of this area.

      (2) Upon arrival in this area the Japanese roads proved to be inadequate for our supply needs. Since occupation these roads have been improved, and are now adequate for the normal transport and supply needs of this organization.

      (3) The Japanese bridges on the road to Nagasaki were found capable of supporting from seven (7) to fifteen (15) tons. This will not allow the passage of our medium tanks.

   b. Ordnance.

      (1) All personnel and tanks of this Battalion are equipped with one (1) unit of fire. This has proved adequate for the defense of this area.

   c. Quartermaster.

      (1) The supply of materials to this Battalion since occupation has been adequate.
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d. Disposition.

(1) All Japanese armament and equipment once belonging to the Japanese government found in this organization's zone of responsibility has been reported to DA. This equipment has either been turned over to DA or is under guard in the Battalion area.

e. Procurement.

(1) All facilities and equipment once privately owned by the Japanese and now being used by this organization have been procured through normal channels.

CHAPTER VII

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

At the time of embarkation, this Battalion was under orders to be prepared to make a combat landing. Carrying all its organic vehicles and equipment on the shipping assigned, it was impossible for this Battalion to properly carry out this mission with eleven (11) LSM's assigned.

For proper combat loading of all vehicles and equipment aboard Landing Ship Mediums, fifteen (15) vessels would be required.

It is recommended that intelligence materials be made available and time allowed for the proper briefing of platoon leaders prior to embarkation. With the Battalion organization broken up, as is necessary for transportation by Landing Ship Medium, intrabattalion communication is difficult at best. Briefing should be even more extensive than usual when movement to Target Area is to be made under such conditions.
1. The first week following arrival at Target a plan of recreation and athletics was devised whereby each company could be active if detached. This Battalion remained intact and one (1) volleyball court, two (2) horseshoe courts were prepared for each company. The companies also set up two (2) recreation rooms, one (1) used for ping-pong and the other as a reading room. The following weeks the program expanded and an inter-battalion league started in basketball, volleyball, and softball and each company entered one (1) team in each sport. A battalion team was organized in softball and basketball which has been playing two (2) to three (3) games a week. A tennis court and badminton court are available to the battalion at any time in addition to a movie which is held every evening.

2. A sight-seeing tour is conducted on which ten (10) men from each company can travel on a planned picturesque trip. At the present time a battalion library which will be open to all hands during the afternoon and evening is being completed. In addition to the previous activities, a boxing and wrestling room and parallel bars have been constructed in company areas. Fishing is available to all hands and particular attention is being stressed in each activity so that each individual in the company may be aided.
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To be filled in by unit commander
(From records, if immediately available)

Date unit left United States: 3 November, 1942
Date unit was (assigned) (attached) to Sixth Army July, 1945
Unit CO (Name, rank, branch, A.S.N.) WILLIAMSON, John L., Jr., LtCol., USMC
Date Present CO assumed command of unit: 3 July, 1946 08264
Date last inspector General: Never inspected

**STRENGTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
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<th>Nurses</th>
<th>EN.</th>
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<td>Present Eff Str</td>
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*Includes U.S. Navy Personnel.

**Personnel changes by month in past six full months**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
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<th>Hay</th>
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<th>Jul</th>
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<td>13</td>
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*Includes Warrant Officers.

**AGCT Results**

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<th>CL</th>
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<th>CI</th>
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<td>283</td>
<td>209</td>
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**Status of Specialists in accordance with T/O**

**Short (i.e., 3 Mechanics 014)**

| 1 Barber, 022 | 2 Cooks, 060 |
| 1 Carpenter, 060 | 1 Radio repairman, 174 |
| 3 Clerks, general, 055 | 5 Clerks, typist, 405 |
| 1 Painter, vehicle, 143 | 1 Communications chief, 542 |
| 2 Sanitary control, 096 | 2 Scout observer, 636 |
| 1 Welder, combination, 255 | 15 Tank mechanic, 360 |

**Over (i.e., 1 Cook 060)**

| 23 Truck Drivers, light, 545 |
| 1 Ammunition technician, 508 |
| 1 Demolition specialist, 533 |
| 3 NCO's 555 |
| 4 First Sergants, 585 |
| 2 Ambulance drivers, 599 |
| 4 Stockman, general, 735 |
| 96 Tank Crewman, 735 |

| 1 Operations assistant, 791 | ANNEX (B) |
| 1 Camouflage, 800 |
| 2 Quartermaster supplyman, 821 | CONFIDENTIAL |
| 4 Fuel mixer operator, flamethrower, 979 | |

673
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Medical History of Unit for Past three Full Months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inj-</th>
<th>Woun-</th>
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<td>Nov.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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Number of personnel participating in leaves, redeployment, etc., for past six months, including current month.

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<th>Officers and WO's</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
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<td>North Redeployment Leave or TDY</td>
<td>Redeployment Furlough or TDY</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Apr</td>
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Disciplinary Record for Past Six Full Months

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<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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<td>Traffic Violations</td>
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<td>Summery Courts-Martial</td>
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<td>Deck Courts-Martial</td>
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<td>General Courts-Martial</td>
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Recommendations for improvement of unit with respect to supply and transportation, administration and administrative records, living conditions, morals, etc;
**CONFIDENTIAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>JACKET NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE OF BORN</th>
<th>DUTY</th>
<th>DUTIES ASSIGNED</th>
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<tr>
<td>LIEUTENANT COLONEL</td>
<td>WILLIAMSON, John I., Jr.</td>
<td>03284 10 Mar 45 1203 LtCol BnComdr.</td>
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<td>CAPTAIN</td>
<td>WYNOLS, Walter E., Jr.</td>
<td>03888 15 Jun 43 1203 Maj BnExecO.</td>
<td>1 Jun 45</td>
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<td>*DOODELL, Dale N.</td>
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<td>029232 28 Feb 45 1203 Lt.</td>
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<td>*JOHNSON, Howard L.</td>
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<td>032391 31 Mar 45 1203 Lt.</td>
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<td>14 Aug 44</td>
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<td>*KELING, Richard J.</td>
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<td>028191 31 Jan 45 1203 Capt.</td>
<td>Co, &quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>26 Jan 44</td>
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<td>*MACPADDEN, John J., Jr.</td>
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<td>030449 29 Feb 45 1203 Lt.</td>
<td>Co ExecO, &quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>30 May 44</td>
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<td>*ROGERS, John S.</td>
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<td>032454 31 Mar 45 1203 Lt.</td>
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<td>*SEYER, Charles B.</td>
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<td>Co &quot;B&quot;</td>
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<td>*SIMMONS, Homer E.</td>
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<td>*SMITH, Evan A.</td>
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<td>018224 31 Oct 43 1203 Capt.</td>
<td>Co. &quot;A&quot;</td>
<td>8 Nov 43</td>
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<td>*SOLCUSE, George J., Jr.</td>
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<td>027278 31 Jan 45 9312 Lt.</td>
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<td>WOLF, Frederick H.</td>
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<td>BRYON, Martin G.</td>
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<td>042343 24 Oct 44 9331 Capt.</td>
<td>Bn Adj; COH &amp; S; Bn CashO; Bn VotO; Bn BondO; Bn S-3; Bn Provost Marshal; Bn EdO</td>
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<td>DONALDSON, David H.</td>
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<td>FURTH, Allan C.</td>
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<td>S-3; Bn Provost Marshall; Bn EdO</td>
<td>1 Jun 45</td>
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<td>GEIKER, Edward C.</td>
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<td>041053 30 Aug 44 1203 Lt.</td>
<td>Bn Accon &amp; Lno; Bn Spl ServO.</td>
<td>1 Jun 45</td>
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<tr>
<td>GESKE, Richard H.</td>
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<td>041054 30 Aug 44 1203 Lt.</td>
<td>Bn Accon &amp; Lno; Bn Spl ServO.</td>
<td>1 Jun 45</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX (C)
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GLENN, Jack (n)  040433 16Aug44 1203 Lt. CoU. 1Jun45
KIRK, "O" "L"  039174 13Jun44 1203 Lt. CoU. 23Dec44
LAUDEA, Judson J.  041280 13Sep44 4000 Capt. S-4; Sn;un0; Sn 1Jun45
Sn10; SnIndry0 1203 Lt. CoU.
1203 Lt. CoU.
1203 Lt. CoU.

SARANT OFFICERS
GRAY, Robert E. (CP)  043400 30Nov44 0500 Wo. AsstComO. 25Apr45
MCFEELY, Roger A. (LT)  027504 2May43 4503 Wo. Cu; OrdFl; Sn 19Jul45
                  4000 Wo. Pol0; CampConst & aint0

LIEUTENANT (NAVY)
MURPHY, John J. (LC)  313693 1Mar45  SnIndo; SnSan 15Jun45
                           0; Salaria& Epi
demic Disease
                           Control0.

ADDITIONAL OFFICER

LIEUTENANT (NAVY)
HAAS, Albert F. (DO)  171528 1Aug44  SnDent0. 9话44

"Donuts Reserve.

W. C. BROWN,
Second Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps
Adjutant.

ANNEX (C)

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No Marine replacements received since our arrival at Nagasaki.

(JOINED INTRA-DIVISION):

<table>
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<tr>
<th>From:</th>
<th>Arrival Date:</th>
<th>USMC</th>
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<td>2ndASCo, DivHqBn.</td>
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<td>2dHqR, 2dMarDiv.</td>
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<td>23Oct45</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2dHqIdn, 2dScTrps.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2dHqR, 2dMarDiv.</td>
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Navy replacements received since our arrival at Nagasaki.

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<th>From:</th>
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<tr>
<td>5th Amph Corps Evac</td>
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Officers and enlisted men transferred from this battalion since our arrival at Nagasaki are as follows:

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<tr>
<th>To:</th>
<th>Transfer Date:</th>
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<th>USN</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2dHqIdn, 2dScTrps.</td>
<td>23Oct45</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>US. for discharge</td>
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<td>DivHqBn.</td>
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</table>

Total: 3 143 7

ANNEX (D)
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From: Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion.
To: The Commanding General.

1. Training and Organization.

a. During the period subsequent to the Okinawa Operation, Headquarters Battalion organized an extensive training schedule designed to include all enlisted personnel in staff sections, as well as personnel in other units of the battalion. Special emphasis was placed on the training of military police personnel.

Training of the Second Provisional Pocket Detachment and of the Division Reconnaissance Company was under direct supervision of 2-3. Air-ground liaison, naval gunfire liaison and Shore Party groups of the Second Assault Signal Company were assigned to Regimental Combat Teams for training. Elements of replacement drafts assigned to the Division Signal Company were integrated into the training program outlined for that unit. All personnel of the battalion had opportunity to zero small arms.

b. During the training phase and shortly prior to embarkation at Saipan, the Division Reconnaissance Co. was completely mechanized and equipped with the following items:

(1) Three (3) trucks, 2½ ton, cargo.
(2) One (1) truck, 2½ ton, wrecker.
(3) Fifteen (15) trucks, 2½ ton, cargo.
(4) Four (4) cargo carriers, M29C.
(5) Three (3) trailers, 1 ton, cargo.
(6) One (1) trailer, 1 ton, greasing.
(7) One (1) trailer, 2½ ton, cargo.
(8) Seven (7) guns, motor carriage, w/75mm guns.
(9) Six (6) guns, motor carriage, w/o 75mm guns.

This company embarked at Saipan in vessels assigned to Regimental Combat Team Eight.

c. Approximately two (2) months prior to leaving Saipan, Second Assault Signal Company was organized into Shore Party Teams, Naval Gunfire Teams and Air-Ground Liaison Teams, plus the Headquarters Section. All Shore Party Teams, Naval Gunfire Teams and Air-Ground Liaison Teams, with the exception of the
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Subject: Headquarters Battalion Operations Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

Division Headquarters Shore Party Team were assigned to Second, Sixth and Eighth Regimental Combat Teams, Pioneer Battalion, and Engineer Battalions. Teams embarked with the units to which assigned.

d. The mapping and reproduction sections of the Second Engineer Battalion were attached to Headquarters Battalion for duty on 1 September, 1945. On 15 September, 1945, when it had become evident that a combat assault on Japan was unlikely, the Second Provisional Bogue Detachment passed from control of Headquarters Battalion.

e. Except in isolated instances, personnel of Headquarters Battalion not assigned to RCT's were boated on the command ship.

2. Operations Subsequent to Landing

a. The division command post was selected on 23 September, 1945 and elements of the Division Signal Company landed at Nagesaki on the same day to establish communications nets. A reconnaissance party of the Second Military Police Company landed on 23 September, 1945, and remaining elements of that company arrived on 24 and 25 September. Other units of the battalion were landed subsequently without incident.

b. The Second Military Police Company was established with billet, offices and brig facilities adjacent to the Division Command Post. Then the score of the company's activities was ascertainment, Co A, 1st BN, 2nd Regiment was assigned as an auxiliary military police unit to work in conjunction with the Second Military Police Company. This unit was replaced by a Battery of the 1st BN, 10th Marines on 9 November, 1945.

c. On disembarkation at Nagesaki, Naval Gunfire Liaison and Air-Ground Liaison teams continued to serve with the Regiments and Battalions to which they had been previously attached. Then, on 1 October, 1945, Second Assault Signal Company was skeletonized. All personnel, except a few officers and men scheduled for early transfer outside the Division, were transferred to the units with which currently serving, and equipment was turned over to the cognizant accountable officers for disposition.
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d. Shortly after debarkation, Div Recon Co. was assigned to operational control of CT 8, and continued to serve with that Combat Team till the closing date of this report.

e. Faring and Reproduction Sections have been particularly active since arrival in the Nagasaki area, and are at present engaged in making a Topographic Survey of the Atomic Bomb Area.

F. J. IC Quillen

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- 3 -
SECOND ENGINEER BATTALION

OPERATIONS REPORT

OCCUPATION OF KYUSHU
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HEADQUARTERS, SECOND ENGINEER BATTALION, SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLUSH MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

6 December, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of Kyushu.

1. Preparation and Planning.

(a) The Engineer Battalion of a Marine Division is essentially a combat organization capable of road construction, water supply, bridge building, camouflage and demolition work. The former companies of the battalion normally reinforce an infantry combat team to perform the engineering necessitated by the offense, defense or supply during the accomplishment of the mission.

(b) When the division is in a rear area for rehabilitation, the mission of the battalion, aside from training, is the development of and improvement in camp facilities.

(c) The duties of the engineers, when plans for the occupation were made, appeared to be essentially those encountered in a rehabilitation camp with water supply assuming paramount importance. Consequently, the routine duties of the Engineers on Saipan dictated the needs to be met in the occupation. Planning was based on this premise and the materials required were on hand.

(d) Inasmuch as previous combat restrictions as to shipping had been lifted no rear echelon was to be maintained, and it was planned to move all organic equipment of the battalion to the target.

(e) Equipment was serviced and anticipated needs in spare parts prepared to assure continued functioning of equipment under conditions expected at the target.

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2. **Training and Organization.**

(a) All training had been directed initially toward participation in combat similar to that experienced by the military service in previous Pacific operations.

(b) During the interval between cessation of hostilities and the occupation, only training in orientation, military disciplines, customs of the service and equipment maintenance was possible. The continued duties of camp maintenance at Saipan served the purpose of training for the occupational duties of the engineers.

(c) The Engineer Battalion was organized into a Headquarters and Service Company and three (3) letter companies. One letter company was attached to each of the Regimental Combat Teams while the Headquarters and Service Company remained with Division Headquarters.

3. **Narrative Report of Occupation.**

The Second Engineer Battalion landed at Nagasaki on 26 September, 1945, immediately conducting field reconnaissance to determine existing utility installations and to secure for the Division Engineer detailed reports as to the condition of roads in the immediate Nagasaki area and surrounding locality. Two significant factors were at once obvious; first the Japanese electrical system, as organized, was sufficient to supply most power needs; second the water system was functioning and supplying the city adequately, though many mains which had been broken were still not repaired. There was a significant loss of water through leaks throughout the area. The city had been cleared of debris although trash piles existed and many buildings were in such condition as to be a hazard to the safety of personnel, and second that roads were narrow and tortuous. Many were suited only to light traffic and only the main arteries were considered to have surfacing which would withstand heavy and continued military traffic.
Operations Report, Occupation of Kyushu. (Continued)

During the period of the initial phases of the reconnaissance, the battalion was proceeding with unloading operations which were made difficult by lack of immediate dock space or facilities. Inclement weather, which made all motor park areas quagmires, and the inadequate areas for AP berthing and LST docking hindered the unloading operation. Debris was cleared away from unloading areas and landing areas were bulldozed to facilitate unit discharge of cargo.

Initial reconnaissance revealed a city, an estimated 40% destroyed, with some power plants neutralized because of bombing and many secondary water mains in need of repair or replacement.

Street cars were not operating and many power lines were down, with hot wires constituting a menace to personnel. Little deliberate destruction of utilities was discovered although some equipment seemed to have been scabbed off. Parts which therefore rendered them inoperative. This was true of electrical motors and in some instances gasoline motors.

The streets showed some bomb-damage effect, and many were impassable to dual wheeled vehicles due to the presence of rubble and accumulations of debris. The majority of houses, factories and small dwellings were in some way affected by blast effect of the atomic bomb. In general, Nagasaki seemed to have been a city equipped with modern facilities of power, light, and water supply which were in need of maintenance, and repair, and in the case of power lines, re-installation as the installations had deteriorated due to the lack of materials for proper maintenance. Immediate steps were taken to insure utilities in the areas to be occupied by military forces. This entailed using existing Japanese installations and personnel which were in most cases found satisfactory when supervised and supplemented by service personnel.
The Japanese method of chlorinating the water was considered inadequate as the parts per million did not register at the source. The chlorination was stepped up initially to 12 to 15 parts per million to assure decontamination of lines and when the water was pronounced potable, was dropped to 2 to 1 parts per million at which level it is currently being maintained.

In the electrical system it was found necessary to step up the voltage in the Japanese lines as it was consistently lower than that in use by the military services. Precautionary measures to insure an adequate power supply to military installations were taken; providing a generator powered circuit which could be cut on in case Japanese power failed. This proved good tactics since several times during the typhoon, power did fail locally and the generator system had to be resorted to.

The streets, with local help, were cleared of debris by Army, NCB, Pioneer Battalion, and Engineer Battalion equipment and personnel. Japanese installations were removed insofar as possible. With unloading accomplished the heavier companies joined their respective REG's.

"A" Company attached to RCT2, moved to the Kamigó Barracks where they laid out a priority of work schedule and began repairing the buildings, constructing a framework for water storage tanks, and supplying emergency maintenance on the roads. Odd plumbing and drainage jobs were also completed as required. Camp improvement and maintenance was initiated which included installation of showers, construction of screened heads and galleys, wiring of buildings, offices and quarters, and maintenance work on access and egress roads.

"B" Company attached to RCT6, moved into the Mitsubishi Electrical Works. Their main problem consisted of an access and egress road across the south western peninsula in the Nagasaki area.
Operations Report, Occupation of Kyushu. (Continued)

The latter operation included an 800 ft. runway made of planking salvaged from the Hitubishi shipyard. This was necessary since ditching and making fills with rock carried from local sources was impractical due to the surface water table.

"C" Company, attached to the Eighth Regiment, proceeded on to Ieshaya where the immediate requirements were to make accessible roads into the camp area and to install an adequate water system. The roads of dirt and clay were rendered impassable during the typhoon due to heavy military traffic.

Water from local wells was highly contaminated. By installing a purification system adequate potable water and washing water was supplied from the second day on. Wash water was supplied through the existing Japanese pipe system and drinking water was hauled in trailer tanks.

Then the Regiment was ordered to Kumamoto. "C" Company accompanied and was once again confronted with the necessity of keeping roads open. This time however, without a serious drainage problem confronting them.

It was found necessary to take over the Ieshaya water sources from which the city and camp were supplied. One officer and six men were sent to the Tenth Marine Regiment to install a water system, supplement the local public works officer in roads and camp maintenance. A quarry was opened using engineer equipment operators who also supervised personnel supplied from the Regiment.

A pipe system was installed for Camp Newman, mostly with Japanese labor and engineers who proved exceedingly helpful and energetic inprocuring essential materials. For the most part the water system left by "C" Company was taken over and as conditions improved showers were installed using boilers found on the premises. Japanese labor for unskilled work was used initially and later, under the Camp Public Works Officer, skilled carpenters, glaziers, electricians and plumbers were utilized.
H&S Company within the Nagasaki area to prepare for the anticipated refrigeration needs of the division, installed eight (8) walk-in-boxes as a storage plant at Dajima docks. Inspection disclosed that many Japanese refrigeration units could be put into use, the main drawback being that they were ammonia operated in contrast to the frig boxes in use by the division. Use of Japanese units, however, was necessary since some units were damaged en route from Saipan.

One 1 November, 1945, RCT2 was ordered to move to Southern Kyushu. "A" Company of this battalion accompanied them to their new location. They left Nagasaki Harbor on 8 November, 1945 aboard LST's. The company was loaded out with Battalion Landing Teams. They landed at the City of Kanoya on 9 November, 1945 and commenced unloading that date. All unloading was completed by 14 November. One battalion of RCT2 moved to the vicinity of Miyakonojo, the second platoon of "A" Company accompanied them to this city.

Since landing in this area all elements of "A" Company have been occupied in setting up a camp for the Second Regiment. Their duties have included production of potable water, maintenance of existing roads, development of unloading ramps and storage areas at the docks, plus general improvement of existing buildings in their camp area.

On 4 November, 1945, one battalion of RCT2 moved overland from Kumamoto to Kagoshima. One platoon of "C" Company accompanied them to their new location. Their work since the move has consisted of road maintenance and water production in that area. The battalion took over a Japanese Camp at Kagoshima, as a result no new construction was necessary. However, reinforcing and maintenance of existing buildings has been carried on continuously.

On 21 November, 1945 this organization received Division Special Order Number 168-45 which set forth a schedule for the inter-change of high point personnel with the low point personnel of the Fifth Marine Division.
This organization was scheduled to inter-change one fourth of exchange personnel with the Fifth Engineer Battalion on 23 November, one fourth on 25 November, one fourth on 27 November, and one fourth on 29 November.

This transfer of personnel affected work schedules in so far as no major construction work could be handled at this time. This procedure remains in effect to date.

In general, the work of the Second Engineer Battalion has been divided into two definite parts. The first was and is that of the Letter companies attached to the various RCT's and working under the direct control of the RCT commander. The second was and is that of the H&S Company which has been used as a focal point on which the Engineer Group was formed. The H&S Company has performed the majority of utilities works in the Engineer Group.

4. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) Comments.

(1) A Marine Engineer Battalion is originally formed, equipped and trained for combat. Consequently much of the work required by occupational operations is not in line with the capabilities of the organization.

(2) No engineer officer was sent on the original reconnaissance of the area to be occupied. Consequently, the engineering data available at the time of the initial landing was not complete.

(3) The immediate requirements of the division necessitated too many tasks to proceed simultaneously and as a consequence, a job schedule could not be set up and maintained.

(b) Recommendations.

(1) An engineer officer should be present on all initial reconnaissances.
Operations Report, Occupation of Kyushu. (Continued)

(2) A base maintenance unit should be assigned to zones where any lengthy occupation is contemplated.

(3) The letter companies of the Engineer Battalion should revert to the Control of the Engineer Battalion as soon as the initial phases of an operation are over.

(4) Units of the Division should accomplish by their own initiative many of the minor tasks they call on the engineers to perform.

J. H. Partridge
SECOND PIONEER BATTALION

OPERATIONS REPORT,

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND PIONEER BATTALION,
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General.

Subject: Second Pioneer Battalion Report, Occupation of Japan.

I. Preparation and Planning for the Operation.

(a) Preparation and planning for the assault on Japan began with the receipt of Division Training Order No. 13. The other units which would comprise the Division Shore Party were unknown. Due to this and the amount of scheduled Division and Battalion construction, immediate extended Shore Party training was not possible.

A two phase training program was established, the first, to cover the period 1 July, 1945 to 15 August, 1945. Phase I was to place emphasis on individual training, with the basic idea that all men, by rotation of personnel on construction missions, would receive as complete an individual training course, as possible. A school was to be held from 25 July to 8 August for new Shore Party Officers and NCO personnel.

It was expected that experienced Shore Party Officers would be called upon to hold familiarization lectures for regimental combat teams.

Phase II of the training program, 15 August to 15 September, 1945, was divided into two periods of two weeks. The first period included all phases of specialized sectional training and the functioning of each Shore Party Section. Period two of Phase II was to cover the training of Shore Party Teams and groups as units, and the training and functioning of the Division Shore Party. Each Shore Party Team and group was to conduct two (2) cp's and the Division Shore Party as a unit, one (1) cp during these two weeks of training.

(b) Preparation and Planning for the Occupation of Japan began with verbal orders received concerning the formation of the Division Shore Party, 1 September, 1945. It was planned that the Second Pioneer Battalion would be Shore Party Group A, to function with BCT2. A training program was outlined to include familiarization with Shore Party functions, Military Police duties, and Japanese language, customs, and history.
Second Pioneer Battalion Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

Plans were made to have one Pioneer company prepare to form, along with one Naval Construction Battalion company, a Shore Party Group C if necessary.

It was expected that the Battalion would leave no rear echelon.

II. Training and Organization.

(a) The training schedule as planned for the assault on Japan was carried out only to a small degree until 18 August, 1945, the date on which all Division and Battalion construction was ordered to cease. Not more than thirty to fifty men in the battalion were available for training. Due to the lack of experienced crews it was found to be impractical to rotate construction details.

Several lectures were delivered to other units of the Division on the Shore Party function. It was found that the personnel could not be spared from construction missions to have an officer and NCO school.

No task organization for the assault on Japan was established.

(b) The training for the occupation of Japan commenced 20 August, 1945, and continued until 15 September, 1945. This training consisted of individual instructions only in Shore Party duties, Military Police duties, and in familiarization with Japanese language, customs, and history.

The task organization for Shore Party Group A was established 7 September, 1945, with "A" company and attached ASCO unit as Shore Party Team #1 to execute the Shore Party mission with BLT 2/2, "B" company and attached ASCO unit as Shore Party Team #2 to execute the Shore Party mission with BLT 3/2, and "C" company as Shore Party Team #3 to remain in Shore Party Group Reserve.

The embarkation of Shore Party Group A began 11 September, 1945. Three tractors with their operators were loaded aboard a Division Motor Transport LST. Shore Party Team #1, Shore Party Headquarters equipment, and one-half of Shore Party Group A Headquarters were loaded aboard one LST commencing 15 September, 1945. Equipment and operators of Shore Party Teams #2 and #3 were loaded aboard a second LST the same date. Personnel of Shore Party Teams #2 and #3 less their Motor Transport sections and one-half of Shore Party Group A Headquarters were loaded aboard a RCT2 APA.
Second Pioneer Battalion Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

III. Occupational Operations.

From the day of landing, 23 September, 1945 until 30 September, 1945, the Second Pioneer Battalion was engaged in Shore Party work as Shore Party Group A.

On 30 September, 1945, the Second Marine Division Shore Party was dissolved, and on 2 October, 1945, the Second Pioneer Battalion became part of the Engineer Group. As part of the Engineer Group, the Second Pioneer Battalion performed such construction and maintenance as assigned by the Division Engineer.

The Pioneer Battalion is set up primarily for Shore Party work, and not for engineering work of any magnitude. Consequently only comparatively minor construction and maintenance has been undertaken. The Battalion is capable of major projects, but has been hampered by lack of engineering personnel, the shortage of experienced equipment operators, and the lack of proper engineering equipment for such projects, i.e., the necessary equipment such as power graders, rollers, and rock crushing machinery for road reconstruction and maintenance. Pioneer Shore Party equipment has been supplemented whenever possible by equipment borrowed from the Marine and Army Engineers, and the Naval Construction Battalion.

The policy of the Pioneer Battalion concerning labor has been to employ native Japanese whenever possible, under the supervision of Marine personnel. It has been found that Japanese labor can be used satisfactorily, providing active supervision is maintained.

The principal work undertaken has been the reconstruction and maintenance of the road network between the town of Nagasaki and the area included by the Second Tank Battalion and Camp Trowbridge. Continuous maintenance has been necessary because of the initial poor construction of these roads, and their inability to withstand the necessarily heavy traffic over them. One cut and fill has been made to avoid an extremely bad section, and to reduce the amount of one-way traffic on the road. A small quarry was established to provide crushed rock for surfacing. It was found that residue from an asbestos quarry made a suitable binder.

*Note. Reference: Annex 4*.

Brigade Report, Occupation of Japan.
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Second Pioneer Battalion Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

During the time that the Pioneer Battalion was billeted in the Nagasaki Middle School, constant maintenance of the approach road to the billet was necessary.

The second major use of Pioneer equipment was in connection with clearing storage areas for use by the Division Quartermaster. It was found that by picking over the rubble and removing all large pieces of steel, masonry, and wood, rough grading the area with T91 dozers to spread the remaining rubble, and crushing that rubble with a sheep-foot roller, a satisfactory storage area could be cleared with a minimum of effort. The major difficulty in clearing a bombed area has been the breaking of water mains. It has been found that the Japanese place their water mains too close to the surface for dozers to operate easily.

Two athletic fields were graded in the bombed area. Both areas were originally athletic fields, but it was necessary to remove rubble, and to haul approximately eight hundred cubic yards of earth in, to make satisfactory infields.

The development and operation of the Engineer Battalion lumber yard was under Pioneer supervision. Other work performed by the Battalion included the unloading of lumber barges on the west side of Nagasaki harbor, the construction of LCM moorings, repair of Dujima wharf, and maintenance of the Pioneer billet.

While the major missions of the Pioneer Battalion have been indicated above, the major part of both personnel and equipment was continually loaned out to other units. Shore Party cranes, light units, and tractors were used extensively by the Division Quartermaster, Commissary, and other supply units for the unloading of supplies and the establishment of dumps. Approximately thirty pieces of Pioneer equipment with operators were used daily in this manner.

IV. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) Throughout the period of training for what was to be the assault on Japan, little training of value to Shore Party personnel, i.e., establishment and control of supply dumps, building of access roads, control of traffic, beach defense, etc., was held primarily because of the large amount of construction work, both Division and Battalion.

(b) Some difficulty was encountered in unloading
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Second Pioneer Battalion Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)

the Division at the target. Due to the lack of time for preliminary reconnaissance for dump sites and unloading points, it would be suggested that in unloading operations, unaccompanied, the Shore Party Group and Team Commanders be allotted ample time for reconnaissance before supplies and equipment are moved ashore.

(c) In some cases, proper shipping space was not allotted for heavy Engineer equipment. Much time is lost when such equipment must be dismantled and reassembled on the beach.

(d) Both the operations, Engineer and Shore Party, and the training of the Battalion have been made difficult by the lack of rank, particularly of Staff NCO grades. In many instances, Corporals have been Platoon Chiefs and acting Section Chiefs of Motor Transport Sections, where the T.O. strength allows Staff Sergeants and Technical Sergeants.

[Signature]

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding.
SECOND SERVICE BATTALION

OPERATIONS REPORT

OCCUPATION OF KYUSHU
I. Planning, Training, and Organization.

a. This battalion made no plans for the assault of Japan as no information or orders were issued relative to such action.

b. It is to be noted that this report is concerned only with personnel and units operating as an integral part of this organization, and does not include parts of this organization under operational control of the Division Quartermaster, Division Headquarters, and Regimental Combat Teams. Listed below are the elements of this organization which were not under Battalion control.

(1) Under Division Quartermaster
   a. Division Commissary Officer and assistants.
   b. Division Accountable Officer and assistants.
   c. Division Exchange Officer and assistant.
   d. Division Laundry Officer and 4th Separate Laundry Platoon.
   e. Division Salvage Officer and Salvage Section.

(2) Under RCT 2
   a. 1st Platoon Supply Company
   b. 1st Platoon Service Company
   c. 1st Platoon Ordnance Company

(3) Under RCT 6
   a. 2nd Platoon Supply Company
   b. 2nd Platoon Service Company
   c. 3rd Platoon Ordnance Company

(4) Under RCT 8
   a. 3rd Platoon Supply Company
   b. 3rd Platoon Service Company
   c. 2nd Platoon Ordnance Company

(5) Under Division Headquarters
   a. 2nd War Dog Platoon

(6) Under 2nd Tank Battalion
   a. Tracked Vehicle Platoon (Ordnance Company)
Operations Report (continued)

C. For purpose of this report, the following elements of this organization are shown as being Service Battalion (less detachments) which operated under control of the Commanding Officer of Service Group. In this instance, the Battalion Commander and Commanding Officer of Service Group were one and the same, Lt. Col. John H. Fartridge, USMC.

(1) Headquarters Company
(2) Company Headquarters, Supply Company
(3) Fourth Platoon, Supply Company
(4) Company Headquarters, Service Company
(5) Fourth Platoon, Service Company
(6) Company Headquarters, Ordnance Company

D. Plans and Preparation.

(1) Upon receipt of Tentative Task Organization, Embarkation Instructions, and Camp Evacuation Order on 21 August, 1945, the Battalion Commander called a meeting of Company Commanders, Battalion Quartermaster, and Platoon Leaders of administratively attached platoons (Laundry and War Dogs). At this meeting the officers mentioned were informed of as much of the orders as the Battalion Commander felt they should know, and preliminary planning begun. Inspections for shortages in uniforms and equipment were held for all hands, and shortages were filled. Indocriation in the use of winter cold-wet weather clothing was given by the clothing section men of Division Quartermaster.

(2) Each Company Commander was responsible for submission of the following rosters and date.
   a. Tentative embarkation rosters by platoon.
   b. Unit Personnel and Tonnage Tables.
   c. Cargo Manifests (to support (b) above).
   d. Tentative rear-echelon rosters. (In case there should be a rear echelon.)

(3) The fourth platoons (ordinarily rear-echelon) and Company Headquarters Personnel were used for getting battalion and company property ready for shipment, and to prepare the camp for evacuation. It is to be noted that operations of all types were seriously hampered by a shortage of officers, as well as special assignments of officers to loading work and Division Area Inventory as other units of the division evacuated their respective areas. Other difficulties en-
countered included transfer of men to Transient Center, P.K.F. Fco. for processing for discharge. This necessitated a re-shuffling of personnel to equalize platoons as much as possible, and caused a shortage of men for regular functions such as camp guard, police, and working parties.

(4) On 7 September, 1945 when the Operation Plan was received, the Battalion Commander reviewed such pertinent points as he felt individual officers should know by virtue of their particular job or duties. During the period from 21 August to 7 September, there was close liaison with the Division Quartermaster and the Regimental Combat Teams on preparation of sailing rosters, shipping space requirements, personnel changes, and tentative embarkation dates. During this period the personnel of the battalion continued normal duties of supply and maintenance for the division, as well as movement of gear and equipment to the spotting areas on the docks under the control and direction of the Division Quartermaster. It was found that very little time could be given to training or instruction due to the fact that almost all personnel were working on a twenty four hour, seven day a week basis.

E. Embarkation.

(1) On 10 September, RCT 2 ordered aboard its attached units which were embarked that day and the following day. Control passed to RCT 2. The first platoon of Supply Company embarked 10 September on AFA 178, USS Grimes. The first platoon of Service Company embarked 10 September on AFA 138, USS Breton. The first platoon of Ordnance Company embarked 11 September on AFA 125, USS Lenier.

(2) On 12 September, RCT 6 ordered aboard its attached units which were embarked that day and the following day. Control passed to RCT 6. The second platoons of both Supply Company and Service Company embarked 12 September on AFA 168, USS Gege. The shortage of officers made it necessary for one officer to be assigned platoon leader for both platoons. On 12 September the third platoon of Ordnance Company embarked aboard AFA 168, USS Gege. On 13 September the second platoon of Ordnance Company and Company Headquarters of Ordnance Company embarked aboard AFA 57, USS Capricornus. Captain H. G. Feft, Ordnance Company Commander was designated Commanding Officer of troops aboard the ship.
Operation Report (continued)

(3) On 14 September the below listed units were embarked on APA 201, USS Henard.
   a. Headquarters Company
   b. Company Headquarters of Supply Company
   c. Third Platoon of Service Company
   d. Fourth Platoon of Service Company
In the absence of the Battalion Commander who was designated Shore Party Commander, the Battalion Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant D. F. Timberlake, was appointed acting battalion commander until such time as Lt. Col. Fertridge could be relieved of Shore Party duties and rejoin the battalion at the target area. Another difficulty encountered was the receipt of thirty three enlisted replacements on the eve of embarkation of the battalion headquarters. These men were assigned as a second section of Service Company Headquarters to be embarked the following day.

(4) On 15 September, Company Headquarters of Service Company, including the replacements received the night before, were embarked aboard APA 58, USS Applng.

(5) On 16 September the third and fourth platoons of Supply Company were embarked aboard the APA 201, USS Henard. These platoons had been left on the docks to help complete last minute loading of Division Quartermaster Supplies and Equipment. On the same date an eight men Staff NCO section from Division Quartermaster was embarked on the Henard. Again the shortage of officers made it necessary for one officer to be assigned platoon leader for two platoons.

(6) On 17 September the 2nd War Dog Platoon was loaded in two sections and reverted entirely to division control. One section was embarked aboard AXA 57, USS Capricornus, and the other section aboard AXA 15, USS Indromeda.

F. Enroute.

(1) On 18 September the convoy departed from Tenopag Harbor, Seoul. While enroute additional instructions and information was promulgated by the Commanding Officer of Troops and disseminated to all personnel through daily briefing in troop compartments. This instruction included disclosure of the target area, Nagasaki, and all
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Operation Report. (continued)

Information available from C-2 studies concerning the area.
Aerial photographs, maps, and overlays were used to show
the area destroyed by the atomic bomb, probable landing or
docking areas, assembly points, and possible occupation
zones. English-Japanese phrase books were distributed to
all personnel and elementary instruction was given in pro-
nunciation and use of the books. Occupational duties were
stressed, as well as terms of surrender and treatment of
Japanese nationals. Unit and detachment commanders were
briefed on the probable disposition and orders for their
organizations.

G. Arrival.

(1) On the morning of 23 September the convoy sailed into
the outer harbor of Negoesari. Various unit commanders went
ashore in landing craft for a reconnaissance of respective
areas. No one from this organization was ordered ashore
this date. The following day, 24 September, the Second
Battalion Eighth Marines, less Easy Company and an
attached unit, disembarked from the ship. Colonel C. W. Hart, USMC, Commanding Officer of Service Troops, his Adjutant,
1st Lieutenant E. E. Gethart, and Service Battalion
Quartermaster, 1st Lieutenant E. L. Bailey, went ashore
on 24 September for a reconnaissance of the Service
Battalion and Service Troops area. On 25 September, the
elements of Service Battalion, less third platoon of
Service Company and Supply Company, disembarked from the
beach at 1400 and proceeded by truck to the Service
Battalion area. The third platoon of Service Company and
Supply Company passed to control of RCT 8.

(2) On 25 September Company Headquarters of Service Com-
pany disembarked from APA 58, USS Appling and proceeded
by truck to the Service Battalion area. The same date
Company Headquarters of Ordnance Company disembarked from
AXA 57, USS Cepricornus and proceeded by truck to the Ser-
vice Battalion area.

(3) This movement brought all elements of Service Battalion
(less detachments) back into direct control of Service
Battalion Headquarters. On 26 September Captain H. G. Teft,
Ordnance Company Commander assumed temporary command of
the battalion pending the release of Lt.Col. Fertridge from
unloading duties as Shore Party Commander.
II. Occupational Operations.

The duties carried out by this Battalion in an occupational status differ very little from the duties carried out in combat or rest camp conditions. Immediately upon landing the remaining personnel from Supply Company were taken under the control of the Division Quartermaster for operation of Division Warehouses and Dumps. The men of Service Company not attached to Regimental Combat Teams were used for work in setting up camp in the battalion area, repair of buildings, building of a galley, and general camp work. On 26 October a large number of men were transferred for discharge. Insofar as possible, the men remaining in camp were made replacements in platoons attached to RCT's. Since landing, the Division Quartermaster has gradually gained control of all men from Supply Company, except the third platoon which is still attached to RCT 8, to men the Division Dumps. The Ordnance Platoons are still attached to the Regimental Combat Teams and are operating with them under supervision of the S-4 of the respective regiments.

Lt. Col. Fertridge was relieved as Shore Party Commander on 30 September and resumed command of the battalion. On 6 October Lt. Col. Fertridge was relieved as Battalion Commander and assigned duty as Commanding Officer of 2nd Engineer Battalion. On this date Capt. H. C. Teft, Ordnance Company Commander, was assigned additional duty as Commanding Officer of Service Battalion. At this writing, Capt. Teft is still the Commanding Officer of this organization.

The Battalion Headquarters, (consisting of Headquarters Company, and Company Headquarters of Service, Supply, and Ordnance Companies), is operating purely as an administrative agency for the personnel records of all men in the battalion. The Battalion Area provides billeting space and mess facilities for the men operating under the Division Quartermaster. In addition, Division Salvage section is set up in this area, but are operating under control of the Division Quartermaster. The Battalion Area also affords limited athletic facilities, nightly movies, a small library, and an educational program with nine class hours per week.
Operation Report.  
(continued)

The work of this headquarters has not changed materially during operational operation except that it is much more difficult. Personnel scattered over Kyushu with RT's, it is increasingly difficult to administrate for them, lacking personal contact.

III. Comments and Recommendations.

A. The most outstanding shortcoming in the entire operation was lack of definite information. From the first phase of this organization's preparation, to establishment of camp in Nagasaki, lack of adequate information hampered operations. Ship allocations to our platoons attached to RT's were not settled until two days before the first platoons boarded ship. This caused a last minute rush trying to get embarkation rosters completed. Loading dates changed daily. Embarkation dates and hours changed almost hourly.

B. Aside from the above mentioned conditions, it is believed that the entire movement was carried off as smoothly as possible under existing conditions. As noted earlier in this report, this battalion sailed from Seipen short ten officers, which left us at seventy five percent rated Table of Organization strength. The assignment of the Battalion Commander to Shore Party duties did not further the smoothness of operations.

C. It is recommended that this organization be represented more fully in conferences, not only in preliminary planning, but in late stage planning and changes which occur in the regiments. The lack of definite information mentioned above could be remedied by taking steps to make certain this battalion is informed of late changes as they occur. With parts of the battalion scattered throughout the division for control, it is very difficult to keep all the records in order. Elements of Service Battalion were embarked on eight separate ships in this last movement. In the past we have had men from this battalion on as many as fifteen different ships. Closer liaison is recommended from regiment to battalion as changes occur.

D. It is recommended that the Division Quartermaster be furnished dock parties as far as possible from organizations other than Service Battalion when loading out operations take place. Drawing this organization of all available men to handle supplies in dock spotting areas for the Division Quartermaster makes it next to impossible to accomplish the task of loading out the battalion property and properly preparing the battalion camp for evacuation.
PART 4

Maps to accompany 2d Marine Division Operation Report, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
155778

Film and splice in pg. 3/6