


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SECOND MARINE DIVISION



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REPORT ON THE

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

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SGT/dpa
Serial 0716

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

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From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Via: (1) The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps.
(2) The Commanding General, Sixth Army.
(3) The Commanding General, Army Forces, Pacific.
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and
Pacific Ocean Area.
(5) The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific.

Subject: Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

References: (a) PacFlt Conf Ltr 1 CL-45, dtd 1Jan 45.
(b) VAC Special C No 120-45, dtd 1Nov 45.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.

1. In compliance with references, enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. In order to preclude the necessity of forwarding all copies through the chain of command, each organization shown in the distribution list has been forwarded the prescribed number of copies.

3. Copies of all Operation Orders, Administrative Orders, and Staff Reports included in this report and annexes thereto, are downgraded from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with reference (b).

LeRoy P. Hunt
LeROY P. HUNT.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC.

REPORT OF OCCUPATION OF KYUSHU, JAPAN

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- A. Kyushu, 1/25,000, AMS, L872, 1945
- B. Central Japan, 1/250,000, Second Edition, L571, AMS-2.

* Unit journals, dispatch summaries, periodic reports with copy for CMC only.

** Includes report of 2d Medical Battalion.

*** Includes report of 2d Motor Transport Battalion.

SGT/dpa
Serial 0716

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

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PART I

COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT

a. Planning - On 22 June, 1945, this Division reported by dispatch to the Fifth Amphibious Corps in compliance with a Fleet Marine Force, Pacific dispatch received on 21 June, 1945. Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Amphibious Corps directed the commencement of planning for the invasion of Japan. Upon receipt of the first tentative draft of the Fifth Amphibious Corps plan, planning was commenced by this Division. During the planning phase, the G-2 Section, after a thorough study of all available material, held a number of conferences in order to orient the staff and regimental commanders relative to the target. After a study of all available intelligence material, the G-3 Section prepared the first tentative draft of the Division plan for invading Japan and receiving the approval of the Commanding General thereon. On 2 August, 1945, the Commanding General, accompanied by the C/S, G-2, G-3, and G-4 departed for MAUI and reported to Fifth Amphibious Corps to discuss this plan in conjunction with the Commanding General of the Fifth Marine Division, the Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps, and the naval commands involved. The Division Signal Officer had previously reported to the Fifth Amphibious Corps for signal planning. The plan was approved by Fifth Amphibious Corps and upon the return of the Commanding General and his staff officers on 11 August, 1945, more detailed planning began and continued until 15 August, 1945, when orders were received to cancel all planning and stand by for further orders. Planning did not get below the Division level although regimental commanders were cognizant of all Division plans.

b. Training - This Division, less RCT 8, returned from OKINAWA on 14 April, 1945 and after reestablishing camp inaugurated a new training program. A training directive was issued on 26 June, 1945, which set forth a training program in two (2) phases. The first phase from 1 July - 15 August, for individual training, and the second phase from 16 August - 15 September, for unit and combined training. The first phase was carried out, but the second phase was only partially completed. The limited terrain on SAIPAN not restricted by island development was not suitable for training problems for artillery and tanks, although some training for these weapons was accomplished there. It was found necessary to send artillery to AGRIHAN in the north of MARIANAS to fire service

practice, and similarly tanks were sent to the island of TINIAN for further training. Infantry training was carried out along normal lines. Owing to the cancellation of the invasion, combined training did not get beyond the battalion stage. Air-ground training, using live bombs and ammunition, was commenced as field exercises for battalions and regiments on SAIPAN but was not quite completed due to the termination of the war, and the undesirability of conducting further hazardous training. Although hampered by a lack of facilities, the Division prepared and used a number of rifle ranges and field firing ranges. Of particular interest was a surprise-target range which was of considerable value in training riflemen for combat. Photos and a description of this range were forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. On receipt of orders on 18 August, 1945 all plans for the invasion of Japan were cancelled and new plans for the occupation of Japan were prepared. These plans were based on the primary premise that the Division would land in the NAGASAKI area, prepared for a combat landing over beaches, or prepared to land over docks in the event that there was no opposition. Training for the occupation commenced shortly after receipt of orders and included training in the use of cold-wet weather clothing, duties of military police on occupation duties, and special schools such as Motor Transport, Cooks and Bakers, and orientation of personnel.

c. Organization - In general, the Division was organized along the rather standard lines used in previous amphibious operations. The Task Organization included three (3) Regimental Combat Teams, Artillery Group, Second Tank Battalion, Engineer Group, Service Troops, and Division Troops. During this period, in accordance with a directive from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, assault platoons were organized and the Division Reconnaissance Company was reorganized and reequipped according to a new T/O sent out by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. The artillery regiment also reorganized two (2) of its battalions in accordance with directives from higher authority so that it had three (3) 105mm Howitzer Battalions and one (1) 155mm Howitzer Battalion.

d. Advance Reconnaissance of the objective - It was learned from higher headquarters that it would be possible to send an advance party to the target area for the purpose of making preparations to receive the Division on its arrival. On 16 September, 1945, an advance reconnaissance party from the Division arrived in NAGASAKI. This party consisted of one (1) officer from the G-3 Section, one (1) officer from the G-4 Section, one (1) Japanese language officer and one (1) officer from each Regimental Combat Team. This reconnaissance party accompanied a VAC reconnaissance party. Upon its arrival in NAGASAKI, this party made preliminary preparations for the landing of the Division in the NAGASAKI area and established initial liaison with Japanese authorities. It also conducted a survey of selected landing areas, commenced selection and preparation of suitable billets, and collection of all available information on the water supply, electricity, sanitation and other local conditions.

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PART I - COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT (CONT'D).

e. Occupational Operations -

(1) The Division commenced loading in ships of TRANSRON 12 on 10 September, 1945. Loading was completed and the Division sailed on 17 September, 1945. The Division arrived and commenced debarking at NAGASAKI on 23 September, 1945 after an uneventful voyage. The advance reconnaissance party reported aboard the USS CAMBRIA (Flagship) immediately on arrival of the Division and furnished much helpful information.

(2) Initially the plan called for the Division to occupy the NAGASAKI Harbor area and carry out its assigned mission in that area. The Division commenced unloading on 23 September, 1945 and completed the task on 28 September, 1945. The Division Command Post opened ashore in the NAGASAKI Customs House at 0900 on 25 September, 1945. Intensive patrolling was initiated throughout the occupied area and the development of plans for extending the zone of occupation continued.

(3) Upon completion of the necessary reconnaissance, Regimental Combat Team 8 was moved to KUMAMOTO in Central KYUSHU. At this time a reconnaissance party of experienced field officers was sent to Southern KYUSHU to make a survey of facilities and Japanese forces and installations thereat with the view to extending the 8th Marines area of responsibility to include KAGOSHIMA KEN and to have Regimental Combat Team 2 occupy MIYAZAKI KEN and a small part of KAGOSHIMA KEN.

(4) Regimental Combat Team 2 commenced movement to Southern KYUSHU by echelon on 26 October, 1945 and completed the movement on 13 November, 1945. It should be emphasized that the movements of Regimental Combat Team 2 and Regimental Combat Team 8 were facilitated by the fact that advance reconnaissance had established the necessary liaison with the Japanese in the areas concerned and had provided the regiments concerned with much data relative to the mission at hand.

(5) By 14 November, 1945, the Division had completed occupation of its entire zone as initially assigned, and was continuing its missions of checking on compliance of the surrender terms and the disposition of enemy material and equipment on the mainland, and had further initiated action to execute the same missions on outlying islands. OSUMI GUNTO was occupied on 22 November, 1945 and KOSHIKI RETTO on 23 November, 1945. On 24 November, 1945, Regimental Combat Team 6 commenced to take over the area of responsibility of the Fifth Marine Division, which move was scheduled for completion by 10 December, 1945. By 10 December, 1945, the Second Marine Division was

scheduled to have occupied all of KYUSHU and the outlying islands of the south and west coasts thereof, with the exception of FUKUOKA KEN and OITA KEN. These two KENS were held by the 32d Infantry Division

f. Japanese compliance with surrender terms - In general, the Japanese compliance with surrender terms was found to be excellent, and no trouble was experienced with the Japanese except for minor difficulties occasioned largely by the lack of understanding on the part of the Japanese of exactly what was expected of them, and the language barrier.

g. Supply, Equipment, and Logistics -

(1) Planning -

(a) General -

(1') Logistical planning for the invasion of Japan began on 26 June, 1945. During July and the early part of August, information was received concerning tentative allocations of shipping preloads for landing ships, and special mounting instructions for rations, engineer supplies, cold-wet weather clothing, and ammunition. Based on the above information, preliminary estimates of supply and shipping requirements for mounting the Division were made. The first tentative draft of Fifth Amphibious Corps Administrative Order Number 5-45, dated 4 August, 1945, was received on 13 August, 1945. Planning for the invasion of Japan ceased immediately after the cessation of hostilities against the Japanese.

(2') The planning phase for the occupation of Japan began on 17 August, 1945, with the receipt of a dispatch containing a warning order from the Commanding General, Sixth Army, to the Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps with the Second Marine Division as an information addressee. Information contained in the above directive was such that a considerable amount of preliminary planning could be completed prior to actual receipt of an order from Fifth Amphibious Corps.

(3') On 26 August, this Division was informed by Fifth Amphibious Corps that the Division would commence embarkation about 20 September, 1945.

(4') Based on the above directives, and on Fifth Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45 subsequently received, Division Administrative Order No. 13-45 was promulgated. In the preparation of this order, attention was paid to the two possible type of landing of the Division, that is, an assault landing across beaches and unloading in a harbor alongside wharves. In general, the principles of combat loading were adhered to. Division supplies were carried by the regimental combat teams and each was so equipped, supplied, and loaded as to be self sustaining if necessary.

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PART I - COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT (CONT'D).

(b) Division Quartermaster --

(1') The Division Quartermaster had been informed as to the quantities and types of supplies and equipment to be carried, in accordance with the Sixth Army warning order. These supplies had been procured and most had been hauled to the staging areas prior to receipt of Fifth Amphibious Corps Administrative Order No. 6-45. Such minor adjustments as were required were made upon receipt of the Corps order.

(2') In view of the disposition of Division supplies among the regimental combat teams, the distances which might separate the combat teams, and the anticipated difficulties of truck transportation over the inadequate road net in the NAGASAKI area, the supply plan provided for the following:

(a') Each Regimental Combat Team to establish its own dumps from supplies unloaded from its shipping and to subsist and supply itself from such dumps with the aid of attached supply and service personnel.

(b') Division Headquarters and Division Troops to be initially subsisted and supplied by one Regimental Combat Team.

(c') During the initial phase, the Division Quartermaster to exercise overall supervision of the issue of supplies, to anticipate future needs and to submit timely requisitions.

(d') At the earliest practicable date, after future employment of the Division became known, the Division Quartermaster would assume control over all Division supplies and resume normal operations.

(e') Upon the arrival of resupply shipping at NAGASAKI, the Division Quartermaster would take over all supplies unloaded and establish a Division dump.

(c) Motor Transport --

(1') Subsequent to the OKINAWA operation, an extensive program of vehicle maintenance was carried out. As a result of this program, all vehicles in the Division were in good mechanical condition at the time of embarkation.

(2') At the time of embarkation, virtually all motor transport equipment was brought up to table of allowance strength.

(d) Engineer -

(1') Information available for engineer planning was meager. This was due to the lack of information regarding damage to the city of NAGASAKI caused by the atomic bomb.

(2') Inasmuch as all organizational equipment of the Engineer Battalion was to be embarked, this battalion was prepared to execute any mission for which it might be designated.

(e) Transport Quartermaster -

(1') A school for unit transport quartermasters was conducted under the direction of the Division Transport Quartermaster. As a result, all units had officers trained in transport quartermaster duties for the preparation of loading plans and supervising of loading.

(2') Shipping allocations for mounting the Division were not made available until six (6) days before the commencement of embarkation. The limited time available was a distinct handicap in the planning of the loading.

(f) Shore Party and Ships' Platoons -

(1') Prior to embarkation, the Division Shore Party was organized from the Second Pioneer Battalion and the 43d Naval Construction Battalion to form two (2) shore party groups of three (3) teams each. The Pioneer Battalion, trained in shore party operations and organized to function as the nucleus of a Division shore party, formed one (1) shore party group. The 43d Naval Construction Battalion, trained in shore party operations prior to attachment to this Division, formed the second shore party group. Communication, medical evacuation and military police personnel were provided by the 2d Assault Signal Company, 2d Medical Battalion and 2d Military Police Company.

(2') Provisions were made for cargo handlers aboard ships (ships' platoons) to be provided from troops embarked aboard each ship on the basis of four (4) officers and eighty (80) enlisted on each AKA or APA, two (2) officers and twenty (20) enlisted on each LST, and one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted on each LSM.

(2) Supplies and Equipment -

(a) This Division arrived in NAGASAKI on 23 September, 1945, with the following quantities of supply:

Class I	30 days supply
Class II	30 days supply
Class III	15 days supply
Class IV	30 days supply
Class V	3 U/F (AFPAC)

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PART I - COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT (CONT'D).

Arrival of initial resupply shipping was as follows.

Class I	11 October
Class II	29 October
Class III	11 October
Class IV	29 October

(b) Although this Division has never suffered from an acute shortage of vital supplies, the status of resupply has been somewhat less than adequate. Unexpected delays in arrival of resupply shipping resulted in critical shortages of certain items of Classes II and III, principally housekeeping supplies and white gasoline. Lack of balance and variety in resupply shipments of Class I has resulted in shortages of some foods needed to provide varied menus. At times only six (6) of the usual fifteen (15) varieties of meat products in the "B" type rations have been available. Practically no fresh provisions were received during the first two (2) months of occupation. Some supplies, notably construction materials for repairing housing facilities and powdered bleach for water purification were requisitioned from Japanese sources.

(c) Adequate engineering equipment is available to perform all light construction and repair tasks which have been assigned. The engineer units are organized for combat tasks and are therefore not fully prepared to expeditiously perform large construction projects.

(d) The motor transport equipment situation is satisfactory. The attachment of an Army Quartermaster truck company has augmented the organic divisional motor transportation to such an extent that each regimental combat team is provided with a much needed truck company, and sufficient transportation remains to render adequate support to ship unloading activities.

(e) The nature of the mission of this Division has required a considerable movement of troops from the NAGASAKI area to other localities. Troop movements have been successfully executed through the use of existing rail and water transportation facilities. Overland movement of troop units by vehicles has been necessarily reduced to a minimum in view of inadequate roads and bridges to support heavy traffic.

(f) Adequate logistical support of units outside the NAGASAKI area has been maintained principally by rail and by water. These lines of supply have been found sufficient to meet all supply requirements of the units concerned.

(Over)

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h. Special features -

(1) Naval Gunfire -

(a) Naval Gunfire personnel were trained by the Naval Gunfire Training Section at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters.

(b) Plans were made for Naval Gunfire Support of this Division in accordance with Annex (C) to Operation Plan No. 2-45, Fifth Amphibious Corps. However, as a result of the peaceful attitude of the Japanese, the plan was modified by Commander Task Group 54.1 cancelling all ship assignments, fire support areas and zones of responsibility.

(c) When elements of this Division initiated landings at NAGASAKI, Naval Gunfire Support was available on call, under the control of Commander Task Group 54.3. Three (3) destroyers and one (1) cruiser were available.

(d) The Naval Gunfire Control net was secured at 1545 on A-1 Day (23 September, 1945) when it became apparent that there was no need for Naval Gunfire Support.

(2) Air Support -

(a) The first information as to the probable air support task organization for the operations was outlined in Annex (C) to Operation Plan No. 2-45, Fifth Amphibious Corps, and dated 7 September, 1945. The anticipated task force consisted of approximately eighteen (18) VF and twelve (12) VTB type aircraft to be available for A-Day strikes.

(b) On A-Day, Division SAR and SAO nets were opened with CTF 54.1.10 at 0930. No CAP was on station over target. All Air Support nets were secured at 1500 on A-Day. No requests for Air Support were received from Division units and no requests were made to COMASCU - 9.

(3) Artillery -

(a) Planning for the scheduled assault on Japan did not reach regimental level prior to the time that the assault was cancelled. Training, however, coincided with other Division training. The Tenth Marines were organized with one (1) battalion of 155mm howitzers and three (3) battalions of 105mm howitzers. While the Division was on SAIPAN, firing could be conducted by only one (1) battery at a time and this firing was confined to an extremely small area. Conditions were so congested that it became obvious that no artillery unit could possibly train satisfactorily on SAIPAN. To accomplish necessary service practices it was decided to attempt to conduct battalion service practices on some nearby sparsely inhabited island and a regimental practice in conjunction with Fifth

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PART I - COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT (CONT'D).

Amphibious Corps artillery on GUAM. As a result of this fact the S-3 of the Tenth Marines and the G-3 of the Division made an aerial reconnaissance of the Northern MARIANAS in early July. This reconnaissance indicated that AGRIHAN ISLAND offered some possibilities for artillery training. The matter was discussed with COMMARIANAS and authority granted to make a ground reconnaissance of the area under consideration. A reconnaissance party sailed for AGRIHAN on 14 July and returned on 21 July. The Second and Third Battalions of the Tenth Marines sailed for AGRIHAN on 30 July, conducted battalion firing problems thereon, and returned to SAIPAN on 16 August. Before further training could be conducted in this area the assault on Japan was cancelled and the Division artillery commenced training for the occupation of Japan. The Tenth Marines trained for the occupation along lines similar to the infantry organizations. Upon landing in Japan and finding no opposition likely, the Tenth Marine was assigned an area of responsibility and performed routine occupation duties.

(b) Had it been necessary for this Division to land in assault the artillery support would have been handicapped by two (2) factors. First, the artillery had insufficient opportunity to train and, second, the artillery had little or no opportunity to conduct firing problems in conjunction with the supported infantry.

(4) Intelligence -

(a) Mission - The change from plans for an invasion to plans for the occupation of Japan necessitated a considerable change in the mission assigned the intelligence agencies of this command. The primary mission of intelligence was redirected from securing purely combat intelligence to furnishing the intelligence necessary in establishing control of the Japanese armed forces and civil population and imposing thereon the prescribed surrender terms.

(b) Intelligence Plan - On the basis of this mission a G-2 Plan was completed, outlining the duties of the G-2 and S-2 Sections as specifically as possible, and directing their efforts towards securing information concerning:

(1') The status of demobilization and disarmament of the Japanese forces.

(2') Intelligence targets, i.e., military, civil and industrial installations, personalities, agencies, and records.

(3') Counterintelligence data.

(4') The general attitude of the civilian population

(c) Organization -- The G-2 Plan also included an explanation of the manner in which it was believed necessary to reorganize the G-2 Section to perform the mission with the personnel available:

(1') Operational Intelligence -- The administrative or office personnel of the G-2 Section were given the responsibility of collating, processing and disseminating the intelligence secured by all agencies. This included preparation of daily reports, maintaining lists of intelligence targets which had been examined or which should be examined, dispatching detachments for special or routine investigations of intelligence targets, checking Japanese information for accuracy, examining political and economic trends, etc.

(2') Language Section -- Anticipating the continuous and varied employment of the limited number of language personnel at the disposal of the Division, the Language Section was sub-divided into various specialty groups as follows:

(a') Order of Battle.

(b') Civil Intelligence.

(c') Military Intelligence.

(d') Technical Intelligence.

(e') Headquarters Pool

In addition two (2) language officers and one (1) enlisted man were attached to each combat team.

(3') The API Section -- This section was expected initially to process all aerial photographs received for unreported enemy information. API personnel were to be utilized in collating road, terrain, and defensive information. In addition, the section was assigned the responsibility of securing and distributing maps for the Division.

(4') The Scout and Observer Section -- It was planned to use the Scouts and Observers for maintaining the G-2 Radio Net, and for special patrolling and reconnaissance, etc.

(5') Counter-intelligence Corps Detachment -- The CIC Detachment was closely integrated with the functioning of the G-2 Section operating under instructions issued by higher headquarters.

(6') The Photographic Section -- The Photographic Section was assigned a considerable number of intelligence missions

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PART I - COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT (CONT'D).

in addition to those required by the Public Information Section. Complete coverage of all military installations and many civil targets was planned.

(7') The Mapping and Reproduction Section:- This group was prepared to provide the necessary revised mosaics, maps, and other material of like nature needed in preparation for and during the occupation.

(d) Functioning - In actual practice the plan and organization outlined above has proved extremely satisfactory with some changes. The orderly progression of the occupation, the greatly expanded zones of action of this organization, and practical experience in carrying out assigned missions have resulted in some modifications. Of these the following are most noteworthy:

(1') The Technical Intelligence Group was found unnecessary due to the appearance of specially trained Technical Teams from higher echelons.

(2') The lack of trained Language personnel and the constantly increasing demand for them necessitated that the Civil and Military Intelligence Groups be pooled and augmented with attachments from Corps. Personnel from either group has been used to perform any mission arising.

(3') Little use was found for the Scout and Observer Section, and the majority of the personnel have been used to augment the S-2 Sections of the Artillery Regiment.

(4') Although additional Language personnel have been assigned to the G-2 Section from Corps, the number available is still insufficient. This is particularly true since a number of the present personnel must be utilized for non-intelligence activities.

(5) Procurement -

(a) The Procurement Board was formed 24 September, 1945. The Board consisted of the G-4 as chairman, the Signal, Engineer and Medical Officers as members.

(b) On 1 October, 1945, a Secretary was added to the board. The Procurement Board was re-organized on 8 October, 1945. A Procurement Section was established consisting of a Lieutenant Colonel as Chief of Section, a Major as Executive Officer, a Captain in charge of the Real Estate Subsection, a Captain in charge of the Supply Subsection, a Transportation Subsection, and an Administrative Subsection.

(c) These subsections conducted surveys, investigated G-2 reports of critical material and maintained a continuous check on the Liaison Committee's ability to comply with demands. Many instances were found where the Prefectural Government was not as well informed as to the amount and location of materials in the Ken as was the Supply subsection of Procurement. This lack of information is attributed to the desire of the Government to avoid using the materials of large concerns such as Mitsubishi, Misui and Kawanami.

(d) Difficulty was encountered with the Mitsubishi interests in that they would obey the Government's orders only if they were a direct result of orders from the occupation forces.

(e) As of 31 October, 1945, the Division had procured from the Japanese Liaison Committee approximately \$24,000 worth of materials and \$10,000 worth of rentals.

(6) Inventory, safeguarding and disposition of surrendered material -

(a) Surrendered material of the Japanese Armed Forces in the area of responsibility of the Second Division was reported by location and inventory as required by the Terms of Surrender through the branch of the Japanese force having cognizance of such materials. These reports were initially consolidated by the G-2 section and published in the G-2 periodic report. Intelligence sections in each RCT area of responsibility then checked locations and inventories as far as possible.

(b) Initially, all items in the Nagasaki area that could be moved, were collected in warehouses pending further instructions for disposition. These warehouses were placed under guard and records kept of all items received. Upon landing, stores of surrendered material were under Japanese guards. As the occupation forces expanded in their areas of responsibility certain installations were taken over and placed under guard by occupation forces. At present some dumps are still under Japanese guard.

(c) Japanese inventories in general were found to be correct. Numerous dumps have been discovered through patrol activity of which no report was made by Japanese sources. In most cases it is believed that such errors were unintentional.

(d) On 25 October, 1945, a Disposition Section was organized in the Division and one in each RCT. These sections have been issued definite instructions in regard to disposing of all Japanese surrendered material.

(e) In general, all weapons and material made for combat only are being destroyed; those materials that have a civilian use are either used by the occupation forces or are returned to the Japanese to assist in the reestablishment of their civilian economy.

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PART I - COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT (CONT'D).

(f) At present, the processing and disposition of surrendered material is being effected by RCTs in the division area under current instructions and by the Disposition sections. Japanese labor, transportation and material are being used to effect disposition of all surrendered stores. The disposition sections supervise Japanese labor and render weekly reports of progress which are consolidated by the Division Disposition Section and forwarded to V Amphibious Corps.

(7) Military Government -

(a) During the planning stage, there were assigned to the division a special staff section of four military government officers. Just prior to embarkation from Seiban an army military government group was assigned to augment this staff section. This group consisted of eleven (11) officers having various specialist ratings but lacked all organization equipment and all enlisted personnel provided for in its table of organization. Upon landing and assuming occupational duties, it became almost immediately evident that a military government organization embracing a separate staff and operational group and divided in the particular specialist categories provided for in this group was not suited to efficiently meet the occupational situation encountered. Accordingly all available military government personnel were integrated into a single special staff section and assignments made to fields where the services of military government officers were needed without regard to previous classifications. As the area of actual occupation was enlarged and separate areas of responsibility assigned to the different regiments, separate military government groups were organized and attached to these units and areas. To enable this expansion, additional military government officers were assigned to the Division by the V Amphibious Corps so that the Division finally had a total of 35 such officers. These groups varied according to the particular needs of the unit and area and ranged from one to five (5) officers in each group. A specialist staff was maintained at Division Headquarters to exercise general supervision over these groups and insure uniformity of policy and operation. Because military government was to a large extent pioneering in the development of policies and methods of operation, the Division group continued to function as an operating group in regard to NAGASAKI KEN, in addition to carrying out its supervisory functions. In this way, it was possible for this group to develop operational technique and then direct the application of this technique by the subordinate groups. This experimentation was made necessary by the absence of specific operational directives from higher headquarters in the field of military government.

(b) Military government operations to date have in general related to the following matters:

(1') Utilizing the resources of the local community to meet the needs of the occupation forces. At the very start, this consisted of the procurement of coolie labor for unloading the ships, cleaning up the areas occupied by the troops, and similar tasks. Later, the demand steadily increased for skilled laborers, such as carpenters, glaziers, plumbers, roofers, electricians and the like. Great difficulty was initially encountered in securing the services of an adequate number of skilled workers. In order to more efficiently utilize the available skilled manpower, military government assumed the task of supervising projects as a whole, allocating previously procured materials and employing native architects and labor supervisors. During the greater part of this period, the occupation forces have employed in the NAGASAKI city area alone, from one to two thousand unskilled and from two to three hundred skilled workers daily. The units outside this area employ an equal or larger number of workers daily. In addition to supplying this labor directly through military government, the local prefectural government required the private corporations owning certain buildings in which our troops were located to provide additional labor to make such buildings habitable. Several hundred skilled workers were utilized daily under military government supervision on these projects.

(2') Improving the health conditions of the area so as to prevent the outbreak of any diseases which might injuriously affect our troops. This program included water purification, instituting and supervising proper waste disposal systems for garbage and night soil, supervising the setting up of a workable medical reporting system, and the fitting out of a demonstration hospital where local medical personnel will work under the direction and supervision of military government. To enable the working out of this extensive public health program, the division surgeon assigned additional personnel to work under the direction of the military government medical officer.

(3') Complete survey of the industrial establishments, governmental structure, public utilities and educational institutions of the area.

(4') Assisting in the rehabilitation of the local economic structure in line with policies laid down by SCAP. The fishing industry was re-established and operations started within ten (10) days of the landing of the occupation forces. Local transportation was revived, including both inland sea transport, rail and motor transport. Numerous industries, ranging from salt manufacture, food processing and clothing manufacture to ship construction were assisted to resume operations. Price control was exercised over all establishments patronized by members of the

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PART I - COMMANDING GENERAL'S BASIC REPORT (CONT'D).

occupation forces. Stores complying with all military directives were permitted to display signs denoting such approval. The rehabilitation of public utilities were supervised and assisted.

(5') Supervision of the legal system insofar as Japanese are charged with offenses against the occupying forces. Each case is individually investigated and disposed of only under the close supervision and direction of military government.

(6') Supervising the carrying out of SCAP directives and policies by the local government in connection with repatriation, education and similar fields. This involves checking all directives received by or made by the local prefectural governments, and also supervising the actual operations of the local authorities in carrying out these directives at ports of embarkation, in the schools and wherever such operations are carried out.

1. Conclusion -

(1) In reviewing the difficulties and problems which confronted this division on its arrival in JAPAN, there are a number of matters which are worthy of particular attention.

(2) The first is the behavior of the command as a whole. No attempt need be made to describe the feelings that would be normal to a division arriving in JAPAN on occupation duty and the behavior that such feelings might be expected to produce in a victorious army. However, it is a matter of record that instances of crimes against Japanese nationals were so few as to be astonishing. There are a number of reasons for this, one of course being the inability of the average American to commit such crimes in cold blood. In addition to that characteristic there was another very important reason, namely; specific training for occupational duties. It is believed that the schools which were held on the duties of an occupation force and the formation of one trained military police company in each regiment were in no small way contributing factors to the lack of crime during the occupation. These schools included military police duties, military discipline and courtesy, and a study of the Japanese people, customs and geography.

(3) Special mention should also be made of the work of the division medical personnel and the remarkably low incidence of sick - less than one (1) percent. Previous training, plus the initiative and energy of the medical staff, produced results. Confronted with bomb shattered cities, a bewildered population, contaminated water supply, endemic diseases, and the operation of

of two repatriation ports -- all the necessary items to produce an epidemic -- the medical corps turned to and did an outstanding job. The low sick rate, a potable water supply and the establishment of a Japanese hospital in NAGASAKI under division direction all speak for the way in which the job was done.

(4) The task of disposing of enemy surrendered material, an enormous one at best, was further complicated by the reduction of the effective strength of the division and the transfer home of key personnel. The number of dumps to be guarded placed a strain on the division which was alleviated to a degree by the use of Japanese guards. The use of Japanese guards with surprise visits by Marine patrols did much to save manpower and still permitted effective accomplishment of the job.

(5) Language personnel, as mentioned elsewhere in this report, were insufficient. When a division is scattered as this one necessarily has been it is obvious that more language personnel should be provided in order to carry out the job assigned most efficiently.

(6) A maximum use of Japanese facilities, labor, and governmental organization consistent with the situation at hand has been made as directed by SCAP. Unquestionably, the occupation has been simplified in this manner, and in general little trouble was experienced.

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ANNEY (A)

CCCUPATICNAL OPERATIONS REPORT

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Serial 00714

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 57

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
3 October, 1945.

Map: See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Cpn Plan No 14.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Cpn Plan No 14.

1. See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Cpn Plan No 14 and G-2 Studies and information issued separately.
2. 2d Mar Div, Reinf, at 0900, on 5 Oct 45, extend zone of responsibility to include OMUTA SHI and immediate vicinity and KUMAMOTO SHI and immediate vicinity, establish occupational control of OMUTA SHI, and initiate movement of occupation troops to KUMAMOTO, in order to further carry out the Enforcement of Surrender Terms. See Annex (A) (Operation Overlay).
3. (a) RCT 2 occupy assigned area of responsibility and continue to carry out assigned missions. Be prepared on order to occupy that area of responsibility now assigned to RCT 6.

(b) RCT 6 occupy assigned area of responsibility and continue to carry out assigned missions. Be prepared on order to move by ship from NAGASAKI Area. Assigned area of responsibility to be occupied by RCT 2 on order.

(c) RCT 8 at 0900, on 5 Oct 45, occupy OMUTA with a minimum of one (1) company, reinforced, and establish occupational control of OMUTA SHI and immediate vicinity; initiate movement of RCT 8, less one company, reinforced, to KUMAMOTO for the purpose of occupying KUMAMOTO SHI and immediate vicinity and carry out assigned missions.

(d) Arty Gp occupy the assigned area of responsibility and carry out missions previously assigned to RCT 8.

(e) 2d Tk Bn - Normal. Support RCT 2 on call in occupational duties.

(f) Engr Gp - Normal.

(g) Serv Trs - Normal.

(h) Div Trs - Normal.

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Operation Order

2d Mar Div No 87

- (x) (1) Continue reconnaissance throughout areas of responsibility and locate all installations or dumps of military nature not previously identified or located. Guard (if required by paragraph 3. (x) (2) below), inventory and report same.
- (2) Guard (continue guarding) any Japanese dump or installation of immediate or potential danger to our forces. Japanese guards will suffice when the installation has been rendered harmless (as in the case of Arty positions when breach blocks are in our custody, and small arms are removed).
- (3) Maintain surveillance over Japanese guards by patrol, or otherwise if required.
- (4) Maintain inventories and make surprise checks of items guarded by Japanese in order to insure the security of the guarded items.
- (5) Secure, inventory, and guard controlled items of Japanese equipment as follows:

Sabers, swords, pistols, watches, flags, binoculars. (This does not apply to personally owned watches).

Under no circumstances will these items be issued or disposed of.

- (6) Prepare and forward to this Headquarters lists (five (5) copies) of all Japanese installations, dumps, and guards on same within areas of responsibility, and show thereon the following:

Guarded by (Japanese Unit, Marine Corps Unit).
Under surveillance by (Patrol, Fixed Guard Post).
No guard (Reason no guard required).

These lists are to be compiled upon the initial locating of the installation or dump, and will be kept up to date by the prompt forwarding of current corrections.

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 57

(7) Neither civilians, nor their private dwellings will be searched except by Japanese Civil Police or on order of this Headquarters.

(8) Continue such activity relative to occupation, enforcement of surrender terms, and readiness for combat as laid down in 2d Mar Div Operation Plan No 14.

4. See Administrative Order No 58 and current instructions as issued.

5. (a) See Annex (H) (Signal Communication) to Opn Plan No 14.

(b) Command Posts:

2d Mar Div, Reinf	- Customs House, NAGASAKI. (94.5-62.2)
RCT 2	- Kamigo Barracks, NAGASAKI. (94.1-58.7)
RCT 6	- Mitsubishi Shipyard Office Building, NAGASAKI. (93.3-62.6)
RCT 8	- Communication Building, ISAHAYA Airfield. (16.4-75.5)
Arty Gp	- Naval Barracks, ISAHAYA Airfield. (16.3-75.1)
2d Tk Bn	- FUKIBORI. (91.1-55.5)
Engr Gp	- (94.85-61.45)
Serv Trs	- (94.05-61.1)
Div Trs	- (94.5-62.2)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. F. GOCD, JR.,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Annex:
(A) (Operation Overlay)

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 57

Distribution:

CG	-- 1	2d Tk Bn	- 1
G-1	-- 1	Div Hq Bn	- 1
G-2	-- 1	2d Engr Bn	- 1
G-3	-- 1	2d Pion Bn	- 1
G-4	-- 1	2d Serv Bn	- 1
Div Sig O	-- 1	2d Med Bn	- 1
Div Ord O	-- 1	2d MT Bn	- 1
Div QM	-- 1	43d MCB	- 1
Div Provost Marshal	-- 1	32d Inf Div	- 2
RCT 2	-- 5	5th Mar Div	- 2
RCT 6	-- 5	V Amph Corps	- 2
RCT 8	-- 5	War Diary	- 1
10th Mar	-- 6	F-I-L-E	- 10
Serv Trs	-- 2		

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div Co 57

ANNEX (A)
OPERATION OVERLAY

Map: Kwachin, 1/250,000, AMS LSVI, 1940.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. P. GOOD, JR.,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Opn Order No 57

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Serial 00716

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 58

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
in the field.
7 October, 1945.

Maps. See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Operation Plan No 14

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Operation Plan No 14.

1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Operation Plan No 14 and G-2 Studies and Information issued separately.
(b) Elements of the V Amphibious Corps continue to occupy additional areas and to enlarge that portion of KYUSHU under surveillance and control of occupation forces.
2. The 2d Mar Div, Reinf, in addition to developing the occupation of assigned areas of responsibility, will defend against and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy any hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:
 - (a) Maintaining at all times in each regimental area of responsibility a force of at least one (1) Battalion prepared to move on two (2) hours notice, with one (1) Company of such Battalion motorized, prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.
 - (b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the Division, a minimum of 75% of the command during hours of darkness.
 - (c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each separate billeting area, and area of responsibility.
 - (d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces, or prevent the execution of assigned missions.

For areas of responsibility, see Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order No 57.

3. (a) RCT 2 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone will be attached to RCT for execution of this plan.

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Operation Order

2d Mar Div No 58

(b) RCT 6 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone will be attached to RCT for execution of this plan.

(c) RCT 8 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All Troops within assigned zone will be attached to RCT for execution of this plan.

(d) Arty Gp will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone will be attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan. Be prepared to move as directed and to provide Arty support to elements of the Div on order.

(e) 2d Tk Bn attached to RCT 2 for execution of this plan.

(f) Engr Gp attached to RCT 2 and RCT 6 in accordance with the area of responsibility in which billets are located.

(g) Serv Gp attached to RCT 2 and RCT 6 in accordance with the area of responsibility in which billets are located.

(h) Div Trs attached to Arty Gp, RCT 2, and RCT 6 in accordance with the area of responsibility in which billets are located.

(x) (1 Plans will divide the areas of responsibility into sectors, and will show for each area of responsibility the following:

Sector responsibility.

Units retained within area of responsibility in accordance with this order.

Plan of billet defense.

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 58

(2) Regiments will be prepared to move on order to the support of other divisional units, and to this purpose will conduct reconnaissance of road nets throughout respective and adjacent areas of responsibility.

(3) Plans to be submitted to this Headquarters prior to 12 October, 1945, and rehearsal of defense plans to be commenced by that date, and continued weekly thereafter.

(4) Where rehearsals of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese nationals to become unduly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of the drill.

4. See Administrative Order No 58 and current instructions as issued.
5. See Operation Order No 57.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUHAN,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

CG	- 1	RCT 2	- 5	2d Serv Bn	- 1
G-1	- 1	RCT 6	- 5	2d Med Bn	- 1
G-2	- 1	RCT 8	- 5	2d MT Bn	- 1
G-3	- 1	10th Mar	- 6	43d NCB	- 1
G-4	- 1	Serv Trs	- 2	32d Inf Div	- 2
Div Sig O	- 1	2d Tk Bn	- 1	5th Mar Div	- 2
Div Ord O	- 1	Div Hq Bn	- 1	V Amph Corps	- 2
Div CM	- 1	2d Engr Bn	- 1	War Diary	- 1
Div Pro Mar	- 1	2d Pion Bn	- 1	F-T-L-E	- 10

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 59

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
11 October, 1945.

Maps: See Annex (A) (Intelligence) (to be issued).

TASK ORGANIZATION

2d Mar Div, Reinf - Maj Gen HUNT, USMC.

(a) RCT 2 - Col GUTTS, USMC.

2d Mar (less Det as directed)
Co C 2d MT Bn
Co B 2d Med Bn
Co A 2d Engr Bn
1st Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
2d Tk Bn

(b) RCT 6 - Col WILLIAMS, USMC.

6th Mar
Co A 2d MT Bn
Co A 2d Med Bn
Co B 2d Engr Bn
3d Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
2d Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
2d Plat Sup Co 2d Serv Bn
2d Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
1 SP Com Party

(c) RCT 8 - Col McFARLAND, USMC.

8th Mar
Co E 2d MT Bn
Co E 2d Med Bn
Co C 2d Engr Bn
2d Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
Det 2d Mar as directed
Div Gen Co (less Det)

Det VAC Kill Conv Teams at:
KUMAMOTO
MIYAZAKI
KAGOSHIMA

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Operation Order

2d Mar Div No 59

(d) Arty Gp - Col CLARK, USMC.

10th Mar

2d Amph Trk Co

Co A 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)

1 SP Com Party

Det Div Rgn Co

(e) Engr Gp - Lt-Col PARTWITT, USMC.

2d Engr Bn (less Cos A, B and C)

43d NBC

1208th Engr (C) Bn (USA)

2d Pion Bn

2d Plat Bomb Disposal Co H&S Bn 740

(f) Serv Trs - Col MARTIN, USMC.

2d Serv Bn (less Dets)

4th Sep Ldry Plat

2d Med Bn (less Dets)

3d Plat 4th Salv Rep Co

2d MT Bn (less Dets)

3656th QM Trk Co (USA)

(g) Div Trs - Lt-Col BENNET, USMC.

Div Hq Bn (less Dets)

Co D 3d LP Bn (Prov)

2d Mar War Dog Plat

54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)

498th CIC B3 Det (Combat)

05d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Co

(h) VMO-2 - Capt LEPKE, USMC.

1. See Annex (A) (Intelligence) (to be issued) and G-2 Studies and Information issued separately.

2. The 2d Mar Div, Reinf, will:

(a) Continue execution of assigned missions in area now occupied;

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 50

(b) At 0700 on 11 October, extend zone of responsibility to include all of Southern KUSHU, less areas assigned KANOKA Occupation Force, and initiate patrol surveillance of entire assigned area;

(c) Establish at MIYAZAKI and at KAGOSHIMA, capitals of KENS, Marine Detachments commanded by a field officer representing the Commanding General, 2d Mar Div, in carrying out assigned missions;

The above in order to further carry out the enforcement of Surrender Terms.

For areas of responsibility see Annex (B) (Operation Overlay).

3. (a) ROTC 2 -

(1) Continue to carry out previously assigned missions.

(2) Provide supervisory personnel at NAGASAKI, port of entry of repatriated Japanese Nationals, and conduct check for weapons, loot and excess food.

(b) ROTC 6 - Continue to carry out previously assigned missions.

(c) ROTC 8 -

(1) Continue to carry out previously assigned missions.

(2) On order, extend area of responsibility to include KUMAMOTO KEN, MIYAZAKI KEN and KAGOSHIMA KEN (less areas assigned KANOKA Occupation Force) and initiate patrol surveillance of this area.

(3) Establish detachments at MIYAZAKI and at KAGOSHIMA, capitals of KENS, to represent the Commanding General, 2d Mar Div, in carrying out assigned missions. MIYAZAKI Detachment to be made up of Detachment of ROTC 2 attached to ROTC 8.

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Operation Order

2d Mar Div No 59

(4) Assume command of VAC Mil Govt units previously established at KUMAMOTO, MIYAZAKI and KAGOSHIMA.

(5) Provide supervisory personnel at KAGOSHIMA, port of entry of repatriated Japanese Nationals, and conduct check for weapons, loot and excess food.

(6) Initially coordinate surveillance of area of Southern KYUSHU assigned KANOYA Occupation Force with CO that force. Prepare to assume operational control of that force on order.

(d) Arty Gp - Continue to carry out previously assigned missions.

(e) Engr Gp - Continue normal missions.

(f) Serv Trs - Continue normal missions.

(g) Div Trs - Continue normal missions.

(h) VMO-2 - Continue normal missions. Conduct reconnaissance of airfields in Southern KYUSHU on order, and as directed by this Hq.

(x) (1) Special emphasis will be placed on prevention of looting and the maintenance of a high standard of sanitation.

(2) Commanders concerned will exercise surveillance of areas of responsibility by judicious use of patrols. Minimum patrol strength beyond range of immediate support; one (1) platoon.

(3) Japanese authorities will be required to maintain adequate guards on installations, dumps, and equipment except those involving prescribed items which require direct control by occupation forces. See Annex (A) (Intelligence).

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 59

(4) For missions relative to enforcement of Surrender Terms, see Annex (D) (Enforcement of Surrender Terms) to 2d Mar Div Operation Plan No 14.

(5) Annex (C) (Implementation of SCAP Directive to Japanese Government dated 4Oct45) will be initiated by inspection of all prisons and places of detention, within assigned areas and by assumption of control of all records of organizations abolished under terms of that directive. Any effort in the part of any individuals or organizations to circumvent the directive will be immediately reported to this Hq.

(6) Task Group Commanders will keep this Hq advised of projected movements.

4. See Administrative Order No 59 and current instructions as issued.

5. (a) See Annex (D) (Signal Communication) (to be issued).

(b) Command Posts:

2d Mar Div, Reinf	- Customs House, NAGASAKI (1204.50-1062.20)
RCT 2	- Yamigo Barracks, NAGASAKI (1204.10-1058.70)
RCT 6	- Mitsubishi Shipyard Office Building, NAGASAKI (1203.32-1062.56)
RCT 8	- KUMAMOTO (1381.90-1077.00)
Arty Gp	- Naval Barracks, ISAWAYA Airfield (1316.30-1075-10)
2d Tk Bn	- FUKIYORI (1291.30-1055.60)
Engr Gp	- NAGASAKI (1296.15-1063.40)
Serv Trs	- NAGASAKI (1294.05-1061.10)
Div Trs	- Customs House NAGASAKI (1204.50-1062.20)

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 59

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUNEAN
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Annexes:

- (A) - Intelligence (to be issued).
- (B) - Operation Overlay.
- (C) - SCAP Directive to Japanese Government dated 4Oct45.
- (D) - Signal Communication (to be issued).

Distribution:

CG	- 1	RCT 2	- 5	2d Serv Bn	- 1
G-1	- 1	RCT 6	- 5	2d Med Bn	- 1
G-2	- 1	RCT 8	- 5	2d MT Bn	- 1
G-3	- 1	10th Mar	- 6	43d NCB	- 1
G-4	- 1	Serv Trs	- 2	32th Inf Div	- 2
Div Sig O	- 1	2d Tk Bn	- 1	5th Mar Div	- 2
Div Ord O	- 1	Div Hq Bn	- 1	V Amph Corps	- 2
Div QM	- 1	2d Engr Bn	- 1	War Diary	- 1
Div Pro Mar	- 1	2d Pion Bn	- 1	Mil Govt Det	- 1
Procurement Board	- 1	Mil Govt Det	- 1	F I L E	-10

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Operation Order
2d Mar Div No. 59

ANNEX (A)

INTELLIGENCE

Maps: Map of KYUSHU, Scale 1:250,000, AMS L571, August, 1945.

1. Summary of Enemy Situation.

(a) See:

(1) CINCPAC-CINCPOA Information Bulletin No. 132-45, Northern KYUSHU.

(2) CINCPAC-CINCPOA Information Bulletin No. 21-45, Southern KYUSHU.

(3) A-2, 2d Mar Div Order of Battle Information, Division Zone of Responsibility, dated 17 October, 1945, (Appendix No. 1, hereto).

(4) A-2 Plan, 2d Mar Div, dated 8 September, 1945.

(5) A-2, 2d Mar Div, Periodic Reports as issued.

2. Essential Elements of Information

(a) Determine the location, type, amount and accessibility of all military, naval, and air force installations, materiel and equipment to be turned over to the Occupation Forces within the Division Zone of Responsibility.

(b) Determine the name, code name or number, war time and present strength, location, chain of command, T/O, T/A, and T/E, names of Commanding Officers and other personalities, and the mission of all military, semi-military, secret and terroristic units.

(c) Determine the number of Japanese officers and men demobilized daily within assigned zone of responsibility.

(d) Determine the location, type, personnel employed, products and activities, now and during the war, of all civil installations engaged in or connected with the war effort.

(e) Determine if all military materiel and equipment in the hands of civilians and civilian institutions have been collected by the local authorities.

(f) Determine the names, addresses and present and previous occupations of all personnel dismissed from governmental

Operation Order

2d Mar Div No. 59 (Annex (A) - Intelligence).

office since 1 October, 1945.

(g) Determine the name, occupation, race, age, nationality, and charges against any political prisoner of JAPAN who was under protection and surveillance, or detention and imprisonment, and released since 1 October, 1945.

(h) Investigate prominent civil and military personalities for strategic intelligence information.

(i) Determine the general attitude of service and civilian personnel, with respect to cooperation, and acquiescence to surrender terms, or attempts at evasion or violation of Allied requirements.

3. Intelligence Missions:

(a) General Instructions.

(1) All units will:

a. Secure, investigate and confirm the information listed in paragraph 2, above, within assigned zones of responsibility.

b. Institute thorough patrolling within assigned zones of responsibility to locate, examine and seize any military, naval, or air force installations, equipment, or material not reported by the Japanese.

4. Measures for Handling Prisoners, Captured Documents and Material:

(a) Interrogation and evacuation:

(1) The assignment of temporary numbers and the custody and transportation of prisoners are the responsibility of the Provost Marshall.

(2) Language Personnel will assist the Provost Marshall in the preparation of POW and/or other tags, and in the compilation of rosters, in the capacity of interpreters only.

(3) Prisoners will be segregated as follows:

a. Military personnel:

(1) Commissioned.

Operation Order
3d Mar Div No. 59 (Annex (A) - Intelligence).

(2') Non-commissioned.

(3') Enlisted.

b. Irregulars (armed and semi-armed military civilians).

c. Civilian suspects (persons suspected of executing or contemplating overt or hidden resistance to the occupation, whether as individuals or members of societies).

d. Internees (civilians held solely for the military or technical information they possess).

e. Others (persons apprehended for resistance, disorderly or illegal acts, or other reasons not included in (c)).

(4) The primary objectives of interrogation will be, in the order of priority:

a. To determine the presence and location of Japanese military forces, equipment and supplies in the area.

b. To determine the presence of elements and activities which constitute a potential threat to orderly occupation.

c. To determine the organization and functions of police and other governmental agencies.

(5) The following types of persons will be interrogated as a matter of routine:

a. Selected Army, Navy, and Civilian personnel or disarmed Japanese possessing tactical and OOB information, and data pertinent to the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese forces.

b. Japanese Army, Navy and civilian personnel possessing information of possible CIC interest.

c. Suspects, either civilian or military, such as members of the Black Dragon and terrorist societies or other groups thought to contemplate sabotage or secret resistance to the occupation.

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d. Key personnel of police and governmental agencies.

e. Technical, scientific, economic, financial, etc., experts.

(6) Occupation units will normally interrogate only persons thought to have information of immediate bearing on the mission of the echelon concerned. Names, positions, and locations of other selectees for detailed interrogation in the categories listed above will be reported promptly and regularly to G-2.

(7) Interrogation processes will conform to instruction and guides to be issued at a later date.

(b) Documents and technical materiel:

(1) For the purposes of the occupation phase, documents shall include any and all types of files, records and plans of military, police, governmental, industrial research, and economic organizations and agencies, as well as records of political associations, institutes and societies, military, civil and industrial and scientific studies, manuals and instructions, code books and procedures of military or civilian communications units or departments, diaries and logs of military personnel or units and of scientific and industrial research activities; sketches, blueprints and diagrams of military and industrial installations, equipment and processes, technical photographs, microfilm, and motion pictures; and any other written or reproduced material which may contain information relative to any phase of the Japanese war effort and to the present status of the nations military, industrial, scientific, and political activities. Technical materiel includes all weapons, munitions, aircraft, vessels, vehicles, optical equipment, radio and electric equipment, chemical equipment, and machinery of whatever nature employed by the military forces; and industrial and laboratory equipment, machinery and installations, samples, specimens, experimental models, devices of whatever nature employed in production and research by any agency associated with the military forces.

(2) Files, records and all other documents in any quantity, and technical materiel of any type will not be removed from the location where found until examined

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by a qualified Language Officer. Locations of such items will be reported to G-2 as rapidly as possible. Installations containing such items will be placed under guard until final disposition has been made by or through this Headquarters.

(3) The personal appropriation of documents or technical materiel is strictly forbidden. Seizure of documents and materiel may consist of either removal or leaving in place under guard. All documents and materiel seized must be safeguarded.

a. For list of controlled items see paragraph 2 to Appendix (II) to Annex (J) to 2d Mar Div Adm O No. 58-45.

(4) Documents will be selected for immediate exploitation on the basis of their estimated importance to:

- a. Operational intelligence, for information of tactical importance concerning the general Japanese military situation.
- b. Intelligence planning, for information required to prepare for the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese military forces.
- c. OOR for data on the locations, strengths, equipment and materiel of the Japanese military forces.
- d. Technical intelligence, for information on secret, new or experimental weapons, equipment and materiel.
- e. CIC and Military Government, for information required by these agencies in their establishment of Allied control.
- f. Military Intelligence Research, for information necessary to confirm or modify previous intelligence estimates.

(5) Special effort will be made to secure all documents relating to the following:

- a. Japanese military, semi-military and military-supervised organizations.

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b. Scientific and research organizations sponsored by or working for the Japanese government or the military.

c. All police organizations, including security and political police.

d. Important economic and industrial organizations.

e. Institutes, bureaus and agencies devoted to racial, political and similar nationalistic research, education or propaganda.

f. Agencies and persons responsible for war crimes and atrocities.

(6) Documents of purely CIC interest will be made available promptly to CIC, who subject to authorization from G-2, may freeze such documents.

(7) All intelligence agencies searching for documents will maintain records of the nature, quantity and location of the types of documents listed in 4 above which they may discover in the course of their search.

(8) Documents required by the various Japanese governmental agencies, by essential services and by military organizations for administrative purposes pending demobilization will remain accessible to the Japanese authorities concerned even after seizure.

(9) Only documents of immediate general importance to the occupation forces will be forwarded to G-2. They will be forwarded promptly and regularly. Such documents include:

a. All information on Japanese military units and agencies in the area.

b. Information on secret and experimental weapons.

c. Information on individuals, groups, and associations which furnish a potential threat to peaceful occupation.

(10) Documents confiscated and removed shall insofar as possible be kept intact in the order in which they are found, technical documents dealing with any piece of

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equipment or machinery will not be separated from the material to which they refer.

(11) Documents which are not of immediate general importance to the occupation forces will be screened on the spot. A document report covering the general categories of the documents, place of location, and means of guarding will be forwarded to G-2.

(c) Miscellaneous:

(1) War Trophies:

a. See Appendix II to Annex JIG to 2d Mar Div Admin O No. 58-45.

(2) Intelligence Credential Cards:

a. Members of Intelligence Sections within the V Amphibious Corps will have in their possession at all times "OFFICIAL EXAMINER" Cards. These cards will be honored by all units of this Command and entitle the duly identified bearer the privilege of searching for and examining intelligence material.

b. Selected Technical Intelligence personnel within the V Amphibious Corps have been issued "OFFICIAL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE" Passes. These passes will likewise be honored by all units of this Command, and entitle the duly identified bearer the privilege of searching for, examining, and collecting intelligence material upon proper receipting for the collected articles.

c. Bearers of "OFFICIAL EXAMINER" and "OFFICIAL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE" Passes must carry a 2d Mar Div Duty Pass in all cases where for intelligence material is being searched for, examined or collected in restricted areas.

5. Maps and Photographs:

(a) Maps, photographs and other materiel will be issued without request. Additional information will be disseminated as it becomes available. Special distributions may be requested of G-2.

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(1) Strategic Maps:

- a. Japan Road Map, 1:1,000,000, (AMS, 1945).
- b. Kyushu, 1:500,000 (AFFAC L471) (2nd Edition) July 1945.
- c. VAC Occupational Zone, 1:500,000, (Repro. Topo. Co., V Amphib. Corps).
- d. Central Japan, 1:250,000, (AMS L571 1944).
- e. Northern Kyushu, 1:100,000, (Repro. Topo. Co., V Amphib. Corps).
- f. Mileage Table and Route Map for Island of Kyushu, (no scale), (Repro. Topo. Co., V Amphib. Corps), 15 Oct. 1945.

(2) City and Town Plans:

- a. Omuta City Plan, 1:10,000, (AMS 1944).
- b. Kagoshima City Plan, 1:17,500, (Approx), (Repro. Topo. Co., VAC), 1945.
- c. Isshaya City Plan, 1:10,000, (AMS, 1944).
- d. Kumamoto City Plan, 1:12,500, (AMS, 1944).
- e. Omura City Plan, (2 sheets), 1:10,000, (Repro. Topo. Co., VAC).
- f. Nobeoka City Plan, 1:12,500, (AMS 1945).
- g. Nagasaki (revised) City Plan, 1:12,500, (G-2, 2nd Mar Div), 1 Oct. 1945.
- h. Miyazaki City Plan, 1:25,000, (copy of captured Japanese Map), (G-2, 2nd Mar Div).

(3) Aerial Mosaic:

- a. Uncontrolled Mosaic of Miyazaki, 1:13,000, (G-2, 2nd Mar Div) October, 1945.

c. Counterintelligence Measures:

(a) General:

- (1) See paragraph VII, Div Gen C No. 32-45; Intelligence Doctrine, SOP.

(b) Counterintelligence Corps personnel:

- (1) See Appendix No. 4 to Annex (A) to 2d Mar Div Opn Plan No. 14-45, Counterintelligence.

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Public Information:

(1) Public Information functions will be conducted in accordance with the policies of CINCPOA. All elements will accord to the accredited press and radio representatives, both organic and attached every practicable facility.

(2) See Div Gen O No. 4-45, Public Relations SOP.

7. Reports and Distribution:

(a) Periodic Reports:

(1) S-2 Periodic Reports will be rendered daily to cover the period 1800-1800, and to reach G-2 as soon as practicable. (For form, type and amount of information to be included in the S-2 Periodic Report, see Appendix (II) hereto.

(b) Weekly report:

(1) Weekly reports from all S-2's will be sent to G-2 via electrical means each Friday to reach G-2 not later than 1800. These weekly reports will contain the following information:

a. Total number of Japanese troops who have surrendered individually or in groups during the week.

b. Total number of Japanese troops disabled and made prisoners during the week.

c. Weekly and cumulative totals of a and b above.

(c) Special reports:

(1) All S-2's will submit special reports on the following information to G-2:

a. Location, description, and inventory of stocks of gold, silver, platinum and foreign currencies found in military or naval installations.

b. Location, description and inventory of all types of Japanese maps.

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c. Reports on all Chinese Nationals in Regimental Zone of responsibility, to include place of origin, North, South or Central China.

d. Report of confiscation of all monetary and other negotiable assets documents, pictorial records and film suspected or known to belong to the Nazi party, now in hands of German Nationals.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUHAN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

References:

- (I) - G-2, 2d Mar Div Order of Battle Information, Division Zone of Responsibility, dated 17 October, 1945.
- (II) - Form and Type of Information Required in G-2 Periodic Reports.

Distribution:

See Annex (X) (Distribution)

OFFICIAL:

JUHAN

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SECRET

Serial 00721
SECRET

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APPENDIX (A)

ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION

O.C.B. OF JAPANESE ARMY GROUND FORCES.

Unit Location August 15th	Probable Loca- tion Oct. 10th	Former Strength Sep. 26th	Present Strength Oct 1st Oct. 10th
25th Div. MIYOKOMOJO Area	KOSAYASHI	16,568	15,739 ?
77th Div. HITOYOSHI Area	KASIMI	13,365	13,365 13,365
26th Div. IZUMI-SHIBUSHI Area.	OSUMI-KATSU- YAMA.	7,375	3,480 ?
146th Div. KAMURASAKI- CHIRIY Area	OKUCHI	2,940	2,140 ?
154th Div. TSUNO-TAKA-ABE Area.			
156th Div. MIYAZAKI Area	MIYAZAKI	16,200	16,200 ?
206th Div. KOGOSHI Area	KOGOSHI	19,250	19,250 ?
212th Div. NOBOKA-TOBITAKA Area.	TSUNO	11,244	2,335 ?
216th Div. KUMAMOTO Area.	UTC	8,225	8,225 8,225
303rd Div. IZUMI-TAKANONO Area.	KAMUCHI	10,918	10,918 10,918
98th IAB KINOYA Area.	TAKAZAKI- NITA	5,638	5,638 ?
122nd IAB NAGASAKI Area.	NAGASAKI City.		145
125th IAB ONARON Area.	HITOYOSHI Area.	4,453	4,453 ?
126th IAB AMATUSA SHIMA	AMATUSA	7,513	7,513 ?

(A)(1) - 1

SECRET

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Order of Battle Information.

A.

KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE C.O.B.

(1) Breakdown of the larger Army forces as reported to VAC by the Japanese.

(a) 77th Division (Reported to be 15% demobilized as of 30Sep45)

UNIT	TOWN	GUN or SHI	STRENGTH (1Aug45)
Division Headquarters	IBENE	AIRA County	1,036
98th Infantry Regt	FUKUBA	AIRA County	3,081
99th Infantry Regt	ISHIHARA		3,081
100th Infantry Regt	KARAO		3,081
77th Cavalry Regt	KAGOSHIMA	KAGOSHIMA City	534
77th Mountain Arty Regt	YAPORUBOTA		1,540
77th Transport Regt	YOKOGAWA	AIRA County	749
77th Engineer Regt	FUJOTO	AIRA County	732
Anti-Tank Unit	MICHIBA (?)	AIRA County	463
Communication Unit	NAGAHARA	IZUMI County	239
Ordnance Duty Unit	SHIGETOMI	ISA County	81
Chemical Unit	SHI ONA		85
Medical Unit	SHI ONA		491
1st Field Hospital	YOKOGAWA	AIRA County	195
4th Field Hospital	NOBEKURA		200
Veterinary Hospital	TAWATARI	IBUSUMI County	52
		Division Total	15,640

(b) 86th Division (Reported to be 69% demobilized as of 30Sep45).

Division Headquarters	MATSUYAMA	SOO County	1,070
187th Inf Regt			3,081
188th Inf Regt	KOYAMA	SOO County	3,081
189th Inf Regt	KITAGATA	AIRA County	3,081
364th Inf Regt			3,207
765th Ind Inf Bn			897
766th Ind Inf Bn			897
767th Ind Inf Bn			897
86th Field Arty Regt			1,108
86th Engineer Regt			732
86th Transport Regt			749
Anti-Tank Unit	NAKARA		480
Communication Unit			239
Ordnance Duty Unit			81
Chemical Unit	IWAKAWA	SOO County	85
Medical Unit			491
1st Field Hospital			195
4th Field Hospital			200
Veterinary Hospital			52
		Division Total	20,823

(A) (I) - 2

Division Total

20,823

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Order of Battle Information.

(c) 146th Division (Reported 87% demobilized)

UNIT	TOWN	CUN or SHI	Strength (1 Aug 45)
Division Headquarters	OKUCHI	ISA County	643
421st Inf Regt	IATSUZAKI	KAWANABE County	3,850
422d Inf Regt	INO		3,850
423rd Inf Regt	HIGASHIKARYU		3,850
424th Inf Regt	KAWABE		3,207
Arty Unit	KAWABE		508
Anti-Tank Unit	KAWANABE	KAWANABE County	484
Communication Unit	KAWABE		484
Transport Unit	KAWABE		235
Ordnance Duty Unit	KAWABE		108
Field Hospital	KAWABE		208
		Division Total	17,427

(d) 206th Division (Reported 18% demobilized)

Division Headquarters	KAWAUCHI	HIOKI County	1,041
510th Inf Regt	KAWAUCHI	HIOKI County	4,434
511th Inf Regt	TASHIGI	SENDAI City	4,434
512th Inf Regt	YUNOMOTO	HIOKI County	4,434
206th Mountain Arty Regt	YUNOMOTO	HIOKI County	2,496
206th Mortar Regt	TAKE-YOSHI	HIOKI County	1,666
Anti-Tank Unit	NOKUBI	" "	480
Chemical Unit	ISAKO	" "	1,187
Machine Gun Co.	SHIMOTAJIRI	" "	340
Engineer Unit	YUNOMOTO	" "	1,003
Transport Unit	GORIZUKA	" "	436
Communication Unit	YUNOMOTO	" "	298
Ordnance Duty Unit	YUNOMOTO	" "	112
Medical Unit			1,109
1st Field Hospital			277
2nd Field Hospital			277
4th Field Hospital	YUNOMOTO	HIOKI County	277
Veterinary Hospital			125
		Division Total	23,426

(e) 303rd Division (Reported 10% demobilized)

Division Headquarters	KAWAUCHI	HIOKI County	776
337th Inf Regt			3,042
338th Inf Regt			3,042
339th Inf Regt			3,042
Anti-Tank Unit			692
Engineer Unit			806
Communication Unit			280
Transport Unit			300
Field Hospital			232
		Division Total	12,212

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Order of Battle Information.

(f) Units presumed to be completely demobilized

UNIT	TOWN	GUN or SHI	Strength
4th Arty Command			119
9th Ind Field Arty Regt	IZAKU	HIOKI County	1,862
20th Heavy Field Arty Regt	ISHUIN	HIOKI County	700
28th Heavy Field Arty Regt (31 % demobilized)	OKUCHI	ISA County	2,286
44th Ind Heavy Arty Bn	SHISHILU		453
87th Machine Gun Bn			481
37th Tank Regt	TANO	SOO County	1,198
1st Special Guard Co	IZUMI		300
2nd Special Guard Co	MIZUHINI	SATSUMA County	300
3rd Special Guard Co	KAMAUCHI	HIOKI County	300
4th " " "	SHIMOKOSHIKI	SATSUMA County	300
5th " " "	ICHINI	KIMOTSUKI County	300
6th " " "	ISAKU	HIOKI County	300
7th " " "	KASEDA	KAWANABE County	300
8th " " "	IMAHARAKI	KAWANABE County	300
9th " " "	YAMAKAWA	IBUSUKI County	300
10th " " "	IWAKAWA	SOO County	300
11th " " "	KAGOSHIMA		300
12th " " "	HAYATO	AIRA County	300
13th " " "	ORUCHI	ISA County	300
14th " " "	KANOYA	KIMOTSUKI County	300
15th " " "	ONEJIME	KIMOTSUKI County	300
16th " " "	TAKAYAMA	ISA County	300
17th " " "	SHIBUSHI	SOO County	300
18th " " "	NAKATANE	SOO County	300

(g) Units partially demobilized (extent indicated by %)

21st Mortar Bn	KAGOSHIMA	KAGOSHIMA City	
24th Medium Mortar Bn (.5%)	KAWANABE	KAWANABE County	1,407
25th Medium Mortar Bn (.59%)	KASEDA	KAWANABE County	1,407
61st Machine Cannon Co (.8%)	CHIRAI		76
3rd Engineer Unit (.4%)	TAKARABE	SOO County	167
72nd Ind Engineer Bn (.30%)	TAKARABE	SOO County	814
82nd Ind Engineer Bn (.29%)	TAKARABE	SOO County	891
104th Ind Engineer Bn (.14%)	IJUN	HIOKI County	891
122nd Ind Engineer Bn (.41%)	KAGOSHIMA	KAGOSHIMA City	891
43rd Signal Regt (.5%)	IJUN	HIOKI County	1,891
60th Field Const. Bn (.16%)	SUEYOSHI	SOO County	304
65th Suicide Boat Bn (.4%)	GALC	AIRA County	96
Kagoshima Regt'l Headquarters			110
3rd Inf Repl Unit (.75%)			

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Order of Battle Information.

MIYAZAKI AREA C.O.B.

(1) A breakdown of army forces as reported to VAC by the Japanese.

(a) 25th Division (Hq in KOBAYASHI, NISHI MOROKATA GUN)

UNIT	TOWN	GUN	STRENGTH (1 Aug 45)
Division Headquarters	KOBAYASHI	NISHI-MOROKATA	1,033
14th Inf Regt	YAKAHARU	NISHI-MOROKATA	5,014
40th Inf Regt	YAKAHARU		5,014
70th Inf Regt	SADOHARA		5,014
75th Cavalry Regt	KOBAYASHI	ISHI-MOROKATA	1,048
15th Mountain Arty Regt	"	" "	3,076
25th Engineer Regt.	"	" "	913
25th Transport Regt	"	" "	3,593
Medical Unit	"	" "	1,109
Chemical Unit	"	" "	227
Communication Unit	"	" "	239
Ordnance Duty Unit	"	" "	112
1st Field Hospital	"	" "	277
Veterinary Hospital	"	" "	239
Division Total			27,033

(b) 154th Division

Division Headquarters	TSUNA	KOYU GUN	643
445th Inf Regt			3,850
46th Inf Regt			3,850
47th Inf Regt			3,850
48th Inf Regt			3,850 (?)
Arty Unit			580
Anti-Tank Unit	TSUNA	KOYU GUN	484
Communication Unit	"	" "	235
Transport Unit	"	" "	486
Ordnance Duty Unit	SUGIYASHI		108
Field Hospital			208
Division Total			18,072 (?)

(c) 156th Division (Reported 41 demobilized. Division Total 16,894)

Division Headquarters	MIYAZAKI	MIYAZAKI City	113
453rd Inf Regt	SUMIYOSHI	MIYAZAKI County	3,850
454th Inf Regt	MIYAZAKI	" "	3,850
455th Inf Regt	MIYAZAKI	" "	3,850
456th Inf Regt	MIYAKE	HIGASHI-MOROKATA County	3,207
Arty Unit			508
Anti-Tank Unit	SHIMIZOSHI	MIYAZAKI County	484
Communication Unit	HONJO	HIGASHI-MOROKATA County	235
Transport Unit	YAKAHARU	" "	481
Ordnance Duty Unit	HONJO	" "	108
Field Hospital			208

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Order of Battle Information.

(d) 212th Division (Reported 90% demobilized)

UNIT	TOWN	GUN	Strength (1 Aug 45)
Division Headquarters	TSUNO	KOYU GUN	1,041
516th Inf Regt	TSUNO	" "	4,434
517th Inf Regt	SHINCHAYA	" "	4,434
518th Inf Regt	TATENO		4,434
Chemical Unit	TSUNO	KOYU GUN	187
212th Mountain Arty Regt	TSUNO	" "	2,496
212th Motor Regt	KIWADA	" "	1,666
Anti-Tank Gun Unit			480
Machine Gun Co			340
Engineer Unit	HIRAYAMA	KOYU GUN	1,003
Communication Unit	TSUNO	" "	298
Transport Unit			436
Ordnance Duty Unit			112
Medical Unit			1,109
1st Field Hospital			277
2nd Field Hospital			277
4th Field Hospital			277
Division Total			23,426

(e) 136th AA Regt (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by %)

UNIT	TOWN	GUN	Strength
33rd Ind Machine Cannon Co	MIYAKONOJO	KITA-MOROKATA GUN	138
55th Ind AA Co	"	"	162
56th Ind AA Co	"	"	162
21st Ind Machine Cannon Co	"	"	1,075
24th Ind Machine Cannon Co	"	"	144
27th Ind Machine Cannon Co	"	"	144
31st Ind Machine Cannon Co	"	"	138
32nd Ind Machine Cannon Co	"	"	138
12th Ind Machine Cannon Co	MITTABARA	MIYAZAKI GUN	144
1st Arty Command Hq (6%)	* KURONOKI	KOYU GUN	177
6th Arty Intelligence Regt	* KUBOTSUCHI	MIYAZAKI GUN	637 (1%)
13th Field Heavy Arty Regt	* YASUHISA	" "	1,669
54th Field Heavy Arty Regt	* YAFSUSA	KITA-MORAKATA GUN	
40th Heavy Arty Ind Bn	* HIROSE	MIYAZAKI GUN	392
43rd Heavy Arty Ind Bn	* UMEKITA	KITA-MORAKATA GUN	453 (.67)
5th Field Arty Bn	* GAIYOSHI	MIYAZAKI GUN	
7th Field Arty Bn	* SADONNARA	" "	
28th Ind Mtn Arty Bn	* TSUMA	KOYU GUN	528
4th Mortar Bn	* HIROSE	MIYAZAKI GUN	1,407 (8%)
20th Mortar Bn (15%)	* TAMIGUSHIRA	KITA-MORAKATA GUN	1,407
2nd Rocket Bn	* MIYAZAKI	MIYAZAKI SHI	845

* These Units are not under the 136th AA Regt.

Operation Order

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(f) Independent Units (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by *)

UNITS	TOWN	GUN or SHI	STRENGTH (1 Aug 45)
104th Ind Engineer Bn	IJUIN	HIOKI GUN	891
120th Ind Engineer Bn	MIYAKAMOJO	KITA-MORAKATA GUN	891
34th Ind I.T. Bn	SHONAI	" "	"
58th Ind I.T. Bn	KOBAYASHI	NISHI- "	808 (1%)
84th Ind I.T. Bn	SHONAI	KITA- "	808 (1%)
41st Signal Regt	SHONAI	" "	1,821 (1%)
43rd Signal Regt	IJUIN	HIOKA GUN	1,891 (5%)
65th LofC Sector Unit	KOBAYASHI	NISHI-MORAKATA	
4th Field Const Unit	SHONAI	KITA- " GUN	82 (2%)
45th Field Const Unit	SHONAI	" " "	
16th Field Duty Unit	YOSHIMATSU	HIGASHI " "	17
45th Land Duty Co	SHANONAI	KITA- " "	511
159th Land Duty Co	YATSUSHIRO	HIGASHI- " "	511
181st " " "	MIYAKAMOJO	KITA- " "	511
65th LofC Duty Co	KOBAYASHI	NISHI " "	203
3th Ind Auto Brigade	SHONAI	KITA- " "	145
32nd Suicide Boat Unit	TAIIGASHIRA	" " "	96

(g) Special Garrison and Guard Co (probably completely demobilize)

204th Special Garr Co	NOBEOKA	NOBEOKA City	126
205th Special Garr Co	ABURATSU	KINAMI NAKA GUN	126
1st Special Guard Co	NOBEOKA	NOBEOKA City	300
2nd " " "	AKAWA		300
3rd " " "	TAKACHIHO	NISHI-USUKI GUN	300
4th " " "	TAKAHASHI	HIGASHI-USUKI GUN	300
5th " " "	TAKANABE	KOYU County	300
6th " " "	TSUBA	" "	300
7th " " "	MIYAZAKI	MIYAZAKI City	300
8th " " "	KIYOTAKE	MIYAZAKI County	300
9th " " "	TAKAOKA	HIGASHI-MORAKATA GUN	300
10th " " "	KOBAYASHI	NISHI-MORAKATA GUN	300
11th " " "	TAKAJO	KOYU County	300
12th " " "	MIYAKAMOJO	KITA-MORAKATA GUN	300

(h) Miyazaki Regt (of the Kumamoto Repl Div)

Regimental Headquarters	MIYAZAKI	MIYAZAKI City	84
2nd Inf Repl Unit	MIYAKAMOJO	KITA-MORAKATA GUN	3,203

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- (1) Army Hospitals (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by %)

UNIT	TOWN	GUN or SHI	STRENGTH (1Aug45)
Army Hospital	KAWANAMI	KOYU GUN	94
11th LofC Hospital	TANO	" " (2%)	359
9th LofC Hospital	KOBAYASHI	NISHI Morankata GUN (2%)	359
Kagoshima Army Hospital			268

2. C.O.B. OF JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCES.

A. Army Air Bases in KAGOSHIMA Prefecture

- (1) BANSEI Airfield Unit (Reported 99% demobilized). Located in HIOKA County; strength as of 1Aug45 as follows:

Pilots	Trainers	Maintenance	AA Guard	Total
20	0	170	0	190

- (2) CHIRAN Airfield Unit (reported 99% demobilized). Located in KAWANABE County; strength as of 1Aug45 as follows:

Pilots	Trainers	Maintenance	AA Guard	Total
40	0	1,440	20	1,500

- (3) KANBYU Airfield Unit (Reported completely demobilized). Located in IBUSUKI County; consisted of 30 AA Guard Personnel.

B. Army Airfields in MIYAZAKI KEN

- (1) KARASEHARA Airfield Unit (reported 90% demobilized. Located in KOYU County.

Pilots	Trainers	Maintenance	AA Guard
0	0	0	150

- (2) KIWAKI Airfield Unit. Located in MIYAZAKI County.

Pilots	AA Guard	Total
12	15	27

- (3) MIYAKANOJO, East Airfield Unit (reported 97% demobilized. Located in MIYAKANOJO City.

Pilots	Trainers	Maintenance, all 3 fields	AA Guard
50	0	1080	50

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(4) MIYAKANOJO, West Airfield Unit. Located in MIYAZAKI City
(reported 79% demobilized).

pilots	AA Guard	Total
50	50	100

(5) NITTABARU Airfield Unit (reported 99% demobilized). Loca
ted in KOYU County.

Pilots	Maintenance	AA Guard	Total
24	1460	40	1,524

3. SASEBO NAVAL KEIBITAI LOCATIONS.

TAKESHITA TO UEKI - West Coast KYUSHU.

THIS IS AN INCOMPLETE LIST AND WILL BE CORRECTED PERIODICALLY, AS
NEW INFORMATION IS OBTAINED.

UNIT	KEN AND/OR GUN	HIGHER ECHELON	STRENGTH 14 Oct.	
TAKESHITA	NISHISONOKI GUN	SASEBO KEIBITAI	Offi 1	5 Men
	MATSUSHIMA			
SUTOHATA	NISHISONOKI GUN	" "		
	MATSUSHIMA		1	6
NOMOZAKI	NAGASAKI KEN			
	NISHISONOKI GUN	" "		1
KAPASHIMA	" "	" "	1	5
MOGI	" "	" "	1	5
TSUNABA	" "	" "		
FUNATSU	NAGASAKI KEN	" "		
	KITA GUN			4
UKI	NAGASAKI KEN			
	ISAHAYA - SHI	" "	1	5
AINO	NAGASAKI KEN	" "		4
	MINAMI-GUN			
CHIJITA	" "	" "	1	4
IMAYAMA	" "	" "		4
OKITSU	" "	" "		3
IMATOYAMA	" "	" "	1	6
TOIIOKA	KUMAMOTO KEN	" "		
KANESHIMA	" "	" "		
KOMATSUZAKI	KUMAMOTO KEN	" "		
	AMAKUSA GUN			
SURIGAHAMA	KAGOSHIMA KEN	" "		
	KIMOTSURI GUN			
NAGATANI	" "			
SAKANOTO	" "			
UEKI	KAGOSHIMA KEN			

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3. SASEBO NAVAL KEIBITAI LOCATIONS, (CONT'D).

UNIT	KEN AND/OR GUN	HIGHER ECHELON	STRENGTH 14 Oct.
MAKESHIMA	NAGASAKI KEN NISHISONOKI GUN	SASEBO KEIBITAI	1 Off. 10 Men
A A	" "	" "	6 "
KOMAGI	" "	" "	4 "
OMAO	" "	" "	
AKUOURA	" "	" "	
POKASUMACHI	" "	" "	
UNAGAMI	" "	" "	
ISAHAYA	NAGASAKI KEN ISAHAYA-SHI	" "	6 Men
KAGURA	" "	" "	
KANABUGAMA	" "	" "	
MATUSEHARA	" "	" "	

4. I.C.B. OF JAPANESE NAVAL GROUND FORCES.

a. Naval Forces in KAGOSHIMA Prefecture.

(1) Naval Ground Forces (Extent of demobilization indicated by %).

UNIT	TOWN	GUN	STRENGTH (1 Aug 45)
5th Special Attack Force Headquarters (70%)	SAKURA SHIMA	KAGOSHIMA	132
5th Assault Unit (99%)	TANI YAMA & KATA URA	KAWANABE	4,137
525th NCB (100%)	KAIKI	AIRA	388
526th NCB (100%)	SHIBUSHI Airfield	SOO	367
529th NCB (100%)	KUSHIHA Airfield	KIMOTSUKI	417
532d NCB (100%)	IBUSUKI	IBUSUKI	361
522 NCB (100%)	KASANOCHARA Airfield	KIMOTSUKI	589
525rd NCB (100%)	IZUMI Airfield	IZUMI	713
524th NCB (100%)	KOKUBA	AIRA	726
525th NCB (100%)	IBUSUKI	IBUSUKI	634
5211th NCB (100%)	KANOYA	KIMOTSUKI	1,013
5214th NCB (100%)	IWAKAWA Airfield	SOO	826
5217th NCB (100%)	KANOYA	KIMOTSUKI	757

b. Naval Ground Forces in MIYOZAKI KEN. (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by %).

35th Assault Unit	KOSOSHIMA	HIGASHI-USUKI GUN (93%)	2,186
526th NCB	MIYAZAKI	MIYAZAKI City (100%)	637
5212th NCB	ABURATSU	MIYAKI-NAKA COUNTY (100%)	790

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Mar Div No. 58 (Annex (A) - Intelligence - Appendix (I))

1. C.O.B. OF JAPANESE NAVAL AIR FORCES.

a. Report from VAC taken from 5th Air Fleet Report on demobilization status.

<u>BASE</u>	<u>TOTAL PERS</u> <u>DATE (?)</u>	<u>PRESENT STRENGTH</u> <u>SEPT. 29</u>
KANOYA	13,000	
KASANOHARA	200	900
KUSHIRA	1,500	
IWAKAWA	2,000	128
# 1. KOKUBU	2,000	100
# 2. KOKUBU	1,000	30
KOGOSHIMA	2,500	60
IZUMI	3,000	100
HITOYOSHI	1,200	50
MIYAZAKI	500	20
TOMITAKA	3,000	250
TANEKA SHIMA	600	600
OMURA	6,000	?
ISAHAYA	1,500	65
SHIMABARA	300	
UNZEN	200	0
MAKUSA	2,000	222

(1) Naval Air Bases in KAGOSHIMA KEN. (Extent of demobilized indicated by %).

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GUN or SHI</u>	<u>STRENGTH (1Aug45)</u>
KANOYA Airfield (99%)	KIMOTSUKI	13,210
KASANOHARA Airfield (93%)	"	1,404
KUSHIRA Airfield (87%)	"	3,790
IWAKAWA Airfield (99%)	SOO	2,121
KOKUBU Airfield #1 (96%)	AIRA	2,538
KOKUBU Airfield #2 (96%)	"	1,705
KAGOSHIMA Airfield (89%)	KAGOSHIMA City	2,569
IZUMI Airfield (95%)	IZUMI	4,028
SAKURA SHIMA Airfield (90%)	KAGOSHIMA	504

(2) Naval Air Bases in MIYAZAKI KEN. (Units partially demobilized extent indicated by %).

MIYAZAKI Airfield (89%)	MIYAZAKI City	571
TOMITAKA Airfield (96%)	HIGASHI-USUKI County	3,716

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APPENDIX (II)

FORM AND TYPE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED
IN S-2 PERIODIC REPORTS

1. The following form is to be used for S-2 Periodic Reports. Instructions concerning the type and amount of information required are contained herein:

Unit Heading

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S-2 Periodic Report

O. _____

Date

From: 1800I

To : 1800I

References: (a)

Enclosures: (A)

Map(s) :

1. Demobilization and disarmament.

(a) Japanese military units hitherto unreported, including regular and semi-military organizations such as home guard, civilian volunteer defense corps, military police etc. Information concerning these units should include location of headquarters, disposition, code name or number, war-time strength, present strength, number already demobilized, names of C.O.'s and staff officers, T/O's, T/A's and T/E's. If possible determine its plan for war including zone of responsibility, final defensive line, etc., and make a separate report. More detailed information concerning units already reported should also be included in this paragraph.

NOTE: When the information listed above is too lengthy to be included in the report proper, it should be attached to the report as an OCB Annex. and referred to in this paragraph as such.

(b) Japanese military units demobilized and disarmed during the period. Information should include number of personnel demobilized and disarmed, officer or enlisted, from what unit, former strength of unit, present strength of unit, names and ranks of demobilized personnel and their destinations, and from where demobilized.

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Appendix (II) - FORM AND TYPE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED IN S-2
PERIODIC REPORTS).

NOTE: If this information is too lengthy to include in the Periodic Report proper it should be attached as an OOB Annex and referred to as such in this paragraph.

(c) General attitude of military and semi-military units. Information includes extent of cooperation and acquiescence in surrender and demobilization terms. Specific and detailed reports will be made of acts of non-cooperation, attempts at evasion or concealment, sabotage or destruction of arms and equipment.

(d) Information includes: location, description, and inventory of ordnance, signal, quartermaster, engineer dumps, caches, or installations; of equipment in any factory, privately or government owned, which formerly produced, produces now or can produce material for war; of all stored equipment and materiel which was formerly used or can be used for war (i.e., items as food, clothing, transport, fuel, building materials, etc.); of weapons and military or factory equipment found in schools; and of any caches of gold, silver, platinum, or foreign currencies, etc.

NOTE: Above information may be attached as an enclosure if necessary and referred to as such in this paragraph.

2. Intelligence targets.

(a) Under surveillance (investigated)

Intelligence targets are defined as governmental and municipal buildings and agencies; army, air and naval headquarters; schools, experimental and research stations, and other similar military installations; and factories and plants engaged in work of possible intelligence interest. This information should be fairly brief but should include: nature of subject under investigation, name of subject, location, function in past and present, name of owner, superintendent or manager, present and planned (future) activities, state of equipment, state of ownership, government or military connection, and, in addition, in the case of a factory or plant, what it produced in wartime, what it plans to produce, output both past and present, and number employed both past and present.

(b) Not yet under surveillance.

Under this sub-paragraph should be listed those intelligence targets as defined above which have been located but not

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Appendix (II) - FORM AND TYPE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED IN 3-2
PERIODIC REPORTS).

investigated. They should be by name with location by city
or, in the case of a small town, by coordinates.

3. Counter-intelligence.

(a) Persons apprehended or interned.

Names of and other pertinent data concerning individuals
on suspect lists, war criminals and others who were apprehended
or detained during the period.

(b) Suspects.

Names of above (para 3. (a)) who have been located but
not yet apprehended, and names of suspects not previously
reported. Give reasons and details of latter.

(c) Subversive activities.

Espionage, sabotage and other subversive activities
detected during period giving details.

(d) Unfriendly organizations.

Location, general description, activities and principal
personalities of extremist, terrorist and espionage organizations
both military and civilian seized or located during the period.

(e) Miscellaneous.

Names, addresses and case history of former political
prisoners. Other miscellaneous data of counter-intelligence
interest.


4. Civilian population.

(a) General attitude, including extent of cooperation and
attempts at evasion or violation of Allied requirements,
acquiescence in surrender terms, political trends insofar as
they affect security, and evidence of unrest.

5. Miscellaneous.

(a) Any other matters of intelligence interest not specif-
ically covered by the preceding sub-divisions.

/s/ Signature.



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ANNEX (C)

SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

1. The SCAP Directive to Japanese Government dated 4 October 1945, attached hereto, constitutes Annex (C) to 2d Mar Div Operation Order No 59.


BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JAHAN,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Cpn C No 59.

OFFICIAL:



TAXIS

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SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 4OCT45

The following information originates from SCAP (addressed to Joint Chiefs of Staffs) and is quoted for your information and guidance. Message begins: The following directive was issued to the Japanese Government this date: Quote 1. "In order to remove restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties and discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion, the Imperial Japanese Government will:

(a) Abrogate operations of all provisions of all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations which:

(1) Establish or maintain restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government.

(2) Establish or maintain restrictions on the collection and dissemination of information.

(3) By their terms or their application, operate unequally in favor of or against any person by reason of race, nationality, creed or political opinion.

(b) The enactments covered in paragraph (a), above, shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(1) The peace preservation law (Chien Iji Ho), law number 54 of 1941, promulgated on or about 10 March, 1941.

(2) The protection and surveillance law for thought offense (Shiso Han Hogo Kansatsu Ho) law number 29 of 1936, promulgated on or about 29 May, 1936.

(3) Regulations relative to application of protection and surveillance law for thought offense (Shisohan Hogo Kansoku Ho Shikorei), Imperial ordinance number 401 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November, 1936.

(4) Ordinance establishing protection and surveillance stations (Hogo Kansoku - Jo Kansei,) Imperial ordinance number 403 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November, 1936.

SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 4Oct45. (Cont'd)

(5) Ordinance establishing protection and surveillance stations, (Hogo Kansoku - Jo Kansei,) Imperial ordinance number 403 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November, 1936.

(6) The precautionary detention procedure order (Yobo Kokia Tetsuzuki Rei,) Ministry of Justice order, Shihosho Rei, number 49, issued on or about 14 May, 1941.

(7) Regulations for treatment of persons under precautionary detention (Yobo Koki-In Shogu Rei), Ministry of Justice order, Shihosho Rei, number 50, issued on or about 14 May, 1941.

(8) The national defense and peace preservation law (Kokubo Hoan Ho) law number 49 of 1941, promulgated on or about 7 March, 1941.

(9) National Defense and Peace preservation law enforcement order (Kikudo Hoan Ho Shiko Rei) Imperial ordinance number 542 of 1941, issued on or about 7 May, 1941.

(10) Regulations for appointment of lawyers under peace preservation laws (Beingoshi Shitei Kitei, Ministry of Justice order, Shihoserei,) number 47 of 1941, issued on or about 9 May, 1941.

(11) Law for safeguarding secrets of military material resources (Guanyo Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho,) law number 25 of 1939, promulgated on or about 25 March, 1939.

(12) Ordinance of or the enforcement of the law for safeguarding secrets of military material resources (Guanyo Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho Shiki Tei), Imperial ordinance number 413 of 1939, issued on or about 24 January, 1939.

(13) Regulations for the enforcement of the law of safeguarding secrets of military material resources (Guanyo Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho Shiki Kisoiku), Ministries of War and Navy ordinance number 3 of 1939, promulgated on or about 26 June, 1939.

SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 4OCT45. (Cont'

(14) Law for the protection of military secrets (Gunki Hogo Ho), law number 72 of 1937, revised by law number 58 of 1941.

(15) Regulations for the enforcement of the law for the protection of military secrets (Gunki Hogo Ho Shiko Kisku), Ministry of War ordinance number 59, issued on or about 12 December 1939 and revised by Ministry of War ordinance number 6, 20 and 58 of 1941.

(16) The Religious body law (Shukyo Dentai Ho), law number 77 of 1939, promulgated on or about 8 April, 1939.

(17) All laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations amending, supplementing or implementing the foregoing enactments.

(c) Release immediately all persons now detained, imprisoned, under "protection or surveillance", or whose freedom is restricted in any other manner who have been placed in that state of detention, imprisonment, "protection and surveillance", or restrictions of freedom;

(1) Under the enactments referred to in paragraph 1. (a) and (b) above.

(2) Without charge.

(3) By charging them technically with a minor offense, when, in reality, the reason for detention, imprisonment, "protection and surveillance" or restriction of freedom, was because of their thought, speech, religion, political beliefs, or assembly. The release of all such persons will be accomplished by 10 October, 1945.

(d) Abolish all organizations or agencies created to carry out the provisions of the enactments referred to in paragraph 1. (a) and (b) above and the part of, or functions of, other offices or subdivisions of other civil departments and organs which supplement or assist them in the execution of such provisions. These include, but are not limited to:

SCAP DIRECTIVE TO J-PANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 4OCT45. (Cont'd)

(1) All secret police organs.

(2) Those departments in the Ministry of Home Affairs, such as the Bureau of Police, charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.

(3) Those departments, such as the special higher police (Tokubetsu Koto Keisa Tsu Bu), in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, the Osaka Metropolitan Police, any other Metropolitan Police, the police of the Territorial Administration of Hokkaido and the various Prefectural Police charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.

(4) Those departments, such as the protection and surveillance commission, and all protection and surveillance stations responsible thereto, under the Ministry of Justice charged with protection and surveillance and control of thought, speech, religion, or assembly.

(e) Remove from office and reemployment the Minister of Home Affairs, the Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, the Chief of Osaka Metropolitan Police Board, the Chief of any other metropolitan police, the Chief of Police of the Territorial Administrative of Hokkaido, the Chiefs of each prefectural police department, the entire personnel of the Special Higher Police Departments, the entire personnel of the Special Higher Police of all metropolitan, territorial, and prefectural police departments, the Guiding and Protecting officials and all other personnel of the Protection and Surveillance Commission and of the Protection and Surveillance Stations. None of the above persons will be reappointed any position under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Justice or any police organization in Japan. Any of the above persons whose assistance is required to accomplish the provisions of this directive will be retained until the directive is accomplished and dismissed.

SCAP DIRECTIVE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED 4OCT45. (Cont.)

(f) Prohibit any further activity by police officers, members of Police forces, and other government, national or local, officials or employees which is related to the enactments referred to in paragraph 1. (a) and (b) above and to the organs and functions abolished by paragraph 1. (a) above.

(g) Prohibit the physical punishment and mistreatment of all persons detained, imprisoned, or under protection and surveillance under any and all Japanese enactments, laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations. All such persons will receive at all times ample sustenance.

(h) Ensure the security and preservation of all records and any and all other materials of the organs abolished in paragraph 1. (a). These records may be used to accomplish the provisions of the directive, but will not be destroyed, removed, or tampered with in any way.

(i) Submit a comprehensive report to this headquarter not later than 15 October, 1945, describing in detail all action taken to comply with all provisions of this directive. This report will contain the following specific information prepared in the form of separate supplementary reports:

(1) Information concerning persons released in accordance with paragraph 1. (c) above. (To be grouped by prison or institution in which held or from which released or by office controlling their protection and surveillance).

a. Name of person released from detention or imprisonment or person released from protection and surveillance, his age, nationality, race and occupation.

b. Specification of criminal charges against each person released from protection and surveillance, his age, nationality, race and occupation.

c. Specifications of criminal charges against each person released from detention or imprisonment or reason for which each person was placed under protection and surveillance.

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2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the Field,
11 October, 1945.

ANNEX (D)

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. Frequency Assignment

(a) Principal Nets

DIVISION COMMAND NET (TBX-TCS) (CW) 2568 Kcs.
Guarded by Division, all RCT's, 10th Mar,
2d TkbN, RcnCo, and other units as directed.

DIVISION COMMAND (608 - 610) (V) 27.4 mcs.
Guarded as directed.

DIVISION COMMAND (300) (V) 40.0 mcs.
Guarded as directed.

DIVISION INTELLIGENCE NET (SCR-300) (VOICE) 42.6 mcs.
Guarded as directed by G-2.

RCT COMMAND NET (TBX-TCS)	2dMar	4805 Kcs
	6th Mar	4075
	8thMar	4505

DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE NET (TCS) (VOICE) 1876 Kcs

DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMAND NET (TCS) (VOICE) 1670 Kcs.

DIVISION ARTILLERY AIR SPOT (TCS) (VOICE) 4755 Kcs.

(b) Internal Assignment.

RCT Wpns Co.	2dMar	6290 Kcs.
	6thMar	6030
	8thMar	1505

10th Marines	5665 Kcs
	2276

(c) SCR 300 Frequencies.

Division Command Net	40.0 mcs.		
	2dMar	6thMar	8thMar
H&S Command	41.0	42.0	40.4
1stBn Command	40.2	40.6	40.8
2ndBn Command	41.4	41.6	41.2
3rdBn Command	42.4	42.2	41.8
Spare	43.2	42.8	43.6

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2d Mar Div No 59 (Annex (D) - Signal Communications)

(d) SCR 608 - 610 Frequencies.

	<u>2dMar</u>	<u>6thMar</u>	<u>8thMar</u>
H&S Command	28.0 mcs	27.0	29.0
10th Marines Command	33.0 mcs		
10th Marines Internal	28.7 29.3 31.7	29.7 33.4 33.9	31.3 36.6 31.9
Division Command	27.4		

(e) SCR 508 - 510 Frequencies.

2dTkBn Command	20.0		
TkCo Command	(A) 21.5 mcs	(B) 24.3	(C) 26.7
TkBn Internal	22.1 23.1 23.8	25.2	25.5 25.8
2d Recon Co	22.4 24.9	26.1	
2d MP Co Command	20.9	2d MT Bn 22.9	

(f) Radio sets SCR 536, as issued to organizations, may be used on their pre-set frequencies, by those organizations.

2. Radio Call Signs.

(a)

HQ, 2D MAR DIV	JASON	4XQ
ADC, 2D MAR DIV	SWEATBAND	8SC
SUPPORT GROUP	TIGRESS	9AL
RCT 2	SOYBEAN	8GY
BLT 1/2	ROUNDHEAD	7MY
BLT 2/2	CABLECAR	2GE
BLT 3/2	JEWSHARP	4YL
WEAPONS Co., RCT 2	FIRSTRATE	3VI
RCT 6	WARCLUB	9PP
BLT 1/6	POLAND	6VJ
BLT 2/6	DAZZLER	3CV
BLT 3/6	MONITOR	5TE
WEAPONS Co., RCT 6	DIANA	3FE
RCT 8	NONCOM	6AH
BLT 1/8	JUNTAN	8QX
BLT 2/8	PUEBLO	6ZQ
BLT 3/8	FLAGSTONE	3WD
WEAPONS Co., RCT 8	SEALSKIN	7UX
DIV ARTY (10th Marines)	CLOUDBREAK	2RT
1ST BN, 10TH MAR	GUITAR	4JF
2ND BN, 10TH MAR	KITSAP	5DI
3RD BN, 10TH MAR	HAMBONE	4KT
4TH BN, 10TH MAR	YOLA	6AB
VMO-2	LODESTAR	

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2D ENGR BN	CABIN	2GC
2D PION BN	GRANDSLAM	4GX
2D TANK BN	FLEA BITE	3WS
2D RECON CO	CONTRACTOR	2VK
2D SERV BN	BONIFACE	1YK
2D MEC BN	COCOON	2SS
2D AMPHIB TRK CO	SUPERIOR	8RB
2D WAR DOG PLAT	SALINAS	7PR
2D MT LN	CAMBRIC	2HH
2D MAR DIV AIR OBSERVER	DRAGON FLY	3IJ
2D MP Co	TURKEY	9HP
2D MAR DIV ARMY SPOTTER	BALLBAT	
ARMY GP	PRESTO	6XT
1298th ENGR BN	BURGOO BAKER	2EWB
43D NG BN	LICORICE	5HI
A CO 20TH AMPH TRK BN(PROV)	GATO ABLE	2LAA
Spare #1	DELEGATE	3DR
Spare #2	POLE AX	6VL
ENGR GP	PUNCHINELLO	7AD
SERV TROOPS	MACAROON	5KT
DIV TROOPS	TRIPOLI	9FZ
Spare #3	LATONIA	5FU
Spare #4	TWOTONE	9IL
Spare #5	NATHANHALE	5WQ
HQ. VAC	KELLOGG	5BL
VAC AIR OBSERVER	CONGO	
5TH MAR DIV	REBEL	7FP

(b) Except where specifically noted, all calls indicate the COMMANDING OFFICER.

(c) Calls for the following, unless otherwise assigned in this annex are formed as indicated below:

(1) COMPANY and BATTERY voice calls are formed by adding "ABLE", "BAKER", "CHARLIE", etc., to the voice calls of the battalion or other parent organization. Company and battery CW calls are formed by adding "A", "B", "C", etc., to the CW calls of the parent organizations. Assume the example:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Voice Call</u>	<u>CW Call</u>
1st Bn, 8th Mar	SUNTAN	8QX
Co A, 1st Bn, 8th Mar	SUNTAN ABLE	8QXA
1st Bn, 10th Mar	GUIAR	4JF
Btry B, 1st Bn, 10th Mar	GUIAR BAKER	4JFB

Serial 00721

SECRET

Operation Order

2d Mar Div No 59 (Annex (D) - Signal Communications.)

(2) PLATOON and SECTION calls are formed by adding "ONE", "TWO", "THREE", etc., to voice call and "1", "2", "3", etc., to CW calls of the parent organizations. Weapons companies use "ONE" and "TWO" for the 37mm platoons, and "FOUR" for the 105mm platoon. For individual guns of the 105mm platoon add the numbers "ONE", "TWO", "THREE", "FOUR" to the platoon number "FOUR".

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Voice Call</u>	<u>CW Call</u>
Co B, 1st Bn, 8th Mar	SUNTAN BAKER	8QXB
2d Plt, Co B, 1st Bn, 8th Mar	SUNTAN BAKER TWO	8QXB2
1st Sect, Btry B, 1st Bn, 10th Mar	GUITAR BAKER ONE	4JFB1

(3) REAR ECHELON calls are formed by adding "REAR" to the unit voice call and "R" to the CW Call. ADVANCED ECHELON calls are formed by adding "KRAY" to the unit voice call and "K" to the CW call.

(4) SHORT PARTY calls are formed by adding "PETER" and "P" to the Voice and CW calls respectively, of the unit to which attached.

(d) Collective Call.

All Stations this net (circuit)

CENTRAL 2LQ

(e) "Call Signs and Code Names" are to be used within the Division as Radio Calls, and unit code names in text of dispatches in order to speed up traffic by use of modified clear text.

3. Telephone Switchboard Code Names

(a) BARNACLE	2D MARINE DIVISION
BALLOT	2D MARINES
BILLY	6TH MARINES
BLUEBELL	8TH MARINES
BULL	10TH MARINES
BLANK	2D TANK BN
BLEED	2D MEDICAL BN
BLINKER	2D SERVICE BN
BREAKER	2D MOTOR TRANSPORT BN
BLISSFUL	2D ENGINEER BN
BLONDE	2D PIONEER BN
BOLO	2D M P Co.
BOILER	2D ASCO

3. Telephone Switchboard Code Names (Cont'd)

BLADE	
BLUSH	
BLOTTER	DIV LOCALS
BLOOM	
BLOKE	43 NC BN
BUSHEL	2D SIG CO

RED, WHITE, BLUE or GREEN, added to the telephone directory name of the regiment switching central indicates the switching central of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th (Regt'l Wpns Co.).

Example: BAYLOT BLUE is the directory name of the switching central of the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Marines.

(b) Prior to the opening hour, forward CP switchboard code name will be followed by the word "FORWARD". Prior to the closing hour, rear CP switchboard code name will be followed by the word "REAR".

(c) Telephone Switchboard Code Names will be separate and distinct from Radio Call Signs. Radio Call Signs will be used as the tactical Code names for units in modified plain language dispatches.

(d) Unit CP's will be identified by signs using Telephone Switchboard Code Names.

(e) Telephone Switchboard Code Names for other principal units of the 5th Amphibious Corps are:

TIGER	VAC
COLUMBUS	5TH MAR DIV
RAMECO	32D INF DIV

4. Visual Signals

(a) Aircraft Maneuver Signals:

<u>Signal</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
360 degree left turn	Request CP identification.
Alternate dips & climbs	Request front line markings.
Rock Wings	Message understood.
Yaw right & left	Am going to drop message
360 degree right turn	Mission completed.
Sharp "S" turn	Will support you-indicate target
Circle right rocking wings	Message not understood - repeat

(b) Panel Code:


(1) CCBP-8 effective.

(2) Panel Identification.

V Corps . . . 7	32nd Inf Div . . . 3
2nd MarDiv . . 2	5th MarDiv . . . 5

(c) Air Dropping Procedure:

(1) Panels will be displayed as shown below.



(2) One or more of the following methods of identification will be used:

- a. Signal lamps, colored smoke or fires. These, when used, will be set up within the panel outline or the target area. Where colored smoke is to be used, the color will be specified in the request.
- b. Guides flown in the dropping plane.
- c. The directing of air drop planes to the target by liaison type planes.
- d. Air-ground radio, if air-ground radio is employed, channels, frequency, and call sign will be included in the air drop request.

(3) Parachute Color Scheme:

BLUE	Rations and water.
WHITE	Weapons and demolitions.
YELLOW	60mm, 81mm and 75mm Ammo.
RED	All small caliber ammo and grenades.
GREEN	Medical, Signal & Misc. supplies.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J.P. JAHAN, ..
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Opn O No 59.

OFFICIAL:

Carvin
TAXIS
3

(D) - 6

Serial 00729
SECRET

Change Number 1 to:

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 59.

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
26 October, 1945.

1. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 2 add:
"Det "A" Div Sig Co
Det "B" Div Sig Co"
2. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 8 add:
"Det "C" Div Sig Co
Det "D" Div Sig Co"
3. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Serv Trs add:
"Corps Evac Hosp #3
Det 8th Serv Regt"
4. Under Div Trs delete:
"2d Mar War Dog Plat"

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JIHAN,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Operation Order Number 59.

OFFICIAL:

Taxis

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
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

23 OCTOBER, 1945

FROM: CG SECOND MARDIV			INFORMATION OF:		
ACTION TO: RCT 2 ARTY GP DIV TRS			CG V AMPH CORPS		
ECT 6 ENGR GP VMC-2			CG 5TH MARDIV		
ECT 8 SERV TRS					
CLASSIFICATION			PRECEDENCE		
Secret XXX	Confidential	Restricted	Routine	Deferred	Priority OF

THIS IS OPERATION ORDER NO 60 X RCT 2 INITIATE MOVE TO SOUTHERN KYUSHU AS FOLLOWS X RELIEVE 1ST BN 127TH INFANTRY AT KANOKA WITH ONE (1) BLT X SEND RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT MIYAZAKI MAKE IMMEDIATE REPORT RECOMMENDATION BILLETS AVAILABLE ONE (1) BLT AND RCT HQ THAT VICINITY X UPON ARRIVAL MIYAZAKI CG RCT 2 MAKE FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS USE OF REMAINING BLT X RCT 8 ON ORDER ESTABLISH ONE (1) BLT AT KAGOSHIMA X ASSUME CONTROL THAT PORT X PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT U S FORCES ASHORE SOUTHERN KYUSHU AREA X SUPERVISE JAP REPATRIATION ACTIVITIES THROUGH KAGOSHIMA WAN X REGULATE SHIPPING USED TO DISPOSE OF JAP MILITARY EQUIPMENT AT SEA X RCT 8 COORDINATE REQUIREMENTS OF BLT 2/2 LOCATED IN KAGOSHIMA KEN INSCFAR AS REQUESTS ON JAPANESE CIVIL AUTHORITIES ARE CONCERNED X FOR BOUNDARIES SEE OPERATION OVERLAY TO THIS ORDER ISSUED SEPARATELY XX



Serial 10000
10000

UNCLASSIFIED
BY SP-5 J. P. J.

UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Map: Central Japan, 1:500,000, Second Edition, 1971, AND-2.

BY ORDER OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY

J. P. J. J.
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff


REMARKS:
Map as per Order No. 20.


OFFICIAL

DATE
2


PRINT 1

PRINT 2





SHEET 2



HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

31 OCTOBER, 1945

FROM: CG SECOND MARDIV			INFORMATION OF:		
ACTION TO: RCT 2 ARTY GP DIV TRS			CG V AMPH CORPS		
RCT 6 ENGR GP VMC-2			CG 5TH MAR DIV		
RCT 8 SERV TRS			CG 32D INF DIV		
CLASSIFICATION			PRECEDENCE		
SECRET XXX	CONFIDENTIAL	RESTRICTED	ROUTINE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY XXX

THIS IS OPERATION ORDER NUMBER 61 X RCT 2 LESS SECOND BATTALION
MOVE TO SOUTHERN KYUSHU AS FOLLOWS X RCT 2 HEADQUARTERS REGIMENTAL
WEAPONS COMPANY AND ATTACHED UNITS AS DESIGNATED BY COMMANDING
OFFICER RCT 2 COMMENCE LOADING AT NAGASAKI ON 1 NOVEMBER X FIRST
BATTALION SECOND MARINES AND REMAINDER ATTACHED UNITS RCT 2
COMMENCE LOADING ON ORDER SECOND MAR DIV X WHEN LOADED MOVE TO
KANOKA FOR OCCUPATION OF MIYAKONOJO AND MIYAZAKI X ARTY GP WILL
FURNISH ONE (1) BATTALION TO RELIEVE FIRST BATTALION SECOND MARINES
AND TAKE OVER ITS DUTIES IN THE NAGASAKI AREA ON ORDER FROM SECOND
MAR DIV X SUPPLIES X THIRTY (30) DAYS CLASS I AND III X TWO (2)
UNITS OF FIRE X CLASSES II AND IV AS AVAILABLE UP TO THIRTY (30)
DAYS X FOR BOUNDARIES SEE OPERATION OVERLAY TO OPERATION ORDER
NUMBER 60 XX

HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

DATE 2 NOVEMBER, 1945

FROM: CG SECOND MARDIV			INFORMATION OF:		
ACTION TO: RC 2 ARTY GP DIV TRS RCT 3 ENGR GP VMO-2 RCT 1 SERV TRS			CG V AMPH CORPS CG 5TH MAR DIV CG 32D INF DIV		
CLASSIFICATION			PRECEDENCE		
SECRET XXX	CONFIDENTIAL	RESTRICTED	ROUTINE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY XXX

THIS IS SECOND MARDIV OPERATION ORDER NUMBER 62 X EFFECTIVE
050800I 10TH MARINES AREA RESPONSIBILITY EXTENDED TO INCLUDE
AREA IN VICINITY OF NAGASAKI PREVIOUSLY TO RCT 2 AND AMAKUSA-TO
PREVIOUSLY TO RCT 8 AS INDICATED ON OPERATION OVERLAY TO THIS
ORDER ISSUED SEPARATELY X 1/10 MOVE TO KAMIGO BARRACKS ON ORDER
COMMANDING OFFICER 10TH MARINES EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIME X
KAMIGO BARRACKS PASSES TO CONTROL COMMANDING OFFICER 10TH MARINES
IMMEDIATELY X 1/2 CONTINUE TO PROVIDE GUARDS AND MILITARY POLICE
AS DIRECTED BY COMMANDING OFFICER 10TH MARINES UNTIL 1/10 IS
ESTABLISHED NEW LOCATION XX

-1110

$$6 \equiv 10$$

5
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2

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Serial 00737
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 62.

OPERATION OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY OPERATION ORDER NO 62

Map: Central Japan, 1/250,000. Second Edition, 1971, and on.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JAHAN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Opn Order No 59.

OFFICIALS:

Curran
for TAXIS
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SECRET

1340

1020

NOV 4 1945

Serial 00740

SECRET

Change No 1 to

Operation Order

2d Mar Div No 62.

Map: Central Japan, 1/250,000, Second Edition, L571, AMS-2.

1. Upon receipt of this change, all holders of Operation Order No 62 will immediately effect the change indicated by attached overlay.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUHAN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Opn Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:

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TAXIS

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81

Serial 00752

SECRET

Change No 2 to

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 62.

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the Field,
20 November, 1945.

Map: Central Japan, 1/250,000, Second Edition, L571, AMS-2.

1. Upon receipt of this change, all holders of Operation Order No 62 will immediately effect the change indicated by attached overlay.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Opn Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:


Davis

TAXIS

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SECRET

1760
+ 970



Serial 90752

SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 52

CHANGE NO 2 TO OPERATION ORDER NO 52

Map: Central Japan, 1:25,000, Second Edition, 1971, AMS 2

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT.

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Ops Order No 52.

OFFICIAL:

Takis
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SECRET

600
+ 900

Serial 00743
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 63

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
8 November, 1945.

1. The following organization of 2d Marine Division, Reinforced, is effective as of 080800I:

TASK ORGANIZATION

2d Mar Div, Reinf - Maj Gen HUNT, USMC.

(a) RCT 2 - Lt-Col O'DONNELL, USMC.

2d Mar
Co C 2d MT Bn
Co B 2d Med Bn
Co C 2d Med Bn
Co A 2d Engr Bn
1st Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
1st Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
Det Mecon Unit
Det A Div Sig Co
Det B Div Sig Co
415th Malaria Survey Det
Det VAC Mil Govt Team:
MIYAZAKI

(b) RCT 6 - Col JUHAN, USMC.

6th Mar
Co A 2d MT Bn
Co A 2d Med Bn
Co B 2d Engr Bn
3d Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
2d Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
2d Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn

(c) RCT 8 - Col McFARLAND, USMC.

8th Mar
Co B 2d MT Bn
Co E 2d Med Bn
Co C 2d Engr Bn
2d Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn
Div Rcn Co (less Det)
Det C Div Sig Co
Det D Div Sig Co

Serial 00743

SECRET

Operation Order

2d Mar Div No 63

36th Mal Control Det
Det VAC Mil Govt Teams at:
KUMAMOTO
KAGOSHIMA

(d) Arty Co - Col CLARK, USMC.

10th Mar
Co "A" 43d NCB
2d Amph Trk Co (less 1st Plat)
Co "A" 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)
Det Div Rcn Co (1 Sgt, 12 men, 12 H.T.)
2d Tk Bn
Tracked Vehicle Plat Ord Co

(e) Engr Gp - Lt Col PARTRIDGE, USMC.

2d Engr Bn (less Cos "A", "B" and "C")
43d NCB (less Co A)
1298th Engr (C) Bn (USA)
2d Pion Bn
2d Plat Bomb Disposal Co VAC

(f) Serv Trs - Lt Col MERKER, USMC

2d Serv Bn (less Dets)
4th Sep Ldry Plat
2d Med Bn (less Dets)
2d MT Bn (less Dets)
3656th QM Trk Co (USA)
Corps Evac Hosp #3
Co "B" 264th Med Bn
Co "C" 264th Med Bn
73d Fld Hosp

(g) Div Trs - Lt Col McQUILLEN, USMC

Div Hq Bn (less Dets)
54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
498th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
498th CIC Det
93d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
94th Mal Control Det
1st Plat 2d Amph Trk Co

(h) VMO-2 - Lt WAILES, USMCR.

Serial 00743

SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 33

(1) Harbor Gp - Lt Col LLOYD, USMC

1st Sep Hq & Sup Co (Prov)
124th Port Co, USA
24th Depot Co

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Opn Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:


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3

Serial 00755

SECRET

Change No 1 to

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 63.

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
26 November, 1945.

1. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Div Trs delete:
"498th CIC Det"
2. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Engr Gp delete:
"2d Plat Bomb Disposal Co VAC"
3. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Harbor Gp delete:
"24th Depot Co"
4. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 6 delete:
"Co "A" 2d Med Bn"
5. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 6 add:
"Det E Div Sig Co
Port Surgical Hosp #1"
6. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Div Trs add:
"92d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
95th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
Det Sig Bn VAC"
7. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Harbor Gp add:
"34th Depot Co"
8. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 2 add:
"Co "A" 873d Engr Avn Bn
101st Ord Bomb Disp Sqd
623d QM Rhd Sec"
9. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Serv Trs add:
"2d Plat Bomb Disposal Co VAC"
10. Under Arty Gp change "2d Amph Trk Co (less 1st Plat)
to read "Amph Trk Co (less 1st Plat), 2d MT Bn".

(over)

SECRET

(Appendix 4)

11. Under Div Trs change "1st Plat 2d Amph Trk Co" to
read "1st Plat Amph Trk Co, 2d MT Bn".

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

C. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Cpn Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:

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TAXIS

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Serial 00755
SECRET

Change No 2 to

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 63

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
4 December, 1945.

1. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Div Trs delete:
"54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)
498th CIC B3 Det (Combat)
1st Plat Amph Trk Co, 2d MT Bn"
2. In TASK ORGANIZATION under RCT 2 delete:
"Co A 873d Engr Avn Bn"
3. In TASK ORGANIZATION under Arty Gp change:
"Amph Trk Co, 2nd MT Bn (less 1st Plat)
to read Amph Trk Co, 2nd MT Bn"


BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Operation Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:


TAXIS

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SECRET

90

Serial 00749

SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 64.

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field.
14 November, 1945.

Maps: Kyushu, 1/25,000, AMS, L872, 1945.
Central Japan, 1/250,000, Second Edition, L571,
AMS-2.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Operation Order 2d Mar Div No 7.

1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 2d Mar Div No 14 and G-2 Studies and Information issued separately.
(b) Elements of the V Amph Corps continue occupy additional areas and to enlarge that portion of KYUSHU under surveillance and control of occupation forces.
2. The 2d Mar Div, Reinf, in addition to developing occupation of assigned areas of responsibility will defend against and subsequently disperse, capture or destroy any hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:
 - a) (1) Regiments with two (2) or more battalions in the same locality will have one (1) battalion prepared to move out on two (2) hours notice with one (1) company of such battalion motorized and prepared to move out on one-half (1/2) hours notice.
(2) Battalions billeted separately, will have one (1) company prepared to move out on one (1) hours notice, motorized as practicable.
 - (b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the Div, a minimum of 75% of the command during hours of darkness.
 - (c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each separate billeting area, and the overall defense within each regimental area of responsibility.

Serial 00749
SECRET

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 64.

(d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces or prevent the execution of assigned missions. For areas of responsibility, see Operation Overlay to Operation Order No 62 and Change No 1 to Operation Order No 62.

3. (a) RCT 2 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone are attached to RCT 2 for execution of this plan.

(b) RCT 6 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone are attached to RCT 6 for execution of this plan.

(c) RCT 8 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone are attached to RCT 8 for execution of this plan.

(d) Arty Gp will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of action. All troops within assigned zone (less VMO-2) are attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan. Be prepared to move as directed and to provide artillery support to elements of this Div on order.

(e) Engr Gp attached to Arty Gp and RCT 6 in accordance with the area of responsibility in which billets are located.

(f) Serv Trs attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan.

(g) Div Trs attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan.

(h) VMO-2 as directed by this Hq, and local defense.

(i) Harbor Gp attached to Arty Gp for execution of this plan.

Serial 0740

SECRET

Operation Order

2d Mar Div No 64

- (x) (1) Plans will divide the areas of responsibility into sectors and will show for each area of responsibility: Sector responsibility and plan of billet defense.
- (2) Regiments will be prepared to move on order to the support of other divisional units and will conduct reconnaissance of road nets throughout respective areas of responsibility.
- (3) Plans will be submitted to this Hq prior to 25 November, 1945, and rehearsal of defense plans will be commenced by that date and continued weekly thereafter.
- (4) Where rehearsals of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese Nationals to become unduly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of the drill.
4. See Administrative Order No 58 and current instructions as issued.
5. (a) See Annex (H) (Signal Communications) to Operation Plan No 14.
- (b) Command Posts:
- 2d Mar Div, Reinf - Customs House, NAGASAKI
(94.5-62.2).
- RCT 2 - MIYAKONOJO (141750-094200)
- RCT 6 - Mitsubishi Shipyard Office
Building, NAGASAKI
(93.3-62.6)
- RCT 8 - KUMAMOTO (1381.90-1077.00)
- Art Gp - Naval Barracks, ISAHAYA
Airfield (16.3-75.1)
- Engr Gp - (94.85-61.45)

Serial 00749

SECRET

Operation Order

2d Mar Div No 64

Serv Trs	- (94 05-61.1)
Div Trs	- (94.5-62.2)
VMO-2	- ISAHAYA (1315.9-1075.9)
Harbor Gp	(94.5-62.2)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Same as Operation Order No 59.

OFFICIAL:

Lewis
TAXIS

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HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

DATE 23 NOVEMBER 1945

FROM: CG SECOND MARDIV			INFORMATION OF: VAC X 5TH MARDIV X 32d INF DIV X RCT 2 X RCT 8 X ENGR GP X SERV TBS X DIV TBS X VMO-2 X HARBOR GP X		
ACTION TO: RCT 6 X 10TH MAR					
CLASSIFICATION			PRECEDENCE		
SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL XXXXX	RESTRICTED	ROUTINE XXXXX	DEFERRED	PRIORITY OF

OP TO ACTION X ROUTINE TO INFO

THIS IS 2D MAR DIV OPERATION ORDER NO 65 X RCT 6 AND ARTILLERY
GROUP EXPAND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO INCLUDE AREAS SHOWN ON
OPERATION OVERLAY TO THIS ORDER ISSUED SEPARATELY X CONTROL OF
NEW AREAS EFFECTIVE ON DATES INDICATED SAME OVERLAY XX

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

32
+4
24

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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Serial 0718
CONFIDENTIAL

Change Number 1 to

Operation Order
2d Mar Div No 65

2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the Field.
28 November, 1945.

Map: Central Japan, 1/250,000, Second Edition, L571, AMS-2.


1. Upon receipt of this change, all holders of Operation Order No 65 will immediately effect the boundary changes indicated by attached overlay.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
Same as Cpn Order No 59.

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SERIAL 0718
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPERATION ORDER
TO MAR DIV HQ 58.

CHANGE NO. 1 TO OPERATION ORDER NO. 58
Map: Central Japan, 1/500,000, Second Edition, 1971, AMS-2
BY ORDER OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

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Same as Operation Order No. 58.

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HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

13 DECEMBER 1945

FROM: CG SECOND MARDIV		INFORMATION OF:		
ACTION TO: RCT 6 10TH MAR		5TH MARDIV VAC		
CLASSIFICATION		PRECEDENCE		
SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	RESTRICTED	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
	XXXXXXXXXX			PRIORITY OP OP

THIS IS CHANGE NUMBER 2 TO SECOND MARDIV OPN O NUMBER 65 X EFFECT
RELIEF ELEMENTS OF FIFTH MARDIV PROGRESSIVELY ON DATES AS
FOLLOWS X RCT 6 EXTEND AREA RESPONSIBILITY TO INCLUDE AREA
RESPONSIBILITY OF 13TH MAR (LESS 1ST BN 13TH MAR) AT 050800I
AND REMAINDER OF AREA ASSIGNED RCT 6 BY THIS OPN O AT 081000I X
FIFTH MARDIV RETAINS RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPATRIATION ACTIVITIES
UNTIL RELIEF ALL ELEMENTS FIFTH MARDIV COMPLETED X ARTY GP
EXTEND AREA RESPONSIBILITY AS INDICATED THIS OPN O AND RELIEVE
1ST BN 13TH MAR AT 041200I XX

1990-70-10
JGG/jcl

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

25 October, 1945.

RESTRICTED

DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE)

ORDER NUMBER 61-45) : Organization of Disposition
Section, 2d Marine Division.

Reference: (a) Annex (J) to 2d Mar Div Adm O No. 58-45.

1. Effective immediately, the Division Disposition Section, Headquarters, Second Marine Division is established as follows:

Division Disposition Officer

LtCol. E. B. GAMES, USMC.

Executive Officer

LtCol. C. J. SEIBERT, II, USMC.

Ordnance Assistant

1stLt. L. McN. GILLIS, USMC.

Administrative Assistant

1stLt. R. P. ARMSTRONG, USMCR.

Disposal Group

2d Platoon, VAC Bomb Disposal Co.
Ordnance Co., 2d Serv Bn (less tracked vehicles
and ordnance platoons).

2. The assignment of the above officers, units, and such clerical personnel as may be required will be promulgated by separate special order.

3. The Division Disposition Officer will have general supervision of the disposition of surrendered materiel within the 2d Marine Division Zone of Responsibility. In addition, this section will assume the direct responsibility for the disposition of materiel in the zones of responsibility of RCT-2 and RCT-6, as shown in Annex (B) to 2d Mar Div Opn O #59, as its area of sole responsibility.

RESTRICTED

-2-

DIV ADM O NUMBER 61-45:

(Cont'd)

25Oct45.

4. Disposition of equipment and materiel in areas outlined in paragraph 3, above, guarded by units of the 2d and 6th Regiments, will be coordinated with the Commanding Officers of those regiments.

5. All surrendered equipment and material that are to be requisitioned for operational needs of U. S. Forces will be released by the Disposition Officer having control of such items.

6. The Heads of Special Staff Sections at this Headquarters will assist the Division Disposition Officer in the disposition of equipment and materiels coming under their cognizance in accordance with U. S. Army classification of materiel and equipment.

7. In order to expedite disposition, direct communication between the Corps and Division Disposition Officers is authorized.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUHAN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: See Distribution Sheet.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ K. C. ZIEG,

For J. G. GOLDBERG,
LtCol, USMC,
AGCS, G-4.

Change No 1, 61-45 dated 31Oct45
Incorporated in this reproduction.

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

5 November, 1945.

RESTRICTED

DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE)

ORDER NUMBER. . . 62-45) : Procurement Section, Organization of.

Reference: (a) Annex (H) (Revised) 2d Mar Div Adm O No. 58-45.

1. Effective immediately, the Division Procurement Section, Headquarters, Second Marine Division is established as follows:

Division Procurement Officer

LtCol. R. L. STALLINGS, USMC

Executive Officer

Major W. S. MC LAUGHLIN, USMC

Real Estate Officers

Capt. R. F. SCHULTZ, USMCR
2dLt. J.L. RUNDELL, USMCR

Transportation Officer

1stLt. O. D. CHURCHILL, AUS, TC

Supply Officer

1stLt. J. D. HAMMOND, USMCR

Military Government Officer

Capt. W. T. ELLIS, CAC

2. The assignment of the above officers, and such clerical personnel as may be required will be effected by separate special order.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

J. P. JUEAN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Acting Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: "B" and "D"

OFFICIAL:

J. G. GOLDBERG,
LtCol, USMCR,
ACofS, G-4.

RESTRICTED

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF
IN THE FIELD.

12 November, 1945

RESTRICTED

DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE)

ORDER NUMBER

64-45)

: COLLECTION AND RETENTION OF CIVILIAN
ARMAMENT.

1. The following policy concerning the collection and retention of civilian armament will obtain in the zone of responsibility of this Division.

2. Local Japanese authorities will be instructed to collect all revolvers, rifles, shotguns, and swords in the hands of civilians and deliver same to the headquarters of the local Occupation Forces.

3. Hunting guns will be returned to individuals only if the requirements outlined below are fulfilled:

a. An individual desiring the return of his hunting gun must submit a written application in the form of an affidavit with supporting facts certifying that the gun is needed to provide a livelihood for the individual concerned and that the weapon was not utilized in any way for military purposes during the war.

b. This application and affidavit will be submitted, via the Chief of Police of the Ken, to the CO of the Occupation Forces in the Ken concerned. Upon receipt of such application the Chief of Police will investigate the circumstances and in his forwarding endorsement state whether or not the request is legitimate.

c. Once legitimacy has been determined Commanding Officers, or their designated representatives, will execute an approving endorsement on the application and return two copies to the Police Department. Upon receipt of this endorsement the Police Department will issue one copy of the approving endorsement and a license for retention of the gun to the individual concerned. Upon presenting his license and his copy of the approved application the individual will be issued his gun.

d. Japanese police authorities will explain clearly to any person granted a license that that person will be held personally responsible in case of any deception in connection with the issuance of the license.

RESTRICTED

-2-

DIV ARM O NO.

64-45

(Cont'd)

12Nov45.

e. Police authorities will be required to maintain a registry of all weapons issued and such registry will be available at all times for inspection by Occupation Forces. Spot checks will be made without prior warning.

4. Swords will be returned to civilians only upon written application by the individual, and only if the application is accompanied by documentary evidence proving that the weapon is of very unusual artistic value, was not used in the war, and belongs to a bona-fide civilian, not one who has been discharged from the armed services, nor to a family which had an immediate member on active duty at any time during the recent war.

5. Armament other than that indicated in paragraphs 3. and 4. above will be retained by occupation forces until further orders.

6. This order supersedes all previous directives concerning collection and retention of civilian arms.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUNT:

G. A. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: "B" and "D".

O F F I C I A L:

J. G. GOLDBERG
LtCol., USMCR,
ACofS, G-4.

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Serial 0716
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX (B)

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

GRL-jfp
Serial: 0721

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, P.T.,
IN THE FIELD.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 December, 1945.

From: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: Annex (B), Occupational Operations Report.

I. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

1. Personnel.

a. During the period subsequent to the OKINAWA operation, full reports were rendered monthly by the division listing by specification serial numbers (SSN's) the personnel in the division. These reports gave a clear picture of the needs of the division with regard to both officer and enlisted personnel, line duty and specialists. Personnel reporting to the division for duty did not fill the existing needs for, although the division was up to T/O strength in numbers, there was a definite shortage of non-commissioned officers for line duty, and there were shortages in all the specialist branches except communications. Because of necessity, line duty personnel were placed in the specialist vacancies, where possible, and trained to fill the needs of the division.

b. An adjutant's and "1" section school was held prior to the embarkation for this operation; attendance was required of all Adjutants, "1's", sergeants majors and acting sergeants majors in the division. This school was designed to train the administrative personnel of the division for combat. The training and subject matter covered in the school was prepared before the surrender of the Japanese, and so had equipped the administrative sections of the division for any eventuality. Schools were conducted within units for various specialist branches such as engineers, ordnance and communications, in an effort to alleviate the strain brought about by the shortage of specialists.

c. Very few authorizations for promotion of line duty enlisted personnel were received during the preliminary planning period, so there was no opportunity to fill the existing vacancies within the division.

2. General.

a. Original plans called for a minimum rear echelon, to take care of equipment which could not be handled in the initial lift. Administration plans called for all "paper work" elements to go forward with the initial lift, and all administration except that of the rear elements themselves would be taken forward with the division.

Subject: Annex (B)', Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

II. PLANNING PHASE.

1. Personnel.

a. Personnel available to the division indicated clearly that there would not be a 5% overage available. As the conditions under which the landings would be made became definite it was apparent that no readily available pool of replacements would be necessary during the progress of the operation. The expected casualties were small, and could be dropped by each individual unit with no risk of combat efficiency being impaired dangerously. No draft was made available for Shore Party work, so Ships Platoons were formed from the personnel embarked on each ship. The nucleus of the Shore Party was formed from the Pioneer Battalion, and the 43rd Naval Construction Battalion, attached for the operation.

b. Full preparations were made to handle casualties, including complete card index files of all personnel on the rolls of the division.

c. During the planning phase an excess of 55 officers existed in the division. This excess was distributed mainly in the infantry regiments (about 12%) and there was an 8% shortage in the artillery regiment, since there had not been enough qualified artillery officers ordered to the division to fill the existing needs. The division was brought down to T/O strength in officers just prior to embarkation, through the required transfer to the United States for discharge, eligible officers down to T/O strength. The infantry regiments still possessed a slight overage in officers (about 6%) and the artillery regiment was about 11% short.

2. General.

a. Accurate lists of the shipping assigned to the division were made available at such a late date that complete embarkation plans could not be prepared by division. Loading began just 60 hours subsequent to the initial receipt of ship assignments, and that assignment was not complete. In order to accomplish loading with the least possible delay, transdivs were assigned to regiments, and designated elements were assigned to the regiment for loading (as concerns personnel only). The G-1 office coordinated the flow of information from attached units to the regimental loading officers, and as ship assignments were made embarkation plans were begun. The Complete Embarkation Plan was completed during the embarkation phase. Numerous last minute changes in the shipping assigned required many changes in the embarkation plan, however, on the sailing day the plan was complete, corrected to date, and had been distributed to all required addressees.

Serial: 0721

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Annex (B), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

b. Shipping provided actually proved capable of lifting the entire division and no rear echelon was necessary.

III. EMBARKATION PHASE.

1. Personnel.

a. Two days after embarkation had begun, orders were received to transfer 790 enlisted personnel from the division. Some of these men had already embarked when the orders were received. Because some personal baggage had already been loaded in holds and could not be reached, about 150 men were transferred without their seabags, provision being made to ship the seabags after arrival at the target.

b. Three days after loading had begun, 921 replacements arrived and had to be allocated to the various units of the division. An officer messenger had been dispatched to the transcient center at Guam, and the SSN calls of the replacements were available to the division about 24 hours before the draft actually arrived. By the time the 921 replacements had disembarked, complete plans were made for their assignment to units, and the men were taken directly to the ships on which they were to embark for the voyage. The replacements received were not the SSN's which had been ordered, and so further depleted the effective strength of the division, for reason of having many billets not filled with men possessing the proper capabilities.

c. Organization of the newly arrived enlisted men and placement with the proper units was completed two days prior to sailing time, and all embarkation rosters were corrected to include the additional personnel. All units immediately began training and briefing their replacements, in order to bring the division to the best possible state of efficiency.

IV. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING.

1. Personnel.

a. Efficient personnel functions were hampered since D-Day, due to the lack of knowledge regarding replacements of line and specialist personnel eligible under current directives for possible release from active duty. The lack of specialist personnel existing in the clerical, commissary, quartermaster, bookkeeping and auditing fields made more difficult the effective accomplishment of the occupation mission assigned to the division.

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Subject: Annex (B), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd).

b. Since D-Day, directives received from higher authority made eligible for release from active duty approximately 8,000 officers and men.

(1) Marines: These directives made eligible for release from active duty personnel with 70, 60, and 50 discharge credits respectively; also those 38 and 35 years of age and over. Lastly, precedence for discharge was given all personnel with three or more children.

(2) Navy: Directives from higher Navy authority involved varied types of release from active duty from this division of officers and men. First, men desiring to re-enlist were granted leave to return to the U.S. Secondly, officers and men with 44 points were eligible for discharge. Thirdly, the critical score for enlisted men was dropped to 41, 39, and 38 respectively. Fourthly, enlisted men were returned to the U.S. under a 18 months rotation plan. And lastly, the T/O allowances for enlisted, were reduced from 948 to 643, making it possible to return to the U.S. 305 enlisted men.

c. Since the division was ordered to maintain strength not below 90% of the T/O allowances, and a total of only 45 officers and 130 men were transferred to the division as replacements for those 8,000 eligible for release, it was impossible to release men during the first two months of occupation, although eligible.

d. On 22 October, 1945 a detail of 57 marine officers and 1159 marine enlisted men having more than 70 discharge credits, and 67 navy enlisted with 44 or more points, embarked for the U.S., this number bringing the division strength to 90% of the T/O. Since then, on 3 Nov, 10 Nov and 19 Nov, 151 navy enlisted men with three or more dependents, 82 men with 41 or more points, and 65 with 39 or more points respectively were transferred to the U.S. for processing and possible discharge. On 13 November a small detail of 40 marine officers and 471 marine enlisted, each of whom was either 35 years of age or older, or who had three children, embarked for the U.S. The strength of the division was then below that required by current directives, with no probable replacements.

e. A plan was devised whereby personnel eligible for return to the U.S. in this division, would be interchanged with personnel of the Fifth Marine Division not eligible for return to the U.S. This plan was approved by higher authority 16 November, 1945, making possible the return to the U.S. of 7,348 men and 305 officers in this division eligible for discharge under current directives, and those having 24 or more months overseas.

CONFIDENTIAL-----
Subject: Annex (B), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd).

f. On 18 November, 1945 it was contemplated that the most expeditious method of carrying out the interchange of personnel was a mutual exchange by battalions, commencing with the separate battalions, followed by battalions within regiments, concluding with clerical personnel in each Division Headquarters. On 24 November, 1945 this plan is to be operative.

2. Deceased Allied Prisoners of War.

a. Army recovery teams operating in Kyushu prior to D-Day had recovered from all Japanese prisoner of war camps, four hundred and fifty-seven cremated remains of allied prisoners of war. These remains had either been crated by the Japanese, or the recovery teams, and shipped to Nagasaki. After a thorough search, eighty-five additional individual remains were located in the Nagasaki area.

b. All cremated remains were counted and inventoried and lists containing all information were compiled and sent to the Army Recovery Section attached to the Fifth Corps, for additional information possibly included in their records.

c. Completed lists indicated the following nationality groups accounted for in this area:

262	Dutch
154	Americans
109	British
15	Australians
2	Canadians
<u>542</u>	TOTAL

d. According to Fifth Corps directive, all remains were to be listed and crated for shipment to Base X, Manila, with the exception of British subjects which were to be interred in the allied section of the division cemetery. On 8 November, 1945 the crated remains were ready for shipment to Manila, and a cemetery plot and proper ceremony were approved for the British subjects. However, on 19 November, 1945, telephonic information from Fifth Corps directed that the British remains be included with the shipment to Base X, Manila.

Officer
GLENN

LONG.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B)

MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT

I. PLANNING PHASE

The personnel assigned to Military Government duties during the planning stage consisted of a special staff section of four officers. Just prior to embarkation from Saipan an Army Military Government unit, the 93rd Hq. and Hq. Det., Military Government Group, was assigned to the Division. This group consisted of eleven officers but was lacking all organizational equipment and all enlisted personnel provided for in its table of organization. The officers of this group covered the following specialist assignments: Industry and Resources, Legal, Medical, Interpreter, Salvage, Labor, Supply, Transportation Public Safety, Adjutant, and Personnel.

II. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING

1. Organization.

Upon landing and assuming occupational duties, it became almost immediately apparent that the organization of Military Government personnel, which had been planned for combat conditions, was unsuited to efficiently meet the actual situation encountered. Accordingly all available personnel were integrated into a single special staff section and assignments made to fields within which officers' services were required without regard to previous specialist ratings.

The organization of the Military Government Section continued to be maintained on a flexible basis and was changed from time to time as the division progressed with its general occupational plans. All changes in the Military Government organization were made within the framework of and in conformity to the organization of the division and its subordinate units. As each regiment was assigned a separate area of responsibility, a group of Military Government Officers were assigned to the regiment in accordance with its particular needs. Similar groups were in turn formed by the regiments and assigned to separate battalions or detachments as they assumed control over separately assigned areas of responsibility. Additional Military Government Officers were assigned to the division by the V Amphibious Corps to meet the expanding demands for Military Government services. The present organization of Military Government within the

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

division is set forth on the chart attached hereto. This organization is based in general upon the following formula:

1. A division Military Government Officer, with an assistant who also acts as Liaison Officer with the local government, and an adjutant.
2. A specialist staff, who also act as a ken team for Nagasaki Ken.
3. A Regimental Military Government Officer for each of the four regiments of the division.
4. Ken teams with headquarters at each of the ken capitals.
5. Military Government sections with each detached tactical unit.

About 1 November, 1945, two additional Army units, the 92nd and the 95th Hq. and Hq. Detachments, Military Government Groups, were assigned to the division. This change did not materially alter conditions, as most of the members of these groups had been previously attached to the division on temporary duty. These groups were not kept intact as separate operational units but the members worked into the division Military Government organizational pattern.

Liaison with the local government was arranged through a Japanese Liaison Group which was organized prior to occupation. A representative of this committee with an interpreter was assigned office space in the Military Government offices at Division Headquarters Building. Separate direct telephone connections over Japanese lines were installed for the use of this representative to the Governor's Office, to the Water Department, to the Electrical Department, and to other Japanese governmental agencies with whom frequent and prompt contact was deemed necessary. Later a Military Government Officer was installed as Liaison Officer with an office next to that of the Governor at the Ken Prefectural Building with a telephone connecting with the military communications system. This enabled speedy contact with the ken officials in cases where a personal presentation of a problem was deemed desirable. This officer also acted as the personal agent for the delivery of official communications between the military forces and the Prefectural Government. He also obtained for the use of the occupational forces translations of all official instructions received by the Ken government through Japanese

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT, (Cont'd).

Governmental channels. It has been found that very often instructions reach the Ken Government from the General Headquarters of the occupational forces through Japanese governmental channels considerably quicker than information concerning such instructions is received through military channels. This has contributed to the difficulty of properly supervising the activities of the local government and their compliance with the directives of the General Headquarters of the occupation forces. In several cases, it has thus become necessary to institute requests for confirmation through military channels of instructions received by the local government before machinery for proper supervision of the accomplishment of these instructions could be instituted.

2. Operations.

The Military Government Section commenced to function on 25 September, 1945.

a. Resources and Industry.

Resources and industry was divided into five main sections namely: 1. Heavy and light industry (except shipbuilding), mining. 2. Agriculture, fisheries, price and wage control. 3. Public utilities. 4. Motor and rail transportation, shipping. 5. Civilian supply, shipbuilding.

The officer in charge of each of the five main divisions proceeded to conduct general surveys relating to his division and compile facts concerning its operation and needs for rehabilitation.

Priority list of activities to be established was as follows: Food, fuel, clothing, and dwellings, and all efforts were directed to this program.

The fishing industry was re-established and operations started ten days after landing. Fishing regulations were set up under the direction of the Port Director. The fisheries officer of the Prefecture was held responsible to carry out all regulations and to license all boats.

Available fuel was located and cargo boats were given permits to haul commodities between coastwise ports. The ferry service was re-established to provide food for peoples of outlying islands and to provide transportation for labor. All debris was searched for available building materials and fuel.

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

Clothing manufacturers were located and available Japanese military clothing was either distributed or turned over to these factories to process for usable clothing. Japanese gas masks were converted to Japanese rubber shoes.

Available Japanese military and naval food stores were inventorized and turned over to the Prefectural Government for distribution, salt factories were re-established and encouraged to expand operations. The quota system was maintained in food production. Fish meal fertilizers and rotten grain was prepared for use by the farmer. Price and wage controls had been established as of 15 August, 1945 and were rigidly enforced. Central bazaars were established with controlled prices. The Mayor was told to establish a rehabilitation committee thru which stores which properly marked their merchandise and maintained the approved price levels were issued an "approved store" sign. The price control officer covered these stores as well as others frequently, checking on prices and methods of operation. Violators were closed by the Japanese police.

The Japanese tax on amusements was exempted for members of the occupation force from the beginning. By order of the Japanese Federal Government dated 16 October, 1945 the tax on manufactured commodities was exempted. This exemption was implemented by a Division Order authorizing the use of tax-exemption certificates. As a result of this exemption souvenir prices were lowered substantially.

Black market activity was present at all times during this period of occupation. Civilian police were ordered to be on the alert at all times for black market operations. The major items in black markets were cigarettes, beer, sake, and shellfish. The black market, by its nature, is not capable of complete removal until restored production permits widespread distribution of all commodities.

Shipbuilding, as authorized by higher authority, was started and regulations for their operation prepared and adopted. Repair and rehabilitation of fishing craft and small cargo craft were started and expedited to re-establish transportation.

Motor transportation was found in a deplorable condition. Japanese military and naval transportation was acquired. Thru Military Government, excesses of certain items formerly the property of Japanese Army and Navy forces, such as air compressors, grease, tires, etc, held by occupa-

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

tion forces and not needed by them, were turned over to the Prefectural Transportation Department. About twelve trucks and eight search light bases, formerly owned by Japanese armed forces, were demilitarized by the Japanese under occupation forces supervision, and, thru Military Government, turned over by Disposition Board to said department. Depots were established and by cannibalizing and use of every available part many trucks were returned to service. The manufacture of two wheel carts was started and the first of these will be in service by 1 December, 1945. Automotive fuel was obtained in limited quantities from Japanese Military and Naval depots. All available trucks were pooled under the supervision of the Prefectural Chief of Motor Transportation.

Public utilities were inadequate due to war damage. An advisory program was adopted in conjunction with the Division Engineer. Repair and rehabilitation was encouraged, and electric and sewage services as well as roads were put into satisfactory operation. Water was delivered to all outlets in a purified palatable condition seven days after landing. Further improvements in all utilities are continuing.

b. Legal.

A survey of courts, judges, and the legal system throughout the Ken was made. The police were required to retain in custody any civilians arrested for criminal offenses against the occupying forces, until advised by Military Government as to disposition thereof. The police department was required to prepare and present, weekly, a report of such offenses, information of which was transmitted to Corps. This report was subsequently required every three days.

In conjunction with the Public Prosecutor's Office, this district, a system of disposing of such cases was evolved. Under this system, minor cases are disposed of in weekly conference between the Military Government legal officer, and the Public Procurator; such disposition consisted of offender being released, on probation, after varying periods of incarceration, suggested by the legal officer, dependent on the character and severity of the offense, or of offender being held for trial by the Japanese courts. Major offenses are held for disposition by higher authority. In cases thus far tried by the Japanese courts, the punishment ranged from six months to three years imprisonment.

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

c. Fiscal.

A survey covering currency on hand or in circulation, non-legal currency, and banking facilities, was secured from the Economic Section, of the Ken. In the main, it showed an adequacy of banking facilities and legal currency for the area. It was found that banking institutions had not received sufficient official notice, pertaining to prescribed types of non-legal currency. This delinquency was remedied by having the Economics Department circulate the proper information. A spot check of six main banks in Nagasaki City was made to ascertain any sizeable supply of bullion (gold, silver, platinum); a small supply of silver coin was found. This section also supervises returning repatriates to insure enforcement of provisions as to the amount of currency brought into the country.

d. Public Safety.

The Prefectural Chief of Police submits a weekly report covering: 1. All incidents between civilians and members of the occupation force. 2. The general condition of all jails. 3. Any large increases or decreases in population. 4. Any indications of subversive activity.

The Special Higher Police Section, and the Foreign Affairs Section of the Prefectural Police Department were dissolved by order of SCAP. Police Chief Suzuki was relieved by SCAP directive and succeeded in office by Mikawa.

e. Repatriation.

Upon application of representatives of several large groups of Koreans for repatriation, unsuccessful efforts were made to secure craft for this purpose. As subsequently evolved, the Governor of the Ken was charged with the duty of repatriation.

Food and clothing were furnished and an increased ration allotment from the Ken arranged for several British subjects, resident in Nagasaki.

Military Government co-operated with G-2, Provost Marshall and native Harbor Police in screening returning demobilized soldiers and starting them home as quickly as possible.

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT (Cont'd).

f. Public Welfare.

Shortly after landing a survey was begun thru the Relief Section of the Prefectural Government. Present relief laws were left in effect and restoration of relief agencies was encouraged.

g. Civilian Supply.

Survey made in accordance to order of Corps Military Government Officer regarding adequacy of food potential for period of December 1945 thru June 1946. At time of survey, it was established that, with the exception of sugar and salt, there would be sufficient food either in stock, to be harvested, or to be imported from neighboring prefectures to satisfy the existing ration system for the period. Accordingly, a request was placed with Corps for salt and sugar to cover this period.

Since the time of initial survey however, bad weather has decreased the potential of harvestable food-stuff, and it is considered that March and April 1946 will be bad months unless food can be imported from China, Korea, etc.

A better system of control over the farmer is being presently planned whereby the quota for each farmer may be increased. Staple commodities are reaching the black market through the farmer. A more consistent method of control would greatly eliminate this undesirable practice. Further, the Prefectural Government is adding certain inducements to the farmers for increased production.

During initial period, fuel was greatly augmented through use of materiel derived from damaged and destroyed buildings. Fuel is now beginning to arrive from outlying areas which supply majority of Nagasaki's supply.

h. Education.

The educational mission of Military Government is to supervise the elimination of militarism and ultranationalism, in doctrine and practice, from all elements of the Japanese educational system and the inclusion of such new courses of instruction in school curricula as are necessary to accomplish the mission of proper dissemination of democratic ideals and principals.

In order to accomplish this mission the Educa-

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

ational Officer arranged to have Military Government supplied with the National Department of Education and of all information published at the prefectural level for the guidance of the schools.

As of this date the following schools have been inspected: Kwassui Women's College, Kwassui Girls High School, Nagasaki Girls High School, Nagasaki Middle School, Keiho Middle School, Nagasaki Commercial School, Nagasaki Second Commercial School, Chinzei Middle School, Iiabayashi Primary School, and the Katuyama Primary School. These inspections revealed that certain militaristic practices, such as saluting and military drill, still prevailed in some schools. Prefectural officials were informed of this situation and such practices have been discontinued.

In conjunction with the Military Intelligence a complete survey of teachers and text books is being conducted. Teachers are being interviewed to determine qualification. Text books are being translated in order to determine the pages or sections which should be deleted.

Ken officials have been advised to institute programs for the retraining and reeducation of the Japanese teachers. The curriculum of the normal schools is being revised in accordance with the objective of raising the teaching standards.

A questionnaire was prepared for the headmaster of every school by the Educational Officer and distribution was made through the Prefectural Education Section. When these are accomplished and returned to the Military Government Office, the information supplied will furnish a working basis for long range educational operations.

i. Labor.

The initial function of the labor section was to supply coolie labor to the Shore Party to facilitate unloading of ships and storing of materials and gear.

As the occupation progressed demands for additional coolie labor and for many classifications of skilled labor were made by the occupying forces.

A system of permanent parties of both coolie and skilled labor was installed with the result that labor parties were dispatched automatically to the using unit eliminating the necessity of members of the occupation

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) -- MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

forces transporting the labor parties to the place of work.

At the end of the first month of occupation native labor employed numbered over two thousand daily and at the end of the second month totaled three thousand in Nagasaki shi alone. Skilled and unskilled labor pools were also established at Isahaya and Omura early in the occupational stages and at the end of the first two months an average of two hundred and fifty to three hundred unskilled laborers were used daily. An additional force to supplement the permanent parties in Nagasaki was assembled and dispatched daily to units needing labor for emergency and other details. A third force of skilled stevedores was assigned to the shore party on a 24 hour daily basis.

Skilled labor in Nagasaki was dispatched on a 'job' basis to the requesting unit with the approval of the Commanding Officer, Service Troops, and after proper insertion on a maintained priority list. Procurement of materials was facilitated by the usage of a chit system whereby requested materials were released from the engineer supply yards by the Labor Officers who correlated same with the supply of labor to the job. This system eliminates the dispatch of labor to units not having obtained the supplies necessary to proceed with the construction and assures the continuity of work by a steady stream of both craftsmen and necessary materials.

To facilitate the initial procurement of materiel for construction purposes this office maintained on a full time basis an architect whose services were utilized to make job appraisals and estimates of supplies required.

Work inspectors were assigned to supervise the work proceedings and make proper adjustments of skilled labor needs. Two building contractors and five foremen supervised these details. One man in charge of coolie labor and two assistants were maintained on a full time basis in an office established at the central labor pool.

In the outlying districts the units were dispatched skilled labor on a like basis by the Military Government Officer present with the unit.

To increase the efficiency of future operations the following items of interest are noted herein. On debarkation into a devastated area the primary factor to be considered is the hasty preparation of lodging and mess

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

areas and the subsequent renovation thereof. In order to accomplish this with the minimum of effort and the maximum of efficiency the Labor Officer should immediately prepare and submit to the local government a list of skilled craftsmen that will be required and the approximate number thereof, in the interim and before such labor is utilized, common or manual laborers should be applied to cleaning the debris and preparing the billet areas. Further, a list of materiel that may be needed should be given the local authorities and such should be located and secured by them for use by the occupying forces. These supplies should be utilized to the fullest extent possible before using those brought by the occupying forces. In order to facilitate the complete reconstruction the entire supply and labor situation must be correlated by one office sufficiently staffed to maintain outside supervision and assignment in addition to the office procedure involved. Details deserving immediate consideration are the daily work hours, to include night shifts, feeding of laborers of all type, salary and or wages and the payment thereof, transportation, and tools of all types. The latter factor, of prime importance, is one encountered in devastated areas where movement, fire and ruin have caused the loss of much time due to the failure of workmen to own or be able to secure the proper tools necessary for job completion. Lastly the human factor must be considered. In order to attain the maximum efficiency from labor of any type, the proper supervision is needed. Units moving in their commands men with the proper labor supervisory backgrounds should assign such men in supervisory capacities in every instance including the supervision of ordinary manual laborers on any task. Failure of units to follow such a practice results in time and labor loss and retardation in great proportion to the job results.

j. Public Health and Medicine.

The following activities have been carried out, or are being carried out under this section of Military Government:

On 25 September, 1945 the Nagasaki water system was surveyed with the idea of determining whether or not it would be adequate, if chlorinated, to supply the whole of the city as well as the occupying forces. Survey of the bomb damage and the stock of bleaching powder at that time in the city indicated that the water could be made potable with relatively little difficulty. These measures were carried out, and the water was declared potable during the first week of October. Since then, sufficient quantities of bleach-

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

ing powder have been imported to maintain the potability of the water for general consumption.

On 29 September, 1945 steps were taken to re-establish the night soil and garbage collection systems which had not been functioning at all since the date of the atomic bombing - 9 August, 1945 - and collection of these materials was begun. Since that time, it had gradually improved to a point where the city is beginning to show the effects of the cleaning up campaign. It is still far from perfect, but plans are in action at this date to accomplish the complete job and have a city-wide collection system functioning by December 15th. Especial emphasis has been given from the first to areas occupied by our forces.

On 1 October, 1945 a survey was made of the hospitals, the numbers and quality of the doctors, the number of nurses and midwives, and other medical facilities to determine the damage from the atomic bombing. It was determined that there were no regular municipal hospitals functioning, and that the small hospitals of the numerous private doctors were in very bad state of disrepair. In addition, over 90% of the medicines and medical supplies which were not destroyed totally by the bombing, had been used up during the six weeks subsequent to the bombing to care for the more than 100,000 casualties of the bombing itself.

For the above reasons, it was felt that it was necessary to reestablish certain medical facilities through the Ken Headquarters and to set up a distribution system for the confiscated Japanese Army and Navy medical supplies found in the immediate area. To carry out these necessities, warehousing of all Japanese medical supplies was done in the Military Government warehouse, and plans were drawn up for the conversion of two school buildings into municipal hospitals, one to be the general hospital and the other the infectious disease hospital, and in addition the former Japanese Army hospital to be repaired under the direction of Military Government immediately, the expense to be carried totally by the Ken, which would act as a 100 bed (12 bassinette) receiving hospital for the poor of the city. As of this date, the two school buildings are nowhere near completion, and will probably be ready to open to receive patients not before 1 February, 1946. The hospital being repaired under Military Government direction to be known as Blair General Hospital will be ready to receive patients during the week of 20 November, 1945.

In addition to the above, the Japanese Naval

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
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (B) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT. (Cont'd).

Hospital at Omura has been set up by the Japanese Nagasaki Medical School, whose facilities in Nagasaki were totally destroyed, as the home of the Nagasaki Medical School, and will be able to receive as an evacuation hospital any chronic cases from Blair General Hospital.

Beginning on 15 October, 1945, a daily reporting system for communicable diseases was established in Nagasaki Shi, and this has since been extended to include Isahaya, Omura, Kumamoto, Shimabara, and Obama-Unzen.

With a view to overcoming the health hazard in this area presented by the presence of large numbers of the common mosquito vectors of malaria, Japanese encephalities, dengue, and filariasis, the Malaria Control Detachment (Army) which has been attached to this section has begun a sanitary cleanup of the city, as far as they are able to with their light equipment. Plans are in formulative stage for general cleaning up of the innumerable locations of mosquito breeding by the use of heavier equipment.

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*Functions of Ken Team for NAGASAKI presently being performed as additional duties by members of Division MG Staff. NOTE: (1) Ken Teams consist of four to six officers. (2) MG Sections consist of one or two officers.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (B)

PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT

1. Preliminary Planning and Training Phase

a. During the Preliminary Planning Phase the Division Military Police were largely occupied with routing duties. Company training was centered on duties of the company during combat. The Provost Marshal entered into the Preliminary Planning, along with the Military Government Section, and G-2, to provide for proper deployment of personnel of the Division, and to control contact with Japanese civilians.

2. Planning Phase.

a. Planning for the military Police include planning for combat functions in the initial stages, subject to final determination of opposition to be encountered during the landing. It was necessary to plan for Military Police to guard beach dumps, and to control traffic on the beaches, and inland to Regiments. Certain personnel of the Military Police Company were made available to the Shore Party Commander for these functions.

3. Embarkation.

a. Plans were made for augmenting the Division Military Police Company by a section of the 3rd MP Bn (Prov) when it became known that a company of that Battalion would be attached to the Division sometime after arrival at the Target Area.

b. (Div) MFCo embarked 10% understrength.

4. Movement to and Arrival at Target Area.

a. Because of the nature of the operation and the need for coordination of Military Police and infantry elements of the Division, control of the Military Police was passed to the G-3 section two (2) days before arrival at the Target Area.

5. Occupational Operations

a. An advance party of one (1) officer and eight (8) enlisted men from the Div MFCo landed on the morning of 24 September to establish security of the Div CP and effect a reconnais-

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APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (B) - PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT. (Cont'd).

sance of the city of Nagasaki and vicinity, with emphasis on traffic problems. The main body of the Div 1PCo landed 25 September and was deployed as follows:

- (1) Traffic Platoon - established traffic control on MSP; and in landing areas.
- (2) Prisoner of War Platoon - took over local security of Div CP and adjacent area, and established a P.C.V. collecting point and Division Brig.
- (3) Straggler Platoon - established a straggler line through the city in front of landing troops. Installed details in five (5) of the more important Japanese Police Stations.
- (4) Men from all platoons were used for guard duty on dumps and motor pools. Personnel were inadequate for the missions assigned.

b. This general plan was followed until the 1PCo's were organized and began to supplement the Div 1PCo by taking over partial traffic control and town patrols in Nagasaki, and within PCT zones of responsibility.

c. The straggler line was eventually consolidated around various restricted areas which were posted and patrolled by Military Police.

6. The Provost Marshal, upon establishment ashore, and after organization of the various Regimental 1PCo's, assumed a supervisory role over Military Police activities throughout Division area of Responsibility.

7. On 15 October, control of the Military Police was passed to the Hq. Commandant. On 7 November, the RCT 2 1PCo was relieved of all duties in the Nagasaki area by the 1st Bn., 10th Marines.

8. The investigation section was reestablished and concerned itself with the following types of cases:

a. Offenses committed by Allied personnel against personnel of Allied Governments.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX II(A) TO ANNEX (B)
DIVISION FIRE MARSHAL REPORT

1. Organization and Training.

a. On 13 October, approximately three weeks subsequent to initial landing at Nagasaki, a fire department comprised of Marine personnel was organized. The unit, consisting of one (1) officer and thirteen (13) enlisted men functions separately, but in cooperation with Japanese fire fighters.

b. Equipment includes two (2) motorized pump engines, procured from the Japanese government. Individual extinguishers were found to be in poor condition and all equipment had been generally neglected.

c. Regular classes are held in pump operation, ladder drill and maintenance. Prescribed routes to critical areas have been designated; all billets and storage spaces have been inspected; and fire drill is held regularly for troops. Each regiment and separate battalion has designated a fire marshal who works in conjunction with the division fire marshal.

d. In addition to responding to alarms in U. S. Government installations, the Fire Department renders assistance in combatting fires in Japanese owned structures whenever circumstances require.

2. Operations subsequent to landing.

a. To date, the unit has responded to six (6) fire calls. Only one of the fires - a warehouse, was of prime importance. Fire hydrants are practically nonexistent and it is necessary to pump water from whatever source is available. Even in those areas where hydrants are found, water pressure is inefficient for effective fire fighting.

b. It has been noted that Japanese are relatively slow in responding to fire calls, and usually arrive at the scene of a fire much later than does this Marine unit.

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APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (B) -- PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT. (Cont'd).

b. Offenses committed by Allied personnel against Japanese nationals or the Japanese Government.

c. Offenses by Japanese against Allied personnel or Allied Governments were referred to the Military Government Section.

10. The Table of Organization for a Div MPCo was soon found to be both inadequate and impractical for the mission assigned.

11. For employment and functioning of the PCT MPCo's, see operation reports of the several PCT's.

12. The following recommendations are made:

a. That the Provost Marshal's Office and the Div MPCo be organized as follows:

- | | |
|---|------------------|
| (1) Headquarters section (Adm., Mess, Provost Marshal's Office and Property). | 40 enl. - 2 Off. |
| (2) Traffic Platoon | 50 enl. - 2 Off. |
| (3) Straggler Platoon | 50 enl. - 2 Off. |
| (4) Prison Platoon (Including P.O.W.) | 50 enl. - 1 Off. |
| (5) Investigation & Vice Control. | 15 enl. - 2 Off. |

b. That the Div MPCo be commanded by an officer of the rank of Major, with additional duty as Division Provost Marshal.

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APPENDIX III TO ANNEX (B)

SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT

I. ATHLETICS, RECREATION, AND SUPPLY.

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATION:

In anticipation of a future assault operation, which was later thought to be a possible operation of occupation, the following general preparations were made:

(a) Meetings of Units Special Services Officers were held to discuss problems and plans for athletics, recreation, and supply needs.

(b) Bulletins were issued pertaining to organization, schedules, and supplies.

(c) Athletic and recreation gear was distributed, and additional gear requisitioned.

(d) Sufficient reasonably up-to-date films were obtained to provide a three-weeks schedule for the main Units of the Division.

(e) Interest was stimulated in the organization of Unit Shows, for the entertainment of Division Units.

2. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING:

The following operations relative to athletics, recreation, and supply have been conducted since arrival in Japan:

(a) General:

(1) A general survey has been made of existing facilities by Division Special Services Officers, and Unit Special Services Officers.

(2) A minimum of suitable buildings and storage spaces were secured by the Division for Special Services Offices and supplies upon arrival. Subsequently, this condition has improved due to added facilities.

(3) Division and Unit Special Services Officers attended a two-day conference at Headquarters, VAC, on Education and its relation to the whole morale program.

(4) Two details of Officers and Enlisted Men, selected for capabilities in special service activities, were instructed at a Special Services School conducted by VAC.

(5) The Division Special Services Officer, or his representatives, have contacted all Division, and

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 APPENDIX III TO ANNEX (B) - SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT. (Cont'd).

attached Units to ascertain general conditions relating to athletics, recreation, and supply.

(b) Athletics:

(1) Suitable athletic fields have been constructed within the Division.

(2) A detail of officers is attending a special school, pertaining to athletics at Osaka. This school is being conducted by the Sixth Army.

(3) Schedules for various types of athletic competition have been prepared.

(c) Recreation:

(1) A Motion Picture schedule was in operation after the first week subsequent to arrival in Japan. By exchange of film on hand, this schedule has been maintained.

(2) Numerous suitable installations in all areas for the showing of Motion pictures, and other entertainment have been utilized.

(3) A Taxi-Dance Hall has been established in Nagasaki, and others are planned in other areas occupied by this Division.

(4) Recreation Halls are being constructed in all Division Areas.

(5) Arrangements have been made for sight-seeing tours of Buddhist Temples and Shrines throughout the Division areas. Interpreters will act as guides.

(6) Rest Camps for the Division are being surveyed.

(7) The "Stars and Stripes", when received, have been distributed insofar as practicable.

(8) There have been two performances of the USO Show "Kiss and Tell" in the Division Theater, Nagasaki.

(d) Supply:

(1) Christmas Cards in the amount of 100,000 have been printed and distributed to Division and Attached Units.

(2) Representatives of Special Services have contacted Special Services representatives at Sasebo and Okinawa to obtain additional materials.

3. COMMENTS:

(a) No athletic and recreational supplies have been received since landing, prior to special trips to Sasebo,

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APPENDIX III TO ANNEX (B) - SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT. (Cont'd).

and Okinawa.

(b) No facilities for a Motion Picture Exchange have been established in Kyushu since the arrival of troops.

(c) There is a serious lack of projector parts, (lamps, exciter bulbs, etc.), affecting the successful showing of Motion Pictures. These have been requisitioned without avail.

(d) Local electric power has proved inadequate for operation of radios issued by Special Services.

(e) One USO Show has been obtained. A real lack of adequate facilities to accommodate feminine members of the casts exists.

II. EDUCATION AND INFORMATION.

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATION:

Prior to cessation of hostilities, and later in anticipation of occupation duty, the following preparations were made for an extended Education program.

(a) A survey of the current program with recommendation for expansion was made.

(b) The following materials were requisitioned: 7,000 text books for unit classes, school supplies (pencils, paper, etc.), application blanks and standard forms, guidance materials (catalogs).

(c) Unit Education organizations were strengthened.

(d) Units were advised on methods of organizing the materials.

(e) Surveys of educational interest were encouraged in all Units and conducted in some.

(f) Bulletins, memoranda, and other materials were issued to assist Unit Education Officers in their preparations.

2. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING:

The following operations have been conducted by the Division Education and Information Office subsequent to landing:

(a) Recommendations were made to the G-1 section on the basic program under occupation conditions.

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APPENDIX III TO ANNEX (B) - SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT. (Cont'd).

(b) A meeting of all Unit Education Officers was held and plans were outlined and basic materials distributed. Unit classes were directed.

(c) Approximately 2,000 of the 3,000 text books received on requisition were distributed for use in Unit classes.

(d) School was established and supplies were and are still being procured locally. Distributions have been made as available.

(e) A meeting at VAC to outline the Army Education Training program was directed. Division Special Services Officers attended this meeting.

(f) Classes are under way in Units furthering Educational program. Total enrollment is approximately 1,000 within the Division, and attached Units.

3. COMMENTS:

(a) Lack of adequate text books has been one of the factors impeding more rapid organization of classes. Of 7,000 texts requisitioned, only 3,000 have been received.

(b) In view of the contemplated expansion of the Education program as promulgated, additional personnel are required to carry out this feature.

III. PERSONAL AFFAIRS.

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATION:

In anticipation of Occupation and the expected discharge of personnel, the following plans were made:

(a) A survey was made of information available and the requesting of the latest material available for distribution.

(b) Materials on hand was distributed to all Division and attached Units.

(c) Organization of a program was partially completed prior to departure from Saipan.

2. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING:

The following operations relative to Personal Affairs have been conducted subsequent to arrival in Japan.

(a) Organization of program was completed and additional materials were secured and distributed in kits to all

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APPENDIX III TO ANNEX (B) - SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT. (Cont'd).

Division and attached Units.

(b) Transcriptions of the G. I. Bill Rights has been scheduled for all Units. Lectures, bulletin boards, and interviews have been aids to presenting information.

(c) All Division and attached Units are being visited by Special Services Officers.

(d) A meeting at VAC to outline the Personnel Affairs program was directed, and was attended by Special Services Officers.

SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
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1 December 1945.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX (B)

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT REPORT

1. Because of shipping uncertainties immediately prior to the operation, it was difficult for the Headquarters Commandant to plan, other than tentatively, for movement of the command post. When shipping was allocated and did arrive, however, it was found to be practicable to boat almost the entire headquarters organization on the command ship.
2. Staff offices were in operation aboard ship at least six hours before it was necessary to close offices at the former command post.
3. Arrived at the Target, the Headquarters Commandant, in conjunction with the Chief of Staff and the Signal Officer, made tentative selection of a command post located adjacent to the docks. The building selected was large and in reasonably good condition, and had served as the Nagasaki Customs House.
4. In this connection, it is pointed out that hardly a structure in Nagasaki escaped effects of the atomic bomb - a fact which complicated the location of suitable billeting space for personnel.
5. Advance reconnaissance personnel had located and secured a sizeable building for quartering headquarters personnel. This building proved inadequate for proper housing, and units were separated and moved to other billets as they were provided.
6. Practically every building procured was without windows and was in bad repair, resulting in unavoidable delay in their use as adequate billeting space. This condition was accentuated by the inaccessible approaches to the buildings. Roadways are steep, narrow and were designed for pedestrian traffic. The problem of supply and of garbage disposal has been difficult and has necessitated extensive use of Japanese labor to make carriage by hand.
7. Necessary separation of units of Headquarters Battalion spread troops over a wide area and hindered control in the initial phases of the landing.
8. Each billet was organized under its own plan of defense, and the whole was integrated with the defense plan of the regiment in control of the area.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF
IN THE FIELD.

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1 December 1945.

APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (B)

ADJUTANT'S REPORT

1. Preparation and planning.

a. The sudden end of the war with Japan injected so many unusual factors into the administrative end of the division that very few if any valid deductions could be drawn from the occupation insofar as being of any value to future operations. The entire cause for this unusual situation was the point system for discharge and the entire occupation of Japan up until this date has revolved around this one question from the administrative end.

b. On 31 July 1945, fifteen days prior to the end of the war, and one week before the dropping of the first atomic bomb this division received Letter of Instruction 075, which gave the first indication that the Marine Corps was contemplating any sort of demobilization. It was reiterated that action was imminent and that information desired was for planning purposes only. In view of this and of the approaching Olympic operation, no serious thought was given to this letter other than furnishing the desired information. Simultaneously with the close of the war a warning was received stating that this division could expect to take part in the occupation of Japan.

Two days after receipt of this warning order FMF Pac dispatch 24011 was received directing that action be taken on MARCORPS dispatch 212252 which stated that all men with 85 or more discharge credits would be transferred to the United States for processing and discharge down to 90% of TO strength.

The above factors necessarily limited proper planning by this section for the occupation of Japan. However, steps were taken to include the following points:

- (1) Casualty reporting.
- (2) Speedy routing of dispatches during a combat operation.
- (3) Operation with or without a rear echelon.

(c) Equipment necessary for combat:

One factor from an administrative point of view is the difficulty of operating without a rear echelon, inasmuch as this division did go into the operation without such an echelon. The following factors had to be accounted for:

- (1) The possibility of operating in a combat situation.
- (2) The administering of the division in the forward area.
- (3) The lack of shipping and office space aboard ship to have all files and equipment available during the voyage to the target.

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APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (B) - ADJUTANT'S REPORT. (Cont'd).

- (4) The desire of the Navy to withdraw shipping from the target as soon as possible.

In an attempt to solve some of the above problems the following steps were taken:

- (1) Adjutant's section gear was divided into that absolutely necessary to the division for a period of 3 weeks and that which could be disposed with for that period.
- (2) The necessary equipment was placed in the troop space and the other was stowed in the hold.
- (3) The troops space gear had to be again divided into that which would be necessary for combat and that which would not be needed in combat.
- (4) Follows a breakdown of equipment and men.

(a) Equipment necessary for 3 week period:

4 typewriters
4 field desk (fully equipped with stationery) with chairs.
1 alphabetical roster of entire division
1 skeleton Ellis-Dran File in locker box
1 Blackout Tent
1 Jeep

(b) Personnel for 3 week period:

1 Captain - Adjutant
1 Lieutenant - Casualty Report Officer
1 Sergeant Major
4 Clerks, correspondence
4 Runners

(c) Equipment necessary for combat:

2 typewriters (field)
2 field desks
1 Blackout Tent
1 Jeep

(d) Personnel necessary for combat:

1 Captain - Adjutant
1 Lieutenant - Casualty Report Officer
1 Sergeant Major
3 Clerks, casualty report
2 Clerks, correspondence
4 Runners

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APPENDIX V TO ANNEX (B) - ADJUTANT'S REPORT. (Cont'd)

The above breakdown of personnel and equipment was found to be satisfactory and no serious difficulty occurred.

2. Operations subsequent to landing.

a. No attempt will be made to narrate the activities of this section during the occupation phase inasmuch as only routine administration was carried on in addition to transferring personnel to the United States for discharge. A separate report on demobilization by this division will be submitted at a later date.

b. One point however is worthwhile mentioning at this time incident to the occupation - the great distances involved, aggravated by faulty telephone communication. This was solved by two expedients:

- (1) The use of OY aircraft as special couriers
- (2) Close liaison between the Division Message Center and the Division Adjutant for radio communication.

3. Comments and recommendations.

Any far flung or new recommendations from the adjutant's section at this time would be premature. However, one fact stands out insofar as the adjutant's duties in routing correspondence to other members of the staff.

a. Many staff sections which heretofore have had relatively little importance in the war time staff structure have assumed new duties in occupation - namely, military government, provost marshal, disposition, and procurement. Very often these officers are not trained in staff procedure, or being from either the Army or Navy, are not familiar with Marine Corps staff work.

In view of the foregoing it is strongly recommended that frequent and thorough staff conferences be held so as to acquaint all members of the staff with their duties and responsibilities and to establish a better liaison between staff sections.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FIFTH
IN THE FIELD.

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1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VI- TO ANNEX (B)

POST OFFICE REPORT

I. Planning and Preparation.

1. Plans were made prior to embarkation to deliver mail at target through normal channels in the event of an assault landing and combat ashore. Post office personnel was instructed accordingly.

2. During embarkation, mail was delivered aboard ship. Embarkation rosters were used in sorting the mail according to ships.

II. Operations Subsequent To Landing.

1. After the division reached Nagasaki on 23 September, 1945, the first mail was obtained from a seaplane tender in Nagasaki harbor on 25 September, and delivery to addressees was begun the same day. Additional mails were obtained from the tender on 26, 27 and 29 September. After that date Nagasaki was left without direct air mail service and incoming and outgoing airmail was routed through Sasebo, the nearest air terminal. Destroyer Escorts were used to transport the mails between Sasebo and Nagasaki, semi-weekly service being provided. On occasions, Sasebo received no Nagasaki mail for four or more consecutive days. When the mail failed to reach Sasebo until after the third or fourth day, it failed to connect with semi-weekly DE and left Nagasaki without mail for a full week.

2. Commencing 15 October, 1945, the division began exchanging mail with Sasebo each day by utilizing military coaches on the Japanese railway. Two post office clerks accompany the mail, leaving Nagasaki at 0657, arriving Sasebo at 0945; leaving Sasebo at 1435, and arriving Nagasaki 1746. These clerks transport incoming and outgoing letter mail for all Army, Navy and Marine personnel in the Nagasaki area.

3. During their stay at Sasebo between arrival and departure of daily trains, the clerks sort the division's mail sufficiently to permit them to make delivery to units at Omura and Isahaya on the return trip. Postal clerks from those units meet the train and take possession of the mail directly from the clerks aboard the train.

4. Mail for those elements of the division located at Kumamoto, Kagoshima, Omuta and Kanoya was also segregated at Sasebo and left with the postal clerks meeting the train at Isahaya. These clerks delivered the mail to VPOC pilots leaving Isahaya at 0700 the following morning for Kumamoto, Kanoya, etc.

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 APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX (B) - POST OFFICE REPORT. (Cont'd).

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5. Parcel post, registered mail and official funds were exchanged once a week between the division and the outlying units such as those at Kumamoto by having the clerks from the units make a weekly trip by rail to the division post office at Nagasaki.

6. By 11 November, 1945, the personnel at outlying points had increased to such an extent that air transportation of mail by VMO-2 planes was discontinued for lack of plane capacity.

7. To replace the airmail service to the outlying units, as well as the weekly exchange of parcel post, registered mail and official funds by rail, a postal car was set up in a combination baggage car-coach on 13 November, 1945. This car is in charge of two armed post office clerks. It is scheduled to leave Nagasaki for Miyakonojo every third day, and make direct exchanges with post office clerks at Omuta, Kumamoto, Hitoyoshi and Miyakonojo. Mail for units stationed at Kanoya, Miyazaki and Shibushi is left with the post office unit at Miyakonojo, and those units exchange with Miyakonojo. At the present time, the units at Kagoshima exchange with their next higher echelon at Kumamoto.

8. When the volume warrants, direct cars of parcel post will be made up for Kumamoto, Kagoshima, Miyakonojo, Kanoya and Miyazaki.

III. Recommendations.

1. There has always been an abnormal demand for embossed air mail envelopes during the early phase of assault operations, commercial stationery being unavailable. The same condition prevailed during the occupational operation. The volume of outgoing parcels was larger than during any phase of an assault operation; consequently, more large-denomination stamps were needed. Stamp stock actually sold by the division during the month of October was as follows:

2,300	@	1¢	-	23.00
3,600	@	2¢	-	72.00
3,200	@	3¢	-	96.00
4,700	@	5¢	-	235.00
7,400	@	10¢	-	740.00
2,700	@	15¢	-	405.00
5,800	@	20¢	-	1,160.00
4,600	@	25¢	-	1,150.00

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APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX (B) - POST OFFICE REPORT. (Cont'd).

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700	@	30¢	-	210.00
2,700	@	50¢	-	1,350.00
3,450	@	\$1	-	3,450.00
100	@	13¢(SD)	-	13.00
142,300	@	6¢(AM)	-	8,538.00
126,000	@	6¢(AM)	-	7,665.00(In book form)
172,500	AM Env. @			
	\$63.16 per M		-	10,895.10
TOTAL.....				\$36,002.10

2. The problem of transporting airmail envelopes to target in such way as to prevent the gummed flaps from adhering to the body of the envelope was solved in the Okinawa and Nagasaki operations by packing the envelopes in Wilson drums, ten thousand envelopes and three bags of moisture-absorbent per drum. Adhesion which formerly resulted from exposure to rainfall, too hot, humid atmosphere, and from pressure exerted by other cargo was totally eliminated and the envelopes reached destination in perfect condition.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

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1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B)

LEGAL OFFICE REPORT

I. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

There was no preliminary planning done by the legal office. The functioning of said office was normal. Captain Anthony S. E. Bone relieved Captain George S. Green on August 25, 1945, as Division Legal Officer.

II. PLANNING PHASE.

The work of the legal office was carried on as usual except that 50% of the office equipment was crated for loading so as to cause no delay, since the legal office was on a twenty-four hour standby.

III. EMBARKATION PLAN.

There were two general court martial cases already tried but the records thereof to be completed at the time of embarkation. The necessary office equipment to complete the pending records of the two general court martial cases was brought aboard ship with the office personnel. While enroute to the division destination, the records of the two cases were completed. On hand with the office personnel aboard ship were the necessary material to render legal assistance to the complement of the ship.

IV. OPERATION SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING.

a. On D plus 1 day, the legal office was set for normal operation. All pending work was expedited.

b. The legal officer has operated since D plus 1 day without an assistant legal officer. Captain Clay Nixon, who is division assistant legal officer has been engaged in two naval general court martial cases without being able to devote any of his time to division legal affairs.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B) - LEGAL OFFICE REPORT.

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GENERAL COURT MARTIAL

There have been a total of 28 general court martial cases during the period beginning June 26, 1945, to and including November 30, 1945.

The above mentioned 28 general court martials include the following offenses:

SLEEPING UPON HIS WATCH - - - - -	5
LEAVING HIS POST WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY RELIEVED - - - - -	2
VIOLATION OF A LAWFUL REGULATION ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - - - - -	1
STEALING PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE NAVAL SERVICE THEREOF - - - - -	3
WRONGFULLY AND KNOWINGLY DISPOSING OF PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE NAVAL SERVICE THEREOF - - - - -	1
WRONGFULLY AND KNOWINGLY DISPOSING OF ARMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE NAVAL SERVICE THEREOF - - - - -	2
WILFULLY DESTROYING PROPERTY - - - - -	1
KNOWINGLY AND WILFULLY APPLYING TO HIS OWN USE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE NAVAL SERVICE THEREOF - - - - -	6
FAILING TO USE HIS UTMOST EXERTIONS TO DETECT, APPREHEND, AND BRING TO PUNISHMENT AN OFFENDER - - - - -	2
VIOLATION OF A LAWFUL GENERAL ORDER ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - - - - -	1
DRUNKENNESS - - - - -	7
CARELESSLY ENDANGERING LIVES OF OTHERS - - - - -	1
CONDUCT TO THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE - - - - -	6
STRIKING ANOTHER PERSON IN THE NAVY - - - - -	1
BREAKING ARREST - - - - -	1

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B) - LEGAL OFFICE REPORT.

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GENERAL COURT MARTIAL (Cont'd)

AWOL -----	3
DESERTING HIS STATION AND DUTY IN TIME OF BATTLE -----	1
DESERTION IN TIME OF WAR -----	1
FALSEHOOD -----	3
CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN -----	4
DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE TO HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER -----	1
TREATING HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER WITH CONTEMPT -----	1
THREATENING TO STRIKE HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER -----	1
STRIKING HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER WHILE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE -----	1
WRONGFULLY AND KNOWINGLY SELLING PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE MILITARY SERVICE THEREOF -----	1
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER -----	1

TOTAL FENSES 58

ENCLOSURE (B) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B) - LEGAL OFFICE REPORT.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY COURT MARTIAL

	OFFENSES
AWOL - - - - -	58
ENTERING RESTRICTED AREA - - - - -	30
UNDER INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR - - - - -	6
SELLING WHISKEY - - - - -	1
HAVING INTOXICATING LIQUOR IN HIS POSSESSION - - - - -	7
DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS - - - - -	25
SLEEPING ON WATCH - - - - -	9
ENDANGERING LIVES OF OTHERS - - - - -	2
NEGLECT IN HANDLING OF WEAPON - - - - -	4
APPLYING TO HIS OWN USE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE USE OF THE NAVAL SERVICE THEREOF - - - - -	6
LEAVING POST WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY RELIEVED - - - - -	3
PETTY PILFERING - - - - -	2
DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE TO HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER - - - - -	9
FALSEHOOD - - - - -	2
BREAKING ARREST - - - - -	2
RESISTING ARREST - - - - -	4

TOTAL OFFENSES 169

NOTE: The total offenses listed does not indicate total SCM cases.

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DECK COURT MARTIAL

	OFFENSES
AWOL - - - - -	71
AOL - - - - -	10
ENTERING RESTRICTED AREA - - - - -	60
UNDER INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR - - - - -	1
SELLING WHISKEY - - - - -	1
HAVING WHISKEY IN HIS POSSESSION - - - - -	2
DRINKING WHISKEY AS A BEVERAGE - - - - -	3
DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS - - - - -	28
USING OBSCENE LANGUAGE AND DISRESPECTFUL IN LANGUAGE TO HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER - - - - -	19
NEGLECT OF DUTY - - - - -	15
STRIKING ANOTHER PERSON IN THE SERVICE - - - - -	1
ENDANGERING LIVES OF OTHERS - - - - -	11
APPLYING TO HIS OWN USE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED FOR THE USE OF THE NAVAL SERVICE THEREOF - - - - -	3
FALSEHOOD - - - - -	1
BREAKING ARREST - - - - -	1
RECKLESS DRIVING - - - - -	1
WEARING IMPROPER UNIFORM - - - - -	1
CREATING DISTURBANCE - - - - -	1
PETTY PILFERING - - - - -	2
USING LIBERTY CARD OF ANOTHER - - - - -	1

TOTAL OFFENSES 233

NOTE: The total offenses listed does not
include total DC cases.

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ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B) - LEGAL OFFICE REPORT

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LEGAL ASSISTANCE

ACTIVITY: 2ndMarDiv

PERIOD C. REPORT:

NAME OF LEGAL

From: Jun45

ASSISTANCE OFFICER: A. S. E. BONO

To: Nov45

ADDRESS OF LEGAL

ASSISTANCE OFFICE: Hq, 2ndMarDiv

DETAILS OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE RENDERED

	Oral Advice	Corres- pondence	Document Prepared	Referred to Civil ian Atty	TOTAL
AGENCY					
Powers of atty., etc.	30	3	52		85
CONTRACTS	2				
DOMESTIC RELATIONS	92	2	7	16	117
ESTATES					
Admin., probate, etc.	5		1		6
INSURANCE	9				9
LANDLORD AND TENANT					
Leases, eviction, etc.	1				1
PERSONS					
Citizenship, insanity	5				
REAL ESTATE					
Deeds, mtgs., etc.	5		5		10
SOLDIERS' & SAILORS'					
RELIEF ACT	2				2
TAXATION					
(income, local)	1				
WILLS					
(prep. & drafting)	9		7		16
MISCELLANEOUS	17				17
TOTALS	178	5	72	16	

GRAND TOTAL 271

Civilian bar cooperation: EXCELLENT

Number civilian attorneys to
whom matters have been referred: 16

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ENCLOSURE (E) TO APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (B) - LEGAL OFFICE REPORT.

BOARD OF INVESTIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS

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1. Boards of Investigation convened within this command during period beginning 26 June, 1945, to and including 30 November, 1945: TOTAL 8.

2. Administrative Reports within this command during period beginning 26 June, 1945, to and including 30 November, 1945: TOTAL 23.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (B)
PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT

1. Preparation and planning for the operation.

Acting on instructions from VAC, plans were made to accommodate eight (8) civilian war correspondents for the assault operation. Arrangements were made with interested sections for their billeting, messing and transportation. About 20 August work was begun on a Division Press Book to serve as a reference for the civilian correspondents and for the Public Information Section's personnel. The book, completed just prior to the Division's embarkation from Saipan, contains a history of the Division, of the three Regimental Combat Teams and of the Tenth Marines, as well as the names and biographical sketches of the Commanding General, the Assistant Division Commander, the executive staff officers of the Division, Divisional special staff section heads, the commanding officers and executive officers of all units through battalion levels, the commanding officers of all companies and twenty (20) Division "personalities". Preparation of the book, a bound volume complete with a two-color cover design by the Division's combat artist, entailed research into the unit histories to bring them up to date, interviews with all persons concerned, preparation of the biographical material, editing of all written material and considerable time in assembling and binding.

2. Training and organization.

Preparation of the press book, especially the interviewing involved, enabled the Combat Correspondents to become better acquainted with the units and the officers of the units with which they were to serve during the operation. Two weeks prior to the Division's embarkation from Saipan, the assignment of all men to the organizations with which

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (B) - PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT. (Cont'd).

they would serve during the operation was completed. The Public Information Officer, the Assistant Public Information Officer, one (1) Combat Correspondent (who could double as a battle broadcaster), one (1) Radio Technician, two (2) drivers and guides for the civilian correspondents and one (1) clerk were assigned to Division Headquarters. The Division Photographic Section was prepared to furnish photographic still and movie coverage at Division Headquarters as desired. Two (2) Combat Correspondents and one (1) Photographer were assigned to the Second, Sixth and Eighth Regimental Combat Teams; one (1) Combat Correspondent and one (1) Photographer to the Tenth Marines; one (1) Combat Correspondent and one (1) Combat Artist to the Second Engineer Battalion, and one (1) Combat Correspondent to the Second Pioneer Battalion.

3. Operations subsequent to landing.

a. The fact that the operation became one of occupation rather than combat necessitated little change in plans. All assignments of Correspondents and Photographers remained in force. The only change was in the type of material prepared. Instead of writing about, photographing and recording the fighting and deeds of individual Marines, the Combat Correspondents and Photographers were instructed to cover general aspects of the occupation. Correspondents were told to feature human-interest angles on Marines in their units and on the Japanese in their areas of occupation; the reaction of the Marines to the Japanese people and their customs and the experiences of liberated Allied nations internees. Stories about the atomic bomb were kept at a minimum since much of this material was of a technical nature

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (B) - PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT. (Cont'd).

and already had been covered extensively by civilian news agencies.

b. When the Division arrived on the 23rd of September, two Navy hospital ships already were in the area, evacuating liberated Allied prisoners. Two (2) Combat Correspondents and two (2) Photographers were ordered to these ships to interview and write stories about the Marines aboard who had just been released from Japanese prison camps. The audience granted by the Commanding General to local Japanese officials for the purpose of issuing orders concerning the occupation was covered aboard the command ship by writers, photographers and recording technicians.

c. The anticipation that eight (8) civilian correspondents would accompany the Division on the operation never materialized; civilian correspondents who later visited the Division ascribed this to a lack of information in Tokyo about the operation, and to the Navy's announcement that correspondents would soon revert to civilian status, which led most of them to begin making plans to return to the United States. As a result, there was no civilian press coverage of the initial phase of the operation, and all news stories, photographs, art work, and radio programs on the landing and on subsequent events were produced by the Division's Public Information personnel. In late October and November, however, civilian correspondents began visiting the Division area, and the Public Information Section provided guides, transportation, information and other services to representatives of the British Paramount Newsreel Company, the London Daily Sketch, Australian newspapers, the North American Newspaper Alliance and the Boston Globe (the latter a former Combat

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (B) - PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT. (Cont'd)

Correspondent who had served with the Division during the Taraw and Seipan operations.

d. During the time covered by this report, the Public Information Section has forwarded to Washington, D.C., for distribution to the nation's news services, newspapers, magazines, radio networks, radio stations and art exhibits the following material: a total of two hundred and seventy-seven (277) news and feature stories, one hundred and two (102) of which were accompanied by photographs; sixty-six (66) photographs with captions; thirty-seven (37) 50-foot magazines of 16mm. Kodachrome film and four (4) 100-foot magazines of 16mm. Kodachrome film, a total of 2,250 feet of film; six (6) film packs of Kodak Super XX; eleven (11) sheets of Kodachrome 4x5 film; four (4) hours of magnetic wire recordings containing thirteen (13) different radio programs; fifteen (15) water color paintings and thirty-six (36) pen and ink and pencil sketches.

4. Comments and recommendations

a. The work of the Combat Correspondents, Photographers, Artists, Technicians and Clerks of this section was done well. The sudden change from war to peace, the sudden change in the type of material available for news stories, photographs and recordings, did not decrease the amount or lower the quality of the work turned in. Because higher echelons instructed this section to forward its material to three different addresses and because two of these addresses were not provided with Marine Corps Public Information liaison officers, much of the material was needlessly delayed. Also, the unexplained slowness of mail service, causing material prepared by

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (B) - PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT.(Cont'd).

this office to arrive at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, as much as 23 days after it was posted here, has greatly affected the value of much of this material.

b. Acting on advice from various Marine Divisions, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, has announced its intention of reducing the Public Information Section of a Marine Division to one officer, four enlisted correspondents and one artist. It is recommended that this reduction be effected immediately, as the amount of valuable Public Information work which can be done in this Division no longer requires a section of the present strength. It is recommended, also, however, that the Public Information Section still be allowed the services of two photographers provided by the Division's Photographic Section, and be assigned one driver and one clerk provided by Division Headquarters Company.

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (B) - PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORT.(Cont'd).

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