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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX (E)

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

a. Planning - The diversity of probable types of employment of motor transport within a combat or occupation mission, it was the plan of this division to attach one (1) platoon of a Truck Company, Motor Transport Battalion to each Regimental Combat Team, for assistance in manning regimental supply trains. The remainder of Motor Transport Battalion cargo vehicles were to form a motor pool for the division supply train. This pool was to be supplemented, the tactical situation permitting, by organic 2½-ton cargo vehicles of other units within the division. During the ship-to-shore phase, all vehicles were to be placed under the control of the Division Shore Party Commander; upon completion of this phase organic vehicles would return to unit control, and vehicles comprising the Division Motor Pool would be returned to the control of the Commanding Officer, Motor Transport Battalion, under whose supervision such pool would be maintained and operated. Each Shore Party Group was to be furnished, from MTBn., a liaison officer who would land with Group Headquarters and assist the Groups Commander in the control and employment of transportation. Maintenance (3rd echelon and limited 4th echelon) would be provided for by attaching an Automotive Repair Platoon from Automotive Repair Company, Motor Transport Battalion, to each Regimental Combat Team. The remainder of the Automotive Repair Company would perform 3rd and 4th echelon repairs on all Division vehicles, less those organically part of an RCT.

b. Preparation - In accordance with directives from higher echelon, all vehicles of this division were prepared for deep-water fording, insofar as kits, therefore, were available. Difficulty was experienced with the type of fording kit furnished (WV-6-A) and after testing, it was decided not to use these kits as they rendered vehicles inoperable by causing undue condensation on electrical parts and resultant "Shorting-out". In addition, normal engine temperatures were found to melt the asbestos compound contained in these kits. All motor transport of this division was in "combat condition" prior to embarkation, despite the fact that some vehicles of the Second Motor Transport Battalion were used, literally, the day of embarkation. Policy of this division makes mandatory a ten per cent daily preventive maintenance "deadline", in addition to normal mechanical deadlines - a fact which contributed greatly to

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX (E) (Cont'd)

the "up-to-the-minute" readiness of its Motor Transport.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. Training - All unit training directives encompassed comprehensive driver-training schedules, with emphasis on driver-maintenance personnel was conducted by all organizations within the Division that were charged with maintenance responsibility of 3rd echelon, or above. Practically, up until the cessation of hostilities very little training of maintenance specialists was required, inasmuch as selective-service personnel were being received as replacements, who were highly skilled in their particular specialties, prior to induction. In cases of personnel whose abilities and proper experience classified them as "helpers", they were apprenticed to more highly skilled men and, eventually, were developed into thoroughly competent personnel in the specialty for which they were trained. At the present time, discharges have created an acute shortage of skilled maintenance personnel, and due to volume of work to be performed and shortage of personnel, it is virtually impossible to institute any comprehensive training program designed to qualify the almost totally unskilled personnel being received as replacements.

b. Organization - On 20 July, 1945, the Second Motor Transport Battalion was ordered organized in accordance with the "G" Tables of Organization. The increase of total personnel (approximately 34%) over the "F" T/O, was to be supplied, principally, by transfers from other organizations within the Division. Approximately 62% of this increase is made up by authorization of additional maintenance personnel; the other 38% consisting of drivers and administrative personnel occasioned by the authorization of an additional truck company. Overall, a Marine Division, under the "G" T/O, is authorized an increase of automotive maintenance personnel (excluding Ordnance SSN's) of about 27% over the "F" T/O. In view of the above reorganization, it was assumed that the Motor Transport Battalion was to assume responsibility for all 3rd echelon repairs, and accordingly, as reflected in task organizations for the assault on and the occupation of Japan, one (1) Automotive Repair Platoon of Automotive Repair Company, Second Motor Transport Battalion, was attached to each RCT, in addition to one (1) platoon of a truck company. The foregoing organization is in effect at the present time, except that each RCT now has attached to it an entire truck company of Second Motor Transport Battalion, leaving one (1) truck company for the Division Motor Pool.

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX (E)

3. OCCUPATION OPERATIONS

a. On 23 and 24 September, 1945, personnel and vehicles of the Second Motor Transport Battalion were landed at Nagasaki, and immediately commenced unloading operations. Companies "A", "B", and "C", thereof were engaged in debarkation operations of RCT-6, RCT-8, and RCT-2, respectively. On 25 September, "D" Company plus 2½-ton cargo and dump vehicles from Second Tank Battalion 3076th Army Eng. Dump Truck Company, Second Engineer Battalion, Second Pioneer Battalion, and 10th Marines, formed a 126 truck pool which was placed at the disposal of the Division Shore party Commander, and was operated under the immediate supervision of the Commanding Officer, 2dMTBn.

b. Ship unloading operations were substantially completed by 1 October, and control of the Division Motor Pool reverted to the Commanding Officer, 2dMTBn. Considerable difficulty was experienced in locating suitable truck park and dispatching facilities, and it is felt that an advance reconnaissance by the Division Motor Transport Officer, along with a representative of the Shore Party Commander, would have been of inestimable help in this respect. During the unloading period an average deadline of 10½ was experienced. Fire trouble was encountered to a greater than normal degree, due to debris-littered roads and the resultant "picking-up" of nails and metal fragments. During the first two weeks of operations, approximately 5000 "hot-patches" had been used, as a result of the foregoing conditions. On this basis, an initial supply of 6000 patches is recommended for similar operations.

c. As previously indicated, the Army Engineer Dump Truck Company, the 3076th, was placed under the operational control of the Commanding Officer, 2dMTBn. This organization joined Division on 23 September, 1945 and had an approximate complement of 4 officers, 104 enlisted, and 28 operative vehicles (Dump Trucks). The 3076th Eng. Dump Truck Co. was detached as of 10 October, 1945. On 29 September, 1945, the Division Motor Pool was further supplemented by the joining of the 3656th Army Quartermaster Truck Co., with a complement of 5 officers, 117 enlisted, and 43 operative 2½-ton cargo trucks.

d. As of 1 November, 1945, due to the fact that the Second Marine Division had been given the responsibility of operating the port of Nagasaki, a "Ship Unloading" motor pool was ordered formed, under the direction of the Commanding Officer, 2dMTB. The complement of this pool follows:

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX (E) (Cont'd).

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>2$\frac{1}{2}$-ton CARGO TRUCKS</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
3656 Army QM Truck Co.	12		25
2nd Tank Bn.	15		31
10th Marines	<u>33</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>72</u>
	60	1	128

Maintenance responsibility, for the aforementioned pool, has been assumed by 2dMFBn.

e. Generally speaking, operational and maintenance facilities, at the present time, are as complete as personnel limitations will permit. Adequate motor vehicle replacement part stocks are present, and due to a resupply shipment recently received, (30 October, 1945), it has been possible to effect replacement of unserviceable vehicles.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Personnel - It is the belief of the undersigned that the "G" T/O provides adequate personnel for proper manning and maintaining of motor transport equipment within a Marine Division provided that actual strength can be maintained at no less than 90% of authorized. The burden of Motor Transport under the present occupation mission, has been increased disproportionately, as compared to previous garrison functions, due to widespread separation of units and repair facilities. The attendant and obvious difficulties of this situation make it mandatory that trained repair personnel, especially, be given prior consideration in requests for replacements.

b. Supply, Equipment and Logistics. Mounting out needs immediately prior to the present mission were adequately filled, insofar as both vehicles and replacement parts were concerned. Certain minor deficiencies existed, but were in no way of such magnitude as to affect seriously, present operations.

c. As of the present, spare-parts stocks are entirely adequate and vehicular equipment is present in sufficient numbers to accomplish the mission. Hand tool stocks, to a certain extent, have been depleted, and it is hoped that they will be included in the forthcoming resupply shipment. Some difficulty has been experienced in providing attached Army units with automotive spare-parts. Requisitions have been submitted to 8th Field Service Regiment for these parts and attempts apparently, are being made to obtain them from the nearest Army sources. This situation, is not, at present, critical because of Army Organizations being equipped with all new or near-new equipment.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

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1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (E)

SHORE PARTY REPORT

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

a. The organic equipment of the Pioneer Battalion has been chosen for its usefulness on and in the vicinity of the beach in expediting the movement across the beach of the men, equipment and material of the landing force. Where the landing is unopposed and pier and ramp facilities of a harbor are available the equipment required is much the same. The operations as they concern shore party troops are essentially the same whether or not opposition is met. Consequently in preparing and planning for the occupation, no change was made in the equipment to be carried or in the functional training of the personnel involved.

b. The Naval Construction Battalion assigned to the division for shore party work was so trained and equipped that it could function as a duplicate of the Pioneer Battalion. As a result, no effort was made to use the Pioneer Battalion as the nucleus of the division shore party to be reinforced by the Construction Battalion. Instead each unit intact was prepared to function as a Regimental Combat Team shore party for each of the intended assault regiments.

c. All equipment was serviced and prepared for the operation and maintenance performed to continue it in a state of readiness throughout its use in the loading out phase of the operation.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. During the training stages, the division shore party was organized into two groups of three Shore Party Teams each. The Pioneer Battalion, trained in Shore Party Operations and organized to function as the nucleus of a Division Shore Party became Shore Party Group 1, to function with RCT-2. The Forty-third Naval Construction Battalion, trained in Shore Party Operations prior to attachment to the Division, became Shore Party Group 2, to function with RCT-6. Communications facilities were to be provided by the Second ASCO and the organic medical personnel of the Pioneers and the Naval Construction Battalion plus efforts of the Second Medical Battalion were to handle evacuation. Personnel from the Second Military Police company were operationally attached.

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (E) - SHORE PARTY REPORT. (Cont'd)

The Division Shore Party Headquarters was constituted by personnel from the following organizations: Second Service Battalion, Second Pioneer Battalion, Second Medical Battalion, Second ASCO, and the Forty-third Naval Construction Battalion. A readjustment in personnel numbers and in equipment was made between the Pioneer Battalion and Naval Construction Battalion in order that the two Shore Party Groups would be equal in strength and similarly equipped. When it appeared as though three Shore Party Groups would be required the following arrangements were decided upon: Shore Party Group 1, formed on two Pioneer companies; Shore Party Group 2, formed on two Naval Construction Battalion companies; Shore Party Group 3, formed on one Pioneer company, and one Naval Construction Battalion company. Facilities for embarking personnel and equipment did not precisely permit the flexibility this arrangement would indicate. However, it was planned that an equitable disposition of personnel and equipment could readily be made according to Shore Party needs at the target.

3. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS

a. All Shore Party cranes, lighting equipment and personnel were involved in loading out the Division. All Shore Party equipment was embarked aboard four LST's and the personnel of four Shore Party Teams were embarked on these same LST's. A fifth LST was available for transportation of Shore Party personnel, but its load was Naval Construction Battalion equipment of a nature other than that which could be used for Shore Party work. Three Pioneer dozers and operators were embarked aboard a Motor Transport Battalion LSM. The remaining Shore Party personnel, one complete Shore Party Team and excess personnel from teams embarked on Shore Party LST's were embarked aboard the USS Melette, an APA of RCT-2's shipping. The Division Shore Party Headquarters was embarked aboard the Division Command ship.

b. The actual landing involved two echelons of Shore Party organization. Personnel from the USS Melette landed about 1900, 23 September, 1945. Personnel from the Motor Transport Battalion LSM landed about 1400, 23 September, 1945, with equipment. The Shore Party LST's arrived at the target at 1400, 24 September, 1945.

c. Shore Party equipment landed in a pattern conforming to the landing of the personnel. Three Pioneer dozers landed and were employed immediately, 1400, 23 September, 1945. One Engineer crane landed about 1900, 23 September, 1945, and was employed on Dejima wharf.

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (E) - SHORE PARTY REPORT. (Cont'd)

All remaining Shore Party equipment arrived by 1400, 24 September, 1945, and was immediately disposed at the various landing points and dumps requiring its application.

d. The transports carrying the Division arrived at the target 24 hours prior to the arrival of the Shore Party LST's. The only available personnel of the Shore Party for unloading on the 23rd of September, 1945, were those embarked aboard the Melette. These were divided into two groups upon arrival at the beach and assigned to shipping of RCT-2 and RCT-6. Native labor and personnel of the RCT's brought the total labor involved in unloading and working the dump areas to approximately seven hundred per RCT.

e. RCT attached transportation was used in each instance. Only one T-9 Crane on Dejima wharf and a 12 ton hammerhead crane (Japanese) at Akunoura Engine works were available initially. Additional crane facilities, increased transportation, lighting equipment and personnel became available with the arrival of the Shore Party LST's.

f. When the two hospital ships initially tied up at Dejima wharf pulled off on the second day after the division landed, landing points were available or developed for continuous unloading as follows: Accommodations on the east side of the harbor included facilities for three AKA's, four LST's and many smaller craft unloading simultaneously; accommodations on the west side of the harbor included facilities for two AKA's, two LST's and many smaller craft unloading simultaneously. Rhino's were used in the latter stages of unloading from the seaward side of the AKA's.

g. Control of the Shore Party Operation was adapted to the circumstances of unloading at Nagasaki. All dump control was assumed by the S-4 of each RCT at the outset and continued thus, for all cargo allotted to RCT shipping was to be controlled by the RCT's. Traffic was controlled initially by the RCT MP's, and later by the Division MP's. Subsequently, the combat teams again took charge within their zones of responsibility. All boat control was via the transron, transdiv, and transport beach parties. A small boat pool was established under the Division Shore Party via the transron beach party. Control of this pool subsequently shifted to the Port Director via the garrison force boat pool officer. Transportation control was initially under RCT dispatchers until a Division Motor Pool was established under the Division Shore Party control.

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX (E) - SHORE PARTY REPORT. (Cont'd)

All Division unloading equipment was initially under group control, but for proper exploitation, a pool was established under the Division Shore Party control. Shore Party labor (Pioneer and Naval Construction Battalion) was under the control of the Shore Party Group commanders. All Native labor was under Division Shore Party control. RCT personnel worked under RCT representatives.

h. General unloading had begun about 1900, 23 September, 1945, and all ships of the transon were unloaded by 0900, 28 September, 1945. All LST's and LSM's assigned to the Division were completed at this time with the exception of LST 817, a VAC hospital unit that had arrived on 27 September, 1945.

4.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Unloading areas were extremely congested because of lack of storage area, enclosed warehouse space and parking area. Road conditions in the confines of Nagasaki were extremely poor and but slight improvement was possible without destroying Japanese houses immediately abutting the streets.

b. A much more expeditious handling of unloading under occupational conditions requires the Shore Party to arrive prior to the arrival of the Division to lay out and execute plans for the unloading of all shipping. Such preparations as they regard landing points, dumps, access roads and native labor, would increase unloading efficiency immeasurably.

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ANNEX (F)

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT

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GCR/rlm
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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

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From: The Division Signal Officer.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: Annex (F), Occupational Operations Report.

1. Planning Phase

a. The Signal Officer was given early access to the Operation Plans of higher echelons, which greatly facilitated signal planning within the Division. Preliminary information concerning items of Signal Operating Instructions and Corps Signal Plans was received from VAC Signal Officer in a conference at Saipan about the middle of July.

b. Tentative signal plans for the Division were prepared during August, and the final drafts were completed the first week in September. Last minute information was received from VAC Signal Officer on Mt. McKinley at Saipan on September 15th.

c. The frequency plan was adequate with but one exception: a VMO crystal frequency was not available for the Division Artillery Air Spot frequency and there was insufficient time to have crystals ground to the assigned frequency.

d. A conference of all regimental and separate battalion communication officers was held, just prior to embarkation, in which all points of the signal plan were covered.

2. Occupation Phase

a. Upon arrival Nagasaki, complete communication facilities with all elements of the Division went into operation aboard the Command Ship, U.S.S. Cambria. These consisted of medium frequency and VHF radio nets within the Division and medium frequency radio net to VAC, with a joint message center continuing in operation. These communications operated in excellent style, both during the time afloat and during ship to shore movement of the regiments and separate battalions.

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Subject: Annex (F), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

2. Occupation Phase (Cont'd)

b. As soon as practicable, the Signal Officer and the Signal Company Commander went ashore to make preliminary reconnaissance for the communication facilities for Division Headquarters and for the communication system within the Division. Wire and wire-laying equipment were unloaded as rapidly as possible and wire lines were begun, including trunk lines to the four regiments and the separate battalions and locals within the Division CP at the Customs House, Nagasaki, and other installations as necessary. By 26 September, complete Division wire system had been installed and was operating, although it was found necessary to requisition two Japanese commercial; open-wire lines from Nagasaki to Isahaya in order to have telephone communication with the two regiments at Isahaya.

c. Vehicular radio sets were moved ashore on 24 September and on the 25th the complete Division radio network was set up with the forward echelon stations ashore operating in the nets. Due to the distance separating the regiments it was found necessary to secure the VHF sets and depend entirely on medium frequency, high power, CW stations. When the Division CP moved ashore on the 25th a rear echelon station was left on the Cambria to provide ship to shore communication during the completion of the unloading; otherwise all Division communications were operated from the CP ashore. Radio communication was, in general, excellent and continuous to all echelons throughout. This proved to be of utmost value during the period that wire was being installed.

d. Radio Link communications between Division CP ashore and VAC Headquarters at Sasebo was established on 26 September and provided excellent talking circuits. Japanese lines from Sasebo to Nagasaki were requisitioned later but have not yet operated as satisfactorily as the Radio Link channels. Radio teletype was established to VAC on one of the channels of the Radio Link on 27 September and has since carried the greatest burden of traffic between the two headquarters, although the Corps CW radio net has continued to operate in excellent style and much traffic has been cleared over it.

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Subject: Annex (F), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)
1 December, 1945.

2. Occupation Phase (Cont'd)

e. With the installation of the wire lines within the Division, the telegraph switchboard was installed in the Division Message Center and telegraph service instituted to the four regiments and to the 2D Engineer Battalion. This has been the main means for transmitting messages within the Division. The field wire lines, which were laid from Nagasaki to the 8th and 10th Marines at Isehaya and proved inadequate for telephone communications due to their length and for which Japanese commercial lines were substituted, proved to be excellent for telegraph communications.

f. The Division Message Center and the Division Coding Room were established in proximity to each other in the Division CP building. Both have an installed teletype operating on the same channel to VAC.

g. As the regiments were moved out into Southern Kyushu, communication facilities were expanded to take care of the new locations. Since it was impossible to utilize our own wire installations, Japanese commercial facilities were utilized and the complete installation as of this date is shown in Appendices 1, 2 and 3. Likewise, the Distances were too great for ordinary radios so each regiment in outlying areas, plus battalions which were at important locations, were equipped with SCR 299's and a long distance, high powered, medium frequency CW Division Command net was established. The station at the Division Command Post was established on top of a hill about three miles from the Command Post, a building was constructed to house it, and radios were installed therein. Teletype communication was established between the Message Center in the Customs House and the Radio Station. This station has operated perfectly and has handled a huge volume of traffic and the signals have been 5 X 5 between all stations at all times of the day and night. The radio network is shown in Appendix 4. The same efficiency cannot always be said for the telephone network as the Japanese wire lines have not been dependable and the distances involved are very great. However, by the use of amplifying telephones TP-9 it has been possible to have telephone communications

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Subject: Annex (F), Occupational Operations Report (Con't)

2. Occupation Phase (Cont'd)

to the 8th and 10th Marines most of the time and to the 2D Marines and battalions at Kagoshima and Kancyo about 50 per cent of the time.

h. As other units of the Division move out from Nagasaki, it is planned to expand our existing radio network and telephone system to include them.

3. Supply and Equipment

a. Supply has been excellent. Although the initial allowances were not sufficient to meet the expanding need of an occupation situation, the Division Signal Quartermaster had ample supplies to re-supply them with everything necessary. The first re-supply shipment arrived about thirty days after the 2D Marine Division landed, and both the amounts and types of signal gear contained therein took care of replenishing Signal Quartermaster stock very nicely. Naturally, since this was a combat re-supply shipment there was a good amount of combat signal gear which was not needed, but this could not be helped, and it is believed that the Signal Section, Supply Service, FMF Pac, did an excellent job in planning this shipment.

b. For an occupation operation such as this where great distances are involved, additional signal equipment is needed by the Division. In this case, we have found it necessary to draw an additional 6 SCR 299's or equivalent, 4 Teletypewriters EE-97, 4 SCR 193's, 2 TC-4's and several additional power units, such as the PE-95. Also, the Division could use a considerable amount more of Radio Link Equipment than the one station which it has to 5th Fthb Corps Headquarters, if it were available. All of the above equipment, except the Radio Link, was quickly supplied to the Division by the 5th Fthb Corps and the 8th Service Regiment at Sasebo.

c. Several Japanese Military Switchboards have been procured for use in small units in lieu of the FD-72. Likewise, a considerable number of military receivers have been utilized as recreation receivers.


George C. Ruffin, Jr.
GEORGE C. RUFFIN, JR.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX (B)

LINE ROUTE MAP OF JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LINES




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
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX (F)
CIRCUIT DIAGRAM - EFFECTIVE 20 NOV 45

NOTE:

JC - Japanese Commercial
C - Spiral 4 Carrier



APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX (F)
TRAFFIC DIAGRAM
2d Marine Division
Effective 23 Nov 45




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Appendix 3

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX (F)
LINE ROUTE MAP
EFFECTIVE - 20 Nov 45
- MAP -
CITY PLAN - NAGASAKI
REVISED EDITION
APPROXIMATE SCALE - 1:12,500

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ANNEX (G)
to
OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS REPORT

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JHP:gaj
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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

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From: The Division Engineer.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: Annex (G), Occupational Operations Report.
APPENDICES: (1) 43rd Naval Construction Battalion Report.
(2) 1298th Engineer Combat Battalion Report.

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING.

a. The Engineers, Pioneers and Naval Construction Battalions attached to and part of a Marine Division are essentially combat organizations capable of road construction, water supply, bridge building, camouflage, demolitions, and shore party work. The latter companies of the Division Engineer Battalion normally reinforce an infantry combat team during accomplishment of the mission while the Division Pioneer Battalion and the attached Naval Construction Battalion initially constitute the division shore party.

b. With the division in a rear area for rehabilitation, the mission of all engineer units, aside from training, is the development, maintenance and improvement of camp facilities.

c. It was not known, at the time plans for the occupation of Kyushu were being made, what engineer units would be available to the division aside from its organic engineer units.

d. The duties of the engineers, when plans for the occupation were made, appeared to be essentially those encountered in a rehabilitation camp with water supply assuming paramount importance. Consequently, the routine duties of the engineers on Saipan dictated the needs to be met in the occupation. Planning was based on this premise and the materials required were on hand.

e. In as much as previous combat restrictions as to shipping had been lifted, no rear echelon was to be maintained and it was planned to move all organic equipment to the target.

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Subject: Annex (G), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

f. Equipment was serviced and anticipated needs in spare parts prepared to assure continued functioning of equipment under conditions expected at the target.

g. Detailed reports of the activities of the 2nd Pioneer Battalion and of the 2nd Engineer Battalion are included in Part III of the Second Marine Division Occupational Operations Report.

2. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION.

a. All training had been directed initially toward participation in combat similar to that experienced by the military service in previous Pacific Operations.

b. During the interval between cessation of hostilities and the occupation, only training in orientation, military discipline, customs of the service and equipment maintenance was possible. The continued duties of camp maintenance at Saipan served the purpose of training for the occupational duties of the Engineer.

3. NARRATIVE REPORT OF OCCUPATION.

Upon arriving at the zone of operation on 23 September, 1945 the Assistant Division Engineer was immediately sent ashore to set up a central control for engineer work and to contact Officials of the Prefectural Engineer Branch. At this time, as throughout the occupation, one of the letter companies of the Engineer Battalion was with each of the Regimental Combat Teams leaving the Battalion H&S Company as the main engineer organization for the remainder of the division.

Each Letter Company had the task of performing engineer functions for its respective RCT while H&S Company took over the task of rehabilitating the utilities in the City of Nagasaki and in controlling the overall engineer picture in the Division zone of responsibility.

It was discovered upon landing that water was sufficient in quantity for the use of the Division but that it had been insufficiently chlorinated to come up to the specifications set by the Division Surgeon. Immediate steps were taken to remedy this situation and water supply was made the number one priority as had been planned during the planning phase of the operation.

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Subject: Annex (G), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

Aside from water supply, other existing utilities appeared in fair shape.. The voltage in the electrical system was very low but was being put back to normal by the Japanese. To supplement the local electrical power, generators were set up where needed throughout the Division.

Roads and bridges throughout the zone of responsibility were in a usable condition. Roads showed a complete lack of maintenance and were covered with rubble. Bridges were classed by the Japanese as ten (10) ton capacity structures but inspection showed that the majority of them were capable of carrying twenty (20) tons.

On 26 September, 1945, all of the elements of the Engineer Battalion were ashore and set up to work. At this time H&S Company took over the complete supervision of the water supply of the city. The latter companies remained with their RCT's performing all the engineer functions.

On 27 September, the 1298th Army Engineer Combat Battalion joined the Division and was given the task of rehabilitating the Isahaya road, the rehabilitation of roads in the Division area north of the Division Headquarters and of constructing an airstrip for light planes in the bombed area.

On 29 September, the 43rd Naval Construction Battalion reverted from the control of the Shore Party to that of the Division Engineer and was given the jobs of rehabilitating the facilities at the Dejima Wharf, construction of access roads from the various docks to the main routes of communications and the rehabilitation of petroleum storage facilities in the Nagasaki Harbor area.

On 2 October, 1945 the 2nd Pioneer Battalion reverted from control of the Shore Party to that of the Division Engineer. It was given, as a primary task, the rehabilitation of all routes of communication south of Division Headquarters.

As the various units came under the control of the Division Engineer a Division Engineer Group was formed with the Division Engineer in over all control of the various engineer elements. This made possible a central control over the work of the four battalions whose composition and capabilities varied considerably.

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Subject: Annex (G), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

Through this control it was possible to allocate tasks to those organizations best fitted for the work and it is believed that through this control greater cooperation was possible.

The initial tasks of the various units as set forth in prior paragraphs was, in most cases, of a type which necessitated constant supervision, roads needed constant maintenance, bridges had to be repaired from time to time and, in two cases, replaced. The petroleum storage facilities were extensive enough to require constant work and the Dejima Wharf was constantly in need of maintenance.

Added to the continuing jobs mentioned above other short range tasks constantly appeared. Stoves were designed and manufacturing began; refrigeration units were set up throughout the division; repairs of all types were necessary in various buildings; areas were cleared for open storage and work was constantly necessary in facilitating the unloading of ships. As the jobs appeared they were apportioned out to the various engineer organizations by the Division Engineer.

In order to facilitate the supply of various construction materials such as lumber, nails, cement and so forth, a central supply dump was set up, under the control and direction of the 2nd Engineer Battalion, from which supplies were drawn by the engineers and other elements.

In all works by the Engineer Group, maximum use was made of Japanese labor. Much of the work, such as water supply and highway maintenance, was accomplished through direct cooperation with the prefectural engineers and it was found that this scheme was quite workable in most cases.

The Japanese engineers in the Nagasaki Prefecture were totally without any adequate engineering equipment. This equipment, as well as supervision, was furnished by the Engineer Group and it is believed that this facilitated maintenance and other work in most instances.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Comments.

(1) All of the elements of the Engineer Group were originally formed, equipped and trained for combat.

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Subject: Annex (G), Occupational Operations Report. (Cont'd)

Consequently, much of the work required by occupational operations, such as the inspection and operation of boilers and the repair of inside plumbing was not in line with the capabilities of the various organizations.

(2) No engineer officer was sent on the original reconnaissance of the area to be occupied. Consequently, the engineering data available at the time of the initial landing was not complete.

(3) The immediate requirements of the division necessitated too many tasks to proceed simultaneously and as a consequence, a job schedule could not be set up and maintained.

b. Recommendations.

(1) An engineer officer should be present on all initial reconnaissances.

(2) A base maintenance unit be assigned to zones where any lengthy occupation is contemplated.

(3) The letter companies of the engineer battalion should revert to the control of the Division Engineer as soon as the initial phases of an operation are over.

(4) Units of the Division should accomplish by their own initiative many of the minor tasks they call on the Engineers to perform.

J. H. Partridge
J. H. PARTRIDGE.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (G)

43rd NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION

1. SHORE PARTY OPERATIONS

a. The 43rd Naval Construction Battalion officially joined the Second Marine Division on Saipan during the latter part of August 1945 and was assigned as part of the Division shore party for the occupation of Nagasaki, Japan. The battalion proceeded to Nagasaki with the main elements of the Second Marine Division and landed in Nagasaki Harbor on 23 and 24 September. Five ships were used to transport the main body of the battalion, and its equipment, from Saipan to Nagasaki; LSTs 734, 887, 1073, LSM 498 and APA 156. A small amount of lumber and some personnel were transported by several other ships.

b. The first group, consisting of the executive officer, who acted as assistant shore party commander, and his staff plus a part of "D" Company, arrived in Nagasaki on Sunday, 23 September and immediately disembarked in the Dejima Wharf area, later they were assigned the task of unloading AKA 101 which carried general supplies.

c. The remainder, and the greater part of the Battalion, arrived in Nagasaki on 24 September and beached LSTs 734, 887, and 1073 and LSM 498 on the west side of the harbor near the Mitsubishi Electrical Co. main plant. The battalion command post was immediately set up in the warehouse south of dry dock #3, and men, material, and equipment were started ashore as rapidly as possible. A parking lot for heavy equipment was located and established near the Mitsubishi Engine Works area. Other supplies and personnel were moved to the dock area, and into the large warehouse south of dry dock #3. LST 734 contained rolling stock only and in a matter of approximately six (6) hours it was unloaded. LSM 498 was also unloaded in a few hours. The other two LST's contained part rolling stock and part construction materials and boxed gear. They were rather slow in unloading since no place could be found to store the material due to extremely congested traffic conditions in the area. Unloading of all LST's was finally completed early on 28 September.

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX (G) - 43rd NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION

d. During the unloading of the battalion gear, equipment and personnel, the unloading of AKA 101 continued around the clock and it was finally unloaded and most of its cargo stowed in warehouses by 28 September.

e. During the unloading period the battalion established its personnel on the second and third decks of the large warehouse at the south side of dry dock #3, with the exception of the parties who remained on board the LSTs, and "A" Company, which camped in the open out near dry dock #3.

f. On 25 September, "C" Company was sent to the Dejima Wharf area to supplement the shore party working in that area unloading ships at the wharf. They completed their duty on 29 September.

g. Completion of the unloading operations on the west side of Nagasaki Harbor and the securing of "C" Company in the Dejima Wharf area marked the end of the shore party stage of the battalions occupation of Nagasaki.

2. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

a. Upon the completion of the shore party phase of the Nagasaki landings the 43rd Naval Construction Battalion was assigned various projects in the harbor area. The main projects and a brief discussion of each follows:

(1) Rehabilitation of Dejima Wharf.

This work consisted of clearing, leveling, and generally repairing access roads to the wharf and the connecting roads within the area. Warehouses on the wharf, which were damaged by bombing attacks were also repaired in general. Repairing of concrete deck and the wooden fenders on the wharf. This work is now completed.

(2) Improvement of L.S.T. Landings.

A large amount of debris was removed and bulldozer work was done on the LST landing area just south of Dejima Wharf. This work is now complete and the area was expanded to accommodate at least four (4) LSTs landing simultaneously.

(3) Repair of Division Commissary Warehouse.

General repair work was performed on this large warehouse. Partitions were strengthened and repaired, entrances on one side boarded up, and entire roof repaired. Work now is completed.

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APPENDIX I to ANNEX (G) - 43rd NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION.

(4) Miscellaneous Work for Division QM.

Shelving in warehouses and a fence around the quarter-master storage yard are now complete.

(5) Road Repair, West Side of Nagasaki Harbor.

Approximately four (4) miles of road paralleling the west bank of Nagasaki Harbor and running from dry dock #1 northerly to the main highway just beyond the Urakami-gawa, was generally repaired, rebuilt, drained, and cleared. This work is now complete and the road is being constantly maintained.

(6) Rehabilitation of Fuel and Gasoline Storage Facilities- Nagasaki Harbor.

Shortly after arrival in Nagasaki a survey of existing oil tanks in the harbor was begun, with the object of finding suitable tanks for fuel oil and gasoline storage. Several tanks in good condition were selected and cleaned, pipe relaid to the water's edge, and a pump installed for handling the motor gasoline storage. One (1) 42,000 bbl. tank now contains diesel oil; one (1) 42,000 bbl. tank and one (1) 40,000 bbl. tank contain aviation gasoline; one (1) 40,000 bbl. tank and one (1) 25,000 bbl. tank are being filled with motor gasoline. A loading platform and piping have been installed for the dispensing of fuel at these tanks. A Complete survey has been made of this area and a location map is now completed.

(7) Quarters for Strategic Bomb Survey Group.

Work was started on the repair of a building for the strategic bomb survey group. After this work was approximately 35% complete it was taken over by Mitsubishi.

(8) Athletic Field for the 6th Marines.

The leveling, grading, and surfacing of an athletic field for the 6th Marines, located near the Mitsubishi Electrical Mfg. buildings on the west side of Nagasaki Harbor is now complete.

(9) Armed Forces Radio Station at Omura.

The armed forces radio station at Omura, Kyushu, which serves the Nagasaki-Sasebo area called on the 43rd NCB for assistance in building studios, erecting towers, etc. One platoon of "B" Company spent two weeks on this job and erected three (3) 85ft steel radio masts, constructed broadcasting studios, and generally repaired the buildings occupied by the group.

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APPENDIX I to ANNEX (3), 43rd NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION.

(10) Atomic Field Landing Strip Extension.

An extension to the atomic field landing strip is now in process of being made.

(11) Butler Warehouses for the Division.

Five (5) 40' x 100' Butler warehouses are under construction to be used as storage facilities for the Second Division.

b. Miscellaneous work for Second Marine Division Senior Officers' Quarters.

Miscellaneous carpenter and plumbing work has been done at the Senior Officers' Quarters.

c. Company "A" is now on detached duty at Isahaya, Kyushu, working on road repair, heating buildings, and general carpenter work for the 10th Marine Regiment.

d. During the time the battalion has been in Nagasaki it has occupied two large warehouses successively as billeting areas. The ~~first~~ warehouse, located near dry dock #3, proved unsuitable for our needs so the battalion moved to a large three story building adjacent to dry dock #1. Considerable work has been put in on this building in order to make it liveable. All battalion offices, the battalion warehouse, galley, mess hall and various shops are also located on the first deck.

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SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF
IN THE FIELD.

1 December, 1945.

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX (G)

1298th ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION

1. Unit arrived at Honolulu, T.H. from U. S. on 8 August, 1945. Quartered at Schofield East Range. Additional equipment and supplies were drawn and training was started in preparation for Olympic Operation. Processing, packing and training continued until 30 August at which time loading on LST's 828, 390, and 870 took place.

2. Unit attached to V Amphib Corps for operations, left Pearl Harbor, Oahu, 3 September as part of convoy of 18 LST's. Convoy arrived at Sasebo, Japan, 24 September but LST's 828, 390 and 870 proceeded to Nagasaki the following morning. Upon arriving at Nagasaki, the unit was attached to Second Marine Division. A reconnaissance party was sent ashore 26 September for purpose of selecting a battalion bivouac site. All troops and equipment were disembarked 27 September. Troops were billeted at Oura School, approximately two miles east of downtown Nagasaki.

3. Upon landing at Nagasaki, the battalion was given the missions of repair and maintenance of the main roads and bridges from Northern Nagasaki to Southern Nagasaki, and construction of an air strip for liaison planes in the "atomic bomb" area, located in the northern section of the city.

4. A reconnaissance of the assigned roads and bridges was made 27 September and the over-all picture was that most roads were cluttered with debris, often to the extent of leaving a two-way road only sufficiently cleared for one-way traffic. The roads were generally full of pot-holes, and numerous flat flagstones had become loosened and removed. Several bridges were in need of repair, and one in the atomic bomb area failed, which necessitated a bypass which, in turn, created a bottle-neck in traffic circulation.

5. Each company was given a section of the city for repair of main roads and bridges and continuous maintenance of both. It was decided to put in a Bailey bridge adjacent to the site of the failed bridge in the atomic bomb area.

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APPENDIX II to ANNEX (G) - 1298th ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION.

The bridge was to be a 110 ft. DD to carry 35 tons. Work was started 30 September. The soft springy nature of the terrain made it necessary to make a 120 ft span and to use unusually large supports under the bearings. The approaches being of the same material required numerous loads of stone and brick in order to overcome the settling of the road bed. The bridge and approaches were completed and open for traffic 1700, 2 October. Two platoons of "C" Company were used.

6. Work on the airstrip was started 30 September by one platoon of "A" Company. The strip was to be 800 ft long, all weather, for liaison planes. The site of the strip was an open air stadium with walls approximately 5 ft high. The long axis of the oval was 600 ft, which necessitated the removal of the walls at both ends. The entire area was strewn with debris. The subsurface within the stadium was of good material, but on the outside it was soft and spongy. Heavy equipment used were bulldozers, motorized graders, carryall scrapers, air compressors, sheepfoot rollers and smooth roller. Nearby supplies of coarse gravel and cinders were used for surfacing. Rain in the ratio of two out of three days delayed operations, but the strip was open for operation 11 October. 350 Japanese laborers were used.

7. General repair and maintenance of roads and streets in Nagasaki was started 1 October and the nature of the work made it a continuous process. Repair of the road from Nagasaki RR station, running north to Mitsubishi Ordnance Plant, was largely a matter of removing debris from the sides of the road, which opened the way for two-lane traffic. The road from Nagasaki RR station east to Isahaya required hauling gravel for filling rough spots and pot-holes. No available asphalt or suitable binder created a problem in the repair. Local Japanese labor places the gravel from the stock piles along the roads established by our trucks. The roads generally south through town from the RR station involved clearing debris, smoothing off rough stretches, filling pot-holes and replacing flat stones for surfacing.

8. 8 October, "C" Company was assigned the mission of reinforcing an existing timber trestle bridge located two miles east of Omura, bridge capacity to be increased to 12 tons. One platoon was used and bridge job was finished 2000, 11 October.

9. 16 October, "A" Company was assigned the mission of demolishing two reinforced concrete smokestacks in the vicinity of the air-strip.

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APPENDIX II to ANNEX (G), 1298th ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION.

One stack was 100 ft high and 28 ft in circumference at the base; the other 150 ft high and 38 ft in circumference at the base. Each was demolished by placing a 300 pound charge at the base. Job was finished 1600, 17 October.

10. 16 October, "C" Company was assigned the mission of resurfacing a steel trestle bridge located in the Nagasaki RR yard, 200 yds west of the Bailey bridge. Bridge was completed and open for traffic 1700, 17 October.

11. 17 October, the Battalion was given the missions of making a thorough reconnaissance of the Nagasaki area for Japanese construction supplies. Supplies were gathered at Division Dump.

12. 23 October, two missions were received from Division Headquarters; one the reconstruction of a rifle range at North Nagasaki; the other the construction of a radio house at a high point in East Nagasaki beyond this headquarters. The rifle range was to be of American design with 10 targets and firing points at 100, 200, 300, and 500 yards. The job was assigned "B" Company and work was started 24 October. The range was ready for use on 10 November. "C" Company was assigned the job of the construction of the radio house. Work was started 24 October and completed 6 November.

13. 24 October, the Battalion was given the mission of installing and operating a quarry in the vicinity of the airfield. Operation got under way 31 October.

14. 2 November, the mission of reinforcing and strengthening a timber trestle bridge at Matsue Gawa, near downtown Nagasaki, was given to "B" Company. Bridge was in bad condition, rated at 8 ton capacity. It was repaired and increased to 20 ton capacity. Mission completed 6 November.

15. 2 November, "A" Company was given assignment of dismantling the Bailey Bridge which was constructed 30 September. Mission completed 5 November.

16. 7 November, "C" Company was given assignment of repairing a dance hall for Division use in downtown Nagasaki. Hall was the second story of a two-story structure, which necessitated the placing of additional supports. Much of the finished interior work was done by skilled native laborers. Job finished 9 November.

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APPENDIX II to ANNEX (G), 1298th ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION.

17. 12 November, the Battalion was assigned the job of remodeling a building for a Division Recreation building. The building, located approximately 800 yds south of Division Headquarters and 200 yds north of Matsue Gawa bridge, was a two-story dwelling. Practically the entire interior had to be torn out, additional supports added and the interior completely remodeled. "B" Company was assigned the job and work was started 12 November and was approximately 80% completed as of 30 November.

18. 12 November, work was started on the erection of storage huts in the Division storage area located one block north of the Bailey Bridge site. Job consisted of erecting 12 Quonset type huts as soon as they were unloaded from ships. Each company was assigned a portion of the job and work on the foundations was started immediately. Upon unloading the ships, it was discovered the buildings were Butler storage huts, which necessitated changing the dimensions of the foundations. Work was approximately 30% completed as of 30 November.

19. Throughout the period of occupation (27Sept-30Nov), Japanese civilians at the rate of 150 per day were used on practically all jobs. Much rain was encountered the first two weeks of occupation but very little during the remainder of the period.

20. Continuous improvement was made in the billet area throughout the period of occupation. The original building was a simple two-story frame school house 30 ft by 500 ft with a few scattered shacks in the area. Improvement was made to the extent that all missing windows and glass were replaced and Japanese insulating material added. Four temporary kitchens, four temporary mess halls, latrines, shower room with hot and cold running water, movie building, post exchange building, three-quarter length football field, four volleyball courts and a basketball court were constructed for the comfort of the troops.

21. Water supply created a problem for the first two weeks of occupation due to the fact that it was impure, plus the fact that water pipes and pressure were insufficient to get water to billet area. About mid-October the reservoir water was chlorinated sufficiently and additional pipes were laid for a distance of about a mile which enabled the unit to have running water by merely inserting a gasoline driven pump in the main 100 ft from the billet area.

22. No enemy interference was encountered at any time during the occupation.

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OPERATIONS REPORT

of the

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

KYUSHU

*Nagasaki

*Nobeoka

Miyazaki *

*Miyakonojo

*Kagoya

by the

SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

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SECOND REGIMENT

SECOND MARINE DIVISION

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OPERATIONS REPORT

(A) Planning. No detailed planning was accomplished by the regiment in connection with an assault landing on KYUSHU. Battalion commanders and members of the regimental staff were given a general picture of the terrain, and some conception of the type of combat to expect, in conferences held by both the regimental commander and division staff.

During the limited planning phase after cessation of hostilities, preparatory plans were made for early embarkation and movement to an assigned area of occupation. Upon receipt of 2nd Marine Division Operation Plan No 14 on 6 September, 1945, for the landing and occupation of the NAGASAKI area, final plans were drafted, which of necessity were very general in scope, and RCT 2 Operation Plan No 17 was issued on 8 September. Thereafter new information was disseminated by directives and frequent conferences, and units proceeded with preparations for loading. Transportation of supplies and equipment to the staging area at TANAPAG Harbor had commenced on 27 August and loading of the ships assigned to RCT 2 started on 10 September, 1945. Detailed plans for the landing and unloading at NAGASAKI were withheld pending information on harbor facilities.

(B) Training. During the period just prior to the cessation of hostilities, the regiment was engaged in Phase III of the current combat training program, which consisted of advanced schooling and firing of all infantry weapons, battalion field problems, regimental CPX's and coordinated training with supporting units.

When hostilities ceased the training schedule was completely revised and a program inaugurated emphasizing military police duties, close order drill, ceremonies, customs and courtesies, customs of the Japanese people, and other subjects that might better qualify troops for occupation duties. Few training manuals were available and experienced instructors limited, thus making it difficult to carry out satisfactory training in many of these subjects.

(C) Organization. A Regimental Combat Team was organized for the operation consisting of following units:

- 2d Marines
- Co "C", 2d MT Bn
- Co "B", 2d Med Bn
- Co "A", 2d Engr Bn
- 1st Plat Ord Co, 2d Serv Co
- 1st Plat Sup Co, 2d Serv Co
- 1st Plat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn
- 1st Plat Auto Repair, 2d MT Bn
- 1st Band Sect

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4 Air Ln Teams
4 SFC Parties
4 Arty Ln Teams
1 Tk Ln Team

All supporting units were maintained intact in the RCT Headquarters Group except that one Air Ln Team, one SFC Party, and one Arty Ln Party was assigned each BLT. In addition, BLT 2/2 and 3/2 were each assigned a 37mm Platoon from the Regimental Weapons Company. As a precaution, all plans and attachments were made for coping with any possible Japanese resistance to our landing, or subsequently in the occupation phase.

At the time of sailing the regiment was approximately one-hundred and eighty under authorized personnel strength.

(D) Advanced Reconnaissance of the Objective. One officer from RCT 2 was attached to an advanced reconnaissance party which departed by air from SAIPAN for NAGASAKI on 14 September, four days before departure of the RCT, for the purpose of reconnoitering billeting areas and harbor facilities. On arrival of the Task Group and before landing, this officer joined the RCT with valuable information on docking facilities, staging areas for equipment and supplies, and billeting spaces for troops, which assisted the commanding officer in making final plans for the landing and unloading.

(E) Occupational Operations. RCT 2 sailed from SAIPAN on 18 September, 1945, on the ship comprising TRANSDIV 36, and arrived in the outer harbor of NAGASAKI at approximately 0800, 23 September. The commanding officer, RCT 2 received verbal orders from the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division, on board the command ship, to land in the vicinity of DEJIMA Wharf, which was the Customs Dock of NAGASAKI, relieve the Marine guard established there by the USS WICHITA for POW evacuation, and commence unloading immediately.

BLT commanders, having been previously called on board the RCT command ship, were issued orders for a landing in column of BLTs, at various points adjacent to DEJIMA Wharf, in the order of BLT 3/2 - 2/2 - 1/2, with boat waves in column, and boats within each wave in column. BLT 3/2 was ordered to land at 1300, the remaining two BLTs and RCT 2 Headquarters Group on call.

The first wave of BLT 3/2 landed at 1303: BLT 2/2 landed at 1440, and BLT 1/2 at 1530. RCT 2 CP opened on DEJIMA Wharf at 1744 and at 1600 orders were issued for the movement of units to the assigned billeting area at YAMIGO Barracks, four and one-half (4½) miles south of NAGASAKI. A few vehicles were available from an Army Truck Company then present at NAGASAKI, but the majority of troops marched to the barracks. One AKA was brought alongside for immediate unloading at the dock, while all

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other ships of the TRANSDIV commenced unloading into small boats.

The billeting area at KANIGO Barracks offered sufficient space for all units of the RCT, but was in need of extensive cleaning and repair. Barracks had to be disinfected, drainage ditches cleaned, heads emptied, and all buildings put into shape. Japanese labor was used to the maximum for all tasks, but it took several days to adequately billet personnel.

Initially, occupation operations were confined to insuring that all large calibre defense guns in the vicinity of NAGASAKI had been made inoperable, locating intelligence targets, and obtaining information on known Japanese installations. The RCT 2 area of responsibility, as assigned by 2nd Marine Division, was divided among the BLTs, and search patrols commenced operating throughout the area about 28 September, with the mission of locating any military installations, materiel dumps and utilities not previously reported by the Japanese. For the most part, foot patrols were required because of the generally inadequate road net, and lack of sufficient transportation, especially light vehicles suitable for the Japanese roads, the best of which were continually troublesome for heavier vehicles. Where necessary, guards were established on installations of potential value to our forces, and on explosive dumps of a nature dangerous to the success of the occupation. On previously reported installations the Japanese military were ordered to maintain a guard pending decisions in regard to the disposition of materiel. Whenever possible the Japanese civilian police were ordered to furnish guards in order to minimize the use of small detachments of Marines at widely scattered points. Once the search of a sector had been completed, routine surveillance patrols investigated it periodically.

Co "A" was designated as the Regimental Military Police Company, with the primary mission of furnishing Military Police details for the NAGASAKI area. This company was not charged with directly regulating the activities of the Japanese nationals, and any control measures that were imposed were made a responsibility of the Japanese police under Military Police supervision.

On 23 October 1945, orders were received to transfer one BLT to KANOGA, KYUSHU, and relieve the 1st Bn 127th Inf (Army) which was part of a task force occupying the airfield near that city. BLT 2/2 embarked on four (4) LSTs, landed in the vicinity of KANOGA, and assumed occupational control of that area on 30 October. At the same time the RCT commander reconnoitered the MIYAKONOJO and MIYAZAKI areas for the purpose of determining the adequacy of billeting facilities for the remainder of the RCT.

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On 2 November, 1945, the RCT Headquarters Group and BLT 3/2 commenced loading on four (4) LSTs for movement to MIYAKONOJO. A landing was made at TAKASU, west of KANOYA, where BLT 2/2 had unloaded, and all personnel and equipment transferred to railroad cars for the remainder of the movement forty (40) miles to MIYAKONOJO. An advance party was sent ahead by road to arrange billeting and speed up work of the Japanese laborers previously ordered to rehabilitate the Japanese 23rd Inf Army Barracks there. RCT 2 CP opened at MIYAKONOJO on 6 November, 1945.

BLT 1/2, at NAGASAKI, was ordered to commence loading on 5 November, 1945, and move by LST to TAKASU thence by rail to MIYAZAKI, KYUSHU. This move was completed on 12 November. There again, the Japanese had been ordered to prepare the barracks in that city for occupation. In all cases the work done was invaluable, due to the exceedingly dirty and unsanitary conditions prevailing prior to arrival.

Before the separation of BLT 1/2 and 2/2 from the RCT, each was furnished detachments from Co "A" 2d Engr Bn, Co "C" 2d MT Bn, and the 1st Serv Platoon, in order to supply them additional transportation, some water purification equipment, and a bakery unit. A Medical Company was also attached to BLT 2/2 at KANOYA due to the extra personnel of the Army Air Force there, who came under control of BLT 2/2.

In general, the billets of all units in this new area were adequate as to size and construction, but lacked any facilities approaching our standards. As was the case at NAGASAKI, they were in need of extensive cleaning and repairs, part of which was done by the Japanese before our arrival. First and most important, in the occupation of any Japanese buildings, was to improve the existing sanitary conditions.

The area of responsibility of RCT 2, now including all of MIYAZAKI Prefecture and half of KAGOSHIMA Prefecture, was again divided among BLTs, and by the middle of November the resumption of occupation duties was well underway. The size of the respective areas required more motorized patrols and the lack of sufficient organic transportation was a hindrance to the progress which might otherwise have been made in the occupation of the area. The great number of widely dispersed ammunition, weapons and materiel dumps in each area necessitated patrols of several days duration. Inventories as turned in by the Japanese were verified and materiel destroyed or otherwise disposed of by Marines or by the Japanese, under supervision of Marine personnel. In some cases, ammunition and explosives located far inland had to be transported by rail to coastal towns and dumped at sea from small boats. Equipment or materiel of value to civilians was turned over to local Japanese government agencies for distribution. Many unreported installations and dumps were discovered.

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(F) Supply, Equipment and Logistics. Beginning with the return of RCT 2 to SAIPAN in April following the OKINAWA operation, a continuous program was placed in effect to bring all units of the regiment up to top standards as to equipment, in anticipation of imminent combat operations.

This involved repairs, survey and reissue of individual equipment, weapons, ammunition and transportation in keeping with division directives, tables of basic allowances, and G-4 Standing Operating Procedure.

The continuous nature of the program and the time available for its accomplishment enabled the regiment to achieve a considerable degree of readiness, as to equipment, prior to departure from SAIPAN for NAGASAKI.

Supply plans were not prepared for an assault landing on KYUSHU at the regimental level, at the time of the cessation of hostilities.

The general plan for transportation of all division supplies and equipment by Regimental Combat Teams was outlined at a meeting of Regimental S-4s and Executive Officers early in September, after the 2nd Marine Division was assigned an area of occupation.

Supply plans for the operation were based on Division Administrative Order No 58-45 and units were informed by Regimental Orders, conferences and memoranda. Specific instructions for supply at NAGASAKI in the form of Division Memorandum A-1, dated 22 September, was issued Sunday, 23 September, the day of landing, at a conference on board the USS CAMBRIA. According to this memorandum, regiments were directed to retain control of, and issue as prescribed, all division supplies and equipment unloaded from their ships. In compliance, RCT 2 unloaded all the division supplies which had been carried, direct from the ships to assigned warehouses south of DEJIMA Wharf. RCT 2 issued all supplies and equipment to regimental units, and to all division and attached units, until 7 October when the Division Quartermaster took over that function.

Logistical control of the supply of RCT 2 at NAGASAKI was relatively simple, inasmuch as the whole organization was grouped at KAMIGO Barracks, four and one-half (4½) miles southeast of the Division supply base and all hauling could be accomplished by truck in 30 minutes.

When RCT 2 was transferred to southeastern KYUSHU and BLTs dispersed to three billeting areas, at widely separated points, all several hundred miles distant from Division and Corps supply installations, the problem of supply became more difficult. BLT 1/2 at MIYAZAKI and BLT 2/2 at KANOKA were authorized to send their respective periodic supply reports direct to the G-4. All

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regular requisitions for other than automatic supplies, which are based on the periodic reports, were funneled through the Regimental Quartermaster at MIYAKONOJO.

Fresh supplies were shipped by rail in refrigeration cars from NAGASAKI and SASEBO to the separate BLTs. Resupply of regular rations, fuel and equipment was shipped by water from NAGASAKI and SASEBO, to TAKASU and thence by rail and truck to KANOYA, MIYAKONOJO, and MIYAZAKI.

This arrangement necessitated RCT 2 sending a quartermaster unloading detail to KANOYA each time a resupply ship landed, in order to supervise the distribution of supplies to the various units of the RCT.

This problem of resupply might have been greatly simplified if supplies were shipped direct to each BLT by train. This method was used on one shipment of winter clothing, cleaning gear, stoves and blankets to the Regimental Quartermaster at MIYAKONOJO and was very successful, eliminating the double-handling which was necessary when a water shipment was made.

During November, six shiploads of supplies and equipment arrived at KANOYA by water, two of which were for the KANOYA Task Force and BLT 2/2 exclusively; the remainder a combined supply for all units. On this basis, four ships a month will be required to resupply elements of RCT 2 adequately if ships are used exclusively.

(G) Conclusion - Comments and Recommendations.

1. The practice of sending an advance party to a new billeting area prior to the arrival of the main body of troops cannot be too strongly recommended. With sufficient time available, such a party can greatly expedite occupation by making billeting assignments, and suitable arrangements for the procurement of labor and materiel. In addition to facilitating the movement of troops in an orderly fashion, a more favorable impression is made upon the local populace with which the unit concerned will be carrying out their occupation duties. An Engineering Officer should be included in the party, with the specific mission of inspecting buildings to determine whether or not they are safe for use.

2. There always exists a very definite need for language personnel. Each RCT should have a minimum of ten qualified officer interpreters both for combat and occupation duties.

3. The general impression gained during the initial stages of the occupation was that the Japanese, both

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civilian and military, were outwardly very cooperative. However, innumerable instances occurred of very incomplete reports and inventories being turned in by the Japanese. Many examples were evident of accurate reporting of obvious or bulky equipment, and upon interrogation, an absence of any knowledge of less obvious items, such as medical supplies, communication gear, or photography equipment. To complicate such questioning, Military and Naval personnel who previously had been in command of an area were transferred and outside personnel, without knowledge of existing conditions in that area, put in command prior to occupation by our forces. This was done ostensibly, to avoid embarrassing questioning.

4. Prior to occupation of enemy areas more time might well be spent on instruction in the purpose and function of Military Police. Marines without this background and having received only combat training, are ill-equipped to properly perform such duties during the early stages of an occupation. It might even prove advantageous to establish Military Police in an area prior to the arrival of main occupation force, to ease the congested period of heavy traffic and increased activity during the unloading and movement of large bodies of troops, and create the proper "first impression" on the conquered peoples.

5. From the standpoint of TQMs, it is imperative that all equipment and supplies to be loaded out for an operation, regardless of whether commercial or combat loaded, be assigned a priority according to anticipated needs by the highest echelon being embarked. This should avoid loading and transporting items of doubtless value while others of a critical nature are left behind.

6. The problem of insufficient transportation constantly arises. Occupation of a large area in such terrain as this necessitates numerous motorized patrols requiring light vehicles suitable for all types of roads. Each BLT should have a minimum of 15 cargo jeeps and 5 one-ton trucks in order to function efficiently.

7. The present system of Disposition is an excellent one and although having a slightly unwieldy "bookkeeping system" it should be satisfactory.

8. Military Government personnel have been invaluable for the work required of occupation forces. However none of the sections had sufficient personnel to turn in an efficient job. By supplementing the Military Government Sections with extra Marines most of the sections are now functioning in a manner in which they were designed to operate. Once a Military Government unit has become established in an area, it is desirable that the transfer of personnel in such units be held to a

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minimum. Their knowledge of local conditions and liaison with public officials is immensely valuable when there are frequent changes in key Japanese personnel holding public office, as has been the case throughout southern KYUSHU.

9. The functioning of the Special Services were of tremendous value. However, because of the large area over which the units were spread, the equipment available was entirely inadequate to take care of all units. Motion picture film, which is one of the best morale builders, was difficult to obtain and the transportation system inadequate to distribute the few films available to the units in the field.

10. The continuous transfer of personnel for discharge has made the occupation duties difficult in that it has necessitated retraining personnel repeatedly for key positions. This has caused considerable delay in carrying out the duties of the occupation.

C. J. O'Donnell

C. J. O'DONNELL,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding Second Marines, Second Marine Division.

OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

Annex (A)

consists of
Copies of Operation Plans and Orders
Issued Since Date of Occupation

Serial 00107

SECRET

Operation Order
RCT 2 No 18

RCT 2,
In the field.
0800, 1 Oct 45.

Map: 1/25,000 KYUSHU, A.M.S. L872, 1945. Sheets 4045 II NE,
II NW, II SE, and II SW.

TASK ORGANIZATION

RCT 2 - Col Cutts, USMC

(a) BLT 1/2 - Lt Col Totman, USMC

1st Bn 2d Mar

(b) BLT 2/2 - Lt Col Rovetta, USMC

2d Bn 2d Mar

RWC 2d Mar

(c) BLT 3/2 - Lt Col Layer, USMCR

3d Bn 2d Mar

(d) RCT Hq Gp

H&S Co 2d Mar

Co "B" 2d Med Bn

Co "A" 2d Engr Bn

Co "C" 2d MT Bn

1st Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn

~~1st Plat Sup Co 2d Serv Bn~~

1st Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn

1st Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn

1. See RCT 2 Opn Plan No 17.
2. RCT 2 will continue reconnoitering, searching out caves, air-raid shelters and installations, and maintaining security patrols throughout the area of responsibility.
3. (a) BLT 1/2, continue to carry out occupational duties within assigned area of responsibility as shown by Annex (A)(Operation overlay).

(b) BLT 2/2, with RWC attached, continue to carry out occupational duties within assigned area of responsibility as shown by Annex (A)(Operation Overlay).

SECRET

Operation ~~Order~~ ^{Plan} RCT 2 No. 18 (cont'd)

3. (cont'd)

(c) BLT 3/2, employing 2d Tank Battalion as available, continue to carry out occupational duties within assigned area of responsibility as shown by Annex (A) (Operation Overlay).

(d) Hd Gp, continue operations as directed.

(x) (1) All patrols will direct attention toward locating hidden installations, arms, explosives or material endangering success of the occupation.

(2) All installations will be checked to determine the accuracy of the information contained in enclosures (A), (B), (C), (D) and (E) to G-2 Intelligence Memorandum dated 28 September 1945.

(3) Breech blocks may be removed from guns and retained in custody where it is believed necessary to render the weapon inoperable. No steps will be taken to render any weapon permanently inoperable.

(4) Maximum use will be made of interpreters for interrogation of civilians.

(5) Civil police will be used when possible to avoid spreading unnecessary alarm among civilians.

(6) No civilian houses will be searched, nor will civilians be disarmed except by civil police.

(7) Installations guarded by civil police do not require a Marine guard unless a special situation warrants duplication in which case a report will be made to this Hd.

(8) Once an area has been searched, periodic patrols will be dispatched to maintain security, unless otherwise directed.

(9) Billeting of guard detachments will be arranged by the unit concerned.

Serial 00107

SECRET

Operation ^{Plan}~~Order~~ RCT 2 No. 18 (cont'd)

4. Supply - Normal.

5. Sig Com

(a) RCT2 Command Post at KAVIGO Barracks.

(b) Sig Com in accordance Annex (E) to Div Opn
Plan No. 14 - 45.

(1) 2016 kcs assigned additionally as a Frol
frequency.

(2) 28.0 mcs assigned Regtl MP Co.

(c) Sig supply and repair normal.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

MC QUILLEN
X

Annexes:

(A) - Operation Overlay

Dist: "B"

OFFICIAL:


[Signature]
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446

F. J. McVILLAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF,
Executive Officer.



Serial 00108
SECRET

RCT-2.
In the field.
0800, 5Oct45.

Change No. 1 to

Operation Order
RCT-2 No. 18

1. The following change to RCT-2 Opn
O No. 18 is effective this date:

(a) Page 1 under TASK ORGANIZATION,
Para (d) RCT Hq Gp, delete 1st Plat
Sub Co 2d Serv Bn.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

MC QUILLEN
X

DIST:

Same as RCT-2 Opn O No. 18.

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Serial 00115

SECRET

Change Number 2 to

RCT 2,
In the field.
21 November 1945.

Operation Order

RCT 2 No 18

1. The following change to RCT 2 Opn
0 No 18 is effective this date:

(a) RCT 2 Opn 0 No 18 is hereby
designated as RCT 2 Opn Plan No
18, and will be referred to as
such in the future.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL:

R. B. WILDE,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

DIST:

Same as RCT 2 Opn 0 No 18.

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Serial 00106

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Operation Plan

RCT 2 No 19

RCT 2

In the field.

9 October, 1945.

Maps: 1:25,000 KYUSHU, A.M.S. L872, 1945.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex (A).

1. (a) See Operation Order No 18 and Intelligence studies and Information since issued.

(b) Elements of the V Amphibious Corps continue to occupy additional areas and to enlarge that portion of KYUSHU under surveillance and control of occupation forces.

(1) The 2d Mar Div, Reinf., in addition to developing the occupation of assigned areas of responsibility, will defend against and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy any hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:

(a) Maintaining at all times in each regional area of responsibility a force of at least one (1) Battalion prepared to move on two (2) hours notice, with one (1) company of such Battalion motorized, prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.

(b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the Division, a minimum of 75% of the command during hours of darkness.

(c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each separate billeting area, and area of responsibility.

(d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces or prevent the execution of assigned missions.

2. RCT 2 will be prepared to initiate action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned zone of responsibility. All troops within assigned zone will be attached to RCT 2 for execution of this plan.

SECRETOperation Plan

RCT 2 No 19

-
3. (a) BLT 1/2, be prepared on order to occupy and defend assigned area of responsibility, and/or dispatch troops to any other part of RCT 2 area of responsibility in order to suppress hostile activity.
- (b) BLT 2/2, be prepared on order to occupy and defend assigned area of responsibility, and/or dispatch troops to any other part of RCT 2 area of responsibility in order to suppress hostile activity. On even days of the Month the BLT will be maintained in a standby status ready to move on two (2) hours notice, with one company motorized prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.
- (c) BLT 3/2, be prepared on order to occupy and defend assigned area of responsibility, and/or dispatch troops to any other part of RCT 2 area of responsibility in order to suppress hostile activity. On odd days of the Month the BLT will be maintained in a standby status ready to move on two (2) hours notice, with one company motorized prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.
- (d) RCT Hq Gp, less Co "A", prepare a plan for defense of RCT 2 billeting area and be prepared to execute same on order. Co "A", be prepared to establish and maintain traffic control posts throughout Regimental zone of responsibility in order to facilitate all vehicular or troop movements and to revert to parent control on order. Co "C" 2d MT Bn be prepared to furnish transportation for motorized company as required by para 3. (b) and (c) above.
- (e) 2d Tk Bn, prepare a plan for defense of billeting areas and be prepared to execute subsequent missions on order.
- (f) Engr Gp, prepare a plan for defense of billeting areas. Comprise portion of area reserve and be prepared to move elements on order.
- (g) Serv Gp, prepare a plan for defense of billeting areas. Comprise portion of area reserve and be prepared to move elements on order.
- (h) Div Trs, prepare a plan for defense of billeting areas. Comprise portion of area reserve and be prepared to move elements on order.

SECRET

Operation Plan

RCT 2 No 19

- (x) (1) All BLTs will be prepared to move on order to the support of other units of the RCT, and will become familiar with road nets throughout RCT area of responsibility with this purpose in view.
- (2) Defense plans to be submitted to this Hq by 12 October, 1945, and rehearsals to begin on that date and held weekly thereafter. Attached units will notify this Hq whenever drills are to be scheduled. BLTs and RCT Hq Gp will hold drills at direction of RCT Commander.
- (3) On receipt of orders to execute this plan, BLT Commanders will alert their units and await further orders. All other units will immediately execute plan of billet defense.
4. a. One (1) U/F for all .30 cal. weapons, and one-half (1/2) U/F for mortars will be maintained at the Regt'l S-4 and Yellow Beach dumps.
- b. All other supply - normal.
5. Sig Comm
- a. RCT 2 CP at KATIGO Barracks.
- b. Sig Comm in accordance with Annex (F) to 2d Mar Div Opn Plan No 14.
- c. All BLTs, 2d Tk Bn, and Engr Gp check into Regt'l Command net (4805 kcs) and maintain continuous watch in event of execution of this plan. This is a CW net.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

F. J. MCQUILLEN
Lt Col, U.S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer

Annexes:

- (A) - Task Organization
(B) - Operation Overlay

SECRET

Serial 00106
SECRET

Operation Plan
RCT 2 No 19

Distribution:

BLT 1/2	- 6	copies
BLT 2/2	- 6	"
BLT 3/2	- 6	"
RWC/2	- 1	"
H&S/2	- 3	"
2d Tk Bn	- 1	"
Eng Gp	- 3	"

Serv Gp	- 3	copies
Div Trs	- 2	"
2d Mar Div	- 3	"
RCT 6	- 1	"
RCT 8	- 1	"
10th Mar	- 1	"
RCT 2 Hq	- 6	"

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Operation Plan

RCT 2 No 19

ANNEX (A)

TASK ORGANIZATION

RCT 2 - Col Cutts, USMC

(a) BLT 1/2 - Lt Col Totman, USMC

1st Bn 2d Mar (less Co "A")

(b) BLT 2/2 - Lt Col Rovetta, USMC

2d Bn 2d Mar

1st Plat RWC

(c) BLT 3/2 - Lt Col Layer, USMCR

3d Bn 2d Mar

2d Plat RWC

(d) RCT Hq Gp - Maj La Grone, USMC

Co "A" (RCT 2 MP Co)

H&S Co 2d Mar

Co "B" 2d Med Bn

Co "A" 2d Engr Bn

Co "C" 2d MT Bn

1st Plat Ord Co 2d Serv Bn

1st Plat Serv Co 2d Serv Bn

1st Plat Automotive Repair Co 2d MT Bn

RWC (less 1st & 2nd Plats)

(e) 2d Tk Bn - Lt Col Williamson, USMC

(f) Engr Gp - (less Dets) - Maj Kirkpatrick, USMCR

2d Engr Bn (less Cos A, B and C)

1298th Engr (C) Bn (USA)

2d Flon Bn

2d Plat Bomb Disposal Co VAC

(g) Serv Gp - (less Dets) - Col Martyr, USMC

2d Serv Bn (less Dets)

4th Sep Ldry Plat

2d Med Bn (less Dets)

Serial 00106

SECRET

Operation Plan

RCT 2 No 19 (Annex (A) - Task Organization)

3d Flat 4th Salv Rep Co

2d MT Bn (less Dets)

3656th QM Trk Co (USA)

Div Sig Co

(h) Div Trs (less Dets) -

Div Hq Bn (less Dets)

Co "D" 3d MP Bn (Prov)

2d Mar War Dog Plat

VMC-2

54th CIC A2B2 Det (Area)

498th CIC B3 Det (Combat)

93d Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

F. J. MCQUILLEN

Lt Col, U.S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer

Distribution:

Same as Operation Plan RCT 2 No 19.

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EXCLUDED FROM
DISTRIBUTION
NO 10

NOT A
TO THE FIELD
3 October 1960


ANNEX (B)

OPERATION QUILAY

ALL: CUSC, 1/30,000, A.M.S. LATE, 1960.
BY ORDER OF DEPARTMENT
P. J. MCWILLIAMS
Lt Col, U.S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

REFERENCE:
Same as Operation Plan NO 2 No 10.

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2



Serial 00106

SEC-RT

Change Number 1 to

Operation Plan

ROT 2 No 19

ROT 2

In the field.

11 October, 1945.

1. In paragraph 2, add:

This regiment will also be prepared to move on order to the support of other divisional units, and to this purpose will conduct reconnaissance of road nets throughout respective and adjacent areas of responsibility.

2. In paragraph 3 (x) add:

(4) Where rehearsals of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese nationals to become greatly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of the drill.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL GILTS:

MC WILLEN

X

Distribution:

Same as ROT 2 Opn Plan No 19.

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Serial 00109
SECRET

RCT 2
In the field.
23 October, 1945.

Operation Plan
RCT 2 No. 20

Map: 1:25,000 KVUSHU, A.M.S. L872, 1945.

TASK ORGANIZATION

RCT 2 - Col Cutts, USMC

(a) BLT 1/2 - Lt Col Totman, USMC

1st Bn, 2d Mar

(b) BLT 2/2 - Lt Col Revetta, USMC

2d Bn, 2d Mar

Co "C", 2d Med Bn

Det Mccorn, 2d Med Bn

1st Plat, Co "C", 2d MT Bn

Det C "A", 2d Engr Bn

Det 1st Plat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn

~~Det Div Hq Bn Det B Div Sig Co.~~

~~B Co~~

(c) BLT 3/2 - Lt Col Bennett, USMC

3d Bn, 2d Mar

(d) R/Wons Co - Maj Rustard, USMC

R/Wons Co, 2d Mar

(e) RCT Hq Gp - Capt Hedrick, USMCP

H&S Co, 2d Mar

Co "B", 2d Med Bn

Co "A", 2d Engr Bn (less det)

Co "C", 2d MT Bn (less 1st Plat)

1st Plat Engr Co, 2d Serv Bn

1st Plat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn (less det)

1st Plat Automotive Repair Co, 2d Serv Bn

~~Det A Div Sig Co~~

1. (a) See Intelligence Studies and G-2 reports as issued.

(b) Elements of 2d Mar Div continue to occupy additional areas to extend control over that portion of KVUSHU assigned by V Amphibious Corps.

SECRET

Operation Plan

RCT 2 No 20

2. RCT 2, in addition to maintaining surveillance of present area of responsibility will commence development of newly assigned area of responsibility by:

(a) Movement of one (1) BLT to KANOYA to relieve 1st Bn 127th Infantry. (Army).

(b) Reconnaissance of MIYATAKI to determine availability of billeting facilities for RCT Hq Co and one (1) BLT.

(c) Employment of remaining BLT as necessary to carry out assigned missions.

3. (a) BLT 1/2 continue to carry out occupational duties in assigned area of responsibility.

(b) BLT 2/2 proceed on order by transportation to be provided to KANOYA, relieve the 1st Bn 127th Infantry and maintain occupational control of that area.

(c) BLT 3/2 continue to carry out occupational duties in assigned area of responsibility and on order be prepared to execute movement to destination to be announced.

(d) R/Wong Co assume immediate control of area of responsibility of BLT 2/2 and carry out occupational duties in that area.

(e) RCT Hq Co carry out normal missions.

(x) (1) BLT Commanders will acquaint themselves with procurement procedure with a view to being able to function independently in that respect.

(2) Newly assigned BLT areas of responsibility to be designated at a later date.

(3) Unit commanders will follow SIXTH ARMY SOP (to be issued) in disposing of Japanese ordnance material.

(4) Maximum use will be made of civil police in carrying out occupational duties. Civilian homes will not be searched nor will civilians be disarmed by U. S. Armed Forces.

SECRETOperation PlanRCT 2 No 20

(5) Guards will be established over installations or dumps that are of intelligence value, or of a nature dangerous to success of occupation.

(6) Once an area has been searched, surveillance will be maintained by use of periodic patrols. (Minimum patrol strength beyond range of immediate support; one (1) platoon.)

(7) Special emphasis will be placed on prevention of looting and the maintenance of a high degree of sanitation.

(8) Annex (C) to 2d Mar Div Opn O No 59 (Implementation of SCAP Directive to Japanese Government dated 4Oct45) will be initiated by inspection of all prisons and places of detention within assigned areas and by assumption of control of all records of organizations abolished under terms of that directive. Any effort on the part of any individuals or organizations to circumvent the directive will be immediately reported to this Hq.

(9) Unit commanders are authorized to confiscate all monetary or other negotiable assets, documents, pictorial records and photographic film of the Nazi party now in the hands of German nationals.

(10) All Japanese training aids such as target frames, silhouette targets, tables, benches and mapboards, found in installations will be conserved and reported to this Hq.

(11) Seizure of any precious metals or foreign currency will be reported to this Hq immediately.

4. Admin - BLT 2/2 twenty (20) days resupply; two (2) U/F. Other units - normal.

5. (a) See Annex (B) (Signal Communication)

(b) Command Posts:

RCT 2 : KAMIGO Barracks - to be announced.
BLT 1/2: KAMIGO Barracks - to be announced.
BLT 2/2: KAMIGO Barracks - KANOYA.
BLT 3/2: KAMIGO Barracks - to be announced.
R/Wops : KAMIGO Barracks - to be announced.

(c) Use ITEM time.

Serial 00109
SECRET

Operation Plan
RCT 2 No 20

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

F. J. MC QUILLLEN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Annexes:

- (A) Operation Overlay (to be issued later)
- (B) Signal Communication

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Operation Plan

RCT 2 No 20

ANNEX (B)

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. Sig Com in accordance with Annex (D) to 2d MarDiv Opn Order No 59 as supplemented by this annex, and with U. S. Navy Communication Instructions.

2. Radio:

(a) See Appendix I for Div Commo Net Coverage.

(b) BIT 2/2 maintain continuous watch on Div Commo Net. (SCR 209 provided for this purpose; TBW provided as alternate set).

(c) Additional frequency assignment:

2300 kcs. - Best'l Patrol Freq (to be utilized for patrol Com. Senior station guarding net is NCS.).

(d) Para 4432, Chapter 4, Section D, Communication Instructions, to be strictly followed.

(e) Optimum use to be made of radio repair personnel and equipment provided by Div Sig Co.

3. Wire:

(a) See Appendix II for Japanese wire network.

(b) Use existing Japanese wire network:

(1) Japanese telephone lines terminated in postoffices at KANOYA, MIYAKONOJO, and MIYAZAKI.

(2) Japanese telephone lines utilized to be jump red around Japanese switchboards.

(3) Japanese to maintain all Japanese telephone lines.

(4) Local lines may be obtained from Japanese through local procurement board.

(5) Japanese lines other than locals on request to RComO.

Operation Plan
RCT 2 No 20

(Annex (B) - Signal Communications)

(6) Japanese telephone supervisors:

KANOYA - Mr. ARATA
MIYAZAKI - Mr. YAMAZAKI

(c) Installation of local Marine telephone lines authorized.

(d) KANOYA Air Task Force has radio link with VAC;
VAC has radio link with 2d MarDiv.

KANOYA Air Task Force - FRISCO
VAC - - - - TIGER

4. Message Center

(a) See Appendix III for Air C under Coverage.

(b) Air Courier Service in accordance 2d Mar Div
Memo No 276-45.

(c) Crypto-rules:

(1) CSP 1500/1607 is prescribed as the primary
crypto system.

(2) Modified Clear (Use of radio voice calls for
units and shackle cipher for numerals) may be used
where urgency or lack of more secure ciphers
dictates.

(3) Shackle Cipher-list five (5) from Pac 6(A)
effective-Chang #1 to 2d MarDiv Gen Order
#33-44 and Div Memo #163-45 govern.

(d) Plain language versions of encrypted dispatches
will not be transmitted over radio or non-military
wire circuits. Subject to the above limitations
RESTRICTED and CONFIDENTIAL traffic may be trans-
mitted in modified clear over radio link voice
circuits. Should it become necessary to retransmit
such traffic by radio, it must be paraphrased and
a new date/time group assigned prior to trans-
mission.

(e) Classified traffic may be sent by radio in this
manner:

SECRET - - - Encrypted
CONFIDENTIAL - - Modified Clear
RESTRICTED - - Modified Clear

Serial 00109
SECRET

Operation Plan
RCT 2 No 20

(Annex (B) - Signal Communications)

(f) All units prepare destruction bills covering all
crypto-codes in accordance with DNC 5.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CUTTS:

F. J. MC QUILLEN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Appendices:


- (I) - Radio Net
- (II) - Telephone Net
- (III) - Air Courier

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
DIVISION COMMAND NET




(RE) WHEN ESTABLISHED

ANNEX B APPENDIX I

TELEPHONE NET



AIR COURIER



ANNEX B APPENDIX 3

Serial 1010

SECRET

Change Number 1 to:

RCT 2
In the field
28 October 1945

Operation Plan

RCT 2 No 20

1. In TASK ORGANIZATION under BLT 2/2 change
"Det Div Fq Bn" to read "Det B Div Sig Co"
2. Under RCT 2 Hq Gp, change "Det Div Hq Bn" to
read "Det A Div Sig Co"

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL EL O'DONNELL

R. W. WILDE
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Distribution:

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Serial 00110
SECRET

Operation Order
RCT 2 No 1-45

RCT 2
In the field.
0800, 1 November, 1945.

Map: KYUSHU 1:500,000, 2d Edition, AFPAC 2.

TASK ORGANIZATION

RCT 2 - Lt Col O'Donnell, USMC

(a) BLT 1/2 - Lt Col Totman, USMC

1st Bn, 2d Mar
Det Co "A", 2d Engr Bn
3d Plat, Co "C", 2d MT Bn
Det 1st Serv Plat, 2d Serv Bn

(b) BLT 2/2 - Lt Col Revetta, USMC

2d Bn, 2d Mar
Co "C", 2d Med Bn
Det Recon, 2d Med Bn
1st Plat, Co "C", 2d MT Bn
Det Co "A", 2d Engr Bn
Det 1st Plat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn
Det "B", Div Sig Co

(c) BLT 3/2 - Lt Col Bennett, USMC

3d Bn, 2d Mar

(d) RCT Hq Gp - Major Bustard, USMC

H&S Co, 2d Mar
RWC, 2d Mar
Co "B", 2d Med Bn
Co "A", 2d Engr Bn (less Dets)
Co "C", 2d MT Bn (less 1st & 3d Flats)
1st Plat Ord Co, 2d Serv Bn
1st Plat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn (less Dets)
1st Plat Auto Repair Co, 2d Serv Bn
Det "A", Div Sig Co

1. (a) See Intelligence studies and G-2 Reports as issued.

(b) Elements of 2d MarDiv continue to occupy additional areas and extend control over that portion of KYUSHU assigned by V Phib Corps.

SECRET

Operation Order

RCT 2 No 1-45

2. RCT 2 (less BLT 2/2) will move to MIYAZAKI KEN, occupy and carry out Enforcement of Surrender Terms in the assigned area of responsibility.

See Annex (A) (Operation Overlay)

3. (a) BLT 1/2 continue to carry out assigned missions in present area of responsibility. When relieved by the 1st Bn, 10th Marines of duties in present area, and on order of 2d Mar Div move to vicinity of MIYAZAKI and occupy new area of responsibility as assigned.

(b) BLT 2/2 continue to carry out occupational duties in assigned area of responsibility.

(c) BLT 3/2 on order move to vicinity of MIYAKONOJO, occupy and carry out Enforcement of Surrender Terms in assigned area of responsibility.

(d) RCT Hq Gp on order move to vicinity of MIYAKONOJO and carry out normal missions.

(x) (1) All previous orders as pertain to occupation duties and Enforcement of Surrender Terms in assigned areas of responsibility remain in effect.

(2) Attention is directed to Annex (J) (Disposition of Surrendered Material Plan) to Division Administrative Order No 58-45, and to the functions of the Regimental Disposition Officer and Depot Control Group as governed by that plan.

4. (a) Supplies - Class I, II - thirty (30) days.
Class III, IV - up to thirty (30) days, as available.
Ammo - 2 U/F.

(b) Uniform - Utility with steel helmets; transport packs.

5. (a) See Annex (B) (Signal Communications) to RCT 2 Opn Plan No 20.

SECRET

Serial 00110

SECRET

Operation Order

RCT 2 No 1-45

(b) Command Posts:

RCT 2:	KAMIGO Barracks - to be reported
BLT 1/2:	KAMIGO Barracks - to be reported
BLT 2/2:	KANOYA
BLT 3/2:	KAMIGO Barracks - to be reported

(c) Use ITEM time.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL.

R. B. WILDE,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer

Annexes:

(A) - Operation overlay


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Serial 00110
SECRET
Operation Order
RCT 2 No 1 - A5
(With Change #1
Serial 00111)

RCT 2
In the field.
0800, 1 November 1945.

ANNEX (A)

OPERATION OVERLAY

Map: ZRUSEK, 1:500,000, 24 Edition, APPA3 2.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'CONNELL:

H. B. WILDE,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

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Serial 00111
SECRET

Change No 1 to

Operation Order
RCT 2 No 1-45

RCT 2
In the field.
1200, 8 November 1945.

1. Under TASK ORGANIZATION, (b) BLT 2/2, add
"3rd Plat RWC".

2. Under (d) RCT Hq Co, change second line
to read: "RWC, 2d Var (less 3rd Plat)".

3. See overlay attached.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL:

R. B. WILDE,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

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THE
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 1, 1900
TO THE
HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE
NAVY
DEPARTMENT
FROM
THE
SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY

Serial 00113

SECRET

Operation Order

RCT 2 No ~~8-45~~
~~2-45~~

RCT 2

In the field.

16 November 1945

Maps: KYUSHU, 1/25000, AMS, L872, 1945.
1:250,000 CENTRAL JAPAN, Second Edition,
L571 AMS 2.

TASK ORGANIZATION:

RCT 2 - Lt Col O'Donnell, USMC

(a) BLT 1/2 - Lt Col Totman, USMC

1st Bn, 2d Mar
Det Co "A", 2d Engr Bn
Det 1st Serv Plat, 2d Serv Bn

(b) BLT 2/2 - Lt Col Revetta, USMC

2d Bn, 2d Mar
Co "C", 2d Med Bn
1st Plat Co "C", 2d MT Bn
Det Co "A", 2d Engr Bn
Det 1st Serv Plat, 2d Serv Bn
Det "B", Div Sig Co
3rd Plat RWC

(c) BLT 3/2 - Lt Col Bennett, USMC

3rd Bn, 2d Mar

(d) RCT Hq Gp - Maj Bustard, USMC

H&S Co, 2d Mar
RWC, 2d Mar (less 3rd Plat)
Co "B", 2d Med Bn
Co "A", 2d Engr Bn (less Dets)
Co "C", 2d MT Bn (less 1st Plat)
1st Plat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn (less Dets)
1st Plat Auto Repair Co, 2d MT Bn
Det Recon (US Army)
Det "A", Div Sig Co

1. (a) See Intelligence Studies and Reports as issued.

(b) Elements of the 2d Mar Div, Reinf, continue to occupy additional areas of KYUSHU.

SECRET

Operation Order

RCT 2 No 8-45

2. RCT 2 in addition to carrying out enforcement of surrender terms and developing the occupation of assigned areas of responsibility, will be prepared to defend against and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy any hostile groups attempting interference with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:

(a) Maintaining at all times in each battalion area of responsibility one (1) company prepared to move on one (1) hour notice, with one (1) platoon of that company prepared to execute a motorized movement on thirty (30) minutes notice.

(b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the RCT, a minimum of 75% of the command during the hours of darkness.

(c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the defense of each separate billeting area and area of responsibility.

(d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups are forming or endangering our forces within the assigned zone of responsibility.

(e) Being prepared to move on order to the support of other divisional units.

For areas of responsibility see
Change No 1 to Operation Order
No 1-45.

3. (a) BLT 1/2 prepare a plan showing initial action to be taken against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within the battalion area of responsibility.

SECRET

Serial 00113

SECRET

Operation Order

RCT 2 No ~~X-45~~

(b) BLT 2/2 prepare a plan showing initial action to be taken against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within the battalion area of responsibility. All ground forces within the assigned area are attached to the BLT for the execution of this plan.

(c) BLT 3/2 prepare a plan showing initial action to be taken against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within the battalion area of responsibility.

(d) RCT HQ Gp prepare a plan for defense of the RCT Command Post, Co "C" 2d MT Bn be prepared to furnish BLT 3/2 sufficient transportation for the movement of one (1) company on two (2) hours notice.

(x) (1) Operation Plan No 19 is superseded by this order and may be destroyed without report.

(2) Plans to be submitted to this Hq by 23 November 1945, and rehearsal of defense plans will be commenced by that date and continued weekly thereafter.

(3) Where rehearsal of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese nationals to become unduly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of such activity.

(4) Battalions will be prepared to move to the support of adjacent units, and to this purpose will conduct a road reconnaissance of adjacent areas of responsibility.

4. (a) Uniform - steel helmets, normal arms.

(b) Ammo - 1 U/F for all weapons to be maintained in unit dumps.

Serial 00113
SECRET

Operation Order

RCT 2 No ~~8-45~~
~~2-45~~ -----

5. (a) See Annex (B) Signal Communications
to RCT 2 Opn Plan No 20.

(b) Command Post:

RCT 2 - MIYAKONOJO (1417.50-0942.80)

BLT 1/2 - MIYAZAKI (0633.10-0962.70)

BLT 2/2 - KANOYA (1399.50-0901.50)

BLT 3/2 - MIYAKONOJO (1417.50-0942.80)

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL:

R. B. WILDE,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

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Serial 00114

SECRET

Change Number 1 to

RCT 2,
In the field.
21 November 1945.

Operation Order

RCT 2 No 3-45

1. The following change to RCT 2 Opn
O No 3-45 is effective this date:

(a) RCT 2 Opn O No 3-45 is hereby
designated as RCT 2 Opn O No 2-45,
and will be referred to as such in
the future.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL O'DONNELL:

R. B. WILDE,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

DIST:

Same as RCT 2 Opn O No 3-45.

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OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

ANNEX (B)

S-1 REPORT

consists of

- APPENDIX (I) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT.
- APPENDIX (II) - PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT.
- APPENDIX (III) - SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT.
- APPENDIX (IV) - ADJUTANT'S REPORT.

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ANNEX (B)

S-1 REPORT

APPENDIX (I) - MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT

One Military Government Officer was attached to RCT 2 about two weeks prior to departure from the NAGASAKI area. There, the duties were mainly concerned with procurement and control of civilian labor.

A Military Government unit had been functioning for approximately a month in the MIYAZAKI Prefecture before the arrival of the RCT. During this time they had issued instructions to the Prefectural Government as pertained to enforcement of the Surrender Terms, and conducted surveys of the agriculture, industries, and economics of the area. Liaison had been established with public officials and much preliminary work accomplished toward development of the occupation.

With the arrival of RCT 2, the Military Government Officers were attached to the RCT and ordered to the various BLT locations, the Regimental Military Government Section being located at MIYAZAKI near the MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE Offices. Their work is primarily concerned with maintaining liaison between unit commanders and the local civilian governmental agencies. Through the Military Government, arrangements are made for releasing military supplies, such as food, transportation, clothing, fuel, and medical supplies.

Close liaison is necessary among the Military Government, Procurement, and Dispositions sections. At times their work involves common civilian or military agencies and conflicting policies must be avoided.

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APPENDIX (II) - PROVOST MARSHAL REPORT

Company "A" was designated as the unit responsible for Military Police duties in the area of responsibility while RCT 2 was in NAGASAKI. On moving to SOUTHERN KYUSHU, each battalion appointed Military Police to function in its respective area.

In establishing Military Police control, close liaison with the Japanese civil police has been of the greatest importance in supervising and controlling the movements and activity of the civilian population.

The Military Police operated under the supervision of the Provost Marshal for each area. A Military Police Station was located in each town or city in which troops are billeted.

Since the primary purpose of the Military Police is to keep our personnel out of trouble, the greatest number of posts were placed in heavily populated sections within the limits of the liberty areas. A system of foot and jeep patrols was found to be the most satisfactory. Foot patrols were established in districts most frequented by our troops, with the telephone as a means of communication with the Military Police Station. Radio jeep patrols covered the remainder of the area.

Incidents of trouble between civilians and members of the U. S. forces were few in number. The greatest number of offenders were apprehended for entering restricted areas.

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APPENDIX (III) - SPECIAL SERVICES REPORT

There was little damage and no loss of equipment during the move from SAIPAN to NAGASAKI. Immediately upon occupation of KAMIGO Barracks, movie equipment was set up in two locations within the camp area. Initially only old films were available and those were of doubtful entertainment value. Later on, however, some additional films were obtained.

Six loudspeakers were located throughout the camp area, and recordings broadcast three periods daily. At times relay of radio broadcasts was possible, dependent on reception.

There were three basketball courts, with cement decks available to all units, and one field suitable for softball or football. Improvement was underway on other fields at the time the RCT received orders to move. In addition, fishing facilities were available at a lake near KAMIGO Barracks, and a skeet shooting range was built adjacent to the camp area.

Prior to leaving the NAGASAKI area, an educational program had been planned with each unit organizing its own instruction periods and arranging for instructors under the supervision of the RCT Special Services Officer. Applications for the various subjects had been collected and at the time of moving to Southern KYUSHU the program was ready to begin pending arrival of text books.

In the RCT area of responsibility in Southern KYUSHU, more space was available for athletic fields and conditions more favorable for all types of outdoor sports. Movie films, had to be supplied by courier plane from NAGASAKI, arrived irregularly and were inadequate for such widely separated units.

Transfer of personnel required reorganization of the educational program. A selected number of officers and men were sent to conferences at VAC Headquarters and Sixth Army Headquarters for brief training in connection with the program.

APPENDIX (IV) - ADJUTANT'S REPORT

During the preliminary planning period 1 August, 1945 to 18 September, 1945, the S-1 Section was engaged in routine duties, and preparation for embarkation. An embarkation plan was formulated in conformance with the tactical plan for the operation. All supplies and equipment for an extended operation were obtained, crated, marked and made ready for transport. Embarkation rosters were prepared in accordance with existing instructions as was a tentative embarkation schedule. Liaison was established between ships and embarking units. Embarkation of troops, which began 9 September 1945, was complicated somewhat by the detachment of two hundred and seventy (270) men for return to the continental limits of the United States for discharge.

Upon landing at NAGASAKI a detachment from the S-1 Section went forward with a reconnaissance party and arranged for the billeting of the RCT at KAMIGO Barracks. For two days the section was engaged in setting up a forward CP, making permanent billeting arrangements and general coordination of staff functions with the rear CP. Following this came a period of several days of unremitting application in order to bring routine personnel and administrative records and reports up to date.

During the preliminary planning period for the movement to Southern KYUSHU approximately three hundred (300) more men were detached and transferred to the U. S. for processing and discharge.

Upon arriving in the MIYAKONOJO area it was found that the Military Government Section had done commendable work in connection with preparation of quarters and storerooms. Billeting the units and making them comfortable in their quarters was greatly facilitated due to this factor. The S-1 Section immediately set up a CP and for several days was occupied in bringing the unit records and reports up to date.

On 18 November the S-1 Section began to prepare for the interchange of personnel with the 5th Division. Rosters of men eligible for return to the United States and subsequent discharge were prepared and sent to Division Headquarters. It was found that approximately fifty percent of the personnel of the regiment would be involved in the interchange. Arrangements were made for the transportation, billeting and assignment of incoming personnel. BLT 1/2 personnel, plus one third of the RCT Headquarters personnel were interchanged on 23 November, and BLT 3/2 personnel, plus one third of the RCT Headquarters personnel on 25 November, 1945. The interchange of BLT 2/2 and the remainder of the RCT Headquarters personnel was scheduled for 1 December. There will necessarily be a considerable amount of screening and reassignment of personnel within the regiment after the completion of the transfer in order that the personnel needs of the different units may be best fulfilled by the material on hand.

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OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

ANNEX (C)

S-2 REPORT

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ANNEX (C)

S-2 REPORT

On the return of RCT 2 from the OKINAWA operation, efforts were made to increase the number of Japanese language personnel in the regiment, through regimental language schools. A school was started with twenty (20) students at the end of June, 1945 and continued with this number until 5 September. After the surrender of JAPAN, special efforts were made to accelerate this course. Students spent full time five days a week in classroom study, and in practice at the Internment Compound, Camp Susupe, SAIPAN. It was impossible to increase further the number of students because of a lack of suitable instructors. Instruction of all troops of the RCT in use of the "Handbook of Japanese" was held by G-2 language personnel prior to embarkation.

When it became known that this RCT would take part in the occupation of JAPAN, intelligence personnel throughout the regiment were given special instruction in the geography, history, customs, laws, and government of JAPAN as well as Military Police duty and allied subjects. Emphasis was placed on training in civil intelligence work. A shortcoming in this instruction resulted from a lack of source material. It was necessary to conjecture and speculate to a certain extent, and for the purpose of clarifying the anticipated duties so far as possible, frequent conferences of the Regimental S-2 with the G-2 and conferences of the Regimental and Battalion S-2's were held.

On arrival at NAGASAKI, the Intelligence Section sent an advance detail ashore with representatives of the S-1, S-4, and Communications Sections to reconnoiter routes to KAMIGO Barracks, the proposed billeting area, and dock and warehouse space. Preliminary intelligence work consisted of reconnoitering the road net and verifying maps, determining the attitude of civilian and military Japanese, and locating and investigating high priority intelligence targets. BLT S-2's were responsible for intelligence functions in their sectors of responsibility, while the RCT S-2 coordinated and supervised intelligence functions in the regiment, collected and collated information. In cases where BLTs located more intelligence targets than they could put under surveillance, the RCT S-2 section lent assistance with its personnel.

By the time RCT 2 left NAGASAKI, all intelligence targets assigned by G-2 in the area of responsibility, and located by elements of the RCT had been investigated and reported on. Experience proved that the most efficient means of investigating known intelligence targets was by jeep patrol. An officer,

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interpreter, and one other intelligence man could cover several intelligence targets in a day, traveling by jeep. Intelligence personnel were attached to search patrols whenever possible, and located many additional targets to be investigated more thoroughly by jeep patrols.

Civilian opinion was regularly sampled by both officer and enlisted interpreters. Information so obtained was seldom considered reliable since it was a characteristic of the Japanese to give the answer that they thought the occupation forces wanted.

Children of high school age spoke quite freely about local affairs and installations in many cases where older Japanese professed ignorance. Released internees who remained in Japan furnished fairly reliable information on Japanese "thought trends". It was noted that higher ranking officers spoke more freely than low ranking personnel, apparently because they knew more and had a definite idea as to how much information they intended to give.

Before the regiment moved to southern KYUSHU, a Japanese speaking intelligence officer made a reconnaissance of the area and contacted local Japanese authorities. He instructed them to prepare lists of installations, both civil and military, inventories, desired Order of Battle information, maps showing defensive installations, and locations of units, and to provide necessary liaison personnel.

This was found to save a great deal of time and effort, and placed necessary information at the disposal of occupation troops immediately upon arrival. Information thus furnished was verified before search patrols attempted to uncover unreported installations.

Japanese reports were found to be generally accurate. There were omissions and mistakes, however, resulting from poor liaison between branches of the Japanese armed forces and between various civilian agencies. Misunderstandings also arose from the fact that the Japanese considered that once they turned a list in to one agency of the occupation forces, all agencies were cognizant. Unfortunately this was not always true, and constant efforts were necessary to maintain proper liaison between Military Government, CIC, Dispositions Sections, and Intelligence Sections.

Proper liaison between echelons and between sections within echelons was one of the greatest problems throughout. Initially there was considerable duplication of effort, which was

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finally minimized by frequent conferences between the S-2, higher and lower echelons, and other agencies within the regimental echelon. An Intelligence Plan and an Intelligence Guide were published within the regiment to clarify the functions of Regimental and Battalion sections, and proved successful.

Language personnel were assigned to BLTs as available, and Japanese interpreters were also used where practicable. It was found necessary to conduct Japanese language schools in the regiment after arrival at JAPAN in order to relieve language personnel from non-intelligence functions. Instructors in these schools were local Japanese. Initially at KAMIGO Barracks, it was necessary to have a language man on duty at all times in the regimental CP to handle routine liaison with the Japanese, but when proper Japanese liaison personnel and interpreters were made available, this was no longer necessary. One Marine interpreter was always kept available at the CP for intelligence work.

Demobilization and disarmament had been nearly completed by the Japanese prior to the arrival of occupation forces, and this fact hampered efforts to obtain necessary information from certain key personnel who had been demobilized and had left the area. Verification of demobilization and arms collection reports was extremely difficult, and it was generally necessary to take the word of the Japanese.

Experience showed that a large field section was not necessary on the Regimental level, but that more clerks, draftsmen, and interpreters were needed. Teams of intelligence field section men were made available to the battalions, where they were assigned to patrols sent out by rifle companies. The regimental field section was finally cut down to a minimum size and the field sections within the battalions built up until they were overstrength.

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OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

ANNEX (D)

S-4 REPORT

consists of

- APPENDIX (I) - Transport Quartermaster Report.
- APPENDIX (II) - Quartermaster Report.
- APPENDIX (III) - Medical Report.
- APPENDIX (IV) - Disposition Section Report.
- APPENDIX (V) - Procurement Section Report.
- APPENDIX (VI) - Motor Transport Report.

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ANNEX (D)

S-4 REPORT

APPENDIX (1) - TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER REPORT.

A. Loading and Embarkation - SAIPAN to NAGASAKI.

A regimental staging area was assigned by 2d Mar Div on 26 August. Hauling of supplies and equipment to this area commenced the following day in sufficient time to adequately arrange material for proper loading.

Div Administrative Order No 58-45 and shipping allocations were received on 6 September, four days prior to loading.

Ships TQM's came ashore on Saturday, 8 September, and cargo and personnel allocations were made that day. Paper loading plans were accomplished by troop and ship TQM's during the period from Saturday afternoon until Sunday evening.

Loading of ships commenced on Monday, 10 September at the docks at TANAPAG HARBOR, SAIPAN. The following table shows ships, loading dates, and major units embarked.

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>DATE LOADED</u>	<u>MAJOR UNITS</u>
USS GRIMES APA 172	10-11 Sept	RCT 2 HQ GP
USS MERIWETHER APA 203	10-11 Sept	BLT 1/2
USS BRAXTON APA 138	10-11 Sept	BLT 2/2
USS LANIER APA 125	10-11 Sept	BLT 3/2
USS MILLETTE APA 156	10-11 Sept	2d Bn., 10th Mar. Co "B", 2d Med Bn.
USS WAUKESHA AKA 84	10-13 Sept	RVC/2
USS TY-ELL AKA 80	11-13 Sept	Co "A", 2d Engr Bn.

Embarkation of personnel was completed 13 September 1945. Due to lack of dock space at TANAPAG HARBOR, 11 ships assigned RCT 2 could not be loaded simultaneously.

Because of the late arrival of assigned ships, paper loading plans were hurried. Assignment of additional cargo to RCT 2 by Division after the original allocations were made, tended to complicate loading. The lack of a shore party also necessitated special arrangements on short notice immediately prior to loading.

B. Loading and Embarkation - NAGASAKI to TAKASU.

BLT 2 with attached units, was loaded out on four LSTs at

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NAGASAKI on 25-26 October and completed unloading at TAKASU on 30 October.

RCT 2 Headquarters with attached units and BLT 3/2 was loaded out on four LSTs on 1-2 November and completed unloading at TAKASU on 7 November. The size and equipment of the units embarked and the 30 days of organic supplies made the problem of loading on four LSTs difficult. There was no time available for paper loading the ships of any of the three units which left NAGASAKI.

BLT 1/2 remained at KAMIGO Barracks and was relieved by units of the 10th Marines on 5 November. BLT 1/2 was loaded out on four LSTs at NAGASAKI on 5-6 November and completed unloading at TAKASU on 12 November.

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APPENDIX (II) - QUARTERMASTER REPORT.

Preparations for an assault operation by the Quartermaster section of RCT 2, included survey of all items of clothing and individual equipment to make each man's gear as complete as possible.

Two sets of dungarees, one blanket and two pairs of socks per man were impregnated in June to provide insect repellent clothing.

Shoes and web equipment were kept in good condition by continuous repair trailer unit up until the time of loading for NAGASAKI.

Frequent unit inspections were made in accordance with Division and Regimental directives to insure that organizational and individual equipment was maintained at high standards.

Change from assault to occupational preparations did not materially affect the Quartermaster clothing and commissary sections, except that the issue of heavy winter clothing was begun soon after occupation of the NAGASAKI Area.

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APPENDIX (III) - MEDICAL REPORT

Prior to leaving SAIPAN for the occupation of KYUSHU, all personnel who had not previously been immunized within the past five months were immunized with cholera, typhus, and plague vaccines. Routine immunizations of tetanus toxoid, triple typhoid boosters and smallpox vaccinations were also given.

Upon arriving in NAGASAKI and after the designation of KAMIGO Barracks as the billeting area for RCT 2, medical personnel were required to spray the buildings with DDT in Kerosene or Xylene concentrate, before occupation by our troops. The area was generally in poor sanitary condition with mosquito and fly larvae prevalent, and the dirty buildings filled with flea-ridden straw mats. The Japanese type beds required emptying and deodorizing with chloride of lime and oil before using. Drainage ditches were stopped up in need of repair. Water was supplied by a large, well constructed reservoir about a half mile from the camp. At the time of our arrival the water was not being treated, but chlorination of two and one-half parts per million at the source for several days made it potable. Until this was accomplished, all water was boiled before being used.

The regimental aid station and attached medical company were established in an old Japanese dispensary. Patients requiring further treatment, not available at the medical company hospital, were sent to a Corps Evacuation Hospital located about twenty miles away. There was no occurrence of epidemics, nor any venereal disease reported while at KAMIGO Barracks. Health of the command was excellent, with less than one percent ineffectives.

With the occupation of the new area of responsibility in southern KYUSHU, many of the same medical problems were encountered. By previous orders, the Japanese had commenced cleaning the barracks and improving the area generally. Early displacement of one BLT to KANOYA necessitated attachment of an additional medical company to the RCT, which increased the medical facilities to adequately handle all units of the regiment in spite of the distance between locations. Evacuation of patients was accomplished by a hospital train every third day, or in emergency by plane.

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APPENDIX (IV) - DISPOSITION SECTION REPORT.

Organization for disposition of Japanese war materiel commenced with issuance of Regt Admin O 1-45 which directed that one Depot Control Unit be organized for each BLT. In each BLT the organization varied, but basically it was formed around the assault platoon in each case because of the knowledge of demolitions of the men in that organization. It is desirable to have each Depot Control Unit divided into several teams, each headed by an officer, in order to work different areas simultaneously.

One of the first things that needed to be done was to limit the number of people who could go to Japanese dumps and get materiel, especially trophy items. Passes were issued with a Japanese translation on the back, five to each Depot Control Unit, and an order issued to the Japanese Military and Naval forces and the civil police in the regimental area of responsibility concerning the safekeeping of dumps and storage areas not yet taken over by occupation troops. On this order was a facsimile of the pass.

In order to make use of Japanese army personnel for assisting in disposition, an order was issued the 57th Army on 15 November directing that a Japanese officer be furnished each Depot Control Unit to obtain labor, drivers, mechanics, and technicians as required, to arrange for rail and water transportation, and generally assist in disposition. The army was directed to provide 20 trucks for each Depot Control Unit initially with mechanics and maintenance facilities.

Complete demobilization was ordered by 1 December 1945 and the civil police have already been directed and plan to take over the guarding of Japanese dumps on that date.

Requests for Japanese war materiel for use of own troops were made through the S-4. Request by civilians are made through the Ken Government concerned, via the military government to the Disposition Officer.

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APPENDIX (V) - PROCUREMENT SECTION REPORT.

Various types of Japanese civilian supplies have been procured by this organization in accordance with Annex E, (Revised), to Division Administrative Order Number 58-45, and the various subsequent revisions thereof, including Division Memorandum Number 258-45.

At KAMIGO Barracks, NAGASAKI, all procurement by units of RCT 2 was handled by the Regimental S-4. Since dispersion of the PLTs, the first and Second Battalion have set up their own procurement boards in compliance with Division and Regimental directives and submit completed procurement forms to higher echelon for record.

The procurement officers of each unit function in close liaison with the Unit S-2 and military government officer in order to keep informed on all available sources of civilian supplies.

Well over one-hundred procurement transactions have been completed by RCT 2 and subordinate units since the initiation of the procurement system. Virtually every type of supplies and equipment have been obtained when necessary, ranging from items of furniture to horses.

Most of the Japanese supplies which have been procured come within the general category of building and construction materials. The bulk of the lumber, nails, paint, plumbing and electrical fixtures, and metal used in the repair and building of the camps occupied by units of RCT 2 have been from Japanese sources.

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APPENDIX (VI)- MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT.

All vehicles of RCT 2 were maintained in readiness for combat operations, up until cessation of hostilities. This involved installation of machine gun mounts, camouflage painting, and water-proofing prior to loading.

Drivers schools for all vehicle-drivers of the Regiment including weasel-drivers, were held at SAIPAN to instruct personnel in proper vehicle operation and maintenance.

Second echelon maintenance was carried out in compliance with current directives and orders at SAIPAN and at NAGASAKI, and is being carried out under the present circumstances which require that vehicles be sent from FLT 1/2 at MIYAZAKI to the Regimental Motor Transport Officer at MIYAKONOJO, as spare parts, skilled mechanics and repair equipment are not available at the battalion billets.

Since the landing at NAGASAKI, Co "C" 2d MT Bn have provided much-needed heavy transportation and third echelon maintenance facilities. However, the shortage of spare parts which has always been critical has been a constant problem and it is strongly recommended that an ample stock of parts be carried by the A&R Section of Motor Transport to shorten the period of dead-lining a vehicle.

Tire patches have been another item of critical shortage and has handicapped occupation duties to some extent.

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OCCUPATION REPORT
SECOND MARINE REGIMENT

ANNEX (E)

COMMUNICATIONS REPORT

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ANNEX (E)

COMMUNICATION REPORT

During the planning phase for an assault landing on KYUSHU, training of communication personnel was marked by increased attention to field communication procedure. Team training was stressed during various command post exercises. On 22 July 1945, all communication sections within RCT 2 participated in a division communication command post exercise held in the field under combat conditions, and with planned, dummy traffic used to place maximum loads on communication channels. Further scheduled division command post exercises were cancelled at the cessation of hostilities with the Japanese.

Preparations were then begun for the occupation of Japan. All units within the combat team had been brought to excess of T/C strength by training line personnel to perform communication duties. All major items of signal equipment were made available. Communication annexes and signal operating instructions were issued in time for them to be passed to subordinate units and a series of conferences of communication officers demonstrated that the basic communication annexes were clearly written and contained the essential information.

The loading of the ship for the movement to JAPAN was conducted under the supervision of the assistant regimental communication officer. All gear needed for an assault landing and for five days operation ashore was placed so to be readily available. A joint Marine-Navy message center was established, while ship to ship communications was furnished by the Navy. During the shipboard movement to JAPAN all communication personnel were schooled as to the general plan, the geography and location of the target, duties of occupational forces, and the details of the communication plan.

RCT 2 landed at NAGASAKI prepared for combat operations if necessary. Ship to shore control was provided by Marine radio nets. Initial contact ashore was by radio and runner only, but wire communication with the forward CP at KAMIGO Barracks was established the day after the landing. The rear CP remained at DEJIMA Wharf for three days. During this time an advance party consisting of the assistant regimental communication officer and half of each section proceeded to the billeting area and commenced installations there. The movement to KAMIGO Barracks was under routine communication procedure, and installations there were set up in accordance with the standard plan for a camp communication system. RCT 2 maintained contact with the 2nd Marine Division by utilizing three telephone lines, superimposing a telegraph channel on one of these lines, and maintaining a continuous watch on the division command net.

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Information as to the details of the movement of RCT 2 from KAMIGO Barracks to the Southeastern part of KYUSHU was available to communication officers in sufficient time to enable them to make plans for the unusual communication requirements imposed by the distance between the headquarters of both higher and subordinate units. This move was made by LSTs and normal loading, ship-board, and unloading procedures governed.

Radio equipment afforded the infantry regiment by the Tables of Allowances was not sufficient to provide adequate and reliable radio communications. To overcome this, the Division Signal Officer provided RCT 2 with two SCR 299 radios, one TBW radio, one SCR 193 radio, and ten additional TCS radios. This equipment, in addition to that normally allowed, proved sufficient to carry out the radio mission. Also the radio jeeps acquired by the disbandment of attached ASCO teams proved of value for patrols and Military Police nets.

This regiment used telephone lines installed and maintained by the Japanese for communications between MIYAKONOJO, NAGASAKI, KUMAMOTO, MIYAZAKI, and KANOYA. These lines were unreliable at first but supervision by Marine communication officers increased their efficiency. RCT 2 was issued twenty three TP-9, amplifier telephones which afforded person to person calls between division headquarters and RCT headquarters. These phones are seriously effected by unfavorable atmospheric condition, but nevertheless they are extremely valuable and are the only means by which direct telephone communication can be made with Division Headquarters at NAGASAKI.

Division provided an air courier service to KANOYA and MIYAKONOJO every other day, and special plane service upon request. Message runs to MIYAZAKI were made by train.

It is felt that the normal allowances of communication personnel and equipment are sufficient to perform the missions assigned with the additional radio equipment aforementioned.

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6TH MARINES OPERATIONS REPORT
ON
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
FROM
23 SEPTEMBER, 1945
TO
30 NOVEMBER, 1945.

HEADQUARTERS, 6TH MARINES,
2D MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE. SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

8 December, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division.
Subject: 6th Marines Operations Report, Occupation of
JAPAN.

1. The subject report is submitted herewith in
compliance with Division Special Order Number 161-45.

J. P. J. J. J.
J. P. J. J. J.

6TH MARINES OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

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APPENDICES

1. Dispatch summaries (1 copy submitted)
2. Periodic reports (1 copy submitted)
3. OPN orders

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PART I PREPARATION AND PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

1. PREPARATION FOR THE OPERATION

a. Preparation for the forthcoming operation had been proceeding on a combat basis prior to the termination of hostilities and the capitulation of the Japanese. After the cessation of hostilities, preparations had to be made for an "occupation" operation. As a result, the training trend changed on 24Aug45, when emphasis began to be placed on military police duties, military government and civil affairs and interior guard duty as well as normal military training.

b. On 5Sep45, 2dMarDiv AdmO No. 58-45 was received and physical preparation for breaking camp and subsequent embarkation began.

c. Quartermaster and TQM sections began to inventory and to spot gear on the docks during the same period in preparation for "loading out" the regiment.

(1)

d. Additional "on the spot" occupation preparations were made when an advance party from RCT-6 landed at the target area on 16Sep45. The mission of this party was to locate suitable billeting, docking and storage areas and to make reconnaissance of the road net, and communication facilities.

(2) Several reconnaissances of the area were necessary before adequate storage and billeting areas could be located. Building and barracks selected were still being occupied by the Japanese. Orders were issued through the Prefectural Governor to vacate these structures by 23Sep45. One large ship outfitting warehouse was found to be large enough to accommodate all supplies of RCT-6 as well as certain additional amounts of Division gear. Docking areas for AKA's and APA's were obtained on 23Sep45 by the S-3 through cooperation with the Port Director. Roads which had been blocked by debris were cleared and made passable for two way traffic by the Japanese. Cranes and crane operators were made available by the Japanese and two hundred Japanese laborers were obtained on a twenty-four hour basis to assist in unloading the regiment.

2. PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION

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a. The Regimental Planning Room opened on 6Sep45 following the receipt of 2dMarDiv Operation Plan No. 14 on 5Sep45. All elements of the Regimental Staff were given access to the room. RCT-6 Operation Plan No. 8-45 and Regimental AdmO No. 3-45 were published and distributed by 8Sep45 to all units of the task organization.

b. Planning for the operation had to be "dualistic" in nature in as much as the status of the actual landing was in doubt. The Regiment had to be prepared to make an opposed landing against the enemy's homeland as well as an unopposed occupation landing. As the time for embarkation neared it became evident the Japanese resistance to the landings was improbable. Nevertheless, plans for both an opposed and an unopposed landing were retained.

PART II TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

1. TRAINING

a. Prior to the end of the war on 14Aug45, training of the regiment had been proceeding upon a normal combat preparation basis. Training had advanced as far as Regtl CPX's, Air-ground Liaison Problems and joint Tank-Infantry tactics.

b. Commencing on 24Aug45 and continuing through 12Sep45 training was planned with a view to acquainting all members of the regiment with the problems of occupation. During this period the following subjects were stressed. Military Courtesy and Discipline, Military Police Duties, Military Government and Civil Affairs and Interior Guard Duties.

c. Following embarkation of RCT-6, training in what to expect from Japan and the Japanese continued. Normal military training continued but additional emphasis was laid on subjects calculated to provide the individual Marine with knowledge basic to his new role as a member of an occupying force. The following are some of the more important of the courses of instruction:

- Malaria and plague prevention and control.
- Rules of land warfare.
- Correct relations with the population of Japan and Japanese customs.
- Interior Guard Duty.
- Post embarkation responsibilities.

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2. ORGANIZATION

a. During the movement to Japan and the initial occupation stages therein, the RCT-6 Task Organization was composed of the following:

RCT-6, Reinf, Col Gregon A. Williams, USMC.

- (a) BLT 1/6 - LtCol Richard D. Strickler, USMC
1stBn, 6thMar
AGL Team
SFC Party
- (b) BLT 2/6 - LtCol James R. Clark, USMCR
2dBn, 6thMar
AGL Team
SFC Party
- (c) BLT 3/6 - LtCol George D. Rich, USMC.
3rdBn, 6thMar
AGL Team
SFC Party
- (d) RCT Weapons Group - Capt William L. Cerutti, USMCR
Wpns/3
- (e) RCT Service Group - Capt Harris H. Davis USMCR
Co B, 2dEngrBn
Co A, 2dMTBn
3rdPlat, OrdCo, 2dServBn
2dPlat, ServCo, 2dServBn
2dPlat, SupplyCo, 2dServBn
2dPlat, Automotive Repair, 2dMTBn
- (f) RCT Hq Group - Capt Earl C. Dunn, USMCR
Hq&ServCo, 6thMar
Scouts and Snipers Plat, 6thMar (MP)
AGL Team
SFC Party
A/Mod Co

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b. Following the initial occupation stages of the operation the necessity of maintaining some of the combat adjuncts of the Combat Team lessened and on 1Oct45 AGL and SFC teams were either transferred back to their parent organizations or absorbed into the 6th Marines. More recently the Task Organization has been further changed by the return of the 2d Flat Supply Co to the 2d ServBn, on 8Nov45.

PART III OCCUPATION OPERATIONS NARRATIVE

1. Occupation operations of the 6th Marines have been conducted under the general guidance of both the S-2 and the S-3 staff sections. Digested patrol and operations reports are given chronologically in the following paragraph. Suitable notation has been made to differentiate between S-2 and S-3 reports. For full coverage of these operations reference should be made to the S-2 Periodic Report or to the S-3 Operations Report for the desired period.

2. The following is a digest of the S-2 and S-3 Operations reports, all map references are to KYUSHU: 1:25,000 ANSL 872.

23Sep45 S-3 Element of RCT-6, including 1/6, 2/6, 3/6, less rear echelons, landed on the west side of NAGASAKI KC at 1300 in area of (1293-1061). The regimental CP was established in the warehouse at TATIGAMI Fitting out wharf. Unloading ships started immediately.

24Sep45 S-2 Inspection of coastal guns and searchlight at (1294.2-1063.20) in the company of G-2 officers revealed that the breech blocks had been removed and that the position was under guard.

24Sep45 S-3 All units of RCT-6 other than rear echelons and ships platoons ashore. Supplies and gear being unloaded.

25Sep45 S-2 A patrol was sent through sector of responsibility to prevent looting of intelligence items. Found triple AA mount, ammunition and extensive tunnels at (1292.61-1061.65). All gun positions have been checked and found to comply with the surrender terms.

25Sep45 S-3 Advance echelons of 2/6 and 3/6 moved forward, to their new and permanent billeting areas. Unloading continued.

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26Sep45 S-2 Reconnaissance and inspection of intelligence targets was completed in two phases. The first, under the direction of the S-2, has been the verifying, locating, and inspecting of Japanese military positions. Positions at the following coordinates were checked:

1. (1292.00-1060.50)
2. (1290.00-1059.50)
3. (1290.00-1058.90)
4. (1288.60-1062.90)
5. (1290.30-1064.50)
6. (1292.20-1064.80)

The second phase has been the inspection of all buildings in this area for items of intelligence value. Documents were found and inspected by G-2 Language Personnel.

26Sep45 S-3 All of 2/6 and 3/6, with the exception of one (1) Company each remaining as rear echelons, in new areas.

27Sep45 S-2 Lt. BRIER accompanied by Capt OTSUKA of the Japanese Navy inspected Naval dumps at (1293.20-1061.70) and (1293.40-1062.40). Japanese were instructed to maintain a guard on the dump until further orders from this Headquarters. The documents found on 26Sep45 were examined by a translation team from Division Language. Results turned in to G-2.

27Sep45 S-3 Regimental Hq, H&S/6 and Wons/6 moved from warehouse to their new permanent billeting areas. Unloading completed and battalions squaring away.

28Sep45 S-2 Party of one officer (Ass't S-2) and Capt YAMAMOTA of the Japanese Navy inspected seven Japanese ammunition dumps in area (1292.70-1061.30). Overlay of ammunition positions checked and given to Division Headquarters. Captain YAMAMOTA knew nothing of any other dumps other than the seven mentioned above. Party of one officer and two men checked gun positions at (1292.50-1069.30). Found no guns. This was verified by natives of the immediate area. Found small underground factory at (1292.30-1068.40). It had been moved from the South after atomic bomb raid. Party of one officer and five enlisted men checked gun positions at (1292.60-1061.60); found weapons, extensive tunnels, and large quantity of ammunition.

29Sep45 S-2 Checked gun positions at (1292.50-1069.30) and found no guns. Report considered false unless verified by Div Headquarters. Documents in building at (1293.30-1062.50) were checked by Division Language Officer. Possible valuable documents are being held by this Headquarters. Ammunition and guns located in dumps (See 27Sep) were checked again. Information gained as to what ships they were taken from. Seven sealed caves out of a total of nineteen at (1292.00-1062.50). Open caves revealed nothing. Sealed caves will be investigated. Burned Japanese rifles found at (1290.6-1062.50) revealed no distinguishing characteristics other than regulation Japanese Army issue.

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30Sep45 S-2 Party of one officer and two men found guns and ammunition at (1293.95-1067.09). Position marked by white flag. Breach blocks removed and stored with guns in small building on reverse slope of hill.

S-3 Forward elements of 1/6 moved to their permanent billeting area.

10Oct45 S-2 Checked intelligence targets in G-2 Intelligence Plan dated 8Sep. Found all reports on industry and damage to be correct. Detailed report on conditions and changes made at all locations forwarded to Division G-2.

20Oct45 S-2 An intelligence party of one officer and four enlisted men supervised the removal of all civilian arms from schools located at (1292.20-1061.2), (1293.25-1063.15) and (1292.85-1062.33) by the Japanese Police. Arms were stored in Police Station at (1293.60-1063.35). Marine MP's on post at station are guarding weapons. Current total of weapons collected is 1773. A patrol checked Japanese Army dump No. 11 and found everything in accordance with Japanese inventory of 23Sep. An aerial reconnaissance party of two officers checked roadnet from NAGSAKI-TOKITSU-MARAMUTSU-NAGAURA-KATAKOMI-KOMIDAKE and OKUSKI.

30Oct45 S-2 Patrol sent to KA IAO SHI to check material at Japanese Army dump (1290.35-1059.35). Everything accounted for as in Japanese inventory of 23Sep45. Patrol examined arms at FUKUDA School (1289.15-1062.49) and also in school (1289.15-1062.49) at TEGUMA. Police given custody of weapons. Reported one YAMAGUITI to CIC on his suspicious activities.

40Oct45 S-2 Submitted statement to Chief of Police whereby he states that he has done everything in his power to find all civilian arms in this area. Located former Secretary of Military Affairs of FUKUDA. Reported name and address to CID.

50Oct45 S-2 CIC reported to this office and then visited one YAMAGUITI's place of business. (See 30Oct) YAMAGUITI had left for the day. Will investigate on 60Oct. Collection of weapons at TOKITSU and SETO by Japanese Police began today.

60Oct45 S-2 Weapons collected and stored in Police Station at (1293.60-1063.35). Under Marine guard. CIC reported on activities of one SHINOKAWA former Secretary of Military Affairs at FUKUDA.

30Oct45 S-2 Investigation of the looting and destruction of installations in the OITA Shipyard area (1292.3-1060.3), is being conducted this date.

10Oct45 S-2 Investigated village of SHIKI I and vicinity. Found two abandoned 12.7cm gun positions at (1284.50-1960.70). Weapons here were collected and sent to SETO by Japanese Police.

120Oct45 S-3 Foot patrol from 3/6 made reconnaissance of battalion and regtl hq defense area.

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13Oct45 S-2 Following intelligence targets investigated:

1. Merchant Marine Barracks (1293-1061)
2. Tategami-machi Barracks (1292-1060.5)
3. Shojuwayama Barracks (1292.5-1060.50)
4. Kozakihana Oil Piers (1291.5-1059.5)
5. Hijashi Engine Works (1293.7-1062.9)
6. Akunoura Engine Works (1293.1-1062.1)

Investigated report of rifle fire in area (1292.05-1060.3).
Unable to gain information.

S-3 All units of the regiment held billet defense rehearsals and tested billet defense plans which had been previously prepared.

14Oct45 S-2 Inspection of Submarine Cable Terminal and Repair Station at (1292.5-1060.80) revealed the following info:

The station is a branch office of the YOKOHAMA-TOKYO Imperial Cable Company and has 300 miles of cable on hand. One SAKAMOTO, the Chief Engineer, is in charge at present. The cable is in operation between here and YOKOHAMA and OSAKA.

15Oct45 S-2 Routine checks of all previously inspected intelligence targets made to ascertain their present condition. Everything remains the same as previously reported. Japanese storage of land mines located at (1292.00-1060.00) investigated and found dugout sealed. Suggest authorities be contacted and situation investigated. All small boats on Western shore of NAGASAKI Bay have been inspected and found lacking of intelligence information.

S-3 Rear echelon of 1/6 moved forward to their permanent billeting area.

16Oct45 S-2 Check-up on Mitsubishi Electrical Company (1293.50-1062.70) revealed present number of employees and also number of employees during the war. Chief Engineer attended school in the U.S. He informed us that the Japanese Navy had ordered all documents burned after the surrender and had been put into effect. Radio and receiver set located at (1293.90-1063.40).

17Oct45 S-2 Intelligence party checked on curriculum at ASAHI school (1293.30-1063.20). Everything adhered to surrender terms.

18Oct45 S-2 Patrol checked the Submarine Detector Station on IKE-SHIMA and OKIKI-SHIMA.

S-3 Foot patrol from 3/6 made Run at (1292.85-1063.10), (1293.7-1063.9). Foot patrol from 1/6 proceeded on foot N on W Coast road to TEGUMA. Entire road was found passable for 6x6, but was quite narrow.

19Oct45 S-2 Reconnaissance of main coast road between OURA and TEGUMA. Police notified to turn in all precious metals and foreign currency and to state location where items were found.

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19Oct45 S-3 Foot patrol from 3/6 made Ren of (1292.2-1063.8) (1292.1-1064.2) and (1292.2-1063.4).

20Oct45 S-2 Survey begun on all manufacturing and processing plants in this area to determine whether reconversion had begun, and what future plans were. Patrol dispatched to the Northern sector of the area. They will for three days contact all village officials and gather all intelligence information available. Chief of Police has started search for all precious metals in this area.

S-3 Foot patrol from 1/6 proceeded N on road from OURA to KOE, then NE on road to point Approx at (1289.3-1065.9), where road becomes a trail. Motorized overnight patrol, consisting of 10 1-Ton 4x4 trucks left Regtl CP to proceed via the E Coast Road to OMODAKA. Last Comm from patrol places them at OMOKAKA.

21Oct45 S-2 Patrol in Northern sector has contacted villages on the West Coast of DOFU Peninsula today.

S-3 Motorized patrol went from OMODAKA to SETO to MIE, where a landslide interfered with further travel. Patrol returned to OMODAKA to spend night.

22Oct45 S-2 Police aiding in investigation of all industries in this area. Patrol dispatched on 20Oct to Northern sector returned this afternoon with information on defensive positions, living conditions, weapons, politics, etc.

S-3 Patrol which left for OMODAKA on 20Oct left OMODAKA at 0735 and arrived at NAGASAKI at 1115. All communities which they visited seemed friendly except SETO, and MAT UNAGA, the chief of Police seemed somewhat hostile to the occupation forces. Foot patrol from 1/6 left OURA and went to (1290.8-1063.9), following good trail. Patrol in 1/4-ton truck from 3/6 went to (1292.3-1064.3), (1292.3-1064.8), and (1292.0-1062.0).

23Oct45 S-3 Foot patrol from 3/6 went to (1293.7-1063.9), (1292.9-1063.1) and (1291.0-1064.7). Foot patrol from 3/6 reconnoitered (1291.75-1062.45) and (1292.30-1063.40). Foot patrol from 1/6 reconnoitered gun posn at (1288.7-1063.0); and Radar posn at (1290.3-1064.7).

24Oct45 S-2 One officer and enlisted interpreter interviewed former British POW at NAGAURA. A full report on Mr. A. F. GABB, 70 years of age, was dispatched to Division Headquarters for action. Discovery of underground storage containing three tons of dynamite at (1290.50-1062.50). Complete inventory of public holdings in FUKUDA made by Fir st Battalion, Sixth Marines.

S-3 Foot patrol from 1/6 inspected fishing craft at KOURA, KOE, TAKITOMARA, TEGUMI. All craft were found registered with Japanese, but none have received info nor complied with Div order requiring registration with Mil Govt.

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25Oct45 S-3 Patrol from 3/6 reconnoitered (1292.5-1064.2) Patrol from 3/6 reconnoitered (1292.3-1064.7). Patrol from 1/6 to KOURA and thence NE to road beginning at (1288.3-1064.7).

26Oct45 S-2 Police Chief of INASA reported lack of precious metals, etc. in his area. Intelligence men checking his reports. TOKITSU and SETO are still working on their report. Patrol covered small boats at FUKUDA.

S-3 Patrol from 1/6 found Hosp (5-bed) at (1287.30-1063.40). Patrol from 2/6 located 500-lb Dml bomb at (1290.9-1061.51). Patrol from 3/6 inspected Co Defense Area at (1293.00-1062.00). Patrol from 3/6 checked Posns at (1293.2-1063.9), (1292.9-1063.1), 1291.0-1064.7 and (1293.2-1063.9).

28Oct45 S-2 Raw metals dump at (1293.25-1065.25) was maintained by Mitsubishi and was under guard by Japanese. No metals have been removed since surrender. Roadnet information secured on NW coast road.

29Oct45 S-2 Routine patrolling throughout West shore area. No new information obtained other than launching of two ships at shipways (1293.00-1061.00). Investigation is underway to find information on ships. Motorized patrol to North sector as far as SETO. Will institute industrial survey in this sector.

S-3 Motorized patrol left NAGASAKI and proceeded to TOKITSU, MURAMATSU and MIE, returned from MIE to MURAMATSU and is planning to spend the night in SETO.

Patrol from 2/6 to Target square (90-60) and (91-61) to investigate area. Patrol from 1/6 to investigate caves in area.

30Oct45 S-2 Two ships launched on 29Oct were DONAN MARU and HIRAO MARU. All information obtained as to owners, weight, for future use etc. British subject A. F. GABB was contacted and he submitted statements to S-2. All information forwarded to CIC for thorough investigation of Japanese landing of supplies. Patrol to SETO returned with road net information, and had instituted industrial survey.

S-3 Motorized patrol mentioned on 29Oct45 left SETO at 0900 and proceeded to YUKINOBU, KOURA, KUROSAKI, MIE, and NAGASAKI. Patrol arrived at NAGASAKI at 1545. Patrol from 3/6 reconnoitered (1292.3-1061.4), (1292.2-1061.4), (1292.0-1062.5) and (1290.3-1061.9). Patrol from 2/6 reconnoitered target square (91-63). Patrol from 2/6 conducted reconnaissance in target square (92-63).

31Oct45 S-2 Check made on Army dump at (1292.00-1060.50). Everything found as listed. Gun positions located at (1290.60-1065.80). Received formal statement from former POW A. F. GABB who said that Japanese had arms, fuel, supplies, etc. in hills that were not to be turned in to American forces of Occupation. CIC is in full charge of the case.

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31Oct45 S-3 Patrol from 2/6 investigated area (91-61) and found 75 air raid shelters. Patrol from 2/6 investigated area (92-61) and found one empty gun emplacement and two empty underground rooms. Patrol from 3/6 reconnoitered Rd nets in areas (70-89), (70-90), (69-90), (69-89), (71-89), (71-90).

1Nov45 S-2 Routine patrol found everything in order on KAMINO-SHIMA. S-3 Patrol from 3/6 to (68-90), (68-91), (69-90) and (69-91). Patrol from Wpns/6 to (1289.5-1066.7). Patrol from 1/6 to (92-62).

2Nov45 S-3 Patrol from 3/6 investigated areas (69-88), 70-89), (70-90), (70-91). Patrol from 2/6 investigated area (90-65). Patrol from 2/6 reconnoitered area (91-65) and found 15 air raid shelters and 3 empty gun emplacements. Patrol from 2/6 reconnoitered area (92-65) and found 15 air raid shelters.

4Nov45 S-2 Investigation began on location, size, etc. of any Japanese radio equipment. To date only one station has been located; the SHIKIMI station at (1286.30-1067.60).

5Nov45 S-2 The presence of another radio station has been reported in vicinity of area (1280-1099). Industrial survey of Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd. now complete.

S-3 Patrol from 3/6 reconnoitered areas (1291-1067), (1292-1067), (1290-1068), (1291-1068), and (1292-1068). Patrol from 2/6 reconnoitered areas (1291-1064) and (1292-1064). Patrol from 2/6 reconnoitered areas (1291-1063) and (1292-1063).

6Nov45 S-2 All information on industrial survey within limits of TOKITSU district complete. Also report on Mitsubishi Electrical Company, Ltd. Patrol investigated KYUSHU Electrical Power Plant at (1292.90-1062.45) and obtained all necessary information.

S-3 Patrol from 1/6 went by LCM to SHIKIMI then to (1285.7-1067.7) to check barracks, then to EIKO. Patrol from 2/6 left for (1291.0-1062.0). Patrol from 2/6 reconnoitered area at (1293.0-1063.0). Patrol left from 1/6 and reconnoitered (1291.8-1070.3), (1291.2-1070.05), (1290.5-1070.3) and along trail from (1290.0-1070.3) to (1289.3-1070.0).

7Nov45 S-2 Patrol discovered radio at (1292.80-1067.90)- Japanese led patrol past the radio location and insisted that nothing of value was to be found in the house where radio was located. This is the first attempt at concealing information from our patrols. Radio located at HAYASHI Engine Works. (1293.85-1063.03). Patrol reconnoitered town of EIKO. Underground tunnels located behind Mitsubishi Electrical Company. Total of 87 machines found. Investigation proved machines had been reported by Japanese.

S-3 Patrol from 3/6 proceeded to NISHIGO thence through squares (1292-1066) and (1291-1066) and returned to 3/6 area at 1145.

8Nov45 S-2 Patrol found six dummy gun positions and two 40mm positions at (1292.13-1063.87).

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8Nov45 S-3 Patrol from 1/6 by LCM to KAKINOURA-SHIMA to accomplish mission as directed by 2dMarDiv dispatch 030949I, quote: "THIS CONFIRMS AND AMPLIFIES MY TELEPHONIC ORDER OF 071947. X LOAD PCN DETCH PLAT STRENGTH IN AN LCT X PREP TO LV FOR KAKINOURA-SHIMA AT 080900 I PROCEED TO SAKITO ON KAKINOURA-SHIMA X UPON ARR ELEMENTS LAND AND INVESTIGATE CHINESE DISTURBANCES REPORTED THAT ISLAND X DISARM AND PLACE MARINE GUARD OVER ANY CHINESE DISTURBING PEACE X AUTHORITY WILL BE GRANTED BY THIS HQ TO EVACUATE CHINESE TO MAINLAND FOR REPATRIATION IF REQUESTED X ON CLEARANCE BY THIS HQ FURTHER EXTEND OCCUPATION OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE ALL ISLANDS OFF COAST S OF O-SHIMA N OF KABA-SHIMA AND E OF A N - S LINE THROUGH KAKINOURA-SHIMA INCLUSIVE....." UNQUOTE X

S-3 Patrol from 3/6 conducted radio experiment from BLT 3/6 barracks to area in vicinity of (1293.5-1065.5) (Atomic-bombed area) with SCR 300, SCR 610 and TCS radios.

9Nov45 S-2 Motorized reconnaissance to O. ODAKA to take necessary action on reported radio in that area.

S-3 Received the following dispatches from patrol which left 8Nov45 for KAKINOURA-SHIMA: 0330-031540 "Have arrived at SAKITO, KAKINOURA-SHIMA". 1405-030300/I "Posn same at SAKITO, KAKINOURA-SHIMA". 1515 "Chinese situation under control. No necessity to arrest anyone. Request permission to continue mission". 1630I "Patrol ordered to continue mission to MATSU-SHIMA, OKINO-SHIMA, IKI-SHIMA, then to return to OURA for further Instns". Patrol left 2/6 and proceeded to ABANOWAKI via KIBACHI AND KASEDO to investigate warehouses. Fire fighting equip found in warehouse in ABANOWAKI and 1000 blankets in KIBACHI.

10Nov45 S-3 Patrol investigating MATSU-SHIMA, OKINO-SHIMA and IYE-SHIMA, according to Div orders.

11Nov45 S-3 Following dispatch received from patrol investigating islands N of NAGASAKI HARBOR: "110350--Left for MATSU-SHIMA".

12Nov45 S-2 Industrial survey of SETO now completed. Patrols were dispatched to check the sources of power, types of buildings and the fishing industry at KIBACHI (1291.50-1060.60), KOSEDO (1290.65-1060.1) and ABANOWAKI (1290.40-1059.40).

S-3 Patrol returned to OURA at 1345 from MATSU-SHIMA aboard LCT 954. Patrol from 3/6 reconnoitered (1292.5-1069.3), (1292.2-1069.4), (1291.75-1069.91), (129 .95-1069.95), (1291.0-1069.3), (1290.8-1069.8) and (1289.15-1069.60).

13Nov45 S-2 Patrol discovered large emplacement for searchlight and extensive underground passages at (1292.53-1066.40). An extensive search of small fishing craft along the docks in grid squares (1293-1062 and (1293-1063). Patrol instructed to look for radio equipment and foreign currency. Boarding parties continued to search ships in NAGASAKI harbor.

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14Nov45 S-2 Patrol checked three 12cm guns at (1293.20-1061.70) and found breech blocks still in guns. Japanese police informed of this position. Boarding party went aboard SETGA-MARU at (1293.25-1061.25) and gathered all information on following: Owner, where built, tonnage, length, type, cargo, damage to ship, crew wartime duties, future duty and last port of call. All ships are investigated in a like manner.

S-3 Patrol from 1/6 left for MIE on 2 LCVTs to establish location, use and ownership of radio Equip and to check on fishing boat licenses and registration.

15Nov45 S-2 Patrol searched building at (1293.35-1062.55) and discovered deck plan of Japanese cruiser AOBA. Doctors examined contents of drug and narcotic report from SETO. Some drugs could not be identified.

17Nov45 S-2 Patrol located radio equipment on two Mitsubishi tug boats. Reported to Military Government.

18Nov45 S-3 Orders to 1/6 for patrol as directed 2dMarDiv Dispatch 181915/I, Quote: "THIS CONFIRMS MY TELEPHONIC ORDER OF 181815 X SEND DETACHMENT OF ONE (1) OFFICER AND TWELVE (12) MEN ABOARD YUGAO-MARU PRIOR TO 181900 X THIS DETACHMENT WILL PROCEED TAKA-SHIMA IMMEDIATELY AFTER EMBARKATION X UPON ARRIVAL THERE AT SUPERVISE AND CONTROL EMBARKATION OF 371 NORTH CHINA REPATRIATES X ON COMPLETION OF EMBARKATION PROCEED TO HARIO BARRACKS SASEBO CLEARING TAKA SHIMA NOT LATER THAN 190800 X UPON ARRIVAL HARIO BARRACKS DETACHMENT WILL TURN REPATRIATES OVER TO AUTHORITIES THERE AT X ON COMPLETION PROCEED ABOARD YUGAO MARU TO SAKITO KAKINOURA SHIMA CLEARING HARIO BARRACK NOT LATER THAN 191600 X UPON ARRIVAL SAKITO SUPERVISE AND CONTROL EMBARKATION 372 NORTH CHINA REPATRIATES X PROCEED WITH REPATRIATES TO HARIO BARRACKS X UPON ARRIVAL TURN REPATRIATES OVER TO REPATRIATION AUTHORITIES X UPON COMPLETION THIS DUTY RETURN TO NAGASAKI ABOARD YUGAO MARU AND REPORT TO UNIT X DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION TURNING OVER BOTH GROUPS OF CHINESE AT HARIO BARRACKS IS 201200 X INTERPRETER IS ALREADY ABOARD YUGAO MARU X Unquote.

19Nov45 S-2 Patrol discovered commercial dynamite at (1299.70-1060.75).

S-3 Detail of 1 off and 12 men from 1/6 left NAGASAKI at 2135, 18Nov to act as guard detail aboard the YUGAO-MARU, which is to remove N China repatriates from TAKA-SHIMA and KAKINOURA-SHIMA. Patrol from 1/6 left for KAKINOURA-SHIMA aboard LCT 973. Patrol arrived at KAKINOURA-SHIMA at 1430 19Nov45. Patrol from 2/6 to SETO on 5-day patrol. Patrol from 3/6 to OMODAKA on 5-day patrol.

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20Nov45 S-3 Patrol which left for KAKINOURA-SHIMA and TAKA-SHIMA aboard the YUGAC-MARU docked at Customs Wharf at 1715 this date and proceeded to 1/6 area. Patrol which left for Ren of KAKINOURA-SHIMA on 19Nov45 completed mission on that island and left for O-SHIMA for reconnaissance of that island. Transportation left at 1145 for SETO to bring back patrol sent 19Nov45, due to planned move of 2/6 on 24Dec45. Patrol from 3/6 (at ONODAKA) to look for gun emplacements in area.

21Nov45 S-2 Advance party left for SASEBO at 0830. Past intelligence information on Northern half of KYUSHU will be taken from 5thMarDiv reports.

S-3 Following Msgs received from patrol aboard (LCT 973) : (a) 201615 LEAVING O-SHIMA to spend night at SAKITO. (b) 210810 LEAVING SAKITO FOR O-SHIMA. (c) 211355 LEAVING O-SHIMA for HAKA SHIMA. (d) 211615 STORM FORCES US TO RETURN TO SAKITO. One off and 50 men at patrol station at ONODAKA. Following Msgs received: "210900 ALL WELL HERE X TWO PATROLS MADE YESTERDAY IN VICINITY OF ONODAKA X COASTAL DEFENSE POSN FOUND X ONE OFF AND TEN MEN ON PATROL TO OKUSKI TODAY X WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL AFTER-NOON X RESULTS LATER X 211455 PATROL LEFT ABOUT 0800 RETURNED 1500 X MADE RCN OF SMALL ISLAND OFF OKUSKI X FOUND ONLY OYSTER FARM X NO MIL OBJECTS X BAD WEATHER AND RDS CUT PATROL SHORT X ALL WELL X The following is a condensed summary of verbal report of OinC of armed guard aboard YUGAC-MARU from 18Nov to 20Nov: Lv NAGASAKI 2150; Ar TAKA-SHIMA 2330; Lv TAKA-SHIMA 0745 19Nov w/372 repatriates aboard; Ar HARIO BKS 1230 19Nov--turned repatriates over to Maj PROLL; Lv HARIO BKS 1430 19Nov--Ar SAKITO; KAKINOURA SHIMA 1700 19Nov; Lv SAKITO, KAKINOURA-SHIMA 1930 20Nov w/372 repatriates aboard; Ar HARIO BKS 1130 20Nov--turned repatriates over to authorities; Lv HARIO BKS 1330 20Nov; Ar NAGASAKI 1715 20Nov.

22Nov45 S-2 Patrol checked on reported blinker activity at (1293.23-1063.06). Possible blinker mount discovered but not equipment. A night patrol will be dispatched on 23Nov to set watch on position.

S-3 Patrol embarked aboard LCT 973 returned to 1/6 at 1300. Patrol had been to KAKINOURA-SHIMA, O-SHIMA AND HAKA SHIMA. Convoy returned from ONODAKA with patrol outpost of 1 Off and 50 men who had been stationed there. 2/6 loading for move to SAGA.

23Nov45 S-2 Patrol searched small villages on West shore in attempt to locate sabers, reported being sold in this area. No further blinker activity.

24Nov45 S-2 Patrol located commercial powder in reveted area at (1292.35-1064.20). Patrol report of ONODAKA activities confusing and conflicting--corrected report to follow.

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24Nov45 S-3 One (1) Off and three (3) men departed from 3/6 at 0700. Anticipated return 1700 25Nov45. 2/6 left NAGASAKI at Approx 0800 by Tr and freight train for new location and permanent site at SAGA. High point rear echelon of 2/6 remains in old location. Anticipate that this element will move by train to SASEBO on 25Nov45.

25Nov45 S-2 Corrected report on OMODAKA and vicinity turned in to this office. Gun positions, supplies and ammo plotted on map to accompany this. Patrol dispatched to KAKINOURA SHIMA, O SHIMA AND HAKO SHIMA this date.

S-3 Rear Ech of 50-point men and above left NAGASAKI by train at 0830 for SASEBO. 2/6 relieved 2/27 at 1200 this date and assumed control of SAGA KEN for the 2dMarDiv. 3/6 patrol at OMODAKA scheduled to return at 1800 this date.

26Nov45 S-2 Patrol report on islands mentioned under 25Nov submitted to this office. Patrol covered KAMINO SHIMA and verified earlier report.

27Nov45 S-2 Boarding party searched following ship: Destroyer HASU, Cargo vessel LAISHYO-MARU, Mine Layer KATOKU and Cargo ship KONEI-MARU. Everything conformed to surrender terms.

S-3 1/6 dispatched one (1) Plat to act as guard aboard the YUGAO-MARU for 582 Korean Repatriates. Scheduled to depart from NAGASAKI 0700 28Nov45 and arrive at HARIO BKS 1200 28Nov45. Plat scheduled to embark aboard YUGAO-MARU between 1600 and 1800 this date.

28Nov45 S-2 Routine patrolling of area revealed no further intelligence information. Boarding party searched Navy Ship TSUKUSHI-MARU and submitted report to this office.

S-3 One (1) Off and Plat from 1/6 aboard CHOFOCKU-MARU sailed at 0310 28Nov45 with 269 Korean Repatriates for HARIO BKS, SASEBO AREA. ETA, 1300, 28Nov45. Fwd Ech of 1/6 CP moved to Naval Aircraft Factory, SASEBO. Lv NAGASAKI 0900--Ar SASEBO 1300.

29Nov45 S-2 Patrol checked schools on Western shore and found that all wooden rifles had been burned as ordered. Free hand map of HONSHU showing important occupation points and industry found. Submitted map to Division Headquarters.

S-3 1/6 loading at OURA on LSTs 943 and 1091. Anticipated that LSTs will leave OURA on Sat, 1Dec45. 2/6 CP at (1335.0-1125.0). Outposts of one (1) Co established at TOSU (1358.0-1141.5). Plat at KARATSU (130013-114030).

30Nov45 S-2 Patrol covered KAMINO-SHIMA and found area in proper order.

S-3. 1/6 loading at OURA on LSTs 943 and 1091. One (1) Off and 10 men from 2/6 to TOSU at 0800 to return this date. Mission to Assist FOX Co in disposition work. One (1) Off and 4 men from 2/6 to KANZAKI to assist FOX Co Detachment with disposition work. Returned 1330. Det at KARATSU consists of 3 Off and 44 men. Mission to carry out disposition work and to secure Intel data. Det at KANZAKI consists of 1 Off and Plat Mission to carry out disposition work and to secure Intel data.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That sufficient clothing of garrison type and facilities to maintain this clothing in proper condition be kept available in order to provide uniformity and a smart military appearance at all times among occupational troops.
2. That an advance party be sent to reconnoiter an area to be occupied with recovery parties and that this advance party be allowed sufficient personnel and sufficient time prior to landing of main unit to acquire and have native populace, clear, clean and initiate repair on billets, storage space, docking facilities and lines of communication. That a complete low vertical and oblique photo coverage be made of immediate areas of occupation in order to provide material for accurate API studies prior to dispatching an advance party.
3. That TO's and TBA's be adjusted to meet the requirements of occupation. The readjustment of TO's to include military police, Military Government, interpreters, Technical Intelligence personnel. The readjustment of TBA's to include the increased requirements for transportation due to the extended area allotted units.
4. That a study of the area of occupation be made to ascertain recreation facilities available and that an extensive recreation program be initiated at the earliest practicable moment.
5. That troops be kept cognizant of the overall picture of occupation and their part in the occupation. Unit Commanders through continuous handling of classified matter sometimes lose sight of what can be told the troops and what can't. It is therefore recommended that the Division through the Public Information Sections issue periodically an Information Sheet in sufficient number to allow distribution to each man. That this material be unrestricted and the men be permitted to send such material home.

COMMENTS

1. It is believed that food initially was entirely adequate but that as time passed the men who in combat would find the food satisfactory felt that the lack of variety, absence of fresh food, and inadequacy of some items such as bread was unsatisfactory during an occupation. One contributing factor was that the initial ration did not allow for the increase in appetite of troops in a cold climate.
2. It is believed that the instruction given personnel in the customs, habits, and industries of Japan prior to the occupation proved very beneficial.

APPENDIX NUMBER THREE

OPERATION ORDERS

FROM

23 SEPTEMBER, 1945,

TO

30 NOVEMBER, 1945.

C O P Y

Serial: 00425

SECRET:

RCT-6

In The Field

10 October 1945

OPERATION ORDER

RCT-6 No. 17.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Change No. 2 and 3 to Opn Plan No. 8.

1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Opn Plan No. 8.
(b) While continuing to develop the occupation of assigned area the 2d Mar Div will be prepared for the defense of each separate billeting area.
2. RCT-6 will be prepared to initiate defense of each separate billeting area in order to repulse any impending attack by hostile groups.
3. (a) BLT 1/6 will be prepared to initiate defense of OURA Barracks.
(b) BLT 2/6 will be prepared to initiate defense of their billet.
(c) BLT 3/6 will be prepared to initiate defense of billets in immediate RCT-6 Headquarters area.
(d) RCT Wpns Group will assemble in billet area and await orders as regimental reserve during billet defense.
(e) Co "A", 2nd MT Bn, 2nd Plat Automotive Repair, 2nd MT Bn attached, will be prepared to initiate defense of Truck Park during billet defense.
43rd NCB will be prepared to provide defense of their billet and regimental warehouse area.
(x) (1) For the purpose of this order attached or divisional units, except Co "A", 2nd MT Bn and 2nd Plat Automotive Repair, 2nd MT Bn, will be under operational control of the CO of the area in which they are billeted.
4. See Regt'l Administrative Order No. 3-45 and instructions issued subsequent thereto.
5. See Annex (H) (Signal Communications) to Opn Plan No. 8.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WILLIAMS

E. B. GAMES,
LtCol., USMC,
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as Opn Plan No. 8, RCT-6.

SECRET

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L:

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SECRET

C O P Y

Serial 00426

SECRET

RGT-6

In the Field

11 October, 1945.

OPERATION ORDER

RGT-6 No. 18.

Maps: (1) AMS L872 KYUSHU 1:25,000 4045 II SW and 4045 II NW.
(2) AMS L571 CENTR L JAPAN 1:250,000 Sheet 44 and 55.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Changes Nos. 2 and 3 to Opn Plan 8-45.

1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to Opn Plan No. 8-45.
(b) While continuing to develop the occupation of assigned areas, the 2d MarDiv will defend against, and subsequently disperse, capture or destroy any hostile groups which interferes with the accomplishment of the assigned mission.
22. RGT-6, in addition to continuing to develop the occupation of its area of responsibility will:
 - (a) Maintain at all times one (1) battalion prepared to move on two (2) hours notice, with one (1) company motorized, prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.
 - (b) Maintain within each separate billeting area a minimum of 75% of the command during the hours of darkness.
 - (c) Establish and continue rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each billeting area (See Opn Order No. 17) and the area of responsibility.
 - (d) Initiate prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces, or prevent the accomplishment of assigned missions.

For Sectors of Responsibility, See Annex (A) and (B) (Opn Overlays) to Opn Order.

3. (a) BLT 1/6, during area defense, will provide defense of OURA Barracks and, as regimental reserve be prepared to move by water or overland to regimental final defensive area.
(b) BLT 2/6 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned sectors.

SECRETOperation OrderRCT-6 No. 18.

- (c) BLT 3/6 will prepare a plan to show initial action against hostile forces which are forming or attacking our forces within assigned sectors. The CO, BLT 3/6, in addition, will have one (1) company motorized and prepared to move on thirty* (30) minutes notice. The RMTO will be prepared to furnish ten (10) 2½ ton and seven (7) 1 ton trucks to BLT 3/6 for use of the motorized company in time to allow the company to move on thirty (30) minutes notice. The CO, BLT 3/6 is authorized to make all necessary arrangements for the entrucking of such company with the RMTO. Copies of all truck and vehicle assignment tables will be submitted to this Hq (Regt'l S-3). BLT 3/6 will be relieved of warehouse guard during area defense by 43rd NCB's.
- (d) Regt'l Spns Co is designated Regt'l reserve, and upon initiation of area defense will assemble in billeting areas and await orders from the Regt'l Commander.
- (e) Co A, 2d MT Bn with 2d Plat Automotive Repair, 2d MT Bn will provide defense of truck park during area defense.
- (f) Co B, 2d Engr Bn will augment defense of Hq billeting area during area defense and be prepared to conduct engineering missions as directed.
- (g) Co A, 2d Med Bn will be prepared to move from OURA Barracks either by water or overland to Regt'l Warehouse area and receive patients.
- (h) 43rd NCB's will provide one (1) company to relieve BLT 3/6 of warehouse guard during area defense. 43rd NCB, less one (1) company will stand by in billeting area as area reserve.
- (i) (1) BLTs will be prepared to move on two (2) hours notice on a rotation basis, BLT 1/6 from 1200, 12Oct to 1200, 13Oct; BLT 2/6 from 1200, 13Oct to 1200, 14Oct, BLT 3/6 from 1200, 14Oct to 1200, 15Oct and then rotation in order.

SECRET

Serial 00426

SECRET

Operation Order

RCT-6 No. 18.

- (2) Plans drawn by the BLTs will divide their areas of responsibility into sectors and will show for each sector of responsibility the unit responsible.
 - (3) BLTs will be prepared to move on order in support of other Regt'l or Division units.
 - (4) BLTs will provide for protection of property in billets during area defense.
 - (5) Plans will be submitted to this Hq (Regt'l S-3) by 1200, 12Oct45. Rehearsals of plans will commence on 12Oct45 at an hour to be designated later, and will be continued weekly thereafter. Rehearsals as directed will be limited to assembling of units, reconnaissance of area, and CPXs unless otherwise designated. Under no circumstances will gardens or other property be damaged unless otherwise directed.
 - (6) BLT CO's will be prepared, when directed, to send reconnaissance parties to study road nets in adjacent areas.
4. See Regt'l Administrative Order No. 3-45 and instructions issued subsequently thereto.
5. See Annex (H) (Signal Communication) to Opn Plan No. 8, RCT-6.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WILLIAMS

E. B. GAMES,
LtCol., USMC,
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as Opn Plan No. 8, RCT-6.

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L:

FULLER

-3-

1110

1250

SECRET

2 = 3

6 = 10

ANNEX (A) OPERATION OVERLAY
TO OPERATION ORDER NO. 18


Map, Tactical Map Kyushu
1:250,000 AMS L571

SECRET

5 = 2

1050

1500



1294
1064

SECRET

ANNEX (B) OPERATION OVERLAY
OPERATION ORDER NO. 18

Final Defence Area

Map: Tactical Map Kyushu
1:25,000 AMS L872

August , 1945

SECRET

1291
1059

C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL

6th Marines
In the Field
17 November, 1945

Operation Order
Number 19-45

Map: KYUSHU, 1:100,000

1. a. DOFU-DAKE Peninsula, the area of responsibility of the Sixth Marines, has been partially covered by water and motorized patrols.

b. Stationing troops within certain outlying communities will assist in enforcing the Surrender Terms, and in impressing the Japanese with the fact of the occupation.

2. The Sixth Marines, within their zone of responsibility, will establish platoon-size patrol outposts at SETO and OMODAKA to carry out occupation missions.

3. a. First Battalion, Sixth Marines will continue their previously assigned patrol missions and be prepared to send an overnight patrol to KAKINOURA-SHIMA weekly as directed by this Hq.

b. Second Battalion, Sixth Marines will establish at SETO, when directed by this Hq, an outpost of platoon size, supplemented by the addition of two (2) corpsmen, a Com Sec Team of three (3) men and TCS, one or more Intelligence Section personnel, and an enlisted interpreter. For area of responsibility see Annex A (Overlay).

c. Third Battalion, Sixth Marines will establish at OMODAKA, when directed by this Hq, an outpost of platoon size, supplemented by the addition of two (2) corpsmen, a Com Sec Team of three (3) men and TCS, one or more Intelligence Section personnel and an enlisted interpreter. For area of responsibility see Annex A (Overlay).

x. (1) Missions for patrols will be as follows:

(a) Run of road and footpath net.

(b) Search for Mil. Equip and supplies in area.

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- (c) Enforce all occupation orders, including curfew regulations.
 - (d) Through presence of troops keep fact of occupation constantly before Japanese people.
 - (e) Accomplish such missions as may be assigned by Regtl S-2.
 - (f) Perform such other missions as may be directed by Regtl Comdr.
- (2) Civilian and private dwellings will not be searched without adequate cause, and then only with the assistance of Japanese Civil Police.
- (3) Units at patrol outposts will be relieved every tenth (10th) day.
4. a. Uniform as prescribed by Bn CO.
- b. Normal arms, w/one (1) unit of fire.
- c. Rations and water for one (1) day in excess of the estimated length of the patrol.
- d. One (1) 1/4-Ton 4x4 truck w/driver and one (1) 1-Ton 4x4 truck w/driver will be available to each patrol outpost. Vehicles will be rotated when the patrol outposts are relieved. Motor transport for overnight patrols will be as requested by Bns and approved by this Hq.
- e. Medical supplies as prescribed by the Regtl Surgeon,
- f. Other necessary arrangements for supply and transport to be made by Bn COs with Regtl S-4.
5. a. Patrol outposts will maintain Com from 0700 to 1900 on the Regtl command net frequency (4075). Routine patrol reports and operations reports to be made at 1100 and 1500.
- b. Positions of patrol outposts CPs to be reported when established.

- 2 -

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BY ORDER OF COLONEL JUHAN:

D. W. FULLER,
LtCol, USMC,
Executive Officer.

Annex:

A - Operation Overlay (Areas of Responsibility).

DISTRIBUTION: "C", "E", and "F".

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

SMITH

-3-

SECRET

ATTN (A) OVERLAY TO DTIC 10
Areas of Responsibility
Map, Northern Kyushu, 1:100,000



Serial 0508
CONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT TEAM EIGHT

OPERATION REPORT NUMBER 1-45

OCCUPATION
OF
JAPAN



Copy No 26
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Serial 0508
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CT-8, 2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field,
1 December 1945.

Operation Report
CT-8 No 1-45

Map: Central Japan, 1:250,000, 2d Edition, L571, AMS-2.

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

1. Planning -

(a) After a series of briefings conducted by the G-2 Section during the latter part of August, for the Combat Team Commander, Executive Officer, S-3, and S-2, the Combat Team Planning Room was opened and the S-3, S-2, and API officer devoted most of their time to preparation for the planning phase of the forthcoming operation. Material received from Division was all handled with the utmost secrecy and an accurate set of filing and report folders were made to prepare the foundation for further planning by the Combat Team staff.

(b) After the briefing of the Combat Team Commander, Executive Officer, S-3, and S-2, and after the preliminary preparations were set in motion in the planning room, the Landing Team Commanders and remaining staff members were briefed in a series of lectures by the Combat Team Commander, and then admitted to the planning room. The first draft of Second Marine Division Operation Plan Number 14 was received on 22 August 1945, and immediate steps were taken for the preparation of the Combat Team plan which was completed and available to all units of the Combat Team on 9 September 1945.

(c) It is believed that there was adequate time for the planning phase of the operation and that the Landing Teams, by having their staff admitted to the planning room after the Landing Team Commanders had become familiar with the situations, had ample time to give proper attention to all plans issued by the Combat Team.

(d) For the purpose of planning prior to embarkation, the photographic coverage of Northern and Southern KYUSHU was considered to be very inadequate; and fairly good of the NAGASAKI area. Low oblique photos of possible landing areas were not made available. Stereo-coverage of the NAGASAKI area was inadequate.

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CT-8 No 1-45

(e) Prior to debarking, photographs were received of ISAHAYA and vicinity, but they were also of very poor coverage.

2. Training -

(a) The period from 26 June 1945 to 3 July 1945, was spent on OKINAWA during which time the Combat Team was engaged in combat and preparations for the return to SAIPAN, MARIANAS islands. On 10 July 1945, this Combat Team reoccupied its former camp on SAIPAN, MARIANAS Islands.

(b) Training for future combat commenced shortly after the arrival of the Combat Team at SAIPAN. An extensive athletic program was carried out along with practical training consisting of surprise-target ranges, field problems, and zeroing of weapons.

(c) The Combat Team operations office made requests for the various ranges available during this period and assigned them to the units within the Combat Team. Schedules were so arranged that each Landing Team had access to the ranges and training areas an equal number of times. The infantry-tank problems were especially effective because of the cooperation between tank platoons and the infantry units working with them. However, training at SAIPAN was hindered due to limited training areas and facilities.

(d) Designated personnel attended the following schools during this period: "Preparation of Dehydrated Foods", "Counter mortar School", and "Radio Countermeasures School".

(e) When the bayonet lug was added to the carbine, carbines were not re-zeroed because the Combat Team was unable to secure the range.

(f) The air-ground problem which had been scheduled for Combat Team Eight on 20 August 1945, was

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CT-8 No 1-45

never carried out because of a change in training policy resulting from the surrender of the Japanese. The infantry-artillery training scheduled for 23 August 1945, was cancelled for the same reason.

(g) Designated personnel attended a Combat Team Military Police School given by the members of the Military Police Company. The personnel selected for this school were persons who had served less than eighteen (18) months overseas in order that they could teach such schools within their respective Landing Teams before going home. The school was repeated a few days later to permit stragglers and any additional personnel who unit commanders desired to attend.

(h) Training schedules for the period 17 August 1945 to 15 September 1945, were in accordance with directives from Division. Such training included the following: Military Courtesy, Military Discipline, Close Order Drill, Ceremonies, Rifle Marksmanship, Military Government, Civil Affairs, and Interior Guard Duty. Training schedules were carried out entirely during the morning hours, and an intensive athletic program was carried out each afternoon. Conditioning hikes were numerous during this period.

(i) On 18 September 1945, the regiment left SAIPAN, MARIANAS Islands, and sailed for NAGASAKI, KYUSHU, JAPAN, where it arrived on 23 September 1945. The training aboard ship consisted of a half day each day during which time Japanese History, Japanese Customs and Habits, and Japanese Government were covered thoroughly. Training to date, since landing on KYUSHU, commenced on 15 October 1945, with emphasis on Close Order Drill, Veterans' Benefits, Military Courtesy, Troop Inspection, Military Police Duties, Conditioning Hikes, and Organized Athletics. One hour each week was devoted to publication and review of Landing Team, Combat Team, and Division Orders currently in effect. A series of venereal disease inspections was accomplished weekly by the medical department.

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3. Task Organization -

COMBAT TEAM EIGHT - Col T. G. McFarland, USMC

(a) LT 1/8 - Lt Col Hayward, USMC

1st Bn, 8th Mar (-)
2d Plat, Co "B", 2d MT Bn
1st Plat, Co "C", 2d Engr Bn
Det "D", Div Sig Co

(b) LT 2/8 - Lt Col Nusbaum, USMCR

2d Bn, 8th Mar
Co "B", 1st Bn, 8th Mar
Det Regtl S-4 Sec

(c) LT 3/8 - Lt Col Wallace, USMC

3d Bn, 8th Mar
3d Plat, Co "B", 2d MT Bn
3d Plat, Co "C", 2d Engr Bn

(d) Support Group - Maj Van Evera, USMC

Wpns Co, 8th Mar

(e) CT Troops - Lt Mott, USMCR

H&S Co, 8th Mar
Co "B", 2d MT Bn (-)
Co "C", 2d Engr Bn (-)
Co "E", 2d Med Bn
2d Plat, Ord Co, 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat, Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat, Auto Repair Co, 2d MT Bn
Det "C", Div Sig Co

4. Advance Reconnaissance of Objective -

(a) On 16 September 1945, Combat Team S-4 arrived at NAGASAKI with an advance party from Second Marine Division and V Amphibious Corps. On 18 September,

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at 0800, all Combat Team representatives were briefed and the following plans made:

(1) Priorities in landing were assigned to Combat Team Two, Combat Team Six, and Combat Team Eight, in that order.

(2) Combat Team Two would land over the DEJIMA Pier and adjoining areas.

(3) Combat Team Eight would not land until a suitable place was found for them, none being available in the Division zone of action.

(4) That since the disposition of Combat Team Eight was not known, but in the belief that they would not be landed in the NAGASAKI Area, the S-4, therefore, assisted Combat Team Six in the location of quarters, determination of traffic routes, and checked the suitability of docking areas.

(b) On Sunday, 23 September 1945, Combat Team Eight's S-4 rejoined his organization. The situation at that time was:

(1) Combat Team Eight was to remain aboard ship until all other teams had been moved ashore.

(2) The senior officer of the Advance Party was to inform the Commanding General of the lack of quarters available for Combat Team Eight and recommend that the Combat Team remain on board ship until another area could be located for their use.

5. Occupational Operation (Narrative) -

(a) Combat Team Eight arrived within NAGASAKI WAN at 0800, 23 September 1945. Landing of troops was delayed one day due to a change in the billeting area. Landing Team 1/8 disembarked on the floats north of

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of Dejima Pier at 0700, 24 September 1945. Combat Team Eight set up Command Post in the Harbor Police building while an advance Command Post was established at the ISAHAYA Naval Air Base. Landing Team 2/8 and Landing Team 3/8 disembarked on order. Troops of this Combat Team were ashore by 1345, 24 September 1945.

(b) Trucks with troops of Landing Team 1/8 departed from NAGASAKI for ISAHAYA Naval Air Base 0750, 24 September 1945. Landing Team 2/8, Landing Team 3/8, Weapons Company and Headquarters and Service Company left NAGASAKI by train at 1510, 24 September 1945. All troops arrived at ISAHAYA by 1610 with the exception of working parties which remained at the harbor to unload the ships.

(c) Upon arrival at the ISAHAYA Naval Air Base, Combat Team Eight was billeted and preparations were made to improve the area. The water supply was inadequate and unsafe for use. The electrical system was in need of repair and expansion. Roofs had to be put on six (6) of the eight (8) hangars along with minor repairs to other buildings. General police of the area was activated. This work was done by Japanese labor which was procured through the Military Government.

(d) During the time of Combat Team Eight's stay at ISAHAYA, 25 September to 13 October 1945, inclement weather prohibited any extensive training. Training during this period consisted of close order drill and nomenclature and cleaning of individual and organizational weapons. A Military Police Company was formed, and posts were established in ISAHAYA during the day with roving radio-jeep patrols at night.

(e) Combat Team Eight's zone of responsibility was changed to include all of KUMAMOTO KEN. On 5 October 1945, an advance reconnaissance party consisting of appropriate staff members left ISAHAYA for KUMAMOTO to arrange for final movement of this Combat Team to the new area. On 13 October, all units of Combat Team Eight, with the exception of a rear echelon, were located in the KUMAMOTO area. Landing Team 1/8 was billeted at the former Japanese Sixth Field Artillery School. Landing Team 3/8 was billeted at the former Japanese Sixth Engineer Battalion area, and Landing Team 2/8, Weapons

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Company, Headquarters and Service Company, and attached units were located at the former KUMAMOTO Army Cadet Academy.

(f) Combat Team Eight's foot and mechanized patrols immediately began to patrol the KUMAMOTO area. Units which were not patrolling followed a program of regular garrison routine with emphasis on military courtesy, bearing and discipline. When at this time a Disposition Section was formed, its main purpose is the disposition of Japanese military supplies.

(g) Combat Team Eight's zone of responsibility was enlarged to include KAGOSHIMA KEN. On 29 October 1945, Landing Team 1/8 was ordered to KAGOSHIMA. Its main duties were to receive and handle repatriates going to various home islands and returning to JAPAN, and disposition of Japanese materiel. On 9 November 1945, Landing Team 3/8 moved to HITOYOSHI for the purposes of disposition and patrolling distant area in KUMAMOTO KEN.

(h) Landing Team 2/8 continued to patrol areas around the city of KUMAMOTO and handle disposition in this area. The Division Reconnaissance Company maintained mechanized patrols in the outer zone of responsibility for Combat Team Eight. In KUMAMOTO the Military Police Company was enlarged by transferring all personnel of Weapons Company to the Military Police Company for duty.

6. Jap Compliance With Surrender Terms -

(a) In making a study of Japanese compliance with the surrender terms as laid down by the Allied Powers one must keep in mind the four salient points of these surrender terms which are as follows: (1) Cessation of hostilities and prompt disarmament of Japanese armed forces and people wherever located. (2) Relinquishment of all power by the Japanese Government to the designated military commander. (3) Continuation of maintenance of law and order by constituted Japanese officials and police. (4) Relinquishment of war-making materials and installations and evacuation of personnel from Japanese occupied territories as directed by the designated military commander.

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(b) With the possible exception of a few minor drunken brawls between demobilized Japanese soldiers and Chinese Prisoners of War at OMUTA, there have been no instances where either the Japanese military or the people have failed to cease hostilities and disarm in Combat Team Eights' areas of responsibility.

(c) The voyage from SAIPAN to NAGASAKI was without interference from the Japanese Navy. The debarkation at NAGASAKI and the subsequent move to ISAHAYA, 23 September and 24 September, was made without incident.

(d) During Combat Team Eights' short stay at ISAHAYA it was noted that although they were confused in the initial phase of the occupation, the Japanese were most cooperative. The ISAHAYA Police were collecting all the arms from the civilians. The Japanese military and Naval Units in the vicinity contacted this Headquarters submitting demobilization reports and inventories of military supply dumps. A check was made by Intelligence Section personnel, and it was revealed that the Japanese information was correct.

(e) When the Combat Team moved to KUMAMOTO on 5 October 1945, the demobilization and disarmament situation in that KEA was excellent. This was due mainly to the cooperation received from the Headquarters, KUMAMOTO Divisional District. Not only were very complete inventories and strength reports submitted, but overlays and maps showing the disposition of units and their material were added.

(f) On the whole the Japanese seemed very willing to disarm and exceptionally eager to return to their homes. It was only the confusing and indefinite orders, which emanated from higher Allied echelons, that slowed down the complete Japanese demobilization and disarmament.

(g) At both ISAHAYA and KUMAMOTO the Japanese Prefectural Governments relinquished their powers to the Commander. Combat Team Eight Liaison Committees were set up by the Prefectural officials. These committees kept in

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constant touch with the Commanding Officer in order to receive his orders and pass them on to the government officials. The Liaison groups with their English-speaking and well educated members helped to bridge the language and customs barriers that exist between the Japanese and Allied Forces.

(h) The Japanese Police with their very complete records proved invaluable in contacting or causing the arrest of persons wanted by this Headquarters either for apprehension or business purposes.

(i) Not only did the police assist along these lines but they exercised firm control over the civilians and demobilized military. Taking their orders from the Combat Team Commander they enforced curfew regulations, collected civilian weapons, and assisted our military police in routine traffic control. Information on civilian institutions such as factories, schools, hospitals, political organizations, and public utilities, was obtained by this Headquarters through the Japanese Police.

(j) In connection with the fourth and final pertinent point in the surrender terms, it has already been mentioned that the Japanese disarmed readily, but it is well to mention that not only were Japanese arms turned over to us, but also all military structures such as schools, barracks, warehouses, organic vehicles, communication equipment, foodstores, and quartermaster supplies.

7. Supply, Equipment, and Logistics -

(a) This Combat Team carried its organic equipment plus one-third (1/3) of the Divisions' supply or replenishment. This was predistributed by Division and spotted in Combat Team areas on the beach at Naval Operating Base, Tanapag Harbor, SAIPAN, Marianas Islands, by Division and Army transportation. Since this organization was the last of the Combat Teams to load out, it had large quantities of supplies which had been left behind by other units to load aboard at the last minute.

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(b) Due to the limited beach areas available for unloading, the lack of equipment available to clear the beach area, lack of lights necessary for the efficient conduct of night operations, and heavy rains throughout the loading period, a great deal of the supply was damaged by water and some through pilfering. Supplies were moved as rapidly as possible to the Combat Team area at ISAHAYA, and were there placed in what appeared to be the best possible storage areas. Heavy rains again overtaxed the drainage facilities and some of the supplies were wet for the second time. On arrival at KUMAMOTO, where excellent storage facilities were available, salvage operations were conducted with considerable success.

(c) Due to the dispersal of units, the transportation problem was considerable. A shipping and receiving section was formed at the Combat Team quartermaster area and supplies loaded onto rail or truck transportation and sent to the using organization.

(d) No particular supply difficulties have been encountered.

8. Special Features. -

(a) Naval Gunfire, Air and Artillery - No training in either Naval Gunfire, Air and Artillery was undertaken by members of this Combat Team during the training phase for the occupation or assault of JAPAN.

(b) Intelligence -

(1) At SAIPAN shortly after the news of the Japanese surrender the Combat Team Intelligence Section received orders to open the planning room for the Southern KYUSHU operation.

(2) Maps and aerial photographs of KYUSHU were distributed to the Landing Teams and to staff members along with extensive studies of tentative areas of responsibility. The S-2 section then proceeded to assist in the writing of the Operation Order by submitting overlays and

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inserting the necessary Intelligence Annexes.

(3) While aboard ship from the 18th of September 1945, the S-2 section conducted a briefing program for all personnel covering such topics as areas of responsibility, general nature of terrain, climatic conditions, standard operating procedure, road networks, public utilities, and the Japanese people, their customs and habits.

(4) The Intelligence section comprised and integral part of the reconnaissance party that went forward to ISAHAYA to prepare that city for occupation by the Combat Team and through the medium of language personnel, contacted Japanese Government and military officials in the sector.

(5) From the 24th of September to the 5th of October 1945, Intelligence personnel located and investigated military dumps and installations. Inventories and strength reports were submitted to the Section by the Japanese and in turn these reports and inventories were investigated. The local police were contacted, and the Section made certain that they collected all civilian weapons.

(6) The Section obtained and reported on extensive Order of Battle of Japanese units in the ISAHAYA and SHIMABARA Areas. A very close check on Japanese demobilized military personnel, which included names, ranks, units, and home addresses of discharges, was kept by the Section.

(7) Again, on the 5th of October, the Section assisted in the Reconnaissance of KUMAMOTO KEN, and even before the arrival of the main body at KUMAMOTO the Section had commenced to "process" KUMAMOTO KEN. Unlike the situation at ISAHAYA, opportunity for thorough investigations and wide expansion presented itself. This opportunity was seized as Intelligence parties, reinforced by more language personnel, reconnoitered OMUTA, KAGOSHIMA, HITOYOSHI, OTSU, MISUMI and AMAKUSA.

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(8) At present an Intelligence Section is permanently attached to Baker Company at OMUTA: the S-2 Section of Landing Team 3/8 is operating in HITOYOSHI; the S-3 Section of Landing Team 1/8 is covering KAGOSHIMA; while the S-2 Section of Landing Team 2/8 is working in KUMAMOTO.

(9) Since moving to KUMAMOTO, the Combat Team S-2 Section has been able to work in closer conjunction with the Counter-intelligence Corps in curtailing subversive activities, clearing interpreters, and investigating possible war criminals. Counter-intelligence Corps has proved extremely valuable in assisting in the processing of repatriates who are at present jamming the ports of KAJIKI and KAGOSHIMA.

(10) Military Government and the Combat Team S-2 Section have also worked hand in hand on civilian political and economic problems since the move to KUMAMOTO.

(c) Procurement - Procurement has been handled by a subsection of the Division Procurement Section, the Combat Team S-4 acting as senior member. No difficulties have been encountered to date with the exception of the problem of evaluating properties actually taken over. Most of the installations in use by the Combat Team and attached units were of a strictly military nature and were taken over as a part of the surrendered military property. The Japanese Liaison Committee has proved of great value in the location of scarce items.

(d) Inventory, Safeguarding and Disposition of Surrendered Materiel -

(1) The inventory, safeguarding and disposition of enemy materiel was initially taken over as a function of the S-4 section. Later, as the responsibility of that Section increased, disposition tasks were transferred to the S-3 Section.

(2) An officer designated as Enemy Materiel

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Officer was given custody of a warehouse area connected with the Combat Team Quartermaster Area where controlled items, trophies for troops, museum and war memorial pieces are stored. A Records Section for the consolidation of all reports for submission to higher echelon is in operation, and nine (9) Depot Control Groups are in the field. One of these groups is stationed in each of the cities of OMUTA, KUMAMOTO, MISUMI, YATSUSHIRO, HITOYOSHI, MINIMATA, IZUMI, SENDEI, and KAGOSHIMA. Landing Team Commanders are responsible for the conduct of disposition activities in their areas of control.

(3) A school for the training of key personnel was held 4, 5, and 6 November 1945, at Combat Team Eight Headquarters. Personnel from each Landing Team attended.

(4) Safeguarding is also done under the direction of the Landing Team Commanders, and troops are sent into the areas where supplies are located for the purpose of supervising actual disposition carried out by Japanese labor.

(e) Military Government - Military Government Officers attached to Combat Team Eight have accomplished the following:

(1) Secured offices for Military Government.

(2) Secured eighty-seven (87) trucks from the Japanese Army. Forty-two (42) of these are now operable and thirty (30) are being used by the tactical troops to haul materials and labor. Twelve (12) of the trucks are used by the Prefectural Government to haul food and clothing, fuel and building materials into KUMAMOTO from outlying areas. Sixteen (16) passenger cars were also secured, seven (7) are operable and in use by U. S. Forces.

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(3) Supervised the turning over of Japanese Military food, clothing, and medical supplies to the Prefectural Government, Home Ministry Department.

(4) Furnished labor, materials and supplies to rehabilitate the three (3) areas occupied by forces of this Combat Team.

(5) Conducted surveys of present status and organization in the following fields:

- a. Transportation.
- b. Fisheries.
- c. Forestry.
- d. Public Health and Sanitation.
- e. Commerce and Industry, etc.

(Note: Additional periodical reports in these fields are made automatically by the Prefectural Officials to this office.)

(6) Accomplishes the objective of procurement of labor and supplies through close cooperation with the Liaison Committee.

(7) Secured forty-eight (48) interpreters, examined them for their ability, and had them screened by Counter Intelligence Corps. Supervises the interpreter pool used by tactical forces throughout Combat Team Eight's area.

(8) Instituted and maintains rigid control over rationing and price control in KUMAMOTO KEN.

(9) Set up Military Government in OMUTA and HITOYOSHI to assist the Tactical Forces in these places.

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(10) Instituted curfew for Japanese civilians, in compliance with instructions from Corps, in KUMAMOTO and other areas where there are American Military Forces. The curfew is being very satisfactorily enforced by the local Japanese Police under control of Military Government.

(11) Worked through Liaison Committee to establish KUMAMOTO Bazaar, to provide occupation troops an opportunity to purchase authentic Japanese articles of good quality at reasonable prices.

9. Conclusion - In conclusion the following recommendations are submitted:

(a) Due to the large area occupied, the short range combat communication equipment was found unsatisfactory; for this type of operation longer range communication facilities should be provided.

(b) A definite policy should be stated to clarify and simplify reports and methods of their submission.

(c) Provisions should be made to protect men from a sudden climatic change, which was known to exist, before the operation commenced.

(d) A definite policy on the treatment of water in all areas should be established prior to the operation.

(e) Definite, reliable, information relative to types and capacities of vessels as regards personnel accommodations should be given to units in time for proper planning.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND.

M. S. RAHISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

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Annexes:

- (A) - Copies of Operation Plans and Orders and
Administrative Orders issued after occupation
of KYUSHU.
- (B) - S-1 Report.
- (C) - S-2 Report.
- (D) - S-3 Report.
- (E) - S-4 Report.
- (F) - Report by Signal Officer.
- (G) - Report by Engineer Officer.

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ANNEX (A)

COPIES OF OPERATION PLANS AND ADMINISTRATION
ORDERS ISSUED AFTER THE OCCUPATION

1. The orders and plans issued by this Combat Team after the occupation are enclosed with this Annex as follows:

- (a) Combat Team Eight Operation Plan Number 8-45
- (b) Combat Team Eight Operation Orders Number 6-45, 7-45 and 8-45. Change Number 1 to Combat Team Operation Order Number 8-45.
- (c) Combat Team Eight Occupation Orders Number 1-45, 2-45 and 3-45.
- (d) Regimental Administrative Orders Number 17-45, 18-45, 21-45 and 22-45.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND.

M. S. RAHISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

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Serial 00515
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CT-8, 2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field,
13 October, 1945.

Operation Plan
CT-8 No 8-45

Maps: KYUSHU - 1:250,000 KUMAMOTO - Sheet 56 and KOKURA -
Sheet 45.
KYUSHU - 1:50,000 - Sheets No 4245 II, III, IV.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See CT-8 Opn Plan No 7-45.

1. (a) See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to CT-8 Opn Plan No 7-45, G-2 Studies and Information issued separately.

(b) Elements of the V Amphibious Corps continue to occupy additional areas and to enlarge that portion of KYUSHU under surveillance and control of occupation forces.
2. This Cf, in addition to developing the occupation of assigned area of responsibility, will defend and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy all hostile groups which interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions by:
 - (a) Maintaining at all times in the regimental area of responsibility a force of at least one (1) Battalion prepared to move on two (2) hours notice, with one (1) Company of such Battalion motorized, and prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.
 - (b) Maintaining at each separate billet of the Cf a minimum of seventy-five per cent (75%) of the command during the hours of darkness.
 - (c) Establishment and continued rehearsal of plans for the separate defense of each separate billeting area, and area of responsibility.
 - (d) Initiating prompt and direct action whenever and wherever hostile groups endanger our forces, or prevent the execution of assigned missions.

For areas of responsibility, see Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to 2d Mar Div Opn No 57.

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Operation Plan

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3. (a) LT 1/8 (less "B" Co) will, on order from this Hqs, assume responsibility for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the CT zone of action.
- (b) LT 2/8 will, on order from this Hqs, assume responsibility for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the CT zone of action.
- (c) LT 3/8 will, on order from this Hqs, assume responsibility for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the CT zone of action.
- (d) Troops/8 will augment LT 1/8 when the latter is charged with the responsibility for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the CT zone of action.
- (e) CT Troops will be prepared at all time to carry out normal missions.
- (f) B/8 Reinf will at all times be responsible for initial action against hostile groups which are forming or attacking within the company zone of action, (OMJA Area).
- (x) (1) Units of this CT are assigned sectors of responsibility, for action subsequent to initial action against hostile groups, as shown on Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to this Plan.
- (2) Unit commanders will take whatever action is necessary, depending on the situation, to successfully defend against hostile troops.
- (3) Passive defense measures will be en-

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Operation Plan

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forced. Attention will be paid to the dispersal of ammunition and fuel dumps.

(4) All units of this CT will be prepared to move on order to the support of other regimental or divisional units, and to this purpose will conduct reconnaissance of road nets throughout respective and adjacent areas of responsibility.

(5) Responsibility of the immediate defense of the CT area of responsibility will be rotated between the LTs weekly, assignments to be made by Field msg.

(6) By 12 October, 1945, and weekly thereafter, orders will be issued by this Hqs creating imaginary situations requiring that immediate defensive action be taken by the unit charged with the responsibility of initial defense.

(7) Where rehearsals of defense plans or other troop movements may cause Japanese nationals to become unduly excited, liaison with the Japanese concerned will be established prior to the commencement of the drill.

(8) The RMTO will be prepared to furnish the (10) 2½ ton and seven (7) 1 ton trucks to the duty LT for the use of the motorized company in time to allow the company to move on thirty (30) minutes notice. The CO of the duty LT is authorized to make all necessary arrangements for the entrucking of such company with the RMTO. Copies of all truck and vehicle assignment tables will be submitted to this Hq (Regtl S-3).

4. See Regimental Administrative Order No 17-45 and current instructions as issued.

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5. See 2d Mar Div Operation Order No 57.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND.

M. S. RAHISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

ANNEX:


(A) - Operation Overlay.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as Annex (A) (Distribution) to CT-8
Operation Plan No 7-45.

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Operation Plan
No. 3-45

APPENDIX (a)

OPERATION PLAN

Map: 113881, 1:50,000, Sheet No. 45, 5-11, III,
IV, 1952-1953, 1949

BY ORDER OF GENERAL T. A. MC FARLAND

Colonel T. A. MC FARLAND
Executive Officer

113881, 1:50,000, Sheet No. 45, 5-11, III,
IV, 1952-1953, 1949

113881

Serial 00523
SECRET

CT-8, 2d Mar Div, Reinf,
In the field,
1500, 28 October 1945.

Operation Order
CT-8 No 6-45

Maps: (a) Central JAPAN, 1:250,000, Second Edition AMS-2,
Sheets Nos 56 and 61.
(b) JAPAN, 1:500,000, Second Edition AFPAC-2,
KYUSHU 13100 E 12920.

TASK ORGANIZATION.

(a) LT 1/8 - Lt Col Hayward, USMC

1st Bn, 8th Mar (-)
2d Plat, Co "B", 2d MT Bn
1st Plat, Co "C", 2d Engr Bn
Det Regtl S-2 Sec
Det "D" Div Sig Co

(b) LT 2/8 - Lt Col Nusbaum, USMCR

2d Bn, 8th Mar
Co "B", 1st Bn, 8th Mar

(c) LT 3/8 - Lt Col Wallace, USMC

3d Bn, 8th Mar
3d Plat, P MT Co
3d Plat, C Engrs

(d) Spt Gp - Maj Van Evera, USMC

Wpns Co, 8th Mar

(e) CT Trs - Lt Mott, USMCR :

H&S Co, 8th Mar
Co "B", 2d MT Bn (-)
Co "C", 2d Engr Bn (-)
Co "E", 2d Med Bn
2d Plat Ord Co, 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat Serv Co, 2d Serv Bn
3d Plat Automotive Repair Co, 2d MT Bn
Det "C", Div Sig Co

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Operation Order

CT-8 No 6-45

1. See Annex (A) (Intelligence) to 2d Mar Div Opn Order No 59-45, and S-2 Studies and Information issued separately.
2. Combat Team Eight will:
 - (a) Continue execution of assigned missions in area it now occupies.
 - (b) On 28 October, extend zone of responsibility to include all of KUMAMOTO KE, and that portion of KAGOSHIMA KE as shown by Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to this order.

For boundaries and areas of responsibility see Annex (A) (Operation Overlay) to this order.

3. (a) LT 1/8 will:

(1) Execute the move to KAGOSHIMA in echelon as follows:

- a. 28 October - "A" Co and MP Gp
- b. 29 October - Motor Convoy
- c. 30 October - Remainder of LT

(2) Provide supervisory personnel at KAGOSHIMA, port of entry of repatriated Japanese Nationals, and conduct check for weapons, loot, and excess food.

(3) Initially coordinate surveillance of area of Southern KYUSHU assigned KAI OYA Occupation Force with CO of that Force.

(4) Carry out extensive patrols in area of responsibility.

- (b) LT 2/8 will:

(1) Carry out extensive patrolling in assigned area.

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Operation Order

CT-8 No 6-45

(2) Carry out normal and previously assigned missions.

(c) LT 3/8 will:

(1) Carry out extensive patrolling in assigned area.

(2) Carry out normal and previously assigned missions.

(d) Sot Gp - Continue normal missions.

(e) CT Trs - Continue normal missions.

(x) (1) Special emphasis will be placed on prevention of looting and the maintenance of a high standard of sanitation.

(2) Commanders concerned will exercise surveillance of areas of responsibility by judicious use of patrols. Minimum patrol strength beyond range of immediate support; one (1) Plat. Two (2) copies of patrol plans and overlays will be submitted to Regtl S-3 office forty-eight (48) Hrs prior to execution of patrols.

(3) Japanese authorities will be required to maintain adequate guards on installations, dumps, and equipment except those involving prescribed items which require direct control by occupation forces.

(4) For missions relative to enforcement of Surrender Terms, see Annex (D) (Enforcement of Surrender Terms) to 2d Mar Div Operation Plan No 14.

(5) Annex (E) (SCAF Directive to Japanese Government) to this order will be initiated by inspection of all prisons and places of detention

SECRETOperation Order

CT-8 No 6-45

within assigned areas and by assumption of control of all records of organizations abolished under terms of that directive. Any effort in the part of any individuals or organizations to circumvent the directive will be immediately reported to this Hq.

(6) Reports will be submitted in accordance with existing directives.

4. See current administrative orders and directives.

5. (a) Sig Com - Normal in accordance with current directives.

(b) Command Posts:

CT Hq	-	(13819 - 10770)
LT 1/8	-	To be announced
LT 2/8	-	(13819 - 10770)
LT 3/8	-	(13822 - 10728)

BY ORDER OF COLONEL T. G. MC FARLAND.

M. S. RAHISER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

Annexes:

- (A) - Operation Overlay Revised.
(B) - SCAP Directive to Japanese Government.

Distribution:

2d Mar Div	- 10	Mil Govt Det (KAGOSHIMA)	- 1
CO	- 1	LT 1/8	- 6
RX	- 1	LT 2/8	- 6
S-1	- 1	LT 3/8	- 6
S-2	- 1	Spt Gp	- 2
S-3	- 1	CT Trs	- 8
S-4	- 1	CT-2	- 1
S-10	- 1	CT-6	- 1
S-16	- 1	War Diary	- 1
Mil Govt Det (KUMAMOTO)	- 1	F I L E	- 5

OFFICIAL:

WARNER

-3-

- 4 -

SECRET

8=2

3
11
1

3=2

1400

950

0351
1330

Serial 00000
22202
Serial 00000
22202

ST-0, 2d MAP Div. Reinf.
In the field.
1000, 2 November 1940.

INDEX (A)

REL. COUNCIL (REVIEW)

Map: Cont. of Japan, 1:500,000, Second Edition
and 2, Sheets No 45, 46, 47, and 48.

Quadrangle No. 45 of the Japanese Empire
Sheet No. 45.

BY ORDER OF GENERAL T. G. McFARLAND.

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps.
Military Officer.

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FROM THE 2d MAP Div. Reinf. ST-0.

ST-0

